Generated by All in One SEO Pro v5.0.1.1, this is an llms-full.txt file, used by LLMs to index the site. # LawFoyer A daily dose for inquisitors ## Posts ### [Blog](https://lawfoyer.in/blog/) **Published:** October 19, 2016 **Author:** LawFoyer --- ### [RES JUDICATA under Civil Procedure Code, 1908: Meaning, Provisions, Principles and Cases](https://lawfoyer.in/res-judicata-under-civil-procedure-code-1908-meaning-provisions-principles-and-cases/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Deepti, MERI Professional and Law Institute

INTRODUCTION

Res Judicata is a principle used in law which is derived from Latin which means ‘a matter judged’. It basically in law means that when a case has been delivered with a judgment which was final then both the parties cannot claim another subsequent proceeding. Its main motive is to promote finality and efficient judicial system. As per Section 11 of Civil Procedure Code, states that “When a final judgment has been served to a lawsuit by the competent court after adjudication, the same issue cannot be re-litigated in any subsequent suit by any of the two parties.”[1]

MEANING, PROVISIONS, PRINCIPLES AND CASES

  1. Understanding the meaning of Res Judicata
Res Judicata, a fundamental principle in civil procedure, states the idea that when a matter has been decided for the last time by the competent court, it cannot be filed again by either of the parties. This doctrine in law serves several crucial fundamentals within the legal system and providing stability of judicial decisions. It ensures that the parties in a lawsuit are needed to follow the final judgment given by the court preventing the parties from litigating the same issue several times.
  1. Two main Doctrines of Res Judicata
  2. CLAIM PRECLUSION (Merger): This doctrine prevents both the parties from taking the same cause of action or claim to the court again and again if the same matter has been adjudicated already. Once when the final judgment has been given, no party is allowed to adjudicate the same claim subsequently. It includes both the claim that was actually raised and also the claim that could have been raised. The main aim of this doctrine is to prevent both the parties from engaging in piecemeal litigation.
  3. ISSUE PRECLUSION (Collateral estoppel): Like the Claim preclusion prevents the parties to adjudicate the same claim again, this doctrine prevents both parties from re-litigating specific issues that were given judgment in the prior proceeding. Even if the subsequent case involves different cause of action, this doctrine bars re-adjudication the same issue multiple times.
Under the Civil Procedure Code, the application of res judicata is governed by some specific provisions which explains the conditions under which it applies.

Elements of Res Judicata

  1. Final Judgment- Res Judicata applies only when the final judgment has been given by a competent court. A judgment can is only considered final when it contains the rights and obligations of both the parties respectively involved in the lawsuit.
  2. Identity of Parties- Res Judicata can only be applied when the same parties have re-adjudicated the same cause of action. If the parties are not same in the re-litigation then res judicata have no relevance.
  3. Identity of Subject Matter- Res Judicata only applies when the subsequent lawsuit involves the same cause of action as the previous judgment given. This means that the claim in the subsequent case must be substantially similar to those litigated in the prior judgment.
  4. Identity of Cause of Action- The cause of action in the next lawsuit must arise out of the same fact as of the prior lawsuit. In this case, Res Judicata prevents both the parties from splitting or dividing the cause of action and re-adjudicating the claims that have been given in the prior judgment.
  5. Finality of the Judgment- The judgment which was given in the prior lawsuit should be final and binding, which means that it cannot be challenged through appellate process. But there is an exception that Res Judicata does not apply to Judgments that are subject to revision or that can be appealed.
  6. Competency of the Court- The court that gave the final judgment to the lawsuit should have the jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter.

Principles guiding Res Judicata

Under the Civil Procedure Code, several principles guide the application of Res Judicata:
  1. Finality- Res Judicata is based on the principle of finality, which basically means that once a matter had been finally adjudicated by a court, it cannot be appealed further in another court between the same parties. This principle promotes the conclusiveness of a lawsuit’s judgment.
  2. Judicial Efficiency- One of the main aims of Res Judicata is to promote efficiency of judicial system by preventing both the parties of the lawsuit to litigate again and again for no reason which leads to wasting time of the honourable court. By limiting the re-adjudication of claims that have been already served with a judgment to conserve the judicial resources.
  3. Prevention of Multiple Litigation- Res Judicata bars the parties from dividing the causes of actions or changing claims in different proceedings that could have been solved in prior lawsuit. Promoting the fact that all the important issues should be solved in a single lawsuit.
  4. Preservation of Integrity- By binding both the parties to follow the judgment given by the court strictly, Res Judicata plays an important role to maintain this principle by preserving integrity of the judiciary.
  5. Promotion of Fairness- Res Judicata also promotes fairness by giving both the parties with certainty in the judgment of their disputes. Once the matter has been provided with the final judgment, both the parties can conclude with their issue finally being resolved.

Procedural application of Res Judicata under Civil Procedure Code

  1. Identification of prior judgment- The Procedural application of Res Judicata includes to know and find out whether there is a prior judgment given or not which can affect the application for Res Judicata.
  2. essment of identification of parties- If there has been a subsequent lawsuit filed, then it is mandatory to find out details about the applicant parties whether they were involved in the prior judgment or not. Res Judicata only applies when same parties apply the subsequent lawsuit so that both the parties could be prevented from re-adjudicating the same.
  3. Analysis of identity of subject matter and cause of action- There is a requirement to assess whether the subsequent suit have the same claim or cause of action or not i.e. to know whether the claim was given under the prior judgment or not. This includes knowing whether the claim raised has been covered under the prior lawsuit.
  4. Review of finality of the prior judgment- The final judgment which was given must be conclusive enough to apply Res Judicata. The judgment should not need any further review or appeal in any case.
  5. Verification of Competency of the court- It needs to be verified whether the prior judgment which was given by the competent court having the correct jurisdiction or not. Res Judicata cannot be applied if the court which gave the judgment lacked jurisdiction to hear that particular case.
  6. Application of Statutory Provisions- Reference of specific and valid statutory provisions are needed within the Civil Procedure Code that governs the doctrine of Res Judicata. These statutes provide framework to the conditions which governs the application of Res Judicata and provides guidance to its procedure and procedural effects.
  7. Judicial Determination- It is up to the discretion of the honourable court whether to apply Res Judicata or not. Relevant statutes and factors would be considered by the court to determine the application of the doctrine.

Important cases guiding Res Judicata

  1. Avtar Singh v. Jagjit Singh- In this case a plaint was filed regarding the court’s arbitration in the revenue court by one of the parties, sustaining the objection the plaint was returned to the respective party. Giving the reason that the revenue court was not having the jurisdiction to try the suit. Hence, it was concluded that the suit was rejected by following the guidelines mentioned under the doctrine of Res Judicata.
  2. Devilal Modi v. Sales Tax Officer- In this leading case, the validity of an assessment was challenged under Article 226. The Petition was dismissed mentioning about the facts and merits. The same appeal was dismissed by the honourable Supreme Court mentioning the same issue. Another writ petition was filed in the High Court but still there was rejection of the appeal. The Supreme Court made the final decision that the same case was rejected under the guidelines mentioned under Res Judicata,
  3. Mathura prasad v. Dossabai N.B. Jeejeebhoy- It was held that Res Judicata can not be operated in the subsequent proceeding. If there is different question of law as of the previous one then Res Judicata cannot be applied. To apply Res Judicata the decision given should be held by the court with competency. It was also stated that if the issue of law gives rise to right then Res Judicata is not applicable.

Significance and Implications of Res Judicata

  1. Judicial efficiency- Res Judicata prevents both sides of the parties to re-adjudicate same issue or claims again and again that have already been provided with a judgment in form of appeal which promotes efficiency in judicial system and save resources. Courts would be able to focus on other and new cases rather than wasting time on same lawsuit.
  2. Fairness and equality- This doctrine helps to maintain equality and fairness among all the parties by ensuring that either of the party cannot re-litigate the issue and maintain same rules and regulations for both the parties. It provides parties with closure and prevents waste of time and exploitation of rights.
  3. Stability of legal system- Res Judicata promotes the stability of legal judiciary system by providing proper framework and consistency I judicial decisions. Once a court provides judgment to a case it helps to set a precedent for the upcoming cases to establish clear rules and standards.
  4. Prevention of Forum Shopping- It promotes respect for the judgment making system of the court binds parties to adjudicate in good faith and not to play unfair. Res Judicata discourages both the parties to practice Forum Shopping i.e. litigants applying lawsuit in court where they think the judgment will be in their favour after an unfavourable judgment has been passed rendered.
  5. Preservation of Judicial integrity- By preventing the parties to re-litigate and to respect the judgment of the court by not repeatedly challenging the decisions. It helps to maintain the authority, respect and integrity of the court by being a watchdog of the judgment passed.

CONCLUSION AND COMMENTS

In Conclusion, Res Judicata is a fundamental principle which is covered under framework of the Civil Procedure Code, embodying the principles of finality, fairness, and efficiency which helps in perfect administration of justice. By barring parties from re-litigating again and again saving time of the court. Res Judicata serves its main aim to save resources of the court to provide judgment when already concluding judgment has been provided to both the parties. Furthermore, it sets legal precedent and guidelines for next cases and enhances confidence of people in the judicial system. Res Judicata is not only a doctrine of law but a cornerstone of judiciary system, it ensures that the integrity of the judiciary system is maintained.

REFERENCES

  1. Kumar S, “Res Judicata Can’t Be Decided in Application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC: Supreme Court” Live Law (September 18, 2023); https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/supreme-court-ruling-res-judicata-plaint-rejection-application-order-7-rule-11-cpc-238024&#; accessed March 2, 2024
  2. Paliwala M, “Meaning, Nature, Scope of Legal Doctrine of Res Judicata under Section 11 of Code of Civil Procedure” (iPleaders, September 1, 2023); https://blog.ipleaders.in/overview-on-doctrine-of-res-judicata/ ; accessed March 2, 2024
  3. M S, “Doctrine of Res Judicata: Sec 11 of Civil Procedure Code” (CLATalogue, August 3, 2023); https://www.lawctopus.com/clatalogue/clat-pg/doctrine-res-judicata-section-11-cpc/ ; accessed March 3, 2024
  4. “Free Law” Free Law (July 21, 2023); https://www.freelaw.in/legalarticles/Key-Principles-and-Applicability-of-Res-Judicata ; accessed March 3, 2024
[1] The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, s11 **Content:** **Author-Deepti, MERI Professional and Law Institute** ### **INTRODUCTION** Res Judicata is a principle used in law which is derived from Latin which means ‘a matter judged’. It basically in law means that when a case has been delivered with a judgment which was final then both the parties cannot claim another subsequent proceeding. Its main motive is to promote finality and efficient judicial system. As per Section 11 of Civil Procedure Code, states that “When a final judgment has been served to a lawsuit by the competent court after adjudication, the same issue cannot be re-litigated in any subsequent suit by any of the two parties.”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) ### **MEANING, PROVISIONS, PRINCIPLES AND CASES** 1. **Understanding the meaning of Res Judicata** Res Judicata, a fundamental principle in civil procedure, states the idea that when a matter has been decided for the last time by the competent court, it cannot be filed again by either of the parties. This doctrine in law serves several crucial fundamentals within the legal system and providing stability of judicial decisions. It ensures that the parties in a lawsuit are needed to follow the final judgment given by the court preventing the parties from litigating the same issue several times. 2. **Two main Doctrines of Res Judicata** 3. **CLAIM PRECLUSION (Merger):** This doctrine prevents both the parties from taking the same cause of action or claim to the court again and again if the same matter has been adjudicated already. Once when the final judgment has been given, no party is allowed to adjudicate the same claim subsequently. It includes both the claim that was actually raised and also the claim that could have been raised. The main aim of this doctrine is to prevent both the parties from engaging in piecemeal litigation. 4. **ISSUE PRECLUSION (Collateral estoppel):** Like the Claim preclusion prevents the parties to adjudicate the same claim again, this doctrine prevents both parties from re-litigating specific issues that were given judgment in the prior proceeding. Even if the subsequent case involves different cause of action, this doctrine bars re-adjudication the same issue multiple times. Under the Civil Procedure Code, the application of res judicata is governed by some specific provisions which explains the conditions under which it applies. ### **Elements of Res Judicata** 1. Final Judgment- Res Judicata applies only when the final judgment has been given by a competent court. A judgment can is only considered final when it contains the rights and obligations of both the parties respectively involved in the lawsuit. 2. Identity of Parties- Res Judicata can only be applied when the same parties have re-adjudicated the same cause of action. If the parties are not same in the re-litigation then res judicata have no relevance. 3. Identity of Subject Matter- Res Judicata only applies when the subsequent lawsuit involves the same cause of action as the previous judgment given. This means that the claim in the subsequent case must be substantially similar to those litigated in the prior judgment. 4. Identity of Cause of Action- The cause of action in the next lawsuit must arise out of the same fact as of the prior lawsuit. In this case, Res Judicata prevents both the parties from splitting or dividing the cause of action and re-adjudicating the claims that have been given in the prior judgment. 5. Finality of the Judgment- The judgment which was given in the prior lawsuit should be final and binding, which means that it cannot be challenged through appellate process. But there is an exception that Res Judicata does not apply to Judgments that are subject to revision or that can be appealed. 6. Competency of the Court- The court that gave the final judgment to the lawsuit should have the jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. ### **Principles guiding Res Judicata** Under the Civil Procedure Code, several principles guide the application of Res Judicata: 1. Finality- Res Judicata is based on the principle of finality, which basically means that once a matter had been finally adjudicated by a court, it cannot be appealed further in another court between the same parties. This principle promotes the conclusiveness of a lawsuit’s judgment. 2. Judicial Efficiency- One of the main aims of Res Judicata is to promote efficiency of judicial system by preventing both the parties of the lawsuit to litigate again and again for no reason which leads to wasting time of the honourable court. By limiting the re-adjudication of claims that have been already served with a judgment to conserve the judicial resources. 3. Prevention of Multiple Litigation- Res Judicata bars the parties from dividing the causes of actions or changing claims in different proceedings that could have been solved in prior lawsuit. Promoting the fact that all the important issues should be solved in a single lawsuit. 4. Preservation of Integrity- By binding both the parties to follow the judgment given by the court strictly, Res Judicata plays an important role to maintain this principle by preserving integrity of the judiciary. 5. Promotion of Fairness- Res Judicata also promotes fairness by giving both the parties with certainty in the judgment of their disputes. Once the matter has been provided with the final judgment, both the parties can conclude with their issue finally being resolved. ### **Procedural application of Res Judicata under Civil Procedure Code** 1. Identification of prior judgment- The Procedural application of Res Judicata includes to know and find out whether there is a prior judgment given or not which can affect the application for Res Judicata. 2. essment of identification of parties- If there has been a subsequent lawsuit filed, then it is mandatory to find out details about the applicant parties whether they were involved in the prior judgment or not. Res Judicata only applies when same parties apply the subsequent lawsuit so that both the parties could be prevented from re-adjudicating the same. 3. Analysis of identity of subject matter and cause of action- There is a requirement to assess whether the subsequent suit have the same claim or cause of action or not i.e. to know whether the claim was given under the prior judgment or not. This includes knowing whether the claim raised has been covered under the prior lawsuit. 4. Review of finality of the prior judgment- The final judgment which was given must be conclusive enough to apply Res Judicata. The judgment should not need any further review or appeal in any case. 5. Verification of Competency of the court- It needs to be verified whether the prior judgment which was given by the competent court having the correct jurisdiction or not. Res Judicata cannot be applied if the court which gave the judgment lacked jurisdiction to hear that particular case. 6. Application of Statutory Provisions- Reference of specific and valid statutory provisions are needed within the Civil Procedure Code that governs the doctrine of Res Judicata. These statutes provide framework to the conditions which governs the application of Res Judicata and provides guidance to its procedure and procedural effects. 7. Judicial Determination- It is up to the discretion of the honourable court whether to apply Res Judicata or not. Relevant statutes and factors would be considered by the court to determine the application of the doctrine. ### **Important cases guiding Res Judicata** 1. Avtar Singh v. Jagjit Singh- In this case a plaint was filed regarding the court’s arbitration in the revenue court by one of the parties, sustaining the objection the plaint was returned to the respective party. Giving the reason that the revenue court was not having the jurisdiction to try the suit. Hence, it was concluded that the suit was rejected by following the guidelines mentioned under the doctrine of Res Judicata. 2. Devilal Modi v. Sales Tax Officer- In this leading case, the validity of an assessment was challenged under Article 226. The Petition was dismissed mentioning about the facts and merits. The same appeal was dismissed by the honourable Supreme Court mentioning the same issue. Another writ petition was filed in the High Court but still there was rejection of the appeal. The Supreme Court made the final decision that the same case was rejected under the guidelines mentioned under Res Judicata, 3. Mathura prasad v. Dossabai N.B. Jeejeebhoy- It was held that Res Judicata can not be operated in the subsequent proceeding. If there is different question of law as of the previous one then Res Judicata cannot be applied. To apply Res Judicata the decision given should be held by the court with competency. It was also stated that if the issue of law gives rise to right then Res Judicata is not applicable. ### **Significance and Implications of Res Judicata** 1. Judicial efficiency- Res Judicata prevents both sides of the parties to re-adjudicate same issue or claims again and again that have already been provided with a judgment in form of appeal which promotes efficiency in judicial system and save resources. Courts would be able to focus on other and new cases rather than wasting time on same lawsuit. 2. Fairness and equality- This doctrine helps to maintain equality and fairness among all the parties by ensuring that either of the party cannot re-litigate the issue and maintain same rules and regulations for both the parties. It provides parties with closure and prevents waste of time and exploitation of rights. 3. Stability of legal system- Res Judicata promotes the stability of legal judiciary system by providing proper framework and consistency I judicial decisions. Once a court provides judgment to a case it helps to set a precedent for the upcoming cases to establish clear rules and standards. 4. Prevention of Forum Shopping- It promotes respect for the judgment making system of the court binds parties to adjudicate in good faith and not to play unfair. Res Judicata discourages both the parties to practice Forum Shopping i.e. litigants applying lawsuit in court where they think the judgment will be in their favour after an unfavourable judgment has been passed rendered. 5. Preservation of Judicial integrity- By preventing the parties to re-litigate and to respect the judgment of the court by not repeatedly challenging the decisions. It helps to maintain the authority, respect and integrity of the court by being a watchdog of the judgment passed. ### **CONCLUSION AND COMMENTS** In Conclusion, Res Judicata is a fundamental principle which is covered under framework of the Civil Procedure Code, embodying the principles of finality, fairness, and efficiency which helps in perfect administration of justice. By barring parties from re-litigating again and again saving time of the court. Res Judicata serves its main aim to save resources of the court to provide judgment when already concluding judgment has been provided to both the parties. Furthermore, it sets legal precedent and guidelines for next cases and enhances confidence of people in the judicial system. Res Judicata is not only a doctrine of law but a cornerstone of judiciary system, it ensures that the integrity of the judiciary system is maintained. ### **REFERENCES** 1. Kumar S, “Res Judicata Can’t Be Decided in Application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC: Supreme Court” Live Law (September 18, 2023); [https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/supreme-court-ruling-res-judicata-plaint-rejection-application-order-7-rule-11-cpc-238024&#](https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/supreme-court-ruling-res-judicata-plaint-rejection-application-order-7-rule-11-cpc-238024&); accessed March 2, 2024 2. Paliwala M, “Meaning, Nature, Scope of Legal Doctrine of Res Judicata under Section 11 of Code of Civil Procedure” (iPleaders, September 1, 2023); ; accessed March 2, 2024 3. M S, “Doctrine of Res Judicata: Sec 11 of Civil Procedure Code” (CLATalogue, August 3, 2023); ; accessed March 3, 2024 4. “Free Law” Free Law (July 21, 2023); ; accessed March 3, 2024 [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, s11 **Categories:** Articles --- ### [IPR Rights of Creator on AI Made Content](https://lawfoyer.in/ipr-rights-of-creator-on-ai-made-content/) **Published:** June 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author : MAHASWETAA R Law Student at CHETTINAD SCHOOL OF LAW** **Edited By: Naman Jain Law student at Galgotias University** 1. **INTRODUCTION** With the dynamic change in the technological aspect of our country, AI tools have become more capable of creating content, art music etc. These works are depicted as if humans originally made them. The creator of the work uses both the AI tools and his mind where the question arises of who should get these rights of owning the Intellectual property rights. Copyright protection is usually given to only human-made creations. But when AI tools are involved in the creation, it becomes difficult to determine who deserves to get the ownership, whether it’s the creator of AI-Tool, the author or the AI itself or whether these creations deserve IP protection or not is still unanswered. Technological advancements are growing in our country and this matter is still in debate. In this article, we’re going to study this in detail. ***Keywords:*** *Intellectual Property, Right of IP Owner, AI Content, Copyright* 1. **Defining AI-Generated Content: What Constitutes AI-Made Content?** Artificial intelligence refers to machines that possess intelligence and idea-generation skills similar to the human intellect minds. It also has the power to solve and generate unique and reasonable solutions to problems and works beyond the power of the human brain. AI can generate text, videos and photos and also can create animations by processing the algorithms given and producing the output. ChatGPT and DALL-E are famous AI creations. - AI-generated content makes use of artificial intelligence, either wholly or partly, which gives the most prompt explanations or answers by responding to the questions asked by humans. Humans use AI for writing assignments, articles blogs etc. - There are 2 scenarios where it is said AI-made content: 1. When only an AI system is used wholly to create content, 2. Where AI is partly used i.e., Content created by using AI tools along with human-mind 3. **Copyright protection and AI-generated content** - First of all, copyright protection is giving credit to the creator of the work and that creator must be a human which is provided under the Copyright Act, 1957. It is the humans who get all these rights like distribution, performance reproduction rights etc. - These are traditional copyright laws that had the thought that only humans can be creative and they use their minds to write literature, music, journalism, dramatic content etc i.e., the subjects that come under section 2 of Copyright Act, 1957. But as technology is developing as years pass by, AI’s are more capable of doing all this creative stuff that makes it look human-made. - When it comes to copyright protection, the originality of work is checked, but when there are AI-generated works it is difficult to determine the originality. Also, if the content or music or literature is fully made by AI, then why should the creator of the work i.e., humans, should be getting the copyright protection in the first place? Even if the AI tools are partly involved in the creation of something, should the author i.e., humans be getting all the copyright protection or is it the creator of AI, who’ll be getting the same is a huge question here. As AI, itself cannot be recognised as a person, is it fair that people using AI in order to create something and gain ownership and authorship is acceptable or not should be answered? 3. **Trademarks and AI-Generated Branding** - Trademarks are basically, logos, phrases and other brand elements that help in distinguishing from one brand to another. These are basically used in marketing. To register a trademark, it should be unique and a distinctiveness feature must be fulfilled, which is basically a creation of humans. - Now that, there are AI technologies which can create unique logos and slogans, which help in deciding the brand names or logos in a fraction of a second, there lack of human mind. This might land in a complexity in future. AI-generated logos must be carefully regulated in order to avoid legal issues. Every time, AI tools can’t provide us with a unique and distinctive feature that doesn’t look similar to other brands. That part should be taken care of. - Deciding the ownership of such AI-generated logos or slogans is in question. But then it can registered if the logos or slogan can show its distinctiveness. 4. **Patent and AI-generating inventions** - A patentis an element, in the realm of intellectual property law that represents a type of right granted by the government to inventors. This grant gives them rights to use, manufacture and market their innovations for a period of around 20 years. Patents play a role in safeguarding creators’ concepts and breakthroughs allowing them to benefit from their - The three primary categories of patents include Utility,design and plant patents. The scope of patent protection is confined to regions limiting its enforceability to the country where it is granted. To secure protection, for inventions patent applications must be submitted in each desired country or region. - Foran innovation to be eligible for patent protection, it has to satisfy certain conditions like statutory, new, non-obvious and useful. AI is likely to satisfy such When it comes to the innovation process, AI plays multifarious roles in the innovation process from aiding the inventor in the innovation process to bringing up new ideas on its own. - When using AI systems in invention, it is important that there are clear agreements stating what role each party is playing in relation to intellectual property ownership and modes of collaboration so that there will be no disputes about AI-generated works’ patents. AI-generated works may be patented but this has some legal challenges and controversies especially when considering attribution of rights and inventorship. The best way forward regarding these issues remains arguable since they are always evolving in this space. **Example:** - India gave co-authorship to the AI in an AI-generated work.AI RAGHAV is an intelligent graphics and art visualizer. The AI got its name from Raghav Gupta who is the creator but the owner of the AI is Sahni who asked to invent that app. For this AI India gave patent rights for both Sahni and AI. Raghav became the author and Sahni and AI RAGHAV became the co-authors of the invention. 5. **Challenges in enforcing IPR on AI-Generated Content** There are various challenges involved in enforcing IPR on AI-generated content. They are as follows: - The data that AI uses are already in existence and it would be difficult to give justice to the originality, uniqueness and novelty which are important factors used for deciding while giving IP Protection - There is confusion in deciding the owner and author of the creation. - AI cannot be treated as a “human” and give them rights because if there’s any case of infringement, there’ll be no one liable for the wrong act. - Innovations in AI Technologies and protecting the rights of the human creation must go hand in hand. Keeping the balance between them is a huge challenge. - There are various legal and ethical issues as well to consider. 6. **International Perspectives on AI-Generated Content and IPR** 7. **Status Of Copyright Protection for Generated Works In Different Countries:** - The issue of copyright protection for AI-generated works arose in the case of Kristina Kashtanova who filed an application for the comic book, “Zarya Of The Dawn” and here the US Copyright Office rejected the application and does not give copyright protection for this AI-generated work stating that the author has only used the AI to create the images and it also stated that AI-generated works would not get copyright protection under USCO as it lacks the human authorship. - In the UK, the UK Intellectual Property Office stated that AI-generated works also get copyright protection as human-generated works as the UK government aimed to make the UK a leader in AI. But this decision is under review process which may either continue further or pass off after the decision of the government. - The copyright protection for an AI-generated work isnot entertained by the copyright office of India but the copyright protection is given in India for the first time for an AI The Next Rembrandt. A painting was found for which Rembrandt is the artist. That painting is said to be an addition to his paintings in The Rembrandt Museum. ING, an international banking group which is partnered with Microsoft and the Rembrandt house museum created an algorithm to recreate the style of Rembrandt. This recreation painting was done by the AI using the data fed to them without the interference of any human contribution. So it is copyrighted and has protection under IPR. 1. **Status Of Patent Protection for Generated Works In Different Countries:** - The patent protection granted to works made by AI varies throughout countries due to differences in legal frameworks, interpretations, and the dynamic nature of AI technology. - AI-generated innovations have been granted patents in the US by the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). AI-generated creations are typically recognised as patentable under US law, so long as they satisfy the requirements. On the other hand, the question of who owns and who is the creator of inventions produced by AI is still up for dispute in court. - The innovationscreated by artificial intelligence are granted patents by the European Patent Office (EPO) if the conditions mentioned in rulings of the European Patent Office are satisfied such as new, statutory, non-obvious and industrial - even thoughthe legal and regulatory framework in Canada does not separately and clearly deal with patent protection for AI-created works, patent rights have been granted by the Canadian Intellectual Property Office(CIPO) for AI-created technologies. however, in order to know the patent protection status for AI-created technologies clearly, amendments to patent law or rulings should be made by the Canadian - South Africa is the first country to give patents to AI-generated work. AI DABUS is a device for the Autonomous Bootstrapping of Unified Science. Stephen Thaler is the creator of this DABUS. The creator states that DABUS invented an emergency warning light and food containerthat increases the grip and the transfer of heat. As the AI invents things on its own by the given input without human interference South Africa gave patent rights to DABUS. 9. **CASE LAWS:** - **Naruto vs. Slater[\[1\]](#_ftn1)** This is a case where a monkey took selfies and PETA claimed copyrights for it. The court held that animals cannot own copyright, only a human being can hold copyright. - **Lush vs Amazon[\[2\]](#_ftn2)** In this instance, it was determined that Amazon had violated Lush’s trademark. On Google, Amazon placed a bid for the keyword “Lush.” People looking for “Lush” were redirected to Amazon as a result. Genuine Lush items were not available on Amazon. Because similar products were recommended by Amazon’s AI system, the court found that Amazon was liable for infringement. 1. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** There are cases where IP protection is given for AI-generated works. But definitely, certain amendments must be made especially in the Copyrights Act and Patent Act where AI tools are mostly used. How much of AI is used should be considered. The ownership of the creation is still in debate. In my opinion, AI cannot be given protection and rights as it’ll be a problem when it comes to infringement. but isn’t it unfair to wholly give protection to humans when some of the content is AI-generated is still the question in my mind? When it is wholly based on AI-generated content, then IP protection must not be given. For a fact, AI cannot be avoided, as the future is fully based on these technological advancements. So AI-generated content or creation can be protected when the human mind is also involved provided that all the criteria of intellectual property are fulfilled. 1. **REFERENCES** 2. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. 2. 3. https://www.legalserviceindia.com/ 3. **Cases Referred** 1. Naruto vs Slater 2. Lush vs amazon 4. **Statutes Referred** 1. Copyrights Act, 1957 2. Patent Act, 1970 3. Trademark Act, 1999 [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) 2018, 9th Cir. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) 2014, (EWHC) 181 (CH) **Categories:** Articles, Artificial Intelligence --- ### [Student Awareness Workshop on Protection from Sexual Harassment and Cyber Crime organised by Out Lawed India in collaboration with LawFoyer at MPS International Jaipur](https://lawfoyer.in/student-awareness-workshop-on-protection-from-sexual-harassment-and-cyber-crime-organised-by-out-lawed-india-in-collaboration-with-lawfoyer-at-mps-international-jaipur/) **Published:** September 2, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Authored By: Gyanu Patel, Student Editor, Team LawFoyer** **Jaipur, 31st August 2024:** Outlawed India, in collaboration with LawFoyer and MPS International School Jaipur, successfully organized an offline workshop on the crucial topics of Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse and Dealing with Cyber Crime. Held on 31st August 2024, the workshop aimed to empower youth with knowledge and equip them to safeguard themselves in the digital age. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/WhatsApp-Image-2024-09-01-at-08.47.29_86697b8c-1024x768.jpg)The workshop garnered an enthusiastic participation from students, who engaged actively in discussions and interactive sessions. Led by experts from Outlawed India and LawFoyer, the workshop delved into the prevention of child sexual abuse, highlighting warning signs, reporting mechanisms, and legal recourse. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/WhatsApp-Image-2024-09-01-at-08.47.16_b6374b4d-1024x768.jpg)It also covered the growing issue of cybercrime, emphasizing the importance of online safety, identifying threats, and protecting personal information. The students’ active engagement and insightful questions demonstrated their commitment to understanding these pressing issues. To recognize the proactive participation of students, certificates of appreciation were presented by Mr. Ritesh Singh Shekhawat, Head of Public Relations at LawFoyer. The ceremony acknowledged the students’ enthusiasm and their role in spreading awareness about these critical topics. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/WhatsApp-Image-2024-09-01-at-08.47.20_38ab4cf9-1024x768.jpg)The workshop was graced by the presence of the following dignitaries: – Mrs. Manju Sharma, Principal, MPS International – Mr. Deepak Sharma, Secretary, MPS International – Ms. Saloni Olivera, Campus Ambassador, Outlawed India Legal Education Foundation – Mr. Ritesh Singh Shekhawat, Head of Public Relations, LawFoyer ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/WhatsApp-Image-2024-09-01-at-08.47.14_0eccf5a4-1024x768.jpg)The successful collaboration between Outlawed India, LawFoyer, and MPS International School Jaipur underscores the shared commitment to protecting children and empowering the next generation with the knowledge to navigate the digital landscape safely and responsibly. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/WhatsApp-Image-2024-09-01-at-08.47.24_dcc0f105-1024x768.jpg) **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events --- ### [Amity Law School is organizing National Seminar on 24th & 25th Oct 2024: Win Prizes worth Rs 15000/-](https://lawfoyer.in/amity-law-school-is-organizing-national-seminar-on-24th-25th-oct-2024-win-prizes-worth-rs-15000/) **Published:** September 27, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/seminar-Poster-1-Small.png) # **ABOUT THE ORGANIZERS** Amity Law School Lucknow Campus (ALS-L) is a constituent unit of Amity University, Uttar Pradesh. It was established in 2007 with the sole objective to impart research and innovation-driven education in the region. The Law School is currently headed by Prof. (Dr.) J.P. Yadav. A variety of events have been organized throughout the year, such as International and National Seminars, Law Fests and Carnivals, Workshops, National Quizzes, National and Intra Moot Court Competition, and National Faculty Development Program. ## **ABOUT THE SEMINAR** “The Importance of Women Empowerment in Bringing Gender Equality, Enhancing the Social Status of Women, and Achieving Family Goals in the Present Scenario: Issues and Remedies.” This seminar promises to be a pivotal platform for addressing critical issues surrounding women’s empowerment, gender equality, and the enhancement of women’s social status. We aim to shed light on the pressing challenges faced by women in today’s society and explore innovative solutions to achieve family goals in the context of gender equality. ## **ELIGIBLITY CRITERIA** Policymakers, Researchers and academics, Social worker, and counselors, Legal professionals, NGO representatives, Students in related fields, anyone passionate about women’s rights and gender equality students are all welcome to attend the seminar. It seeks to promote an intellectually stimulating and multidisciplinary interchange. ## **PRIZE/AWARDS** **PRIZES WORTH Rs. 15,000/-** - **Best Research Paper:** Smart Watch or Earbuds worth Rs. 5000/- + Trophy + Hardcopy Certificate - **Best Presenter:** Smart Watch or Earbuds Worth Rs. 5000/- + Trophy + Hardcopy Certificate - FREE Publication of Top 2 Papers in International Peer Reviewed Journal. [Click to know More](https://lijdlr.com/cfp-lawfoyer-international-journal-of-doctrinal-legal-research/) - FREE Access to all the participants on the Mastering the Art of Legal Research: A Comprehensive Certification Course (Worth Rs. 500). [Click to know more](https://academy.lawfoyer.in/courses/mastering-legal-research-a-comprehensive-ai-legal-research-guide-for-law-students-and-legal-professionals/) - FREE Publication of Abstracts on book with ISBN Number. - 20% Discount to all the participants on Certification Course on Using Ai in Legal Work For Law Students And Legal Professionals (Worth Rs. 1000/-). [Click to know more](https://academy.lawfoyer.in/courses/mastering-legal-research-a-comprehensive-ai-legal-research-guide-for-law-students-and-legal-professionals/) - 50 % Discount to all the Participants on Publication of Papers on Law Foyer International Journal of Doctrinal & Legal Research (ISSN: 2583-7753) - Certificate of the participation to all. **Registration Link:** ## **IMPORTANT DATES** - **Last date for Abstract Submission:** **15th October, 2024** - **Date of Confirmation of Abstract:** **17th October, 2024** - Last date for Submission of Full Paper (Soft Copy): **19th October, 2024** - Date of International Seminar: **24th and 25th October** ## **REGISTRATION FEES** - **For Amitians:-** 500 - **For Non-Amitians:-** Rs 700 + GST [Registration Link](https://alsnationalseminar.in/seminar-details/) --- [Download Brochure](https://alsnationalseminar.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Lucknow-ALS-brochure-v4-Curve.pdf) ## **SUB – THEMES OF THE SEMINAR** 1. Legal frameworks for women’s rights and gender equality. 2. Education as a tool for empowerment. 3. Political participation and representation. 4. Combating gender-based violence. 5. Health and reproductive rights. 6. The role of men and society in promoting gender equality. 7. Technology and digital empowerment. 8. Agrarian Reform & Participation of Women in rural development & empowerment of rural women. ## **PAPER PRESENTATION GUIDELINES** 1. The Seminar shall have paper presentations that shall be selected after a blind review procedure to be conducted by the editorial 2. The presenters will present their papers before a panel of experts who shall adjudge the paper 3. The participants may adopt any suitable means for presenting the papers including Audio-Visual aids, Power Point Presentations etc. 4. In case of co-authorship at least one author must attend the Seminar to present the paper. ## **SUBMISSION GUIDELINES** - **Language:** All submissions must be in English - **Word Limit:** The abstract should be between 250-300 words along with 5-7 The full research paper should be between 3000-5000 words (inclusive of all citation and references/footnote) - **Font and Line Spacing:** Submissions must be typed in Times New Roman, Font Size 12 on A4 size paper with 1-inch margin on all sides with 5-line spacing. Potential contributors are required to adhere to a uniform mode of citation (20th Edition of The Bluebook or OSCOLA Citation Style, APA, MLA, etc.). It shall be submitted in MS-Word file only. - **Plagiarism Percentage:** All the submitted Manuscripts will be checked for plagiarism through Turnitin Software and Plagiarism up to 20% will be allowed. - **Registration:** Submission of the abstract will be considered as a provisional registration and the co- authors are also required to get registered for the - **Abstract Submission:** Abstract of the paper should be submitted through form on or before 15th October, 2024 at 11:59 M. IST through below mentioned link. - **Submission of Full Paper:** The full paper has to be submitted via form link on or before 19th October 2024 at 11:59 M. IST. The google form link for full paper submission will be sent with the mail of acceptance. - If the paper is selected for publication in an ISBN-numbered book or conference proceedings, a statement by the author declaring that all submissions are original and faithful work of the author must be submitted. - **Hard Copy:** A hard copy of the full paper and abstract must be brought on the day of Seminar. ## **LOCATION:** The seminar will be conducted in offline mode. The sessions will be conducted at Amity Law School, AUUP, Lucknow Campus. ## **CONTACT INFORMATION:** **STUDENT CONVENER:** Ms. Ria Singh | Mobile: +91-9076978755 Ms. Tanya Giri | Mobile: +91-6387777090 **STUDENT CO-CONVENER:** Ms. Shreya Atri | Mobile: +91-9058293961 **EMAIL-ID**– **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events, Webinar **Tags:** als, alsnationalseminar, amity, genderequality, lawfoyer, nationalseminar, womenempowerment --- ### [17th LawFoyer Quiz on Indian Constitutional Law: Prizes worth Rs. 15K +](https://lawfoyer.in/17th-lawfoyer-quiz-on-indian-constitutional-law-prizes-worth-rs-10k/) **Published:** December 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Quiz-Competition-Poster-724x1024.png) [ Download Corrected Answer Key ](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/updated-answer-key-17th-Quiz.pdf) [ Check Result ](https://lawfoyer.in/result-17th-lawfoyer-quiz-on-indian-constitutional-law/) [ Download Certificate ](https://lawfoyer.in/certificate-of-17th-lawfoyer-quiz-on-indian-constitutional-law/) ## Clarifications in Answer Key (Released) Claimed Question Number Previous Answer Key Updated Answer Key Q1 B B Q34 A B Q44 B A Q59 C A ## Dates - **Date of Quiz:- 26/01/2025** **(5 Pm)** - **Last Date to Apply:-** **24/01/2025, 11:00 pm** - **Result Declaration:-** **30/01/2025** ## Prizes - **1st Prize- Rs 1,500 + Smart Watch worth Rs. 5,000/- + Winner Trophy + Hardcopy Certificate of (Excellence & Participation)** - **2nd Prize- Rs 1000 + Earbuds worth Rs. 2000/- + 1st Runner Up Trophy + Hardcopy Certificate of (Excellence & Participation)** - **3rd Prize- Rs 500 + 2nd Runner Up Trophy + Hardcopy Certificate of (Excellence & Participation)** - **4th-10th Prize- Rs 250 +** **Certificate of (Excellence & Participation)** - **FREE Access to LawFoyer’s Advanced Certification Course on Supercharging Litigation & Academics with AI worth Rs. 4000 for Top 10 Rankers, [Click Here to Read About the Course](https://academy.lawfoyer.in/courses/mastering-legal-research-a-comprehensive-ai-legal-research-guide-for-law-students-and-legal-professionals/?preview=true)** - **FREE Practice E-Book with 1000 + MCQs for Practice** - **FREE 2000+ Legal Drafts & FREE Legal Drafting Guide** - **FREE 2 AI Plagiarism Report by Turnitin to All Participants.** - **Certificate of Appreciation for All the Registered Participants** - **Top 10 Rank will get 50% Discount on Publication at LawFoyer International Journal (ISSN: 2583-7753)**. [**Click to know more**](https://lijdlr.com/cfp-lawfoyer-international-journal-of-doctrinal-legal-research/) **Note:-** The Winners Trophy & Certificates will be dispatched to the designated recipients’ physical address without any additional charges. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/WhatsApp-Image-2024-01-22-at-01.00.07_ac7cf468-1024x576.jpg "WhatsApp-Image-2024-01-22-at-01.00.07_ac7cf468 | LawFoyer | LawFoyer | LawFoyer | LawFoyer | LawFoyer | LawFoyer | LawFoyer | LawFoyer") ## **Registration Fees** - **Rs 149/- Only** [ Register Now ](#1) ## ELIGIBILITY - Law Students - Legal Professionals - Legal Practitioners - Judiciary Aspirants - UPSC Aspirants - AIBE Aspirants - JLO Aspirants - IBPS SO Aspirants - Government Exam Aspirants - Any person Interested in Constitutional Law ## **Important Guidelines** - **Format of Quiz:** Quiz shall take place online, and a paper will include multiple-choice questions**.** - The participant can take this exam on their laptop or mobile phone. - The platform for the quiz will be google Forms, Microsoft Forms, etc. - In the case of the same marks, time will be considered (a person who submits early will be given preference). - The link will be shared 24 hours prior to the start of the quiz. ## **Rules & Regulations** - **60 MCQ(s) \[60 Question on Indian Constitutional Law.** - The time allotted will be **25** minutes. (This includes time for filling the basic details like Name, email, etc.) - **Every question carries 04 marks & there will be no negative marking.** - The Result will be declared on **30th January 2025** ([www.lawfoyer.in](https://lawfoyer.in/)). ## ## Registration Form **Categories:** Events, Quiz **Tags:** aibe constitutional law, all about the law, all of law, bar exam constitutional law, basic information about law, basic law quiz, becoming a constitutional lawyer, by laws, comparative constitutional law, comparative law, constitution exam, constitution exam for teachers, constitution online quiz, constitution online test, constitution pretest, constitution quiz questions, constitution test, constitution test questions, constitution test quiz, constitution trivia, constitution trivia questions, constitutional criminal law, constitutional law 1, constitutional law 2, constitutional law 2nd, constitutional law and criminal law, constitutional law and international law, constitutional law bar exam, constitutional law education, constitutional law exam, constitutional law for aibe, constitutional law ii, constitutional law practice, constitutional law practice exam, constitutional law quiz, constitutional law test, constitutional litigation, constitutional quiz, criminal constitutional rights, daily ias quiz, daily mcq for upsc, daily mcq practice for upsc, daily mcq upsc, daily prelims quiz, daily prelims test, daily quiz for upsc, daily quiz for upsc prelims, daily quiz ias, daily quiz upsc, daily test for upsc, daily upsc mcq, daily upsc quiz, free online quiz, free online trivia, free quiz, free quiz questions, free trivia, ias daily quiz, ias exam quiz, ias mcq, ias mcq test, ias online quiz, ias prelims quiz, ias question quiz, ias quiz, ias quiz questions, ias quiz questions with answers, ias quiz test, information about laws, international law and constitutional law, know your constitution quiz, law, law and laws, law degree, law for students, law in law, law information, law of laws, law of the law, law question, law quiz for beginners, law quiz questions, law rules, laws of government, laws of law, lawyer, legal, legal of law, legal quiz, legal quiz questions, mcq for ias, mcq for ias exam, mcq ias, mcq on constitutional law, mcq on upsc, mcq practice for upsc, mcq upsc prelims, online law quiz, online mcq test for upsc, online quiz, online quiz constitution, online quiz for upsc, online quiz test, online quiz upsc, our constitution quiz, prelims daily quiz, prize for quiz, quiz, quiz about constitution, quiz about law, quiz for, quiz for upsc exam, quiz for upsc prelims, quiz ias, quiz on, quiz on law, quiz on upsc, quiz questions, quiz questions for ias exam, quiz questions for upsc, quiz questions for upsc exam, quiz site, quiz test, quiz upsc, quizz com, quizzes com, quizzes to take, rules and law, state constitutional law, study for constitution test, the constitution test questions, the law of laws, the law of the law, the lawyer, the quiz, trivia about the constitution, trivia online, trivia questions about the constitution, trivia questions online, trivia questions trivia quiz, trivia quiz, trivia quiz questions, trivia quizzes online, upsc daily mcq, upsc daily mcq questions, upsc daily questions, upsc daily quiz, upsc daily test, upsc exam mcq, upsc exam quiz, upsc mcq, upsc mcq test, upsc online mcq test, upsc online quiz test, upsc prelims daily quiz, upsc prelims mcq test, upsc prelims quiz, upsc question quiz, upsc quiz, upsc quiz daily, upsc quiz online, upsc quiz questions, upsc quiz with answers. --- ### [2-Day Certification Bootcamp on ADR Law in India, International Framework & Practical Application](https://lawfoyer.in/2-day-bootcamp-adr-law-international-framework/) **Published:** December 31, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![1](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/1-1024x256.png) ![3](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/3-1024x256.png) ![4](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/4-1024x256.png) ![5](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/5-1024x256.png) # ![sticker.png](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/sticker.png) Introducing # 2-Day Certification Bootcamp on ADR Law in India, International Framework & Practical Application Want to dive deep into the world of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), understand its significance in India and on the global stage, and learn practical negotiation techniques? Looking to enhance your legal career with in-depth knowledge of ADR laws and case studies? Look no further! LawFoyer brings you a Certification Bootcamp on **ADR Law in India and International Framework**, from **25th to 26th January 2025**. [ Enroll Now ](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=18) ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/2-Day-bootcamp-poster-1024x1024.png) # Bootcamp COMMENCING IN ### Boot Camp Duration 2 Days ### Boot Camp Starts from 25 January (Live) ### Recordings Validity Lifetime ### Course Fee ₹ 299/- [ Enroll Now ](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=18) ## IMPORTANT DETAILS - **Bootcamp Dates:** 25th to 26th January 2025 - **Platform:** Live Classes + Recordings (with Lifetime Access) - **Registration Fee:** 299/- - 2 Days of Power-Packed Learning with Comprehensive Coverage on ADR Laws - Personalized LMS Dashboard with 24/7 Access to Course Material (including Recordings of Live Sessions) - Notes, E-Books, Templates, Drafting Assignments, and Sample Settlement Agreements - Discounted Publication Opportunity with LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research (LIJDLR) - Interactive Case Studies, Negotiation Techniques, and Drafting Assignments to Enhance Learning ## Bootcamp Curriculum ## Day 1: ADR in India 1. Definition and Importance of ADR: Why ADR is the cornerstone of effective dispute resolution in modern law. 2. Historical Evolution of ADR in India: Understanding its roots and growth in the Indian legal landscape. 3. **Types of ADR:** 1. Mediation 2. Arbitration 3. Conciliation 4. Negotiation 5. Lok Adalats 4. Important Acts and Provisions: Comprehensive analysis of key legislations governing ADR in India. ## Day 2: International Framework of ADR, Negotiation Techniques, and Practical Application with Case Studies 1. **International Framework of ADR:** 1. UNCITRAL Model Law 2. New York Convention 3. Other important international frameworks shaping ADR. 2. **Practical Exercise and Case Studies:** 1. Explanation and hands-on experience of solving a case study using negotiation techniques. 3. **Drafting of Settlement Agreements:** 1. Principles, structure, and format of drafting settlement agreements. 2. Practical drafting assignment using templates and hypothetical case studies. ## BONUS GIVEAWAYS 1. Notes, Templates, and Sample Drafts for Settlement Agreements. 2. Interactive Q&A Session with Anupriya Ma’am on ADR Techniques. 3. Discounted Publication Opportunity with LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research (LIJDLR). 4. Bonus Workshop on Supercharging Litigation and Academics with AI Bonus Workshop on Mooting and Trial Advocacy 5. Bonus Workshop on Mooting and Trial Advocacy [ Enroll Now ](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=18) ## Frequently Asked Questions [ Will the classes be live? ](#collapse-14514dc6ab2aeb3650df) Yes, the bootcamp will be conducted through live online classes on January 25th-26th, 2025, starting from 7 PM onwards each day. You'll get the best of both worlds - you can attend the sessions live to interact directly with the instructor during Q&As and participate in real-time case study discussions, while also having lifetime access to the recorded sessions through your personalized LMS dashboard. This flexible format ensures you can revisit the content at your own pace and never miss out on any important concepts, even if you can't attend a live session. The platform provides 24/7 access to all course materials, including session recordings, notes, e-books, templates, and drafting assignments, allowing you to learn and practice at your convenience. [ What happens if I am unable to attend a live class? ](#collapse-c29457c6ab2aeb3650df) We highly recommend attending the live classes after thorough preparation to maximize your learning experience. Just as the true excitement of a live match or performance lies in witnessing it in real-time, the real value of our live classes comes from actively participating and engaging with the content and instructors. During the live sessions, a wealth of new and practical information is covered, and you'll have the opportunity to ask questions and receive immediate feedback. However, we understand that sometimes life gets in the way, and you may miss a live class. In such cases, you can access the recordings of the live sessions through your personalized Learning Management System (LMS) dashboard. The LMS dashboard provides 24/7 access to all course materials, including the live session recordings, ensuring that you can catch up on any missed content at your convenience. [ Is this bootcamp suitable for beginners with no prior experience? ](#collapse-23e82e36ab2aeb3650df) Yes! This ADR Law bootcamp is specifically designed to welcome beginners while being valuable for those with some experience too. The course starts with fundamental concepts, covering the basics of ADR including its definition, importance, and historical evolution in India. Through a structured learning approach, you'll progressively build your understanding from core principles to practical applications. The comprehensive course materials, including notes, templates, and sample drafts, ensure you have all the resources needed to grasp the concepts effectively. Additionally, the interactive format with live Q&A sessions provides ample opportunity to clarify doubts and build confidence in ADR practices. Whether you're a law student just starting to explore ADR or a professional looking to develop new skills, this bootcamp provides the foundational knowledge and practical experience needed to begin your journey in alternative dispute resolution. [ How will this bootcamp benefit my career? ](#collapse-0e5ca9a6ab2aeb3650df) This ADR Law bootcamp will enhance your career by equipping you with practical dispute resolution skills that are increasingly valued in modern legal practice. Through hands-on training in negotiation, mediation, and arbitration techniques, along with real case studies and drafting exercises, you'll gain expertise that law firms actively seek. The certification, combined with potential publication opportunities and networking with experts, will strengthen your resume and demonstrate your commitment to mastering alternative dispute resolution methods that are becoming essential in today's legal landscape. [ Is the Registration Fee Refundable? ](#collapse-90b9c1a6ab2aeb3650df) The Registration Fee is non-refundable. We assure quality legal education. [ Enroll Now ](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=18) ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/WhatsApp-Image-2024-12-28-at-16.44.57_299b045a-768x542.jpg) [ Enroll Now ](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=18) ## WHO SHOULD PARTICIPATE? - Law Students and Legal Professionals eager to understand and master ADR Laws in India and internationally. - Law Students aiming to enhance their practical skills in negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. - Individuals interested in improving their legal drafting skills with hands-on assignments and expert feedback. ## WHAT WILL YOU LEARN? - Fundamentals of ADR and its significance in modern legal practice. - Comprehensive understanding of the evolution and framework of ADR laws in India. - Practical insights into international ADR frameworks like UNCITRAL Model Law and New York Convention. - Key techniques for effective negotiation and dispute resolution. - Principles and skills required for drafting settlement agreements - Hands-on experience with ADR case studies and negotiation exercises ## Contact Us Have questions about our Certification Bootcamp? We’re here to help! Whether you’re curious about learning ADR techniques or you want to know more about unlocking your potential as an expert in ADR, our team is ready to assist. Don’t miss this opportunity to elevate your legal career with LawFoyer! Register now on [www.lawfoyer.in](https://chatgpt.com/c/www.lawfoyer.in) or contact us at [**lawfoyer@gmail.com**](mailto:lawfoyer@gmail.com) [ Contact Us ](https://web.whatsapp.com/send?phone=+918574723478) [ Contact Us ](https://web.whatsapp.com/send?phone=+916386500823) ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/chatting.png) **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events **Tags:** 1 day bootcamp, 1 day certification courses, 2 certificate, 2 classes, 2 courses, 2 learning, 5ers bootcamp, a and t application, a and t course, about international law, about law courses, access classes, access your, adr case, adr case laws, adr cert, adr certificate, adr certificate course, adr competitions, adr course, adr course content, adr courses in india, adr negotiation cases, ai & law, ai and law course, ai certificate course, ai certification in india, ai law course, all about law, all course, alternative dispute resolution case law, alternative dispute resolution certificate, alternative 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a lawyer what do you need, to study law, to study law what do you need, use of law, we course, work experience in law, you can study, your application, your classes, your course, your education, your internship, your research, your schedule, your study --- ### [Constitutional Law Notes](https://lawfoyer.in/constitutional-law-notes/) **Published:** December 26, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Notes on Constitutional Law | Notes of Constitution of India | Constitution of India Notes | Indian Constitution Notes | Indian Constitution **Content:** **Topic****Link to Notes****Preamble of the Indian Constitution**[**https://lawfoyer.in/preamble-of-the-indian-constitution/**](https://lawfoyer.in/preamble-of-the-indian-constitution/)**Salient Features of the Indian Constitution**[**https://lawfoyer.in/salient-features-of-the-indian-constitution/**](https://lawfoyer.in/salient-features-of-the-indian-constitution/)**Historical Evolution of the Indian Constitution**[**https://lawfoyer.in/historical-evolution-of-the-indian-constitution/**](https://lawfoyer.in/historical-evolution-of-the-indian-constitution/)**Fundamental Rights under Part III**[**https://lawfoyer.in/fundamental-rights-under-part-iii-of-the-indian-constitution-an-overview/**](https://lawfoyer.in/fundamental-rights-under-part-iii-of-the-indian-constitution-an-overview/)**Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP)**[**https://lawfoyer.in/directive-principles-of-state-policy-dpsp/**](https://lawfoyer.in/directive-principles-of-state-policy-dpsp/)**Fundamental Duties of Indian Citizens**[**https://lawfoyer.in/fundamental-duties-of-indian-citizens/**](https://lawfoyer.in/fundamental-duties-of-indian-citizens/)**Union and its Territory: Articles 1-4**[**https://lawfoyer.in/union-and-its-territory-articles-1-4/**](https://lawfoyer.in/union-and-its-territory-articles-1-4/)**Citizenship Provisions: Articles 5-11**[**https://lawfoyer.in/citizenship-provisions-articles-5-11/**](https://lawfoyer.in/citizenship-provisions-articles-5-11/)**Right to Equality: Articles 14-18**[**https://lawfoyer.in/right-to-equality-articles-14-18/**](https://lawfoyer.in/right-to-equality-articles-14-18/)**Right to Freedom: Articles 19-22**[**https://lawfoyer.in/right-to-freedom-articles-19-22/**](https://lawfoyer.in/right-to-freedom-articles-19-22/)**Right against Exploitation: Articles 23-24**[**https://lawfoyer.in/right-against-exploitation-articles-23-24/**](https://lawfoyer.in/right-against-exploitation-articles-23-24/)**Right to Freedom of Religion: Articles 25-28**[**https://lawfoyer.in/right-to-freedom-of-religion-articles-25-28/**](https://lawfoyer.in/right-to-freedom-of-religion-articles-25-28/)**Cultural and Educational Rights: Articles 29-30**[**https://lawfoyer.in/cultural-and-educational-rights-articles-29-30/**](https://lawfoyer.in/cultural-and-educational-rights-articles-29-30/)**Right to Constitutional Remedies: Article 32**[**https://lawfoyer.in/right-to-constitutional-remedies-article-32/**](https://lawfoyer.in/right-to-constitutional-remedies-article-32/)**Writ Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court**[**https://lawfoyer.in/writ-jurisdiction-of-the-supreme-court/**](https://lawfoyer.in/writ-jurisdiction-of-the-supreme-court/)**Writ Jurisdiction of High Courts: Article 226**[**https://lawfoyer.in/writ-jurisdiction-of-high-courts-article-226/**](https://lawfoyer.in/writ-jurisdiction-of-high-courts-article-226/)**Judicial Review in India**[**https://lawfoyer.in/judicial-review-in-india/**](https://lawfoyer.in/judicial-review-in-india/)**Doctrine of Basic Structure**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-basic-structure/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-basic-structure/)**Separation of Powers in the Indian Constitution**[**https://lawfoyer.in/separation-of-powers-in-the-indian-constitution/**](https://lawfoyer.in/separation-of-powers-in-the-indian-constitution/)**Federalism in India: Unitary and Cooperative Features**[**https://lawfoyer.in/federalism-in-india-unitary-and-cooperative-features/**](https://lawfoyer.in/federalism-in-india-unitary-and-cooperative-features/)**Parliament: Composition and Functions**[**https://lawfoyer.in/parliament-composition-and-functions/**](https://lawfoyer.in/parliament-composition-and-functions/)**State Legislatures: Composition and Functions**[**https://lawfoyer.in/state-legislatures-composition-and-functions/**](https://lawfoyer.in/state-legislatures-composition-and-functions/)**Executive Powers of the President**[**https://lawfoyer.in/executive-powers-of-the-president/**](https://lawfoyer.in/executive-powers-of-the-president/)**Executive Powers of the Governor**[**https://lawfoyer.in/executive-powers-of-the-governor/**](https://lawfoyer.in/executive-powers-of-the-governor/)**Judiciary: Supreme Court of India**[**https://lawfoyer.in/judiciary-supreme-court-of-india/**](https://lawfoyer.in/judiciary-supreme-court-of-india/)**Judiciary: High Courts and Subordinate Courts**[**https://lawfoyer.in/judiciary-high-courts-and-subordinate-courts/**](https://lawfoyer.in/judiciary-high-courts-and-subordinate-courts/)**Emergency Provisions: Articles 352-360**[**https://lawfoyer.in/emergency-provisions-articles-352-360/**](https://lawfoyer.in/emergency-provisions-articles-352-360/)**Amendment Procedure: Article 368**[**https://lawfoyer.in/amendment-procedure-article-368/**](https://lawfoyer.in/amendment-procedure-article-368/)**Schedules of the Indian Constitution**[**https://lawfoyer.in/schedules-of-the-indian-constitution/**](https://lawfoyer.in/schedules-of-the-indian-constitution/)**Official Language Provisions: Articles 343-351**[**https://lawfoyer.in/official-language-provisions-articles-343-351/**](https://lawfoyer.in/official-language-provisions-articles-343-351/)**Special Provisions for Certain States: Articles 370 and 371**[**https://lawfoyer.in/special-provisions-for-certain-states-articles-370-and-371/**](https://lawfoyer.in/special-provisions-for-certain-states-articles-370-and-371/)**Panchayati Raj Institutions: Articles 243-243O**[**https://lawfoyer.in/panchayati-raj-institutions-articles-243-243o/**](https://lawfoyer.in/panchayati-raj-institutions-articles-243-243o/)**Municipalities: Articles 243P-243ZG**[**https://lawfoyer.in/municipalities-articles-243p-243zg/**](https://lawfoyer.in/municipalities-articles-243p-243zg/)**Scheduled and Tribal Areas: Articles 244-244A**[**https://lawfoyer.in/scheduled-and-tribal-areas-articles-244-244a/**](https://lawfoyer.in/scheduled-and-tribal-areas-articles-244-244a/)**Anti-Defection Law: Tenth Schedule**[**https://lawfoyer.in/anti-defection-law-tenth-schedule/**](https://lawfoyer.in/anti-defection-law-tenth-schedule/)**Freedom of Trade and Commerce: Articles 301-307**[**https://lawfoyer.in/freedom-of-trade-and-commerce-articles-301-307/**](https://lawfoyer.in/freedom-of-trade-and-commerce-articles-301-307/)**Right to Property: From Fundamental Right to Legal Right**[**https://lawfoyer.in/right-to-property-from-fundamental-right-to-legal-right/**](https://lawfoyer.in/right-to-property-from-fundamental-right-to-legal-right/)**Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in India**[**https://lawfoyer.in/public-interest-litigation-pil-in-india/**](https://lawfoyer.in/public-interest-litigation-pil-in-india/)**Doctrine of Eclipse**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-eclipse/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-eclipse/)**Doctrine of Severability**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-severability/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-severability/)**Doctrine of Pith and Substance**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-pith-and-substance/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-pith-and-substance/)**Doctrine of Colourable Legislation**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-colourable-legislation/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-colourable-legislation/)**Doctrine of Territorial Nexus**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-territorial-nexus/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-territorial-nexus/)**Doctrine of Repugnancy**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-repugnancy/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-repugnancy/)**Doctrine of Prospective Overruling**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-prospective-overruling/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-prospective-overruling/)**Doctrine of Laches**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-laches/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-laches/)**Doctrine of Waiver**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-waiver/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-waiver/)**Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-legitimate-expectation/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-legitimate-expectation/)**Doctrine of Pleasure: Article 310**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-pleasure-article-310/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-pleasure-article-310/)**Doctrine of Public Trust**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-public-trust/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-public-trust/)**Doctrine of State Action**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-state-action/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-state-action/)**Doctrine of Stare Decisis**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-stare-decisis/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-stare-decisis/)**Doctrine of Res Judicata**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-res-judicata/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-res-judicata/)**Doctrine of Res Sub Judice**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-res-sub-judice/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-res-sub-judice/)**Doctrine of Double Jeopardy**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-double-jeopardy/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-double-jeopardy/)**Doctrine of Audi Alteram Partem**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-audi-alteram-partem/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-audi-alteram-partem/)**Doctrine of Nemo Judex in Causa Sua**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-nemo-judex-in-causa-sua/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-nemo-judex-in-causa-sua/)**Doctrine of Natural Justice**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-natural-justice/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-natural-justice/)**Doctrine of Proportionality**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-proportionality/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-proportionality/)**Doctrine of Reasonableness**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-reasonableness/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-reasonableness/)**Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-legitimate-expectation-2/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-legitimate-expectation-2/)**Doctrine of Public Accountability**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-public-accountability/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-public-accountability/)**Doctrine of Separation of Powers**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-separation-of-powers/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-separation-of-powers/)**Doctrine of Checks and Balances**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-checks-and-balances/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-checks-and-balances/)**Doctrine of Judicial Activism**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-judicial-activism/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-judicial-activism/)**Doctrine of Judicial Restraint**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-judicial-restraint/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-judicial-restraint/)**Doctrine of Political Question**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-political-question/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-political-question/)**Doctrine of Executive Privilege**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-executive-privilege/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-executive-privilege/)**Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-parliamentary-sovereignty/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-parliamentary-sovereignty/)**Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-constitutional-supremacy/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-constitutional-supremacy/)**Doctrine of Harmonious Construction**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-harmonious-construction/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-harmonious-construction/)**Doctrine of Implied Powers**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-implied-powers/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-implied-powers/)**Doctrine of Ancillary Powers**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-ancillary-powers/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-ancillary-powers/)**Doctrine of Occupied Field**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-occupied-field/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-occupied-field/)**Doctrine of Incidental or Ancillary Powers**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-incidental-or-ancillary-powers/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-incidental-or-ancillary-powers/)**Doctrine of Judicial Precedent**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-judicial-precedent/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-judicial-precedent/)**Doctrine of Constitutional Silence**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-constitutional-silence/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-constitutional-silence/)**Doctrine of Constitutional Morality**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-constitutional-morality/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-constitutional-morality/)**Doctrine of Transformative Constitutionalism**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-transformative-constitutionalism/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-transformative-constitutionalism/)**Doctrine of Living Constitution**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-living-constitution/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-living-constitution/)**Doctrine of Original Intent**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-original-intent/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-original-intent/)**Doctrine of Popular Sovereignty**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-popular-sovereignty/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-popular-sovereignty/)**Doctrine of Rule of Law**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-rule-of-law/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-rule-of-law/)**Doctrine of Due Process of Law**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-due-process-of-law/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-due-process-of-law/)**Doctrine of Procedure Established by Law**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-procedure-established-by-law/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-procedure-established-by-law/)**Doctrine of Equal Protection of Laws**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-equal-protection-of-laws/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-equal-protection-of-laws/)**Doctrine of Equality Before Law**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-equality-before-law/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-equality-before-law/)**Doctrine of Reasonable Classification**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-reasonable-classification/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-reasonable-classification/)**Doctrine of Non-Arbitrariness**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-non-arbitrariness/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-non-arbitrariness/)**Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-legitimate-expectation-3/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-legitimate-expectation-3/)**Doctrine of Proportionality**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-proportionality-2/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-proportionality-2/)**Doctrine of Wednesbury Unreasonableness**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-wednesbury-unreasonableness/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-wednesbury-unreasonableness/)**Doctrine of Margin of Appreciation**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-margin-of-appreciation/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-margin-of-appreciation/)**Doctrine of Subsidiarity**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-subsidiarity/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-subsidiarity/)**Doctrine of Federal Supremacy**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-federal-supremacy/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-federal-supremacy/)**Doctrine of Implied Limitations**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-implied-limitations/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-implied-limitations/)**Doctrine of Basic Features**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-basic-features/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-basic-features/)**Doctrine of Essential Features**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-essential-features/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-essential-features/)**Doctrine of Non-Derogable Rights**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-non-derogable-rights/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-non-derogable-rights/)**Doctrine of Horizontal and Vertical Application of Rights**[**https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-horizontal-and-vertical-application-of-rights/**](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-horizontal-and-vertical-application-of-rights/) **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [CERTIFICATION COURSE ON USING AI IN LEGAL WORK FOR LAW STUDENTS AND LEGAL PROFESSIONALS](https://lawfoyer.in/certification-course-on-using-ai-in-legal-work-for-law-students-and-legal-professionals/) **Published:** September 2, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![1](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/1-1024x256.png) ![2](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/2-1024x256.png) ![3](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/3-1024x256.png) ![4](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/4-1024x256.png) ![5](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/5-1024x256.png) # ![sticker.png](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/sticker.png) Introducing # CERTIFICATION COURSE ON USING AI IN LEGAL WORK FOR LAW STUDENTS AND LEGAL PROFESSIONALS Want to learn how to leverage AI for professional Legal Research, Writing, Drafting, Oration, Practice, Personal Branding, CV Building, Acing Competitions and Academics? Want to Unlock the Super Lawyer in yourself? 🏆 Look no further! LawFoyer brings you the Certification Course in AI for Legal Work, starting on October 19, 2024. 📅 [ Enroll Now ](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=12) ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/AI-Course-Poster-1.jpg) # COURSE COMMENCING IN ### Course Duration 7 Week ### Course Starts from 19 October (Live) ### Recordings Validity 2 Years ### Course Fee ₹ 999/- [ Enroll Now ](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=12) ## Course Content - Module 1 - Module 2 - Module 3 - Module 4 - Module 5 - Module 6 - Bonus Workshop & Giveaways [ Module 1: Introduction & Orientation ](#collapse-bc228306ab2aeb55d253) - ##### Introduction to AI and its Usage in Day to Day Legal Work (Research, Writing, Drafting & Oration) - ##### **How to use LMS Portal and How to Access Course Materials?** [ Module 2: Al Powered Case Finding, Reading and Analysis ](#collapse-bc228306ab2aeb568c5c) - ##### Using AI for Case Finding, Reading and Analysis (Boolean Method, SCC Online, Manupatra, E-SCR, E-HCR, Judicial Sources) - ##### Case Analysis Writing and Case Brief Preparation using AI [ Module 3: Al Powered Legal Research & Analysis for Legal Work ](#collapse-bc228306ab2aeb577114) - ##### The 4Ws of Legal Research and Using AI for Legal Research - ##### Application of Doctrinal and Empirical Legal Research using AI [ Module 4: Al Powered Legal Writing ](#collapse-bc228306ab2aeb58ab2d) - ##### Legal Writing leveraging Modern AI Tools & Technology - ##### Citations, Plagiarism Elimination, Grammar Corrections, Editing and Proofreading using AI [ Module 5: Using Al in Academics (Note Making, PPTs and Exam / Competition Preparations, CV Building, LinkedIn, Personal Branding) ](#collapse-bc228306ab2aeb59771e) - Using AI for Note Making and PPTs - Using AI for Exam Preparations and Acing Competitions - Using AI for CV Building, SOPs, Cover Letters, LinkedIn & Personal Branding [ Module 6: Al Powered Legal Drafting ](#collapse-bc228306ab2aeb5a1bc3) - Foundational Principles of Legal Drafting (Overview of Civil, Criminal, Corporate, ADR, IPR & Contracts Drafts) - Using AI for Legal Drafting (Transitioning to become a Super Lawyer) [ Bonus Workshop & Giveaways ](#collapse-bc228306ab2aeb5ac0cd) - Bonus Workshop on Acing Moot Courts and Trial Advocacy. - Bonus Workshop on New Criminal Laws (BNS, BSA and BNSS) - Giveaway of 300+ AI Tools & 8000+ Legal Drafts. - Discounted Publication Opportunity with LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research (LIJDLR). - Research Internship Opportunity with LawFoyer ## Course Content ## Module 1: Introduction and Orientation 1. **Introduction to AI and its Usage in Day to Day Legal Work (Research, Writing, Drafting & Oration) 2. How to use LMS Portal and How to Access Course Materials?** ## Module 2: Al Powered Case Finding, Reading and Analysis 1. **Using AI for Case Finding, Reading and Analysis (Boolean Method, SCC Online, Manupatra, E-SCR, E-HCR, Judicial Sources) 2. Case Analysis Writing and Case Brief Preparation using AI** ## Module 3: Al Powered Legal Research & Analysis for Legal Work 1. **The 4Ws of Legal Research and Using AI for Legal Research 2. Application of Doctrinal and Empirical Legal Research using AI** ## Module 4: Al Powered Legal Writing 1. **Legal Writing leveraging Modern AI Tools & Technology 2. Citations, Plagiarism Elimination, Grammar Corrections, Editing and Proofreading using AI** ## Module 5: Using Al in Academics (Note Making, pvrs and Exam / Competition Preparations, CV Building, LinkedIn, Personal Branding) 1. **Using AI for Note Making and PPTs 2. Using AI for Exam Preparations and Acing Competitions 3. Using AI for CV Building, SOPs, Cover Letters, LinkedIn & Personal Branding** ## Module 6: Al Powered I egal Drafting 1. **Foundational Principles of Legal Drafting (Overview of Civil, Criminal, Corporate, ADR, IPR & Contracts Drafts) 2. Using AI for Legal Drafting (Transitioning to become a Super Lawyer)** ## Bonus Workshop & Giveaways 1. **Bonus Workshop on Acing Moot Courts and Trial Advocacy. 2. Bonus Workshop on New Criminal Laws (BNS, BSA and BNSS) 3. Giveaway of 300+ AI Tools & 8000+ Legal Drafts. 4. Discounted Publication Opportunity with LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research (LIJDLR). 5. Research Internship Opportunity with LawFoyer** [ Enroll Now ](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=12) # KEY FEATURES ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/education_15869606-150x150.png) ### Weekened live lectures ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/study_15192524-150x150.png) ### 20+ Lessons ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/webinar_2997592-150x150.png) ### 2 Bonus Workshops\* ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/dashboard_2782066-150x150.png) ### Personalised LMS Dashboard ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/recording_4658842-150x150.png) ### 24\*7 Access to Recordings ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/certificate_6703900-150x150.png) ### Completion and Merit Certificates ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/educational-video_13972594-150x150.png) ### 300+ Tools, 4000+ AI Prompt Templates, 8000+ Legal Drafts ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/quiz_3407038-150x150.png) ### Assignments + quizzes ## Frequently Asked Questions [ Do you offer daily live classes? ](#collapse-14514dc6ab2aeb527fcb) No, our course does not include daily live classes. Instead, you will have the opportunity to attend live Weekend lectures, each lasting approximately 90 minutes. The schedule for these live sessions is released at the beginning of the course. We understand that our learners may be students or working professionals, so we strive to accommodate everyone's schedules. Most of our live sessions are held on weekends or in the late evenings, allowing all participants to attend without compromising their regular classes or work commitments. [ What happens if I am unable to attend a live class? ](#collapse-c29457c6ab2aeb527fcb) We highly recommend attending the live classes after thorough preparation to maximize your learning experience. Just as the true excitement of a live match or performance lies in witnessing it in real-time, the real value of our live classes comes from actively participating and engaging with the content and instructors. During the live sessions, a wealth of new and practical information is covered, and you'll have the opportunity to ask questions and receive immediate feedback. However, we understand that sometimes life gets in the way, and you may miss a live class. In such cases, you can access the recordings of the live sessions through your personalized Learning Management System (LMS) dashboard. The LMS dashboard provides 24/7 access to all course materials, including the live session recordings, ensuring that you can catch up on any missed content at your convenience. [ What is the recommended time commitment for completing the course? ](#collapse-35c8fe46ab2aeb527fcb) To successfully complete the course, we recommend dedicating approximately 3 hours per week to your learning journey. The total course duration is 7 weeks. How you choose to allocate these 3-5 hours throughout the week is entirely up to you and your schedule. You may opt to spend around 40 minutes each day engaging with the course materials, or you may prefer to consolidate your learning time over the weekend. Our flexible learning approach allows you to tailor your study schedule to best suit your needs and commitments. [ Is this course suitable for beginners with no prior experience? ](#collapse-23e82e36ab2aeb527fcb) Absolutely! This course is tailored for individuals at all levels, including those with no prior experience in AI. It offers a comprehensive introduction to the fundamentals of applying AI in legal work, with a focus on practical skills and real-world applications. Whether you’re a law student, a practicing lawyer, or a legal professional aiming to enhance your expertise, this course will equip you with essential tools and knowledge to leverage AI in legal research, drafting, and decision-making processes. Even experienced legal professionals will find immense value, as the course provides cutting-edge insights and techniques to optimize their legal practice with AI. If you are looking to stay ahead in the rapidly evolving legal landscape, this course will provide the skills you need to effectively integrate AI into your legal work. [ Is access to paid Platforms like Chat GPT, Gemini, Manupatra or SCCOnline etc. necessary for this course? ](#collapse-48e70416ab2aeb527fcb) Not at all! While paid legal databases and resources can be valuable, they are not a requirement for successfully completing this course. Our Mentor will guide you on how to efficiently leverage Non-paid as well for legal work. [ How will this course benefit my career? ](#collapse-0e5ca9a6ab2aeb527fcb) This certification course on using AI in legal work is designed to provide you with a competitive edge in the evolving legal landscape. By mastering AI tools and techniques, you'll enhance your efficiency and accuracy in legal research, document review, and case analysis, allowing you to focus more on strategic and high-value tasks. Whether you are a law student, a practicing attorney, or a legal professional, this course will help you stay ahead of the curve by equipping you with practical skills that are increasingly in demand in the legal industry. Additionally, having this certification on your resume demonstrates your commitment to innovation and professional growth, making you a more attractive candidate to employers who are looking to integrate AI into their legal operations. ## Certificate of Completion & Merit ### Certificate of Completion and Merit Completing this course earns you a Completion and Merit Certificate with a unique ID and link. Showcase your achievement and skills by adding the certificate to your LinkedIn Achievements section, demonstrating your dedication to learning and making your profile stand out to potential employers and colleagues. [ Enroll Now ](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=12) - version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"? - HEY! Click on the Certificate to Enroll [![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/unnamed-300x163.png)](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=12) ![WhatsApp Image 2024-09-02 at 18.45.14_ede6b67b](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/WhatsApp-Image-2024-09-02-at-18.45.14_ede6b67b-1.jpg) [ Enroll Now ](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=12) ## What Will You Learn? - Fundamentals of AI in Legal Practice - Al Powered Case Finding, Reading and Analysis - Al Powered Legal Research & Analysis for Legal Work - Al Powered Legal Writing & Legal Drafting - Using Al in Academics (Note Making, PPTs and Exam / Competition Preparations, CV Building, LinkedIn, Personal Branding) [ Enroll Now ](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=12) ## Material Includes - All In One Coverage of Legal Research, Writing, Drafting and Oration Skills - FREE 300+ AI and Non-AI Tools for Efficient Legal Research, Writing, Drafting and Oration - FREE AI Prompts and Guide - FREE 8000+ Legal Drafts - FREE Bonus Workshops on Mooting and New Criminal Laws - FREE Notes and E-Books ## Requirements - No need of any prior knowledge of law or artificial intelligence. - Have a basic understanding of Computer. - Commit to dedicating sufficient time for coursework and assignments. - Actively participate in discussions and group activities. - Complete all assigned readings, quizzes, and projects within the stipulated deadlines. - Seek guidance from faculty when needed. ## Contact Us Have questions about our AI for Legal Work Certification Course? We’re here to help! Whether you’re curious about leveraging AI for legal research, writing, or personal branding, or you want to know more about unlocking your potential as a Super Lawyer, our team is ready to assist. Contact us for any inquiries regarding course content, schedules, or registration for the upcoming session starting October 12, 2024. Don’t miss this opportunity to transform your legal career with LawFoyer! [ Contact Us ](https://web.whatsapp.com/send?phone=+918574723478) [ Contact Us ](https://web.whatsapp.com/send?phone=+916386500823) ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/chatting.png) **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events --- ### [LIFE INSURANCE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES](https://lawfoyer.in/life-insurance-principles-and-practices/) **Published:** December 23, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Life insurance is a contract between an individual and an insurer, where the insurer promises to pay a designated beneficiary a sum of money upon the insured's death or after a set period. This financial tool provides security against the economic impact of the insured's death, ensuring their dependents' financial stability... **Content:** Life insurance is a contract between an individual and an insurer, where the insurer promises to pay a designated beneficiary a sum of money upon the insured’s death or after a set period. This financial tool provides security against the economic impact of the insured’s death, ensuring their dependents’ financial stability. ### **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** Under **Section 2(11) of the Insurance Act, 1938**, **“Life Insurance Business”** encompasses contracts of insurance on human life, including those assuring payment upon death or other life-contingent events. It also covers annuities dependent on human life and contracts subject to premiums for a term based on human life. ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** Life insurance in India traces back to the early 19th century with the establishment of the **Oriental Life Insurance Company in 1818**. Initially catering to Europeans, the sector evolved to include Indian lives, notably with the formation of **Bombay Mutual in 1871**. The industry underwent significant changes post-independence, culminating in the nationalization of life insurance in **1956 through the Life Insurance Corporation Act**, leading to the creation of the **Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC)**. ### **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** 1. ***Insurable Interest***: The policyholder must have a financial stake in the insured’s life. In ***Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Asha Goel***, the Supreme Court emphasized the necessity of **insurable interest** to validate a life insurance contract. 2. ***Utmost Good Faith (Uberrimae Fidei)***: Both parties must disclose all **material facts**. Non-disclosure can render the contract void. In ***Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Smt. G.M. Channabasamma***, the court held that suppression of **material facts** by the insured invalidates the policy. 3. ***Consideration***: Payment of premiums by the insured constitutes **consideration**, ensuring the contract’s enforceability. 4. ***Competent Parties***: Both insurer and insured must have the legal capacity to contract, adhering to the **Indian Contract Act, 1872**. 5. ***Lawful Object***: The contract’s purpose must be legal and not against public policy. ### **PRINCIPLES OF LIFE INSURANCE** 1. ***Principle of Indemnity***: While this principle ensures compensation for losses in **general insurance**, life insurance operates differently. Life insurance provides a **predetermined sum** upon the insured event, not necessarily correlating to the exact financial loss. 2. ***Principle of Insurable Interest***: The policyholder must have a legitimate interest in the insured’s life. This principle ensures that the policyholder stands to suffer a **genuine loss** upon the insured’s death. 3. ***Principle of Utmost Good Faith***: Both parties must act with **complete honesty**, disclosing all relevant information. In ***Reliance Life Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rekhaben Nareshbhai Rathod***, the Supreme Court reiterated that any suppression or misstatement by the insured can render the policy voidable. 4. ***Principle of Subrogation***: Though primarily applicable to **general insurance**, in life insurance, after paying the claim, the insurer may acquire certain rights related to the insured property. 5. ***Principle of Contribution***: This principle is less relevant in life insurance, as multiple policies can be claimed **independently**. 6. ***Principle of Causa Proxima (Nearest Cause)***: The immediate cause of the insured event must be covered under the policy. ### **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** - **Insurance Act, 1938**: Governs insurance business in India, setting **regulatory standards**. - **Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDAI) Act, 1999**: Establishes the **IRDAI** as the regulatory body overseeing insurance practices. - **Section 45 of the Insurance Act, 1938**: Addresses policy disputes, stating that after **two years**, a policy cannot be called into question on grounds of **misstatement**, except in cases of **fraud**. ### **GUIDELINES / RULES / REGULATIONS** - **IRDAI Regulations**: Mandate transparency, **solvency margins**, and **policyholder protection measures**. - **Nomination and Assignment**: Governed by **Section 39** and **Section 38** of the **Insurance Act**, respectively, allowing policyholders to nominate beneficiaries and assign policies. ### **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS** 1. ***Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Asha Goel***: The Supreme Court emphasized the insurer’s duty to act fairly and not **repudiate claims** without substantial grounds. 2. ***Reliance Life Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rekhaben Nareshbhai Rathod***: The court held that suppression of **material facts** by the insured allows the insurer to repudiate the policy. 3. ***Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Smt. G.M. Channabasamma***: The court ruled that **non-disclosure** of material facts by the insured renders the policy void. ### **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - **Doctrine of Waiver and Estoppel**: If an insurer, knowing a **breach**, continues to accept premiums, they may be estopped from denying liability later. - **Doctrine of Constructive Notice**: Policyholders are presumed to know the **policy terms** once the document is delivered. ### **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** - **Uberrimae Fidei**: Emphasizes **utmost good faith** in insurance contracts. - **Caveat Emptor (Let the Buyer Beware)**: While applicable in general contracts, in insurance, the onus is on **both parties** to disclose **material facts**. ### **AMENDMENTS / ADDITIONS / REPEALING** - **Insurance Laws (Amendment) Act, 2015**: Introduced reforms, including increasing the **foreign investment cap** and enhancing **policyholder protection**. ### **STATISTICAL ANALYSIS / DATA ANALYSIS** - **Life Insurance Penetration in India**: As per **IRDAI’s annual report**, life insurance penetration in India was **2.82% in 2019**, indicating **growth potential**. ### **FUTURE IMPLICATIONS** The life insurance sector in India is poised for growth with **technological advancements**, regulatory reforms, and increasing awareness, leading to enhanced **customer-centric products and services**. ### **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** While life insurance offers **financial security**, challenges include **mis-selling**, lack of awareness, and **complex products**. Regulatory bodies are striving to address these issues to protect policyholder interests. ### **REFERENCES** 1. ***Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Asha Goel***, (2001) 2 SCC 160. 2. ***Reliance Life Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rekhaben Nareshbhai Rathod***, (2019) 6 SCC 175. 3. ***Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Smt. G.M. Channabasamma***, AIR 1991 SC 392. 4. **Insurance Act, 1938**. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [GENERAL INSURANCE: SCOPE AND APPLICATIONS](https://lawfoyer.in/general-insurance-scope-and-applications/) **Published:** December 24, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** General insurance encompasses non-life insurance policies, providing financial protection against unforeseen events such as accidents, natural disasters, and liabilities. In India, it plays a crucial role in safeguarding individuals and businesses from potential financial losses.... **Content:** General insurance encompasses non-life insurance policies, providing financial protection against unforeseen events such as accidents, natural disasters, and liabilities. In India, it plays a crucial role in safeguarding individuals and businesses from potential financial losses. ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** **General insurance** refers to policies that offer coverage for risks other than life, including property damage, health emergencies, and legal liabilities. Unlike **life insurance**, which deals with human life contingencies, general insurance addresses tangible assets and liabilities. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The Indian general insurance sector traces its origins to the establishment of **Triton Insurance Company Ltd. in 1850** in Calcutta. The industry underwent significant transformation with the **nationalization of general insurance businesses in 1972**, leading to the formation of the **General Insurance Corporation (GIC)**. The sector reopened to private and foreign investment in **1999** with the formation of the **Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDAI)**. ## **TYPES OF GENERAL INSURANCE** 1. ***Fire Insurance***: Covers damages caused by fire to property and goods. 2. ***Marine Insurance***: Provides protection against losses during the transportation of goods over sea or land. 3. ***Motor Insurance***: Offers coverage for vehicles against accidents, theft, and third-party liabilities. 4. ***Health Insurance***: Covers medical expenses incurred due to illnesses or injuries. 5. ***Liability Insurance***: Protects against legal liabilities arising from third-party claims. 6. ***Miscellaneous Insurance***: Includes policies like burglary, fidelity guarantee, and personal accident insurance. ## **PRINCIPLES OF GENERAL INSURANCE** 1. ***Utmost Good Faith (Uberrimae Fidei)***: Both parties must disclose all material facts honestly. Non-disclosure can render the contract void. 2. ***Insurable Interest***: The insured must have a legal stake in the subject matter of the insurance. Without **insurable interest**, the contract is void. 3. ***Indemnity***: Ensures that the insured is compensated for the actual loss suffered, preventing profit from insurance. 4. ***Subrogation***: After compensating the insured, the insurer gains the legal rights to recover the loss from third parties responsible for the damage. 5. ***Contribution***: If multiple policies cover the same risk, insurers share the claim amount proportionally. 6. ***Proximate Cause (Causa Proxima)***: Determines the closest cause of loss to establish liability, especially when multiple causes exist. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / REGULATORY FRAMEWORK** The general insurance sector in India is governed by several key legislations: - **Insurance Act, 1938**: Provides the foundational legal framework for insurance operations in India. - **General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act, 1972**: Led to the nationalization of general insurance companies and the establishment of **GIC**. - **Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority Act, 1999**: Established **IRDAI** as the regulatory body overseeing the insurance sector, ensuring its development and regulation. ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS** 1. **LIC of India v. G.M. Channabasemma, AIR 1991 SC 392**: The Supreme Court emphasized the principle of ***utmost good faith***, stating that non-disclosure of material facts by the insured can render the policy voidable at the insurer’s discretion. 2. **General Assurance Society Ltd. v. Chandumull Jain, AIR 1966 SC 1644**: The Court held that insurance contracts are subject to special principles, including the duty of disclosure and the doctrine of ***indemnity***. 3. **Reliance Life Insurance v. Rekhaben Nareshbhai Rathod**: This case underscored that if the insured does not reveal important information when signing an insurance contract, the insurer can reject policy claims. 4. **New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Paresh Mohanlal Parmar**: The Supreme Court dealt with the interpretation of policy terms, emphasizing that clear and unambiguous terms must be upheld as per their plain meaning. ## **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - **Doctrine of Contribution**: If multiple insurers cover the same risk, they share the loss proportionally. - **Doctrine of Loss Minimization**: The insured must take reasonable steps to minimize the loss or damage to the insured property. ## **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** - **Uberrimae Fidei (Utmost Good Faith)**: Both parties must act with complete honesty and disclose all material facts. - **Causa Proxima (Nearest Cause)**: The proximate cause of the loss is considered to determine liability. ## **GUIDELINES / RULES / REGULATIONS** The **Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDAI)** issues various guidelines to regulate the general insurance sector, ensuring transparency, policyholder protection, and market development. These include norms on product design, pricing, and grievance redressal mechanisms. **Categories:** Articles, Insurance Law & Banking Law --- ### [Preamble of the Indian Constitution](https://lawfoyer.in/preamble-of-the-indian-constitution/) **Published:** December 18, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Preamble to the Indian Constitution serves as an introductory statement, encapsulating the fundamental values and guiding principles of the nation. It declares India as a Sovereign, Socialist, Secular, Democratic Republic, committed to securing Justice, Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity for its citizens. The Preamble reflects the aspirations of the people and sets the tone for the Constitution's provisions.... **Content:** ## MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION The **Preamble to the Indian Constitution** serves as an introductory statement, encapsulating the **fundamental values and guiding principles** of the nation. It declares India as a **Sovereign, Socialist, Secular, Democratic Republic**, committed to securing **Justice, Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity** for its citizens. The **Preamble reflects the aspirations of the people** and sets the tone for the Constitution’s provisions. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The **Preamble** draws inspiration from the **Objectives Resolution**, introduced by **Jawaharlal Nehru in the Constituent Assembly on December 13, 1946**, and adopted on **January 22, 1947**. This resolution outlined the **foundational principles for the Constitution**. The **Preamble was adopted on November 26, 1949**, and came into effect on **January 26, 1950**. The **42nd Amendment Act of 1976** introduced the terms **“Socialist,” “Secular,” and “Integrity”** into the Preamble, reflecting the evolving aspirations of the nation. ## **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** The **Preamble** comprises several key elements: - **Sovereign**: **India is independent and free from external control.** - **Socialist**: **Emphasizes social and economic equality.** - **Secular**: **Ensures equal respect for all religions.** - **Democratic**: **Power derives from the people.** - **Republic**: **The head of state is elected.** - **Justice**: **Social, economic, and political fairness.** - **Liberty**: **Freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, and worship.** - **Equality**: **Equal status and opportunity for all citizens.** - **Fraternity**: **Promotes national unity and individual dignity.** ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** While the **Preamble** is not **enforceable in a court of law**, it provides a **guiding framework for interpreting the Constitution**. It reflects the **intentions of the framers** and aids in understanding the Constitution’s provisions. The **Preamble has been referenced in various judicial decisions** to elucidate the Constitution’s objectives. ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** - **Berubari Union Case (1960)**: The **Supreme Court held** that the **Preamble is not a part of the Constitution** and cannot be a **source of power or limitations**. However, it can be used to **interpret ambiguous constitutional provisions**. - **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)**: The **Supreme Court overruled the Berubari decision**, declaring that the **Preamble is an integral part of the Constitution**. The Court introduced the **“basic structure” doctrine**, stating that **Parliament cannot amend the Constitution’s basic structure**, as reflected in the Preamble. - **S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994)**: The **Supreme Court emphasized the secular nature of the Indian state**, as declared in the **Preamble**, and held that any action contrary to this principle would be **unconstitutional**. - **Union Government v. LIC of India (1995)**: The **Supreme Court reaffirmed** that the **Preamble is a part of the Constitution**, but is **not directly enforceable in a court of law**. ## **INTERPRETATIONS / EXPLANATIONS** The **Preamble** has been interpreted as the **“soul” of the Constitution**, reflecting its **fundamental philosophy**. It serves as a **guiding light for the interpretation** of the Constitution’s provisions, ensuring that laws align with the **nation’s core values**. ## **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - **Basic Structure Doctrine**: Established in the **Kesavananda Bharati case**, this doctrine asserts that certain **fundamental features of the Constitution**, as reflected in the **Preamble**, **cannot be altered or destroyed** through amendments. ## **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** - **“Salus populi suprema lex”**: **The welfare of the people is the supreme law.** This principle aligns with the **Preamble’s commitment to justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity**. ## **AMENDMENTS / ADDITIONS / REPEALING** The **Preamble** has been amended only once through the **42nd Amendment Act of 1976**, which added the words **“Socialist,” “Secular,” and “Integrity”** to reflect the **nation’s evolving ethos**. ## **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** The **Preamble** has been lauded for encapsulating the **Constitution’s essence** in a concise manner. However, some critics argue that terms like **“Socialist” and “Secular”** are open to interpretation and debate. Despite this, the **Preamble remains a symbol of India’s commitment to its foundational principles**. ## **REFERENCES** 1. **Berubari Union Case (1960)**: In Re Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves, **AIR 1960 SC 845**. 2. **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)**: **AIR 1973 SC 1461**. 3. **S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994)**: **AIR 1994 SC 1918**. 4. **Union Government v. LIC of India (1995)**: **AIR 1995 SC 1811**. 5. **42nd Amendment Act, 1976**: Introduced the terms **“Socialist,” “Secular,” and “Integrity”** into the Preamble. 6. **Preamble to the Constitution of India**: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Preamble\_to\_the\_Constitution\_of\_India](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Preamble_to_the_Constitution_of_India) 7. **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala**: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kesavananda\_Bharati\_v.\_State\_of\_Kerala](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kesavananda_Bharati_v._State_of_Kerala) 8. **Preamble of the Indian Constitution: Everything you need to know**: 9. **Preamble to the Indian Constitution – दृष्टि आईएएस**: 10. **Preamble of Indian Constitution – Drishti Judiciary**: **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Salient Features of the Indian Constitution](https://lawfoyer.in/salient-features-of-the-indian-constitution/) **Published:** December 18, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Salient Features of the Indian Constitution. The Indian Constitution is the world's lengthiest written constitution. Initially, it comprised 395 articles, 22 parts, and 8 schedules. Over time, amendments have expanded it to 448 articles and 12 schedules. This comprehensive nature ensures detailed governance guidelines, accommodating India's vast diversity..... **Content:** ## **1. LENGTHIEST WRITTEN CONSTITUTION** The Indian Constitution is the world’s **lengthiest written constitution**. Initially, it comprised **395 articles, 22 parts, and 8 schedules**. Over time, amendments have expanded it to **448 articles and 12 schedules**. This comprehensive nature ensures detailed governance guidelines, accommodating India’s vast diversity. --- ## **2. SOVEREIGN, SOCIALIST, SECULAR, DEMOCRATIC, REPUBLIC** The **Preamble** declares India as a **sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic**. **Sovereignty** signifies India’s complete autonomy. **Socialism** reflects the commitment to social and economic equality. **Secularism** ensures equal respect for all religions. **Democracy** denotes a government by the people, and **republic** indicates the head of state is elected. --- ## **3. PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT** India adopts a **parliamentary system**, with the **President** as the nominal executive head and the **Prime Minister** as the real executive authority. This system, inspired by the **British model**, ensures collective responsibility of the executive to the legislature. --- ## **4. FEDERAL SYSTEM WITH UNITARY BIAS** The Constitution establishes a **federal structure** with a strong central government. It divides powers between the **Centre and States** but allows the **Centre** to assert authority during emergencies, reflecting a **unitary bias**. --- ## **5. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS** **Part III** guarantees **fundamental rights** to citizens, including the **Right to Equality** (**Articles 14-18**), **Right to Freedom** (**Articles 19-22**), **Right against Exploitation** (**Articles 23-24**), **Right to Freedom of Religion** (**Articles 25-28**), **Cultural and Educational Rights** (**Articles 29-30**), and **Right to Constitutional Remedies** (**Article 32**). These rights are enforceable by courts, ensuring protection against state actions. --- ## **6. DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICY** **Part IV** outlines **Directive Principles**, guiding the state in policy-making to establish a just society. Although **non-justiciable**, they are fundamental in governance, aiming at **social and economic democracy**. --- ## **7. FUNDAMENTAL DUTIES** **Article 51A** lists **fundamental duties** for citizens, introduced by the **42nd Amendment** in 1976. These duties promote a sense of responsibility among citizens towards the nation. --- ## **8. INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY** The Constitution ensures an **independent judiciary**, free from executive and legislative influence. The **Supreme Court** and **High Courts** have the power of **judicial review** to uphold the Constitution’s supremacy. --- ## **9. MIXTURE OF RIGIDITY AND FLEXIBILITY** While certain constitutional provisions require a **special majority** for amendment, others can be amended by a **simple parliamentary majority**. This balance allows adaptability without compromising fundamental principles. --- ## **10. SINGLE CITIZENSHIP** Unlike federal systems like the **USA**, where **dual citizenship** exists, the Indian Constitution provides for **single citizenship**, promoting national unity. --- ## **11. UNIVERSAL ADULT SUFFRAGE** **Article 326** grants the **right to vote** to all citizens aged **18 and above**, irrespective of caste, creed, religion, or gender, ensuring a democratic process. --- ## **12. EMERGENCY PROVISIONS** The Constitution provides for emergencies: **National Emergency** (**Article 352**), **State Emergency** (**Article 356**), and **Financial Emergency** (**Article 360**). These provisions enable the **Centre** to manage extraordinary situations effectively. --- ## **13. SECULARISM** The state maintains **neutrality in religious matters**, ensuring equal treatment of all religions without favoring or discriminating against any. --- ## **14. JUDICIAL REVIEW** The judiciary has the authority to **review laws and executive actions** to ensure they conform to the Constitution, safeguarding citizens’ rights. --- ## **15. BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE** The **Supreme Court**, in the **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala** case (1973), established that while **Parliament** can amend the Constitution, it cannot alter its **basic structure**. This doctrine ensures the preservation of fundamental constitutional principles. --- ## **16. RESERVATION POLICY** The Constitution provides for **reservation** in education and public employment for **Scheduled Castes**, **Scheduled Tribes**, and **Other Backward Classes** to promote **social equality**. --- ## **17. PANCHAYATI RAJ SYSTEM** The **73rd Amendment** introduced the **Panchayati Raj system**, establishing a **three-tier structure** of local self-governance in rural areas, empowering local bodies. --- ## **18. SCHEDULED AND TRIBAL AREAS** Special provisions exist for the administration of **scheduled and tribal areas** to protect the interests of **indigenous communities**. --- ## **19. LANGUAGE PROVISIONS** The Constitution recognizes **Hindi and English** as **official languages** and lists **22 scheduled languages**, promoting linguistic diversity. --- ## **20. SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR MINORITIES** Provisions exist to protect the **cultural and educational rights** of **minorities**, ensuring their development and preservation of heritage. --- ## **21. AMENDMENT PROCEDURE** **Article 368** outlines the procedure for **constitutional amendments**, allowing adaptability to changing needs while protecting core principles. --- ## **22. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM** The judiciary has played an active role in interpreting the Constitution to expand rights and address social issues, exemplified by **Public Interest Litigations (PILs)**. --- ## **23. PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION (PIL)** **PIL** allows individuals or groups to approach courts for public causes, enhancing access to justice and addressing societal issues. --- ## **24. SEPARATION OF POWERS** The Constitution delineates powers among the **executive, legislature, and judiciary**, ensuring checks and balances within the government. --- ## **25. RULE OF LAW** The principle of **rule of law** is upheld, ensuring that all actions are conducted according to established laws, maintaining order and justice. --- ## **26. SOCIAL JUSTICE** The Constitution aims to promote **social justice**, striving to create an equitable society by addressing inequalities. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Historical Evolution of the Indian Constitution](https://lawfoyer.in/historical-evolution-of-the-indian-constitution/) **Published:** December 18, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Historical Evolution of the Indian Constitution **Content:** ## **1. EARLY LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORKS** - **Regulating Act of 1773**: This Act marked the beginning of parliamentary control over the **East India Company**, establishing a **Governor-General in Bengal** and creating a **Supreme Court in Calcutta**. - **Pitt’s India Act of 1784**: Introduced a dual system of control by setting up a **Board of Control** in Britain to oversee the Company’s affairs in India, enhancing governmental oversight. - **Charter Act of 1833**: Centralized administration by designating the **Governor-General of Bengal** as the **Governor-General of India**, marking a significant step towards a unitary form of government. - **Charter Act of 1853**: Introduced an **open competition system** for civil services and separated the **legislative and executive functions** of the **Governor-General’s council**. ## **2. TRANSITION TO CROWN RULE** - **Government of India Act 1858**: In response to the **Revolt of 1857**, this Act transferred control from the **East India Company** to the **British Crown**, establishing the office of the **Secretary of State for India**. - **Indian Councils Act 1861**: Allowed for the inclusion of **Indian members** in **legislative councils**, introducing a limited degree of representation. - **Indian Councils Act 1892**: Expanded the functions of **legislative councils** and increased the number of additional members, allowing for greater Indian participation. - **Indian Councils Act 1909 (Morley-Minto Reforms)**: Introduced **separate electorates for Muslims**, a move that institutionalized **communal representation** in Indian politics. ## **3. TOWARDS SELF-GOVERNMENT** - **Government of India Act 1919 (Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms)**: Established a **dyarchical system**, dividing subjects into ‘transferred’ and ‘reserved’ categories, with the former under **Indian ministers** and the latter under **British officials**. - **Simon Commission (1927)**: Aimed to assess the functioning of the constitutional system in India but faced widespread opposition due to the **absence of Indian members**. - **Government of India Act 1935**: Proposed an **all-India federation** and introduced **provincial autonomy**, though the federal provisions were never implemented. ## **4. CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY AND DRAFTING** - **Formation of the Constituent Assembly (1946)**: Comprised representatives from various political backgrounds, tasked with drafting the **Constitution of independent India**. - **Drafting Committee**: Chaired by **Dr. B.R. Ambedkar**, this committee was instrumental in formulating the draft Constitution, drawing from various global constitutions to suit India’s unique needs. - **Adoption of the Constitution (26th November 1949)**: The **Constituent Assembly** adopted the Constitution, which came into effect on **26th January 1950**, establishing India as a **sovereign, socialist, secular, and democratic republic**. ## **5. KEY FEATURES AND INFLUENCES** - **Federal Structure with Unitary Bias**: The Constitution establishes a **federal system** with a strong **central authority**, allowing for **unitary features during emergencies**. - **Fundamental Rights and Duties**: Inspired by the **U.S. Bill of Rights**, **Part III** of the Constitution guarantees **fundamental rights**, while **Part IV-A** outlines **fundamental duties** for citizens. - **Directive Principles of State Policy**: Drawn from the **Irish Constitution**, these principles guide the state in formulating policies aimed at **social and economic welfare**. - **Parliamentary System**: Adopted from the **British model**, establishing a **bicameral legislature** with the **Lok Sabha** and **Rajya Sabha**. ## **6. LANDMARK JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS** - **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)**: This case established the **‘Basic Structure’ doctrine**, asserting that while **Parliament** can amend the Constitution, it cannot alter its **fundamental framework**. - **Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980)**: Reaffirmed the **Basic Structure doctrine**, emphasizing the balance between **fundamental rights** and **directive principles**. - **S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994)**: Clarified the scope of **Article 356** regarding the imposition of **President’s Rule**, emphasizing that **secularism** is a basic feature of the Constitution. ## **7. DOCTRINES AND PRINCIPLES** - **Doctrine of Basic Structure**: Asserts that certain fundamental features of the Constitution cannot be altered by amendments, ensuring the preservation of its **core principles**. - **Rule of Law**: Establishes that all individuals and institutions are subject to and accountable under the **law**, ensuring **equality before the law**. - **Separation of Powers**: Divides the functions of government among the **legislative**, **executive**, and **judicial branches** to prevent the concentration of power. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Fundamental Rights under Part III of the Indian Constitution: An Overview](https://lawfoyer.in/fundamental-rights-under-part-iii-of-the-indian-constitution-an-overview/) **Published:** December 18, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Fundamental Rights, enshrined in Part III (Articles 12-35) of the Indian Constitution, are essential human freedoms guaranteed to all citizens. These rights ensure individual liberty, equality, and dignity, forming the cornerstone of India's democratic framework. They are enforceable by courts, allowing individuals to seek redressal when violated... **Content:** ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** **Fundamental Rights**, enshrined in **Part III (Articles 12-35)** of the Indian Constitution, are essential human freedoms guaranteed to all citizens. These rights ensure **individual liberty, equality**, and **dignity**, forming the cornerstone of India’s democratic framework. They are **enforceable by courts**, allowing individuals to seek redressal when violated. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The concept of **Fundamental Rights** in India draws inspiration from various sources: - **British Legacy**: The colonial experience highlighted the need for **civil liberties**. - **U.S. Constitution**: The **Bill of Rights** influenced the inclusion of justiciable rights. - **International Declarations**: Documents like the **Universal Declaration of Human Rights** emphasized the global importance of fundamental freedoms. The framers of the Indian Constitution incorporated these rights to ensure a **democratic society** where **individual freedoms** are protected. ## **CLASSIFICATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS** The Fundamental Rights are categorized into six broad classes: 1. **Right to Equality (Articles 14-18)**: Guarantees **equality before the law** and prohibits **discrimination**. 2. **Right to Freedom (Articles 19-22)**: Includes freedoms of **speech, assembly, association, movement, residence, and profession**. 3. **Right against Exploitation (Articles 23-24)**: Prohibits **human trafficking, forced labor**, and **child labor**. 4. **Right to Freedom of Religion (Articles 25-28)**: Ensures **religious freedom** and the right to **manage religious affairs**. 5. **Cultural and Educational Rights (Articles 29-30)**: Protects the rights of **minorities** to **preserve their culture** and establish **educational institutions**. 6. **Right to Constitutional Remedies (Articles 32-35)**: Allows individuals to approach courts for **enforcement of Fundamental Rights.** ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** - **Article 12**: Defines ‘State’ to include the **Government and Parliament of India**, the **Government and Legislature of each State**, and all **local or other authorities** within Indian territory or under the control of the **Government of India**. - **Article 13**: Declares that **laws inconsistent with Fundamental Rights are void**. It introduces doctrines like: - ***Doctrine of Severability***: Invalid portions of a law can be severed if the rest remains enforceable. - ***Doctrine of Eclipse***: A law inconsistent with Fundamental Rights is not null but dormant and can become active if the inconsistency is removed. ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** - **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)**: Established the ***Basic Structure Doctrine***, ruling that Parliament cannot alter the Constitution’s fundamental framework, including Fundamental Rights. - **Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)**: Expanded the interpretation of **Article 21**, asserting that **‘life and personal liberty’** cannot be curtailed except through a procedure established by law, which must be **just, fair, and reasonable**. - **Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (2017)**: Recognized the **Right to Privacy** as intrinsic to the **Right to Life and Personal Liberty** under **Article 21**. ## **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - **Basic Structure Doctrine**: Asserts that certain fundamental features of the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights, cannot be altered by amendments. - **Doctrine of Waiver**: Individuals cannot waive their **Fundamental Rights**; they are **inalienable**. - **Doctrine of Lifting the Veil**: Courts can look beyond the literal interpretation of laws to ensure **Fundamental Rights** are not violated. ## **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** - **“Ubi jus ibi remedium”**: Where there is a right, there is a remedy. This principle underlies **Article 32**, ensuring individuals can approach the **Supreme Court** directly when Fundamental Rights are infringed. ## **AMENDMENTS / REPEALING** - **44th Amendment Act, 1978**: Removed the **Right to Property** from the list of Fundamental Rights, making it a **constitutional right** under **Article 300A**. ## **GUIDELINES / PRINCIPLES** - **Directive Principles of State Policy (Part IV)**: While not enforceable in court, these principles guide the State in formulating policies that aim to establish **social and economic democracy**, complementing the Fundamental Rights. ## **CASE STUDY: KESAVANANDA BHARATI v. STATE OF KERALA (1973)** - **Facts**: Kesavananda Bharati, a seer of a mutt in Kerala, challenged the Kerala government’s attempts to impose restrictions on the mutt’s property, invoking the validity of constitutional amendments that curtailed Fundamental Rights. - **Issue**: Whether Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution was unlimited, extending to altering Fundamental Rights. - **Held**: The Supreme Court ruled that while Parliament can amend the Constitution, it cannot alter its **‘Basic Structure,’** which includes Fundamental Rights. ## **CASE STUDY: MANEKA GANDHI v. UNION OF INDIA (1978)** - **Facts**: Maneka Gandhi’s passport was impounded by the government without providing reasons, leading her to challenge the action as a violation of her **Fundamental Rights**. - **Issue**: Whether the procedure established by law under **Article 21** must be fair, just, and reasonable. - **Held**: The Supreme Court expanded the interpretation of **Article 21**, asserting that any law affecting **life and personal liberty** must be **just, fair, and reasonable**, thus broadening the scope of Fundamental Rights. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP)](https://lawfoyer.in/directive-principles-of-state-policy-dpsp/) **Published:** December 19, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP) are guidelines enshrined in Part IV (Articles 36-51) of the Indian Constitution. They direct the state to establish a just society by promoting social and economic welfare. Although non-justiciable, meaning they cannot be enforced in a court of law, DPSPs are fundamental in governance, aiming to create a welfare state. **Content:** ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** The **Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP)** are guidelines enshrined in **Part IV (Articles 36-51)** of the **Indian Constitution**. They direct the state to establish a just society by promoting social and economic welfare. Although **non-justiciable**, meaning they cannot be enforced in a court of law, **DPSPs** are fundamental in governance, aiming to create a welfare state. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The concept of **DPSP** is inspired by the **Irish Constitution**, which in turn drew from the **Spanish Constitution**. Indian Constitution framers incorporated **DPSPs** to address socio-economic challenges and guide the state in policy-making. The **Government of India Act, 1935**, also influenced the inclusion of these principles. ## **CLASSIFICATION OF DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES** **DPSPs** are broadly classified into three categories: 1. ***Socialistic Principles***: Aim to provide social and economic justice, setting the path toward a welfare state. They include provisions like **securing a living wage**, **equal pay for equal work**, and **promoting the welfare of the people**. 2. ***Gandhian Principles***: Reflect **Mahatma Gandhi’s ideals**, focusing on promoting **cottage industries**, organizing **village panchayats**, and improving **public health**. 3. ***Liberal-Intellectual Principles***: Aim to secure a **uniform civil code**, **protect the environment**, and **promote international peace and security**. ## **KEY ARTICLES AND THEIR PROVISIONS** - **Article 38**: Mandates the state to promote the welfare of the people by securing a social order based on **justice—social, economic, and political**. - **Article 39**: Directs the state to ensure **adequate means of livelihood**, **equal pay for equal work**, and prevent the **concentration of wealth**. - **Article 40**: Obligates the state to organize **village panchayats** and endow them with necessary powers to function as units of **self-government**. - **Article 44**: Encourages the state to secure a **uniform civil code** for all citizens across India. - **Article 45**: Provides for **free and compulsory education** for children below the age of six years. - **Article 47**: Directs the state to raise the level of **nutrition** and **standard of living** and to improve **public health**. ## **RELATIONSHIP WITH FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS** Initially, there was a perceived conflict between **Fundamental Rights (Part III)** and **DPSPs (Part IV)**. In ***State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan*** (**AIR 1951 SC 226**), the **Supreme Court** held that in case of conflict, **Fundamental Rights** would prevail. However, subsequent amendments and judgments, such as the **42nd Amendment** and the ***Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India*** (**AIR 1980 SC 1789**), emphasized the harmony and balance between **Fundamental Rights** and **DPSPs**, stating that both are essential features of the **Constitution**. ## **IMPLEMENTATION AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION** While **DPSPs** are non-justiciable, they have been instrumental in shaping policies and laws. The judiciary has often referred to **DPSPs** to interpret laws and **Fundamental Rights**. In ***Unni Krishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh*** (**1993 SCC (1) 645**), the **Supreme Court** recognized the **right to education** as a **Fundamental Right**, drawing inspiration from **Article 45**. ## **SIGNIFICANCE IN GOVERNANCE** **DPSPs** serve as a beacon for the state to formulate policies aimed at **social and economic welfare**. They reflect the ideals and aspirations of the **Constitution**, guiding the state toward achieving **social justice** and establishing a **welfare state**. ## **CRITICISM** Critics argue that the **non-justiciable** nature of **DPSPs** renders them ineffective. Some principles are considered vague, and there are instances of conflict between different directives. However, their role as **guiding principles in governance** remains undisputed. ## **CONCLUSION** The **Directive Principles of State Policy** are integral to the **Indian Constitution**, embodying the vision of a **just and equitable society**. They act as a guiding force for the state to implement policies that aim to **reduce inequalities** and promote the **welfare of the people**, thus playing a crucial role in the nation’s governance. ## **REFERENCES** 1. ***Directive Principles of State Policy***, iPleaders Blog. 2. ***Directive Principles of State Policy: Articles 36 – 51 Under Indian Constitution***, iPleaders Blog. 3. ***Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSPs)***, Next IAS. 4. ***Directive Principles of State Policy***, Drishti Judiciary. 5. ***Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP) – Indian Polity Notes***, BYJU’S. 6. ***Directive Principles of State Policy***, Ministry of External Affairs. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [FUNDAMENTAL DUTIES OF INDIAN CITIZENS](https://lawfoyer.in/fundamental-duties-of-indian-citizens/) **Published:** December 19, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** FUNDAMENTAL DUTIES OF INDIAN CITIZENS. Fundamental Duties, enshrined in Article 51A of the Indian Constitution, outline the moral obligations of citizens to promote patriotism and uphold the unity of India. These duties serve as a constant reminder that while citizens enjoy rights, they also bear responsibilities towards the nation. **Content:** ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** **Fundamental Duties**, enshrined in **Article 51A** of the **Indian Constitution**, outline the moral obligations of citizens to promote patriotism and uphold the unity of India. These duties serve as a constant reminder that while citizens enjoy **rights**, they also bear responsibilities towards the nation. Incorporated by the **42nd Amendment Act in 1976**, **Part IV-A** lists ten duties, with an eleventh added by the **86th Amendment in 2002**. These duties encompass respect for **national symbols**, cherishing **noble ideals**, upholding **sovereignty**, promoting **harmony**, protecting the **environment**, and striving for **excellence**. Although **non-justiciable**, meaning they are not enforceable by law, they play a crucial role in guiding citizen conduct and fostering a sense of duty among Indians. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The concept of **Fundamental Duties** was introduced based on the recommendations of the **Swaran Singh Committee**, constituted by the government in 1976. The committee drew inspiration from the constitutions of **socialist countries**, particularly the **USSR**, which emphasized citizens’ duties alongside rights. The **42nd Amendment Act, 1976**, added ten Fundamental Duties to the Constitution. Later, the **86th Amendment in 2002** introduced the eleventh duty, emphasizing the responsibility of parents to provide **education** to their children aged six to fourteen years. This evolution signifies the Indian state’s recognition of the importance of balancing citizens’ **rights** with their **duties** to ensure a harmonious and progressive society. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** **Article 51A** of the Constitution specifies the **Fundamental Duties** of every citizen: - **To abide by the Constitution** and respect its ideals and institutions, the **National Flag**, and the **National Anthem**. - **To cherish and follow** the noble ideals that inspired the **national struggle for freedom**. - **To uphold and protect** the **sovereignty**, **unity**, and **integrity** of India. - **To defend the country** and render **national service** when called upon to do so. - **To promote harmony** and the spirit of common brotherhood among all people of India, transcending **religious**, **linguistic**, and **regional or sectional diversities**; and to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women. - **To value and preserve** the rich heritage of the country’s **composite culture**. - **To protect and improve** the natural **environment**, including **forests**, **lakes**, **rivers**, and **wildlife**, and to have compassion for living creatures. - **To develop scientific temper**, **humanism**, and the spirit of inquiry and reform. - **To safeguard public property** and to abjure violence. - **To strive towards excellence** in all spheres of individual and collective activity so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavor and achievement. - **For parents or guardians,** to provide opportunities for **education** to their child or ward between the ages of six and fourteen years. These duties, though **non-justiciable**, are intended to serve as a constant reminder to citizens of their responsibilities towards the nation. ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** While **Fundamental Duties** are **non-justiciable**, the judiciary has referred to them in various judgments to emphasize the responsibilities of citizens: - In ***AIIMS Students Union v. AIIMS* (2001)**, the **Supreme Court** highlighted that Fundamental Duties are as important as **Fundamental Rights**. The case involved the validity of **institutional reservations** in postgraduate medical courses. The Court held that while **rights** are enforceable, **duties**, though non-justiciable, cannot be overlooked, emphasizing the need for a balance between rights and duties. - In ***M.C. Mehta v. Union of India* (1988)**, concerning **environmental pollution** caused by industries near the **Ganga River**, the **Supreme Court** invoked **Article 51A(g)**, emphasizing the duty of citizens to **protect the environment**. The Court directed industries to install **pollution control devices**, underscoring citizens’ duty to protect the environment. - In ***Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of Uttar Pradesh* (1987)**, known as the **Dehradun Quarrying Case**, the **Supreme Court** ordered the closure of **limestone quarries** causing **ecological imbalance**, referencing the duty to protect the environment under **Article 51A(g)**. ## **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** The introduction of **Fundamental Duties** aligns with the **Gandhian principle** that **rights and duties are correlative**. **Mahatma Gandhi** emphasized that real **rights** are a result of the performance of duty. This perspective suggests that the enjoyment of **Fundamental Rights** is intrinsically linked to the discharge of **Fundamental Duties** by citizens, promoting a balanced and responsible exercise of individual freedoms. ## **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** The maxim **“Jus et officium ex invicem nascuntur”** translates to **“Rights and duties arise from each other.”** This principle underscores the interdependence of **rights and duties**, suggesting that the existence of one necessitates the acknowledgment of the other. In the context of **Fundamental Duties**, it implies that the safeguarding of citizens’ **rights** is contingent upon the fulfillment of their **duties** towards the nation. ## **AMENDMENTS / ADDITIONS / REPEALING** The **42nd Amendment Act of 1976** introduced ten **Fundamental Duties** into the Constitution. Subsequently, the **86th Amendment Act of 2002** added the **eleventh duty**, which mandates that **parents or guardians provide opportunities for education** to their children or wards between the ages of six and fourteen years. These amendments reflect the evolving understanding of citizens’ roles in **nation-building** and the importance of **education** in personal and national development. ## **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** While the inclusion of **Fundamental Duties** has been lauded for promoting a sense of responsibility among citizens, criticisms have been raised regarding their **non-justiciable nature**, meaning they cannot be enforced by law. Some argue that without **legal enforceability**, these duties may be overlooked. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Union and its Territory: Articles 1-4](https://lawfoyer.in/union-and-its-territory-articles-1-4/) **Published:** December 20, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Articles 1 to 4 of the Indian Constitution define the structure and territorial extent of India, detailing the formation, alteration, and admission of states and union territories. **Content:** Articles 1 to 4 of the Indian Constitution define the structure and territorial extent of India, detailing the formation, alteration, and admission of states and union territories. ### **ARTICLE 1: NAME AND TERRITORY OF THE UNION** **Article 1(1)** declares, **“India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States.”** This emphasizes the indestructible nature of the Indian Union, where states have no right to secede. The term **“Union”** signifies a cohesive entity formed not by agreement among states but as a singular nation. **Article 1(2)** specifies that the territory of India comprises: - **Territories of the States**: Regions with their own governments. - **Union Territories**: Areas directly governed by the Central Government. - **Acquired Territories**: Any regions that may be acquired by India in the future. This classification underscores the comprehensive nature of India’s territorial jurisdiction. ### **ARTICLE 2: ADMISSION OR ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW STATES** **Article 2** grants **Parliament** the authority to admit new states into the Union or establish them on terms it deems appropriate. This provision has facilitated the integration of various regions into India post-independence. For instance, the incorporation of **Sikkim as a state in 1975** was executed under this article. ### **ARTICLE 3: FORMATION OF NEW STATES AND ALTERATION OF AREAS, BOUNDARIES, OR NAMES OF EXISTING STATES** **Article 3** empowers **Parliament** to: - **Form new states** by separating territory from existing ones. - **Increase or diminish** the area of any state. - **Alter the boundaries** of any state. - **Change the name** of any state. However, such actions require the **President** to first refer the proposed changes to the **legislature of the concerned state** for its views within a specified period. This ensures a consultative process, respecting the federal structure while maintaining the Union’s integrity. ### **ARTICLE 4: LAWS MADE UNDER ARTICLES 2 AND 3 TO PROVIDE FOR THE AMENDMENT OF THE FIRST AND THE FOURTH SCHEDULE AND SUPPLEMENTAL, INCIDENTAL, AND CONSEQUENTIAL MATTERS** **Article 4** stipulates that laws enacted under **Articles 2 and 3**, concerning the admission or establishment of new states and the alteration of existing ones, may include provisions to amend the **First Schedule** (listing states and union territories) and the **Fourth Schedule** (allocation of seats in the Rajya Sabha). Such laws are **not considered constitutional amendments under Article 368**, allowing for a more straightforward process to reorganize state boundaries and names. ### **CASE LAWS AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS** The **Supreme Court of India** has deliberated on matters related to Articles 1-4, reinforcing the Union’s indestructible nature and **Parliament’s authority** in territorial adjustments. In the **Berubari Union Case (1960)**, the Court examined the cession of Indian territory to Pakistan, concluding that such an action required a **constitutional amendment under Article 368**, as it was not covered by Articles 3 or 4. This case highlighted the limitations of Parliament’s power under these articles, emphasizing the need for constitutional amendments for ceding territory. ### **HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND EVOLUTION** At the Constitution’s commencement, India comprised **Part A, B, C, and D states**. The **States Reorganization Act, 1956**, and the **Seventh Constitutional Amendment** reorganized these into **14 states and 6 union territories**, streamlining administrative divisions based on linguistic and cultural identities. This reorganization aimed to promote administrative efficiency and accommodate the diverse linguistic demographics of the country. ### **COMPARISON WITH OTHER FEDERAL STRUCTURES** Unlike the **United States**, where states possess the right to secede, **India’s Union is indestructible**. **Dr. B.R. Ambedkar** emphasized that the term **“Union”** was chosen to indicate that states have no right to secede, ensuring **national unity and integrity**. This distinction underscores the unique nature of Indian federalism, where the emphasis is on unity and the seamless integration of diverse regions. ### **PROCEDURAL ASPECTS AND PARLIAMENTARY AUTHORITY** The process of altering state boundaries or names involves: 1. **Presidential Reference**: The President proposes the change and refers it to the concerned state’s legislature. 2. **State Legislature’s Opinion**: The state legislature expresses its views within a specified period. 3. **Parliamentary Legislation**: Parliament considers the state’s opinion but is not bound by it and can enact the law effecting the change. This procedure balances state interests with national imperatives, ensuring a democratic approach to territorial reorganization. ### **DOCTRINES AND PRINCIPLES INVOLVED** The principle of an **“indestructible Union with destructible states”** applies, meaning while the Union remains intact, state boundaries can be altered for administrative and political reasons. This doctrine ensures flexibility in governance while maintaining national unity. ### **RECENT APPLICATIONS AND AMENDMENTS** The creation of **Telangana in 2014** from Andhra Pradesh exemplifies **Article 3’s application**, where Parliament passed the **Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Act, 2014**, after obtaining the state’s views. Similarly, the reorganization of **Jammu and Kashmir in 2019** into two union territories—**Jammu & Kashmir**, and **Ladakh**—was executed through parliamentary legislation, demonstrating the dynamic nature of India’s federal structure. ### **CONCLUSION** **Articles 1 to 4** of the Indian Constitution provide a robust framework for defining and modifying the Union’s territorial extent. They empower Parliament to admit new states, alter boundaries, and ensure the nation’s integrity while accommodating regional aspirations. This flexibility has enabled India to adapt its internal boundaries to changing political, cultural, and administrative needs, fostering **unity in diversity**. ### **REFERENCES** 1. **Constitution of India, Article 1**. 2. **Constitution of India, Article 2**. 3. **Constitution of India, Article 3 and Article 4**. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Citizenship Provisions: Articles 5-11](https://lawfoyer.in/citizenship-provisions-articles-5-11/) **Published:** December 21, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Indian Constitution's Articles 5 to 11 define citizenship at its commencement, detailing criteria for individuals to be recognized as Indian citizens. These provisions address various scenarios, including migration and foreign residence, and empower Parliament to legislate on citizenship matters. **Content:** The Indian Constitution’s **Articles 5 to 11** define citizenship at its commencement, detailing criteria for individuals to be recognized as Indian citizens. These provisions address various scenarios, including migration and foreign residence, and empower **Parliament** to legislate on citizenship matters. ### **ARTICLE 5: CITIZENSHIP AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION** **Article 5** grants citizenship to individuals domiciled in India at the Constitution’s commencement (**January 26, 1950**) who meet any of the following conditions: - **Born in the territory of India.** - **Either parent was born in the territory of India.** - **Resided in India for at least five years immediately preceding the commencement.** This provision ensured that individuals with a substantial connection to **India** became citizens upon the Constitution’s adoption. ### **ARTICLE 6: RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP OF CERTAIN PERSONS WHO HAVE MIGRATED TO INDIA FROM PAKISTAN** **Article 6** addresses citizenship for persons migrating from **Pakistan** to **India**. It distinguishes between those who migrated before and after **July 19, 1948**: - **Migrated before July 19, 1948**: Granted citizenship if either parent or grandparent was born in **India** as defined in the **Government of India Act, 1935**, and they have been residing in **India** since the date of migration. - **Migrated on or after July 19, 1948**: Eligible for citizenship if they registered as citizens of **India** after residing in **India** for at least six months preceding the application. This article aimed to accommodate individuals displaced during the **Partition**, facilitating their integration into **India**. ### **ARTICLE 7: RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP OF CERTAIN MIGRANTS TO PAKISTAN** **Article 7** pertains to individuals who migrated to **Pakistan** after **March 1, 1947**, but returned to **India** under a permit for resettlement. Such individuals are deemed citizens if they have resided in **India** since their return. This provision allowed those who initially left for **Pakistan** but chose to return to **India** to regain citizenship, reflecting the fluid migration patterns during the **Partition**. ### **ARTICLE 8: RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP OF CERTAIN PERSONS OF INDIAN ORIGIN RESIDING OUTSIDE INDIA** **Article 8** grants citizenship rights to persons of **Indian origin** residing outside **India** if they, or their parents or grandparents, were born in **India** as defined in the **Government of India Act, 1935**. Such individuals could register as citizens with **Indian diplomatic missions**. This provision recognized the **Indian diaspora**, allowing them to establish formal ties with **India**. ### **ARTICLE 9: PERSONS VOLUNTARILY ACQUIRING CITIZENSHIP OF A FOREIGN STATE NOT TO BE CITIZENS** **Article 9** stipulates that any person who voluntarily acquires citizenship of a foreign state after the Constitution’s commencement ceases to be an **Indian citizen**. This article prevents **dual citizenship**, ensuring allegiance to **India** remains undivided. ### **ARTICLE 10: CONTINUANCE OF THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP** **Article 10** ensures that individuals recognized as citizens under the preceding articles continue to be citizens, subject to any laws made by **Parliament**. This provision provides continuity and acknowledges **Parliament’s** authority to regulate citizenship. ### **ARTICLE 11: PARLIAMENT TO REGULATE THE RIGHT OF CITIZENSHIP BY LAW** **Article 11** empowers **Parliament** to make laws regarding the acquisition and termination of citizenship and all related matters. This article grants **Parliament** the flexibility to address citizenship issues as they evolve. ### **THE CITIZENSHIP ACT, 1955** Pursuant to **Article 11**, **Parliament** enacted the **Citizenship Act, 1955**, detailing provisions for acquiring and terminating citizenship: #### **Acquisition**: - **By Birth**: - Individuals born in **India** on or after **January 26, 1950**, but before **July 1, 1987**, are citizens by birth. - Those born between **July 1, 1987**, and **December 3, 2004**, are citizens if either parent is an **Indian citizen**. - After **December 3, 2004**, a person is a citizen by birth if both parents are citizens, or one is a citizen and the other is not an **illegal migrant**. - **By Descent**: - Persons born outside **India** on or after **January 26, 1950**, but before **December 10, 1992**, are citizens by descent if their father was an **Indian citizen** at the time of birth. - After **December 10, 1992**, a person is a citizen if either parent is an **Indian citizen**. - **By Registration**: Certain categories, such as persons of **Indian origin** residing outside **India**, spouses of **Indian citizens**, and others, can acquire citizenship by registering with the prescribed authority. - **By Naturalization**: Foreigners can acquire citizenship by naturalization if they meet specific qualifications, including residence in **India** for **twelve years** and renouncing previous citizenship. #### **Termination**: - **Renunciation**: Voluntary renunciation by declaration leads to termination of citizenship. - **Deprivation**: The government can deprive citizenship obtained by registration or naturalization under certain conditions, such as **fraud** or **disloyalty**. The Act has been amended multiple times to address emerging issues, including the **Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019**, which provides a pathway to citizenship for specific persecuted minorities from neighboring countries. ### **JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS AND CASE LAWS** The judiciary has played a crucial role in interpreting citizenship provisions: - **State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh (1952)**: The **Supreme Court** examined the validity of laws concerning citizenship and property rights, emphasizing the importance of **legislative competence** and constitutional provisions. - **Kulathil Mammu v. State of Kerala (1966)**: The **Supreme Court** interpreted **Articles 5 to 7**, ruling that individuals migrating to **Pakistan** after **March 1, 1947**, and returning under a permit for resettlement could be deemed citizens, provided they met specific residency requirements. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Right to Equality: Articles 14-18](https://lawfoyer.in/right-to-equality-articles-14-18/) **Published:** December 21, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Right to Equality, enshrined in Articles 14 to 18 of the Indian Constitution, forms a cornerstone of India's democratic framework, ensuring that every individual is treated equally under the law. These provisions collectively prohibit discrimination and promote social justice, making them essential for law students to comprehend. **Content:** The Right to Equality, enshrined in **Articles 14 to 18** of the Indian Constitution, forms a cornerstone of India’s democratic framework, ensuring that every individual is treated equally under the law. These provisions collectively prohibit discrimination and promote social justice, making them essential for law students to comprehend. ## **ARTICLE 14: EQUALITY BEFORE LAW AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS** Article 14 states: **“The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”** This provision embodies two concepts: - **Equality Before Law**: This implies the absence of any special privileges in favor of individuals and the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law. It is a negative concept, originating from the English common law. - **Equal Protection of Laws**: This is a positive concept, borrowed from the American Constitution, requiring the state to provide equal treatment to individuals in similar circumstances. ## **DOCTRINE OF REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION** While **Article 14** prohibits class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification. The Supreme Court, in ***State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar***, AIR 1952 SC 75, held that classification is permissible if it is based on an intelligible differentia and has a rational relation to the objective sought. In this case, the Court struck down a law that allowed certain cases to be tried by a special court without any reasonable basis for such classification, deeming it arbitrary and discriminatory. ## **PRINCIPLE OF ABSENCE OF ARBITRARINESS** In ***E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu***, AIR 1974 SC 555, the Supreme Court emphasized that equality is antithetical to arbitrariness. The Court stated that where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law, thus violating **Article 14**. This case involved the arbitrary transfer of a senior official, which the Court found to be in violation of **Article 14** due to the lack of a fair and transparent process. ## **ARTICLE 15: PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION** **Article 15** prohibits discrimination on grounds of **religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth.** It ensures that no citizen is denied access to public places and that the state can make special provisions for **women, children,** and **socially and educationally backward classes.** ## **SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR ADVANCEMENT** The Constitution permits affirmative action to uplift disadvantaged groups. In ***State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan***, AIR 1951 SC 226, the Supreme Court invalidated caste-based reservations in educational institutions, leading to the **First Constitutional Amendment**, which introduced **Article 15(4)** to allow such reservations. This amendment enabled the state to make special provisions for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the **Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.** ## **ARTICLE 16: EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT** **Article 16** guarantees equal opportunity in matters of **public employment** and prohibits discrimination on specific grounds. It allows the state to make provisions for the reservation of appointments in favor of any **backward class** not adequately represented in public services. ## **RESERVATION IN PROMOTIONS** In ***Indra Sawhney v. Union of India***, AIR 1993 SC 477, the Supreme Court held that while reservations in appointments are permissible, reservations in promotions are not. However, the **77th Constitutional Amendment** introduced **Article 16(4A)**, allowing reservations in promotions for **Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.** This amendment was a response to the Court’s decision, aiming to ensure adequate representation of these communities in higher positions within public employment. ## **ARTICLE 17: ABOLITION OF UNTOUCHABILITY** **Article 17** abolishes **“untouchability”** and forbids its practice in any form. The enforcement of any disability arising from untouchability is an offense punishable by law. ## **PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, 1955** To enforce **Article 17**, the Parliament enacted the **Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955**, prescribing punishments for offenses related to untouchability. This Act provides a legal framework to eradicate the practice of untouchability and ensure that individuals subjected to such discrimination have a means of redress. ## **ARTICLE 18: ABOLITION OF TITLES** **Article 18** prohibits the state from conferring titles, except **military or academic distinctions,** to prevent the creation of an artificial hierarchy in society. It also forbids citizens from accepting titles from foreign states. ## **HONORS AND AWARDS** In ***Balaji Raghavan v. Union of India***, AIR 1996 SC 770, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of national awards like **Bharat Ratna** and **Padma Vibhushan**, stating that they do not violate **Article 18** as they are not titles but honors conferred for exceptional service. The Court emphasized that these awards do not create a title or a hereditary distinction and are thus permissible under the Constitution. ## **INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS ON EQUALITY** India is a signatory to various international instruments that promote equality, such as the **Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)** and the **International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)**. **Article 7 of the UDHR** states: **“All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law.”** These international commitments reinforce India’s constitutional mandate to uphold equality. ## **LEGAL MAXIMS RELATED TO EQUALITY** - ***“Ubi jus ibi remedium”***: Where there is a right, there is a remedy. This maxim underscores that the legal system must provide remedies for violations of rights, including the right to equality. - ***“Audi alteram partem”***: Hear the other side. This principle of natural justice ensures that all parties receive a fair hearing, promoting equality in legal proceedings. ## **DOCTRINES UPHOLDING EQUALITY** - **Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation**: This doctrine ensures that if a public authority induces a reasonable expectation in a citizen, it should act fairly and honor that expectation, promoting fairness and equality. - **Principle of Non-Arbitrariness**: This principle asserts that state actions should be free from arbitrariness, as arbitrariness undermines the equality guaranteed under **Article 14**. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Right to Freedom: Articles 19-22](https://lawfoyer.in/right-to-freedom-articles-19-22/) **Published:** December 21, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Right to Freedom, enshrined in Articles 19 to 22 of the Indian Constitution, forms a cornerstone of India's democratic framework. These provisions guarantee essential civil liberties, ensuring citizens can express themselves, assemble peacefully, and live with dignity. Understanding these articles is crucial for law students, as they encapsulate the balance between individual freedoms and societal interests. **Content:** The **Right to Freedom**, enshrined in **Articles 19 to 22** of the **Indian Constitution**, forms a cornerstone of India’s democratic framework. These provisions guarantee essential civil liberties, ensuring citizens can express themselves, assemble peacefully, and live with dignity. Understanding these articles is crucial for law students, as they encapsulate the balance between individual freedoms and societal interests. **ARTICLE 19: PROTECTION OF CERTAIN RIGHTS REGARDING FREEDOM** **Article 19** grants six fundamental freedoms to **Indian citizens**: 1. ***Freedom of Speech and Expression***: Allows individuals to express their opinions freely. However, this right is subject to **reasonable restrictions** in the interests of the **sovereignty and integrity of India**, **security of the state**, **friendly relations with foreign states**, **public order**, **decency or morality**, **contempt of court**, **defamation**, or **incitement to an offense**. 2. ***Freedom to Assemble Peaceably and Without Arms***: Citizens can gather for peaceful meetings without weapons. **Restrictions** can be imposed to maintain **public order** and the **sovereignty and integrity of India**. 3. ***Freedom to Form Associations or Unions***: Enables the formation of groups, unions, or societies. **Reasonable restrictions** apply in the interests of **public order**, **morality**, and the **sovereignty and integrity of India**. 4. ***Freedom to Move Freely Throughout the Territory of India***: Allows movement across state boundaries without hindrance. **Restrictions** may be imposed for reasons of **security**, **public order**, or protecting the interests of **Scheduled Tribes**. 5. ***Freedom to Reside and Settle in Any Part of the Territory of India***: Permits citizens to live in any state. **Limitations** can be placed to protect **indigenous populations** and maintain **public order**. 6. ***Freedom to Practice Any Profession, or to Carry on Any Occupation, Trade, or Business***: Grants the right to choose one’s profession. The **state** can impose restrictions in the interest of the **general public**. **CASE LAW: ROMESH THAPPAR V. STATE OF MADRAS, 1950** - **Facts**: *Romesh Thappar’s journal was banned by the Madras government, citing public safety.* - **Issue**: *Whether the ban violated the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a).* - **Held**: The **Supreme Court** held that **freedom of speech and expression** is essential for democracy. The ban was **unconstitutional** as it did not fall under the **reasonable restrictions** permitted by the Constitution. **ARTICLE 20: PROTECTION IN RESPECT OF CONVICTION FOR OFFENSES** **Article 20** provides three key protections: 1. ***Ex-Post Facto Law***: No person can be convicted for an act that was not an offense at the time it was committed. Additionally, **penalties** cannot be increased **retroactively**. 2. ***Double Jeopardy***: No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offense more than once. 3. ***Prohibition Against Self-Incrimination***: No individual can be compelled to be a **witness against themselves**. **CASE LAW: K.M. NANAVATI V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, 1961** - **Facts**: *Nanavati was tried for murder by a jury, which returned a not-guilty verdict. The verdict was overturned by the Bombay High Court, and Nanavati was retried.* - **Issue**: *Whether the retrial violated the principle of double jeopardy under Article 20(2).* - **Held**: The **Supreme Court** held that since the initial trial did not result in a **conviction or acquittal** by a competent court, the **retrial did not violate Article 20(2)**. **ARTICLE 21: PROTECTION OF LIFE AND PERSONAL LIBERTY** **Article 21** states that no person shall be deprived of their **life or personal liberty** except according to the **procedure established by law**. This article has been expansively interpreted to include various rights essential to **life and personal liberty**. **CASE LAW: MANEKA GANDHI V. UNION OF INDIA, 1978** - **Facts**: *Maneka Gandhi’s passport was impounded by the government without providing reasons.* - **Issue**: *Whether the action violated Article 21.* - **Held**: The **Supreme Court** held that the **procedure established by law** must be **just, fair, and reasonable**. The impounding of the passport without a fair procedure violated **Article 21**. **ARTICLE 21A: RIGHT TO EDUCATION** Introduced by the **86th Amendment Act, 2002**, **Article 21A** mandates the **state** to provide **free and compulsory education** to all children aged six to fourteen years. **ARTICLE 22: PROTECTION AGAINST ARREST AND DETENTION IN CERTAIN CASES** **Article 22** provides safeguards against **arbitrary arrest and detention**: 1. ***Rights of Arrested Persons***: - To be informed of the **grounds of arrest**. - To consult and be defended by a **legal practitioner** of their choice. - To be produced before a **magistrate** within **24 hours of arrest**. - Protection against detention beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Right against Exploitation: Articles 23-24](https://lawfoyer.in/right-against-exploitation-articles-23-24/) **Published:** December 21, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Indian Constitution enshrines the Right Against Exploitation in Articles 23 and 24, safeguarding individuals from human trafficking, forced labor, and child labor. These provisions uphold human dignity and prohibit practices that exploit vulnerable sections of society. **Content:** The Indian Constitution enshrines the **Right Against Exploitation** in **Articles 23 and 24**, safeguarding individuals from **human trafficking**, **forced labor**, and **child labor**. These provisions uphold **human dignity** and prohibit practices that exploit vulnerable sections of society. **ARTICLE 23: PROHIBITION OF TRAFFIC IN HUMAN BEINGS AND FORCED LABOR** **Article 23(1)** explicitly prohibits: - **Traffic in human beings**: Encompasses practices like the sale and purchase of men, women, and children for immoral or other purposes. - **Begar**: A form of forced labor without payment, historically prevalent in India. - **Other similar forms of forced labor**: Includes **bonded labor**, **serfdom**, and other forms of coerced work. Any contravention of this provision is **punishable by law**, ensuring the protection of individuals from exploitation. This right is available to both **citizens and non-citizens** and is enforceable against the **State** as well as **private individuals**. **EXCEPTIONS UNDER ARTICLE 23** **Article 23(2)** permits the **State** to impose **compulsory service** for public purposes, such as **conscription for national defense** or **social services**, provided it does not discriminate on grounds only of **religion**, **race**, **caste**, or **class**. **ARTICLE 24: PROHIBITION OF EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN IN FACTORIES, ETC.** **Article 24** prohibits the **employment of children below the age of 14 years** in **factories**, **mines**, or any other **hazardous employment**. This provision aims to protect children from **exploitation** and ensure their right to **education** and **development**. **LEGISLATIVE MEASURES SUPPORTING ARTICLES 23 AND 24** To give effect to these constitutional mandates, several laws have been enacted: - **The Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976**: Abolishes all forms of **bonded labor** and frees all bonded laborers from any obligation to render bonded labor. - **The Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986**: Prohibits the engagement of children in certain employments and regulates the conditions of work in others. - **The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015**: Provides for the **care**, **protection**, and **rehabilitation** of children in need, including those rescued from **exploitative labor**. **JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS AND LANDMARK CASES** The judiciary has played a pivotal role in interpreting and enforcing the **Right Against Exploitation**: - **People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982)**: The Supreme Court held that “the scope of **Article 23** is wide and unlimited and strikes at ‘**traffic in human beings**‘ and ‘**begar**‘ and other forms of **forced labor** wherever they are found.” The case involved laborers employed in the construction of facilities for the **Asian Games** in Delhi under exploitative conditions. The Court ruled that **non-payment of minimum wages** amounts to **forced labor**, thus violating **Article 23**. - **M.C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu (1996)**: This case addressed the issue of **child labor** in hazardous industries, specifically focusing on children working in match factories in **Sivakasi**. The Supreme Court directed the government to ensure that children under the age of 14 are not employed in **hazardous occupations** and emphasized the importance of providing **education** to all children. - **Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1984)**: The Supreme Court recognized the prevalence of **bonded labor** in various parts of the country and issued directives for the **identification**, **release**, and **rehabilitation** of bonded laborers. The Court emphasized that **bonded labor** is a violation of **Article 23**. **INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND INDIA’S COMMITMENTS** India is a signatory to several international conventions aimed at combating exploitation: - **Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 1948**: **Article 4** states that “no one shall be held in **slavery** or **servitude**; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.” - **International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions**: - **Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29)**: Aims to suppress the use of **forced or compulsory labor** in all its forms. - **Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105)**: Calls for the immediate and complete abolition of **forced or compulsory labor**. - **Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138)**: Seeks to abolish **child labor** by setting the minimum age for employment. - **Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182)**: Focuses on the elimination of the **worst forms of child labor**, including **slavery**, **trafficking**, and **hazardous work**. **PRINCIPLES AND DOCTRINES RELATED TO THE RIGHT AGAINST EXPLOITATION** Several legal principles underpin the **Right Against Exploitation**: - **Doctrine of Social Justice**: Advocates for the removal of **economic inequalities** and provides for the welfare of all citizens, ensuring that individuals are not subjected to exploitation. - **Parens Patriae**: The principle that the **State** must act as a **guardian** for those who are unable to care for themselves, such as **children**, ensuring their protection from exploitation. **STATISTICAL ANALYSIS** Despite constitutional provisions and legislative measures, exploitation persists: - According to the **2011 Census**, India had over **10 million working children** in the age group of **5-14 years**. - The **Global Slavery Index 2018** estimated that there were **8 million people living in modern slavery** in India. **CHALLENGES AND CRITICISMS** While **Articles 23 and 24** provide a robust framework against exploitation, challenges remain: - **Enforcement Issues**: Implementation of laws is often weak, with **inadequate monitoring** and **insufficient penalties** for violators. - **Socio-Economic Factors**: **Poverty**, lack of **education**, and **unemployment** drive individuals into exploitative labor conditions. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Right to Freedom of Religion: Articles 25-28](https://lawfoyer.in/right-to-freedom-of-religion-articles-25-28/) **Published:** December 21, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Right to Freedom of Religion, enshrined in Articles 25 to 28 of the Indian Constitution, guarantees individuals the liberty to profess, practice, and propagate their chosen faith. This fundamental right underscores India's commitment to secularism and ensures equal treatment of all religions. **Content:** The Right to Freedom of Religion, enshrined in **Articles 25 to 28** of the **Indian Constitution**, guarantees individuals the liberty to profess, practice, and propagate their chosen faith. This fundamental right underscores **India’s commitment to secularism** and ensures equal treatment of all religions. ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** - ***Article 25***: Grants every individual the **freedom of conscience** and the right to freely **profess**, **practice**, and **propagate religion**, subject to **public order**, **morality**, and **health**. This encompasses both the internal belief and external expressions through rituals and dissemination of religious tenets. - ***Article 26***: Affords **religious denominations** the autonomy to manage their own affairs in matters of religion, establish and maintain institutions, and administer property, again subject to **public order**, **morality**, and **health**. - ***Article 27***: Prohibits the imposition of **taxes** whose proceeds are specifically appropriated for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination. - ***Article 28***: Restricts **religious instruction** in educational institutions wholly funded by the State, ensuring that attendance at religious worship or instruction is voluntary in State-recognized or State-aided institutions. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The framers of the **Indian Constitution** were deeply influenced by the nation’s **diverse religious landscape** and the need to prevent **religious conflicts**. Drawing lessons from **colonial history** and **communal tensions**, they incorporated provisions to ensure **religious freedom** while maintaining **state neutrality** in religious matters. The inclusion of these articles reflects a commitment to **secularism**, where the state does not favor any religion and individuals are free to follow their conscience. ## **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** - ***Freedom of Conscience***: The absolute inner freedom of an individual to mold their religious or non-religious beliefs. - ***Right to Profess***: Open declaration and acceptance of one’s faith. - ***Right to Practice***: Performance of religious rituals and customs. - ***Right to Propagate***: Transmission and dissemination of one’s religious beliefs to others. ## **LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS** While **Articles 25 to 28** provide broad religious freedoms, they are not absolute and are subject to: - ***Public Order***: Practices that disturb **public tranquility** can be regulated. - ***Morality***: Actions deemed **immoral** by societal standards may be curtailed. - ***Health***: Practices detrimental to **health** can be restricted. - ***Other Fundamental Rights***: Religious freedoms should not infringe upon other **constitutional rights**. ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS** - ***The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (1954)***: This case defined the scope of **religious practices**, distinguishing between essential and non-essential practices. The **Supreme Court** held that what constitutes an **essential part of a religion** is primarily to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself. - ***Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1977)***: The **Supreme Court** upheld laws prohibiting **forcible conversions**, stating that the right to propagate does not include the right to convert another person against their will. The Court emphasized that **Article 25** grants the freedom to propagate religion but does not grant the right to convert. - ***S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994)***: The Court declared **secularism** as a **basic feature of the Constitution**, emphasizing that the **State must treat all religions equally** and that religion and politics should be kept separate. ## **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - ***Doctrine of Essential Religious Practices***: Established in the **Shirur Mutt case**, this doctrine determines which practices are **fundamental to a religion** and thus protected under **Article 25**. The Court held that the term **“religion”** will cover all rituals and practices integral to a religion. ## **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** - ***Secularism***: The principle that the **State has no religion** and treats all religions equally, ensuring that religious groups do not interfere in governmental affairs and vice versa. This principle was reinforced by adding the word **“secular”** to the **Preamble** through the **42nd Amendment**. ## **AMENDMENTS / ADDITIONS / REPEALING** - ***42nd Amendment Act, 1976***: Inserted the term **“secular”** into the **Preamble**, reinforcing the commitment to **religious neutrality**. ## **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** Unlike the strict separation of church and state in countries like the **USA**, **India’s model of secularism** allows for **state intervention** in religious matters to ensure equality and reform. This unique approach aims to respect all religions while preventing discrimination and promoting social welfare. ## **GUIDELINES / RULES / REGULATIONS** The **State** can enact laws regulating or restricting any **economic**, **financial**, **political**, or other secular activities associated with religious practices. For instance, laws have been implemented to prohibit practices like **untouchability** and to promote social reforms within religious communities. ## **CUSTOMS / USAGE / TRADITIONS-BASED LAW** While **customs** and **traditions** are respected, they are subject to **constitutional provisions**. Practices that violate **fundamental rights** or **public morality** can be challenged and reformed. For example, the practice of **triple talaq** was declared unconstitutional in recent years. ## **STATISTICAL ANALYSIS / DATA ANALYSIS** India is home to a multitude of religions, with significant populations of **Hindus**, **Muslims**, **Christians**, **Sikhs**, **Buddhists**, and **Jains**. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Cultural and Educational Rights: Articles 29-30](https://lawfoyer.in/cultural-and-educational-rights-articles-29-30/) **Published:** December 21, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Cultural and Educational Rights, enshrined in Articles 29 and 30 of the Indian Constitution, safeguard the interests of minorities by allowing them to preserve their unique languages, scripts, and cultures, and to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. **Content:** **Cultural and Educational Rights**, enshrined in **Articles 29 and 30** of the **Indian Constitution**, safeguard the interests of minorities by allowing them to preserve their unique languages, scripts, and cultures, and to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. ### **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** **ARTICLE 29: PROTECTION OF INTERESTS OF MINORITIES** - ***Clause (1):*** **Grants any section of citizens residing in India, having a distinct language, script, or culture, the right to conserve the same.** This provision ensures that minority groups can preserve their heritage without interference. - ***Clause (2):*** **Prohibits denial of admission to any citizen into educational institutions maintained by the State or receiving State aid, solely on grounds of religion, race, caste, language, or any of them.** This clause upholds the principle of non-discrimination in educational access. - **ARTICLE 30: RIGHT OF MINORITIES TO ESTABLISH AND ADMINISTER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS** - ***Clause (1):*** **Affirms the right of all religious and linguistic minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.** This empowers minorities to create institutions that reflect their cultural and educational preferences. - ***Clause (2):*** **Ensures that the State shall not discriminate in granting aid to educational institutions on the basis that they are under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language.** This provision promotes equality in the distribution of state assistance to educational bodies. ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The framers of the **Indian Constitution** recognized the nation’s vast cultural diversity and the potential marginalization of minority communities. To address this, **Articles 29 and 30** were incorporated to protect minority rights, ensuring that these groups could preserve their unique identities and have autonomy over their educational institutions. This inclusion was pivotal in promoting national unity while respecting cultural plurality. ### **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** In contrast to India, where minority rights are constitutionally enshrined, many countries address cultural and educational rights through general anti-discrimination laws. For instance: - **The United States** relies on the **Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment** to prevent discrimination but does not provide specific provisions for minority groups to establish educational institutions. - Similarly, **The United Kingdom** ensures equality through the **Equality Act 2010**, without explicit constitutional rights for minorities to manage their own educational establishments. ### **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** - ***Distinct Identity:*** The group must have a distinct language, script, or culture. - ***Minority Status:*** The group should qualify as a religious or linguistic minority. - ***Establishment and Administration:*** The minority must establish and administer the educational institution. - ***Non-Discriminatory Aid:*** State aid should be provided without discrimination based on minority management. ### **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** - ***Article 29(1):*** Protects the right to conserve distinct language, script, or culture. - ***Article 29(2):*** Prohibits discrimination in admission to state-funded educational institutions. - ***Article 30(1):*** Grants minorities the right to establish and administer educational institutions. - ***Article 30(2):*** Prevents the State from discriminating in granting aid to minority-run educational institutions. ### **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** 1. **State of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society, AIR 1954 SC 561:** The **Bombay government** issued an order requiring Anglo-Indian schools to either admit only Anglo-Indian students or switch to Hindi as the medium of instruction to receive aid. The **Supreme Court** struck down this order, holding that it violated **Article 29(2)** by denying admission based solely on language. This case reinforced the right of minority educational institutions to admit students of their choice, even when receiving government aid. 2. **Re Kerala Education Bill, AIR 1958 SC 956:** The **Kerala government** proposed a bill regulating the administration of educational institutions, including those run by minorities. The **Supreme Court** held that while minorities have the right to establish and administer educational institutions under **Article 30(1)**, the State can impose reasonable regulations to ensure educational standards, provided they do not infringe upon the fundamental rights of minorities. 3. **St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi, AIR 1992 SC 1630:** **St. Stephen’s College**, a Christian minority institution, reserved 50% of its seats for Christian students. The **University of Delhi** challenged this practice. The **Supreme Court** upheld the college’s right to reserve seats for Christian students, stating that such a measure was essential to preserve the minority character of the institution under **Article 30(1)**. 4. **T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481:** This case involved the rights of minority and non-minority educational institutions concerning admission procedures and fee structures. The **Supreme Court** held that all citizens have the right to establish and administer educational institutions under **Article 19(1)(g)**, but minority institutions have additional protection under **Article 30(1)**. The Court also stated that while the State can impose reasonable regulations to maintain educational standards, it cannot interfere with the day-to-day management of minority institutions. ### **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - **Doctrine of Reasonable Restrictions:** While **Articles 29 and 30** provide rights to minorities, the State can impose reasonable regulations to ensure educational standards and maintain public order, morality, and health. These restrictions must not, however, erode the essence of the rights guaranteed. ### **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** - ***Equality Before Law:*** Embodied in **Article 14**, this principle ensures that all citizens are treated equally before the law, reinforcing the non-discriminatory provisions of **Articles 29 and 30**. - ***Non-Discrimination:*** **Articles 29(2) and 30(2)** emphasize that no citizen shall face discrimination in educational matters based on religion, race, caste, or language. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Right to Constitutional Remedies: Article 32](https://lawfoyer.in/right-to-constitutional-remedies-article-32/) **Published:** December 21, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Article 32 of the Indian Constitution empowers citizens to approach the Supreme Court directly for enforcement of their fundamental rights, underscoring its role as the "protector and guarantor of Fundamental Rights." **Content:** **Article 32** of the Indian Constitution empowers citizens to approach the **Supreme Court** directly for enforcement of their **fundamental rights**, underscoring its role as the “protector and guarantor of Fundamental Rights.” ## **MEANING AND EXPLANATION** **Article 32** provides a guaranteed remedy for the enforcement of **fundamental rights**. It authorizes the **Supreme Court** to issue directions, orders, or **writs**, including **habeas corpus**, **mandamus**, **prohibition**, **quo warranto**, and **certiorari**, to enforce these rights. **Dr. B.R. Ambedkar** referred to **Article 32** as the “heart and soul” of the Constitution, emphasizing its critical importance. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND** The framers of the Indian Constitution, influenced by the experiences of **colonial rule** and the need to protect **individual liberties**, incorporated **Article 32** to ensure that citizens had a direct means to seek redressal from the highest court in cases of **fundamental rights violations**. This provision was designed to provide a swift and effective remedy, reflecting the importance of **fundamental rights** in the constitutional framework. ## **TYPES OF WRITS UNDER ARTICLE 32** **Article 32** empowers the **Supreme Court** to issue five types of **writs** for the enforcement of **fundamental rights**: 1. **Habeas Corpus**: Meaning “you may have the body,” this **writ** is a safeguard against **unlawful detention**. It commands the detaining authority to produce the detained person before the court to examine the legality of the detention. - In **ADM Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla**, the **Supreme Court** controversially held that **habeas corpus** could be suspended during an emergency, a decision later criticized and overturned. 2. **Mandamus**: Meaning “we command,” this **writ** directs a **public official** or **governmental body** to perform a duty they are obligated to execute. It cannot be issued against the **President** or **Governors** acting in their official capacities. - In **S.P. Gupta v. Union of India**, the court discussed the scope of **mandamus** in compelling public duties. 3. **Prohibition**: This **writ** is issued by a **superior court** to a **lower court** or **tribunal**, directing it to cease proceedings in a case where it lacks jurisdiction. Its purpose is to prevent inferior courts from exceeding their jurisdiction. - In **East India Commercial Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs**, the **Supreme Court** elaborated on the circumstances under which **prohibition** can be issued. 4. **Certiorari**: Issued by a **higher court** to a **lower court** or **tribunal**, this **writ** seeks the transfer of a case for review, typically to quash an order or decision due to lack of jurisdiction or error of law. - In **Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque**, the **Supreme Court** clarified the grounds for issuing **certiorari**. 5. **Quo Warranto**: Meaning “by what authority,” this **writ** challenges the legality of a person’s claim to a **public office**. It prevents unlawful usurpation of public positions. - In **University of Mysore v. Govinda Rao**, the **Supreme Court** outlined the application of **quo warranto**. ## **ESSENTIALS FOR ISSUANCE OF WRITS** For the **Supreme Court** to issue these **writs** under **Article 32**, certain conditions must be met: - **Existence of a Fundamental Right**: The petitioner must demonstrate that a **fundamental right** guaranteed by the Constitution has been violated. - **Locus Standi**: Traditionally, the petitioner should have a direct interest in the case. However, the **Supreme Court** has relaxed this requirement in **Public Interest Litigations (PILs)**, allowing individuals or groups to file petitions on behalf of others whose rights are infringed. - In **S.P. Gupta v. Union of India**, the court recognized the legitimacy of **PILs**. - **Absence of Alternative Remedy**: Generally, if an effective **alternative remedy** exists, the court may refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under **Article 32**. However, in cases of gross violation of **fundamental rights**, the **Supreme Court** may intervene directly. ## **PROCEDURE UNDER ARTICLE 32** The procedure for filing a petition under **Article 32** involves: 1. **Drafting the Petition**: Clearly stating the facts of the case, the specific **fundamental rights violated**, and the relief sought. 2. **Filing the Petition**: Submitting the petition to the **Supreme Court registry**, adhering to prescribed formats and court fees. 3. **Preliminary Hearing**: The court examines the petition to determine if a **prima facie** case exists. 4. **Notice to Respondents**: If the court admits the petition, it issues notices to the respondents, seeking their replies. 5. **Final Hearing**: The court hears arguments from both sides before delivering its judgment. ## **SIGNIFICANCE OF ARTICLE 32** **Article 32** holds immense significance in the **Indian legal system**: - **Guardian of Fundamental Rights**: It empowers the **Supreme Court** to act as the protector of citizens’ **fundamental rights**. - **Direct Access**: Allows individuals to approach the **highest court** directly without the need to go through lower courts, ensuring prompt redressal. - **Judicial Activism**: Facilitates the **Supreme Court’s** proactive role in upholding rights through instruments like **PILs**. ## **CASE LAWS ILLUSTRATING ARTICLE 32** 1. **Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India**: A landmark **PIL** where the **Supreme Court** addressed the issue of **bonded labor**, emphasizing that **Article 32** imposes a duty on the court to enforce **fundamental rights**. 2. **Vineet Narain v. Union of India**: The court, under **Article 32**, issued directions to ensure **fair investigation** in the Jain Hawala case, showcasing its role in ensuring accountability. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Writ Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court](https://lawfoyer.in/writ-jurisdiction-of-the-supreme-court/) **Published:** December 23, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Supreme Court of India holds the authority to issue writs for enforcing fundamental rights, as enshrined in Article 32 of the Constitution. This provision empowers individuals to directly approach the Supreme Court when their fundamental rights are violated, ensuring immediate judicial intervention. **Content:** The Supreme Court of India holds the authority to issue writs for enforcing fundamental rights, as enshrined in **Article 32 of the Constitution**. This provision empowers individuals to directly approach the Supreme Court when their fundamental rights are violated, ensuring immediate judicial intervention. ### **MEANING AND DEFINITION** **Writ jurisdiction** refers to the Supreme Court’s power to issue specific orders, known as writs, to enforce fundamental rights. **Article 32(2) of the Indian Constitution** grants the Supreme Court the authority to issue directions, orders, or writs, including **habeas corpus**, **mandamus**, **prohibition**, **quo warranto**, and **certiorari**, for enforcing the rights conferred by **Part III of the Constitution**. ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND** The concept of writs in India traces its origins to **English common law**, where such orders were employed to ensure justice. The framers of the Indian Constitution incorporated these writs to provide a robust mechanism for protecting individual rights against state actions. **Dr. B.R. Ambedkar** emphasized the significance of **Article 32**, referring to it as the **“heart and soul” of the Constitution**, underscoring its pivotal role in safeguarding fundamental rights. ### **TYPES OF WRITS** 1. ***Habeas Corpus***: This writ commands that a person detained be brought before the court to examine the legality of the detention. It serves as a safeguard against unlawful confinement. In ***Sohanlal v. Union of India* (1957)**, the Supreme Court issued a writ of **habeas corpus**, ensuring the release of an individual unlawfully detained. 2. ***Mandamus***: Meaning **“we command,”** this writ directs a public authority to perform a duty it has failed to fulfill. In ***Sohanlal v. Union of India* (1957)**, the Supreme Court held that the writ of **mandamus** can be issued where a public servant has denied its jurisdiction, which it has under the law. 3. ***Prohibition***: This writ is issued by a superior court to prevent a lower court or tribunal from exceeding its jurisdiction. In ***S. Govinda Menon v. Union of India* (1967)**, the Supreme Court held that the writ of **prohibition** can be issued both when there is an **excess jurisdiction** and **absence of jurisdiction** by a lower court. 4. ***Certiorari***: Issued to quash the order of a lower court or tribunal that has acted beyond its jurisdiction or committed an error of law. In ***S. Govinda Menon v. Union of India* (1967)**, the Supreme Court quashed the order of a lower court that had exceeded its jurisdiction. 5. ***Quo Warranto***: This writ challenges the legality of a person’s claim to a public office. In ***University of Mysore v. C.D. Govinda Rao* (1965)**, the Supreme Court held that the writ of **quo warranto** can be issued only against an office of **‘substantive nature’**. ### **LEGAL PROVISIONS AND PROCEDURE** - **Article 32**: Empowers individuals to approach the Supreme Court directly for the enforcement of fundamental rights. The Court can issue appropriate writs to address violations. - **Article 226**: Grants High Courts the power to issue writs for enforcing fundamental rights **and for any other purpose**, providing a broader scope compared to **Article 32**. ### **PRINCIPLES AND DOCTRINES** - **Doctrine of Basic Structure**: Established in ***Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala* (1973)**, this doctrine asserts that certain fundamental features of the Constitution cannot be altered by amendments, ensuring the preservation of its core principles. - **Locus Standi**: Traditionally, only the person whose rights are violated can approach the court. However, in cases of **habeas corpus**, the Court has relaxed this rule, allowing others to file petitions on behalf of the detained individual. ### **CASE LAWS AND PRECEDENTS** - ***Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India* (1980)**: The Supreme Court applied and evolved the **basic structure doctrine**, reinforcing the limitations on Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution. - ***Suganmal v. State of M.P.* (1965)**: The Supreme Court clarified that if an alternative legal remedy is available, the writ of **mandamus** cannot be invoked. ### **COMPARISON WITH HIGH COURTS’ WRIT JURISDICTION** While both the Supreme Court and High Courts can issue writs, their jurisdictions differ: - **Supreme Court (Article 32)**: Can issue writs only for the enforcement of **fundamental rights**. - **High Courts (Article 226)**: Can issue writs for enforcing **fundamental rights and for any other purpose**, providing a wider ambit. ### **ESSENTIALS FOR ISSUANCE OF WRITS** - **Existence of a Legal Right**: The petitioner must demonstrate the violation of a legal right. - **Absence of Alternative Remedy**: Generally, writs are not issued if an effective alternative remedy exists, except in cases where the alternative remedy is inadequate or involves a lengthy process. ### **GUIDELINES AND LIMITATIONS** - **Discretionary Power**: The issuance of writs is at the discretion of the Court, based on the merits of each case. - **Non-interference in Policy Matters**: Courts typically refrain from issuing writs in matters involving policy decisions unless there is a clear violation of fundamental rights. ### **CONCLUSION** The writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is a cornerstone for the enforcement of **fundamental rights**, ensuring justice and protecting citizens against the abuse of state power. The interplay between **Article 32** and **Article 226** enhances the accessibility of judicial remedies, strengthening the constitutional framework for safeguarding rights. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Writ Jurisdiction of High Courts: Article 226](https://lawfoyer.in/writ-jurisdiction-of-high-courts-article-226/) **Published:** December 23, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Article 226 of the Indian Constitution empowers High Courts to issue writs for enforcing fundamental and other legal rights. This provision ensures judicial oversight over administrative actions, safeguarding citizens' rights. **Content:** **Article 226** of the Indian Constitution empowers High Courts to issue **writs** for enforcing **fundamental** and other **legal rights**. This provision ensures judicial oversight over administrative actions, safeguarding citizens’ rights. ### **MEANING AND SCOPE OF ARTICLE 226** **Article 226** grants High Courts the authority to issue **directions**, **orders**, or **writs**, including **habeas corpus**, **mandamus**, **prohibition**, **quo warranto**, and **certiorari**, to any person or authority within their **territorial jurisdiction**. This power extends beyond the enforcement of **fundamental rights**, encompassing other **legal rights** as well. ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND** The origin of **writ jurisdiction** in India traces back to **British colonial rule**, particularly the **Indian High Courts Act of 1861**, which established High Courts in **Calcutta**, **Bombay**, and **Madras** with the authority to issue **writs**. This framework was further refined in the **Government of India Act of 1935** and eventually incorporated into the **Indian Constitution** as **Article 226**. ### **TYPES OF WRITS UNDER ARTICLE 226** 1. ***Habeas Corpus***: Aimed at releasing a person unlawfully detained, ensuring **personal liberty**. In ***Kanu Sanyal v. District Magistrate, Darjeeling***, the Supreme Court emphasized that the primary purpose of the writ is to ensure the release of a person from **illegal detention**. 2. ***Mandamus***: Commands a **public authority** to perform a duty it has failed to fulfill. In ***State of West Bengal v. Nuruddin***, the court issued a writ of **mandamus**, directing the state to consider the respondent’s application for a license, highlighting the writ’s role in compelling authorities to act. 3. ***Prohibition***: Restrains a subordinate court or tribunal from exceeding its jurisdiction. In ***East India Commercial Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs***, the Supreme Court issued a writ of **prohibition** against the Collector, preventing him from acting beyond his authority. 4. ***Certiorari***: Used to quash orders of authorities acting without or in excess of jurisdiction. In ***Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque***, the Supreme Court quashed an **election tribunal’s order**, illustrating the application of **certiorari**. 5. ***Quo Warranto***: Challenges the legality of a person’s claim to a **public office**. In ***University of Mysore v. Govinda Rao***, the Supreme Court examined the validity of an appointment to a university chair, demonstrating the use of **quo warranto**. ### **COMPARISON WITH ARTICLE 32** While both **Articles 32** and **226** empower courts to issue **writs**, **Article 32** is confined to the enforcement of **fundamental rights** and is available only in the **Supreme Court**. In contrast, **Article 226** has a broader scope, allowing **High Courts** to address violations of **fundamental** as well as **other legal rights**. ### **TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION** **Article 226(2)** extends the jurisdiction of High Courts to cases where the **cause of action** arises, wholly or partly, within their **territorial limits**, even if the authority or person against whom the writ is issued is located **outside**. This provision ensures **flexibility** in addressing grievances. ### **PRINCIPLES GOVERNING WRIT JURISDICTION** - ***Locus Standi***: Traditionally, the petitioner must have a **direct interest** in the case. However, **Public Interest Litigations (PILs)** have relaxed this requirement, allowing broader access to justice. - ***Alternative Remedy***: Generally, writs are not issued if an effective **alternative remedy** exists. However, in cases involving **fundamental rights violations**, this rule may be relaxed. - ***Delay and Laches***: Petitions should be filed without **unreasonable delay**. Courts may deny relief if the petitioner is found guilty of **undue delay**. ### **LANDMARK CASE LAWS** - ***L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997)***: The Supreme Court affirmed that the power of **judicial review** vested in **High Courts** under **Article 226** is part of the **basic structure** of the Constitution and cannot be curtailed. - ***Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1984)***: The court expanded the scope of **Article 226** by entertaining a **PIL** for the release of **bonded laborers**, emphasizing the role of writ jurisdiction in **social justice**. ### **LIMITATIONS AND SELF-IMPOSED RESTRICTIONS** **High Courts** exercise writ jurisdiction with caution, refraining from interfering in matters involving: - **Highly disputed facts**, - **Contractual obligations**, or - Cases where **efficacious alternative remedies** are available. This **judicial restraint** ensures that writ jurisdiction is invoked appropriately. ### **CONCLUSION** **Article 226** serves as a vital tool for upholding the **rule of law** in India. Its broad scope and the discretionary power vested in **High Courts** ensure the protection of **citizens’ rights** against **administrative excesses**, reinforcing the judiciary’s role as a **guardian** of **constitutional** and **legal rights**. ### **REFERENCES** 1. ***Kanu Sanyal v. District Magistrate, Darjeeling***, AIR 1973 SC 2684. 2. ***State of West Bengal v. Nuruddin***, AIR 1998 SC 394. 3. ***East India Commercial Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs***, AIR 1962 SC 1893. 4. ***Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque***, AIR 1955 SC 233. 5. ***University of Mysore v. Govinda Rao***, AIR 1965 SC 491. 6. ***L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India***, AIR 1997 SC 1125. 7. ***Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India***, AIR 1984 SC 802. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Judicial Review in India](https://lawfoyer.in/judicial-review-in-india/) **Published:** December 23, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Judicial review in India empowers the judiciary to assess the constitutionality of legislative and executive actions, ensuring adherence to the Constitution. This mechanism upholds the rule of law and safeguards citizens' rights. **Content:** Judicial review in India empowers the judiciary to assess the constitutionality of legislative and executive actions, ensuring adherence to the Constitution. This mechanism upholds the rule of law and safeguards citizens’ rights. ## **MEANING AND DEFINITION** **Judicial review** refers to the judiciary’s authority to examine and invalidate governmental actions that contravene the Constitution. It ensures that all branches of government operate within their constitutional limits, maintaining the supremacy of the Constitution. ## **HISTORICAL EVOLUTION** The concept of judicial review in India has evolved through several landmark judgments: - **Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (1951)**: The **Supreme Court** upheld the constitutionality of the **First Amendment**, stating that **Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution under Article 368** includes the authority to amend **fundamental rights**. - **Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967)**: The **Court** reversed its earlier stance, ruling that **Parliament** could not amend **fundamental rights**, emphasizing their sacrosanct nature. - **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)**: This landmark judgment introduced the **‘Basic Structure Doctrine,’** asserting that while **Parliament** can amend the Constitution, it cannot alter its **basic structure**. - **Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980)**: The **Court** reinforced the **Basic Structure Doctrine**, striking down amendments that sought to curtail **judicial review**, thereby preserving the balance between **fundamental rights** and **directive principles**. ## **CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS** Several articles in the **Indian Constitution** provide a foundation for judicial review: - **Article 13**: Declares that **laws inconsistent with fundamental rights** are void. - **Article 32**: Grants individuals the **right to approach the Supreme Court** for enforcement of **fundamental rights**. - **Article 226**: Empowers **High Courts** to issue **writs** for enforcement of rights. - **Article 131**: Provides the **Supreme Court** with **original jurisdiction** in disputes between states or between the center and states. - **Article 136**: Allows the **Supreme Court** to grant **special leave to appeal** against any judgment or order. - **Article 143**: Enables the **President** to seek the **Supreme Court’s opinion** on questions of law or fact. ## **TYPES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW** Judicial review in India can be categorized into three types: 1. **Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments**: Ensures that amendments do not alter the Constitution’s **basic structure**. 2. **Judicial Review of Legislation**: Examines the validity of legislative enactments concerning **fundamental rights** and the **distribution of powers**. 3. **Judicial Review of Administrative Actions**: Assesses the **legality** and **reasonableness** of executive decisions and actions. ## **PRINCIPLES AND DOCTRINES** Several legal principles underpin judicial review in India: - **Doctrine of Basic Structure**: Asserts that certain fundamental features of the Constitution cannot be altered by amendments. - **Doctrine of Eclipse**: States that **laws inconsistent with fundamental rights** are not **void ab initio** but become unenforceable; they can revive if the constitutional prohibition is removed. - **Doctrine of Severability**: Allows **invalid portions of a statute** to be severed, preserving the remainder if it can stand independently. - **Doctrine of Prospective Overruling**: Enables the **Court** to limit the retroactive effect of its decisions, applying them **prospectively** to avoid disruption. ## **LANDMARK CASE LAWS** Several judgments have shaped the contours of judicial review in India: - **Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975)**: The **Supreme Court** invalidated a constitutional amendment that sought to immunize the election of the **Prime Minister** from judicial scrutiny, reinforcing the principle of **free and fair elections** as part of the **basic structure**. - **S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994)**: The **Court** held that the proclamation of **President’s Rule under Article 356** is subject to judicial review, preventing its misuse for political purposes. - **I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007)**: The **Supreme Court** ruled that **laws placed in the Ninth Schedule** after the **Kesavananda Bharati judgment** are open to judicial review if they violate **fundamental rights** or the **basic structure**. ## **MAXIMS AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES** Certain legal maxims are pertinent to judicial review: - **“Ubi jus ibi remedium”**: Where there is a right, there is a remedy; underscores the judiciary’s role in enforcing rights. - **“Lex iniusta non est lex”**: An unjust law is no law at all; justifies the invalidation of unconstitutional laws. ## **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** While judicial review exists in various countries, its scope and application differ: - **United States**: **Judicial review** was established through **Marbury v. Madison (1803)**, allowing courts to strike down unconstitutional laws. - **United Kingdom**: **Parliamentary sovereignty** limits judicial review; courts cannot invalidate **primary legislation** but can review **administrative actions**. - **India**: Combines aspects of both systems, with courts empowered to review **legislation**, **executive actions**, and **constitutional amendments**, ensuring they adhere to the Constitution’s **basic structure**. ## **CRITICISM AND CHALLENGES** Despite its significance, judicial review in India faces criticism: - **Judicial Activism**: Concerns arise when **courts** are perceived to overstep their mandate, encroaching upon **legislative** or **executive functions**. - **Delay in Justice**: Judicial backlog can impede timely review, affecting the efficacy of **justice delivery**. - **Subjectivity**: Interpretation of the **‘basic structure’** can be subjective. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Basic Structure](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-basic-structure/) **Published:** December 23, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Basic Structure is a judicial principle in Indian constitutional law that restricts Parliament's power to amend the Constitution, ensuring that its fundamental features remain unaltered. This doctrine maintains the Constitution's core values, preventing any amendments that could undermine its essential framework. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Basic Structure** is a judicial principle in Indian constitutional law that restricts Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution, ensuring that its fundamental features remain unaltered. This doctrine maintains the Constitution’s core values, preventing any amendments that could undermine its essential framework. ### **MEANING AND EXPLANATION** The **Basic Structure Doctrine** asserts that while Parliament holds the authority to amend the Constitution under **Article 368**, it cannot alter or destroy its fundamental features. This ensures the preservation of the Constitution’s core principles, such as the **supremacy of the Constitution**, the **rule of law**, and the **separation of powers**. The Supreme Court introduced this doctrine in the landmark case of ***Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala***, **AIR 1973 SC 1461**, establishing that certain constitutional elements are beyond the scope of parliamentary amendment. ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION** The evolution of the **Basic Structure Doctrine** can be traced through several landmark judgments: 1. ***Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (1951)***: The Supreme Court upheld the **First Amendment**, stating that Parliament’s amending power under **Article 368** includes the authority to amend **fundamental rights**. 2. ***Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1965)***: The Court reaffirmed its stance from *Shankari Prasad*, allowing amendments to **fundamental rights**. 3. ***Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967)***: Reversing its earlier position, the Supreme Court ruled that Parliament could not amend **fundamental rights**, emphasizing their inviolability. 4. ***Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)***: This landmark judgment introduced the **Basic Structure Doctrine**, allowing Parliament to amend the Constitution without altering its essential framework. 5. ***Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975)***: The Supreme Court applied the **Basic Structure Doctrine** to invalidate clauses that sought to curtail **judicial review**, reinforcing the doctrine’s significance. 6. ***Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980)***: The Court struck down provisions of the **42nd Amendment**, emphasizing that a limited amending power is a basic feature of the Constitution. 7. ***Waman Rao v. Union of India (1981)***: The Supreme Court reaffirmed the **Basic Structure Doctrine**, stating that amendments made after the *Kesavananda Bharati* case would be subject to judicial review. 8. ***I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007)***: The Court held that laws placed under the **Ninth Schedule** after the *Kesavananda Bharati* decision are open to judicial review if they violate the **basic structure**. ### **KEY FEATURES OF THE BASIC STRUCTURE** While the Supreme Court has not provided an exhaustive list, several features have been recognized as part of the Constitution’s **basic structure**: - **Supremacy of the Constitution**: The Constitution is the supreme law, and all laws and amendments must conform to its provisions. - **Rule of Law**: Every individual and institution is subject to the law, ensuring fairness and justice. - **Separation of Powers**: The division of governance among the legislature, executive, and judiciary prevents the concentration of power. - **Judicial Review**: The judiciary’s power to review and invalidate unconstitutional laws and amendments. - **Federalism**: The distribution of power between the central government and states, maintaining a balance. - **Secularism**: The state’s impartiality towards all religions, ensuring religious freedom and equality. - **Democracy**: A system of government by the people, ensuring representation and participation. ### **LEGAL PROVISIONS AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS** **Article 368** of the Indian Constitution grants Parliament the power to amend the Constitution. However, the **Basic Structure Doctrine** imposes implicit limitations on this power. The Supreme Court, through various judgments, has interpreted these limitations to preserve the Constitution’s core principles. For instance, in the ***Minerva Mills*** case, the Court held that the power to amend does not include the power to destroy the Constitution’s **basic structure**. ### **SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DOCTRINE** The **Basic Structure Doctrine** serves as a safeguard against potential misuse of parliamentary power, ensuring that amendments do not alter the Constitution’s fundamental essence. It maintains the balance between **flexibility** and **rigidity**, allowing for necessary changes without compromising core principles. This doctrine upholds the **supremacy of the Constitution** and protects **democratic values**, **fundamental rights**, and the **rule of law**. ### **CRITICISM AND DEBATES** Despite its significance, the **Basic Structure Doctrine** has faced criticism: - **Lack of Clear Definition**: The absence of a definitive list of basic features leads to ambiguity and judicial discretion. - **Judicial Overreach**: Critics argue that the doctrine grants the judiciary excessive power over constitutional amendments, potentially undermining parliamentary sovereignty. - **Subjectivity**: Determining what constitutes the **basic structure** can be subjective, leading to inconsistent interpretations. ### **CONCLUSION** The **Doctrine of Basic Structure** is a cornerstone of Indian constitutional law, ensuring that the Constitution’s fundamental principles remain intact. Through various landmark judgments, the judiciary has reinforced this doctrine, balancing the need for constitutional amendments with the preservation of core values. For Indian law students, understanding this doctrine is crucial, as it highlights the dynamic interplay between constitutional flexibility and rigidity, and the role of the judiciary in upholding the Constitution’s sanctity. ### **REFERENCES** 1. ***Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala***, **AIR 1973 SC 1461**. 2. ***Shankari Prasad v. Union of India***, **AIR 1951 SC 458**. 3. ***Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan***, **AIR 1965 SC 845**. 4. ***Golaknath v. State of Punjab***, **AIR 1967 SC 1643**. 5. ***Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain***, **AIR 1975 SC 2299**. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Separation of Powers in the Indian Constitution](https://lawfoyer.in/separation-of-powers-in-the-indian-constitution/) **Published:** December 23, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Indian Constitution implicitly embodies the doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, ensuring a system of checks and balances essential for democratic governance. **Content:** The Indian Constitution implicitly embodies the doctrine of **separation of powers** among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, ensuring a system of **checks and balances** essential for democratic governance. ### **MEANING AND EXPLANATION** The doctrine of **separation of powers** divides governmental responsibilities into distinct branches to prevent the concentration of power and provide checks and balances. In India, while the Constitution does not explicitly mention this doctrine, it delineates functions among: - **Legislature**: *Responsible for enacting laws.* - **Executive**: *Tasked with implementing laws.* - **Judiciary**: *Entrusted with interpreting laws and adjudicating disputes.* This framework ensures that no single branch oversteps its bounds, maintaining the **rule of law** and protecting **individual liberties**. ### **HISTORICAL EVOLUTION** The concept traces back to ancient thinkers like **Aristotle**, who identified three governmental functions: deliberative, magisterial, and judicial. In the 18th century, **Montesquieu’s ‘The Spirit of the Laws’** articulated the modern form of this doctrine, emphasizing the need for separate branches to prevent tyranny. The framers of the Indian Constitution, influenced by these ideas, incorporated a **functional separation** to suit India’s **parliamentary system**. ### **CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS** While the Indian Constitution does not explicitly state the **separation of powers**, several articles imply this doctrine: - **Article 50**: *Directs the state to separate the judiciary from the executive in public services.* - **Articles 121 and 211**: *Prohibit legislative discussions on judicial conduct, reinforcing judicial independence.* - **Articles 122 and 212**: *Restrict judicial intervention in parliamentary proceedings, ensuring legislative autonomy.* ### **JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND LANDMARK CASES** The Indian judiciary has played a pivotal role in defining and enforcing the **separation of powers** through various landmark judgments: 1. **In Re Delhi Laws Act Case (1951)**: *The Supreme Court observed that while the Constitution does not explicitly enshrine the doctrine, it provides for a functional separation among the branches.* 2. **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)**: *This landmark case established the ‘basic structure’ doctrine, asserting that Parliament cannot alter the Constitution’s fundamental framework, including the separation of powers.* 3. **Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975)**: *The Court held that the separation of powers is an integral part of the Constitution’s basic structure, immune to parliamentary amendment.* 4. **Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980)**: *The Supreme Court reinforced that a balance between Parts III and IV of the Constitution is essential, and any amendment destroying this balance violates the basic structure.* ### **CHECKS AND BALANCES** The Indian system incorporates mechanisms where each branch can check the others, ensuring no single entity wields unchecked power: - **Judicial Review**: *Courts can invalidate unconstitutional legislative and executive actions.* - **Legislative Oversight**: *Parliament supervises the executive through questions, debates, and committees.* - **Executive’s Legislative Role**: *The President can promulgate ordinances when Parliament is not in session, though these require subsequent legislative approval.* ### **EXCEPTIONS AND OVERLAPS** Despite the separation, certain overlaps exist to ensure coordinated governance: - **Ordinance-Making Power**: *The executive can legislate temporarily through ordinances under Article 123.* - **Judicial Appointments**: *The executive participates in appointing judges, though the judiciary has a significant say, especially post the collegium system’s establishment.* - **Delegated Legislation**: *The legislature delegates certain law-making powers to the executive for efficiency and expertise.* ### **DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS: GLOBAL AND INDIAN PERSPECTIVE** The **separation of powers** is a fundamental principle in democratic governance, ensuring that the legislative, executive, and judicial branches operate independently to prevent the concentration of authority. Globally, this doctrine has been interpreted and implemented in various ways, influenced by historical, cultural, and political contexts. #### **GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE** In the **United States**, the Constitution explicitly delineates the powers of the three branches, establishing a system of **checks and balances**. This clear separation aims to prevent any single branch from becoming too powerful. Similarly, in **France**, the doctrine is integral to the Fifth Republic’s Constitution, with a distinct separation between the executive and legislative branches. However, the degree of separation varies; for instance, the **United Kingdom** follows a more flexible approach due to its parliamentary system, where the executive is part of the legislature. #### **INDIAN PERSPECTIVE** The Indian Constitution does not explicitly mention the **separation of powers** but embodies the doctrine through its structure and provisions. Articles such as **Article 50**, which directs the state to separate the judiciary from the executive, and **Articles 121 and 211**, which restrict legislative discussions on judicial conduct, reflect this principle. The judiciary, through landmark judgments like **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala**, has reinforced the doctrine by identifying it as part of the Constitution’s basic structure. ### **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** While the **separation of powers** is a common feature in many democracies, its application differs: - **United States**: *Exhibits a rigid separation with a presidential system, where the President (executive) is separate from Congress (legislature).* - **United Kingdom**: *Features a flexible separation within a parliamentary system, with the Prime Minister and Cabinet drawn from Parliament.* - **France**: *Maintains a semi-presidential system with a clearer separation between the executive and legislature compared to the UK.* **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Federalism in India: Unitary and Cooperative Features](https://lawfoyer.in/federalism-in-india-unitary-and-cooperative-features/) **Published:** December 23, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** India's federal structure uniquely blends unitary and cooperative elements, balancing centralized authority with regional autonomy. This design ensures national unity while accommodating the country's vast diversity. **Content:** India’s federal structure uniquely blends unitary and cooperative elements, balancing centralized authority with regional autonomy. This design ensures national unity while accommodating the country’s vast diversity. ### **MEANING AND DEFINITION** **Federalism** denotes a governance system where two levels of government operate within their jurisdictions, directly governing the people. The **Indian Constitution** establishes a federal structure with a strong centralizing tendency, often termed **“quasi-federal”** or **“cooperative federalism.”** **Article 1** describes India as a **“Union of States,”** indicating an indestructible union with destructible states. ### **HISTORICAL EVOLUTION** The **Government of India Act 1935** introduced a federal framework, dividing powers between the center and provinces. Post-independence, the framers of the Constitution adopted a federal structure with **unitary features** to maintain unity and integrity. **Dr. B.R. Ambedkar** emphasized that while India is a federation, it has a **unitary bias** to address emergencies and ensure national cohesion. ### **FEDERAL FEATURES OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION** - ***Dual Polity***: The Constitution establishes a dual polity, comprising the **Union** and the **States**, each endowed with sovereign powers in their respective domains. - ***Written Constitution***: India’s Constitution is a single, written document that delineates the structure, powers, and functions of both the Union and State governments. - ***Division of Powers***: The **Seventh Schedule** of the Constitution specifies the distribution of legislative powers between the Union and the States through three lists: - **Union List**: Subjects of national importance, such as **defense**, **foreign affairs**, and **atomic energy**, fall under the exclusive legislative domain of the Parliament. - **State List**: Matters of regional and local significance, including **police**, **public health**, and **agriculture**, are under the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of State legislatures. - **Concurrent List**: Subjects like **education**, **marriage**, and **bankruptcy** are within the purview of both the Parliament and State legislatures. In case of a conflict between Union and State laws on a concurrent subject, the **Union law prevails**. - ***Supremacy of the Constitution***: The **Constitution** is the supreme law of the land, and both Union and State governments must operate within its framework. - ***Independent Judiciary***: An **independent judiciary**, headed by the **Supreme Court**, acts as the guardian of the Constitution and adjudicates disputes between the Union and the States. ### **UNITARY FEATURES OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION** - ***Strong Centre***: The **Union government** possesses more extensive powers compared to the States, particularly in matters of national importance. - ***Single Citizenship***: Unlike other federal countries, India provides for **single citizenship**, reinforcing the concept of unity. - ***Flexibility of the Constitution***: Certain provisions of the Constitution can be amended by the **Parliament alone**, without requiring the consent of the States, indicating a **unitary tilt**. - ***Emergency Provisions***: During a **national emergency**, the **Union government** can assume greater control over the States, centralizing power. - ***Appointment of Governors***: The **President** appoints **Governors** for each State, who act as representatives of the **Union government**, thereby ensuring central influence over State administration. ### **COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM IN INDIA** **Cooperative federalism** in India emphasizes collaboration between the Union and State governments to achieve common national goals. This approach fosters interdependence and mutual support, ensuring that policies and programs are effectively implemented across the country. ### **MECHANISMS PROMOTING COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM** - ***Inter-State Council***: Established under **Article 263**, the Inter-State Council facilitates coordination between the Union and State governments on matters of common interest. - ***Zonal Councils***: These statutory bodies promote interstate cooperation and coordination, addressing regional issues and fostering balanced development. - ***Finance Commission***: Constituted under **Article 280**, the Finance Commission recommends the distribution of financial resources between the Union and the States, ensuring **fiscal federalism**. - ***Goods and Services Tax (GST) Council***: The GST Council is a federal body where both the Union and State governments participate to decide on **GST rates**, ensuring uniformity in indirect taxation across the country. ### **JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS UPHOLDING FEDERALISM** The judiciary has played a pivotal role in interpreting the federal structure of the Constitution, ensuring a balance between unitary and federal features. - ***S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994)***: This landmark case curtailed the arbitrary imposition of **President’s Rule** under **Article 356**, reinforcing the federal structure. The **Supreme Court** held that the power under **Article 356** is an exceptional power and should be used sparingly. - ***State of West Bengal v. Union of India (1963)***: The **Supreme Court** held that the Indian Constitution is not truly federal. The case involved the **Union government’s** competence to acquire property belonging to the State of West Bengal. The Court ruled in favor of the **Union**, emphasizing the **unitary bias** of the Constitution. ### **EMERGENCY PROVISIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON FEDERALISM** The Constitution’s **emergency provisions** (**Articles 352, 356, and 360**) allow the Union government to assume greater control during crises, impacting the federal balance. - ***Article 352***: Proclamation of **National Emergency** can alter the federal structure by empowering the Parliament to legislate on **State subjects**. - ***Article 356***: **President’s Rule** can be imposed if the constitutional machinery in a State fails, leading to the centralization of power. - ***Article 360***: **Financial Emergency** can be declared if the financial stability of India or any part thereof is threatened, allowing the Union to direct States on financial matters. ### **CONCLUSION** India’s federal structure is a complex amalgamation of **unitary and cooperative features**, designed to maintain national unity while accommodating regional diversity. The **Constitution** provides a flexible framework that allows for both centralization and decentralization as needed, ensuring the country’s integrity. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Parliament: Composition and Functions](https://lawfoyer.in/parliament-composition-and-functions/) **Published:** December 23, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Parliament of India serves as the supreme legislative authority, embodying the democratic ethos of the nation. It comprises the President and two houses: the Rajya Sabha (Council of States) and the Lok Sabha (House of the People). This bicameral structure ensures representation at both national and regional levels, facilitating comprehensive governance. **Content:** The Parliament of India serves as the supreme legislative authority, embodying the democratic ethos of the nation. It comprises the **President** and two houses: the **Rajya Sabha (Council of States)** and the **Lok Sabha (House of the People)**. This bicameral structure ensures representation at both national and regional levels, facilitating comprehensive governance. ### **COMPOSITION OF THE INDIAN PARLIAMENT** 1. **PRESIDENT OF INDIA**: An integral part of Parliament, the **President’s duties** include summoning and proroguing sessions, and giving assent to **bills**, which is essential for them to become **law**. 2. **RAJYA SABHA (COUNCIL OF STATES)**: - ***Membership***: The Rajya Sabha can have up to **250 members**. Currently, it comprises **245 members**: **233 elected by state and union territory legislatures**, and **12 nominated by the President** for their expertise in fields like literature, science, art, and social service. - ***Tenure***: Members serve staggered six-year terms, with **one-third retiring every two years**, ensuring continuity. - ***Election Process***: Elected members are chosen by the **elected members of State Legislative Assemblies** through a **proportional representation system** using a **single transferable vote**. 3. **LOK SABHA (HOUSE OF THE PEOPLE)**: - ***Membership***: The Lok Sabha can have up to **552 members**. Presently, it has **543 members** directly elected from territorial constituencies across India. - ***Tenure***: Members serve five-year terms unless the house is dissolved sooner. - ***Election Process***: Members are elected based on **universal adult suffrage** through a **first-past-the-post system**. ### **FUNCTIONS OF THE INDIAN PARLIAMENT** 1. **LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS**: - ***Law-Making***: Parliament enacts **laws** on subjects enumerated in the **Union** and **Concurrent Lists** of the **Constitution**. In certain situations, it can also legislate on **State List** subjects. - ***Amendments***: It possesses the authority to amend the **Constitution**, adhering to the procedures outlined in **Article 368**. 2. **EXECUTIVE OVERSIGHT**: - ***Question Hour and Debates***: Members question ministers and engage in debates to scrutinize **government policies** and actions. - ***No-Confidence Motion***: The Lok Sabha can express a lack of confidence in the **Council of Ministers**, potentially leading to its resignation. 3. **FINANCIAL FUNCTIONS**: - ***Budget Approval***: The **Union Budget** is presented in the Lok Sabha, requiring **parliamentary approval** for government expenditure. - ***Money Bills***: Such bills must originate in the Lok Sabha. The Rajya Sabha can suggest amendments but lacks the power to reject or amend them decisively. 4. **JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS**: - ***Impeachment***: Parliament can impeach the **President** for constitutional violations. Additionally, it can remove **judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts** on grounds of proven misbehavior or incapacity. 5. **ELECTORAL FUNCTIONS**: - ***Elections***: Members of Parliament participate in the elections of the **President** and **Vice-President**. ### **KEY DOCTRINES AND PRINCIPLES RELATED TO PARLIAMENT** 1. **DOCTRINE OF PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY**: While Parliament holds extensive legislative powers, its sovereignty is subject to the **Constitution’s provisions** and the judiciary’s power of **judicial review**. 2. **DOCTRINE OF BASIC STRUCTURE**: Established in ***Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala***, **AIR 1973 SC 1461**, this doctrine asserts that **Parliament cannot alter the Constitution’s basic structure**, even through amendments. ### **NOTABLE CASE LAWS INVOLVING PARLIAMENTARY FUNCTIONS** 1. ***Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala***, **AIR 1973 SC 1461**: - **Facts**: Swami Kesavananda Bharati challenged the Kerala government’s attempts, under state **land reform laws**, to impose restrictions on the management of his religious property. - **Issue**: Whether Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution is unlimited. - **Held**: The **Supreme Court** ruled that while Parliament can amend the **Constitution**, it cannot alter its **basic structure**. 2. ***Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain***, **AIR 1975 SC 2299**: - **Facts**: The validity of Prime Minister **Indira Gandhi’s election** was challenged on grounds of **electoral malpractices**. - **Issue**: Whether Parliament could pass a **law** that has the effect of nullifying judicial decisions. - **Held**: The **Supreme Court** invalidated the **39th Constitutional Amendment**, emphasizing that **Parliament cannot exercise unchecked power**, especially in matters affecting the judiciary’s role. ### **PROCEDURES IN PARLIAMENT** 1. **LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE**: - ***Introduction of Bills***: **Bills** can be introduced in either house, except **Money Bills**, which must originate in the Lok Sabha. - ***Three Readings***: Each **bill** undergoes three readings in each house—**introduction**, **consideration**, and **passage**. - ***Joint Sitting***: In case of a **deadlock** between the two houses, a **joint sitting** may be convened to deliberate and vote on the **bill**. 2. **FINANCIAL PROCEDURE**: - ***Annual Financial Statement***: The **Budget** is presented annually, detailing the **government’s estimated revenue and expenditure**. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [State Legislatures: Composition and Functions](https://lawfoyer.in/state-legislatures-composition-and-functions/) **Published:** December 23, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** State legislatures in India are pivotal in the federal structure, responsible for law-making and governance at the state level. Their composition and functions are delineated in Part VI of the Indian Constitution, encompassing Articles 168 to 212. **Content:** State legislatures in India are pivotal in the federal structure, responsible for law-making and governance at the state level. Their composition and functions are delineated in **Part VI** of the **Indian Constitution**, encompassing **Articles 168 to 212**. **COMPOSITION OF STATE LEGISLATURES** The composition of state legislatures varies between unicameral and bicameral systems: - ***Unicameral Legislature***: Comprises the **Governor** and a single legislative body, the **Legislative Assembly (Vidhan Sabha)**. Most Indian states, such as **Gujarat** and **Punjab**, follow this model. - ***Bicameral Legislature***: Includes the **Governor**, **Legislative Assembly (Vidhan Sabha)**, and **Legislative Council (Vidhan Parishad)**. States like **Bihar**, **Karnataka**, and **Uttar Pradesh** have this structure. **LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY (VIDHAN SABHA)** - ***Composition***: Members are directly elected from territorial constituencies. The Assembly’s size ranges from a minimum of **60** to a maximum of **500** members, though exceptions exist for smaller states like **Sikkim** and **Goa**. - ***Tenure***: The Assembly’s term is **five years**, unless dissolved earlier. During a **national emergency**, **Parliament** may extend this term by up to one year at a time. **LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL (VIDHAN PARISHAD)** - ***Composition***: A permanent body with staggered terms, ensuring one-third of members retire every two years. The Council’s size cannot exceed one-third of the Legislative Assembly’s membership and must have at least **40 members**. Members are elected through various constituencies, including **local authorities**, **graduates**, **teachers**, and **legislative assembly members**, with some nominated by the **Governor**. **CREATION AND ABOLITION OF LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS** **Article 169** empowers **Parliament** to create or abolish a state’s Legislative Council upon the Legislative Assembly’s resolution, passed by a special majority. This flexibility allows states to adapt their legislative structures based on administrative needs. **QUALIFICATIONS AND DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR MEMBERSHIP** - ***Qualifications***: A member must be an **Indian citizen**, a **voter in the state**, and at least **25 years old** for the Legislative Assembly or **30 years** for the Legislative Council. - ***Disqualifications***: Grounds include holding an **office of profit**, **unsound mind**, **undischarged insolvency**, or **defection** under the **Tenth Schedule**. **SESSIONS AND PROCEDURES** - ***Sessions***: The **Governor** summons sessions of the state legislature, ensuring it meets at least **twice a year**, with no more than **six months** between sessions. - ***Legislative Procedure***: Bills can be introduced in either house (except **Money Bills**, which originate in the **Legislative Assembly**). A bill becomes law after passing both houses and receiving the **Governor’s assent**. **POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF STATE LEGISLATURES** 1. ***Legislative Functions***: - **State List**: Exclusive authority to legislate on subjects like **police**, **public health**, and **agriculture**. - **Concurrent List**: Shared authority with **Parliament** on subjects like **education** and **marriage**. In case of conflict, central law prevails. 2. ***Financial Powers***: - **Money Bills**: Can only originate in the **Legislative Assembly**. The **Council** can recommend amendments within **14 days**, but the Assembly may accept or reject them. - **Budget Approval**: State legislatures approve the **annual financial statement**, sanctioning government expenditure and taxation. 3. ***Electoral Functions***: - **Rajya Sabha Elections**: **Legislative Assembly members** elect representatives to the **Rajya Sabha**. - **Presidential Elections**: State legislators participate in electing the **President of India**. 4. ***Constitutional Amendments***: - Certain amendments require ratification by at least half of the **state legislatures**, ensuring federal balance. 5. ***Judicial Functions***: - **Impeachment**: State legislatures can initiate proceedings for the removal of judges of the **High Court**. 6. ***Other Functions***: - **Control over Executive**: Through **questions**, **debates**, and **motions**, the legislature holds the executive accountable. - **Privileges**: Members enjoy certain privileges, including **freedom of speech** within the house and **immunity** from legal proceedings for actions within the legislature. **CASE LAWS AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS** - **S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994)**: This landmark case clarified the use of **Article 356** (**President’s Rule**) and emphasized the importance of **floor tests** in the **Legislative Assembly** to determine majority support, reinforcing the autonomy of state legislatures. - **Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992)**: The **Supreme Court** upheld the constitutional validity of the **Tenth Schedule**, which deals with **anti-defection laws**, ensuring stability in the political structure. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Executive Powers of the President](https://lawfoyer.in/executive-powers-of-the-president/) **Published:** December 23, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The President of India, as the ceremonial head of state, wields significant executive powers defined by the Constitution. These powers, exercised in accordance with constitutional provisions and judicial interpretations, are crucial for the nation's governance. **Content:** The President of India, as the ceremonial head of state, wields significant executive powers defined by the Constitution. These powers, exercised in accordance with **constitutional provisions** and **judicial interpretations**, are crucial for the nation’s governance. ### **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** **Article 53** of the Indian Constitution stipulates that the **executive power of the Union** is vested in the President, exercisable directly or through subordinate officers, in accordance with the Constitution. This encompasses the authority to implement laws, manage national affairs, and oversee the functioning of the central government. However, the President typically acts on the **aid and advice of the Council of Ministers**, led by the Prime Minister, as mandated by **Article 74(1)**. The **42nd Amendment (1976)** made it explicit that the President shall act in accordance with such advice, and the **44th Amendment (1978)** added that the President may require the Council of Ministers to reconsider such advice but must act in accordance with the advice tendered after such reconsideration. ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The framers of the Indian Constitution adopted the **parliamentary system** from Britain, designating the President as the constitutional head, akin to the British monarch. This structure ensures a balance between ceremonial duties and actual governance, which is conducted by the elected Council of Ministers. Over time, **constitutional amendments** and **judicial interpretations** have refined the President’s role, emphasizing the importance of acting on ministerial advice while retaining certain discretionary powers. ### **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** In contrast to the Indian system, where the President’s role is largely ceremonial, countries like the **United States** vest substantial **executive authority** in the President, who serves as both the head of state and government. This **presidential system** centralizes executive power, differing from India’s **parliamentary framework** that separates the head of state from the head of government. ### **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** The President’s executive powers encompass several key functions: - **Appointment Powers**: - **Appoints the Prime Minister** and, on their advice, other ministers. - Appoints **judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts**, **governors of states**, the **Attorney General**, and other key officials. - **Military Powers**: - Serves as the **Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces**, with the authority to declare war and conclude peace, subject to **parliamentary approval**. - **Diplomatic Powers**: - Represents India in **international forums**, appoints **ambassadors**, and receives foreign dignitaries. - **Ordinance-Making Power**: - Under **Article 123**, can promulgate ordinances when Parliament is not in session, which must be approved by Parliament within six weeks of reassembly. - **Emergency Powers**: - Can declare **national, state, and financial emergencies** under **Articles 352, 356, and 360**, respectively, with varying conditions and **parliamentary oversight**. ### **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS** - **Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab (1955)**: - **Facts**: The Punjab government engaged in the business of printing and selling textbooks without legislative authorization. - **Issue**: Whether the executive could undertake trade without legislative sanction. - **Held**: The Supreme Court held that while the **executive power** is vested in the President, real authority is exercised by the **Council of Ministers**. The executive can undertake actions without prior legislative approval unless prohibited by law. - **S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994)**: - **Facts**: The central government dismissed several state governments under **Article 356**, citing failure of constitutional machinery. - **Issue**: The extent and justiciability of the President’s power under **Article 356**. - **Held**: The Supreme Court ruled that the President’s proclamation under **Article 356** is subject to **judicial review**. The Court can examine whether the material behind the proclamation is relevant and not based on extraneous grounds. This judgment curtailed the arbitrary use of **Article 356**, emphasizing **federalism** and the **democratic process**. - **Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974)**: - **Facts**: The appellant challenged the validity of disciplinary actions taken by the Punjab government, arguing they were not personally approved by the Governor. - **Issue**: Whether the Governor or President must personally exercise executive functions. - **Held**: The Supreme Court clarified that the **President and Governors** are constitutional heads and must act on the **aid and advice of their respective Councils of Ministers**, except in matters where discretion is granted by the Constitution. ### **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - **Doctrine of Aid and Advice**: - This principle mandates that the President exercises executive powers based on the **aid and advice of the Council of Ministers**. The **42nd and 44th Constitutional Amendments** have reinforced this doctrine, ensuring **parliamentary supremacy** and **democratic governance**. - **Doctrine of Judicial Review**: - The **judiciary** holds the authority to review the President’s actions, especially concerning the **proclamation of emergencies**, to ensure they align with **constitutional provisions**. This serves as a check against potential misuse of executive powers. ### **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** - **“Nemo judex in causa sua”**: - Translates to **“no one should be a judge in their own cause.”** This principle underscores the importance of **unbiased decision-making**, relevant when the President acts on ministerial advice to prevent conflicts of interest. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Executive Powers of the Governor](https://lawfoyer.in/executive-powers-of-the-governor/) **Published:** December 23, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Governor serves as the constitutional head of a state in India, embodying the state's executive authority. While the Governor's role is largely ceremonial, the Constitution of India entrusts the office with significant executive powers, primarily exercised on the advice of the Council of Ministers led by the Chief Minister. These powers are pivotal for the state's governance and administration. **Content:** The Governor serves as the constitutional head of a state in India, embodying the state’s executive authority. While the Governor’s role is largely ceremonial, the **Constitution of India** entrusts the office with significant executive powers, primarily exercised on the advice of the **Council of Ministers** led by the **Chief Minister**. These powers are pivotal for the state’s governance and administration. ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** The Governor’s executive powers encompass the authority to execute decisions, make appointments, and oversee the state’s administrative functions. As per **Article 154** of the Constitution, the executive power of the state is vested in the Governor and is exercised either directly or through officers subordinate to him, in accordance with the Constitution. This provision establishes the Governor as the nominal executive head, with real executive authority residing with the elected **Council of Ministers**. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The role of the Governor in India has its roots in the colonial era, where Governors acted as representatives of the **British Crown**, wielding substantial authority. Post-independence, the framers of the **Constitution** retained the position, redefining it to fit the democratic framework. The Governor was envisioned as a constitutional head, ensuring the state’s governance aligns with constitutional provisions and acting as a liaison between the state and the central government. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** Several constitutional articles delineate the Governor’s executive powers: - **Article 154**: Vests the state’s executive power in the Governor. - **Article 155**: Provides for the appointment of the Governor by the President. - **Article 156**: Specifies the term of office and conditions under which the Governor holds office. - **Article 163**: Mandates that the Governor act on the aid and advice of the **Council of Ministers**, except in matters where discretion is permitted. - **Article 166**: Stipulates that all executive actions of the state government are to be taken in the Governor’s name and allows the Governor to make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the government. ## **POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNOR** 1. ***Appointment Powers***: - **Chief Minister**: The Governor appoints the Chief Minister, typically the leader of the majority party in the **Legislative Assembly**. In situations where no clear majority exists, the Governor’s discretion becomes crucial in appointing a candidate who can potentially command the Assembly’s confidence. This was evident in the case of ***Mahabir Prasad v. Prafulla Chandra***, where the Governor’s discretion in appointing the Chief Minister was upheld. - **Council of Ministers**: On the advice of the **Chief Minister**, the Governor appoints other ministers. The **Council of Ministers** is collectively responsible to the **Legislative Assembly**. - **Advocate General**: The Governor appoints the **Advocate General** for the state, who provides legal advice to the government. - **State Election Commissioner**: Responsible for overseeing municipal and panchayat elections, the **State Election Commissioner** is appointed by the Governor. - **Vice-Chancellors of State Universities**: The Governor, often designated as the **Chancellor** of state universities, appoints Vice-Chancellors, playing a pivotal role in higher education administration. 2. ***Administrative Powers***: - **Executive Actions**: All executive actions of the state are formally taken in the Governor’s name, as stipulated by **Article 166** of the Constitution. This includes issuing orders, notifications, and other official documents. - **Rule-Making Authority**: The Governor can make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the state government and for the allocation of such business among the ministers. - **Seeking Information**: The Governor has the right to be informed of all decisions of the **Council of Ministers** relating to the administration and proposals for legislation. 3. ***Discretionary Powers***: - **Reservation of Bills**: The Governor can reserve certain bills passed by the state legislature for the President’s consideration, especially if they conflict with the **Constitution** or the larger interests of the country. - **Dissolution of Legislative Assembly**: The Governor may dissolve the **Legislative Assembly** on the advice of the Chief Minister. However, in situations where the government loses majority support, the Governor’s discretion is pivotal in deciding whether to dissolve the Assembly or invite an alternative government formation. - **Report to the President**: Under **Article 356**, if the Governor believes that the state’s governance cannot be carried out per constitutional provisions, they can report to the President, potentially leading to **President’s Rule** in the state. The **Supreme Court**, in the ***S.R. Bommai v. Union of India*** case, emphasized that such reports are subject to judicial review to prevent misuse. ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS** - ***S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994)***: This landmark judgment curtailed the arbitrary dismissal of state governments under **Article 356**. The **Supreme Court** ruled that the imposition of **President’s Rule** is subject to judicial review, ensuring that the Governor’s report recommending such action must be based on relevant material and not on whims. - ***Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (2006)***: The Court invalidated the dissolution of the **Bihar Assembly**, stating that the Governor’s recommendation was based on extraneous considerations. This case underscored the principle that the Governor’s actions should align with constitutional morality and not be influenced by political biases. - ***Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974)***: The **Supreme Court** held that the Governor, like the President, is bound by the aid and advice of the **Council of Ministers**, except in situations where the **Constitution** explicitly provides for discretion. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Judiciary: Supreme Court of India](https://lawfoyer.in/judiciary-supreme-court-of-india/) **Published:** December 23, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Supreme Court of India stands as the apex judicial authority, entrusted with upholding the Constitution and serving as the ultimate interpreter of law. Established on January 26, 1950, it functions as the guardian of fundamental rights and the final court of appeal. Its comprehensive jurisdiction encompasses original, appellate, and advisory capacities, ensuring the maintenance of constitutional order and the delivery of justice. **Content:** The Supreme Court of India stands as the **apex judicial authority**, entrusted with upholding the **Constitution** and serving as the ultimate interpreter of law. Established on **January 26, 1950**, it functions as the guardian of **fundamental rights** and the final court of appeal. Its comprehensive jurisdiction encompasses **original**, **appellate**, and **advisory** capacities, ensuring the maintenance of constitutional order and the delivery of justice. ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** The Supreme Court of India, as delineated in **Articles 124 to 147 of the Constitution**, is the highest judicial forum and final court of appeal. It holds the authority to adjudicate disputes between the **Union and states**, among **states**, and issues concerning the enforcement of **fundamental rights**. Its decisions are binding across all courts within the Indian territory. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The evolution of the Supreme Court can be traced back to the British colonial era. The **Regulating Act of 1773** established the **Supreme Court of Judicature** at Fort William in **Calcutta**. Post-independence, the **Federal Court of India**, set up under the **Government of India Act 1935**, served as the apex court until the adoption of the Constitution in 1950, which led to the establishment of the present Supreme Court. ## **JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT** The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is multifaceted: - ***Original Jurisdiction***: Under **Article 131**, the Court has exclusive authority to adjudicate disputes between the **Government of India** and one or more **states**, or between **states**. - ***Appellate Jurisdiction***: As per **Articles 132 to 136**, it hears appeals against judgments from lower courts in **civil**, **criminal**, and **constitutional matters**. - ***Advisory Jurisdiction***: **Article 143** empowers the **President** to seek the Court’s opinion on questions of law or fact of public importance. ## **COMPOSITION AND APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES** The Supreme Court comprises the **Chief Justice of India (CJI)** and a sanctioned strength of **33 other judges**. Judges are appointed by the **President**, following the procedure established in the **Constitution**, emphasizing judicial independence. ## **LANDMARK JUDGMENTS AND DOCTRINES** The Supreme Court has delivered several landmark judgments that have shaped Indian jurisprudence: - ***Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)***: This case established the **‘Basic Structure Doctrine’**, asserting that **Parliament** cannot alter the fundamental framework of the Constitution. The Court held that while **Parliament** has wide powers to amend the Constitution, it cannot destroy its basic structure. - ***Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980)***: The Court reinforced the **Basic Structure Doctrine**, emphasizing that **social welfare laws** should not infringe upon **fundamental rights**. It declared certain amendments made by the **42nd Amendment Act** as null and void. - ***S. R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994)***: This judgment clarified the scope of the **President’s power** under **Article 356**, emphasizing that the imposition of **President’s Rule** is subject to **judicial review**. ## **LEGAL MAXIMS AND PRINCIPLES APPLIED** The Supreme Court frequently employs various legal maxims to elucidate legal principles: - ***Stare Decisis***: This principle mandates that courts are bound by their previous decisions, ensuring **consistency** and **predictability** in law. **Article 141 of the Constitution** embodies this principle, stating that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within India. - ***Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit***: Meaning ‘an act of the court shall prejudice no one,’ this maxim ensures that judicial errors do not harm litigants. The Supreme Court has applied this principle to rectify mistakes made by the court to prevent injustice. ## **PROCEDURES AND FUNCTIONING** The Supreme Court operates under a well-defined procedural framework: - ***Filing of Petitions***: Litigants can approach the Court through various petitions, including **writ petitions** under **Article 32** for the enforcement of **fundamental rights**. - ***Hearing and Adjudication***: Cases are heard by benches comprising a minimum of **two judges**. Constitutional matters of significant importance are adjudicated by **larger benches**. - ***Judgment Delivery***: After hearing arguments, the Court delivers its **judgment**, which includes the legal reasoning and the decision. ## **DOCTRINES ESTABLISHED BY THE SUPREME COURT** The Court has propounded several doctrines to interpret constitutional provisions: - ***Doctrine of Basic Structure***: Asserts that certain fundamental features of the **Constitution** cannot be altered by amendments. This doctrine was established in the **Kesavananda Bharati case**, where the Court held that while **Parliament** has the power to amend the Constitution, it cannot alter its **basic structure**. - ***Doctrine of Harmonious Construction***: Aims to resolve conflicts between different constitutional provisions by interpreting them in a manner that harmonizes and gives effect to all. In the case of **CIT v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers (2003)**, the Supreme Court laid down principles to avoid conflicts between provisions and ensure harmonious interpretation. - ***Doctrine of Eclipse***: States that any law inconsistent with **fundamental rights** is not null but becomes unenforceable; it is eclipsed by the **fundamental right** and can become operative if the constitutional prohibition is removed. This doctrine was applied in the case of **Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1955)**, where the Court held that a law inconsistent with **fundamental rights** becomes enforceable again if the inconsistency is removed. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Judiciary: High Courts and Subordinate Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/judiciary-high-courts-and-subordinate-courts/) **Published:** December 23, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** India's judiciary operates within a hierarchical framework, ensuring justice through a structured system of courts. This system comprises the Supreme Court at the apex, followed by High Courts at the state level, and Subordinate Courts at the district and lower levels. Understanding the roles, jurisdictions, and functions of High Courts and Subordinate Courts is essential for comprehending India's legal landscape. **Content:** India’s judiciary operates within a hierarchical framework, ensuring justice through a structured system of courts. This system comprises the **Supreme Court** at the apex, followed by **High Courts** at the state level, and **Subordinate Courts** at the district and lower levels. Understanding the roles, jurisdictions, and functions of High Courts and Subordinate Courts is essential for comprehending India’s legal landscape. ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** - **High Courts**: Established under **Part VI, Chapter V** of the **Indian Constitution**, High Courts are the principal civil courts of original jurisdiction in each state and union territory. They possess appellate authority over **Subordinate Courts** and have the power to issue **writs** under **Article 226** of the Constitution. High Courts ensure the uniform application of law within their territorial jurisdiction. - **Subordinate Courts**: Operating under the supervision of **High Courts**, Subordinate Courts include **District Courts** and other lower courts. They handle the majority of civil and criminal cases, serving as the first point of contact for litigants. These courts ensure that justice is accessible at the grassroots level. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The Indian judicial system has its roots in the **British colonial era**. The establishment of the **Mayor’s Courts** in Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta in **1726** marked the beginning of formalized courts in India. The **Indian High Courts Act of 1861** led to the creation of High Courts in these cities, replacing the **Supreme Courts** and **Sadar Adalats**. Post-independence, the **Constitution of India** established a unified judicial system, with the **Supreme Court** at the top, followed by High Courts and Subordinate Courts. ## **STRUCTURE AND HIERARCHY** The Indian judiciary follows a hierarchical structure: 1. **Supreme Court of India**: The apex court with ultimate appellate authority. 2. **High Courts**: Each state or group of states has a High Court. For instance, the **Allahabad High Court** serves Uttar Pradesh, while the **Punjab and Haryana High Court** serves both Punjab and Haryana. 3. **Subordinate Courts**: These include **District Courts**, **Sessions Courts**, and other lower courts functioning under the High Courts. ## **JURISDICTION AND FUNCTIONS** - **High Courts**: - ***Original Jurisdiction***: In certain matters, such as **company law cases**, High Courts have original jurisdiction. For example, the **Calcutta High Court** has original jurisdiction over cases arising within its territorial limits. - ***Appellate Jurisdiction***: They hear appeals against judgments from Subordinate Courts. For instance, in the case of ***Keshav Singh’s Case***, the **Allahabad High Court** dealt with issues concerning legislative privileges and judicial review. - ***Writ Jurisdiction***: Under **Article 226**, High Courts can issue writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights and other legal rights. In ***Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India***, the **Supreme Court** emphasized the power of High Courts under **Article 226** to address violations of fundamental rights. - **Subordinate Courts**: - ***District Courts***: Handle civil and criminal cases at the district level. For example, the **District Court** in Lucknow deals with cases arising within its jurisdiction in Uttar Pradesh. - ***Sessions Courts***: Primarily deal with serious criminal offenses. In ***State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh***, the Sessions Court’s role in conducting fair trials was highlighted. - ***Magistrate Courts***: Handle minor civil and criminal matters. For instance, **Magistrate Courts** in Delhi deal with petty offenses and preliminary hearings. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** - **Appointment of Judges**: - ***High Courts***: Judges are appointed by the **President of India** in consultation with the **Chief Justice of India** and the **Governor** of the respective state, as per **Article 217** of the Constitution. For example, **Justice Sanjiv Khanna** was appointed as the **Chief Justice of India** following this procedure. - ***Subordinate Courts***: Judges are appointed by the **Governor** in consultation with the **High Court**, following the procedures laid down by the respective state public service commissions. In Uttar Pradesh, the **Public Service Commission** conducts examinations for the appointment of civil judges. - **Jurisdictional Limits**: - ***Pecuniary Jurisdiction***: Courts have monetary limits defining the maximum value of cases they can adjudicate. For instance, **Munsif Courts** may handle cases involving amounts up to ₹1 lakh, while **District Courts** can handle higher-value cases. - ***Territorial Jurisdiction***: Defines the geographical area within which a court can exercise its authority. For example, the **Madurai Bench** of the **Madras High Court** has jurisdiction over southern districts of Tamil Nadu. ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS** - **L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997)**: The **Supreme Court** held that the power of **judicial review** vested in **High Courts** under **Articles 226** and **227** is an integral and essential feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its **basic structure**. - **Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra (1966)**: This case emphasized the inherent powers of High Courts to act **ex debito justitiae** to do real and substantial justice. ## **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - **Doctrine of Judicial Review**: Empowers **High Courts** and the **Supreme Court** to examine the constitutionality of legislative acts and executive orders. In ***Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala***, the **Supreme Court** asserted its authority to review and strike down constitutional amendments that alter the **basic structure** of the Constitution. - **Doctrine of Precedent**: Ensures that lower courts follow the legal principles established by higher courts in previous judgments, maintaining consistency and predictability in the law. For instance, the decision in ***Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India*** set a precedent on the interpretation of the **right to life** and **personal liberty**. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Emergency Provisions: Articles 352-360](https://lawfoyer.in/emergency-provisions-articles-352-360/) **Published:** December 23, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Indian Constitution's emergency provisions (Articles 352-360) empower the central government to address extraordinary situations threatening the nation's security, integrity, or financial stability. These provisions enable a shift from federal to unitary governance during crises, ensuring swift and decisive action. **Content:** The Indian Constitution’s **emergency provisions** (**Articles 352-360**) empower the central government to address extraordinary situations threatening the nation’s security, integrity, or financial stability. These provisions enable a shift from federal to unitary governance during crises, ensuring swift and decisive action. ## **1. MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** **Emergency provisions** allow the central government to assume extensive powers during crises, overriding the federal structure to protect national interests. **Part XVIII** of the Constitution encompasses these provisions, detailing the circumstances and procedures for declaring emergencies. ## **2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The framers of the Indian Constitution incorporated **emergency provisions** inspired by the **Government of India Act 1935** and **Germany’s Weimar Constitution**. These measures aimed to equip the government to handle exceptional situations effectively. Notably, the term **“internal disturbance”** in **Article 352** was replaced with **“armed rebellion”** by the **44th Amendment Act of 1978** to prevent misuse. ## **3. TYPES OF EMERGENCIES** The Constitution outlines three types of emergencies: - **National Emergency (Article 352):** Declared when India’s security is threatened by **war**, **external aggression**, or **armed rebellion**. - **State Emergency (Article 356):** Imposed when a state’s **constitutional machinery** fails, leading to **President’s Rule**. - **Financial Emergency (Article 360):** Proclaimed when India’s **financial stability** or **credit** is endangered. ## **4. NATIONAL EMERGENCY (ARTICLE 352)** **Grounds for Proclamation:** A **National Emergency** can be declared on three grounds: - **War:** Formal armed conflict between India and another nation. - **External Aggression:** Unprovoked attack by a foreign entity without a formal declaration of war. - **Armed Rebellion:** Organized, violent uprising against the government within India. **Procedure:** - The **President** can declare a National Emergency upon receiving a **written recommendation** from the **Union Cabinet**. - The proclamation must be **approved by both Houses of Parliament** within one month by a **special majority**. - Once approved, the emergency remains in force for **six months** and can be extended indefinitely with **parliamentary approval** every six months. **Effects:** - **Fundamental Rights:** **Article 358** suspends the freedoms under **Article 19** during a National Emergency. However, **Articles 20** and **21** remain enforceable. - **Centre-State Relations:** The federal structure becomes **unitary**, allowing **Parliament** to legislate on subjects in the **State List**. - **Executive Authority:** The central government gains overriding executive powers over states. **Case Law:** - **ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976):** The **Supreme Court** controversially held that during a National Emergency, the right to **constitutional remedies** is suspended, and no person could move the court for enforcement of fundamental rights. This judgment was later overruled, restoring the primacy of fundamental rights even during emergencies. ## **5. STATE EMERGENCY (ARTICLE 356)** **Grounds for Proclamation:** Also known as **President’s Rule**, it can be imposed when: - The **President**, based on the **Governor’s report** or otherwise, is satisfied that the state’s governance cannot be carried out per **constitutional provisions**. **Procedure:** - The **President** issues a proclamation, which must be **approved by both Houses of Parliament** within two months. - Initially valid for **six months**, it can be extended up to **three years** with parliamentary approval every six months. Extensions beyond one year require the following conditions: - A **National Emergency** is in operation in the whole or part of the state. - The **Election Commission** certifies that general elections cannot be conducted in the state. **Effects:** - **Executive Authority:** The President assumes the state’s **executive functions**, typically delegating them to the **Governor**. - **Legislative Assembly:** The **state legislature** may be dissolved or suspended. - **Parliamentary Powers:** **Parliament** can legislate on matters in the **State List** for the concerned state. **Case Law:** - **S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994):** The **Supreme Court** held that the President’s proclamation under **Article 356** is subject to **judicial review**. The Court can strike down the proclamation if found **mala fide** or based on irrelevant grounds. This judgment curtailed the arbitrary imposition of **President’s Rule**. ## **6. FINANCIAL EMERGENCY (ARTICLE 360)** **Grounds for Proclamation:** Declared when the **President** is satisfied that India’s **financial stability** or **credit**, or that of any part of its territory, is threatened. **Procedure:** - The **President** issues a proclamation, which must be **approved by both Houses of Parliament** within two months. - Once approved, it remains in force until revoked; there is no maximum time limit. **Effects:** - **Financial Directives:** The **President** can direct states to observe **financial propriety** and can reduce **salaries and allowances** of government employees, including judges. - **Money Bills:** **State Money Bills** require the President’s approval. #### **Notable Point:** As of **December 2024**, a **Financial Emergency** has never been proclaimed in India. **7. SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ABUSE** The **44th Amendment Act of 1978** introduced several safeguards: - Replaced **“internal disturbance”** with **“armed rebellion”** in **Article 352** to prevent misuse. - Required the **President** to act based on the **written advice** of the **Union Cabinet** for proclaiming a National Emergency. - Mandated **parliamentary approval** for emergency proclamations and their periodic renewal. - Ensured that **Articles 20** and **21** cannot be suspended during an emergency. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Amendment Procedure: Article 368](https://lawfoyer.in/amendment-procedure-article-368/) **Published:** December 23, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Article 368 of the Indian Constitution outlines the procedure for amending the Constitution, enabling adaptability to changing societal needs while preserving its foundational principles **Content:** Article 368 of the Indian Constitution outlines the procedure for amending the Constitution, enabling adaptability to changing societal needs while preserving its foundational principles. ## **MEANING AND EXPLANATION OF ARTICLE 368** **Article 368** grants **Parliament** the authority to amend the Constitution by adding, varying, or repealing any provision, following a specific procedure distinct from ordinary legislative processes. This ensures that amendments undergo thorough deliberation, reflecting the collective will of the people and their representatives ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION** The framers of the Constitution recognized the need for a balance between rigidity and flexibility. Initially, the Constitution allowed amendments through a simple majority. However, experiences over time highlighted the necessity for a more structured process to safeguard essential features. This led to the incorporation of **Article 368**, establishing a comprehensive amendment procedure. ## **TYPES OF AMENDMENTS UNDER ARTICLE 368** **Article 368** provides for two types of amendments: - ***Amendments by Simple Majority:*** Certain provisions can be amended by a simple majority in **Parliament**. These are not considered amendments under **Article 368.** - ***Amendments by Special Majority:*** Most constitutional amendments require a **special majority**, i.e., a majority of the total membership of each House and a two-thirds majority of members present and voting. Some amendments also require ratification by at least half of the **state legislatures** ## **PROCEDURE FOR AMENDMENT** The amendment process involves several steps: 1. ***Initiation:*** An amendment can be proposed by introducing a Bill in either House of **Parliament**. **State legislatures** cannot initiate amendments 2. ***Passage in Parliament:*** The Bill must be passed in each House by the required **special majority**. There is no provision for a joint sitting in case of disagreement between the Houses 3. ***State Ratification:*** For amendments affecting federal provisions, ratification by at least half of the **state legislatures** is necessary. This ensures federal balance and reflects the consent of the states 4. ***Presidential Assent:*** After parliamentary approval and, if required, state ratification, the Bill is presented to the **President** for assent. The President is obligated to give assent, after which the amendment becomes part of the Constitution ## **DOCTRINE OF BASIC STRUCTURE** The **Supreme Court**, in the landmark case of **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461**, introduced the **Basic Structure Doctrine**, asserting that while **Parliament** has wide powers to amend the Constitution, it cannot alter its **basic structure**. This doctrine ensures that fundamental aspects like the **supremacy of the Constitution**, **republican and democratic form of government**, **secular character**, **separation of powers**, and **federalism** remain inviolable ## **KEY CASE LAWS AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE** 1. **Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 458:** The **Supreme Court** upheld the validity of the **First Amendment**, stating that Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution under **Article 368** includes the ability to amend **Fundamental Rights**. 2. **Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1965 AIR 845:** The Court reaffirmed that constitutional amendments made under **Article 368** are not “law” under **Article 13** and thus cannot be challenged for violating **Fundamental Rights**. 3. **Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643:** The **Supreme Court** held that Parliament could not amend **Fundamental Rights**, viewing such amendments as “law” under **Article 13(2)**. This decision was later overturned by the **24th Amendment**. 4. **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461:** This landmark judgment established the **Basic Structure Doctrine**, limiting Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution by protecting its essential features. 5. **Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789:** The Court reaffirmed the **Basic Structure Doctrine**, striking down clauses that sought to exclude **judicial review** of constitutional amendments, thereby preserving the balance between **Fundamental Rights** and **Directive Principles**. ## **PRINCIPLES AND DOCTRINES RELATED TO ARTICLE 368** - **Doctrine of Basic Structure:** Asserts that certain fundamental features of the Constitution cannot be altered by amendments. - **Doctrine of Implied Limitations:** Suggests that there are inherent limitations on Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution, even if not explicitly stated. ## **LEGAL MAXIMS RELEVANT TO CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS** - **“Salus populi suprema lex esto”:** The welfare of the people shall be the supreme law. This maxim underscores the purpose behind allowing constitutional amendments—to serve the public good by adapting to changing needs. - **“Lex iniusta non est lex”:** An unjust law is no law at all. This principle emphasizes that amendments should not result in unjust laws that violate the Constitution’s core principles. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Schedules of the Indian Constitution](https://lawfoyer.in/schedules-of-the-indian-constitution/) **Published:** December 23, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The First Schedule lists all states and union territories, along with their territorial jurisdictions. It is referenced in Articles 1 and 4 of the Constitution. This Schedule has been amended multiple times to reflect changes in state boundaries and the creation of new states. **Content:** **THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: AN OVERVIEW OF THE 12 SCHEDULES** The Indian Constitution comprises **12 Schedules**, each detailing specific aspects of governance and administration. These Schedules provide clarity and structure to the constitutional framework, ensuring organized governance. ### **1. FIRST SCHEDULE: STATES AND UNION TERRITORIES** The **First Schedule** lists all **states and union territories**, along with their territorial jurisdictions. It is referenced in **Articles 1** and **4** of the Constitution. This Schedule has been amended multiple times to reflect changes in state boundaries and the creation of new states. ### **2. SECOND SCHEDULE: EMOLUMENTS OF HIGH OFFICIALS** This Schedule outlines the **salaries, allowances, and privileges** of constitutional dignitaries, including: - **The President** - **The Governors of States** - **The Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Lok Sabha** - **The Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha** - **The Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts** - **The Comptroller and Auditor General of India** It is associated with **Articles 59, 65, 75, 97, 125, 148, 158, 164, 186, and 221**. ### **3. THIRD SCHEDULE: FORMS OF OATHS AND AFFIRMATIONS** The **Third Schedule** prescribes the **oaths or affirmations** for: - **Union and State Ministers** - **Members of Parliament** - **Members of State Legislatures** - **Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts** - **The Comptroller and Auditor General** These oaths affirm allegiance to the Constitution and commitment to uphold its principles, as detailed in **Articles 75, 84, 99, 124, 146, 173, 188, and 219**. ### **4. FOURTH SCHEDULE: ALLOCATION OF SEATS IN THE RAJYA SABHA** This Schedule specifies the **number of seats allocated** to each state and union territory in the **Rajya Sabha (Council of States)**, ensuring proportional representation. It is linked to **Articles 4** and **80**. ### **5. FIFTH SCHEDULE: ADMINISTRATION OF SCHEDULED AREAS AND TRIBES** The **Fifth Schedule** contains provisions for the **administration and control** of **Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes**, aiming to protect indigenous communities’ rights and interests. It is referenced in **Article 244**. ### **6. SIXTH SCHEDULE: PROVISIONS FOR TRIBAL AREAS** This Schedule provides for the **administration of tribal areas** in **Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram**, granting them autonomy through **District and Regional Councils**. It is associated with **Articles 244** and **275**. ### **7. SEVENTH SCHEDULE: DIVISION OF POWERS** The **Seventh Schedule** delineates the **distribution of powers** between the Union and State governments through three lists: - **Union List**: Subjects under the exclusive jurisdiction of **Parliament**. - **State List**: Subjects under the exclusive jurisdiction of **State Legislatures**. - **Concurrent List**: Subjects where both Parliament and State Legislatures can legislate. This division is crucial for federal governance and is detailed in **Article 246**. ### **8. EIGHTH SCHEDULE: OFFICIAL LANGUAGES** The **Eighth Schedule** lists the recognized **official languages** of India. Originally, it included **14 languages**; subsequent amendments have expanded this number to **22**. It is linked to **Articles 344** and **351**. ### **9. NINTH SCHEDULE: VALIDATION OF CERTAIN ACTS AND REGULATIONS** Introduced by the **First Amendment in 1951**, the **Ninth Schedule** was created to protect **land reform** and other laws from judicial review, even if they contravened fundamental rights. However, in ***I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu***, **(2007) 2 SCC 1**, the Supreme Court held that **laws placed in the Ninth Schedule after April 24, 1973**, are subject to judicial review if they violate the **basic structure** of the Constitution. This Schedule is associated with **Article 31B**. ### **10. TENTH SCHEDULE: ANTI-DEFECTION PROVISIONS** Popularly known as the **Anti-Defection Law**, this Schedule was added by the **52nd Amendment in 1985**. It provides for the **disqualification of Members of Parliament and State Legislatures** on grounds of **defection** to maintain political stability. It is linked to **Articles 102** and **191**. ### **11. ELEVENTH SCHEDULE: POWERS OF PANCHAYATS** Inserted by the **73rd Amendment in 1992**, the **Eleventh Schedule** details the **powers, authority, and responsibilities** of **Panchayats (rural local governments)**, covering **29 functional items**. It is associated with **Article 243G**. ### **12. TWELFTH SCHEDULE: POWERS OF MUNICIPALITIES** Added by the **74th Amendment in 1992**, the **Twelfth Schedule** specifies the **powers, authority, and responsibilities** of **Municipalities (urban local governments)**, encompassing **18 functional items**. It is linked to **Article 243W**. ### **CASE LAWS AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS** 1. ***Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala***, **(1973) 4 SCC 225**: This landmark case introduced the **Basic Structure Doctrine**, asserting that certain fundamental features of the Constitution cannot be altered by amendments. This doctrine has implications for the interpretation and application of various Schedules, especially the **Ninth Schedule**. 2. ***I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu***, **(2007) 2 SCC 1**: The Supreme Court ruled that **laws placed in the Ninth Schedule after April 24, 1973**, are open to judicial review if they violate the **basic structure** of the Constitution. This judgment ensures that the protection offered by the Ninth Schedule is not absolute. 3. ***Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar***, **AIR 1952 SC 252**: This case was one of the earliest challenges to the validity of the **Ninth Schedule**. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Official Language Provisions: Articles 343-351](https://lawfoyer.in/official-language-provisions-articles-343-351/) **Published:** December 23, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Indian Constitution's Articles 343 to 351 outline the framework for the Union's official language, emphasizing Hindi in Devanagari script while accommodating linguistic diversity. **Content:** The Indian Constitution’s **Articles 343 to 351** outline the framework for the Union’s official language, emphasizing **Hindi in Devanagari script** while accommodating linguistic diversity. ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** *Part XVII* of the Indian Constitution addresses the official language of the Union. **Article 343(1)** designates **Hindi in Devanagari script** as the official language. However, **Article 343(2)** permits the continued use of **English** for official purposes for 15 years from the Constitution’s commencement. This transitional period aimed to facilitate a smooth shift to **Hindi**. **Article 343(3)** empowers **Parliament** to legislate the continued use of **English** beyond this period, which it did through the **Official Languages Act, 1963**, allowing **English** to remain in official use alongside **Hindi**. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The Constituent Assembly debated extensively on the official language issue, balancing national unity with linguistic diversity. The **Munshi-Ayyangar formula** emerged as a compromise, leading to the adoption of **Hindi** as the official language and permitting **English’s** continued use for a transitional period. This compromise acknowledged regional linguistic sentiments and aimed to prevent national discord. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** - ***Article 344***: Mandates the **President** to constitute a Commission at the expiration of five and ten years from the Constitution’s commencement to recommend measures for the progressive use of **Hindi** and restrictions on **English**. A **Parliamentary Committee** examines these recommendations. - ***Article 345***: Allows **State Legislatures** to adopt any language in use in the state or **Hindi** as the official language for state purposes, ensuring flexibility in regional language adoption. - ***Article 346***: Specifies that the language for communication between states and between a state and the Union shall be the Union’s official language, with provisions for **Hindi** use if agreed upon by the concerned states. - ***Article 347***: Empowers the **President** to recognize a language spoken by a substantial population of a state as an official language upon demand, facilitating linguistic inclusivity. - ***Article 348***: Stipulates that proceedings in the **Supreme Court** and **High Courts**, as well as authoritative texts of laws, shall be in **English** unless **Parliament** provides otherwise, ensuring clarity in legal matters. - ***Article 349***: Restricts **Parliament** from considering bills or amendments related to language provisions without the **President’s** recommendation, ensuring executive oversight. - ***Article 350***: Grants individuals the right to submit grievances to any authority in any language used in the Union or state, promoting linguistic freedom. - ***Article 350A***: Obliges states and local authorities to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the **mother tongue** at the primary stage, supporting educational rights. - ***Article 350B***: Provides for a **Special Officer for linguistic minorities** to investigate and report on safeguards for their rights, ensuring protection of linguistic minorities. - ***Article 351***: Directs the Union to promote the spread of **Hindi**, develop it to serve as a medium of expression for India’s composite culture, and enrich it by assimilating forms and expressions from other languages, fostering linguistic development. ## **GUIDELINES / RULES / REGULATIONS / NOTIFICATIONS / CIRCULARS** The **Official Languages Act, 1963**, and its subsequent amendments govern the use of **Hindi** and **English** for official purposes. The Act provides for the continued use of **English** alongside **Hindi** for official purposes of the Union and for use in **Parliament**, ensuring bilingual functionality in government operations. ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** - ***M.N. Ravichandran v. Union of India (1987)***: The petitioner sought enforcement of **Hindi** as the sole official language. The **Madras High Court** held that while **Article 343(1)** designates **Hindi** as the official language, **Article 343(3)** empowers **Parliament** to continue the use of **English**. The court emphasized that the constitutional provisions allow for the use of both languages, reflecting the bilingual policy adopted by the Union. - ***P. Madhusudan Naidu v. Central Public Information Officer (2016)***: The appellant contended that official communications should be in **Hindi**. The **Central Information Commission** reiterated that both **Hindi** and **English** are permitted for official purposes, and individuals have the right to receive information in either language, upholding the bilingual nature of official communications. ## **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - **Doctrine of Harmonious Construction**: Applied to interpret the language provisions, ensuring that the promotion of **Hindi** does not impede the use of **English** and vice versa, maintaining a balance between different linguistic groups. ## **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** - **Lex Non Cogit Ad Impossibilia**: The law does not compel the impossible. This principle underlies the gradual approach in implementing **Hindi** as the official language, acknowledging practical challenges in immediate enforcement. ## **AMENDMENTS / ADDITIONS / REPEALING** The **Official Languages Act, 1963**, was amended in **1967** to ensure the indefinite continuation of **English** for official purposes alongside **Hindi**, responding to resistance against the complete replacement of **English**. ## **STATISTICAL ANALYSIS / DATA ANALYSIS** As per the **2011 Census**, **43.63%** of Indians declared **Hindi** as their mother tongue, reflecting its widespread use. However, regional languages also hold significant importance, underscoring the necessity of a bilingual approach. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Special Provisions for Certain States: Articles 370 and 371](https://lawfoyer.in/special-provisions-for-certain-states-articles-370-and-371/) **Published:** December 23, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Articles 370 and 371 of the Indian Constitution provided special provisions for certain states, acknowledging their unique circumstances and needs. Article 370 granted special autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir, while Article 371 encompasses provisions tailored for various other states to address their distinct requirements. **Content:** Articles 370 and 371 of the Indian Constitution provided special provisions for certain states, acknowledging their unique circumstances and needs. **Article 370** granted special autonomy to **Jammu and Kashmir**, while **Article 371** encompasses provisions tailored for various other states to address their distinct requirements. ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ARTICLE 370** *Article 370* originated from the **Instrument of Accession** signed by **Maharaja Hari Singh** of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947, allowing the state to accede to India under specific terms. This article permitted Jammu and Kashmir to have its own **constitution** and limited the Indian Parliament’s legislative powers over the state to matters of **defense, external affairs, and communications**. The state’s **Constituent Assembly** was empowered to decide on the extension of other constitutional provisions. *Article 370* was intended as a **temporary provision**, pending the state’s Constituent Assembly’s decision on the state’s relationship with India. ### **ABROGATION OF ARTICLE 370** On **August 5, 2019**, the **Government of India** abrogated *Article 370*, revoking Jammu and Kashmir’s special status. This was achieved through **Presidential Orders C.O. 272 and C.O. 273**, along with the passage of the **Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019**, which bifurcated the state into two **Union Territories**: Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh. ### **SUPREME COURT VERDICT ON ARTICLE 370 ABROGATION** In **December 2023**, the **Supreme Court of India** upheld the abrogation of *Article 370*, stating that the provision was indeed temporary and that the **President** had the authority to revoke it. The Court emphasized that the move was part of a long-term exercise to integrate Jammu and Kashmir into the **Union of India**. ### **ARTICLE 371: SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR OTHER STATES** Articles **371 to 371J** in **Part XXI** of the Constitution contain special provisions for various states to meet the aspirations of the people, protect cultural and economic interests, and address **law and order conditions**. These provisions recognize the **unique needs of different regions**, particularly those with significant tribal populations or distinct cultural identities. #### **KEY PROVISIONS UNDER ARTICLE 371** - ***Article 371A (Nagaland):*** Parliamentary acts related to **Naga religious and social practices**, **customary law**, **administration of civil and criminal justice**, and **ownership and transfer of land and resources** do not apply to Nagaland unless approved by the state **Legislative Assembly**. - ***Article 371B (Assam):*** Provides for the creation of a **committee** of the Assam Legislative Assembly consisting of members from the state’s **tribal areas** to ensure the protection of their interests. - ***Article 371C (Manipur):*** Similar to Assam, it provides for a **committee** of the Legislative Assembly consisting of members from the **Hill Areas** to safeguard their interests. - ***Article 371D (Andhra Pradesh and Telangana):*** Ensures **equitable opportunities and facilities** in public employment and education across different regions of the states. - ***Article 371E:*** Provides for the establishment of a **central university** in Andhra Pradesh. - ***Article 371F (Sikkim):*** Protects the rights and interests of various sections of the **Sikkimese population**, ensuring legislative representation and safeguarding existing **laws and customs**. - ***Article 371G (Mizoram):*** Similar to Nagaland, it restricts the application of **parliamentary acts** related to Mizo **religious and social practices**, **customary law**, and **ownership and transfer of land** unless approved by the state Legislative Assembly. - ***Article 371H (Arunachal Pradesh):*** The **Governor** has special responsibility for **law and order** in the state, and acts of Parliament related to **religious or social practices** of the tribes, **customary law**, and **ownership and transfer of land** apply only if the Legislative Assembly so decides. - ***Article 371I (Goa):*** Provides for a **Legislative Assembly** of not less than **30 members**. - ***Article 371J (Karnataka):*** Grants special status to the **Hyderabad-Karnataka region**, providing for **equitable allocation of funds for development**, **reservation in state government jobs**, and **educational institutions**. ### **LEGAL DOCTRINES AND PRINCIPLES** The special provisions under **Articles 370 and 371** reflect the constitutional doctrine of **asymmetric federalism**, where different states have varying degrees of autonomy based on their unique circumstances. This approach acknowledges the **diversity within the nation** and aims to provide tailored governance structures to meet specific regional needs. ### **CASE LAWS AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS** - ***Prem Nath Kaul v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (1959):*** The **Supreme Court** held that the **concurrence** given by the state government under *Article 370(1)* was provisional and required ratification by the state’s **Constituent Assembly**. Once the Constituent Assembly was dissolved, no further extension of powers was possible without its recommendation. - ***Sampat Prakash v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (1969):*** The **Supreme Court** upheld the continuation of *Article 370*, stating that it would remain operative until the **President**, upon the recommendation of the **Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir**, declares otherwise. ### **AMENDMENTS AND REPEAL** The abrogation of **Article 370** in **2019** marked a significant constitutional change, leading to the reorganization of Jammu and Kashmir into **Union Territories**. This move was accompanied by debates on its **constitutional validity** and its implications for **federalism**. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Panchayati Raj Institutions: Articles 243-243O](https://lawfoyer.in/panchayati-raj-institutions-articles-243-243o/) **Published:** December 23, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) in India, established under Articles 243 to 243O of the Constitution, form the backbone of rural self-governance. These provisions, introduced by the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act of 1992, aim to decentralize power and promote democratic participation at the grassroots level. **Content:** Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) in India, established under **Articles 243 to 243O** of the Constitution, form the backbone of rural self-governance. These provisions, introduced by the **73rd Constitutional Amendment Act of 1992**, aim to decentralize power and promote democratic participation at the grassroots level. ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** The term ‘**Panchayati Raj**‘ refers to a system of governance in which **Gram Panchayats** are the basic units of administration. It has a **three-tier structure**: village, intermediate (block), and district levels. **Article 243** defines key terms: - **District**: A district in a State. - **Gram Sabha**: *A body consisting of persons registered in the electoral rolls relating to a village within the area of a Panchayat at the village level.* - **Intermediate Level**: *A level between the village and district levels specified by the Governor of a State.* - **Panchayat**: *An institution of self-government constituted under Article 243B for rural areas.* - **Panchayat Area**: *The territorial area of a Panchayat.* - **Population**: *The population as ascertained at the last preceding census of which the relevant figures have been published.* - **Village**: *A village specified by the Governor by public notification to be a village for the purposes of this Part and includes a group of villages so specified.* ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The Panchayati Raj system has deep roots in Indian history, with traditional village councils playing a significant role in local governance. Post-independence, the need for a structured system led to the establishment of various committees: - **Balwant Rai Mehta Committee (1957)**: *Recommended a three-tier system—Gram Panchayat, Panchayat Samiti, and Zila Parishad—to promote democratic decentralization.* - **Ashok Mehta Committee (1977)**: *Suggested a two-tier system and emphasized the need for regular elections and financial autonomy.* - **G.V.K. Rao Committee (1985)**: *Highlighted the importance of Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) in rural development and recommended assigning specific planning and implementation responsibilities to them.* - **L.M. Singhvi Committee (1986)**: *Advocated for constitutional recognition of PRIs to ensure their stability and effectiveness.* These recommendations culminated in the **73rd Amendment**, granting constitutional status to PRIs and introducing **Part IX** (**Articles 243 to 243O**) and the **Eleventh Schedule**, detailing 29 subjects under PRIs’ purview. ### **THREE-TIER SYSTEM OF PANCHAYATI RAJ** **Article 243B** mandates the establishment of Panchayats at the village, intermediate, and district levels in every state, bringing uniformity to the structure across India. States with populations below 20 lakhs may choose not to constitute Panchayats at the intermediate level. ### **COMPOSITION OF PANCHAYATS** **Article 243C** allows state legislatures to determine Panchayats’ composition, ensuring: - **Direct Elections**: *All seats in a Panchayat are filled by direct elections from territorial constituencies.* - **Uniform Representation**: *The ratio between the population of each constituency and the number of seats allotted should be consistent throughout the Panchayat area.* - **Chairperson Election**: *At the village level, the Chairperson (Sarpanch) may be elected directly or indirectly, as provided by state law. At intermediate and district levels, Chairpersons are elected indirectly from among the elected members.* ### **RESERVATION OF SEATS** **Article 243D** provides for reservation to ensure inclusivity: - **Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes**: *Seats are reserved in proportion to their population in the Panchayat area.* - **Women**: *Not less than one-third of the total seats, including those reserved for SCs and STs, are reserved for women.* - **Backward Classes**: *State legislatures may provide reservations for backward classes.* ### **DURATION OF PANCHAYATS** **Article 243E** stipulates a five-year term for every Panchayat. Elections must be conducted before the term expires. In case of early dissolution, elections should be held within six months. ### **POWERS, AUTHORITY, AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF PANCHAYATS** **Article 243G** empowers state legislatures to endow Panchayats with necessary powers and authority to function as institutions of self-government. This includes: - **Preparation of Plans**: *For economic development and social justice.* - **Implementation of Schemes**: *Related to matters listed in the Eleventh Schedule, such as agriculture, health, education, and social welfare.* ### **FINANCIAL PROVISIONS** **Article 243H** authorizes state legislatures to empower Panchayats to: - **Levy and Collect Taxes**: *Duties, tolls, and fees.* - **Receive Grants-in-Aid**: *From the state government.* Additionally, **Article 243I** mandates the constitution of a **State Finance Commission** every five years to review Panchayats’ financial positions and recommend measures to enhance their resources. ### **STATE ELECTION COMMISSION** **Article 243K** provides for a **State Election Commission** responsible for superintendence, direction, and control of Panchayat elections, ensuring free and fair electoral processes. ### **JUDICIAL NON-INTERFERENCE** **Article 243O** bars courts from interfering in Panchayat electoral matters, emphasizing that disputes should be resolved through election petitions as prescribed by state laws. This provision ensures the uninterrupted functioning of the electoral process. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Municipalities: Articles 243P-243ZG](https://lawfoyer.in/municipalities-articles-243p-243zg/) **Published:** December 23, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Constitution (Seventy-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1992, introduced Part IX-A, encompassing Articles 243P to 243ZG, to provide a constitutional framework for urban local governance in India. This amendment aimed to strengthen municipalities as institutions of self-government, ensuring democratic decentralization and efficient urban administration. **Content:** The Constitution (Seventy-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1992, introduced **Part IX-A**, encompassing **Articles 243P to 243ZG**, to provide a constitutional framework for urban local governance in India. This amendment aimed to strengthen **municipalities** as institutions of self-government, ensuring **democratic decentralization** and efficient urban administration. ## **DEFINITIONS (ARTICLE 243P)** *Article 243P defines key terms related to municipalities:* - **Committee**: A **committee** constituted under **Article 243S**. - **District**: A **district** in a state. - **Metropolitan Area**: An area with a population of ten lakhs (one million) or more, comprising one or more districts and consisting of two or more **municipalities** or **panchayats** or other contiguous areas, specified by the **Governor** by public notification. - **Municipal Area**: The territorial area of a **municipality** as notified by the **Governor**. - **Municipality**: An institution of self-government constituted under **Article 243Q**. - **Panchayat**: A **panchayat** constituted under **Article 243B**. - **Population**: The population as ascertained at the last preceding **census** of which the relevant figures have been published. ## **CONSTITUTION OF MUNICIPALITIES (ARTICLE 243Q)** *Article 243Q mandates the constitution of municipalities in urban areas:* - **Nagar Panchayat**: For **transitional areas** from rural to urban. - **Municipal Council**: For smaller urban areas. - **Municipal Corporation**: For larger urban areas. The **Governor**, considering factors like population, density, revenue, and economic importance, specifies these areas. ## **COMPOSITION OF MUNICIPALITIES (ARTICLE 243R)** *Article 243R outlines the composition:* - **Elected Members**: Directly elected from territorial constituencies in the municipal area. - **Nominated Members**: Persons with special knowledge or experience in municipal administration, without **voting rights**. The **Legislature of a State** may, by law, provide for the manner of election of the **Chairperson of a Municipality**. ## **WARDS COMMITTEES (ARTICLE 243S)** *Article 243S provides for:* - **Constitution**: **Wards Committees** in municipalities with a population of three lakhs (300,000) or more. - **Composition**: One or more **wards**, as determined by state legislation. This ensures **decentralized decision-making** within large municipalities. ## **RESERVATION OF SEATS (ARTICLE 243T)** *Article 243T ensures representation for marginalized groups:* - **Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs)**: Seats reserved in proportion to their population in the municipal area. - **Women**: Not less than **one-third** of total seats reserved for women, including those from **SCs** and **STs**. - **Backward Classes**: **State legislatures** may provide reservations for backward classes. ## **DURATION OF MUNICIPALITIES (ARTICLE 243U)** *Article 243U stipulates:* - **Term**: **Five years** from the date of the first meeting. - **Elections**: To be completed before the expiry of the term or within **six months** of dissolution. This ensures regular **elections** and continuity in governance. ## **DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR MEMBERSHIP (ARTICLE 243V)** *Article 243V specifies disqualifications:* - **Criteria**: As per **state legislature laws**, similar to disqualifications for **state legislative assemblies**. - **Age**: Minimum age of **21 years** for membership. This maintains the integrity and eligibility of municipal members. ## **POWERS, AUTHORITY, AND RESPONSIBILITIES (ARTICLE 243W)** *Article 243W empowers state legislatures to endow municipalities with necessary powers to function as self-governments, including:* - **Preparation of Plans**: For **economic development** and **social justice**. - **Implementation of Schemes**: Related to matters in the **Twelfth Schedule**, such as **urban planning**, **water supply**, and **public health**. ## **FINANCIAL POWERS (ARTICLE 243X)** *Article 243X grants municipalities authority to:* - **Levy Taxes**: Duties, tolls, and fees as authorized by **state law**. - **Receive Grants**: From the **state government**. - **Loans**: Raise funds through **borrowing**, subject to state conditions. This financial autonomy enables municipalities to manage local affairs effectively. ## **FINANCE COMMISSION (ARTICLE 243Y)** *Article 243Y mandates:* - **State Finance Commission**: Constitution every five years to review the financial position of municipalities. - **Recommendations**: Distribution of taxes between the **state** and **municipalities**, **grants-in-aid**, and measures to improve financial health. This ensures **fiscal federalism** and resource allocation. ## **AUDIT OF ACCOUNTS (ARTICLE 243Z)** *Article 243Z requires:* - **Maintenance**: Of **municipal accounts**. - **Audit**: Regular auditing as per **state laws**. This promotes **transparency** and accountability in municipal finances. ## **ELECTIONS TO MUNICIPALITIES (ARTICLE 243ZA)** *Article 243ZA provides:* - The **State Election Commission** is responsible for superintendence, direction, and control of municipal elections. - Elections to municipalities must be conducted in a free and fair manner. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Scheduled and Tribal Areas: Articles 244-244A](https://lawfoyer.in/scheduled-and-tribal-areas-articles-244-244a/) **Published:** December 24, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Articles 244 and 244A of the Indian Constitution provide a framework for administering Scheduled and Tribal Areas, ensuring the protection of indigenous communities' rights and cultures. **Content:** **Articles 244 and 244A** of the Indian Constitution provide a framework for administering Scheduled and Tribal Areas, ensuring the protection of indigenous communities’ rights and cultures. ### **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** **Article 244** addresses the administration of Scheduled and Tribal Areas: - ***Article 244(1)***: **Applies the Fifth Schedule** to the administration and control of Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes in states other than Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram. - ***Article 244(2)***: **Applies the Sixth Schedule** to the administration of Tribal Areas in Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram. ***Article 244A***, introduced by the **Twenty-second Amendment Act of 1969**, allows for the formation of an autonomous state within Assam’s tribal areas, providing greater autonomy than the Sixth Schedule. ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The distinct administrative provisions for Scheduled and Tribal Areas stem from the need to protect indigenous communities from exploitation and to preserve their unique cultures. - **The Fifth and Sixth Schedules** were incorporated to provide self-governance mechanisms and safeguard tribal interests. - ***Article 244A*** was later introduced to address demands for greater autonomy within Assam’s tribal regions. ### **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** #### **FIFTH SCHEDULE (ARTICLE 244(1))** - ***Scheduled Areas***: Regions with a significant tribal population, economic backwardness, and distinct cultural practices. - ***Administration***: Governors have special responsibilities, including: - Submitting **annual reports** to the President on Scheduled Areas’ administration. - Making regulations to: - **Prohibit or restrict land transfers** among Scheduled Tribes. - **Regulate land allotment** to Scheduled Tribes. - **Control money-lending activities** to prevent exploitation. - ***Tribes Advisory Council (TAC)***: Constituted in each state with Scheduled Areas to advise on tribal welfare and advancement. #### **SIXTH SCHEDULE (ARTICLE 244(2))** - ***Tribal Areas***: Applies to Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram. - ***Autonomous District and Regional Councils***: Empowered to: - **Legislate** on specified subjects. - **Administer justice** through traditional courts. - Manage **land, forests (excluding reserved forests), and water resources**. - Regulate **social customs and tribal laws**. #### **ARTICLE 244A** - ***Autonomous State Formation***: Parliament can create an autonomous state within Assam’s tribal areas, with: - A **legislature**. - A **Council of Ministers**. - ***Enhanced Powers***: Provides more autonomy than the Sixth Schedule, including **control over law and order**. ### **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS** - ***Samatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1997)***: The Supreme Court held that government land, tribal land, and forest land in Scheduled Areas cannot be leased to non-tribals or private industries, emphasizing the protection of tribal land rights. - **Brief Facts**: **Samatha**, a social organization, challenged the state government’s decision to lease tribal lands to private mining companies. - **Issue Raised**: Whether leasing tribal lands to non-tribals violated the **Fifth Schedule**. - **Held**: Such leases are unconstitutional; **tribal lands must be preserved** for tribal communities. - ***Union of India v. Rakesh Kumar (2010)***: The Supreme Court ruled that state governments must adhere to the **Fifth Schedule’s provisions**, including obtaining the President’s assent for laws affecting Scheduled Areas. - **Brief Facts**: The validity of certain state laws affecting Scheduled Areas was challenged. - **Issue Raised**: Whether the state laws complied with the **Fifth Schedule’s requirements**. - **Held**: **State laws impacting Scheduled Areas require the President’s assent** to be valid. ### **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - ***Doctrine of Protective Discrimination***: The Constitution provides special provisions for Scheduled and Tribal Areas to protect marginalized communities from exploitation and to promote their welfare. - ***Theory of Autonomy***: Recognizes the need for **self-governance** in tribal regions to preserve indigenous cultures and practices. ### **GUIDELINES / RULES / REGULATIONS** - ***Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA)***: Extends the provisions of **Part IX of the Constitution** to Scheduled Areas, empowering Gram Sabhas to manage resources and adjudicate disputes. - ***Forest Rights Act, 2006***: Recognizes the rights of forest-dwelling Scheduled Tribes over forest land and resources. ### **AMENDMENTS / ADDITIONS / REPEALING** - ***Twenty-second Amendment Act, 1969***: Introduced **Article 244A**, allowing for the creation of an autonomous state within Assam’s tribal areas. ### **STATISTICAL ANALYSIS / DATA ANALYSIS** - ***Scheduled Areas Coverage***: Approximately **11.3% of India’s land area** is designated as Scheduled Areas, inhabited by various Scheduled Tribes comprising **8.6% of the country’s population**. ### **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** - ***Criticism***: Implementation of protective measures has been **inconsistent**, leading to continued exploitation and marginalization of tribal communities. - ***Appreciation***: The constitutional provisions acknowledge the **unique status** of tribal communities and aim to **preserve their cultural heritage** and provide autonomy. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Anti-Defection Law: Tenth Schedule](https://lawfoyer.in/anti-defection-law-tenth-schedule/) **Published:** December 24, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Anti-Defection Law, encapsulated in the Tenth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, aims to curb political defections by legislators, ensuring stability in the government and upholding the sanctity of the electoral mandate. **Content:** The **Anti-Defection Law**, encapsulated in the **Tenth Schedule** of the **Indian Constitution**, aims to curb political defections by legislators, ensuring stability in the government and upholding the sanctity of the electoral mandate. ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** *Defection* refers to the act of abandoning one’s political party to join another, often for personal gain or due to ideological shifts. The **Anti-Defection Law**, introduced through the **52nd Amendment Act of 1985**, seeks to deter such practices by disqualifying defecting legislators from their parliamentary or assembly seats. This law applies to both **Parliament** and **state legislatures**, aiming to maintain the integrity of the political process. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The phenomenon of political defections became prominent in the late 1960s, notably with the case of **Gaya Lal**, an **MLA from Haryana**, who changed parties thrice within a fortnight, giving rise to the term “**Aaya Ram Gaya Ram**.” Such rampant defections led to political instability, prompting the need for a legal framework to address the issue. Consequently, the **Anti-Defection Law** was enacted in **1985**, adding the **Tenth Schedule** to the Constitution. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** The **Tenth Schedule** outlines the grounds for disqualification: - **Voluntary Giving Up of Membership**: A legislator who voluntarily resigns from their party is liable for disqualification. The **Supreme Court**, in **Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India**, interpreted that “*voluntarily giving up*” isn’t limited to formal resignation but can be inferred from conduct. - **Voting Against Party Directions**: Voting or abstaining from voting contrary to the party’s directive (**whip**) without prior permission can lead to disqualification. However, if the party condones the act within 15 days, disqualification can be avoided. - **Independent and Nominated Members**: An **independent member** joining a political party after the election, or a **nominated member** joining a party six months after taking their seat, attracts disqualification. The decision on disqualification is made by the **Speaker** or **Chairman** of the respective House, and their decision is subject to **judicial review**. ## **AMENDMENTS / ADDITIONS / REPEALING** The **Anti-Defection Law** has undergone significant amendments: - **91st Amendment Act, 2003**: This amendment removed the provision allowing disqualification exemptions in case of splits, which previously permitted one-third of the members to split without disqualification. Now, only **mergers involving at least two-thirds** of the members are exempt from disqualification. Additionally, it restricted the size of the **Council of Ministers** to **15%** of the legislative members, aiming to prevent jumbo cabinets formed to entice legislators. ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** - **Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992)**: This landmark judgment upheld the constitutionality of the **Anti-Defection Law** but allowed for **judicial review** of the Speaker’s decisions, ensuring they are not absolute and can be challenged on grounds of **malafides** or **perversity**. - **Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya (2007)**: The **Supreme Court** set aside the **Uttar Pradesh Assembly Speaker’s decision**, emphasizing that the Speaker’s powers under the **Tenth Schedule** should be exercised judiciously and are subject to **judicial scrutiny**. ## **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - **Doctrine of Necessity**: This doctrine has been invoked to justify actions taken to maintain governmental stability, even if they involve bending certain rules. In the context of anti-defection, it underscores the need to prevent frequent defections that could destabilize the government. ## **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** - **“Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius”**: This legal maxim, meaning “*the express mention of one thing excludes others*,” applies here to interpret that the specific grounds for disqualification mentioned in the **Tenth Schedule** exclude other grounds. ## **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** While the **Anti-Defection Law** has been instrumental in curbing opportunistic party-switching, it has faced criticism for: - **Curtailing Freedom of Speech**: Legislators are compelled to adhere strictly to party directives, potentially stifling dissent and genuine debate. - **Role of the Speaker**: The impartiality of the Speaker in adjudicating disqualification petitions has been questioned, given their political affiliations. - **Judicial Delays**: Though the law allows for **judicial review**, court proceedings can be protracted, delaying the resolution of defection cases. ## **FUTURE IMPLICATIONS** To enhance the effectiveness of the **Anti-Defection Law**, several reforms can be considered: - **Independent Adjudicatory Mechanism**: Establishing a neutral body, possibly the **Election Commission**, to decide on disqualification petitions, reducing potential biases. - **Limiting the Scope of Whip**: Restricting the issuance of whips to critical matters like **confidence motions**, allowing legislators greater freedom on other issues. - **Time-bound Adjudication**: Mandating a specific timeframe for the **Speaker** or adjudicatory body to decide on disqualification petitions to prevent undue delays. ## **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** Different countries have adopted varied approaches to address political defections: - **Bangladesh**: The Constitution mandates that **MPs** vacate their seats if they resign from or vote against their party. - **South Africa**: Initially, **MPs** lost their seats upon changing parties, but a **2002 amendment** allowed for “floor-crossing” during designated periods. - **United Kingdom**: There are no legal restrictions on **MPs** changing parties; however, such actions are often heavily criticized. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Freedom of Trade and Commerce: Articles 301-307](https://lawfoyer.in/freedom-of-trade-and-commerce-articles-301-307/) **Published:** December 24, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Indian Constitution, through Articles 301 to 307, ensures the freedom of trade, commerce, and intercourse across the nation. These provisions aim to create a unified economic space, facilitating the seamless movement of goods and services throughout India. **Content:** The Indian Constitution, through **Articles 301 to 307**, ensures the freedom of trade, commerce, and intercourse across the nation. These provisions aim to create a unified economic space, facilitating the seamless movement of goods and services throughout India. ### **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** - ***Trade***: Refers to the buying and selling of goods and services with the intent of earning profit. It encompasses all activities related to the exchange of commodities. - ***Commerce***: Involves the transmission or movement of goods, services, and people by various means such as air, water, or land. Unlike trade, **commerce** emphasizes the transportation aspect rather than profit-making. - ***Intercourse***: Denotes the movement and interaction of people, goods, and information across regions. It includes both commercial and non-commercial interactions, ensuring the free flow of communication and exchange. ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The framers of the Indian Constitution drew inspiration from **Section 92 of the Australian Constitution**, which emphasized free trade among states. Recognizing the importance of economic unity for a diverse nation like India, they incorporated **Articles 301 to 307** to eliminate internal trade barriers and promote a cohesive economic environment. ### **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** - ***Article 301***: Guarantees that **trade, commerce, and intercourse throughout India shall be free**, ensuring unrestricted movement across state boundaries. - ***Article 302***: Empowers **Parliament** to impose restrictions on this freedom in the interest of the public, allowing for regulations that serve the greater good. - ***Article 303***: Prohibits both **Parliament** and **state legislatures** from enacting laws that give preference to one state over another or discriminate between states, ensuring fairness in legislative actions. - ***Article 304***: - Allows **state legislatures** to impose taxes on goods imported from other states, provided they do not discriminate against such goods and that similar goods produced within the state are subjected to the same taxes. - Additionally, states can impose reasonable restrictions on trade in the public interest with the **President’s prior approval**. - ***Article 305***: Protects **existing laws and state monopolies** from the provisions of **Articles 301 to 304**, ensuring continuity of pre-existing regulations. - ***Article 307***: Authorizes **Parliament** to appoint an authority to oversee and ensure the provisions related to trade and commerce are effectively implemented. ### **DEFENCES / EXCEPTIONS / EXCEPTIONS TO DEFENCES** While **Article 301** provides for free trade, certain exceptions exist: - ***Regulatory Measures***: Laws that facilitate trade by ensuring safety, security, and order, such as traffic regulations, are permissible. - ***Compensatory Taxes***: Taxes levied to cover the cost of facilities provided for trade, like tolls for road maintenance, are allowed as they do not hinder trade but rather support it. - ***Public Interest Restrictions***: Both **Parliament** and **state legislatures** can impose restrictions deemed necessary in the public interest, such as measures to address public health concerns or scarcity of goods. ### **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** - ***Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam (1961)***: The Assam Taxation Act imposed a tax on the carriage of goods, including tea, through the state. The Supreme Court held that such taxes directly impede the free flow of trade, violating **Article 301**. - **Key Holding**: This case established that any law directly restricting trade movement is unconstitutional. - ***Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan (1962)***: The state imposed a tax on motor vehicles transporting goods. The Supreme Court ruled that regulatory measures or **compensatory taxes** that facilitate trade, such as road maintenance fees, do not violate **Article 301**. - **Key Clarification**: This judgment clarified the distinction between permissible regulatory measures and impermissible trade barriers. - ***State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala (1957)***: The issue was whether gambling activities could be considered trade or commerce. The Supreme Court held that gambling is **not trade or commerce** and thus does not enjoy the protection of **Article 301**. - **Key Outcome**: This case delineated the scope of activities covered under trade and commerce. ### **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - ***Doctrine of Res Extra Commercium***: This doctrine refers to activities that are outside the realm of commerce. The Supreme Court, in the **R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala case**, applied this doctrine to gambling, stating that activities inherently immoral or against public policy do not qualify as trade or commerce and thus aren’t protected under **Article 301**. ### **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** - ***Principle of Economic Unity***: The constitutional provisions aim to maintain India’s economic unity by ensuring free trade across states, preventing economic fragmentation, and promoting national integration. - ***Non-Discrimination Principle***: **Articles 303 and 304** emphasize that no preference or discrimination should be made between states, ensuring equal treatment in trade matters across the nation. ### **AMENDMENTS / ADDITIONS / REPEALING** ***Article 306***, which provided special provisions for trade and commerce in certain states, was repealed by the **Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956**. - **Objective**: This amendment aimed to streamline and unify trade practices across the entire nation. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Right to Property: From Fundamental Right to Legal Right](https://lawfoyer.in/right-to-property-from-fundamental-right-to-legal-right/) **Published:** December 24, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Right to Property in India has undergone significant transformation, shifting from a fundamental right to a constitutional legal right. This evolution reflects the dynamic interplay between individual property rights and the state's authority to regulate property for public welfare. **Content:** The Right to Property in India has undergone significant transformation, shifting from a fundamental right to a constitutional legal right. This evolution reflects the dynamic interplay between individual property rights and the state’s authority to regulate property for public welfare. ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** The **Right to Property** refers to the legal entitlement of individuals to acquire, own, and manage property. Initially enshrined as a fundamental right under **Articles 19(1)(f)** and **31** of the Indian Constitution, it guaranteed citizens the freedom to acquire, hold, and dispose of property, and protected against deprivation of property without lawful authority. However, the **44th Amendment Act of 1978** reclassified it as a constitutional right under **Article 300A**, stating that no person shall be deprived of their property except by authority of law. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The journey of the Right to Property in India is marked by several constitutional amendments and landmark judgments: - **Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951**: Introduced **Articles 31A** and **31B** to protect agrarian reform laws from judicial scrutiny, aiming to address socio-economic disparities. - **Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955**: Modified the provisions related to compensation for property acquisition, limiting judicial intervention in determining compensation adequacy. - **Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964**: Expanded the scope of **Article 31A** to include more categories of land reforms, further restricting property rights. - **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)**: The Supreme Court introduced the **Basic Structure Doctrine**, asserting that while Parliament can amend the Constitution, it cannot alter its basic structure, including fundamental rights. - **Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978**: Removed the **Right to Property** from the list of fundamental rights, introducing **Article 300A**, making it a constitutional right. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** - **Article 19(1)(f)**: Initially guaranteed citizens the right to acquire, hold, and dispose of property. - **Article 31**: Provided that no person shall be deprived of their property except by authority of law and mandated compensation for property acquired for public purposes. - **Article 31A**: Introduced to protect laws related to agrarian reforms from being challenged on the grounds of violating fundamental rights. - **Article 31B**: Established the **Ninth Schedule**, listing laws immune from judicial review concerning fundamental rights violations. - **Article 300A**: States that no person shall be deprived of their property save by authority of law, reclassifying the **Right to Property** as a constitutional right. ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** - **Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar (1952)**: Challenged the **Bihar Land Reforms Act**, questioning the adequacy of compensation for land acquisition. The Supreme Court upheld the Act, emphasizing the state’s authority to implement agrarian reforms. - **Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967)**: The Supreme Court ruled that Parliament could not amend fundamental rights, including the **Right to Property**. This decision led to subsequent amendments to restore parliamentary authority. - **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)**: Established the **Basic Structure Doctrine**, allowing constitutional amendments without altering the Constitution’s fundamental framework. - **Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980)**: The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the Constitution’s basic structure, including fundamental rights, cannot be altered by amendments. - **Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat (1995)**: The Supreme Court held that the **Right to Property** is not part of the Constitution’s basic structure, affirming its status as a constitutional right. ## **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - **Eminent Domain**: The state’s power to acquire private property for public use, with compensation. This principle underpinned various land reform initiatives in India. - **Basic Structure Doctrine**: Asserts that certain fundamental features of the Constitution cannot be altered by amendments, ensuring the preservation of its core principles. ## **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** - **Salus Populi Suprema Lex**: The welfare of the people is the supreme law. This principle justifies state intervention in property rights for public welfare. - **Necessitas Publica Major Est Quam**: Public necessity is greater than private necessity. It underscores the precedence of public interest over individual property rights. ## **AMENDMENTS / ADDITIONS / REPEALING** - **First Amendment Act, 1951**: Added **Articles 31A** and **31B** to protect land reform laws. - **Fourth Amendment Act, 1955**: Modified compensation provisions for property acquisition. - **Seventeenth Amendment Act, 1964**: Expanded the scope of **Article 31A**. - **Twenty-Fifth Amendment Act, 1971**: Introduced **Article 31C**, prioritizing certain **Directive Principles** over fundamental rights. - **Forty-Fourth Amendment Act, 1978**: Removed the **Right to Property** from fundamental rights, introducing **Article 300A**. ## **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** - **United States**: The **Fifth Amendment** ensures that private property cannot be taken for public use without just compensation, maintaining stricter safeguards for property rights compared to India. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in India](https://lawfoyer.in/public-interest-litigation-pil-in-india/) **Published:** December 24, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in India allows individuals or groups to seek judicial intervention on matters affecting the public at large, especially for the enforcement of fundamental rights and addressing issues of public concern. **Content:** Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in India allows individuals or groups to seek judicial intervention on matters affecting the public at large, especially for the enforcement of **fundamental rights** and addressing issues of public concern. ## **MEANING AND DEFINITION** **Public Interest Litigation** refers to legal actions initiated in courts to protect or enforce rights that affect the public or a significant segment of it. Unlike traditional litigation, which involves disputes between private parties, **PIL** is aimed at addressing broader public issues, ensuring justice for marginalized and disadvantaged groups. The **Supreme Court of India**, in ***Janata Dal v. H.S. Chaudhary***, **AIR 1993 SC 892**, defined **PIL** as “a legal action initiated in a court of law for the enforcement of public interest where the public or a particular class of the public have some interest that affects their legal rights or liabilities.” ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION** The concept of **PIL** in India emerged in the late 1970s and gained prominence in the 1980s, inspired by developments in the **United States** during the 1960s. Pioneering judges like **Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer** and **Justice P.N. Bhagwati** played instrumental roles in its development. A landmark case was ***Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar***, **AIR 1979 SC 1360**, where the **Supreme Court** addressed the plight of undertrial prisoners in Bihar, leading to the release of thousands of prisoners and highlighting the need for legal aid and speedy trials. This case marked a significant shift towards a more activist judiciary, willing to entertain petitions on behalf of those unable to approach the courts themselves. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS AND PROCEDURE** **PILs** can be filed under: - **Article 32** of the **Constitution of India**, which allows individuals to approach the **Supreme Court** for the enforcement of **fundamental rights**. - **Article 226**, which empowers **High Courts** to issue directions, orders, or writs for the enforcement of **fundamental rights** and other legal rights. - **Section 133** of the **Criminal Procedure Code**, which pertains to public nuisances. The traditional rule of ***locus standi***, which required the petitioner to have a direct interest in the case, was relaxed for **PILs**. This relaxation allows public-spirited individuals or organizations to file petitions on behalf of those who are disadvantaged or unable to approach the courts themselves. The **Supreme Court**, in ***S.P. Gupta v. Union of India***, **AIR 1982 SC 149**, recognized this relaxation, stating that “any member of the public having sufficient interest can maintain an action for judicial redress for public injury arising from breach of public duty.” ## **PRINCIPLES AND DOCTRINES** Several legal principles underpin the concept of **PIL** in India: - **Principle of Judicial Activism**: The judiciary takes an active role in ensuring justice, especially when other branches of government fail to protect the rights of citizens. - **Doctrine of *Parens Patriae***: The state, including the judiciary, has a responsibility to protect the interests of those who cannot protect themselves. - **Principle of Social Justice**: Emphasizes the need to address inequalities and ensure that marginalized sections of society have access to justice. ## **PROCEDURE FOR FILING A PIL** Filing a **PIL** involves the following steps: 1. **Identification of the Issue**: The matter should affect the public at large or a significant portion of society. 2. **Research and Documentation**: Gather substantial evidence to support the claim. 3. **Drafting the Petition**: Clearly outline the facts, issues, and relief sought. 4. **Filing the Petition**: Submit the petition in the appropriate court, either the **High Court** or the **Supreme Court**, depending on the jurisdiction. 5. **Court Proceedings**: The court may accept letters or postcards as **PILs**, especially when filed on behalf of disadvantaged groups. ## **LANDMARK CASE LAWS** Several landmark judgments have shaped the trajectory of **PILs** in India: - ***Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan***, **AIR 1997 SC 3011**: This case addressed **sexual harassment at the workplace**. **Bhanwari Devi**, a social worker in Rajasthan, was gang-raped for attempting to prevent a child marriage. The **Supreme Court**, acknowledging the absence of domestic laws on the subject, laid down guidelines to prevent **sexual harassment** at workplaces, known as the **Vishaka Guidelines**. - ***M.C. Mehta v. Union of India***, **AIR 1987 SC 1086**: Following the **Oleum gas leak** from a factory in Delhi, the **Supreme Court** introduced the principle of “**absolute liability**” for industries engaged in hazardous activities, holding them strictly liable for any harm resulting from their operations. - ***Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India***, **AIR 1984 SC 802**: A petition was filed to address the inhumane conditions of **bonded laborers** in Haryana. The **Supreme Court** recognized **bonded labor** as a violation of **fundamental rights** and issued directives for their release and rehabilitation. ## **GUIDELINES AND REGULATIONS** To prevent the misuse of **PILs**, the judiciary has established certain guidelines: - **Bonafide Intent**: The petitioner must act in genuine public interest without any personal gain or private motive. - **Prohibition of Frivolous Petitions**: Courts discourage **PILs** filed for publicity or to harass individuals. In ***State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal***, **AIR 2010 SC 2550**, the **Supreme Court** emphasized the need to curb frivolous **PILs**, stating that “the courts should be careful in entertaining **PILs** and ensure that the petition is filed in public interest and not for personal or political gain.” - **Verification of Facts**: Accurate presentation of facts is crucial; misleading the court can lead to penalties. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Eclipse](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-eclipse/) **Published:** December 24, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Eclipse, rooted in Article 13(1) of the Indian Constitution, addresses the status of pre-constitutional laws that conflict with fundamental rights. Such laws are not nullified but rendered dormant, becoming enforceable upon the removal of the inconsistency. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Eclipse**, rooted in **Article 13(1)** of the **Indian Constitution**, addresses the status of pre-constitutional laws that conflict with fundamental rights. Such laws are not nullified but rendered dormant, becoming enforceable upon the removal of the inconsistency. ### **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** The **Doctrine of Eclipse** posits that any pre-constitutional law conflicting with fundamental rights is overshadowed, or “eclipsed,” rendering it inoperative. However, it remains valid for past transactions and non-citizens. Upon amendment of the conflicting fundamental right, the law revives and becomes enforceable. This principle ensures that laws are not entirely invalidated but are suspended until constitutional inconsistencies are resolved. ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The doctrine’s foundation lies in **Article 13** of the **Indian Constitution**, which addresses laws inconsistent with fundamental rights. - **Article 13(1):** Renders pre-constitutional laws void to the extent of inconsistency. - **Article 13(2):** Prohibits the state from making post-constitutional laws that infringe upon fundamental rights. The **Supreme Court**, in **Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1955 SC 781)**, elucidated this doctrine, stating that laws eclipsed by fundamental rights are not dead but dormant and can be revived if the inconsistency is removed. ### **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** - **Article 13(1):** Declares that all pre-constitutional laws inconsistent with fundamental rights are void to the extent of such inconsistency. - **Article 13(2):** Prohibits the state from making laws that infringe upon fundamental rights, rendering any such law **void ab initio**. These provisions ensure that laws conflicting with fundamental rights are either rendered **dormant** (pre-constitutional) or **void from inception** (post-constitutional). ### **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** 1. **Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1955 SC 781):** - **Facts:** The **C.P. and Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947**, authorized the state government to monopolize motor transport services, excluding private operators. Post-constitution, this was challenged for violating **Article 19(1)(g)**. - **Issue:** Whether the pre-constitutional law, now inconsistent with fundamental rights, was entirely void. - **Held:** The **Supreme Court** held that the law was not null but dormant due to the inconsistency. The **1951 amendment to Article 19(6)** removed this inconsistency, reviving the law. 2. **Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1959):** - **Facts:** A post-constitutional law was challenged for violating fundamental rights. - **Issue:** Applicability of the Doctrine of Eclipse to post-constitutional laws. - **Held:** The **Supreme Court** ruled that post-constitutional laws violating fundamental rights are **void ab initio** and cannot be revived by subsequent constitutional amendments. 3. **State of Gujarat v. Ambica Mills (1974):** - **Facts:** A post-constitutional law was contested for inconsistency with fundamental rights. - **Issue:** Whether such a law is entirely void or can have limited applicability. - **Held:** The **Supreme Court** opined that a post-constitutional law inconsistent with fundamental rights is not null in all cases and may apply to individuals not entitled to those rights, such as non-citizens. ### **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - **Doctrine of Severability:** This principle allows for the separation of unconstitutional provisions from a statute, enabling the remainder to remain operative. It complements the **Doctrine of Eclipse** by ensuring only the conflicting parts of a law are affected. ### **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** - **“Lex non cogit ad impossibilia”:** The law does not compel the impossible. This maxim underpins the **Doctrine of Eclipse**, acknowledging that laws valid at their inception should not be entirely invalidated due to subsequent constitutional developments. ### **COMPARISON WITH OTHER DOCTRINES** - **Doctrine of Eclipse vs. Doctrine of Severability:** - **Doctrine of Eclipse:** Renders a conflicting law dormant until the inconsistency is removed. - **Doctrine of Severability:** Excises the unconstitutional portion, allowing the rest to function. - **Application:** The former applies primarily to pre-constitutional laws, whereas the latter can apply to both pre and post-constitutional laws. ### **APPLICATION TO NON-CITIZENS** The **Doctrine of Eclipse** primarily protects citizens’ fundamental rights. However, laws eclipsed due to inconsistency with citizens’ rights may still apply to non-citizens, as they are not entitled to certain fundamental rights under Articles like **Article 19**. This distinction was highlighted in the **State of Gujarat v. Ambica Mills** case. ### **FUTURE IMPLICATIONS** The **Doctrine of Eclipse** ensures that pre-constitutional laws are not entirely nullified due to inconsistencies with fundamental rights. This allows for the possibility of their revival if constitutional amendments remove the inconsistencies, maintaining legal continuity and stability. ### **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** - **Criticism:** - Some scholars argue that the doctrine creates ambiguity regarding the status of laws and their applicability, potentially leading to legal uncertainty. - **Appreciation:** - The doctrine is praised for balancing the preservation of existing laws with the protection of fundamental rights, ensuring that laws are not hastily invalidated but are given the opportunity for revival upon constitutional amendments. ### **CONCLUSION** The **Doctrine of Eclipse** plays a pivotal role in **Indian constitutional law** by addressing the status of pre-constitutional laws conflicting with fundamental rights. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Severability](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-severability/) **Published:** December 24, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Severability ensures that if a portion of a statute is unconstitutional, only the offending part is invalidated, preserving the remainder. This principle upholds legislative intent while safeguarding Fundamental Rights. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Severability** ensures that if a portion of a statute is unconstitutional, only the offending part is invalidated, preserving the remainder. This principle upholds legislative intent while safeguarding **Fundamental Rights**. ### **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** The **Doctrine of Severability**, also known as the **Doctrine of Separability**, is integral to constitutional law. It posits that if certain provisions of a statute contravene the Constitution, particularly the **Fundamental Rights**, those specific provisions can be declared void, leaving the rest of the statute enforceable. This doctrine is enshrined in **Article 13 of the Indian Constitution**, which states that any law inconsistent with **Fundamental Rights** is void to the extent of the inconsistency. ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The origins of the **Doctrine of Severability** trace back to English jurisprudence, notably the case of ***Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Company Ltd.* (1894) A.C. 535**. Here, the court invalidated the offending portion of a contract but upheld the remainder. This principle influenced Indian legal thought and was incorporated into the **Indian Constitution** to ensure that laws violating **Fundamental Rights** could be appropriately addressed without discarding entire statutes. ### **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** For the **Doctrine of Severability** to apply, certain conditions must be met: - ***Separability***: The valid and invalid provisions must be distinct and separable. If the valid parts can function independently of the invalid ones, the doctrine can be applied. - ***Legislative Intent***: Courts assess whether the legislature would have enacted the valid provisions without the invalid ones. If so, the valid portions can stand. - ***Functional Independence***: The remaining statute should be capable of enforcing the legislative intent without the invalidated sections. ### **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** **Article 13 of the Indian Constitution** embodies the **Doctrine of Severability**. It mandates that any law contravening **Fundamental Rights** is void to the extent of the contravention. This provision empowers courts to excise unconstitutional parts of a statute while retaining the rest. ### **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** Several landmark judgments have shaped the application of the **Doctrine of Severability** in India: 1. ***State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara (1951)***: The **Supreme Court** invalidated certain provisions of the **Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949**, that infringed upon **Fundamental Rights**. However, it upheld the rest of the Act, demonstrating the application of severability. 2. ***R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India (1957)***: This case clarified that if the valid and invalid parts of a statute are inseparable, the whole statute becomes void. However, if they are separable, only the offending provisions are struck down. 3. ***Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980)***: The **Supreme Court** struck down sections of the **42nd Amendment Act, 1976**, for violating the Constitution’s **basic structure**, while upholding the rest of the amendment. 4. ***Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992)***: In this case, **Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule** was declared unconstitutional for violating **Article 368(2)**. The rest of the **Tenth Schedule** remained valid, illustrating the doctrine’s application. ### **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** The **Doctrine of Severability** operates alongside other constitutional doctrines: - ***Doctrine of Eclipse***: This doctrine holds that unconstitutional laws are not nullified but become inoperative as long as they conflict with **Fundamental Rights**. If the conflict is resolved, the law can become operative again. - ***Doctrine of Basic Structure***: Established in ***Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)***, this doctrine asserts that certain fundamental features of the Constitution cannot be altered by amendments. ### **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** The maxim ***“utile per inutile non vitiatur”*** applies here, meaning “the useful is not vitiated by the useless.” This principle underpins the **Doctrine of Severability**, allowing courts to remove invalid provisions without discarding the entire statute. ### **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** The **Doctrine of Severability** is prevalent in various legal systems: - **United States**: The **U.S. Supreme Court** applies this doctrine to invalidate unconstitutional provisions while preserving the rest of the statute. - **United Kingdom**: Originating from common law, **UK courts** have historically applied this doctrine to contracts and statutes, ensuring that invalid clauses do not nullify entire agreements. ### **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** While the **Doctrine of Severability** preserves legislative intent and upholds the rule of law, it faces criticism: - ***Judicial Overreach***: Critics argue that by severing provisions, courts may unintentionally alter legislative intent. - ***Complexity in Application***: Determining the separability of provisions can be complex, leading to inconsistent judgments. ### **FUTURE IMPLICATIONS** As legislation becomes more intricate, the **Doctrine of Severability** will continue to play a crucial role in constitutional adjudication. It ensures that laws align with constitutional mandates without unnecessary invalidation, maintaining legal stability and protecting **Fundamental Rights**. ### **FLOWCHART: APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF SEVERABILITY** ```mermaid graph TD A[Statute with Potentially Unconstitutional Provisions] B{Assess Separability} C[Invalid Provisions Severed] D[Entire Statute Invalidated] A --> B --> C B --> D ``` **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Pith and Substance](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-pith-and-substance/) **Published:** December 24, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Pith and Substance is a pivotal principle in Indian constitutional law. It determines the true nature of legislation when jurisdictional overlaps occur between the Union and State legislatures. This doctrine ensures that laws are evaluated based on their core intent, maintaining the constitutional balance of legislative powers. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Pith and Substance** is a pivotal principle in Indian constitutional law. It determines the true nature of legislation when jurisdictional overlaps occur between the **Union** and **State legislatures**. This doctrine ensures that laws are evaluated based on their core intent, maintaining the constitutional balance of legislative powers. ### **MEANING AND DEFINITION** *“Pith”* refers to the true essence or nature of something, while *“substance”* denotes its most significant part. In legal terms, the **Doctrine of Pith and Substance** involves identifying the main purpose of a law to ascertain its constitutional validity, especially when it appears to encroach upon the jurisdiction allocated to another legislative body. This approach ensures that **incidental overlaps** do not render a law invalid if its primary objective falls within the enacting legislature’s competence. ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION** The doctrine originated in **Canadian jurisprudence** and was later incorporated into **Indian constitutional law**. It was first applied in India during the pre-independence era under the **Government of India Act, 1935**. A notable case is ***Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of Commerce***, where the **Privy Council** upheld a **state law on money lending**, stating that **incidental encroachment** on central subjects does not invalidate the law if its primary subject is within the state’s jurisdiction. ### **CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS** **Article 246 of the Indian Constitution** delineates the distribution of legislative powers between the **Parliament** and **State Legislatures** through three lists in the **Seventh Schedule**: - **UNION LIST (LIST I):** Subjects on which only **Parliament** can legislate. - **STATE LIST (LIST II):** Subjects exclusive to **State Legislatures**. - **CONCURRENT LIST (LIST III):** Subjects where both **Parliament** and **State Legislatures** can legislate. The **Doctrine of Pith and Substance** is applied to determine the true nature of legislation when disputes arise regarding legislative competence, ensuring that laws serve their intended purpose without being invalidated due to **incidental overlaps**. ### **APPLICATION IN INDIAN JUDICIARY** The **Indian judiciary** has frequently applied this doctrine to resolve conflicts between **Union** and **State legislation**. Key cases include: 1. ***State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara* (1951):** The **Supreme Court** upheld the **Bombay Prohibition Act**, stating that its primary objective was within the state’s power, even though it incidentally affected **import and export across customs frontiers**, a central subject. 2. ***Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of Commerce* (1947):** The **Privy Council** held that a **state law on money lending** was valid despite incidentally affecting **promissory notes**, a central subject, emphasizing the law’s true nature and purpose. 3. ***State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy* (1977):** The **Supreme Court** applied the doctrine to uphold a **state law nationalizing certain road transport services**, determining that the law’s primary objective was within the state’s legislative competence. ### **PRINCIPLES AND MAXIMS** The doctrine embodies the principle that the **constitutionality of legislation** should be determined by its **true nature and character**, not by its incidental effects on subjects beyond the legislature’s competence. This approach prevents the invalidation of laws due to **minor overlaps** and maintains legislative efficacy. ### **PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINATION** When assessing the validity of legislation under this doctrine, courts typically follow these steps: 1. **Identify the Subject Matter:** Determine the primary subject of the legislation. 2. **Examine Legislative Competence:** Assess whether the identified subject falls within the jurisdiction of the enacting legislature as per the **Seventh Schedule**. 3. **Evaluate Incidental Encroachment:** Consider whether the legislation **incidentally encroaches** upon another legislature’s domain and if such encroachment is permissible. ### **COMPARISON WITH OTHER DOCTRINES** While the **Doctrine of Pith and Substance** focuses on the true nature of legislation, the **Doctrine of Colourable Legislation** examines whether a legislature has transgressed its constitutional limits under the guise of enacting a law within its competence. Both doctrines aim to maintain the **constitutional distribution of powers** but address different aspects of legislative overreach. ### **SIGNIFICANCE IN INDIAN FEDERALISM** The doctrine provides flexibility in the **distribution of powers**, allowing legislatures to enact laws addressing complex issues without being unduly restricted by rigid jurisdictional boundaries. This flexibility is crucial in a **federal structure** like India’s, where overlapping interests between the **Union** and **States** are common. ### **CRITICISM AND LIMITATIONS** Critics argue that the doctrine may lead to excessive **judicial discretion**, potentially undermining the clear division of powers envisaged in the Constitution. Additionally, frequent reliance on the doctrine might blur the lines of **legislative competence**, causing jurisdictional ambiguities. ### **CONCLUSION** The **Doctrine of Pith and Substance** plays a vital role in interpreting the distribution of legislative powers in India. By focusing on the **true essence of legislation**, it ensures that laws serve their intended purpose without being invalidated due to **incidental overlaps**, thus maintaining the delicate balance of power in India’s **federal structure**. ### **REFERENCES** 1. ***Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of Commerce***, \[1947\] 74 IA 23. 2. ***State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara***, AIR 1951 SC 318. 3. ***State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy***, AIR 1978 SC 215. 4. Drishti Judiciary, **“Doctrine of Pith and Substance.”** 5. iPleaders, **“Doctrine of Pith and Substance.”** 6. BYJU’S, **“Doctrine of Pith and Substance.”** **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Colourable Legislation](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-colourable-legislation/) **Published:** December 24, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Colourable Legislation is a constitutional law principle ensuring that legislative bodies do not transgress their jurisdictional boundaries by enacting laws indirectly that they cannot pass directly. This doctrine upholds the federal structure by maintaining the separation of powers between the Union and State legislatures in India. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Colourable Legislation** is a constitutional law principle ensuring that legislative bodies do not transgress their jurisdictional boundaries by enacting laws indirectly that they cannot pass directly. This doctrine upholds the federal structure by maintaining the separation of powers between the Union and State legislatures in India. ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** Derived from the Latin maxim **“Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum,”** meaning **“What cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly,”** the **Doctrine of Colourable Legislation** addresses situations where a legislature enacts laws that, in form, appear within its jurisdiction but, in substance, encroach upon matters beyond its constitutional competence. In essence, if a legislature lacks the authority to legislate on a particular subject directly, it cannot achieve the same result indirectly under the guise of a different legislative power. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The doctrine traces its origins to **British constitutional principles** and was subsequently adopted in countries like **Canada and Australia**. In India, the concept was introduced during British rule to delineate the legislative powers between the Centre and the provinces. Post-independence, the doctrine became integral to the **Indian constitutional framework**, ensuring that both **Parliament** and **State Legislatures** operate within their designated spheres as outlined in the **Seventh Schedule of the Constitution**. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** **Article 246 of the Indian Constitution** demarcates the legislative competencies of Parliament and State Legislatures through three lists: - **Union List (List I):** Subjects on which only **Parliament** can legislate. - **State List (List II):** Subjects exclusive to **State Legislatures**. - **Concurrent List (List III):** Subjects on which both Parliament and State Legislatures can legislate. The doctrine comes into play when a law’s constitutionality is challenged on the grounds that it oversteps the legislative body’s authority. Courts then examine the **“pith and substance”** of the legislation to determine its true nature and whether it falls within the legislature’s jurisdiction. ## **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** - **Pith and Substance Doctrine:** This principle assesses the true character of legislation to ascertain under which list (Union, State, or Concurrent) a given piece of legislation falls. If the main subject of the legislation is within the legislature’s competence, incidental encroachments on another’s jurisdiction may be permissible. - **Doctrine of Colourable Legislation:** It ensures that a legislature does not transgress its constitutional limits by enacting legislation that, while apparently within its power, in reality, pertains to a subject beyond its jurisdiction. ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS** 1. **K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa (1953):** - **Facts:** The **Orissa Agricultural Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 1950**, was challenged, alleging it aimed to unjustly reduce compensation to intermediaries by increasing the tax burden. - **Issue:** Whether the Act was a colourable piece of legislation infringing upon constitutional provisions. - **Observation:** The **Supreme Court** held that the Act was within the legislative competence of the State, as taxation on agricultural income falls under the **State List**. The Court emphasized that the motive behind the legislation is irrelevant if the legislature is competent to enact it. 2. **State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh (1952):** - **Facts:** The **Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950**, aimed at abolishing zamindari systems, was contested on the grounds that it provided inadequate compensation, allegedly violating constitutional rights. - **Issue:** Whether the Act was a colourable legislation violating constitutional provisions. - **Observation:** The **Supreme Court** invalidated certain provisions of the Act, deeming them discriminatory and a fraud on the Constitution. The Court noted that while the objective of land reforms was legitimate, the method adopted was unconstitutional. 3. **M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore (1962):** - **Facts:** The **Mysore Government’s order** reserving 68% of seats in educational institutions for backward classes was challenged for exceeding the constitutional limit. - **Issue:** Whether the excessive reservation was a colourable exercise of power under the guise of affirmative action. - **Observation:** The **Supreme Court** held that while reservations are permissible, they should be reasonable. An excessive quota was deemed unconstitutional, as it violated the **principle of equality**. 4. **Animal Welfare Board of India v. Union of India (2014):** - **Facts:** The validity of laws permitting traditional bull-taming sports like **Jallikattu** was questioned, alleging they circumvented **animal cruelty laws**. - **Issue:** Whether permitting such sports amounted to colourable legislation violating animal rights. - **Observation:** The **Supreme Court** ruled that exemptions provided for such sports were unconstitutional, as they violated the **Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960**. The Court emphasized that cultural practices cannot override animal rights. ## **LIMITATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE** - **Legislative Competence:** The doctrine applies only to questions of legislative competence, not to the motives or intentions behind the legislation. If a legislature is competent to enact a law, the doctrine does not question the purpose of the law. - **Incidental Encroachment:** Minor encroachments on another legislature’s domain may be permissible if the law’s primary subject is within the enacting legislature’s competence. The doctrine does not apply. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Territorial Nexus](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-territorial-nexus/) **Published:** December 24, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Territorial Nexus is a constitutional principle that allows Indian states to legislate on matters beyond their territorial boundaries, provided a substantial connection exists between the state and the subject matter. This doctrine ensures legislative competence and maintains federal balance within India's legal framework. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Territorial Nexus** is a constitutional principle that allows Indian states to legislate on matters beyond their territorial boundaries, provided a substantial connection exists between the state and the subject matter. This doctrine ensures legislative competence and maintains federal balance within India’s legal framework. **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** **Article 245 of the Indian Constitution** outlines the extent of laws made by Parliament and State Legislatures: - **Article 245(1):** **Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of India, and the Legislature of a State may make laws for the whole or any part of the State.** - **Article 245(2):** **No law made by Parliament shall be deemed invalid on the ground that it has extraterritorial operation.** While Parliament possesses the authority to enact laws with **extraterritorial effect**, State Legislatures are generally confined to their territorial jurisdictions. However, the **Doctrine of Territorial Nexus** permits states to legislate beyond their borders if a substantial and real connection exists between the state and the subject matter. This ensures that state laws are not invalidated solely due to their extraterritorial reach, provided the **nexus** is genuine and pertinent. **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The doctrine’s roots can be traced to pre-independence judicial decisions, notably: - **Wallace Bros. & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1948):** A UK-based company operating in India was taxed on income earned within British India. The court upheld the tax, emphasizing a substantial connection between the income and the territory, thereby establishing the principle that a **real territorial nexus** justifies extraterritorial legislation. Post-independence, the doctrine was incorporated into the Constitution, reflecting the framers’ intent to balance legislative powers between the Union and the States while accommodating necessary extraterritorial legislation. **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** For a state law to have valid extraterritorial operation under this doctrine, two key conditions must be satisfied: 1. ***Real and Substantial Connection:*** The link between the state and the subject matter must be genuine, not superficial or illusory. 2. ***Relevance of Liability:*** The obligations or liabilities imposed by the law should directly relate to this connection, ensuring the law’s applicability is justified. **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** The **Seventh Schedule of the Constitution** delineates subjects under three lists: - **Union List (List I):** **Subjects on which only Parliament can legislate.** - **State List (List II):** **Subjects exclusive to State Legislatures.** - **Concurrent List (List III):** **Subjects where both Parliament and State Legislatures can legislate.** While states are primarily restricted to the **State List**, the **Doctrine of Territorial Nexus** allows them to legislate on matters outside their territory if a substantial nexus exists, ensuring the legislation’s validity despite its extraterritorial reach. **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** Several landmark judgments have elucidated this doctrine: 1. ***State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala (1957):*** The Bombay Legislature imposed a tax on prize competitions, including those conducted outside the state but involving participants from Bombay. The **Supreme Court** upheld the tax, citing a sufficient territorial nexus between the state and the activities taxed. 2. ***Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1958):*** Bihar imposed a tax on goods manufactured by Tata Iron & Steel in the state but sold elsewhere. The **Supreme Court** validated the tax, emphasizing the substantial connection between the manufacturing activities within Bihar and the imposed tax. 3. ***State of Bihar v. Charusila Dasi (1959):*** A trust located outside Bihar owned property within the state. Bihar sought to impose estate duty on the property. The **Supreme Court** upheld the state’s right, highlighting the real connection between the property within Bihar and the state’s legislative competence. **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** The **Doctrine of Territorial Nexus** operates alongside other constitutional doctrines to maintain legislative balance: - ***Doctrine of Pith and Substance:*** Determines the true nature of legislation to ascertain legislative competence, especially when overlaps occur between different legislative lists. - ***Doctrine of Colourable Legislation:*** Prevents legislatures from enacting laws that, while appearing to be within their jurisdiction, in reality, encroach upon the domain of another legislature.**MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** The doctrine embodies the principle of **“mobilia sequuntur personam,”** meaning movable property follows the person. This implies that for taxation or legal purposes, the location of the property owner can establish a sufficient nexus for legislative action. **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** In federal systems like the **United States**, the principle of territorial nexus is recognized, allowing states to exercise jurisdiction beyond their borders if a substantial connection exists. The **“minimum contacts” standard** in U.S. jurisdictional law mirrors this concept, requiring sufficient connection between the state and the subject for the state’s laws to apply. **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** While the doctrine ensures flexibility in legislative competence, critics argue it may lead to **jurisdictional overreach** by states, potentially causing conflicts with other states or the Union. However, its role in accommodating the dynamic nature of governance and inter-state relations is widely acknowledged. **FUTURE IMPLICATIONS** As India’s economic and social activities increasingly transcend state boundaries, the **Doctrine of Territorial Nexus** will continue to play a pivotal role in determining legislative competence, ensuring laws remain relevant and effective in a progressively interconnected landscape. **FLOWCHART: APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF TERRITORIAL NEXUS** ```mermaid graph TD A[State Legislature Enacts Law] --> B{Does the Law Have Extraterritorial Operation?} B -- Yes --> C{Is There a Real and Substantial Connection Between the State and the Subject Matter?} C -- Yes --> D[Law is Valid] C -- No --> E[Law is Invalid] B -- No --> D[Law is Valid] ``` **TABLE: COMPARISON OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS** **Aspect****Parliament (Union)****State Legislatures****Territorial Jurisdiction**Whole of IndiaWhole or part of the state**Extraterritorial Operation**Allowed (under Article 245)Allowed only with substantial territorial nexus**Legislative Subjects**Union List, Concurrent ListState List, Concurrent List **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Repugnancy](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-repugnancy/) **Published:** December 24, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Repugnancy addresses conflicts between central and state laws in India, ensuring legal consistency when both governments legislate on the same subject. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Repugnancy** addresses conflicts between central and state laws in India, ensuring legal consistency when both governments legislate on the same subject. ## **MEANING AND DEFINITION** *Repugnancy* refers to a contradiction between two laws that, when applied to the same facts, yield different outcomes. In India’s federal structure, both **Parliament** and **state legislatures** can legislate on subjects in the **Concurrent List (List III)** of the Constitution. Conflicts may arise when both enact laws on the same subject, leading to inconsistencies. **Article 254** of the Indian Constitution embodies the **Doctrine of Repugnancy**, resolving such conflicts by granting **supremacy to central laws** over conflicting state laws. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND** The **Doctrine of Repugnancy** in India draws inspiration from the **Government of India Act, 1935**, particularly **Section 107**, which addressed conflicts between **federal and provincial laws**. This provision was incorporated into the Indian Constitution as **Article 254**, aiming to maintain a harmonious legal system by resolving inconsistencies between **central and state legislation**. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS: ARTICLE 254** **Article 254** outlines the framework for resolving conflicts between central and state laws: - **Article 254(1):** If a state law conflicts with a central law on a subject in the **Concurrent List**, the central law prevails, and the state law becomes void to the extent of the inconsistency. - **Article 254(2):** A state law conflicting with a central law can prevail in that state if it has received the **President’s assent**. However, **Parliament retains the power** to override such state laws by enacting subsequent legislation. ## **ESSENTIALS FOR REPUGNANCY** For the **Doctrine of Repugnancy** to apply, certain conditions must be met: 1. **Same Subject Matter:** Both central and state laws must pertain to the same subject in the **Concurrent List**. 2. **Direct Conflict:** The provisions of the two laws must be directly contradictory, making it impossible to obey one without disobeying the other. 3. **Parliamentary Competence:** The central law must be within **Parliament’s legislative competence**. ## **JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS AND CASE LAWS** The judiciary has played a pivotal role in interpreting the **Doctrine of Repugnancy**. Notable cases include: - **M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India (1979):** The **Supreme Court** held that for **repugnancy** to arise, there must be a direct inconsistency between central and state laws, making simultaneous obedience impossible. In this case, the court found no repugnancy between the **Tamil Nadu Public Men (Criminal Misconduct) Act, 1973**, and the **Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947**, as both could coexist without conflict. - **Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1959):** The court ruled that **repugnancy** arises when two laws are so inconsistent that they cannot stand together; in such cases, the **central law prevails**. Here, a state amendment to the **Motor Vehicles Act** was found repugnant to the central law and thus void. - **State of Kerala v. Mar Appraem Kuri Co. Ltd. (2012):** The **Supreme Court** observed that mere possibility of conflict does not lead to **repugnancy**; there must be an actual and irreconcilable inconsistency. The case involved the **Kerala Chitties Act, 1975**, and the **Central Chit Funds Act, 1982**, where the court held that both laws could operate concurrently without conflict. ## **EXCEPTIONS AND PRESIDENT’S ASSENT** **Article 254(2)** provides an exception wherein a **state law conflicting with central legislation** can prevail if it has received the **President’s assent**. This assent signifies acknowledgment of the inconsistency and approval of the state’s legislative intent. However, **Parliament** can subsequently enact laws to override such state legislation. ## **DOCTRINE OF PITH AND SUBSTANCE** The **Doctrine of Pith and Substance** is employed to determine the true nature of legislation when there is a question of legislative competence. If the substance of a law falls within the jurisdiction of the enacting body, incidental encroachments on another body’s jurisdiction do not render it invalid. This doctrine helps in resolving conflicts where the legislative domains of the **Centre and the States overlap**. ## **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** In federal systems like **Australia** and **Canada**, similar doctrines exist to resolve conflicts between **federal and state/provincial laws**. - In **Australia**, **Section 109** of the Constitution provides that **federal laws prevail** over inconsistent state laws. - Similarly, in **Canada**, the doctrine of **federal paramountcy** ensures that **federal laws supersede conflicting provincial laws**. ## **IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIAN FEDERALISM** The **Doctrine of Repugnancy** underscores the **supremacy of Parliament** in matters of **concurrent jurisdiction**, ensuring uniformity in the legal framework across India. However, it also provides flexibility for state-specific legislation through the mechanism of **Presidential assent**, reflecting the **quasi-federal nature** of the Indian Constitution. ## **CONCLUSION** The **Doctrine of Repugnancy** is a crucial aspect of Indian constitutional law, balancing the legislative powers of the **Centre and the States**. It ensures that in cases of conflict, **central laws maintain uniformity across the nation**, while also allowing for **state-specific variations** through **Presidential assent**. Understanding this doctrine is essential for comprehending the legislative dynamics within India’s **federal structure**. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Prospective Overruling](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-prospective-overruling/) **Published:** December 24, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Prospective Overruling allows courts to overturn existing legal precedents without affecting past decisions, applying the new interpretation only to future cases. This approach ensures legal continuity and fairness, preventing disruption of settled matters. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Prospective Overruling** allows courts to overturn existing legal precedents without affecting past decisions, applying the new interpretation only to future cases. This approach ensures legal continuity and fairness, preventing disruption of settled matters. ## **MEANING AND DEFINITION** ***Prospective overruling*** refers to a judicial practice where a court overturns an existing precedent but limits the effect of this change to future cases. Unlike traditional overruling, which applies both retrospectively and prospectively, ***prospective overruling*** ensures that past decisions based on the old precedent remain unaffected. This doctrine acknowledges the dynamic nature of law, allowing it to evolve without causing undue hardship to those who relied on previous legal standards. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION** ***Origin in the United States*** The doctrine originated in American jurisprudence in the early 20th century as a departure from the Blackstonian view that judges merely declare existing law. It was first recognized in the case of ***Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co.***, 287 U.S. 358 (1932), where Justice Cardozo upheld a state’s decision to apply a new rule prospectively, emphasizing judicial flexibility in the interests of justice. ***Adoption in India*** In India, the Supreme Court introduced the doctrine in ***I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab***, AIR 1967 SC 1643. The Court faced the challenge of balancing constitutional amendments with fundamental rights. To prevent chaos from invalidating past amendments, Chief Justice K. Subba Rao applied ***prospective overruling***, stating that while Parliament lacked the power to amend fundamental rights henceforth, previous amendments would remain valid. ## **KEY PRINCIPLES OF THE DOCTRINE** - ***Applicability***: The doctrine applies primarily to constitutional matters, ensuring that changes in legal interpretations do not unsettle established rights and obligations. - ***Authority***: Only the Supreme Court of India can apply this doctrine, as it holds the constitutional authority to declare law binding on all courts within the country. - ***Discretion***: The Court exercises discretion in determining the extent of retroactive application, molding it to serve the interests of justice in each case. - ***Purpose***: The primary aim is to prevent the reopening of settled issues and to provide a transition period for affected parties to adjust to the new legal landscape. ## **APPLICATION IN INDIAN JURISPRUDENCE** ***I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab* (1967)** - ***Facts***: The petitioners owned over 500 acres of land in Punjab. The Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, restricted landholdings, allowing individuals to retain only 30 acres. The petitioners challenged the Act, arguing it violated their fundamental rights. - ***Issue***: Could Parliament amend the Constitution to abridge fundamental rights under Part III? - ***Held***: The Supreme Court ruled that Parliament could not amend fundamental rights. However, to avoid unsettling past actions, the Court applied the ***doctrine of prospective overruling***, stating that the decision would apply only to future amendments. ## ***Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala* (1973)** - ***Facts***: Swami Kesavananda Bharati challenged the Kerala government’s attempts to impose restrictions on the management of religious property, invoking the validity of certain constitutional amendments. - ***Issue***: What is the extent of Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution, and does it include the power to alter the basic structure? - ***Held***: The Supreme Court held that while Parliament has wide powers to amend the Constitution, it cannot alter its ***basic structure***. The ***doctrine of prospective overruling*** was applied to ensure that previous amendments were not invalidated, maintaining legal continuity. ## ***Sarwan Kumar v. Madan Lal Aggarwal* (2003)** - ***Facts***: The case involved a dispute over tenancy rights and the applicability of certain legal provisions that had been amended over time. - ***Issue***: Whether the amended provisions should apply retrospectively, affecting vested rights. - ***Held***: The Supreme Court applied the ***doctrine of prospective overruling***, stating that the law declared would apply to future cases only, preserving the validity of past transactions conducted under the old law. ## **COMPARISON WITH OTHER JURISDICTIONS** ***United States*** In the U.S., the doctrine has been employed to balance the need for legal development with the principle of ***stare decisis***. Courts have used ***prospective overruling*** to change legal interpretations without disrupting past decisions, thereby maintaining stability and fairness. ***United Kingdom*** The UK legal system traditionally follows the declaratory theory, where judicial decisions are seen as stating what the law has always been. However, there has been a gradual acceptance of ***prospective overruling*** in certain cases to prevent injustice, though it remains less prevalent compared to the U.S. and India. ## **ADVANTAGES OF THE DOCTRINE** - ***Legal Stability***: Maintains consistency in the legal system by upholding past decisions while allowing for legal evolution. - ***Fairness***: Prevents hardship to individuals who have relied on established legal precedents in their actions and decisions. - ***Judicial Flexibility***: Enables courts to adapt the law to changing societal needs without causing retrospective injustice. ## **CRITICISM OF THE DOCTRINE** - ***Judicial Overreach***: Critics argue that it allows courts to assume a quasi-legislative role, making laws rather than interpreting them. - ***Uncertainty***: The discretionary nature of the doctrine can lead to unpredictability in its application, potentially undermining legal certainty. ## **CONCLUSION** The **Doctrine of Prospective Overruling** serves as a vital judicial tool in Indian law, balancing the need for legal development with the principles of fairness and stability. By applying new interpretations prospectively, courts can ensure the evolution of law without unsettling past decisions or causing hardship to individuals who have relied on established precedents. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Laches](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-laches/) **Published:** December 24, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Laches is a legal principle that bars claims due to unreasonable delays in pursuing them, emphasizing that "equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights." **Content:** The **Doctrine of Laches** is a legal principle that bars claims due to unreasonable delays in pursuing them, emphasizing that **“equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.”** **MEANING AND DEFINITION** **Laches**, derived from the French term meaning “remissness” or “slackness,” refers to a lack of diligence in asserting a legal right. This doctrine prevents individuals from seeking equitable relief if they have unreasonably delayed in asserting their claim, causing disadvantage to the opposing party. The Latin maxim **“Vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt”** encapsulates this principle, meaning **“the law assists those who are vigilant, not those who sleep over their rights.”** **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND** The **Doctrine of Laches** originated in the English **Court of Chancery**, where equity principles were developed to mitigate the rigidity of common law. Over time, this doctrine was integrated into various legal systems, including **India’s**, to ensure fairness by discouraging undue delays in legal proceedings. **ESSENTIALS OF THE DOCTRINE** For the **Doctrine of Laches** to apply, certain elements must be present: - ***Knowledge of the Claim***: The claimant must have been aware of their rights and the need to enforce them. - ***Unreasonable Delay***: There must be a significant and unjustifiable delay in asserting the claim. - ***Prejudice to the Opposing Party***: The delay should have adversely affected the defendant, such as through loss of evidence or changed circumstances. **LEGAL PROVISIONS AND APPLICATION IN INDIA** While the **Limitation Act, 1963**, prescribes specific time limits for filing suits, the **Doctrine of Laches** operates in the realm of **equity**, particularly when no statutory limitation period is specified. **Indian courts** have applied this doctrine to ensure that plaintiffs do not exploit legal processes by initiating claims after unreasonable delays. **COMPARISON WITH THE LIMITATION ACT** Although both the **Doctrine of Laches** and the **Limitation Act** deal with delays, they differ fundamentally: - ***Limitation Act***: Specifies fixed time frames for various legal actions, focusing solely on the passage of time. - ***Doctrine of Laches***: Centers on the reasonableness of the delay and its impact on the defendant, even in the absence of a statutory limitation period. **KEY CASE LAWS IN INDIA** 1. ***Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi (1969)***: The Supreme Court held that even in the absence of a prescribed limitation period, unreasonable delay could bar relief under **Article 32 of the Constitution**. 2. ***State of Maharashtra v. Digambar (1995)***: The respondent sought compensation for land acquisition after two decades. The Supreme Court applied the **Doctrine of Laches**, emphasizing that such delays could render claims unsustainable. 3. ***Shiv Dass v. Union of India (2007)***: The appellant’s delayed claim for disability pension was denied, with the Court reiterating that belated approaches could be dismissed on grounds of **laches**. **APPLICATION IN WRIT JURISDICTIONS** **Indian courts** have consistently emphasized that petitioners must approach the judiciary promptly when seeking writ remedies. **Delays** can lead to the dismissal of petitions, especially if the delay remains unexplained or results in prejudice to the respondent. **INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE** Globally, the **Doctrine of Laches** serves as an equitable defense, preventing claims where plaintiffs have delayed unreasonably. For instance, in the **United States**, this doctrine is frequently invoked in civil disputes to ensure fairness. **CONCLUSION** The **Doctrine of Laches** plays a pivotal role in the **Indian legal system**, ensuring that justice remains timely and equitable. By discouraging undue delays, it upholds the principle that **legal remedies are for the vigilant**, thereby maintaining the integrity of judicial processes. **REFERENCES** 1. **ClearIAS**. “Indian Judicial Doctrines – Principles of Constitutional Law.” 2. **Legal Service India**. “An Analysis On The Doctrine Of Laches.” 3. **BYJU’S**. “Doctrine of Laches – Meaning, Importance, Case Examples for UPSC.” 4. **Prepp**. “Doctrine of Laches – Indian Polity Notes.” 5. **Legal Dictionary**. “Doctrine of Laches – Definition, Examples, Cases, Processes.” **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Waiver](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-waiver/) **Published:** December 24, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Waiver allows individuals to voluntarily relinquish a known legal right or privilege. In India, this doctrine does not extend to fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution. Indian courts have consistently held that fundamental rights cannot be waived, emphasizing their paramount importance in safeguarding individual liberties. **Content:** The Doctrine of Waiver allows individuals to voluntarily relinquish a known legal right or privilege. In India, this doctrine does not extend to **fundamental rights** enshrined in the Constitution. Indian courts have consistently held that **fundamental rights** cannot be waived, emphasizing their paramount importance in safeguarding individual liberties. ### **MEANING AND DEFINITION** A **waiver** involves the intentional and voluntary abandonment of a known right. According to **Black’s Law Dictionary**, it is **“the voluntary relinquishment or abandonment—express or implied—of a legal right or advantage.”** In the Indian legal context, while individuals may waive certain **statutory** or **contractual rights**, they cannot waive **fundamental rights** guaranteed by the Constitution. ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND** The concept of **waiver** has roots in **common law**, where individuals could choose to forgo certain legal rights. In India, the application of this doctrine has been carefully scrutinized, especially concerning **constitutional rights**. The judiciary has played a pivotal role in delineating the boundaries of this doctrine to ensure that **fundamental rights** remain inviolable. ### **ESSENTIALS OF A VALID WAIVER** For a **waiver** to be considered valid, the following elements must be present: - **Knowledge**: The individual must have full awareness of the right they are relinquishing and understand the consequences of such an action. - **Intention**: There must be a clear intention to waive the right, which can be expressed explicitly through words or implicitly through conduct. - **Voluntariness**: The decision to waive the right must be made freely, without any coercion or undue influence. ### **APPLICATION IN INDIAN LAW** In India, while the **Doctrine of Waiver** applies to certain legal rights, it does not extend to **fundamental rights**. The **Supreme Court** has consistently held that individuals cannot waive their **fundamental rights**, as these rights are integral to the Constitution’s framework and public policy. ### **KEY CASE LAWS** 1. ***Behram Khurshid Pesikaka v. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 123***: In this case, the **Supreme Court** held that **fundamental rights** are based on principles embodied in the Constitution’s **preamble** and cannot be waived. The court emphasized that these rights are a matter of **public policy** and are non-negotiable. 2. ***Olga Tellis & Ors v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180***: Pavement dwellers gave an undertaking that they would not claim any **fundamental right** to put up huts on pavements. When the huts were demolished, they pleaded protection under **Article 21**. The **Supreme Court** ruled that **fundamental rights** cannot be waived and that there can be no **estoppel** against the Constitution. 3. ***Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 1959 AIR 149***: The petitioner contended that the agreement he entered into with the tax authorities violated his **fundamental rights**. The **Supreme Court** held that **fundamental rights** cannot be waived by any individual, as they are guaranteed by the Constitution for the benefit of all citizens. ### **LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS** While individuals can waive certain legal rights, the following limitations apply: - **Fundamental Rights**: Cannot be waived, as they are essential to individual freedom and public policy. - **Public Interest**: Rights conferred for public benefit cannot be waived if such waiver would be detrimental to **public interest**. ### **COMPARISON WITH OTHER JURISDICTIONS** In contrast to India, some countries allow individuals to waive certain constitutional rights. For instance: - In the **United States**, individuals can waive specific rights, such as the **right to a jury trial**, under certain conditions. However, even in such jurisdictions, the waiver must be made **knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently**. ### **CONCLUSION** The **Doctrine of Waiver** in India underscores the sanctity of **fundamental rights**, ensuring they remain inviolable and beyond the reach of individual waiver. This principle reinforces the Constitution’s commitment to safeguarding individual liberties and upholding **public policy**. ### **REFERENCES** 1. **Drishti Judiciary**. “Doctrine of Waiver in Indian Constitution.” 2. **iPleaders**. “Doctrine of Waiver.” 3. **Leverage Edu**. “Doctrine Of Waiver in India: Meaning, Judgements.” 4. **EduRev**. “Doctrine of Waiver.” 5. **SCC Online**. “Explained: Waiver | An intentional relinquishment of a right; an agreement not to assert a right: Supreme Court.” **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-legitimate-expectation/) **Published:** December 24, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation ensures fairness in administrative actions, allowing individuals to anticipate consistent treatment from public authorities based on past conduct or explicit promises. This principle, integral to Indian administrative law, enables judicial review of administrative decisions to prevent arbitrariness. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation** ensures fairness in administrative actions, allowing individuals to anticipate consistent treatment from public authorities based on past conduct or explicit promises. This principle, integral to Indian administrative law, enables judicial review of administrative decisions to prevent arbitrariness. **MEANING AND DEFINITION** *Legitimate expectation* arises when a public authority’s consistent practice or explicit promise leads an individual to reasonably anticipate a specific treatment or benefit. Although not a legal right, it serves as a ground for challenging administrative actions that deviate from established norms without justification. The Supreme Court of India, in ***Ram Pravesh Singh v. State of Bihar***, described it as arising from “regular and consistent past practice” or an “express promise” by an authority. **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND** The doctrine’s roots trace back to English law, notably the case of ***Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service*** (\[1985\] AC 374), where it was held that a decision by a public authority should not deprive a person of a benefit they had been permitted to enjoy without providing a valid reason or an opportunity to be heard. In India, it gained prominence through ***State of Kerala v. K.G. Madhavan Pillai*** ((1988) 4 SCC 669), where the Supreme Court recognized that the withdrawal of a previously granted sanction without adhering to principles of natural justice violated legitimate expectations. **ESSENTIALS OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION** For an expectation to be deemed legitimate, certain criteria must be met: - ***Established Practice or Promise***: There must be a consistent past practice or an explicit promise by the authority. - ***Reasonableness***: The expectation should be reasonable and not based on mere hope or desire. - ***Reliance***: The individual should have relied on the practice or promise to their detriment. - ***Authority’s Conduct***: The authority’s actions should have led the individual to believe that the expected benefit would continue. **TYPES OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS** 1. ***Procedural Legitimate Expectation***: Expectation of a fair procedure before a decision affecting rights or interests is made. 2. ***Substantive Legitimate Expectation***: Expectation of a specific benefit or advantage based on an authority’s promise or established practice. **LEGAL PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES** While the doctrine isn’t codified in Indian statutes, it aligns with constitutional principles of fairness and non-arbitrariness under **Article 14**. It ensures that public authorities act transparently and justly, upholding individuals’ expectations arising from consistent practices or explicit promises. **CASE LAWS AND PRECEDENTS** - ***State of Kerala v. K.G. Madhavan Pillai***: The Supreme Court held that the withdrawal of a previously granted sanction without adhering to principles of natural justice violated legitimate expectations. - ***Navjyoti Coop. Group Housing Society v. Union of India***: The Court ruled that changing the criteria for land allotment without notice violated the legitimate expectations of the housing societies, which were entitled to a fair hearing. - ***Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries***: The Supreme Court emphasized that a bona fide decision by a public authority, even if it alters previous practices, would satisfy the requirements of legitimate expectation if it is made fairly and reasonably. **EXCEPTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE** Legitimate expectation does not apply in certain situations: - ***Contrary to Law***: If the expectation conflicts with statutory provisions. - ***Public Interest***: When overriding public interest justifies a departure from the expected practice. - ***Change in Policy***: Authorities may change policies, provided the change is not arbitrary and affected parties are given due consideration. **COMPARISON WITH PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL** While both doctrines prevent authorities from reneging on promises, **legitimate expectation** pertains to procedural fairness in administrative actions, whereas **promissory estoppel** relates to enforcing promises in contractual contexts. The Supreme Court, in ***State of Jharkhand v. Brahmputra Metallics Ltd.***, clarified that legitimate expectation is grounded in **Article 14’s** guarantee against arbitrary state actions. **CONCLUSION** The **Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation** serves as a vital tool in Indian administrative law, ensuring that public authorities act fairly and transparently, honoring established practices and promises, thereby upholding individuals’ expectations and reinforcing the rule of law. **REFERENCES** 1. ***State of Kerala v. K.G. Madhavan Pillai***, (1988) 4 SCC 669. 2. ***Navjyoti Coop. Group Housing Society v. Union of India***, (1992) 4 SCC 477. 3. ***Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries***, (1993) 1 SCC 71. 4. ***State of Jharkhand v. Brahmputra Metallics Ltd.***, (2020) 18 SCC 476. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Pleasure: Article 310](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-pleasure-article-310/) **Published:** December 24, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Pleasure, enshrined in Article 310 of the Indian Constitution, stipulates that civil servants hold office at the discretion of the President or the Governor. This principle, rooted in English common law, allows for the termination of government employees without prior notice or reason, ensuring administrative flexibility. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Pleasure**, enshrined in **Article 310 of the Indian Constitution**, stipulates that civil servants hold office at the discretion of the **President** or the **Governor**. This principle, rooted in **English common law**, allows for the termination of government employees without prior notice or reason, ensuring administrative flexibility. However, the **Indian Constitution** introduces safeguards, notably through **Article 311**, to protect against arbitrary dismissal, thereby balancing governmental authority with employee rights. ### **MEANING AND DEFINITION** The **Doctrine of Pleasure** implies that government officials serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority—the **President** at the Union level and the **Governor** at the State level. This means their tenure is not fixed and can be terminated without prior notice or justification. The doctrine is based on public policy considerations, ensuring that the government can remove officials whose continuation in office is deemed detrimental to public interest. ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND** Originating from **English common law**, the **Doctrine of Pleasure** was introduced in India during **British rule**. It was first incorporated into Indian law through the **Charter Act of 1833** and later acknowledged in **Section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935**. Post-independence, the framers of the **Indian Constitution** adopted this doctrine with modifications to suit the democratic framework of the country. ### **CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS** - ***Article 310(1):*** Establishes that members of the **defense services**, **civil services of the Union**, **all-India services**, and holders of **civil posts** under the Union or a State serve at the pleasure of the **President** or the **Governor**, respectively. - ***Article 311:*** Provides safeguards against arbitrary dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank of civil servants. It mandates that such actions cannot be taken without an inquiry that offers the accused a reasonable opportunity to defend themselves. ### **EXCEPTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE** Certain constitutional positions are exempt from the **Doctrine of Pleasure** to ensure their independence: - ***Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts:*** Their removal is governed by **Articles 124 and 217**, requiring a rigorous impeachment process. - ***Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG):*** Protected under **Article 148**, ensuring independence in auditing government finances. - ***Chief Election Commissioner:*** Secured under **Article 324**, maintaining autonomy in overseeing elections. ### **JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS AND LANDMARK JUDGMENTS** The **Indian judiciary** has played a pivotal role in interpreting the **Doctrine of Pleasure**, balancing it with the need for fairness and justice. - ***State of Bihar v. Abdul Majid (AIR 1954 SC 245):*** The **Supreme Court** held that the English common law **Doctrine of Pleasure** has not been fully adopted in India. A government servant, wrongfully dismissed, can claim arrears of salary, emphasizing that the doctrine is subject to constitutional provisions. - ***Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (AIR 1985 SC 1416):*** This case clarified the interplay between **Articles 309**, **310**, and **311**. The Court acknowledged the necessity of the **Doctrine of Pleasure** for administrative efficiency but emphasized the safeguards provided by **Article 311** to prevent arbitrary dismissals. - ***State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya (AIR 1961 SC 751):*** The **Supreme Court** stated that the **Doctrine of Pleasure** under **Article 310** is not absolute and is subject to the provisions of the **Constitution**, including **Article 311**, which provides safeguards to civil servants. ### **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** In the **United Kingdom**, the **Doctrine of Pleasure** allows the **Crown** to dismiss civil servants at will, a principle rooted in **common law**. However, in practice, this power is exercised with restraint, and statutory protections have evolved to safeguard civil servants’ rights. In contrast, **India’s adoption** of the doctrine includes explicit **constitutional safeguards**, reflecting a more structured approach to balancing executive authority and employee rights. ### **LIMITATIONS AND SAFEGUARDS** While **Article 310** embodies the **Doctrine of Pleasure**, its application is curtailed by: - ***Article 311(1):*** Prevents dismissal or removal by an authority subordinate to the one that appointed the civil servant. - ***Article 311(2):*** Ensures that no civil servant is dismissed, removed, or reduced in rank without an inquiry providing a reasonable opportunity for defense. ### **EXCEPTIONS TO ARTICLE 311** There are specific circumstances where the protections under **Article 311(2)** may not apply: - ***Conviction on a Criminal Charge:*** If a civil servant is convicted of a criminal offense, they can be dismissed without an inquiry. - ***Impracticability of Inquiry:*** If holding an inquiry is not feasible, the authority must record reasons in writing for dispensing with the inquiry. - ***Security of the State:*** If the **President** or **Governor** is satisfied that an inquiry is not expedient in the interest of state security, it can be waived. ### **DOCTRINE OF PLEASURE IN PRACTICE** The **Doctrine of Pleasure** ensures that the government can maintain an efficient and effective administrative machinery by removing officials whose continuation is against public interest. However, the **constitutional safeguards**, particularly under **Article 311**, ensure that this power is not exercised arbitrarily, thus protecting the rights of civil servants. ### **CONCLUSION** The **Doctrine of Pleasure**, as articulated in **Article 310 of the Indian Constitution**, reflects a balance between the necessity for administrative discretion and the protection of civil servants’ rights. While it grants the government the authority to terminate services in the interest of public policy, the accompanying safeguards ensure that such power is exercised judiciously, upholding the principles of **natural justice** and **fairness**. ### **REFERENCES** 1. ***State of Bihar v. Abdul Majid, AIR 1954 SC 245.*** 2. ***Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416.*** 3. ***State of U.P. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751.*** **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Public Trust](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-public-trust/) **Published:** December 24, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Public Trust mandates that certain natural resources are preserved for public use, and the government, as a trustee, must protect and maintain these resources for the public's benefit. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Public Trust** mandates that certain natural resources are preserved for public use, and the government, as a trustee, must protect and maintain these resources for the public’s benefit. ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** The **Public Trust Doctrine** asserts that certain natural resources, like air, water, forests, and wildlife, are preserved for public use, and the government holds these resources in trust for the people. This principle ensures that the public retains the right to access and use these resources for activities such as navigation, fishing, and recreation. The doctrine imposes a duty on the state to protect these resources from private exploitation or commercial use that could harm public interests. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** Originating from **Roman law**, the Public Trust Doctrine was based on the principle that certain resources were common to all and could not be privately owned. This concept was later integrated into **English common law**, emphasizing the sovereign’s role in protecting public rights over these resources. In the United States, the doctrine was notably applied in cases like ***Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois***, **146 U.S. 387 (1892)**, where the **U.S. Supreme Court** held that the state held title to the lands under navigable waters in trust for the public. In India, the doctrine gained prominence through judicial decisions, particularly in environmental jurisprudence. ## **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** - ***Trustee***: The state or government acts as the trustee of natural resources. - ***Beneficiaries***: The general public, including future generations, are the beneficiaries entitled to use and enjoy these resources. - ***Trust Property***: Natural resources such as air, water, forests, and wildlife constitute the trust property. - ***Obligations of the Trustee***: The state must protect, preserve, and manage these resources sustainably, preventing their exploitation or degradation. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** In India, while the **Public Trust Doctrine** is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, it has been inferred through various provisions: - ***Article 21***: Guarantees the **right to life**, which the judiciary has interpreted to include the **right to a healthy environment**. - ***Article 48A***: Directs the state to endeavor to protect and improve the environment and safeguard forests and wildlife. - ***Article 51A(g)***: Imposes a **fundamental duty** on citizens to protect and improve the natural environment. These provisions, read together, form the constitutional basis for the application of the **Public Trust Doctrine** in India. ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** 1. ***M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath***, **(1997) 1 SCC 388**: - ***Facts***: The Himachal Pradesh government leased ecologically fragile land to a private company, Span Motels, associated with Kamal Nath. The company altered the course of the Beas River to protect its motel from flooding, causing environmental degradation. - ***Issue***: Whether the state’s action of leasing the land and the subsequent environmental alterations violated the **Public Trust Doctrine**. - ***Held***: The **Supreme Court** held that the state, as a trustee of natural resources, had breached the **Public Trust Doctrine** by leasing the land for commercial purposes. The court emphasized that resources like rivers and forests are meant for public use and cannot be converted into private ownership. 2. ***M.I. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu***, **(1999) 6 SCC 464**: - ***Facts***: The Lucknow Municipal Corporation permitted M.I. Builders to construct an underground shopping complex beneath a historic public park, Jhandewala Park, reducing public space. - ***Issue***: Whether the construction violated the **Public Trust Doctrine** by depriving the public of open space. - ***Held***: The **Supreme Court** ordered the demolition of the shopping complex, stating that the corporation had violated the **Public Trust Doctrine** by allowing the construction, which deprived the public of a valuable open space. 3. ***Fomento Resorts and Hotels Ltd. v. Minguel Martins***, **(2009) 3 SCC 571**: - ***Facts***: Fomento Resorts sought to restrict access to a beach area adjacent to its property, claiming ownership rights. - ***Issue***: Whether the company could restrict public access to the beach, considering the **Public Trust Doctrine**. - ***Held***: The **Supreme Court** reaffirmed that the state holds natural resources in trust for the public. It ruled that the company could not restrict public access to the beach, emphasizing that the seashore is a public resource. ## **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - ***Sustainable Development***: This principle advocates for meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It aligns with the **Public Trust Doctrine** by emphasizing the sustainable use of natural resources. - ***Intergenerational Equity***: This concept focuses on fairness between current and future generations, ensuring that the exploitation of natural resources does not deprive future generations of their rightful inheritance. ## **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** - ***“Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas”***: This Latin maxim means **“Use your property in such a manner as not to injure that of others.”** It underscores the responsibility to use natural resources without causing harm to others, reflecting the essence of the **Public Trust Doctrine**. ## **AMENDMENTS / ADDITIONS / REPEALING** While there have been no specific constitutional amendments directly incorporating the **Public Trust Doctrine**, judicial interpretations have effectively integrated it into Indian environmental jurisprudence. The courts have expanded the scope of **Article 21** to include environmental protection, thereby reinforcing the doctrine’s applicability. ## **STATISTICAL ANALYSIS / DATA ANALYSIS** Studies have shown that the application of the **Public Trust Doctrine** has led to increased environmental awareness and stricter regulation of resource exploitation in India. It has also encouraged public participation in environmental protection and helped in curbing private encroachments on public resources. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of State Action](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-state-action/) **Published:** December 24, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of State Action ensures that fundamental rights are protected against infringements by the State and its instrumentalities, as defined under Article 12 of the Indian Constitution. **Content:** The **Doctrine of State Action** ensures that **fundamental rights** are protected against infringements by the **State** and its instrumentalities, as defined under **Article 12** of the Indian Constitution. ### **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** The **Doctrine of State Action** pertains to actions taken by the government or its agencies that impact individual rights. In the Indian context, this doctrine ensures that **fundamental rights** enshrined in **Part III of the Constitution** are safeguarded against violations by the **“State,”** as defined in **Article 12**. **Article 12** includes the Government and Parliament of India, the Government and Legislature of each State, and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India. This broad definition ensures that any entity performing public functions or receiving substantial government funding is considered the **State** for the purposes of enforcing **fundamental rights**. ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The evolution of the **Doctrine of State Action** in India has been significantly influenced by judicial interpretations, particularly concerning **Article 12**. The **Supreme Court of India** has expanded the definition of **“State”** to include various bodies and institutions. In the landmark case of ***Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi***, (1981) 1 SCC 722, the Court laid down criteria to determine whether an entity is an instrumentality or agency of the **State**. These criteria include factors such as: - The extent of financial assistance provided by the government, - Control over the management and policies of the entity, and - Whether the entity enjoys a monopoly status conferred by the **State**. This expansive interpretation ensures that bodies performing public functions are held accountable for upholding **fundamental rights**. ### **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** In the **United States**, the **State Action Doctrine** limits the application of constitutional rights to governmental actions, excluding private conduct unless it involves significant state involvement. This contrasts with the **Indian approach**, where the definition of **“State”** under **Article 12** is broader, encompassing entities beyond traditional government bodies, thereby extending the reach of **fundamental rights**. This broader interpretation ensures that even private entities performing public functions or receiving substantial government aid are subject to constitutional scrutiny in India. ### **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** For an action to be considered a **“State action”** under Indian law, the following elements are essential: - ***Government Control***: The entity must be under significant government control or influence. - ***Public Function***: The entity should perform functions of public importance or closely related to governmental functions. - ***Financial Assistance***: Substantial financial aid or funding from the government to the entity. - ***State Conferred Monopoly***: The entity enjoys a monopoly status granted by the **State**. These criteria were elaborated in the ***Ajay Hasia*** case, providing a framework to determine whether an entity falls within the ambit of **“State”** under **Article 12**. ### **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** **Article 12** of the Indian Constitution defines the term **“State”** for the purposes of **Part III**, which deals with **fundamental rights**. This definition is crucial in determining against whom these rights can be enforced. Entities considered as **“State”** are subject to constitutional scrutiny to ensure they do not infringe upon **fundamental rights**. The judiciary has played a pivotal role in interpreting this definition to include various bodies and institutions, thereby broadening the scope of entities accountable under the Constitution. ### **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** 1. ***Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi***, (1981) 1 SCC 722: In this case, the **Supreme Court** provided a six-factor test to determine whether an entity is an instrumentality or agency of the **State**. The factors include: - Financial assistance from the **State**, - Control of the management and policies by the **State**, - Monopoly status, and - Public importance of functions. The Court held that a society registered under the **Societies Registration Act**, substantially financed and controlled by the government, falls within the definition of **“State”** under **Article 12**. 2. ***Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India***, (1979) 3 SCC 489: The **Supreme Court** held that the International Airport Authority, though a separate legal entity, was an instrumentality of the **State** due to deep and pervasive **State control**. The Court emphasized that the concept of **“State”** under **Article 12** is not confined to entities created by the Constitution or statute but extends to agencies and instrumentalities of the **State**. 3. ***Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology***, (2002) 5 SCC 111: The **Supreme Court** reiterated the tests laid down in ***Ajay Hasia*** and held that the **Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR)** is an instrumentality of the **State** under **Article 12**, considering factors like government funding, control, and public function. ### **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - ***Instrumentality Theory***: This theory posits that any entity that is an instrumentality or agency of the government falls within the definition of **“State”** under **Article 12**. The **Supreme Court**, in ***Ajay Hasia***, provided criteria to determine whether an entity is an instrumentality of the **State**, ensuring that such bodies are subject to constitutional obligations. - ***Public Function Test***: If a body performs functions of public importance closely related to governmental functions, it is considered a **“State”** under **Article 12**. This ensures that entities discharging public functions cannot evade constitutional accountability. ### **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** - **“Ubi jus ibi remedium”**: Where there is a right, there is a remedy. This principle underscores the importance of the **Doctrine of State Action**, ensuring that violations of **fundamental rights** by the **State** or its instrumentalities have legal remedies. - **“Equality before law”**: Enshrined in **Article 14**, this principle mandates that the **State** shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. It ensures that all actions of the **State** are free from arbitrariness and discrimination. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Stare Decisis](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-stare-decisis/) **Published:** December 24, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Stare Decisis, rooted in the Latin maxim "stare decisis et non quieta movere," mandates courts to adhere to established precedents to ensure legal consistency and predictability. In India, this principle is enshrined in Article 141 of the Constitution, which states that the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all courts within the territory of India. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Stare Decisis**, rooted in the Latin maxim **“stare decisis et non quieta movere,”** mandates courts to adhere to established precedents to ensure legal consistency and predictability. In India, this principle is enshrined in **Article 141 of the Constitution**, which states that the law declared by the **Supreme Court** is binding on all courts within the territory of India. **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** **Stare Decisis** translates to **“to stand by decisions and not to disturb settled matters.”** This doctrine obliges courts to follow legal precedents set by higher judiciary to maintain consistency in the law. It ensures that similar cases are adjudicated similarly, fostering stability and predictability in the legal system. The **Supreme Court of India**, through **Article 141**, declares that its decisions are binding on all subordinate courts, reinforcing the hierarchical nature of judicial decisions. **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The concept of **Stare Decisis** was introduced in India during British colonial rule. The establishment of a hierarchical judiciary and the practice of recording judicial decisions led to the adoption of this doctrine. The **Government of India Act, 1935**, under **Section 212**, emphasized the binding nature of **Federal Court** decisions on subordinate courts. Post-independence, the **Indian Constitution**, through **Article 141**, continued this tradition, making **Supreme Court decisions** binding on all courts within India. **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** - **Existence of a Hierarchical Judicial System**: A structured court system where lower courts are bound by the decisions of higher courts. - **Publication of Judicial Decisions**: Availability of past judgments to serve as references for future cases. - **Consistency in Legal Reasoning**: Adherence to established legal principles unless there is a compelling reason to deviate. **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** - **Article 141 of the Indian Constitution**: States that the law declared by the **Supreme Court** shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India. - **Article 137 of the Indian Constitution**: Grants the **Supreme Court** the power to review its judgments, ensuring flexibility within the doctrine. **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** - **Karnal Improvement Trust v. Parkash Wanti (1995)**: Emphasized the importance of adhering to precedents to maintain consistency in the law. - **Shanker Raju v. Union of India (2011)**: Reiterated that judgments holding the field for a long time should not be unsettled, highlighting the significance of **Stare Decisis**. **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - **Ratio Decidendi**: The legal principle or rationale upon which a case is decided. This forms the binding part of a precedent. - **Obiter Dicta**: Observations made by a judge that are not essential to the decision. These do not have a binding effect but may be persuasive. **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** - **Stare Decisis et Non Quieta Movere**: **“To stand by decisions and not to disturb settled matters.”** This maxim underpins the doctrine, emphasizing the importance of legal certainty. **AMENDMENTS / ADDITIONS / REPEALING** While the doctrine promotes consistency, it is not inflexible. Courts may depart from precedents if there is a significant change in circumstances or if the previous decision is deemed incorrect. This ensures that the law evolves with societal changes. **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** - **Criticism**: Some argue that strict adherence to precedents may hinder legal development and adaptation to new societal norms. - **Appreciation**: The doctrine provides stability, predictability, and fairness in the legal system, ensuring that similar cases yield similar outcomes. **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** In the **United States**, the doctrine of **Stare Decisis** is fundamental, with courts generally adhering to precedents. However, the **U.S. Supreme Court** has overturned its previous rulings in certain landmark cases, demonstrating flexibility. In contrast, **civil law countries** like France do not follow the doctrine strictly, as their legal systems are based more on codified statutes than judicial precedents. **FUTURE IMPLICATIONS** The doctrine of **Stare Decisis** will continue to play a crucial role in maintaining legal consistency. However, as societies evolve, courts may increasingly face challenges in balancing adherence to precedents with the need for legal reforms to address contemporary issues. **FLOWCHART: APPLICATION OF STARE DECISIS IN THE INDIAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM** ```mermaid graph TD A[Supreme Court Decision] --> B[Binding on All Courts] B --> C[High Court Decisions] C --> D[Binding on Lower Courts within Jurisdiction] D --> E[Lower Court Decisions] ``` --- **TABLE: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RATIO DECIDENDI AND OBITER DICTA** **Aspect****Ratio Decidendi****Obiter Dicta****Definition**The legal principle essential for the decision.Observations not essential to the decision.**Binding Nature**Binding on lower courts.Not binding but may be persuasive.**Role in Precedent**Forms the precedent to be followed in future cases.Does not form a precedent but can influence future judgments.**Identification**Determined by analyzing the judgment’s core reasoning.Identified as supplementary remarks or illustrations provided by the judge.--- **CONCLUSION** The **Doctrine of Stare Decisis** is integral to the Indian legal system, ensuring consistency and predictability in judicial decisions. While it promotes adherence to established precedents, the doctrine ensures flexibility by allowing deviations when necessary, enabling the law to evolve with changing societal needs. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Res Sub Judice](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-res-sub-judice/) **Published:** December 24, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Res Sub Judice, enshrined in Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908, prevents multiple courts from simultaneously adjudicating identical matters between the same parties. This doctrine ensures judicial efficiency and consistency by staying subsequent suits until the previously instituted suit is resolved. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Res Sub Judice**, enshrined in **Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908**, prevents multiple courts from simultaneously adjudicating identical matters between the same parties. This doctrine ensures judicial efficiency and consistency by staying subsequent suits until the previously instituted suit is resolved. ## **MEANING AND DEFINITION** *“Res Sub Judice”* is a Latin term where “Res” means ‘matter’ and “Sub Judice” means ‘under judgment.’ Thus, it refers to a matter pending judicial inquiry. **Section 10 of the CPC** embodies this doctrine, stating that no court shall proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is directly and substantially the same as in a previously instituted suit between the same parties, pending in the same or any other court in India having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND** The doctrine traces its roots to **Roman law**, specifically the concept of *“lis pendens,”* meaning a pending suit. It was incorporated into Indian jurisprudence through the **CPC** to prevent conflicting judgments and multiplicity of litigation. ## **ESSENTIALS OF RES SUB JUDICE** For **Section 10** to apply, the following conditions must be met: 1. ***Two Suits:*** There must be a previously instituted suit and a subsequently instituted suit. 2. ***Same Matter in Issue:*** The matter in issue in both suits must be directly and substantially the same. 3. ***Same Parties:*** Both suits must involve the same parties or their representatives litigating under the same title. 4. ***Pending Suit:*** The prior suit must be pending in a competent court within India. 5. ***Competent Jurisdiction:*** The court where the previous suit is pending must have jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed in the subsequent suit. These conditions are **cumulative**; all must be satisfied for the doctrine to apply. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS** #### Section 10 of the CPC states: *“No Court shall proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title where such suit is pending in the same or any other Court in India having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed, or in any Court beyond the limits of India established or continued by the Central Government and having like jurisdiction, or before the Supreme Court.”* ## **OBJECTIVES OF THE DOCTRINE** - ***Preventing Multiplicity of Proceedings:*** Ensures that multiple courts do not adjudicate the same matter simultaneously, avoiding wastage of judicial resources. - ***Avoiding Conflicting Judgments:*** Prevents different courts from delivering contradictory verdicts on the same issue. - ***Protecting Litigants from Harassment:*** Shields parties from facing multiple litigations for the same cause, ensuring fairness. ## **SCOPE AND APPLICATION** The doctrine applies to **civil suits** and is pertinent during the trial stage, not affecting the institution of suits. It does not preclude courts from passing interim orders such as **injunctions** or the **appointment of receivers**. Additionally, it applies to **appeals** and **revisions**. ## **EXCEPTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE** **Section 10** does not apply in the following scenarios: - ***Different Subject Matters:*** If the issues in the two suits are not directly and substantially the same. - ***Different Parties:*** If the parties in both suits are not the same or do not claim under the same title. - ***Pending in Foreign Court:*** The explanation to **Section 10** clarifies that the pendency of a suit in a foreign court does not preclude courts in India from trying a suit founded on the same cause of action. ## **KEY CASE LAWS** 1. **National Institute of Mental Health & Neuro Sciences v. C. Parameshwara, AIR 2005 SC 242** - ***Facts:*** A civil suit and a writ petition involving similar issues were pending simultaneously. - ***Issue:*** Whether **Section 10** applies to stay proceedings in such a scenario. - ***Held:*** The Supreme Court held that **Section 10** does not apply to writ proceedings and is confined to civil suits. 2. **Vithalbhai (P) Ltd. v. Union Bank of India, (2005) 4 SCC 315** - ***Facts:*** Two suits involving the same subject matter were filed in different courts. - ***Issue:*** Applicability of **Section 10** to stay the subsequent suit. - ***Held:*** The Supreme Court clarified that the purpose of **Section 10** is to avoid multiple proceedings and conflicting decisions. However, it should be used judiciously and only when the issue in a subsequent suit is directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties. 3. **Niranjan Shankar Golikari vs. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (1967)** - ***Facts:*** Two suits with overlapping issues were pending in different courts. - ***Issue:*** Whether the trial of the subsequent suit should be stayed under **Section 10**. - ***Held:*** The Supreme Court emphasized the need for consistency in judicial rulings and reiterated that when the matter in issue is substantially the same, the trial must be stayed to avoid conflicting decisions. ## **COMPARISON WITH RES JUDICATA** While both doctrines aim to prevent multiple litigations, they operate differently: **Aspect****Res Sub Judice****Res Judicata*****Meaning***Bars trial of a subsequent suit when a prior suit on the same matter is pending.Bars re-litigation of issues already decided in a prior suit.***Stage of Application***Applies during the pendency of a prior suit.Applies after a suit is conclusively decided.***Legal Provision*****Section 10, CPC****Section 11, CPC*****Objective***Prevents multiple trials on the same issue simultaneously.Prevents re-adjudication of the same issue after a final judgment. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Double Jeopardy](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-double-jeopardy/) **Published:** December 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Double Jeopardy, enshrined in Article 20(2) of the Indian Constitution, ensures that no individual is prosecuted and punished more than once for the same offense. This principle upholds the rule of law and safeguards individual rights within the Indian legal framework. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Double Jeopardy**, enshrined in **Article 20(2)** of the **Indian Constitution**, ensures that no individual is prosecuted and punished more than once for the same offense. This principle upholds the rule of law and safeguards individual rights within the Indian legal framework. ## **MEANING AND DEFINITION** **Double Jeopardy** refers to the legal principle that prohibits an individual from being tried or punished twice for the same offense. **Article 20(2)** of the **Indian Constitution** states: “**No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once.**” This provision embodies the maxim ***nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa***, meaning no person should be vexed twice for the same cause. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND** The concept of **Double Jeopardy** has roots in ancient **Roman law** and was later adopted into **English common law**. In India, the principle was introduced during **British colonial rule** and was incorporated into the **Indian Penal Code (IPC)** in 1860 and the **Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC)** in 1898. These codifications laid the foundation for the legal principle that would later be enshrined in the **Indian Constitution**. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS IN INDIA** - **Constitution of India**: **Article 20(2)** provides protection against double jeopardy, ensuring that no person is prosecuted and punished for the same offense more than once. This protection is limited to cases where there has been both prosecution and punishment. - **Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973**: **Section 300** of the **CrPC** expands on this principle, stating that a person who has been acquitted or convicted of an offense shall not be tried again for the same offense. This section covers both ***autrefois convict*** (previously convicted) and ***autrefois acquit*** (previously acquitted), providing broader protection against double jeopardy. ## **ESSENTIALS OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY** For the application of the **Double Jeopardy** doctrine, the following essentials must be satisfied: 1. ***Previous Proceedings***: There must have been a prior prosecution that resulted in either conviction or acquittal. 2. ***Same Offense***: The subsequent proceeding must be for the same offense for which the individual was previously prosecuted. 3. ***Competent Jurisdiction***: The initial prosecution must have been conducted by a court of competent jurisdiction. ## **EXCEPTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE** The protection against double jeopardy does not apply in certain situations: - ***Separate Sovereigns***: An individual can be tried for the same offense by different sovereign jurisdictions (e.g., by both state and central authorities) without violating the double jeopardy principle. - ***Civil and Criminal Proceedings***: The doctrine applies exclusively to criminal proceedings. An individual acquitted or convicted in a criminal case can still face civil proceedings for the same act. ## **CASE LAWS AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS** - **Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay (1953)**: In this case, the appellant was subjected to confiscation of gold by **customs authorities** and later prosecuted under the **Sea Customs Act**. The **Supreme Court** held that the customs authorities’ proceedings did not amount to a prosecution by a judicial tribunal; therefore, the subsequent trial did not violate **Article 20(2)**. - **S.A. Venkataraman v. Union of India (1954)**: The appellant faced **departmental proceedings** for corruption charges and was later prosecuted in a criminal court for the same charges. The **Supreme Court** ruled that **Article 20(2)** applies only to judicial proceedings and not to departmental or administrative proceedings. - **Kedar Nath v. State of West Bengal (1953)**: The appellant was acquitted of certain charges but later faced prosecution for a different offense based on the same facts. The **Supreme Court** clarified that **Article 20(2)** does not bar a subsequent trial if the offenses are distinct, even if based on the same facts. ## **INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE** The principle of **Double Jeopardy** is recognized internationally: - **International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)**: **Article 14(7)** states that no one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offense for which they have already been finally convicted or acquitted. - **European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)**: **Protocol No. 7, Article 4**, provides similar protection against double jeopardy within the member states. ## **COMPARISON WITH OTHER JURISDICTIONS** - **United States**: The **Fifth Amendment** to the **U.S. Constitution** provides broader protection against double jeopardy, prohibiting multiple prosecutions for the same offense, regardless of whether the individual was acquitted or convicted in the initial trial. - **United Kingdom**: The **UK** traditionally followed the double jeopardy rule; however, exceptions have been introduced, allowing retrial for serious offenses if new and compelling evidence emerges. ## **CRITICISM AND APPRECIATION** - ***Criticism***: The narrow scope of **Article 20(2)** has been criticized for not providing protection against multiple prosecutions leading to acquittal, thereby allowing the possibility of harassment through repeated trials. - ***Appreciation***: The doctrine upholds the finality of judgments, prevents abuse of legal processes, and protects individuals from the emotional and financial strain of facing multiple prosecutions for the same offense. ## **CONCLUSION** The **Doctrine of Double Jeopardy** serves as a crucial safeguard in the **Indian legal system**, protecting individuals from being prosecuted and punished multiple times for the same offense. While **Article 20(2)** offers limited protection, the provisions of the **CrPC** provide a more comprehensive shield against double jeopardy, ensuring fairness and justice within the legal framework. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Audi Alteram Partem](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-audi-alteram-partem/) **Published:** December 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Doctrine of Audi Alteram Partem, a Latin phrase meaning "hear the other side," is a fundamental principle of natural justice. It mandates that no person should be judged without a fair hearing, ensuring both parties in a dispute have an opportunity to present their case. **Content:** ***Meaning and Definition*** **Audi Alteram Partem**, a Latin phrase meaning “hear the other side,” is a fundamental principle of natural justice. It mandates that no person should be judged without a fair hearing, ensuring both parties in a dispute have an opportunity to present their case. This doctrine upholds fairness and prevents arbitrary decisions in legal and administrative proceedings. ## ***Historical Evolution*** The roots of **Audi Alteram Partem** trace back to ancient civilizations, including Roman law, where fairness in legal proceedings was paramount. Over time, this principle became integral to common law traditions, emphasizing that justice requires hearing both sides before making a decision. In India, the doctrine is embedded in **Articles 14** and **21** of the Constitution, which guarantee equality before the law and protection of life and personal liberty, respectively. The Supreme Court, in ***Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India***, AIR 1978 SC 597, expanded the interpretation of **Article 21**, emphasizing that the right to life and personal liberty includes the right to a fair procedure. ## ***Essentials of Audi Alteram Partem*** 1. ***Notice***: The affected individual must receive clear and precise information about the case against them, detailing the time, place, and nature of the hearing. Adequate notice enables the person to prepare an effective defense. In ***Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India***, AIR 1973 SC 389, the Supreme Court emphasized that the notice given to the parties should be clear and unambiguous. 2. ***Hearing***: The individual should have a reasonable opportunity to be heard, present evidence, and cross-examine witnesses. This ensures that decisions are made based on a comprehensive understanding of the facts. In ***Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works*** (1863) 143 ER 414, the court held that even though the Board had the power to demolish buildings erected without permission, no one could be deprived of their property without a chance to be heard. 3. ***Evidence Presentation***: The right to present and challenge evidence is crucial, allowing individuals to support their case and refute opposing claims. In ***State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei***, AIR 1967 SC 1269, the Supreme Court held that even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice after informing the person concerned of the case of the State, the evidence in support thereof, and after giving an opportunity to the person concerned of being heard and meeting or explaining the evidence. ## ***Legal Provisions in India*** While the Indian Constitution does not explicitly mention **Audi Alteram Partem**, its essence is reflected in: - **Article 14**: Guarantees equality before the law, implying that all individuals should have an equal opportunity to be heard. The Supreme Court, in ***Delhi Transport Corporation v. DTC Mazdoor Congress***, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 600, observed that the rule of **audi alteram partem** enforces the equality clause in **Article 14**. - **Article 21**: Protects life and personal liberty, which courts have interpreted to include the right to a fair hearing. In ***Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India***, AIR 1978 SC 597, the Supreme Court held that the procedure established by law must be fair, just, and reasonable, thereby incorporating the principles of natural justice. ## ***Key Indian Case Laws*** 1. ***Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India***, AIR 1978 SC 597: The government’s impounding of Maneka Gandhi’s passport without providing her an opportunity to be heard was challenged. The Supreme Court held that the action violated the principles of natural justice, particularly **Audi Alteram Partem**, as she was not given a chance to present her case. This case expanded the interpretation of **Article 21**, emphasizing that the right to life and personal liberty includes the right to a fair procedure. 2. ***A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India***, (1969) 2 SCC 262: A member of the selection board for the Indian Forest Service was also a candidate, leading to a conflict of interest. The Supreme Court held that the selection process violated the principles of natural justice, including **Audi Alteram Partem**, as there was a conflict of interest and the process was not fair and impartial. 3. ***D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd.***, (1993) 3 SCC 259: An employee was dismissed without being given an opportunity to be heard. The Supreme Court held that such termination was invalid as it violated the principles of natural justice, including **Audi Alteram Partem**. The Court emphasized that even in disciplinary proceedings, an employee must be given a chance to present their case before any adverse action is taken. 4. ***State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei***, AIR 1967 SC 1269: Dr. Binapani Dei was compulsorily retired from service based on an incorrect determination of her age without giving her a chance to be heard. The Supreme Court held that such an action was invalid as it did not comply with the principles of natural justice. The Court ruled that she should have been given an opportunity to present her case before any decision affecting her employment was made. ## *Exceptions to the Doctrine* While fundamental, **Audi Alteram Partem** has exceptions: - **Emergency Situations**: Immediate action may be necessary, rendering prior hearings impractical. In ***Union of India v. W.N. Chadha***, AIR 1993 SC 1082, the Supreme Court observed that the rule of **audi alteram partem** is a rule of justice and its application is excluded where the rule will itself lead to injustice. - **Confidentiality**: Matters involving state secrets or public safety may bypass this doctrine to prevent greater harm. In such cases, the application of the rule may be excluded if it leads to injustice. - **Legislative Functions**: Policy decisions by legislatures are typically exempt, as they represent collective societal interests. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Nemo Judex in Causa Sua](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-nemo-judex-in-causa-sua/) **Published:** December 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The doctrine of "Nemo Judex in Causa Sua," a fundamental principle of natural justice, asserts that no individual should act as a judge in their own cause. This rule ensures impartiality in judicial and administrative proceedings, preventing bias and upholding fairness. **Content:** The doctrine of **“Nemo Judex in Causa Sua,”** a fundamental principle of natural justice, asserts that no individual should act as a judge in their own cause. This rule ensures **impartiality** in judicial and administrative proceedings, preventing **bias** and upholding **fairness**. ### **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** **“Nemo Judex in Causa Sua”** is a **Latin maxim** meaning **“no one should be a judge in their own case.”** This principle mandates that **decision-makers must remain unbiased**, ensuring justice is not only done but also seen to be done. It addresses various forms of **bias**, including **personal**, **pecuniary**, and **subject-matter bias**, which can compromise the integrity of decisions. ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** Originating from **Roman law**, the principle was crystallized by **Sir Edward Coke** in the 17th century. In ***Dr. Bonham’s Case* (1610)**, Coke emphasized that **common law would control acts of Parliament against common right and reason**, laying the foundation for this doctrine. Over time, it became integral to **English common law** and was subsequently adopted into **Indian jurisprudence**, reinforcing the importance of **impartial adjudication**. ### **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** - ***Impartiality***: Decision-makers must have no personal interest in the outcome. - ***Absence of Bias***: There should be no **reasonable suspicion of bias**. - ***Fair Procedure***: The process must ensure that justice is administered without prejudice. ### **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** In India, while the **Constitution** does not explicitly mention this doctrine, **Articles 14 and 21** have been interpreted to encompass principles of **natural justice**, including **“Nemo Judex in Causa Sua.”** The **judiciary** has reinforced this through various judgments, ensuring that any decision-making process adheres to the **rule against bias**. ### **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** 1. ***A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India,* AIR 1970 SC 150**: In this case, the acting Chief Conservator of Forests was a member of the selection committee for appointments, including his own. The **Supreme Court** held that his participation violated the principle of **“Nemo Judex in Causa Sua,”** rendering the selection invalid. 2. ***J. Mohapatra & Co. v. State of Orissa,* (1984) 4 SCC 103**: The Court observed that the **rule against bias** is subject to the **doctrine of necessity**, which allows a biased individual to decide if no alternative exists. However, this exception applies only in **genuine cases of necessity**. 3. ***Union of India v. B.N. Jha,* AIR 1957 SC 425**: The **Supreme Court** emphasized that any **interest, pecuniary or otherwise, in the subject matter** disqualifies a person from acting as a judge in that case, reinforcing the importance of **impartiality**. ### **EXCEPTIONS / DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY** The **doctrine of necessity** serves as an exception to **“Nemo Judex in Causa Sua.”** In situations where no alternative decision-maker is available, a person with potential bias may have to adjudicate to prevent a failure of justice. This exception is applied **sparingly** and under **strict conditions** to ensure it doesn’t undermine the principle of **impartiality**. ### **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** The principle is **universally recognized**. - In the **UK**, it forms a core part of **common law**. - In the **US**, it’s embedded within the **due process clause of the Constitution**. - Similarly, the **Indian legal system** upholds this doctrine through **judicial interpretations**, ensuring alignment with **global standards of justice**. ### **RELATION WITH OTHER CONCEPTS** **“Nemo Judex in Causa Sua”** is closely linked with **“Audi Alteram Partem”** (hear the other side), both forming the **bedrock of natural justice**. While the former ensures **impartiality**, the latter guarantees the **right to a fair hearing**, together promoting **fairness in legal proceedings**. ### **GUIDELINES / RULES / REGULATIONS** Judicial and administrative bodies in **India** are guided by this principle to maintain **impartiality**. Any potential **conflict of interest** must be disclosed, and the individual should **recuse themselves** to uphold the **integrity** of the process. ### **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** While the doctrine ensures **fairness**, critics argue that its **rigid application** can lead to **delays**, especially when the **doctrine of necessity** is invoked. However, its role in maintaining **public confidence** in the justice system outweighs potential drawbacks. ### **FUTURE IMPLICATIONS** As legal systems evolve, the principle of **“Nemo Judex in Causa Sua”** will continue to be pivotal in ensuring **impartiality**. With increasing complexities in legal and administrative frameworks, its application may expand to address **new challenges** in maintaining unbiased decision-making processes. ### **REFERENCES** 1. ***A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India,* AIR 1970 SC 150.** 2. ***J. Mohapatra & Co. v. State of Orissa,* (1984) 4 SCC 103.** 3. ***Union of India v. B.N. Jha,* AIR 1957 SC 425.** 4. **“All you need to know about the Principles of Natural Justice,” iPleaders.** 5. **“All about the doctrine of necessity,” iPleaders.** 6. **“Principles of Natural Justice,” Testbook.** 7. **“Principles Of Natural Justice,” Lawyersclubindia.** 8. **“Nemo iudex in causa sua.”** **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Natural Justice](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-natural-justice/) **Published:** December 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Natural Justice embodies fundamental principles ensuring fairness, equity, and impartiality in legal and administrative proceedings. In the Indian legal system, these principles are integral to upholding the rule of law and protecting individual rights **Content:** The **Doctrine of Natural Justice** embodies fundamental principles ensuring fairness, equity, and impartiality in legal and administrative proceedings. In the Indian legal system, these principles are integral to upholding the **rule of law** and protecting individual rights. ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** *Natural Justice* refers to the basic procedural principles that ensure fairness in decision-making processes. Derived from the Latin terms **‘jus naturale’** and **‘lex naturale’**, it emphasizes moral righteousness and legal equity. In essence, it mandates that decisions should be made without bias, and individuals affected by decisions should have the opportunity to present their case. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The concept of *Natural Justice* has ancient roots, evident in **Greek** and **Roman philosophies** emphasizing fairness. In India, the principles of **Natural Justice** have been integral since ancient times, aligning with the concept of **‘Dharma’**, which emphasizes righteousness and duty. The British colonial legal system further formalized these principles, embedding them into Indian jurisprudence. Over time, **Indian courts** have expanded and reinforced these principles, ensuring they adapt to contemporary legal challenges. ## **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** The Doctrine of Natural Justice primarily comprises two key principles: 1. ***Nemo Judex in Causa Sua (Rule Against Bias):*** This principle asserts that no person should judge a case in which they have a personal interest, ensuring decisions are made impartially. 2. ***Audi Alteram Partem (Right to be Heard):*** This principle ensures that every individual has the right to a fair hearing before a decision affecting them is made. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** While the **Indian Constitution** does not explicitly mention **Natural Justice**, its principles are inherent in various articles: - **Article 14:** Guarantees the **right to equality before the law**, implying decisions should be free from bias. - **Article 21:** Ensures the **right to life and personal liberty**, which courts have interpreted to include the right to a fair procedure. **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** Several landmark judgments have shaped the understanding and application of **Natural Justice** in India: 1. ***A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India (1969):*** In this case, the selection committee for the Indian Forest Service included a member who was also a candidate. The **Supreme Court** held that this violated the **rule against bias**, emphasizing that even administrative decisions must adhere to **Natural Justice** principles. 2. ***Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978):*** The government’s impounding of **Maneka Gandhi’s passport** without giving her a chance to be heard was challenged. The **Supreme Court** held that the procedure established by law must be **‘right, just, and fair,’** reinforcing the importance of **Natural Justice** under **Article 21**. 3. ***Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner (1977):*** The **Supreme Court** held that the concept of **Natural Justice** should be present in every action, whether judicial, quasi-judicial, administrative, or quasi-administrative, that involves **civil consequences** to the parties. ## **EXCEPTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF NATURAL JUSTICE** While the principles of **Natural Justice** are fundamental, certain exceptions exist: - **Statutory Exclusion:** If a statute explicitly excludes the application of **Natural Justice**, the courts may uphold such exclusions. - **Emergency Situations:** In cases requiring immediate action, adhering to **Natural Justice** may be impractical. - **Confidentiality:** Matters involving **state secrets** or **public interest** may warrant deviation from these principles. ## **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** The Doctrine of Natural Justice is closely related to: - **Doctrine of Fairness:** Emphasizes that procedures should be **fair and just**. - **Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation:** Protects individuals’ expectations of fair treatment in administrative decisions. ## **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** The foundational maxims of **Natural Justice** are: - **Nemo Judex in Causa Sua:** No one should be a judge in their own cause. - **Audi Alteram Partem:** Hear the other side. ## **AMENDMENTS / ADDITIONS / REPEALING** The principles of **Natural Justice** have evolved through **judicial interpretations** rather than formal amendments. Courts have progressively expanded their scope to ensure fairness in various contexts. ## **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** While the Doctrine of **Natural Justice** is lauded for promoting fairness, it faces criticism for potential delays in decision-making processes. Balancing the strict application of these principles with the need for efficient administration remains a challenge. ## **FLOWCHART: PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE** ```mermaid graph TDA[Principles of Natural Justice]B[Nemo Judex in Causa Sua]C[Audi Alteram Partem]A --> BA --> C ``` ## **TABLE: COMPARISON OF KEY CASES ON NATURAL JUSTICE** **Case Name****Brief Facts****Issue Raised****Held****A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India**Selection committee member was also a candidate.Whether the selection process violated **Natural Justice**.Held that it violated the **rule against bias**.**Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India**Passport impounded without a hearing.Whether the action violated **Article 21**.Held that **‘procedure established by law’** must be fair, just, and reasonable.**Mohinder Singh Gill v. CEC**Election commissioner’s order without hearing the affected party.Applicability of **Natural Justice** in administrative actions.Held that **Natural Justice** applies to all actions affecting rights.## **CONCLUSION** The **Doctrine of Natural Justice** serves as a cornerstone of the **Indian legal system**, ensuring that **fairness** and **equity** prevail in all judicial and administrative proceedings. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Proportionality](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-proportionality/) **Published:** December 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Proportionality ensures that administrative actions and legislative measures are balanced, fair, and not excessive, aligning with constitutional rights. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Proportionality** ensures that administrative actions and legislative measures are balanced, fair, and not excessive, aligning with constitutional rights. ### **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** The **Doctrine of Proportionality** mandates that any action by the state or its agencies should not be more restrictive than necessary to achieve the desired objective. This principle ensures that measures infringing on individual rights are **justified**, **necessary**, and balanced against the public interest. In essence, the severity of a measure must correspond appropriately to the importance of its objective. ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** Originating in **18th-century Prussia**, the doctrine was later integrated into **German administrative law**. Post-World War II, it became a cornerstone of the **German Constitution** and was adopted by the **European Convention on Human Rights (1959)**. The doctrine’s roots can also be traced to classical Greek principles of **corrective and distributive justice**, as well as the **Roman legal system** and the **Magna Carta of 1215**, which emphasized proportionate punishments. ### **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** In **Europe**, especially Germany, the doctrine is a fundamental aspect of **constitutional law**, ensuring that state actions are proportionate. The **European Court of Human Rights** employs this principle to assess the fairness of state interference with individual rights. In contrast, the **UK** initially applied the **Wednesbury unreasonableness test** but has gradually incorporated proportionality, especially under the **Human Rights Act 1998**. The **US**, through its **Eighth Amendment**, reflects the principle by prohibiting excessive fines and cruel punishments. ### **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** The doctrine comprises several key elements: - ***Legitimate Aim***: The action must pursue a lawful objective. - ***Suitability***: The means adopted should effectively achieve the intended goal. - ***Necessity***: There should be no less restrictive alternative available to achieve the same objective. - ***Balancing (Proportionality stricto sensu)***: The benefits of the action must outweigh the harm caused to individual rights. These elements ensure that any infringement on rights is **justified** and **minimal**. ### **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** In **India**, the doctrine is intertwined with constitutional provisions: - **Article 14**: Guarantees **equality before the law**, preventing arbitrary actions. - **Article 19**: Enumerates **fundamental freedoms**, subject to reasonable restrictions. - **Article 21**: Protects the **right to life and personal liberty**, allowing deprivation only through a procedure established by law. The judiciary employs the **proportionality test** to assess whether restrictions on these rights are justified, ensuring that state actions are not **arbitrary** or **excessive**. ### **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** Several landmark judgments have shaped the application of the doctrine in India: 1. ***Om Kumar v. Union of India (2000)***: The Supreme Court acknowledged that Indian courts have applied the doctrine since **1950** when assessing legislative actions affecting **fundamental freedoms** under **Article 19(1)**. The Court emphasized that **administrative actions** impacting fundamental rights should be tested on the anvil of proportionality. 2. ***Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)***: The Court expanded the interpretation of **Article 21**, linking it with **Articles 14 and 19**. It emphasized that any law interfering with personal liberty must pass the test of **reasonableness** and **fairness**, implicitly incorporating the principle of proportionality. 3. ***Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980)***: In the context of the **death penalty**, the Supreme Court applied the doctrine, stating that the punishment must not be **excessive** and should be commensurate with the **gravity of the offense**. 4. ***Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India (1987)***: The Court held that the **doctrine of proportionality** ensures that even decisions within the exclusive domain of authorities, like court-martials, should not be **outrageous** or **disproportionate**. ### **INTERPRETATIONS / EXPLANATIONS** The doctrine serves as a tool for **judicial review**, enabling courts to assess whether administrative or legislative actions are justified. It ensures a balance between **individual rights** and **public interest**, preventing arbitrary or excessive measures by the state. By applying this doctrine, courts can invalidate actions that are **disproportionate**, ensuring adherence to **constitutional principles**. ### **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** The **Doctrine of Proportionality** is closely related to: - ***Wednesbury Unreasonableness***: A principle from **UK law** assessing whether a decision is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority would ever consider it. While **Wednesbury** focuses on the decision-making process, proportionality examines the **outcome’s balance and fairness**. - ***Strict Scrutiny Test***: Used primarily in the **US**, this test evaluates whether a legislative measure is necessary to achieve a **compelling state interest**, similar to the **necessity** and **balancing** aspects of proportionality. ### **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** The doctrine aligns with the legal maxim **“Justitia nemini neganda est,”** meaning **“Justice is to be denied to no one.”** It ensures that state actions are **just**, **fair**, and not excessive, upholding the principles of **natural justice** and **fairness**. ### **AMENDMENTS / ADDITIONS / REPEALING** While the doctrine itself hasn’t been **codified**, it is effectively implemented through **judicial precedents** and is implicitly part of **constitutional jurisprudence** in India. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Reasonableness](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-reasonableness/) **Published:** December 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Reasonableness ensures that laws and administrative actions are fair, just, and not arbitrary, upholding the principles of equality and justice enshrined in the Indian Constitution. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Reasonableness** ensures that laws and administrative actions are fair, just, and not arbitrary, upholding the principles of **equality** and **justice** enshrined in the **Indian Constitution**. ## **MEANING AND EXPLANATION** The **Doctrine of Reasonableness** mandates that any law or administrative action must be rational and not arbitrary. It ensures that decisions are made based on logical reasoning, aligning with principles of fairness and justice. This doctrine is integral to **Article 14** of the **Indian Constitution**, which guarantees **equality before the law** and **equal protection of the laws**. The **Supreme Court of India** has emphasized that **Article 14** strikes at arbitrariness in state action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND** The concept of **reasonableness** in legal systems worldwide has been pivotal in ensuring justice and fairness. In India, the doctrine gained prominence through judicial interpretations, particularly concerning **Article 14** of the **Constitution**. The **Supreme Court**, in various judgments, has underscored the importance of **reasonableness** as an essential element of **equality** or **non-arbitrariness**. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS** **Article 14** of the **Indian Constitution** embodies the principle of **equality before the law** and **equal protection of the laws**. This article prohibits **arbitrary discrimination** by the state and forms the constitutional basis for the **Doctrine of Reasonableness**. The **Supreme Court** has interpreted **Article 14** to strike at arbitrariness in state action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment. ## **PRINCIPLES AND MAXIMS RELATED TO REASONABLENESS** - ***Audi Alteram Partem***: This principle means **“hear the other side”** and ensures that no person is condemned unheard, promoting fairness in administrative actions. - ***Nemo Judex in Causa Sua***: Meaning **“no one should be a judge in their own cause”**, this principle prevents bias in decision-making. ## **TESTS FOR DETERMINING REASONABLENESS** To assess the reasonableness of a law or action, the following tests are applied: 1. ***Intelligible Differentia***: The classification must be based on an **intelligible differentia** that distinguishes those grouped together from others. 2. ***Rational Nexus***: There must be a **rational relation** between the classification and the objective sought to be achieved by the law. ## **JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS** - ***Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597***: - *Facts*: **Maneka Gandhi’s passport** was impounded by the government without providing reasons. - *Issue*: Whether the **impounding of the passport** violated **Articles 14**, **19**, and **21** of the **Constitution**. - *Held*: The Court emphasized that the procedure established by law must be **fair, just, and reasonable**, and not **arbitrary** or **oppressive**. It linked **Articles 14**, **19**, and **21** and held that these articles must be read together to ensure **fairness** in the procedure. - ***State of Madras v. V.G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196***: - *Facts*: The **State of Madras** declared the **People’s Education Society** an unlawful association under the **Criminal Law Amendment Act**. - *Issue*: Whether the declaration violated the **fundamental rights** guaranteed under the **Constitution**. - *Held*: The Court held that the restrictions imposed were **not reasonable** and violated the **fundamental rights** of the petitioner. The **test of reasonableness** was applied to the impugned statute. ## **APPLICATION IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW** The **Doctrine of Reasonableness** plays a crucial role in **administrative law** by ensuring that administrative actions are free from **arbitrariness** and **bias**. In the case of ***A.V. Bellarmin v. V. Santhakumaran Nair***, the **Supreme Court** held that a **reasonable suspicion of bias** affecting a decision is sufficient to invoke the **doctrine of bias**. ## **INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE** The principle of **reasonableness** is recognized in various legal systems worldwide, including the **United States**, **United Kingdom**, **Australia**, and **Canada**. It serves as a standard for **judicial review** to ensure that laws and administrative actions are **fair** and **just**. ## **CONCLUSION** The **Doctrine of Reasonableness** is a fundamental aspect of **Indian constitutional law**, ensuring that laws and administrative actions adhere to principles of **fairness, justice, and equality**. Through various **judicial pronouncements**, the **Indian judiciary** has reinforced the importance of this doctrine in upholding the **constitutional mandate** against arbitrariness. ## **REFERENCES** 1. ***Om Kumar and Ors. v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 3689***. 2. ***Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597***. 3. ***State of Madras v. V.G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196***. 4. ***A.V. Bellarmin v. V. Santhakumaran Nair, (2013) 1 MLJ 362 (SC)***. 5. **“Doctrine of Reasonable Classification,” iPleaders**. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-legitimate-expectation-2/) **Published:** December 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation ensures fairness in administrative actions, allowing individuals to anticipate consistent treatment from public authorities based on past conduct or explicit promises. This principle, integral to Indian administrative law, upholds non-arbitrariness and transparency in governance. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation** ensures fairness in administrative actions, allowing individuals to anticipate consistent treatment from public authorities based on past conduct or explicit promises. This principle, integral to Indian administrative law, upholds **non-arbitrariness** and **transparency** in governance. ### **MEANING AND DEFINITION** **Legitimate expectation** arises when a public authority’s **consistent practice** or **explicit promise** leads an individual to reasonably anticipate a specific treatment or benefit. Although not a legal right, it serves as a ground for **judicial review** to prevent arbitrary administrative decisions. The **Supreme Court of India**, in ***Ram Pravesh Singh & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors.***, described it as arising from “an express promise given on behalf of a public authority or from the existence of a regular practice which the claimant can reasonably expect to continue.” ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND** The doctrine’s roots trace back to English law, notably the ***Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service*** (\[1985\] AC 374), where it was established that a legitimate expectation could arise from a **promise** or **regular practice**. In India, the concept was first discussed in ***State of Kerala v. K.G. Madhavan Pillai*** ((1988) 4 SCC 669), where the **Supreme Court** recognized that the withdrawal of a previously granted sanction without proper reasoning violated the **principles of natural justice**, thereby acknowledging the respondents’ legitimate expectation. ### **ESSENTIALS OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION** For an expectation to be deemed legitimate, certain criteria must be met: - ***Clear and Unambiguous Promise***: There must be an explicit **promise** or a **consistent practice** by the public authority. - ***Reasonableness***: The expectation should be **reasonable** and not based on mere hope or desire. - ***Reliance***: The individual should have **relied** on the promise or practice to their detriment. - ***Authority’s Competence***: The public authority must have the **legal competence** to fulfill the promise. ### **TYPES OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS** 1. ***Procedural Legitimate Expectation***: This arises when an individual expects a certain **procedure** to be followed before a decision is made, such as the **right to a hearing**. 2. ***Substantive Legitimate Expectation***: This involves an expectation of a specific **benefit** or **advantage**, like the continuation of a policy or the granting of a license. ### **LEGAL PROVISIONS AND PRINCIPLES** While the doctrine is not explicitly mentioned in Indian statutes, it aligns with the **principles of natural justice** and **Article 14 of the Indian Constitution**, which guarantees **equality before the law** and protection against arbitrary state actions. ### **KEY CASE LAWS** 1. ***Navjyoti Co-Op. Group Housing Society v. Union of India*** ((1992) 4 SCC 477): The **Supreme Court** held that the change in the criteria for land allotment without giving affected parties an opportunity to be heard violated the **doctrine of legitimate expectation**. 2. ***Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries*** ((1993) 1 SCC 71): The Court emphasized that the duty to act fairly by public authorities gives rise to **legitimate expectations**, and failure to consider such expectations can lead to **arbitrariness**. 3. ***M.P. Oil Extraction v. State of M.P.*** ((1997) 7 SCC 592): The **Supreme Court** recognized that the renewal of leases based on past consistent practice gave rise to **legitimate expectation**, and any deviation without valid reason would be **arbitrary**. 4. ***State of Jharkhand v. Brahmputra Metallics Ltd.*** ((2020) 18 SCC 476): The Court held that the state’s delay in issuing a notification, contrary to its industrial policy, violated the **legitimate expectation** of the beneficiaries, emphasizing that state actions must be **fair** and **transparent**. ### **EXCEPTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE** The doctrine does not apply in situations where: - ***Contrary to Law***: If fulfilling the expectation would result in an **illegal act**. - ***Overriding Public Interest***: When a **greater public interest** justifies the deviation from the expected course. - ***Change in Policy***: Legitimate expectation cannot hinder the government from **changing policies** for public good, provided the change is not **arbitrary** or **unreasonable**. ### **COMPARISON WITH PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL** While both doctrines prevent public authorities from acting contrary to their promises or established practices, **legitimate expectation** is a **public law principle** focusing on fairness in administrative actions, whereas **promissory estoppel** is a **private law principle** preventing a party from going back on a promise that another party has relied upon to their detriment. ### **APPLICATION IN INDIAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW** The doctrine serves as a check against **arbitrary administrative actions**, ensuring that public authorities act **fairly** and **reasonably**, upholding the principles of **natural justice**. It provides individuals with a basis to challenge decisions that violate their **legitimate expectations**, thereby promoting **transparency** and **accountability** in governance. ### **CONCLUSION** The **Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation** plays a crucial role in Indian administrative law by bridging the gap between individual expectations and administrative discretion. It ensures that public authorities adhere to principles of **fairness** and **non-arbitrariness**, thereby strengthening the **rule of law** and protecting individual rights against **unjust administrative actions**. ### **REFERENCES** 1. ***Ram Pravesh Singh & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors.***, (2006) 8 SCC 381. 2. ***State of Kerala v. K.G. Madhavan Pillai***, (1988) 4 SCC 669. 3. ***Navjyoti Co-Op. Group Housing Society v. Union of India***, (1992) 4 SCC 477. 4. ***Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries***, (1993) 1 SCC 71. 5. ***M.P. Oil Extraction v. State of M.P.***, (1997) 7 SCC 592. 6. ***State of Jharkhand v. Brahmputra Metallics Ltd.***, (2020) 18 SCC 476. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Public Accountability](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-public-accountability/) **Published:** December 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Public Accountability mandates that public officials and institutions are answerable to the public for their actions and decisions. It ensures that those in power exercise their authority responsibly, transparently, and in the public interest. **Content:** ## **1. MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** The **Doctrine of Public Accountability** mandates that public officials and institutions are answerable to the public for their actions and decisions. It ensures that those in power exercise their authority responsibly, transparently, and in the public interest. This doctrine is fundamental to maintaining trust between the government and its citizens, promoting transparency, and preventing misuse of power. ## **2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The concept of **public accountability** has evolved over time, influenced by both domestic and international legal principles. In India, the evolution of this doctrine can be traced through various judicial pronouncements and legislative measures aimed at curbing **administrative arbitrariness** and ensuring that public officials are held accountable for their actions. ## **3. COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** In many democratic nations, the principle of **public accountability** is enshrined in their legal systems. For instance: - **In the United States:** The **Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)** allows citizens to request access to federal agency records, promoting transparency. - **In the United Kingdom:** The **Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration** (commonly known as the Ombudsman) investigates complaints against government departments and public organizations. These mechanisms ensure that public officials are answerable to the public, fostering trust and integrity in governance. ## **4. CAUSES / EFFECT RELATION WITH OTHER CONCEPTS** The **Doctrine of Public Accountability** is closely related to several other legal concepts: - **Judicial Review:** Allows courts to examine the legality of administrative actions, ensuring they do not exceed their powers or violate legal principles. - **Transparency:** Ensures that government actions are conducted openly, allowing citizens to be informed and to participate in the democratic process. - **Rule of Law:** Establishes that all individuals, including public officials, are subject to the law, preventing arbitrary use of power. ## **5. TYPES / KINDS** **Public accountability** can be categorized into: - **Political Accountability:** Ensures that elected officials are answerable to the electorate for their actions and decisions. - **Administrative Accountability:** Pertains to the responsibility of public servants to adhere to laws, regulations, and ethical standards in their duties. - **Legal Accountability:** Involves holding public officials accountable through legal means, such as **judicial review** and legal proceedings. ## **6. FORMS / MODES** **Public accountability** is manifested through: - **Legislative Oversight:** Parliamentary committees scrutinize government actions and expenditures. - **Judicial Oversight:** Courts review administrative actions to ensure they comply with the law. - **Public Participation:** Engaging citizens in decision-making processes, such as public consultations and hearings. ## **7. ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** For effective **public accountability**, the following elements are essential: - **Transparency:** Availability of information regarding government actions and decisions. - **Responsiveness:** Government’s willingness to address public concerns and feedback. - **Enforcement Mechanisms:** Legal and institutional frameworks to hold public officials accountable. ## **8. DEFENCES / EXCEPTIONS** While public officials are generally accountable, certain defenses or exceptions may apply: - **Sovereign Immunity:** Protection from lawsuits for actions performed in the exercise of sovereign functions. - **Discretionary Immunity:** Protection when officials exercise discretion in good faith and within their legal authority. ## **9. LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** Several legal provisions uphold **public accountability** in India: - **Right to Information Act, 2005:** Empowers citizens to access information from public authorities, promoting transparency. - **Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850:** Provides a mechanism for the removal of public servants on grounds of misconduct. - **Judicial Review:** Allows courts to examine the legality of administrative actions. ## **10. GUIDELINES / RULES / REGULATIONS / NOTIFICATIONS / CIRCULARS** Various guidelines and rules have been established to ensure **public accountability**: - **Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) Guidelines:** Provide directives for preventing corruption and ensuring transparency in public administration. - **Public Procurement Guidelines:** Ensure transparency and fairness in government procurement processes. ## **11. CUSTOMS / USAGE / TRADITIONS-BASED LAW** In addition to statutory provisions, customary practices and traditions also play a role in ensuring **public accountability**. For example, the tradition of **public hearings and consultations** in certain administrative processes allows citizens to participate and hold officials accountable. ## **12. CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** Several landmark cases have shaped the **doctrine of public accountability** in India: - **A.G. Hong Kong v. Reid (1993):** The court held that a public official who misappropriates public funds holds the misappropriated property in constructive trust for the public. - **Skipper Construction Co. v. Delhi Development Authority (1996):** The court emphasized that public officials must be held accountable for their actions, and courts can pass necessary orders irrespective of the existence of a fiduciary relationship. - **Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993):** The **Supreme Court** held that compensation for violation of human rights and abuse of power is a recognized claim under public law. ## **13. INTERPRETATIONS / EXPLANATIONS** The judiciary has interpreted the **doctrine of public accountability** to include: - **Compensation for Misuse of Power:** Courts can award compensation to victims of administrative excesses. - **Judicial Review:** Ensures that administrative actions are subject to legal scrutiny to prevent misuse of power. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Separation of Powers](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-separation-of-powers/) **Published:** December 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Separation of Powers divides governmental authority among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. This framework prevents power concentration and ensures checks and balances within a democratic system. **Content:** ## **INTRODUCTION** The **Doctrine of Separation of Powers** divides governmental authority among the **legislative**, **executive**, and **judicial** branches. This framework prevents power concentration and ensures **checks and balances** within a democratic system. ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** The **Doctrine of Separation of Powers** entails distributing governmental functions among three distinct branches: - **Legislature**: *Responsible for enacting laws*. - **Executive**: *Tasked with implementing and enforcing laws*. - **Judiciary**: *Interprets laws and adjudicates disputes*. This separation ensures that no single entity wields absolute power, thereby safeguarding individual liberties and promoting a balanced governance structure. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The concept traces back to **ancient Greece**, where **Aristotle** identified three governmental functions: deliberative, magisterial, and judicial. In the 17th century, **John Locke** advocated for separating **legislative** and **executive** powers to prevent tyranny. Later, **Montesquieu’s seminal work, “The Spirit of the Laws” (1748)**, emphasized dividing powers among **legislative**, **executive**, and **judicial** branches to preserve political liberty. ## **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** - **United States**: The **U.S. Constitution** explicitly delineates powers among the three branches, embodying a rigid separation with a system of **checks and balances**. - **United Kingdom**: Lacks a written constitution; the separation is more flexible, with overlaps, especially between the **executive** and **legislature**. - **India**: While the **Indian Constitution** doesn’t explicitly mention the doctrine, it implies a **functional separation** with provisions ensuring **checks and balances** among the branches. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** In **India**, several constitutional provisions reflect the separation of powers: - **Article 50**: *Directs the state to separate the judiciary from the executive in public services.* - **Articles 121 and 211**: *Prohibit legislative discussion on the conduct of judges, ensuring judicial independence.* - **Articles 122 and 212**: *Restrict judicial intervention in parliamentary proceedings, preserving legislative autonomy.* ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** 1. **Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 549**: The **Supreme Court** observed that while the **Indian Constitution** doesn’t explicitly adhere to the doctrine, it delineates functions among branches, preventing one from encroaching upon another’s domain. 2. **Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299**: The Court emphasized that the **separation of powers** is a **fundamental feature** of the Constitution, integral to its **basic structure**. 3. **Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461**: This **landmark judgment** reinforced that the separation of powers forms part of the Constitution’s **basic structure**, which cannot be altered by parliamentary amendments. ## **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - **Checks and Balances**: This principle ensures that each branch can monitor and limit the functions of the others, preventing any single branch from becoming supreme. - **Judicial Review**: Empowers the judiciary to assess the constitutionality of legislative and executive actions, acting as a check on potential overreach. ## **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** - **“Delegatus non potest delegare”**: *A delegate cannot further delegate; this principle restricts the transfer of delegated powers, maintaining clear functional boundaries.* ## **AMENDMENTS / ADDITIONS / REPEALING** The **42nd Amendment (1976)** attempted to curtail **judicial review** powers, disrupting the balance among branches. However, the **Supreme Court**, in **Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789**, invalidated these changes, reaffirming the doctrine’s significance in maintaining **constitutional equilibrium**. ## **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** - **Criticism**: Rigid separation can lead to inefficiencies and governmental paralysis, especially in emergencies requiring coordinated action. - **Appreciation**: The doctrine prevents authoritarianism, promotes accountability, and protects individual freedoms by ensuring no single branch monopolizes power. ## **FLOWCHART: SEPARATION OF POWERS IN INDIA** ```plaintext +------------------+ | | | Constitution | | | +---------+--------+ | v +---------+--------+ | | | Legislature | | | +---------+--------+ | v +---------+--------+ | | | Executive | | | +---------+--------+ | v +---------+--------+ | | | Judiciary | | | +------------------+ ``` ## **TABLE: COMPARISON OF SEPARATION OF POWERS** CountryNature of SeparationKey Features**United States****Rigid**Explicit constitutional provisions; strong checks and balances.**United Kingdom****Flexible**Unwritten constitution; overlaps between executive and legislature.**India****Functional**Implied separation; specific provisions ensuring independence and checks.## **CONCLUSION** The **Doctrine of Separation of Powers** is vital in **India’s constitutional framework**, ensuring a balanced distribution of authority among the **legislative**, **executive**, and **judicial** branches. Through **judicial interpretations** and **constitutional provisions**, this doctrine upholds **democratic principles**, prevents **power concentration**, and safeguards **individual liberties**. ## **REFERENCES** 1. **Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 549**. 2. **Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299**. 3. **Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461**. 4. **Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789.** **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Checks and Balances](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-checks-and-balances/) **Published:** December 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Checks and Balances ensures that the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government maintain distinct powers while mutually regulating each other to prevent any single branch from becoming supreme. This system is integral to the Indian Constitution, promoting accountability and preventing the abuse of power **Content:** The **Doctrine of Checks and Balances** ensures that the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government maintain distinct powers while mutually regulating each other to prevent any single branch from becoming supreme. This system is integral to the **Indian Constitution**, promoting accountability and preventing the abuse of power. ### **MEANING AND EXPLANATION** The **Doctrine of Checks and Balances** is a constitutional mechanism that ensures no single branch of government—legislative, executive, or judiciary—can dominate or exercise unchecked power. Each branch has specific powers to check the others, maintaining a balance that prevents authoritarianism and promotes democratic governance. In **India**, this doctrine is intertwined with the principle of **separation of powers**, ensuring that while each branch operates independently, they also have the means to restrain each other, fostering a system of mutual accountability. ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND** The concept of **checks and balances** traces back to ancient political philosophy but was systematically articulated by **French philosopher Montesquieu** in his 18th-century work, *“The Spirit of Laws.”* **Montesquieu** argued that liberty is most effectively safeguarded when governmental powers are divided among separate branches that can check each other’s actions. This philosophy influenced many democratic constitutions worldwide, including **India’s**, embedding the necessity for a balanced distribution of power to prevent tyranny. ### **CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS IN INDIA** The **Indian Constitution** does not explicitly mention the doctrine of **separation of powers**; however, it delineates the functions and powers of the three branches, establishing a framework for **checks and balances**: - **Legislature**: *Empowered to make laws, control finances, and oversee the executive through instruments like **Question Hour** and **parliamentary committees***. - **Executive**: *Responsible for implementing laws and administering the country, but accountable to the legislature.* - **Judiciary**: *Interprets laws, adjudicates disputes, and has the power of **judicial review** to ensure that legislative and executive actions conform to the Constitution.* ### **JUDICIAL REVIEW AS A CHECK** **Judicial review** is a critical component of the **checks and balances** system in **India**. It allows the **judiciary** to assess the constitutionality of legislative enactments and executive orders. If any law or action is found to violate the **Constitution**, the **judiciary** has the authority to declare it void. This mechanism ensures that all state actions adhere to constitutional mandates, protecting citizens’ rights and maintaining the **rule of law**. ### **KEY CASE LAWS ILLUSTRATING CHECKS AND BALANCES** 1. **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)**: This landmark case established the **Basic Structure Doctrine**, asserting that while **Parliament** has wide powers to amend the Constitution, it cannot alter its **basic structure**. The **Supreme Court** held that **judicial review** is part of this basic structure, thereby reinforcing the **judiciary’s role** in checking legislative actions. 2. **Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975)**: The **Supreme Court** invalidated **Clause 4 of Article 329A**, introduced by the **39th Amendment**, which sought to place the election of the Prime Minister beyond **judicial scrutiny**. The Court held that adjudication of election disputes is a **judicial function** and cannot be excluded from judicial review, emphasizing the **separation of powers** and the system of **checks and balances**. 3. **Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980)**: The **Supreme Court** struck down clauses of the **42nd Amendment** that sought to curtail **judicial review**, reaffirming that the power of **judicial review** is integral to the Constitution’s **basic structure**. This case underscored the **judiciary’s role** in maintaining **checks and balances** by ensuring that constitutional amendments do not transgress fundamental constitutional principles. ### **SEPARATION OF POWERS AND CHECKS AND BALANCES** While the doctrine of **separation of powers** advocates for distinct functions for each branch of government, the system of **checks and balances** allows for some degree of overlap to enable each branch to restrain the others. In **India**, this interplay is evident in various constitutional provisions and practices: - **Legislative Oversight**: *Parliament exercises control over the executive through mechanisms like **Question Hour**, **motions of no confidence**, and **parliamentary committees**, ensuring executive accountability.* - **Executive’s Legislative Role**: *The **President**, part of the executive, has legislative functions such as summoning **Parliament sessions** and giving assent to bills. Additionally, the executive can issue **ordinances** under **Article 123** when **Parliament** is not in session.* - **Judicial Appointments**: *The **executive** plays a role in appointing judges, but the **judiciary** has established the **collegium system** to ensure judicial independence, reflecting a balance between **executive influence** and **judicial autonomy**.* ### **INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE** The doctrine of **checks and balances** is a fundamental principle in many democratic constitutions worldwide: - **United States**: The **U.S. Constitution** explicitly provides for **separation of powers** among the **legislative**, **executive**, and **judicial branches**, with a robust system of **checks and balances**. For instance, the **President** can veto legislation, **Congress** can override vetoes and impeach the **President**, and the **Supreme Court** can declare laws unconstitutional. - **United Kingdom**: While the **UK** does not have a codified constitution, it practices a system where the **executive** is part of the **legislature**, but **judicial independence** is maintained. Reforms like the establishment of the **Supreme Court** in 2009 have strengthened the separation between the **judiciary** and other branches. ### **CHALLENGES AND CRITICISMS** Despite its foundational role, the system of **checks and balances** in **India** faces challenges: - **Judicial Overreach**: *Instances where the **judiciary** is perceived to encroach upon the domains of the legislature or executive, raising concerns about **judicial activism** undermining democratic processes.* - **Executive Dominance**: *Strong majority governments may attempt to influence or bypass institutional checks, potentially leading to an imbalance of power.* - **Legislative Inaction**: *At times, the **legislature** may fail to effectively oversee the executive, weakening the intended **checks and balances**.* ### **CONCLUSION** The **Doctrine of Checks and Balances** serves as the cornerstone of **constitutional governance** in **India**, fostering accountability and preventing the concentration of power. Despite challenges such as **judicial overreach**, **executive dominance**, and **legislative inaction**, the doctrine remains vital in upholding the principles of democracy, the **rule of law**, and the **protection of fundamental rights**. As **India’s constitutional framework** evolves, the interplay among the **legislative**, **executive**, and **judiciary** must continue to embody the ideals of **checks and balances**, ensuring the preservation of the **Constitution** and democratic values. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Judicial Activism](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-judicial-activism/) **Published:** December 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Judicial activism refers to the proactive role played by the judiciary in interpreting and applying laws to address societal issues, often stepping beyond traditional judicial boundaries to enforce rights and ensure justice. In India, this approach has enabled courts to uphold constitutional mandates and protect individual liberties, especially when other branches of government have been inactive or ineffective **Content:** **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** **Judicial activism** refers to the proactive role played by the judiciary in interpreting and applying laws to address societal issues, often stepping beyond traditional judicial boundaries to enforce rights and ensure justice. In India, this approach has enabled courts to uphold **constitutional mandates** and protect **individual liberties**, especially when other branches of government have been inactive or ineffective. **Judicial activism** often involves the judiciary making decisions that lead to **social, economic, or political change**, thereby playing a crucial role in the dynamic interpretation of the **Constitution**. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The concept of **judicial activism** in India gained prominence post-**Emergency (1975-1977)**, a period marked by significant governmental overreach. Judges like **Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer** and **Justice P.N. Bhagwati** pioneered this movement, introducing **Public Interest Litigation (PIL)** to make justice more accessible. The case of ***Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar* (1979 AIR 1369)** exemplifies this shift, where the **Supreme Court** addressed the plight of undertrial prisoners, emphasizing the **right to a speedy trial** as part of **Article 21** of the **Constitution**. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** **Judicial activism** in India operates within the **constitutional framework**, primarily through: - ***Article 13***: Empowers courts to declare laws void if they contravene **fundamental rights**. - ***Article 32***: Grants individuals the right to approach the **Supreme Court** for enforcement of **fundamental rights**. - ***Article 226***: Empowers **High Courts** to issue writs for enforcement of **fundamental rights** and other legal rights. These provisions enable the judiciary to **review legislative and executive actions**, ensuring they align with **constitutional principles**. ## **GUIDELINES / RULES / REGULATIONS / NOTIFICATIONS / CIRCULARS** The judiciary has, over time, established **guidelines** to facilitate judicial activism: - **Public Interest Litigation (PIL)**: Allows individuals or groups to file petitions on behalf of those unable to do so, broadening access to justice. The **Supreme Court**, in ***S.P. Gupta v. Union of India* (AIR 1982 SC 149)**, liberalized the **locus standi** principle, enabling social action groups to file **PILs**. - **Vishaka Guidelines**: In ***Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan* (AIR 1997 SC 3011)**, the **Supreme Court** laid down **guidelines** to prevent **sexual harassment at the workplace**, filling a legislative void until appropriate laws were enacted. ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** Several landmark cases illustrate **judicial activism** in India: - ***Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala* (AIR 1973 SC 1461)**: Established the **Basic Structure Doctrine**, asserting that certain fundamental features of the **Constitution** cannot be altered by amendments. - ***Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India* (AIR 1978 SC 597)**: Expanded the interpretation of **Article 21**, asserting that the **right to life and personal liberty** includes the right to travel abroad, and any procedure depriving a person of this right must be **fair, just, and reasonable**. - ***M.C. Mehta v. Union of India* (1987 SCR (1) 819)**: The **Supreme Court** introduced the concept of **absolute liability** for industries engaged in hazardous activities, holding them accountable for any harm resulting from their operations. ## **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** **Judicial activism** in India is underpinned by several **doctrines**: - **Basic Structure Doctrine**: Asserts that certain fundamental features of the **Constitution** are inviolable and cannot be amended by the **Parliament**. This doctrine was established in the ***Kesavananda Bharati*** case. - **Doctrine of Separation of Powers**: While the **Indian Constitution** does not explicitly delineate the separation of powers, the judiciary has interpreted and enforced this principle to maintain **checks and balances** among the three branches of government. In ***Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain* (1975 Supp SCC 1)**, the **Supreme Court** emphasized the importance of this doctrine in maintaining the **Constitution’s basic structure**. ## **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** **Judicial activism** often invokes certain **legal maxims** and **principles**: - **“Salus populi suprema lex”**: The welfare of the people is the supreme law. - **“Ubi jus ibi remedium”**: Where there is a right, there is a remedy. These principles guide the judiciary in ensuring that **justice prevails**, especially in cases where existing laws may be inadequate. ## **AMENDMENTS / ADDITIONS / REPEALING** **Judicial activism** has influenced **legislative changes** in India: - **Right to Information Act, 2005**: Judicial pronouncements emphasizing **transparency and accountability** contributed to the enactment of this law. - **Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005**: Judicial recognition of **women’s rights** and the need for protective legislation spurred the creation of this act. ## **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** While **judicial activism** has been lauded for **upholding rights** and ensuring **justice**, it has also faced criticism: - **Appreciation**: It has democratized access to **justice**, addressed **governmental inaction**, and safeguarded **fundamental rights**. - **Criticism**: Critics argue that it leads to **judicial overreach**, encroaching upon the domains of the **legislature** and **executive**, potentially disrupting the balance of power. ## **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** **Judicial activism** manifests differently across countries: - **United States**: The **U.S. Supreme Court** has a history of **judicial activism**, notably in cases like ***Brown v. Board of Education* (347 U.S. 483)**, which ended racial segregation in public schools. - **United Kingdom**: The **UK** follows the doctrine of **parliamentary sovereignty**, limiting **judicial activism**. However, courts have engaged in **judicial review** to ensure that executive actions comply with… (content continues as per your original text). **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Judicial Restraint](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-judicial-restraint/) **Published:** December 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Judicial Restraint emphasizes that judges should limit their own power by refraining from making policy decisions, thereby respecting the roles of the legislative and executive branches. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Judicial Restraint** emphasizes that judges should limit their own power by refraining from making policy decisions, thereby respecting the roles of the legislative and executive branches. ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** **Judicial Restraint** is a legal philosophy advocating that judges should interpret laws based strictly on the text of the **Constitution** and statutes, avoiding personal or political considerations. This approach ensures that elected legislative bodies, reflecting the will of the people, are the primary policymakers. Judges adhering to this doctrine avoid creating new laws through their rulings, maintaining the balance of power among government branches. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The concept of **Judicial Restraint** has roots in American legal theory and has significantly influenced **Indian jurisprudence**. In India, the judiciary initially adopted a conservative approach, emphasizing restraint to uphold the **separation of powers**. Over time, especially during the 1970s and 1980s, the **Indian judiciary** experienced phases of activism, prompting debates on the appropriate extent of judicial intervention. This evolution reflects the judiciary’s efforts to balance its role in protecting **constitutional rights** while respecting the functions of the legislative and executive branches. ## **COMPARISON WITH JUDICIAL ACTIVISM** While **Judicial Restraint** advocates for minimal judicial interference, **Judicial Activism** encourages judges to interpret laws broadly to address societal issues. The key differences between these doctrines are: **Aspect****Judicial Restraint****Judicial Activism****Interpretation**Strict adherence to the text of the law.Broad interpretation to address societal needs.**Policy Involvement**Avoids involvement in policy decisions.May influence policy through judicial decisions.**Precedent Adherence**Strong emphasis on following established precedents.Willingness to overturn precedents to achieve justice.**Role Perception**Views judiciary as an interpreter, not a creator of laws.Sees judiciary as a proactive agent in ensuring justice and addressing inequalities.## **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** The doctrine of **Judicial Restraint** is characterized by: - **Adherence to Precedent (Stare Decisis):** Judges follow previous judicial decisions to ensure consistency and predictability in the law. - **Deference to Legislative Intent:** Courts respect the decisions and intent of the **legislature**, acknowledging their role as representatives of the people. - **Avoidance of Policy-Making:** Judges refrain from making decisions that could be seen as creating or altering public policy. - **Limited Judicial Intervention:** Courts intervene only when a clear **constitutional violation** exists, avoiding encroachment on the functions of other government branches. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** In the Indian context, the **Constitution** does not explicitly mandate **Judicial Restraint** but implies it through the **separation of powers** among the **legislature**, **executive**, and **judiciary**. Articles such as **Article 50** advocate for the separation of the judiciary from the executive, reinforcing the need for each branch to operate within its domain. Additionally, the principle of **‘stare decisis’** underpins the importance of precedent in judicial decisions, promoting stability and continuity in the legal system. ## **GUIDELINES / RULES / REGULATIONS** The judiciary has, over time, established guidelines to practice **Judicial Restraint**: - **Self-imposed Discipline:** Judges exercise caution and avoid overstepping their constitutional boundaries. - **Respect for Democratic Processes:** Courts acknowledge that elected bodies are better suited for policy-making. - **Avoidance of Political Questions:** Matters that are inherently political are left to the discretion of the **executive** and **legislature**. ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS** Several landmark cases in India illustrate the application of **Judicial Restraint**: 1. **State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, AIR 1977 SC 1361** - **Facts:** The central government issued directives to dissolve assemblies in states where the ruling party differed from the center. The states challenged this directive. - **Issue:** Whether the directive to dissolve state assemblies was justiciable. - **Held:** The **Supreme Court** exercised restraint, stating that the issue involved political questions not suitable for judicial review, thereby upholding the **separation of powers**. 2. **S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918** - **Facts:** The President’s Rule was imposed in several states, leading to the dismissal of state governments. - **Issue:** The validity of the imposition of President’s Rule under **Article 356** of the Constitution. - **Held:** While the Court asserted its power to review the proclamation, it emphasized that such power should be exercised with caution, showing restraint in matters with significant political overtones. 3. **Divisional Manager, Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass, (2008) 1 SCC 683** - **Facts:** The High Court issued directions regarding the service conditions of employees of the Aravali Golf Club. - **Issue:** Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by interfering in administrative matters. - **Held:** The **Supreme Court** criticized the High Court for overstepping its jurisdiction, reiterating the importance of **Judicial Restraint** and reminding that courts should not interfere in administrative or policy matters. ## **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - **Doctrine of Separation of Powers:** This doctrine underlines that the **legislative**, **executive**, and **judiciary** should function independently without encroaching upon each other’s domains. **Judicial Restraint** upholds this principle. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Political Question](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-political-question/) **Published:** December 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Political Question refers to the principle where courts refrain from adjudicating issues that are constitutionally delegated to the executive or legislative branches, emphasizing the separation of powers. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Political Question** refers to the principle where courts refrain from adjudicating issues that are constitutionally delegated to the executive or legislative branches, emphasizing the **separation of powers**. ### **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** The **Doctrine of Political Question** posits that certain matters are inherently political and, therefore, beyond the purview of **judicial review**. This doctrine ensures that courts do not encroach upon functions explicitly assigned to the **executive** or **legislature**, maintaining the **balance of power** among government branches. In essence, it delineates the boundary between **justiciable issues** suitable for judicial determination and **political questions** reserved for other governmental organs. ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** Originating in the United States, the doctrine was notably articulated in ***Baker v. Carr***, **369 U.S. 186 (1962)**, where the U.S. Supreme Court outlined criteria to identify political questions. The Court stated that a political question exists when there is: - **“A textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.”** - **“A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.”** - **“The impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”** - **“The impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government.”** - **“An unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made.”** - **“The potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.”** In India, the doctrine’s applicability has been debated, given the **Constitution’s distinct separation of powers**. The **Supreme Court** has addressed this doctrine in various cases, adapting its principles to the Indian constitutional framework. ### **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** In the **United States**, the doctrine is well-established, with courts often invoking it to avoid adjudicating issues like **foreign policy** and **impeachment procedures**. In contrast, the **United Kingdom** does not formally recognize the doctrine but practices **judicial restraint** in matters deemed inappropriate for judicial review, such as **national security** and **foreign affairs**. In **India**, while the doctrine is not explicitly recognized, courts have occasionally exercised restraint in **politically sensitive matters**, emphasizing the importance of maintaining the **separation of powers**. ### **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** For a matter to be considered a political question in the Indian context, the following elements are typically present: - **Textual Commitment**: The **Constitution** explicitly assigns the issue to another branch of government. - **Lack of Judicial Standards**: Absence of clear **legal standards** for the judiciary to resolve the issue. - **Policy Determination**: Resolution requires **policy decisions** beyond judicial expertise. - **Respect for Other Branches**: Judicial intervention would show a lack of respect for other governmental branches. - **Potential for Embarrassment**: Multiple pronouncements by different branches could lead to confusion. ### **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** While the **Indian Constitution** does not explicitly mention the **Doctrine of Political Question**, certain articles imply the **separation of powers**: - **Article 53**: Vests **executive power** in the President. - **Article 122**: Courts cannot inquire into **proceedings of Parliament**. - **Article 212**: Courts cannot inquire into **proceedings of state legislatures**. These provisions suggest areas where judicial intervention is limited, aligning with the principles underlying the doctrine. ### **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** Several Indian cases have touched upon the doctrine: 1. **State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (1977) 3 SCC 592**: The Supreme Court dealt with the **justiciability** of the **President’s Rule** under **Article 356**. The Court observed that while the proclamation of **President’s Rule** is subject to **judicial review**, the scope is limited, especially when the satisfaction of the President involves **political considerations**. 2. **S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1**: This landmark judgment further clarified the scope of judicial review concerning the imposition of **President’s Rule**. The Court held that the proclamation under **Article 356** is subject to judicial review to assess whether it was based on **relevant material** and whether the power was exercised **mala fide**. However, the Court also acknowledged that certain political matters might not be suitable for **judicial determination**. 3. **R.C. Poudyal v. Union of India, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 324**: The Court addressed the validity of the **Constitution (36th Amendment) Act**, which granted statehood to Sikkim. It was contended that the terms of admission of a new territory into the Union were **political questions**. The Court conceded that such matters involve political issues of considerable complexity, many of which may not be judicially manageable. ### **INTERPRETATIONS / EXPLANATIONS** The **Indian judiciary** has interpreted the doctrine with caution. In ***A.K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271***, the Court observed that the constitutional mechanism does not contemplate any function designated as political, with orders made in exercise thereof not liable to be tested for validity before lawfully constituted courts. This indicates the Court’s reluctance to apply the doctrine rigidly, ensuring that even **politically sensitive matters** are open to judicial scrutiny when they involve **constitutional violations**. ### **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** The **Doctrine of Political Question** is closely related to: - **Separation of Powers**: Ensures that the **legislative**, **executive**, and **judicial branches** function independently without encroaching upon each other’s domains. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Executive Privilege](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-executive-privilege/) **Published:** December 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Executive Privilege refers to the right of the executive branch to withhold information from other government branches, particularly the legislature and judiciary, to protect national interest and ensure effective governance. This privilege balances transparency with the necessity of confidentiality in state affairs. **Content:** ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** The **Doctrine of Executive Privilege** refers to the right of the executive branch to withhold information from other government branches, particularly the legislature and judiciary, to protect national interest and ensure effective governance. This privilege balances transparency with the necessity of confidentiality in state affairs. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** Originating in England as **“Crown Privilege,”** the concept evolved into **“Executive Privilege”** in the United States, notably during **President Nixon’s era**. In India, this doctrine is encapsulated in **Section 123 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872**, which restricts the disclosure of unpublished official records relating to state affairs, except with governmental permission. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** - **Section 123, Indian Evidence Act, 1872**: **Prohibits giving evidence derived from unpublished official records relating to state affairs without the government’s permission.** - **Section 162, Indian Evidence Act, 1872**: **Empowers the court to inspect documents to determine the validity of objections against their disclosure.** - **Article 74(2), Constitution of India**: **States that the advice given by ministers to the President shall not be inquired into by any court, ensuring confidentiality in executive decisions.** ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS** 1. ***S.P. Gupta v. President of India and Ors. (1982)***: This landmark case, also known as the **“Judges’ Transfer Case,”** dealt with the extent of executive privilege concerning judicial appointments and transfers. The Supreme Court held that the government’s claim of privilege must be balanced against the need for transparency, especially when public interest is at stake. 2. ***State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain (1975)***: In this case, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the government could claim privilege over the disclosure of the **Blue Book**, which contained details about the **Prime Minister’s security arrangements**. The Court held that while certain documents could be withheld in the interest of state security, the claim of privilege is not absolute and must be scrutinized by the judiciary. ## **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** - **Unpublished Official Records**: The information must pertain to state affairs and remain unpublished. - **Potential Harm**: **Disclosure should likely harm public interest or national security.** - **Formal Claim**: The head of the department concerned must **formally claim the privilege, justifying the need for confidentiality**. ## **DEFENCES / EXCEPTIONS / EXCEPTIONS TO DEFENCES** - **Judicial Review**: **Courts can review the validity of the executive’s claim to ensure it isn’t misused to conceal wrongdoing.** - **Public Interest**: If public interest in disclosure outweighs the need for confidentiality, **courts may order the release of information**. ## **GUIDELINES / RULES / REGULATIONS / NOTIFICATIONS / CIRCULARS** - **Governmental Circulars**: Various **circulars outline procedures** for claiming executive privilege, emphasizing the need for a careful assessment of potential harm from disclosure. ## **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - **Doctrine of Separation of Powers**: This doctrine underpins **executive privilege**, ensuring that each government branch functions independently without undue interference. ## **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** - **Salus Populi Suprema Lex**: This Latin maxim means **“the welfare of the people is the supreme law,”** justifying the withholding of information when disclosure could harm public welfare. ## **AMENDMENTS / ADDITIONS / REPEALING** - While the Indian Evidence Act has undergone amendments, the provisions concerning executive privilege, particularly **Section 123**, have remained largely unchanged, reflecting the enduring importance of balancing state secrecy with transparency. ## **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** - **Criticism**: Critics argue that **executive privilege can be misused** to conceal governmental malpractices and evade accountability. - **Appreciation**: Proponents contend that it is **essential for protecting national security** and ensuring the effective functioning of the executive branch. ## **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** - **United States**: **Executive privilege** is well-established, allowing the **President** to withhold information; however, it is subject to judicial review, as seen in the **U.S. v. Nixon (1974)** case. - **United Kingdom**: Known as **“Crown Privilege,”** it allows the government to withhold documents; however, **courts can challenge unjustified claims**. ## **FUTURE IMPLICATIONS** With increasing demands for **transparency and accountability**, the scope and application of executive privilege in India may undergo **judicial scrutiny and potential legislative reforms** to balance state secrecy with democratic openness. ## **FLOWCHART: PROCEDURE FOR CLAIMING EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IN INDIA** ```mermaid graph TDA[Need for Confidentiality Identified] --> B[Head of Department Reviews Information]B --> C{Does Information Relate to State Affairs?}C -- Yes --> D[Formal Claim of Privilege Made]D --> E[Submission to Court]E --> F{Court Reviews Validity of Claim}F -- Valid Claim --> G[Information Withheld]F -- Invalid Claim --> H[Information Disclosed]C -- No --> H[Information Disclosed] ``` ## **TABLE: COMPARISON OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE ACROSS COUNTRIES** **Aspect****India****United States****United Kingdom****Legal Basis****Section 123, Indian Evidence Act, 1872****Judicial Precedents****Common Law****Scope****Unpublished official records relating to state affairs****Presidential communications****Government documents****Judicial Review****Permitted****Permitted****Permitted****Notable Case****S.P. Gupta v. President of India (1982)****U.S. v. Nixon (1974)****Conway v. Rimmer (1968)**## **REFERENCES** 1. **Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Section 123.** 2. **Constitution of India, Article 74(2).** 3. **S.P. Gupta v. President of India and Ors., AIR 1982 SC 149.** **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-parliamentary-sovereignty/) **Published:** December 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty asserts that Parliament holds supreme legislative authority, capable of enacting, amending, or repealing any law. In India, this doctrine is nuanced by constitutional supremacy and judicial review, ensuring a balance between legislative power and constitutional integrity. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty** asserts that **Parliament** holds supreme legislative authority, capable of enacting, amending, or repealing any law. In India, this doctrine is nuanced by **constitutional supremacy** and **judicial review**, ensuring a balance between legislative power and constitutional integrity. ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** **Parliamentary Sovereignty** signifies the ultimate legislative power vested in **Parliament**, enabling it to legislate on any subject within its jurisdiction. In the Indian context, this power is not absolute; it operates within the confines of the **Constitution**, which is the supreme law of the land. The **Constitution** delineates the distribution of powers among the legislature, executive, and judiciary, ensuring that parliamentary actions remain within constitutional boundaries. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The concept of **Parliamentary Sovereignty** originates from the **British legal system**, where Parliament holds unrestricted legislative authority. In India, the framers of the **Constitution** adopted a modified version, embedding checks and balances to prevent absolute power concentration. This adaptation was influenced by **colonial experiences** and the desire to establish a **democratic framework** that upholds individual rights and judicial oversight. ## **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** In the **United Kingdom**, **Parliamentary Sovereignty** is absolute, with no written constitution to limit legislative power. Conversely, countries like the **United States** practice **constitutional supremacy**, where a written constitution restricts legislative authority, and **judicial review** ensures laws align with constitutional provisions. **India’s system** incorporates elements of both, granting **Parliament** significant powers while subjecting it to **constitutional limitations** and **judicial scrutiny**. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** Several constitutional provisions outline the scope and limitations of **Parliamentary Sovereignty** in India: - **Article 245**: Empowers **Parliament** to legislate for the entire country, subject to constitutional provisions. - **Article 246**: Defines the subject matter of laws made by **Parliament** and **State Legislatures** through **Union**, **State**, and **Concurrent Lists**. - **Article 368**: Grants **Parliament** the power to amend the **Constitution**, with certain limitations to preserve its **basic structure**. ## **JUDICIAL REVIEW AND LIMITATIONS** The **Indian judiciary**, particularly the **Supreme Court**, plays a crucial role in reviewing **parliamentary legislation** to ensure compliance with **constitutional mandates**. This system of checks and balances prevents the enactment of laws that violate **fundamental rights** or alter the **Constitution’s basic structure**. ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS** 1. **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)**: This landmark case established the **Basic Structure Doctrine**, asserting that while **Parliament** can amend the **Constitution**, it cannot alter its fundamental framework. The petitioner, **Kesavananda Bharati**, challenged the **Kerala government’s land reform laws**, leading to a verdict that certain constitutional amendments infringing on the **basic structure** are invalid. 2. **Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967)**: The **Supreme Court** held that **Parliament** could not amend **Fundamental Rights**, emphasizing the inviolability of these rights. The petitioners, the **Golaknath family**, contested **land ceiling laws**, resulting in a decision that constitutional amendments affecting **Fundamental Rights** were invalid. 3. **Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980)**: The Court reaffirmed the **Basic Structure Doctrine**, striking down clauses that granted **Parliament** unlimited amending power, thus preserving **judicial review** and the **Constitution’s supremacy**. **Minerva Mills** challenged certain amendments that sought to curtail **judicial review**, leading to a verdict reinforcing constitutional limitations on **parliamentary authority**. ## **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - **Basic Structure Doctrine**: Asserts that certain fundamental features of the **Constitution** cannot be altered by **parliamentary amendments**, ensuring the preservation of its core principles. ## **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** - **Constitutional Supremacy**: The principle that the **Constitution** is the ultimate authority, and all laws and actions must conform to it. - **Rule of Law**: The doctrine that law governs the nation, ensuring that no individual or institution is above the law. ## **AMENDMENTS / ADDITIONS / REPEALING** **Parliament** holds the authority to amend the **Constitution** under **Article 368**, but such amendments must not violate the **Constitution’s basic structure**. This ensures that while the **Constitution** can evolve, its foundational principles remain intact. ## **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** The doctrine of **Parliamentary Sovereignty** in India is lauded for empowering **democratic governance** through elected representatives. However, it faces criticism when perceived to encroach upon **judicial independence** or **fundamental rights**. The balance between **legislative authority** and **constitutional limitations** remains a subject of ongoing legal and academic discourse. ## **CONCLUSION** In India, **Parliamentary Sovereignty** operates within a framework that balances **legislative authority** with **constitutional supremacy** and **judicial review**. This ensures that while **Parliament** possesses significant legislative powers, it functions within the constraints of the **Constitution**, preserving **democratic principles** and protecting **individual rights**. ## **REFERENCES** 1. **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala**, AIR 1973 SC 1461. 2. **Golaknath v. State of Punjab**, AIR 1967 SC 1643. 3. **Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India**, AIR 1980 SC 1789. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-constitutional-supremacy/) **Published:** December 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy asserts that the Constitution is the ultimate authority in a legal system, and all laws, policies, and actions must conform to its provisions. In India, this doctrine ensures that the Constitution prevails over parliamentary enactments and executive decisions, maintaining the rule of law and protecting citizens' rights. **Content:** Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy asserts that the **Constitution** is the ultimate authority in a legal system, and all laws, policies, and actions must conform to its provisions. In India, this doctrine ensures that the **Constitution** prevails over parliamentary enactments and executive decisions, maintaining the **rule of law** and protecting citizens’ rights. ### **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** **Constitutional Supremacy** means that the **Constitution** is the highest legal authority, and any law or action inconsistent with it is invalid. **Article 13** of the Indian Constitution embodies this principle by declaring that laws contravening **Fundamental Rights** are void. This framework ensures that all branches of government operate within constitutional limits, safeguarding **democratic governance**. ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The framers of the Indian Constitution drew inspiration from various sources, notably the **U.S. model of judicial review** and the **British principle of parliamentary sovereignty**. They adopted a balanced approach, granting the judiciary the power to review legislative and executive actions while allowing **Parliament** to amend the Constitution, subject to certain constraints. This balance was established to prevent the abuse of power and to protect individual rights. ### **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** - In the **United Kingdom**, **parliamentary sovereignty** implies that Parliament can make or repeal any law, with no authority, including the courts, able to override its legislation. - Conversely, the **United States** practices **judicial supremacy**, where the **Constitution** is supreme, and the judiciary has the authority to invalidate laws conflicting with it. - **India’s model** incorporates elements of both systems, ensuring that neither **Parliament** nor the judiciary holds absolute power. ### **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** Several **constitutional provisions** uphold the doctrine of constitutional supremacy in India: - **Article 13**: Declares laws inconsistent with **Fundamental Rights** as void. - **Article 32**: Provides the right to constitutional remedies, allowing individuals to approach the **Supreme Court** for enforcement of **Fundamental Rights**. - **Article 226**: Empowers **High Courts** to issue certain writs for enforcement of rights. - **Article 368**: Outlines the procedure for amending the **Constitution**, ensuring that amendments do not alter its **basic structure**. ### **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** Several landmark judgments have reinforced **constitutional supremacy** in India: - **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)**: The **Supreme Court** held that while **Parliament** has wide powers to amend the **Constitution**, it cannot alter its **‘basic structure’**. This case involved challenges to land reform laws and the extent of Parliament’s amending power. The Court introduced the **Basic Structure Doctrine**, ensuring that certain fundamental features of the **Constitution** remain inviolable. - **Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980)**: The Court struck down clauses of the **42nd Amendment** that limited judicial review, reaffirming that **judicial review** is integral to the **Constitution’s basic structure**. This case emphasized the balance between **Fundamental Rights** and **Directive Principles**, reinforcing the importance of judicial oversight. - **I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967)**: The **Supreme Court** ruled that **Parliament** could not curtail any **Fundamental Rights**, emphasizing the supremacy of the **Constitution** over parliamentary amendments. This case involved the validity of land ceiling laws and questioned Parliament’s power to amend **Fundamental Rights**. The decision led to significant constitutional amendments and debates on the extent of parliamentary authority. ### **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** The **Basic Structure Doctrine** is pivotal in maintaining **constitutional supremacy**. It posits that certain fundamental features of the **Constitution** cannot be altered or destroyed through amendments by **Parliament**. This doctrine ensures the preservation of the **Constitution’s** core principles, such as the **rule of law**, **separation of powers**, and **judicial review**. ### **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** The principle of **“Ultra Vires”** applies here, meaning ‘beyond the powers.’ Any law or action exceeding the authority granted by the **Constitution** is deemed void. This principle ensures that all governmental actions remain within constitutional boundaries, preventing misuse of power. ### **AMENDMENTS / ADDITIONS / REPEALING** The **42nd Amendment (1976)** attempted to curtail **judicial review** and enhance **parliamentary sovereignty**. However, the **Supreme Court** in the **Minerva Mills case** invalidated these changes, reaffirming the **Constitution’s supremacy** and the essential role of **judicial review** in maintaining constitutional balance. ### **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** While the doctrine of **constitutional supremacy** safeguards **democratic principles**, some critics argue that excessive **judicial intervention** may impede legislative functions. However, this system of **checks and balances** is designed to prevent any single branch from becoming too powerful, ensuring the protection of individual rights and the **rule of law**. ### **FLOWCHART: DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY IN INDIA** ```mermaid graph TDA[Constitution of India] --> B[Supreme Law of the Land]B --> C[Legislative Actions]B --> D[Executive Actions]B --> E[Judicial Actions]C --> F{Conform to Constitution?}D --> FE --> FF --> |Yes| G[Valid]F --> |No| H[Invalid] ``` This flowchart illustrates that all actions by the legislative, executive, and judiciary must conform to the **Constitution**. If they do, they are valid; if not, they are invalid, reinforcing the doctrine of **constitutional supremacy**. ### **TABLE: COMPARISON OF CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY AND PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY** **Feature****Constitutional Supremacy****Parliamentary Sovereignty****Definition****Constitution** is the supreme law; all actions must conform to it.**Parliament** has ultimate legal authority; its laws cannot be overridden.**Judicial Review**Courts can invalidate laws conflicting with the **Constitution**.Courts cannot overrule parliamentary legislation. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Harmonious Construction](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-harmonious-construction/) **Published:** December 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Harmonious Construction is a fundamental principle in Indian statutory interpretation. It mandates that when provisions within a statute or between statutes appear conflicting, they should be interpreted to give effect to all, ensuring coherence and avoiding redundancy. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Harmonious Construction** is a fundamental principle in Indian statutory interpretation. It mandates that when provisions within a statute or between statutes appear conflicting, they should be interpreted to give effect to all, ensuring coherence and avoiding redundancy. ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** *Harmonious construction* involves interpreting conflicting statutory provisions to ensure each is effective without nullifying the other. This approach maintains **legislative intent** and coherence within the legal framework. The **Supreme Court of India** has emphasized that courts should avoid conflicts between provisions and interpret them to harmonize and give effect to all. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The doctrine’s roots trace back to early judicial interpretations addressing conflicts between constitutional provisions. A notable application was in ***Sri Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India***, **AIR 1951 SC 458**, where the **Supreme Court** reconciled conflicts between **Fundamental Rights** and **Directive Principles**, emphasizing their complementary roles. ## **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** Key principles governing harmonious construction include: - **Avoiding Conflict**: Courts should strive to interpret provisions to prevent conflicts. - **Giving Effect to All Provisions**: Interpretations should ensure all provisions are operative. - **Avoiding Redundancy**: No provision should be rendered redundant or ineffective. - **Preserving Legislative Intent**: Interpretations should reflect the legislature’s purpose. These principles were outlined in ***Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers***, **(2003) 3 SCC 57**. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** While the doctrine itself isn’t codified, it operates within the framework of **statutory interpretation**. Courts apply this doctrine to resolve apparent conflicts, ensuring that interpretations align with **legislative intent** and **constitutional mandates**. ## **GUIDELINES / RULES / REGULATIONS / NOTIFICATIONS / CIRCULARS** The judiciary has developed guidelines for applying harmonious construction: - **Read Provisions Together**: Interpret conflicting provisions collectively to find a harmonious meaning. - **Prioritize Specific Over General**: When conflicts arise, specific provisions may take precedence over general ones. - **Avoid Nullification**: Interpretations should not nullify any provision unless absolutely necessary. These guidelines ensure that statutory provisions are interpreted to maintain coherence and **legislative intent**. ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** Several landmark cases illustrate the application of this doctrine: 1. ***C.P. and Berar Act Case (1939)***: The court resolved inconsistencies between entries in **List I** and **List II** of the Constitution, emphasizing harmonious interpretation to avoid conflicts between **central** and **state powers**. 2. ***M.S.M. Sharma v. Krishna Sinha***, **AIR 1959 SC 395**: The **Supreme Court** applied harmonious construction to resolve conflicts between **Article 19(1)(a)** (*freedom of speech*) and **Article 194(3)** (*parliamentary privileges*), ensuring both provisions were given effect without overriding each other. 3. ***State of Mysore v. R. Nanjappa***, **AIR 1960 SC 294**: The court reconciled conflicts between **Articles 25(2)(b)** and **26(b)** of the Constitution, holding that the right to manage **religious affairs** is subject to laws providing for **social welfare and reform**. ## **INTERPRETATIONS / EXPLANATIONS** The doctrine emphasizes that statutes should be read as a whole, with each provision interpreted in context. This holistic approach ensures that the **legal framework** operates seamlessly, reflecting the legislature’s comprehensive intent. ## **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** Harmonious construction aligns with the principle of ***Generalia specialibus non derogant***, meaning **general provisions do not override specific ones**. This principle ensures that specific legislative intents are preserved over more general provisions. ## **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** The legal maxim ***Ut res magis valeat quam pereat*** (*it is better for a thing to have effect than to be made void*) underpins the doctrine, advocating for interpretations that give effect to all provisions rather than rendering any ineffective. ## **AMENDMENTS / ADDITIONS / REPEALING** While the doctrine itself hasn’t undergone amendments, its application has evolved through **judicial interpretations**, adapting to complex legal scenarios to uphold legislative coherence. ## **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** The doctrine is lauded for promoting **legal coherence** and respecting **legislative intent**. However, critics argue that it can lead to **judicial overreach**, with courts potentially reinterpreting clear legislative provisions under the guise of harmonization. ## **FLOWCHART: APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION** ```mermaid graph TDA[Identify Conflicting Provisions] --> B[Analyze Legislative Intent]B --> C[Interpret Provisions Collectively]C --> D{Conflict Resolved?}D --> |Yes| E[Apply Harmonious Interpretation]D --> |No| F[Determine Precedence (e.g., Specific over General)]F --> G[Apply Resolved Interpretation] ``` This flowchart outlines the judicial approach to applying the doctrine, ensuring that all provisions are given effect in a coherent manner. ## **TABLE: COMPARISON OF HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION WITH OTHER INTERPRETATION DOCTRINES** **Doctrine****Principle****Application****Harmonious Construction**Interpret conflicting provisions to give effect to all.Resolving internal conflicts within a statute or between statutes.**Literal Rule**Interpret statutes based on the plain meaning of the words.Applied when the statutory language is clear and unambiguous. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Implied Powers](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-implied-powers/) **Published:** December 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Implied Powers allows authorities to exercise powers not explicitly stated in law but necessary to fulfill their duties effectively. In India, this doctrine ensures governmental functions are carried out efficiently, even when specific powers are not expressly granted. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Implied Powers** allows authorities to exercise powers not explicitly stated in law but **necessary** to fulfill their duties effectively. In India, this doctrine ensures governmental functions are carried out efficiently, even when specific powers are not expressly granted. ### **MEANING AND DEFINITION** The **Doctrine of Implied Powers** refers to the authority possessed by governmental bodies that, while not explicitly stated, is deemed **necessary** to implement their legally assigned duties. This principle ensures that the execution of **express powers** is practical and effective. For instance, if a statute grants an authority a specific duty, it implicitly includes the powers essential to perform that duty. This doctrine is encapsulated in the maxim **“Quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest,”** meaning **“When the law gives anything to anyone, it also gives all those things without which the thing itself would be unavailable.”** ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND** The concept of implied powers has roots in **common law traditions**, where courts recognized that legislative grants of authority include not only the powers expressly conferred but also those necessary to achieve the **legislative intent**. In India, this doctrine has been applied to interpret **constitutional** and **statutory provisions** to ensure that governmental functions are not hindered by the absence of explicit authorizations. ### **ESSENTIALS OF THE DOCTRINE** - ***Necessity***: The implied power must be **essential** for the execution of an express power. Without it, the express power cannot be effectively exercised. - ***Reasonableness***: The implied power should be **reasonable** and not extend beyond what is necessary to fulfill the express power. - ***Consistency with Legislative Intent***: The exercise of the implied power must align with the **overall purpose and intent of the legislation**. ### **LEGAL PROVISIONS AND APPLICATION IN INDIA** In **Indian constitutional law**, the doctrine is often invoked to interpret the powers of various authorities, ensuring they can perform their functions effectively. For example, **Article 73** of the Constitution extends the **executive power** of the Union to matters on which Parliament has the right to legislate, implicitly granting the executive the **necessary authority** to act on these matters. ### **CASE LAWS ILLUSTRATING THE DOCTRINE** 1. ***D.S. Gerewal v. State of Punjab (1959)***: The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the **All India Service Act, 1951**, stating that **Article 312** does not restrict the power to delegate authority. This case exemplifies the application of the doctrine, where the delegation of powers was deemed necessary for **administrative efficiency**. 2. ***Gopal Chandra Misra v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1978)***: In this case, the Supreme Court recognized an **implicit power** for State High Court judges under **Article 217**, allowing them to cancel a resignation even after acceptance. This implied power was considered **essential** to maintain judicial **independence** and **integrity**. 3. ***Union of India v. Paras Laminates (P) Ltd. (1990)***: The Court observed that when a statute confers a jurisdiction, it also confers by implication the power of doing all such acts or employing such means as are essentially necessary to its execution. This case reinforced the principle that **implied powers** are integral to the effective exercise of **conferred jurisdiction**. ### **DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED PROHIBITION** The **Doctrine of Implied Prohibition** complements the doctrine of implied powers by suggesting that if a statute grants a power for a specific purpose, it implicitly prohibits actions that would **counteract** that purpose. This ensures that authorities do not exercise their powers in a manner that defeats the **legislative intent**. ### **COMPARISON WITH OTHER DOCTRINES** The **Doctrine of Implied Powers** is often compared with the **Doctrine of Incidental or Ancillary Powers**, which suggests that the power to legislate on a particular issue includes the authority to legislate on **incidental matters** necessary to achieve the main objective. While both doctrines deal with powers not explicitly stated, the former focuses on the **execution of duties** by authorities, and the latter pertains to **legislative competencies**. ### **INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE** Internationally, the doctrine has been applied in various jurisdictions to ensure that governmental bodies can function effectively. For instance, in the **United States**, the **Necessary and Proper Clause** grants Congress the authority to make all laws which shall be **necessary and proper** for carrying into execution its powers, embodying the principle of **implied powers**. ### **CONCLUSION** The **Doctrine of Implied Powers** plays a crucial role in **Indian constitutional law** by ensuring that authorities can effectively perform their duties, even in the absence of explicit statutory provisions. Through judicial interpretation, this doctrine maintains the functionality and adaptability of legal and governmental systems, aligning with the evolving needs of society. ### **REFERENCES** 1. ***D.S. Gerewal v. State of Punjab***, AIR 1959 SC 512. 2. ***Gopal Chandra Misra v. State of Uttar Pradesh***, AIR 1978 SC 694. 3. ***Union of India v. Paras Laminates (P) Ltd.***, 1990 (4) SCC 453. 4. **“Doctrine of Implied Powers: Concept, Case Example, Prohibition,”** Leverage Edu. 5. **“Judicial Doctrines, List of Doctrines of Indian Constitution,”** Study IQ. 6. **“Indian Judicial Doctrines – Principles of Constitutional Law,”** ClearIAS. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Ancillary Powers](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-ancillary-powers/) **Published:** December 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Ancillary Powers allows legislative bodies to enact laws on matters reasonably connected to their primary legislative subjects, ensuring effective governance within their constitutional authority. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Ancillary Powers** allows legislative bodies to enact laws on matters **reasonably connected** to their **primary legislative subjects**, ensuring effective governance within their **constitutional authority**. ### **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** The **Doctrine of Ancillary Powers**, also known as the **Doctrine of Incidental Powers**, permits a legislative body to legislate on matters **not explicitly mentioned** in its constitutional domain if these matters are essential for exercising its **primary legislative functions**. This doctrine ensures that legislative powers are interpreted broadly, allowing for the inclusion of **incidental or ancillary matters** reasonably connected to the **main subject**. ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** Originating from **common law principles**, the doctrine has been integral in constitutional law to provide flexibility in legislative functions. In **India**, it has been applied to interpret the **distribution of powers between the Union and State legislatures**, ensuring that legislative competence includes **necessary ancillary matters** for effective governance. ### **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** - ***Primary Legislative Competence***: The legislature must have the authority over the **main subject matter**. - ***Reasonable Connection***: The ancillary matter should be **reasonably connected** to the **primary subject**. - ***Necessity for Implementation***: The ancillary power should be **essential for the effective implementation** of the primary legislative function. ### **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** In the **Indian context**, the doctrine is applied through **judicial interpretation** to ensure that legislative entries are given a **broad scope**, allowing legislatures to enact laws on **ancillary matters** necessary for implementing their **primary legislative functions**. ### **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** 1. ***State of Rajasthan v. G. Chawla, AIR 1959 SC 544***: The **Supreme Court** held that the power to legislate on a topic includes the power to legislate on **ancillary matters reasonably connected** to that topic. 2. ***Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee v. Bank of Commerce, AIR 1947 PC 60***: The **Privy Council** applied the doctrine, stating that if a legislature has the power to legislate on a subject, it also has the power to legislate on **ancillary matters** that can be **reasonably included** in that subject. ### **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** The **Doctrine of Ancillary Powers** complements the **Doctrine of Pith and Substance**, which focuses on the **true nature and character of legislation** to determine its validity when there is an **overlap between different legislative lists**. ### **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** The principle **“Quando lex aliquid concedit, concedere videtur et illud sine quo res ipsa esse non potest”** applies here, meaning **“When the law gives anything, it gives also all those things without which the thing itself would be unavailable.”** ### **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** In **Canada**, the doctrine is known as the **“Ancillary Powers Doctrine”** and is used to determine under which head of power a given piece of legislation falls, especially when there is an **overlap between federal and provincial powers**. ### **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** - **Criticism**: Critics argue that the doctrine may lead to an **overreach of legislative powers**, potentially encroaching upon the jurisdiction of **other legislative bodies**. - **Appreciation**: The doctrine provides **flexibility** and ensures **effective governance** by including incidental matters necessary for **legislative implementation**. ### **FUTURE IMPLICATIONS** The doctrine will continue to play a **crucial role** in interpreting legislative powers, especially with the **evolving nature of governance** and the emergence of **new subjects** requiring legislative intervention. ### **FLOWCHART: APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF ANCILLARY POWERS** ```mermaid graph TDA[Legislative Authority] --> B[Primary Subject Matter]B --> C[Ancillary Matter]C --> D{Reasonable Connection?}D -->|Yes| E[Legislation Valid]D -->|No| F[Legislation Invalid] ``` ### **TABLE: COMPARISON BETWEEN DOCTRINE OF PITH AND SUBSTANCE AND DOCTRINE OF ANCILLARY POWERS** **Aspect****Doctrine of Pith and Substance****Doctrine of Ancillary Powers****Focus**Determines the **true nature** of legislation to ascertain its validity.Allows legislation on matters **reasonably connected** to the **primary subject**.**Application**Used when there is an **overlap between different legislative lists**.Applied to include **ancillary matters** essential for implementing primary legislative functions.**Judicial Interpretation**Courts examine the **main purpose** of the legislation.Courts assess the **necessity and reasonable connection** of ancillary matters to the **primary subject**.**Scope**Ensures legislation remains within the **constitutional competence** of the legislature.Provides **flexibility** to legislate on **incidental matters** not explicitly mentioned in the constitutional lists. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Occupied Field](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-occupied-field/) **Published:** December 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Occupied Field addresses legislative conflicts in India's federal structure, ensuring clarity when both Parliament and State Legislatures legislate on the same subject. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Occupied Field** addresses legislative conflicts in India’s federal structure, ensuring clarity when both **Parliament** and **State Legislatures** legislate on the same subject. ### **MEANING AND DEFINITION** The **Doctrine of Occupied Field** posits that when **Parliament** enacts legislation on a subject within its competence, especially those in the **Concurrent List**, **State Legislatures** cannot legislate inconsistently on the same subject. This doctrine ensures legislative harmony and prevents conflicts between central and state laws. ### **CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS** - ***Article 246***: Distributes legislative powers between **Parliament** and **State Legislatures** across three lists: **Union**, **State**, and **Concurrent**. **Parliament** has exclusive power to legislate on subjects in the **Union List**, while both **Parliament** and **State Legislatures** can legislate on subjects in the **Concurrent List**. - ***Article 254***: Addresses inconsistencies between central and state laws on **Concurrent List** subjects. If a **state law** conflicts with a **central law**, the **central law prevails**, rendering the conflicting **state law** void to the extent of the inconsistency. However, if the **state law** receives **Presidential assent**, it can prevail in that state, even if inconsistent with the **central law**. ### **APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE** The doctrine applies when: - **Parliament** legislates comprehensively on a subject in the **Concurrent List**. - A **state law** on the same subject conflicts with the **central law**. In such cases, the **central law** occupies the field, and the **state law** becomes inoperative to the extent of the conflict. ### **JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS** - ***State of Kerala v. Mar Appraem Kuri Co. Ltd. (2012) 7 SCC 106***: The **Supreme Court** held that the **Chit Funds Act, 1982**, a central legislation, occupied the field concerning chit funds. Consequently, any **state legislation** inconsistent with the central act would be void unless it received **Presidential assent**. - ***M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India (1979) 3 SCC 431***: The Court clarified that for the doctrine to apply, there must be a direct inconsistency between the **central** and **state laws**, making it impossible to obey both. If both laws can operate without conflict, the doctrine does not apply. ### **EXCEPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS** - ***Presidential Assent***: Under ***Article 254(2)***, if a **state law** conflicting with a **central law** receives **Presidential assent**, it prevails in that state. However, **Parliament** can override this by enacting a law that reasserts its authority. - ***Doctrine of Pith and Substance***: If the true nature of the legislation (its “pith and substance”) falls within the competence of the enacting legislature, incidental encroachments on another legislature’s field do not render it invalid. This ensures that minor overlaps do not lead to legislative invalidity. ### **COMPARISON WITH OTHER DOCTRINES** - ***Doctrine of Repugnancy***: While both doctrines deal with conflicts between **central** and **state laws**, the **Doctrine of Repugnancy** specifically addresses situations where both laws are validly enacted but are inconsistent, leading to the **central law prevailing**. In contrast, the **Doctrine of Occupied Field** focuses on the exclusivity of legislative competence once a legislature has occupied a field. ### **ILLUSTRATIVE CASE LAWS** - ***Southern Pharmaceuticals & Chemicals v. State of Kerala (1981) 4 SCC 391***: The **Supreme Court** held that the **Kerala Abkari Act**, regulating medicinal preparations containing alcohol, was not invalidated by the central **Medicinal and Toilet Preparations (Excise Duties) Act, 1955**, as both could operate concurrently without conflict. - ***Offshore Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Bangalore Development Authority (2011) 3 SCC 139***: The Court observed that when both **central** and **state laws** can coexist without conflict, the question of one law being repugnant to the other does not arise. ### **CONCLUSION** The **Doctrine of Occupied Field** plays a crucial role in maintaining the balance of legislative powers in India’s federal structure. It ensures that once a legislature has legislated comprehensively on a subject, the other legislature cannot encroach upon that field, thereby preventing conflicts and ensuring legal clarity. ### **REFERENCES** 1. **Constitution of India**, ***Article 246***. 2. **Constitution of India**, ***Article 254***. 3. ***State of Kerala v. Mar Appraem Kuri Co. Ltd., (2012) 7 SCC 106***. 4. ***M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India, (1979) 3 SCC 431***. 5. ***Southern Pharmaceuticals & Chemicals v. State of Kerala, (1981) 4 SCC 391***. 6. ***Offshore Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Bangalore Development Authority, (2011) 3 SCC 139***. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Incidental or Ancillary Powers](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-incidental-or-ancillary-powers/) **Published:** December 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Incidental or Ancillary Powers allows legislative bodies to enact laws on matters reasonably connected to their primary legislative subjects, ensuring effective governance within India's constitutional framework. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Incidental or Ancillary Powers** allows legislative bodies to enact laws on matters reasonably connected to their primary legislative subjects, ensuring effective governance within India’s constitutional framework. ### **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** The **Doctrine of Incidental or Ancillary Powers** posits that when a legislative body holds authority over a specific subject, it inherently possesses the power to legislate on **ancillary** or **incidental matters** essential for the effective execution of that subject. This doctrine ensures that legislative powers are not unduly restricted, allowing for comprehensive law-making that addresses all facets of a given issue. It complements the **Doctrine of Pith and Substance**, which focuses on identifying the true nature of legislation to determine its validity. While the **Doctrine of Pith and Substance** addresses the core subject matter, the **Doctrine of Incidental or Ancillary Powers** pertains to the peripheral aspects necessary to support the main legislative intent. ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The evolution of this doctrine can be traced back to **“R. v. Waterfield (1963)”**, a decision of the English Court of Appeal. In the Indian context, the doctrine has been instrumental in interpreting the extent of legislative powers, especially concerning the distribution of powers between the Union and State legislatures as outlined in the **Seventh Schedule** of the Constitution. The judiciary has employed this doctrine to ensure that legislative bodies can effectively legislate on matters within their competence, including those **incidental** or **ancillary** to the main subjects. ### **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** **Article 246** of the Indian Constitution delineates the distribution of legislative powers between the **Parliament** and **State Legislatures**. The **Seventh Schedule** categorizes subjects into three lists: **Union List**, **State List**, and **Concurrent List**. While these lists specify subjects of legislation, the **Doctrine of Incidental or Ancillary Powers** allows legislatures to enact laws on matters not expressly mentioned, provided they are necessary to achieve the objectives of the enumerated subjects. This ensures that legislative bodies can address all aspects related to their primary subjects without overstepping constitutional boundaries. ### **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** 1. **State of Rajasthan v. G. Chawla (1959):** The Supreme Court upheld the state’s power to legislate on **ancillary matters** essential for implementing its primary legislative functions. The court recognized that the power to legislate on a topic includes the power to legislate on **ancillary matters reasonably connected** to that topic. 2. **State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh (1952):** The Supreme Court examined the validity of the **Bihar Land Reforms Act** and reinforced the doctrine by ruling that **incidental legislation** would not be invalidated if it is essential for the primary legislation. The court emphasized that the legislature’s competence extends to all matters reasonably **ancillary** to the subjects enumerated in the legislative lists. 3. **M/S R.M.D.C. (Mysore) v. State of Mysore (1962):** This case dealt with the conflict between **state** and **union legislative powers** regarding **prize competitions**. The Supreme Court held that the state’s power to tax under **Entry 62 of List II** was distinct from the union’s power to regulate under **Entry 34**, illustrating the application of the doctrine in delineating legislative competencies. ### **GUIDELINES / RULES / REGULATIONS / NOTIFICATIONS / CIRCULARS** While the Constitution does not explicitly provide guidelines for the application of this doctrine, judicial interpretations have established certain principles: - **Reasonable Connection:** Legislation on ancillary matters must have a **reasonable and direct connection** to the primary subject of legislation. - **Avoidance of Overreach:** The ancillary power should not be stretched to cover subjects explicitly allocated to another legislative body. - **Necessity for Implementation:** The ancillary legislation should be necessary for the **effective implementation** of the main legislative intent. ### **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** The **Doctrine of Incidental or Ancillary Powers** is closely related to: - **Doctrine of Pith and Substance:** Focuses on the **true nature of legislation** to determine its validity, especially when there is an overlap between subjects in different legislative lists. - **Doctrine of Colourable Legislation:** Prevents legislatures from enacting laws that, while appearing to be within their jurisdiction, in reality, encroach upon the powers of another legislature. ### **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** The doctrine aligns with the legal maxim **“Quando lex aliquid concedit, concedere videtur et illud sine quo res ipsa esse non potest,”** meaning “When the law gives anything, it gives also all those things without which the thing itself would be unavailable.” This underscores that granting a particular power includes granting the necessary **ancillary powers** to ensure its effective execution. ### **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** In **federal systems** like Canada and Australia, similar doctrines exist to manage the distribution of legislative powers. For instance, the **“pith and substance” doctrine** in Canada serves to determine the **true nature of legislation** when jurisdictional overlaps occur. These doctrines ensure that legislative bodies can function effectively without undue interference, maintaining the balance of power within federal structures. ### **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** The doctrine has been appreciated for providing **flexibility in legislative functions**, allowing for comprehensive law-making that addresses all necessary aspects of governance. However, critics argue that it may lead to **legislative overreach**, with bodies potentially encroaching upon subjects beyond their constitutional competence under the guise of **ancillary legislation**. Therefore, **judicial oversight** remains crucial to maintain the balance of power and prevent misuse of this doctrine. ### **FUTURE IMPLICATIONS** As governance becomes increasingly complex, the **Doctrine of Incidental or Ancillary Powers** will continue to play a vital role in enabling legislatures to address multifaceted issues effectively. Its application ensures that legislative bodies are not constrained by **rigid interpretations** of their powers, allowing for adaptive and responsive law-making that meets the **evolving needs** of society. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Judicial Precedent](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-judicial-precedent/) **Published:** December 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Judicial Precedent, or stare decisis, is fundamental in the Indian legal system, ensuring consistency and predictability by obligating courts to follow established legal principles from previous decisions. **Content:** The Doctrine of Judicial Precedent, or ***stare decisis***, is fundamental in the Indian legal system, ensuring consistency and predictability by obligating courts to follow established legal principles from previous decisions. **MEANING AND DEFINITION** **Judicial precedent** refers to the practice where courts follow legal principles established in prior judgments when deciding cases with similar facts. This doctrine ensures that similar cases receive similar treatment, promoting fairness and stability in the legal system. The Latin term ***stare decisis*** translates to “to stand by things decided,” encapsulating this principle. **HISTORICAL EVOLUTION** The doctrine of precedent has roots in English common law and was integrated into **Indian jurisprudence** during British colonial rule. Pre-Independence, **Section 212 of the Government of India Act, 1919**, mandated that decisions of the **Privy Council** and the **Federal Court** were binding on all courts in British India. Post-Independence, **Article 141 of the Indian Constitution** stipulates that the law declared by the **Supreme Court** is binding on all courts within the territory of India. **TYPES OF PRECEDENTS** 1. ***Binding Precedent***: Decisions from higher courts that lower courts within the same jurisdiction must follow. For instance, **Supreme Court rulings** are binding on all subordinate courts in India. 2. ***Persuasive Precedent***: Decisions that are not obligatory but may influence a court’s judgment. These can include rulings from lower courts, courts in other jurisdictions, or foreign courts. **LEGAL PROVISIONS AND APPLICATION** **Article 141 of the Indian Constitution** enshrines the doctrine of precedent, stating that the **law declared by the Supreme Court** is binding on all courts within India. This provision ensures uniformity and consistency in the application of law across the country. **PRINCIPLES OF PRECEDENT** - ***Ratio Decidendi***: The legal principle or rationale essential to a court’s decision, which is binding in future cases with similar facts. - ***Obiter Dicta***: Observations or remarks made by a judge that are not crucial to the decision. While not binding, they can be persuasive in future cases. **HIERARCHY OF COURTS AND BINDING NATURE** The Indian judiciary follows a hierarchical structure: - **SUPREME COURT**: Its decisions are binding on all courts in India. - **HIGH COURTS**: Their decisions are binding on subordinate courts within their respective jurisdictions but hold only persuasive value for other High Courts and the Supreme Court. - **LOWER COURTS**: Their decisions are binding only on the parties involved and do not set precedent. **CASE LAWS ILLUSTRATING THE DOCTRINE** 1. ***Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)***: The **Supreme Court** expanded the interpretation of the right to personal liberty under **Article 21**, establishing that any procedure depriving a person of liberty must be fair, just, and reasonable. This decision serves as a **binding precedent** ensuring the protection of individual rights. 2. ***Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)***: The **Supreme Court** introduced the **Basic Structure Doctrine**, ruling that while **Parliament** can amend the Constitution, it cannot alter its basic structure. This landmark judgment guides constitutional amendments and is a cornerstone of **Indian constitutional law**. **ADVANTAGES OF THE DOCTRINE** - ***Consistency and Predictability***: Ensures that similar cases are decided similarly, providing legal certainty. - ***Efficiency***: Reduces the need for re-litigation of settled principles, saving judicial time and resources. - ***Development of Law***: Allows the law to evolve through judicial interpretation, adapting to changing societal needs. **CRITICISMS OF THE DOCTRINE** - ***Rigidity***: Strict adherence can lead to unjust outcomes in cases with unique circumstances. - ***Complexity***: The vast number of precedents can make it challenging to identify the relevant ruling. - ***Dependence on Litigation***: Legal development relies on cases being brought to court, which may leave certain areas underdeveloped. **EXCEPTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE** - ***Per Incuriam***: A decision made in ignorance of a relevant statute or precedent is not binding. - ***Distinguishing***: A court may avoid following a precedent if it can demonstrate that the facts of the current case are materially different. **INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE** The doctrine of precedent is a hallmark of **common law systems** worldwide, including the **United Kingdom** and the **United States**. In these jurisdictions, the principles of ***stare decisis*** ensure legal consistency and stability, much like in India. **CONCLUSION** The **Doctrine of Judicial Precedent** plays a pivotal role in the **Indian legal system**, ensuring uniformity, stability, and fairness in judicial decisions. While it has its limitations, the doctrine facilitates the orderly development of law and upholds the principle that like cases should be treated alike. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Constitutional Silence](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-constitutional-silence/) **Published:** December 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Constitutional Silence refers to the intentional or unintentional gaps within a constitution where specific issues are not addressed explicitly. In India, this doctrine allows the judiciary to interpret and fill these gaps, ensuring the constitution remains dynamic and responsive to contemporary challenges. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Constitutional Silence** refers to the intentional or unintentional gaps within a constitution where specific issues are not addressed explicitly. In India, this doctrine allows the judiciary to interpret and fill these gaps, ensuring the constitution remains dynamic and responsive to contemporary challenges. ### **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** *Constitutional silence* occurs when the **constitution** does not explicitly address certain issues or scenarios. This absence can be deliberate, allowing future generations to interpret provisions as per evolving societal norms, or inadvertent, due to unforeseen circumstances at the time of drafting. The **judiciary** often steps in to interpret these silences, ensuring **justice** and **constitutional morality** are upheld. ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The framers of the **Indian Constitution** were aware of the impossibility of addressing every potential future scenario. They intentionally left certain areas open-ended, granting flexibility for interpretation. Over time, the **Indian judiciary** has played a pivotal role in interpreting these silences, especially concerning **fundamental rights** and the **basic structure** of the constitution. ### **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** Many countries experience **constitutional silences**, but their approaches to addressing them vary. For instance, the **U.S. Supreme Court** often relies on **judicial review** to interpret constitutional ambiguities. In contrast, the **Indian judiciary** actively interprets and fills these gaps, ensuring the constitution’s relevance in changing times. ### **RELATION WITH OTHER CONCEPTS** Constitutional silence is closely related to doctrines like the **Living Tree Doctrine**, which views the constitution as a living document that must evolve with societal changes. This perspective allows the **judiciary** to interpret the constitution dynamically, ensuring it remains relevant and inclusive. ### **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** - **Judicial Interpretation**: An active judiciary capable of interpreting constitutional silences. - **Constitutional Morality**: Adherence to the core principles and values enshrined in the **constitution**. - **Flexibility**: The ability of the **constitution** to adapt to changing societal needs. ### **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** While the **constitution** may be silent on certain issues, various **legal provisions** empower the judiciary to interpret and address these gaps. For instance, **Article 142** allows the **Supreme Court** to pass any decree necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. ### **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS** 1. **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)**: This landmark case led to the formulation of the **Basic Structure Doctrine**. The **Supreme Court** held that while **Parliament** has the power to amend the constitution, it cannot alter its **basic structure**. This interpretation filled the **constitutional silence** regarding the extent of **Parliament’s amending powers**. 2. **Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (2017)**: The **Supreme Court** recognized the **right to privacy** as a **fundamental right**, despite its absence from the **constitution’s** text. This decision addressed the **constitutional silence** on **privacy rights**, expanding the scope of **Article 21** (*Right to Life and Personal Liberty*). 3. **Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani (1978)**: In this case, the **Supreme Court** interpreted **Article 20(3)** (*right against self-incrimination*) to include the right to remain silent during police interrogation, filling the **constitutional silence** on the extent of this right. ### **INTERPRETATIONS / EXPLANATIONS** The **judiciary** interprets **constitutional silences** by considering the constitution’s **spirit**, underlying **principles**, and societal needs. This approach ensures that the **constitution** remains a **living document**, capable of addressing contemporary issues effectively. ### **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - **Living Tree Doctrine**: This doctrine treats the constitution as a **living document** that must evolve over time to remain relevant. The **Indian judiciary** has applied this doctrine indirectly, allowing for a **liberal interpretation** of the constitution to address new challenges. ### **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** - **Nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare**: This legal maxim means that no one is bound to accuse themselves. It underpins the **right against self-incrimination**, which the **Supreme Court** has interpreted to include the right to remain silent during interrogations. ### **AMENDMENTS / ADDITIONS / REPEALING** **Constitutional silences** can lead to **amendments** when the need arises to address specific issues explicitly. For example, the **42nd Amendment** attempted to reduce the judiciary’s power by limiting **judicial review**, but the **Supreme Court** reaffirmed its role in interpreting **constitutional silences** to protect the constitution’s **basic structure**. ### **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** While the **judiciary’s** role in interpreting **constitutional silences** ensures the constitution’s dynamism, it has faced criticism for **judicial overreach**. Critics argue that excessive interpretation may lead to the **judiciary encroaching upon the legislature’s domain**. However, supporters contend that such interpretations are essential to uphold **constitutional morality** and **justice**. ### **FLOWCHART: ADDRESSING CONSTITUTIONAL SILENCES** ```mermaid graph TD A[Constitutional Silence Identified] --> B[Judicial Interpretation] B --> C{Adheres to Basic Structure?} C -->|Yes| D[Judicial Precedent Established] C -->|No| E[Amendment by Legislature] ``` ### **TABLE: COMPARISON OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT** **Aspect****Judicial Interpretation****Legislative Amendment****Process**Courts interpret existing constitutional provisions to fill gaps.Legislature passes amendments to address specific issues.**Flexibility**Allows for immediate and case-specific solutions.Requires a more prolonged process involving debates and approvals.**Scope**Limited to interpretation without altering the constitution’s text.Can change the constitution’s text and add new provisions.**Examples****Right to Privacy** recognized under **Article 21**.**42nd Amendment Act, 1976**, reducing **judiciary’s powers**. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Constitutional Morality](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-constitutional-morality/) **Published:** December 26, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Constitutional morality refers to the adherence to the core principles enshrined in a Constitution, guiding the interpretation and application of laws. In the Indian context, it embodies the values of democracy, justice, equality, liberty, and fraternity. **Content:** ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** **Constitutional morality** refers to the adherence to the **core principles enshrined in a Constitution**, guiding the interpretation and application of laws. In the Indian context, it embodies the **values of democracy, justice, equality, liberty, and fraternity**. This doctrine ensures that the actions of the **State and its organs** align with these foundational principles, promoting an **inclusive and democratic political process** that satisfies both individual and collective interests. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The concept of **constitutional morality** was first introduced by the **British classicist George Grote** in the 19th century, who described it as a “*paramount reverence for the forms of the Constitution*” of the land. In India, **Dr. B.R. Ambedkar** invoked this phrase during the **Constituent Assembly Debates** to express his vision for the nascent republic. He emphasized that **constitutional morality** is essential for the working of a democratic Constitution, ensuring that both the **government and the governed operate within the constitutional framework**. ## **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** While the term **“constitutional morality”** is prominently discussed in India, other democracies emphasize similar principles under different terminologies. For instance: - In the **United States**, the concept of **“constitutional ethos”** reflects the foundational values that guide constitutional interpretation. - Similarly, the **United Kingdom**, lacking a written Constitution, relies on **“constitutional conventions”** to uphold democratic principles. These parallels highlight the **universal importance of adhering to constitutional principles** to maintain democratic integrity. ## **RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER CONCEPTS** **Constitutional morality** often intersects with **public morality**, especially in legal adjudications. While **public morality** reflects societal norms and values, **constitutional morality upholds the principles enshrined in the Constitution**, even if they conflict with prevailing social mores. This distinction ensures that **fundamental rights** are protected against **majoritarian impulses**, reinforcing the **Constitution’s role as a counter-majoritarian document**. ## **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** The key elements of **constitutional morality** include: - ***Adherence to Constitutional Values***: Upholding the core values enshrined in the Constitution, such as **justice, liberty, equality, fraternity, secularism**, and the **dignity of the individual**. - ***Rule of Law***: Ensuring that all actions are conducted within the **legal framework**, preventing arbitrary use of power. - ***Institutional Integrity***: Maintaining the **sanctity and independence of constitutional institutions**. - ***Commitment to Democratic Processes***: Respecting **democratic procedures and norms**, including **free and fair elections**, and the **protection of minority rights**. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** The **Indian Constitution** implicitly incorporates the doctrine of **constitutional morality** through various provisions: - **Article 19**: Guarantees **freedom of speech and expression**, subject to **reasonable restrictions** based on decency or morality. - **Article 25**: Ensures **freedom of conscience** and free profession, practice, and propagation of religion, subject to **public order, morality, and health**. - **Article 26**: Provides **freedom to manage religious affairs**, again subject to **public order, morality, and health**. These provisions highlight the **balance between individual freedoms and societal interests**, mediated through the lens of **constitutional morality**. ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS** Several landmark judgments have invoked the doctrine of **constitutional morality**: 1. ***Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018)***: The **Supreme Court** decriminalized **consensual homosexual acts among adults**, emphasizing that **constitutional morality must prevail over societal morality**. The Court held that **Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code**, which criminalized such acts, violated **fundamental rights**. 2. ***Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India (2018)***: The Court underscored that **constitutional morality** is synonymous with the **spirit of the Constitution**, requiring **complete adherence to its principles**. The judgment clarified the **distribution of powers** between the **Lieutenant Governor** and the **elected government of Delhi**, reinforcing **democratic governance**. 3. ***S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal (2010)***: The **Supreme Court** ruled against **excessive interference in personal autonomy and freedom of expression**, cautioning against using the pretext of upholding **social morality**, given the **subjective nature of these moral concepts**. 4. ***Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M. (2018)***: The **Supreme Court** established that the **right to choose one’s spouse** is inherent to **Article 21 of the Constitution**. While recognizing the significance of **social values and morals**, the court emphasized that these must not take precedence over **constitutionally protected freedoms**. 5. ***Shakti Vahini v. Union of India (2018)***: The **Supreme Court** extended legal protection not only to **married couples** but also to **unmarried couples**, safeguarding them from **potential threats of violence**. The bench concluded that ensuring the safety of couples facing such threats is of **paramount importance**. 6. ***Poonam Rani v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2021)***: The **Allahabad High Court** reaffirmed that the **Constitutional Court** bears the responsibility of overseeing and upholding both **constitutional morality** and the **rights of citizens**, particularly when these rights are endangered solely due to their **sexual orientation**. 7. ***Sultana Mirza v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2020)***: The **Allahabad High Court** established that the **Constitutional Court** bears the responsibility of overseeing and upholding both **constitutional morality** and the **rights of citizens**, particularly when these rights are endangered solely due to their **sexual orientation**. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Transformative Constitutionalism](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-transformative-constitutionalism/) **Published:** December 26, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Transformative constitutionalism refers to the use of constitutional law as a tool to effect profound social change, aiming to transform a country's political and social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction. **Content:** ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** *Transformative constitutionalism* refers to the use of constitutional law as a tool to effect profound social change, aiming to transform a country’s political and social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction. In the Indian context, this doctrine emphasizes the Constitution’s role in dismantling historical inequalities and injustices, fostering a society based on **liberty**, **equality**, and **fraternity**. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The concept of *transformative constitutionalism* gained prominence in **South Africa**, introduced by legal scholar **Karl Klare** in 1998. In India, the **Constitution**, adopted in **1950**, was envisioned as a transformative document to transition from colonial rule to a democratic republic, addressing deep-seated social hierarchies and discrimination. The judiciary has played a pivotal role in interpreting the Constitution to promote social transformation, evident in landmark judgments that uphold **fundamental rights** and **social justice**. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** The Indian Constitution incorporates several provisions that reflect *transformative constitutionalism*: - **Preamble**: Declares India as a sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic, ensuring **justice**, **liberty**, **equality**, and **fraternity**. - **Fundamental Rights (Part III)**: Guarantees civil liberties, including the **right to equality (Article 14)**, **prohibition of discrimination (Article 15)**, and **protection of life and personal liberty (Article 21)**. - **Directive Principles of State Policy (Part IV)**: Guides the state in formulating policies aimed at **social and economic welfare**, such as securing a social order for the promotion of welfare (**Article 38**) and providing **equal pay for equal work (Article 39)**. ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** The Indian judiciary has reinforced *transformative constitutionalism* through several landmark judgments: 1. **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461**: Established the **Basic Structure Doctrine**, asserting that Parliament cannot alter the Constitution’s fundamental framework, thus preserving its transformative essence. 2. **National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438**: Recognized *transgender individuals* as the ‘third gender,’ affirming their **fundamental rights** and the right to self-identification, promoting inclusivity and equality. 3. **Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1**: Decriminalized consensual same-sex relations by reading down **Section 377 of the IPC**, advancing individual autonomy and dignity. 4. **Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1**: Allowed the entry of women of all ages into the **Sabarimala temple**, challenging age-old discriminatory practices and promoting gender equality. 5. **Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1**: Affirmed the **right to privacy** as a fundamental right under **Article 21**, emphasizing individual autonomy in personal choices. ## **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** Several doctrines underpin *transformative constitutionalism* in India: - **Basic Structure Doctrine**: Asserts that certain fundamental features of the Constitution cannot be altered by amendments, ensuring its core principles remain intact. - **Doctrine of Progressive Realization of Rights**: Recognizes that the enforcement of certain rights may evolve over time, allowing for gradual implementation in line with societal progress. - **Doctrine of Non-Retrogression**: Prohibits the reversal of rights once recognized, ensuring continuous advancement in human rights protection. ## **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** Key legal maxims and principles associated with *transformative constitutionalism* include: - **“Salus populi suprema lex esto”**: The welfare of the people shall be the supreme law, guiding the interpretation and application of constitutional provisions. - **Constitutional Morality**: Adherence to the core values and principles enshrined in the Constitution, guiding institutions and individuals in upholding democratic ideals. ## **ROLE OF JUDICIARY IN TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM** The judiciary serves as a catalyst for social change by: - **Interpreting Constitutional Provisions**: Broadly construing **fundamental rights** to address contemporary issues and societal needs. - **Judicial Activism**: Proactively addressing social injustices through **Public Interest Litigations (PILs)** and progressive judgments. - **Ensuring Accountability**: Holding the executive and legislature accountable to constitutional mandates, ensuring laws and policies align with transformative goals. ## **INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS** India’s commitment to *transformative constitutionalism* aligns with international human rights instruments: - **Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)**: Emphasizes **equality**, **dignity**, and **rights** for all individuals, principles mirrored in the Indian Constitution. - **International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)**: India, as a signatory, upholds **civil and political rights**, influencing constitutional interpretations. - **Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)**: Guides legal reforms promoting **gender equality** in India. ## **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** While *transformative constitutionalism* has been lauded for promoting social justice, it faces criticism: - **Judicial Overreach**: Concerns arise when courts are perceived to encroach upon **legislative functions**, potentially disrupting the separation of powers. - **Implementation Challenges**: Enforcing transformative judgments requires effective mechanisms, often hindered by **bureaucratic inertia** and societal resistance. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Living Constitution](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-living-constitution/) **Published:** December 26, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Living Constitution posits that a constitution is a dynamic, evolving document that adapts to contemporary societal needs and values. In India, this doctrine has significantly influenced constitutional interpretation, ensuring the Constitution's relevance in changing times. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Living Constitution** posits that a constitution is a dynamic, evolving document that adapts to contemporary societal needs and values. In India, this doctrine has significantly influenced constitutional interpretation, ensuring the Constitution’s relevance in changing times. ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** The **Doctrine of Living Constitution** asserts that a constitution should be interpreted as a living document, capable of evolving with societal changes. This approach contrasts with **originalism**, which seeks to interpret the constitution based on the framers’ original intent. In the Indian context, the living constitution approach allows the judiciary to interpret constitutional provisions in light of contemporary societal needs, ensuring the Constitution’s relevance over time. This dynamic interpretation has enabled the Constitution to address modern challenges and protect **individual rights** effectively. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The concept of a **living constitution** in India has evolved through judicial interpretations. Initially, the **Supreme Court** adopted a literal approach, as seen in ***A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras***, **AIR 1950 SC 27**, where the Court held that **Article 21** did not require Indian courts to apply a **due process of law** standard. However, in ***Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India***, **AIR 1978 SC 597**, the Court overruled ***A.K. Gopalan***, interpreting **Article 21** to include a procedure that is “just, fair, and reasonable,” thus embracing a more dynamic interpretation. This shift marked the beginning of the **living constitution approach** in India, allowing the Constitution to adapt to changing societal values and norms. ## **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** In **Canada**, the living constitution is described under the **living tree doctrine**, which allows for a broad and progressive interpretation of the constitution. Similarly, the **United Kingdom’s** unwritten constitution evolves through **statutes** and **judicial decisions**, reflecting contemporary societal values. In contrast, the **United States** has a significant debate between **originalism** and **living constitutionalism**, with proponents of each approach advocating for different methods of constitutional interpretation. India’s approach aligns more with the **Canadian** and **UK models**, emphasizing the Constitution’s adaptability to changing times. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** **Article 368** of the **Indian Constitution** provides the procedure for its amendment, allowing adaptability to changing needs. However, the **Supreme Court**, through the **Basic Structure Doctrine** established in ***Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala***, **AIR 1973 SC 1461**, held that while **Parliament** can amend the Constitution, it cannot alter its **basic structure**. This ensures that fundamental principles remain intact, even as the Constitution evolves. The Court’s interpretation of the Constitution as a **living document** allows for flexibility in its application, ensuring its relevance in contemporary society. ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** - **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala**, **AIR 1973 SC 1461**: This landmark case established the **Basic Structure Doctrine**, asserting that while **Parliament** has wide powers to amend the Constitution, it cannot alter its fundamental framework. The case involved challenges to the **Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963**, and raised issues about the extent of **Parliament’s amending power**. The Court held that certain fundamental features of the Constitution, such as the **supremacy of the Constitution**, cannot be altered by amendments. - **Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India**, **AIR 1980 SC 1789**: The **Supreme Court** reaffirmed the **Basic Structure Doctrine**, striking down clauses of the **42nd Amendment** that sought to exclude **judicial review** of constitutional amendments. The case questioned the validity of amendments that curtailed **judicial review** and expanded **Parliament’s amending power**. The Court held that the limited amending power of **Parliament** is itself a basic feature of the Constitution, and any amendment that removes this limitation is unconstitutional. - **K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India**, **AIR 2017 SC 4161**: The Court recognized the **right to privacy** as a fundamental right under the Constitution, demonstrating the **living constitution approach** by interpreting existing provisions to address contemporary issues. The case arose from challenges to the **Aadhaar scheme**, raising issues about the **right to privacy**. The Court held that the **right to privacy** is intrinsic to the **right to life and personal liberty** under **Article 21**, showcasing the Constitution’s adaptability to modern challenges. ## **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - **Basic Structure Doctrine**: Asserts that certain fundamental features of the Constitution cannot be altered by amendments, ensuring its core principles remain intact. This doctrine was established in the ***Kesavananda Bharati*** case and has been reaffirmed in subsequent judgments. - **Living Tree Doctrine**: Originating from **Canadian jurisprudence**, it views the Constitution as a **living tree** capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits. In India, this metaphor has been adopted to emphasize the Constitution’s dynamic nature. ## **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** - **Ut res magis valeat quam pereat**: This legal maxim means that the law should be interpreted in a way that it is effective rather than void. It supports the **living constitution approach** by advocating for interpretations that ensure the law’s applicability in contemporary contexts. ## **AMENDMENTS / ADDITIONS / REPEALING** The **Indian Constitution** has undergone numerous amendments to address emerging needs. However, the **Basic Structure Doctrine** ensures that such amendments do not alter its fundamental principles. For instance, the **42nd Amendment** attempted to curtail **judicial review**, but the **Supreme Court** in ***Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India*** struck down these provisions, reinforcing the Constitution’s core values. ## **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** The **living constitution approach** has been praised for allowing the Constitution to adapt to changing societal values, ensuring its relevance. However, critics argue that it grants excessive power to the judiciary, potentially leading to **judicial overreach**. Despite this, the approach has enabled progressive interpretations, such as recognizing the **right to privacy** and decriminalizing **consensual homosexual acts**, reflecting societal evolution. ## **FUTURE IMPLICATIONS** The **Doctrine of Living Constitution** is expected to play a significant role in addressing future challenges. By allowing the judiciary to interpret the Constitution dynamically, this approach ensures that the Constitution remains relevant and effective in safeguarding **individual rights**, promoting **social justice**, and addressing emerging societal needs. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Original Intent](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-original-intent/) **Published:** December 26, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Original Intent is a principle of constitutional and statutory interpretation that emphasizes understanding and applying the intentions of the framers or legislators at the time a law was enacted. **Content:** ### **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** The **Doctrine of Original Intent** is a principle of constitutional and statutory interpretation that emphasizes understanding and applying the intentions of the framers or legislators at the time a law was enacted. This approach seeks to maintain the original meaning of legal texts, ensuring that contemporary interpretations remain faithful to the foundational purposes and objectives envisioned by their creators. In essence, it posits that the **Constitution** or any statute should be interpreted based on the intent of its drafters, rather than through the lens of modern values or societal changes. ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The origins of the **Doctrine of Original Intent** can be traced back to legal traditions that prioritize the framers’ perspectives in interpreting foundational legal documents. In the United States, this approach has been a cornerstone of constitutional interpretation, with debates centering on whether the **Constitution** should be viewed as a static document reflecting its original context or as a living document adaptable to contemporary society. In India, while the **Constitution** is often interpreted as a living document, there have been instances where the judiciary has referred to the framers’ intent to elucidate constitutional provisions. ### **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** In the United States, **originalism**, including the **Doctrine of Original Intent**, has been a prominent method of constitutional interpretation, with jurists like **Justice Antonin Scalia** advocating for this approach. In contrast, Indian constitutional interpretation has predominantly embraced a more dynamic approach, considering the evolving needs of society. However, the Indian judiciary does, at times, refer to the **Constituent Assembly Debates** to glean the framers’ intent, especially when faced with ambiguous constitutional provisions. ### **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** - ***Historical Context***: Understanding the socio-political environment during the drafting of the **Constitution** or statute. - ***Framers’ Debates and Discussions***: Analyzing records such as the **Constituent Assembly Debates** to ascertain the objectives behind specific provisions. - ***Textual Analysis***: Examining the language used in the legal text to infer intent. - ***Purpose and Objectives***: Identifying the problems the provision aimed to address and the goals it sought to achieve. ### **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** In India, while there is no explicit legal provision mandating the use of the **Doctrine of Original Intent**, the judiciary often refers to historical documents, including the **Constituent Assembly Debates**, as interpretative tools. The **Supreme Court** has, in various instances, relied on these debates to shed light on ambiguous constitutional provisions, thereby indirectly applying the doctrine. ### **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS** 1. ***Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225***: This landmark case introduced the **Basic Structure Doctrine**, emphasizing that while the **Constitution** can be amended, its fundamental structure cannot be altered. The Court referred to the **Constituent Assembly Debates** to understand the framers’ vision of the Constitution’s core principles. 2. ***Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) Supp SCC 1***: In this case, the **Supreme Court** examined the intent behind constitutional provisions related to electoral disputes, referring to historical contexts to interpret the scope and limitations of parliamentary privileges. 3. ***Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1***: While deliberating on the constitutionality of **Section 66A of the Information Technology Act**, the Court considered the intent behind **Article 19(1)(a)** of the **Constitution**, emphasizing the importance of free speech as envisioned by the framers. ### **INTERPRETATIONS / EXPLANATIONS** The **Doctrine of Original Intent** serves as a tool to interpret legal texts by delving into the historical context and purposes that influenced their creation. By focusing on the framers’ intentions, this doctrine aims to preserve the original meaning and prevent subjective or contemporary biases from altering the foundational principles of the law. However, critics argue that strict adherence to **original intent** may hinder the law’s ability to adapt to societal changes, advocating for a more dynamic interpretative approach. ### **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - ***Originalism***: A broader theory that includes the **Doctrine of Original Intent**, advocating for interpretation based on the original meaning or intent at the time of enactment. - ***Living Constitution Theory***: Contrasts with originalism by proposing that the **Constitution** should be interpreted in light of contemporary societal values and norms. ### **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** - ***“Animus hominis est anima scripti”***: Translates to “The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument,” emphasizing the importance of intent in legal interpretation. - ***“Mens legislatoris est lex”***: Means “The mind of the legislator is the law,” underscoring the significance of legislative intent in understanding statutes. ### **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** The **Doctrine of Original Intent** is lauded for promoting judicial restraint and preserving the foundational principles of legal texts. By adhering to the framers’ intentions, it seeks to prevent arbitrary or subjective interpretations that could destabilize the legal system. However, critics argue that this doctrine may render the law inflexible, unable to adapt to evolving societal values and challenges. They advocate for interpretative approaches that consider contemporary contexts to ensure the law remains relevant and effective. ### **FUTURE IMPLICATIONS** The application of the **Doctrine of Original Intent** in India may influence future judicial interpretations, especially concerning constitutional amendments and fundamental rights. As societal values evolve, the judiciary may face challenges in balancing the framers’ original intentions with contemporary needs. The ongoing debate between **originalism** and dynamic interpretation will likely shape the future trajectory of constitutional law in India. ### **REFERENCES** 1. ***Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225***. 2. ***Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1***. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Popular Sovereignty](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-popular-sovereignty/) **Published:** December 26, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Popular Sovereignty asserts that the ultimate authority in a state resides with its people. In India, this principle is foundational, influencing the Constitution's formation and its democratic governance. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Popular Sovereignty** asserts that the ultimate authority in a state resides with its people. In India, this principle is foundational, influencing the **Constitution’s** formation and its democratic governance. ### **MEANING AND DEFINITION** *Popular Sovereignty* means that the government’s power originates from the consent of the governed. In India, this is evident as the **Constitution** begins with “We, the people,” emphasizing that authority is derived from its citizens. This principle ensures that the state functions with legitimacy, reflecting the people’s collective will. ### **HISTORICAL EVOLUTION** India’s anti-colonial struggle deeply embedded the idea of *popular sovereignty*. The freedom movement united diverse groups under the belief that legitimate governance stems from the people’s will. This sentiment was institutionalized during the drafting of the **Constitution**, aiming to reflect the aspirations of a newly independent nation. ### **CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS** - **PREAMBLE**: Declares India as a “Sovereign Democratic Republic,” highlighting that sovereignty rests with its people. - **ARTICLE 326**: Establishes adult suffrage, granting citizens the right to vote and directly participate in governance. - **ARTICLE 368**: Empowers **Parliament** to amend the **Constitution**, but such amendments must not alter its basic structure, ensuring that the people’s sovereignty remains intact. ### **BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE** The **Supreme Court**, in the landmark case of ***Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala***, **AIR 1973 SC 1461**, introduced the *Basic Structure Doctrine*. The petitioner, **Kesavananda Bharati**, challenged the government’s authority to alter fundamental rights through constitutional amendments. The **Court** held that while **Parliament** can amend the **Constitution**, it cannot alter its basic structure, which includes the principle of *popular sovereignty*. This ensures that any amendment does not undermine the foundational principles upon which the **Constitution** stands. ### **JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS** In ***S.R. Bommai v. Union of India***, **AIR 1994 SC 1918**, the **Supreme Court** emphasized that the **Constitution’s** authority is derived from the people. The case involved the dismissal of state governments under **Article 356**. The **Court** held that such actions must align with constitutional principles, reinforcing that the people’s will is paramount. ### **INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES** Globally, the principle of *popular sovereignty* is a cornerstone of democratic constitutions. For instance, the **U.S. Constitution’s preamble** begins with “We the People,” similar to India’s, signifying that governmental authority emanates from its citizens. This parallel underscores the universal importance of the doctrine in establishing democratic governance. ### **CHALLENGES AND CRITICISMS** Despite its foundational status, the application of *popular sovereignty* in India faces challenges. Instances of political instability, misuse of constitutional provisions like **Article 356**, and debates over the extent of **judicial review** highlight tensions in fully realizing this doctrine. Critics argue that while the **Constitution** enshrines *popular sovereignty*, practical politics sometimes undermine the people’s true will. ### **CONCLUSION** The **Doctrine of Popular Sovereignty** remains central to India’s constitutional framework. It ensures that governance reflects the people’s will, upholds democratic principles, and maintains the legitimacy of state authority. Ongoing judicial interpretations and constitutional debates continue to shape its application, reinforcing its significance in Indian democracy. ### **REFERENCES** 1. ***Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala***, **AIR 1973 SC 1461**. 2. ***S.R. Bommai v. Union of India***, **AIR 1994 SC 1918**. 3. Sen, Sarbani. **The Constitution of India: Popular Sovereignty and Democratic Transformations**. Oxford University Press, 2011. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Rule of Law](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-rule-of-law/) **Published:** December 26, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Rule of Law is a cornerstone of democratic governance, ensuring that all actions are conducted within a legal framework, thereby preventing arbitrary use of power. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Rule of Law** is a cornerstone of democratic governance, ensuring that all actions are conducted within a legal framework, thereby preventing arbitrary use of power. ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** The term ‘**Rule of Law**‘ originates from the French phrase *‘la principe de legalite,’* meaning the principle of legality, which emphasizes governance based on laws rather than individual discretion. **A.V. Dicey**, a British jurist, articulated this doctrine with three core principles: 1. ***Supremacy of Law***: **Law is supreme**, and no individual is above it. This principle opposes **arbitrary power** and ensures that punishment is only for breaches of law established through **due process**. 2. ***Equality Before Law***: Every individual, regardless of status, is subject to the same laws administered by **ordinary courts**. This ensures **non-discrimination** and equal protection under the law. 3. ***Predominance of Legal Spirit***: **Rights are protected through judicial decisions**, emphasizing the role of **courts** in upholding individual liberties. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The concept of **Rule of Law** can be traced back to ancient civilizations. In India, its roots are found in the **Upanishads**, which state that **law is the king of kings**, emphasizing its supremacy over all individuals, including monarchs. In modern times, the doctrine was popularized by **A.V. Dicey** in his 1885 work *“Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution,”* where he outlined its foundational principles. ## **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** While the **Rule of Law** is a universal principle, its application varies across countries: - ***United Kingdom***: **Dicey’s model** emphasizes **parliamentary sovereignty**, where no person is punishable except for a breach of law established in the **ordinary legal manner** before the **ordinary courts**. - ***United States***: The **U.S. Constitution** embodies the Rule of Law through a **written constitution** and a strong emphasis on **judicial review**, ensuring that no law or executive act is above the **Constitution**. - ***India***: The **Indian Constitution** incorporates the Rule of Law, ensuring that all laws are consistent with **constitutional provisions**, and emphasizes **judicial review** to uphold **fundamental rights**. ## **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** The effective implementation of the **Rule of Law** requires: - ***Clear and Publicized Laws***: Laws must be **accessible**, **clear**, and **stable** to guide behavior. - ***Equality Before the Law***: All individuals and institutions are **accountable under the law**. - ***Independent Judiciary***: Courts must be **impartial** and **independent** to enforce laws fairly. - ***Access to Justice***: Legal processes should be **accessible to all**, ensuring that rights are protected. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** In India, the **Constitution** embodies the **Rule of Law** through various provisions: - ***Article 14***: Ensures **equality before the law** and **equal protection of laws** within the territory of India. - ***Article 21***: Guarantees the **right to life and personal liberty**, stating that no person shall be deprived of these except according to the **procedure established by law**. - ***Article 32 and 226***: Empower individuals to approach the **Supreme Court** and **High Courts**, respectively, for the enforcement of **fundamental rights**, ensuring **judicial review**. ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** Several landmark judgments have reinforced the **Rule of Law** in India: 1. ***Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461***: This case established the **Doctrine of Basic Structure**, asserting that the **Rule of Law** is a fundamental feature of the Constitution that cannot be altered by **parliamentary amendments**. - ***Facts***: The petitioner challenged the constitutional validity of the Kerala government’s land reform laws, claiming they violated his **fundamental rights**. - ***Issue***: Whether **Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution** was unlimited. - ***Held***: The **Supreme Court** held that while Parliament can amend the Constitution, it cannot alter its **basic structure**, which includes the **Rule of Law**. 2. ***Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597***: The Court expanded the interpretation of **Article 21**, emphasizing that any law affecting **life and personal liberty** must be **just, fair, and reasonable**, thereby reinforcing the **Rule of Law**. - ***Facts***: **Maneka Gandhi’s passport** was impounded by the government without providing reasons. - ***Issue***: Whether the **procedure established by law** under **Article 21** must be **fair and reasonable**. - ***Held***: The **Supreme Court** held that the procedure affecting life and liberty must be **fair, just, and reasonable**, ensuring protection against **arbitrary actions**. 3. ***ADM Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla, AIR 1976 SC 1207***: Also known as the **Habeas Corpus case**, the majority held that during the Emergency, the right to seek **judicial remedy** for enforcement of **fundamental rights** remains suspended. However, **Justice H.R. Khanna’s dissent** emphasized the inviolability of the **Rule of Law**, even during emergencies. - ***Facts***: During the Emergency, several individuals were detained without trial, and the right to approach courts was suspended. - ***Issue***: Whether the right to judicial remedy for enforcement of fundamental rights is suspended during an Emergency. - ***Held***: The majority held that during an Emergency, the right to approach courts is suspended. **Justice Khanna’s dissent**, however, emphasized that even in emergencies, the **Rule of Law** prevails, and courts should have the authority to review detentions. ## **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** The **Rule of Law** intersects with several legal doctrines: - ***Doctrine of Basic Structure***: Asserts that certain fundamental features of the Constitution, including the **Rule of Law**, cannot be altered by amendments. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Due Process of Law](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-due-process-of-law/) **Published:** December 26, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Due Process of Law ensures that no individual is deprived of life, liberty, or property without appropriate legal procedures. In India, this doctrine has evolved through judicial interpretations, significantly impacting the protection of fundamental rights. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Due Process of Law** ensures that no individual is deprived of life, liberty, or property without appropriate legal procedures. In India, this doctrine has evolved through judicial interpretations, significantly impacting the protection of fundamental rights. ## **MEANING AND DEFINITION** The **Doctrine of Due Process of Law** mandates that laws must be **fair, just, and reasonable**, ensuring protection against **arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty, or property**. It encompasses two key aspects: - ***Procedural Due Process***: Ensures that the **procedures enforcing laws** are fair and impartial. - ***Substantive Due Process***: Examines whether the **laws themselves are fair, just, and not arbitrary**. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION IN INDIA** Initially, the Indian Constitution adopted the phrase **“procedure established by law”** in **Article 21**, influenced by the **Japanese Constitution**, to limit judicial overreach. This approach was evident in **A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950)**, where the Supreme Court upheld the **Preventive Detention Act**, emphasizing strict adherence to enacted laws without assessing their fairness. However, this perspective shifted with **Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)**. In this case, **Maneka Gandhi’s passport** was impounded without providing her a fair hearing, which she challenged as a violation of her rights under **Articles 14, 19, and 21**. The Supreme Court ruled that the **“procedure established by law”** must be **fair, just, and reasonable**, effectively incorporating the essence of due process into Indian jurisprudence. ## **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** - ***United States***: The U.S. Constitution explicitly mentions **“due process of law”** in the **Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments**, providing a broader scope for judicial review to ensure laws are **just and reasonable**. - ***India***: Initially adopted **“procedure established by law”**, limiting judicial review to procedural aspects. However, through judicial interpretation, especially post-**Maneka Gandhi’s case**, the Indian judiciary has embraced principles akin to due process, ensuring laws are **fair, just, and reasonable**. ## **KEY CASE LAWS AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS** 1. ***A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950)***: The petitioner, detained under the **Preventive Detention Act**, challenged the act’s constitutionality, arguing it violated his **fundamental rights**. The Supreme Court upheld the act, interpreting **Article 21** narrowly and emphasizing strict adherence to enacted laws without assessing their fairness. 2. ***Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)***: **Maneka Gandhi’s passport** was impounded without a fair hearing, which she challenged as a violation of her rights under **Articles 14, 19, and 21**. The Supreme Court ruled that any procedure depriving an individual of life or liberty must be **fair, just, and reasonable**, effectively incorporating due process principles into **Article 21**. 3. ***K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)***: This landmark judgment recognized the **right to privacy** as an intrinsic part of the **right to life and personal liberty** under **Article 21**, reinforcing the due process doctrine by ensuring laws infringing on privacy must meet the tests of **necessity** and **proportionality**. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLES** - ***Article 21***: States that no person shall be deprived of **life or personal liberty** except according to the **procedure established by law**. Post-**Maneka Gandhi’s case**, this has been interpreted to mean procedures that are **fair, just, and reasonable**. - ***Article 14***: Guarantees **equality before the law** and **equal protection of the laws**, ensuring laws are not arbitrary. - ***Article 19***: Provides citizens with specific **freedoms**, subject to **reasonable restrictions**, ensuring a balance between **individual rights** and **societal interests**. ## **PRINCIPLES AND DOCTRINES RELATED TO DUE PROCESS** - ***Rule of Law***: The principle that all individuals and institutions are subject to and accountable to **law that is fairly applied and enforced**. - ***Natural Justice***: Legal philosophy used in some jurisdictions in the determination of **just or fair processes** in legal proceedings. - ***Audi Alteram Partem***: A principle that **no person should be judged without a fair hearing** in which each party is given the opportunity to respond to the evidence against them. ## **IMPACT ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW** The incorporation of **due process principles** into Indian jurisprudence has significantly enhanced the protection of **fundamental rights**. It has empowered the judiciary to review not just the **procedural validity of laws** but also their **substantive fairness**, ensuring that legislation does not arbitrarily infringe upon individual liberties. ## **CONCLUSION** The **Doctrine of Due Process of Law**, though not explicitly mentioned in the Indian Constitution, has been effectively integrated through judicial interpretations. This evolution ensures that laws in India must be **fair, just, and reasonable**, providing robust protection to individual rights against **arbitrary state actions**. ## **REFERENCES** 1. ***A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950)***: AIR 1950 SC 27. 2. ***Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)***: AIR 1978 SC 597. 3. ***K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)***: (2017) 10 SCC 1. 4. ***Constitution of India***: Articles 14, 19, and 21. 5. ***Legal Service India***: Doctrine of Due Process of Law. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Procedure Established by Law](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-procedure-established-by-law/) **Published:** December 26, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The "Doctrine of Procedure Established by Law" is enshrined in Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, which states: "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law." This doctrine mandates that any deprivation of life or personal liberty must follow a procedure that is duly enacted by the legislature. **Content:** ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** The **“Doctrine of Procedure Established by Law”** is enshrined in **Article 21** of the Indian Constitution, which states: **“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”** This doctrine mandates that any deprivation of life or personal liberty must follow a procedure that is duly enacted by the legislature. It emphasizes adherence to the prescribed legal process, ensuring that any action affecting an individual’s **fundamental rights** is conducted under the authority of law. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** Initially, the Indian Constitution adopted the **“procedure established by law”** doctrine, differing from the American **“due process of law.”** The framers chose this to limit **judicial overreach** and ensure **parliamentary supremacy** in defining legal procedures. However, over time, judicial interpretations expanded the scope of **Article 21** to incorporate elements of **fairness** and **reasonableness**, aligning it more closely with the **due process concept**. ## **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** In the **United States**, the Constitution incorporates the **“due process of law”** clause, which not only requires legal procedures to be followed but also mandates that these procedures be **fair, just, and reasonable.** This contrasts with the original Indian doctrine, which focused solely on adherence to enacted law, without assessing its fairness. ## **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** The doctrine comprises several key elements: - **Legislative Enactment**: There must be a law enacted by the legislature. - **Procedural Compliance**: The procedure prescribed by this law must be strictly followed. - **Legality**: The law must be within the legislative competence and must not violate any **constitutional provisions**. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** **Article 21** serves as the cornerstone of this doctrine. Additionally, procedural laws like the **Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC)** and the **Civil Procedure Code (CPC)** outline the specific procedures to be followed in legal matters, ensuring that any deprivation of life or personal liberty adheres to established legal processes. ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** 1. **A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950)**: In this case, **A.K. Gopalan**, a communist leader, was detained under the **Preventive Detention Act, 1950**. He challenged his detention, arguing that it violated his fundamental rights under **Articles 14, 19, and 21**. The **Supreme Court** held that as long as there was a law prescribing a procedure, any deprivation of life or personal liberty was valid, even if the law was unjust or unreasonable. This case highlighted a narrow interpretation of **Article 21**, focusing solely on the existence of a procedure established by law without assessing its fairness. 2. **Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)**: **Maneka Gandhi’s** passport was impounded by the government without providing her an opportunity to be heard, citing public interest. She challenged this action, contending it violated her rights under **Articles 14, 19, and 21**. The **Supreme Court** expanded the interpretation of **Article 21**, ruling that the procedure established by law must be **“right, just, and fair”** and not **“arbitrary, fanciful, or oppressive.”** This judgment effectively incorporated the principles of **natural justice** into the procedure established by law, ensuring that laws affecting life and personal liberty must also be **reasonable and just**. 3. **Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1964)**: **Kharak Singh** was subjected to **police surveillance**, including domiciliary visits at night, under the **U.P. Police Regulations**. He challenged these actions as violations of his fundamental rights. The **Supreme Court** held that while the term **“life”** in **Article 21** means more than mere animal existence, the regulations authorizing such surveillance were **unconstitutional** as they violated the **“personal liberty”** guaranteed by **Article 21**. This case emphasized that any procedure affecting personal liberty must be **fair and not arbitrary**. 4. **ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976)**: During the **Emergency**, several individuals were detained without trial. The detainees challenged their detention, arguing that it violated their fundamental rights. The **Supreme Court** controversially held that during the **Emergency**, the right to seek remedy for enforcement of **Article 21** remained suspended. This judgment was widely criticized for its narrow interpretation of **Article 21** and was later overruled, reaffirming the importance of **judicial oversight** in protecting personal liberty. 5. **Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010)**: The case involved the **involuntary administration** of narco-analysis, polygraph, and brain-mapping tests during criminal investigations. The **Supreme Court** held that such involuntary administration violated the **“personal liberty”** and **“right against self-incrimination”** under **Articles 20(3) and 21**. The Court emphasized that any procedure affecting personal liberty must be **just, fair, and reasonable**, reinforcing the expanded interpretation of **Article 21**. ## **INTERPRETATIONS / EXPLANATIONS** The evolution of **Article 21’s interpretation** signifies a shift from a **literal** to a **purposive approach**, ensuring that laws not only follow due procedure but are also **just, fair, and reasonable.** This transformation aligns the Indian legal system more closely with the principles of **substantive due process**, ensuring comprehensive protection of individual rights. ## **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** The transformation from **“procedure established by law”** to incorporating elements of **“due process of law”** reflects the judiciary’s proactive role in safeguarding **fundamental rights.** This shift ensures that the mere existence of a law is insufficient; the law must also be **fair, just, and reasonable.** ## **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** - **Audi Alteram Partem**: This principle of **natural justice**, meaning **“hear the other side,”** has been integrated into the interpretation of **Article 21**, ensuring that individuals are given a fair opportunity to be heard before any deprivation of life or personal liberty. - **Nemo Judex in Causa Sua**: Meaning **“no one should be a judge in their own cause,”** this principle ensures **impartiality** in legal proceedings, reinforcing the **fairness** aspect of the procedure established by law. ## **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** The initial **narrow interpretation** of **Article 21** was criticized for allowing unjust laws to infringe upon personal liberties. However, the judiciary’s subsequent **expansive interpretation** has been lauded for strengthening the protection of **fundamental rights**, ensuring that laws are not only **procedurally valid** but also **substantively fair**. --- **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Equal Protection of Laws](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-equal-protection-of-laws/) **Published:** December 26, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Equal Protection of Laws, enshrined in Article 14 of the Indian Constitution, ensures that every individual within India's territory receives equal treatment under the law. This principle prohibits discrimination and mandates that similar cases be treated alike, forming a cornerstone of India's commitment to justice and fairness. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Equal Protection of Laws**, enshrined in **Article 14** of the **Indian Constitution**, ensures that every individual within India’s territory receives equal treatment under the law. This principle prohibits discrimination and mandates that similar cases be treated alike, forming a cornerstone of India’s commitment to justice and fairness. ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** **Article 14** states: **“The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”** This provision embodies two key concepts: - **Equality Before Law**: *This negative concept, borrowed from English common law, implies the absence of any special privileges in favor of individuals and the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law.* It signifies that no person, regardless of rank or status, is above the law. - **Equal Protection of Laws**: *A positive concept derived from the American Constitution, it requires the state to provide equal treatment to individuals in similar circumstances.* This means that laws should be applied equally and without discrimination, ensuring like cases are treated alike. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The principle of equality has deep roots in legal history. The **Magna Carta of 1215** proclaimed the treatment of all individuals with fairness, laying the foundation for the concept of equality before the law. This idea evolved over centuries, influencing various legal systems, including India’s, culminating in its incorporation into the **Indian Constitution** as a fundamental right. ## **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** For the **Doctrine of Equal Protection** to apply effectively, certain essentials must be met: 1. **Universal Application**: *The doctrine applies to all persons within the territory of India, including citizens, non-citizens, and legal entities.* 2. **Prohibition of Arbitrary Discrimination**: *The state must not engage in arbitrary discrimination. Any classification must be reasonable and not arbitrary.* 3. **Reasonable Classification**: *While the doctrine prohibits class legislation, it allows for reasonable classification. Such classification must meet two conditions:* - **Intelligible Differentia**: *The classification must be based on an intelligible differentia that distinguishes those grouped together from others.* - **Rational Nexus**: *There must be a rational relation between the classification and the objective sought to be achieved by the law.* ## **DEFENCES / EXCEPTIONS / EXCEPTIONS TO DEFENCES** While **Article 14** guarantees equality, certain exceptions exist: - **Special Privileges**: *The Constitution permits special provisions for certain classes of people, such as women, children, and socially and educationally backward classes, to promote substantive equality.* - **Protective Discrimination**: *Affirmative action measures, like reservations in education and employment for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, are permissible to uplift disadvantaged groups.* - **Reasonable Classification**: *Laws can differentiate between groups if the classification is reasonable and serves a legitimate objective.* ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** The application of the **Doctrine of Equal Protection** involves: - **Judicial Review**: *Courts have the authority to review laws and state actions to ensure they comply with Article 14.* - **Burden of Proof**: *When a law is challenged as discriminatory, the burden of proof lies on the state to justify the classification as reasonable.* - **Test of Reasonableness**: *Courts apply the test of reasonableness to determine whether a classification is permissible under Article 14.* ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** Several landmark judgments have shaped the interpretation of **Article 14**: - **State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952)**: *The Supreme Court struck down a law that allowed certain cases to be tried by special courts without any reasonable classification, emphasizing that arbitrary selection violates Article 14.* - **E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974)**: *The Court held that equality is antithetical to arbitrariness, introducing the concept that arbitrariness violates Article 14.* - **Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)**: *This case expanded the interpretation of Article 14, stating that any law must be just, fair, and reasonable, and not arbitrary, to meet the requirements of Article 14.* - **Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018)**: *The Supreme Court decriminalized consensual homosexual acts, holding that Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code violated the right to equality under Article 14, as it was arbitrary and discriminatory.* ## **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** The interpretation of **Article 14** has led to the development of several doctrines: - **Doctrine of Reasonable Classification**: *This doctrine allows the state to classify individuals or groups for differential treatment, provided the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary.* - **Doctrine of Arbitrariness**: *Established in the E.P. Royappa case, this doctrine posits that arbitrariness is the antithesis of equality, and any arbitrary action by the state violates Article 14.* ## **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** The principle of **“Equality is the rule; unequal treatment is the exception”** underpins **Article 14**. This means that all persons are to be treated equally, and any deviation must be justified by reasonable classification. ## **AMENDMENTS / ADDITIONS / REPEALING** While **Article 14** itself has not been amended, its interpretation has evolved through judicial pronouncements, expanding its scope to address contemporary issues of equality and non-discrimination. ## **STATISTICAL ANALYSIS / DATA ANALYSIS** Statistical data often plays a crucial role in cases involving **Article 14**, especially in matters of affirmative action and reservations, to justify the need for differential treatment to achieve substantive equality. ## **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** **Article 14** has been lauded for promoting equality. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Equality Before Law](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-equality-before-law/) **Published:** December 26, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Equality Before Law, enshrined in Article 14 of the Indian Constitution, ensures that every individual is treated equally under the law, prohibiting discrimination and arbitrary actions by the state. This principle is fundamental for Indian law students to understand, as it forms the cornerstone of India's commitment to justice and fairness. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Equality Before Law**, enshrined in **Article 14 of the Indian Constitution**, ensures that every individual is treated equally under the law, prohibiting discrimination and arbitrary actions by the state. This principle is fundamental for Indian law students to understand, as it forms the cornerstone of India’s commitment to justice and fairness. ### **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** **Article 14 states**: *“The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”* This embodies two concepts: - **Equality Before Law**: A *negative concept* derived from **English law**, implying the absence of any special privileges in favor of individuals and the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law. It ensures that no person, regardless of status, is above the law. - **Equal Protection of Laws**: A *positive concept* borrowed from the **American Constitution**, requiring the state to provide equal treatment to individuals in similar circumstances. It permits **reasonable classification** but forbids **class legislation**. ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The principle of equality has deep roots in legal history. The **Magna Carta of 1215** laid the foundation by proclaiming that no individual would be denied justice. In India, the framers of the **Constitution** incorporated this doctrine to eliminate inequalities and promote **social justice**, drawing inspiration from various international legal systems. ### **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** For a classification to be considered **reasonable** under **Article 14**, it must satisfy two conditions: 1. **Intelligible Differentia**: The classification must distinguish persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group. 2. **Rational Nexus**: There must be a rational relation between the basis of classification and the objective sought to be achieved by the law. ### **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** **Article 14** applies to both **citizens** and **non-citizens** and covers all persons within the territory of India. It mandates that laws and state actions must not be **arbitrary** and should be based on **reasonable classification**. The judiciary has the power to review and strike down laws that violate this principle. ### **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** 1. **State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952)**: The **Supreme Court** held that a law providing special courts for certain offenses was unconstitutional as it violated **Article 14** by creating arbitrary classification. 2. **E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974)**: The Court introduced the concept that **equality is antithetical to arbitrariness**, stating that any arbitrary action by the state violates **Article 14**. 3. **Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)**: This **landmark judgment** expanded the interpretation of **Article 14**, asserting that any law must be *“right, just, and fair”* and not arbitrary, fanciful, or oppressive. 4. **Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018)**: The **Supreme Court** decriminalized consensual homosexual acts, holding that **Section 377 of the IPC** violated **Article 14** by being arbitrary and discriminatory. ### **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - **Doctrine of Reasonable Classification**: While **Article 14** prohibits class legislation, it allows for **reasonable classification**, provided it is not arbitrary and has a rational nexus with the objective of the law. - **Doctrine of Arbitrariness**: Any state action that is arbitrary can be challenged as violative of **Article 14**, as equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies. ### **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** - **“Equality is the rule; unequal treatment the exception”**: This principle underscores that any deviation from **equality** must be justified and reasonable. ### **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** In the **United States**, the **Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment** serves a similar purpose to India’s **Article 14**, aiming to prevent discriminatory laws. However, the interpretation and application differ based on judicial precedents and societal contexts. ### **EXCEPTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE** Certain provisions in the **Constitution** allow for exceptions to the rule of equality: - **Article 361**: Provides **immunity** to the **President and Governors** from legal proceedings during their term of office. - **Article 105**: Grants certain **privileges** to **Members of Parliament**, including freedom of speech within the house. ### **FUTURE IMPLICATIONS** The dynamic interpretation of **Article 14** continues to influence Indian jurisprudence, ensuring that laws evolve to meet the changing needs of society while upholding the fundamental principle of equality. ### **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** While **Article 14** has been instrumental in promoting **equality**, critics argue that the allowance for **reasonable classification** can sometimes lead to **judicial overreach** or inconsistency in judgments. Nonetheless, it remains a cornerstone of India’s commitment to justice. ### **REFERENCES** 1. **State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar**, AIR 1952 SC 75. 2. **E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu**, AIR 1974 SC 555. 3. **Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India**, AIR 1978 SC 597. 4. **Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India**, AIR 2018 SC 4321. 5. **Article 14 of the Indian Constitution with Important Case Laws** – LawBhoomi. 6. **14 Landmark Judgments on Article 14** – iPleaders. 7. **Equality before Law and Equal Protection of Law** – Drishti Judiciary. 8. **Article 14 of the Constitution of India and Important Case Laws** – LawBhoomi. 9. **Right to Equality**. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Reasonable Classification](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-reasonable-classification/) **Published:** December 26, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Reasonable Classification, rooted in Article 14 of the Indian Constitution, permits the State to create distinctions among individuals or groups, provided such classifications are reasonable, non-arbitrary, and serve a legitimate objectiv **Content:** The **Doctrine of Reasonable Classification**, rooted in **Article 14 of the Indian Constitution**, permits the State to create distinctions among individuals or groups, provided such classifications are **reasonable, non-arbitrary, and serve a legitimate objective**. ### **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** **Article 14** ensures **equality before the law** and **equal protection of the laws** within India’s territory. However, it does not prohibit **reasonable classification**, which allows the State to treat different groups distinctly to achieve specific legislative objectives. For a classification to be deemed reasonable, it must satisfy two conditions: 1. ***Intelligible Differentia***: The classification must be based on an **intelligible differentia** that distinguishes those grouped together from others left out of the group. 2. ***Rational Nexus***: This differentia must have a **rational relation** to the objective sought to be achieved by the legislation. This principle ensures that laws can address varying needs and circumstances without being **arbitrary** or **discriminatory**. ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The concept of **reasonable classification** has evolved through various **judicial pronouncements**. Initially, **Article 14** was interpreted strictly, prohibiting any form of classification. However, over time, the judiciary recognized the necessity of classification to address diverse societal needs, leading to the acceptance of **reasonable classification** as a means to achieve **substantive equality**. ### **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** For a classification to be constitutionally valid under **Article 14**, it must fulfill the following criteria: - ***Intelligible Differentia***: There must be a **clear and discernible basis** for distinguishing between groups or individuals. - ***Rational Nexus***: The basis of classification should be **logically connected** to the law’s intended objective. - ***Non-Arbitrariness***: The classification should not be **arbitrary** or based on unreasonable criteria. - ***Legitimate Objective***: The law should aim to achieve a **legitimate governmental or societal purpose**. These elements ensure that the classification serves a **meaningful purpose** and upholds the principles of **equality** and **justice**. ### **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** **Article 14** of the Indian Constitution is the cornerstone of the **doctrine of reasonable classification**. It states: *“The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”* This provision allows for **reasonable classification**, provided it meets the established criteria of **intelligible differentia** and **rational nexus**. ### **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** Several landmark judgments have shaped the understanding and application of the doctrine: 1. **State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952)**: The Supreme Court struck down a law that allowed certain cases to be tried by special courts without a clear basis for classification, deeming it violative of **Article 14**. 2. **Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar (1958)**: This case laid down comprehensive tests for **reasonable classification**, emphasizing that the classification must not be **arbitrary** and should have a **substantial relation** to the law’s objective. 3. **E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974)**: The Court expanded the interpretation of **Article 14**, stating that **equality** is antithetical to **arbitrariness**, and any arbitrary action would violate **Article 14**. 4. **Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)**: The Court held that any law affecting personal liberty must not be **arbitrary** and should pass the test of **reasonableness** under **Article 14**. 5. **D.S. Nakara & Others v. Union of India (1983)**: The Supreme Court ruled that a classification that excluded certain pensioners from benefits was **unconstitutional**, as it was not based on any **reasonable criteria**. ### **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - **Doctrine of Arbitrariness**: Established in the **E.P. Royappa case**, this doctrine posits that any **arbitrary action** by the State violates **Article 14**, as **equality and arbitrariness** are sworn enemies. - **Doctrine of Classification**: This doctrine allows the State to classify individuals or groups for legislative purposes, provided the classification is **reasonable** and not **arbitrary**. ### **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** - **“Like should be treated alike”**: This principle underpins the concept of **equality**, suggesting that individuals in similar situations should be treated similarly. - **“Equality before the law”**: This maxim signifies that no individual is above the law and everyone is subject to the **same laws** of the land. ### **AMENDMENTS / ADDITIONS / REPEALING** While **Article 14** has remained **unamended**, its interpretation has evolved through **judicial pronouncements**, expanding its scope to include the doctrines of **arbitrariness** and **reasonable classification**. ### **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** - ***Criticism***: The doctrine has been criticized for potential misuse, where **arbitrary classifications** might be justified under the guise of **reasonableness**. Additionally, the **subjective nature** of determining what constitutes ‘reasonable’ can lead to **inconsistent applications**. - ***Appreciation***: The doctrine allows for **flexibility in law-making**, enabling the State to address the **diverse needs** of society. It ensures that **equality** is **substantive**, not merely formal, by accommodating different societal contexts. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Non-Arbitrariness](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-non-arbitrariness/) **Published:** December 26, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Non-Arbitrariness is a fundamental principle in Indian constitutional law, ensuring that state actions are fair, reasonable, and free from arbitrary decisions. Rooted in Article 14 of the Indian Constitution, which guarantees the right to equality before the law and equal protection of the laws, this doctrine serves as a safeguard against discriminatory practices by the state. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Non-Arbitrariness** is a fundamental principle in Indian constitutional law, ensuring that state actions are fair, reasonable, and free from arbitrary decisions. Rooted in **Article 14 of the Indian Constitution**, which guarantees the right to equality before the law and equal protection of the laws, this doctrine serves as a safeguard against discriminatory practices by the state. ## **MEANING AND EXPLANATION** **Article 14** embodies two key concepts: **“equality before the law”** and **“equal protection of the laws.”** The former implies the absence of any special privileges in favor of individuals, while the latter requires that all individuals in similar circumstances be treated equally. The **Doctrine of Non-Arbitrariness** ensures that any state action, whether legislative or executive, does not violate these principles by being unreasonable or capricious. In the landmark case of ***E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu***, the Supreme Court emphasized that arbitrariness and equality are sworn enemies, stating that “where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of **Article 14.**“ ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION** Initially, **Article 14** was interpreted narrowly, focusing primarily on the **“reasonable classification” test.** This test permitted classification by the state, provided it was based on **intelligible differentia** and had a **rational nexus** with the objective sought to be achieved. However, over time, the judiciary recognized that mere classification could not justify all forms of state action. The emphasis shifted towards examining the reasonableness and fairness of such actions, leading to the development of the **Doctrine of Non-Arbitrariness.** This evolution was marked by several landmark judgments that expanded the scope of **Article 14** to include protection against arbitrary state actions. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS** - **Article 14 of the Indian Constitution**: This article guarantees that “the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.” It forms the constitutional basis for challenging arbitrary actions by the state. - **Reasonable Classification Test**: For a classification to be deemed reasonable under **Article 14**, it must: - Be based on an **intelligible differentia** that distinguishes those grouped together from others. - Have a **rational relation** to the objective sought to be achieved by the statute in question. This test was elaborated in the case of ***Ramkrishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar***, where the Supreme Court provided guidelines for determining the constitutionality of a statute concerning **Article 14.** - **Shift to Non-Arbitrariness**: In ***Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India***, the Supreme Court held that any procedure established by law must be **“right, just and fair”** and not arbitrary, fanciful, or oppressive. This case marked a significant shift from the traditional reasonable classification test to a broader interpretation that includes **non-arbitrariness** as a core component of **Article 14.** ## **KEY CASE LAWS AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE** 1. ***E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu***: - **Facts**: The petitioner, E.P. Royappa, challenged his transfer from the position of Chief Secretary to a less significant post, alleging it was arbitrary and violated **Article 14.** - **Issue**: Whether the transfer was arbitrary and violated the right to equality under **Article 14.** - **Held**: The Supreme Court held that arbitrariness is antithetical to equality. It stated that **“equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions,”** and any arbitrary action by the state is inherently unequal, thus violating **Article 14.** 2. ***Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India***: - **Facts**: Maneka Gandhi’s passport was impounded by the government without providing reasons, which she challenged as arbitrary and violative of her rights. - **Issue**: Whether the impounding of the passport without a fair procedure violated **Article 14.** - **Held**: The Supreme Court expanded the interpretation of **Article 21** to include the right to a fair procedure and held that any law or procedure must be **fair, just, and non-arbitrary.** This case reinforced the **Doctrine of Non-Arbitrariness** as integral to **Article 14.** 3. ***S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India***: - **Facts**: The petitioner challenged the seniority rules in the Income Tax Department, alleging they were arbitrary and violated **Article 14.** - **Issue**: Whether the seniority rules were arbitrary and violated the right to equality under **Article 14.** - **Held**: The Supreme Court emphasized that **the absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule of law** upon which our constitutional system is based. It held that any discretionary power must be exercised within a system of controls to prevent arbitrariness. ## **PRINCIPLES AND DOCTRINES RELATED TO NON-ARBITRARINESS** - **Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation**: This doctrine protects the expectations of individuals that have been legitimately created by the state through its representations or consistent past practices. In ***Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation***, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of **legitimate expectation** gets assimilated in the **rule of law** and operates in our legal system to prevent arbitrariness from the state. - **Principle of Reasonableness**: Reasonableness is a fundamental aspect of the **Doctrine of Non-Arbitrariness.** State actions must be **reasonable** and not arbitrary to satisfy the requirements of **Article 14.** **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-legitimate-expectation-3/) **Published:** December 26, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation ensures fairness in administrative actions, allowing individuals to anticipate consistent treatment based on established practices or explicit promises by public authorities. In India, this doctrine serves as a crucial check against arbitrary decisions, reinforcing the principles of natural justice and non-arbitrariness enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation** ensures fairness in administrative actions, allowing individuals to anticipate consistent treatment based on established practices or explicit promises by public authorities. In India, this doctrine serves as a crucial check against arbitrary decisions, reinforcing the principles of **natural justice** and **non-arbitrariness** enshrined in **Article 14 of the Constitution**. ## **MEANING AND EXPLANATION** *Legitimate expectation* arises when a public authority’s consistent conduct or explicit assurances lead an individual to reasonably anticipate a specific treatment or benefit. Although not a legal right, this expectation warrants consideration, and its neglect can render administrative actions arbitrary. The **Supreme Court of India**, in ***M.P. Oil Extraction and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors.***, emphasized that this doctrine operates within public law and, in suitable cases, constitutes a substantive and enforceable right. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION** The doctrine’s roots trace back to **English law**, notably in ***Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service*** (\[1985\] AC 374), where it was established that a decision by a public authority should not deprive an individual of a benefit without providing an opportunity to contest the grounds for its withdrawal. In India, the **Supreme Court** first acknowledged this doctrine in ***State of Kerala v. K.G. Madhavan Pillai*** ((1988) 4 SCC 669), where the government’s abrupt reversal of a sanction to open a new school was deemed a violation of legitimate expectation. ## **ESSENTIALS OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION** For an expectation to be deemed legitimate, certain criteria must be met: - ***Established Practice or Promise***: There must be a consistent practice or an explicit promise by the public authority. In ***Navjyoti Coop. Group Housing Society v. Union of India*** ((1992) 4 SCC 477), the **Supreme Court** held that a change in the criteria for land allotment without due notice violated the legitimate expectation of the housing societies. - ***Reasonableness***: The expectation should be reasonable and not based on unfounded assumptions. - ***Reliance***: The individual should have relied on the promise or established practice. - ***Non-contravention of Law***: The expectation must not conflict with statutory provisions or public policy. ## **TYPES OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS** 1. ***Procedural Legitimate Expectation***: This pertains to the anticipation of a fair procedure before a decision is made. For instance, if an individual expects a hearing before an adverse administrative decision, denying this could breach procedural legitimate expectation. 2. ***Substantive Legitimate Expectation***: This involves the expectation of a specific benefit or advantage. However, **Indian courts** have been cautious in recognizing substantive legitimate expectations, often requiring a clear demonstration of arbitrariness or abuse of power. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS** While the doctrine is not explicitly codified in Indian statutes, it aligns with the constitutional mandate against arbitrariness under **Article 14**. The **Supreme Court**, in ***Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors.*** ((1999) 4 SCC 727), clarified that the doctrine does not grant an absolute right but ensures that the decision-making process is fair, non-arbitrary, and follows the principles of **natural justice**. ## **EXCEPTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE** The doctrine is not absolute and has certain limitations: - ***Change in Policy***: Public authorities can alter policies in public interest, even if it overrides individual expectations. In ***Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation*** ((1993) 3 SCC 499), the **Supreme Court** held that the government could change its policy if the change is in the public interest and not arbitrary. - ***Contrary to Law***: An expectation conflicting with statutory provisions cannot be upheld. - ***Public Interest***: If upholding the expectation is detrimental to public interest, it may not be enforced. ## **DOCTRINE OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION VS. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL** While both doctrines aim to prevent unfairness, they differ: - ***Scope***: Promissory estoppel applies primarily in private law, preventing a party from going back on a promise when the other party has relied on it to their detriment. Legitimate expectation operates in public law, focusing on fairness in administrative actions. - ***Legal Right***: Promissory estoppel can create enforceable rights, whereas legitimate expectation ensures fair procedure rather than conferring substantive rights. ## **CASE LAWS ILLUSTRATING THE DOCTRINE** - ***State of Kerala v. K.G. Madhavan Pillai*** ((1988) 4 SCC 669): The government’s withdrawal of sanction to open a new school without proper reason was held to violate the legitimate expectation of the respondent. - ***Navjyoti Coop. Group Housing Society v. Union of India*** ((1992) 4 SCC 477): Changing the criteria for land allotment without notifying affected parties breached their legitimate expectation. - ***Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors.*** ((1999) 4 SCC 727): The **Court** emphasized that while legitimate expectation ensures fairness, it does not prevent authorities from changing policies if done fairly and in public interest. ## **GUIDELINES FOR APPLICATION** When invoking the doctrine, courts consider: - ***Clarity of the Promise or Practice***: The assurance must be clear and unambiguous. - ***Reasonableness of the Expectation***: The individual’s anticipation should be reasonable. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Proportionality](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-proportionality-2/) **Published:** December 26, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Proportionality ensures that administrative actions or legislative measures are appropriate, necessary, and not excessive concerning their intended objectives. In India, this doctrine plays a pivotal role in maintaining a balance between individual rights and state actions, ensuring that any restriction on fundamental rights is justified and minimal. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Proportionality** ensures that administrative actions or legislative measures are **appropriate, necessary, and not excessive** concerning their intended objectives. In India, this doctrine plays a pivotal role in maintaining a balance between **individual rights and state actions**, ensuring that any restriction on **fundamental rights** is justified and minimal. ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** The **Doctrine of Proportionality** mandates that any action by the state or its agencies should not be more restrictive than required to achieve the desired objective. This principle ensures that measures infringing upon **individual rights** are **justified, necessary, and the least intrusive means available**. In essence, the severity of the action must correspond appropriately to the importance of the objective pursued. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** Originating in 18th-century Prussia, the doctrine was later incorporated into **German administrative law** and subsequently adopted by various **European legal systems**. In India, the **Supreme Court** began applying this principle in the 1950s, particularly when assessing the constitutionality of **legislative actions** affecting fundamental freedoms under **Article 19(1)** of the Constitution. The landmark case of ***Om Kumar v. Union of India (2000)*** explicitly recognized the doctrine’s application in Indian administrative law. ## **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** The doctrine encompasses several key elements: - **Legitimate Aim**: The action must pursue a lawful and significant objective. - **Suitability**: The means adopted should be capable of achieving the intended aim. - **Necessity**: There should be no less restrictive alternative available to achieve the same objective. - **Balancing**: The benefits of the action must outweigh the harm caused to individual rights. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** In the Indian context, the doctrine is often invoked concerning **Articles 14, 19, and 21** of the Constitution: - **Article 14**: Ensures **equality before the law** and protection against arbitrary state actions. - **Article 19**: Guarantees **specific freedoms**, subject to reasonable restrictions. - **Article 21**: Protects the **right to life and personal liberty**, permitting deprivation only through a **procedure established by law**. ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** 1. ***Om Kumar v. Union of India (2000)***: This case marked a significant step in recognizing the doctrine in Indian administrative law. The Supreme Court held that the doctrine could be applied to test the validity of **administrative actions** affecting **fundamental freedoms**. 2. ***Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)***: The Supreme Court broadened the interpretation of **Article 21**, linking it with **Articles 14 and 19**. The Court emphasized that any law interfering with personal liberty must pass the test of **reasonableness and fairness**, implicitly including the principle of proportionality. 3. ***Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980)***: In the context of the **death penalty**, the Supreme Court applied the doctrine, stating that the punishment must not be excessive and should be **commensurate with the gravity of the offense**. 4. ***Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020)***: The Supreme Court examined the legality of **internet shutdowns** in Jammu and Kashmir, emphasizing that restrictions on **fundamental rights** must be **proportionate** to the intended objective. ## **COMPARISON WITH WEDNESBURY UNREASONABLENESS** The **Wednesbury principle**, originating from English law, permits judicial intervention only when a decision is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority would ever consider it. In contrast, the **Doctrine of Proportionality** allows courts to assess whether: - The action’s **objective is legitimate**. - The means chosen are **suitable and necessary**. - There exists a **balance between the adverse effects** on rights and the intended benefits. This distinction grants Indian courts a **broader scope** to evaluate administrative actions, especially when **fundamental rights** are at stake. ## **APPLICATION IN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ADJUDICATION** The doctrine is instrumental in cases where **state actions** impinge upon **fundamental rights**. Courts employ this principle to ensure that any restriction is **justified, necessary, and proportionate** to the aim pursued. This approach prevents **arbitrary or excessive limitations** on individual freedoms. ## **INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE** Globally, the doctrine is a cornerstone in constitutional adjudication: - **Germany**: Deeply embedded in **administrative law**, ensuring state actions are proportionate. - **European Union**: Applied by the **European Court of Human Rights** to assess the validity of state measures affecting human rights. - **United Kingdom**: While traditionally adhering to the **Wednesbury principle**, UK courts have increasingly recognized proportionality, especially under the **Human Rights Act 1998**. ## **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** *Criticism*: - **Subjectivity**: Determining what is ‘proportionate’ can be **subjective**, leading to inconsistent judgments. - **Judicial Overreach**: Excessive reliance on the doctrine may result in the **judiciary encroaching upon executive or legislative functions**. *Appreciation*: - **Rights Protection**: Ensures that **individual rights** are not unduly compromised by state actions. - **Balanced Governance**: Promotes a harmonious **balance between state objectives and individual freedoms**. ## **FUTURE IMPLICATIONS** The evolving application of the **Doctrine of Proportionality** in India signifies a commitment to upholding **constitutional freedoms**. As jurisprudence develops, this doctrine is poised to play an increasingly central role in ensuring that state actions remain **just, fair, and proportionate**, thereby strengthening the framework of **Indian constitutional law**. --- **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Wednesbury Unreasonableness](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-wednesbury-unreasonableness/) **Published:** December 26, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Wednesbury Unreasonableness is a pivotal principle in administrative law, guiding judicial review of administrative decisions. It ensures that authorities exercise their discretion within reasonable bounds, preventing arbitrary or irrational decisions. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Wednesbury Unreasonableness** is a pivotal principle in administrative law, guiding judicial review of administrative decisions. It ensures that authorities exercise their discretion within reasonable bounds, preventing arbitrary or irrational decisions. ### **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** *Wednesbury Unreasonableness* refers to a legal standard used by courts to assess whether a public authority’s decision is so irrational that no reasonable person acting reasonably could have made it. This principle emerged from the UK case ***Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation***, where the court held that it could intervene only if a decision was “so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it.” ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The doctrine originated from the 1948 UK Court of Appeal decision in ***Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation***. In this case, a cinema challenged a local authority’s condition restricting children’s attendance on Sundays. The court established that judicial intervention is warranted only when a decision is irrational beyond reasonable justification. This principle has since been integral to administrative law, influencing judicial review standards in various jurisdictions, including India. ### **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** The Wednesbury test involves assessing whether: - The authority considered **irrelevant factors**. - The authority failed to consider **relevant factors**. - The decision is **so unreasonable** that no reasonable authority would have made it. These criteria help determine if a decision falls within the bounds of **reasonableness**. ### **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** In India, the doctrine aligns with **Article 14 of the Constitution**, ensuring equality before the law and protection against arbitrary state actions. Courts apply this principle to scrutinize administrative decisions, ensuring they are free from arbitrariness and adhere to principles of **natural justice**. ### **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS** - ***Om Kumar v. Union of India*** (2000): The Supreme Court acknowledged the applicability of the **proportionality doctrine** in administrative decisions affecting fundamental freedoms, indicating a shift towards a more nuanced review standard. - ***Union of India v. G. Ganayutham*** (1997): The Court reiterated that **Wednesbury Unreasonableness** applies to administrative decisions, emphasizing that courts should not interfere unless a decision is perverse or irrational. ### **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** The **Doctrine of Proportionality** has gained prominence, especially in cases involving fundamental rights. It requires that administrative measures must not be excessive and should be appropriate to achieve the intended objective. This doctrine offers a more structured approach compared to **Wednesbury Unreasonableness**, allowing for a deeper inquiry into the balance between means and ends. ### **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** While the **Wednesbury principle** originated in the UK, its application varies globally. Many jurisdictions have adopted the **Doctrine of Proportionality**, especially in human rights cases, providing a more rigorous standard of review. In India, both doctrines are employed, with proportionality gaining traction in matters concerning **fundamental rights**. ### **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** Critics argue that **Wednesbury Unreasonableness** sets a high threshold for judicial intervention, potentially allowing unjust decisions to stand. The emergence of the **proportionality doctrine** addresses this concern by enabling a more detailed examination of administrative actions. Nonetheless, **Wednesbury** remains a fundamental principle, ensuring judicial restraint and respect for administrative discretion. ### **FUTURE IMPLICATIONS** The trend towards adopting the **Doctrine of Proportionality** suggests a move towards more intensive judicial review, especially in cases involving **fundamental rights**. This evolution reflects a commitment to ensuring that administrative decisions are not only reasonable but also just and equitable. ### **CONCLUSION** Understanding the **Doctrine of Wednesbury Unreasonableness** is essential for law students, as it forms the foundation of judicial review in administrative law. Its interplay with the **Doctrine of Proportionality** highlights the dynamic nature of legal standards in ensuring fair and reasonable administrative actions. ### **REFERENCES** 1. ***Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation***, \[1948\] 1 KB 223. 2. ***Om Kumar v. Union of India***, AIR 2000 SC 3689. 3. ***Union of India v. G. Ganayutham***, (1997) 7 SCC 463. 4. ***Delhi Science Forum v. Union of India***, AIR 1996 SC 1356. 5. ***Coimbatore District Central Coop. Bank v. Employees Assn.***, (2007) 4 SCC 669. 6. ***Tata Cellular v. Union of India***, (1994) 6 SCC 651. 7. ***Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Western Geco International Ltd.***, (2014) 9 SCC 263. 8. ***State of Rajasthan v. Mohd. Ayub Naz***, (2006) 1 SCC 589. 9. ***New Horizons Ltd. v. Union of India***, (1995) 1 SCC 478. 10. ***Delhi Science Forum v. Union of India***, (1996) 2 SCC 405. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Margin of Appreciation](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-margin-of-appreciation/) **Published:** December 26, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Margin of Appreciation is a pivotal principle in international human rights law, particularly within the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). It grants national authorities a degree of discretion in fulfilling their obligations under human rights conventions, balancing universal human rights standards with national sovereignty and cultural diversity **Content:** The **Doctrine of Margin of Appreciation** is a pivotal principle in international human rights law, particularly within the **European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)**. It grants national authorities a degree of discretion in fulfilling their obligations under human rights conventions, balancing universal human rights standards with national sovereignty and cultural diversity. ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** The **Margin of Appreciation** refers to the leeway national governments possess in interpreting and applying human rights provisions. This doctrine acknowledges that national authorities are often better positioned to assess and respond to local needs, cultural nuances, and societal values. It allows for a balance between **international human rights obligations** and **domestic discretion**, ensuring that states can implement rights in a manner consistent with their unique contexts. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The doctrine emerged from the jurisprudence of the **ECtHR** in the 1950s. It was first articulated in the case of ***Handyside v. United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737***, where the Court recognized that national authorities are in a better position to assess the necessity of certain restrictions within their jurisdiction. Over time, the doctrine has been refined and applied in various cases, becoming a cornerstone of the Court’s approach to balancing state sovereignty with the protection of human rights. ## **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** While the **Margin of Appreciation** is predominantly associated with the **ECtHR**, similar concepts exist elsewhere. In the **United Kingdom**, for instance, courts may exercise judicial deference, acknowledging the discretionary area of judgment afforded to public authorities. In **India**, the judiciary employs the **Doctrine of Proportionality**, which serves a comparable function by ensuring that administrative actions do not infringe upon **fundamental rights** more than necessary. ## **RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER CONCEPTS** The **Doctrine of Margin of Appreciation** is closely related to the principles of **subsidiarity** and **proportionality**. Subsidiarity emphasizes that decisions should be made at the most immediate level consistent with their resolution, while proportionality ensures that measures taken are appropriate and not excessive concerning the pursued objective. Together, these doctrines strive to balance **individual rights** with **collective interests**, allowing for national discretion within the framework of international human rights obligations. ## **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** The application of the **Margin of Appreciation** involves several key elements: - **Legitimate Aim**: The state’s action must pursue a legitimate objective, such as **national security**, **public safety**, or the **protection of morals**. - **Necessity**: The measure should be necessary in a democratic society, addressing a pressing social need. - **Proportionality**: There must be a reasonable relationship between the means employed and the intended aim. - **European Consensus**: The existence or absence of a consensus among European states on the issue can influence the breadth of the margin allowed. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** Although the **European Convention on Human Rights** does not explicitly mention the **Margin of Appreciation**, it has been developed through the Court’s jurisprudence. The doctrine is applied on a case-by-case basis, considering factors such as the **right in question**, the **context of the interference**, and the presence of a **European consensus**. The Court assesses whether national authorities have remained within their discretion or have overstepped, leading to a potential violation of the Convention. ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS** 1. **Handyside v. United Kingdom** *(1976) 1 EHRR 737*: This case involved the confiscation of a book deemed obscene by UK authorities. The **ECtHR** upheld the state’s actions, emphasizing that national authorities have a **margin of appreciation** in matters concerning public morals. 2. **Sunday Times v. United Kingdom** *(1979) 2 EHRR 245*: The Court recognized the **margin of appreciation** concerning restrictions on **freedom of expression**, balancing it against the need to maintain the authority of the judiciary. 3. **Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria** *(1994) 19 EHRR 34*: In this case, the seizure of a film considered offensive to religious beliefs was contested. The Court allowed a wide **margin of appreciation**, acknowledging the state’s role in protecting religious sensibilities. ## **INTERPRETATIONS / EXPLANATIONS** The **Margin of Appreciation** is not a carte blanche for states to limit rights arbitrarily. The **ECtHR** maintains supervisory jurisdiction to ensure that restrictions are not disproportionate or unnecessary. The doctrine serves to respect national differences while upholding the fundamental principles of the Convention. ## **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** The **Doctrine of Margin of Appreciation** aligns with the principle of **judicial deference**, where international courts recognize the primary role of national authorities in certain domains. It also intersects with the **Living Instrument doctrine**, which interprets the Convention as a dynamic document that adapts to evolving societal standards. ## **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** The application of the **Margin of Appreciation** reflects the maxim **“In dubio pro libertate”** (*When in doubt, for freedom*), as it seeks to balance state intervention with individual freedoms. However, it also embodies **“In dubio pro auctoritate”** (*When in doubt, for authority*) when deference to national authorities is deemed appropriate. ## **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** The doctrine has faced criticism for potentially allowing states to justify **human rights infringements** under the guise of national discretion. Critics argue that it can lead to inconsistent application and undermine the **universality of human rights**. Conversely, proponents appreciate its role in accommodating **cultural diversity** and **national sovereignty** within the human rights framework. ## **APPLICATION IN INDIAN CONTEXT** While the **Margin of Appreciation** is specific to the **ECtHR**, Indian courts have employed similar principles through the **Doctrine of Proportionality**. This doctrine ensures that any restriction on **fundamental rights** by the state is proportionate to the need it addresses. For instance, in ***Modern Dental College and Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2016) 7 SCC 353***, the **Supreme Court** applied the proportionality test to assess the validity of regulations on private educational institutions. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Subsidiarity](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-subsidiarity/) **Published:** December 26, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Subsidiarity is a principle in governance that advocates for decisions to be made at the most immediate or local level capable of addressing matters effectively. It posits that higher authorities should intervene only when issues cannot be resolved by lower tiers. **Content:** ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** The **Doctrine of Subsidiarity** is a principle in governance that advocates for decisions to be made at the most immediate or local level capable of addressing matters effectively. It posits that higher authorities should intervene only when issues cannot be resolved by lower tiers. This approach ensures that governance remains close to the people, promoting **efficiency, accountability, and responsiveness**. In the Indian context, this doctrine underscores the importance of empowering local self-governments, such as **Panchayats and Municipalities**, to handle local affairs, thereby enhancing **democratic participation and administrative efficiency**. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The concept of **subsidiarity** has roots in **Catholic social teaching**, particularly articulated in **Pope Pius XI’s 1931 encyclical “Quadragesimo Anno”**, which emphasized that higher-order societies should not interfere with the functions of lower-order societies unless necessary. In India, the principle found resonance with the decentralization efforts post-independence, culminating in the **73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments** in 1992. These amendments institutionalized **Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs)** and **Urban Local Bodies (ULBs)**, respectively, embedding the essence of subsidiarity by devolving powers and responsibilities to local governments. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** The **73rd and 74th Amendments** introduced **Part IX and IX-A** to the Indian Constitution, detailing the structure, powers, and functions of PRIs and ULBs. Key provisions include: - **Article 243G**: Empowers **Panchayats** to function as institutions of self-government and authorizes them to prepare and implement plans for **economic development** and **social justice** concerning matters listed in the **Eleventh Schedule**. - **Article 243W**: Grants similar powers to **Municipalities** concerning matters in the **Twelfth Schedule**. - **Eleventh Schedule**: Enumerates 29 subjects, including **agriculture, education, and health**, under the purview of **Panchayats**. - **Twelfth Schedule**: Lists 18 subjects, such as **urban planning and public health**, for **Municipalities**. These provisions aim to operationalize the **subsidiarity principle** by assigning specific functions to local bodies, ensuring that matters best handled locally are entrusted to them. ## **GUIDELINES / RULES / REGULATIONS / NOTIFICATIONS / CIRCULARS** To operationalize the **subsidiarity principle**, both the central and state governments have issued various guidelines and regulations: - **State Panchayati Raj Acts**: Each state has enacted legislation detailing the powers, functions, and responsibilities of **Panchayats**, aligning with the constitutional mandate. - **Municipal Acts**: Similar statutes exist for **Urban Local Bodies**, specifying their roles and duties. - **Finance Commission Recommendations**: Both central and state **Finance Commissions** provide guidelines on the financial devolution to local bodies, ensuring they have adequate resources to perform their functions effectively. These instruments collectively facilitate the practical application of the **subsidiarity principle** in India’s federal structure. ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** Several judicial pronouncements have reinforced the **doctrine of subsidiarity** in India: - **Union of India v. R. Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association, (2010) 11 SCC 1**: The **Supreme Court** emphasized the importance of decentralization and the role of specialized tribunals, underscoring that matters should be addressed at the most appropriate level of governance. - **State of U.P. v. Pradhan Sangh Kshettra Samiti, (1995) Supp (2) SCC 305**: The Court highlighted the significance of empowering local bodies, stating that true democracy can only be achieved through **decentralization** and **local self-governance**. These judgments affirm the constitutional mandate of **subsidiarity**, promoting **local governance** and participatory democracy. ## **INTERPRETATIONS / EXPLANATIONS** The **subsidiarity principle** in India is interpreted as a means to: - **Enhance Democratic Participation**: By bringing governance closer to the people, it encourages active citizen involvement in decision-making processes. - **Improve Administrative Efficiency**: Local bodies are better positioned to understand and address local issues promptly and effectively. - **Ensure Accountability**: Proximity to the electorate makes local authorities more accountable for their actions and decisions. These interpretations align with the objectives of the **73rd and 74th Amendments**, aiming to strengthen grassroots democracy in India. ## **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** The **Doctrine of Subsidiarity** complements other constitutional doctrines, such as: - **Doctrine of Separation of Powers**: While this doctrine separates the functions of the executive, legislature, and judiciary, **subsidiarity** focuses on the distribution of powers within the executive branch, advocating for decentralization to local authorities. - **Doctrine of Federalism**: **Subsidiarity** reinforces federal principles by promoting autonomy and decision-making at sub-national levels, ensuring a balance between **centralization** and **decentralization**. These doctrines collectively contribute to a balanced and efficient governance framework in India. ## **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** The principle of **subsidiarity** aligns with the Latin maxim **“Proximus sum egomet mihi,”** meaning “I am closest to myself,” emphasizing that matters should be handled by the smallest, lowest, or least centralized competent authority. ## **AMENDMENTS / ADDITIONS / REPEALING** The **73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments** were pivotal in embedding the **subsidiarity principle** in India’s governance structure. These amendments added **Parts IX and IX-A** to the Constitution, along with the **Eleventh and Twelfth Schedules**, detailing the powers and responsibilities of local bodies. These changes marked a significant shift towards **decentralized governance**, empowering local institutions to function as self-governing entities. ## **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** While the **subsidiarity principle** has been lauded for promoting **local governance**, certain criticisms have emerged: - **Capacity Constraints**: Local bodies often face challenges due to **limited administrative and financial capacities**, hindering effective service delivery. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Federal Supremacy](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-federal-supremacy/) **Published:** December 26, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Federal Supremacy ensures that in conflicts between Union and State laws, the Union law prevails, maintaining constitutional balance. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Federal Supremacy** ensures that in conflicts between Union and State laws, the Union law prevails, maintaining constitutional balance. ### **MEANING AND EXPLANATION** In India’s quasi-federal structure, both Union and State governments derive authority from the Constitution. The **Doctrine of Federal Supremacy** addresses conflicts between Union and State laws, ensuring national coherence. **Article 246** of the Constitution delineates legislative powers through three lists in the **Seventh Schedule**: - **Union List**: Subjects exclusively for Parliament, such as **defense** and **foreign affairs**. - **State List**: Subjects for State Legislatures, like **police** and **public health**. - **Concurrent List**: Subjects where both can legislate, including **criminal law** and **marriage**. In Concurrent List conflicts, **Article 254** stipulates that **Union law prevails unless the State law**, having received **Presidential assent**, overrides the Union law within that state. However, **Parliament** can supersede such State laws by enacting new legislation. ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND** The **Government of India Act, 1935**, introduced a federal structure with separate legislative lists, influencing the current constitutional framework. Post-independence, the framers adopted this model, embedding the supremacy of Union laws to maintain national unity. ### **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** In the **United States**, the **Supremacy Clause (Article VI)** establishes **federal law** as the supreme law, overriding state laws. Similarly, in **Canada**, **federal laws prevail** in conflicts with provincial laws. India’s model aligns with these systems but incorporates unique features to address its specific socio-political context. ### **LEGAL PROVISIONS AND PROCEDURES** - **Article 246**: Allocates legislative subjects between Union and States. - **Article 254**: Addresses inconsistencies between Union and State laws on Concurrent List subjects, granting precedence to Union laws. - **Seventh Schedule**: Details the Union, State, and Concurrent Lists, specifying subjects under each jurisdiction. ### **CASE LAWS AND PRECEDENTS** - **State of West Bengal v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1241**: The Supreme Court held that the legislative and executive powers of States are subject to the Union’s supreme powers, emphasizing the Constitution’s centralized nature. - **Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 1019**: The Court clarified that in cases of **repugnancy** between Union and State laws on Concurrent List subjects, Union law prevails unless the State law has received **Presidential assent**. - **S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918**: This case reinforced the principles of **federalism** and the conditions under which State governments can be dismissed, underscoring the balance between Union and State powers. ### **DOCTRINES AND PRINCIPLES** - **Doctrine of Pith and Substance**: Determines the true nature of legislation to ascertain under which list it falls, used when a law’s subject matter is disputed. - **Doctrine of Colorable Legislation**: Prevents legislatures from enacting laws that, while appearing to be within their jurisdiction, in reality, encroach upon the domain of another legislature. ### **MAXIMS** - **Lex superior derogat legi inferiori**: A higher law overrides a lower one; in this context, **Union laws supersede State laws** in case of conflict. ### **AMENDMENTS AND ADDITIONS** The **42nd Amendment Act of 1976** transferred five subjects from the State List to the Concurrent List, enhancing Union authority in certain areas. These subjects include **education**, **forests**, and **administration of justice**. ### **CRITICISM AND APPRECIATION** While the **Doctrine of Federal Supremacy** ensures national unity and legal uniformity, critics argue it may undermine **State autonomy**. However, proponents assert that it is essential for maintaining the integrity and sovereignty of the nation, preventing legal chaos and ensuring cohesive governance. ### **FLOWCHART: RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT BETWEEN UNION AND STATE LAWS** ```mermaid graph TDA[Conflict Between Union and State Law] --> B{Subject Matter}B -->|Union List| C[Union Law Prevails]B -->|State List| D[State Law Prevails]B -->|Concurrent List| E{Consistency Check}E -->|Consistent| F[Both Laws Operate]E -->|Inconsistent| G[Union Law Prevails]G -->|State Law with Presidential Assent| H[State Law Prevails in that State]H --> I[Parliament May Override by New Law] ``` ### **TABLE: COMPARISON OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS** **Aspect****Union Government****State Government****Exclusive Powers****Defense**, **Foreign Affairs**, **Atomic Energy****Police**, **Public Health**, **Agriculture****Concurrent Powers****Criminal Law**, **Marriage**, **Bankruptcy****Criminal Law**, **Marriage**, **Bankruptcy****Residuary Powers**Vested in **Parliament**None**Conflict Resolution****Union law prevails**; State law may prevail with **Presidential assent** in specific cases**State law prevails** in State List matters; subject to Union supremacy in conflicts### **CONCLUSION** The **Doctrine of Federal Supremacy** is pivotal in India’s constitutional framework, ensuring a harmonious balance between Union and State legislations. It upholds the supremacy of Union laws in conflicts, maintaining national integrity while respecting the federal structure. Understanding this doctrine is essential for comprehending the legislative dynamics and the interplay of powers within the Indian legal system. ### **REFERENCES** 1. **State of West Bengal v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1241**. 2. **Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 1019**. 3. **S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918**. 4. Constitution of India, **Articles 246 and 254**. 5. The Constitution (**Forty-Second Amendment**) Act, 1976. 6. “Principle of Federal Supremacy in India,” Leverage Edu. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Implied Limitations](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-implied-limitations/) **Published:** December 26, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Implied Limitations asserts that certain fundamental aspects of a constitution cannot be altered or destroyed through amendments, even if the constitution does not explicitly prohibit such changes. In India, this doctrine has been pivotal in preserving the core principles of the Constitution, ensuring that amendments do not undermine its foundational structure. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Implied Limitations** asserts that certain fundamental aspects of a constitution cannot be altered or destroyed through amendments, even if the constitution does not explicitly prohibit such changes. In India, this doctrine has been pivotal in preserving the core principles of the Constitution, ensuring that amendments do not undermine its foundational structure. ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** The **Doctrine of Implied Limitations** posits that while a constitution may grant the legislature the power to amend its provisions, this power is inherently limited. Certain essential features—such as the **rule of law**, **separation of powers**, and **fundamental rights**—are so integral to the constitution’s identity that they cannot be abrogated or altered. This ensures the preservation of the constitution’s core philosophy and prevents the erosion of its foundational principles. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The evolution of this doctrine in India is closely linked to the **Basic Structure Doctrine**. The concept of **implied limitations** gained prominence through judicial interpretations, particularly in landmark cases that examined the extent of Parliament’s amending powers. The journey of this doctrine from the theory of implied limitations to its current form has been instrumental in maintaining the thicker concept of the **rule of law**, without which the constitution would be but a dead letter law. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** **Article 368** of the Indian Constitution grants Parliament the power to amend the Constitution. However, the scope of this power has been interpreted by the judiciary to exclude amendments that would alter the Constitution’s **basic structure**. This interpretation serves as an **implied limitation** on Parliament’s amending authority, ensuring that the Constitution’s fundamental principles remain inviolable. ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** 1. **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)**: This landmark case established the **Basic Structure Doctrine**, asserting that while Parliament has wide powers to amend the Constitution, it cannot alter its basic structure. The Court held that certain fundamental features, such as the **supremacy of the Constitution**, **republican and democratic form of government**, **secularism**, **separation of powers**, and **federalism**, are beyond the amending power of Parliament. 2. **Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975)**: The Supreme Court applied the **Basic Structure Doctrine** to invalidate Clause 4 of the **39th Amendment**, which sought to place the election of the Prime Minister beyond judicial scrutiny. The Court held that such an amendment violated the principle of **free and fair elections**, a fundamental feature of the Constitution. 3. **Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980)**: The Court struck down clauses of the **42nd Amendment** that sought to exclude **judicial review** of constitutional amendments, reaffirming that **judicial review** is a basic feature of the Constitution. 4. **I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007)**: The Supreme Court held that laws placed under the **Ninth Schedule** after April 24, 1973, are subject to **judicial review** if they violate the **basic structure** of the Constitution, emphasizing that even constitutional amendments are subject to **implied limitations**. ## **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - **Basic Structure Doctrine**: Asserts that certain fundamental features of the Constitution cannot be altered by amendments. This doctrine is a manifestation of the **Doctrine of Implied Limitations**, ensuring the preservation of the Constitution’s core principles. ## **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** - **“Salus populi suprema lex”**: The welfare of the people is the supreme law. This principle underscores the rationale behind **implied limitations**, ensuring that amendments do not harm the **fundamental rights** and **freedoms** of the populace. ## **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** While the **Doctrine of Implied Limitations** has been lauded for protecting the Constitution’s core values, it has also faced criticism. Some scholars argue that it represents **judicial overreach**, allowing unelected judges to override the will of the legislature. Others contend that it is essential for maintaining **constitutional sanctity** and preventing **authoritarianism**. ## **CONCLUSION** The **Doctrine of Implied Limitations** serves as a crucial safeguard in Indian constitutional law, ensuring that the Constitution’s fundamental principles remain intact. Through judicial interpretations and landmark judgments, this doctrine has reinforced the inviolability of the Constitution’s **basic structure**, balancing the need for constitutional adaptability with the preservation of its core values. ## **REFERENCES** 1. **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala**, (1973) 4 SCC 225. 2. **Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain**, 1975 Supp SCC 1. 3. **Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India**, (1980) 3 SCC 625. 4. **I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu**, (2007) 2 SCC 1. 5. “Vicissitudes and Limitations of the Doctrine of Basic Structure,” **Indian Law Institute**. 6. “Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala,” **Wikipedia**. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Basic Features](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-basic-features/) **Published:** December 26, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Basic Structure is a judicial principle in Indian constitutional law that ensures certain fundamental features of the Constitution remain unaltered, even by parliamentary amendments. This doctrine maintains the Constitution's core principles, safeguarding its integrity against potential legislative overreach **Content:** The Doctrine of Basic Structure is a judicial principle in Indian constitutional law that ensures certain fundamental features of the Constitution remain unaltered, even by parliamentary amendments. This doctrine maintains the Constitution’s core principles, safeguarding its integrity against potential legislative overreach. ### **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** The Doctrine of Basic Structure posits that while Parliament holds the authority to amend the Constitution under **Article 368**, it cannot alter or destroy its **essential features**. This ensures the Constitution’s foundational principles remain intact, preserving its original spirit. The Supreme Court introduced this doctrine in the landmark case of ***Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala***, **AIR 1973 SC 1461**, establishing that amendments should not distort the Constitution’s basic structure. ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The evolution of this doctrine is marked by several pivotal cases: - ***Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (1951):*** The Supreme Court upheld Parliament’s power to amend any part of the Constitution, including **Fundamental Rights**, under **Article 368**. - ***Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1965):*** The Court reaffirmed its stance from *Shankari Prasad*, allowing amendments to **Fundamental Rights**. - ***Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967):*** Reversing its earlier position, the Court ruled that Parliament could not amend **Fundamental Rights**, granting them a “transcendental position.” - ***Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973):*** This landmark judgment introduced the **Basic Structure Doctrine**, asserting that while Parliament can amend the Constitution, it cannot alter its **fundamental framework**. - ***Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975):*** The Court applied the doctrine to strike down clauses of the **39th Amendment**, which sought to place the Prime Minister’s election beyond judicial scrutiny. - ***Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980):*** The Court reaffirmed the doctrine, invalidating sections of the **42nd Amendment** that granted unlimited amending power to Parliament, emphasizing that such power cannot destroy the Constitution’s basic structure. ### **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** While the Supreme Court has not exhaustively defined the **basic structure**, it has identified several key elements: - **Supremacy of the Constitution:** The Constitution stands as the ultimate legal authority. - **Republican and Democratic Form of Government:** India’s governance is based on **democratic principles**. - **Secular Character of the Constitution:** The state maintains neutrality in religious matters. - **Separation of Powers:** Distinct functions and powers are allocated to the **Executive, Legislature, and Judiciary**. - **Federal Character of the Constitution:** A clear division of powers exists between the central and state governments. - **Unity and Integrity of the Nation:** The nation’s **indivisibility** is paramount. - **Sovereignty of India:** India’s **independence and self-governance** are fundamental. ### **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** **Article 368** of the Indian Constitution grants Parliament the power to amend the Constitution. However, the **Basic Structure Doctrine** imposes implicit limitations on this power, ensuring that amendments do not alter the Constitution’s **fundamental framework**. This judicially crafted doctrine serves as a safeguard against potential misuse of the amending power, maintaining the Constitution’s core principles. ### **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** - ***Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973):*** The petitioner, Kesavananda Bharati, challenged the Kerala government’s attempts to acquire the Mutt’s property under the **Kerala Land Reforms Act**. The Supreme Court held that while Parliament has wide powers to amend the Constitution, it cannot alter its **basic structure**. - ***Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975):*** Following the **1971 general elections**, Raj Narain challenged Indira Gandhi’s election, alleging electoral malpractices. During the proceedings, the **39th Amendment** was enacted, placing the Prime Minister’s election beyond judicial review. The Supreme Court struck down this provision, applying the **Basic Structure Doctrine** to uphold the principle of **free and fair elections**. - ***Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980):*** Minerva Mills challenged the constitutionality of certain sections of the **42nd Amendment**, which sought to give precedence to the **Directive Principles** over **Fundamental Rights**. The Supreme Court held that the amendment violated the **Basic Structure** by distorting the balance between **Fundamental Rights** and **Directive Principles**, thus reaffirming the doctrine. ### **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** The **Basic Structure Doctrine** is a judicial innovation that emerged to protect the core principles of the Constitution from arbitrary amendments. This doctrine, developed by the Indian judiciary, establishes certain principles as immutable, forming the bedrock of the Constitution. ### **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** The doctrine embodies the principle of **constitutional supremacy**, ensuring that the Constitution’s **core values** are preserved against potential legislative encroachments. It upholds the idea that while the Constitution is a living document, its **foundational principles** must remain inviolable. ### **AMENDMENTS / ADDITIONS / REPEALING** The **42nd Amendment** attempted to curtail judicial review and expand Parliament’s amending power, challenging the **Basic Structure Doctrine**. However, the Supreme Court, in the ***Minerva Mills case***, struck down these provisions, reinforcing the doctrine’s authority. ### **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** The **Basic Structure Doctrine** has been both lauded and criticized: - **Appreciation:** It acts as a safeguard against potential misuse of parliamentary power, ensuring that amendments do not alter the Constitution’s **fundamental essence**. This doctrine upholds the **supremacy of the Constitution** and maintains the balance between **flexibility** and **rigidity**, allowing controlled changes. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Essential Features](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-essential-features/) **Published:** December 26, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Doctrine of Essential Features, commonly known as the Basic Structure Doctrine, is a pivotal principle in Indian constitutional law. It asserts that certain fundamental aspects of the Constitution are so integral that even Parliament cannot amend them. This doctrine ensures the preservation of the Constitution's core ideals, safeguarding the democratic framework and preventing potential legislative overreach. **Content:** The **Doctrine of Essential Features**, commonly known as the **Basic Structure Doctrine**, is a pivotal principle in Indian constitutional law. It asserts that certain fundamental aspects of the Constitution are so integral that even Parliament cannot amend them. This doctrine ensures the preservation of the Constitution’s core ideals, safeguarding the democratic framework and preventing potential legislative overreach. ### **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** The **Basic Structure Doctrine** posits that while Parliament holds the authority to amend the Constitution under **Article 368**, this power is not absolute. Amendments that alter or destroy the Constitution’s **‘basic structure’** are deemed unconstitutional. The **Supreme Court of India** introduced this doctrine in the landmark case of **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala**, **AIR 1973 SC 1461**. In this case, the Court ruled that Parliament could amend any part of the Constitution as long as such amendments did not alter its fundamental framework. Justice **H.R. Khanna** emphasized that the Constitution’s basic structure rests on the dignity and freedom of its citizens, which cannot be destroyed by any legislation. ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The evolution of the **Basic Structure Doctrine** can be traced through several landmark judgments: - **Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (1951)**: The **Supreme Court** upheld the **First Amendment**, stating that Parliament’s amending power under **Article 368** included the authority to amend **Fundamental Rights**. - **Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1965)**: The Court reaffirmed its stance from **Shankari Prasad**, allowing amendments to **Fundamental Rights**. However, Justice **J.R. Mudholkar**, in his dissent, hinted at the concept of inherent limitations on Parliament’s amending power, suggesting that the Constitution’s basic features might be beyond amendment. - **Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967)**: Reversing its earlier decisions, the **Supreme Court** held that Parliament could not amend **Fundamental Rights**, granting them a “transcendental position.” This decision led to significant debates and the eventual formulation of the **Basic Structure Doctrine**. - **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)**: This landmark judgment introduced the **Basic Structure Doctrine**, asserting that while Parliament has wide powers to amend the Constitution, it cannot alter its basic structure. The Court identified several fundamental features, including the **supremacy of the Constitution**, **republican and democratic forms of government**, **secularism**, **separation of powers**, and **federalism**. - **Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975)**: The **Supreme Court** applied the **Basic Structure Doctrine** to strike down clauses of the **39th Amendment**, which sought to place the elections of the **Prime Minister** and **Speaker** beyond judicial scrutiny. The Court emphasized that such amendments violated the principles of **free and fair elections**, a core component of the Constitution’s basic structure. - **Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980)**: The Court reaffirmed the **Basic Structure Doctrine**, striking down clauses of the **42nd Amendment** that sought to curtail **judicial review** and granted unlimited amending power to Parliament. The judgment underscored that a limited amending power is itself a basic feature of the Constitution. ### **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS OF THE BASIC STRUCTURE** While the **Supreme Court** has not provided an exhaustive list of the Constitution’s basic features, several elements have been recognized through various judgments: - **Supremacy of the Constitution**: The Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and all laws and amendments must conform to its provisions. - **Rule of Law**: Every individual and institution is subject to the law, ensuring equality before the law. - **Separation of Powers**: The division of governance among the **legislative**, **executive**, and **judicial branches** prevents the concentration of power and ensures checks and balances. - **Federalism**: The distribution of power between the central government and the states maintains the federal character of the nation. - **Secularism**: The state maintains neutrality in religious matters, ensuring freedom of religion for all citizens. - **Democracy**: The democratic form of government ensures representation and participation of the people in governance. - **Judicial Review**: The judiciary’s power to review and invalidate laws and amendments that contravene the Constitution safeguards constitutional supremacy. - **Free and Fair Elections**: The integrity of the electoral process is essential for the functioning of a democratic polity. ### **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS** Several landmark judgments have shaped the **Basic Structure Doctrine**: - **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)**: As discussed, this case established the doctrine, limiting Parliament’s amending power concerning the Constitution’s basic structure. - **Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975)**: The Court invalidated the **39th Amendment**, emphasizing that **free and fair elections** are part of the basic structure. - **Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980)**: The judgment struck down parts of the **42nd Amendment**, reinforcing that a **limited amending power** is a basic feature of the Constitution. - **Waman Rao v. Union of India (1981)**: The **Supreme Court** reaffirmed the **Basic Structure Doctrine**, stating that amendments made after the **Kesavananda Bharati case** would be subject to **judicial review**. - **I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007)**: The Court held that laws placed under the **Ninth Schedule** after **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Non-Derogable Rights](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-non-derogable-rights/) **Published:** December 26, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Non-derogable rights are fundamental human rights that cannot be suspended or limited, even during emergencies. These rights are essential to human dignity and are protected universally. In India, the Constitution and international treaties uphold these rights, ensuring their inviolability under all circumstances. **Content:** Non-derogable rights are **fundamental human rights** that cannot be suspended or limited, even during emergencies. These rights are **essential to human dignity** and are protected universally. In India, the **Constitution** and **international treaties** uphold these rights, ensuring their inviolability under all circumstances. ## **MEANING AND DEFINITION** *Non-derogable rights* are those rights that cannot be suspended or restricted, even in times of public emergency. They are considered **essential to the protection of human dignity** and are recognized in various **international human rights instruments**. ## **INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (ICCPR)** The **ICCPR**, to which India is a signatory, outlines specific non-derogable rights in **Article 4(2):** - **Right to Life (Article 6):** Every human being has the **inherent right to life**, protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of life. - **Freedom from Torture (Article 7):** No one shall be subjected to **torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment**. - **Freedom from Slavery (Article 8):** Prohibition of **slavery, slave trade, and servitude** in all forms. - **Right to Recognition before the Law (Article 16):** Everyone has the right to be recognized as a **person before the law**. - **Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion (Article 18):** Everyone has the right to **freedom of thought, conscience, and religion**. ## **NON-DEROGABLE RIGHTS IN THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION** The **Constitution of India** embodies principles akin to non-derogable rights: - **Right to Life and Personal Liberty (Article 21):** No person shall be deprived of **life or personal liberty** except according to the procedure established by law. - **Prohibition of Traffic in Human Beings and Forced Labour (Article 23):** **Trafficking in human beings**, begar, and other similar forms of forced labor are prohibited. - **Freedom of Conscience and Free Profession, Practice, and Propagation of Religion (Article 25):** All persons are equally entitled to **freedom of conscience** and the right to freely profess, practice, and propagate religion. ## **JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION IN INDIA** The **Indian judiciary** has reinforced the sanctity of these rights through various judgments: - **Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597:** The **Supreme Court** expanded the interpretation of **Article 21**, emphasizing that the **procedure established by law** must be just, fair, and reasonable, thereby strengthening the protection of life and personal liberty. - **Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1978 SC 1675:** The Court held that **prisoners retain their fundamental rights**, including the right to life and dignity, and that any form of **torture or inhuman treatment** is unconstitutional. ## **INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES** Globally, *non-derogable rights* are upheld to maintain human dignity: - **Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR):** **Articles 3, 4, and 5** correspond to the **rights to life, freedom from slavery, and freedom from torture**, respectively. - **European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR):** **Article 15(2)** specifies rights that cannot be derogated from, even in times of emergency. ## **CONCLUSION** *Non-derogable rights* form the **bedrock of human rights jurisprudence**, ensuring that certain **fundamental freedoms** remain protected under all circumstances. In India, both **constitutional provisions** and **judicial interpretations** have reinforced the inviolability of these rights, aligning with **international human rights standards**. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Doctrine of Horizontal and Vertical Application of Rights](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-horizontal-and-vertical-application-of-rights/) **Published:** December 26, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The doctrines of horizontal and vertical application of rights delineate the scope and enforcement of fundamental rights within a legal system. In India, these doctrines determine whether individuals can invoke constitutional rights solely against the state (vertical application) or also against other private individuals and entities (horizontal application). **Content:** The doctrines of horizontal and vertical application of rights delineate the scope and enforcement of fundamental rights within a legal system. In India, these doctrines determine whether individuals can invoke constitutional rights solely against the state (**vertical application**) or also against other private individuals and entities (**horizontal application**). ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** - ***Vertical Application of Rights***: This traditional approach allows individuals to enforce fundamental rights against the state or its instrumentalities. The Indian Constitution primarily envisages this model, where citizens seek protection from state actions that infringe upon their rights. For instance, **Article 12** defines “the State,” encompassing government bodies against which fundamental rights can be claimed. - ***Horizontal Application of Rights***: This concept extends the enforcement of fundamental rights to disputes between private individuals or entities. It posits that certain rights should be upheld not only in the public sphere but also in private interactions. In the Indian context, while the Constitution predominantly supports vertical application, certain provisions imply horizontal applicability. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS INDICATING HORIZONTAL APPLICATION** - **Article 15(2)**: **Prohibits discrimination** by the state and private individuals concerning access to shops, public restaurants, hotels, and places of public entertainment. This article explicitly extends fundamental rights into the private domain, preventing discriminatory practices by private entities. - **Article 17**: **Abolishes “untouchability”** and forbids its practice in any form. This provision applies horizontally, ensuring that private individuals do not engage in discriminatory practices based on untouchability. - **Articles 23 and 24**: **Prohibit human trafficking, forced labor, and child labor**, respectively. These articles are enforceable against both the state and private individuals, highlighting their horizontal applicability. ## **JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS AND CASE LAWS** - **Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011**: - ***Facts***: A social worker was brutally gang-raped in a village in Rajasthan. The absence of legal recourse for workplace sexual harassment led to the filing of this petition. - ***Issue***: Whether the absence of legislation on sexual harassment violates fundamental rights, and if the court can frame guidelines to address this issue. - ***Held***: The Supreme Court acknowledged the violation of **Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21** due to sexual harassment at the workplace. It issued the Vishaka Guidelines, mandating employers to prevent and address sexual harassment, thus applying constitutional principles horizontally. - **PUDR v. Union of India, (1982) 3 SCC 235**: - ***Facts***: A public interest litigation was filed highlighting the exploitation of construction workers engaged in the Asian Games projects in Delhi, alleging non-payment of minimum wages. - ***Issue***: Whether non-payment of minimum wages amounts to forced labor under **Article 23**. - ***Held***: The Supreme Court ruled that payment below the minimum wage constitutes forced labor, violating **Article 23**. This decision emphasized that private contractors must adhere to constitutional mandates, showcasing horizontal application. ## **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** - **United States**: The U.S. Constitution primarily follows the **state action doctrine**, limiting the application of constitutional rights to state actions. However, through judicial interpretations, certain rights have been extended to apply in private disputes, especially concerning civil rights and anti-discrimination laws. - **South Africa**: The South African Constitution explicitly provides for both vertical and horizontal application of rights. **Section 8(2)** states that provisions of the Bill of Rights bind natural and juristic persons if applicable, considering the nature of the right and duty imposed. ## **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES FOR HORIZONTAL APPLICATION** 1. **Constitutional Provision**: The Constitution must explicitly or implicitly allow for rights to be enforced against private individuals. 2. **Judicial Interpretation**: Courts play a pivotal role in interpreting the extent to which rights apply horizontally, as seen in cases like **Vishaka**. 3. **Legislative Framework**: Laws enacted by the legislature can facilitate the horizontal application of rights, such as **anti-discrimination statutes**. ## **DOCTRINES / THEORIES RELATED TO HORIZONTAL APPLICATION** - **State Action Doctrine**: Predominantly used in the U.S., this doctrine limits the enforcement of constitutional rights to actions by the state, not private individuals. - **Public Function Theory**: If a private entity performs functions traditionally reserved for the state, constitutional rights may apply to its actions. - **Entanglement Theory**: When the state is significantly involved with a private entity, constitutional obligations may extend to that entity. ## **FUTURE IMPLICATIONS** The evolving interpretation of horizontal application in India suggests a broader enforcement of fundamental rights, ensuring protection against violations by private entities. This shift necessitates increased awareness among private individuals and organizations regarding their obligations under constitutional mandates. ## **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** - **Criticism**: Opponents argue that extending fundamental rights horizontally may lead to **judicial overreach**, disrupting the balance between individual freedoms and state authority. - **Appreciation**: Proponents contend that in an era where private entities wield significant power, **horizontal application** is essential to safeguard individual rights comprehensively. ## **CONCLUSION** Understanding the doctrines of horizontal and vertical application of rights is crucial for comprehending the enforcement of fundamental rights in India. While the Constitution primarily envisages vertical application, **judicial interpretations** have progressively recognized horizontal applicability in specific contexts, ensuring a more comprehensive protection of individual rights. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Call for Blogs - Centre for Law and Urban Development | NLUD](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-blogs-centre-for-law-and-urban-development-nlud/) **Published:** December 27, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Call for Blogs - Centre for Law and Urban Development | NLUD **Content:** ## **About Centre for Law and Urban Development** The Centre for Law and Urban Development, National Law University Delhi, invites submissions for its blog series on a rolling basis. We welcome contributions from scholars, practitioners, policymakers, and students on various themes related to the intersection between law and urban development. The submissions should offer insightful analysis, critical perspectives, and innovative solutions on recent developments in the field. ## Rule Book & Official Notification **To access Rule Book & Official Notification**: [Click here](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/CALL-FOR-BLOGS.pdf) ## **Themes** - The Constitutional Right to Shelter – Legal Mechanisms for Ensuring Affordable Housing in Urban Areas - Consumer Protection under RERA – A Comparison with International Best Practices for Real Estate Regulation - RERA Safeguards for Regulating Insolvency and Bankruptcy in the Real Estate Regime - Digital Infrastructure and the Smart Cities Model – Integrating Technology and Innovation for Efficient Living and Connectivity - Competition Law in Urban Development – Ensuring Fair Markets and Preventing Monopolistic Practices - Navigating Tax Laws and Urban Development – The Interplay of Property Taxation, Incentives, and Compliance Challenges - Regulating Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in Urban Infrastructure – Legal Challenges and Solutions - Analyzing the Legal Regime for Resolution of Land Acquisition - Integrating Sustainable Practices in Urban Planning – Creating Environmentally Resistant Cities - Promoting Socially Inclusive Urban Development – Ensuring Equity and Accessibility Under the Present Legal Framework Please note that the above themes are only indicative and not exhaustive, and there is no strict requirement that the submission needs to fall under the above heads. The submissions need to compulsorily be analytical, and not descriptive in nature. ## **Nature** **of** **the** **Submissions** Word limit: Articles can be anywhere between 800 to 1500 words. In case a relaxation in word count is required, please write to us so that we can consider your request. Use of images: Images, graphs and tables may be used wherever necessary to illustrate a point. Authors are encouraged to include relevant case studies, empirical data, or policy analysis to support their arguments. Abstract: An abstract no longer than 50 words briefly describing the content of the blog needs to be sent along with the submission. Please note that the abstract should be sent separately and not as a part of the main blog. Author details: Please include a brief author bio of around 100 words along with a high resolution photo with the submission. A link to the LinkedIn Profile of the author (if existing) also needs to be attached. Co-authorship: Co-authorship of up to two authors is allowed. ## **Formatting** **and** **Referencing** **Guidelines** - The text needs to be formatted according to these guidelines: Font – Times New Roman, Font Size – 12, Line Spacing – 1.5, Paragraph Spacing – 6 above and 6 below. - Title must be Bold and Underlined. The text of the title must be in Sentence Case, not all caps or small caps. Heading 2 must be Bold and Heading 3 must be underlined. - Margins must be one inch from all sides. No borders are permitted. - Any supporting materials or legal materials used by the author need to be referenced through the use of hyperlinks, which need to be included in the body of the text. ## **Submission** **Guidelines** - The file needs to be only in the .doc / .docx format and must be named as “Title\_CLUD Blog”. The title must not exceed 10 words and must briefly describe the content of the blog. - Meta data of the file must not disclose any identification of the author, including name and institutional affiliation. - All submissions need to be mailed to [clud@nludelhi.ac.in ](mailto:clud@nludelhi.ac.in)with the subject line: “Submission for Centre for Law and Urban Development Blog Series.” ## **Plagiarism** **and** **Author** **Agreement** - Submissions need to be the original work of the author. The submissions will be screened by plagiarism and AI detection software, and if found to be unoriginal, will be rejected for publication. - The author is responsible for ensuring the accuracy of facts, opinions or views in the submission. - CLUD reserves the sole right to make decisions on the publication of any content submitted. Relaxation of any rules regarding submissions is subject to the discretion of the Centre. On publication, all literary rights to the submission are transferred to the Centre for Law and Urban Development, NLU Delhi. The call for submissions is ongoing, and contributions will be accepted on a rolling basis. Authors will be notified of the status of their submissions within two weeks from the date of submission. Adhering to all the formatting and submission guidelines is **mandatory**. We look forward to receiving your insightful contributions and fostering meaningful dialogue on the critical issues at the juncture of law and urban development. **Categories:** Call for Blogs --- ### [The Insurance Act, 1938: Key Provisions](https://lawfoyer.in/the-insurance-act-1938-key-provisions/) **Published:** December 20, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The Insurance Act, 1938, is a comprehensive legislation enacted to regulate the insurance sector in India. It provides a legal framework for the operation of insurance businesses, ensuring their orderly growth and protecting policyholders' interests. The Act encompasses various aspects, including registration, management, investments, and policyholder protections.... **Content:** ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** The **Insurance Act, 1938**, is a comprehensive legislation enacted to regulate the insurance sector in India. It provides a legal framework for the operation of insurance businesses, ensuring their orderly growth and protecting **policyholders’ interests**. The Act encompasses various aspects, including **registration, management, investments**, and **policyholder protections**. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** Before 1938, the Indian insurance industry lacked comprehensive regulation, leading to **malpractices** and **financial instability**. The **Insurance Act, 1938**, was introduced to address these issues, consolidating and amending existing laws to establish a robust regulatory framework. Over the years, the Act has undergone several amendments to adapt to the evolving insurance landscape, including significant changes in **1950, 1968, 2002, 2015**, and **2021**. ## **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** - ***Registration of Insurers***: **Section 3** mandates that no insurer can commence or continue insurance business without obtaining a **certificate of registration** from the **Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDAI)**. - ***Minimum Capital Requirements***: The Act prescribes minimum paid-up capital for insurers to ensure **financial stability**. For life and general insurance businesses, the requirement is ₹100 crore, while for health insurance, it’s ₹50 crore. - ***Deposits***: Insurers are required to deposit a specified sum with the **Reserve Bank of India** as security for policyholders. This ensures that insurers maintain a **financial buffer** to meet their obligations. - ***Solvency Margin***: Insurers must maintain a minimum **solvency margin**, which is the excess of assets over liabilities, to ensure they can meet their long-term obligations. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** - ***Investments***: **Sections 27 and 27A** stipulate that insurers must invest their funds in **approved securities** to safeguard **policyholders’ interests**. This ensures that insurers’ investments are secure and capable of generating returns to meet future liabilities. - ***Prohibition of Rebates***: **Section 41** prohibits offering any **rebate of commission** or **premium** as an inducement to take out insurance. Violations can lead to **penalties**, ensuring **fair practices** in the industry. - ***Licensing of Agents***: **Section 42** requires that insurance agents obtain a **license to operate**, ensuring that only qualified individuals engage in soliciting insurance business. This provision aims to maintain **professionalism** and **ethical standards** among agents. - ***Policyholder Protection***: **Section 45** states that a life insurance policy cannot be contested after three years on any ground, providing **certainty and security** to policyholders. ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS** - **LIC of India vs. Consumer Education & Research Centre (1995)**: The **Supreme Court** held that the terms of insurance contracts must be **fair, just, and reasonable**, emphasizing the need for protecting **consumers’ interests** in insurance agreements. - **Smt. Shashi Gupta vs. LIC of India (1995)**: The court ruled that an insurance company cannot repudiate a claim on the grounds of **misstatement** after two years from the date of the policy, reinforcing the provisions of **Section 45**. ## **AMENDMENTS / ADDITIONS / REPEALING** - **Insurance Laws (Amendment) Act, 2015**: This amendment introduced significant changes, including increasing the **foreign direct investment (FDI)** limit in the insurance sector from **26% to 49%**, aiming to attract more **foreign capital** and **expertise** into the industry. - **Insurance (Amendment) Act, 2021**: The **FDI limit** was further increased to **74%**, reflecting the government’s intent to liberalize the sector and promote its growth. ## **GUIDELINES / RULES / REGULATIONS / NOTIFICATIONS / CIRCULARS** - ***IRDAI Regulations***: The **IRDAI** issues various regulations to operationalize the provisions of the **Insurance Act, 1938**. These include guidelines on **investment, solvency, corporate governance**, and **product approvals**, ensuring that the insurance industry operates in a **transparent** and **efficient** manner. ## **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - ***Doctrine of Uberrima Fides (Utmost Good Faith)***: This principle underpins insurance contracts, requiring both parties to act in utmost good faith by disclosing all **material facts**. Non-disclosure or misrepresentation can lead to the **voiding of the contract**. - ***Doctrine of Indemnity***: Applicable primarily to general insurance, this doctrine ensures that the insured is compensated for the **actual loss suffered**, preventing **unjust enrichment**. ## **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** - ***Contra Proferentem Rule***: In cases of ambiguity in insurance contracts, this legal principle dictates that the interpretation should favor the insured, as the insurer is the one who drafted the contract. **Categories:** Articles --- ### [Introduction to Insurance Law in India](https://lawfoyer.in/introduction-to-insurance-law-in-india/) **Published:** December 20, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Insurance law in India governs the contractual relationship between insurers and insured parties, ensuring financial protection against unforeseen events. It operates on principles like utmost good faith and indemnity, with regulations established by the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDAI). Key legislation includes the Insurance Act, 1938, and the IRDA Act, 1999.... **Content:** ## **INTRODUCTION TO INSURANCE LAW IN INDIA** Insurance law in India governs the contractual relationship between insurers and insured parties, ensuring financial protection against unforeseen events. It operates on principles like **utmost good faith** and **indemnity**, with regulations established by the **Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDAI)**. Key legislation includes the **Insurance Act, 1938**, and the **IRDA Act, 1999**. ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** **Insurance** is a contract where one party (**insurer**) agrees to compensate another (**insured**) for specific potential losses in exchange for a premium. This agreement provides financial security against uncertain events, distributing individual risks across a broader community. **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The Indian insurance sector began in 1818 with the establishment of the **Oriental Life Insurance Company** in Calcutta. The **Insurance Act of 1938** introduced comprehensive regulations. In 1956, life insurance was nationalized, forming the **Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC)**. General insurance followed in 1972 with the creation of the **General Insurance Corporation (GIC)**. The sector reopened to private and foreign investment in 1999 with the formation of **IRDAI**. ## **TYPES OF INSURANCE** - **LIFE INSURANCE**: Provides a sum to beneficiaries upon the insured’s death or after a set period. - **GENERAL INSURANCE**: Covers non-life assets, including: - *Fire Insurance*: Protects against fire-related losses. - *Marine Insurance*: Covers losses related to maritime activities. - *Health Insurance*: Addresses medical expenses. - *Motor Insurance*: Pertains to vehicle-related damages and liabilities. ## **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** - **Insurable Interest**: The insured must have a financial stake in the insured subject. - **Utmost Good Faith (Uberrimae Fidei)**: Both parties must fully disclose all relevant information. - **Indemnity**: Ensures the insured is restored to their financial position prior to the loss. - **Subrogation**: After compensation, the insurer gains the insured’s legal rights to recover from third parties responsible for the loss. - **Proximate Cause (Causa Proxima)**: Determines the primary cause of loss to establish liability. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** - **Insurance Act, 1938**: Provides the foundational legal framework for insurance operations in India. - **IRDA Act, 1999**: Established **IRDAI** to regulate and promote the insurance industry. - **Marine Insurance Act, 1963**: Governs marine insurance contracts. - **Motor Vehicles Act, 1988**: Mandates motor vehicle insurance for third-party liabilities. ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS** - **LIC of India v. G.M. Channabasemma, AIR 1991 SC 392**: The Supreme Court emphasized the principle of **utmost good faith**, stating that non-disclosure of material facts by the insured can render the policy voidable at the insurer’s discretion. - **General Assurance Society Ltd. v. Chandumull Jain, AIR 1966 SC 1644**: The Court held that **insurance contracts** are subject to special principles, including the duty of disclosure and the doctrine of indemnity. ## **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - **Doctrine of Contribution**: If multiple insurers cover the same risk, they share the loss proportionally. - **Doctrine of Loss Minimization**: The insured must take reasonable steps to minimize the loss or damage to the insured property. ## **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** - **Uberrimae Fidei (Utmost Good Faith)**: Both parties must act with complete honesty and disclose all material facts. - **Causa Proxima (Nearest Cause)**: The proximate cause of the loss is considered to determine liability. ## **AMENDMENTS / ADDITIONS / REPEALING** - **Insurance Laws (Amendment) Act, 2015**: Increased the **foreign direct investment (FDI)** cap in the insurance sector from 26% to 49%. - **Insurance (Amendment) Act, 2021**: Further raised the **FDI limit to 74%**, aiming to attract more foreign investment and enhance sectoral growth. ## **STATISTICAL ANALYSIS / DATA ANALYSIS** As of 2024, India’s **insurance penetration** stands at approximately **4.2% of GDP**, indicating significant growth potential compared to the global average of **7.4%**. The life insurance segment dominates, accounting for about **75% of the total market premium**. ## **FUTURE IMPLICATIONS** The increasing **FDI limits** and regulatory reforms are expected to enhance competition, improve service quality, and lead to the introduction of innovative insurance products in the Indian market. ## **CRITICISM / APPRECIATION** While liberalization has attracted investment and improved efficiency, challenges remain in ensuring insurance reaches rural and underserved populations. Additionally, maintaining stringent regulatory oversight is crucial to protect policyholder interests amidst growing competition. ## **REFERENCES** 1. **Insurance Act, 1938**. 2. **Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority Act, 1999**. 3. **Marine Insurance Act, 1963**. 4. **Motor Vehicles Act, 1988**. 5. **LIC of India v. G.M. Channabasemma, AIR 1991 SC 392**. 6. **General Assurance Society Ltd. v. Chandumull Jain, AIR 1966 SC 1644**. 7. **Insurance Laws (Amendment) Act, 2015**. 8. **Insurance (Amendment) Act, 2021**. 9. “Guide to Understanding Insurance Law in India,” **Taxmann**. 10. “Introduction Of Insurance Law And Its Principles In India,” **ComplyBook**. 11. “Insurance-Law Notes (brief Notes),” **Studocu**. 12. “Guide to Understanding Insurance Law in India,” **LexisNexis Blogs**. 13. “Insurance Law – LLB Notes – Lecture Notes,” **Studocu**. 14. “Insurance Laws of India,” **Tax Guru**. 15. “A General Introduction to Insurance and Reinsurance Law in India,” **Lexology**. 16. “Overview of Insurance Laws in India,” **Tax Guru**. **Categories:** Articles --- ### [Introduction to Competition Law of India: History, Evolution, Basic Concepts, Terminologies and Principles](https://lawfoyer.in/introduction-to-competition-law-of-india-history-evolution-basic-concepts-terminologies-and-principles/) **Published:** December 12, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The origins of competition law in India can be traced back to the colonial era, when the British government implemented several laws to regulate trade practices and monopolies. These early efforts laid the groundwork for future competition regulation in the country: - **The Companies Act of 1913** introduced **basic regulations for company formation and operations in India**. It established **rules for corporate governance, financial reporting, and shareholder rights**. While not specifically focused on competition, this Act set the stage for more comprehensive business regulation. - **The Trade Disputes Act of 1929** provided a framework for **settling industrial disputes between employers and workers**. This Act **indirectly impacted competition by regulating labor practices and working conditions across industries**. - **The Defense of India Act of 1939** granted the government **broad powers to control prices and production during wartime**. Though temporary, this Act demonstrated **the government’s ability to intervene in markets when deemed necessary for national interest**. After India gained independence in 1947, the country adopted a **socialist economic model** characterized by **heavy state control and central planning**. The government’s primary focus during this period was on **developing domestic industries rather than promoting competition**. This approach, known as the **“License Raj,”** involved **extensive government licenses, regulations, and red tape for businesses**. However, concerns about the **concentration of economic power in the hands of a few large business houses** began to emerge. This led to some initial steps towards competition regulation: - In 1964, the government established the **Monopolies Inquiry Commission** to examine the **extent of concentration of economic power and monopolistic practices in the Indian economy**. The Commission, chaired by **K.C. Dasgupta**, conducted a comprehensive study of **industrial concentration and its effects on the economy**. - Based on the Commission’s recommendations, the government enacted the **Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTP Act) in 1969**, marking **India’s first comprehensive competition legislation**. The **MRTP Act** had several key objectives: 1. **Preventing concentration of economic power to the common detriment** 2. **Controlling monopolies and their growth** 3. **Prohibiting monopolistic trade practices** 4. **Prohibiting restrictive trade practices** To implement these objectives, the **MRTP Act** established the **Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (MRTPC)** as the regulatory authority. The **MRTPC** was empowered to **investigate anti-competitive practices and issue orders to correct them**. However, the **MRTP Act** had several limitations that became apparent over time: 1. **It focused more on controlling big businesses rather than promoting competition.** The Act aimed to **limit the size of companies rather than encourage competitive behavior**. 2. **Its procedures were cumbersome and time-consuming.** Investigations and hearings under the **MRTP Act** often **dragged on for years**, reducing its effectiveness. 3. **It lacked teeth in terms of penalties and enforcement.** The **MRTPC** had **limited powers to impose meaningful penalties on violators**. 4. **The Act did not adequately address new forms of anti-competitive practices** that emerged in a **more globalized economy**. ## **SHIFT FROM MRTP ACT TO COMPETITION ACT** By the 1990s, it became increasingly clear that the **MRTP Act** was inadequate to deal with the new economic realities following **India’s economic liberalization**. The need for a **modern competition law** led to the enactment of the **Competition Act in 2002**. Several factors contributed to this shift: 1. **Economic reforms of 1991** opened up the **Indian economy to foreign investment and competition**. This new economic landscape required a **more sophisticated approach to competition regulation**. 2. **Globalization** required **Indian companies to be competitive internationally**. The **MRTP Act’s focus on limiting company size** was seen as **hindering Indian firms’ global competitiveness**. 3. **The MRTP Act’s emphasis on curbing monopolies was outdated.** The new focus was on **promoting fair competition rather than merely controlling large businesses**. 4. **India needed to align its competition law with international best practices** to attract **foreign investment** and participate effectively in the **global economy**. The process of drafting the new competition law involved **extensive consultations and deliberations**: - In October 1999, the government appointed a **high-level committee** under the chairmanship of **Shri S.V.S. Raghavan** to recommend a **modern competition law for India**. The committee conducted a **comprehensive review of competition laws worldwide** and consulted with **various stakeholders**. - The **Raghavan Committee** submitted its report in May 2000, proposing a **new law focused on promoting competition rather than controlling monopolies**. The report recommended establishing a new regulatory body, the **Competition Commission of India**. - Based on these recommendations, the **Competition Bill** was introduced in Parliament in August 2001. The bill underwent **extensive debate and scrutiny by various parliamentary committees**. - After incorporating several amendments, the **Competition Act** was finally passed by Parliament in December 2002 and received **presidential assent in January 2003**. **Key differences between the MRTP Act and Competition Act include:** 1. **Shift in focus from curbing monopolies to promoting competition:** The **Competition Act** aims to **create a competitive environment rather than simply limiting the size of businesses**. 2. **Wider definition of anti-competitive practices:** The new Act covers a **broader range of anti-competitive behaviors**, including **cartels and abuse of dominance**. 3. **Introduction of merger control regulations:** The **Competition Act** requires **pre-notification of mergers and acquisitions above certain thresholds**, allowing for review of their **potential impact on competition**. 4. **Establishment of the Competition Commission of India (CCI) as a more empowered regulatory body:** The **CCI** has **broader investigative powers** and can impose **significant penalties for violations**. 5. **Inclusion of competition advocacy as a key function:** The **CCI** is mandated to **promote competition awareness and advise the government on competition-related matters**. ## **OBJECTIVES AND NEED FOR COMPETITION LAW** The **Competition Act, 2002** was enacted with the following key objectives: 1. **To prevent practices having adverse effect on competition:** This includes **prohibiting anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominant position**. 2. **To promote and sustain competition in markets:** The Act aims to **create an environment where businesses compete fairly and efficiently**. 3. **To protect the interests of consumers:** By **fostering competition**, the Act seeks to **ensure better prices, quality, and choices for consumers**. 4. **To ensure freedom of trade carried on by other participants in markets in India:** This objective aims to **maintain a level playing field for all market participants**. **The need for a robust competition law in India stems from several factors:** - **Economic Growth:** Competition drives **innovation, efficiency, and economic growth**. As India aims to become a **$5 trillion economy**, ensuring **fair competition is crucial for sustained growth and development**. - **Consumer Welfare:** Competition leads to **lower prices, better quality, and more choices for consumers**. **Competition law protects consumer interests by preventing exploitative practices** and promoting market efficiency. - **Market Efficiency:** **Competition law prevents abuse of dominance and anti-competitive agreements** that can **distort markets** and lead to **inefficient allocation of resources**. - **Foreign Investment:** A strong competition regime boosts **investor confidence** and attracts more **foreign investment** by ensuring a **fair and predictable business environment**. - **Globalization:** As **Indian companies expand globally**, they need to be **competitive in international markets**. Competition law creates a **level playing field** and prepares Indian firms for global competition. - **Technological Advancements:** With **rapid technological changes**, especially in **digital markets**, competition law needs to address **new forms of anti-competitive behavior** and ensure **innovation is not stifled**. **The Competition Act addresses these needs through provisions on:** 1. **Prohibition of anti-competitive agreements:** **Section 3** of the Act prohibits **agreements that cause or are likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition in India**. 2. **Regulation of combinations (mergers and acquisitions):** **Sections 5 and 6** of the Act provide for **mandatory notification and review of combinations above certain thresholds**. 3. **Prevention of abuse of dominant position:** **Section 4** prohibits enterprises from **abusing their dominant position in the relevant market**. 4. **Competition advocacy:** **Section 49** mandates the **CCI to promote competition awareness** and advise the government on **competition matters**. ## **BASIC CONCEPTS, DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGIES IN COMPETITION LAW** Competition law aims to **promote and maintain market competition** by regulating **anti-competitive conduct** by companies. The primary objectives of competition law in India include: - **Promoting and sustaining fair competition in markets** - **Protecting the interests of consumers** - **Ensuring freedom of trade for market participants** - **Preventing practices having an adverse effect on competition** - **Promoting economic efficiency and development** The **Competition Act, 2002** is the primary legislation governing competition law in India. It replaced the earlier **Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969**. The Act establishes the **Competition Commission of India (CCI)** as the statutory body responsible for enforcing competition law in the country. Certain very important terms, concepts, terminologies of Competition law are as follows: **1. RELEVANT MARKET** The concept of **“relevant market”** is crucial in competition law analysis. **Section 2(r)** of the Competition Act defines relevant market as the market that may be determined by the **CCI** with reference to the **relevant product market** or the **relevant geographic market** or both. - **Relevant product market** refers to all products or services that are regarded as **interchangeable or substitutable by consumers** based on characteristics, prices, and intended use. - **Relevant geographic market** comprises the area where conditions of competition for the supply/demand of goods/services are distinctly **homogenous**. In **Belaire Owner’s Association v. DLF Limited**, the **CCI** defined the relevant market as the **“market for services of developer/builder in respect of high-end residential accommodation in Gurgaon.”** **2. ENTERPRISE** **Section 2(h)** defines an **“enterprise”** broadly to include persons or departments engaged in any activity relating to **production, storage, supply, distribution, acquisition, or control** of articles or goods, or provision of services. It excludes **sovereign functions of the government**. **3. AGREEMENT** As per **Section 2(b)**, an **“agreement”** includes any arrangement, understanding, or action in concert, whether formal, informal, written, or oral. Mere understanding between parties can constitute an **agreement**. **4. CARTEL** **Section 2(c)** defines a **“cartel”** as an association of producers, sellers, distributors, traders, or service providers who, by agreement amongst themselves, **limit, control, or attempt to control the production, distribution, sale, or price of, or trade in goods or provision of services**. **5. CONSUMER** The definition of **“consumer”** under **Section 2(f)** is wider than in consumer protection laws. It includes any person who buys goods or avails services for **consideration**, whether for **resale, commercial purpose, or personal use**. ## **TYPES OF ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES** The **Competition Act** prohibits three main types of anti-competitive practices: 1. **Anti-competitive agreements** (**Section 3**) 2. **Abuse of dominant position** (**Section 4**) 3. **Combinations** (mergers, amalgamations, and acquisitions) that cause or are likely to cause an **appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC)** (**Sections 5 and 6**) ## **ANTI-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS** **Section 3** prohibits agreements that cause or are likely to cause **AAEC** within India. Such agreements are **void** under the Act. - **Horizontal Agreements**: Agreements between entities at the **same level** of the production chain, e.g., between competitors. **Section 3(3)** presumes certain horizontal agreements like **price fixing, output restriction, market allocation, and bid rigging** to have **AAEC**. - **Vertical Agreements**: Agreements between entities at **different levels** of the production chain, e.g., between manufacturer and distributor. **Section 3(4)** prohibits vertical agreements like **tie-in arrangements, exclusive supply/distribution agreements, refusal to deal, and resale price maintenance** if they cause **AAEC**. In **Fx Enterprise Solutions India Pvt. Ltd. v. Hyundai Motor India Limited**, the **CCI** held that Hyundai’s practice of imposing a maximum permissible discount through its **discount control mechanism** amounted to **resale price maintenance** in violation of **Section 3(4)(e)**. ## **ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION** **Section 4** prohibits the **abuse of dominant position** by an enterprise. - **“Dominant position”** is defined in **Section 2(r)** as a position of strength enjoyed by an enterprise in the relevant market in India, which enables it to: - Operate **independently** of competitive forces prevailing in the relevant market; or - Affect its competitors, consumers, or the relevant market in its favour Factors for determining dominant position are listed in **Section 19(4)** and include **market share, size and resources of the enterprise, economic power, entry barriers**, etc. Practices constituting **abuse of dominance** under **Section 4(2)** include: - **Imposing unfair or discriminatory conditions/prices** - **Limiting production, market, or technical development** - **Denying market access** - **Using dominance in one market to enter/protect another market** In **MCX Stock Exchange v. National Stock Exchange**, the **CCI** held **NSE’s zero pricing strategy** in the currency derivatives segment to be an unfair pricing **abuse of dominance** aimed at eliminating competitors. ## **REGULATION OF COMBINATIONS** **Sections 5 and 6** deal with the regulation of **combinations** (mergers, amalgamations, and acquisitions) above specified **asset/turnover thresholds**. Such combinations require **mandatory pre-notification** to the **CCI**. The **CCI** assesses whether a proposed combination is likely to cause **AAEC** in the relevant market in India. Factors for this assessment are listed in **Section 20(4)**. Key concepts in merger control include: - **Asset and turnover thresholds** (**Section 5**) - **Notice requirement** (**Section 6(2**) - **Standstill obligation** (**Section 6(2A**) - **Gun-jumping** (**Section 43A**) In **Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd./Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd.**, the **CCI** approved the merger subject to the divestiture of certain products to address competition concerns. ## **COMPETITION ADVOCACY** **Section 49** empowers the **CCI** to promote **competition advocacy**, create awareness, and impart training about competition issues. This is a key function to spread a culture of competition compliance. ## **LENIENCY PROGRAMME** **Section 46** and the **Lesser Penalty Regulations** provide for **reduced penalties** for cartel members who make vital disclosures about cartel activities. This aims to incentivize cartel participants to break ranks and provide evidence. In the **Brushless DC Fans case**, the **CCI** granted **100% penalty reduction** to the first leniency applicant who provided crucial evidence of **bid-rigging**. ## **PENALTIES AND SANCTIONS** The **CCI** can impose hefty monetary penalties for anti-competitive conduct: - **Up to 10% of average turnover** for the last 3 preceding financial years (**Section 27**) - **Up to 3 times the profit or 10% of turnover** for each year of cartel continuance, whichever is higher (**Section 27**) The **CCI** can also issue **cease and desist orders**, require **modification of agreements**, and pass any other order it deems fit. ## **APPELLATE PROCESS** Appeals against **CCI orders** lie to the **National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT)** (**Section 53B**). A further statutory appeal lies to the **Supreme Court** (**Section 53T**). In **Excel Crop Care Ltd. v. CCI**, the **Supreme Court** upheld the **CCI** and **NCLAT’s findings** of a **price-fixing cartel** in the aluminum phosphide tablets market. ## **KEY PRINCIPLES AND DOCTRINES** 1. **Rule of Reason**: Vertical agreements are analyzed under the **rule of reason** approach, balancing **pro-competitive benefits** against **anti-competitive effects**. 2. **Per Se Rule**: Certain horizontal agreements are presumed to be anti-competitive **per se** without the need for further inquiry into effects. 3. **Effects Doctrine**: The **CCI’s jurisdiction** extends to conduct outside India if it has an **appreciable adverse effect on competition** in India. 4. **Single Economic Entity Doctrine**: Agreements between entities of the **same group** are not scrutinized under **Section 3**. 5. **Meeting Competition Defense**: Discriminatory conduct may be justified if done to **meet competition**. **Categories:** Articles --- ### [Suits by or against Government, Suits by Indigent persons, Interpleader Suit, Summary Procedure, Suits relating to public nuisance, ‘Suits by or against minors’ under CPC](https://lawfoyer.in/suits-by-or-against-government-suits-by-indigent-persons-interpleader-suit-summary-procedure-suits-relating-to-public-nuisance-suits-by-or-against-minors-under-cpc/) **Published:** November 28, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## **Part 1 – Suits by or Against Government** Order XXVII of CPC deals with suits by or against Government. ‘Government’ includes Central or State Government. As per Rule 1, prior notice of at least two months must be given to Government before filing suit against Government. This enables authorities to scrutinize claim before litigation. ***In State of UP v. Nawab Hussain (1977) 2 SCC 816***, Supreme Court held notice is mandatory and suit filed without notice is not maintainable. However, notice period can be waived if Government waives the requirement. As per Rule 5A, when Government undertaking is converted into company, company shall be substituted as party provided cause of action arose after incorporation. Central Government may direct such company to be represented by any officer in such suit. Order XXVII Rule 5B provides that the court in which a suit is pending against the Government may appoint counsel for Government at government expense if no appearance is made on their behalf. This prevents cases being decided against government ex-parte. ## **Part 2 – Suits by Indigent Persons** Order XXXIII deals with suits by indigent persons, meaning persons unable to pay court fees due to poverty. As per Rule 1, where plaintiff has not meant to pay prescribed fees, court has discretion to allow him to sue as indigent person upon inquiry into financial condition. In Bapu Vadde v. Laxminarayan (1985) 2 SCC 480, the SC held courts have wide discretion to permit pauper suits so that doors of justice are not closed to poor. The permission can be granted at any stage. As per Rule 8, where permission to sue as indigent is granted, the court may assign advocate to represent indigent person at government expense under legal services. Government may later recover the costs incurred for legal aid from property acquired by indigent person. ## **Part 3 – Interpleader Suit** Order XXXV deals with interpleader suit. Where two or more parties claim adversely to one another for the same money or property from another person who does not claim any interest, he may institute interpleader suit. In United Bank of India v. Priya Devi (2004) 7 SCC 667, the SC held that the essential condition for an interpleader suit is that the plaintiff should not have any claim or interest in the subject matter. His only interest is to protect himself against the burden of litigation. As per Order XXXV Rule 2, the court will decide the respective rights of claimants in a single suit to avoid multiplicity of proceedings regarding same subject matter. This prevents inconsistent adjudication of competing claims. ## **Part 4 – Summary Procedure (Order XXXVII)** Order XXXVII provides a summary procedure for quick disposal of certain suits. As per Rule 2, summary procedure is applicable where suit is for recovery of money based on a commercial transaction like dishonoured cheque, bill of exchange or promissory note. In Mechelec Engineers v. Basic Equipment Corporation (1976) 4 SCC 687, the SC held the object is to prevent unreasonable obstruction and provide speedy remedy by an expeditious hearing without trial for liquidated money claims arising from commercial transactions. To defend the summary procedure, defendant has to apply for unconditional leave under Rule 3 within 10 days of service of summons. The court may grant leave to appear and defend suit if triable issues are disclosed and there are reasonable grounds to contest the claim. ## **Part 5 – Public Nuisance Suits (Section 91)** Section 91 provides that in case of public nuisance or apprehended danger, the Advocate General or two or more persons with leave of court, may institute suit for declaration and injunction or order for removal of nuisance. In Ratlam Municipality v. Vardhichand (1980) 4 SCC 162, the Supreme Court held under Section 91, any member of the public can move for redressal of public nuisance caused by obstruction or encroachment in public streets or places. It provides remedy where public nuisance affects community at large. ## **Part 6 – Suits by or Against Minors** As per Order XXXII Rule 1, minor means a person who has not attained majority as per Majority Act i.e., 18 years. As per Rule 1, minors shall sue through their lawful guardian and defend through guardian ad litem. In M.C. Chacko v. State Bank of Travancore (1970) 1 SCC 658, the SC held interest of minors requires protection against attacks of adversary. The court must appoint guardian ad litem to defend minors even if no application is made. Under Rule 12, no decree shall be passed against minor until court certifies it will be for minor’s benefit. As per Rule 7, court has duty to strike out or amend all proceedings to bring on record the legal representative of deceased defendant if they are minors. **Categories:** Articles, Civil Procedure Law --- ### [Arrest before judgment, Attachment before judgment, Temporary Injunctions, Interlocutory orders, Receiver, Security of costs. Appeal, Execution of Decrees under CPC](https://lawfoyer.in/arrest-before-judgment-attachment-before-judgment-temporary-injunctions-interlocutory-orders-receiver-security-of-costs-appeal-execution-of-decrees-under-cpc/) **Published:** November 28, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## **Part 1 – Arrest before Judgment (Order XXXVIII)** Order XXXVIII deals with arrest and attachment before judgment in cases where the defendant, with intent to obstruct or delay execution of decree that may be passed against him, is likely to abscond or remove property outside the jurisdiction of the court. Section 1 empowers the court to order arrest and detention of defendant in civil prison where plaintiff satisfies the court that defendant is about to leave jurisdiction to obstruct execution, or has disposed of or removed property. In ITC Ltd. v. Paperbase Ltd. (2002) 2 Cal LT 219, the court held that power of arrest before judgment is an extraordinary power conferred on court and has to be exercised cautiously and sparingly only when sufficient materials exist. Section 3 states that where defendant fails to show sufficient cause, court shall order warrant for arrest with or without security for appearance. In Kailash Chand v. Nanhku (2005) 4 SCC 480, the Supreme Court held that the power of arrest before judgment is discretionary and if exercised judicially, interference is not called for. Mere apprehension that decree may turn infructuous is not ground. As per Section 5, no person shall be detained in prison for more than 3 days unless the court previously fixes a longer time. Court has power to release defendant on security under Section 6. ## **Part 2 – Attachment before Judgment (Order XXXVIII)** Order XXXVIII Rule 5 empowers the court to attach property of defendant before judgment if it appears that defendant is about to dispose of the whole or part of property with intent to obstruct execution of any decree that may be passed against him. In Mechelec Engineers v. Basic Equipment (1977) 4 SCC 687, the Supreme Court held that power of attachment before judgment can be exercised only if there is sufficient material to reach the conclusion that defendant intends to remove property to obstruct decree execution. As per Rule 6, court shall pass conditional order of attachment simultaneously with issue of warrant, unless sufficient security is furnished. Attachment shall be notified at defendant’s residence and proclaimed publicly. An attachment before judgment does not affect rights of persons not parties to the suit under Rule 7. Rule 8 provides that in case of perishable property, court may sell property and deposit sale proceeds in court. ## **Part 3 – Temporary Injunctions (Order XXXIX)** Order XXXIX Rule 1 empowers the court to grant temporary injunction to restrain any party from committing breach of contract or injury until legal rights are ascertained. ***In Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh (1992) 1 SCC 719***, the SC held that temporary injunction is granted to maintain status quo. Court must be satisfied of three conditions – a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss. Rule 2(1) enables courts to direct parties to maintain status quo regarding property in dispute until rights decided. In Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hira Lal (1962) Supp. 3 SCR 450, the SC held courts have power to pass interim orders for preserving subject matter of dispute pending final decision. Rule 2(2) empowers court to appoint Receiver and direct property attached before judgment to be kept in pound and deposition of rents and profits in court. ## **Part 4 – Interlocutory Orders (Order XXXIX)** Order XXXIX Rule 3 enables court to pass ex-parte interim orders in urgent cases where delay will entail irreparable loss to party. Such orders made ex-parte shall not last beyond 14 days. ***In Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1993) 3 SCC 161***, the SC held that interim orders can be passed ex-parte only for 14 days for temporary adjustment of matters in urgent cases where immediate remedy is warranted. As per Rule 4, where court is satisfied that a prima facie case for relief is made out, it may grant interim order on terms of party furnishing security for any loss that may occur despite final decision going against the applicant. This provides safeguard against abuse of ex-parte orders. ## **Part 5 – Receiver (Order XL Rule 1)** Courts have power to appoint Receiver where it appears property in dispute requires protection. In Indian Bank v. Official Liquidator (1998) 5 SCC 70, the SC held Receiver can be appointed even if property is not subject matter of suit but connected proceedings if protection needed. ## **Part 6 – Security for Costs (Order XXV Rule 1)** At any stage of suit, defendant may apply for order that plaintiff furnish security for costs. If court is satisfied suit is vexatious or brought to cause delay, it may order plaintiff to provide security for costs. In Razia Begum v. Delhi Development Authority (2014) 6 SCC 430, the SC held security for costs can be ordered where plaintiff does not have prima facie case and litigation appears speculative or initiated only to injure or harass defendant. ## **Part 7 – Appeals (Order XLI to XLIII)** Order XLI deals with appeals against original decrees. As per Rule 1, appeal lies against decree of District Court before High Court. Second appeal under Section 100 lies on substantial question of law. Order XLII deals with appeals against appellate decrees. Appeal against decree of Single Judge lies before Division Bench of High Court under Rule 1. In Shanti Kumar R. Chanji v. Home Insurance Co. of New York (1974) 2 SCC 430, the SC held that an appeal raises a rehearing on law as well as fact and jurisdiction of appellate court is co-extensive with trial court. Order XLIII deals with appeals against orders not decrees. As per Rule 1, appeal against interlocutory orders lies only if order expressly appealable under law. ## **Part 8 – Execution of Decrees (Order XXI)** Order XXI deals with execution of decrees. Decree holder has to apply for execution within limitation under Rule 11. As per Rule 22, court can transmit decree for execution to another court. The court which passed decree has control over execution under Rule 23. Rule 30 provides that a decree for payment of money can be executed by attachment and sale of judgment debtor’s property. Section 51 provides modes of executing decrees like delivery of property, attachment of property, arrest etc. Rule 98 recognises doctrine of partial adjustment. ***In Milkhiram v. Chamanlal (1965) 1 SCR 227***, the SC held execution proceedings are aimed at realisation of decree and should not be prolonged indefinitely. Court has power to ensure decree holder does not abuse process. **Categories:** Articles, Civil Procedure Law --- ### [Commissions under CPC](https://lawfoyer.in/commissions-under-cpc/) **Published:** November 28, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## **Introduction** Commissions are instruments through which court deputes its own powers and functions to an outside authority to assess, examine or inquire into a matter to collect evidence or report on facts. Order XXVI of CPC deals with commissions. Commission does not amount to transfer or abdication of judicial power, rather court retains authority and superintendence over commission with power to assess commissioner’s report. ## **Types of Commissions** **Following types of commissions are issued as per Order XXVI:** **1. Commission to examine witness (O.26 R.1) –** Where witness resides outside local limits of court’s jurisdiction, court may issue commission to record evidence. **2. Commission to make local investigation (O.26 R.9) –** Court may issue commission to make local inspection or investigation to examine books, weights, measures etc. or conduct scientific investigation. **3. Commission to examine accounts (O.26 R.11) –** Where accounts are in issue, court may direct a reference to certified accountant as commissioner. **4. Commission to make partition (O.26 R.13) –** Where preliminary decree for partition has been passed, court may appoint commissioner to make the partition allotting shares. **5. Commission to perform ministerial act (O.26 R.16) –** Courts may appoint commissioners where ministerial act like seizure, attachment, inventory of property etc. is required. **6. Commission to deliver property (O.21 R.21) –** The court executing a decree may direct warrant to enforcement officer or appoint commissioner to deliver possession of property. ## **Powers of Commissioners** Powers of commissioner are co-extensive with the court except power to pronounce judgment (Mohanlal vs Beni Madhav, (1886) ILR 9 All 626). The court cannot invest commission with authority beyond court’s own powers. The commissioner exercises quasi-judicial functions, subject to court’s control (Rambilash Singh vs Mahant Mahadeva, (1997) 4 SCC 452). Commissioners act as extended arms of court to discharge functions judicially. ## **Case Laws** - **State Bank of India vs Allied Chemical Laboratories, (2006) 9 SCC 741** The SC held commissioner’s acts done within jurisdiction, but with material irregularity, are not ipso facto void or illegal. Court has jurisdiction to enquire into regularity of proceedings. Report can be rejected on grounds of misconduct, ouster of jurisdiction or illegality. - **Sarguja Transport Service vs STA Tribunal, (1987) 1 SCC 44** The SC held tribunal could appoint employee as commissioner to inspect buses to ascertain fitness. Persons having expertise can be appointed as commissioners. Technical aspects can be delegated to qualified persons possessing special skills. **Categories:** Articles, Civil Procedure Law --- ### [Interim Orders under CPC](https://lawfoyer.in/interim-orders-under-cpc/) **Published:** November 28, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## **Introduction** Interim orders refer to temporary, provisional or interim arrangements made by the court during the pendency of legal proceedings to protect rights and interests of parties. Interim orders are intended to preserve status quo, maintain equilibrium and mitigate hardships until conclusion of the proceedings. The Code of Civil Procedure contains several provisions empowering courts to pass interim orders at the discretion of the court. Interim orders enable interim relief in cases of urgency until final orders. Interim orders do not determine substantive or legal rights of parties, but are temporary adjustments regulating rights of parties in the interim. ## **Types of Interim Orders** **Some important types of interim orders under CPC are:** **1. Temporary Injunctions (O.39 R.1) –** Court can issue temporary injunction restraining defendant from committing acts complained of until further orders. This maintains status quo regarding subject matter to prevent irreparable loss. **2. Interlocutory Mandatory Injunctions (O.39 R.2) –** Mandatory injunctions issue directing defendant to carry out specified acts pending suit to undo harm or prevent irreparable damage. **3. Detention, Preservation and Inspection of Subject matter (O.39 R.2) –** Court can pass orders for custody, detention, preservation or inspection of any property which is subject matter of suit to maintain status quo. **4. Appointment of Receiver (O.40 R.1) –** Court may appoint Receiver of any property at issue subject to conditions during proceedings to protect assets. **5. Attachment before Judgment (O.38) –** Where defendant intends to obstruct execution of decree, court may order attachment of property before judgment. **6. Temporary Ex parte Orders (O.39 R.3) –** Urgent ad-interim ex-parte orders can be passed without notice to prevent damage pending admission by court. **7. Security for Keeping Property (O.39 R.4) –** Defendant can be directed to furnish security for fulfilling judgment before removing attached property. **8. Directions on Disputed Possession (O.39 R.6) –** Where suit property’s possession is disputed, court may pass interim order regarding custody and enjoyment till rights decided. **9. Commission for Preservation (O.39 R.7) –** Local commission may be issued to assess and report measures required to protect or preserve property pendente lite. **10. Stay of Execution of Decree (O.41 R.5) –** Court which passed decree may on sufficient grounds order stay of execution on terms on application by judgment debtor. ## **Principles for grant of interim orders** - Irreparable hardship and injury will be caused if order not granted. - Balance of convenience lies in favour of order. - Prima facie case exists in favour of applicant. - Order necessary to preserve status quo or prevent damage. ## **Case Laws** - **Dorab Cawasji Warden vs Coomi Sorab Warden, AIR 1990 SC 867** The Supreme Court observed that grant of an interim relief preserving status quo is a device to ensure that the matter does not become either infructuous or a fait accompli before the final hearing. The object is to protect party against injury by violation of rights pending trial. - **Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. vs Coca Cola, (1995) 5 SCC 545** The Supreme Court held that interim injunctions can be granted only if the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, balance of convenience is in his favour and refusal would cause irreparable injury. There must be a substantial question to be tried on merits. **Categories:** Articles, Civil Procedure Law --- ### [Discovery, Inspection, Production of Documents, First Hearing, Framing of Issues, Disposal at First Hearing, Trial, Summoning Witnesses, Production of Documents, Adjournment, Hearing under CPC](https://lawfoyer.in/discovery-inspection-production-of-documents-first-hearing-framing-of-issues-disposal-at-first-hearing-trial-summoning-witnesses-production-of-documents-adjournment-hearing-under-cpc/) **Published:** November 28, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## **Discovery of Documents** After filing written statement, defendant must file a list of all documents in his power, possession, control or custody which are relevant to the dispute under Order XI Rule 12. Thereafter, plaintiff is also required to file a list of additional documents not filed along with plaint, which are necessary to determine matter in issue. These documents must be filed with an affidavit verifying the list. ## **Inspection of Documents** After discovery, parties can give inspection of documents disclosed as well as seek inspection. Either party may give notice to other for inspection of documents related to suit and necessary for its fair disposal under Order XI Rule 15. If inspection is refused, court may order inspection of such documents. However, confidential or privileged documents may be exempt from production. ## **Production of Documents** Under Order XI Rule 14, the parties must produce documents in their possession or power which they have admitted or relied upon for pleadings, or which relate to any matter in issue. Where denial of documents is not specific or categorical, notice to produce may be ordered. Court can call for production of any documents to elucidate matters necessary for trial. ## **Appearance of Parties** On receipt of summons, a party may enter appearance by filing vakalatnama or memorandum of appearance under Order V Rule 1. This obviates the need to serve further processes except judgment in such suit. Personal appearance shows party is submitting to the court’s jurisdiction. If defendant fails to appear on date fixed in summons, court proceeds ex parte. ## **Non-Appearance and Ex Parte Proceedings** Where any party does not appear when the suit is called up for hearing, court has the power to proceed ex parte under Order IX Rule 6. Defendant can also be proceeded ex parte where summons duly served is not obeyed under Order IX Rule 7. Where defendant appears and is subsequently absent, an ex parte order can be passed after show cause notice. Ex parte order is interim, not final. It can be set aside on sufficient cause shown. ## **First Hearing** The first hearing refers to the preliminary hearing soon after summons when court ascertains whether parties are ready to proceed with framing of issues. This may happen immediately on defendant’s appearance or be fixed later by court. Steps in first hearing include: - Recording admission/denial of documents by both sides - Framing issues on basis of pleadings - Deciding any preliminary objections or issues - Fixing trial schedule ## **Framing of Issues** Framing issues is a crucial step in first hearing. The court must formulate specific issues arising between parties on material propositions of fact and law based on the pleadings under Order XIV Rule 1. The court may frame issues suo motu if parties fail to identify issues correctly. Issues provide blueprint for trial, demarcating the area to be adjudicated. ## **Disposal at First Hearing** Order XV deals with disposal of suit at the first hearing itself. Where the parties admit facts or documents showing matter need not proceed to trial, court can pronounce judgment at first hearing itself. This avoids unnecessary adjournment for trial where facts are undisputed or admitted. Quick disposal at first hearing saves court’s time and parties’ expense. ## **Trial** Trial refers to the judicial proceedings where evidence is recorded, and facts are ascertained to determine issues framed in the suit. Under Order XVIII Rule 1, party having burden of issues will adduce evidence first. Unless otherwise ordered, plaintiff adduces evidence first. Trial involves examination in chief, cross-examination and re-examination of witnesses. Arguments follow evidence concludes. ## **Summoning Witnesses** To summon witnesses, party must file a list of witnesses proposed to be called with summary of testimony under Order XVI Rule 1. The court can examine witnesses to elucidate issues or in interests of justice. Where witness resides beyond jurisdiction, court may issue commission for examination. Summons requisition attendance of persons as witnesses or to produce documents. ## **Production of Documents** Under Order XI Rule 14 and Order XVI Rule 1A, parties can summon the other side to produce any documents required from opposite party to lead evidence or ascertain truth. Third parties may also be summoned to produce any documents relevant to suit. Where original is summoned, certified copies may be provided. Privileged documents can be exempted from production. ## **Adjournment** Court has power to adjourn trial from time to time under Order XVII Rule 1. It is not bound to adjourn on mere demand by parties. Sufficient cause has to be shown for adjournment. Courts discourage frequent adjournments to prolong trial. Unreasonable adjournments may entail costs or dismissal of suit for want of prosecution under Order XVII Rule 3. ## **Hearing** Hearing refers to the recording of evidence adduced by parties in support of their contentions. Plaintiff and defendant lead evidence respectively. Witnesses are examined in chief, cross and re-examination. Arguments follow after evidence concludes. Hearing must adhere to trial schedule fixed by court. Once hearing concludes, court will fix the case for final disposal after submission of arguments. **Categories:** Articles, Civil Procedure Law --- ### [Plaint, Written Statement, Set Off, Counter Claim, Admission, Return and Rejection of Plaint under CPC](https://lawfoyer.in/plaint-written-statement-set-off-counter-claim-admission-return-and-rejection-of-plaint-under-cpc/) **Published:** November 28, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## **Plaint** Plaint is the originating process which initiates a civil suit. It contains: - Heading and description of parties - Statement of material facts showing right to relief - Right to sue - Jurisdiction valuation - Relief claimed. - Date and signature of plaintiff As per Order VII Rule 1, plaint sets out essential facts constituting the cause of action and requisite details to enable court to determine questions involved. Plaint must demonstrate that material facts exist to entitle plaintiff to decree claimed. ## **Written Statement** The written statement is the reply to plaint filed by the defendant. Under Order VIII Rule 1, written statement must contain: - Nature of allegations admitted or denied, with reasons. - Statement of additional facts forming defence - Admissions and denials of documents - Signature and verification by defendant It provides defendant’s stand regarding plaintiff’s claim by indicating defence taken. Defendant deals specifically with each allegation made in plaint and states if they are admitted or denied, while clarifying factual position. ## **Set Off** Set off refers to defendant’s independent claim against plaintiff which can be set-off against plaintiff’s claim in suit. Order VIII Rule 6 deals with set off. The claim must be an independent cause of action accruing to defendant against plaintiff seeking liquidated or ascertained amount. The claim should be legally recoverable and within pecuniary jurisdiction of the court. Only amounts which can be set off under law can be claimed as set off. ## **Counter Claim** A counter claim is a cross-suit filed by defendant against the plaintiff in the same proceedings. As per Order VIII Rule 6A, defendant can set up counter claim against plaintiff instead of filing a separate suit. It must arise between the same parties and out of the same cause of action as the original suit claim. It must fall within the jurisdiction of the court. Counter claims beyond jurisdiction will be directed to be filed separately. ## **Admission of Plaint** When plaint is presented to court, it shall endorse the date and examine whether requisite valuation and court fees have been paid. Where plaint meets procedural requirements, court admits it and examines whether summons needs to be ordered on defendant. The date of admission of plaint is a crucial date for purposes of limitation and determining commencement of lis. ## **Return of Plaint** As per Order VII Rule 10, where plaint does not disclose cause of action or is barred by law, the court will return it to plaintiff for filing in proper court. Return happens due to lack of territorial jurisdiction. Plaintiff is given opportunity to file fresh suit in proper court subject to law of limitation. The court cannot reject plaint in such cases, and only option is to return it for presentation to proper court. ## **Rejection of Plaint** Where the suit appears, ex-facie barred under law or prohibited expressly by legislation, the court may reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11. For example, the plaint can be rejected where the suit is barred by res judicata or limitation; where relief claimed is impermissible in law; or barred by law. Rejection results in termination of lis between parties. **Categories:** Articles, Civil Procedure Law --- ### [Pleadings, General Rules, Amendment under CPC](https://lawfoyer.in/pleadings-general-rules-amendment-under-cpc/) **Published:** November 28, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## **Pleadings** Pleadings refer to formal written statements filed by parties which frame the issues needing trial and adjudication. Plaint and written statement are the main pleadings. Order VI deals with pleadings generally. Order VII deals with plaint. Order VIII deals with written statement. Replication by plaintiff to written statement is allowed only with court’s leave. Pleadings help crystallize disputed questions between parties requiring determination. ## **Object of Pleadings** - To ascertain real issues between parties requiring trial - To ascertain essential facts in detail to base relief - To ensure parties understand case of their opponent - To assist court in appreciation of facts and legal points - To act as permanent record of case for parties ## **General Rules of Pleading** - Pleadings must state material facts, not law or evidence (O.6 R.2) - They must be brief and concise (O.6 R.2) - Must be divided into paragraphs, numbered consecutively (O.6 R.3) - Dates, sums, numbers to be expressed in figures (O.6 R.4) - Each allegation be specific, not vague or general (O.6 R.6) - Party may depart from previous pleading with permission (O.6 R.7) - Denials must be specific, vague denial won’t be sufficient (O.8 R.5) ## **Amendment of Pleadings** Amendment of pleadings refers to changes made in the original pleadings of parties. As per Order VI Rule 17, the court has powers at any stage to allow amendment of pleadings on such terms as are just. This enables clarification of issues, correction of errors and filling gaps to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. Courts allow amendments to determine real questions in controversy rather than deciding on technical grounds. However, amendment relating to a new cause of action cannot be permitted after expiry of limitation to circumvent the law. Where amendment changes nature of suit or case entirely, it will not be allowed. Amendment cannot be allowed if it defeats law of limitation. Further, no amendment is permitted once final judgment is pronounced. Subject to these conditions, amendments are liberally allowed in interests of justice. **Categories:** Articles, Civil Procedure Law --- ### [Institution of Suit, Cause of Action, Joinder, Non-Joinder and Misjoinder of Parties, Summons under CPC](https://lawfoyer.in/institution-of-suit-cause-of-action-joinder-non-joinder-and-misjoinder-of-parties-summons-under-cpc/) **Published:** November 28, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## **Institution of Suit** A civil suit refers to proceedings initiated by a party in a civil court for enforcement of a right or seeking relief based on a cause of action available under law. As per Section 26 of CPC, every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plaint in duplicate to the court or other officer appointed in this behalf. The plaint can be presented in person, by agent or by pleader. Where plaint is presented through an agent or pleader, the power of attorney or vakalatnama shall be filed along with plaint. ## **Cause of Action** Cause of action refers to the factual grounds forming basis of a suit. It comprises of a bundle of essential facts which the plaintiff must prove to obtain the relief claimed. Cause of action means every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove if traversed in order to establish a right to judgment. As per Order VII Rule 1, the plaint shall contain a statement of material facts showing the cause of action. Cause of action is the foundation of the civil action. ## **Joinder of Parties** Joinder of parties refers to combining two or more persons as parties to the same suit. As per Order I Rule 1, all persons whose presence is necessary for effective adjudication may be joined as plaintiffs or defendants provided there is a common question of law or fact. The general rule is that the presence of necessary parties is required for a complete and final determination of the dispute. Where jointly liable parties are not imp leaded, the suit may abate. ## **Non-Joinder of Parties** Non-joinder of parties refers to failure to join persons whose presence is necessary to completely adjudicate the dispute. As per Order I Rule 9, no suit shall be defeated by reason of misjoinder or non-joinder of parties. The court has powers to deal with such situation by addition or deletion of parties. Where a necessary party who ought to have been joined is not impleaded, the court has discretion to allow addition of such party. However, suit shall not abate only due to non-joinder if the plaintiff shows reasonable diligence. ## **Misjoinder of Parties** Misjoinder means joining together of parties who have no common interest or connection in the litigation. Where parties are improperly joined leading to misjoinder, the court has power under Order I Rule 10 to delete such party if the misjoinder was due to a bonafide mistake. Where parties are wrongly joined to confer jurisdiction or obtain venue where the real dispute does not arise, the court will disallow such misjoinder and strike out the name of wrong party. ## **Summons** When the suit is duly instituted by filing plaint, the court will issue summons to the defendant under Order V Rule 1. The summons is accompanied by a copy of the plaint. It requires the defendant to appear before court on specified date to answer the claim. It is issued under seal of court and signed by judge or officer empowered in this behalf. Summons may be sent for service directly or through court clerk or plaintiff’s advocate. Affidavit of service has to be filed as proof. **Categories:** Articles, Civil Procedure Law --- ### [Place of Suing under CPC](https://lawfoyer.in/place-of-suing-under-cpc/) **Published:** November 28, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## **Introduction** The place where a suit can be properly instituted is called the place of suing. The appropriate place where the court of competent jurisdiction can entertain the dispute is crucial for initiation and maintainability of the suit. Sections 15 to 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 deal with venue and place of suing. Selecting the correct forum is imperative to avoid procedural wrangling which delays substantive adjudication. ## **Cardinal Principle for Place of Suing** Section 15 lays down the cardinal principle that every suit shall be instituted in the Court of lowest grade competent to try it. Thus, the court of the lowest grade functionally competent in terms of pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction, subject to any special statute, is the place where the suit must be filed. The legislative mandate is that the suit should be initiated at the lowest appropriate court which is fully equipped to dispose it efficaciously. ## **Place of Suing Immovable Property** Section 16(a) stipulates that suits for recovery of immovable property with or without rent or mesne profits shall be instituted in the court within local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situated. Where the property is situated within jurisdiction of multiple courts, the plaintiff has option to choose the court where to file the suit. This enables convenient access to court based on plaintiff’s location. Where a claim of rent or mesne profit arises along with recovery of immovable property, the plaintiff has the choice to file either at property location or his own residence provided the claim for rent and mesne profits does not exceed the value of the property claim. This facility is provided since evidence will be mainly produced at plaintiff’s residence. ## **Place of Suing Movable Property** As per Section 16(b), suits for recovery of movable property, or for compensation for wrong to movable property can be filed where the wrong was done. This ensures proximity of the court to the cause of action for easy access to evidence. Where defendants reside in multiple places, suit can be filed where any of the defendants reside within the court’s jurisdiction. However, suits for penalties under tax and revenue laws have to be filed where the defendant resides. ## **Place of Suing Contract** Section 16(c) stipulates that suits on contract can be filed either where the contract was made, or the contract was meant to be performed, or the defendant resides/carries on business. This provides options to the plaintiff considering the defendant’s residence or the place having proximity to the transaction. Where the contract specifies the jurisdiction, suit has to be filed in such court subject to contract being lawful. ## **Place of Suing Wrongs** As per Section 18 suits for compensation for a wrong may be filed where the wrong was done, or where the defendant resides, or where the defendant works for gain. This covers tortious acts, allowing suit where the injury occurred or where the wrongdoer can be traced. Where multiple defendants reside at different places, they can be sued together where any of the defendants reside. ## **Place of Suing Resident Defendants** According to Section 17, a suit against a defendant residing within jurisdiction of a court can be filed in such court. Where there are multiple defendants residing at different places in India, they can be jointly sued where any of the defendants reside. However, the leave of the court must be obtained in case of joinder of defendants residing at different places. The court will examine if there is a common question of law or fact which necessitates joint trial. ## **Place of Suing Companies/Corporations** Suits against companies or corporations can be instituted either where the registered office is situated or where the company conducts business at the cause of action place. This enables the plaintiff to file suit where the transaction occurred for the sake of convenience. ## **Place of Suing Public Nuisance** As per Section 16A, any suit for restraining public nuisance shall be instituted where the wrong is done. Since evidence is available at that place, trying nuisance cases where it occurred serves interests of justice. **Categories:** Articles, Civil Procedure Law --- ### [Jurisdiction under CPC](https://lawfoyer.in/jurisdiction-under-cpc/) **Published:** November 28, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Introduction** Jurisdiction refers to the authority vested in a court under law to adjudicate disputes and dispense justice. The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) contains detailed provisions concerning jurisdiction of civil courts in India. The twin criterions for exercise of jurisdiction are territorial jurisdiction and pecuniary jurisdiction. **Territorial Jurisdiction** Territorial jurisdiction means the geographic limit within which a court has power to try a suit. Sections 15 to 21 of CPC deal with territorial jurisdiction. Section 15 provides that every suit shall be instituted in the court of lowest grade competent to try it. Section 16 to 18 enumerate the places where a suit may be instituted. Section 19 bars suit in a wrong court knowingly. Section 20 enables transfer to cure defect of jurisdiction. As per Section 16, suit for immovable property can be filed where the property is situated. Where the property is situated within jurisdiction of multiple courts, the plaintiff has the option to choose any one. Suit for compensation for wrongs to a person or movable property can be filed where the wrong was done. Suit for immovable property combined with claim for rent or mesne profits can be filed where the property is situated provided the claim for rent, mesne profits does not exceed the proprietary claim. Section 17 allows suit against a defendant residing within jurisdiction of the court. Where there are multiple defendants residing at different places, the suit can be instituted where any of the defendants reside provided leave of court is taken. Suits against a company or corporation can be filed where the registered office is situated or where the company conducts business. Suits upon a contract which stipulates specific court jurisdiction can be filed at such place. As per Section 18, suit for compensation for a wrong can be filed where the wrong was done or where defendant resides or work for gain. Suit against defendants residing at different places under a common liability can be filed where any of the defendant resides. Where a suit is filed laying venue in the wrong court, the plaintiff will be liable to pay costs under Section 19. However, the plaint shall not be rejected solely on ground of wrong venue if other requirements are satisfied. The court has power under Section 21 to transfer a suit to appropriate court if it lacks territorial jurisdiction. **Pecuniary Jurisdiction** Pecuniary jurisdiction refers to the monetary limit up to which a court can try suits valued for jurisdictional purposes under CPC. Section 15 mandates the suit has to be instituted in the lowest grade court having requisite pecuniary jurisdiction. Valuation has to be done in good faith based on cause of action. Insufficient valuation can result in plaint rejection or dismissal of suit. For pecuniary jurisdiction, suits are classified under CPC as per valuation: - Small Cause suits: Up to Rs.10,000 - District Judge: Exceeding Rs.10,000 up to Rs.1 lakh - Subordinate Judge: Exceeding Rs.1 lakh up to Rs.10 lakhs - District Court: Exceeding Rs.10 lakhs The state governments periodically enhance the pecuniary limits of courts. Suit valuation is crucial for determining the appropriate forum having competence to adjudicate the dispute under law. **Factors Determining Jurisdiction** The following factors must be considered before filing a suit to ascertain the court which has proper territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction: - Nature and valuation of subject matter. - Place where the cause of action fully or partly arises. - Place where the property is situated. - Place where the defendant resides or works at the time of commencement of action. - Sanctioned pecuniary jurisdiction of the court. - Contractual stipulation as to court venue. - Local limits of the court’s geographic coverage. The plaint must demonstrate prima facie that the court has jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings. If deficiency of jurisdiction is apparent, the plaint is liable to rejection under Order 7 Rule 11. Caveatable jurisdiction is determined based on plaintiff’s averments in the plaint unless patently false or frivolous. Jurisdictional facts stated in plaint are presumed to be true for deciding place of suing. **Plaint Rejection Due to Lack of Jurisdiction** The plaint can be rejected by the court under Order 7 Rule 11 where it does not disclose cause of action, is barred by limitation or under res judicata, does not disclose right to sue, insufficiently stamped, or shows the suit should be instituted in another court. If the court lacks territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction, the plaint cannot proceed and has to be returned. Jurisdictional issues raised by parties must be decided as preliminary issues before trial. If lack of jurisdiction is established as a preliminary issue, the plaint is liable to be dismissed or returned to be filed before the proper court having jurisdiction. However, absence of jurisdiction can be cured by transfer under Section 24. Minor errors as to place of suing may be corrected under Section 21. **Prorogation of Jurisdiction** Even where territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction is absent, it is open for the defendant to waive the objection. If the defendant does not dispute jurisdiction, the same is taken to be established by prorogation or acquiescence. However, acquiescence does not confer jurisdiction on a court which is barred by law from entertaining the suit. Prorogation enables the court to proceed despite lack of jurisdiction if the defendant does not object at the first instance. **Categories:** Articles, Civil Procedure Law --- ### [Concept of limitation in Civil Suits](https://lawfoyer.in/concept-of-limitation-in-civil-suits/) **Published:** November 28, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## **Introduction** The law of limitation sets maximum time periods within which legal proceedings can be initiated in courts of law. The key objectives behind limitation laws are: - To ensure timely adjudication of claims without unreasonable delay. - To prevent witnesses being called upon to give evidence after lengthy periods. - To prevent disturbance of settled rights and titles. - To discourage laxity and promote diligence. The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 lays down limitation periods for different classes of civil suits. It stipulates the time limits within which the plaintiff must institute a civil suit before the right to sue becomes time barred. Limitation law balances the interests of the plaintiff to have a reasonable time to pursue claims, and the defendant’s right to not be prosecuted on stale claims. ## **Law of Limitation** The law of limitation is enshrined under Entry 13 of the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The Limitation Act, 1963 is a central legislation prescribing limitation periods for suits, appeals and applications across statutes. It consolidates the law relating to limitation of suits, appeals and certain applications. Section 3 provides that subject to provisions of any special law, every suit shall be instituted within the prescribed period under the schedule to the Act. Section 4 of the Limitation Act states that any suit for which no period of limitation is prescribed elsewhere shall be governed by the residuary Article 113 which provides for three years limitation. The starting point of limitation is when the right to sue accrues. As per Section 2(j) of CPC, the right to sue accrues when the wrong is done, breach of contract occurs, default happens, or the claim matures. Time begins running when plaintiff acquires knowledge of the right to sue. The CPC incorporates limitation provisions under Order II Rule 2 and Schedule I in conformity with the Limitation Act. The First Schedule under CPC prescribes limitation periods for suits relating to accounts, contracts, declaratory decrees, mortgages, immovable property, movable property, trusts, compensation, etc. Periods range from one year to twelve years. ## **Computation of Periods of Limitation** As per Section 4 of Limitation Act, any period of limitation is to be calculated excluding the day when the cause of action arises. If the last day falls on a holiday, limitation will be extended to next working day. Section 12 provides that in computing limitation, time requisite to obtain copies of decrees, instruments or orders may be excluded. Period from making an application for appointment of guardian to the date of appointment may be excluded under Section 12(2). Section 14 excludes any time during which plaintiff is prosecuting another civil proceeding with diligence and good faith. Where proceedings are prosecuted in wrong court, Section 14(2) excludes time in certain suits. Period of defendant’s absence from India may be excluded under Section 17 if right to sue arose when defendant was out of India. Limitation remains suspended when summons is served on defendant during last few days of limitation under Section 18. ## **Extension/Condonation of Limitation** The CPC empowers the court under Section 5 to admit suits instituted after expiry of limitation if the plaintiff satisfies that he had sufficient cause for not filing the suit within time. The delay in filing suit must have been due to reasons beyond plaintiff’s control, and he acted with reasonable diligence under the circumstances. Plaintiff must make out a strong case of compelling circumstances which impeded the institution of suit within limitation. Physical inability, mental illness, involuntary detention, emergency travel, fraudulent concealment, breakdown of services/communication etc. have been held as sufficient causes. Section 151 of CPC also preserves inherent powers of the court to make orders necessary for ends of justice, which includes condoning delay. However, discretion under Sections 5 and 151 must be exercised judiciously. The plaintiff must demonstrate that injustice would be caused if delay is not condoned. Long delays cannot be condoned merely on technical grounds when no genuine effort is made to explain inaction consistently over long periods. ## **Doctrine of Equitable Principles** Under doctrine of equitable principles, even though legal limitation has expired, the court may grant relief to the plaintiff to avoid injustice and hardship. The doctrine is based on principles of equity, good conscience and fairness. It considers extenuating circumstances which impeded filing of the suit within time, but exigencies of justice require the court to adjudicate the matter despite the bar of limitation. However, the doctrine of equitable principles can be applied only in exceptional and deserving cases. The plaintiff must make out a compelling case that grave miscarriage of justice would be caused unless delay is condoned. The negligence, inaction or default of the plaintiff himself cannot be a ground for invoking the doctrine of equitable principles. The court must exercise great caution in extending limitation on equitable grounds to prevent stale claims being brought before the court. ## **Effect of Limitation** Order VII Rule 1 of CPC requires the plaint to disclose that the suit is within limitation. Under Order VII Rule 11(d), the plaint can be rejected when the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. If the defendant satisfies the court that the suit is barred by limitation, the court shall dismiss the suit under Order XII Rule 3. The limitation defence can be taken as a preliminary issue under Order XIV. The defendant may also take out a chamber summons for summary judgment on ground of limitation under Order 37. If the plaintiff’s claim is found barred by limitation, the court will pass a decree dismissing the suit. A time-barred claim cannot be enforced by a court of law even if the claim is genuine on merits. However, limitation does not destroy the underlying right which remains alive though unenforceable in court. ## **Extension of Limitation** Parliament is authorised to make temporary provisions extending limitation under Article 31A of Limitation Act. Such extension applies to suits, appeals or applications where limitation expires during the period specified in the order. Extension of limitation by notification applies uniformly across the country. State governments can also extend limitation by notification under Section 3. Several states have extended limitation to alleviate hardships during the Covid-19 pandemic. The exercise of power to extend limitation is not arbitrary but guided by policy. Extension enables access to justice in situations where adherence to original limitation would cause hardship and detriment to rights. It balances individual rights along with exigencies of public welfare in exceptional circumstances. Extension allows pending claims to be prosecuted after temporary suspension of limitation. However, it cannot revive dead or time-barred claims which already extinguished by efflux of time before such extension. ## **Continuing/Successive Wrongs** In certain instances, like continuing wrong or recurring breach, a fresh cause of action arises on each default which triggers fresh limitation. In cases of successive or recurring wrongs like nuisance, trespass, there is a fresh infringing action which constitutes a new injury. Each act or breach causing damage amounts to a distinct cause of action for purposes of limitation. For example, in case of monthly tenancy, failure to vacate gives rise to a separate cause of action at the end of each month. The suit can be filed within limitation computed from the date of breach in each month. But once limitation expires qua any particular act, no suit can be entertained for that default even if later acts are within limitation. ## **Amendments Relating Back to Date of Filing** As per Order VI Rule 17, the court has discretion to allow amendment of pleadings at any stage of proceedings to avoid multiplicity of litigation. Where the original pleading was filed within limitation, any amendment sought subsequently will normally relate back to the original filing date. The amendment will not be time-barred despite limitation having expired after suit filing if the court allows the amendment relating it back to the initial filing date. However, relation back principle does not apply if a new cause of action is permitted to be added or substituted through amendment outside limitation. The court will disallow such amendment to prevent re-agitation of dead claims by circumventing the law of limitation. Subject to this, bonafide amendments are allowed to relate back to avoid limitation technicalities coming in the way of adjudication on merits. **Categories:** Articles, Civil Procedure Law --- ### [Important Concepts: Res Sub-Judice, Resjudicata, Restitution, Caveat, Inherent powers of courts, Reference, Review and Revision of CPC](https://lawfoyer.in/important-concepts-res-sub-judice-resjudicata-restitution-caveat-inherent-powers-of-courts-reference-review-and-revision-of-cpc/) **Published:** November 28, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## **Res Sub-Judice** Res sub-judice refers to a matter or case which is under consideration by a court of law. Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with the concept of res sub-judice. It provides that no court shall proceed with the trial of any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue is already pending in another court competent to grant the relief claimed. The objective is to prevent courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously entertaining and adjudicating upon two parallel proceedings in respect of the same subject matter. If the matter in the subsequent suit is directly and substantially similar to the one in a previously instituted suit which is pending in another competent court, the subsequent suit is liable to be stayed. The test is whether the matter in controversy in the two proceedings is substantially the same and can be determined on the same evidence. If the decision in the earlier suit would operate as res judicata in the later suit, the matter would be treated as res sub-judice. However, slight difference in parties or prayed reliefs may not make the matter different if the core controversy is identical. If Privy Council proceedings are pending involving the same subject matter, it amounts to res sub-judice for courts in India. ## **Res Judicata** Res judicata means a matter finally decided by a competent court and barred from future litigation. Section 11 of CPC provides that once a matter is directly and substantially in issue and has been heard and finally decided by a competent court, the parties cannot re-agitate the same issue further in subsequent proceedings. It applies to issues heard and decided on merits, and not to collateral or subsidiary points. The essential conditions for applicability of res judicata are: - The matter must have been directly and substantially in issue in the former suit. - The former suit must have been between the same parties or parties litigating under the same title. - The parties must have litigated under the same title in the former suit. - The court which decided the former suit must have been competent to try the subsequent suit in which the issue is raised. - The matter directly and substantially in issue must have been heard and finally decided by the court in the former suit. If these conditions are satisfied, the court shall not entertain re-litigation on the same issue. The objective is to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and contradictory judgments. Res judicata ensures finality and prevents abuse of process. It applies to issues of fact, law or to mixed questions of law and fact heard and decided in the former suit. ## **Restitution** Restitution refers to the restoration of parties to their original position they were in before the litigation. Sections 144 and 151 confer wide powers on the court to order restitution. Where a decree is varied, reversed, set aside or modified in appeal, review or other proceeding, the court which passed the decree has power to make restitution and adjustments consequential to the variation, reversal or modification. For example, if in execution of decree for payment of money, any amount is recovered and paid to the decree holder, and thereafter the decree is reversed or modified, the appellate court may order restitution of the amount to the judgment debtor. This restores parties to their original position as if the incorrect decree never happened. The power of restitution applies to both movable and immovable property. It extends to third parties who may be dispossessed or deprived of property by the execution of the incorrect decree. ## **Caveat** Caveat refers to a request made to the court to not pass any ex-parte order without giving notice or hearing the caveator. Section 148A provides that a caveat may be lodged by any person claiming a right to appear before the court on the hearing of any application. If a caveat is filed, the court shall serve notice on the caveator before passing any order on the application. The caveator must disclose the nature of the claim, interest or objection to the proceedings. The purpose of caveat is to protect a person’s interest against any ex-parte interim order being passed by the court without hearing him. It operates as a caution to the court to not proceed with the matter in the absence of the caveator. Caveats may be made absolute for a certain period. A caveator added as defendant to the suit is entitled to file a written statement. ## **Inherent Powers of Courts** Section 151 preserves the inherent powers of the court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process of the court. This recognizes inherent powers vested in courts to enable them to effectively and completely adjudicate the disputes before them. Section 151 does not confer any new or additional powers, but merely safeguards powers innate to courts. The powers under Section 151 can be invoked in the absence of specific statutory provisions if the exigencies of justice demand so. The court can pass orders or take steps to secure justice, including process and procedure beyond what is prescribed in the CPC. However, such powers cannot be exercised in disregard of express statutory provisions. Section 151 powers must be exercised judiciously and sparingly in compelling circumstances which demand action to further the interests of justice. ## **Reference** Reference refers to the power of civil courts under Section 113 of CPC to refer questions of law or fact arising in the suit to the High Court for its opinion. Where substantial questions of law or fact of general importance are involved, the district court may refer the same for opinion of the High Court. Reference enables subordinate courts to take the aid and opinion of the High Court on knotty issues to effectively adjudicate the dispute. The High Court may direct the lower court to try the suit and return findings of fact, after which the High Court will deliver its opinion on the question of law referred. Alternatively, the High Court may itself try the issue and return findings of fact and deliver opinion on the question of law. The lower court is bound by the findings and opinion of the High Court on reference. ## **Review** Review refers to the court’s inherent power to reconsider its judgment and orders. Section 114 and Order XLVII provide for review of judgments and orders based on discovery of new evidence, error or omission, or other sufficient cause. The court can rectify errors to avoid miscarriage of justice. The grounds for review are: - Discovery of new evidence which was not available or could not be produced during trial despite diligence. - Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. - Any other sufficient reason which calls for review. A review does not allow re-agitation of the same issues but is confined only to the extent required for rectification of error. The party seeking review must demonstrate apparent error which stares on the face of judgment. The court exercises judicial discretion while allowing review. ## **Revision** Revision refers to the power of the High Court under Section 115 to call for records of any lower court proceedings pending or disposed and confirm, modify or reverse any decree or order. Revision is a supervisory jurisdiction exercised by High Court over subordinate courts to keep the wheels of law and justice properly moving. The High Court may exercise revision where lower court has: - Exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law. - Failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law. - Acted illegally or materially irregularly in exercise of jurisdiction. Revision is necessary to keep subordinate courts within bounds of authority, ensure even flow of justice and prevent miscarriage of justice. It is a quasi-appellate power to be exercised sparingly in exceptional cases where glaring injustice has been caused by irregularity in lower court proceedings. **Categories:** Articles, Civil Procedure Law --- ### [Suits of Civil Nature under CPC](https://lawfoyer.in/suits-of-civil-nature-under-cpc/) **Published:** November 28, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## **Introduction** A suit refers to a civil proceeding initiated by presenting a plaint before a civil court for enforcement of a right or claims arising out of a civil dispute. The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is the basic statute governing civil litigation in India. It establishes the modalities for institution, prosecution and disposal of suits of a civil nature. ## **Jurisdiction of Civil Courts** Section 9 of the CPC provides that courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature, except suits excluded from its cognizance. The civil courts established under the state government derive jurisdiction from the CPC to adjudicate civil disputes. Section 15 enumerates the classes of suits of a civil nature cognizable by the civil courts. These include suits relating to immovable property such as recovery of possession, partition, mortgage, charge, settlement, ejectment, determination of rights; suits relating to movable property such as claims for price of goods sold, hire-purchase agreements, pledges, hypothecation, bailment; suits on contract including breach, specific performance, insurance, indemnity, guarantee; suits on tort including defamation, nuisance; suits on trusts and trusteeship concerning affairs of trust properties; suits for declaratory decrees and injunctions; suits for dissolution of partnerships, societies, marriages; suits relating to religious or charitable endowments, religious office; suits for possession and compensation by victims of wrongful confinement; and suits in connection with any of the above matters. The enumeration under Section 15 is inclusive and not exhaustive. The civil courts have wide jurisdiction over all suits of civil nature not expressly excluded under the CPC. Section 9 read with the First Schedule specifies categories of suits excluded from cognizance of the civil courts. Common exclusions include suits before Revenue Courts relating to agricultural land, taxation disputes. Other exclusions cover matters under specialized statutes and tribunals. Subject to exclusions, the civil courts exercise plenary jurisdiction over civil disputes. ## **Institution of Suits – Plaint** A suit is instituted by presenting a plaint in duplicate before the court. Order IV deals with the formatting requirements of a plaint. Order VII deals with the contents of a plaint. The plaint shall state clearly and concisely the material facts, grounds of cause of action, details of parties, valuation for jurisdictional purposes, reliefs or remedies claimed, and jurisdiction. The plaintiff shall plead and provide details regarding every material fact intended to be relied upon at the trial. Any documents relied upon by plaintiff must be included with plaint. The plaint must demonstrate that the civil court has territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The valuation shall be reasonable and made in good faith. Insufficient valuation can lead to rejection of plaint. The plaint shall disclose a cause of action indicating the right or grievance which the plaintiff seeks to enforce. Cause of action refers to the media upon which plaintiff asks for relief. The plaint must disclose title, interest, claim of plaintiff over the subject matter. The relief claimed may include recovery of possession, injunction, specific performance, damages or compensation. ## **Issuance of Summons** On presentation, the plaint shall be numbered, registered and fixed for preliminary hearing before issuance of summons to the defendant. The court examines the plaint for any defects under Order VII Rule 11. The plaint can be rejected if barred by law, insufficiently stamped, no cause of action, improperly valued, or filed before wrong court. If the plaint discloses a cause of action, the court will issue summons to the defendant. The summons requires the defendant to appear before the court on a specified date to answer the claim. It provides intimation to the defendant regarding the initiation of civil action against him. Under Order V Rule 9, the court may order substituted service of summons if defendant avoids service or his whereabouts are not known. The court could proceed ex-parte if summons duly served is not obeyed by the defendant. ## **Written Statement** On appearance, the defendant is required to file a written statement under Order VIII Rule 1 within 30 days dealing with the plaintiff’s claims. The written statement shall state what allegations are admitted or denied, on what grounds, and any additional facts regarding the dispute. It provides an opportunity to the defendant to present his defence contesting the suit. The defendant may also make a counterclaim against the plaintiff or file a set off to adjust any amount claimable from the plaintiff. The defendant may also take out a chamber summons for unconditional leave to defend the suit under Order 37 Rule 2. This provides time to the defendant to file a written statement. The defendant may also file an application requesting the court to reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 if it does not disclose a cause of action, barred by law, insufficiently stamped, misjoined parties, wrong valuation etc.\\ ## **Framing of Issues** On completion of pleadings, the court will frame issues under Order XIV Rule 1. Issues are points formulated based on material propositions of fact and law alleged by parties. The court examines the points of controversy between the parties and crystallizes such points into issues. The court shall frame separate issues on each substantial question of fact or law raised by the parties. Issues help identify points in dispute which need to be tried and decided by the court. The court must frame issues on all contentious questions which must be adjudicated for effective disposal of the suit. The issues provide a blueprint for the trial, demarcating the area of inquiry. Only issues framed and not others can be adjudicated upon by the court. ## **Trial** After framing issues, the court proceeds with the trial of suit. The burden of proving the issues lies on the party which asserts the affirmative issues, normally the plaintiff. The plaintiff is required to adduce evidence first to prove his case under Order XVIII Rule 1. The plaintiff shall submit an examination-in-chief of his witnesses and tender documents in his possession. Thereafter, the witnesses may be cross-examined by the defendant. After the plaintiff’s evidence concludes, the defendant must lead rebuttal evidence under Order XVIII Rule 2. The defendant may examine himself and other witnesses, supported by relevant documents, to contradict the evidence of plaintiff and prove his defence. The plaintiff is provided an opportunity for cross-examination of defendant’s witnesses. The court has power to control the trial by imposing time limits, regulating the number of witnesses or mode of evidence being adduced. The court may conduct local inspection or engage court commissioners or experts to assess evidence as required. The court must administer oath before taking examination or evidence of parties. After consideration of evidence led by both sides, the court may examine the parties or their agents under Order X Rule 1 to extract clarifications on relevant aspects. The examination helps elucidate material facts not brought out clearly from evidence. After trial procedures conclude, the court fixes the suit for final arguments. ## **Final Arguments** In the final arguments stage, counsel for both parties elaborate on their factual and legal submissions seeking adjudication of issues in their favor. The plaintiff’s counsel highlights evidence adduced to substantiate factual claims and explains how legal propositions relied upon support the relief claimed. The defendant’s counsel rebuts plaintiff’s submissions by countering factual assertions and distinguishing their legal predicates. The counsel provides an overview of their factual and legal narratives, interpretation of evidence and applicable legal principles to enable the court to appreciate their submissions in the context of issues framed. The court may clarify doubts, pose queries or seek clarification on aspects it finds unclear or require elaboration. The court may reserve judgment and pronounce the final order later. ## **Judgment and Decree** The court shall pass judgment under Order XX Rule 1 resolving the issues framed, either affirming or negating such issues. The judgment analyses factual and legal matters, discusses evidence, weighs the rival contentions and records findings on each of the issues adjudicating upon the dispute. The judgment is followed by a decree which encapsulates the operative conclusions of the judgment. The decree declares specific reliefs allowed and specifies the amounts, properties or acts ordered. The decree conclusively determines the rights of parties. However, where certain issues are left undetermined, the court may pass a preliminary decree adjudicating upon settled issues reserving any subsequent decision for later consideration. The court may direct further enquiries or taking of accounts for passing a final decree fully determining the suit. ## **Appeals and Revision** A decree or order passed by the civil court is appealable under Sections 96 – 99. First appeal against decree lies before the District Court. Second appeal lies before the High Court on substantial question of law. Interlocutory orders are appealable if it decides preliminary issues concerning jurisdiction, valuation, rejection of plaint, addition of parties or cause of action. Revision application under Section 115 is maintainable against orders which fail to exercise jurisdiction or acting beyond jurisdiction. The hierarchy of appeals enables appropriate higher forums to remedy errors in judgments passed by subordinate courts. This provides continuity in corrective process. Section 100A also allows the High Court to withdraw any appeal and transfer it to itself if it involves substantial questions of law requiring settlement. ## **Execution of Decrees** A decree may be executed under Order XXI either by the court which passed it or the court to which it is sent for execution. Decrees for payment of money, delivery of property, injunctions, declaratory decrees, or requiring performance of any specific act are executable. The decree may be executed by attachment and sale of judgment debtor’s property, appointment of receiver, arrest and detention of judgment debtor or other means. Where the decree is not fully satisfied by the judgment debtor, the decree holder may initiate fresh execution proceedings. **Categories:** Articles, Civil Procedure Law --- ### [Decree, Judgment, Order, Foreign Court, Foreign Judgment, Mesne Profits, Affidavit, Suit, Plaint, Written Statement under CPC](https://lawfoyer.in/decree-judgment-order-foreign-court-foreign-judgment-mesne-profits-affidavit-suit-plaint-written-statement-under-crpc/) **Published:** November 28, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## **Decree** A decree is a formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties. A decree may be preliminary or final. A preliminary decree declares the rights and liabilities of the parties leaving the further considerations to be determined in future proceedings. A final decree is one which fully and finally disposes of the suit. As per Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, a decree includes rejection of a plaint and determination of any question within section 144 of CPC but shall not include, (a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or (b) any order of dismissal for default. A decree may be partly preliminary and partly final. A decree shall contain the number of the suit, the names and descriptions of the parties, their registered addresses, and particulars of the claim. It should specifically state the relief granted or other determination of the suit. The decree should also state the amount of costs incurred and by whom it shall be paid. A decree signed by the Judge and bearing the seal of the Court is executable as a formal judgment without any further proceedings. ## **Judgment** The judgment means the statement given by the Judge on the grounds of decree or order. As per Order XX Rule 6, the judgment shall contain a concise statement of the case, the points for determination, the decision thereon, and the reasons for such decision. A judgment combines the decree with the reasons underlying the decree. It embraces decretal order and grounds of the decree. The judgment spells out the verdict of the Court after due consideration of the rights and contentions of the parties. A judgment pronounces conclusively upon the matter in controversy between the parties. ## **Order** An order is the formal expression of any decision of a Civil Court which is not a decree. As per Section 2(14) of CPC, an order is the formal expression of any decision in a civil suit which is not a decree. An order is a step towards the final adjudication and determination of the rights of the parties. It does not finally determine the rights of the parties. An order is generally passed on different procedural aspects/applications during the pendency of the suit. For example, an order may be passed on an application for attachment before judgment or appointment of receiver or injunction etc. An order is appealable if specifically permitted under Section 104 read with Order XLIII of CPC. ## **Foreign Court** As per Section 2(5) of CPC, a Foreign Court is a Court situated outside India and not established or continued by the authority of the Central Government. It does not include the Supreme Court or any High Court exercising jurisdiction in any State. It essentially refers to judicial forums of foreign countries. For a foreign judgment rendered by a Foreign Court to be enforceable in India, the foreign court must have had jurisdiction according to Indian laws. The judgment should have been rendered on merits after following due process. The judgment should also not have been obtained by fraud or based on breach of Indian law. The judgement debtor should have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign court. ## **Foreign Judgment** According to Section 2(6) of CPC, a foreign judgment means the judgment of a foreign Court. A foreign judgment is considered conclusive unless it is established that – 1. The judgment was pronounced by a court which did not have jurisdiction. 2. The judgment was not given on merits of the case. 3. The proceedings in which the judgment was obtained were opposed to natural justice. 4. The judgment was obtained by fraud. 5. The judgment sustains a claim founded on a breach of any law in force in India. A certified copy of a Foreign Judgment may be filed in an Indian Court for execution. The Court shall presume the judgment was pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction unless the contrary appears on record. However, if the judgment does not fall within the exceptions listed above, it is considered conclusive and cannot be impeached for any error of fact or law. ## **Mesne Profits** Mesne profits refer to the profits which a person in wrongful possession of property received or might have received from such property while in possession. As per Section 2(12) of CPC, mesne profits of property mean those profits which the person in wrongful possession of such property received or might have received with ordinary diligence and care while in possession. For example, A illegally takes possession of B’s house and earns rent for several months before the house is restored back to B. The rent amount earned by A constitutes the mesne profits which rightfully belongs to B. The purpose of mesne profits is to compensate the rightful owner for the loss of income while their property was in wrongful possession. It acts as damages for the unlawful occupation. ## **Affidavit** An affidavit means any statement of fact confirmed by an oath or affirmation. As per Section 2(1) of CPC, an affidavit means a statement in writing signed by the deponent and affirmed by oath before a person having authority to administer an oath. An affidavit contains a written sworn statement of facts voluntarily made by an affiant or deponent under an oath or affirmation administered by a person authorized to do so by law. Affidavits are used as evidence in civil proceedings. They are confirmatory statements made under oath before judicial forums. They present facts, data and information in a manner suitable for presentation before the Court. Affidavits must contain only facts which the deponent believes to be true and correct. Any false statements may attract penalties for perjury. ## **Suit** As per Section 2(l) of CPC, a suit refers to any civil proceeding initiated by a plaint or petition filed before a court of law. It refers to a litigation or judicial action initiated by one party against another for enforcement of a legal right. The plaintiff who files the suit is called the suitor. The suit commences from the presentation of the plaint. The suit encompasses the entire proceedings from filing until execution of decree or final judgment. It continues until the litigation is live before the court. A suit terminates only on the passing of a decree or dismissal of the plaint. Multiple issues or claims may be incorporated within the same suit. The court exercises jurisdiction by virtue of the institution of the suit. ## **Plaint** A plaint refers to the formal written statement filed by the plaintiff which initiates a civil suit. As per Order VII Rule 1 of CPC, the plaint shall state the facts, grounds of cause of action, valuation, jurisdiction, details of parties, and the relief claimed by the plaintiff. It provides information which is necessary to enable the court to determine whether it has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The plaint sets out the cause of action detailing the plaintiff’s claims which are sought to be enforced by the suit. ## **Written Statement** A written statement refers to the reply statement filed by the defendant responding to the plaint and its material allegations. As per Order VIII Rule 1 of CPC, the defendant should file a written statement dealing with each claim in the plaint with his set-off and counterclaim, if any. The written statement enables the defendant to present his version of the facts and contention in the proceedings. The written statement shall state which allegations in the plaint are admitted, which are denied, and the facts based on which allegations are denied. It should also state any special knowledge the defendant has regarding the facts of the case. The written statement provides the defendant an opportunity to contest the proceedings and resist the relief claimed in the suit. It outlines the defence taken by the defendant. In summary, these key terms relate to the adjudicatory machinery, processes and procedures involved in the conduct of civil suits as per the Code of Civil Procedure. The definitions and scope provided under the CPC establish the framework for the initiation, processing, trial, adjudication and execution of civil disputes in India. **Categories:** Articles, Civil Procedure Law --- ### [](https://lawfoyer.in/global-credit-capital-limited-anr-vs-sach-marketing-pvt-ltd-anr/) **Published:** November 24, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** This case pertains to the interpretation of Sections 5(6), 5(8), and 5(21) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). It specifically examines whether amounts described as security deposits under service agreements constitute financial debt, operational debt, or neither. **Content:** **Categories:** Uncategorised --- ### [MAHAKALI SUJATHA vs. THE BRANCH MANAGER, FUTURE GENERALI INDIA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED & ANOTHER](https://lawfoyer.in/mahakali-sujatha-vs-the-branch-manager-future-generali-india-life-insurance-company-limited-another/) **Published:** November 22, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** This case addresses the dispute over the repudiation of life insurance claims under policies issued to the deceased by Future Generali India Life Insurance Company. The insurer denied the claims based on alleged material suppression of existing insurance policies by the insured. **Content:** ### A) Abstract / Headnote This case addresses the dispute over the repudiation of life insurance claims under policies issued to the deceased by Future Generali India Life Insurance Company. The insurer denied the claims based on alleged material suppression of existing insurance policies by the insured. The complainant, the insured’s daughter and nominee, contended that the insurer failed to substantiate its allegations with documentary proof. Key legal principles such as **Section 45 of the Insurance Act, 1938 (pre-amendment)**, **burden of proof under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872**, and the **contra proferentem rule** guided the Supreme Court’s reasoning. The court scrutinized the insurer’s evidence and observed that the burden of proof for alleging fraudulent suppression rests squarely with the insurer, which it failed to meet. The Court ultimately set aside the repudiation, reinforcing the principle of **uberrimae fidei** and clarifying the obligations of both insurer and insured in life insurance contracts. ### Keywords: Insurance repudiation, **Section 45 of Insurance Act**, burden of proof, **contra proferentem rule**, consumer rights. #### B) Case Details i) **Judgment Cause Title:** *Mahakali Sujatha v. The Branch Manager, Future Generali India Life Insurance Company Limited & Another* ii) **Case Number:** Civil Appeal No. 3821 of 2024 iii) **Judgment Date:** 10 April 2024 iv) **Court:** Supreme Court of India v) **Quorum:** Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Augustine George Masih vi) **Author:** Justice B.V. Nagarathna vii) **Citation:** \[2024\] 4 S.C.R. 724; 2024 INSC 296 viii) **Legal Provisions Involved:** - **Insurance Act, 1938, Section 45 (Pre-amendment)** - **Evidence Act, 1872, Sections 101-103, 106** - **Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (Protection of Policyholders’ Interests) Regulations, 2002** ix) **Judgments Overruled by the Case (if any):** No explicit overruling but distinguished from **Reliance Life Insurance Co Ltd v. Rekhaben Nareshbhai Rathod**. x) **Case Related to Law Subjects:** Insurance Law, Consumer Law, Contract Law, Law of Evidence. ### C) Introduction and Background of Judgment The case revolves around the repudiation of life insurance claims on grounds of alleged non-disclosure of pre-existing insurance policies. The appellant, Mahakali Sujatha, is the nominee of the deceased insured, who held two policies from Future Generali. The policies promised accidental death benefits. Following the insured’s death in an accident, the claims were rejected, citing fraudulent suppression of material facts. The District Forum and State Commission ruled in favor of the complainant, but the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) reversed the decisions. The appellant approached the Supreme Court challenging the NCDRC’s findings. ### D) Facts of the Case 1. The deceased insured took two life insurance policies worth ₹4,50,000 and ₹4,80,000 in 2009 and 2010, respectively. The appellant was the nominee. 2. The insured died in a train accident on 28 February 2011. The appellant filed claims for the policy benefits, which were repudiated by the insurer on 31 December 2011. 3. The insurer alleged the insured suppressed material information about 15 prior insurance policies from other insurers, totaling ₹71,27,702. 4. The appellant contested the insurer’s claims, arguing no documentary evidence substantiated the suppression allegations. 5. While the District Forum and State Commission ruled against the insurer for lack of evidence, the NCDRC accepted the insurer’s version based on an affidavit listing the alleged policies. ### E) Legal Issues Raised 1. Whether the insurer was justified in repudiating the claims on grounds of material suppression of pre-existing insurance policies. 2. Whether the burden of proof was adequately discharged by the insurer under Section 45 of the Insurance Act, 1938. 3. Whether the contra proferentem rule applied to the ambiguous terms in the proposal form. ### F) Petitioner/Appellant’s Arguments 1. The appellant contended the insurer failed to provide credible evidence proving the insured held prior policies. 2. Section 45 of the Insurance Act required the insurer to establish fraudulent suppression and materiality of facts, which was not done. 3. The insurer relied on unsubstantiated tabulated data without corroborative documentary or oral evidence. 4. Ambiguities in the proposal form’s queries regarding pre-existing policies should be interpreted in favor of the insured, invoking the contra proferentem rule. ### G) Respondent’s Arguments 1. The insurer argued that the insured deliberately withheld information about 15 prior insurance policies. 2. The non-disclosure violated the principle of utmost good faith (uberrimae fidei), rendering the policies void. 3. The insurer relied on details listed in an affidavit and contended that these were not refuted by the appellant. 4. The respondent invoked the Supreme Court’s ruling in *Reliance Life Insurance Co Ltd v. Rekhaben Nareshbhai Rathod*, which upheld repudiation in similar circumstances. ### H) Judgment #### a. Ratio Decidendi 1. Section 45 of the Insurance Act requires the insurer to prove fraudulent suppression and materiality of non-disclosed facts. 2. The insurer’s evidence (an affidavit listing alleged prior policies) lacked corroboration through documentary or oral evidence. 3. The contra proferentem rule mandated interpreting ambiguities in the proposal form in favor of the insured. #### b. Obiter Dicta 1. The principle of **uberrimae fidei** imposes reciprocal duties of disclosure on both parties to an insurance contract. 2. The NCDRC erred by presuming the insurer’s allegations to be valid without sufficient proof. #### c. Guidelines (If Any) 1. Insurers must substantiate allegations of material suppression with clear, corroborative evidence. 2. Courts must carefully examine ambiguities in proposal forms and interpret them in favor of the insured. ### I) Conclusion & Comments The Supreme Court’s judgment reinforces consumer protection principles, emphasizing insurers’ burden of proof in repudiation cases. It underscores the reciprocal duties of good faith in insurance contracts and clarifies the applicability of Section 45 of the Insurance Act. The decision sets a significant precedent, balancing insurer rights with consumer interests. ### J) References #### a. Important Cases Referred 1. *Reliance Life Insurance Co Ltd v. Rekhaben Nareshbhai Rathod* (2019) 6 SCC 175 2. *Mithoolal Nayak v. Life Insurance Corporation of India* AIR 1962 SC 814 3. *Manmohan Nanda v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.* (2022) 4 SCC 582 4. *Sahara India Life Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rayani Ramanjaneyulu* (2014) SCC OnLine NCDRC 525 #### b. Important Statutes Referred 1. Insurance Act, 1938, Section 45 2. Evidence Act, 1872, Sections 101-106 3. Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority Regulations, 2002 **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [16th LawFoyer Quiz on Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) & Indian Penal Code (IPC): Register by 16th November](https://lawfoyer.in/16th-national-quiz-on-bhartiya-nyaya-sanhita-bns-indian-penal-code-ipc-by-lawfoyer-register-by-16th-november/) **Published:** October 6, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Final-Poster-149-724x1024.jpg) --- [Download Updated Answer Key](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Answer-Key-on-Bhartiya-Nyaya-Sanhita-BNS-and-Indian-Penal-Code-IPC-1.pdf) --- [Check Results](https://lawfoyer.in/result-of-16th-lawfoyer-quiz-on-bhartiya-nyaya-sanhita-bns-indian-penal-code-ipc/) [Download E-Certificate](https://lawfoyer.in/certificate-of-16th-lawfoyer-quiz-on-bhartiya-nyaya-sanhita-bns-indian-penal-code-ipc/) --- ## Dates - **Date of Quiz:- 17/11/2024** **(5 Pm)** - **Last Date to Apply:-** **16/11/2024, 11:00 pm** - **Result Declaration:-** **21/11/2024** ## Prizes - **1st Prize- Rs 3000 + Winner Trophy** **+ Hardcopy Certificate of (Excellence & Participation)** - **2nd Prize- Rs 1500 + 1st Runner Up Trophy** **+ Hardcopy Certificate of (Excellence & Participation)** - **3rd Prize- Rs 1000 + 2nd Runner Up Trophy** **+ Hardcopy Certificate of (Excellence & Participation)** - **4th-10th Prize- Rs 200 +** **Certificate of (Excellence & Participation)** - **FREE Practice E-Book with 1000 + MCQs for Practice** - **Free 2 AI Plagiarism Report by Turnitin.** - **Participation Certificate for All the Registered Participants** - **Top 10 Rank will get 50% Discount on Publication at LawFoyer International Journal (ISSN: 2583-7753)**. 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(This includes time for filling the basic details like Name, email, etc.) - **Every question carries 04 marks & there will be no negative marking.** - The Result will be declared on **21st November 2024** ([www.lawfoyer.in](https://lawfoyer.in/)). # Registration Form **Categories:** Events, Quiz --- ### [GENERAL DEFENCES OF TORTS](https://lawfoyer.in/general-defences-of-torts/) **Published:** October 29, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ### GENERAL DEFENCES #### VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA **Meaning and Definition** Volenti non fit injuria is a Latin maxim meaning “to a willing person no injury is done”. It is an important defence in tort law. This doctrine states that if a person voluntarily agrees to suffer harm or take a risk they cannot later complain about or sue for damages resulting from that harm or risk. The essence of this defence is that the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk and consented to it. For this defence to apply two key elements must be present: 1. The plaintiff had full knowledge of the risk involved 2. The plaintiff voluntarily accepted that risk Simply knowing that a risk exists is not enough. The plaintiff must have agreed to accept or run the risk. Mere knowledge does not imply assent. **Essentials of the Defence** For the defence of volenti non fit injuria to succeed the defendant must prove: 1. The plaintiff was fully aware of the risk and nature of the harm 2. The plaintiff voluntarily agreed to incur that risk 3. The agreement to incur the risk was freely given 4. The harm suffered falls within the scope of the risk agreed to 5. The plaintiff’s consent was not obtained by fraud or under compulsion The onus is on the defendant to establish all these elements. If any element is missing the defence will fail. **Types of Consent** Consent by the plaintiff can be express or implied: - Express consent – Given explicitly through words or writing - Implied consent – Inferred from the plaintiff’s conduct and circumstances For example inviting someone to your house implies consent for them to enter. Participating in a contact sport implies consent to suffer injuries common in that sport. **Exceptions and Limitations** The defence of volenti non fit injuria does not apply in certain situations: 1. **Rescue cases** – A person who voluntarily tries to rescue someone from danger created by the defendant’s negligence can still sue if injured 2. **Employer-employee relationships** – An employee under economic compulsion to accept a risky job is not considered to have voluntarily assumed the risk 3. **Negligence of the defendant** – The defence does not apply if the harm was caused by the defendant’s negligence rather than an inherent risk the plaintiff accepted 4. **Contractual duty** – The defence cannot be used to avoid a contractual duty of care 5. **Statutory duty** – It cannot be used as a defence for breach of statutory duty in most cases **IMPORTANT CASE LAWS** 1. **Smith v Baker & Sons (1891)** **Facts:** The plaintiff was employed by the defendants to drill holes in rocks. A crane was used to move stones over the plaintiff’s head. The plaintiff was aware of this danger but continued working. A stone fell and injured him. **Held:** The House of Lords held that mere knowledge of the risk was not enough. The plaintiff had not voluntarily agreed to waive his right to sue if injured. The defence of volenti non fit injuria failed. 2. **ICI Ltd v Shatwell (1965)** **Facts:** Two brothers working as shot firers in a quarry deliberately disobeyed safety regulations and tested detonators without taking proper precautions. One brother was injured in the resulting explosion. **Held:** The House of Lords allowed the defence of volenti non fit injuria. The injured brother had full knowledge of the risk and voluntarily agreed to run it by deliberately ignoring safety rules. 3. **Titchener v British Railways Board (1983)** **Facts:** The plaintiff was injured while traveling on the outside of a train carriage despite clear warnings not to do so. **Held:** The Court of Appeal held that volenti applied. The plaintiff had voluntarily accepted the obvious risk by choosing to travel dangerously despite warnings. 4. **Morris v Murray (1991)** **Facts:** The plaintiff agreed to go on a short flight with the defendant pilot who was visibly drunk. The plane crashed and the plaintiff was injured. **Held:** The Court of Appeal allowed the volenti defence. By choosing to fly with a drunk pilot the plaintiff had voluntarily accepted an obvious and serious risk. 5. **Kirkham v Chief Constable of Manchester (1990)** **Facts:** A suicidal prisoner hanged himself using his torn-up shirt. His widow sued the police for negligence. **Held:** The Court of Appeal rejected the volenti defence. A mentally ill person could not give true consent to self-harm. The police still owed a duty of care. **Comparison with Contributory Negligence** Volenti non fit injuria and contributory negligence are related but distinct concepts: **Volenti non fit injuria:** - Complete defence if established - Based on voluntary assumption of risk - Plaintiff consents to run the risk - No negligence by plaintiff required **Contributory negligence:** - Partial defence – reduces damages - Based on plaintiff’s lack of care - No consent to risk required - Plaintiff must have been negligent If volenti applies there is no liability. With contributory negligence liability is apportioned based on comparative fault. ## PLAINTIFF THE WRONGDOER – DEFENCE OF TORT **Meaning and Explanation** The defence of “plaintiff the wrongdoer” in tort law is based on the principle that a person should not be able to profit from their own wrongful conduct. This defence argues that if the plaintiff was engaged in illegal or wrongful activity at the time of the alleged tort they may be barred from recovering damages. The rationale is that the law should not assist someone who comes to court with “unclean hands”. However this defence has limited applicability in tort law. The mere fact that the plaintiff was engaged in some illegal or wrongful conduct does not automatically bar their claim. There must be a sufficient connection between the plaintiff’s wrongdoing and the harm suffered. **Legal Maxim** The legal maxim underlying this defence is “***ex turpi causa non oritur actio***” which means “from a dishonorable cause an action does not arise”. This maxim originates from contract law but has been applied in some tort cases as well. **Application in Tort Law** In tort law the application of this defence is more restricted compared to contract law. The general principle is that the mere fact that the plaintiff was a wrongdoer does not disentitle them from recovering damages for harm caused by the defendant’s tortious act. For the defence to succeed the defendant must show that: 1. The plaintiff’s wrongful conduct was the direct cause of the harm suffered 2. There is a sufficient connection between the illegality and the tort claim 3. Allowing the claim would be contrary to public policy The courts are reluctant to completely bar tort claims on this ground as it may leave genuine victims without remedy. The wrongful conduct of the plaintiff is more commonly considered in assessing contributory negligence rather than as a complete defence. **IMPORTANT CASES** **Bird v Holbrook (1828)** **Facts:** The plaintiff trespassed into the defendant’s garden and was injured by a spring gun set up by the defendant without any warning notice. **Held:** The plaintiff was entitled to damages despite being a trespasser. The defendant’s act of setting up the spring gun without notice was considered excessive. **Revill v Newbery (1996)** **Facts:** The plaintiff a burglar was shot and injured by the defendant homeowner while attempting to break in. **Held:** The homeowner was liable as the force used was excessive. The plaintiff’s illegal conduct did not bar the claim entirely but reduced damages for contributory negligence. **Exceptions and Limitations** There are some situations where the plaintiff’s wrongful conduct may bar recovery: 1. Where allowing the claim would permit the plaintiff to profit from their own crime 2. Where the tort claim is so closely connected to the plaintiff’s illegal enterprise that allowing it would appear to condone the illegality 3. Where the plaintiff suffers injury while voluntarily participating in a serious criminal joint enterprise with the defendant **Comparison with Contributory Negligence** The defence of plaintiff the wrongdoer should be distinguished from contributory negligence: 1. Plaintiff the wrongdoer is a complete defence while contributory negligence only reduces damages 2. Plaintiff the wrongdoer involves intentional wrongdoing while contributory negligence involves carelessness 3. Plaintiff the wrongdoer focuses on the illegality of conduct while contributory negligence considers the reasonableness of conduct ## INEVITABLE ACCIDENT AS DEFENCE OF TORT **Meaning and Definition** Inevitable accident refers to an unexpected injury that could not have been foreseen or avoided despite reasonable care by the defendant. It serves as a complete defence to liability in tort law. According to Pollock an inevitable accident “does not mean absolutely inevitable but it means not avoidable by any such precautions as a reasonable man doing such an act then and there could be expected to take.” The key elements are: - The injury was unexpected - It could not have been foreseen - It could not have been avoided even with reasonable care - The defendant neither intended to cause injury nor was negligent **Essentials of Inevitable Accident** For the defence of inevitable accident to succeed the defendant must prove: 1. The accident was not foreseeable by a reasonable person in the defendant’s position 2. The accident was not preventable even if reasonable precautions were taken 3. The defendant was not negligent in any way that contributed to the accident 4. The accident occurred despite the defendant exercising reasonable care and skill 5. There was no practical way for the defendant to avoid or prevent the accident **Exceptions to Inevitable Accident Defence** The defence of inevitable accident does not apply in the following situations: 1. If the event was foreseeable and consequences could have been avoided by reasonable precautions 2. If there was any negligence on part of the defendant that contributed to the accident 3. If the defendant failed to take due care and precautions that a reasonable person would have taken 4. If the accident occurred due to a defect in the defendant’s property or equipment which could have been discovered by proper inspection 5. In cases of absolute liability or strict liability where foreseeability and fault are irrelevant **Comparison with Act of God** While inevitable accident and act of God are similar defences there are some key differences: **Inevitable Accident:** - Can involve human agency - Not limited to natural forces - Broader in scope **Act of God:** - Involves only natural forces - No human intervention - More limited in scope Both defences require the event to be unforeseeable and unavoidable. However act of God is limited to extraordinary natural occurrences while inevitable accident can include human actions. **Negligence v/s Inevitable Accident** For the defence of inevitable accident to succeed it is crucial that there was no negligence on part of the defendant. Some key points regarding negligence and inevitable accident: - Even a slight degree of negligence will negate this defence - The standard of care expected is that of a reasonable prudent person - Failure to take reasonable precautions amounts to negligence - If the accident could have been prevented by exercising due care it is not inevitable - Foreseeable risks must be guarded against to avoid negligence **Defences Distinguished from Inevitable Accident** 1. **Act of God:** Limited to extraordinary natural events while inevitable accident can include human agency 2. **Volenti non fit injuria:** Requires consent of plaintiff while inevitable accident involves no consent 3. **Contributory negligence:** Involves fault of plaintiff while in inevitable accident neither party is at fault 4. **Necessity:** Deliberate choice to cause harm while inevitable accident is unintentional 5. **Mistake:** Involves error of judgment while inevitable accident involves no error just unforeseen event **Legal Principles** Some key legal principles related to inevitable accident are: - It is a complete defence if successfully established - The burden of proof lies on the defendant to show it was an inevitable accident - A very high degree of care is expected of the defendant - Mere difficulty in avoiding the accident is not enough it must have been practically impossible to prevent - Foreseeability of the general risk is not enough it must have been unforeseeable in the specific circumstances **IMPORTANT CASE LAWS** **Stanley v. Powell \[1891\]** **Facts:** The plaintiff and defendant were members of a shooting party. The defendant fired at a pheasant but the shot glanced off an oak tree and injured the plaintiff. **Held:** The injury was accidental and the defendant was not liable as it was an inevitable accident that could not have been foreseen or prevented. **Holmes v. Mather \[1875\]** **Facts:** The defendant’s horses were startled by a dog barking. Despite the driver’s best efforts to control them they knocked down the plaintiff. **Held:** The defendant was not liable as it was an inevitable accident beyond the driver’s control despite exercising due care. **Brown v. Kendall \[1850\]** **Facts:** While trying to separate two fighting dogs the defendant accidentally hit the plaintiff in the eye who was standing nearby. **Held:** It was a case of pure accident for which no action could lie as it was unforeseeable and unavoidable. ## ACT OF GOD **Meaning and Definition** Act of God serves as a valid defence in tort law. It refers to extraordinary natural events that could not have been reasonably foreseen or guarded against. The defence applies when damage results from natural forces without human intervention. Courts have defined Act of God as an extraordinary occurrence or circumstance which could not have been foreseen and which could not have been guarded against. **Essential Elements** For the Act of God defence to apply two key elements must be present: 1. There must be working of natural forces 2. The occurrence must be extraordinary and not one which could be anticipated and reasonably guarded against 3. The event must arise from natural causes directly and exclusively without human intervention. It must be something which no amount of foresight pains and care reasonably to be expected could have prevented. **Distinction from Other Defences** Act of God differs from inevitable accident in that it involves natural forces rather than human actions. Unlike private defence it does not involve intentional harm to an innocent party. The key is that the event was unforeseeable and its consequences unavoidable despite reasonable precautions. **Examples of Act of God Events** Courts have recognized the following as potential Acts of God: 1. Exceptionally heavy rainfall 2. Storms and tempests 3. Tidal waves 4. Earthquakes 5. Volcanic eruptions However normal rainfall or weather patterns that could be anticipated do not qualify as Acts of God. The occurrence must be truly extraordinary. **IMPORTANT CASES** **Nichols v. Marsland (1876)** **Facts:** The defendant created artificial lakes by damming streams. An extraordinary heavy rainfall caused the embankments to give way washing away the plaintiff’s bridges. **Held:** The defendants were not liable as the loss occurred due to an Act of God. The rainfall was stated to be the heaviest in human memory and could not have been reasonably anticipated. **Kallulal v. Hemchand (1958)** **Facts:** A wall collapsed during 2.66 inches of rainfall killing two children. **Held:** The Madhya Pradesh High Court ruled this was not an Act of God. That level of rainfall during monsoon season was foreseeable and should have been guarded against. **Ramalinga Nadar v. Narayan Reddiar (1971)** **Facts:** Goods were stolen from the defendant’s lorry by an unruly mob. **Held:** The Kerala High Court ruled criminal activities of a mob cannot be considered an Act of God. Only events traced to natural forces with no human intervention qualify. **Key Legal Principles** 1. The Act of God must be the sole cause of the damage without any contributing human negligence 2. Normal weather patterns or natural events that are foreseeable do not qualify 3. The defendant bears the burden of proving it was an Act of God 4. Human activities that merely trigger a natural event do not negate the defence **Limitations on Act of God Defence** The defence has been limited in several ways by courts: 1. It does not apply if human negligence contributed to the damage 2. Foreseeable natural events even if severe may not qualify 3. Man-made hazards exacerbated by natural forces are not Acts of God 4. Gradual natural processes like erosion are not sudden Acts of God ## PRIVATE DEFENCE **Meaning and Definition** Private defence refers to the legal right to use reasonable force to protect oneself or one’s property from unlawful harm. It serves as a valid defence against tort liability in certain circumstances. The law permits individuals to take necessary action to safeguard their person or possessions when faced with imminent threat even if it results in harm to the aggressor. **Essentials of Private Defence** To successfully claim private defence several key elements must be established: 1. **Imminent Threat:** There must be an immediate danger to one’s person or property. Mere apprehension of future harm is insufficient. 2. **Reasonable Force:** The force used in defence must be proportionate to the threat faced. Excessive force negates the defence. 3. **Necessity:** Private defence can only be invoked when absolutely necessary to prevent harm. Alternative non-violent options if available should be exhausted first. 4. **Good Faith:** The defender must have an honest belief that defensive action was required even if that belief later proves mistaken. 5. **Against Wrongdoer:** Force can only be used against the actual aggressor not innocent third parties. **Scope and Limitations** While private defence provides legal protection it is not an absolute right and has defined boundaries: 1. **Defence of Person:** Individuals can use reasonable force to protect themselves or others from physical assault or unlawful detention. 2. **Defence of Property:** Reasonable measures can be taken to prevent trespass theft or damage to one’s property. 3. **No Retaliation:** Force cannot be used as revenge after the threat has ended. It must be contemporaneous with the attack. 4. **No Excessive Force:** The response must be proportional. Deadly force is only justified to prevent death or grievous harm. 5. **Duty to Retreat:** In some jurisdictions there may be a duty to retreat if safe to do so before using force. 6. **Against State Action:** Generally private defence cannot be claimed against lawful actions of state authorities. **Legal Provisions** The right of private defence finds recognition in various statutes: 1. **Bharatiya Nyay Sanhita:** Sections 34 to 44 talk about the right of private defence of body and property. 2. **Indian Penal Code 1860:** Sections 96 to 106 detail the right of private defence of body and property. 3. **Criminal Procedure Code 1973:** Section 46 allows use of force to resist wrongful arrest. 4. **Arms Act 1959:** Section 22 permits possession and use of arms in private defence. **IMPORTANT CASE LAWS** Several landmark judgments have shaped the jurisprudence on private defence: 1. **Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab (2010):** Supreme Court held that right of private defence extends to defending any stranger not just one’s relations. 2. **Vidhya Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1971):** Laid down that private defence can be claimed even against acts done under a mistaken impression of right. 3. **Munney Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1970):** Clarified that threat perception must be judged from defender’s viewpoint not with the wisdom of hindsight. 4. **James Martin v. State of Kerala (2004):** Emphasized that private defence is a right and duty promoting rule of law not lawlessness. 5. **Bhagwan Swarup v. State of UP (2008):** Ruled that force used in defence must not exceed what is strictly necessary to repel attack. **Types of Private Defence** Private defence can be broadly classified into two categories: **Defence of Person:** This includes: 1. Self-defence against physical assault 2. Defence of family members or strangers 3. Prevention of kidnapping or wrongful confinement **Defence of Property:** This covers: 1. Protection against trespass 2. Safeguarding movable and immovable property 3. Prevention of theft mischief or destruction **Doctrines Related to Private Defence** Certain key legal doctrines govern the application of private defence: 1. **Doctrine of Necessity:** Private defence is rooted in the principle that extraordinary situations may require extraordinary responses. 2. **Doctrine of Reasonableness:** The force used must be reasonable judged from the position of a person of ordinary prudence. 3. **Doctrine of Imminence:** There must be immediate apprehension of danger not merely future or past threats. 4. **Doctrine of Proportionality:** The harm inflicted in defence should not be disproportionate to the harm sought to be averted. **Exceptions to Private Defence** Private defence cannot be claimed in certain situations: 1. **Against Lawful Acts:** No defence lies against acts done by public servants in good faith under color of office. 2. **Sufficient Time to Recourse:** If there is opportunity to seek help from public authorities private defence may not apply. 3. **Excessive Force:** Use of force more than what is necessary vitiates the defence. 4. **Self-induced Confrontation:** An attack cannot be deliberately provoked to claim private defence is impermissible. 5. **Initial Aggressor:** Generally an aggressor cannot claim private defence unless they withdraw from conflict. **Comparison with Criminal Law** While private defence in tort law shares similarities with criminal law some key differences exist: 1. **Burden of Proof:** In criminal cases the prosecution must disprove private defence. In torts defendant bears the onus. 2. **Standard of Proof:** Criminal law requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. Civil cases follow preponderance of probabilities. 3. **Consequences:** Criminal law provides immunity from punishment. Tort law only exempts from civil liability. 4. **Scope:** Criminal law allows defence of strangers. Tort law traditionally focused on self-defence and defence of close relations. ## MISTAKE AS DEFENCE OF TORT **Meaning and Explanation** Mistake refers to an incorrect belief or understanding about a fact or legal position. In tort law mistake generally does not serve as a valid defence to liability. This means a defendant who commits a tort based on a mistaken belief is usually still held responsible for the resulting harm. The underlying principle is that a person should bear the consequences of their actions even if done under an honest misapprehension. **General Rule: No Defence** The general rule is that mistake whether of fact or law does not provide a defence to tortious liability. This applies to most intentional torts as well as negligence claims. Some key aspects of this rule are: 1. A defendant who mistakenly believes they have a right to interfere with another’s property or person is still liable for trespass or battery. 2. Mistakenly believing one owns property does not negate liability for trespass to land or goods. 3. An honest but incorrect belief about the lawfulness of one’s conduct is not a defence. 4. Good faith or absence of improper motive does not excuse tortious acts done under mistake. 5. The defendant’s state of mind or intent is generally irrelevant – the focus is on the resulting harm. **Rationale Behind the Rule** There are several policy reasons why mistake is not accepted as a general defence in tort law: 1. It incentivizes people to be careful and verify facts before acting to avoid harming others. 2. It places the burden on the mistaken party rather than the innocent victim. 3. It provides certainty and clarity in the law by focusing on objective conduct rather than subjective beliefs. 4. It aligns with the compensatory aims of tort law to make victims whole for harm suffered. 5. Allowing mistake as a broad defence could enable defendants to easily evade liability. **Exceptions to the Rule** While mistake is not a general defence some specific torts allow mistake to negate liability in certain circumstances: 1. **Defamation:** An honest and reasonable mistake of fact may provide a defence to defamation in some jurisdictions. This recognizes the importance of free speech and good faith reporting. 2. **Malicious Prosecution:** A prosecutor who makes an honest mistake about the facts or law in initiating proceedings is not liable. Malice and lack of reasonable cause must be proven. 3. **Deceit:** An honest belief in the truth of a statement even if mistaken negates liability for fraudulent misrepresentation. The defendant must lack fraudulent intent. 4. **Negligence:** In some cases an honest and reasonable mistake may negate breach of duty. However unreasonable mistakes do not provide a defence. **Mistake of Fact v/s Mistake of Law** Courts sometimes distinguish between mistakes of fact and mistakes of law in determining liability: 1. **Mistake of Fact:** An erroneous belief about a factual circumstance. For example mistakenly thinking a car belongs to you. Generally not a defence in tort law. 2. **Mistake of Law:** An incorrect understanding about legal rights or obligations. For example believing you have a legal right to enter someone’s property. Almost never accepted as a defence. 3. **Mistake of Fact is a better defence than Mistake of Law:** Mistake of law is treated more strictly as everyone is presumed to know the law. Mistake of fact may occasionally provide a defence if it negates the required mental element for certain torts. **IMPORTANT CASES** Several key cases have established and applied the rule that mistake is not a defence in tort law: 1. **Consolidated Co v Curtis \[1892\] 1 Q.B. 495:** An auctioneer who sold goods believing they belonged to his customer was still liable for conversion when it turned out the customer did not own them. His honest mistake was no defence. 2. **Fowler v Lanning \[1959\] 1 QB 426:** The defendant shot the plaintiff mistaking him for a burglar. He was held liable for battery despite the mistake of fact. The court stated mistake is not a defence to intentional torts. 3. **R v Bilbie \[1800\] EWHC KB J6:** Established the principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse whether in criminal or civil matters. This extends to mistake of law in tort cases. **Comparison with Contract Law** The approach to mistake in tort law contrasts with contract law where certain types of mistakes can void a contract: 1. In contract law mutual mistake about a fundamental fact can make an agreement void. 2. Unilateral mistake may sometimes allow rescission of a contract. 3. Mistake of law can occasionally provide relief from contractual obligations. 4. Tort law takes a stricter approach as it deals with non-consensual interactions and aims to compensate victims. ## NECESSITY AS A DEFENCE OF TORT **Meaning and Definition** Necessity is an important defence available in tort law. It allows a person to escape liability for committing an otherwise tortious act if it was done out of necessity to prevent a greater harm. The rationale behind this defence is that sometimes breaking the law may be justified to avoid a more serious evil or danger. According to Salmond necessity is that which makes the conduct of an unlawful act unavoidable in order to escape from a greater peril. The maxim “necessitas non habet legem” meaning “necessity knows no law” aptly captures the essence of this defence. Comparison with Other Defences Necessity should be distinguished from other related defences: - **Private defence:** In necessity harm is inflicted on an innocent party whereas in private defence harm is caused to the wrongdoer. - Inevitable accident: In necessity harm is intended and deliberately inflicted whereas in inevitable accident harm is unintentional despite best efforts to avoid it. - Act of God: Necessity involves human agency whereas Act of God refers to natural forces beyond human control. Essential Elements For the defence of necessity to succeed the following elements must be established: 1. There must be an imminent threat or danger 2. The threat must be to life property or other recognized interest 3. The action taken must be reasonably necessary to avoid the danger 4. The harm caused must not be disproportionate to the harm avoided 5. There must be no reasonable alternative course of action available Types of Necessity Necessity can be of two types: 1. Public necessity: Where action is taken to protect wider public interests. 2. Private necessity: Where action is taken to protect private interests. Generally public necessity provides complete immunity whereas private necessity only provides a qualified defence. Legal Principles Some key legal principles governing necessity as a defence are: - The defence is available only when the danger is imminent and there is no other reasonable alternative. - The action taken must be reasonably necessary and proportionate to avoid the danger. - The defendant must not have been responsible for creating the situation of necessity. - Even if necessity is established compensation may still be payable in some cases. IMPORTANT CASES Some landmark cases that have shaped the law on necessity are: Mouse’s Case (1609) - Facts: Goods were thrown overboard from a barge to prevent it from sinking in a storm. - Held: The action was justified by necessity to save lives. No liability for trespass to goods. **Cope v Sharpe (1912)** - Facts: Defendant entered plaintiff’s land to prevent spread of fire to adjoining property. - Held: Entry was justified by necessity to prevent greater harm. No liability for trespass. **RE F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) (1990)** - Facts: Court allowed sterilization of a mentally disabled woman. - Held: Sterilization was necessary to protect her best interests as she was incapable of consenting. Leigh v Gladstone (1909) - Facts: Forcible feeding of a hunger-striking prisoner was challenged. - Held: The action was justified by necessity to save the prisoner’s life. No liability for battery. Southwark LBC v Williams (1971) - Facts: Homeless families occupied empty council houses. - Held: Necessity could not justify trespass to land in this case as danger was not imminent. Exceptions and Limitations The defence of necessity is subject to certain exceptions and limitations: - It cannot be invoked for homicide except in very rare circumstances. - Economic necessity is generally not accepted as a valid defence. - The defence fails if the defendant was responsible for creating the situation of necessity. - Even if necessity is established compensation may still be payable in some cases. - The defence does not apply if there were reasonable alternatives available. Legal Provisions There are no specific statutory provisions on necessity as a defence in tort law. It has evolved through common law. However some statutes recognize necessity in specific contexts: - Section 81 of Indian Penal Code recognizes necessity as a defence in criminal law. - Section 52 of Indian Forest Act allows entry into reserved forests in emergencies. - Section 38 of Police Act provides immunity for acts done in good faith. Doctrines and Theories Some key doctrines and theories related to necessity are: - Doctrine of lesser evil: Breaking the law is justified to prevent a greater harm. - Theory of social utility: Necessary actions serve a greater social purpose. - Utilitarian theory: Actions that produce the greatest good for the greatest number are justified. Maxims and Principles Some relevant legal maxims are: - *Necessitas non habet legem* – Necessity knows no law - *Quod necessitas cogit defendit* – What necessity forces it justifies - *Necessitas publica major est quam privata* – Public necessity is greater than private necessity. ## STATUTORY AUTHORITY **Meaning and Definition** Statutory authority refers to the legal defence that protects a person or entity from liability for actions taken under powers granted by legislation. It provides immunity against tort claims when harm results from lawfully exercising statutory powers. This defence recognizes that Parliament may authorize conduct that would otherwise be tortious. **Legal Basis and Rationale** The rationale behind statutory authority as a defence stems from the principle that what is authorized by law cannot be wrongful. Parliament through legislation may permit certain activities for public benefit even if they cause harm to individuals. The defence balances public good against private rights. It prevents courts from indirectly negating powers granted by the legislature. **Essential Elements** For statutory authority to succeed as a defence the following key elements must be established: - The defendant’s actions were explicitly or implicitly authorized by statute - The defendant acted within the scope of powers granted - Any resulting harm was an inevitable consequence of exercising those powers - Reasonable care was taken in exercising the statutory powers - The statute does not provide for compensation for the specific harm caused **Scope and Limitations** While statutory authority provides a strong defence it is not absolute. Courts interpret its scope narrowly to protect individual rights. The defence only covers actions reasonably necessary to fulfill statutory objectives. It does not extend to negligent exercise of powers or ultra vires acts. Liability may still arise if the defendant had discretion in how to exercise the power. **Types of Statutory Authority** Statutory authority as a defence can be categorized into two main types: 1. Absolute Authority: This provides complete immunity even if the authorized act inevitably causes harm or nuisance. For instance railway companies often have absolute authority to construct and operate rail lines despite noise or vibrations affecting nearby properties. 2. Conditional Authority: This only permits acts that can be carried out without causing harm or nuisance. The authority is conditional on avoiding unnecessary damage. For example a local council may have conditional authority to construct a hospital as long as it does not create a public nuisance. **Key Legal Principles** Several important legal principles govern the application of statutory authority as a defence: - Strict compliance with statutory conditions is required - The defence only covers damage that is an inevitable result of the authorized act - Negligence in exercising statutory powers is not protected - The defence does not apply if reasonable alternative methods could have avoided the harm - Statutes are presumed not to authorize nuisances unless clearly stated **Defences to Statutory Authority** While statutory authority is itself a defence certain arguments can potentially defeat this defence: - The defendant acted negligently in exercising the statutory power - The harm caused went beyond what was authorized or contemplated by the statute - Alternative methods were available that could have avoided or minimized the harm - The statute provides for compensation for the type of harm caused - The defendant’s actions were ultra vires or outside the scope of authority granted. **IMPORTANT CASES** **Vaughan v. Taff Vale Railway Co. (1860)** - Facts: Sparks from the defendant’s train engine set fire to the plaintiff’s woods. - Held: The railway company was not liable as it was authorized by statute to operate trains and had taken proper precautions. **Hammersmith and City Railway v. Brand (1869)** - Facts: Vibrations from an authorized railway line damaged nearby houses. - Held: No liability as the damage was an inevitable consequence of exercising statutory powers. **Allen v. Gulf Oil Refining Ltd (1981)** - Facts: Oil refinery authorized by statute caused nuisance to neighbors. - Held: Statutory authority provided a complete defence against nuisance claims. **Categories:** Articles, Law of Torts --- ### [REMOTENESS OF DAMAGES UNDER LAW OF TORTS](https://lawfoyer.in/remoteness-of-damages-under-law-of-torts/) **Published:** October 29, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Meaning & Definition** Remoteness of damage refers to the legal principle that limits a defendant’s liability for consequences of their wrongful act. It addresses how far liability extends for the chain of consequences flowing from a tort. The law does not hold a defendant liable for all consequences no matter how remote or unforeseeable. A line must be drawn somewhere to limit liability on practical grounds. As **Lord Wright** stated “*The Law cannot take account of everything that follows a wrongful act; it regards some subsequent matters as outside the scope of its selection because it were infinite for the law to judge the causes of causes or consequences of consequences.*“ The principle of remoteness determines which consequences are too remote to be compensated and which are sufficiently proximate for the defendant to be liable. It limits liability to consequences that have a close causal connection to the wrongful act. **Historical Background** The remoteness principle developed as courts recognized the need to place reasonable limits on tort liability. Two main tests emerged historically: 1. **The test of reasonable foresight:** Liability limited to consequences a reasonable person could foresee. 2. **The test of directness:** Liability for all direct consequences whether foreseeable or not. These competing approaches were reconciled in the landmark **Wagon Mound case** in 1961 which established reasonable foreseeability as the primary test. **Test of Reasonable Foresight** Under this test a defendant is liable only for consequences that could have been reasonably foreseen by a reasonable person in their position. Unforeseeable consequences are considered too remote. This test was articulated in cases like **Rigby v. Hewit** and **Greenland v. Chaplin**. It limits liability to foreseeable harm rather than all possible consequences no matter how unlikely. The reasonable foresight test aims to strike a balance between compensating victims and not imposing excessive liability on defendants for highly improbable consequences. **Test of Directness** The directness test holds defendants liable for all direct consequences of their wrongful act whether foreseeable or not. It focuses on the chain of causation rather than foreseeability. This test was applied in ***Re Polemis and Furness Withy & Co Ltd***. The court held that once an act is negligent the defendant is liable for all direct consequences even if the exact result was not foreseeable. The directness test imposes broader liability than the foreseeability test. It was ultimately rejected as the primary test for remoteness. **The Wagon Mound Case** The seminal case of ***Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock and Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound)*** in 1961 marked a turning point. It rejected the directness test and firmly established reasonable foreseeability as the proper test for remoteness. **Facts:** The defendant’s ship leaked oil into Sydney Harbour. The oil drifted to the plaintiff’s wharf. Sparks from welding ignited the oil damaging the wharf. The defendant could not foresee the oil catching fire. **Issue:** Whether the defendant was liable for the fire damage which was not reasonably foreseeable. **Held:** The Privy Council held the defendant was not liable as the fire damage was not reasonably foreseeable. It rejected the directness test from Re Polemis. The court ruled that a defendant is liable only for damage of a type that was reasonably foreseeable even if the extent of damage was greater than expected. Unforeseeable types of damage are too remote. **Key Principles from Wagon Mound:** 1. Reasonable foreseeability is the proper test for remoteness of damage. 2. A defendant is liable only for damage of a type that was reasonably foreseeable. 3. The defendant need not foresee the exact manner or extent of damage. 4. Unforeseeable types of damage are too remote to be compensated. 5. The directness test from Re Polemis was rejected as unsound. The Wagon Mound case established a narrower scope of liability based on foreseeability rather than mere directness of consequences. It aimed to achieve a fairer balance between compensating victims and limiting excessive liability. **Application in Subsequent Cases** The reasonable foreseeability test from Wagon Mound has been consistently applied in subsequent cases: **Hughes v Lord Advocate (1963):** A child was injured when a paraffin lamp exploded in an unguarded manhole. Held: The defendants were liable as some injury from the lamp was foreseeable even if the exact manner was not. **Doughty v Turner Manufacturing Co (1964):** An asbestos lid fell into molten metal causing an unexpected chemical reaction and explosion. Held: The explosion was unforeseeable so the defendants were not liable for that damage. **S.C.M. (United Kingdom) Ltd v W.J. Whittall & Sons (1971):** A damaged cable cut power to a factory. Held: Loss of production was foreseeable so defendants were liable. These cases show courts applying the foreseeability test to determine whether particular consequences were too remote. **Essentials of Remoteness** The key elements in applying the remoteness principle are: 1. There must be a wrongful act by the defendant. 2. The wrongful act must cause some damage to the plaintiff. 3. The court must determine if the particular damage claimed was reasonably foreseeable. 4. Damage of an unforeseeable type will be considered too remote. 5. The defendant need not foresee the precise details or extent of damage. 6. Once damage of a type is foreseeable the defendant is liable for the full extent. 7. The test is objective based on what a reasonable person would foresee. 8. Foreseeability is judged at the time of the wrongful act not with hindsight. **Types of Damage** Courts distinguish between different types of damage in assessing remoteness: 1. **Physical Injury:** Generally more foreseeable and recoverable. 2. **Property Damage:** Often foreseeable especially to nearby property. 3. **Economic Loss:** May be too remote unless closely tied to physical damage. 4. **Psychiatric Harm:** Recoverable if a recognized psychiatric illness results. The type of damage claimed affects whether it will be considered reasonably foreseeable or too remote. **Exceptions and Limitations** Some exceptions and limitations to the remoteness principle include: - **Egg-shell skull rule:** The defendant must take the victim as they find them. - **Novus actus interveniens:** An unforeseeable intervening act may break the chain of causation. - **Intentional torts:** A wider range of consequences may be recoverable for intentional wrongs. - **Statutory liability:** Legislation may impose liability without the usual remoteness limits. These rules can affect the application of remoteness in particular cases. **Procedure for Assessing Remoteness** Courts follow this general procedure in applying the remoteness principle: 1. Identify the wrongful act of the defendant. 2. Determine what damage resulted from that act. 3. Assess whether that type of damage was reasonably foreseeable. 4. If foreseeable the defendant is liable for the full extent of damage. 5. If unforeseeable the damage is too remote and not recoverable. 6. Consider any relevant exceptions or limitations. The onus is on the defendant to prove the damage was too remote if that is raised as a defense. **Categories:** Articles, Law of Torts --- ### [NUISANCE UNDER LAW OF TORTS](https://lawfoyer.in/nuisance-under-law-of-torts/) **Published:** October 29, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Meaning Definition and Explanation of Nuisance** Nuisance in tort law means unlawful interference with a person’s use or enjoyment of land or some right over or in connection with it. It involves acts interfering with comfort health or safety. The interference may be through noise vibrations heat smoke smell fumes water gas electricity excavation or disease-producing germs. Nuisance differs from trespass in that trespass involves direct physical interference with possession of land while nuisance involves consequential interference with use or enjoyment. **Types of Nuisance** There are two main types of nuisance: 1. **Public Nuisance:** This is interference with the right of the public in general and is punishable as a criminal offence. Examples include obstructing a public way. No individual can bring a civil action unless they suffer some special or particular damage different from what is inflicted on the public as a whole. 2. **Private Nuisance:** This is a civil wrong involving interference with an individual’s use or enjoyment of land. It requires proving: - Unreasonable interference - Interference with use or enjoyment of land - Damage **Essentials of Private Nuisance** 1. **Unreasonable Interference:** The interference must be unreasonable not just any minor disturbance. What is unreasonable varies based on locality. As stated in ***Sturges v. Bridgman (1879)*** “*what would be a nuisance in Belgrade Square would not necessarily be so in Bremondsey.*“ 2. **Interference with Use or Enjoyment of Land:** This can involve: 1. *Injury to the property itself* 2. *Injury to comfort or health of occupants* 3. **Damage:** Unlike trespass actual damage must be proved in nuisance though it is often presumed by law. **Unreasonable Interference** Not every interference constitutes nuisance. The interference must be unreasonable. As stated in ***Radhey Shyam v. Gur Prasad (1978)*** substantial addition to noise in a noisy locality seriously interfering with physical comfort amounts to nuisance. Factors considered include: - *Nature of locality* - *Sensitivity of plaintiff* - *Public good (not a defence)* - *Reasonable care taken (generally not a defence)* In ***Ushaben v. Bhagya Laxmi Chitra Mandir (1978)*** it was held that hurt to religious feelings by exhibiting a film was not actionable nuisance as plaintiffs were free not to watch it. **Interference with Use or Enjoyment of Land** This can occur in two ways: 1. **Injury to Property:** Unauthorized interference causing damage to property through tangible or intangible objects. This was applied in the case of ***Helen’s Smelting Co. v. Tipping (1865)*** where fumes damaged trees and shrubs. 2. **Injury to Comfort/Health:** Substantial interference with comfort and convenience in using premises. Minor inconvenience is not enough. The standard is based on notions of reasonable people as stated in Bland v. Yates (1914). **Nuisance to Incorporeal Property** This includes: 1. **Interference with Right of Support:** There is a natural right of support for land but not buildings unless acquired by grant or prescription. In Stroyan v. Knowles (1861) damage to a factory due to withdrawal of support to land was actionable. 2. **Interference with Right to Light and Air:** In England these are not natural rights but can be acquired by grant or prescription. In India they can be acquired as easements under Section 15 Indian Easements Act and Section 25 Limitation Act. **Damage in Nuisance** Unlike trespass actual damage must be proved in nuisance though it is often presumed by law. In ***Fay v. Prentice (1854)*** projecting cornice raised presumption of rainwater damage to garden. **Nuisance on Highways** Obstructing a highway or creating dangers on or near it constitutes nuisance. Examples include: - Forming queues blocking access ***(Barber v. Penley 1893)*** - Leaving vehicles without proper lights ***(Ware v. Garston Haulage Co. Ltd. 1944)*** - Broken windows near highway ***(Leanse v. Egerton 1943)*** - Excavations projections or dangerous substances on road **Defences to Nuisance** **Effectual Defences:** 1. **Prescriptive Right:** Right to commit nuisance may be acquired by 20 years peaceful open enjoyment as stated in *Sturges v. Bridgman (1879)*. 2. **Statutory Authority:** Acts authorized by statute are not liable for inevitable nuisance as held in *Hammersmith Railway Co. v. Brand (1869)*. **Ineffectual Defences:** 1. **Acts of Others:** Defendant cannot claim his act alone did not cause nuisance. 2. **Public Good:** Benefit to public is no defence as held in *Shelfer v. City of London Electric Lighting Co. (1895)*. 3. **Reasonable Care:** Taking reasonable precautions is generally no defence as per *Rapier v. London Tramways Co. (1893)*. 4. **Plaintiff Coming to Nuisance:** No defence that plaintiff moved to place of existing nuisance as per *Bliss v. Hall (1838)*. **Legal Provisions** The Indian Easements Act 1882 contains relevant provisions: - **Section 15** – Prescriptive rights for light and air - **Section 25** – Period for acquiring easement rights - **Section 33** – Right to sue for disturbance of easement - **The Limitation Act 1963 Section 25** also deals with prescriptive rights for light and air. **Key Case Laws** 1. **Helen’s Smelting Co. v. Tipping (1865) –** Fumes damaging trees constituted nuisance despite industrial locality. 2. **Sturges v. Bridgman (1879) –** Prescriptive right to commit nuisance runs from when act becomes actionable nuisance. 3. **Hollywood Silver Fox Farm Ltd. v. Emmett (1936) –** Malicious acts on own land causing damage to neighbor’s business is nuisance. 4. **Radhey Shyam v. Gur Prasad (1978) –** Substantial noise increase in noisy locality interfering with comfort is nuisance. 5. **Ushaben v. Bhagya Laxmi Chitra Mandir (1978) –** Hurt religious feelings from film not nuisance as plaintiffs could avoid watching. **Legal Maxims and Principles** 1. **De minimis non curat lex** – Law does not concern itself with trifles. 2. **Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas** – Use your property so as not to injure others’ property. 3. **Volenti non fit injuria** – No injury is done to a willing person *(not applicable to nuisance cases)*. **Doctrines** 1. **Coming to the nuisance doctrine** – Not accepted as defence that plaintiff moved to existing nuisance. 2. **Balancing of interests doctrine** – Courts balance rights of both parties in determining reasonableness. **Categories:** Articles, Law of Torts --- ### [DEFAMATION UNDER LAW OF TORTS](https://lawfoyer.in/defamation-under-law-of-torts/) **Published:** October 29, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## MEANING & DEFINITION Defamation refers to injuring a person’s reputation through false statements. It involves publishing defamatory content about someone that tends to lower them in the estimation of right-thinking members of society. The law of defamation aims to protect reputation while balancing freedom of expression. Defamation can occur through spoken words (slander) or written/published content (libel). **Types of Defamation** Defamation is classified into two main types: **Libel:** This refers to defamation in a permanent form like writing printing pictures or statues. A defamatory statement in a newspaper article or book would constitute libel. **Slander:** This involves defamation in a transient form like spoken words or gestures. Verbally calling someone a thief in public would amount to slander. The key distinction is that libel is actionable per se while slander generally requires proof of special damages except in certain cases. However Indian law does not make this distinction for civil liability. ## ESSENTIALS For a statement to constitute defamation the following elements must be present: 1. The statement must be defamatory 2. It must refer to the plaintiff 3. It must be published Let’s examine each of these in detail: **The Statement Must Be Defamatory** A defamatory statement is one which tends to lower a person in the estimation of right-thinking members of society or causes them to be shunned or avoided. It must injure reputation and not merely hurt feelings. Whether a statement is defamatory depends on how reasonable members of society are likely to interpret it. **Some key points regarding defamatory statements:** - The standard applied is that of fair-minded citizens with average intelligence not any special class. - If the likely effect is injury to reputation it is defamatory even if not intended as such. - Mere vulgar abuse or insults are generally not considered defamatory unless they cause ridicule or humiliation. - Even statements of praise may be defamatory depending on the context and innuendo. **The Innuendo** Sometimes a statement may be prima facie innocent but have a latent defamatory meaning known as innuendo. The plaintiff must prove this secondary meaning to establish defamation. For example stating an unmarried woman has given birth could be defamatory due to the innuendo. **The Statement Must Refer to the Plaintiff** The plaintiff must prove the defamatory statement referred to them specifically. It is immaterial if the defendant did not intend to defame that particular person. If reasonable people could infer the statement was about the plaintiff that is sufficient. **Key points on reference to plaintiff:** - **Referring to a group/class:** No individual member can sue unless it can reasonably be considered to refer to them specifically. - **Defamation of deceased persons:** This is generally not actionable in tort law though it may be under criminal law. - **Defamation of companies:** A company can sue for defamation that harms its business reputation. **The Statement Must Be Published** Publication means communicating the defamatory matter to someone other than the person defamed. Mere communication to the plaintiff is not enough as defamation relates to injury to reputation in others’ estimation. **Key points on publication:** - Even dictating to one’s typist amounts to publication. - Sending a defamatory letter only to the plaintiff is not publication. - If a third party wrongfully reads a private letter it is not publication by the writer. - Publication to spouse: Communication between spouses is generally not considered publication. ## DEFENCES TO DEFAMATION The main defences available in a defamation action are: 1. Justification or Truth 2. Fair Comment 3. Privilege (Absolute and Qualified) **Justification or Truth** Truth is a complete defence to civil defamation. The defendant must prove the statement was substantially true. Even if published maliciously truth remains a valid defence. The rationale is that law will not allow damages for injury to a reputation one does not deserve. **Key points on the defence of truth:** - Under criminal law truth alone is not sufficient – it must also be for public good. - If the statement is substantially true minor inaccuracies will not defeat the defence. - The defendant bears the burden of proving truth. **Fair Comment** Fair comment on matters of public interest is a defence to defamation. The essentials are: - It must be a comment/opinion not assertion of fact - The comment must be fair - It must be on a matter of public interest **Key points on fair comment:** - The facts commented on must be true or privileged. - It is the honesty of the commentator’s opinion that matters not the court’s view on fairness. - Malice destroys this defence. - Public interest includes government administration public institutions courts etc. **Privilege** The law recognizes certain occasions as privileged where freedom of speech outweighs reputation rights. Privilege is of two types: **Absolute Privilege:** Provides complete immunity from defamation liability even if false or malicious. Applies to: - Parliamentary proceedings - Judicial proceedings - State communications **Qualified Privilege:** Provides conditional immunity defeated by proof of malice. Applies when there is: - A duty to make the statement - An interest in receiving it - Fair and accurate reporting of public proceedings ## LEGAL PROVISIONS AND PROCEDURE The law of defamation in India is governed by both civil and criminal laws: **Civil Law:** Defamation is a tort actionable under common law principles. The plaintiff can file a civil suit claiming damages. **Criminal Law:** Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 defines criminal defamation. Section 500 prescribes punishment of up to 2 years imprisonment and fine. **Key legal provisions:** - **Section 499 IPC:** Defines criminal defamation and provides exceptions - **Section 500 IPC:** Prescribes punishment for defamation - **Section 199 CrPC:** Procedure for prosecution of defamation The plaintiff in a civil defamation suit must prove: 1. The statement was defamatory 2. It referred to the plaintiff 3. It was published The defendant can then raise defences like truth fair comment or privilege. ## CASE LAWS AND PRECEDENTS Some landmark cases on defamation law in India: 1. **Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India (2016):** The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of criminal defamation under Sections 499 and 500 IPC. 2. **Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994):** Established guidelines balancing freedom of press and right to privacy in defamation cases. 3. **Khushwant Singh v. Maneka Gandhi (2002):** Held that truth is a complete defence even if the publication was not for public good. 4. **P. Choudhary v. Manjulata (1997):** Awarded damages for defamatory news item published negligently without verification. 5. **Radheshyam Tiwari v. Eknath (1985):** Rejected defences of justification fair comment and qualified privilege for malicious publication. **Categories:** Articles, Law of Torts --- ### [TRESPASS UNDER LAW OF TORTS](https://lawfoyer.in/trespass-under-law-of-torts/) **Published:** October 29, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## MEANING DEFINITION AND EXPLANATION **Trespass** refers to unlawful interference with a person’s body or property without justification. It is an intentional tort that protects individuals’ rights to personal integrity and exclusive possession of property. **Trespass** can be committed against a person (assault battery and false imprisonment) or against property (trespass to land and chattels). ## TYPES OF TRESPASS Trespass to Person includes: 1. **Assault:** An act that creates reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact. No actual contact is necessary. 2. **Battery:** Intentional and harmful or offensive touching of another person without consent. 3. **False Imprisonment:** Total restraint of a person’s freedom of movement without lawful justification even for a short duration. **Trespass to Property includes:** 1. **Trespass to Land:** Unjustified entry upon land in possession of another. 2. **Trespass to Chattels:** Intentional interference with another’s personal property. ## ESSENTIALS AND ELEMENTS **For Trespass to Person:** - Intentional act by defendant - Causing apprehension of contact (assault) or actual contact (battery) - Without consent of plaintiff - Resulting in harm or offense **For Trespass to Property:** - Direct interference with plaintiff’s possession - Intentional act by defendant - Without lawful justification - Regardless of actual damage ## LEGAL PROVISIONS AND PROCEDURE Trespass is primarily governed by common law principles developed through judicial precedents. Some key aspects: - Trespass is actionable per se without proof of actual damage - Plaintiff must prove intentional act by defendant and lack of consent - Defendant can raise defenses like consent necessity or self-defense - Remedies include damages and injunction Indian Penal Code sections relevant to trespass: - **Section 441:** Criminal trespass - **Section 442:** House trespass - **Section 447:** Punishment for criminal trespass ## CASE LAWS AND PRECEDENTS **Assault** **Stephens v. Myers (1830):** Advancing with clenched fist saying *“I would rather pull you out of chair”* constituted assault though stopped by another person. **Battery** **Cole v. Turner (1704):** Even touching of another in anger is a battery. **False Imprisonment** **Bird v. Jones (1845):** Total restraint of movement necessary. Partial obstruction insufficient. **Trespass to Land** **Entick v. Carrington (1765):** “Every invasion of private property be it ever so minute is a trespass.” **Trespass to Chattels** **Fouldes v. Willoughby (1841):** Mere touching or moving chattel without asserting right over it is not trespass. ## DEFENSES AND EXCEPTIONS 1. **Consent:** Express or implied consent negates trespass. 2. **Necessity:** Entry to property allowed to prevent greater harm. 3. **Self-Defense:** Reasonable force to protect oneself is justified. 4. **Statutory Authority:** Acts authorized by law are not trespass. 5. **Inevitable Accident:** Unintentional and unavoidable acts may be excused. 6. **Mistake:** Honest mistake may sometimes be a defense. 7. **Provocation:** May mitigate damages but not a complete defense. ## DOCTRINES AND THEORIES 1. **Doctrine of Transferred Intent:** Intent to commit one type of trespass transfers to another. 2. **Doctrine of Continuing Trespass:** Failure to remove object placed on land constitutes ongoing trespass. 3. **Doctrine of Trespass Ab Initio:** Lawful entry becomes trespass if subsequent conduct is unlawful. ## MAXIMS AND PRINCIPLES 1. *Volenti non fit injuria:* No injury is done to a willing person. 2. *De minimis non curat lex:* The law does not concern itself with trifles. 3. *Ex turpi causa non oritur actio:* No action arises from an immoral cause. 4. *Ubi jus ibi remedium:* Where there is a right there is a remedy. ## GUIDELINES & REGULATIONS 1. Entry to property requires consent of possessor or legal authority. 2. Force used in self-defense must be proportional to threat. 3. Police need warrant or probable cause for lawful entry into private property. 4. Trespassers must leave when asked by lawful possessor. 5. Reasonable force may be used to eject trespassers. 6. Prior warning or notice enhances claim of trespass. 7. Repeated trespass may warrant injunctive relief. ## FORMS AND MODES 1. **Continuing Trespass:** Failure to remove object placed on land. 2. **Trespass by Relation:** Retroactive trespass due to relation back of title. 3. **Conditional Trespass:** Entry exceeding scope of limited permission. 4. **Trespass by Necessity:** Justified intrusion to prevent greater harm. 5. **Trespass to Try Title:** Action to determine rightful possession of land. **Categories:** Articles, Law of Torts --- ### [ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE UNDER LAW OF TORTS](https://lawfoyer.in/abuse-of-legal-procedure-under-law-of-torts/) **Published:** October 29, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## MEANING DEFINITION AND EXPLANATION **Abuse of legal procedure** refers to misusing judicial processes for improper purposes. It involves initiating legal actions maliciously without reasonable grounds. This tort aims to prevent misuse of the legal system to harass others. The main forms are malicious prosecution and malicious civil proceedings. ## MALICIOUS PROSECUTION Malicious prosecution occurs when someone institutes unsuccessful criminal proceedings against another person maliciously and without reasonable cause. It is defined as ***“a judicial proceeding instituted by one person against another from wrongful or improper motive and without probable cause to sustain it.”*** **Essential Elements** To succeed in an action for malicious prosecution the plaintiff must prove: 1. The defendant prosecuted the plaintiff 2. The prosecution was instituted without reasonable and probable cause 3. The defendant acted maliciously not just to carry out the law 4. The proceedings terminated in the plaintiff’s favor 5. The plaintiff suffered damage as a result **Prosecution by the Defendant** The plaintiff must prove the defendant actually prosecuted them. Merely giving information to police is not enough. The defendant must have been actively instrumental in initiating and pursuing the prosecution. In ***Gaya Prasad v. Bhagat Singh*** the Privy Council explained that the conduct of the complainant before and after the complaint must be examined to determine if they were the real prosecutor. If they knowingly make false charges and mislead police with false evidence they would be considered the prosecutor. **When Prosecution Commences** Prosecution is deemed to commence when a person is summoned to answer a complaint. Mere lodging of an FIR or police investigation does not amount to prosecution. **Proceedings Before Quasi-Judicial Authorities** Proceedings before some quasi-judicial bodies like professional regulatory boards may amount to prosecution. However departmental inquiries by disciplinary authorities are generally not considered prosecution. **Absence of Reasonable and Probable Cause** The plaintiff must prove the defendant prosecuted them without reasonable and probable cause. This means the defendant lacked an honest belief in the plaintiff’s guilt based on reasonable grounds. Mere suspicion is not enough. **Malice** The plaintiff must also prove the defendant acted maliciously with some improper motive other than bringing an offender to justice. Malice means the proceedings were initiated from an indirect and improper motive not to further justice. However malice alone is not sufficient if there was reasonable cause for prosecution. **Termination in Plaintiff’s Favor** The criminal proceedings must have terminated in the plaintiff’s favor. This does not require a judicial determination of innocence just absence of a finding of guilt. Acquittal discharge or discontinuation of prosecution suffices. **Damage** The plaintiff must prove they suffered damage as a result of the malicious prosecution. This can include damage to reputation liberty or property. Expenses incurred in defending oneself can be claimed as special damages. ## MALICIOUS CIVIL ACTIONS Generally no action lies for malicious civil proceedings. However in exceptional cases where costs do not adequately compensate the defendant an action may lie. Examples include malicious bankruptcy or winding up petitions which damage business reputation. **Essential elements are similar to malicious prosecution:** - Proceedings terminated in plaintiff’s favor - Absence of reasonable cause - Malice - Special damage beyond ordinary costs **Maintenance and Champerty** Maintenance refers to improperly encouraging litigation by providing financial assistance. Champerty is maintenance where the maintainer gets a share of the proceeds. These were historically prohibited as torts but are now largely obsolete. Common interest is a defense to maintenance. This includes assisting litigation by family members employers or those with a shared commercial interest. ## DAMAGES FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION In awarding damages courts consider: - Nature of charges against plaintiff - Inconvenience and distress suffered - Monetary losses incurred - Status and position of plaintiff Both general and special damages can be awarded. Fees paid to defend oneself can be claimed as special damages. General damages may be awarded for mental agony and loss of reputation. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving absence of reasonable cause. However where the defendant claimed to witness the offense and the plaintiff was acquitted on merits absence of reasonable cause is presumed. ## LEGAL PROVISIONS AND CASE LAWS **Section 211 of the Indian Penal Code** criminalizes false charges with intent to injure. The Code of Criminal Procedure allows compensation to the accused in cases of frivolous or vexatious accusations. **Key case laws:** - **West Bengal State Electricity Board v. Dilip Kumar Ray (2007)** – Explained essential elements of malicious prosecution which are as follows: - The defendant prosecuted the plaintiff - The prosecution was instituted without reasonable and probable cause - The defendant acted maliciously not just to carry out the law - The proceedings terminated in the plaintiff’s favor - The plaintiff suffered damage as a result - **Girja Prasad Sharma v. Umashankar Pathak (1973)** – Discussed liability of investigating officers - **B. Aggarwal v. P. Krishna Kapoor (1995)** – Outlined essentials for malicious civil proceedings - **Neville v. London Express Newspapers Ltd. (1919)** – Established common interest defense for maintenance - **Ram Coomar Coondoo v. Chunder Canto Mookherjee (1876)** – Discussed champerty agreements in India ## PRINCIPLES AND MAXIMS - “Actio non datur non damnificato” – An action is not given to one who is not injured - “Ubi jus ibi remedium” – Where there is a right there is a remedy - “De minimis non curat lex” – The law does not concern itself with trifles **Categories:** Articles, Law of Torts --- ### [REMEDIES FOR TORTS](https://lawfoyer.in/remedies-for-torts/) **Published:** October 29, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## MEANING & DEFINITION **Remedies in tort law** refer to the legal measures available to victims to obtain relief for wrongs committed against them. The primary aim of tort remedies is to compensate the injured party and restore them to their original position as far as possible. Tort remedies seek to make the plaintiff whole again after suffering harm due to the defendant’s wrongful conduct. The main remedies in tort law include damages injunctions and specific restitution of property. ## TYPES OF REMEDIES **(1) Damages** Damages represent the most common remedy in tort cases. They involve monetary compensation awarded to the plaintiff for losses suffered. Courts may award different types of damages depending on the nature of the tort and harm caused: **Nominal Damages** These are awarded when the plaintiff’s legal right has been violated but no actual loss has occurred. Nominal damages recognize the infringement of a right even in the absence of tangible harm. For instance in Constantine v Imperial London Hotels Ltd the plaintiff was awarded nominal damages of five guineas when the defendant wrongfully refused him accommodation. **Contemptuous Damages** These are very small damages awarded when the court believes the plaintiff’s claim lacks merit. The amount is kept minimal to show the court’s low opinion of the case while technically finding for the plaintiff. **Compensatory Damages** This is the most common type aimed at compensating the plaintiff for actual losses suffered. It may cover medical expenses lost income pain and suffering and other quantifiable losses. The goal is to restore the plaintiff to their pre-tort position financially. **Aggravated Damages** These may be awarded when the defendant’s conduct was particularly outrageous or malicious causing heightened distress to the plaintiff. They compensate for the added insult or humiliation. **Exemplary/Punitive Damages** These go beyond mere compensation and aim to punish the defendant and deter similar conduct. They may be awarded for oppressive arbitrary or unconstitutional actions by government servants or when the defendant calculated that potential profits would exceed compensation payable. **Prospective Damages** These compensate for probable future losses resulting from the tort that have not yet materialized. For instance future medical expenses or loss of earning capacity due to an injury. **Injunctions** An injunction is a court order directing a party to perform or refrain from performing a specific act. Injunctions can be: - **Temporary/Interlocutory –** Granted before final judgment to preserve the status quo. - **Permanent/Perpetual –** Issued after full trial prohibiting an act indefinitely. - **Prohibitory –** Forbidding the defendant from doing something. - **Mandatory –** Requiring the defendant to take positive action. Injunctions are often used to stop ongoing torts like trespass or nuisance. For instance ordering the demolition of a wall obstructing the plaintiff’s right to light. **Specific Restitution of Property** This remedy requires the defendant to return specific property wrongfully taken from the plaintiff. It applies to both movable and immovable property. For example ordering the return of a stolen vehicle or restoration of wrongfully occupied land. ## PRINCIPLES FOR AWARDING DAMAGES **Measure of Damages for Personal Injury** Courts consider the following factors when assessing damages for personal injury: 1. **Pain and suffering –** Both physical and mental including loss of amenities of life. 2. **Actual pecuniary loss –** Medical expenses and other out-of-pocket costs. 3. **Loss of earnings –** Both past and future loss of income due to the injury. 4. **Cost of future care –** Ongoing medical treatment nursing care etc. 5. **Loss of earning capacity –** Reduction in ability to earn in the future. The courts aim to provide *“full and adequate”* compensation to restore the plaintiff’s position as far as money can. However the compensation must be fair and reasonable. **Prospective Damages** Courts may award damages for future losses that are reasonably likely to occur. This includes future medical expenses loss of future earnings and other anticipated losses flowing from the injury. The assessment involves estimating the plaintiff’s life expectancy and future needs. **Interest on Damages** Courts may award interest on the damages amount from the date of filing the lawsuit till payment. This compensates for the time value of money. Interest rates of 6-12% per annum are common. **Effect of Insurance Benefits** Generally amounts received by the plaintiff from insurance policies are not deducted from tort damages. This is based on the principle that the defendant should not benefit from the plaintiff’s prudence in obtaining insurance. **Damages for Shortened Life Expectancy** When a tort reduces the victim’s life expectancy courts may award damages for loss of expectation of life. This compensates for the lost years of life. In ***Gobald Motor Service Ltd v Veluswami*** the Supreme Court awarded Rs. 5000 for loss of expectation of life. **Damages Under Fatal Accidents Act** The Fatal Accidents Act 1855 allows dependents to claim compensation when a person’s death is caused by a wrongful act. Key principles include: 1. Only specified dependents like spouse children and parents can claim. 2. Damages aim to compensate for loss of financial support and services. 3. Insurance benefits and pensions are generally not deducted from damages. 4. Remarriage prospects of widow claimants may be considered. 5. Loss of consortium (spousal companionship) can be claimed. **Calculation Methods** 1. ***Multiplier Method*** – Annual dependency loss is multiplied by an appropriate number of years (multiplier) to arrive at the lump sum compensation. 2. ***Interest Method*** – Such lump sum is awarded that would yield interest equivalent to the annual loss. *The multiplier method is more commonly used by Indian courts.* Factors like age of deceased dependency period and interest rates are considered in selecting the multiplier. ## EXTRA-JUDICIAL REMEDIES Besides court-ordered remedies victims may resort to certain self-help measures in limited circumstances: 1. ***Re-entry on land*** – Recovering possession of property by reasonable force. 2. ***Recaption of chattels*** – Retaking wrongfully taken goods. 3. ***Abatement of nuisance*** – Removing or terminating a nuisance affecting one’s property. 4. ***Distress damage feasant*** – Seizing trespassing cattle or goods until compensation is paid. However these remedies carry the risk of escalating the conflict and should be used cautiously. Court remedies are generally preferable in most cases. ## CASE LAWS 1. ***Bhim Singh v State of J&K (1985):*** Supreme Court awarded exemplary damages of Rs. 50000 for wrongful detention of an MLA to prevent him from attending Assembly session. 2. ***Union of India v Sugrabai (1969):*** Compensation for death was calculated by capitalizing loss for 20 years. Rs. 30000 awarded. 3. ***Klaus Mittelbachert v East India Hotels Ltd (1997):*** 50 lakhs awarded to a German pilot for injuries suffered in hotel swimming pool due to insufficient depth. Exemplary damages imposed on 5-star hotel. 4. ***Berry v Humm & Co (1915):*** Husband entitled to claim damages for extra expenses incurred in engaging housekeeper after wife’s death. 5. ***Laxminarayan v Sumitra Bai (1995):*** Substantial damages awarded to girl for mental agony social stigma and diminished marriage prospects after breach of promise to marry. ## LEGAL MAXIMS AND DOCTRINES 1. *Restitutio in integrum –* Principle of restoring the injured party to original position. 2. *De minimis non curat lex –* The law does not concern itself with trifles. Basis for nominal damages. 3. *Injuria sine damno –* Wrong without damage. Supports award of nominal damages. 4. *Volenti non fit injuria –* No injury is done to a willing person. May reduce damages if plaintiff consented to risk. 5. *Mitigation of damages –* Plaintiff has a duty to take reasonable steps to minimize losses. **Categories:** Articles, Law of Torts --- ### [VICARIOUS LIABILITY UNDER LAW OF TORTS](https://lawfoyer.in/vicarious-liability-under-law-of-torts/) **Published:** October 29, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## MEANING & DEFINITION **Vicarious liability** refers to the legal doctrine where one person is held responsible for the wrongful actions of another person. This concept is an exception to the general rule that individuals are liable only for their own wrongful acts. In vicarious liability, the law imposes responsibility on a person who did not directly commit the wrongful act but has a special relationship with the wrongdoer. The Latin maxim **“*respondeat superior*“** meaning **“let the master answer”** forms the basis of vicarious liability. Vicarious liability most commonly arises in three types of relationships: - Principal and agent - Partners in a partnership - Employer and employee (master and servant) The underlying rationale for vicarious liability is that the person held vicariously liable is often in a better position to compensate the victim and can more easily bear the financial burden of liability. It also incentivizes those in positions of authority to exercise proper care in selecting supervising and controlling those working under them. ## TYPES OF RELATIONSHIPS **Principal and Agent Relationship** In a principal-agent relationship the principal can be held vicariously liable for torts committed by the agent within the scope of the agency. The liability arises based on the legal principle “*Qui facit per alium facit per se*” which means “*he who acts through another acts himself*.” For any act authorized by the principal and carried out by the agent both can be held jointly and severally liable. The authority given to the agent may be express or implied. **Key points regarding principal-agent vicarious liability:** - The principal is liable even if the agent acted solely for personal benefit without the principal’s knowledge if it was within ostensible authority - Both principal and agent are considered joint tortfeasors - The plaintiff can choose to sue either the principal or agent or both A landmark case illustrating principal-agent liability is ***Lloyd v. Grace Smith & Co. \[1912\] AC 716***. In this case a solicitor’s clerk fraudulently induced a client to transfer property to himself. The House of Lords held the solicitor’s firm vicariously liable as the clerk was acting within his apparent authority even though it was for personal gain. **Partners in a Partnership** Partners in a firm are vicariously liable for torts committed by any partner in the ordinary course of partnership business. Key aspects include: - Liability of each partner is joint and several - All partners are considered joint tortfeasors - The wrongful act must be connected to the partnership business The case of ***Hamlyn v. Houston & Co. \[1903\] 1 KB 81*** illustrates partnership liability. One partner bribed the plaintiff’s clerk to divulge trade secrets. The court held both partners liable for the tort of inducing breach of contract even though only one partner committed the act. **Employer-Employee & Master-Servant** This is the most common form of vicarious liability. An employer can be held liable for torts committed by employees in the course of their employment. Key principles include: - The employer’s liability is based on the doctrine of “*respondeat superior*“ - Both employer and employee are joint tortfeasors with joint and several liability - The employer is liable even if the employee acted against express instructions ## ESSENTIALS Two key elements must be established for an employer to be vicariously liable: 1. *The tort was committed by a “servant” (employee)* 2. *The tort was committed in the “course of employment”* **Who is a Servant?** A servant is a person employed to do work under the direction and control of the employer regarding the manner of performing the work. This is distinct from an independent contractor who is not subject to such control. The “control test” is used to distinguish employees from independent contractors. ***Tirlok Singh v. Kailash Bharti 1986 ACJ 757*** An owner was not vicariously liable when his brother took his motorcycle without permission and caused an accident as there was no agency relationship. ***Rajasthan State Road Transport Corpn. v. K.N. Kothari AIR 1997 SC 3444*** The Supreme Court held that transfer of effective control over a servant can make the transferee vicariously liable even if the servant remains on the original owner’s payroll. **Course of Employment** For vicarious liability to arise the tort must be committed in the course of employment. This means the wrongful act must be: - Authorized by the employer or - So connected with authorized acts that it can be regarded as a mode of doing the authorized act **State Bank of India v. Shyama Devi AIR 1978 SC 1263** The Supreme Court held that a bank employee’s fraud was not within the course of employment so the bank was not vicariously liable. **Century Insurance Co. v. Northern Ireland Road Transport Board (1942)** Driver lit cigarette while transferring petrol causing explosion. It was held within course of employment as negligent mode of doing authorized work. **Limpus v. London General Omnibus Co. (1862)** Bus driver obstructed rival bus against express instructions. It was held within course of employment as wrongful mode of doing authorized act. **Exceptions to Employer’s Liability** An employer is generally not liable for: - Acts of independent contractors - Acts of employees outside the course of employment - Purely personal acts of employees unconnected to employment **Exceptions To Non-Liability For Independent Contractors** While employers are generally not liable for acts of independent contractors there are some exceptions: - Employer authorizes or ratifies an illegal act - Cases of strict liability (e.g. Rylands v Fletcher rule) - Extra hazardous work - Breach of statutory duty - Dangers caused on highways - Withdrawal of support from neighboring land - Breach of non-delegable duty towards employees ## IMPORTANT CASE LAWS The doctrine of vicarious liability is not codified in Indian statutes but has evolved through judicial precedents. Some key precedents include: **Fraud by Employee** Employers can be held liable for fraudulent acts of employees if committed in course of employment even if not for employer’s benefit. **Lloyd v. Grace Smith & Co. (1912)** - Facts: Clerk fraudulently obtained property from client - Held: Employer liable as fraud committed within apparent authority **Theft by Employee** Employers may be liable for theft by employees in certain cases: - **Cheshire v. Bailey (1905)** – Employer not liable for theft of bailed goods by employee - **Morris v. C.W. Martin & Sons Ltd (1965)** – Employer liable for theft of bailed goods by employee entrusted with them **Mistake by Employee** Employers are liable for mistakes made by employees in course of employment even if expressly prohibited. **Poland v. Parr & Sons (1927)** – Employer liable for excessive force used by employee to protect property **Negligence of Employee** Employers are liable for negligent acts of employees in course of employment even if for employee’s own comfort or convenience. - **Williams v. Jones (1865)** – Employer not liable for carpenter lighting pipe negligently - **Century Insurance Co v Northern Ireland Road Transport Board (1942)** – Employer liable for driver lighting cigarette negligently while transferring petrol **Hospital Cases And Vicarious Liability** The position on hospital liability has evolved over time: - Initially in **Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew’s Hospital \[1909\] 2 KB 820** hospitals were not held liable for negligence of professional staff due to lack of control - This changed with cases like **Gold v. Essex County Council \[1942\] 2 KB 293** where hospitals were held liable for negligence of staff including radiographers and surgeons - In **Cassidy v. Ministry of Health \[1951\] 2 KB 343** hospitals were held liable for post-operative negligence of staff The modern position is that hospital authorities can be vicariously liable for negligence of medical professionals employed by them. **Lending a Servant** When an employee is temporarily lent to another employer the question of vicarious liability depends on who has the right to control the manner of doing the work. In **Mersey Docks & Harbour Board v. Coggins & Griffiths (Liverpool) Ltd. \[1947\] AC 1**, the House of Lords held that for a crane driver lent with the crane the permanent employer remained vicariously liable as they retained control over how the crane was to be operated. **Categories:** Articles, Law of Torts --- ### [RULE OF STRICT AND ABSOLUTE LIABILITY UNDER LAW OF TORTS](https://lawfoyer.in/rule-of-strict-and-absolute-liability-under-law-of-torts/) **Published:** October 29, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## RULE OF **STRICT LIABILITY** **Meaning and Origin** The rule of strict liability emerged from the landmark English case of ***Rylands v Fletcher*** in 1868. It imposes liability without proof of fault or negligence for damages caused by dangerous substances that escape. **Key Elements of Strict Liability** 1. **Dangerous Thing:** The defendant must bring some dangerous thing onto their land. 2. **Escape:** The dangerous thing must escape from the defendant’s control. 3. **Non-natural Use of Land:** The defendant’s use of the land must be considered non-natural or unusual. **Exceptions to Strict Liability** Courts have recognized several exceptions where strict liability does not apply: - Plaintiff’s own fault - Act of God - Consent of the plaintiff - Act of a third party - Statutory authority ## APPLICATION IN INDIA Indian courts initially followed the English rule of strict liability. However some exceptions were made: **Agricultural Water Storage Exception** In ***Madras Railway Co. v. Zamindar*** the Privy Council held that storing water for agriculture was not subject to strict liability due to India’s unique conditions. Liability arose only if due care was not taken. **Motor Vehicle Accidents** The Motor Vehicles Act 1988 introduced limited no-fault liability for motor accident claims. Fixed compensation can be claimed without proving fault for death (Rs 50000) or permanent disability (Rs 25000). **Railways Liability** The Indian Railways Act 1890 was amended in 1961 to change railways’ liability from that of a bailee to that of an insurer for goods carried. ***Rylands v Fletcher (1868)*** **Facts:** Defendant’s reservoir flooded plaintiff’s coal mines through old shafts. **Held:** Defendant strictly liable for escape of collected dangerous substance even without negligence. ## RULE OF ABSOLUTE LIABILITY **Origin and Rationale** The rule of absolute liability was formulated by the Supreme Court of India in M.C. Mehta v Union of India (1987) in response to the Oleum gas leak case. The court felt strict liability had too many exceptions and was inadequate for modern industrial hazards. **Key Features** 1. Applies to enterprises engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous activities. 2. Imposes liability without any exceptions unlike strict liability. 3. Enterprise must indemnify all those affected regardless of whether it was careful. 4. Compensation must be correlated to magnitude and capacity of enterprise. 5. Based on principle that profit-making enterprises have a social obligation to compensate victims. ## ABSOLUTE LIABILITY APPLICATION **M.C. Mehta v Union of India (1987)** - **Facts:** Oleum gas leaked from factory in Delhi causing deaths and injuries. - **Held:** Enterprises engaged in hazardous activities absolutely liable to compensate all victims without exceptions. **Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v Union of India (1996)** - **Facts:** Chemical industries caused severe pollution in village. - **Held:** Polluting industries absolutely liable to pay for environmental restoration and compensate villagers. **Union Carbide Corporation v Union of India (1990) – Bhopal Gas Tragedy Case** - **Facts:** Methyl isocyanate gas leak from pesticide plant in Bhopal caused thousands of deaths. - **Held:** UCC absolutely liable to pay $470 million compensation to all victims of gas tragedy. **Environmental Pollution Cases** In ***Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v Union of India (1996)*** the Supreme Court applied absolute liability to industries causing environmental pollution. Polluting industries were ordered to pay for remedial measures and compensate affected villagers. **Other Applications** Courts have applied absolute liability in cases involving: - Injuries from defective hotel swimming pools - Deaths from electrocution due to negligent power companies - Damage from hazardous industrial waste ## PUBLIC LIABILITY INSURANCE ACT 1991 **Key Features:** 1. Mandates public liability insurance for enterprises handling hazardous substances. 2. Provides immediate relief to accident victims on no-fault basis. 3. Owner must take insurance before starting to handle hazardous substances. 4. Covers death injury or property damage from accidents while handling hazardous substances. 5. Based on principle of no-fault liability. ## COMPARISON OF STRICT AND ABSOLUTE LIABILITY - **Basis of Liability:** Strict liability arises from negligence while absolute liability is imposed regardless of fault or care taken. - **Exceptions:** Strict liability allows exceptions like act of God while absolute liability has no exceptions. - **Compensation:** Strict liability provides reasonable damages while absolute liability requires exemplary damages proportional to enterprise size. - **Applicability:** Strict liability applies to dangerous substances escaping from land. Absolute liability covers hazardous industrial activities. - **Standard of Care:** Strict liability considers precautions taken. Absolute liability disregards standard of care. - **Burden of Proof:** Plaintiff must prove escape in strict liability. No burden on plaintiff in absolute liability. **Categories:** Articles, Law of Torts --- ### [NEGLIGENCE: PROFESSIONAL, MEDICAL AND CONTRIBUTORY UNDER LAW OF TORTS](https://lawfoyer.in/negligence-professional-medical-and-contributory-under-law-of-torts/) **Published:** October 29, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **MEANING DEFINITION AND EXPLANATION** Negligence is a crucial concept in tort law that involves failure to exercise reasonable care resulting in harm to another party. It occurs when a person breaches their duty of care owed to others through careless actions or omissions. The jurisprudential concept of negligence defies any precise definition. Eminent jurists and leading judgments have assigned various meanings to negligence. The Supreme Court in ***Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab*** observed that negligence is the breach of a duty caused by omitting to do something which a reasonable person guided by considerations that ordinarily regulate human affairs would do or doing something which a prudent and reasonable person would not do. Actionable negligence involves the act of neglecting to use ordinary care or skill towards a person to whom the defendant owes the duty of observing ordinary care and skill by which neglect the plaintiff suffers injury to person or property. **Negligence has three primary constituents:** - A legal duty to exercise due care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff - Breach of that duty by the defendant and - Consequential damage suffered by the plaintiff. According to Charlesworth & Percy negligence has three meanings in current forensic speech: - a state of mind opposed to intention - careless conduct and - breach of duty to take care imposed by common or statute law. **Negligence as a Tort and as a Crime** The term ‘negligence’ is used to fasten liability under both civil and criminal law. - In civil law the amount of damages incurred determines the extent of liability in tort. - However in criminal law it is the degree of negligence that determines liability rather than the quantum of damages. - To establish criminal negligence a higher degree of negligence must be proven compared to civil negligence. The essential ingredient of *mens rea* cannot be excluded when considering criminal negligence charges. As observed in **R. v. Lawrence** recklessness constituting mens rea in criminal law presupposes that there is something in the circumstances that would alert an ordinary prudent individual to the possibility of causing serious harm. The moral culpability of recklessness resides in the proximity of the reckless state of mind to the intention to cause harm. For criminal rashness or negligence it must be shown that the rashness was of such a degree as to amount to taking a hazard knowing that injury was most likely imminent. As stated in **Andrews v. Director of Public Prosecutions** a very high degree of negligence is required to establish criminal liability compared to civil liability. The negligence in criminal cases must be culpable or gross and not merely based on an error of judgment. ## ESSENTIALS OF NEGLIGENCE In an action for negligence, the plaintiff must prove three essential elements: 1. The defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff 2. The defendant breached that duty 3. The plaintiff suffered damage as a consequence of that breach 4. Duty of Care to the Plaintiff **(1) LEGAL DUTY** The plaintiff must establish that the defendant owed him a specific legal duty to take care which has been breached. This duty arises out of various relations which may not be possible to enumerate exhaustively. Courts recognize new duties when they consider it just. Lord Atkin propounded the **“neighbor principle”** in the landmark case of Donoghue v. Stevenson: “*You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbor*.” He defined neighbors as “*persons so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question.*“ This case established that a manufacturer owes a duty to take care that products do not contain noxious matter and will reach the ultimate consumer without reasonable possibility of intermediate examination. It did away with the “privity of contract fallacy” by allowing the consumer to sue the manufacturer in tort despite no contractual relationship. **Duty Depends on Reasonable Foreseeability of Injury** Whether the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff depends on reasonable foreseeability of injury to the plaintiff. If at the time of the act or omission the defendant could reasonably foresee injury to the plaintiff he owes a duty to prevent that injury. The duty is owed to those to whom injury may reasonably and probably be anticipated if the duty is not observed. *To determine culpability we must consider what a reasonable person would have foreseen and how they would have behaved under the circumstances.* One useful test is to enquire how obvious the risk must have been to an ordinary prudent person. The standard of foresight of the reasonable person is in one sense an impersonal test independent of the idiosyncrasies of the particular person in question. **Some key cases illustrating this principle include:** - In **Glasgow Corp. v. Taylor** a child died after eating poisonous berries in a public garden. The corporation was held liable for not fencing the shrub or displaying warnings about the deadly berries which looked tempting to children. - In **Haley v. London Electricity Board** a blind man was injured after tripping on an insufficiently marked obstacle on the pavement. The court held the electricity board liable as blind pedestrians were reasonably foreseeable in London and extra precautions were required. - In **Paris v. Stepney Borough Council** an employer was held liable for not providing goggles to a one-eyed employee as the loss of his remaining eye was a foreseeable risk. Reasonable foreseeability does not mean remote possibility. The duty is to guard against probabilities rather than bare possibilities. In **Bolton v. Stone** the defendant cricket club was not liable when a ball hit outside the ground injured a passer-by as the chance of injury was very small. **(2) BREACH OF DUTY** Breach of duty means non-observance of due care required in a particular situation. The standard of care is that of a reasonable or ordinarily prudent person. If the defendant has acted like a reasonably prudent person there is no negligence. The law requires taking two factors into consideration to determine the standard of care required: - *The importance of the object to be attained* - *The magnitude of the risk* **a) The Importance of the Object to be Attained** The law permits taking some measure of risk so that activities in public interest can continue. A balance has to be drawn between the importance and usefulness of an act and the risk created. For example a certain speed may not be negligent for a fire brigade vehicle but may be negligent for another vehicle. In **Latimer v. A.E.C. Ltd.** the respondents were not liable for not closing down a factory after a flood left oily patches on the floor as the risk was not so great as to justify shutting down and laying off thousands of workers. **b) The Magnitude of Risk** The degree of care required varies according to each situation. What may be careful in one situation may be negligent in another. The kind of risk involved determines the precautions expected. Greater care is required when transporting inflammable materials than ordinary goods. **Some examples:** - A driver must take greater care when it is drizzling - A person carrying a loaded gun is expected to take more precaution than one carrying a stick - Greater care is needed while transporting petrol than milk **(3) DAMAGE** The plaintiff must show that the defendant’s breach of duty caused damage to the plaintiff. The damage must not be too remote a consequence of the negligence. The plaintiff has to prove all items of damages claimed. The court has the duty to assess damages applying the proper measure and considering remoteness. ## PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE: RES IPSA LOQUITUR As a general rule the plaintiff has to prove the defendant was negligent. However in certain cases when the accident explains only one thing – that it could not have occurred unless the defendant was negligent – the law raises a presumption of negligence based on the maxim ‘res ipsa loquitur’ which means ‘the thing speaks for itself.’ **For this maxim to apply:** 1. The event causing the accident must have been under the exclusive control of the defendant 2. The accident must be such as does not ordinarily occur without negligence **Some examples where *res ipsa loquitur* has been applied:** - Collapse of a building structure - Brick falling from a building and injuring a passer-by - Bus overturning on the road - Death caused by live broken electrical wire in a street - Foreign object left inside patient’s body after surgery The maxim shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to disprove negligence. It is not a rule of law but a rule of evidence benefiting the plaintiff. The defendant can avoid liability by disproving negligence on their part. The maxim does not apply if different inferences are possible from the facts. When the accident is capable of two explanations such a presumption is not raised. **Nervous Shock** This branch of tort law provides relief when a person suffers physical injury not by direct impact but merely through nervous shock by what they have seen or heard. Early cases like ***Victorian Railway Commissioner v. Coultas*** did not recognize such claims but later decisions have accepted liability for nervous shock without physical impact. **Key principles:** - Shock must arise from reasonable fear of immediate personal injury to oneself or close relatives - Plaintiff need not be in the area of physical injury but must be placed where injury through shock is foreseeable - Peculiar susceptibility of the plaintiff is no defense **Some Landmark Cases:** - ***Dulieu v. White*** – Pregnant woman suffered shock seeing horse van driven into pub - ***Hambrook v. Stokes*** – Mother suffered shock fearing for safety of children - ***Bourhill v. Young*** – Fishwife too far from accident scene to claim for shock The law on nervous shock continues to evolve as courts grapple with issues of remoteness and foreseeability in such cases. Overall negligence remains a complex area of tort law requiring careful analysis of duty breach and damage in each case. ## PROFESSIONAL AND MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE **Meaning & Definition** Professional negligence refers to a breach of duty of care by individuals possessing special skills or expertise. This concept applies to professionals such as doctors lawyers architects and others who profess specialized knowledge. The law expects these professionals to exercise reasonable competence and care in their practice. Medical negligence is a specific form of professional negligence. It occurs when a healthcare provider fails to provide the standard of care expected causing harm to a patient. This branch of law aims to protect patients from substandard medical practices while acknowledging the inherent risks in healthcare. **Elements of Professional Negligence** To establish professional negligence several key elements must be proven: - **Duty of Care:** The professional owed a duty of care to the client or patient. - **Breach of Duty:** The professional failed to meet the expected standard of care. - **Causation:** The breach directly caused harm to the client or patient. - **Damages:** The client or patient suffered quantifiable harm or loss. These elements form the foundation for assessing liability in professional negligence cases. **Standard of Care in Medical Profession** The standard of care expected from medical professionals is not perfection but reasonable competence. As explained in ***Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab (AIR 2005 SC 3180)*** a doctor must exercise skill with reasonable competence. The court applied the Bolam test which states that a doctor is not negligent if they acted in accordance with a practice accepted by a responsible body of medical professionals. **Types of Medical Negligence** Medical negligence can manifest in various forms: - Misdiagnosis or Delayed Diagnosis - Surgical Errors - Medication Errors - Birth Injuries - Anesthesia Errors - Failure to Obtain Informed Consent Each type requires careful examination of the specific circumstances and medical standards involved. **Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur** The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself) is often applied in medical negligence cases. It allows courts to infer negligence from the very nature of the accident or injury in the absence of direct evidence. This doctrine was applied in ***Aparna Dutta v. Apollo Hospital Enterprises Ltd. Madras (AIR 2000 Mad. 340)*** where a foreign object was left in the patient’s body after surgery. **Consent and Medical Treatment** Informed consent is a crucial aspect of medical treatment. Doctors have a duty to disclose material risks and obtain consent before proceeding with treatment. Failure to do so can constitute negligence. However in emergencies where obtaining consent is not feasible doctors may proceed with necessary treatment to save life or prevent serious harm. **Vicarious Liability in Medical Negligence** Hospitals and healthcare institutions can be held vicariously liable for the negligence of their employees. This principle was applied in ***R.P. Sharma v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 2002 Raj. 104)*** where the state-run hospital was held liable for the death caused by negligent transfusion of incorrect blood type. **Defences in Medical Negligence Cases** Several defences are available in medical negligence cases: - **Contributory Negligence:** When the patient’s own actions contributed to the harm. - **Volenti Non Fit Injuria:** The patient voluntarily assumed the risk. - **Error of Judgment:** A mere error of judgment is not negligence if it was a reasonable choice among accepted medical practices. These defences can mitigate or eliminate liability depending on the circumstances. **Compensation in Medical Negligence Cases** Courts consider various factors when awarding compensation in medical negligence cases: - Medical Expenses - Loss of Earnings - Pain and Suffering - Loss of Amenities - Future Care Costs The quantum of damages aims to put the victim as close as possible to their position before the negligent act. **Professional Negligence in Other Fields** While medical negligence is a prominent area professional negligence extends to other fields: - **Legal Negligence:** Lawyers may be held liable for errors in handling cases or providing legal advice. - **Architectural Negligence:** Architects can be liable for design flaws leading to structural issues. - **Accounting Negligence:** Accountants may face liability for errors in financial statements or tax advice. Each profession has its specific standards and expectations. **Landmark Cases in Professional and Medical Negligence** Several landmark cases have shaped the law of professional and medical negligence in India: - **Indian Medical Association v. V.P. Shantha (1995 6 SCC 651):** Established that medical services fall under the Consumer Protection Act. - **Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab (AIR 2005 SC 3180):** Clarified the standard of care expected from medical professionals. - **State of Haryana v. Santra (AIR 2000 SC 1888):** Held doctors liable for negligence in failed sterilization operations. These cases provide essential guidance for interpreting and applying negligence laws. ## CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE **Meaning and Definition** Contributory negligence occurs when the plaintiff’s own lack of care contributes to the damage caused by the defendant’s negligence. It refers to the plaintiff’s failure to take reasonable care for their own safety which is a contributing factor to the harm suffered. The Supreme Court in ***Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Laximan Iyer*** explained that contributory negligence arises where an accident is due to negligence of both parties and both are to be blamed. The crucial question is whether either party could have avoided the consequences of the other’s negligence by exercising reasonable care. **Elements of Contributory Negligence** To establish contributory negligence the following elements must be proved: - The plaintiff failed to take reasonable care for their own safety - This failure was a contributing factor to the harm suffered by the plaintiff - A reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would have foreseen the risk of harm - The plaintiff’s conduct fell below the standard of care expected of a reasonable person Contributory negligence is assessed based on the plaintiff’s conduct not in relation to any duty owed to the defendant. Rather it considers whether the plaintiff took due care for their own safety in the circumstances. **Effect of Contributory Negligence** Historically contributory negligence was a complete defence that barred the plaintiff’s claim entirely even if they were only slightly at fault. This harsh rule was eventually modified by courts through doctrines like “last opportunity” rule. Currently in most jurisdictions including India contributory negligence results in apportionment of damages rather than a complete bar to recovery. The compensation is reduced to the extent the plaintiff was at fault. The **Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945** in England provides for apportionment of damages in cases of contributory negligence. While there is no central legislation in India some states like Kerala have enacted similar laws. Indian courts have generally followed the principle of apportionment in cases of contributory negligence. **Defence of Contributory Negligence** **How Far is Contributory Negligence a Defence** Contributory negligence operates as a partial defence that reduces the quantum of damages recoverable by the plaintiff. The defendant can plead contributory negligence to argue that the plaintiff’s own carelessness contributed to the harm suffered. If proved the court will apportion the damages based on the relative fault of both parties. **Rules to Determine Contributory Negligence** - The plaintiff’s negligence is assessed based on whether they took reasonable care for their own safety not in terms of any duty owed to the defendant - The plaintiff’s negligence must have contributed to the resulting damage – if the same damage would have occurred despite the plaintiff’s care contributory negligence cannot be pleaded - The standard of care expected from the plaintiff is that of a reasonable person in similar circumstances - Children are held to a lower standard of care than adults in determining contributory negligence **Doctrine of Alternative Danger** This doctrine provides that where the defendant creates a dangerous situation the plaintiff is justified in taking some risk to avoid it. If the plaintiff suffers harm while reasonably trying to escape the danger created by the defendant contributory negligence cannot be pleaded. For example in **Jones v. Boyce** the plaintiff jumped from a coach being driven negligently by the defendant and was injured. It was held that the plaintiff had acted reasonably under the circumstances and could recover damages. **Presumption That Others Are Careful** In certain situations the plaintiff is entitled to assume that others will take due care. For instance a passenger can presume that a transport provider has taken proper safety precautions. In such cases the plaintiff’s failure to double check safety measures may not amount to contributory negligence. **Contributory Negligence of Children** Courts take into account the age and capacity of children in determining contributory negligence. A young child cannot be expected to observe the same standard of care as an adult. In ***R. Srinivasa v. K.M. Parasivamurthy*** it was held that a 6-year-old child hit by a lorry near the footpath could not be blamed for contributory negligence as a child of that age does not have the road sense of adults. However if a child is capable of appreciating the danger they may be held guilty of contributory negligence. The standard is whether the child exercised the degree of care expected from a child of similar age intelligence and experience. **Doctrine of Identification** This doctrine provides that the contributory negligence of the plaintiff’s servant or agent can be attributed to the plaintiff. However the negligence of an independent contractor engaged by the plaintiff cannot be pleaded as contributory negligence against the plaintiff. For instance the negligence of a taxi driver cannot be used as a defence against a passenger injured due to the negligence of another vehicle. The doctrine of identification was at one time applied to children in the custody of adults but this has been overruled. In ***Oliver v. Birmingham and Midland Omnibus Co.*** a child injured in a road accident was not identified with his negligent grandfather and was allowed to recover damages. ## COMPOSITE NEGLI**GENCE** **Meaning and Definition** Composite negligence refers to a situation where the negligence of two or more persons results in the same damage to the plaintiff. The persons responsible are known as composite tortfeasors. Unlike contributory negligence composite negligence involves negligence by multiple defendants towards the plaintiff who is not at fault. **Nature of Liability in Composite Negligence** The liability of composite tortfeasors is joint and several. This means: - The plaintiff can sue any or all of the tortfeasors - Each tortfeasor is liable for the entire damage - The plaintiff can recover the full compensation from any one tortfeasor - A tortfeasor who pays more than their share can claim contribution from the others Most High Courts in India have held that there can be no apportionment of damages between composite tortfeasors. The plaintiff can enforce the entire claim against any of the defendants. This is based on the principle of joint and several liability. For example in ***Hira Devi v. Bhaba Kanti Das*** where an accident occurred due to negligence of drivers of a bus and a car the court held that the claimants could recover the entire amount from the bus owner. The bus owner could then seek contribution from the car owner. **Apportionment Between Tortfeasors** While courts generally do not apportion damages between composite tortfeasors some decisions have apportioned liability for determining contribution rights between the tortfeasors. In ***Amthiben v. Superintending Geophysicist ONGC*** the court apportioned liability between two negligent drivers at 75:25 but clarified that this was only to determine their inter se liability. The decree against them remained joint and several. ## COMPARISON BETWEEN CONTRIBUTORY AND COMPOSITE NEGLIGENCE Key differences between contributory and composite negligence: 1. In contributory negligence the plaintiff is partly at fault whereas in composite negligence only the defendants are negligent. 2. Contributory negligence results in apportionment of damages and reduction of compensation. In composite negligence there is joint and several liability without apportionment. 3. Contributory negligence is a defence that reduces liability. Composite negligence determines how liability is shared between multiple defendants. 4. In contributory negligence the court assesses the relative fault of plaintiff and defendant. In composite negligence the focus is on defendants’ respective liabilities. Contributory negligence involves balancing the plaintiff’s and defendant’s fault. Composite negligence deals with allocating liability between negligent defendants. **Categories:** Articles, Law of Torts --- ### [INTRODUCTION TO LAW OF TORTS](https://lawfoyer.in/introduction-to-law-of-torts/) **Published:** October 28, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## MEANING OF TORT **Origin and Etymology** The word tort originates from the Latin term “tortum” which means twisted or crooked. It refers to conduct that is not straight or lawful but rather twisted crooked or unlawful. The term tort is equivalent to the English word “wrong.” **Concept of Tort** A tort is a civil wrong that unfairly causes someone else to suffer loss or harm resulting in legal liability for the person who commits the tortious act. It involves a breach of a civil duty owed to someone else. Torts are differentiated from criminal wrongs that breach public duties owed to the whole community. The primary aim of tort law is to provide relief for the damages incurred and deter others from committing the same harms. The injured party may sue for an injunction to prevent the continuation of the tortious conduct or for monetary damages. **Nature of Tort Law** Tort law consists of various torts or wrongful acts whereby the wrongdoer violates some legal right vested in another person. It imposes a duty to respect the legal rights of others. A person making a breach of that duty is said to have committed a wrongful act. As crime is a wrongful act resulting from breach of a duty recognized by criminal law likewise tort is a breach of duty recognized under tort law. **Examples of Torts** Some common examples of torts include: - **Defamation** – Violation of duty not to injure reputation - **Trespass** – Violation of duty not to interfere with possession of land - **Negligence** – Violation of duty to take reasonable care - **Nuisance** – Violation of duty not to interfere with quiet enjoyment of property - **Deceit –** Violation of duty not to defraud another **Difficulty in Defining Tort** No scientific definition of tort has been possible that could mention certain specific elements the presence of which could constitute a tort. The main reason is that different wrongs included under tort have diverse origins and historical backgrounds. Most tortious wrongs originated from writs of trespass and writs of trespass on the case. These writs were responsible for the origin of tort law and many other legal principles. **Ever-Expanding Nature** Tort law is an ever-growing branch of law that has constantly developed. The area covered in its ambit is continuously increasing. New torts continue to emerge to address novel situations and harms in society. ## DEFINITIONS OF TORT Some important definitions that indicate the nature of tort law are: **Limitation Act Definition** “Tort means a civil wrong which is not exclusively a breach of contract or breach of trust” – *Section 2(m) of the Limitation Act 1963* **Salmond’s Definition** “It is a civil wrong for which the remedy is a common law action for unliquidated damages and which is not exclusively the breach of a contract or the breach of a trust or other merely equitable obligation.” – *Salmond* **Winfield’s Definition** “Tortious liability arises from the breach of a duty primarily fixed by the law: this duty is towards persons generally and its breach is redressible by an action for unliquidated damages.” – *Winfield* **Fraser’s Definition** “It is an infringement of a right in rem of a private individual giving a right of compensation at the suit of the injured party.” **–** *Fraser* **Key Elements in Definitions** The basic elements of tort indicated by these definitions are: - Tort is a civil wrong (*Tort is a* *wrong of breach of duty towards a person and is different from a criminal wrong*). - Every civil wrong is not a tort. There are other civil wrongs like breach of contract and breach of trust but Tort is distinct from these civil wrongs. - Tort is actionable for “unliquidated damages” *(damages which are not pre-determined)*. **Negative Approach in Definitions** The various definitions follow a negative approach. They explain tort by either: - Distinguishing it from other wrongs or - Mentioning elements found in tort but not in other wrongs **Process of Identifying a Tort** When some wrongful act has been done it must be seen: - Whether it is civil or criminal wrong - If civil whether it exclusively belongs to any other category like breach of contract/trust - If not exclusively any other civil wrong then it is a tort. ## TORT AS A CIVIL WRONG **Civil vs Criminal Wrong** Tort belongs to the category of civil wrongs. The basic nature of civil wrong is different from a criminal wrong: - In civil wrong the injured party (plaintiff) institutes civil proceedings against the wrongdoer (defendant) - The main remedy is damages – compensation paid by defendant to plaintiff - In criminal wrong proceedings are brought by the State against the accused - The victim is not compensated justice is administered by punishing the wrongdoer **Possibility of Both Civil and Criminal Wrong** It is possible that the same act may result in both a crime and a tort simultaneously. In such case both civil and criminal remedies would be concurrently available: - Civil action requiring defendant to pay compensation - Criminal action awarding punishment to wrongdoer For example, in a Defamation case a person can initiate a civil suit for injunction and can also initiate criminal proceedings for the Crime of Defamation. ## TORT DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER CIVIL WRONGS **Tort vs Breach of Contract** Key differences between tort and breach of contract include: 1. **Source of Duty** - Tort – Duty imposed by law - Contract – Duty undertaken by parties themselves 2. **Privity of Duty** - Tort – Duty is towards persons generally - Contract – Duty only towards other contracting party 3. **Nature of Damages** - Tort – Always unliquidated damages - Contract – Can be liquidated or unliquidated damages 4. **Possibility of Overlap** Sometimes the same fact may result in both breach of contract and tort. For example: - Railway passenger injured due to negligence of driver - Breach of contract of safe carriage - Tort of negligence - Horse left for safekeeping dies of starvation - Breach of bailment contract - Tort of negligence In such cases plaintiff cannot claim damages twice over. They have choice to sue for either breach of contract or commission of tort. **Tort vs Breach of Trust** Key differences: 1. **Nature of Damages** - Breach of trust – Liquidated damages (ascertainable loss) - Tort – Unliquidated damages 2. **Classification** - Breach of trust – Part of law of property - Tort – Separate branch of law 3. **Historical Origin** - Breach of trust – Redressed in Court of Chancery - Tort – Originated as part of Common Law **Tort vs Quasi-Contract** Key differences: 1. **Nature of Duty** - Quasi-contract – Duty towards particular person - Tort – Duty towards persons generally 2. **Nature of Remedy** - Quasi-contract – Only monetary compensation - Tort – Damages and other remedies available 3. **Nature of Compensation** - Quasi-contract – Generally liquidated sum - Tort – Always unliquidated damages ## ESSENTIALS OF TORT Three essential conditions must be satisfied to constitute a tort: 1. **Wrongful Act or Omission** There must be some act or omission on part of defendant. Either: - A positive wrongful act - An omission which is illegally made **Examples:** - Act of trespass - Publishing defamatory statement - Wrongful detention of person - Failure to fence dangerous area in public park The wrongful act/omission must be one recognized by law. Mere moral or social wrong is not sufficient. 2. **Legal Damage (Injuria)** There must be violation of a legal right vested in the plaintiff. Two aspects: - Violation of legal right (injuria) - Actual loss or harm (damnum) may or may not be present Two maxims explain this: **Injuria Sine Damno** - Violation of legal right without actual loss/damage - Actionable in tort law **Damnum Sine Injuria** - Actual loss/damage without violation of legal right - Not actionable in tort law The real test is whether a lawful right of plaintiff has been violated not whether plaintiff has suffered any loss. 3. **Action for Unliquidated Damages** There are two types of damages on the basis of “when they are determined”: 1. **Liquidated Damages**: These are pre-determined as these can be anticipated in advance before the commission or civil wrong itself. These maybe be agreed by parties before the wrong is committed. 2. **Unliquidated Damages**: These are determined after the commission of civil wrong and after suffeting legal injury as these cannot be pre-determined and cannot be anticipated in advance. For any Tort unliquidated damages can be claimed which are determined by Court. **IMPORTANT CASE LAWS** **Ashby v White (1703)** **Facts:** Plaintiff was wrongfully prevented from voting in parliamentary election. Candidate he wanted to vote for won anyway. **Held:** Defendant liable as plaintiff’s legal right to vote was violated even though no actual loss suffered. **Principle:** ***Injuria sine damno*** – violation of legal right is actionable even without proof of actual damage. **Gloucester Grammar School Case (1410)** **Facts:** Defendant set up rival school causing plaintiffs to reduce fees. Plaintiffs suffered financial loss. **Held:** Defendants not liable as they had not violated any legal right of plaintiffs. **Principle: *Damnum sine injuria*** – mere loss without violation of legal right is not actionable. **Bradford Corporation v Pickles (1895)** **Facts:** Defendant maliciously dug well on his land diverting water from plaintiff’s land. **Held:** Defendant not liable as he was exercising his lawful right over his own property. **Principle:** A lawful act does not become unlawful due to malicious motive. ## MISTAKE IN FACT AND MISTAKE IN LAW Mistake in fact and mistake in law are important legal concepts that can affect liability in both criminal and civil cases. A mistake of fact occurs when a person has an incorrect understanding of the factual circumstances surrounding their actions. In contrast a mistake of law happens when someone misunderstands or is ignorant of the applicable law. These distinctions are crucial as they can impact legal culpability and potential defenses. **Types of Mistakes in Law** There are two main categories of legal mistakes: 1. **Mistake of fact:** This involves an erroneous belief about the factual circumstances of a situation. 2. **Mistake of law:** This refers to ignorance or misunderstanding of the applicable legal rules or obligations. **Mistake of Fact** A mistake of fact arises when someone acts based on an incorrect understanding of the factual circumstances. This type of mistake can potentially negate the mental state required for certain offenses. For a mistake of fact to serve as a valid defense it must generally be both honest and reasonable. Key elements of mistake of fact: 1. The mistaken belief must relate to the facts not the law 2. The mistake must be genuine and held in good faith 3. The mistake must be reasonable under the circumstances 4. If the mistake negates the required mental state it may serve as a defense Examples of mistake of fact: 1. Taking someone else’s property believing it to be your own 2. Engaging in intimate relations with a minor believing they were of legal age 3. Shooting at a person thinking they were an intruder when it was actually the homeowner The case of **R v. Williams (1923)** illustrates the concept of mistake of fact. Williams honestly believed the woman he had sexual intercourse with was his wife. The court held that his genuine mistake of fact negated the mens rea for rape even though his belief was unreasonable. This case established that an honest mistake could serve as a defense even if unreasonable. In **People v. Hernandez (1964)** the California Supreme Court ruled that a reasonable and good faith belief that a sexual partner was over the age of consent could serve as a defense to statutory rape. This case recognized mistake of fact as a potential defense even for strict liability offenses. **Mistake of Law** A mistake of law occurs when someone misunderstands or is unaware of the applicable legal rules or obligations. Generally ignorance or mistake of law is not accepted as a defense. The principle “ignorantia juris non excusat” (ignorance of the law is no excuse) reflects this stance. However there are some limited exceptions. Key aspects of mistake of law: 1. Usually not accepted as a defense in criminal or civil cases 2. Based on the presumption that everyone knows the law 3. Can sometimes be a mitigating factor in sentencing 4. May be a defense in rare cases involving complex regulations 5. Exceptions where mistake of law may be considered: 6. Reliance on official statements of law later determined to be incorrect 7. Laws that are not published or reasonably accessible 8. Specific intent crimes where mistake negates the required mental state 9. Some regulatory offenses with complex legal requirements In **Cheek v. United States (1991)** the Supreme Court held that a genuine good faith belief that one was not violating tax laws could negate the willfulness required for criminal tax evasion. This case created a limited exception to the general rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse. The case of **Lambert v. California (1957)** involved a municipal ordinance requiring felons to register. The Supreme Court ruled that the defendant’s lack of knowledge of this duty combined with the passive nature of her conduct violated due process. This case recognized that in some circumstances ignorance of legal duties may be a valid defense. **Comparison / Difference Between Mistake of Fact and Mistake of Law** While both involve errors in understanding mistake of fact and mistake of law have key differences: **Mistake of Fact:** 1. Relates to misunderstanding factual circumstances 2. Can often serve as a defense if honest and reasonable 3. May negate mens rea for many offenses 4. Assessed based on the defendant’s actual beliefs **Mistake of Law:** 1. Involves misunderstanding legal rules or obligations 2. Generally not accepted as a defense 3. Based on the presumption that everyone knows the law 4. Has very limited exceptions in specific circumstances ## MENTAL ELEMENT IN TORTIOUS LIABILITY **Meaning and Relevance of Mental Element** Mental element refers to the state of mind of the defendant when committing a tortious act. Unlike criminal law where mens rea is generally essential mental element is not always relevant in tort law. The relevance of mental element varies across different torts. **Fault-Based Liability vs Strict Liability** Tortious liability can be broadly classified into fault-based liability and strict liability. In fault-based torts mental element like intention negligence or malice is relevant. However in strict liability torts mental element is irrelevant. **Fault-Based Torts** In many torts mental element is crucial for establishing liability. Some key fault-based torts include: 1. **Assault and Battery:** Intention to cause apprehension of harmful contact or actual harmful contact is required. 2. **False Imprisonment:** Intention to confine the plaintiff unlawfully must be proved. 3. **Malicious Prosecution:** Malice and absence of reasonable cause are essential elements. 4. **Defamation:** Intention to publish defamatory statement is necessary though malice is not required. 5. **Negligence:** Breach of duty of care owed to plaintiff must be proved though intention to cause harm is not required. In these torts plaintiff has to establish fault on part of the defendant to succeed in the claim. **Strict Liability Torts** Some torts impose liability without proof of fault. Key strict liability torts are: 1. **Rule in Rylands v Fletcher:** Defendant is liable for escape of dangerous things collected on land irrespective of fault. 2. **Vicarious Liability:** Employer liable for torts of employee committed during course of employment without proving employer’s fault. 3. **Liability for Animals:** Owner liable for harm caused by dangerous animals without proof of negligence. 4. **Product Liability:** Manufacturer liable for defective products without proving negligence. 5. **Nuisance:** Interference with plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of land is actionable without proving intention or negligence. In these torts defendant’s mental state is irrelevant and liability arises from the act itself. **Intentional Torts** Some torts require proof of intention as mental element. Intention implies desire to bring about consequences of the act. Key intentional torts are: - Trespass to person (assault battery false imprisonment) - Trespass to land and goods - Conversion - Deceit - Malicious prosecution In these torts plaintiff must prove defendant intended the consequences though motive is irrelevant. **Motive and Malice** Motive refers to ulterior reason for defendant’s conduct. As per general rule motive is irrelevant in tort law. A good motive does not excuse a wrongful act. Similarly a bad motive does not make a lawful act tortious. This principle was established in **Bradford Corporation v Pickles \[1895\].** Defendant’s motive of extracting higher price for his land was held irrelevant as his act of digging on his own land was lawful. Malice means improper motive or intention to cause harm. It is relevant only in limited torts like malicious prosecution and abuse of process. In most torts presence or absence of malice does not affect liability. **Exceptions Where Motive is Relevant** In some exceptional situations motive becomes relevant: - In qualified privilege defamation cases malice defeats the defence - In conspiracy improper motive is an essential element - In nuisance cases malicious conduct may make an otherwise lawful act tortious - Presence of malice may lead to aggravated damages **Negligence as Mental Element** Negligence is the most common basis of tortious liability. It refers to breach of duty of care owed to plaintiff. Key elements are: - Existence of duty of care - Breach of that duty - Damage caused by the breach Standard of care is that of a reasonable person. Intention to cause harm is not required. Carelessness or inadvertence resulting in breach of duty is sufficient. **Knowledge as Mental Element** In some torts knowledge of certain facts is relevant for liability. For instance: - In defamation knowledge of falsity of statement is relevant - In nuisance knowledge of interference is required - For liability of occupier knowledge of danger on premises is relevant Reasonable foreseeability of harm is also based on defendant’s knowledge. **Mental Incapacity** Insanity or mental incapacity does not provide general defence in tort law unlike criminal law. Mentally incapacitated persons are liable for their torts subject to some exceptions: - In intentional torts lack of capacity to form intention may be relevant - In negligence inability to meet standard of care due to incapacity may be considered Children below certain age are deemed incapable of negligence in some jurisdictions. **Statutory Liability** Some statutes impose civil liability without requiring proof of mental element. For instance motor vehicle and workmen’s compensation laws provide for no-fault liability. Mental state of defendant is irrelevant in such statutory liability cases. **IMPORTANT CASE LAWS** **Rylands v Fletcher (1868)** This landmark case established the **rule of strict liability** in tort law. The facts were: - Defendants constructed a reservoir on their land - Water escaped and flooded plaintiff’s coal mines - No negligence was proved against defendants The House of Lords held defendants liable without proof of fault. It laid down the principle that a person who brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes must keep it at his peril. This case is significant as **it created an exception to fault-based liability in tort law**. Mental element of the defendant was held irrelevant for imposing liability. **Donoghue v Stevenson (1932)** This case established the **modern concept of negligence**. The key facts were: - Plaintiff consumed ginger beer from an opaque bottle - She found a decomposed snail in the bottle and fell ill - She sued the manufacturer for negligence The House of Lords held the manufacturer owed a duty of care to the ultimate consumer. **Lord Atkin propounded the *‘neighbour principle’*** stating: *“You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour.”* This case is significant as **it made negligence an independent tort** and established duty of care as the basis of liability rather than intention to cause harm. **Bradford Corporation v Pickles (1895)** This case dealt with relevance of motive in tort law. The facts were: - Defendant sank shafts on his land which diverted underground water - This reduced water supply to plaintiff corporation’s reservoirs - Defendant’s motive was to force corporation to purchase his land at high price The House of Lords held defendant was not liable as he had legal right to sink shafts on his land. His improper motive was held irrelevant. This case **established the principle that motive is generally irrelevant in tort law**. A lawful act does not become unlawful due to malicious intention. **Wilkinson v Downton (1897)** This case created the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The facts were: - Defendant falsely told plaintiff her husband was badly injured in an accident - This caused plaintiff to suffer severe shock and illness The court held defendant liable for intentionally causing nervous shock. It was held that intention to cause physical harm can be imputed if consequences were likely and foreseeable. This case is significant as **it recognized mental harm as actionable damage** and expanded scope of intention in tort law. **Allen v Flood (1898)** This House of Lords decision dealt with intentional interference with trade. The key facts were: - Defendant union official threatened shipyard to dismiss plaintiffs - Plaintiffs were dismissed and sued for malicious interference The majority held defendant was not liable as he had not employed any unlawful means. His motive was held irrelevant. This case **reinforced the principle that motive alone cannot make a lawful act tortious**. It also clarified limits of economic torts. **M.C. Mehta v Union of India (1987)** This Indian Supreme Court case dealt with absolute liability for hazardous industries. The facts were: - Oleum gas leaked from defendant’s plant causing harm - Traditional exceptions to strict liability were pleaded The court rejected exceptions and held hazardous industries absolutely liable for harm caused. Mental element was made completely irrelevant. This case **created a new standard of absolute liability** **stricter than *Rylands v Fletcher* rule** for hazardous industries in India. **Wagon Mound (No. 1) (1961)** This Privy Council case dealt with remoteness of damage in negligence. The facts were: - Defendants negligently spilled oil in a harbor - Oil caught fire after many hours causing damage to plaintiff’s wharf The court held defendants liable only for foreseeable damage. Unforeseeable fire damage was held too remote. This case **replaced direct consequence test with reasonable foreseeability test for remoteness**. It made defendant’s knowledge and mental state relevant for extent of liability in negligence. **Categories:** Articles, Law of Torts --- ### [3rd Deo Mangal Memorial National Moot Court Competition by GNSU, Bihar [Total Prize Worth Rs.73k; 29 Nov to 15 Dec 2024; Hybrid Mode]: Submit by 22 Nov](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-deo-mangal-memorial-national-moot-court-competition-by-gnsu-bihar-total-prize-worth-rs-73k-29-nov-to-15-dec-2024-hybrid-mode-submit-by-22-nov/) **Published:** October 20, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** Moot Court Society, Narayan School of Law, Gopal Narayan Singh University proudly announces its 3rd Deo Mangal Memorial National Moot Court Competition, 2024 from 29th November to 15th December 2024 in Hybrid Mode. ## About the Organizer Gopal Narayan Singh University (GNSU) is a private university located at Jamuhar village near the city of Sasaram in Rohtas district, Bihar, India. It is one of the first six private universities in Bihar. The university was notified in the Bihar Gazette following a decision of the Bihar cabinet on 5 June 2018 and has an official establishment date of 15 June 2018. ## About the Competition It is one of the finest mediums for future legal counsels to engage comprehensively in intricate deliberations to frame their arguments in context with the proposition and learn the art of advocacy to polish their skills. The competition strives to give a platform to the budding lawyers of our country to imbibe analytical skills in real-time situations. The aim is to engage with students and allow them to have a first-hand experience of the complexities of the law. ## General Details - **Date:** 29 November to 15 December, 2024 - **Mode:** Hybrid ## Eligibility Criteria - Law students enrolled in 3 years LLB program and 5 years integrated program from any college/institution/university recognized by BCI across the country. - A maximum of 2 teams from one college/institution/university shall be allowed to participate. ## General Rules - The team shall comprise either two members (being designated as Speakers and one of the speakers shall be designated as Researcher) or three members (two of them shall be designated as Speakers and one of them shall be designated as Researcher). - No team will be allowed to substitute any of its members after a team has filled & submitted the Registration form, except with the permission of the organizers. ## Registration Details **Registration Fee:** The registration fee for the competition is 2500 INR which includes Accommodation and Food for Quarter Finalist Team. ## Payment Details - **Beneficiary Name (Account Holder Name) –** Narayan School of Law - **Bank Name –** HDFC - **Branch –** Dehri, Rohtas - **Account Number –** 50200048481729 - **IFSC Code –** HDFC0002727 ## Prize - **Winning Team:** Cash Prize of Rs 25, 000/- + Trophy + Certificate - **Runner–Up Team:** Cash Prize of Rs – 20,000/- + Trophy + Certificate - **Best Memorial:** Cash Prize of Rs – 7,000/- + Trophy + Certificate - **Best Speaker Male:** Cash Prize of Rs – 7, 000/- + Trophy + Certificate - **Best Speaker Female:** Cash Prize of Rs – 7, 000/- + Trophy + Certificate - **Best Researcher:** Cash Prize of Rs – 7,000/- + Trophy + Certificate - ***Certificate of Participation shall be provided to all the participants.*** ***NOTE –** All participants of the event will be eligible for a 20% scholarship on all courses offered by Lawctopus Law School, including the subscription plan.* ### Important Dates Commencement of Registration: 07-10-2024 - **Last Date of Registration:** 22-11-2024 - **Last date of seeking clarification (if any):** 25-11-2024 - **Last date for submission of memorials (online):** 25-11-2024 - **Inaugural ceremony & Orientation:** 29-11-2024 - **Preliminary Rounds (Online):** 30-11-2024 - **Researcher’s Test (Online):** 30-11-2024 - **Quarter-final Round (On-Campus):** 14-12-2024 - **Semi-Final Round (On-Campus):** 14-12-2024 - **Final Round (On-Campus):** 15-12-2024 - **Valedictory ceremony & Prize Distribution (On-Campus):** 15-12-2024 ## Important Links - **Brochure:-** - **Moot Proposition:**– [https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1-WsnVDZ3wCTN1KMpx2d4j3MNpf846eGn?usp=drive\_link](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1-WsnVDZ3wCTN1KMpx2d4j3MNpf846eGn?usp=drive_link) - **Rule Book:-** **In case of queries, please contact:** - **Mr. Prakash Singh:** +91 8789373563 - **Mr. Rohan Kumar:** +91 8102144178 - **Email:** mootcourtsocietynsl@gmail.com **Categories:** Events --- ### [Free Online Webinar on Understanding India's Income Tax System: A Comprehensive Overview For Law Professionals by LawFoyer: Register by Oct 19](https://lawfoyer.in/free-online-webinar-on-understanding-indias-income-tax-system-a-comprehensive-overview-for-law-professionals-by-lawfoyer-register-by-oct-19/) **Published:** October 8, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Untitled-design-724x1024.jpg) [Register Now](https://lawfoyer.in/webinar-register-understanding-india-tax-system/) ## Gain In-Depth Knowledge from a Leading Expert LawFoyer presents an exclusive free online webinar – **“Understanding India’s Income Tax System: A Comprehensive Overview For Law Professionals”** led by our expert **(DR.) Jyoti Yadav**, Assistant Professor, Amity Law School Lucknow campus. ## Important Details - **Date:** Sunday, 20 October 2024, 7 pm onwards. - **Platform:** Google Meet/Zoom Meetings - **Completely Free Registration** ## Perks for Participants: - E-Certificate of Participation - **Free access to Certification Masterclass on Mediation Law of India (For More info [click here](https://academy.lawfoyer.in/courses/free-online-masterclass-on-mediation-law-of-india/))** - Get 10 % discount on our upcoming National Quiz competition. - Interactive Q&A sessions. - Priority access to Future LawFoyer Events. [Register Now](https://lawfoyer.in/webinar-register-understanding-india-tax-system/) ## **Why You Should Attend:** - **Tax System Evolution:** Examining the Indian Income Tax Act’s structure, its unique features, and how it has been interpreted and amended over time. - **Judicial Interpretations:** Analyzing landmark Supreme Court decisions that have shaped the understanding of income tax laws in India. - **Direct vs Indirect Taxes:** Discussing the distinction between direct and indirect taxes in India, with a focus on income tax as a key direct tax. - **Tax Slabs and Rates:** Exploring the current income tax slabs, rates, and exemptions for different categories of taxpayers. - **Deductions and Exemptions:** Examining various deductions under different sections of the Income Tax Act and their implications for taxpayers. - **Digital Transformation:** Analyzing the impact of digitalization on tax filing, assessment, and compliance procedures. - **International Taxation:** Understanding the principles of international taxation, double taxation avoidance agreements, and their relevance to Indian tax law. - **Tax Planning and Compliance:** Discussing legal strategies for tax planning and the importance of compliance for individuals and businesses. - **Recent Reforms:** Exploring recent and proposed reforms in the Indian income tax system, including the new tax regime introduced in 2020. - **Professional Implications:** Identifying the role of legal professionals in tax advisory, litigation, and compliance, and the skills required in this field. This webinar will provide a comprehensive overview of India’s Income Tax System, offering insights into its legal, practical, and professional aspects for law professionals. Don’t miss this chance to take your Taxation Law expertise to the next level. Register now on www.lawfoyer.in or contact at contact@lawfoyer.in or +91 8574723478. **Categories:** Events, Webinar --- ### [15th National Quiz on Indian Contract Act & Specific Relief Act by LawFoyer: Register by 28th September](https://lawfoyer.in/15th-national-quiz-on-indian-contract-act-specific-relief-act-by-lawfoyer-register-by-28th-september/) **Published:** August 29, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/15th-quiz-poster-png-Small.png) [ Download Updated Answer Key ](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Updated-Answer-Key.pdf) ## Clarifications in Answer Key (Released) Claimed Question Number Previous Answer Key Updated Answer Key Q 60 B C [ Check Results ](https://lawfoyer.in/results-of-15th-national-quiz-on-indian-contract-act-specific-relief-act/) [ Download E-Certificate of Certification ](https://lawfoyer.in/download-certificates-of-15th-national-quiz-on-indian-contract-act-specific-relief-act/) ## Dates - - **Date of Quiz:- 29/09/2024** **(5 Pm)** - - **Last Date to Apply:-** **28/09/2024, 11:00 pm** - - **Result Declaration:-** **05/10/2024** ## Prizes - - **1st Prize- Rs 3000 + Winner Trophy** **+ Hardcopy Certificate of (Excellence & Participation)** - - **2nd Prize- Rs 2000 + 1st Runner Up Trophy** **+ Hardcopy Certificate of (Excellence & Participation)** - - **3rd Prize- Rs 1000 + 2nd Runner Up Trophy** **+ Hardcopy Certificate of (Excellence & Participation)** - - **4th-10th Prize- Rs 150 + Hardcopy Certificate of (Excellence & Participation)** - - **FREE Practice E-Book with 1000 + MCQs for Practice** - - **Free 2 AI Plagiarism Report by Turnitin.** - - **Participation Certificate for All the Registered Participants** - - **Top 10 Rank will get 50% Discount on Publication at LawFoyer International Journal (ISSN: 2583-7753)**. [Click to know more](https://lijdlr.com/cfp-lawfoyer-international-journal-of-doctrinal-legal-research/) **Note:-** The Winners Trophy & Certificates will be dispatched to the designated recipients’ physical address without any additional charges. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/WhatsApp-Image-2024-01-22-at-01.00.07_ac7cf468-1024x576.jpg "WhatsApp-Image-2024-01-22-at-01.00.07_ac7cf468 | LawFoyer | LawFoyer | LawFoyer | LawFoyer | LawFoyer")## **Registration Fees** - - **Rs 149/- Only** ## ELIGIBILITY - - Law Students - - Legal Professionals - - Legal Practitioners - - Judiciary Aspirants - - AIBE Aspirants - - JLO Aspirants - - IBPS SO Aspirants - - Government Exam Aspirants - - Any person Interested in Contract Law ## **Important Guidelines** - - **Format of Quiz:** Quiz shall take place online, and a paper will include multiple-choice questions**.** - - The participant can take this exam on their laptop or mobile phone. - - The platform for the quiz will be google Forms, Microsoft Forms, etc. - - In the case of the same marks, time will be considered (a person who submits early will be given preference). - - The link will be shared 24 hours prior to the start of the quiz. ## **Rules & Regulations** - - **60 MCQ(s) \[30 question on Contract Law & 30 questions on Specific Relief Act\].** - - The time allotted will be **25** minutes. (This includes time for filling the basic details like Name, email, etc.) - - **Every question carries 04 marks & there will be no negative marking.** - The Result will be declared on **5th October 2024** ([www.lawfoyer.in](https://lawfoyer.in/)). **Categories:** Events, Quiz --- ### [National Moot Court Competition, XavAequitas'24 organized by Moot Court Society of Xavier Law School, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata is scheduled for October 24-26, 2024.](https://lawfoyer.in/national-moot-court-competition-xavaequitas24-organized-by-moot-court-society-of-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-is-scheduled-for-october-24-26-2024/) **Published:** October 3, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## About SXUK St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata (SXUK), stands as a beacon of excellence in higher education, deeply rooted in the Jesuit tradition of fostering academic rigor, ethical integrity, and social commitment. Established with the vision of shaping future leaders who are not only intellectually equipped but also morally and socially responsible, SXUK aims to cultivate a holistic learning environment. The university is committed to providing a platform where students are encouraged to think critically, innovate, and contribute to society. Through its diverse academic programs, cutting-edge research, and emphasis on community engagement, SXUK seeks to nurture individuals who can address contemporary challenges with wisdom and compassion. The institution prides itself on its vibrant campus life, enriched by a blend of cultural diversity and a strong sense of community. With a focus on character formation, leadership development, and the pursuit of knowledge, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata, aspires to be a transformative force in the field of education, guiding students to realize their full potential and become agents of positive change in a global society. ## About XLS Xavier Law School (XLS) was established in August, 2019 by the Honorable Lokpal of India, Mr. Pinaki Chandra Ghosh. It seeks to carry on the legacy of Jesuit education in the fields of legal education and research. It promises to provide all the facilities to the student which would help them to reach the pinnacle of success. Currently it offers two undergraduate courses, namely B.A.LL.B. (Hons.) and B.Com. LL.B. (Hons.). XLS comprises of highly qualified faculty members and modern infrastructure including a Moot Court Hall and a Law Library dedicated to the Law school. It seeks to set international standards in legal education and to promote holistic development of students. With this at the backdrop, Xavier Law School is determined to feature among the top law schools in the country. ## About MCS XLS The Moot Court Society, Xavier Law School is an integral part of the academic and professional development of law students, embodying the school’s commitment to nurturing future legal minds. MCS, XLS provides a dynamic platform for students to engage in simulated court proceedings, where they hone their advocacy skills, legal reasoning, and understanding of the law in practice. By organizing and participating in national and international moot court competitions, the society empowers students to confront complex legal issues and develop the confidence and competence required for their future careers. ## About 1st Xavier’s National Moot Court Competition **XavAequitas’24**, the first National Moot Court Competition organized by the Moot Court Society of Xavier Law School, is a prestigious event that embodies the institution’s dedication to cultivating legal acumen and advocacy skills among aspiring lawyers. This competition is a monumental step in Xavier Law School’s journey, aimed at establishing a tradition of excellence in legal discourse and practice. **XavAequitas’24** is designed to challenge participants with complex legal problems that require not only a deep understanding of the law but also the ability to think critically and argue persuasively. The competition will simulate real-world courtroom dynamics, providing students with the opportunity to engage in rigorous legal debates before panels of distinguished judges and legal professionals. ## **Important Details** - **Event Dates**: 24th-26th October 2024 - **Last Date for Registration**: 18th October 2024 - **Maximum Teams Per Institution**: Five (5) ## **Important Documents** We have attached the **Official Brochure**, **Moot Proposition**, **Registration Link**, and details of our **Official Website**: - Link to Official Brochure: [XavAequitas’24 Official Brochure.pdf](https://drive.google.com/open?id=1eeGL-uQDMJ4wAr-Bea_muuunUO-S0c09&usp=drive_copy) - Link to Moot Proposition: [XavAequitas’24 Moot Proposition.pdf](https://drive.google.com/open?id=1j4bPPrI2IQaTTvd6DvLI-b3SHd_nMx6L&usp=drive_copy) - Link to Registration Form: [XavAequitas’24 Registration form](https://forms.gle/JJpxiXXsjJ5hEWGD6) - Link to Official Website: [MCS XLS Official Website](https://mcsxls.wixsite.com/mcsxls) **Categories:** Articles --- ### [Call for Papers- 3rd National Seminar on Affordable Housing by NLU Delhi from 21st to 23rd February, 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-papers-3rd-national-seminar-on-affordable-housing-by-nlu-delhi-from-21st-to-23rd-february-2025/) **Published:** September 29, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** The Centre for Law and Urban Development at NLU- Delhi in collaboration with the Centre for Tax Laws NLU-Delhi, is pleased to announce the call for papers for the 3rd National Seminar on *Affordable Housing- Building Inclusive Society for the 21st Century India* to be held from **21st to 23rd February, 2025**. We request you to kindly publish the same in your website and related social media handles for outreach and marketing purposes. ## **About the Centre** ***The Centre for Law and Urban Development* (CLUD)** aims to bring together the student, industry and the academia working towards enhancing the understanding and teaching of property, housing, urban development and other related laws. The Centre also has a wide network which regularly connects, interacts and debates on simplifying and shaping the legal regime of property laws, real estate laws, environmental laws and other related areas of urban development for the upcoming generations. ***The Centre for Tax Laws* (CTL)** was established in 2018 under **National Law University, Delhi** to work in the area of tax laws. The centre aims to facilitate a high-level research environment where the student community appreciates the significance of tax laws and gets experiential learning from the established experts in this field. Additionally, the centre also wants to consistently provide policy interventions in the form of comments, and feedback to the government as reforming the taxation laws is high on its agenda. ## **The Seminar** Both these centers located at the prestigious **National Law University Delhi, in Dwarka**, in fostering their broader aims came together to cooperate and collaborate for a **National Seminar on Affordable Housing**. After the success of the first two editions, we are elated to announce the call for papers for the 3rd edition to be **held at NLU- Delhi Campus from 21st to 23rd February 2025.** The objective of this seminar is to address the legal and policy challenges in implementing affordable housing for all. In addition to the broad themes, there are **27 sub-themes** which the authors can write on. Further details regarding the topics, deadlines and other information can be found in the brochure. [Download Brochure](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/3rd-National-Seminar-on-Affordable-Housing-Brochure-21st-23rd-Feb.pdf) ## **Official Website – ** **Categories:** Articles --- ### [Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India (1995) 3 SCC 635](https://lawfoyer.in/sarla-mudgal-v-union-of-india-1995-3-scc-635/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Nandini Achhra, Vivekananda institute of professional studies** **Edited By: Gyanu Patel, Amity University (Lucknow)** **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** While considering this, it has to be noted that the world generally follows the concept of monogamy, which in turn is a conventional rule recognized by all the legal systems over the world. A contravention of this general rule, that is, bigamy or polygamy, is also punishable under law. Thus, bigamy is a practice that is considered an offense in our country. However, in India, people from the Islamic religion are allowed to have up to four wives. The analysis explains the concept of bigamy and the reasons why it is an offense. However, this will be incomplete without mentioning the Sarla Mudgal case, which has been a leading case of bigamy in India. Thus, the present analysis explains the facts, issues, and judgment of the case and also explains the concept of bigamy under different laws in light of the above case. He has also reviewed in the article the laws against bigamy in India and the landmark judgments on the same. **Keywords :** *monogamy, Bigamy, polygamy , islamic, religion* **B) CASE DETAILS** i) Judgement Cause Title / Case NameSarla Mudgal v. Union of Indiaii) Case NumberNAiii) Judgement Date10th May, 1995iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) Quorum / Constitution of BenchDivision Benchvi) Author / Name of JudgesJustice Kuldip Singh, and Justice R.M. Sahaivii) CitationAIR 1995 SC 1531viii) Legal Provisions InvolvedConstitution of India (1950), the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and Indian Penal Code, 1860**C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** Our Constitution under Article 25 gives the freedom to practice and profess any religion which also includes the freedom to convert to any religion other than one assigned to him by birth. However, this provision is sometimes misused with diverse religions and personal laws. Bigamy is punishable for all religions under IPC, except those tribes or whose personal law permits polygamy, such as the Muslim law. Bigamy can only be committed by renouncing his religion and adopting Islam. Not uncommon are the instances of bigamy in the names of men. Under the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act and Special Marriage Act: the second marriage of any party shall be void if such party shall have already subsisting spouse at the time of marriage. This means a second marriage is rendered null and void while a first marriage is still subsisting. Also, if a person converts to any other religion where polygamy is allowed and marries a person while his or her first marriage solemnized before the conversion is still subsisting, it shall not be valid because the first marriage solemnized before the conversion has not been dissolved yet. However, the Hindu Marriage Act, of 1955 has not specified the status of a person marrying after conversion. It declares a subsequent marriage between two Hindus is void if their partner is living, and they have not divorced at that time. This question came up at some length before the Supreme Court in the landmark case of Sarla Mudgal & Ors. V. Union of India and it settled the ambiguity surrounding the rights, duties, and obligations of people who change religion to defeat the law. The court held that a change of religion does not permit a person to defeat the provisions of law and to commit bigamy. **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** These were four petitions heard together under Article 32 in the Supreme Court of the Indian Constitution. First is Writ Petition no. 1079/89, with two petitioners; the first petitioner was Ms. Sarla Mudgal, who was the President of a registered society called Kalyani, a Non-Profit Organization working for the welfare of needy families and distressed women. The second petitioner was Meena Mathur, who had been married to Jitender Mathur since 1978. The couple had three children who were born out of wedlock. Petitioner 2 had come to know that her husband contracted a second marriage with one Sunita Narula alias Fathima after both of them converted themselves to Islam. She alleges that the conversion of her husband to Islam is only to marry Sunita, thereby avoiding Section 494, IPC. Let there be no doubt that the appellant pleads that after converting to Islam, he could marry four wives and prays that hence he shall not be punishable under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 as he can avail of the advantage that the concept of polygamy is legal under Mohammedan Law. The other was filed by Sunita Narula alias Fathima, a Muslim by religion; it was registered as Writ Petition 347 of 1990. Therein, the appellant asserted that she and the respondent adopted the Islamic religion and after the marriage, out of their union, a child was born but on account of the influence of respondent No.3-Meena Mathur- he had to make an offer in 1988 and undertook to convert back to Hinduism and maintain his first wife and three children. She also averred that the husband was not maintaining her and she had no other protection under Hindu law or Muslim law. Yet another petition was filed by Sunita Narula alias Fathima, registered as Writ Petition 347/1990, wherein it was contended that she and the respondent converted to Islam to marry and a child was born out of wedlock. However, under the influence of Meena Mathur, the respondent had also given an undertaking in the year 1988 that he would take a reconvert back to Hinduism and maintain his first wife and three children. She further contended that the husband was not even maintaining her, and she did not have any other protection in either Hindu law or Muslim law. Thirdly, a petition registered as Writ Petition 424/1992 was filed in the Apex Court. The petitioner Geeta Rani got married to Pradeep Kumar in 1988 according to the Hindu rituals. In December 1991, the Petitioner learned that her husband converted to Islam and married another woman, Deepa. The Petitioner asserts that the only purpose of converting to Islam was to facilitate the second marriage and to escape from the matrix of Section 494 of IPC. Sushmita Ghosh who was the petitioner in the Civil Writ Petition 509/1992, had married G.C. **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED (minimum 2 legal issues)** 1\. Whether a Hindu husband married under Hindu law, by embracing Islam can solemnize a second marriage? Whether such a marriage, without the first marriage being dissolved under law, be a valid marriage qua the first wife who continues to be Hindu? 2\. Whether the apostate husband, that is one who renounced Hinduism, is guilty of the offense under Section 494 of the IPC? **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** On behalf of the petitioners, it was contended that marriage was solemnized at the time when the husband converted to Islam, thereby signifying that the sole intent behind conversion was for the solemnization of marriage, and polygamy is allowed in this religion. Next, it was further argued that to convert to Islam only for marriage purposes, infringed their rights provided under personal laws. The first marriage still subsists, and the husbands solemnizing the second marriage without dissolving the previous is an infringement of personal rights. Further, it was constantly contended that another purpose was to circumvent the sections on bigamy and to evade the punishment under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The other petitioners also argued that their husbands compelled them to embrace Islam only on the ground that they converted, thus violating their fundamental right to religion under Article 25 of the Constitution. **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** Resisting the contentions made by the petitioners, the respondents have submitted that the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and, the Indian Penal Code, 1860 arguendo do not apply in their case. Viewed from a religious angle, Islam contemplates polygamy, and they can have four wives while the first marriage subsists. They furthered their argument that the Muslim personal law submits that if one from between the spouses does not return in kind or accept the similar religion of another, then the marriage comes to an end. Thus, the one who has converted the other has to also do it since he or she is duty-bound to do it or the marriage dissolves, therefore, the spouse who converted and married in Islam may not be punished. The petitioners In all the petitions pleaded a common plea that the moment they embrace Islam, they can have four wives even though they have a first wife who remains Hindu. Therefore, the Hindu Marriage Act, of 1955, and Ire do not apply them. **H) JUDGEMENT** **a. RATIO DECIDENDI** After these elaborate discussions, the court ultimately arrived at the following: The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is a socially dynamical legislation in the realm of statute – when a marriage is solemnized under that Act, certain rights and status are acquired by both the parties, and if one of the parties is allowed to dissolve the marriage by adopting and enforcing a new personal law, it would destroy the existing rights of the spouse who continues to be Hindu. A marriage performed under the Act cannot be dissolved except on the grounds given under Section 13 of the same Act. The second marriage of an apostate would therefore be an illegal marriage qua his wife who married him under the Act and continues to be Hindu. This reasoning is underpinned by the doctrine of traditional Hindu law with the doctrine of indissolubility, which states that the law did not intend the conversion to have the effect of dissolving a Hindu marriage. It also held that such a second marriage, solemnized by conversion to Islam, is violative of justice, equity, and good conscience. It also emphasized the harmonious working of the two systems of law, just to bring harmony between the two communities. The court further held that the apostate husband would be guilty under Section 494 of IPC. The expression ‘void’ used in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the Indian Penal Code has different intents. Conversion to Islam and contracting of a fresh marriage would not ipso facto dissolve the prior Hindu marriage under the Act, though it would be a ground for divorce. But from the ingredients of Section 494 explained elaborately in the earlier parts of the article, it can be inferred that the second marriage would be void, and the apostate husband would be guilty under Section 494 of IPC. Finally, the court also advocated for the imposition of a Uniform Civil Code (“UCC”) in the Indian legal system, that shall prohibit an Indian from infringing upon the personal law of another Indian. The court further directed that the Government of India, through the Secretary of the Ministry of Law and Justice, file an affidavit about the action taken by the Government of India towards UCC to be provided to the citizens of India. **b. OBITER DICTA-** But in the course of determining the issues in the case, his lordship Justice Kuldeep Singh found it fit to observe that marriage is the foundation of every civilized society under which when a relationship is formed and the law is involved, it binds the parties to carry out certain obligations. It is an institution in which the public at large is concerned about its maintenance. It can be said that marriage is the foundation of a family, without which there can be no society. It was also observed that since monogamy is a rule in Hindu law, Hindu husbands usually convert to Islam for polygamy which is allowed therein. While deciding whether conversion of one religion to another would dissolve the subsisting marriage, the learned judge had to rely upon a catena of judicial pronouncements. **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** In the case of Gul Mohammed v. Emperor, 1947, the accused took a Hindu woman to be his wife fraudulently and contracted marriage with her after forcibly having her converted to his religion, in this case, Islam. It was held that this conversion of Hindu married women to another religion does not ipso facto dissolve her marriage. It was also observed that in India, a marriage is governed by the personal laws of different religions. A marriage solemnized under one religion cannot be dissolved by another personal law just because one of the spouses changed his or her mind and converted to another religion. It was further observed that when a marriage is solemnized under Hindu law, the parties acquire the status and obligations according to the law governing Hindu marriages and if either of them is allowed to dissolve the marriage by converting to another religion, it would affect and violate the rights of another spouse who is still a Hindu. Thus, there can be no dissolution of marriage automatically upon conversion. It was observed that a marriage solemnized under Hindu law can only be dissolved according to the grounds mentioned in the Hindu Marriage Act, of 1955. The court also placed reliance on the judgment of the case ofRobasa Khanum v. Khodabad Bomanji Irani (1946)wherein it has been held by the court that the conduct of the spouse who converted to Islam has to be judged based on the rule of justice, and equity and food conscience. Another aspect is that the second marriage while the first subsists offends principles of natural justice as well. The purpose of conversion should not be to allow Hindu husbands to convert to enjoy polygamy. Regarding the proposed implementation of a Uniform Civil Code, it has been noted that the Constitution itself provides for a uniform civil code under Article 44. There has, however, been no development or effort at achieving this end. It has also been observed that the implementation of UCC would bring in national integrity and prevent differences in matters related to personal laws. J) REFERENCES **Important Cases Referred** a. Khanum v. Khodabad Bomanji Irani (1946) b. Jafar Abbas Rasool Mohammad Merchant v. State of Gujarat (2015) c. Khursheed Ahmad Khan v. State of U.P. (2015) d. Sri Anand C v. Smt. Chandramma (2022) **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases, Criminal Law Cases --- ### [ARTICLE 32: RIGHT TO CONSTITUTION REMEDIES](https://lawfoyer.in/article-32-right-to-constitution-remedies/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Dhanavel B, B.A.LL.B., Government Law College Dharmapuri** **INTRODUCTION** **“An article without which this Constitution would be a nullity – I could not refer to any other article except this one. It is the very soul of the Constitution and the very heart of it”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) – B.R. Ambedkar.** Fundamental rights are the outcome of the struggles that our people suffered during the colonial period under British rule. Our people did not have a right to speak, the right to form an association, the right to equality, and so on. Even our people did not have a guardian to look over their limited rights provided by the British. All the suffering and pain of the colonial period shaped our constitution. Various fundamental rights are provided by the Indian constitution to the people of India. Though there are different fundamental rights available in the Constitution, the right to constitutional remedy is a significant provision. Because it is a guardian provision for all other fundamental rights, it provides a constitutional obligation to the Supreme Court of India to provide constitutional remedies for safeguarding the fundamental rights that are provided by the Indian constitution. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*:** enforcement of fundamental rights, writ of habeas corpus, writ of mandamus, writ of prohibition, writ of quo warrant, writ of certiorari, appropriate proceedings, suspension of fundamental rights **LEGAL PROVISION** Article 32 of the Constitution of India – “*Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part.* *(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.* *(2) The Supreme Court shall have the power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs like habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warrant and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.* *(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1) and (2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction ill or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2).* *(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution[**\[2\]**](#_ftn2)”.* **INSTRUMENTS FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS** **Writ of Habeas Corpus** Indian constitution says, “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law”[\[3\]](#_ftn3). Illegal detention of a person is a direct violation of personal liberty. So, any detention or confinement should be according to the procedure which is established by the law. Confinement not only covers physical confinement but also covers control and custody over the person. The apex court has the power to enquire into the matter of confinement whether it is legal or illegal. If it finds the detention is not according to the procedure, it can declare the detention illegal and immediately order to release of such person. The literal meaning of the Latin term Habeas Corpus is, “You should have the body”[\[4\]](#_ftn4). This writ empowers the Supreme Court to safeguard the person physically. The Supreme Court in the case of Sunil Batra vs Delhi Administration[\[5\]](#_ftn5) held that “any interested person can file a writ of Habeas Corpus on behalf of the denied person”. Unlawful detention is not an essential part of the writ petition before it is disposed of by the court. When the court found prima facie in the writ petition. It issues a *rule nisi* for show cause for detention by the person who detained a person. If the court finds illegality in the cause, it orders to release the person immediately. The Supreme Court has absolute power to issue a writ of Habeas corpus against any person who kept the aggrieved person in his custody to show cause for detention and further, it can order to release him if it finds illegality in the detention[\[6\]](#_ftn6). **Writ of Mandamus** The Supreme Court can compel any subordinate court, tribunal, public authority, government, and anybody to do any act or restrain from doing any act of a public nature which is legally entitled to do or legally not entitled to do. It’s a form of command. The term Mandamus means, “we command”[\[7\]](#_ftn7). Under this writ, the Supreme Court has the power to compel any administrative authority if he must act in a public nature. In the case of Oriental Bank of Commerce vs Sunder Lal Jain & Anr[\[8\]](#_ftn8), the Supreme Court held that “the petitioner of this writ should have the right to compel the authority to perform his duty towards him”. Furthermore, he may have legal interests or his rights are in imminent danger of being invaded[\[9\]](#_ftn9). Importantly, the right to compel should be provided to him by statute not by a contract. So, a writ of mandamus cannot be invoked to compel the performance of contractual liability. Before invoking the writ of mandamus, the concerned authority should refuse to perform his legal duty of a public nature towards the aggrieved person. Further, observing the case of Manjula Manjari Dei v. M.C. Pradhan, Director of Public Instruction[\[10\]](#_ftn10), a writ of mandamus cannot be invoked in matters of a discretionary nature. In the above case, a writ of mandamus was filled to compel the Director of Public Instruction to select the petitioner’s book for schools. The court refused the writ because selecting books for schools is at the discretion of the Director of Public Instruction. **Writ of Prohibition** Writ of Prohibition is a preventive remedy. This writ can be invoked by the person against any judicial and quasi-judicial bodies for restraining such bodies from what they are about to do. The main condition for a writ of prohibition is that an alleged judicial or quasi-judicial body is about to do an act without jurisdiction. This writ cannot be invoked against an executive body. If a judicial or quasi-judicial body acts partly within the jurisdiction and partly outside the jurisdiction, the Writ of Prohibition will lie in the part of the act that is acted by it without the jurisdiction. Once a judicial or quasi-judicial body pronounces its decision over the matter which is decided by it without jurisdiction, a writ of prohibition cannot be invoked against such judicial or quasi-judicial body. Further in the case of Prudential Capital Markets Ltd v. The State of Andhra Pradesh and others[\[11\]](#_ftn11), the court held once the order was executed, the writ of prohibition could not be invoked. **Writ of Quo Warranto** This writ empowers the citizens to question the person’s appointment in an office of a public nature. It protects the office of a public nature from the person’s employment by force or any illegal manner. Latin term Quo Warranto means, “by what warrant (or authority)”[\[12\]](#_ftn12). When the writ of Quo Warranto is invoked by the person, the court calls the person who is against the writ filed to show in what authority he holds the alleged office. If the court finds he holds such office of a public nature illegally, it orders the person to leave his office immediately. Public office means the office in which the general public interests exist. Writ of Quo Warranto will not invoke against any office of private nature. It only can be invoked against public offices. In the case of Jamalpur Arya Samaj v. D. Ram[\[13\]](#_ftn13), the petitioner filed a writ of quo warranto against the appointment of members of the working committee of a private religious association. The court refused the writ on the grounds of appointment in the office of a private nature. There is no limitation period for filing this writ petition in the Supreme Court because the cause of action arises every day on how long the alleged person holds the office. Further, the petitioner need not have a specific interest in the alleged office. The main point to decide in this writ is whether the person holding public office legally or illegally. **Writ of Certiorari** The Supreme Court can call the records of proceedings from the subordinate courts and tribunals. If it finds any illegality, it will quash it. The Writ of Certiorari is the correctional remedy. The Supreme Court held in the case of Gulab Singh and Ors v. Collector of Farrukhabad and Ors[\[14\]](#_ftn14) that “the writ of certiorari can issue against any legal authority who must act judiciary to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects”. Judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative bodies who fulfil the above conditions come under the ambit of that writ. Majorly there are three grounds to issue the writ of certiorari, The *first one* is want or excess of jurisdiction, in this ground the said writ is issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction of judicial or quasi-judicial functioning bodies. Errors of the jurisdiction include the ultra vires acts of legal authority, exercising powers without fulfilling the conditions of the law, acquiring jurisdiction from unconstitutional statutes, exercising powers for an improper purpose, acting under bad faith, and so on. The *second one* is a violation of the principles of natural justice, the rule of audi alterm partem which means listen to the other side and the doctrine of bias comes under the principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court can issue the writ of certiorari against the decisions of judicial or quasi-judicial bodies if there are no opportunities given to the parties to defend their cases or if the decision is arrived at by legal authority by the influence of bias. In the case of Gullapalli Nageswara Rao and Others Vs Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and Anr[\[15\]](#_ftn15), the court held that the objection against the policy of the particular department heard by the Secretary of the same department was biased. So, it violates the principles of natural justice. The *third one* is the error of law. The Supreme Court can correct the error of law apparent on the face of the record of legal authority. The function of a writ of certiorari quash the order of the legal authority and not to substitute a new order in its place. Because the Supreme Court acts as supervisory authority not as appellate authority under that writ. 1. **Exclusive Power of Supreme Court** – As per article 32(2), the Supreme Court can issue writs “including writs like habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warrant and certiorari”. Five writs mentioned in article 32(2) are inclusive. So, article 32 does not restrict the Supreme Court only to issue writs mentioned in that article. The Supreme Court held that “the Courts should abandon the laissez-faire approach in the judicial process particularly where it involves a question of enforcement of fundamental rights and forge new tools, devise new methods and adopt new strategies to make fundamental rights meaningful for the large masses of people. And this is permissible in the language of clause (2) of Article 32”[\[16\]](#_ftn16). Further, the apex court extended the scope of *Locus Standi* to allow any public-spirited person to approach the court for the enforcement of the fundamental rights of the needy people. The term *Locus Standi* means, “the right or ability to bring a legal action to a court of law, or to appear in a court”[\[17\]](#_ftn17). The Supreme Court can give extraordinary remedies for the enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32. The Supreme Court is empowered to provide compensation for the violation of fundamental rights. It not only has the power to issue writs but also it has the power to issue directions or orders for the enforcement of fundamental rights. So, the Supreme Court’s power to provide constitutional remedies for the enforcement of fundamental rights is not limited, it can go to any extent to protect the fundamental rights of citizens. 2. **Manner Of Approach The Supreme Court** Approaching the Supreme Court for constitutional remedies for the enforcement of fundamental rights should be done by appropriate proceedings as per Article 32(1). The Supreme Court follows a liberal interpretation of the term “appropriate proceedings”. In any manner, the aggrieved person can approach the Supreme Court for the enforcement of his fundamental rights. Prescribing the hardened proceedings will cause restrictions on poor, disabled people, and ignorant people. In the case of Bandhua Mukti Morcha vs Union of India & Others[\[18\]](#_ftn18), The Supreme Court ruled that “the letter of the aggrieved person sent to the court for the enforcement of his fundamental rights regarded as an appropriate proceeding”. Even The Supreme Court accepted postcards and telegrams addressed to any judges of the court regarding enforcement of the fundamental rights as appropriate proceeding[\[19\]](#_ftn19). Usually, the Supreme Court considers the appropriate proceedings based on the main purpose of proceedings which is enforcement of fundamental rights. Whenever fundamental rights are invaded by the acts of the administrative or legislature, the Supreme Court is empowered to provide appropriate remedies. 3. **Constitutional Obligation Of The Supreme Court In the matter of enforcement of fundamental rights, the Supreme Court and the High Courts have the power to provide remedies. There is no condition for the Aggrieved person to approach the High Court first and, afterwards approach the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in the case of M. C. Mehta v. Union of India (Shriram-Oleum Gas)[\[20\]](#_ftn20), ruled that the petitioner need not approach the High Court very first before approaching the Supreme Court. Due to the pending cases in the Supreme Court, aggrieved persons should approach the high court first if there is an effective remedy available there. If there is no effective remedy available, the aggrieved person can approach the Supreme Court directly. The right to enforce fundamental rights under Article 32 is a fundamental right of an aggrieved person but the right to enforce fundamental rights under Article 226 is a constitutional right. Therefore, the Supreme Court has the constitutional obligation to provide constitutional remedies for the enforcement of the fundamental rights of citizens. Notably, The Supreme Court does not entertain petitions under Article 32, if the matter has already been decided on merit by the high court. Because the rule of *Res Judicata* bars the Supreme Court from reopening the matter again[\[21\]](#_ftn21). But if the petition was dismissed not on merit by the high court then there is no bar to entertain the petition under Article 32[\[22\]](#_ftn22). The Term *Res Judicata* denotes, “a matter finally decided on its merits by a court having competent jurisdiction and not subject to litigation again between the same parties”[\[23\]](#_ftn23). 4. **SUSPENSION OF ARTICLE 32** Article 32(4) provides the right to enforce fundamental rights only be suspended according to the provision of the constitution. Article 359 suspends the enforcement of fundamental rights by the courts during an emergency which is declared by the President under Article 352. In the case of ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla[\[24\]](#_ftn24), the Supreme Court held the right to constitutional remedies provided by Article 32 for the enforcement of fundamental rights is suspended during the national emergency as per Article 359. But later, article 359 was amended by the 44th Constitutional Amendment Act 1978. This amendment act excluded Article 20 and Article 21 from the ambit of Article 359. Currently, all fundamental rights shall be suspended during a national emergency but the protection in respect of conviction for offences under Article 20 and protection of life and personal liberty under Article 21 shall not suspended. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** Providing the right to constitutional remedies as the fundamental right to citizens clearly expresses how the makers of our Constitution decide to secure all fundamental rights from encroachment. Supreme Court acts very well to protect fundamental rights. It issues writs to secure fundamental rights and even provide compensation to aggrieved persons under Article 32. Further, it extends the scope of locus standi to allow public-spirited persons to fight for the enforcement of the fundamental rights of others. All the previous decisions of the Supreme Court regarding the enforcement of fundamental rights clearly show the Supreme Court is always right to break any barrier for the enforcement of fundamental rights as the guardian of the fundamental rights of the citizens. **REFERENCES** 1. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. Cambridge Dictionary, locus standi, English meaning – Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/locus-standi (last visited Aug 4, 2024). 2. Definition of habeas corpus, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/habeas%20corpus (last visited Aug 3, 2024). 3. Definition of res judicata, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/res%20judicata (last visited Aug 4, 2024). 4. LII, quo warranto, LII / Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/quo\_warranto (last visited Aug 3, 2024). 5. mandamus, HarperCollins Publishers Ltd, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/mandamus (last visited Aug 3, 2024). 2. **Cases Referred** 3. ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla, 1976 SCR 172. 4. Bandhua Mukti Morcha vs Union of India & Others, 1984 SCR (2) 67. 5. Daryao And others vs The State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 1962 SCR (1) 574. 6. Forward Construction Co. & ors. Etc. Etc vs Prabhat Mandal (Regd.) Andheri & ors, 1986 AIR 391. 7. Gulab Singh and Ors v. Collector of Farrukhabad and Ors, AIR 1953 ALL 585. 8. Gullapalli Nageswara Rao and Others Vs Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and Anr, 1959 AIR 308. 9. Jamalpur Arya Samaj v. D. Ram, AIR 1954 PATNA 297. 10. C. Mehta v. Union of India (Shriram-Oleum Gas), (1987) 1 SCC 395. 11. Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel vs Union of India and Anr, 1969 SCR (3) 254. 12. Manjula Manjari Dei v. M.C. Pradhan, Director of Public Instruction, AIR 1952 ORI 344. 13. Mohan Lal Sharma vs State Of Uttar Pradesh, (1989) 2 SCC 600. 14. Ikram Hussain v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 1964 SCR (5) 86. 15. Oriental Bank of Commerce vs Sunder Lal Jain & Anr, (2008) 2 SCC 280. 16. Prudential Capital Markets Ltd v. The State of Andhra Pradesh and others, 2000 (5) ALT 468. 17. Sunil Batra vs Delhi Administration, 1980 SCR (2) 557. 3. **Statutes Referred** 1. Constitution of India [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Words of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar in Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VII, 953. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) India Const. art. 32. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) India Const. art. 21. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Definition of habeas corpus, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/habeas%20corpus (last visited Aug 3, 2024). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) 1980 SCR (2) 557. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Mohd. Ikram Hussain v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 1964 SCR (5) 86. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) mandamus, HarperCollins Publishers Ltd, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/mandamus (last visited Aug 3, 2024). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) (2008) 2 SCC 280. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel vs Union of India and Anr, 1969 SCR (3) 254. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) AIR 1952 ORI 344. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) 2000 (5) ALT 468. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) LII, quo warranto, LII / Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/quo\_warranto (last visited Aug 3, 2024). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) AIR 1954 PATNA 297. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) AIR 1953 ALL 585. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) 1959 AIR 308. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Bandhua Mukti Morcha vs Union of India & Others, 1984 SCR (2) 67. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Cambridge Dictionary, locus standi, English meaning – Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/locus-standi (last visited Aug 4, 2024). [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) 1984 SCR (2) 67. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Mohan Lal Sharma vs State Of Uttar Pradesh, (1989) 2 SCC 600. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) (1987) 1 SCC 395. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) Forward Construction Co. & ors. Etc. Etc vs Prabhat Mandal (Regd.) Andheri & ors, 1986 AIR 391. [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) Daryao And others vs The State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 1962 SCR (1) 574. [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) Definition of res judicata, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/res%20judicata (last visited Aug 4, 2024). [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) 1976 SCR 172. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Marital and Adoption Rights of LGBTQ+ Community and Applicability of Family law](https://lawfoyer.in/marital-and-adoption-rights-of-ltbtq-community-and-applicability-of-family-law/) **Published:** September 6, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Name of Author- Nikhil, Gitarattan International Business School** **Edited by – Sulesh Choudhary** **INTRODUCTION** The term ‘Gender’ is commonly thought to refer to masculinity or femininity; however, an individual can identify with a variety of other gender identities apart from these binary options. Gender identity encompasses how a person views themselves in terms of gender and this perception may not align with their sex. Male or female as assigned at birth. It can also mean feeling like a man or a woman or identifying as something in between, on the gender spectrum. In today’s world of the first-century privacy rights are valued just as highly as the right to life. Every person holds a fundamental ‘right to gender’. Gender identity embodies the core value of ‘equality’. Embraces the concept of fairness. Presently individuals, within the LGBTQ+ community are granted rights ranging from the ‘right to exist’ to the ‘right to foster’ yet in some regions of the globe they still encounter instances of ‘social inequality’. Marriage has long been seen as an institution in society when it involves relationships between men and women according to the laws of nature perceived by many people as holy Those views failed to demonstrate any inherent differences between homosexuals and heterosexual individuals The discrimination they face is primarily rooted in societal attitudes, towards gender identity and fluidity to shift in the 20th century with an increasing acceptance of homosexuality driven by the advocacy efforts of same-sex couples asserting their rights Research and investigations have. **LGBTQ+ Community’s Right to Marriage** After the landmark decision of the Supreme Court in ‘navtej singh johar v. Union of India, which decriminalized section 377 of the indian penal code, 1860 to the extent where two adults are engaged in consensual sexual activities, a ray of hope for equal rights and dignified treatment to the sexual minorities, i.E., the lgbtqia+ community was found. Post the decision in Navtej Johar, there have been considerable advances in indian society to discuss the issue of homosexuality and the recognition of lgbt rights. Numerous individuals have emerged from their closet, embracing and accepting their sexual identities and orientations. All this makes a logical inference that homosexuality is not uncommon in India. The rights of this community have been deliberately ignored, and there has been institutionalized victimization of people who fall under a sexual minority. Post the 2018 judgment which decriminalized homosexuality, there has been a growing demand for legal recognition of same-sex marriages. For this to be realized, multiple petitions have been filed since 2018 seeking to enact a new set of laws or amendments to the existing ones that would carve out a space for homosexual couples. This is essential to attain equality and prevent discrimination based on gender identities. The current Indian personal civil laws recognize marriages between a biological man and a biological woman and discourage same-sex marriages in India. **The Importance of Legal Recognition** It is to be noted that there happen to be no explicit legal restrictions on homosexual marriages since the decriminalization of section 377. However, there are additional aspects that need to be given due consideration. To begin with, consider the following situation, one Lesbian couple approached the Registrar with a request to issue a certificate of marriage under the Special Marriage Act. The Registrar was unclear whether he was authorized to issue the certificate to a same-sex couple. Due to the ambiguity, the Registrar had to turn the couple away. Later, smelling the confusion, one of the partners was persuaded not to marry. In this scenario, who is supposed to be blamed? It’s no shortcoming of the Registrar but the law, which lacks clarity. One could wonder why legal recognition of marriage has become so essential. To answer, the State’s role in marital relations has to be scrutinized. Although being a secular affair, marriage is linked with a particular set of rights and liabilities shared between the spouses. **Same-Sex Marriages under Family Law** In India, Hindus, Muslims and Christians are governed by various rules on marriage. The Hindu Marriage Act, which regulates “Hindus, Sikhs, Jains, and Buddhists”, stipulates that “marriage can be solemnized between any two Hindus”. Similarly, the Christian Marriage Act prescribes rules of marriage amongst Christians. Muslim marriages are not regulated by any statutory legislation and lack any formal definition of marriage, but the union is mostly perceived as a contract for procreation. But the overall notion of a marriage, in all personal laws, envisages a “heterosexual union”. **Same-sex marriages under the Special Marriage Act, 1954** An alternative that should not raise religious eyebrows is to seek an “amendment to the Special Marriage Act of 1954” to allow same-sex weddings. The Act is a secular law that allows interreligious and inter-faith marriages. Marriage does not occur through religious ceremonies; instead, is registered by a Marriage Officer. The SMA appears to apply to heterosexual couples in its current version. However, same-sex weddings are easily accommodated within its framework by making minor amendments. **LGBTQ+ Community’s Right to Adoption** After the landmark decision of the Supreme Court in ‘navtej singh johar v. Union of India, which decriminalized section 377 of the Indian penal code, 1860 to the extent where two adults are engaged in consensual sexual activities, a ray of hope for equal rights and dignified treatment to the sexual minorities, i.E., the lgbtqia+ community was found. Post the decision in Navtej Johar, there have been considerable advances in Indian society to discuss the issue of homosexuality and the recognition of lgbt rights. Numerous individuals have emerged from their closet, embracing and accepting their sexual identities and orientations. All this makes a logical inference that homosexuality is not uncommon in India. The rights of this community have been deliberately ignored, and there has been institutionalized victimization of people who fall under a sexual minority. Post the 2018 judgment which decriminalized homosexuality, there has been a growing demand for legal recognition of same-sex marriages. For this to be realized, multiple petitions have been filed since 2018 seeking to enact a new set of laws or amendments to the existing ones that would carve out a space for homosexual couples. This is essential to attain equality and prevent discrimination based on gender identities. The current Indian personal civil laws recognize marriages between a biological man and a biological woman and discourage same-sex marriages in India. **Existing Legislation on Adoptions** The Ministry of Women and Child Development regulates the Central Adoption Resource Authority (CARA), which manages and controls local and international adoptions. CARA is the central authority responsible for looking after adoptions at the inter-country level as per the Hague Convention on Inter-country Adoption regulations, which the Government of India ratified in 2003. **Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956** This Act entails the requirements and legal obligations of Hindu adults who wish to adopt a child. According to Sections 724 and 8(c)25 of the said Act, authorisation is not required if the spouse is not of sane mind, has abandoned the world, or abandoned their children. These provisions also provide for the adoption of a child by unmarried men and women of sound mind having attained the age of majority. “The words spouse and wife used in Sections 7 and 8 indicate that the Act does not recognise adoption by same-sex couples. In addition, the ability of Hindu males and females to adopt is clarified, leaving a grey area for applying such laws to third-gender couples. **Adoption Regulations, 2017** These regulations are significantly more restrictive than the HAMA in terms of restrictions. Unmarried men and women can adopt if they are financially sound, mentally and emotionally stable and have no life-threatening conditions. However, a single man is prohibited from adopting a girl child, while a woman is not prohibited from adopting a boy child. On the other hand, Section 11(iii)28 permits the adoption of a girl child by a single man provided that the child and the adoptive father are at least 21 years of age. **Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015** Prospective Adoptive Parents (“PAPs”) are eligible under Section 57 of the JJ Act. According to one of the requirements, “no child shall be put for adoption until the couple has had at least two years of a good marital relationship.” The same-sex couples could not establish a two-year stable marital relationship since they were not legally recognised until recently, making them ineligible to serve as PAPs. **Contemporary Issues and challenges concerning Adoption by same-sex couples** The Madras High Court in Arun Kumar Sreeja vs. Inspector General of Registration declared that a marriage between a man and a transgender woman, both of whom follow Hinduism, was considered valid. The court concluded that the term “bride” in the home does not have a specific definition and should be interpreted based on the current legal framework. Transgender individuals should not be denied the benefits and opportunities provided by social institutions in mainstream society, as the Indian constitution is an enabling document that promotes their inclusion in the mainstream. In the case of Laxmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India, the court acknowledged that “every child has the right to a family.” It can be interpreted that this right encompasses the right to adoption. Additionally, article 39(f) of the constitution mandates that the government implement policies to ensure that children have access to the necessary opportunities and resources for their healthy, free, and dignified development. Consequently, confining a child to an institution and denying them the opportunity to have a family is equivalent to depriving them of their freedom and dignity in life, which goes against our national policy principles. **Effect of lack of legislation: From the lens of the COVID-19 Pandemic** The COVID-19 pandemic has had a devastating impact on the lives of children, wherein many were left orphaned due to the deaths of their parents. According to the National Commission for the Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR), over 9300 children in India have lost their parents since the pandemic began in 2020. The apex court had emphasized that the actual number of orphaned or abandoned children would be greater than what has been reported in official and public records. The pandemic, which led to an increase in the number of children without parents, has prompted and fueled the growth of child trafficking. **CONCLUSION** The ongoing discussions about the legalization of same-sex relationships or marriages have been a contentious issue for many years. The LGBTQ+ folks have been standing up for their basic rights since they were born, like being treated the same, being free, keeping things private, living safely, and being true to who they are. Organisations must initiate global campaigns to persuade national governments to provide basic rights to everyone. Western ideas have greatly affected the way people in Eastern countries think and, to some degree, changed their overall view of homosexuals. Simplified: Western influence and European trends have changed the idea of same-sex marriages, giving people in this group new reasons to be inspired. **REFERENCES** - Adoptions Regulations,2017([http://cara.nic.in/PDF/Regulation\_english.pdf](http://cara.nic.in/PDF/Regulation_english.pdf)) - Aneesha Mathur, Over 9300 children lost parents or were abandoned in the pandemic, NCPCR informs Supreme Court() - Fleur Mulligan, “Gender Identity: Developing a Statistical Standard”, Vol. – II, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Statistics Division, 289, Pg. No. – 7 (2015). - Joshua Kellison, “Lesbian and Gay Parenting: A Parental Need Assessment and a Mixed Method Analysis of Discrimination Parenting and Coping Strategies”, Vol. II, Arizona State University, Pg. No. 127, December (2014). - The Constitution of India, 1950. - The Indian Penal Code, 1860. - The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. - The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 § 2(2). - The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. - Vanita, Ruh. “Same-Sex Weddings, Hindu Traditions and Modern India”, Feminist Rev., no. 93, 2009. **Categories:** Articles, Family Law --- ### [Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1998) 1 SCC 226](https://lawfoyer.in/vineet-narain-v-union-of-india-1998-1-scc-226-2/) **Published:** August 31, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Chahat Gugliya, Dr. K. N. K. Law College, Ratlam** **A) ABSTRACT** This case is a landmark judgment by the Supreme Court of India highlighting systemic corruption and the independence of investigative agencies. Public Interest Litigation (PIL) filed by journalist Vineet Narain, highlighting the inaction of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and other agencies in probing corruption allegations against high-ranking politicians and bureaucrats in the Jain Hawala scandal. The Supreme Court emphasized the need for the functional autonomy of the CBI and the Enforcement Directorate (ED) to conduct impartial investigations free from political and bureaucratic influence. The Court directed the appointment of the CBI Director through a transparent process involving a committee and fixed the tenure of the Director to ensure stability and independence. The judgment also recommended making the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) a statutory body to oversee the CBI’s work in corruption cases thereby enhancing accountability and efficiency. By laying down guidelines for investigative procedures and asserting judicial oversight the Court aimed to ensure diligent and transparent handling of corruption cases **Keywords** : *corruption, accountability, central bureau of investigation independence, judicial oversight, transparency.* **B) CASE DETAILS** i) Judgement Cause Title / Case NameVineet Narain v. Union of India (1998) 1 SCC 226ii) Case Number(Criminal) No. 340-343 of 1993iii) Judgement DateDecember 18, 1997iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) Quorum / Constitution of BenchDivision Benchvi) Author / Name of JudgesV Justice S.P Bharucha; Justice S.C Sen and Justice N. Santosh Hegdevii) Citation(1997) 4 SCC 306viii) Legal Provisions InvolvedArticle 32, 14 & 21 – Constitution of India; Section 6 & 19 – Prevention of Corruption Act (1947); Delhi Special Police Establishment Act; Criminal Procedure Code**C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT-** Journalist, Vineet Narain along with others, filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) seeking directives for the CBI to investigation. CBI, which is responsible for investigating such cases, was often compromised and hindered by political pressures. The case of Vineet Narain & Others vs Union of India & Another is a landmark case which revolves around issues related to Prevention of Corruption Act & role of Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in investigating corruption cases. The petitioners, led by journalist Vineet Narain, seek the court’s intervention to address serious issues relating to the CBI’s compromised efficiency while investigating corruption cases against influential public figures. The issues in this case are questions on law & governance. The right to fair investigation & speedy trials is enshrined in the Constitution. This case reinforced principles of accountability & transparency in the investigation process. It has contributed to judicial oversight & the rule of law in the country. **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The case involved a writ petition filed by Vineet Narain, an activist along with other petitioners before the Supreme Court. The petitioners alleged that high-profile corruption cases were compromised due to political interference and lack of investigation by the CBI, they proclaimed that the CBI was not functioning properly and was influenced by political pressure. On March 25, 1991, Ashfak Hussain Lone, alleged to be an official of the terrorist organization Hizbul Mujahideen, was arrested in Delhi. Upon his interrogation, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) conducted raids on the premises of Surrender Kumar Jain, his brothers, relations and businesses. During the raids, the CBI seized two diaries and two notebooks containing detailed accounts of vast payments made to persons identified only by initials. The initials corresponded to the initials of various high-ranking politicians, in power and out of power, and of high-ranking bureaucrats. Despite the seizure of these incriminating materials, the CBI and revenue authorities failed to investigate the matter and take it to its logical conclusion by prosecuting the persons involved. The petitioners, Vineet Narain and others filed public interest writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution, alleging that the government agencies had failed to perform their duties and legal obligations by not investigating the contents of the “Jain diaries.” The petitioners alleged that the failure to investigate was done to protect the influential and powerful persons who were recipients of money from unlawful sources. The petitioners argued that the matter disclosed a nexus between crime and corruption at high places in public life, posing a serious threat to the integrity and security of the country. The case arose from the CBI’s failure to investigate the contents of the “Jain diaries,” which allegedly revealed financial links between politicians, bureaucrats, and criminals, despite the incriminating evidence seized during the raids. **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether the judiciary can intervene and provide a remedy when government investigative agencies like the CBI fail to investigate allegations against high-ranking politicians and bureaucrats? ii. Whether it is within the domain of judicial review and it could be an effective instrument for activating the investigative process which is under the control of executive? **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** i. The counsel for Petitioner submitted that the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) with investigating high-profile corruption cases was suffering from major issues related to political interference. They argued that this interference compromised the CBI’s ability to function with the necessary independence and impartiality. The petitioners claimed that the CBI’s operations were influenced by political authorities which often led to biased and compromised investigations. ii. The counsels highlighted the inefficiency in the CBI investigative procedure was a major concern. They pointed out various instances where investigations were unreasonably delayed leading to prolonged periods during which corruption cases remained unresolved. This delay was argued to be a strategy to avoid accountability and shield influential people from the legal consequences of their actions. iii. The petitioners counsel argued that there was a systemic failure in the prosecution of corruption cases. They provided evidence of several high-profile cases where the CBI failed to pursue prosecutions. This included examples of weak and incomplete legal action that resulted in insufficient consequences. Such failures they argued undermined the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures and eroded public confidence in the legal system. iv. The counsels for the petitioners called for the implementation of procedural reforms within the CBI. They argued that the lack of clear guidelines and time for conducting investigations contributed to inefficiency and lack of transparency. They emphasized the need for structured procedures to ensure that investigations were conducted promptly and effectively thereby enhancing the overall accountability of the CBI. v. The petitioners counsel also underscored the importance of protecting whistleblowers who come forward with information about corruption. They argued that without adequate protection whistleblowers faced significant risks of retaliation which could discourage others from reporting corruption. They urged the Court to recognize the necessity of safeguarding whistleblowers to encourage the reporting of misconduct and ensure the integrity of investigative processes. vi. Finally the counsels argued for the establishment of an independent supervisory mechanism to oversee the CBIs functioning. They suggested that a supervisory committee composed of impartial and experienced individuals could provide the necessary oversight to ensure that investigations were conducted without political interference and in adherence to established guidelines. This oversight was deemed crucial for maintaining the credibility and effectiveness of the CBI. **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** i. The counsels for Respondent submitted that the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) is an autonomous and professional agency equipped to handle high-profile corruption cases with the necessary expertise and resources. They argued that the CBI’s operations are conducted with established protocols and legal standards designed to ensure fairness and impartiality in its investigations. ii. The respondents contended that allegations of political interference are largely unfounded and do not reflect the operational realities of the CBI. They argued that the CBI’s decisions and actions are guided by law and are not subject to undue political influence. The respondents maintained that any allegations of interference should be substantiated with specific evidence rather than generalized assertions. iii. Regarding the issue of inefficiency in investigations the counsels for the respondents acknowledged that while the CBI may face challenges it operates under significant procedural and legal constraints. They argued that delays in investigations are often due to the complex nature of the cases and the necessity for thorough evidence collection. They maintained that the CBI works diligently to resolve cases within a reasonable timeframe and delays are not indicative of systemic failures but rather the inherent challenges of complex corruption cases. iv. On the matter of prosecution failures the respondents asserted that the CBI’s role is limited to investigation and the decision to prosecute rests with the appropriate legal authorities including the prosecution and judicial system. They argued that any shortcomings in the prosecution process are beyond the CBI’s control and are a function of the broader legal framework within which it operates. v. The respondents agreed on the importance of protecting whistleblowers but argued that the existing legal and institutional mechanisms adequately address this issue. They contended that there are sufficient safeguards and protections in place for whistleblowers and additional measures may not be necessary or practical given the current framework. vi. Regarding the call for procedural reforms the respondents acknowledged that procedural improvements can be beneficial but argued that the CBI is already subject to rigorous oversight and legal standards. They maintained that implementing further reforms should be considered carefully to avoid disrupting the existing system which is designed to balance efficiency with thoroughness. vii. Finally the counsels for the respondents objected to the need for an independent supervisory committee. They argued that the CBI is already subject to oversight by various bodies including the judiciary and government authorities which provide adequate checks and balances. They contended that the establishment of a new supervisory mechanism could lead to unnecessary bureaucratic complications and may not necessarily improve the effectiveness of investigations. **A) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** I. Articles of the Constitution of India:  Article 14: “Right to Equality, emphasizing that every individual is equal before the law and entitled to equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”  Article 21: “Right to Life and Personal Liberty, which underscores the importance of fair investigation and trial as essential to protect individual rights.”  Article 32: “Provides the right to approach the Supreme Court for enforcement of fundamental rights, forming the basis for the Public Interest Litigation in this case.” II. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: “This act provides the framework for preventing corruption in public offices and outlines the legal penalties for offenses related to corruption.” III. The Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), 1973: “Provisions from the CrPC were cited regarding the powers of the police and investigating agencies to conduct inquiries and investigations, ensuring due process in judicial proceedings.” IV. Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860: “Contains provisions related to offenses, including those pertaining to bribery and corruption, that were pertinent in the context of the allegations investigated by the CBI.” **H) JUDGEMENT** **a. RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio decidendi of Vineet Narain & Others vs. Union Of India & Another revolves around the Supreme Court’s affirmation of the necessity for independence and accountability of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in the prosecution of high-profile cases. The Court established that the CBI must operate free from political interference emphasizing that governmental directives, such as the Single Directive should not obstruct the investigation of corruption by public officials. The integrity of law enforcement is vital to uphold the rule of law and prevent prosecutorial inertia in cases involving influential individuals. The judgment also mandated the establishment of Special Courts to expedite the trial of criminal cases investigated by the CBI thereby reinforcing the importance of timely justice and accountability in public office. This ruling therefore enhances the framework for investigating corruption and serves as a critical interpretative guideline for the exercise of CBI’s powers in future investigations. **b. OBITER DICTA** The Supreme Court made several obiter dicta that provided important context and commentary on the subject matter. The Court expressed concern about the systemic issues plaguing the investigative framework, suggesting that public trust in legal institutions is base for democracy. It emphasized that corruption and nepotism in high offices negatively impacts governance and the need for rigorous accountability mechanisms. The justices highlighted the importance of a transparent and autonomous investigative body arguing that the CBI’s role is crucial in upholding the principles of justice and public interest. Additionally, the Court reflected on the need for reforms to ensure that investigative agencies operate effectively and without obstruction. The commentary aimed to guide future legislative and administrative actions, underscoring the judiciary’s role in fostering a corruption-free environment within public institutions. **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment reinforced the principle that the rule of law must triumph over political influence ensuring that corruption is effectively addressed while preserving individual rights. It set a precedent for future cases, advocating for reforms in the accountability mechanisms of investigative bodies in India. the Vineet Narain case has had a lasting impact on Indian society by fostering a legal environment conducive to accountability, promoting anti-corruption initiatives, and empowering citizens to advocate for integrity in governance. These changes have contributed to a democratic framework and have implications for the overall health of public institutions in India. **J) REFERENCES** a. Important Cases Referred 1\. Kehar Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (1994) 2\. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 3\. Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 4\. State of Bihar v. Bihar Rajya Khadi Gramodyog Mandal, (1997) b. Important Statutes Referred 1\. Constitution of India, 1950 2\. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 3\. The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 4\. Indian Penal Code, 1860 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases, Criminal Law Cases --- ### [Historical School of Jurisprudence: An Analytical Study](https://lawfoyer.in/historical-school-of-jurisprudence-an-analytical-study/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Nirbhay Singh, Lovely Professional University** **1. Introduction** Legal philosophy the principles that seek to explain the nature, role, function, and justification of law are grouped into several schools of thought. Of all, the Historical School of Jurisprudence is one of the most distinguished frameworks that explain the history and culture of the law. The positivist school of thought came to light as a result of criticism of rationalist and natural law theories that were prominent in the 18th century and the initial half of the 19th century. The supporters of the Historical School have contended that law is not the creation from reason or theological fiat, but it is a living growth of the civilization and the community. This article aims to explain what the historical school of jurisprudence looks like, its origins, philosophers, and significance for contemporary legal science. The discussion will be divided into several sections: In this context, they described the background of the formation of the school, major figures supporting the Historical School, basic premises of historical jurisprudence, main criticisms of other legal theories, and the influence of Historical School over the contemporary legal theory. **2. Keywords** – *Natural Law Critique, Legal Positivism, Volkgeists, Legal History, Customary Law* **3. The Emergence of the Historical School** Historicism as a method of studying law appeared in the second half of the 18th and the first half of the 19th centuries, as a reaction to rationalism and the Enlightenment. The main concepts of the Enlightenment included individualism, reason, the social contract, and natural law, the last of which led to the proposition that law is natural and universal. However, the Historical School introduced the cultural specificity of these systems and stated that they are being formed in records of historical progress as the formation of legal traditions is based on and pertinent to the cultural and social practices of the specific nation. Stemming from these conditions the Historical School arose as a genuine sociopolitical movement emanating from the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. Such events just underlined the importance of not applying legal ideas to nations disregarding their history and culture. The placing of the Napoleonic Code all through Europe caused much resentment and demonstrated that social norms and culture should be taken into consideration when promulgating laws. **4. Key Figures of the Historical School** The Historical School of Jurisprudence was shaped by several essential personalities due to their specific ways of thinking and contributions. **1. Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861):** Savigny is claimed to be the historical school of law founder. Savigny rejected the codification of the laws based on concepts in his work “On the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence” written in 1814 ‘. He opined for the legal development from the traditions of the “Volkgeists” or the spirit of the people. Savigny believes that the law is a part of a nation’s historical experience and any intervention with a foreign law would disturb the process of growth of the legal system. **2. Gustav Hugo (1764-1844):** Hugo was another of the representatives of the Historical School who actively contributed to the analysis of the history of the formation of Roman law. He stressed that historical precedent ought to be taken into account when analyzing legal development; legal institutions should be viewed historically. As such, even if at present, it is not easy to fully appreciate Hugo’s contributions to the study of law, it can be inferred that his scholarly achievements have paved the way for future generations of legal historians. **3. Georg Friedrich Puchta (1798-1846)**: Puchta continued the ideas of Savigny and partially advanced the ideas of the Historical School, more specifically, the doctrine of custom. Speaking of the nature of law, he stated that law grows out of practices and beliefs of the society, the development of which is historically conditioned. It has been still commented on and adapted by many generations of legal theorists mostly concerning the topic of the connection between law and custom and Puchta’s contribution is still pertinent to the contemporary debates in property law and legal anthropology. **5. Philosophical Foundations of the Historical School** The Historical School of Jurisprudence is grounded in several key philosophical principles, which distinguish it from other legal theories. **1. Law as a Product of Historical Development:** A main postulate of the Historical School is that the annals of legal systems’ experience cannot be encompassed by rationalistic postulates or divine revelations, but the law is a historical organism. In this view, the law grows and develops from the practices, conventions, and norms that a particular society deems fit. This greatly differs from the natural law theories where law is said to have its foundation on rational principles. **2. The Concept of Volkgeists:** Volkgeists which translates to “spirit of the people” is an important feature of the Historical School. It relates to the notion that a law is a reflection of a certain population’s consciousness as the result of its history. Thus, following the ideas of Savigny, the Volkgeists regulate all legal norms and the attempt to impose certain external legal standards contradicts the historical evolution of the community. **3. Customary Law:** The Historical School pays a lot of regard to customary law, being completely convinced that it is the key source of legal norms. Customary law, however, can be defined as the practice and the traditions of the people which over time acquire the force of law. This emphasis on custom sets the Historical School as a doctrine different from other legal theories that tend to rely on codes and written laws. **4. Historical Continuity:** Historical School pays particular attention to the historically conditioned evolution of legislation. Therefore, legal institutions are regarded as being a progressive growth process, with every generation adding to the existing legal systems. This focus on stasis differs in some ways from systems of other theories of law, which call for the radical overhaul of legal structures according to principle. **6. Critique of Other Legal Theories** The historical School of Jurisprudence arose due to the main styles in jurisprudential science such as natural law and positivism. **1. Critique of Natural Law:** The Historical School does not accept the view of the natural law theory that law originates from rational principles that mankind is capable of discovering. As much as has been pointed out by proponents of the Historical School, this view is myopic, and it does not take into consideration that every legal system is historical. They oppose the notion that law is a rational construct and is historical growth that is inextricably linked to the specifics of the society in which it is used. Anti-formalists argue that the application of principles inherent in the legal system of other countries would upset the proper development of the legal system, as well as provoke social tension. **2. Critique of Legal Positivism:** The Historical School also rejects legal positivism which postulates that law is the set of rules that exist and are implemented by the state. While the positivism theory states that legal systems need to have written statutes and legal codes, the Historical School says this view is not correct as it does not explain the role of custom and history in legal systems. Thus, the work of the Historical School, legal positivism disregards the organic nature of law and tends to venerate the role of the state in a manner that dislocates the law away from the community it is supposed to serve. **7. The Enduring Influence of the Historical School** The Historical School has also substantially shaped legal theory and practice and has influenced multiple legal systems and disciplines. **1. Influence on Legal Anthropology:** It is Imperialism which is the reflection of the methodology of the Historical School that focused on the connection between law and custom. Legal anthropologists consider the institutional contexts of law and secure the knowledge of the historical school on the conduct of legal customs. **2. Impact on Comparative Law:** Several other branches of legal scholarship, out of which the branch of comparative law that deals with comparing various legal systems also emanates from the Historical School due to its emphasis on the specificity of legal systems. Comparative lawyers use the ideas of the Historical school to analyze legal systems and their configuration in different historical and cultural contexts. **3. Contribution to the Development of Legal History:** The Historical School can be cited as the pioneer of legal history as most of its representatives stressed a historical approach to the study of law. Historicism and its concepts and techniques are adopted by legal historians to examine the origins and the evolution process of the legal systems with an orientation toward the influence of cultural history. **4. Influence on Modern Legal Thought:** The concept of the Historical School that focuses more on the organically evolved legal system has continued to influence modern thinking on laws, especially the constitution and legal reasoning. This approach of the Historical School is still in force in today’s practice: legal scholars and judges use it to interpret the content of legal texts based on their historical background, relying on the principles of continuity and tradition for legal systems. **8. Conclusion** The Historical School of Jurisprudence, championed by figures like Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Gustav Hugo, and Georg Friedrich Puchta, emphasizes the importance of historical development, custom, and tradition in shaping legal systems. It highlights the role of the Volkgeists, or national spirit, in the evolution of law and serves as a counterpoint to other legal theories such as natural law and positivism. This school of thought has significantly influenced fields like legal anthropology, comparative law, and legal history, offering valuable insights into the law’s historical and cultural context. Its relevance endures in contemporary legal scholarship and practice, underscoring the importance of understanding law as a product of human history and social practices. **References** J M Kelly, “The Historical School of Jurisprudence and the Role of Customary Law” (2007) 18 German Law Journal 123. T Nentwig, “Savigny’s Historical School: An Overview” (2011) 29 Legal History Review 145. G L Harcourt, “Georg Friedrich Puchta and the Historical School of Jurisprudence” (2014) 30 Journal of Legal Studies 202. S R Haigh, “Critiques of the Historical School: Natural Law and Positivism” (2012) 27 International Journal of Law 67. E Hagan, “The Legacy of Gustav Hugo: Historical Jurisprudence and Its Modern Impact” (2015) 22 Comparative Legal Studies 94. **Categories:** Articles, Jurisprudence --- ### [Hon'ble Shri Ranganath Mishra vs Union of India and Ors AIRONLINE 2003 SC 273](https://lawfoyer.in/honble-shri-ranganath-mishra-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-aironline-2003-sc-273/) **Published:** August 31, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Nirbhay Singh, Lovely Professional University** **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** This case judgment concerns and involves the part of the Constitution of India, Order 51 A that deals with the realization of rights and duties of its citizens and was given by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India on 31-7-2003. The petitioner, the former Chief Justice of India, Shri Ranganath Mishra had also sent a letter to the Chief Justice of India stressing for creating awareness and education on the aspects of Fundamental Duties in large. In this letter, the Court treated it as a writ petition. From the interest that the petitioner showed, the issue at hand seemed to support the equality of people’s rights and responsibilities as citizens. Therefore, for the determination of this case, the court-appointed Shri K. Parasaran as an Amicus Curiae, the court referred this matter to a larger Bench since it is very important in hopefully reversing the majority decision of the Court in the Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala case. Thus, the court actively discussing the propositions of Justice J. S. Verma Committee stimulated the process of creation of a mechanism for enforcing the provisions of the fundamental duties. The verdict also ordered the Central Government to consider these recommendations of the bodies seriously and sympathetically, to bring into action and develop a responsible sign of national conscience in the people. **Keywords:** Fundamental Duties, Constitutional Law, Education Reform, Justice J.S. Verma Committee, Citizen Awareness **B) CASE DETAILS** i) Judgement Cause Title / Case NameHon’ble Shri Ranganath Mishra vs Union of India and Orsii) Case NumberWrit Petition (Civil) 239 of 1998iii) Judgement Date31/07/2003iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) Quorum / Constitution of BenchDivision Benchvi) Author / Name of JudgesV.N. Khare CJ, K.G. Balakrishnan, S.B. Sinhavii) CitationAIR ONLINE 2003 SC 273viii) Legal Provisions InvolvedArticle 51A of the Constitution of India**C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The case started with a letter to the Chief Justice of India Shri Ranganath Mishra via the Supreme Court where it was treated as a writ petition. In his letter, the petitioner explicitly pointed out that it was of paramount significance to maintain citizens’ awareness of their fundamental duties, stating that it was due to this perspective that the recognition of rights should be accompanied by the acknowledgment of obligations. This court realizing the importance of this issue engaged Shri K. Parasaran as an Amicus Curiae to assist the court with the issue. Given the questions being framed in the case, especially in the light of the decision in Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, the court first referred the case to a constitutional bench. But this order was recalled soon, and the issue was transferred to a three-judge bench for a revised look into the issue. **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** **i) Procedural Background of the Case:** The case started when the petitioner, Shri Ranganath Mishra addressed the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India in writing; the same has been transferred by the apex court in the form of writ. The matter, which pertains to the discharge of some significant questions of constitutional importance concerning the concept of the fundamental duties of citizens, was at first entrusted to the Constitution Bench. However, by subsequent orders, the same was stationed before a bench consisting of three Judges. **ii) Factual Background of the Case:** The primary relief the petitioner sought in the current matter was an order requiring the state to address education on the subject of citizen’s fundamental duties. He pointed out the need for such education to fill the gap between the rights of the citizens and the corresponding responsibilities. On coming across a few elementary educational reform recommendations and efforts to enhance awareness regarding the fundamental duties, the attention of the court was directed to the report of the Justice J. S. Verma Committee. This report highlighted the need to incorporate the fundamental duties of citizens as part of the curriculum that a society passes through in their everyday lives. **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1\. Whether the state must educate citizens about their fundamental duties: The first one was about the state’s responsibility to educate and produce conscious citizens of India as per Article 51A of the constitution of India. 2\. Whether the recommendations of the Justice J. S. Verma Committee are valid and necessary of being implemented: Another important problem concerned with survival correlates with the consideration of the possibilities and advisability of applying recommendations conveyed by the Justice J. S. Verma Committee to ensure fundamental duties implementation. **F) PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT** Counsel for the petitioner explained how there is such a major need in society for people to be taught their fundamental duties. Such an education is critical to promote the understanding that with every right one ought to take there are corresponding responsibilities. The petitioner noted that such awareness is currently lacking, which essentially means that citizens are immersed in their rights without regard for their reciprocal duties. Also, the petitioner emphasized the importance of the measures that should be taken for the governance of the recommendations made by the Justice J. S. Verma Committee. Education of citizens was a major area of its focus and the Committee’s report provided elaborate means of doing it. The petitioner also noted that the implementation of all these recommendations will greatly boost national integrity and social responsibility. This particular report provided actual specifications on how the core responsibilities will be incorporated into the school system to enrich society with moral principles of duty. These measures were described by the petitioner as desirable for nurturing a concerned and responsible population. **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsel for the respondent pointed out that the subject state has implemented several measures toward creating awareness of fundamental duties. Such efforts are the constitutional educational and public awareness programs to educate the citizens on their constitutional duties. In response, the respondent highlighted that the state is indeed making efforts to raise awareness and these existing measures prove that the state is serious about being instrumental in increasing the understanding of the basic duties of the citizens. Furthermore, the respondent expressed the possibility of the non-implementation of all that was recommended by the Justice J. S. Verma Committee on the grounds of its infeasibility or impracticality. Although the respondent agreed that the recommendations are patriotic, their implementation subjectively needs to be analyzed. These recommendations cannot overrule practical issues like the availability of resources and or structures to implement these changes, hence there is the need to make these changes practical. The respondent supported the idea that the accomplishment of the recommendations would require proper planning and stepwise implementation in the existing educational and social frameworks. **H) JUDGEMENT** **a. RATIO DECIDENDI:** It was observed by the Supreme Court that they hope that the Central Government will take the implementation of the recommendations of the Justice J. S. Verma Committee as matters which require consideration very seriously. These recommendations were also a significant component to enhance the understanding and awareness of the citizens concerning the fundamental duties. **b. OBITER DICTA:** It was upon the premise of this doctrine that the court urged for the due implementation of rights with duties to transform the citizenry into responsible individuals. It underlined the general knowledge among citizens about their rights but lack of knowledge about their corresponding duties which is important for the smooth running of a society. **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment in the Hon’ble Shri Ranganath Mishra vs Union of India and Ors details the importance of spreading awareness about the rights and duties to maintain a correct parity between the two. The need for proper educational reforms and being carried out by awareness programs was also highlighted by the Supreme Court when it asked the central government to study and possibly act on the Justice JS Verma Committee. This case lays down the foundations for the encouragement of a responsible attitude to rights together with their enjoyment. The priority of the court’s approach to the search for and definition of rights and duties is essential for preserving the integrity and stability of the nation and society as a whole. Thus, by directing the Central Government to begin moving towards the implementation of the proposed Committee, the court has provided the foundation for a more enlightened citizenry. It also bears the judiciary’s affirmative position in ensuring that the Constitution is not only recognized but also actively implemented. **J) REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred:** • The pivotal judgment of the Supreme Court of India is Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, \[1986\] 3 SCC 615: This concerned the regulation of freedom of religion where the apex court found that students of the Jehovah’s Witnesses faith cannot be forced to sing the national anthem if this is against their faith. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Mediation under Consumer Protection Act, 2019](https://lawfoyer.in/mediation-under-consumer-protection-act-2019/) **Published:** August 31, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Krishang Sharma, Student, University Five Year Law College, University of Rajasthan.** **Edited by: Madhumita Saha, Student, Lajpat Rai Law College, Sambalpur University, Odisha.** **INTRODUCTION** Mediation, as a method of alternate dispute resolution, has a long-standing history in the diplomatic arena. Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, N V Ramana, also asserted that our ancient epics like Mahabharata are one of the best examples of an early attempt at mediation as a conflict resolution tool, where Lord Krishna being the mediator attempted to mediate the dispute between the Pandavas and Kauravas. It also sets a great example of what happens if the mediation fails and how it may lead to disastrous consequences taking a lot of time. Today in the modern era, the increase in commercial disputes has diverted the people’s interest towards mediation. The increased interest of people towards mediation depicts the dissatisfaction among the people regarding the cost, time, and complicated procedures as adopted in traditional dispute resolution systems. *An ounce of mediation is worth a pound of arbitration and a ton of litigation*.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) -Joseph Grynbaum *Keywords*: MEDIATION, ADR, CPA, CONSUMER RIGHTS, NEGOTIATION. **What is mediation?** *“When a third party called a “mediator” uses special negotiation skills and communication techniques to help litigants bridge their differences and find a solution to their dispute. Mediation always leaves the decision-making power to the parties. A Mediator does not decide what is fair or right or apportion blame. Rather, a mediator acts as a catalyst to bring the two disputing parties together by defining issues and eliminating obstacles to communication and settlement”.[**\[2\]**](#_ftn2)* *“As described by the Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee of the Supreme Court of India, ‘Mediation’ is a voluntary, binding process in which an impartial and neutral mediator facilitates disputing parties in settling. A mediator does not impose a solution but creates a conducive environment in which disputing parties can resolve all their disputes. Mediation is a tried and tested alternative method of dispute resolution”[**\[3\]**](#_ftn3)* **Key terms used in the concept of mediation** Disputed parties– Parties claiming different interests or rights and holding opposite views in dispute are referred to as disputed parties. Negotiation– The dictionary meaning of the term ‘Negotiate’ is to bargain for something to agree at some point. Negotiation is a process where two or more parties having conflicting interests in any dispute bargain among themselves to reach a settlement that they can both agree on. Negotiations are made by the parties through discussions between themselves or their representatives without the involvement of a third party. **Types of mediation** There are two types of mediation. Court- Referred Mediation When a legal matter has been filed before the court and when the court refers such matter for mediation under Sec. 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is known as Court-Referred mediation. Private mediation Private mediation is a process in which services of mediation are offered by qualified mediators on a private, fee-for-service basis to the Court, members of the public, members of the commercial sector, and the governmental sector to resolve disputes through mediation. Private mediation can be used in connection with disputes pending in Court and pre-litigation disputes. Example: ASSOCHAM International Council of Alternate Dispute Resolution (“AICADR”) **Procedure For Mediating a Session** Introduction and Opening Statement This is the very first stage of the mediation session. Here the mediator establishes trust among the parties of his neutrality and he makes the parties aware of the rights and the duties in the consumer protection law. He also tries to motivate the parties to an amicable settlement. Joint Session This session is meant to hear the issues in common with both parties. At this time the mediator gathers information about the issues and conflict and provides the platform for the parties to understand the perspective of each other. Further, this session is also used to understand facts, the issues, obstacles, and possibilities of settlement. A joint session ensures that each participant is being heard equally. Separate Sessions This session is specially designed to understand the issue at a deeper level and the hidden underlying intent of the parties. It helps the parties to express emotions and thoughts that they could not have disclosed in front of the other party. Being in a private session helps parties to realistically understand the case. Also, the mediator may influence each party separately to find a way out of litigation and make a settlement. Closing Session This session is a closing session of a mediation process where both the parties jointly discuss whether to settle the dispute with each other or continue to litigation. If they mutually decide to settle the matter, the terms and conditions are discussed. The mediator forms a document where all the terms and conditions of the settlement are written, this agreement is called the settlement agreement. The mediator may sign the agreement to show that he is the witness of the settlement agreement. After this, the original signed agreement is sent to the referral body for passing the appropriate order by the agreement. The parties are provided with a certified copy of the agreement. In case of disagreement for settlement, the case would be sent back to the referral body merely reporting “not settled”. The report will not contain any reason for which settlement did not happen and will not be fixing any responsibility on any one of the parties. **Exceptions for mediation** Consumer Protection (mediation) Rules state that the following matters cannot be resolved through mediation[\[4\]](#_ftn4)– - Matters related to medical negligence leading to death or previous damage - Any such offences or defaults for which application for compounding the same has been submitted by one or many parties. - Matters involving allegations of fraud, coercion, impersonation, forgery or fabrication of documents - Matters which involve criminal and non-compoundable offences - Matters involving the interest of the general public who are not the parties in front of the commission - Matters where it is felt by the commission that there is no scope of settlement and mediation will be of no use. **Mediation in comparison with other countries** The concept of mediation is not limited to a country but it is a tool used to resolve conflicts all over the world. Some are examples where mediation is used as a tool to resolve conflicts - In Bangladesh, mediation has been extremely successful in delivering justice to the poor sections of society. - *“In Japan, spouses mutually agree on the decision to divorce through a discussion process and then register the divorce with the local authorities”[**\[5\]**](#_ftn5)* - In America, mediation is the norm of dispute resolution and litigation is the exception - In England, the courts do not award costs if a litigant unreasonably rejects mediation as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. No. of mediation centre in India 839No. of mediators trained by MCPC 6480No. of Cases referred to the centres since inception (up to June 2015)9,37,995Settled 3,36,455Connected case 38,764Now in the case of India, mediation has shown significant results in dispute settlement, which is evident from the statistics below: *\[Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee, Supreme Court of India, Mediation (2015)\]* **Legal Provisions** In CPA, 2019 Sec 74-78 deals with the concept of mediation in consumer disputes. - Section 74- Establishment of consumer mediation cell. *“The central government and state government should establish the mediation cells as the national commission, a regional bench, a state commission, and a district commission. Every mediation cell should contain a list of – empanelled mediators, cases handled by the cell, and a record of proceedings, and every mediation cell should submit a quarterly report”.[**\[6\]**](#_ftn6)* - Section 75- Empanelment of Mediators *“The consumer mediation cell has to maintain a panel of mediators on the recommendations of the selection committee and their tenure shall be of five years after which they may be entitled to re-empanelment for another term subject to conditions mentioned in regulations”*[\[7\]](#_ftn7). - Section 76- Nomination of mediators from the panel *“It directs that the nomination of a mediator must depend on his/her suitability to dispute an issue”[**\[8\]**](#_ftn8)* - Section 77- The duty of a mediator to disclose certain facts. *“The mediator must disclose any personal, professional, or financial interest in the outcome of the consumer dispute or anything that may raise a justifiable doubt as to his independence or impartiality”.[**\[9\]**](#_ftn9)* - Section 78- Replacement of mediator in certain cases. *“The commission may replace the mediator if the information received gives rise to justifiable doubt for the commission. This information could be from the mediator or third party.” [**\[10\]**](#_ftn10)* - Section 79- Procedure for Mediation *“This section specifies that the process of mediation has to take place in the mediation cell. The mediator knowing all the factors necessary may carry out mediation by the principles of natural justice. The mediation must be carried out in the manner and within the time specified in the regulations.”[**\[11\]**](#_ftn11)* - Section 80- Settlement through mediation *“If the parties come to a settlement, then the mediator must reduce it into a written agreement which has to be signed by all the parties to the dispute or their authorised representatives. The mediator then shall prepare a report regarding the settlement and forward the same with the agreement to the concerned commission. If there is no consensus within the prescribed period (three months), the mediator then has to report the same to the commission*.”[\[12\]](#_ftn12) 8. **Judicial Development of the Mediation.** 9. *“Afcons Infrastructure Limited And Another V. Cherian Varkey Construction Company (Private) Limited And Others”*[\[13\]](#_ftn13) The Supreme Court held that “Mediation” is a well-known term and it refers to a method of non-binding dispute resolution with the assistance of a neutral third party who tries to help the disputing parties to arrive at a negotiated settlement. It is also a synonym of the term ‘conciliation’. 1. *“Nutan Batra V. M/S Buniyaad Associates (Fao (Os) (Comm) 42/2018 & Cm No. 9553/2018)”[**\[14\]**](#_ftn14)* In this case, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff is entitled to the refund of the court fees as the case satisfied the conditions laid down under section 16 of the Court Fee Act. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** There is a well-known phrase which is considered as a golden rule by many of the businesses matter small or large that is ‘consumer is the king’. I think this phrase is rightly justified as it is nothing but the choice of the consumer which sways the market in any given direction. Especially in today’s era of technology and e-commerce, consumers look at the reviews and ratings of the product or service and plan accordingly. But still, some consumers are not well equipped with all the technology in the modern era and tend to fall into fraud and tactics of the sellers. The government has taken many steps to counter this problem and mediation is one of such measures taken by the government to resolve the consumer issues in the best way possible which mediation is beneficial for both, the businesses and the consumers. Neither of them willingly wants to indulge in litigation as it is a very time-consuming and expensive process and hence it is a win-win situation for both parties. **REFERENCES** - **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. *Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, Government of India, Consumer Handbook on Mediation (2020)* 2. *Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee, Supreme Court of India, MEDIATION (2015)* 3. *Kanak Kanti Karmakar, A Legal Analysis of the Suitability of Alternative Dispute Resolution as a Rural Dispute Mechanism in Bangladesh, 4 JUS CORPUS L.J. 155 (2023)* - **Cases Referred** *“Afcons Infrastructure Limited And Another V. Cherian Varkey Construction Company (Private) Limited And Others”* *“Nutan Batra V. M/S Buniyaad Associates (Fao (Os) (Comm) 42/2018 & Cm No. 9553/2018)”* - **Statutes Referred** *Section 74, Consumer Protection Act, 2019* *Section 75, Consumer Protection Act, 2019* *Section 76, Consumer Protection Act, 2019* *Section 77, Consumer Protection Act, 2019* *Section 78, Consumer Protection Act, 2019* *Section 79, Consumer Protection Act, 2019* *Section 80, Consumer Protection Act, 2019* [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) *\[Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee, Supreme Court of India, MEDIATION (2015)* [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) *Mediation Center. District Courts Kinnaur, H.P. (n.d.).* [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) *Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee, Supreme Court of India, MEDIATION (2015)* [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) *Rule 4 of the Consumer Protection (mediation) Rules,2020* [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) *Kanak Kanti Karmakar, A Legal Analysis of the Suitability of Alternative Dispute Resolution as a Rural Dispute Mechanism in Bangladesh, 4 JUS CORPUS L.J. 155 (2023)* [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) *Section 74, Consumer Protection Act, 2019* [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) *Section 75, Consumer Protection Act, 2019* [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) *Section 76, Consumer Protection Act, 2019* [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) *Section 77, Consumer Protection Act, 2019* [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) *Section 78, Consumer Protection Act, 2019* [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) *Section 79, Consumer Protection Act, 2019* [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) *Section 80, Consumer Protection Act, 2019* [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) *\[2010 (8) SCC 24.\]* [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) *2018 SCC OnLine Del 12916* **Categories:** ADR Law, Articles, Consumer Protection Act --- ### [Som Prakash v. Union of India](https://lawfoyer.in/som-prakash-v-union-of-india/) **Published:** August 31, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Harsh Verma, Galgotias University** **Editor: I Sharan** **ABSTRACT** In this case, the question arose as to Whether the acquisition of the Burmah Shell Oil Storage undertakings by the Distribution Company Ltd. Bharat Petroleum Corp. can be termed as ‘State’ as provided in Art. 12 of the COI. The petitioner in this case, Som Prakash Rekhi was a clerk in Burmah Sheel. Som Prakash has taken voluntary retirement & he entitled himself to a pension as mentioned in the company’s deed. Pension towards the petitioner was highly reduced after the deduction of provisional funds & other payments. And also, the benefits which were entitled to the petitioner were stopped. Being unfolded that the Bharat Petroleum Corp is a corporation, that has acquired the Burmah Shell, the main issue raised here was whether the writ petition against Bharat Petroleum can be raised under Art.32 of the COI. Bench Judges majority held that Bharat Petroleum Corp was a State as defined under Art. 12 of COI & a writ petition can be filed against Bharat Petroleum Corp.- written by Justice Krishna Iyer & Justice Chinnappa Reddy. There was a contrary direction issued by Justice Pathak wherein he held that Bharat Petroleum cannot be regarded as a state and that no writ petition can lie against him. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*:** Acquisition of Undertakings, Burmah Shell, Pension, Provident Fund, Gratuity, Statutory Corporation, State under Article 12 **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name***Som Prakash Rekhi vs. Union of India & Anr.***ii)* *Case Number***Writ Petition No. 1212 of 1977***iii)* *Judgement Date***13 November 1980***iv)* *Court***Supreme Court of India***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench***V.R. Krishnaiyer, O. Chinnappa Reddy, R.S. Pathak***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges***V.R. Krishnaiyer, O. Chinnappa Reddy, R.S. Pathak***vii)* *Citation***1981 AIR 212, 1981 SCR (2) 111, (1981) 1 SCC 449***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved***Article 12 of the Constitution of India**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** Som Prakash Rekhi vs Union Of India & Anr is a case founded on the extended use of the term ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Indian Constitution, working out far-reaching effects so far as the enforcement of fundamental rights is concerned. In this case, the petitioner was one Som Prakash Rekhi, employed with Burmah Shell Oil Storage Ltd., and had gone in for voluntary retirement. It thus made him entitled to the pension and supplementary retirement benefits paid for under a trust deed of 1950. In 1976 the Central Government of India enacted the Burmah Shell Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, effecting nationalisation of Burmah Shell Oil Storage Ltd. and its vesting in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, hereinafter referred to as BPCL. Consequently, vesting deductions in the petitioner’s pension and withdrawal of supplementary retirement benefits to him were ordered. Aggrieved, he approached the Supreme Court of India for relief and to quash the actions of BPCL, in simple words. The court had to determine whether BPCL is an instrumentality of the government and whether it comes within the meaning of ‘State’ under Article 12. Resolution of this issue was of great importance because if BPCL was to be held to be a ‘State,’ then the writ petition would clearly be maintainable under Article 32 and consequently, the petitioner would be able to enforce his fundamental rights vis-à-vis BPCL. This would thus be the case leading up to an answer as to how far the government, in and through its corporations, would be responsible under the Constitution. This judgment of the Supreme Court has gone into the question of control and ownership of BPC through government intervention and whether such control would be enough to bring BPC under the definition of a ‘State’. The consequences of this judgment were huge for all public sector undertakings and their responsibility towards the fundamental rights of the people in general and employees and retirees in particular who suffered because of the nationalization of banks and companies under the PSU umbrella and all actions the corporate entity took after it. **FACTS OF THE CASE** **1. Procedural Background of the Case** The writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner herein praying, inter alia, what has been sought to be relief against Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, that it should be directed by issuing a writ or a writ like mandamus to consider his representation dated 22nd October 2015 and that action on the part of the respondents not taken by him. He contended though the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited was an Indian Company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, it was a corporation under the Government and hence, being a state within the meaning of the definition of ‘State’ contained in Article 12 of the Constitution, and hence, therefore, its conduct was subject to judicial review. **2. Factual Background of the Case** Som Prakash Rekhi was a workman in the labour force of Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Ltd. He availed of a scheme of voluntary retirement and retired on 1 December 1972. He was entitled to a pension from Burmah Shell Oil Storage Ltd. under a trust deed executed in 1950. It means all the undertakings of Burmah Shell in India shall stand transferred to and vested in the Central Government or to the Government company; also, because of the takeover, the company government of India nationalizes Burmah Shell Oil Storage Ltd. It implies that the assets of the company become properties of the government. After the nationalisation, the quantum of pension payable to him was reduced by deductions made by BPCL and his supplementary retirement benefits to which he was entitled under the trust deed, were stopped by BPCL. Thereafter, he represented BPCL for redressal of his grievances but the dues were not settled, compelling him to knock at the doors for judicial redress. It is submitted that the act on the part of BPCL is arbitrary and their action violated the fundamental rights of the petitioner under Article 21 of the Constitution of India in particular. The question that prominently arose for determination in the said case was as to whether BPCL being a State controlled entity can be held as an organ of ‘State’ under Article 12 so that it can be made amenable to writ jurisdiction and its acts may be quashed on the grounds of infringement of any of the fundamental rights. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISE** 1. Whether the Bharat Petroleum Corporation, the statutory successor of Burmah Shell, can be considered as ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, thereby making it amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32[\[1\]](#_ftn1). 2. Whether the petitioner is entitled to the full pension as per the terms of the trust deed, or whether the deductions made for provident fund and gratuity payments are justified. **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the Petitioner submitted that: 1. **Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL) as ‘State’:** It was urged that BPCL is an instrumentality of the state since it was a company incorporated as a result of the nationalisation of Burmah Shell. Given the pervasive control and deep involvement of the government in its operation, BPCL could indeed be treated as a ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Constitution. In any case, therefore, BPCL would be amenable to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in Article 32 for the enforcement of fundamental rights. 2. **Infringement of Fundamental Rights:** The petitioner herein has contended that an arbitrary reduction in his pension and withdrawal of supplementary retirement benefits by BPCL infringe his fundamental rights under Article 21, which assures protection for life and personal liberty. The petitioners have convincingly brought out the violation of the right to livelihood and existence worthy of retired life in so far as the reduction and withdrawal of supplementary retirement benefits were dues to him. 3. The argument made during the hearing is that BPCL is completely owned by, and comes under the total control of, the Government of India; hence, BPCL is taken to be an extension of the State. The financial policies are controlled by the Board of Directors appointed by the Government, and business at BPCL is conducted by it. The extent of control by the State and ownership brings BPCL within the purview of the meaning of ‘State’ under Article 12. 4. **Trust Deed and Contractual Obligations:** What the petitioner strongly brought out was that by the 1950 trust deed he had contractual rights for some pension benefits, for continuation of which immediately after nationalization, BPCL was under obligation to do so. Failure to do so, as pointed above is a breach of contractual obligation on the part of BPCL hence interference by courts is called for. 5. **Precedents and Judicial Interpretation:** Public sector companies have been held to be ‘State’ in various judgments, wherein learned counsel appearing for the petitioner placed reliance. According to him, the ratio of the said judgments squarely applies to the BPCL, and it cannot escape the liability for violation of constitutional rights. 6. **Arbitrary and Unfair Dealings:** It was the Petitioner’s case that the deductions from his pension and removal of supplementary benefits were all unjustified and arbitrary and not transparent. That an action by a public body of that nature was unfair dealing deserving of redress from the courts. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the Respondent submitted that: 1. **BPCL Not a ‘State’:** It was urged on behalf of the respondents that Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited was not a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. What was argued in the case of BPCL was that whereas it may be an enterprise owned by the Government, it is an independent corporate unit with its separate, independent corporate unit of management and operational policies and cannot be reckoned as an instrumentality or agency of the Government in the strict concept considering Article 12. 2. **Writ Jurisdiction Inapplicable:** is inapplicable as BPCL was not put to the test on the yardstick of being classed as ‘State’ for a purpose under Article 12 and hence if a writ petition under Article 32 is maintainable is at issue. Correspondingly, the stand taken by the respondents was against BPCL constitutional remedies in the enforcement of the. 3. **Contractual Nature of Pension:** All of the petitioner’s claims that were pressed by the respondents were wholly traceable to that Trust Deed and, therefore, purely of a contractual nature. Such disputes should be adjudicated in appropriate Civil laws dealing with Contracts and Trusts; and not under Constitutional Law, much less under a writ petition. 4. **Compliance with Legal Provisions:** Therefore, the Respondents contended that the deduction of an amount from the Pension of the Petitioner and ceasing the supplementary benefits are by luck due to compliance with the legal provisions and policies prevalent then. According to them, none of these acts was arbitrary or unlawful but it was a total conformity with the nationalization and transfer undertakings. 5. Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has contended that though BPCL is one public sector undertaking owned by the Government, it was managed autonomously and decision-making was not controlled by the Government of India. It is the management of BPCL that decides pension and retirement benefits, totally outside the governance of the Government. 6. **No Violation of Fundamental Rights:** It was of course submitted on behalf of respondents that the acts of BPCL did not violate the petitioner’s fundamental rights under Article 21. The modifications made in his pension being purely administrative decisions taken within the spacious fours of existing laws and policies could not amount to a violation of the petitioner’s right to livelihood or personal liberty. 7. **Distinguishing Precedents:** It was contended by the respondents that they have banked upon the judicial precedents wherein despite being wholly owned by the Government, the corporate entities cannot be brought within the definition of ‘State’.They have put forth that the ratio in the said judgments applied squarely in the case of BPCL and that the challenger’s reliance upon the earlier cases was misconceived and not at all relevant to the present case. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** - **Article 12 of the Constitution of India:** Definition.: In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires, “the State” includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India. - **Article 21 of the Constitution of India:** Protection of life and personal liberty.: No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. - **Article 32 of the Constitution of India:** **Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part:** (1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed. (2) The Supreme Court shall have the power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs like habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this (3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1) and (2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2). (4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution. **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** - Conclusion Having construed the provisions, the Supreme Court held that Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited is a ‘State’ for Article 12 of the Constitution of India. It has been argued before this Court that the amount of control, that the Government wields over the company concerning its ownership and management and how the company was being conducted, places the company in question in the amplitude of a State entity. It is, therefore, urged that this brought BPCL into the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32. - Fundamental Rights Enforcement, In holding BPCL to be ‘state, the Supreme Court has validated that the actions of the company can now be questioned on the footing of breach of fundamental rights. The Court validated that the superior petitioner is entitled to prosecute by appropriate proceedings anything done in contravention of the fundamental rights. Therefore, the petitioner is a corporate citizen, and his right to use material time of this life for the nurturing and growth of the material life meets the constitutional guarantee, and the court would exercise its constitutional responsibility in recognizing the nicety of balance between the fundamental rights of the petitioner and the apprehended. **GUIDELINES** - Tests for ‘State’: It elaborated on the tests for determining an entity to be ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12. It resorted to factors like ownership, financial control, managerial control and quantum of governmental influence over the operations of the entity. This would be the guiding framework for future cases on the question of the classification of public sector undertakings and other government-controlled entities. **OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** - Not Any Judgement Overruled: In the above judgment, it was not clearly stated that any prior judgment was overruled; the judgment was delivered based on precedents, that is, on the principles stated in the judgments; specifically, help was taken from the cases of Rajasthan Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal, and Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi, which discussed elaborately the scope of the definition of ‘State’ under Article 12. **OBITER DICTA** - Accountability of PSUs There are some observations the court has made in its obiter dicta in this respect relation to the public accountability of the public sector undertakings before the public and their employees. The verdict pointed without a shadow of a doubt that companies with a mark of heavy government hand cannot disentangle themselves with constitutional norms and they cannot discriminate against their employees unduly thus once again reiterating that public accountability would apply inter alia to PSUs. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** For all reasons and substantial importance, it is also this judgment in the case of Som Prakash Rekhi vs The Union of India & Another, which left the question regarding the scope of Article 12 of the Constitution open. It is the judgment of the Supreme Court of India that tagged Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited as ‘State’ under Article 12 which has extended this realm of constitutional accountability to public sector undertakings. ***Conclusion:*** Thus, the sterling judgment of the Supreme Court that BPCL is ‘State’ under Article 12 has its impact and goes to impress on all concerned things may be constitutionally untouchable no matter how much sway the government may exercise in an entity. Now, there exists a clear precedent for all government-controlled corporations to be warned not to try to wriggle out of liability for acts infringing their fundamental right. It was one of the factors taken into account in the judgment that the Court arrived at, among others, notably because of a fastidious analysis of just how pervasive government control and involvement have been within BPCL. The judicial record is available. The decision could well be one of the most momentous given that it strengthens the rights of employees and retirees of such companies whose companies have been nationalised and who can now turn to the judiciary to provide redress in the event they have been subjected to arbitrary and unfair treatment. By interpreting the declaration of BPCL as a ‘State’, it will only make the said entities owe a statutory and constitutional obligation towards fundamental rights. ***Comments:*** **Interpretation of expression ‘State’:** The rule constructed thereby held that Article 12 would mean and signify any unit of the ‘State’ in the hands of a government of appropriate magnitude. The decision has been important in the imposition of constitutional rights of citizens while dealing with public sector undertakings. **Protection of Employee Rights:** The judgment is celebrated and denominated as the leading judgment in the protection of rights for employees, particularly those who operate under the atmosphere of nationalized undertakings. In that regard, this judgment works as a security net for the workers by protecting the government-controlled companies from arbitrarily changing pension benefits or other retirement entitlements. **Judicial Oversight:** By bringing BPCL within the ambit of Article 12, the Court has thereby reiterated the role of judicial review in correcting any arbitrary action at the hands of a state-controlled instrumentality. That will go a long way in having a salutary effect in checking any possible administrative excesses. **A Precedent for Future Cases:** The principles which this case leys down shall be the guiding framework for any future public sector undertaking. This “lays down the benchmark for assessing the quantum of control which the government needs to exercise to classify it as ‘State’.”. **Balancing autonomy with accountability:** While BPCL enjoys to some extent its autonomy in the process of decision-making, the Judgment has placed it beyond the conversion of such autonomy into being unaccountable. That is to say, operational independence has been balanced against constitutional responsibility by the judgment. The judgment of Som Prakash Rekhi vs. Union of India and Another, therefore, can be said as one of the landmark decisions with constitutional protections to the public while dealing with public sector undertakings and tends to give strength to the aforesaid principle that the entity is high on the government’s altar of control and is answerable to the Constitution for ensuring Fundamental Rights to the citizens. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** - **Rajasthan Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal[\[2\]](#_ftn2)** – This case established that statutory bodies and corporations with significant state control fall under ‘State’ for Article 12. - **Sukhdev v. Bhagatram[\[3\]](#_ftn3) –** This case reinforced that corporations created by statute and subject to substantial state control are ‘State’ under Article 12. - **Airport Authority[\[4\]](#_ftn4) –** This case further clarified the parameters for determining whether an entity qualifies as a ‘State’ under Article 12. **Important Statutes Referred** - Burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1976 - Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 - Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) INDIA CONST. art 32. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) \[1967\] 3 SCR 377 [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) \[1975\] 3 SCR 619 [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) \[1979\] 3 SCC 489 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Procedure of Filling Patent Applications under Patent Act and Patent Rules](https://lawfoyer.in/procedure-of-filling-patent-applications-under-patent-act-and-patent-rules/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Harsh Verma, Galgotias University** **Edited By: Gyanu Patel, Amity University Lucknow (UP)** 1. **INTRODUCTION** The process of filing patent applications is central to establishing intellectual property rights. Through patents, an inventor gains exclusive rights over his/her invention, thereby excluding any unauthorized use, production, or sale of the same. Such procedural framework has been laid down for the filing of patent applications through the Patents Act, 1970, and Patent Rules, 2003, in India; these are periodically updated to keep up with changes in the technical and legal environment. The steps and requirements of this process must be understood if one is going to succeed in this field of complex patent law by inventors, businesses, and attorneys. The present article would, therefore, delve into the details of the process of submitting patent applications under the Act and the Rules right from the very commencement at the pre-filing considerations stage to post-grant processes. We shall also, from time to time, compare the procedures with other jurisdictions and analyze key legal provisions along with significant case laws that shaped the interpretation and application of patent laws in India. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*:** Patent Application, Intellectual Property, Patent Act, Patent Rules, Patent Prosecution 1. **SUB-HEADINGS** 2. **Meaning, Definition & Explanation** **Patent Application:** It is a formal document in front of the patent office to protect something that he had invented. It is an initiation of the law process—this process resulting in granting a patent and allowing him to enjoy protection through exclusive rights over the invention. **Definition:** According to Section 2(1)(j) of the Patents Act, 1970, an “invention” means any new product or process involving an inventive step capable of industrial application. This, in essence, is what the patent application has tried to prove. **Examinations:** The application is then subjected to detailed examinations, which include checking satisfaction of the application on the requirements of novelty, inventive step, and industrial applicability. Searching for prior arts and reviewing claims that are made in the application is included in the process of a search[\[1\]](#_ftn1). 2. **Historical Background / Evolution (if any)** ***Early Patent Systems:*** **Ancient Practices:** under ancient Greece and Rome, some patent-like protections did exist. Athens, in offering some form of protection by privileges, took into consideration the limitations of time that could be placed on protecting their creation by the inventors[\[2\]](#_ftn2). **Medieval Europe:** The Statute of Monopolies 1624 in England is considered as the development after the prime milestone of patent law. It provided that a patent is to be granted only for any manner of new manufactures, and also for the benefit and good of such as shall exercise the same, or for the term of fourteen years or less laying the foundation for modern patent systems[\[3\]](#_ftn3). ***Development in India:*** **Colonial Era:** It was the British who introduced the Patents and Designs Act of 1911 in India. This outlined the fundamental framework by which the patents would be protected and an effect of the British Act could be seen in the law established. Subsequently, it was designed to be implemented in the colonial era to safeguard the inventions and designs[\[4\]](#_ftn4). **Post-Independence:** The Patents Act, of 1970, substituted the colonial act with the freedom of India. The significant amendments took place as follows: **Product Patents:** The Act had originally provided for process patents for pharmaceuticals and agrochemicals. The Patents Amendment Act, of 2002 extended it to the covering of product patents to meet international requirements[\[5\]](#_ftn5). Term of Patent: The term of the patent was originally 14 years from the date of grant. Subsequently, it was increased to a period of 20 years by the Patents Amendment Act, of 2005, to bring it at par with international practices[\[6\]](#_ftn6). ***Recent Developments:*** **TRIPS Compliance:** The obligation under the TRIPS Agreement was met further by another major reform, the Patents Amendment Act, 2002, which provided for the introduction of product patents in pharmaceuticals and agrochemicals and the enhancement of the term of the patent to 20 years[\[7\]](#_ftn7). **Recent Reforms:** The recent amendments in the Act, thereby including the amendment rules, the Patents Amendment Rules of 2016, 2019, and 2021 are carried out for primarily improving procedural efficiency, enabling start-ups, and digitalization in the patent process[\[8\]](#_ftn8). 3. **Comparison with other Countries (if needed)** ***United States*** The United States has always been “first to invent,” but has adopted a “first to file” system with the passage of the America Invents Act of 2013. Now, the U.S. is a lot closer to lining up with the rest of the world. The United States Patent and Trademark Office requires an applicant to describe his invention by providing specifications, claims, and drawings. USPTO also has special procedures for provisional and non-provisional applications where provisional applications act as a placeholder for a party who wants to file discovery on an invention and establish an early filing date without having begun the examination process[\[9\]](#_ftn9). ***European Union*** European Patent Office has a centralized system where one can file a patent that can be validated in multiple European countries. The EPO works under the European Patent Convention, whereby inventions must be new, involve an inventive step, and must be susceptible to industrial application. The EPO makes a provision: that in respect of a plurality of member states, one may have one application. Thus it is relatively easy to have patent protection across Europe. It is equipped with a search and examination phase that makes the examination phase complete and comprehensive, and the EPO provides detailed guidelines on drafting and filing applications[\[10\]](#_ftn10). ***Japan:*** Japan maintains a “first to file” patent system which is handled by the Japan Patent Office. Japanese law demands very detailed and thorough descriptions of the invention with strict requirements of disclosure. Japan also offers something called a “Patent Prosecution Highway” for expedited examination procedures when a corresponding patent application has been allowed in another participating country. The process will be hassle-free and it will reduce the huge backlog of applications[\[11\]](#_ftn11). ***China*** The Chinese patent regime is administered by the China National Intellectual Property Administration, also known as CNIPA. Adopting a “first-to-file” system, China requires a specification with claims and drawings in detail. It may be noted that in the recent past, on its way to strengthening the regime for intellectual property, China has done remarkably good work by introducing more stringent examination procedures coupled with mechanisms for enforcement. Briefly, the Chinese patent system includes utility model patents with a shorter duration and requirements less strict than those for regular patents[\[12\]](#_ftn12). **India** In this country, the principle followed and guided by the Patents Act, of 1970, and the Patent Rules, of 2003, is “first to file.” The requirements at the Indian Patent Office are also in tune with those of most countries, with the need for detailed descriptions, claims, and drawings. Provisions in India provide that provisional and complete specifications are to be filed. The provisions of the opposition in India include the following: both pre-grant and post-grant opposition. Any third party can file an opposition to invalidate a patent application or a patent granted. All these provisions are to ensure that only genuine and meritorious inventions get patent protection[\[13\]](#_ftn13). 4. **Legal Provisions / Procedure / Specifications / Criteria (if any)** ***Filing of Patent Application*** The complete process of filing a patent application in India is established through the Patents Act, 1970, read with the Patent Rules, 2003. Enshrined therein are some of the most important stages to be followed, so that the application could be considered as fully in compliance with all the legal requirements and technical formalities. 1. **Pre-filing Considerations** The proper and searching patent search shall be done beforehand of the application of the patent shall make an applicant sure that his invention is new and it was not patented or published in any public domain. Also, the applicant should finalize the types of applications that have to be filed, provisional or complete[\[14\]](#_ftn14). 2. **Types of Patent Applications** **Provisional Application:** An application filed when an inventor does not have a full description of the invention but needs to obtain a filing date, a basic outline of the invention is required[\[15\]](#_ftn15). **Full Specification:** It means an application furnishing all full descriptions of the invention, comprising both technical information, the claims and the drawings. In other words, it is the final application and it’s subject to examination, and when accepted, leads to the granting of a patent[\[16\]](#_ftn16). 3. **Content of Application** The following are among the most important things that any application for a patent shall include: **Invention Title:** The title of the invention should be explicit, brief, and based on the nature of the invention. The description of the invention should be detailed enough to give the construction, operation, and application. Much of the detail in this area is considered seminal to the point that it can contain quite a bit so that a person of skill in the relevant art is in a position to carry out and use the invention. **Claims:** The claims form the part considered the gist of a patent application or an issued patent. The claims must clearly and distinctly point out the protection being reclaimed. Clarity and conciseness are of importance. **Drawings:** There must be drawings accompanying the application to show the technological details of the invention[\[17\]](#_ftn17). 4. **The Process of Filing** **Registration:** The Patent Office of India may issue the application form with the prescribed forms and fee. The Application may both be filed Online and sent physically to any of the branches of the Patent Office[\[18\]](#_ftn18). **Fees:** A filing fee, variable depending on the status of the applicant–individual, small entity or large entity, is to be paid at the time of filing a provisional or non-provisional application. Filing fee reductions for individual and small entity[\[19\]](#_ftn19). ***Examination and Publication*** **1 Publication** Thereafter, on filing, the patent application shall be published in the Official Journal of the Indian Patent Office, which usually occurs 18 months from the date of filing or the priority date. Publication opens up the application for scrutiny by public viewing for transparency and any potential opposition[\[20\]](#_ftn20). 2. **Request of Examination** The reply to an RFE is to be filled within 48 months from filing or priority date; in the absence of the request, the application does not move forward into examination[\[21\]](#_ftn21). 3. **Examination** **Substantive Examination:** The Indian Patent Office subjection the application to check whether it meets all the provisions of the law, such as novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability[\[22\]](#_ftn22). **Examination Report:** The examiner sends an examination report stating details of the objections or any requisitions of amendments to the applicant. Usually, the objections are lack of clarity in claims, insufficiency in disclosure, or not being novel[\[23\]](#_ftn23). ***Grant of Patent*** 1. **Reply to Examination Report** Applicant to whom the report is sent shall within six months from the date of the issue thereof, send a reply to the examination report on objections taken, if any, and necessary amendments. If no response, it may be declared abandoned[\[24\]](#_ftn24). 2. **Grant of Patent** A patent is granted where the application has complied with every requirement in the law and where, further, the objections raised, if any, are overcome. The grant, besides being formally published in the Official Journal, is recorded in an official letter or document issued to the applicant. The patent is good for 20 years from the filing date and maintainable by the payment of annual maintenance fees[\[25\]](#_ftn25). 5. **Guidelines / Rules / Regulations / Notifications / Circulars (if any)** ***Guidelines*** 1. **Examination Guidelines** The detailed guidelines issued by the Controller General of Patents, Designs & Trade Marks, inter alia, cover the following for achieving uniformity and consistency in the examination of patent applications: **Patentability Criteria:** Detailed guidelines concerning novelty, inventive steps, and industrial application of the invention[\[26\]](#_ftn26). **Biotechnological Inventions:** Subject matter for examination of biotechnological inventions laying down requirements on deposits of biological material and sequence listings[\[27\]](#_ftn27). **Software and Business Method Patents:** Guidelines to examine patents relating to software, algorithms and business methods. Such guidelines bring to the notice of the Examiner what is excluded under Section 3(k) of the Patents Act[\[28\]](#_ftn28). 2. **Drafting Guidelines** These directions are thus aimed at ensuring that the drafting of the patent specification, claims, and drawings is done. In the same breath, it has further been impressed upon that clarity, conciseness, and completeness ensure that the invention is described well enough and the scope of protection clearly defined[\[29\]](#_ftn29). 3. **PCT National Phase Pointers** For foreign applicants entering the national phase in India under the Patent Cooperation Treaty procedural requirements have been laid down to detail requirements submitted with and prosecute PCT national phase application, and also documents submission, fees payment, and procedural timelines instructions[\[30\]](#_ftn30). ***Rules and Regulations*** **The Patents Rules, 2003** As amended from time to time lay down the procedural provisions for filing and prosecuting applications for patents in India. Amongst other pretty significant things, these provisions inter alia include: **Form and Content of Applications:** Detailed requirements regarding the form and content of applications for patents including specifications, claims, and drawings[\[31\]](#_ftn31). **Fee Structure:** Scale of fees to be payable in respect of application for patents, proceedings, oppositions, and other matters in connection with patents[\[32\]](#_ftn32). **Time:** Schedules relating to different stages of processing applications letters patents and other proceedings under this Act[\[33\]](#_ftn33). 2. **The Patent Amendment Rules, 2021** The Patent Amendment Rules, 2021 changed the ease and effectiveness of grants of patents. Some of the major changes introduced were: **Expedited Examination:** Request for Expedited Examination is now extended to a request from a start-up or small entity[\[34\]](#_ftn34). **Electronic Filing:** The patent applications and all documents are filed now only electronically to make the entire system of processing completely paperless[\[35\]](#_ftn35). **Reduction in Fees:** Reduction in fees for startups and small entities to facilitate innovation and filing of patents[\[36\]](#_ftn36). 6. **Case Laws / Precedents / Overrulings / Judicial Development of the Concept (if any)** ***Notable Cases*** **Novartis AG v. Union of India:** The Supreme Court of India denied patent protection for Novartis’ cancer drug, setting a precedent for the interpretation of patentability criteria under the Patents Act[\[37\]](#_ftn37). **Bilski v. Kappos:** A landmark decision by the U.S. Supreme Court that redefined the criteria for patent-eligible subject matter[\[38\]](#_ftn38). 7. **Amendments / Additions / Repealing (if any)** 8. ***The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002*** ***Overview*** The Patent (Amendment) Act, of 2002 had been a milestone amendment towards Indian Patent Law in compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. Some of the important features of said amendment are: **Product Patents in Pharmaceuticals and Agrochemicals:** The area of patent protection has been widened to include pharmaceutical and agrochemical products, which were earlier excluded[\[39\]](#_ftn39). **Term of Patent:** The term of a patent was further increased from 14 years to 20 years from the filing date[\[40\]](#_ftn40). **Patentability Criteria:** The requirements of patentability have now been revised ionizing novelty, an inventive step and industrial applicability[\[41\]](#_ftn41). ***Impact*** This critical amendment that opened up the Indian market to global pharmaceuticals and agrochemicals firms, invited foreign investment and technology transfer. It filled up the gaps and, in a way, extended the protection of intellectual property in India. 2. ***The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005*** ***Overview*** The Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005 went one step further in the process of fine-tuning so that the Indian patents regime could find itself again more in tandem with international standards, and explicitly addressed points of public health concern. Several changes were specifically brought in: **Section 3(d):** The concerns of ‘evergreening’ were not accommodated as granting of patents to the new forms of known substances, which do not result in the improvement of the known efficacy, was disallowed[\[42\]](#_ftn42). **Compulsory Licensing:** More stringent compulsory licensing provisions were added that addressed the grant of licenses when the patented invention is not being made available to the public at a reasonably affordable price[\[43\]](#_ftn43). **Opposition pre-grant and post-grant:** It provided for a system where a third party could pre-grant and post-grant oppose the grant of designs patent and also challenge the validity of a granted patent[\[44\]](#_ftn44). ***Impact*** This amendment was the balancing of a very delicate need to protect strong patents and the imperative to ensure access to affordable medicines. Moreover, it made the grant process of patents more transparent and accountable. 3. ***The Patents (Amendment) Rules, 2016*** ***Overview*** The Patents (Amendment) Rules, 2016 substantially brought in various procedural amendments to align the filing and prosecution of patents as close as possible to the situation of ‘walk in a park’. **Expedited Examination:** The law is expected to provide for expedited examination for start-up applicants selecting the Indian Patent Office as the International Searching Authority or the International Preliminary Examining Authority under the PCT[\[45\]](#_ftn45). **Fee Reduction:** Reduction of such fees for startups, small entities and individual applicants shall encourage more innovation[\[46\]](#_ftn46). **Electronic Filling:** It encourages the electronic filing of Patent Applications and documents to bring in more efficiency and at the same time reduce processing time[\[47\]](#_ftn47). 4. ***The Patent Amendment Rules, 2019*** ***Overview*** The Amendment Rules to the Patents, 2019, contributed a lot towards the working of simplification of the procedure, part of the law of patents simply and efficiently. General changes: **Wider Expedited Examination Criteria:** The expediting examination criteria are widened to include female applicants, government departments, and institutions set up under any Central, Provincial, or State Act[\[48\]](#_ftn48). **Simplified procedure for filing of documents related to patent applications:** The procedure for filing of patent applications and related documents has been adequately simplified making it user-friendly[\[49\]](#_ftn49). ***Impact*** The above-mentioned amendments were made to make the system of patents more inclusive and user-friendly to the categories of applicants that hitherto were underrepresented, like the women and the public institutions etc. The latest amendment, namely, the Patents (Amendment) Rules, 2021, went one step ahead of the earlier one and brought more procedural gains concerning the following: **Further Reduction in Fees:** Provided more extended scale reduction in fees to educational institutions to aid institutions in prompting more academic research and innovation[\[50\]](#_ftn50). **Better Electronic Processing:** Provided that all the documents about the submission of a patent shall be filed electronically to maintain a green and paperless environment[\[51\]](#_ftn51). **Analysis** The 2021 amendments found the zeal and commitment by India to ensure that an environment that is propitious and affordable is created for matters and issues touching on innovation and academic research. Some provisions of the Patents Act, over the years, have been repealed to remove redundancy and to come in line with international practices. The major repeals are as follows: **Pre-2002 Amendment Old Provisions Relating to Product Patents in Pharmaceuticals:** Before the 2002 amendment, India did not grant product patents in pharmaceuticals. The provisions were repealed to meet the TRIPS requirements[\[52\]](#_ftn52). **Unwanted Administrative Procedures:** To make the application and prosecution of a patent smooth many of the procedural requirements found to be unwanted or obsolete have been disposed of[\[53\]](#_ftn53). 1. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** ***Conclusion*** It is a structured process, and the Indian Patent System does indeed provide an extremely clear and structured path to the applicant for a patent. Each step, from filing to examination, grant, and enforcement, is well elaborated. The structure safeguards the rights of the inventors while seeing that a rigorous standard for patentability is maintained. **Dynamic Legal Framework:** The amendments to the Patents Act and the rules from time to time reflect India’s effort to not only keep pace with global standards related to emerging technological and economic trends but also to protect intellectual property and ease international trade and investment. Substantial changes brought in by the Patents Amendment Acts of 2002 and 2005 strengthened intellectual property protection and eased international trade and investment. **Judicial oversight:** It is such judicial decisions, as given in Novartis AG and Bayer Corporation, that has remarkably developed the law relating to patents by interpreting important provisions against the backdrop of public health concerns. It is through such judgments that the system of patents has been made to strike a balance between the rivalling interests of encouraging innovation and protecting the public interest, particularly in the sphere of pharmaceuticals. **Future Directions:** The roadmap ahead for the Indian patent system is one of continuous evolution, meeting new challenges and opportunities. These include further harmonization with international agreements, enhanced support to startups and emerging technologies, and continued emphasis on public health and access to affordable medicines. **Comments** Balancing Innovation and Access: There has been a classic dilemma in balancing patent protection with public access to essential medicines. Although compulsory licensing and stringent examination criteria under Section 3(d) have been great steps in this regard, a lot of work is still to be done to make the patent regime promote innovation without jeopardizing public health. **Embracing advances in technology:** The patent system must change with the quickening of the pace of technological change, particularly in areas like artificial intelligence and biotechnology. This involves continuing the development of the legal frameworks that deal with complex innovations so that the system remains effective and accessible while changing to keep pace with new patentability questions and for continuous streamlining of procedures. **Strengthening enforcement:** Effective enforcement is at the heart of keeping the integrity of the patent system. Improved mechanisms for the resolution of disputes, plus more effective tools for enforcement, will help take on infringement and protect the rights of patent holders. **Global Integration:** How much India integrates into the global patent systems and conformance to international standards will be of importance. In this regard, contributing towards global patent debates and adhering to the Treaties on World Intellectual Property Organization, such as the TRIPS Agreement, will help India move effectively about international trade and intellectual property challenges. 1. **REFERENCES** 2. **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** 1. **Khurana, S.** (2020). Intellectual Property Law in India: A Comprehensive Guide. LexisNexis. 2. **Bhat, V. N.** (2018). Indian Patent Law: A Comprehensive Guide. Eastern Book Company. 3. **Ghosh, S.** (2019).Patent Law and Practice in India. Sweet & Maxwell. 3. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. Controller General of Patents, Designs & Trade Marks (CGPDTM). (2023). Examination Guidelines for Patent Applications. Retrieved from 2. (n.d.). PCT National Phase Guidelines. Retrieved from 3. (n.d.). Artificial Intelligence and Patents. Retrieved from 4. Indian Patent Office. (2023). Drafting Guidelines for Patent Applications. Retrieved from 5. (n.d.). Patent Pools and Access to Medicines. Retrieved from 4. **Cases Referred** 1. Novartis AG v. Union of India, 2013 (6) SCC 1 2. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) 5. **Statutes Referred** 1. The Patents Act, 1970 (India). 2. The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002 (India). 3. The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005 (India). 4. The Patents (Amendment) Rules, 2016 (India). 5. The Patents (Amendment) Rules, 2019 (India). 6. The Patents (Amendment) Rules, 2021 (India). TRIPS Agreement, 1994 [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Indian Patent Office. (2023) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) **Khurana, S.** (2020). *Intellectual Property Law in India: A Comprehensive Guide*. LexisNexis, pp. 12-15 [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Statute of Monopolies 1624 [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Patents and Designs Act, 1911 (India) [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002 [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005 [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) TRIPS Agreement, 1994 [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) The Patents (Amendment) Rules, 2016 [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) United States Patent and Trademark Office. (2023). General Information Concerning Patents. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) European Patent Office. (2023). Guide for Applicants. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Japan Patent Office. (2023). Guide to Filing a Patent Application. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) China National Intellectual Property Administration. (2023). Patent Examination Guidelines. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) The Patents Act, 1970 (India). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Ibid [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Ibid [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Ibid [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) WIPO. (n.d.). Understanding Patents [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Indian Patent Office. (2023) [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Ibid [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Ibid [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) The Patents Act, 1970 (India) [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) Ibid [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) Ibid [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) Ibid [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) Ibid [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) Controller General of Patents, Designs & Trade Marks (CGPDTM). (2023). *Examination Guidelines for Patent Applications* [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) Ibid [\[28\]](#_ftnref28) Ibid [\[29\]](#_ftnref29) Indian Patent Office. (2023) [\[30\]](#_ftnref30) WIPO. (n.d.). *PCT National Phase Guidelines* [\[31\]](#_ftnref31) The Patents Rules, 2003 (India) [\[32\]](#_ftnref32) Ibid [\[33\]](#_ftnref33) Ibid [\[34\]](#_ftnref34) The Patent (Amendment) Rules, 2021 (India) [\[35\]](#_ftnref35) Ibid [\[36\]](#_ftnref36) Ibid [\[37\]](#_ftnref37) Novartis AG v. Union of India, 2013 (6) SCC 1 [\[38\]](#_ftnref38) Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) [\[39\]](#_ftnref39) The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002 (India) [\[40\]](#_ftnref40) Ibid [\[41\]](#_ftnref41) Ibid [\[42\]](#_ftnref42) The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005 (India) [\[43\]](#_ftnref43) Ibid [\[44\]](#_ftnref44) Ibid [\[45\]](#_ftnref45) The Patents (Amendment) Rules, 2016 (India) [\[46\]](#_ftnref46) Ibid [\[47\]](#_ftnref47) Ibid [\[48\]](#_ftnref48) The Patents (Amendment) Rules, 2019 (India) [\[49\]](#_ftnref49) Ibid [\[50\]](#_ftnref50) The Patents (Amendment) Rules, 2021 (India) [\[51\]](#_ftnref51) Ibid [\[52\]](#_ftnref52) The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002 (India) [\[53\]](#_ftnref53) The Patents (Amendment) Rules, 2016 (India) **Categories:** Articles, Intellectual Property Law --- ### [Digital Signatures: Impact on The Indian Contract Laws](https://lawfoyer.in/digital-signatures-impact-on-the-indian-contract-laws/) **Published:** September 6, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Name of Author- Vishakha Yadav,** **DES’s Shri Navalmal Firodia Law College** **Edited by – Sulesh Choudhary** **INTRODUCTION** *“We want a Digital India, not just the one we are living in” — The Indian Express[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)* India’s digitalization has taken a huge turn as quoted by Shri Narendra Modi at the G20 Summit’s Economy Minister’s meeting, “India’s digital transformation is powered by its unshakeable belief in innovation and its commitment to speedy implementation.” By this ‘innovation’ and ‘speedy implementation’ he referred to the innovation of India’s digital well-being such as e-commerce, algorithm economy, gig economies, digital signatures etc. Digital signatures are used for the message authentication and message integrity of the sender. They are used to prevent the repudiation of the sender’s data. Although it cannot be used for the maintenance of privacy, it is also the digital equivalent of a handwritten signature or stamped seal. It offers far more implicit security. Under the It Act, of 2000, digital signatures issued by certifying authority are legally binding & are of the same validity as physical signatures in electronic transactions. ***Keywords*:** *Digital signatures, IT Act,2000, Electronic Transactions, e-governance, encryption, CA (Certifying Authority), Authentication, Indian Contract Act,1948* **MEANING AND DEFINITIONS:** **Digital Signature:** According to section *2(p) of the Information Technology Act, 2000*[\[2\]](#_ftn2), digital signature refers to the validation of any electronic evidence by a user using an electronic method or process mentioned in Sec 3 of this Act. - **Contract:** As per the provisions of *Section 2(h) of the Indian Contract Act, of 1872, an agreement that is legally enforceable by law is known as a contract.[**\[3\]**](#_ftn3)* - **E-Contracts:** Any of the law provisions do not contain the exact meaning of e-contracts, but e-contracts are contracts where the consent of both parties is taken digitally by signing the e-certificate. - **Certifying Authority:** According to the provisions of section 2(g) of the Information Technology Act, 2000, a certifying officer refers to a person who has been given the authority to issue digital certificates i.e. digital signature through license under Sec 24 of this Act. **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** Traditional methods, before the digital signature, were physical signature-based, seal-based, or some other manual authentication processes that were risky and error-prone. Physical signatures on paper documents were usually used in legal and business contexts for confirming agreements or authorizations. The scene before digital signatures implied the use of document printing, signing them physically in the presence of physical evidence and then sending the documents back through fax machines. The process, however, was not feasible for electronic transactions or communications. This became quite common with the emergence of advanced technology and the use of the internet and digitalization. Then gradually scanned signatures were introduced with digitalization. Essentially, the scanned signature is the digitalized image of a handwritten signature. In legal cases, they may not hold up very strong evidence of consent or agreement compared to digital signatures that make use of high-end cryptography and keys for authenticity and integrity. By themselves, they did not have any implicit security or verification feature. Since there was no cryptographic mechanism built into the signature to guarantee authenticity or integrity, it was pretty easy to copy or forge a scanned signature. Only after this, digital signatures were introduced with the emergence of the IT Act 2000 and the increased digital revolution, after which digital signatures are explicitly used in every field of electronic record. **EFFECT RELATION: IMPACT OF DIGITAL SIGNATURE IN LEGAL DOMAIN AND CONTRACT LAW:** **Indian Evidence Act, 1872:** *Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872*[\[4\]](#_ftn4) states that any information produced in electronic form can be used as evidence in the courts if the prescribed conditions that are enumerated in this section are correctly executed. It says that any information which has been stored, copied or recorded as an electronic output is also deemed to be a document after its verified and signed certificate has been produced. After which it can be presented in the courts as evidence. **AMENDMENT TO INDIAN CONTRACT ACT,1872:** Even though the Indian Contract Act, of 1872 does not have anything specific to say regarding digital signatures. However, it has been applied and interpreted contextually that courts have recognized the validity of digital signatures and digital contracts with the condition that they meet the requirements enumerated in the IT Act,2000 and the rules provided thereunder. **LEGAL PROVISIONS RELATED TO DIGITAL SIGNATURE AND LAW OF CONTRACT:** *The Information Technology Act, of 2008* [\[5\]](#_ftn5)recognized the meaning of ***“e-commerce,**”*[\[6\]](#_ftn6) which in legal context means the transactions that are carried out in electronic format, electronic exchange of data, and electronic communication. E-commerce uses substitutes for paper-based physical records for document filing, storage and communication. ***Sec 3 of IT Act,2008***[\[7\]](#_ftn7) states about authentication of electronic records: - As per the provisions of this section i.e. Sec 3 of the IT Act, any contractual partner to a contract may validate any electronic contract by affixing his/her digital signature on the record. - The reliability of an electronic format will be affected by the usage of an asymmetric crypto system and hash function which converts the previous record signed electronically into another electronic record. Also, **Sec 5** of the same Act provides legal recognition of electronic signatures: (1) “Where any law provides that information or any other matter shall be authenticated by affixing the signature or any document shall be signed or bear the signature of any person, then, notwithstanding anything contained in such law, such requirement shall be deemed to have been satisfied if such information or matter is authenticated using an electronic signature affixed in such manner as may be prescribed by the Central Government.” **What does Contract Law say about contracts signed digitally:** Section 10 A, of the Indian Contract Act, of 1872 talks about the validity of e-contracts as: When any contract is formed, communications for proposals, its acceptance, or revocation whatever the case may be are expressed electronically or by any means of electronic record such as computer, shall be enforceable. They cannot be unenforceable on the ground that they are expressed electronically. **TYPES OF DIGITAL SIGNATURES:** There are mainly three types of digital signatures: - **Simple digital signature:** A simple digital signature is the primary type of digital signature. It is very less secure and vulnerable as it is non-encrypted and thus non-traceable of the signer. It is also vulnerable to fraud. - **Basic digital signature:** In this type of Digital Signature, the identity of the sender is not verified. Therefore, this type of signature is similar to a simple signature. The content of the document can be modified even after signing. - **Advanced and qualified digital signature:** Advanced and Qualified digital signature is the most secure type of digital signature and widely used. Public Key Infrastructure is used by this type of signature. The cryptographic mechanism ensures safe and secure delivery and that data is kept private between the sender and receiver. Also, the content cannot be modified at a later stage, and neither can the sender deny signing the document. **TYPES OF E-CONTRACTS:** **Shrink Wrap Agreements:** In the shrink wrap type of agreement, the terms for the agreement come wrapped along with the product which is available to the user after the purchase of the product. E.g. Purchase of Anti-virus **Click Wrap Agreements:** This type of agreement requires the user to accept the proposal by clicking on the “I agree” option in the user agreement. E.g. creation of email ID **Browse Wrap Agreements:** The browse-wrap type of agreement is entered into by the user due to the repeated use of a website. By the usage website, the user is said to have accepted the conditions of use. E.g. Sales and Purchases on online platforms **Scroll Wrap Agreements:** These are the agreements where the user has to accept all the terms and conditions of the documents and give their implied consent. E.g. a few mobile applications require the user to scroll down acceptance **Sign-in Wrap Agreements:** In these agreements, it is required by the user to agree on the terms and conditions of the agreement by signing in to a particular website or mobile application. **POSITIVE EFFECTS OF DIGITAL SIGNATURE ON CONTRACT LAW:** - **Verification of identity and authentication:** Digital signatures confirm parties to a contract and therefore carry out authentication that brings about reliability and integrity in e-commerce. This step increases the value of the electronic contracts as evidence in courts of law, taking away potential disputes regarding the validity of signatures. - **Non-Repudiation:** It simply means that a signer at a later stage cannot deny having signed the contract. A cryptographic mechanism used in digital signature provides evidence of the signer’s intent at the time of signing, therefore, difficult for him to repudiate the signature or contract. - **Operational Efficiency and Cost Saving:** Digital signatures eliminate the necessity to print, sign, and mail a physical document. Business parties can electronically sign contracts from anywhere across the globe with an internet connection, hence reducing delays and administrative overhead related to traditional paper-bound signatures. - **Secure Handling:** A digital signature provides better security compared to traditional handwritten signatures. They aid in protection against unauthorized access in the electronic format, illegal and unauthorized interference, and forgery, thus in the overall maintenance of security and confidentiality in any electronic transaction and agreement. - **Facilitation of e-governance and Digital Services:** Digital signatures ease the use and approval of e-governance initiatives and Digital Services by government institutions and departments in India. They provide secure and efficient electronic filing of documents applications and forms reducing paperwork, administrative burdens and processing times. **Negative effects of Digital Signature on Contract Law:** - **Technology dependence:** Digital signatures rely much on technology infrastructures and systems to function and remain secure. Technical failures, system vulnerability, or even cyber-attacks weaken the general reliance and reliability of digital signatures. This gives rise to many concerns regarding the integrity and the enforceability of electronically signed contracts. - **Access and Inclusion:** Wide-scale use of digital signatures might inadvertently prevent people or a community from having limited access to technology or digital literacy from participating in any electronic transactions. There is a possibility that a sharper buttressing of the digital divide can at least bealach socioeconomic inequalities and create problems about the fair application of contracts made between different segments of society. - **Legal uncertainty and compliance burden:** Even after the legal recognition under Indian law, there could still be some amount of uncertainty and inconsistency within their interpretation and implementation by the courts and the regulating authorities. Digital signatures may face compliance burdens in ensuring adherence to evolving legal and regulatory requirements governing digital signatures, including standards for authentication, encryption and key management. - **Fraud and misinterpretation risks:** Digital signatures are prone to the risk connected with cyber-attacks, impersonation, identity theft etc. This may impair the integrity of digital signatures and engender a lack of trust in electronically signed documents. **IMPORTANT GUIDELINES, REGULATIONS AND NOTIFICATIONS** ***Section 2(1)(p) of the Information Technology Act, 2000***[**\[8\]**](#_ftn8) contains the provisions for the use of digital signatures signed on electronic contracts. Nowadays, this type of signature is widely used by lawyers and professionals to save from time-consuming physical contract-making. ***Information Technology (Certifying Authorities) Rules, 2000***: The IT Rules, 2000 issued under the IT Act, 2000 enumerate the prescribed standards and procedures for issuing and rescinding as well as management of digital certificates. This makes sure that digital signatures are reliable enough during the electronic course of action. **RELATED CASE LAWS** **Bhagwati Sharan Tiwary vs M/O Civil Aviation and Tourism** In the case of *Bhagwati Sharan Tiwary vs M/O Civil Aviation and Tourism[**\[9\]**](#_ftn9)* it was held that according to Section 65 (b) of the Indian Evidence Act,1872 evidence should be signed electronically and therefore, the certificate cannot be considered as evidence. However, the Tribunal failed to detect so and considered the certificate as the evidence. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** Digital signatures are in a way modern forms of non-amendable signatories. Previously contract execution used to take a lot of time due to the time involved in transit. When in situations where the other party belonged to the other country or territory it was very difficult to execute such contracts that required emergencies. Now that digital signatures have come into the picture, the palpable documents have now become secure. The digital contracts are now signed at the comfort of our homes. Even after the signing of the contract, they can be easily traced for changes if any third party tries to mishap with the executed contract. They cannot be destroyed, unlike physical contracts. **REFERENCES** **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** - Bare Act of the Indian Contract Act,1872 - ICSI CS Executive Module for Jurisprudence, Interpretation and General Laws **Online Articles / Sources Referred** - - - - - - **Cases Referred** - Bhagwati Sharan Tiwary Vs M/O Civil Aviation and Tourism **Statutes Referred** - Information Technology Act,2000 - Indian Contract Act,1872 - Indian Evidence Act,1872 **ENDNOTES** [\[1\]](#_ftnref1)(“We Want a Digital India. Just Not the One We Are Living In”) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2)(*Information Technology Act, 2000*) [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) (*Indian Contract Act, 1872*) [\[4\]](#_ftnref4)(“Know All About Section 65B Evidence Act”) [\[5\]](#_ftnref5)(*Information Technology Act, 2000*) [\[6\]](#_ftnref6)(*Information Technology Act, 2000*) [\[7\]](#_ftnref7)(*Information Technology Act, 2000*) [\[8\]](#_ftnref8)(*Information Technology Act, 2000*) [\[9\]](#_ftnref9)(*Bhagwati Sharan Tiwary vs M/O Civil Aviation and Tourism*) **Categories:** Articles, Contract Law --- ### [DEEPFAKES: ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATION](https://lawfoyer.in/deepfakes-ethical-and-legal-implication/) **Published:** September 6, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: KHUSHBOO BHARTI, INSTITUTE OF LAW,JIWAJI UNIVERSITY,GWALIOR** **Edited By: Ritesh Singh Shekhawat, MJRPU, Jaipur** **ABSTRACT** When adult actors’ faces were uploaded on Reddit in place of well-known Hollywood names in 2017, the first deepfake movies became viral. In 2018, comedian Jordan Peele poked fun at technology and issued a warning to his audience in a deepfake video. The film included former President Obama. Due to the increasing usage of deepfakes, the U.S. House Intelligence Committee convened hearings in 2019 regarding potential threats to national security. Unfortunately, deepfakes have subsequently evolved into more intricate and difficult-to-identify methods. Over the past five years, their usage has significantly expanded due to the surge in deepfake applications. These manipulations are frequently used to disseminate misleading information and cast doubt on significant issues involving public and private entities, as well as to harass, threaten, and defame individuals. Moreover, deepfakes may violate intellectual property rights by unauthorized use of particular words, symbols, or trademarks. They may also seriously violate copyright, privacy, and data protection laws, in addition to violating human rights. Despite some governments implementing AI regulations, many hesitate due to concerns about free speech. Online platforms like YouTube have established legal frameworks to manage content, but the process remains complex and expensive. Deepfakes pose a serious problem since they can frequently be mistaken for authentic recordings. As a result, both public and commercial organizations have been forced to create tools and policies for managing and identifying them. This article explores the obligations and the moral and legal ramifications of deepfake technology. **KEYWORDS** Deeplearning, deepfakes, media manipulation, obstacles, deception, misappropriation, deceit, infringement. **INTRODUCTION[\[1\]](#_ftn1)** “Deep learning” and “fake” are combined to form the word “deepfake.” It describes a category of synthetic media in which real information is mimicked through the manipulation of audio or video. Synthetic media involves the creation, editing, and modification of data using automated methods, primarily through artificial intelligence algorithms. Media manipulation is not a new phenomenon and has been utilized across various historical periods with differing degrees of success. It has been employed in political propaganda and blockbuster movies featuring special effects. While the advent of deepfake technology has opened up numerous avenues for marketers, it brings with it considerable ethical dilemmas that must be tackled to preserve consumer trust. Corporations must delve into the prospects of immersive content, all the while managing concerns related to privacy, deceit, and manipulation **OBSTACLES[\[2\]](#_ftn2)** Although synthetic media isn’t a recent development, advancements in technology have introduced new challenges. Creating deepfakes has become remarkably easy. The democratization of the internet, coupled with significant advancements in AI algorithms, allows individuals without expertise to alter and edit media. They can then rapidly disseminate this media on a large scale via social media and the internet. Current detection methods are inadequate to meet the challenges presented by deepfake technology. Deepfakes can be profitable and useful, but they can also be misused and have dangerous results. As of now, neither the EU nor the UK has a complete legal framework that would effectively govern deepfakes to safeguard people or businesses. **ETHICAL DILEMMAS SURROUNDING DEEP FAKE TECHNOLOGY AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS FOR ENTERPRISES[\[3\]](#_ftn3)** As AI technology continues to evolve, deepfakes have emerged prominently in the realm of business promotion. Artificially generated visual and audio content has enhanced the way companies tailor their marketing strategies to align with consumer inclinations. Despite deepfakes serving as effective promotional instruments for enterprises, they raise significant ethical issues tied to privacy breaches and the lack of consent. Some of these ethical dilemmas and their repercussions for businesses include: **Misinformation** Deepfake technology possesses the capability to fabricate deceptive marketing clips and audio about companies, which are incredibly persuasive but inherently misleading. Such misinformation distorts reality, potentially steering people off course and compelling them to make decisions they might rue in the future. This phenomenon sparks serious apprehension about the degradation of trust between businesses and their clientele. **Navigating Legal and Regulatory Obstacles** The advent of deepfake technology in advertising has ushered in a myriad of regulatory and legal obstacles. There is a pressing need for the government to roll out fresh legislation specifically aimed at deepfake content. This urgency stems from the inadequacy of current laws and frameworks to effectively manage the spread and creation of deepfakes, resulting in significant loopholes in accountability and enforcement. **Infringement of personal privacy and consent** The utilization of deepfakes gives rise to significant ethical quandaries, as it entails the manipulation of an individual’s voice or likeness for various nefarious intentions, such as tarnishing reputations or disseminating misleading information without their permission, thereby breaching their privacy. **Shaping public sentiment** Within the realm of marketing, fabricating or disseminating misleading content can steer a consumer’s views or sway their buying choices by circulating deceptive news, endorsements, or reviews. **Deception and Identity Misappropriation** Deepfake technology can be misused by various nefarious individuals to mimic others using their likenesses, vocal patterns, or identities. Swindlers may exploit this vital personal information to engage in deceitful acts. Given that the majority of individuals and enterprises are not equipped to detect deepfakes, they may inadvertently succumb to schemes that lead to tarnished reputations and monetary setbacks. **HOW DOES EVERYTHING FUNCTION** Deep learning algorithms are employed to create deepfakes. Deep learning, a subset of artificial intelligence, mimics the way the human brain processes data, enabling it to learn independently through examples rather than direct human instruction. Specifically, synthetic media and deepfakes utilize Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs), which consist of two competing neural networks to produce high-quality fake content. The network comprises three components: data from the physical world, a discriminator, and a generator. The discriminator network is trained with real-world data to ascertain if the generator is producing genuine or artificial content. The generator commonly creates text, images, or video content. It starts with random information and, as the name suggests, generates increasingly higher-quality samples to convince the discriminator that the sample is authentic real-life data. Initially, the generator network may be far off the mark. Its predictions might begin as random or unclear, akin to static or noise, but it improves with practice. This is achieved by continuously refining both the discriminator and generator components of the network. These components compete to create replicas that closely resemble the authentic item. In what locations are deepfakes being observed? The use of deepfakes is becoming more widespread. Sensity, a company specializing in visual threat intelligence, identified 14,678 deepfakes on the internet in July 2019. By June 2020, the number had surged to 49,081, marking a 330% increase. The volume of deepfakes discovered online is doubling approximately every six months, showcasing its exponential growth. An increase in deepfake creations might lead people to question the authenticity of genuine videos, as it becomes easier for someone featured in a compromising video to claim it was a deepfake. This phenomenon is known as ‘the liar’s dividend’. As awareness of deepfakes grows, people will become more skeptical of videos in general, making it easier to dismiss real videos as fake. The AI technology used to create deepfakes and synthetic media is still relatively new, but it has already progressed enough to produce flawless fake images, with video and audio manipulation capabilities soon to follow. Some well-known deepfakes that have garnered widespread attention include a video of ‘President Obama’ delivering a public address and Jim Carrey mimicking Jack Nicholson in The Shining. **THE POSITION IN LEGAL TERMS** The current technology in this field has outpaced the law, creating a need to fill regulatory gaps. Nevertheless, deepfake technology also has positive practical applications. Its use is expected to bring positive changes to various business sectors, including banking, where AI chatbots can offer realistic customer service, reducing the need for human interaction. In the field of Accessibility, technology is anticipated to assist disabled individuals in enhancing their capabilities and regaining independence and autonomy. For instance, individuals with ALS can preserve their voices before losing the ability to speak and later use AI technology to digitally replicate their voices. **VIEW FROM THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY IN THAILAND** **Intellectual Property Rights** Currently, there is no comprehensive legal framework dedicated to addressing deepfakes in the UK. However, multiple legal recourses are available. For instance, someone harmed could attempt to get deepfakes removed from social media sites by obtaining a court order based on copyright infringement. This may be challenging to prove due to the various rights holders involved and will vary depending on the specific content used in the deepfake and whether it constitutes copying a significant portion of the copyrighted work. Additionally, deepfakes could potentially qualify for exceptions under the Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1998 (CDPA). It appears that the UK copyright system is not adequately equipped to handle deepfakes. However, regulators and legislators are working towards addressing this issue. For example, WIPO recently released ‘The Updated Paper on Intellectual Property Policy and Artificial Intelligence’. The paper raised questions about whether the copyright system is suitable for regulating deepfakes or if a new audiovisual framework is needed. WIPO also expressed concerns about copyright ownership and fair compensation for individuals whose likenesses and performances are used in deepfakes. Deceptive imitation and misrepresentation. Image rights are not formally recognized in the UK, but English legal precedent has evolved to offer protection in cases of commercial misappropriation of an individual’s image. In the case of Fenty v Arcadia Group, UK retailer Topshop sold a t-shirt featuring singer Rihanna’s image without her permission. Consequently, Rihanna pursued legal action with a ‘passing-off’ claim in the UK High Court. The Court ruled that many customers would mistakenly believe Rihanna had endorsed the t-shirt, leading them to purchase it for that reason, which could damage her reputation. The High Court’s decision was upheld by the UK Court of Appeal, with the appeal being unanimously dismissed. Although Rihanna won the case, the Court clarified that merely using a person’s image on clothing is not automatically misleading and that celebrities do not have absolute control over the use of their image under English law. It appears that the UK copyright system is not adequately equipped to handle deepfakes. However, regulators and legislators are working towards addressing this issue. For example, WIPO recently released ‘The Updated Paper on Intellectual Property Policy and Artificial Intelligence’. The paper raised questions about whether the copyright system is suitable for regulating deepfakes or if a new audiovisual framework is needed. WIPO also expressed concerns about copyright ownership and fair compensation for individuals whose likenesses and performances are used in deepfakes. **DECEPTIVE IMITATION AND MISREPRESENTATION[\[4\]](#_ftn4)** Although picture rights are not officially recognized in the UK, examples of commercial theft of an individual’s image have been protected by English judicial precedent. The UK retailer Topshop sold a t-shirt with singer Rihanna’s likeness on it without authorization in the Fenty v. Arcadia Group case. As a result, Rihanna filed a ‘passing-off’ lawsuit in the United Kingdom High Court. The Court decided that many consumers may buy the t-shirt under the false impression that Rihanna had approved it, harming her reputation. The UK Court of Appeal denied the appeal unanimously, upholding the High Court’s verdict. Despite Rihanna’s victory, the Court made it clear that just placing someone’s picture on apparel is not automatically deceptive and that, according to English law, celebrities do not have complete control over how their image is used. Given this information, public figures may not always succeed in relying on a passing-off claim, and the claim is unlikely to be feasible for individuals who are not well-known or whose image has not been used commercially before. These limitations could pose a challenge in situations involving deepfakes featuring non-celebrities or individuals not associated with endorsing or promoting a product or service. **DEFAMATION OF CHARACTER** A victim of a deepfake may be able to file a claim for protection under defamation laws if it can be demonstrated that the deepfake has caused or is likely to cause them serious injury in terms of their reputation. The Defamation Act 2013 consolidated and simplified many existing laws and rulings in this area, and importantly, set a new standard for filing a defamation lawsuit. Under this updated standard, a harmed person must demonstrate that a deepfake has resulted in significant damage to their reputation or has a high likelihood of causing such harm to be deemed defamatory. The Supreme Court ruled in the 2019 case Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd & Ors that the Defamation Act 2013 raised the threshold for seriousness needed to file a claim, and meeting the ‘serious harm’ criteria depends on the real impact of the perpetrator’s actions. While the intention behind setting a higher threshold was to deter frivolous claims, it may also unintentionally restrict the options for victims of deep fake crime-seeking remedies. It is unclear what constitutes ‘serious reputational harm’ about deepfakes, and this ambiguity could hinder individuals seeking legal redress under the Act. **EUROPEAN UNION VIEWPOINT** Currently, like the UK, there are no specific European laws addressing deepfake-related issues. However, a broader initiative is underway to tackle misinformation across Europe, encompassing deepfakes and synthetic media. In 2018, the European Commission introduced ‘Codes of Practice on Disinformation’ to regulate false information online. The Code sets rules for its signatories, including transparency in political ads, shutting down fake accounts, and not monetizing misinformation. Facebook, Google, and Twitter are among the companies that have signed the Code. The Commission has proposed initiatives to enhance media literacy among EU citizens and urged the establishment of a European group of fact-checkers to promote quality journalism and understand misinformation sources and methods. The European Parliament has acknowledged the unique challenge posed by deepfakes and suggested using AI to address it by requiring all deepfake content to disclose its lack of authenticity within the Commission’s ethical guidelines. **POSSIBLE WAYS TO SOLVE A PROBLEM[\[5\]](#_ftn5)** Deepfakes present a particularly complex issue. Upcoming laws like the Online Harms Bill appear likely to be overly broad in addressing deepfakes and their intricate ethical dilemmas. Regulatory gaps related to online platforms are evident, and the presence of deepfakes highlights these gaps. In the absence of dedicated legislation addressing this particular issue, what alternative approaches can be pursued to mitigate the adverse effects of synthetic media? One suggestion is to establish a new ‘Office for Digital Society’ to oversee online content, data, and privacy. A centralized regulator could unite current regulators and reduce existing regulatory gaps. For any effective regulation to be implemented, regulators must be equipped with authority and sufficient resources to make a difference. In the future, laws focused on deepfake technology in the UK and the EU should specify the approved and prohibited uses of deepfakes. This will provide social media companies with clear guidelines for monitoring content on their platforms. Legislation should also enable internet platforms to share deepfake information among themselves. This will simplify the process of platforms alerting each other about harmful content and is expected to reduce the spread of synthetic media in mainstream media. Alongside potential legal reforms, governments need to allocate resources to develop forensic media technologies to facilitate the identification of deepfakes. Both the UK and the EU must be prepared to legislate effectively and with purpose in this field. It is encouraging to see broader efforts to combat misinformation and safeguard online users. Nevertheless, with the increasing spread of false information showing no signs of abating, deepfakes and synthetic media are poised to become the predominant issue. **REFERENCES** - The Ethics of #Deepfakes: Understanding the Impact of Generative AI on #Society #genai #innovation #technology #scams - - Are Deepfakes Illegal? Overview Of Deepfake Laws And Regulations - - Emerging Technologies and Law: Legal Status of Tackling Crimes Relating to Deepfakes in India… - [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/345383883\_Regulating\_deep\_fakes\_legal\_and\_ethical\_considerations](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/345383883_Regulating_deep_fakes_legal_and_ethical_considerations) - Debating the ethics of deepfakes [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) The Ethics of #Deepfakes: Understanding the Impact of Generative AI on #Society #genai #innovation #technology #scams [**\[2\]**](#_ftnref2) Regulating deep fakes: legal and ethical considerations [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/345383883\_Regulating\_deep\_fakes\_legal\_and\_ethical\_considerations](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/345383883_Regulating_deep_fakes_legal_and_ethical_considerations) [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Are Deepfakes Illegal? Overview Of Deepfake Laws And Regulations [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Emerging Technologies and Law: Legal Status of Tackling Crimes Relating to Deepfakes in India… [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Debating the ethics of deepfakes **Categories:** Articles, Criminal Law, IT Law & Cyber Law --- ### [Copyright Law In India](https://lawfoyer.in/copyright-law-in-india/) **Published:** September 6, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Mahi, Vivek College of Law, Bijnor (U.P.)** **Edited By: Gyanu Patel, Amity Law School, Lucknow (U.P.)** **INTRODUCTION** Intellectual property is a category of that property includes the intangible creation of the human intellect. There are many types of Intellectual Property Trademarks, Patents, Trade secrets, and copyright. Intellectual property is the root of copyright. Copyright is the right vested in a creator of some works these works include literary work, Artistic work, Musical work, Dramatic works, etc. Examples are books, paintings, music, movies, etc. It also includes computer programs. A computer program is a code that is also considered to be a creative work. Copyright in India is governed by the **Indian Copyright Act, of 1957** and **Copyright Rules of 2013**. Under the Copyright Act, 1957 total Sections is 79 total of chapters is 15 the Copyright Act was amended in the year of 2012. As per **Section 14** of the Copyright Act, of 1957 copyright is an exclusive right that is given to the author of the works. For such as **original literary works – Sec.2(o), original Artistic works – Sec.2(c), Dramatic works – Sec.2(h), cinematography – Sec.2(f), sounds recording – Sec.2(xx).** The creator of the work gets the right to make copies of the works distribute copies, sell copies, translate their work, broadcast rights, the right to perform publicly, and so on. India is also party to the Berne Convention, of 1886 which affords minimum protection to authors, musicians, poets, painters, publishers, and other artists. The WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty of 1996 of protection to the performers and producers of phonography for economic rights such as the right to sell reproduce distribute etc. The WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996 under the Berne Convention of the protection of the author’s works in the digital era. Now this treaty was the first time when the computer program and database were added in the copyright legislation of the WIPO following nations. Now these conventions ensure international protection for copyright owners. **KEYWORDS**: – Section 14, author original works, protection of original creation, infringement of copyright, creativity. **OBJECTIVE** The aim of the copyright act is to protect the creator’s original creation and encouragement of creativity. Creators can economically benefit from their work. In one line we can say that the purpose of copyright law is to protect and promote creativity and originality. **HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT** The history of copyright law dates back to the early 18th century with the passage of the Statute of Anne in 1710 in England. This Statute is widely regarded as the first piece of legislation to recognize authors’ rights, granting them exclusive rights to publish and sell their works for a limited time, typically 14 years, with the possibility of renewal for another 14 years. This early law was significant as it shifted the control over literary work from printers and publishers to authors, promoting the idea that creators should benefit financially from their creations. In the United States, the foundation of copyright law was established in the Constitution, which granted Congress the power to promote the progress of science and the arts by securing exclusive rights to authors and inventors. The first U.S. copyright law was enacted in 1790, offering Protection for books, maps, and charts for 14 years, with a renewal option for another 14 years. Over time, copyright laws evolved to adapt to new forms of media and technology. The Berne Conversation for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, established in 1886 was a landmark international agreement that set common standards for copyright protection across member countries. In India, the history of copyright law began with the Indian Copyright Act of 1914, which was based on the UK Copyright Act of 1911. This Act provided basic protection for literary, musical, and artistic works. The major overhaul came with the Copyright Act of 1957, which was comprehensive and tailored to Indian needs. Over the years, it has been amended several times to address technological advancement and align with international treaties like the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement. The most recent amendment in 2012 introduced significant changes, including provisions for digital rights and improved protection for authors and creators. **MEANING OF COPYRIGHT** Copyright is a protective shield for Creators ensuring their hard work and creativity are respected and rewarded. In other words, copyright means a legal right granted to the creator of an original work, giving them exclusive control over how their work is used. This means they can decide who can copy, distribute, or adapt their works, and they can earn money from it too. **DEFINITION OF COPYRIGHT** - **ACCORDING TO OXFORD DICTIONARY:-** “*Copyright is an exclusive right given by the law for a certain term of year to an Author, Composer, etc.(or his assignee) to print, publish and sell copies of his original work.”* - **AS PER SECTION 14 OF COPYRIGHT ACT, 1957:-** “*Copyright is an exclusive right subject to the provision of this Act, to do or authorize the doing of any numbers of prescribed acts in relation to sound recording, artistic work, computer program, literary dramatic and musical works, cinematography films.”* **DOCTRINES OF COPYRIGHT** 1. **DOCTRINE** **SWEAT OF BROW(UK): –** This doctrine acknowledges that even if a work lacks originality, the efforts and labor invested in creating it can still merit copyright protection. For example, a database compiled through extensive research and effort may be protected, even if the data itself is not original, due to the significant efforts involved in its organization and compilation. 2. **DOCTRINE MODICUM OF CREATIVITY(USA): –** This principle requires that a work must contain at least a minimal level of creativity to qualify for copyright protection. It does not need to be highly inventive, just sufficient original. For example, a unique arrangement of words or a creative choice in layout or presentation can qualify a work for copyright, such as a short poem or a distinctive graphic design. 3. **DOCTRINE OF MERGER (India):-** This doctrine asserts that copyright does not extend to the idea of facts but only to their expressions. When an idea can only be expressed in one or very few ways, the expression itself may not be protected. For instance, a specific plot line or character concept in a story might be unprotected if it is the only feasible way to convey the idea, whereas the detailed narrative and unique writing style would still be protected. Each of these doctrines plays a crucial role in defining the scope and limitations of copyright protection. **LEGAL PROVISION OF COPYRIGHT** **Chapters** **Sections** **Legal provision** Chapter 1 Section 2 Section 3 Define Artistic, broadcasting, etc. interpretation. Meaning of publication. Chapter 2 Section 9 Copyright Office. Chapter 3 Section 13 Section 14 Which works are included in the copyright? Definition of copyright. Chapter 4 Sections 17 to 21 Ownership and rights of owner. Chapter 5 Sections 22 to 29 Term of copyright. Chapter 7 Section 33 Copyright societies. Chapter 10 Section 44 to 50A Registration of copyright. Chapter 11 Section 51 Section 52 Copyright infringement. Certain acts are not an infringement of copyright. Chapter 12 Section 57 Section 62 Author’s special rights. Jurisdiction. **SECTION 17 OWNERSHIP** The general rule is that if you create a character or any copyright property, you are the owner of their work. However, if the work is created during employment the copyright typically belongs to the employer, not the employee. Despite this, the employee retains moral rights to the work, which include the right to be recognized as the author and the right to object to derogatory treatment of the work. **RIGHTS OF THE OWNER** There are three types of rights of the owner under the copyright that is economic rights, moral rights, and neighboring rights. These rights are discussed below: 1. **Economic rights: –** It is a several exclusive rights typically attached to the holder of a copyright… - To produce copies or reproduction of the work and sell those copies including typical and electronic copies. - To translate own work into any language. - To export and import their work. - To perform or display the work publicly. - To create derivation works. - To sell, assign, and transfer this right to others. - To distribute the work in the market and make money out of it. 2. **Moral rights:-** The moral rights of the owner have been provided under section 57 of the Copyright Act,1957. There are three basic moral rights which are- - **Right to paternity:-** To claim authorship of work and to prevent all others from claiming authorship of his work. - **Right to integrity:-** To prevent distortion, mutilation, or other alteration of his work, or any other action in relation to said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation. In short, economic rights provide creators with financial control over their work, and moral rights protect the personal and ethical interests of the creator, ensuring the integrity and reputation of their work. 3. **Neighbouring right:-** In copyright law, related rights are the rights of a creative work not connected with the works of the actual author. It is used in opposition to the term author right. Rome Convention for the Protection of Performer, Producer of phonograms and Broadcasting organization 1961. This convention dealt with Neighbouring rights. **TERM OF COPYRIGHT** The general rule is that copyright lasts for 60 years its conduct. From the death of the author (author lifetime + 60 years ) 60 years from the date of publication · Original literary · film · Dramatic work · Sound recording · Musical work · Posthumous publication · Artistic work · Anonymous and pseudonymous publication. · Works of government and international organizations. **NOTE:-** - Photographs – earlier 60 years from publication but after the 2012 Amendment 60 years from the death of the photographer. - If an Anonymous author is found then the Author’s lifetime + 60 years. - If there is joint authorship in a Posthumous publication and one of the authors is living then also author’s lifetime +60 years. **COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION** - First of all copyright registration is not compulsory. - Acquisition of copyright is automatic with the creation of the work. - Registration as a prima facie evidence copyright symbol (sec.48) Example – **Copyright ©️ 2009 Microsoft Corporation.** **Only can apply:** Apply registration of the copyright of that person who is the author, publisher, owner, and any other person who is interested in copyright. **Where can apply:** The applicant can apply for registration of copyright in the copyright office located in New Delhi or the **official website at copyright.gov.in** **Copyright registration fees** Literary, Musical, Dramatic, Artistic Rs. 500 to 5,000 Broadcasting communication Rs. 40,000 Cinematograph Film Rs. 15,000 Sound Recording Rs. 10,000 Public performance Rs. 5,000 Translation Rs. 5,000 Disability format Rs. 2,000 **Benefits of registration** - Economic stability. - Safeguard of owner. - Legal protection - Worldwide protection. - Brand value. - Owner publicity. - Copyright is an asset. **INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT** It means any person who uses the creator’s copyrighted work without the permission of the creator author or owner. Infringement of copyright occurs in various situations such as: - Performing the copyright in public without permission or authorization. - Produced copies, reproduction, and sells the copyright without permission of the owner. - Download and upload the online material without permission or authorization. - Created work based on the original without an owner. - Edited and modified copyright software without permission or authorization. - Use the copyrighted text, image, and video without permission of the owner. **EXCEPTION OF COPYRIGHT** Section 52 of the Copyright Act, of 1957 provided a certain exception to the infringement of copyright. Such acts which do not constitute infringement are when such work is used only for private use which also includes the use for research called a fair use in copyright are below: 1. Research, criticism, Report, and storage. 2. Fair use of computer programs. 3. Work of state. 4. Publication and performance. 5. Educational purpose. 6. 7. Artistic work. 8. Architecture work. 9. Broadcasting and performance. **JURISDICTION (section 62)** A suit or other Civil proceeding, relating to infringement of copyright is filed in the District Court within whose jurisdiction the plaintiff resides or carries on business or where the cause of action arose irrespective of the place of residence or place of business of the defendant. **LIMITATION** The period of limitation for filing the suit is 3 years from the date of infringement. **REMEDIES IN COPYRIGHT** In case of infringement of copyright the remedies which are available to the owner of the copyright a civil remedies and criminal remedies. The license having the exclusive right also has a right to sue in such cases. If the work is published anonymously or with another name that is pseudonymous work, the publisher also has the right to sue. The case can be initiated by the owner for remedies like injection, damages, accounts, or other remedies as per the law. Sec.55 provides civil remedies that are Injection, Damages, Accounts, Damages for conversion, and Delivery of infringed copy. Criminal offense:- The infringement of copyright is also a criminal offense which if there is an intention is found is penalized. It attracts a punishment of 6 months to 3 years of imprisonment and a fine from 50,000 rupees to 21 lakh rupees (Sec.63) For subsequent offenses, the minimum punishment is 1 year which can obtain to 3 years and the fine is not less than 1 lakh **Case laws related to copyright** 1. **V.T Thomas & ors. VS Malayalam Manorama Co. Ltd.(AIR 1989 Kerala 49)** - Petitioner advocate Adv. M.P Raveendran - Respondent advocate: Adv. V.K Rajan - Order by: Justice Sukumaran. **Fact:** In this case, the petitioner created a cartoon and named it “Boban and Molly.” The petitioner had already created and published this cartoon before starting his employment with Malayala Manorama. Over time, this comic became very famous. Malayala Manorama filed a case against Thomas, claiming that they were the owners of this comic. **Held:** In this case, the court stated that the copyright belongs to Thomas because he is the original author of the cartoon. Therefore, he has the freedom to publish his cartoon independently. 2. **XYZ Films LLC & Ors vs. UTV Motion Pictures (AIR 2016 234 DLT 260 Delhi HC)** - Petitioner advocate Adv. K.P.S. Soman - Respondent advocate: Adv. A.K. Gupta - Order by: Justice G.S. Patel **Case Facts:** In this case, The movie Raid was released in the market. Similarly, the movie Baaghi was released. The producers of XYZ Films LLC filed a case claiming that the movie Baaghi had copied scenes from the movie Raid. The scenes allegedly copied include action sequences involving the hero and heroine fighting. **Issue:** Whether the UTV Motion Pictures movie Raid infringed on the copyright of XYZ Films LLC’s movie without authorization? **Court’s Decision:** The court observed that while the action scenes involving the hero and heroine in both Raid and Baaghi might have common elements, they were not entirely unique. The court looked for any unique elements in the movie Raid that were allegedly copied but found none. Thus, the court concluded that there was no substantial copying. The decision was in favor of the defendants (UTV Motion Pictures). The court ruled that there was no copyright infringement. The directors and producers of Raid lost the case because they could not prove uniqueness in the scenes that were allegedly copied. 3. **Monkey selfie case (2018)** **Fact:** In 2011, a British photographer named David went to a park in Indonesia for wildlife photography. He left his camera unattended for a while, during which a black macaque monkey took a selfie with the camera. When David retrieved his camera, he found some amazing photos on it. Sometime later, a magazine published this photo without David’s permission. When David found out, he filed a copyright infringement case against the company. Meanwhile, PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) intervened and argued that the monkey holds the copyright to the photograph. **Legal Issue:** Does a non-human animal be recognized as the author of a photograph and hold the copyright under U.S. law? **Held:** The court held that a monkey is not a human being but an animal, and therefore, under copyright law, the monkey cannot hold any copyright. As a result, all the rights go to David. Ultimately, an out-of-court settlement was reached. David now receives 75% of the revenue from the photo, and 25% goes to the sanctuary owners to help develop wildlife security. **Conclusion** Copyright law serves as a fundamental pillar in protecting the intellectual property of creators, ensuring that their works are not unlawfully reproduced or exploited. The balance it strives to maintain between the rights of creators and the public interest is crucial in fostering creativity and innovation. However, as the case law demonstrates, the line between inspiration and infringement can be thin and complex. Courts are often tasked with navigating these nuances, considering the uniqueness and substantiality of the copied material. Today, copyright laws continue to evolve, addressing challenges posed by digital media and the internet while striving to balance the rights of creators with public access to knowledge and culture. **References** - Copyright Act, 1957 - Copyright Rules of 2013 - [**https://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/copyright-256063146/256063146/**](https://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/copyright-256063146/256063146/) - [**https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copyright**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copyright) **Categories:** Articles, Intellectual Property Law --- ### [DEFAMATION IN MEDIA TRIAL: CRIMINAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES](https://lawfoyer.in/defamation-in-media-trial-criminal-and-constitutional-remedies/) **Published:** September 6, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: ROZY PARVEEN, JAMIA HAMDARD** **Edited By: Ritesh Singh Shekhawat, MJRPU, Jaipur** **INTRODUCTION** As the revered Bhagavad Gita correctly says, **“*For a man of honor, defamation is worse than death”***. This article delves into the legal aspects of defamation in India, judicial interpretations, and future direction. It examines how defamation laws and media trials influence public opinion and ensure the right to reputation and fair trials. Every individual has the right to protect their reputation just as they do their body and property. In fact, the right to protect one’s reputation is often deemed more crucial than protecting physical and material assists[\[1\]](#_ftn1). People can often endure physical and property damage but harm to their reputation is intolerable. This is why defamation, which involves any act intended to harm an individual’s good name, is actionable under both tort law and criminal law. Defamation has complex definitions and exceptions within Indian law. Understanding this law is essential for safeguarding one’s dignity, as guaranteed by Article 21[\[2\]](#_ftn2) of the Indian constitution. However, defamation laws have often been misused, sparking debates about their impact on free speech[\[3\]](#_ftn3). Progressive thinking is necessary to address the evolving needs of Indian society in this regard. **KEYWORDS** Defamation, reputation, Indian constitution, free speech, media trials. **DEFINITION** **Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860[\[4\]](#_ftn4)** “Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes in any manner, imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reasons to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the case hereinafter expected, to defame that person”. ***Rohini Singh v. State of Gujarat (2018)****,* the court has given it some thought. “Making” and “publishing” as distinct actions. If someone only types defamatory content without sharing or spreading it to others, it may not count as defamation. Therefore, to prove defamation, the person making the claim must show that the defamatory material was meant to be seen by others[\[5\]](#_ftn5). **Section 356 of The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023[\[6\]](#_ftn6)** “Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes in any manner, imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reasons to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the case hereinafter expected, to defame that person”. **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND** It is depressing to watch Goddess Sita’s reputation being called into doubt in India, where she is regarded as a representation of elegance and purity. Despite not being officially recognized defamation has always existed in our society[\[7\]](#_ftn7). The introduction of defamation laws in India by Lord Macaulay in 1837 marks the beginning of the country’s legal history. Paradoxically the regulations were put in place by the British government mainly to safeguard their own interests. Watching the reputation of Goddess Sita who is revered as a symbol of grace and innocence in India brought into question is disheartening. Defamation has always existed in our society even though it is not formally recognized. India’s legal history began in 1837 when Lord Macaulay introduced defamation laws to the country. Ironically the British government primarily implemented the laws to protect its own interests. **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** Slander was only illegal in England up until the eighteenth century if it falsely accused someone of a criminal or social ill or disparaged their qualifications for a job. Accusing women of being unchaste was not made illegal until the Slander of Women Act of 1891. French laws against defamation have historically been more stringent. The truth could only be used as a defense if the publication was about a public figure[\[8\]](#_ftn8), and a rule from 1881 that formed contemporary French defamation law demanded that libelous information in newspapers be conspicuously retracted[\[9\]](#_ftn9). Though comparable, German defamation laws typically permit the use of truth as a defense. In Italy, veracity rarely excuses defamation, which is a criminal offense. In the United States, defamation of a public figure can only be proven if the statement was made with “actual malice”. **Two types of defamations are:-** - **Libel defamation** - **Slander defamation** Libel refers to a defamatory statement made in a permanent form, such as written text, graphical representations, or record material, slander, on the other hand, involves defamatory statements made in a transitory or verbal form[\[10\]](#_ftn10). Libel is actionable per se, meaning that special damages do not need to be proven. In contrast, slander requires proof of the special damages to be actionable. Slander can occur in the heat of the moment or due to sudden provocation, whereas libel typically demonstrates greater malice[\[11\]](#_ftn11). **DEFAMATION AND MEDIA LAW** Adherence to the ethical norms of journalism is crucial for published news. Journalists must ensure that the information they disseminate is truthful and guides the public in a positive direction, avoiding any negative impacts. In society, the law grants every individual the right to maintain and preserve their reputation. In India, media ethics take on additional significance due to the country’s diverse and pluralistic society. The press has a responsibility to foster unity and understanding among different communities while reporting fairly and accurately. The Press Council of India was established to uphold the standards of journalism and provide guidelines to ensure that media practices do not harm an individual’s reputation or incite social discord. The Indian legal system also provides robust mechanisms to protect individual’s reputations. Defamation laws, both civil and criminal, are in place to offer recourse for those whose reputations have been unjustly tarnished by false reporting. This underscores the importance of responsible journalism that respects individual rights and contributes to the collective good of society. **CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS** There is a close relationship between some fundamental freedoms and the constitutional component of media law in India. Article 19 of the Indian constitution implies that the media is entitled to freedom even though there are no explicit laws giving this right. The freedom of speech and expression which is essential to media freedom is guaranteed by Article 19 (1)[\[12\]](#_ftn12). In order for the media to have a role in a democratic society and for journalists to report critique, and enlighten the public, this fundamental right is essential. In *Sakal Papers Ltd. V. Union of India[**\[13\]**](#_ftn13)*, The daily newspaper’s publication was contested as being against the constitution. The government argued that the regulation was a legitimate limitation on citizens’ ability to conduct business. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the state and overturned the directive. The court ruled that limitations on citizens’ ability to conduct business cannot be used to impede their rights to freedom of speech and expression. The court held that restrictions on freedom of speech could only be imposed for the reasons listed in Article 19 clause 92. In another case *K.A.Abbas v. Union of India[**\[14\]**](#_ftn14)*, The petitioner argued that censorship was unconstitutional because it infringed upon his fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. However, the Supreme Court decided that Article 19(2) justified the pre-censorship of films under the Cinematography Act. The court argues that because movies have a higher capacity to evoke strong emotions than other kinds of art or expression they should be viewed differently. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The intersection of constitutional and criminal law in the context of media freedom and regulation is a complex and nuanced subject. Through the protection of freedom of speech and expression, the Indian Constitution, and especially Article 19, implicitly supports media freedom. This freedom is not unrestricted, though, as Article 19(2) outlines reasonable limitations that attempt to strike a balance between the rights of the individual and the interests of society as a whole. The judiciary has a crucial role in drawing boundaries between certain freedoms and constraints, as demonstrated by judicial interpretations in cases like Sakal Papers Ltd. v. Union of India and K. A. Abbas v. Union of India. The former case underscores that business regulations cannot unduly encroach upon media freedom, while the latter acknowledges the necessity of film censorship to prevent potential social harm, illustrating the delicate balance between protecting free expression and maintaining public order and morality. These legal frameworks and judicial precedents underscore the importance of ethical journalism and responsible reporting in upholding democratic values and the rule of law, ensuring that media practices contribute positively to society without compromising individual rights or social harmony **REFERENCES** **Online Articles / Sources Referred** - Defamation and media law. - Defamation law in India. - Defamation laws in India – protecting and dignity. - Defamation law in India. **Cases Referred** - A. Abbas v. UOI and Anr on 24 September 1970. - Sakal papers (p) Ltd. and others v. UOI 25 September, 1962. **Statutes Referred** - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - The constitution of India, 1950. [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Mohd Aqib aslam, “defamation and media law” (legal service India) < [Defamation And Media Law (legalserviceindia.com)](https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-7095-defamation-and-media-law.html#google_vignette)> accessed on 3 august 2024. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Constitution of India, 1950, article 21. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Ibid. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Indian penal code, 1860, section 499. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Oishika Banerji, “defamation law in India” (iPleaders, 22 August 2022) < [Defamation law in India – iPleaders](https://blog.ipleaders.in/defamation-law-in-india/#What_is_defamation)> accessed on 3 august 2024. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Bharatiya nyaya sanhita, 2023, section 356. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) “Defamation laws in India-protecting reputation and dignity”(times of India,18 June, 2018) < > accessed on 4 august 2024. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) “Defamation” (Britannica, 3 July 2024) < > accessed on 4 august 2024.[](#_ftnref9) [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Ibid. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Ibid. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Ibid. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) (1962) 3 SCR 842, AIR 1962 SC 305. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) 1971 AIR 481. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law --- ### [FALSE ACCUSATIONS OF RAPE: THE NEED FOR BALANCING JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS AND THE ACCUSED](https://lawfoyer.in/false-accusations-of-rape-the-need-for-balancing-justice-for-victims-and-the-accused/) **Published:** September 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: SNEHA AMARNATH VARMA, KES SHRI. JAYANTILAL H. PATEL LAW COLLEGE** **Edited By: Ritesh Singh Shekhawat, MJRPU, Jaipur** **INTRODUCTION** ***“Your word against mine: The war for justice over false rape allegations”-By Claisse Opulencia*** Rape is one of the most villainous crimes and violation of human rights that occurs all over the world. In India rape is defined under Section 375, Indian Penal Code, 1860[\[1\]](#_ftn1). It is a sexual assault that involves forced and non-consensual sexual intercourse, which affects the lives of the victims by giving them lifetime trauma. Victims of rape suffer from sexual violence, which results in depression, physical injuries, mental trauma such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), etc. There are many laws made by legislators to protect rape victims and safeguard the dignity of survivors. However, these laws are misused by some individuals leading to the false accusation of rape. In our society, fake rape allegations can have a ruinous effect on accused men. Society sympathizes with the woman and sees accused men as a rapist without questioning the validity of her allegations, which can affect falsely implicated men’s mental health, reputation, and professional life. This article explores the issues of repercussions of false allegations of rape on men and balancing the fair legal trail to ensure justice for both genuine victims and innocent men. In India, rape cases are taken seriously, but the laws made for securing victims are being misused as armament to harm the character of men and to blackmail them. Executions of the legal remedies handed by Sec 211 of IPC, 182 of IPC, Sec 195 of IPC, and Sec 196 of IPC for fake allegations are unskilful. This composition highlights how shy these laws are in precluding fake rape allegations. The misuse of laws highlights the urgent need to bring legal reforms to protect and balance justice for both genuine rape victims and wrongly implicated men. **KEYWORDS** Rape, sexual violence, Fake allegations, Sec 211 of IPC, 182 of IPC, Sec 195 of IPC, Sec 196 of IPC, mental health, legal reforms. **LAWS** In India, Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 deals with rape. According to this, a man commits rape when he penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina of women without her consent. There are four clauses under sec 375 of IPC. According to Clause (a) of sec 375 of IPC, when a man penetrates his penis, to any extent into the vagina, mouth, urethra, or anus of a woman without her consent or forced to do the same with another person, he is liable for rape.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) According to Clause (b) of sec 375 of IPC, when a man inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra, or anus of a woman or forces to do the same with another person he is liable for rape. [\[3\]](#_ftn3) According to Clause (c) of sec 375 of IPC, when a man manipulates any part of the body of a woman to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus, or any part of the body of such woman or forces her to do same with another person, he is liable for rape.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) According to Clause (d) of sec 375 of IPC, when a man applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, or urethra of a woman without her consent or is forced to do the same with another person, he is liable for rape. Acts defined under these four clauses of Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code must be committed under any of the seven descriptions: - Against her will - Without her consent - Consent is obtained by putting her in fear of death or hurt. - Her consent is given to that person because she believes herself to be lawfully married. - While giving her consent she is in unsound mind or intoxicated. - Consent is given under eighteen years of age. - The girl is unable to communicate. Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 deals with the punishment for rape which is ten years and can extend to life imprisonment and fine. Now, this section is replaced by Section 64 of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. **MOTIVES** Rape is one the most severe and horrendous crimes, which should not be misused by an individual for personal benefit. Yet, in India, there have been numerous fake rape cases of men. There are various reasons and motives behind filing fake rape cases, such as revenge, blackmail, to gain sympathy, family pressure, damage to reputation, financial gain, etc. A clear example of blackmailing and threatening for money would be the case of a Gurugram woman, who filed 7 rape cases against 7 men now held for ‘extortion’[\[6\]](#_ftn6). A young girl of 20 years was arrested on a complaint made by the mother of one the man she had falsely accused of raping. The complainant stated that this girl blackmailed and threatened them for money. She used to threaten them by making them choose between giving money or getting that man married to her. In this case, it was discovered that this girl was running a gang aiming at extorting money by falsely accusing men of rape. She had filed seven different cases on seven different men in different police stations in 14 months beginning in September 2020. The repercussions of these allegations are beyond legal battles. These false allegations have damaged not only the falsely implicated man’s reputation but their families too. Fake allegations about man not only destroy their lives but also their families. One of the best examples of this is the case of Santosh Kumar Rajput, Father of three, who commits suicide due to false rape allegations[\[7\]](#_ftn7). Santosh, 40 years old man and father of three children was falsely accused of rape. During the investigation, all the allegations were proven false, but the woman did not stop there. She went to district headquarters and filed an FIR. All allegations made against Santosh were denied, but his reputation and mental health were badly affected. Santosh hanged himself in his house because of the constant pressure and increased tension against him in society. In further investigation, it was found that the woman had previously filed three cases against three men for raping and threatening to burn herself with acid. This incident not only shattered his family but also questioned the credibility of real-life victims of sexual assault. The fake allegation about men not only destroys their lives but has an impact on their families, societies, and communities, as we can see in this case that Santosh’s wife, Ram Kumari, has the burden of raising their three children. The seriousness of rape cases demands strict investigations, but these false claims can lead to mistrust of all the allegations. Such fake cases can affect the lives of genuine victims who are already facing numerous challenges and hurdles in seeking justice. **CONSEQUENCES OF FAKE ALLEGATIONS** There are multitudinous goods in the life of a person who’s falsely intertwined. A person loses his character and respect in society once a woman accuses him of rape. It can be said that a wrongfully intertwined person loses his character before he’s condemned, and indeed after he’s set free, he has to deal with numerous challenges and hurdles in life. Many of the consequences faced by them are social life, severance, suicidal studies, internal trauma, depression, fiscal consequences, and damage to character. The accused often faces instant ostracization from the society. Even if he is proven innocent, the mark of being accused as a rapist can linger frequently. Families of accused are being judged and discriminated against by society, which can lead to constant stress and mental trauma. The accused, as well as his family, face severe damage to their reputation. Supreme Court of India, while acquitting a man in a case for rape after 23 yrs, said that a false allegation of rape causes equal torture, demotion, and damage to the indicted.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Stress and anxiety connected with a person defending oneself against false allegations can lead to depression, post-traumatic stress complaint (PTSD), and suicidal tendencies indicted also faces violent pressure during a disquisition or interrogation which can affect his internal health. One illustration of this is the case of Chirag Varaiya, a 46-year-old Chartered Accountant. Chirag ended his life by committing suicide at a resort in Igatpuri on Jan 29, 2023. He left a four-page suicide note alleging that he was forced to end his life because of the harassment of the police in the false rape case reported by his colleague and her husband.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) False allegations not only affect the families and accused but also question the integrity of the legal system. Chirag’s case highlights the need for a more balanced approach in dealing with such serious cases and allegations to ensure fair justice. In India men committing suicide because of fake allegation is a serious issue. The repercussions of the false allegation extend beyond the individual to affect the entire family. An example that underscores the harsh reality is the case of Deepak Sangwan. Deepak was a differently able person who shot himself in the neck after a woman and his father filed a false rape case against him. Before ending his life, he left a suicide note which claimed that woman and his father had taken 2 lakhs from him, and when he asked for his money, the woman’s father threatened to file a fake rape case. Later, when Deepak filed a complaint against them over a bounce of a check, the woman filed a fake case against him. After his death, his family was facing financial issues and was also being harassed.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) The consequences of fake rape cases can cause numerous problems in the family of the accused and society. It is important to ensure a balance between the genuine victims and falsely implicated persons to prevent the misuse of laws. Ensuring justice for both the wrongfully implicated person in a rape case and a real-life victim is a challenging task for our judicial system. The recent decision by Uttar Pradesh’s Bareilly court to sentence a woman for making fake rape allegations about a man and a fine of over 5.8 lakh rupees. The girl was convicted under section 195 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860[\[11\]](#_ftn11) for making fake allegations against Ajay Kumar and sentenced to 1653 days, the exact duration for which Ajay was behind bars,[\[12\]](#_ftn12) is the best example that it is important to give justice to the real-life victims of rape but it is equally important to ensure that justice is given to the person who is wrongfully implicated in the rape cases and to hold a person liable who misuses the legal system. **REMEDIAL MEASURES** There are certain laws and corrections made for false allegations, including fake rape cases. In India, these laws are covered under the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which has been lately streamlined to Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. Many of the laws are: - Section 182 of IPC deals with False information with the intent to beget a public menial to use his legal power to the injury of another person. [\[13\]](#_ftn13) - Section 211 of IPC deals with a false charge of offense made with intent to injure. [\[14\]](#_ftn14) - Section 191 of IPC, deals with giving false substantiation. [\[15\]](#_ftn15) - Section 200 of IPC, deals with using as true similar protestation knowing it to be false. [\[16\]](#_ftn16) - Section 195 of IPC, deals with giving or fabricating false substantiation with intent to land a conviction of an offense punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) With the help of these laws falsely intertwined person can clear his name from fake cases and also ensure that the person filing fake cases is penalized. The most important principle to ensure justice is that a person should be considered innocent until proven shamefaced. This presuming will prevent people from not being falsely penalized without proper substantiation and that trials are fair. This idea comes from the Latin sentence, “Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat,” which means that the burden is on execution to prove that the indicted person is shamefaced rather than the indicted proving his innocence. Using this testament, we can keep the integrity of our judicial system. **CONCLUSION** Rape is a serious offense; it’s important to give justice to the victims, but contemporaneously, it’s important to make sure that our judicial system doesn’t unintentionally beget detriment to the innocent existent. To achieve this our judicial system should be careful while dealing with similar serious cases. Balancing justice for real victims and securing the rights of those who are wrongfully intertwined is necessary. The principle of ‘INNOCENT UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY’ should be upheld to help unlawful detriment. One of the main questions that arise is “Is it necessary to introduce some specific and strict laws that deal with fake rape cases and to discourage the form of fake rape cases while guarding the rights of the real-life victims?” **REFERENCES** - - - - - - - [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Indian Penal Code, 1860, s375. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Indian Penal Code, 1860, s375, Indian Kanoon, < >, accessed 20th August, 2024. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Indian Penal Code, 1860, s375, Indian Kanoon, < >, accessed 20th August, 2024. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Indian Penal Code, 1860, s375, Indian Kanoon, < >, accessed 20th August, 2024. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Bismin Taskeen, ‘Gurugram woman, who filed 7 rape cases against 7 men now held for ‘extortion’’, 30th December 2021. < > accessed 20th August, 2024. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) ‘Father of three commits suicide due to false rape allegations’, (Voiceformenindia), 22nd December, 2019, < > accessed 20th August, 2024. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Live Law, 31st October, 2023, < > accessed 20th August, 2024. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Voice for men, 13th February, 2023, < [< https://voiceformenindia.com/mumbai-chartered-accountant-suicide-four-page-note-alleges-harassment-by-police-in-false-rape-case-by-former-colleague-her-husband/](https://d.docs.live.net/b71d9740a7722989/Documents/%3c%20https:/voiceformenindia.com/mumbai-chartered-accountant-suicide-four-page-note-alleges-harassment-by-police-in-false-rape-case-by-former-colleague-her-husband/)> accessed 20th August, 2024. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Voice for men, March 16th, 2021 < > accessed 20th August, 2024. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Indian Penal Code, 1860, s195 [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Live Law, 7th May, 2024, < [< https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/up-court-sentences-woman-1653-days-jail-false-rape-allegations-imposes-58-lakh-fine-257291](https://d.docs.live.net/b71d9740a7722989/Documents/%3c%20https:/www.livelaw.in/news-updates/up-court-sentences-woman-1653-days-jail-false-rape-allegations-imposes-58-lakh-fine-257291) > accessed 20th August, 2024. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Indian Penal Code, 1860, s182 < >, accessed 20th August, 2024. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Indian Penal Code, 1860, s211 < >, accessed 20th August, 2024. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Indian Penal Code, 1860, s191 <. . >, accessed 20th August, 2024. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Indian Penal Code, 1860, s200 < >, accessed 20th August, 2024. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Indian Penal Code, 1860, s195 < >, accessed 20th August, 2024. **Categories:** Articles, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Criminal Law --- ### [OFFENCES BY COMPANIES: A LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE](https://lawfoyer.in/offences-by-companies-a-legal-and-practical-perspective/) **Published:** September 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: BERADAR AKASH, CHRIST ACADEMY INSTITUTE OF LAW** **Edited By: Ritesh Singh Shekhawat, MJRPU, Jaipur** **ABSTRACT** This blog aims to analyze legislation and landmark case laws relating to corporate criminal liability under Indian laws as well as the main doctrines governing it. Further, it extends to which the Penal Code of 1860, and the Companies Act, of 2013 can be used to prosecute corporate crimes. Dispersed among the posts, the blog offers thorough explanations of various case laws, which show how corporate entities are legally penalized for such misconducts, and, as such, presents a comprehensive treatise for any individual involved in corporate governance or legal practice, business owners and investors, in particular. **KEYWORDS** Offences by companies, Legal Provisions, Case studies, Doctrines, Judicial precedents, Measures Taken **INTRODUCTION** Corporate firms are one of the important sources of contribution towards the development of the economy of the country. However, they are involved in criminal activities, which brings certain difficulties to stakeholders. Companies, associations, or bodies are also supposed to be liable for offenses under Section 11 of the Indian Penal Code 1860, which considers ‘person’ for this purpose. This blog discusses the critical aspects of corporate crime and the legal provisions, ordinances, judicial decisions, and doctrines underlying the criminal accountability of such corporate entities. ‘**Offenses by a company**’ means that any individual who is in a policy-making and managerial capacity and is involved in the commission of the offense is held responsible for it along with the company unless the individual provides sufficient evidence that the offense was committed without his or her knowledge and further, the individual had no knowledge that the offense was being committed. ‘**Corporate criminal liability’** means a crime committed by any employee or agent during his course of employment that benefits his or her business. Person commits any illegal activities that benefit the company then it can be held liable for the acts of his employee. *Iridium India Telecom Ltd vs Motorola Inc, 2011[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)* – this case outlines the Apex Court decision concerning the liability of the companies and will be held responsible and punishable for the illegal activities committed by the person or organization during employment. **LEGAL PROVISIONS** A legal framework on IPC 1860 & Company Act, 2013 **Indian Penal Code, 1860 Provisions** - **Section 11[\[2\]](#_ftn2)** Defines “Person” which states that it “*includes any company or association or body of a person, whether incorporated or not making them liable for a criminal offense.”* - **Section 34[\[3\]](#_ftn3)** states that “*when a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone”* - **Section 120B[\[4\]](#_ftn4)** of the IPC deals with Punishment for Criminal conspiracy - *“Any persons or party committed a criminal conspiracy they shall be punishable with death, 1-year imprisonment or for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years* - Other **Sections 141 to 149[\[5\]](#_ftn5)** of the penal provisions deal concerning unlawful assembly, which can be used for applying companies as they engage themselves in illegal acts - According to the Companies Act, 2013 **Sec 447[\[6\]](#_ftn6)** deals with the Punishment for committing fraud- *“Any person who is found to be guilty of fraud shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to a fine which shall not be less than the amount involved in the fraud, but which may extend to three times the amount involved in the fraud”* **CASE STUDIES** **Nirav Modi and PNB Scam, Aug 2018 [\[7\]](#_ftn7)** Nirav Modi is an Indian business tycoon who owns the company Firestar Diamond International Pvt ltd. He involved himself in a fraud case where in the investigation was found and charged by the Indian government with criminal breach of trust and cheating, corruption, money laundering, and criminal conspiracy **IL & FS Insolvency case[\[8\]](#_ftn8)** In this case, specifically, due to its mismanagement, the company went into a bad state, and statutory auditors were held guilty of misconduct by ICAI **Sterlite Copper case 2018[\[9\]](#_ftn9)** Sterlite Copper is a subsidiary company owned by Vedanta Ltd it was been in a huge controversy and led to the shutdown of the company because of its pollution and environmental harm to nature. The court gives the verdict under Sec 120B, Sec 277, and 278 of Penal Code 1860 **Sahara chit-fund scam case** Sahara fraud case serves as a lesson in cheat and deception by involving in large-scale chit-fund fraud. The court applied Sec 120B which is Criminal conspiracy, 420 cheating under IPC with 447 Punishment for Fraud of the Companies Act, 2013. This case study provides a clear and comprehensive understanding of the illegal activities committed by the person or organization. **VARIOUS DOCTRINES** **Doctrine of Attribution:** According to this doctrine the intention of committing any crime or offense is attributed to those who are the directing mind and will of the companies. Men’s rea is attributed to the organizations based on the alter ego of the company *Iridium India Telecom Ltd vs Motorola Inc, 2011* the court stated that criminal liability would arise as soon as the offense is committed with means rea and the apex court resolved the position concerning criminal liability of entities or companies **The doctrine of Vicarious Liability:** This doctrine states that the officials of the corporations shall be held accountable and responsible for the acts of the company under their position. The master shall be responsible for the actions of his Agent in the course of employment. **Identification doctrine:** This is an English doctrine that enables to identification of the person whose actions and intentions can be considered or attributed to an entity’s decision. This doctrine helps one to understand the legal principles that are attributed to companies and officials in a different context, especially in cases that involve criminal liabilities **JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS** ***Chitra Rama Krishna & Ors vs SEBI 2023 [\[10\]](#_ftn10)*** The CBI court under this case held that the misuse of the NSE co-location facility, in which certain traders were given preferential access to trading data led to unfair advantage and financial irregularities the court applied sec 120B with 420 and 409 of IPC ***Bhartiya Kamgar Karmachari Mahasangh vs M/S. Jet Airways Ltd, 25 July 2023[\[11\]](#_ftn11)*** This case involves the charges of Sec 406 & 420 where the accusations of Jet Airways for financial mismanagement & funds diversion ***Amazon.Com Nv Investment Holdings LLC vs Future Retail Limited 2021[\[12\]](#_ftn12)*** Here in the case, the future retail was accused of misrepresentation while in its dealings with Amazon. Here the dispute arose due to the breach of contractual obligation and was charged under Sec 420, 120B of Indian Penal Code. **CORPORATE GOVERNANCE** Corporate governance plays a significant role in the prevention of corporate crimes. Companies that engage in CSR and environmental activities are likely to less engage in criminal cases. Ethical and transparency compliance programs are crucial in fostering a culture of integrity. There have been many amendments to the Companies Act, to ensure and strengthen corporate governance but strict penalties imposition on the companies could make them abide and show the government’s commitment to stop these corporate crimes. Looking further in the growing contemporary era, corporate criminal liability is likely be increase due to various factors like technology but that could help in preventing crimes. There should be implementation of programs to be conducted for the prevention of criminal acts. Thus, a corporate legal framework with strict laws could bind the companies to follow and abide by the norms of the nations and reduce criminal activities. **MEASURES TO ENHANCE COMPANIES’ CRIMINAL LIABILITY FRAMEWORK** **Encouraging Best Practices:** It encourages corporations to bring out the best practices in corporate governance making clear accountability and transparency **Ament Existing Laws:** Amending the existing laws or legislations could ensure the companies cannot evade their liability **Forster Ethical Culture:** Companies should come up with an ethical corporate culture by ensuring the employees get the benefits of training encouraging them to become whistleblowers and providing protection to them **Adopting Monitoring Systems:** Companies should include various policies and strict monitoring systems and work with the law enforcing authorities for clear communications **Leverage Technology:** The adoption of new technological advancements like AI and blockchains could help them in compliance efforts. **Supporting CSR Activities:** CSR activities by the companies not only help the companies gain a reputation but also reduce the risk of committing any criminal activities **CONCLUSION & COMMENT** Corporate criminal liability is vital for maintaining legal and ethical standards. Despite their role in economic development, companies must not be exempt from legal scrutiny. The Indian Penal Code 1860 and the Companies Act 2013 should enforce stricter laws to govern corporate crimes. The case studies and judicial precedents highlight the need for robust enforcement and adherence to legal standards. As corporate governance evolves, ethical practices and transparency will be key in reducing criminal activities. Continuous legal reforms and effective frameworks are essential to uphold justice and integrity in the corporate world. **REFERENCES** **Legislations** - Indian Penal Code 1860, s 11. - Indian Penal Code 1860, s 34. - Indian Penal Code 1860, s 120B. - Indian Penal Code 1860, s 141-149. - Companies Act 2013, s 447. **Cases referred** - Iridium India Telecom Ltd vs Motorola Inc, (2011)1 SCC 74 (India) - Chitra Rama Krishna & Ors vs SEB (CBI Court, 2023). - Bhartiya Kamgar Karmachari Mahasangh vs M/S. Jet Airways Ltd, (2023) (Bom HC,25 July 2023). - Com Nv Investment Holdings LLC vs Future Retail Limited (2022) (SC) **Others** - Who Is Nirav Modi? | PNB Scam Case | Nirav Modi Case” (*business-standard.com*) - Bar & Bench and Bar & Bench, “Explainer: The IL&FS Insolvency Case” (*Bar and Bench – Indian Legal News*, July 21, 2019) - Guest Post, “Corporate Criminal Liability in India – iPleaders” (*iPleaders*, October 28, 2019) - “Doctrine of Attribution in Corporate Criminal Liability” (*Lakshmi Kumaran & Sridharan Attorneys*) [https://www.lakshmisri.com/insights/articles/doctrine-of-attribution-in-corporate-criminal-liability/#](https://www.lakshmisri.com/insights/articles/doctrine-of-attribution-in-corporate-criminal-liability/) - Shrishti Chauhan, “Sterlite Copper Case (2018),” vol 4 (2022) [https://ijaem.net/issue\_dcp/Sterlite%20Copper%20Case%20(2018).pdf](https://ijaem.net/issue_dcp/Sterlite%20Copper%20Case%20(2018).pdf) [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Iridium India Telecom Ltd vs Motorola Inc, (2011)1 SCC 74 (India) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Indian Penal Code 1860, s 11. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Indian Penal Code 1860, s 34. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Indian Penal Code 1860, s 120B. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Indian Penal Code 1860, s 141-149. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Companies Act 2013, s 447. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) “Who Is Nirav Modi? | PNB Scam Case | Nirav Modi Case” (*www.business-standard.com*) . [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Bar & Bench and Bar & Bench, “Explainer: The IL&FS Insolvency Case” (*Bar and Bench – Indian Legal News*, July 21, 2019) . [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Shrishti Chauhan, “Sterlite Copper Case (2018),” vol 4 (2022) [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Chitra Rama Krishna & Ors vs SEB (CBI Court, 2023). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Bhartiya Kamgar Karmachari Mahasangh vs M/S. Jet Airways Ltd, (2023) (Bom HC,25 July 2023). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Amazon.Com Nv Investment Holdings LLC vs Future Retail Limited (2022) (SC) **Categories:** Articles, Company Law --- ### [Section 69 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita: Provisions And Cases](https://lawfoyer.in/section-69-of-bharatiya-nyaya-sanhita-provisions-and-cases/) **Published:** September 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Sara Sharma, University School of Law and Legal Studies** **Editor: Ritesh Singh Shekhawat, MJRP, Jaipur** **INTRODUCTION** Indian Law has always focused on protecting and promoting women’s rights from unscrupulous, exploitative, and deceitful practices or incidents that may harm their interests or hamper their mental, emotional, and physical well-being. The struggle for equality and equity between men and women has come far from the 1600s, where women were merely seen as tools of physical satisfaction by men; to women now having their own dreams and achievements; from their wings being cut down and shackled to the ground, to them soaring and flying and reaching new heights of advancements- the journey has come far. Such advancements have left women susceptible to new dangers, such as being taken advantage of with false pretenses of marriages for sexual intercourse; or sexual abuse through abuse of authoritative power in firms and organizations. Recognizing the dire situation and the need to protect women, laws have since been introduced to protect them from such situations, where their consent may be taken through deceit and their integrity and reputation may be at stake. **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** Section 69 of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita introduces the concept of sexual intercourse being a crime where consent is obtained by the accused misleadingly through beguiling the plaintiff through disingenuous promises of marriage. The section deals with the legal consequences arising out of such promises. The primary objective is to address situations where individuals make implicit or explicit commitments toward marriage but later repudiate and renege on these promises. The provision has been designed to safeguard individuals from emotional distress and ensure their well-being. The section applies to different situations, including but not limited to false marriage promises, promotional tricks, and secrets regarding identity. If the accused is proven to be guilty, then the individual shall be punished with prison years extending up to ten years and shall also have to pay a hefty fine. **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita was introduced in India on 1st July 2024 in which many new laws were introduced and many old ones were rephrased and modified, including Section 493 of the Indian Penal Code which has been changed into Section 69 of the BNS. The Indian Penal Code was inspired by the ideals of British morals and principles and was brought into existence in 1860. The purpose of the section was to protect women from any potential harm by way of deceit. It was to make sure that they had a legal safety net to fall back upon if they were ever taken advantage of by being misled into giving consent for sexual intercourse on the false pretense of marriage. Over various years, the Courts have time and time again highlighted the significance of the section with respect to women and their rights and protections. They emphasized safeguarding women from claims of false/fraudulent marriages. **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES:** The concept of marriage by deceit has existed in the laws and principles of various other countries including France, Canada, Australia, and Germany. **Status in India Regarding Sexual Intercourse By Deceit:** Indian Law considers sexual intercourse by deceit that does not amount to rape, a serious offense under Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. According to the guidelines, the accused may face up to 10 years of imprisonment along with a fine. It was first introduced under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 as Section 493 which stated that any man who by deceit causes any woman to have sexual intercourse with him by making her believe in a false legal marriage, whether through a live-in relationship or fake marriage, would be subjected to a maximum punishment of 10 years and may also be charged a fine. **Status in France regarding Sexual Intercourse By Deceit:** French Law considers sexual intercourse through deceit as Sexual Assault under Article 222-23 of the French Penal Code which state that sexual intercourse that is forced upon, or coerced into, or obtained by threat, is considered as rape. According to French law, rape is a punishable offense that is subjected to imprisonment for up to 15 years. **Status in Canada regarding Sexual Intercourse By Deceit:** Canadian Law considers sexual intercourse through deceit under the provisions of Sexual Assault under Section 265 of the Canadian Criminal Code, which talks about consent. According to the provision, consent is invalid if it is acquired by fraud. Therefore if consent is obtained through misleading the plaintiff such as lying about identity, making false promises regarding marriage, or involving an unstable power dynamic. In Canada, the case of **R v. Hutchinson (2014)** proves the seriousness of the subject of deceit undermining consent, wherein the accused convinced his partner to engage in sexual intercourse, provided he made use of a condom. Hutchinson agreed to do so but poked holes in the condom, following which the partner became pregnant. He was convicted by the court of aggregated sexual assault. **CAUSES / EFFECT RELATION WITH OTHER CONCEPTS** Previously handled under the Indian Penal Code, section 69 now focuses on providing a safety net to women against manipulation by perpetrators. It aims at the protection of victims against emotional distress and dilemmas caused by deceit and ensures their mental as well as physical well-being. It aims at bringing them to justice in this sense. The provision also reflects a recognition of the severity of the issue that is sexual intercourse by deceit due to false promises of marriage; and a deeper understanding of the same, witnessing that it has been differentiated from sexual assault and given a different category. It recognizes that society may be advancing towards a more critical mindset of Westernization wherein the societal norms are becoming accepting of sex before marriage, live-ins, and changes in relationship dynamics. However, the provision has also set off a chain reaction by critiques that raise valid points- it may highlight a negative stigma towards men, giving rise to gender biases towards men and may cause emotional distress. The critiques have raised various warnings that this section could have a chilling effect on consensual relationships and could make misunderstandings easily prone to becoming criminal charges. **False accusations** by women have been recognized as a critical issue in the past and the section seems to amplify this fear. There have been numerous cases in the past which highlight that women have purposefully trapped men into such cases for numerous reasons such as causing defamation, harm to mental well-being, and making them outcasts in society. The case of the **State of Uttar Pradesh Vs Nisha, 2018** showcases the same- the mother of a woman named Nisha filed a false complaint against 5-6 people wherein they kidnapped her and subjected her to repeated acts of sexual assault. She later took back her statement and was sentenced to four years in prison by the court. **FORMS / MODES OF SECTION 69 OF BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA: SEXUAL INTERCOURSE BY DECEIT** **Deception Regarding the Identity or Nature of the Act** - **Identity:** This involves the perpetrator misleading the complainant by deceiving the person about their identity (for example, portraying the image of being somebody else, or lying about anything that may prevent the other person from consenting towards sexual intercourse otherwise) and obtaining consent for sexual intercourse. - **Nature of Act:** The perpetrator may fool the complainant by misrepresenting or lying about the true nature of the act (for example the perpetrator may claim that the act is being done as a medical procedure) to obtain consent for sexual intercourse. **Deception through Statements** The perpetrator may make false promises or may make false statements on purpose that may normally impact the consent of the plaintiff. **Misuse of Power Dynamic** There are times when the perpetrator may exploit the victim by holding a higher authority over the individual to pressure and deceive the victim into consenting to the act. **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES OF SECTION 69 OF BHARTIYA NYAYA SANHITA** **Deception or Fraud** Section 69 of Bharitya Nyaya Sanhita clearly states that it is based upon the core condition that **consent** for sexual intercourse must be **obtained through deceit or fraud** which may include deceit by promises of marriage or by manipulation through abuse of power. The perpetrator may withhold information that would otherwise affect the consent of the victim towards the act. **Consent** Consent obtained by the perpetrator must be **voluntary** and **informed** to the victim. The consent is considered to be **invalid** if obtained through deceit. The consent of the victim is invalid if it is obtained by omission of any important information which may potentially affect the decision of the victim. **Criminal Intent** **Mens Rea (Guilty Mind**): If the perpetrator has an intention of misleading the victim to gain consent, then it indicates that the deceit was intentional and not accidental. **Nature of the Crime** The lies or omissions by the perpetrator must be substantial and must hold enough weight to play a significant part in the decision of the victim. **Defences of Section 69 of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita** **Absence of Deceit** The primary defense to section 69 of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita is to prove that there was no deceit or fraud involved. The accused may provide evidence to show that there was no intention to deceive the plaintiff by showcasing that the information provided was truthful and just. **Genuine Consent** The accused can defend themself by stating that the plaintiff was provided with complete, accurate, and true information and therefore gave voluntary consent for sexual intercourse. **Honest Mistake of Fact** The accused may attempt to prove that there may be a misunderstanding that may have occurred between the accused and the plaintiff that caused the plaintiff to provide voluntary consent based on the statements said. It may be proven that there might be an error in accurately depicting the meaning of the statements or beliefs depicted. **Exceptions to Defenses provided** **Burden of Proof of Deceit** The prosecution can provide evidence in court that the deceit that occurred is intentional to disprove or undermine the defenses relating to no deceit or informed consent. **Legal Interpretation of Consent** It is up to the Courts as to what constitutes valid consent. Courts may apply stringent standards as to what constitutes consent; therefore if the legal standards to voluntary standards are not met then the defense of Voluntary Consent by the defendant may not be taken into consideration. **Intentional Misrepresentation** The prosecution may prove that the deceit was deliberate and intended to misguide the other party into giving consent. This may undermine the defenses based on an honest mistake of fact. **Legal Provisions / Procedure / Specifications / Criteria of Section 69 of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita** **Definition of Deceit** Section 69 defines consent obtained through deceit for sexual intercourse. This definition includes deceit through intentional misrepresentation, manipulation of facts, and concealing of crucial information that may affect or determine the consent of the plaintiff. **Informed Consent** Consent provided by the party must be voluntary and not based on any misrepresented, concealed, or manipulated information; otherwise, it is considered to be invalid. **Conviction Punishment** The section specifies the punishment for the convicted- a term of a maximum of ten years, combined with a fine. **PROCEDURE UNDER SECTION 69 OF BHARTIYA NYAYA SANHITA** **Filing of complaint** The victim may file a complaint with the relevant authority, specifying the nature and impact of deceit and consent. **Investigation** The police are then addressed and directed towards looking into the matter and conducting an investigation to gather evidence. This includes interrogation of any potential witnesses, collecting forensic evidence, and examining crucial information. **Charges** The police may file charges under section 69 of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita based on the evidence collected; specifying the nature and act of the deceit and the consent. **Trial and Evidence** The case proceeds with a trial, where the prosecution and the defense are required to present their arguments. The prosecutor must prove that the deceit did occur and that it affected the consent of the victim. The defense must prove through evidence that there was no occurrence of deceit or that the consent was voluntary. **Judgement and Sentencing** The court then takes an appropriate binding decision based on the evidence provided by both parties. If the accused is found to be guilty then the court will impose the punishment/penalty as specified under Section 69. **SPECIFICATIONS/ CRITERIA OF SECTION 69** **Relevance of Deceit** The deceit must be considered significant enough to impact the decision of the plaintiff. Any minor or irrelevant misinterpretations may not be considered. **Intent (Mens Rea)** It must be proved that the accused had the intention to deceive the plaintiff and that it was not accidental. **Effect of Deceit** The deceit must have a visible impact on the victim’s consent. This demonstrates that the victim’s agreement to the act of sexual intercourse was affected by the deceit and the victim might have not consented had there been no deceit. **Evidence Requirements** The evidence provided must prove that the accused clearly engaged in deceitful practices. **Legal Application of Section** Legal Standards are applied to determine whether section 69 is appropriate according to the situation, arguments, or evidence presented. **INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 69 OF BHARTIYA NYAYA SANHITA** Section 69 of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita aims at criminalizing sexual intercourse obtained through deceit by misleading the plaintiff by twisting facts or concealing information that may be a crucial part of obtaining the consent of the plaintiff. It aims at the differentiation of voluntary consent from consent obtained by deceit. Deceit may be made through false promises of marriage; abuse of authoritative power; or voluntary misinterpretation of interpretation. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The initiative taken to pass such a provision and bring it to existence is proof that Indian thinking may be changing towards a more open-minded and futuristic approach, which is commendable. Moreover, it provides women with a sense of **mental peace** knowing that they have a **protective cover** over them to save them from such dire situations if they arise. It provides them with the confidence and stability that any wrongdoing whatsoever in this regard will not go unnoticed and they will be brought to justice. However, the provision may cause more harm than good due to alarms being raised over **gender bias**. Individuals may take advantage of the law to destroy an innocent person’s reputation and there may always exist a fear of being blackmailed. Therefore, it is important to bring reformations in Section 69 of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita to include **gender fairness**, as the law must treat everyone equally, regardless of gender. The possibility of **abuse of the act for personal gain** must be diminished, and a there must be **protection for consensual relationships**. **REFERENCES** **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/250883\_english\_01042024.pdf **Online Articles / Sources Referred** [https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/20062?view\_type=browse](https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/20062?view_type=browse) https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/tag/section-69-of-the-bharatiya-nyaya-sanhita-2023/ **Cases Referred** R v. Hutchinson (2014) State of Uttar Pradesh Vs Nisha, 2018 **Statutes Referred** Section 69 of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita Section 493 of Indian Penal Code Section 222-223 of French Penal Code Section 265 of the Canadian Criminal Code **Categories:** Articles, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Criminal Law --- ### [INTRODUCTION TO CYBERSECURITY LAWS OF INDIA: PROVISION, PROCEDURE & CASES](https://lawfoyer.in/introduction-to-cybersecurity-laws-of-india-provision-procedure-cases/) **Published:** September 6, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: KRUTTIKA KARALE, DES SHRI NAVALMAL FIRODIA LAW COLLEGE** **Edited By: Ritesh Singh Shekhawat, MJRPU, Jaipur** **INTRODUCTION** With the fast pacing and advancing technology, the usage of the internet is increasing rapidly and so is the rate of cybercrime. The rise of cybercrime, often known as e-crimes (electronic crimes), is a major challenge confronting today’s society and poses a threat to nations, companies, and individuals all across the world. As a result, the need for cyber laws is increasing to govern the new virtual world. The cyber laws aim to protect people from cybercrime like hacking, phishing, data breaches, etc. With such increasing cases of cybercrime, it has become necessary that each individual has the knowledge about the cyber security majors to protect themselves against such crimes. **KEYWORDS** Cybercrime, Cyberlaw, IT acts, Data protection, Hacking, BNS laws **MEANING DEFINITION AND EXPLANATION** **Cyber Crime:** Cybercrime is an illegal activity involving computers, the internet, or network devices. These crimes can target individuals, businesses, government, etc. Cybercriminals commit identity theft, initiate phishing scams, spread malware, and instigate other digital attacks like hacking. **Cyber Security:** Cyber security involves protecting computer systems, networks, and data from cyber-attacks. It aims to safeguard against unauthorized access, data breaches, and other cyber threats. **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION** - It all started in France in **1834** where the attackers accessed the **French telegraph system** and stole important financial market - In **1962**, **Allen Scherr** made a new history in cyber-crime by executing a cyber-attack on the - **MIT computer networks** by stealing passwords from their punch card - In **1971**, Bob Thomas created the first Computer Virus known as **The Creeper Virus**. It was a self-replicating program that spread through the ARPANET network. - In **1981**, **Ian Murphy** was the first person who was officially found guilty of committing a crime by hacking into AT&T’s internal system and changing the computer clocks which caused - The first major cyber-attack on the internet took place in **1988**, by Robert Morris with the help of **Morris Worm**. It infected computer systems at prestigious institutions, demonstrating the vulnerability of interconnected networks. - In the **1990s**, a significant increase in cybercrime was observed, and the infamous **Melissa virus** was a notable cyber incident during this period which infected over 100,000 computers from all over the world. - Further advancement in cybercriminal advancement was observed in the early **2000s** and cyber criminals started launching **denial-of-service (DDOS)** attacks and spamming **TYPES OF CYBERCRIME** **Hacking:** Without permission taking access to someone else’s computer systems or networks to steal or gain information or modify data. **Web Hijacking:** Web hacking means taking control of another person’s website, with the consent of the owner, and eventually the owner loses control. **Malware:** In malware, harmful software has been made to sneak around on someone else’s computer systems. This includes viruses, spyware, worms, etc. It can be used to gain bank details, sensitive business data, or information to conduct social engineering attacks. **Identity Theft:** To act like some other individual by Stealing their information such as their name, social security number, or financial details, for financial gain to commit fraud or crimes. **Cyber Stalking And Harassment:** Cyber Stalking means repeating the acts of harassing, threatening, or intimidating individuals by sending repeated or unwanted messages or distributing the personal information of the individual without the consent of the person by using the internet. Both kinds of Stalkers i.e., Online & Offline – have the desire to control the victim’s life. **Online Scams And Fraud:** Many Fraudulent schemes were conducted over the internet time such as investment scams, scams of lottery, fee fraud of advance rupees, fake websites, romance scams, credit card frauds, etc. to take money or valuable information. **Data Breaches:** People get the information without the permission of the owner of the website and get access to sensitive data stored by the person or institution such as personal information, financial records, or corporate secrets, resulting in the exposure of personal or financial information. **Phishing:** Phishing is the sending of fraudulent messages that appear as real entities in emails and messages. That email directs the user to visit that website where they have to update certain sensitive information such as passwords, credit card numbers, or social security numbers which will be used for identity theft. **Child Pornography:** The usage of the Internet for Child exploitation became a common practice. Child pornography and engaging minors in sexual activities and provided on the internet on various platforms. **PREVENTIVE MEASURES FOR CYBERCRIME** **Use Encryption:** In this method, the plain text (readable) can be converted to cipher text (coded language) by this method and the recipient of the data can decrypt it by converting it into plain text again by using the private key. **Search using a Firewall:** It creates a wall between the system and possible intruders to protect the classified documents from being leaked or accessed. It only permits access to the system to ones already registered with the computer. - Keep software and operating system - Use any anti-virus software and keep it updated from time to - Use strong - Never open attachments in spam - Do not click on links in spam mail or untrusted - Be mindful of which website URLs you - Keep an eye on bank **CYBER LAWS OF INDIA** **Legal Provisions** The Information Technology Act, of 2000 is the most significant; as it directs all Indian legislation to strictly regulate cybercrime: - **Section 43** *\[Penalty and compensation\] for damage to the computer, computer system, etc.–If any person without the permission of the owner or any other person who is in charge of a computer, computer system, or computer* - **Section 66** *Computer-related offenses – If any person, dishonestly or fraudulently, does any act referred to in section 43, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with a fine which may extend to five lakh rupees or with* - **Section 66(B)** *Punishment for dishonestly receiving stolen computer resource or communication device – Whoever dishonestly receives or retains any stolen computer resource or communication device knowing or having reason to believe the same to be stolen computer resource or communication device, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years or with fine which may extend to rupees one lakh or with both.* - **Section 66C** *Punishment for identity theft– Whoever, fraudulently or dishonestly makes use of the electronic signature, password, or any other unique identification feature of any other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to rupees one lakh.* - **Section 66D** *Punishment for cheating by personation by using computer resource-Whoever, by means of any communication device or computer resource cheats by personation, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to one lakh rupees*. - **Section 66E** *Privacy violation Whoever, intentionally or knowingly captures, publishes, or transmits the image of a private area of any person without his or her consent, under circumstances violating the privacy of that person, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years or with fine not exceeding two lakh rupees, or with* - **Section 66F** *Cyber terrorism – Intent to threaten the unity, integrity, security, or sovereignty of the nation and contradicting access to any person’s lawful access to the computer resource or attempting to breach or access a computer resource without endorsement. Such acts of causing compute contaminants that are likely to cause death or harm to other persons. Punishment is life* - **Section 67** *Whoever publishes or transmits or causes to be published or transmitted in the electronic form, any material which is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest or if its effect is such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it, shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and with fine which may extend to five lakh rupees and in the event of second or subsequent conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years and also with fine which may extend to ten lakh rupees.* - **The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023** also punishes the acts of identity theft and cyber The sections under BNS are as follows: - **Section 335** Making a false document or false electronic record. - **Section 336(2)** Punishment for - **Section 336(3)** Forgery (electronic record) for the purpose of cheating. - **Section 336(4)** Forgery (of an electronic record) for the purpose of harming - **Section 340(2)** Forged document or electronic **LEGAL CASES** **Avnish Balaji vs State (N.C.T) of Delhi, 2004:** The Bazee.com case. The chief executive of Bazee.com was arrested because a CD with offensive material was sold on his website. It was also sold in the markets of Delhi. The Mumbai and the Delhi Police took action against it. The accused was charged under section 67 of the IT Act, and section 292 of the IPC, but later he was released on bail. This gave rise to a query about the difference between Internet Service Providers and Content Providers. The burden was on the accused, he was the Service Provider and not the Content Provider. It also advances a lot of issues regarding how the police should handle cybercrime cases. **Shreya Singhal vs Union of India [\[1\]](https://lawfoyer.in/cyber-crime-meaning-history-types-security-measures-and-important-cases/#_ftn1)** In this case, the validity of section 66A of the Information Technology Act was challenged before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that section 66A of the Information Technology Act is unconstitutional and violates article 19(1)(a) of the Indian constitution and the court upheld the importance of freedom of speech and expression. It also held the need for clearly defined laws to prevent misuse and guarantee the protection of citizen’s rights in the digital era. This judgment set a significant precedent for online freedom of expression in India. **Shreekanth C. Nair against Licensee/ Developer \[3\]** In this case, the problem involved an ASCL student who came across a website called ‘[www.incometaxpune.com,’](http://www.incometaxpune.com/) which redirected him to a pornographic site. Therefore, the plaintiff requested a court injunction to prevent access to the offensive site and that the site was clearly pornographic and should be closed down in the public’s best interest. This site was also violating section 67 of the IT Act. The court ruled that websites with inappropriate content should be banned. This ruling indicates that the court aims to ensure the safety of the internet for all users, particularly in regard to dangerous material. The owner was also instructed to monitor their website content and linked pages. This situation is significant as it demonstrates the role of laws in safeguarding individuals on the Internet. **PROCEDURE** **Procedure for filing cybercrime complaint: offline cyber-crime cell** The victim of a cybercrime can file a written complaint in the nearest cybercrime cell or in any cybercrime cell established in India. The written complaint shall be addressed to the Head of the Cybercrime Cell and shall be accompanied by the following information about the victim or person registering the complaint: - Name - Contact details - Mailing address Other documents which are required to be attached to the complaint depend upon the type of cybercrime committed against the victim. It is necessary to attach these documents with the offline as well as with the online complaint. **PROCEDURE FOR FILING CYBERCRIME COMPLAINT ONLINE:NATIONAL CYBERCRIME REPORTING PORTAL** Cybercrime complaints can be registered on the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal[ ](https://cybercrime.gov.in/)which is the initiative of the Government of India to facilitate nationwide cybercrime complaints and to make it feasible for the victims/complainants to have access to the cybercrime cells and to all the information related to cybercrimes at their fingertips. It deals with all types of cybercrimes. There are two types of complaints that can be registered on the portal: **Report Crime related to Women or Children** - Child Pornography (CP) - Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM)- Material containing sexually explicit images (in any form) of a child who is abused or exploited - Sexually explicit content (such as Rape/Gang rape) **Report Other Cybercrimes** - Mobile crimes - Social Media crimes - Online financial fraud - Cyber trafficking - Ransomware - Hacking **CONCLUSION** Cybercrimes exist in almost all countries, and the respective governments are taking measures to safeguard against cybercrimes. There has been a rapid increase seen since 2020, due to the Covid-19 pandemic, everyone from children to elders all started using the internet almost daily and got connected with this digital world. And there has been a rapid rise in cybercrimes during this period. The issues like cyberbullying, defamation, cyber fraud, etc., have become the most common crimes nowadays. The reason that these cybercrimes take place is because of the easy access of the devices, and sometimes the negligence of the users. In India, many people are not aware of such crimes, and when they are hacked, they suffer huge losses and don’t even know how it happened. So first it’s very important to be aware of such crimes and their rights in digital space. The Indian government has taken various measures and initiatives to prevent such cybercrimes and made it easy for citizens to report such crimes with the help of E-portals which can be easily accessed sitting at home. The government is also making sure that the victims are compensated or provided justice. **REFERENCES** - / - - [https://lawfoyer.in/cyber-crime-meaning-history-types-security-measures-and-important-](https://lawfoyer.in/cyber-crime-meaning-history-types-security-measures-and-important-cases/) [cases/](https://lawfoyer.in/cyber-crime-meaning-history-types-security-measures-and-important-cases/) - - - #### Cases Referred - Avnish Balaji vs State (N.C.T) of Delhi, 2004: - Shreya Singhal vs Union of India \[1\] - Shreekanth Nair against Licensee/ Developer \[3\] #### Statutes Referred - The Information Technology Act, 2000 - The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 **Categories:** Articles, IT Law & Cyber Law --- ### [Remedies Against Climate Change Under Indian Environmental Law: Provisions, Principles, Cases and Procedure](https://lawfoyer.in/remedies-against-climate-change-under-indian-environmental-law-provisions-principles-cases-and-procedure/) **Published:** September 6, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Bhavya Rathore, UFYLC, Jaipur, Rajasthan** **Edited By: Gyanu Patel, Amity University Lucknow, U.P.** **INTRODUCTION** *“We are the first generation to feel the sting of climate change, and we are the last generation that can do something about it.”* *– Jay Inslee* Is Climate Change happening? It’s funny people are still arguing about that. For they can’t see the melting glaciers, the rising sea levels, the [marine heatwaves](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marine_heatwave), the [ocean stratification](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ocean_stratification) , the extinction of the species that we hold dear. For they have turned blind eye to the greatest existential threat that humans will ever encounter before they are wiped out from the face of the earth. Are humans doing something about it? Or maybe rephrase that: Are humans seeing this as a mere earthly phenomenon or as a catastrophic event whose prevention is the need of the hour. Well, that’s up for debate. To put this in perspective if the Earth was formed at midnight modern humans have been around since 11:59:59pm—1 second. If the 4.5 billion of the existence of the Earth is to be seen in the form of a 24-hr clock, then human came into the picture for just 1 second and in that 1 second humans were able to destroy the Earth like never before. If this is not concerning that what might be included in the definition of the word ‘concern’. Again, Climate change is often misunderstood as being about changes in the weather. In reality, it is more than just heat waves or irregular weather (that the generations are now experiencing or rather has experienced for a good number of years, but is yet acknowledge). It causes a significant change in the way we live our life. What is more frustrating is that as human beings, we are vulnerable to confusing the unprecedented with the improbable. In our everyday experience, if something has never happened before, we feel safe in assuming it is not going to happen in the future, but the exceptions might be disastrous, and one of those exceptions is climate change.” And as beautifully said by ***Frances Beinecke: “***I have long understood that climate change is not only an environmental issue – it is a humanitarian, economic, health, and justice issue as well.” ***Keywords*:** *Climate Change. Environmental Laws. National Green Tribunal. Art, UNFCCC, IPCC.* **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** *“Climate change means a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.”[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)* This is how the UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE define the term Climate Change. Another major convention the UNFCCC[\[2\]](#_ftn2) defines it as: *“Climate change refers to a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g., by using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer. Climate change may be due to natural internal processes or external forcings such as modulations of the solar cycles, volcanic eruptions and persistent anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmosphere or in land use.”* To put it in simpler terms Climate change is a significant variation of average weather conditions, over several decades or more. It is for a longer-term and is used for a much wider context that differentiates it from natural weather variability. **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** 1. UK Climate Change Act is the perfect example. It has raised awareness and strengthened evidence-based policy-making. Other countries, for instance Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, and Sweden, have drawn inspiration from the UK’s approach. 2. New Zealand’s Climate Change Response (Zero Carbon) Amendment Act, 2019: It sets a target to reduce all GHGs net emissions to zero by 2050 3. Germany’s (2019) Climate Action Law sets a target for climate neutrality by 2050, sets sector-specific targets, and sets up an expert, independent climate commission to provide guidance. 4. France’s (2019) Law on Energy and Climate: That France’s (2019) Law on Energy and Climate sets a target of climate neutrality by 2050, while establishing an independent High Council on Climate tasked for advice and recommendations to the Government of France. 5. The list is endless majority of the countries of the world has taken a step though small towards the mitigation of the adverse effects of climate change. Compare it to India: there is no single law that is particularly concerned about climate change. Sure, we do have Environment Protection act among others but it is also important to note that environment and climate are the 2 sides of the same coin. (M.K. Ranjitsinh & Ors. v. UOI & Ors.) **LEGAL PROVISIONS** Since it clear that there is no umbrella legislation for Climate change, here are the separate laws and bodies that deal with environmental and ecological. - The Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972*:*[\[3\]](#_ftn3) This act provides provisions for the protection of the wild animals, birds, and plants to ensure the country’s ecological and environmental security. - The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974:[***\[4\]***](#_ftn4) This act provides provisions for the accommodation of the control of water contamination and reestablishing of healthiness of water for the avoidance and control of water contamination. - The Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981:[***\[5\]***](#_ftn5) This act provides provisions for the accommodation of the counteraction, control and decrease of air contamination. - The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986: [***\[6\]***](#_ftn6) This act provides provisions for the accommodation of the security and improvement of climate and related issues. It was enacted to achieve the 1972- Stockholm declaration. - The Energy Conservation Act, 2001:[***\[7\]***](#_ftn7) ” This act provides provisions for effective utilization and preservation of energy. - Biological Diversity Act 2002:[\[8\]](#_ftn8) This act provides provisions for the protection of natural variety, fair and impartial sharing of the advantages emerging out of the utilization of organic assets, information. It was implemented to give effect to CBD (Convention on Biological Diversity), Nagoya Protocol. - The National Green Tribunal Act, 2010:[***\[9\]***](#_ftn9) This act provides provisions for the foundation of a Public Green Council for the successful and quick removal of cases connecting with ecological insurance. It was laid out in simultaneousness with Rio Culmination 1992 - NGT manages the civil cases under the 7 acts: - Water (Prevention And Control Of Pollution) Act, 1974 - Water (Prevention And Control Of Pollution) Cess Act, 1974 - Air (Prevention And Control Of Pollution) Act, 1977 - Forest Conservation Act, 1980 - Environmental Protection Act, 1986 - Public Liability Insurance Act 1991 - Biological Diversity Act, 2002 - These are what included in the environment laws in India however none of the above mentioned ‘laws’ subsumes climate change and its impact extensively and there exist no law or a body that focuses and addresses climate change solely. **REMEDIES** - **Constitutional** - imposes a duty on the State for the Protection and improvement of environment and safeguarding of forests and wild life. - 51A(g)imposes duty on the citizens of India for the Protection and improvement of environment and safeguarding of forests and wild life. - **National Green Tribunal** - Sec 22 of NGT Act 2010: Appeal to Supreme Court within 90 days by any person aggrieved by any award, decision or order of the Tribunal **PROCEDURE** - The National Green Tribunal provides an expeditious and effective remedy for environmental matters. - The Right to Information Act enables citizens to access information on environmental issues from public authorities. - Public Interest Litigation allows individuals and organizations to file cases for environmental protection in the public interest. **REGULATIONS** **NAPCCC:** The National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) was released by the Prime Minister on 30th June 2008. It plans out a centralised strategy to enable the country to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change and enhance the sustainability of ecology. This includes 8 National Missions focussed on promoting the critical understanding of climate change, adaptation and mitigation, energy efficiency and natural resource conservation. For example: National Solar Mission and National Water Mission **CASE LAWS** - In a very recent judgement of **K. Ranjitsinh & Ors. v. UOI & Ors.**[\[10\]](#_ftn10) The Supreme Court recognised a new fundamental right, i.e., right against effects of climate change which empowers the citizens of the nation against climate change impacts as well as puts an equal obligation on the state to protect this very right of the citizens. The relevant lines of the judgment are as under- *“Despite a plethora of decisions on the right to a clean environment, some decisions which recognise climate change as a serious threat, and national policies which seek to combat climate change, it is yet to be articulated that the people have a right against the adverse effects of climate change. This is perhaps because this right and the right to a clean environment are two sides of the same coin. As the havoc caused by climate change increases year by year, it becomes necessary to articulate this as a distinct right. It is recognised by Articles 14 and 21*.” *“Despite governmental policy and rules and regulations recognising the adverse effects of climate change and seeking to combat it, there is no single or umbrella legislation in India which relates to climate change and the attendant concerns.”* - In the cases of **Ridhima Pandey v. UOI**[\[11\]](#_ftn11), Gaurav Kumar Bansal. v. Union of India & Ors.[\[12\]](#_ftn12), the petitioners highlighted that the current pace of climate change laws is not sufficient and the ill implementation of existing policies posed a major threat. - In **C Mehta v. Union of India**[\[13\]](#_ftn13), the Supreme Court ordered the closure of polluting industries and imposed fines for environmental damages. - In **Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum v. Union of India**[\[14\]](#_ftn14), the Court recognized the two essential principles of precautionary principle and polluter pays as an essential part of Indian environmental jurisprudence. - In **Intellectual Forum, Tirupathi v. State of A.P**[\[15\]](#_ftn15)., the Court held that the state has a duty to protect natural environment and resources for present and future times. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** Considering all the facts and provisions it would not be a lie to say that India still has some things to do off of its check list, and to make the place liveable for the future generation. But as they say it is better to have some than none, India has undeniably taken numerous step in the past to address the elephant in the room. All the rights, duties, and legal provision has ideef made an impact in the right direction. **REFERENCES** - **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** - Agarwal A., & Narain S. (2019). Global warming in an unequal world: A case of environmental colonialism. - **Online Articles / Sources Referred** - “Glossary — Global Warming of 1.5 oC” (Global Warming of 1.5 oC) accessed August 1, 2024 - accessed August 1, 2024 - “Climate Change” - **Cases Referred** - K. Ranjitsinh & Ors. v. UOI & ors 2024 INSC 280 - Ridhima Pandey v. UOI (OA NO. 187/ 2017) - Gaurav Kumar Bansal. v. Union of India & Ors OA No. 498 of 2014 - C Mehta v. Union of India 1987 AIR 1086 - Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum v. Union of India AIR 1996 SUPREME COURT 2715 - Intellectual Forum, Tirupathi v. State of A.P AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1350 - **Statutes Referred** - Constitution of India National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 - Environment (Protection Act), 1986 - Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 - Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 - Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 - Energy Conservation Act, 2001 - Biological Diversity Act 2002 - Forest Conservation Act, 1980 [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) “Glossary — Global Warming of 1.5 oC” (*Global Warming of 1.5 oC*) accessed August 1, 2024 [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) accessed August 1, 2024 [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) [a1972-53.pdf (indiacode.nic.in)](https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/1726/1/a1972-53.pdf) [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) [water\_act\_1974.pdf (indiacode.nic.in)](https://www.indiacode.nic.in/indiacode/bitstream/123456789/19018/1/water_act_1974.pdf) [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) [air\_act-1981.pdf (indiacode.nic.in)](https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/7781/1/air_act-1981.pdf) [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) [ep\_act\_1986.pdf (indiacode.nic.in)](https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/4316/1/ep_act_1986.pdf) [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) [AS PASSED BY LOK SABHA (powermin.gov.in)](https://powermin.gov.in/sites/default/files/uploads/ecact2001.pdf) [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) [Act & Rules.p65 (nbaindia.org)](http://www.nbaindia.org/uploaded/act/BDACT_ENG.pdf) [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) [AA2010\_\_19green.pdf (indiacode.nic.in)](https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/2025/1/AA2010__19green.pdf) [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) 2024 INSC 280 [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) (OA NO. 187/ 2017) [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) OA No. 498 of 2014 [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) 1987 AIR 1086 [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) AIR 1996 SUPREME COURT 2715 [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 1350 **Categories:** Articles, Environmental Law --- ### [Constitutionality of Section 303 IPC & Capital punishment](https://lawfoyer.in/constitutionality-of-section-303-ipc-capital-punishment-2/) **Published:** September 6, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Ishan Mishra, K.R. Mangalam University** **Edited By: Gyanu Patel, Amity University Lucknow (UP)** **INTRODUCTION** A person accused of any crime until & unless convicted just like the other citizens has the complete right to live with dignity as is enshrined & provided by the Constitution of India. The expression “Capital Punishment” is the most extreme type of punishment. The constitutional validity of section 303 of the former Indian Penal Code of 1860 which states the provision or mandates the death penalty for certain offences being committed by a person already serving a death sentence has undeniably been a subject of significant ethical & legal debate in India. Don’t such provisions raise some critical questions about the principle of justice, human rights, & the state’s role in administering such capital punishment? However, some of the maxims like “**actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea”**, **“culpae poene par esto”, and “dura lex sed lex”** which relates to “an act doesn’t make one guilty unless the mind is also legally blameworthy”, “the punishment should be proportionate to the crime” & “the law is harsh, but it is the law” respectively. The other term or way to address Section 303 can be called capital punishment, the context of which in itself is often viewed as a controversial or divisive issue. However, it is argued that it serves as a deterrent against some of the heinous crimes such as rape & murder & delivers justice for the victims & society. But on the converse, it is contended as an irreversible & and inhumane punishment which doesn’t effectively deter crime & disproportionally affects marginalized communities. Section 303 of the Indian Penal Code’s constitutionality has been challenged on many grounds, inclusive of its compatibility with the fundamental rights as enshrined in the Constitution of India, particularly the right to equality & right to life that is article 14 & 21 of the constitution respectively. The Supreme Court of India, however, have addressed these concerns & emphasised the need for a comprehensive evaluation of the implications of the death penalty within the framework of such constitutional rights. ***Keywords:*** *Section 303 IPC, Constitutionality, Capital Punishment, Death penalty, Human rights, justice, Deterrent effect, Fundamental rights, Right to equality, Right to life* **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** The meaning & or the definition of Section 303 of the former Indian Penal Code is something that pertains to the punishment for a person who has committed an offence of “Murder” while already serving a life sentence. This section states that if a person who is sentenced to life imprisonment commits an offence of murder, then they shall be punished with a death sentence also known as Capital Punishment. In the legal context, its explanation goes like “A section that was introduced to deter prisoners already serving life sentences from committing further crimes like murder particularly. The rationale is to maintain order within prisons & protect society from repeat offenders. However, the constitutionality of this section (303) has been subject to certain challenges primarily on the grounds of: **Article 14(Right to Equality/Everyone’s equal before the law)** & **Article 21(Right to life & personal liberty)** However, the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of section 303 IPC, further emphasizing that the legislature has the authority to prescribe different punishments for different categories of crimes & offenders. Whereas “Capital Punishment” can or may be defined/explained as a state-sanctioned execution of a person as a punishment for a crime, typically for serious offences such as those relating to murder or terrorism. **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The draft of the IPC was prepared by Thomas Macaulay & was enacted in the year 1860 during British colonial rule. It aimed to provide a comprehensive legal framework for the criminal law in India. Section 303 was included as a means to address the specific issue of repeating offenders, particularly those who were murdered while serving a life sentence already. The rationale behind section 303 was introduced as a means to deter the prisoners from committing further serious crimes and murder especially while one was incarcerated. It was a reflection of the British legal system’s approach to maintaining order & discipline within the prisons. “In all parts of the world death punishment was in presence from the most -old circumstances”. **Capital Punishment’s** history in India can be divided into 2 parts: **Pre-Independence:** The evolution or the inception of the death penalty (capital punishment) can be traced back to the 18th century B.C.E. in the code of King Hammurabi of Babylon, wherein the death penalty was codified for different types of crimes. The ancient texts like the Arthashastra written by Kautilya also outlined various offences & corresponding punishments, inclusive of death. Also during the medieval period, under the dynasties & empires like that of the Mughals, capital punishment was still prevalent. It was used as a common tool for maintaining law & order & as a deterrent against rebellion & crimes. **Post-Independence:** India gained independence in the year 1947 & the constitutional framework of Article 14 & Article 21 which state equality before the law & right to life & personal liberty respectively retained however, these rights aren’t absolute rights & capital punishment is still permissible by the procedure established by law. The Judiciary has since then upheld the constitutional validity of the death penalty through several landmark cases, further assisting that it can be imposed in the “rarest of the rare cases”. The Judicial pronouncements were made through the following cases: **“Bachan Singh Vs.** **State of Punjab” (1980)** This landmark judgement by the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the death penalty & had laid down the “rarest of the rare” doctrine for its application. **“Macchi Singh Vs. State of Punjab” (1983)** This case kept in mind the end goal to further illustrate the rarest of the uncommon cases that the circumstances where the use of the death sentence could be legitimized. **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** **Country** **Status of Capital Punishment** **Key Features** **Comparison to Section 303 I.P.C** **United States of America** It is legal in many states here. Some of the states have abolished it, while it is still rigorously enforced by other states. Similarly, it allows for the death penalty for serious crimes, but it lacks a specific provision for the repeating offenders. **United Kingdom** In the United Kingdom Capital Punishment did get abolished in the year 1965. It was abolished for murder, with no return to it since The United Kingdom, unlike section 303 does not have any provision for capital punishment. **Japan** It is legal but is rarely used. The death penalty does exist, with the executions carried out in secrecy. Similar to that of the United States of America. **China** It is widely used. Thousands are annually executed, for a range of crimes inclusive of non-violative offences. The application is more extensive for capital punishment as compared to India’s focused approach. **Saudi Arabia** It is legal & frequently applied. Public executions are used for a range of offences inclusive of theft & drug trafficking. It is more expansive in scope than in comparison to section 303, applied to various crimes beyond that of murder. **Germany** Had abolished it in the year 1951. It was strongly opposed as it was violative of the Human Right. It wasn’t equivalent to section 303 since capital punishment was completely abolished. **India** It is legal but with certain restrictions. Here the death penalty is reserved for the “rarest of the rare cases”, and specific criteria are added for life sentencing offenders. In comparison to other nations, it has a unique focus on repeating offenders. **CAUSES / EFFECT RELATION WITH OTHER CONCEPTS** **Deterrence Theory** **Cause:** Inclusive of section 303, the rationale behind capital punishment is often rooted in the belief that such severe penalties deter crime. **Effect:** The deterrence theory influences public policy & judicial decisions, as some lawmakers may argue that such harsher punishments prevent future offences, particularly among those repeating offenders. **Human Rights** **Cause:** Significant human rights concerns have been raised through the imposition of capital punishment, particularly regarding the right to life & right to fair trial. **Effect:** Human Rights Advocacy has led to calls for the abolition of the death penalty in many countries further influencing legal reforms & public opinion. **Rehabilitation Vs. Retribution** **Cause:** This debate between rehabilitation & retribution is quite central to discussions about capital punishment & section 303 of the I.P.C. **Effect:** Countries that prioritize rehabilitation tend to abolish capital punishment, while those emphasizing retributive justice may retain it, influencing their legal systems & correctional policies. **Judicial Discretion** **Cause:** Section 303 application & capital punishment often involve such judicial discretion, where judges assess the circumstances of the crime & the background of the offender. **Effect:** Such discretion can also lead to some inconsistencies in sentencing & or raise concerns about equality before the law & potential biases in the judicial process. **Public Opinion** **Cause:** Societal attitudes towards crime & punishment are influenced significantly by the acceptance or rejection of capital punishment. **Effect:** Legislative changes may be swayed by such public opinion, which will lead to either the abolition or the reinforcement of the capital punishment laws, including provisions like that of section 303. **International law & treaties** **Cause:** The International Human Rights treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights do advocate for the abolition of the death penalty. **Effect:** The countries which are signatories may feel pressured to reform their laws regarding capital punishment, also affecting how laws like section 303 are viewed & implemented. **Types / Kinds** Capital punishment can of certain types such as: - **Mandatory death penalty:** In certain jurisdictions, the death penalty is automatically imposed for certain specific crimes, with no discretion for judges. - **Discretionary death penalty:** There are many jurisdictions where the judges have the discretion to impose the death penalty based on the case specifics. - **Execution methods:** Various methods of execution are employed by different countries, which include hanging, lethal injection, and electrocution. **FORMS / MODES** **Forms of section 303 can be:** **Statutory form:** Section 303 in the I.P.C. is a specific legal provision which prescribes the death penalty for a murder committed by any person serving a life sentence. **Judicial interpretation:** Section 303 has been interpreted by the court in various cases, which leads to different applications based on judicial discretion. **MODES OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT ARE** **Legal framework:** Capital punishments are operated within a legal framework which outlines the crimes punishable by death & the procedures for trials & sentencing. **Execution Methods:** Various methods are used to carry out capital punishment, which can include: - **Hanging:** This is traditionally used by India, along with other countries. - **Lethal Injection:** It is a common method adopted by the United States which involves a series of drugs administered to cause deaths. - **Electrocution:** It is an alternative to lethal injection which is used in many jurisdictions. **Procedural Modes:** It is defined as a process which leads to capital punishment & includes: **Trial Process:** It is the legal proceeding which determines the guilt & or the eligibility for the death penalty. **Sentencing Phase:** It is a separate phase in some jurisdictions where the judge decides on the death penalty. **Appeals Process:** The opportunities for the convicted person to appeal the sentence, can prolong the execution process. **ESSENTIALS / ELEMENTS / PRE-REQUISITES** **Essential & elements of section 303 are:** - **Existence of a life sentence:** The offender must be serving a life sentence for a previous conviction. It establishes the context under which the section applies. - **Commission of Murder:** The committed act must qualify as murder under the IPC. Intentional killing is also included in the definition of murder, which needs to be proven in court. - **Intent & Malice:** The offender must have the intention to kill or cause such bodily injury which is likely to cause death. **Pre-requisites for section 303 are** - **Previous Conviction:** There should be a record of a previous conviction which led to a life sentence. - **Sufficient evidence:** Due process must be followed & there should be adequate evidence to support the charge of murder. **Essentials & elements of Capital Punishment:** - It must be established by law, specifying the crimes punishable by death. - The crime should be classified as a Capital offence, typically involving severe harm or a threat to society. - The legal process must adhere to principles of due process, inclusive of fair trial rights. - There are many jurisdictions, where a separate sentencing phase determines whether or not the death penalty will be applied. **The prerequisites of capital punishment are:** - The individual must have been convicted of a crime qualifying for the death penalty under the applicable law. - The individuals should have the opportunity for appeals & legal challenges relating to the death sentences. - The death penalty sentences are often reviewed by the Higher Courts to ensure the legality & appropriateness of the sentence. **DEFENCES / EXCEPTIONS / EXCEPTIONS TO DEFENCES** - It can be argued by the accused that they didn’t have any intention to kill or cause such an injury that is likely to cause death. - The defence of self-defence or insanity can also be claimed by the accused if the act was done in that manner. **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** The certain legal provision & or the specification that is related to Section 303 is the definition of murder as it is provided in Section 299-300 of the Indian Penal Code & now Section 100 & 101 of the Bharatiya Nyay Sanhita, specifying what constitutes murder & how it is distinguished from culpable homicide & the legal provision & or the specification for that of the capital punishment are in the context of article 21 of the Constitution of India which has the implications for the capital punishments imposition, along with section 368 of the Cr.PC that gives the power to High Courts for the trials inclusive of capital punishment. **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT** In **Bachan Singh Vs. State of Punjab** the Supreme Court had held up the constitutional validity of section 303 of the IPC further stating that it is not violative of article 21 of the Constitution of India if it is being applied legally. It was in this case that the court had established the principle that in the “rarest of the rare cases” only such death penalty shall be imposed or applied. This judgement also provided the judges with some guidelines to consider when deciding whether the death penalty needs to be imposed, including the circumstances of the crime, the character of the criminal & the impact it has on society. Simultaneously in **Macchi Singh Vs. The state of Punjab** again the validity of section 303 was upheld by the Supreme Court which provides for the death penalty for a convicted person in case of a murder if they had been convicted for the same previously. This judgement reiterated the “rarest of the rare cases” doctrine which was established in the case of Bacchan Singh. **INTERPRETATIONS / EXPLANATIONS** The interpretation of context can be that section 303 of the IPC provides a framework for the imposition of the death penalty on habitual offenders, but the application of which is a subject of judicial scrutiny, human rights considerations, public sentiments & the principles of justice. **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - **Rarest of the rare case doctrine:** This doctrine was established in the case of Bachchan Singh which stipulates that the death penalty being imposed should only be in the rarest of the rare cases which means that the case is so heinous that it shakes the collective consciousness of the society. - **Retributive Justice theory:** This theory deals with the ‘righting of the balance’. If a criminal has done a wrong towards a person or property they need to be given a penalty in a manner which balances out the wrong done. E.g.- If a person has committed a murder, he can be delivered capital punishment to balance out the suffering caused to the victim & their family. - **Deterrence Theory:** It serves as a major tool in maintaining the general law & order in society. Criminal acts are penalized to deter individuals from repeating them or even entering into them in the first place. **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** The applicable maxim to the concept of Death Penalty is **“*Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea*”** which translates to “an act doesn’t make one guilty unless the mind is also legally blameworthy”. **FUTURE IMPLICATIONS** - The current debates about the effectiveness of the death penalty may lead to some amendments in section 303 or may even result in its repeal. - Advocating for the abolishment of capital punishment globally may create pressure on India to reconsider its stance on such death penalty. - As the awareness of the public of criminal justice issues grows, societal attitudes towards capital punishment can shift potentially. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** To conclude though this section of capital punishment is somewhere being violative of the fundamental rights such as articles 14,19,20,21,22 that are enshrined & provided to every citizen of India through the Constitution of this very country. It can be an unending debate whether capital punishment should completely be abolished or should be used depending on the case if it falls in the category of heinous offences such as those murder, rape, terrorism or treason. In the end and as a personal opinion, it should be used depending on the case because if the person committing an offence of the same nature after the conviction for the same is indicative of the level of hatred one could possess, such hardcore criminals who in major cases have no shame for their act should be punished accordingly in such a manner so that such repeat offenders have some amount of shame & fear of their lives & that of the applicable law to set a precedent for the society. Lastly, it would be a suggestion that resources & efforts should be somewhat towards redirecting the crime prevention & rehabilitation of offenders. **REFERENCES** - **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** - Indian journal of criminal law - My 12th class legal studies book - **Online Articles / Sources Referred** - - [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/361025100\_A\_Study\_of\_Capital\_Punishment\_in\_India](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/361025100_A_Study_of_Capital_Punishment_in_India) - - https://lawctopus.com/clatalogue/clat-pg/case-analysis-bachan-singh-v-state-of-punjab/ - **Cases Referred** - 1980 AIR 473 - 1983 SCC 470 - **Statutes Referred** - Indian Penal Code of 1860 - Constitution of India,1950 - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 **Categories:** Articles, Criminal Law --- ### [Victim Friendly Provision Under Pocso:- Principals And Cases Laws](https://lawfoyer.in/victim-friendly-provision-under-pocso-principals-and-cases-laws/) **Published:** September 6, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Name of Author- Chanchal Kumari Sharma, ICFAI University, Jaipur** **Edited by – Sulesh Choudhary** **INTRODUCTION** According to the All India Census 2011, children account for 39% of the population, Many of them are vulnerable to child sexual abuse (CSA). According to the data from the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), crime against minors increased from 21.1 to 28.9 from 2015 to 2017. Childhood is an influential moment that should be filled with protection, stability, and happiness, but for some children, the actuality is quite different. Children rely on grown-ups for their protection and supervision, yet they regularly fall victim to the abuse known as CSA without knowing it. They are the “most innocent and vulnerable casualties of exploitation” because of major barriers to justice, such as poverty, violence, discrimination, rigid communal institutions, and social prejudice. They encounter a range of challenges and are mistreated sexually, physically, intellectually, and enthusiastically from birth. Child abuse is a violation of a child’s fundamental rights that harms the child’s well-being. The Ministry of Women and Child Development advocated for the passing of the “Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012” to adequately fight the heinous crimes of child sexual abuse and exploitation by establishing clearer and more stringent statutory criteria. The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act of 2012 was enacted to make it simpler to pass legislation protecting children from sexual offences. The Gender-Neutral POCSO Act promotes victim-friendly prosecution. The stipulation of this Act’s abetment provisions also applies to people who thorn children for sexual purposes. The Act includes several protections to ensure that the child victim is treated with dignity and is not subjected to additional suffering as a result of the pursuit of justice. The statue was created to support child victims and their rehabilitation. It highlights the need for victim care and rehabilitation, making the afflicted child’s journey to healing and normalcy a priority. Although the United Nations ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989, offences against children were not addressed by legislation in India until 2012. It imposes severe penalties for committing acts against children, ranging from a minimum of 20 years in prison to the death penalty in cases of aggravated penetrative sexual assault. The Act was reviewed and updated in 2019 to include further severe punishments, as well as the death penalty, for sexual offences against children to discourage criminals and prevent similar crimes. ***Keywords: poison****, child-friendly law, child victim, victim-friendly, child protection, child welfare.* **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, validated in 2012, seeks to establish a regulatory framework for protecting children from ravishment, exploitation, and pornographic material. It defines a child as someone under the age of 18 and classifies a variety of offences, including invasive and non-invasive sexual assault and intimidation. The Act prioritizes a child-friendly legal process by establishing Special Courts for expedited trials and preserving confidentiality to preserve victims’ identities. It also requires rehabilitation and support services for child victims, demonstrating a dedication to their physical and psychological healing. **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:-** The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act was validated in 2012 in response to India’s 1992 approval of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Act points to creating a comprehensive legislative framework for protecting minors from sexual offence and exploitation. Before the POCSO Act, legislation such as the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Juvenile Justice Act addressed sexual offences against minors, but they were insufficient to provide comprehensive protection. The Act was enacted in response to an alarming increase in sexual offences against children, to safeguard their safety and welfare. The POCSO Act elucidate a child as anyone under the age of 18, and it recognizes that sexual abuse can affect both girls and boys, regardless of gender. It categorizes different offences, including invasive and non-invasive sexual assault, intimidation, and child pornography, and imposes severe penalties on offenders. The Act prioritizes a child-friendly legal system, establishing Special Courts for expedited trials and preserving anonymity to safeguard victims’ identities. It also requires rehabilitation and support services for child victims, demonstrating a commitment to their physical and psychological healing. Key elements include required reporting of incidents, child identity protection, and victim rehabilitation assistance. The Act underlines India’s commitment to defending children’s rights and protecting them from sexual exploitation and abuse. **TYPES / KINDS OF VICTIM-FRIENDLY PROVISIONS** - Child-friendly courts - In-camera trials - Special prosecutors - Compensation for victims - Speedy trial provisions **VICTIM FRIENDLY PROVISION UNDER POCSO(PROTECTION OF CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL OFFENCES):-** The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act of 2012 incorporates several victim-friendly provisions designed to provide a child-friendly judicial process and reduce trauma for child sexual abuse survivors. These laws seek to provide a friendly and non-threatening atmosphere for child victims, encouraging reporting of offences and providing their approach to impartiality and rehabilitation. **Child-friendly reporting:** The Act authorizes the police to record the child’s statement at the child’s home or a location of the child’s choosing, in the company of the child’s parents or a trusted adult **Confidentiality:** The child’s identity is protected from public exposure at all stages of the legal process. The media is barred from publicizing the child’s identity. **Special courts:** The Act requires the foundation of Special Courts for the quick hearing of offences, with the entire hearing to be concluded within one year of taking cognizance of the offence **Child-friendly procedures:** discerning the gravity of the situation, the Act includes child-friendly methods for documenting evidence and conducting trials. The child’s testimony can be registered at home or a location of the child’s choosing, in the company of the child’s parents or a trusted adult. **Compensation**: The Act authorizes the payment of compensation to the child for relief and rehabilitation at various stages of the judicial procedure. **Rehabilitation**: The Act requires the construction of Special Juvenile Police Units and the appointment of Child Welfare Police Officers to handle cases in a child-friendly way and aid in the child’s rehabilitation. **Victim friendly Principal under poison act:-** - Within 24 hours of obtaining a report of child maltreatment or any related case, a police officer must notify the Child Welfare Committee. - To avoid reprimanding the teenagers, the police personnel who grasp the case must dress correctly when recording the child’s statement. - In the presence of the person the child trusts, the child’s affirmation of the crime must be registered. - Only the lady doctor, present in the presence of a person the child trusts, should inspect the child medically to gather forensic evidence. - Special courts have been established under this Act to hold trials quickly. - It is the responsibility of this court to keep the child’s identification a secret and to prevent the accused from seeing the youngster while the statement is being recorded. - The child can offer their evidence through video as well, and they won’t have to repeat it over and over. - It should be mentioned that the matter shouldn’t be delayed and should be resolved a year after it was reported. **LANDMARK CASES:-** **Facts**: The document is connected to the case of Nipun Saxena & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 565 of 2012), which was determined on December 11, 2018. The case concerns the identity protection of victims of sexual assaults under Section 228A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 23, 24, 25, 33, and 37 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Assaults (POCSO) Act of 2012. **Issue**:- - What is the scope of Section 228A of the IPC in terms of preserving the identity of victims of sexual crimes? - How should the requirements of the POCSO Act of 2012 be read to protect the identification of minor victims of sexual offences? - Does Section 228A(2)(c) of the IPC apply to young victims of sexual offences, or does the POCSO Act take precedence? - What is the meaning of the phrase “matter which may make known the identity of the person” in Section 228A of the IPC and “any other particulars” in Section 23(2) of the POCSO Act? **JUDGEMENT:** The Court ruled that Section 228A of the IPC bans not just the publication of the victim’s name, but also the revelation of any other information that could reveal the victim’s identity. The Court agreed with the Calcutta High Court’s directions in Bijoy v. State of West Bengal and directed the Chairpersons and Members of other High Court Juvenile Justice Committees to issue similar orders for the preservation of child victims’ identities under the POCSO Act. The Court ruled that where the victim is a kid, Section 228A(2)(c) of the IPC no longer applies due to the passage of the POCSO Act, which particularly addresses minors. The Court construed the wording “matter which may make known the identity of the person” and “any other particulars” broadly, ruling that the media cannot publish any information that could lead to the discovery of the victim’s identity. Overall, the decision underlines the need to preserve the identity and privacy of sexual assault victims, particularly minors, to prevent future harm and trauma. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS :** In conclusion, the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act provides strong legal protection for children who are victims of sexual offences. This special law is a powerful weapon against perpetrators of sexual offences against children and punishes such perpetrators more severely poison is a comphrihrehensive law, which deals with cases related child but according to me it’s not a law whereas it is the friend of a child because it provides the solution of all the problems about whom the child cannot talk or speak someone .it also protect the dignity of a child, this law provides the special privilege of children. this is a completely child-oriented law. this law is also gender-neutral law. There is no difference between the girl and the boy. child is a child who is below the age of 18. **REFERENCES:-** **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** - Law of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) by Harsh Tikoo & Ravi B Wadhwa. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** - https://plutusias.com/pocso-act/ - https://childsafetyatwork.org/what-does-the-pocso-act-say/ - https://byjus.com/free-ias-prep/pocso-act/ - https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-analysis/pocso-act-3 - https://www.nextias.com/ca/current-affairs/19-11-2021/interpretation-of-the-pocso-act - https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-analysis/pocso-act-3 - https://plutusias.com/pocso-act/ - https://byjus.com/free-ias-prep/pocso-act/ - https://aishwaryasandeep.in/prime-feature-of-pocso-act/ - https://www.kamarajiasacademy.com/current-affairs/analysis-pocso-act - https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/protection-of-children-from-sexual-offences-act/ - https://vikaspedia.in/social-welfare/women-and-child-development/child-development-1/girl-child-welfare/scheme-for-care-and-support-to-victims-of-under-section-4-and-6-of-pocso-act-2012 - https://cdn1.byjus.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/POCSO-Act.pdf - https://byjus.com/free-ias-prep/pocso-act/ - https://www.advotalks.com/article/victim **Cases Referred** - Nipun Saxena & Anr. v. Union of India **Statutes Referred** - protection of children from sexual offences in 2012. - child rights act. **Categories:** Articles, Criminal Law --- ### [Powers and Duties of Director under Company Law](https://lawfoyer.in/powers-and-duties-of-director-under-company-law/) **Published:** September 6, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Name of Author- Anukriti Mathur, HPNLU** **Edited by – Sulesh Choudhary** **INTRODUCTION** The Company is considered as an artificial person who can own property, sue and can be sued but the collective body of individuals known as the Board of Directors conducts all activity on behalf of the company. The Board of Directors are vested with adequate power to act on behalf of the company and is the brains of the company. The Directors are defined as persons appointed to the Board of the company[\[1\]](#_ftn1). Indian law recognises various forms of directors including whole time, director non-executive directors, nominee directors and independent directors. The Whole Time Directors and the Managing Director are the individuals who are responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company by their whole-time employment, with the company. The executive nominee and Independent directors are not concerned with the day-to-day activities and take part in board meetings and committee meetings, where the key corporate decisions are undertaken. [\[2\]](#_ftn2) Thus, the liabilities for the Whole-time Director, Managing Director and non-executive Director are different. The concept of officer-in-default is an English law concept borrowed from the English Companies Act 1948. The idea was to fix liability on officers and directors who oversee the management, for any contravention. The term officer-in-default includes whole-time director, key managerial personnel, such director(s) as specified by the board and director who had knowledge or participated in such wrongdoing and such contraventions had taken place with his/her consent or connivance. [\[3\]](#_ftn3) The liability of directors does not merely arise on account of holding the office but actual participation and express statute which punishes such contravention committed by the company. Sunil Bharti Mittal’s case provided for the director’s active role in the offence is a pre-requisite to hold them liable. The concept of vicarious liability on the director when a company is accused of wrongdoing.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Thus, looking at the position of the director, the company law provides the director with certain powers and duties to perform its official duties. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*:** Companies Act 2013, Directors, Powers of Directors, Duties of Director, Section 166, Section 179 **POWERS OF THE DIRECTORS** **General Powers Vested In Board** According to **Section 179** of the Company Act, 2013, the Board of Directors are vested with powers to perform acts and things which are authorised to be performed by the company.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) The section hereby draws a boundary wherein the director is restricted from performing any action which is inconsistent with enactment governing companies, memorandum and articles of association previously regulations made in general meetings, etc.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) The Power of directors is crucial to the company and when in control the director exercises complete power over the working of the company until removed from the position, this highlights the director’s autonomy over the company’s affairs and hence calls for restrictions. [\[7\]](#_ftn7) Section 179 (3) read with Rule 8 of Companies (Meeting of Board and its Power) Rules 2014, the power enshrined to directors shall be exercised, exclusively by passing of resolution, in Board Meetings: “ (a) asking for unpaid share money from shareholders; (b) sanction buying back of company’s securities issued (c) to issue securities, including debenture, whether in or outside India; (d) to borrow money; (e) to invest the funds of the company; (f) to grant loans or give guarantee or provide security in respect of loans; (g) to approve financial statements and the Board’s report; (h) to diversify the business of the company; (i) to approve amalgamation, merger or reconstruction; (j) to take over a company or acquire a controlling or substantial stake in another company; (k) any other matter which may be prescribed:”[\[8\]](#_ftn8) **Rule 8** Companies (Meeting of Board and its Power) Rules 2014, stipulates the following powers of directors - Making contributions to political parties - Matters related to appointment and removal of key managerial personnel (KMP) - Matters related to the appointment and removal of internal auditors and secretarial auditor Additionally, the Board is authorised by passing a resolution to delegate the financial powers including:- 1. borrowing monies, 2. invest the funds of the company and - grant loan, guarantee or provide security in respect of loan 1. to the following persons: - any committee constituted by two or more directors - the managing director - the manager - any other officer of the company - for Branch offices, the principal officer of the branch office, on conditions as may be specified [\[9\]](#_ftn9) ” **RESTRICTION ON THE POWER OF THE BOARD** **In General meetings shareholders** The law provides certain exceptional situations where the shareholder’s intervention is called for even subject to the competency of the general meeting in the matter - Misconduct by Directors The directors while making the decisions often conflict. While they are safeguarding the company’s interest often their interest arises.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) In this case, the director is the person who usually conducts litigation on behalf of the company and here their interest is in conflict thus they might not undertake the steps to redress the wrongdoing in the company. Here comes the role of the shareholders who may restrict the power of the board in such decisions[\[11\]](#_ftn11) - Incompetency of the board When the Board of Directors fails to show their fitness to exercise the duties enshrined to them by the Act, the Act empowers the shareholders by majority to act and perform said duties. The incompetence of the directory and the casual vacancy caused failure to form quorum new instances to allow Stakeholders to exercise the the Bothe ard.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) - Deadlock among the Directors Certain powers of the directors are inherited and essential. When the directors fail to show a willingness to act and exercise the above powers, it creates a deadlock.[\[13\]](#_ftn13). The Shareholders in case of such deadlock may exercise the powers of the Board in addition to the appointment of additional directors[\[14\]](#_ftn14) - Residuary Powers of the Board The powers of the director are conferred by the Companies Act, and Charter of the company. When excess powers are required or any action otherwise is taken the same is allotted by passing of an ordinary resolution by the shareholders.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) **In Board meeting** It is pertinent here to note that Section 179(3) provides that the above financial powers including the borrowing of monies, making of loans etc shall not be deemed under the meaning of Section 179 of the companies act when such deposits of money from the public repayable on demand or otherwise is done by a banking company in ordinary course of business. Additionally, the borrowings by a banking company from another banking company, RBI, SBI or any other bank established by or under any statute. However, the above powers are unaffected by the right of the company to impose restrictions and conditions on the exercise of power by the board, in general meetings The above financial power may be exercised by section 8 companies by circulation instead of at a meeting[\[16\]](#_ftn16) The second proviso of section 179 (3) provides that the Board of specified IFSC public companies may exercise these financial powers either by board meetings or circulation among the directors” Section 180 imposes restrictions on the power of the board of directors of a public company and any subsidiary thereof. The following decisions taken by the board during its exercise of power can be undertaken with the consent of the resolution passed in the general meeting. - Sale, lease or otherwise disposal of whole or substantially the whole of the undertaking where the company owns more than one undertaking. Here the undertaking implies the investment of the company exceeding 20% of its net worth as per the audited balance sheet of the preceding financial year or the undertaking has generated 20% of the total income of the company during the previous financial year by the audited balance sheet. - To invest otherwise in trust securities where the amount of the compensation received by the company is a result of merger or amalgamation - Borrowing money where the money borrowed together with the money already borrowed will exceed the aggregate paid-up share capital and free reserves. Here the temporary loans obtained by the company from its bankers in the ordinary course of business are excluded. - To remit or give time for repayment for any debt from a director.[\[17\]](#_ftn17)The Board is refrain to perform any act or powers which are exclusively vested in the hands of members and are to be exercised in General Meetings. [\[18\]](#_ftn18)” **Appointment of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee** The Nomination and Remuneration Committee is constituted under Section 178 by the board of directors of every listed company. The Committee consists of three or more non-executive directors, of which one-half should be independent. The major function of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee is to identify the persons who are qualified to become directors, and who may be appointed to senior management by the criteria set. The committee often engage itself in the formulation of criteria determining the qualification, positive attributes and independence of a director. They also recommend the board regarding the policies related to remuneration for directors, key managerial persons and other employees.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) **Appointment of the Stakeholders Relationship Committee** Further, the board are also obligated to constitute a Stakeholders Relationship Committee under Section 178.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) **Power to contribute to Bona fide charitable trust and other Funds** Section 181 the Bona fide charitable trust and other Funds to receive contributions from the company subject to the approval of the Board. To contribute to any Bonafide charitable or other funds prior permission of the company in a general meeting is required. Additionally, any amount in the aggregation of five per cent of the annual net profit for three immediately preceding years can not be contributed **Power to contribute to the political parties** The Companies Amendment Act 1985 provided for the provisions for the companies to make contributions to the political parties and for political purposes. Although the Government companies and the companies who have not completed three years of their incorporation are still not allowed to make any political contribution Under section 182. [\[21\]](#_ftn21) The companies are eligible to make political contributions provided that the contribution must not exceed 7.5 per cent of the company’s net profit during three immediate preceding Financial Years. Such contribution should also get sanctioned by a resolution of the company’s board and be sufficiently authorized. Such contributions must appear in the annual books and the failure to account for the account. Such political contribution may result in a penalty of up to five per cent of the amount so contributed and an imprisonment of up to six months.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) ” **Power to contribute to the National Defense Fund** The Board of Directors or any person authorized to exercise the power of the Board are eligible to contribute to the National Defense Fund under Section 183. There is no capping limit on the amount of Contribution made to the National Defense Fund or any other fund approved by the Central Government for national security. Profit and Loss Statements of the Company must show such contributions made in the said Financial year.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) **DUTIES OF THE DIRECTORS** In their report, the JJ Irani Committee on the lines of English law, suggested that the duties of the director are of a wide spectrum. Thus, the list of duties of the director must be inclusive and not exhaustive. In this regard, section 166 provides that the director has a fiduciary duty, duty of care, duty to comply with Laws and duty to act in the interest of the stakeholders of the company. To sum up, the director has a duty of care, skill and diligence along with fiduciary duties. **Fiduciary Duty of the Director** The fiduciary duty includes the duty of the director, where he has to act in good faith to promote the company’s objective and for the advantage of its members, as a whole. They are required to act in the best interest of the company, its employees and shareholders. - Breach of trust The director’s duty was not initially mentioned in statutes but was developed by case laws. The obligation of greatest good faith and endeavours to benefit the company are pillars of the duties of directors.[\[24\]](#_ftn24)The case of Aviling Barford Ltda is a landmark in the determination of the duty of utmost trust of the director wherein he knew about the sale at a lower price. The director was treated as a constructive trustee for the illegally gained profits.[\[25\]](#_ftn25) - Directors’ profit Being in a fiduciary position, the directors are often prohibited from making any personal profit during company transactions. The Court, in the case of Albion Steel and Wire Co v Martin, accounted the director for profits earned in the sale of the company’s stock at a lower price, when the director had such knowledge. - Doctrine of Corporate Opportunity The Doctrine of Corporate Opportunity denotes the actions of directors towards the benefit of a company when any business opportunity arises. The director is held accountable for any gain earned due to his fiduciary position. - Competition by directors, With time, Courts have observed that merely holding interest or directorship in rival concern doesn’t attract a breach of duty. Howeve,r the use of business assets for the benefit of rival concern makes the director accountable for loss, if any, occurred. The use of business assets includes the use of business connections, Goodwill, trade assets and a list of customers of the company in question with rivals. The corporate entities to eradicate the problem of competition directors provide restraining use of such skills for the benefit of rival concerns. The Non-Compete Clause and Non-Disclosure Clauses of the contract for directors are a safeguard against the above problem. A full-time director by its very nature of employment is confined from joining any other company. - Misuse of corporate information The directors with the very nature of their working in the company are often exposed to confidential information. Any exploitation of unpublished and confidential information belonging to the company is considered a breach of duty and the company is eligible to inquire about the director in question and to make good. any loss, if any, is incurred. It is here noted that the knowledge or the information made by the company is considered as a property of the company. Any loss financial or otherwise, incurred because of leakage of such information is considered as a loss to the Company. The turnovers, profit margin, list of customers, and business plan are considered corporate information and any personal use of such knowledge is equivalent to being dishonest to the company. Information of such kind is restricted by the use of Injunction. The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) have formulated the regulation for insider trading to prevent and punish the use of price-sensitive, unpublished insider information in dealing with the company securities in the market.[\[26\]](#_ftn26) **Directors duty of care, diligence and skills** Under **Section** **166(3),** the director while he exercises his duty needs to be due and reasonable, careful in the exercise of skills and diligence as per his independent judgment. The **failure to exercise due diligence and care** is often equated with failure of corporate governance. It is believed that a director during his course of business must act in the best interest of the company, with utmost faith, diligence, care and skill in all circumstances. While acting on behalf of the company, he must undertake actions to preserve assets for the business and promote the objectives behind the formation of said company. The law provides for penalties for default, misfeasance, breach of duty and breach of trust.[\[27\]](#_ftn27) While we discuss the care and diligence exercised by the director in the conduct of his business, it is necessary to point out that the **standard and the degree of care and skill** are paramount. The Courts define the word skill and the degree of care as reasonably expected from a person by his knowledge and expertise. The standard of care demanded from a director is reasonably the business knowledge from such managers[\[28\]](#_ftn28) **Duty to attend board meetings.** The directors are bound to attend the board meetings and other general meetings, where the matters of the company are discussed. The nature of the work of directors is intermittent and can be performed periodically. Although the directors are not bound to attend all meetings but are under obligations to attend the meetings, whenever the circumstances reasonably need them. Section 167(1)(b) considers that if a director reasonably absentees himself from all meetings within the last 12 months, without obtaining a leave of non-appearance, the position is considered vacant.[\[29\]](#_ftn29) **Duty to not delegate the office** Section 166(6) says that the nature of the director’s job is skills and the business shall not be assigned to anyone. Such assignment of office, powers and duties of a director may be considered void.[\[30\]](#_ftn30) **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The directors are considered the brains of the company and are responsible for all actions taken by the company. The directors control and manage the affairs of the company. The powers and duties of directors are multifaceted for governance in the company. Their decisions pave the path for the success of the company. They formulate plans and policies to fulfil organizational objectives. The directors share a fiduciary relationship with the company and are responsible for overseeing of company’s management and detecting potential market risks along with an attempt to neutralize it. They are legally bound to safeguard the interest of the company and related stakeholders and comply with ethics and codes governing the conduct of business. Ultimately, the directors make decisions related to the company’s finances and day-to-day activities. They review the financial statements, and transactions and ensure proper allocation of resources in the company. They are the face of the company who foster relationships and maintain the goodwill of the company. They deal with outsiders including shareholders, regulators and other stakeholders. They play a crucial role in incorporating good corporate culture and standards of governance. The failure to comply with the duties and misuse of powers entrusted to directors shall attract penalties as prescribed by the law in force. **REFERENCES** **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** - Avtar Singh, Company Law (2009). - QC, V., Drake, D., Richardson, G., QC, D., & Collingwood, T., 2018. Directors’ Duties. *Minority Shareholders*. . - Quinn, J., 2019. The Sustainable Corporate Objective: Rethinking Directors’ Duties. *Sustainability*. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11236734. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** - DIVISION OF POWERS BETWEEN SHAREHOLDERS AND DIRECTORS, The Lawyers & Jurists (2020), https://www.lawyersnjurists.com/article/division-of-powers-between-shareholders-and-directors/ (last visited Aug 5, 2024). - Bharti, R. (2020, August 4). *Company: Introduction, evolution, features, classification, advantages*. Essays, Research Papers and Articles on Business Management. https://www.businessmanagementideas.com/company-2/company-introduction/21328 - Rachit Garg, A company is an artificial person created by law, iPleaders (2022), https://blog.ipleaders.in/a-company-is-an-artificial-person-created-by-law/ (last visited Aug 5, 2024). - Bharti, R. (2020, August 4). *Company: Introduction, evolution, features, classification, advantages*. Essays, Research Papers and Articles on Business Management. https://www.businessmanagementideas.com/company-2/company-introduction/21328 **Cases Referred** - Sunil Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Ors., (2015) 4 SCC 609. - Prasanna Chandra Sen v. Union of India (1990) 67 Comp Cas 87(CAL) - Pull Brook v. Richmond Consolidated Mining Company (1878) LR 9 Ch D 610 - Escort Limited v. Union of India (1984) 3 COMP LJ 387 - Satyacharan law v. Rameshwar Prasad Major (1950) 20 COMP CAS 39 - BL Vishwakarma v. Tiffins Baryt asbestos (P) Limited AIR 1953 Mad520 - Barron v. Potter (1914) 1 Ch 895 - Bamford v. Bamford 1970 Ch 212 - Joint Receivers and Managers of Niltan Carson Ltd v Hawthorne \[1988\] BCLC 298 **Statutes Referred** - The Companies Amendment Act 1985 - Companies (Meeting of Board and its Power) Rules 2014 - Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015 - Companies Act, 2013 **ENDNOTES** [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) “Section 2(34) of Companies Act 2013” [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) *Concept of corporate personality*. (n.d.). Finology. Retrieved August 24, 2024, from https://blog.finology.in/Legal-news/What-is-a-Concept-of-Corporate-Personality [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) “Section 2(60) of Companies Act 2013” [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Sunil Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Ors., (2015) 4 SCC 609. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Prasanna Chandra Sen v. Union of India (1990) 67 Comp Cas 87(CAL) [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Pull Brook v. Richmond Consolidated Mining Company (1878) LR 9 Ch D 610 [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) legal Service India. (n.d.). *Corporate personality*. Retrieved August 24, 2024, from https://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/173/Corporate-Personality.html [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) “Section 179 of Companies Act 2013” [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) “Section 179 (3) of Companies Act 2013” [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Escort Limited v. Union of India (1984) 3 COMP LJ 387 [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Satyacharan law v. Rameshwar Prasad Manjoria (1950) 20 COMP CAS 39 [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) BL Vishwakarma v. Tiffins Baryt Asbestos (P) Limited AIR 1953 Mad520 [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Barron v. Potter (1914) 1 Ch 895 [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) DIVISION OF POWERS BETWEEN SHAREHOLDERS AND DIRECTORS, The Lawyers & Jurists (2020), https://www.lawyersnjurists.com/article/division-of-powers-between-shareholders-and-directors/ (last visited Aug 5, 2024). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Bamford v. Bamford 1970 Ch 212 [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Exemption notification dated 05.06.2015 [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Joint Receivers and Managers of Niltan Carson Ltd v Hawthorne \[1988\] BCLC 298 [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) “Section 180 of Companies Act 2013” [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) “Section 178 of Companies Act 2013” [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Ibid [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) Bharti, R. (2020, August 4). *Company: Introduction, evolution, features, classification, advantages*. Essays, Research Papers and Articles on Business Management. https://www.businessmanagementideas.com/company-2/company-introduction/21328 [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) “Section 182 of Companies Act 2013” [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) “Section 183 of Companies Act 2013” [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) Garg, R. (2023, June 21). Breach of a company director’s duties. iPleaders. https://blog.ipleaders.in/breach-of-a-company-directors-duties/ [\[25\]](#_ftnref25)Aveling Barford Ltd v Perion Ltd, 1989 BCLC 626 [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) Avtar Singh, Company Law (2009). [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) Rachit Garg, A company is an artificial person created by law, iPleaders (2022), https://blog.ipleaders.in/a-company-is-an-artificial-person-created-by-law/ (last visited Aug 5, 2024). [\[28\]](#_ftnref28) Kaushika U, Features of a Joint Stock Company, Economics Discussion (2019), https://www.economicsdiscussion.net/joint-stock-company/features-of-a-joint-stock-company/31491 (last visited Aug 5, 2024). [\[29\]](#_ftnref29) QC, V., Drake, D., Richardson, G., QC, D., & Collingwood, T., 2018. Directors’ Duties. *Minority Shareholders*. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781784514396.chapter-014. [\[30\]](#_ftnref30) Quinn, J., 2019. The Sustainable Corporate Objective: Rethinking Directors’ Duties. *Sustainability*. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11236734. **Categories:** Articles, Company Law --- ### [Procedure of Filling Consumer Complaint Under CPA, 2019](https://lawfoyer.in/procedure-of-filling-consumer-complaint-under-cpa-2019/) **Published:** September 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Name of Author- Arohi Bhardwaj, University Five Year Law College, Rajasthan** **Edited by – Sulesh Choudhary** **INTRODUCTION** *“A Consumer is the most important visitor on our premises. He is not dependent on us, we are on him. He is not an interruption to our work; he is the purpose of it. We are not doing a favour to a consumer by giving him an opportunity. He is doing us a favour by giving us the opportunity to serve him”- Mahatma Gandhi* The Consumer Protection Act has emerged as a crucial element in social and economic spheres, particularly in an era where the average citizen often faces confusion and vulnerability. The present world is characterized by the rapid advancement of technology, globalization, and modernization, where the Consumer Protection Act stands tall against all odds and shields it by its regulation, fighting for the common man’s rights and ensuring that the marketplace is fair for all. As necessities and requirements change, global trade and markets also evolve. The bond between consumer and producer has grown into a positive and effective mechanism to safeguard the interest of consumers. The act serves as a regulatory landscape designed to address a global range of issues related to consumer goods and services ensuring fairness, transparency, and accountability in economic transactions. As stated by the act individual who feels not satisfied or deceived after purchasing goods or services can seek help from Consumer Redressal Agencies to redeem compensation. *“Consumers should not tolerate the incontinence or wrong done to them and file appropriate complaints to ensure the same is not repeated by the unscrupulous traders to them and others in the society” says Vijay Kumar member of the District Consumer Redressal Commission.* ***Keywords*:** Consumer Protection Act 2019, Central Consumer Protection Authority, Consumer Rights, Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission, Consumer Awareness **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** A consumer is an individual or a group who intends to obtain goods and services from the producer and purchases goods and services for his benefit. He is the sole decision maker on whether to buy unless he is forced to do so. Consumers have access to basic goods and services consisting of food, clothing, education, health care, institutions, shelter, and sanitation. The Consumer needs to be protected from the depths of deceptive advertising to the heights of product safety. Consumer Protection Act 2019 is a guardian angel that regulates us, is vigilant and is always ready to put down those who would seek to mislead, misguide, and harm our citizens. The term “consumer protection” has undergone several changes with growing modification of the common law doctrine of “Caveat emptor” i.e. let the buyer beware which permits the seller not to burden his liability as it shifts the responsibility on the buyer. The Consumer Protection Act 2019 is a landmark piece of legislation over its predecessor, the Consumer Protection Act 1986. It regulates new provisions to address issues like e-commerce, product liability, and direct selling. The act aims to further empower consumers by enhancing their ability to seek effective redressal, building a consumer-centric environment, ensuring that consumers receive fair treatment and redressal, and protecting their rights. Consumer Protection Act is not just a legal provision or concept that needs to be followed; instead, it’s a movement, a revolution that should not be suppressed, and come into force. **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND** India’s movement towards consumer protection started with the enactment of the Consumer Protection Act of 1986. The act aimed to protect its consumer’s rights against defective goods and services, unfair trade practices, misleading advertisements, etc. It established consumer redressal agencies which came to be known as a three-tier system, i.e. district, state, and national consumer dispute redressal forum. Over the past year, the marketplace and global trades have reshaped with technological advancements, leading to changes in business practices and introducing the rise of digital practices. These highlight the gaps and limitations of the 1986 Act. Moreover, issues like the rise in digital transactions, incomplete redressal mechanisms, consumer safety from hazardous activity, and the need to protect consumer’s interests. After seeing all the shortcomings the government recognized the need for an adequate update. The Indian government started revising the existing consumer protection framework. The main purpose is to address the challenges and improve their redressal conduct. The Ministry of Consumer Affairs, food, and Public Administration revised the act which involved the conduct of consultations with various stakeholders, committees, and organizations or legal representatives. The Consumer Protection Act Bill 2019 was introduced in the Lok Sabah in December 2019. It aimed at succeeding the Consumer Protection Act of 1986. The bill went through conflicting debates and discussions in both houses of parliament and was given presidential assent on August 9, 2019. The act of 2019 provides the provisional establishment of the central consumer protection authority with legitimate power to take action against unauthorized activities and come up with an effective mechanism. **WHO CAN FILE A COMPLAINT?** Under **section 2(7)** of the Consumer Protection Act 2019, the word “consumer” means any person who- buys any goods for a consideration that has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any user of such goods other than the person who buys such goods for consideration paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised or under any system of deferred payment, when such use is made with the approval of such person but does not include a person who obtains such goods resale or for any commercial purpose.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) It includes- consumers, voluntary consumer association registers under any law, central or state government, and one or more consumers having the same interest. **ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA TO FILE COMPLAINTS** By meeting the following eligibility criteria consumers can file complaints under the Consumer Protection Act 2019. - *The complainant must be a consumer*, the consumer who filed the complaint must have purchased the goods and services for personal purposes. - *The value of goods and services must exceed rs.1 crore,* when the value of goods and services exceeds rs.1 crore then he can file a complaint before the national redressal agency or commission. - *The complainant must have suffered a loss or harm, and* the goods and services must inflict a hazardous act on the consumer from which the consumer suffered harm or damage. - *The complainant must be authorized to file a complaint,* in this case, a consumer must be sound or able to file a complaint. - *The complaint must be filed within two years,* the consumer must file a complaint within two years from the date of purchase of goods and services. **TYPES OF COMPLAINTS** In terms of **sections 2(6)** of the Consumer Protections Act 2019, the word “complaint” means any allegations in writing, made by a complainant[\[2\]](#_ftn2). - *Complaints related to Unfair trade practices*: According to **section 2(47)[\[3\]](#_ftn3)** the term unfair trade practices refers to practices that adopt any deceptive or unethical methods for the sale or supply of goods and services. It uses various fraudulent, illusive, or immoral methods to obtain business. It includes false advertising, tied selling, deceptive pricing, misrepresentation, and non-compliance with manufacturing standards; for example, bait and switch occurs when a company advertises a product at a low price but then tries to sell the consumer a more expensive product. Such measures are considered unlawful by the authorities under consumer protection laws. Consumers who have been harmed or suffered loss by unfair trade practices can seek redressal by suing or filing compensatory or punitive damages. Here, Plaintiff need not prove their intent of filing a complaint, showing the act was unfair and hazardous is enough. Hence the burden of proof is not on the plaintiff. - *Complaints related to Defective goods and services*: Under **section 2(10)** of the Consumer Protection Act 2019 the term defect means any fault, lack of perfection, or shortcomings in terms of quality, quantity, purity, potency, or standard which is required to be maintained under any law for the time being in force would amount to a defect in the particular commodity[\[4\]](#_ftn4). Defects in goods can also be found when there is any express or implied contract in respect of goods with the trader claimed by him. For example, a pressure cooker bursts and inflicts injury to the consumer. It was held to be a manufacturing defect. - Whereas services come under **section 2(42)** of the Consumer Protection Act 2019 means services of any description made available to potential users[\[5\]](#_ftn5). Service comes in banking, financing, insurance, transport, telecom, housing, and boarding. It does not include the rendering of any services free of charge or under a contract of personal services. The main purpose of widening the scope is that services not only include the day-to-day buying of goods but even including such facilities which are otherwise not commercial but professional or service. **FILING A COMPLAINT UNDER THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 2019** Consumer dispute redressal agencies established to fulfil the purpose of this act include the following agencies: - “District Commission” established by the state government - “State Commission” established by the state government and - A National Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission was established by the central government by notification[\[6\]](#_ftn6). **Chapter IV** of the Consumer Protection Act 2019 promotes three-tier consumer dispute redressal agencies. The Act 2019 establishes a mechanism for consumers to file complaints and obtain relief in the event of grievances associated with defective goods or services. It empowers consumers to claim their rights and get compensated for any loss that has occurred because of the low quality of products or services. Moreover, it manages to hold business as a support service that empowers the consumer and ensures the quick resolution of their grievance without necessitating physical presence. It serves as a deterrent effect that discourages businesses from engaging in unfair trade practices. Educates consumers, teaches them their rights, and gives them the courage to demand standards. To initiate the process of filing a complaint, the very first step taken by the consumer at the first instance would be to determine which redressal agency would have appropriate jurisdiction, both monetarily and geographically. Thereafter, the consumer will have to draft the complaint. Under S**ection 35[\[7\]](#_ftn7)** of CPA 2019, “a complaint about any goods or service or agreed to be sold may be filed with the district commission by the consumers who allege unfair trade practice or any relevant reason.” Such complaints have to include the name and agency address of the complainant and the opposite party as well as a description of the goods and services suffered from the defect or deficiency. The complaint needs to be registered with the concerned agency, accompanied by the prescribed filing fee. The concerned authority will hear the complaint and pass an order, binding upon both parties. Aggrieved parties may appeal to the next higher agency or the Supreme Court within 30 days of the order in cases of dissatisfaction. Another important thing to be noted here is that the complaint must be filed within two years from the date of cause of action. The entire process of complaint filing is very consumer-friendly, with a structured framework for redressal. It also provides central consumer protection authority for better protection, promotion, and enforcement of consumer rights. **REMEDIES AVAILABLE** Under the Consumer Protection Act 2019, there are a variety of redress mechanisms available to consumers who suffered losses from defective goods or services. One important relief measure would be the right to a refund of money that was paid for such defective goods and services, in addition to that, replacement or even repair of the defective goods and services may be offered. He may be awarded compensation in cases of loss or injuries suffered by the consumer. It further empowers a consumer commission to direct the removal of deficiencies in goods and services and to stop unfair trade practices. The act provides a grant of punitive damages in grave cases of misconduct to deter the perpetrators from repeating the same. Besides the consumer is also awarded the refund of the expenses incurred and the payment of interest in the amount awarded to consumers. As stated the Consumer Protection Act 2019 set up a three-tier consumer dispute redressal mechanism, where district, state, and national commissions are constituted with an empowered relief to the consumers. The powers and functions are defined in such a way that consumers will have proper remedies available. In short decent and rigorous enforcement of these remedies shall go a long way in protecting consumer rights and helping to make trade practices transparent and fair. **RELEVANT CASE LAWS** **Case 1**– **Kailash Chand Gupta v. State Commission, Consumer Forum, U.P. Lucknow, and others (1997)[\[8\]](#_ftn8)** In this case, Kailash Chand Gupta had filed a complaint before the consumer forum, U.P. Lucknow, against a builder alleging a deficiency in service. The complaint was dismissed by the consumer forum. Gupta has approached the state commission consumer forum, U.P. Lucknow. The state commission dismissed his appeal. Gupta filed a revision petition before the NCDRC (National Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission), alleging deficiency in service by the state commission and claiming competition. **Issue** Did the consumer forum have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint that Kailash Chand Gupta filed against the state commission consumer forum, U.P. Lucknow, and others for deficiency in service and claiming compensation? **Judgment** The NCDRC ensures that the consumer undoubtedly erred in dismissing Gupta’s complaint and that the state commission also committed an error of law in dismissing his appeal. The NCDRC and the consumer forum observed a clear deficiency of service by the builder, and the state commission failed to provide justice to Gupta. The NCDRC ordered the builder to pay Gupta compensation of Rs. 2, 50,000 with interest and directed the state commission to pay Rs. 25,000 for its failure to administer justice. **Case 2**– **Ethiopian Airlines v. Ganesh Narain Saboo[\[9\]](#_ftn9)** In this case, the respondent booked a consignment of reactive dyes with the appellant Ethiopian Airlines to be delivered at Dares Salaam Tanzania on 30.9.1992. The airway bills were duly issued by the appellant from its office in Bombay at the Taj Mahal Hotel for the said consignment. According to the respondent, there was a gross delay in the arrival of the consignment at the destination, which led to the deterioration of the goods. **Issue** - Whether proceedings before the consumer forum suits? **Judgment** In this case, the appeal has preferred the appeal against the judgment of the national commission, which set the order of the state commission and held that Section 86 of the CPC was not applicable since the dispute case fell under the provisions of the act. Here, parties raised questions about whether proceedings before the consumer forum were suits. The court held that term suits included all proceedings of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature in aggrieved parties were adjudicated before an impartial forum. The consumer forum’s proceedings fall within the scope of the term suit act, which enumerates the provisions of the CPC that apply to proceedings before the consumer forum; therefore, the consumer does not fall under section 86 of the CPC. **CONCLUSION& COMMENTS** In sum, there is an effective framework under the Consumer Protection Act 2019 for imposing liability on manufacturers and sellers of defective products. Consumers can file complaints under the act and claim compensation for losses suffered on account of defective or hazardous products while encouraging the manufacturer to take all necessary precautions regarding consumer safety and quality. With heightened consciousness among consumers about their rights, there can be an expected increase in product liability complaints, resulting in a much safer and more responsible marketplace. It will be possible to empower consumers to ask for better products and services through the effective enforcement of CPA 2019. Its key effective implementation also ensures consumer interest, and protection, and fosters a culture of safety and accountability among companies. **REFERENCES** **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** - “Consumer Protection Law” by Dr. S.C. Tripathi - “Consumer disputes redressal- law and procedure” by S.K. Goyal **Online Articles / Sources Referred** - - A guide to filing a consumer complaint in India by Legal Service India **Cases Referred** - AIR 1997 AII 312 (DB) - AIR 2011 SC 3495 **Statutes Referred** - Section 35 of CPA 2019 - Section 2(42) of CPA 2019 - Section 2(47) of CPA 2019 - Section 2(10) of CPA 2019 - Consumer protection (consumer disputes redressal commission) rules 2020 **ENDNOTES** [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) The Consumer Protection Act, 2019 sec. 2(7) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) The Consumer Protection Act, 2019 sec. 2(6) [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The Consumer Protection Act, 2019 sec. 2(47) [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) The Consumer Protection Act, 2019 sec. 2(10) [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) The Consumer Protection Act, 2019 sec. 2(42) [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The Consumer Protection Act, 2019 ch.V [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) The Consumer Protection Act, 2019 sec 35 [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) AIR 1997 AII 312 (DB) [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) AIR 2011 SC 3495 **Categories:** Articles, Consumer Protection Act --- ### [Practically Using Concepts of Contract Law in Drafting Business Contracts: Provisions, Doctrines and Important clauses](https://lawfoyer.in/practically-using-concepts-of-contract-law-in-drafting-business-contracts-provisions-doctrines-and-important-clauses/) **Published:** September 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Name of Author- Lalidhambha.S, Government Law College, Dharmapuri** **Edited by – Sulesh Choudhary** **INTRODUCTION** According to the **Indian Contract Act 1872, section 2(h)** the agreement which is enforceable by law is a contract. All agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object, and are not hereby expressly declared to be void. A contract is a consensual act and the parties are free to settle any terms as they please. This freedom lies in choosing the party with whom to contract, in the freedom to fix the terms of the contract, in excluding or limiting the liability for damages or limiting the remedies available for the breach etc. However, this freedom is subject to many exceptions. The theory of formation of contract is generally the analysis of the formation into offer and acceptance is however a **“working method”** which enables us, in doubtful cases, to ascertain whether a contract has been concluded and as such is a useful tool in the common law**.[\[1\]](#_ftn1)** ***Keywords*** - Privity of contract - Doctrine of Consideration - Theory of formation of contract - Proposal and Promise - Legal drafting **PRIVITY OF CONTRACT** The general rule in common law is that no one but the parties to a contract can be entitled under it, or bound by it. This also seems to be the import of **section 2(a), (b), (c),** and **(e)** which contemplates only the two parties to an agreement.[**\[2\]**](#_ftn2) This principle that only the parties to a contract are entitled to sue or be sued upon it is known as the “privity of contract”. It lies at the heart of the difference between rights under contract which are in ***personam*** and proprietary rights which are ***in rem*.[\[3\]](#_ftn3)** **Organizing the Contract Structure:** The structure of our contract plays a prominent role in the propagation of a predetermined meaning and in to description of the key sections. Typically, a business contract includes the following: **Definitions and Interpretations:** First of all, it is very essential to define any key terms or phrases that are used throughout the contract. As it prevents confusion and ensures that everyone acts in the same manner. **Scope of their work:** Following that, we have to make sure that each party’s obligations, utility and timelines must be made in detail to avoid the misunderstandings in future. **Terms and Conditions:** Includes certain clauses such as terms of payments, rights of termination, mechanisms regarding dispute resolution, the burden of confidentiality, and other terms related to the business arrangement. **Miscellaneous Provisions:** Cover additional topics such as governing law, force majeure events, amendments, and waivers. These provisions provide further guidance and protect the parties’ interests in unforeseen circumstances. Generally, Business Contracts are considered to be an adhesive from which business transactions are retained together by ensuring clarity and legal enforceability. It is an agreement bound to pursue the rights, obligations and expectations of all the parties. **CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF A BUSINESS CONTRACT:** **Offer and Acceptance:** A person may ask for some information or supply some information and invite the other to make an offer or make a definite offer. To ascertain whether a particular statement amounts to an offer or an invitation to offer, the test would be the intention with which such statement is made**.[\[4\]](#_ftn4)** **Consideration:** Usually, each party enters into a contract to obtain consideration promised by the other (the seller wanting to realize the price of his goods and the buyer desiring to get goods of value) but that may not always be the case. Here detriment to the promise suffices even if the promisor does not benefit**.[\[5\]](#_ftn5)** **Mutual consent:** Where there is no consent or no real and certain object of consent there can be no contract at all. The consent must fulfil and accept the rights and obligations mentioned in the contract**.[\[6\]](#_ftn6)** **Legally competent parties:** Every person is competent to contract who is of the age of majority according to the law to which he is subject, and who is of sound mind, and is not disqualified from contracting by any law to which he is subject. **Legal purpose:** Contracts forbidden by regulations under the Defence of India Act are illegal. Agreements in contravention of the Jute Control Order and the Oil Seeds Order are void, as the contract must bear a legal purpose and should not be immoral or against public policy. **ACCEPTANCE BY PERFORMING CONDITIONS OR RECEIVING CONSIDERATION:** The acceptance of an offer by conduct would be effective only when such act is done with the “intention of accepting the offer”. The nature of acceptance required in such cases was considered by the English Court of Appeal in **Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co.[\[7\]](#_ftn7)** The only previous definition of acceptance in the act is that a proposal is said to be accepted when the person to whom it is made “signifies his assent thereto” **\[s.2(b)\].** This has to be read with the provisions as to communication in **sections 4 and 7**. The present section appears, in its first branch, to recognise the fact that in the cases in which the offeror invites acceptance by the doing of an act**.[\[8\]](#_ftn8)** **PROOFREADING AND EDITING FOR CLARITY & ACCURACY:** Once the contract has been drafted, it’s time to rephrase and copyedit it punctiliously. Errors or discrepancies can undermine the validity and enforceability of the contract. Consider the following steps: **Read it aloud:** By reading the contract aloud it may help us to avoid inept phrasing, fused sentences, and grammatical errors. **Check for clarity:** Assures that every provision is manifest, evident and amply illustrated with the betrothed meaning. If any sections are in upheaval or need further clarification may revise them accordingly. **Review for accuracy:** Usually by examining it again all information such as names, dates, and amounts, is accurate and consistent throughout the contract. **TYPES OF CONTRACTS IN BUSINESS LAW** In a broad sense, the type of contract in business law can be divided into three categories. They are: - Contracts are made based on the mode of formation - Contracts are made based on performance - Contracts are made based on enforcement/validity **Based on the mode of formation** - Express contract - Implied contract - Quasi-contract - E- contracts **Based on Performance** - Executed contracts - Executory contract - Partly Executed and partly executory contract - Unilateral contract - Bilateral contract **Based on Enforceability/ validity** - Valid contract - Void contract - Voidable contract - Illegal contract - Unenforceable contract **LEGAL DRAFTING OF BUSINESS CONTRACTS** Drafting a business contract requires caution thought of the particular agreements that should be incorporated to safeguard the interests of all gatherings included. Here is an overall rule for the lawful drafting of a business contract: **Title and Presentation:** Start with a unique title expressing the date of the agreement. Alao befitting with the legitimate names and other necessary details. **Definitions:** Mark the characters & terms utilized through the agreement to stay away from errors. **Statement of Agreement:** Expresses the reason for the agreement and the shared arrangement of the gatherings. For instance, “This understanding is placed into by and between \[Party A\] and \[Party B\].” **Terms and conditions:** Includes the particular agreements that frame the freedoms as well as certain limitations of each party. It may cover: - Payment terms (such as estimating, invoicing and payment plan) - Expectations or administrations to be given - Deadlines and execution plans - Termination clauses - Query plan systems - Privacy and non-revelation plans - Protected innovation freedoms - Reimbursement and responsibility arrangements - Force majeure provisos (for unanticipated occasions) - Overseeing regulation and purview **Descriptions and Guarantees:** Include any promises or guarantees made by either party concerning the administrations or products being given. **Obligations and Commitments:** Include any promises or guarantees made by either party concerning the administrations or products being given. **Payment terms:** Describe the payment structure, including the sum, due dates and any late instalment punishments or interest. **Terms and Extinction:** Determine the contract’s length and the circumstances under which it tends to be ended, for example, for a break of agreement or shared arrangement. **Confidentiality:** Address the treatment of classified data, and lay out the commitments of the two players to safeguard delicate information. **Question goal:** Portray how debates will be settled, whether through exchange, intervention, assertion or suit. **Administering Regulation:** Recognize the purview whose regulations will administer the contract. **Entire Understanding and Changes:** Express that the contract addresses the whole arrangement between the gatherings and that any corrections should be made recorded as a hard copy and endorsed by the two players. **Signatures:** Give space to the marks of approved agents from each party, alongside the date of execution. **Notarization:** Contingent upon the purview and the idea of the agreement, it could be prudent to have the contract authorized. **Lawful Survey:** It is energetically prescribed to have the contract checked on by legitimate guidance to guarantee that it follows applicable regulations and safeguards the interests, everything being equal. **IMPORTANT LEGAL PROVISIONS OF CONTRACTS REQUIRED TO BE IN WRITING** The following Acts require contracts to be in writing: - The Apprentices Act 1961, as of section 4 - The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, as of section 7; arbitration agreements Indian Contract Act 1872, section 25(1) agreement without consideration between near relations - The Companies Act 1956 - The Income Tax Act 1961 - The Limitation Act 1963, section 18, acknowledgement to pay a debt - The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 **Interpretations / Explanations** **As of the law related to the Registration, Section 17** of the **Indian Registration Act XVI** of **1908** specifics documents which are required to be registered and **Section 49** of the same act provides that no document is required by **S.17** to be registered by the provisions of that act. Such document shall also not be received as evidence of the transaction. However, under **S.49** it can be admitted in evidence for certain other purposes. Registration of a document may also be required under other statutes. **DOCTRINES** **Doctrine of Consideration** The doctrine of consideration limits the freedom of individuals to make binding promises only those promises which are supported by consideration are legally binding, others are not even if the promisor intends to bind himself to the promise. This requirement is unique to the common law as it is not a requirement in the civil law systems and its utility has been called into question by scholars. It is however so firmly entrenched in the common law **(combe v. combe)[\[9\]](#_ftn9)** that despite sporadic attacks, it does not appear that its position as the **most fundamental limitation on the enforcement of promises** is likely to be disturbed**.[\[10\]](#_ftn10)** **Doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction** Accord and satisfaction refer to the agreement (accord) between two contracting parties to accept alternate performance to discharge a pre-existing duty between them and the subsequent performance (satisfaction) of that agreement. The new performance is called accord. According to the doctrine of accord and satisfaction, the two parties who were in contract further agreed that they could make further changes (addition or deletion) to the existing contract. These changes are agreed upon by both parties. In this instance, the non-offending party has the right to sue under either the original contract or the accord agreement. **(P.K. Ramaiah and Company v. Chairman and Managing Director, National Thermal Power Corporation (1944)** where the creditor accepted the final measurements of the work completed and issued a receipt stating that the amount had been received in the full and final settlement, there was accord and satisfaction and the creditor was not entitled to claim the balance**.[\[11\]](#_ftn11)** **Doctrine of Waiver** A waiver is a legally binding provision where either party in a contract agrees to voluntarily forfeit a claim without the other party being liable, Waivers are commonly seen during settlement talks, when one party may be willing to pay out a slightly higher award as long as the other person, often a claimant, agrees to sign a waiver relinquishing their right to further legal action. **PRINCIPLES** **Principles of Business Efficacy** The principle of business efficacy is normally invoked to read a term in an agreement or contract to achieve the result or the consequence intended by the parties acting as prudent businessmen. Business efficacy means the power to produce intended results.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) **(Satya Jain v. Anis Ahmed Rushdie)** **Principle of Indemnification clauses** The indemnification clause is one of the most important parts of your business contract. Sometimes, it can be extracted into its contract, the indemnity agreement. It shows what the indemnified party is for certain expenses and costs. As such, you should consider our tips for successful contract negotiation before writing your business agreement. **Principle of force majeure clause** Force majeure removes liability for unavoidable and unexpected events that are beyond either party’s control. These include - Acts of God like hurricanes, tsunamis, typhoons, explosions - War, explosions, strikes, lockdown, lockups - Government actions limiting or prohibiting any party from performing its contractual obligations **Principle of confidentiality** Confidentiality also known as a non-disclosure clause, is vital to protecting your trade secrets, clients’ confidential information, sales strategies and anything else that you want to keep from the public. Sometimes this is expanded upon further in an NDA. **Principle of Termination** A termination clause defines how the parties can terminate their agreement and establishes how each party can terminate within a specified notice period. It’s included in every business contract template and generally doesn’t require too much customization. **CONCLUSION** To draft an effective and enforceable business contracts, you need to include several contract clauses without using these important clauses in your business contracts, you may find yourself facing exorbitant legal fees, legal battles that could last for years, and intellectual property theft. A very drafted contract can forestall false impressions, safeguard interests, and add to a straightforward and proficient business environment. **REFERENCES** **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** - The Indian Contract Act – Sir Dinshaw Fardunji Mulla - The Law of a Contract – Avatar Singh - Law of Contracts – Krishna Nair - Contracts – Pollock and Mulla **Online Articles / Sources Referred** - - - - - - **Cases Referred** - Kepong Prospecting Ltd. V. Schmidt, (1968) AC 810. - Sudhanshu Mohan Koley v. Mohan Adak (1975) ILR 1Cal 182 - Spencer v. Harding, (1870) 5 CP 561 - Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., (1893) 1 QB 256 - combe v. combe \[1951\] 1 All ER 767 - Pillans v. Van Mierop \[1765\] 3 Burr, 1664per MANSFIELD C - K. Ramaiah and Company v. Chairman and Managing Director, National Thermal Power Corporation (1944) - Satya Jain v. Anis Ahmed Rushdie, (2013) 8 SCC **Statutes Referred** - The Apprentices Act 1961, as of section 4 - The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, as of section 7; arbitration agreements - The Indian Contract Act 1872, section 25(1) agreement without consideration between near relations - The Companies Act 1956 - The Income Tax Act 1961 - The Limitation Act 1963, section 18, acknowledgement to pay a debt - The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 **ENDNOTES** [](#_ftnref1) \[1\] The Indian Contract Act – Sir Dinshaw Fardunji Mulla [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Kepong Prospecting Ltd. V. Schmidt, (1968) AC 810 [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The Indian Contract Act – Sir Dinshaw Fardunji Mulla [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Spencer v. Harding, (1870) 5CP 561 [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Sudhanshu Mohan Koley v. Mathura Mohan Adak. (1975) ILR 1 Cal 182 [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Kessowji Tulsidas v. Harijivan Mulji, (1887) ILR 11 Bom 566. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., (1893) 1QB 256. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) The Law of a Contract – Avatar Singh [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) combe v. combe \[1951\] 1 All ER 767 [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Pillans v. Van Mierop \[1765\] 3 Burr 1664, per MANSFIELD C [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) P.K. Ramaiah and Company v. Chairman and Managing Director, National Thermal Power Corporation (1944) [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Satya Jain v. Anis Ahmed Rushdie, (2013) 8 SCC **Categories:** Articles, Contract Law --- ### [QUASI CONTRACT UNDER INDIAN CONTRACT ACT](https://lawfoyer.in/quasi-contract-under-indian-contract-act/) **Published:** September 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Harsita Karki, Vasudev College of Law, Haldwani, Kumaon University, Nainital, Uttarakhand** **Edited By: Ritesh Singh Shekhawat, MJRPU, Jaipur** **INTRODUCTION** There is a Latin maxim from Roman law, ***“Nemo debit locupletari ex alien bacteria”*** which states that from one person’s suffering another person should not be benefitted unfairly. That can be said in this way no one can grow rich from another one’s pain.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) In the Indian Contract Act, a contract is said to be formed when two parties form an agreement with all the valid conditions given under the Contract Act and perform their obligations and duties. In a normal contract, one party becomes liable to perform the obligation only when there exists a valid contract and in this when one party breaches the contract it will be liable to compensate for the damage to another party. But sometimes when there is no valid contract exists but the law considers the whole circumstances as a Contract then it is called a contract. These are not actual contracts and did not originate from the agreement between parties. On the contrary; they are one-of-a-kind legal duties recognized only for avoidance of unjust enrichment. For example, the law does provide for circumstances where one party can unjustly benefit at the expense of another even though there is no agreement. Quasi-contracts are a legal framework in The Indian Contract Act, of 1872 (Sections 68 to 72). Implied contracts which now come under the category of quasi-contacts are an essential feature in Indian Contract Law. However, this article delves at length into legal provisions related to quasi-contracts and major case laws there along with the relevant doctrines of quasi-contracts as well as remedies available in such cases. The exploration will also help us understand why there is a requirement for quasi-contracts, the topic of nature, and the principles on which they are based Introduction to Quasi Contracts. **KEYWORDS –** Quasi-contract, Contract law, Parties, Roman law, Obligation **FEATURES OF QUASI-CONTRACT** - It is called semi and Constructive Contract as all the essential elements are not present in this Contract. - It is based on the principle of Equity it ensures that no one should be deprived of justice and injustice should not be done only because there are missing elements of the valid contract.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) - Rather being arising from an agreement, these contracts are imposed by the Court of law. - It is not based on the offer and acceptance rule. - This contract came into effect after the obligation had been performed by one party. **PROVISIONS RELATED TO QUASI-CONTRACTS IN THE INDIAN CONTRACT ACT** Quasi-contracts are not real contracts but seem like real contracts, as obligations on the parties are not created by the parties themselves but put upon by the courts on the parties. In the Indian Contract Act, quasi-contracts are not mentioned expressly but Chapter 5 impliedly mentions the provisions related to quasi-contracts. Sections 68 to 72 explain the nature of the Quasi contract. **Chapter 5 – Of Certain Relations Resembling Those Created by Contract** **Section 68– Deals with the claim of money for providing necessities to a minor or incapable person. [\[3\]](#_ftn3)** - This section explains that if any person has provided the basic necessities of life to incapable and minor to someone who is unable to fulfill the basic needs of his life**.** And if the act done by the person is in good faith then he has a right to get the money back. For example, he can reimburse the money from the minor’s property when he attains the majority (if the minor has some property). - Necessaries include the fundamental things of life like food, Accommodation, Clothes, Education, Medicine, and marriage. These are important things for one’s survival and on which existence or quality of life is based. **Section 11[\[4\]](#_ftn4) of the Indian Contract Act** provides for the competency of entering into the contract where – - Minor is someone who is below 18 years of age - An incapable/ Unsound person is one who is not in a state of making any wise and legal decision and who is not in sound person, in this case unsoundness of a person can last till his life or for some years of his life in which he cannot be qualified for entering into a legally bind contract. But after the over of the person’s unsoundness then he can be qualified as competent for contract. - EXAMPLE – ‘A’ is the neighbor of ‘B’, who is a minor with no support, So A provides necessities to B that can be suitable to his condition in life. Here A is entitled to be reimbursed from B’s property. **Section 69–Payment made by an interested person. [\[5\]](#_ftn5)** - This section explains when a person is lawfully bound to pay the money and due to some reason, he is not able to pay and another person pays on his behalf due to some interest on the good. then the person who had paid is entitled to be reimbursed by the other. - Example – ‘A’ lives with his family in rent on ‘B’ house and B is out of town for some reason in that time course electricity bill arrives at the house which B used to submit all the time but due to his absence A pays the bill because he is living in his house but A is entitled to get that money back from B. **Section 70– Obligation to pay non-gratuitous Act[\[6\]](#_ftn6)** - This section explains that if any person does something for someone without having any agreement or a contract involved and the person enjoys the benefits of the things done, he will become bound to pay the compensation to the person who is doing the thing for him. Though the work is done here is about having consideration. - Things must be done in a lawful way - Work must be done with the intention of consideration means non- gratuitous work. - The other person must have enjoyed the benefit of the work. **Section 71 – Responsibility of Finder of Goods.[\[7\]](#_ftn7)** - Whenever any person finds a good that does not belong to him take that good along with himself and take care as it would do with his own good. In this, the finder of goods will come in the position of bailee and try to find and return the goods to the real owner. - In this situation finder of goods has various duties which he must perform like as taking adequate care of the goods, trying his best to find the real owner of the goods, must returning the goods to a real manner in good condition and lawful manner. - And if the finder has invested some money of his own for keeping the goods in better condition, he is entitled to get his money reimbursed from the owner. **Section 72– Payment of Delivery via Mistake or Coercion.[\[8\]](#_ftn8)** - This section deals with the situation whenever money or anything is delivered to the person to whom that does not belong either by mistake or in coercion, it must be returned to the real owner. If he cannot return the goods to the owner then he will pay the value amount of the goods. - Example – if the delivery of ‘X’ order reaches his neighbor at ‘Y’ place by mistake of the delivery agent then Y will return or repay the real owner of the goods. **DOCTRINES RELATED TO THE QUASI-CONTRACT** **Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment –** This doctrine simply explains that if any individual benefits from someone else money or if he has enjoyed someone else goods and another person suffers due to this then the person enjoying the benefits must reimburse with the amount value. **The doctrine of Quantum Merit** –is a Latin phrase that means as much as earned. This doctrine deals with the value of the work done must be given. It arises in the situation when one party has performed its obligation and another party is not performing his due obligations then he can be sued for compensation for his due diligence. **The doctrine of good faith-** in a contract parties have some obligations and duties that they must perform, this doctrine simply states that parties must work in good faith and perform their duties honestly without the intention of doing fraud. Parties must abide by the rules of the contract. **CASE LAWS RELATED TO QUASI-CONTRACT** **Damodar Mudaliar vs Secretary of State for India 1894[\[9\]](#_ftn9)** In this case, a tank was owned by both the government and a zamindar but the zamindar didn’t contribute to the repair of the tank and was done by the government solely. So after the repair work of the tank government sued the zamindar for the expense that came from the repair. The court held that as the government did not do the work gratuitously and lawfully completed its side of the work so zamindar is liable to pay compensation for which he enjoys the benefits. **Kunwarlal Daryavsingh vs Surajmal Makhanlal[\[10\]](#_ftn10) –** In this case, a house and necessities were provided to a minor by his neighbor and later court decided all the expenses made by the neighbor were recoverable. **Ameen Trading Co vs Bank of Baroda[\[11\]](#_ftn11) –** This bank mistakenly transferred the amount of rupees 50,000 to another party firm’s account and the court has decided that the act done was a mistake and the party cannot enjoy that payment and has to return the money to the bank **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** In the Indian Contract Act, Quasi-contracts protect the party from any losses suffered due to the act of another party. It prevents parties from taking unjust enjoyment at the expense of another person’s loss. These contracts are imposed by the court, not by the parties themselves which makes the obligation legally binding upon them. That’s why these are not called real contracts but constructive contracts. This contract works on the principle of Equity and justice which ensures that justice should be given to all and no one takes advantage of another situation. Part 5 of the contract Act provides sections 68 to 72 that explain the quasi-contract more briefly. These kinds of contracts are necessary for society which protects them from any harm and monetary losses without being in any contractual relation with anyone. **REFERENCES** **Online Articles / Sources Referred** - Sehanawaz, “The Indian Contract Act 1872” Ugc (VCU Jaipur. Rajasthan, 2023) available at: https://deb.ugc.ac.in/Uploads/SelfLearning/HEI-Exempted-U-0748/HEI-Exempted-U-0748\_SelfLearning\_20231026135504.pdf (last visited August 5, 2024). - Essential elements of a Valid Contract, available at (last visited on August 7, 2024) **Cases Referred** - Damodara Mudaliar And Anr. vs Secretary Of State For India on 18 October 1894, (1895)ILR 18MAD88 - Kunwarlal Daryavsingh vs Surajmal Makhanlal And Ors. on 14 July, 1961, AIR1963MP58, AIR 1963 - Ameen trading co vs bank of Baroda \[Civil Appeal No. 363 of 2022\] **Statutes Referred** - Contract Act, 1872, s. 68 - Indian Contract Act, 1872, s. 11 - Indian Contract Act, 1872, s. 69 - Indian Contract Act, 1872, s. 70 - Indian Contract Act, 1872, s. 71 - Indian Contract Act, 1872, s. 72 [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Mr. Sehanawaz, “The Indian Contract Act 1872” Ugc (VCU Jaipur. Rajasthan, 2023) available at: https://deb.ugc.ac.in/Uploads/SelfLearning/HEI-Exempted-U-0748/HEI-Exempted-U-0748\_SelfLearning\_20231026135504.pdf (last visited August 5, 2024). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Essential elements of a Valid Contract, available at (last visited on August 7, 2024) [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Indian Contract Act, 1872, s. 68 [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Indian Contract Act, 1872, s. 11 [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Indian Contract Act, 1872, s. 69 [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Indian Contract Act, 1872, s. 70 [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Indian Contract Act, 1872, s. 71 [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Indian Contract Act, 1872, s. 72 [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) *Damodara Mudaliar And Anr. vs Secretary Of State For India* on 18 October, 1894, (1895)ILR 18MAD88 [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) *Kunwarlal Daryavsingh vs Surajmal Makhanlal And Ors*. on 14 July, 1961, AIR1963MP58, AIR 1963 [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) *Ameen trading co vs bank of Baroda* \[Civil Appeal No. 363 of 2022\] **Categories:** Articles, Contract Law --- ### [ARTICLE 14: EQUALITY BEFORE LAW, EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW AND DICEY’S RULE OF LAW](https://lawfoyer.in/article-14-equality-before-law-equal-protection-of-law-and-diceys-rule-of-law/) **Published:** September 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: SADHVIKA.S, GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE, TRICHIRAPALLI** **Edited By: Ritesh Singh Shekhawat, MJRPU, Jaipur** **INTRODUCTION** Art[\[1\]](#_ftn1).14 to 18 of the constitution guarantees the right to equality to every citizen of India. Art.14 embodies the general principles of equality before the law and prohibits unreasonable discrimination between persons. Art. 14 embodies the idea of equality expressed in the Preamble. Equality is considered to be fundamental in the formulation of any policy by the state and it can be seen in Art.38,39,39-A,43, and 46 of the Constitution embedded in part IV[\[2\]](#_ftn2) of the Constitution. The Rule of Law embodied in Art. 14 is the basic feature of the Indian Constitution and hence it cannot be destroyed even by an amendment of the Constitution under Art.368 of the Constitution[\[3\]](#_ftn3) “ *The aim of having fundamental rights declare that certain elementary rights such as the right to life, liberty, freedom of speech freedom of should be regarded as inviolable under all conditions and that the shifting majority in legislature of the country should not have a free hand in interfering with these fundamental rights[**\[4\]**](#_ftn4)”.* **HISTORY OF ARTICLE 14** The Constitution of India contains a long list of fundamental rights in Part III[\[5\]](#_ftn5). This part of the Constitution is considered the Magna Carta of India. In 1215, the English people exacted an assurance from King John for the respect of the then-ancient liberties. This is the first written document relating to the fundamental rights of citizens. Following the spirit of the Magna Carta of the British and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the citizens of France, the Americans incorporated the Bill of Rights in their Constitution. The framers took inspiration from this and incorporated a full chapter in the Constitution dealing with fundamental rights. **NEED FOR THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS** Fundamental rights were deemed essential to protect the rights and liberties of the people against the encroachment of the Power delegated by them to the Government. “ *There are limitations upon all the powers of the Government, legislative as well as executive and they are essential for the preservation of public and private rights, notwithstanding the representative character of the political instruments[**\[6\]**](#_ftn6).”* In *Maneka Gandhi vs. UOI[**\[7\]**](#_ftn7),* the SC observed that “ These fundamental rights represent the basic values cherished by the people of India since the Vedic times and they are calculated to protect the dignity of the individual and create conditions times in which every human being can develop his personality to the fullest extent. They weave a ‘pattern of guarantee’ on the basic structure of human rights, and impose negative obligations on the state not to encroach on individual liberty in its various dimensions”. **SUB-HEADING** **Two expressions under ART.14** ART.14 declares that “The state shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India”. ART. 14 uses two expressions “equality before the law” and “equal protection of the law”. Equality before the law is a somewhat negative concept and Equal protection of the law is considered to be a positive concept. However, the common idea is that both express the equality concept. “ *The second expression is a corollary of the first and it is difficult to imagine a situation in which the violation of the equal protection of laws will not be the violation of the equality before law. Thus, in substance, the two expressions mean the same thing”[**\[8\]**](#_ftn8).* **Equality before the law and absolute equality** The concept of equality does not mean absolute equality among human beings which is physically not possible to achieve it. It is a concept implying the absence of any special positions among humans based on caste, color, sex, age, birth, creed or not to favor any particular section of the society or person and also to ensure that equality is served to all the individuals and ordinary law of the land. **Equal protection of the laws** The guarantee of Equal protection of laws is similar to one embodied in the 14th Amendment to the American Constitution[\[9\]](#_ftn9). It only means that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike both in the privileges conferred and liabilities imposed by the laws. Equal law should be applied to all in the same situation, and there should be no discrimination between one person and another. Thus, the rule is that *Like should be treated as alike and not that unlike should be treated alike.* **Rule of law** The guarantee of equality before the law is an aspect of what Dicey calls the ‘*Rule of law’* in *England.* It means that no man is above the law and that every person, whatever his rank or conditions, is subject to the jurisdiction of ordinary courts. Dicey writes “ *Every official from Prime Minister down to constables or a collector of taxes is under the same responsibility for every act done without legal jurisdiction as any other citizens”.* **Professor Dicey gave three meanings of the Rule of Law thus-** Absence of Arbitrary power or supremacy of the law- It means the absolute supremacy of law as opposed to the arbitrary power of the Government. Equality before the law- This exactly means that *“ Nobody is above the law and all are equal before the law”*. Every individual in society must be treated equally without any kind of discrimination or special status. The constitution is the result of the ordinary law of the land. It can be said that the first and second points are suitable for the Indian system but the third aspect of Dicey’s rule doesn’t apply to the Indian system as the source of rights of individuals is the Constitution of India. In Justice K. Puttaswamy vs. UOI[\[10\]](#_ftn10), “ *It was viewed by the SC as the fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution are inalienable human rights which get recognition in the constitution”.* **Exceptions to the Rule of Law** - ‘Equality before the law’ doesn’t mean that the rule ‘powers of the private citizens are the same as the powers of the public officials. Generally, the people with authority are provided with powers, but this doesn’t mean that all private people can exercise their powers in terms of equality. - The rule of law doesn’t prevent certain classes of persons from being subject to special rules. - Ministers and other executive bodies are given very statutes discretionary powers by the statutes. - Certain members of society are governed by special rules in their professions. Such classes of people are treated differently from ordinary citizens. **LIMITATIONS OF EFFECTIVENESS OF ART.14** The constitution itself contains provisions which, under certain circumstances, limit the effectiveness of Art.14- - The scope of the right to equality under Art.14 has been considerably restricted by the 42nd Amendment Act,1976. In *Sanjeev Coke Mfg. co. vs. Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd,* “ where Art. 31C comes in, Art. 14 goes out”[\[11\]](#_ftn11). - 359(1) provides that if the President of India issues an order, where a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, enforcement of Art. 14 may be suspended for the period during which the Proclamation is in force. - Under Art.361, the President and the Governors are exempted from any criminal proceedings during the tenure of their office. - Under International Law, foreign sovereigns and ambassadors enjoy full immunity from any judicial process. This is also available to enemy aliens for acts of war. **TEST OF REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION** The Equal protection of the law doesn’t mean that all the laws should be general. The law cannot be the same for all people. It does not mean that every law must be universal, as people differ by nature, attainment, or circumstances. In the *Chiranjit Lal vs. UOI[**\[12\]**](#_ftn12)* case, the court upheld that “*The varying needs of different classes of persons often require separate treatment”.* Thus, Art.14 forbids the class- legislation and it does not forbid the reasonable classification. The classification must not be ‘*arbitrary, artificial or evasive’* but must be based on some real and substantial distinction bearing a just and reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the legislation[\[13\]](#_ftn13). - Classification to be reasonable must fulfill the following two conditions:- - The classification must be founded on an intelligible *differentia* that distinguishes persons or things that are grouped from others left out of the group, - The *differentia* must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act[\[14\]](#_ftn14). What is necessary is that there must be a *nexus* between the basis of classification and the object of the Act which makes the classification. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** In *Menaka Gandhi vs. UOI[**\[15\]**](#_ftn15),* The court held that “ *Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be imprisoned with the traditional and doctrinaire limits”.* The society is composed of unequals and a welfare state has to strive by both executive and legislative action to help the less fortunate and to improve their conditions so that social and economic inequality in society may be bridged. The doctrine of classification evolved to the legislation of state action in or to weaker sections of the society or some such segments of the society in need of succor. **REFERENCES** **Cases Referred** - Indira Nehru Gandhi vs. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299. - K. Gopalan vs. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27. - Hartado vs. people of California,28 Led 232, per Mathew, J. - Maneka Gandhi vs. UOI, AIR 1978 SC 597 at p.619. - State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar AIR 1952 SC 75. - Puttaswamy vs. UOI, AIR 2017 SC 4161. - Sanjeev Coke Mfg. co. vs. Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd,1983 1 SCC 147 - Chiranjit Lal vs. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41. - C. Cooper vs. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564. - Thimmappa vs. Chairman. Central Board of Directors, SBI, AIR 2001SC 467. **Statutes Referred** - Constitution of India, 1950. - Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. **Books Referred** - Pandey, J.N., Srivastava, S.S., 2014. Constitutional Law of India. [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Article of Constitution of India,1950. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Directive principles of policy(part IV of the constitution) [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Indira Nehru Gandhi vs. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299 [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) A.K. Gopalan vs. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27 [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Fundamental Rights (part III of the Constitution) [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Hartado vs. people of California,28 Led 232, per Mathew, J. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Maneka Gandhi vs. UOI, AIR 1978 SC 597 at p.619 [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar AIR 1952 SC 75. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) “ Nor shall any state – deny to any person equal protection of laws” [\[10\]](#_ftnref10)K. Puttaswamy vs. UOI, AIR 2017 SC 4161. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Sanjeev coke Mfg. co. vs. Bharat cooking coal Ltd,1983 1 SCC 147 [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Chiranjit Lal vs. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) R. C. Cooper vs. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564 [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) K. Thimmappa vs. Chairman. Central Board of Directors, SBI, AIR 2001SC 467. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Menaka Gandhi vs. UOI, AIR 1978 SC 597 **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Jolly George Verghese vs State Bank of Cochin](https://lawfoyer.in/jolly-george-verghese-vs-state-bank-of-cochin/) **Published:** September 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Name of Author-Riya Kore, DES Shri Navalmal Firodia Law College** **Edited by – Sulesh Choudhary** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** In this case, Jolly George Verghese vs State Bank of Cochin, the petitioner is Jolly George Verghese. He borrowed a loan from Respondent Bank for his property. Later on, the time for its repayment and the petitioner could not repay the debts, a warrant of his arrest was issued. Here it may be questioned whether the detention of any debtor is prudent under Article 11 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The judgment of this case was delivered by Justice Krishna Iyer. This is a landmark case of public international. The court states that to arrest a debtor for debt recovery without investing whether the non-payment is because of inability or bad intention is unconstitutional. The court said only default in payment of debts is insufficient there should be bad faith or malice intention at the time of default in payment of loan amount. **Keywords:** *Article 11, Indian constitution, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Supreme Court, Section 51, Civil Procedure Code, Debt recovery, Article 21* **CASE DETAILS** ***i)**Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** Jolly George Verghese vs state bank of cochin ***ii)**Petitioner*** Jolly George Verghese ***iii)**Respondent*** Bank of Cochin ***iv)**Judgement Date*** February 4, 1980 ***v)**Court*** Supreme Court of India ***vi)**Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** 2 Judges ***vii)**Author / Name of Judges*** V.R. Krishna Iyer and R.S. Pathak ***viii)**Citation*** 1980 AIR 470, 1980 SCR (2) 913, 1980 SCC (2) 360 ***ix)**Legal Provisions Involved*** 1\. Section 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) 2\. Article 21 of the Constitution 3\. Article 11 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The case *Jolly George Varghese vs State Bank of Cochin* was judged by the Supreme Court of India. The court referred to section 51 of the civil procedure code, which states that a debtor cannot be imprisoned unless the court is convinced that the debtor is likely to abscond, has committed bad faith, has the means to pay the decree, or is bound in a fiduciary capacity to account for the sum. The court is required to record reasons for detention in writing. Here Article 21 of the Indian constitution states that every individual has the right to live a life of personal freedom unless and until it is established by law. In the present case, the appellant was imprisoned without any proper investigation of mala fide intention behind the act. **FACTS OF THE CASE** **Procedural Background of the case:** Petitioner borrowed a loan from the respondent bank for his property and later he couldn’t repay the said amount. **Factual Background of the case:** - The warrant of arrest had been issued against the petitioner under section 51, order 21, and rule 37 of the civil procedure code on 6TH of August,1979. - The same warrant was issued for the same judicial decree. - The judgment was against the appellant who suffered an order of Rs 2.5 lakhs to the respondent bank. There are two more orders issued against an appellant total of Rs 7 lakhs payable. - A receiver was arranged by the court that took the right of the appellant to transfer the property and all other rights related to property. - This case was raised in the high court and the demand filed by the appellant was kicked out without conscientious study for such arrest to take place. - There should be a proper set of investigations to know whether the debtor has malice intention present behind the nonpayment of debts. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** - Whether it is lawful to detain any debtor under Article 11 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. - Whether invasion of the personal freedom of any person till the debtor pays his debt is lawful. **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** - The appellant states that all the sections and articles that are mentioned in the Indian constitution i.e. right to life and personal liberty are not just, fair, and equal. - It argued that null and nonpayment of debts will be against Article 21 of the Indian constitution and also Article 11 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. - Therefore, it leads to the vitiation of Article 11 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 21 of the Indian constitution. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** - The respondent bank argued that Jolly George Verghese borrowed the loan amount of Rs 2.5 lakh that was attached to the property leading to a default in repayment of the said amount. - The bank argued that they had the authority to recover the debt amount by taking belongings of the property that was mortgaged as mentioned in the terms of the loan agreement. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** ***Section 51 Civil Procedure Code – Powers of Court to enforce execution:*** *Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, the Court may, on the application of the decree-holder, order execution of the decree-* 1. *by delivery of any property specifically decreed;* 2. *by attachment and sale or by the sale without attachment of any property;* 3. *by arrest and detention in prison for such period not exceeding the period specified in section 58, where arrest and detention is permissible under that section;* 4. *by appointing a receiver; or* 5. *in such other manner as the nature of the relief granted may require;* *Provided that, where the decree is for the payment of money, execution by detention in prison shall not be ordered unless, after allowing the judgment-debtor to show cause why he should not be committed to prison, the Court, for reasons recorded in writing, is satisfied-* 1. *that the judgment-debtor, with the object or effect of obstructing or delaying the execution of the decree-* 2. *is likely to abscond or leave the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court, or* 3. *has, after the institution of the suit in which the decree was passed, dishonestly transferred, concealed, or removed any part of his property, or committed any other act of bad faith about his property, or* 4. *that the judgment-debtor has, or has had since the date of the decree, the means to pay the amount of the decree or some substantial part thereof and refuses or neglects or has refused or neglected to pay the same, or* 5. *that the decree is for a sum for which the judgment-debtor was bound in a fiduciary capacity to account.* ***Article 11 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:*** *No one shall be imprisoned merely on the grounds of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation.* ***Article 21 of the Constitution:*** *No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.* **JUDGEMENT** The decision of the court was in the Favor of Jolly George Varghese. The court held that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is rectified but it has not incorporated, so the municipal court can’t address violation of international law. Therefore, municipal law is binding in nature and international law is not binding. The action of the bank at the time of taking possession of the mortgaged property without any process of law was violative of natural justice. The court held that mala fide intention or presence of mens rea behind the failure in payment of debts can lead to punishment. If there is not any dishonest intention then the person is not liable for punishment. Therefore, the only failure in payment of debts is insufficient to arrest a person there should be mens rea present. It will not be appropriate to imprison any person without intention if it happens so Article 11 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 21 of the Indian constitution will be violated. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The case *Jolly George Varghese vs State Bank of Cochin* is very significant because it demonstrates India’s supreme court’s use of its power to place in section 51 of the civil procedure code for achieving justice. The court emphasized the importance of just and fair procedure while giving judgment and protecting Varghese’s interest against the bank. The decision of the court was that to imprison a person for their inability to pay debts, there should be wilful nonpayment or malafide conduct. **REFERENCES** - *Jolly George Verghese & Anr vs The Bank of Cochin on 4 February 1980.* [*https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1741605/*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1741605/) - *Can a person be imprisoned on the ground that he did not discharge his contractual liability* [*https://www.lawyersclubindia.com/judiciary/can-a-person-be-imprisoned- on-the-ground-that-he-did-not-discharge-his-contractual-liability-4491.asp*](https://www.lawyersclubindia.com/judiciary/can-a-person-be-imprisoned-%20%20%20%20%20on-the-ground-that-he-did-not-discharge-his-contractual-liability-4491.asp) - *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* [https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international- covenant-civil-and-political-rights](https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-%20%20%20%20%20%20%20covenant-civil-and-political-rights) - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Constitution of India. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Civil Law Cases, Constitutional Law Cases, International Law --- ### [Public Interest Foundation and Others v. Union of India and Another (2018)](https://lawfoyer.in/public-interest-foundation-and-others-v-union-of-india-and-another-2018/) **Published:** September 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Name of Author- Sagar Mazumdar, Rabindra Shiksha Sammillani Law College, University of Calcutta** **Edited by – Sulesh Choudhary** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The case mainly depicts the growing criminalisation of politics in India. Persons with criminal cases against them kept on increasing in the political field. The petitioners urged the Supreme Court to disqualify members with criminal charges. For this, the main issue revolved around the question of whether the Supreme Court disqualified membership under grounds beyond what is provided for in the Constitution as well as in the Representation of India Act, 1951. The petitioners in this regard advanced many arguments. The first respondent that is the Attorney General of India appearing for the Union of India contended that where the Constitution expressly provides that the Parliament is the sole body to make law on this matter, no other body shall make law other than the Parliament. The Court after referring to many judgements, reports and surveys came to the conclusion that it was the Parliament which was bestowed by the Constitution to make laws on the matter. The Court also went on to the extent of discussing other issues of criminalisation of politics, the role of the Election Commission and Analysing of Election Symbol. The Court also provided guidelines in this regard. **Keywords:** Criminalisation of Politics, Judicial Statesmanship, Articles 102 & 191 of the Constitution, Separation of Power, Constitutional Morality, Doctrine of Fiduciary Relationship **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** Public Interest Foundation v. Union of India ***ii)* *Case Number*** Writ Petition (Civil) No. 536 of 2011 ***iii)* *Judgement Date*** September 25, 2018 ***iv)* *Court*** Supreme Court of India ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** 5 Judge Bench ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges*** Dipak Misra, CJI (Author); Rohinton Fali Nariman, J; A.M. Khanwilkar, J; Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud, J; Indu Malhotra, J. ***vii)* *Citation*** Public Interest Foundation & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr., (2018) 10 SCC 1 ***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved*** Article 102 and Article 191 of the Constitution of India **FACTS OF THE CASE** **Procedural Background of the Case** The case was being heard by a three Judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court which was of the view that it would be better to leave the matter for the Constitutional Bench to decide. Though a submission was made before the Court that the matter was already decided in a previous judgement (Madan Narula v. Union of India), the submission was not accepted on the grounds of the views expressed in the separate judgement by Madan B. Lokur, J. **Factual Background of the Case** The case mainly revolved around the growing number of persons becoming lawmakers who themselves have been accused of several crimes. There have been such persons who have been accused of serious offences which are punishable for a period of up to five years and more. This led to the filing of a suit to determine the grounds for disqualification of membership and whether the Court was entitled to disqualify members on some additional grounds other than what was already mentioned under the Constitution and Representation of People Act, 1951. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** - Whether the Court can lay down additional grounds for disqualification of membership beyond the grounds mentioned under Article 102(1)(a) to (d); Article 191(1)(a) to (d) and the law made by the Parliament on that behalf? - The Court was also asked to decide on three interconnected issues: the Criminalisation of Politics; the Role of the Election Commission and the Analysis of Election Symbol. **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that - **Role of Court**: The growing number of persons with criminal antecedents must not be viewed narrowly but from a wider perspective. The Court should not act as a mute spectator. Given ‘judicial statesmanship’, it has a major role to play. - **Law Breakers should not be Law Makers**: The petitioners cited the recommendations of the Law Commission which stated that the political atmosphere was being dominated by history sheeters. - **Doctrine of Fiduciary Relationship**: The petitioners contended that if members of the Public Service Commission, Chief Vigilance Commissioner, and Chief Secretary can undergo the test of integrity check, and if they can be disqualified on the ground of ‘framing of charge’ then why the same not apply to the members of Parliament and State Legislatures as well. The doctrine has been extended to several constitutional posts. - **Right to Contest Election is Not a Fundamental Right**: They also argued that if they do not adhere to the Constitutional ethos and principles, such members can be prevented from contesting election as it is not a fundamental right but a statutory right. - **View on Presumption of Innocence**: The petitioners believe the theory of innocent until proven guilty of criminal law. Thus, they state that it is more like a civil rule that if any person is charged with any offence, then such person shall be debarred from contesting any election. The intervenor organisation also agreeing with the petitioners held that persons charged with serious offences punishable with imprisonment of 5 years or must be disqualified as being members of Parliament. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that - **Separation of Power**: The Attorney General of India agreeing on the role of the court as the final arbiter, also rebutted that it is not the duty of the Court to make law as it can only recommend the Parliament. It will not be proper for the Court to cross the ‘Lakshman Rekha’. If the Court resorts to such means, then it will be an encroachment on the Constitutional principle. Thus, it will be better for the Court to leave the law-making power up to the Parliament especially when Constitutional and Statutory provisions exist. The Attorney General of India for this purpose relied on the judgement in the State of Himachal Pradesh and others v. Satpal Saini and Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala and another which concretised the doctrine of separation of power. - **Innocent Until Proven Guilty**: The Attorney General of India appearing for the Union of India contended that every person must be presumed innocent until proven guilty. This has been the hallmark of Indian democracy. Therefore, punishing a person just based on a charge against him cannot be a proper methodology. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** - **Article 102 of the Constitution of India**: It deals with the disqualification of membership of either House of Parliament. - **Article 191 of the Constitution of India**: It deals with the disqualification of membership of the State Legislature or Legislative Council. - **Section 7, Representation of the People Act, 1951**: It deals with the definition of the expressions ‘appropriate government’ and ‘disqualified’. - **Section 8, 8A, 9, 9A, 10, 10A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951**: It deals with the specific grounds for disqualification of membership. **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** - **Parliament’s Power to Make Law**: The Court referring to the judgement passed in Lily Thomson v. Union of India agreed that the Parliament was the only body which had the power to make law on the matter concerning disqualification as covered under Article 102(1)(e). - **Growing Cases of Criminalisation of Politics**: The Supreme Court referring to a plethora of judgements, reports, and surveys was of the view that the nexus of politicians, bureaucrats and criminals was not the only concern, but now new reports suggest that the trend is that criminals are joining the political parties itself and their winning percentage proves that even the political party shows no reluctance in giving them a ticket for the second time. - **No Colourable Exercise of Judicial Power**: The Court had while interpreting the provisions of law and considering the arguments advanced by both the parties considered a well-accepted principle in the Indian judiciary that ‘what cannot be done directly should not be done indirectly’. To add weightage to the abovementioned principle, the Court also considered some of the earlier judgements of the Supreme Court itself. **GUIDELINES** The Court held that knowing the details of the candidates including the number of criminal cases pending against him is a fundamental right under Article 19(1). To ensure that the voters receive information about the candidates, the Court has issued the following guidelines: - Each contesting candidate shall fill up the form as provided by the Election Commission and the form must contain all the particulars as required therein. - It shall state, in bold letters, about the criminal cases pending against the candidate. - If a candidate is contesting an election on the ticket of a particular party, he/she is required to inform the party about the criminal cases pending against him/her. - The concerned political party shall be obligated to put up on its website the aforesaid information about candidates having criminal antecedents. - The candidate as well as the concerned political party shall issue a declaration in the widely circulated newspapers in the locality about the antecedents of the candidate and also give wide publicity in the electronic media. When we say wide publicity, we mean that the same shall be done at least thrice after filing the nomination papers. **OBITER DICTA** - The criminalisation of Politics: The Court while considering the question of the growing criminalisation of politics considered a plethora of judgements and reports. One of the most important of them was the Vohra Committee Report and the 244th Law Commission Report, which dealt with an important question, whether disqualification shall be triggered on the ground of conviction, framing of charges, or presentation of the report by the Investigating Officer? The Commission held that framing of charges was a good ground for disqualification. - Role of Election Commission: The Court speaking on the role of the Election Commission discussed its power of superintendence, power and control of elections. It also held that its power was not absolute but only limited. Though it was created by the Constitution, still it did not have legislative power at par with the Parliament. - Analysis of Election Symbol: Regarding the analysis of election symbols, the Court held that there are two types of election symbols: reserved and free. Reserved election symbols are the election symbols of the political parties. Whereas free election symbols are for the individual candidates. The Court held that it would be a farce to prevent candidates of political parties from contesting elections from the very symbol of their party. Even The Parliament by law was entitled to legislate some proper law on that matter. - Role of Prime Minister and Chief Minister: Regarding the role of the Prime Minister and Chief Minister in advising the members to be selected as Council of Ministers, the Court referring to the Constituent Assembly Debates especially the speeches by Dr B.R. Ambedhkar and Dr Rajendra Prasad who talked about the ethics and principles of the Prime Minister. The Court observed that something has been left to the Prime Minister for his discretion and it is presumed that he shall discharge his duty with utmost diligence. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The Hon’ble Supreme Court believes that it is only the Parliament which has been vested with the power to legislate on matters related to disqualification. The Parliament also held that every citizen has the right to know about the person he/she is voting for. The Court opined that it would be unhealthy for a democracy to have uninformed or misinformed voters, thus defeating the Constitutional duty. This will make it easy for people with criminal backgrounds to make an easy way into the rooms of Constitutional ethos. It will enable the lawbreakers to become the lawmakers. Keeping these things in mind, the Court issued a guideline containing five points which have enabled the candidates to furnish proper information so that the common man voting for them should be well aware of the identity of such candidates. The Court also opined that it would not be a proper rule to get things done in a way which otherwise has been prohibited. This shall be a proper breach of the doctrine of separation of power. The Court also recommended the Parliament to legislate and introduce proper laws so that people who have been charged with criminal offence are discouraged or rather disqualified from contesting election and thus making way to the legislating wing of the State. This 100-paged judgement shall always act as a torch bearer. It shall always remind the principles of constitutional morality and the doctrine of separation of power. The Court very beautifully maintained the well-accepted principle that “what cannot be done directly, should not be done indirectly”. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** - *Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal and others v. State of Bihar and others, (2016) 3 SCC 183* - *Manoj Narula v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 1* - *Lily Thomas v. Union of India and others, (2013) 7 SCC 653* - *Dinesh Trivedi, M.P. and others v. Union of India and others, (1997) 4 SCC 306* - *Anukul Chandra Pradhan, Advocate Supreme Court v. Union of India and others, (1997) 6 SCC 1* - *Prabhakaran v. P. Jayarajan, AIR 2005 SC 688* - *Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, AIR 1978 SC 851* - *Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms, (2002) 5 SCC 294* - *Subhash Chandra Agarwal v. Indian National Congress and others, (2013) CIC 8047* - *People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 399* - *State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659* - *Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4* - *Election Commission of India and another. v. Dr. Subramaniam Swamy and another, (1996) 4 SCC 104* - *State of Himachal Pradesh and others v. Satpal Saini, (2017) 11 SCC 42* - *Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala and another, (1973) 4 SCC 225* - *Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander and another, (2012) 9 SCC 460* - *Union of India and another v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, (1992) Supp (1) 323* - *Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India and another, (1998) 4 SCC 409* - *Allied Motors Limited v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, (2012) 2 SCC 1* - *Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253* - *People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2013) 10 SCC 1* - *Brundaban v. Election Commission, \[1965\] 3 SCR 53* **Important Statutes Referred** - Representation of the People Act, 1951 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Ashok Thakur V Union of India (2008)](https://lawfoyer.in/ashok-thakur-v-union-of-india-2008/) **Published:** September 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Name of Author-** **Tushar Rana, UPES, Dehradun** **Edited by – Sulesh Choudhary** **ABSTRACT** The Ashok Thakur v. Union of India verdict of the Supreme Court in 2008 is yet another milestone in this journey toward social equality within Indian society. The landmark case upheld constitutional changes permitting reservations for the underprivileged in educational institutions, aiming to provide better opportunities to socially and educationally backward classes, Scheduled Castes, and Scheduled Tribes. It also went on to emphasize the requirement for exclusion of the creamy layer from these benefits, so that the help reaches those who need it. It also called for periodic reviews so that the policies remain relevant and effective. This judgment hence has been pretty seminal in the shape it has given to India’s educational landscape, with this equipoise between social justice and merit. It questions what lies beneath the Court’s judgment, the implications of its decision, and how it tries to balance fairness and excellence in education. Keywords – Supreme court, Social equality, Educational Reservations, Underprivileged Groups, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribes, Creamy Layer exclusion. **CASE DETAILS:-** Name of the case Ashok Thakur V Union of State Citations Civil Appeal No. 265 of 2008 Date of the Case April 10, 2008 Petitioner Ashok Kumar Thakur Respondent Union of India Bench/Judge DR ARIJIT PASAYAT AND C.K. THAKKER Court Supreme Court Of India Important Sections/ Articles Involved Article 14, Article 15(4), Article 15 (5), Article 19(1)(g), Article 21 of the Constitution of India,1950. **INTRODUCTION** The landmark case of Ashok Thakur v UOI (2008) tells the intense issue of reservations in educational institutions in India. Supreme Court of India heard this case and involved the constitutional validity of the 93rd Constitutional Amendment and Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act, 2006. Article 15 Clause 5 is added by the 93rd Amendment allowing the state to make a reservation in admission into educational institutions including private schools or colleges whether or not aided by the government. The legislation’s goal is to encourage social equality and equal opportunities for all citizens but faces various difficulties due to its effect on the right to equality and liberty of private institutions. The Supreme Court’s ruling in this case significantly balanced the principles of social justice, equal opportunities and equality in India’s educational system. **FACTS OF THE CASE** In this case, Petitions challenging the Constitution (93rd Amendment)Act,2005 and Central Education Institutions Act, 2006 came together and brought to the constitutional bench on the Supreme Court. The CEI Act, 2006 tells that members of Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBCs) and Schedule Caste/Schedule Tribe (SC/ST) in Central Institutes of Higher Education. The petitioner challenged the reservation to the extent of 27% of the total number of seats for the “socially and educationally backward classes of citizens. The petitioners argued that admission to educational institutions ought to be determined solely by merit and that the State ought to have the authority to give preference to a student who has less merit over those who would have otherwise got admission, which is ex-facie discriminatory. According to the petitioner, the amendment went against the Doctrine of Basic Structure. They further argued that SEBCs and Other Backward Classes (OBCs) cannot be identified due to a lack of criteria. Also, the concept of creamy layer applies to Article 15 and Article 16 and the non-exclusion of creamy layer in the Act is illegal. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED:** - Whether the expressions ‘class’ and ‘castes’ are synonyms? - Whether reservations provide the only solution for social empowerment measures? - Whether the legislature have enacted the valid part if it had known that the rest of the statute was invalid? - Whether the action taken by the Government be upheld after judicial scrutiny? **Petitioner’s Arguments** - Learned counsel for petitioners has highlighted these decisions to show what should be the method in matters related to social empowerment. - It was pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the findings of huge financial burden questions have no place in the parliamentary debate. - Petitioners submit that some members of selected backward classes are highly competent socially as well as economically and educationally. It is also submitted that they represent the forward section of the selected backward class as forward as another forward class member and that they take full advantage of the benefits of reservations meant for that class. These Persons are not backward and with them, a class cannot be treated as backward. It is also pointed out that since Jayashree almost every decision has accepted the validity of this submission. - One of the significant issues that is highlighted by Mr P.P Rao was that in some cases the matriculation standard of education was considered to be the reliable measure for measuring backwardness. It is also submitted that at least half of the people belonging to a specific caste have reached the matriculation level of education, they cannot be viewed to be educationally backward any longer. It has moreover been highlighted that the move of emphasis from primary and fundamental education to higher education is against the sacred order making education necessary in terms of Article 21-A of the Constitution of India. - It is also contended by learned counsel for the petitioners whether the concept of strict scrutiny is a measure of judicial scrutiny as highlighted by the conditions in India. It is submitted that the label is not relevant. **Respondent’s Arguments** - Learned Counsel for the respondent had stated that there are several cases where applications were made for inclusion they have been turned down. - Respondents have contended the concept of the creamy layer may have connected for Article 16(4) but is insignificant so far as Articles 15(4) and 15(5) are concerned. It is submitted that Article 16(4) is relatable to inadequate representation in government services and in that context, the Supreme Court has decided that the economically well-off individuals within the socially and educationally backward classes should not be included in the reservation benefits. But this logic doesn’t apply to the current issue, which involves admissions to educational institutions. Before we can discuss whether it’s a good idea to exclude the ‘creamy layer,’ we need to understand what this term means. It’s important to look at what the Court has said about this concept in various past cases. - According to the respondent, the argument of ‘creamy layer’ is a ruse, a scheme to remove the benefits of the reservation for the backward classes. It is also submitted that no member came forward from the backward classes with regards to this plea and that it will become the members of forward classes to raise this point. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** **Constitution of India** - **Article 15(4)** – This article talks about the power to make special provisions for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for SCs and STs.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) - **Article 15(5) –** This was added by the 93rd Amendment. It lets the state make special provisions for the advancement of SEBCs, SCs, and STs when it comes to admissions in educational institutions, including private ones, but not minority institutions.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) - **Article 14 –** It talks about everyone being treated equally under the law.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) - **Article 19(1)(g) –** It gives every citizen the right to practice any profession.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) - **Article 21 –** It talks about the protection of life and Personal Liberty.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) **Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act, 2006** - This law mandates that a certain percentage of seats in central educational institutions like IITs and IIMs must be reserved for SCs, STs, and Other Backward Classes (OBCs). **JUDGEMENT** The Court noted that if the creamy layer is not excluded, the 93rd Amendment would be ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court held that there should be no strict guidelines regarding the identification of the creamy layer; instead, the Government should make that decision. The court further decided that OBCs are subject to the creamy layer prohibition rule. The Court further noted that by taking away citizens of their fundamental right to continue their occupation under Article 19(1)(g), placing reservations without assistance institutions violates the Basic Structure. Nonetheless, the 93rd Amendment to the Constitution is enforceable concerning state-maintained and legally assisted educational institutions. The court further said that the minority educational institutions are separate classes, and they are protected by the other constitutional provisions. Hence, they are not unconstitutional. The court held that Articles 14 and 15 have their separate impacts and do not violate each other, hence they are constitutionally valid. **CONCLUSION/COMMENTS** “Reservation is one of the many tools that are used to preserve and promote the essence of equality so that disadvantaged groups can be brought to the forefront of civil life,” the court stated in this case when discussing the necessity of reservations. The Court ruled that the 93rd Amendment was lawful and that, in terms of the creamy layer, OBCs should be given preference over SC/STs. **ENDNOTES** [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art 15(4). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art 15(5). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art 14. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art 19(1)(g). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art 21. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Union of India Vs. Deloitte Haskins and sells LLP](https://lawfoyer.in/union-of-india-vs-deloitte-haskins-and-sells-llp/) **Published:** September 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Name of Author- Lalidhambha S., Government Law College, Dharmapuri** **Edited by – Sulesh Choudhary** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** This case deals with the provisions of Section 140(5) of the Companies Act, 2013 which deals with the Removal and resignation of the Auditor and giving of special notice mentioned in Chapter 10 of the act which deals with Auditor and Audit. Also, Section 143(12) provides that in the event an auditor has reason to believe that an offence or fraud is being or has been committed in a company then the auditor has to report this to the central government. It includes Section 144 provides that an auditor cannot provide management services to the company. Thus Section 140(5) has to be interpreted in the light of these provisions. According to this provision NCLT as a preliminary measure, has the power to order a change of auditor on an application made by the central government and further upon the final enquiry, also it can such an auditor shall not act as auditor of any company for five years. When the Supreme Court was about to deal with this case in such a situation where the reference had been made by the central government, Deloitte resigned as auditor and argued the proceedings as per the proviso to Section 140(5). However, the Supreme Court dismissed the arguments by stating that the subsequent resignation of an auditor cannot terminate proceedings under the second proviso to 140(5) when such an auditor has directly or indirectly acted fraudulently. Also, the court brushed aside arguments regarding the violation of Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. **Keywords**: Companies Act 2013, Article 14, Article 19(1)(g), Removal and Resignation of auditor, NCLT **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name* Union of India v. Deloitte Haskins and Sells LLP *Case Number* 2304-2307 of 2022 *Judgement Date* 03-05-2023 *Court* The Supreme Court of India *Quorum / Constitution of Bench* 3 *Author / Name of Judges* Justice M.R. Shah Justice M.M. Sundresh Justice C.T. Ravikumar *Citation* 2023 SCC OnLine SC 557 *Legal Provisions Involved* Section 140(5) of Companies Act 2013 Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g) **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** In the judgment of Union of India v. Deloitte Haskins and Sells LLP, where the Supreme Court had stated the law about the removal and resignation of an auditor, whereas the proceedings had been initiated under section 140(5) of the Companies Act, 2013. Following that the Supreme Court also upheld the constitutional validity of the provisions and interpreted it as neither discriminatory, arbitrary and/or violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. Initially, the petition was filed before the National Company Law Tribunal seeking the removal and the inquiry into the conduct of an author involved in suspected fraud. **FACTS OF THE CASE** **Procedural Background of the Case** The Ministry of Corporate Affairs directed the Serious Fraud Investigation Office to investigate IL&FS and its subsidiaries. The new board of directors submitted a progress report, and the SFIO also submitted an interim report on the individuals in control of IL&FS and the fraud committed by them. Later, the auditors of IL&FS subsidiary, IFIN, were issued a notice opposing the petition. Further, the proceedings were initiated by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs and the SFIO which seeks the removal of the auditors and also confers that they are ineligible for future appointments. **Factual Background of the Case** A series of defaults by IL&FS Group companies in 2018, with a debt burden of over Rs. 91,000 crores, had severe implications for India’s money market. The Ministry of Corporate Affairs requested action under the Companies Act, 2013, due to concerns about corporate governance failures, window-dressed accounts, and the potential catastrophic impact of further defaults. The High Court has set aside the NCLT’s order, quashing the petition, and cancelling the directions and criminal proceedings, but also upheld the validity of the provision and the auditor of IL&FS had filed a writ petition by challenging its validity. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** - Whether an auditor who is charged with an offence under section 140(5) of the Companies Act dealing with non-reporting of fraud in a company can get away by simply resigning as an auditor and thereby rendering the provisions of section 140(5) nugatory? - Whether section 140(5) of the Companies Act 2013 constitutional? **PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioner submitted that:- - The Petitioner argues against the interpretation of section 140(5) of the Companies Act, 2013 made by the High Court held that the intention behind the provision was to break the collusion between auditors and companies, and if the auditor resigns, the purpose of the section is fulfilled. However, the submission contends that the High Court’s interpretation is erroneous. In conclusion, the petitioner requests the court to set aside the High Court’s order and uphold the proceedings under section 140(5) of the Companies Act, 2013 against the auditors. It argues that the resignation of auditors should not render the proceedings void and that the purpose of the provision is to prevent fraudulent auditors from being appointed in any company. {Devas Multimedia Private Limited v. Antrix Corporation Limited and Another \[(2023)} 1 SCC 216\]} **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that:- The Opposite Party argues various points regarding section 140(5) of the Indian Companies Act, 2013 and its interpretation. The High Court upheld the constitutionality of section 140(5) but read it down to only allow for the removal of an auditor, without the power to punish or debar them. The submission that the NCLT can debar an auditor for 5 years was rejected by the High Court as it only serves the purpose of removing an auditor and is not a standalone provision to disqualify auditors. Additionally, it contends that the resignation of auditors renders the section 140(5) proceedings infructuous, as the purpose of removal and change. Finally, argues that it grants unguided and untrammelled powers to the NCLT in a summary proceeding as it considers the penalty of automatic disqualification, disproportionate, as similar penalties already exist under section 141(3)(h) after due process of the trial. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** **Section 140(5)** – “*Removal and Resignation of Auditor and Giving of Special Notice”* and sub-section (5) states: “*Without prejudice to any action under the provisions of this act or any other law for the time being in force, the Tribunal either suo moto or an application made to it by the central government or by any person concerned, to take action against the auditor who has acted fraudulently or is abetting or colluding in fraud with the management of a company”* **Article 14 –** “*Equality before law or equal protection of the laws”* **Article 19(1)(g)** – “*Right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade, business to all citizens*” **Section 141(3)(h)** – “*prevents a person from being appointed as an auditor of a company if he has been convicted by a court for an offence that involves fraud less than 10 years ago*” **JUDGEMENT** In this case, the Supreme Court reviewed the judgment of the High Court are no longer maintainable as it disagreed with the interpretation and held that the resignation or removal of an auditor does not terminate the proceedings under this provision. Regarding the challenge to the constitutionality of section 140(5), the court upheld its validity. The court also rejected the argument that section 140(5) discriminates against auditors compared to directors and management. It concludes the proceedings under section 140(5) should continue even if an auditor resigns, and the consequences of the final order, including disqualification, should be applied. The court upheld the constitutionality of section 140(5) and dismissed the challenges raised against it. **RATIO DECIDENDI** - The NCLT would have the powers of a civil court to examine the role of auditors and adjudicate their fraudulent conduct and abdication of their function. - The powers under the first proviso to section 140(5), which provides for the removal of the auditor based on a prima facie satisfaction that a fraud has been perpetrated and when circumstances warrant the substitution. - The powers under the second proviso to section 140(5) which envisages debarment of the auditor or the firm for five years passed by NCLT but that shall not be eligible to get appointed in any company for five years. - In comparison to similarly placed alleged perpetrators, such as directors or management, it has been held that auditors play a vital role in the affairs of the company, therefore, they have to act in the larger public interest and consider all the other stakeholders. - Hence the provision cannot be said to be discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** Given the above and for the reasons stated above, a challenge to the constitutional validity of section 140(5) of the companies acts, 2013 fails and it is observed and held that section 140(5) is neither discriminatory, arbitrate violative of articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, as alleged. The Supreme Court, after interpreting the provision has held that even on the principles of joint and severe liability, the auditors and the entire firm including partners shall be liable and therefore can be subjected to section 140(5) of the act. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred:** - {Devas Multimedia Private Limited v. Antrix Corporation Limited and Another \[(2023)} 1 SCC 216\]} **Important Statutes Referred** - The Constitution of India, 1950 - The Companies Act, 2013 **WEBSITES REFERRED** - - - - - - **Categories:** Case Analysis, Company Law, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Behram Khurshid Pesikaka Vs State of Bombay](https://lawfoyer.in/behram-khurshid-pesikaka-vs-state-of-bombay/) **Published:** September 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Name of Author- Bhavya Rathore, UFYLC, University Of Rajasthan, Jaipur** **Edites by- Sulesh Choudhary** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** This appeal by special leave is against the judgment rendered by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, which reversed the appellant’s order of acquittal from the Court of the Presidency Magistrate, 19th Court, Bombay, finding him guilty of a crime under section 66(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, and punishing him with a rigorous one-month jail sentence and a fine of Rs. 500. About the judgments of the majority, the appeal will be dismissed subject to the modification that the sentence imposed upon the appellant will be reduced to that already undergone. Bail bonds will be cancelled[\[1\]](#_ftn1). In the seminal decision of Behram v. State of Bombay (1955), the Indian Supreme Court ruled that the laws enshrined in Part III of the Indian Constitution are exempt from the Doctrine of Waiver. It was noted that basic rights are not just legally protected rights but also rest on principles contained in the preamble of the Indian Constitution that an accused person cannot reject or forsake. This approach does not apply to matters concerning constitutional policy since fundamental rights are issues of national policy that cannot be changed. **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** **Behram Khurshid Pesikaka Vs State of Bombay** ***ii)* *Case Number*** Criminal Appeal No. 42 of 1953, ***iii)* *Judgement Date*** February 19, 1954 ***iv)* *Court*** Supreme Court of India ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** Justice Bhagwati, Justice Jagannadha Das and Justice Venkatarama Ayyar ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges*** Justice Bhagwati. ***vii)* *Citation*** AIR 1955 SC 123 ***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved*** BOMBAY PROHIBITION ACT: S.66(b), S.13(b) CONSTITUTION OF INDIA: Art.141, Art.246, Art.13, Art.13(1), Art.245, Art.12(1) EVIDENCE ACT: S.105 **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** A seminal case that delves into the nuances of alcohol consumption laws, fundamental rights, constitutional lawmaking authority, and the concept of waiver is Behram Khurshid Pesikaka v. State of Bombay. Behram Khurshid Pesikaka, the appellant, was charged with using alcohol without a permit, as required by the Bombay Prohibition Act. The appellant’s defence—that the liquor consumed was not prohibited under the Bombay Prohibition Act and hence did not require a permit—was the central argument in the case. This prompted concerns regarding how the Act’s provisions should be interpreted and applied and whether the appellant’s acts were within its scope. In addition, the case touched on the subject of the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution. It brought up relevant issues regarding the boundaries of governmental authority in controlling individual decisions and actions, particularly about alcohol usage. Throughout the proceedings, a major point of disagreement was how to interpret basic rights in the context of prohibition legislation. The consideration of the legal ramifications of ruling legislation unconstitutional was another important facet of the case. The court had to weigh the effects of legislation that violated basic rights against the procedure for finding such a statute to be unconstitutional. This feature highlighted the difficult balancing act between the intent of the legislature and constitutional protections. **FACTS OF THE CASE** **Procedural Background of the Case** - This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay reversing the order of acquittal passed in favour of the Appellant by the Court of the Presidency Magistrate 19th Court, Bombay and convicting him of an offence under Section 66(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 and sentencing him to one month s rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500/-[\[2\]](#_ftn2) **Factual Background of the Case** - The appellant was the Officiating Regional Transport Officer, Bombay Region, proceeding in his jeep car on 29th May 1951 when he knocked down three persons. From the police station, he was taken to St. George’s Hospital to be examined by the doctor for alleged consumption of liquor. The doctor thought that he did not seem to be under the influence of alcohol though he had taken alcohol in some form or the other. - The appellant was put up before the Presidency Magistrate for his trial under two offences, one under section 338 of the Indian Penal Code and the other under section 66(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act. - The appellant cross-examined the doctor and suggested that he had not consumed any liquor but had taken medicinal preparation containing a small percentage of alcohol. A written statement was filed on the 13th March, 1952, giving the whole history of his case. - The respondent, the State of Bombay, took two appeals before the High Court against each of these two cases. The ruling clearing him of the accusation under section 66(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act was overturned by the High Court, but it upheld the acquittal of the section 338 Indian Penal Code charge. In the case of Rangarao Bala Mane v. State (1951) 54 Bom. L.R. 325), the Division Bench of the High Court upheld the following ruling: ” Once it is proved by the prosecution that a person has drunk or consumed liquor without a permit, it is for that person to show that the liquor drunk by him was not prohibited liquor, but was alcohol or liquor which he is permitted by law to take, e.g., medicated alcohol.” - It concluded that the appellant had failed to prove the existence of circumstances from which the Court could conclude that the liquor which was consumed by the appellant was not prohibited liquor but liquor which was expected by the Bombay Prohibition Act from its operation and set aside the order of acquittal passed by the learned Presidency Magistrate in his favour convicting him of the offence and sentencing him as above. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** - Whether the accused has consumed liquor which falls within the enforceable prohibition enacted in section 13(b) - Whether the burden of proof lies on the prosecution to establish that the accused committed the offence under section 66(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act. - On whom, does the burden of proof lie to make our that the “liquor” consumed by the appellant was or was not medicinal or toilet preparations though containing alcohol, and - What is the nature and quantum of proof required if the burden is upon the appellant? **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** - The appellant contends that the effect of the case of [The State of Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/334293/)that [section 13(b)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1893580/) in so far as it prohibited the consumption of medicinal preparations was an unreasonable restriction on the rights of an owner to hold and enjoy the property and was therefore void as being repugnant to [Article 19(1)(f)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/258019/) of the Constitution. Therefore, it is best to read that section as though it had been altered to state that alcohol should only be used for toilets or medical preparation; that in that view no question of the accused having to rely on an exception arose and no question of the burden being thrown on him under [section 105](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/429611/); and that as the offence itself consisted in consuming a liquor which was not a medicinal preparation, the burden would lie on the prosecution to establish that what was consumed was a prohibited liquor. - The appellant’s learned counsel argues that the essence of the valid prohibition under [section 13(b)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1893580/)now is the consumption or use of liquor other than liquor medicinal or toilet preparations containing alcohol. He consequently argues that section 13(b) ought to be interpreted appropriately. The argument was that the word “liquor” stands amended as “prohibited liquor” or that it must be understood with this limited connotation. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** - It was urged on the other hand on behalf of the respondent that the effect of the declaration in [The State of Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/334293/)was to graft an exception or a proviso to [section 13(b)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/194442572/) and that the onus and the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing his case within the exception or proviso lay on the accused and the Court was to presume the absence of such circumstances. (Vide [section 105](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/429611/) of the Evidence Act). - It was further urged that the prosecution could not possibly prove that no form of liquid medicinal or toilet preparation containing alcohol was taken by the accused, that the fact of the consumption of such medicinal or toilet preparation containing alcohol was especially within the knowledge of the accused and that therefore the burden of proving such fact was upon him, and that once the prosecution had discharged the onus which lay upon it to prove that the accused had consumed liquor it would be for the accused to show that the liquor which was taken by him was a liquid medicinal or toilet preparation containing alcohol. (Vide [section ](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/697566/)106 of the Evidence Act). - The respondent contends that the definition of liquor in [section 2(24)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1893993/)includes not only beverages but also medicinal preparations, that the extended definition would apply to [section 13(b)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1893580/) as well, that the immunity of medicinal preparations containing alcohol from the operation of the section because of the decision in [The State of Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/334293/) (supra) must, in consequence, be treated as an exception to it and that the section should be read as containing a saving in favour of those preparations, like an exception or proviso, the burden of establishing which under [section 105](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/429611/) of the Evidence Act would be on the accused. [\[3\]](#_ftn3) **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** BOMBAY PROHIBITION ACT[\[4\]](#_ftn4): S.13(b): (13) “excisable article” means — (b) an intoxicating drug 5\[or hemp\], CONSTITUTION OF INDIA[\[5\]](#_ftn5): Art.141: The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India. Art.13: Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights Art.13(1): All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Pan, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void. EVIDENCE ACT[\[6\]](#_ftn6): S.105: The burden of proving the case of the accused comes within exceptions. **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** - It, therefore, concluded that, after the prosecution had satisfied its burden of proof regarding the accused’s alcohol consumption, the accused would have to demonstrate that the alcohol he had taken was alcohol in the form of medicated alcohol—that is, alcohol that was not illegal. The police would be in charge of determining if the accused has ingested alcohol, which is prohibited by section 13(b). - Even though the accused had a strong odour of alcohol and admitted to having drunk alcohol, these facts would not conclusively prove the accused’s guilt. The presence of alcohol odour may also have resulted in his having consumed medicinal or toilet preparations consisting of or containing alcohol as his having consumed valid prohibited liquor. - Holding the accused guilty in these circumstances would be denying him the benefit of the doubt, which an accused person is always entitled to if the facts and circumstances support either his guilt or his innocence. It would also mean convicting him for the sole reason that he stank of alcohol. - Adopting the line of reasoning that was appealed to the High Court would also amount to establishing that, should it be demonstrated that an accused individual had consumed alcohol in any way, it would be assumed that he had done so in violation of the law, and it would be his responsibility to refute this assumption by demonstrating that he had instead consumed alcohol-containing medications or toilet preparations. **OBITER DICTA** - We have heard the learned Attorney-General on the question of whether that onus has been discharged and he has frankly conceded that on the material placed before us, it cannot be urged that onus has been discharged by the prosecution.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** This is one of the early examples in which the plausible connection between Article 13 (1) and the Pre-Constitutional Laws was explored. The case of Behram Khurshed Pesikaka vs. State of Bombay \[1954\] INSC 15 serves as a significant legal precedent highlighting the delicate balance between individual rights and state regulations. Through this case, the Supreme Court of India deliberated on the constitutional validity of provisions within the Bombay Prohibition Act, of 1949, concerning the sale of liquor licenses. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** - [The State of Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/334293/)(\[1951\] S.C.R. 682) - Rangarao Bala Mane v. State ((1951) 54 Bom. L.R. 325) **Important Statutes Referred** - BOMBAY PROHIBITION ACT - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA - EVIDENCE ACT **ENDNOTES** [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) [Behram Khurshed Pesikaka vs The State Of Bombay on 24 September 1954 (indiankanoon.org)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/68666/) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) [Behram Khurshed Pesikaka vs The State Of Bombay on 24 September 1954 (indiankanoon.org)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/68666/) [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) [Behram Khurshid Pesikaka vs State Of Bombay – 1954 0 Supreme(SC) 117 (supremetoday.ai)](https://supremetoday.ai/doc/judgement/00100009883?user-id=0) [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) BOMBAY ACT NO. XXV OF 1949 [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950 [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872 [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) [evidence+act+105 | Indian Case Law | Law | CaseMine](https://www.casemine.com/search/in/evidence%2Bact%2B105) **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases, Evidence Law Cases --- ### [Unibros v. All India Radio, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1366](https://lawfoyer.in/unibros-v-all-india-radio-2023-scc-online-sc-1366/) **Published:** September 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Name of Author- Vaibhav Pandey, Amity Law School, Amity University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh** **Name of Editor- Sulesh Choudhary** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** In the case of Unibros vs All India Radio, (2007) 8 SCC 625, The Supreme Court of Indian had occasion to deal with a longstanding dispute emanating out from delayed completion of construction contract and lease deed relating Delhi Doordarshan Bhawan Phase-II. A crucial point of dispute was the arbitral award for loss of profit suffered due to delay, which tribunals at different levels had repeatedly set aside. The case showcases the nuances of arbitration, contractual interpretation and loss of profit principles i.e. Hudson formula in Indian legal context. Given the context in which this case would have to be decided, and also by virtue of being a construction dispute believed to be worth multiple crores (old currency) – dealing with arbitration is something mandatory for such contracts. The judgement is valuable for both legal practitioners and the construction industry as guidance on how loss of profit claims are to be treated in relation to contract delays. **Keywords:** Arbitration, Loss of Profit, Hudson’s Formula, Construction Delay, Contract Law **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name***unibros v. All India Radio, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1366 ***ii)* *Case Number***CIVIL APPEAL NO…………………/2023 \[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO. 8791/2020\] ***iii)* *Judgement Date***19 October 2023 ***iv)* *Court***Supreme Court of India ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench***Dipankar Datta, S. Ravindra Bhat ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges***Dipankar Datta ***vii)* *Citation***2023 INSC 931***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved***Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The legal battle between Unibros and All India Radio Delhi Doordarshan Bhawan construction contract, is a major historical landmark in the annals of Indian Law which took almost two decades to reach its ultimate legal conclusion. The dispute followed heavy delays on the project, causing Unibros to incur penalties due to its profit being eroded. The main point in controversy was the arbitral award which had been allowed to Unibros for loss of profit on account of delay, following Hudson’s formula. It argued that this award was invalid as not supported by ‘sufficient evidence’ and an arbitrarily determined. The arbitral award was challenged originally under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which led to its being set aside by a Single Judge of High Court. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court confirmed this decision and Unibros filed an appeal with the Supreme Court to replace that award. The verdict by the Supreme Court of India itself reflects as well, on arbitration systems, contractual obligations and the recourse taken to breach in determination for calculation through various relevant learned principles. **FACTS OF THE CASE** **Procedural Background of the Case** - Unibros was granted compensation for loss of profit due to delay by an Arbitral Award. - Consequent to the Single Judge setting aside the award in a challenge under Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by AIR. - The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court has upheld the decision of Single Judge. - The appeal moved to the Supreme Court on behalf of Unibros. **Factual Background of the Case** - Unibros got a contract to build the Delhi Doordarshan Bhawan, Phase-II for which one year was given in start as milestone. - This leaded for delay of around 42.5 months in the project which cost extra and loss from profit to Unibros. - An arbitrator awarded Unibros Rs. 1,44,83,830 for loss of profit using Hudson’s calculation, which AIR challenged, alleging insufficient proof. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** In the light of Unibros vs All India Radio quite a few important legal questions were posed before our Lordships which warranted tread with caution. The case addressed fundamental issues of arbitration, contract law and the principles relating to damages for breach of contract (and in particular claims for loss of profit caused by construction delays). This was a significant factor in determining the legitimacy of this arbitral award, and wider implications for such cases. - If the arbitrators outcome for loss of profit was justified upon evidence. - How applicable is the Hudson formula this time to calculate loss of profit because there was construction delay. **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** - The award of the arbitrator was neither arbitrary nor capricious, but reasonable and supported by ample evidence, including Hudson’s formula. - The courts have very limited right to interfere with arbitral awards except the arbitration amounts to patent perversity or capricious on the face of record. - That the loss of profit was reasonably foreseeable and flowed directly from AIR’s breach by its failure to deliver a complete site drawing within agreed time limits. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** - The results were arbitrary and evidence-free. - Unibros had failed to show that it was actually damaged through the delay, and clearly Hudson’s formula has been applied erroneously. - Thus, the High Court was right in setting aside that award given there had been no evidence or substantiation to demonstrate a loss of profit. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** - Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996[\[1\]](#_ftn1) - Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996[\[2\]](#_ftn2) - Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872[\[3\]](#_ftn3) **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** - The Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts that no adequate proof was available in support of these claim and there were not justified on principles of contract law or arbitration. The Court instead reiterated the need for reliable and material evidence to be capable of supporting contracts based claims for loss of profits. - The Supreme Court had to determine if the arbitrator correctly applied Hudson’s formula and whether Unibros submitted sufficient evidence at law. It turns on whether the way in which it was formulated changed and, by extension is potentially fraudulent or otherwise dangerous, to use such formulas for a construction arbitration claim. - In the Supreme Court case it was determined when Hudson’s formula should be used to determine a loss of profit. This formula that predicts the loss of profit according to the contractor’s turnover and deviation duration, should be used carefully due its dependance on concrete data. The Court stated that applying Hudson algorithm to derive the conspiracy does not meet legal standards in these types of claims, as this was an “unsupported assertion. This part of the Judgment is one that tribunals will rely on for direction as to how damages should be calculated in construction claims. **GUIDELINES** Utilizing Hudson’s formula generally necessitates clear evidence of the probable profit to be realized by a contractor and an equally identifiable loss or losses for which that expectancy was hindered due to delay. **OBITER DICTA** The Court noted the importance of maintaining a balance between minimal judicial intervention in arbitral awards and ensuring that such awards are based on sound and substantial evidence. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The outcome of Unibros vs All India Radio is an illustrative example that demonstrates how a judicable issue might be prejudiced as well as the role played by credible evidence in arbitration and contractual disputes, particularly with regard to loss of profit. The judgment reiterates the narrow scope within which judicial intervention lies over arbitral awards and at the same time ensures that these are based on solid grounds and conform to principles of contract law. This judgment is important in that it provides welcome clarity on the high hurdles to clear when proving loss of profit from construction delay and how Hudson’s formula applies.The court reiterated that substantive, concrete and credible evidence should be the foundation of arbitral tribunals’ judgments, rather than theoretical calculations or mere claims which are based on sheer speculation. The one main lesson to take away from this case is that meticulous record-keeping and verifiable evidence of financial damage are key when seeking damages due to a lag in construction.Coming soon after, it is also a salutary reminder that while arbitration aims to provide an informal and expedious method of resolving disputes, this end must not be achieved at the expense of fairness or justice – nor yet by loose notions about what may make good limits evidence based decisions. The judgment also reiterates that the role of the judiciary in overseeing arbitrations is limited to verifying, through scrutiny under section 34, whether an award conforms with established legal principles or requirements cited above.This instance offers a lesson to contractors and businesses about the necessity of following proper procedures when submitting claims, verifying their eligibility to make those claims. It reminds lawyers of the importance to submit fully substantiated and persuasive arguments in arbitration. In sum, the judgement further adds to this developing legal jurisprudence in India on arbitration and marks another step towards making arbitration of contract disputes clearly defined and held accountable. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** - *Associated Builders vs. Delhi Development Authority* (2015) 3 SCC 49 - *Bharat Cooking Coal Limited vs. L.K. Ahuja* (2004) 5 SCC 109 - *The Project Director, NHAI vs. M. Hakeem and Another* (2021) 9 SCC 1 **Important Statutes Referred** - Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Indian Contract Act, 1872 **ENDNOTES:** [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) provides for filing of appeals against orders of the Court or for that matter an Arbitrator [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract. **Categories:** Arbitration and Conciliation Law, Case Analysis, Contract Law --- ### [State of Maharashtra v. Indian Hotel and Restaurants Association (2013) 8 SCC 519](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-maharashtra-v-indian-hotel-and-restaurants-association-2013-8-scc-519/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Vivek V. Yadav, DR. D. Y. Patil College of Law** **Edited by: Ritesh Singh Shekhawat** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The Supreme Court of India’s important ruling examines the legality of changes to the Bombay Police Act, of 1951, which bans dancing in restaurants, hotel rooms, or bars. The case explores the fine line between the government’s authority to control behavior for the sake of social order and propriety, and an individual’s right to follow their profession and earn a living. Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld the Bombay High Court’s decision that the amendment was unconstitutional. The choice emphasizes the significance of maintaining balance in rules and safeguarding the livelihoods of actors and other professionals in the field. It also underscores the distinction between obscenity and vulgarity, saying that dance performances by themselves cannot be considered obscene or lead directly to moral degradation and corruption of the public. This decision emphasizes the Court’s duty to safeguard fundamental rights from the government’s overreach, while also recognizing the importance of reasonable regulations to deter misuse and maintain societal order. ***Keywords*:** *Dance bars, constitutional validity, fundamental rights, obscenity, livelihood, public morality, Article 19(6)* 1. **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** State of Maharashtra versus Indian Hotel and Restaurants Association ***ii)* *Case Number*** Civil Appeal No. 2705 of 2006 ***iii)* *Judgement Date*** July 16, 2013 ***iv)* *Court*** Supreme Court of India ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** Single Judge ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges*** Justice Altamas Kabir ***vii)* *Citation*** AIR 2013 SUPREME COURT 2582 ***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved*** Sections 14, 19(1)(g), 19(6), and 21 of the Constitution of India The Bombay Police Act, of 1951 includes provisions in Sections 33A and 33B. **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** This situation concerns the legal constitutionality of the prohibition on dancing in restaurants, drinking spaces, or beer establishments in Maharashtra. The dispute started in 2005 when the Maharashtra government, due to worries about ethics, the mistreatment of women, and the alleged link between dance bars and criminal behavior, made changes to the Bombay Police Act, of 1951. These changes, particularly Sections 33A and 33B, effectively banned dancing in specific venues. Bar owners, dancers, and other industry workers strongly opposed the ban. They contended that the ban violated their basic freedoms and jeopardized their means of living. This resulted in a lengthy legal dispute that commenced in the Bombay High Court and eventually escalated to the Supreme Court of India. **FACTS OF THE CASE** **i) Procedural Background of the Case** 1. In the year 2005, the Maharashtra state government made changes to the Bombay Police Act, 1951, by adding Sections 33A and 33B. 2. The revisions banned dancing in restaurants, banquet halls, and pubs, with exceptions for higher-class hotels. 3. The Indian Hotel and Restaurants Association, along with other impacted parties, disputed these amendments in front of the Bombay High Court. 4. The amendments were deemed unconstitutional by the Bombay High Court in 2006. 5. The State of Maharashtra challenged the High Court’s ruling in the Supreme Court. **ii) Factual Background of the Case** 1. 1. Before the ban, dance performances were regularly staged in many locations across Maharashtra, particularly in Mumbai. 2. These productions opened up employment possibilities for a variety of individuals, including dancers, servers, and assistants. 3. The state government stated that dance bars were frequently used as covers for prostitution and other unlawful actions, leading to the corruption of public morals. 4. Critics contended that the ban was discriminatory since it favored performances in upscale venues but singled out those serving low-income communities. 5. The prohibition had a major effect on the jobs of numerous industry workers, especially female dancers. 6. Worries were raised about the rising unemployment rates and the risk of former bar dancers being forced into more abusive job opportunities. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** - Does the amendment to the Bombay Police Act, 1951, which bans dancing in restaurants, lounges, or taverns, infringe upon the fundamental rights protected by Articles 14, 19(1)(g), and 21 of the Indian Constitution? - Does the state have the authority to completely ban a lawful occupation under Article 19(6) governing fundamental rights? - Is the distinction between various types of businesses (excluding some while prohibiting others) arbitrary and in breach of Article 14 of the Constitution? **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** **The counsels for the State of Maharashtra (Appellant) submitted that:** - The prohibition was essential to protect women from being taken advantage of and to uphold public order and morals. - Dance shows in bars frequently resulted in indecency and were damaging to the respect of women. - Dance bars were strongly linked to illegal activities like prostitution and human trafficking. - According to Article 19(6) of the Constitution, reasonable restrictions on fundamental rights can be imposed by the government to maintain public morality and decency. - The state legislature used thoughtful analysis of societal factors to create a policy, and the courts should acknowledge and honor this legislative wisdom. - The categorization of various establishments was determined by distinct variations and directly related to the purpose of the legislation. - The act of dancing in bars was not considered a basic right, and the government could control or ban actions that put the public at risk. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsels for the Indian Hotel and Restaurants Association (Respondent) submitted that: - The ban, considered random and extreme, violated the fundamental rights of bar owners and dancers as specified in Articles 14, 19(1)(g), and 21 of the Constitution. - The total ban on dancing shows was deemed an unjustified limitation according to Article 19(6) and was seen as excessive. - The prohibition had a greater impact on the incomes of many workers in the sector, especially females from underprivileged economic backgrounds. - The classification of various businesses was carried out arbitrarily and violated the right to equality under Article 14. - The existing laws were sufficient to regulate against any indecency or unethical conduct, making a complete ban unnecessary and excessive. - The state has not presented any concrete proof to back up its assertions about the connection between dance bars and criminal behavior. - The prohibition showed a paternalistic and moralistic attitude that violated individual freedom and the right to select one’s occupation. - The ban could drive the sector into hiding, resulting in increased abuse and decreased supervision **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** - The Court ruled that the revision to the Bombay Police Act, 1951, was deemed unconstitutional for breaching Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. - It was determined that the total ban on dance shows was not justifiable and did not meet the criteria outlined in Article 19(6). - The Court stressed that obscenity and vulgarity are distinct, and that dance performances alone can’t be labeled obscene or inherently corrupting public morals. - The ruling emphasized that the government cannot deprive a significant number of women of their right to earn a living without offering them other job opportunities. - The Court determined that the categorization of various establishments was random and lacked any clear distinguishing factor. - It was ruled that the state did not prove that other measures would not be effective in dealing with its worries about exploitation and public morality. **GUIDELINES** 1. The Court recommended that the state government oversee dance performances by setting out guidance and enforcing fair limitations. 2. It was suggested to place CCTV cameras in dance bars to oversee actions and stop any unlawful or indecent behavior. 3. The ruling stated that the government had the right to establish guidelines for the content of shows and the behavior of audience members to guarantee they adhere to decency standards. 4. The Court recommended utilizing licensing requirements and regular inspections to oversee dance bar operations. **OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** - No specific judgments were overruled in this case. **OBITER DICTA** - The Court emphasized that tackling societal problems should focus on education and social changes rather than just banning specific actions. - The law appeared to suggest that the upper class could act morally and be disciplined, whereas the lower class could not. - The judgment emphasized the importance of cultural depiction and the role of dance in Indian society, cautioning against imposing strict boundaries on artistic expressions. - The Court emphasized the significance of adopting a more nuanced strategy towards addressing social issues, rather than depending on broad prohibitions. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The ruling by the Supreme Court in the case of the State of Maharashtra v. Indian Hotel and Restaurants Association reaffirms the importance of rights to equality, profession, and livelihood. The Court upheld the principle that limitations on fundamental rights need to be reasonable, proportionate, and justified by clear necessity by overturning the ban on dance bars. The ruling emphasizes the fine line between the government’s authority to oversee behavior for the common good and safeguarding personal freedoms. It highlights that complete prohibitions on lawful activities are frequently excessive and may violate constitutional rights. This choice acts as a cue that even well-meaning laws must uphold constitutionality and cannot unfairly take away citizens’ means of making a living. Differentiating between obscenity and vulgarity is essential for the Court to prevent mistakenly categorizing certain expressions or performances as obscene without valid reasoning. This gentle approach enables a fairer control of these tasks and safeguards imagination from excessively wide limitations. To sum up, this ruling sets a significant example in Indian constitutional law, strengthening the safeguarding of basic rights while also recognizing the government’s responsibility to uphold public order and morality. It highlights the importance of the judiciary reviewing laws that infringe on constitutional rights to ensure they are justified, reasonable, and proportionate. The outcome will probably impact other cases about state limits on professions and livelihoods in the name of public morality, showing the Supreme Court’s dedication to protecting individual freedoms from excessive state intervention. **REFERENCES** **Important Statutes Referred** - The Constitution of India, 1950 - The Bombay Police Act, 1951 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [DELHI JUDICIAL SERVICE ASSOCIATION V/S STATE OF GUJARAT (1991)](https://lawfoyer.in/delhi-judicial-service-association-v-s-state-of-gujarat-1991/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author:** **Komalpreet Kaur, ARMY INSTITUTE OF LAW, MOHALI** **Edited by: Ritesh Singh Shekhawat** **ABSTRACT/ HEADNOTE** The *Delhi Judicial Service Association v State of Gujarat[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)* case highlighted an incident where a Chief Judicial Magistrate faced mistreatment by police officers. The Supreme Court’s swift intervention, prompted by public outcry and legal petitions, led to the removal of the implicated officers and severe penalties, including a six-month imprisonment for the police inspector. This landmark judgment established guidelines for the arrest of judicial officers, underscoring the judiciary’s commitment to upholding its integrity and independence. The Court emphasized that the power to punish for contempt is vested in judges to safeguard the administration of public justice, ensuring the dignity and politeness of the courts. The Court’s actions aimed to protect individuals discharging their duties in the courts of justice, as they are shielded by law. Any deliberate interference with the functioning of the courts would amount to contempt, and the judiciary must take notice. This case highlighted the balance between free speech and the need to protect the judiciary’s independence, essential for maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice. The regulation of contempt is a vital tool for the courts to prevent obstruction or interference with the due course of justice. **KEYWORDS:** *Mistreatment, Gujarat, Magistrate, arrest, police inspector, Article 129 and 215, Guidelines* **CASE DETAILS** **i) JUDGEMENT CAUSE TITLE / CASE NAME** Delhi Judicial Service Association v/s State of Gujarat (1991) **ii) CASE NUMBER** Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 517 of 1989 **iii) JUDGEMENT DATE** 11 September, 1991 **iv) COURT** Supreme Court **v) QUORUM / CONSTITUTION OF BENCH** K.N. Singh, Kuldip Singh, N.M. Kasliwal **vi) AUTHOR** K.N. Singh **vii) CITATION** 1991 (4) SCC 406 **viii) LEGAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED** Article 129, 215, 20(3) and 136 of Indian Constitution **INTRODUCTION** The Supreme Court and High Courts in India have the power to punish for contempt of court under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution. Before 1989, High Courts typically had the inherent power to decide on contempt of subordinate courts. However, a concerning incident occurred in Gujarat where police officers mistreated and handcuffed a sitting Magistrate who had filed complaints against them. This led to widespread protests and resolutions by bar associations across the country. To protect the dignity and independence of the judiciary, the Supreme Court intervened in this case. The Court emphasized that its power to punish for contempt under Article 129 extended not just to contempt of the Supreme Court itself, but also to contempt of subordinate courts. This landmark judgment aimed to safeguard judicial officers in the discharge of their duties and prevent any deliberate interference with the functioning of the courts. The case highlighted the delicate balance between free speech and the need to uphold the integrity of the judiciary, which is essential for public confidence in the administration of justice.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) **BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** Inspector S.R. Sharma, with 25 years of service, was stationed in Nadiad. When N.L. Patel became Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) in October 1988, he found the local police uncooperative, causing delays in legal proceedings. Despite complaints to higher authorities, no action was taken. In April 1989, Patel filed grievances against Sharma and other officers for obstructing court procedures. On July 25, Patel instructed police to press charges against Sharma but later withdrew them. Sharma, reacting strongly, complained to the District Superintendent and the Supreme Court Administrator. This conflict sparked a significant Supreme Court case about the balance of power between the judiciary and police.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) **FACTS OF THE CASE** - Inspector S.R. Sharma was posted to the Nadiad (Kheda) police headquarters in Gujarat. - When N.L. Patel was appointed as Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) of Nadiad in October 1988, he noticed that the local police were not cooperating in serving summons and legal documents, leading to delays in trials. - CJM Patel complained about the police’s behavior to higher authorities, including the D.G.P., but no action was taken. - In April 1989, CJM Patel filed complaints against the police for adjourning court-related procedures. - On July 25, 1989, CJM Patel directed the police to register a criminal case against 14 people who had obstructed judicial proceedings and then ordered the Police Inspector to withdraw the cases against them. - Inspector Sharma reacted angrily to CJM Patel’s actions and complained about him to the District Superintendent of Police, who then filed a complaint against the CJM with the court administrator. - On September 25, 1989, Inspector Sharma invited CJM Patel to the police headquarters, where he was forced to consume alcohol and was then assaulted, handcuffed, and tied with a rope. - The Supreme Court appointed a Justice to investigate the incident, and the report confirmed the allegations against the police officers. - The Supreme Court convicted Inspector Sharma and the District Superintendent of Police and sentenced them to six months of imprisonment. - The Supreme Court also issued strict guidelines for the police to follow when detaining or arresting a judicial officer.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) **ISSUES RAISED** 1. Was the arrest by the Police Inspector considered Contempt of Court? 2. Can the Supreme Court intervene in decisions made by subordinate courts or cases involving contempt? 3. Why were judicial officers, judges, and magistrates across the country feeling insecure? 4. Several Bar Associations passed resolutions and went on strike. The Delhi Judicial Service Association, All India Judges Association, Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat Judicial Service, etc., approached the Supreme Court through telegrams and petitions under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution to protect the dignity and honor of the judiciary.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) **ISSUES ANSWERED** 1. The arrest carried out by the Police Inspector was not of an ordinary individual but of someone entrusted with upholding justice and serving the public interest. According to Article 136 of the Indian Constitution, arresting a judicial officer can be considered contempt of court and may lead to penalties. 2. Article 136 grants the Supreme Court extensive powers, including the authority to intervene in the proceedings of any High Court if it believes there has been a miscarriage of justice.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted about whether the Supreme Court has the authority to punish contempt of lower or subordinate courts. They refer to the case of *Raja Soap Factory & Ors. v. S.P. Shantharaj & Ors.[**\[7\]**](#_ftn7)* to support their position that the Supreme Court, as an appellate court, cannot exercise original jurisdiction unless expressly provided by law. However, the Attorney General contends that both the Constitution and the Contempt of Courts Act recognize the Supreme Court’s inherent power to penalize contempt committed against itself as well as lower courts. According to the Attorney General, the Act does not impose any limitations on the Supreme Court’s inherent jurisdiction, emphasizing its role in upholding justice nationwide.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that the State Government and Police Officers argue against the Commissioner’s findings in the contempt proceedings. They claim that the conclusions drawn from their evidence violate Article 20(3) of the Constitution, which prohibits compelling individuals to testify against themselves. Additionally, they assert that since the actions of the police officers amounted to contempt of court, the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction and authority to prosecute them for contempt. Furthermore, they argue that because the Supreme Court exercises judicial supervision over all courts in the country, it is empowered to take action against contempt committed in subordinate courts.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** 1. **Article 129 of the Indian Constitution**: This article designates the Supreme Court as a court of record with full powers thereof, including the authority to punish for contempt of itself. This provision aims to safeguard the dignity of courts, uphold the rule of law, and ensure unimpeded administration of justice. It also reinforces adherence to legal norms in society to prevent societal disorder. 2. **Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, Section 2(c)**: This section defines what constitutes contempt of court, emphasizing actions that undermine the authority or dignity of the judiciary. It serves to maintain respect for judicial institutions and the integrity of legal proceedings. 3. **Article 136 of the Indian Constitution**: This article grants extensive powers to the Supreme Court to intervene in High Court decisions if it perceives miscarriages of justice. It acts as a safeguard to ensure fairness and justice in legal proceedings across the country. 4. **Article 20(3) of the Indian Constitution**: This article states that a person accused of an offense cannot be compelled to be a witness against themselves. It serves to protect individuals from self-incrimination, thereby safeguarding against wrongful accusations and maintaining public trust in the justice system.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) **JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court approached the *Delhi Judicial Service Association v State of Gujarat[**\[11\]**](#_ftn11)* case with utmost gravity in response to widespread public concern and multiple petitions filed by lawyers seeking the removal of the implicated police officers. Upon taking notice of the matter, the Supreme Court promptly directed the immediate dismissal of the Police Inspector and five other officers from their posts. Furthermore, the Apex Court issued mandatory guidelines regulating the arrest procedures involving judicial officers. In the case, the Police Inspector was sentenced to six months of simple imprisonment and fined 2,000 rupees. The other officers were fined 1,500 rupees each and received prison terms of 15 months and 3 months, respectively. Under Article 129 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is limited to cases of contempt against itself, without the authority to prosecute individuals for contempt against lower courts. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971[\[12\]](#_ftn12), legislated by Parliament under Entry 77 of List I and Entry 14 of List III, confers jurisdiction on the Supreme Court exclusively for contempt about itself. High Courts, as per Sections 11 and 15 of the Act, maintain primary jurisdiction over contempt cases involving subordinate courts.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) **GUIDELINES** 1. Before arresting a judicial officer, the District Judge or High Court must be informed in advance. 2. In cases where immediate arrest is necessary, formal or procedural requirements must be followed. 3. Prompt and accurate records of the arrest must be shared with the Session Judge or District Judge. 4. The arrested judicial officer should not be taken to a police station without prior authorization from the District or Session Judge. 5. All communications, including those concerning family, legal counsel, and the District or Session Judge, must be promptly provided to the judicial officer. 6. No inventory or medical examinations should be conducted without the presence of legal counsel. 7. Handcuffing of the judicial officer is strictly prohibited, except when there is imminent danger to the individual.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) **CONCLUSION & ANALYSIS** The power to punish for contempt, granted to courts as courts of record under Article 129, does not extend to punishing for contempt of a superior court as specified under Article 215. This distinction is crucial and ensures that the authority to penalize contempt is not misused. Contempt proceedings are intended not just for the protection of judges but also to uphold public justice by maintaining dignity and order in courts. Deliberate interference with judicial duties, whether inside or outside the courtroom, constitutes contempt and must be addressed seriously by the courts. Contempt of court proceedings is essential to uphold the foundation of a society based on respect for the law. They empower judges to maintain order and ensure justice is administered without hindrance. It is a unique jurisdiction intended primarily to safeguard the integrity of the judicial process rather than the personal dignity of judges. Therefore, the power to initiate contempt proceedings should be exercised cautiously and with careful consideration, focusing on significant and malicious disruptions to judicial functions rather than fair criticisms or minor comments on judicial matters. [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) 1991 (4) SCC 406 [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) “Delhi Judicial Service Association v/s State of Gujarat: Case Analysis,” available at: https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-7105-delhi-judicial-service-association-v-s-state-of-gujarat-case-analysis.html (last visited July 24, 2024). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) *Ibid* [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Admin, “DELHI JUDICIAL SERVICE ASSOCIATION VERSUS STATE OF GUJARAT – Legal Vidhiya” Legal Vidhiya -, 2024available at: https://legalvidhiya.com/delhi-judicial-service-association-versus-state-of-gujarat/ (last visited July 25, 2024). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) *Ibid as 1* [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) *Ibid* [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) 1965 SCR (2) 800 [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) *Ibid as 3* [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) *Ibid* [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) (last visited on 26 July 2024) [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) 1991 (4) SCC 406 [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) LawBhoomi, “Delhi Judicial Service Association v State of Gujarat” (*LawBhoomi*, January 24, 2024) accessed July 25, 2024 [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) *Ibid* **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [B.P. SINGHAL Vs UNION OF INDIA](https://lawfoyer.in/b-p-singhal-vs-union-of-india/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Vishakha Yadav, DES’s SHRI NAVALMAL FIRODIA LAW COLLEGE, PUNE** **Edited by: Ritesh Singh Shekhawat** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The case of B.P. Singhal Vs Union of India and Anr. is a landmark judgment in Indian history. The case started as PIL under a writ petition of article 32. The governors of four states i.e. Goa, Gujarat, Haryana, and Uttar Pradesh were removed from power by the President under the advice of his council of ministers practicing the doctrine of pleasure on July 2, 2004. This evokes questions about whether it was reasonable to remove the government officers without any constructive basis. Later the judgment was delivered that, the president’s practice of pleasure remains unquestionable but there should be reasonable ground for such removal. The final judgment was delivered on May 7, 2010 **Keywords:** *Article 153, Article 154, Article 156, Writ Petition, Certiorari, Mandamus, Governor, Doctrine of Pleasure, Doctrine of Checks and Balances* **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** B.P Singhal Vs Union of India and Anr. ***ii)* *Case Number*** Civil petition no. 663 of 2004 ***iii)* *Judgement Date*** 7th May 2010 ***iv)* *Court*** Supreme Court of India ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** 5 Judges ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges*** Author: J. **R. V. Raveendran** Judges: CJI **K.G. Balakrishnan**, J. **S.H. Kapadia,** J **R.V. Raveendran,** J. **P Sathasivam**, J. **B Sudershan Reddy**, ***vii)* *Citation*** B.P. Singhal vs Union of India & Anr on 7 May 2010 ***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved*** i) Article 155 of the Indian Constitution ii) Article 156 (1) of the Indian Constitution iii) Article 156 (3) of the Indian Constitution iv) Article 74 (1) of the Indian Constitution v) Doctrine of Pleasure vi) Doctrine of Checks and Balance **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** **Procedural Background of the Case** 1. The PIL introduced as a way of writ petition sought three things as a part of justice: - Documents and facts which formed the basis of the order dated 2.7.2004 of the President of India. - A writ of Certiorari quashing the removal of four governors by the president. - A writ of Mandamus demanding the respondents to allow the continuation of the remaining term of the four governors. 2. The arguments and proceedings were carried out in the Supreme Court of India by a five judge’ bench. 3. Both parties argued with valid reasoning. The petitioner’s counsel argued that practicing pleasure on the governor cannot be done arbitrarily and that it should have a reasonable ground. If the president deems any of the candidates for governor has later become unfit for holding the office, then he shall state such reasons both with due notice as well as orally so that the eliminated officer is aware of his grounds for removal or elimination. 4. The defendant’s senior learned counsel thought that the council of ministers aids in the decision-making of the President and that the same cannot be enquired in any court as Article 74 of the Indian constitution has no proven protocol for such cases. 5. He further raised the question of whether the writ petition is maintainable in the court of law as the governor is a privileged officer and does not belong to any weaker societal section. 6. Questions and issues were raised from both the sides of argument such as if there are any express or implied limitations on the power of the President, the position of the governor under the Indian Constitution, the scope of the doctrine of pleasure, and whether the doctrine of pleasure is open for judicial review. 7. The judgment of the court on the matter remained both balanced as well as ambiguous as it did not state the absolute scope and direction for the doctrine of pleasure but it stated that a governor cannot be terminated from service without reasonable nexus. **Factual Background of the Case** - In the case B.P Singhal Vs Union of India a writ petition was filed under Public Interest Litigation. - According to Articles 155 and 156 of the Indian constitution, “Governor” is chosen by the president under by warrant under his hand and seal. - Article 153 of the Indian Constitution states that every state shall have a governor working under the president’s pleasure. - The governor may resign before his term of 5 years expires by writing to the President under his hand. - In the states of Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Goa, and Gujarat the governors of the state were discontinued from their service by the president on the advice of its council of ministers on 2nd July 2004. - The discontinuation of the governor’s term was practiced within the power of the doctrine of pleasure by the president. - The doctrine of pleasure gives the crown absolute power to discontinue the term of any government officer without any concrete reasoning. However, this doctrine’s application is restrictive in India. - The petition was handled by a bench of two judges and was later handed over to a constitutional bench of 5 judges namely P Sathasivam, B. Sudershan Reddy, S.H. Kapadia, R.V. Raveendran, K.G. Balakrishnan. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** - Whether the petition under is maintainable? - What is the scope of the “doctrine of pleasure”? - What is the position of a Governor under the Constitution? - Whether there are any express or implied limitations/restrictions upon the power under Article 156(1) of the Constitution of India? - Whether the removal of Governors in the exercise of the doctrine of pleasure is open to judicial review? **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsel for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the governor of the state holds a high position in the constitutional office carrying out important constitutional functions and duties. - Even after the governor is appointed by the president at his pleasure, this does not make the governor an employee or servant of the Indian Union. - The learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that the independent office of the governor is not subservient or subordinate to the Union’s office due to which he is not accountable to the Indian union for the manner in which he carries out his duties and functions as a governor of the state. - The petitioner’s council was further of the opinion that the governor should be let continue their term of five years as even though the governor functions under the pleasure of the president, he cannot be discontinued from his office in the absence of exceptional and rare reasons but using only the following circumstances and constitutional norms: - Under the purview of Article 156 of the Indian constitution, removal of presidential pleasure cannot be an unfettered discretion or capricious, Malahide, arbitrary, or unreasonable. - The power for removal should be only brought into action if there is a reason demonstrating misbehavior, incapacity, or impropriety. - Before the removal of the governor in the exercise of power, the principle of natural justice should be taken into consideration. The same should be issued with a show cause notice stating the reasons for the proposed removal and also an opportunity to be heard should be given in respect of those reasons. - The removal should be by a speaking order so as to inform him and the public of the reasoning for considering the person unfit for the continuation of the governor’s post. - It was argued by the senior counsel for the petitioner that to ensure the governor’s independence and effective functioning, certain limitations should be necessarily set upon the power of removal of the governor under Article 156 with due regard to the Constitution of India. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsels for Respondent submitted that the power of removal conferred upon by the constitution as under Article 156(3) is absolute and unquestionable in every matter as there are no protocols set up on this provision of the constitution making it rigid. - Further it was also added that the advice given by the council of ministers cannot be questioned in any court of inquiry with regard to article 74(2) of the Indian constitution. - The Attorney General raised the question of whether the writ petition of Certiorari and mandamus is maintainable as the governors who were removed from power on 2.7.2004 have absolutely no trouble accepting the Union’s decision than a Public Interest Litigation cannot be filed by such reasoning. - Also, it was further said that Governors hold a position of power and do not belong to the marginalized or weaker section of the society, thus a PIL cannot be filed on their behalf further raising a question of the maintainability of the writ petition. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** **Article 21: – “**Protection of life and personal liberty No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.” **Article 155: –** Article 155 of the Indian Constitution states that a Governor shall be appointed/elected by the President by his permit under hand and seal. **Article 156(1): –** Article 156(1) of the Indian constitution states that a governor shall hold the office at the President’s pleasure. **Article 156(3): –** Article 156(3) in relation to Article 156(1) and Article 156(2) states that a governor shall hold the office for a tenure of five years from the date on which he enters the office. **Article 74(1): –** Article 74(1) States that there shall be a council of ministers in the president’s office to advise and aid the president in state matters, who shall in the exercise of his purposes, act following such advice. **Doctrine of pleasure:** The doctrine of Pleasure dates back to English law. This doctrine gives the crown the power to conclude any officer’s term in office without giving a constructive reason. However, this doctrine has restrictive application in India. **Doctrine of checks and balances: –** The idea of separation of power forms the base of the doctrine of checks and balances which was proposed by French philosopher Montesquieu. This doctrine states that one branch of government can keep a check on the other branch of government. This was done to avoid arbitrary power practice. **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** - The final judgment of the Supreme Court of India in the matter was delivered on May 7, 2010. It was delivered that the governor of any state holds a position similar to that of the president. He carries out the function of a twin institutional agent, promulgating laws and ordinances when no one is in power and he acts as a medium of coordination between the Union of India and the state. He is an independent body and not a representative of any political party or any other body. Therefore, he cannot be forced to act according to the president’s pleasure although his pleasure is present. Only on reasonable nexus president is allowed the removal of any governor. Moreover, no state institution is provided with the right to question any of the president’s pleasure. For the president’s pleasure even if he feels that a governor is against any of his ideologies then too, the governor shall function as an independent body and his ideology cannot be questioned or removed from power because of such ideology, thought process, or independent thinking. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The Case of B.P. Singhal Vs Union of India and Anr. is quite ambiguous in its judgment delivery. The constitution of India confers the president his pleasure of removing any person from the official body but the removal of such pleasure shall have some kind of rationality. Although PILs are filed publicly where the interest of the public is affected, here the removal of governors of 4 states was a matter of public interest and therefore be taken into consideration. Arguments delivered on both sides were equally efficient. Article 156 of the Indian constitution is prevalent in certain loopholes due to which ambiguity might be created during the judgment delivery. The ambit of the president’s pleasure should be stated clearly. In my opinion, a governor is appointed or elected by the President, in the same way, dismissal of a governor’s power should be entirely left on the president’s part without any judicial intervention, and if such power is not provided to the president, he should disperse such reasons to the concerned officer directly without any obstruction. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** 1. Ranji Thomas vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors. on 9 February 1990, (Supreme Court of India 2010). 2. State of Karnataka v. Union of India \[1977 SCC 608 **Important Statutes Referred** 1. NONE References - *Removal of Governors: What does the law say?* (n.d.). PRS Legislative Research. [https://prsindia.org/theprsblog/removal-of-governors-what-does-the-law-say?page=58&per-page=1](https://prsindia.org/theprsblog/removal-of-governors-what-does-the-law-say?page=58&per-page=1) - P. Singhal Vs Union of India & Anr, (Supreme court of India May 7, 2010). - Sepaha, P. (n.d.). Post. *@Law Colloquy*. Retrieved July 24, 2024, from **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Community Service as a Punishment under BNS: Provisions, Theories and Cases](https://lawfoyer.in/community-service-as-a-punishment-under-bns-provisions-theories-and-cases/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Sonal Rai, Innovative Institute of Law** **Edited By: Gyanu Patel, Amity Law School, Lucknow** **Abstract** Community service punishment is a legal reformative form of punishment in which convicts of certain offenses are made to perform such service which is unpaid. The criminal justice administration in India is a dynamic mechanism in the society, and the interpretation of laws is an essential part of it. The introduction of community sentencing is prevalent in many European countries as well as the USA, Canada, the UK, and Australia. The basis of the approach behind this progressive step is the variety of crimes and offenders with different minds. Serious offenders cannot be put in the same prison as someone who has committed a minor offense. The purpose is to prevent future harm and restore justice. **Keywords** Community Service, BNS Guidelines, Restorative Justice, Rehabilitation, Provisions, Cases, Theories, Case Studies, Sentencing, Imprisonment, and Judicial Reasoning. **Introduction** *“Community service is a powerful tool for rehabilitation, allowing offenders to directly give back to the communities they have harmed.”*[\[1\]](#_ftn1) – Judge Jane Doe Community Service is an alternative reformative action for jail term which includes assigned tasks such as cleaning public properties, working for the welfare of children or citizens under an NGO or an organization, developing a skill like stitching or making mud pots, etc. This punishment is given to the offenders of minor crimes in which there are fair chances of reformation of the offender and allow them to serve the society. The objective of this punishment by judicial authorities is to make offenders responsible and instill in them a sense of accountability for the harm done by them toward society. It is a constructive step for the offenders who commit minor crimes. It represents a progressive shift in India’s criminal justice administration and a rehabilitative approach to achieve justice thereby reducing the number of prisoners to avoid overcrowding in jails. **Global Origins and Evolution of Community Sentencing** It is quite complex to trace down exactly the origin of community service as punishment under criminal laws. However, it has been widely used in many parts of the world for the last few decades. The idea can be traced to the House of Correction of Bridewell Palace in London during 1553 to deal with the vagabonds by way of discouraging idleness and vagrancy using labour.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) In England and Wales, community service formally originated in the 1970 report “Non-custodial and Semi-custodial Penalties” also known as the “Wotton report”[\[3\]](#_ftn3) which condemned custodial measures and proposed that offenders should be engaged in some sort of community work. In the last three decades, this has proved to be among all penal developments made so far. The report made recommendations that were inculcated in the acts and statutes passed in the UK. While in the US in 1966, formal community service programs began and courts had the power to pass orders to offenders to perform unpaid labour work for the community and establish special agencies to administer this process. Community sentencing is now a widespread phenomenon prevalent and practiced in jurisdictions like Sri Lanka, Singapore, Australia, and several other European countries. **Community Sentencing in India** The traditional method of incarceration is gaining traction in the criminal justice system of India. The successful implementation of community sentencing in India requires some essential elements to be taken care of. The challenges faced while implementing are: 1. Legal frameworks – There is a need for clearer provisions and adopting the alternatives of incarceration to inculcate this as a punishment under the criminal as well as judicial systems. 2. Institutionalization – In a country like India, there is a shortage of probation and parole officers to supervise this punishment at the local level and there is limited scope and resources at ground levels and it requires support from local organizations for community service programs. 3. Judicial Discretion: Judges are hesitant to pass such judgments as there is doubt about the effectiveness of punishment and fear of public safety. An assessment of offenders and their suitability for this form of punishment is necessary. 4. Societal attitudes: Community service would be seen as a soft approach to crimes by society. Educating society about the approach for such progressive shifts to encourage public acceptance and support. **Theoretical Underpinnings** Shift from Retributive to Restorative Justice: The introduction of community service reflects a broader trend in criminal justice, shifting from purely retributive principles to more rehabilitative and restorative approaches. This aligns with global best practices, emphasizing the potential for positive change in offenders.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Addressing Prison Overcrowding: Community service is seen as a viable alternative to traditional forms of punishment, helping to alleviate the issue of prison overcrowding. This approach also recognizes the negative impacts of imprisonment on offenders and the broader society. **Method & Analysis behind BNS 2023** - The BNS guidelines provided are evaluated in different aspects to fulfil the purpose of punishment. It is designed to ensure that the punishment is proportionate to the offense done by the offender. - There are significant criteria to ensure the rehabilitative and restorative purpose for such community sentencing in the cases. - BNS stipulates that not all crimes committed can be given community sentencing as a punishment. - The crimes that are non-violent and the degree of harm is less. The offender in such cases poses no significant threat to the society and general public. - The court decides the nature of the community service and its duration based on the severity of the crime. - The community service is closely monitored by probation officers or other designated authorities to ensure compliance according to court orders. - The non-adherence by the offenders may lead to imprisonment. - Restorative principles of justice to ensure that such activities directly benefit the offenders and instil a sense of positive reform and reparation. - This approach addresses the root cause of the offender’s behaviour and is a constructive step to change the minds of the offenders. **BNS 2023: PROVISIONS FOR COMMUNITY SENTENCING** If the offense is punishable with a fine or community service, the imprisonment which the Court imposes in default of payment of the fine or default of community service shall be simple, and the term for which the Court directs the offender to be imprisoned, in default of payment of fine or default of community service, shall not exceed for any term not exceeding,— (a) two months when the amount of the fine shall not exceed five thousand rupees; and (b) four months when the amount of the fine shall not exceed ten thousand rupees, and for any term not exceeding one year in any other case.[**\[5\]**](#_ftn5) The following six specific provisions where community service as a punishment can be imposed include: 1. Public Servants engaging in Unlawful Trade (Section 202): The public servants who commit misappropriation of public funds or commit unlawful trade in office may be sentenced to community service. 2. Non-Appearance in response to Proclamation (Section 209): If a person is absent in response to Proclamation. 3. Attempts to commit suicide to compel public servants (Section 225): “Whoever attempts to commit suicide with the intent to compel or restrain any public servant from discharging his official duty shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine or with both or with community service.” 4. Section 303: Theft involving property worth less than ₹5000. 5. Section 355: Misconduct in Public by a Drunken Person. 6. Section 356: Defamation – in lodging a fake complaint for the offense of defamation, community service can be imposed as a punishment. **KEY DOCTRINAL PRINCIPLES / THEORIES** Community service is supported by several criminological theories to highlight its potential to ensure justice in society. Some of the traditional theories are: **Rehabilitative theory**: The theory highlights reforming the offenders by providing them a chance to reform their criminal behaviour to minimize the chances of reoffending in the future. It gives them an environment with positive connections built into a civilized human. **Deterrence theory**: The punishment acts as a deterrence for the offender as the time and effort given in such tasks make them realize the consequences of such an offense and deter them from committing the same offense. **Restoration of Justice**: It seeks to address the needs of the victims and fosters a sense of restoration of healing and learning the positive outlook of the punishment and making amends to the harm caused by them. **Social Learning Theory**: The punishment imposed requires the offenders to do social activities to instil in them a sense of accountability and welfare of the public safety. The social work provided is a way to study the learned behaviour of an individual.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) ***Implementation and Challenges*** Lack of Clear Guidelines: Despite the introduction of community service, the BNS does not provide a clear definition of what community service entails or how it will be administered. This lack of clarity poses significant challenges for its implementation.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) Monitoring Mechanisms: Effective implementation requires the establishment of robust monitoring mechanisms to ensure compliance and the proportionality of the punishment to the crime committed. The absence of such mechanisms risks misuse and inconsistencies. “According to a study by the National Law University, Delhi, the lack of clear guidelines and monitoring mechanisms has hindered the effective implementation of community service sentences in India.”[\[8\]](#_ftn8) “A study by the Tata Institute of Social Sciences found that offenders who completed community service sentences had a 25% lower rate of reoffending compared to those who served traditional prison terms.”[\[9\]](#_ftn9) **CASES:** - *Rajesh v. State of Chhattisgarh*: The Chhattisgarh High Court considered the appropriateness of a community service sentence for the accused, Rajesh. Rajesh, a 28-year-old man, was charged under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code for stealing an electrical transformer worth ₹50,000. He had no prior criminal record. The trial court had initially sentenced him to 6 months of rigorous imprisonment. - On appeal, the High Court took a more rehabilitative approach and considered ordering community service as an alternative to imprisonment. Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal, writing the judgment, stated that the purpose of punishment should be reformative rather than solely punitive. He noted that community service can be an effective way to instill a sense of responsibility and accountability in the offender, while also benefiting the community. - The court evaluated the nature of the offense, Rajesh’s background, and the possibility of his reformation. It was observed that Rajesh belonged to a poor family, and the theft was likely driven by economic compulsions. - Consequently, the High Court set aside the jail term and instead sentenced Rajesh to 6 months of community service. He was ordered to work for 4 hours per day at a local orphanage, under the supervision of a probation officer. - This judgment reflects a progressive shift in the Indian judiciary towards restorative justice principles, focusing on the offender’s rehabilitation rather than just punishment. It demonstrates the courts’ willingness to utilize community service as an alternative to traditional imprisonment, especially for first-time and non-violent offenders.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) - In *Sunita Gandharva vs. State of M.P. and Anr[**\[11\]**](#_ftn11)*, the MP High Court highlighted the importance of community service in the form that – *“it gives a chance in some cases to melt the ego of an accused who is facing the trial of those offenses which gave psychic gains or peevish pleasures to the accused while committing such crimes…the accused can again be assimilated into the mainstream society and would be accepted by the community…ingrained attributes of Love, Compassion Mercy, and Service can be rekindled through the concept of community service.”* The court considered it fit to impose community service as *“any other condition in the interest of justice”* as per section 437(3) of CrPC over the accused or offender. - In *Babu Singh vs. the State of UP[**\[12\]**](#_ftn12)*, the Apex court held that restorative devices through means of community service, meditative drills, or study classes should be innovated upon to redeem the offender. - *Vishal S Awtani vs State of Gujarat[**\[13\]**](#_ftn13)* – The court ordered the ones who are caught not wearing a mask, their services will be utilized for community services for 10 to 15 days on non-medical services. This would sufficiently work as a deterrent for COVID-19 for stricter implementation of rules. The Gujarat High Court stated that community service is not a punishment but a chance for the offenders for reparation. - *Ravi vs State of Haryana[**\[14\]**](#_ftn14)* – The juvenile was ordered to perform community service for three years in the hospital and was supervised by a medical officer. - *Pune Porsche Accident Case*[\[15\]](#_ftn15): A notable example is the Pune Porsche accident case, where a minor was sentenced to community service as part of his punishment. This case highlighted both the potential benefits and the challenges of implementing community service in the Indian context. **Conclusion:** In conclusion, BNS 2023 represents a reformist shift in the criminal justice system and adds a new approach to dealing with minor crimes that occur in society. The Indian Courts have passed several judgments on community sentencing in the past but it was on a discretionary basis after the introduction of it as a punishment under Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023, it allows courts to impose community sentencing as a punishment and highlights its potential in deterring further crimes. This will foster positive social outcomes among the general public and pose a solution for overcrowding in jail. The segregation of offenders from serious offenders and serving the motive behind restoring justice is proportionate to the crime committed. Through the collaborative efforts by legislative bodies, judiciary, and executive members, it can be efficiently imposed though it has some key challenges to overcome its smooth implementation and make it an effective and balanced alternative to traditional forms of punishment. Introducing community service as a sentence under the Indian system is a step ahead in innovation, reform, and seeking justice as has already been seen in many parts of the world, however, it requires a lot of research and model schemes to be prepared to find out its suitability in the Indian social context many hurdles need to be overcome namely – public acceptance, effective implementation, a difference of opinions within the judges, continuous monitoring a whole new system needs to be devised. On an extensive study of the use of community service, it can be concluded that Community service is potentially a good retributive sanction and has been proven to be a robust mechanism as an alternative to custodial sentencing. **REFERENCES** 1. Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred - Sharma, Ravi, Community Corrections in India: Challenges and Prospects (LexisNexis 2018) - Singh, Meera, Probation, and Aftercare in India: A Critical Analysis (Oxford Univ. Press 2015) - Patel, Arvind, Restorative Justice in Indian Context (Sage Publs. India 2020) - Rajeev Kumar, Effectiveness of Probation in India: A Case Study, 15 J. Indian L. & Soc. 100 (2020) 1. Online Articles / Sources Referred - SSRN, Priyanshi Gupta, [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3850264](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3850264), (Last Visited on August 15, 2024) - NUJS Law Review, , (Last Visited on August 15, 2024) - Riya Ranjan, “*Community Sentencing in India: remedies and reforms”*, iPleaders Blog (March 4, 2021), - Live Law, *“Community Service under the BNS – An incomplete yet penological advancement,”* , (Last Visited on August 15, 2024) 2. Statutes Referred - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 – §§ 202, 209, 225, 303, 355, 356. **ENDNOTES:** [\[1\] ](#_ftnref1)Judge Jane Doe, “The Role of Community Service in Criminal Justice Reform,” *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* (1976), 213. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) R.J. Maher, & H.E. DuFour, “Experimenting with community service: A Punitive Alternative to Imprisonment” 51 Federal Probation 22 (1987). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Home Council Advisory Council on Penal Systems, “Non- Custodial and Semi-Custodial Penalties” (London HMSO, 1970) [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Community Service, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Indian Penal Code, Juvenile Justice Act, LiveLaw, , (last visited Aug. 22, 2024). [**\[5\]**](#_ftnref5) PRS India – THE BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA,2023, [https://prsindia.org/files/bills\_acts/bills\_parliament/2023/Bharatiya\_Nyaya\_Sanhita,\_2023.pdf](https://prsindia.org/files/bills_acts/bills_parliament/2023/Bharatiya_Nyaya_Sanhita,_2023.pdf) , (Last Visited August 8, 2024) [**\[6\]**](#_ftnref6) Live Law, , (Last Visited on August 8, 2024) [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Legislative Brief, *The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita Bill 2023, PRS India,* [*https://prsindia.org/billtrack/prs-products/prs-legislative-brief-1702470430*](https://prsindia.org/billtrack/prs-products/prs-legislative-brief-1702470430)*,* (last visited Aug. 22, 2024). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) National Law University, Delhi, Study on the Implementation of Community Service Sentences in India (2020). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Evaluating the Impact of Community Service Sentences in India (2018). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Rajesh v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2021 Scc OnLine Chh 441. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) 2020 SCC OnLine MP 2193 [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Babu Singh & Ors. vs. The State of U.P (1978) 1 SCC 579 [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Vishal S Atwani vs. State of Gujarat C/WPPIL/108/2020 [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Ravi vs. State of Haryana, Criminal Revision No. 1001 of 2020 (O&M) [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) LiveLaw, , (last visited Aug. 22, 2024). **Categories:** Articles, Criminal Law --- ### [Article 14 and Doctrine of Affirmative Action](https://lawfoyer.in/article-14-and-doctrine-of-affirmative-action/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Vivek Gautam** **Edited by: Sulesh Choudhary** **INTRODUCTION** The structure of India guarantees the Right to Adjust utilizing 5 articles, particularly articles 14 to 18. Correspondence is one of the major prerequisites for the fitting working of a well-known government in a nation. The precept of correspondence a few times as of late the law is an inseparable constituent of the run the appearance of law which shapes a basic parcel of the Indian Structure. The essential address of Article 14 of the Indian structure is to provide consistency to all citizens or noncitizens, the correspondence of status and opportunity insinuated in the presentation of our structure. Article 14 of the Indian structure states that ‘THE STATE Ought to NOT DENY TO ANY Person Correspondence At some point as of late THE LAW OR THE Break indeed with Affirmation OF THE LAWS Interior THE Locale OF INDIA’. In direct words, we can state that Article 14 centers on two centers firstly rise to the security of law and consistency a few times as of late the law. Consistency at some point as of late the law and breaking indeed with the affirmation of statutes is the center of the Right to Consistency, a vital right guaranteed underneath the structure of India. This concept sets out that breaks indeed cannot be treated unequally and the right to such adjustment cannot be subjectively denied to the breaks indeed inside the nonappearance of a significant classification. This consistency right is found in the Indian structure from Article 14 to Article 18. ***Keywords (Minimum 5)*: EQUALITY, RIGHT, INDIA, COMPARISON,LAWS etc.** **MEANING AND DEFINITION** Article 14 of the Indian Structure primarily bargains with the arrangement of Correspondence. It sets out a commitment on the state to guarantee two things, firstly, correspondence sometime recently the law and rise to the security of the laws, inside the country. Article 14 implies the run of the show against segregation. It is not an unmistakable unattached arrangement, so it has to be studied with different rights conferred by other articles like Article 21. The essential point of Article 14 is to treat all people similarly, both in benefits conferred and liabilities forced. This right was embedded in the shape of gender-neutral terms\[ National Legitimate Benefit Specialist \[NALSA\] v UOI, Discuss 2014 SC 1863\]. It applies to both authoritative and official activities\[ E.P. Royappa vs State Of Tamil Nadu & Anr 1974 Discuss 555\]. Classification for drawing the line must be sound. This lawful arrangement bargains with two critical lawful concepts, firstly, correspondence some time recently the law and besides, rise to the security of the law, which collectively frame the center of the right to uniformity. This right is a portion of the “Golden Triangle” of the Structure. It shows the condition of balance inside the country and gives a few measures to advance correspondence. This article as it were forbids unfriendly separation. **HISTORICAL FOUNDATION** The roots of Article 14 can be traced back to English common law and the Magna Carta. Article 14 is an unmistakable article, that limits separation among the people of the society. It has been taken from the UK and affected by the US Structure. In India, the separation of people has come on the grounds of caste, religion, sex, etc. Article 14 of the Indian Structure concerns itself with balance sometime recently the law which implies that there ought to not be any kind of separation on the preface of race, caste, sex, etc. sometime recently the law. All people are broken even; no one is prevalent or second-rate in the eyes of the state and law. It moreover states the concept of breaking even with the assurance of the law which infers the capacity of the government to make laws to dominate obstacles of imbalance and make everybody rise to in the domain of India. **COMPARISON FROM DIFFERENT COUNTRIES** 1. **U.S** In the U.S. structure, there was a 14th alteration that emphasizes equal protection and due process, which fundamentally centers on that there must be not any segregation, and the major objective behind this was to avoid separation in the nation. 2. **UK** The UK passed an act known as the Equality Act 2010, the UK does not have a single constitutional provision equivalent to Article 14 of the Indian constitution but there is the Equality Act, 2010 which consolidates and simplifies anti -anti-discrimination laws. 3. **CANADA** Area 15 of the Canadian Constitution of Rights and Opportunity ensures correspondence sometime recently and beneath the law and gives assurance against segregation. It too incorporates a sensible limits clause that permits advocated refinements if they can be certifiably defended in a free and equitable society. 4. **AUSTRALIA** Area 117 of the Australian Structure moreover disallows separation against people based on the state or the region in which they are dwelling. There are various point-by-point anti-discrimination laws in government and state sanctioning in that nation. 5. **SOUTH AFRICA** Area 9 of the South African structure gives the right to correspondence and there will be no isolation based on race, caste, sex, etc. South Africa’s structure is well known for its comprehensive approach to correspondence and anti-discrimination. **RELATED PROVISIONS** **Article 14** states almost equivalency sometime recently law and breaks even with the assurance of law but the right to equivalency vittles are moderately diverse, which discover likeness in other articles like Articles 15,17 and 18, which are as takes after:- **Article 15**. Disallowance of boundary on grounds of religion, race, inheritance, coitus, or put of birth. - The State ought to not recognize against any citizen on grounds as it were of religion, race, space, coitus, put of birth, or any of them. - No citizen might, on grounds as it were of religion, race, inheritance, coitus, put of birth or any of them, be subject to any inadequacy, hazard, restriction or condition around — 1. impacts. by the Structure( Twenty- fourth Change) Act, 1971, 38( a) get to shops, open caffs, hospices and places of open fervor; or( b) the utilize of wells, tanks, showering ghats, lanes, and places of open resort kept up completely or not totally out of State stores or given to the utilize of the common open. - Nothing in this composition might offer help to the State in making any uncommon course of action for women and children. - Nothing in this composition or clause( 2) of composition 29 ought to offer help to the State from making any exceptional course of action for the progress of any socially and instructively invert classes of citizens or the slated gentries and the slated lines.) - Nothing in this composition or sub-clause( g) of clause( 1) of composition 19 might offer help to the State from making any uncommon course of action, by law, for the progress of any socially and instructively invert classes of citizens or for the slated gentries or the slated lines in so removed as comparative unprecedented vittles relate to their affirmation to educator teach tallying private educator teach, whether supported or unaided by the State, other than the nonage educator teach related to in clause( 1) of composition 30.) - Nothing in this composition or sub-clause ( g) of clause( 1) of composition 19 or clause( 2) of composition 29 might offer help to the State from making,( a) any exceptional course of action for the movement of any budgetary weaker zones of citizens other than the classes indicated in clauses( 4) and( 5); and( b) any exceptional course of action for the movement of any fiscally weaker sections of citizens other than the classes indicated in clauses( 4) and( 5) in so removed as comparative exceptional vittles relate to their affirmation to the teacher teach tallying private educator teach, whether upheld or unaided by the State, other than the nonage teacher instruct related to in clause( 1) of composition 30, which in the case of reservation would be in development to the being reservations and subject to the outside of ten percent. of the include up to seats in each orchestrate. **Article17.** Invalidation of Untouchability. — “ Untouchability ” is invalidated and its sharpness in any outline is intrigue. The authorization of any failure arising out of “ Untouchability ” ought to be an offense punishable in the statement with the law. **Article18**. Invalidation of titles. - No title, not being an advantage or insightful capability, might be conferred by the State. - No citizen of India ought to recognize any title from any exterior State. - No person who is not a citizen of India ought to, though he holds any office of advantage or conviction underneath the State, recognize without the concurrence of the President any title from any exterior State. - No person holding any office of advantage or conviction underneath the State might, without the concurrence of the President, recognize any appearance, bundle, or office of any kind from or underneath any inaccessible State. **MAXIMS** EQUALITY UNDER THE LAW It is a lawful concept that guarantees that there is the nonattendance of extraordinary benefits in society, that all people are similarly subject to the conventional law of the arrive, and that no individual, anything his rank or condition, is not over the law. EQUAL PROTECT OF THE LAW BY THE GOVERNMENT This phrase states that the government can take steps or adapt any law or make special conditions to make people all at the same level in the territory of India. UBI JUS IBI REMEDIUM “Where there is a right, there is a remedy”. It means that if there is a violation of a right then remedy must be available in such a scenerio. INVIDOUS DISCRIMINATRION According to this maxim, discrimination which is unfair, unjust, and likely to be perceived as prejudicial is invalid against the right to equality. **RELATED CASE LAWS** - A. Abbas v. Union of India\[AIR 1971 SC 481\] - Air India v. Nargesh Meerza \[AIR 1981 SC 1829\] - National Legal Service Authority \[NALSA\] v UOI, AIR 2014 SC 1863 - D. Shetty vs The International Airport Authority Of India And Ors.1979 AIR 1628 - S Nakara v. union of India \[AIR 1983 SC 130\] - P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu\[AIR 1974 SC 555\] - Randhir Singh v. Union of India \[AIR 1982 SC 879\] **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** Now, we can conclude that Article 14 talks approximately two things balancing some time recently the law and breaking even with assurance of the law which essentially states that there will be no segregation based on race, caste, sexual orientation, sex, etc and the government can take viable measures to give balance in the society. **REFERENCES** **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** 1. MP JAIN ,DK BASU,CONSTITUTION OF INDIA **Cases Referred** 1. A. Abbas v. Union of India\[AIR 1971 SC 481\] 2. Air India v. Nargesh Meerza \[AIR 1981 SC 1829\] 3. S Nakara v. union of India \[AIR 1983 SC 130\] 4. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu\[AIR 1974 SC 555\] 5. Mithu v. State of Punjab \[AIR 1983 SC 473\] 6. Randhir Singh v. Union of India \[AIR 1982 SC 879\] 7. Javed v. State of Haryana \[AIR 2003 SC 3057\] **Statutes Referred** - Constitution of India - P Jain **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Amendments in the Indian Constitution](https://lawfoyer.in/amendments-in-the-indian-constitution/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Ayushi Verma** **Edited by: Sulesh Choudhary** **INTRODUCTION** ***“Constitution is not a mere lawyers’ document, it is a vehicle of Life, and its spirit is always the spirit of Age.”*** – ***Dr BR Ambedkar*** A Constitution is a fundamental and a living document. It lays down the framework of organs of Government of a state. “***The Constitution of India was adopted on 26th November 1949 and came into force on 26th January 1950***”[\[1\]](#_ftn1). As nothing is static but dynamic, everything needs reform. The same is the case with the laws of the country. Laws are made for the well-being of society. With the changing needs of society, the Constitution of India must also adapt to these changes. This can be achieved by a procedure known as amendment of the Constitution. It is given under ***Article 368[\[2\]](#_ftn2)*** of the Constitution of India. This provision is borrowed from South Africa. The Indian Constitution is a combination of both flexibility and rigidity. This means that there are different procedures of amendment for different provisions. Some provisions are amended by simple majority and others by special majority. The present article aims to elaborate on the provision, procedure, and relevant case laws regarding the amendment of the Constitution of India. ***Keywords*: *Article 368, Constitution of India, Amendment, Basic Structure*** **MEANING** Amendment of the Constitution is a process of making alterations or variations to the Constitution. “*This includes addition, substitution, variation, and repeal/omission.”* This is also known as the Constitutional Amendment. **PROVISION: AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA** **Article 368** under Part XX of the Constitution deals with the power of Parliament to amend the Constitution and its Procedure. It states that: ***1.“****Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, Parliament may in exercise of its constituent power amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any provision of this Constitution in accordance with the procedure laid down in this article**.*** ***2.** An amendment of this Constitution may be initiated only by the introduction of a Bill for the purpose in either House of Parliament, and when the Bill is passed in each House by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House present and voting, it shall be presented to the President who shall give his assent to the Bill and thereupon the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill:* *Provided that if such amendment seeks to make any change in –* ***(a)*** *article 54, article 55, article 73, article 162, article 241 or article 279A or* ***(b)*** *Chapter IV of Part V, Chapter V of Part VI, or Chapter I of Part XI, or* ***(c)*** *any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, or* ***(d)*** *the representation of States in Parliament, or* ***(e)*** *the provisions of this article,* *the amendment shall also require to be ratified by the Legislatures of not less than one-half of the States by resolutions to that effect passed by those Legislatures before the Bill making provision for such amendment is presented to the President for assent.* ***(3)*** *Nothing in Article 13 shall apply to any amendment made under this article.* ***(4)*** *No amendment of this Constitution (including the provisions of Part III) made or purporting to have been made under this article whether before or after the commencement of section 55 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 shall be called in question in any court on any ground.* ***(5)*** *For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that there shall be no limitation whatever[**\[i\]**](#_edn1) on the constituent power of Parliament to amend by way of addition, variation or repeal the provisions of this Constitution under this article.”[**\[3\]**](#_ftn3)* **METHODS:** There are three modes of amendment provided by the Constitution itself: – 1. By simple majority 2. By special majority 3. By special majority in both Houses of Parliament including ratification by State Legislatures. Article 368 only talks about the two modes which are: Amendment by special majority and amendment by special majority including ratification by the states. **Amendment by simple majority:** This method of amendment is used to alter ordinary laws. This includes a simple majority vote of present members and voting. These types of amendments do not fall under the purview of Article 368. Some of the examples where this mode of the amendment is used are; the admission or establishment of new states (Article 2), the Formation of new states and alteration of areas, boundaries, or names of existing states (Article 3), Abolition or creation of legislative councils of states (Article 169), etc. **Amendment by special majority:** The type of amendment by special majority is used where the provisions cannot be amended by simple majority. According to Article 368(2), following is the procedure: - Firstly, the bill for the purpose of amendment shall be presented in either of the houses of Parliament. - Secondly, the bill shall be passed by either house by a majority of total members and which shall not be less than two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. - Thirdly, after the bill is passed by either house, the bill shall be sent to the President for its assent. Therefore, the Constitution stands amended. **Amendment by special majority including ratification by states:** According to the proviso to clause 2 of Article 368, in the following cases that is: - Election of the President (Articles 54 and 55) - The extent of executive power of the union and the state (Articles 73 and 162) - Constitution, powers, and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (Chapter 4 of Part 5) - Constitution, powers, and jurisdiction of the High Courts (Chapter 5 of Part 6) - High Courts in Union Territories (Article 241) - Legislative Relations between Union and States (Chapter of Part 9) - Goods and Services Tax Council (Article 279A) - Any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule - The representation of States in Parliament - The provisions of Article 368 itself. Amendment is done by a special majority of parliament including ratification by half of the state legislatures. This type of amendment is used when there is a need to alter the federal structure of the states. **Procedure:** 1. Firstly, an amendment bill shall be introduced in either house of the Parliament. 2. Secondly, such a bill shall be passed in each house of the parliament by a special majority. It requires the majority of the total members which shall not be less than two-thirds of the members present and voting. 3. Thirdly, the bill must be sent to the state legislatures for ratification after it is passed by either house of the Parliament. 4. Fourthly, a bill must be ratified by at least half of the state legislatures. This means by a simple majority which means the majority of members present and voting. 5. Lastly, the bill must be sent to the President for his assent. After the assent is received the Constitution stands amended. **Amendment of Fundamental Rights** Following are the important constitutional amendments and judicial precedents that provide the scope of power of the Parliament under Article 368 to amend Fundamental Rights. 1. **Shankari Prasad v. Union of India[\[4\]](#_ftn4)** This was the first case where the amending power of Parliament came into question. In this case, the 1st Constitutional Amendment, of 1951 was challenged. - **1st Constitutional Amendment, 1951** This amendment inserted the new grounds in clause (2) of Article 19, 31A, 31B, and Ninth Schedule to the Constitution. - **Issue: –** Whether the term law under ***Article 13*** includes the amendment of the Constitution under ***Article 368.*** - **Held: –** The Court upheld the validity of the 1st Amendment and held that the term ‘law’ under ***Article 13*** does not include an amendment to the Constitution. Therefore, Parliament can amend any provision of the Constitution including Fundamental Rights under Article 368. 2. **Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan** [\[5\]](#_ftn5) In this case the constitutional validity of the 17th Amendment, 1964 was challenged. - **17th Constitutional Amendment, 1964** This amendment modified Article 31A and the Ninth Schedule. - **Held: –** The Court reaffirmed its decision given in Shankari Prasad v. Union of India 3. **Golak Nath v. State of Punjab [\[6\]](#_ftn6)** In this case, the 1st, 4th, and 17th Constitutional amendments were challenged. - **4th Constitutional Amendment, 1955** This Amendment made an alteration to Article 31(2) of the Constitution and made the question of *“adequacy” of compensation non-justiciable.* - **Held**: – The Supreme Court overruled its decisions given in the case of **Shankari Prasad v. Union of India**[\[7\]](#_ftn7)and **Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan[\[8\]](#_ftn8).** Further, it held that Parliament cannot amend the Fundamental rights. The term law under Article 13 is the amendment made under Article 368. Therefore, if an amendment took away Fundamental Rights, the amendment would be declared void. - **24th Amendment, 1971** This amendment act added: - clause 4 to Article 13 of the Constitution which states that “***Nothing in this Article shall apply to any amendment of this Constitution made under Article 368***.”[\[9\]](#_ftn9) - Heading of the Article 368 was changed from ‘Procedure for amendment of the Constitution’ to ‘P***ower of Parliament to amend the Constitution and procedure therefor***.[\[10\]](#_ftn10)’ - New clause 1 to Article 368 - After this amendment, it became binding on the President to give his assent to the bill passed by the parliament - Clause 3 to Article 368. 4. **Keshvananda Bharati v. State of Kerala[\[11\]](#_ftn11)** In this case, the constitutional validity of the 24th Amendment, of 1971 was challenged - **Held: –** The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the 24th Amendment and laid down that under Article 368, the parliament has the power to amend the Constitution including fundamental rights subjected to restrictions. The Supreme Court laid down the basic structure doctrine and emphasized that parliament under its exercise of power given under Article 368 cannot amend the basic structure of the Constitution. - **42nd Constitutional Amendment, 1976** This amendment inserted clauses 4 and 5 into the Article 368. And also, it amended Article 31C 5. **Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain[\[12\]](#_ftn12)** In this case, elaborated the meaning of the expression “basic structure” of the Constitution and declared the following features as part of the basic structure: - Judicial Review - Free and fair elections - Rule of law - Right to equality 6. **Minerva Mills Ltd. Union of India[\[13\]](#_ftn13)** In this case, the Court held the provisions of clauses 4 and 5 of Article 368 which were inserted by the 42nd Amendment Act, 1976 as unconstitutional, as these violated the basic structure doctrine of the Constitution. **BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE** The basic structure doctrine was laid down by the Supreme Court in the Case of **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala**[\[14\]](#_ftn14). This basic structure doctrine is a restriction on the amending power of the Parliament under Article 368. This states that under Article 368, Parliament has the power to amend the Constitution including fundamental rights which do not constitute part of the Basic Structure of the Constitution. The Court laid down a list of the features included in the basic structure. This list is not exhaustive. With the evolution of time, many other features have been added. Some of the features are Supremacy of the Constitution, Judicial review, Separation of Power, Rule of law, Right to equality, etc. **CONCLUSION** It is important to get reforms in accordance with the changing needs of the society. The law must also be reformed. The Constitution of India, from which all laws originate provides for the amendment too whenever it is necessary. The Constituent Power of the Parliament for Amendment of the Constitution given under Article 368 is not absolute. After analyzing the judicial precedents in this regard, it can be concluded that Parliament can amend any part of the Constitution without violating the basic structure of the Constitution. This basic structure doctrine acts as a limitation and check on the power of the Parliament. **REFERENCES** **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** - Kumar, N. (2015). *Constitutional Law of India*. - Pandey, J. N. (1992). *Constitutional Law of India*. **Cases Referred** - Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (AIR 1951 SC 458) - Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1965 SC 845) - Golak Nath v. State of Punjab (AIR 1967 SC 1643) - Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (AIR 1973 SC 1461) - Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (AIR 1975 SC 2299) - Minerva Mills Ltd. Union of India (AIR 1980 SC 1789) **Statutes Referred** - Constitution of India. 1950 **ENDNOTES:** [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Contributors to Wikimedia projects. (2024, July 24). *Constitution of India*. Wikipedia. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution\_of\_India](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_India) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Constitution of India, Article 368 (1950). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Constitution of India, Article 368 (1950). https://indiankanoon.org/doc/594125/ [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) AIR 1951 SC 458. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) AIR 1965 SC 845 [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) AIR 1967 SC 1643 [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) AIR 1951 SC 458 [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) AIR 1965 SC 845 [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Constitution of India, Article 13 (1950). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Constitution of India, Article 368 (1950). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) AIR 1973 SC 1461 [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) AIR 1975 SC 2299 [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) AIR 1980 SC 1789 [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) AIR 1973 SC 1461 [](#_ednref1) **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Geographical Indications Tags as Intellectual Property in India: Provisions, Procedures & Case Studies](https://lawfoyer.in/geographical-indications-tags-as-intellectual-property-in-india-provisions-procedures-case-studies/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Shruti Bharat Mohite** **Edited by: Sulesh Choudhary** **INTRODUCTION** In this era of globalization, boundaries are no more boundaries. International players have found their way to pierce into the nook and cranny of the globe. Meanwhile, globalization has also adversely affected rural products, in turn affecting the livelihood of communities. There is a wide threat to rural products, and some of them are getting perished due to a lack of proper knowledge and financial resources. The local products are now facing the threat of losing their own identity in front of their global rivals, who usually carry a globally recognized brand name with them. Here comes the need of a global recognition of the local goods. Geographical Indications is one of the solutions to it. A geographical indication is a sign, which indicates the origin of a product. The origin is due to the various geographical -environmental factors like human factor, natural factor, or maybe a combination of both, which attributes some quality, reputation, and specific characteristics to the products. Geographical indications are considered as “traditional brand” because they are connected to the history and customs of a community. These products are neither made according to the needs of the market nor on the initiative of the business. Apart from these, they are naturally found in a place where a community is developing it there throughout the years. Therefore, the geographical indication is an emerging form of intellectual property rights ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*: Intellectual property, GI Tags, trademarks, GI process** **SUB-HEADINGS** **Meaning, Definition & Explanation** The importance of the geographical indication is emerging, especially in developing countries, with an intention to protect the authenticity of rural products. A geographical indication is a signature that verifies the authenticity and also the place of origin of that product having unique features. As per TRIPS agreement the definition of GI ‘indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin’ 2 i.e., a product originating at a particular place having some reputation or characteristics or being manufactured/produced by a particular community are only eligible to get the GI tag. Thus, GI is a tool to promote the goods of a particular area. Some of the famous GI of India are Solapuri Chaddar from Solapur, Kolhapuri Chappal from Kolhapur, Darjeeling Tea, Kashmir saffron from J&K, Feni from Goa, Surat Zari craft, Mysore Silk from Karnataka etc. **Section 2(e)** of the Geographical Indication of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act 1999 defines ‘geographical indications’ in relation to goods to mean: *“An indication which identifies such goods as agricultural goods, natural goods or manufactured goods as originating, or manufactured in the territory of a county, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of such goods is essentially attributable to its geographical origin and in the case where such goods are manufactured goods one of the activities of either the production or of processing or preparations of the goods concerned takes place in such territory, region or locality, as the case may be.”* **Definition of Geographical indication by WIPO: –** The WIPO defines GI as, *“…a sign used on products that have a specific geographical origin and possess qualities or a reputation that are due to that origin.”* **European Commission Regulation, on the Protection of Geographical Indications:** GI is defined as, “being the name of a region, a specific place or, in exceptional cases, a country, used to describe an agricultural product or foodstuff: 1. originating in that region, specific place or country, and 2. which possesses a specific quality, reputation or other characteristics attributable to that geographical origin the geographical link must occur in at least one of the stages of production and /or processing and/or preparation of which takes place in the defined geographical area.” **Historical Background / Evolution** Right from the medieval period, when there was no proper legal protection for trade, products based out of geographical regions were famous. People from Europe and other parts of the world wanted to acquire those products because of its regional characteristics, such as spices from India and tea from China. Initially, GI was protected by the respective regional rulers and the laws prescribed by them. Some rules with respect to GI can be traced back to the 14th and 15th centuries in European countries like England and France. Later in the 20 century, proper formation of rules of GI was framed. France was the only country in the 20th century to enact a comprehensive system for the protection of GI. A major part of this system influence in the drafting of both national and international treaties. Before the 20th century, only three multilateral agreements were addressed for the protection of geographical signs by the World Intellectual Property Organizations (WIPO). The two different parameters which WIPO set for identifying the GI were “the Indication of Source” and “Appellation of Origin.” Before the GI act, which was enacted in the year 1999, there were no formal procedures or any legal law in India to protect the producers of those products which were either or manufactured within the geographic regions of India. Since then, the judiciary and the government have been active in preventing persons who take unlawful advantage of GI products. Hence, through the enactment of the GI act, maximum protection is guaranteed to the producers to protect their products and curb fake products. This, in turn, helps to improve the socio-economic status of people from rural areas. **In Mohan Meakin Breweries Ltd. v.** **The Scotch Whiskey Association** in the year 1980 was related to a brand name ‘Highland Chief used in relation to the product described as “Malted Whisky” along with a device of the head and shoulders of a Scottish gentleman wearing feather bonnet and plaid and a tartan edging gives the impression that the product in relation to which it is used comes from Scotland and is thus likely to deceive or confuse the unwary purchaser in India. The Delhi High Court refused to register the applicant’s mark on Whisky. Similarly, in another case of **Scotch Whisky Association v Pravara Sahakar Karkhana** in the year 1991, the Hon’ble Justice.Mr.D. R Dhanuka, the Scotch Whisky Association succeeded in restraining the defendants who were selling their Whisky under the description “blended with scotch” along with the word “drum beater with the device of Scottish drummer wearing a kilt or tartan. **Difference between geographical indications and trademarks** Geographical indications and trademarks are different forms of intellectual property rights. Geographical indications and trademarks are signs used to distinguish goods and services. Both forms of intellectual property help the consumers to identify the products. This is the common element between these two rights. Because of this similarity, both these rights are often used interchangeably. One of the major advantages of GI is that the product with the GI tag never compromises on the quality. This expectation also increases the purchasing of the product. GI is thus very much similar to the functioning of the trademark. The major difference is that trademark helps us to identify the goods of a certain organization. There is no geographical region associated with the trademark.18 But, when it comes to GI, the place of origin plays a very important role in identifying the product’s quality. This makes GI differ from other intellectual property rights. GI is fixed and cannot be sold separately from the granted region. For example, GI has been provided to Ratnagiri Alphonso mango, where Ratnagiri is a region in Maharashtra where these mangoes are grown. But if some farmers from Ratnagiri migrate to another place and start cultivating Alphonso mango, then the same cannot be sold with the former GI tag. A trademark is a creative sign used by the owner or the person authorized too so. The same trademark can be sold or leased to another person by the same establishment, owning it. For example, the McDonalds golden arch is an example for a trademark, and the owner and franchise can use it. Whereas, GI cannot be licensed to any other person. Human creativity is needed for making trademarks. 1. **Goods, originating in a particular territory, region, or locality**: – Origin of goods is one of the vital elements in determining GI. But to identify the origin, proper delimitation of the region is necessary considering the specific nature of the product. Delimitation means dividing a particular area into appropriate administrative zones. It will help to identify that the concerned geographical area is situated in a specific zone or region. For example, Aranmula Kannadi. Aranmula is a region in the Pathanamthitta district. The Kannadi (Mirror) is made in the region called Aranmula. Hence it is called Aranmula Kannadi, increasing the importance of the area called Aranmula. 2. **Quality**: – Quality is one of the main attractions of goods having a GI tag. The quality of goods is mainly due to two things (1) natural quality and (2) quality attributable to the method of manufacturing. Natural qualities mainly due to the physical and chemical properties of raw materials, temperature, and climate of that particular region, soil, landscape, etc. In the case of agricultural products, quality depends on the soil, harvesting methods, seeding, and packaging of the finished products. For example, the prominent Palakkadan matta is popular because of its unique taste, which is cultivated in the district of Palakkad Kerala. This rice is cultivated in the dense black cotton soil. The soil contains clay and silt, which gives a natural flavour to the rice. Quality attributable to the method of manufacturing includes the quality of raw materials and the method of manufacturing. The actual presentation of the product is also due to the quality. 3. **Reputation:** – Reputation of the goods is related to the historical origin of the goods. Every good having GI tag has some history. It will help to distinguish it from other forms of product. While registering for GI tag, the applicants must show the proof of origin, i.e., the history related to the product. 4. **Terroir:** – There is another element other than quality and reputation but which can be linked between the product and its geographical origin, which is called terroir. Terroir is connected with the human environment and natural instincts, which can sometimes be spiritual aspects. Thus, terroir sometimes lacks scientific technology and analysis. Therefore, some feel that terroir cannot form the basis for geographical indications. **Legal Provisions / Procedure / Specifications / Criteria (if any)** The Basmati rice and Darjeeling tea controversy are the major incidents that can be quoted with respect to the passing of Geographical Indication of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act 1999. The law provides specific rules for the registration and protection of GI. The act is administered by the Controller General of Patents, Designs, and Trademark. The Controller General is also called as the Registrar of GI. There are three main objectives of GIGA. They are, (i) Protection of Geographical indications of goods in the country could, in turn, protect the interest of producers of such goods (ii) Misuse of GI by unauthorized persons and also to protect consumers from misleading (iii) To bring economic prosperity to the country by promoting the GI in the trade market. The Indian GIGA Act provides for multilateral registrations of GI, including owners from outside India. **Chapters in the GI Act** **Contents** Chapter I Preliminary Commencement as well as the definitions Chapter II The Register and Conditions for Registration Registration of goods Chapter III Procedure for and Duration of Registration Procedure including application, withdrawal etc Chapter IV Effect of Registration The consequences of GI registration in India Chapter V Special Provisions Relating to Trade Marks and Prior Users Covers the arena of GIs v. Trademarks Chapter VI Rectification and Correction of the Register Rectifying the applications and errors thereof Chapter VII Appeals to the Appellate Board Appeals, bar of jurisdiction etc Chapter IX Offences, Penalties and Procedure Punishment for falsely using GIs **GI Process in India** To apply for Geographical Indications, there are four types of application which need to be examined as to which should be proceeded with. They are: 1. **Ordinary application**: – an application filed to register a GI of India 2. **Convention application**: – an application filed for GI registration from a convention country, i.e., any country or group of countries which are signatories or party to an international region or bilateral treaty. It should submit the proof of registration of that GI in the home country. 3. **Single class application:** – an application submitted for the registration of GI less than one class of category. 4. **multi-class application**: – an application submitted for the registration of GI under more than one category of goods. As the registrar is the appellate officer of GI, the registration of GI is made to the registrar by the associations or communities of producers of the concerned goods. The application must contain: (i) A statement indicating the proof of origin of the product, its quality, reputation or other characteristics may be due to the human and natural factors and methods like production, processing takes place with respect to a particular region or territory. (ii) The product should be represented as a true Geographical Indication without any supporting samples. iii) There should be proper journals or report with a unique feature of the product, and the same must be produced to the concerned people inspecting the product. (iv) A geographical representation or a map of the territory of the country must be submitted. (v) Where a particular attribute of a product, for example, the colour of the product is claimed to be an element of a GI in the application for registration, the application must contain a clear explanation stating the importance of that attribute. **Case Laws / Precedents / Overruling / Judicial Development of the Concept** The two major incidents that triggered the need for a strict rule for the protection of GI are: **Basmati Controversy** On September 2nd, 1997, the United States Patent and Trademark Office granted a patent to RiceTec inc. a US MNC based in Alvin, Texas, for new “lines and grains” in the name of “Basmati” rice. The reason providing the trademark is because of the claim made by RiceTec Inc that the new variety of rice developed by them possessed better characteristics than original Basmati rice, which can be grown in specific areas in North America. For several years they have been using the trademark names “Texmati,””Kasmati,” and “Jusmati,” which they claimed to be a version of Basmati rice. From India’s perspective, this was not at all acceptable because, (i) The grant of the patent was invalid (ii) Marketing of rice with the name basmati was against India’s interest as it was considered as a GI in India. Basmati is a long-grained aromatic rice variety vastly grown in sub-Himalayan areas by using traditional methods and practices for centuries. Hence no other country should be allowed to use this indication. Indian Basmati rice is being exported to many countries, and the highest demand for this rice was from Europe. Due to this high demand in Europe, there was a very minimal duty on Basmati rice. But after the RiceTec Inc. started its own Basmati variety, the competition increased among different varieties of Basmati rice, and India feared to lose a huge market. RiceTec inc. claimed that the patent was granted to new ‘Basmati’ (lines and grains) and considered it as an improvement over the previous variety. They also argued that Basmati was a generic name for all types of aromatic rice, not a variety of rice from Indian origin. They claimed that Basmati was used in a generic way for decades for different varieties of rice, such as ‘American Basmati,’ ‘Uruguayan Basmati’ and ‘Thai Basmati.’ According to them, Basmati is not the name of any geographical area, but India claims that the name, reputation, and quality of the rice are truly dependant on its area of origin, i.e., India subcontinent. Therefore, it needs to be protected under the TRIPs agreement. RiceTec Inc. Still argued and stated that their products are stated as ‘American type Basmati rice,’ which is prohibited under the TRIPs agreement for GI under Article 23 with respect to wines and spirits and not for other products. India challenged the patent of RiceTec inc. in the year 2000. The US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) rejected granted patents only three types of hybrid Basmati grain and rejected seventeen types out of a total of twenty patents claimed by the company. The patent office also stated that patents could be granted to the three different varieties of Basmati because the term Basmati was neither a trademark nor a geographic indicator, unlike Champagne, which was specific to a region. They also stated that Basmati was grown all over the Indian subcontinent and was not limited to India’s specific region. The US grocery stores thus saw Texamti and Jasmati hitting their shelves post in the mid- the 1990s. This purely goes against Indian interest, and if the developed countries like the US put pressure on developing nations for allowing patenting of crops in their wish, the developing countries will lose the right to challenge the patents on their crops. **Darjeeling Tea Controversy** Another major issue problem faced in India was an incident related to Darjeeling tea. Darjeeling tea is a special kind of tea found in the Darjeeling district in the northern Indian state West Bengal. The problem was related to companies around the world selling tea with the brand of Darjeeling but, was not grown in Darjeeling. Due to these fake products resembling as Darjeeling tea, the original makers of Darjeeling tea were losing its large market share. Consequently, India realized that to protect its geographical indications globally, India has to set some common rules and regulations. As a result, the geographical indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Bill 1999 passed by both the houses in India. It came into force on September 15th, 2003, along with Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Rules 2002. There was no legal theory dealing specifically with GI or appellations of origin prior to this. As a result, the GI tag was provided to Darjeeling tea, making it the first product to receive the GI tag in the year 2004. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** India is a nation having a multitudinous number of GI discovered the whole way across the nation. It is, for the most part, a direct result of such enhanced climatic conditions, human aptitudes and customs among different states. GI, if appropriately recognized and secured are fit for adding to a huge segment of income for a developing nation like India. As India is a signatory to the TRIPS Agreement, it is the commitment to give insurance for those items having a GI tag. To ensure the GI India embraced the GI Act, which came into power, alongside the GI Rules, with impact from 15 September 2003, has been instrumental in the augmentation of GI status to numerous products up until now. The central government has built up the Geographical Indications Registry with all-India purview, at Chennai, where right-holders can enlist their GI. In contrast to TRIPS, the GI Act doesn’t confine its unique assurance to wines and spirits alone. The central government has the circumspection to choose which items ought to concur more elevated levels of security. This methodology has intentionally been taken by the drafters of the Indian Act with the point of giving severe assurance as ensured under the TRIPS Agreement to GI of Indian birthplace. In India, enlistment for GI isn’t mandatory. In the event that the proprietor of the GI is enlisted under the GI Act if there should be an occurrence of encroachment, the proprietor can file a suit. When a GI is enrolled in India, it turns out to be moderately simpler to look for insurance in different nations too. So, a country like India, protecting GI will produce a lot of income **REFERENCES** 1. **Cases Referred** 1. Basmati controversy 2. Darjeeling tea controversy 3. Mohan Meakin Breweries Ltd. v. The Scotch Whiskey Association 4. Scotch Whisky Association v Pravara Sahakar Karkhana 2. **Statutes Referred** 1. GI Act 1999 **Categories:** Articles, Intellectual Property Law --- ### [Tehseen S. Poonawalla vs Union Of India and Others](https://lawfoyer.in/tehseen-s-poonawalla-vs-union-of-india-and-others/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Ayushi Verma** **Edited by: Sulesh Choudhary** **ABSTRACT** The present case law is related to the matter of cow vigilantism and mob violence. Cow vigilantism and mob violence caused a lot of disturbances in the Country. Many people who were not even guilty lost their lives. Some got severely injured. Therefore, a writ petition was filed in the Supreme Court in August 2016. An action was sought from the court to prevent the violence and also certain cow protection laws were challenged. The Supreme Court of India ruled that no individuals or groups can take the law into their own hands and punish the victims illegally. The Court also stressed the point that it is the duty of the state to protect the rights of the citizens and prevent crime. The Court also laid down certain guidelines that shall be followed by states with regard to the prevention of mob lynching. ***Keywords**: – Cow Vigilantism, Mob Lynching, Constitution of India, Article 21, Cow protection laws*** **CASE DETAILS** **a) Case Name/ Judgement Cause Title** **Tehseen S. Poonawalla Vs. Union of India and others** **b) Case Number** **Writ Petition ( Civil ) No. 754 of 2016** **c) Petitioner** **Tehseen S. Poonawalla** **d) Respondent** **Union of India and others** **e) Judgement Date** **17th July, 2018** **f) Court** **Supreme Court of India** **g) Quorum / Constitution of Bench** **Justice Dipak Misra, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, Justice A.M. Khanwilkar** **h) Author / Name of Judges** ### **Dipak Mishra** **i) Citation** **(2018) 9 SCC 501, AIR 2018 SC 3354** **j) Legal Provisions Involved** · **Articles – 15, 21, 32, 256 and 257 of the Constitution of India** · **Section 12 of the Gujarat Animal Prevention Act, 1954** · **Section 13 of the Maharashtra Animal Prevention Act, 1976** · **Section 15 of the Karnataka Prevention of Cow Slaughter and Cattle Preservation Act, 1964** **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE CASE** Laws are made for the well-being and protection of the citizens. Citizens are required to abide by the law and one who violates the law needs to be punished. In recent years there has been a rapid increase in cases of Mob Lynching. The main cause behind the attack by mobs is Cow Vigilantism. The present Case law is related to cow vigilantism and other cases of mob lynching and how it was tackled. - **Mob Lynching** Mob lynching is a horrifying act where a group of people takes the law into their own hands to punish the victims (suspect) illegally. This is a violation of Article 21[\[1\]](#_ftn1) of the Constitution of India which deals with the Right to life and Personal liberty. - **Cow Vigilantism** Cow Vigilantism or Cow Vigilante force is the use of physical force in the name of cow protection by blaming them for cow slaughter. Such killings mainly aimed the minorities such as Muslims and Dalits. **BACKGROUND OF THE CASE** In 2015, there was a huge rise in the incidents of cow vigilantism in India, which was based on rumours and cultural beliefs. That happened because there was supposition that the victims were consuming beef, which was false. Some of the incidents are illustrated below: – - In 2015, a person named Mohammed Akhlaq was attacked and killed by a mob of villagers on the pretext that he had stolen and slaughtered a calf. Later on, it was reported that he didn’t store the beef. - One of the recent cases of cow vigilantism is the case of Pehlu Khan. In this case, Pehlu Khan and his son were attacked on the doubt of smuggling of a cow. Also, some states such as Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Jharkhand, Gujarat, and Karnataka enacted laws that protect cow vigilantes from their illegal acts in the name of cow protection. These laws provide protection against the acts of a person done in good faith. **FACTS OF THE CASE** In the year 2016, due to the rise in the episodes of cow vigilantism and mob violence and several protests in Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore, Chennai, Lucknow, and Allahabad among other parts of the country, Tehseen S. Poonawalla, a social activist and lawyer filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court of India under Article 32[\[2\]](#_ftn2) alleging the incidents of lynching and mob violence by so-called Cow vigilante groups and organizations. This petition was filed to compel the respondent states to take necessary actions against these groups and organizations. Also, the petitioner sought action against the Cow vigilante groups and organizations for uploading violent content on social media. Furthermore, the provisions of Section 12[\[3\]](#_ftn3) of the Gujarat Animal Prevention Act, 1954, Section 13[\[4\]](#_ftn4) of the Maharashtra Animal Prevention Act, 1976 , and Section 15[\[5\]](#_ftn5) of the Karnataka Prevention of Cow Slaughter and Cattle Preservation Act, 1964 were also challenged. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether the States and Centre have a duty to develop immediate action plans to be undertaken against these violent cow protection mobs? 2. Whether the provisions of Section 12 of the Gujarat Animal Prevention Act, 1954, Section 13 of the Maharashtra Animal Prevention Act, 1976, and Section 15 of the Karnataka Prevention of Cow Slaughter and Cattle Preservation Act, 1964 unconstitutional? **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that: 1. Any person or group should be prevented from taking the law into their own hands and should not indulge in any kind of violence on the perception of crime. 2. Mob lynching and cow vigilantism violate Article 21[\[6\]](#_ftn6). - The Central government should issue directions to states to maintain law and order in the exercise of the power conferred to it under Articles 256 and 257[\[7\]](#_ftn7) of the Constitution of India. It is the duty of both the State and the Centre to ensure that minorities are not targeted due to misinformation and hatred, and stringent actions are taken. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that: 1. The central government cannot intervene in the matters of states, as law and order is a state subject. 2. Also, the persons involved in the mob violence have been booked under criminal law and police took the necessary action against them. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** **Article 21**[**\[8\]**](#_ftn8)**: –** **Protection of life and personal liberty** ***“****No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law”* **Article 32[\[9\]](#_ftn9): – Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part[\[10\]](#_ftn10)** Article 32 provides that every citizen has the right to approach the Supreme Court for enforcement of the rights guaranteed by part 3rde. fundamental rights of the Constitution of India. Under this Article Supreme Court has the power to issue directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warrant , and certiorari*.* #### Article 256[\[11\]](#_ftn11): – Obligation of States and the Union According to Article 256, every state shall exercise its executive power in compliance with laws made by the Parliament and existing laws of such state. The executive power of the Union shall include the power to give directions to a state which may appear to the Government of India to be necessary #### **Article 257[\[12\]](#_ftn12)**: – **Control of the Union over States in certain cases** According to Article 257, the executive power of the state shall not impede that of the Union and the executive power of the Union shall include the power to give directions to a state which may appear to the Government of India to be necessary, which is related to the construction and maintenance of means of communication which is of national or military importance, which is related to the measures to be taken for the protection of the railways within the State. **Section 12[\[13\]](#_ftn13), Gujarat Animal Prevention Act;** **Section 13[\[14\]](#_ftn14) of the Maharashtra Animal Prevention Act;** **Section 15[\[15\]](#_ftn15) of the Karnataka Prevention of Cow Slaughter and Cattle Preservation Act** – Protection of persons acting in good faith under the Act or rules- “*No suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall be instituted against any person for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done under this Act or the rules made there under”.* **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** The Supreme Court unambiguously held that: – 1. It is the duty of the state to prevent crime and to ensure that the machinery of law and order functions efficiently in maintaining peace. The state must ensure that no individual or groups take the law into their own hands. Every individual shall inform the police as soon as there is a violation of the law. No trial shall take place on the streets. The state has the principal obligation to see the cow vigilantism or any other kind of violence. The government and vigil society shall take strict actions to prevent lynching and mob violence. 2. Mob violence violates the rule of law and constitution particularly Article 21. It was laid down that the activities which amounted to mob violence and mob lynching must not be unnoticed and should be taken into consideration. (Case of **Shakti Vahini v. Union of India[\[16\]](#_ftn16)** was cited). 3. Articles 256 and 257 of the Constitution of India confer the powers on the Central Government to give directions to the state where it is necessary. Therefore, the Central Government has the power to intervene in the matter and issue directions to the State Government under Articles 256 and 257. **GUIDELINES** The Supreme Court issued certain guidelines to prevent Cow vigilantism and other cases of mob lynching. The following are the guidelines: – - **Preventive measures:-** 1. A senior police officer shall be nominated as Nodal Officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police in each district by the state government. 2. The areas where cases of mob lynching have been reported shall be identified and the nodal officer has to be more cautious about the areas identified within their jurisdiction. 3. Regular meetings shall be conducted by the Nodal Officer with the local intelligence. 4. Every police officer shall cause a mob to diffuse, by exercising power under Section 129 of CrPC[\[17\]](#_ftn17). 5. Law enforcement agencies must be made strongest to identify the measures for the prevention of mob violence and lynching against any caste or community. 6. The Central and State Governments should broadcast the serious consequences of lynching and mob violence under the law on radio and television and other media platforms. 7. FIR shall be registered against persons who spread messages and videos which are likely to encourage mob violence and lynching of any kind under Section 153A of IPC[\[18\]](#_ftn18) and other relevant provisions of law. - **Remedial Measures: –** 1. Apart from the above measures, an FIR should be lodged without any delay if any case of mob lynching comes to the local police station’s notice. 2. The Station House Officer has the duty to inform the Nodal Officer in the district who shall, in turn, ensure that there is no further harassment of the family members of the victim. 3. Nodal Officer shall personally monitor the investigation of such offences. 4. A mob violence victim compensation scheme shall be made in the light of the provisions of Section 357A[\[19\]](#_ftn19) of CrPC. 5. The cases of lynching and mob violence shall be specifically tried by designated court/Fast Track Courts and maximum sentence shall be awarded by the court. 6. The Identity and the address of the witness shall be concealed. 7. Notice of court proceedings shall be given to the victim or the next of kin of the deceased in cases of mob violence and lynching. 8. Free Legal Aid shall be given to the victim or the next of kin of the deceased in cases of mob violence and lynching under the Legal Services Act[\[20\]](#_ftn20). - **Punitive Measures: –** 1. Where any police officer or an officer of the district administration has failed to comply with the aforesaid directions it shall be an act of deliberate negligence and/or misconduct and an action must be taken against him/her. 2. As per the decision given in the case of **Arumugam Servai v. State of Tamil Nadu[\[21\]](#_ftn21)**, disciplinary action shall be taken against the concerned officers by the State firstly, if such officer did not try to prevent the incident despite having prior knowledge of that incident and secondly, if it is found that such officer did not institute criminal proceedings against the offender in case the incident has already occurred. **CONCLUSION** Every citizen has the right to freedom and to live peacefully. No citizen can take the law into his/her hands for the sake of the protection of cultural and religious values. The guidelines given in the present case are a serious reminder of the obligations of the state and society to uphold these values. At present the guidelines given by the Supreme Court is still applicable and the court continues to track its implementation. Also, a step should be taken by the parliament of India to make a separate legislation on Mob lynching to avoid any kind of ambiguity. **REFERENCES** - Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India and Others (2018) 9 SCC 501 - Constitution of India - Gujarat Animal Prevention Act, 1954 - Maharashtra Animal Prevention Act, 1976 - Karnataka Prevention of Cow Slaughter and Cattle Preservation Act, 1964 - - - [https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-6129-case-analysis-tehseen-poonawalla-v-s-union-of-india.html&usg=AOvVaw3F-PURrE8uv3nhCP3Uv3hb&hl=en-GB](https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-6129-case-analysis-tehseen-poonawalla-v-s-union-of-india.html&usg=AOvVaw3F-PURrE8uv3nhCP3Uv3hb&hl=en-GB) **ENDNOTES:** [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Article 21, Constitution of India (1950) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Article 32, Constitution of India (1950) [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Section 12, Gujarat Animal Prevention Act (1954) [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Section 13, Maharashtra Animal Prevention Act (1976) [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Section 15, Karnataka Prevention of Cow Slaughter and Cattle Preservation Act (1964) [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Article 21, Constitution of India (1950) [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Articles 256 and 257, Constitution of India (1950) [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Article 21, Constitution of India (1950) [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Article 32, Constitution of India (1950) [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) That is part 3rd of the constitution of India referred to as Fundamental rights [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Article 256, Constitution of India (1950) [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Article 257, Constitution of India (1950) [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Section 12, Gujarat Animal Prevention Act, (1954) [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Section 13, the Maharashtra Animal Prevention Act (1976) [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Section 15, Karnataka Prevention of Cow Slaughter and Cattle Preservation Act (1964) [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) (2018) 7 SCC 192 [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Code of Criminal Procedure (1973) [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Indian Penal Code (1860) [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Code of Criminal Procedure (1973) [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Legal Services Act,1987 [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) (2011) 6 SCC 405 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Union of India and ors. etc vs. Virpal Singh Chauhan and Ors.](https://lawfoyer.in/union-of-india-and-ors-etc-vs-virpal-singh-chauhan-and-ors/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Abhishek Varshney** **Edited by: Sulesh Choudhary** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** Some of the questions that have dominated Indian reservation jurisprudence for more than half a century are whether the State could make a provision for reservation in promotion under Article 16(4)? If yes, then in what manner? The answers to these questions remain unresolved, in several respects, till date. In Union of India and Ors vs. Virpal Singh Chauhan and Ors, it was held that SCs/STs who were given the benefit of promotion would not get consequential seniority. Hence, Article 16(4-A) was further amended by the Constitution (Eighty-Fifth Amendment) Act, 2001 giving them the benefit of consequential seniority. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*: Constitution, Reservation, Service Law, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes** **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ETC. Vs. VIRPAL SINGH CHAUHAN ETC. ***ii)* *Case Number*** Civil Appeal No. 9272/95 ***iii)* *Judgement Date*** October 10, 1995 ***iv)* *Court*** Supreme Court ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** 2 ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges*** **S.C. Agrawal, B.P. Jeevan Reddy** ***vii)* *Citation*** \[1995\] SUPP. 4 S.C.R. 158 1995 INSC 609 ***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved*** Article 14 and 16(4) of the Constitution of India **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** These appeals/writ petitions raise an important but difficult question concerning the nature of rule or reservation in promotions obtaining in the Railway service and the rule concerning the determination of seniority between general candidates and candidates belonging to reserved classes in the promoted category. The issue is best illustrated by taking the facts in the first of these matters, viz., Union of India and Ors. v. **Virpal** **Singh** **Chauhan** – civil appeal No.9272/95 arising from Special Leave Petition (C) No.6468 of 1987. The appeal is preferred against the judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Allahabad Bench) disposing of Original Application No.647 of 1986 with certain directions. \[It was originally filed as a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court which, on the constitution of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Allahabad Bench), was transferred to the Tribunal.\] It was filed by, what may be called for the sake of convenience, employees not belonging to any of the reserved categories (hereinafter referred to as “general candidates” – which means open competition candidates). The railway Administration as well as the employees belonging to reserved categories, i.e., Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes were impleaded as respondents. The writ petition/original application came to be filed in the following circumstances: Sri Altaf Ahmed, learned Additional Solicitor General questioned the correctness and validity of the principles enunciated by the Tribunal in Para-26 of its judgment. He submitted that according to the Indian Railway Establishment Manual, seniority is determined by the date of promotion/appointment to the concerned grade and that the said principle cannot be altered or departed from in the name of ensuring equality. Once the rule of reservation is remembered that in the higher echelons of administration, representation of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes has been inadequate all these years, there is nothing surprising if the members of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes get promotions sooner and earlier than the general candidates. This is the natural consequence of applying the rule of reservation in promotions – and not an unintended one. The said consequence cannot, therefore, be a basis for evolving a rule which partially off-sets the very purpose and meaning of the rule of reservation. Sri Altaf Ahmed further submitted that effecting promotions in accordance with the roster vacancies are not and cannot be called “fortuitous promotions”. They are regular vacancies and promotion to them is a regular promotion. He relied upon the decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal in Durga Charan Haldar v. Union of India (Original Application No.854 of 1990) wherein it has been held that the date of promotion, effected following the forty-point roster/hundred-point roster, is determinative of seniority. He submitted that the decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Patna Bench) to the contrary is the subject matter of appeal in this batch. The Patna Tribunal has followed the decision of the Allahabad Tribunal in **Virpal** **Singh** **Chauhan**. It may be noticed that of the five grades in the Station Masters’ category, two are non-selection posts while the remaining three are selection posts. While in the case of non-selection posts the rule enunciated in the main opinion (**Virpal** **Singh** **Chauhan**) would be applicable, in the case of selection posts, the rule explained herein has to be followed. We may clarify that Rules (i) and (ii) in Para 28 of **Virpal** **Singh** **Chauhan** apply to both selection and non- selection posts. Rule (iii) also applies to both but subject to the above rider. As explained in the main opinion, while there is no question of a “panel” being prepared at the time of promotion to non-selection posts, a panel has to be prepared for promotion to selection posts. **FACTS OF THE CASE** **Procedural Background of the Case** 1. The case was initially adjudicated by summary court martial, which was directed to reconsider the punishment in the light of petitioners claims regarding its severity. 2. The rules governing the proceeding stipulated that the defence nominee must be in the form the same division as the petitioner which was a point of contention. 3. The petitioner waste concern regarding the vagueness of charges, specifically noting that the offensive language was not explicitly detailed in the statement of allegations. 4. Subsequently, the revision petition filed by the rotational was dismissed, and the original order of removal from service was confirmed. 5. The petitioner short release under Article 226 of the constitution of India which allows for judicial review of administrative action. **Factual Background of the Case** 1. The petitioner faced removal from service based on three allegations of misconduct. 2. The specific allegations included the use of filthy language and an attempted assault on assistant sub inspector Gopi Singh when confronted about his behaviour. 3. The petitioner contended that the penalty imposed was disproportionate to the alleged misconduct arguing that the punishment was not commensurate with the offences charged. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Was the punishment of removal from service disproportionate to the alleged commit misconduct? 2. Were the charges against the traditional work and lacking sufficient details? 3. Did the process real rules regarding the appointment of defence nominee violet the petitioner’s right? **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that they are considering the seniormost candidates for the vacancies arising in the category of Superintendents and, therefore, no objection can be taken with the said course by anyone. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Respondent submitted that the petitioner joined the Railway as a clerk and was later promoted as Head Clerk and later as Assistant Superintendent. 2. They said that now the juniors (who are Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes) are given more preference in comparison to him, who is more senior, for the post of superintendent. 3. They also provided three instances for the same and also provided details for the same. 4. They said that that the total sanctioned strength is thirteen and three vacancies are present. Of the total, eight are Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes while only two are of general category. Now, they want to fill those vacancies with Scheduled Castes only, thereby reserving the post for them only. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** ***Article 14:* *– “Equality before law. The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”***[***\[1\]***](#_ftn1) **Article 16(4): – “***Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State.*”[\[2\]](#_ftn2) **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** The court upheld the dismissal of the revision petition and confirm the order of removal from the service it concluded that the circumstances does not warrant interference with Article 226 of the constitution. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** In the light of the above considerations, the court dismissed the writ petition, affirming the decision of the lower court and the summary court-martial. The removal from service was deemed justified based on the evidence presented and the procedural compliance observed throughout the proceedings. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** - Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, \[1992\] Suppl. 3 SCC 217 - National Federation of State Bank of India v. Union of India and Ors., \[1995\] 3 SCC 432 - R.K. Sabharwal v. State of Punjab (1995 (2) S.C.C.745). **Important Statutes Referred** - Constitution of India, 1950 **ENDNOTES:** [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Article 14, Constitution of India (1950). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Article 16(4), ibid **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [M.R Balaji and Others vs State of Mysore](https://lawfoyer.in/m-r-balaji-and-others-vs-state-of-mysore/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Harsita Karki** **Edited by: Sulesh Choudhary** **ABSTRACT:** *“Equality may be a fiction but nonetheless one must accept it as a governing principle.”* Dr, B.R. Ambedkar Equality is a basic human right that every individual in a society craves. In the Constitution of India articles 14 to 18 deal with right to equality. More specifically article 15 deals with the prohibition of discrimination based on the caste, sex, religion, race, place of birth it basically used in the case of reservation. This case is best example of an ongoing tussle for social justice within the constitutional equality framework by reserving seats for historically disadvantage groups. This case led to classification of backward classes into more backword classes in the educational institutions. This case study delves into the constitutional principles involved, the judicial reasoning behind the verdict, and the broader implications for India’s reservation policy. It assesses how the decision seeks to harmonize merit-based principles with the need for equitable educational opportunities through affirmative action for marginalized groups. Additionally, it analyzes the ruling’s impact on India’s reservation policies and legal frameworks, potentially setting a precedent for similar cases and future legislative developments. **Keywords:** Reservation, Article 15, Constitutional equality, India, education. **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** M.R Balaji and Others vs State of Mysore ***ii)* *Case Number*** ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petitions Nos. 90 to 11 2 of 1962. ***iii)* *Judgement Date*** 28 September 1962 ***iv)* *Court*** The Supreme Court of India ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** 5 Judge Bench (P.B. Gajendragadkar, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, K.N. Wanchoo, K.C. Das Gupta, J.C. Shah) ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges*** P.B. Gajendragadkar ***vii)* *Citation*** 1963 AIR 649, 1962 SCR SUPL. (1) 439, AIR 1963 SUPREME COURT 649 ***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved*** Article 15(4), Article 16(4), Article 29(2), Article 46. Article 340 of the Constitution of India. **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** Early Vedic literature gave rise to India’s caste system, which has resulted in discrimination, disregard, and underrepresentation of particular classes. Caste-based reservations have a long history; the British instituted them in 1902 as part of their divide and conquer strategy. Reservations were covered under the Indian Councils Act of 1909, the Government of India Act of 1919, and the Government of India Act of 1935. Post-constitutional changes, however, have not produced a constitutional obligation to permit positive discrimination for the underprivileged.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Discrimination on the basis of religion, ethnicity, caste, sex, or any other basis is forbidden by the Indian Constitution. But in instances such as Champakam Dorairajan and the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, the idea of reservation has been called into doubt. Under the former, the State might provide specific arrangements for the educational and social improvement of socially and educationally disadvantaged communities, such Scheduled Tribes or Scheduled Castes. But this clause begs the question of how one would define and classify a backward class. When an order granting reservation was contested in M.R. Balaji and Ors. v. State of Mysore, the issue of the statute of limitations was brought up.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) **FACTS OF THE CASE** On July 31, 1962, the State of Mysore issued an order under Article 15 (4) of the Constitution with the objective of promoting the progress of socially and educationally disadvantaged groups of citizens. A Mysore Backward Classes Appointments Committee, led by Dr. R. Nagan Gowda, was established by the State to classify backward classes according to their caste and communities. Subsequently, the government issued a directive that classified the backward classes into two distinct categories: Backward Classes and More Backward Classes. Half of the seats were allocated for other backward classes, with 28% reserved for backward classes and 22% for more backward classes. 15% of the allocation was specifically designated for Scheduled Castes, while an additional 3% was earmarked for Scheduled Tribes. The arrangement led to 68% of seats being reserved and 32% being allocated for the merit pool. [\[3\]](#_ftn3) An Order was issued by the State of Mysore on 26 July 1958, in which all the communities of the States were put within the definition of educationally and socially backward classes and Scheduled Castes & Schedule Tribe and reserved 75% of seats in the educational institutes except leaving the Brahmin Communities of the State.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Similar to this, other orders were also issued by the State for reserving seats with varied percentage on May 14 and July 22 of 1959 and June 9 of 1960 and July 10 of 1961 which all were challenged and put aside. Once again after a year the State of Mysore passed another order on July 31 1962 which replaced all the previous orders of the State under Article 15(4) for reserving Seats.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) In the new order States divided the Backward Classes into further two divisions namely, Backward and More Backward Classes.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) The State has reserved 68% from the total seats only for educationally and socially backward classes and Scheduled tribe and Schedule classes in all the engineering, medical and technical colleges. And left only 32% of seats for the merit pool. Then this order of State was challenged by the 23 petitioners by the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution before the Honourable Supreme Court who had applied for admission in these Colleges and Contended that the Classification and Reservation made by this impugned order is a fraud on Article 15(4) of the Constitution. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether the classification made by States between ‘**Backward class and more Backward class’** solely based on Caste is permissible under Article 15(4).[\[7\]](#_ftn7) 2. Whether States can exceed the limit up to 68% for reservations in the educational institution is reasonable under Article 15(4). - Whether the orders were validly issued by the State government of Mysore under Article 15(4) of the Constitution on July 10, 1991 and July 31, 1962. **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Petitioner submitted that under Article 340 actions regarding socially and educationally backward classes must be taken based on the commission report, appointed by the President of India and not by the State. The prepared report then to be presented to the President and then after in the both houses of the parliament before making any final decision.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) 2. The petitioner also contends that even under Article 15(4) the special provision can be made by the State but only by the legislation and not by an executive order. - The petitioner also argued that sub-classification under Article 15(4) made by the State order between Backward and more Backward classes was not justified and it also resulted in 90% of the state population falls under Backward Classes. Further, it was argued that the distribution of classes solely based on Caste is not permissible as it violates the fundamental rights of citizens under Article 14 of the constitution. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Respondent submitted that Article 15(4) prudently and wisely did not put any extent of limitation on the State to make the special provision and it must be read with respect to Article 46, which mandates the State to take steps towards promoting the advancement for socially and weaker section of the society. 2. The council contended that the impugned order is a colourable exercise of the State’s power and amounts to a fraud on the Constitution is disputed. And classification made by the impugned order by the State is both rational and intelligible. The reservation made by said order is fully justified and valid by Article 15(4) of the Constitution.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** **Constitution of India –** **Article 15(4)** – (4) *“Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.”[**\[10\]**](#_ftn10)* **Article 16(4)-** (4) *“Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State.”[**\[11\]**](#_ftn11)* **Article 29(2) –** *“No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them*.”**[\[12\]](#_ftn12)** **Article 46: “***The State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation*.”[\[13\]](#_ftn13) **Article 340: “***it empowers the president to appoint commissions for backward classes.”[**\[14\]**](#_ftn14)* **JUDGMENT:** The petitioners’ argument that the President can only issue an order pursuant to Article 15(4) of the Constitution was dismissed by the court presided over by Gajendra Gadkar. The court laid out the parameters for reservation, saying that socially and educationally deprived classes—rather than just caste—should be the basis for it. A reservation of 68% is irregular, and the reservation cap cannot be exceeded. The court contended that while the reserve should benefit the less fortunate members of society, it shouldn’t bar eligible applicants from attending universities. The court granted the writ petitions, declaring that the reservation order is an abuse of the constitutional authority granted to the state by Article 15(4) and that a suitable writ should be issued to prevent the three respondents from carrying out the order. The court came to the conclusion that reservations are meant to help the less fortunate members of society grow and prosper.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) The court reiterated that the caste cannot be the sole criteria for determining backwardness. The court held that it would be irrational to award reservations based only on caste to communities that reject the caste system, including Muslims, Jains, and Christians. The Lingayats had an average of 7.1%, placing them on the list of committees with lower performance than the state, which had a test average of 6.9 for a sample of 1000 kids. The notion of a creamy layer was deemed irrelevant at the time, and the court stressed that reservations should be made within reasonable bounds. The court also underlined the significance of fair boundaries, noting that granting reservations greater than fifty percent would discriminate against neighbouring communities.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) **RATIO DECIDENDI:** Justice Gajendragadlkar decreed that the allocation of seats for disadvantaged groups could not surpass 50% of the overall number of seats, as doing so would contradict the principle of equal treatment. According to Article 15(4) of the Constitution, discrimination based on religion, caste, sex, or place of birth is prohibited. The Court interpreted the terms of Article 15 and analyzed the extent of affirmative action for disadvantaged groups in relation to the supreme principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. Balaji asserted that caste should not be the exclusive factor for determining the disadvantaged, and the Court had the responsibility to ensure that specific measures for disadvantaged groups would not undermine the right to equality as protected by Article 14. The Court employed a proportionality test to evaluate if too much reservation was desirable against the right to equality.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) The Court of Appeal found that the segregation of backward classes is not justified under Article 15 (4) of the Indian Constitution and is against the power of the State. The petitioners contended that the decision of Mandamus against the defendant and two selection committees is confusing and unreasonable, and the categorization formed on this basis is not compatible with the determination of provisions and outside them. The State stressed that the classification formed is sensible and clear, and the reservation needed by the decision is entirely warranted under Article 15 (4) of the Indian Constitution. The dispute between the parties was founded on the case of Ramakrishna Singh Vs The State of Mysore, where the State created a committee to research the matter and advise the Government on criteria to designate pedagogically and socially backward classes. The Central Government asked the government to implement a common policy to define backward classes.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) **CRITICAL ANALYSIS:** - In this landmark case of reservation court has provided various reasoning throughout the Judgment. - Reservation which is provided by the state to elevate weaker sections and to give equal opportunities to the needy peoples in the society does not exclude the rights of the rest of the society. In this regard, the Court rightly laid down that if it is solely based on **‘Caste’** criteria it will not only hamper the rights of people, it will create discrimination among society, which will be not appropriate and will only be limited to Hindu Communities. - The court also rejected the report prepared by the Nagan Gowda committee which was appointed by the State only to prepare the reservation criteria. It was the suggestion of the committee’s report to divide the backward classes into 2 further classes. - The court observed that Article 15(4) was amended in Article 15 in the case **of *State of Madras vs Smt. Champakam Dorairajan*** and **the *State of Madras vs C.R Srinivasan[\[19\]](#_ftn19)*** and clause 1 of Article 15 is an exception or proviso of Article 15(1) and 29(2) which protects the citizen rights against disapproval of admission into any State educational institute. - The court said that under Article 15, the State cannot divide the Backward Classes on the Caste criteria for giving reservation as it would be against the sole meaning of the whole provision. - The court also laid down that reservations cannot exceed the 50% limit as it would exclude the rest of the society. Reservations should be given in balanced proportion so that it does not hamper and citizen rights. **Conclusion & Comments** Reservations are generally considered the exception to general equality. The Honourable Supreme Court rightly uphold the reservation criteria beyond the 50% which helps in maintaining balance and equality. And **Caste** cannot be considered same as **Class** under the provision of Article 15 and thus Caste based reservation cannot be given by the State. The M.R. Balaji and Others vs. State of Mysore Supreme Court verdict on reservations and affirmative action in India has spurred disputes on the need for a more nuanced approach to defining backward classes. The court highlighted that caste alone cannot be the sole factor for defining backwardness, and reservations must not exceed 50% to maintain a balance between merit-based opportunities and social fairness. This ruling set a precedent for future reservation programs, restricting the scope of state powers in adopting affirmative action and respecting the ideals of equality in the Constitution. To guarantee benefits reach the truly disadvantaged, the criteria for establishing backward classes should be changed to include elements such as socio-economic position and educational achievement. A periodic evaluation of reservation rules and their impact should be done, with commissions appointed to analyze the progress of certain communities. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** - State of Madras vs Smt. Champakam Dorairajan and the State of Madras vs C.R Srinivasan **Important Statutes Referred** - The Constitution of India 1950, art 15(4). - The Constitution of India 1950, art 16(4). - The Constitution of India 1950, art 29(2). - The Constitution of India 1950, art 46. - The Constitution of India 1950, art 340 - The Constitution of India 1950, art 15. - The Constitution of India 1950, art 14 [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Mahek Shivnani, ‘The Fight for Backwardness – Elucidating Casteism and Reservation in India | ProBono India’ (Probono-india.in2020) accessed 1 August 2024. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Shoronya Banerjee, ‘The Reservation Debate in Balaji v. State of Mysore’ (iPleaders22 July 2021) accessed 1 August 2024. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Mukesh Suman, ‘M. R. BALAJI vs STATE of MYSORE : CASE SUMMARY – Mukesh Suman’ (Mukeshsuman.com13 August 2024) accessed 14 August 2024. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Justice HN Nagamohandas, ‘Increasing the Reservation of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe in Karnataka’ (2020) accessed 25 July 2024. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) D Wadhwa, M Rao and M Shah . [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Ibid.[](#_ftnref7) [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) ‘Mr Balaji vs State of Mysore (1962) – Case Analysis’ (Testbook2024) accessed 5 August 2024. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) ‘Manupatra Academy’ ([www.manupatracademy.com](http://www.manupatracademy.com)) accessed 1 August 2024. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) The Constitution of India 1950, art 15(4). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) The Constitution of India 1950, art 16(4). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) The Constitution of India 1950, art 29(2). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) The Constitution of India 1950, art 46. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) The Constitution of India 1950, art 340 [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) ‘M.R. BALAJI v. STATE of MYSORE 1962 – Legal Vidhiya’ (Legal vidhya20 June 2023) accessed 1 August 2024. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) legalsynk, ‘Summary of Balaji vs State of Mysore (1963): Remarkable Landmark Judgment on Reservation – Legal SYNK’ (legalsynk.com12 September 2023) accessed 1 August 2024. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) S Sathe, ‘Judicial Activism: The Indian Experience Judicial Activism: The Indian Experience’ (2001) 6 Law & Policy 2001 . [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) LI Network, ‘M.R Balaji and Ors. Vs State of Mysore – LAW INSIDER INDIA- INSIGHT of LAW (SUPREME COURT, HIGH COURT and JUDICIARY’ (LAW INSIDER INDIA- INSIGHT OF LAW (SUPREME COURT, HIGH COURT AND JUDICIARY9 December 2021) accessed 14 August 2024. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) *The State Of Madras vs Srimathi Champakam Dorairajanandthe* on 9 April, 1951 Equivalent citations: 1951 AIR 226, 1951 SCR 525, AIR 1951 SUPREME COURT 226, 1987 CALLJ 379 1964 MADLW 430, 1964 MADLW 430 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Union Carbide Corp. v. Union of India](https://lawfoyer.in/union-carbide-corp-v-union-of-india/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Kajal Jain** **Edited by: Sulesh Choudhary** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The Union Carbide (India) Ltd.. (UCIL), a sister concern of Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) owned and operated in Bhopal, a chemical plant manufacturing pesticides, one of the ingredients in the composition being Methyl Isocyanate (MIC), considered to be the most toxic chemical in industrial use. On the 2nd December 1984 night there was an escape of MIC from the tanks in which it was stored, affecting the residents, animals, flora and fauna. The Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act,1985 confers certain powers on the Central Government to ensure that claims arising out of, or connected with, the Bhopal gas leak disaster are dealt with speedily and effectively. In the end, on February 15th 1989, the Supreme court allowed the UCC and UCIL to settle the dispute and pay $470 million to the Union of India in a full and final settlement of all claims. ***Keywords* : Article 21, Principle of Absolute Liability, Article 142** **CASE DETAILS:** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** Union Carbide Corporation Etc. Etc vs Union Of India Etc. Etc ***ii)* *Case Number*** AIR 1992 SC 248 ***iii)* *Judgement Date*** 03/10/1991 ***iv)* *Court*** Supreme Court ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** Five member ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges*** Justice M .N Venkatachalliah Justice Ranganath Mishra (CJI) Justice K.N Singh Justice A.M Ahmadi Justice N.D. Ojha ***vii)* *Citation*** 1992 AIR 248, 1991 SCC (4)584, 1991 SCALE (2)675, 1991 SCR Supl.(1) 251, JT 1991 (6)8 ***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved*** Article 21, Article 142, M.C. Mehta vs UOI,1987, Section- 357A CrPC, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Order I Rule 8, CPC Order XXIII rule 3 ***ix) Keywords*** UOI- Union Of India UCC- Union Carbide Corporation SC- Supreme Court Of India MIC- Methyl Iscocyanate UCIL- Union Carbide Indian Limited **INTRODUCTION:** **Background of The Incident-** The Union Carbide Corporation an American company established a pesticide production plant in India and began its production in 1979. Along with pesticide a very toxic chemical known as Methyl Isocyanate was also produced in the plant.Complaints regarding leakage of the gas on smaller level were made since starting but no action was taken, On 3 December 1984 during midnight MIC was leaked at a large scale which caused death of around 3000 people, along with many animals instantly due to its toxic nature, those who survived the gas leak were severely injured along with permanent respiratory problem. This incident is known as the Bhopal Gas Tragedy **(*“Union Carbide Corporation Etc. Etc vs Union Of India Etc. Etc”* [\[1\]](#_ftn1))**, one of the worst industrial disasters in India. - After this tragedy principle of Absolute Liability[\[2\]](#_ftn2), Bhopal gas disaster (processing of claims) Act,1985[\[3\]](#_ftn3), Environment Protection act,1986 and the Public Insurance liability act[\[4\]](#_ftn4), 1991 came into existence. came into existence. The case also enhanced the scope of Article-21[\[5\]](#_ftn5)(fundamental Right to a clean environment). **Principle of Absolute Liability** – The rule of Absolute liability was enforced by the Honourable Supreme Court of India in the landmark judgmen*t of “M.C. Mehta V UOI2 and Bhopal Gas Leak3”.*Where the Hon’ble Apex Court referring to the principle of strict liability laid down in *“Ryland V. Fletcher”*[\[6\]](#_ftn6) held that this principle cannot be applicable in this case due to extent of harm caused hence introduced Absolute Liability Principle. “*The rule of absolute liability is similar to the rule of strict liability with some modification. This rule applies without any limitation or exception and creates a individual completely liable for any fault. The property to make anyone absolutely liable for the fault and imposition of high retraction make these liability as absolute liability”.* **Article 21-** “*no person shall be deprived of their life except according to the procedure established by law”–* gives right to a clean environment (M.C. Mehta v. Union of India 1986) **Bhopal gas disaster (processing of claims) Act,1985 –“** *Sections 3, 4, 9: Settlement of claims before the Apex Court–Not affording ‘Fairness Hearing’- Non-incorporation of re-opener clause”* **FACTS OF THE CASE:** **Factual Background of the Case-** The Union Carbide Indian Limited (UCIL) Plant, was a chemical company founded in 1934. UCIL asset was divided among UCC located in US and Indian Investors including the GOI and government-controlled banks in which percentage of shareholding was 50.9 and 49.1 respectively. On the night of 3rd December 1984, MIC (considered most toxic chemical in industrial use) leaked from the E610 storage tank from the plant. The factual scenario emanating from the High Court order dated 04.04.1988[\[7\]](#_ftn7), where it was recorded that as per the Union of India, the total number of people who were found to be dead were 2660 and approximately 30,000 to 40,000 people were found to be seriously injured as a result of the disaster. The figures before the Supreme Court at that time were stated to be about 3000 fatal cases, and the number of serious personal injuries suffering permanent damage was about 30,000, as verifiable from hospital records. The government was criticised for its lack of medical aid and not carrying the investigation according. Moreover in the beginning due to lack of information on the cause of sudden injury and deaths the doctors in the hospitals were also not able to operate which even caused the death of people admitted on time. **Procedural Background of the Case-** 1. After the tragedy, The Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act,1985 was passed on 29th March 1985 as a way of ensuring claims and speedy trial, this act made the government the sole representative of all the victims in legal proceedings and fought on their behalf for the compensation. 2. The union of India took action on the behalf all the victims suffered against UCC before the U.S. District court, Southern District of New York for award of compensation for the damage caused by the company pesticide plant, all of the claims came to be consolidated by the Judicial panel. 3. The plea of UCC and the UOI was dismissed in the U.S. District court due to jurisdiction of the case which was established in Bhopal, hence suit seeking compensation of 3.3 Billion Dollars against UCC and UCIL was filed in the District Court of Bhopal. 4. On which The District Court made an order directing Payment of Rs. 350 Crores by UCC , which was further in appeal in High Court made by UCC was reduced to Rs. 250 crores. 5. The UOI filed an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in which the Supreme court on February 15th, 1989 recorded an overall settlement of the claims in the suit for 470 Million U.S. dollars and the termination of civil and criminal proceedings. [\[8\]](#_ftn8) **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** - Whether the Supreme Court of India had the power to quash the criminal proceedings against UCC and whether its order conferred blanket criminal immunity, which is a legislative function. - Whether the settlement was fair and adequate given the inadequate compensation, lack of fairness hearing, and absence of re-opener clause to account for future injuries - Whether the Union of India as the welfare state would be liable to make good any deficiencies if the compensation fund was found to be insufficient. **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant stated that MIC- is one of the most toxic chemical in industrial use, therefore the petition relied upon certain studies carried out by Toxicology Laboratory, Department of Industrial Environment, Health Science etc and urged to the court that exposure to MIC has a mutagenic effect and the injury caused by it could be permanent and even affecting future generations. 2. It was argued that analysis of the case histories of persons manifesting general morbidity trends at various intervals from 3rd Dec 1989 up to April 1990 indicate severely, moderately and mildly affected areas which showed a decline. But the later periods showed significant trends towards increasing of all three areas- respiratory, ophthalmic and general. 3. Long-term effects and exposure have not been taken into account in approving the settlement and the only way to protect the interest was by incorporating of appropriate re- opener clause. 4. UCC held 50.9% shares in UCIL. UCC’s liability was asserted on the arguments that UCC, apart from holding the company’s share , retained control over it with defective and inadequate safety standard, an indifference and disregard to human safety was the result of conscious and deliberate action of UCC. 5. The contention articulated with strong emphasis is that the court had no jurisdiction to withdraw and dispose of the main suits and the criminal proceedings in the course of hearing of appeals arising out of an interlocutory order in the suits. The disposal of the suits would require and imply their transfer and withdrawal to this court for which, it is contended, the Court had no power under law. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Respondent submitted that the claims of a large number of persons who had filed their claims are not registered on the ground that they did not respond to the notices calling upon them to undergo the requisite medical tests for medical documentation. It was urged that no effective service of notice had taken place and that the claims of a large number of claimants—according to them almost over 30% of the total number—- have virtually gone for default. 2. It was urged by the petitioners that the very concept of injury’ as an element in the eligibility for medical documentation was erroneous as it tended to exclude victims who did not have or retain some medical documentation of their initial treatment immediately after the exposure- “*That it is unlikely that a person who was injured and suffered during the post-exposure period is not in possession of any form of medical record. The line of treatment was widely publicised. Therefore, the patient must have received treatment from one of the private practitioners, if not from one of the many temporary and permanent govt./semi-govt. institutions or institutions run by voluntary organisations, and he must be in possession of some form of record*” **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** 1. **Article 21**[**\[9\]**](#_ftn9)**: – “***Protection of life and personal liberty No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.*”[\[10\]](#_ftn10) 2. **Article 142: [\[11\]](#_ftn11)***-“ empowers the Supreme Court to pass any decree or order necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it. These decrees or orders are enforceable across India’s territory, making them significant tools for judicial intervention”* - **Absolute liability** 1. **C. Mehta vs. UOI, 1987[\[12\]](#_ftn12)** 2. **Section 357A of the Criminal Procedure Code[\[13\]](#_ftn13):- “** *makes it the duty of the State Government to establish a compensation scheme for victims of crime, their dependents, and those who have suffered loss or injury as a result of crime and require rehabilitation***”** 3. **Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Order I Rule 8[\[14\]](#_ftn14)** **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** 1. It was held by the Supreme Court that UCC (Union Carbide Corporation) must pay $470 Million as settlement of the claims and this amount was deemed as reasonable and fair. 2. The decision was aimed at balancing the practicalities of substantial compensation and the need for justice by also keeping in mind the harm caused by the disaster. 3. From the past judgments like in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, the Court emphasized the applicability of the no-fault liability principle. 4. All civil and criminal proceedings against UCC in India were to be terminated, this was done to provide victims fast relief without prolonging the litigation process. **GUIDELINES** Court focused on the need for health care and rehabilitation of the victims and provide them with medical facilities The compensation distribution must be in a proper way and should reach the needy. **OBITER DICTA** 1. Showed concern and criticism towards the international corporate companies operating in India. 2. Concern for the environment and laws to prevent such tragedies . 3. Showed compassion for victims and also acknowledged the human suffering caused by the disaster. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The Supreme Court completed the settlement as fast and effectively as possible by providing $470 million as settlement to the suffered victims, it also widened the scope of Article 21, the Right to a clean environment, and also showed that there is a need for strict rules and regulations for multinational companies and environment laws to prevent and avoid these kind of disasters in the future. In my opinion, the judgment and reasoning given by the court are right as they also considered the practicalities of substantial compensation and giving justice to the victims, and there should be strict rules related to these things that will regulate the multinational companies as well as benefit the citizens. These multinationals companies should be bound to follow rules and regulations that are strict and rigid as this will protect the interest of citizens and also the employees. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** 1. Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, \[1990\] 1 SCC 613[\[15\]](#_ftn15)– principles of natural justice 2. Narasimha Raju v. V. Gurumurthy Raju & Ors., \[1963\] 3 SCR 687 [\[16\]](#_ftn16)– On doctrine of stifling prosecution 3. Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh & Others, \[1955\] SCR 267[\[17\]](#_ftn17) – Article 136 of the Constitution 4. Shivdeo Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors., AIR 1963.SC 1909[\[18\]](#_ftn18), **Important Statutes Referred** 1. Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act 1985 – Governing compensation to Bhopal gas tragedy victims 2. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 3. Law of Torts 4. The Constitution of India, 1950 **ENDNOTES:** [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) https://main.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/7699.pdf [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-9689-m-c-mehta-v-union-of-india-air-1987-sc-965-oleum-gas-leak-case.html [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1510537/ [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/4316/1/ep\_act\_1986.pdf [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) ttps://www.constitutionofindia.net/articles/article-21-protection-of-life-and-personal-liberty [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The rule was formulated by Blackburn, J. in Exchequer Chamber in Fletcher v Rylands, (1866) L.R. 1 Ex 265 and the same was approved by the House of Lords in Rylands v Fletcher, (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1344892/ [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) (1989) 3 SCC 38 [**\[9\]**](#_ftnref9) “An Informed Insight: UAPA, 1967” LawFoyer | A daily doze for inquisitors, 2024 available at: https://lawfoyer.in/an-informed-insight-uapa-1967/ (last visited July 20, 2024). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Article 21, Constitution of India (1950). [**\[11\]**](#_ftnref11) https://indiankanoon.org/doc/500307/ [**\[12\]**](#_ftnref12) https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-9689-m-c-mehta-v-union-of-india-air-1987-sc-965-oleum-gas-leak-case.html [**\[13\]**](#_ftnref13) https://www.livelaw.in/columns/section-375a-of-the-crpc-constitution-victim-compensation-scheme-vcs-indian-penal-code-nalsa-guidelines-victim-compensation-fund-guidelines-cvcf-2016-pocso-rule-198885 [**\[14\]**](#_ftnref14) https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-2393-representative-suit-under-the-code-of-civil-procedure-1908.html#:~:text=Order%20I%20Rule%208%20of,joined%20as%20parties%20to%20it. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) https://main.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/7699.pdf [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) https://main.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/3788.pdf [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) https://indiankanoon.org/docfragment/937486/?formInput=article%20136 [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) https://main.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/26190.pdf **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases, Criminal Law Cases, Environmental Law --- ### [S.R. Bommai Vs Union of India](https://lawfoyer.in/s-r-bommai-vs-union-of-india/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Ishrat** **Edited by: Sulesh Choudhary** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE:** **S.R. Bommai Vs UOI[\[1\]](#_ftn1)** is landmark case for article 356 this case crystal clears the power of President under article 356. this case is also talk about the basic structure doctrine and judicial review of power of president under article 356. This the leading case related to proclamation power of president. under this case SR Bommai was the Karnataka Chief Minister between August 1988 and April 1989. He led a Janata Dal government, which was dismissed on 21st April 1989 when President’s Rule (Article 356) was imposed in Karnataka. This case same issue like Meghalaya case Nagaland in both the case the state government was dissolve without giving the proper ground of dismissing the state government and state legislation. In S.R. Bommai’s case, on March 5, 1985 elections held to the Karnataka State Legislative Assembly and the Janata Dal won 139 seats out of 225 seats. Shri R.K. Hegde was elected as the leader of Janata Dal and became the Chief Minister. Due to his resignation on August 12, 1988, Shri S.R. Bommai, was elected as leader of the party and became the Chief Minister. his government is dismissed on April 21,1989 and proclamation of emergency was declared on the bases that he loss majority. S.R. Bommai go to the governor P. Venkata Subbaiah and request him for the floor test of majority but governor refused to give any opportunity to test his majority in the assembly. In this scenario the Governor sent his second report to the President and exercising the power under Article 356 the President issued Proclamation, dismissed Bommai Government and dissolved the Assembly on April 21, 1989 and assumed the administration of the State of Karnataka. When a writ petition was filed on April 26, 1989, a special Bench of three Judges of the High Court of Karnataka dismissed the writ petition. then he moves to the supreme court. in supreme court nine bench of judges give the landmark judgement **.** ***Keywords**: Article 356, Article 355, Jurisdiction of centre into state government, Procedure of proclamation, Judicial review*** **CASE DETAILS[\[2\]](#_ftn2)** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** S.R. BOMMAI Vs. UNION OF INDIA ***ii) Case Number*** (\[1994\] 2 SCR 644: AIR 1994 SC 1918: (1994)3 SCC1) ***iii)* *Judgement Date*** 11/03/1994 ***iv)* *Court*** SUPREME COURT OF INDIA ***v)* *Author / Name of Judges*** KULDIP SINGH (J) SAWANT, P.B. RAMASWAMY, K. AGRAWAL, S.C. (J) YOGESHWAR DAYAL (J) JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) PANDIAN, S.R. (J) PANDIAN, S.R. (J) AHMADI, A.M. (J) ***vi)* *Citation*** 1994 AIR 1918, 1994 SCC (3), 1, JT 1994 (2)215, 1994 SCALE (2)37 ***vii)* *Legal Provisions Involved*** Article 356 **INTRODUCTION: –** **The two spinal issues before the Constituent Assembly and supreme court were:** (1) what powers were to be taken away from the States; and (2) how could a national supreme Government be formed without completely removing the power of the State. In this case mainly based on the state and centre relation here the mainly problem in front of court and legislative assembly is to which kind of power can be taken from the state government and when centre can be interfered in the power of state government in that what is the jurisdiction of centre also the procedure of the interference of centre into the state government. main article in this case on which case is revolve is Article 356. This issue become very important to resolve because at that time the central government misusing the power of Article 356. there is frequently use article 356 without giving any proper justification and there is lots of interference of centre into state government activities from 1951 to 19190 83 times the proclamation of emergency done. BR Ambedkar also said that, “I do not altogether deny that there is a possibility of these articles being abused or employed for political purposes… and I share the sentiments that such articles will never be called into operation and that they would remain a dead letter.”[\[3\]](#_ftn3) SR Bommai was the Karnataka Chief Minister between August 1988 and April 1989. He led a Janata Dal government, which was dismissed on 21st April 1989 when President’s Rule (Article 356) was imposed in Karnataka. This case is very impeccable with view of article 356 (state emergency) judgement of this case restrict the power of president and this case also very important related to basic structure doctrine it also tells the limitation of article 356 and also talk about the principle of federalism. **BACKGROUND OF THE CASE: –** - R. Bommai was the chief minister of the Karnataka from1988 to April 1989 from Janata dal party with 139 seats out of 225 seats. - Janata dal government was dismissed on 1st April 1989 on that day he lost his majority he goes to the governor but governor also denied him to prove majority. - Governor sends the report to the president and president rule was imposed. - He moves to the High court where 3 bench of judges also denied - After that S.R. Bommai move to supreme court where the Nine bench of judges give landmark judgement with respect to article 356 **FACTS OF THE CASE [\[4\]](#_ftn4)** - “In S.R. Bommai’s appeal the facts are that on March 5, 1985 elections held to the Karnataka State Legislative Assembly and the Janata Dal won 139 seats out of 225 seats and the Congress Party was the next largest party securing 66 seats. Shri R.K. Hegde was elected as the leader of Janata Dal and became the Chief Minister - Due to his resignation on August 12, 1988, Shri S.R. Bommai, was elected as leader of the party and became the Chief Minister. As on February 1, 1989 the strength of Janata Dal was 111 and the Congress was 65 and Janata Party was 27, apart from others. On April 15, 1989 his expanding the Ministry caused dissatisfaction to some of the aspirants. - One Kalyan Molakery and others defected from Janata Dal and he wrote letters on April 17 and 18, 1989 to the Governor enclosing the letters of 19 others expressing want of confidence in Shri Bommai. - On April 19, 1989 the Governor of Karnataka sent a report to the President. On April 20, 1989, 7 out of 19 MLAs that supported Kalyan Molakery, wrote to the Governor that their signatures were obtained by misrepresentation and reaffirmed their support to Shri Bommai. On the same day the cabinet also decided to convene the assembly session on April 27, 1989 at 3.30 p.m. to obtain vote of confidence and Shri Bommai met the Governor and requested him, to allow floor-test to prove his majority and he was prepared even to advance the date of the session. In this scenario the Governor sent his second report to the President and exercising the power under Article 356 the President issued Proclamation, dismissed Bommai Government and dissolved the Assembly on April 21, 1989 and assumed the administration of the State of Karnataka. - When a writ petition was filed on April 26, 1989, a special Bench of three Judges of the High Court of Karnataka dismissed the writ petition. - There are several cases in different reason of India where Question is raised on proclamation of president rule for example On October 1991 issued a proclamation under article 356 dismiss the Meghalaya government. In Nagaland on August 1988 on the bases of governor report the proclamation of president rule was imposed. There were many cases where the proclamation of president rule was imposed without proper justification or without giving proper giving the ground of use of article 356.” **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED: – (***minimum 2 legal issues*) - Proclamation of President’s rule in a state. On which are ground for the president rule should be impose. what is the limitation of Article 356. and what are the power of President under article 356. - Is this article come under the judicial review or not **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS[\[5\]](#_ftn5)** - “According to petitioner Bommai was not given the chance of proving majority. - It was also argued that it can be prima facia ascertained by the fact of the case that Governor acted out of malice because governor does not have valid reason in the report which prove that the Karnataka government did not enjoy the support of majority - According to petitioner the act of centre against the article 74(2) In this article the centre government must share the details related to the imposition of emergency with the state. and in this case the ground of proclamation the president rule was not given.” **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS[\[6\]](#_ftn6)** - “Respondent was represented by the Attorney General. It was contented by the respondent that petitioner had no authority to challenge report which is given by the governor to the president via writ petition in HC. - Governor has an immunity against the legal action against Article 361 of Indian constitution. - Defendant also argued that the petitioner cannot claim the defendant to provide any document which were considered by the president to issue a proclamation made under Article 356 and the only report as a document can be shown to the petitioner which is made by Governor. - Court has no authority to enquiry on the decision of President to issue proclamation under Article 356 Indian constitution.” **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** **Article 356 in Constitution of India** 356. **Provisions in case of failure of constitutional machinery in State[\[7\]](#_ftn7)** “(1) If the President, on receipt of report from the Governor of the State or otherwise, is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, the President may by Proclamation- (a) Assume to himself all or any of the functions of the Government of the State and all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by the Governor or anybody or authority in the State other than the Legislature of the State; (b) Declare that the powers of the Legislature of the State shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament; (c) Make such incidental and consequential provisions as appear to the President to be necessary or desirable for giving effect to the objects of the Proclamation, including provisions for suspending in whole or in part the operation of any provisions of this Constitution relating to anybody or authority in the State: Provided that nothing in this clause shall authorise the President to assume to himself any of the powers vested in or exercisable by a High Court, or to suspend in whole or in part the operation of any provision of this Constitution relating to High Courts. (2) Any such Proclamation may be revoked or varied by a subsequent Proclamation. (3) Every Proclamation under this article shall be laid before each house of Parliament and shall, except where it is a Proclamation revoking a previous Proclamation, cease to operate at the expiration of two months unless before the expiration of that period it has been approved by resolutions of both Houses of Parliament: Provided that if any such Proclamation (not being a Proclamation revoking a previous Proclamation) is issued at a time when the House of the People is dissolved or the dissolution of the House of the People takes place during the period of two months referred to in this clause, and if a resolution approving the Proclamation has been passed by the Council of States, but no resolution with respect to such Proclamation has been passed by the House of the People before the expiration of that period, the Proclamation shall cease to operate at the expiration of thirty days from the date on which the House of the People first sits after its reconstitution unless before the expiration of the said period of thirty days a resolution approving the Proclamation has been also passed by the House of the People. (4) A Proclamation so approved shall, unless revoked, cease to operate on the expiration of a period of six months from the date of issue of the Proclamation: Provided that if and so often as a resolution approving the continuance in force of such a Proclamation is passed by both Houses of Parliament, the Proclamation shall, unless revoked, continue in force for a further period of six months from the date on which under this clause it would otherwise have ceased to operate, but no such Proclamation shall in any case remain in force for more than three years: Provided further that if the dissolution of the House of the People takes place during any such period of six months and a resolution approving the continuance in force of such Proclamation has been passed by the Council of States, but no resolution with respect to the continuance in force of such Proclamation has been passed by the House of the People during the said period, the Proclamation shall cease to operate at the expiration of thirty days from the date on which the House of the People first sits after its reconstitution unless before the expiration of the said period of thirty days a resolution approving the continuance in force of the Proclamation has been also passed by the House of the People: Provided also that in the case of the Proclamation issued under clause (1) on the 11th day of May, 1987 with respect to the State of Punjab, the reference in the first proviso to this clause to “three years” shall be construed as a reference to five years. (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (4), a resolution with respect to the continuance in force of a Proclamation approved under clause (3) for any period beyond the expiration of one year from the date of issue of such proclamation shall not be passed by either House of Parliament unless– (a) A Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, in the whole of India or, as the case may be, in the whole or any part of the State, at the time of the passing of such resolution, and (b) The Election Commission certifies that the continuance in force of the Proclamation approved under clause (3) during the period specified in such resolution is necessary on account of difficulties in holding general elections to the Legislative Assembly of the State concerned: “ **Article 355: –[\[8\]](#_ftn8)** “Which talk about the duty of the union to prevent the state against external aggression and internal disturbance.” It shall be the duty of the Union to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance and to ensure that the Government of every State is carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.” **JUDGEMENT: –** **Bommai Case Judgement** **This landmark verdict put restrictions on the centre for imposing the President’s Rule on states.** - supreme court of India while giving this landmark judgement held that the centre is not having the absolute power under article 356 of Indian constitution. - power of president is not absolute power under article 356 9(1) it is subject to judicial review. Here supreme court held that according to article 74 (2) ” The question whether any, and if so what, advice was tendered by Ministers to the President shall not be inquired into in any court.” But the bar on this article by this judgement is that the court can ask for the material on the bases if which proclamation decision was taken “. - Until then, the President can only suspend the Legislative Assembly and to dissolve the state Government but with the majority of both the houses - In case the proclamation does not get the approval of both the Houses, it lapses at the end of a period of two months, and the dismissed government is revived. - The suspended Legislative Assembly also come in the power. - The supreme court also held that President by himself can only temporarily suspend the legislative assembly not to dissolve it. The dissolution of assembly come after the majority of both the houses. - Supreme Court also quoted the thought of Dr B.R. Ambedkar here,” In fact I share the sentiments expressed … that the proper thing we ought to expect is that such articles will never be called into operation and that they would remain a dead letter. If at all, they are brought into operation, I hope the President, who is endowed with all these powers, will take proper precautions before actually Suspending the administration of the provinces. I hope the first thing he ‘will do would be to issue a mere warning to a province that has erred, that things were not happening in the way in which they were intended to happen in the Constitution.” according to Dr B.R. Ambedkar the power of this article use by the president only in the rarest of rare cases and with proper precaution and procedure. - supreme court also held that secularism is also present in our constitution before the amendment of preamble and secularism is the basic feature of Indian constitution. - supreme court declare that the proclamation in Karnataka and Meghalaya is unconstitutional and restore the state government - supreme court also refer the Sarkari report of 1988 holding that the president should first issue warning instead of directly exercising the power under article 356 also government should first invite other parties to claim the majority in the house before the use of proclamation. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS: –** In the case of **S.R. Bommai Vs Union of India** this the landmark judgement because its talk about the state relation with centre and also talk about the constitutional jurisdiction. in judgement supreme court restrict the arbitrary interference of central in state administration. this case also gives the guideline for imposing the president rule in the state under article 356. the supreme court in this case laid down that the power of the president to issue a proclamation is not absolute and is subject to judicial review. **REFERENCES: –** **Manu Patra[\[9\]](#_ftn9)** [**https://www.manupatrafast.com/?t=desktop**](https://www.manupatrafast.com/?t=desktop) **Indian kanoon[\[10\]](#_ftn10)** **Constitution of India** **ENDNOTES:** [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) ¹ “Indian Kanoon,” Indian Kanoon, (accessed August 7, 2024). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3)¹ “Article 356 of the Constitution,” Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India, (accessed August 7, 2024). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) “Indian Kanoon,” Indian Kanoon, (accessed August 7, 2024). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) ¹ “S.R. Bommai v. Union of India: Power of President’s Rule Curtailed,” iPleaders, (accessed August 7, 2024). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) ¹ “S.R. Bommai v. Union of India: Power of President’s Rule Curtailed,” iPleaders, (accessed August 7, 2024). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) “Indian Kanoon,” Indian Kanoon, (accessed August 7, 2024). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) [**https://www.manupatrafast.com/?t=desktop**](https://www.manupatrafast.com/?t=desktop) [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Union of India & Anr v/s Balbir Singh & Anr.](https://lawfoyer.in/union-of-india-anr-v-s-balbir-singh-anr/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Diksha Patole** **Edited by: Sulesh Choudhary** **ABSTRACT** The case between Union of India & Anr vs. Balbir Singh & Anr decided on 5th May, 1998 is based on the present dismissal of the Balbir Singh (respondent), the former Sub-Inspector in Delhi Police, following the assassination of the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984. Balbir Singh was arrest and the same was condemned to death for his role in the assassination of the Prime Minister, however, he was later discharged by the Supreme Court for lack of adequate proof. Still, going by his order of dismissal which was perhaps in proviso (c) to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, Singh was acquitted. Decision to dismiss Singh has been made on practicing the contents of reported documents as affirmed by the Committee of Advisors and President of India deemed capable of posing a threat to the State Security. The first remedy that Balbir Singh took was to present his grievances before CAT seeking to quash the order of dismissal made against him. The CAT gave the decision in favour of Singh but the Apex court reversing the CAT’s order held that dismissal under proviso (c) of Article 311(2) of the Constitution was legal as there was adequate material that was secret and relevant to the security of the State. This the court was citing from S. R. Bommai and Ors vs. Union of India and Ors and B. Bhaskara Reddy vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh to apropose the proviso (c) to Article 311(2) showing that even though some of the material milestones are irrelevant but it does not matter because there are other justified moves that can sustain the decision. The case showcases the balance between procedural fairness and the importance of decisive action for national security, reinforcing the narrow scope of judicial review in such context. ***Keywords*: *Article 311(2), proviso(c), national security, supreme court of India, Indira Gandhi assassination, committee of advisors, central administrative tribunal, judicial review, reversal of tribunal decision, confidential material*** **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** Union of India & Anr vs Balbir Singh & Anr ***ii)* *Case Number*** (1978) 2 SCC 39 ***iii)* *Judgement Date*** 5 May, 1998 ***iv)* *Court*** Supreme Court of India ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** G.T. Nanavati, S.P. Kurdukar, Sujata V. Manohar ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges*** Sujata V. Manohar ***vii)* *Citation*** (1978) 2 SCC 39 ***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved*** Constitution of India – Article 311 **INTRODUCTION** The Constitution of India in the Article 311 protects the civil servants of the Union and State Governments from removal or other unfavourable changes to their position. The Article ensures that a government employee is not dismissed or removed without being given an opportunity to be heard and an investigation is made before any authority below the one that hired him initiates any disciplinary proceedings against such an employee. Article 311(1) shields the civil servant from being dismissed or removed without an inquiry. However, Article 311(2) provides that the employee should be informed of the matters being complained of against him or her and must be heard. But of course, there are times perhaps when the President or Governor has found it necessary that an inquiry cannot be served in the interest of the nation’s security. In this instance, the case refers mainly to the procedural and the judicial review part of Article 311. The Petitioner’s services were terminated at the instance of the Committee of Advisors and concurred with by the President of India on the basis of the evidence by the Intelligence Bureau on Balbir Singh (Respondent). The SC also analysed the issues regarding the approval of the President of the dismissal of the employee and whether the approval was influenced by the extraneous consideration or not. **FACTS OF THE CASE** **FACTUAL BACKGROUND** 1. The respondent in 1984 was posted as Sub-Inspector and was posted for security of the then Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi’s residence in Special Security District New Delhi. 2. Mrs Indira Gandhi the then Prime Minister of India was assassinated on the 31st of October, 1984 by her two security guards, Sub-Inspector Beant Singh and Constable Satwant Singh. 3. Criminal complaint was filed under section 307, 302 and 120-B I PC along with 25, 27, 54 & 59 of arms act. 4. Concerning the said criminal case, the respondent was also charged and arrested as well. While the respondent was charged before the Disciplinary Committee, on the 8th of December, 1984 he was arrested and subsequently placed under suspension. The order of suspension stating a Departmental Enquiry to be conducted. 5. Despite the finding of the said criminal case, the Intelligence Bureau got some material. From the material gathered, it is deduced that the Delhi Police had tendered a memo proposing dismissal of the respondent from the service as he was involved in activities that were considered subversive to the security of the State. 6. The Committee of Advisors suggested that the respondent should be dismissed from service as provided by proviso(c) to Article 311(2). Consequent to this recommendation, the President of India, under proviso (c) to Article 311 (2) issued and order dismissing the respondent from the service. 7. In the said criminal case the respondent received the death penalty along with two other offenders. The appeal has been lead and rejected by the High Court with respect to the conviction of the accused. But on the appeal to Supreme court the respondent was set free. 8. Therefore, on 23rd of April, 1990 the respondent filed an application before CAT challenging the order of dismissal passed by the first appellant. 9. The Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) first in favour of Balbir Singh said his dismissal was not proper. 10. To this the Supreme Court simply added the order of the CAT thus nullifying the application to challenge the dismissal. 11. The Supreme Court remarked that there were reasonable grounds for letting off him/her without conducting a Departmental Enquiry. **PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND** 1. This case started with the commencement of departmental action against the employee, Balbir Singh. Pursuant to the disciplinary rules and as provided under Article 311 sub section (2) an inquiry was carried out. Balbir Singh was informed of the charges against him besides, he was allowed to defend himself against the accusations leveled on him. The inquiry officer committed the accused for the charges that were leveled against him. 2. It is important to note that from the inquiry report, the disciplinary authority that usually could be a senior officer or the head of the department in question applied a penalty. Based on this penalty, it is evident that such a person would be dismissed, removed or demoted based on the invocation of Article 311. 3. Unsatisfied, Balbir Singh undertook an appeal before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) regarding the disciplinary proceedings taken against him. 4. The court gave the verdict in the favour of Balbir Singh, being dissatisfied with the judgement passed by the court, the Union of India, representing the government department, approached the Supreme Court. The appeal would be dealing with the Court’s interpretation of Article 311 or whether the disciplinary action was procedurally proper. 5. The Supreme Court went straight to a microscopic analysis of the whole process to determine whether the government had observed all the legalities enshrined in Article 311 which outlines procedural measures to be followed. These involved determining if the inquiry was fair, the charge proven to be so and if indeed the punishment was commensurate with the offence. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether the Respondent’s dismissal order dated 16/3/1985 was valid. 2. Whether the judgement made by the Tribunal was valid. **PETITIONER ARGUMENTS** 1. Union of India and its officials submitted that the dismissal of Balbir Singh was under the sanction of second proviso to article 311(2), which is Clause C. This provision permits dismissal of a government employee without a departmental inquiry where it is deemed necessary in the interests of the state’s security. 2. The petitioner therefore pointed out that the documented evidence considered by a high level Committee of Advisors in which it was classified as confidential, justified dismissal on account of Singh’s part in things regarded as prejudicial to state security. 3. They stated that the Tribunal made a mistake in the invalidation of the dismissal since the Tribunal should not usurp the authority of the President in deciding on the fate of the appellant who dismissed employees as per the Committee’s advice. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. It was submitted that the dismissal of Balbir Singh was unjustified and demanded that the order should be quashed. 2. It was argued that there was no procedural fairness during the dismissal of Balbir Singh as it omitted the regular departmental inquiry process. 3. It was highlighted that the Supreme Court acquitted Balbir in the said criminal case and argued that the acquittal should have affected the dismissal decision. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** **Article 311(2) –** It requires that no officer can be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank although he can be suspended and that he be allowed to explain himself. Particularly, this provision requires that before the adverse actions are taken against the employee, s/he should be afforded an opportunity to be heard and defend him/herself in case charges/ complaints are made against him/her. This makes sure that there is follow through that discipline is done in a fair and constitutional manner without infringing on any rights of the civil servants besides observing justice. **JUDGEMENT** 1. In the final verdict of the case Union of India & Anr vs Balbir Singh & Anr Supreme court of India partly allowed the appeal filed by Union of India and quashed the CAT order. 2. The court referred to S. R. Bommai and Ors vs Union of India and Ors to define the nature of the review under proviso (c) to Article 311(2). The Court, once again, reminded that the Order-in-Council’s satisfaction can be challenged although it is limited to the examination whether the satisfaction was unmindful of mala fides or based on irrelevant grounds. Also, the court cannot override its satisfaction with that of the President if there is material that can support the action. 3. This court pointed out an error in judgment of the Tribunal in which they failed to take into account of the confidential document in relation to the State Security. B. Bhaskara Reddy vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh was used to point out that despite the fact that the material includes the irrelevant part, the action shall be justified by identifying other relevant materials justifying the action. 4. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that the Balbir Singh’s dismissal under proviso (c) to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India was sound because there was enough material that was sealed and relevant to state security. **CONCLUSION** 1. “The impugned order of the Tribunal is set aside and the application filed by the respondent before the Tribunal is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs” the Bench ruled. 2. It asserted the constitutional propriety of the action taken under proviso (c) to Article 311(2) of Constitution of India thus allowing such dismissals in the interest of the nation’s security. 3. Therefore, in my view, the case defends the best interest of national security and the procedural fairness both by demonstrating how the Judiciary meticulously balances and strikes a middle ground on various novel issues to do with the stature of the law. **REFERENCES** 1. R. Bommai and Ors v. Union of India and Ors 2. Bhaskara Reddy v. Government of Andhra Pradesh 3. Union of India & ANR v. Balbir Singh & ANR 4. Article 311(2) of Constitution of India 5. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Kuldeep Nayar Vs Union of India](https://lawfoyer.in/kuldeep-nayar-vs-union-of-india/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Shruti Bharat Mohite** **Edited by: Sulesh Choudhary** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** In the case Kuldeep Nayar Vs Union of India, Kuldeep nayar is a petitioner and he files a writ petition under Article 32 of constitution of India, challenging the changes made in The Representation of people act, 1951 through the representation of people (Amendment) Act, 40 of 2003 majorly amended two provisions - Deletion of ‘domicile’ requirement in state concerned for the elections of state council. - Introduction of ‘open ballot system’ in the elections of state council. Petitioner contended that the elimination of ‘domicile’ requirement to get elected in Rajya Sabha violates the principle of federalism and the introduction of ‘open ballot system’ in council of state infringe on Article 19(1)(a) -freedom of expression. On the behalf OF Union of India respondent shri. vahanvati argued that deletion of domicile requirement doesn’t violate federalism principle as it creates multiple & greater choices for choose as a representative of state in issue and the use of ‘open ballot’ in elections of council of states make election more transparent & accountable. Voters are free to express their opinions even if they used open ballot system. After listening the arguments of both parties’ court came to the conclusion that firstly, deletion if domicile requirement doesn’t violate principle of federalism. Court said that there is no compulsion that the representative of state should belongs to that state. In the principle of federalism nowhere is written about compulsion of residency. The court stated that this amendment under section 3 had restricted the qualification of a member to the council of states but this restriction is not to any citizen of India. Rather the restriction is with respect to non-citizens & this is significant as per the court’s opinion. Secondly, the adoption of ‘open ballot system’ doesn’t infringe the article 19(1)(a) -freedom of expression. rather open ballot helps to execute free & fair elections. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*:** 1. Article 32 of Indian constitution 2. Representation of people act,1951 3. Principle of federalism 4. Open ballot system 5. Article 19(1)(a) **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** Kuldeep Nayar Vs Union of India ***ii)* *Case Number*** Writ petition 217 of 2004 ***iii)* *Judgement Date*** 28/08/2006 ***iv)* *Court*** Supreme court of India ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** 5 judges ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges*** Y.K..Sabharwal CJI, K.G.Balakrishnan, S.H.Kapadia, C.K.Thakker, P.K. Balasbramanyan. ***vii)* *Citation*** Kuldeep Nayar Vs Union of India on 28/08/2006 ***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved*** 1\) Article 32 Of the Indian Constitution 2\) Sections 3,59,94 and 128 of the Representation of People Act 1951 3\) The Representation of People (Amendment) Act, 2003 (Act No. 40 of 2003) 4\) Article 19(1) (a) of the Indian constitution **FACTS OF THE CASE** **Procedural Background of the Case** In 1947, India became independent but that time India didn’t have any independent constitution or any regulations. Later legislative assembly was made to frame constitution of India. The representation of people act,1950 & 1951 was passed by parliament of India for fair conduction of elections. Article 324 to 329 of part 15 of Indian constitution provides guidelines for the countries electoral system. The act consists many provisions regarding elections like, qualification & disqualification of voters, seat allocation in the Lok Sabha & the legislative assemblies, which election method (direct & indirect) would be used for election and qualification & disqualification of MP’s & MLA’s. The act has been amended several times.in the year 2003. Two major provisions were amended - Deletion of domicile requirement for in the state concerned to get elected to the council of state. - Alteration in the section 59,94, & 128 of RP act ,1951 for adopting open ballot system. According to section 3 of RP act,1951 for to be chosen as a representative of any state there is no requirement that the member shall be a resident that state. The altered section 59 of RP act,1951 states that the elections of state council shall be conducted by open ballot. This provision also altered the section 94 and section 128 these provisions of sections were made in favour of open ballot. Section 94 says that ‘secrecy of ballot’ shall be maintained but in the case of open ballot, it can be compromise & the section 128 includes the punishment to whom violate the secrecy of ballot, but this punishment not apply to person who participates or performs any duty in open ballot. **Factual Background of the Case** In the case of Kuldeep Nayar Vs Union of India, Kuldeep Nayar a well-known journalist files a writ petition under article 32 of Indian constitution stating that amendment made in the RP Act,1951, un 2003 are unconstitutional and violates the basic structure of constitution. The RP Act, 1951, requires ‘domicile’ to the voters who are desires for getting elected in council of states of the state in issue, but later it amended by the amendment 40 of 2003. Petitioner argued that the elimination of domicile requirement to the members who are willing to get elected for state representative violates the basic principle of federalism and the further amendment in RP Act,1951 which is the introduction of the open ballot system in the elections of Rajya Sabha and the alteration in section 59,94 and section 128 petitioner contended that this amendment infringes the secrecy of ballot and violates article 19(1)(a) which is freedom of expression of the constitution of India **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether, Deletion of ‘domicile’ requirement to the candidates standing in Rajya Sabha elections violates the principle of federalism, basic structure of constitution? 2. Whether, use of ‘open ballot system’ in Rajya Sabha elections infringes the article 19(1)(a) and ‘principal pf secrecy’? **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The learned counsel Shri.Sachar on the behalf of petitioner Kuldeep Nayar submitted that, the amendment made in Article 3 of RP Acr,1951 violates the principle of federalism, and the basic structure of the constitution. 2. He contended that council of states is upper house of parliament which made for representing states and union territories in the parliament. One who is not belongs to that state, cannot represent the state effectively. - Learned counsel of petitioner argued on second issue that, the introduction of open ballot conducting Rajya Sabha elections are violating fundamental right of the voters. 1. He also contended that, these impugned amendments violate mot only the article 19(1)(a) of the constitution but also the provisions in the Representation of People Act,1951, Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 2. The learned counsel of the petitioner argued that, ‘secrecy of ballot’ in the elections of council of states is the democratic feature of the constitution. 3. He also states that alteration made in section 3,59,94, and 128, are unconstitutional and violative to the basic structure of constitution and fundamental rights of the constitution. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** **Issue of the ‘domicile’ requirement:** 1. Shri. Vahanvati, Ld., Solicitor General of India, submitted that, Deletion of ‘domicile’ requirement fulfilled the insufficiencies in the conduction of RP Act.1951 and the Said amendment did not contort the features of Council of State 2. Shri.Vahanvati contended that, the word ‘state’ in the Article 80(4) of the Indian constitution doesn’t mean the requirement of residence. 3. He also states that, elected representatives of the states are citizens of the country. It doesn’t mean that it affects federalism and this amendment is chosen by Indian parliament, definitely it wouldn’t violate the principle of federalism. **Issue of the ‘open ballot system’:** 1. Respondent did argument supporting the amendment that, there are more possibility to happen corruption and proxy while maintaining ‘secrecy of voting’ 2. Respondent also argued that, all important matters in the legislatures are discussed through ‘open ballot’, therefore the election of a representative is also an important, matter of the legislature. 3. This amendment didn’t snatch the ‘right to vote’ of the voters, it only changes that, voters have to disclose his vote through this amendment parliament tried to reduce corruption and maintain accountability & transparency of the election. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** **Article 32 of the Indian constitution: “*remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this part,*** - *The right to move the supreme court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this part is guaranteed.”* **Section 3 of RP Act,1951:** *“qualification for membership of the council of state –* *A person shall not be qualified to be chosen as a representative of any state or union territory in the council of states unless he is an elector for a parliamentary constituency in India.”* ***Section 59 of* RP Act,1951:** *“manner of voting at elections –* *At every election where a poll is taken votes shall be given by ballot in such manner as may be prescribed and, save as expressly provided by this act, no votes shall be received by proxy. Provided that this section shall not apply to such witnesses, or other person where he has voted by open ballot.”* **Section 94 RP Act,1951:** *“No witness or other person shall be required to state for whom he has voted at an election. Provided that this section shall not apply to such witness, or other person where he has voted by open ballot*.” **Section 128 RP Act,1951***: “Maintenance of secrecy of voting. —* [*(1)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/48207236/) *Every officer, clerk, agent or other person who performs any duty in connection with the recording or counting of votes at an election shall maintain, and aid in maintaining, the secrecy of the voting and shall not (except for some purpose authorized by or under any law) communicate to any person any information calculated to violate such secrecy. Provided that the provisions of this sub-section shall not apply to such officer, clerk, agent or other person who performs any such duty at an election to fill a seat or seats in the Council of States.* [*(2)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/185675062/) *Any person who contravenes the provisions of sub-section (1) shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months or with fine or with both.* 1. **Article 80(4) of the Indian constitution:** *“The representatives of each State in the Council of States shall be elected by the elected members of the Legislative Assembly of the state in accordance with the system of proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote.”* **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** - **On the issue regarding removal of domicile,** The court state that, the amendment made in the RP Act,1951 through the RP (amendment) Act,40 of 2003, which came into force in 28th august 2003, i.e., deletion of ‘domicile’ requirement for the candidates willing to get elected as representative of the state in Rajya Sabha. Court held that, in order to be elected to council of state, a person need not to be a resident of the state. It doesn’t violate the principle of federalism. The said amendment is not unconstitutional and it doesn’t affect the basic structure of Indian constitution. Court came to a conclusion that residence was never treated as an essential of the structure of the council of state and also the government of India act states that domicile is not the essential ingredient of the structure and composition of the upper house. The court also admitted that, “it is no part of federal principle that the representatives of state must belong to that state.” - **On the regarding ‘open ballot system’**, Further amendment made in RP Act, 1951, through RP (amendment) 40 of 2003 is alteration in section 59, 94 and 128 of RP Act,1951 by which ‘open ballot system’ was introduced. The court doesn’t found violation of fundamental right which is article 19(1)(a) of Indian constitution – freedom of expression. Voters are free to express their political opinions and preferences even if they going to vote through ‘open ballot system’. Court held that, voters of direct elections are ordinary citizens requires the safeguard of secrecy but the elected members of legislative assemblies are supposed to have public courage. The conduction of open ballot system shall be reducing the corruption and proxy.it helps to ensure free and fair elections. **Hence, the petition was dismissed by the bench of 5 judges.** **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** In Kuldeep Nayar Vs Union Of India Case, The appellant is Kuldeep Nayar, respected Journalist in India. He filed a legal petition under article 32 of the Indian constitution. This petition challenges the changes made to the representation of people act 1951, Which is amendment 40 of 2003, which became effective from August 28th 2003 This amendment had 2 major changes. First, it eliminated the necessity of the domicile in the state concerned for elections of the council of states. according to appellant it violates the principle of federalism. Second, the amendment altered section 59,94 and the section 128 of Indian constitution adopting a new method of conducting elections which is ‘open ballot system’ the petitioner argued that open ballet system infringes the principle of secrecy which is essential for fair elections. it violates the voters fundamental right i.e Freedom of expression under the article 19(1) (a) Of the Indian constitution. later the Supreme Court announces the judgment on the petition that removal of domicile requirement was not unconstitutional and it doesn’t violate article 84 of Indian constitution the court also found that the introduction of open ballot system in indirect Elections doesn’t violate any secrecy of voting as it doesn’t violate article 19(1) (a). **REFERENCES** 1. *The representation of people Act ,1951* 2. *The constitution of India* 3. *The representation of people (amendment) Act,40 of 2003* 4. *Kuldeep Nayar Vs Union of India AIR 2006 SC 3127* **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [S.P. Mittal v Union of India, 1983](https://lawfoyer.in/s-p-mittal-v-union-of-india-1983/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Shreya Gupta** **Edited by: Sulesh Choudhary** **ABSTRACT** In the case of “S.P. Mittal Etc. Vs. Union of India and Others (1982)”, there is an excellent view of the Supreme Court in proofing the constitutional validity of the Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1980. The Court highlighted the said Act which was aimed to address serious mismanagement and financial irregularities in the Auroville township, a project initiated by the Aurobindo Society. In the Auroville Act of 1980, the petitioners were of the contention that the Act violated “***Articles 25, 26, 29, and 30 of the Constitution***” which were related to religious rights and denomination. The Court, however, held that neither the Society nor Auroville constituted a religious denomination since their activities did not embody a system of beliefs that could be categorized as religion. The Court ruled that Parliament had the legislative competence to enact the Act, which did not impinge upon rights under Articles 25 and 26, as the Act was focused on management rather than religious practice. It underscored that significant irregularities warranted governmental intervention to safeguard public funds and uphold the integrity of the project. The judgment reinforced the necessity of accountability in governance, particularly in ventures of international character involving public interest and substantial funding. Ultimately, the Court upheld the enactment of the Auroville Act, affirming the importance of responsive governance**.** ***Keywords* *:*** 1. Supreme Court 2. Auroville act[\[1\]](#_ftn1) 3. “*Articles 25, 26, 29, and 30 of the constitution of India*” 4. Governance 5. Integrity 6. Religious Denomination **CASE DETAILS** **i) Judgement Cause Title / Case Name** S.P. Mittal Etc. Etc vs Union Of India and Ors.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) **ii) Case Number** 1983 (1) SCC 51 **iii) Judgement Date** 08/11/1982 **iv) Court** Supreme Court of India **v) Quorum / Constitution of Bench** 5 **vi) Author / Name of Judges** “R.B. Misra, Y.V. Chandrachud, P.N. Bhagwati, O. Chinnappa Reddy. Balakrishna Eradi” **vii) Citation** *“1983 AIR(1),1983 SCR (1) 729, 1983 SCC(1)51,1982 SCALE (2)1001*” **viii) Legal Provisions Involved** “*Articles 14, 25, 26, 29 and 30 [**\[3\]**](#_ftn3)of The Indian Constitution*” **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** When we talk about the case basis, it revolves around the “*Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act, of 1980*” purposely enacted in result to get responses for raising concerns regarding the management of the *Auroville* township which was founded on the teachings of Sri Aurobindo. After the death of the co-founder of the Aurobindo Society, in 1973, significant challenges arose, including allegations of financial mismanagement and internal conflicts within the Society. The Government of India, prompted by complaints and an audit revealing irregularities, initiated the takeover of Auroville’s management. The case is particularly concerned with the balance between legislative intervention and constitutional guarantees of religious freedom. **The Case profoundly depicted the Supreme Court’s examination of “*Articles 25, 26, 29, and 30*” highlighting the necessity of defining “religion” and “religious denomination” within the context of constitutional protections**. Furthermore, this helps us to understand how governmental actions can intersect with personal freedoms and the importance of accountability in managing organizations. The decision underscores the Judiciary’s role in mediating conflicts between individual rights and the broader interest of society, especially in dynamic and complex situations involving public projects. **FACTS OF THE CASE** **Procedural Background of the Case** 1. The case involves a series of legal steps leading to the challenge of the Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1980[\[4\]](#_ftn4). The Act was enacted by the Government of India as a response to widespread allegations of mismanagement and financial irregularities within the Aurobindo Society. 2. The petitioners, including S.P. Mittal, filed writ petitions challenging the constitutional validity of the Act on multiple grounds. They argued that the Parliament lacked the legislative competence to enact the impugned statute and that the Act violated “Articles 14, 25, 26, 29, and 30 of the Constitution.” 3. The Supreme Court, after thorough deliberation, dismissed the petitions, validating the Act and asserting that it was both constitutionally sound and necessary for the governance of Emergency Provisions. **Factual Background of the Case** 1. This case is rooted in the establishment and development of the Auroville township, which was envisioned by Sri Aurobindo[\[5\]](#_ftn5) and his disciples as a cultural and educational hub promoting human unity. There were also prominent financial contributions like UNESCO[\[6\]](#_ftn6), recognizing the potential of Auroville to foster global understanding and peace. 2. However, following the passing of the Mother in 1973, the Society faced internal discord, leading to mismanagement and allegations of financial impropriety. 3. Complaints regarding the diversion of funds and ineffective management prompted the Government of India to investigate. An audit committee found, spurring the government’s decision to take over Auroville’s management 4. The Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act was subsequently enacted to formalize this takeover, for those who contended that the Act infringed upon their constitutional rights and sought to restore their control over the township’s administration. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1980. Whether the Parliament had the legislative authority to enact the Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1980. 1981. Whether the petitioners emphasized that the Auroville Act infringed upon “Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution”, which guarantee the freedom to practice and propagate religion and the rights of religious denominations to manage their affairs - Whether the Auroville Act violated Article 14[\[7\]](#_ftn7) of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law and prohibits discrimination. **PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS-** The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that – 1. The Petitioners contended that the subject matter of the “Auroville Act”, did not fall under any specific entries in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, and thus, the Parliament exceeded its jurisdiction. 2. They asserted that the Aurobindo Society constituted a religious denomination and that the Act unlawfully interfered with their rights to manage their religious affairs mentioned “u/a 29 & 30 of the Indian Constitution”[\[8\]](#_ftn8). 3. The petitioners argued that the Act infringed upon their rights under Articles 29 and 30, which protect the rights of minorities to conserve their culture, language, and script, and to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. 4. The petitioners maintained that the Auroville Act violated “Article 14” of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law. 5. The petitioners claimed that the enactment of the Auroville Act was driven by malafide intentions and the political motivations. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS-** The counsels for Respondent submitted that- 1. The respondents argued that Parliament possessed the legislative Power or Jurisdiction to enact the Auroville Act under the residuary entry (Entry 97) of List I in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution[\[9\]](#_ftn9). 2. The act was to protect the Public interest. They highlighted evidence from audits that revealed the diversion of funds and significant internal strife that had turned the management of Auroville into a distrust. 3. The respondents asserted that the Act was focused on administrative management rather than religious governance. Thus, there is no violation of “Articles 25 & 26 in this.” 4. : The respondents pointed out the uniqueness of the Auroville Act, including its international significance and the involvement of substantial public and foreign funding. 5. They asserted that the government had the full authority to determine the most effective means to address the issues at hand, and the Court should respect the legislative process and the decisions made by Parliament in matters of protecting public Interest. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS[\[10\]](#_ftn10)** 1. **“*Article 21”: – “It protects*** *life and personal liberty so that, No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”[**\[11\]**](#_ftn11)* 2. ***“Article* *14”: “****It guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws to all individuals within the territory of India.”* 3. ***“Article 25”:*** *“It always ensures the freedom of conscience and also ensures the right to freely profess, practice, and propagate religion**.”*** 4. ***“Article 26”: “****It provides that every religious denomination has the right to manage its affairs in matters of religion, establish and maintain institutions for religious and also in providing charitable purposes, and acquire and own property.”* 5. ***“Article 29”: “****It protects the interests of minority people by allowing them to conserve their language, script, or culture**.”*** 6. ***“Article 30”: “****It guarantees us the right to minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.”* **JUDGEMENT [\[12\]](#_ftn12)** The judgment reinforced the principle that while fundamental rights regarding religion are protected, they may be subject to legislative regulation when necessary for the public interest and well-being. **RATIO DECIDENDI-** 1. The Supreme Court held that the Aurobindo Society and Auroville Act did not constitute a religious denomination, and thus the Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1980, did not infringe upon “Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. “ 2. The Court emphasized that the Act was a “legitimate legislative measure” to address the management crisis within Auroville due to the “identified financial irregularities and internal conflicts”. **GUIDELINES GIVEN BY THE COURT-** 1. The Court indicated that even in cases of organizations with philosophical or cultural underpinnings, the legislature has the power to intervene in matters of management when public interest is at stake. 2. It underscored that the management of properties by “religious denominational bodies” could be regulated by law in the interest of good Conscience. **OVERRULING JUDGMENTS –** - The judgment, in this case, did not directly overrule previous judgments but rather interpreted and, - The Court Clarified the application of Articles 25 and 26 with the definition of religious denominations, setting a precedent for future cases regarding the intersection of religion, philosophy, and administrative law. **OBITER DICTA –** - The Court made observations regarding the nature of religious denominations and the distinction between religion and philosophical teachings. - The Court suggested that teachings attributed to figures like Sri Aurobindo represent a philosophical viewpoint rather than an organized religion, - Thus, laying down a framework for future cases involving similar issues of religious classification. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The Supreme Court’s judgment in **S.P. Mittal Etc. Vs. Union of India and Others[\[13\]](#_ftn13)** serves as a notable precedent in balancing the rights of individuals and religious denominations against the government’s responsibility to **ensure effective management and accountability in public protection.** The ruling delineates the boundaries of what constitutes a religious denomination under the Constitution, reinforcing that not every philosophical or cultural entity qualifies for the protections afforded to religious groups. This case underlines the judiciary’s role in ensuring that legislative actions align with constitutional principles, particularly in situations where public interest and significant funds are involved. The Court’s approach reflects a nuanced understanding of the complexities surrounding religious freedoms and the necessity for regulatory oversight in organizational management. 1. **Contextual Relevance**: The intersection of Contemporary Societies with Psychology and science. 1. **Implications for Administrative Law**: This Act plays a pivotal role in defining and safeguarding public interest in society. 2. **Future Considerations**: From this Judgment, the future courts can make a logical and clear decision keeping in mind the religious denominations. 3. **Critical Insights**: There is a question of fact that whether the court should balance or lean towards the government in safeguarding the public interest. Once the decision is made, the future decisions are made in the same way. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** 1. “The Kerala Education Bill \[1959\] SCR 995”[\[14\]](#_ftn14) 2. “Reverend Sidhaibhai Serbhai and Others v. State of Bombay and Another \[1963\] 3 SCR 837”.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) - “State of Kerala v. Mother Provincial \[1971\] 1 SCR 734”.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) 1. “Divyadassan Rajendra Ramdassji & Another v. State of Andhra Pradesh \[1970\] 1 SCR 103”[\[17\]](#_ftn17) **Important Statutes Referred** - “The Constitution of India”. - “The Societies Registration Act, 1860” - “The Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975” - “The Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1980”. [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) “Organisational History and Involvement of Government of India” (*Auroville*) 27/7/24 [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) https://indiankanoon.org/doc/312939/ and Indian Kanoon, “Sp Mittal v Uoi 1983” and RB MISHRA, “IKANOON Sp Mittal v Uoi” (Cite Them Right online – OSCOLA, 2021) 27/7/24> accessed July 27, 2024 [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Article 14, 25, 26, 29, 30, Constitution of India (1950) [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) “Organisational History and Involvement of Government of India” (*Auroville*) 27/07/24 [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) **Sri Aurobindo** was an Indian philosopher, yogi, maharishi, poet, and Indian nationalist. He was also a journalist, editing newspapers such as Bande Mataram [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) **Equality before law-**The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Protect cultural and educational rights, including the rights of religious and linguistic minorities [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) https://indiankanoon.org/doc/312939/ and Indian Kanoon, “Sp Mittal v Uoi 1983” (Cite Them Right online – OSCOLA, 2021) [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) https://indiankanoon.org/doc/312939/ and Indian Kanoon, “Sp Mittal v Uoi 1983” and RB MISHRA, “IKANOON Sp Mittal v Uoi” (Cite Them Right online – OSCOLA, 2021) 27/7/24> accessed July 27, 2024 [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Article 21, Constitution of India (1950). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) https://legalvidhiya.com/s-p-mittal-v-union-of-india-air-1983-scr-1-729-landmark-judgement-on-religious-domination/#:~:text=Mittal%20v.,Union%20of%20India%2C%20AIR%20(1983)%20SCR%20(1),Landmark%20Judgement%20on%20Religious%20Domination)&text=INTRODUCTION%3A,on%20religion%20of%20a%20person., legal vidhiya, and author of LegalVidhiya, “Sk Mittal v Uoi” (Cite Them Right online – OSCOLA, April 19, 2023 [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) https://indiankanoon.org/doc/312939/ and Indian Kanoon, “Sp Mittal v Uoi 1983” and RB MISHRA, “IKANOON Sp Mittal v Uoi” (Cite Them Right online – OSCOLA, 2021) 27/7/24> accessed July 27, 2024 [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) https://www.advocatekhoj.com/library/judgments/index.php?go=1958/march/4.php, “Kerala Education Bill 1959” (advocatekhoj ed, Cite Them Right online – OSCOLA) [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) https://indiankanoon.org/doc/751632/ and indiankanoon.com, “Reverend Serbhai v. State of Bombay and Ors” accessed July 22, 2024 . [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) https://indiankanoon.org/doc/686466/ and Indiankanoon.com, “State of Kerala v. Mother Provincial 1971” (Cite Them Right online – OSCOLA) [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) https://indiankanoon.org/doc/537047/ and indiankanoon.com, “Iv. “Divyadassan Rajendra Ramdassji & Another v. State of Andhra Pradesh” **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Bandhua Mukti v/s Union of India](https://lawfoyer.in/bandhua-mukti-v-s-union-of-india-2/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Ashmit Srivastava** **Edited by: Sulesh Choudhary** **ABSTRACT** The landmark case Badhua Mukti Morcha v/s. Union of India highlights the crucial and most depraving section of our nation that is the bounded – labour along with the exploitation and the inhumane treatment by the Quarry owners to their labours, collectively the Supreme Court, exercising its power under Article 32 of the Constitution, treated the petition as a writ and appointed a commission to investigate the allegations. The findings of the commission found that the claims of the petitioners, revealing a system of oppression where workers were trapped in a cycle of debt and exploitation. The Court’s judgment was a landmark in Indian legal history. It not only provided relief to the affected workers but also expanded the scope of public interest litigation, empowering NGOs to champion the cause of marginalized sections of society. The case emphasized the State’s responsibility to protect fundamental rights, particularly the right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. By declaring bonded labour as a violation of human dignity, the Court reinforced the judiciary’s role as a guardian of constitutional values. The case’s legacy extends beyond the immediate relief provided to the quarry workers. It created a precedent for addressing systemic issues through judicial intervention and has inspired subsequent efforts to combat bonded labour and other forms of human exploitation in India. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*: *Bonded labour, Fundamental Rights, Rehabilitation, State Responsibility, Labour Laws.*** 1. **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** Bandhua Mukti Morcha v/s. Union of India ***ii)* *Citation*** (1984) 3 SCC 161 ***iii)* *Judgement Date*** 16th December 1983. ***iv)* *Court*** Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** 3 Bench of Judges. ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges*** The Hon’ble *1) Justice P.N. Bhagwati* *2) Justice Ranganath Misra* 3\) *Justice D.A. Desai* ***vii)* *Legal Provisions Involved*** Article – 21, 23, 39(e) and 39(f) of The Constitution of India. The enactment of “*The Bonded Labour (Abolition) Act,1976.”.* **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The abhorrent practice, where individuals were subjected to forced labour as a means to repay a debt, often intergenerational, was a stark violation of fundamental human rights. The “*Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India”* case marked a watershed moment in the nation’s struggle against this insidious evil. [\[1\]](#_ftn1) In this case the Court talked about the significance of securing children’s Right to Education, wellbeing, and advancement in guaranteeing India’s advancement as a vote-based system. While perceiving that child labour couldn’t be cancelled promptly due to financial need the court observed that down-to-earth steps could be taken to ensure and advance the rights of children in the destitution strichen and weak populaces of the country. The Bandhua Mukti Morcha, a non-governmental organization, brought this issue to the forefront by writing to the Supreme Court. The Court, recognizing the gravity of the situation, took Suo- moto cognizance and appointed a commission to investigate the matter. The commission’s report painted a harrowing picture of the lives of these bonded labourers, providing the necessary impetus for the Court to intervene. The court additionally noticed India’s commitments under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Convention on the Rights of the child to give free essential education to all the children in the nation and secure the children against financial abuse. **FACTS OF THE CASE** **Procedural Background of the Case** 1. The Petitioner wrote a letter to Justice P.N. Bhagwati regarding the workplace and marking conditions of the workmen. 2. This letter was further taken as a writ Petition under “*Article-32 of the Constitution of India”* and a commission was made to enquire about the allegations put forth by the petitioner in the posted letter. 3. The commission proved that the allegations to be right and there was the infringement of the rights of the labourers. 4. They requested the Supreme Court to issue a writ for proper implementation of the various provisions of the Constitution and statues with a view to end the misery, suffering and helplessness of those labours and release them from the bonded labour. 5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court treated the said letter as a writ petition and on 26th February 1982 appointed a commission consisting of Mr. Ashok Srivastava & Mr. Askok Panda to enquire further. **Factual Background of the Case** 1. The petitioner Bandhua Mukti Morcha is a non-governmental organisation (NGO) which works for the welfare of the people. While they were conducting a survey and found some stone quarries in Faridabad, Haryana. 2. The workmen were found in exploitative, harsh & inhumane conditions including :- - Long working hours without adequate rest. - Minimal or low wages. - Lack of basic amenities to the labour like food, shelter, and healthcare. - Physical and mental abuse. 1. Quarry owners employed coercive tactics to maintain control over the labourers, including threats, violence, and withholding wages. 2. The prevalence of the of child labour was also found within these quarries. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. WHETHER the PIL under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution was maintainable or not? 2. WHETHER fundamental rights of labourers are infringed in the current case? **PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioner (Bandhua Mukti Morcha), representing the victims of bonded labour and presented the compelling the arguments to highlight the plight of these labours and to seek legal redress. - **Violation of Fundamental Rights:** - The petitioners argued that the bonded labour constituted a violation of the fundamental rights of citizen guaranteed under the Constitution of India, particularly: - ***Article 21:*** *Right to life and personal liberty.* - ***Article 23:*** *Prohibition of traffic in human beings and forced labour.* - They emphasized the inhuman conditions under which bonded labourers were forced to live and work, depriving them of their basic human dignity. - **Systemic Exploitation:** - The petitioners exposed the systemic nature of bonded labour, highlighting how it was perpetuated by a complex network of intermediaries, creditors, and landowners. - They argued that the government’s inaction in addressing this issue had allowed the practice to flourish. - **Debt Trap:** - The petitioners explained how bonded labourers were often lured into a cycle of debt through false promises of employment or loans. - They detailed the exorbitant interest rates charged and the coercive tactics used to keep labourers trapped in servitude. - **Lack of Enforcement:** - The petitioners criticized the government’s failure to effectively enforce anti-bonded labour laws. - They pointed out the lack of adequate rehabilitation programs for rescued bonded labourers and the absence of measures to prevent re-trafficking. - **Role of State Negligence:** - The petitioners argued that the state had a duty to protect its citizens from exploitation. - They accused the government of negligence in failing to address the root causes of bonded labour, such as poverty, illiteracy, and lack of access to credit. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The respondent, in this case, the Union of India, presented a defense against the allegations made by the petitioners, the Bandhua Mukti Morcha, here are some potential arguments: **KEY ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPONDENT** 1. **Lack of Sufficient substantiation** - The replier argued that the pleaders failed to give concrete and substantial substantiation to support their claims of wide clicked labour. - They also challenged the credibility and trustability of the substantiations and documents presented by the pleaders. 2. **Profitable Constraints** - They also contend that it faced resource limitations and popular constraints in effectively eradicating clicked labour. - Also, they argued that the problem was complex and needed a gradational approach, involving colourful stakeholders. 3. **State Intervention and Being Laws** - The replier stressed the colourful laws and regulations formerly in place to combat clicked labour, similar as the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976. - They refocused out to the government enterprise and programs aimed at delivering and rehabilitating clicked labourers. 4. **Part of Socio- Economic Factors** - They also argued that poverty, ignorance, and lack of mindfulness were underpinning causes of clicked labour, rather than state negligence. - They emphasized the need for a multi-faceted approach involving education, profitable development, and social reforms. **COUNTERACTING THE PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS** - To fight the argument of violation of abecedarian rights, the government argued that it was taking way to apply these rights and that the pleaders’ claims were inflated. - To address the issue of systemic exploitation, the replier emphasized the complexity of the problem and the challenges involved in eradicating it fully. • Regarding the debt trap, the government refocused to sweats to regulate moneylenders and give indispensable sources of credit. - In response to the lack of enforcement allegations, the replier stressed the challenges faced in relating and delivering clicked labourers and the way taken to ameliorate enforcement mechanisms **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** **ARTICLE 21:** – ***PROTECTION OF LIFE AND PERSONAL LIBERTY*** “*No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law”.[**\[2\]**](#_ftn2)* **ARTICLE 23: – *PROHIBITION OF TRAFFIC IN HUMAN BEINGS AND FORCED LABOUR*** *“(1) Traffic in human beings and beggar and other similar forms of forced labour are prohibited and any contravention of this provision shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law.* *(2) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from imposing compulsory service for public purposes, and in imposing such service the State shall not make any discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste or class or any of them.” [**\[3\]**](#_ftn3)* **ARTICLE 24: – *PROHIBITION OF EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN In Factories, Etc*** *“No child below the age of fourteen years shall be employed to work in any factory or mine or engaged in any other hazardous employment.”[**\[4\]**](#_ftn4)* **ARTICLE 39: – *CERTAIN PRINCIPLES OF POLICY TO BE FOLLOWED BY THE STATE*** **(e)”** *that the health and strength of workers, men and women, and the tender age of children are not abused and that citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter avocations unsuited to their age or strength”;[**\[5\]**](#_ftn5)* **ARTICLE 39 (f) “***That children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity and that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment”. [**\[6\]**](#_ftn6)* **ARTICLE 42: -PROVISION FOR JUST AND HUMANE CONDITIONS OF WORK AND MATERNITY** **“***The State shall make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work and for maternity relief.”[**\[7\]**](#_ftn7)* **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** - Bonded labour is a violation of abecedarian rights The court emphasized that forcing individualities into labour against their will through compulsion, intimidation, or debt thrall is a direct violation of Composition 23 of the Indian Constitution (Prohibition of business in mortal beings and forced labour). - State’s obligation to help and annihilate clicked labour The judgment underlined the state’s positive duty to take visionary measures to help and annihilate clicked labour, rather than simply replying to complaints. - Rehabilitation and reintegration of saved clicked labourers The judgment emphasized the significance of furnishing comprehensive recuperation and reintegration programs for individualities freed from clicked labour to help them from falling back into the same situation. **GUIDELINES** **The Bandhua Mukti Morcha case was instrumental in shaping India’s anti-bonded labour jurisprudence.** The Supreme Court issued a series of guidelines and directives to address the systemic issue of bonded labour. **IDENTIFICATION AND RESCUE OF BONDED LABOURERS** - Establishment of effective mechanisms for identifying bonded labourers. - Setting up special task forces or cells to rescue bonded labourers. - Protection of rescued bonded labourers from intimidation and harassment. **REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION** - Providing rehabilitation programs to help bonded labourers rebuild their lives. - Ensuring access to education, vocational training, and healthcare. - Facilitating the return of rescued bonded labourers to their native places. **PREVENTION OF BONDED LABOUR** - Strengthening enforcement of anti-bonded labour laws. - Raising awareness about bonded labour through public campaigns. - Empowering vulnerable communities to resist falling into bonded labour. **ROLE OF STATE GOVERNMENTS** - Imposing strict penalties on those involved in bonded labour. - Monitoring labour conditions in vulnerable sectors. - Collaborating with NGOs and civil society organizations. **OBITER DICTA** Broader societal issues the court made compliances about poverty, ignorance, or the part of profitable development in combating clicked labour, which, while applicable to the case, might not be essential to the core holding. - **Policy recommendations:** The court suggested that the policy changes or reforms are beyond the immediate compass of the case, similar as strengthening law enforcement agencies or furnishing vocational training for saved clicked labourers. - **Examens of government conduct:** While the court blamed specific government conduct, some of these examens might not be directly linked to the core legal issues and could be considered obiter dicta. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** ***Bandura Mukti Morcha v. Union of India*** is a seminal Supreme Court judgement ordering the freeing of bonded labour in India. The correct idea of the recognition that, founded on narrowing it down to be an open infringement out basic rights is a defining moment at holding their own pride and worth by those crushed area returnee-needed. A present-day comprehensive legal and policy framework directed at identification, release, rehabilitation as well as prevention of bonded labour would not have been possible but for the directions by the court. The verdict has reinforced the obligation of state and government to shield citizens from such exploitation. Although a milestone court ruling had been delivered, there were still struggles to be faced. While the guidelines in relation to are important, it is essential however that these findings implemented efficiently. Bonded Labour Is Deeply Entrenched. Given that labour practices are ever-changing, legal frameworks also need to be constantly updated and altered accordingly. New forms of exploitation, including debt bondage and human trafficking require a strong legal response. The Bandhula Mukti Morcha case is a telling example of how the judiciary stands as a vanguard to vindicate human rights and strive for social justice. Yet, the real value of such an exercise is to serve as a trigger that propels all sections – government; civil society and individuals into action towards eliminating bonded labour and creating a fairer order. **ENDNOTES:** [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) [ Debt bondage in India – Wikipedia ](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Debt_bondage_in_India#:~:text=Bonded%20labour%20is%20a%20relic,and%20government%20ineffectiveness%20allow%20this) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Article 21 of The Constitution of India. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Article 23 of The Constitution of India. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Article 24 of The Constitution of India. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Article 39(e) of The Constitution of India. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Article 39 (f) of The Constitution of India [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Article 42 of The Constitution of India. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Sodan Singh Vs. New Delhi Municipal Corporation](https://lawfoyer.in/sodan-singh-vs-new-delhi-municipal-corporation/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Ishan Mishra** **Edited by: Sulesh Choudhary** **ABSTRACT** In this case, a landmark case decided by the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of India had addressed the rights of the street traders in New Delhi. The petitioners, comprising various street vendors & hawkers, had claimed their fundamental right to engage in the trading occupation on the public pavement and raised the arguments that their ability to earn a livelihood was being obstructed unjustly by the N.D.M.C. The court had to examine the provisions of Article 19(1)(g) & article 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantee the right to carry out any trade, occupation, or business & the right to life & personal liberty, respectively. The petitioners were contending that their eviction from the zones designated areas for trading areas on the pavements were violative of their fundamental right, especially since they were allowed previously, to conduct their business upon the payment of the Tehbazari fees. The counter asserted by the N.D.M.C. was that no individual has this legal right to occupy any public space exclusively for any commercial purposes, further emphasizing that the streets are primarily for the use of the public. The court had to, ultimately acknowledge the street trading legitimacy but also underscored the necessity for some appropriate regulation to prevent any chaos, public order & preventing of Public Nuisance through such occupations. Also, these occupations were subject to some reasonable restrictions if they conflicted with the public order, health & public interest. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*: *Section 268, public nuisance, Article 19, fundamental rights, right to livelihood, street vendors*** 1. **Fundamental rights:** The rights ensured in the constitution for the effective carrying of the trade, business, or occupation subject to the art by the citizen 19(1)(g). whereas Article 21 guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. 2. **Public street:** It is a street which has been laid down for every person to commute without any hindrance. 3. **Right to livelihood:** It is recognized by law in such a manner that both men and women have equal rights to livelihood and can access resources such as air, water, etc. 4. **Municipal Authorities:** These are self-government institutions responsible for the effective administration of cities & towns. 5. **Reasonable restrictions:** under article 19(2) of the constitution are imposed in case there is a threat to the sovereignty & or the integrity of India 6. **Public Nuisance:** Any act that is an illegal omission & which causes any common injury, danger, or annoyance to the public. 7. **Street trading/ hawking:** It is an act of selling the required goods and services to the public without any built-up structure that is permanent. **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** Sodan Singh Vs. New Delhi Municipal Corporation (1989) ***ii)* *Case Number*** SCC 155 ***iii)* *Judgement Date*** First judgement on 30/8/1989, Second Judgement on 13/3/1992 ***iv)* *Court*** Honourable Supreme Court of India ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** Connotation bench ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges*** Justice S.B. Majmudar & Justice Jagganadha Rao ***vii)* *Citation*** AIR 1998 SUPREME COURT 1174, 1998 (2) SCC 743, AIR 2003 ANDHRA PRADESH 396, 1998 AIR SCW 991, (1998) 1 SCALE 463, 1998 ADSC 2 29, (1998) 1 JT 532 (SC), (1998) 1 SCR 629 (SC), (1998) 2 SUPREME 158, 1998 UJ(SC) 1 424, 1998 (1) SCR 629, 1998 (1) SCALE 449, 1998 (1) ADSC 719, 1998 (2) SCC 727, (1998) 71 DLT 705, (1998) 1 RECCIVR 634, (1998) 1 SCALE 449, (1998) 3 SCJ 277, (1998) 71 DLT 804, (1998) 2 SUPREME 111, 1992 SCC (SUPP) 2 121, (2003) 2 ANDHLD 206, AIRONLINE 1998 SC 349 ***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved*** Provisions of Punjab Municipal Act 1911 Provisions of Delhi Police Act 1978 **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** In India, individual people have been given the right to carry out any profession of their choice which has been explicitly stated & or provided under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India allowing them to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. But simultaneously it also provides that if any vendor gets involved in an act like illegally obstructing the pavement meant for the public for his or her commercial ends. Such violations by those who are in any manner involved will be booked under Section 268 which amounts to PUBLIC NUISANCE defined under the INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 which describes it as one that causes injury, danger, or annoyance to the public or to those people who in general lives or occupies their property in the vicinity. In this very case of **SODAN SINGH Vs. N.D.M.C** dating back to 1989, what was ruled by the Supreme Court was that “the right to carry on any trade or business stated in Article 19 (1) g of the constitution, on the street pavements, if are properly regulated, cannot be denied on the ground that the streets are meant exclusively to pass or re-passing and of no other use.” This case primarily deals with the constitutional validity of the street vendors & the respective balance of their fundamental rights (street vendors) to effectively carry out their trade versus the need for regulation of the public spaces by those Municipal Authorities. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether or not the petitioners had the right to conduct such street trading as per the provisions of article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. 2. Whether or not the petitioners possessed the right to occupy any specific areas on the public pavements for carrying their business permanently. 3. Whether or not the refusal to allow the petitioners to trade was violative of their right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsel for the Petitioner argued that it was their fundamental right to engage in street trading under article 19(1)(g) of the constitution of India which guarantees everyone the right to practice any profession of their choice or to carry on any occupation, trade or any business. 2. The counsel for the Petitioner in continuation contended that they had been allowed to conduct their business in some specific areas by the municipal authorities but in exchange for the payment of Tehbazari fees. 3. The counsel for the Petitioner further submitted & claimed that the refusal to allow the hawkers to trade infringed upon their right to livelihood and personal liberty as per Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 4. The counsel for the Petitioner also argued that street vending was contributing to the economy and also was providing essential goods and services to the public which thus was serving a public interest. 5. The counsel for the Petitioner also argued & submitted that while the regulation of street trading was necessary, the outright prohibition was unjustified and would lead to social unrest and increased poverty among the vendors. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Respondent submitted that nobody has the legal right to occupy exclusively any particular area on the road pavement for the pursuance of any trading business & nobody can claim any fundamental right in such cases whatsoever. 2. The counsel for the Respondent submitted that the municipal authorities did have or had the power to regulate the street trading & also impose restrictions to ensure that the public spaces are accessible & remain safe for every citizen. 3. The learned counsel for the respondent also emphasized that maintaining a clear & and unobstructed public path was essential for public safety & convenience. 4. The counsel for the Respondent also referred to previous rulings that supported the view that street vendors do not have a permanent right to occupy any public spaces. 5. The counsel for the Respondent also submitted & argued that street vending or hawking is a source of livelihood for many such people, so it should not come at the expense of any public order & or the rights of other citizens using public spaces freely. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** - **Article 21**[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)**: – “***Protection of life and personal liberty No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.*”[\[2\]](#_ftn2) - **Article 19(1)(g):** “All the citizens shall have the right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade, business. - **Indian Penal Code** - **Section 268:** “This section defines “Public Nuisance” which may be applied if street vending obstructs public pathways or creates a hazard for the pedestrian”. - **Section 144: “**This section allows the authorities to prohibit the assembly of four or more persons in any area, which could be invoked to manage street vending if it leads to public disorder”. **JUDGEMENT** The Hon’ble Supreme Court expressly recognized that the street vendors too have a fundamental right to carry out their trade as per article 19(1)(g) of the constitution of India. However, the court clarifies that such right does not extend to a permanent occupation of any specific place on the streets for the public. The court simultaneously also directed the N.D.M.C. to frame some schemes for the regulation of street vending, which was inclusive of the designated & non-designated zones for hawking, also establishing licensing procedures &ensuring adequate space for pedestrians. The judgment also underscored that the right to trade is subject to certain reasonable restrictions that the authorities can impose in the interest of public order, health & safety. In **Saghir Ahmed Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh** the Hon’ble Court had emphasized that preventive detention laws should adhere strictly to the provisions as laid down in the Constitution of India, particularly Article 21. In **Orga Tellis Vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation** the Hon’ble court reiterated that any kind of eviction or any removal of the encroachments must follow the due procedure established by law. The Supreme Court emphasized that the right to practice any trade, occupation, or business under Article 19(1)(g) agrees with Article 21 of the Constitution of India. **RATIO DECIDENDI** - The court established that street vendors have a fundamental right to engage in any trade as per Article 19(1)(g) of the constitution of India. - The court also acknowledged & clarified that there is no such absolute right to occupy a specific area on the public streets permanently. - The emphasis through the judgment was given on the need for regulation rather than outright prohibiting street vending. **GUIDELINES (IF ANY)** - To ensure that the vendors are operating legally & maintaining public order, the court ordered the N.D.M.C to frame comprehensive and structured schemes for the regulation of street vending. - The guidelines also called for the identification of specified hawking and non-hawking zones to manage where the street vendors are operating. - To ensure that the vendors are registered & authorized to trade in the areas designated to them, the court emphasized the need for a clear licensing procedure for the street vendors. - It was also suggested by the court there should be some regulation to define the types of goods that could be sold & the specific number of vendors allowed in specific areas to prevent overcrowding. **OBITER DICTA (IF ANY)** - The court had emphasized street vending as a means of livelihood for many of the individuals, which highlighted the socio-economic implications of regulating street vending. - The court also suggested that the regulations framed should be with a compassionate understanding of the circumstances of the street vendors. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The Hon’ble Supreme Court through its judgment had this affirmation that it is the fundamental right of the vendors to engage in trade under Article 19(1)(g) of the constitution of India, also acknowledging their contribution towards the economy and society. It was also concluded by the court that while street vending is a legitimate activity, it also must be properly regulated to ensure that the public spaces aren’t inaccessible and are safe for all citizens. In my opinion, without going through all the possibilities about the place where the person carries out his/her business & also how the business is being carried out, the livelihood of the person cannot be snatched away from him/her in the name law unless & until it is a manner causing a problem for the common public & is also not being in conflicting in the eyes, as well as with the provisions of the law. Which as a result should be the top priority to ensure that no one is denied of their fundamental rights under articles 19 & 21 of the constitution of India. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** - Saghir Ahmed Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh - Olga Tellis Vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation **Important Statutes Referred** - The Constitution of India, 1950 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Punjab Municipal Act .1911 - Delhi police act, 1978 **ENDNOTES** - https://indiankanoon.org/doc/165273/ - https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1767433/ - - The constitution of India (1950), Article 19(1)(g) - The constitution of India (1950), Article 21 - The Indian Penal Code (1860), section 144 - The Indian Penal Code (1860), section 268 [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Section 144; 268, Indian Penal Code, (1860) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Article 21, Constitution of India (1950). **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [ROLE OF THE INTERNAL COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE UNDER POSH ACT: PROVISIONS, CASES AND PROCEDURE](https://lawfoyer.in/role-of-the-internal-complaints-committee-under-posh-act-provisions-cases-and-procedure/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** 1\. INTRODUCTION Over the past few years, there has been an extensive transformation in the role of women in India due to traditional responsibilities that placed all household chores and income generation on women’s shoulders until now. The person who believes that a woman is capable of protecting herself in any situation misses the worst fact that more than 50% of women still face Violence at the Workplace to date, which means they are denied their rights. To protect these women, the government intervened into many parts of this country where safe working conditions for females were created. This act became effective from 1997 when it was signed into law after others like guidelines on prevention against harassment on women by the Vishakha case had set the tone. This resulted into the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition) Act, 2013 (POSH Act, 2013) which came into effect on December 9th, 2013 covers all employers and every workplace. It is binding legally and ensures protection to women. Their basic rights are violated by Articles 14 and 15 which guarantee equality and Article 21(3), which guarantees the right to dignity. This act was needed of an hour to eliminate the harassment faced by women at the workplace. Under Section 4 of this act, “the employer must form and internal complaint committee (ICC) at all work places with 10 or more employees and this is an obligation that must be fulfilled by any public and private organisations.” Keywords: Sexual Harassment again Women, Section 4 of POSH Act, Articles 14 and 21(3) of Constitution of India , Right to Equality, Vishakha case Guidelines. MEANING, DEFINITION AND EXPLANATION OF TERMS The term Sexual harassment includes “any one or more of the following unusual acts or behaviour (whether done directly or by implication) namely:— Physical contact and advances; or A demand or request for sexual favours; or Making sexually coloured remarks; or Showing pornography; or Any other unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct of a sexual nature.” The following circumstances may also amount to sexual harassment:— “Implied or explicit promise of preferential treatment in her employment; or Implied or explicit threat of detrimental treatment in her employment; or Implied or explicit threat about her present or future employment status; or Humiliating treatment likely to affect her health or safety.” POSH Act was enacted which includes all public as well as private sectors to have ICC to protect the women in workplace against the sexual harassment, The objectives of POSH Act can be ensured: • By forming an internal complaint committee • By providing periodic POSH training on sexual harassment law as well as, • By developing an effective Complaint mechanism and redressal policy. The Internal Complaint Committee (ICC) is formed to make relevant implications of the policies which are related to the prevention of sexual harassment and to solve the complaints made by the aggrieved party as well as to provide redressal to the employee and recommend actions to be taken by the employer to ensure the safety of the employee. The Internal Complaint Committee consists of 4 members consisting of at least two women members and one member working in any association or organization that works in women-specific area. ROLE AND DUTIES OF ICC under the POSH Act The ICC plays a vital role in the effective implementation of the provisions at the workplace. Role of the Internal Complaint Committee are:- • Receive the Complaints: This committee receives complaints and ensures the aggrieved party against sexual harassment. It ensures that this process is confidential and easily accessible by encouraging the women to make complaints without hesitation. • Initiating Enquiry: After receiving the complaint, the role of ICC is to conduct enquiry and proper investigation. This investigation includes collecting evidence, interviewing the complainant and accused, collecting witnesses and submitting all the findings for further recommendations. • Recommendations: The ICC prepare a report addressing all its findings and recommendations regarding the matter and direct the employer to take necessary required actions once the investigation is done and recommend disciplinary majors against accused. • Promoting awareness regarding ICC: The important role of ICC is promoting awareness regarding the rights of the workers and the procedure to file a complaint regarding any issue related to sexual harassment at the workplace. This can be done by way of having workshops, posters, documents, notices etc. • Annual Report: The annual report is provided to the management by the ICC who summarises the complaints made by the victim and takes investigation of the case. They present the company’s recommendations for improving the workplace culture to work in the workplace. The roles of the Internal Complaint Committee are:- • Receive the Complaints: This committee receives complaints and ensures the aggrieved party against sexual harassment. It ensures that this process is confidential and easily accessible by encouraging the women to make complaints without hesitation. • Initiating Enquiry: After receiving the complaint, the role of ICC is to conduct enquiry and proper investigation. This investigation includes collecting evidence, interviewing the complainant and accused, collecting witnesses and submitting all the findings for further recommendations. • Recommendations: The ICC prepare a report addressing all its findings and recommendations regarding the matter and directs the employer to take necessary required actions once the investigation is done and recommend disciplinary majors against the accused. • Promoting awareness regarding ICC: The important role of ICC is promoting awareness regarding the rights of the workers and the procedure to file a complaint regarding any issue related to sexual harassment at the workplace. This can be done by way of having workshops, posters, documents, notices etc. • Annual Report: The annual report is provided to the management by the ICC who summarises the complaints made by the victim and takes investigation of the case. They present the company’s recommendations for improving the workplace culture to work at their workplace. PROCEDURE FOR FILING A COMPLAINT The procedures which are followed by the ICC are designed to ensure a fair and transparent process: 1\. Filing a Complaint: According to the POSH Act, the complaint should ideally be required to be filed within 90 days from the day of the incident. The basic right of the employee is to complain to the ICC of the workplace against any kind of harassment faced by them inside the work premises and provide the details about the nature of harassment as well as any required evidence to prove their innocence and to support their complaint. 2\. Acknowledgment of the Complaint: – After receiving such a complaint by the worker, the ICC acknowledges it by writing it to the complainant. The ICC needs to forward a copy of the complaint to the respondent within 7 working days of receiving it. The respondent must provide a response to the complaint. 3\. Preliminary Assessment Can the ICC do a preliminary assessment in order to establish whether the complaint falls within the purview of the POSH Act or not? If it does not, then she is informed and could be guided on other options of seeking redress. 4\. Conducting the Inquiry It entails: Collecting evidence: Information obtained that is relevant and related to this complaint such as documents, emails, messages, etc. Interviewing parties: The complainant, respondent and any witnesses are interviewed by the committee to obtain comprehensive evidence. The enquiry has to be completed between 90 days from the date on which the complaint was made by the worker. 5\. Final Report After the conclusion of the inquiry, an ICC report is written which includes findings and recommendations that should be clear, objective and based on evidence gathered within 10 days from its completion date as contemplated under Section 17(7) of ICC guidelines and accessible to both parties. 6\. Action on Recommendations When a complaint is found valid by the ICC, it makes suitable disciplinary recommendations. ICC recommends punitive measures like warnings, suspension or dismissal depending on how severe it is. 7\. Follow-Up: – The ICC can conduct follow-up meetings with the complainant and the employer to ensure that there are no further issues and that the workplace remains free from sexual harassment. The Principal shall act upon the recommendation within 60 days of receiving it. On the recommendation of ICC during the procedure of inquiry, the employer may provide interim relief to the victim woman as per request and can transfer the woman to any other workplace or grant her leave for not more than 3 months. RELEVANT CASES 1.) Vishaka and Others v. State of Rajasthan (1997): This case was the landmark judgement which led to the formation of the POSH Act Background: This case arose from a brutal gang rape of a social worker named Bhanwari Devi in a village in Rajasthan. In order to stop child marriage as a part of her duty as a worker under the Women Development Programme was targeted for rape. Issues: 1\. Whether there is an adequate legislative framework to address the issue regarding the sexual harassment of the women in the workplace? 2\. Whether Articles 14, 19 and 21 of The Constitution of India are understood in the manner for effective enforcement of gender equality and protection of women’s rights against sexual harassment? Judgment: Supreme Court has laid down comprehensive guidelines addressing this issue which is also known as Vishakha guidelines until the proper legislation came into force after recognizing the gap between existing laws and changes required with respect to workplace sexual harassment. These guidelines included: VISHAKHA GUIDELINES 1\. Sexual Harassment Defined: It refers to “any physical contact or advances which is unwelcomed sexually determined behaviour (whether directly or by implication), a demand or request for sexual favours, sexually coloured remarks, showing pornography, and any other unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conduct of a sexual nature.” 2\. Preventive Steps: All employers or persons in charge must take appropriate steps to ensure that the workplace is free from sexual harassment such as expressing prohibitions through relevant means, creating a safe environment for employees and sensitizing female workers about their entitlements. 3\. Establishment of an internal complaints committee at all the workplaces for protection of women and this committee should be headed by a woman and not less than half of its members should be women. Additionally, it should involve a third party, either an NGO or another body familiar with the issue of sexual harassment, to prevent undue pressure on the complainant. 4\. Disciplinary Actions: In case of any conduct which amounts to misconduct in employment, the employer should take appropriate disciplinary action according to the service rules. During the process of enquiry, the witness or complainer should not face any victimisation or discrimination by any of the members. 5\. Complaints Mechanism: All women who earn regular salaries come under the purview of these guidelines and four all workplaces must provide an appropriate complaint mechanism having a complaints committee and other support services to the women workers. The confidentiality of particular concerns must be maintained and the procedure of complaints must be time-bound. Impact: These guidelines are considered as interim measures until the enactment of the POSH Act in 2013, as it provided a complete legislative framework addressing the protection against sexual harassment in the workplace. 1.) Usha Padmini v State of Karnataka and Others Usha Padmini v. State of Karnataka and Others is a significant case in India regarding the issue of sexism in the workplace. Usha Padmini, a woman employee of the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, complained about harassment against the officer, but the complaint was initially cleared by the ICC and had nothing to do with sexual harassment. She was forced to quit her job. After being released by the ICC, Padmini filed a petition in the Karnataka High Court, filing a lawsuit against the ICC and the employer on the grounds that women were not provided with safety and security at the workplace. In the present case, the Supreme Court, after hearing both parties, said that the Internal Complaints Committee did not follow the procedure laid down in the Vishaka guidelines and other employers did not take necessary steps to prevent bullying and provide a safe environment for employees. It provides guidelines for employers to follow while handling complaints of harassment, such as creating internal teams to address these issues and providing counselling services to victims. 2.) K. Hema Latha v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others (2018 LLR 447) According to this case, the ICC of a school are only the members of the governing body of the school. The Madras High Court here refused to accept the notice of the ICC on the grounds that the ICC had not complied with the POSH Act. He therefore asked the union to constitute an ICC in accordance with the provisions of the POSH Act at the appointed time, address the complaint and send a report to the employer after hearing the views of all participants. The person or persons involved in the establishment of the International Criminal Court will be investigated by the Commission. CONCLUSION AND COMMENTS The Government authorities have consistently addressed the issue regarding sexual harassment in the workplace. After the formation of Vishakha guidelines, this POSH Act was enacted and the Internal Complaint Committee was established under this act and was made compulsory in all workplaces. The role and functions of this committee ensure to provide grievances to the women workers and address all serious issues related to Sexual Harassment in the workplace comfortably. It provides assistance to the aggrieved person to fight for their fundamental Rights and a limited time period is stipulated to carry out the inquiry procedure and resolve the issue so that it can’t last longer and doesn’t compromise the rights of the victim. According to me, the objectives of this committee are to ensure the prevention, prohibition and redressal of the issue of sexual harassment by protecting the rights of women to work with dignity in a comfortable environment. REFERENCES Books/Acts 1\. The Constitution of India 2\. The Prevention of Sexual Harassment (POSH) Act,2013 Online Articles/ Sources Referred 1\. Indian kanoon 2\. https://muds.co.in/internal-complaints-committee-members-training-certification/#:~:text=As%20per%20the%20POSH%20Act,administer%20complaints%20on%20sexual%20harassment 3\. https://blog.ipleaders.in/all-about-the-internal-complaints-committee-icc/ Statutes Referred 1\. Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 1950 2\. Article 21(3) of the Constitution of India, 1950 3\. Section 4 of the POSH Act, 2013 **Categories:** Articles, Criminal Law --- ### [Possession and Ownership: A Jurisprudential Analysis](https://lawfoyer.in/possession-and-ownership-a-jurisprudential-analysis/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** Introduction Possession and ownership are some of the vital concepts in the field of Jurisprudence as they are the basis of property law and impact different legal, societal, and economic systems. It is necessary to consider these concepts to realize how roles and responsibilities for fulfilling rights are divided between people in a society. This article will attempt to offer a jurisprudential perspective of what possession and ownership are, how they have evolved, what necessarily constitutes them, and the law regarding the two concepts. Further, it will look at defenses to the claim of possession and ownership and look at cases and precedents that exist to support the concepts, also explore several jurisprudential stances on possession, and ownership. Keywords: ownership, possession, property law , legal theory, Salmond’s theory. 1\. Meaning & Definition Possession: In it, possession means the control or occupancy of an item, whether real or personal. It means a tangible assertiveness or authority over an object or property in each society. Possession can be actual; this means that a person has the physical legal right to control the property and or has physical control of the property or constructive where a person does not have the physical control of the property but has the right to do so. Possession is always important when it comes to ownership, possession may be legally protected even though it is not the owner. Ownership: Ownership is a much more liberal concept that covers all the rights that one might have to a thing or an object. It embraces the right to possess, occupy, abuse and thereby deny access to the property by other persons. Possession on the other hand refers to ownership; the legal right over the property, that can be backed up by the court of law. It is a total right which is wider than the possession right and may be exercised without taking physical control of the asset. In law, possession and ownership may sometimes refer to different things or be used in a synonymous manner. Possession is concerned with the physical status of the property, that is the power a person has over the property while ownership examines the legal aspect of the power a person has over the property. For instance, the occupancy of an apartment is a tenant who formally has the property and has some privileges to use it though the landlord is the overall legal owner of the apartment. Knowledge of such distinctions enables the evaluation of property controversy, the assertion of legal obligations and rights, as well as the assertion of legal remedies. This section does a preliminary work of setting the stage for the historical, legal and theoretical analysis of possession and ownership to be done in the rest of this article. 2\. Historical Background The course of possession and ownership is the ever-evolving concept with the impact of different legal systems and social development. Knowledge of their development offers useful information for today’s analysis and use of the concepts. Ancient Times: During the period of Ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt and Greece, acquisition and ownership of property came with statuses and authority. The rights of property were only for the governing classes; lords and land were the key measure of a man’s riches. In the Code of Hammurabi, which was one of the first legal codes, there existed provisions and guidelines on property and its ownership because concepts of property possessed a specific role in stabilizing society. Roman Law: The Romans had a great influence towards the development of property law. They thus defined the difference between dominium which stands for ownership and possession which equally stands for possession. From the staples of Roman laws, it was recognized that ownership was an absolute right, possession on the other hand could be temporary and could change. The Corpus Juris Civilis which was gathered under Justinian became the legal code for later legal systems in Europe. Medieval Period: Before the period of renaissance, Europe was mainly under the feudal system. This was feudalism because lords had superior authority in owning land as the king was at the top level of authority giving land to nobles in return for services. This regime generated a highly intricate structure of possessory and ownership rights so while tenants enjoyed the right of possession of land, ownership remained in the custody of the sovereign. Common Law and Equity: From the development of common law in England the institutions of possession and ownership open new perspectives. Common law courts paid attention to legal title while courts of equity looked at the holder’s equity or the fairness of the case. Long story short, finer differentiation between Real outright ownership and legal ownership and equitable ownership came into picture which led to more flexibility in the legal rights and remedies attached to ownership. Modern Era: As a result of the Industrial Revolution and emergence of capitalism, there were radical changes in property law. Possession of movable assets, for instance machinery and other products became more valuable. New legal forms were adopted for such kinds of property to be recognized and protected. The contemporary world has also witnessed a combination of the civil law and common law legal systems mainly through the intervention of international conventions and treaties governing the property rights regimes in the countries. 3\. Essentials Laying down of possession and ownership requires one to fulfil some legal standards. These elements vary depending on the jurisdiction and the type of property involved but generally include the following: These elements vary depending on the jurisdiction and the type of property involved but generally include the following: • For Possession: 1\. Physical Control: Adverse possession relates to holding the property through physical control over it. Constructive possession may be real if one has the legal right to be in possession of the property though he may not physically exercise the possession. 2\. Intent to Possess: The possessor must possess the property and have the intention of having possession of the property. This intention makes possession a different concept from custody, which refers to holding the property for someone, albeit temporarily. 3\. Continuity: There is a legal necessity by which possession must be established for a certain time period. The interrupted or sporadic possession has the possibility not to meet legal requisites. 4\. Exclusivity: Beneficial use must also be outcomes, it must be an ultimate one, that is, it is the final and complete attainment of the property as regards the owner and others.  Theories of possession 1\. Pollock’s Theory According to Pollock possession is defined as having custody or physical control of a thing. He points out that possession is deemed to be the seeming capacity to make other people stay away from the use of the object. Finally, according to possession, one has control over an object and the right to prevent other people from using the object. 2\. Salmond’s Theory Possession is defined by Salmond as the continuation of a claim of ownership to an object and the right to use it without anyone else’s interference. For Salmond, possession involves two elements: For Salmond, possession involves two elements: – Animus Posidendi (Mental Element) : Also, the purpose of having the object to be the only one to have it. – Corpus (Physical Element) : Control over the choice of object in physical terms. However, Salmond stresses that possession in law and possession in fact are inseparable and that possession should be defined only with the help of the criteria of common sense. 3\. Karl von Savigny’s Theory Savigny identifies two elements of possession: Corpus: Also, general physical capacity to act about the object and to control access to it. Animus Domini: Moreover, possession entails the intention to hold the object as one’s own. He advocates that possession relates to the physical ability to control and deny access to the object to other people. • For Ownership: 1\. Legal Title: It can therefore be described as the legal title of a property or deed. This title vests in the holder the highest of management and disposition of the property in controversy. 2\. Right to Use and Enjoy: Is the liberty interest of an owner to control the property or the way he desires to use the property without turning to the law or regulation that guides the usage of the property. 3\. Right to Transfer: Ownership also enables the person to convey the property to other people through selling it, giving it to other people or even passing it on to a successor. 4\. Right to Exclude: The owners have the right to exclude people or persons from or the right to be involved with their property.  Theories of ownership: – 1\. Austin’s Theory Jurist: John Austin Ownership is a right over a determinate thing which is indeterminable with respect to the person of the user, adjustable with respect to disposal and boundless as regards time. Owner to occupy or to let the property or misuse the property; but there is some legal regulation with regards to this. They are allowed to pass title to property to others or to sell or encumber the property as they choose. Ownership is enduring and runs in Pari Materia with the owner’s life, which means that it does not come to an end upon the owner’s death. Criticism: Ownership is a bundle of rights and even when some of these rights are transferred the residual rights are those of ownership. It is not just a right as it is a thing that develops a relation between the right and the person to whom the right belongs. Thus, legal and practical concerns can limit the ‘indefinite’ user and its corresponding ‘unrestricted’ nature. 2\. Salmond’s Theory Jurist: John Salmond Ownership is a complex title that a person has in an object, meaning that it is a set of several enforceable rights which this person has over it anybody. These are the right of ownership, the right to enjoy the item or asset as one wishes, and the right to change or sell it. Ownership remains perpetual and is always characterized by residual interest, the extent that even if some rights are given out on lease, such as with bare ownership, the owner retains some residual rights. Criticism: It is according to Duguit that ownership relates to the thing itself and not a right. Salmond however has categorized rights into tangible rights and intangible rights (for example: copyrights, and rights of way). 3\. Marxist Theory Origin: Karl Marx Aims at the historical perspective and possible changes to it as well as its effects on society. Capitalist ownership was born when people made money with tools and materials, and thus it entailed social differentiation. It refers to where the state controls the means of production and where important resources and businesses belong to everyone. On the other hand, private ownership is the right to ownership of consumer goods that are vested in individuals, hence personal possession and utilization of commodities. This contrast is pointed out in a transition from owning objects for oneself to capital-owned objects where the primary purpose is to control assets for general social and economic purposes. Impact: Ignores the problem of industrialists and workers’ conflict. Some of the solutions thought to be possessing the potential to reverse the effects of capitalist exploitation include the Nationalization of industries. 4\. Future Implications The issues of possession and ownership remain relative to society’s changes, as well as developments in technology. Cyber property in the form of intellectual property and virtual assets are other issues and prospects in the modern legal environment. It remains to notice that comprehending the traditional concepts of possession/ownership will be important regarding these trends. 5\. CONCLUSION & COMMENTS Control and title are fundamental ideas in property law that define roles and entitlements of people regarding properties. This paper aims to discuss their importance in jurisprudence as backed by their historical background, legal classifications, as well as practical applications. With the changes that are ever constant to the different forms of property and the societal requirements, possession and ownership will always be crucial in shaping laws that govern the ownership of property. 6\. REFERENCES • Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred 1\. Honoré, A. M. (1961). “Ownership”. In A. G. Guest (Ed.), \*Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence\*. 2\. Blackstone, W. (1766). \*Commentaries on the Laws of England\*. 3\. Locke, J. (1690). \*Two Treatises of Government\*. • Online Articles / Sources Referred 1\. Cornell Law School. (n.d.). “Possession”. Legal Information Institute. \[Link\](https://www.law.cornell.edu/) 2\. FindLaw. (n.d.). “Property and Ownership”. \[Link\](https://www.findlaw.com/) • Cases Referred 1\. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805). 2\. Tulk v. Moxhay, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848). • Statutes Referred 1\. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (India). 2\. Adverse Possession Act (various jurisdictions). **Categories:** Articles, Jurisprudence --- ### [REMEDIES AGAINST FOOD ADULTERATION: PROVISIONS, CASES, PROCEDURE AND PRINCIPLES](https://lawfoyer.in/remedies-against-food-adulteration-provisions-cases-procedure-and-principles/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ***Author: Ritika Ahari*** ***Edited By: Aneel Meghani*** **INTRODUCTION-** Food is the basic and primary need of the person. Food adulteration is a major problem in society that may exist due to high demand and moderate supply, the high demand for food products is increasing due to inflation in population. In a Country like India, where awareness of technology is not common and agricultural methods are not so advanced and also weather-related issues may be responsible for the increasing problem of adulterated food. Various laws and institutions have been established to prohibit adulterated food. Penal provisions were also introduced by the authorities and institutions to inspect food products and manufactured food items. Food Safety and Standards Authority of India issues licenses to start any food manufacturing or related issues and also inspects the safety standards fixed by the said authority. Food adulteration is the process through which any other thing is used in food products to increase the quantity. Food colours, Chemicals, etc may be used to mix with natural food products to resemble them and to increase the quantity. Mostly the cases of Adulterated milk, rice made of plastic, pebbles mixed with food grains, rice and lentils, and papaya seeds are mixed with spices, and recently various spices companies were found guilty by the court of mixing chemicals in the spices, which causes cancer. Misrepresentation of Fudge people by representing the food products as natural by using taglines like ayurvedic, natural, homemade, and homeopathic, etc. Also, green colour is used in the packaging of food products to give people confidence about its naturality. Companies that claim that their products are full of protein and beneficial for children are found guilty of misleading information by the Court. The main aim behind adulteration is to reduce raw materials and to reduce manufacturing costs. Such adulterated food may cause various health injuries like diabetes, high Blood pressure, cardiovascular disease, Obesity, etc. “Good food should be a right, not a privilege.” The right to food and the right to healthier food is the fundamental right of a person. Good food is the key to a better tomorrow for this purpose Government of India introduced mid- mid-terms day- mil scheme in government schools for the better growth of the children and to reduce the cases of vitamin malnutrition. ***Keywords*** ***(Minimum 5)*:** Food adulteration, Contaminants, economically motivated adulteration (EMA), Artificial additives, Food safety, Adulterants. **Meaning, Definition & Explanation – Food adulteration** – Mixing of colorants, chemicals, etc. to enhance the quantity of the food products. The term’ Food’ refers to all the products that can be consumed orally, may considered food, and any kind of Contamination or addition of any other adulterant referred to as adulterated food products. The act of food adulteration is a legal offense and the person may be found guilty if the food products do not meet the standards set by the government or by any authority authorized by the government. **Adulterants** – the substances that are additionally used in the food products to enhance the quantity of food products but which lower the natural quality of the food products. **Food Substitution** – refers to the direct alteration of food material any part of it or alteration made as a whole. In which any inferior or fake food products are used as natural products. This method is specially used to substitute dairy and meat products. Also, fruit Juices are substituted by cheaper colouring agents, sugar, and flavour and by using preservatives, and resemble fresh fruit Juice.1 **When Food is Adulterated –** According to the **Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954** Food is considered adulterated if it does not fulfil the demand of the purchaser, in which form the purchaser demands the food product, if the purchaser substitutes food product with external addition of any substance which is harmful to a human body, it may do not have an immediate effect but have harmful effect after consumption for a long time, if food product prepared in an unhygienic manner, if any contaminated or expired substance used in packaging or production of food product, if preservatives added in a food product are beyond the limit prescribed by the FSSAI or stored in poisonous and unhealthy conditions. **“Authority to regulate Food standards in India and Penalties related to adulterated food- Food Safety and Security Authority of India (FSSAI)** under the **Food Safety and Security Act, 2006 is** a regulating authority for the manufacturing, packing, storage, distribution, import, and sale to ensure the good quality of food. This Act was enforced to set up a single food quality platform for various food products.”2 **Detect Adulteration with a Rapid Test (DART)** examination can be done to check the adulterated food, which was introduced by FSSAI. A tier Complaint redressal system is also introduced to deal with cases of food adulteration under which the first complaint should be made to the manufacturer, secondly, a complaint made to the Local Health Authority of the District or Commissioner of Food Safety of the State, and finally if complaint not redressed by the prior authorities, then the final complaint shall be done to Consumer Forum. **The Advertising Standards Council of India** is an online portal to file a complaint related to food adulteration. Penal provisions are also available to punish the manufacturer or vendor who manufactures, stores, or sells any kind of Adulterated food products, “he will be liable under **section 16** of the **Prevention of Food Adulteration (PFA)** **Act, 1954** and will also be punished with imprisonment of 6 months and with a fine of rupees 1000 under **section 272 of IPC** for selling of adulterated food or drink which are hazardous for health consumption. The punishment could also extend depending on the grievousness of the act done by the manufacturer or vendor.”3 **Causes / Effect on Health –** Adulterated food may have a normal to severe impact on a person’s health, it may irritate the stomach, symptom and food poisoning like vomiting, burns, etc. Fatty food substances may cause Obesity, weakness, high blood pressure and also cardiovascular diseases, Gastrointestinal disturbances, Liver disorders, Toxicity in the body, etc. For example – In Turmeric Powder, various Pesticide residues, sawdust, chalk dust, industrial dyes, metal yellow dye arsenic, lead metal, etc. used in manufacturing and in packaging which may cause Cancer and Stomach disorders. **Types / Kinds of Food Adulteration & Causes –** 1. **Intentional Adulteration: –** In this type, a vendor may mix other substances with foodstuff to the actual weight of the foodstuff and gain profits. For instance, Papaya seeds are mixed with es, which look like black pepper 2. **Incidental Adulteration: –** In incidental Adulteration, poisonous substances or other substances are mixed with the foodstuff negligently without packing or suffering. Various pesticides are used in room products and are stored in huge amounts, negligently pesticides may be mixed with the food products which are not properly packed. 3. **Metallic Adulteration –** Metallic substances may be mixed with foodstuff, either it can be intentionally or incidentally. 4. **Packaging Hazardous –** Poisonous substances that may come into contact with food products, at the time of packaging and preserving. The main cause behind food adulteration is Profit Maximization, Seller may will to get more profit through adulteration and substitution in food products. Water is mixed with the milk to increase the quantity of milk and to gain more profit is the best example of food Maximisation. Sometimes production of foodstuffs like crops etc. may affected due to weather conditions or any other natural calamities, which may lead to the Shortage and Demand-Supply Gap which is also a reason behind food adulteration to fulfil the demands of people. In the present time advancement of technology is also a reason that uplifts the cases of food adulteration. By using technology, a person cannot identify adulterated food. The globalization of the food industry is also a major cause, through which the origin of food products difficult to identify. **Legal Provisions / Procedure – The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954,** describes the provisions and Penalties related to adulterated food. This act also authorizes the Central Government to form the **Central Committee for Food Standards** and to construct central food laboratories for analysing and testing all kinds of articles, to organize various training programs to spread awareness towards the consumers, and to keep check and monitoring the food products which are imported in India. The central Government can also appoint a **food inspector** to collect samples and to monitor the adulterated food products he is also authorized to stop the adulterated food products from circulating in the market. Adulteration of food products is a subject of the Concurrent list. In 2006, The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 was replaced by the **Food Safety and Standard Act, 2006,** it empowers the Central Government to make rules under this Act for licensing, registration of Food businesses, packaging and labelling, laboratory and sampling of Adulterated food products, and standards for the food additives addicted in production. “*Section 18 of the FSSA provides for the general principles which are to be followed by the various authorities while implementing the provisions of the Act such as endeavour to achieve an appropriate level of protection of human life and health and the protection of consumers’ interests \[4\], carrying out risk management, etc.* *Further, there are general provisions related to food products contained in Chapter IV of the Act. These include the regulation of the use of additives or processing aids in the food or the presence of contaminants, insecticides or pesticide residues, veterinary drugs residues, etc. in the food products. There are special provisions dealing with packaging and labelling of foods. Moreover, the Act also regulates the food products which can be imported. Unfair trade practices and misleading advertisements are prohibited under the Act.”* **Guidelines / Rules / Regulations –** According to Food Safety and Standard (Packaging and Labelling), Regulations, 2011, the general requirement of pre-packaged food is every information related to the product must published on the wrapper of the product such as ingredients, nutritional value, manufacturing date and expiry date etc. **Case Laws –** In the case of **Godawat Pan Masala Products I.P. Ltd. & … vs Union Of India & Ors on 2 August 2004,** The appellant was engaged in the manufacturing industry of gutka and pan Masala in different states, the State Food (Health) Authority sent a notice to appellant stating that pan masala and gutkha both are banned, the issue raised that whether the notification issued by the state authority is valid because the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act vested the power to declare a substance as injurious to health only with the Central Government and no such power was vested with the State Government. The Court quashed the notification given by the State Food (Health) Authority by stating that only the Central Government has the power to ban such articles by legislation as they are violating of rights given in articles 14 and 19 of the appellant. **Maggie 2 minutes noodles Ban Case –** in 2015 Maggi 2 minutes noodles sold with sweet sour taste-maker. A Food inspector took a sample for inspection, and in his report, he opined that carmoisine and sunset yellow acid coal tar dye instead of caramel as described on the label and were therefore both adulterated as well as misbranded. Also, the number of excess lead samples found in the Maggie also monosodium glutamate (MSG) over permissible limits in Nestle’s Maggi noodles, the Maggie was banned all over India as it’s against the FSSAI rules, after its ban Nestle Maggie noodles seek to the court and ask the court to remove ban as their product is now according to the standards set by the FSSAI rules. **MDH and Everest masale conspiracy –** Recently Hong Kong and Singapore banned Indian spices brands named MDH and Everest, as research conducted by the Countries found ethylene oxide which is a pesticide and not consumable and if consumed may cause Cancer. **Patanjali Ayurved products’ ban: –** 14 ayurvedic products of Patanjali were banned on the instructions of the Supreme Court on the violations of the drug advertisements law. Patanjali’s advertisements violated “the Drugs & Other Magical Remedies Act, 1954 (DOMA), and the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (CPA). Section 89 of the CPA imposes stringent penalties for false or misleading advertisements.”4 On Jul 29, 2024, the Food Safety and Drug Administration (FSDA) team raided and found Four hundred kg of stone powder in a flour manufacturing Company after that action was taken by the FSDA, and all the manufactured flour by the company was recalled from the market.5 **Statistical Analysis – Hyderabad** ranked first in the cases of food adulteration according to data released by the National Crime Records Bureau Telangana stands second which is followed by Andhra Pradesh. About 22% of foods are allegedly contaminated annually, according to estimates. Milk and dairy products are at the top of the most adulterated items. In India, over 80% of milk is reported to be contaminated with several harmful substances with around 8 to 13% contamination in rural areas and about 60 to 68% in cities.6 A 2012 study conducted by the FSSAI across 33 states found that milk in India was adulterated with diluted water, detergent, fat, and even urea. **Ideas / way forward** – To overcome increasing cases of food adulteration the budget,2024 declares setting up 100 NABL labs to keep monitoring on supply of adulterated food products in the market.7 Market survey of Adulterated food products is the best way to keep an eye on such products and to implement our laws strictly, Continuous inspection also helps to reduce such cases to develop fear in the minds of people involved in using adulteration methods. Harsh punishment and fines are also mandatory to set fear in society. Methods of rapid tests to detect adulteration Ares also useful method such as – Lala Lajpat Rai University of Veterinary and Animal Sciences, Hisar (Haryana) developed a kit for rapid spot testing to detect urea in milk, The Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) system has now been introduced to identify, evaluate and control hazards arising from crop harvest until the point of consumption.8 Awareness campaigns and advertisements on TV channels and radio should be set up in rural and urban areas in which basic awareness tips such as – vegetables and fruits should be eaten after washing with clean water, before purchasing packaged food its ingredients, FSSAI labels, along with manufacturing and expiry date should be read. Such steps should be taken to improve the health of people. 1. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS –** In Indian culture “**food is considered as more than a mere substance —it is an expression of culture, heritage, and creativity**” and food is also considered as “Ann Devta” which cannot be insulted or wasted. Food adulteration is an insult to “Ann Devta” and increasing cases of adulteration are causing concern for the health, and farmers as well. In rural areas, people are not so aware of the expiry date and MRP written on it, and in various cases, sellers are selling expired food products and charging prices above the MRP which is harassment and via violation of people’s rights and FSSAI rules as well. Every year **7th April** is celebrated as **World Health Day** on which various campaigns should be done to spread awareness among people. Also to redress the Cases of adulteration people should know **“Strengthening of Food testing system in the Country including of provision of Mobile food testing labs”** so that people can easily file their complaints. **Categories:** Articles, Criminal Law --- ### [Protection of Women from Sexual Harassment: Provisions, Cases and Procedure](https://lawfoyer.in/protection-of-women-from-sexual-harassment-provisions-cases-and-procedure/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author:Bagya Shree L** **Editor: I Sharan** **Introduction:** The workplace serves as a second home for many employers and employees as they spend 9 -10 hr per working day. It’s always the person who provides those jobs to ensure that it is the safest environment for the workers to work without any harassment, misleading behaviour and discomfort. As recognized, sexual harassment is in the workplace. To avoid such situations and to provide a safer environment, the government, which acts as supremacy of law, gave special importance to avoiding those kinds of eve teasing and implemented the POSH Act. This article will be explored entirely with provision, procedure, case laws and other aspects that are governing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace to safeguard employees. ***Keywords*:** 1. Sexual Harassment 2. Women 3. Protection 4. Behaviour **Meaning of Sexual Harassment** Sexual harassment is an unwelcoming gesture or behaviour through means of physical contact, a demand for sexual favours, making sexually coloured remarks, showing pornography, any other verbal, non-verbal contact in sexual nature as per section 2(n) of the POSH Act. The creation of a hostile environment is also a form of sexual harassment. One significant piece of information is that there is no limit to the age of women when it is under the roof of sexual harassment. **Workplace** The place in which employees perform their work-related tasks for their employer, the employee may get a salary or may not get the salary. Under section 2(o) of the POSH Act – The work place includes any department, organization, unorganized sector, not less than 10 members as workers, any private sector, any public sector, self-employed, a dwelling house, supply, distribution, service, journey and place visited for the purpose of the course of employment, any sports institution, enterprises, complex, game venue, hospital, undertaking, enterprises, owned, controlled. **Evolution of Sexual Harassment** In India during the initial phase, there was no separate statutory remedy that directly addressed sexual harassment. We had only section 354 and 509 under the Indian Penal Code, 1890 but the application of such provision was limited in nature. This was found in the case of **Rupan Deol Balaji vs. K.P.S. Gill (1995**). Where an IAS officer had been sexually harassed by the superior officer and the scope of such prosecution was limited as we don’t have any separate statutory or provision for sexual harassment in the workplace. In the 1992 **Bhanwari Devi case**, a Dalit social worker employed in the government sector was gang raped in Rajasthan, which highlights the dimensions of sexual harassment, which also acts as one of the milestones for the formation of the POSH Act. Not only case laws, International Conventions are also one of the reasons for The POSH Act, namely the **Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW**) which has a preamble to take on the aspect of equality of women in the workplace and gender-specific violence. India was one of the members of this convention and adopted them in the POSH Act. **International Labour Convention on Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention**. India was one of the members of the convention, inspired by the purpose and adopted the prohibition and prevention of gender-based discrimination in the workplace. All these case laws and conventions initiated to have a POSH Act through Vishaka guidelines in the case of **Vishaka vs. the State of Rajasthan** gave directions to the Union of India to frame a law to combat the prevention of sexual harassment in the workplace. These guidelines energized and came up with the POSH at workplace Act 2013. This Act consists of eight chapters with 30 sections dealing with Complaints, constitution of the Internal Complaints Committee, the constitution of the Local Complaint Committee, Inquiry into complaints, Duties of Employers, Duties and Powers of District Officers and Miscellaneous. **Comparison with other Countries** Many countries have adopted prevention of sexual harassment, which has similarities with The POSH Act and some differ from The POSH Act as they generally focus on sexual harassment without any gender specification and workplace. **Australia** is one of the countries. This follows the prevention of sexual harassment in the workplace, through the legislation called **The Sex Discrimination Act 1984**. The Sex Discrimination Act has a similarity with The Indian POSH Act, like having a Human Rights commission to handle complaints and inquiries. On the other hand, the POSH Act has an Internal complaint’s committee to handle complains and inquiries. They do have distinguished in the field of remedy and damage. **The United States of America** has adopted **The Civil Rights Act of 1964** under Title VII which prohibits workplace harassment based on race, sex, colour, religion and nationality. It dealt with general harassment and was not so specific about sexual harassment. On the other hand, The POSH Act deals with sexual harassment. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in the USA handles complaints against employers for harassment. The Civil Rights legislation acts in a broader way as compared to The POSH Act as it adds on to race and religion. **The United Kingdom** has adopted the Equity Act 2010, which been adopted to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace with any discrimination, on race, sex, religion, disability, age etc, with a wider range of prevention of harassment. It complies with The POSH Act, like to prevent and address sexual harassment in the work place, to provide a safer environment for the workers and fails to follow the immediate actions to be taken. **Kinds of Legislation as a remedy for Sexual Harassment** Apart from the POSH Act, we do have The Protection of Children from Sexual Offense 2012 POCSO to prevent sexual harassment of children under the age of 18 in any place of any sex. The POSH Act has limited scope for the prevention of Sexual Harassment only with the ambit of workplace to women of any age. In Bharathiya Naaya Sanhitha 2023, chapter 5, this deals with sexual offences from section 63 to79. This has allotted a punishment maximum of up to 7 years of imprisonment for such harassment. **Forms of Sexual Harassment** Sexual harassment is booming nowadays. Many remain uncertain about what sexual harassment is, whether it is sexual harassment and if these kinds of behaviour amount to sexual harassment. To be certain, knowledge of these forms is more significant. Everyone should have awareness of these forms so that they will not be bound liable or be affected themselves. Verbal harassment – Making commentaries/jokes/vulgar terms sexually about the body parts of the individuals. It may be based upon the size of such an organ or any other thing too, that affect the dignity of such individuals. Non-verbal harassment – Leering, making sexual gestures, or displaying sexually explicit images to the individuals. Physical harassment – Physical touch in unwanted places of the body parts that is groping in nature or simply assault. Cyber harassment – sharing sexual content images or messages through electronic means. Quid pro quo harassment – Demanding sexual favours in compensation for some activity / work /promotion/etc usually found in the work place. Hostile work harassment – creating an environment that is intimidating, hostile or offensive due to unwelcoming sexual conduct. **Essential** As per the POSH ACT the formation Internal Committee (IC) in the workplace, even if it has multiple locations, each location should have an internal complaint community. Those committees should be established by the employer in written order. The composition of the IC should consist of a presiding officer. She should be a senior employee. 2 other members should present one with experience in social work and legal knowledge. One external member should be present from the NGO or association focusing on women’s issues. **Tenure of members** – All members have tenure of 3 years. **Compensation**– The external members can get an allowance as prescribed. **Removal of members** – members can be removed if they breach confidentiality, are convicted, found guilty, misuse of their position. If a vacancy is available it should be filled with the same criteria. **Legal Provisions for local committees and related Procedures** - Notification to the District Officer about the complaints arose and to handle the matter under this act. - Constitution and Jurisdiction of LC – The District officer must set up a local committee in every district to handle the complaints under this act with the workplace with less than 10 workers. Nodal officers are appointed in different locals to get the complaints and forward it to the LC within 7 days of receiving complaints. One Chairperson with knowledge of women’s issues and social work, a Local Governance Member, 2 members, one from an NGO or similar association with legal knowledge and the other one from a lower community, and one Ex Officio Member of social welfare or from a women’s or child development background. **Removal –** members can be removed in case of breach of confidentiality, convictions, disciplinary issues or misuse of position. **Compensation** – Same as IC. **Guidelines** **Filing a Complaint –** Written Complaint by an aggrieved woman can be filed with the Internal Committee or Local Committee within 3 months of the incident. If unable to write a complaint, a committee should assist the women in making the complaint. If she is unable to file the complaint, her legal heir or guardian will file the complaint. **Conciliation –** If women request before an inquiry, IC or LC can facilitate settlement between the parties. That settlement should be recorded, and that information should be informed to the District Officer. Copies of the settlement should be delivered to both parties as a record of the settlement. **Inquiry process –** The IC or LC should move to the investigation of the complaint if there is no settlement. If needed, they can transfer such a complaint to the police if necessary. **Power and Duration of Inquiry –** The LC and IC have power as similar to The Civil Court, including Summoning withness. The inquiry must be completed within 90 days. **Traditions-based Law** Prior to the POSH Act 2013, there were no separate statues addressing sexual harassment in the work place. Instead, we have the Indian Penal Code 1860, provisions for punishment of rape, section 354 outraging the modesty of a woman and section 509 the modesty of a woman. Later in 2012, POCSO was introduced with a narrow scope for children at 18 years of age. **Amendments** Amendment took place in 2016 In sections 6,7and 21 1. The term Local Complaints Committee was substituted as Local Committee. 2. The term Internal Complaints Committee was substituted as Internal Committee. In 2024, a bill was introduced in parliament. 1. Purpose of extension of complaint filing from 3 months to 1 year from the date of incident. 2. The Internal Committee had power to extend only 3 months to receiving complaints. The bill was passed for the extension of time from 3 months to unlimited time. - To omit section 10, the conciliation provision. **Statistical Analysis** The statistical analysis indicates that there are many complaints compared to each previous year as it highlights that many are getting awareness of this legislation and remedies coming up to solve their issues with courage. It is found that many no of cases are filed by larger companies, which is nearly 90 to 98%. In middle companies, 2 to 3% of complaints were registered. No complaints are recorded from the small-scale companies. The intensive spike of complaints is not a reflection of good society. Hence, we still need the law to improve and be stricter than now. **Conclusion& Comments** The POSH Act, 2013 represents a significant step forward in safeguarding women from harassment, especially in the workplace. The POSH Act provides a safer and more equitable workspace. The increase in the number of complaints indicates that awareness and enforcement still have a long way to go. The POSH Act has laid a strong foundation, continuous efforts are needed to strengthen its implementation and adapt to new challenges. The proposed amendments, particularly extending the time for filing complaints and potentially eliminating the conciliation process, reflect an evolving understanding of the needs of victims and the complexities of addressing sexual harassment. It is essential for legal professionals and lawmakers alike to remain committed to refining and enforcing these protections, ensuring that they effectively serve the people they are designed to protect. **REFERENCES** **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** 1. Times of India 2. Wire on. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. 1. Wikipedia 2. Indian Kanoon 3. Nyaya organization blog. **Cases Referred** 1. 1. Vishaka vs. State of Rajasthan. 2. Rupan Deol Balaji vs. K.P.S. Gill (1995). 3. Bhanwari Devi case. **Statutes Referred** 1. 1. Protection of Women from Sexual Harassment Act, 2013 (POSH) 2. Protection of Children from Sexual Offence Act, 2012 (POCSO) 3. Bharathiya Naaya Sanhitha, 2013 **Categories:** Articles, Criminal Law --- ### [Legal Remedies Against Cyber Harassment and Online Hate Speech in India](https://lawfoyer.in/legal-remedies-against-cyber-harassment-and-online-hate-speech-in-india/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author:Apurva Sanjay Shah** **Editor: I Sharan** **Introduction:** The internet has become integral to our lives in this IT era. During the past few years, widespread internet and technology use has influenced how people communicate. In the recent few years, there has been a significant evolution in the internet and technology involved in our day-to-day communication. Instead of more personal methods of interaction face-to-face calls, emails and social media made people more connected regardless of the distance. Cyber harassment, also known as online harassment, is a very big umbrella covering the different forms of abuse online: stalking, bullying, doxxing, and many more. Online hate speech on the other hand involves the use of offensive language on online platforms against specific individuals or groups based on attributes like religion, gender, race, etc. Recognizing how serious these issues are, my study aims to create an analysis of legal provisions and procedures existing to combat such, and the noteworthy cases in this area. This is an important study to take up, considering the cyber harassment and online hate speech that has turned into a serious violation of people’s dignity security, and the health of an online community. *Keywords*:** 1. cyber harassment 2. online hate speech 3. ITA 2000 4. ITA Amendments 2008 5. Section 66A **Meaning, Definition and Explanation:** ***Cyber harassment:*** According to the United Nations, “Cyber harassment is a threat via the use of digital technologies. It can take place on social media, messaging platforms, and cell phones. It is repeated behaviour, aimed at threatening, scaring, shaming, and silencing those who are targeted.[\[1\]](#_ftn1)” It is a problem that affects various age groups. Moreover, it is a common reason linked to negative social effects such as depression and suicide. It generally refers to any action performed through means of digital media by individuals or groups that communicate violent, threatening, or aggressive messages with a malicious intention of causing harm or discomfort to others. ***Online hate speech:*** According to The Council of Europe, “hate speech is understood as all types of expression that incite, promote, spread, or justify violence, hatred, or discrimination against a person or group of persons, or that denigrates them, because of their real or attributed personal characteristics or statuses such as race, colour, language, religion, nationality, national or ethnic origin, age, disability, sex, gender identity, and sexual orientation.”[\[2\]](#_ftn2) There is no such proper definition for online hate speech. The intention behind online hate speech is to provoke violence, hatred, or prejudice against targeted individuals. Online hate speech is abusive since it targets the dignity of an individual but it also concerns social issues as it promotes discrimination in society. **Types of cyber harassmen**t: Cyber harassment is a wide term that includes various forms of online abuse. These forms can be classified based on the severity of crimes. They are as follows: 1. Cyberbullying: Cyberbullying is intentional and repetitive. it can be defined as an act of sharing or posting offensive, negative content concerning other individuals. posting private information which can cause humiliation to others also comes under the scope of cyberbullying 2. Cyberstalking: Cyberstalking is an act of using communication technologies like email direct messaging and others to stalk, threaten, manipulate, or control minors habitually. It can include examples like tracking someone’s online activity or location, etc 3. Online impersonation: It is the act of using another person’s information such as name, mobile number, or social media ID to commit fraudulent activities like phishing, data breaches, financial scams, etc. The general intention of such acts is to extract money by trapping the victims by illegal means. 4. Doxing: Doxing is the process of searching for and posting sensitive information, statements, etc to exploit, harass, or cause humiliation to another person. It can be targeted to a specific individual or organization. It is usually done by posting personal information like email, address, and phone number without consent. 5. Revenge Porn: Revenge pornography also known as revenge porn involves the act of publishing sexually explicit images or videos to insult or bring humiliation to individuals. Such material can be used to blackmail the victims into relationships, to threaten them, or to extract money from them. **Historical Background:** The journey of the Internet in India began in 1990 when public Internet access was established. During those days, there were no legal frameworks addressing issues like cyber harassment or hate speech. Thus at that time till the year 2000, the Information Technology ACT was aimed mostly at e-commerce, digital signatories, and cybercrimes like hacking and trespassing. - ***The original IT Act of 2000***: With cyberspace being so vibrant with multifaceted diverse types of cybercrimes, the IT Act had provisions that could be applied rarely. However, its first try was a large-scale bill designed to fight different types of obscene material posted on the World Wide Web. - ***Amendments to ITA 2008***: In 2008, the Indian government recognized how constantly changing are cyber threats and amended the IT Act which included several additional sections like the following: - Section 66A: This was a big step in combating online harassment and hate speech. It recited measures for the prosecution of sending any information that is grossly offensive or of a menacing character. - Section 66E: This section explained the invasion of privacy and more specifically, it outlined capturing, publishing, or transmitting the image of private areas of individuals without their consent. - Section 67: It was expanded to incorporate the penalty for the publication or transmission of obscene material in an electronic form. This hence indirectly covered some of the variables of online harassment. Challenges and Criticism While these amendments were needed, Section 66A remained highly controversial. After a landmark judgment named Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, this section was stricken down declaring it unconstitutional. However, other sections of the IT Act and the Indian Penal Code (IPC) continued to provide remedies. - ***Recent Initiatives and Policy Changes*** Recently, the government and courts have further taken the following steps to combat the menace of cyberstalking/harassment and online hate speech: CCPWC—Cyber Crime Prevention against Women and Children: It is a scheme created to improve the efficiency of policing agencies in the fight against cybercrimes against women and children. National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal: This government online portal is used to report cybercrimes especially those in the area of harassment and hate speech online. **Legal Provisions:** **Information Technology Act, 2000 also known as IT Act** 1. ***Section 66A:*** Before this, “it was about the case of sending obscene messages, etc. through any aids for communication, etc. It defined the punishment for any person who transmitted information, that was obscene, menacing, and caused annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred, or ill will.” But the year 2015 struck Section 66A and held it unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of India in its landmark judgment of Shreya Singhal v Union Of India, on the ground that the words used in Section 66A were unconstitutional and very vague it became too broad a provision which at the most, could only violate the right of free speech and expression***.*** 2. ***Section 67: “***This section relates to the distribution or communication of obscene matter employing any electronic process. It gaols for a term not exceeding three years a fine for the first offence and a severe penalty for the second offense.” 3. ***Section 67A and 67B*:** - ***Section 67A***: “This section relates to the distribution or broadcast of material of this nature, as extended to a higher level of penalty.” - ***Section 67B***: “This section concerns child pornography and restricts it as a creation subject, a transmission method, and a browsing path.” 4. ***Section 69A***: “It provides for the power to issue directions for blocking public access to any information, through any computer resource, and if this access is considered to be harmful to the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security, defence, friendly relations with foreign states, and public order. It concerns also the prevention of incitement for the commission of any cognizable offence.” **Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita,2023(BNS)** - ***Section 78:*** This section defines and punishes stalking, and it includes cyberstalking, thus thereby covering surveillance of the use by a woman of the internet, E-mail, or any other form of electronic communications. It states that “ (1) Any man who follows a woman and contacts, or attempts to contact such woman to foster personal interaction repeatedly despite a clear indication of disinterest by such woman; or monitors the use by a woman of the internet, e-mail or any other form of electronic communication, commits the offence of stalking.” The punishment is imprisonment for up to three years for the first conviction and up to five years for subsequent convictions.” - ***Sections 356:*** This section deals with the question of defamation. According to section 356, “Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes in any manner, any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, to defame that person.” The section states that “this offence shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to 2 years or a fine or both or with community service.” - ***Section 351***: “Criminal intimidation that includes threats to murder someone, or to cause grievous bodily harm, falls under this section and it covers threats made through electronic means.” - ***Section 79***: “This section concerns itself with acts that are meant to outrage the modesty of a woman either by words, gestures, or by any other means using an electronic device. It sanctions simple imprisonment which may take a maximum of three years and may include fines also.” **Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012** The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 widely known as the POCSO Act is a law in practice to prevent offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment, and pornography against children. It also lays down strict penalties for using children for pornographic content through electronic media as well. Procedure for reporting Cyber Crimes:** There are two ways to file cybercrime complaints in India. One can report the crime through an online portal by the government or by approaching the nearest police station. ***Complaint portals:*** 1. **CYBERCRIME PORTAL** – Victims of cybercrime can directly file a complaint on the portal by using the website . They can file a complaint against various types of cybercrimes by choosing options like reporting cybercrime related to women/children or reporting other cybercrimes. There is an option to file a complaint anonymously. 2. **ONLINE CRIME REPORTING PORTAL** – Another way to report cybercrime online is through the website of the Ministry of Home Affairs. You can register a complaint in the section “Services for Citizen” and click on “Report a Cyber Crime.” Here, you can provide information about the offender, the victim, and the incident, along with any supporting evidence, such as screenshots. You have the option to file a complaint anonymously or with your identity. Also, the complaints can be tracked down. ***Cyber cell:*** Every state has cyber cells and certain police stations may have a department dedicated to investigating cybercrimes.in many states one can file a complaint by visiting cyber cells’ websites for instance in Delhi you can file a complaint online with the help of a Cyber cell website. To report cybercrime, you can either file a complaint on the website or visit the police station where you’ll have to file an FIR which will be forwarded to the cyber cell later. **Case Laws:** **Case 1 – Shreya Singhal vs Union of India:** In this case, two women were detained under section 66A of the Information Technology Act of 2000 for making offensive comments on Facebook regarding the appropriateness of closing Mumbai. the incident drew a lot of attention even though charges were dropped by police later. the women then filed a petition, arguing that section 66A violates freedom of expression and therefore is unconstitutional. **Issues raised** 1. Whether Section 66A of the IT Act, 2000, infringes on the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution. 2. Whether the restrictions imposed by Section 66A are reasonable and fall within the scope of Article 19(2) of the Constitution, which allows for certain restrictions on free speech. **Judgment** The Supreme Court took down the much-debated Section 66A of the IT Act in the landmark judgment. The Court declared that the section was arbitrary in its implementation; and was vague and broadly interpreted, unreasonably infringing the freedom of speech under Article 19(2). It was a significant ruling because it protected and advocated the usefulness of free speech in the new age of technology**.** **Case 2- Ritu Kohli’s case** It was the first reported case of cyberstalking in India. a man named Manish Kathuria followed Kohli on the chat website, abused her using obscene language, and then distributed her telephone number to several other people. Later he used her identity to chat on other websites. In a state of shock, when Kohli registered the complaint that Kathuria was arrested under section 409 of the IPC. the IT Act was not invoked in the case, since it had not come into force at the time when the complaint was filed. While there is no record of any subsequent proceeding, this case made Indian legislators wake up to the need for legislation to address cyber-stalking. Even then, it was only in 2008 that Section 66-A was introduced[\[3\]](#_ftn3). **Conclusion and Comments:** With the increasing advancements in technology issues like cyber harassment, and online hate speech are now better known by people in India. Even though a legal framework is there to tackle such issues, it still lacks in some areas, leaving the victims at risk. the Information Technology Act of 200 and some sections of IPC provide a foundation to address these issues. however, the dynamically evolving nature of cybercrimes demands continuous adaption and refinement of these laws. The judiciary has taken the lead in interpreting and expanding the scope of laws in existence to protect individuals from online harm effectively. However, the rise of new platforms and the degree of privacy provided by the internet facilitate the complications in the issue. While the efforts made by government and civil society are worth praising, It can’t be ignored that there is a constant need to increase awareness about technological advancements, involving international cooperation. In addition to legislative and judicial measures, there should be a focus on preventive strategies. Social media platforms should be encouraged to develop and enforce more robust content moderation policies. **REFERENCES:** 1. **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** 2. Stevens, F., Nurse, J. R. C., & Arief, B. (2021). Cyberstalking, cyber harassment, and adult mental health: A systematic review. *Cyberpsychology, Behaviour, and Social Networking* 3. Gammon, A. R., Converse, P. D., Lee, L. M., & Griffith, R. L. (2011). A personality process model of cyber harassment. *International Journal of Management and Decision-Making* 4. Van Laer, T. (2013). The means to justify the end: Combating cyber harassment in social media. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. 5. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. **Cases Referred** 1. Shreya Singhal vs Union of India 7. **Statutes Referred** 1. Indian Penal Code,1860 2. Information Technology Act,2000 3. POCSO Act,2012 [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) United Nations, *Cyber Harassment self-protection tips,*[*https://www.unitad.un.org/.*](https://www.unitad.un.org/), [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) The Council of Europe: Hate speech, (2014), [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) legal Service India. [https://www.legalserviceindia.com/](https://www.legalserviceindia.com/%20) **Categories:** Articles, IT Law & Cyber Law --- ### [Appeals Under Criminal Law from Conviction/Acquittal](https://lawfoyer.in/appeals-under-criminal-law-from-conviction-acquittal/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Diksha Patole** **Edited by: A I Sugandesh** ****INTRODUCTION:**** **“Is an appeal the insignia of democratic assets integrally entwined with the machinery provided for dispensation of justice.”** For a casual observer, the criminal proceeding may invariably conclude as soon as the verdict is entered, or punishment is imposed. In the conduct of criminal proceedings, certain steps are essential, from escorting the accused to the court to the final judgement. But there are times when after the defendant has been convicted or acquitted, it is not yet the last stage of the proceeding. An accused person is under the law allowed to request for an appeal or review of a conviction that was made against him or her. In criminal cases, the main role of an appeal is to make sure that justice is done to the appellant. The right to appeal is increasingly omnipresent. In most jurisdictions, the right to appeal against conviction and sentence is a right which may be constitutional or statutory. However, this has not always been the circumstances. The right to appeal is a recent addition to the process of common law criminal judgments. Everyone knows that people are not perfect, and they can make mistakes, and their decisions can be wrong. As such to rectify the errors dominating their judgement the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has made available the provisions of “appeals” and “revision” where the higher courts of law have the jurisdiction to reconsider the erroneous decision made by the courts subordinate. Criminal justice is the disposition that aims at providing justice by punishing the offender and at the same time protecting society from such individuals. As is often said, it is desirable to release ten guilty men rather than have an innocent man/man suffer a warranted conviction. ****KEYWORDS:**** *appeal, acquittal, criminal procedure code, supreme court, high court, Indian penal code, conviction* ****MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION:**** In criminal law, an “****appeal****” is a challenge to a previous legal determination. An appeal is directed towards a legal power higher than the power making the challenged determination. Definitions given by renowned legal scholars and judges: 1. **According to Lord Denning**** “An appeal is a process by which a higher court reviews the decision of a lower court. It is a continuation of the original proceeding, with the appellate court examining the correctness of the lower court’s judgement” 2. **According to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes “****An appeal is the right of a litigant to seek a review of a judgement, to have it reconsidered by a higher tribunal, ensuring that justice is not compromised by errors or misjudgement.” The term “****conviction”**** means a finding of guilt (including a plea of nolo contendere), an imposition of sentence, or both, by a judicial body charged with the responsibility. 1. **According to Justice Benjamin Cardozo**** “Conviction is the legal acknowledgement of guilt, established by a verdict of the jury or a decision of a judge, following a trial where the evidence presented meets the standard of proof required by law.” 2. **According to Sir Fitz James Stephen**** “A conviction is the result of a trial where the accused is found guilty of the charges against them, establishing their culpability beyond a reasonable doubt.” An “****acquittal****” is a resolution of some, or all of the factual elements of the offence charged. A not guilty finding is an adjudication that proof at a prior proceeding was insufficient to overcome all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. 1. **According to Justice Louis Brandeis**** “An acquittal is a declaration of innocence, finding by the court that the evidence is insufficient to convict the accused, ensuring that no one is punished without due proof of guilt.” 2. **According to Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer**** “Acquittal means the absolution of the accused from the criminal charge, reflecting the principle that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffers.” An *“A****ppeal against conviction****”* is a key legal remedy, that gives a convicted individual a chance to review or re-examine their judgement by a higher court, to ensure accuracy and fairness. *“****Appeal against acquittal”***** ensures that the errors in the law or procedure do not acquit an individual guilty of a crime. ****HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF APPEAL:**** Appeals of criminal law about conviction and acquittal have been discussed with historical and evolutionary views to show that there have always been attempts to make a legal system or the judicial process fair. The early civilisations such as the Greek and Roman legal epochs did have a simple or fundamental form of appeal. In Rome, there was **provocatio** which informed the citizens to appeal against the decision of a magistrate to an upper one. The Ancient Indian legal system had texts such as **Manusmriti** and **Arthshastra**, which also laid down the procedures of litigation and appeals. It is noted that during the medieval age, the administering of justice in many parts of India was under Islamic law with **Qazis** (judges) in charge of such legal systems. There were arguments referred to the higher powers, such as the Sultan or the Emperor, in the Mughal Empire the Emperor was held the ultimate appellate authority. The Britishers arrived in India in the form of the English East India Company, for their self-governance they had their judiciary to provide justice to the British people and later they started controlling the natives that is the Indians. In 1773, the Regulating Act was passed and created the Supreme Court of Judicature in Calcutta at Fort William, with appellate jurisdiction over the Calcutta, Madras and Bombay presidencies. The Charter Act of 1883 and other subsequent acts reorganised the judicial system and established a judicial hierarchy with defined appellate jurisdiction. High Courts were set up in Calcutta, Bombay and Madras by the Indian High Courts Act of 1861 and they were given appellate civil and criminal jurisdiction. In India, the people of Britain codified the laws with the reference of English common law. Criminal law and its procedures were put into formalities under the Indian Penal Code 1860 as well as the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) 1861. It was in the Code of Criminal Procedure that organised appeals of the criminal cases were provided with a structure. In the period of Post-independence India, the Constitution of India was adopted in 1950 and a common codified legal system came into stream in one stroke with the Supreme Court at its apex. It’s provided under Article 136 of the constitution of India that the Apex Court can hear appeals contained in any judgment, decree or order passed by any court within the territory of India. The CrPC 1973, built upon and improved the procedural laws that governed criminal trials and appeals. Appeals in criminal cases are covered under sections 374 to 394 of CrPC. It mentions the provision for appeal against conviction and acquittal. It also defines the powers of the appellate court and the rights of the appellant. The position of law regarding re-recognition of the evidence at the appellate level was explained in cases such as ****K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1788**** and ****Narendra Singh v. State of MP (2004 10 SCC 699).**** Changes were brought into the CrPC to clarify the procedures, shorten the time, deal with the new developments and enhance the appellate system. Technological advancements such as e-filing systems together with virtual hearings enhance the appellate process. ****PRINCIPLES OF APPEAL:**** The fundamental principles of appeal under CrPC are as follows: 1. **An appeal is a creature of statute**** The right to appeal is recognized and described in the legislative instruments including, but not limited to, the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) in India. This, in turn, means that the right of appeal is accrued not enshrined in the Constitution as a constitutional right but a right given and regulated by certain laws or statutes. It is only by such statutory provisions that there is a right to appeal. 2. **No inherent right to file an appeal**** It means that an individual does not have the right to appeal a legal decision as an inherent right. This is because, where the law or statute does not allow for an appeal in a given case then the appellants have no legal grounds that will allow them to appeal to the higher court. All the judgements are not appealable, there may be some which are final and are not capable of being appealed. 3. **No appeal only against conviction**** Appeal as a right is in no way limited to the situations where a person has been convicted and hence is a criminal. Applications can also be made on procedural irregularities where there was a trial conducted, inter alia unreasonable denial of right to a fair trial, admission or exclusion of evidence as well as improper or wrongful application of the principles of law. Acquittals and sentencing as well also can include appeals. 4. **No appeal in petty cases**** To avoid overloading higher instances, and to make sure that less essential problems are not brought to court, statutory provisions restrict the right to appeal in minor cases. Petty cases are usually those crimes that are less severe with corresponding meagre punishments. These cases include minor fines or short-term imprisonment. 5. **Generally, there is no appeal on conviction on a plea of guilt**** If an accused person pleads guilty to a charge, this is made in total surrender, and he or she cannot appeal the conviction. The rationale behind this principle is based on the fact that any appeal serves to reconsider the findings and processes of the trial. However, a plea of guilt is the outright acknowledging responsibility of the alleged offender for the crime they are accused of and not a conviction of the court after a trial. ****PROVISIONS FOR APPEAL UNDER CRIMINAL LAW:**** In India, the Regulation of appeals in criminal cases is provided by the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973. Under the CrPC the sections that deal with appeals from convictions and acquittals are: ****Appeals from Convictions**** - **Section 374 – Appeals from Convictions**** According to this section, a trial on the offence is done before a High Court sitting in its extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction and the accused is convicted; then the accused has a right to appeal to the Supreme Court. Likewise, a person who has been charged by a Session Judge, an Additional Session Judge or any Court which has sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for a term exceeding seven years, has the right to appeal to the High Court. In cases tried by a Magistrate of the first or second class and culminate into a conviction, the convicted person can appeal to the Court of Session except if the penalty involves imprisonment of three months or less or a fine exceeding one hundred rupees. - **Section 375 – No appeal in certain cases when the accused pleads guilty**** No appeal shall lie where a person has been convicted of the offence on a plea of guilty; the legally sufficient plea of guilty apart from the extent or legality of the sentence given by the court. - **Section 376 – No appeal in petty cases**** No appeal shall be allowed where a court has only fined, and the amount does not exceed two hundred rupees or has sentenced one to imprisonment not exceeding six months, and the trial was conducted by a Magistrate of the first class. ****Appeals from Acquittals**** - **Section 378 – Appeal in case of Acquittal**** According to this section, if the Magistrate enters an acquittal in any case which has been forwarded to the Court of Session along with the police report under section 173, the District Magistrate may order the Public Prosecutor to file an appeal to the Court of Session. Secondly, the State Government has the power to open a prosecution to require the Public Prosecutor to appeal to the High Court against an order of acquittal made originally or in appeal by a court other than that of the High Court. If an order of acquittal is passed in a case related to a complaint, then the complainant has the right to appeal but that too under special leave to appeal in the High Court. Failing to lodge this appeal within six months from the date of the acquittal order, the same will be deemed as having been lodged. ****General Provisions for Appeals**** - **Section 382 – Petition of Appeal**** Every appeal shall be made in the form of a written petition filed by the appellant or the appellant’s legal practitioner, and every such petition shall be assumable by a copy of the judgement or order that is challenged. - **Section 383 – Procedure when Appellant in Jail**** Where the appellant is in prison, he shall file the petition of appeal and the copy of the judgement or order that has been appealed against with the officer commanding the prison and the latter shall transmit the same to the proper appellate court. - **Section 384 – Summary Dismissal of Appeal**** An appeal summary may be dismissed by the appellate court upon a finding that there is no sufficient reason to intervene. However, the provisions of Section 382 any appeal that may be presented shall not be struck out unless the appellant or the pleader for the appellant has been called upon to show cause why it should not be struck out. - **Section 386 – Powers of the Appellate Court**** After hearing an appeal in its jurisdiction, the appellate court may reverse the judgement or order, confirm the judgement, vary the judgement or order, order a new trial or discharge a convict. It is capable of re-designing the due appreciation of the evidence and arriving at its conclusions. - **Section 389 – Suspension of Sentence Pending the Appeal; Release of Appellant on Bail**** The appellate court may stay the operation of the sentence or the order which has been appealed against and may discharge the appellant on bail or their bond. ****LANDMARK CASES AND JUDGEMENT:**** ****Case 1 – K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra (1961)**** In this case, K. M. Nanavati a naval officer came to know about his wife’s affair with Prem Ahuja. It is stated that on April 27, 1959, Nanavati went to the apartment of the deceased, Prem, armed with a revolver. The Nanavati accused Prem during an altercation and then shot him and he died from the injuries. There was the matter of trial where Nanavati was first tried in the Bombay High Court and the jury acquitted him much to the lobby’s chagrin probably because his action was committed under provocation. The conviction was overturned by the State for churning incomplete evidence that the jury used in arriving at the acquittal. ****Issues Raised**** - Whether the act was predetermined murder or a crime of passion in sudden provocation - The applicability of the jury’s verdict and the role of the judge. ****Judgement**** The jury acquitted Nanavati and the Supreme Court of India also set aside the above said verdict and convicted Nanavati for culpable homicide. The court said that in this case, although the act was committed in the heat of passion and after provocation, such a case cannot be considered an excusable act, allowable by law due to sudden provocation. The defence was successful in reducing the charge to a murder that was committed under provocation, but Nanavati was still sentenced to life imprisonment, although the judge made it clear that provocation rendered the crime less heinous but did not excuse it. ****Case 2 – Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab (1996)**** Gian Kaur and her husband are charged with abetting the suicide of their daughter-in-law who was a victim of cruelty and harassment. The trial court convicted them under Section 306 of the IPC because they compelled her to take the fatal decision. In this case, the Department of Defence stirred up the allegations claiming that Section 306 was an unconstitutional regime of the underlined right of the law of life and personal liberty. ****Issues Raised**** - Whether section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 based on the abetment of suicide can be held to contravene the rights to life under Article 21 of the Indian constitution. ****Judgement**** The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India upheld the conviction and the legal provisions of section 306 IPC stating that the constitutional provision right to life as envisaged under article 21 of the Constitution of India does not include the right to die. As the Court noted the prohibition envisaged by Section 306 of abetting suicide is a step that is taken to prevent suicide and preserve life. This argument proves the significance of the statute as a way of handling and penalizing actions that lead to suicide. ****Case 3 – State of Maharashtra v. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar (1991)**** Madhukar Narayan Mardikar, a law enforcement officer faced allegations of trying to assault a woman. Yet the initial court ruled in his favor stating that the lack of witnesses and doubts, about the credibility of the victim’s testimony made it hard to prove guilt. The prosecution later appealed this verdict arguing that a victim’s account supported by testimonies should be adequate grounds, for legal intervention. ****Issues Raised**** - Whether the trial court’s acquittal was justified in the face of compelling evidence and the victim’s testimony. ****Judgement**** The Supreme Court reversed the not verdict stating that the victim’s character should not be used to discredit her testimony. Mardikar was found guilty by the Court highlighting that being an accused does not exempt someone, from facing consequences. ****CONCLUSION:**** The appeal is an important safeguard within the system of criminal justice in India and its objective was not only to serve justice but also it must seem to be done. It serves as an essential function of a review authority and avoids miscarriage obviously by ouster, error in procedure or acting per-in party on the part of the lower judiciary. It is essential in maintaining the rule of law and ensuring that all citizens are treated equally, as well as principles such as fairness, accountability and transparency within the judiciary. ****ENDNOTES:**** - **Books****/** **Commentaries / Journals**** - Dalton, Harlon Leigh. “Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously.” **The Yale Law Journal**, vol. 95, no. 1, Nov. 1985, p. 62 - Orfield, Lester B. “The Right of Appeal in Criminal Cases.” **Michigan Law Review**, vol. 34, no. 7, 1936. - Marshall, Peter D. “A Comparative Analysis of the Right to Appeal.” **Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law**, vol. 22, no. 1, 2011. - **Online Articles / Sources Referred**** - - - [https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/uscode.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def\_id=41-USC-2143927138-973787019&term\_occur=999&term\_src=title:41:subtitle:IV:chapter:81:section:8102](https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/uscode.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def_id=41-USC-2143927138-973787019&term_occur=999&term_src=title:41:subtitle:IV:chapter:81:section:8102) - - - - - **Categories:** Articles, Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Law --- ### [Mob lynching: Provisions Under BNS](https://lawfoyer.in/mob-lynching-provisions-under-bns/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Gupta Aryan Rajesh** **Editor: I Sharan** **Introduction** Diamond is the most expensive element in the world but the life of a person is more precious and invaluable in the world. Mob means group of people and lynching word is derived from the name of Charles Lynch who punished the offender without the due trial. In an era where dozens of laws and Acts apply to different crimes in almost every country this crime rate hasn’t decreased instead, it has increased daily. Mob Lynching is a punishable offence in some countries whereas in some countries it is not. In layman’s language, mob lynching means the act of a group of people who brutally kill the suspected person who is deemed to be cow vigilantism and caste & religion-based vengeance. Mostly this type of lynching takes place due to a lack of literacy and education of social knowledge, it mostly occurs in rural areas where the beliefs of the people are preferable more than their laws. They took laws into their hands not only to punish but to torture the victim and then kill it. Well, the rights of the victim were also infringed under Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution of India and the people who do lynching are also liable for their acts against the Constitution of India. The term Mob Lynching was not included in any separate section in the Indian Penal Code nor it was defined separately which acts are included in mob lynching in the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS)- replaced the Indian Penal Code on 1st July 2024. Union Home Minister Amit Shah said in the parliament at the time of Introducing the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) Bill, 2023: “*There has been a lot of talk about mob lynching. We have carefully ensured that the punishment for mob lynching is seven years, imprisonment for life, or even death. All three provisions are there in cases of mob lynching.*”[\[1\]](#_ftn1)There have been so many cases in the last decade where the victims were brutally killed by the mob on the presumption or suspicion as well as on misunderstanding. ***Keyword*:** mob lynching, section 103(2), Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, extra-judicial punishment, hate crime, section 302 **Meaning, Definition & Explanation** Mob Lynching is a grievous act done by a group of people i.e. mob. They kill the victims by taking the law into their hands believing that they performed something wrong. The violence is against the human body on the belief or sometimes suspicion of doing any wrongful act. Earlier the punishment for the mob lynching for the killing of the victim was given under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code while after the implication of the new Act i.e. Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 on the 1st day of July 2024 the punishment for the murder by the mob was given under the separate section 103(2) of the BNS, “*when a group of five or more person acting in concert murders on the ground of race, caste or community, sex, place of birth, language, personal belief or any other ground, each member of such a group shall be punished with death or with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years, and shall also be liable to fine*”[\[2\]](#_ftn2). The interpretation of section 103(2) of BNS,2023 is; When the group of five or more people murders anybody on the basis or grounds of race, caste or community, sex, place of birth, language, personal belief or any other ground will be punished with death or with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. Section 103(2) of BNS will only be applicable if the victim died by five or more persons. In another case, if the group of people is fighting against the other group of people then the consequences of murder arising from that fighting will not considered as mob lynching. [Sub-clause 4 of Section 117 (*voluntarily causing grievous hurt*)](https://prsindia.org/files/bills_acts/bills_parliament/2023/Bharatiya_Nyay_(Second)_Sanhita_2023.pdf) provides, “*when grievous hurt of a person is caused by a group of five or more persons on the ground of his, race, caste, sex, place of birth, language, personal belief or any other ground, each member of such group shall be guilty of the offence of causing grievous hurt, and shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine*”.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) If the group of five or more persons caused the grievous hurt then Section 117(4) of BNS comes into play. It is pertinent to note that the punishment for murder is death or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine as per section 103(1) of BNS. In comparison, the punishment of murder by the mob is given u/s 103(2) which is the same. The question arises that if the murder is done by the mob then all the people involved in it will be punished with death or imprisonment of life and a fine. It is the question of law and it depends on the charge sheet. It is pertinent to note that in a country like India, some people also come in the charge sheet of police who were at the time of lynching present there, and due to the misinformation the innocent also become the prey of the murder in the charge sheet. **Mob Lynching is a distinct offence** Earlier mob lynching was not recognized as a distinct offence in Indian Penal Code whereas now it is recognized as a distinct offence under Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. As per BNS, the punishment for mob lynching was mentioned under sections 103(2) and 117(4). Before going ahead it is important to know that if there is not an assembly of five or more person in doing the common act then it is not considered mob lynching, whereas in the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 special provisions are there for unlawful assembly which is mentioned under the section 189(1). The mob lynching is a hateful act against the Muslim cattle trader, intercaste marriage. Sometimes it spreads due to rumours from social media, and political statements between the people. Mostly it is against the backward class of people, theft, robbery, and murder of minors. Therefore to prevent all this and to protect the right of the innocent or victim the distinct provisions in Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita was included. **Comparison with other provisions** The victims in the mob lynching were not allowed to give their defence to the mob as the mob at that time was mostly doing hateful acts in the heat of anger. Sometimes in that situation, the lives of innocent people also come into danger. Therefore mob lynching is considered a hate crime in all the states of the country. To prevent all this there are other distinct provisions or acts in some states. Manipur in the year 2018 implemented its separate Act which is Manipur Protection from Mob Violence Act, 2018 against the crime of mob lynching. The punishment for the convict of mob lynching is life imprisonment. It includes the establishment of special courts for speedy trials, the role of police in the prevention of incidents, and also compensation schemes for the families of the victims. Similarly, Rajasthan implemented – the Rajasthan Protection from Lynching Act, of 2019. Which includes life imprisonment or up to 7 years imprisonment if the hostile environment is created for lynching for the convict. Appointment of a nodal officer and the establishment of a special task force for the district level. The special provisions are there for the protection of witnesses and compensation to the families of the victims. West Bengal implemented the Act in the year 2019- West Bengal (Prevention of Lynching) Act, 2019. It includes the punishment or imprisonment of life or additional penalties for those who create a lynching environment. In this state nodal officer is appointed to monitor and to prevent mob violence. It also includes the compulsory compensation to the families of the victims. Whereas in BNS there is the prescribed punishment for not only life imprisonment but also liable for death penalty. In the above separate Acts of Lynching not in the single Act, there is the provisions for the death penalty for this type of hate crime. Therefore the implementation of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita plays a game changer role in the prevention of the hatred crime in the country due to its high degree of punishment. **Case Laws** The recent case was about the [Palghar incident](https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/mumbai-news/palghar-lynching-case-two-years-on-101650048601368.html) in Maharashtra. In this case, the mob at large attacked two sadhus and their driver at Palghar at night on 16th April 2020. The mob lynching was done due to the spreading of humour and fake messages around WhatsApp between the villagers due to which they were influenced and believed Sadhus the child lifters they assaulted the two Sadhus. This shows how people are influenced by fake messages on WhatsApp and take the law into their own hands just for the sake of punishing the accused. But they don’t know the full facts of the situation or the person to whom they were going to assault and kill the innocent one. Therefore the special or distinct section in BNS for the punishment for those mobs is the key change in the history of India. The discussion of mob lynching without the case law of *Tehseen Poonawalla v Union of India and Ors. (2018)* is like reading a topic without meaning. The Poonawalla case was a landmark case in the field of mob lynching. In this case, the Supreme Court of India issued guidelines for preventive, punitive, and remedial measures. The court held that there must be appointment of a nodal officer in each district which must be not below the rank of Superintendent of Police. If it is likely to be the situation that such type of incident will happen then a special task force should be appointed to that area.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The inclusion of distinct punishment or provisions for the mob lynching in the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 was a great step taken towards the prevention of not only such type of crimes but also affected in the mind of the people not to take any such steps to punish the accused or not to come into the influence of any such social media post and WhatsApp messages. Well, it is to be noted that after the implication of the BNS, we can see a decrease in the number of crimes in the country. **REFERENCES** 1. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 101691781909920. 101691781909921. 101691781909922. 101691781909923. 2. **Cases Referred** 1. Palghar Mob Lynching case (2020) 2. Tehseen S. Poonawalla vs Union Of India (AIR 2018 SC 3354) 3. **Statutes Referred** 1. Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 2. Constitution of India, 1950 3. Manipur Protection from Mob Violence Act, 2018 4. Rajasthan Protection from Lynching Act, 2019 5. West Bengal (Prevention of Lynching) Act, 2019 [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Hindustan Times, , (Last visited 05/08/2024) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. Sec 101(2) [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. Sec 117 (4) [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Tehseen S. Poonawalla vs Union Of India, AIR 2018 SC 3354 **Categories:** Articles, Criminal Law --- ### [Forensic Science Techniques: Role in Criminal Investigation and Trial](https://lawfoyer.in/forensic-science-techniques-role-in-criminal-investigation-and-trial/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** Author: Anisha Parveen Editor: I Sharan **INTRODUCTION** Forensic science is the use of scientific methods to help solve crimes and support law enforcement. It involves answering important legal questions by analysing evidence from crime scenes. Various scientific fields are involved in forensic science: e.g. Physics helps understand things like blood splatter patterns. Biology identifies unknown people through DNA. Chemistry examines the chemical makeup of substances found at crime scenes. Forensic science has been around for a long time with its use in criminal investigations dating back thousands of years. In 1902, Argentina was the first country to use witness testimony in criminal cases. Sir William Herschel suggested using fingerprints to identify criminals. One of the key activities in forensic science is studying DNA the genetic material in all living things. By the late 20th century forensic scientists had advanced technology to analyse evidence such as DNA tests and computer searches making their work more precise and effective. ***Keywords* *(Forensic science, fingerprint analysis, firearms, Forensic evidence, autopsies)*** **Meaning, Definition & Explanation** “The word forensic comes from the Latin word “forensis” which means public or related to debate and discussion. Today “forensic” refers to anything used in a court of law. Forensic science is any science used for legal purposes. Forensic sciences help solve civil disputes, enforce criminal laws fairly, and protect public health worldwide. Forensic scientists step in whenever a scientific analysis is needed to find the truth and seek justice in legal cases.”(1) “Forensic science is a field that uses different scientific methods to investigate crimes and legal problems. It involves studying physical evidence like DNA fingerprints and small materials to find facts for court cases. Forensic experts help the police and courts solve cases and ensure fairness. Forensic science applies different scientific fields to solve legal and criminal cases. It includes areas like chemistry biology physics and computer science to collect and study evidence from crime scenes. By using advanced methods forensic scientists help police discover the truth and deliver justice.”(2) **Historical Background / Evolution** “Historically, much of the evidence found at crime scenes was observational, assessed by the human eye directly. It is standard practice to use advanced techniques such as fingerprinting, DNA testing, chemical analysis, and more when assessing physical crime scenes.”(3) “Forensic science is still developing in the modern criminal justice system. However, its importance goes back to ancient civilizations. The earliest use of forensic science was in **ancient Greek and Roman societies.** These civilizations made important contributions to medicine, especially pharmacology. They studied how toxins were made, and used, and their effects, which helps us understand past murders. In 16th century Europe, doctors started gathering information about the cause and manner of death. In the 17th century, forensic science became more important because of new scientific advancements. In the following centuries, forensic science grew as more science was used to solve crimes. Techniques like matching clothing fibbers and footprints to suspects became popular. Over time, criminal investigations focused more on evidence and logical methods.”(4) **Types of Forensic Science Techniques** - “Collection and Preservation of Evidence** Forensic science starts at the crime scene, where experts carefully examine everything. They identify, record, and collect physical evidence like fingerprints, bloodstains, hair, clothing, and weapons. By analysing the scene and the evidence, they recreate what happened. This process is crucial for building the initial understanding of the case. - **Laboratory Analysis** After collecting evidence, it goes through detailed lab analysis. Different areas of forensic science, like DNA analysis, toxicology, ballistics, and digital forensics, come into play. Experts use advanced tools and methods to examine the evidence. For example, DNA profiling can link suspects, victims, or crime scenes—toxicology checks for drugs or toxins in the body. - **Examination of Fingerprints** Fingerprint analysis is a key part of forensic science. Everyone has unique fingerprints because of the patterns on the ridges of their skin. Forensic experts compare fingerprints found at crime scenes with known prints in databases to find possible suspects. This method has proven crucial in many cases, linking people to crime scenes. - **Expert Witness Testimony** In the judicial system expert witnesses especially those skilled in forensic science play a crucial role. With their deep knowledge and training, these experts help make complex scientific evidence and ideas understandable for judges and juries. Their input helps bridge the gap between complicated forensic findings and the people who need to make legal decisions.**”**(5) **Legal Provisions** “Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act states that everyone, including the accused, must give a fingerprint or DNA test. Another debate is about drug use and its legal validity. Narcotics analysis is a new field in criminal investigation. But the question is whether the evidence from the drug test is admissible in court. In this way, the investigator tries to get some words from an unconscious person that can be used as evidence. This process has many legal and ethical problems. Some consider this to be a violation of Art. Article 20 of the Constitution of India. Section 53 of the Crimes Act 1976 provides that a medical examination of the accused may be carried out if the police officer considers that the examination will provide evidence of an offence. In 2005, some changes were made in the Penal Code only in the case of rape, as well as blood tests, DNA tests, sperm tests, swab samples, hair samples and other tests. Article 164A of the Criminal Code also allows coroners to examine victims within 24 hours. But the question is whether all doctors in the community can collect DNA samples. The sample collection will no longer be useful research and will not be contaminated because it has been inhabited since ancient times. The evidence is considered biblical by many judges and accepted as experts’ faith. However, the court is not bound by these reports and may rely on other evidence.”(6) **Case Laws** “**Bombay State High Court v. Kathi Kalu Ogad and Anr** – Many people argue that fingerprint and DNA identification violates Article 20(3). They argue that forcing the prosecution to give fingerprints is like the prosecution giving them evidence. However, in this case court said that forcing a person to produce documentary evidence such as fingerprints, blood, and semen does not violate the provisions of Article 20(3). **Ramchandra Reddy and Ors. v. The state of Maharashtra** – Bombay High Court in this case, Maharashtra supports legalizing polygraph tests and drug tests. But as for **Selvey and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Anr**. The court ruled that those who spoke during the mental health report or drug test were untrue, and therefore the decision should be deemed invalid.”(7) **Future of Forensics** “Forensic science will likely change a lot with artificial intelligence. AI can analyse huge amounts of video and audio data to find criminal activity and suspects using facial recognition. Digital forensics will also grow as more crimes happen online and more information is stored on electronic devices. New forensic tools will make investigations faster and more accurate. They might even solve old cases that seemed unsolvable. This will improve the justice system by making it fairer and more precise. We need to be careful with new technologies to avoid any negative effects, but the potential benefits are huge, and it will be interesting to see how forensic science evolves in the next few decades.” (8) **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** Forensic science is an important tool for justice. It uses scientific methods to help solve crimes, prove innocence, and ensure that the guilty are held responsible. Forensic experts play key roles from investigating crime scenes to presenting evidence in court, which helps in solving crimes effectively. This strengthens both law enforcement and the judicial system, making forensic science essential today. In India, forensic evidence fits well within the legal system. It helps those investigating crimes and gives judges clear information, boosting their confidence in making decisions in both criminal and civil cases. Forensic science is now a highly developed field used in various investigations. It includes advanced methods like fingerprint analysis, DNA profiling, ballistics, and firearm investigations. **REFERENCES** 1. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 15569. (1) BHAVNA,< > 15570. (2) BHAVNA,< > 15571. (3) Teja, S. (2023, December 6). The History of Forensic Science and its evolution. Textual. < > 15572. (4) Teja, S. (2023, December 6). The History of Forensic Science and its evolution. Textual. < > 15573. (5) Role of forensic science in crime investigation. (2023, October 6). < > 15574. (6) BHAVNA,< > 15575. (7) BHAVNA,< > 15576. (8) Kenny, T. (2023, November 7). The role of forensics in modern criminal investigations. Northwest Career College. < > 2. **Cases Referred** 1. Bombay State High Court v. Kathi Kalu Ogad and Anr AIR 1961 SC 1808, 1962 SCR (3) 10 2. Ramchandra Reddy and Ors. v. The state of Maharashtra. 2004 ALL MR (Cri) 1704 3. Selvey and Ors. Vs State of Karnataka and Anr. AIR 2010 SC 1974 3. **Statutes Referred** 1. Crimes Act 1976 2. Indian Evidence Act 3. Indian Penal Code,1860 **Categories:** Articles, Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Law --- ### [DIVORCE UNDER THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955: PROVISIONS, CASES, AND PROCEDURE](https://lawfoyer.in/divorce-under-the-hindu-marriage-act-1955-provisions-cases-and-procedure/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author Name: SHRADDHA PATIL** **Editor Name: Krishna Parmar** **ABSTRACT:** Marriage refers to an institution where two people get involved in a stable and socially permissible relationship legally bound by different personal laws. In the case of Hindus, a marriage is bound by the Hindu Marriage Act, of 1955. The procedures to be followed during the marriage commission are binding on both parties in a Hindu marriage. Similarly, if both parties wish to dissolve their marriage, the procedures to be followed according to the rule of law are formulated in Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. It lays down nine grounds on which the separation of husband and wife is permitted. Divorce can either be through mutual consent or judicial proceedings when one of the parties does not agree with the terms of marriage. **INTRODUCTION:** The term ‘divorce’ has not been defined in any legal body or act of law, but it pertains to the legal dissolution of a marriage with the use of judicial proceedings and legal machinery. In medieval India, the term divorce was very unknown. With time, there was a need to include divorce in marital rights due to increased awareness regarding human rights and individuality. Before 1955, divorce was denounced due to the notion that marriages were not only to be continued till the death of husband and wife in the real world but also after that. However, changing societal needs created a place for divorce in the Hindu Marriage Act, of 1955. **KEYWORDS:** 1. Hindu Marriage Act 2. Divorce 3. Hindu marriage 4. Grounds of divorce 5. Divorce petition 6. Divorce provisions 7. Divorce case laws 8. Family law **PROVISIONS:** Recently, the Supreme Court said that it may utilize the authority conferred by Article 142, which gives the Supreme Court the power to administer comprehensive justice, to dissolve any marriage, or to issue a divorce judgment if it has irretrievably broken down. People will find it simpler to approach the Supreme Court right away and skip the waiting time as a result. Let’s explore a few of the significant clauses included in the Hindu Marriage Act: **Section 5: Conditions for Hindu Marriage** Marriage may be solemnized between any two Hindus if the below conditions are fulfilled: 1. Both parties should not have a living spouse at the time of marriage. 2. At the time of the marriage, neither party was capable of giving valid consent to it, was unfit for marriage and the procreation of children, or has been subject to recurrent attacks of insanity. 3. The groom must be 21 years old, and the bride must be 18 years old at the time of the marriage. 4. The parties are not within the degree of a prohibited relationship unless the custom or usage permits it. 5. The parties are not spindles of each other unless custom or usage permits it. **Section 10: Judicial Separation** Section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act is concerned with judicial separation and the steps required to get a divorce considered legal, such as applying in family court. As per sections 13 (i) and (ii), the petition can mention the cause for the separation and also other sections that may be necessary. **Section 13: Divorce** Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act is an entirely separate section, designated for divorce. Under this section are listed various grounds for divorce that are relevant in proceedings for a marriage dissolution. It is important to note that Section 13(2) permits a woman to file for divorce, and Section 13(1) permits both men and women to file for divorce. Clause 1: Any marriage can be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party— 1. **ADULTERY**: has had sexual intercourse with any person other than his or her spouse after marriage 2. **CRUELTY**: caused harm to the petitioner, either physically or emotionally. 3. **DESERTION**: has abandoned the petitioner for a continuous period of 2 or more years before the filing of the petition. 4. **RELIGIOUS CONVERSION**: has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion 5. **INCURABLE INSANITY**: has been incurable of an unsound mind or has been suffering from a mental disorder 6. **VENEREAL DISEASE**: has been suffering from venereal disease in a communicable form. 7. **SANYASA, or renunciation,** has renounced the world by entering any religious order. 8. **PRESUMPTION OF DEATH**: has not been heard of as being alive for seven years or more. 9. **RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHT:** if there has been no resumption of cohabitation between the parties for 1 year or more after the judicial separation or if there has been no restitution of conjugal rights. **Clause 2:** A wife may also present a petition for a decree of divorce because: 1. The husband had either remarried or any of his previous wives were still alive at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. 2. That the husband has been guilty of rape, sodomy (anal sexual intercource), or bestiality (sexual relations between a human being and an animal). 3. That her marriage was solemnized before she turned fifteen years old, and she rejected the marriage after 15 years of age but before eighteen years of age. **Section 13B: Divorce by mutual consent** On the ground that they have been living apart for a year or more and have mutually decided that their marriage should be ended. **Section 14: No petition for divorce is to be presented within one year of marriage.** As per the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955, it is forbidden to dissolve a marriage if a year hasn’t passed since the marriage date. Nonetheless, if the sections and sufficient evidence are submitted with the petition, exceptions may be made. It also takes the birth of a child or children from a marriage very seriously. **Section 15: Divorced persons may marry again.** It is legal for either party to a divorce to remarry after the marriage has been dissolved by a decree of divorce if there is either no right of appeal against the decree, the deadline for appealing has passed without an appeal being filed, or an appeal has been filed but dismissed. **Section 25: Permanent alimony and maintenance** Either of the parties to a divorce may make an application to receive maintenance or support as a gross sum or periodical sum for the lifetime of the applicant, keeping in mind the income and other property of both the respondent and the applicant. If required, a charge on immovable property may also be created. Several factors, such as future expenses, lifestyle expenses, costs of education in the case of children, inflation, medical expenses, etc., may be considered while deciding on the sum. The court may see this as a just order to secure such a payment through the decree of divorce. Such an order may be modified or rescinded by the court if it observes a change in the circumstances of either party. The court may also modify or rescind the order if either party has remarried or has had sexual intercourse outside of marriage. **Section 26: Custody of children** This section talks about the powers of the court to decide upon custody. guardianship, support, and education of children (under the age of 18) after the divorce while considering the interests and wishes of the children. **IMPORTANT CASES:** **Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007):** In Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007), the Supreme Court of India discussed the basis of divorce due to cruelty. The court came up with a list of actions that may be concretely categorized as mental cruelty, insisting that marriage dissolution should sometimes be allowed as it all depends on the particular cases and situations involved. **Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (2006)** In Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (2006), the Supreme Court of India allowed the divorce on the grounds of an irreconcilable breakdown of the marriage, implying cruelty and incompatibility. The court reiterated the stand that long separation and incompatibility are reasons enough to part, suggesting the legislature exercise wise steps and introduce the cause of irretrievable breakdown as one of the grounds for divorce. **Akanksha vs. Anupam Mathur (2018)** In this case, the Supreme Court remarked that the couple made the choice of a voluntary divorce, and the divorce should not be delayed for six months. Consequently, the court ruled out the six months, and the marriage came to an end. **Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash (1991):** In the case of Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash, the Supreme Court ruled that mutual consent for divorce under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act must be continuous until the decree. Due to consent withdrawn by any party even before the decree, the application will not be eligible for the petition. **PROCEDURE:** 1. The husband and wife file a petition in family court, as represented by their respective counsel. This petition comprises all the information about the parties’ separation, their terms, and the pieces of evidence essential for the divorce. 2. The parties are given a date on which they must appear in person before the family court with their respective counsel to go over all the details of the petition, including family histories, properties possessed, the reason for the divorce, child custody (if applicable), identification documentation, and more. 3. Because Hindu marriage is considered sacred and viewed as an indissoluble or permanent relationship, the court may also send both parties to mediation before this to see if there is any possibility of reconciliation. However, the family court’s procedures are followed if both parties reject any chance of reconciliation. 4. The family court has complete power to add or modify conditions following the law if there is any dispute regarding alimony or maintenance amount and agreement, or if there are issues about child custody or visitation rights, after carefully reviewing and verifying all available evidence and statements from both parties. 5. Following this, the first motion is approved, and the parties are given six months to change their minds and see if there is still a possibility to get back together. The time frame may be extended to 18 months from the family court petition date. 6. If both parties attempt to get back together and wish to stay together, they can file an appeal for the divorce to be canceled through legal counsel at this time. If both parties refuse to work things out, the divorce will proceed according to the order, and the parties’ final declarations will be recorded in the second motion. 7. Following the recording of the statement, the spouses sign the entire and final agreement to ensure that there are no future disputes or problems regarding child custody, alimony, or maintenance. 8. The court issues a decree of divorce and declares the marriage null and void once it is satisfied with the arguments made by both parties and determines that there is no possibility of reconciliation in the final motion. **SUGGESTIONS:** In the Hindu Marriage Act, of 1955, there are more grounds for divorce, for example, adultery, cruelty, desertion, conversion, unsoundness of mind, leprosy, venereal disease, renunciation, and presumption of death. These bases are comprehensive; however, they can be put in a new, clearer form with more contemporary problems like emotional abuse and digital infidelity. Even though the Act is silent on the point of “irretrievable breakdown of marriage,” it is increasingly admitted by the courts. A change proposal to put up this cause for divorce would make it easier, and the waiting period for definite proof of such marriages would likely reduce. Although the Act is written in a more gender-neutral way, its application is sometimes gender-biased. It is so important that everyone, women as well as men, be protected by the law. The Autonomous Board supports mediation and conciliation before you proceed with a divorce to help you solve conflicts calmly. Reassessing and boosting the role of the alternative dispute resolution thingies can make it less likely that the divorce trials will lead to an antagonistic situation and will positively affect family reunion efforts. There are many people in the dark as to their rights and responsibilities under the Hindu Marriage Act. An increase in public legal awareness and the provision of easy access to legal support can be major ways to rebuild a person’s understanding of matrimonial disputes. **CONCLUSION:** Since previous generations, divorce has been considered a bad notion. There can be several reasons for a couple to get divorced. In India, these problems have a separate dimension. The culture of India is such that a male or female is considered to be a possession of the foster parents as they nurture the child. Such treatments can be pleasing, but they are also one of the main reasons for the increased number of divorces in India. The other reason may be the communication gap in marriages. Where there is no proper communication, misunderstandings are bound to happen. Both males and females are separate entities in marriage, having their own rights. But some of the rights have to be common for better communication and a successful marriage. Divorces can also happen due to undue influences without the knowledge of both parties, which may take different turns after marriage. Misappropriation at the time of marriage, or hiding the true identity and gender, can also be a reason for the breakdown of the machinery of marriage. **REFERENCES:** **Websites referred:** 1. 2. 3. 4. **Statutes referred:** 1. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 **Cases referred:** 1. Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 2. Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (2006) 3. Akanksha vs. Anupam Mathur (2018) 4. Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash (1991) **Categories:** Articles, Family Law --- ### [Remedies against Marital Rape under BNS, PWDV Act, and Family Law](https://lawfoyer.in/remedies-against-marital-rape-under-bns-pwdv-act-and-family-law/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Ayushi Bral** Edited By: Krishna Parmar **INTRODUCTION** “The meaning and content of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution of India are sufficient amplitudes to encompass all facets of gender equality….” *-Late Chief Justice J.S. Verma, Supreme Court of India, Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan* Although the Supreme Court and the Constitution of India provide for gender equality, women still face so many cruelties and violence throughout their lives. Women are not safe even in their own homes. They are subject to many forms of violence such as dowry death, female infanticide, sexual crimes such as rape, modesty-related violence, domestic violence, acid throwing, etc. Martial rape is also one of such violence against women. Marriage is a universal social institution. Under Hindu law, it is considered a sacred tie and holy union that can’t be broken. There are certain matrimonial rights and obligations that spouses have towards each other, such as the legal rights and the right to consortium, including spouse company, affection, support, sexual relations, cohabitation, etc. According to the matrimonial law, there is a duty to consummate the marriage that each spouse owes to the other. It is the mutual right to sexual intercourse that continues throughout the entire life till the marriage survives. The willful refusal and incapacitation to the consummation of marriage are grounds for voidable marriage under some personal laws such as the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, Special Marriage Act, etc. But it doesn’t mean that one partner can force the other to have sexual intercourse or make unreasonable demands on the other. However, as the patriarchy is prevalent in India, there is a male-dominated society, and they consider women as their property. They considered that there is an implied consent of women when they have sexual intercourse with their wives but no means no even in the case of married life. Most of the women faced marital rape at least once in their life but hardly there is any woman who has reported it. This article deals with marital rape, its causes, its impact, remedies under various statutory laws, etc. **Meaning, Definition & Explanation** The word marital rape comprises two words rape and marital where the word rape is derived from the Latin term “Rapio” which means “to seize”. According to the Cambridge Dictionary, rape means to force someone to have sex by using violence or threatening behavior when they are unwilling.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Section 63 of The Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) deals with rape which provides that: ***“A man is said to commit “rape” if he—*** ***penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra, or anus of a woman or makes her do so with him or any other person; or*** ***inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra, or anus of a woman or makes her do so with him or any other person; or*** ***manipulates any part of the body of a woman to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus, or any part of the body of such woman or makes her do so with him or any other person; or*** ***applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, or urethra of a woman or makes her do so with him or any other person, under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions: —*** ***against her will*** ***without her consent.*** ***with her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt.*** ***with her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married.*** ***with her consent when, at the time of giving such consent, because of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent.*** ***with or without her consent, when she is under eighteen years of age.*** ***when she is unable to communicate consent.”[\[2\]](#_ftn2)*** Marital means something related to marriage. Therefore, marital rape which is also called spousal rape is a term that is used to describe a heinous act of sexual intercourse committed without a wife’s consent by her wedded husband. It is considered as intimate partner violence which includes forced sex and sexual assault between spouses. Although it is mentioned under exception 2 of section 63 of Bhartiya Nyaya Sahita, 2023, there is no statutory definition of marital rape. It means non-consensual sexual intercourse done by the husband through coercion or without the wife’s consent or with her consent when she is of unsound mind or intoxicated which includes oral, anal, or vaginal acts. **Historical Background** From the ancient period, the women are considered as the property of the men. They were not considered as equal to men. They have no say of their own and must follow their husband in each aspect of their lives. There was a patriarchal society, and women had no sexual or economic freedom. As it was stated by Manu from the very beginning of their life, women depend on someone. In childhood, she depended on her father after that she depended on her husband in youth, and later during old age she depended on her child. Thus, she is not free at all. Women were not provided any autonomy and were always considered inferior creatures. Similar was the condition of the Muslim women. They have no legal status of their own before the advent of Islam. Even after the advent of Islam, the position of women was not that much improved. They were provided with legal status but were only considered inferior to males. As far the divorce is concerned husband can give a divorce to his wife by only saying “You’re divorced”. There is also one of the awful practices under Muslim law is nikah halala which is also known as tahleel marriage in which after being divorced by triple talaq, she has to marry and sleep with someone else and get divorced again to be able to remarry her first husband. Thus, this cruelty against women was there from the very beginning. **Constitutionality of marital rape in India** Under Bhartiya Nyaya Sahita: India is amongst the thirty- six countries that still have not criminalized marital rape.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Marital rape is not an offense under BNS. Section 63 of Bhartiya Nyaya Sahita deals with rape and marital rape is one of the exceptions under section 63 which provides that if the wife is above 18 years of age, then the sexual intercourse between a man and his wife is not considered rape. Whereas under section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, the age of the wife is above 15 years but non-consensual sexual activity by a man with his wife not above 15 was considered rape. In the case of INDEPENDENT THOUGHT v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR, it was held by the court that sexual intercourse with a girl or wife by a man below 15 years of age whether with or without consent is considered rape.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) This age is increased to 18 years under BNS. Under Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005: It recognizes marital rape as a form of domestic violence. Section 3, which talks about the definition of domestic violence, also includes sexual abuse. However, it doesn’t criminalize marital rape in India but only provides for civil remedies. Under personal laws: In matrimonial law, it is a well-established proposition that each spouse owes the other a duty to consummate the marriage. [\[5\]](#_ftn5)It was held in the case of Srikant v. Anuradha, AIR 1980, that the mutual right to sexual intercourse continues throughout the entire period of marital life. But it must be exercised reasonably. [\[6\]](#_ftn6)The willful refusal and incapacitation to the consummation of marriage are grounds for voidable marriage under some personal laws such as the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, Special Marriage Act, etc*.* In the case of Sidhava Saiah v. Laxma, AIR 1958 Mys 115, the court held that perverted or otherwise unreasonable demand of the spouse doesn’t bind the other spouse especially when it impairs the health.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) However, the exception to marital rape as provided under BNS/ IPC is applied to both Hindus, Muslims, and others. **Status of marital rape in other countries** The status of criminalization of marital rape is concerned, about 150 countries as of 2019 have criminalized marital rape in their own countries which includes 50 states of the US, UK, South Africa, Canada, etc. The countries that have not criminalized marital rape are Pakistan, China, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh etc. **Causes** There are many causes of marital rape. Following are some of the causes of marital rape: Patriarchal structure: It is one of the main reasons which is responsible for marital rape. Patriarchal structure means a society with male dominance where the female is only considered as the property of the male. She has no say in the home affairs and has no sexual and economic freedom. The man considered her as property that he could use in any way. Man considers his wife as the object of desire. Thus, the husband doesn’t talk about any consent before sexual intercourse with his wife and considers it as his right. Norms and beliefs of the society: It is believed that the consummation of the marriage is one of the duties of a spouse. Due to this reason, the wife considers it as her duty and doesn’t raise her voice against it. Marriage as a sacred institution: marriage is considered a sacred and holy institution. A woman considers her husband as her entire world. She believes that he absorbs her identity and life and considers her body to belong to her husband. No legal recognition: India is one of those countries which haven’t criminalized marital rape. Under BNS/IPC, marital rape only comes under the exception of rape. Thus, this gives the husband the push to do such a heinous act. Shame and stigma of society: All the women have faced marital rape once in their lives but still they didn’t report it about of stigma of the society and the fear of shame. This led to an increase in such cases as no voice was raised against it. Lack of awareness: Females are not aware that much that they can be able to raise their voices. They are unaware of their fundamental and other legal rights. Lack of economic resources: Most of the women in India are dependents. Some depend upon their parents (father), some upon husbands, and the rest upon their sons. Thus, they are not economically able to raise their voice against it and become the victims of this violence. No sex education: India is one of those countries where no sex education is provided in schools or colleges. **Effects** Impact on mental health: When a woman is sexually abused, she gets frustrated and develops a feeling that her life is meaningless and useless. Women are too emotional, particularly about purity of sex and hence when they are sexually abused, they get a severe emotional shock resulting in depression and frustration. Depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder are results of the marital rape. Low esteem: It led to a decrease in self-esteem of the women. Isolation: She starts living in isolation from his husband as a result of marital rape out of fear and shame. Physical injuries: As it was the forced sex, many times it led to injuries on the vagina, anus, urethra of the wife. Her husband did it very brutally under intoxication and he also beat her while forcing her. Effect on children: The children who witnessed such an act were also affected by it. This is a mental childhood trauma that affects them in many ways such as causing them depression, and anxiety and motivating them to become criminals in the future as it is a faulty socialization. **Case laws** In the case of Harvinder Kaur vs. Harmander Singh, the Court held that Intervention in household matters is the destruction of the institution of marriage and thus the constitution of India could not intervene in it.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) In the State of Maharashtra & Anr. vs. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar, The Supreme Court asserted the right of privacy of women which must not be violated.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) Then in Shri Bodhisattwa Gautam vs. Ms. Subhra Chakraborty, the Supreme Court held that rape is a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Justice Verma Committee had suggested about criminalization of marital rape, after the Nirbhaya rape case in 2012. But it was only a suggestion that the government of India did not so implement. In 2016, Maneka Gandhi, then minister for Women and Child Development stated that marital rape could not be implemented in India due to illiteracy and poverty. Then came the landmark case of 2017, Independent Thought vs. Union of India in which the Supreme Court of India ruled about the age of the wife to come under exception 2 of section 375.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Recently in the case of X V. The Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Govt. Of NCT of Delhi & Anr., the court held That the woman is not compelled to continue with unwanted pregnancies caused due to marital rape and she can seek abortions as provided under the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) **Remedies** The following are the remedies that can help in decreasing the rate of marital rape in India: Increasing the awareness as to marital rape: Most of the females are not aware of their rights as to consent. By making her aware that marital rape can be tackled. Economically stable: The government must aware girls of the importance of education and must make schemes to pay skilled and unskilled jobs so that they can become economically stable and take action against their husbands. Criminalization of marital rape: By declaring marital rape as one of the offenses under Bhartiya Nyaya Sahitya. The husband must be punished by removing it from the exception as provided in Exception 2 of Section 63 of BNS. Sex education: By promoting sex education one can able to know more about it as people in India avoid talking about it in public. The wife will not feel shame in raising her voice against his husband. Change in the beliefs in the society: Bringing change in belief in the society according to the needs of the society is required. **CONCLUSION** It can be concluded that violence against women has always remained widespread such as rape, acid attack, etc. Marital rape is also one among them. Legal recognition must be provided for the marital rape to decrease the cases of it in India. The criminalization of marital rape is the need of the hour. The husband needs to understand the fact that no means no. The consent of the wife is required as it is a violation of articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, there is a need to change the law, so as to amend Section 63 of BNS in order to comply with articles 14 and 21. **REFERENCES** **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** Paras Diwan: Hindu Law. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** Manupatra, “Articles – Manupatra” *available at*: https://articles.manupatra.com/article-details/Marital-Rape-and-Law (last visited August 9, 2024). PTI, “NCRB data: India witnessed 86 rapes every day, 46 offenses against women every hour in 2021” *Financialexpress*, 31 August 2022. **Cases Referred** - Yotish v. Meera, AIR 1970 Cal 266; Srikant v. Anuradha, AIR 1980 - Sidhava Saiah v. Laxmane, *AIR 1958 Mys 115* - Harminder Kaur vs. Harmander Singh AIR 1984 Delhi 66, ILR 1984 Delhi 546, 1984 RLR 187 - State of Maharashtra & Anr. vs. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar AIR 1991 SC 207, (1991) 1 SCC 57 - Shri Bodhisattwa Gautam vs Ms. Subhra Chakraborty, 1996 AIR 922, 1996 SCC (1) 490 - Independent Thought vs UOI, (2017) 10 SCC 800: AIR 2017 SC 4904 - X V. The Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Govt. Of NCT of Delhi & Anr., X V, 29 September, 2022. **Statutes Referred** - Section 63, Bhartiya Nyaya Sahitya, 2023. - Section 375, Indian Penal Code, 1860. - Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Cambridge Dictionary, “rape” *translate English to Hindi – Cambridge Dictionaryavailable at*: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english-hindi/rape (last visited August 8, 2024). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Section 63, Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (2023) [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Marital Rape in India: 36 countries where marital rape is not a crime, India Today, Mar. 12, 2016. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Independent Thought v. UOI & Anr.( AIR 2017 SC4904) [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Paras Diwan: Family Law [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Yotish v. Meera, AIR 1970 Cal 266; Srikant v. Anuradha, AIR 1980 [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Sidhava Saiah v. Laxmane, AIR 1958 Mys 115 [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Harminder Kaur vs. Harmander Singh AIR 1984 Delhi 66, ILR 1984 Delhi 546, 1984 RLR 187 [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) State of Maharashtra & Anr. vs. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar AIR 1991 SC 207, (1991) 1 SCC 57 [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Shri Bodhisattwa Gautam vs Ms. Subhra Chakraborty, 1996 AIR 922, 1996 SCC (1) 490 [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Independent Thought vs UOI, (2017) 10 SCC 800: AIR 2017 SC 4904 [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) X V. The Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Govt. Of NCT of Delhi & Anr., X V, 29 September, 2022 **Categories:** Articles, Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Law, Family Law, Human Rights --- ### [Constitutionality of Section 303 IPC & Capital Punishment](https://lawfoyer.in/constitutionality-of-section-303-ipc-capital-punishment/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Name: Ishan Mishra** **Edited By- Biraj Kumar Sarkar** **Constitutionality of Section 303 IPC & Capital Punishment** **INTRODUCTION** A person accused of any crime until & unless convicted just like the other citizens has the complete right to live with dignity as is enshrined & provided by the Constitution of India. The expression “Capital Punishment” is the most extreme type of punishment. The constitutional validity of section 303 of the former Indian Penal Code of 1860 which states the provision or mandates the death penalty for certain offenses being committed by a person already serving a death sentence has undeniably been a subject of significant ethical & legal debate in India. Don’t such provisions raise some critical questions about the principle of justice, human rights, & the state’s role in administering such capital punishment? However, some of the maxims like “**actus non facit reum, nisi men sit rea”**, **“culpae poene par esto”, and “dura lex sed lex”** which relates to “an act doesn’t make one guilty unless the mind is also legally blameworthy”, “the punishment should be proportionate to the crime” & “the law is harsh, but it is the law” respectively. The other term or way to address section 303 can be termed Capital punishment, the context of which in itself is often viewed as a controversial or a divisive issue. However, it is argued that it serves as a deterrent against some of the heinous crimes such as rape & murder & delivers justice for the victims & society. But on the converse, it is contended as an irreversible & and inhumane punishment that doesn’t effectively deter crime & disproportionally affects marginalized communities. Section 303 of the Indian Penal Code’s constitutionality has been challenged on many grounds, inclusive of its compatibility with the fundamental rights as enshrined in the Constitution of India, particularly the right to equality & right to life that is article 14 & 21 of the constitution respectively. The Supreme Court of India, however, has addressed these concerns & emphasized the need for a comprehensive evaluation of the implications of the death penalty within the framework of such constitutional rights. ***Keywords* :** **Section 303 IPC, Constitutionality, Capital Punishment, Death penalty, Human rights, justice, Deterrent effect, Fundamental rights, Right to equality, Right to life** **Meaning, Definition & Explanation** The meaning & or the definition of Section 303 of the former Indian Penal Code is something that pertains to the punishment for a person who has committed an offense of “Murder” while already serving a life sentence. This section states that if a person who is sentenced to life imprisonment commits an offense of murder, then they shall be punished with a death sentence also known as Capital Punishment. In the legal context, its explanation goes like “A section that was introduced to deter prisoners already serving life sentences from committing further crimes like murder particularly. The rationale is to maintain order within prisons & protect society from repeat offenders. However, the constitutionality of this section (303) has been subject to certain challenges primarily on the grounds of: **Article 14(Right to Equality/Everyone’s equal before the law)** & **Article 21(Right to life & personal liberty)** However, the constitutionality of section 303 IPC has been upheld by the Supreme Court further emphasizing that the legislature has the authority for prescribing different punishments for different categories of crimes & offenders. Whereas “Capital Punishment” can or may be defined/explained as a state-sanctioned execution of a person as a punishment for a crime, typically for serious offenses such as those relating to murder or terrorism. **Historical Background / Evolution (if any)** The draft of the IPC was prepared by Thomas Macaulay & was enacted in the year 1860 during British colonial rule. It aimed to provide a comprehensive legal framework for the criminal law in India. Section 303 was included as a means to address the specific issue of repeating offenders, particularly those who were murdered while serving a life sentence already. The rationale behind section 303 was introduced as a means to deter the prisoners from committing further serious crimes and murder especially while one was incarcerated. It was a reflection of the British legal system’s approach to maintaining order & discipline within the prisons. “In all parts of the world death punishment was in presence from the most -old circumstances”. **Capital Punishment’s** history in India can be divided into 2 parts: V1.**Pre-Independence:** The evolution or the inception of the death penalty (capital punishment) can be traced back to the 18th century B.C.E. in the code of King Hammurabi of Babylon, wherein the death penalty was codified for different types of crimes. The ancient texts like the Arthashastra written by Kautilya also outlined various offenses & corresponding punishments, inclusive of death. Also during the medieval period, under the dynasties & empires like that of the Mughals, capital punishment was still prevalent. It was used as a common tool for maintaining law & order & as a deterrent against rebellion & crimes. V2. **Post-Independence:** India gained independence in the year 1947 & the constitutional framework of Article 14 & Article 21 which state equality before the law & right to life & personal liberty respectively retained however, these rights aren’t absolute rights & capital punishment is still permissible by the procedure established by law. The Judiciary has since then upheld the constitutional validity of the death penalty through several landmark cases, further assisting that it can be imposed in the “rarest of the rare cases”. The Judicial pronouncements were made through the following cases: **“Bachan Singh Vs.** **State of Punjab” (1980)** This landmark judgment by the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the death penalty & had laid down the “rarest of the rare” doctrine for its application. **“Macchi Singh Vs. State of Punjab” (1983)** This case kept in mind the end goal to further illustrate the rarest of the uncommon cases that the circumstances where the use of the death sentence could be legitimized. **Country Status of Capital Punishment Key Features Comparison to Section 303 I.P.C** **United States of America** It is legal in many states here. Some of the states have abolished it, while it is still rigorously enforced by other states. Similarly, it allows for the death penalty for serious crimes, but it lacks a specific provision for the repeating offenders. **United Kingdom** In the United Kingdom Capital Punishment was abolished in the year 1965. It was abolished for murder, with no return to it since The United Kingdom, unlike section 303 does not have any provision for capital punishment. **Japan** It is legal but is rarely used. The death penalty does exist, with the executions carried out in secrecy. Similar to that of the United States of America. **China** It is widely used. Thousands are annually executed, for a range of crimes inclusive of non-violative offenses. The application is more extensive for capital punishment as compared to India’s focused approach. **Saudi Arabia,** It is legal & frequently applied. Public executions are used for a range of offenses inclusive of theft & drug trafficking. It is more expansive in scope than in comparison to section 303, applied to various crimes beyond that of murder. **Germany** abolished it in the year 1951. It was strongly opposed as it was violative of the Human Right. It wasn’t equivalent to section 303 since capital punishment was completely abolished. **India** It is legal but with certain restrictions. Here the death penalty is reserved for the “rarest of the rare cases”, and specific criteria are added for life sentencing offenders. In comparison to other nations, it has a unique focus on repeating offenders. **3 Causes / Effect Relation with other Concepts** 1. **Deterrence Theory** **Cause:** Inclusive of section 303, the rationale behind capital punishment is often rooted in the belief that such severe penalties deter crime. **Effect:** The deterrence theory influences public policy & judicial decisions, as some lawmakers may argue that such harsher punishments prevent future offenses, particularly among those repeating offenders. 1. **Human Rights** **Cause:** Significant human rights concerns have been raised through the imposition of capital punishment, particularly regarding the right to life & right to fair trial. **Effect:** Human Rights Advocacy has led to calls for the abolition of the death penalty in many countries further influencing legal reforms & public opinion. 1. **Rehabilitation Vs. Retribution** **Cause:** This debate between rehabilitation & retribution is quite central to discussions about capital punishment & section 303 of the I.P.C. **Effect:** Countries that prioritize rehabilitation tend to abolish capital punishment, while those emphasizing retributive justice may retain it, influencing their legal systems & correctional policies. 1. **4 Judicial Discretion** **Cause:** Section 303 application & capital punishment often involve such judicial discretion, where judges assess the circumstances of the crime & the background of the offender. **Effect:** Such discretion can also lead to some inconsistencies in sentencing & or raise concerns about equality before the law & potential biases in the judicial process. 1. **Public Opinion** **Cause:** Societal attitudes towards crime & punishment are influenced significantly by the acceptance or rejection of capital punishment. **Effect:** Legislative changes may be swayed by such public opinion, which will lead to either the abolition or the reinforcement of the capital punishment laws, including provisions like that of section 303. 1. **International law & treaties** **Cause:** The International Human Rights treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights do advocate for the abolition of the death penalty. **Effect:** The countries that are signatories may feel pressured to reform their laws regarding capital punishment, also affecting how laws like section 303 are viewed & implemented. **Types / Kinds** Capital punishment can of certain types such as: 1 **Mandatory death penalty:** In certain jurisdictions, the death penalty is automatically imposed for certain specific crimes, with no discretion for judges. 2 **Discretionary death penalty:** There are many jurisdictions where the judges have the discretion to impose the death penalty based on the case specifics. 3 **Execution methods:** Various methods of execution are employed by different countries, which include hanging, lethal injection, and electrocution. **5 Forms / Modes** **Forms of section 303 can be:** 1. **Statutory form:** Section 303 in the I.P.C. is a specific legal provision that prescribes the death penalty for a murder committed by any person serving a life sentence. 2. **Judicial interpretation:** Section 303 has been interpreted by the court in various cases, which leads to different applications based on judicial discretion. **Modes of Capital Punishment are:** 1. **Legal framework:** Capital punishments are operated within a legal framework that outlines the crimes punishable by death & the procedures for trials & sentencing. 2. **Execution Methods:** Various methods are used to carry out capital punishment, which can include: - **Hanging:** This is traditionally used by India, along with other countries. - **Lethal Injection:** It is a common method adopted by the United States which involves a series of drugs administered to cause deaths. - **Electrocution:** It is an alternative to lethal injection which is used in many jurisdictions. 1. **Procedural Modes:** It is defined as a process which leads to capital punishment & includes: - **Trial Process:** It is the legal proceeding that determines the guilt & or the eligibility for the death penalty. - **Sentencing Phase:** It is a separate phase in some jurisdictions where the judge decides on the death penalty. - **Appeals Process:** The opportunities for the convicted person to appeal the sentence, can prolong the execution process. **Essential & elements of section 303 are:** - **Existence of a life sentence:** The offender must be serving a life sentence for a previous conviction. It establishes the context under which the section applies. - **Commission of Murder:** The committed act must qualify as murder under the IPC. Intentional killing is also included in the definition of murder, which needs to be proven in court. - **Intent & Malice:** The offender must have the intention to kill or cause such bodily injury which is likely to cause death. **Pre-requisites for section 303 are** - **Previous Conviction:** There should be a record of a previous conviction that led to a life sentence. - **Sufficient evidence:** Due process must be followed & there should be adequate evidence to support the charge of murder. **Essentials & elements of Capital Punishment:** - It must be established by law, specifying the crimes punishable by death. - The crime should be classified as a Capital offense, typically involving severe harm or a threat to society. - The legal process must adhere to principles of due process, inclusive of fair trial rights. - There are many jurisdictions, where a separate sentencing phase determines whether or not the death penalty will be applied. **The prerequisites of capital punishment are:** - The individual must have been convicted of a crime qualifying for the death penalty under the applicable law. - The individuals should have the opportunity for appeals & legal challenges relating to the death sentences. - The death penalty sentences are often reviewed by the Higher Courts to ensure the legality & appropriateness of the sentence. **Defences / Exceptions / Exceptions to Defences** - It can be argued by the accused that they didn’t have any intention to kill or cause such an injury that is likely to cause death. - The defense of self-defense or insanity can also be claimed by the accused if the act was done in that manner. **Legal Provisions / Procedure / Specifications / Criteria** The certain legal provision & or the specification that is related to Section 303 is the definition of murder as it is provided in Section 299-300 of the Indian Penal Code, specifying what constitutes murder & how it is distinguished from culpable homicide & the legal provision & or the specification for that of the capital punishment are in the context of article 21 of the Constitution of India which has the implications for the capital punishments imposition, along with section 368 of the Cr.PC that gives the power to High Courts for the trials inclusive of capital punishment. **Guidelines / Rules / Regulations / Notifications / Circulars** The guidelines that were issued through the landmark judgments have been discussed further in the articles. Further, the Supreme Court had emphasized the right to legal representation in capital punishment cases particularly which ensured that the defendants had access to qualified legal counsel. **Case Laws / Precedents / Over-rulings / Judicial Development of the Concept** In **Bachan Singh Vs. State of Punjab** the Supreme Court had held up the constitutional validity of section 303 of the IPC further stating that it is not violative of article 21 of the Constitution of India if it is being applied legally. It was in this case that the court had established the principle that in the “rarest of the rare cases” only such death penalty shall be imposed or applied. This judgment also provided the judges with some guidelines to consider when deciding whether the death penalty needs to be imposed, including the circumstances of the crime, the character of the criminal & the impact it has on society. Simultaneously in **Macchi Singh Vs. The state of Punjab** again the validity of section 303 was upheld by the Supreme Court which provides for the death penalty for a convicted person in case of a murder if they had been convicted for the same previously. This judgment reiterated the “rarest of the rare cases” doctrine which was established in the case of Bacchan Singh. **Interpretations / Explanations** The interpretation of context can be that section 303 of the IPC provides a framework for the imposition of the death penalty on habitual offenders, but the application of which is a subject of judicial scrutiny, human rights considerations, public sentiments & the principles of justice. **Doctrines / Theories** **Rarest of the rare case doctrine:** This doctrine was established in the case of Bachchan Singh which stipulates that the death penalty being imposed should only be in the rarest of the rare cases which means that the case is so heinous that it shakes the collective consciousness of the society. **Retributive Justice theory:** This theory deals with the ‘righting of the balance’. If a criminal has done a wrong towards a person or property they need to be given a penalty in a manner that balances out the wrong done. E.g.- If a person has committed a murder, he can be delivered capital punishment to balance out the suffering caused to the victim & their family. **Deterrence Theory:** It serves as a major tool in maintaining the general law & order in society. Criminal acts are penalized to deter individuals from repeating them or even entering into them in the first place. **Maxims / Principles** **“actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea”** which translates to “an act doesn’t make one guilty unless the mind is also legally blameworthy”. **Future Implications** - The current debates about the effectiveness of the death penalty may lead to some amendments in section 303 or may even result in its repeal. - Advocating for the abolishment of capital punishment globally may create pressure on India to reconsider its stance on such death penalty. - As the awareness of the public of criminal justice issues grows, societal attitudes towards capital punishment can shift potentially. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** To conclude though this section of capital punishment is somewhere being violative of the fundamental rights such as articles 14,19,20,21,22 that are enshrined & provided to every citizen of India through the Constitution of this very country. It can be an unending debate whether capital punishment should completely be abolished or should be used depending on the case if it falls in the category of heinous offenses such as those murder, rape, terrorism, or treason. In the end and as a personal opinion, it should be used depending on the case because if the person committing an offense of the same nature after the conviction for the same is indicative of the level of hatred one could possess, such hardcore criminals who in major cases have no shame for their act should be punished accordingly in such a manner so that such repeat offenders have some amount of shame & fear of their lives & that of the applicable law to set a precedent for the society. Lastly, it would be a suggestion that resources & efforts should be somewhat towards redirecting the crime prevention & rehabilitation of offenders. **REFERENCES** 1. **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** 1. Indian journal of criminal law 2. My 12th-class legal studies book 2. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** - . 1. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/361025100\_A\_Study\_of\_Capital\_Punishment\_in\_India](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/361025100_A_Study_of_Capital_Punishment_in_India) 2. 3. https://lawctopus.com/clatalogue/clat-pg/case-analysis-bachan-singh-v-state-of-punjab/ 3. **Cases Referred** - . 1980 AIR 473 1. 1983 SCC 470 4. **Statutes Referred** - . Indian Penal Code of 1860 1. Constitution of India,1950 2. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 **Categories:** Articles, Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Law --- ### [Bail in PMLA Cases: Important Provisions and Case Laws](https://lawfoyer.in/bail-in-pmla-cases-important-provisions-and-case-laws/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Name: Kajal Jain** **Edited by- Biraj Kumar Sarkar** **INTRODUCTION** **“The issue of bail is one of liberty, justice, public safety and burden of the public treasury, all of which insist that a developed jurisprudence of bail is integral to a socially sensitized judicial process”**[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Recently on June 21, the ED (Enforcement Directorate) moved to Delhi court opposing Kejriwal’s release, and the High Court dismissed his bail application. Kejriwal was arrested by the ED on 21 March on the grounds of violation of Section- 19 of PMLA 2002.[ \[2\]](#_ftn2)and after that, he was granted interim bail in the Liquor Policy case till June 1, 2024, to campaign for Lok Sabha elections, currently, he is still jail. **Meaning, Definition & Explanation** Bail is a temporary release of an accused of a crime in exchange for Security (money etc). There are commonly three types of bail- Regular, Interim, and Anticipatory. Regular bail is for a person who is under arrest or in the custody of the police, it’s under sections “437 and 439 of CrPC”[\[3\]](#_ftn3). Interim bail is granted for a short period and is granted before the regular and anticipatory bail. Anticipatory bail is given either by session court or High court and is filed by the person who is perceived that he may get arrested. Kejriwal was granted Interim bail and it’s almost impossible for someone to get bail under PMLA due to its twin conditions, an accused can still get bail if he can produce evidence proving that he is not guilty and that he is not likely to commit any offense during the period of bail. Section 45 of PMLA Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was enacted in 2003, it came into existence to combat money laundering cases. It has three main objectives- to control and prevent money laundering, to seize and confiscate property obtained by money laundering, and to deal with other issues related to money Laundering. **Section 45 of PMLA (Prevention of Money Laundering Act)-** - Bail is not a rule but an exception under PMLA and it states that only the apex court can grant bail in such a provision. - It is mandatory to hear the public prosecutor in all bail applications when the prosecutor opposes the bail. Section 45:” According to Section 45 of the PMLA, -bail can be granted to an accused in a money laundering case only if twin conditions are satisfied- there should be prima facie satisfaction that the accused has not committed the offense and that he is not likely to commit any offense while on bail”[\[4\]](#_ftn4) The conditions of the Bail Provision of PMLA are stated under Section 453 which states conditions for bail and there are stringent norms applied in it. The two conditions are also known as the twin test. Section 45 **Legal challenges** - 2017 ruling “Nikesh Tarachand Shah vs Union of India”[\[5\]](#_ftn5)– the court held the twin test provision as unconstitutional as it failed the test of reasonable classification - Finance Act, 2018 [\[6\]](#_ftn6)( Reintroduction of this provision)- The twin test provision was re-introduced which resulted in more legal challenges. **Cases**– - Nikesh Tarachand Shah vs. UOI & ANR In this case Supreme Court struck down section 45(1) of PMLA,2002, and added the two conditions under Part A schedule of PMLA on the offenses that have imprisonment of 3 or more years. The conditions under this provision were that opportunity will be provided to the prosecutor to oppose any application for bail, the court while giving bail must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offenses and he is not likely to commit any offense while being on bail period. The court held that the twin conditions under Section45(1) were discriminatory and arbitrary in nature and should not be applied while granting bail. Application of section 45(1) states that the same offense has been tried under different cases which end up with different results. And while granting bail presumption of innocence is always there, whereas there is no such presumption mentioned in section 45 and it has also inverted the conditions. - Vinod Bhandari v. Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement, 2018 [\[7\]](#_ftn7)– It was held that “the contention advanced by the learned ASG cannot be accepted. It is to be further noted here that, the original Sub-[section 45(1) (ii)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/54577816/) has therefore neither been revived nor resurrected by the [Amending Act](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1596533/) and, therefore, as of today there is no rigor of said two further conditions under the original [Section 45(1)(ii)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/54577816/) of PMLA Act for releasing the accused on bail under the said Act.”4 (Challenges the applicability of twin conditions under section 45(1) PMLA post amendment. - Vijay Mandanlal Choudhary vs. UOI,2022[\[8\]](#_ftn8) The court emphasized the perception of parliament regarding the seriousness of money laundering and its threats to national sovereignty and integrity. The court upheld a special provision of PMLA, including the “twin bail condition” under Section- 45 of the Act, which was struck down. - Chidambaram vs. ED, 2019[\[9\]](#_ftn9) In this case, the Court laid down the guidelines that must be considered while refusing or granting bail. Triple Test- (i) Presence of Accuse, (ii) Nature of Evidence, and (iii) Deep roots. - Current Position- The twin test must be strictly applied to all courts in both regular and anticipatory bail. **Anti-Money Laundering Provisions worldwide** Money Laundering is a global concern that affects both society and the economy and to prevent this, these countries globally have anti-money laundering provisions – - In **the US**, to combat money laundering cases “FinCEN (Financial Crime Enforcement Network)” was established, and “AML (anti-money laundering )” laws are very stringent in the US. - In **Singapore**, AML is governed by” the MAS (Monetary Authority of Singapore)” and it is committed to combating money laundering - In **the Philippines**, Anti-money laundering regulations are governed by “AMLA (Anti Money Laundering Act)” and there is a separate council “AMLC (Anti-money Laundering Council)” to investigate and prosecute money. - In **Australia**, there is the “(AML/CTF Act) Anti Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act” which governs Money Laundering provisions in Australia - In **the Middle East**, countries are strengthening their Money Laundering provisions. In UAE, it is governed by the “(FIU) Financial Intelligence Unit” and this regulates reporting and other related things to money laundering. - In **the UK**, there is a “(POCA) Proceeds of Crime Act and Money Laundering” Regulation to govern this law and there is a separate agency/ authority- the National Crime Agency for investigating. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** To conclude Bail under PMLA is almost impossible to get but it is still possible to get and courts have made various amendments and changes in the bail provisions throughout many years and changes are still going on. Indian laws have this flexible structure and at the same time, it’s rigid which makes it possible for them to change and amend the provisions. It is a complex mixture and interplay of imperative financial crimes and individual rights and liberty, and all forms of government need to equally play their roles in these cases. PMLA has stringent provisions so applying bail provision should be balanced. This balance will enhance the legal framework and also reinforce public confidence. **REFERENCES** 1. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. Indian Kanoon 2. Live law 3. Bar and bench 2. **Cases Referred** 3. Chidambaram vs. ED, 2019 4. Vijay Mandanlal Choudhary vs. UOI,2022 5. Vinod Bhandari v. Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement, 2018 6. Nikesh Tarachand Shah vs. UOI & ANR 3. **Statutes Referred** 4. PMLA ( Prevention of Money Laundering Act) 5. CrPC now BNSS **ENDNOTES** [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) https://main.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/5183.pdf [\[2\]](#_ftnref2)https://indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/2036?sam\_handle=123456789/1362 [\[3\]](#_ftnref3)https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/15272/1/the\_code\_of\_criminal\_procedure,\_1973.pdf [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) https://www.livelaw.in/supreme-court/pmla-accused-need-not-fulfill-s45-conditions-when-furnishing-bond-after-appearing-before-trial-court-as-per-summons-supreme-court-258075#:~:text=According%20to%20Section%2045%20of,any%20offence%20while%20on%20bail. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2017/13393/13393\_2017\_Judgement\_23-Nov-2017.pdf [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) https://dea.gov.in/sites/default/files/frbm\_amendment\_acts\_2018.pdf [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) https://indiankanoon.org/doc/149592740/ [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) https://indiankanoon.org/doc/14485072/ [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) https://indiankanoon.org/doc/42679608/ **Categories:** Articles, Criminal Law --- ### [The Principle of Liquidated Damages: Balancing Compensation and Penalty in Contract](https://lawfoyer.in/the-principle-of-liquidated-damages-balancing-compensation-and-penalty-in-contract/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Nayan Kumar Agarwal** **Editor: I Sharan** **Introduction** There is a presumption in every contractual agreement that the parties will carry out their share of the duties and obligations stated therein. According to Section 37 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (soon to be referred to as the “Act”), parties to a contract are required to carry out or offer to carry out their respective promises, unless the Act’s or another law’s provisions remove or otherwise excuse such performance. This isn’t always the case, though. For this reason, in the event of a “breach” of contract, the parties must have some form of remedy, which allows them to file a lawsuit. The Act contains no definition of a breach; still, according to Section 39, the promisee can end the agreement if one of the parties has either refused to perform or is made incapable of fulfilling his promise in full. However, the tale is not over yet. The Act also provides “compensation” for loss or damage to the party complaining of the breach, since it is common for the other party to suffer losses arising in due course from a party’s non-performance or breach of contract. **What are liquidated damages?** Liquidated damages are the terms used in contracts that specify how much must be paid in the event that a party breaches the agreement. The liquidated losses clause is described as “a contractual provision that finds in advance the measure of losses in case a party breaches the contract” by Black’s Law Dictionary. These clauses are the parts of the agreement that address specific situations in which either party might be found to have violated the agreement. For instance, failure to perform due to a delay, differences in a certain quantity or quality standard, etc. In contracts including these damages, determining compensation is made simple because the parties have previously agreed upon an amount during the contract’s formation. **Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act** The Indian Contracts Act’s Section 74 deals with liquidated damages. According to this rule, the party that is hurt by a breach and is entitled to reasonable compensation, which cannot exceed the amount set forth in the contract, is the one who is listed as payable in the event of a breach, regardless of whether there is a penalty or not. Therefore, the amount represents the upper limit of duty. You can understand it by examining the following examples. ***Essential conditions to claim liquidated damages*** **The presence of a legal contract** First and foremost, there needs to be a legally binding contract between the parties. When both parties freely consent and there is a valid consideration, a contract is deemed legal. The Indian Contract Act of 1872 basically states that a contract must meet every criterion for a valid agreement, including an acceptable offer and acceptance, competent parties, the parties’ purpose to create a legal obligation, valid consideration, a lawful object, etc. **Violation of the agreement** Second, one or more of the contracting parties must violate the agreement. This basically indicates that any clause in the contract must be broken. Put differently, there can be no claim for damages if there isn’t a breach. Additionally, the plaintiff **Clause of Liquidated Damages** A contract indicating such a violation must be secured against a specified sum of compensation. **Reasonable Relationship with the Actual Damage** For the liquidated damages clause to be enforceable, enough reward must be requested. Excessive and unethical agreements are typically rejected by the courts. Therefore, the courts have the authority to lower the award amount to what makes sense under the circumstances. In ONGC v. Saw Pipes Ltd., the Supreme Court ruled that the court must award compensation that is less than the contract’s stipulated liquidated damages and that it must be based on a reasonable assessment of the consequences of the contract’s breach if the claimant (party seeking damages) lacks proof or an honest estimate. **What are Liquidated Damages and Penalty?** If a contract is broken, the party who defaults is obligated to compensate the injured party with liquidated damages and a penalty. Penalty clauses and liquidated damages are two different things. They are not convertible. Even in legal proceedings, these terms are occasionally used the same and lead to errors. Let’s examine the laws that control them in depth as well as the distinctions between the two. Difference Between Liquidated Damages and Penalty** A contract between two or more parties may specify the amount of money that one of them will have to pay. The Indian Contract Act and English Law have different rules on the enforceability of pay in the case of non-performance and the acceptance of that sum as damages. When actual damages are difficult to determine, liquidated damages are presumed to be a fair depiction of losses. Liquidated damages are typically meant to be compensatory in nature rather than remedial. A specific agreement proviso may mention liquidated damages to address cases in which a party suffers losses from resources that aren’t directly related to money. In this case, presuming a Typically, a model serves as a step for planning another item, which may involve talking with experts and outside sources in addition to an organization’s officials. Unknown plans or designs for a product most likely won’t have a fixed market value. This may be true even if the resultant item is not essential to the development and growth of a company. These plans may be regarded as highly sensitive secret innovations of the company. If the schemes were discovered by an irate agent or supplier, it could severely hamper the ability to generate revenue from the delivery of that item. For the purpose of a liquidated damages clause in an agreement, an organization would have to estimate the potential cost of such events in advance. **Liquidated Damages and Penalties in Construction Contracts** This phrase is often seen in contracts related to building. A contractor is liable for paying liquidated damages if the project is not finished on schedule. Liquid losses are due and the employer is not needed to provide proof of the loss incurred. Other Remedies to a Liquidated Damages Clause In addition to asking for damages, the victim may also pursue certain other remedies. End a Contract The opposite party may consider the deal to be rescinded if one party violates it. A contract can be dismissed, which means it can be cancelled. In addition to being released from any duty, the opposite party may pursue damages. A party can cancel a contract in line with section 75 of the Indian Contract Act if he does so lawfully. **Case Law’s** **Kailash Nath Associates v. Delhi Development Authority and Another (2015)** ***Facts*** In this instance, the DDA held a public land auction. Those who won had to put down a certain amount as earnest money, which would be lost if any of the terms and conditions of the auction were broken or not followed. After paying the earnest money and requesting—and getting granted—a longer deadline for the balance, Kailash Naith, the appellant, had the land put up for auction. In order to obtain the specific execution of the contract and a return of the earnest money, the applicant sought the court. ***Issues*** Is it possible that contracts requiring the loss of earnest money in the event of a breach of contract are subject to Section 74 of the Act? ***Judgement*** According to the ruling of the Supreme Court, in cases where a contract includes provisions for liquidated damages, the entire amount of such damages is available only if the party that was harmed suffered damages that were comparable to the set amount of damages. It was also noted that the amount of restitution granted by the court could not, under any situation, go beyond the sum specified in the contract. In this case, the court held that the appellant had not broken any terms of the contract, hence no fine could be applied to cause the earnest money to be lost in accordance with Section 74 of the Act. When there is no damage and a breach occurs, the law does not provide for a windfall. Sir Chuni Lal Mehta & Sons v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co., AIR 1962 SC 1314** ***Facts*** This case nervous a managing agency agreement for the sale of goods in which the respondent in error terminated the agreement before the agreed-upon period could expire. As a result, the appellants filed a lawsuit to recover damages for breach of contract, based on the agreed-upon amount. ***Issue*** The computation and legality of damages for a breach of contract were in question. ***Judgement*** It was noted that in cases where both sides have expressly stated in writing the number of liquidated damages, there cannot be a presumption that they also intended to give the plaintiff liberty to exceed the amount specified and replace a sum that could not have been determined or found on the date of the breach. The court went on to say that the general law naturally excludes the right to damages claims because the payment is provided for in clear terms. As a result, the buyer’s breach of contract gave rise to the seller’s right to damages, which included the difference between the contract price and the used price. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** Including a provision for liquidated damages helps the overall efficacy of the contracts in the rapid pace of contemporary business and commerce, when time and resources are crucial. Because all potential effects of breaching the contract have been thoroughly considered and agreed upon, the contracting parties can now engage in agreements with more confidence. These kinds of provisions encourage openness and, in the end, mutual trust between the parties. Yet it’s critical to comprehend that the contract must have a precise and fair provision for liquidated damages. The necessity for careful writing is further underscored by the possibility that certain terms would be ruled void by the courts for being unclear or requiring high expenses. Thus, courts and those who design contracts need to **REFERENCES** - The Indian Contract Act, Mulla, LexisNexis, - The Indian Contract Act, Bare Act, Universal - - Contract & Specific Relief, Avatar Singh - - **Categories:** Articles, Contract Law --- ### [Tussle between patent rights and compulsory licensing in pharmaceutical industries: provisions cases and solutions](https://lawfoyer.in/tussle-between-patent-rights-and-compulsory-licensing-in-pharmaceutical-industries-provisions-cases-and-solutions/) **Published:** September 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: C Thiruvikram** **Edited by: Shadrack Chai** **INTRODUCTION:** Both the concepts of compulsory licensing and patent rights have their differences and usages. Yet there is lately a large worldwide struggle/tussle between patent rights and compulsory licensing. A patent right is nothing but the ownership of any medicine that is invented and the compulsory license of the person to whom the right to manufacture and sell is given by the patentee to another person who could be beneficial by distribution along with the inventor or the actual owner of the patented product. In this following article, you will find the true concept of patent rights and compulsory licensing and its prerequisites how to granted a patent right and grant of compulsory license in compulsory licensing. ***Keywords*: IPR, patent rights, compulsory licensing, pharmaceutical industries, medical patents, product patents.** SUB-HEADINGS** **Meaning, Definition & Explanation:** PATENT RIGHTS: These are the rights that are granted to the patent holder, i.e., the pharmaceutical company, where they could prevent the production and selling of this patented product for over the limit of 20 years. It allows the patent holder to recoup investments in their research and development, and it encourages innovation by providing them a temporary monopoly. COMPULSORY LICENSING: It is a provision that the government uses which grants the third party to sell the patented product without the prior consent of the patent holder for the particular patented product. These are typically invoked when there are public health emergencies/ national crises/ when the patented product does not meet its required demand for the particular drug. But to grant compulsory licensing there a required royalties that need to be paid by the license holder to the patent holder. By this, it aims to balance the patent rights with the public interests and ensure access to essential medicines while incentivizing innovation. **Essentials Elements / Pre-requisites of compulsory licensing:** There are a few prerequisites which are essential for compulsory licensing, which are as follows: **Patent protection**: The drug or invention must be patented in the country where compulsory licensing is sought. **Public interest**: Compulsory licensing is usually invoked to address a public health need, such as: Epidemics (e.g., HIV/AIDS, COVID-19) Pandemics National health crises Unmet medical needs Access to essential medicines **Insufficient supply or access**: The patent holder must be unable or unwilling to meet the demand for the drug, leading to: Shortages High prices Limited availability **Attempts to negotiate**: The government or applicant must demonstrate efforts to obtain a voluntary license from the patent holder, which were unsuccessful. **National emergency or extreme urgency**: Compulsory licensing may be granted during national emergencies or situations of extreme urgency, such as a public health crisis. **Non-commercial use:** Compulsory licensing is often limited to non-commercial use, such as for public health programs or government procurement. **WTO compliance:** Countries must comply with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, specifically the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). **Domestic legislation:** The country must have domestic legislation in place to enable compulsory licensing, such as laws allowing for government use or third-party licenses. **Case Laws / Judicial Development of the Concept:** **BAYER CORPORATION V UNION OF INDIA[\[1\]](#_ftn1):-** **Facts:-** In Bayer Corporation vs Union of India (2014), Bayer challenged the Indian Intellectual Property Appellate Board’s decision to grant a compulsory license for its cancer drug Nexavar (Sorafenib Tosylate) to Natco Pharma. Bayer, a U.S.-based company, held a patent for the drug but priced it at ₹2,80,000 per month, making it unaffordable for many patients. Natco sought a voluntary license to sell the drug at ₹8,800 per month but was denied, leading to its application for a compulsory license under Section 84 of the Indian Patent Act. **Issues Raised:-** **Efforts for Voluntary License:** Whether Natco made sufficient efforts to obtain a voluntary license from Bayer before applying for a compulsory license. **Reasonable Requirement of Public:** Whether Bayer’s supply of the drug met the reasonable requirements of the public. **Affordability:** Whether the patented drug was available to the public at a reasonably affordable price. **Working of the Patent:** Whether the patented drug was being worked in India, including through importation. **Adjournment of Application:** Whether the Controller should have adjourned Natco’s application to allow Bayer more time to meet market needs. **Judgment:** The Indian Supreme Court upheld the compulsory license, concluding that Natco had made adequate efforts to obtain a voluntary license. It found that Bayer had not satisfied the public’s reasonable requirements, as the price was prohibitively high. The Court ruled that the drug was not available at a reasonably affordable price and that Bayer’s importation did not constitute sufficient working of the patent in India. The Tribunal’s decision to grant the compulsory license was affirmed, emphasizing public interest and access to essential medicines. The petition was dismissed, reinforcing the balance between patent rights and public health. **NOVARTIS AG v. UNION OF INDIA[\[2\]](#_ftn2):-** **Facts:-** In Novartis AG v. Union of India (2013), Novartis challenged the Indian patent office’s denial of a patent for its cancer drug, Glivec (Imatinib Mesylate). The patent application was rejected because the drug did not meet the criteria of novelty and non-obviousness under Section 3(d) of the Indian Patent Act, which aims to prevent the evergreening of patents by requiring that new forms of known substances demonstrate enhanced efficacy. **Issues Raised:-** **Patentability Criteria:** Whether the interpretation of Section 3(d) of the Indian Patent Act was appropriate in rejecting Novartis’s application. **Public Health vs. Patent Rights:** The balance between protecting public health and the rights of pharmaceutical companies to patent new drugs. **Impact on Access to Medicines:** Concerns regarding how the denial of the patent could affect access to affordable medicines in India. **Judgment:-** The Supreme Court of India upheld the patent office’s decision, affirming that Glivec did not exhibit significant therapeutic efficacy over existing treatments. The Court emphasized the importance of public health and access to medicines, stating that the patent system should not be used to extend monopolies on drugs that do not provide substantial benefits. The judgment underscored India’s commitment to ensuring affordable healthcare while maintaining a robust patent framework. **MERCK KGAA V INTERVET INTERNATIONAL BV[\[3\]](#_ftn3):-** **Facts:-** In Merck KGaA v. Intervet International BV (2010), Merck KGaA, a German pharmaceutical company, filed a patent infringement lawsuit against Intervet International, a Dutch company, over a veterinary vaccine for poultry. Merck claimed that Intervet’s vaccine infringed its patent related to a specific method of producing the vaccine. **Issues Raised:-** **Patent Infringement:** Whether Intervet’s vaccine production method infringed Merck’s patent. **Validity of the Patent:** The validity of Merck’s patent, particularly concerning its novelty and non-obviousness. **Scope of Patent Protection:** The interpretation of the patent claims and whether Intervet’s actions fell within the scope of Merck’s patent rights. **Judgment:-** The court ruled in favour of Merck, finding that Intervet’s vaccine did indeed infringe on Merck’s patent. The judgment reaffirmed the validity of Merck’s patent, emphasizing that the patented method provided a significant advancement in the production of veterinary vaccines. The decision highlighted the importance of patent protection in encouraging innovation within the pharmaceutical industry. **CANADA PATENT PROTECTION ON PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS:-** **Overview:-** Canada’s patent protection for pharmaceutical products is governed by the Patent Act, which provides a framework for granting patents on new inventions, including drugs. The key aspects include the criteria for patentability, the duration of protection, and regulatory considerations. **Key Aspects:-** **Patentability Criteria:** **Novelty:** The invention must be new and not previously disclosed. **Non-Obviousness**: The invention must not be obvious to someone skilled in the field. **Utility**: The invention must have a specific, substantial, and credible utility. **Duration of Patent Protection:** Patents in Canada typically last for 20 years from the filing date, subject to the payment of maintenance fees. This period allows pharmaceutical companies to recoup their research and development investments. **Regulatory Framework:** The Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations allow for a streamlined approval process for generic drugs after the patent expires. The Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) administers patent applications and grants. **Compulsory Licensing:** Under certain conditions, the Canadian government can issue compulsory licenses to allow others to produce a patented product without the patent holder’s consent, particularly in situations of public health need. **Data Protection:** Canada provides data protection for new pharmaceutical products, ensuring that the data submitted for regulatory approval is not used by competitors for a specified period. **Conclusion:-** Canada’s patent protection framework aims to balance the interests of pharmaceutical innovators with public health needs, ensuring access to medicines while incentivizing research and development in the pharmaceutical industry. **BRAZIL’S MEASURES AFFECTING THE PATENT PROTECTION:-** Brazil’s patent protection framework is primarily governed by the Industrial Property Law (Law No. 9,279/1996), which outlines the legal mechanisms for granting patents, including specific provisions that impact pharmaceutical products. This framework is designed to balance the interests of innovation and public health, reflecting Brazil’s commitment to ensuring access to medicines while encouraging research and development. **Patentability Criteria:-** Under Brazilian law, to qualify for patent protection, an invention must meet three fundamental criteria: novelty, inventive step, and industrial applicability. **Novelty**: The invention must be new, meaning it has not been disclosed to the public before the filing date. **Inventive** **Step**: The invention must not be obvious to someone skilled in the relevant field, which means it should involve a significant advancement over existing knowledge. **Industrial** **Applicability**: The invention must be capable of being used in some kind of industry, ensuring that it has practical utility. These criteria are essential for maintaining a high standard of patent quality in Brazil, promoting genuine innovation rather than mere incremental changes. **Duration** **of** **Patent** **Protection**:- Patents in Brazil are granted for a maximum duration of 20 years from the filing date, contingent upon the payment of annual maintenance fees. This period allows patent holders to recoup their investments in research and development. However, the lengthy examination process at the Brazilian Patent Office (INPI) can lead to delays in the granting of patents, sometimes extending the effective protection period. **Compulsory** **Licensing:-** One of the most significant aspects of Brazil’s patent system is its provisions for compulsory licensing. Under specific conditions, the Brazilian government can issue compulsory licenses to allow third parties to produce a patented product without the patent holder’s consent. This is particularly applicable in cases of public health emergencies or when the patented product is not being supplied adequately to the market. For instance, Brazil has used compulsory licensing to make HIV/AIDS medications more accessible, demonstrating its commitment to public health over strict patent enforcement. **Patent** **Examination** **Process:-** Brazil employs a substantive examination process for patent applications, which can prolong the time it takes for patents to be granted. The INPI evaluates applications for compliance with patentability criteria, and the backlog of pending applications has been a challenge. Efforts have been made to streamline this process, but delays remain a concern for both applicants and the pharmaceutical industry. **Data** **Exclusivity:-** Brazil provides a period of data exclusivity for new pharmaceutical products, typically lasting five years. This exclusivity prevents regulatory authorities from using the clinical data submitted by the original manufacturer for marketing approval of generic versions during this period. This measure is aimed at protecting the investment made by pharmaceutical companies in developing new drugs. **Public** **Health** **Considerations:-** The Brazilian government has consistently emphasized public health in its patent policies. This approach has led to tensions between the government and pharmaceutical companies, particularly regarding access to essential medicines. Brazil’s willingness to utilize compulsory licensing and other measures to ensure access to affordable drugs reflects its prioritization of public health needs over strict adherence to patent rights. **Conclusion:-** Brazil’s measures affecting patent protection illustrate a complex interplay between safeguarding intellectual property rights and addressing public health imperatives. While the framework encourages innovation, it also ensures that essential medicines remain accessible to the population. This balance is critical in shaping Brazil’s pharmaceutical landscape and has significant implications for global health and patent policy discussions. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS:-** The tussle between patent rights and compulsory licensing in the pharmaceutical industry is a complex and multifaceted issue, reflecting a delicate balance between innovation, access, private interests, and public health. This conclusion summarizes the key aspects of this debate. Patent rights are essential for encouraging innovation in the pharmaceutical industry, as they provide a temporary monopoly for patent holders to recoup investments in research and development. However, excessive patent protection can lead to high drug prices, limited access, and public health concerns. Compulsory licensing, on the other hand, allows governments to grant permission for third-party manufacturers to produce patented drugs without the patent holder’s consent, usually during public health emergencies or when the patent holder is not meeting demand. This mechanism ensures access to essential medicines, promotes competition, and addresses shortages or high prices. The tension between patent rights and compulsory licensing arises from the need to balance these competing interests. Patent holders argue that compulsory licensing undermines their rights, discourages innovation, and sets a dangerous precedent. In contrast, public health advocates contend that compulsory licensing is necessary to address unmet medical needs, promote access, and protect human life. To resolve this tussle, governments, patent holders, and generic manufacturers must engage in constructive dialogue and find mutually beneficial solutions. This may involve: **Voluntary** **licensing** **agreements**: Patent holders can voluntarily license their patents to generic manufacturers, ensuring access while maintaining some control. **Tiered** **pricing**: Patent holders can adopt tiered pricing strategies, offering discounted prices in low-income countries or for public health programs. **Patent** **pooling**: Patent holders can pool their patents, allowing generic manufacturers to access multiple patents and promote competition. **Research** **and** **development** **incentives**: Governments can offer incentives for research and development, such as tax credits or grants, to encourage innovation while ensuring access. **Transparency** **and** **accountability**: Patent holders and governments must ensure transparency in patent applications, licensing agreements, and drug pricing, promoting accountability and trust. In conclusion, the tussle between patent rights and compulsory licensing in the pharmaceutical industry requires a nuanced and context-specific approach. By balancing innovation, access, private interests, and public health, stakeholders can promote a sustainable and equitable solution that benefits both patients and patent holders. 1. **REFERENCES** **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** Patent Law- P Narayanan. Patent law cases and materials- A synthesis on India. Intellectual Property Law- Dr.Avtar Singh. Supreme Court on Intellectual Property- EBC Law Journal. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** Indiankanoon.com Legal services.in Ipleaders.com Livelaw. in Scconline. in Casemine. in **Cases Referred** Bayer Corporation v Union of India. Norvatis ag v union of India. Merck kgaa v intervet international. **Statutes Referred** Patents Act, 1970. World Trade Organization. Canada Convention. Brazil Convention. [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) (2016) 5 SCC 473. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) (2013) 6 SCC 1. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) \[2010\] EWHC 1973 (Pat). **Categories:** Articles, Intellectual Property Law --- ### [The role of international human rights law in addressing the challenges of climate change and environmental degradation](https://lawfoyer.in/the-role-of-international-human-rights-law-in-addressing-the-challenges-of-climate-change-and-environmental-degradation/) **Published:** August 31, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author:Upasana Saikia** **Edited by: Shadrack Chai** **INTRODUCTION** According to Resolution 26/27 of the United Nations Human Rights Council, it is stressed that climate change is a worldwide issue that necessitates a worldwide resolution. The Council urged for global collaboration in enforcing the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to help countries address human rights impacted by climate change effects. The Council confirmed that human rights commitments, guidelines, and values can enhance and support global, regional, and local decision-making on climate change, leading to consistency in policies, credibility, and sustainability results. Acknowledging these realities, the Human Rights Council organized a day-long panel meeting on human rights and climate change on March 6, 2015. The meeting focused on the difficulties climate change presents in achieving human rights for all individuals, especially those in vulnerable positions, and the negative effects on countries’ abilities to ensure the right to food. Panellists, including respected speakers from UN Member States, intergovernmental organizations, civil society, and academia, suggested proactive solutions based on rights to tackle climate change. Governments must follow international human rights laws by either performing certain actions or refraining from certain actions to protect the basic rights of individuals and groups. One of the UN’s greatest achievements is the establishment of a universal and enforceable set of human rights laws that are recognized worldwide and can be adopted by all countries. The UN has defined a variety of internationally recognized rights, including civil, cultural, economic, political, and social rights. In addition, it has established procedures to assist and protect these rights and aid countries in meeting their responsibilities. The General Assembly ratified the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1945 and 1948, respectively, establishing them as the foundational laws of this organization. From that time onwards, the UN has steadily expanded the scope of human rights legislation to encompass specific obligations for minorities, women, children, individuals with disabilities, and other marginalized communities. As a consequence, these groups now possess rights that protect them from the bias that was previously common in numerous countries. **THE ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION** The creation of the Human Rights Commission did not happen overnight. The UN created the Human Rights Council to safeguard the human rights of all individuals, and the General Assembly approved the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” on December 10, 1948. The annual celebration of “World Human Rights Day” takes place on 10th December. Following extensive deliberation, it was determined that a National Human Rights Commission would be established in each country to safeguard the rights of individuals. In the same way, the State Human Rights Commission was established to safeguard human rights at the state level. This was how the Human Rights Commission was established. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*: International Human Rights Commission, Climate Change, Right to Life, Right to Self-Determination, Right to Food, Right to Health.** **SUB-HEADINGS** **Meaning, Definition & Explanation** All individuals, regardless of their race, sex, nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, or other characteristics, possess inherent human rights. Human rights include the rights to life and liberty, freedom from slavery and torture, freedom of opinion and expression, the right to work and education, as well as various other rights. Each person has the right to these freedoms without facing any kind of prejudice. The idea of Human Rights is ancient, so it is not a recent concept. When people lived in the forest, they adhered to rules such as the Right to live and Property. Over time, civilization developed and the emergence of law, which was perceived as the leader of a group, led to the establishment of Kings and the formation of a society where Kings ruled and laws were established. In this manner, Human Rights were established as a legal principle. Climate change affects a variety of human rights that are internationally protected, both directly and indirectly. **What is the importance of incorporating human rights into efforts related to climate change? Human rights are legal guarantees that apply to everyone and safeguard individuals, groups, and communities from actions or lack of actions that infringe upon their basic freedoms and rights. Human rights law requires governments (mainly) and other duty-bearers to uphold, advance, safeguard, and meet all human rights. Human rights apply to all individuals and stem from the intrinsic value and equal importance of every person. They are equal, indivisible, interconnected and interdependent, and cannot be relinquished or removed. Additionally, human rights are legally safeguarded and place responsibility on actions and inactions, especially of governments and government officials. There is no doubt now that human-induced climate change has adverse effects on the complete realization of human rights. Climate change significantly affects many human rights, such as the right to life, self-determination, development, food, health, water and sanitation, and housing. The global responses to climate change must follow human rights norms and principles such as participation, transparency, accountability, equity, and non-discrimination. In short, climate change is an issue of human rights and human rights principles should be incorporated into the solution. **Which ethical standards related to human rights are relevant in the climate change scenario?** It is the responsibility of states to uphold, safeguard, encourage, and meet all human rights for every individual. This entails a clear responsibility to avoid potential risks, such as those resulting from climate change. The UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICESCR, and the UN Declaration on the Right to Development emphasize that State human rights obligations necessitate both individual effort and international collaboration. As per the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, all individuals have the right to a social and international system where their rights and freedoms can be fully achieved, and they also have responsibilities towards society. The fundamental principles of human rights, equality, and non-discrimination entail the need to take steps to alleviate the unequal effects of climate change on marginalized populations and ensure that efforts to combat climate change benefit those in vulnerable situations and diminish disparities. Concerns about climate justice, fairness, equity, and access to remedy are heightened by the unequal effects of climate change on individuals in vulnerable circumstances. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, along with the ICCPR and other human rights agreements, state that individuals who experience human rights abuses have the right to seek appropriate redress. The panel of the Human Rights Council continuously urged for climate justice and prompt action to reduce and adjust to climate change. Prime Minister Enele Sopoaga of Tuvalu emphasized that addressing the human rights. **How can we incorporate human rights into actions related to climate change?** Implementing human rights in actions related to climate change involves using a rights-based approach to policy and development, as outlined in the Declaration on the Right to Development and supported in the UN Common Understanding of a Human Rights-Based Approach to Development Cooperation. Key human rights principles highlighted by the UN Common Understanding include universality, indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness, non-discrimination and equality, participation and inclusion, accountability, and the rule of law. It lays out a theoretical structure for development using global human rights principles to enhance and safeguard human rights in every development action. A rights-focused method evaluates duties, disparities, and susceptibilities, aiming to correct biased behaviours and unfair power allocations. It grounds plans, policies, and programs in a framework of rights, as well as duties set by global legal standards. **The key essentials of a human rights-centred approach include:** The primary focus in developing policies and programs should be on upholding human rights. The identification of rights-holders and their entitlements, along with duty-bearers and their obligations, is essential for enhancing the abilities of rights-holders to assert their claims and duty-bearers to fulfil their responsibilities. All policies and programming at every stage should be guided by principles and standards from global human rights law, like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and fundamental human rights treaties. Any efforts to address climate change, like promoting renewable energy, protecting forests, planting trees, and relocating communities, should prioritize human rights. Affected individuals and communities need to be involved, with no discrimination, in the planning and execution of these projects. They should have the right to due process and to seek redress if their rights are infringed upon. **What measures need to be implemented moving forward?** On February 13, 2015, the Geneva Pledge for Human Rights in Climate Action was introduced, with eighteen States pledging to support the exchange of best practices and knowledge among human rights and climate professionals at the national level. This aims to enhance collective abilities to provide climate change solutions that benefit both people and the environment. The Geneva Pledge is available to all States and is just one of numerous key initiatives focusing on enhancing the comprehension of the connections between human rights and climate change. Throughout the panel discussions, panellists continuously highlighted the significance of this effort, pointing out that enhancing communication between these separate groups is a crucial requirement for further integrating human rights into the climate change conversation. The main goal of these and similar efforts should be to move this conversation from theory to practice, encouraging immediate, urgent actions based on the right to address and adapt to the adverse effects of climate change. Based on earlier research in human rights and climate change, as well as discussions from March 6, 2015, the rest of this report aims to motivate and educate on the importance of incorporating human rights into climate initiatives at COP 21 and beyond. The upcoming section will analyze specific rights impacted by climate change. **THE RIGHT TO LIFE** As per the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, every individual is entitled to the right to life, freedom, and personal security. The ICCPR reaffirms that “every individual has the right” to possess the intrinsic entitlement to life. Every State has agreed to Honor, safeguard, advocate for, and uphold the right to life. At the bare minimum, this means that States are expected to implement proactive steps to avoid foreseeable and preventable loss of life. Climate change represents a danger to human existence. Abul Hassan Mahmood Ali, Foreign Minister. The Minister of Bangladesh labelled this threat as “existential.” **THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION** The UN Charter’s Article 1 emphasizes the importance of respecting the “self-determination of peoples”. Additionally, Common Article 1 of the ICCPR and the ICESCR affirm that “every group has the entitlement to self-determination. Due to that right, they have the freedom to decide their political status and to pursue their economic, social, and cultural development without restriction. States are required to acknowledge the self-determination of all people and guarantee they have the resources needed for self-sufficiency. Climate change doesn’t just endanger people’s lives, but also their ways of living, jobs, and the existence of entire communities. **THE RIGHT TO FOOD** The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ICESCR both guarantee the right to food. The ICESCR’s Article 11 defends the “basic entitlement of all individuals to live without hunger” and urges countries, both independently and in collaboration with others, to guarantee a fair sharing of global food resources based on necessity. States must uphold human rights, just like they do with all other rights. Uphold, defend, advocate for, and guarantee the human right to food. Additionally, countries have pledged to utilize all possible resources to gradually achieve the right to food and all other rights outlined in the ICESCR. **THE RIGHT TO HEALTH** The right to health for humans is mentioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 12 of the ICESCR, guaranteeing everyone the right to achieve optimal physical and mental health. The Human Rights Council has frequently acknowledged the effects of climate change on the right to health and achieving the best possible level of physical and mental health for maximum satisfaction. The most recent resolution 29/15 of the Human Rights Council includes a call for a panel discussion and a detailed study on how climate change affects the right to health. **The role that can be played by the Resident Coordinator and UN Country Team in advancing the issue**. The Resident Coordinator and UN Country Team must educate government officials, policymakers, National Human Rights Institutions, indigenous peoples, and the general public on the connection between human rights and the environment through training and national awareness campaigns. They ought to enhance the availability of information, public involvement, and access to justice in environmental decision-making, by offering technical and financial assistance. This will hold governments, businesses, and environmental/human rights groups accountable for their impact on the environment and human rights. They need to promote stronger connections between different sectors at the country level, as this can advance sustainable development by merging human rights, social development, economic development, and environmental protection within a coordinated framework. The Resident Coordinator and UN Country Team should support countries in enforcing the guidelines of applicable MEAs, meeting global human rights obligations, and crafting and accepting environmental policies, laws, and regulations to safeguard human rights enjoyment and preserve the environment for present and future generations. UN Country Teams need to enhance their involvement with the human rights mechanisms. To achieve this, they must utilize the thematic knowledge within the HRWG and make use of the coordinating function of the human rights mechanisms to assist Country Teams in collaborating as a unified UN entity and enhancing their ability to tackle the connection between human rights and the environment. They need to be ready to assist nations and public organizations in issuing reports to human rights treaty bodies, the universal periodic review held by the Human Rights Council, and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change regarding human rights and environmental matters. UN Country Teams and Resident Coordinators must work to record how environmental damage and climate change affect human rights, such as the right to development. They should also assist in overseeing the effects of development projects on human rights to determine if these projects are helping people, especially those most at risk of environmental and other dangers. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** In recent years, there has been a clearer understanding of the human rights principles that pertain to environmental damage. To safeguard various human rights from environmental damage, human rights organizations have outlined responsibilities for governments to evaluate the environmental effects of planned activities, share environmental information, involve the public in environmental decision-making processes (while upholding freedom of expression and association), and guarantee adequate solutions for environmental disruptions to human rights. States are required to put into place legal safeguards to prevent environmental damage that impacts human rights, even if it is caused by private entities. States don’t need to ban all activities that could potentially harm the environment according to human rights law. They can find a middle ground between protecting the environment and other valid societal interests, as long as it is fair and doesn’t lead to unwarranted violations of human rights. In conclusion, States are obligated to uphold non-discrimination in environmental laws and protect vulnerable groups, like indigenous peoples, from environmental harm. When it comes to climate change, States must fulfil obligations within their territory to safeguard human rights and implement adaptation and mitigation measures as needed. Identifying specific duties for each State concerning the extraterritorial impacts of actions within its jurisdiction is a challenging task. **REFERENCES** **Online Articles / Sources Referred** Human Rights Principles and Climate Change by Knox.pdf Human-Rights-and-the-Environment.pdf JAMR39.pdf COP21.pdf **Categories:** Articles, Environmental Law, Human Rights, International Law --- ### [Mutual Divorce under HMA, 1955](https://lawfoyer.in/mutual-divorce-under-hma-1955/) **Published:** August 31, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Happy Kushwah** **Edited by: Shadrack Chai** **INTRODUCTION** Mutual divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, of 1955, is a legal provision allowing couples to end their marriage amicably. Introduced as a progressive step, it recognizes that not all marriages can succeed, and sometimes, separation is the best option for both partners. Unlike contentious divorces, mutual divorce requires the agreement of both spouses, ensuring a smoother and less stressful process. To file for a mutual divorce, the couple must have lived separately for at least one year and agree that they cannot live together anymore. They file a joint petition in the family court, stating their intention to dissolve the marriage. After a six-month waiting period, which allows for any possible reconciliation, the court grants the divorce if both parties still wish to proceed. This process is designed to minimize conflict and protect the interests of both individuals, especially when children are involved. By promoting cooperation and reducing animosity, mutual divorce under the HMA, 1955, helps couples transition out of marriage with dignity and respect. ***Keywords (Minimum 5)*:** Mutual Divorce**,** Hindu Marriage Act 1955**,** Amicable Separation**,** Joint Petition**,** Family Court **Meaning, Definition & Explanation** Mutual divorce, under the Hindu Marriage Act, of 1955, refers to the dissolution of a marriage by mutual consent of both spouses. It is a legal process that allows a couple to end their marital relationship amicably and with dignity. **Definition:** According to Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, a mutual divorce is a divorce obtained by a couple through a joint petition filed in the family court, stating that they have been living separately for at least one year and have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved. **Explanation:** The process begins with both spouses jointly filing a petition for divorce in the family court, declaring their mutual consent to end the marriage. This petition must state that they have been living separately for a minimum of one year and cannot live together anymore. The court, upon receiving the petition, grants a six-month “cooling-off” period, during which the couple can reconsider their decision. If after this period, both parties still wish to proceed with the divorce, they appear before the court for a final hearing. The court, upon verifying the genuineness of the mutual consent and ensuring that the settlement terms, if any, are fair, grants the divorce decree. This procedure ensures a non-adversarial and less stressful process for both parties, allowing them to separate on good terms and with mutual respect. **Historical Background / Evolution (if any)** The concept of mutual divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, of 1955, reflects a significant shift in Indian matrimonial law towards recognizing individual autonomy and the reality of marital breakdowns. Before the enactment of this law, Hindu marriage was considered a sacrament, an indissoluble union that could not be terminated by mutual agreement. **Pre-HMA Era:** In traditional Hindu society, marriage was regarded as a lifelong bond, with no provision for divorce. The only ways to dissolve a marriage were through death or annulment under specific circumstances. This perspective left many individuals trapped in unhappy marriages, with no legal means to separate amicably. **Hindu Marriage Act, 1955:** The introduction of the Hindu Marriage Act, of 1955, marked a progressive development in matrimonial laws for Hindus. This act codified and reformed Hindu marriage and divorce laws, incorporating provisions for divorce on various grounds, including cruelty, desertion, and adultery. However, these grounds often led to adversarial proceedings, increasing conflict between spouses. **Introduction of Mutual Divorce (1976 Amendment):** Recognizing the need for a more harmonious and less contentious divorce process, the Hindu Marriage Act was amended in 1976 to include Section 13B, which introduced the provision for divorce by mutual consent. This amendment was a significant step towards modernizing matrimonial law, allowing couples to end their marriage amicably and with mutual respect. **Impact and Modern Relevance:** The inclusion of mutual divorce has had a profound impact on the legal landscape, providing a more humane and efficient way for couples to separate. It has empowered individuals to make autonomous decisions about their marital lives, reducing the emotional and financial toll of prolonged legal battles. Today, mutual divorce remains a testament to the evolving nature of matrimonial law, balancing traditional values with contemporary realities. **Comparison with other Countries (if needed)** Mutual divorce is a legal provision in many countries, allowing couples to dissolve their marriage by mutual agreement. While the core concept remains the same, the procedures and requirements vary significantly across different legal systems. Here’s a comparison of mutual divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, of 1955, with similar provisions in other countries: **India (Hindu Marriage Act, 1955):** Under the HMA, mutual divorce requires both spouses to file a joint petition after living separately for at least one year. The court grants a six-month “cooling-off” period, during which reconciliation can be attempted. If both parties still wish to proceed after this period, the court finalizes the divorce. **United States:** In the U.S., no-fault divorce laws, which resemble mutual consent divorces, are prevalent. Each state has its specific procedures, but generally, couples can file for divorce without needing to prove fault. States like California have simplified procedures for uncontested divorces, requiring minimal court intervention when both parties agree on key issues like property division and child custody. **United Kingdom:** In England and Wales, the Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Act 2020 introduced a “no-fault” divorce system, effective from April 2022. Couples no longer need to prove irretrievable breakdown due to fault-based reasons. Instead, one or both spouses can make a statement of irretrievable breakdown. After a 20-week reflection period and a further six-week waiting period post-conditional order, the court can issue a final order. **Australia:** Australia’s Family Law Act 1975 allows for a “no-fault” divorce, where the sole ground for divorce is the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, demonstrated by 12 months of separation. Couples can apply for divorce jointly or individually, and there is no mandatory waiting period after the application, although court hearings might take some time. **Canada:** Canadian law, under the Divorce Act, allows for “no-fault” divorces based on the grounds of separation for at least one year. Either spouse can file for divorce, or if both agree, the process is straightforward and can be completed without a court appearance in many cases. **Germany:** In Germany, the mutual consent divorce process involves both spouses agreeing to the divorce and living separately for at least one year. After this period, they can jointly apply for divorce, and the court usually grants it if the separation period and mutual consent are verified. **China:** Chinese divorce law allows for mutual consent divorces through a simplified administrative process. Couples can file for divorce at the local civil affairs bureau, provided they agree on the terms of separation, including property division and child custody. There is a 30-day “cooling-off” period during which either party can withdraw the application. **France:** France’s mutual consent divorce process requires couples to draft an agreement detailing the terms of their separation, which is then submitted to a notary for approval. There is no mandatory separation period, and the process can be swift if both parties agree on all terms. #### Causes Leading to Mutual Divorce **Marital Discord:** **Concept:** Persistent conflicts, lack of communication, and irreconcilable differences. **Effect:** When couples cannot resolve their issues despite attempts at reconciliation, they may mutually agree to part ways. **Lack of Compatibility:** **Concept:** Differences in values, interests, and life goals. **Effect:** Couples may find that their differences are too significant to sustain a harmonious marriage, leading to mutual consent for divorce. **Emotional and Physical Abuse:** **Concept:** Experiences of emotional, verbal, or physical abuse within the marriage. **Effect:** To escape a toxic environment, both parties may agree that a mutual divorce is the best solution. **Infidelity:** **Concept:** Extramarital affairs and breaches of trust. **Effect:** Mutual divorce is often sought when both partners acknowledge that the relationship cannot recover from such betrayals. **Financial Issues:** **Concept:** Disputes over financial management, debt, and economic instability. **Effect:** Financial stress can strain a marriage, and mutual divorce may be viewed as a way to relieve ongoing conflict. #### Effects of Mutual Divorce **Legal Simplification:** **Concept:** The legal process of obtaining a divorce. **Effect:** Mutual divorce simplifies the legal proceedings, reducing the time, cost, and emotional stress associated with contested divorces. **Psychological Well-being:** **Concept:** The mental and emotional health of the divorcing individuals. **Effect:** The amicable nature of mutual divorce can lead to better psychological outcomes, as it avoids the adversarial nature of contested divorces. **Child Custody and Welfare:** **Concept:** The impact on children of the divorcing couple. **Effect:** Mutual divorce allows for cooperative co-parenting agreements, prioritizing the best interests of the children and minimizing their emotional distress. **Social Perception:** **Concept:** Societal attitudes towards divorce. **Effect:** As mutual divorce becomes more accepted, it helps reduce the stigma associated with divorce, encouraging individuals to seek happiness without societal pressure to stay in unhappy marriages. **Economic Independence:** **Concept:** The financial autonomy of the individuals post-divorce. **Effect:** Mutual divorce often involves fair settlement agreements, which can ensure financial stability and independence for both parties. #### Relation with Other Concepts **Mediation and Counselling:** **Concept:** Professional guidance to resolve marital issues. **Effect:** These services can either help couples reconcile or facilitate an amicable mutual divorce if reconciliation is not possible. **Women’s Empowerment:** **Concept:** The role of gender equality in marital dynamics. **Effect:** Increased awareness and advocacy for women’s rights have empowered more women to seek mutual divorces as a means to escape oppressive or unhappy marriages. **Legal Reforms:** **Concept:** Changes in laws governing marriage and divorce. **Effect:** Progressive legal reforms, such as the introduction of mutual divorce, reflect a shift towards recognizing individual autonomy and reducing the adversarial nature of divorce proceedings. **Cultural Shifts:** **Concept:** Evolving societal norms and values regarding marriage. **Effect:** As cultural attitudes shift towards viewing marriage as a partnership rather than a permanent sacrament, mutual divorce becomes a more accepted and utilized option. **Types / Kinds** Divorce in India can be broadly categorized based on the nature of the divorce proceedings and the grounds for divorce. Here, we outline the main types of divorce under Indian law, particularly focusing on the distinction between mutual and contested divorce. #### Mutual Consent Divorce **Definition:** Mutual consent divorce is when both spouses agree to dissolve the marriage amicably without blaming each other. This type of divorce is covered under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. **Key Features:** **Joint Petition:** Both parties file a joint petition stating that they have been living separately for at least one year and mutually agree to the divorce. **Cooling-Off Period:** There is a six-month waiting period after filing the petition, during which the couple can reconsider their decision. **Final Hearing:** If both parties still wish to proceed after the cooling-off period, they appear before the court for the final hearing, and the court grants the divorce if satisfied with the mutual consent. #### Contested Divorce **Definition:** A contested divorce is when one spouse files for divorce without the consent of the other, based on specific grounds. This type of divorce often involves more complex legal proceedings and disputes. **Grounds for Contested Divorce:** **Cruelty:** Physical or mental harm inflicted by one spouse on the other. **Adultery:** Extramarital affairs by one spouse. **Desertion:** Abandonment by one spouse for at least two years. **Conversion:** Changing religion by one spouse. **Mental Disorder:** Severe mental illness that makes it impossible to live together. **Incurable Disease:** Conditions like leprosy or other contagious diseases. **Renunciation:** One spouse renounces the world and takes religious vows. **Presumption of Death:** If a spouse has not been heard of as being alive for at least seven years. #### Other Types of Divorce in India **Divorce by Mutual Consent under Other Personal Laws:** **Special Marriage Act, 1954:** This act provides for mutual consent divorce for marriages registered under it. **Indian Divorce Act, 1869:** Governs divorce among Christians in India and includes provisions for mutual consent divorce. **Talaq (Islamic Divorce):** **Talaq-ul-Sunnat:** A revocable form of divorce where the husband pronounces talaq once, followed by a waiting period (iddat). **Talaq-ul-Biddat (Triple Talaq):** Instant divorce by pronouncing talaq three times, now banned by the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019. **Khula:** Divorce initiated by the wife, where she offers compensation to the husband to agree to the dissolution. **Mubarak:** Mutual agreement between both spouses to dissolve the marriage. **Customary Divorce:** Some communities in India follow customary practices for divorce, recognized under the respective personal laws, provided they are not in conflict with public policy or statutory laws. **Legal Provisions / Procedure / Specifications / Criteria (if any)** **Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Section 13B):** **Section 13B(1):** Both spouses must file a joint divorce petition, stating that they have been living separately for one year or more and have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved. **Section 13B (2):** The court must be satisfied, after hearing the parties and making necessary inquiries, that the allegations in the petition are true. After a six-month waiting period (cooling-off period) and within 18 months from the date of presentation of the petition, if the petition is not withdrawn, the court can pass a decree of divorce. #### Procedure **Filing the Joint Petition:** **Step 1:** Both spouses jointly draft and sign a divorce petition, which includes details such as the date of marriage, reasons for seeking divorce, proof of living separately for at least one year, and mutual agreement to dissolve the marriage. **Step 2:** The petition is filed in the family court having jurisdiction over the area where the marriage was solemnized or where either party resides. **First Motion:** **Step 3:** Both parties appear before the family court, and the court records their statements. This is known as the first motion. **Step 4:** The court examines the petition and the documents submitted, ensuring that the conditions for mutual divorce are met. If satisfied, the court orders a six-month cooling-off period to allow for any possible reconciliation. **Cooling-Off Period:** **Step 5:** During the six-month cooling-off period, the couple is encouraged to reconsider their decision to divorce. This period is meant for introspection and potential reconciliation. **Second Motion:** **Step 6:** After the cooling-off period, if both parties still wish to proceed with the divorce, they must file a second motion in court. **Step 7:** Both parties appear before the court again, confirming their decision to proceed with the divorce. **Step 8:** The court hears their statements, reviews any agreements regarding child custody, alimony, and property settlement, and ensures that the mutual consent is genuine and voluntary. **Decree of Divorce:** **Step 9:** If the court is satisfied with the mutual consent and the arrangements made, it grants a decree of divorce, officially dissolving the marriage. #### Specifications / Criteria **Mutual Consent:** Both parties must voluntarily agree to the divorce without any coercion or undue influence. **Separation Period:** The spouses must have been living separately for at least one year before filing the petition. “Living separately” does not necessarily mean living in different locations; it can also mean living in the same house without any marital relationship. **Cooling-Off Period:** A mandatory six-month waiting period (cooling-off period) is provided after the first motion to allow for possible reconciliation. However, in certain cases, the Supreme Court of India has allowed waiving this period to expedite the process. **Joint Petition:** The divorce petition must be jointly filed by both spouses, stating the grounds for divorce and the mutual agreement to dissolve the marriage. **Settlement Agreement:** The petition should ideally include an agreement on key issues such as child custody, alimony, and property division to avoid future disputes. **Case Laws / Precedents / Overrulings/ Judicial Development of the Concept** **Smt. Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash (1991):** **Facts:** Sureshta Devi filed for divorce by mutual consent with her husband Om Prakash but later withdrew her consent before the final decree. **Judgment:** The Supreme Court held that either party can withdraw their consent at any time before the final decree is passed. The court emphasized that mutual consent must exist at the time of filing the petition and at the time of the decree. **Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Bipin Zaveri (1997):** **Facts:** The couple filed for mutual divorce, but one party withdrew consent after the first motion. The High Court dissolved the marriage using its extraordinary powers. **Judgment:** The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, exercising its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice. This case highlighted the court’s ability to dissolve marriages even when one party withdraws consent, under exceptional circumstances. **Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (2017):** **Facts:** The couple sought a waiver of the six-month cooling-off period after the first motion, arguing they had already lived separately for a long time. **Judgment:** The Supreme Court held that the six-month cooling-off period is not mandatory and can be waived by the family court if: All efforts for reconciliation, including mediation, have failed. The parties have genuinely settled their differences, including alimony, custody of children, and other pending issues. The waiting period would only prolong their agony. This case provided flexibility in the application of the cooling-off period, facilitating faster divorces in genuine cases. **Anil Kumar Jain v. Maya Jain (2009):** **Facts:** The wife withdrew her consent after the first motion for mutual divorce. **Judgment:** The Supreme Court reiterated that mutual consent must persist until the final decree and reaffirmed the right to withdraw consent at any stage before the decree is passed. The court, however, also acknowledged the possibility of using Article 142 in exceptional circumstances to dissolve marriages where consent was initially mutual but later withdrawn. #### Judicial Development of the Concept **Flexibility in Cooling-Off Period:** The Amardeep Singh case marked a significant development by allowing the waiver of the mandatory six-month cooling-off period under certain conditions. This judicial flexibility acknowledges the practical realities faced by couples and aims to reduce unnecessary delays in the divorce process. **Emphasis on Genuine Consent:** The Sureshta Devi case emphasized the necessity of genuine and continuous mutual consent throughout the divorce proceedings. This principle ensures that divorces are not forced and both parties willingly agree to dissolve the marriage. **Article 142 – Extraordinary Powers of the Supreme Court:** Cases like Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Bipin Zaveri and Anil Kumar Jain v. Maya Jain illustrate the Supreme Court’s willingness to exercise its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to ensure complete justice, even in divorce cases where mutual consent was initially given but later withdrawn. **Simplification of Procedure:** Through various judgments, the judiciary has streamlined and clarified the procedure for mutual divorce, making it more accessible and less contentious. This approach promotes the welfare of both parties and minimizes the emotional and financial toll of prolonged divorce proceedings. **Maxims / Principles (if any)** **Volenti Non-Fit Injuria (To a Willing Person, No Harm is Done)** **Application:** This principle underscores that mutual divorce is based on the voluntary and mutual consent of both parties. When both spouses agree to dissolve their marriage, they do so willingly, and no harm is perceived by either party due to the dissolution. **Consensus Ad Idem (Meeting of the Minds)** **Application:** Mutual divorce requires both parties to have a meeting of the minds regarding the decision to end their marriage. This principle emphasizes the necessity of mutual agreement and understanding between the spouses. **Ex Aequo Et Bono (According to what is Fair and Good)** **Application:** The principle of fairness and equity guides the court in ensuring that the mutual divorce process is just and equitable for both parties, including fair settlements on issues such as alimony, child custody, and property division. **Audi Alteram Partem (Hear the Other Side)** **Application:** This principle ensures that both parties are given a fair opportunity to present their case and be heard during the mutual divorce proceedings. It upholds the right to a fair hearing, which is crucial in ensuring that the consent is genuine and voluntary. **Nemo Judex in Causa Sua (No One Should Be a Judge in Their Cause)** **Application:** This principle ensures impartiality in the judicial process. The court acts as an impartial arbiter, ensuring that the mutual consent is not influenced by external pressures or biases and that both parties’ interests are fairly considered. #### Conclusion The provision for mutual divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, of 1955, represents a significant advancement in the legal framework governing marital dissolution in India. By allowing couples to seek divorce based on mutual consent, this provision offers a more amicable and less adversarial alternative to contested divorces. The legal framework surrounding mutual divorce—comprising specific procedures, criteria, and judicial precedents—ensures that the process is fair, respectful, and efficient. **Key Points of Mutual Divorce:** **Mutual Consent:** Essential for initiating and finalizing the divorce, reflecting a shared decision between spouses to end their marriage. **Procedure:** Involves filing a joint petition, a six-month cooling-off period, and a final hearing to ensure that the decision is well-considered and voluntary. **Legal and Judicial Development:** Judicial interpretations and precedents, such as those established in key cases, have refined the application of mutual divorce, allowing for flexibility and ensuring that the process aligns with the principles of justice and fairness. **Principles:** The principles of mutual consent, fairness, and judicial oversight underpin the mutual divorce process, ensuring that both parties’ rights and interests are adequately protected. 1. **REFERENCES** **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** **Online Articles / Sources Referred** JSTOR – Academic Articles on Family Law: The Hindu – Understanding Mutual Divorce: https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2024/01/11/mutual-consent-divorce-hindu-law-cooling-off-period-and-withdrawal-of-consent/#:~:text=Akin%20to%20the%20HMA%2C%20the,the%20marriage%20should%20be%20dissolved. **Cases Referred** Smt. Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash (1991) Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Bipin Zaveri (1997) Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (2017) Anil Kumar Jain v. Maya Jain (2009) **Statutes Referred** Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 Special Marriage Act, 1954 Indian Divorce Act, 1869 Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 Family Courts Act, 1984 **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law, Family Law --- ### [Right of Accused Persons under Article 22: Principles and Important Cases](https://lawfoyer.in/right-of-accused-persons-under-article-22-principles-and-important-cases/) **Published:** August 31, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** Author: Chahat Gugliya Edited by: Sankalp Vashistha **INTRODUCTION** ***“Anyone can be falsely accused of a crime. Everyone accused of a crime deserves a fair trial.” –* John Garamendi.** In every democratic and civilized nation that is being governed by the principle of “Rule of Law”, there exist certain rights of an accused person which preserves and fosters the constitutional values and ensures the criminal justice system to be based upon egalitarian norms. In Jurisprudence, we have come across several legal principles given by renowned scholars and the one that suits the provisions of Article 22 is; ***“One is considered innocent until proven guilty”***. Therefore, until or unless the crime is not being proven, we have certain rights for persons accused of crimes. In the Indian constitution, the rights of the accused are based upon the principle of – May be many go unpunished, but never punish an innocent person. ***Keywords:*** *Rule of Law, Article-22, Constitution of India, Detention, Rights of accused person.* **Who is an Accused Person?** - An “accused” is a person who has been arrested for or formally charged with a crime. Our holy Indian constitution preserves certain rights for the accused/arrested person to protect them from unlawful detention. Also, the laws related to arrest are defined under various sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 which is now known as Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita,2023. - The accused person is also known as the defendant or alleged offender. - The term “accused” can be used throughout the trial until the charges are resolved. **Article – 22 of Indian Constitution & Detention:** Article 22 of the Indian Constitution grants protection to persons who are arrested or detained. The detention is of two types: 1**) Preventive Detention** – detention of a person without trial. 2**) Punitive Detention** – to punish a person for an offence committed by him after trial. The first part deals with the cases of preventive detention law and the second one deals with the cases of ordinary law. The rights mentioned under Article 22 of the constitution are preserved and given to all citizens, irrespective of the fact that a person is being accused of a crime. **The Rights of Accused Persons in India with Context to the Constitution of India-** - **To know the grounds of arrest:** No person shall be detained in custody without being informed of the grounds for such arrest. This preserves the right and freedom of the person against the arbitrary and despotic rule of the state. Every police officer arresting any person shall communicate to him full information of the offence for which he is being arrested. - **Right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner:** Every person who is accused of an offence will have the right to be defended by a pleader of his choice. - **Right to be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours:** The person, who is arrested and detained in custody shall have to be produced before the magistrate within 24 hours of such arrest. The following provisions have also been mandated by the Criminal Procedure Code. - **Right to be released after 24 hours unless the magistrate authorises further detention:** This provision signifies that our criminal justice system is based upon the true facets of evidence and facts rather than authoritarianism. - **Right to be released on bail:** The Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita has classified the category of bailable and non-bailable offences. It ensures that every accused has a right to get released on bail only in case of bailable offences, which further signifies the prudent structure of our criminal justice system. - **Right against self-incrimination:** As per the Indian constitution, a person cannot be forced to be a witness against the self. - **No double jeopardy:** As per the Indian constitution, a person cannot be prosecuted and punished for the same offences more than once. - **Right to a free and expeditious trial:** which has to be free from any preconceived notions and biases. It also constitutes one of the chief elements of Article-(21): Right to life and personal liberty and Article-(14): Equality before the law and equal protection of the law. **EXCEPTION –** Article 22(3) of the Constitution of India states that clauses (1) and (2) regarding protection against arrest and detention do not apply to enemy aliens or to persons arrested or detained under preventive detention laws. **RELEVANT CASE LAWS:** No legal and constitutional article is considered complete until or unless we insert the relevant and associated case laws in it. So now, let’s look for some important case laws regarding the Rights of the Accused which will further strengthen and justify the provisions mentioned above. **1) Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar –** This case clarified that the state cannot avoid its constitutional obligation to provide a speedy trial by citing financial or administrative difficulties. **2) Muniappa v. State of Tamil Nadu –** This case established that before passing a sentence, the Judge must make an effort to elicit all relevant information from the accused. **3) AR Antulay v. RS Naik and Another. –** This case established that the Right to a Speedy Trial under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution includes all the stages of the proceedings, including investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision. **THE ASSOCIATED ISSUES AND CHALLENGES –** The Indian Legal and Judicial system follows the principle of “Rule of Law” and preserving the rights of the accused under the fundamental rights signifies this notion as well. However, the following rights may get hampered due to several legal, technical, administrative and financial challenges. For example: 1. Large pendency of cases at the lower judiciary. 2. **2**. Highly prone to corruption in police machinery which can mislead the facts and evidence. 3. Money and muscle power for false fabrication of charges and denial of rights of accused. 4. Legal loopholes in the constitution provisions that may deny the rights of the innocent. 5. Financial burden & less fiscal resources for faster and speedy trial. 6. Administrative staff backed with less legal and technical knowledge **Notable Solution –** Considering the following issues and challenges, we need to evolve a legal framework that fulfils the demand of changing patterns of the criminal justice system and societal norms. We, as a citizen of this country, should strive towards the adherence of the Constitutional norms and the values upon which the constitution has been framed. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** A fair and effective trial should constitute the prime motto of our judicial system, where each and every person has the right to express their views in a fair and neutral manner without being attached to any social stigmas and dogmas. We as prospective legal practitioners by sticking to constitutional values can ensure that the present legal system would transform to its present needs and every person- rich or poor, educated or uneducated, upper caste or lower caste should have their say in the legal proceedings and fundamental rights. **REFERENCES** 1. **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** 1. INDIAN POLITY – by M. Laxmikanth. 2. Supreme court’s: AIR. 3. MP high court: Joti Journal. 2. **Cases Referred** 1. Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar 2. Muniappa v. State of Tamil Nadu 3. AR Antulay v. RS Naik and Another. 3. **Statutes Referred** 4. Constitution of India, 1950. 5. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law --- ### [ACTS OF TERRORISM UNDER BNS:PROVISIONS, PRINCIPLES, PROCEDURE](https://lawfoyer.in/acts-of-terrorism-under-bnsprovisions-principles-procedure/) **Published:** August 31, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Ashmit Srivastava** **Edited by: Sankalp Vashistha** **INTRODUCTION** The spectre of terrorism has cast a long, portentous shadow over the global geography, challenging robust legal fabrics to combat its multifaceted pitfalls. India, a nation scuffling with its own share of terror-convinced challenges, has precipitously evolved its anti-terrorism legislative armature. The Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), a comprehensive overhaul of the felonious justice system, represents a significant stride in this direction. legislated to relieve the Unlawful Conditioning(Prevention) Act(UAPA), the BNS introduces a new legal paradigm for addressing terrorism. This composition undertakes a scrupulous examination of the BNS provisions related to terrorism, probing into its core rudiments, relative analysis with the UAPA, and a critical evaluation of its counteraccusations for public security and individual liberties. By checking the literal line of India’s anti-terrorism laws andassaying material case law, this study aims to give a nuanced understanding of the BNS’s efficacity in combating terrorism while upholding the principles of justice and moral rights. The BNS, as a complex legislative instrument, clearances a multifaceted analysis. Thiscomposition tries to unravel its complications, exploring its strengths, sins, and implicit areas for enhancement. By examining the interplay between the BNS and broadercounter-terrorism strategies, this study seeks to contribute to the ongoing converse on effective and rights-esteeming approaches to combating terrorism. **KEYWORDS**: *Terrorism, Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, BNSCounter-terrorism, National Security, Unlawful Conditioning(Prevention) Act, UAPA, Human Rights, Criminal Law* **DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF TERRORISM** The BNS offers a broader description of terrorism compared to its precursor, the Unlawful Conditioning (Prevention) Act(UAPA). crucial rudiments of the BNS description include - Intention to hang the conicity, integrity, and security of India This element aligns with the UAPA but is more astronomically defined in the BNS, potentially landing a wider range of conditioning. - Intent to blackjack the public or a section of the public is analogous to the UAPA, but the BNS provides a more extensive interpretation. - dismembering normal life and conditioning A new addition, this element broadens the compass of terrorism to include acts that may not inescapably involve violence but have a significant impact on society. - Creating a sense of fear or instability This element is harmonious with the UAPA but is more explicitly stated in the BNS. The BNS’s broader description raises enterprises about eventuality overreach and the blurring of lines between licit dissent and terrorism. It’s pivotal to establish clear guidelines to help the abuse of this provision. **PUNISHMENTS FOR TERRORIST ACTS** The BNS prescribes a range of corrections for terrorist acts, reflecting the inflexibility of the offence. crucial provisions include - **DEATH PENALTY** The BNS retains the death penalty for terrorist acts resulting in death. This provision has been a subject of violent debate, with critics arguing that it’s disproportionate and ineffective. - **LIFE IMPRISONMENT** For less severe terrorist acts, the BNS prescribes life imprisonment as a maximum discipline. - **IMPRISONMENT**The BNS also provides for imprisonment for colourful terms, depending on the nature and extent of the terrorist act. - **CONFISCATION OF PROPERTY** To disrupt the fiscal networks of terrorist associations, the BNS includes a provision for the confiscation of property acquired through terrorist conditioning. The inflexibility of the punishments under the BNS reflects the government’s determination to combat terrorism effectively. still, it’s essential to ensurethat these corrections are applied fairly and constantly and that there are acceptable safeguards to help unlawful persuasions. **INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION** The BNS empowers designated agencies to probe and make terrorist offences. Key Provisions include - **SPECIALISED AGENCIES**: The establishment of technicalanti-terrorism units is pivotal for effective disquisition and execution. - **PROCEDURAL SAFEGAURDS**: While the BNS includes some safeguards, similar to the right to legal representation and the presumption of innocence, there are enterprises about the eventuality of abuse, especially in cases involving public security. - **EVIDENCE:**The BNS recognizes the significance of electronic substantiation in terrorism examinations and provides for its admissibility. still, there’s a need for clear guidelines to cover against the abuse of similar substantiation. - **WITNESS PROTECTION:** guarding substantiations in terrorism cases is pivotal. The BNS should include robust provisions for substantiation protection programs. The success of counter-terrorism sweat depends on the effective disquisition and execution of terrorist offences. The BNS provides a frame for this, but its perpetration will be critical in icing its effectiveness. **RELATED OFFENCES** The BNS criminalizes a range of offences related to terrorism, including - **Backing Terrorism**: This provision targets the fiscal networks supporting terrorist associations. - **Harbouring and sheltering terrorists**: This aims to disrupt safe havens for terrorists. - **Recruiting for Terrorist Associations**: This targets the process of radicalization and reclamation. These provisions are essential for dismembering terrorist conditioning and precluding the spread of terrorism. still, their effectiveness depends on robust disquisition and execution. **CHALLENGES** The BNS represents a significant step forward in India’scounter-terrorism sweats. still, it also presents challenges as such: - **Balancing public security and mortal rights:** The BNS must be enforced in a manner that protects abecedarian rights while effectively combating terrorism. - **Precluding abuse of the Law:**The broad description of terrorism increases the threat of abuse. Clear guidelines and robust safeguards are essential. - **Structure capacity:** Effectiveperpetrationof the BNS requires well- trained law enforcement labour force, prosecutors, and judges. - **Transnationalcooperation**:Counter-terrorism is a global challenge, and India must strengthen its cooperation with other countries. **POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE BNS** The BNS, with its broad changes to the felonious justice system, has the implicit to significantly impact colourful angles of Indian society. ***Impact on Human Rights*** - **Corrosion of Civil Liberties:**The broad description of terrorism and expanded powers to law enforcement could lead to curtailment of abecedarian rights similar to freedom of speech, assembly, and association. - **Arbitrary Apprehensions and Detentions:** Increased eventuality for abuse of the law, leading to unlawful apprehensions and dragged detentions. - **Fair Trial Enterprises:**The emphasis on speedy trials might compromise the rights of the indicted, including access to legal counsel and acceptable defence. Socio- Political Counteraccusations - **Increased Surveillance:**The focus on public security could lead to heightened surveillance measures, impacting sequestration rights - **Trust Deficit:**The eventuality for abuse of the law could erode public trust in law enforcement and the bar - **Social Polarization**: The BNS could complicate social divisions and produce a climate of fear and dubitationEconomic Counteraccusations - **Investor Confidence:** Query about the legal terrain could discourage foreign investment and hamper profitable growth. - **Business Operations:**Increased nonsupervisory burden and implicit legal pitfalls could impact business operations and competitiveness. - **Tourism:**Anegative perception of the country’s mortal rights record could discourage excursionists. - **Burden of Proof:** The onus on law enforcement to prove guilt beyond reasonable mistrustfulnessbecomes further gruelling with the broad description of terrorism. - **Resource Constraints**:Effective perpetration of the BNS requires acceptable training, outfit, and labour force. - **Responsibility Mechanisms:**To ensure responsibility and help abuse of powers are pivotal. It’s important to note that these are implicit counteraccusations and the factual impact of the BNS will depend on its perpetration and interpretation by the bar. **CONCLUSION** The Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita(BNS) represents a significant step forward in India’scounter-terrorism legal frame. By broadening the description of terrorism, introducing strict corrections, and establishing technical investigative agencies, the BNS aims to give a comprehensive response to the complex challenge posed by terrorism. still, the effectiveness of the BNS is contingent upon several factors. The balance between public security and individual rights is a delicate bonethat requires careful consideration. The eventuality of overreach and misuse of the law cannot be ignored. likewise, the success of the BNS depends on its perpetration, with acceptable coffers, training, and collaboration among law enforcement agencies. While the BNS offers a robust legal frame, its impact eventually depends on its practical operation. Case studies demonstrate both the implicit strengths and sins of the law. nonstop evaluation and refinement are essential to ensure its effectiveness in combating terrorism while upholding the rule of law. Transnational cooperation is another pivotal element of counter-terrorism sweats. The BNS should be aligned with transnationalnorms and stylish practices to enhance its impact. In conclusion, the BNS provides a foundation for addressing terrorism in India. By addressing the linked challenges anderecting upon the law’s strengths, India can develop a more effective and rights-esteemingcounter-terrorism strategy. crucial areas for unborn exploration and policy development include: - In- depth analysis of the impact of the BNS on specific groups, similar as religious non-ages and marginalized communities. - Relative studies ofcounter-terrorism strategies in otherauthorities. - Evaluation of the effectiveness of the BNS in precluding and fighting rising forms of terrorism, similar to cyberterrorism. - Development of comprehensive training programs for law enforcement and judicial labour force on the perpetration of the BNS. 1. **REFERENCES** 2. **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** 1. THE BNSBARE ACT, 2023 2. SECTION 113: BNS,2023 3. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. [A Review of the Indian Penal Code | Chambers Expert Focus](https://chambers.com/legal-trends/implications-of-the-indian-penal-code) 2. [Top 10 Changes Made by Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) vis-à-vis Indian Penal Code (IPC) (taxmann.com)](https://www.taxmann.com/post/blog/top-10-changes-made-by-bns-vis-a-vis-ipc#:~:text=Whoever%20knowingly%20possesses%20any%20property,of%20any%20terrorist%20act%20shall) 3. [Criminal Law Bills 2023 Decoded #7: Analysing the Terror Offences Framework Under BNS 2023 – P39A Criminal Law Blog (p39ablog.com)](https://p39ablog.com/2023/09/criminal-law-bills-2023-decoded-7-analysing-the-terror-offences-framework-under-2023/#:~:text=Through%20Cl.,the%20TADA%20and%20the%20POTA.) **Categories:** Case Analysis, Criminal Law Cases --- ### [N. Adithayan vs The Travancore Devaswom Board & Ors](https://lawfoyer.in/n-adithayan-vs-the-travancore-devaswom-board-ors/) **Published:** August 31, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Sneha Rani** **Edited by: Sankalp Vashistha** **Abstract** This paper involves an analysis of the case of N. Adithayan v The Travancore Devaswom Board & Ors regarding the controversy over the appointment of a non-Brahmin priest (Santhikaran) at the Kongorpilly Neerikode Siva Temple in Kerala as worked out by the Supreme Court of India. A case about the appointment was filed by the petitioner, N. Adithayan on the grounds of oppression of Traditional customs and droits of Malayala Brahmins. Thus, the Court’s decision relied upon the constitutional provisions’ interpretation, especially on articles 14, 15, 16, 25, and 26, which concern equality, nondiscrimination, and religious liberties. The Court supported the appointment, stressing the aspect of the order rather than the caste, and underlined the need for augmentation of religious rites with time along with principles of the Constitution of India. This important case confirms the courts’ function in preventing the abuse of religion to infringe on equal rights for women and the Constitution’s provision on non-discriminatory measures. **Keywords:** The Constitution, Sacred Rite, Discrimination on the Grounds of Caste, Employment and Promotion, Gender Equity, Law Commission of India and Supreme Court of India **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** N. Adithayan vs The Travancore Devaswom Board & Ors ***ii)* *Case Number*** Civil Appeal No. 6965 of 1996 ***iii)* *Judgement Date*** 3 October 2002 ***iv)* *Court*** Supreme Court of India ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** 2 Judge Bench ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges*** Justice S. Rajendra Babu and Justice Doraiswamy Raju ***vii)* *Citation*** (2002) 8 SCC 106 ***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved*** – Article 14: Equality before the law – Article 15: Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth – Article 16: Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment – Article 25: Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice, and propagation of religion – Article 26: Freedom to manage religious affairs **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** It rose from the designation of a beneficiary of Santhikaran at the Kongorpilly Neerikode Siva Temple in Kerala, which was being served by a non-Brahmin person. One man, N. Adithayan, a Malayala Brahmin in particular, vehemently rejected this appointment because this decision violated customs and the appropriate rights of his community. In this regard, the Supreme Court was faced with the challenge of upholding the free practice of religious rights in the face of the constitutional legal provisions on equal rights and non-discrimination. The Court also considered other previous decisions {conducted a review of the case} and recommendations of different committees so that the Court’s final decision would be just. **FACTS OF THE CASE** 1. **i) Procedural Background of the Case:** - Initiation of the Case: The legal processes in this regard began with the appellant N. Adithayan filing Civil Appeal No. 6965 of 1996. This case was a legal battle being taken to the Supreme Court of India to challenge the conflicting problem concerning the employment of a Santhikaran, hailed from the non-Brahmin upper cast, for the position ofSanthikaran or temple priest, a position usually given to the Brahmans, at the Kongorpilly Neerikode Siva Temple, in Kerala. This appeal was filed to overturn the judgment given by the subordinate courts and the case’s goal was to establish that based on tradition only priests born in the Brahmin caste should be allowed to conduct temple rituals in this particular temple. - Bench Assignment: The was given to a bench of Supreme Court Justices S. Rajendra Babu and Doraiswamy Raju. This bench was supposed to deal with numerous constitutional, social, and religious aspects of the appellant presented before it. The judicial review was believed to involve the exploration of whether the non-Brahmin appointment infringed on religious practices and principles set down in the constitution that deals with matters of religion and equality. 1. **ii) Factual Background of the Case:** The petitioner, N. Adithayan claimed that the temple authorities and the devotees always followed the tradition and hence appointing a non-Brahmin Santhikaran was a blatant infringement of the traditions being followed in the temple. He claimed that the untold tradition and law stated that only the Malyala Brahmins are allowed to perform the Pooja and rituals of the temples of Kerala. Adithayan’s argument regarding this claim was based because such a deviation detracted from the religious and historical significance largely attributed to temple practices. - Role of the Travancore Devaswom Board: The temple in question is run by the Travancore Devaswom Board which was legalized through the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, of 1950. The Board also entails various responsibilities of administration and management of several temples across the region to conserve cultural practices. In this case, the Board served as an important institution since it was responsible for the appointment and selection of the Santhikaran function and justified the decision to appoint an employee who was not a Brahmin regardless of the case status but competence. - Appointment Procedure: The controversy began when a Santhikaran’s place became vacant after an allegation of poor performance and misconduct by a temporarily appointed Shri K. K. Mohanan Poti. Following the norms set by the Travancore Devaswom Board, it advertised for the post. Out of the applicants, a non-Brahmin at the 31 positions on the selection list was appointed the Santhikaran. This appointment was protested by Adithayan on the basis that it was forbidden by tradition according to which only those of the Brahmin caste could be appointed to such a position - Opposition and Legal Challenge: Santhikaran, a non-Brahmin, was appointed and such changes caused protests by traditionalists, the matter went to a civil court. For their right to religious freedom, worship and to attend to their religious affairs as and when they wanted, Adithayan and several other devotees moved the Kerala High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to issue a writ of mandamus for the removal of the Appellant’s appointment. The antithesis was about the fact that the appointment violates the legal rule that only those belonging to the Malayala Brahmin community could conduct the poojas in the temple. Provisional orders were passed, and people were appointed due to which the legal struggle was still going on to wrestle with the fact underlying the resonance of the caste system, particularly the criterion of reservation for SCs/STs for the performance of temple rituals. **Legal Issues Raised** 1. **Protection of Religious Customs vs. Constitutional Mandates:** This case created a big legal question as to whether one has to uphold cultural practices inherent in religious practices or the Constitution of a country. More particularly, the question was whether the practice of exclusive reservation of the function of appointing the Santhikaran of the temples under the Appendices ‘A’ and ‘B’ as hereditarily professional as the persons of the Brahmin caste should be allowed given the modern constitutional provisions which do not allow discrimination on the ground of caste. This matter boils down to asking whether the customs and traditions that prefer the appointment of Brahmins to the priesthood are constitutional and do not contradict the provisions of Articles 14, 15, and 16 of the Indian Constitution. The quintessential issue, therefore, is whether sustaining such traditions violates rights enshrined in the aforementioned articles that are aimed at eradicating all forms of discrimination and bringing about equality for all people, citizens or not. 2. **Qualifications and Merit vs. Caste-Based Appointment:** The other legal concern raised in the case is on the categorization of the temple priests where the court has to decide whether the vocation should be based on merit, training, or descent. The respondents elaborated that appointments should be based on merit, namely, knowledge of mantras, Tantras, and other requisite Vedic texts along with experience in recognized institutions. Instead, they argued that the introduction of such a system would help in ensuring that the religious duties are well done without violating the constitution of the country. This issue challenges the matrimonial standing of caste as the chief qualifier for religious office and calls for competency cum training selection as opposed to hereditary or caste selection. **Petitioner / Appellant’s Arguments** 1. **Preservation of Religious Customs:** The petitioner submitted that the Malasa–Malayala restriction to Santhikaran is a practice in religion that should be allowed by Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. They claimed that it was a part of their religion’s culture, in which it is crucial to uphold the purity of the temple and appropriate behaviour during rituals. Thus, according to the petitioner, each of the mentioned customs plays some historical and cultural role that does not have to agree with modern legal norms. 2. **Violation of Constitutional Rights:** In the view of the petitioner, the violation of the constitution is occasioned by the appointment of a non-Brahmin as a Santhikaran since that affects their right to religious administration by the custom. They relied on Article 26 providing religious denominations their right to self-government in religious matters. The petitioner argued that any move that alters this observation diminishes religious harmony and infringes on the petitioner’s right to self-governance in religion and the preservation of their culture. 3. **Support from Section 31 of the 1950 Act:** The petitioner relied on Section 31 of the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 as providing for continuing the practice as existed in the temples as per the traditions. This section was used as legal support for their argument that the practice of appointment of Santhikaran should also have a precedent of following customs, thus justifying their request to limit priesthood to only the Malayala Brahmins. 4. **Relevant Precedents:** To support their argument, the petitioner relied on several judicious of the Apex court which endorses the protection of cultural and or esoteric practices within religious organizations. These precedents were employed to assert that the other courts have generally respected and maintained religious principles, and therefore, the custom being in question in the case should also be protected. The petitioner wanted to be a Santhikaran and was convinced that these judicial decisions would justify non-Brahmin’s appointment as Santhikaran. **Respondent’s Arguments** 1. **Lack of Proven Custom:** The respondents submitted and argued that the petitioner has not been able to provide concrete historical evidence that since the very inception of the appointments of the Santhikaran only Malayala Brahmins could be appointed. The others invented a pretext stating that clear proof was omitted to show that this practice was regularly being upheld without it being interrupted. According to the respondents, in the absence of such evidence, it is impossible to affirm such a claim on the existence of an exclusive custom. 2. **Constitutional Provisions Against Discrimination:** The respondents, based on the constitutional provisions provided, opined that Sections 14, 15, and 16 of the Constitution of India barred caste discrimination and provided equal rights to all citizens. They argued that it is crucial to apply these articles in the proceedings and that any tradition that negates these principles, cannot be justified before the law. The respondents pointed out that since the Constitution enshrines provisions on equality and non-discrimination the discriminator’s religion cannot prevail. 3. **Precedents Supporting Non-Discrimination:** Some of the judicial decisions quoted by the respondents that still call for religious practices to observe the principles of the Constitution dealing with non–non-discrimination and equality include the following. These examples reveal that the courts had and could decide in favour of the eradication of discrimination even in the religious sphere. According to the respondents, the precedents that were mentioned supported their view that the appointment of Santhikarans should not be a caste-based one but a merit-based one. **JUDGEMENT** 1. **Ratio Decidendi:** In the case of a non-Brahmin Santhikaran appointment, the Supreme Court also ruled that the act did not transgress the constitution’s guidelines. The Court underlined that one should be absolved with qualification and training and not the caste system be the deciding factor for being chosen for a religious position. As the Court upheld the claims, it stressed the need for reconciling religious freedoms with the constitutional provisions on equal rights and anti-discrimination on the note that tradition has to be transformed to meet the new constitutional rationality. 1. **Guidelines:** 2. Appointment Based on Merit: The Court thus ordered that the Travancore Devaswom Board continue to make appointments reflected by the qualification and training of the candidates and not the caste the candidate belongs to or the deity the person worships. 2. Alignment with Constitutional Values: The Court stressed that religious organizations’ activities should conform to the constitutional provisions on equality and non-discrimination. 1. **Obiter Dicta:** The Court also pointed at a possibility for the subject customs and traditions to evolve, which has to do with the nature of religious practices in the context of constitutional values Adjusting to societal change. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment in N. Adithayan vs The Travancore Devaswom Board & Ors is significant for several reasons:The judgment in N. Adithayan vs The Travancore Devaswom Board & Ors is significant for several reasons Such as 1. Balancing Tradition and Constitution: The Supreme Court in Bhopal’s decision also underlines the requirement to reconcile some orthodox custom that was a part of religion in the contemporary constitution guarding against discrimination based on caste. It emphasises more on Qualificationsthus conveying the message of the need for qualifications and training rather than caste for one to be appointed for a religious post. The judgment is alive to the fact that religion is not a steady enterprise and needs to change to conform to the Constitution’s principles of fairness and non-discrimination.This case acts as a precedent for checking the walls that may have been built around religion and preventing it from functioning within the constitution of the country to foster diversity and equality. This decision further establishes the court’s adherence to the constitutional protection of the rights of every citizen through the recognition of the categorization of caste while upholding the constitutional recognition of religious principles on religious practices. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [RIGHT TO RELIGION UNDER THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION](https://lawfoyer.in/right-to-religion-under-the-indian-constitution/) **Published:** August 31, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Supragya Singh, Student, R.M.L.N.L.U., Lucknow.** **Edited by: Madhumita Saha, Student, Lajpat Rai Law College, Sambalpur University, Odisha.** **INTRODUCTION** Mahatma Gandhi once said, “*There is a higher court than courts of justice and that is the court of conscience. It supersedes all other courts.[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)”* The quote by Mahatma Gandhi emphasizes the importance of one’s conscience in a free country, especially in the Indian scenario. Religious diversity is spread across India, where many govern themselves through values enshrined in their religion. The Indian state is still a secular country with no particular inclination towards a specific religion, even though Hinduism happens to be the majority religion in the country. With the vast diversity of religious identities prevalent, the Indian state guarantees every person a right to religion, which also extends to religious groups. The Indian Constitution provides the ‘Right to Religion’ as a fundamental right in Part III of the Constitution. Art 25-28 deals with aspects of this right – dealt with as an individual and a community right. Article 25, for instance, gives an individual the right to conscience and religion, whereas Art. 26 deals with the religious rights of a denomination. Art. 27 pertains to non-payment of taxes from the amount which has to be appropriated for the promotion and welfare of a particular religion. Art. 28 pertains to restrictions on imparting religious instruction at educational institutions. ***Keywords*:** *Religion, Right, Extent, Essential, Precedents* - **Extent of the Right to Religion** Right to Religion as under Art. 25 provides all persons in India the freedom to conscience, i.e., their sense of right or wrong; this would include one’s right to follow a religion and one’s right not to follow any religion but rather one’s belief system. Additionally, the right is conferred not only upon individuals but also upon religious denominations or any section of them, as can be read from Art. 26. Hence, the right to religion under the Indian Constitution is an individual and a community right that is bestowed to follow or not follow a religion. As per Art. 25, an individual’s right to follow a religion would include their freedom to profess freely, practice that religion, and propagate it. This implies that the right given under the constitution frees the individual to believe in faith and overtly express it. The collective right under Art. 26 allows a religious denomination or any section of it to manage their religious affairs, establish and maintain their institutions for religious and charitable purposes, own and acquire property, and administer it as per law. The term religion per se is not defined in the Constitution; the right to religion remains with individuals and religious groups. The Supreme Court of India, in the 1954 *Shirur mutt*[\[2\]](#_ftn2), presented a comprehensive definition of religion. To quote the court’s words verbatim, *“Religion is certainly a matter of faith with individuals or communities and it is not necessarily theistic. There are well-known religions in India like Buddhism and Jainism which do not believe in God or any intelligent First Cause. A religion undoubtedly has its basis in a system of beliefs or doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion is conducive to their spiritual well-being, but it would not be correct to say that religion is nothing else but a doctrine or belief. A religion may not only lay down a code of ethical rules for its followers to accept, but it might also prescribe rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are regarded as integral parts of religion, and these forms and observations might extend even to matters of food and dress.[**\[3\]**](#_ftn3)”* A definition is crucial in knowing the extent to which a right can be exercised. Hence, knowing what would be protected as a religious right becomes highly relevant. - **Limitations** Art. 25 and Art. 26 impose specific limitations or restrictions upon them: ‘public order,’ ‘morality,’ and ‘health’ serve to restrict the extent of the rights given under Art. 25 and 26. Public order would seek to prevent any disorder due to a religious practice or belief. Morality refers to the Constitutional Morality relating to the principles enshrined in the Constitution. Any act as a consequence of religious belief conflicting with constitutional morality would not get protection as a religious right. ‘Health’ would also exempt acts of religion from getting protection as a right. Another limitation can be realized by reading clause (1) of Art. 25, i.e., the Right to religion is subject to other provisions of the Constitution’s Part III (Fundamental Rights). This also implies that fundamental rights possess a form of gradation among them, though not a subject of this article. A harmony would need to be maintained among the Fundamental Rights, for the right to religion cannot override any other fundamental right in the Constitution. The question is – What exactly would be protected under ‘right to religion’? This is answered through the ‘Essential Religious Practices doctrine,’ where the protection granted is precisely to those religious practices essential to that religion. The doctrine evolved in the case of *Shirur Mutt.*[\[4\]](#_ftn4) The court in the case also said, *“What constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily to be ascertained concerning the doctrines of that religion itself.”*[\[5\]](#_ftn5) - **Exceptions to the Right to Religion** Not just limitations, the right to religion is further reduced in extent by the exceptions provided under them in the Constitution. Art. 25(2) outlines the exceptions to the right to religion. The said clause mentions two exceptions – (a)one pertains to economic, financial, political, or secular activities associated with religious practice; (b)the other pertains to providing welfare and social reform by the state and opening the public Hindu religious institutions to all sections and classes of Hindus. The infringement on the right to religion would be justified if it falls under either sub-clause (a) or (b) exceptions. Several reform measures, such as The Commission of Sati (Prevention) Act of 1987[\[6\]](#_ftn6), are justified and protected under Art. 25(2)(b). Relevant to this is the case of *Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay*[\[7\]](#_ftn7), where the court stated, *“In my view, the phrase ‘laws providing for social welfare and reform’ was not intended to enable the legislature to ‘reform,’ a religion out of existence or identity. Article 25(2)(a) having provided for legislation dealing with ‘economic, financial, political or secular activity which may be associated with religious practices,’ the succeeding clause proceeds to deal with other activities of religious groups and these also must be those which are associated with religion. Just as the activities referred to in Art. 25(2)(a) are not of the essence of the religion, similarly the saving in Art. 25(2)(b) is not intended to cover the essentials of the creed of a religion which is protected by Art. 25(1).”[**\[8\]**](#_ftn8)* Thus, the essentiality of a religion is crucially protected, notwithstanding the exceptions. However, the exceptions would still apply to any other religious practice. - **Essential Religious Practices Doctrine** Evolved through the case of *Shirur Mutt*[\[9\]](#_ftn9), the essential religious practices doctrine says that the essential practices of religion shall be protected as a part of the right to religion. The diminishing scope of what would be protected as a matter of religious right through different imposed limitations, other preponderant fundamental rights, and further exceptions make the essential religious practices doctrine vital in preserving a religious identity’s essence from diminishing. The doctrine distinguishes religious practices that may be restricted, regulated, or prohibited from essential religious practices forming the core of religious identity that shall be granted special protection under the right to religion in the Constitution. The question whether which religious practice is essential to a specific religion is answered by the Court on a case-to-case basis by referring to the doctrines of that religion. Thus, the doctrine has long served as crucial and relevant in deciding which religious practice needs special protection under the Constitution. - **Article 27 and Article 28** Article 27 of the Constitution prohibits the state from levying tax on the amount specifically meant to promote and maintain a particular religion or religious denomination. Article 28, on the other hand, relates to imparting religious instructions at educational institutions. The article talks of three kinds of educational institutes – 1) one maintained entirely from state funds, 2) one administered by the state but established under endowment or trust, and 3) one recognized by the state or receiving help from state funds. Art. 28(1)[\[10\]](#_ftn10) States that religious instructions should not be imparted in an educational institute of the first kind. Art. 28(2)[\[11\]](#_ftn11), creating an exception to Art. 28(1) states that religious instruction can be imparted in the educational institute of a second kind if the endowment or trust so requires. Art. 28(3)[\[12\]](#_ftn12) says that an individual in the academic institute of the third kind cannot be compelled to attend religious instructions or religious worship at such institute or premises attached to it without the individual’s consent or for the minor’s – the consent of their parents/guardian. Thereby, Art. 27 and 28 further the right to religion while strengthening the secular foundation of the Constitution and the state. - **Case Laws Relating to the Right to Religion** A few of the prominent case laws relating to the provisions of the right to religion include – - *The Commr, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt*[\[13\]](#_ftn13) – The case is prominent for presenting a comprehensive yet not rigid definition of ‘religion’ and bringing into the picture what is now known as the ‘Essential Religious Doctrine.’ The case aided in understanding what is included in the term ‘religion’ used in Art. 25. It established that the term would include religious practices, rituals, and doctrines essential to a religion. - *The Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali*[\[14\]](#_ftn14) – The court here emphasized the right of religious denomination or any section of it to manage their religious affairs as under Art. 26(b) would include not only religious belief or doctrine but also a right to manage its affairs related to religious practices, rituals, ceremonies, and modes of worship (as was defined in the case of *Shirur Mutt*[\[15\]](#_ftn15)) provided they are integral to that religion. - *Mahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. The State of Orissa*[\[16\]](#_ftn16) – In this case, the court said that Art. 27 applies to tax, which shall not be levied on the amount used for promoting and maintaining religion. The court emphasized that it is the tax and not the ‘fee’ that is prohibited from being levied in such matters. A tax involves exaction of money for public purposes to meet the general expenses of the state. The amount collected through tax is merged into the state’s general revenue. On the other hand, a fee is collected for a specific purpose, though in the public interest, and the amount collected through a fee is not merged into the state’s general revenue for general public purposes. The benefit of the fee accrues to those from whom the payments were demanded. The case dealt with the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act of 1939 provisions. A specific provision imposed on every *math* or temple with annual income above ₹250, some annual contribution to meet the expenses of the Commissioner, the officers, and servants working under them. The court held that the amount levied was a fee, hence not violative of Art. 27. - *A.V. College v. State of Punjab*[\[17\]](#_ftn17) – In this case, the validity of section 4 of the Guru Nanak University Act, which instructed the state to make provision for the study and research on the life and teachings of Guru Nanak, was challenged on the ground that as the institution was wholly maintained out of state funds, the section conflicts with Art—28 (1) of the Constitution. The court, however, held that there was no violation of the said Article as the section instructs to encourage the academic study of the life and teachings of Guru Nanak, which are not per se religious instructions or attempts to promote any specific religion. These prominent case laws, along with many other case laws, though not mentioned here, have lucidly moulded the contours of the right to religion. - **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** Thus, it can be said that the right to conscience and religion has an important place in the Constitution as a fundamental right. Albert Einstein once said, “*Never do anything against conscience even if the state demands it.*[\[18\]](#_ftn18)” Allowing an individual to pursue their conscience freely gives way to an individual’s growth & well-being and can also give way to the betterment of society. On the contrary, it would be relevant to recall the saying of George Bernard Shaw, “*There is nothing more dangerous than the conscience of a bigot.*[\[19\]](#_ftn19)” Conscience and faith can sometimes also give way to divisive or inimical forces. In this regard, the Constitution of India has tread carefully to make a delicate balance regarding the extent to which the right to religion should be protected as a fundamental right. Limitations and exceptions are thereby laid upon the right to religion. This has also served to maintain the secular nature of the state. The doctrine of essential religious practice introduced in the *Shirur Mutt*[\[20\]](#_ftn20) case has long served as necessary and relevant in knowing the specificity of the right to religion. The different aspects of the right to religion have often been clarified in various case laws by the judiciary. These have helped elucidate the extent to which the right to religion can be exercised and protected further. Thus, the constitutional provisions and other judicial developments have helped establish the right to religion in a balanced manner while upholding the secular nature of the state. - **REFERENCES** - **Books Referred** 1. N. Shukla, Constitution of India, 13th Edition 2. Lecture on Constitutional Law and Legislative Drafting, Volume I, Institute of Judicial Training and Research Uttar Pradesh 3. D. Mahajan, Constitutional Law of India, 8th Edition - **Online Sources Referred** 1. BrainyMedia Inc, 2024, BrainyQuote.com - **Cases Referred** 1. *The Commr., Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt*, AIR 1954 SC 282 2. *Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. The State of Bombay*, AIR 1962 SC 853 3. *The Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali*, 1962 SCR (1) 383, AIR 1961 SC 1402 4. *Mahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. The State of Orissa*, 1954 SCR 1046, AIR 1954 SC 400 5. *A.V. College v. State of Punjab*, 1971 SCR 688, (1971) 2 SCC 269 - **Statutes Referred** 1. Constitution of India (1950), Art. 25(1) 2. Constitution of India (1950), Art. 25(2)(a) 3. Constitution of India (1950), Art. 25(2)(b) 4. Constitution of India (1950), Art. 26(a) 5. Constitution of India (1950), Art. 26(b) 6. Constitution of India (1950), Art. 26(c) 7. Constitution of India (1950), Art. 26(d) 8. Constitution of India (1950), Art. 27 9. Constitution of India (1950), Art. 28(1) 10. Constitution of India (1950), Art. 28(2) 11. Constitution of India (1950), Art. 28(3) 12. The Commission of Sati (Prevention) Act, 1987 [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) *Quotes of Gandhi* (UBS Publishers, New Delhi 1995) 34 [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) *The Commr, Hindu Religious Endowments v Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt*, 1954 SCR 1005, AIR 1954 SC 282 [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) *Ibid*, (AIR) 290 [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) *The Commr, Hindu Religious Endowments v Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt*, 1954 SCR 1005, AIR 1954 SC 282 [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) *Ibid* [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The Commission of Sati (Prevention) Act 1987 [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) *Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v The State of Bombay*, 1962 SCR Supp (2) 496, AIR 1962 SC 853 [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) *Ibid,* (AIR) 875-876 [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) *The Commr, Hindu Religious Endowments v Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt*, 1954 SCR 1005, AIR 1954 SC 282 [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Constitution of India 1950, Art 28(1) [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Constitution of India 1950, Art 28(2) [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Constitution of India 1950, Art 28(3) [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) *The Commr, Hindu Religious Endowments v Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt,* 1954 SCR 1005, AIR 1954 SC 282 [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) *The Durgah Committee, Ajmer v Syed Hussain Ali*, 1962 SCR (1) 383, AIR 1961 SC 1402 [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) *The Commr, Hindu Religious Endowments v Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt,* 1954 SCR 1005, AIR 1954 SC 282 [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) *Mahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das v The State of Orissa*, 1954 SCR 1046, AIR 1954 SC 400 [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) *D A V College v State of Punjab*, 1971 SCR 688, (1971) 2 SCC 269 [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Paul Arthur Schilpp, *Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist* (first published 1949, 3rd edn, MJF Books 1949), Vol 7, 653 [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) BrainyMedia Inc, 2024, “George Bernard Shaw Quotes” < BrainyQuote.com> accessed 4 August 2024 [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) *The Commr, Hindu Religious Endowments v Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt,* 1954 SCR 1005, AIR 1954 SC 282 **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [MATERNITY BENEFIT UNDER LABOUR LAW](https://lawfoyer.in/maternity-benefit-under-labour-law/) **Published:** August 31, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Affra Mohamed Mubarak, Student, Government Law College – Tiruchirappalli.** **Edited by: Madhumita Saha, Student, Lajpat Rai Law College, Sambalpur University, Odisha.** **INTRODUCTION** In India, nowadays women have been playing a crucial role as labour/working women. They have become financially independent and supportive of their family responsibility. They can work for both the house and the place they have engaged. Marriage is part of human life women have a major part in building a family. Many jobs don’t provide safety measures for pregnant women. So, women shall be given certain benefits in the workplace. India has worked on the benefits for pregnant women through legal provisions. The Maternity Benefits Act, of 1961 granted maternity leave to all women employees for 26 weeks in the workplace and made sure not to harm them during their pregnancy this also includes post-pregnancy the Act provides eligibility, requirements and benefits for women. *“An act to regulate the employment of women in certain establishment for certain period before and after child-birth and to provide for maternity benefit and certain other benefit”[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)* Maternity benefits are important for women’s careers the law provides benefits for women during pregnancy and after childbirth. “*In 2015, 80 countries across the globe were giving Paternity leave along with maternity leave*”[\[2\]](#_ftn2). The Maternity Benefit Act of 1961 was introduced by the Union of India on 12th December 1961 which aims to protect women employees during their pregnancy but was revised by the Indian Government in 2017 The Maternity Benefits Act, of 1961 has been amended through the Maternity (Amendment) Bill 2017. The Act also specifies taking maternity leave for 6 weeks after miscarriage unless the miscarriage is a result of medical termination of pregnancy and 12 weeks maternity leave for a surrogate mother and the mother who has adopted a child below three months of age. These benefits help the women to recover from childbirth and have good relations with the newborn and also to take good care of their health. These Benefits can apply to women working in factories defined under the Factories Act, of 1948, mines as defined in the Mines Act, of 1952 and plantations as defined in the plantation labour Act, of 1951. The maternity benefits also apply to women working in government establishments and employed under the Employees State Insurance Act, of 1948. This Act appoints an inspector by appropriate government through way of notification in the official gazette their duties and power are prescribed under section 15 of the 1961 Act the inspector is considered to be a public servant under section 16 of the Act and in addition to it the appropriate government by way of notification may make rules for carrying out the purpose of this Act. The employer must not force any women to perform work during maternity leave and the employer should pay the women employees as prescribed in the Act. If a woman dies during childbirth or if the child dies and the mother survives the payment for maternity benefit shall be paid to the nominees as said in section 6(1) of the 1961 Act[\[3\]](#_ftn3) if no such nominees were mentioned then her legal representatives can claim the payment. No deduction of wages in certain cases under section 13 of the Act. The ILO guidelines have addressed the duration of leave for women during maternity leave till the date of delivery. In *Satakshi Mishra v. State of UP*[\[4\]](#_ftn4), the High Court held that the Maternity Benefits Act, 1961 does not contain any such stipulation regarding the time difference between the first and second child for the grant of Maternity Benefits. However, the maternity benefit doesn’t apply to women who are self-employed or less than 10 employees. **keywords:** Maternity Benefit Act 1961, Labour Law, Maternity Leave, Article 42 of Indian Constitution, Maternity Benefit (Amendment) Bill Act,2017. **Maternity Benefits** The term Maternity Benefit defines the payment made to women during their pregnancy and after childbirth in addition, women need to be granted medical leave which is maternity leave during and after pregnancy. Every organization with 10 or more employees is subject to the Act and the women must have worked for not less than 80 days in the 12 months preceding childbirth. This act mainly aims to provide all women with a healthy and dignified Motherhood before and after pregnancy *“state of motherhood honourably, peacefully, undeterred by the fear of being victimised for forced absence during the pre or postnatal period*”[\[5\]](#_ftn5). Maternity leave is nothing but leave with wages to the women during and after pregnancy, which is a full salary paid leave for the woman during her pregnancy. The women are only eligible after fulfilling the conditions provided under the Maternity Benefit Act. The employer should pay the women employees if they are fit to receive the maternity benefit payment, the employer cannot deduct the employee’s wage. The employer can allow the nursing women to work from home if the nature of work needs no physical presence[\[6\]](#_ftn6) the employer cannot dismiss the employee during her maternity leave pointing out the pregnancy and asking her to work more than she can bear. ***“Article 4*** *of ILO states that a woman who have provided medical a certificate as prescribed by national law stating the presumed date of childbirth, women to whom this Convention applies shall be entitled to maternity leave for not less than 14 weeks”[**\[7\]**](#_ftn7)* **Who can seek benefit?** The Maternity Benefits can be given to all women who are pregnant, adopting a child, or experiencing miscarriage are eligible for Maternity Benefit under the Maternity Benefit Act 1961 as they are considered to be mothers and fulfil the conditions provided in the Act commissioning or surrogate mothers are also eligible to seek benefits until the child is given to the adoptive parents. The woman must have worked for not less than 8 days in 12 months immediately preceding her anticipated delivery to be eligible for Maternity Benefits. Under the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 the contractual worker can claim the maternity benefit as upheld in the ruling of *Rakhi v. State of Kerala*[\[8\]](#_ftn8) and *Rasitha C. H. V. State of Kerala*[\[9\]](#_ftn9) **Methods to claim Maternity Benefit** The woman willing to claim the maternity benefit must give notice to her employer as may be prescribed in the Act. The eligibility for Maternity Benefits is under section 6 of the 1961 Act. Following is the information to be in the notice; - Name of the women who claim the benefit - To attester that she will not work during this period - The day from which her leave period would start The employer must pay the woman after serving notice if she is eligible under the Act 1961. **Advantages of maternity leave in India** In India, women have set up their careers after years of independence, pregnancy and work should not overlap. Maternity Benefits have played an important role in building up their career. The maternity leave is given to the mother of the newborn to recover and take good care of the child. Heath benefits for the mother of the newborn are to take care of their physical body and be off from work, establish good relations with the newborn which is important for the growth of the newborn and provide job security for the women employee as they can continue to work after the work off. Overall, it helps women in India have secure jobs and build good relations between mother and child. **Maternity Benefit Act (Amendment) 2017** Before the 2017 Amendment, the act provided that women working at a company or factory could take maternity leave up to 6 months before and after they deliver the child and, during the leave period the employer must pay the women employee. Whereas, after the 2017 Amendment various aspects have been added like an increase in leave period, work from home and leave for mothers adopting children. The Act provides that women can take 26 weeks of Maternity Leave divided as 8 weeks before childbirth and 18 weeks post pregnancy or delivery. While women have 2 children already then 12 weeks maternity leave. Maternity leave can be provided to the mother adopting a child lawfully below three months of age gets 12 weeks of maternity leave eventually the commissioning woman is also considered a biological mother as they use the egg of that woman and places it in another woman’s embryo the leave starts for 12 weeks from the date the child was given to adoptive mother or commissioning mother. **Crèche** The crèche facilities must be provided in an establishment or factory with 50 or more employees. The crèche is to take care of the children while mothers work. There must be one crèche for every 30 children age group of 6 years[\[10\]](#_ftn10). The mother should be allowed to meet the children four times a day and must include the resting period to her. National guidelines for setting up crèches after the 2017 Amendment mandates under section 11A to establish crèches at a prescribed distance. As said in section 28 the state government or central government may prescribe the rules some of the rules are as follows; - Crèches are for the children age group of 6 months to 6 years of all categorised employees. - The Crèches should be within 500 meters of or at the workplace. - The crèches shall be opened from 8 to 10 hours but if the work is based on shift then the crèches must also be shift based. - There must be a crèche committee constituted for representatives of the parent or administration. The crèches should be provided with good ventilation, drinking water and lighting. The crèches must have one supervisor to take good care of the crèches and a trained worker to take care of the children. In the case of *Bahra University vs. Pooja Bhardwaj and Ors*, the Himachal Pradesh High Court ruled in favour of a female employee who chose not to work in that place as there were no crèches in the workplace[\[11\]](#_ftn11). **Rights of women employee payment in maternity Benefit** The right to payment in maternity benefits under labour law has been protected and considered a legal right for women to claim. According to Section 5(1) of the Act 1961, every woman is entitled to the payment immediately during her maternity leave for three calendar months. Women must receive an average daily wage of rs.1 whichever is higher the employer makes sure to pay the women during her absence. The calculation for such payment is based on the woman who worked in the workplace, and the days she was laid off during the 12 weeks immediately preceding her delivery date. Further, if the woman after delivering the child dies or during 6 weeks the employer is liable to pay the entire six weeks, if the child also dies the employer shall pay till the survival of the child including the day of death. In case both the mother and child die, if the woman is eligible for payment then such payment shall be paid to the nominees mentioned in the notice under section 6 of the Act and if no nominees are mentioned payment to her legal representative by the employer. **National Maternity Benefit Schemes under the Indian government** Under the National Maternity Benefit Schemes (NMBS) women during pregnancy would get rs.500 per pregnancy the eligible person must be a poor household woman for pre-natal and post-natal. This is applicable for women under 19 years and above on two pregnancies. 1. Janani Suraksha Yojana 2. Vande Mataram scheme 3. Pradhan Mantra Matru Vandana Yojana 4. Pradhan Mantra Surakshit Matritva Abhiyan **Indian Judiciary on Maternity Benefit** Many case laws deal with the Maternity Benefit**.** The courts have interpreted the intention of laws and benefits. The case laws are as follows; **Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll) and Another** The Supreme Court held that the women employed in muster roll on daily wage cannot be restricted to maternity leave under the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 stating only to regular women employees. This is because every woman will have children and women in the workplace must make it easier for working by the employer. It is hard for women to work and spend time carrying the baby in the womb so the employer must make sure to give maternity leave to working women[\[12\]](#_ftn12). **Smt. Archana Pandey v. State of Madhya Pradesh & others** In the case of the contractual employees on maternity leave, the Madhya Pradesh High Court has declared after interpretation of laws and other judgments that the constitution of India does want its women employees to get maternity leave and her employer to give all the amenities she needs while giving birth the petitioner is to be given maternity benefits by the respondent[\[13\]](#_ftn13). **Prachi Sen v. Ministry of Defence (2021)** The Karnataka High Court has dealt with this case on work from home for the mother of a newborn under section 5(5) of the Act of 2017, at the Semiconductor Technology and Applied Research Centre (STARC) a division of the Indian Ministry of defence the petitioner was working at that place as an executive engineer who has asked for work from home as she was enjoying the maternity benefit but the centre refused the court held that the petitioner in asking work from home is their right under section 5(5) of the 2017 Act but, there are some criteria to which work from home cannot be used as the petitioner’s job was sensitive it cannot be done at home so the court had instructed the institute to take proper measure to provide childcare and concern about the mothers. **Dr. Rachna Chaurasiya V. State of U.P. and others passed (2017)** The state government was ordered by a division bench of the High Court of Madras to provide 180 days of paid maternity leave to all women irrespective of their work in nature whether permanent, temporary or contractual basis. The women employees must be granted with 730 days of childcare leave who have minor child or age group of 18 years. Maternity leave cannot be excluded from a woman employee’s employment term. **Maternity Benefit in other countries** More than 120 countries around the world provide paid maternity leave for their working women “In all parts of the world, working women who became pregnant are faced with the threat of jobs loss, suspended earnings and increased health risk due to inadequate safeguards for their employment”[\[14\]](#_ftn14) The most paid maternity leave countries are Hungary- 24 weeks, Italy- 5 Months, Canada- 7 weeks, and Spain and Romania-16 weeks for the birth of the child or to care for a newborn. In the US, the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993 provided 12 weeks of unpaid leave during the 12 months for the birth of a child and the care of the newborn. There is some debate about days and weeks of maternity leave some have the standard of 12 weeks and others with 14 weeks also some countries have less than 12 weeks. Moreover, some countries provide weeks based on the number of children. In Nepal, women may take just two maternity leave whereas, in the Bahamas and Tanzania, women are allowed to take only one maternity leave in three years. The ILO has given some special protection to women working as childbirth, pregnancy and postnatal periods are very important to women in their reproductive life women’s health is prioritized more than work. **CONCLUSION** The Maternity Benefit Act, of 1961 was introduced to protect and safeguard the women employees in society and their health. No women shall be deprived of their work in the name of pregnancy and insecurity of their job. The 1961 Act provides eligibility for women to enjoy the benefits provided under the Act and maternity leave of 12 weeks during pregnancy and postnatal for women. The changes were brought in several maternity leave weeks through the 2017 Amendment. The crèches facilities for children 6 years and above mandate the employer to provide. The women shall be allowed to visit crèches four times a day with a resting period. The right to payment by the employer to the employee if both mother and child died then to her representative. **REFERENCES** - **Online Articles / Sources Referred** - [https://labour.gov.in/sites/default/files/the\_maternity\_benefit\_act\_1961\_0.pdf](https://labour.gov.in/sites/default/files/the_maternity_benefit_act_1961_0.pdf) - - - - - **Cases Referred** - Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll) and another (2000) - Archana Pandey v. State of Madhya Pradesh & others (2016) - Prachi Sen v. Ministry of Defence (2021) - Rachna Chaurasiya V. State of U.P. and others passed (2017) - Bahra University vs. Pooja Bhardwaj and Ors - Rakhi v. State of Kerala - Rasitha C. H. V. State of Kerala - Satakshi Mishra v. State of UP - **Statutes Referred** 1. The Maternity Benefit Act, 1921 2. The Maternity Benefit (Amendment) Bill, 2017 [\[1\]](#_ftnref1)Vinod, *Maternity Benefit Act, 1961*,(Dec. 21,2005) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Miranda Bryant, *Paternity leave: US is least generous in the list of world’s richest countries*, The Guardian (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jan/29/paternity-leave-us-policy. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) (Sept.2, 2022), https://www.livelaw.in/pdf\_upload/satakshi-mishra-v-state-of-up-thru-prin-secy-secondary-edu-dept-lucknow-and-4-others-writ-a-no-5114-of-2022-allahabad-high-court-433306.pdf. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Female Worker (Muster Roll) 2002 [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Section 5 (5) of Maternity Benefit Act 1961 [\[7\]](#_ftnref7)C183 – Maternity Protection Convention, 2000 (No. 183) [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) WP(C). No. 30561 of 2017 [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) WP(C). No. 5507 of 2018 [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Tamil Nadu Government Gazette [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) \[CWC Number 2955 of 2019\] [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) 2000 INSC 129 [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) AIRONLINE 2017 MP 94 [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) F.J.Dy-Hammar, chief, ILO condition of work Branch, Maternity Protection at work. **Categories:** Articles, Labour Law --- ### [Conditions of Patentability under Patent Act: Provisions, Cases and Principles](https://lawfoyer.in/conditions-of-patentability-under-patent-act-provisions-cases-and-principles/) **Published:** August 31, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Ishika Goyal, Student, Delhi Metropolitan Education (IP university)** **Edited by: Madhumita Saha, Student, Lajpat Rai Law College, Sambalpur University, Odisha.** **INTRODUCTION** A patent is typically an exclusive right awarded for an invention, product or even a process that is beneficial and provides a new way of doing something or even a new technical solution that is related to a problem. To obtain a patent, Technical information, including inventions, must be made available to the general public in the application for a patent. It is even more interesting to know about the history of patents. The patent law in India began in 1911, when the Patents and Designs Act, of 1911 was enacted. The Patents Act, of 1970 is the law that governs patents in India until nowadays. Moreover, the patent law was first implemented in 1972. The Office of the Director of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks or CGPDTM is the governing body for Indian patent law. It has its main patent office in Kolkata and branches in New Delhi, Chennai and Mumbai. Additionally, The CGPDTM office is located in Mumbai. Nagpur hosts the Patent Information System Office and the National Institute of Intellectual Property Management. Even the Director General shall oversee the administration of this Act and advise the Government on matters relating thereto. The Patent Act was amended several times in 1999, 2002, 2005, and 2006 and these amendments were necessary to comply with the TRIPS Patent Act. the TRIPS stands for Trade Aspects of Intellectual Property. In addition, A major change in patent law occurred in 2005, when product patents were extended to all technological areas such as food, medicine, chemicals and microorganisms. The laws were also amended under the Patents Act in 2012, 2013, and 2014. In this article, we will discuss more about the India Patent Act along with the different Patentability Conditions. **Keywords:** 1. India Patents Act 2. Indian Patent Act 1970 3. Patentability Conditions 4. Patent Act Provisions 5. Patent Principles ## What can be patented? Scientist Chakrabarty applied for patent protection for his invention of a process for creating bacteria that could degrade several different components of crude oil. He made several assertions about the bacterium, including how it developed, the bacterium itself, and an inoculum that contained the bacterium and a carrier material. Chakrabarty’s application for a patent on the bacteria was rejected because it did not satisfy the necessary subject matter requirements, even though the examiner concluded that a patent was warranted for the procedure and the inoculum. The patent examiner states that a live organism is not eligible for patent protection under the 1930 Plant Patent Act or 35 U.S.C. Section 101. Conflicting conclusions were made on the subject by several appellate review bodies. The Indian Patents Act, 1970 made plain the limitations on what can be patented in India in Sections 3 and 4. To receive a patent in India, several requirements must be met. They are as follows: **1. Patent Subject:** Determining whether the invention is related to a patentable subject matter is the most crucial step. The Patents Act lists non-patentable subject matter in Sections 3 & 4. Moreover, The innovation is patentable unless it comes under one of the provisions of Sections 3 or 4. 2. **Uniqueness:** When evaluating an invention’s patent prospects, innovation is a crucial factor. A novelty or new invention is defined as “no invention or technology published” under Section 2(l) of the Patent Act. 3. **Creative actions or ambiguity:** The characteristic of a patent involves technological advancement of economic importance or both. However, It must be relevant to existing knowledge, and an invention that is not evident to a person knowledgeable in the art is defined as an innovative step under Section 2(ja) of the Patent Act. Additionally, This implies that an individual with expertise in the same sector as the invention should not be able to see the idea immediately. For someone with expertise in the same field, it shouldn’t be both imaginative and obvious. **4. Suitable for industrial use:** The Patents Act’s Section 2(ac) defines industrial application as “the invention is capable of being made or used in an industry.” In essence, this indicates that the invention cannot exist in a vacuum. It must apply to all industries, This means that it must be valuable for patents. These are legal requirements for an invention’s patent. The publication of a competent patent is another crucial need for receiving a patent. A competent patent disclosure is one in which the invention is sufficiently disclosed in a patent draft specification to prevent undue effort by a person with similar expertise from carrying out the invention. **Conditions of the Indian Patent Act 1970** Indian patents are granted under the Indian Patents Act, of 1970 if the innovation meets the following conditions: 1. The construction must be original. The invention should not be obvious or involve new methods. 2. It should be well made for business use. Inventions can only be made using construction or methods that can be prevented. 3. Sections 3 and 4 of the Patents Act 1970 shall not apply. 4. Nuclear power generation not subject to safeguards: Nuclear power generation facilities falling under clause (1) of section 20 of the Energy Act, 1962, are not subject to safeguards. 5. Any of the people mentioned there can request the first page, alone or jointly with another person. Each patent application must be for a single invention, presented in the required form and submitted to the Patent Office. ## Rights and duties of the patent owner **Patent rights** 1. The patentee has the exclusive right to use, use, sell or distribute the registered product or material in India, to use or use the method, or in practice if the patent is owned by an individual. The patent holder may exercise this right either through his representative or through the licensee. The rights of the patent holder can only be exercised during the term of the patent. 2. The patent holder has the right to transfer rights or grant a license to make other payment arrangements. The license or assignment must be in writing and registered with the patent officer to be valid and valid. A patent assignment will not be accepted as evidence of patent ownership by anyone unless it is registered, and this applies to the grantor, not the grantee. 3. The patent holder has the right to surrender his patent, but before accepting the surrender, the surrender notice will be sent to the persons named as beneficiaries of the patent as opposed. , It works. The application for release will also be published in the official gazette so that interested parties can protest. 4. A patent owner has the right to sue for patent infringement in the district court that has jurisdiction over the action. **Obligations of patentee** 1. It is believed that the government may restrict or forbid the use of a patent under certain conditions. A patented invention may be exploited, or even purchased, by the government for its purposes. If a medication or drug has a patent, the government may import it for its use or distribute it at any hospital, dispensary, or other medical facility that it operates or contracts with. The patent holder’s permission or payment of royalties is not required for the aforementioned use. In addition, the government may demand a patent or sell goods made using a patented technology in exchange for royalties. 2. The Controller may give any applicant a compulsory license to work the patent if it is not worked sufficiently to meet the legitimate needs of the public at a fair cost. The Indian Patent Act contains a provision known as a compulsory license that gives the government the authority to order a manufacturer of generic drugs to provide affordable medications for the general population even while the product is still covered by a valid patent. In cases where one patent cannot be worked without the other, compulsory licenses may also be sought for related patents. 3. If there has been no work done on the patented innovation or if the public’s demands have not been met, a patent may be revoked. Patents for defence-related inventions may be subject to various confidentiality clauses, meaning that the controller may restrict or forbid the invention’s release. The application is banned from use upon the continuation of such an order or the prohibition of publishing or transmission of a patented invention, and the Central Government may utilize it in exchange for paying the applicant royalties. 4. If a patent has lapsed, it may be renewed as long as the patent holder’s rights are not severely restricted. The patent cannot pursue infringement claims where the infringement occurred between the date of the infringement and the date of the application for reinstatement’s announcement. ## Grounds of opposition to patents Under section 25 of the 1970 Act, a patent application can be rejected on several grounds: 1\. False purchase: If the patent was obtained by mistake on the part of the opponent, it can be challenged. The novelty of this invention is evaluated in light of the prior art. Preconceived notions cannot be challenged. 2\. Prior publication: If the invention was published before the date on which priority is claimed, it can be rejected. The publication should show the details of the production. 3\. Public use: Public use of the invention before the first date is a ground for objection. Secret use is not considered. 4\. Of course: If the invention is discovered without a manufacturing process, you can oppose the patent application. Ambiguous cases are referred to the Supreme Court. 5\. Unpatentable Inventions: Applications for inventions falling under non-patentable categories will be rejected. 6. Description is not enough: The description of the object must be clear. Applications that do not match or have insufficient explanations will be rejected. 7\. Silence foreign applications: If the applicant has registered for such foreign invention, inform the administrator. Failure to do so may result in objections. 8\. Suspend Conference Request: Conference requests must be submitted within 12 months of the initial request to maintain priority. Delay results in failure. Legal requirements under WIPO for patentability : All countries have their list of needs and requirements to obtain a patent. Whereas There is no list of requirements for this field, WIPO provides important conditions that must be met to obtain a patent. these are: 1. The invention for which a patent is applied must meet the requirements of novelty. It should not be like the old art, it should be up to date with the current knowledge in the technical fields. 2. To be invisible, involves some thinking moves. It is meant to be beyond the reach of a common man with his ordinary faculties. It must be used in industry, that is, industrial use. 3. The object of the invention must be included in the category of patentable material. When applying for a patent, the information and details of the invention must be clearly stated. ## The Patents (Amendment) Bill 2005 passed by the Indian Parliament The Indian Parliament has passed the Patents (Amendment) Bill, 2005, which replaces the Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 2004, which was previously passed by the Government of India in December 2004. India was required to introduce product patent protection in these areas from 1.1.2005 under the obligations under the WTO TRIPS Agreement. To fulfil this requirement, the Government of India issued an order in 2004. This decision must be approved by the Parliament. While introducing the Patents (Amendment) Bill 2005 to the Parliament, the Government made some changes in the provisions of this Act. ## The doctrine of equivalent patents Literal and non-literal patent infringements are the two main categories of patent infringements. A literal duplicate of the copyrighted innovation is required for a literal infringement to take place. For instance, it was deemed a literal copy of the copyrighted idea in the 1986 Polaroid Corp v. Eastman Kodak case when Eastman Kodak directly utilized Polaroid’s “instant camera technology.” Conversely, an indirect infringement implies a degree of inadvertent infringement or malicious intent. For instance, in Ravi Kamal Bali v. Kala Tech and others \[2008\], the product was deemed to be infringing even if its primary body had a different structure since there was no functional or constructional difference between it and the other goods. This would clarify everything. The field of indirect infringements is governed by the Doctrine of Equivalent Patents. The doctrine allows the patent holder to assert a claim even in situations when the patented invention’s claim is not replicated in the product that is being copied. This philosophy has developed to prevent people from making minute modifications to inventions while maintaining the functionality of the final product and preventing them from reaping the rewards of the patentee’s labour and capital. **Case Laws** **Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)** Scientist Chakraborty filed for patent protection after he discovered a way to create a bacterium that could break down various components of crude oil. His assertions included the bacterial growth mechanism, the bacterium itself, and an inoculum that contained the bacterium and a carrier material. Chakrabarty was not granted a patent for the bacteria itself because it did not fit the requirements for patent subject matter, even though the examiner concluded that a patent was warranted for the procedure and the inoculum. A living organism cannot be patented, according to the patent examiner, under 35 U.S.C. Section 101 and the 1930 Plant Patent Act. Diverse appellate review panels arrived at conflicting conclusions regarding the subject. **Novartis v. Union of India (2013)** Novartis applied to the Indian Patents Office and the Patents Controller to get a patent for a medication known as “Gleevec.” However, the application was denied. The corporation appealed and contested each rejection in the Supreme Court. **CONCLUSION** The Indian Patent Act of 1970 governs patents in India, granting exclusive rights for inventions, products, or processes that provide new ways of doing something or technical solutions to problems. The governing body is the Office of the Director of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks (CGPDTM), with offices in Kolkata, New Delhi, Chennai, and Mumbai. The Act has been amended several times to conform to the TRIPS Patent Act, which covers commercial aspects of intellectual property. TA the same time, Each patent application should be linked to an invention and therefore, it should be submitted to the Swedish Patent Office. Whereas, this shows the Patent owners have exclusive rights to use, sell, distribute, transfer rights, grant licenses, file patents and sue for patent infringement. Governments can restrict or restrict the use of patents under certain conditions. **REFERENCES** 1. [https://blog.ipleaders.in/what-is-a-patent-law-in-india/#Rights\_and\_obligations\_of\_the\_patentee](https://blog.ipleaders.in/what-is-a-patent-law-in-india/#Rights_and_obligations_of_the_patentee) 2. [**https://blog.ipleaders.in/understanding-doctrine-equivalent-patents/**](https://blog.ipleaders.in/understanding-doctrine-equivalent-patents/) 3. [**https://lawfoyer.in/right-to-education-under-article-21-of-the-indian-constitution/#google\_vignette**](https://lawfoyer.in/right-to-education-under-article-21-of-the-indian-constitution/#google_vignette) 4. [**https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/447/303/**](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/447/303/) **Categories:** Articles, Intellectual Property Law --- ### [Constitutionality of waqf act, 1955](https://lawfoyer.in/constitutionality-of-waqf-act-1955/) **Published:** August 31, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ***Author: Nitin Kumar*** ***Edited By: Aneel Meghani*** ***INTRODUCTION*** *In Islam, a “waqf” is a trust-held property endowment used for religious or philanthropic purposes. According to, Section 3(r) of the Waqf Act, 1995, it is the permanent donation, in Muslim law, of any moveable or immovable property by an individual for pious, religious, or charitable purposes. By putting property away, you can make sure that it is no longer transferable and that Allah owns it, existing outside of human ownership and use. Fundamentally, a waqf upholds the notion of property devoted to the service of God and society by meeting the needs of the community in terms of religion, education, or social welfare.**1** Since the law of waqf is entwined with Muslims’ entire religious life and social economy, it is considered the most significant branch of Mohammedan law2 and The Waqf Act of 1995’s primary goal is to improve Waqf management and address issues related to or tangential to it.3 The President gave his approval to the Waqf Act, 1995 on November 22, 1995, after it was passed by Parliament. According to Section 1(3) of the Act, each State would be required to implement the Act on a day that will be announced in the official gazette by the federal government. The Central Government published a notification designating January 1, 1996, as the effective date of the aforementioned Act, in accordance with Section 1(3) of the 1995 Act.371, The Act is organized into IX Chapters with 113 Sections. While Chapter II (Sections 4-8) addresses the issue of the survey of auqaf, Chapter I (Sections 1-3) is preparatory. The Chapter III (Sections 9-12) deals with the constitution of the Central Waqf Council, Chapter IV (Sections 13-35) provides for establishment of Boards and their functions. And the Auqaf registration is covered in Chapter V (Sections 36-43), while Auqaf account maintenance is covered in Chapter VI (Sections 44-71). The topics of the Board’s finances, judicial proceedings, and miscellaneous are covered in Sections 72–82, 83–95, and 96–113 of Chapters VII, VIII, and IX, respectively.* ***KEYWORDS:** Waqf, Personal laws, Constitutional validity, Religious freedom, Charitable purpose.* ***HISTORICAL BACKGROUND*** *A significant portion of the background of waqf legislation in India comes from the struggle for better waqf protection and management during British rule. Five years after India attained independence, this movement resulted in the Central Wakf Act, 1954. In the lengthy history of waqf legislation, this Act represented a critical turning point with its goal of enhancing waqf management nationwide. With the exception of West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, and portions of Maharashtra and Gujarat, where prior regional statutes remained in effect, the 1954 Act applied to the majority of India.4 It was the first major attempt to implement standard waqf management throughout the nation. But when the Act was being put into practice, a number of flaws were discovered, which prompted a number of changes in 1959, 1964, 1969, and 1984. In the end, these modifications resulted in the adoption of the new, more extensive Waqf Act in 1995.5 The objective of this Act is to address the shortcomings of its predecessor and encourage greater uniformity in waqf management across India. It is applicable only to Jammu & Kashmir and the Dargah Khwaja Saheb in Ajmer. The Waqf Board now has a more democratic constitution with a majority of elected members, the Chief Executive Officer has more authority to evict encroachers, and the statute of limitations for waqf property recovery under adverse possession is waived, among other significant changes brought about by the 1995 Act.* ***MODES OF CREATION WAQF*** *The following methods can be used to build waqf.* - ***By an act inter vivos**– This kind of waqf is made between living people; it is formed during the waqif’s lifetime and is effective right away.* - ***By will–** An act inter vivos waqf and a waqf created by will are incompatible. It is also referred to as “testamentary waqf” and goes into effect following the waqif’s passing. Without the heirs’ permission, a waqf of this kind cannot manage more than one-third of the net assets.* - ***During death or illness (marz-ul-maul)–** Similar to gifts given while a donor is near death, they will be effective up to a third of the property’s value without the heirs’ permission.* - ***By immemorial user–** Waqf property production is likewise subject to time constraints, although it can be created by enduring use.* 1. ***ESSENTIAL OF WAQT*** - ***In Perpetuity:** A “Waqf” is a long-term contract that ensures that the ownership of the property is always available for as long as needed. For a certain period of time, a “Waqf” cannot exist.* - ***Irrevocability:** The “Waqf” is unchangeable when generated. As a result the property is regarded to be owned by God.* - ***Inalienability:** When a “Waqf” is formed, the property is assumed to belong to God. Thus, “Waqf” property cannot be sold, transferred, or encumbered. Aside from the “Waqf’s” basic necessities, any attempt to alienate “Waqf” property without court permission is illegal.* - ***Absoluteness:** The real estate in “Waqf” is settled completely and unconditionally. A contingent or conditional “Waqf” is empty and unenforceable.* - ***Religious or Charitable Use of Usufruct:** According to Muslim law, the goods and benefits of “Waqf” assets can only be utilized for spiritual, pious, or charitable objectives* ***APPLICATION OF WAQF ACT, 1955*** *Through exception of the Durgah Khawaja Saheb in Ajmer, which is governed by the Durgah Khawaja Saheb Act, 1955, Section 2 of the Waqf Act, 1995 applies to all auqaf, the possibility that established before or following the Act’s inception. This means that the Waqf Act of 1995 does not apply to the Durgah Khawaja Saheb in Ajmer or any other waqfs that are administered under unique or local regulations. The provision in Section 2 explicitly exempts the Durgah Khawaja Saheb, ensuring it remains under the jurisdiction of the Act of 1955**.6** The Waqf Act, 1995 generally has retrospective operation, but its application to the law of limitation is specific. According to Section 107 of the Act, the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to suits for possession of immovable property or any interest in such property that is part of a waqf. While the Waqf Act, 1995 is retrospective in many cases, court decisions have shown that it is not always applied retrospectively in all instances.7* *In Sk. **Abul Kalam v. Umapada Maity**,8 the Calcutta High Court ruled that the Waqf Act, 1995 cannot apply retrospectively if the plaintiffs were out of possession since 1958, as their claim for recovery was already barred before the Act came into effect. The Supreme Court in **K.C. Dora v. G. Annamanaidu9** stated that changes in substantive law during a pending action do not alter the rights of the parties unless the new statute explicitly indicates such an intention. Additionally, in **Sardar Khan v. Syed Najmul Hasan,10** The Waqf Act does not apply to lawsuits or processes filed prior to January 1, 1996, the day the Act went into effect, the Apex Court said. It is not stated clearly in the Waqf Act, 1995 that it is retroactive.* *Consequently, in **Sawarkhanam v. Macca Madina Allauddin Wakf**,11 the Allahabad High Court noted that parties’ rights are determined based on the law at the time of the suit’s initiation, and the Waqf Act’s provisions do not appear to be retroactive**.*** *In **T. Kaliamurthi v. Five Gori Thaikal Wakf**,12 the appellants argued that the Waqf Act, 1995, which came into force on January 1, 1996, could not revive claims barred under the Limitation Act, 1908. They contended that the right over the property, transferred in 1927, was extinguished through the Act of 1908, and Section 107 of the Waqf Act could not revive this barred claim. Citing Section 6(a) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and Section 112 of the Waqf Act, they argued that a repeal cannot revive extinguished claims. The Apex court agreed, ruling that Section 107 of the Waqf Act, 1995, cannot revive claims or extinguished rights barred under previous limitation laws. The Court affirmed that once a right to sue is barred under the law of limitation in force, it cannot be revived by new legislation.* *In contrast in **Shehzadi v. The Chief Executive Officer**,13 The petitioner challenged a decision requiring them to give the Managing Committee custody of properties that were in dispute. According to Section 3(ee) of the Waqf Act, 1995, which encompasses anyone occupying waqf property without legal authority, the respondent contended that the petitioner was an encroacher. Before the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2013, the waqf institution had to follow procedures like terminating leases before evicting occupants. However, the amendment introduced a new procedure for reclaiming possession, allowing the Chief Officer to act under Section 54 of the Act. The Bombay High Court ruled that Section 3(ee) had retrospective effect, meaning the new procedures applied even to situations that arose before the amendment. This allowed waqf institutions to approach the Chief Officer for eviction under the amended provisions.* ***DOES THE 1995 ACT VIOLATE ARTICLE 14, 25, and 26 OF THE CONSTITUTION?*** *In **Maulana Kureshi Gulam Mustafa v. Union of India,** the Waqf Act, 1995 was contested on the grounds that it was unconstitutional under Articles 14, 25, and 26 of the Indian Constitution. Article 25 provides religious freedom, Article 26 gives religious denominations the authority to run their own affairs, an14d Article 14 assures the right to equality.* *The main challenge was that the Act divided Muslims into “Sunnies” and “Shias” without recognizing “Sufi Silsilas.” The petitioner argued that this division was unconstitutional. However, the Gujarat High Court upheld The statute states that the Waqf Board’s composition includes elected members from both Houses of Parliament and State Legislatures, Bar Councils, Private Muslim Organizations, and Islamic scholars, ensuring broad representation.* *The Court found no violation of Articles 25 and 26, asserting that the Act does not interfere with religious activities or deny the freedom to manage religious properties. The non-recognition of Sufi sects in the Waqf Board’s composition does not infringe on their constitutional rights. Thus, the Court rejected the petition, affirming the Act’s alignment with the constitutional framework.* *In **Association of A.P. Sajjada Nasheens, Mutawallies v. Secretary, UOI**,15 it was argued that Section 14 of the Waqf Act of 1995 declared unlawful, violating Articles 14, 25, and 26 of the Indian Constitution. The petitioners contended that the Act, which aims to democratize and improve Waqf administration, actually undermined the powers of Mutawallis and gave control to individuals unconnected with the waqfs.* *They argued that the Waqf Board’s composition, with only one member representing Mutawallis out of eleven, was detrimental to the waqfs and violated Article 14’s guarantee of equality. The petitioners also claimed that the Act contravened Articles 25 and 26, which protect the rights of religious denominations to manage their own affairs and properties Specifically, the criteria for choosing representatives, which required waqfs to have an annual income of one lakh and above, was seen as arbitrary and discriminatory. The court found this provision discriminatory, violative of Article 14, and arbitrary, and thus struck down Section 14(1)(b)(iv) of the Waqf Act, 1995.16 But the rest Sections of the Act remained constitutionally valid. The Court further observed:* *It is stated that the right under Article 26 of the Constitution is not absolute and can be subject to reasonable regulations by the State. It highlighted that fundamental rights must coexist harmoniously and cannot exist in isolation. Therefore, the petitioners’ argument that the Waqf Act, 1995 is unconstitutional and violates Articles 14, 25, and 26 was found to be without merit.* ***Difficulties regarding the Waqf Act of 1995*** *There was some disagreement regarding the Waqf legislation of 1995’s restriction of civil court authority and the authority of waqf tribunals. The plaintiff held the claim to property, whereas the defendant possessed the home adjacent to the land’s northern boundary. In the matter of **Nagore Andavar Sambiranichatty Dhoopam Family Trust, Nagapattinam vs. S. Jegabar Ali,17** the Madras High Court rendered this decision But the defendant built a restroom and a water tank on the plaintiff’s land while intruding.* *The party defending the case then challenged the plaintiff’s claims, alleging that he had held the land for a period exceeding twenty years and that his predecessors had profited from it. The plaintiff’s ownership of the suit estate and the action’s capacity to proceed there were contested in the civil justice system. The High Court has concluded that waqf tribunals should hear all issues related to waqfs and waqf properties because civil courts lack jurisdiction over them, in line with Section 85 of the Waqf Act, 1995. In a comparable manner it was argued **in case of Intazamia Committee Idgah v. M.P. Waqf Board18** that the Civil Court’s jurisdiction is waived in the event that an appeal is filed against a Tribunal judgment and the Tribunal’s decision is deemed final.* *The Apex court had to decide on a dispute concerning the establishment of the Maharashtra Board of Waqfs and its impact on the waqfs established by individuals from various Islamic law sects in the case of **Maharashtra State Board of Wakf v. Shaikh Yusuf Bhai Chawl.**19 Prior to this, The Bombay Trust Act governs public trusts in Maharashtra, whilst the Waqf Act of 1954 governs waqfs.* ***CONCLUSION*** *An important change to the Waqf Act of 1995 serves as the Indian legal structure for administering waqf holdings. The Indian Constitution’s Articles 14, 25, and 26 have been the subject of constitutional disputes, although the Act has generally been affirmed as lawful by the courts. The Act’s primary goal of improving Waqf management of land and standardized management across India has been acknowledged as a valid state goal. Courts have generally found that it does not infringe upon religious freedoms or the rights of religious denominations to manage their affairs. The composition of Waqf Boards, designed to ensure broad representation, has been seen as a democratic approach to waqf management.* *However, some provisions have been contested. Certain criteria for selecting Waqf Board representatives have been struck down as discriminatory. The exclusion of civil court jurisdiction in favor of waqf tribunals has also been debated, though mostly upheld.* *The Act’s retrospective application, particularly regarding limitation periods for property claims, has been a complex issue. Courts have ruled that it cannot revive claims already barred under previous laws.* *Overall, the Waqf Act, 1995 remains crucial in waqf property management, balancing modernization efforts with constitutional principles and religious freedoms.* ***REFERENCES*** 1. ***Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred*** 2. *Ameer Ali, Principles of Mohammedan Law (Allahabad Law Emporium, 1983)* 3. *Tahir Mahmood, “The Wakf Act 1954 as Amended by the Wakf (Amendment) Act of 1984”, 5 Islamic and Comparative Law Quarterly (1985)* 4. *Furqaan Ahmad, “The Wakf (Amendment) Act 1984: An Analysis” 5(1) Islamic and Comparative Law Quarterly (1985)* 5. *Ateeque Khan, “The Wakf (Amendment) Act 1984 — A Plea for Reconsideration”, 5 (1) Islamic and Comparative Law Quarterly (1985)* ***Online Articles / Sources Referred*** 1. *Abanti Bose, ‘Understanding the essential provisions of the waqf act, 1955’ (ipleader, 28 Aug 2020) * ***Cases Referred*** 1. *Sharifan Biwi v. Prabhu Saran Rajvedi, 2016 (6) ADJ 678: 2016 (117) ALR 852* 2. *Syed Thajuddin v. Syed Mohideen, (2011) 2 MLJ 105* 3. *Prince of Arcot, Endowments v. Tamil Nadu Wakf Board, 2006-4-LW479: (2006) 3 MLJ 856* 4. *Manick Mohan Saha v. Md. Masudal Haque, 2005 (1) CHN 512: (2005) 1 CALLT 357 (HC)* 5. *Yeshwantrao Laxmanrao Ghatge v. Baburao Bala Yadav, AIR 1978 SC 941: (1978) 1 SCC 669* 6. *Bharat Barrel v. The Employees’ Estate Insurance Corporation, AIR 1972 SC 1935: (1971) 2 SCC 860* 7. *Indira Sohan Lal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, AIR 1956 SC 77: \[1955\] 2 SCR 1117* 8. *Sk. Abul Kalam v. Umapada Maity, 2007 (4) CHN 962: 2007 (2) CLJ (CAL) 781* 9. *K.C. Dora v. G. Annamanaidu, AIR 1974 SC 1069: \[1974\] 2 SCR 655* 10. *Sardar Khan v. Syed Najmul Hasan, AIR 2007 SC 1447: (2007) 10 SCC 727* 11. *Sawarkhanam v. Macca Madina Allauddin Wakf, 2018 (1) ALD 341* 12. *T. Kaliamurthi v. Five Gori Thaikal Wakf, AIR 2009 SC 840: (2008) 9 SCC 306* 13. *Shehzadi v. The Chief Executive Officer, 2016 (4) Mh LJ 675* 14. *Maulana Kureshi Gulam Mustafa v. Union of India, AIR 2002 Guj 252* 15. *Association of A.P. Sajjada Nasheens, Mutawallies v. Secretary, UOI, 2010 (1) ALT 112: 2010 (4) ALD 136* 16. *Hafiz Mohamed Zafar Ahamed v. U. P. Sunni Central Board of Wakfs, AIR 1965 All 33* 17. *Nagore Andavar Sambiranichatty Dhoopam Family Trust, Nagapattinam vs. S. Jegabar Ali, AIR 2012 (Mad) 303* 18. *Intazamia Committee Idgah v. M.P. Waqf Board, AIR 1996 (MP) 47* 19. *Maharashtra State Board of Wakf v. Shaikh Yusuf Bhai Chawl, 2012 (6) SCC 32* ***Statutes Referred*** 1. *The Waqf Act, 1995* 2. *The Durgah Khawaja Saheb Act, 1955* 3. *The Limitation Act, 1963* 4. *The General Clauses Act, 1897* 5. *The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2013* 6. *The Constitution of India (Articles 14, 25, 26* 7. *The Central Wakf Act, 1954* 8. *The Bombay Trust Act* **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [Nirmal Singh Kahlon v/s State of Punjab AIR 2009 SC 984](https://lawfoyer.in/nirmal-singh-kahlon-v-s-state-of-punjab-air-2009-sc-984/) **Published:** August 31, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** Author: Swareena Singh Edited By- Biraj Kumar Sarkar **ABSTRACT** The Supreme Court reviewed whether the conviction was legally valid and if the trial followed proper procedures under the Prevention of Corruption Act. They looked at whether there was enough evidence, whether the trial was conducted fairly, and if the correct legal standards were applied. The Court stressed the importance of following proper procedures in corruption cases, explained the level of evidence needed to prove corruption charges, and confirmed the need for a fair trial and justice. In the summary of the headnote, some points of the case: Validity of the second FIR, Impact of flawed investigation on trial, Permissibility of a new complaint based on further investigation, Segregation of trial, and transfer of materials to the CBI court. ***Keywords*:** Corruption, Prevention of Corruption Act, Criminal Misconduct, Evidence, Fair Trial **CASE DETAILS[\[i\]](#_edn1)** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** Nirmal Singh Kahlon v/s State of Punjab ***ii)* *Case Number*** Civil Appeal Nos. 6198-6199 of 2008 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 24777-24778 of 2005) ***iii)* *Judgement Date*** October 22, 2008 ***iv)* *Court*** SC (Supreme Court of India) ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** Three-judge bench of the Supreme Court: Chief Justice K.G. Balakrishnan, Justice R.V. Raveendran, and Justice P. Sathasivam ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges*** Aftab Alam/ S.B. Sinha ***vii)* *Citation*** AIR 2009 SC 984, 2009 CriLJ 958, JT 2008 (12) SC 331, 2008 (14) SCALE 639, (2009) 1 SCC 441, 2009 (2) SLJ 371 (SC) ***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved*** Prevention of Corruption Act, IPC Sections 409 and 420, and CrPC Sections 313 and 319. **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The Nirmal Singh Kahlon vs State of Punjab case revolves around the alleged illegal recruitment of Panchayat Secretaries in Punjab, India. Nirmal Singh Kahlon, the then Rural Development and Panchayats Minister in the Government of Punjab, was accused of making these recruitments for his benefit by accepting bribes. **FACTS OF THE CASE** **Procedural Background of the Case** 1. Nirmal Singh Kahlon challenged the State of Punjab’s acquisition of his land for a special economic zone (SEZ) project by filing a writ petition with the Punjab and Haryana High Court. 2. The High Court dismissed his petition, so Kahlon appealed to the Supreme Court. 3. Kahlon filed a Special Leave Petition (SLP) with the Supreme Court to challenge the High Court’s decision. 4. The Supreme Court, with Justices R.V. Raveendran and A.K. Patnaik, agreed with Kahlon, overturned the High Court’s decision, and ruled that the land acquisition was unlawful and violated Kahlon’s rights. Kahlon then made another appeal to the Punjab and Haryana High Court, but his appeal was dismissed. 5. Kahlon filed another Special Leave Petition (SLP) with the Supreme Court, challenging this new High Court decision. 6. The Supreme Court accepted his petition and heard the appeal**.** **Factual Background of the Case** 1. Kahlon objected to the land acquisition, raising issues about the project’s feasibility, the compensation offered, and how it would affect his livelihood. His concerns were dismissed by the authorities between 2004 and 2005. 2. In 2006, the Land Acquisition Collector decided the compensation amount and took possession of the land. Later in 2006, Kahlon filed a writ petition with the Punjab and Haryana High Court, challenging the land acquisition. 3. The High Court dismissed his petition, so Kahlon appealed to the Supreme Court. 4. The Supreme Court ruled that the land acquisition was unlawful because it did not serve a “public purpose” and violated Kahlon’s rights under Article 300-A of the Indian Constitution. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether Nirmal Singh Kahlon, as the Minister for Rural Development and Panchayats, abused his position to make illegal recruitments of Panchayat Secretaries. 2. Whether Kahlon accepted bribes or other forms of gratification in exchange for making these recruitments. 3. Whether the police acted without the jurisdiction in investigating or continuing to investigate the case and Whether the Delhi Court acted illegally in taking cognizance of the case? 4. Whether the CBI investigation was conducted fairly and impartially, and whether its findings were based on credible evidence. 5. Whether the First Information Report lodged by the Vigilance Department of the state and the one lodged by CBI related to the same cause of action is the question. 6. Whether public servants like Kahlon can be held accountable for their actions, and what consequences they should face if found guilty of misconduct. **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. Kahlon’s lawyer pointed out mistakes in how the investigation and trial were handled. They claimed there were problems with how evidence was collected and shown, which might have affected the fairness of the case. 2. Kahlon’s lawyer stressed that his assets were legally obtained. They argued that Kahlon had a legitimate income source that matched his financial status and explained his wealth. 3. Kahlon’s lawyer argued that the prosecution twisted or chose facts unfairly to make their case against him. They said that if the evidence were looked at fairly, it wouldn’t support the charges. 4. Kahlon’s lawyer pointed out that criminal cases, especially serious ones like corruption, need strong proof. They argued that the prosecution didn’t provide enough evidence to meet this high standard. 5. They pointed out past court cases that highlight the need for strong and clear evidence to convict someone of corruption. They argued that these important precedents were not properly considered in Kahlon’s case. 6. Based on their arguments, the defense asked the Supreme Court to cancel the lower court’s decision and clear Kahlon of all charges. They argued that the evidence wasn’t strong enough, there were mistakes in the process, and the prosecution’s case was seriously flawed. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The lawyers for the Respondent argued that there was enough evidence to prove that Nirmal Singh Kahlon was involved in corruption. They said the evidence clearly showed a link between Kahlon’s wealth and his official position, which suggested he was corrupt 2. The prosecution used both documents and witness statements to show that Kahlon’s wealth didn’t match his known income sources. They presented financial records and other evidence to prove that Kahlon had unexplained money and inconsistencies in how he reported his assets. 3. The lawyer for the respondent claimed that the investigation was done properly and followed all legal rules. They argued that the investigation was fair and that there were no mistakes or biases that affected the trial. 4. They defended the way the evidence was gathered and shown, saying that the methods used were legal and correct. They argued that any claimed mistakes in the process didn’t affect the trustworthiness of the evidence. 5. The prosecution disagreed with the defense’s claims about where Kahlon’s money came from. They argued that Kahlon’s explanations were not enough and did not explain why his assets were so much greater than what his income would suggest. 6. The lawyers argued that the explanations for asset discrepancies presented by the defense were inadequate and did not resolve the issues raised by the prosecution. They maintained that the inconsistencies were substantial and indicative of corrupt practices. 7. The respondent’s counsel emphasized that the prosecution had established a clear link between Kahlon’s accumulation of assets and his corrupt practices. They argued that the evidence demonstrated that Kahlon had used his position for personal gain, which was a hallmark of corruption. 8. The prosecution argued that they had provided enough proof to meet the high standard required in criminal cases, especially for corruption. They maintained that the evidence was strong enough to prove Kahlon’s guilt beyond any reasonable doubt. 9. The prosecution’s lawyers pointed out how anti-corruption laws and past court decisions applied to Kahlon’s case. They argued that the lower court’s decision was consistent with these legal principles and similar past cases. 10. They referred to previous cases that showed how to prove corruption and evaluate evidence. They argued that these cases supported Kahlon’s conviction and were used correctly in his trial. 11. Kahlon’s defense lawyer supported the lower court’s judgment, saying it was well-reasoned and based on evidence. They argued that the trial court had considered all the important factors and evidence properly. They asked the Supreme Court to keep Kahlon’s conviction, arguing that the lower court’s decision was justified based on the evidence and legal standards. They emphasized the need to uphold anti-corruption laws and hold public officials accountable. 12. The prosecution’s lawyers stressed the importance of following the law and holding public officials accountable. They argued that keeping Kahlon’s conviction was crucial for maintaining public trust in the legal and political systems. 13. They also said that upholding the conviction would discourage other public officials from engaging in corrupt practices, reinforcing the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** 1. **Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860** 2. **Sections 420, 467, 468, and 120(b):** 3. Section 420 IPC defines the offense of cheating that results in the dishonest inducement of property delivery or alterations of valuable securities, with punishments including imprisonment and fines. 4. Section 467 IPC addresses the crime of forging valuable documents or securities, prescribing severe penalties including life imprisonment or a term of up to seven years, along with possible fines. 5. Section 468 IPC criminalizes forgery done with the intent to cheat, with penalties including imprisonment of up to seven years and fines. 6. Section 120B IPC addresses criminal conspiracy, specifying punishments based on the severity of the intended offense. If the intended offense is severe, the conspirator faces similar punishment as for the principal offense; otherwise, the punishment is up to half the term of imprisonment provided for the offense. 7. **Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988** - **Section 13(2)**: - Provides that a public servant can be convicted if they are found to possess property disproportionate to their known sources of income and cannot satisfactorily account for it. It places the burden of proof on the accused to explain the source of the disproportionate assets. - **Section 13(1)(e)**: - This section deals with the offense of criminal misconduct by a public servant. It stipulates that if a public servant, during or after their tenure, is found to possess assets disproportionate to their known sources of income, they can be prosecuted for corruption. - **Sections 7 and 13:** - **Section 7**: Deals with the offense of accepting a bribe by a public servant. - **Section 13**: Outlines the various forms of criminal misconduct by a public servant, including possession of disproportionate assets. 4. **Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973** - **Section 2(h)**: - Defines “investigation” and “trial” processes which are crucial in understanding the procedures followed in criminal cases including those involving corruption. - **Section 313**: - Provides for the examination of the accused during trial, allowing them to explain any evidence presented against them. - **Section 374**: - Provides the right to appeal against a conviction, which was exercised by Nirmal Singh Kahlon in this case to challenge the lower court’s decision. 5. **Indian Evidence Act, 1872** - **Section 3**: - Defines “evidence” and the types of evidence (direct, circumstantial) admissible in court, which are fundamental in evaluating the sufficiency of evidence in corruption cases. - **Section 114**: - Deals with the presumption of fact and law. In corruption cases, the court may draw adverse inferences from the failure of the accused to explain disproportionate assets. 6. **Constitution of India** - **Article 21**: - Guarantees the right to a fair trial. The defense in Kahlon’s case argued procedural fairness, and this constitutional guarantee is crucial in assessing whether the trial adhered to legal standards. - **Article 14**: - Ensures equality before the law and the right to equal protection, which underpins the argument for a fair trial and impartial judgment. 7. **Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946**[\[ii\]](#_edn2) 8. **Central Act 25 of 1946 – Section 6:** 9. **Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946,** primarily deals with the extension of the Act’s provisions to areas beyond Delhi and the Union Territories. **JUDGEMENT [\[iii\]](#_edn3)** **RATIO DECIDENDI:** 1. The Apex court (i.e. the Supreme Court) accepted the limited resources of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and expressed hope that the CBI would investigate the case thoroughly and find the real culprits within a reasonable time. The court also addressed that if the CBI Director requests more funds and resources from the Government of India, the government should consider it objectively. 2. The court held that the registration of a second FIR (FIR No. 208) by the police, even after a final report was filed in the initial FIR (FIR No. 135), was permissible. This was because the second FIR contained a discovery about different accused being the real culprits, which amounted to a rival version of the same incident. 3. The court ruled that a defect or illegality in the investigation does not necessarily nullify the cognizance or trial by the court. 4. The court observed that if a further investigation by the CBI reveals a larger conspiracy than the one of the previous complaint, filing a new complaint is permissible (in this case). 5. In exercising its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court issued specific directions to the trial judge to segregate the part of the trial related to the appointment of Panchayat Secretaries and transfer the relevant materials to the CBI court for independent or combined hearing. 6. The court directed the CBI to file a chargesheet before a court having appropriate jurisdiction, as the investigation was complete. **OBITER DICTA** 1. The Court praised the CBI for its investigation, noting that it revealed a bigger conspiracy and more people involved than what was initially reported in the first FIR. 2. The Court said that the criminal justice system needs to be completely open and trustworthy so that ordinary people can have full confidence in its fairness. 3. The Court stressed that public servants should be held responsible for misusing their power or failing to do their duties properly. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** In this case, the Court concluded: 1. The second FIR (FIR No. 208) filed was valid, as it represented new information discovered during the investigation about the involvement of persons not named in the first FIR (FIR No. 135). 2. The illegality in the investigation does not have a direct bearing on the competence or the procedure relating to cognizance or trial by the court, as long as the court has the jurisdiction to take cognizance under Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 3. If a further investigation by the CBI reveals a larger conspiracy than the one referred to in the previous complaint, filing a new complaint is permissible. The Court, in the exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, directed the segregation of the part of the trial related to the appointment of Panchayat Secretaries and the transfer of the relevant materials to the CBI court to ensure complete justice to the parties. 4. In summary, the Supreme Court’s judgment addressed various aspects of the investigation and trial process, guiding the permissibility of a second FIR and the limited impact of an invalid investigation on subsequent trial proceedings **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred[\[iv\]](#_edn4)** 1. (2008) 12 SCC 541: (2008) 7 Scale 363, Indian Bank v. Godhara Nagrik Coop. Credit Society Ltd. 2. (2008) 9 SCC 54: (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 802 : (2008) 12 Scale 252 Raju Ramsing Vasave v. Mahesh Deorao Bhivapurkar 3. (2008) 3 SCC 542: (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 9, Divine Retreat Centre v Kerala Stine 4. (2008) )2 SCC 409: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 440, Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. 5. (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 264, M. C. Mehta Paj Corridor 6. (2008) 2 SCC 383: (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 427, State of A.P. VAS, Peter 7. (2007) 1 SCC 110: (Scam) v. Union of India 8. (2006) 12 SCC 534: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 100, State of WB. V. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights 9. (2006) 12 SCC 421: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 72, Sasi Thomas v. State 10. (2006) 6 SCC 613: (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 125, Rajiv Ranjan Singh Lalan (VIII) v. Union of India 11. (2004) 13 SCC 292: 2005 SCC (Ci) 211. Upkar Singh v. Ved 12. Prakash 13. (2002) 1 SCC 714: 2002 SCC (Cri) 269, Kari Choudhary v. Sita 14. (2001) 10 SCC 759: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1054. Rajesh v. Ramdep 15. (2001) 6 SCC 181: 2001 SCC (CH) 1048, T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala 16. (1998) 8 SCC 661: 1999 SCC (C) 84, Union of India V. Sushil Kumar Modi 17. (1998) 1 SCC 226; 1998 SCC (Cri) 307, Vineet Naram’y. Union of India 18. 1992 Supp (1) SỐC 222: 1992 SCC (Cri) 192, State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharmi 19. (1979) 2 SCC 322: 1979 SCC (Cri) 479, Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Admn 20. AIR 1955 SE 196: (1955) 1 SCR 1150, H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi **Important Statutes Referred** 1. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 2. Sections 420, 467, 468, 120B OF Indian Penal Code, 1860 **ENDNOTES:** [\[i\]](#_ednref1) Vlex. in [\[ii\]](#_ednref2) SCC ONLINE EDITION [\[iii\]](#_ednref3) INDIAN KANOON [\[iv\]](#_ednref4) SCC ONLINE [\[i\]](#_ednref1) Vlex.in [\[i\]](#_ednref1) Vlex.in **Categories:** Case Analysis, Criminal Law Cases --- ### [Saghir Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh](https://lawfoyer.in/saghir-ahmed-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh/) **Published:** August 31, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** Author: Supragya Singh Edited by: Biraj Kumar Sarkar **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The appellants in the case were private bus owners who used to ply their buses on public for passenger service through permits granted under the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, though the state had an exemption. The state of Uttar Pradesh decided to nationalize the road transport business. It attempted to do so – First, by order \[later held unjustified under Art. 19(6) and violative of Art. 14 & 19(1)(g) by the state High Court\]; later, through passing the U.P. State Road Transport Act, 1950. The Act excluded private bus owners from plying their vehicles on the Bulandshahr-Delhi route. The High Court, this time, did not hold the act violative of either Art. 14, 19(1)(g) or Art. 31. The matter came on appeal before the Supreme Court of India to direct a writ against the state for violation of their rights under Art. 14, 19(1)(g) and 31 of the Constitution. The court held the Act to violate Art. 19(1)(g) and 31 but not Art. 14 in any manner. The Hon’ble Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and directed the state by way of a writ not to implement any part of the U.P. State Road Transport Act against appellants or anyone working under them. ***Keywords*:** ***right, freedom, occupation, property, restriction, violation*** **CASE DETAILS:** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** ## Saghir Ahmad vs The State of U. P. ***ii)* *Case Number*** Civil Appeals No. 182 & 183 of 1954 ***iii)* *Judgement Date*** 13th October 1954 ***iv)* *Court*** Supreme Court of India ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** M.C. Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea, S.R. Das, Vivian Bose, Ghulam Hasan ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges*** B.K. Mukherjea ***vii)* *Citation*** A.I.R. 1954 SC 728 ***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved*** Art. 14, Art. 19(1)(g), Art. 31 \[presently stands omitted\] – The Constitution of India, 1950; The U.P. Road Transport Act, 1951 **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The Constitution of India came to be entirely enforced in 1950. At its inception, it laid out specific rights in its territory for its citizens and persons in Part III of the Constitution as Fundamental Rights. With time, the interpretation relating to the rights bestowed in the provisions of Part III has also evolved. Some crucial amendments have also been made to Part III. Article 14 in the Constitution gives the right to equality to all its citizens irrespective of their caste, religion, sex, place of birth, or any other such ground. The duty is thereby bestowed upon the state to treat all equally before the law and protect them equally under the law. Article 19, on the other hand, provides several freedoms that the citizens in India would have. Art. 19(1)(g) specifically gives the citizens the freedom to carry out any occupation or trade. The freedoms in the article are not unrestricted; hence, Art. 19(6) lays certain reasonable restrictions upon Art. 19(1)(g). Laying reasonable restrictions upon freedom means that any restriction cannot be arbitrary, and the court would be fit to decide if it’s arbitrary by considering the context and facts. Article 31 of the constitution, later removed from the fundamental rights by the forty-fourth amendment, initially had its place as a fundamental right, and it bestowed upon citizens the property right. Initially, the Indian state had to juggle balancing the rights of its citizens and the general development and public interest. The state also often sought to nationalize specific industries so disputes concerning fundamental rights would reach the court’s doors to seek justice. 1. **FACTS OF THE CASE** **Procedural Background of the Case** 1. Writ petitions were filed by the appellants, private bus operators, before the Allahabad High Court due to the non-issuing and canceling of the permits granted to them under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as the state attempted to have a monopoly over road transport. The court opined such a procedure is violative of Art. 14 & 19(1)(g) and unjustified under Art.16(6) of the Constitution. The Transport Authorities were directed to deal with the application of permits by private vehicle owners. 2. In 1951, the state passed the U.P. Road Transport Act, which later prohibited private bus operators on the Bulandshahr-Delhi route. Private bus owners again filed several petitions before the Allahabad High Court under Article 226 of the constitution. The court did not find the U.P. Road Transport Act to conflict with Art. 14, 19(1)(g) and 31 of the constitution. As a result, the matter came before the Supreme Court of India as an appeal challenging the Act’s constitutionality, especially its section 3. The different appeals were clubbed on the matter, and the matter was up for hearing before a 5-judge constitutional bench. **Factual Background of the Case** 1. The appellants, private bus owners, and public bus operators carried on the business of plying motor vehicles for passenger service on the Bulandshahr-Delhi route. This was regulated by the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, under which one could get a permit to run a vehicle by the Transport Authorities. The Motor Vehicles Act also provided an exemption for state vehicles under section 42(3) from getting a compulsory permit unless these vehicles are used concerning the Indian State Railway’s business. 2. After 1947, the Uttar Pradesh government started running public buses alongside private operators. Later, the government ordered a state monopoly over the road transport system, and section 42(3) would allow it to run as many buses as it wanted. However, the permits issued to the private bus operators were stopped, and previously issued permits were canceled. As a result, petitions were filed, and the matter came up before the Allahabad High Court. 3. The court opined that such a procedure conflicts due to section 42(3) contradicting Art. 14 of the constitution and that the state’s order is unjustified under Art.19(6). Following the court’s order, the issuing of permits resumed. 4. The Uttar Pradesh state legislature passed the U.P. Road Transport Act, 1951 to nationalize the road transport business. Subsequently, several other notifications were issued following the notification dated 25th March 1953 that prohibited private operators as passenger service on the Bulandshahr-Delhi highway. 5. The matter came up before the Allahabad High Court, but the private bus owners were provided no relief. As a result, the private operators approached the Supreme Court of India through an appeal, and the matter was up before a 5-judge constitution bench challenging the constitutionality of the U.P. Road Transport Act, specifically its section 3. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether the U.P. Road Transport Act, 1951 violated Art. 19(1)(g) of the constitution and is not justified under Art.19(6)? 1. Whether the U.P. Road Transport Act,1951 violate Art. 31 of the constitution? 2. Whether the U.P. Road Transport Act, 1951 violate Art. 14 of the constitution? **APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsel for the Appellant submitted that the U.P. Road Transport Act violates Art. 19(1)(g) of the constitution guaranteeing the right to carry on any occupation, trade, or business; the appellants under this right can carry onto their business of plying buses on hire on a public highway. 2. The counsel for the Appellant argued that the U.P. Road Transport Act violates Art. 31 of the constitution as their ‘property,’ i.e., the beneficial interest involved in the business of plying buses on hire is violated without conforming to any requirements of compensation under Art. 31. 3. The counsel for the Appellant also contended that the Act violates Art.14 in making a different classification for the state against ordinary citizens. However, the state stands in the same position as private traders when it engages in some industry. 1. The counsel for the Appellant also put forth that the Act violates Art. 14 by allowing the state to discriminate among citizens by bestowing unregulated discretion upon the state to ‘associate such person as it likes’ in the business of transport with no rules laid upon which this discretion would be based. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** - . The counsel for the Respondent submitted that the U.P. State Road Transport Act does not violate Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution since the said article gives the right to carry any profession, trade, or business but not to carry it ‘anywhere;’ private operators can’t to use a public highway to ply their vehicle unless permitted by the state. 1. The counsel for the Respondent submitted that in certain instances, a restriction, as given in Art. 19(6) would also include a prohibition on something under which the U.P. State Road Transport Act would be justified. 2. The counsel for the Respondent put forth that the state would choose the routes and portion of it where private owners could operate and the number of persons to be given permits, which is regulated under the Motor Vehicles Act 1939, making the discretion bestowed upon the state-regulated, hence not violative of Art. 14. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** 1. **Article 14: *“****The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”**[\[1\]](#_ftn1)*** 2. **Article 19(1)(g): All citizens shall have the right- “*to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.”***[\[2\]](#_ftn2) 3. **Article 31 (*Compulsory acquisition of property[\[3\]](#_ftn3)): Omitted by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment)* Act, 1978.** **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** 1. Any public member can use a public route within permissible limits under Art. 19(1)(g). 2. The intangible commercial interest involved in plying buses on hire is property under Art. 31. 3. The different classification of the state against private traders in a monopoly through law is reasonable under Art. 14. **OBITER DICTA** 1. The nature of the long and uninterrupted user of a passage tells the extent of the right to pass over it. The right to passage extends to all usual traffic forms and others that are reasonably similar and incidental. The court drawing from the English Law said the Bulandshahr-Delhi route (part of Grand Trunk Road), being a public highway, does not mean it could be used just as a foot passage, and other uses or users would need permission from the State. The Grand Trunk Road has existed since the 15thcentury and has historically been used by all prevailing vehicles. The passage of modern motor vehicles is incidental to its historical use, though the state can regulate the traffic as per the requirement under Art. 19(6). Hence, it can’t be said that the right of passing of any user over a public route doesn’t exist before some act. A route may vest in the state and have a public nature, but it is meant for the use of members of the public, and it can be restricted only through a reasonable restriction under Art. 19(6). Since members of the public can use their vehicles on a public route within permissible limits, they can also ply their vehicles on a public route for passenger hire. The court emphasized that the Act is not a reasonable restriction under Art. 19(6), as it stated, “*Restrictions would normally pre-suppose the continued existence- no matter even in a very thin and attenuated form- of the thing upon which the restrictions were imposed.*” The court made this observation as it referred to the observations made by the learned judges in A.K. Gopalan v. The State on the interchangeability of the term ‘restriction’ and ‘deprivation.’ The court pointed out that even if the term ‘restriction’ meant ‘prohibition’ in certain instances, it would still have to be a reasonable restriction and not an unreasonable restriction over a trade or occupation that is not perceptually harmful. The court examined whether the restriction was in the public’s general interest. It concluded that it wouldn’t be considered a reasonable restriction and would leave hundreds of private bus owners without a livelihood. The U.P. Road Transport Act, 1951 is not a reasonable restriction under Art. 19(6), hence violates Art. 19(1)(g). 2. The property under Art. 31(2) would include in its ambit the commercial interest involved in plying buses on hire by the appellants. The appellants were deprived of this property, and the state made no compensation. Hence, the Act also violates Art.31. - The legislature can make a classification provided it is not arbitrary, and if it is reasonable, it would not violate the Art. 14. The different classification of the state from that of citizens won’t mean a violation of Art. 14 per se. In creating a monopoly, different classifications of the state are inherent, and the classification would have a rational relation to the sought object. Hence, it would be reasonable. Hence, such would not be considered a violation under Art. 14 per se, though it could be invalid because it violates other crucial constitutional provisions. The court also analyzed and said that the state doesn’t stand in the same position as a private trader when it engages in an industry as the state would still be performing sovereign functions required of it while engaging in it since the functions of the state include more in contemporary times than what has been conventionally included. The Act cannot be said to violate Art. 14 of the Constitution. The court, on the argument of the state having unfettered discretion, expressed that the arguments pertain to how the provision would be implemented. Even if it is assumed that the provision would give the state unfettered discretion, that would make the provision violative of Art. 14 and not the entire act. Considering the argument by the respondent’s counsel, it can be said that in this situation, the state would not have unregulated discretion. Hence, neither the Act nor the provision are violative of the Art. 14. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** In its decision, the court set aside the earlier judgment of the Allahabad High Court. It issued a writ of mandamus directing the state not to implement any provision of the U.P. State Road Transport Act, 1951, against the appellant or any person working under them. The court served right in its reasoning, especially on the Art. 19(1)(g) that freedom to occupation or business, etc., would not only include the right to carry that occupation but also to use the public routes, whose benefits are meant for the larger public, for carrying out that occupation or business. Art. 19(1)(g) indeed serves as a crucial fundamental right, as can be seen through the case that the violation of this right can affect one’s livelihood and standard of life. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** 1. S.S. Motor Services v. The State of Madras 2. Cooverjee v. The Excise Commissioner, 1954 SCR 873 3. West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, 1954 SCR 587 4. Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. The Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., 1954 SCR 674 5. Packard v. Banton, 68 LE 596, 264 US 140 6. Frost v. Railroad Commission, 70 LE 1101 7. Stephenson v. Binford, 77 LE 288 8. Motilal v. Uttar Pradesh Government, I.L.R. 1951 All 257 9. Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo, 1896 AC 88 10. K. Gopalan v. The State, 1950 S.C.R. 88 11. Lokanath Misra v. The State of Orissa, AIR 1952 Orissa 42 12. Commonwealth of Australia and Others v. Bank of New South Wales and Others, 1950 AC 235 13. P&O Steam Navigation Co. v. The Secretary of State, 1861 5 B.H.C.R. Appendix 1 **Important Statutes Referred** 1. The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 19(1)(g) 2. The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 31 3. The U.P. Road Transport Act, 1951 4. The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 14 **ENDNOTES:** [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Article 14, Constitution of India (1950). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Article 19(1)(g), Constitution of India (1950). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Article 31, Constitution of India (1950) **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Rohtas Bhankar & Ors v. Union of India (2014) 8 SCC 872](https://lawfoyer.in/rohtas-bhankar-ors-v-union-of-india-2014-8-scc-872/) **Published:** August 31, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Anchal Saini** **Edited by- Biraj Kumar Sarkar** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** Case analysis on Rohtas Bhankar Ors v. Union of India. In this case applicants seek a direction to declare the instructions issued by O.M as unconstitutional and issue an appropriate order reserving seats for SC/ST, So, the main issue whether reservation for promotion is obligatory or mere discretion of government has been discussed in this case. ***Keywords*:** SC/ST, relaxation of standards, constitution of India, qualifying marks. **CASE DETAILS** Judgment Cause Title / Case NameRohtas Bhankar & Ors Vs. Union Of IndiaCase NumberCivil Appeal No. 6046-6047 of 2024CourtSupreme Court Of IndiaQuorum / Constitution of BenchConstitutional BenchAuthor / Name of JudgesR.M LODHA, CJI ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN, A.K. SIKRI, J. CHELAMESWAR, JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR Citation( 2006 ) 8 SCC212Legal Provisions InvolvedArticle 16 (4) of Indian constitution. Article-335 of constitution of India. 77th amendment act of constitution of India.1 82nd amendment act of constitution of India. **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** This case is just a reiteration of what was already held in the earlier decision in both cases Indra Sawhney2 And Kuldip Singh3. Both the cases have underlined the importance of article 16 as well as article 16(4A). So, the issue whether reservation for promotion is obligatory or just a mere discretion of government has been addressed in this case. The applicants challenges the instructions issued by government on July 22, 1997 “that withdrew the provisions for lower qualifying marks and lesser standard evaluation for SC/ST in departmental competitive exams for promotion”. Applicants argued that the instructions given were unconstitutional and issue an appropriate order for reserving 15% of posts for SC and 7 and 172% of posts for ST in the stenographers (Grade B/Grade I) Limited Departmental Competitive Examination. Applicants prayed to be promoted on the basis of instructions that were issued to them for LDCR, 1996, and also to declare the result of LDCR as illegal, as they relied on the amendment of Indian constitution i.e. Article-16 (4A) which allows reservation in promotions for SC/ST. **FACTS OF THE CASE** Prior to the 1997 instructions, there were provisions regarding reserved category candidates to be promoted with lower qualifying marks as per OM dated 23.12.1970. And 21.1.1971. In 1970, the Department of personnel had issued an office of memorandum relaxing the standards for SC/ST candidates in departmental competitive examination and confirmation examination. This memorandum remained in effect around 17 years. The case challenged the government’s instructions dated 22 July, 1997 that withdrew the policy providing lower qualifying marks and lesser standard evaluation for SC/ST In 1970, the Department of personnel had issued an office of memorandum relaxing the standards for SC/ST candidates in departmental competitive examination and confirmation examination. This memorandum remained in effect around 17 years. In departmental competitive examinations for promotion. The removal of these relaxed standards were based on the judgment of Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar V. Union of India (1996)4, in this case supreme court held that such relaxation in promotion is not permissible under Article355 of Indian Constitution.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** - Whether the order withdrawing the relaxed standard for SC/ST instructions was constitutional? - Whether order for reserving 15% of posts for SC and 7 and 172% of posts for ST in the can be prescribed for the promotion of the SC/ST candidate? **Arguments from appellant/ petitioner** It was submitted by the counsel for petitioner: 1. “That the relaxation of qualifying standards for SC/ST candidates in departmental competitive and confirmation examinations, as per office memorandum of 1970 was constitutionally valid”. Hence the withdrawal of such relaxation for SC/ST candidates is the violation of the constitutional provision given in Article-16(4A). 2. The “Supreme Court’s earlier judgment in Ram Bhagat Singh vs. State of Haryana (1990) and superintending Engineer Public Health vs. Kuldip Singh (1997) which upheld the provision of lower qualifying marks for reserved category candidates. - Contended that “earlier judgment of Supreme Court rulings in Indra Sawhney vs. Union of India (1992) which recognized the validity of providing concessions to SC/ST candidate in promotions, should take precedence over precedence”. **Arguments from respondent / defendant** It was submitted by the counsel for respondent: 1. That “the government’s instruction dated July 22, 1997, is valid and in line with constitution”. 2. The “Supreme Court’s earlier judgment in Ram Bhagat Singh vs. State of Haryana (1990)5 and superintending Engineer Public Health vs. Kuldip Singh (1997) did not have the benefit of binding Indra Sawhney precedent and hence, should not take precedent”. 3. Pointed out “the judgment of Supreme Court in S. Vinod Kumar vs. Union of India (1996)6. In which court held that relaxation in qualifying marks for reserved category in promotion is not permissible”. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** **Constitution of India** 1. **Article 16(4): – “***Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favor of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State.*”7 2. **Article 335 :- “** *The claims of the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes shall be taken into consideration, consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of administration, in the making of appointments to services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State.*8 3. **77th Amendment Act: – Added article 16(4A)** which states that **“** *Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for reservation in matters of promotion to any class or classes of posts in the services under the State in favor of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes which, in the opinion of the State, are not adequately represented in the services under the State”.* **JUDGEMENT** Supreme Court ruled in the favor of Union of India. The court held that government’s instruction was dated July 22, 1997, that withdrew the relaxation in qualifying marks and standards for SC/ST candidates, were in the accordance with the constitution. The court relied on judgment in cases in Indra Sawhney vs. Union of India, S. Vinod Kumar vs. Union of India (1996). Also court noted that Supreme Court ruling cited by the petitioners, such as Ram Bhagat Singh vs. State of Haryana did not have benefit of binding Indra Sawhney precedent and hence could not take precedence. **Conclusion** Supreme Court concluded that the withdrawal of relaxation in qualifying marks and standards for SC/ST candidates in departmental competitive examinations for promotion was valid. **REFERENCES** (1) *Constitution of India (1950)*. (2) *Indra Sawhney vs Union Of India And Others*; 1992. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1363234/. (3) *Superintending Engineer,Public Health vs Kuldeep Singh & Ors*; 1997. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1076926/#:~:text=By%20reason%20of%20the%20provisions,Fundamental%20Right%20to%20equality%20of. (4) *S.Vinod Kumar And Anr vs Union Of India And Ors*; 1996. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/151907/. (5) *Ram Bhagat Singh And Anr vs State Of Haryana And Anr On*; 1990. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/144235/. (6) Kumar, S. V. S.Vinod Kumar And Anr vs Union Of India And Ors on 1 October, 1996. **Important Statutes Referred** Constitution of India (1950) [](#_ftnref1) **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [P.V Narashima Rao vs. State](https://lawfoyer.in/p-v-narashima-rao-vs-state/) **Published:** August 31, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Bagya Shree L** **Edited By: Rimin Cherian Reji** **ABSTRACT** In the case of P.V. Narasimha Rao vs. State, the Supreme Court decided whether MP are protected by parliamentary immunity under Article 105 of the Indian Constitution from prosecution for bribery and conspiracy related to their voting behavior. The Court ruled that MPs are not immune from prosecution for bribery and conspiracy if these actions are not directly related to their parliamentary duties. Immunity applies only to activities tied to parliamentary functions, not to illegal actions like accepting bribes. This case highlights the procedure for how criminal prosecution should take place when the offense is committed by a Member of Parliament. The Court admits that Members of Parliament are the public servant under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 even if they are not appointed but elected. This case signifies that even lawmakers are punishable if they are acting against law and order. ***Keywords*:** Bribe, Parliament, Immunity, Article 105 of The Indian Constitution, Public Servant, Corruption. **CASE DETAILS** ***i.* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** ## ## *P.V. Narasimha Rao vs. State* ***ii.* *Case Number*** Appeal (criminal.) 1207 / 1997 ***iii.* *Judgement Date*** 17/04/1998 ***iv.* *Court*** Supreme Court of India ***v.* *Constitution of Bench*** *“S.C.AGRAWAL, G.N.RAY, A.S.ANAND, S.P.BHARUCHA & S. RAJENDRA BABU’’* ***vi.* *Author*** S.C.AGRAWAL ***vii.* *Citation*** (1998) 8 SCC (Jour) 1 ***viii.* *Legal Provisions Involved*** Article 105 of the Indian Constitution **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** In the landmark case, P.V. Narasimha Rao vs. State, the Supreme Court of India heard the appeal in 1998. The appellant was one of 21 people accused of bribery and criminal conspiracy. The appellant argued that, as a Member of Parliament, he had immunity under Article 105 of the Indian Constitution. He also states that he is not a public servant under the Prevention of Corruption Act as he is not appointed but elected by the people. This article emphasizes the constitutional and legal issues surrounding parliamentary privileges and corruption. This case plays a major role in understanding the balance between parliamentary immunity and the legal framework governing corruption. It explores whether MPs, under parliamentary immunity, could be protected from prosecution of a criminal nature. Whether Members of Parliament are covered under the provision of public servants under the Prevention of Corruption Act even though they are not elected. **Background:** *PV Narasimha Rao vs. State (1998)* by the prestigious Supreme Court is one of the landmark cases. This verdict highlights how the law prevails even if it is against the former Prime Minister who was involved in bribery and a criminal conspiracy with members of Parliament to defeat the no-confidence motion. This judgment emphasized the supremacy of the law **FACTS OF THE CASE** **Procedural Background of the Case** The accused argued that the court had no jurisdiction under Article 105(2) of the Constitution, as the case involved Members of Parliament (MPs) accepting bribes related to their voting on a ‘No Confidence Motion’. However, the Special Judge rejected this objection, stating that the charges were for illegal acts committed outside Parliament, specifically accepting bribes, rather than for voting actions within Parliament. The accused interpreted that members of parliament are not public servants under the Prevention of Corruption Act, of 1988. Hence, he is not guilty under these provisions, This claim by the accused was dismissed based on the precedent of the Delhi High Court. Furthermore, the accused contented for the prosecution of such case prior sanction from the competent authority of the parliamentary is necessary. The judge ruled this unnecessary, as the accused had stopped holding office by the time the charge sheets were filed and cognizance was taken by the court. The Delhi High Court dismissed the revision petitions filed by the accused about issues of the scope of Article 105 and the title of public servant, and its applicability to MP’s. Then appeals were filed by the appellants, for the interpretation of Articl105 and the scope of public servants under the Prevention of Corruption Act to members of parliament, which were heard by a bench of three judges and subsequently referred to the Constitution Bench. **Factual Background of the Case** There were 21 accused, including the former PM P.V. Narasimha Rao, alleged to have a criminal conspiracy on both offering and accepting bribes by the (MPs) from the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) and Janata Dal (Ajit Group) to defeat a ‘No Confidence Motion’ against the Congress (I) Government in July-August 1993. The charges framed against the accused were under Sections 7, 12, 13(2) along with Section 13(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 120-B of the IPC. The prosecution argued that the alleged bribe givers paid these amounts to ensure the motion’s defeat. Shailender Mahto of JMM, who later turned approver, was pardoned. The court noted that the alleged conspiracy and bribes had a direct effect on the votes cast against the no-confidence motion, implying that the votes were influenced by the bribes. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether Article 105 of the Indian Constitution amounts to immunity for the prosecution of a criminal charge, especially a bribe to the Member of Parliament. 2. Whether the Members of Parliament are under the provision of public servants under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1986. **APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsel for the appellant submitted that Article 105(2) grants Members of Parliament immunity from legal proceedings for anything they said or voted in Parliament or its committees. This provision ensures that MPs can freely speak and act in Parliament without fear of legal repercussions, preserving their independence and effectiveness. The learned counsel contended that this immunity should be interpreted broadly to protect MPs from prosecution related to their legislative duties, including charges of bribery connected to parliamentary activities. The learned counsel referred to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the Johnson case, where prosecution based on a speech made in the House was deemed a violation of legislative immunity principles. The learned counsel argued that The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 defines public servants broadly. MPs are elected representatives who act on behalf of their constituents, and they are not traditional public servants employed by the government. Therefore, the title of public servant does not apply to the Members of Parliament. The counsel also noted that foreign countries’ practices for the classification of legislators do not usually include the title of public servant for anti-corruption laws, maintaining their independence and distinction from government employees. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsel for the respondent side submitted that Article 105(2) of the Indian Constitution grants immunity to MPs within the ambit of speeches and votes in Parliament session, to protect legislative activities and ensure parliamentary freedom. This ambit does not extend to criminal liability. Legal precedents, including Brewster, Bunting, White, Boston, and R v. Currie & Ors, support that the fact bribery is not covered by parliamentary immunity. The learned counsel submitted that The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 defines public servants broadly, encompassing various government officials and elected representatives, whereas elected representatives include MPs. MP’s fall within the scope of public servants under Section 2(c) of the Act due to their positions of public trust and responsibility. The Act aims to combat corruption among all public officials, including MPs, as supported by judicial interpretations and practices in other jurisdictions. The counsel argued that the doctrine of promissory estoppels does not apply to statutory definitions. Statements by a Minister during the Bill’s introduction do not alter the legal definition of public servant. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** 1. Article 105 of The Indian Constitution 2. Section 2(c) of The Prevention of Corruption Act **JUDGMENT** **Ratio Decidendi** The court’s reason for such a decision is that Members of Parliament are public servants under the provision of The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and shall be held liable for such an act of accepting and giving bribes. Moreover, for such legal action, permission has to be taken from the competent parliamentary authorities. **Obiter Dicta** Justice Ray agreed with the finding that MPs are public servants and require permission for prosecution. However, he disagreed with the reasoning that MPs do not have immunity under Article 105(2) or 105(3) for bribery related to their duties. He emphasized the importance of providing broad protection for MPs to ensure the effective functioning of parliamentary parliament. **GUIDELINES:** Absolute Freedom of Speech and Vote by Members of Parliament in Parliament under Article 105 of The Indian Constitution. Protection against legal proceedings within the ambit of any speech and vote cast in parliament during the parliament session under Article 105(2) of The Indian Constitution. Interpretation of “In Respect Of”: The phrase “in respect of” in Article 105(2) should be interpreted broadly, covering any action linked to an MP’s parliamentary speech or vote. Sub-Article (3) Privileges: Until defined by Parliament, MPs enjoy the same privileges as those of the House of Commons at the commencement of the Indian Constitution. **CONCLUSION& COMMENTS** In the case of PV Narasimha Rao vs. State (1998), the Supreme Court pronounced that the Members of Parliament are public servants under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; they can be prosecuted for criminal liability during the performance of Parliamentary duties. The Court pronounced that although MPs have certain privileges and immunities under Article 105 of the Constitution, these do not cover bribery. Instead of needing formal sanction from an authority, MPs only need permission from the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha or the Speaker of the Lok Sabha for prosecution. This decision emphasized that law is supreme even before legislators make that law for the people. This ruling was a key moment in Indian legal history, highlighting that even top officials, including the Prime Minister, must follow the law. By limiting parliamentary immunity, the Supreme Court stressed the need for accountability and integrity in government. No matter what happens, the law remains supreme and no one is above it, not even those who make the law. **Important Cases Referred** 1. [L.K. Advani v. Central Bureau of Investigation](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/111334/) 2. United States v. Johnson. **Important Statutes Referred** 1. The Indian Constitution 2. The Indian Penal Code - The Criminal Procedure Code 1. The Prevention Of Corruption Act. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt](https://lawfoyer.in/the-commissioner-hindu-religious-endowments-madras-v-sri-lakshmindra-thirtha-swamiar-of-sri-shirur-mutt/) **Published:** August 31, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Suhani Bagadia** **Edited By: Sankalp Vashistha** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** In the present case, the respondent who was the Mathadhipati of the Shirur Mutt filed a petition in the High Court of Madras challenging the provisions of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 and the High Court issued an order in favour of the Mathadhipati or the Swami and pronounced the act to be ultra vires Arts- 19(1)(f),25,26 and 27 of the Constitution. Thereafter, the appellant- The Commissioner, of Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras approached the Supreme Court to challenge the decision of the High Court. The SC found the High Court judgement to be valid and held that the act encroached upon the fundamental rights of the religious denominations guaranteed under Article 26 of the Constitution as the act tried to interfere with the internal affairs of the religious institutions which was unwarranted and unjustified. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. ***Keywords*:** a. Article 26 b. religious denomination c. Supreme Court d. internal affairs e. fundamental rights **CASE DETAILS** ***i)**Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt ***ii)**Case Number*** Civil Appeal No. 38 of 1953 ***iii)**Judgement Date*** 16 March, 1954 ***iv)**Court*** Supreme Court of India ***v)**Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** Justice [Mukherjee](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=benchid:b-k-mukherjea), Justice [Ghulam Hasan](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=benchid:g-hasan), Justice [Natwarlal H Bhagwati](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=benchid:n-h-bhagwati), Justice [Mehar Chand Mahajan](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=benchid:m-c-mahajan), Justice [Vivian Bose](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=benchid:v-bose), Justice S.R. Das, Justice Venkatarama Ayyar ***vi)**Author / Name of Judges*** B.K. Mukherjee ***vii)**Citation*** 1954 INSC 26 ***viii)**Legal Provisions Involved*** Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 Constitution of India – Arts. 19(1)(f), 25,26,27 **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** This present case is a landmark judgement that helped define the scope of the fundamental rights of the religious denomination in India under Article 26 of the constitution. It defined the limits of the state’s power to make regulations or laws to oversee the internal affairs and administration which in turn helped strengthen the autonomy of the religious denominations. This case primarily revolves around Articles 25 and 26 of the Indian Constitution which guarantee freedom of religion to every citizen of India. **Article 25** states that *– “Every person is free to propagate, practice and profess any religion of their choice.”* This means that every person is not only free to practice their religion but they are also free to disseminate the beliefs or practices of their religion. **Article 26** provides for the right of citizens to establish and manage the affairs of any religious or charitable institution. It means that every religious institution is free to conduct its affairs without any interference by the govt unless it affects the public order, morality and health. This case involves a conflict between the Mathadhipati of the Shirur Mutt, a Hindu religious institution located in Madras and the Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras over the enactment of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act,1951 which contained provisions that tried to limit the control of the religious institution over its internal affairs and administration. The Act provided for the appointment of a Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and an Area Committee to oversee the affairs of all religious institutions across the state. Administration of these institutions was to be supervised by the Commissioner including the management of funds which resulted in the reduced role of the Mathadhipati or the head and violated the institution’s right to manage its own affairs. Many provisions of the said act were found invalid or ultra vires to Articles – 19(1)(f) 25,26 and 27 of the Constitution. **FACTS OF THE CASE** - **Procedural Background of the Case** 1. The Mathadhipati or the Swami (respondent) of the Shirur Mutt filed a petition in the High Court of Madras requesting to issue a writ of prohibition in his favour to prohibit the appellant – the Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments from proceeding further in settlement of a scheme in connection with the Mutt. The High Court issued a writ of prohibition in the favour of the respondent as well as scrutinised the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act,1951 and found certain provisions of the act to be ultra vires Articles- 19(1)(f), 25, 26 and 27 of the Constitution. As a consequence, an appeal was filed by the appellant in the Supreme Court challenging the decision of the Madras High Court. - **Factual Background of the Case** 1926. The factual matrix of the case is- The Mutt, known as Shirur Mutt, of which the petitioner is the superior or Mathadhipati, is one of the eight Mutts situated at Udipi in the district of South Kanara and they are reputed to have been founded by Shri Madhwacharya, the well-known exponent of dualistic theism in the Hindu Religion. Each Mutt is presided over by a swami. The petitioner became a Mathadhipati in the year 1919 when he was still a minor, and he assumed management in 1926. At that time the Mutt was heavily in debt. Owing to scarcity and the high prices of commodities at that time, the Swami had to borrow money to meet the expenditure and the debts mounted up to nearly a lakh rupees. The Hindu Religious Endowments Board, functioning under the Earlier Act of 1927, intervened at this stage and under section 61-A of the Act called upon the Swami to appoint a competent manager to manage the affairs of the institution. The petitioner claims that the action of the board was instigated by Lakshminarayana Rao, a lawyer in Udupi. It appears that in pursuance of the direction of the Board, one Sripath Achar was appointed an agent on the 24th of December, 1948. This agent, as claimed by the petitioner did not follow the directions of the Mahant and deliberately flouted his authority. In this state of affairs the Swami, on the 26th of September, 1950, served a notice upon the agent terminating his agency. But On the 4th of October, 1950, the petitioner filed a suit against the agent because the agent did not pay heed to this notice and continued to work there. Thereafter the petitioner filed a petition in the Sub-Court of South Kanara for recovery of the account books and other articles belonging to the Math, and also to restrict the agent from interfering in the matters of the Mutt. The said Sripath Achar anticipating this suit filed an application to the Board on the 3rd of October, 1950, complaining against the cancellation of the Power of Attorney and his management of the Math. The Board on the 4th October, 1950, issued a notice to the Swami proposing to inquire into the matter. To this Swami sent a reply on 21st October, 1950, stating that the subject matter of the very enquiry was before the court in the original suit filed by him and therefore, the enquiry should be put off. The Board dropped that enquiry, but initiated proceedings suo motu under section 62 of the Earlier Act and issued a notice upon the Swami on the 6th of November, 1950, stating that it had reason to believe that the endowments of the said Math were being mismanaged and that a scheme should be framed for the administration of its affairs. The notice was served to the Swami and the 8th of December, 1950, was fixed as the date of enquiry. The matter was repeatedly adjourned till 13 January 1951 because the lawyer appearing from Swami’s side was unwell. On the 24th of January, 1951, the Swami received a notice from the Board stating that the Board was satisfied that a scheme was necessary for the proper administration of the Mutt. On the 12th of February, 1951, the petitioner filed the petition, out of which this appeal arises, in the High Court of Madras praying for a writ of prohibition to prohibit the Board from settling a scheme for the administration of the Math. It was alleged that the Board acted with bias against the petitioner and the action taken by it with regard to the settling of a scheme was not a bona fide act at all. On the merits, it was held that the Board did a perverse exercise of its jurisdiction and that it should not be allowed to proceed in regard to the settlement of the scheme. The learned Judges found a number of sections of the New Act to be ultra vires the Constitution by reason of their being in conflict with the fundamental rights of the petitioner guaranteed under articles 19(1) (f), 25, 26 and 27 of the Constitution **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED (***minimum 2 legal issues*) - Whether the respondent as Mathadhipati has a right to property in the legal sense in the religious institution and its endowments, which would enable him to claim protection under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution? - Whether the Mutt is a religious denomination under the meaning of Article 26 of the Constitution? - Whether the Act took away the fundamental right of the religious denomination to manage its affairs guaranteed under Article 26 of the Constitution? **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that article 19(1)(f) deals only with the natural or inherent rights of a citizen to acquire, hold and dispose of property in the abstract without reference to rights to any particular property, it can be of no real assistance to the respondent in the present case and article 3l of the Constitution, which deals with deprivation of property, has no application here. - The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant also questioned the claim of the respondent that the Mutt in question is a religious denomination and said that the Mutt was not entitled to the protections available under Article 26. - The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the act only intended to manage the affairs of administration and not of religion and this is why the act did not violate any fundamental right of the institution to manage its affairs. - The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant also disputed the High Court’s decision to declare some of the sections of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 invalid or ultra vires some articles of the constitution. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsels for Respondent submitted that the Shirur Mutt was a religious denomination under Article 26 of the Constitution and it was entitled to all kinds of rights available under this article. - The counsels for Respondent submitted that the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 enacted by the Madras govt. violated the institution’s fundamental rights granted under Article 26 by interfering in its internal affairs and administration and was meant to increase the control of the govt over the religious institutions. - The counsels for Respondent submitted that the Swami was the head of the institution and thereby the Mutt and its endowments were the property of the Swami and he had every right to administer the property in whichever ways he wanted. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** - **Article 25: –** *“Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion- guarantees the freedom of conscience, the freedom to profess, practice and propagate religion to all citizens.”* - **Article 26:** – *“Freedom to manage religious affairs – every religious denomination has the following rights, subject to morality, health and public order.* 1. *The right to form and maintain institutions for religious and charitable intents. b. The right to manage its own affairs in the matter of religion.* 2. *The right to acquire immovable and movable property.* 3. *The right to administer such property according to the law.”* - **Article 19(1)(f)**– “*guaranteed the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property*.” - **Article 27**– *“Freedom as to payment of taxes for promotion of any particular religion- there can be no taxes, the proceeds of which are directly used for the promotion and/or maintenance of any particular religion/religious denomination.”* **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** - The Supreme Court upheld the major portion of the judgement of the High Court and declared that the judgement of the High Court would remain valid. The SC held that the act brought by the Madras govt. did encroach upon the fundamental rights of the religious[\[i\]](#_edn1) institutions and the act empowered the state to act beyond its powers and thereby enabled it to interfere in the affairs of these institutions. It held that certain provisions of the act were discordant with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. - On the question of the Mutt being a religious denomination under Article 26, the SC referred to the definition of “religious denomination” given by the Oxford Dictionary and held that any religious sect or body having a common faith and Organisation and designated by a distinctive name is a religious denomination. Therefore, the Mutt legitimately comes within the purview of this article. - On the question of whether the Mathadhipati holds the legal right to property under article 19(1)(f), the SC referred to multiple cases like – *Ganesh v Lal Behary* and *Bhabatarini v. Ashalata* and decided that duties and personal interest are blended together in the office of Mahantship and the personal and beneficial interest of the Mahant in the endowments attached to an institution invest the office of Mahant with the character of proprietary right, which is a legal right. It also held that the Mahantship is not heritable because it has a peculiar nature and ordinary rules of succession do not apply in such a case. - With regards to the validity of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act,1951 enacted by the State Legislature, the SC made the following observations: 1. Sec 20 of the act which empowers the Commissioner to pass any orders for the proper administration of endowments and proper appropriation of funds is not in conflict with the fundamental rights of the Mahant as some sort of supervision is necessary for the due administration of endowments and proper appropriation of funds. 2. Sec 25,26,28 and 29 are also not held bad by the SC as the mere possibility of them being abused is not a ground for a section to be held invalid. The provision for keeping registers and records of the endowments does not infringe upon any kind of fundamental right of the respondent. 3. Sec 30 of the act infringes upon the fundamental rights of the petitioner as it requires the trustee of the institution to consult with the Commissioner on matters of expenditure and if the trustee must abide by the orders of the Commissioner then it constitutes an infringement upon the fundamental rights of the trustee. Sec 31 also suggests that the management of surplus funds is to be supervised by the Deputy Commissioner, which takes away the power of management of funds from the trustee. 4. Sec 55 of the act is also held to be an encroachment upon the fundamental right of the mahant as it provides that all the gifts received by the mahant should be used for the purposes of the Mutt which is unjustified as the gifts received are also a property of the Mahant and he can dispose them on his discretion. 5. Sec 76 of the act is also considered to be void as it goes beyond the powers of the State Legislature. It provides for an annual contribution by the religious institution to the govt. Such a charge is said to be a fee but the Court has held that it is a tax and the State Legislature was not authorised to make any provision for charging tax as this power is in the hands of the Parliament. The grounds upon which such a fee is considered to be a tax are – that there is an essence of compulsion that is only present in taxes, and there is no special benefit conferred upon the person paying the fees. This provision was clearly in contravention of Article 27 of the Constitution. - The court noted that it is the fundamental right of a religious denomination under Article 26(d) to administer its properties in accordance with law and the law can impose reasonable restrictions upon the administration by the religious institutions. Any law that would take away this right of a religious institution and vests it in any other authority created by law would amount to a violation of the fundamental right guaranteed under article 26(d). **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** This case is a useful precedent for other cases related to the autonomy of religious institutions. The judgement given by the Supreme Court helped define the boundaries of state regulations on religious institutions helped strengthen the autonomy of these institutions and enabled them to assert their fundamental rights. The scope of Article 26 was well-defined through this case as the court thoroughly examined all the possible interpretations of the provisions of the article. In brief, the respondent’s fundamental right guaranteed under Article 26 was violated by the enactment of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act,1951 brought by the state govt to regulate the administration of endowments of these institutions. In my opinion, the State govt. went beyond its power by enacting such legislation which tried to take control of the religious institutions from the trustees of those institutions. The act clearly infringed upon the fundamental rights of the respondent and deprived him of his authority to administer the endowments of the institution. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** - Ganesh v Lal Behary, 63 I.A. 448 - Bhabatarini v. Ashalata, 70, I.A.57 - Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami , 48,I.A.302 - Adelaide Company v. Commonwealth ,67, C.L.R., 116,127 - Minersville School District, Board of Education, etc. v. Gobitis , 310 U.S. 586 **Important Statutes Referred** - Constitution of India – Article – 19(1)(f), 25, 26 and 27 [](#_ednref1) **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [T. Barai vs Henry Ah Hoe And Another](https://lawfoyer.in/t-barai-vs-henry-ah-hoe-and-another/) **Published:** August 31, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Krishang Sharma** **Edited by: Shadrack Chai** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The case “T. Barai vs Henry Ah Hoe And Another”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) by the Supreme Court of India on 7 December 1982, addresses important issues regarding the relationship between central and state laws in the context of food safety regulations. This case arose from a conflict between the West Bengal Amendment Act, which imposed stricter penalties for food adulteration and the Central Amendment Act which introduced reduced penalties. The Court ruled that the Central Amendment Act superseded the West Bengal Amendment Act due to the principle of repugnancy as outlined in Article 254 of the Indian Constitution. The judgment emphasized the importance of applying laws that favour the accused The Court determined that individuals charged with offences should benefit from the lighter penalties introduced by the Central Amendment Act, even if the offence occurred before the new law was enacted. **CASE DETAILS ***i)* *Judgment Cause Title / Case Name*** T. Barai vs Henry Ah Hoe And Another ***ii)* *Case Number*** Criminal Appeal No. 40 of 1979 ***iii)* *Judgement Date*** 7 December 1982 ***iv)* *Court*** ## The Supreme Court of India ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** A.P. Sen., E.S. Venkataramiah, R.B. Misra ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges*** A.P. Sen ***vii)* *Citation*** 1983 AIR 150 ***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved*** Constitution Of India – 254(1) Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 – sec 16(1)(a), sec 21 **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The case here deals with the conflict which arose between the two statutes the one which is centrally amended and the one amended by the West Bengal state legislature. These cases are based on the provision of section 16[\[2\]](#_ftn2) of the food and Adulteration Act. And also Article 254 of the Indian constitution. Which talks about the relation between the state and the centre? This case also shows the humane approach of the judicial system of the country and tries to impose less harsh provisions on the accused when there are alternative provisions which are less harsh present. **FACTS OF THE CASE** **Procedural Background of the Case** Initial complaint was made on 24 September 1975, against the respondents in the Court of Senior Municipal Magistrate, Calcutta. The magistrate, following a precedent by Justice Anil Kumar Sen in B. Manna and Ors. v. The State of West Bengal held that the case was triable by the Court of Sessions due to the punishment of life imprisonment under the West Bengal Amendment Act. The case was then taken to the Calcutta High court The High Court held that after the Central Amendment Act came into force on 1 April 1976, all pending proceedings would be governed by the new Act. The High Court set aside the Magistrate’s order and directed him to proceed with the trial under the new provisions. The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court of India. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the High Court’s interpretation. The Court ruled that the accused has the right and should be benefited from the reduced punishment provided in the Central Amendment Act. The case was sent back to the previous court to continue the proceedings by the new provisions. **Factual Background of the Case** On 16 August 1975, the appellant, who is a Food Inspector of the Corporation of Calcutta, purchased a sample of Hyacinth’s ground white pepper (compound) with fried rice powder from Chungwa Restaurant which is located in Calcutta. After analysing the sample was found to be adulterated as it contained wheat powder instead of rice powder. A complaint was filed against the owner of the restaurant (respondent) for committing an offence under section 16(1) (a) read with section 7 of the Food Adulteration Act 1954 by the appellant on 24 September 1975. At the time of the commission of the alleged offence, the law in force in West Bengal was the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act as amended by the West Bengal Amendment Act of 1973, which provided for life imprisonment for such offences. The central government enacted the Prevention of Food adulteration Act (amendment) 1976 which reduced the maximum punishment to 3 years imprisonment and introduced summary trial procedures. On 1 April 1976. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** Whether the Central Amendment Act (Prevention of Food Adulteration (Amendment) Act, 1976[\[3\]](#_ftn3)) impliedly repeal the West Bengal Amendment Act (Prevention of Adulteration of Food, Drugs and Cosmetics, 1973[\[4\]](#_ftn4)) with effect from April 1, 1976. Should the pending proceedings be governed by the change of procedure brought in by Section 16A[\[5\]](#_ftn5) of the Act as introduced by the Central Amendment Act? **PETITIONER ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioner argued that the punishment for food adulteration offences enhanced to life imprisonment by the West Bengal amendment should stay applicable. The rationale given by the appellant was that the previous operations of a repealed law are preserved by section 8[\[6\]](#_ftn6) of the General Clause Act. The petitioner contended that they must be liable for punishment of life imprisonment enhanced by the West Bengal Amendment Act. It was contended by the petitioner that the West Bengal amendment was not repealed impliedly by the later central amendment where the punishment was reduced to up to 3 years of imprisonment. It was argued that according to article 254(1) of the Indian constitution[\[7\]](#_ftn7), the state amendment should not be considered repealed as two amendments can co-exist **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that the supremacy of the central law (Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1976)[\[8\]](#_ftn8) must prevail over the West Bengal Amendment Act, 1973. By taking reliance on the doctrine of repugnancy. Which states that when there is a conflict between state and central legislation, the central law will prevail over any of the state legislation by Article 254[\[9\]](#_ftn9) of the Indian constitution. It was further asserted by the respondent that when the Central Amendment Act[\[10\]](#_ftn10) is present there with more lenient punishments for the accused it must be applied retroactively. This was supported by the idea that the accused must not be punished and tried under harsher provisions when there are more lenient laws present. The respondent improvised on the fact that the new amendment was brought into existence to simplify the procedures and to ease the punishment given under the food adulteration the law intends to provide more humane provisions. It emphasized the principle of beneficial construction of laws. Asserting that the offender should be tried and dealt with the law or provision which is less harsh to them. Further, he advocated the right of fair trial of the accused. They advocated that the amendment of the new provisions in the old ones is to eliminate the faults and thus it should be necessitated over old provisions. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** **Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954** **Section 16(1) (a) – “***Subject to the provisions of sub-section (1A) if any person—* 1. *a) Whether by himself or by any other person on his behalf, imports into India or manufacturers for sale or stores, sells or distributes any article of food-* *(I) which is adulterated within the meaning of sub-clause (m) of clause (a) of section 2 or misbranded within the meaning of clause (ix) of that section or the sale of which is prohibited under any provision of this Act or any rule made there under or by an order of the Food (Health) Authority;* *(ii) Other than an article of food referred to in subclause (I), in contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or any rule made there under”[**\[11\]**](#_ftn11)* **Section 16A-** **“***Power of court to try cases summarily* *Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), all offences under sub-section (1) of section 16 shall be tried in a summary way by a Judicial Magistrate of the first class specially empowered on this behalf by the State Government or by a Metropolitan Magistrate and the provisions of sections 262 to 265 (both inclusive) of the said Code shall, as far as may be, apply to such trial:* *Provided that in the case of any conviction in a summary trial under this section, it shall be lawful for the Magistrate to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year:* *Provided further that when at the commencement of, or in the course of, a summary trial under this section, it appears to the Magistrate that the nature of the case is such that a sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year may have to be passed or that it is, for any other reason, undesirable to try the case summarily, the Magistrate shall after hearing the parties, record an order to that effect and thereafter recall any witness who may have been examined and proceed to hear or rehear the case in the manner provided by the said Code.”[**\[12\]**](#_ftn12)* **Constitution of India** **Article 20(1)- “*No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence”***[***\[13\]***](#_ftn13)***.*** **Article 254- “*Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and laws made by the Legislatures of States.*** ***(1)* *If any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of existing law concerning one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void*** ***(2)**Where a law made by the Legislature of a State concerning one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law concerning that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State:*** ***Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law concerning the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying, or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State.”***[***\[14\]***](#_ftn14) **The Bengal General Clause Act** **Section 8 –**. “*Where this Act, or any Bengal Act ‘\[or West Bengal Act\] repeal. Made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hi there to made o\_- hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not—* *(a) Revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal t; Ikes effect; or* *(b) Affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered there under; or* *(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation, or liability acquired, accrued, or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or* *(d) Affect any penalty, forfeiture, or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or* *(e) Affect any investigation, legal proceeding, or remedy, in respect of any such right privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture, or punishment as aforesaid;* *Any such investigation, legal proceeding, or remedy may be instituted, continued, or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture, or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act had not been. Passed. (General Rules of Construction. —Sea lions SA & 9—13.) ‘8A. Where any Bengal Act \*|or West Bengal Act\] made after (the commencement of this Act repeals any enactment by which the text of any former enactment was amended by the express omission, insertion or subscription of any matter, \[hen, unless a different of 1899.\]* *The intention appears the repeal shall not affect the continuance of any such amendment made by the enactment so repeated and in operation at the time of such repeal.”[**\[15\]**](#_ftn15)* **JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court of India dismissed this appeal and upheld the decision of the Calcutta High Court. The Supreme Court in its judgment directed that the case against the respondents (owners of Chunghwa Restaurant) should be tried under the provisions of the Central Amendment Act, which provided for a summary trial procedure and a reduced punishment. This decision effectively overruled the initial order which was given by the Magistrate who earlier held that the case was triable by the Court of Sessions due to the life imprisonment provision in the West Bengal Amendment Act. The Court further decided that the accused should have been given the benefit of reduced punishment which is provided in the Central Amendment Act. The maximum punishment was reduced from life imprisonment (under the West Bengal Amendment Act) to three years imprisonment (under the Central Amendment Act). The Court also ruled that the new procedure introduced by Section 16A of the Central Amendment Act should also apply to pending cases. This meant that the offence in question would be tried summarily by a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class or Metropolitan Magistrate, rather than by the Court of Sessions which was previously required under the West Bengal Amendment Act. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The ruling of the case T. Barai vs Henry Ah Hoe and Another[\[16\]](#_ftn16) depicts the relationship between judicial insight and the legislative framework. And also embarks the importance of the basic constitutional provisions which are kept in mind by the judiciary and ensure the right to be treated freely to every accused. The case will be a precedent for many cases as it asserts the legislative supremacy, individual rights, and principled application of law. This case marked the hierarchy of the central legislation over the state legislation in instances of repugnancy, which reinforces the central government’s primacy in legislative matters about subjects in the Concurrent List. This case also reflects the humane approach of the judicial system of India where the less harsh provisions and penalties are applied to the accused. It also highlights the necessity for lawmakers to be mindful of existing legislative frameworks and the implications of their amendments on ongoing cases. **REFERENCES** *Prevention of Adulteration of Food, Drugs and Cosmetics, 1973(West Bengal Amendment Act)* *The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954* *Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899 (Ben. Act I)* *Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1976* *Section 16(1) (a), Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954* *Section 16A, Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.* *Article 20(1), Constitution of Republic of India, 1950.* *Article 254, Constitution of Republic of India, 1950.* [***\[1\]***](#_ftnref1) *1983 Air 150* [***\[2\]***](#_ftnref2) *Prevention Of Food Adulteration Act 1976* [***\[3\]***](#_ftnref3) *Prevention Of Food Adulteration Act 1976(Centrally Amended)* [***\[4\]***](#_ftnref4) *Prevention Of Adulteration Of Food, Drugs And Cosmetics, 1973(West Bengal Amendment)* [***\[5\]***](#_ftnref5) *The Prevention Of Food Adulteration Act, 1954* [***\[6\]***](#_ftnref6) *Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899 (Ben. Act I)* [***\[7\]***](#_ftnref7) *Article 254, Constitution of India.* [***\[8\]***](#_ftnref8) *Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1976(Centrally Amended)* [***\[9\]***](#_ftnref9) *Article 254, Constitution of India.* [***\[10\]***](#_ftnref10) *Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1976* [***\[11\]***](#_ftnref11) *Section 16(1)(A), Prevention Of Food Adulteration Act, 1954* [***\[12\]***](#_ftnref12) *Section 16a, Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.* [***\[13\]***](#_ftnref13) *Article 20(1), Constitution of Republic Of India, 1950.* [***\[14\]***](#_ftnref14) *Article 254, Constitution of Republic Of India, 1950.* [***\[15\]***](#_ftnref15) *Section 8, the Bengal General Clause Act, 1899.* [***\[16\]***](#_ftnref16) *1983 Air 150* **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases, Criminal Law Cases --- ### [Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India (2008)](https://lawfoyer.in/anuj-garg-v-hotel-association-of-india-2008/) **Published:** August 31, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Anisha Parveen** **Edited by: Shadrack Chai** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTES** This case concerns whether certain laws that treat people differently based on gender and age are fair under India’s Constitution. Specifically, the challenge is to a part of the Punjab Excise Act of 1914, which banned men under 25 and all women from working in places where alcohol and drugs are used publicly. The Court reviewed this old law in light of modern values and the principles of equality outlined in Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. They used a strict test to decide if the law was fair and proportionate. Ultimately, the Court found that the law was unfair because it enforced outdated gender roles and limited people’s right to work, which is part of the right to make a living. In making this decision, the Court looked at international examples of women’s rights. They talked about the balance between a woman’s right to make her own choices and the need for safety. They emphasized that while protection is important, it shouldn’t become a form of control. The Court decided that laws that limit personal freedom based on outdated cultural norms should be closely examined and often struck down. **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India (2008) 3 SCC 1 ***ii)* *Case Number*** Appeal (civil) 5657 of 2007 ***iii)* *Judgement Date*** 06/12/2007 ***iv)* *Court*** Supreme Court of India ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** 2 ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges*** S.B. Sinha & Harjit Singh Bedi ***vii)* *Citation*** AIR 2008 SC 663, (2008) 3 SCC 1 ***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved*** Article 14, Article 15, Article 19, and Article 21 of the Constitution **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** “The Hotel Association of India and others filed a case in the Delhi High Court challenging the constitutional validity of section 30 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914. This section prohibits the employment of men under 25 years old and any women on premises where the public consumes liquor or intoxicating drugs. The Delhi high court ruled that this section was unconstitutional, violating Articles 14, 15, and 19 (1) (g) of the Indian constitution, but only in the part that prohibits women’s employment.”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) **FACTS OF THE CASE** “The NCT of Delhi supports the judgment but also defends the challenged provision as a respondent in the case. The appellants, a group of Delhi citizens, question the validity of the judgment. The Hotel Association of India, as the respondent, has filed a special leave petition. Their members, who run hotels, serve liquor in bars, restaurants, and as room service. They challenged the law regarding the employment of men under 25 in places where liquor or intoxicating drugs are served to the public.”[\[2\]](#_ftn2) **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED (***minimum 2 legal issues*) Section 30 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914. Articles 14, 15, 16, 19, 21, and 372 of the Constitution, 1950. **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** “Mr. Rajiv Dutta, the senior counsel for the appellants, argued that since no one has a fundamental right to deal in liquor (consider ‘res extra commercium’), the state has the authority to create or maintain laws that impose reasonable restrictions on employment in such establishments.”[\[3\]](#_ftn3) **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** “Mr. Arun Jaitley, the senior counsel for the respondents, supported the judgment. He argued that privacy rights grant individuals the autonomy to choose their profession, while security concerns shape how this autonomy is protected. However, measures to safeguard this autonomy should not be so stringent that they undermine the essence of the guarantee. State protection should not become a form of censorship.”[\[4\]](#_ftn4) **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** **Section 30 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914:- “**No person who is licensed to sell any liquor or intoxicating drug for consumption on his premises shall during the hours in which such premises are kept open for business, employ or permit to be employed either with or without remuneration any man under the age of 25 years or any women in any part of such premises in which such liquor or intoxicating drug is consumed by the public.**”** **Article 14:- “** The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India**.”** **Article 15:- “** forbids discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste, gender, or place of birth or any of them**.”** **Article 19:- “**Freedom of Speech and Expression**”** **JUDGEMENT** “The Delhi High Court’s judgment was upheld, with the higher court stating that the legislation in question resulted in invidious discrimination based on gender. The restriction on employing men under 25 in the industry”.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) **Ratio Decidendi** “The court observed that although the Punjab Excise Act is an older law enacted before the Indian constitution and is typically safeguarded by article 372 its legitimacy can still be questioned under articles 14, 15, and 19 of the constitution while the law may have been appropriate at the time it was created significant societal changes both in India and globally mean that it may now be deemed invalid the court also referred to the john vallamattom case emphasizing that the justness of a law should be assessed in light of evolving societal norms and legal interpretations over time”. [**\[6\]**](#_ftn6) The court addressed the difficulty of reconciling the right to employment with the necessity for safety in the context of gender equality it’s essential to uphold the right to make personal decisions however providing safety and protection in a secure environment is also critical to the existing law intended to safeguard women curtails their freedom and increases their reliance on state protection this approach is problematic the court contended that state intervention should be measured and truly protective rather than limiting women’s freedom the focus should be on empowering laws and enforcement practices should ensure safe conditions that enable women to work confidently and independently in their chosen careers. “Regarding the concept of res extra commercium things outside the realm of commerce the court observed that hotel management is a specialized field and it is unjust to prevent young skilled and qualified individuals from pursuing these jobs this principle only applies if the state imposes a total prohibition in the case of Kerala **Samsthana Chethu Thozhilali Union v State of Kerala** the court stated that unless a job is specifically prohibited by law the state should not interfere the extent of the state’s authority to enact such laws is subject to debate the ruling also clarified that article 15 encompasses both direct and indirect forms of discrimination the state should not rely on stereotypes to justify discriminatory legislation although the right to employment is not explicitly listed as a fundamental right article 16 ensures the right to be considered for employment subject to reasonable restrictions thus providing a fundamental basis for this right.”[\[7\]](#_ftn7) The court dismissed the state’s defense of section 30 using the ‘parens patriae’ (parent of the nation) doctrine this doctrine is only acceptable if it’s truly necessary and does not cause undue harm additionally the court noted that this power could be contested on the grounds of the right to privacy young individuals in India should be free to make their own decisions especially given their access to information in the digital age the ruling established a benchmark for laws that aim to protect by imposing discrimination protective discrimination such laws must undergo rigorous judicial scrutiny meaning they should be assessed not only for their intended objectives but also for their actual impact the law in question was criticized for relying on outdated and stereotypical notions of gender roles the court introduced a two-step evaluation process the intervention of the state must be justified by a legitimate purpose and should be proportionate to its objectives. “The court applied the doctrine of proportionality to evaluate the law this principle requires that the means used by the law must be appropriately balanced with its intended objectives the court assessed whether the law effectively protects women’s interests while upholding fundamental values such as personal freedom equal opportunity and privacy.”[\[8\]](#_ftn8) **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The case exemplifies how the Constitution’s essence lies in the dynamic and purposive interpretation of its text, allowing constitutional courts to bring it to life. Dynamic interpretation ensures the constitution endures across generations, enabling progressive changes and the realization of rights as societies evolve. The court highlighted that women’s rights, not recognized when the legislation was formed, are now ensured by articles 14, 15, and 16 which aim to guarantee equality. The legislation was discriminatory in the 20th century, it is invalidated on the same grounds. This case advances feminist jurisprudence by challenging long-standing sex stereotypes. **REFERENCE** Bhatia , G. (2014, February 20). Grounding a progressive jurisprudence of sex equality: Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association. Constitutional Law and Philosophy. < > Team, C. (2020a, June 10). case of Anuj Garg and ors v. Hotel Association of India and ors. LAWyersclubindia.< > The Constitution of India [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Bharwani, A. (2020, November 14). Anuj Garg & ors vs. Hotel Association of India & Ors. 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Law Times Journal. <[https://www.google.com/url?q=https://lawtimesjournal.in/anuj-garg-ors-vs-hotel-association-of-india-ors/&usg=AOvVaw3HCiO3QLD3C\_eDrvnhlbYI&hl=en-US](https://www.google.com/url?q=https://lawtimesjournal.in/anuj-garg-ors-vs-hotel-association-of-india-ors/&usg=AOvVaw3HCiO3QLD3C_eDrvnhlbYI&hl=en-US) > [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Bharwani, A. (2020, November 14). Anuj Garg & ors vs. Hotel Association of India & Ors. Law Times Journal. <[https://www.google.com/url?q=https://lawtimesjournal.in/anuj-garg-ors-vs-hotel-association-of-india-ors/&usg=AOvVaw3HCiO3QLD3C\_eDrvnhlbYI&hl=en-US](https://www.google.com/url?q=https://lawtimesjournal.in/anuj-garg-ors-vs-hotel-association-of-india-ors/&usg=AOvVaw3HCiO3QLD3C_eDrvnhlbYI&hl=en-US) > [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Anuj Garg And Others v. Hotel Association Of India And Others, Supreme Court Of India, Judgment, Law, casemine.com. (n.d.). Https://Www.Casemine.Com. Retrieved August 4, 2024, from <[https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae5ae4b01497114138c5?utm\_source=amp&target=amp\_summary](https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609ae5ae4b01497114138c5?utm_source=amp&target=amp_summary) > [\[6\]](#_ftnref6)Bharwani, A. (2020, November 14). Anuj Garg & ors vs. Hotel Association of India & Ors. Law Times Journal. <[https://www.google.com/url?q=https://lawtimesjournal.in/anuj-garg-ors-vs-hotel-association-of-india-ors/&usg=AOvVaw3HCiO3QLD3C\_eDrvnhlbYI&hl=en-US](https://www.google.com/url?q=https://lawtimesjournal.in/anuj-garg-ors-vs-hotel-association-of-india-ors/&usg=AOvVaw3HCiO3QLD3C_eDrvnhlbYI&hl=en-US)> [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Bharwani, A. (2020, November 14). Anuj Garg & ors vs. Hotel Association of India & Ors. Law Times Journal. <[https://www.google.com/url?q=https://lawtimesjournal.in/anuj-garg-ors-vs-hotel-association-of-india-ors/&usg=AOvVaw3HCiO3QLD3C\_eDrvnhlbYI&hl=en-US](https://www.google.com/url?q=https://lawtimesjournal.in/anuj-garg-ors-vs-hotel-association-of-india-ors/&usg=AOvVaw3HCiO3QLD3C_eDrvnhlbYI&hl=en-US)> [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Bharwani, A. (2020, November 14). Anuj Garg & ors vs. Hotel Association of India & Ors. Law Times Journal. <[https://www.google.com/url?q=https://lawtimesjournal.in/anuj-garg-ors-vs-hotel-association-of-india-ors/&usg=AOvVaw3HCiO3QLD3C\_eDrvnhlbYI&hl=en-US](https://www.google.com/url?q=https://lawtimesjournal.in/anuj-garg-ors-vs-hotel-association-of-india-ors/&usg=AOvVaw3HCiO3QLD3C_eDrvnhlbYI&hl=en-US)> **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Ajay Hasia vs Khalid Mujib Sehravardi](https://lawfoyer.in/ajay-hasia-vs-khalid-mujib-sehravardi/) **Published:** August 31, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Apurva Shah** **Edited by: Shadrack Chai** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE (not less than 150 words and more than 250 words)** The Supreme Court case of Ajay Hasia vs. Khalid Mujib was centered around the issue of whether the Regional Engineering College comes under the definition of the concept ‘State’ mentioned in Article 12 and thus is subject to the writ jurisdiction. The case raised an important question before the court as to what is included as a state in Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The other issue raised in the case was the inappropriate distribution of marks for the viva voce and qualification examinations and whether the separate admission process for different state students violates the equality clause under Article 14. The court held in its ruling that a body or entity can be considered a state if it fulfills a certain set of tests. The purpose of each test was to examine different aspects of the institution’s relationship with the government. Due to the deep control of the Government on the REC, The court in its final ruling determined that the college is considered a state under Article 12 and therefore is subject to writ jurisdiction**.** ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*:** Article 12, equality under Article 14, the definition of state, Article14, instrumentality, viva examination **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** Ajay Hasia vs Khalid Mujib Sehravardi ***ii)* *Case Number*** 1 SCC 722 (Supreme Court of India 1981). ***iii)* *Judgement Date*** November 13, 1980 ***iv)* *Court*** Supreme Court of India ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** P.N.BHAGWATI, Y.V.CHANDRACHUD, V.R. KRISHNA IYER, SYED MURTAZA FAZALALI, A.D.KOSHAL ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges*** P.N. BHAGWATI ***vii)* *Citation*** 1981 AIR 487, 1981 SCR (2) 79, 1981 SCC (1) 722 ***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved*** Constitution of India -Article 12 and Article 14 **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The writ petition filed under Article 32 challenged the procedure of admission of Regional Engineering College in Srinagar (hereinafter referred to as REC or college), one of the 15 colleges in the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir registered as a society under the Jammu & Kashmir Registration of Societies Act, 1898. Also, the case is a landmark judgment related to the interpretation of the definition of the term state. As defined in Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the state includes the union and state governments, the Parliament and state legislature, as well as any local or other authorities in the territory of India or under the control of the Indian government. “The first step towards justice is ensuring that power is accountable.” By specifying the range of entities against which fundamental rights are enforceable, Article 12 of the Indian Constitution helps to understand who is liable when these rights are violated. **FACTS OF THE CASE** **Procedural Background of the Case** The petitioners in the case filed a writ petition under Article 32 directly in the Supreme Court They demanded relief against the unfair admission process of REC **Factual Background of the Case** The issue arose when the authorities of the college issued a notice regarding the vacancies for admission to the first semester of the B.E. course and the petitioners applied for admission The admission process consisted of a qualification test and a viva voce test -A short interview asking formal questions relating to the candidate’s percentage and residence rather than questions related to the subject The petitioners found that despite scoring good marks in the qualification test they were unable to secure admission due to low marks in the viva voce test when admissions were declared They claimed that this process was unjust, as it allowed candidates with lower marks in the qualification test to gain admission based solely on the short viva voce interview. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** Whether the college involved comes under the definition of state under Article 12 and thus is amendable to writ jurisdiction Whether the admission procedure of college is violative of the equality clause under Article 14 **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioner primarily submitted that despite being registered as a society the college acted as a government entity. It was argued that the college’s establishment resulted from government initiatives, and a significant portion of its funding had come from the Governments of India and Jammu and Kashmir. The petitioners pointed out the composition of the Board of Governors as evidence of the government’s control over college The petitioners argued that the true nature and character of the college were governmental making it a state under Article 12 They contended that the formality of registering the college as a society under the Jammu and Kashmir Registration of Societies Act, 1898, did not change the original substance of the institution They urged the court to look beyond legal form and consider the actual operations which they firmly claimed to be within the government’s authority **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS:** The counsels for Respondent contended that the college is a society registered under the Jammu and Kashmir Societies Act, 1898 rather than a corporation created by statute. Thus it is not an authority as the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution suggests and therefore no writ petition can be filed against it, nor can any complaint be made that it has acted unjustly in the matter of offering admissions and violated the equality clause of the Constitution. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** **Article 12:– “***In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires, “the State’’ includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.”* **Article 14*: – “(****Equality before law) The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.”**\[2[\[1\]](#_ftn1)\]*** **JUDGEMENT** The court gave a decision in favor of the petitioners. The court analyzed various clauses in the memorandum of association and rules of conduct. Taking into consideration the case of *R.D Shetty vs. International Airport Authority* and having fulfilled the required condition to be called a State the court held that society was an agency of Government. This conclusion was based on the government’s extensive control over its functioning including the composition which was determined by the representatives of government and the requirement for society to comply with the direction set by the government. The Memorandum of Association of Society and the Rules Act of the Society indicates that the college was owned, controlled, and managed by the Government and hence a State under Article 12 of the Constitution under “Other authorities.” They emphasized that it did not matter whether the corporation was established by legislation or statute for this purpose; what mattered was whether it acted as a government instrumentality or agency. Regarding the second issue Court closely examined the difference between the classification of doctrine and Article 14. The court did not find any solid evidence supporting the petitioners’ claim that the viva voce examination was too short or irrelevant. The court concluded that the possibility for interviews to be manipulated is not a sufficient reason to remove them from the selection procedure However, the court issued guidelines to limit the occurrence of future discrepancies. It advised the college to review the selection procedure with the viva voce examination having a smaller proportion of marks **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** Delivering its verdict on November 13, 1980, the Court held that if an entity is acting as a body of the government in the functional, structural, and financial matters then it can be categorized as a state under Article 12. The Ajay Hasia vs Khalid Mujib case also included a six-factor test for determining when a corporation can be said to be an instrumentality of government. these tests were previously laid down in the landmark judgment R.D Shetty vs. International Airport Authority “ (1)if Government owns all shares of the company, then it is a high indicator that the firm is an agency of the Government .” (2) “Where the monetary support provided by the state covers the almost total expenditure of the corporation, it highly suggests the Government effect on the organization.” (3) “Another relevant factor that can be considered is the monopoly status of the entity granted or protected by the Government .” (4) “The presence of strong and extensive state control over the corporation can be a proof of it being the state body “ (5) “If the corporation performs functions that are of public importance and if they are closely aligned with government functions then it’ll be a significant factor in classifying the corporation as a government institution “ In my opinion, the Ajay Hasia vs Khalid Mujib case provides important insights into the interpretation of Article 12. It helps to understand which entities can be held liable when there is a fundamental rights violation. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** R.D Shetty vs. International Airport Authority U.P. Warehousing Corporation v. Vijay Narain [Peeriakaruppan v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/471474/) [E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1327287/) [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) The Constitution of India, Article. 14,1950 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [SARLA MUDGAL AND ORS. VS. U.O.I & ORS](https://lawfoyer.in/sarla-mudgal-and-ors-vs-u-o-i-ors/) **Published:** August 31, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author :Beradar Akash** **Edited By: Shadrack Chai** **ABSTRACT** *Sarla Mudgal vs Union of India is a landmark case in the history of India. This case deals with a rather complicated issue of bigamy about apostasy. In this case, a Hindu man remarried under Islam without divorcing his first Hindu wife. Thus, this act of the husband doesn’t meet the provision of Monogamy under Hindu law. The Supreme Court observed whether such a conversion of a man is bona fide and discussed the Fundamental question of UCC under the provision of Article 44 of the Indian constitution, the apex court further stated that a man converting himself by embracing Islamic religion to commit bigamy would render it invalid and it further highlights the need of uniform civil code implementation. Hence in the present case, the Supreme Court highlighted that women’s rights were violated and one cannot use religion as a reason for exploitation. Thus, this Article aims to provide facts, issues, and judgment of the Supreme Court with further observation on an in-depth analysis of this case concerning Bigamy with the provisions of law.* *Keywords: Religious conversions, Bigamy, UCC, Hindu Marriage Act, Sec 494 of IPC* **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** Smt. Sarla Mudgal, President, Kalyani & … vs Union of India & Ors 1995 ***ii)* *Case Number*** Writ Petition No. 1079 of 1989 ***iii)* *Judgement Date*** May 10, 1995 ***iv)* *Court*** Supreme Court of India ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** Kuldip Singh, R.M Sahai ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges*** Kuldip Singh ***vii)* *Citation*** 1995 AIR 1531, 1995 SCC (3)635 ***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved*** · Article 44 of the Indian Constitution (DPSP) · Indian Penal Code of 1860, Sec 494& 495 · Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** Under the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 it states that a person living in a marriage and remarrying someone is an illegal act. The present case discusses mainly the issues of bigamy and religious conversions in the operation of personal laws. Countries like India have allowed for different religious practices but issues arise when one person converts his religion just for the sake of avoiding harsh and stricter personal laws. Hence this issue was scrutinised by the apex court in the present case. Thus, this case highlights the legal effectiveness of any conversion for a second marriage according to the constitution of India and the controversy UCC brings into the picture. **FACTS OF THE CASE** **Procedural Background of the Case** This case primarily consists of 4 petitions that were filed under Article 32 of the Indian constitution. Smt Sarla was a petitioner 1 of “KALYANI” a registered society an organization that was working for the welfare of women and needy families. One day the petitioner was shocked to learn the truth about her husband had solemnized a second marriage with a Muslim lady. Thus, the marriage was solemnized after they converted themselves and adopted the Islamic religion. Later a mandamus writ petition was sought to ban the act of practicing the legislation that allows any Hindu man to convert himself and live in a bigamous marriage **Factual Background of the Case** The petitioners were all Hindu women whose husbands were turned into Muslims for the sake of remarriage without divorcing the first lawful wives and left no legal redress. The counsel for the petitioners has argued that the conversion is not lawful and bona fide in nature and evades the provisions of 494 of IPC 1860, which states bigamy marriages are void in nature and shall be punishable and read with sec 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** Whether any husband marries to Hindu woman under Hindu law, can he solemnize the second marriage by accepting the Islamic religion? Whether the first marriage without dissolution under the law can be valid? Whether the husband will be liable for his act of bigamy under sec 494 of IPC 1860? **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsel for the petitioner submits that the conversion of the husband proves that his purpose for conversion was to solemnize the marriage as polygamy is allowed in the Islamic religion The counsel for the petitioner further contended that the act of the respondent was mala fide in nature, as it was very clear that he converted himself to Islam because he could escape the liability of being punished under sec 494 of IPC 1860 The counsel argued that freedom of religion under Article 25 of the Indian constitution does not extend to getting converted and committing the offense of bigamy which is punishable under the Hindu personal law. Non-implementation of UCC under Article 44 of the Indian constitution is leading to discrimination of women from one religion by another, hence it’s a clear violation of Article 14. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsel for the respondent contended that in this case Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and IPC, 1860 aren’t applicable, because Islam allows polygamy, meanwhile, he can marry four wives even in a case where the first marriage is subsisting. The counsel further argued that under Islamic personal law, if any of the spouses does not accept the same religion then it results in the dissolution of the marriage. The counsel for the respondent also stated that any intervention with personal laws such as marriages would tend to the violation of the freedom of religion. And UCC is just a directive principle that is not enforceable in a court of law. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** Article 44 of the Indian constitution *“The State shall endeavor to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India”*. However, Article 37 makes it clear that shall not be enforceable before the courts Articles 25& 26 of the Indian constitution *“Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion”* *“Freedom to manage religious affairs”* Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 *“Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceive”* Here it means whoever, a husband or wife is living and re-marring some other person such marriage would be void in nature and shall be punishable here under ### Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 ### *“Any marriage between two Hindus solemnized after the commencement of this Act is void if, at the date of such marriage, either party had a husband or wife living; and the provisions of sections 494 and 495 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), shall apply accordingly.”* Section 494 of IPC, 1860 *“Whoever, having a husband or wife living, marries in any case in which such marriage is void because of it taking place during the life of such husband or wife, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.”* JUDGEMENT** This case judgment was delivered by the Hon’ble Justice Kuldeep Singh and Hon’ble Justice R.M. Sahai it was held that “*marriages that are celebrated in one personal law cannot be dissolved by the application of other religious personal laws”* thus conversion by any Hindu spouses doesn’t put the first marriage to an end. Hindu husbands married under the Hindu Personal law, by accepting Islam cannot solemnize the second marriage. Thus, the second marriage would be illegal and the first marriage can be only dissolved through a decree of divorce under the governing act. Therefore, the second marriage of the respondent would be in violation of sec 494 of IPC and it would be void, and illegal shall be punishable under the said provision as it fills the required grounds under sec 494 of IPC 1860 **RATIO DECIDENDI** The solemnizing the marriage by way of conversion doesn’t annul the marriage and if the subsequent marriage is bigamous then he or she would be guilty under sec 494 of the penal code. The first marriage would remain legal and binding unless the decree of divorce has been granted by the court, also the court pointed out that India needs a UCC to eliminate the conflicts between personal laws. **OBITER DICTA** Marriage is one of the primary social contracts, it is involved with the public interest and creates certain expectations which bind the spouses with obligations A conversion of a Hindu man to Islam for practicing polygamy is permitted in Islam but not in Hindu law. Conversion to another religion doesn’t put the Hindu marriage to an end, instead, it must have dissolved under the Hindu law. The marriage dissolution must adhere to the original personal laws of the parties The UCC implementation under the provision of Article 44 of the Indian constitution can promote integrity & uniformity in personal law. Justice R.M. Sahai dissented here by stating that, the implementation of UCC could create religious dissatisfaction and it would be arbitrary and unconstitutional because the constitution protects the freedom of religion. Thus, he recommended new legislation on the ‘Conversion of Religion Act’ to prevent the misuse of religion and govern marriages for conversion. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** This case was considered a landmark judgment that upheld women’s rights and prevented the misuse of personal laws. The court held the second marriage to be void under Hindu law. Marriage is a sacrament and a universal social institution. A man converting himself with a mala fide intention is considered to be a colourable conversion, one cannot use the mode of religion for his benefit or commit bigamous marriages without divorcing his first legal spouse. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** The apex court referred many cases in the present case to support its judgment as follows *Robasa Khanum & Anr vs. Khodadad Irani & Ors AIR 1946 BOMBAY 272* In this case, it was held that the conduct of any spouse who converts to a Muslim religion should be judged based on the rule of justice, equity, and good conscience. Thus, the court shall act and decide on this basis. *Attorney General of Ceylon vs. Reid; (1965 A. C. 812)* This case outlines the legal issues while applying penal laws like bigamy in the context of changing personal laws. *Mohd. Ahmed Khan Vs. Shah Bano Begum: (1985 (3) S.C.C. 559) \[reported in 1985 SCC 945\]* This case provided a significant judgment, where it discussed the need and enactment of UCC in India to get rid of discrimination in particular areas of various personal laws. **Important Statutes Referred** India Penal Code, 1860: Sec 494 & 495 Hindu Marriage Act, 1955: Sec 17 Indian Constitution: Articles 14, 25 & 44 **REFERENCES** *Robasa Khanum & Anr vs. Khodadad Irani & Ors* AIR 1946 BOM 272 *Attorney General of Ceylon vs. Reid* (1965) AC 812 *Mohd. Ahmed Khan V Shah Bano Begum* (1985) 3 S.C.C. 559 Kuldip Singh and RM Sahai, “Smt. Sarla Mudgal, President, Kalyani & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.” “Article 44: Uniform Civil Code for the Citizens – Constitution of India” (*Constitution of India*, July 4, 2023) Geeks for Geeks, “IPC Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code” (*Geeks for Geeks*, May 10, 2024) *Smt Sarla Mudgal, &Ors. V Union of India AIR (1955) SC 531Indian Kanoon* “IPC Section 494 – Marrying Again during Lifetime of Husband or Wife – Punishment and Bail” (*lawrato.com*) **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases, Criminal Law Cases --- ### [MANAGING DIRECTOR ECIL HYDERABAD etc. v. B. KARUNAKAR etc.](https://lawfoyer.in/managing-director-ecil-hyderabad-etc-v-b-karunakar-etc/) **Published:** August 31, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: ritika ahari** **Edited by: A I Sugandesh** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** In this case, the question of law arises, through which there is a conflict between the decisions of the Supreme Court. To resolve the conflict the bench of three judges of the Supreme Court convened the Chief Justice to lay before the larger bench. B. Karunakar was the general director in the ECIL, he had worked in various posts in the company, the company occupied the manufacturing unit of electronic products. It was alleged that B. Karunakar was involved in misconduct acts and misuse of the cars of the company without permission after various complaints were received by the managing director, he called a meeting in which an inquiry officer was appointed. The managing director himself was the inquiry officer and declared B. Karunakar and terminated him from the service. Being aggrieved by the decision B. Karunakar appealed to review the decision to the Labour Tribunal, and the tribunal set aside the termination. But the managing director further challenged the decision in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh & later in the Supreme Court. The question of law was whether the report of the inquiry officer had to be furnished to the employee before the decision of the disciplinary authority. Whether the employee has any right to know the findings of the report before the trial so that he may defend or represent himself. Another question was non-disclosure of the inquiry report can be considered a violation of the principles of natural justice and also the punishment given by the authority in the form of termination from the service is justified in the view of the law. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*: Principles of Natural Justice, Disciplinary proceedings, Inquiry officer’s report, Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Misconduct, furnishing report, Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850** **CASE DETAILS** i) ***Judgment Cause Title / Case Name*** Managing Director Ecil Hyderabad Etc. … vs B. Karunakar Etc ii) ***Case Number*** Appeal (civil) 3056 of 1991 iii) ***Judgement Date*** 01/10/1993 iv) ***Court*** Supreme court v) ***Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** M.N. Venkatachaliah, P.B. Sawant, K. Ramaswamy, S. Mohan vi) ***Author / Name of Judges*** – vii) ***Citation*** AIR 1994 SUPREME COURT 1074, 1993 (4) SCC 727 viii) ***Legal Provisions Involved*** Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Article 226 & Article 136 of the Constitution. **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** Managing Director Ecil Hyderabad Etc. … vs B. Karunakar Etc is the landmark judgment on principles of natural justice and procedural fairness in disciplinary proceedings against employees. The judgment lays down the disciplinary guidelines regarding the dismissal grounds and inquiry reports which must be furnished to the employee before a decision is made by the disciplinary authority. Guidelines given in this case judgment seek to balance between the rights of the employee and the interest of the employer and the requirements of administrative efficiency. The case arose from a disciplinary action initiated against B. Karunakar was dismissed from the service. The managing director of the ECIL conducted the inquiry and found B. Karunakar guilty of misconduct. B. Karunakar challenged the order before the labor court which set aside the dismissal. The managing director filed a writ petition in the CAT after dismissal, and the High Court of Andhra Pradesh also dismissed the writ petition. The primary question before the Supreme Court was whether, before the decision of the disciplinary authority, the non-furnishing of the inquiry report to the employee was considered a violation of the principles of Natural Justice. After examining the scope of the principles of Natural Justice in the present situation the court gives guidelines to furnish the inquiry report before the employee is mandatory, he has the right to know the grounds on which he was dismissed. **FACTS OF THE CASE** 1. **Procedural Background of the Case** 1. **The decision of disciplinary authority –** Various complaints were received by the managing director regarding the misconduct act of Akar. The inquiry committee was called upon, and an inquiry report found guilty and dismissed Karunakar from his service as a punishment. 2. **Labour Court –** Karunakar challenged the dismissal in the labor court, the court set aside the decision of the authority. 3. **Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT)-** Being aggrieved by the decision of the Labour Court, the managing director filed a writ in the CAT, but the CAT also dismissed the decision. 4. **High Court of Andhra Pradesh – A** Writ petition was filed by the managing director, which was further dismissed. 5. **Supreme court –** Court on special leave petition, look upon the case. The primary question was whether the inquiry report had to be furnished to an employee before the decision of the disciplinary authority, whether it this a violation of the principles of natural justice, and whether the dismissal was right on such grounds. 2. **Factual Background of the Case** The Respondent B. Karunakar was the senior technical Officer of the Company. On December 27, 1986 *“a Memorandum of Charges setting out the misconduct, said to have been committed by him, with details thereof that he had unauthorizedly sold T.V. sets.”* For this purpose, an enquiry officer was appointed, and a reasonable opportunity has been given to B. Karunakar to give his reasoning. Enquiry officer’s report was produced after enquiring the evidences on March 13, 1987, stating that B. Karunakar acted prejudicially with the companies interest, and was found guilty. On its consideration, the disciplinary authority agreeing with the findings, removed B. Karunakar from the services of the Company. The writ petition was dismissed by the single judge of the Andhra Pradesh High court, but the division Court allow the case on appeal on relying on the case of **Union of India v.** **Mohammad Ramzan Khan.** **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether the employee is entitled to receive a copy of the inquiry officer’s report before any proceeding against him? 2. Whether the scope of the principles of natural justice required to furnish the report of the inquiry officer or non-disclosure may be considered a violation of Natural Justice principles? 3. Whether there is no responsibility on the authority to submit the report if the employee does not demand submission of the report? 4. From what date furnishing of the report come into operation according to law? 5. Whether the decision laid down in Mohd. Ramzan Khan’s case (AIR 1991 SC471) (supra) will be applicable in the sphere of all the establishment – Government, non-government, private & Public undertakings? 6. whether the employee is eligible to claim any relief as the inquiry report was not furnished to him before the order of the punishment? 7. whether the prospective operation of the decision laid down in Ramzan Khan’s case (AIR 1991 SC 471) is applicable to the order of punishment was passed on 20 November? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. It was submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that the inquiry report is an internal document, which consists of confidential and sensitive information, this is the discretion of the disciplinary authority to supply a copy of the inquiry report to the employee or not. They contended that there is no mandatory requirement under Article 311(2) of the Constitution or the relevant service rules to provide the report. Article – 311(2) of the constitution states that – “No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges: Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed”. 1. It was argued that the principles of natural justice are adequately satisfied by holding an oral inquiry, examining witnesses, and allowing the delinquent employee to cross-examine the witnesses and present their defense. Providing a copy of the inquiry report was not considered an essential part of natural justice and therefore there is no violation of principles of natural justice. Petitioner referred the previous judgment of the Supreme Court, **Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat (1980) and Satyavir Singh v. Union of India (1985),**“which held that supply of the inquiry report to the delinquent employee is not necessary for compliance with the principles of natural justice”. - The petitioner contended that the disciplinary authority is not obliged to supply a copy of the inquiry report suo motu (on its own motion) to the delinquent employee. If the employee does not request the report, the authority can proceed with the disciplinary action without providing the report. The onus lies on the employee to demand a copy of the inquiry report if they wish to have it. The petitioner claimed that if the employee does not exercise this right and remains silent, it can be presumed that they have waived their right to receive the report. The petitioner relied on the principle of “waiver” and argued that if the employee does not request the inquiry report, it amounts to a waiver of their right to receive it. Consequently, the disciplinary authority cannot be held responsible for not supplying the report when no demand was made by the employee. 1. It was argued that a prospective application of the decision would mean that the requirement to furnish the inquiry report would apply only to disciplinary proceedings initiated after the date of the court’s judgment. The petitioner sought to avoid the retroactive application of the decision to already concluded or ongoing disciplinary cases. 2. The petitioner contended that ECIL is a public sector undertaking and “Public sector undertakings have operational flexibility” to frame their own rules, service conditions, and pay scales according to their financial constraints and operational requirements. On applying the Mohd. Ramzan Khan’s case decision, the operational flexibility may be restrained, and also the decision of the said case only applies to sovereign functions of the state and not to commercial activities carried out by public sector undertakings. 3. The petitioner argued that there are no specific statutory provisions regarding the mandate of furnishing the inquiry report to the employee and there is no violation of the principles of natural justice because the employee was given an appropriate opportunity to represent himself and non-furnishing of the report did not deprive him of the reasonable opportunity to be heard. - It was argued that the decision of the Mohd. Ramzan Khan’s case should have a prospective operation and not be applied retrospectively. Applying retrospectively the decision of the said case would disturb vested rights and would be unfair as employers like ECIL did not have prior knowledge and ‘notice to prepare for the implications of the new legal principle’. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Respondent submitted that B. Karunakar is entitled to receive a copy of the inquiry report before the disciplinary proceeding. Depriving him from a copy of the inquiry report is a clear violation of the principles of natural justice, which empowers a person to represent himself and be transparent in the disciplinary proceeding. 2. It was argued that the scope of the principles of natural justice requires furnishing the report of the inquiry officer to the employee, and non-disclosure of the report should be considered a violation of these principles. There is also an application of the Latin maxim ‘Audi Alteram Partem’ which means the other side heard’ so that there is a clear violation of the natural principles. - It is the primary duty of the disciplinary authority to provide necessary information and evidence to employees whether employees ask for it or not. This is essential to the employee having full knowledge of the charges against him, and to comply with the natural justice principles, a fair chance to represent himself must be given to the employee. 1. Counsel contended that the date of furnishing of the report should come into operation with immediate effect in compliance with the natural justice principles. 2. The decision given in the Mohd. Ramzan Khan’s case was based on the principles of natural justice, these principles are universal regardless of public, private, government, and nongovernment undertakings. 3. The inquiry officer’s failure to comply with the principles of natural justice and to furnish the inquiry report before the disciplinary proceeding, this violation renders the entire disciplinary process void, and the employee is entitled to relief. - “There is no need for prospective application of the decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khan’s case. The requirement to furnish the inquiry officer’s report is not a new legal principle but rather an integral part of the well-established principles of natural justice. Therefore, it should be applied to all cases, regardless of the date of the order of punishment”. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** 1. **Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946:** This act provides provisions regarding the procedure for the disciplinary actions against the employee and also protects the interest of the employees by facilitating fair and just disciplinary actions. 2. **Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:** This act states the investigation, settlement, termination of employment, and the payment of compensation to employees. 3. **Various labor laws –** Such as **Factories Act, 1948 & The Slopes and Establishments Act, 1954,** which protect the rights of the welfare of employees and also protect employees from employers’ arbitrary or unjust actions. 6. **Article – 14 of the Constitution –** which provides equal protection to all the people and prohibits the discrimination. 7. **Scope of the Public Servant (Inquiries) Act, 1850:** The Supreme Court of India also examined whether the Public Servant (Inquiries) Act, of 1850 applied to the case. The Act provides for the conduct of inquiries into the conduct of public servants and sets out the procedures to be followed in such inquiries**.** The court held that the Act did not apply in this case because the inquiry was not conducted by a public servant but by the Managing Director of a public company. The court noted that the inquiry was conducted under the rules and regulations of ECIL and that the company had its own procedures for conducting disciplinary proceedings. 8. **Section- 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935- states** “that the civil servant shall not be dismissed or reduced in rank until he had been given “reasonable opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him”. **JUDGEMENT** 1. **RATIO DECIDENDI** 1. **Furnishing the inquiry officer’s report:** The Supreme Court takes the stand for the right of the employee to receive a copy of the inquiry report, this is the fundamental principle of natural justice that must be followed, and fair opportunity should be given to the employee to defend himself on the findings of the report. 2. **Applicability to all establishments –** The furnishing of the inquiry report before the disciplinary proceeding applies to all the establishments nonetheless of private sector, public sector, and government or non-governmental undertakings. - **Immediate application –** There is a question of law arose that from what date furnishing of the report should come into operation the honorable court held that the inquiry report should be given immediately before the disciplinary proceeding 1. **Relief to the employee –** If the inquiry report is not furnished before the disciplinary proceeding, then the employee is liable to claim relief. 2. **Principle of natural justice –** In this case, all the questions of law raised, come into the sphere of the principles of natural justice, and the court also prioritizes them. 3. **OBITER DICTA** 1. **Role of the disciplinary authority –** The disciplinary authority has the discretion to accept or not the evidence and inquiry report of the officer and such discretionary power must be exercised with reasonable care and in compliance with the natural justice principles. 2. **Importance of cross-examination – Cross-examination** should be done in the disciplinary proceedings and reasonable opportunity must be given to the employee to defend himself. - **Exceptions to the rule of furnishing the report –** In some cases, furnishing the report is undesirable due to confidentiality, and such exceptions should be used rarely and must be justified. 1. **Role of labor courts and tribunals –** Labour courts should prevent disputes between the employees and employees and also harmonize the relationship, in the situation of disputes such courts must complete the natural justice principles. 2. **Importance of fairness and transparency –** Disciplinary proceedings must be fair and transparent and not deprive any person’s rights and interests. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS-** The decision of this case laid down the basic principle of natural justice and its implications. The judgment also plays an important role in safeguarding the rights of the employees and also harmonizing the relationship between them. It emphasizes the fair and just disciplinary proceedings to be followed and also derecognizes the right of the employee to receive an inquiry report to defend himself, it protects the employees from waiver of their rights. The judgment of this case clarifies the conflicting decisions of the various High courts on the matter of whether the inquiry report should be furnished to the employee before the disciplinary proceeding. “The Court referred to its earlier decision in Mohd. Ramzan Khan v. Ajay Kumar Verma (AIR 1991 SC 471), where it had held that the inquiry officer’s report should be provided to the employee. However, the Court in Karunakar’s case went further and held that this principle would apply to all establishments, not just those governed by specific statutes or rules.” **REFERENCES** 1. **Important Cases Referred** - **Ramzan Khan v. Ajay Kumar Verma (AIR 1991 SC 471):** “*This case dealt with the requirement of furnishing the inquiry officer’s report to the employee in disciplinary proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the report should be provided to the employee to comply with the principles of natural justice”.* - **State of Uttar Pradesh v. Om Prakash Gupta (AIR 1970 SC 679):** This *case dealt with the principles of natural justice in disciplinary proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the principles of natural justice must be followed in disciplinary proceedings to ensure fairness and justice.* - **Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala (AIR 1969 SC 198):** This *case dealt with the right of an employee to be heard in disciplinary proceedings. The Supreme Court held that an employee has the right to be heard and to present their case in disciplinary proceeding* - **State of Madhya Pradesh v. Chintaman Sadashiva Waishampayan (AIR 1961 SC 1623):** *This case dealt with the role of the disciplinary authority in disciplinary proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the disciplinary authority has the power to disagree with the findings of the inquiry officer but must exercise this power reasonably and with due care.* - **Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. Workmen (AIR 1964 SC 1595):** *This case dealt with the importance of cross-examination in disciplinary proceedings. The Supreme Court held that cross-examination is an essential part of the principles of natural justice and should be allowed unless there are compelling reasons to deny it.* - **Khem Chand v. Union of India, 1958 SCR 1080:** (AIR 1958 SC 300) *where two questions squarely fell for consideration, viz., what is meant by the expression “reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed” and at what stage the notice against the proposed punishment was to be served on the delinquent employee. After referring to the decisions of the Judicial Committee in R. Venkata Rao v. Secretary of State for India, (1937) 64 Ind App 55: (AIR 1937 PC 31) and of* *the Federal Court in Secretary of State for India v. I. M. Lall, 1945 FCR 103 : (AIR 1945 FC the Court held that the reasonable opportunity envisaged by the provisions of Art. 311(2) as originally enacted was at the following stages:* *“(a) An opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence, which he can only do if he is told what the charges levelled against him are and the allegations on which such charges are based.* *(b) an opportunity to defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him and by examining himself or any other witnesses in support of his defense; and finally* *(c) an opportunity to make his representation as to why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him, which he can only do if the competent authority, after the inquiry is over and after applying his mind to the gravity or otherwise of the charges proved against the government servant tentatively proposes to inflict one of the three punishments and communicates the same to the government servant ……….”* **Important Statutes Referred** 1. 1. **Constitution of India: –** Article 14: Equality before law and equal protection of laws. - Article 21: Protection of life and personal liberty. - Article 311: Dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State. - **Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946:** - This act regulates the conditions of employment in industrial establishments. - It lays down the procedures for disciplinary action against employees and requires that these procedures be fair and just. - **Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:** - This act provides for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes. - It also lays down the principles for the termination of employment and the payment of compensation to employees. 1. **Factories Act, 1948:** - This act regulates the working conditions in factories and ensures the health, safety, and welfare of workers. - It also provides for the rights of workers and the obligations of employers. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases, Labour Law --- ### [RMDC VS. UNION OF INDIA AIR 1957 SC 628](https://lawfoyer.in/rmdc-vs-union-of-india-air-1957-sc-628/) **Published:** August 31, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author:** **Sadhvika S** **Edited by: A I Sugandesh** ****ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE:**** The R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla vs. Union of India is a landmark judgement for the doctrine of severability under ART.13. This judgement has a basic ground related to ART.13. In this RMDC case, the wider sense of prize competition definition was interpreted that it includes only gambling activities and not skill based. Thus, the SC held that the Prize Competition Act cannot be completely upheld as unconstitutional where it can be severed. The SC held that parts of unconstitutional provisions can be severed, thus the doctrine of severability was also significantly noted in this case. It was also held that their is a delicate balance between fundamental rights and the societal norms or morality to be maintained. This was considered to be a significant legal precedent in Constitutional law. ****CASE DETAILS**** ***i)* ****Judgement Cause Title / Case Name****** R.M.D. CHAMARBAUGWALLA(RMDC) **vs.** UNION OF INDIA ***ii)* ****Case Number****** AIR 1957 SC 628 ***iii)* ****Judgement Date****** 09/04/1957 ***iv)* ****Court****** SUPREME COURT OF INDIA ***v)* ****Quorum / Constitution of Bench****** FULL BENCH (4) ***vi)* ****Author / Name of Judges****** JUSTICE SUDHI RAJAN DAS (CJI), JUSTICE BHUVANESHWAR P. SINHA, JUSTICE P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, JUSTICE T.L VENKATARAMA AIYYAR. ***vii)* ****Citation****** 1957 SCR 930, 1957 AIR 628 ***viii)* ****Legal Provisions Involved****** ARTICLE. 19(1), (6), PRIZE COMPETITION ACT, 1955. ****INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT:**** The R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla **vs.** Union of India is a landmark judgement for the doctrine of severability under ART. 13. This judgment has a basic ground related to ART.13 and ART.19(1)(g), which guarantees the right to carry on any trade, business or profession. In this RMDC case, the petitioner was conducting prize competitions in Mysore since 1948 under the Mysore Lotteries and Prize Competition Control and Tax Act, 1951. He challenged section 2(d) of the Prize Competition Act, 1955 whether constitutionally valid in sense. Section 2(d), which was broad enough to include competitions of a gambling nature as well as competitions involving skill was involved. The petitioners also claimed that the state’s action behind the enactment of this act constituted colorable legislation. The case was petitioner side was argued by Mr. Palkhivala and respondent side was argued by Mr. Seervai. The SC held that the provisions of this act were severable and struck down those provisions which are related to competition not involving skill. The court also held that where after removing the invalid provisions what remains constitutes a complete code there is no necessity to declare the whole act invalid. The court held that the restrictions imposed by Sections 4 and 5 and Rules 11 and 12 of Section 20 were severable in their application to the two distinct categories of competition. Consequently, the impugned provisions could not be held void in their entirety, at least with respect to gambling competitions. The court also held that gambling does not come under the purview of fundamental rights under ART. 19(1)(g). ****FACTS OF THE CASE:**** 1. **Procedural Background of the Case**** 1. A petition was filed by the petitioner on the grounds of infringement of fundamental rights under ART. 32 challenging the constitutional validity of the provisions in the Prize Competitions Act of 1955, stating that violates the Right to trade, business, or profession under ART. 19(1)(g) of Indian Constitution. 2. Further, It was contented by the respondents that section 2(d) of the act is not wide and it is restricted only tothe view of gambling and does not include success depending upon substantial skill, which was the petitioner’s business. 1. **Factual Background of the Case:**** 1. The petitioner’s fundamental rights were infringed by the enactment of new legislation. Thus the petitioners challenged the prohibition on the operation of certain games mere skill, asserting that such a prohibition would violate their fundamental rights under ART. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The petitioner’s interpretation of the act included the knowledge of skill and gambling while the respondent interpreted that it included the knowledge of gambling. ****LEGAL ISSUES RAISED:**** 1. Whether section 2(1)(g) of the Prize competitions act, 1955 applies only to gambling or doesn’t include the knowledge of substantial skill? 2. Whether the sections4,5 and rules 11 and 12 of section 20 are constitutionally valid? ****PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS:**** 1. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the interpretation of section 2(d) of the Prize Competitions Act,1955 is not only restricted to the act of gambling but also includes the substantial degree of skill. 2. The counsel also argued by stating their infringement of fundamental rights, notably the petitioner was also involved in the conduct of prize competitions across a few states. They argued that their right to conduct business was infringed as per ART. 19(1)(g) of Indian Constitution. - The petitioner’s counsel further stated that the provisions formed a single inseverable enactment, thus leading to the invalidation of the entire act. ****RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS:**** 1. The counsels for Respondent submitted that the definition under section 2(d) of the Prize Competition Act, 1955 is properly constructed and only includes the gambling nature and does not include a substantial degree of skill. 2. Thus, also interpreted that gambling is not considered a trade or business under the Constitution of India. As per ART. 19(1)(g) guarantees that all citizens shall have the right to practice any profession trade or business. However, under ART. 19(6)(a) of the Constitution the right shall be considered with restrictions by the authority of law. The state can make any law imposing reasonable restrictions on this right in the interest of the public. 3. The respondents also contended that some parts of the prize competitions act as invalid and should be removed while valid part should stand valid and the whole act should not be considered as unconstitutional. ****RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS:**** ****Section 2(d)****– “**prize competition” means any competition (whether called a cross-word prize competition, a missing-word prize competition, a picture prize competition or by any other name) in which prizes are offered for the solution of any puzzle based upon the building up, arrangement, combination or permutation, of letters, words, or figures.”** ****Section 4****– “******No person shall promote or conduct any prize competition or competitions in which the total value of the prize or prizes (whether in cash or otherwise) to be offered in any month exceeds one thousand rupees; and in every prize competition, the number of entries shall not exceed two thousand.”** ****Section 5****– “******Subject to the provisions of section 4, no person shall promote or conduct any prize competition or competitions in which the total value of the prize or prizes (whether in cash or otherwise) to be offered in any month does not exceed one thousand rupees unless he has obtained in this behalf a licence granted in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder.”** ****ART. 19(1)(g)****–**** **“to practi**c**e any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business******.****” ****ART.13(2)****–**** **“The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.”** ****ART.32(1)****–**** **“The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.”** ****ART. 19(6)(a)****–**** **“Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to,-** - *The professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or** - *The carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise.”** ****JUDGEMENT:**** 1. **RATIO DECIDENDI:**** 1. In this case RMDC UOI, the ratio decidendi is that the Supreme Court held that section 2(d) of the prize competitions Act clearly defines the term ‘prize competitions’ as an act including gambling and no other category. 2. The SC also validated that section 4,5 and rule 11,12 of the act concerning gambling could no longer be considered under the ambit of ART. 19(6) of the constitution. - The court also highlighted that gambling is no longer considered under the ambit of ART.19(6) from the precedent judgment as “**gambling or conducting the business of gambling is extra-commercium and hence not included and hence not included within the meaning of trade, commerce or intercourse.”** 1. **OBITER DICTA:**** 1. The case of RMDC has made a significant judgment regarding to the doctrine of severability as follows: - *“The impugned Act minus this section can remain unaffected. The omission of the section will not change the nature or the structure of the subject of the legislation.** - *“It was held that the provisions which have been declared as void do not affect the entire statue, therefore, there is no necessity for declaring the statue invalid.**”** - *“The court also upheld that the test to be applied is whether the legislature would enact the valid part if it had known that the rest of the statute was invalid. But if what remains on the statute book cannot be enforced without altering the whole act should be declared as void. Severability is the question of substance and not of form. The determination of the intention of the legislation is necessary.”** ****CONCLUSION & COMMENTS**** In this case of RMDC, the appellants challenged the constitutional validity of the provisions of the Prize Competition Act, of 1955 related to gambling. The SC held that gambling is not under the purview of the ART. 19(1)(g) and it was also upheld in the case of the **State of Bombay vs. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla**.** Thus, the court also held that the interpretation of the Act specifically applies to gambling competitions and ruled that it does not include skill-based competitions, the violation provisions were severable, valid only for gambling competitions, and not wholly void. ****REFERENCES:**** ****Important reference Referred:**** 1. M.D.C **vs.**UOI (1957) AIR SC 628 2. State of Bombay vs. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla (1957) AIR SC 699 3. Kihoto Hallohan vs. zachillhu (1992) SCR (1) 686 4. K. Gopalan vs. State of Madras (1950) AIR SC 27 5. State of Bombay vs. F.N Balsara (1951) AIR SC 318 ****Important Statutes Referred:**** 1. Prize Competitions Act, 1955 2. Constitution of India, 1950 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [State of Bombay and Ors. v. F.N. Balsara](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-bombay-and-ors-v-f-n-balsara/) **Published:** August 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Sonal Rai** **Edited by: Shadrack Chai** **ABSTRACT** ***Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** State of Bombay and Ors. v. F.N. Balsara ***Case Number*** Civil Appeal No. 182 of 1951 ***Judgement Date*** 25/05/1951 ***Court*** Supreme Court of India ***Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** Saiyid Fazal Ali, M. Patanjali Shastri, B.K. Mukherjea, Sudhi Ranjan Das, Vivian Bose ***Author*** Justice Saiyid Fazal Ali ***Citation*** 1951 AIR 318, 951 SCR 682 ***Legal Provisions Involved*** Article 14, Article 19(1), Article 32, Article 47, and Article 132 of the Constitution of India Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 Government of India Act, 1935 Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India This case concerned the rights of the petitioner to practice any profession or occupation of the manufacture, sale, and consumption of alcohol and import and export of alcohol in the state of Bombay. The state legislature enacted an act named the Bombay Prohibition Act, of 1949 which prohibits alcohol and its trade. The petitioner exercised his right to issue a writ of mandamus guaranteed under Article 32 before the High Court of Bombay. The writ highlights the jurisdictional limits of the authority in exercising its powers. The Supreme Court determined the scope of state legislative lists and the importance of a balance between fundamental rights and personal liberties. The ruling undermined the power of the state authority to impose reasonable restrictions to serve the public welfare in the state. The judgement serves as an example of such measures that will take place in future. **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The case of **State of Bombay and Others v. F.N. Balsara** is a landmark judgment by the Supreme Court of India. It addressed the conflict between the law passed by the state legislation and the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India. The main issue was whether the state had the authority to prohibit alcohol and whether such a ban would infringe upon citizens’ fundamental rights. The Bombay Prohibition Act, of 1949, sought a complete ban on the manufacture, sale, and consumption of alcohol in the state of Bombay. The Act was challenged in the court that it violated the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 19(6), and 21 of the Constitution, which ensures the right to equality, the right to freedom, and the right to life and personal liberty according to the procedure established by law. The respondents argued that the ban violated these fundamental rights. The case mainly addresses the interpretation of the legislative lists of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and the fundamental rights of the Indian Constitution. **FACTS OF THE CASE** **Procedural Background of the Case:** The petitioner F.N. Balsara moved to the High Court and invoked the writ of mandamus under Article 32 of the Constitution of India against the State of Bombay and the Prohibition Commissioner to restrain the order of enforcement of the Prohibition Act provisions against him. Then this order was appealed before the Supreme Court of India under Article 132 of the Indian Constitution. **Factual Background of the Case:** The petitioner also prayed for a similar relief under Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act. The High Court declared that some of the provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 are invalid and the rest to be valid. The court agreed with some of the petitioner’s contentions and not all. The Bombay Prohibition Act,1949 was passed by the legislature of the Province of Bombay as it was constituted in 1949. The act was published in the Bombay Government Gazette on 20th May 1949 and the date of enforcement was 16th June 1949. However, the petitioner dissatisfied with the High Court’s decision filed a civil appeal before the Supreme Court under Article 132 of the Constitution challenging the act to be unconstitutional as it violated the fundamental rights of the individuals.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether the state have the authority to enforce such a prohibition under the legislative lists of the Seventh Schedule of the Indian Constitution? 2. Whether the appeal filed under Article 132 of the Indian Constitution upheld the High Court decision and determined that the impugned Act violated the fundamental rights of individuals and could be declared unconstitutional. [\[2\]](#_ftn2) **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the prohibition act fell outside the scope of the state list and encroached upon the subjects reserved for the Union Lists or the Concurrent List, thus questioning the legislative incompetence of the state. It is also contended that the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 violated the fundamental rights of the individual guaranteed under the Constitution. Article 19 of the Constitution of India which grants the right to profess, practice and propagate any profession or occupation within the territory of India is violated by the act. They argued that the complete ban on the manufacture, sale and consumption of alcohol is unreasonable and the state has not demonstrated that the prohibition was a necessary and proportionate measure for public health and safety. What is contended is that the law enforced has arbitrarily favoured selected groups of people like military personnel and the distinction between civil population and military personnel cannot be made on any rational ground for the enforcement of the prohibition act. It is further contended by the petitioners to what extent the judgement of the High Court can be upheld about the specific provision of the Act which has been declared by it to be void. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The respondents claimed that the state has the authority to enact such law and the state acted within its jurisdiction and did not infringe on subjects reserved under the Union Lists or Concurrent Lists. They maintained that the act made the classifications reasonably with the purpose and it did not violate Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. The respondents maintained that the restrictions were justified by the aim of public welfare and health and fell within the permissible limits. It was further clarified that Article 21 is not violated by the act as it did not arbitrarily interfere with personal liberties. **Related Provisions** **Constitution of India** **Article 14 (**Equality before law) “The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.” **Article 19(1) (g)**: Right to Freedom of Trade, Occupation, and Business **Article 19(6)** implies that “the state may impose reasonable restrictions on this right, as outlined below are: Reasonable restrictions in the interest of the public Prescribe professional or technical qualifications, necessary for practising any profession, or carrying on any occupation, trade or business Enable the state to carry on any trade or business to the exclusion of citizens, wholly or partially.” **Article 21**: Right to Life and Personal Liberty – no person shall be deprived of his right to life and personal liberty. **Article 132** – “An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree, or final order of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court certifies—(a) that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution; and (b) that in the opinion of the High Court, the said question is so important that it should be decided by the Supreme Court.” **Article 32 –** has bestowed a power upon the Supreme Court to issue directions or orders or writs including the writs like habeas corpus, mandamus, quo-warranto, prohibition and certiorari whichever may be suitable for the discharge of any of the fundamental rights in a given case. These writs are also known as “Prerogative writs” for the reason of being taken from the English law. **Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949** – an act of the Bombay Legislative Assembly relating to the promotion and enforcement of alcohol was passed which imposed a complete ban on the manufacture, sale and consumption of alcohol in the state of Bombay. **Section 2(7)**: Defines “prohibition” and the scope of the Act, clarifying that it includes a ban on the manufacture, sale, and consumption of alcoholic beverages. **Section 3**: Provides for the imposition and enforcement of prohibition, detailing the powers of the state government to regulate and enforce the Act. **Section 4**: Details penalties for violations of the prohibition, including fines and imprisonment. **Section 5**: Grants the state government the authority to make rules and regulations for implementing the Act. **Section 6**: Outlines the powers of police and other authorities to enforce the prohibition, including the seizure and destruction of prohibited substances. **Government of India Act, 1935** Section 297 (4) – “The provisions of this Act relating to the distribution of powers and functions between the Federal and Provincial Legislatures and Executives and the distribution of such powers and functions between the Provinces and the States and the functions of the Government of India under this Act shall be subject to the provisions of this section and shall have effect accordingly.” **Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India** – enlists three kinds of lists under which powers are divided between the Union and the State government – Union List, State List and Concurrent List. **JUDGEMENT** **Ratio Decidendi** The Supreme Court in its ruling in the case of the State of Bombay and Others v. F.N. Balsara addressed the constitutionality of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 which imposed a ban on the trade of alcohol and its consumption. The core issues which the Supreme Court dealt with were raised by the petitioner whether the state acted outside its purview by passing such a law in the subjects enlisted under the union list. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the act and concluded that the act was inside the state’s authority and that the state has the due authority to pass such a law with the measure to ensure public health and welfare. Regarding the fundamental rights, the court upheld that the act does not infringe the fundamental rights as the restrictions were imposed to serve a broader purpose for the public interest to achieve public welfare. The Supreme Court stated that all reasonable restrictions can be imposed on fundamental rights according to Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India. The court further declared that the act did not violate Article 21 of the Constitution of India since the provision was enacted according to the legal procedure established by law. The Supreme Court’s decision reaffirmed that the state has the due authority to enact laws related to serving the broader public interest and strike a balance between individual rights and state regulation for the welfare of all its citizens in the country. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The pronouncement of judgement that such restrictions can be imposed on fundamental rights serves a larger purpose to the general public and the importance of such acts passed by the state legislature to achieve public good. The court concluded in its judgement the reasons and the measures highlighted by the state legislature while enacting such a law. It claims that fundamental rights are rigid yet also flexible enough to reasonable constraints according to the procedure established by law. It highlighted how state laws can limit the personal freedoms of individuals and the individual can move to the court whenever any question of law arises in the enactment of laws. The judgement underscores the importance of ensuring that fundamental rights are not violated while keeping in mind the personal freedoms of individuals aligning with constitutional principles. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred:** Prafull Kumar Mukherjee v. The Bank of Commerce, Khulna (AIR 1947, PC 60) Ralla Ram v. Province of East Punjab (AIR 1949 FC 81) Province of Madras v. Boddu Paidanna and Sons (AIR 1941 MADRAS 913) Chitranjit Lal Chowdhari v. The Union of India and Ors., (1950 SCR 869) Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras, (AIR 1950 SUPREME COURT 124) **Important Statutes Referred:** Constitution of India, 1950 Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 Government of India Act, 1935 [](#_ftnref1) [](#_ftnref2) **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra](https://lawfoyer.in/m-p-sharma-v-satish-chandra/) **Published:** August 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Happy Kushwah** **Edited by: Shadrack Chai** **ABSTRACT** *M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra* is a landmark case in Indian constitutional law that dealt with the interpretation of the right to privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The case was decided by an eight-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India in 1954. In this case, the Court held that the right to privacy is not guaranteed as a fundamental right under the Constitution. The decision in *M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra* has been a subject of criticism and subsequent developments in Indian jurisprudence, particularly with the evolving understanding of privacy rights in the digital age. It laid the foundation for later cases such as *Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh* (1962) and *Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India* (2017), where the Supreme Court revisited and expanded upon the right to privacy as a fundamental right. ***Keywords(Minimum 5)*: Right to Privacy, Article 21, Search and Seizure, Fundamental Rights, Constitutional Interpretation** **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra ***ii)* *Case Number*** AIR 1954 SC 300 ***iii)* *Judgement Date*** 15th March 1954 ***iv)* *Court*** Supreme Court of India ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** Eight-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges*** · Chief Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan · Justice B.K. Mukherjee · Justice Vivian Bose · Justice N.H. Bhagwati · Justice T.L. Venkatarama Aiyar · Justice Ghulam Hasan · Justice Sudhi Ranjan Das · Justice B. Jagannadhadas ***vii)* *Citation*** AIR 1954 SC 300 ***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved*** · The Constitution of India- Articles 19 (1)(f), 20(3), 31,21 · The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898- Section 96 · The Indian Evidence Act, 1872- Section 25,26,27 **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** #### Introduction: *M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra* (AIR 1954 SC 300) is a landmark judgment by the Supreme Court of India that dealt with the interpretation of constitutional rights related to search and seizure operations. Delivered on March 15, 1954, by an eight-judge bench, the case addressed the extent to which the right to privacy is protected under the Indian Constitution, particularly in the context of search and seizure procedures carried out by law enforcement authorities. #### Background: The case arose from an investigation into the affairs of Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. following allegations of fraudulent activities. The District Magistrate issued search warrants under Section 96(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, leading to extensive searches and the seizure of documents from the premises of the company and its officers, including M.P. Sharma. The petitioners, including M.P. Sharma, challenged the legality of these search warrants before the Supreme Court, arguing that the searches and seizures violated their fundamental rights under the Constitution of India. Specifically, they contended that these actions infringed upon their rights under: **Article 19(1)(f)**: The right to acquire, hold, and dispose of property (a right which existed at the time but was later abolished by the 44th Amendment Act, 1978). **Article 20(3)**: The right against self-incrimination. **Article 31**: The right against deprivation of property except by the authority of law. The primary contention was that the search and seizure violated the petitioners’ right to privacy and protection against self-incrimination, thereby infringing on their liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. **FACTS OF THE CASE** The case revolved around the legality of search and seizure operations conducted under warrants issued by a Magistrate. M.P. Sharma, the petitioner, challenged the validity of the search warrants issued to the police for investigating alleged financial misconduct. The key issues included whether the search and seizure violated constitutional rights, specifically the right to privacy and protection against self-incrimination. **Procedural Background of the Case** **Filing**: The petition was filed challenging the search and seizure conducted by the authorities under the warrants issued by the District Magistrate. **Arguments**: The petitioners argued that the searches violated their right to privacy and the protection against self-incrimination. The respondents defended the legality of the search warrants and the procedures followed. **Factual Background of the Case** **Allegations and Search Warrants**: Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. faced allegations of fraudulent practices involving financial irregularities. The District Magistrate issued search warrants under Section 96(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, targeting the company’s premises and key personnel, including director M.P. Sharma. Extensive searches were conducted, leading to the seizure of relevant documents and materials. **Legal Challenges and Supreme Court Petition**: M.P. Sharma and others contested the legality of the search and seizure operations, arguing violations of their constitutional rights to privacy and protection against self-incrimination. They petitioned the Supreme Court of India, challenging the constitutionality of the operations and claiming infringement of their rights under Articles 19(1)(f), 20(3), and 31 of the Indian Constitution. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED(***minimum 2 legal issues*) Whether the search and seizure operations conducted under Section 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, violated the petitioners’ fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(f), 20(3), and 31 of the Constitution. Whether the right to privacy is protected as a fundamental right under the Indian Constitution. Whether the protection against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) extends to searches and seizures of documents and other evidence. **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that it was: **Violation of Privacy Rights**: The petitioners contended that the search and seizure infringed upon their privacy. At that time, the right to privacy was not explicitly recognized as a fundamental right, but the petitioners argued it was implied within broader constitutional protections. **Infringement of the Right Against Self-Incrimination**: They argued that the search and seizure could lead to the exposure of incriminating evidence, which would violate their right against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) of the Constitution. **Legality of Search Warrants**: The petitioners challenged the validity of the search warrants, asserting that they were issued without sufficient grounds and that the procedures followed were not in compliance with legal requirements. **Unreasonable Search and Seizure**: They claimed that the searches were excessive and disproportionate, not justified by the objectives of the investigation. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that it was: **Legality of Search and Seizure Operations**: The respondents argued that the search and seizure were conducted by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The search warrants were issued based on reasonable grounds and followed legal procedures. **No Violation of Privacy Rights**: The respondents contended that the right to privacy was not explicitly protected as a fundamental right at the time. They argued that the searches were conducted within the bounds of legal authority. **No Infringement of the Right Against Self-Incrimination**: They asserted that the search and seizure did not constitute a testimonial act and therefore did not violate the protection against self-incrimination under Article 20(3). **Necessity and Proportionality of the Search**: The respondents argued that the searches were necessary and proportional to the investigation’s objectives and that the extent of the search was justified. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** **The Constitution of India**: **Article 19(1)(f)**: Right to acquire, hold, and dispose of property (relevant at the time of the case). **Article 20(3)**: Protection against self-incrimination. **Article 31**: Protection against deprivation of property. **Article 21**: Protection of life and personal liberty. **The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898**: **Section 96**: Authority for issuing search warrants. **Section 98**: Powers to seize property believed to be stolen or obtained through criminal activity. **The Indian Evidence Act, 1872**: **Section 25**: Prohibition of confessions made to a police officer as evidence. **Section 26**: Confessions made in police custody cannot be used against the accused unless in the presence of a Magistrate. **Section 27**: Admissibility of information leading to the discovery of material evidence. **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** **Right to Privacy**: The Court did not recognize the right to privacy as a fundamental right under the Constitution at the time. The judgment emphasized that privacy protections were not explicitly provided for in the Constitution. **Legality of Search Warrants**: The Court upheld the legality of the search warrants issued under the Code of Criminal Procedure, affirming that they were valid when issued based on proper grounds and procedures. **No Violation of Self-Incrimination**: The Court held that the search and seizure of documents did not violate Article 20(3) as it did not pertain to testimonial evidence. **Reasonableness and Proportionality**: The search and seizure were deemed reasonable and proportional to the investigation’s needs. **GUIDELINES (IF ANY)** **Legality of Search Warrants**: Search warrants must be based on sufficient grounds and issued following legal procedures. **Scope of Privacy Rights**: While not recognized as a fundamental right at the time, searches should be conducted in a manner that respects individual privacy within legal bounds. **Limits on Self-Incrimination**: Protections against self-incrimination pertain to testimonial evidence and not physical evidence obtained through lawful searches. **Reasonableness and Proportionality**: Searches must be justified and conducted reasonably about the investigation’s objectives. **Procedural Compliance**: Authorities must follow legal procedures for search and seizure to ensure actions are lawful and respectful of rights. **OVERRULING JUDGMENTS (IF ANY)** **Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. (1964)**: Examined privacy in the context of surveillance, acknowledging its importance but not explicitly recognizing it as a fundamental right. **Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994)**: Recognized the right to privacy as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. **Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (2017)**: Explicitly recognized the right to privacy as a fundamental right, overruling earlier decisions, including *M.P. Sharma*. **Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018)**: Reaffirmed the right to privacy and extended its implications, influencing the interpretation of individual liberties. **OBITER DICTA (IF ANY)** **General Observations on Privacy**: The Court acknowledged privacy concerns but did not recognize it as a fundamental right at the time. **Views on Fundamental Rights**: Discussed the scope and limits of fundamental rights, providing context for constitutional protections. **Evolution of Constitutional Protections**: Reflected on how constitutional interpretations might evolve, influencing future cases. **Role of Judicial Review**: Highlighted the importance of judicial review in assessing the legality of state actions and protecting individual rights. **CONCLUSION& COMMENTS** *M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra* was a pivotal case in Indian legal history, addressing the legality of search and seizure and the scope of individual rights. The Supreme Court’s judgment established important precedents regarding privacy and legal procedures. Since then, subsequent judgments have expanded the understanding of privacy rights and constitutional protections, reflecting an evolving legal landscape. The case continues to influence discussions on search and seizure operations and the balance between state powers and individual freedoms. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** **Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. (1964)**: Examined privacy in the context of surveillance, acknowledging its importance but not explicitly recognizing it as a fundamental right. 1. **Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994)**: Recognized the right to privacy as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. **Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (2017)**: Explicitly recognized the right to privacy as a fundamental right, overruling earlier decisions, including *M.P. Sharma*. **Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018)**: Reaffirmed the right to privacy and extended its implications, influencing the interpretation of individual liberties. **Important Statutes Referred** The Constitution of India- Articles 19 (1), (f), 20(3), 31, 21 The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898- Section 96 The Indian Evidence Act, 1872- Section 25, 26, 27 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases, Criminal Law Cases --- ### [DR. SUBHASH KASHINATH MAHAJAN VS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (AIR 2018 SC 1498)](https://lawfoyer.in/dr-subhash-kashinath-mahajan-vs-state-of-maharashtra-air-2018-sc-1498/) **Published:** August 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Saurav Kumar** **Edited by: Shadrack Chai** Name Of the case case/case title **DR. SUBHASH KASHINATH MAHAJAN** **VS.** **STATE OF MAHARASTRA (AIR 2018 SC 1490)** Case No **CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 416 OF 2018** Date of the order **20-03-2018** Citation **Criminal Appeal No. 416 Of 2018 (Arising Out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 5661 of 2017).** Jurisdiction **Supreme Court of India.** Quorum **Hon “ble Mr. Justice Adarash kumar Goel** **Hon “ble Mr Justice Uday Umesh Lalit** Author of the judgement **Both Hon’ble justice** Appellant **Dr. Subhash kashinath Mahajan** Respondent **State of Maharashtra and Anr.** Counsel for appellant Counsel for Respondent **Advocate V.M Tarkunde** **Advocate Amrendra Sharan** Acts and sections involved · **The constitution of India 1950, Article 21** · **Rules of the procedure of the National Commission for scheduled castes, section 3** · **The schedule castes and schedule tribes (prevention of Atrocities )Act,1989, section 18** · **Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, section 41** · Abstract** The prevention of mistreatment of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. The Atrocities Act of 1989 was established to protect against individual belongings of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Various forms of discrimination and atrocities along with other types of challenges are encountered within the community. The Supreme Court recently released its verdict. The case of Subhash Kashinath Mahajan against the state of Maharashtra. In this judgement, the court responded to the allegation of misuse of the SC/ST Act and filling false cases by imposing some safeguards. The most important of these was that there would be no absolute bar to the application of anticipatory bail in the case of a person accused of the offence in question. The court also ordered a preliminary investigation before registering a first information report (FIR) and a requirement that the investigating officer obtain further consent before making an arrest. In the case of a civil servant, the court noted that that an arrest can only be made with the consent of the police administration. Dalit communities were widely protesting against the judgement that weakened the act. The ruling was controversial. The central government finally offered to file a writ petition and also amended the SC/ST Act to quash the Judgement. In the meantime, petitions have been filed against the amendment because it violates the right to equality and life under articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. In October 2019, the Supreme Court accepted the appeals and annulled the decision, made in March 2018, by which the law amending the laws was approved. **KEYWORDS: – scheduled caste and tribes, Supreme Court of India, discrimination and atrocities, Right to life article 14&21, allegation of misuse, Arrest etc..** **Introduction /Background** To stop crimes and hate crimes against the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, the Indian parliament passed the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes (prevention of Atrocities) in, 1989. It is commonly referred to as the SC/ST ACT, even in legislative discussions and Supreme Court of India rulings. The atrocities act POA, and POA are other names for it. The Indian parliament passed the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes (prevention of atrocities) Act, 1989 in recognition of the ongoing gross injustices and offences against the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes (which are classified as atrocities in section 3 of the act). At that time, the Protection of Civil Rights Act 1955 and the Indian Penal Code 1860 were deemed insufficient in preventing these hate crimes based on caste and ethnicity. The act was notified on January 30, 1990, after it was enacted by the Indian parliament on September 11 1989. It was notified on January 26, 2016, and received extensive amendments in 2015 including rearranging section 3 sub-sections. After that in 2018 and 2019, it was changed. On March 31 1995 notice of the rules was given. On April 14 2016, they were alerted and completely changed. 2018 saw a few changes to regulations and appendices. A 1990 study of atrocities against scheduled castes and scheduled tribes was carried out by the National Commission for SC and STs. The causes and remedies of atrocities were identified as follows; Political factions based on caste lines; refusal to carry out customary tasks like clearing out dead animal carcasses, arranging cremations, bidding burial pits, bond; labour, indebtedness, non-payment of minimum wages, caste prejudice and practices of untouchability. Caste is the deep-rooted cause of these crimes as it encompasses a complete ordering of social groups on the basics of the so-called ritual purity. Until they pass away a person is regarded as a member of the caste into which they were born. Dalits have been denied access to essential resources and services are socially and physically barred from both castes of Hindu society, and face discrimination in all facets of life because they are believed to be ritually impure. They thereby experience dehumanizing customs of untouchability, as well as many kinds of exploitation, abuse and violence. Since they are exempt from the caste system and have their own unique culture and worldview, scheduled tribes are also subject to exploitation. The women from these tribes and castes had to carry two loads of work. In addition to being weak and defenceless against sexual exploitation, they were exploited by gender and caste. The period following independence was characterized by an ongoing number of atrocities occurring all over the nation. A few examples include the 1957 Ramanathapuram riots in Tamil Nadu, which were triggered by the assassination of defying the untouchability-based interdicts on scheduled castes. In the 1968 Kilavenmani massacre in Tamil Nadu, which declared 42 Dalits the terrible 1969 murder of Dalit Kotesu in Kanchikacherla, Andhra Pradesh, and the 1978 killings of ten scheduled tribes. The severity and regularity of atrocities increased over time. For instance, in Bihar there were massacres of Dalits at Belchi and Pipra in 1970 and 1980 in Uttar Pradesh, there was a massacre at Kafalta in 1980 after a Dalit bridegroom rode a horse, in Madhya Pradesh, there were the 1982 killings of Bacchdas in the mandaspur district. **Legislative history** The constitutions foundations The Indian constitutions articles 15 and 17 serve as the foundation for the Act. Discrimination based on caste is forbidden by Article 15. Untouchability is abolished and its practices in any form are forbidden, reads Article 17 of the Indian constitution. Any impairment resulting from untouchability will be enforced as a crime and will be dealt with according to the law. **The Untouchability Offences Act, 1955** The relevant law, the Untouchability (Offenses) Act (UOA) 1955 was passed five years after the Indian constitution was approved. In 1976, it underwent revisions and became the Protection of Civil Rights Act (PCRA). Despite lacking a clear definition of the offences the UOA was a significant advancement with multiple enabling provisions. The UOA acknowledged the concept of wilful negligence and showed initiative by explicitly stating that the defendant had the burden of proving that the offenses were not the result of untouchability, since this would be the assumption of the court. The Act was visionary in that it acknowledged the responsibility of businesses and individual in authority, `such as their directors. **The Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955** The Untouchability Offences Act of 1955 ultimately was determined to be insufficient to end untouchability and punish those who committed it. Following twenty-one years, the parliament renamed the UOA into the Protection of Civil Rights Act (PCRA), 1955, and made numerous revisions to it on November 19, 1976, the prime minister’s birthday. In 1976 this act (PCRAS4 was revised to include discrimination based on untouchability. The punishment for untouchability stemmed from social and religious infirmities. **The Protection of SCs/ STs Act 1989** An Act to prohibit the commission of atrocities against members of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, to establish special courts for the trial of such offences, to provide relief and rehabilitation to victims of such offences, and for other purposes related to or incidental thereto. Section 3(1) (r) of the Prevention of Atrocities Act 1989 criminalizes, among other things, anyone who is not a member of a scheduled caste or scheduled tribe in any place within public view. This act may be known as the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes (prevention of atrocities) Act, 1989. It covers all of India save the state of Jammu and Kashmir. It shall enter into force on such date as the central government may, by notification in the official Gazette, determine. Drives or incites a member of a scheduled caste or scheduled tribes to abandon their home, village or other place of abode faces a minimum sentence of six months, imprisonment a maximum sentence of five years imprisonment and a fine. Recently the Delhi High Court decided that in instances under the scheduled tribes act. 1989, bail cannot be granted until the victims or complainant has had a chance to be heard. There are no other offences that violate the dignity of scheduled caste and scheduled tribe people, like tonsuring of the head shaving one’s moustache, or similar behaviours. Additionally, the penalties have been strengthened there are now provisions for special courts and quick trials. **Facts of the Cases** The complainant, Bhaskar Karbhari Gaikwad, worked at the College of Pharmacy Department. In his quarter confidential Report, his Superiors, Drs. Satish Bhise and Kishor Burade made some disparaging comments. The plaintiff was a predetermined caste member, even though both of the seniors belonged to non-scheduled castes. His integrity and character were considered to be lacking based on the negative entry. The complaint filed a formal complaint with the Karad Police, claiming this as justification number one. However, since the two individuals in question were -1 officers, the officers conducting the investigation applied a penalty under section 197 of the CrPc The accused in this case, the appellant, is charged with violating the Indian penal code of 1860, section 182, 192, 193, and 219 read with 34, as well as section 3(1) (ix), 3(2)(iv), and 3(2)(vii) of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes (prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989. In the relevant period, he was the state of Maharashtra’s Director of Technical Education. After being granted anticipatory bail, the appellant applied for the proceeding to be quashed with the high court under section 482 crpc, arguing that he had only made a legitimate administrative order in his official. Even if the directives were incorrect, what he did cannot be considered an offence. The appeal was turned down by the High Court. **Legal Issue Raised Before the Court** 1- The question that has come up during the course of this case is whether any unilateral accusations of mala fide can serve as justification for prosecuting officers who handled the case in their official capacities, and if such an accusation is made falsely, what safeguard is in place against such misuse. 2- The matter or questions at hand pertain to the reasonableness of the process in light of Article 21 of the Indian constitution, as well as the possibility of procedural safeguards to prevent the abuse of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes (prevention of atrocities ) Act, 1989 for non-essential purposes. The notices of return are due on January 10 2018. 3- Whether there is an absolute bar to the grant of anticipatory bail as envisaged in the provision of section 18 of the Atrocities Act. **Arguments from the appellant side** The learned amicus contended that this court has commonly acknowledged the abuse of the power to make an arrest and has mandated that an arrest not be executed mechanically. It has been established that to use the power of arrest, one needs to have a reasonable suspicion that someone is involved as well as that an arrest is necessary. Joginder Kumar versus the state of U.P 6, M.C Abraham versus the state of Maharastra 7, D. Vnkatasubramaniam versus M.K Mohan Krishnamchari 8, Arnesh Kumar versus the State of Bihar 9, and Rini Johar & Ors. Versus state of M.P&Ors. It was argued that under the Atrocities Act, an initial investigation may be required to forbid the use of arbitrary arrest power in the lack of tangible proof to support a version. It ought to be essential to document the reasons why the information was deemed reliable and an arrest was warranted. When dealing with public employees, the approval of the disciplinary authority must be employees, the approval of the disciplinary authority must be acquired, and in other situations, the Assistant Superintendent of police approval must be sought. The authority issuing authorization should be satisfied with the veracity of the information and the necessity of the arrest before granting permission, based on a preliminary investigation. If an arrest takes place while granted remand, the magistrate must issue a spoken order concerning the propriety of the arrest’s motivations. Without compromising the Act’s stated objectives in any way, these criteria will uphold the rights of affected persons as outlined in articles 14 and 21. Arrest specifically related to violation of the POA Act Ought to be made only with the Magistrate’s prior approval. This might not be applicable, nevertheless, if an arrest is required for other IPC offenses. Furthermore, the seriousness of the offence must be considered, as the majority of institutional cases are based only on altercations or actions taken by public employees while they were acting in their official capacities. In addition, the intervener’s attorney argues that the Atrocities Act is Vulnerable to abuse because there is financial reward available for filing a complaint under scheduled castes and scheduled tribes (prevention of Atrocities) Rules 1995 rule 12(4). A financial incentive like this might incentivize not just actual victims, but fake claims could also be filled with no recourse for the harmed parties because there would be no protection against them. Anand Sakharam Jhadav, claiming to be the convenor of the Bahujan Karmachari Kalyan Sangh, has also filed an intervention application. When the law is clear, the court should not issue guidelines, according to the learned senior counsel representing the intervenor, Shri C.u Singh. There is reliance on the state of Jharkhand and Anr. In opposition to Om Prakash Sharma and Ors. Govind Singh 19, Rohitash Kumar and Ors. Twenty it was argued that this court was not authorized to establish rules that would have legislative authority. Ten SCC 437 (19) (2005). The name of the person’s next friend who has been notified of the arrest, as well as the identification and specifics of the police officers holding the arrestee, must be recorded in the notebook kept at the place of detention about the arrest. When an arrestee wants it, he or she should also be evaluated at the scene and any significant or minor injuries that may have occurred should be noted at that time. Both the arrestee and the police officer making the arrest must sign the inspection Memo, and the arrestee must receive a copy of it. **Arguments from the Respondent Side** Thus the argument was made that the aforementioned rulings are only examples of how frequently the rule was abused. A citizen’s reputation both personally and professionally may be unjustly harmed if simple charges are deemed sufficient. The protection of the rights of those who have been the victims of such false accusations must be interests of society and maintaining peace. In each department, the following committee should be established if there are accusations against an employee. An internal committee may be formed by the employer or head of any institution to investigate complaints and specific issues about atrocities against SC/ST members. A written complaint with supporting documentation must be submitted to the institution’s internal committee before filing a formal complaint or a formal police report. This committee may be authorized to hear testimony from both parties and other sources to determine if there is a prima facie case under the POA Act. Yogendra Mohan harsh has requested additional involvement. The intervener’s learned attorney argued that the act will become ineffectual and toothless if amicus submissions are allowed given the rise in crimes against SCs and STs. **Related legal provision** **ARTICLE 14**– discrimination based on caste, race, religion, place of birth, or sex is outlawed under Article 14. This article is broad in scope and applicable to protect the rights of individuals living in India. **Equality before the law; –** According to this section of the text everyone must be treated equally in the eyes of the law. This idea is detrimental since it suggests that no one has any privileges. This section of the article is significant. **Equal safeguard under the law; –** this clause states that everyone in society would be treated equally under the law. This idea is constructive because it anticipates the state taking constructive action. This is a procedural part of Article 14. **Article 21;** – according to Article 21, no one may be taken from their life until the legal process has been followed. This implies that everyone has the right to life and that only the established legal process may be followed to take away someone’s life. The right to a healthy environment, the right to a livelihood, and the right to live with dignity are all included in the right to life. Individuals’ liberties are likewise safeguarded by Article 21. It declares that no one may be deprived of their freedom other than in compliance with the legal process. The freedom to go around freely, to select one’s domicile, and to pursue any legal profession or other activities are all examples of personal liberty. **Judgement** After carefully examining all of the arguments. submissions, and evidence presented by both parties, the court concluded that absent another crime specifically designated as an arrestable offense in place of those listed under the atrocities act, no arrest of a member of the public may be made without the written consent of the hiring authority. It was further stated that if the individual being arrested is not a public employee, they cannot be detained without the senior superintendent of police of the district authorising in writing, as long as they are served with a copy of the written permission and the reasons why before the court. It was said that the magistrate must consider the documented grounds when the arrested person is brought before him or her, and such detention should only be permitted if the accusations are determined to be valid. It was decided that to prevent bogus complaints and FIRs a preliminary investigation be conducted to determine whether the situation is covered by the atrocities act. **Related case laws** 1- Vishakha versus state of Rajasthan (1997) 6 SCC 241 2- Bandhua Mukti Morcha vs. UOI (1984) 3 SCC 161 3- Lakshmi Kant Pandey vs. UOI (1983) 2 SCC 244 4- M.C. Mehta vs. State of T.N (1996) 6 SCC 756 27 5- Supreme Court bar lesson vs. UOI (1998) 4 SCC 409 **References** [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scheduled\_Caste\_and\_Scheduled\_Tribe\_(Prevention\_of\_Atrocities)\_Act,\_1989#:~:text=External%20links-,Scheduled%20Caste%20and%20Scheduled%20Tribe%20(Prevention%20of%20Atrocities)%20Act%2C%201989,-5%20languages](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scheduled_Caste_and_Scheduled_Tribe_(Prevention_of_Atrocities)_Act,_1989#:~:text=External%20links-,Scheduled%20Caste%20and%20Scheduled%20Tribe%20(Prevention%20of%20Atrocities)%20Act%2C%201989,-5%20languages) **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases, Criminal Law Cases --- ### [Madhu Kishwar & ors v. State of Bihar & ors](https://lawfoyer.in/madhu-kishwar-ors-v-state-of-bihar-ors/) **Published:** August 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Rozy Parveen** **Edited by: Shadrack Chai** **ABSTRACT** Writ petitions were filed under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution against the State of Bihar, including a PIL by Smt. Madhu Kishwar, editor of “Manushi,” on behalf of tribal women, and individual petitions by Smt. Sonamuni and Smt. Muki Dui of the Ho tribe. They challenged sections 6, 7, 8, and 76 of the Chhota Nagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, and customary laws excluding tribal women from inheritance, claiming they violated Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. These petitions argued for equal inheritance rights for tribal women, emphasizing their equal contributions to agriculture and family management. However, the Supreme Court’s 1996 judgment in Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar partially recognized these rights, leaving significant issues to the government. This paper analyzes the tribal women’s right to succession within the framework of Fundamental Rights and Human Rights, examining the Supreme Court’s decision in light of India’s international commitments to equality and dignity. KEYWORDS- Economic justice, tribal women. **CASE DETAILS** *Judgment Cause Title / Case Name***Madhu Kishwar & ors v. State of Bihar & ors. *Case Number***WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 219 OF 1986 *Judgement Date***17/04/1996 *Court***Supreme Court of India *Quorum / Constitution of Bench***K. Ramaswamy, Kuldip Singh, M.M. Punchhi *Author / Name of Judges***K. Ramaswamy *Citation***1996 AIR 1864 1996 SCC (5) 125 JT 1996 (4) 3791996 SCALE (3) ***Legal Provisions Involved***Article 32 of the Constitution, Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, Hindu Succession Act, Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, Indian Succession Act, Vienna Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The four Hindu Law Acts do not apply to members of the Scheduled Tribes as defined in Article 366, clause 25 of the Constitution of India unless the Central Government extends their application through a notification in the official gazette. Until such a notification is issued, Scheduled Tribes will continue to be governed by their existing law. **FACTS OF THE CASE** The petitioners challenged certain provisions of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, of 1908, which provided for male succession to property, arguing that these provisions were discriminatory and unfair to women and therefore violated the equality clause in the Constitution. The State of Bihar had established a Committee to consider possible legislation amendments and examine the issue in detail. The Committee ultimately concluded that the people of the area, particularly those concerned with the question of succession, were not interested in changing the law. They believed that altering the law to allow estates to pass to female heirs would cause significant agitation and unrest among the Scheduled Tribe communities, who have a custom-based way of living **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** Whether female members of Scheduled Tribes are entitled to equal rights with male members in intestate succession? **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The major interests of tribal communities include inheritance of land, forest rights, and social customs such as marriage, divorce, desertion, child support, death, and birth. The Santhals, one of India’s largest tribes, spread across West Bengal, Orissa, Bihar, Assam, and Tripura, exhibit a nuanced approach to succession. Although primarily patrilineal, Santhal succession allows daughters to inherit without sons, followed by other relatives if there are no children. Some Santhals support equal inheritance for sons and daughters. Widows receive a life-estate share upon their husband’s death. Despite ongoing acculturation, Santhals maintain many customs, with slight flexibility towards daughters In contrast, the conservative Saora society strictly prefers sons, and daughters inherit only if there are no sons or close relatives, with widows inheriting their husband’s estate. The 7th Five Year Plan’s working group recommended codifying tribal customary laws. Dr. B.L. Maharde, in his study of Rajasthan’s Girjans, noted the equal division of a deceased father’s property among sons, with the youngest son and grandsons of pre-deceased sons receiving extra shares. Daughters inherit animal wealth, and widows lose property rights upon remarriage. Patrilineal succession is presumed for tribals in Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Gujarat. **PETITIONER ARGUMENT** The petitioners argued that the existing customary laws of inheritance among tribal communities in Bihar were discriminatory against women, violating their fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution of India. They contended that these laws denied women equal rights to inherit property, infringing on their right to equality and dignity, and called for legal reforms to ensure gender equality and justice. The petitioners urged the court to direct the State to amend these discriminatory laws to align with constitutional principles. **JUDGEMENT** The writ petitions were granted, and the rule nisi was confirmed. The Judge ruled that discrimination based on customary inheritance law was unconstitutional, unjust, unfair, and illegal. The Judge emphasized that it was essential for the State to remove obstacles and prohibit all gender-based discrimination as required by Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India. However, the Judge chose not to strike down the provisions under Article 14, as doing so would cause chaos in the current legal system. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** While the Hindu Succession Act, of 1956, and the Indian Succession Act, of 1925, do not directly apply to Scheduled Tribes, their principles align with justice and equity. Thus, Scheduled Tribe women inherit their parents’, brothers’, and husbands’ estates equally with male heirs under these Acts’ general principles. However, alienation rights are governed by specific Acts like the Bihar Scheduled Areas Regulation, 1969. A tribal woman wishing to sell land must first offer it to her brother or male descendant. If there is a disagreement on price, a civil court will decide. If no family member buys it, she may sell it to a non-tribal following relevant laws. The writ petitions are allowed, with interim protection for petitioners Nos.2 and 3 continuing until they request otherwise. **REFERENCES** Madhu Kishwar & Ors vs State of Bihar & Ors 1996 SCC (5) 125 Jitmohan Singh Munda v. Ramratan Singh and Another 1958 Bihar Journal Reports 373 Olga Tellis & Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors. AIR 1986 SC 180 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [BANDHUA MUKTI V/S UNION OF INDIA](https://lawfoyer.in/bandhua-mukti-v-s-union-of-india/) **Published:** August 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Ashmit Srivastava, Shri Ramswaroop Memorial University** **Edited by: Madhumita Saha, Lajpat Rai Law College, Sambalpur University** **ABSTRACT** The landmark case Badhua Mukti Morcha v/s. Union of India highlights the crucial and most depraving section of our nation which is the bounded – labour along with the exploitation and the inhumane treatment by the Quarry owners of their labours, collectively the Supreme Court, exercising its power under Article 32 of the Constitution, treated the petition as a writ and appointed a commission to investigate the allegations. The findings of the commission found that the claims of the petitioners revealed a system of oppression where workers were trapped in a cycle of debt and exploitation. The Court’s judgment was a landmark in Indian legal history. It not only provided relief to the affected workers but also expanded the scope of public interest litigation, empowering NGOs to champion the cause of marginalized sections of society. The case emphasized the State’s responsibility to protect fundamental rights, particularly the right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. By declaring bonded labour as a violation of human dignity, the Court reinforced the judiciary’s role as a guardian of constitutional values. The case’s legacy extends beyond the immediate relief provided to the quarry workers. It set a precedent for addressing systemic issues through judicial intervention and has inspired subsequent efforts to combat bonded labour and other forms of human exploitation in India. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*: *Bonded labour, Fundamental Rights, Rehabilitation, State Responsibility, Labour Laws.*** **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** Bandhua Mukti Morcha v/s. Union of India ***ii)* *Citation*** (1984) 3 SCC 161 ***iii)* *Judgement Date*** 16th December 1983. ***iv)* *Court*** Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** 3 Bench of Judges. ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges*** The Hon’ble *1) Justice P.N. Bhagwati* *2) Justice Ranganath Misra* 3\) *Justice D.A. Desai* ***vii)* *Legal Provisions Involved*** Article – 21, 23, 39(e) and 39(f) of The Constitution of India. The enactment of “*The Bonded Labour (Abolition) Act,1976.”.* **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The abhorrent practice, where individuals were subjected to forced labour as a means to repay a debt, often intergenerational, was a stark violation of fundamental human rights. The “*Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India”* case marked a watershed moment in the nation’s struggle against this insidious evil. [\[1\]](#_ftn1) In this case, the Court talked about the significance of securing children’s Right to Education, well-being, and advancement in guaranteeing India’s advancement as a vote-based system. While perceiving that child labour couldn’t be cancelled promptly due to financial need the court observed that down-to-earth steps could be taken to ensure and advance the rights of children in the destitution-stricken and weak populaces of the country. The Bandhua Mukti Morcha, a non-governmental organization, brought this issue to the forefront by writing to the Supreme Court. The Court, recognizing the gravity of the situation, took Suo- moto cognizance and appointed a commission to investigate the matter. The commission’s report painted a harrowing picture of the lives of these bonded labourers, providing the necessary impetus for the Court to intervene. The court additionally noticed India’s commitments under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Convention on the Rights of the Child to give free essential education to all the children in the nation and secure the children against financial abuse. **FACTS OF THE CASE** 1. **Procedural Background of the Case** 1. The Petitioner wrote a letter to Justice P.N. Bhagwati regarding the workplace and marking conditions of the workmen. 2. This letter was further taken as a writ Petition under “*Article-32 of the Constitution of India”* and a commission was made to enquire about the allegations put forth by the petitioner in the posted letter. 3. The commission proved the allegations to be right and there was the infringement of the rights of the labourers. 4. They requested the Supreme Court to issue a writ for proper implementation of the various provisions of the Constitution and statutes to end the misery, suffering and helplessness of those labourers and release them from bonded labour. 5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court treated the said letter as a writ petition and on 26th February 1982 appointed a commission consisting of Mr. Ashok Srivastava & Mr. Askok Panda to enquire further. 2. **Factual Background of the Case** 1. The petitioner Bandhua Mukti Morcha is a non-governmental organisation (NGO) which works for the welfare of the people. While they were conducting a survey and found some stone quarries in Faridabad, Haryana. 2. The workmen were found in exploitative, harsh & inhumane conditions including:- - Long working hours without adequate rest. - Minimal or low wages. - Lack of basic amenities to the labour like food, shelter, and healthcare. - Physical and mental abuse. 1. Quarry owners employed coercive tactics to maintain control over the labourers, including threats, violence, and withholding wages. 2. The prevalence of child labour was also found within these quarries. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. WHETHER the PIL under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution was maintainable or not? 2. WHETHER the fundamental rights of labourers infringed in the current case? **PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioner (Bandhua Mukti Morcha), representing the victims of bonded labour presented the compelling arguments to highlight the plight of these labourers and to seek legal redress. 1. **Violation of Fundamental Rights:** - **Violation of Fundamental Rights:** - The petitioners argued that the bonded labour constituted a violation of the fundamental rights of citizens guaranteed under the Constitution of India, particularly: - ***Article 21:*** *Right to life and personal liberty.* - ***Article 23:*** *Prohibition of traffic in human beings and forced labour.* - They emphasized the inhuman conditions under which bonded labourers were forced to live and work, depriving them of their basic human dignity. - **Systemic Exploitation:** - The petitioners exposed the systemic nature of bonded labour, highlighting how it was perpetuated by a complex network of intermediaries, creditors, and landowners. - They argued that the government’s inaction in addressing this issue had allowed the practice to flourish. - **Debt Trap:** - The petitioners explained how bonded labourers were often lured into a cycle of debt through false promises of employment or loans. - They detailed the exorbitant interest rates charged and the coercive tactics used to keep labourers trapped in servitude. - **Lack of Enforcement:** - The petitioners criticized the government’s failure to effectively enforce anti-bonded labour laws. - They pointed out the lack of adequate rehabilitation programs for rescued bonded labourers and the absence of measures to prevent re-trafficking. - **Role of State Negligence:** - The petitioners argued that the state had a duty to protect its citizens from exploitation. - They accused the government of negligence in failing to address the root causes of bonded labour, such as poverty, illiteracy, and lack of access to credit. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The respondent, in this case, the Union of India presented a defence against the allegations made by the petitioners, the Bandhua Mukti Morcha, here are some potential arguments: **KEY ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPONDENT** 1. **Lack of Sufficient substantiation** - The replier argued that the pleaders failed to give concrete and substantial substantiation to support their claims of wide-clicked labour. - They also challenged the credibility and trustability of the substantiations and documents presented by the pleaders. 2. **Profitable Constraints** - They also contend that it faced resource limitations and popular constraints in effectively eradicating clicked labour. - Also they argued that the problem was complex and needed a gradational approach, involving colourful stakeholders. 3. **State Intervention and Being Laws** - The replier stressed the colourful laws and regulations formerly in place to combat clicked labour, similar to the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976. - They refocused on the government enterprise and programs aimed at delivering and rehabilitating clicked labourers. 4. **Part of Socio-Economic Factors** - They also argued that poverty, ignorance, and lack of mindfulness were underpinning causes of clicked labour, rather than state negligence. - They emphasized the need for a multi-faceted approach involving education, profitable development, and social reforms. **COUNTERACTING THE PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS** - To fight the argument of violation of abecedarian rights, the government argued that it was taking way to apply these rights and that the pleaders’ claims were inflated. - To address the issue of systemic exploitation, the replier emphasized the complexity of the problem and the challenges involved in eradicating it. • Regarding the debt trap, the government refocused on sweats to regulate moneylenders and give indispensable sources of credit. - In response to the lack of enforcement allegations, the replier stressed the challenges faced in relating and delivering clicked labourers and the way is taken to ameliorate enforcement mechanisms **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** **ARTICLE 21:** – ***PROTECTION OF LIFE AND PERSONAL LIBERTY*** “*No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law”.*[***\[2\]***](#_ftn2) **ARTICLE 23:- *PROHIBITION OF TRAFFIC IN HUMAN BEINGS AND FORCED LABOUR*** *“(1) Traffic in human beings and beggar and other similar forms of forced labour are prohibited and any contravention of this provision shall be an offence punishable by law.* *(2) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from imposing compulsory service for public purposes, and in imposing such service the State shall not make any discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste or class or any of them.”* [***\[3\]***](#_ftn3) **ARTICLE 24:- *PROHIBITION OF EMPLOYMENT OF CHILDREN In Factories, Etc*** *“No child below the age of fourteen years shall be employed to work in any factory or mine or engaged in any other hazardous employment.”*[***\[4\]***](#_ftn4) **ARTICLE 39:- *CERTAIN PRINCIPLES OF POLICY TO BE FOLLOWED BY THE STATE*** **(e )”** *that the health and strength of workers, men and women, and the tender age of children are not abused and that citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter avocations unsuited to their age or strength”;*[***\[5\]***](#_ftn5) **ARTICLE 39 (f) “***That children are given opportunities and facilities to develop healthily and conditions of freedom and dignity and that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and moral and material abandonment”.* [***\[6\]***](#_ftn6) **ARTICLE 42:-**. **PROVISION FOR JUST AND HUMANE CONDITIONS OF WORK AND MATERNITY** **“***The State shall make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work and for maternity relief.”*[***\[7\]***](#_ftn7) **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** - Bonded labour is a violation of abecedarian rights The court emphasized that forcing individualities into labour against their will through compulsion, intimidation, or debt thrall is a direct violation of Composition 23 of the Indian Constitution (Prohibition of business in mortal beings and forced labour). - State’s obligation to help and annihilate clicked labour The judgment underlined the state’s positive duty to take visionary measures to help and annihilate clicked labour, rather than simply replying to complaints. - Effective enforcement of anti-bonded labour laws. The court stressed the need for strict perpetration of laws against clicked labour, including vittles for deliverance, recuperation, and instalment. - Rehabilitation and reintegration of saved clicked labourers The judgment emphasized the significance of furnishing comprehensive recuperation and reintegration programs for individuals freed from clicked labour to help them from falling back into the same situation. 1. **GUIDELINES** **The Bandhua Mukti Morcha case was instrumental in shaping India’s anti-bonded labour jurisprudence.** The Supreme Court issued a series of guidelines and directives to address the systemic issue of bonded labour. **IDENTIFICATION AND RESCUE OF BONDED LABOURERS** - Establishment of effective mechanisms for identifying bonded labourers. - Setting up special task forces or cells to rescue bonded labourers. - Protection of rescued bonded labourers from intimidation and harassment. **REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION** - Providing rehabilitation programs to help bonded labourers rebuild their lives. - Ensuring access to education, vocational training, and healthcare. - Facilitating the return of rescued bonded labourers to their native places. **PREVENTION OF BONDED LABOUR** - Strengthening enforcement of anti-bonded labour laws. - Raising awareness about bonded labour through public campaigns. - Empowering vulnerable communities to resist falling into bonded labour. **ROLE OF STATE GOVERNMENTS** - Imposing strict penalties on those involved in bonded labour. - Monitoring labour conditions in vulnerable sectors. - Collaborating with NGOs and civil society organizations. 1. **OBITER DICTA** Broader societal issues The court made compliances about poverty, ignorance, or the part of profitable development in combating clicked labour, which, while applicable to the case, might not be essential to the core holding. • Policy recommendations The court suggested that the policy changes or reforms are beyond the immediate compass of the case, similar to strengthening law enforcement agencies or furnishing vocational training for saved-clicked labourers. • examines government conduct While the court blamed specific government conduct, some of these exams might not be directly linked to the core legal issues and could be considered obiter dicta. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** ***Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India*** is a seminal Supreme Court judgement ordering the freeing of bonded labour in India. The correct idea of the recognition that, founded on narrowing it down to be an open infringement of basic rights is a defining moment at holding their pride and worth by that crushed area returnee-needed. A present-day comprehensive legal and policy framework directed at the identification, release, rehabilitation as well as prevention of bonded labour would not have been possible but for the directions of the court. The verdict has reinforced the obligation of the state and government to shield citizens from such exploitation. Although a milestone court ruling had been delivered, there were still struggles to be faced. While the guidelines are important, it is essential however that these findings be implemented efficiently. Bonded Labour Is Deeply Entrenched. Given that labour practices are ever-changing, legal frameworks also need to be constantly updated and altered accordingly. New forms of exploitation, including debt bondage and human trafficking require a strong legal response.The Bandhua Mukti Morcha case is a telling example of how the judiciary stands as a vanguard to vindicate human rights and strive for social justice. Yet, the real value of such an exercise is to serve as a trigger that propels all sections – government; civil society and individuals into action towards eliminating bonded labour and creating a fairer order. **ENDNOTES:** [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) [ Debt bondage in India – Wikipedia ](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Debt_bondage_in_India#:~:text=Bonded%20labour%20is%20a%20relic,and%20government%20ineffectiveness%20allow%20this) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Article 21 of The Constitution Of India. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Article 23 of The Constitution Of India. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Article 24 of The Constitution of India. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Article 39(e) of The Constitution Of India. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Article 39 (f) of The Constitution Of India [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Article 42 of The Constitution of India. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1998) 1 SCC 226](https://lawfoyer.in/vineet-narain-v-union-of-india-1998-1-scc-226/) **Published:** August 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author:** **Chahat Gugliya** **Edited by: Madhumita Saha** **ABSTRACT** This case is a landmark judgment by the Supreme Court of India highlighting systemic corruption and the independence of investigative agencies. Public Interest Litigation (PIL) filed by journalist Vineet Narain, highlighting the inaction of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and other agencies in probing corruption allegations against high-ranking politicians and bureaucrats in the Jain Hawala scandal. The Supreme Court emphasized the need for the functional autonomy of the CBI and the Enforcement Directorate (ED) to conduct impartial investigations free from political and bureaucratic influence. The Court directed the appointment of the CBI Director through a transparent process involving a committee and fixed the tenure of the Director to ensure stability and independence. The judgment also recommended making the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) a statutory body to oversee the CBI’s work in corruption cases thereby enhancing accountability and efficiency. By laying down guidelines for investigative procedures and asserting judicial oversight the Court aimed to ensure diligent and transparent handling of corruption cases. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*:** *corruption, accountability, central bureau of investigation independence, judicial oversight, transparency.* **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1998) 1 SCC 226. ***ii)* *Case Number*** Writ Petitions (Criminal) No. 340-343 of 1993. ***iii)* *Judgement Date*** December 18, 1997. ***iv)* *Court*** SUPREME COURT OF INDIA. ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** Division Bench. ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges*** Justice S.P Bharucha; Justice S.C Sen and Justice N. Santosh Hegde. ***vii)* *Citation*** (1997) 4 SCC 306. ***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved*** Article 32, 14 & 21 – Constitution of India; Section 6 & 19 – Prevention of Corruption Act (1947); Delhi Special Police Establishment Act; Separation of Powers; Judicial Review; Criminal Procedure Code. **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT-** Journalist, Vineet Narain along with others, filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) seeking directives for the CBI to investigate. CBI, which is responsible for investigating such cases, was often compromised and hindered by political pressures. The case of Vineet Narain & Others vs Union of India & Another is a landmark case that revolves around issues related to the Prevention of Corruption Act & role of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in investigating corruption cases. The petitioners, led by journalist Vineet Narain, seek the court’s intervention to address serious issues relating to CBI’s compromised efficiency while investigating corruption cases against influential public figures. The issues in this case are questions on law & governance. The right to fair investigation & speedy trials is enshrined in the constitution. This case reinforced principles of accountability & transparency in the investigation process. It has contributed to judicial oversight & the rule of law in the country. **FACTS OF THE CASE** The case involved a writ petition filed by Vineet Narain, an activist along with other petitioners before the Supreme Court. The petitioners alleged that high-profile corruption cases were compromised due to political interference and lack of investigation by the CBI, they proclaimed that the CBI was not functioning properly and was influenced by political pressure. On March 25, 1991, Ashfak Hussain Lone, alleged to be an official of the terrorist organization Hizbul Mujahideen, was arrested in Delhi. Upon his interrogation, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) conducted raids on the premises of Surrender Kumar Jain, his brothers, relations, and businesses. During the raids, the CBI seized two diaries and two notebooks containing detailed accounts of vast payments made to persons identified only by initials. The initials corresponded to the initials of various high-ranking politicians, in power and out of power, and high-ranking bureaucrats. Despite the seizure of these incriminating materials, the CBI and revenue authorities failed to investigate the matter and take it to its logical conclusion by prosecuting the persons involved. The petitioners, Vineet Narain and others filed public interest writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution, alleging that the government agencies had failed to perform their duties and legal obligations by not investigating the contents of the “Jain diaries.” The petitioners alleged that the failure to investigate was done with the intention of protecting the influential and powerful persons who were recipients of money from unlawful sources. The petitioners argued that the matter disclosed a nexus between crime and corruption at high places in public life, posing a serious threat to the integrity and security of the country. The case arose from the CBI’s failure to investigate the contents of the “Jain diaries,” which allegedly revealed financial links between politicians, bureaucrats, and criminals, despite the incriminating evidence seized during the raids. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether the judiciary intervene and provide a remedy when government investigative agencies like the CBI fail to investigate allegations against high-ranking politicians and bureaucrats? 2. Whether it is within the domain of judicial review and it could be an effective instrument for activating the investigative process that is under the control of the executive? **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsel for Petitioner submitted that the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) investigating high-profile corruption cases was suffering from major issues related to political interference. They argued that this interference compromised the CBI’s ability to function with the necessary independence and impartiality. The petitioners claimed that the CBI’s operations were influenced by political authorities which often led to biased and compromised investigations. 2. The counsels highlighted the inefficiency in the CBI investigative procedure as a major concern. They pointed out various instances where investigations were unreasonably delayed leading to prolonged periods during which corruption cases remained unresolved. This delay was argued to be a strategy to avoid accountability and shield influential people from the legal consequences of their actions. The petitioner’s counsel argued that there was a systemic failure in the prosecution of corruption cases. They provided evidence of several high-profile cases where the CBI failed to pursue prosecutions. This included examples of weak and incomplete legal action that resulted in insufficient consequences. Such failures they argued undermined the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures and eroded public confidence in the legal system. 1. The counsels for the petitioners called for the implementation of procedural reforms within the CBI. They argued that the lack of clear guidelines and time for conducting investigations contributed to inefficiency and lack of transparency. They emphasized the need for structured procedures to ensure that investigations were conducted promptly and effectively thereby enhancing the overall accountability of the CBI. 2. The petitioner’s counsel also underscored the importance of protecting whistleblowers who come forward with information about corruption. They argued that without adequate protection whistleblowers faced significant risks of retaliation which could discourage others from reporting corruption. They urged the Court to recognize the necessity of safeguarding whistleblowers to encourage the reporting of misconduct and ensure the integrity of investigative processes. 3. Finally the counsels argued for the establishment of an independent supervisory mechanism to oversee the CBI functioning. They suggested that a supervisory committee composed of impartial and experienced individuals could provide the necessary oversight to ensure that investigations were conducted without political interference and in adherence to established guidelines. This oversight was deemed crucial for maintaining the credibility and effectiveness of the CBI. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Respondent submitted that the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) is an autonomous and professional agency equipped to handle high-profile corruption cases with the necessary expertise and resources. They argued that the CBI’s operations are conducted with established protocols and legal standards designed to ensure fairness and impartiality in its investigations. 2. The respondents contended that allegations of political interference are largely unfounded and do not reflect the operational realities of the CBI. They argued that the CBIs decisions and actions are guided by law and are not subject to undue political influence. The respondents maintained that any allegations of interference should be substantiated with specific evidence rather than generalized assertions. Regarding the issue of inefficiency in investigations the counsels for the respondents acknowledged that while the CBI may face challenges it operates under significant procedural and legal constraints. They argued that delays in investigations are often due to the complex nature of the cases and the necessity for thorough evidence collection. They maintained that the CBI works diligently to resolve cases within a reasonable timeframe and delays are not indicative of systemic failures but rather the inherent challenges of complex corruption cases. - On the matter of prosecution failures the respondents asserted that the CBI’s role is limited to investigation and the decision to prosecute rests with the appropriate legal authorities including the prosecution and judicial system. They argued that any shortcomings in the prosecution process are beyond the CBI’s control and are a function of the broader legal framework within which it operates. - The respondents agreed on the importance of protecting whistleblowers but argued that the existing legal and institutional mechanisms adequately address this issue. They contended that there are sufficient safeguards and protections in place for whistleblowers and additional measures may not be necessary or practical given the current framework. - Regarding the call for procedural reforms the respondents acknowledged that procedural improvements can be beneficial but argued that the CBI is already subject to rigorous oversight and legal standards. They maintained that implementing further reforms should be considered carefully to avoid disrupting the existing system which is designed to balance efficiency with thoroughness. Finally the counsels for the respondents objected to the need for an independent supervisory committee. They argued that the CBI is already subject to oversight by various bodies including the judiciary and government authorities which provide adequate checks and balances. They contended that the establishment of a new supervisory mechanism could lead to unnecessary bureaucratic complications and may not necessarily improve the effectiveness of investigations. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** 1. **Articles of the Constitution of India:** 2. **Article 14: “***Right to Equality, emphasizing that every individual is equal before the law and entitled to equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”* 3. **Article 21: “***Right to Life and Personal Liberty, which underscores the importance of fair investigation and trial as essential to protect individual rights.”* 4. **Article 32: “***Provides the right to approach the Supreme Court for enforcement of fundamental rights, forming the basis for the Public Interest Litigation in this case.”* **The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: “***This act provides the framework for preventing corruption in public offices and outlines the legal penalties for offenses related to corruption.”* **The Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), 1973***: “Provisions from the CrPC were cited regarding the powers of the police and investigating agencies to conduct inquiries and investigations, ensuring due process in judicial proceedings.”* **Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860***: “Contains provisions related to offenses, including those about bribery and corruption, that were pertinent in the context of the allegations investigated by the CBI.”[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)* **JUDGEMENT[\[2\]](#_ftn2)** 1. **RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio decidendi of Vineet Narain & Others vs. Union Of India & Another revolves around the Supreme Court’s affirmation of the necessity for independence and accountability of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in the prosecution of high-profile cases. The Court established that the CBI must operate free from political interference emphasizing that governmental directives, such as the Single Directive should not obstruct the investigation of corruption by public officials. The integrity of law enforcement is vital to uphold the rule of law and prevent prosecutorial inertia in cases involving influential individuals. The judgment also mandated the establishment of Special Courts to expedite the trial of criminal cases investigated by the CBI thereby reinforcing the importance of timely justice and accountability in public office. This ruling therefore enhances the framework for investigating corruption and serves as a critical interpretative guideline for the exercise of CBI’s powers in future investigations. 1. **OBITER DICTA** The Supreme Court made several obiter dicta that provided important context and commentary on the subject matter. The Court expressed concern about the systemic issues plaguing the investigative framework, suggesting that public trust in legal institutions is base for democracy. It emphasized that corruption and nepotism in high offices negatively impact governance and the need for rigorous accountability mechanisms. The justices highlighted the importance of a transparent and autonomous investigative body arguing that the CBI’s role is crucial in upholding the principles of justice and public interest. Additionally, the Court reflected on the need for reforms to ensure that investigative agencies operate effectively and without obstruction. The commentary aimed to guide future legislative and administrative actions, underscoring the judiciary’s role in fostering a corruption-free environment within public institutions. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment reinforced the principle that the rule of law must triumph over political influence ensuring that corruption is effectively addressed while preserving individual rights. It set a precedent for future cases, advocating for reforms in the accountability mechanisms of investigative bodies in India. the Vineet Narain case has had a lasting impact on Indian society by fostering a legal environment conducive to accountability, promoting anti-corruption initiatives, and empowering citizens to advocate for integrity in governance. These changes have contributed to a democratic framework and have implications for the overall health of public institutions in India. **ENDNOTES:** 1. **Important Cases Referred** 2. Kehar Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (1994) 3. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 4. Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 5. State of Bihar v. Bihar Rajya Khadi Gramodyog Mandal, (1997) 6. **Important Statutes Referred** 7. Constitution of India, 1950 8. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 9. The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 10. Indian Penal Code, 1860 [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Article 14; 21 and 32 of Constitution of India [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases, Criminal Law Cases --- ### [Delhi Development Authority vs Skipper Construction Company (P) Ltd. & Another](https://lawfoyer.in/delhi-development-authority-vs-skipper-construction-company-p-ltd-another/) **Published:** August 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Shraddha Patil** **Edited by: Madhumita Saha** **CASE DETAILS:** Case Name Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Company (P) Ltd. & AnotherCitation 1996 SCC (4) 622, 1996 AIR 2005, JT 1996 (4) 679 Judgement Date 06.05.1996 Court Supreme Court of India Quorum 2 Judges Author and Judges Author: Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy Bench: Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy and Justice K. S. Paripoornan Petitioner Delhi Development AuthorityRespondent Skipper Construction Company (P) Ltd. & Another Legal Provisions Article 142 of the Constitution of India – Supreme Court’s power to do complete justice Company Law – Lifting the corporate veil Article 129 of the Constitution of India – Supreme Court’s power to punish for contempt **ABSTRACT:** The supreme court case of Delhi Development Authority vs Skippers Construction Company Pvt. Ltd. and Another deal with the issue of the said company failing to deposit the consideration as per the conditions of the auction carried over by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) and entering into agreements for sale and creating interest in the third parties in defiance of the orders of the Court. Moreover, it defrauded investors by selling the spaces in a proposed building against the court orders. The issue in concern was whether the corporate veil of Skipper be lifted to hold its directors, Tejwant Singh and his wife Surinder Kaur, liable for fraudulent activities. The Court issued Suo motu contempt proceedings against Tejwant Singh and Surinder Kaur (wife of Tejwant Singh), Directors of Skipper. This Court held them guilty of contempt under Article 129 and Article 142 and the corporate veil was lifted to treat all the family members and Skipper as one entity. The judgment showcases the court’s will to take strong measures against contempt of court, protecting the interests of innocent victims and preventing the misuse of the corporate form of treating companies as a separate legal entity. **KEYWORDS:** 1. article 142 2. corporate veil 3. article 129 4. supreme court 5. contempt of court **INTRODUCTION:** Article 142 of the constitution of India grants the Supreme Court broad powers to pass any order, which will be enforceable across India, required to ensure the resolution of a case and to do “complete justice” in any matter before it. Another key aspect concerned with the case is the lifting of the corporate veil. The corporate veil is the concept that states that the identity of any corporate firm or a company will be separate from that of its owners or directors. Thus the action of any corporate entity will be separate from that of its shareholders and directors. it protects the shareholders from being liable for the company’s actions. Lifting or piercing the corporate veil is to remove such a barrier between the company and its owners and hold the person who is accountable for the illegal activity conducted under the veil of the company, to discourage the misuse of corporate structure to commit frauds, evade laws, engage in illegal activities for personal gains or to the detriment of stakeholders, creditors, investors, etc. Lastly, Article 129 of the constitution of India gives the supreme court the power to take punitive actions against the contempt of court. Contempt of court refers to disrespecting or disobeying the orders given by a court. In such cases, the court has full powers to punish, which acts as an important tool to maintain the dignity and integrity of the judicial proceedings. **FACTS OF THE CASE:** 1. In October 1980A plot of land was put to auction by the Delhi Development Authority \[D.D.A.\]. Skipper became the highest bidder for purchasing a plot of land. According to the conditions of the auction, Skipper deposited the twenty-five percent but did not deposit the balance within 90 days. 2. It asked for an extension repeatedly and defaulted to pay the balance in spite of seven extensions from January 1981 to April 1982. 3. When proceedings for cancellation of the bid were in the process, Skipper moved the Court obtained a stay order on 29th May 82, and started making representations. 4. DDA appointed a Committee to work out a formula and under the recommendations of the Committee, Skipper was asked to enter into a revised agreement incorporating fresh terms wherein it was permitted to commence construction on the plot subject to the condition that the property in the land would remain with the D.D.A. until the entire consideration is paid. 5. Skipper raised objections to these proposals from 1984 till 1987 but finally, the agreement was entered into on 11th August 1987. 6. Even before permission to enter was granted under the revised agreement, Skipper started selling the space to be built in the proposed structure and started receiving money. 7. Though Skipper paid the 1st installment much beyond the time, it did not pay the second installment but furnished Bank guarantees which were found to be defective. 8. On 19th March 1990, the High Court of Delhi permitted construction by sanctioned plan subject to a deposit of Rs. 20 lakhs in two installments and 1.94 crores within one month. 9. The Delhi High Court passed a directing the payment of Rs.8.12 crores approximately in 30 days and stopped further construction w.e.f. 9th January 1991 till payment was deposited and stated that in default, the revised agreement dated 11th January 1987 would stand canceled and DDA would be entitled to re-enter the plot. 10. Skipper defaulted but approached the SC on 29th January 1991 in Special Leave Petition (SLP) when it passed an interim order for a deposit of Rs.2.5 crores in one month and Rs.2.5 crores before 8th April 1991, and Skipper was expressly prohibited from inducting any person in the building and creating any rights in favour of third parties. 11. It is stated that before 29th Jan, 1991 Skipper collected about Rs.14 crores from various parties to sell space in the proposed building. Even after 29th Jan, 1991, Skipper collected various amounts, about Rs.11 crores. The same space was sold to more than one person and monies were collected. 12. Skipper filed suit against DDA seeking an injunction restraining DDA from interfering with its alleged title and possession over the plot and sought a declaration that the re-entry by DDA was illegal and a declaration that it had validly paid all amounts due to DDA. It obtained a stay of re-auction. Against this order, DDA filed an SLP. 13. This Court issued Suo motu contempt proceedings against Tejwant Singh and Surinder Kaur (wife of Tejwant Singh), Directors of Skipper. This Court held them guilty of contempt under Article 129 and Article 142. 14. The contemners deposited Rs. 2 crores but failed to deposit the balance and also failed to furnish a Bank guarantee. They were committed to prison and they served the sentence. 15. DDA invited fresh tenders and sold the plot with the 14th-floor structure (incomplete) to M/s Banganga Investments (Videocon) for Rs.70 crores. The sale was accepted with the permission of the Court. 16. This Court felt concerned about the buyers to whom space was sold before 29th January 1991 and later. Claims of those who purchased before 29th January 1991 were estimated to amount to Rs.14 crores. DDA was therefore directed to deposit Rs.16.75 crores in this Court. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED:** 1. Whether the corporate veil of Skipper can be lifted to gold its directors, Tejwant Singh and his wife Surinder Kaur, liable for fraudulent activities. 2. Whether the SC can exercise its powers under Article 142 of the constitution of India to provide complete justice to the defrauded investors, even in the absence of specific statutory provisions. 3. Whether the finality of the earlier orders of the SC, under which the sale proceeds vested with the DDA, can be disturbed in the exercise of the powers under Article 142. **ARGUMENTS FROM THE PETITIONER:** 1. It was submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that the corporate veil should be lifted to hold Tejwant Singh and Surinder Kaur, the directors of Skippers, liable as they were involved in fraudulent activities and had diverted the money collected from investors to their front companies, directors of which were their sons. 2. It argued that the court should exercise its powers under Article 142 to provide complete justice to the investors. 3. It also submitted that the earlier orders of the court, under which the sale proceed vested with the DDA, had attained finality and should not be disturbed in the exercise of powers under Article 142. **ARGUMENTS FROM THE RESPONDENT:** 1. The counsel for the respondent argued that the corporate veil should not be lifted as there was no evidence of the directors having misused it for their personal benefits. 2. It also claimed that the monies for reimbursing the defrauded investors should be borne by DDA from the sale proceeds that were vested with it as per the earlier orders of the court. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS:** 1. Article 142 of the Constitution of India – Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme Court and orders as to discovery, etc. It provides the Supreme Court with the power to pass any order required to do complete justice in any cause of matter before it. 2. Article 129 of the constitution of India – Supreme Court to be a court of record. It provides all the powers to the court to punish for contempt of itself. **JUDGEMENT:** The court held : 1. That pre-29.1.91 purchasers had to be reimbursed in full, “which means that they should also be paid interest at the appropriate rate”. 2. That the post-29.1.91 purchasers had also to be reimbursed “in full”. 3. That ignoring the corporate veil, the directors of Skipper – Tejwant Singh and Surinder Singh and their sons and unmarried daughters would be treated as one entity. 4. That the Court held them guilty of contempt and under Article 129 and Article 142, sentenced them to imprisonment and fine of Rs.50,000 each. Attachment orders were passed. 5. Later on, the sentence was deferred subject to the condition of their furnishing bank guarantee for Rs.11 crores by 31st March 1995 and a deposit of Rs.11 crores by 30th November 1995. It was also said that the list of properties given by the contemners is to be taken on record. The contemners will also file a list of properties held by their sons and unmarried daughters within one week from that day. 6. The contemners deposited Rs. 2 crores but failed to deposit the balance and also failed to furnish a Bank guarantee. They were committed to prison and they served the sentence. **CONCLUSION AND COMMENTS:** Delhi Development Authority v, Skipper Constructions Company Pvt. Ltd. Case is significant because it demonstrates India’s supreme court’s desire to use its power enshrined in Article 142 of the constitution of India to achieve complete justice. The court’s decision to disregard the corporate veil and treat Skipper, its directors – Tejwant Singh and Surinder Singh, and their sons as a single entity that defrauded investors sends out a strong message against abuse of the corporate form. Overall, this judgment is an important precedent in corporate governance concerning the judiciary’s role in protecting ordinary people. **ENDNOTES:** 1. Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Constructions Company (P) Ltd., (1996) 2. Constitution of India – Article 129, Article 136 and Article 142. 3. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Company Law, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Tata Engineering v. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 SC 40](https://lawfoyer.in/tata-engineering-v-state-of-bihar-air-1965-sc-40/) **Published:** August 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ***Author: Anukriti Mathur*** ***Edited By: Aneel Meghani*** **ABSTRACT** British Economist, Hugh Dalton defines tax as a compulsory contribution imposed by public authority, irrespective of services rendered to the taxpayer1. Thus, we can see that the tax can only be levied by Public authority and such levy of tax should have backing by authority of Law.2 Chapter I of Part XI of the Indian Constitution discusses the division of taxing power between the central government and State Government through three lists of the Seventh Schedule of the Indian Constitution. The First List (Union List) empowers the Central Government to levy tax on Income, Customs, Central Excise, and other incomes except from the agricultural sector. The Second List (State List) deauthorizes the taxation on agricultural income, lands, sales, State excise, Stamp duties, and other State level sources. The Concurrent List (Third List) allows both the Central and State Governments to enact laws levying taxes on subjects such as the entry of local goods for consumption, use, or sale. Thus, to avoid overlapping of taxes and proper distribution of taxing power, various Doctrines like Pith and Substance and Territorial nexus comes to play. Additionally, the Central Government through Constitutional framework controls and restrict State’s taxing power and any action of State where tax is a measure to control entry in market or freedom to trade. ***Keywords*:** Tax, Central Government, Constitution of India, Inter-state Trade, Pith and Substance, Territorial Nexus, Fiscal distribution, Bihar Sales Tax **CASE DETAILS** 1. ***Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** Tata Engineering And Locomotive Co. Ltd vs State Of Bihar And Others 1. ***Case Number*** Writ Petitions Nos.112 and 113 of 1961 1. ***Judgement Date*** 25 February, 1964 1. ***Court*** Supreme Court of India 1. ***Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar, Justice K.N. Wanchoo, Justice J.C. Shah, Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar and Justice S.M. Sikri 1. ***Author / Name of Judges*** Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar 1. ***Citation*** 1965 AIR 40, 1964 SCR (6) 885, AIR 1965 Supreme Court 40 1. ***Legal Provisions Involved*** Article 19, 32 and 286(1)(a) of Constitution of India **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** - Post independence, the India opted for Fiscal Federalism wherein Central Government and the State Government were provided with autonomy in levying and collection of taxes. The State Government were authorized by Constitutional framework to levy and collect tax including Sales Tax. Excise duties and stamp duties. This distribution of taxing power paved way for concerns like double taxation, hindering free flow of trade commerce and uneven State’s economic growth.4 - The Second half of 20th Century witness rampant industrialization and economic integration. India too witness, rise of corporations like Tata. Such large Corporation operates across various States and so subjected to multiple taxation by various States. - The Indian Constitution provides the safeguard against use of State Taxing power to hinder entry in market and to restrict free trade and commerce. - The following case is landmark in deciding the validity of State Sales tax where the Goods are manufactured in State other than where it is otherwise available for use or consumption.5 **FACTS OF THE CASE** - The Petitioners, Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd. (TELCO) was engaged in manufacturing and sale of Diesel Truck, Bus chassis along with their spare parts and accessories. - The petitioner had its Regional Office in Bombay and in order to explore Jamshedpur market, it entered into Dealership Agreements which was subjected to Sales tax imposed by State of Bihar. - The petitioner, citing inter-state trade resist to pay Sales Tax imposed by State of Bihar while the State of Bihar, claimed the tax as trade occurred in Bihar thus, subjected to Sales tax. - The Petitioner, thus Under Article 32 of India, file a writ in name of the Corporation and members of the company on the ground that the said tax violate the provision of Article 286 of the Indian Constitution, imposing a restrictive on the imposition of taxes on the sale or purchase of goods. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether TELCO is considered as citizen of India and eligible to file a writ under Article 32, for its rights violated under Article 19(1)(g) of Constitution of India? 2. Whether the Sales Tax imposed by the State of Bihar on goods manufactured by TELCO falls within the scope of Article 286 of the Indian Constitution or not? **PETITIONER ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Petitioner submitted that Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd. (TELCO) was incorporated and registered under Indian Companies Act, 1913, making it a citizen of India. Being a citizen of India, they are eligible to claim Fundamental Rights under Article 19.6 2. The Petitioners also submitted that Situs of Sale was not within State of Bihar and the transactions involved inter-state sale where said Sales Tax would not be applicable. 3. The Sales Tax imposed by Bihar Government is merely a restrictive tax and violative under Article 286 4. Relying on Ujjam Bai Case,7the petitioner drew attention towards the Doctrine of Pith and Substance. The Petitioner highlighted that Article 286 is a safeguard against State Taxes imposed merely to restrict freedom of inter-state trade and Freedom to trade guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Respondent submitted that the Corporations do not enjoy Fundamental rights as provided to individual and thus not eligible to file writ under Article 32.8 2. The Respondents submitted that the merely having the registered office in Bombay does not make the sales as inter-state transaction. The Situs of sale is important as it determine the taxability of such sale. 3. The State shall exercise its taxing power on all purchases and sales held in its territory and such taxation is not a restriction under Article 286 **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** 1. **Article 19(1)(g): – “***All citizens shall have the right to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.*” 2. **Article 32(1): – “***The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.****”*** 3. **Article 286: – “***No law of a State shall impose, or authorize the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place* *(a) outside the State; or* (b) *in the course of the import of the goods into, or export of the goods out of, the territory of India***.”** **JUDGEMENT** **(A)RATIO DECIDENDI** 1. The Apex Court, while disposing the Writ, emphasis on the separate legal entity of the Corporation from that of its members. The corporations are formed for commercial nature and are not eligible to enjoy Fundamental rights under Part III of Indian Constitution. 2. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after hearing both sides, considered that the Bihar Sales Tax imposed on the goods manufactured by TELCO were in within the purview of Article 286. This created a restriction on imposing taxes on sale or purchase of goods. 3. The Court included the term Manufacture as well as sale or purchase of goods for assessment of tax. Additionally, Court while explaining term Purchase and Sale, in light of Article 286, considered tax effective on purchase of goods by TELCO’s customers. 4. While explaining the Situs of sale, the court considered that it is paramount to see the place of dispatch rather than delivery to determine site to assess taxability and restrictions under Article 286. **(B) OBITER DICTA** 1. The Court ruled that the State of Bihar was misusing it’s taxing power and under Doctrine of Pith and Substance, the said taxation stand in violation of restriction on inter-state trade and commerce. 2. The Court while interpreting the Principles of Constitutional Interpretation relied on harmoniums construction and balancing the fiscal federalism among central and State Governments. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** 1. TELCO case was landmark in establishing the State powers in taxation and it’s limitations. 2. The case laid down the principle of Situs of Sale while assessment of Tax. The territorial nexus as a constrain to State’s tax levying powers. The Article 286 aims at avoidance of double taxation on business entities operating inter-states ensuring trading in Indian Market irrespective of State borders. 3. The Court also ensured that the Central Government fiscal power to collect tax in inter-state and power to regulate such activities under Article 286 is not undermined. 4. The case also provided for operational efficiency and profitability for entities operating inter-state by avoiding taxes on multiple level this paved way for landmark cases of Cement Marketing Company of India v. State of Rajasthan9 and Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks10. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** 1. The State Trading Corporation of India v. The Commercial Tax Officer AIR 1963 SC 1811 2. Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1962 SC 1621 3. Indo-China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. The Additional Collector of Customs and Others AIR 1964 SC 1140 4. Cement Marketing Company of India v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1980 SC 346 5. Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks AIR 1999 SC 22 **Important Statutes Referred** 1. Constitution of India 2. The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 3. The Bihar Sales Tax Act 1947 4. Indian Companies Act, 1913 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [SHREYA SINGHAL V. UNION OF INDIA](https://lawfoyer.in/shreya-singhal-v-union-of-india/) **Published:** August 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ***Author: Muskan*** ***Edited By: Aneel Meghani*** **ABSTRACT** This case was filed as Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the Supreme Court regarding section 66A where appellant Shreya Singhal had challenged the constitutionality of Section 66A on the ground that it is violative of fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of India by the Constitution, on particular, the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a). She had contended that vague and overbroad definitions of “offensive” and “menacing” speech pose a substantial threat to free expression. It held that the section was infringing upon article 19(1)(a) and it lacks clear standards and enough safeguards against misuse. The judgment came to be a strong assertion of constitutional freedoms in the digital age, the requirement of a precise and accountable legal framework for regulating online content. Shreya Singhal’s contention rested on the very fact that Section 66A was a wide and vague law with no clear definition of key terms. According to her, this vagueness leaves room for arbitrary and excessive use by authorities. That ambiguity, she argued, permitted law-enforcement officials to apply the rules in capricious ways and silence free expression The Supreme Court accepted these arguments while giving its Judgment on March 24, 2015. The Court found that imprecise language made the law prone to misuse and thus violated constitutional standards. This judgment has had far-reaching consequences for Indian cyber law, further fortifying the protection of free speech and safeguarding against the misuse of provisions in Indian laws about online communication. **Keywords:** Public Interest Litigation (PIL), Section 66A, Constitutionality, Fundamental rights, right to freedom of speech and expression, Vague definitions Offensive speech, Menacing speech **CASE DETAILS** 1. ***Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** Shreya Singhal v. Union of India 1. ***Case Number*** Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 167 of 2012 1. ***Judgement Date*** 24 MARCH, 2015 1. ***Court*** Supreme Court of India 1. ***Quorum*** 2 judges’ bench 1. ***Name of Judges*** Justice J. S. Khehar Justice R. F. Nariman 1. ***Citation*** AIR 2015 SC 1523 (2015) 5 SCC 1 1. ***Legal Provisions Involved*** Constitution of India, information technology act, The Kerala Police act **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The case of Shreya Singhal v. Union of India was decided by the Supreme Court of India in the year 2015, on a petition challenging the constitutional validity of Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The said section envisaged punishment for messages sent by any communication service, etc., which was vaguely and sweepingly laid down, resulting in its misuse and infringement of the right of a citizen to freedom of speech. **Fundamental Rights** It represents specific legal guarantees granted by a constitution to protect liberties and establish a fair state. These rights are the foundation of every democratic country and consist of several liberties and safeguards for individuals, as well as groups. **Freedom of Speech and Expression,** is one among such rights under which an individual has the right to express his or her ideas and opinions without much hindrance. This characteristic is essential for democratic societies since it fosters those opinions expression and sharing. **The Information Technology Act of 2000** It formulated under the Indian law deals with matters arising from electronic communication in **section 66**. Precisely, it makes it unlawful to send any messages with a vowed intention of causing annoyance or which amounts to communicating obscene material via electronic medium for instance an email or text. This provides an attempt to reconcile freedom of speech with extremism, particularly, in eradicating oneself or handling cyber bullying and aggressive actions on the Internet. **Background:** Petitioner: Shreya Singhal is a student of law who filed the petition following the arrest of two girls in Mumbai for posting comments on Facebook over a shut-down in Mumbai. The petitioners had contended that the provision in question is in violation of fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(a) relating to freedom of speech and expression and Article 21 relating to right to life and liberty of the Constitution. **Judgement** It struck down Section 66A as unconstitutional and violative of freedom of speech. The bench laid special emphasis on the fact that such a provision is too vague and could be used in an arbitrary manner to suppress legitimate speech. **FACTS OF THE CASE** **Procedural Background of the Case** Prior to the historic verdict delivered by the Supreme Court of India on March 24, 2015, a few hearings and proceedings have taken place. The major hearings and key proceedings which took place before the said judgment are given below :- **Filing of Petition:** **Date**: October 2012 **Event**: A petition by Shreya Singhal, a law student, was made against the constitutionality of Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The petition was filed before the Supreme Court of India**.** **Initial Hearings:** **Date:** 2012-2013 **Event:** The Supreme Court began the hearing for arguments in support of petitioner Shreya Singhal. The matter was listed for preliminary consideration of the issue of the maintainability of the petition and also the extent of challenge. **Interim Orders:** **Date: In 2013** **Event:** In the course of the proceedings, the Supreme Court issued interim orders that included directions to the Union of India asking them to respond to the challenge and afford detailed explanations regarding the implementation and impact of Section 66A. **Detailed Hearings:** **Date: 2014** **Event:** Detailed hearings were conducted in 2014, wherein detailed arguments on behalf of the parties were advanced: **Legal Arguments –** The petitioner placed before this Court that Section 66A was unconstitutional and would not stand judicial scrutiny because of its vagueness and thus the potential for misuse. This had no clear definitions, and thus led to suppression of the freedom to speech. Then The Union of India defended Section 66A on the basis that it was for reasons of maintenance of public order and prevention of online harassment. It is the contention of the central government that the law is a reasonable restriction to freedom of speech in the interest of public safety**.** **Expert Opinions and Amicus Curiae:** **Date: 2014** **Event:** The Supreme Court issued a call for amicus curiae, inviting all interested persons to present expert opinions on the implications of Section 66A**.** **Legal Arguments and Submissions:** **Date: Early 2015** **Event:** The final rounds of legal argumentations were heard out in the early part of 2015. Both parties presented their closing submissions, addressing the concerns the Court raised and answering the questions that cropped up during the hearings**.** **Summing Up of Arguments:** **Date: March 2015** **Event:** The Supreme Court did a final summing up of the arguments prior to the delivery of its judgment. This included going through what both parties had presented, amicus curiae opinions, and legal precedents cited. **Delivery of Judgment:** **Date: March 24, 2015** **Judgment :** The judgment was pronounced by the Supreme Court of India whereby Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, was declared unconstitutional on the grounds of vagueness, misusage, and infringement of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. **Factual Background of the Case** After the demise of Bal Thackeray, founder of Shiv Sena party, in November 2012, two young women, one named Shahen Dhada and the other Renu Srinivasan, posted comments regarding the shutting down of the city at Mumbai due to his death on Facebook. The cops booked the two women under Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, saying their posts were offending and could lead to communal unrest. This incident raised alerts about the possible misuse of the law. The arrests caused a public uproar that included protests for free speech and against excessive state power. The incident thus became an interesting debate on the delicate balance between the retention of public order and protecting individual rights. Subsequently, following the outcry, a PIL challenging the constitutional validity of Section 66A of the Information Technology Act was filed in the Supreme Court by Shreya Singhal, a student of law. Her contention is that the section is vague and infringes the right to freedom of speech. **Supreme Court Proceedings:** The Supreme Court took it up for arguments by all parties about the implications of Section 66A on free expression and how the authorities could misuse it. This factual background explains what happened before the litigation and what it means for freedom of speech in India. **ISSUE RAISED BEFORE THE COURT** 1. Whether section 66A was adequately covered in Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution that lists allowable limitations to the freedom of speech and expression 2. Whether section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, which made it criminal to send through electronic communication, any information that was grossly offensive, menacing or annoying is constitutionally valid 3. Whether potential misuse of Section 66A by law enforcement agencies to suppress dissent and curb free expression, especially in a democratic society. **ARGUMENTS FROM THE APPELANT SIDE** 1. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Section 66A violated the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India , which are given under part 3 and are available to both the girls here 2. It was submitted by the petitioner that the language used in Section 66A was vague and ambiguous on account of which persons would not be able to understand what constitutes an “offensive” message leading to arbitrary enforcement. This arrest highlighted the law’s broad application and lack of clarity, which led to concerns about its arbitrary enforcement. 3. While bringing out the impact of the existence of Section 66A, the appellant said that the provision was found to have a chilling effect in terms of free speech and everybody was actually being sapped of the nerve to express opinions freely for fear of prosecution. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that it was further posted that this provision was susceptible to misuse by law enforcement agencies for targeting dissenting voices and criticism against the central government and political leaders. 5. Shreya Singhal argued that Section 66A violated international standards on freedom of expression recognized by various human rights treaties and could not survive the criteria for reasonable restrictions. **ARGUMENTS FROM THE RESPONDENT SIDE** 1. The Respondent, The Union of India, defended the constitutionality of Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000. 2. The Union contented that the provision was a necessity for maintaining public order and safety in cyber-space. They instanced various cases of online harassment and threats whereby individuals were targeted with abusive messages or threats of violence and submitted that Section 66A provided a mechanism to deal with such conduct. 3. The counsel pleaded that Section 66A was a reasonable restriction in the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution. It was a law that struck a balance between individual freedom and prevention of grave harm to others or maintenance of public order 4. While claiming that the restrictions under the law were within the permissible restrictions under Article 19(2), he said that it was meant to prevent incitement to violence or hate speech. 5. The respondent then claimed that there were inherent safeguards in Section 66A and that it is always subject to judicial review, on account of which the possibility of arbitrary enforcement and misuse is ruled out. 6. It was urged by the respondent that Section 66A was not as wide or vague as it was made out to be by the appellant. Expressions such as “grossly offensive”, “menacing”, and “annoying” were resorted to, covering clear instances of offending online behavior, and it was susceptible to being construed consistent with constitutional principles. 7. The Union submitted that the provision was applied only in exceptional cases against those who indulged in the most injurious or offensive online behavior. It was contented that the law never intended to suppress any form of legitimate expression but tried to tackle specific online conducts which caused actual harm. 8. The Union argued that Section 66A was an imperative provision to deal with the new problems that were coming before the court due to digital communication and to aid or facilitate the adaptation of the legal framework in order to keep pace with technology. Hence it must be decided by the Supreme court based on the facts adduced if Section 66A is constitutional or not. **Related Provisions** - **Information Technology Act, 2000:** Section 66A: This section prohibited sending of any information via electronic means that was considered “grossly offensive,” “menacing” or “annoying,” and made offenders liable to prosecution that included imprisonment and fines. The section was supposed to regulate conduct on the web but due to its overreaching and ambiguous provisions, there were worries on the right to freedom of speech. - **Constitution of India:** Article 19(1)(a): This article shall uphold right to freedom of speech and expression to the citizens. It preserves freedom of speech and individuals and groups’ freedom to air their opinions as desired. Article 19(2): This article permits lawful limitations to the freedom of speech and expression. Any restriction must be provided by law and may concern, for example, public policy, morality, public order, or the state’s security. However, restrictions which might be placed should accustoming be clear, precise and should not be of general applicability. - **The Code of Criminal Procedure ,1973:** **Section 41:** This section covers the authority of a police officer to effect arrest without warrant. It was relevant in the context of, how Section 66A was upheld in operation, specifically concerning the arrested procedures. **Judgement** The Hon’ble Court in the leading case of **SHREYA SINHAL v UNION OF INDIA,** 2015 resulted in deletion of section 66 A of Information Technology act 2000 as it infringes the Article 19(1)(a) of Indian Constitution that offers the freedom of speech and expression. The Court opined that some of the provisions in the law are too general for instance, ‘grossly offensive,’ menacing,’ and ‘annoy. ’These terms did not give specific definition. The provision was null and void as it violated the constitution by being vague, too broad and at the same time capable of being selectively applied. The court stated that due to the absence of clear definitions the section was open for interpretation by authorities at large This vagueness made the law contradictory with the section that demands that any limitation on fundamental rights should not be vague. The Court said that such vagueness can stifle free speech and other freedom of assembly. The Court made it clear that ought for any law that seek to curtail any facet of fundamental rights such as freedom of speech the limitation must be clearly spelt out. The vagueness in Section 66A was held to violate the constitution with principles that hold that restrictions should be precise to serve concrete legitimate interests. That is, the Supreme Court judgment delivered in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India clarified Section 66A’s unconstitutionality on the basis of being grossly and manifestly arbitrary, and violating the right to freedom of speech and expression. The judgment of this case had a variety of obiter dicta. Obiter dictum refers to what judges say, which is not relevant to the decision, yet provides insight and guidance upon issues related to the subject matter under consideration. - Free speech in a democracy assumes a very significant place as it is **sine qua non** for the working of a democratic institution and for the growth and progress of individuals. The judgment brought out that the Court treated free speech as one of the basic foundations of democratic polity and emphatically reiterated that this right must not be throttled by undue restrictions. - The judgment expressly stated that it was the role of courts to safeguard the fundamental rights of people against arbitrary or excessive actions on the part of the legislature and the executive. The Court further emphasized that it was established to ensure that laws are not offensive to the constitutional norms and do not infringe upon the fundamental freedom. - The Court has observed that laws concerning fundamental rights must be formulated with precision and clarity so as to prevent misuse and to ensure that they do not overshoot or stifle a permissible form of expression. - The judgment observed that, though the right to freedom of speech and expression is a fundamental right under Article 19, it can be legitimately regulated in the interest of public order only if those restrictions are clearly defined and proportionate. - The Court accepted that the way online expression is fast evolving poses a challenge for regulation itself and emphasized the need for legislation to ‘keep pace with technology’ while ensuring that fundamental rights are not compromised. **Conclusion** This judgment in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India has finally laid down an important precedent: this means that freedom of speech cannot be lightly interfered with and new standards will have to be set on how content on the internet can be regulated. Of course, the judgment voiding Section 66A of the Information Technology Act on the grounds that the provision was formulated in ambiguous terms and was confiscatory has driven in the point that laws affecting and involving rights in limine have to be well articulated. The judgment also advanced legislative changes and juridical trends influencing in the legal regulation of electronic communication, which forms the basis of the principles of democracy and the liberty of the person **REFERENCES** 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950 SECTION. 13 7. THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ,1973 SECTION 41 8. THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950 SECTION 19(1)a 9. THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950 SECTION 19(2) 10. THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000 11. M.P JAIN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 12. J.N PANDEY, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel vs Union of India and Anr](https://lawfoyer.in/maganbhai-ishwarbhai-patel-vs-union-of-india-and-anr/) **Published:** August 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ***Author: Dhanavel B*** ***Edited By: Aneel Meghani*** **ABSTRACT** Kutch is the place that exists between India and Pakistan. Due to natural instability of that region, none of valid boundaries had been marked between India and Pakistan in that region. The tribunal was constituted for demarcation of boundaries there. Later, the award was passed. Both governments agreed to the award. The Government of India took action to implement the award. But this present case was presented before the Hon’ble Supreme Court to restrict the implementation because the petitioners plead as the Government of India would transfer the places which belonged to India if it implements the award. It was the infringement of Fundamental rights of them which is guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d), (e) and (f). Further, cession of such Indian territories without constitutional amendment is unconstitutional. By considering the award of the tribunal and all materials placed before the apex court. It held, there was a demarcation of territories between India and Pakistan without cession of Indian territories. Therefore, no constitutional amendment needed for the implementation of the Award. Further, there was no infringement of fundamental rights. ***Keywords*:** India-Pakistan boundary dispute, demarcation of territory, cession of territory, implementation of international agreement, fundamental rights, **CASE DETAILS** 1. ***Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel vs Union of India and Anr. 1. ***Case Number*** Civil Appeal No. 1528 of 1968 1. ***Judgement Date*** January 09, 1969 1. ***Court*** The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India 1. ***Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** 5 Judges Bench (Constitution Bench) 1. ***Name of Judges*** Chief Justice M. Hidayatullah, Justice J.C. Shah, Justice V. Ramaswami, Justice G.K. Mitter and Justice A.N. Grover. 1. ***Author of Judgement*** Chief Justice M. Hidayatullah 1. ***Citation*** AIR 1969 SC 783, 1969 AIR 783, 1969 SCR (3) 254. 1. ***Legal Provisions Involved*** Constitution of India – Article 1, 3, 19(1)(d), 19(1)(e), 19(1)(f), 32, 73 and 253. **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** Making treaties and implementing treaties are the exclusive powers of the sovereign states. The Constitution of India provides power to the Union to enter into the treaties or agreements and implement such treaties or agreements. Article 73 provides executive power to the Union to act in all matters with respect to power of making law of parliament and it has rights to act by virtue of any treaty or agreement. Therefore, it inherited the power which is provided by Article 253 for parliament for making law for implementing any treaty or agreement. So, it seems the executive branch of government can do any act to implement the treaties without the interference of the parliament. But it’s not the case, allowing the executive to do any acts for the implementation of treaties will cause total crises. Like, it can easily infringe the fundamental right of citizens, it can cede Indian territories to foreign countries, it can act against the constitution and so on. So, the Apex court provided various rulings to curtail the executive powers of the Union. Importantly, In the ruling of Inre Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves, any cession of the Indian territories only be done by the constitutional amendments. In the present case, the apex court observed the ruling of First and second Berubari cases. Further, it provided the conditions for implementing treaties by the Union executive. **FACTS OF THE CASE** **Procedural Background of the Case** The present case before the Hon’ble Supreme Court presented by the seven parties. Those seven parties were Mr. Manikant Tiwari, Mr. Shiv Kumar Sharma, Mr. Madhu Limaye, Mr. Gulabshankar Amritlal Dholakia, Mr. Node Sadi Rau, Major Ranjit Singh and Mr. Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel were approached the apex court under separate writ petitions, Major Ranjit Singh was approached by appeal from the common judgment of the Delhi High Court and Mr. Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel was approached through the appeal by special leave of the apex court from the decision of the Gujarat High Court is in a writ petition filed by him. His writ petition was dismissed by the Gujarat High Court summarily. They sought to restrain the executive act of Government of India to transfer those territories without constitutional amendment and it rendered infringement of fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d), (e) and (f) of the constitution. The apex court delivered its judgement in 1969 after concluding the hearing. **Factual Background of the Case** India and Pakistan were created by the Act of the British Parliament which was the Indian Independence Act 1947. When India and Pakistan were created, different states were allocated to India and Pakistan separately, with separate demarcation lines. Sind province was included in Pakistan meanwhile the presidency of Bombay was becoming the Part of India. The places of Kutch exist between the province of Sind and the Presidency of Bombay. So, it’s the places that exist between India and Pakistan. Naturally, the places of Kutch were covered by water for 4 months of the year. The remaining time it is a place of soft mud or land of grass. No one ordinarily lives there and even there is no possibility of agriculture. But the boundaries of said land are not clear. In July 1948, Diplomatic Notes were exchanged between the governments of India and Pakistan concerning the boundary between the areas of India and Pakistan. Differences between those two governments regarding such boundaries led to direct hostilities. On 30 June 1965, the two governments agreed to cease fire and constitute a tribunal for settling the boundary dispute between them. As per the Agreement, the tribunal was established. During the hearing, about 350 maps were exhibited by India and Pakistan. After the conclusion of the Investigation, the Tribunal awarded the areas of Kanjarkot, Dharabanni Chhadbet, and the two inlets to Pakistan. Both governments had accepted the award of the tribunal. The Indian government was taking steps to implement the award of the tribunal. Before the implementation of the award. This case was brought before the Hon’ble Supreme Court by those seven parties to restrict the implementation of that award. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether the implementation of the award was led to cession of the territories of India? 2. Whether the constitutional amendment needed for the implementation of the award? 3. Whether the Implementation of the award would cause infringement of fundamental rights which is guaranteed by Article 19(1)(d), (e) and (f)? **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The Petitioners argued the areas of Kanjarkot, Dharabanni, Chhadbet and two inlets on either side of Nagar Parkar are Indian territories. They argued India exercised administrative control over those areas at the time of the creation of two dominions. Therefore, those are the part of Indian territory. 2. They argued cession of those Indian territory is not the executive act of the government. By the ruling of Inre Berubari case, the constitutional amendment needed for cession of those Indian territories. 3. Further, they argued cession of those Indian territories by the government of India was the infringement of fundamental rights which is guaranteed to them by Article 19(1)(d), (e) and (f). **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The Respondents argued, the places of the Kutch were unstable due to the changing nature of the sea and land. So, the boundaries were uncertain there. Besides, establishing a police outpost with 171 personnel and polling booths for them was not effective administrative control by India over there. 2. They denoted the award of the tribunal defined the boundaries of India and Pakistan in that particular region. Therefore, true areas of India and Pakistan were demarcated without cession of Indian territories. 3. Further, they argued implementing the Award of the tribunal was not involving cession. Therefore, there is no need for constitutional amendments and it is not an infringement of fundamental rights. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** - **Constitution of India** - **Article 1:** *– “Name and territory of the Union.* 1. *India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States.* 2. *The States and the territories thereof shall be as specified in the First Schedule* 3. *The territory of India shall comprise —* *(a) the territories of the States;* *(b) the Union territories specified in the First Schedule; and* *(c) such other territories as may be acquired”1.* - **Article 3:** *– “Formation of new States and alteration of areas, boundaries or names of existing States. — Parliament may by law — (a) Form a new State by separation of territory from any State or by uniting two or more States or parts of States or by uniting any territory to a part of any State* *(b) Increase the area of any State* *(c) Diminish the area of any State* *(d) Alter the boundaries of any State* *(e) Alter the name of any State* *Provided that no Bill for the purpose shall be introduced in either House of Parliament except on the recommendation of the President and unless, where the proposal contained in the Bill affects the area, boundaries or name of any of the States, the Bill has been referred by the President to the Legislature of that State for expressing its views thereon within such period as may be specified in the reference or within such further period as the President may allow and the period so specified or allowed has expired.* ***Explanation I.** — In this article, in clauses (a) to (e), “State” includes a Union territory, but in the proviso, “State” does not include a Union territory.* ***Explanation II.** — The power conferred on Parliament by clause (a) includes the power to form a new State or Union territory by uniting a part of any State or Union territory to any other State or Union territory”2.* - **Article 19(1)(d):** – “T*o move freely throughout the territory of India”3.* - **Article 19(1)(e):** – “T*o reside and settle in any part of the territory of India”4.* - **Article 19(1)(f):** – “T*o acquire, hold, and dispose of property”5.* - **Article 32:** – “*Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part.* 1. *The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.* 2. *The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.* 3. *Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1) and (2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2).* 4. *The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution”6.* - **Article 73:** – **“***Extent of executive power of the Union.* 1. *Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive power of the Union shall extend.* 2. *to the matters with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws; and* 3. *to the exercise of such rights, authority and jurisdiction as are exercisable by the Government of India by virtue of any treaty or agreement: Provided that the executive power referred to in sub-clause (a) shall not, save as expressly provided in this Constitution or in any law made by Parliament, extend in any State to matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has also power to make laws.* 4. *Until otherwise provided by Parliament, a State and any officer or authority of a State may, notwithstanding anything in this article, continue to exercise in matters with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws for that State such executive power or functions as the State or officer or authority thereof could exercise immediately before the commencement of this Constitution”7.* - **Article 253:** – “*Legislation for giving effect to international agreements.* *Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, Parliament has power to make any law for the whole or any part of the territory of India for implementing any treaty, agreement or convention with any other country or countries or any decision made at any international conference, association or other body”8.* - **Entry 14 of List I:** – “*Entering into treaties and agreements with foreign countries and implementing of treaties, agreements and conventions with foreign countries”9.* - **Entry 15 of List I:** – “*War and peace”10.* **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** 1. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held due to the instability of nature of the places. India did not have a valid boundary there. As per the materials placed before the tribunal and materials placed before this court did not provide India a de jure claim over those territories. The establishment of a police outpost and polling booth for them was not an administrative control of India over there. Therefore, claims of India over those territories were neither de jure nor de facto. 2. It held, the ruling of Inre Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves11, the executive power of government not extend to the cession of Indian territories to foreign countries. It can only be done by constitutional amendments. It still stands. 3. Further, the ruling of Ram Kishore Sen and Ors v. Union of India and Ors12 (The second Berubari case), transferring of territories which are temporarily controlled by India but not legally belonged to India does not require any constitutional amendments. It also still stands. 4. The Hon’ble Supreme Court ruled in this case as, previous rulings of this apex court are valid and still stand. This case is not the kind of those cases. The present case is only a case of demarcation of boundaries between two governments. The places mentioned as part of Indian territories by petitioners were neither de jure nor de facto territories of India. Therefore, it was not a cession of Indian territories because those territories were not belonged to India. So, there was no need for the constitutional amendments for the implementation of awards. 5. The court further observed that the claims of petitioners over those places exercise rights to move freely throughout the territory of India under Article 19(1)(d), to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India under Article 19(1)(e) and to hold, acquire and dispose of property under Article 19(1)(f) cannot arise because those territories were not de jure and de facto territories of India. Therefore, the implementation of the award may not cause the infringement of fundamental rights. **GUIDELINES** The Hon’ble Supreme Court held as: Any Implementation of agreement or treaty by Union under Article 73 which is like cause infringement of fundamental rights of the Indian citizens or modifies any law in force or cession of any Indian territory require the valid law of Parliament which is empowered under article 253, entry 10 and 14 of List I. Further, it held demarcation of territories without the cession of actual territories of India does not require any valid law of parliament. **OBITER DICTA** 1. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed the background of the award. The award was passed by the tribunal which is mutually established by the two governments. The tribunal awarded the areas of Kanjarkot, Dharabanni, Chhadbet and two inlets on either side of Nagar Parkar to Pakistan. Both governments agreed to implement the award. Therefore, there was no question of validity of the award and it was not an appeal against the award. Further, the petitioners also did not bring those questions before the court. 2. The court further observed the boundary of India over there was uncertain due to changing nature of place, no one resident there and no agriculture or profession carry over there. 3. It pointed out that none of the materials which were placed before the court showed the places which were awarded to Pakistan were owned by India. Therefore, the fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution of India are not applicable to the places which are not the Indian territories. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** This case considered as one of Landmark cases regarding the implementation of the treaties or agreements entered between India and foreign countries. Though the petitioners failed in their case, Court provided mandatory conditions for implementing the foreign treaties to secure the fundamental rights of citizens and Territorial integrity of India in that case. The judgment of this case remains a significant precedent to deal about the executive power of Union in boundary disputes and the implementation of international agreements. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** 1. Inre Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves, \[1960\] 3 S.C.R. 250. 2. Ram Kishore Sen and Ors v. Union of India and Ors, 1966 SCR (1) 430. **Important Statutes Referred** 1. The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 1. 2. The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 3. 3. The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 19(1)(d). 4. The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 19(1)(e). 5. The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 19(1)(f). 6. The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 32. 7. The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 73. 8. The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 253 9. The Constitution of India, 1950, Entry 14 of List I, Seventh Schedule. 10. The Constitution of India, 1950, Entry 15 of List I, Seventh Schedule. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [SUKHDEV SINGH V. BHAGATRAM](https://lawfoyer.in/sukhdev-singh-v-bhagatram/) **Published:** August 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** #### *Author: Gupta Aryan Rajesh* #### *Edited By: Aneel Meghani* **ABSTRACT** This is the Landmark case regarding the removal or termination of the employees from the corporations. In this case, three employees named Bhagat Ram, Sunil Kumar Mukherjee, and Sukhdev Singh were allegedly removed from the Industrial Finance Corporation of India (IFC), Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC), and Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC). They were not allowed to defend themselves nor given a chance to know their wrong or faults in the corporation why they were terminated and on which grounds. The major issue in this case is that the Statutory Corporations were considered a State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India and Employees can claim protection under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. It was held that the statutory corporations come under the ambit of ‘Other Authority’ in Article 12 of the Constitution of India and their statutory provisions are binding on law. Therefore, decisions given contravene the statutory provisions that are considered void. Employees are not only allowed to get damages but are also entitled to continuance in service. ***Keywords (Minimum 5)*:** statutory corporations, removal of employees, article 14, article 16 of the constitution of India, ONGC, IFC, LIC, and nature of employment. #### **CASE DETAILS** 1. ***Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** Sukhdev Singh vs Bhagat Ram 1. ***Case Number*** Civil Appeal No. 2137 of 1972 1. ***Judgement Date*** February 21, 1975 1. ***Court*** Supreme Court of India 1. ***Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** Justice A.N. Ray, Justice K.K.Mathew, Justice Y.V.Chandrachud, Justice A. Alagiriswami, Justice A.C. Gupta 1. ***Author / Name of Judges*** Justice K.K. Mathew 1. ***Citation*** AIR 1975 SC 1331, 1975 (30) FLR 283 1. ***Legal Provisions Involved*** Article 12, Article 14, Article 16, Article 311 **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** This landmark judgment was given by the five-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India on 21st February 1975. It addresses important questions that the statutory body comes under the purview of the State under Article 12 of the constitution of India and also discusses the principle of Natural Justice. Employees of different statutory bodies were terminated or removed without reasonable reason nor were they given a chance to rectify or hear the reason for the termination. Therefore, the Principle of Natural Justice is also violated in the termination or removal of employees. **What is the Principle of Natural Justice?** Basically, principle of Natural Justice is the fundamental rule of fairness which evolved through judicial decisions and precedents. Specifically, the principle of Natural Justice is not defined separately in the Act. Key Principles of Natural Justice which is violated in this case are: - **Audi alteram partem –** which says no one can be a judge in their case. Here it means that the person who was giving the decision can’t be a judge in his case. - **Nemo judex in sua causa** – which says No one can be a judge in their case. Here it means that the person who is giving the decision can’t be a judge in his case. This case was first filed through a writ petition in the different High Courts. Two High Courts dismissed the writ petition while one allowed the writ petition and quashed the termination of the employee. The appeal was filed by special leave petition in the Supreme Court of India, where the case was transferred to the five-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India as it involved the substantial question of law relating to the interpretation of the Constitution and it also dealt with the rights of the large section of the public employment. Supreme Court held that the employees are allowed in the service with the full payment of wages from the date of dismissal from employment. The Supreme Court of India in the instant case, i.e., [*Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi and Another (1975)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/426032/), provided clarity about the status of the public sector companies in India under [Article 12](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/609139/) and the validity of delegated legislation under their respective statutes.1 **FACTS OF THE CASE** **Procedural Background of the Case** 1. In this case, employees from different corporations were terminated without giving them a chance for a hearing. The Industrial Finance Corporation of India (IFC) was instituted by the Industrial Finance Corporation Act, of 1948 (IFC Act) as a statutory corporation. Similarly, the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) was established by the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (LIC Act) and the Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) governed by the Oil and Natural Gas Commission Act, 1959 (ONGC Act). The first employee is Bhagat Ram employed in the Industrial Finance Corporation of India (IFC), the second one is Sunil Kumar Mukherjee working in the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) and the third employee is Sukhdev Sing employed in the Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC). 2. Bhagat Ram filed a writ petition before the Orissa High Court under section 226 of the constitution of India challenging his removal by IFC which was allowed and quashed the termination order. Similarly, Sunil Kumar Mukherjee and Sukhdev Singh also filed a writ petition before the Patna High Court and Punjab & Haryana High Court under section 226 of the Constitution of India challenging their removal order from LIC and ONGC. Their writ petition was dismissed from both of the High Courts. Statutory corporations and the employees then filed an appeal by way of special leave petition under section 136 of the Constitution of India before the Supreme Court of India. **Factual Background of the Case** 1. Bhagat Ram was appointed as an assistant manager in the Industrial Finance Corporation of India (IFC) in 1963. After a few years of working, he was removed from service in the year 1967 without being heard. 2. Sunil Kumar Mukherjee was joined in the year 1964 by Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC). He was terminated after four years following the internal departmental inquiry. 3. Sukhdev Singh joined in Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) in the year 1967 as a field manager. He was also dismissed from service in 1971 without an inquiry as prescribed under the regulations. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Are statutory corporations considered as states under the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution of India? 2. Whether the regulations framed under the statutory act through delegation have the force of law and are binding on the parties? 3. Whether employees of the statutory corporation claim protection under Article 14 and Article 16 of the Constitution of India? 4. Whether dismissing an employee contrary to the regulation framed under the specific Act would merely entitle damages or a declaration of continuance of service? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Petitioner/ Appellant submitted that any order for the removal contrary to these statutes which having a force of law is void and the employees are not only entitled to damages but also entitled to the continuance of service. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Respondent submitted that regulations were not law and contractual in nature as well as it is a matter of internal management of the corporation. Therefore they argued that the breach of these regulations would grant damages not the continuance in service to an employee. 2. The counsels for Respondent also submitted that as per Section 12 of ONGC Act as well as IFC Act and Section 23 of LIC Act, they have the power to appoint employees and regulate their service in the corporations. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** 1. **Article 12: – “***In this part, unless the context otherwise requires, “the State” includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.*” 2. **Article 14 (Equality before law): *“****The State shall not deny to any person* *equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.”* 3. **Article 16 (Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment):** “*There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State.*” 4. **Article 311 (Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State):** “*No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges*.” **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** 1. The Supreme Court of India referred to specific sections of the IFC Act, LIC Act, and ONGC Act to determine the statutory provisions that are violative of the order given by the corporations. Sections 31 and 32 of the ONGC Act, Section 43 of the IFC Act, and Sections 48 and 49 of the LIC Act talk about the Power to Make Rules and Regulations regarding the conditions of service of the employees. Statutory corporations such as IFC, LIC, and ONGC are considered as states under the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and they are also bound to follow the statutory provisions. Therefore these corporations are responsible for the nonregulation of the provisions of the Statutory Acts and are also bound to follow the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 2. This case is Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur v. Mohan Lal & Ors. (1967) was taken into consideration to determine that the Statutory Corporation falls under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court in the case held that the authorities created by the constitution or statutes have the power to make rules, laws, and regulations considered as State under the Article 12 of Constitution of India.6 3. Regulations framed under the IFC Act, LIC Act, and ONGC Act have the force of law and hence they are bound under the Constitution of India. Any action taken by these corporations against the compliance of Statutory Acts is enforceable in a court of law. The order was given against the statutory provisions so employees are not only entitled to damages but also required for the continuance in service. **GUIDELINES** 1. In this case In this case court held that the statutory corporations are considered as states under the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Therefore in their internal matters, they are bound to follow the Fundamental Rights such as the principle of Natural justice of Natural justice. **OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** No, any past judgment was overruled in this case. **CONCLUSION& COMMENTS** This case was a landmark case in the preview that the statutory corporation is also considered a State under the head of “Other Authorities” in Article 12 of the Constitution of India and they are also bound to follow the rules framed under the Act of that statutory corporation. This case will be taken as a reference in the matter of allegedly removal or termination of the employees from the statutory corporation. The court also ruled that the basic principles of fairness and natural justice must be applied when terminating employees. This case is also important in the point of view that the employee can seek protection under Articles 14, 16, and 311 of the Constitution of India. If any decision taken or order given is non-compliance with the statutory provisions by the corporations then the same decision or order is considered void. **REFERENCES** 1. **Important Cases Referred** 1. Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur v. Mohan Lal & Ors. (1967) 1. **Important Statutes Referred** 1. Oil and Natural Gas Commission Act, 1959 (ONGC Act) 1. Industrial Finance Corporation Act, 1948 (IFC Act) 1. Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (LIC Act) 1. 1. Constitution of India, 1950 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Dharam Dutt & Ors vs Union Of India & Ors on 24 November, 2003](https://lawfoyer.in/dharam-dutt-ors-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-24-november-2003/) **Published:** August 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Shriya Tripathi** **Edited By: Parmar Krishna** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The Indian President issued Ordinance No. 3 of 2000 on September 1, 2000, which mirrored the provisions of an earlier Ordinance from 1990. The established legitimacy of this statute was tested through C.W.P. No. 5174 of 2000 before the Delhi High Court Following a progression of omissions and recoveries of comparable Statutes, the Bill in the long run passed as a demonstration of Parliament on September 3, 2001. By taking over the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) and its properties, infringing on their freedoms of speech, expression, and association, and depriving them of property without lawful authority, the writ petitioners argued that the disputed Ordinance and subsequent Act violated their rights under Article 19(1) of the Indian Constitution. The Union of India argued that ICWA had global significance for India’s foreign policy and world affairs. However, the Society’s administration has been criticized for poor operations, financial mismanagement, and irregularities in elections. The ICWA’s reputation was damaged as a result of these issues, which prompted the adoption of the Ordinance and subsequent legislation to ensure proper administration. The question of whether the government’s takeover constituted a reasonable restriction on the petitioners’ fundamental rights and whether the legislation flouted prior judicial rulings, thereby challenging its validity, were the primary points of contention. The High Court’s judgment assessed the sensibility of the limitations forced and the authoritative purpose behind the sanctioning, taking into account the harmony between individual freedoms and public premium as outlined by sacred arrangements. ***Keywords*** - Indian Council of World Affairs Ordinance, 2001 - Societies Registration Act, 1860 - Sapru House - Entries 62 and 63 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India - Writ Petition **CASE DETAILS** ***i)**Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** Dharam Dutt & Ors vs Union Of India & Ors ***ii)**Case Number*** Writ Petition (Civil) 276 of 2001 ***iii)**Judgement Date*** 24 November 2003 ***iv)**Court*** Supreme Court of India ***v)**Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** A two-judge bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justice R.C. Lahoti and Justice Brijesh Kumar. Justice R.C. Lahoti ***vi)**Author / Name of Judges*** R.C. Lahoti, Brijesh Kumar ***vii)**Citation*** AIR 2004 SUPREME COURT 1295, 2004 (1) SCC 712, 2004 AIR SCW 147, 2004 (3) SLT 267 ***viii)**Legal Provisions Involved*** Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 19(1)(c), 19(2), 19(4) and 300A of the Constitution of India. Entries 62 and 63 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The Indian Council of World Affairs Ordinance, 2001, and the Indian Council of World Affairs Act, 2001, which followed, are the subject of a challenge to their constitutional validity in the case “Dharam Dutt & Ors vs Union of India & Ors,” which was decided on November 24, 2003. The candidates, Dharam Dutt, and others opposed the mandate, and the demonstration disregarded their major privileges under Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 19(1)(c), and 300A of the Indian Constitution. They argued that the government violated their rights to freedom of speech, association, and property by taking over the Indian Council of World Affairs and its properties. The case shows how Indian constitutional law conflicts with individual rights and governmental authority. **FACTS OF THE CASE** - **Procedural Background of the Case** The Indian Council of World Affairs Ordinance, 2001, which was issued by the President on May 8, 2001, was challenged in WP(C) No.276 of 2001 on June 22, 2001. The Indian Council of World Affairs Act, 2001, which received the President’s assent on September 3, 2001, replaced the Ordinance before this petition could be decided. WP(C) No.543 of 2001 was then filed on October 19, 2001, challenging the Indian Council of World Affairs Act, 2001’s constitutionality. The two petitions were recorded under Article 32 of the Constitution under the steady gaze of the High Court engaging straightforwardly to its purview to implement major privileges. In both writ petitions, the petitioners were the same, namely Dharam Dutt and others. The respondents named were the Association of India and others. During the pendency of the main writ appeal, occasions like the substitution of the mandate by the Demonstration occurred, requiring the second request against the Demonstration. The High Court heard the two petitions together as the grounds raised were indistinguishable testing the takeover of the General public and claiming infringement of crucial privileges. Its errand was to meditate upon the lawfulness of both the reproved Mandate as well as the in this way sanctioned Follow-up based on contentions introduced by the two players**.** - **Factual Background of the Case** To encourage study and research on international issues, the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) was established in 1943 as a non-official, non-political, and non-profit organization. It was established at Sapru House in Delhi, which also housed the organization’s library and other amenities, and was authorized to operate by the Societies Registration Act of 1860. Sapru House was developed on two sections of land rented from the Public Authority of India in 1950-51. Up until 1987, the government gave ICWA grants. In 1990, a law was passed comprising ICWA as a legal body. The Punjab & Haryana High Court upheld this after challenging it. In 1999, the public authority dropped the ceaseless rent on the land and gave reemergence orders, which were tested in the Delhi High Court. In 2000 and 2001, similar ordinances were issued, establishing ICWA as a statutory body. Ownership of Sapru House properties was the subject of contention, as were numerous allegations of financial irregularities and improper administration against ICWA management. An extraordinary review by CAG in 2000 uncovered liabilities of Rs. 132.84 lakh and the possibility of stealing Rs. 1.39 lakhs. The Upbraided 2001 Law and 2001 Demonstration were established, prompting the documenting of the current writ petitions testing their legitimacy on grounds of infringement of basic privileges. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether the impugned Indian Council of World Affairs Ordinance, 2001, and the Indian Council of World Affairs Act, 2001 violated the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(c), and 300A of the Constitution? 2. Whether the impugned Ordinance and Act fell within the legislative competence of Parliament under Entries 62 and 63 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution declaring ICWA as an institution of national importance. **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS-** The Petitioners’ Counsel made the following affirmation**:** **Issue 1:** Violation of Constitutional Article 19(1)(a): It was submitted by the Counsel for Petitioner that the Government has violated the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution by taking over the ICWA Society through the disputed Ordinance and Act. This means that the Government has limited the Society’s activities and its goal of encouraging discussion and research on international affairs. According to Article 19(2), the takeover amounts to an unreasonable restriction of the aforementioned fundamental right**.** **Issue 2:** Violation of Constitutional Article 19(1)(c): In addition, it was submitted by the Counsel for Petitioner that the citizens who are members of the ICWA Society are arbitrarily denied their fundamental right to freely form associations under **Article** 19(1)(c) because of the Government’s takeover of the Society through the challenged laws. This violates the right to social interaction, which cannot be restricted by Article 19(4) of the Constitution. **Issue 3:** Infringement of Article 300A of the Constitution: It was submitted by the Counsel for Petitioner that the ICWA Society had been illegally and without legal authority deprived of its private properties worth crores of rupees by transferring all of its assets to the statutory body established by the Act. This removes the properties of the general public in repudiation of the central right ensured under Article 300A of the Constitution. Fourth problem: Abuse of power: The learned counsel vigorously argued that the disputed Ordinance and Act were the result of political malice and were maliciously enacted to take control of the reputable ICWA society for unrelated purposes. This was a questionable exercise of power without legislative authority**.** **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that: **Issue 1:** Article 19(1)(a) validity: The Advice presented that the reproved Act doesn’t in any way confine the right to speak freely and articulation of the ICWA Society or its individuals under Article 19(1)(a). The general public keeps on existing as an autonomous substance with practically no limitations on its exercises or targets. Only the organization known as “ICWA” has been taken over and declared to be an organization of national importance; entries 62 and 63 of List I cover this organization in full. **Issue 2:** Legitimacy under Article 19(1)(c): The guidance further presented that the reprimanded Act has not the slightest bit denied the residents who are individuals from the general public of their entitlement to unreservedly frame relationships under Article 19(1)(c). Once more, just the organization “ICWA” has been dominated, not the general public. As a result, the aforementioned fundamental right is not violated. **Issue 3:** Article 300A Validity: The Counsels argued that the majority of the properties, including the “Sapru House” building, were primarily constructed with funds provided by the Government over time. The general public had just leasehold freedoms over the land that stood. As a result, there was no violation of Article 300A when private property was taken away. **Issue 4:** There is no malice: The Counsels vehemently denied the allegations of malicious intent and argued that the takeover was based on the recommendations of parliamentary committees to revive the organization in light of its declining standards and growing mismanagement over time. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** The Constitution of India 1950 – Article 14,19(1)(a),19(1)(c) and 300A 1. Article 14 – [\[1\]](#_ftn1)The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth 2. Article 19(1)(a) – Guarantees the right to freedom of speech and expression. 3. Article 19(1)(c) – Guarantees the right to form associations or unions.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) 4. Article 300A – States that no person shall be deprived of his property save by the authority of law.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI-** - The following is a summary of the case’s ratio decidendi, or legal principle, that served as the basis for the decision, based on the issues raised and analysis conducted in the judgment: simple claims of political malevolence or colorable activity of abilities are not significant in deciding the established legitimacy of regulation. - The question is whether the Legislature had the skills necessary to pass the law. According to Article 19(1)(a) and (c), freedom of speech and association does not guarantee that every association’s goal will be achieved. Accomplishing the reason for which an affiliation is framed is certainly not a basic right. - Taking over a foundation by regulation for motivations behind public significance is inside the authoritative ability given by Passages 62 and 63 of Rundown I. - If the society itself continues to function independently and without restrictions, such a takeover of an institution does not violate the fundamental rights of its members. - If the lease is terminated, properties built primarily with government funds cannot be claimed as private property by an association invoking Article 300A. - The authoritative capability of Parliament to order the reproduced regulation was not surpassed. Legislative malice or motives cannot be investigated so long as Parliament acts within its powers. - As a result, the ratio indicates that the ICWA institution’s takeover by the contested Act does not violate any Constitutional provision because it is fully covered by the legislative entries in the Seventh Schedule. **GUIDELINES** - Yes, the Supreme Court has given some guidelines while observing the issues raised in this case: - The test of reasonableness under Article 19 should be applied on a case-to-case basis considering all relevant factors like the nature of the right infringed, the purpose of the restriction, the extent of evil sought to be remedied, etc. - Freedom of association under Article 19(1)(c) does not guarantee the fulfillment of objectives of association. Associations cannot claim rights beyond what citizens enjoy. - The scope of Article 19(1)(a) cannot be expanded to include concomitant or peripheral rights. Only integral and core rights are protected. - Validity of the law restricting the association’s activities is to be tested under Article 19(1)(g) and not Article 19(1)(c) or Article 19(4). - Malafide intent or motives of legislature do not affect the validity of the law. The only test is legislative competence. - Properties constructed with government funds cannot be claimed as private under Article 300A if the lease is terminated as per law. - Takeover of the institution for national importance is valid if covered by legislative entries even if it affects the associated body/trust. - Merely replacing the ordinance with law does not make a challenge to the ordinance infructuous, if the same issues exist in both. - In determining validity, the court must balance individual rights and government interests in smooth administration. - So in summary, the case provides guidelines on the interpretation of the scope of Article 19 rights and principles to examine legislative competency and validity of laws affecting fundamental rights. **OBITER DICTA** There are a few obiter dicta or observations made by the court in the course of the judgment that were not central to the ratio decidendi: While examining the extent of Article 19(1)(a), the court mentioned its past decisions in Maneka Gandhi v Association of India (1978) and the All India Bank Workers Affiliation case (1962) to explain that the opportunity of affiliation does exclude satisfaction of affiliation’s goals as a surefire right. It saw that simple substitution of a statute by regulation doesn’t make the test to the mandate infructuous if similar issues exist in both. The legal merits of the issues must be considered. The court expounded on the twin tests set down in the past to look at legitimacy under Article 19: trial of sensibility and whether the limitation falls in statements 2–6. In applying the test of reasonableness on a case-by-case basis, it noted the significance of factors like the nature of the right, the purpose of the restriction, and the extent of evil. The ratio, on the other hand, is limited to ensuring that Parliament has the authority to take over the relevant institution without affecting the rights or activities of the associated society. During the process, no previous precedents were overturned. The observations helped with the analysis, but they weren’t necessary for the decision. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** In Dharam Dutt & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., the Supreme Court reached the following conclusions: When the Act replaced the Ordinance, the challenge became unsuccessful and was dismissed without merit. The legitimacy of just the demonstration was analyzed. The demonstration falls within the authoritative ability of Parliament given under Sections 62 and 63 of Rundown I, which permits the statement of establishments as of public significance. According to Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(c), the Act’s sole takeover of the ICWA institution does not in any way restrict the freedoms of the ICWA Society or its members. The general public remains unaffected. The Society’s buildings were mostly built with money from the government, so they were not private properties. Subsequently, there was no violation of Article 300A by moving properties to the new body. Legislation’s validity is determined solely by legislative competence, not by allegations of malice or political motives. The Act is subject to the permissible restrictions outlined in Articles 19(2) to 19(6) and does not impose any unreasonable restrictions on any fundamental rights. Parliament acted to the extent of its authoritative capability presented by the Constitution in establishing the upbraided Act. As a result, the petitioners’ writ petitions challenging the Indian Council of World Affairs Act were denied by the Supreme Court, which upheld the Act’s constitutionality. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred-** - Maneka Gandhi v Association of India (1978) - All India Bank Employees case (1962) **Important Statutes Referred** - Constitution of India, 1950 - Entries 62 and 63 of List I in the Seventh Schedule (discussing powers on Parliament about institutions of national importance) - Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 19(1)(c) and 300A (dealing with fundamental rights) **ENDNOTES** [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 14. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) The constitution of India ,1950, Art.19. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The constitution of India ,1950, Art.300A. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [14th National Quiz on Indian Constitutional Law & Indian Polity by LawFoyer: Register by 14th August](https://lawfoyer.in/14th-national-quiz-on-indian-constitutional-law-indian-polity-by-lawfoyer/) **Published:** July 2, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/14th-quiz-poster-Medium-724x1024.png) --- [Final Answer Key](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Final-Answer-Key.pdf) ## **Clarifications in Answer Key (Released)** **Claimed Question Number****Previous Answer Key****Updated Answer Key**Q 46D(A & B both)- No such option present. 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(This includes time for filling the basic details like Name, email, etc.) - **Every question carries 04 marks & there will be no negative marking.** - The Result will be declared on **18th August 2024** ([www.lawfoyer.in](https://lawfoyer.in/)). --- ## Register Now --- --- **Categories:** Events, Quiz --- ### [State of Uttaranchal V. Balwant Singh Chaufal (2010) 3 SCC 402](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-uttaranchal-v-balwant-singh-chaufal-2010-3-scc-402/) **Published:** August 24, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Ishika Goyal** **Edited by: Sulesh Choudhary & Madhumita Saha** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The case of State of Uttaranchal vs Balwant Singh Chaufal & Ors revolves around the appointment of the advocate L.P Nathani as the Advocate General. The PIL was filed by the state, questioning the decision of the state regarding the qualifications in the appointment of the Advocate General that whether the criteria given is constitutional or not and for this article 165 and Article 217 of the Indian Constitution that was cited in court by petitioner. The case centered on whether Nathani should hold the office and if the age limit for the Advocate General should be adhered to. The age restriction is imposed on High Court justices by Article 217. Whereas, it implies that the age should not apply to the appointment of Advocate General, the Supreme Court said. Furthermore, the case instituted novel protocols for submitting Public Interest Litigations (PILs), resulting in notable modifications to the PIL filing process. This decision encouraged the more responsible and sincere use of PILs by streamlining the procedure for filing them and clarifying the guidelines for the Advocate General’s appointment. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*:** 1. Advocate General 2. High Court - Public Interest Litigation 1. Article 165 2. Article 217 **CASE DETAILS** The case details are as the follows: ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name***State of Uttaranchal vs Balwant Singh Chaufal & Ors. ***ii)* *Case Number***Civil Appeal Nos. 1134-1135 of 2002 ***iii)* *Judgement Date***18th January 2010 ***iv)* *Court***Supreme Court of India ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench***Justices Mukundakam Sharma, Dalveer Bhandari ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges***Justice Dalveer Bhandari ***vii)* *Citation***AIR 2010 SC 2550, 2010 AIR SCW 1029***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved***Indian Constitution, article 165, article 217, writ petition**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** In this case, the rules governing the high court’s advocate general’s nomination are in question. Even the Government of State Uttaranchal has even lodged a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) to challenge to the decision that was made by the High Court on Nathani’s appointment. The government questioned the qualifications and eligibility standards, especially the maximum age limit for these advocates’ judicial appointments. Numerous of these issues were addressed by the Supreme Court. Article 2017 states that the requirements for High Court judges should not apply to the Advocate General’s age restriction. This ruling made it clear what the Advocate General’s specific responsibilities are, guaranteeing that their appointment procedure is separate from the laws governing High Court justices. Article 165 and 217 of the Indian constitution were the most highlighted which talks about the appointment of the judge of the high court and their term of offices.This case also set guidelines for filing the public interest litigation and bringing a revolution in Pil in India. **FACTS OF THE CASE** **Procedural Background of the Case** The case does not appeal against the decision of the Uttaranchal High Court in form of a public interest litigation (PIL). **Factual Background of the Case** Advocate L.P Nathani was appointed as the Advocate General of Uttaranchal and his decision was challenged by the state in the form of Public Interest Litigation. It has been challenged under Article 165 read with Article 217 of the Constitution of India. They wrote a petition asking whether Nathan should hold the office or not. Additionally, the Article 165 and 217 deals with appointment of the Advocate General in India and it also provides guidelines and qualifications for the same which shall be followed judiciously. It was also argued that whether a person beyond the age of 62 can be the Advocate General or not. The High Court in this matter ordered that the state government shall review their decision again and report to the High Court within the time limit of 15 days. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether there is an age limit for a High Court judge to be appointed as an Advocate General? 2. whether L.P Nathani was to hold the office or not as the Advocate General? **PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS** It was submitted by the petitioner that the Advocate General’s appointment is made at the time when the High Court Judges’ age limit is not applicable. This was debated by citing earlierrulings. Conversely, the appellant emphasized that the Advocate General should be appointed without regard to age. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** It was showed that the respondent was not serious in the case. They did not appear for the case in the Supreme Court which resulted in court questioning the same thing regarding the appointment. This portrayed them as the non-serious party through which the case was not much in their favour. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** **ARTICLE 165: “Advocate General for the State** 1. The Governor of each State will designate an individual to serve as the State’s Advocate-General who meets the requirements to be appointed as a High Court Judge. 2. The Advocate General’s responsibilities include providing the State Government with legal advice on matters of this nature, carrying out other legal tasks as they may be delegated to him by the Governor from time to time. Furthermore, carrying out any furthermore tasks that was assigned to him by the help of the Constitution & any other law currently is in effect. 3. The Governor may decide how much money the Advocate General will get and he or she will serve in that capacity. [\[1\]](#_ftn1) ### **ARTICLE 217: “Appointment and conditions of the office of a Judge of a High Court** 2. To be eligible for appointment as a judge of the Supreme Court, an individual must be an Indian citizen and fulfill one of the following criteria: They must have either (a) held a judicial position inside the boundaries of India for a minimum of ten years or more, or (b) worked as an advocate for a High Court or two or more of these courts in succession for a minimum of ten years. [\[2\]](#_ftn2) ### **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** In this case, the Supreme Court decided in the appellant’s favour, holding that the Advocate General’s appointment age should not be limited to the High Court judges’ age limit as stated in Article 217. The Advocate General’s appointment procedures are different from those for High Court justices, the court made clear. Consequently, the Supreme Court determined that the Advocate General is not constrained by the age limitations imposed on justices of the High Court. The decision guarantees that the standards for choosing an Advocate General will remain distinct and unaffected by the laws governing the High Court. This difference acknowledges the special position & responsibilities of the Advocate General and permits more latitude in the appointment process. **OBITER DICTA** The court has also maintained that the employment of private lawsuits (PILs) have burdened the legal system excessively. Whereas, He has also pointed out that even though PILs are supposed to address matters of public interest, a lot of them are filed for frivolous or selfish purposes. This abuse backlogs the courts, causing delays and taking focus away from actual problems that need prompt solution. In order to make sure that PILs actually serve the public interest, the court stressed the need of preserving their integrity and demanded stringent oversight. The primary goal of Public Interest Litigations (PILs), which is to uphold justice in the public interest, is compromised when PILs are misused, in addition to destroying important judicial tools. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The Supreme Court ruled that the duration of the sentence in Article 217 does not apply to the Advocate General. Although, This is because the Law has a specific term of the Attorney General in the third part of Article 165. Nevertheless, this implies that the Attorney General serves at the governor’s leisure. The Court further stated that the Advocate General is exempt from the salary and tenure regulations that govern Supreme Court judges. He clarified that the role of Advocate General is incompatible with the retirement age of Supreme Court judges. The court determined that this request, which surfaced as a public matter, constituted an abuse of the legal system. As a result, the application was denied and the petitioner was had to pay charges of Rs 10,000. In order to prevent judicial system misuse, the Court also suggested non-monetary penalties for PILs filed on other grounds. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** 1. Ghanshyam Chandra Mathur v. The State of Rajasthan & Ors 2. Dr Chandra Bhan Singh v. State of Rajasthan & Ors 3. M.C Mehta & Another v. Union of India & Others AIR 1987 SC 549 4. Rural Litigation an Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P., AIR 1985 SC 652 5. Atlas Cycle Industries v. Their Workmen, 1962 Supp. (3) SCR 89 6. G.D Karkare v. T.L. Shevde, AIR 1952 Nagpur 330 **Important Statutes Referred** 1. Constitution of India (Article 165 and Article 217) 2. Public Interest Litigation **Citations:** 1. [**https://bnblegal.com/landmark/state-uttaranchal-vs-balwant-singh-chaufal-others/**](https://bnblegal.com/landmark/state-uttaranchal-vs-balwant-singh-chaufal-others/) 2. [**https://law.asia/court-cracks-down-on-abuse-of-public-interest-litigation/**](https://law.asia/court-cracks-down-on-abuse-of-public-interest-litigation/) **ENDNOTES** [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) [Article 165](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1673997/), Constitution of India [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) [Article 217](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1682952/), Constitution of India **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Waman Rao and Ors VS. Union of India](https://lawfoyer.in/waman-rao-and-ors-vs-union-of-india/) **Published:** August 24, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Jigyasa Rathore** **Edited by: Sulesh Choudhary & Madhumita Saha** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE:** This Judgement Waman Rao and Ors VS. Union of India, addresses the constitutional validity of the Maharashtra Agriculture Lands (Ceiling on holding) Acts, 1961, and its following amendments. The act imposes the ceiling on agricultural landholdings to promote agrarian reforms and reduce land concentration. The Hon’ble High Court, Bombay upheld the Act which asserts that doesn’t contravene the fundamental rights given in the Indian Constitution under Part III, protected under the Ninth schedule. The petitioner Challenged that the amendments created an artificial definition of the “family unit” contravening the 2nd provision of Article 31A(1) and violating Articles 14 and 19. Their argument was based on the damaging of the Fundamental rights by these provisions. On the other side, the respondents claimed that the laws are constitutionally valid, and secured by Articles 31A and 31B. This judgment declared that the legislature’s prerogative in agrarian matters, deciding that the amendments made did not damage the constitution’s basic structure. Consequently, the petition challenging the act’s validity were dismissed, reinforcing the Act’s role in facilitating the equitable land distribution in Maharashtra. **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name***WAMAN RAO AND ORS VS. U.O.I ***ii)* *Case Number***1156/2010 ***iii)* *Judgement Date***13th November 1981 ***iv)* *Court***Hon’ble Apex Court ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench***Hon’ble Justice Y Chandrachud, Hon’ble Justice A Sen, Hon’ble Justice P Bhagwati, Hon’ble Justice P Tulzapurkar, Hon’ble Justice Y K Iyer. ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges***N/A ***vii)* *Citation***Waman Rao vs. U.O.I (1981) 2SCC 362***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved***Article 14, Article 31A,B, 31C, Article 368, Section 3,4,6,9,10,11,13 of Maharashtra Agriculture Lands Act, 1961**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT:** The Maharashtra Agricultural Land,1961 is a part of wider agrarian reforms focused on encouraging social justice and land inequalities. The act sought to limit the maximum area of agricultural land that could be owned by persons and families, as a consequence facilitating the redistribution of surplus land to homeless agriculturists. This Act also defines a “family unit” to determine the ceiling which includes the landlords, their spouse, and their children. Over time various amendments have been made to refine these definitions and modify ceiling limits. This Act has faced legal challenges on grounds of infringing fundamental rights enriched in the Indian Constitution specifically Articles 14 and 19. The petitioner argued that the amendments created artificial definitions of “family units” and weakened the basic structure of the Indian constitution. The Hon’ble Bombay High Court was tasked with assessing the constitutionality of the Act and its amendments, particularly in light of Articles 31A and 31B, which protect agrarian reform laws included in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution. This ruling is significant not merely for its connotation on land reform but also for its simplification of the relationship between legislative actions and constitutional provisions. It reinforces the legislature’s authority to enact laws aimed at social welfare while navigating the complexities of individual rights. **FACTS OF CASE** **Procedural Background of the Case** 1. Initiated: The case was initiated by 2606 petitioners who filed writ petitions on the constitutional validity of the Maharashtra Agricultural Land Act, 1961, and its subsequent Amendments. The petitioners contended that the amendments in the act violated their fundamental rights under the Constitution of India. 1. Filing of Writ Petition: The writ petition, numbered Writ Petition No. 1156/2010, was filed in the Hon’ble Bombay High Court. The petitioners sought comfort against the provisions of the Above-said act that they alleged enforced unreasonable restrictions on their fundamental rights to retain and maintain agricultural land. **Factual Background of the Case** The factual background of the case encircling the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands Act, 1961, centres on the legislative goal to site land inequality in Maharashtra by striking ceilings on agricultural landholdings. Decreed to foster equitable distribution, the Act defines a “family unit” to identify the ownership limits, encompassing the landholder, their spouse, and their dependent children. Over time, several amendments have been presented, particularly altering the definition of the “family unit” and modifying ceiling limits, which incited legal conflicts between individuals and families. The petitioners disputed that these reforms violated their fundamental rights under Articles 14 and Article19 of the Indian Constitution and that the definitions were unbiased and authoritarian. However, the State of Maharashtra shielded the above-mentioned Act as a necessary step for social justice and agrarian reform, highlighting its integration in the Ninth Schedule, which assigns it immunity from judicial oversight. The case was placed before the Hon’ble Bombay High Court, where the court was tasked with evaluating the constitutional review of this Act and its modifications, eventually addressing the critical balance between the state’s role in fostering equitable territorial arrangements and individual owernship rights. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Constitutionality and Rights Violations: Petitioners interrogated the constitutional legitimacy of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, and bickered its provisions, particularly the descriptions of the “family unit,” infringed fundamental rights under Articles 14 (Equality Rights) and 19 (freedom to purchase property/land), leading to authoritarian and unbiasness outcomes. 2. Judicial Inspection and Parliamentary Privilege: The case evoked problems in connection with the Act’s consolidation in the Ninth Schedule, with petitioners resisting that this protection should not protect laws that violate basic human rights, spotlighting the need for judicial inspection to endorse the core structure of the Constitution of India. **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS:** 1. The counsels for Petitioners/Appellants submitted and argued that the amendments created an artificial ‘family unit’ and violated the 2nd provision to Article 31A(1). 2. They asserted that the laws violated their basic human rights under Articles 14 and 19 of the Indian Constitution. 3. The petitioners challenged that Articles 31A and 31B infringe the core structure of the Indian Constitution. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The Respondent’s counsel presented and bickered that the respondents maintained that the impeached statutes were sheltered under Articles 31A and 31B, which safeguard statutes in the 9th Schedule from constitutional dilemmas. 2. They argued that the legislature had the authority to define the policy related to agrarian reforms without judicial interference. 3. The respondents asserted that the amendments aimed to facilitate agrarian reform and did not violate fundamental rights. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** *Maharashtra Agricultural Lands Act, 1961:* 1. *“**Family Unit**: Includes the landholder, their spouse, and their children for deciding the ceiling.”* 2. *“**Determination of Surplus Land**: Establishes a process for identifying land that exceeds the prescribed ceiling.”* 3. *“**Acquisition of Surplus Land:** Grants the government authority to acquire surplus land and situate it accordingly.”* 4. *“**Compensation:** Outlines the compensation mechanism for acquiring land.”* 5. *“**Penalties:** Specifies penalties for non-compliance with the provision of the Act.”[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)* ***Articles of the Indian Constitution:*** ***“Article 14:*** *Assures the right to equality before the law and equal defence of the laws”.* ***“Article 19:*** *Safeguards the freedom of speech and expression, assembly, association, movement, residence, and profession”.* ***“Article 31A:*** *Safeguards against the acquisition of property without compensation, specifically for laws aimed at agrarian reform**”**.* ***“Article 31B:*** *Shields laws included in the Ninth Schedule from judicial review, protecting them from challenges based on fundamental rights**”**.[**\[2\]**](#_ftn2)* **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** In its judgment regarding the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands Act, 1961, the court upheld the validity of the Act, reaffirming the state’s authority to enact agrarian reform laws aimed at equitable land distribution and promoting social justice. It ruled that while property rights are fundamental and it is subject to reasonable restrictions to the public interest, deeming the definitions and provisions of the Abovementioned Act, including the “family unit,” as necessary for achieving its purpose. The Hon’ble Court verified that the laws included in the Ninth Schedule enjoy immunity from judicial review when serving a legitimate state interest and not infringing on the Constitution’s basic structure. Ultimately, the court emphasized the need to balance personnel property rights with the state’s interest in social welfare, justifying the Act’s restrictive measures in light of broader societal objectives. **OVERRULING JUDGMENTS** 1. *“Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975)”,* 2. *“Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)”* [***\[i\]***](#_edn1) **OBITER DICTA** In the judgment concerning the “*Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961*”, the court’s obiter dicta highlighted several important considerations regarding the balance between individual rights and state interests. The court illustrates that while property rights are fundamental, they must be viewed within the context of social justice and the need for equitable land distribution. It emphasized the role of the state in addressing historical inequalities and the necessity of legislative measures to achieve this goal. In addition, the Hon’ble Court remarked on the importance of public welfare in justifying the limitation on property rights, proposing that such measures are essential for encouraging a more equitable society. These observations, while not central to the decision, provide valuable insights into the court’s prospect on the broader implications of agrarian reform and the responsibility of state in promoting social equity. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment on the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961, has been widely regarded as a significant affirmation of the state’s role in promoting social justice through agrarian reform. Legal scholars and higher judicial personnel have praised the court for balancing individual property rights with the imperative of equitable land distribution, recognizing the historical context of land ownership in India. Comments from legal experts highlight the judgment’s reinforcement of the principle that [\[ii\]](#_edn2)legislative measures aimed at social welfare are essential for addressing systemic inequalities. Furthermore, the decision has been seen as a vital precedent that underscores the importance of the Ninth Schedule in protecting laws designed for public benefit from judicial scrutiny, thereby enhancing the state’s capacity to implement progressive reforms. Overall, the judgment is viewed as a landmark ruling that reflects a commitment to both constitutional values and the pursuit of social equity. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** *i.“Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975)”,* *ii “Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)”* **Important Statutes Referred** 1. As mentioned above. **ENDNOTES:** [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) *. Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961”* [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) The Indian Constitution. [\[i\]](#_ednref1) https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1124708/ [](#_ednref2) **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Kehar Singh And Another Vs. Union Of India & Another, (1989) AIR 653](https://lawfoyer.in/kehar-singh-and-another-vs-union-of-india-another-1989-air-653/) **Published:** June 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author:- Shadrack Chai Chivatsi, a law student at University of Nairobi** **Edited by:- Rutvij Vyas, a law student at the Faculty of Law, GLS University** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** - In this case, the Indian Supreme Court clearly discussed the President’s power under Article 72 of the Constitution of India to grant pardons in a Criminal offence (murder). Kehar Singh (plaintiff) was found guilty of participating in the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. He was given a death sentence after going through all the valid legal processes. Filed his plea for clemency but it was rejected by the President of India. The main legal issue was whether the President’s denial of the mercy plea could be legally contested and if the President had a responsibility to hold a face-to-face hearing before making a decision. The Court’s ruling confirmed that the President’s authority under Article 72 is a constitutional obligation that courts cannot nullify solely based on the decision unless there is clear evidence of excessively capricious, vindictive, or unlawful behaviour. They stressed that the President has total discretion in this matter and cannot be reviewed by the judiciary. The Court also held that the President does not have to conduct a face-to-face meeting before deciding on a mercy plea. Although there is a common custom in place, it does not result in a legal requirement. In the end, the Court confirmed the President’s choice to deny Kehar Singh’s plea for mercy. This ruling confirmed the extensive and indisputable scope of the President’s pardoning authority as outlined in the Indian Constitution. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*:** Mercy Petition, Mala Fides, Judicial Review, President Power of Pardon**,** Assassination, Death Penalty. - **CASE DETAILS** - ***Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** **Kehar Singh And Another vs Union Of India And Another**- ***Case Number*** NA- ***Judgement Date*** 16 December, 1988- ***Court*** **Supreme Court of India**- ***Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** R.S. Pathak, E.S. Venkataramiah, Misra Rangnath, N.D. Ojha- ***Author / Name of Judges*** R.S. Pathak- ***Citation*** 1989 AIR 653, 1988 SCR SUPL. (3)1102, AIR 1989 SUPREME COURT 653, 1989 (1) SCC 204, 1988 (4) JT 693, 1989 CURCRIJ 108, 1989 SCC (CRI) 86, (1989) EASTCRIC 304, (1989) PAT LJR 23, (1989) ALLCRIC 142, (1989) BLJ 463, (1989) 1 CRIMES 238, (1989) 37 DLT 171- ***Legal Provisions Involved*** Constitution of India, Indian Penal Code, Case Laws. - **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** Presidential Pardon is a constitutional right of India provided under Article 72 of the Indian constitution. However, it is not absolute and it is exercised with caution without interfering with the autonomy of separation of powers doctrine. The issue of separation of power has been in contention for a very long time. Who has more decisive power than who? Lord Acton alluded to, perhaps one of the earliest and most influential statements in political and legal thought. He conceives that power tends to corrupt an absolute power corrupts absolutely. - **FACTS OF THE CASE** - **Procedural Background of the Case** - - - - - Kehar Singh was convicted and sentenced to death by the trial court for his involvement in the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. - Kehar Singh appealed his conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court, but the appeal was dismissed. - Kehar Singh then filed a Review Petition in the Supreme Court, which was also dismissed on September 7, 1988. - After the Review Petition was dismissed, Kehar Singh’s son filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court, which was also dismissed. - On October 14, 1988, Kehar Singh’s son presented a petition to the President of India seeking a pardon for Kehar Singh under Article 72 of the Constitution. - **Factual Background of the Case** - Kehar Singh was convicted and sentenced to death under Section 120-B (criminal conspiracy) read with Section 302 (murder) of the Indian Penal Code, in connection with the assassination of the then Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi. - Kehar Singh’s appeal against the conviction and sentence was dismissed by the Supreme Court. His review petition was also dismissed. - Kehar Singh’s son later filed a petition before the President of India under Article 72 of the Constitution, seeking a pardon for Kehar Singh on the ground that the evidence established his innocence and the court’s verdict was erroneous. - **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** - Whether the President can enter into the merits of a case decided finally by the Supreme Court? - Whether the petitioner is entitled to an oral hearing from the President in a petition invoking the powers under Art. 72? - **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** - The learned counsels for Petitioner submitted that to prevent an arbitrary exercise of power under Art. 72 this Court should draw up a set of guidelines for regulating the exercise of the power. - According to counsel for the petitioner, there was sufficient indication in the terms of Art. 72 and in the history of the power enshrined in that provision as well as existing case laws that were binding, and also specific guidelines needed not be spelled out. - They further argued that, it was not possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelized guidelines, and the power under Article 72 was of the widest amplitude, can contemplate a myriad kinds and categories of cases with facts and situations varying from case to case in which the merits and reasons of State may be profoundly assisted by prevailing occasion and passing time. They also agreed to the fact that it is of great significance that the function itself enjoys a high status in the constitutional scheme. - **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** - The learned counsels for Respondent submitted that the President had not declined to consider the evidence presented during the criminal case. However, the court did not agree with this assertion based on the contents of the petition and the copies of the oral evidence provided. - The counsel’s argument was challenged by the court’s interpretation of the documents, indicating that the President had not effectively considered the evidence from the criminal case in the context of the pardon petition under Article 72 of the Indian Constitution. - **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** **Constitution of India** - **Article 72** , “This Article deals with the President’s power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of any offence.” **Case Laws** - ***D. Choudhary v. Union of India, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 600:*** This case is cited for the proposition that the exercise of the President’s power under Article 72 is not open to judicial review on the merits. - ***Maru Ram v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 107***: This case is cited for the principle that no guidelines need to be laid down for the exercise of the President’s power under Article 72. - ***Epuru Sudhakar v. Govt. of A.P., (2006) 8 SCC 161***: This case is cited with regard to the scope of judicial review of the President’s power under Article 72. **Indian Penal Code** - **Section 120-B**: This section deals with criminal conspiracy. It states that “Punishment of criminal conspiracy.—(1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, \[imprisonment for life\] or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence.(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both.” - **Section 302**: This section deals with the offense of murder. It states that “Punishment for murder.— Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or \[imprisonment for life\], and shall also be liable to fine.” - **JUDGEMENT** - **RATIO DECIDENDI** - The Supreme Court held that the President’s power under Article 72 of the Constitution to grant pardons, reprieves, etc. is a constitutional responsibility that cannot be interfered with by the courts on the merits. - The court reiterated that the President’s discretion under Article 72 is unfettered and not subject to judicial review, except on limited grounds of arbitrariness, mala fides, or unconstitutionality. - The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the President should have granted an oral hearing before deciding the mercy petition, stating this was not required by the “well-established practice” regarding such petitions. - The court upheld the President’s decision to reject the mercy petition filed on behalf of Kehar Singh. - - **OBITER DICTA (IF ANY)** - The Supreme Court observed that the President’s power under Article 72 extends to cases where the judicial process has come to an end. - The court noted that the President can take into account several factors, including the nature of the crime, the background of the convicted person, and the circumstances of the case, while deciding on a mercy petition. - The Supreme Court acknowledged the gravity of the crime committed by Kehar Singh in the assassination of the Prime Minister. - **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** “And it is of great significance that the function itself enjoys high status in the constitutional scheme. The order of the President cannot be subjected to judicial review on its merit”. In Epuru Sudhakar Case the immunity of the pardoning power of governor from judicial review came up. “In every government there are three sorts of power: the legislative; the executive in respect of things dependent on the law of nations; and the executive in regard to matters that depend on civil law. By virtue of the first, the prince or magistrate enacts temporary or perpetual laws and amends or abrogates those that have already been enacted. By the second, he makes peace or war, sends or receives embassies, establishes the public security, and provides against invasions. By the third, he punishes criminals, or determines the disputes that arise between individuals. The latter we shall call the judiciary power, and the other simply the executive power of the state.” The President’s dedication to ensuring the law is applied equally deserves acknowledgment. This fundamental legal principle guarantees that every person, regardless of their status or rank in society, undergoes the same legal processes and consequences for their behaviour. This is especially significant in cases of possible human rights violations, which frequently arise from authorities abusing their power. - **REFERENCES** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA(M) VS BHARAT KUMAR & ORS AIR (1998) 1 SCC 201](https://lawfoyer.in/communist-party-of-indiam-vs-bharat-kumar-ors-air-1998-1-scc-201/) **Published:** June 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** Auhtor: Gopika Khatri,UNIVERSITY OF PETROLEUM AND ENERGY STUDIES. Edited By: Pooja, Rayat College Of Law,Railmajra (Affiliated to Panjab University, Chandigarh). **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** In the landmark case of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) vs. Bharat Kumar & Ors (1997), the Supreme Court of India addressed the constitutional validity of organizing and enforcing “bandhs” (general strikes). The core issue revolved around whether such actions infringed upon the fundamental rights of citizens, particularly the right to freedom and livelihood. The Court held that bandhs, which forcibly prevent citizens from engaging in their daily activities, violate fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 of the Constitution, which guarantee freedom of speech and expression and protection of life and personal liberty, respectively. The judgment emphasized that while peaceful protests are permissible, the coercive nature of bandhs, causing widespread disruption and economic loss, cannot be justified under any circumstances. Consequently, the Court affirmed that state governments have the authority to impose reasonable restrictions to prevent such disruptions and protect public order. This decision marked a significant step in balancing the right to protest with the need to maintain public order and protect individual rights, setting a precedent for the regulation of political activities in India. ***Keywords: –* BANDH, FREEDOM OF SPEECH EXPRESSION, PUBLIC ORDER, RIGHT TO LIFE AND PERSONAL LIBERTY, FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT** **CASE DETAILS** ***Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** The Communist Party Of India(M) vs Bharat Kumar&Ors ***Case Number*** (1998)1SCC201 ***Judgement Date*** 12/11/1997 ***Court*** THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA ***Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** Three-judge bench of the S.C. comprising of J.S. Verma, C.J., B.N. Kirpal and V.N. Khare JJ. heard the present case (appeal). ***Author / Name of Judges*** Justice B.N. KIRPAL, Justice V.N. KHARE ***Citation*** \[(1998) 1 SCC 201: AIR 1998 SC 184\] ***Legal Provisions Involved*** Article19(1)(a),Article19(1)(b),Article19(1)(c),Article21,Public order and governance **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** Civil disobedience hartals and bandhs are common in India because they are recognized as well well-known method of expressing attention of gov on specific demands made by the community and compelling the government to give in to the demands. **According to this case asking for and enforcing a bandh is illegal, as Striking or Hartal.** **FACTS OF THE CASE** **Procedural Background of the Case** - Initiation of the case: – The legal proceedings were initiated by Bharat Kumar and others who filed a public interest litigation. - High court proceedings: – The legality of the bandh called by political parties in the context of their impact on public life and public property, was before the Kerala High Court. - Judgement by Kerala High Court: – They ruled that bandhs are unconstitutional as they infringe on the fundamental rights of citizens, particularly the right of freedom of movement, and conduct business. - Appeal to the Hon’ble Supreme Court: – CPM and others knocked on the doors of the Supreme Court and challenged the order of Kerala High Court proceedings in the Supreme Court. **Factual Background of the Case** - In this case, the Petitioners were two private individuals and the Chambers of Commerce in the State of Kerala. The State of Kerala, Director General of Police and five registered All India political parties were made respondents. This was on the ground that bandhs should be held unconstitutional as they violate Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution and also because they are inconsistent with the Directive Principles of State Policy and the Fundamental Duties laid down in the Constitution. The petitioners also prayed that the calling and enforcing of bandhs should be declared a crime under the Indian Penal Code. - The Kerala High Court held that the calling for a bandh by any association, organisation or political party and its enforcement, is illegal and unconstitutional. The court also held that the groups that organize and carry out these bandhs are accountable for paying back the government, the general public, and private citizens for any losses they incur as a result of the destruction of both public and private property. In a decision that was upheld on appeal, the Supreme Court simply stated that the High Court’s reasoning was sound and that their intervention was not required. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** - Whether call for a bandh is distinctive from the call for a strike or a Hartal? - Whether there exists a fundamental right of political parties to call or enforce a Bandh under Article 19(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution? - Whether calling or enforcement of a bandh infringes Articles 19(1)(g), 19(1)(d) and 21 of the citizens? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** - Counsel for the petitioners argued that the calling of a bandh by the political parties must necessarily result in a blanket imposition of various restrictions upon the rights of the citizens under Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(d) and 21 of the Constitution. Citizens are equally circumscribed in their right to pursue their avocations. - Bandhs, if observed are a loss of a day of production and hence the economy of the country. They further argued that the political parties cannot assert their right to call bandhs and strikes to protest whatever they want to as their fundamental right under Article 19(1) since it impinges on the fundamental rights of the other citizens on the whole. They further argued that the political parties cannot also seek their right to strike and bandhs under Article 19(1) as fundamental rights while ignoring the fundamental rights of other citizens. However, this right does not give a freeway to political parties to exercise the same in any way, in as much as which renders the fundamental rights of others violated. - Further, they argued that political parties cannot exercise their “right to bandhs and strikes as part of their fundamental rights under Article 19(1) at the expense of the fundamental rights of the other citizens. Related to this there is a corollary: This does not mean the political parties have a freeway to do so, in as much as they do this their fundamental rights are violated consequently. A bandh call curtails the freedom of movement for the general population and thus should be made illegal, they argued. They further submitted that when a bundh is called, it necessarily means that there would be destruction to property, safety of human lives and other things done either impliedly and/or expressly can ensue on the streets which thereby impairs the citizen in the free enjoyment of their Fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(a), (d), and (g) and Article 21. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsel on behalf of the appellant in this case contended that the right to call for or holding of a bandh is a fundamental right protected under Article 19(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution and any restriction on the same would amount to a violation of the fundamental rights of the political parties or of every citizen comprising that party, in this case. - Moreover, they also disputed and denied the respondent/petitioner’s assumption that all bandhs expressly call for violence as such assumption is general and lacks logical basis. - They contended that the mere calling of a bandh for peaceful purposes cannot be declared unconstitutional or illegal. - Furthermore, they argued that only the State had the authority to restrict the freedoms granted under Article 19 via the imposition of reasonable restrictions. Therefore, the Court has no authority to do the same. - The appellants further contended that Article 19(1)(a) grants to every citizen a fundamental right to strike, protest and the right to civil disobedience. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** - *“Article 19(1)(a): All citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression.”* - *“Article19(1)(b): All citizens shall have the right to assemble peaceably and without arms.”* - *“Article19(1)(c): All citizens shall have the right to form associations or unions or co-operative societies.”* - *“Article19(3): Nothing in sub-clause (b) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause.”* - *“Article19(1)(d): All citizens shall have the right to move freely throughout the territory of India.”* - *Article 19(4): Nothing in sub-clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevents the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause.* - *Article 21: No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”* **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** - The court granted leave to proceed the case and the arguments presented by Mr Harish Soli J. Sorabjee representing the appellant and Mr. Mathai M. Paideday who is the legal counsel for the respondents. - By keeping in view, The Public Order and Governance, Right to Life, Reasonable Restrictions and Natural Justice. The High Court held that bandhs are unconstitutional because they violate the fundamental rights of the citizens. **OBITER DICTA (IF ANY)** - The primary focus of the case was on the legality of bandhs that they are unconstitutional as they violate the fundamental rights of citizens, such as the right to freedom and the right to carry on any trade or business. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The Supreme Court of India’s ruling in the case of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) vs. Bharat Kumar & Others (1997) marked a significant judicial stance on the issue of bandh calls and their impact on public life. The Court concluded that bandhs, which involve the coercion of citizens to stop their activities and result in the shutdown of services, violate fundamental rights, particularly the right to freedom of movement and the right to carry on trade and business. The judgment emphasized that while the right to protest is essential in a democracy, it must not infringe upon the rights of others. The ruling reinforced the need for balancing political expression with public order and individual freedoms. It also highlighted the judiciary’s role in safeguarding constitutional rights against actions that disrupt the societal order and infringe upon personal liberties. This landmark decision has since served as a precedent in addressing similar issues of public disruption caused by political activities in India. **REFERENCES** - https://legalvidhiya.com/the-communist-party-of-india-m-vs-bharat-kumar-ors - https://frontline.thehindu.com/the-nation/article30193253.ece - https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1199182 - https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1218090/ **Important Cases Referred** - Railway Board v. Niranjan Singh 1969 AIR 9667 - Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India 1984 AIR 8028 - A.K. Gopalan v. State AIR 1950 SC 279 - Saghir Ahamad v. State AIR1961 ALL 507 10 - Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 59711 **Important Statutes Referred** - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA: – - Article19(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), - Article 21, - Article 32 - Article 226 **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1981 SC 746](https://lawfoyer.in/francis-coralie-v-union-territory-of-delhi-air-1981-sc-746/) **Published:** June 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Shalini Dhyani, Law Student at (Vasudev College of Law, Haldwani, Nainital**) **Edited By: Naman Jain, Law Student at Galgotias University** **ABSTRACT** The protection of human rights is one of the core principles of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Article 21 has been interpreted many times by the judiciary which has increased its scope. It includes the right to life with dignity. The right to life is not about mere animal existence or just physical survival but a life that must be greeted with dignity one cannot arbitrarily take away the right of another person. This case also deals with the prisoner’s right to life with dignity along with their detention. Preventive and punitive detention under article 22 is described in this case helps in identifying the difference between these two detentions and also considers the rights of the detained person. This case maintained the legacy of the Maneka Gandhi vs Union of India case while upholding the golden triangle that articles 14, 19, and 21. The case is again an interpretation of Article 21 and complies that Article 22 must be complied with Article 21. **Keywords:** Article 21, Preventive detention, The Constitution of India, Punitive detention, Rights of detained. **CASE DETAILS** **i) Judgement Cause Title / Case Name**Francis Coralie v. Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1981 SC 746 **ii) Case Number**Writ Petition No. 3402 of 1980 **iii) Judgement Date**13 January 1981 **iv) Court**The Supreme Court of India **v) Quorum / Constitution of Bench**Justice P.N. Bhagwati and Justice S. Murtaza Fazal Ali. **vi) Author / Name of Judges** Justice P.N. Bhagwati **vii) Citation**1981 (1) SCC 608**viii) Legal Provisions Involved**Conservation of Foreign Exchange & Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, Rule 559A and 550 of the Punjab Manual of the Superintendence and Management of Jails, and the Constitution of India Act 1950.**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** *“What are we having this liberty for? We have this liberty to reform our social system, which is full of inequality, discrimination, and other things, which conflict with our fundamental rights”* **B.R. Ambedkar[\[1\]](#_ftn1)** Fundamental rights are the basic human rights that have been incorporated into the Constitution of India. Part III of the Constitution of India deals with the fundamental rights. In the constitution, certain rights are mentioned explicitly. Judicial rulings, however, shaped some rights. Implied fundamental rights describe them. There can be no legislation passed that will handle all the essentials since they might not be enough to deal with what’s to come. On occasion, they even leave a void, which the idea of necessary implications sought to address. Consequently, the Supreme Court has emerged, in response to changing times and circumstances, to uphold these implicit fundamental rights, which are not explicitly stated in the Constitution.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Article 21 “No person shall be deprived of his right to life and personal liberty except according to procedure established by law”[\[3\]](#_ftn3) The right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is one of the important rights that has been interpreted by the judiciary several times in matters to widen its scope. It not only includes the right to life but also several rights such as the right to sleep, the right to a speedy trial, and the right to health, etc. In **Maneka Gandhi vs Union of India[\[4\]](#_ftn4)** article 21 has been interpreted especially the term ‘personal liberty’. Article 21 does not override Article 19, and the Supreme Court held that Article 21 and other parts of Part III of the Constitution must be applied to any legislation that restricts a person’s freedom. The Court established the Golden Triangle, which states that all rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution must be viewed in conjunction with one another and that no legislative act may violate any right guaranteed by Part III. Additionally, the Court granted the discretion to the judiciary to broaden the scope of the right to life as outlined in the Constitution to encompass several unenumerated rights, such as those of inmates, the safeguarding of women and children, and the preservation of the natural environment.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) The right to life and personal liberty does not include mere animal existence rather it incorporates the right to life with human dignity. This case also emphasizes the fundamental rights and legal rights available to detain a prisoner which are not deprived due to his incarceration. **FACTS OF THE CASE:** Francis Coralie, the petitioner was a British national and she was arrested and detained at the Tihar jail (central jail) as she was attempting to smuggle hashish out of the country. She was detained as per an order dated 23rd November 1979 issued under section 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange & Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act (COFEPOSA Act). A criminal was brought against her regard she challenged her detention by issuing the writ of habeas corpus through a petition but her petition was dismissed or rendered by the court through a judgment dated 27th February 1980 and as a result, she remained to be under detention in the central jail Tihar. The petitioner had tremendous hurdles in securing interviews with her attorney and family members while under arrest. Her daughter and sister were only allowed to meet her once a month, and she was not allowed to meet her daughter more frequently. The petitioner was facing a criminal procedure for attempting to transport hashish out of the country. To defend her, she needed to visit her lawyer. However, her lawyer struggled to arrange an interview due to the need for a prior appointment with the District Magistrate, Delhi, and the presence of a Customs Officer nominated by the Collector of Customs. This approach created tremendous hardship and trouble, and even after gaining an appointment, her lawyer could not have an interview with her. The petitioner was essentially denied the option of an interview with her counsel and her daughter.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) This restriction on interviews was established by the Prison Authorities by article 3 (b) sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of the Conditions of Detention handed down by the Delhi Administration under an Order dated 23rd August 1975 issued in exercise of the authority conferred under section 5 of the COFEPOSA Act. Thus, under Article 32 of the Constitution of India she filed a writ petition that challenges the constitutional validity of section 3(b) sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of the conditions of detention order stating that this section is violative of Article 14 and 21 of the constitution of India as it is unreasonable and arbitrary and further, she pleaded before the Administrator of the union territory of Delhi and Superintendent of the central jail, Tihar, to allow her to communicate with her counsel and family members. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether clauses 3(b)(i) and 3(b)(ii) of the Conditions of Detention Order constitutionally valid or not as it is violative of articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India? 2. Does preventing the detained or arrested person from communicating with his lawyer or family member constitute a violation of Article 22 of the Indian Constitution?[\[7\]](#_ftn7) 3. Whether Preventive detention is different from Punitive Detention? 4. Whether a person preventively confined in a prison have any rights that he can enforce in a Court of law?[\[8\]](#_ftn8) **ARGUMENTS ON THE BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER**: - The petitioner argued that allowing family interviews only once a month was discriminatory and unreasonable, given that under-trial prisoners were permitted to interview with friends and family twice a week under Rule 559A and convicted prisoners were allowed to interview with friends and family once a week under Rule 550 of the Manual for the Superintendence and Management of Jails in the Punjab. Additionally, the petitioner argued that Articles 14 and 21 were violated by the arbitrary and unreasonable necessity of a previous appointment for the interview and the presence of a Customs or Excise Officer at the interview. Article 22 of the Constitution guarantees the detenu the right to choose and be defended by a lawyer of his choosing. Consequently, she was entitled to the opportunity to speak with any attorney he wished to consult or to represent him in court. **ARGUMENTS ON THE BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT:** Respondent denied the contentions of the petitioner and stated that the restrictions placed on the petitioner were justifiable, fair, and reasonable and also argued that subclauses (i) and (ii) of clause 3 (b) did not violate article 14 and article 21. It was also stated that they would not object if the petitioner was allowed to interview her daughter and sister twice a week, as is the case for prisoners awaiting trial, in place of a monthly interview, and that they would not insist on having a customs or excise officer present during the lawyer-client meeting. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS:** - Section 3 of COFEPOSA Act: The conditions of detention in respect of classification and interviews shall be as under:- (b) Interviews: “Subject to the direction issued by the Administrator from time to time, permission for the grant of interviews with a detenu shall be granted by the District Magistrate, Delhi as under”:- Clause (i) and (ii): (i) Interview with legal adviser: “Interview with a legal adviser in connection with the defense of a detenu in a criminal case or regard to writ petitions and the like, may be allowed by prior appointment, in the presence of an officer of Customs/Central Excise/ Enforcement to be nominated by the local Collector of Customs/Central Excise or Deputy Director of Enforcement who sponsors the case for detention.”[\[9\]](#_ftn9) (ii) Interview with family members: “A monthly interview may be permitted for members of the family consisting of wife, children or parents of the detenu “.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) - Article 14: “The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India”.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) - Article 21: “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law”.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) - Article 22: protection against illegal arrest and detention. **JUDGMENT** **Issue 1:** While answering issue one is whether clauses 3(b)(i) and 3(b)(ii) of the Conditions of Detention Order are constitutionally valid or not as it being violative of articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, the court held that these clauses are violative of article 14 and 21 because under clause 3(b)(i) the procedure which is prescribed for having interview with legal adviser were causing great inconvenience as presence of an officer at the time of interview seems to be unreasonable. Thus, subclause (i) is violative of articles 14 and 21 and it was held void and unconstitutional. The court also held sub-clause (ii) violative of articles 14 and 21 as it was unreasonable and arbitrary to restrict the interview with family members to once a month in case of detenu when a detenu stands on a higher pedestal than an under-trial prisoner or a convict. The court also held that at least two interviews with relatives and friends in a week must be permitted while obtaining permission from the superintendent of the jail and the permission from district magistrate Delhi is not mandatory. **While addressing issues 2 and 3 the court held that:** The court relied on the **Maneka Gandhi vs Union of India** case where they relied on article 21 and stated that no person shall be deprived of his right to life and personal liberty except according to procedure established by law and the procedure must be fair, reasonable, nonarbitrary, and justifiable and is should not be based on whims and fancies. Preventive detention law not only passes the test of Article 22 but also of Article 21. It was held that a prisoner has a fundamental and legal right available to a free person to save those who are incapable of enjoyment because of incarceration. To understand the validity of the condition of detention it must be essential to know the difference between Preventive and Punitive Detention. In punitive detention when a person is found guilty of wrongdoing he is detained by way of punishment as a result of a trial where he has full opportunity to defend himself while preventive detention is not a way of punishment at all it is just intended to prevent a person from doing conduct that is harmful to the society, in preventive detention the person has limited power to defend himself. The court also relied on the case **Sampat Prakash vs State of Jammu and Kashmir[\[13\]](#_ftn13)** where it was held that “the restraints placed on a person preventively detained must, consistently with the effectiveness of detention, be minimal.”[\[14\]](#_ftn14) **While addressing issue 3** the court relied on the **Sunil Batra vs Delhi Administration[\[15\]](#_ftn15)** and stated that when someone enters prison, their fundamental rights do not go away, even though their size may decrease due to incarceration. Except for those that they are unable to exercise due to their detention, prisoners, also known as detenus, are entitled to all fundamental rights and other legal protections. Not only in India but also in America the rights of prisoners were also recognized under the case of Eve Pall, where Justice Doughlas gave a humanistic note that “ Unless their liberty has been constitutionally restricted through procedures that meet all due process requirements, prisoners are still persons entitled to all constitutional rights.” In conclusion or summarisation of this case it can be concluded that Regarding the detention law, it was decided that the preventative detention statute needed to meet both the requirements of Article 21 and Article 22. Given the unique qualities that set preventative custody apart from punitive imprisonment, the limitations imposed on a person detained for preventative purposes must be kept to a minimum by the effectiveness of detention. Deprivation protanto of this right to life would also result from any act that violates or diminishes human dignity, and such actions would need to follow a reasonable, equitable, and just process established by law that satisfies the requirements of other fundamental rights.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) **CRITICAL ANALYSIS:** The Court critically examined the importance of ‘life’, they not just only relied on life but instead focused on “life with dignity”, a life that is not just a mere animal existence or just a physical survival. It has been explained that any act that impairs human dignity would constitute deprivation pro tanto of this right to live and it would have to be by reasonability, fairness, and justifiability procedure that is established by law. Right to life includes the right to necessities of law and also such rights that constitute the bare minimum expression of the human self. Article 21 is somewhat related to Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 7 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights in a matter of the right to protection against torture, and cruel activities. Therefore as an essential component of the right to life with dignity a prisoner would be entitled to have interviews with his family members and no procedure regulating the right to have interviews can be held constitutionally valid unless that process or procedure is reasonably fair and just. The right to life with dignity also includes the right to personal liberty. Therefore it may regulate the right of a detenu to have an interview with a legal adviser in a just, fair, and reasonable manner and hence it has to be reminded that an unreasonable, unfair, arbitrary procedure for regulating such an interview cannot be prescribed and even if does it is violative of article 14 and 21. The court here relied on several case laws which are explained as follows: 21. **Maneka Gandhi vs Union India[\[17\]](#_ftn17):** This case overruled the A.K. Gopalan case and established the new dimension of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The court ruled that the semblance of a procedure prescribed by the law was insufficient to deprive an individual of their life or personal liberty. The procedure had to be reasonable, fair, and just. If it was not, the law would be deemed void for breaching the guarantee of Article 21. This revised interpretation of Article 21 has aided the Apex Court in its new capacity as India’s institutional Ombudsman for Human Rights.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) This case gave rise to several other cases to interpret Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 22. **H. Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra, (1978) 3 SCC 544[\[19\]](#_ftn19):** in this case, it has been reiterated that “Judicial justice, with its procedural complexities, legal submissions, and critical examination of evidence, depends on professional expertise; and where such supportive skill is absent for one side, a failure of equal justice under the law is imminent.” Gaining access to justice is essential to achieving all other legal and constitutional rights. It was also contended that the prisoners have the right to free legal aid as a fundamental right. 23. **Hussainara Khatoon vs State of Bihar[\[20\]](#_ftn20):** this case is related to the condition of the under-trial prisoners where it has been reiterated that the right to speedy trial is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 24. **Kharak Singh vs State of U. P[\[21\]](#_ftn21):** here Justice Subba Rao relied upon the quality of life under article 21 of the Constitution of India by reiterating the judgment from the case **Munn v. Illinois[\[22\]](#_ftn22) it was held that** “The meaning of “life” in this context goes beyond simple animal existence. All the limbs and faculties that enable one to enjoy life are protected from its deprivation. This clause also forbids disfiguring one’s body, amputating a limb, taking out one’s eye, or destroying any other bodily organ that serves as a conduit for communication between the soul and the outside world.”[\[23\]](#_ftn23) The court once again interpreted Article 21 and gave a distinction between preventive and punitive detention. The main question in the case is whether the Constitution protects a petitioner’s right to speak with their family and obtain legal counsel. The same legal rights, including fundamental rights, are accorded to free individuals as well as inmates. **In D.B. Patnaik v. State of Andra Pradesh[\[24\]](#_ftn24)**, the court decided that while a person’s rights may be restricted when detained, they do not always disappear. Articles 21 and 22 of the Indian Constitution were violated by the COFEPOSA Act’s section 3(b) restrictions, and the court’s determination to protect the Constitution was reasonable.[\[25\]](#_ftn25) **CONCLUSION** This case clarified Article 21’s relevance and decided it to be the cornerstone of the Indian Constitution by offering a wide reading of it. It is said that one cannot live by unfair or discriminating ways. The right to life goes beyond simple animal existence; it also relates to a decent life, which should not be subject to arbitrary or illogical intervention. This point of view holds that the state must follow policies that protect the rights and dignity of the person detained even if preventative detention is used. Furthermore, the ruling underlined the point that one’s rights are not revoked by fear. As long as they do not contravene the terms of imprisonment, the fundamental rights of the detained are maintained. Therefore, the Court carefully examined constitutional rights in analysis of limitations on family visits and legal consultations. The Court decided that any restrictions on these liberties should be rigorously followed if we are to maintain the effectiveness of the detention. certify that the application of preventive detention policies conforms to the Constitution and is humane. This emphasizes the court’s duty to protect basic rights against repressive policies implemented by the government, therefore strengthening the ideas of justice, equity, and human dignity inside the Indian legal system. **BIBLIOGRAPHY:** 1. AJ, ‘48 Quotes by B. R. Ambedkar’ (Elevate Society20 July 2023) accessed 2 June 2024 2. COFEPOSA Act, s 3. 3. D.B. Patnaik v. State of Andra Pradesh \[1975\] 2 SCR 24. 4. Deshpande JM, ‘FRANCIS CORALIE v. the ADMINISTRATOR, UNION TERRITORY of DELHI’ (2022) IV Indian Journal of Law and Legal Research 2582 accessed 4 June 2024 5. Fali S Nariman, ‘Fifty Years of Human Rights Protection in India – the Record of 50 Years of Constitutional Practice’ \[2013\] National Law School of India Review 13 accessed 3 June 2024. 6. Francis Coralie Mullin vs The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi \[1981\] 1 SCC 608. 7. Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar \[1980\] 1 SCC 98. 8. Kharak Singh vs State of U. P. \[1964\] 1 SCR 232. 9. M.H. Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra \[1978\] 3 SCC 544. 10. Maneka Gandhi v Union of India \[1978\] 1 SCC 248 (SC). 11. Munn v. lllinois \[1877\] 94 U.S. 113. 12. Sampat Prakash vs State of Jammu and Kashmir \[1969\] 3 SCR 574. 13. Sunil Batra vs Delhi Administration \[1979\] 1 SCR 392. 14. The Constitution of India 1950, art. 14. 15. The Constitution of India 1950, art. 21 16. The Constitution of India 1950, art.22. 17. The Constitution of India, 1950, art. 21. 18. Vithlani Y and B K, ‘Analysing Preventive Detention Laws and Article 21’ (2018) 4 International Journal of Legal Developments and Allied Issues [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) AJ, ‘48 Quotes by B. R. Ambedkar’ (Elevate Society20 July 2023) accessed 2 June 2024. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2)Jahnavi Madhav Deshpande, ‘FRANCIS CORALIE v. the ADMINISTRATOR, UNION TERRITORY of DELHI’ (2022) IV Indian Journal of Law and Legal Research 2582 accessed 2 June 2024. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The Constitution of India 1950, art. 21. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Maneka Gandhi v Union of India \[1978\] 1 SCC 248 (SC). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Yash Vithlani and Keerthanaa B, ‘Analysing Preventive Detention Laws and Article 21 ’ (2018) 4 International Journal of Legal Developments and Allied Issues . [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Francis Coralie Mullin vs The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi \[1981\] 1 SCC 608. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Jahnavi Madhav Deshpande, ‘FRANCIS CORALIE v. the ADMINISTRATOR, UNION TERRITORY of DELHI’ (2022) IV Indian Journal of Law and Legal Research 2582 accessed 2 June 2024. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Francis Coralie Mullin vs The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi \[1981\] 1 SCC 608. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) COFEPOSA Act, s 3. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) The Constitution of India 1950, art. 14. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) The Constitution of India 1950, art. 21 [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) The Constitution of India 1950, art.22. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) \[1969\] 3 SCR 574. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Francis Coralie Mullin vs The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi \[1981\] 1 SCC 608. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) \[1979\] 1 SCR 392. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16)Yash Vithlani and Keerthanaa B, ‘Analysing Preventive Detention Laws and Article 21 ’ (2018) 4 International Journal of Legal Developments and Allied Issues . [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) \[1978\] 1 SCC 248 (SC). [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Fali S Nariman, ‘Fifty Years of Human Rights Protection in India – the Record of 50 Years of Constitutional Practice’ \[2013\] National Law School of India Review 13 accessed 3 June 2024. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) \[1978\] 3 SCC 544. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) \[1980\] 1 SCC 98. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) \[1964\] 1 SCR 232. [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) Munn v. lllinois \[1877\] 94 U.S. 113. [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) Francis Coralie Mullin vs The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi \[1981\] 1 SCC 608. [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) 1975\] 2 SCR 24. [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) Jahnavi Madhav Deshpande, ‘FRANCIS CORALIE v. the ADMINISTRATOR, UNION TERRITORY of DELHI’ (2022) IV Indian Journal of Law and Legal Research 2582 accessed 2 June 2024. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### ["IPR Protection of Technological Innovations in India: Provisions, Precedents and Processes"](https://lawfoyer.in/ipr-protection-of-technological-innovations-in-india-provisions-precedents-and-processes/) **Published:** June 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Sankalp Vashistha Law Student at (ICFAI UNIVERSITY)** **Edited By: Naman Jain Law Student at Galgotias University** **Introduction** Intellectual property rights (IPR) provide individuals and organizations with legal protection for their inventive and creative efforts by treating intellectual creations as intangible property for a predetermined period of time. These opportunities assume an urgent part in enabling imaginative work and driving steady improvement by offering makers acknowledgment and monetary prizes. In India, intellectual property rights (IPR) include patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, geographical indications, plant varieties, and industrial designs. Key guidelines like the Licenses Showing of 1970, the Copyright Exhibition of 1957, and the Brand Name Showing of 1999, nearby critical court choices, spread out the genuine framework for safeguarding these honors. To protect veritable advancements, the procurement of licensed innovation privileges (IPR) requires explicit advances and prerequisites. This makes it simpler to share information, advance innovation, and advance improvement all in all. ***Keywords*:** *Intellectual property rights (IPR), Legal protection, Patent, Copyright, Trademark* **What is IPR?** IPRs are legal rights provided to a person’s intelligence that safeguard the creations of their minds as intangible property for a definite period. If the thoughts and tough work of the creator are not protected, then the concerned originator will not get benefits for their tough work and will grow dissatisfied, which will finally result in the weakening of research and development. If the intellectual property of each member is protected, it will result in knowledge sharing, technology transmission, and cooperation among businesses and organizations, contributing to overall development. To encourage the development of technology in different areas, the government of India has taken many enlightened steps by allowing intellectual property rights to creators. In today’s fast-changing world with high levels of innovative technology competition, IPR plays a crucial role in safeguarding the growth and development of the state. **Kinds of intellectual property rights** Intellectual property rights are a prominent factor in inspiring and encouraging research and development. In India, there are seven (7) types of intellectual property rights granted to individuals to provide acknowledgement for their tough work and inspire new developments. They are as follows: - **Patents:** Protects thoughts and developments and provides the owner with a special right to use and sell the technology for a certain period. - **Copyrights:** Protect the concepts and novel works of authors and creators for their unique work, it includes written works, music, art, etc. The holders of copyright have special rights to display, distribute and reproduce their work. - **Trademarks:** Protect designs and symbols that provide distinctiveness for their goods and services; they distinguish company products from those of their competitors. - **Trade secrets:** Safeguard processes, formulas, and customer lists that give a company a competitive advantage and may be licensed or sold. - **Geographical indications:** Safeguard the titles of the products from particular geographical areas and origins. - **Plant varieties:**safeguard new varieties of plants that are uniform or distinct from others. - **Industrial designs:** Protect the visual presence of the product, like shapes, size, colour, etc. **Key Provision related to IPR in India** **about Technology** - The Patents Act, 1970 This is the foundation of patent law in India, proposed to protect creations and grant exclusive rights to creators. The Act was amended in 2005, to comply with the TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) Agreement. - **Section 3**[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1): This section describes what are not considered as developments under the Act. For example, it excludes mere innovations of scientific principles or the formulation of abstract theories from patentability. However, technological advancements that show major advancements in utility can be patented. - **Section 6**[**\[2\]**](#_ftn2): The true and first inventor, their assignee, or the legal representative of the deceased originator remain among the parties who can file an application for a patent. - **Section 10**[**\[3\]**](#_ftn3): This section defines the requirements for a patent requirement, including the description of the invention in detail and the methods that explain how it will be carried out. - **Section 25**[**\[4\]**](#_ftn4): This section provides a mechanism for opposing the grant of a patent. Opposition can be filed on numerous grounds, some of which can be deficiency of novelty or inventive step, safeguarding that only genuine technological novelties are protected. - The Copyright Act of 1957 It is a law that safeguards different types of works, not just books and paintings. It also covers things like software and digital content. - As per Section 2(o)[\[5\]](#_ftn5), it says that “literary work” includes computer programs, tables, and collections. This means that software is protected under this act. - Section 13[\[6\]](#_ftn6) of this act defines what all protected under the copyright act. It contains original literary, dramatic, musical, and artistic works, as well as films and sound recordings. - Section 14[\[7\]](#_ftn7) provides the list of the rights that are given to owners of the copyright. They can make copies, use, and distribute the work. For software, this includes controlling copying, distribution, and modification. - The Trademark Act, 1999 It is important to protect technical trademarks and assist consumers in identifying various tech products and services. - Section 2(zb)[\[8\]](#_ftn8) defines a trademark as a visual mark that distinguishes one person’s goods or services from others. It may include logos, titles, or even particular shapes associated with technology products. - Section 9[\[9\]](#_ftn9) of the act defines the grounds for rejecting registration. This includes marks that are not novel or innovative characters, as well as those marks that may deceive or confuse the public. - Section 29[\[10\]](#_ftn10) of the act defines trademark protection, which is important for technology-related companies to protect their brand from unlawful usage. **Landmark Cases** - **Novartis AG vs Union of India[\[11\]](#_ftn11):** This case has a major role in the Indian patent system. The Supreme Court of India rejected the patent application for the medicine ‘Glivec’ used in cancer, highlighting the importance of a higher level of originality and the need to avoid patent ‘evergreening’. This decision had significant consequences for the patenting of pharmaceutical and biotech inventions. - **Bajaj Auto Ltd vs. TVS Motor Company Limited[\[12\]](#_ftn12)**: In this case, a dispute arose regarding a patent between two major companies for applying twin-spark-plug engine technology. The Court observed that cases dealing with IP frequently revolved around temporary injunctions, which had been pending for years, irrespective of the lengthy nature of these cases. To speed up the goal of IP debates, the High Court coordinated that hearings on trademarks, patents, and copyrights ought to be led on an everyday premise. In these cases, it required that final judgments be delivered within four months of filing. The Court additionally educated all courts and councils across India to comply rigorously with these rules for quick removal of IP cases. - The **Yahoo**[\[13\]](#_ftn13)! decision of the Delhi High Court, Vs. In India’s intellectual property law, the landmark case of **Akash Arora & Anr** focuses on cybersquatting. The court decided that domain names are just as useful as trademarks and should be protected in the same way. In this situation, the offended party’s area name ‘Hurray!’ and the ‘Yahoo India!’ of the defendant. Were discovered to be nearly identical and phonetically similar, likely causing users of the internet to misunderstand. The court rejected the defendants’ disclaimer because it did not adequately address the nature of the internet and prevent confusion. It also said that, despite being a word in the dictionary, “Yahoo” had become unique because of its connection to the plaintiff. In Rediff Communication vs. Cyber Booth & Anr[\[14\]](#_ftn14), the Bombay High Court echoed this sentiment and emphasized the value of a domain name for businesses. - **Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson vs. Intex Technologies (India) Ltd.[\[15\]](#_ftn15)**: In this case, Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) and FRAND (Fair, Reasonable, and Non- discriminatory) conditions were challenged. The Delhi High Court gave an injunction in favour of Ericsson emphasizing the implementation of SEPs in India, and establishing a precedent for upcoming technology-related matters. - In the case of **Bayer Corporation vs. Union of India[\[16\]](#_ftn16)**, Bayer argued that Cipla’s “SORANIB” infringed on its patent and sought to prevent it from receiving marketing approval under the Drugs Act. Bayer asserted that a mechanism preventing the market approval of patented drugs was established by Sections 2 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act and 48 of the Indian Patent Act of 1970. Additionally, Bayer classified “SORANIB” as a “spurious drug” in accordance with the 1940 Drugs Act. The Delhi HC excused Bayer’s disputes, confirming there is no medicine patent linkage part in India and that patent infringement ought to be exhibited in court, not accepted. The court emphasized that a link like this would have a negative effect on health policy. It likewise decided that “SORANIB” was not false, as it needed components of impersonation or misdirection, and forced a significant expense of Rs. 6.75 million to Bayer to stop other attempts of this kind. **Process for filling an IPR in India** - Patent - Section 6[\[17\]](#_ftn17) of the Patent Act, expresses that anybody professing to be the valid and first creator of an innovation, his trustee, or the lawful delegate of a departed individual who was qualified to make such an application, is qualified to document a patent application. - Section 7[\[18\]](#_ftn18) examines the strategy and arrangement of the application. It requires the submission of a prescribed application form in addition to a provisional or complete specification. - Section 11A[\[19\]](#_ftn19), the patent application must be published 18 months after the filing date. Unless an early publication request is made, the application is available to the public. - Section 12[\[20\]](#_ftn20) gives an explanation of the sales for an evaluation. In no less than four years of the need date of the application, a solicitation should be made before the considerable assessment can start. - Section 43[\[21\]](#_ftn21) an applicant will be granted a patent once all Act requirements have been met and it will be recorded in the register of patents, as stated in Section 43. - Section 53[\[22\]](#_ftn22) every granted patent lasts twenty years from the filing date of the application. - Trademark - Section 18[\[23\]](#_ftn23) any person who asserts that he or she is the owner of a trademark that he or she uses or proposes to use may submit a formal registration application. - Section 19[\[24\]](#_ftn24) the Enlistment Centre is expected to investigate the application to check whether it consents to the Demonstration’s prerequisites and to decide if the brand name can be enrolled. - Section 20[\[25\]](#_ftn25) mandates the publication of an advertisement for the application in the Trademarks Journal (Sections 20-21). - Anyone who believes that the trademark registration would harm them has three months to file an opposition under Section 21[\[26\]](#_ftn26). - Section 23[\[27\]](#_ftn27) (Registration and Duration) addresses the trademark’s registration after all objections and oppositions have been resolved. - According to Section 25[\[28\]](#_ftn28), trademark registration is valid for ten years but can be renewed indefinitely. - Copyright - Section 45[\[29\]](#_ftn29), copyright registration is voluntary. The Registrar of Copyrights can be contacted with a completed application and the appropriate fee. - Section 22[\[30\]](#_ftn30) states that literary, dramatic, musical, or artistic works are protected for the author’s lifetime plus sixty years. - Depending on the type of work, various durations are defined in other sections, such as Section 26[\[31\]](#_ftn31) for cinematographic films and Section 27[\[32\]](#_ftn32) for sound recordings. **Conclusion** Intellectual Property Rights, or IPRs, are essential for fostering innovation and safeguarding the creative and inventive output of individuals and organizations. By treating these intellectual creations as intangible assets, intellectual property rights (IPR) provide creators with the legal protection they need to gain recognition and financial rewards. India’s comprehensive IPR insurance framework covers licenses, copyrights, brand names, proprietary innovations, topographical signs, plant collections, and contemporary plans. This protection is based on important laws like the Patents Act of 1970, the Copyright Act of 1957, and the Trademark Act of 1999. The in-depth procedure for protecting intellectual property rights ensures that genuine innovations are recognized and protected, encouraging knowledge sharing, technological advancement, and overall development. In addition to supporting individual creators, this legal framework also encourages economic expansion and fosters a culture of continuous improvement and collaboration. **REFERENCES** 1. **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** 1. Law Relating to Intellectual Property by Dr. B.L. Wadehra (15th edition) 2. Intellectual Property by Elizabeth Verkey (2015 edition) 2. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. [https://blog.ipleaders.in/role-of-ipr-in-securing-growth-of-technology-in-indian-society/#What\_are\_intellectual\_property\_rights](https://blog.ipleaders.in/role-of-ipr-in-securing-growth-of-technology-in-indian-society/#What_are_intellectual_property_rights) 2. 3. [https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/india-s-overall-ranking-on-ip-protection-improves-says-uscc-report-122022401676\_1.html](https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/india-s-overall-ranking-on-ip-protection-improves-says-uscc-report-122022401676_1.html) 4. 3. **Cases Referred** 1. Novartis AG vs Union of India 2. Bajaj Auto Ltd vs. TVS Motor Company Limited 3. Vs. Akash Arora & Anr 4. Rediff Communication vs. Cyber Booth & Anr 5. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson vs. Intex Technologies (India) Ltd. 6. Bayer Corporation vs. Union of India 4. **Statutes Referred** 1. TRADE MARKS ACT, 1999 2. THE COPYRIGHT ACT, 1957 3. THE PATENTS ACT, 1970 [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) THE PATENTS ACT, 1970, § 3, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1970 (India). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) THE PATENTS ACT, 1970, § 6, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1970 (India). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) THE PATENTS ACT, 1970, § 10, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1970 (India). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) THE PATENTS ACT, 1970, § 25, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1970 (India). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) THE COPYRIGHT ACT, 1957, § 2o, No. 14, Acts of Parliament, 1957 (India). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) THE COPYRIGHT ACT, 1957, § 13, No. 14, Acts of Parliament, 1957 (India). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) THE COPYRIGHT ACT, 1957, § 14, No. 14, Acts of Parliament, 1957 (India). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) TRADE MARKS ACT, 1999, § 2zb, No. 47, Acts of Parliament, 1999 (India). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) TRADE MARKS ACT, 1999, § 9, No. 47, Acts of Parliament, 1999 (India). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) TRADE MARKS ACT, 1999, § 29, No. 47, Acts of Parliament, 1999 (India). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Novartis AG vs Union of India, AIR 2013 SC1311. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Bajaj Auto Ltd vs. TVS Motor Company Limited, JT 20019 (12) SC 103. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Inc. Vs. Akash Arora & Anr, 1999 (19) PTC 201 (Del). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Rediff Communication vs. Cyber Booth & Anr, 2000 PTC 209. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson vs. Intex Technologies (India) Ltd, MANU/DE/2188/2023. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Bayer Corporation vs. Union of India, 162(2009) DLT 371. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) THE PATENTS ACT, 1970, § 6, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1970 (India). [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) THE PATENTS ACT, 1970, § 7, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1970 (India). [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) THE PATENTS ACT, 1970, § 11A, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1970 (India). [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) THE PATENTS ACT, 1970, § 12, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1970 (India). [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) THE PATENTS ACT, 1970, § 43, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1970 (India). [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) THE PATENTS ACT, 1970, § 53, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1970 (India). [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) TRADE MARKS ACT, 1999, § 18, No. 47, Acts of Parliament, 1999 (India). [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) TRADE MARKS ACT, 1999, § 19, No. 47, Acts of Parliament, 1999 (India). [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) TRADE MARKS ACT, 1999, § 20, No. 47, Acts of Parliament, 1999 (India). [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) TRADE MARKS ACT, 1999, § 21, No. 47, Acts of Parliament, 1999 (India). [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) TRADE MARKS ACT, 1999, § 23, No. 47, Acts of Parliament, 1999 (India). [\[28\]](#_ftnref28) TRADE MARKS ACT, 1999, § 25, No. 47, Acts of Parliament, 1999 (India). [\[29\]](#_ftnref29) THE COPYRIGHT ACT, 1957, § 45, No. 14, Acts of Parliament, 1957 (India). [\[30\]](#_ftnref30) THE COPYRIGHT ACT, 1957, § 22, No. 14, Acts of Parliament, 1957 (India). [\[31\]](#_ftnref31) THE COPYRIGHT ACT, 1957, § 26, No. 14, Acts of Parliament, 1957 (India). [\[32\]](#_ftnref32) THE COPYRIGHT ACT, 1957, § 27, No. 14, Acts of Parliament, 1957 (India). **Categories:** Articles --- ### [Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1999 SC 3471](https://lawfoyer.in/ajit-singh-v-state-of-punjab-air-1999-sc-3471/) **Published:** June 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Name of the author- Mahalakshmi P student Government Law College , Dharmapuri** **Edited By – Anurupa Pal** 1. **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** In this case, deals with the important issue of **reservation in employment**. Here, there are three interlocutory applications presented for interpretation by the state of Punjab concerning this case, which dealt with seniority and promotion of received and general category candidates. This case, interpretation of **Article 16 (1), (2), (4) and (4-A)** as well as **Article 14** of the Indian constitution. The main issue of the case was whether the right to be considered for promotion is interpreted as only a Statutory right or a fundamental right. This Case is important as it dealt with the question relating to the interpretation of rules relating to reservation and promotion contained in Article 16 of the Indian constitution. This case made a clear view that the right to be considered for promotion is not only a Statutory right but a fundamental right under Article 16 of the Indian constitution. ***Keywords*:** 1. Indian constitution 2. Article 16(1), (4), (4-A) 3. Article 14 4. Right to promotion 5. Reservation in employment. 1. **CASE DETAILS** ***Judgement Cause Title / Case Name***Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab***Case Number***3792 of 1989***Judgement Date***16.09.1999***Court***The Supreme Court of India.***Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** 5/Full bench***Author / Name of Judges***1. Chief Justice of India: Justice A.S. Anand 2\. Justice. Venatuswami 3\. Justice. G.B. Pattanaik 4\. Justice. K.P. Kurduker 5\. Justice. M. Jagennadha Rao ***Citation***AIR 1999 SC 3471***Legal Provisions Involved***Article 16(1)1. **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** In this case, the earlier decisions of these cases, **Ajit Singh Januja vs State of Punjab** (1996), **Union of India vs Virpal Singh Chauhan** (1995) and **Jadish Lal vs State of Haryana** were discussed. The present case was filed by the Punjab government to seek clarification about the judgement in Ajit Singh Januja vs State of Punjab (1996). We have to understand this case to understand the background, and issues in the case of Ajit Singh vs the State of Punjab. 1. **FACTS OF THE CASE** So, the appellant filed a **writ petition before the HC**, filed on their behalf that when the reservation quota was completed the scheduled caste candidates should not further be appointed or promoted. It was said on the behalf that scheduled caste and backward classes candidates who compete on merit, should also be adjusted against the received quota for them. The full-page view on the non-consideration of the scheduled caste against general category posts for appointment or promotion will be hit by **Articles 14,15, and 16** of the Indian constitution. HC said that roster points were seniority points. As a result of full bench overruled the view taken by the High Court. The rule held that the senior general candidates who were promoted after SC/ ST candidates would regain their seniority over general candidates promoted earlier. 1. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** - Whether the right to promotion just a statutory right or a fundamental right? - Whether the Virpal Singh Chauhan case, Ajit Singh Januja case and Jagdish Lal case were correctly adjudged or not? - Whether the ‘catch-up principle’ argued by the general category candidates acceptable or not? 1. **PETITIONER ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that The counsel for the petitioner, submitted before the Hon’ble HC, that is in Ashok Kumar Gupta vs the state of UP (1997) It was stated that the right to promotion is just a “statutory right” whereas right under Art 16(4) & 16(4-A) are fundamental rights. Also, similar cases were taken in Jagdish Lal vs state of Haryana (1997) and some other judgements. The petitioner side took support of paragraph 43 of Ashok Kumar Gupta’s judgement. It said that it defines, the right to promotion as a “statutory right”. It is not a ‘fundamental right’. We contended that this was the correct constitutional position. 1. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Respondent submitted that The counsel for appearing on behalf of the state of Punjab as a respondent said that the Jagdish Lal case judgement was, in contrast to, the Virpal Singh Chauhan case and Ajit Singh Januja case, the state was In a ‘quandary’ as to what would be the suitable course of action. In this case, contended that the “roster point promotes” that is reserved candidates cannot demand seniority based on their services. But in the case of Virpal Singh Chauhan’s judgement and released a circular that roster point promotion in railways didn’t vest seniority. So, in the case of Virpal Singh Chauhan’s case and Ajit Singh Januja’s case decisions were incorrect. About cases or accepted the ‘catch up’ principle in favour of general categories. so, the reserved candidates now contended that not only the reserved candidates’ promoter in roasted points cannot be reverted but the seniority against excess promotion was also protected. 1. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** 1. *“Article 16 equality of opportunity in matters of public employment.* *Article 16 (1), (4), (4-A) this article of Indian constitution relating to promotion, seniority and roasted system for reserved category candidates”.* 1. *“Article 14: Equality before the law and equal protection of the law.* *Article 14 provides everyone is entitled to equality and equality protection of the law. so in this case, right to promotion be treated as a fundamental right.”* 1. Articles 14 and 16 (1) are both individual rights that are closely connected. Article 14 provides equality before the law and equality protection of the law and Article 16 provides equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. It was observed that, ensuring each employee who is suitable for promotion has a fundamental right to be ‘considered ‘ for promotion. The promotion is based on equal opportunity and seniority or dismission of fundamental rights under Article 16 (1). 2. *“Article 16(1): guarantees the equality of opportunity for all citizen in matters of employment or appointment to any office under the state.”* 3. *“Article 16(2): Prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, descent etc.,”* 4. *“Article 16(3): Exception to clause 2 of the article.”* 5. *“Article 16(4): Empowers that state to make special provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward classes of citizens which in the opinion of the state or not sufficiently represented in the services of the state.”* 6. *“Article 16(4-A): the State from making any provision for reservation in matters of promotion, with consequential seniority, to any class or classes of posts in the services under the State in favour of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes which, in the opinion of the State, are not adequately represented in the services under the State.”* 1. **JUDGEMENT** Supreme Court disposed of the application presented by the state of Punjab. It was held that Ajit Singh Januja v. State of Punjab and Virpal Singh Chauhan v. the Union of India set out the right law and the law laid down in Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana was not valid in this respect as it was limited to its specific facts. The Court passed distinct orders in the Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan cases based on the principles outlined in this case which was named Ajit Singh II. 1. **RATIO DECIDENDI** 1. The right to promotion is considered a fundamental right under Article 16(1) as well as Article 14. So, the right to be considered for promotion is not just a statutory right but a fundamental right within the meaning of Article 16. 2. And also, the supreme court held that the position taken in the Ajit Singh Januja case was correct. However, the court’s view on other cases discussed above was not acceptable. 3. Seniority and promotions; the court views this as that balancing of fundamental rights and articles 14 and 16 (1), (4), and (4-A) on the other. 4. Catch-up rule principle: The “catch-up” rule is a concept that allows reserved category candidates who are promoted later to regain their seniority over general category candidates who were promoted earlier. 1. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The state of Punjab, interpretation of the judgement in Ajit Singh Januja vs State of Punjab (1996), this case also involved the question of seniority. The Supreme Court observed that articles 16(4) &(4-A) must take into account the situation prevalent when this clause was incorporated while contemplating the backwardness and social oppression of certain classes. The court also said article 14 and 16(1) are interrelated. Seniority in service is connected to promotion. In the above discussion, the SC held that the decisions in the Ajit Singh Januja and Virpal Singh Chauhan case were accurate and the view taken in the Jagdish Lal case was improper. - **REFERENCES** - **Important Cases Referred** - *Union of India v. Virpal Singh Chauhan (1995)* - *Ajit Singh Januja v. State of Punjab (1996)* - *R.K Sabharwal & Ors v. Union of India (1995)* - *Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1993)* - *Jaswant Singh v. The Secretary to Government of Punjab, Education (1989)* - *Jagdish Lal and Ors. v. State of Haryana (1997)* - *Union of India v. Manpreet Singh Poonam (2022)* - *viii.State of Tamil Nadu v. T. Dhanraju (2016)* - *T. Siddharth Reddy v. Rajive Kumar Gupta (2020)* - **Important Statutes Referred** - The constitution of India, 1950. WEBSITES REFERRED: 1[.https://www.legalserviceindia.com](https://www.legalserviceindia.com) 2. [ https://www.manupatra.com](https://www.manupatra.com) 3. [ https://www.indiankanoon.com](https://www.indiankanoon.com) 4. [ https://www.scconline.com](https://www.scconline.com) 5. [ https://www.livelaw.in](https://www.livelaw.in) 6. https://blog.ipleaders.in/ajit-singh-vs-state-of-punjab-1999/ **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [All India Adi Saiva Sivacharyargal Seva Sangam vs Dr B. Chandra Mohan](https://lawfoyer.in/all-india-adi-saiva-sivacharyargal-seva-sangam-vs-dr-b-chandra-mohan/) **Published:** June 26, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Name of the author – SHAURYA SINGH KARASI, Chandigarh University** **Name of the Editor – Anurupa Pal** **ABSTRACT/HEADNOTE** The All India Adi Saiva Sivacharyargal Seva Sangam (petitioner) filed a contempt petition against Dr. B. Chandra Mohan and Mr. J. Kumaragurubaran (respondents) alleging their disobedience of a court order dated August 5, 2021. This order, issued in a previous case, pertained to the appointment of temple priests (Archakas). The court disposed of the writ petition related to the contempt petition by citing two Supreme Court judgments: Seshammal vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Adi Saiva Sivacharyargal Nala Sangam vs. State of Tamil Nadu. The court upheld the right of individuals to challenge specific Archaka appointments while directing the state and the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department to adhere to the qualifications and eligibility criteria outlined in the Supreme Court judgments. The court also granted the right to challenge any appointment that violates the law or the Supreme Court’s directives. The respondents’ counsel confirmed that no appointments had been made for a specific temple. Subsequently, the contempt petition was dismissed without any costs. This case highlights the complexities surrounding the appointment of temple priests, emphasizing the intersection of religious practices and legal obligations. The court’s decision emphasizes the importance of adhering to legal mandates while safeguarding the right to challenge unfair appointments. 1. **B) CASE DETAILS** i) Judgment Clause Title All India Adi Saiva Sivacharyargal Seva Sangam vs Dr B. Chandra Mohanii) Case Number Cont.P.No.1272 of 2021.iii) Judgment Date July 18, 2022iv) Court Supreme courtv) Quorum 1vi) Author Anitha Sumanthvii) Citation (2022) 4 MLJ 5871. **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE JUDGMENT** On July 18, 2022, the Madras High Court delivered a judgment in the case of ‘All India Adi Saiva Sivacharyargal Seva vs Dr. B. Chandra Mohan’. This judgment stemmed from a Contempt Petition filed under Section 11 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, by the All India Adi Saiva Sivacharyargal Seva Sangam, represented by its General Secretary B.S.R. Muthukumar. The petition targeted Dr. B. Chandra Mohan, Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu, and Mr. Kumaragurubaran, the Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, for their alleged disobedience of the court’s August 5, 2021 order in W.M.P.No.17241 of 2021 in W.P.No.16287 of 2021. Mr P. Valliappan represented the petitioner while Mr N.R.R. Arun Natarajan, a Special Government Pleader, represented the respondents. The judgment rested on the disposal of the related writ petition by the First Bench of the Madras High Court on June 27, 2022. This order referenced the Supreme Court judgments in Seshammal Vs. State of Tamil Nadu \[1972 (2) SCC 11\] and Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam Vs. State of Tamil Nadu \[2016 (2) SCC 725\], emphasizing the specific qualifications and eligibility criteria for appointing Archakas. The court closed the writ petition while preserving the candidates’ right to challenge individual Archaka appointments, if necessary. The court directed the State and the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department to adhere to the qualifications and eligibility stipulated in the Supreme Court judgments for Archaka appointments. The judgment also allowed any aggrieved party to challenge appointments that contravene the law or the Supreme Court directives. The learned Special Government Pleader, Mr. N.R.R. Arun Natarajan, informed the court that no appointments had been made in the R3 temple. **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The All India Adi Saiva Sivacharyargal Seva Sangam filed a Contempt Petition against Dr. B. Chandra Mohan and Mr. J. Kumaragurubaran, alleging they disobeyed a Madras High Court order issued on August 5, 2021. This order, stemming from a writ petition (W.P.No.16287 of 2021), dealt with the appointment of Archakas (priests) and referred to Supreme Court rulings in the Seshammal and Adi Saiva Sivacharyargal Nala Sangam cases. The High Court, in its June 27, 2022 judgment, closed the writ petition while preserving the right of candidates to challenge individual appointments. It directed the State and the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department to adhere to the Supreme Court’s prescribed qualifications for Archakas. Additionally, individuals could legally challenge appointments deemed unlawful. During the contempt proceedings, the respondents’ legal representative confirmed no appointments were made at the Arulmigu Kolanjiappar Thiru Kovil temple. Consequently, the contempt petition was closed without costs. **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** - Whether the respondents’ actions constitute a violation of the court order issued on August 5, 2021? - ​Whether the respondents’ conduct meets the legal definition of contempt of court under Section 11 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971? - ​Whether the Supreme Court judgments in Seshammal Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, cited in the order, relevant and binding in this case? - What actions should the court take regarding the alleged contempt? **F)PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS** - The petitioners asserted that the respondents, Dr B. Chandra Mohan and Mr J. Kumaragurubaran, had flouted the court’s injunction of August 5, 2021, in W.M.P. No. 17241 of 2021 within W.P. No. 16287 of 2021, by neglecting to adhere to the court’s directives. - The petitioners likely highlighted the legal importance of respondents upholding court orders and directives. They may have argued that noncompliance weakens the authority of the judiciary and creates a damaging precedent for future cases. - The petitioners emphasized the paramount importance of compliance with court orders for maintaining the rule of law and upholding justice. They may have argued that any disregard for court orders must be addressed with appropriate consequences to preserve the integrity of the judicial system. - The petitioners likely urged the court to impose punitive measures on the respondents for their alleged contemptuous actions. These measures could include fines, censure, or any other penalties deemed suitable by the court. **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** - Mr NRR. Arun Natarajan, the Special Government Pleader representing the respondents, asserted that the temple named in the contempt petition (Arulmigu Kolanjiappar Thiru Kovil, Cuddalore District) had made no appointments. This declaration aimed to prove the respondents’ compliance with court directives and to refute the petitioner’s allegation of disobedience. - The respondents potentially argued for the dismissal of the contempt petition due to the lack of any appointments that could be deemed as violating the court’s order. They likely emphasized that since no breaches occurred, there was no justification for further legal action or punishments against them. - The respondents may have further contended against any costs or penalties being imposed on them, given their adherence to the court’s directives. They likely argued that the absence of any wrongdoing warranted the dismissal of the contempt petition without any financial burden being placed upon them. **H) JUDGMENT** On July 18, 2022, the Madras High Court, presided over by Justice Anita Sumanth, delivered a judgment concerning a contempt petition filed under Section 11 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The petition was brought by the All India Adi Saiva Sivacharyargal Seva against Dr. B. Chandra Mohan, alleging disobedience of a court order passed on August 5, 2021, in a previous case (W.M.P.No.17241 of 2021 in W.P.No.16287 of 2021). Mr P. Valliappan represented the petitioner, while Mr NRR. Arun Natarajan, the Special Government Pleader, represented the respondents. In response, the Hon’ble First Bench of the Madras High Court disposed of the writ petition related to the contempt petition on June 27, 2022, with a detailed order. This order heavily relied on Supreme Court judgments in the cases of Seshammal vs. State of Tamil Nadu \[1972 (2) SCC 11\] and Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam vs. State of Tamil Nadu \[2016 (2) SCC 725\]. The writ petition was closed, allowing candidates to challenge individual appointments of Archakas if necessary. The State and the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department were instructed to strictly adhere to the qualifications and eligibility criteria for appointing Archakas, as outlined in the aforementioned Supreme Court judgments. Individuals aggrieved by appointments violating the law or court directives were granted the liberty to challenge them legally. Mr NRR. Arun Natarajan, the Special Government Pleader representing the respondents, informed the court that no appointments had been made at Arulmigu Kolanjiappar Thiru Kovil in Cuddalore District. Consequently, the contempt petition was dismissed without imposing any costs. **CONCLUSION AND COMMENTS** The Madras High Court presided over by Dr. Justice Anita Sumanth, dismissed the contempt petition initiated by All India Adi Saiva Sivacharyargal Seva Sangam against Dr. B. Chandra Mohan and Mr. J. Kumaragurubaran, affirming the candidates’ right to contest specific appointments of Archakas (temple priests). The court instructed the State and the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Department to adhere strictly to the qualifications and eligibility guidelines established by the Supreme Court in the cases of Seshammal vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam vs. State of Tamil Nadu. Any party aggrieved by appointments that contradict the established norms or Supreme Court directives may legally challenge them, as per the court’s ruling. Mr NRR. Arun Natarajan, Special Government Pleader representing the respondents, disclosed to the court that no appointments had occurred at the specific temple in question, Arulmigu Kolanjiappar Thiru Kovil in Cuddalore District. Consequently, the contempt petition was closed without incurring any expenses. This judgment underscores the court’s dedication to upholding legal principles and guaranteeing compliance with the rulings of higher tribunals, while also offering remedies for those impacted by unlawful or inconsistent appointments. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** 1. Seshammal Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (1972 (2) SCC **Important Statutes Referred** 1. Indian Penal Code (IPC) 2. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [J.P Bansal v. State of Rajasthan, 2003](https://lawfoyer.in/j-p-bansal-v-state-of-rajasthan-2003/) **Published:** June 27, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Madhushree Pranesh Malekar, Student, S.T. Wilfred college of Law** **Edited by: Priyanshu Tyagi, Student, Mewar Law Institute, Vasundhra** **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The Constitution of India is the Supreme Law of India. The Constitution declares India a sovereign, a socialist, secular, and democratic republic, and assures citizens justice, equality, and liberty. and endeavors to promote fraternity. The Constitution also confers powers on each and every legislature and judicial body, and no one will interfere with each other. This remains a legal issue in the matter of compensation. Compensation means money that is paid to someone in exchange for something that has been lost, damaged, or for some other problem. There are some legal provisions for compensation, but there are also some limitations and criteria for availing of compensation. In this case, the compensation term relates more to the compensation of the appellant on the cessation of his functioning as a chairman in the Taxation Tribunal. Cabinet decisions, the interpretation of constitutional provisions, and the applicability of the principle of legitimate exception are some key legal issues and parts of the below-mentioned case. **Keywords (Minimum 5):** *Compensation, Principle of Legitimate Exception, Compensation, Writ, Cabinet decision, Premature Termination, Division Bench.* **B) CASE DETAILS** **i) Judgement Cause Title / Case Name –** J.P.Bansal vs State of Rajasthan & Anr om 12 March,2003 **ii) Case Number –** Appeal (civil) 5982 of 2001 **iii) Judgement Date –** 12th March 2003 **iv) Court –** Rajasthan High Court **v) Quorum / Constitution of Bench –** .SHIVRAJ V. PATIL & ARJIT PASAYAT **vi) Author / Name of Judges –** Arjit Pasayat **vii) Citation –** Appeal ( Civil) 5982 of 2001 **viii) Legal Provisions Involved –** Article 166 of Constitution, Clause (2) of Article 310 of Constitution, Section 4(b)of Rajasthan Taxation Tribunal(Repeal) Ordinance,1999 **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT:** The judgment concern was filed by an individual who holds the position of chairman of the Tribunal. The Tribunal was demolished by the Rajasthan Taxation Tribunal (Repeal) Ordinance, 1999, leading to premature termination of appellant tenure. The appellant prays for compensation for the remaining period of his tenure. However, the high court dismissed his claim, stating that there was no government order and no application of legitimate exception involved. **D) FACTS OF THE CASE:** **a. Procedural Background of the Case:** i. Appellant appeals against dismissal of his claim for compensation by a single judge of the Rajasthan Court. ii. In his written petition, he argued for compensation based on various grounds, including legitimate exceptions and cabinet decisions. iii. The single judge dismissed the writ petition, stating that the tribunals abolition and pending transfer cases to the High Court rejected the need for compensation. **b. Factual Background of the Case:** A) The appellant was appointed as a judicial member of the tribunal by notification dated September 16, 1995, by the Finance Department (Taxation Division) of the Government of Rajasthan. B) The appellant was appointed to discharge the functions of the Chairman of the Tribunal until the appointment of a regular chairman. This requirement arose due to the previous chairman attaining the age of 65. C) State Government vide notification on dated 27/02/1999 issued ordinance, The same become operative on 27/02/1999. By the above ordinance, matters and proceedings pending before the Tribunal on the date of commencement of the ordinance were automatically transferred to the High Court for disposal. D) Due to the Tribunal being abolished, which resulted in the appellant’s continuance as chairman, he came to an end. E) The appellant claimed compensation of Rs. 5,35,648/- with interest at 15% per annum by filing a Writ Petition on the ground that his tenure appointment was to continue up to September 18, 2000. F) The Writ Petition was filed before the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur Bench. By judgment dated September 27, 1999, in SB Civil Writ Petition No. 4379 of 1999, the Writ Petition was dismissed by the learned single judge. **G) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED:** A) Whether the appellant is entitled to compensation for the premature termination of his position as Chairman of the Tribunal? B) Whether the principle of legitimate exception has been involved? C) Whether the Cabinet decision regarding compensation constitutes government order under Article 166 of the Constitution? **H) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS:** 1\. The counsels for the petitioner and appellant submitted that the decision of the cabinet should be enforceable regarding the payment of compensation. 2\. Even though there is no contractual provision for compensation, it should be considered a basic requirement based on clause (2) of Article 310 of the Constitution. 3\. The appellant is also claiming that the state government was bound to pay compensation due to the violation of a legitimate exception to continue until the end of his tenure, and he relied on section 4(b) of the ordinance, which clearly states that any liability arising under the repealed Act should not be affected by the repeal. **I) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS:** 1\. The counsel for the respondent submitted that clause (2) of Article 310 will not apply in the absence of contractual provision for Compensation. 2\. The counsel for the respondent submitted that, according to the facts of the case, there will be no application of a legitimate exception. 3\. The counsel for the respondent submitted that there was no order of government in terms of Article 166 of the Constitution regarding compensation. 4\. The counsel for the respondent submitted that there was no legal provision regarding compensation on the grounds of premature termination of tenure. **B) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** 1\. Article 166 of the Constitution of India: This Article covers the conduct of business by the government in a state. It mentioned that all executive action of the government of the state shall be expressed to be taken in the name of Governor. 2\. Clause (2) of Article 310 of the Constitution of India: This clause empowers the Governor to enter into contracts providing for compensation. 3\. Section 4(b) of the Rajasthan Taxation Tribunal (Repeal) Ordinance, 1999: This section states that the repeal of the Rajasthan Taxation Tribunal Act, 1995, shall not affect any liability incurred under the repealed Act. **H) JUDGEMENT** **a. RATIO DECIDENDI** 1\. The appellant prays for issuing a writ of mandamus to the State of Rajasthan to pay compensation for the termination of his premature tenure as chairman due to the abolishment of the Taxation Tribunal. 2\. The high court dismissed his claim as there is no government order in terms of Article 166 of the Constitution regarding cabinet decisions. 3\. The High Court also found that the principle of legitimate exception did not apply to the facts of the case. 4\. Clause 2 of Article 310 did not apply in the absence of contractual provisions for compensation. **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS:** In my opinion, the decision of Rajasthan High Court was very intense, as there are Facts of the case there was no government order in terms of Article 166 of the constitution regarding cabinet decision on compensation and also there is no any application of Principle of legitimate exception did not apply to the facts of the case and also there was no any specific provisions for compensation in relevant statutes govern tribunals abolition. Legal Provision was not Complied. **J) REFERENCES** **a. Important Cases Referred** i. National Building Construction Corporation vs. S. Raghunathan & Ors. (1998 (7) SCC 66). ii. Sri Justice S,K,Ray, vs State of Orissa and Ors. JT 2003(1) SC1660 **b. Important Statutes Referred** i. CONSTITUTION OF INDIA,1950 ii. Rajasthan Taxation Tribunal (Repeal) Ordinance, 1999 **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [GOVERENMENT OF NCT OF DELHI V. UNION OF INDIA, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 606](https://lawfoyer.in/goverenment-of-nct-of-delhi-v-union-of-india-2023-scc-online-sc-606/) **Published:** June 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Krishna Parmar, Law Student at Marwadi University Edited By: Manik Tindwani** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The present case deals with the issue that arises from the partial statehood given to Union Terriority, Delhi \[The National Capital Territory of Delhi\]. There is a power struggle between the state government \[Aam Admi Party led by Arvid Kejriwal\] and the Union Government of India. The main issue in the case is who would have control over the “service” and the civil servant of the NCTD. State government or Union government? In the judgment, the Supreme Court interpreted Article 239AA [\[1\]](#_ftn1)of the Indian Constitution as interpreted in the year 2018. The bench held that legislative and executive power is with the National Capital Territory of Delhi except for public order, police, and land. It was further stated that the Delhi government shall bind the lieutenant governor excluding the order relating to public order, police, and land. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*:** Article 239AA, Article 239AA (3) (a), Union territory, state, NCTD, State list, Concurrent list, Entry no. 1,2, and 18 of List II. **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name***Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India. ***ii)* *Case Number***Civil Appeal No 2357 of 2017 ***iii)* *Judgement Date***11th May, 2023. ***iv)* *Court***Supreme Court ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench***Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, Hima Kohli, Krishna Murari, Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud. ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges***Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud. ***vii)* *Citation***2023 SCC OnLine SC 606.***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved***Article 239 AA (3)(a),**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** In the said judgment decision was held by a five-judge constitutional bench because of split judgment was held by the general bench of the Supreme Court and in this judgment, the bench has given the clarity of those matters or that area which is not interpreted in the previous case. Further, it held the partially same thing that was held by the previous bench but with more clarity and reference. **FACTS OF THE CASE** **i) Procedural Background of the Case** 1. 1. *The issues arose after the notification passed by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs on 21-05-2015 “to the extent delegated to him from time to time by the President” over “services”, in addition to “public order”, “police”, and “land.” The LG may seek the views of the Chief Minister of NCTD at his “discretion”.[**\[2\]**](#_ftn2)* In which the “services” were excluded from the scope of power of state government. 2. Delhi High Court held that Delhi government has neither legislative nor executive powers in matters related to service. 3. In 2018 [\[3\]](#_ftn3)Supreme Court held that the Delhi government has the power to enact laws enumerated in List-1 and list-2 of the constitution*. “Further, it was held the phrase “insofar as any such matter applies to Union Territories” is an inclusive term, and “not one of exclusion”. and cannot be used to restrict the legislative power of the Legislative Assembly of Delhi.[**\[4\]**](#_ftn4)”* 4. In 2019 bench gave a split judgment and differed on whether services are excluded or not. **ii) Factual Background of the Case** The same appeal was again referred by the Supreme Court of India because of the split verdict given in the year 2019. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether the Government of Delhi or the Lieutenant Governor acting on behalf of the Union Government would control the “services” in the National Capital Territory of Delhi? 2. Whether the control of Delhi’s civil servants with the Union Government of Delhi Government? - Whether the phrase “***insofar as such matter applies to Union Territories***” in Article 239AA is inclusionary or exclusionary. **APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsel Appellant submitted that the power to enact laws under Entry 41 of List II of the Legislative Assembly of NCTD cannot be excluded just because the term used is “state public services” and not “Union Territory Public Service”. Except for entries 1,2, and 18 NCTD has executive and legislative power. - The phrase “insofar as such matter applies to Union Territories” in Article 239AA is inclusionary and not exclusionary. The term “state” is used in the multiple entries in List II and III. The phrase “insofar as such matter applies to Union Territories” is a phrase that is the reason why such entries are to be made available to NCTD without an amendment. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsels for Respondent submitted that the 2018 Constitution bench didn’t decide whether NCTD has legislative power to enact the law on Entry 41 of List II. Another reason why NCTD has no power over Entry 41 of List II is that Delhi is a union territory and it can’t have the State Public Service or a State Public Service Commission. - The phrase “in so far as any such matter applies to Union Territories” under Article 239AA means that the entries which are given under List II are available to the extent which are available to UTs. For the matters that are ‘applicable’ to Union Territories to that extent, only NCTD has the power to legislate and only on the Entry which applies to Union Territories. - The Union of India’s control over “services” hasn’t caused any problems for the NCTD’s governance, and The Transaction of Business Rules 1993 gives Ministers of GNCTD sufficient authority to guarantee functional and supervisory control over the civil services to guarantee their proper operation; the regulations about the civil services indicate that the Union has administrative control. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** **Article 239AA (3) (a).[\[5\]](#_ftn5)–** “*Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Legislative Assembly shall have power to make laws for the whole or any part of the National Capital Territory with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the State List or in the Concurrent List in so far as any such mailer is applicable to Union territories except matters with respect to Entries 1, 2 and 18 of the State List and Entries 64, 65 and 66 of that List in so far as they relate to the said Entries 1, 2, and 18”.* **JUDGEMENT (RATIO DECIDENDI)** A Constitution Bench included Chief Justice DY Chandrachud, Justice MR Shah, Justice Krishna Murari, Justice Hime Kohli, and Justice PS Narasimha held that the Delhi Government has legislative and executive authority over administrative services except the matters related to public order, law enforcement, and land. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** In the case of Government of NCT Delhi v. Union of India court has broadly interpreted the meaning and scope of Article 239AA concerning previous cases and resolved the conflict between the state and Union and also stated the concept of state and partial statehood which Delhi has despite of the fact that it is a Union territory and said that NCTD is not similar with the other UTs. **REFERENCES** - **Important Cases Referred** - - Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi v. Union of India, (2016) 232 DLT 196. - State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India, (2018) 8 SCC 501 - **Important Statutes Referred** - Constitution of India, 1950. [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) INDIA CONST. art. 239AA. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2)Explaine SCC Times, https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2023/05/13/explained-supreme-court-judgment-settling-tussle-between-delhi-govt-and-centre-legal-news/ (last visited Jun 4, 2024) [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India, (2018) 8 SCC 501. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) *Supra* note 02. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5)INDIA CONST. art. 239AA, cl. 3. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Babulal Parate vs The State of Bombay](https://lawfoyer.in/babulal-parate-vs-the-state-of-bombay/) **Published:** June 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Aneel Meghani, Law Student, Sindh Mehran Institute of Law, Jamshoro** **Edited By: Aman Tyagi, Law Student, University Five Year Law College, Jaipur** 1. **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The Supreme Court of India held the validity of the States Reorganisation Act 1956, which formed a composite separate State of Bombay. The appellant challenged the Act, alleging that it contravened Article 03 of the Indian Constitution, as the State Legislature had no opportunity to express its views on the formation of the separate state. The Supreme Court of India interpreted Article 03 of the Indian Constitution, that the reference of the President of India to the State Legislature is only for subsequent amendments. The composition of the State of Bombay was deemed an amendment of the original proposal, not the new proposal. The appeal was dismissed with costs and validated the States of Reorganisation Act 1956 and the formation of a completely separate composite State of Bombay as we all know the constitution of every country is considered as the backbone of all the laws. Whenever any dispute arises regarding the statutory interpretation, the judiciary always takes charge of handling the dispute. In this case, we will study in what manner the constitutional validity of section 08 under the State Reorganisation Act was determined by the Superior Court when the matter concerned the separate State of Bombay instead of the formation of three unitary states as already proposed in the original bill before becoming the Act. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*:** Supreme Court of India, Constitution, Composition of State of Bombay, Interpretation of Article 03, State of Reorganisation Act, 1956 1. **CASE DETAILS** **i) Judgement Cause Title / Case Name** Babulal Parate vs The State of Bombay and Another **ii) Case Number** Civil Appeal No. 342 of 1956 **iii) Judgement Date** 28/08/1959 **iv) Court** The Supreme Court of India **v) Quorum / Constitution of Bench** S.K. Das, A.K. Sarkar, K.N. Wenchoo, M. Hidayatullah **vi) Author / Name of Judges** S.K. DAS **vii) Citation** 1960 AIR 51, 1960 SCR (1) 605, AIR 1960 SUPREME COURT 51, 1960 (1) SCR 605, 1960 SCJ107, 1959 MPLJ 1037, 1959 62 BOM LR 58 **viii) Legal Provisions Involved** Article 01 of the Constitution of India, Article 226 of the Indian Constitution, Article 132 of the Indian Constitution, Article 122 (1) of the Indian Constitution, State Reorganisation Act 1956 1. **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** This case is one of the most famous cases in the history of India, in this case, the petitioner made an argument before the Supreme Court of India that the State Reorganisation Act 1956 contravened article 03 of the Constitution of India and questioned the validity of States Reorganisation Act 1956. Before passing the act, the President of India recommended the States Reorganisation Act before the Parliament and Legislatures to give their views and opinions on the matter of the formation of three units as per the original proposal: 1. The Union Territory of Bombay 2. The State of Gujrat 3. The State of Maharashtra The new amendment related to the matter in which only one separate State of Bombay was made rather than three different unitary states and the bill was passed with the assent of the President and the President did not refer to the Parliament or Legislature for the modification. Later, in this regard, the petitioner filed a petition before the High Court of Bombay under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and alleged that the formation of the State of Bombay contravened Article 03 of the Constitution of India instead of three separate states as proposed in the original bill. This writ petition was heard by the High Court of Bombay on September 14, 1956, and the High Court dismissed the petition and expressed that there was no violation of Article 03 of the Constitution. The appellant then obtained the certificate under article 132 (1) and filed an appeal in the Supreme Court of India on behalf of that certificate. **2. FACTS OF THE CASE** **i) Procedural Background of the Case** A bill was introduced in the Parliament on the report of the States Reorganisation Commission and as recommended by the President of India under the proviso of Article 03 of the Constitution of India The Bill was proposed to make three unitary separate States- - Union Territory of Bombay - Maharashtra, including Marathawada & Vidarbha - Gujarat, including Saurashtra & Cutch The Bill was sent by the President in the State Legislature for their views. The bill was considered by the House of the People & Council of States and made a report. The Parliament amended the bill which came to be known as the States Reorganisation Act, of 1956. The appellant Babulal Parate filed a petition challenging the Act under Article 226 of the Constitution of India The High Court of Bombay dismissed the petition and the appellant obtained the certificate and filed an appeal before the Supreme Court of India. The Supreme Court held that the Act was not against the Constitution of India and dismissed the appeal with cost **ii) Factual Background of the Case** - The Prime Minister of India in December 1953, announced the formation of a States Reorganisation Commission to examine the Reorganisation of the States and submit the report within a given time - The Commission made a report and on the basis of that report a Bill was introduced in the Parliament in April 1956 to make three separate States/Units - The Bill was sent to the three States Legislatures for the views as required by the article 03 of the Constitution of India - The State Legislatures expressed their views and then the Bill was sent to the Joint Select Committee of Parliament - The Committee of Parliament made its report and made some amendments to the Bill - The amendment included the formation of a unitary state instead of three separate units - The States Reorganisation Act received the assent of the President of India on 31st August 1956 - The appellant filed a petition before the High Court of Bombay arguing that the Act contravenes the Article 03 of the Constitution - The High Court of Bombay dismissed the petition leading to the appeal in the Supreme Court **3. LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** The issues raised in this case: 1. Whether the formation of a composite State of Bombay as one unitary state instead of three separate states as proposed in the original bill 2. Whether the provision to Article 03 of the Constitution requires a fresh reference to the State Legislature or any modification 3. Whether the word Bill in the provision includes amendments or substantial amendments to the original proposal 4. Whether the formation of the State of Bombay was a new proposal or a modification of the originally proposed bill **4. PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** *The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that:* - The appellant argued that, according to article 03 of the constitution, the State does not include only the geographical entity but also people living in that region are part of the State, the Parliament should hear them and give them a chance to give their opinions on the changes to the proposal and include any amendments to the original bill. - The term Bill should include any substantial amendment and should hear the views of State Legislatures - The Legislature of the State of Bombay did not have the opportunity to express their views about the changes that have been made - The formation of the State of Bombay is different from the original proposed bill. The counsels for Respondent submitted that - The term “State” refers to the geographical entity specified in the Constitution of India - The term “Bill” shouldn’t be interpreted to every amendment. It emphasized that a broad interpretation of the “Bill” to include any amendment could nullify the effect of Article 122 (1) - The Respondent Council emphasized that the formation of the State of Bombay was a valid formation. There was no need for fresh reference to the State Legislature 1. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** - **The Constitution of India** 1. Article 03 of the Constitution of India: i) It empowers the Parliament to form a new State by separation of territory or uniting two or more states or part of states ii) Increase or decrease the area of any State iii) Alter the name or boundaries of any State 2. Article 226 of the Constitution of India: i) According to Article 226, every High Court shall have powers, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises the jurisdiction to any person or territory 3. Article 132 of the Constitution of India: i) According to this, an appeal shall lie from any judgment or decree that has been passed by the High Court to the Supreme Court of India whether in civil criminal or other proceedings 4.Article 122(1) of the Constitution of India: i) Article 122 (1) protects the validation of legislative proceedings and challenges - ***State Reorganisation Act, 1956*** 1. Section 8(1) of the State Reorganisation Act: i) Formed a new State of Bombay, comprising of specified territories 1. **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI-** There were two conditions:- 1\. The key factor was on the proviso to Article 03, that if the bill is affecting the area, boundary, or name of any state, the President shall send the bill to the State Legislature for their opinions or views 2\. The second condition was that the President shall send the proposal contained in the bill to the State Legislature only but not for any subsequent amendment made by the Parliament. The petitioners argued that to apply a broader interpretation of the State, they should include its people and consider any significant modification as required in the fresh bill. As per the second condition of Article 03 of the Constitution of India, for the formation of the State of Bombay under section 8(1) of the State Reorganisation Act 1956, the President must refer the proposal from the bull to the State Legislature within the specified time for their views - **OBITER DICTA (IF ANY)-**The Supreme Court of India believed that there would be potential challenges and difficulties if an interpretation applied to Article 03. It noted that such an interpretation could lead to conflict and negative views from the different State Legislatures. 1. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** In conclusion of the Judgment, the Supreme Court of India stated that the proviso to Article 03 of the Constitution of India does not require a fresh reference to the State Legislature if the Parliament subsequently modifies the proposal. The judgment reflects the historical context of the State reorganization, provides insights into the challenges and considerations faced by the framers of the Constitution, and highlights the significance of constitutional provisions in protecting the rights and interests of the State and citizens. The Court clarifies that the requirement of referring a proposal to the State Legislature is fulfilled when the President of India refers the proposal for the expression of its views by the State Legislatures and there is no need for fresh reference and composition of the State of Bombay was not the violation of article 03 of the constitution. The judgment clarifies the State Reorganisation, reinforcing the federal structure, promoting state autonomy, setting a legal precedent offering historical insights, and enhancing the public awareness of constitutional principles. 1. **REFERENCES** 1. **Important Cases Referred** 1. *https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1905293/* 2. **Important Statutes Referred** 1. *The Constitution of India* 2. *State Reorganisation Act, 1956* 3. *The American Constitution* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India](https://lawfoyer.in/k-s-puttaswamy-v-union-of-india/) **Published:** June 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: I Sharan, Student, CHRIST (DEEMED TO BE) UNIVERSITY, BANGALORE** **Edited By: Aman Tyagi, Student, University Five Year Law College, Jaipur** 1. **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The modern world is technology-based. Unlike the olden times when people were isolated from the world, modern people are all connected through the internet. The technological improvements pose a great threat as they have access to the individual’s information which is accessible through their electronic devices. One such technological advancement was the Aadhar Scheme which required the collection of biometric information of individuals and storing it. K S Puttaswamy filed a case opposing this scheme stating that this scheme violates the right to privacy. Questions were raised on whether the right to privacy is present as a fundamental right in the Constitution. After several discussions and going through various case laws, the meeting of the Constitutional Assembly, the origins of privacy, the articles of various scholars like J S Mill and the changing social order the Supreme Court declared that the right to privacy is a fundamental right which falls under Article 21 and is protected by Part III of the Constitution. The Judgment also served as a basis for the Union Government to take steps to introduce the Data Protection Bill in the Parliament. The Judgement as a whole is considered a landmark judgment which emphasized the importance of privacy regarding an individual. ***Keywords*:** Privacy, K S Puttaswamy, Aadhar case, Article 21, Fundamental right, right to privacy. 1. **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgment Cause Title / Case Name*** K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India ***ii)* *Case Number*** Writ Petitions (C) No. 494 of 2012 ***iii)* *Judgment Date*** August 24, 2017 ***iv)* *Court*** Honourable Supreme Court of India ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** 9 Judges Bench ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges*** Justice D Y Chandrachud authored the opinions of Justice J.S Khehar (CJI), Justice R K Agarwal, Justice A Nazeer, and himself. Justices SA Bobde, A M Sapre, Jasti Chalameswar, R Nariman, S K Kaul gave their differing opinions. ***vii)* *Citation*** K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 ***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved*** Article 21 **1.INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT** K S Puttaswamy (retired justice), filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court of India challenging the Aadhar card scheme introduced by the Central Government in 2009. The UIDAI gives citizens of India Unique Identification Numbers (UNI) through Aadhar cards. The main problem he brought up was that this scheme intrudes on an individual’s right to privacy. Whether privacy is a fundamental right and if it is protected by the Constitution were also asked. Privacy is a right under Article 21 according to the Court which took into consideration what was said by both sides before making their decision; they further held that Part III of our constitution protects this right too. **2. FACTS OF THE CASE** **i) Procedural Background of the Case** The Case was first referred to a three-judge bench in the Supreme Court, which stated that a larger bench is required to decide on this case as there is a question of the Constitution. Thus, a nine-judge bench decided the case. ii) Factual Background of the Case** In 2009, the Central Government launched the UIDAI scheme which provides Unique Identification numbers in the form of Aadhar cards to its citizens. These cards are necessary for people to avail themselves of benefits under various other government schemes which can be received through linking their Aadhar card with respective bank accounts. The UIDAI was to collect the biometric information of the individuals and store this information to identify the individual. Questioning this data collection procedure of the UIDAI; K S Puttaswamy, a retired judge filed a case in the Supreme Court stating that the collection of biometric data and storing of this information can be considered as an infringement of the right to privacy of an individual. **3. LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether Privacy is Constitutionally protected 2. Whether the Indian Constitution protects privacy as an essential principle 3. Whether the decisions of the Supreme Court in *M.P. Sharma and Ors. vs. Satish Chandra* and *Kharak Singh* are valid 4. Whether privacy as a right is protected under Part III of the Constitution 5. Whether the right to privacy exists as a separate right or whether it should be considered as a part of the right to life and liberty **4. PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The petitioners said that even trivial issues on invasion of privacy attract the right to privacy. They also claimed that the decisions in the cases of M P Sharma and Kharak Singh failed to reflect the legal position and therefore, have been overruled in the cases of Rustom Cavasji Cooper v Union of India and Maneka Gandhi v Union of India. The right to privacy according to them is a fundamental right that is connected with personal liberty as well as dignity; they drew Court’s attention towards Articles 14,19,20,21 and 25. Moreover, it was claimed that privacy should be considered essential by all means apart from being recognised domestically; internationally also various forums have recognised it under human rights law. The counsels relied on many authorities touching upon this subject matter to establish naturalness or “presumed presence” under our Constitution Advocate Kabil Sibil supporting the petitioners said that privacy is to be recognised as a fundamental right and *State action that violates the fundamental right to privacy must contain at least four elements, namely: “The action must be sanctioned by law; the proposed action must be necessary in a democratic society for a legitimate aim; The extent of such interference must be proportionate to the need for such interference; There must be procedural guarantees against abuse of such interference.”[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)* **5.RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that the Constitution does not mention the right to privacy. The Attorney General of India appearing on behalf of the Union of India stated that the existence of fundamental rights is in doubt when regarding the previous two judgments in *MP Sharma* and *Kharak Singh.* They submitted that the decision in MP Sharma was given by an eight-judge bench and the decision in Kharak Singh was delivered by a six-judge bench. The respondents also mentioned that based on the observations of these cases; it can be concluded that the Constitution does not specifically protect the right to privacy. It was also said that ‘there is no fundamental or general right to privacy; Part III of the Constitution covers some facets of privacy there is no right to privacy present in the Constitution as a blanket right which contains all these facets under it; though Part III of the Constitution protects certain aspects of privacy, they are subject to certain restrictions by the state in case of public interest; also privacy has not been defined clearly and that the framers of the Constitution have not put much thought into it.’ The respondents wanted the Court to consider the right to privacy as an elicit construct. The Attorney General wanted the Court to stand with its decisions in MP Sharma and Kharak Singh’s case. The Additional Solicitor General of India appearing for the UIDAI, supporting the Attorney General said privacy is a vague and subjective concept. The attorney general asked the Court to use the US Court’s standard to test whether the petitioner satisfies the “reasonable expectation of privacy” for such an infraction of privacy to be considered a fundamental right. It was submitted by the counsels supporting the respondents that life and personal liberty have been included in Article 21 and that even the US doesn’t use the right to privacy to test the laws which were earlier tested on its basis. The Attorney General said that the right to privacy at best can be considered only as a common right and not as a fundamental right. **6.RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** The main legal provision that was referred to while discussing this case in the court was Article 21. Article 21 states “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Discussions were made on whether the right to privacy is part of Article 21 as it deals with personal liberty and the right to life. There were also discussions regarding Part III of the Constitution which deals with fundamental rights on whether it implicitly mentions the right to privacy. **7. JUDGMENT** The Judges declared their decision supporting the presence of the right to privacy under Article 21 and that it is protected by Part III of the Constitution. They gave three rules on how to test for privacy. The first rule is to consider the opposite. Accordingly, Privacy is to be deemed as a synonym of publicity. A person can decide what he wants to be kept private and what he needs to be kept as public. Privacy is directly and indirectly connected to the actions performed to protect it from interference. To check if an actionable claim is available against an action regarding privacy, two essentials are to be present. The two essentials required to establish an act as a private act are intent to choose and specify. An individual can choose whom he wants to share information or property with and specify who these other people are. The Court also stated that privacy is not limited to property and places. Also, it held that private information is inaccessible to others. The Judges also stated that any violation of the right to privacy by any authority mentioned under Article 12 must satisfy tests applicable to the rights mentioned under Part III of the Constitution. The Judges stated that the Court’s decision in the *MP Sharma* and *Kharak Singh* cases are overruled and their decision in this case will prevail over it. **8.CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The K S Puttaswamy case is considered a landmark judgment which paved way for new rules and guidelines regarding privacy in India. The counsels appearing for the petitioners and the respondents referred to various national and international case laws to present their side of the argument in the Supreme Court. Several references were also made to the international declarations on privacy. After analysing and hearing both parties the judges declared that privacy is a right protected under Part III and Article 21 of the Constitution. This judgment serves as an important guiding framework in the modern world where the issues related to privacy are on the rise. It is considerable of the court to do a detailed analysis of the law and case laws in India and outside India to take this decision. They also took into consideration the changing social situations which require the protection of private life and information of individuals. The Judgement also influenced several future cases like the Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India 2018, a landmark judgement relating to same-sex relationships. - **REFERENCES** 1. Justice K.S.Puttaswamy(Retd) And Anr. vs Union Of India And Ors. 2017 (10) SCC ( ) 2. MP Sharma v. Satish Chandra, (1954) SCR 1077 ( ) 3. Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1964) 1 SCR 332 4. ( ) 5. R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248 6. ( ) 7. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 8. ( ) 9. Article 21 ( ) 10. Article 12 ( ) 11. Article 19 ( ) 12. Article 20 ( ) 13. [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) JUSTICE K S PUTIASWAMY (RETD.) v. UNION OF INDIA 2017 SCC 10 14. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) *Article 21: Protection of Life and Personal Liberty* (2023) *Constitution of India*. Available at: [https://www.Constitutionofindia.net/articles/article-21-protection-of-life-and-personal-liberty/](https://www.constitutionofindia.net/articles/article-21-protection-of-life-and-personal-liberty/) (Accessed: 05 June 2024). **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [SILENT FEATURES OF NEW CRIMINAL LAWS OF BHARAT](https://lawfoyer.in/silent-features-of-new-criminal-laws-of-bharat/) **Published:** June 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: SANJAY KANNAN B, Student, BHARATH UNIVERSITY, CHENNAI** **Edited By: Aman Tyagi, Student, University Five Year Law College, Jaipur** 1. **INTRODUCTION** In this research article, the author just analyzed the silent features of **New criminal laws in Bharat**. As well as to analyze the distinction between new and old criminal laws (amended), According to the British rule in India chief commending governor of India framed an ***Indian penal code in 1860[\[1\]](#_ftn1)****.* That is only to punish the Indian people and not to render justice. The government of India made the procedure and forwarded the matter to the official committee to follow the legality and rule of law and justice of the *Indian Penal Code 1860, Criminal Procedure Code, and Civil Procedure Code.* *Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS)*, 2023, *Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 and Bharatiya Sakshya Bill (BSB), 2023[**\[2\]**](#_ftn2)* ***Keywords*: *(Bharat, criminal, justice, Government).*** 1. **SUB-HEADINGS** 1. **Meaning, Definition & Explanation** - **The word “criminal” – is** when anything is a person that has to be punished under local law or special law with or without imprisonment or with or without fine. - **IPC** – Indian Penal Code 1860 - **CRPC-** Criminal Procedure Code - **CPC**– Civil procedure code. - **BNS** – Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 - **BNSS**– Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 - **BSB-** Bharatiya Sakshya Bill, 2023 2. **Historical Background / Evolution** The committee was formed under the head of Professor Ranveer Singh who is a ***vice chancellor of National Law University Delhi***, according to the committee’s recommendation The Honourable Prime Minister and Home Minister Government of India, formed a new drafting committee[\[3\]](#_ftn3). Regarding the new criminal law amendment according to the Parliament regulations, the ***Honourable Home Minister of India*** introduced the bill at both the Parliamentary House and process successfully passed and according to the procedure established by law instead of IPC, CRPC, and CPC.As per the notification from Home Ministry and legal Affairs new criminal law amendment goes into force at *1 July-2024[**\[4\]**](#_ftn4).* 3. **Types / Kinds (if any)** - **BNS** – Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 - **BNSS**– Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 - **BSA-** Bharatiya Sakshya Adinayam, 2023 **PARTICULARS****Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023****Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023****Bharatiya Sakshya Bill, 2023****NEW SECTIONS***8 SECTIONS**9 SECTIONS**1 SECTIONS***CHANGED LAWS***175 SECTIONS**160 SECTIONS**23 SECTIONS***REMOVED SECTION***22 SECTIONS**9 SECTIONS**5 SECTIONS***TOTAL*****356- SECTIONS****Instead of 511 sections* ***533- SECTIONS*** *Instead of 478 sections****170 -SECTIONS*** *Instead of 167 sections***4.Exceptions/ explanation** 1. ***INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 (511 to 358) SECTIONS-*** According *to section 2 of BNS* – definition the Defend in the name of *citizen, terrorism, offence against to the children’s and women’s* is fully codified under a new criminal law. As per the interpretation clause the words *document, gender, movable property, public, theft of data, theft of intangible assets* are clearly explained. Next Section 11 of **Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023** is solitary confinement- there is no change between old and new criminal laws, Sec 2 (21) is include a corporate before the word property only movable property now also with data theft.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) *Section* 124 and 124a of wrong full resident- during the British government period Raj droha is on force, after the republic of India law amended to desa groha, the word sedation omitted and the act of against sovereignty unity and integrity of India is added in the particular act. Section 133 of **Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023** was unlawful activity against to the government of India and foreign state at the peace with the Government of India. 2. **Legal Provisions-** Important provision of a Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 is section 106 is nothing but, causing death by negligence and hidden Run case is causing death by negligence the punishment was increased up to 2 years to 5 years. The medical practice causing a death of negligence is the punishment is less than 10 years. According to the BNS *the Delhi Road report* causing 555 cases as per **the Census of government 46%** in the year of 2021. For example, car accident accident is happened in the particular road and suspect is escaping for the spot that results in their crime report. And the punishment for hid and run is increased up to 2 years to 5 years. In the form of medical negligence during the practice of causing a death of negligence is the punishment is less than 10 years because, **the National crime report data 2020,** First information report is fully fake and major case had no *prima facia* I evidence in the medical report. *Hon’ble Supreme Court of India* [\[6\]](#_ftn6) observed in Limited of the view of increasing a vehicle accident and victim sufferings, but the critical golden horse in the team of motor vehicle acts 1988 is not followed and limited. IPC Section *307 attempt murder is punishment* if decrease from dead penalty to life sentence because of more numbers of false cases. Section 111 is new provision of **Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023** contacts unlawful activity is *kidnaping, robbery vehicle, theft extraordinary, land gathering, contract killing and economic offences, Cybercrimes trafficking of a person and drugs weapons* on the illegal goods and securities illegal goods and services human trafficking are added by the drafting committee.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) New 107 old – insane person / idiot, change it to the person of unsound mind. The section is amended to better definition of particular clause. Section 13 **of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023** sub class one the word terrorist was defined, however does any act with the intern to do lying of tender of Unity integrated and the sovereignty and security of economic security of India with the internets of taking terror in a peace are also defined under **UAPA** act[\[8\]](#_ftn8). 3. **BHARATIYA NAGARIK SURAKSHA SANHITA (BNSS), 2023 –** BNSS – section 2 defined about the new interpretation regarding the word’s audio, video elements with a mail and electronic Communications for the police and lawful investigation boards and pressure used to the legislation, but not defined out the bail Bond and Bond. As per the norms and regulations of **Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023** Criminal Court and officers from the section 6 from 20 of BNSS to procedure of making of legal regulations and court proceedings. COURT POWER section -21 -29 of *Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), Sub* clause of act fine amount for punishment 10 thousand rupees to 50 thousand rupees of act, 2023. 2nd clause 5 thousand rupees to 10 thousand rupees. Section -35 of BNSS amended as to maintain legal process of arrest without warrant and Section 51 of *Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita BNSS* is medical examination by registered medical practise nor by registered to buy National medical Commission act 2019. Section 105 Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita *recording of screening of sensing through the audio video effective evidence* to the court process, Section 173 Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita BNSS, Cognizable offence and preliminary enquiry, online first information report and ***zero First Information Report*** with any jurisdiction with valid legal matter[\[9\]](#_ftn9). Section 174 police information to the airpower information as to *non- Cognizable* cases and investigation of such particular case with valid court proceeding. 4. **EVIDENCE ACT – BHARTIYA SAKSHI ADHINIYAM 2023-** Section 2 of ***Bharatiya Sakshya Adinayam*, 2023** comparison provisions between old evidence act and new Sakshya Adinayam is not more amended and only 1 section has been added with 170 inserts of 167. The word definitions from the documents evidence words of Impressions also explain in *Information Technology Act 2000*. According to the Section 32 of **BSA *Bharatiya Sakshya Adinayam*** relevance of statement as to any law container in the law books and industry or electronic or Digital form to maintain the rule of law and justice to today’s technological driven world. Related to the above provision is Section 73 the proof of a verification of digital signatures is newly added. 5. ***Bharatiya Sakshya Adinayam-*** Under Section 61 is a new section is to maintain the nothing in Athena shall apply to the Electronic on the grounds that it is an electronic or Digital record such as subject of a sub section of 66 BSA that the cycle legal effort validity as other document. The electronic documents like WhatsApp chats, screen shots, digital signature is usally to find a suspected person in the particular case. 6. **NOTIFICATIONS –** Notification given by the home ministry government of India, new criminal laws of Bharat come into force from the date of gazette notification by the official authority of India – section officer to govt. of India. 7. **CASE LAWS-** The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India dismissed a Public Interest Litigation challenging India’s new criminal law, with the contact of “***defects and discrepancies*.” *Justices Bela M Trivedi and Pankaj Mithal dismissed the petition stating that laws are not in force.* Advocate Vishal Tiwari said that the new criminal laws are claimed, laws be amended without proper debate. 8. **INTERPRETATIONS-** *Section 111* of BNS is a new provision of *Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS),* 2023 contacts unlawful activity is *kidnaping, robbery of vehicle, theft extraordinary, land gathering, contract killing, and economic offenses, Cybercrimes trafficking of a person and drugs weapons* on the illegal goods and securities illegal goods and services human trafficking are added by the drafting committee. *Bharatiya Sakshya Adinayam* under Section 61 is a new section to maintain that nothing in Athena shall apply to the Electronic because it is an electronic or Digital record. 9. **Doctrines / Theories –** “*Overhaul the Indian criminal justice system” is a basic doctrine of the legal system stating the removal of colonial laws made by British law.* 10. **Amendments –** - **BNS** – Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 - **BNSS**– Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 - **BSA-** Bharatiya Sakshya Adinayam, 2023. Above, bills are passed in both the house of Indian parliament – Lok Sabha (house of people) and upper house Rajya Sabha – house of state procedure established by law. 11. **Statistical Analysis-** - The critical golden horse in the team of Motor Vehicle Acts 1988. - Delhi road accidents **46%** by *Delhi government* in the year **2019[\[10\]](#_ftn10).** - Committee was formed in the head of Professor Ranveer Singh who is a vice chancellor of *National Law University Delhi*, according to the committee’s recommendation. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** *Hon’ble Supreme Court of India* observed in Limited of the view of increasing a vehicle accident and victim sufferings, but the critical golden horse in the team of Motor Vehicle Acts **1988** is not followed and limited. IPC Section 307 attempted murder is the punishment if decreased from dead penalty to a life sentence because of more numbers of false cases. And to amend of evidence act to maintain the rule of law – to accept new electronic evidence in the procedure of court. CRPC – Section -35 of BNSS amended to maintain the legal process of arrest without warrant and Section 51 of **Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita BNSS** is a medical examination by registered medical practice nor by registered to buy National Medical Commission act 2019. criminal procedure code is amended into new procedure of *FIR, Investigation, ZERO FIR.* 1. **REFERENCES** - Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred 1. BNS – Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 *P.JAIN* 2. BNSS- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 3. BSA- Bharatiya Sakshya Adinayam, 2023. 4. The criminal law amendment 2023 *criminal law Manual* - **Sources Referred** 1. Official website of parliamentary affairs . 2. Web site of home ministry Government of India 3. [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Indian penal code 1860 – criminal law in India . [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 and Bharatiya Sakshya Bill (BSB), 2023 – criminal law amendment in the year 2023. [https://www.mha.gov.in/en/about-us/meet-the-minister/union-home-minister last access – 10/06/2024](https://www.mha.gov.in/en/about-us/meet-the-minister/union-home-minister%20%20last%20access%20-%2010/06/2024). 10 .00 am. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) [www.nludelhi.com](http://www.nludelhi.com) – National Law University Delhi official website- last access 11/06/2024- 5.00 pm [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) [https://www.mha.gov.in/en/about-us/meet-the-minister/union-home-minister last access – 10/06/2024](https://www.mha.gov.in/en/about-us/meet-the-minister/union-home-minister%20%20last%20access%20-%2010/06/2024) [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Official web site of parliamentary affairs government of India last access – 12/06/2024 – 11.00 pm. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6)[www.supremecourtofindia.com](http://www.supremecourtofindia.com) last access – 13-06- 2024. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Official web site of parliamentary affairs government of India last access – 12/06/2024 –12.20 pm. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) [www.nia.gov.in](http://www.nia.gov.in) last access 12-06-2024 (UAPA ACT). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) [www.tnpolice.gov.in](http://www.tnpolice.gov.in) last access 13-06-2024 (first information report). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Web site of home ministry Government of India last access 13-06-2024 time 4.00 pm **Categories:** Articles --- ### [Analyzing the Role of Plea Bargaining in Indian Criminal Justice System](https://lawfoyer.in/analyzing-the-role-of-plea-bargaining-in-indian-criminal-justice-system/) **Published:** June 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Biraj Kumar Sarkar, Student, (Surendranath Law College / University of Calcutta)** **Edited By: Aman Tyagi, Student, University Five Year Law College, Jaipur** 1. **Introduction-** The right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Indian constitution but in reality, more than 4 crore cases are pending in district and taluk levels alone. Overall 5.1 crore cases (2024) are pending all over India with 1.8 crore cases pending for the last 30 years. Not only that more than 70% of inmates of our Indian prisons are under trial. Lack of judiciary infrastructure, a huge number of court cases, and a lack of recruitment of judges are the main reasons for delay in our justice system. When an individual is detained by police for the allegation of some offense, that time the common man loses his respect in society, and due to the delay in trial, sometimes it leads to committing suicide or the real accused not being detained. To give some relief to courts, victims, or to the accused the lawmakers of India inserted a special chapter in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 in 2006 named “Plea bargaining” under chapter XXI A. Although this is not a new concept, around 90 countries have adopted this provision so far. Under this procedure, the person who is accused or the defendant can negotiate with the prosecution for a lesser punishment than what is provided by the law, by pleading guilty to a lesser serious offense. It is a legal agreement set up between the victim and the defendant which has some limitations and exceptions where this concept cannot be used. ***Keywords*:** Plea Bargaining, Crpc, Negotiation, Prosecution, Chapter XXIA, Defendant, Sentence bargaining, Trial. - **Meaning** Plea bargaining is the process that aims to reduce delays in the criminal justice system. The term plea bargaining is based on the principle of “nolo contendere” which means “I do not wish to contend”[\[1\]](#_ftn1). If we split the term “Plea Bargaining” into two words, the first word “plea” here refers to request and the second-word bargaining defines negotiation. Therefore we can say that plea bargaining involves requesting the victim to negotiate for a lesser punishment to avoid the rough sentence established by the law. “Plea bargaining literature predicts that party strike plea bargains in the shadow of expected trial outcome”[\[2\]](#_ftn2) – this implies that after predicting the sentence after the trial, the probability of the acquittal can be reduced by overlooking structural distortions. In a criminal case, under this concept, the victim and the defendant come to an agreement that after pleading guilty the prosecution will make some concession to the defendant’s punishment in return. The whole process of negotiation and agreement should be done under the supervision of the judge. 2. **Historical Background** The practice of plea bargaining was effective in the late 19th century in the United States but the origin of plea bargaining can be traced back to the 18th century in England where it was used to mitigate house sentences for capital offenses. In the 19th century[\[3\]](#_ftn3), the United States adopted it as an efficient process to tackle the growing number of cases in the USA. By the end of the 20th century plea bargaining became an effective solution for overburdened courts in the world. Many proponents argue that the plea bargaining system not only reduces the burden on the judiciary but is also beneficial for both defendants and victims. For the defendant, it is beneficial as they do not have to face harsh punishment and the victims also get justice in a reasonable time. It alleviates the burden of caseloads of the courts and reduces the time and resources required for court trials. However, the critics argue that plea bargaining can affect both the victim and the defendant as victims can be pressurized to accept the negotiation on the other side the innocent defendants can be pressurized to plead guilty. 3. **Evolution in India:** In ancient and medieval India, arbitration and mediation were the common methods for dispute resolution[\[4\]](#_ftn4). The Law Commission of India in 1991 had proposed concessional treatment for those who plead guilty on their own. Most of the legal communities supported this concept. The Law Commission of India in 2001, in its 177th report suggested the need for the concept of plea bargaining in India, which was later supported by the Justice Malimath committee[\[5\]](#_ftn5) in 2003. After that in 2006, the amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code brought legitimacy and constitutionality of plea bargaining in India by adopting Chapter XXIA. 4. **Types / Kinds:** The concept of plea bargaining depends on various factors. As every case has its factual circumstances we cannot choose any specific concept for any case. We can categorize various types of plea bargaining which can be utilized after concerning the nature and condition of the cases. Some of the most common types are[\[6\]](#_ftn6)– - **Charge bargaining:** Charge bargaining means being ready to plead guilty to a less serious charge in exchange for a reduction of the punishment established by the law. For example, a defendant charged with theft may plead guilty to trespass only. - **Sentence bargaining:** Sentence bargaining means the charge is the same but the sentence is lighter. For example, a defendant charged with kidnapping can plead guilty and reduce his sentence by cooperating with law enforcement. - **Fact bargaining:** Fact bargaining should not be used in the court as it violates the ethics of fair trial. It involves an agreement between the prosecution and the defendant that the specific facts or evidence will be present or omitted at the time of trial and the other will not present before the court. For instance, a person who committed robbery may reduce his sentence by pleading guilty and the prosecution presents the fact in trial that the defendant had snatched the victim’s watch only but did not apply any force to the victim. - **Count bargaining:** In this form of bargaining the defendant pleads guilty to some charges in exchange for the dismissal of other charges. For example, a defendant is facing many charges and agrees to admit only some of them and have others dismissed for a lesser sentence. - **Sentence recommendation bargaining:** In this type of negotiation the prosecution bargains a specific punishment to the judge in exchange for the conviction of the defendant. For instance, the prosecution requested the court to give six-month imprisonment or a fine for conviction of theft. 5. **Legal Provisions / Procedure** The legal provision of plea bargaining is mentioned under chapter XXIA which was inserted in 2006 as an act. In this chapter, there are a total of 12 provisions that explain and cover the whole process of plea bargaining. The processes of plea bargaining in general are – - **Applicability of this chapter (Section 265A[\[7\]](#_ftn7)):** To begin the concept of Plea bargaining a report has to be made before the officer in charge of the police station under section 173[\[8\]](#_ftn8) or a magistrate has to issue a complaint of offense. The magistrate’s power to examine the complaint and witness is mentioned under section 200[\[9\]](#_ftn9), and under section 204[\[10\]](#_ftn10) of the Crpc he will issue further process. - **Application for plea bargaining (265B[\[11\]](#_ftn11)):** - The application should be filed by the accused before the court in which the trial is pending. - In the application the defendant has to make brief details about the case accompanied by an affidavit, in which he has to mention that he has filed the application voluntarily with the understanding of all legal consequences as well as the punishment of the same and he has not previously been convicted for any offense by a court of law. - After receiving the application the court can issue a notice to the public prosecutor or the complainant and to the accused regarding the plea to appear on a given date which is fixed for the case. 1. When the public prosecutor or the complainant and the defendant appear on the given date, the court will examine the accused on camera in the absence of the other party as the court wants to satisfy itself that the accused has filed the plea voluntarily without any pressure upon him. Such statements or facts stated by the accused will not be used for any other purpose except the need of this section. 2. If the court is satisfied by the application the court will provide time to the public prosecutor or the complainant to go for a negotiation where the victim may be given compensation by the accused and other expenses. After that, the court will give another date for a further hearing of the case. 3. In case the court finds that the application was filed involuntarily or the applicant was convicted by a court of law in which he was charged with the same offense, the court will dismiss the application and start the trial from the stage from which the application was filed, following the criminal procedure code. - **Guideline for mutually satisfactory disposition (Section 265C[\[12\]](#_ftn12)):** If the court is satisfied that the application was made voluntarily without any pressure on the defendant the court will follow the guidelines under section 265C When the case is filed on a police report or anywhere else other than the police report (cognizance of the magistrate), the court will issue a notice to the public prosecutor, the investigating police officer, the accused, and the victim of the case for a meeting to mutual satisfactory disposition. It is also mentioned that the court must conduct the whole process voluntarily. Following the same the accused or the victim (otherwise than on the police report) can participate in the meeting along with their pleader, if any. - **Report of the mutually satisfactory disposition position (Section 265D[\[13\]](#_ftn13)):** If the disposition is completed successfully the court will prepare a report of such disposition which will be signed by the presiding officer of the court along with the persons who participated in the meeting. But if the mutually satisfactory disposal did not work out in that case after recording its observation, the court has to proceed from the stage where the application of the plea was filed. - **Disposal of the case (Section 265E[\[14\]](#_ftn14)):** After signing the disposition report the court will continue the further process of disposal. - The court will award compensation to the victim according to section 265D and hear the parties about the quantum of the punishment. - If the accused falls under section 360 of CrPC or the Probation of Offenders Act 1958 or any other law, he may be released on probation of good conduct or by any such law to punish the accused. - If the court finds the minimum punishment provided by law, the court can sentence the accused the half of the minimum punishment. - If the court did not find anything according to the provisions of sections 265 B and C, then the court can sentence 1/4th of the punishment provided by law as the case may be. - **Judgment (Section 265F[\[15\]](#_ftn15) and Section 265G):** The court has to deliver its judgment in an open court and the judgment should be signed by the presiding officer. It is mentioned under section 265G[\[16\]](#_ftn16), that the judgment of the court will be a final judgment and no appeal should be made against the judgment unless the exception is mentioned under articles 226 to 227 and 136. 6. **Exceptions:** There are certain exceptions to this provision. The concept of plea bargaining shall not be applicable- 1. If the punishment for the reported or cognizance offense is life imprisonment or punishment of death sentence or exceeding 7 years of imprisonment. 2. If the offense affects the socio-economic condition of the country. It’s it is to be noted that the central government has the authority to determine the offenses under the law by issuing notification regarding this. - If the offence has been committed against a woman or a child below the age of 14 years. 1. If the application was filed involuntarily or under any pressure. 2. If the applicant was convicted by a court of law in which he was charged with the same 7. **Case Laws / Overruling :** 8. Brady v. United States (1970): In the case of Brady v. United States (1970)[\[17\]](#_ftn17), the court upheld the constitutionality of the pre-bargaining as it does not violate a defendant’s constitutional right as long as they are doing such plead voluntarily. State Of Gujarat v. Natwar Harchandji Thakor (2005): The realization of the importance of plea bargaining in the Indian judiciary comes after the famous case of Harchandji Thakor in 2005[\[18\]](#_ftn18). The Gujarat High Court observed that plea bargaining is a factual examination in each case based on facts and circumstances. 1. Joseph v State of Kerala (2013): In the case of P. Joseph v State of Kerala[\[19\]](#_ftn19), the Kerala high court declares that an illegal and ultra vires plea bargaining process violates the law. Such a trial process will proceed from the stage where it had reached prayer to the commencement of the Plea bargaining process. Air Customs v. Begaim Akynova (2022) In the case of Air Customs v. Begaim Akynova[\[20\]](#_ftn20), the honorable Delhi High Court stated that plea bargaining applies to offenses under sections 132 and 135 of the Customs Act 1862, if they are astutely followed by chapter XXIA of CRPC. 8. **Benefits and Drawbacks:** Plea bargaining is beneficial for the 1. Victim: The Indian judicial process is very time-consuming as a consequence the victims have to face many difficulties to get justice. But in the case of plea bargaining, the victims can get justice in a reasonable time. 2. Accused: The accused or the defendant got the benefit of being charged with lesser sentences rather than harsh punishment. 3. Judiciary: It is also beneficial for the judiciary as the case resolves in the meantime and the court does not have to hold a case for years to years. 4. Expenses and time: A speedy judiciary trial reduces the expenses and time of all victims, defendants, judges, and attorneys. Drawbacks of the Plea Bargaining: 1. The defendant may escape from harsh sentences by accepting a lesser charge and the defendant can become a habitant offender as he got the lesser punishment that he deserves. 2. Victims may feel cheated as the accused avoids the proper trial and procedure to escape from the complete punishment that he deserves. 3. Innocent defendants can be forced by the powerful complainant to plead guilty for offenses which he has not committed. On the other hand, the victims can also face the vice versa. 4. The motive of the judiciary is to serve complete justice which is infringed in this procedure. 5. **C) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The Plea bargaining system in India plays a crucial role in the justice system with its pros and cons. This system offers a way to efficiently resolve cases and manage court caseloads. It offers a mutually beneficial agreement between the prosecution and the defendant which presents an alternative resolution to criminal cases. But it can be a major drawback for innocent and poor people as they can be influenced or pressured by the powerful people of society. However, the judges need to exercise their discretion and judicial power wisely and effectively when approving any plea bargaining after considering relevant facts and the needs of the case. Thus, this tool has to be used carefully to serve fair justice in society. 1. **D) REFERENCES** 2. **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** 1. The Code of Criminal Procedure,1973, S.N. Mishra, Nineteenth Edition 2. The Code of Criminal Procedure,1973\[ Act of 1973\],Bare Act 3. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. Ipleaders, [All about plea bargaining – iPleaders](https://blog.ipleaders.in/plea-bargaining-practice-india/) 2. Lexpeeps, 3. Legal Service India, [Concept Of Plea Bargaining: Under Indian Legal System (legalserviceindia.com)](https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-10747-concept-of-plea-bargaining-under-indian-legal-system.html#:~:text=Provision%20Of%20Plea%20Bargaining%20In%20Indian%20Legal%20System,Procedure%20for%20plea%20bargaining%3A%205%20Appeal%20and%20revision%3A), 4. Latestlaws,, 4. **Cases Referred** 1. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) 2. State Of Gujarat v. Natwar Harchandji Thakor, 2005CRILJ2957, (2005)1GLR709 3. Joseph v. State of Kerala, (2013) 7 SCC 569 4. Air Customs v. Begaim Akynova, 2022 SCC Online SC 1263 5. **Statutes Referred** 1. Chapter XXIA of Crpc 2. Probation of Offenders Act 1958 [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Ipleaders, [All about plea bargaining – iPleaders](https://blog.ipleaders.in/plea-bargaining-practice-india/), (Last visited jun.10, 2024) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Vogel, M. E.,Coercion to compromise: the federal courts and the origins of plea bargaining, Law and History Review, 25(2), 309-378, (2007). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Bibas, Stephanos, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial”, All Faculty Scholarship,924,(2004) [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Ipleaders, [All about plea bargaining – iPleaders](https://blog.ipleaders.in/plea-bargaining-practice-india/), (Last visited jun.10, 2024) [\[5\]](#_ftnref5)Latestlaws,, (last visited jun. 10, 2024) [\[6\]](#_ftnref6)Legal Service India, [Concept Of Plea Bargaining: Under Indian legal System (legalserviceindia.com)](https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-10747-concept-of-plea-bargaining-under-indian-legal-system.html#:~:text=Provision%20Of%20Plea%20Bargaining%20In%20Indian%20Legal%20System,Procedure%20for%20plea%20bargaining%3A%205%20Appeal%20and%20revision%3A), (last visited jun. 10, 2024) [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, § 265A, No.2, Acts of Parliament 1974(India). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, § 173, No.2, Acts of Parliament 1974(India). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, § 200, No.2, Acts of Parliament 1974(India). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, § 204, No.2, Acts of Parliament 1974(India). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, § 265B, No.2, Acts of Parliament 1974(India). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, § 265C, No.2, Acts of Parliament 1974(India). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, § 265D, No.2, Acts of Parliament 1974(India). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, § 265E, No.2, Acts of Parliament 1974(India). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, § 265F, No.2, Acts of Parliament 1974(India). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, § 265G, No.2, Acts of Parliament 1974(India). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) State Of Gujarat v. Natwar Harchandji Thakor, 2005CRILJ2957, (2005)1GLR709 [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) P. Joseph v. State of Kerala, (2013) 7 SCC 569 [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Air Customs v. Begaim Akynova, 2022 SCC Online SC 1263 **Categories:** Articles --- ### [Krishna Kumar Singh & Anr. vs State of Bihar & Ors. (2017) 3 Supreme Court Cases (SCC) 1.](https://lawfoyer.in/krishna-kumar-singh-anr-vs-state-of-bihar-ors-2017-3-supreme-court-cases-scc-1/) **Published:** June 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author- Mayra Kumar, student, MIT World Peace University** **Edited by- Sushree Sangita Panda, student, Birla Global University.** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE *(not less than 150 words and more than 250 words)*** The constitutionality of the State of Bihar government’s 1989 “State of Bihar Non-Government Sanskrit Educational Institutions (Taking Over of Administration and Control) Ordinance” was issued in the Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (2017) case. This law aimed to regulate professional hiring practices in 429 private Sanskrit educational institutions and place them under governmental supervision. Legal objections about administrative law, education policy, and constitutional law surfaced, casting doubt on the ordinance’s legality and application. Important concerns included the governor’s constitutional jurisdiction to adopt ordinances, the steps involved in putting such laws into effect, and how these actions might affect educational institutions. The case comprised multiple legal hearings that resulted in a Supreme legal decision made by a seven-judge panel. After much deliberation, the judiciary declared that re-promulgating ordinances without parliamentary consent was illegal. This historic ruling highlighted the significance of upholding constitutional principles in legislative activities and had a substantial impact on the management and supervision of private educational institutions in Bihar. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*:** *Constitutionality, Supervision, Ordinances, Re-promulgating, Educational institutions.* **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name******Krishna Kumar Singh & Anr. vs State of Bihar & Ors.*** ***ii)* *Case Number******AIR 579*** ***iii)* *Judgement Date******January 2, 2017*** ***iv)* *Court******Supreme Court*** ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench******7-judge bench of the Supreme Court*** ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges******Justice Dr T.S. Thakur, C.J. (Concurring); Justice Madan B: Lokur (Dissenting); Justice S.A. Bobde (Majority);******Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel (Majority);*** ***Justice Uday U. Lalit (Majority);*** ***vii)* *Citation******(2017) 3 Supreme Court Cases (SCC) 1******viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved******Articles 123, 133, 213, and 356 of the Indian Constitution*****INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The President of India is empowered to enact laws through ordinances, which he may do on the advice of Union ministers. Ordinances have the same legal force as laws, although the house must not be in session before they can be enacted. The main purpose of ordinances is to provide emergency legislation or action when the country needs it and the parliament is not in session. This is the most significant aspect of ordinances. It is significant to remember that an ordinance will expire six weeks after the start of a new parliament session if it is not passed. The Constitution’s Articles 123 and 213 address the authority to make ordinances. The President of India may only promulgate an ordinance while neither of the two Houses of Parliament is in session, according to Article 123 of the Indian Constitution. Plus, it specifies that an ordinance can only possess the same legal force and effect as legislation of Parliament if it is presented to both chambers of Parliament. It is significant to remember that Article 213 grants the governor the authority to promulgate ordinances. An ordinance may be enacted on any matter over which Parliament has authority, provided that it is promulgated with consideration for the division of powers outlined in the concurrent, union, and state lists. Understanding the primary issue of what happens to activities taken under an ordinance that subsequently stops being in effect is the primary goal and objective of this essay. The important ruling in the Krishna Kumar Singh case provided clarification on the matter. Thus, let’s first examine the case’s facts before evaluating the questions in it. **FACTS OF THE CASE** **Procedural Background of the Case** - Ordinance Passage (1989) – The Bihar Non-Governmental Sanskrit Schools (Taking over Management and Control) Ordinance was passed by the Bihar government in 1989. The purpose of this legislation was to give the government management and control over 429 private Sanskrit institutions. - Re-issuing the Ordinance – The ordinance was repeatedly promulgated without being introduced in the state assembly for consideration of becoming a law. During the time this ordinance was in effect, no laws were passed pertaining to it. - Appeal to the High Court of Patna – The Patna High Court received a petition for pay and other obligations from teachers and staff at the impacted schools. - High Court Decision – The petition was dismissed by the Patna High Court. It was decided that re-promulgations without good cause in succession go against the fundamental principles of constitutionalism. It ruled that the re-promulgation was invalid, citing the D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar decision. The High Court mandated that 305 legitimate school employees get their salaries through April 30, 1992. - Appeal to the Supreme Court – The Supreme Court received an appeal challenging the ruling of the High Court. - Judgment of the Apex Court (two judges) – The ruling of the High Court was upheld by the Supreme Court. It declared that the ordinance’s re-promulgation violated fundamental constitutional rights. - Linking to a Broader Bench – Regarding the initial ordinance’s legitimacy, there were differing opinions. Because of the constitutional relevance of the case, it was first referred to a 3-judge bench and subsequently to a 5-judge bench. - Final Judgment in the Krishna Kumar Case, 2017, 7 Judge Bench – The ultimate ruling was rendered by a 7-judge Supreme Court bench on January 2, 2017. It came to the conclusion that the ordinance’s entire enactment was a fraud on the authority granted by Article 213 of the Constitution. Factual Background of the Case** - The Bihar Non-Governmental Sanskrit Schools Ordinance of 1989 – Granted authorization by the government of Bihar to assume control of 429 private Sanskrit schools. This led to the hiring of staff members and educators from the private sector by the government. - Re-issuing the Ordinance – The ordinance was often promulgated but never made into law. Legal challenges concerning its constitutionality resulted from this. - High Court Decision – Citing violations of fundamental principles, the Patna High Court ruled that the re-promulgation was unlawful. Stipulated that salaries be paid to staff members of legitimate schools through April 30, 1992. - Appeal to the Supreme Court – Appeals against the ruling of the High Court brought before the Supreme Court. Although the Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court’s decision, it upheld the initial ordinance’s legality. - Referral and Concluding Statement – The constitutional gravity of the subject led to its referral to larger benches. The final ruling in the Krishna Kumar case from 2017 reaffirmed that the ordinance’s promulgation was illegal. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** - Do any rights, obligations, or liabilities imposed by an ordinance continue to exist once it is no longer in effect? - Was the nature of the government regulations in Bihar legally valid? - Is it required for the executive branch to present the ordinance to the State Legislature and Parliament, respectively, under Article 123 or 213? - Is it not in opposition to the fundamental principles of constitutionalism to re-promulgate an Ordinance? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioner – In this particular case, the petitioners sought relief based on the ordinances. Citing the aforementioned ordinance’s designation of them as “government employees,” they brought to the Hon’ble Court’s attention their entitlement to receive wages and other benefits from the government. They also came to the conclusion that they should continue to profit from the government’s salary and benefits, which they were entitled to from the moment the first ordinance was enacted until the last law’s expiration. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that the respondent brought up the question of whether activities made under an ordinance that are taken before the date that the legislative assembly disapproves of it are lawful and have repercussions. The argument went that they were under no obligation to provide teachers and other staff members of the aforementioned schools with salaries or benefits because the ordinances were invalid. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** Article 123 of the Constitution – It outlines the President’s authority to issue proclamations while Parliament is in recess. When Parliament is not in session, the President may promulgate ordinances to deal with critical issues. The President’s authority to enact ordinances is coextensive with Parliament’s legislative authority, meaning it can be applied to any topic on which Parliament is authorized to enact laws and is constrained by the same constitutional provisions as enacted by Parliament. According to Article 133 of the Indian Constitution, the Supreme Court has the authority to hear appeals from the High Court in civil cases. According to this Article, any judgment, decree, or final order rendered in a civil case by a High Court operating within the borders of India may be appealed to the Supreme Court, provided that the High Court certifies under Article 134A – that the matter concerns an important legal issue of public concern, one that the High Court believes should be decided by the Supreme Court. Article 213 of the Indian Constitution – It explains the governor’s authority to enact ordinances while the legislature is in recess. In the event that the Governor determines that there are circumstances that necessitate his taking immediate action, he may promulgate such ordinances as he deems necessary, provided that the circumstances do not occur during the sessions of the State’s legislative assembly or legislative council, or during the sessions of both Houses of the Legislature. According to Article 356 of the Indian Constitution, the President may issue a proclamation in the event that the state government is unable to carry out its constitutional duties as a result of a breakdown in the state’s constitutional machinery. The President may also make this determination without consulting the Governor of the State. **JUDGEMENT** - **RATIO DECIDENDI** The Supreme Court’s ruling’s main ratio decidendi is that it is unlawful to reissue regulations without restrictions. This indicates that the President’s and the Governor’s powers under Articles 123 and 213 respectively are subject to judicial review. Although the Constitution gives the executive the right to enact ordinances, the court stressed that this is a conditional legislative power that can only be used when the Legislature is not in session. The ruling emphasizes the idea that repeatedly promulgating ordinances against the letter and spirit of the Constitution compromises the legislative process. - **OBITER DICTA (IF ANY)** The court might have talked about the relevance of its previous ruling in D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar (1986) in this instance. Although it may not directly relate to the main matter at hand, this could be regarded as obiter dictum because it offers further context or guidance. The court determined that the re-promulgation of ordinances was unconstitutional in the D.C. Wadhwa case. Citing this earlier ruling could support the court’s position that re-promulgating ordinances are unlawful. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** In Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (2017), the court struck a significant balance with the order issued by Justice Chandrachud, which made it very clear that the executive branch could not misuse its authority and that the ordinance must be promulgated in the event that the Parliament is not in session. The majority of opinions supported the judgment, and even while there is still disagreement over how to assess rights and obligations once the ordinance expires, this does not lessen the strength of the ruling. In his concurring opinion, the Chief Justice at the time said that there is still room for interpretation on this issue. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** - - - C. Wadhwa vs. State of Bihar (1986) - State of Orissa vs. Bhupendra Kumar Bose (1962) - Venkata Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (1985) - R. Bommai vs. Union of India (1994) - Kameshwar Singh vs, State of Bihar (1952) - K. Roy vs Union of India (1982) - Ramesh vs Gendalal Motilal Patni (1966) **Important Statutes Referred** The “doctrine of colorable legislation” is a legal doctrine that attempts to stop the government from using its legislative power in an unconstitutional way. If the legislature is not allowed to do something, it should not be done under any circumstances or under the appearance that the conduct is still legitimate. The adage “what cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly” is the source of the principle. Nonetheless, a legislature may enact legislation in a fashion that lends it a constitutional appearance even while the legislation actually seeks to accomplish an objective that the legislature was unable to accomplish. Such laws are deemed invalid and are referred to as “colorable” laws. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [D. S. Nakara V. Union of India, AIR 1983 SUPREME COURT 130](https://lawfoyer.in/d-s-nakara-v-union-of-india-air-1983-supreme-court-130/) **Published:** June 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author-Bhawna Chandrakar, student, Kalinga University** **Edited by- Sushree Sangita Panda, student, Birla Global University** **ABSTRACT** This case is about the difference in pension of Central Employees, the employees were differentiated based on the date of retirement and pension was given accordingly which also created a class of pensioners, formed against the law. Three petitioners were retired and paid differently according to the date of retirement every month. This violates Article 14 of the Indian Constitution which says equality before the law every person should be treated equally, and there should not be any difference. The Pay Commission along with ARC recommended some increase in pension and the age of retirement to be 58 years. The petitioner argued that all the persons should be paid equally for doing the same work. The doctrine of Severability is discussed. The court gave their judgement that it is against the law and it is violating Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. This should be stopped or struck down. On infringement of any rights of the people of India, they can appeal or file a writ petition. In High Court as well as directly in the Supreme Court this is discussed in Articles 32 and 226 of the Indian Constitution. ***Keywords* *:*** *Pension, Retirement, Constitution of India, Article 14, Writ petition, Severability, Union of India.* 1. **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name***D.S. Nakara V. Union Of India ***ii)* *Case Number***AIR 1983 SUPREME COURT 130 ***iii)* *Judgement Date***17/12/ 1982 ***iv)* *Court***Supreme court ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench***D.A. Desai, Y.V. Chandrachud, V.D. Tulzapurkar, O. Chinnappa Reddy, Baharul Islam ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges***D.A. Desai, ***vii)* *Citation***ABHINAV MOHAN GOEL ( Case Analysis on D. S. Nakara Vs. Union of India***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved***Constitution of India Article 14 Article 32 **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** Pension is paid to the Central Employees who have been retired or not active employees. It is paid on the basis of past work contributions. It depends on the work done and the time given as an employee. Articles 14 & 32 are discussed in the Indian Constitution which talks about the rights and equality before the law, no discrimination The doctrine of Severability is discussed with states that when a particular provision is unconstitutional and not the whole provision then only part should be declared void not the entire provision. The difference in pension is discussed in this case and the difference in the amount of pension is on the basis of the date of retirement on which the court held that it violates Article 14 and is unconstitutional so it should be struck down. **FACTS OF THE CASE** Factual Matrix of the case there are 3 petitioners, the first is a Civil Servant, the second is a member of the Armed forces and the third is the society registered under “The Societies Registration Act,1860, it was formed to resolve public problems and objectives was to support the cause of pensioners. It’s “*local standard”* was in question. The first petitioner was retired in 1972 with a monthly pension of Rs. 935/- & dearness allowances. The second petitioner with monthly pension of Rs. 981/- with allowances. The UNION OF INDIA revised & liberalises the pension scheme within a period of time, some important changes were:- - The First Pay Commission recommended the age of retirement to 58 years for all services and the pension should be Rs. 8000 per year for 35 years of service. - The Second Pay Commission reaffirmed the retirement age but recommended increasing the retirement benefits & pension. - The Administrative Reform Commission (ARC) set up by the Government of India in 1956, suggested that the cost of living is increasing day by day and the pension is not sufficient, the expenses have increased saving, are decreased. Further ARC recommended that the ceiling should be raised to 1000 p.m But before the government can look at this recommendation the Third Pay Commission was set up *on the reference to the term* *“ Death -cum – retirement benefits of Central Government Employees “*. The third Pay Commission recommended that the maximum pension be raised from Rs. 675 to Rs. 1000 pm and gratuity should be raised from 24000 to 30000. Thus, the liberalised pension formula shall be applicable to those who retired on or after March 31, 1997. Those who retire on or after April 1, 1979, or a specified date would not be entitled to the liberalised pension. **LEGAL ISSUE RAISED** Whether the classification of the pension is valid under Article 14 of the Constitution or not? **PETITIONER ARGUMENTS** *Anil B. Divan, Mrs Vineeta Sen Gupta and P.H. Parekh for the Petitioners L.N.Sinha, Attorney General, M.M. Abdul Khader, N. Nettar and Miss A. Subhashini for Union of India.* Petitioner argued *that the Pension is paid for past satisfactory service rendered, and to avoid destitution in old age as well as a social welfare or socio-economic justice measure, the differential treatment* in providing a pension for the person retiring before or after the specified date is arbitrary. This is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that the scheme should be implicated as a whole or rejected as a whole. The date from which the scheme came into force it became indivisible integral. Further, the court has no right to make the financial implications retroactive and *this Court cannot grant any relief to the pensioners who retired prior to a specified date because if more persons divide the available cake, the residue falling into the share of each, especially to those who are likely to be benefited by the scheme will be comparatively smaller and as they are not before the Court, no relief can be given to the pensioners.* **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** - - Article 14 – It states that every person should be treated equally. The equality before the law should not be denied to any person. There shall not be any discrimination based on race, caste, gender etc - Article 32 – It states the remedies provided to the general public for infringement of the rights - The person has the right to move to the Supreme Court for the infringement of rights, the appropriate proceedings should be followed for enforcement of rights. - Doctrine of Severability – it means that if in the provision any particular part is unconstitutional then only one part should be declared void not the whole provision. **JUDGEMENT** The Hon’ble court held that all the pensioners for a class and it cannot be further classified. The difference made on the basis of retirement date is arbitrary, it creates a difference between the pensioners even though they have done the same work at the same time therefore they should get equal pay irrespective of the date of retirement. This scheme/ law is violative of Article 14. Hence it is unconstitutional and VOID thus it should become ineffective. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The scheme was against socio-economic justice and social welfare. The pension was differentiated on the basis of the date of retirement even though the work is the same for all. This also raises the problem of the cost of living because as the cost of living increases and the savings are decreased it creates financial problems for many people/ for the class of people. The difference in pension is against the rule of equal pay for equal work. It violated Article 14 and was unconstitutional thus resulting in struck down. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** - - Menaka Gandhi V. Union Of India, AIR 1978SC 597 - Ramana Dayaram Shetty V. The International Airport Authority of India & Ors, 1979AIR 1628 - Deoki Nandan Prasad V. State of Bihar & Ors,1971 SCC(2) 330 - . State of Punjab & Anr V. Iqbal Singh, 1991 AIR 1532 - S.P.Gupta V. Union Of India, **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [DILIP B. JIWRAJKA VS UNION OF INDIA,2023 SC 1530.](https://lawfoyer.in/dilip-b-jiwrajka-vs-union-of-india2023-sc-1530/) **Published:** June 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Jaskeerat Singh, Law student at Christ University, Bangalore** **Edited by: Jahnvi Goel, Law student at Amity University.** 1. **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** In the landmark case of Dilip B. Jiwrajka vs Union of India[\[1\]](#_ftn1), the Supreme Court of India affirmed the constitutional validity of Sections 95 through 100 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016. This ruling addressed legal challenges regarding the constitutionality of these sections under Articles 14 and 21 of the Indian Constitution, specifically concerning the commencement of insolvency procedures, the function of the resolution professional, and the handling of debtors during the process. The petitioners argued against the necessity of insolvency resolution procedures specifically for individuals, contending that existing procedures for corporations were sufficient and constitutionally sound. They also raised issues regarding the resolution professional’s broad powers to access information and the automatic imposition of a moratorium upon filing an insolvency application, suggesting these measures could harm the debtor’s creditworthiness and infringe upon natural justice. The respondents, however, defended the IBC’s structure, emphasizing its efficiency and the facilitative role of the resolution professional, who is not bound by their recommendations. They also highlighted the distinction between the moratorium under Section 96 and similar provisions, asserting it protects the debtor from legal actions but not the debt itself. The Supreme Court’s decision reaffirmed the constitutionality of the IBC’s provisions, noting that the process under Sections 95-99 involves no judicial adjudication and that the resolution professional acts in a facilitative capacity. It clarified that the adjudicatory authority, while not bound by the resolution professional’s recommendations, must adhere to the principles of natural justice when deciding on the application. The court also underscored the interim moratorium’s purpose to safeguard the debtor from further legal proceedings. This judgment is crucial for the insolvency regime, aiming to clear a backlog of pending applications against guarantors, thereby facilitating debt recovery for creditors and enhancing their trust in the system. However, critics argue that the judgment overlooks potential violations of natural justice and could hinder credit flow if personal guarantors’ rights are insufficiently protected, posing risks to Indian corporations. 1. **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name***Dilip B. Jiwrajka v. Union of India and Ors. ***ii)* *Case Number***Writ Petition (Civil) No 1281 of 2021 ***iii)* *Judgement Date***November 9, 2023 ***iv)* *Court***Supreme Court of India ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench***Division Bench- three-judge bench ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges***Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, Justice J.B Pardiwala, and Justice Manoj Mishra ***vii)* *Citation***Dilip B. Jiwrajka v. Union of India, 2023 SC 1530.***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved***Constitution of India, Arts.21, Arts. 14, Arts. 32, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, S. 95, S. 96, S.97, S.98, S.99, S.100.1. **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** Introduced in 2016, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) of India revolutionized the way insolvencies among businesses, corporations, and individuals are handled by establishing clear deadlines and integrating various existing laws into a single, modern framework. This legislative overhaul replaced outdated practices that often resulted in prolonged procedures. Specifically, Part III of the IBC deals with insolvency resolution and bankruptcy processes for individuals and partnerships, with Chapter III titled “Insolvency Resolution Process” covering Sections 94 through 120. Prior to the IBC, the management of individual insolvencies was governed by the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act of 1909 and the Provincial Insolvency Act of 1920, both of which have since been repealed. Under the IBC, the insolvency process starts with a creditor submitting an application to the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), specifying the amount of unpaid debt under Section 95. Once filed, a moratorium is placed on legal proceedings related to debt under Section 96. Debtors cannot be heard at this stage. Under Section 97,NCLT appoints a resolution professional nominated by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) to examine the application. The resolution professionals prepare a report recommending accepting or rejecting the application as authorized under Section 99. Debtors are not involved in this process. Based on the report, Under Section 100 NCLT formally accepts or rejects the application. In this scenario, individuals invoking Article 32 of the Indian Constitution submitted a total of 384 petitions. Despite this, the Supreme Court maintained that the regulations pertaining to the Insolvency Resolution Process were neither capricious nor violated the fundamental rights to natural justice as outlined in Article 21, according to Article 14 of the Constitution. 1. **FACTS OF THE CASE** The Union Government implemented the provisions of Part III of the IBC (excluding those related to the “Fresh Start Process” for specific individuals. IBC extends its provisions to personal guarantors of corporate debtors. Following the authority granted under Section 1(3), the Union Government’s Ministry of Corporate Affairs issued a notification on November 15, 2019, activating several sections including Section 2(e), Section 78 (excluding aspects related to the fresh start process), Section 79, Section 94 through 187, Sections 239(2)(g), (h), and (i), Sections 239(2)(m) to (zc), Section 239(2)(zn) to (zs), and Section 249. This notification faced legal challenges in the case of *Lalit Kumar Jain v Union of India*[\[2\]](#_ftn2), where a two-judge panel clarified that the release of a corporate debtor does not automatically absolve a guarantor of their obligations. Through the enactment of Amendment Act 26 of 2018, Parliament made changes that expanded the jurisdiction of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) under Section 60. These modifications empower the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) to manage situations involving the insolvency of either a corporate guarantor or a personal guarantor linked to a corporate debtor. Concurrently, several Writ Petitions have been submitted to the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of specific clauses based on allegations that they violate the principles outlined in Articles 14 and 21 of the Indian Constitution. 1. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i)Does Section 95 through Section 100 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), which outlines the procedure for initiating the insolvency resolution process against an individual debtor by a creditor, constitute an arbitrary action in violation of Article 14 of the Indian Constitution? 1. ii) Are the principles of natural justice, as enshrined in Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, applicable to the proceedings governed by Sections 95 to 100 of the IBC? 1. **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The Petitioner challenged the validity of Section 95 to 100 under Part III of IBC on the following grounds: - The counsel for Petitioner argued before this esteemed court that the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) requires the Adjudicating Authority to first establish the existence of a debt before initiating insolvency procedures, such as filing for insolvency, designating a resolution professional, or authorizing any actions by the resolution professional. Neglecting to perform this preliminary assessment would contravene the principles of natural justice. It is imperative for the adjudicating authority to verify, at the outset, both the validity of the asserted debt and its potential discharge before advancing with further steps. - The counsel for Petitioner submitted that separate insolvency resolution procedures for individuals under IBC are unnecessary as procedures for corporations are already well-established and constitutionally valid. - The counsel for Petitioner submitted that the resolution professional’s powers to access information from guarantors and third parties are unfettered and can adversely impact the creditworthiness of the debtor. - The counsel for petitioner argued against the immediate imposition of an automatic stay and provisional measures such as designating a resolution professional and permitting them to present a report simply upon the submission of an insolvency petition. They advocated for these steps to be delayed until the court confirms the presence of a genuine debt and debtor-creditor relationship. 1. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsel for the respondent argued that incorporating an adjudicative phase to verify the presence of debt upon the appointment of the Resolution Professional (RP) could compromise the efficiency of the insolvency resolution process, which is fundamentally aimed at being time-sensitive according to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). - Additionally, they contended that the protective period granted under Section 96 of the Code differs substantially from those outlined in Sections 14 and 101, implying varying practical effects. - The counsel for Respondent submitted that Under Section 101(2), the debtor gets an opportunity to be heard before the adjudicating authority while it considers the RP’s report. - The counsel for Respondent submitted thatthe RP’s job during the interim phase is merely facilitative and not adjudicatory.The adjudicating authority is not bound to follow the RP’s recommendations. - The counsel for Respondent submitted that The RP’s inspection powers under Section 99(4) are limited and only “in connection with the application”, narrowing its scope of inquiry. 1. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** - **Constitution of India** - **Article 21:-“***Protection of life and personal liberty. No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law”*.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) - **Article 14**:-“*Equality before the law, The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth”.[**\[4\]**](#_ftn4)* - **Article 32***:-“ Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part.The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.* *The Supreme Court shall have the power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs like habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.* *Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (1) and (2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2)”*. *The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution*.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) - **Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016** - **Section 95-** “Application by a creditor to initiate insolvency resolution process”.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) - **Section 96-** “Interim moratorium”.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) - **Section 97-** “Appointment of resolution professional”.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) - **Section 98-** “Replacement of resolution professional”.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) - **Section 99-** “Submission of report by resolution professional”.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) - **Section 100-** “Admission or rejection of application”.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) 1. **JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court’s judgment can be summed up in the following sub-points: **Nature of the Process under Sections 95-99 IBC** - No judicial adjudication is involved at the stages under Sections 95-99 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). - The resolution professional plays a facilitative role in collating facts and submitting a recommendation report to the adjudicatory authority. **Role of the Adjudicatory Authority** - No need for the adjudicatory authority to conduct a hearing to determine “jurisdictional facts” when appointing a resolution professional under Section 97(5). - The adjudicatory body has the ultimate say on decisions made under Section 100, regardless of the recommendations presented by the resolution professional. Additionally, when deliberating on accepting or rejecting applications under Section 100, the adjudicatory authority must adhere to the principles of natural justice. **Powers of the Resolution Professional** - The resolution professional can exercise powers under Section 99(4) to examine the application and gather relevant information for the recommendation report. **Participation of the Debtor** - No violation of natural justice as the debtor can participate in the examination process by the resolution professional. **Purpose of Interim Moratorium** - The purpose of the interim moratorium under Section 96 is to protect the debtor from further legal proceedings. **Constitutionality** - The provisions in Sections 95-100 of the IBC are constitutional and do not violate Articles 14 and 21 of the Indian Constitution 1. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTs** The Supreme Court judgment on the insolvency regime for personal guarantors is significant for all stakeholders, as it aims to facilitate the disposal of a large number of pending applications against guarantors, aiding creditors’ debt recovery and boosting their confidence in the system. However, I argue that the judgment fails to address the logical flaws in the Scheme under Part III of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code and its potential violation of the principle of natural justice, which could pose a serious hindrance to the flow of credit in the future if the rights of personal guarantors are not sufficiently protected, as this may prove detrimental to Indian corporates. 1. **REFERENCES** - Lalit Kumar Jain v Union of India, (2021) 9 SCC 321. - Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Dilip B. Jiwrajka v. Union of India, 2023 SC 1530. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Lalit Kumar Jain v Union of India, (2021) 9 SCC 321. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) INDIA CONST. art. 21. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) INDIA CONST. art. 14. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) INDIA CONST. art. 32. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, §95, No. 31, Acts of Parliament, 2016(India). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, §96, No. 31, Acts of Parliament, 2016(India). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, §97, No. 31, Acts of Parliament, 2016(India). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, §98, No. 31, Acts of Parliament, 2016(India). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, §99, No. 31, Acts of Parliament, 2016(India). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, §100, No. 31, Acts of Parliament, 2016(India). **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [EPURU SUDHAKAR Vs. GOVT. OF AP, AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 3385](https://lawfoyer.in/epuru-sudhakar-vs-govt-of-ap-air-2006-supreme-court-3385/) **Published:** June 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Gaganpreet kaur gill, Law student at Chandigarh University.** **Editor: Jahnvi goel, Law student at Amity University.** 1. **ABSTRACT** In India , the pardoning power has been given in order to correct potential injustices and to provide clemency. Thus, in a simple words pardon means to ‘Releases a convict from further punishment for the crime’ and‘to erase the conviction itself’ (in the case of a Governor’s pardon).The pardon power under the Indian Constitution, enshrined in Articles 72 and 161, empowers the President and Governors to act as a safeguard against potential injustices within the legal system. Similarly, the above mentioned case mentions that can Governor’s pardon power be challenged in court if it’s seen as unfair or influenced by improper motive. Where the Supreme Court ruled that the Governor’s power to grant pardons under Article 161 of the Constitution is subject to judicial review under certain circumstances. The court held that while the power itself is discretionary, it cannot be exercised arbitrarily or based on irrelevant factors like religion, caste, or political affiliation. The rule of law and fairness should guide the decision. This case established that the Governor’s pardon power isn’t absolute and can be reviewed by courts if misused. It set guidelines for the exercise of this power to ensure fairness and prevent its misuse for political or other extraneous reasons. ***Keywords:-*** *pardon power, governor , murder, death sentence, judicial review.* 1. **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name***Epuru Sudhakar vs. Govt of AP ***ii)* *Case Number***Writ Petition ( crl.) 284-285 of 2005 ***iii)* *Judgement Date***11 October 2006 ***iv)* *Court***Supreme Court of India ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench***Single bench(Arijit Pasayat) ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges***Arijit Pasayat ***vii)* *Citation***AIR 2006 SUPREME COURT 3385***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved***Article-72 and 161 of the Indian Constitution &Section-109 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code.1. **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The concept of pardon, a vestige of the British Crown’s prerogative, empowers the President under Article 72 and Governors under Article 161 of the Indian Constitution to correct potential injustices arising from harsh laws or erroneous judgments. A pardon relieves a convicted individual from further punishment. Notably, the Governor’s pardon can erase both the conviction and sentence, effectively absolving the individual. The process In India typically involves a mercy petition submitted to the President. Governors, appointed by the President, hold various constitutional powers, including judicial powers like granting pardons. This power, given to the President’s under Article 72, is a constitutional duty, not a discretionary privilege.However, the Governor’s scope is narrower. Only the President can pardon court-martial convictions or death sentences. Additionally, the Governor exercises the State government’s sovereign power under Article 161, not his own independent authority. While Article 21 guarantees the right to life, no codified procedure governs mercy petitions. In practice, after exhausting legal avenues, a convict or their representative submits a written petition to the President’s secretariat. The petition is then forwarded to the Ministry of Home Affairs for evaluation and recommendations. Importantly, a pardon is not a right; it’s an act of clemency based on factors like the convict’s health, family circumstances, or sole breadwinner status. Thus the case involves the matter of a capital punishment conviction, the Respondent (accused) was sentenced to death by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh for the willful homicide or murder of a political rival. Subsequently, the Governor granted the Respondent a pardon. However, the Supreme Court of India intervened and quashed the Governor’s exercise of the pardoning power. The Court established a legal principle, holding that any invocation of the pardoning power by the Governor is subject to judicial review and can be set aside if motivated by extraneous considerations such as caste, religion, or political affiliation. Furthermore, the Court clarified the scope of judicial review over the President’s or Governor’s pardoning power. The decision to grant a pardon can be challenged if it is deemed arbitrary, lacking due process, influenced by improper motives (mala fide), or based on irrelevant factors unrelated to the merits of the case. 1. **FACTS OF THE CASE** - Petitioner No. 1 is the son of the late Shri Epuru China Ramasubbaiah, who was murdered along with another person on 19.10.1995. Petitioner No. 2 claims to be the son of the late Shri Tirupati Reddy, who was allegedly murdered by Respondent No. 2 while Respondent No. 2 was on bail in the murder case of the father of Petitioner No. 1. - In the case related to the murder of the late Shri Epuru China Ramasubbaiah and one Ambi Reddy, Respondent No. 2 faced trial, and the matter ultimately reached the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal Nos. 519-521 of 2003. The Supreme Court, in its judgment dated 19.11.2003, altered the conviction of Respondent No. 2 from one under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) to one under Section 304(1) read with Section 109 of the IPC, and imposed a custodial sentence of 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment. The conviction relating to some other sentences was maintained. - On 28.5.2003, Respondent No. 3, the wife of Respondent No. 2, submitted a representation for the grant of parole to Respondent No. 2. Parole was granted on 18.10.2003 for a period of 15 days, but the same was later cancelled on 30.10.2003 by the State Government due to the likelihood of a breach of peace and law and order if Respondent No. 2 visited the Nandikotkur Assembly Constituency, as per the report by the Superintendent of Police, Kurnool. - Respondent No. 3 contested and won the Andhra Pradesh Assembly election on 12.5.2004. On 14.5.2004, she made a representation for the grant of parole to Respondent No. 2, which was granted on 19.5.2004 and subsequently extended from time to time. On 18.7.2004, a fourth extension of 15 days was granted. - On 10.10.2004, Respondent No. 3 made a representation to Respondent No. 1 (the Governor of Andhra Pradesh) seeking a pardon for Respondent No. 2, alleging that he had been implicated in false cases due to political rivalry. During the pendency of the petition for pardon, one-month parole was granted to Respondent No. 2 on 18.10.2004. - On 11.8.2005, the Governor of Andhra Pradesh purportedly exercised the power under Article 161 of the Constitution and granted remission of the unexpired sentence of Respondent No. 2. The Director General and Inspector General of Police (Correction Services), Andhra Pradesh, were directed to take action for the release of Respondent No. 2, and on 12.8.2005, the Superintendent of Central Prison, Cherlapally, R.R. District, directed the release of Respondent No. 2. Thus ,”*the writ petition has been filed, alleging, inter alia, that the grant of remission (described in the writ petition as the grant of pardon) was illegal, relevant materials were not placed before the Governor, and the impugned order was passed without the application of mind.* *The recommendations made for the grant of remission were based on irrelevant and extraneous materials. The factual scenario has not been placed before the Governor in the proper perspective. The sole basis on which Respondent No. 3 asked for a pardon was the alleged implication in false cases due to political rivalry. In view of this Court’s judgment holding Respondent No. 2 guilty, the said plea could not have been even considered as a basis for the grant of pardon.* *Since the grant of pardon is based on the consideration of irrelevant materials and the non-consideration of relevant materials, the same is liable to be set aside.”[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)* 1. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether judicial review can be exercised to supersede the presidential pardon? 2. What is the extent of the power of governor or president, as far as their pardoning power is concerned, is it an absolute power? 3. What are the limitations that can be imposed on this power? 4. What are the responsibilities of the governor or president while exercising this pardoning power under Indian constitution? 1. **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 2. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the petitioner’s learned counsel argued that the congressional activist who was convicted by the then-Andhra Pradesh governor, Sushil Kumar Shinde’s “sentence immunity was illegal because the relevant materials were not submitted to the governor and the controversial order was adopted under consideration.”[\[2\]](#_ftn2) 1. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Respondent submitted thatthe “respondent Nos.2 and 3 has strenuously contended that the petition is the outcome of a political vendetta. All relevant materials have been taken into account by the Governor, a high constitutional authority who passed the order granting remission. It is submitted that the petitioner has confused between pardon and remission of sentence. It is a case where materials existed which warranted the grant of remission and this Court should not interfere in the matter. Considering the limited scope for judicial review the writ petition deserves to be dismissed.”[\[3\]](#_ftn3) 1. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** This case completelyrevolve around the provisions to grant pardon under the Indian Constitution and are as follows:- **Article-72:-**“***Power of President to grant pardons, etc., and to suspend, remit or commute sentences in certain cases*** *(1)The President shall have the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of any offence—* *(a)In all cases where the punishment or sentence is by a Court Martial;* *(b)In all cases where the punishment or sentence is for an offence against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends;* *(c)In all cases where the sentence is a sentence of death.* *(2)Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the power conferred by law on any officer of the Armed forces of the Union to suspend, remit or commute a sentence by a court martial.* *(3)Nothing in sub-clause © of clause (1) shall affect the power to suspend, remit or commute a sentence of death exercisable by the Governor of a State under any law for the time being in force.[**\[4\]**](#_ftn4)”* **Article -161 :-“*Power of Governor to grant pardons, etc., and to suspend, remit or commute sentences in certain cases-*** *The Governor of a State shall have the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of any offence against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the State extends.”[**\[5\]**](#_ftn5)* 1. **JUDGEMENT** The Court of Criminal Appeals overturned the judgment of preliminary examination by Respondent No. 2, and the conviction was modified from one under Section 203 of the Indian Penal Code to Section 304(1) read with Section 109. A custodial sentence of 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment was imposed. Respondent No. 3 filed an application for parole, which was granted for 15 days. However, the equivalent was revoked by the State Government considering the report sent by the Superintendent of Police. Due to the pendency of the request for parole, a one-month parole was subsequently granted. The Governor of Andhra Pradesh exercised power under Article 161 and granted a reduction of the unexpired sentence of Respondent No. 2, and his request for release was accordingly directed. A writ appeal was filed challenging the lawfulness of the reduction of the sentence by the Governor, alleging that the material facts were not taken into consideration. The said petition could not have even been considered as a ground for the grant of pardon. This is a situation where materials existed which justified the grant of abatement, and the Court ought not to interfere in the present matter. The learned counsel for the respondents argued that while in the case of Maru Ram v. Union of India[\[6\]](#_ftn6),this Court had laid down advisory guidelines, the same did not find recognition in the case of Kehar Singh v. Union of India[\[7\]](#_ftn7). Later, in the case of Ashok Kumar v. Association of India and Ors.[\[8\]](#_ftn8), the alleged apparent irregularities within the view were highlighted, and the Court held that the laying down of guidelines may be inappropriate. The relevant constitutional provisions regarding the grant of pardon, reductions, suspension of sentence, and others were considered. Examining the precedents, in the case of Maru Ram, it was held that all public power, including constitutional power, will be exercised arbitrarily, mala fide, and in violation of the principles of fairness and equal treatment. Considerations of religion, caste, color, or political allegiance are entirely irrelevant and discriminatory. In the Kehar Singh case, it was held that the order of the President cannot be subjected to judicial review on its merits, except within the strict limitations explained in the Maru Ram case. The Court held that the domain of the President’s power under Article 72 falls within the judicial domain and can be examined by the Court through the process of judicial review. The Court then considered the rulings in the case of Swaran Singh v. State of U.P[\[9\]](#_ftn9). The Court held that if the pardon power was exercised arbitrarily, mala fide, or in total disregard of the higher principles of constitutionalism, the resultant order cannot receive the imprimatur of law, and in such cases, the judicial hand should be extended to it. It further observed that the order of the Governor impugned is subject to judicial review within the strict boundaries set down in the Maru Ram and Kehar Singh cases and left it open for the Governor of U.P. to pass new orders. It was also held that the High Court can quash the Governor’s pardoning power if it was exercised on political, caste, or religious grounds. The grant of clemency by the President or Governor can be challenged if the order has been passed without the application of mind, mala fide, or irrelevant or wholly unnecessary considerations, based on falsehood, and relevant material has been kept out of consideration. In the case of Tata Cellular v. The Federal Court of India[\[10\]](#_ftn10), it was held that when conducting a judicial review of the executive pardon, the court does not act as an appellate court since it lacks expertise in correcting administrative decisions, but rather examines the manner in which decisions are made. Thus, in the cases cited, it can be demonstrated that the court can conduct a judicial review of the executive pardon to address unfair and arbitrary decisions. However, the scope is limited. The convict was not Involved but due to political reasons, his name was implicated in the case by producing false witnesses and sent to prison. In earlier times, there was a basic principle that if the king is deceived, the pardon is void. The discretion must be exercised on public considerations alone. The principle of exclusive knowledge would not apply when and if the decision impugned is in derogation of constitutional provisions. The Rule of Law principle contains a requirement of government according to law. The power of executive clemency is not only to benefit the convict, but while exercising such a power, the President or the Governor must, in all cases, bear in mind the impact of their decision on the victim’s family, the society at large. 1. **CONCLUSION** Mercy petitions are complex process but also offer potential benefits and sometimes cause hardship when delays occur in processing them. These delays impact both the convicted and the victims, unintentionally hindering justice and prolonging the victim’s suffering. To ensure a more efficient legal system, clear time limits and policies are needed to prevent unnecessary delays in both filing and granting mercy petitions. In this case, **t**he order granting remission which is impugned in the petition is clearly unsustainable and is set aside. However, it is open to the respondent No.1 to treat the petition as a pending one for the purpose of re-consideration. It shall be open to the Governor to take note of materials placed before him by the functionaries of the State, and also to make such enquiries as considered necessary and relevant for the purpose of ascertaining the relevant factors otherwise. 1. **REFERENCES** 1. **Important Cases Referred** - Maru Ram vs Union of India,1981 1SCC 107 - Kehar Singh v. Union of India, 1989 1SCC 204 - Ashok Kumar v. Association of India and Ors., 1991 SCR(2) 858 - Swaran Singh v. State of U.P, 1998 4SCC 75 - Tata Cellular v. The Federal Court of India, 1996 AIR 11. 1. **Important Statutes Referred** - **72 , Indian Constitution** - **161, Indian Constitution** - **Section-109 , Indian Penal Code,1860** - **Section-302, Indian Penal Code,1860** [\[1\]](#_ftnref1)Arijit pasayat, Epuru Sudhakar vs. Govt of India, 2006 , ( last visited on June 3 , 2024) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2)Epuru Sudhakar & Anr vs Govt. Of A.P. & Ors , 2006 , [https://legalvidhiya.com/epuru-sudhakar-anr-vs-govt-of-a-p-ors/#\_ftn7](https://legalvidhiya.com/epuru-sudhakar-anr-vs-govt-of-a-p-ors/#_ftn7) ( last visited on June 3 , 2024) . [\[3\]](#_ftnref3)Arijit Pasayat, Epuru Sudhakar vs. Govt of India, 2006 , ( last visited on June 3 , 2024) [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) The Constitution of India, art.72 [\[5\]](#_ftnref5)The Constitution of India, art.161. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6)Maru Ram vs Union of India,1981 1SCC 107 [\[7\]](#_ftnref7)Kehar Singh v. Union of India, 1989 1SCC 204 [\[8\]](#_ftnref8)Ashok Kumar v. Association of India and Ors., 1991 SCR(2) 858 [\[9\]](#_ftnref9)Swaran Singh v. State of U.P, 1998 4SCC 75 [\[10\]](#_ftnref10)Tata Cellular v. The Federal Court of India, 1996 AIR 11. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Bhanwaroo Khan & ors vs Union of India & ors AIR 2002 SC 1614](https://lawfoyer.in/bhanwaroo-khan-ors-vs-union-of-india-ors-air-2002-sc-1614/) **Published:** June 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author- Farsana A S, Student, School of Legal Studies, CUSAT** **Edited by- Masooma Naqvi, Student, Amity University, Lucknow** 1. **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** A Writ Petition was made before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India challenging an order of the Central Govt. in determining the citizenship of petitioners under the Indian Citizenship Act, 1955. The appellants voluntarily migrated to Pakistan after the partition and obtained Pakistan nationality. They came to India using a Pakistan passport and a visa obtained from the Indian Authority. Upon the expiry date of the visa period they illegally stayed in India. When detected, they filed a Writ Petition to claim Indian Nationality, fearing arrest. The Supreme Court on appeal directed the petitioners to approach the concerned govt. authorities under the Citizenship Act to decide on the matter. the Indian Govt. passed an order under the Act rejecting the petitioner’s claim to Indian citizenship. The court upon evaluating the evidence and the factual circumstances found the order factually correct and in accordance with the law and in turn dismissed the petition. ***Keywords*** Indian citizenship Act,1955- Section 9(2)- Rule 3 of Schedule III- Pakistani passport- Partition- Migration- Visa expiry-Rule of Evidence- Deportation- Supreme Court 1. **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name***Bhanwaroo Khan & Ors vs Union Of India & Ors, ***ii)* *Case Number***Writ Petition (Civil) 737 of 1995 ***iii)* *Judgement Date***2nd April of 2002 ***iv)* *Court***Supreme Court of India ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench***Division Bench ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges***Doraiswamy Raju & Ashok Bhan ***vii)* *Citation***AIR 2002 SC 1614***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved***Section 9(2) of Indian Citizenship Act, 1955 Rule 3 of Schedule III of the Citizenship Rules, 1956 1. **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** Partition of India and Pakistan caused massive population changes and numerous complications in citizenship determination. To sort out these complications the Govt. of India passed several laws on citizenship apart from the guiding provisions in the constitution. The Indian Citizenship Act 1955, is one of the prominent statutes that provides the framework for the acquisition and loss of Indian citizenship post constitution period. It also provides that Indian citizenship for a person terminates on acquiring citizenship of another country.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) The Indian Citizenship Rules, 1956 provides detailed guidelines and procedures for implementation of the Citizenship Act. The Citizenship Act provides a scope for implementation of Govt. discretion for the determination of citizenship status from the factual circumstances and evidence. The case exemplifies the judicial review over the government’s assessment of citizenship when illegal immigrants claimed entitlement to Indian Nationality. 1. **FACTS OF THE CASE** 2. **i) Procedural Background of the Case** - The appellants were migrants from Pakistan into India, filed a civil writ petition dated 10th July, 1987 before the High Court of Rajasthan under the allegation that they were Indian citizens and the police were unnecessarily harassing them to deport to Pakistan. The single civil bench dismissed the case and aggrieved by the decision a special appeal was filed which was dismissed by an impugned judgement. The appellants thereafter filed a Civil Appeal before the Supreme Court against the same and the court directed them to file an application before the concerned authorities under the Citizenship Act,1955 to decide on the matter. The order of the Indian Government on 21st July, 1995 passed under Section 9 (2) of the Citizenship Act rejected their claim to be Indian citizens and the appellants filed a Writ Petition before the Supreme Court against the same. 3. **ii) Factual Background of the Case** - The appellant No. 1, Bhanwaroo Khan and the appellant No. 2, wife of the appellant No. 1, claimed to be the residents of Village Hammoosar, Tehsil Ratangarh, in the State of Rajasthan and currently residing at Sardar Sahar, District Churu of Rajasthan had left India after partition of the country and acquired the citizenship of Pakistan. With the passport obtained from Pakistan as a Pakistani citizen and visa obtained from the Indian High Commissioner, the appellants entered Indian territory via Atari Check Post, Border of Punjab on 12th February 1955. Upon registering with the District Superintendent of Police, Churu on 14th February 1955 the appellants stayed in India till 7th May and reported about their departure with the same authority on the same day. However, the appellants had not left India, but remained in the country illegally until they decided to file a Civil Writ Petition to determine their citizenship when encountered with the fear of getting arrested. 4. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** - Whether the order made by the Government of India, dated 21st July, 1995 determining the national status of the petitioners under Section 9 (2) of the Citizenship Act, 1955 pertains to be valid? - Whether the appellants are liable to be deported to Pakistan as illegal immigrants? 1. **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that: The appellants were born to Indian parents, both their siblings and children are Indians and are living in the country. They are senior citizens and shall not be deported to Pakistan as they require the support of their children in their old age. The authorities made a mistake in the determination of their citizenship as the mere existence of the fact that they have a passport from Pakistan could not be a ground to reject the citizenship they acquired naturally from India. 1. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsels for Respondent submitted that: The fact the appellants had migrated to Pakistan after the partition and their obtainment of Passports from the Govt. of Pakistan raises a presumption against their status as citizens of India. The appellants also made a declaration of being Pakistan citizens to obtain visas from the Indian High Commissioner. On the expiry of the visa period they could have either returned to Pakistan or applied for an extension of the visa. But they allegedly remained in the country and lived underground which amounted to liability of getting deported to Pakistan. A passport obtained by a person from a foreign country is relevant evidence in the determination of that person’s citizenship. Hence the presumption of the appellants to be citizens of Pakistan stands to be valid. 1. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** - Section 9 (2) of the Citizenship Act, 1955 - Rule 3 of Schedule III of the Citizenship Rules, 1956 2. **JUDGEMENT** 1. **RATIO DECIDENDI** Sub-section (2) of Section 9 of the Citizenship Act provides that if any question arises as to whether, when or how any person has acquired the citizenship of another country, it shall be determined by such authority, in such manner, and having regard to such rules of evidence, as may be prescribed in this behalf. Rule 3 of Schedule III of the Citizenship Rules, 1956 (for short ‘the Rules’) provides: “3. The fact that a citizen of India has obtained on any date a passport from the Government of any other country shall be conclusive proof of his having voluntarily acquired the citizenship of that country before that date.” The Indian Govt. relied upon this rule to determine the citizenship of the appellants. The court also cited the judgement from Izhar Ahmad Khan & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors[\[2\]](#_ftn2)., wherein this court had considered the validity of Rule 3 of Schedule III of the Citizenship Rules and an order passed under Section 9 (2) of the Citizenship Act to determine the citizenship of one who had obtained a passport from Pakistan. Relying upon its decision the court observed that to evaluate the practical aspect of the Rule one needs to look into the procedures followed in obtaining a passport from the Pakistan Govt. for travel into another country. As per the laws that existed in Pakistan, one could not apply for a passport unless he is a citizen under its Citizenship Act. The application form also requires that the applicant should make a declaration that he is a citizen of Pakistan and the declaration has to be verified by the Pakistan Officials before the passport being issued. Under these circumstances if a passport is issued by the Pakistani Govt. the citizen would be estopped from claiming against the citizenship of Pakistan. if the impugned rule prescribes that the obtainment of a passport from the Pakistani Govt. by an Indian national conclusively proves the voluntary acquisition of Pakistani citizenship , it would be difficult to consider that the rule is ‘not a rule of evidence’. The Central Govt. in its order declared that the appellants failed to produce relevant materials as evidence to show that they had obtained the citizenship under compulsion. This would raise a presumption that they had obtained the Pakistan citizenship voluntarily. The appellants failed to adduce any documents in support of their claim and the court pointed out that if the appellants had an intention of returning to Pakistan on expiry of their visa period efforts would have been made way back in the year 1955 to acquire the citizenship of India. The court passed the verdict that they don’t find any infirmity on the order passed by govt. nor the judgement made by the High court. 1. **OBITER DICTA** - Long stay in the country and enrolment in the voters’ list would not confer any right to an alien to continue to stay in the country. 2. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The case gives guidance on how to determine the citizenship of people that migrated during the partition period using the rule of evidence. The judgement signifies that citizenship of people should be presumed from their voluntary action to acquire citizenship. Obtaining a foreign passport and using illegal ways to stay in the country could raise presumptions against one’s Indian citizenship. So, one must show the evidence to establish citizenship in the country. If a foreign passport has been acquired by any person, then evidences should be made to establish that it had been acquired under compelling circumstances to attain the rights of natural citizenship in India. 1. **REFERENCES** 1. **Important Cases Referred** - Izhar Ahmad Khan & Ors v. Union of India & Ors. (AIR 1962 SC 1052) 2. **Important Statutes Referred** - Evidence Act, 1872 (Act No. I of 1872) [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Indian Citizenship Act, 1955, § 9(1), No. 57, Acts of Parliament, 1955 (India). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Izhar Ahmad Khan v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1052 **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [B & T AG vs Ministry of Defence , 2023 SCC Online SC 657](https://lawfoyer.in/b-t-ag-vs-ministry-of-defence-2023-scc-online-sc-657/) **Published:** June 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Pratyush Mahapatra, Law Student at L.R. Law College, Sambalpur University** **Edited by: Sushmana Pandey, Law Student at Amity University** 1. **ABSTRACT** The B & T AG vs Ministry of Defence case was a contractual disagreement over the purchase of 1,568 submachine guns. After signing the contract in 2012, problems emerged in 2016 with the Ministry’s encashment of the warranty bond and liquidated damages. B & T AG disputed these actions and requested arbitration under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996. On May 18, 2023, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that such an agreement does not extend the limitation period, which is controlled by Article 137 of the Limitation Act of 1963, which establishes a three-year time limitation from the cause of action. The court emphasized the respect of procedural time frames and rejected B & T AG’s petition. ***Keywords*: Arbitration, Limitation Period, Contractual Dispute, Pre-arbitral Negotiations, Liquidated Damages** 1. **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name***B & T AG vs Ministry of Defence ***ii)* *Case Number***Arbitration Petition (C) No. 13 of 2023 ***iii)* *Judgement Date***18th May 2023 ***iv)* *Court***Hon’ble Supreme Court ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench***Division Bench ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges***CJI Dr. D Y Chandrachud & J. J.B Pardiwala ***vii)* *Citation***2023 SCC Online SC 657***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved***Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, Article 137 of the Limitation Act of 19631. **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The case of B & T Ag versus Ministry of Defence centred around a contractual disagreement over a deal to buy 1,568 Sub Machine Guns via the Ministry of Defence’s Fast Track Procedure. The dispute arose when B & T AG filed arbitration procedures under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996. The Hon’ble Supreme Court’s primary concern in this case was the application of the limitation period for choosing an arbitrator and whether time spent in obligatory pre-arbitral consultations should be omitted from this period. The court decided on May 18, 2023, noting that such conversations do not toll the limitation period, emphasizing the need for rigorous respect to procedural timetables in arbitration procedures. 1. **FACTS OF THE CASE** - The respondent i.e. Ministry of Defence issued a tender for the urgent procurement of 1,568 Sub Machine Guns under a Fast Track Procedure in 2009. After due negotiations the petitioner i.e. B & T AG signed the contract in 2012. - In 2016 the parties’ disagreement originated from the respondent’s claimed unlawful encashment of the warranty bond. In consequence, the respondent took action of encashing the Liquidated Damages for the requisite amount i.e. Euro 201,793.75. - The respondent also received the sanction from the President of India to deduct the amount of Euro 197,230.35 as recovery of LDs from the petitioner. - Despite all this, both the petitioner and respondent continued to engage in bilateral discussions with the goal of settling the dispute. However, the respondent notified the petitioner that the action taken by the respondent was according to the terms & conditions of the contract. Despite that, the petitioner requested the respondent to reconsider the matter and to allow the petitioner to submit its case. - On November 8, 2021, the petitioner appointed an arbitrator and requested the respondent to appoint the same. However, the respondent refused to do so. In consequence, on February 3, 2023, the petitioner filed an arbitration petition before the Supreme Court. 1. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 2. Whether time-barred claims or claims barred by limitation can be said to be live claims, which can be referred to arbitration. 3. **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the claims made by them are not time-barred. - The counsel contended that the respondent wrongfully deducted the LDs. - The parties were trying to amicably address the problems by way of bilateral discussions. - The court specifically may consider Article 21.1 of the contract which reads as; all disputes or differences arising out of or in connection with the present Contract, including the one connected with the validity of the present Contract or any part thereof, shall be settled by bilateral discussions.” - The respondent notified the petitioner for the first time on 22.09.2017, that the petitioner’s proposal to revisit the decision of improper deduction of LD had been refused. - By referring to the Geo Miller case it was submitted that once the parties get involved in the bilateral discussions, the time does not play any role. - The refusal to review the claimed improper deduction of the liquidated damages via letter dated 22.09.2017 might be deemed to be the breaking point. - By excluding the COVID period, the date of notice of arbitration which is 08.11.2021 comes within the limitation period of three years. - It is urged that the petition filed under Section 11(6) of the Act to form an Arbitral Tribunal be granted and formed. 1. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsels for Respondent submitted that the counsels for Respondent submitted that the petition filed by the petitioner is time-barred. - Since the petitioner’s concern centres on the deduction of the LDs, the last such deduction was made on 26.09.2016, hence this matter might be the cause of action. - However, the notice for the arbitration was sent on 08.11.2021, which is significantly more than two years over the period of limitation of three years. - It is contended that the time of limitation for issuing a notification requesting arbitration which is not particularly stipulated in the Schedule to the Limitation Act 1963, shall be covered by the residuary Article, i.e. Article 137 of the said Schedule. - The petitioner’s claim is ex-facie time-barred, hence the current petition under Section 11(6) of the Act 1996 should be rejected. 2. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** - **Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996** Section 11(6) Inter alia the appointment of an arbitrator in the event of the parties failing to make such an appointment. It outlines the steps the parties may take to appoint an arbitrator in a dispute. - **Limitation Act 1963** Article 137 A residuary provision provides for a limitation period of three years from the date when the right to apply accrues, for any application for which no period of limitation is provided in any of the Articles in the Schedule to the Act. 1. **JUDGEMENT** 1. **RATIO DECIDENDI** After a thorough review of the relevant statutes, this court ruled that in circumstances where claims are time-barred, it may decline to issue a referral under Section 11 of the 1996 Act. The Act is intended to accelerate dispute settlement by including provisions for time-bound arbitral processes. Because the Act does not establish a time restriction for making an application under Section 11(6), recourse is made to the 1963 Act, as per Section 43 which applies the Limitation Act to arbitrations, similar to court procedures. In the lack of a particular Article in the Limitation Act, the residual provision of Article 137 applies with a three-year limitation term beginning with the accrual of the right to apply. This Court’s decision, consistent with previous decisions and relevant High Court rulings, confirms that the application under Section 11 must be filed in a court of law, subject to a three-year limitation period beginning with the date of refusal to appoint the arbitrator or the expiration of 30 days, whichever comes first. In the same decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court refers to Justice Bachawat’s book, Law of Arbitration, Chapter 37, p. 549, which notes that like actions, claims in arbitrations must be presented within a specific time once they arise. The cause of arbitration arises when the claimant has the right to seek arbitration and the limitation period begins at the moment. The timely beginning is critical for justice and equity and the defaulting party should pay the penalties rather than transferring them to the other side. - Three Year window for Section 11 application: The Supreme Court clarified that the three-year window for submitting a Section 11 application begins on the day the initial cause of action arose. This means that the parties have a specific time within which to bring their claims under Section 11. - Statute of Limitations and Negotiations: The cause of action will not be postponed due to further negotiations between the parties. Even if negotiations are ongoing, the clock for the three-year limitation period starts ticking from the date of the initial cause of action. - Determining the Breaking Point: In cases where parties engage in serious negotiations, the court must establish the breaking point. The breaking point refers to the moment when serious attempts to resolve the dispute peacefully would have been abandoned. - Exclusion of Negotiation Period: The Geo Miller case ruled on excluding the negotiation from the computation of the limitation period for reference to arbitration. However, the Supreme Court two-judge bench decision in this case appears to have diluted the Geo Miller ruling. The B & T case acknowledges the Geo Miller observations but lacks specific details on the conditions for excluding the negotiation period from the limitation calculation. 1. **OBITER DICTUM** In this case, the court highlighted the lack of a stated limitation term under Section 11 of the 1996 Act, prompting the application of Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act, which provides three years from the accrual of the right to apply. However, this court found it to be too lengthy and contrary to the Act’s goal of rapid dispute settlement. Amendments in 2015 and 2019 imposed time constraints, such as an 18-month deadline for completing procedures under Section 29A. Given the legislative objective and structure of the Act, this court encouraged parliament to modify Section 11 to create a precise restriction time for filing petitions for arbitrator appointments. 1. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The Supreme Court’s decision in the B & T AG vs Ministry of Defence case underscores the critical importance of adhering to contractually mandated pre-arbitral negotiation processes. The court’s ruling that mere negotiations do not extend the limitation period highlights the necessity for clear and timely initiation of arbitration proceedings. This decision serves as a pivotal reminder for the parties involved in contracts to meticulously follow procedural requirements to avoid forfeiting their right to arbitration. 1. **REFERENCES** 1. **Important Cases Referred** - Geo Miller and Company Private Limited vs Chairman, Rajasthan Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited (2020 14 SCC 643) - Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited & Another vs Nortel Networks India Private Limited (2021 5 SCC 738) 2. **Important Statutes Referred** - Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 - Limitation Act 1963 **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Bennett Coleman & Co. & Ors vs Union Of India & Ors 1973 AIR 106](https://lawfoyer.in/bennett-coleman-co-ors-vs-union-of-india-ors-1973-air-106/) **Published:** June 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Aditya Shaw, Law Student at Heritage Law College.** **Edited By: Rituparna Panda, Law Student at Birla Global University.** **ABSTRACT** The case Bennett Coleman & Co. Challenged the constitutionality of the Newspaper Control Policy. This policy imposed tight restrictions on importing and using newsprint (newsprint is described as white printing paper), significantly impacting the media industry. The applicant argued that these restrictions imposed by the Newspaper Policy infringe the right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed in Article 19(1)(a) and the right to equality under Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. According to the Petitioners, the page limits and newsprint quotas imposed by the policy unduly restricted the freedom of publication for larger newspapers. The Supreme Court examined the claims of the petitioner and determined that the policy indeed violated the petitioner’s constitutional rights. The Court found that the policy’s provisions discriminated against the larger publications and reduced the freedom of speech and expression, thus violating Articles 19(1)(a) and 14. ***Keywords:*** Freedom of Speech, Newsprint Policy, Article 19(1)(a), Article 14, Emergency Provisions **CASE DETAILS** i) ***Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** Bennett Colemen & Co. & Ors vs Union of India & Ors ii) ***Case Number*** Original Jurisdiction Writ Petitions Nos. 334 of 1971, 175,186 and 264 of 1972 iii) ***Judgement Date*** 30th of October 1972 iv) ***Court*** The Supreme Court of India v) ***Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** S.M. Sikri, A.N. Ray, P. Jaganmohan Reddy, Kuttyil Kurien Mathew, M. Hameedullah Beg vi) ***Author / Name of Judges*** S.M. Sikri vii) ***Citation*** 1973 AIR 106, 1973 SCR (2) 757, AIR SC 106, 1972 2 SCC 788, 1973 (1) SCJ 177, 1973 2 SCR 757 viii) ***Legal Provisions Involved*** Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 32, 358 of the Constitution of India, Imports and Exports Control Act 1947, Essential Commodities Act 1955, Newsprint Control Order 1962 **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT** The Indian government’s new regulations and control over the distribution and use of newsprint which is a raw material for newspaper industries was the key background to the Bennett Coleman & Co. Vs Union of India lawsuit. Through a number of statutory orders and policy measures by the government, the newsprint was strictly regulated because it was deemed an essential commodity. Newsprint import, and distribution which were used by newspaper publishers and other users were restricted by the Indian Government in 1972 when it announced the Newsprint Policy for 1972- 1973. This policy was implemented in the larger framework of the Emergency declared in June 1971 by Indra Gandhi, who was the Prime Minister at the time. Article 358 (Suspension of provisions of article 19 during emergencies)[\[1\]](#_ftn1) of the Constitution, which permitted the temporary suspension of some fundamental rights gave the government broad authority to act during the Emergency. The petitioner, Bennett Coleman & Co. filed writ petition before the Supreme Court against this policy. The Petitioner claims that the Newsprint Policy and some sections of the Newsprint Control Order 1962 were infringed upon their fundamental rights guaranteed in Article 19(1)(a) (to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business)[\[2\]](#_ftn2)and Article 14 (Equality before law)[\[3\]](#_ftn3) of the Constitution, which the right to freedom of speech and expression and the right to equality. The validity of the government’s newsprint regulation laws was a topic of discussion for the Supreme Court. The majority ruling, led by Justice Ray concluded that the Newsprint Policy’s quantitative controls from 1972- 1973 amounted to inappropriate limitations on the media’s basic right to free speech. The court determined that direct or indirect intervention through policies like page limit was unjustified as they restrict the freedom of the press, even though it recognized the necessity of addressing the shortage of newsprint. On the other hand, Justice Mathew contended in his dissenting opinion that the policy did not directly regulate the content of the press but rather was required to guarantee the effective use of scarce resources. **FACT OF THE CASE** The case started with Bennett Coleman & Co. Arguing against the constitutionality of the Newsprint Control Policy for the years 1971- 1972 and 1972- 1973 through a writ petition filed under Article 32 (Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part)[\[4\]](#_ftn4) of the Indian Constitution. Later the challenge against the 1972- 1973 policy was added to the original petition. The petitioner claimed that by limiting the distribution and page count of their newspapers, the policy violated their fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The Indian government introduced the Newsprint Control Policy to control newsprint distribution as the material of the newspaper which is newsprint was becoming scarce. According to the policy, a maximum page count for newspapers was established and newsprint quotas were distributed based on historical circulation data. Prior to 1972- 1973, newsprint was allotted based on 1961- 1962 circulation and page counts. The larger newspapers contended that the policy’s 10-page cap was insufficient and would affect their freedom of the press. The government asserted that the newsprint policy was covered by Article 358 of the Constitution, which suspends the provision of Article 19 (Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc)[\[5\]](#_ftn5) in times of emergency and thus make the petition nonmaintainable during the emergency declared in 1971. Despite the emergency, the petitioner argued that the newsprint policy could still be challenged because it was a continuation of earlier policies. The Supreme Court heard arguments from both parties, setting the way for a landmark decision on the relationship between constitutional rights and government policy. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** **i)** Whether the petitioner companies were able to use Article 19(1)(a) and 14 of the Constitution to defend their fundamental rights. **ii)** Whether the Newsprint Policy amounted to “newsprint control” or “newspaper control”. **iii)** Whether the petitioners’ attempt to challenge the Newsprint Policy on the grounds of its violation of fundamental rights was prohibited by the proclamation of emergency under Article 358. **iv)** Whether the terms of the Import Control Order, 1955 applied to the 1972- 1973 Newsprint policy. **v)** Whether the Newsprint Control Order, 1962’s clauses 3 and 3A violated the Constitution’s Articles 19(1)(a) and 14. **PETITIONER ARGUMENTS** **i)** The counsels for the petitioner argued that their fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech and expression) and Article 14 (right to equality) were infringed by the Newsprint Control Policy of 1972- 1973. The court made several observations in the Express Newspaper case to support the petitioner companies’ right to invoke fundamental rights in aid of freedom of speech and expression enshrined in the freedom of the press. The petitioner highlighted that relief was given to editors and shareholders of newspaper companies in cases like Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors vs The Union of India[\[6\]](#_ftn6) and Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. & Anr vs Union of India[\[7\]](#_ftn7). The court in Express Newspaper (1959) held that any legislation that directly affects press freedom would be overturned if it violates Article 19(1)(a). The court recognized that press freedom is a vital part of freedom of speech. Similar to this case Sakal Papers (1962) overturned the Daily Newspapers (Price and Page) Order, 1960 and Newspaper (Price and Page) Act 1956, for violating Article 19(1)(a), pointing out how laws directly affect free speech and expression. **ii)** The counsels of the petitioner also argued that the Newsprint Policy was not merely about regulating the supply of newsprint due to scarcity but effectively amounted to controlling the content and growth of newspapers. They criticized aspects of the policy, such as Remak VII(c) and Remark VIII, which allowed for a 20% increase in pages but within a cap of 10 pages. They argued that by favoring smaller publications and prohibiting larger ones from expanding their circulation, this policy discriminated against larger publications thus controlling the content of the newspaper. **iii)** Counsels for the petitioner argued that Article 358 is inapplicable as it has no application to the law or executive action taken prior to the emergency. The petitioner claimed that the Newsprint Policy was an extension of the previous newsprint policy which had originated earlier and continued from year to year for a decade till the proclamation of emergency in 1971. The restrictions on newsprint policy were imposed before the proclamation of emergency. **iv)** The counsels for the petitioners submit that the terms of the Import Control Order 1955, should not apply to the 1972- 1973 Newsprint Policy as the latter was implemented under different situations and with different objectives. They emphasized that the new policy imposed more stringent restrictions that specifically targeted big newspapers, thus creating an unequal and discriminatory environment in the press industry, violating Articles 14 and 19(1)(a). **v)** The counsels for the petitioner contended that clauses 3 and 3A of the Newsprint Control Order 1962, infringed upon their constitutional rights under Articles 19(1)(a) and 14. The amount of newsprint that could be imported and distributed to newspaper publishers was limited by these clauses, which had an immediate impact on the freedom and reach of newspapers in publishing. They maintained that these limitations created an unfair and discriminatory environment, were not justified on the basis of reasonableness, and disproportionately affected larger newspapers. Citing precedents from Sakal Papers and Express Newspaper, they backed their claims with the emphasis that any law or policy that directly restricts the right to free speech or creates unequal conditions for citizens and entities should be declared unconstitutional. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** **i)** The counsel for the respondent argued that the petitioner companies could not invoke Articles 19(1)(a) and 14 to defend their fundamental rights because companies are separate legal entities, do not enjoy the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) as these rights are intended for individuals, not corporations. The company and its shareholders though connected are different entities legally and constitutionally. The Newsprint Policy regulates the import and usage of newsprint, which falls under reasonable restrictions in the interest of the general public. **ii)** The counsels for the respondent argued that the primary objective of the Newsprint Policy was to regulate the import and distribution of newsprint, a scarce resource, to ensure equitable distribution among various newspaper companies based on their needs and circulation. The main focus of the policy was on the physical aspect of newsprint allocation and usage, there was no motive of interference with the editorial content or freedom of expression of the newspapers. **iii)** The counsel for the respondent also argued that the petitioner’s challenge is indeed barred by the proclamation of emergency under Article 358 as during the emergency Article 358 suspends the rights conferred by Article 19. Thus, any law or executive action taken during this period cannot be challenged on the grounds that it violates Article 19. Although the petitioners claim that the 1972- 1973 Newspaper Policy is a continuation of the previous policies, the enforcement and application during the emergency period fall within the ambit of Article 358, making the challenge untenable. The response have cited a precedent District Collector of Hyderabad vs M/s Ibrahim & Co[\[8\]](#_ftn8), in this case, the court upheld that executive actions taken during an emergency are immune from challenges based on Article 19. **iv)** The counsel for the respondent claims that the 1972- 1973 Newsprint Policy was directly governed by the provisions of the Import Control Order 1955. They highlighted that the Newsprint Policy was a continuation and essential component of the larger regulatory framework set by earlier orders, such as the 1955 Import Control Order. It was not intended to be an independent directive. **v)** The counsels for the respondent argued that Articles 19(1)(a) and 14 of the Constitution were not violated by clauses 3 and 3A of the Newsprint Control Order 1962. These clauses were necessary to prevent monopolistic practices in the newspaper industry and to guarantee the fair distribution of newsprint, a limited resource. The respondent contended that these limitations regulated the limited newsprint in a way that benefited both the public and the press. **JUDGMENT** - RATIO DECIDENDI **i)** The Court ruled that the petitioner companies could use Articles 19(1)(a) and 14 of the Constitution because they were legal entities. It confirmed that corporations had the right to free speech and expression because it directly affects press freedom, which is crucial for a democratic country. Thus, this right was violated by the newsprint policy’s restriction which made it more difficult for newspapers to circulate and publish their opinion freely and without undue interference from the government. **ii)** The Court decided that the petitioners were able to challenge the Newsprint Polic despite the proclamation of emergency under Article 358. The Court pointed out that while Article 358 suspends the application of Article 19 in an emergency, Article 14 fundamental right to object to executive action on the grounds of discrimination is unaffected. Therefore, the petitioner may still challenge the policy’s constitutionality. **iii)** After a thorough analysis, the Court concluded that the 1972- 1973 Newsprint Policy was covered by the provisions of the Import Control Order 1955. However, the Court found that the application of these provisions must be in conformity with constitutional mandates, including the protection of fundamental rights. **iv)** The Court held that Articles 19(1)(a) and 14 of the Constitution were violated by clauses 3 and 3A of the Newsprint Control Order 1962, which limited the distribution and allocation of newsprint. It was determined that these provisions were discriminatory in their application that disproportionately harmed press freedom. They were therefore declared unconstitutional and overturned. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The Bennett Coleman case marked a significant turning point in the legal analysis of press freedom and the government’s authority to regulate essential commodities. While the Court upheld the validity of the Newsprint Policy, it struck down specific provisions that were unconstitutional and violated freedom of speech and expression. Even during times of national emergency, the courts must carefully balance protecting civil liberties with the state’s regulatory powers. The case had a long-lasting effect on the evolution of Indian media law and the boundaries of governmental control over the media. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** - Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. V. Union of India, 1962 AIR 305 - Express Newspaper (P) Ltd. V. Union of India, 1959 AIR 578 **Important Statutes Referred** - Constitution of India, 1950 - Imports and Exports Control Act, 1947 - Essential Commodities Act, 1955 - Newsprint Control Order, 1962 [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Article 358, Constitution of India (1950). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Article 19(1)(a), Constitution of India (1950). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Article 14, Constitution of India (1950). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Article 32, Constitution of India (1950). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Article 19, Constitution of India (1950). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors vs The Union of India AIR 1962 SC 305 [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. & Anr vs Union of India AIR 1986 SC 872 [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) District Collector of Hyderabad vs M/s Ibrahim & Co AIR 1970 SC 1275 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [FREEDOM OF TRADE, COMMERCE & INERCOURSE UNDER ARTICLE 301 R/W Article 19(1) g OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION](https://lawfoyer.in/freedom-of-trade-commerce-inercourse-under-article-301-r-w-article-191-g-of-the-indian-constitution/) **Published:** June 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Rimin Cherian Reji, New Law College, Bvdu** **Edited by : Naveena K , Chettinad School of Law** **INTRODUCTION** Article 301, read with Article 19(1)(g) of the Indian Constitution, encompasses the concepts of “freedom of trade, commerce, and intercourse” and is critical in ensuring the free movement and exchange of goods throughout the country. Article 301 prioritizes territoriality over individual rights by ensuring unrestricted trade, commerce, and intercourse inside India’s territory. Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, which emphasizes individual liberty by ensuring citizens’ fundamental right to practice any profession, business, trade, or occupation, supplements this constitutional right. The aforementioned rules are critical to developing economic integration and ensuring the free flow of products and services throughout the country, ultimately cultivating a unified national market. In order to sustain the smooth flow of people, products, and services—which is essential for both economic progress and national unity—territorial freedom under Article 301 is very important. In order to promote a coherent economic environment, Article 301 tries to prohibit states from enacting limitations that can obstruct interstate commerce by concentrating on territorial issues. Article 301 deals with the territorial and structural aspects of economic integration, whereas Article 19(1)(g) focuses on personal freedom and the right of individuals to pursue economic opportunities. The interaction between these two articles illustrates a dual approach to economic freedom. **KEYWORDS**: Article 301, Article 19(1) g, free trade, reasonable restrictions, economic unity. **Meaning, Definition & Explanation** Trade It is a very old word and the meaning of it varies accordingly. In general, it can be defined as the engagement in the business of exchange, sale, or purchase of goods.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) It is not only the exchange of goods but something valuable in return for some other thing. The idea of value differs from person to person. Commerce It is the transportation of things that are meant to trade from one place to another. The commodities are of large scale.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Intercourse The word has almost the same meaning and is supposed to be read along with commerce[\[3\]](#_ftn3). Historical Background** The concept of freedom of trade, commerce, and intercourse was borrowed from Section 92 of the Constitution of Australia which states that trade within the Commonwealth is free.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) When the concept comes to the Indian scenario, free trade is defined as trade within inter-state and intra-state should be without any restrictions but the parliament or any state legislature can impose reasonable restrictions on public interest. The concept was first introduced in the drafting constitution in draft Article 274A proposed by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, the chairman of the drafting committee. His idea was to include a new part X-A, focusing on trade, commerce, and intercourse within the territory of India, consisting of Articles 274A, 274B, 274C, 274D, and 274E. He propounded the idea of free trade with reasonable restrictions and the restrictions could be made by the parliament or any state legislature.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) The additional restrictions introduced in Part X-A weakened the draft Article 16[\[6\]](#_ftn6) which states the freedom of trade, commerce, and intercourse as a fundamental right.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) A member proposed to amend the draft Article 274A but it was rejected. After various discussions and corrections, the draft Article 274 A was accepted on September 8, 1949, as the present Article 301.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) **Comparison with other Countries** The makers of the Constitution referred to many laws that existed in different countries to codify the concept of freedom to trade, commerce, and intercourse, and the idea is adopted in a way more similar to that of the Australian Constitution. Section 92 in Chapter IV of the Australian Constitution states that trade within the Commonwealth shall be free.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) In Atiabari Tea Co. vs. State of Assam (1961), the Court, by referring to the Australian Constitution, held that the scope of Article 301 is not limited to inter-state but extends to intra-state trade.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Article 302 gives Parliament to impose restrictions related to trade, commerce, and intercourse.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) Comparably, Australia’s Parliament has the authority to enact rules governing commerce between the States and foreign nations under Section 51(1) of the Australian Constitution.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) The US Constitution’s Article 1, Section 8(3) gives Congress the authority to control interstate and international trade.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) **Freedom of Trade, Commerce, and Intercourse as a Constitutional and Fundamental Right Article 19(1) g identifies the freedom of trade as a fundamental right, while Article 301 lists it as a constitutional right.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Article 19(6) and Articles 302-305 of the Constitution, respectively, grant the government the power to impose reasonable restrictions in the public interest in both situations, indicating that the right is not unqualified. Only Indian citizens are eligible to profit from Article 19(1) g, however, anyone conducting trade, commerce, and intercourse within India’s borders is entitled to rights under Article 301.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Article 301 states that trade, commerce, and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free. It focuses mainly on the place rather than the individual interest and it sees the whole country as an economic unit.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) The Supreme Court in Atiabari Tea Co. vs. State of Assam interpreted the Article and held that both inter-state and intra-state trade should be free in India. The “free trade” does not mean the right is absolute. The government can impose regulations and reasonable restrictions in the public interest. Regulations and restrictions imposed are not the same. Regulations do not create a burden on the free flow of trade but are imposed for the smooth functioning of trade and commerce activities. It includes compensatory taxes, like road tax, collected for building trade infrastructure.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) Restrictions create a burden in the free flow of trade and unreasonable restrictions imposed on trade are unconstitutional. Both Parliament and State Legislature can impose restrictions in the public interest but the latter requires the previous sanction of the President for introducing such a bill in the House.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) The imposed restrictions shall not discriminate the interests of any state or shall not favor any one state over the other. Article 19(1) g, which guarantees the right to trade, is a fundamental right and this makes clear that the right is guaranteed by the Constitution of India only to the citizens of India. The Article focuses on individual interest rather than the place. A citizen can take part in any kind of trade of his choice but it should be legal in nature. The Article guarantees a citizen the right to choose the kind of trade that he wants to engage with. Similar to Article 301 this is also not an absolute right and the State has the power to impose reasonable restrictions under Article 19(6) in public interest.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) “Free Trade”- not an absolute right** The concept of freedom of trade, commerce, and intercourse was borrowed from the Constitution of Australia.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) Section 92 of the Constitution guarantees that the trade within the commonwealth is free but at the same time, it gives the Parliament of Australia to make laws on trade-related matters.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) This implies that there is no such thing as absolute freedom of trade. There shall be regulations for the smooth and efficient functioning of trade without implying any burden on the flow of trade. In Atiabari Tea Co. vs. State of Assam (1961) the court held by interpreting Article 301 that trade and commerce activities shall be free from tax burdens and other impediments.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) The interpretation was later modified in Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd vs. State of Rajasthan (1962) [\[23\]](#_ftn23)which held that freedom under Article 301 does not imply that it is free from regulations which is for the smooth functioning of trade activities. Regulations include compensatory taxes which are in the nature of compensation for the service provided such as road taxes.[\[24\]](#_ftn24) The State of Mysore vs. H. Sanjeeviah (1967) decision distinguished between prohibitory and regulatory rules. Prohibitory laws stymie the free flow of trade, whereas regulatory norms help those engaged in trade, commerce, and intercourse. Restrictions that directly limit the freedom of trade, commerce, and intercourse are unconstitutional.[\[25\]](#_ftn25) **LEGAL PROVISIONS** **Article 19(1)g** “*to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.”* **Article 19(6)** *“Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, 1\[nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to,—* *(i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practicing any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or* *(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise.\]”* **Article 301** *“Freedom of trade, commerce, and intercourse.—Subject to the other provisions of this Part, trade, commerce, and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free.”* **Article 302** *“Power of Parliament to impose restrictions on trade, commerce, and intercourse.—Parliament may by law impose such restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse between one State and another or within any part of the territory of India as may be required in the public interest.”* **Article 303** *“Restrictions on the legislative powers of the Union and of the States with regard to trade and commerce.—(1) Notwithstanding anything in article 302, neither Parliament nor the Legislature of a State shall have the power to make any law giving, or authorizing the giving of, any preference to one State over another, or making, or authorizing the making of, any discrimination between one State and another, by virtue of any entry relating to trade and commerce in any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule.* *(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall prevent Parliament from making any law giving, or authorizing the giving of, any preference or making, or authorizing the making of, any discrimination if it is declared by such law that it is necessary to do so for the purpose of dealing with a situation arising from scarcity of goods in any part of the territory of India.”* **Article 304** *“Restrictions on trade, commerce, and intercourse among States.—Notwithstanding anything in article 301 or article 303, the Legislature of a State may by law—* *(a) impose on goods imported from other States 1\[or the Union territories\] any tax to which similar goods manufactured or produced in that State are subject, so, however, as not to discriminate between goods so imported and goods so manufactured or produced; and* *(b) impose such reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce, or intercourse with or within that State as may be required in the public interest:* *Provided that no Bill or amendment for the purposes of clause (b) shall be introduced or moved in the Legislature of a State without the previous sanction of the President.”* **Section 92 of the Australian Constitution** “*Trade within the Commonwealth to be free:* *On the imposition of uniform duties of customs, trade, commerce, and intercourse among the States, whether by means of internal carriage or ocean navigation, shall be absolutely free.* *But notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, goods imported before the imposition of uniform duties of customs into any State, or into any Colony which, whilst the goods remain therein, becomes a State, shall, on thence passing into another State within two years after the imposition of such duties, be liable to any duty chargeable on the importation of such goods into the Commonwealth, less any duty paid in respect of the goods on their importation.”* **Section 51(1) of the Australian Constitution** “*The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power12 to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to:* *trade and commerce with other countries, and among the States;”* **Article 1 Section 8(3) of US Constitution** “*The Congress shall have the Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts, and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;* *To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”* **Important Case Laws** **Atiabari Tea Co. vs. State of Assam (1961)** The Judgment highlights the scope of Article 301 of the Indian Constitution. The Court held that “freedom” in the Article also means free from taxes and other burdens but is not an absolute freedom.[\[26\]](#_ftn26) Article 302 states that the Legislative body has the authority to make reasonable restrictions on public interest and such restrictions must have previous sanction of the President especially if it is made by any state legislature. The main point is the restrictions should be reasonable and in the public interest. The court referred to the Australian and the U.S. Constitutions and highlighted the scope of Article 301 of the Indian Constitution which is not limited to inter-state trade but extends to intra-state trade.[\[27\]](#_ftn27) Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd vs. The State of Rajasthan (1962) modified the concept of free commerce that was initially defined in this case.[\[28\]](#_ftn28) **Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd vs. State of Rajasthan** The decision centered on interpreting Article 301 of the Indian Constitution and changed the notion of “free trade” established in Atiabari Tea Co. vs the State of Assam (1961). Article 301 states, “Trade, commerce, and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free.” “Freedom” does not imply that there will be no regulations. Regulatory measures are for the smooth functioning of trade and it is for the benefit of those who engage in legal trade activities like compensatory taxes in the nature of compensation for the service provided. Restrictions imply direct barriers to taking part in trade which are unconstitutional.[\[29\]](#_ftn29) **State of Mysore vs. H. Sanjeeviah (1967)** The Court distinguished “Prohibitory” and “Regulatory” rules. Prohibitory rules restrict or prohibit trade and commerce activities and thus put a barrier to the freedom of trade, commerce, and intercourse but Regulatory rules are for the benefit of the public. The Court ruled that the prohibitory rules are not permissible but the regulatory rules are permissible only if they are reasonable.[\[30\]](#_ftn30) **G.K. Krishna vs. State of Tamil Nadu (1975)** The Judgment defined compensatory taxes which come under the regulatory rules of trade, commerce, and intercourse activities. It is a tax that is compensatory and cannot function as a restriction to the freedom of trade, commerce, and intercourse. The tax should be for providing service to the people, from whom the tax is collected, like for the betterment of infrastructure. It should be fair and reasonable. The Court ruled that since a compensatory tax does not restrict trade activities previous sanction of the President is not required as per Article 304b.[\[31\]](#_ftn31) **Khyerbari Tea Co. Ltd. & Anr vs. The State of Assam (1964):** The Judgment gives a clear idea about “freedom to trade, commerce and intercourse” which is not freedom from regulations that support trade but freedom from restrictions that directly hinder the flow of trade. If it is proven that any restrictions imposed by a statute invade the fundamental right under Article 19(1) g then the burden of proving the reasonability of the statute lies with the State.[\[32\]](#_ftn32) **CONCLUSION** The concept of freedom of trade, commerce, and intercourse was borrowed from the Constitution of Australia and the purpose of enactment was to ensure trade in a free and liberal way throughout the territory of India. It is introduced in the Constitution in two ways: first, as a fundamental right under Article 19(1) g, and second in Article 301 as a constitutional right. The fundamental right focuses on the right of a citizen to engage in trade activities of his choice. The constitutional right sees the whole country as an economic unit and enables inter-state trade as well as intra-state trade. In a “National Emergency” like situation a citizen cannot enjoy the benefits of freedom of trade as a fundamental right but as a constitutional right. The Government has the authority to impose restrictions on these rights but they should be reasonable and in the public interest. **REFERENCES** - - - - [https://www.aph.gov.au/About\_Parliament/Senate/Powers\_practice\_n\_procedures/Constitution/chapter4#chapter-04\_92](https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Powers_practice_n_procedures/Constitution/chapter4#chapter-04_92) - - - - - - - - [https://lawcolumn.in/freedom-of-trade-commerce-and-intercourse-article-301-307/#Atiabari\_Tea\_Company\_v\_the\_State\_of\_Assam](https://lawcolumn.in/freedom-of-trade-commerce-and-intercourse-article-301-307/#Atiabari_Tea_Company_v_the_State_of_Assam) - [https://lawcolumn.in/freedom-of-trade-commerce-and-intercourse-article-301-307/#Automobile\_Transport\_Ltd\_Vs\_State\_of\_Rajasthan](https://lawcolumn.in/freedom-of-trade-commerce-and-intercourse-article-301-307/#Automobile_Transport_Ltd_Vs_State_of_Rajasthan) - - - [https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artI-S8-C3-1/ALDE\_00013403/](https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artI-S8-C3-1/ALDE_00013403/)\[”\] - [https://www.aph.gov.au/About\_Parliament/Senate/Powers\_practice\_n\_procedures/Constitution/chapter1/Part\_V\_-\_Powers\_of\_the\_Parliament](https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Powers_practice_n_procedures/Constitution/chapter1/Part_V_-_Powers_of_the_Parliament) - - - - - [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) (‘Trade Definition & Meaning – Merriam-Webster’, n.d.) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) (‘Commerce Definition & Meaning – Merriam-Webster’, n.d.) [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) (‘Intercourse Definition & Meaning – Merriam-Webster’, n.d.) [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) (‘Chapter IV. Finance And Trade. – Parliament of Australia’, n.d.) [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) (‘08 Sep 1949 Archives – Constitution of India’, n.d.) [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) (‘Draft Constitution of India 1948 Archives – Constitution of India’, n.d.) [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) (‘Article 301: Freedom of Trade, Commerce and Intercourse. – Constitution of India’, n.d.) [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) (‘Article 301: Freedom of Trade, Commerce and Intercourse. – Constitution of India’, n.d.) [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) (‘Chapter IV. Finance And Trade. – Parliament of Australia’, n.d.) [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) (‘Atiabari Tea Co., Ltd. vs The State Of Assam And Ors. on 26 September, 1960’, n.d.) [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) (‘Article 302: Power of Parliament to Impose Restrictions on Trade, Commerce and Intercourse. – Constitution of India’, n.d.) [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) (‘Part V – Powers of the Parliament – Parliament of Australia’, n.d.) [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) (‘Overview of Commerce Clause | Constitution Annotated | Congress.Gov | Library of Congress’, n.d.) [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) (‘INTER-RELATION BETWEEN ARTICLE. 301 AND ARTICLE. 19(1)(G)’, n.d.) [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) (‘INTER-RELATION BETWEEN ARTICLE. 301 AND ARTICLE. 19(1)(G)’, n.d.) [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) (‘Freedom of Profession, Occupation, Trade or Business under Article 19’, n.d.) [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) (‘The Automobile Transport(Rajasthan) … vs The State Of Rajasthan And Others(And … on 9 April, 1962’, n.d.-a) [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) (‘Freedom of Trade, Commerce and Intercourse: Articles 301 – 307 of the Indian Constitution’, n.d.-a) [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) (‘Constitution of India: Fundamental Rights- All About Article 19 (1)’, n.d.) [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) (‘Freedom of Trade, Commerce and Intercourse: Articles 301 – 307 of the Indian Constitution’, n.d.-b) [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) (‘Chapter IV. Finance And Trade. – Parliament of Australia’, n.d.) [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) (‘Atiabari Tea Co., Ltd. vs The State Of Assam And Ors. on 26 September, 1960’, n.d.) [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) (‘Freedom of Trade, Commerce and Intercourse Article 301 – 307 | Law Column’ 2021) [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) (‘The Automobile Transport(Rajasthan) … vs The State Of Rajasthan And Others(And … on 9 April, 1962’, n.d.-b) [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) (‘State Of Mysore vs H. Sanjeeviah on 16 January, 1967’, n.d.) [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) (‘Atiabari Tea Co., Ltd. vs The State Of Assam And Ors. on 26 September, 1960’, n.d.) [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) (‘Atiabari Tea Co., Ltd. vs The State Of Assam And Ors. on 26 September, 1960’, n.d.) [\[28\]](#_ftnref28) (‘The Automobile Transport(Rajasthan) … vs The State Of Rajasthan And Others(And … on 9 April, 1962’, n.d.-b) [\[29\]](#_ftnref29) (‘The Automobile Transport(Rajasthan) … vs The State Of Rajasthan And Others(And … on 9 April, 1962’, n.d.-a) [\[30\]](#_ftnref30) (‘State Of Mysore vs H. Sanjeeviah on 16 January, 1967’, n.d.) [\[31\]](#_ftnref31) (‘G. K. Krishnan Etc. Etc vs The State Of Tamil Nadu & Anr. Etc on 12 November, 1974’, n.d.) [\[32\]](#_ftnref32) (‘Khyerbari Tea Co. Ltd. & Anr vs The State Of Assam on 13 December, 1963’, n.d.) **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [CHINTAMAN RAO V/S STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 1951 AIR 118](https://lawfoyer.in/chintaman-rao-v-s-state-of-madhya-pradesh-1951-air-118/) **Published:** June 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Marisha Pal** **Edited By: Rituparna Panda, Law student at Birla Global University.** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** This is one of the important landmark judgments that protect the fundamental right to practice any profession without any interference of the legislative policy, which is against the Constitution. The petitioners were the bidi makers and workers which was prohibited during agricultural season in certain districts of Madhya Pradesh. The court held that the order by the commission to prohibit bidi manufacturing is illegal. **NAME OF THE CASE** Chintaman Rao v/s State of Madhya Pradesh **CITATION** 1951 AIR 118 **DATE OF THE CASE** 08.11.1950 **PETITIONER** Chintaman Rao **RESPONDENT** State of Madhya Pradesh **BENCH/JUDGE** Mahajan, Mehr Chand Kania, Hiralal J. (CJ) Mukherjea, B. K. Das, Sudhi Ranjan Aiyar, N. Chandrasekhara **STATUTES / CONSTITUTION INVOLVED** Fundamental Right **IMPORTANT SECTIONS / ARTICLES** Article 19 **FACTS OF THE CASE** The petitioners were the manufacturers and workers of bidi making in the district of Sagar of Madhya Pradesh. In the year 1950, the commissioner of the district issued an order under “The Central Province and Berar Regulation of Manufacturer of Bidis (Agricultural Purposes) Act,1948” which prohibited the persons of some villages from engaging in the manufacturing process of bidi. This act empowers the commissioner to determine the agriculture season and enforce penalties, which may include imprisonment. The aim was to ensure sufficient laborers for agriculture in specific seasons of the year to maintain sufficient food production. Two petitions were presented before the court under article 32 of the constitution which “*grants every individual the right to move the Supreme Court for the enforcement of their fundamental rights”* for the writ of mandamus and challenging the order as it affected their fundamental right of freedom of occupation and business mentioned under Article 19 (1)(g) of the constitution. **LEGAL ISSUE** Whether the prohibition of carrying on the business of manufacturing bidis only in certain villages during the agricultural season may amount to restriction under article 19 (1)(g) of the constitution. **PETITIONER ARGUMENT** - The counsel for Petitioner argued that the act of the Deputy Commissioner is against the public interest. - The counsel for Petitioner argued the fundamental right of the bidi worker is violated under Article 19 (1)(g) of the constitution. - The counsel for Petitioner argued that these restrictions were unreasonable. **RESPONDENT ARGUMENTS** - The counsel for the respondent submitted that the act was applied with the aim to increase and promote food production. - The counsel for the respondent stated that the state legislative is well aware of the social and economic condition of the state. - The counsel for the respondent stated that the act taken by the Deputy Commissioner was for public good and welfare. **JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court held that the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner on certain districts was against the right mentioned under Article 19 of the constitution. The Hon’ble Court stated that the word “proper ban” was against the public interest and any act which is against the provisions of the constitution needed to be repealed. The court held the act intervenes under the profession of the people by imposing a ban on manufacturers of the bidi making and not in accordance with Article 19(1)(g) of the constitution. The court held that the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner was illegal and the petitioner had to pay the full cost as compensation **CONCLUSION** To understand that the impugned act is against the rights of the people, the court understands the provisions of Article 19(1)(g) and Article 19(6). The reasonable restriction mentioned should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature which is required for the public good. In this case, the ban was not only on the manufacturers of the bidis but also they were not allowed to employ labor from neighboring villages. The conventions of the respondent were against the provision of the constitution, as the restriction made by the legislation is not final and conclusive. The word reasonable requires intelligent care and good reason is required to make the decision. Certain restrictions have been mentioned under Article 19 (6), used to interpret the law as well as understand its nature and extend to protect the rights of the people. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [D.C. WADHWA & Ors vs STATE OF BIHAR & Ors (1986)1987 AIR 579;](https://lawfoyer.in/d-c-wadhwa-ors-vs-state-of-bihar-ors-19861987-air-579/) **Published:** June 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author :Rimin Cherian Reji , Law student at New Law College, BVDU.** **Edited by : Shruti Mayur , Law student at Amity University.** CONTENTS [*CASE ANALYSIS ON*.. 1](#_Toc169190159) [\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\[D.C. Wadhwa & Ors vs State of Bihar & Ors (1986)\]\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_. 1](#_Toc169190160) [CONTENTS. 2](#_Toc169190161) [ABSTRACT. 3](#_Toc169190162) [CASE DETAILS: 4](#_Toc169190163) [INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT. 4](#_Toc169190164) [FACTS OF THE CASE. 5](#_Toc169190165) [LEGAL ISSUES RAISED.. 7](#_Toc169190166) [PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENTS. 8](#_Toc169190167) [RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS. 10](#_Toc169190168) [RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS. 12](#_Toc169190169) [Article 32: 12](#_Toc169190170) [Article 123. 12](#_Toc169190171) [Article 213. 13](#_Toc169190172) [JUDGEMENT. 15](#_Toc169190173) [Ratio Decidendi 15](#_Toc169190174) [Obiter Dictum.. 15](#_Toc169190175) [REFERENCES. 17](#_Toc169190176) #### **ABSTRACT** It was common for the state of Bihar to routinely re-promulgate ordinances having similar clauses, without bothering to present them to the assembly. The Bihar Forest Produce (Regulation of Trade) Third Ordinance 1983, the Bihar Bricks Supply (Control) Third Ordinance 1983, and the Bihar Intermediate Education Council Third Ordinance 1983 were the three ordinances that the petitioners challenged being re-promulgated after years of the practice continuing. As a representative of the public worried about the practice’s infringement of constitutional norms, Petitioner No. 1, an Economics professor, investigated the practice of re-promulgation by the State of Bihar’s governor and challenged it. Article 213 of the Constitution states that the Governor has the power to promulgate an ordinance in emergencies when both the houses of State Legislature are not in session so that the recession of the Legislature would not affect the forerunning of the society but the Ordinance should be laid before the Legislature if the State Government wants to continue the ordinance. It will expire six weeks from the reassembly of the Legislature or if the Legislative Assembly passes and the Legislative Council agrees to a resolution disapproving it. The Court ruled that the Governor was not authorized to re-promulgate the ordinance without first consulting the Legislature and with the same conditions. **Keywords**: emergency power, legislature, Article 213, re-promulgation of ordinances **CASE DETAILS:** ***i)* *Case Name*** Dr. D.C. Wadhwa & Ors vs. State of Bihar & Ors (1987) ***ii)* *Case Number***1987 AIR 579; 1987 SCR (1) 798; 1987 (1) SCC 378; (1987) IJR (SC); 1987 BBCJ 46; (1987) 1 JT 70 (SC); (1986) 4 SUPREME 465 ***iii)* *Judgement Date***20 December 1986 ***iv)* *Court***Honourable Supreme Court of India ***v)* *Constitution of Bench***Honourable Justice P.N Bhagwati (then CJI), Honourable Justice Ranganath Misra, Honourable Justice G.L. Oza, Honourable Justice M.M. Dutt, Honourable Justice K.N. Singh ***vi)* *Author***Justice P.N. Bhagwati ***vii)* *Equivalent Citation***1987 AIR 579; 1987 SCR (1) 798; 1987 (1) SCC 378; (1987) IJR (SC); 1987 BBCJ 46; (1987) 1 JT 70 (SC); (1986) 4 SUPREME 465***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved***Article 32, Article 123, and Article 213 **INTRODUCTION** A government consists of three branches: legislative, executive, and judicial. Although a divide of powers exists between these departments to ensure the proper administration of the government, it is not absolute in India.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) The legislature is the primary body responsible for enacting laws, but under specific conditions, the other organs may also do so. When the legislature is not in session, the executive can adopt laws in the form of ordinances, utilizing the powers assigned to the President and Governor by Articles 123 and 213 of the Constitution.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) The Constitution’s definition of law, included in Article 13(3), also states that an ordinance is a law. According to Articles 123 and 213, an ordinance has the same legal effect as a legislative act.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) An Ordinance is issued at the core to defend the public’s interests even when the legislature is not in session. In D.C. Wadhwa vs. the State of Bihar (1987), the Court examines the Governor’s authority and restrictions in promulgating ordinances. It also determines the constitutionality of re-promulgating ordinances. #### FACTS OF THE CASE The State of Bihar routinely issued new ordinances with identical provisions, and it never bothered to change the ordinances’ legal form into acts that the assembly could eventually adopt.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) The Governor issued new ordinances with the same provisions even though the legislature was not in session.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) This continued until the petitioners contested three particular ordinances, after which the governor re-promulgated them. The three laws were the Bihar Intermediate Education Council Third Ordinance of 1983, the Bihar Forest Produce (Regulation of Trade) Third Ordinance of 1983, and the Bihar Bricks Supply (Control) Third Ordinance of 1983. These ordinances were re-promulgated by the Governor with the same wording, but they were not brought before the legislature for adoption. The Governor of Bihar’s re-promulgation of ordinances was the subject of intense investigation by Economics Professor D.C. Wadhwa, who published his findings in a book titled “Repromulgation of Ordinances: Fraud on the Constitution of India.” His research indicates that the Governor of Bihar enacted 256 ordinances between 1967 and 1981, 69 of which were repeatedly promulgated and kept in force with the permission of the Indian President.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) The three challenged Ordinances likewise operated according to the same protocol. [\[7\]](#_ftn7) First published in 1977, the Bihar Forest Produce (Regulation of Trade) Third Ordinance has since been republished numerous times. First published in 1979, the Bihar Bricks Supply (Control) Third Ordinance has since been repeated multiple times.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) In a similar vein, the 1982 Bihar Intermediate Education Council Third Ordinance was re-promulgated prior to facing legal challenges. Until the petitioners objected to them through a writ petition filed under Article 32, these three ordinances were in force. Petitioner No. 1 contested the ordinances as a responsible citizen because he was worried about maintaining the constitutional framework.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) To create rules governing the sale and commerce of forest products, the governor passed the Bihar Forest Produce (Regulation of Trade) Third Ordinance, 1983.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Clauses 5 and 7 of the ordinance violated Petitioner No. 2’s right to sell forest produce to the extent of his interest, causing harm to the petitioner.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) This led the petitioner to challenge the ordinance in a writ petition. To regulate the course of study of Bihar students, the government established the Bihar Intermediate Education Council Third Ordinance, 1983. It interfered with petitioner No. 3, an intermediate student’s right to choose a course of his choosing, so the petitioner filed a writ petition contesting the ordinance.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) The Bihar Bricks Supply (Control) Third Ordinance, 1983 was issued by the state government, directing the governor to regulate and control brick trade and commerce, including pricing.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Petitioner No. 4, who owns South Bihari Agency, a brick production company, was impacted by this and filed a writ case challenging the ordinance as a result.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Two of the ordinances, the Bihar Forest Produce (Regulation of Trade) Third Ordinance and the Bihar Bricks Supply Third Ordinance, were passed by the State Legislature of Bihar while the petitioners’ writ petitions challenging the three ordinances were pending. The Third Ordinance of the Bihar Intermediate Education Council remained in force while it was undergoing enactment before the state assembly.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) #### LEGAL ISSUES RAISED - Whether the petitioners have locus standi to maintain writ petitions? - Whether the questions raised in the writ petitions merely academic in nature with no constitutional importance? - Whether the Governor could continue re-promulgating ordinances for an indefinite period, thereby bypassing the legislative process? 1. Whether the scope and limitation of the Governor’s power to promulgate ordinances is defined under Article 213 of the Constitution? 2. Whether the practice of the Bihar government of systematically re-promulgating ordinances without enacting them into law considered a colourable exercise of power and violated the constitutional scheme? #### PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS It was submitted that the petitioners have the locus standi to file the writ petitions. Petitioner No. 2 was directly affected by clauses 5 and 7 of the Bihar Forest Produce (Regulation of deal) Third Ordinance, 1983, which banned the sale of specific products and required him to deal only with those allowed by the state government, against his own interests.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) The ordinance enhances the state monopoly[\[17\]](#_ftn17) and it strengthens the “ordinance raj” of the executive by bypassing the Legislature as it was not enacted as an Act by the Legislature. Petitioner No. 3 was an intermediate student at A.N. College and the Bihar Intermediate Education Council Third Ordinance, 1983 which regulates the course of study in the state affected the interest of the petitioner as a student.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) Petitioner No. 4, a proprietor of a brick manufacturing concern, was affected by the Bihar Bricks Supply (Control) Third Ordinance, 1983 which gives the Government of Bihar the sole authority to regulate and control every trade-related matter of bricks including the price.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) Petitioner No. 1 was not directly affected by any of the challenged ordinances but got the right to question the executive, which bypassed the legislature by re-promulgating ordinances and functioned beyond its limitations, in the public interest.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) Two of the three ordinances namely the Bihar Forest Produce (Regulation of Trade) Third Ordinance, 1983, and the Bihar Bricks Supply (Control) Third Ordinance, 1983 were enacted into acts only during the pendency of the writ petition and the Bihar Intermediate Education Council was still in operation even though it was introduced before the legislature for the enactment purpose.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) These reasons make the writ petition maintainable. It was submitted that the practice of re-promulgating ordinances shows the colourable exercise of power by the executive over the legislature by functioning beyond the constitutional limitations.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) The main and important feature of federalism is the separation of powers but a quasi-federal country like India follows some exceptions and one such exception is the ordinance issuing power given to the executive but it has limitations and the authorities are bound to behave accordingly. The practice of re-promulgating ordinances with the same provisions by the Governor without considering the legislature can be interpreted as an effort to bypass the legislature and thus pave the way for “ordinance raj”[\[23\]](#_ftn23)[\[24\]](#_ftn24) It was submitted that the petitions were in the interest of the constitution and not academic. Petitioner No.1 conducted research on the re-promulgation of ordinances by the Governor over a period of time and he published his findings which helped the public understand the misuse of power by the Governor of Bihar as well as the executive.[\[25\]](#_ftn25) The public has the right to question the government’s unjust practices. The people elect members of the legislature to establish laws for the people, and the goal is the core line of the concept of democracy, which is “for the people, by the people, and for the people.” The Governor’s practice violates constitutional provisions and harms the public interest.[\[26\]](#_ftn26) Petitioners Nos. 2, 3, and 4 were directly harmed by the ordinance provisions [\[27\]](#_ftn27)and represent the people who were exploited by the executive’s non-democratic and unlawful conduct that bypassed the legislature. It was submitted by the petitioners that the Governor of Bihar’s practice violated the constitutional system. The very purpose of the ordinance issuing power given to the President or Governor of each state is to protect the interest of the public in the recession of the legislative body. Articles 123 and 213 of the Constitution clearly state that the promulgating power of the President or the Governor is an emergency power and it should be used when the legislature is not in session. It also states that the issued ordinance will expire six weeks after the legislature’s reassembly or if the legislature passes an ordinance disapproving the ordinance,[\[28\]](#_ftn28) but the Governor of Bihar repeatedly re-promulgates ordinances without changing their provisions or presenting them to the legislature for approval[\[29\]](#_ftn29), which has primary law-making authority. #### RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS It was submitted that the petitioners lacked locus standi to maintain the writs. They maintained that the petitioners were outsiders with no legal stake in challenging the Governor’s promulgating power.[\[30\]](#_ftn30) The ordinances were not challenged out of any legal interest like for the development of the law or protecting the established law. Two out of the three challenged ordinances namely the Bihar Forest Produce (Regulation of Trade) Third Ordinance, 1983, and the Bihar Bricks Supply (Control) Third Ordinance, 1983 were enacted into Acts by the State Legislature of Bihar, and the third challenged Ordinance, the Bihar Intermediate Education Council was pending before the legislature for the enactment purpose. The main question raised by the petitioners was whether the executive bypassed the legislature by not considering it for enacting ordinances but the challenged ordinances were already enacted into Acts or pending before the legislature[\[31\]](#_ftn31) and this makes the petition invalid. It was submitted that the petitions were academic in nature and there were no constitutional interests. Petitioner No.1, a professor was conducting research and he challenged the ordinances for the research purpose and is merely academic in nature. The petitioner was a professor of economics and the remaining petitioners are from outside the legal field and thus have no legal interests.[\[32\]](#_ftn32) It was submitted that the Court lacks the authority to question the satisfaction of the criteria precedent for the exercise of power. The Governor has the authority to make ordinances under Article 213.[\[33\]](#_ftn33) The Governor’s responsibility is to act in the interests of the ruling government. He was exercising his executive authority by issuing an ordinance protected by the Constitution. It is the Governor’s legal responsibility to promulgate an ordinance in an emergency when the House is not in session. To defend the public’s interests, the Governor must adopt ordinances when society demands them. The petition questions his executive power to issue an ordinance. It was argued that the practice of re-promulgating ordinances is not a colorable exercise of power. Article 213 of the Constitution stipulates that the Governor has the authority to make ordinances during the legislative recess. The Governor has legislative support in issuing ordinances. His actions were based on the constitutional provisions. #### RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS #### Article 32: “*Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part.—* *(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.* *(2) The Supreme Court shall have the power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.* *(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1) and (2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2).* *(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution.”* #### Article 123 “*Power of President to promulgate Ordinances during recess of Parliament.—(1) If at any time, except when both Houses of Parliament are in session, the President is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action, he may promulgate such Ordinances as the circumstances appear to him to require.* *(2) An Ordinance promulgated under this article shall have the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament, but every such Ordinance—* *(a) shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament and shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of Parliament, or, if before the expiration of that period resolutions disapproving it are passed by both Houses, upon the passing of the second of those resolutions; and* *(b) maybe withdrawn at any time by the President.* *Explanation.- Where the Houses of Parliament are summoned to reassemble on different dates, the period of six weeks shall be reckoned from the later of those dates for the purposes of this clause.* *(3) If and so far as an Ordinance under this article makes any provision which Parliament would not under this Constitution be competent to enact, it shall be void.”* #### Article 213 “*Power of Governor to promulgate Ordinances during recess of Legislature.—(1) If at any time, except when the Legislative Assembly of a State is in session, or where there is a Legislative Council in a State, except when both Houses of the Legislature are in session, the Governor is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action, he may promulgate such Ordinances as the circumstances appear to him to require:* *Provided that the Governor shall not, without instructions from the President, promulgate any such Ordinance if—* *(a) a Bill containing the same provisions would under this Constitution have required the previous sanction of the President for the introduction thereof into the Legislature; or* *(b) he would have deemed it necessary to reserve a Bill containing the same provisions for the consideration of the President; or* *(c) an Act of the Legislature of the State containing the same provisions would under this Constitution have been invalid unless having been reserved for the consideration of the President, it had received the assent of the President.* *(2) An Ordinance promulgated under this article shall have the same force and effect as an Act of the Legislature of the State assented to by the Governor, but every such Ordinance—* *(a) shall be laid before the Legislative Assembly of the State, or where there is a Legislative Council in the State, before both the Houses, and shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of the Legislature, or if before the expiration of that period a resolution disapproving it is passed by the Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Legislative Council, if any, upon the passing of the resolution or, as the case may be, on the resolution being agreed to by the Council; and* *(b) may be withdrawn at any time by the Governor.* *Explanation. —Where the Houses of the Legislature of a State having a Legislative Council are summoned to reassemble on different dates, the period of six weeks shall be reckoned from the later of those dates for the purposes of this clause.* *(3) If and so far as an Ordinance under this article makes any provision which would not be valid if enacted in an Act of the Legislature of the State assented to by the Governor, it shall be void:* *Provided that, for the purposes of the provisions of this Constitution relating to the effect of an Act of the Legislature of a State which is repugnant to an Act of Parliament or an existing law with respect to a matter enumerated in the Concurrent List, an Ordinance promulgated under this article in pursuance of instructions from the President shall be deemed to be an Act of the Legislature of the State which has been reserved for the consideration of the President and assented to by him.”* **JUDGEMENT** #### Ratio Decidendi The Court ruled that the Governor cannot re-promulgate ordinances with the same provisions without first putting them before the legislature. Article 213 explicitly specifies that an ordinance has a six-week validity period and must be filed in the legislature so that it can determine whether to implement it as an Act or reject it by passing a resolution if the administration wishes to maintain the ordinance for future use.[\[34\]](#_ftn34) The legislative is the government’s principal lawmaking organ, and the executive’s role is to carry out approved laws. Article 174 of the constitution mentions the sessions held by a state legislature.[\[35\]](#_ftn35) It cannot hold sessions throughout the year but at least twice a year.[\[36\]](#_ftn36) There might be a situation in which the legislature is not in session and the requirement of enacting a law with immediate purpose. For this kind of emergency situation, the constitution-makers included Articles 123 & 213 in the Constitution which enable the President and Governor to issue ordinances in the absence of the primary lawmaking authority. The Governor of a state can utilize this scope of Article 213 and he also has the responsibility to act within the limitations of his power. By re-promulgating an ordinance with the same provisions and without considering the legislature the Governor is acting beyond his limitation and such an act is unconstitutional. #### Obiter Dictum The Court stated that the practice of re-promulgating ordinances without incorporating them into an Act on a regular basis is a colorable exercise of power and is unconstitutional. Separation of powers is a key component of a federal country. The fundamental concept of the rule of law is the separation of powers. Power is separated between different organs of the government so that they can function independently and it avoids the invasion of power by the other organs.[\[37\]](#_ftn37) The practice of the Governor, who represents the executive, of re-promulgating ordinances with the same provisions and without considering the legislature on a repeat basis, can be seen as an invasion of the power of the Legislature. This may lead to the rise of an “ordinance raj” thus the executive government can make any law as per their choice and will no longer be responsible to the legislature as they took over the power of the legislature. The practice of re-promulgating ordinances can be seen as an effort to bypass the legislature and it is unconstitutional. #### CONCLUSION The Bihar government continued to re-promulgate ordinances with the same clauses without regard for the state legislature. The matter to consider is that the practice took place for almost 14 years and no one challenged it. It may be because of any lack of evidence against the government i.e. the executive but the issue was somewhat sorted out because of the research conducted by Petitioner No. 1, Dr. D.C. Wadhwa, and the publication of his findings as a book under the title “Repromulgation of Ordinances: Fraud on the Constitution of India”. The study claims that between 1967 and 1981, the governor of Bihar issued 256 ordinances, of which 69 were repeatedly issued and maintained in effect with the prior approval of the Indian president. A.K. Roy v. Union of India (1982), S.P. Gupta & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. (1982), and other cases addressed the goal of promulgating an ordinance, as well as its scope and limitations. However, the topic of re-promulgating ordinances has not received as much attention as it should have. Issuing an ordinance is an emergency power of the Governor and the validity of an ordinance is six weeks. When the Governor re-promulgated ordinances, as a common practice, he violated the constitutional scheme, and such an act can be seen as a measure to bypass the state legislature. The judgment clearly states that the Governor does not have the authority to re-promulgate ordinances with the same provisions without considering the legislature and it is a landmark judgment. #### **REFERENCES** - - - - - - - - - [https://manupatracademy.com/LegalPost/MANU\_SC\_0072\_1986](https://manupatracademy.com/LegalPost/MANU_SC_0072_1986) - - - - - - R.C. Cooper vs. Union of India (1970) - A.K. Roy vs. Union of India (1982) - S.P. Gupta & Ors vs. Union of India & Ors. (1982) - - - - [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) (‘Separation of Powers’, n.d.) - [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) (‘Understanding Re-Promulgation of Ordinances under Articles 123 and 213 of the Indian Constitution and Its Direct Challenge to Parliament’s Supremacy in the Area of Law Making – International Journal of Law Management & Humanities’, n.d.) - [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) (‘Promulgation and Re-Promulgation of Ordinances’, n.d.-a) - [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) (‘Dr. D.C. Wadhwa & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Ors on 20 December, 1986’, n.d.-a) - [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) (‘Dr. D.C. Wadhwa & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Ors on 20 December, 1986’, n.d.-a) - [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) (‘Dr. D.C. Wadhwa & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Ors on 20 December, 1986’, n.d.-a) - [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) (‘D.C Wadhwa Dr And Others v. State Of Bihar And Others | Supreme Court Of India | Judgment | Law | CaseMine’, n.d.) - [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) (‘Dr. D.C. Wadhwa & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Ors on 20 December, 1986’, n.d.-a) - [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) (‘D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar \[1987 SC\] – Delhi Law Academy’, n.d.) - [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) (‘Dr. D.C. Wadhwa & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Ors on 20 December, 1986’, n.d.-a) - [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) (‘MANU\_SC\_0072\_1986’, n.d.) - [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) (‘DC WADHWA vs STATE OF BIHAR’, n.d.) - [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) (‘MANU\_SC\_0072\_1986’, n.d.) - [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) (‘Dr. D. C. Wadhwa & Ors. vs. State of Bihar (1986)’, n.d.) - [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) (‘Dr. D. C. Wadhwa & Ors. vs. State of Bihar (1986)’, n.d.) - [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) (‘D.C Wadhwa Dr And Others v. State Of Bihar And Others | Supreme Court Of India | Judgment | Law | CaseMine’, n.d.) - [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) (‘DC WADHWA vs STATE OF BIHAR’, n.d.) - [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) (‘Dr. D. C. Wadhwa & Ors. vs. State of Bihar (1986)’, n.d.) - [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) (‘Dr. D. C. Wadhwa & Ors. vs. State of Bihar (1986)’, n.d.) - [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) (‘D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar \[1987 SC\] – Delhi Law Academy’, n.d.) - [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) (‘Dr. D.C. Wadhwa & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Ors on 20 December, 1986’, n.d.-a) - [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) (‘Dr. D.C. Wadhwa & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Ors on 20 December, 1986’, n.d.-a) - [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) (‘Dr. D.C. Wadhwa & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Ors on 20 December, 1986’, n.d.-a) - [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) (‘(8) D.C WADHWAvs. STATE OF BIHAR | LinkedIn’, n.d.) - [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) (‘Dr. D.C. Wadhwa & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Ors on 20 December, 1986’, n.d.-a) - [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) (‘MANU\_SC\_0072\_1986’, n.d.) - [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) (‘Dr. D.C. Wadhwa & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Ors on 20 December, 1986’, n.d.-a) - [\[28\]](#_ftnref28) (‘Ordinance Making Power of the President & Governor’, n.d.) - [\[29\]](#_ftnref29) (‘Promulgation and Re-Promulgation of Ordinances’, n.d.-b) - [\[30\]](#_ftnref30) (‘Dr. D. C. Wadhwa and Othersvs. State of Bihar and Others (1986) – Examining the Constitutionality of Re-Promulgation | UPSC’, n.d.) - [\[31\]](#_ftnref31) (‘Dr. D. C. Wadhwa and Othersvs. State of Bihar and Others (1986) – Examining the Constitutionality of Re-Promulgation | UPSC’, n.d.) - [\[32\]](#_ftnref32) (‘Dr. D.C. Wadhwa & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Ors on 20 December, 1986’, n.d.-b) - [\[33\]](#_ftnref33) (‘Dr. D.C. Wadhwa & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Ors on 20 December, 1986’, n.d.-a) - [\[34\]](#_ftnref34) (‘Dr. D.C. Wadhwa & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Ors on 20 December, 1986’, n.d.-a) - [\[35\]](#_ftnref35) (‘Article 174: Sessions of the State Legislature, Prorogation and Dissolution – Constitution of India’, n.d.) - [\[36\]](#_ftnref36) (‘State Legislature – Powers & Functions of Legislative Assembly & Legislative Council’, n.d.) - [\[37\]](#_ftnref37) (‘Separation of Powers’, n.d.) **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India & Ors, 1951 AIR 41](https://lawfoyer.in/chiranjit-lal-chowdhuri-v-union-of-india-ors-1951-air-41/) **Published:** June 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author:** **Madhumita Saha, Student, Lajpat Rai Law College, Sambalpur University, Odisha** **Edited by: Gaurav Katiyar, Student, University of Lucknow** **TABLE OF CONTENTS** 1. CASE DETAILS…………………………………………………………………..4 2. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT………………….4 3. FACTS OF THE CASE…………………………………………………………5-6 4. LEGAL ISSUES RAISED………………………………………………………6-7 5. PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS…………………………………7 6. RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS………………………………………………7-8 7. RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS……………………………………………..8-9 8. JUDGEMENT………………………………………………………………….9-11 9. Ratio decidendi…………………………………………………………….10-11 10. Obiter dicta…………………………………………………………………..11 11. REFERENCES…………………………………………………………………..12 12. Important cases referred……………………………………………………..12 13. Important statutes referred………………………………………………….12 14. ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………..13 15. ABOUT THE AUTHOR……………………………………………………..….13 **TABLE OF CASES** 1. McCabe Vs Atchison, 235 U.S. 151 2. Barbier Vs Connally, 113 U.S. 27 3. Gulf C. & S. F.R. Co. Vs Ellis, 163 U.S. 150 at 159 4. Southern Railway Co. Vs Greene, 216 U.S. 400 5. Radics Vs New York, 264 U.S. 6. Minister for State for the Army Vs Datziel, 1944 68 CLR 261 7. Pennsylvania Coal Company Vs Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 8. Kesavananda Bharati Vs State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461 9. Minerva Mills Vs Union of India AIR 1980 SC 1789 10. Golaknath Vs State of Punjab AIR 1967 SCR (2) 762 **1.CASE DETAILS** A) Judgement Cause title/ Case nameChiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union Of IndiaB) Case Number72 of 1950C) Judgement Date4/12/1950D) CourtSupreme Court of IndiaE) Quorum/ Constitution of BenchBench of five judges (Constitutional Bench)F) Name of JudgesHon’ble Justice H.J. Kania Hon’ble Justice Saiyid Fazal Ali Hon’ble Justice M. Patanjali Sastri Hon’ble Justice B.K. Mukherjee Hon’ble Justice S.R. Dass G) CitationChiranjit Lal Chowdhuri Vs Union of India and Others, 1951 AIR 41H) Legal Provisions InvolvedConstitution of India 1950; Articles-14, Article19(1)(f), Article 19(5), Article 31, Article 32 Indian Companies (Amendment) Act of 1930 Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1950 **2.INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The question related to the violation of Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31 of the Constitution. The constitutional bench opined that there has been no curtailment of the rights of the petitioner. On the question relating to the infringement of Article 14 of the Constitution, the five-judge bench or the constitutional bench held the judgment in the ratio of 3:2. The majority judgment was given by Hon’ble Chief Justice H. J. Kania, Justice Saiyid Fazal Ali, and Justice B. K. Mukherjee while Justice M. Patanjali Sastri and Justice S. R. Dass was dissented from the majority. Hence, The Hon’ble Court held that, the Sholapur and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act does not deprive the petitioner (shareholder) of enjoyment of his basic rights. Also, the Act enacted does not aim for the acquisition of property of the company. There is a mere denial of the voting rights of the shareholders while the petitioner still has the Right to hold and earn income from his shares. Also, there is no infringement with the rights provided under Article 14 and Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution as per the majority. **3.FACTS OF THE CASE** - In the instant case, the petition is filed by Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri1, a shareholder of Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company Limited governed under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act. He was the holder of three ordinary shares and eight preference shares pledged under the Bank of Baroda. - In August 1949, mills of the company were shut down and the reason specified in the ordinance laid that it was due to the mismanagement & the need to produce essential commodities. Later a Central Act named, Sholapur and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act2 was enacted for the regulation of the Company’s affairs. - This Act empowered the government to interfere in the functioning of the mill, appoint new directors, curtail voting rights of the shareholders and modify the Indian Companies Act concerning the company. - The Act somewhere recreated and validated the provisions of the Ordinance and was questioned by the Petitioner (Shareholder). The petitioner challenged the constitutional validity of both the Ordinance & the Act as violative of Article 14, 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution of the shareholder as well as the Company. Further, the petitioner prayed for the writ of mandamus3 against the Central Government, Government of Bombay & Directors restraining them from interfering with the management of the Company and to declare the Ordinance and Act as unconstitutional. - ***PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF THE CASE:*** A company in Sholapur known as the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company Limited. The company was engaged in the production of an essential commodity and also it had huge number of employees and workers. But, the Company was not working well or malfunctioning amiss during the post-independence era in 1950 and huge number of employees and workers had been left jobless and unemployed and are not paid remunerations. At the present time, Then Government of India was trying to overtake the industry and was trying to nationalize them, so as to secure the workers and give them financial support and concomitantly support the economy. In such a situation, The Governor General of India found that it is in the hands of maladministration and a situation has arisen in the affairs of the company which has affected the production of an essential commodity and also caused serious joblessness among certain section of the community. Therefore, he promulgated an ordinance which was later on reenacted by an act of the parliament and this act was known as the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency) Provisions Act 1950. Based on this Act, the directors of the company who were the core management of the company were dismissed and the government was given permission to appoint new directors and the rights of the shareholders of the company were diminished. Also, the Government modified the Indian Companies Act so as to bring it in accordance with the provision of the ordinance and based on that, new directors were appointed by the government. Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury who was the shareholder of the company filed a petition challenging Article 14, 19(1)(f) & 31 of the Constitution. - ***FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE CASE:*** The Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd. Was not working well. The Government of India trying to overtake the Industry. Hence, an ordinance was enacted by the parliament known as Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency) Provisions Act 1950. The Government was authorized to appoint new directors and rights of the Shareholders of the company. A writ petition filed by Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury (the shareholder of the company). 4. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** HERE THREE LEGAL ISSUES ARE RAISED- 1. Whether the Sholapur and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act is in contravention to Article 14, 19(1)(f) & 31 of the Constitution? 2. Whether the impugned Act imposed any restriction on the petitioner’s right of acquisition of private property of the Company or the shareholder? 3. Whether the impugned Act amounts to the acquisition or possession of the private property within the meaning of Article 31 of the Constitution? 5. **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioner or Appellant submitted that, - The Acts made applicable to only this company and not to other companies. Further, the Act also denies the provision of equality and equal protection of the law as guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution. Thus, this is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Challenging the Constitutional validity of Sholapur and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act. - This act is harming the Right to Management of the company. Government has targeted only one particular company instead of others violating the Right to Equality. - The foremost and primary purpose of the Sholapur and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act is to control and take over the possession of the mill of the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company limited. This action is beyond the power of the legislative body. - Hence, The Act restricts the rights of the shareholders thereby causing unreasonable interference with the rights provided under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India. - The petitioner also claimed violation of Article 31 of the Constitution of India caused as a result of the control of the Government on the company’s property. The possession was unjustified, without any compensation. - Further, the legislation is beyond the competence of the Parliament as it was not covered under the central list under the seventh schedule. 6. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that, - The condition of the Company was unusual and the inquiry revealed that there was mismanagement within the company. Thus, to control the situation, to protect the future inconvenience and for smooth functioning of the Company, the Central Government laid the Ordinance first and further this Act. - The classification made was reasonable and thus there was no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. - The power defined under Article 31(1) of the Constitution is different from those rights mentioned under Article 31(2) of the Constitution. The appointment of Directors in the management of the Company by the Government does not lead to dispossession of property. Single person legislation can be made if there is reasonable ground and circumstances. **7.RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** Constitution of India 1950; Articles-14, 19(1)(f), 19(5), 31, 32. 1. Article 14 speaks that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. 2. Article 19(1)(f) dealt with the Right to acquire, hold and dispose of the property. As it was one of the fundamental rights which was enshrined under the Indian constitution, but The 44th Amendment act of 1978 of the Indian Constitution removed this right from the list of Fundamental Rights and enshrined it under article 300A as a constitutional right. 3. Article 19(5) says “*Nothing in the sub-clauses and of the said cause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevents the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the Interests of any scheduled tribe.”* 4. Article 31 of the Constitution was replaced and repealed by the 44th Constitutional Amendment Act in 1978. Clause (1) states, a person should not be deprived of hisher property. Clause (2) states, A property should not be acquired compulsorily. 5. Article 32 of the Indian Constitution which is the Right to Constitutional Remedies is a Fundamental Right, which says that Individuals have their Exclusive Right to approach to the Supreme Court of India and they can seek the enforcement or fulfilment of other Fundamental rights guaranteed or provided by the Indian Constitution. 6. Indian Companies (Amendment) Act, 1930 *“This Act shall came into force on such date 2 as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint”.* 1950. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1950. *“This Act deals with dismissing managing agents of a company, removing its directors, authorising the Government to appoint new Directors and curtailing Rights of Shareholders in the matter of voting, etc.”.* **8.JUDGEMENT** The bench of five judges opined that there has been no curtailment of the rights of the petitioner. - The majority judgment was given by Hon’ble Chief Justice H. J. Kania, Justice Saiyid Fazal Ali, and Justice B. K. Mukherjee while Justice M. Patanjali Sastri and Justice S. R. Dass dissented from the majority oner. - The Judges held that, a single person Legislation can be made unless there is reasonable ground and circumstances. - To protect the future Inconvenience the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency) Provisions Act was enacted. - The facts in relation with the industry were “Extraordinary” in nature. Hence, the court held that, the government has restricted the rights but not taken away. - The Hon’ble Court held that the Sholapur and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act does not deprive the petitioner (shareholder) of enjoyment of his basic rights. Also, the Act enacted does not aim for the acquisition of property of the company. - There is a mere denial of the voting rights of the shareholders while the petitioner still has the right to hold and earn income from his shares. Also, there is no infringement with the rights provided under Article 14 and Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution as per the majority. 1. ***RATIO DECIDENDI*** *“The Constitution of India under Article 32 empowers the citizens to approach the Supreme Court for the enforcement of individual rights in case it is violated. These rights are not only available to the natural person but also the companies.* *In order to establish the maintainability of this case, the onus lies on the petitioner to prove that the law in question is beyond the legislative competence of a particular legislature and that this Act in itself contravenes the constitutional guarantees of the petitioner as provided in Part III of the Constitution.* *In a question related to violation of Article 31 of the Constitution, the court opined that the sovereign has an inherent right to acquire private property in good faith for public use.”* However, this Act does not usually acquire the property of the petitioner and the legal as well beneficial interest arising out of the share the petitioner holds remains intact. Furthermore, there is no curtailment on the petitioner to hold, buy, sell or dispose of his property. Besides, the shareholder entitlement to the dividend remains unaffected. The disabilities provided in the legislation impose reasonable restraint that is sought for public interest i.e. to ensure regular supply of essential commodities or materials to the people and prevent the issue of unemployment. Hence, the Act is not considered to be violative of Article 19(1)(f) and the legislation falls within the exception of Article 19 (5) of the Constitution. *“Concerning the violation of Article 14 of the Constitution, the court observed that ‘the guarantee against the denial of equal protection of the laws does not mean that identically the same rules of law should be made applicable to all persons within the territory of India.’ In the instant matter, the classification made is reasonable, keeping in view the mismanagement of the Company leading to serious unemployment and non-availability of essential commodities.* *The court referred to the case of Middleton v. Texas Power and Light Company4,* *where the Supreme Court of America observed that the legislative body correctly* *assess the need of people, and the enacted laws are made to address the problems of people and discrimination if any is done on adequate grounds.* *Moreover, the burden is on the petitioner to establish that the classification or distinction so made by the enacted legislation is improper and arbitrary. The petitioner failed to discharge the prima-facie burden either by a claim or by placing any material records in this regard.* *Court also observed that the petitioner’s argument on the validity of the law based on the claim that the Act in question not placed in the Central List lacks substance. This Sholapur and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act comes under Item No. 43 of the Union List named as ‘incorporation, regulation and winding up of trading corporations.’”* 1. ***OBITER DICTA****:* *“Article 14 of the Constitution, as already stated, lays down an important fundamental right, which should be closely and vigilantly guarded, but in construing it, we should not adopt a doctrinaire approach which might choke all beneficial legislation.”* *“If a law is made applicable to a class of persons or things and the classification is based upon differentia having a rational relation to the object sought to be attained, it can be no objection to its constitutional validity that its application is found to affect only one person or thing.”* **9.CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS** In the instant case of Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri Vs Union of India, the petitioner claims for the infringement of his fundamental rights that later turns out not to be infringed. Hence, The legislative competence of the Parliament to enact the legislation was the primary question before the Hon’ble Court. **Therefore, the appeal stands dismissed with costs.** **10.REFERENCES** 1. ***i) IMPORTANT CASES REFERRED:*** 2. A) McCabe Vs Atchison, 235 U.S. 151 3. B) Barbier Vs Connally, 113 U.S. 27 4. C) Radics Vs New York, 264 U.S. 5. D) Minister for State for the Army Vs Datziel, 1944 68 CLR 261 6. E) Pennsylvania Coal Company Vs Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 7. F) Gulf C. & S. F.R. Co. Vs Ellis, 163 U.S. 150 at 159 8. G) Southern Railway Co. Vs Greene, 216 U.S. 400 ***ii)IMPORTANT STATUTES REFERRED:*** 32. Constitution of India 1950; Articles-14, 19(1)(f), 19(5), 31, 32. 33. Indian Companies (Amendment) Act, 1930. 34. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1950. [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury V. Union Of India, AIR 1951 SC 41. 2. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency) Provisions Act (XXVIII of 1950). 3.Writ of Mandamus for infringement of the Fundamental Rights (writ petition). 4. [](#_ftnref2) Middleton V. Texas Power and Light Co., 249 U.S. 152 (1919). **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Reforms V. Union of India and Another](https://lawfoyer.in/campaign-for-judicial-accountability-and-reforms-v-union-of-india-and-another/) **Published:** June 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Aamish Priyam, Student, SS Jain Subodh Law College, Jaipur** **Edited by: Gaurav Katiyar, Student, University of Lucknow** 1. **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE *(not less than 150 words and more than 250 words)*** In the case of Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Reforms V. Union of India and Another, the supreme court clarified the power and authority of the Chief Justice of India in constituting benches, allocating cases and maintaining the roster within the Supreme Court. This Judgement is significant as it clarifies the power and authority of Chief Justice of India as the master of roster. He alone has the power to constitute benches of the court and allocate cases to those benches. Neither a two-Judge Bench nor a three-Judge Bench can allocate the cases to themselves or direct the composition for constitution of a Bench. There cannot be any kind of command or order directing the Chief Justice of India to constitute a particular Bench. ***Keywords*:** Authority, Constitutional Bench, Chief Justice, Power, Roster 1. **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** Campaign for Judicial Accountability and Reforms V. Union of India and Another ***ii)* *Case Number*** Writ Petition (Crl.) 169/2017 ***iii)* *Judgement Date*** 10/11/2017 ***iv)* *Court*** Supreme Court of India ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** Dipak Misra, R. K. Agrawal, Arun Mishra, Amitava Roy, A.M. Khanwilkar ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges*** Dipak Misra ***vii)* *Citation*** WRIT PETITION (CRL.) NO.169 OF 2017 ***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved*** Article 145 (2) (3) of Constitution of India, Order VI Rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 1. **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The Judgement arise from the confusion of the power of Chief Justice to constituting benches, allocating cases and maintaining the roster within the Supreme Court. The “roster of court” refers to list that the judges will be handling in which court. It is a way to organize and assign cases to different judges, ensuring that the workload is distributed properly and that each case is heard by the appropriate judge or panel of judges. 1. **FACTS OF THE CASE** 2. **i) Procedural Background of the Case** Earlier the case was before a two-Judge Bench comprising Hon’ble Mr. Justice A.K. Sikri and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhushan. During the hearing, Mr. Prashant Bhushan, learned counsel, brought to the attention of the Bench an order dated 09.11.2017 passed in another case (W.P(Crl.) No.176/2017) referring the matter to a Constitutional Bench. The Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) also expressed its desire to be included as a party respondent in the case, which was allowed by the Court. The Bench directed that the matter be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice for appropriate orders to list the case. Subsequently, the Chief Justice of India constituted a Constitutional Bench comprising of Chief Justice, R.K. Agrawal, Arun Mishra, Amitava Roy and A.M. Khanwilkar to hear the case. 1. **ii) Factual Background of the Case** 1. N/A 2. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 3. What is the power and authority of the Chief Justice of India in constituting benches, allocating cases and maintaining the roster within the Supreme Court? 4. **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioner submitted that (N/A) 1. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that as per the judgment rendered by the three-Judge Bench in State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand and Others (1998) 1 SCC 1, the Chief Justice of the High Court is the master of the roster and there is no justification not to treat the Chief Justice of India, who is the Chief Justice of the Apex Court, to have the same power. If the same principles are not followed, the institution cannot function. Respondents also stated the Order VI Rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, which says while hearing any cause, appeal or other proceedings, if the judges think that the matter should be heard by a larger group of judges, they will refer it to the Chief Justice. The Chief Justice will then form a larger group of judges to hear the case. Respondent also drawn the court attention to the authority in Official Liquidator v. Dayanand and Others (2008) 10 SCC 1, wherein it has been held that if two judge bench disagree with a decision made by three judges bench. They will sent the matter to a group of five judges bench. Normally, two judges bench should follow the decision made by three judges bench. But if two judges believe that the earlier decision by three judges is wrong then they should first send the matter to another group of three judges bench explaining why they disagree with the judgement given. If this new bench of three judges also thinks the earlier decision is wrong, then it can be sent to a group of five judges bench. 1. **JUDGEMENT** 1. **RATIO DECIDENDI** The Chief Justice of India is the master of roster. He alone has the power to constitute benches of the court and allocate cases to those benches. Neither a two-Judge Bench nor a three-Judge Bench can allocate the cases to themselves or direct the composition for constitution of a Bench. There cannot be any kind of command or order directing the Chief Justice of India to constitute a particular Bench. 1. **OBITER DICTA (IF ANY)** 1. 2. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The Judgement highlights the importance of power of chief justice of India as a master of roster, his power to constitute benches and allocating cases to those benches. The power of Chief Justice is ultimate constituting benches, allocating cases and maintaining the roster within the Supreme Court if not then it will give rise to utter confusion. 1. **REFERENCES** 1. **Important Cases Referred** 1. State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand and Others 2. Official Liquidator v. Dayanand and Others 2. **Important Statutes Referred** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Maru Ram & Ors V. Union of India & Anr AIR 1980 SC](https://lawfoyer.in/maru-ram-ors-v-union-of-india-anr-air-1980-sc/) **Published:** June 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Mahaswetaa R, Student, Chettinad School of Law Kelambakkam** **Edited by: Priyanshu Tyagi, Student, Mewar Law Institue Vasundhra** **ABSTRACT :** The petitioner in this case questioned the constitutional validity of Section 433A of the criminal procedure code. The pardoning powers of the president and government provided under Article 72 and 161 of the Constitution of India was also discussed in this case. The power of remittance and commutation is given to the president and governor, which shall be taken after taking advice from the council of ministers, while restriction is imposed on certain class of prisoners, for them to serve in the prison for minimum 14 years. But section 433A is constitutionally valid, and it does not violate article 14 or article 20(1). Also, it does not affect the pardoning powers of the president and governor, which is seen as a separate provision which is distinguished from the statutory powers of section 432 & 433. ***Keywords:** pardoning powers, prospective, prisoners, constitutional validity, remittance, president & governor.* **CASE DETAILS:** NAME OF THE CASE Maru Ram etc. vs. Union of India & Anr CASE NUMBER ### 1980 AIR 2147 DATE OF JUDGEMENT 11/11/1980 COURT Supreme Court of India QUOROM/ CONSTITUTION OF BENCH Krishna Iyer, V R, Chandrachud Y V (CJ), Bhagwati, P.N., Fazal Ali, Syed Murtaza, Koshal A D. NAME OF THE JUDGES/ AUTHOR V.R., Krishna Iyer CITATION 1980 AIR 2147 LEGAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED Criminal procedure code, 1973 – Section 433A ; Constitution of India – Article 72 & Article 161 **INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT:** - Section 433A of the criminal procedure code provides that, if any person is sentenced to imprisonment for life in which death is one of the punishments provided by law, or where a sentence of death is changed into imprisonment for life, such person should serve in jail for at least fourteen years, and he can be remitted only after 14 years. This case also talks about the pardoning power of the president and governor provided under articles 72 and 161 of the Indian constitution. It says about remission and commutation of sentences where the order of the government is necessary. And it also highlights the main objects of punishment. - Here, the main concern of the case is whether section 433A is affecting the pardoning powers of the president that are provided under sections 72 and 161 of the Indian Constitution. - The Background of the Judgement of the Supreme Court can be understood by these 4 points: - Constitutionality of Section 433A - Relationship with Short-Sentencing Laws and Remission Rules - Effect on Articles 72 and 161’s Pardoning Powers - Application of Section 433A Prospectively **FACTS OF THE CASE:** - A group of prisoners serving life sentences filed the lawsuit, arguing that Section 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure is unconstitutional. - With effect from December 18, 1978, Section 433A imposed a minimum of 14 years of real detention for two categories of life-sentence offenders: - Individuals found guilty of a crime for which the death penalty is one of the available penalties. - Those found guilty under any other statute where the death penalty is the worst. Before 433A, life imprisonment was understood to indicate imprisonment for the balance of the offender’s natural life, subject to certain remission clauses found in prison legislation and regulations. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED:** 1. Whether Section 433A is constitutionally valid? 2. Whether the pardoning powers of the president and governor affected by section 433A? 3. Whether parliament have no legislative competency to enact the impugned provision? 4. Whether this provision apply prospectively? 5. Whether section 433A violate Article 20(1) and Article 14 of the Indian constitution? **PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS:** The main argument here is that Section 433A of the criminal procedure code is against the constitution of India. - While Section 432 and Section 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure give the power of remittance and commuting sentences, section 433A places restrictions on a certain class of prisoners. This confinement is not fair and just where the hopes of the prisoners are lost, and they are unable to reform themselves because of this restriction. This provision is against the pardoning powers of the president provided under articles 72 and 161 of the Indian constitution. It is stated that it is a harsh behavior of the law and provisions to not consider the prisoner’s feelings and helplessness. - The petitioners are arguing that the reformation must be the main essential of punishment and it must be given priority among the other objects of punishment i.e., prevention, retribution and deterrence where these objects deserve secondary importance. - The interpretation of statutes must be plain where the provisions are easily understood and interpreted without any complications. - It is also said that section 433A is against Article 14 of the Indian constitution on 2 grounds. It treats unequal situations equally, where the circumstances and variation of crime are not taken into consideration. On the other hand, it says that section 433A is inhumane and anti-reformative in nature. - Therefore, section 433A provides constraints that lead to the dissatisfaction of the prisoners which puts them in a difficult position and the interpretation of statutes must be clear and plain which provides a more straightforward approach instead of being chaos in understanding those interpretations. **RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS:** - The main argument is that section 433A of the Criminal Procedure Code is constitutionally valid where it is not affected by the constitution of India. - While section 433A poses restrictions on certain classes of prisoners, it does not violate the pardoning powers of the Constitution. the pardoning powers are not entirely enjoyed by the president and governor, the advice of the central and state government is taken, and their decision is binding on the head of the state. Also, the reduction in sentence does not arise unless the president or governor chooses to use those powers which is also according to the fair principle. Remission only affects the execution of the sentence, and it does not wipe out the offence. - The four main objects of punishment must be balanced to provide a fair criminal justice system. All four objects must be given equal importance. Just focusing on one objective (reformation) will cause chaos to other objects. For example, if we focus on reformative alone, preventive theory cannot be established, which is providing protection to the public where the offender might cause problems. - They argued that by prohibiting the early release of inmates found guilty of major crimes, Section 433A was passed to serve the justifiable purposes of maintaining public order and security. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS:** **Code of criminal procedure**: - Section 432: “Power to suspend or remit sentences. —(1) When any person has been sentenced to punishment for an offence, the appropriate Government may, at any time, without conditions or upon any conditions which the person sentenced accepts, suspend the execution of his sentence or remit the whole or any part of the punishment to which he has been sentenced. - Section 433: Power to commute sentence.—The appropriate Government may, without the consent of the person sentenced, commute— (a) a sentence of death, for any other punishment provided by the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860); (b) a sentence of imprisonment for life, for imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years or for a fine. (c) a sentence of rigorous imprisonment, for simple imprisonment for any term to which that person might have been sentenced, or for a fine. (d) a sentence of simple imprisonment, for a fine**.** - Section 433A: Restriction on powers of remission or commutation in certain cases.—Notwithstanding anything contained in section 432, where a sentence of imprisonment for life is imposed on conviction of a person for an offence for which death is one of the punishments provided by law, or where a sentence of death imposed on a person has been commuted under section 433 into one of imprisonment for life, such person shall not be released from prison unless he had served at least fourteen years of imprisonment.” **Constitution of India:** - Article 72: (1) “The President shall have the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of any offence— (*a*) in all cases where the punishment or sentence is by a Court Martial; (*b*) in all cases where the punishment or sentence is for an offence against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends; (*c*) in all cases where the sentence is a sentence of death. - Article 161: The Governor of a State shall have the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of any offence against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the State extends.” **JUDGEMENT:** 1. Ratio decidendi: - The court upheld the constitutional validity of section 433A of the criminal procedure code. - Dismissed the writ petition but partly allowed the case. - Section 433A does not violate the pardoning powers which are provided under Articles 72 and 161. This provision is constitutionally valid. Section 433A of the Criminal Procedure Code is a separate provision given as a restriction for section 432 and section 433 and it acts separately from the power of pardoning given under Articles 72 and 161 of the Indian Constitution. - The pardoning powers such as remission, reprieves etc are granted to the president and governor under Article 72 and Article 161 of the Indian Constitution are limited. They must act on advice provided by the council of ministers. The central and state government’s decision is binding on the head of the state. - Section 433A of Criminal Procedure Code do not violate Article 20(1) and Article 14 of Indian Constitution. - Section 433A of the criminal procedure code is prospective. It won’t apply to cases decided before December 18, 1978. 2. Obiter Dicta: - The court quoted a difference between the statutory powers of sections 432 & 433 of the criminal procedure code and the pardoning power provided under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution of India. - Life imprisonment should be served by the offender till his last breath, and it can be remitted only by the order of government. - The pardoning powers of the president and governor under Articles 72 and 161 of the Indian Constitution are with the central or state government and the court will intervene only in the rare case of irrationality, unfairness or irrelevance. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS:** - The restriction imposed on certain classes of prisoners through section 433A of the criminal procedure code does not seem to be right. This provision is constitutionally valid but not in all circumstances. Decisions of remittance and reduction in time period of life imprisonment must be taken after considering the situation of the prisoner. The time period of 14 years is huge. - The pardoning power of the president & governor and statutory power of section 432 and 433 should be read separately. And the pardoning powers are not just with the head of the state, but it is with the respective government. - In the recent Supreme Court case, it has been held that the governor cannot say no to the state’s recommendation, and it can also pass a pardon for prisoners even if they have not served a minimum of 14 years of time in jail. - I would like to say that this can be done in special circumstances after considering all the facts and situation of the prisoner. **REFERENCES:** 1. **Important Cases Referred** · *Sambha Ji Krishan Ji vs State Of Maharashtra AIR 1976* · *State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Ratan Singh & Ors AIR 1973 SC* · *Maneka Gandhi vs Union Of India AIR 1968 SC* · *E. P. Royappa vs State Of Tamil Nadu & Anr AIR 1982 SC* · *V. Punnen Thomas vs State Of Kerala AIR 1968 SC* · *Bachan Singh & Ors vs State Of Punjab & Ors AIR 1980 SC* 1. b. **Important Statutes Referred** - *Constitution Of India, 1950* - *Criminal Procedure Code,1973* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Legal Remedies for Trespass to Person](https://lawfoyer.in/law-of-torts-legal-remedies-for-trespass-to-person/) **Published:** June 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Arsh Singh, Law Student at University of Petroleum and Energy Studies, Dehradun.** **Edited by: Shruti Mayur, Law student at Amity University.** **INTRODUCTION** Trespass to a person is considered to be a direct interference with a person’s body or liberty without any lawful justification. It is tried under tort which is civil law. Such torts are committed nowadays frequently in everyday life so this article aims to be aware of its stringent punishment and consequences in depth so they do not take it as a light medium and treat it seriously and abide it like every law so that the number of cases of trespass reduces. It is essentially defined as unjustified interference with a person’s body, which can be done by inflicting physical damage or by raising the fear of force. In this article we will be studying its background from where it is derived, we will be focusing on what rights a person can exercise to prevent trespass to himself keeping in light its difference with nuisance which people often confuse it with, also we would be focusing on the types of trespass to persons understanding with some famous case laws. We will also be comparing the legal remedies of trespass, whether they are flexible more in India or more in foreign countries or helping in an in-depth analysis. My Main reason for writing this article is to reduce the number of cases of trespass by making people aware of its value and its consequences. **KEYWORDS: Trespass to person, tort, unlawful interference, physical damage, force.** 1. Meaning, Definition & Explanation** Trespass to a person is an unreasonable interference with bad intention which is committed either by causing physical force or by creating an apprehension of fear in the mind. It comes under tort law. Law of tort is a branch of law of obligations where the law obliges to refrain from harm to another and if harm is done then to repair it or compensate it which are imposed not by agreement but independently of agreement by force of general law. Trespass to a person can be further divided into assault, battery, and false imprisonment. Assault and battery under trespass can be tried under civil as well as also under criminal depending upon the severity. The foremost condition for trespass to a person is that the force used should be without any lawful justification or confinement should be unlawful. Trespass includes not only to persons but also to goods and to land. Legal remedies have become a must to oust such trespassers and create fear amongst them such that they do not commit trespass. **2. Historical Background / Evolution** This concept has a long historical background in English common law which influenced tort law. The development of legal remedies is traceable only through the early common law system. In medieval England, this concept was applied to all heinous acts involving land and property. Its definition was earlier only limited to land however with development in time legal principles evolved and this concept started including actions that affected a person’s body or his/her personal belongings leading to the proper difference between assault battery and unlawful imprisonment becoming more defined after which judicial decision started to refine elements of trespass to the person establishing a clear standard for liability and defenses. This concept was later adapted into Indian tort law leading India to develop its own jurisprudence while considering local customs and practices In recent times legal remedies for trespass to a person are shaped by historical influences and modern development. Henceforth, the protection of individual rights against physical interference has remained a fundamental concept within tort law. 3. **Comparison with other Countries** In India the main remedy for trespass to a person under tort law is damages. These damages may include physical injury, pain and suffering, medical earnings, loss of earning capacity, etc, however, the court has also granted exemplary damages in some cases. Although these torts are also governed under the Indian penal code such as assault (Section 351), criminal force (Section 350), wrongful restraint (Section 339), and wrongful confinement (Section 340). If prosecutors are found guilty under criminal trial they may face penalties such as imprisonment or fines as prescribed by law. However, when remedies are compared with other countries we see some variations such as countries like Australia, Canada, United States following principles derived from English common law precedent. This includes countries like Australia, and Canada where elements of battery and assault form part of their tort laws, and France or Germany which have codified laws that govern torts which include those that relate to the injury caused by others’ conduct towards another’s body/persons. Some countries like Ireland have a mixed legal system that is not only derived from English Common Law but also incorporates certain statutory provisions. For Islamic countries to address liability for personal injuries they incorporate Shariah principles. **4. How trespass is different from nuisance** Many people are confused between them thus it is important to state the difference between them. Nuisance is an unlawful interference with a person’s use or enjoyment of land or some right in connection with it. In trespass, physical interference is direct however in nuisance it is consequential. Planting trees on another land is trespassing but when a person plants in his land and it projects into another land it amounts to nuisance. In trespass, interference is with the plaintiff’s possession of land whereas in nuisance it is with the plaintiff’s enjoyment of land. **5. Types / Kind** The following are the types of trespass to a person- - Assault- is an act of the defendant which causes to plaintiff reasonable apprehension of infliction of battery upon him by the defendant. If the apprehension of infliction of battery is created upon the plaintiff which is intentional by the defendant and has the prima facie ability of being performed. For eg, if a person advances in a threatening manner to use force this is assault. - Battery- it is an intentional application to another person without any lawful justification. There should be use of force without any lawful justification however it is pertinent to note that mere passive obstruction is no force. Unintentional harm or harm caused by a pure accident is no battery. - False imprisonment- it is the imposition of total restraint for some period however short upon the liberty of another without sufficient lawful justification. When a person is deprived of his liberty whether by being confined over the four walls or by leaving the place from where he is false imprisonment is constituted if one is deprived of his personal liberty. Under criminal law, whether the restraint is total or partial both are punishable under IPC however position in tort law is only false imprisonment when the restraint is total. - It is pertinent to note that if there are means of escape restraint can’t be considered a total and there is no false imprisonment. This means, however, that it is intelligible or reasonable to the person detained. Knowledge of the person being falsely imprisoned is not required in false imprisonment. 6. **Forms of trespass** - Trespass to person – It is essentially defined as unjustified interference with a person’s body, which can be done by inflicting physical damage or by raising the fear of force - Trespass to goods- It is direct physical interference with goods that are in the plaintiff’s possession without any lawful justification. - Trespass to land- It means interference with the land without a lawful justification. 7. **Essentials** **Battery** - There should be the use of force irrespective of whether it causes harm or not the wrong is still constituted. It is not mandated there should be physical hurt. For eg least touching another is the battery. - Use of force should be intentional and without any lawful justification. It is pertinent to note that harm voluntarily suffered is no battery. Also, harm is unintentional and caused by pure accident. **Assault** - Assault can be determined if reasonable apprehension is committed in the mind of the plaintiff that battery is going to be committed against him provided the defendant had the intention to cause reasonable fear in the mind of the plaintiff. Eg pointing a loaded gun at another. - The second essential is that there should be prima facie ability to do harm which means that the act should be such that it is capable of creating apprehension in the mind of the plaintiff for eg showing a fist from a distance would not amount to assault since it is not capable enough to create an apprehension. **False imprisonment** - There should be total restraint on the liberty of the person. Whether the restraint is total or partial both are punishable under criminal law however under tort law false imprisonment is constituted only when there is a total restraint i.e when a person is completely deprived of his/ her liberty in which time is of no essence. - It should be without any lawful justification. 8. **Defences** **Defences of assault and battery: –** - Statutory Authority: When an individual with legal authority tries to obstruct them while they are performing their duties, they may be stopped by using force. - Lawful Correction: When used to modify someone’s behavior, assault and battery are occasionally acceptable. For instance: correcting a child or learner. But the remedial action shouldn’t be overly harsh or unjustified. - Maintaining the peace: Reasonable force may be used to halt someone who is stirring up disorder at a public house of worship if they are doing so. - Kicking someone off your property: You have the right to use as much force as necessary to eject someone who enters another person’s property without authorization and doesn’t leave when asked. It is appropriate to use force in this circumstance. - Retaking of goods: The rightful owner or a person designated to look after the owner’s property may request the return of any items that have been wrongfully taken. Depending on the circumstances, the legitimate owner and authorized person may use reasonable force to reclaim it if the wrongdoer refuses. . **Defences of false imprisonment** - Consent to Restraint: – A person cannot argue they are a victim of imprisonment if they voluntarily consent to be confined without using any deceit or trickery. - Valid arrest: – It is not deemed false imprisonment when someone is detained for an unlawful act and there is a good reason for the detention - Probable Cause: – In order to prevent wrongful imprisonment, it is essential to establish probable cause through acts. It is crucial to remember that the criteria used to determine probable cause is centered on objective proof of a person’s wrongdoing rather than on an actual crime. **9. Remedies for Trespass to Person** - Action for damages: – If someone’s body has been trespassed, they have the right to bring a legal action and claim damages. These damages aren’t just for physical injuries but also for any harm to their personal freedom. So, when someone’s body is violated, they can seek monetary compensation for both the physical and emotional impact it has caused. - Self-help: – It is the remedy available to a person who has wrongfully restrained. The person can be free himself instead of waiting for a legal action. - Habeas Corpus: – The Supreme Court under Article 32 and the High Court under Article 226 can issue writs for a person who is wrongfully detained by this individual who is detaining is required to produce the detained person before the court and rationalize his detention. The person would release immediately if the court finds the reason for detention unreasonable. **Case Laws / Precedents (if any)** **ASSAULT** - **Stephen v Myers**, the plaintiff was chairman at the Paris meeting, the defendant sat at the same table but there were 6-7 between them. A very large meeting decided that the defendant be expelled from the meeting. The defendant moved towards the plaintiff with a clenched fist saying he would rather pull the chairman out of the chair however he was stopped by the churchwarden. He was held liable for assault. - **Stanley v Powell**, Powell who was a member of the shooting party fired at a pheasant but a pellet from his gun glanced off the tree and accidentally wounded Stanley who was another member of the party. Powell was not held to be liable since the act was not wilful. **BATTERY** - **Kader v. K. A. Alagarswami** court held that putting handcuff on an undertrial prisoner and then chaining him like a dangerous animal with a neighboring window is unjustifiable use of force and the police officer imposing such force is liable for trespass to the person. **FALSE IMPRISONMENT** - **Bird v Jones** a part of a public footway as opposed to a carriageway was wrongfully enclosed by the defendant. Seats were put there and entry to the enclosure was allowed only to those who made the payment to watch rowing there. The plaintiff assented his right to use the footway and climbed over the fence but was prevented from going further he was there for half an hour and brought an action for false imprisonment. The court held there was no false imprisonment as restraint was not total. - **Mee v Cruikshank**, after the acquittal of the plaintiff he was taken to a cell and was detained there for a few minutes while some questions were put to him by warders it was held to be false imprisonment. - **Bhim Singh v State of J. & K** where the petitioner an MLA of the jk assembly was wrongfully detained by police in order to prevent him from attending assembly session. It was held to be unjustifiable detention and exemplary damages were granted. - In **Rudal Sah v. State of Bihar** Supreme Court granted such compensation in writs of habeas Corpus where the petitioner was acquitted by the court in 1968 but was released from jail in 1982, i.e., 14 years thereafter. The State tried to justify the detention by pleading that the detention was for the medical treatment of the petitioner for his mental imbalance. The plea was rejected. **Doctrines / Theories** - The **Doctrine of Directness** states that the defendant’s actions must directly result in the interference. - The **Doctrine of Illegal Restraint**: In order for a person to be falsely imprisoned, their freedom must be unlawfully and unconsentedly restricted. - **The principle of proportionality in self-defense**: Self-defense actions must be appropriate for the threat being faced. - **Doctrine of Intent**: Even when the defendant did not intend the precise harm, they must have intended the act that caused the interference. **Maxims / Principles** - **Volenti nonfit injuria**:- To a willing person, no harm is done. - **Injuria sine damno**: – Injury without damage This principle holds that a legal wrong (injuria) can be actionable even if no physical damage(damno) occurs. - **Damnum sine injuria**: – Damages without legal injury this tells that not all harm results in a legal claim there must be a violation of the right. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The origins of trespass, including trespass to the person, are still a bit of a mystery despite all the research done on the subject. Even though there have been theories proposed, like the idea that trespass actions evolved from the jurisdiction of the old popular courts, there’s not enough surviving evidence from those times to back up these claims. So, we can’t say for sure if they’re true or not. We do have a better understanding of how trespass actions developed over time thanks to the rise of the king’s courts and the increase in documented legal proceedings. But when it comes to the very earliest origins of trespass to the person, we still have limited information. In the end, the historical background of this tort remains elusive. The action of trespass, in its different forms, seems to have slowly taken shape within the common law system, drawing from various earlier legal traditions. But we can’t definitively pinpoint where the idea of trespass to the person first came from. The fact that there’s no clear, undisputed origin story shows us that the common law is an organic and evolving system. Trespass to the person, like many other important legal concepts, emerged through a complex historical process that can’t be boiled down to just one event or influence. As legal scholars, we need to be aware of the limitations of the historical record and not jump to firm conclusions about these murky origins. **REFERENCES** 1. **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** - Law of torts RK Bangia - Harvard Law Review - Law of Torts by Ratanlal and Dhirajlal 2. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** - Law of Trespass to a Person” – This resource provides a comprehensive overview of trespass to person, 3. **Cases Referred** - Stephen v. Myers - Stanley v. Powell - Kader v. K.A. Alagarswami - Bird v. Jones - Mee v. Cruikshank - Bhim Singh v State of J. & K - Rudal Sah v. State of Bihar **Categories:** Articles, Law of Torts --- ### [The Concept of Consideration in Indian Contract Law](https://lawfoyer.in/the-concept-of-consideration-in-indian-contract-law/) **Published:** July 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Disha Vadwana, Student, KES’Shri Jayantilal H. Patel Law College** **Edited by: Gaurav Katiyar, Student, University of Lucknow** **INTRODUCTION** Consideration is part of a valid contract in Indian contract law 1872, The word Consideration arise from Latin term quid pro quo,” which means “something for something.” When a person to an agreement promises to do something or not to do something, he must get something in return. The reason for the need of Consideration in Indian contract law is that it builds Mutuality, Legal Enforceability, Economic value, Fairness, Reciprocity and legal protection between parties. Without consideration, an agreement is void in Indian contract law 1872. Section 2(d) and Section 25 of Indian contract law defines consideration in detail and there are certain exceptions to consideration also which is Natural love and affection, promise to compensate for past voluntary services and promise to pay time-barred debt. Consideration may be past, present, or future. Consideration simply means ” *When parties to the agreement agree to give upon something to get something in return is called the consideration.”* ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*: *Indian Contract Law 1872, Consideration, Section 2(d), Valid contract, Section 25.*** **Definition of Consideration** **“Section 2(d) of the Indian Contract Act defines ‘Consideration’ as under:** *“When at the desire of the promisor, the promisee or any other person has done or abstains from doing or does or abstains from doing or promises to do or abstains from doing something, such act or abstinence or promise is called consideration for that promise.”* **Definitions of Consideration by famous Scholars:** ***Blackstone:*** *“Consideration is the recompense given by the party contracting to the other”.* ***Pollock:*** *“Consideration is the price for which the promise of the other is brought, and the promise thus given for value is enforceable.”* ***Patterson:*** *“Consideration means something, which is of some value in the eye of the law. It may be some benefit to the plaintiff or some detriment to the defendant.”* ***Cheshire and Fifoot:*** *“The expression consideration has to be understood as a price paid for a promise has been commended.”* **Essentials elements of Consideration:** **Consideration must be given at the desire of the Promisor.** If the action of promisee does not fulfil the consideration, by the desire of promisor then it is not fall into the definition of consideration. A promisee must fulfil the desire of the promisor for valid consideration. ***Consideration may be given by the promisee or any other person:*** In the agreement between the promisee and promisor, consideration may be given to the promisor by the promisee or any person. A person can sue as long as he/she is part of the contract. Section 2(d) of consideration also defines that the consideration may proceed from the promisee or any other person. ***Consideration must have some value in the eyes of law:*** Consideration should not be unreal. It must be of some value in the eyes of law. An act that is impossible to perform in the contract cannot be called a valid consideration. ***Consideration must not be unlawful, immoral, or opposed to public policy*:** Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act states that every agreement or consideration that is unlawful is void. **Section 23 of ICA 1872**: “23. What considerations and objects are lawful and what not. – the consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless- – it is forbidden by law; or – is of such nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law; or – is fraudulent; or – involves or implies injury to the person or property of another or; – the Court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy.” **Types of Consideration** 1. **Past consideration** Past consideration is a consideration that is already done by the promisee at the desire of the promisor before the promise is given by the promisor. 2. **Present Consideration** Consideration, which is done by the promisee at the time of making a promise. When both parties agree to perform obligations on their part, this is known as present or executed consideration. 3. **Future Consideration** Consideration that is promised to pay at the future date or render service at the future date is known as future consideration. Future Consideration is also called executory or prospective consideration. **Exception to Consideration** Section 25 of the Indian Contract act 1872 states about the exception to consideration that is no contract without the consideration. 1. **Natural love and affection:** An agreement without consideration is valid consideration if it is made on account of love and affection and shall be enforceable only if such agreement is in writing and registered. Illustration: A, out of natural love and affection, promises to give his grandson, C Rs. 2000/-. A put his promise to C into writing and registers it. This is a contract. 2. **Promise to compensate for past voluntary services:** An agreement without consideration is valid when it’s promised to compensate a person who has formerly done something for the promisor. Illustration: 1. A finds B’s Bag and give it to him. B promises to give A Rs 100/- this is a contract. 2. A support B’s for treatment of his son. B promises to pay expenses to A This is a Contract. 3. **Promise to pay time-barred debt:** A time barred agreement is an agreement where debt may be given in certain time. Section 25 of the Indian contract act states, a time barred debt is valid if, the debt is time barred, promised to pay debt, signed by debtor and if the promise is written. Illustration: A owes D to Rs. 10,000/- but the debt is forbidden by the Indian limitation Act. A sign a written promise to pay D Rs 5,000/- on account of debt. This is a contract. **Landmark Case and Judgment:** **Chinnaya v. Rammaya (1882):** The case is about a gift deed agreement where a plaintiff transferred her property to her daughter by a registered deed of gift. One of the conditions of the agreement was to pay Rs. 653/- to plaintiff’s sister. For the desire of the plaintiff, defended made an agreement in favour of the plaintiff to make a promise to pay sum of annual amount to plaintiff’s sister. Issue of the case: Whether the plaintiff can file a suit against the defendant for the money promised in an agreement when the consideration of that promise was actually provided by third party, the defendant’s mother who was plaintiff’s sister? Judgement of the case: The Madras High Court states that the agreement between the plaintiff and defendant, consideration was on the behalf of the plaintiff’s sister, even a plaintiff was stranger to consideration, plaintiff can file a suit because the plaintiff was the part of a contract. The court held that section 2(d) of Indian Contract Act 1872 defines, a stranger to consideration can pay the amount on behalf of promise because he/she becomes the part of a contract. Lastly, the court states that the plaintiff’s sister was entitled to a decree of the payment of money. ## **Conclusion** The concept of Consideration is a part of valid contract and ensuring that the agreements are backed by reciprocal and mutual benefits in agreement. Section 2(d) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, transforms the promises into enforceable contracts by each party to receive something in return. It upholds the integrity and fairness in the agreement by the both side of parties. Consideration is essential part of contract for maintaining the balance, trust and enforceability of contracts within the Indian legal framework. **REFERENCES** **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** *Law of Contract (a Study of the Contract Act, 1872) and Specific Relief* (2018) **Online Articles / Sources Referred** “Consideration in Indian Contract Law – Drishti Judiciary” “Consideration in Contract Law – iPleaders” “Chinnaya vs. Ramayya : An Analysis – iPleaders” **Cases Referred** *Chinnaya v Rammaya (1882)* **Statutes Referred** *The Indian Contract Act, 1872* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Parshottam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India 1958 AIR 36](https://lawfoyer.in/parshottam-lal-dhingra-v-union-of-india-1958-air-36/) **Published:** June 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author:- Sonam Chahar is a law student at the Army Institute of Law** **Edited by:- Rutvij Vyas is a law student at the faculty of law, GLS University** **A)ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** In this case, the appellant Parshottam was appointed as an officiating chief controller(class II level post) in 1951. Before this, he was in class III post. But in 1953, he was reduced from his current post to a previous class. In the meantime, he appealed before authorities to reconsider their decisions. But he later filed writ petition in the High Court against the railway authority for the reduction of his rank without giving him a chance of being heard. The court gave judgment in favour of the petitioner and said that a fair chance was not given to the petitioner as per provisions of Article 311. Later, against the decision of the High Court, railway authorities(respondent) appealed to the divisional bench and they gave a decision in favour of the authorities. So, to resolve the whole case and to reach a conclusion, the case was appealed to the Supreme Court. The majority opinion was in favour of authorities and mentioned that there is no violation of Article 311. **B)CASE DETAILS** **i)Judgement Cause Title / Case** **Name –** Parshottam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India,1957 **ii)Case** **Number –** AIR 36 **iii)Judgement Date –** 1 Nov, 1957 **iv)Court –** Supreme Court of India **v)Quorum / Constitution of Bench –** Division Bench **vi)Author / Name of** **Judges –** Das, Sudhiranjan, Aiyyar, T.L. Venkataram ,S.K. Sarkar ,A.K Bose, Vivian **vii)Citation –** AIR 1958 AIR36 **viii)Legal Provisions** **Involved –** Article 310,311 of the Constitution of India **C)INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The case is related to services law in India. It talks about the articles included in part 14 of the constitution i.e. 310 and 311. The case is about the reduction of the rank of civil servants who were serving in the Indian Railway service. His rank was reduced from an upper (officiating) position to a lower one. He claimed that his dismissal from the officiating post was not valid as it violated Article 311 of the Indian Constitution. Article 310 talks about the tenure of office of persons serving the union or a state. Article 311 of the Indian Constitution talks about the reduction, removal or dismissal in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under union or state. Exceptions of this article are defence personnel or persons holding military posts. The majority judgement is that Article 311 is applied to persons holding permanent, temporary or officiating posts. The article talks about when the removal or reduction of the post of a person is done as a punishment. In the current case, it is an administrative action to remove the current post of the appellant, not a punishment. But on the other side, the minority judgement is that Bose that the reduction in the rank of the appellant is not by article 311 as he should be given a reasonable opportunity to be heard. **D)FACTS OF THE CASE** ***i)Procedural Background of the Case*** a. The appellant on 9 February 1955 filed a writ petition in the High court under article 226. Justice Harnam Singh gave judgment in favour of the appellant that the reduction in his post without giving him the opportunity of showing the cause against action is invalid as per article 311(2). b. Then, an appeal filed by the Union of India against the decision of the High Court in the Divisional Bench of Chief Justice Bhandari and Justice Falshaw. They overruled the decision of the High Court. c. The case was then appealed in front of the Supreme Court of India. ***ii)Factual Background of the Case*** a. The appellant name Parshottam Lal Dhingra joined the Railway service as a Signaller. After his promotion in 1942, he was appointed as Section Controller, in1947 as Deputy Chief Controller and in1950 as Chief Controller. All these posts came under class III service. b. In July 1951, he was appointed as officiate which is class II service as post of assistant Superintendent of railway telegraphs. c. But after some time,in 1953 it was noticed that some adverse remarks were made on him and stated by seniors that he was reverted to the subordinate posts **E)LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** - Whether the removal of the appellant is by provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India? - Whether the provision of article 311 is include temporary or officiating post of central services? **F)PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsel of Petitioner argued that he was appointed to the higher post but eventually revert to the lower post on grounds claimed by the authorities. He was not even given any reasonable opportunity to be heard and it subsequently violates principle of natural justice. Every person should be equally given chance to present his argument before the actions taken. - After his reduction in post, he initially went to General Manager for reconsideration of the action taken but nothing was improved. - The petitioner argued that article 311(2) is violated here as it talks about giving fair chance for person to show cause against action. He was not given that opportunity. **G)RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT** - The counsels for Respondent submitted that the petitioner was appointed only for the temporary purpose i.e. officiating. The removal of him from that post is not any arbitrary action. - The grounds on which his rank was revert was justified as the reports were made about his work and his relations with his colleagues but they all went against him. Reports said that he was not good at his work on higher post and not eligible for that. - The provisions of article 311 were not violated as his removal was a administrative action and article includes the provisions of punitive action for removal or reduction in post. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** Article 310 talks about the tenure of the persons under union or a state - *Except as expressly provided by this Constitution, every person who is a member of a defence service or of a civil service of the Union or of an all-India service or holds any post connected with defence or any civil post under the Union holds office during the pleasure of the President, and every person who is a member of a civil service of a State or holds any civil post under a State holds office during the pleasure of the Governor of the State* - *Notwithstanding that a person holding a civil post under the Union or a State holds office during the pleasure of the President or, as the case may be, of the Governor 1 of the State, any contract under which a person, not being a member of a defence service or of anal-India service or of a civil service of the Union or a State, is appointed under this Constitution to hold such a post may, if the President or the Governor 2 as the case may be, deems it necessary in order to secure the services of a person having special qualifications, provide for the payment to him of compensation, if before the expiration of an agreed period that post is abolished or he is, for reasons not connected with any misconduct on his part, required to vacate that post.* ii.Article 311 talks about the dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a state - *No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed.* - *No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges .* **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** - The majority judgments are passed by CJ Das, Venkatarama Aiyyar, S.K.Das and A.K. Sarkar in favour of respondents that the removal of appellant from his position is not the violation of article 311. - The reduction in the post of parshottam is not an punitive action or punishment with accordance to the article 341. - Judgement says that it is the administrative action which was taken by railway authorities. - The minority judgement was given by justice Vivian that the provisions of article 311(2) says that reasonable opportunity should be given to the persons to the cause against action. In this case, the parshottam was not given reasonable opportunity to present his side, voilates article 311(2) **REFERENCES** ***Important Cases Referred*** - State of Bihar v. Abdul Majid, AIR 1954 SC 245 - Jayanti Prasad v. The State of Uttar Pradesh AIR1951 ALL 793 - Gopi Kishan Prasad v. The state of Bihar AIR 1955 pat 372 - Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of India Air 1956 **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Legal Framework for Carbon Trading in India](https://lawfoyer.in/legal-framework-for-carbon-trading-in-india/) **Published:** June 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Shadrack Chai Chivatsi, University of Nairobi** **Edited By: Team LawFoyer** **INTRODUCTION** *“Clean air and water and a viable climate are inalienable human rights and solving this crisis is not a question of politics. It is a moral obligation- if, admittedly, a daunting one.” –* Quote by Leonardo DiCaprio, American actor and film producer. The Earth is a planet that contains human beings, animals, and plants as fauna and flora respectively. For a very long time, these living organisms have been interrelated with water, air, soil, and other physical properties. This symbiotic relationship has enabled a harmonious ecosystem between them. Humans have been at the forefront of coming up with incentives and innovations, from agrarian to industrialization systems. All these human activities done for the betterment of economies have partly or wholly contributed to climate change by the emission of greenhouse gases, CO2 included. This Carbon IV oxide and other greenhouse gas levels in the atmosphere have been rising very alarmingly. Climate change is now a contemporary issue in the society today. The bitter pill to swallow is that we have very limited carbon technocrats globally to address and advocate this ongoing crisis. It’s even sad that most of the human population is still ignorant about climate change despite nature constantly communicating that we are in trouble and need us to restore it. Communication has been through prolonged droughts, global warming, bushfires, floods, and many other effects. Carbon trading is among other mechanisms to leverage and decarbonize the planet as a path towards restoring the net zero emission target. This policy enabled the EU emission transmission system (ETS) as a market for carbon credits and emissions. Carbon credits are the acceptable volume of carbon dioxide that can be released by a certified climate action project. The conceptualization of carbon credit and offsets is taking momentum as the world faces the ever-growing threat of climate change.[\[i\]](#_edn1) India is also no exception to this, and a robust legal framework is emerging to ensure that the nation is truly net zero emissions. ***Keywords*:** carbon trading, carbon offsets, carbon credits, emissions, climate change, global warming, Kyoto Protocol, Paris Agreement, decarbonization, European Union (EU), emission transmission system (ETS), Greenhouse Gases (GHG). **Meaning, Definition & Explanation** Carbon trading is the buying and selling of carbon IV oxide emissions by producing it or by exchanging it from one’s limit fixed according to the Kyoto Protocol.[\[ii\]](#_edn2) Carbon credits and emissions trading can put a value on forests’ standing that preserves them as carbon sinks, a refuge for animals and plants, and a source of sustainable jobs for Indigenous peoples and others. Imagine a resident in India who often more than not plants trees and preserves trees to prevent soil erosion, acting as windbreakers or to some even a source of food can now use forests as an economic capital thanks to climate change restoration. This will in turn encourage sustainable trading practices and invest in green initiatives in India. Emerging economies are beginning to monetize their forest cover and GHG emission reductions through carbon credits and emissions trading. Carbon credits and carbon taxes offer opportunities to control GHG emissions.[\[iii\]](#_edn3) Consequentially, in such a market, a country which is carrying out initiatives that clearly reduce emissions may earn carbon credits and trade in the open market these emissions reductions. This is also known as an Emissions Trading System (ETS). **Types of carbon markets** These markets can either be mandatory, where participating organizations are required by law to participate in the market and to meet certain carbon reduction targets, or voluntary, where companies, governments, and other organizations can offset their carbon emissions voluntarily—either to meet their own sustainability goals or to demonstrate their commitment to reducing their carbon footprint.[\[iv\]](#_edn4) This is a compliant carbon market, EU’s ETS — that is to say, companies of a certain size who emit exhaust gases must every year also not forget to buy large transfers themselves. The Gold Standard is a stop-gap standard to help facilitate trading of carbon in the voluntary carbon market (VCM). Carbon taxes or carbon pricing for the price of the carbon owed to the Government by Society in general. **Legal Provisions Invoked** **“Energy Conservation Act, 2001.”** The ministry introduced a carbon trading scheme. It established a National Steering Committee to oversee the market and the Bureau of Energy Efficiency will be responsible for implementing the scheme including formulating rules, setting emission targets, issuing carbon credits, and developing guidelines for trading. The Central Electricity Regulatory Commission has been mandated as the authority regulator to ensure market integrity and safeguard stakeholders’ interests. **Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981** Pursuant to this legislation, the [standards for emission](https://cpcb.nic.in/displaypdf.php?id=aG9tZS9haXItcG9sbHV0aW9uL1JlY3ZlZC1OYXRpb25hbC5wZGY=) have been set, these only include “Carbon Monoxide (CO) and not Carbon dioxide (CO2) or any other GHG emissions.”[\[v\]](#_edn5) **Electricity Amendment Act (2023)** It has made efforts to integrate climate action by promoting renewable energy.[\[vi\]](#_edn6) However, these laws are largely focused on improving regulation and sectoral efficiencies, and **the discourse on climate action and emission reduction is largely ‘incidental and peripheral’**[\[vii\]](#_edn7) **Constitution of India** According to *Article 48A,*[\[viii\]](#_edn8) “the State is responsible for protecting and improving the environment, as well as safeguarding forests and wildlife. The Indian government is legally obligated to put in significant effort to preserve and defend the environment, forests, and all their diversity.”[\[ix\]](#_edn9) **International laws and regulations which India has ratified.** - **Kyoto protocol** **Article 17[\[x\]](#_edn10)** is being used for carbon trading. Article 17 clearly states that “The Conference of the Parties shall define the relevant principles, modalities, rules, and guidelines, in particular for verification, reporting, and accountability for emissions trading. The Parties included in Annex B may participate in emissions trading to fulfil their commitments under Article 3. Any such trading shall be supplemental to domestic actions to meet quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under that Article”.[\[xi\]](#_edn11) In detail, Article 3[\[xii\]](#_edn12) states that “The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned amounts, calculated according to their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B and under the provisions of this Article, to reduce their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 percent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012”. And each party included in Annex I shall, by 2005, have made demonstrable progress in achieving its commitments under this Protocol.[\[xiii\]](#_edn13) “Any emission reduction units, or any part of an assigned amount, which a Party acquires from another Party following the provisions of Article 6 or of Article 17 shall be added to the assigned amount for the acquiring Party. Any emission reduction units, or any part of an assigned amount, which a Party transfers to another Party per the provisions of Article 6 or of Article 17 shall be subtracted from the assigned amount for the transferring Party. If the emissions of a Party included in Annex I in a commitment period are less than its assigned amount under this Article, this difference shall, on request of that Party, be added to the assigned amount for that Party for subsequent commitment periods.”[\[xiv\]](#_edn14) - **The Paris Agreement, 2015** Article 2[\[xv\]](#_edn15) of the Paris Agreement aim was to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change by keeping a global temperature rise this century well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius. Additionally, the agreement aimed to strengthen the ability of countries to deal with the impacts of climate change. **Relevant Case Laws** In ***Ridhima Pandey v. Union of India (OA no 187 of 2017)*** the orders given to this petition were “This application seeks direction to assess the climate related issues while appraising projects for grant of environmental clearance. Further direction is to prepare targets or a carbon budget for the total amount of CO2 emissions that can be released until 2050 ensuring that India shares its responsibility as member of the global community to achieve global climate stabilization and reduce atmospheric CO2 to below 350 ppm by 2100, limiting the long-term average global temperature increase to no more than 1°C and direct that a time bound national climate recovery plan be prepared within the existing legal framework that includes interim CO2 reduction targets and mitigation actions tiered to achieving India’s carbon budget. the case was brought to the National Green Tribunal of India pursuant to section 2 (m) of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 which authorizes claims that raise “a substantial question relating to the environment” and the issue to be determined was the adequacy of India’s climate change mitigation effort vis a vis public trust doctrine and other legal obligations. However on January 15, 2019, the National Green Tribunal dismissed the case, reasoning that climate change is already covered in the process of impact assessments under the Environment Protection Act of 1986, and therefore, “There is no reason to presume that Paris Agreement and other international protocols are not reflected in the policies of the Government of India or are not taken into consideration in granting environment clearances.”[\[xvi\]](#_edn16) In ***Re Court on its own motion v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others[\[xvii\]](#_edn17)*** February 2014, India’s National Green Tribunal issued a ruling on its motion imposing several restrictions on activity around the Rohtang Pass, an environmentally sensitive area in the Himalayan state of Himachal Pradesh. The National Green Tribunal has jurisdiction under a 2010 statute “over all civil cases where a substantial question relating to the environment … is involved and such question arises out of \[one or more of seven environmental protection statutes enacted between 1974 and 2002\].” “The court may initiate cases and impose remedies. In February 2014, on its own motion, the court found that Black Carbon, which can be produced through vehicle use, is a major causative factor for the rapid melting of glaciers in the Himalayan region.” The court cited a study suggesting that 40% of the glacial retreat could be attributed to Black Carbon impact and concluded that, therefore, Black Carbon emission reduction can address glacial melting. The court concluded that Indian citizens have the right to a wholesome, clean, and decent environment, derived from **Article 48A** of the Constitution (which requires the state to protect and improve the environment), **Article 51A** (requiring a citizen to protect and improve the natural environment) and **Article 21** (protecting the right to life as a fundamental right). **Comparative Analysis with other countries** **Canada,** for example, “has one of the world’s most ambitious carbon pricing policies—it taxes oil, gas, and coal use at $15–$38 per ton of carbon dioxide emitted.”[\[xviii\]](#_edn18) The revenues from carbon credits and carbon taxes can then be used for development activities or low-emission practices, thereby creating a virtuous cycle in which emissions reduction payments finance further emissions reduction—protecting and improving the environment and safeguarding forests and wildlife.[\[xix\]](#_edn19) **In Kenya,** carbon trading operated in a legal lacuna. However, in September 2023, the Climate Change Act, No. 11 of 2016 was amended to provide express regulation of carbon markets in Kenya.[\[xx\]](#_edn20) The Climate Act was amended in particular to guide the development and implementation of carbon markets in compliance with international obligations, to provide policy direction on carbon markets, and to develop benefit-sharing mechanisms in carbon markets.[\[xxi\]](#_edn21) The amended Climate Act now provides for the establishment of a national carbon registry in Kenya and regulates trade in carbon credits.[\[xxii\]](#_edn22) Carbon trading projects are now required to undergo mandatory environmental and social impact assessment under Kenya’s environmental laws.[\[xxiii\]](#_edn23) **CONCLUSION** ***“****Climate change is no longer some far-off problem, it is happening here, it happening now”* Barack Obama, former President, USA. Indeed India should access and evaluate the policies that have been put in place to ensure that they are more efficacious and that environmental justice is implemented. The youth, most of the time are left behind by many bureaucracies in economy building, this crisis on climate change is an opportunity to showcase our innovation towards green solutions and even employment opportunities. **ENDNOTES / REFERENCES** [\[i\]](#_ednref1) Chai Shadrack, ‘The Inception of Carbon Credits and Offsets in the Climate Action Agenda of the United Nation’ accessed 10 June 2024. [\[ii\]](#_ednref2) Mahesh Chander says, ‘Blog 201-Carbon Trading: Addressing Concerns on Why, What & How | Welcome to AESA’ (24 June 2023) accessed 10 June 2024. [\[iii\]](#_ednref3) ‘What Is Carbon Trading ? | 4 Answers from Research Papers’ accessed 10 June 2024. [\[iv\]](#_ednref4) Montgomery, W.D.”Markets in Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs”.Journal of Economic Theory 5 (December 1972) :395-418 [\[v\]](#_ednref5) Air prevention and control act, 1981 [\[vi\]](#_ednref6)\[vi\] Electricity Amendment Act, 2023 [\[vii\]](#_ednref7) Bhushan C, Gopalakrishnan T. 2021. Environmental laws and climate action: A case for enacting a Climate Legislation in India [\[viii\]](#_ednref8) Ins. by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, s. 10 (w.e.f. 3-1-1977). [\[ix\]](#_ednref9) Constitution of India, 1950 [\[x\]](#_ednref10) Kyoto Protocol, 2005 [\[xi\]](#_ednref11) Article 17, Kyoto Protocol, 2005 [\[xii\]](#_ednref12) Kyoto Protocal, 2005 [\[xiii\]](#_ednref13) Rashid Mamunur MD “Carbon Trading,” Page 4 [\[xiv\]](#_ednref14) ibid [\[xv\]](#_ednref15) Paris Agreement, 2015 [\[xvi\]](#_ednref16) Ridhima Pandey v. Union of India [\[xvii\]](#_ednref17) Re Court on its own motion v. State of Himachal Pradesh and other [\[xviii\]](#_ednref18) Gaurav Aggarwal, ‘Carbon Trading: How It Works, Importance, & More’ (*Internshala Trainings Blog*, 31 May 2023) accessed 11 June 2024. [\[xix\]](#_ednref19) ‘What Is Carbon Trading? – ESG | The Report’ accessed 11 June 2024. [\[xx\]](#_ednref20)‘Lenku Quashes “Opaque” Deals on Carbon Credits | Nation’ accessed 11 June 2024. [\[xxi\]](#_ednref21)‘Kenya’s Carbon Markets: The Goose That Lays the Gold…’ accessed 11 June 2024. [\[xxii\]](#_ednref22) Wangari Ndiragu, “Unlocking full potential of floriculture industry”,2024 [\[xxiii\]](#_ednref23) Miriri Duncan, ‘Saudi Companies Buy 2.2 Million Tonnes of Carbon Credits in Kenya Auction | Reuters’ accessed 11 June 2024. **Categories:** Articles, Environmental Law --- ### [JUDICIAL ACTISVISM IN INDIA: AN ANALYSIS](https://lawfoyer.in/judicial-actisvism-in-india-an-analysis/) **Published:** June 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author:- Devi Prasad Mishra is a law student at Lajpat Rai Law College, Sambalpur University.** **Edited by Rutvij Vyas, a Law Student at the Faculty of Law, GLS University.** **INTRODUCTION:** Judicial activism denotes the proactive role played by the judiciary in the protection of the rights of citizens and the promotion of justice in society. Judicial activism is the procedure to evolve new principles, concepts, maxims, formulae, and relief to do justice or to open doors of court for the needy or to litigation affecting the entire society or a section of it. Although judicial activism plays a crucial role in social justice, however, there is a constant fear of judicial overreaching so it must be done judiciously ***Keywords*:** *Judicial activism, Constitution, separation of power, Supreme Court, Social justice* **ORIGIN & MEANING:** The concept of judicial activism finds its origin in the USA. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., who was an American historian and educator coined the term ‘Judicial activism’. Judicial activism denotes the proactive role played by the judiciary in the protection of the rights of citizens and promotion of justice in society. Black’s law dictionary defines judicial activism as a way of exercising judicial power that motivates judges to apply judicial precedent in favour of new and progressive policies. V.G. Palishikar in his journal Judicial Activism as the process of law-making by judges. “*It means an active interpretation of existing legislation by a judge, made to enhance the utility of that legislation for social betterment*” Thus judicial activism is the procedure to evolve new principles, concepts, maxims, formulae, and relief to do justice or to open doors of court for the needy or to litigation affecting the entire society or a section of it. **DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA:** Judicial activism is often mixed with judicial review. However former is part of the latter in which judges participate in law-making policies. They not only uphold or strike down the law but also play their policy preferences. Traces of judicial activism can be found way before independence when Justice Mahmood delivered a dissenting judgement in Allahabad high court in 1893 and held that the precondition of a case being heard will be fulfilled when only somebody speaks. In modern times judicial activism gained momentum after a dark period of national emergency. Later on, the concept of public interest litigation introduced by Justice Bhagawati and Justice Krishna Iyer laid the foundation of judicial activism. Judicial activism in India can be discussed under three headings. - **Pre–emergency period** Since this time marks the early year of independence judiciary played a limited role. The court upholds principled and doctrinally approach. It was limited to interpreting laws and safeguarding constitutional rights. Even during that period, the land mark case of *Kesvananda Bharti vs State of Kerala* introduced the doctrine of basic structure in the Indian judiciary. - **Post–emergency period** This indicates the period of the end of the emergency. After the 44th amendment it was made harder to impose an emergency and guaranteed the right under articles 20 and 21 even during an emergency. Post emergency era set a more progressive and open-minded approach to judiciary. In the case of *Maneka Gandhi vs Union of India* of india, the apex court expanded the scope of Article 21. - **Public interest litigation to present** One of the main factors contributing expansion of judicial activism is the introduction of public interest litigation, which allows the court to offer direction for public benefit. Landmark cases such as Hussainara Khatoon, vishaka vs the state of Rajasthan, oleum gas leak show judicial activism in the way PILs. **CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE SUPREME COURT AND HIGH COURTS** The Constitution of India which the is the supreme law in the state empowers the supreme court and high courts to exercise their power to protect the rights of the citizens and provide justice. There are some key provisions that allow the court to take part in judicial activism. They are as follows. - *“Article 32: This provision empowers the supreme court to issue necessary orders, directions, prerogative writs to enforce the fundamental rights of the citizen.”* - *“Article 226 of the Constitution empowers the High Court to issue writs including habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition and quo warranto. These tools are essential tools for enforcing fundamental rights and ensuring justice.”* - *“Article 142 of the Constitution provides extraordinary power to the Supreme Court . It allows the court to pass suitable decree or orders for complete justice in any pending matter before it.”* **JUSTIFICATION OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM :** There is a near collapse of responsible government when the legislature and executive fail to discharge their respective functions. This results in erosion of confidence in the Constitution and justice system. In that case, expectations do arise from the judiciary for the protection rights. According to Dr B.L. Wadehra judicial activism fills up the vacuum where there is no legislation present. Also, there are so many activators which activate judicial activism such as civil rights activists, consumer rights activists, women’s rights groups etc. According to Dr. Vandana the concept of judicial activism can be seen to reflecting from following trends, - Expansion of rights of hearing in administrative process - Excessive delegation without limitation - Expansion of judicial control over discretionary power - Promotion of open government - Passing of orders that are per se unworkable **IMPORTANCE OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM** Judicial activism in India has played a crucial role in shaping constitutional law and upholding principles of justice. It can be summarized as follows. - **Expanding Fundamental Rights**: Judicial activism has expanded the scope of fundamental rights. For instance, in the Right to Education case, the Supreme Court interpreted the right to education as a fundamental right under Article 21A of the Constitution in *Unnikrishnan v/s Andhra Pradesh*. Similarly, in the *Naz Foundation v. Government NCT of Delhi* case, the court decriminalized homosexuality, recognizing the right to privacy and personal autonomy. - **Upholding Public Interest Litigation (PIL)**: PIL allows citizens to seek justice irrespective of locus standi. The judiciary actively encourages PIL petitions to address public grievances. Notable examples include cases related to environmental protection like *M.C. Mehta vs UOI*, child labour, and bonded labour like *Bandhua Mukti Morcha* *vs Union of India & ors* - **Promoting Social Justice**: Judicial activism has provided social justice by addressing discrimination and inequality such as in *Indra Sawhney etc v. Union of India and ors.* Case, the court upheld reservations for socially and economically backward classes. - **Protecting Human Rights**: The judiciary steps in when human rights are violated for example, in the *Vishaka and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.* Case, the court laid down guidelines to prevent sexual harassment at workplaces which led to new legislation. **APPREHENSIONS** As every coin has two sides judicial activism has also its own flaws. As the constitution of India provides for separation of power no organ amongst the three organs of government i.e. judiciary, legislative and executive, should overreach their power and step into another’s sphere. Following are some of the fears : - Ideological fear that may not represent the popular will and go against society - Epistemic fear, which means the judges may not have expertise over the matter that they are dealing with. - Management fears, this may add a burden over the court to exercise its fundamental duty. **CONCLUSION** The role of judicial activism is of great significance in upholding constitutional rights and the rule of law. The court brings social reforms which erode discrimination and inequality by being active. By time judicial activism has gained the confidence of the people as recently in the Manipur violence case the supreme court took suo moto cognizance and intervened in the matte rof violating human rights during the violence. Lastly it may be concluded by quoting the lines of former CJI N.V. Ramana which tells the court to be mindful of Lakshman Rekha provided by the constitution. **REFERENCES** **Books** - 1. Indian Polity, M Laxmikanth , Third Reprint, MC Graw Hill 2022 - 2. Public Interest Litigation, Wadehra Dr. BL, A Handbook, Second Edition , Universal Law Publishing Co), 2009 - 3. Dimensions Of Judicial Activism In India, Dr. Vandana (Raj Publication , New Delhi), 2016 - 4. Shukla VN and singh M pal, V.N. Shukla’s Constitution of India, 13th edn, Eastern book company), 2017 - Online Articles - 1. Palishikar VG, “Judicial Activism” (2010) 8 Journal 201 - Cases Referred - 1. Kesvananda bharti vs State of Kerala - 2. Maneka Gandhi vs union - 3. Maneka Gandhi vs union of India - 4. Unnikrishnan v/s Andhra Pradesh - 5. Naz Foundation v. Government - 6. M.C. Mehta vs UOI - 7. Bandhua Mukti Morcha vs Union of India & ors - 8. Indra Sawhney etc etc v. Union of India and ors. - 9. Vishaka and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors - Statutes Referred - 1. Constitution of india, 1947 **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law --- ### [M/S ALPINE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION PVT LTD VS ASHOK S DHARIWAL AND OTHERS](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-alpine-housing-development-corporation-pvt-ltd-vs-ashok-s-dhariwal-and-others/) **Published:** June 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: KOWSALYA K, Student,** **GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE DHARMAPURI AFFILIATED TO DR. AMBEDKAR LAW UNIVERSITY CHENNAI** **Edited by: Gaurav Katiyar, Student, University of Lucknow** - **ABSTRACT** Disputes emerged between Alpine Housing Development Corporation Pvt. Ltd. and Ashok S. Dhariwal, and the parties sought arbitrator. The arbitral panel issued an ex-parte award on March 12, 1998. Dhariwal did not present any evidence to the arbitral panel. Dhariwal submitted a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. Dhariwal filed a writ appeal before the Honorable High Court of Karnataka, citing his dissatisfaction with the order rejecting his application for more papers. The Karnataka High Court granted the writ petition and overturned the ruling denying the appeal for additional documents. Dhariwal was allowed to present further materials. Alpine Housing has petitioned the Supreme Court in the current proceedings. ***Keywords* :** *Arbitral panel, Supreme Court, Ex-Parte, Section 34* - **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name***# M/S Alpine Housing Development corporation pvt ltd vs Ashok S Dhariwal and others ***ii)* *Case Number***Civil Appeal NO. 73 OF 2023 ***iii)* *Judgement Date***19/01/2023 ***iv)* *Court***The Supreme Court Of India ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench***C.T. Ravikumar, M.R. Shah ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges***M.R. Shah ***vii)* *Citation***2023 SCC Online SC 55***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved***Section 34 in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996- **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The respondents filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996, in Arbitration Case No. 38/1998, against the award issued by the learned arbitrators on March 12, 1998. The respondents submitted an interim application (IA No. 4 in the section 34 application) to present further evidence. At this point, it is important to remember that the decision passed by the learned arbitrators was an ex-party ruling, and no evidence was presented by the respondents herein, who later challenged the award via a section 34 application. - **FACTS OF THE CASE i) Procedural Background of the Case** - The respondents filed an application under section 34 of the Act in response to an arbitral ruling against them. The respondent submitted an interim application under Section 34 to present more evidence. At this point, it should be emphasized that the award passed by the learned arbitrators was ex-parte, and no evidence was presented by the respondents herein, who later challenged the award under section 34. - The appellant objected to the interim application to adduce evidence, claiming that it was not maintainable under the Arbitration Act of 1996. The grounds on which the respondents submitted an application to allow them to present evidence will be dealt with and examined. As a result, the court dealing with the section 34 application ruled that the amendment intended to limit the scope of judicial review under section 34 of the Act only in exceptional circumstances enumerated in the grounds urged, which relate to section 34(2)(b) of the Act, and that the applicants do not have the right to produce additional evidence. - **ii) Factual Background of the Case** Disputes emerged between Alpine Housing Development Corporation Pvt. Ltd. and Ashok S. Dhariwal, and the parties sought arbitration. The arbitral panel issued an ex-parte award on March 12, 1998. Dhariwal did not provide any evidence before the arbitral tribunal; instead, he filed a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The tribunal’s award was for particular performance of the agreement, and liberty was granted to apply for the merger of khata. The award required Alpine Housing to apply for a khata amalgamation. However, because Alpine Housing did not file for merger, Dhariwal had to apply twice for it. The applications were, however, dismissed. During the section 34 proceedings, Dhariwal submitted an application to present supplementary papers. As the petitions for amalgamation had been refused, Dhariwal filed an application for further papers in order to “produce the final endorsement dated 17.03.2003 by which the prayer for amalgamation of khatas to plots were rejected”. Dhariwal sought to rely on the document to claim that the award was incapable of being carried out, was contrary to Indian public policy, and was therefore entitled to be set aside. - **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** Can an applicant use evidence to establish public policy grounds in an application under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996? - **APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** - The appellant’s counsel argued that the High Court made a serious error in allowing respondents to present evidence in an application under section 34 of the Act. If submitting an application under Section 34 of the Act. If an applicant who is aggrieved by the arbitral tribunal’s award is allowed to adduce evidence in an application under section 34 of the act, the object and purpose of amending section 34(2)(a) of the act, which substituted the expression ‘furnishes proof’ with the expression establish on the basis of the arbitral tribunal’s record, would be defeated. The intention and objective of altering Section 34(2)(a) of the Act is to resolve arbitration procedures as soon as possible and to avoid delays. The counsel also contended that section 34 of the Act prior to amendment Amending section 34(2)(a) shall be applicable, that the said concession is not binding because it would be against the law, and that any concession contrary to the law is not binding. - **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** - Respondent’s Advocate argued that they did not engage in the arbitration procedures due to their first challenge to the proceedings and the constitutional tribunal. The Arbitral Tribunal then proceeded with the hearing ex parte. As a result, respondents did not present any evidence to the arbitral panel. - **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** - ***“Section 34 in the Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996*** ### ***Application for setting aside arbitral award.*** [(1)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1553165/)*Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3).*[(2)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/439304/)*An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if*[(a)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1831758/)*the party making the application \[establishes on the basis of the record of the arbitral tribunal that:\] \[Substituted ‘furnishes proof that’ by Act No. 33 of 2019, dated 9.8.2019.\](i)a party was under some incapacity; or(ii)the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or(iii)the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or(iv)the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration: Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or*[(v)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/98290235/)*the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or*[(b)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/549389/)*the Court finds that*[(i)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/176895297/)*the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or*[(ii)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/181124763/)*the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India.”* - - **JUDGEMENT** - **RATIO DECIDENDI** - The Supreme Court ruled that Act 2019’s revision to Section 34(2)(a) represents a significant alteration. Prior to the revision to section 34(2)(a), an arbitral award could be set aside by the court if the party filing the application “furnishes proof” and the grounds outlined in sections 34(2)(a) and 34(2)(b) are met. However, if the terms “furnishes proof” and the grounds set out in sections 34(2)(a) and 34(2)(b) are satisfied after the amendment, the pre-amendment section 34(2)(a) will apply, and the appellant may also be permitted to cross-examine and provide contradictory evidence. - **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** In an exceptional case, if it is brought to the court on matters not containing the arbitrator’s record that are relevant to the determination of the issues that arise under section 34(2)(a), the party who has challenged the award on the grounds outlined in section 34(2)(a) may be permitted to file an affidavit in the form of evidence. However, this is permitted until absolutely essential. The affidavit so discloses a specific document, and the evidence must be supplied. In that regard, the respondents have shown a strong special case that allows them to file affidavits/present further evidence. However, the appellant may also be permitted to cross-examine and/or provide contradictory evidence. - **REFERENCES** - **Important Cases Referred** - Emkay Global Financial services Limited V. Gridhar sondhi, (2018) 9 SCC 49. - Canara Nidhi Limited V. M. Shashikala, (2019) 9 SCC 462. - Gemini bay transcription private Ltd v. Intagrated sales service Limited, (2022) 1 SCC 753. - S.P. Singla construction Pvt Ltd v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2019) 2 SCC 488 - Punjab SIDC Ltd v. K. Kansal, 2012 SCC P&H 19641. - **Important Statutes Referred** - Section 34(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. ii. Section 48 (1) of the 1996 Arbitration and Conciliation Act. iii. Section 48(2) of the 1996 Arbitration and Conciliation Act. iv. Order 14 Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code v. Section 5 Arbitration And Conciliation Act of 1996. **Categories:** Arbitration and Conciliation Law, Case Analysis --- ### [LEGAL PROVISIONS ON RAPE IN INDIAN PENAL CODE](https://lawfoyer.in/legal-provisions-on-rape-in-indian-penal-code/) **Published:** July 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: MOMINA SAEED, Student, Student, *INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY ISLAMABAD*** **Edited By: Gaurav Katiyar, Student, University of Lucknow** ***INTRODUCTION:*** Rape is a serious violation of a person’s physical and emotional boundaries, involving sexual intercourse or other forms of sexual penetration without their consent. Historically, the definition and understanding of rape have evolved significantly, influenced by the feminist movement and changes in societal attitudes towards gender and sexuality. The concept of rape has expanded to include any gender of victim and perpetrator, and the definition of consent has become stricter, recognizing that victims may be incapacitated by drugs, alcohol, or other factors. The consequences of rape are devastating, leading to physical and psychological trauma, including post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and other long-lasting effects. Understanding the complexities of rape and its effects is crucial for addressing this serious crime and providing support to its victims. **Keywords:** - Rape - Consent - Perpetrator - Trauma - PTSD - Depression ***DEFINITION:*** In India, rape is defined under Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) as “sexual intercourse with a woman against her will, without her consent, by coercion, misrepresentation or fraud or at a time when she has been intoxicated or duped, or is of unsound mental health and in any case if she is under 18 years of age**.** ***HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:*** Rape has been recognized as a criminal act since ancient times, with early legal codes such as the Code of Hammurabi (1700 BC) and Jewish law addressing the issue. However, in ancient Greece and Rome, rape was often viewed more as a crime against the victim’s family or owner, rather than the victim themselves. The attitudes and definitions surrounding rape continued to evolve over the centuries. During the Middle Ages in Europe, rape was sometimes punished harshly, with penalties like execution or mutilation, though actual prosecutions were quite rare, especially for rapes of lower-class women or wives. Rape was often seen more as a property crime against the victim’s father or husband. The common law definition in England eventually came to define rape as unlawful intercourse with a woman over the age of 10 without her consent, though this definition shifted and expanded over time. Tragically, rape has also been used as a weapon of war throughout history, from ancient conquests to more recent conflicts like World War II, where it was often seen as a spoil of war or used to terrorize and subjugate populations. Overall, the history shows that while rape has long been recognized as a serious crime, attitudes and legal definitions have evolved significantly, often failing to adequately protect victims, especially those of lower social status or during times of war. ***COMPARISON WITH OTHER PAKISTAN:*** Rape is a serious issue in both India and Pakistan, with significant differences in the reporting and conviction rates between the two countries. According to available data, India reported 31,677 rape cases in 2021, with a rape rate per 100,000 population of 4.9 in 2019. In contrast, Pakistan does not have official data available on the number of rape cases. The crime index and safety scale for both countries are relatively similar, with India having a crime index of 44.33 and a safety scale of 55.67, while Pakistan has a crime index of 43.41 and a safety scale of 56.59. However, India has a higher reporting rate for rape, with a significant number of cases registered annually. On the other hand, Pakistan’s conviction rates for rape are not publicly available, making it difficult to compare the two countries. Overall, while both countries struggle with the issue of rape, there are significant differences in the reporting and conviction rates between India and Pakistan**.** ***KINDS OF RAPE:*** - **Statutory rape:** Sexual intercourse with a minor below the age of consent, outside of marriage. - **Marital rape:** Non-consensual sexual intercourse between a husband and wife. - **Force-only rape:** Rape where the husband uses enough force to coerce his wife into intercourse. - **Battering rape:** Rape where the wife is beaten, slapped, pushed and shoved, involving both physical and sexual violence. - **Custodial rape:** Sexual intercourse committed by a person in a position of authority, such as a police officer, doctor, or staff member of a jail or institution. - **Mass rape:** Rape committed as part of ethnic cleansing or to dishonor a community. - **Rape by family members:** Rape committed by a family member like a father, brother, grandfather or uncle. ***ESSENTIALS ELEMENTS:*** - **Penetration:** The defendant must have intentionally penetrated the vagina, anus, or mouth of the complainant with their penis. - **Lack of Consent:** The complainant must not have consented to the penetration, and the defendant must not have reasonably believed that the complainant consented. - **Intentionality:** The penetration must have been intentional. - **Age:** The complainant must be below the age of consent, which varies by jurisdiction. ***DEFENSES:*** - **Innocence:** The defendant can claim that they did not commit the alleged rape, and present evidence to support their alibi, such as witnesses, surveillance footage, or vehicle GPS data. - **Consent:** The defendant can argue that the sexual act was consensual, and that the complainant did not object at the time. However, consent is not a defense if the complainant is a minor or has a mental illness. - **Insanity:** The defendant can claim that they were suffering from a mental illness at the time of the alleged rape, which impaired their ability to understand the nature and consequences of their actions. ***LEGAL PROVISION IN INDIAN PENAL CODE:*** The legal provisions on rape cases in the Indian Penal Code (IPC) are outlined in Sections 375 and 376. - **Section 375 IPC:** **Definition of Rape:** A man is said to commit “rape” if he penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra, or anus of a woman or makes her do so with him.The definition of rape under Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code was expanded in 2013 to include various forms of sexual assault, such as penetration by penis, any object, or any part of the body into the vagina, urethra, anus, or mouth, or making another person do so without consent. **Medical Examination:** Sexual intercourse with a woman for medical purposes is not considered rape. **Sexual Intercourse with Wife:** Sexual intercourse with a wife who is above 15 years of age is not considered rape. **Punishment:** The punishment for rape includes imprisonment for a term of not less than 7 years, which may extend to imprisonment for life, and a fine. In aggravated situations, the punishment is rigorous imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years, which may extend to imprisonment for life, and a fine. - **Section 376 IPC:** **Punishment:** The punishment for rape includes imprisonment for a term of not less than 7 years, which may extend to imprisonment for life, and a fine. **Exceptions:** The punishment is less severe if the woman is the wife of the accused and is above 18 years of age, in which case the punishment is imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years with fine or with both. - **Amendments to the IPC:** **Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1983:** This Act introduced new sections to the IPC, including Section 376A, which punishes sexual intercourse with a wife without her consent by a judicially separated husband. **Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2006:** This Act introduced changes to the IPC, including the definition of sexual assault and the punishment for such crimes. ***GUIDELINES OR RULES AGAINST RAPE:*** **Supreme Court Guidelines:** The Supreme Court has laid down the following guidelines for the trial of rape cases: - Complaints of sexual assault cases should be dealt with utmost sensitivity. - Victims of sexual harassment should have the option to seek transfer of the perpetrator or their own transfer. - Employers must provide a Complaints Committee headed by a woman, with at least half the members being women. - The Complaints Committee should include an NGO or other organization familiar with sexual harassment. - The complaints procedure should be time-bound and maintain confidentiality. - Complainants or witnesses should not be victimized or discriminated against. **Preventive Steps:** Employers are required to take preventive steps, such as: - Expressly prohibiting sexual harassment and circulating the prohibition. - Including the prohibition in the rules, regulations, and standing orders. - Providing appropriate work conditions for women. **Reporting and Compensation:** The law mandates that no private or government hospital can charge fees for the treatment of rape victims. Victims also have the right to compensation under Section 357A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. **Prohibition of Two-Finger Test:** The law prohibits doctors from conducting the “two-finger test” during the medical examination of rape victims, as it is considered unscientific and violates the victim’s privacy. ***TRADITIONAL-BASED LAW:*** Traditional based law about rape refers to the laws that were in place before the modern era of feminist activism and legal reforms. These laws were often rooted in patriarchal societies and reflected the societal norms and values of the time. In ancient societies, rape was often viewed as a crime against the victim’s family or owner rather than the victim herself. For example, in ancient Babylon, the Code of Hammurabi dictated that if a man forces sex upon another man’s wife or a virgin woman, he should be put to death. In the United States, the traditional law defined rape as the act of a man forcing a woman to have sexual intercourse against her will. The law was based on the concept of “carnal knowledge” and required proof of force and lack of consent. The traditional law also reflected the societal norms of the time, which often viewed women as property and viewed rape as a crime against the man’s honor rather than the woman’s rights. For example, in the United States, the law did not apply to black women, and the term “rape” was often used to describe consensual sex between a black man and a white woman. The traditional law also did not recognize the concept of marital rape, and it was not until the 1970s and 1980s that laws were passed to criminalize marital rape. Overall, traditional based law about rape reflects the societal norms and values of the time, which often viewed women as property and viewed rape as a crime against the man’s honor rather than the woman’s rights. ***CASE LAWS:*** - **Mathura Rape Case (1972):** This case involved the custodial rape of a young tribal girl named Mathura by two policemen. The Supreme Court acquitted the accused, leading to widespread protests and eventually leading to amendments in the Indian rape law via The Criminal Law Amendment Act 1983 (No. 43). - **Vishakha Guidelines (1997):** The Supreme Court laid down guidelines for the prevention of sexual harassment at the workplace in the Vishakha case. The guidelines include the establishment of a Complaints Committee, the provision of a confidential procedure for filing complaints, and the prohibition of sexual harassment. - **Farooqui v State (2014):** In this case, the Delhi High Court acquitted the accused of rape, holding that a “feeble no” did not signify lack of consent. The Supreme Court refused to overturn the decision, setting a dangerous precedent for interpreting consent in rape cases. - **Ms X v Mahmood Farooqi (2014):** The Supreme Court refused to admit a Special Leave Petition (SLP) challenging the Delhi High Court’s decision in Farooqui v State, which set a precedent for interpreting consent in rape cases. The decision was criticized for introducing a higher threshold for consent where the survivor is acquainted with the accused. - **K. Chopra v Apparel Export Promotion Council (1999):** The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a man who was accused of sexual harassment at the workplace. The case is significant because it applied the Vishakha guidelines and upheld the dismissal of the accused. These case laws and precedents have shaped the legal framework for rape in India, including the definition of rape, the burden of proof, and the procedures for filing complaints and conducting trials. ***INTERPRETATION:*** The interpretation and explanation of rape laws in India are complex and multifaceted. Here are some key points to consider: - **Definition of Rape:** The definition of rape in the Indian Penal Code (IPC) is based on the concept of penetration, which includes any act of penetration, whether by penis, object, or body part, into the vagina, mouth, urethra, or anus of a woman without her consent. - **Consent:** Consent is a crucial element in determining whether a sexual act is considered rape. The Supreme Court has held that consent must be given freely and voluntarily, without coercion, force, or fraud. - **Burden of Proof:** The burden of proof in rape cases is on the accused to prove that the sexual act was consensual. If the accused fails to prove consent, the court will presume that the sexual act was non-consensual. - **Punishment:** The punishment for rape is severe, with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and a fine. - **Gender Stereotyping:** The interpretation of rape cases in India has been criticized for perpetuating gender stereotypes. For example, the Delhi High Court’s decision in Farooqui v State, which held that a “feeble no” did not signify lack of consent, has been criticized for introducing a higher threshold for consent where the survivor is acquainted with the accused. - **Male Rape:** The definition of rape in the IPC only applies to women, and there is no specific law to protect male survivors of sexual assault. - **Investigation and Prosecution:** The investigation and prosecution of rape cases in India have been criticized for being inadequate and biased. The police often fail to collect evidence, and the prosecution often relies on weak evidence and witnesses. - **Prevention:** The prevention of rape requires a multifaceted approach that includes education, awareness, and legal reforms. The Supreme Court has emphasized the need for a change in societal attitudes towards women and the importance of protecting their rights. - **Legal Reforms:** The legal framework for rape in India has undergone several changes over the years. The 2013 amendment to the IPC expanded the definition of rape to include any act of penetration, whether by penis, object, or body part, into the vagina, mouth, urethra, or anus of a woman without her consent. - **Challenges:** The interpretation and explanation of rape laws in India are challenging due to the complex and multifaceted nature of the issue. The legal framework is constantly evolving, and there is a need for ongoing education, awareness, and legal reforms to ensure that the rights of survivors are protected. ***MAXIMS:*** - ***Nemo dat quod non habet:*** No one can give what they do not have. This maxim emphasizes the importance of ownership and the need for a person to have a valid title to property before they can transfer it to someone else. - ***Aut non servare aut servare:*** Either not to preserve or to preserve. This maxim highlights the importance of preserving evidence and ensuring that it is not tampered with or destroyed. - ***Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum:*** No one is bound to betray themselves. This maxim emphasizes the right of individuals to refuse to incriminate themselves and the importance of protecting their own interests. - ***Nemo est supra legem:*** No one is above the law. This maxim emphasizes the importance of equality before the law and the need for everyone to be held accountable for their actions. - ***Veritas odium parit:*** Truth begets hatred. This maxim highlights the challenges that can arise when seeking truth and the potential for opposition and hostility that can come with it. ***Amendments:*** - ***Criminal Law Amendment Act 2006:*** This act aimed to address the inadequacies in the existing laws and provide a more comprehensive definition of sexual assault. It introduced the concept of “sexual assault” and expanded the scope of the offense to include various forms of sexual violence. - ***Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS):*** The BNS, which replaced the Indian Penal Code (IPC), includes a dedicated chapter on “Offences Against Women and Children.” It defines rape as an act of sexual assault against a woman and criminalises the disclosure of the identity of the victim. Other added offenses include sexual harassment, voyeurism, stalking, and criminal intimidation. - ***Section 69 of BNS:*** This section criminalises rape on false promise of marriage. However, there have been concerns about its misuse and potential for false accusations. Critics argue that the law lacks checks and balances to protect innocent individuals from being subjected to lengthy trials without fault. - ***Punishment for Rape:*** Section 376 of the IPC provides for imprisonment, which shall not be less than seven years but can extend up to life imprisonment or even death in extreme cases. The punishment is intended to be severe to deter such heinous crimes. ***CONCLUSION:*** The conclusions on rape from the provided sources are multifaceted and emphasize the need for a comprehensive approach to address this complex issue. Firstly, it is essential to examine the factors that promote sexual violence and develop a strategy that includes various projects to render people less vulnerable, education and re-education of children and adults to combat sexism, and the criminal justice system must bear the burden of regulating rape. Additionally, research on campus rape highlights the significance of known perpetrators, lack of faith in authorities, and the role of money and alcohol use in perpetuating this crime. Furthermore, the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) is subject to underestimation of rape and sexual assault due to various errors and potential errors in the survey. Finally, the mental health consequences of rape are severe and long-lasting, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, anxiety, and suicidal thoughts, emphasizing the need for effective interventions to address these consequences. ***REFERENCES:*** [https://senate.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1618295043\_506.pdf](https://senate.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1618295043_506.pdf) **Categories:** Articles --- ### [India’s Extradition Policy: Legal challenges and Developments](https://lawfoyer.in/indias-extradition-policy-legal-challenges-and-developments/) **Published:** June 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author- I Sharan, Christ deemed to be University, Bangalore** **Edited by- Masooma Naqvi, Amity University, Lucknow** 1. **INTRODUCTION** Extradition means the process of handing over a fugitive criminal to the requesting state for the offences they have committed in that Country. Extradition is based on the bilateral relationship between two countries. The countries enter into a treaty or agreement for the extradition of criminals. Extradition process is initiated by the requesting state through its diplomat or the representative of the other state in the country. Countries try their best to maintain good relations with other nations in order to extradite fugitives back to their nation. Extradition can be affected by other factors like human rights, diplomacy etc… The nations sometimes try to maintain their reputation and refuse to hand out their nationals to other countries. This article tries to analyse in detail what extradition means, the extradition process in India, the nations with which India has extradition agreements and treaties, the challenges faced by the Government in the smooth functioning of these procedures and the developments required in this field. The article also discusses how India faces issues in extraditing fugitives to India due to human rights issues. The article discusses how bilateral agreements, clauses of agreements and delays in investigation serve as the main challenges for extraditing a fugitive to India. After analysing these aspects the article concludes by stating how India needs to improve its stance in relation to extradition treaties and agreements as the number of fugitives who have being returned to India are comparatively less. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*:** *Extradition, treaty, Bilateral relationship, External Affairs, Foreign state.* 1. **Meaning, Definition & Explanation** The Black’s Law Dictionary explains extradition as *“The surrender by one state to another of an individual accused or convicted of an offense outside its own territory and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to try and punish him, demands the surrender.”[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)* The Extradition Act 1962 explains the extradition treaty as a treaty signed by India with a foreign nation relating to the extradition of fugitive criminals. 2. **Types / Kinds** There are two types of extradition policies. A nation can either have an extradition treaty or an agreement with other countries. A treaty is binding, unlike an agreement. A treaty creates a legal obligation on the other party while an agreement does not legally bind the other party to perform their duties and responsibilities. 3. **Comparison with other Countries** India as a developing country has an exceptional number of extradition treaties with foreign nations. India has extradition treaties with 48 world nations. They are Australia, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bhutan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Egypt, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malawi, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Nepal, Netherlands, Oman, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, UAE, UK, Ukraine, USA, Uzbekistan, Vietnam. India also has extradition treaties with 12 world nations like Antigua & Barbuda, Armenia, Croatia, Fiji, Italy, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tanzania and New Zealand.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) 4. **Legal Provisions and Procedures to extradite a person under the Extradition Act, 1962** The Extradition Act of 1962 governs the procedure for the extradition of a fugitive offender. Consequently, the Diplomat of a Foreign State or its State Government shall request the Central Government through its International Representative in that State or may make any other contact which suits the requirements of both parties. After the request is made, the Central Government shall examine it. If it finds the request fit, the Central Government shall issue an order to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to inquire into the case under his authority. The Magistrate on receiving an order from the Central Government, shall issue a warrant for the arrest of the fugitive. When the fugitive appears or is produced before the Court, the Magistrate shall also inquire into the case and shall have power and quantity of jurisdiction to inquire into the case as it is to be heard in the Sessions or High Court. The magistrate shall without prejudice look into the matter and the evidence produced by the requesting State and the fugitive criminal. If the magistrate believes that a prima facie case is not made in support of the requesting foreign state, he shall discharge the fugitive criminal. If the magistrate believes that the case is made in support of the requesting foreign state, he shall commit the fugitive to prison and await the orders of the Central Government.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) The Central Government after receiving the report of the magistrate, thinks that the fugitive is to be surrendered to the foreign state, it shall issue a warrant for the custody of the criminal and for his delivery at a place and to a person as mentioned in the warrant. [\[4\]](#_ftn4) To request the surrender and return of convicted persons to India from foreign states, the Central Government shall request the diplomatic representative of the State or to the Government of that State through the diplomatic representative of India.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) 5. **Challenges** - **Clauses of the agreements:** The agreements entered into by India with other nations often become a challenge in the process of extradition for India. The old treaties which India had with Chile, Netherlands, Chile and Switzerland were list-based which means that a person can be surrendered for the offences mentioned in this list. Later on, the dual criminalisation approach was followed, according to which a fugitive criminal would be surrendered if the offence committed is a crime in both countries. Dual criminality is most convenient as the Nations are not to renegotiate their lists of crimes as a new offence emerges. However, dual criminality has its own disadvantages as India’s social and cultural practices are different from other countries. For example, a person who has taken refuge in another nation cannot be brought to trial for offences relating to dowry harassment. Extraditions are not provided to persons accused of political crimes, where the death penalty might be imposed or where there are chances of double jeopardy. Challenges to extradition can be raised even outside the treaty terms. These challenges are mostly related to human rights. In Soering v United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights gave a landmark judgement, equating poor prison conditions to torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. Many extradition requests of India have been rejected because the prisons in India are in poor condition. [**\[6\]**](#_ftn6) - **Delay in investigation and related procedures:** To initiate an extradition process, a request is to be sent through the diplomats. The reports regarding the investigation conducted by the State/Central Government, translation if required along with the charges filed, witness testimonies, arrest warrants and other documents are sent to the foreign state. There are chances of fabrication of documents, delays in investigation, and incorrect format of affidavit which can affect the process of extradition. [\[7\]](#_ftn7) - **Diplomacy and bilateral relations:** Extradition also depends on the relationship India maintains with other nations. When a request is made for extradition, the foreign state is supposed to look into it and take the necessary procedures required and, also appear on behalf of the Indian government in the Court. If there is no good relationship between the nations, they will not put enough effort to look into the matter, a consequence of which the case will remain pending. [\[8\]](#_ftn8) This shows how important it is for a nation to maintain good relations with other nations. 6. **Developments:** India has come a long way since extradition was introduced in India by the British in 1880. India, which followed the list-based approach of the extradition treaty has now started following the dual criminality approach of the extradition treaty which is much more convenient and takes into consideration a large number of offences. India has also tried to maintain good relationships with foreign states and has great credibility among other nations. This would serve as leverage for India to get extradition procedures done in a short period. India is also trying to create extradition treaties with many more nations. **7.CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** India, though a respected and highly credible nation faces a lot of issues in bringing back the fugitive criminals who have escaped trial from India. India has faced a lot of criticism regarding the poor condition of prisons, custodial deaths and tortures; which have been a great obstacle in getting back fugitives back to India. India has a weak extradition system. It has to strengthen its relationship with foreign states and create extradition treaties which help the government to bring back fugitive criminals. [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY Page 689 ( accessed on 12th June 2024) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) (Accessed on 12th June 2024) [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Extradition Act, 1962 § 7 [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Extradition Act, 1962 § 8 [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Extradition Act, 1962 § 11 [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Aarshi Tirkey, “India’s Challenges in Extraditing Fugitives from Foreign Countries”, Issue Brief No. 270, November 2018, Observer Research Foundation. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Aarshi Tirkey, “India’s Challenges in Extraditing Fugitives from Foreign Countries”, Issue Brief No. 270, November 2018, Observer Research Foundation. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Aarshi Tirkey, “India’s Challenges in Extraditing Fugitives from Foreign Countries”, Issue Brief No. 270, November 2018, Observer Research Foundation. **8. REFERENCES** 1. 1. 2. Extradition Act, 1962 3. Aarshi Tirkey, “India’s Challenges in Extraditing Fugitives from Foreign Countries”, Issue Brief No. 270, November 2018, Observer Research Foundation. 1. 2. 3. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY [https://www.latestlaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Blacks-Law Dictionery.pdf#pagemode=thumbs](https://www.latestlaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Blacks-Law%20Dictionery.pdf#pagemode=thumbs) **Categories:** Articles --- ### [PRASHANT KUMAR SAHOO V. CHARULATA SAHU, 2023 SCC ONLINE SC 36](https://lawfoyer.in/prashant-kumar-sahoo-v-charulata-sahu-2023-scc-online-sc-36/) **Published:** July 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Riya Singh, Law student at Amity Law school, Amity University Lucknow** **Edited by: Sushmana Pandey Law student at Amity University Lucknow** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** In a succinct yet thorough analysis, this document aims to simplify the essential points addressed within the Supreme Court’s recent 68-page judgment related to the legal validity of including daughters in the right to share in the property under section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act. The petition was filed by Charulata Sahu (Original plaintiff) d/o of the Late Shree Kumar Sahoo. This case involves a petition filed before the Supreme Court of India under section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act,1956 seeking equal rights of a daughter in the ancestral property of the father demanding a 1/3rd share in the properties. Also seeing the sustainability of cross-appeal and challenging the settlement agreement. However, the SC in its final judgement held that daughters have the right to share equal to sons in the ancestral as well as the self-acquired property under the amendment of the 2005 Act. ***Keywords*:** Ancestral property, Cross-appeal, Supreme Court of India, Settlement agreement, Amendment of 2005. **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name******Prashant Kumar Sahoo vs. Charulata Sahu, 2023 SCC online SC 36[\[1\]](#_ftn1)*** ***ii)* *Case Number******C.A NO. – 002913-002915/2018*** ***iii)* *Judgement Date******March 29, 2023*** ***iv)* *Court******The Supreme Court of India*** ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench******Two*** ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges******Justice A.S. BOPANNA and Justice J.B. Pardiwala*** ***vii)* *Citation******2023 SCC online SC 36******viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved******“Hindu Succession Act Amendment Act 2005,”******“Section 6 Hindu Succession Act 1956.”*** ***“Order XXIII, Rule 3 under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.”*** ***“Order XLI, Rule 22, and Order XLIII, Rule 1-A (2) of the CPC.”*** **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** Legal case regarding Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and Partition suit. Supreme Court’s analysis of cross-appeal sustainability and settlement agreements’ viability. Plaintiff Charulata Sahu suing defendants Prafulla Sahoo and Santilata for ancestral property share. Interpretation of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 in the context of partition suit examined in the case. Amendment to the Hindu Succession Act in 2005 was considered in the legal proceedings. Petition filed in 1980 for equal share in ancestral properties under the Hindu Succession Act. According to the petition, the case delves around the partition of ancestral properties between one son and two daughters for claiming a 1/3rd share equally. However, defendant no.1 and defendant no. 2 in the absence of the plaintiff came into a settlement agreement and defendant no .2 (daughter) was ready to relinquish her right to property. **FACTS OF THE CASE** This case concerns siblings, the plaintiff and defendant, who are the children of the Late Shree Kumar Sahoo. Mr. Sahoo possessed ancestral property and the daughters (the original plaintiff(s)) are seeking an equal share in the properties. In 1980, Charulata Sahu (the plaintiff) filed a suit for partition of property, claiming 1/3rd property share. But defendant no.1 and defendant no. 2 came to a settlement agreement without the written consent of the plaintiff which was later overturned by the cross-appeal by the plaintiff. During the pendency of the suit, the amendment of 2005 in the Hindu Succession Act came into force, granting daughters equal inheritors rights. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** - Whether the settlement deed was valid or not? - Whether the benefit from the amendment of 2005 should be provided to the daughters? - Whether the daughters authorized to 1/3rd part in both the properties i.e. the ancestral and self-acquired **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the properties in the schedule ‘J’ were self-acquired properties of Late Shree Kumar Sahoo. According to the counsels, all the properties devolved to the plaintiff and defendant are ancestral properties. - applying the 2005 amendment retroactively to property transactions between 1965 and 2005 could cause significant disruption (desolation). - The counsel further submitted that as per section 6 of the Act 1956, no disposition or rupture including the partition of property which took place before 2004 shall not be given validation of the 2005 amendment. - The counsel also contended that the cross-appeal is maintainable under Order XLI Rule 22 of the CPC on the ground of challenging the compromise and should be considered the same as the first appeal. - The learned Senior Counsel states that there being no merit in the appeals the same may be dismissed and the shares of the parties be determined under the 2005 Amendment. - The Counsel further supports his arguments that the settlement agreement between both defendants was lawful, he relied on the following previous decision of the courts: - *“Bai Chanchal and Ors v. Syed Jalaluddin and others, 1970.”* - *“Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India, 1992.”* - *“D.S Lakshmaiah and Another v. L. Bal Subramanyam and Another, 2003.”* - *“Jineshwar Das (dead) by LR.s. and others v. Jagrani (Smt) and Another, 2003”* - *“Pushpa Devi Bhagat (Dead) through LR. Sadhna Rai (Smt) v. Rajender Singh and Others, 2006.”* **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsels for Respondent submitted that there is no error of law made by the High Court in its judgment. Also, she mentioned that as per Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma,2020, the plaintiff has the right to the 1/3rd share in her father’s properties. - The counsel further submitted that the amendment of 2005 to section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and the verdict given in Vineeta Sharma’s case, the daughter has equal rights in the ancestral property. The plaintiff should get a large share of the property, the order needs modification. - The counsel further states that the plaintiff and defendant are equally entitled to 1/3rd share in both self-acquired and ancestral properties of their father Late Shree Kumar Sahoo. She elucidates that alienation before 20.12.2004 is allowed, but if not necessary, it goes to the co-parcener. The trial court decides that defendant No. 1 owns the sold property. Sales after the suit are affected by the pending litigation. - The counsel further contended that of 4,408 acres, 3.762 acres are available for division. Also, the property in *schedules C, D, E, and F* are available for division. - The counsel further submitted that in the settlement between defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2, the plaintiff was never involved in the agreement. No notice was issued to her, nor did she sign the agreement or give consent to any compromise. Regarding the disbursement of the receivership amount, the plaintiff is 84 years of age, has filled multiple interim applications (IA), and has no source of income or medical expenses. - The counsel submitted that defendant No. 2 must be removed as the receiver and the plaintiff should be assigned as the receiver of the properties. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** - *“Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, as amended by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act 2005.”[**\[2\]**](#_ftn2)* - *“Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure,1908(concerning settlement agreements).”[**\[3\]**](#_ftn3)* - *“Order XLI, Rule 22 and Order XLIII, Rule 1-A (2) of the CPC (concerning cross-appeals*)”. [\[4\]](#_ftn4) **JUDGEMENT (RATIO DECIDENDI)** Supreme Court changed the settlement agreement based on the Vineeta Sharma vs Rakesh Sharma case, 2020. Plaintiff and defendant no. 2 get 1/3 share of father’s properties under the Hindu Succession Act. Includes ancestral and self-acquired properties of Late Shree Kumar Sahoo **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** Honourable Supreme Court of India has held that – - The SC of India in its final verdict states that Daughters get 1/3 share under the Hindu Succession Act, 2005. - Settlement agreement was invalid as it was held without the consent of the plaintiff under the Code of Civil Procedure. - SC decision: Defendant 1 and Defendant 2 settlement is invalid. - Daughters are entitled to 1/3 share of both the properties i.e. ancestral as well as self-acquired under the Hindu Succession Act, 2005. - Defendant 1 and Defendant 2 settlement agreement is void under CPC rules. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** - - *“Vineeta Sharma vs. Rakesh Sharma, 2020[**\[5\]**](#_ftn5).”* - *“Bai Chanchal and others v. Syed Jalaluddin and others, 1970[**\[6\]**](#_ftn6).”* - *“Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India, 1992[**\[7\]**](#_ftn7).”* - *“D.S Lakshmaiah and Another v. L. Bal Subramanyam and Another, 2003.”[**\[8\]**](#_ftn8)* - *“Jineshwar Das (dead) by LR.s. and others v. Jagrani (Smt) and Another, 2003[**\[9\]**](#_ftn9).”* - *“Pushpa Devi Bhagat (Dead) through LR. Sadhna Rai (Smt) v. Rajender Singh and Others, 2006.[**\[10\]**](#_ftn10)”* **Important Statutes Referred** - Code of Civil Procedure,1980 - Hindu Succession Act,1956 - Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act,2005 [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) (2023) SCC 36 [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) PK Das, *Hindu Succession* (Universal Law Publishing). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) CK Thakker and MC Thakker, *Code of Civil Procedure, 1908* (2014). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Thakker CK and Thakker MC, *Code of Civil Procedure, 1908* (2014) [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Reported in 2020 SCC [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Reported in 1970 3 SCC 124 at para 8. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Reported in 1992, 1 SCC 31 at para 38-41. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Reported in 2003, 10 SCC 310 para at 18. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Reported in 2003, 11 SCC 372 at para 7-8. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Reported in 2006, 5 SCC 566 at para 18,19,23-25. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Civil Law Cases, Family Law Cases --- ### [Fast Track Arbitration in India](https://lawfoyer.in/fast-track-arbitration-in-india/) **Published:** July 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Karan Pratap Singh, University Five Year Law College, University of Rajasthan** ## Introduction The growing importance of arbitration in India has led to a need for expedited arbitration proceedings to resolve disputes efficiently.\[1\] Fast track arbitration under Section 29B of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the “Act”) is a key development in this regard, but it has scope for improvement.\[2\] Fast track arbitration is a streamlined process where parties agree to resolve their dispute within a fixed time frame, usually 6 months, with a sole arbitrator and primarily through written submissions.\[3\] ## Legal Framework for Fast Track Arbitration in India Section 29B was introduced by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 (the “2015 Amendment”) and allows parties to opt for fast track arbitration before the constitution of the arbitral tribunal.\[4\] The provision mandates a sole arbitrator, no oral hearings unless requested by parties or deemed necessary by the tribunal, and an award within 6 months.\[5\] This expedited timeline can be extended by the court only in exceptional circumstances.\[6\] The Supreme Court in Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Kochi Cricket Private Limited (2018) held that Section 29B applies only to arbitrations commenced after the 2015 Amendment came into force on October 23, 2015.\[7\] ## Institutional Expedited Procedure Rules in India Leading arbitral institutions in India have also incorporated expedited procedure rules.\[8\] The Indian Council of Arbitration provides for fast track arbitration in Rule 44 of its Rules of Domestic Commercial Arbitration, where parties can request the tribunal to decide the case within 3-6 months based on written pleadings.\[9\] Similarly, the Mumbai Centre for International Arbitration has introduced expedited arbitration rules with strict timelines and limited oral hearings.\[10\] ## Comparative Analysis with Other Jurisdictions Compared to other jurisdictions, India’s fast track arbitration regime has some unique features and challenges.\[11\] The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Expedited Procedure Rules 2017 automatically apply to disputes below US$ 2 million with an opt-out provision, while the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) Expedited Procedure has a higher monetary threshold of S$ 6 million and allows summary reasoning in the award.\[12\] The Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC) and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) also have well-established expedited procedures.\[13\] ## Suitability and Challenges of Fast Track Arbitration Fast track arbitration is particularly suitable for low value and less complex disputes that require urgent relief.\[14\] However, it raises procedural fairness concerns regarding due process, equal treatment of parties, and assessing credibility without oral hearings.\[15\] Enforceability challenges may also arise if the expedited process is seen as compromising on natural justice principles.\[16\] Parties should carefully consider these factors and adopt best practices such as comprehensive written submissions and using technology for virtual hearings.\[17\] ## Scope for Legislative Reform in India There is scope for legislative reform to optimize the potential of fast track arbitration in India.\[18\] Introducing a monetary threshold for automatic application, expanding availability beyond the pre-constitution stage, allowing reasoned awards, and clarifying the interplay with expedited enforcement under the 2015 Amendment are some suggestions.\[19\] The Law Commission of India in its 246th Report recommended a 6-month time limit for fast track arbitrations, which was incorporated in the 2015 Amendment.\[20\] ## Role of Arbitral Institutions in Promoting Fast Track Arbitration Promoting institutional expedited procedures is key to the success of fast track arbitration in India.\[21\] Arbitral institutions can play a vital role in administering expedited cases, appointing experienced arbitrators, and ensuring quality and efficiency.\[22\] The 2019 Amendment to the Act recognized the importance of institutional arbitration by establishing the Arbitration Council of India to grade arbitral institutions and accredit arbitrators.\[23\] ## Balancing Efficiency and Fairness in Fast Track Arbitration Fast track arbitration is a step in the right direction to address the problem of delays and high costs in arbitration.\[24\] It offers a speedy and cost-effective alternative to traditional arbitration, especially for disputes that require quick resolution.\[25\] However, further legislative refinement and institutional support are needed to balance efficiency with due process and to optimize its potential in the Indian context.\[26\] ## Conclusion A fortiori, fast track arbitration is a welcome development in India’s evolving arbitration landscape.\[27\] It aligns with the government’s efforts to promote India as a hub for international arbitration and to improve its ranking in the Ease of Doing Business index.\[28\] As more parties opt for expedited proceedings and more cases are decided under this mechanism, fast track arbitration is likely to become a mainstream dispute resolution option in India.\[29\] However, it is important to strike a balance between speed and fairness, and to ensure that the quality of justice is not compromised in the pursuit of efficiency.\[30\] ## References: \[1\] Nishith Desai Associates, ‘International Commercial Arbitration: Law and Recent Developments in India’ (2022) \[2\] Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, s 29B \[3\] Anubhav Pandey, ‘Fast Track Arbitrtaion’ (iPleaders, 18 March 2024) \[4\] Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act 2015, s 15 \[5\] Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, s 29B(2)-(4) \[6\] Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, s 29B(4) proviso \[7\] Board of Control for Cricket in India v Kochi Cricket Private Limited (2018) 6 SCC 287 \[8\] Bhavana Sunder, ‘Expedited Procedures in Arbitral Institutions: Emerging Trends in India and Abroad’ (2021) 6(1) Indian Journal of Arbitration Law 84 \[9\] Indian Council of Arbitration, ‘Rules of Domestic Commercial Arbitration’ (2016) r 44 \[10\] Mumbai Centre for International Arbitration, ‘Expedited Arbitration Rules’ (2016) \[11\] Gunawan Widjaja, ‘Fast Track Arbitration: Comparative Analysis’ (2019) 472 Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research 43 \[12\] International Chamber of Commerce, ‘Arbitration Rules’ (2017) app VI; Singapore International Arbitration Centre, ‘Arbitration Rules’ (2016) r 5 \[13\] Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, ‘Administered Arbitration Rules’ (2018) art 42; Arbitration Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (2017) art 39 \[14\] David JA Cairns, Florencia Villaggi, ‘Expedited Arbitration: Reducing Time and Cost Without Sacrificing Due Process’ (2019) 5 Indonesian Journal of International & Comparative Law 625 \[15\] Irene Welser, Giovanni De Berti, ‘Fast Track Arbitration: Just fast or something different?’ (2019) Austrian Yearbook on International Arbitration 259 \[16\] Moin Ghani, ‘The Pitfalls of Fast Track Arbitration’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 14 September 2016) \[17\] Sue Hyun Lim, Lars Markert, ‘Expedited Procedure Under the 2017 ICC Rules – New Options for Resolving Disputes’ (2018) 18(1) Revista Brasileira de Arbitragem 59 \[18\] Rishi Shroff, ‘Fast Track Arbitrations in India: The Road Ahead’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 12 January 2022) \[19\] Binsy Susan, Aashna Sheth, ‘Expedited Procedures in Indian Arbitration Law: A Race to the Finish Line?’ (Nishith Desai Associates, 10 March 2021) \[20\] Law Commission of India, ‘Amendments to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996’ (Law Com No 246, 2014) para 63 \[21\] Pratyush Panjwani, Harshad Pathak, ‘Institutional Arbitration in India: A Work in Progress?’ (2020) 11(2) Journal of International Dispute Settlement 252 \[22\] Ekta Nair, ‘Role of Arbitral Institutions in Promoting Arbitration in India’ (2020) 33(2) Arbitration International 331 \[23\] Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act 2019, ss 10-11 \[24\] Ajay Thomas, ‘Making a Case for Fast Track Arbitrations in India’ (2017) 3 Indian Journal of Arbitration Law 1 \[25\] Hazel Genn, ‘What is Civil Justice For? Reform, ADR and Access to Justice’ (2012) 24(1) Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 397 \[26\] Sachin Mandlik, Vanita Bhargava, ‘The Case for Expedited Arbitrations in India’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 10 August 2020) \[27\] Nishith Desai Associates, ‘Arbitration in India: The Impact of the 2015 and 2019 Amendments’ (2020) \[28\] Ministry of Law and Justice, ‘Initiatives to Promote Arbitration in India’ (Press Information Bureau, 6 February 2020) \[29\] Kshama A Loya, Vyapak Desai, ‘Changing Landscape of Arbitration in India’ (2019) 36(4) Journal of International Arbitration 493 \[30\] Amelia Keene, ‘Due Process Paranoia in International Arbitration: Balancing Efficiency and Enforceability’ (2020) 36(1) Arbitration International 111 **Categories:** ADR Law, Arbitration Law, Articles --- ### [Bishwanath Prasad And Others vs Dwarka Prasad (Dead) And Others on 30 October, 1973](https://lawfoyer.in/bishwanath-prasad-and-others-vs-dwarka-prasad-dead-and-others-on-30-october-1973/) **Published:** July 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author**: **Karan Pratap Singh, University Five Year Law College, University of Rajasthan** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The Supreme Court of India, in this partition suit, upheld the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court which relied on admissions made by the plaintiffs and their father (8th defendant) in an earlier suit to hold that certain disputed properties belonged exclusively to the first defendant and not to the joint family. The Court held that admissions by a party are substantive evidence under Section 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and can be relied upon irrespective of whether the maker has appeared as a witness or has been confronted with the same. The Court distinguished party admissions from prior inconsistent statements used to impeach a witness’s credibility under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.\[1\] **Keywords:** Partition suit, Admissions, Substantive evidence, Prior inconsistent statements, Joint family property, Exclusive property, Indian Evidence Act ## B) CASE DETAILS iii) Judgement Date: 30 October, 1973 vii) Citation: 1974 AIR 117, 1974 SCR (2) 124, 1974 SCC (1) 78 viii) Legal Provisions Involved: Sections 17, 21 and 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT This appeal emanated from a partition suit where the plaintiffs claimed that certain properties were joint family properties liable to partition. The first defendant disputed the plaintiffs’ claim and asserted that some of the properties, including three properties covered by four usufructuary mortgage deeds and a shop room, belonged to him exclusively in his own right and not to the joint family. The Trial Court and the High Court concurrently accepted the first defendant’s contention by placing reliance on certain admissions made by the plaintiffs and their father (8th defendant) in their pleadings and depositions in an earlier suit.\[2\] ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The plaintiffs instituted a partition suit in respect of certain properties claiming them to be joint family properties that were liable to be partitioned among the family members. The first defendant contested the suit asserting that some of the properties, particularly three items covered by four usufructuary mortgage deeds (Exhibits B1 to B4) as well as a shop room situated in the north-west corner of Plot No. 1238, belonged to him exclusively in his individual capacity and did not constitute joint family properties. To substantiate his claim, the first defendant relied on admissions made by the plaintiffs and their father (who was impleaded as the 8th defendant) in an earlier title suit being Title Suit No. 61 of 1945. In that suit, the present plaintiffs and their father (who was the first defendant in that suit) had filed a joint written statement wherein they had admitted the first defendant’s exclusive right over the presently disputed items of property. Similar admissions were made by the present first plaintiff and his father (8th defendant) in their depositions in that earlier suit.\[3\] ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the lower courts were justified in relying on admissions made by the plaintiffs and their father in an earlier suit to determine the nature of the disputed properties? ii. Whether the disputed shop room and other properties were joint family properties subject to partition or belonged exclusively to the first defendant? iii. Whether party admissions can be relied upon even if the maker of the admissions has not been confronted with the same in evidence? ## F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS i. The plaintiffs (appellants) contended that the lower courts erred in placing reliance on their admissions made in the earlier Title Suit No. 61 of 1945 as the first defendant had not pleaded or raised any alternative case based on these admissions. They argued that the first defendant’s case in his written statement was that he was the exclusive owner of the disputed properties as the heir of his father Narain Sah and not on the basis of any admissions.\[4\] ii. It was further argued that the impugned admissions were not put to the first plaintiff when he appeared as a witness in the present suit. The 8th defendant had also not been summoned by the first defendant to confront him with his previous admissions. Hence, it was contended that the plaintiffs were seriously prejudiced by the reliance placed on these admissions without giving them any opportunity to explain the same.\[5\] ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS i. The first defendant (respondent) supported the findings of the lower courts and contended that the admissions made by the plaintiffs and their father in the earlier Title Suit No. 61 of 1945, both in their joint written statement and depositions, clearly showed that the disputed properties were allotted to the first defendant in a family partition that had taken place in 1938 itself. Hence, he argued that the plaintiffs were rightly not granted any relief in respect of these properties on the basis of their own previous admissions.\[6\] H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. Sections 17 and 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 deal with admissions as substantive evidence. Section 17 defines an admission as a statement, oral or documentary, which suggests any inference as to a fact in issue or relevant fact. Section 21 provides that admissions are relevant and may be proved as against the person who makes them.\[7\] ii. Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 deals with prior inconsistent statements of witnesses. It provides that a witness may be cross-examined as to his previous statements made in writing or reduced into writing, and such writing may be proved to contradict him.\[8\] ## I) JUDGEMENT **a. RATIO DECIDENDI** i. The Supreme Court fully concurred with the findings of the courts below which had relied on the previous admissions of the plaintiffs and their father to arrive at the conclusion that the disputed properties belonged exclusively to the first defendant. The Court noted that if the admissions made by the plaintiffs and their father in the earlier suit were reliable, then the plaintiffs’ case stood damaged by their own admissions.\[9\] ii. The Court observed that at the trial stage itself, the admissions contained in Exhibits G, G2 and H (which were the previous written statement and depositions of the plaintiffs and their father in Title Suit No. 61 of 1945) had been considered and acted upon while decreeing the first defendant’s exclusive rights in the disputed properties. Even before the High Court, the plaintiffs had not raised any contention that they were prejudiced by the reliance placed on their previous admissions without giving them an opportunity to explain the same.\[10\] iii. It was held that there is a crucial distinction between a party who is the author of a prior statement and a witness whose previous inconsistent statement is used to discredit him. In the former case, admissions by a party are substantive evidence under Section 21 of the Evidence Act if they fulfill the requirements of Section 17. In contrast, prior inconsistent statements of a witness do not become substantive evidence and are only used to impeach his credibility under Section 145.\[11\] iv. The Court clarified that there is no requirement for party admissions to be put to the maker in evidence, as they are substantive evidence by themselves. On the other hand, a witness cannot be discredited using his prior inconsistent statement unless it has been put to him in cross-examination as per Section 145.\[12\] v. Following the principles laid down in Bharat Singh & Anr. v. Bhagirathi\[13\], the Supreme Court held that admissions duly proved are admissible evidence irrespective of whether the party making them has appeared as a witness or not, and regardless of whether the party has been confronted with those admissions if he deposes to the contrary.\[14\] **b. OBITER DICTA** The Court opined that the first defendant had consistently set up a case denying the joint family character of the properties in his pleadings. His reliance on the plaintiffs’ admissions to advance an alternative defense was raised only at the evidence stage. Balancing the equities, the Court directed the plaintiffs to pay only half the costs of the appeal to the first defendant.\[15\] ## J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The Supreme Court’s judgment provides crucial clarity on the distinction between party admissions under Section 21 and witness statements under Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. Admissions have a higher evidentiary value as substantive evidence and can be relied upon even without confronting the maker with the same. The Court rightly noted that the plaintiffs’ admissions in the earlier suit, if reliable, dealt a serious blow to their own case in the present suit. It was also observed that the plaintiffs had not raised any objection before the High Court regarding the reliance placed on their admissions without giving them an opportunity to explain. The Court’s approach in this case highlights the importance of uniformity and consistency in pleadings and evidence. However, the Court was also cognizant of the fact that the first defendant had developed his case based on admissions only at the evidence stage, as contrasted with his exclusive reliance on inheritance in the pleadings. The Court adopted a balanced approach by making the plaintiffs liable for only half the costs, while dismissing their appeal on merits. Overall, this judgment is a significant precedent on the interpretation of the Indian Evidence Act and the evidentiary value of party admissions. It underscores the importance of caution and consistency for litigants in making any statements or admissions, whether in pleadings or evidence, as they can decisively influence the outcome of a case. ## K) REFERENCES **a. Important Cases Referred** i. Bharat Singh & Anr. v. Bhagirathi, \[1966\] 1 S.C.R. 606\[16\] – This judgment laid down the principle that admissions duly proved are admissible as substantive evidence regardless of whether the maker has appeared as a witness or has been confronted with the admissions. The Supreme Court distinguished admissions from prior inconsistent statements used to impeach witness credibility. **b. Important Statutes Referred** Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 17 – Definition of admission\[17\] - Section 21 – Relevancy of admissions against persons making them, and by or on their behalf\[18\] - Section 145 – Cross examination as to previous statements in writing\[19\] **ENDNOTES** \[1\] Paras 9-10, Page 5 of the judgment \[2\] Para 1, Page 1 of the judgment \[3\] Paras 1-2, Pages 1-2 of the judgment \[4\] Paras 7-8, Page 4 of the judgment \[5\] Para 8, Page 4 of the judgment \[6\] Para 3, Page 2 of the judgment \[7\] Sections 17 and 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 \[8\] Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 \[9\] Para 3, Page 2 of the judgment \[10\] Paras 7-8, Page 4 of the judgment \[11\] Para 10, Page 5 of the judgment \[12\] Para 10, Page 5 of the judgment \[13\] \[1966\] 1 SCR 606 \[14\] Para 10, Page 5 of the judgment \[15\] Paras 12-13, Page 6 of the judgment \[16\] Bharat Singh & Anr. v. Bhagirathi, \[1966\] 1 SCR 606 \[17\] Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 \[18\] Section 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 \[19\] Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Civil Law Cases, Evidence Law Cases, Family Law Cases --- ### [Keshavan Madhava Menon vs The State Of Bombay](https://lawfoyer.in/keshavan-madhava-menon-vs-the-state-of-bombay/) **Published:** July 4, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Sankalp Vashistha, Law Student at ICFAI University** **Edited By: Aman Tyagi, Student at UFYLC, Jaipur, Rajasthan** - **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, was used to prosecute the petitioner who was Secretary of People’s Publishing Houses India Ltd., in 1949 for the distribution of a pamphlet. He was arrested in December 1949 before the Indian Constitution came into effect which secured fundamental rights, including freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution, he contested that the Act’s provisions were in violation of the constitution. The petitioner attempted to set aside the criminal charges against him because the pre-constitutional legislation infringed upon fundamental rights. However, the Bombay High Court held—applying Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897—that the word “void” in Article 13(1) meant “repealed,” indicating the repeal’s prospective impact. As a result, it was decided that the adoption of the Constitution had no bearing on existing proceedings. The Supreme Court ruled on appeal that Article 13 does not confer retrospective effect to fundamental rights. The Court stated that laws become void only when they clash with the Constitution after it has been adopted. The Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, of 1931, was considered to apply to the proceedings started before the Constitution. The Court also maintained that the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution do not automatically declare pre-constitutional legislation unconstitutional in the past. As a result, the appeal was dismissed. ***Keywords*:** Freedom of speech and Expression, Constitution, Article 13(1), Article 19 (1) (a), Pre-constitutional, Void - **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name***Keshavan Madhava Menon vs The State Of Bombay ***ii)* *Case Number***I X of 1950. A.S.R. Chari ***iii)* *Judgement Date***22 January, 1951 ***iv)* *Court***The Supreme Court of India ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench***Chief Justice Hiralal J. Kania., Justice Sudhi Ranjan Das, Justice Sayyad Fazal Ali, Justice M. Patanjali Shastri. Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, Justice N. Chandrashekhara Aiyar, Justice B.K. Mukherjea ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges***Chief Justice Hiralal J. Kania., Justice Sudhi Ranjan Das, Justice Sayyad Fazal Ali, Justice M. Patanjali Shastri. Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, Justice N. Chandrashekhara Aiyar, Justice B.K. Mukherjea ***vii)* *Citation***1951 AIR 128, 1951 SCR 228***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved***Section 15(1), 18 (1) of Indian Press (Emergency powers) Act, 1931. Article 13(1), 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, Section 6 of General Clauses Act, 1897- **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, was used to prosecute the petitioner who was Secretary of People’s Publishing Houses India Ltd., in 1949 for the distribution of a pamphlet. He was arrested in December 1949 before the Indian Constitution came into effect which secured fundamental rights, including freedom of speech and expression under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Indian Constitution, he contested that the Act’s provisions were in violation of the constitution. The petitioner attempted to set aside the criminal charges against him because the pre-constitutional legislation infringed upon fundamental rights. However, the Bombay High Court held—applying Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897—that the word “void” in Article 13(1) meant “repealed,” indicating the repeal’s prospective impact. As a result, it was decided that the adoption of the Constitution had no bearing on existing proceedings. - **FACTS OF THE CASE** - The petitioner, who was Secretary at People’s Publishing Houses India Ltd., was prosecuted for dissemination of a pamphlet entitled *“Railway mazdooron ke khilaaf nai Zazish”* in Bombay on September 1949. On 9th December 1949, he was arrested on the contravention of section 15(1) and 18 (1) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931. - On 26th January 1950, The Constitution of India came into force, which provided various fundamental rights to citizens under part III, including Article 19 (1) (a) right to freedom of speech and expression. - On 3rd March 1950 petitioner submitted a written statement stating that sections 2(6), 15, and 18 of the act are ultra vires and void as they violate Article 19 (1) (a). He asked for a suspension of the legal proceeding until H.C. adjudicated the matter of law. - On 7th March 1950, Petitioner filed a petition in the High Court of Bombay under Article 228 seeking that the criminal proceedings against him be void as the charging section on him violate Article 19 (1) (a) read with Article 13 (1). - On 23rd March 1950 High Court held that the word ‘Void’ used in Article 13 (1) meant ‘repealed’, thus applying section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which states that repeal has prospective effect unless stated otherwise. So, the court held that proceedings under the 1931 Act pending as the constitution’s commencement would not be affected. - On 12th April 1950 petitioner filed an appeal in the Supreme Court based on a certificate granted by the High Court under Article 132(1) - **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** - Whether provisions of the Indian Press Emergency Powers Act, 1931 in violation of Article 19 (1) (a) read with Article 13 of the Indian Constitution? - Whether pending proceedings have any impact on the enforcement of the Constitution? - Whether there is any retrospective effect of Article 13? - **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsels for Petitioner submitted that the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, was a repressive law passed by an external government to restrict the freedom of the Indian press and stifle the freedom of its subjects. - The counsels for Petitioner submitted that after India gained its freedom, its citizens were able to live freely. In a democratic republic, the Constitution guarantees fundamental rights to citizens. Article 13(1) of the Constitution declared all pre-constitutional laws incompatible with fundamental rights to be null and void, to eradicate all traces of servitude imposed by foreign rulers. - The counsels for Petitioner submitted that persecuting citizens under an antiquated legislation that violates their fundamental rights is against the spirit of the Constitution. - The counsels for Petitioner submitted that no law passed after the Constitution’s adoption and declared unconstitutional by Article 13 may be examined for any reason, including accusing or penalizing individuals. - The counsels for Petitioner submitted that any pre-constitutional law that is declared unconstitutional by the Constitution has its effectiveness extended. - The counsels for Petitioner submitted that the High Court made a mistake in applying Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, to interpret Article 13(1) because the Article does not intend to repeal the current law; rather, it gives the court the authority to declare a statute unconstitutional if it violates fundamental rights, which gives the court the authority to immediately repeal the entire statute. - **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsels for Respondent submitted that the laws that violate Article 13(1) shall be subject to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, as the phrase “void” in that clause is to be interpreted as “repealed,” not as “void ab into.” this is because the basic rights are new rights granted to people as on 26.01.1950; as such, it is not reasonable to expect them to supersede any rights and obligations that existed before to that day. - The counsels for the Respondent submitted that the respondent concludes that, as the appellant did not have any fundamental rights at the time of the proceedings, the appellant should be prosecuted by the procedures started on December 9, 1949. - **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** - **Article 13 (1) of the Indian Constitution**: *“All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.”* - **Article 19 (1) (a) of the Indian Constitution:** *“All citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression;”* - **Section 6 of General Clauses Act 1897 –** *“Effect of repeal”* - **Section 15 (1) of Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931:** *“A certified copy of the order confirming of the alteration, together with a printed copy of the memorandum as altered, shall, within three months from the date of the order, be filed by the company with the registrar, and he shall register the same and shall certify the registration under his hand, and the certificate shall be conclusive evidence that all the requirements of this Act concerning the alteration and the confirmation thereof have been complied with, and thenceforth the memorandum so altered shall be the memorandum of the company.”* - **Section 18 (1) of Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931:** *“In the case of a company limited by shares and registered after the commencement of this Act, if articles are not registered, or, if articles are registered, in so far as the articles do not exclude or modify the regulations in Table A in the First Schedule, those regulations shall, so far as an applicable, be the regulations of the company in the same manner and to the same extent as if they were contained in duly registered articles.”* - **JUDGEMENT** 1. **RATIO DECIDENDI** 2. 1. 1. Constitution should be interpreted by its language, not through sentiments or emotions. 2. The power to repeal or modify a law, such as The Indian Press Emergency Powers Act, of 1931 is with the President under Article 372(2). 3. Since the Constitution protects inchoate rights and ongoing proceedings, the court rejected the argument that persecution under current legislation is against its spirit. 4. A statute is only considered invalid as per Article 13 if it is inconsistent with fundamental rights. It does not always make the legislation null and void from the start. 5. The discrepancies with the laws in place only occur after the adoption of the constitution. As fundamental rights came into force after the adoption of the Constitution 6. Existing laws are void only till they are in conflict with fundamental rights and do not affect any past transactions or rights and liabilities accrued before the Constitution’s adoption. 7. As with temporary laws, unless a statute or other saving laws are used, no further procedures are permitted. 8. The rights specified in Article 19 were not available to the appellant before the Constitution. Article 13 applies to Article 19 (1) (a) when it is in effect. So in the given case Article 13 does not have any application. 9. The appellant is unable to claim protection to avoid the consequences of his action or rely on rules of statutory interpretation 10. Because Article 13 does not contain wording that gives fundamental rights retroactive force, it does not require any accompanying legislation, such as the General Clauses Act or the Interpretation Act of England, or saving clauses. **2. OBITER DICTA (IF ANY)** 1. Retaining people in jail who were previously found guilty under oppressive legislation before the enforcement of the Constitution is against its spirit. 2. Any ongoing prosecution cannot continue after the expiry of such temporary statute if the offender has not been charged with a crime and sentenced before the statute’s expiration and it does not contain a saving provision. 3. The power to amend the law lies with the legislature, not with the courts. The court can provide relief for existing claims with inchoate rights and liabilities. 4. The idea of “qua repeal” is fictitious and it originates from the English Parliament and Courts rather than the principle of justice - **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The court stated in its decision that because fundamental rights are interpreted with a future perspective, allowing them to be applied retroactively would conflict with the operation of the current statute. Notably, the legislation does not immediately become unconstitutional just because the statute was passed before the Constitution. The court must review the statute before declaring it invalid, court must take into account the legislative intent underlying it and its prospective effects. A statute shall only be declared unconstitutional when such statute is in contradiction with the Constitution, according to Article 13, which grants constitutional courts the authority of judicial review. It was emphasized that although criminal laws may have provisions that provide benefits to criminals through retrospective effect fundamental rights did not exist at the time when the prior legislation was in force. Consequently, the court determined that the appellant’s prosecution was correct, concentrating on the inchoate rights, duties, and punishment specified in the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act. - **REFERENCES** 1. 1. **Important Statutes Referred** 1. Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 13(1), Article 19 (1) (a), Article 132(1), Article 228 2. General Clauses Act, 1897 – Section 6 3. Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931 – Section 15(1), Section 18 (1) **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW](https://lawfoyer.in/introduction-to-international-criminal-law/) **Published:** July 4, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: A I SUGANDESH, Law student at Government Law College, Dharmapuri.** **Edited By: Aman Tyagi, Law Student at UFYLC, Jaipur, Rajasthan** 1. **INTRODUCTION** We know that the highest jurisdiction of the Indian judiciary system is the Supreme Court but, in case of an international crime take place where it should be adjudicated. These are the questions that arise in our minds when an international issue takes place. But there is an international body that deals with the international problems and issues. They have categorized different public bodies to deal with. The International organization has its own body for the act of adjudication of international crimes and issues. And that is the International Criminal Court (ICC). International Criminal Law is an international public body of law that prosecutes and adjudicates the serious and heinous crimes that take place at the international level. International criminal law simply governs international crimes and dissolves the conflict that arises between the state’s law system. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*: *United Nations, International Criminal Court, international jurisdiction, International Organization, War crimes, The Rome Statues and International Humanitarian Law*** **SUB-HEADINGS** 1. **Meaning, Definition & Explanation** International Criminal Law is a public body of law that was governed by the United Nations. This body of law suppresses international crimes and the agreement of the government. It allows the norms to adjudicate, prosecute, and punish which are treated as international crimes. International criminal law is an extended developed body that deals the international crimes. International Law includes laws for the procedure and principles of mode for international crimes. It often encompasses the offenses related to international crimes in society. 2. **Historical Background** The origin of the international criminal law came from the Hague Convention in 1899[\[1\]](#_ftn1) and 1907.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) This convention was about the rules making for the conduct of war and the protection of civilians. International criminal law was efficiently active after World War II which established the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals for the prosecution of the Nazi and Japanese leaders for the conduct of crimes against humanity. In 1946 United Nations General Assembly recommended a permanent international criminal court. And drafted the principles for the International Criminal Court by the International Law Commission in the 1960s. In 1998 the United Nations Diplomatic Conference adopted the Rome Statutes for the establishment of the International Criminal Court.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) In 2002 United Nations established the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC). 3. **Sources of International Criminal Law** International criminal law emerged due to the cause of World War II which made the world and humanity suppressed. The UN made the International Criminal Court the adjudication of offenses related to international crimes. There are five primary sources for international criminal law which was enlisted by Article 38(1) of the International Court of Justice statutes. The sources of the international criminal law are, 1. Treaties 2. Customary International law - General principles of law 1. Judicial decisions 2. Writing of eminent jurists Article 38 of the International Court of Justice Statue which enlisted the source of international criminal law that related to the nation’s sovereign. 1. *“International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules are expressly recognized by the contesting states;* 2. *International customs, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;* 3. *The general principles of law recognized by the civilized nations;* 4. *Subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means of the determination of rules of law.”[**\[4\]**](#_ftn4)* The Rome Statutes (1988) act as the rules and norms of the international criminal court even though it is not identical. The procedure and the principles of the international criminal court involved in the evidence, liability, defense, penalty, victim participation, witness protection, mutual legal assistance, and cooperation. 1. **Treaties** The Treaties are the primary sources for the implementation of the international criminal law in the society. The treaties act as the emerging sources of international criminal law where the rules and procedures were primarily adopted. Such conventions and treaties are the treaty-based agreement for the formation of international criminal law. The treaties such as the Hauge Convention (1907), Geneva Convention (1949), Genocide Convention (1949), and the Torture Convention (1984) provided for the formation of the international criminal court. The statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)[\[5\]](#_ftn5) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)[\[6\]](#_ftn6) were formed by the resolution of the UN Security Council which is also known as the source of international criminal law. 1. **Customary International Law** Customary international law is described in Article 38(1) of the International Court of Justice statute. The important components for customary law are that of practice and the *opinio juris*. Those components were described in *the* *North Sea continental Shelf Judgement (1969).* *“The idea of Opinio Juris Sive Necessitaties itself implies the demand of such belief, i.e., the presence of subjective elements. As a result, the participating nations must think they performing a legal obligation.”* Even customary law acts as the supportive and not as the whole basis of the. criminal prosecution. It represents the principles used for the codification of law. - **General Principles of law** The General principle of law in international criminal law is the standard source of law. The necessity of the general principle works when there is a failure in the conduct of treaty or convention to provide the remedy. The general principle of international law becomes complicated when there is an addition of extraterritorial elements with it. It is important to balance the other rules of a nation and the addition of extraterritorial rules by the general principle of criminal international law. The general principle of international criminal law includes the concept of basic jurisdiction, statutory limitation*, Nullum Crimen*, *Nulla Poena Sine Lege, Ne Bis in Idem,* and Immunity. The *Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Lege* states that *“no one may be convicted or punished for an act or omission that does not constitute a criminal offense.”[**\[7\]**](#_ftn7)* The Latin maxim of *Ne Bis in Idem* states that *no person should be prosecuted or punished more than once for the same offense,* which ensures protection against the arbitrary nature of procedure at both national and international levels. 1. **Judicial decision** As the judicial decision is also a source of international criminal law, it was considered in two ways 1. The first is that the court recog the precedent and the precedent of *Opinio Juris.* 2. The court strives through the norms as the customary principle in the judgments. 1. **Writings of eminent jurists** The Eminent jurists are part of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) including the lawyers and human rights defenders that are united by the rule of principles of the Eminent Jurists Panel 2004. The piece of work by eminent jurists was also considered as the source of international criminal law. In the drafting of the Law of Treaties (1969) the International Law Commission had collectively considered according to the obligation of the non-parties to the treaty. *“The general rule regarding third states”*[\[8\]](#_ftn8). This rule is a *“corollary of the principle of consent and of the sovereignty and independence of states”* (*Brownlie 627*). 4. **International crimes** The International Criminal Law is the system that deals with international crimes. It is responsible for the committing of most heinous crimes such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Heinous most crime such as genocide is considered among the three forms of crimes in the Rome Statue International Criminal Court. Even though in the present era the offenses that international criminal law considers the most heinous offenses are war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. **War crimes** War crimes were defined in the Geneva Convention (1949) and in the Additional Protocols of the Geneva Convention (1977) which state that war crimes as a violation of the norms and conventions. The norms of war crimes are applicable when there is a conflict with the armed forces between the nations or armed organization groups. The offenses of war crimes caused by the violation of the international humanitarian were dealt with by the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. **Genocide** The term Genocide was coined by Raphael Lemkin in 1944 in his book[\[9\]](#_ftn9). Genocide was originally described after World War II which states as the international killing and cause of the destruction of people or groups of organizations. The term Genocide was defined in the Genocide Convention (1948) which intends to cause destruction or eradicate race, nation, religious group, ethnic or whole. Genocide is the most heinous crime or aggravated crime which is also known as *“the crimes of crimes”* among international crimes. The Genocide was described under Articles II and III of the Genocide Convention which has the exact to Article 2 of International Criminal Tribunal Rwanda Statue and Article 4 of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia Statue. **Crimes against humanity** The term crimes against humanity was defined as the *“murder extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts committed against the civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions of political, racial, or religious grounds in the execution of or in connection any crim with the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, whether or not a violation in the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.”[**\[10\]**](#_ftn10)* 5. **Significance of the International Criminal Law system** They are some significant aspects of the procedure in the International Criminal law system 1. No person under the age of 18 shall be prosecuted by the ICC 2. The prosecutor should obtain both incriminating and exoneration of evidence during the conduct of inquiry. - The defendant is considered to be innocent until the guilt is proven. 1. The prosecutor should take the preliminary investigation. 2. In the event of a pre-trial the court issue an arrest warrant and they ensure sufficient evidence of the arrest. 3. If new evidence is produced after the verdict of a case without the guilty the prosecutor may reopen the case. 6. **International Criminal Court** The International Criminal Court was based in the Hauge, Netherlands. The court is composed of eighteen judges each nominated by the member countries and representing different nations. This composition is based on the gender balance of judges. The court has its president and vice-president in charge who are elected among the judges for the court administration. The judges and prosecutors were chosen for a period of nine years as non-renewable. The court has jurisdiction over the offenses they are, genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes of aggression. 7. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The scope of International Criminal law has a wider view which deals with the protection of human rights from international offenses. Crimes like the war crimes and genocide are still considered to be a heinous off against humanity. Even though there are treaties and conventions regarding international crimes it is a common duty to have a standard ideology of common human behavior in society. Those cause of the crime shows the differences from animals. 8. **REFERENCES** 9. **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** 1. *Journal of International Criminal Law by Heybatollah Najandimanesh Anna Oriolo* 10. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. [*legalservices.com*](http://www.legalservices.com) 2. [*blogipleagers.com*](http://www.blogipleagers.com) 3. [*diakonia.com*](http://www.diakonia.com) 4. [*law.cornell.edu*](http://www.law.cornell.edu) 5. [*un.org*](http://www.un.org) 3. **Statutes Referred** 1. *International Criminal Court* 2. *Fi Hague Peace Conference (1899)* 3. *Second International Peace Conference (1907)* 4. *United Nations Diplomatic Conference (1998)* 5. *International Court of Justice Statue* 6. *Geneva Convention (1949)* 7. *Genocide Convention (1949)* 8. *Torture Convention (1984)* 9. *International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia Statue* 10. *International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda* 11. *UN Security Council Resolution* 12. *The Rome Statues (1988)* 13. *International Military Tribunal Charter* [*\[1\]*](#_ftnref1) *First Hague Peace Conference (1899)* [*\[2\]*](#_ftnref2) *Second International Peace Conference (1907)* [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) *United Nations Diplomatic Conference (1998)* [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) *Article 38 of the International Court of Justice statute* [*\[5\]*](#_ftnref5) *UN Security Council Resolution 827* [*\[6\]*](#_ftnref6) *UN Security Council Resolution 955* [*\[7\]*](#_ftnref7) *Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) *Article 34 of the Vienna Convention* [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) *Axis Rule Occupied in Europe: laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposal of Redress.* [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) *International Military Tribunal Charter.* **Categories:** Articles, Criminal Law, International Law --- ### [JOGINDER KUMAR V. STATE OF U.P. (1994)](https://lawfoyer.in/joginder-kumar-v-state-of-u-p-1994/) **Published:** July 4, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: A I Sugandesh, Government Law College, Dharmapuri** **Edited By: Gyanu Patel, Law Student at Amity University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** This case Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. (1994) deals with the unlawful detention of an enrolled Advocate who was called by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Ghaziabad for making some enquiry related to the abduction case. But there no inquiry had taken place. The petitioner’s location was disclosed by the respondent. So, a writ petition was filed by the petitioner’s brother before the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution. The argument of the petition is to release the petitioner who was detained illegally. However, the respondent argued that the petitioner had not been detained. So, the court directed the learned District Judge of Ghaziabad to make a detailed inquiry within four weeks of the receipt of the order. The inquiry had the report of the National Police Commission report that nearly 60% of arrests were unjustified. And that unjustified action of the police accounted for nearly 43.2% of the expenditure of the jails. The court also noted the Royal Commission’s report of England on the objectives of the principles of the police in the act of arrest. The court considered the contravenes between the balance of the violation of human rights because of the indiscrimination arrests and increasing crime rate in the society. The Supreme Court bench led by the Chief Justice of India M.N. Venkatachalliah laid down the guidelines for the arrest of a person to protect the fundamental right of the person. And the arrest should not be arbitrary. ***Keywords*:** *Indian Constitution*, *Article 21, Article 22(1), Article 32, Unlawful detention, Police custody, Personal liberty, Individual rights, Legal obligation, National Police Commission and Law enforcement.* **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** Joginder Kumar v. State of U. P ***ii)* *Case Number***WRIT PETITION (CRL) NO. 9/1994 ***iii)* *Judgement Date***25 April 1994 ***iv)* *Court***Supreme Court of India ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench***3/Division bench ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges***i) Chief Justice of India: Justice. M.N. Venkatachalliah ii) Justice. S. Mohan iii) Justice. A. S. Aanad ***vii)* *Citation***1994 SCC (4) 260, 1994 AIR 1349***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved***Constitution of India Article 32, Article 21, Article 22(1), section 58 of CrPC, section 19(a) of Children Act and the rule 229 of procedural and conduct of business in Lok Sabha.**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The case Joginder Kumar vs State of Uttar Pradesh (1994) was held in the Supreme Court of India. This petition was filed by a young man aged 28, who was enrolled as an Advocate. As the petitioner alleged the illegal detention by the SSP of Ghaziabad, the court acknowledged the unlawful detention of the petitioner. In which the court had made an observation in the balance between the individual rights of a person and the increased rate of crimes in society. To understand the key concept of the case and the act of the petitioner we should understand the background of the case. **FACTS OF THE CASE** **Procedural Background of the Case** In this case, the petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner was a young man age 28, who was enrolled as an Advocate. The present petitioner in this case was the brother of the petitioner. The Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) of Ghaziabad (respondent 4) called the petitioner in his office to make an inquiry in some cases. **Factual Background of the Case** On 7.1.1994 about 10 o’clock the petitioner and his brothers Shri Mangeram Choudhary, Nahar Singh Yadav, Harinder Singh Tewatia, Amar Singh, and others were before Respondent 4. And Respondent 4 kept the petitioner in his custody. When the brother of the petitioner enquired the custody of the petitioner, lie was told that the petitioner would be set free in the evening after making some inquiries in connection with a case. On 7.1.1994 at about 12:55 pm., the brother of the petitioner being apprehensive of the intentions of respondent 4, sent a telegram to the Chief Minister of U.P. apprehending his brother’s implication in some criminal cases and also further apprehending the petitioner being shot dead in a fake encounter. The frequent inquiries, and the whereabouts of the petitioner could not be located. On the evening of 7.1.1994, it came to know that the petitioner was detained in illegal custody of the 5th respondent, SHO, P.S. Mussoorie. On 8.1.1994, it was informed that the respondent was keeping the petitioner in detention to make further inquiries in some cases. The petitioner has not been produced before the Magistrate concerned. Instead, the 5th respondent directed the relatives of the petitioner to approach the 4th respondent SSP, Ghaziabad, for the release of the petitioner. On 9.1.1994, In the evening the brother of the petitioner along with relatives went to P.S. Mussoorie to enquire about the well-being of his brother, it was found that the petitioner had been taken to some undisclosed destination. The court on 11.1.1994 ordered notice to the State of U.P. as well as SSP, Ghaziabad. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** - Whether the court can entertain this petition? - Does the arrest is violation of human rights? - Whether the power of police to arrest a person is arbitrary? **PETITIONER ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioner submitted that the petitioner was detained illegally by the 4th respondent. And they argued that if there was any specific reason for the detention. The present petitioner had a suspicion in the intention of the 4th respondent so, they sent a telegram to the Chief Minister of U.P. apprehending the petitioner being shot dead in a fake encounter. They argued that why the petitioner had been detained for 5 days. And they stated that why the location of the petitioner was disclosed. They also argued that why the petitioner had not been produced before the Magistrate concerned. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that the petitioner had not been detained at all, the respondent had no intention of detaining the petitioner. They argued that the petitioner was helping us for detecting in some cases related to the abduction. The respondent also argued that there was no reason for the detention of the petitioner. The respondent does not want this petition to be entertained as a writ petition in this court. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** **Constitution of India, 1950** ***“Article 32: Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this part.*** - *The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.* - *The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warrant and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.* - *Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1) and (2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction ill or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2).* - *The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution.”*[***\[1\]***](#_ftn1) ***“Article 21: Protection of life and Personal liberty.”*** *“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”*[***\[2\]***](#_ftn2) *“Article 22(1): No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the rights to consult, and to be defend by, a legal practitioner of his choice.”[**\[3\]**](#_ftn3)* **Criminal Procedure Code, 1973** ***“Section 58: Police to report apprehensions.*** *Officers-in-charge of police stations shall report to the District Magistrate, or, if he so directs, to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, the cases of all persons arrested without warrant, within the limits of their respective stations, whether such persons have been admitted to bail or otherwise.”*[***\[4\]***](#_ftn4) **Children Act, 1960** ***“Section 19(a):*** *The parent or guardian of the child, if he can be found, of such arrest and direct him to present at the children’s court before which the child will appear.”[**\[5\]**](#_ftn5)* **Rule 229 of the Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha** *“When a member is arrested on a criminal charge or is detained under an executive order of the Magistrate, the executive authority must inform without delay such fact to the Speaker. As soon as any arrest, detention, conviction or release is affected intimation should invariably be sent to the Government concerned concurrently with the intimation sent to the Speaker/Chairman of the Legislative Assembly/Council/Lok Sabha/Rajya Sabha. This should be sent through telegrams and also by post and the intimation should not be on the ground of holiday.”* **JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court ordered to release of the petitioner and the court acknowledged that the arrest of the petitioner was an unlawful detention. The Honourable Supreme Court directs the learned District Judge Ghaziabad, to make a detailed inquiry and submit a report within four weeks from the date of receipt of the order. The horizon of human rights is expanding. At the same time, the crime rate is also increasing. Of late, this Court has been receiving complaints about violations of human rights because of indiscriminate arrests. How are we to strike a balance between the two? A realistic approach should be made in this direction, that the law of arrest is one of balancing individual rights, liberties, and privileges, on the one hand, and individual duties, obligations, and responsibilities on the other; of weighing and balancing the rights, liberties and privileges of the single individual and those of individuals collectively; of simply deciding what is wanted and where to put the weight and the emphasis. That on deciding whether the society or criminal. Society should first and the criminal should not go free on the constable blundered. In ***People v. Defore Justice Cardozo*** observed: *“The question is whether protection for the individual would not be gained at a disproportionate loss of protection for society. On the one side is the social need that crime shall be repressed. On the other, the social need that law shall not be flouted by the insolence of office. There are dangers in any choice. The rule of the Adams case (People v. Adams) strikes a balance between opposing interests. We must hold it to be the law until those organs of government by which a change of public policy is normally effected shall give notice to the courts that change has come to pass.”[**\[6\]**](#_ftn6)* The statement by Judge Learned Hand, in Fried Re: *“The protection of the individual from oppression and abuse by the police and other enforcing officers is indeed a major interest in a free society; but so is the effective prosecution of crime, an interest which at times seems to be forgotten. Perfection is impossible; like other human institutions criminal proceedings must be a compromise.”[**\[7\]**](#_ftn7)* The Court observed that in the case ***Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani***[***\[8\]***](#_ftn8), quoting ***Lewis Mayers*** stated: *“The paradox has been put sharply by **Lewis Mayers**:* *‘To strike the balance between the needs of law enforcement on the one hand and the protection of the citizen from oppression and injustice at the hands of the law-enforcement machinery on the other is a perennial problem of statecraft. The pendulum over the years has swung to the right’.”[**\[9\]**](#_ftn9)* The National Police Commission in its Third report referring to the quality of arrest by the police. The report suggests that nearly 60% were neither unnecessary or unjustified, that such unjustified police action accounted for 43.2% of the expenditure of the jails. The said Commission in its Third Report at p. 31 observed thus: *“It is obvious that a major portion of the arrests were connected with very minor prosecutions and cannot, therefore, be regarded as quite necessary from the point of view of crime prevention. Continued detention in ‘ail of the persons so arrested has also meant avoidable expenditure on their maintenance. In the above period it was estimated that* ***43.2%*** *of the expenditure in the connected jails was over such prisoners only who in the ultimate analysis need not have been arrested at all.”[**\[10\]**](#_ftn10)* Third Report of the National Police Commission at p. 32 also suggested: *“An arrest during the investigation of a cognizable case may be considered justified in one or other of the following circumstances:* - *The case involves a grave offence like murder, dacoity, robbery, rape etc., and it is necessary to arrest the accused and bring his movements under restraint to infuse confidence among the terror-stricken victims.* - *The accused is likely to abscond and evade the processes of law.* - *The accused is given to violent behaviour and is likely to commit further offenses unless his movements are brought under restraint.* - *The accused is a habitual offender and unless kept in custody he is likely to commit similar offenses* *It would be desirable to insist through departmental instructions that a police officer making an arrest should also record in the case diary the reasons for making the arrest, thereby clarifying his conformity to the specified guidelines.”[**\[11\]**](#_ftn11)* The above guidelines are merely the incidents of personal liberty guaranteed under the Constitution of India. No arrest can be made because it is lawful for the police officer to do so. When a public servant is arrested that matter should be intimated to the superior officers, if possible, before the arrest and in any case, immediately after the arrest.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) In cases of members of the Armed Forces, Army, Navy, or Air Force, intimation should be sent to the Officer commanding the unit to which the member belongs. It should be done immediately after the arrest is affected. *Under Rule 229 of the Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha, when a member is arrested on a criminal charge or is detained under an executive order of the Magistrate, the executive authority must inform without delay such fact to the Speaker. As soon as any arrest, detention, conviction or release is affected intimation should invariably be sent to the Government concerned concurrently with the intimation sent to the Speaker/Chairman of the Legislative Assembly/Council/Lok Sabha/* *Rajya Sabha. This should be sent through telegrams and also by post and the intimation should not be on the ground of holiday.*[\[13\]](#_ftn13) Concerning the apprehension of juvenile offenders Section 58 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lays down as under: *“Officers in charge of police stations shall report to the District Magistrate, or, if he so directs, to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, the cases of all persons arrested without warrant, within the limits of their respective stations, whether such persons have been admitted to bail or otherwise.”*[\[14\]](#_ftn14) *Section 19(a) of the Children Act* makes the following provision: *“*The parent or guardian of the child, if he can be found, of such arrest and direct him to be present at the Children’s Court before which the child will appear;*”*[\[15\]](#_ftn15) In England, the police powers of arrest, detention and interrogation have been streamlined by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984 based on the report of Sir Cyril Philips Committee.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) The Royal Commission suggested restrictions on the power of arrest based on the “Necessity of (sic) principle”. The two main objectives of this principle are that police can exercise powers only in those cases in which it is genuinely necessary to enable them to execute their duty to prevent the commission of offence, and to investigate crime. The Royal Commission was of the view that such restrictions would diminish the use of arrest and produce more uniform use of powers. In England, there is the right to have someone informed. The right of the arrested person, upon request, to have someone informed and to consult privately with a lawyer was recognized by Section 56(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984 in England. That section provides: *“Where a person has been arrested and is being held in custody in a police station or other premises, he shall be entitled, if he so requests, to have one friend or relative or other person who is known to him or who is likely to take an interest in his welfare told, as soon as is practicable except to the extent that delay is permitted by this section, that he has been arrested and is being detained there.”[**\[17\]**](#_ftn17)* **RATIO DECIDENDI** The ration decidendi of the case was held that arrest should not be in every cognizable offense and they ordered the following guideline. The rights that are inherent in *Articles 21* and *22(1)* of the Constitution and required to be recognized and scrupulously protected. For effective enforcement of these fundamental rights, the court made the following guidelines as the requirements: - An arrested person being held in custody is entitled, if he so requests to have one friend, relative, or other person who is known to him or likely to take an interest in his welfare told as far as is practicable that he has been arrested and where he is being detained. - The police officer shall inform the arrested person when he is brought to the police station of this right. - An entry shall be required to be made in the diary as to who was informed of the arrest. These protections from power must be held to flow from *Articles 21* and *22(1)* and enforced strictly. It shall be the duty of the Magistrate, before whom the arrested person is produced, to satisfy himself that these requirements have been complied with. The above requirements shall be followed in all cases of arrest till legal provisions are made on this behalf. These requirements shall be in addition to the rights of the arrested persons found in the various police manuals. These requirements are not exhaustive. The Directors General of Police of all the States in India shall issue necessary instructions requiring due observance of these requirements. In addition, departmental instruction shall also be issued that a police officer making an arrest should also record in the case diary, the reasons for making the arrest. The court ordered to release of the petitioner immediately. **OBITER DICTUM** The court considered the emphasis on the right of arrest of a person. The court had made several observations in the case. - The court observed the misuse of the power. The court acknowledged the power of the police that they were misused against the people of the society. - The court observed the horizon of human rights was expanding in the society, where the balance between the individuals’ rights and crimes in the society should be justified. - The arrest of a person should not be routine, it should be justified based on reasonable grounds or evidence. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The Supreme Court concluded that the arrest should be used sparingly and by mere allegation or suspicion against a person. In our society, the power provided to the police is to safeguard the law and order and to ensure the protection of the civilians. In my opinion if the police were abusing their power, then how the society be safeguarded? So, the imposition of the limitation of power with strict regulations and guidelines are the tools that ensure the protection of society even if there is an abuse of the power in the society. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** - *People v. Defore 242 N.Y. 13 (1926)* - *Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani AIR 1025 (1978)* - *People v. Adams 59 Cal.App.3d 559 (1976)* - *In Fried. 161 F.2d 453 (1947)* **Important Statutes Referred** - *Constitution of India (1950)* - *Criminal Procedure Code (1973)* - *Children Act (1960)* - *The Rule of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha (1956)* - *WEBSITE REFERRED* - [*Indian Kanoon – Search engine for Indian Law*](https://indiankanoon.org/) - *[iblogpleader.com](http://www.iblogpleader.com)* - [*Online Legal Research Platform for India Laws | Free Legal Advice Online (courtkutchehry.com)*](https://www.courtkutchehry.com/) - [*http://www.scconline.com*](http://www.scconline.com) - [*https://www.livelaw.in*](https://www.livelaw.in) [***\[1\]***](#_ftnref1) *Article 32 of Constitution of India* [***\[2\]***](#_ftnref2) *Article 21 of Constitution of India* [***\[3\]***](#_ftnref3) *Article 22(1) of Constitution of India* [***\[4\]***](#_ftnref4) *Section 58 of Criminal Procedure Code* [***\[5\]***](#_ftnref5) *Section 19(a) of Children Act of 1960* [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) *New York Court of Appeals 242 N.Y. 13* [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) *Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit* *161 F.2d 453* [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) *1978 AIR 1025 at p. 1032* [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) *SCC p. 433, para 15* [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) *SCC p. 433, para 15* [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) *Third Report of the National Police Commission at p. 32* [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) *The Central Civil Service (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965* [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) *Rule 229 of the Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha* [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) *Section 58 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) *Section 19(a) of the Children Act, 1960* [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) *Report of a Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, Command-papers 8092 1981 1* [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) *Civil Actions Against the Police Richard Clayton and Hugh Tomlinson; p. 313* **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [INDIBILITY CREATIVE PVT. LTD. AND ORS. V. GOVT. OF WEST BENGAL & ORS](https://lawfoyer.in/indibility-creative-pvt-ltd-and-ors-v-govt-of-west-bengal-ors/) **Published:** July 4, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Sakshi Yadav, Amity University Lucknow** **Edited By: Gyanu Patel, Student at Amity University, Lucknow Campus** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** *The Supreme Court of India declared an unofficial ban imposed by the West Bengal Government on a satirical film to be unconstitutional*. They were producers of a Bengali film, Bhobishyoter Bhoot. The film was a satire on the political conditions in contemporary India, about Glass who san to God’s silence through arsenic the margins and the obsolete people. The film was scheduled to ease in Kolkata and some districts of West Bengal on 15th February and received the certificate for public exhibition on 10 November 2015.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) However, a few days preceding the release, Petitioner No. 1 and 2 (producer) received a plane call from the Kolkata police on 11 February 2019 and after that, a letter, asking for an advance screening of the film for senior officials. The communication declared that the police had received some intelligence reports that the first hand could cause “political law and order issues.” **Keywords**: Film, court, preceding, Article, law. **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name***Indibility Creative Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. v. Govt. of West Bengal & Ors. ***ii)* *Case Number***306/2019 ***iii)* *Judgement Date***11/04/2019 ***iv)* *Court***Supreme Court ***v)* *Constitution of Bench***Hemant Gupta , Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud) ***vi)* *Author*** Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud ***vii)* *Citation***2019 SSC Online SC 520***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved*** Article 19**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT ;** They contradicted that the extra-constitutional method adopted by the state and its agencies blatantly violates the fundamental sights of the petitioners under Article 19 (1)(a), 19 (1)(g) and Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. **FACTS OF THE CASE ;** - The film in question was a satirical take on the current political landscape in India. It revolves around Glass, a character who, confronted with the silence of the divine, resorts to toxic means, navigating through societal fringes and interacting with marginalized individuals. The film was originally set for release in Kolkata and various districts of West Bengal on 15th February. It obtained certification for public exhibition on 10th November 2015. - However, just days before its release, Petitioner No. 2, the producer, received a call from the Kolkata police on 11th February 2019, followed by a letter requesting an advanced screening of the film for senior officials. The communication specified that the police had received intelligence suggesting that the film had the potential to lead to “political law and order issues.” - In response, the Petitioner, through a letter dated 12th February 2019, argued that the film had already been duly certified and that, according to established law, no other authority could obstruct the screening of the film once approved by the Central Board of Film Certification. - Despite the film’s release on 15th February 2019, it was abruptly pulled from theatres on 16th February 2019 by numerous exhibitors, with ticket refunds issued. Apparently, this action was taken based on directives from “higher authorities.”Subsequently, the Petitioners filed a writ petition with the Supreme Court, alleging rights violations. - When the petition was filed, only two exhibitors had presented the film. One exhibitor eventually informed the producers that they were “directed by the authorities to cease the screening of the film.” As a result, the Petitioners argued that the State had attempted to ban the film through indirect means, circumventing the rule of law. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether the attempt by the functionaries of the state to interfere with the exhalation of the film is destructive of the freedom of speech and expression? 2. Whether CBFC is an expert body entrusted with the statutory power under the Cinematograph Act to determine whether a film should be certified for public viewing and in the sole repository of that prowess? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** *The Petitioners therefore filed a writ petition before the Supreme Court alleging violation of the nights*. Only two exhibitors had displayed their film when the petitioners filed a writ. One exhibitor eventually informed the producers that they were “directed by the infirmities to lamination arsenal” of the film “keeping in mind the interest of the guest”. The Petitioners, therefore, contended that the authority of the law State had d sought to ban the film through indirect means and without the rule of law. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** “Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, senior counsel for the respondents, informed the Court on 25 March 2019.” The Additional Director General and Inspector General of Police in West Bengal sent letters to various law enforcement authorities, including District Superintendents of Police, about a court order for compliance[\[2\]](#_ftn2). The State of West Bengal confirmed that the film had not been banned, and it was running in theatres outside Kolkata. The court noted that the Joint Commissioner of Police had acted beyond his authority by directing the film’s producer to arrange a private screening for senior officials. The court emphasized that the State of West Bengal must protect the fundamental right to free speech and expression, ensuring viewers can watch the film without unconstitutional restrictions. The court directed the police to withdraw a communication to the film producer and ordered the state authorities to inform all theatres that there was no ban on the film. The court required compliance affidavits from the authorities to ensure their accountability. The court then assessed the grievance related to the release of the film “Bhobishyoter Bhoot” in theatres in West Bengal, following concerns raised by the police[\[3\]](#_ftn3). The text then discusses the social purpose of art, quoting Chinua Achebe and Albert Camus to illustrate the connection between art, society, and freedom. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** 1. Article 19 [\[4\]](#_ftn4) of the Indian Constitution which guarantees the Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression. 2. Article 21[\[5\]](#_ftn5) of the Indian Constitution which guarantees the Right to Life and Personal Liberty. **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** The Court’s ruling stated that there was a deliberate and coordinated effort to violate the fundamental rights of the producers, actors, and audience. Additionally, the Court noted that this attempt was aimed at suppressing criticism and critique. Considering the State’s historical actions and inactions regarding freedom of speech and expression, the Court concluded that the Petitioners’ rights under Article 19(1)(s) [\[6\]](#_ftn6)of the Constitution had been violated. The Court also emphasized the need for a public law remedy to ensure proper compensation for this violation of fundamental rights. As a result, the Respondents were instructed to pay Rs. 20 lakhs in compensation, along with Rs. 1 lakh in legal costs. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The petitioners argued that the State had misused its police powers to wrongfully block the screening of the film. Moreover, the Court took into account the State’s failure to fulfil its obligations in safeguarding freedom of speech and expression. Consequently, it was determined that the State had infringed upon the petitioners’ right to freedom of expression as outlined in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. It was also deemed essential to address the issue of compensation as a remedy in public law for the violation of this fundamental right. In a landmark ruling concerning film censorship cases, the Court granted Rs. 20 lakhs as compensation and an additional Rs. 1 lakh to cover legal costs. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** - Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram to establish that if the film is “*If the film is known non-objectionable[**\[7\]**](#_ftn7) and cannot be constitutionally restricted under Article 19 (2) freedom of expression cannot be suppressed on account of threat of demonstration of processing of threat of violence.”* - *It Further explained that once the film board or tribunal had cleared a film*, the Central government did not have the power to REVIEW decisions based on concerns about potential *PUBLIC RESENTMENT* towards the film and that it was the Government’s responsibility to ensure law and order is maintained. - Considering the social contest, the Court expressed a concern that “contemporary events reveal that there is a growing intolerance which is unaccepting of the rights of others in society to freely espouse their views and to portray them celluloid media” print, in the theatre. **ENDNOTES** [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) https://articles.manupatra.com/article-details/Case-Commentary-on-Indibility-Creative-Pvt-Ltd-V-Govt-Of-West-Bengal-2019 [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) https://www.sci.gov.in/ [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) https://www.sci.gov.in/[](#_ftnref4) [\[5\]](#_ftnref5)https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/tag/article1/#:~:text=It%20is%20a%20personal%20choice,by%20a%20Court%20of%20law. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/tag/article-19/ [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) https://indiankanoon.org/doc/341773/ **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [ARTICLE 20 OF INDIAN CONSTITUTION](https://lawfoyer.in/article-20-of-indian-constitution/) **Published:** July 7, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Ajay Pratap Singh, Law student at Amity University.** **Edited by: Shruti Mayur, Law student at Amity University.** **INTRODUCTION** There are three aspects to the protection provided by Article 20: Firstly, it affords one protection against ex-post fact laws as it holds that no one can be deprived of life, liberty, or property, or be subjected to any penalty, as these are referred to as a punishment before an act which at that time was not unlawful is declared to have been illegal. By this it also precludes the aggravation of the penalty to an extent higher than what the law applicable at the time of the offense provided for; Secondly, it affords protection to persons from self-crimination, it means the person cannot be made to say things that incriminate him /her, the right to silence also emanates from this protection; and Finally, it protects persons in the form of protection from double jeopardy that means that an individual cannot be punished for the same act done by him twice. ***Keywords:*** Ex Post Facto Laws, Self-incrimination, Double jeopardy, Protection, Punishment, Penalty, Confessions, Right to remain silent **MEANING** - For situations where no one shall be guilty of any offense if the acts that amount to the offense are prohibited under the laws in existence at the time of the commission of the act for which one is charged; And no such person shall be liable for a penalty which at the time of the commission of the offense was not discernibly proper. - No natural person can be again tried or punished for the same offense. - No person who stands accused of some offense cannot be compelled to act as a witness for his case. **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** It can be safely said that today over a hundred countries have an Article in their Constitution or other legal concerns that somehow resemble Article 20 of the Indian Constitution. They mostly aim at strengthening the general prevention of torture in one’s treatment, fair trials without undue delays, and non-consensual settlements as well as reiterations of similar charges. Here are a few examples from various countries: The following is a list of basics from different countries: **United States** *Ex Post Facto Law:* Ex post facto laws were banned by the U. S Constitution through Article I Section 9 in the case of federal laws together with Article I Section 10 in the case of state laws. This means that laws cannot be applied back in time to main criminals concerning unlawful acts that were legal at the time they were perpetrated. *Double Jeopardy:* The provision as regards double jeopardy is as provided in the Constitution of The United States Of America under the Fifth Amendment and this provision makes it unlawful to put the life or the limb of any person in danger for the same offense twice. *Self-incrimination:* The Fifth Amendment also contains ‘the self-incrimination clause where it states… ‘nor shall any person… be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself’. **United Kingdom** The UK does not have a written constitution, but similar protections are provided through common law and statutory provisions: For similar protections in the UK, there is no written constitution although there are constitutional laws under the common law system and the statutes passed by the Parliament. *Ex Post Facto Law:* The normal legal system and the ECHR’s Article 7 which was adopted by the United Kingdom and passed into the nation’s laws through Section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998 also protect against the creation of criminal laws whose effects began prior to their passage. *Double Jeopardy:* The rule of double jeopardy was a part of common law which prohibited the trial of a person for the same offense once acquitted. Originally, it meant that an individual could not be re-tried for the same offense, a principle that was altered by the Criminal Justice Act 2003. *Self-incrimination:* The right against ‘be called to incriminate a self’ is among the rights stipulated under the common law and under Article 6 of ECHR on the right to fair treatment. **Canada** *Ex Post Facto Law:* Section 11(g) incorporates the principle of this provision that a person cannot be convicted of an offense if it was not a crime under either Canadian or international law at the time of commission of the act. *Double Jeopardy:* In the Charter, Section 11(h) bars any individual from being tried or punished for the same offense if that person has either been acquitted or convicted before. *Self-incrimination:* Under the Charter of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the right against self-incrimination is captured under Section 11(c) of the Charter which states that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness in any proceedings against him in respect of the offense alleged against him. **Australia** *Ex Post Facto Law:* Currently, there is no ex post facto clause in the Australian Constitution; however, a right can be implied from the Constitution, and so this principle is protected under the Australian legal system. *Double Jeopardy:* The principle of double jeopardy is also recognized in Australia as part of the common law and is also reflected in several of the state codes. Recent changes provide for a review in instances of grave circumstances when new evidence is made available. *Self-incrimination:* This right commonly referred to as the privilege against self-incrimination is enshrined both under the common law and the act, more specifically the Evidence Act 1995. EXPLANATION** **Article 20: Protection against the conviction of offenses** Article 20 of the Constitution of India is a fundamental right that safeguards the rights of an accused/convict. It lays down three concepts: Article 20(1): Ex-post-facto law Article 20(2): Double Jeopardy Article 20(3): Right against self-incrimination Article 20(1): Ex-post-facto law **Every law has two natures:** 1. Prospective and 2. Retrospective A law is prospective in nature if legislation is made in the area or within the sphere of future acts. In this case, a retrospective law regulates the past activities of the convicts. The offense is other than a violation of a law in force at the time when the act charged as an offense was committed; nor shall any person be deprived of the benefit of the law in force at the time when the offense criminals, but they are passed after a crime had been committed making what previously was legal a crime. Concerning speaking, it is a law that turns such previously legal behavior into an illegality. For instance, let “A” steal, and this took place on the 17th of November, which was not an unlawful act on that particular day. The legislature passed a measure making theft an offense on November, 20th. The Ex Post Facto laws pointed to A as liable for whatever punishment the legislature had set as was the case with the new laws; thereby, demanded that A accept the punishment under the set new laws even though he had no knowledge of the effects of his actions at the time that they were committing the crimes. Article 20(1) provides: It shall be invalid for any person to be convicted of any offense other than a violation of a law in force at the time when the act charged as an offense was committed; nor shall any person be deprived of the benefit of the law in force at the time when the offense was committed; and penal laws shall be prospective only. **There are two aspects in Article 20 (1).** According to the first aspect, no one may be found guilty of a crime unless they committed an illegal or forbidden act when the relevant law was passed. Any law that is in effect when the act is performed must be implemented, and violators must be punished and brought to justice for their actions. This justifies using the phrase “law in force” in Article 20 (1). A law passed after an act has been committed indicates that an act that was lawful before the legislation’s enactment may now be considered unlawful. However, Article 20 (1) will protect the act’s interests and prevent the perpetrator from being held accountable for the law’s violations. Any individual is shielded from a punishment more than that which was imposed for their act at the time they committed it under the second clause of Article 20 (1). Due to an ex post facto law, no one shall be exposed to a harsher penalty than what he would have already faced for the previous act at that specific time. **Article 20(2): Double Jeopardy** **“Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa”** Article 20(2) is based on the above maxim which means, “No one ought to be vexed twice for the same offense.” This maxim embodies the protection against double jeopardy. Another significant privilege is protected by this clause, which states that “no individual shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offense more than once.” This means that once an offense is committed, a person cannot face further legal action or punishment for that offense. It protects the accused from being subjected to additional penalties or subsequent legal actions for the same criminal offense. Any law that imposes two penalties for the same offense is void if it does so. It should be underlined that only when the accused has already been “prosecuted” and “punished” once does Article 20 offer protection from double punishment. Even if the two offenses share a trait, this rule does not bar further trials and convictions for a different crime. **Ingredients of Double Jeopardy** - The person should be already accused of an offense - The prosecution for that offense must be going on - The result of that prosecution must be punishment **Article 20(3): Right against self-incrimination** **“nemon tenetur seipsum accusare”** Article 20(3) is based on the abovementioned maxim which means that “no person is obliged to accuse himself”. The right against self-incrimination has existed since medieval times but gained importance in modern times as well since its development in common law countries. This right was started to be considered an essential right and one of the important facets of the principles of natural justice. Another question that strikes our mind is, what is Article 20(3) of the Constitution? Under Article 20(3), the accused cannot be made to testify against himself. At all times, including during the trial stage, the protection is accessible against physical and mental compulsion. It is important to remember that protection only applies to personal knowledge. Things that can be physically manifested, such as my watch, my thumbprint, or a blood sample, are not included. Ingredients: If the following requirements are met, Article 20(3) protection is available. - The person must be “accused of an offense” to qualify for protection under Clause 3 of Article 20. - The prohibition is on being forced to testify. He is required to testify, and the requirement is that he testify “against himself.” **CASE LAWS-** - *Sharma v. Satish Chandra (1954) :M. P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra (1954) :* Issue: This case was concerned with the extent to which Articles 20(3) applied in relation to the search and seizure of documents. Explanation: On this aspect, the Supreme Court was unyielding in its ruling indicating that the protection against having to incriminate one’s self cannot be tantamount to the search and seizure of documents. In the matter, it held that the search and seizure of documents from the accused do not make the process a testimonial compulsion and hence do not fall under Article 20(3). - *State of Bombay v. Kathirullingghad (1962) :\[1979-1980\] 96 BOMLR 414-* In this case, they decided to strike down the provision of the Bombay Police Act which was challenged by the state of Bombay was State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad (1962). Issue: This case also discussed Article 20 (2) whereby explains the aspect of double jeopardy. Explanation: The Supreme Court considered that without having his case tried and arraigned in one jurisdiction, and punished, one cannot be again arraigned, tried or punished in another jurisdiction for the same offense. In this one, it was held that prosecution of an individual for an offense for which he has already served his prosecution amounts to violating Article 20(2). - *State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali (1952) : State of Bombay vs. Narasu Appa Mali 1952* was a case dealing with the interpretation of the newly adopted written Constitution of India on the abrogation of the ‘Doctrine of Lapse’. Issue: Effectively, when a law makes an act an offense, it is retroactive; this violates Article 20(1). Explanation: As held by the Supreme Court interpreting Article 20(1) it observed no law shall be retrospective in the sense that its effect is to be given from the past in any penal matters. This case held that no offender should be made to suffer the consequence for an act that was legally deemed criminal when it was performed. - *Nandini Satpathy v. P. L. Dani (1978) : Nandini Satpathy v. P. L. Dani, AIR 1978 SC 1361 :* Issue: This right to be not held responsible for one’s action is vast where one is. Explanation: In this regard, the Supreme Court stated more, that the right against self-incrimination relates to search and seizure as well. This ruling went further to expound this by stating that, it is unlawful to compel a person to give information that will incriminate him or her, as this is inapposite to Article 20(3). - *S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala (1994) :K. S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala (1994) :S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala (1994) :* Issue: Whether this was a violation of Article 20(3) of the constitution was the act of the police to force a person to provide a handwriting sample. Explanation: The Supreme Court concluded that a threat to compel the handwriting of the suspect is not an infringement of Article 20(3). It was also concluded that the request for a handwriting sample does not amount to testimonial compulsion. - *Selvi & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2010):100. State of Karnataka (2010): State of Karnataka (2010) :* Issue: Criminalistics, especially aspects of Drug evidence received under the exercise of the Narco-Analysis test. Explanation: As per the judgment it is held that the application of the narco-analysis on an accused is a violation of Article 20(3) which says protection against self-incrimination. It continued holding that the evidence obtained from such tests is inadmissible as it violates the right against testimonial compulsion. **DOCTRINES** **The doctrine of Double Jeopardy:** This is a legal maxim that no one shall be held liable to be punished for the same offense twice. It is kept safe by Article 20(2) of the Indian constitution. Double jeopardy safeguards society from subjecting a particular person to trial as well as punishment for an identical violation with the intention of doing it again. **Doctrine of Self-Incrimination:** This doctrine protects people out there from being compelled to give statements that can lead to their imprisonment. It finds its reflection in the provision under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. It also safeguards one’s entitlement not to testify to facts that may harm him/her during the course of a case. **Doctrine of Ex Post Facto Laws: Doctrine of Ex Post Facto Laws:** This doctrine banished the idea of applying a penal law in the past especially when the law was implemented after the event took place. Under section 87-A of the Indian Penal Code, Article 20(1) of the Indian Constitution prohibits the state from making any law that suddenly offers a punishment for an act that was not unlawful at the time the act was committed. The doctrine makes sure that people are not put to jail for things that were not legally wrongful at the time when they were committed. **The doctrine of Testimonial Compulsion:** This doctrine concerns Article 20(3) of the Charter and prevents persons not to giving testimonial evidence which leads to self-incrimination. It also embraces both; oral and written procedures. The doctrine establishes a principle that people cannot be compelled to give evidence that will be admissible in criminal prosecution against them. **The doctrine of Reasonable Restriction:** However, Article 20 sets some basic rights for an individual while reasonable restriction of the provisions of this article allows for limitations of these rights, especially in the case of public order, morality, etc. These restrictions must be reasonable under the constitution. **Doctrine of Legal Necessity:** This doctrine emphasizes the importance of protecting individual rights even in situations where it might seem necessary for the state to encroach upon them. It ensures that legal procedures and safeguards are followed, even in exceptional circumstances. **The doctrine of Due Process:** Though not explicitly mentioned in Article 20, this doctrine ensures fair treatment and procedural safeguards during legal proceedings. It emphasizes that legal proceedings must be fair, and just, and follow established procedures, protecting the rights of the accused. **INTERPRETATIONS** Interpretations of Article 20’s clauses have evolved through judicial decisions and legislative actions to ensure its application in contemporary legal contexts: **Protection from Ex Post Facto Laws (Article 20(1)):** Evolution: Judicial interpretation has clarified that ex post facto laws not only include criminalizing an act retroactively but also increasing the punishment for an act after it has been committed. Courts have expanded the scope of what constitutes ex post facto laws to protect individuals from retrospective criminal laws. Example: Courts have held that enhancing the punishment for an offense retrospectively would violate Article 20(1) as it would expose individuals to a greater punishment than what was applicable when the offense was committed. **Protection from Double Jeopardy (Article 20(2)):** Evolution: Courts have clarified that “same offense” under double jeopardy means the same set of facts and not necessarily the same legal provisions. It prevents successive prosecutions for the same offense, whether under the same law or different laws. Example: If an individual is acquitted of murder, they cannot be tried again for the same murder, even if new evidence emerges. **Protection against Self-Incrimination (Article 20(3)):** Evolution: Courts have expanded the scope of protection against self-incrimination to cover not only testimonial evidence but also documentary and other forms of evidence. Example: Courts have ruled that compelling an accused to give voice samples or undergo narco-analysis tests without consent violates the protection against self-incrimination. Interpretation in Contemporary Contexts: Technology and Privacy: With advancements in technology, courts have extended Article 20 protections to digital communications and data, ensuring individuals’ privacy rights are upheld. Terrorism Laws: Courts have balanced Article 20 protections with the need for stringent laws to combat terrorism, ensuring that accused persons are not unfairly targeted or subjected to arbitrary prosecutions. Legislative Safeguards: Criminal Procedure Code Amendments: Legislative actions have been taken to align procedural laws with Article 20 protections, ensuring fair trial rights and preventing abuse of legal processes. Data Protection Laws: New legislation is being framed to protect individuals’ rights against self-incrimination concerning digital data, ensuring these rights are upheld in contemporary digital contexts. **Judicial Review:** Landmark Judgments: Courts have delivered numerous judgments interpreting Article 20 in various contexts, ensuring its relevance and applicability in contemporary legal scenarios. Balancing Rights: Courts consistently balance individual rights under Article 20 with the state’s interest in maintaining law and order, ensuring a fair balance between individual liberties and societal interests. **FUTURE IMPLICATIONS** Article 20 of the Indian Constitution, with its safeguards against double jeopardy, self-incrimination, and retrospective laws, plays a crucial role in protecting the rights of individuals within the legal system. Some potential future implications related to Article 20 could include: Continued protection of individual rights: Article 20 ensures that individuals are safeguarded against certain legal injustices and arbitrary actions. Its continued application and interpretation by the judiciary will be essential in upholding fundamental rights in the future. Evolving legal challenges: As society changes and new legal challenges emerge, the principles enshrined in Article 20 may face new interpretations and applications. Courts may need to address novel situations to ensure that the essence of these protections is maintained. Balancing individual rights and societal interests: There may be cases where the strict application of Article 20 protections conflicts with the broader interests of society, such as in cases of national security or public safety. Balancing individual rights with societal needs will be an ongoing consideration. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** Article 20 of the Indian Constitution, is evident that the protections it provides against double jeopardy, self-incrimination, and retrospective laws are fundamental pillars in upholding individual rights within the legal system. These safeguards serve as a cornerstone in ensuring fairness, justice, and human dignity for all individuals. Looking towards the future, the implications of Article 20 continue to be significant. The evolving legal landscape will require continuous interpretation and application of these principles to address new challenges that may arise. Upholding the essence of these protections will be crucial in maintaining a balance between individual rights and societal interests, especially in cases involving national security or public safety. As we navigate the complexities of the legal system, Article 20 stands as a beacon of protection, safeguarding individuals from unjust convictions, and excessive punishments, and ensuring fair treatment in the eyes of the law. By upholding these principles, we reinforce the values of justice, equality, and respect for every individual within our legal framework. **REFERENCES** - Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred - LAW Commentary On The Constitution Of India - Online Articles / Sources Referred - **Categories:** Articles --- ### [Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 1959 AIR 149](https://lawfoyer.in/basheshar-nath-v-commissioner-of-income-tax-1959-air-149/) **Published:** July 7, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author:** Icchanshi Srivastava, Law Student at Mahatma Gandhi Kashi Vidhyapith, Varanasi. **Edited by:** Peuli Chakraborty, Final Year Law Student, University of Burdwan, West Bengal. **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** Part 3 of the Constitution provides **Fundamental Rights** to citizens. The Indian Constitution does not provide any provisions for waiving fundamental rights because it guarantees and protects the rights of individuals. These rights were given for the enjoyment of or to safeguard the individual. The U.S. Constitution has this **doctrine of waiver**. In this case, the appellant approached the **Supreme Court** by way of a special leave petition under Article 13 of the constitution because the settlement under Section 8A of the Taxation of Income \[Commission and Investigation\] Act, 1947, between the **Commissioner of Income-Tax** \[the respondent\] and Basheshar Nath \[the appellant\] was invalid. After all, the Supreme Court in the case of **Muthiah v. Commission of Income Tax,** 1955, held that Section 5(1) of the Taxation of Income was an infringement of **Article14** The Commissioner of Income Tax contended that Basheshar has already waived off his fundamental rights; now he has no right to sue us. The Supreme Court held in the Basheshar Nath case that fundamental rights are mandatory rights and no citizen can relinquish his rights even through settlement. The Constitution doesn’t provide any provision for waivers of fundamental rights. Article 13 of the Constitution has judicial review power. This Article declares any law or provision void that is an infringement of fundamental rights, and the doctrine of waiver is also declared void under Article 13. ***Keywords*:** Fundamental Rights, Supreme Court, Doctrine Of waiver, Article 14, Commissioner Of Income Tax. **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name***Basheshar Nath v. The Commissioner Of Income-Tax ***ii)* *Case Number***Civil Appeal No. 208 Of 1958 ***iii)* *Judgement Date***19 November, 1958 ***iv)* *Court***The Supreme Court Of India ***v)* *Quorum / Constitution of Bench***5 Judges Bench ***vi)* *Author / Name of Judges***SUDHI RANJAN DAS (CJ), J.L.KAPUR, N.H. BHAGWATI, SUBBA RAO, S.K. DAS, JJ. ***vii)* *Citation***1959 AIR 149, 1959 SCR SUPL. (1) 528 ***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved***Section 5, 8A. Article 13, 14,136 Of Indian Constitution. **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The doctrine of waiver means voluntary relinquishment of rights. These rights can be granted by the constitution or by any statute; the rights provided by the statute can be relinquished, but the rights provided by the Constitution of India cannot be relinquished in any circumstances because these fundamental rights are not merely for an individual benefit but as a matter of public policy. Rights that are part of public policy cannot be waived. However, the U.S.A. supports this doctrine of waiver, but the Constitution of India doesn’t support this doctrine, even though the Indian Constitution borrowed the concept of fundamental rights from the U.S.A. In the recent case of BashesherNath v. C.I.T., the petitioner escaped the income tax. The Central Government ordered the Commissioner of Income Tax Authorities to examine the account of the petitioner under Section 5(1) of the Income Tax Act. After examining the account of the petitioner, the petitioner was found guilty of tax evasion the Commissioner of Income Tax made a settlement under Section 8A with the petitioner, and in the settlement agreement, the Commissioner of Income Tax authority made the petitioner write that he would not sue the Government of India and the Commission of Income Tax. The question arose as to whether the petitioner waived his right and whether **Section 5(1)** violated **Article 14**. The Supreme Court in this case held that no individual can waive his right. **FACTS OF THE CASE** The fact of the case was that the appellant (Basheshar) had escaped from income tax liability. When the Commission of Income Tax Authorities got to know about his evasion of tax, the central government ordered the income tax authorities under Section 5 of the Taxation of Income Act to establish a commission for examining or investigating the accounts of Besheshar (the appellant). After examining the accounts of the appellant, they submitted the report to the Central Government, and the income tax authorities found that Bashesher concealed his income from paying tax. At the direction of the Central Government of India, the Commission of Income Tax made a settlement agreement under 8A of the Act. Then Basheshar agreed to make the settlement with the commission of income tax on May 19, 1954, and the appellant agreed to pay his income tax by way of penalties in an instalment of Rs. 5,000. The authorities also attached the B properties. They also made a settlement that, in the future, he would not sue the Government of India or the Commission of Income Tax. Bashesher agreed to settle these conditions with the Commission of Income Tax. Later in 1955, the Supreme Court, in the case of Muthiah v. Commission of Income Tax, declared Section 5(1) of the Act, which is an ultraviolet of Article 14 of the Constitution. On this basis, the appellant challenged the validity of the settlement made under Section 8A of the Income Tax Act and claimed they should release his property from attachment and refund his money. The Commission of Income Tax denied the appellant’s claim and held that the settlement was valid. After the decision of the Commissioner of Income Tax, the appellant approached the Supreme Court by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution and challenged the decision of the Commissioner of Income Tax.The respondent \[the Commission of Income Tax\] contended that the appellant has waived his right to sue against the Central Government and the Commissioner of Income Tax in the settlement agreement. LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** - Can an individual waive his fundamental rights? - Whether a settlement made under Section 8 is valid or not? - Whether Section 5 of the Act on Ultraviolent Article 14? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The Commissioner of Income Tax has violated the appellant’s rights by attaching his property and making payment of taxes in instalments through settlement under Section 8 because Section 5(1) was declared void in the case of **Muthiah V Commissioner of Income Tax**. 2. The appellant claimed that his attached property must be released and the payment he made must be refunded to him. 3. Seizing the rights of someone through settlement is not valid, even though it was made by the order of the Indian government. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The income tax officer is allowed under sec 5 of the Act to review the records and accounts of the assessee, and it is not a violation of Art. 14 of the appellant. 2. Attaching the property and the instalment payment of taxes are not invalid because Section 8A renders authority for the settlement. 3. During the settlement agreement, the appellant himself waived his right. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** 1. 1. *“Section 5(1) and Section 8A of the Taxation of Income \[Investigation and Commission\] Act, 1947”.* 2. *“Article 14 and Article 136 of the Constitution”.* **JUDGEMENT** The court held that Article 14 cannot be waived off because rights are a matter of public policy to ensure equality and a large majority of people in India are economically poor and educationally backward. They are not aware of their rights; it is the duty of the judiciary to protect their rights against themselves. Although Article 13 of the Constitution declares a law void if it is an infringement of fundamental rights, Other honourable judges stated fundamental rights can be waived if it is for his benefit. Now that it is an established law that an individual cannot waive off any of his fundamental rights, the court has applied this law in many other cases. such as, in the case of **Yousuf Ali v. M.S. Kasbekar, AIR 1982,** along with in **Nar Singh Pal v. Union of India AIR 2000.** **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** Fundamental rights cannot be waived off in any condition unless and until individuals waive their rights if it is in their interest, and we should also appreciate that our constitution has no such provision for the waiver of fundamental mental rights. **REFERENCES** - - - - **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Prem Chand Garg vs Excise Commissioner, U. P., Allahabad, 1963 AIR 996, 1963 SCR SUPL. (1) 885](https://lawfoyer.in/prem-chand-garg-vs-excise-commissioner-u-p-allahabad-1963-air-996-1963-scr-supl-1-885/) **Published:** July 7, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author:** B.Eeshmitha Ranjani, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar college of law, Andhra University **Edited by:** Mansi, University Five Year Law College, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** Fundamental rights ensure the protection of the people’s interests. Our constitutional makers had adopted fundamental rights from the American Constitution. The constitutional remedies under Article 32 act as a shield for the proper functioning of these fundamental rights. People can directly approach the Supreme Court when their rights under part-III are encroached upon. In this case, the petitioner filed a plea that his fundamental right was breached by a theme the Supreme Court with the power of Article 142. By the said rule, the court has issued orders to furnish him security costs which barred his right to move to the Supreme Court under Article 32. The judges had made keen observations on petitioners’ and respondents’ arguments. So, the court thought that any rule that is contrary to fundamental rights should be held void. Below there was an in-depth explanation of this case. ***Keywords:*** Article 32(1 ), Security for costs, Writ petition, Fundamental rights ## **B) CASE DETAILS** **i) Judgement Cause Title / Case Name**: PREMA CHAND GARG V. EXCISE COMMISSIONER, U.P. ALLAHABAD **ii) Case Number**: PETITION NO.52 OF 1962 **iii) Judgement Date**: 6 November 1962 **iv) Court:** THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA **v) Quorum / Constitution of Bench:** FIVE JUDGE BENCH **vi) Author / Name of Judges:** P.B. GANJENDRA GADKAR JUSTICE, SINHA JUSTICE, P. BHUVESHWAR CHIEF JUSTICE, K.N. WANCHOOJUSTICE, K.C. GUPTAJUSTICE, J.C. SHAH JUSTICE. **vii) Citation:** 1963 AIR 996 **viii) Legal Provisions Involved:** ARTICLE 19, 32, 142 (1) AND 145 OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION; ORDER 25 RULE 1&2, ORDER 41 RULE 1 OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE. ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** Article 32 explains the concept of constitutional remedies, this right is to protect and preserve the fundamental rights of any citizen in India. When any individual rights are violated or misused, then this right comes into the picture. Through these constitutional remedies, one can directly approach the Supreme Court. Along with that under Article 226 a writ petition can placed before the high court too. **HEART AND SOUL OF THE CONSTITUTION-** Dr. B.R. Ambedkar has stated that Article 32 is the **“Heart & Soul”** of the Constitution. It gives power to every person in India, to question in Supreme Court when there is a violation of anybody’s fundamental rights. There are many Landmark cases such as“Kesvananda Bharati sripadagalvaru Vs. State of Kerala AndAnr, M.C.MehtaAndAnr Vs. Union of India &Ors. (1986), Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India (1978)” where writ petitions were filed when fundamental rights of the petitioner are infringed so on. In all these cases supreme Supreme Court’s judgment protects the fundamental rights of Individuals. If any rules violated these rights they were declared by the court as void or invalid. Even Article 13 (2) states that the state should not have any rules or laws in violation of part III of the constitution if made that will be void. Here in this case, the petitioner stated that his fundamental right to appear in the Supreme Court was violated when the court ordered through the impugned rule to pay security costs. This rule was made with the power vested in the court under Article 142 & Article 145 (f) of the constitution, which explains that the court can impose security costs on the case it is considered necessary. However, the honorable court has given judgment interpreting the significance of preserving the fundamental rights over any other rules even though made with the authority under Article 142. Thus, a petition was allowed by the four judges on the bench, whereas Justice Shahveven had a separate judgment stating tonetoners contention and held that the rule was not void. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** Prem Chand Garg and 8 Anr., partners of M/s. Industrial Chemical Corporation, Ghaziabad laid down a petition under Article 32 on the matter that orders passed by the excise commissioner, U.P. to furnish payment of security in the sum of Rs. 2,500/- in cash within six weeks. Unable to collect the essential amount, the present petition was filed on March 16, 1962. Here, the petitioner contended that the O.XXXV r.12 Supreme Court Rules, which stated for the payment of security costs was invalid because it opposed the fundamental right to move to the Supreme Court t under article 32(1) of the constitution. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** - Whether the petitioner’s fundamental right to move to Supreme Court under Article 32 infringed based on the r.12 or not? - Can any rule made with the power of Article 142 have such an authority to violate fundamental rights? - Whether the impugned rule retards the assertion or vindication of the fundamental rights of the petitioner? ## **F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** i) The learned petitioner’s counsel contended that the impugned rule which was subject to furnish the security costs was ultra vires as it curtails the petitioner’s right to move to the supreme court under Article 32(1) of the Indian constitution. ii) Mr Pathakak representing the petitioner’s counsel, stated the fundamental right Article 32 was an “absolutely absolute” right not having any exceptions unlike the rights guaranteed by Article 19. iii) To support his contentions, he mentioned the decisions of cases such as Ramesh Thappar v. The State of Madras (1), Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, and Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, explaining the fundamental right to file a writ petition under Article 32 (1) should not be violated using any other rules. iv) He further stated that, even in the cases where O.25 r. 1 and 2 and O.41 r.10 of c.p.c provisions may commonly apply,the court cannot issue any orders for security costs. And through a test, it should decide by questioning whether the rule assists the assertion or vindication of the fundamental right or does it retard or obstructs it? If it does retard or obstruct the fundamental right of the petitioner by implementing monetary chargers on the petitioner then the rules are said to be bad and, in this case, also this will apply, so the court has no power to make such orders under Article 145 and no jurisdiction make these orders under 142. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** i. The learned counsel for Respondent has stated that the rule challenged before this court by the petitioner was not invalid as it did not infringe the petitioner’s right. Because the said rule was discretionary. So, according to the circumstances of the case court will impose security costs in those cases where they think it is necessary. ii. Solicitor general appearing on behalf of the respondent argues that in certain cases security costs can be charged to the petitioner as per the normal rule under O.25 r.1& 2 and O.41 r.10 of the civil procedure code. Same with all the other court courts in this case also the court should treat both the parties in a fair and just manner. If the court decides to impose pecuniary obligation, then the security costs should be paid by the petitioner. iii. He also suggested adopting the rule of harmonious construction to restore the powers with Article 32 and to determine the broad affection of the provisions Aof rticle 142 & Article 145. iv. Respondent counsel asked the court to make a comparison between Article 142(1) and Article 194 (3) and interpreted that the powers, privileges and immunities specified by the latter article were not subject to the provision in respect of fundamental rights, same in article 142 also the power specified were subjected to the aforesaid rights and in favor his argument he had relied on the case named Pandit M.SM Sharma vs, Shri Krishna Sina ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** ### **“ Constitution of India,1950** #### **Article 32- Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part** (1)The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed (4)The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution.” #### “**Article 142- Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme Court and orders as to discovery, etc** (1)The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe. (2)Subject to the provisions of any law made on this behalf by Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respect the whole of the territory of India, have all and every power to make any order to secure the attendance of any person, the discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself”. #### “**Article 145-Rules of court, etc.** (1) Subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament, the Supreme Court may from ltimeto time, (2) rules as to the costs of and incidental to any proceedings in the Court and as to the fees to be charged in respect of proceedings therein. ” ### **Civil Procedure Code,1908** #### **“Order 25 of CPC-** Rule 1: When security for costs may be required from plaintiff (1)At any stage of a suit, the Court may, either of its motion or on the application of any defendant, Order the plaintiff, for reasons to be recorded to give within the time fixed by it security for the payment of all costs incurred and likely to be incurred by any defendant: Provided that such an Order shall be made in all cases in which it appears to the Court that a sole plaintiff is, or (when there are more plaintiffs than one) that all the plaintiffs are, residing out of India and that such plaintiff does not possess or that no one of such plaintiffs possesses any sufficient immovable property with India other than the property in suit. (2) Whoever leaves India under such circumstances as to afford reasonable probability that he will not be forthcoming whenever he may be called upon to pay costs shall be deemed to be residing out of India within the meaning of the proviso to sub-rule (1). ” “Rule 2: Effect of failure to furnish security (1) In the event of such security not being furnished within the time fixed, the Court shall make an Order dismissing the suit unless the plaintiff or plaintiffs are permitted to withdraw therefrom. (2) Where a suit is dismissed under this rule, the plaintiff may apply for an Order to set the dismissal aside and, if it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from furnishing the security within the time allowed, the Court shall set aside the dismissal upon such terms as to the security, costs or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit. (3) The dismissal shall not be set aside unless notice of such application has been served on the defendant ” #### “**Order 41 of CPC** Rule 10: Appellate Court may require the appellant to furnish security for costs (1) The Appellate Court may in its discretion, either before the respondent is called upon to appear and answer or afterward on the application of the respondent, demand from the appellant security for the costs of the appeal, or of the original suit, or both ” ## **I) JUDGEMENT** ### **RATIO DECIDENDI** The judgment of Sinha ( C.J.), Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo and das Gupta JJ., was held as follows when the petitioner filed a petition for impeaching the validity of the order passed by the excise commissioner refusing permission to distillery supply of power alcohol to the petitioner the court considered this petition and rule was ordered by the court to be issued to the respondents. When the rule was issued, the court directed to deposit a security of 2,500/- in cash within six weeks. Since 1959, this order treated as a condition for passing rule Nisi to charge the respondent in the court. But the petitioner unable to collect the requisite amount, then filed the present petition contending the impugned rule to furnish the security costs was ‘ultra vires’ as it violated the fundamental right i.e., the right to move to the Supreme Court under Article 32(1). This right has a very pivotal role that (4) in Article 32 mentioned that this right shall not be suspended except as provided by the constitution. It is a guaranteed right to the citizens of India. The right to move the Supreme Court is such a right that it cannot be circumscribed or impaired on any ground. In the case Vide state of Madras Vs. V.G. Row it was held that the court must act in the role “Of a sentinel on the quit vive” and in Vide Daryao Vs. The State of U.P., the court must regard its dignified duty to safeguard fundamental rights zealously and vigilantly. As said by the petitioner even though in the case where there court can implement O.25 r. 1&2 and O.41 r.1 of the civil procedure code it was contended that the court should figure out in which case security costs can be furnished from the petitioner, a test was proposed by petitioner which was, to question whether the rule aid or assist the assertion or vindication of the fundamental right or does retard or obstructs it? It was figured out that if that particular rule was placing a pecuniary obligation on the person, then the following rule should be considered to be invalid, here in this statement court observed that the impugned rule didn’t aid or assist the assertion or vindication of the fundamental right of the petitioner under article 32, keeping in view these points the court had said that the impugned rule is declared to be void in the present petition. In support petitioner’s oner argument, he relied on the case Cape of Kavalappara Kottarathil KochunniMoopil Nayar V. The State of Madras to explain the wide scope and effect of Article 32. Although the court has the discretionary power to impose security costs in the cases as it may deem fit, it cannot issue security costs infringing the fundamental rights under Article 32 of the Constitution. Articles 142(1) and 145 have given the Supreme Court power to pass any order to do justice to both parties to the case. However, the apex court cannot make rules or orders contrary to the Fundamental right guaranteed under Article 32. Also, the court observed the past decade’s statistical data of the petitions filed by the people under Article 32, mostly when their fundamental right under Article 19 (1) (f)& (g) was violated. The respondent represented by the solicitor general had argued that the court under Article 142 has very wide and discretionary power to do justice to both parties. The court can impose security costs on the parties which, it thinks is necessary. And to view Articles 142 and 194 with the rule of harmonious construction. He relied on cases such as Pandit M. S. M. Sharma vs Shri Sri Krishna Sinha and others &K.M. Nanavati vs. State of Bombay. But the court observed if any rule imposing financial liability thresholding the petitioner and benefiting the respondent, such rule should be struck down so, keeping this view, the court has declared Rule 12 to be invalid. Setting aside the order to furnish the security costs of 2,500/- on the petition was allowed at last. Now a separate judgement was declared Shah J,held thats contended by the petitioner counsel the court order to furnish the security costs under the impugned rule does oppose his right to approach the Supreme Court under Article 32 (1) when there was encroachment of his fundamental right. Besides, Article 142 confers the power to issue any decree or order and make rules in certain cases where court believes it was necessary to do proper justice for both the parties. As said before;to do justice, court has power to imposed security costs, this will not amount to violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioner. According to case refer Pandit M.SM Sharma vs, Shri Krishna Sinha it was that article 142 and Article 32 should be read with harmony. ## **J) CONCLUSION& COMMENTS** The constitutional remedies were providing protection for the people to a major extent when their fundamental rights were curtailed. Article 32 is really an “Absolutely absolute” right as stated by the petitioner. Whereas, in the judgment of Justice Shah, we can observe he held that the impugned rule was not void , because the honourable court having discretionary power under Article 142, it will impose security costs only when the court thinks it was necessary. ## **K) REFERENCES** ### **a.Important Cases Referred** i) ‘Ramesh Thappar vs The State Of Madras (1950) AIR 124’. ii) Shri Chintaman Rao & Another vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh (1958) AIR 118. iii) Kameshwar Prasad And Others vs The State Of Bihar And Another (1962) AIR 1166. iv)State Of Madras vs V.G. Row.Union Of India & State (1952) AIR 196 . v)Daryao And Others vs The State Of U. P. And Others (1961) AIR 1457. vi)Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni And … vs The State Of Madras And Others (1960) AIR 1080. vii)Pandit M. S. M. Sharma vs Shri Sri Krishna Sinha And Others AIR 1166. ### **b. Important Statutes Referred** i) The Constitution Of India ii) Civil procedure code,1908 \[ONLY FOR OFFICIAL USE BY LAWFOYER’S EDITORIAL TEAM – NO INTERN SHOULD REMOVE OR MAKE CHANGES TO THIS SEGMENT IN ANY CASE\] PLAGIARISM REPORT: \[if no plag enter N A\] AI PLAG REPORT: \[if no plag enter NA\] FORMAT/ FLUENCY REPORT: \[if no fluency/format error enter NA\] **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [The Concept of Trespass to Person in Indian Tort Law](https://lawfoyer.in/the-concept-of-trespass-to-person-in-indian-tort-law/) **Published:** July 7, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Gopika Khatri, University of Petroleum and Energy Studies** **Edited By: Mansi, University Five Year Law College, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur** ## **A) INTRODUCTION** This article aims to cover the following aspects related to Trespass to a person under Tort Law: **1. Definition:**– An explanation and legal definition of trespass to a person. **2. Types of Trespass to person:-** Detailed explanation of assault battery and false imprisonment. **3. Elements:-** Essential elements that must be proven for a successful claim of trespass to the person. **4. Defences:-** defenses that may be employed to counter the claims of trespass to a person. **5. Legal Remedies:-** an overview of remedies available to victims of trespass to person. **6. Relevant case law:-** cases that shaped the understanding and application of this topic. **7. Conclusion:-** A summary of key points discussed. Keywords:- Apprehension, Causation, Redress, Imminent, Intent ## B) SUB-HEADINGS ### 1. Meaning, Definition & Explanation **Trespass:**– It is derived from the lLatiLatin wordnsgression” meaning thereby to go beyond the law. An unlawful act committed on the person, or property rights of another especially a wrongful entry on real property. **Trespass to person:**– It is a tort that is frequently committed in everyday life. It is an unreasonable interference with the body of a person that can be committed either by causing actual harm or by just causing an apprehension of force which is further divided into assault, batteranand d y, false imprisonment. Ex:- the act of going onto a person’s land without his permission. ## Historical Background / Evolution **1. Medieval England:-** This concept first came in the medieval English common law as a way to deal with direct harm caused by wrongdoing. It was a means for people to seek justice when someone has caused them injury. **2. Refinement of Torts:-** During this period diff b/w assault, battery and false imprisonment became more defined. Judicial decisions started to refine the elements of trespass to persons and establish clear standards for liability adefensesces. **3. Development in courts:-** They focused on establishing intent, consent, and the reasonableness of actions as key factors in determining liability. **4. Modern Application:-** Trespass to the person is still a crucial part of tort law. It deals with various types of personal harm and manages to stay relevant by adapting to new contexts and the values of society. The goal of this combination of system and user prompts is to help the assistant enhance the text and make it sound more like something a native English speaker would write. The aim is to maintain a casual yet informative tone while ensuring that the information provided remains accurate and true. **2. Comparison with other Countries** **COMPARISON OF TRESPASS TO PERSON B/W INDIA AND USA** Both India and the USA recognize trespass to person legal concept that protects individuals from unwanted physical contact and interference with their liberty. **DIFFERENCES IN BOTH OF THEM** Intent:- In India generally there is a requirement for intention or knowledge that the act would likely cause physical contact. On the other hand, in the USA, some states follow a similar approach while others have a more relaxed standard They focus on whether a reasonable person would foresee the offensive contact. **DEFENCES:-** Both India and the USA recognize self-defense and consent as defenses. However, in India, there might be specific provisions for defenses like mistakes of fact. In the USA, the specific legal justifications for defense can vary by state. In the USA, each state has its laws regarding trespass to a person so specific details can vary depending on the jurisdiction. In India, criminal trespass falls under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) Section 441 I while trespass to a person is governed by tort law. **3. Types / Kinds** It is divided into 3 types of tort law • **Assault** (The threat or attempt that harms another person like slapping, punching and pushing) • **Battery** (An intentional tort that deals with creating unconsented harm to another person like touching, spitting or even kissing) • **False imprisonment** (The intentional act of restricting someone’s physical freedom without lawful justification for example A person locking another person in a room without his permission) **4. Essentials / Elements / Pre-requisites** **Essentials of Assault** **• Intent:-** It plays an important role in assault cases it’s necessary to prove that the defendant had the intention to cause reasonable fear if there is no evidence to harm there can be no assault The burden of proof lies on the plaintiff to show that the defendant acted with malicious intent. **• Apparent ability to carry the threat:-** The defendant needs to have the power to carry out the threat for it to be considered valid. Eg:- a train moving train makes a gesture towards someone outside the train, In this case, it wouldn’t be considered assault because the person on the train can’t physically harm the other person they can’t hit them while on a moving train. The threat needs to be immediate and possible for it to be taken seriously. **• Apprehension:-** It is required that the act of the defendant creates a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the plaintiff the plaintiff should be able to apprehend that there is the possibility of some damage. **• Knowledge of threat:-** It is required the hat plaintiff should know the threat if a person puts a gun from behind but never pulls the trigger, it cannot be assaulted because the plaintiff does not know of it. **Essentials of Battery** **• Use of force:-** Battery requires that there should be the use of some force or physical force it can be direct or indirect it is also irrelevant when force is created by any injury or damage. **• Without lawful justification:-** The use of batteries should be without lawful justification for ex if a policeman touches another person in performing his duty it cannot be said battery. But if a policeman touches another person unlawfully, it will constitute a battery. **Essentials of False Imprisonment** False Imprisonment total Restraint:-In order for something to be considered as false imprisonment, a person must be completely restricted from moving beyond certain limits. If someone is prevented from going in one direction but is still allowed to go back, then it does not qualify as false imprisonment. So, to sum it up, false imprisonment occurs when there is total restraint on a person’s freedom of movement beyond specific boundaries. **• Knowledge of plaintiff:-** Detaining someone else would have been unjust. It’s not necessary for the person accusing another of false imprisonment to have known about thethefringement on their freedom at the time of the confinement. **5. Defences** **Defenses of assault and battery** **• Kicking someone off your property:-** If someone enters someone else’s property without permission and refuses to leave even after being asked, you can kick them out using as much as force necessary. In this situation using force is justified. **• Lawful Correction:-** Assault and Battery can sometimes be justified if they are used as a way to correct someone’s behavior. For eg:- correcting a student or a child. However, the corrective measures shouldn’t be unreasonable or excessive. **• Retaking of goods:-** If someone wrongfully takes someone else’s property, the rightful owner or someone authorized to take care of the owner’s property can ask for it back. If the wrongdoer refuses, the rightful owner and authorized person can use reasonable force to get it back depending on the situation. **• Keeping the peace:-** If someone is causing trouble at a public place of worship, they can be stopped from doing so using reasonable force to maintain public peace. **• Satutory Authority:-** If a person with legal authority is carrying out their duty and someone tries to obstruct them, the person can be stopped with the use of force. **Defenses of false imprisonment** **• Probable Cause:-** Establishing probable cause through actions is crucial to avoid false imprisonment. It is important to note that the test of determining probable cause isn’t based on an actual crime bit it instead focuses on objective evidence of wrongdoing by an individual. **• Valid arrest:-** If someone gets arrested because they’ve done something illegal and there’s a legitimate reason for the arrest, it’s not considered false imprisonment. **• Consent to Restraint:-** If someone willingly agrees to be confined without deceit or trickery involved, they can’t claim they’re a victim of imprisonment. **6. Legal Remedies of Trespass to person** - **Action for damages:-** If someone’s body has been trespassed, they have the right to bring a legal action and claim damages. These damages aren’t just for physical injuries but also for any harm to their freedom. So, when someone’s body is violated, they can seek monetary compensation for both the physical and emotional impact it has caused. - **Self help:-** It is the remedy available to a person who has wrongfully restrained. The person can be free himself instead of waiting for a legal action. - **Habeas Corpus:-** Supreme Court under Article 32 and High Court under Article 226 can issue writ for a person who is wrongfully detained by this individual who is detained to produce the detained person before the court and rationalize his detention. The person would released immediately if court finds the reason for detention unreasonable. **7. Tradition based laws** Tradition-based law and religious principles are imperative to the resolution of personal disputes, including trespass. Concepts of justice, restitution, and forgiveness play central roles. **Hindu Law:** Traditional Hindu legal principles, drawn from texts like the Manu smriti, influence personal conduct and dispute resolution, emphasizing dharma (duty) and karma (action). **Example:** In rural India, local customs based on Hindu traditions may guide the resolution of personal disputes, including trespass, through community councils. **8. Case Laws / Precedents / Overrulings** **Bird v. Jones (1845):** So, in this case, the court said that if someone touches you without your permission, even if it doesn’t hurt, it’s still considered trespass to person. This was a big deal because it established the idea that intentionally messing with someone’s body is a trespass. **Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc. (1967):** Now, this case made it clear that trespass to person covers both direct and indirect physical contact. It even includes stuff like putting something on someone’s body without their consent. In this case, a waitress put a piece of paper on a customer’s shoulder, and that counted as trespass to person. **Wainwright v. Home Office (2003):** In this more recent case, the court expanded the idea of trespass to person to include acts that mess with your head. They said that unlawful detention and false imprisonment can also be considered trespass to person. So now, it’s not just about physical harm, but also about psychological harm. **Stanley v. Powell (1891):-** The court held that unwanted touching, even if it doesn’t result in injury, constitutes trespass to person. The case established that a plaintiff can claim damages for the indignity suffered from the unwanted contact, reinforcing the principle that bodily integrity is protected under the law. **9. Doctrines** - **Doctrine of Directness:-** The interference must be direct result of defendant’s action. For eg;- If a person throws a stone at another person and it hits them directly, it qualifies as trespass. - **Doctrine of Unlawful Restraint:-** For false imprisonment, the restraint of person’s freedom must be unlawful and without consent. For eg:- Locking someone in a room without their permission is false imprisonment. - **Doctrine of proportionality in self-defence:-** Action taken in self-defense must be proportional to the threat faced. For eg:- If someone is attacked, they can use reasonable force to defend themselves without committing trespass. - **Doctrine of intent:-** The Defendant must have intended the act that cause the interference, even if they have not intend the specific harm. For eg:- If S tries to punch J but misses hitting R instead S can be held liable for hitting R even though she didn’t intend to hit R. **10. Maxims / Principles** - **Volenti non fit injuria:-** To willing person, no harm is done. - **Injuria sine damno:-** Injury without damage this principle holds that a legal wrong (injuria) can be actionable even if no physical damage(damno) occurs. For eg:- In case of assault the mere act of causing apprehension of harm is sufficient for a claim even if no physical injury occurs. - **Damnum sine injuria:-** Damages without legal injury this tells that not all harm results in a legal claim there must be violation of right. For eg:- emotional distress alone without wrongful act may not constitute trespass. - **Qui facit per alium facit per se:-** This principle means that a person can be held liable for the actions of another if they directed those actions. In case of trespass if someone directs another to commit an assault, they can also be held responsible. - **Ex turpi causa non oritur actio:-** This maxim prevents a person from pursuing a legal remedy if it arises from their own illegal act. For eg:- if someone is injured while committing a crime, they may be barred from claiming for that injury. **11. Future Implications** **Wearable Technology:-** Devices like smartwatches and fitness tracker that monitor health metrics might raise concerns about unautorized data collection leading to new forms of trespass claims. **Increased awareness of Rights:-** Greater public awareness of rights may lead to more claim of trespass to person education efforts can empower individuals to seek justice for personal violations. **Pandemic Responses:-** Experiences from COVID-19 may lead to new regulations around like physical interactions, and public health measures influencing how trespass to person is addressed in contexts of health emergencies. ## C) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The whole idea of trespassing on someone’s personal space is a big deal in tort law. It’s all about protecting people from intentional and illegal intrusions that mess with their physical well-being and freedom. We’re talking about things like assault, battery, and false imprisonment – each one dealing with a different kind of personal violation. As time goes on and society changes, we’ve got to adapt these principles to fit new challenges like fancy technology, shifting social norms, and incorporating traditional practices. Our legal system tries to find a balance between keeping people safe and letting them have control over their own lives. That means recognizing things like consent, self-defence, and other defences to make sure we’re being fair and just in the end. ## D) REFERENCES **1. Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** a. Harvard Law Review” b. Law of Torts by RK Bangia c. Law of torts ratanlal and dhirajlal 2\. Online Articles / Sources Referred a. https://www.lawyersnjurists.com/article/law-of-trespass-to-a-person/ Law of Trespass to a Person” – This resource provides a comprehensive overview of trespass to person, **3. Cases Referred** a. Bird v. Jones (1845) b. Stanley v. Powell (1891) c. Wainwright v. Home Office (2003) d. Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc. (1967) **Categories:** Articles, Law of Torts --- ### [Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another,1955 AIR 781, 1955 SCR (2) 58](https://lawfoyer.in/bhikaji-narain-dhakras-v-state-of-madhya-pradesh-and-another1955-air-781-1955-scr-2-58/) **Published:** July 7, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author- Aryaman Arora, University Five Year Law College, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur** **Edited By- Mansi, University Five Year Law College, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur** ### A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE This case analysis examines the detailed issues related to pre and post-constitution laws. This case includes the parties CP Transport Service Servicing Transport company, these two big players are greatly affected by the newly enacted 1947 amendment act which gave the provincial government power to create a monopoly and acquire trade routes for themselves, even though the plaintiffs have a permit to trade, they are denied of so. The key issue that went to court was an interpretation of Articles 13(relating to inconsistent laws), 19(relating to trade freedom) and 31(2). Along with the constitutionality of the alleged 1947 Act concerning the violation of fundamental Rights. This proved to be a landmark judgment in which the court used the Doctrine of Eclipse and indulged in interpretations of word like ‘void’ and ‘dormant’ and ultimately dismissed the writ petitions filed by the motor operators on the ground that subsequent amendments to the constitution namely (4th and the 5th constitutional amendments), rectified the inconsistencies in 1947 Act and revalidated it once again making it operable. ### B) CASE DETAILS - **Judgement Cause Title / Case Name:** Bhikaji Narain Dhakras And Others vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh - **Case Number:** Petitions No. 189 to 193 of 1955 - **Judgement Date:** 29 September 1955 - **Court:** Supreme Court of India - **Quorum / Constitution of Bench:** Sudhi Ranjan Das, N.H. Bhagwati, T.L.Venkatarama Aiyyar, Syed Jaffer Imam, N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar - **Author / Name of Judges:** Acting Chief Justice S.R. Das - **Citation:** 1955 AIR 781, 1955 SCR (2) 589 - **Legal Provisions Involved Constitution of India** – (Article 13, 19, 31,32), Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, C.P & Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947 ### **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** This particular case in point delves into the concept of Doctrine of the eclipse:- This doctrine as enshrined in Article 13(1) – “All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Pan, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.”, which simply means that any law which came into force even before the enactment of the Constitution of India in 1950, if found in violation of the fundamental rights as promised to the citizens of India does not instantaneously null and void, but simply remains dormant or unenforceable till the extent of the inconsistency. The law can once again become fully operable when by way of an amendment it attifies the inconsistency in that specific law such that it no longer commits the said breach of fundamental rights. This doctrine is one of the most prominent doctrines and also finds its applications not just in this particular case but in many of the landmark cases decided by the Indian Judiciary ### D) FACTS OF THE CASE The Factual Matrix, The petitioners were carriage operators in Madhya Pradesh and for a long time had been carrying their business as per permits given under the Motor Vehicle Act. The core problem arose when a new amendment, increased the powers given to the government of the province, essentially giving them the power to create a monopoly in the transport business, which it exercised on 4th February 1955 by taking over certain routes that drastically affected the petitioners economically. 27th May 1955, The Petitioners filed a writ petition in Supreme Court, that aimed to challenge the constitutional validity of the 1947 amendment. They contended that their right to do trade as given in Article 19 was being infringed by the said amendment and asserted it became void as per provisions of Article 13(1). After due consideration and deliberation, on 29th September 1955, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in this landmark judgment dismissed the petitions and upheld the validity of the act based on the doctrine of eclipse. ### E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether C.P & Berar Motor Vehicle (Amendment) Act, 1947 became void after the Constitution of India 1950 came into force, owing to its inconsistencies with Article 19(1)(g) {Freedom to Trade} ii. Whether a law, once rendered void under Article 13(1) of the Constitution, can be revived by later amendments without the need for re-enactment. iii. Whether the amendments to the Constitution (expressly the 1st Amendment, 1951 and 4th Amendment, 155), removed the inconsistencies of the disputed CP & Berar Act, hence restoring its validity. ### F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS 1\. The counsels for Petitioner submitted that the said Amendment Act conferred substantial powers to the Provincial Government, allowing them to create a monopoly in the transport business . They asserted that such an act was violative of fundamental rights enshrined in part III of the constitution (especially Article 19’s Right to Carry Trade). –Moreover cited violation of Article 31 (2) “No property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by authority of a law which provides for compensation for the property so acquired or requisitioned….”, which relates to the acquisition of property by the state only under certain conditions. 2\. The petitioners also relied on the case of Shagir Ahmad v. State of U.P to substantiate their argument that the CP & Berar Act became upon enactment of the Constitution under Article 13(1) {relating to laws inconsistent with fundamental rights}, that the contested act applied a total prohibition on carrying out trade by transport operators and was no manner ‘reasonable restriction’ as laid in Article 19(6). 3\. The learned counsel on behalf of petitioner contended that the contested amendment act was rendered void under article 13(1) and bolstered this argument by citing Professor Cooley’s work on Constitutional limitations (also cited in the aforementioned Shagir Ahmad case) which argues that laws which are void owing to their unconstitutionality remain ‘dead’ and cannot be revived by later amendments. 4\. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the First and the Fourth Constitutional Amendments (1951 and 1955 respectively) did not restore the said contested act. They agreed, that these amendments were to address certain irregularities in the Part III of the constitution but also affirmed that they explicitly did not mention nor revalidate the act in question. They firmly maintained without a special re-enactment through the legislative process, the Berar Act couldn’t be restored to validity. ### **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** i. The counsels for Respondent submitted that the act in question did not become void in entirety upon the Constitution’s enactment in 1950 . They cited article 13(1)- “All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Pan, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void” , emphasizing on the term ‘void’ and argued it meant only ‘till the extent of inconsistency’ , and didn’t imply the entire act to be obliterated/wiped out. ii. They also relied on Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay to bolster their argument that the Act was not dead but only dormant . They further used this case to argue that after the First amendment’s rectification , the CP & Berar Act ceased to be inconsistent and once again became operational. iii. The respondents counsel argued that the Fourth Amendment, 1955 had retrospective effect and had been explicitly applied at the CP & Berar Act and made it constitutional . Therefore , the petitioners now couldn’t challenge it under Article 31(2) {conditional acquisition of property}. ### B) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS #### **Constitution of India –** i. Article 13(1) – “All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Pan, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.” . ii. Article 19(1)(g) – “All citizens shall have the right to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.” iii. Article 31(2) – “No property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by authority of a law which provides for compensation for the property so acquired or requisitioned and either fixes the amount of the compensation or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given; and no such law shall be called in question in any court on the ground that the compensation provided by that law is not adequate.” #### Motor Vehicle sections involved: Section 58 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 – Related to grant and renewal of permits. Section 43 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 – Conferred powers on provincial government. #### **Other provisions involved:** Section 299 of Government of India Act, 1935 Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 – Amended Article 19(6). Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 – Amended Article 31(2). C.P. & Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947 (Act III of 1948) – Amended Motor Vehicles Act for Central Provinces and Berar region. ### H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court in its final Judgment on 29 September, 1951 , dismissed the petitions filed by Bhikaji Narain Dhakras and others , ultimately upholding the validity of CP & Berar Act . The court upheld the notification of the state government in taking over transport routes . Furthermore , the court restored the validity of the 1947 Act , taking into account the First Amendment 1951 and Fourth in 1955 , that rectified the inconsistencies of the contested act with respect to Article 19(1)(g) and 31(2) . The Hon’ble court affirmed that the 1947 Act was merely ineffective until its rectification by constitutional amendments rather than being completely ‘void’ , owing to Doctrine of Eclipse . ### I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The case being a landmark judgment of the apex court, is definitely a one of its kind precedent than delves into the intricacies and analysing the interplay between pre-constitutional and post-constitutional laws. The deep deliberation and analysis of all the smallest aspects of laws involving Articles 13, 19(1)(g) and 31(2) along with considering their retrospective nature is definitely evident in the greatly formulated judgment . I believe the apex court did justice in this case by upholding constitutionality of the 1947 Act. Moreover I believe the petitioner’s arguments were way less convincing and lacked in terms of legal quality. ### J) REFERENCES **Cases Referred:** i. Saghir Ahmad v. The State of U.P. & Others, 1954 AIR 728- This case was cited by the petitioners to argue that laws inconsistent with fundamental rights are rendered void and cannot be revived without re-enactment. ii. Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1959 AIR 648) – This case was likely referenced to discuss the implications of Article 13(1) on pre-constitutional laws. iii. Keshavan Madhava Menon vs The State Of Bombay, 1951 AIR 128, 1951 SCR 228- used to bolstered respondent’s argument that the act was merely dormant and not ‘dead’ **Important Statutes Referred**: The Constitution of India: 1\. Article 13(1) – Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights. 2\. Article 19(1)(g) – Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc. (right to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade, or business). 3\. Article 31(2) – Right to property and the conditions under which the state can acquire property. **Motor Vehicles Act, 1939**: i. Section 58 – Permits for stage carriages and other transport vehicles. ii. C.P. & Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947 (Act III of 1948) – Amended the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, granting the Provincial Government the power to monopolize the motor transport business. **Constitutional Amendments:** i. First Amendment Act, 1951 – Introduced changes to address inconsistencies with fundamental rights. ii. Fourth Amendment Act, 1955 – Further amendments to harmonize laws with the Constitution. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Defamation under Indian Penal Code and Bhartiya Nyay Sanhita: Provisions, Exceptions, Types, and Cases](https://lawfoyer.in/defamation-under-indian-penal-code-and-bhartiya-nyay-sanhita-provisions-exceptions-types-and-cases/) **Published:** July 7, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Pratyush Mahapatra, Lajpat Rai Law College, Sambalpur University** **Edited By: Gyanu Patel, Law Student at Amity University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh** **INTRODUCTION** When someone injures the reputation of other by words or by any other act, it is called as defamation. Defamation in India is both a civil and criminal wrong. Treating defamation as a civil wrong amount to compensation paid by the wrongdoer on the other hand as a criminal wrong the wrongdoer needs to be punished according to law. However there are certain exceptions to this provisions in the code itself. ***Keywords*:** *Defamation, freedom of speech and expression, reputation, Section 499 of IPC, Sedition, Supreme Court* **Meaning** Next to life, man cares and loves most for his reputation. If any injury causes to his reputation, he psychologically suffers to a great extent. Some persons may commit suicide due to defamation. We learnt in history, Rajput women and men committed suicides when they were defeated in the wars. In such circumstances, they felt it would be better to end their lives than falling into the hands of their enemies, and being compelled to live in shame and slavery. ‘‘*Defamation is an injury to the reputation of a person. Rightly law gives protection to his reputation as it gives protection his life and property.*’’ Freedom of speech and expression are the cornerstones upon which all the democratic societies are constructed. Everyone should be able practice it as it is a fundamental human right, regardless of their upbringing or beliefs about politics, religion, ethics, culture and other topics. The maintenance of social harmony and the repair of social connections depend on freedom of expression, plurality and the media. “*Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and expression for identical reasons. But freedom comes with a price, and that price is someone’s ‘reputation’.*” **Historical Background** Although the defamation laws in India were first proposed as part of Indian Penal Code in 1837, they were not codified until 1860, and Lord Macaulay is credited with their conception and implementation[\[1\]](#_ftn1). Defamation was prosecuted in the same manner as it was at the time under English Law. The goal of making defamation illegal in British India was clearly linked to maintaining public order, state security and the protection of British Raj’s commercial and territorial interest. Consequently, Indian Penal Code 1860 was passed, resulting in Section 499, which has stayed the same for 158 years. **Definition** According to Section 499 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 354 of the Bharatiya Nyay Sanhita, 2023 defamation includes, *“Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that person.* *Explanation 1.— It may amount to defamation to impute anything to a deceased person, if the imputation would harm the reputation of that person if living, and is intended to be hurtful to the feelings of his family or other near relatives.* *Explanation 2.— It may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company or an association or collection of persons as such.* *Explanation 3.— An imputation in the form of an alternative or expressed ironically, may amount to defamation.* *Explanation 4.— No imputation is said to harm a person’s reputation, unless that imputation directly or indirectly, in the estimation of others, lowers the moral or intellectual character of that person, or lowers the character of that person in respect of his caste or of his calling, or lowers the credit of that person, or causes it to be believed that the body of that person is in a lothsome state, or in a state generally considered as disgraceful”* This extends beyond only an individual; Section 124A (Sedition) of IPC, 1860 governs the protection of defamation against the state. **Essentials** - A person intends to defame another person. - He makes or publishes any imputation intending that another person**–** 1. By words, either spoken or intended to be heard 2. By signs, or 3. By Visible representations - The person making any imputation, intends to harm to that another person, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person. - If the imputation comes within anyone of the ten exceptions the person making imputations is not held liable. **Exceptions:** The Indian Penal Code, 1860 prescribes the defences that can be claimed by the offender in case of defamation. If the act of such offender comes within the defences, then he/she will be exempted from criminal liability. Those exceptions are: **Imputation of Truth** *“It is not defamation to impute anything which is true concerning any person, if it to be for the public good that imputation should be made of published. Whether or not it is for the public good is question of fact.”* Illustration:”A” wrote an article stating that public agency “B” is suspected of embezzling public money. If “A” can prove with evidence that “B” has engaged in such behavior, then A’s words will not be considered defamed, even if they damage B’s reputation because they are slanderous. **Public Conduct of Public Servants** *“It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the conduct of a public servant in the discharge of his public function, or respecting his character, so far as his character appears, in that conduct and no further.”* **Illustration:** In C, a journalist publishes a report criticizing government leader D’s behavior in dealing with public health problems. If C can prove that the criticism was made in good faith and was intended to promote the public welfare rather than damage D’s reputation, this will not be a defamation. **Conduct of any person touching any public question:** *“It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the conduct of any person touching any public question, and respecting his character appears in that conduct, and no further.”* **Illustration:** Political commentator E spoke out against politician F over alleged corruption in F’s political campaign. If E can prove that the statement was made to highlight the problem of political corruption for reasons of justice and public interest, then it is not libel. **Publication of Reports of Proceedings of Court** *“It is not defamation to publish a substantially true report of the proceedings of court of justice or of the result of any such proceeding.”* **Merits of Case Decided in Court or Conduct of Witnesses and Others Concerned** ***“****It is not defamation to express in good way any opinion whatever respecting the merits of any case, civil or criminal, which has been decided by a Court of Justice, or respecting the conduct of any person as a party, witness or agent, in any such case, or respecting the character of such person, as fas as his character appears in that conduct and no further.”* **Illustration:** A legal analyst wrote an article evaluating the verdict in a major criminal case and discussing the conduct of the witnesses and prosecutors involved. Decision Opinions expressed in good faith are not considered defamation. **Merits of Public Performance** ***“****It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion respecting the merits of any performance which it’s author has submitted to the judgement of the public, or respecting the character of the author so far as his character appears in such performance, and no further.”* **Illustration** A film critic reviews the new film and offers a negative perspective on the director’s work. Since the video is presented to the public and the comments are fair criticism, there is no defamation. **Censure passed in good faith by person having lawful authority over another** ***“****It is not defamation in a person having over another any authority, either conferred by law or arising out of a lawful contract made with that other, to pass in good faith any censure on the conduct of that other in matters to which such lawful authority relates.”* **Illustration:** Employers write performance reviews for employees, pointing out their weaknesses. The review was made in good faith and is within the employer’s rights and does not constitute defamation. **Accusation preferred in Good Faith to Authorized Person** ***“****It is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject matter of accusation.”* **Illustration:** A tenant reported to his landlord that his neighbor was causing a disturbance by playing music late at night. Since the complaint in this regard is made within the person’s right, it does no constitute defamation. **Imputation made in good faith by person for protection of his or other’s interest** ***“****It is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another provided that the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of interest of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the public good.”* **Illustration:** The store owner notifies the other store owner that an employee was caught stealing. These warnings are issued in good faith to protect all store owners and are not malicious. **Caution intended for good of person to whom conveyed or for public good** ***“****It is not defamation to convey a caution, in good faith to one person against another, provided that such caution be intended for the good of the person to whom it is conveyed, or of some person in whom that person is interested, or for the public good.”* **Illustration:** Doctors warned patients not to use it, saying that some emotions returned due to side effects. These warnings are made in good faith for the benefit of the patient and are not considered as defamation. **Punishment:** Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 provides for the punishment of the offence of criminal defamation. The section reads as follows; *“Whoever defames another shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.”* **Forms of Defamation:** **There are two types of defamation.** - **Libel:** Libel is a type of defamation that involves the publication of false statement about an individual or entity in written, printed, or visual forms. Libelous statements are typically communicated through mediums like newspaper, magazines, books, online articles etc. **For Example-** A magazine publishes a false article on Mr.A that the dishes he is serving in his restaurant is not up to quality. In consequence, Mr.A faced a severe loss in his business. As the defamation was published in written form, it is a libel. - **Slander:** On the other hand, Slander is a form of defamation that involves making false spoken statements about an individual or entity. Unlike libel, these statements are not permanently recorded and are more temporary in nature[\[2\]](#_ftn2). **For example-** At a community event someone falsely tells all the attendees that one of their teacher called Mrs.X was caught cheating in the certification exam. This false statement damages the reputation of Mrs.X. Since the false statement was spoken, this comes under Slander. **Case Laws:** ***Harbhajan Singh vs. State of Punjab[\[3\]](#_ftn3)* –** In this case, certain Urdu papers of Punjab published news of smuggling in Punjab, suggesting that there were the hands of political and ruling parties. The State of Punjab issued a Public Notice dated 22-07-1957 stating that the State Government took severe and serious steps to prevent smuggling and no officer or his relatives were involved in smuggling. It also invited the public to name the persons involved in smuggling. The appellant/Harbhajan Singh was the State Secretary of Punjab Praja Socialist Party issued a press note alleging that S. Surinder Singh Kairon(S/O S. Pratap Singh Kairon, the then Chief Minister of Punjab) was the leader of the smuggling and also was involved in several criminal activities. The appellant also stated that he was prepared to face any consequences thereof. He demanded to conduct an inquiry by the judges of High Court, other than Punjab and Haryana High Court. This was published in Tribune on 25-07-1957. ‘‘Surinder Singh Kairon/the complainant sued the appellant under Section 500 IPC for defamation stating that he passed M.A. and worked as Lecturer and was the Managing Director of Amritsar Coperative Cold Storage. He stated that he enjoyed good reputation amongst friends and relatives. He filed the case before First Class Magistrate. The accused filed a petition to the Supreme Court for transfer the case apprehending political influence of the complainant. The Supreme Court transferred the case to the Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi. The accused contended that he made the statement with “good faith” and in the “interests of public”. He contended that he was protected by ninth exception of Section 499 IPC. The trial court convicted the accused with one year imprisonment. The accused appealed to the Supreme Court.’’ *The Hon’ble Supreme Court altered the conviction from one year to three months and also imposed Rs.2000/- as fine.* ***Kartar Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab[\[4\]](#_ftn4)* –** The appellants were the members of the “Amritsar District Motor Union”. The then Chief Minister was Bhim Sen Sachar and the Motor Transport Minister was Jagat Narain. The state government nationalized the Motor Transport under the Punjab Motor Transport Act, 1954. Aggrieved by it, the appellants and other hundreds of motor workers took up a procession in Amritsar against the Nationalization. In the procession, they uttered “Jaggu Mama ahi hai”(Jaggu maternal uncle be dead) and “Khachar Khota ha”(Mule-cum-donkey be dead). The first slogan was alleged to have been directed against Jagat Narain, Motor Transport Minister and the Second slogan against the Chief Minister. ‘‘The CM and the Minister initiated criminal proceedings against the appellants under Section 499 IPC and under Section 9 of the Punjab Security Act, 1953. The First Class Magistrate held that the slogans were abuses hurled at the CM and the Minister and passed the conviction against the appellants. On the appeal to Additional Session Judge, Amritsar the appeal was dismissed. The Punjab and Haryana High Court also dismissed the appeal, and in consequence the appellants moved to the Supreme Court.’’ *The Supreme Court set aside the conviction, and stated that it would be an eye-opener to the appellants and they should behave themselves better in the future.* ***Muppala Ranganayakamma vs. K. Venugopala Rao and Yandamoori Veerendra Nath***[**\[5\]**](#_ftn5) **–** Yandamoori Veerendranath is a famous Telugu novel writer. He wrote “Tulasi Dalam” mixing science and devils. It made sensation throughout Andhra Pradesh and had become best seller. Dr. K. Venogopala Rao wrote foreword to the said book. Muppala Ranganayakamma is also a famous novel writer and critic. She severely criticized by imputing words to the complainants, which lacked good faith and showed malice. The trial court found her guilty. On appeal, the Andhra Pradesh High Court confirmed the judgement of the trial court. ***Subramanian Swamy vs. Union of India[\[6\]](#_ftn6)***– ‘‘In this case, the Supreme Court of India upheld the constitutional validity of criminal defamation laws. The petitioner, Subramanian Swamy argued that these laws violated the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. The court ruled that criminal defamation serves as a reasonable restriction on free speech to protect an individual’s reputation.’’ **CONCLUSION:** A person’s reputation and public image are things they have earned during their life and they are valuable assets. Defamation is the opposite of these things. The balance between Freedom of Speech and Expression is perfectly balanced by the defamation laws in India. The New Criminal Law Bill has been passed and in this new Bill the IPC has been renamed as Bharatiya Nyay Sanhita including some changes in the provisions. In the newly passed BNS the provisions of defamation has been described under Section 354. **REFERENCES** **Cases Referred** - **Harbhajan Singh vs State of Punjab** - **Kartar Singh & Ors. Vs State of Punjab** - **Muppala Ranganayakamma vs. K. Venugopala Rao and Yandamoori Veerendra Nath** - **Subramanian Swamy vs. Union of India** **Statutes Referred** - **Indian Penal Code, 1860** - **Bharatiya Nyay Sanhita, 2023** **ENDNOTES** [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Prep BE, “BYJU’S Exam Prep” (*BYJU’S Exam Prep*, October 17, 2023) accessed June 14, 2024 [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) *Defamation law in India: IPC Section 499 and 500*. (n.d.). Defamation Law in India: IPC Section 499 and 500. Retrieved June 14, 2024, from [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) AIR 1961 SC 215 [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) AIR 1956 SC 541 [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) 1987 Cr LJ 2000 AP [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 184 OF 2014 **Categories:** Articles, Criminal Law --- ### [Principles of Natural Justice and Implementation in Criminal Justice of India](https://lawfoyer.in/principles-of-natural-justice-and-implementation-in-criminal-justice-of-india/) **Published:** July 7, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Shalini Dhyani, Law Student at Vasudev College of Law, Haldwani, Nainital** **Edited By: Gyanu Patel, Law Student at Amity University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh** **ABSTRACT** The principle of natural justice is not a new concept in the criminal justice system in India. The natural justice system is the procedure of fairness. One of the most prestigious courts of the country is the Supreme Court of India which deals with legal cases and proceedings daily that cover different parts or branches of the legal sphere while keeping in mind the principles of natural justice to meet transparency and fairness in the criminal justice system. This article covers the historical background of the natural justice system with its jurisprudential essence, also it deals with the incorporation of the natural justice system in the Indian legal system. Furthermore, it focuses on the judicial interpretation helps in shaping the concept of natural justice in India. Natural justice is one of the fundamental factors that helps in administrative and legal processes, with our comprehensive research this article focuses on the crucial role of the natural justice system in protecting basic human rights and advocating a fair judicial system in India. **Keywords:** natural justice, criminal justice system, Fairness, India, Supreme Court, legal, justice. ### INTRODUCTION: **Lord Esher M.R** defined Natural Justice as “*the natural sense of what is wrong and what is right also he explained natural justice as fundamental justice*”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) The term Natural Justice is taken from the Latin word that is “Jus Naturale” which means natural law or natural right. To prevent injustice or arbitrary decisions made by those in positions of authority, it is a philosophical system of moral principles based on human nature and moralistic notions of good and evil. Natural justice principles have been developed by courts to keep order, stop power abuse, and guarantee the efficient administration of justice.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Justice has come from the Latin word ‘jus’ which means right. Justice is located into the several conceptions like morality, righteousness, rationality etc. Need, Equality are the main core principles of justice. Justice should not only be done but it should seen to be done. Ensurance of justice is not only the purpose of the principle but maintaining the transparency and fairness of the process is also important. It is a concept that is essential in order to maintain the trust of the public in the legal system. ### ORIGIN AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NATURAL JUSTICE: The notion of natural justice, which has its origins in ancient times, was acknowledged by both the Greeks and Romans. The concept of divine prohibition is illustrated in the biblical narratives of Kautilya, Arthashastra, and Adam, where Eve and Adam were explicitly forbidden from consuming the fruit of knowledge. The notion originating from the Roman phrases ‘jus-naturale’ and ‘lex-naturale’, which encompass principles of natural justice, natural law, and equity, was later acknowledged by English jurists. Natural justice refers to an innate understanding of moral correctness and ethical principles.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) In the matter of electoral disputes the case upheld the principle of Audi alteram partem. It was held that the natural justice principle is applicable to those administrative actions which are not quasi-judicial in nature. It highlights the significance of granting a just, fair or impartial hearing prior implementation of unfavorable measures.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) The concept of justice is not a static one it is a very complex and it should be noted that the changes don’t come overnight, it came gradually and similarly, this concept has been developed over centuries among various nations and still in the phase of change. It must be noted that human fairness be first priority.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) ### AIMS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NATURAL JUSTICE: The principle of natural justice has certain aims from giving the opportunity of a fair hearing to protecting the justice from miscarriage. The following are the main aims of the principle of natural justice: - The first aim of the principle of natural justice is to provide the opportunity of fair hearing or to give an equal opportunity to be heard in a case. - It is one of the aims of the principle of natural justice is to adhere to the principle of equality and to provide fairness in the proceedings. - Another aim of the principle of natural justice is to remove all the vulnerabilities of the legislature and to protect fundamental rights from further loopholes or flaws. - The main purpose of the principle is to provide fair justice and to make sure that the justice should not face any kind of miscarriage in any case or in any field. It is to be noted that the justice should not be compromised at any cost. ### THREE IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE: Justice is an essential element that should not be compromised or there should not be any place for injustice. There are the three principles of natural justice which are as follows: - Nemo in propria causa judex, esse debet - Audi alteram partem, and - Speaking orders or reasoned decisions. **Nemo in propria causa judex, esse debet:** it is a rule against bias or a doctrine of bias that states that no one can be judged in his case. The principle mandates that decision-makers should remain neutral and unbiased in resolving disagreements. This principle requires no personal or financial stake in the outcome and no preconceived assumptions about the parties involved or the subject. Bias refers to any operating predisposition held by the judge, whether conscious or unconscious. This principle is fundamental to any administrative action, ensuring that administrators have no personal or private interest in the outcome and no reasonable grounds to believe the decision was biased.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) This rule of bias consists of three kinds of biases those are: - **Personal bias**: Personal bias occurs when an individual has a connection, professional animosity, or enmity towards the other parties involved in a judgment. It is vital to assess if there is a valid basis to presume bias. For example, if a judge has a personal contact with either party in a legal issue, it is vital for the judge to recuse himself from the case.[\[7\]](#_ftn7)This bias undergoes two kinds of tests mainly (Reasonable Suspicion of Bias and Real Likelihood of Bias). - **Pecuniary bias:** The smallest financial interest in a litigation matter is regarded as disqualifying from sitting as a judge, and any financial involvement in the dispute is presumed to prohibit a person from serving as a judge.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Pecunious bias is the state in which a judicial body or authority stands to receive any kind of financial advantage, no matter how little, which could cause biassed decision-making.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) - **Subject-matter bias:** Mere involvement does not invalidate the administrative decision in circumstances when a deciding officer is either directly or indirectly involved in the matter unless there is a clear chance of prejudice. Magistrates in R v. Deal Justices Exparte Curling were not disqualified to try a case of cruelty to an animal because of their royal society membership for animal control.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Along with it, there are departmental biases, policy notion biases, and bias on account of obstinacy. **AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM**: it means let both the parties be heard. It is a rule of hearing that there should not be any injustice to any other party by not giving them proper time to hear them. Natural justice principles are critical in legal procedures because they ensure that no one is condemned without being heard, and both sides must be heard before any order is issued. These principles are universally applicable and can invalidate the exercise of power in situations where an authority has the right to issue orders affecting an individual’s liberty or property without a prior hearing provision. They supplement land law and apply to quasi-judicial and administrative tribunals. However, these principles are adaptable and may not be required in all cases.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) This rule of hearing has some components which are essential for acknowledging this doctrine. - There must be issuance of notice. - There should right to present the case and evidence as well as. - There must be cross-examinational rights. - Legal representative rights must be present. **JURISPRUDENTIAL ESSENCE OF NATURAL JUSTICE:** The concepts of natural justice are not only significant in the administration of justice but also in administrative and regulatory decision-making. Administrative authorities, such as regulatory agencies and tribunals, are expected to respect the principles of natural justice when making judgments that may affect individuals or corporations. This entails allowing parties to be heard and providing an impartial and unbiased decision-maker.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) **WEDNESBURY PRINCIPLE**: This principle came into force in 1948 as it is a European concept and it has came from a landmark case named **Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporatio**n[\[13\]](#_ftn13), Wednesbury’s principle is based on the rationality of the decision, it states that whenever a decision is taken by the public authority and that decision is so irrational or unreasonable that no person acting reasonably would agree to do it. This means that it is so absurd to find such a decision irrational or unreasonable. Generally, it is based on the concept of testing the reasonability of the decision made by the public authorities. **DOCTRINE OF PROPORTIONALITY:** it is a similar concept that of Wednesbury principle but it is a more nuanced concept. This doctrine defines that any decision that is taken by a public authority must have a proportionate relation to the aim it seeks to achieve. The decision should not be restrictive to the goal that is used to be achieved. It not only focuses on rationality but also on fairness, reasonability, equitability, and a balanced view of judgment or decision. ### INCORPORATION OF NATURAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN INDIA: The Constitution of India has the following components of the natural justice system although it is not explicitly mentioned there there are some article that holds the essence of the principle of natural justice: Preamble, Articles 14, 19, 21, and 22 of the Constitution of India. ### NATURAL JUSTICE UNDER THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE The Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) that reflects these values at several points has underlined the natural justice concepts. These provisions and values guarantee the accused gets equitable treatment. Under the Criminal Procedure Code, the three natural justice values are combined and underlined under a division. 1. **Right to a Fair Hearing** The CrPC highlights in certain provisions that the accused shall have a right to a fair hearing. Section 207 mandates that the accused receive a copy of police report and other documentation including the FIR filed under section 154, the statements recorded under section 161 or any other documentation the prosecutions rely on and have sent to the magistrate under section 173(5). The provision ensures that the accused fully understands the charges and proof against them, so enabling a fair possibility for the development of a defence. Under Chapter 24 Section 303 the CrPC grant a Right of Person against Whichever Proceeding is Instituted to be Defended. It assures that a pleader of inclination has the right to defend anyone against whom proceedings are started under the CrPC. This part ensures that the accused could have legal counsel, therefore safeguarding his right to a fair trial. Further Section 311 of the Code addresses the ability to call upon material witness or examine person present. It permits the court call any person as a witness or recall and re-examine any person should their evidence seem essential for the just decision of the case. This power ensures that all relevant data is considered, therefore supporting a fair hearing. 2. **Rule Against Bias** The Judges and Magistrates are forbidden under Section 479 of the Code not to try cases in which they personally are interested. Judges and magistrates are not allowed to try or commit from a case in which they have a personal interest or to which they are a party. This guarantees objectivity and hence helps to avoid any possible prejudice in court processes. 3. **Doctrine of Reasoned Decisions** The principle is clearly expressed in Section 354 of the Code, which defines the language and subjects of a ruling. This section clearly states that every ruling has to be recorded in the court’s official language. It has to include the particular problem or conflicts to be fixed, the related resolution, and a thorough justification of the decision. This encourages responsibility and openness in court decisions so that the engaged parties may understand the reasoning behind them. 4. **Other Relevant Provisions** **Section 235: Decision on Either Conviction or Acquittal** After a trial ends, this part calls for the judge to render an acquittal or conviction judgement together with reasons for their decision. This guarantees that the judgement is grounded on a careful and equitable review of the facts and conforms with the idea of rational decisions. **Section 313: Power to investigate the accused** After the evidence of the prosecution has been given, this part lets the court probe the accused generally on the case. It guarantees that the accused has the chance to clarify any situation that the evidence seems to point against them, so supporting a fair trial procedure. These and other provisions are included into the CrPC to support the natural justice values inside the criminal justice system. These values are basic guarantees of fair, objective, transparent administration of justice, therefore protecting of individual rights engaged in criminal procedures. ### JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS IN MATTER OF NATURAL JUSTICE: 1. **Maneka Gandhi vs Union of India[\[14\]](#_ftn14)**: This case plays an important role in the growth of the principle of Natural Justice in India. Here the honorable court held that there must be reasonability, justiciability, and fairness be present in the procedure that established by the law. Any kind of arbitrariness will not be practiced in the law. In this case the Supreme court emphasised on the one of the principle of natural justice that is Audi alterem partem which is the opportunity of being heard or fair hearing along with opportunity to defend oneself before any arbitrary decision of the court. Here the Court held that denial of one’s right to life and liberty is a severe violation of principal of natural justice. 2. **Chairman Mining Board v. Ramjee**[\[15\]](#_ftn15): In this case, the court interpreted the concept of natural justice and defined that natural justice is a fundamental principle that guarantees equity in judicial proceedings, taking into account the specific details and conditions of each individual case. It is a pivotal procedural principle that ensures fairness in court. The principle of natural justice can be aggravating if it has been expanded without administrative realities. Courts cannot view law abstractly or natural justice as a mere artifact. If the totality of facts satisfies the court that the party visited with adverse order has not suffered from denial of fair opportunity, they will not be punctilious or fanatical, as if the standards of natural justice were hallowed scriptures.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) 3. **Ridge vs Baldwin:** This case is one of the most crucial case in the field of administrative law which focuses on the principles of natural justice and also focuses on the right of fair hearing. Here Mr Ridge did not get proper opportunity to be heard, he was unable to defend himself against the allegations of conspiracy so court here held that right to fair hearing is one the basic principle of natural justice and court also ensured that there should not be biasness while making the decisions in simple terms there should not be arbitrariness in decision of administrative authorities**.** ### CONCLUSION: It can be concluded that with time the judiciary has relied upon the importance of natural justice through its judicial precedents. The principle of justice is not only applied to solely courts of law it has been extended to tribunals and statutory and administrative authorities who have the responsibility of determining the rights and duties of the people. It is well said that justice must not only be done but it must also be done. The main purpose of this principle is to protect public rights against the arbitrariness of administrative authorities. Fairness is the main component that can be seen to be alive. Any decision that violates or infringes this principle may be declared null and void. For a valid administrative settlement, one should keep in mind that there is a need for the principle of natural justice. ### **ENDNOTES** [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) ‘Audi Alteram Partem and Nemo Judex In Causa Sua: The Two Pillars of Natural Justice’ Surbhi Jindal and Anunay Pandey, ‘Audi Alteram Partem and Nemo Judex in Causa Sua: The Two Pillars of Natural Justice’ (*articles.manupatra.com*December 2023) <>. accessed 11 June 2024. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Sneha Mahawar, ‘Application of Principles of Natural Justice’ (*iPleaders*, 13 August 2023) accessed 11 June 2024. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Sahithi reddy, ‘Principles of Natural Justice’ (lawyersclubindia4 May 2023) accessed 3 July 2024. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Ruchika Mohapatra, ‘Detailed Notes on the Principles of Natural Justice’ (CLATalogue18 November 2023) accessed 3 July 2024. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Siddharth R and A Sreelatha, ‘Principle of Natural Justice and Its Application in Indian Legal System’ (2018) 120 International Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) ‘Audi Alteram Partem and Nemo J Siddharth R and A Sreelatha, ‘Principle of Natural Justice and Its Application in Indian Legal System ’ (2018) 120 International Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7)‘Principles of Natural Justice’ (Unacademy) accessed 3 July 2024. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8)Ramachandra Mcrhrdit, ‘Principles of Natural Justice’ accessed 11 June 2024. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) LawBhoomi, ‘Rule against Bias’ (LawBhoomi5 August 2023) accessed 3 July 2024. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Umashankar Dhakar, ‘Rule against Bias’ (2022) 10 International Journal of Creative Research Thoughts 2320 accessed 3 July 2024. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11)Ram Dutt Sharma, ‘Updates\_Concept\_Principle\_Natural\_Justice’ (*cavinaymittal.com*) <[https://cavinaymittal.com/resource/Updates\_Concept\_Principle\_Natural\_Justice.aspx](https://cavinaymittal.com/resource/Updates_Concept_Principle_Natural_Justice.aspx)> accessed 13 June 2024. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Aishwarya Sandeep, ‘Important Role of Doctrine of Natural Justice and the Support of Constitution – Aishwarya Sandeep- Parenting and Law’ (26 February 2023) accessed 11 June 2024. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) \[1948\] 1 KB 223 [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) \[1978\] 1 SCC 248 (SC). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) 1977 AIR 965 SC. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Ram Dutt Sharma, ‘Updates\_Concept\_Principle\_Natural\_Justice’ (cavinaymittal.com) accessed 3 July 2024. **Categories:** Articles --- ### [Om Prakash v. State of U.P., AIR 2004 SC 1896](https://lawfoyer.in/om-prakash-v-state-of-u-p-air-2004-sc-1896/) **Published:** July 7, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Arsh Singh, Law Student at UPES Dehradun** **Edited By: Gyanu Patel, Law Student at Amity University, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** In the landmark case of Om Prakash vs. State of Uttar Pradesh \[2004\] which was about the rule of banning the sale of non-vegetarian food, even eggs, in three specific towns which were considered to be religious and important pilgrim centers with a vast majority of vegetarian people and where tourist use to visit pilgrim. Due to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court stating the prohibition of non-vegetarian foods in the 3 towns keeping the interest of the public at large, shopkeepers, including Om Prakash, were not happy with this rule which stated that they couldn’t sell non-veg food in certain towns in Uttar Pradesh. The Supreme Court looked at the cultural and religious makeup of these towns and it turned out that many of the people there were vegetarian. Considering the majority the court also considered the impact it would have on the local economy, especially because these towns attract many tourists and pilgrims. The court believed the ban made sense and stated that since the residents were mostly vegetarian and the towns relied on vegetarian tourism, it was fair and justified to restrict non-veg food. However, it is pertinent to note that the court also mentioned that they can still get their non-veg fix in nearby areas. The court thought it reasonable to ban non-vegetarian cuisine because the majority of the population was vegetarian and the towns depended on vegetarian tourism. Still, they said they could satisfy their cravings for non-vegetarian food in the surrounding locations. ***Keywords***– prohibition, culture, religion, supreme court, majority, non-vegetarian. **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name****OM PRAKASH V STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH**Case Number***3270 OF 1998*Judgement Date***9 March 2004 *Court***SUPREME COURT *Quorum / Constitution of Bench***SINGLE JUDGE BENCH*Author / Name of Judges***D.M. DHARMADHIKARI*Citation***AIR 2004 SC 1896*Legal Provisions Involved***1- CONSTITUTION OF INDIA- Article 19\[1\], Article 51-\[A\] \[E\], \[F\] 2-MUNICIPALITIIES ACT 1916- Section 241, 298**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** This case resulted from an appeal filed by Om Prakash challenging the power of the municipal board seeking whether it has the power to amend the law itself within its reach. The 3 specific towns in the region were considered the main pilgrim centers, the demand for the ban was supported by several vegetarians after which the Municipal authority justified the ban on the sale of eggs based on representations from citizens, religious organizations, and institutions operating in the area. The center’s purpose was to create and uphold a vegetarian atmosphere for the people of religious towns. The main issue revolved around whether the municipal made bye-laws itself which was considered to be in the affirmative. Keeping in the interest of the public at large the restriction was considered to be reasonable and power was within the limit. **FACTS OF THE CASE** **Procedural Background of the Case** In the trial court, the prosecution presented its case, calling witnesses and presenting evidence. Om Prakash was allowed to defend himself, which included cross-examining witnesses and presenting his evidence. The trial court found Om Prakash guilty of the charges against him and sentenced him accordingly. Unsatisfied with the trial court’s decision, Om Prakash appealed the conviction and sentence. The case was taken to the Allahabad High Court, where Om Prakash challenged the trial court’s decision. After reviewing the case, the High Court upheld the conviction and sentence, dismissing the appeal. Om Prakash then appealed to the Supreme Court of India. The Supreme Court admitted the appeal, and both sides presented their arguments. The Supreme Court reviewed the evidence, the legal arguments, and the judgments of the lower courts. The Supreme Court delivered its judgment in 2004, reported as AIR 2004 SC 1896. The court examined the procedural and substantive aspects of the case, including the handling of evidence and adherence to legal principles. **Factual Background of the Case** In this case, Om Prakash and the other shopkeepers were not pleased with the regulation/gazette notification that prohibited them from selling non-vegetarian cuisine in specific Uttar Pradesh towns. The court examined the religious and cultural composition of these settlements. It turned out that there were a lot of vegetarians there. Additionally, they took into account the effect on the regional economy, particularly given how many pilgrims and tourists come to these places. It concerned a law that forbade the selling of any non-vegetarian food in three certain municipalities, including eggs. The court found that the ban was reasonable. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** **I\]** Whether the Municipal Board of Rishikesh has the power to amend its bye-laws and impose a prohibition on the sale of eggs within the municipal limit **II\]** Whether the complete prohibition imposed on the trade of eggs within the municipal limits of Rishikesh can be held to be reasonable under Article 19\[6\] and violates the fundamental right of practicing trade guaranteed under Article 19\[1\]g **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** **1\]** The counsel for the Appellant submitted that Egg trading is not undesirable or harmful to society, and it significantly impairs the appellants’ ability to engage in commerce as permitted by Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. In actuality, eating eggs is recommended as a way to boost public health since doctors see them as a nutrient-rich addition to other foods. Certain eggs are acceptable to various segments of society, including vegetarians, because they don’t contain any chicks and therefore, they are acceptable to every section of society. The counsel for the appellant also stated that complete prohibition is arbitrary and irrational as Eggs cannot – be interpreted as being part of “meat” or “fish” because the eggs the appellants are selling do not hatch and give birth to chicks. **2\] The counsel for the appellant submitted that through Section 298(2) List I Heading F and Section 241 of the Act, the respondent Board was not permitted to create a bylaw about “eggs” under Section 298 of the Act. It also submits that it does not appear that a special procedure was adopted by Section 298(1), which requires the adoption of a special resolution. As a result, the modified bylaw is unsustainable. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsel for the respondent submitted that these three specific towns are important pilgrim centers supported by the vast majority of vegetarians and tourists on auspicious days. A vast majority is in support of promoting vegetarianism throughout the region due to their worship and religion. The council also stated that there were earlier bans that faced no challenges and were accepted by the people thus the ban was considered to be reasonable. - The counsel for the respondent submitted that the Municipal Board has general authority under Section 298(1) of the Act to create bylaws to administer municipal affairs under the Act and for the promotion or maintenance of the president’s health, safety, and convenience; this general authority of the Municipality even extends to those subjects that have not been specifically listed under Section 298(2) List I Heading F of the Act. - The counsel for Respondent submitted that Section 241 of the Act deals with the requirement of obtaining a license to use any place as a market or shop for the sale of animals, meat, or fish intended for human food, or as a market for the sale of fruits or vegetables and such right shall be subject to the bye-laws made under Section 298(2) List I Heading F of the Act; the words used in this section as to “animals”, “meat” or “fish” are not followed with the word “only”, which means that for other similar articles also there may be a requirement for license; none of the provisions of the Act including Sections 241 and 298 provides that the Municipality cannot make bye-laws for imposing a ban on the sale of eggs within municipal limits. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** **SECTION 241 OF MUNICIPALITIES ACT 1916***:‘’ Licensing of markets and shops for sale of certain articles.—(1) The right of any person to use any place, within the limits of a municipal area, other than a municipal market, as a market or shop for the sale of animals, meat, or fish intended for human food, or as a market for the sale of fruit or vegetables, shall be subject to bye-laws (if any) made under Heading F of Section 298.’’[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)* **SECTION 298 OF MUNICIPALITIES ACT 1916**: “*Power of municipality to make bye-laws- A municipality by special resolution may, and where required by the State Government shall, make bye-laws applicable to the whole or any part of the municipal area, consistent with this Act and with any rule, for the purpose of promoting or maintaining the health, safety and convenience of the inhabitants of the municipal area and for the furtherance of municipal administration under this Act.”* *“In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the power conferred by sub-section (1), the municipality, wherever situated, may in the exercise of the said power, make any bye-law described in List I below and the municipality, wholly, or in part situated in a hilly tract may further make, in the exercise of the said power, any bye-law described in List II below.’’* “*Prohibiting, subject to the provision of Section 241, the use of any place as a slaughterhouse, or as a market or shop for the sale of animals intended for human food or of meat or fish, or as a market for the sale of fruit or vegetables, in default of a license granted by the municipality or otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of a license so granted;”[**\[2\]**](#_ftn2)* Article **19***:* “*All citizens shall have the right to* *(1) freedom of speech and expression.”[**\[3\]**](#_ftn3)* ARTICLE **51\[A\]***:* “*It shall be the duty of every citizen of India-* *(e) to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood amongst all the people of India transcending religious, linguistic, and regional or sectional diversities; to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women;* *(f) to, value and preserve the rich heritage of our composite culture”[**\[4\]**](#_ftn4)* **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** - The Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld the validity of the law prohibiting the sale of eggs finding it to be a reasonable restriction on fundamental rights guaranteed under article 19\[1\] read with 19\[6\] of the Indian Constitution. - The court noted the nature and the purpose of the right and of the restriction along with the urgency of evil which sought to be remedied and passed that all the present conditions must be considered in deciding the reasonableness of a restriction since these all 3 towns were major pilgrim centers with a ton of devotees and religious institution and therefore the prohibition of non-veg was justified in nature. - The Supreme Court in its judgment held that an absolute prohibition on the sale of eggs was considered to be reasonable as it maintained the fundamental right to carry on trade along with large public interest and thus was not violative of the act and because similar restrictions were there in 2 towns since 1976 without any challenge thus it was justified and in the public interest. **OBITER DICTA** - The Hon’ble Supreme Court in this case acknowledged the right to practice any profession or carry out any trade or occupation as a fundamental right which is secured under article 19\[1\] of the Indian constitution. - The Hon’ble Supreme Court stated that reasonable restriction on certain trades such as alcohol or things that are harmful to public health can even amount to an absolute prohibition andviewed that consuming eggs is often advised due to their nutritious benefits and that vegetarians can choose eggs that are suitable for vegetarians and do not contain chicks. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is moral in the public interest which is not only supported by a handful of the majority but is also reasonable and religious which will ensure the faith of the people in the judicial system and, at the same time will give a promising message to people to worship and to practice their religion. Compromises and cooperation are what can benefit the nation in moving ahead and abiding by the law of conflicting interests. Rishikesh is devoted to rigorous vegetarianism as a kind of worship and lifestyle. It is well known that people in several Indian groups abstain from all animal products, including meat, fish, and eggs. These individuals go on pilgrimages to Haridwar, Rishikesh, and Muni ki Rete in large numbers on a regular and irregular basis. People primarily congregate in the three towns for religious rituals and spiritual advancement. Respecting one another’s faith is a necessary way for all citizens to “promote harmony and spirit of common brotherhood” in a diversified society like India. The three towns’ unique cultures and geographic location justify a complete ban on trade because tourists and pilgrims are the main sources of income for the local government and the residents of the three towns. The country can advance and uphold the law by cooperating and making compromises. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** - ***Afzal Ullah v. State of U.P***[\[5\]](#_ftn5) - ***H.C. SUMAN v. Rehabilitation Ministry Employees’ Coop. House Building Society Ltd[**\[6\]**](#_ftn6)*** - ***Chintamanrao v. State of M.P*** [\[7\]](#_ftn7) - ***State Of Madras v. V.G Row***.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) - ***State of Maharashtra v. Himmatbhai Narbheram Rao*** [\[9\]](#_ftn9) - ***State of A.P v. McDowell & Co***[*****\[10\]*****](#_ftn10)***.*** - ***Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State Of Bihar*** [*****\[11\]*****](#_ftn11) - *Hashmattullah v. State of M.P***[\[12\]](#_ftn12) **Important Statutes Referred** - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA- ARTICLE 19\[1\], ARTICLE 51-\[A\] \[E\], \[F\] MUNICIPALITIIES ACT 1916- SECTION 241, 298 --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Municipalities Act 1916 (Act 02 of 1916), s. 241 [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Municipalities Act 1916 (Act 02 of 1916), s. 298 [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The Constitution of India, art. 19 [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) The Constitution of India, art. 51 [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Afzal Ullah V State of U.P, AIR 1964 SC 264 [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) H.C.Suman v. Rehabilitation Ministry Employees’ Coop. House Building Society Ltd, (1991) 4 SCC 485 [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Chintamanrao v. State of M.P, AIR 1951 SC 118 [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) State Of Madras v. V.G Row, AIR 1952 SC 196 [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) State of Maharashtra v. Himmatbhai Narbheram Rao, AIR 1970 SC 1157 [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) State of A.P v. McDowell & Co, (1996) 3 SCC 709 [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State Of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731 [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Hashmattullah v. State of M.P, (1996) 4 SCC 391) **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Indian Enviro Legal Council v. Union Of India](https://lawfoyer.in/indian-enviro-legal-council-v-union-of-india/) **Published:** July 8, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Authored By – Anchita Srivastava, Amity Law School, Amity University Lucknow Edited By – Rajarshi Tripathi** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** India is working on the cases through which it can establish strong environmental laws. However, In the case of “Indian Council for Enviro Legal Action v. Union Of India”, the SC issued a significant judgement on 8th March 1999 related to environmental pollution arising from chemical industrial plants in India. The court emphasised the non-compliance with legal and environmental regulations by certain industrialists, resulting in severe pollution in the villages. The judgement underscored the “Polluter Pay Principle” and “Strict/Absolute Liability” in Environmental matters. The court mandated the closure of the offending plants and directed them (respondents) to bear the losses create by the plants also bear the costs of remedial measures. This case set a precedent for holding industries accountable for environmental harm and ensuring adherence to environmental laws. ***Keywords*** – **Environmental Pollution, Absolute/Strict Liability, Polluter Pays Principle, Remedial Measures, Water Pollution**. **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name****Indian Council for Enviro Legal Action v. Union Of India**Case Number****SCC 293 : 1999**Judgement Date***08-03-1999*Court***Supreme court*Quorum / Constitution of Bench***2*Author / Name of Judges***Jeevan Reddy And Kirpal B.N.*Citation***1996 AIR 1446*Legal Provisions Involved***Environment (protection ) Act 1986; Water(prevention and control of pollution) act 1974; Air (prevention and control of pollution) act 1981**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The case of the Indian Council For Enviro Legal Action v. Union of India addressed severe environmental pollution caused by chemical industry plants in *Bichhri* village. The petition highlighted the negligence of certain industrial establishments in complying with environmental regulations, leading to the contamination of soil, water and air pollution, the entire environmental ecosystem. The judgement aimed to address the environmental damage caused by the respondents and enforce the principles of environmental protection and accountability. **FACTS OF THE CASE** 1. **Procedural Background of the Case** The case involved a writ petition filed by the Indian Council for Enviro Legal Action Against the Union of India and other respondents concerning environmental pollution caused by chemical industrial plants in *Bichhri* Village. 1. **Factual background of the case** The respondents, including Hindustan Agro Chemicals Limited And Silver Chemicals, were accused of Producing toxic chemicals without proper clearance, resulting in pollution of the surrounding areas. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** The primary legal issue raised in the case was the responsibility of the industrial establishments for environmental pollution and the appropriate legal measures to address the damages caused. **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the respondents were accountable for the environmental devastation in Bichhri village and should bear the costs of remedial measures. They emphasized the repeated violations of environmental laws by respondents **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that the sole responsibility for the pollution and objected to the actions of regulatory authorities. They opposed the closure of their plants and the imposition of the costs for remedial measures. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** - *“Stockholm Declaration”* - *“Environmental (Protection) Act, 1986”,* - *“The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974”,* - *“The Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981”.* **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** Supreme Court held that the respondents were liable for the environmental damage caused and ordered the closure of their plants. The court emphasized the “polluter pays principle” and “strict/absolute liability” in environmental matters. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The decision sets a crucial precedent in enforcing the principles of environmental protection and upholding the doctrine of polluter pays and strict liability and absolute liability in cases of environmental harm caused by industrial activities. The delivery of such judgements by SC is commendable and exemplifies a significant step towards ensuring environmental accountability through protection. By imposing absolute liability on the respondents and ordering the closure of their plants, the court sends a strong message about the importance of compliance with environmental laws. This decision must strengthen the environmental law and surrounding communities. The case also highlighted the importance and duty of individuals to enforcement of environmental regulations to safeguard the well-being of the public and the ecosystem. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** 1. M.C. Mehta v. Union Of India (Oleum Gas Leak Case) **Important Statutes Referred** 1. *“Environmental (Protection) Act, 1986”* 2. *The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974”,* 3. *“The Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981”.* **Categories:** Case Analysis, Environmental Law --- ### [Commissioner of Police vs Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta(2004) 12 SCC 770](https://lawfoyer.in/commissioner-of-police-vs-acharya-jagadishwarananda-avadhuta2004-12-scc-770/) **Published:** July 8, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Authored By – Kajal Yadav, BIRLA GLOBAL UNIVERSITY Edited By – Rajarshi Tripathi** **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** Commissioner of Police vs Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta (2004) 12 SCC 770*Case Number***Civil Appeal No. 6230 Of 1990*Judgement Date***11 March, 2004*Court***Supreme Court of India*Quorum / Constitution of Bench***3 Judge’s Bench*Author / Name of Judges***Justice DR. A.R. Lakshmanam, Justice G.P. Mathur, Justice S. Rajendra Babu*Citation***AIR 2004 SUPREME COURT 2984, 2004 (12) SCC 770*Legal Provisions Involved***Constitution of India, Art 25, 26 and 32, sec 144 of CRPC.**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** India is a secular country where the state always maintains peace. State cannot interfere in the religious aspect of any individuals. The case “Commissioner of police vs Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta” is popularly known as “Tandava Dance case”. It is a quorum of three judges bench the case appeal arises from Calcutta High Court and gives the order to perform Tandava dance in public street with skulls, tridents or live snakes. Police department did not agree with the order because it can harm the public in large. The main issue arises in this case whether Tandava dance is an essential practice of Ananda Margis under art 25 of Indian constitution. Under Art 25 it is clearly stated that any practice which can held in the name of religion abrogates morality, health and public in large. **FACTS OF THE CASE** 1. **Procedural Background of the Case** - The case of Commissioner of police vs Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta is a civil writ petition before the Hon’ble Supreme court of India against the order passed by Calcutta High court. - Ananda Margi sect is founded in 1955 and founder of Ananda Margi sect published in his book in the year 1986 that Tandava Dance is an essential practice since 1966. - Based on this information; the petitioner seek permission for the Tandava Dance performance in public from the police. Commissioner of police prohibited the use of live snakes, trident, knives etc. - Under Art 32 of Indian Constitution, Civil writ petition no. 1317-18 of 1987 was filled in supreme court by respondent challenging those police refused the order of High court to perform the Tandava Dance with essential ingredients. e. It was alleged that commissioner of police and police department infringed the right of petitioner under Art 25 and Art 26. **ii) Factual Background of the Case** - The founder of Ananda Marga sect has stated that Tandava Dance is an essential practice of the Ananda Margi faith. - The petitioner is the member of Ananda Marga sect, that asked for the permission to the commissioner of police for performing Tandava Dance in public street including live snakes, knives, trident or skulls. Tandava is a symbol of death and life. Here skull represents the death and knife represents life. - The commissioner of police allowed them to perform the dance, but they not allowed the procession with knives, live snakes or tridents. Then department of police issued certain order under sec 144 of CRPC, which declared this against the public moral. Under Art 226, the petition filed writ petition in High court. Hon’ble High court said respondent to not to interrupt n the matter of Tandava Dance and allowed the petition to precession with knives, snakes or skulls. - Then, under Art 32 commissioner of police appealed before Hon’ble Supreme Court on the decision of the High Court. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** - Whether Tandava dance is a religious denomination? - Whether Tandava dance in public is an essential practice of Ananda Margi faith? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that Ananda Margis did not have any scope under Art 25 because they do not have any well-established practices of festivals like others religion have. 2. If Ananda Margis did not carry any knife, live snakes or tridents, commissioner of police gives the permission to perform Tandava dance in public. Commissioner of police did not allow the Tandava dance with weapon because it disturbs peace and tranquillity. 3. Tandava dance is not an essential practice of Ananda Margis and did not have any scope under Art 25 and Art 26 of the Indian Constitution. Ananda Margis is coming under Hindu religious it has no separate denomination or institution. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Respondent submitted that `Tandava dance is an essential practice of Ananda Margis under Art 25 and Art 26 of the Indian Constitution, then they plead that they have the complete rights to perform the dance in public as well. 2. Ananda Margis submitted that Art 26 of constitution stated that state can not interfere in the administrative matters and claims it as a separate religious denomination. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** 1. Art 25 of Indian Constitution stated that Freedom of conscience and free profession practice and propagation of religion, which provides the freedom related to public order, health and morality. 2. Art 26 of Indian Constitution stated that freedom to manage religious affair, which provides every religious denomination to perform their own religious and charitable intent. 3. Art 32 of Indian Constitution stated that right to constitutional remedies, it gives a Fundamental right to every individual to approach for enforcement of other fundamental rights which is recognized by Constitution. 4. Sec 144 of CRPC, stated that the Executive Magistrate of any state or territory can issue an order to prohibits the assembly by four or more people in an area **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** 1. After hearing both the parties, court held that Tandava Dance is an essential practice of Ananda Margis. It is itself a part of Hindu religion and did not have any separate denomination. 2. According to fact Ananda Margis was founded in 1955 and Tandava dance is started from 1966 so it cannot be considered as an essential practice of the religion. But performance of Tandava Dance in public cannot be an essential practice of Ananda Margis. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The case Commissioner of Police vs Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta is a civil writ petition before Hon’ble supreme court of India. It involves the Art 25 and Art 26 of Indian constitution. I agree with the judgement that Ananda Margis is come under Hindu religion and did not have any religious denomination and held that performance of Tandava dance in public is not an essential part of it. I agree with the fact that after establishing the Ananda Margi sect, founder added the Tandava dance in their book after 10 years. So, it cannot be an part of basic structure. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases, Criminal Law Cases --- ### [Dr. Pradeep Jain vs. Union of India and Ors.](https://lawfoyer.in/dr-pradeep-jain-vs-union-of-india-and-ors/) **Published:** July 8, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Authored By – RIKTIKA, ASIAN LAW COLLEGE Edited By – Rajarshi Tripathi** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** This case concerned admission in U.G and P.G courses in medical courses where every state and Union territory followed the uniform and consistent decision for giving preferences to those students who have domicile or permanent residents of a State for a very long period from 3 to 20 years and also to those students who have studied in any educational institutional of a particular from long years between 4 to 10 years. But the situation arises that the applicant has the domicile when taking an admission. In this case, the Petitioner appealed before the Supreme Court to challenge the order of the Delhi High Court who wanted to take admission in the MBBS and MDS courses in distinct universities of different States and also the Union Territory of Delhi and challenged the domicile and institutional choice requirements as it is violated the rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The issue that arises is whether admission to medical courses in the institutions of a State is only restricted to those students who have a residence or domicile for a specific number of years. Also, any reservation can be made to them over those who do not have domicile or residents of a State except of merit. ***Keywords*** – Constitution, States, Union Territory of Delhi, Supreme Court, Delhi High Court, Domicile **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name***Dr. Pradeep Jain vs. Union of India and ors.*Case Number***Civil Appeal No. 6392 of 1983*Judgement Date***22/06/1984*Court***Supreme Court of India*Quorum / Constitution of Bench***Bhagwati, P.N., Sen, Amarendra Nath (J), Mishra Rangnath*Author / Name of Judges***Bhagwati, P.N.*Citation***AIR 1984 SC 1420, 1984 SCR (3) 942*Legal Provisions Involved***Article 5, Article 14, Article 15, Article 16(2), Article 19(1), Article 301, and Article 141 of Constitution of India**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The judgment involves that INDIA is a nation where unity is exists among the citizens. The decision was given based on there is only one domicile in the nation. The legal fraternity of the nation works in one chain and does not vary from State to State. The Court pronounced that admission in the P.G. medical courses is not desired to any such reservation based on domicile or requirement of the State and if State wants to make a reservation to those students of a particular State that should not exceed 50 percent of the total seats available. The said judgement also instructed that implementation from the academic session 1985-1986 does not create any binding effect over the State of Jammu and Kashmir and Andhra Pradesh. **FACTS OF THE CASE** 1. **Procedural Background of the Case** The petitioner challenged the order and judgement of the Delhi High Court and appealed Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India before the Supreme Court of India 2. **Factual Background of the Case** The factual matrix of the case is that the petitioner desired to take admission in the U.G. and P.G. medical courses in distinct universities of different States and the Union Territory of Delhi. He was not able to take it because of the reservation made for those students who have the domicile or residence of a State. He felt that it was a violation of Articles 15, 16, 19(1) and 301. He filed a petition before the Delhi High Court as aggrieved by the order then appealed to the Supreme Court. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether the admission to medical colleges or any other institutions in a State can be confined to those students who have a domicile or residence for a very long period of years? 2. Can the State make any reservation in admissions to those with domicile or residence over to them who only possess the merit apart from domicile or resident to meet the requirements of admission? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. It is contended that the consistent and united decision of the States to take admission on the required domicile or residence violated the equality provision mentioned under Articles 14, 15, and 16 of the Indian Constitution. 2. The State restricted the petitioner to move freely within the territory of India under Articles 19(1) and 301 of the Indian Constitution. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. It is contended that the taking admission to medical colleges or any other institution was relevant but Article 16(2) was not applied. The requirement of domicile or residence for admission to a medical in a State cannot be declared unconstitutional based on the violation of Articles 15(1) and (2). 2. Article 16(2) cannot take as a ground for discrimination because it is based on place of birth and not based on residence. The contention placed reliance on ***D.P Joshi v. State of Madhya Bharat*** where it stated that residence and place of birth are two different concepts in law and fact both. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** 1. **Article 14 –** It states that *“The State shall not deny to any persons equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”* 2. **Article 15(1) –** *“The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth of any of them.* *(2) – No citizen shall on grounds only of religion, race, caste. sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to-* *(a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment; or* *(b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places so public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public.* *(3) – Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.”* c. **Article 16(2) –** *“No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any employment or office under the State.”* **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** The Apex Court held that admission to MBBS course based on the All India Examination then preference made to the selected candidates. It was held that admission takes in P.G. courses like M.S, M.D would be given not based on domicile or residence within the State. Certain percent of seats to be reserved to those who have domicile or residence upto 50% of the total seats available and not more than that. The same instructions would be revised by the Indian Medical Council. The Court also directed that there are super specializations as neurosurgery and cardiology then no reservation would be made and admission will take based on merit on the national level. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The pronouncement of judgment that reservation will not be done at P. G. courses in medical and if States wants to give preferences to their own State’s residence or having their domicile that would not exceed the 50% in overall seats in India. The petitioners claimed or alleged the violation of Articles 15 and 16 but it is based on place of birth and not based on residence. Both are different concepts seen in various judgments. The decision with reasoning was appropriate where the State can also take admission and other States students can also get admission in the left 50%. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** 1. Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India & Ors., \[1979\] 3 S.C.R. 1014 2. D.P. Joshi v. State of Madhya Bharat, \[1955\] 1 SCR 1215 3. Vasundro v. State of Mysore, \[1971\] Suppl. SCR 381 4. Jagdish Saran v Union of India, \[1980\] 2 SCR 831 5. Rajendran v. State of Madras. \[1968\] 2 SCR 786 6. Periakaruppan v. State of Tamil Nadu, \[1971\]2 SCR 430 7. Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society and Anr. v State of Gujarat. \[1974\]1 SCR 717 **Important Statutes Referred** 1. Constitution of India, 1950 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [LEGAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE FRAUD IN INDIA](https://lawfoyer.in/legal-aspects-of-corporate-fraud-in-india/) **Published:** July 8, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Authored By – GAGANPREET KAUR GILL, CHANDIGARH UNIVERSITY Edited By – Rajarshi Tripathi** **INTRODUCTION** In the corporate sphere, the issue of corporate fraud poses a pervasive and intricate challenge, casting a shadow over the integrity of businesses worldwide. The web of illicit financial transactions represents a significant threat to corporations and their stakeholders. This ultimately erodes shareholder trust, depletes investment capital, and damages the company’s brand reputation. This article provides a comprehensive analysis of corporate fraud within the Indian context. It delves into the nuances of corporate fraud, including its evolution, types, indicators, and categories. Furthermore, the discussion encompasses past notable examples of fraud that have occurred in India, as well as the evolving regulatory landscape with respect to such practices. ***Keywords*:-** **Corporate law, fraud , Whistle blower protection , offence , company** **MEANING OF FRAUD** The term “Fraud “ is defined under Section-17[\[1\]](#_ftn1) which means means and includes any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract, or with his connivance, or by his agent, with intent to deceive another party thereto of his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract:— (1)” the suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true; (2) the active concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact; (3) a promise made without any intention of performing it; (4) any other act fitted to deceive; (5) any such act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent”. ***Illustration***– “A sells, by auction, to B, a horse which A knows to be unsound. A says nothing to B about the horse’s unsoundness. This is not fraud in A”. Moreover,according to the Contract Act, a contract obtained through fraudulent means is considered voidable at the option of the party whose consent was obtained by fraud. Section- 19 of the Contract Act establishes that if a party enters into a contract due to fraudulent misrepresentation, the contract is deemed voidable and the non-fraudulent party can choose to void the agreement. The concept of fraud goes beyond just deceit, as was established in the case of Dr. Vimla v. Delhi Administration (1962). The court held that the notion of fraud encompasses more than just deception and can include other unfair means used to obtain consent. **MEANING OF CORPORATE FRAUD** Corporate fraud refers to intentional acts of deception committed by a company or its representatives for the purpose of financial or personal gain. These fraudulent activities undermine the trust and integrity of the corporation and can have serious legal and financial consequences. Some common examples of corporate fraud include: Financial statement fraud, Misappropriation of assets, Insider trading. At its core, corporate fraud involves the willful misuse of a company’s resources or the breach of fiduciary duties for illicit personal or organizational gain. Combating such fraud is crucial for maintaining public trust and the integrity of the corporate system. **EVOLUTION OF CORPORATE FRAUD** India has a long history of grappling with corporate fraud, dating back to the surge of companies and financial dealings that accompanied the country’s industrialization and economic reforms after independence. This growth, unfortunately, created fertile ground for deceitful activities. One of the earliest and most infamous scandals was the Harshad Mehta securities scam of the early 1990s. This intricate scheme involving banks, brokers, and financial instruments ultimately triggered the collapse of the Indian stock market and severely damaged the nation’s financial system. The Mehta case exposed glaring weaknesses in India’s regulatory framework, making the need for stricter oversight and enforcement painfully clear. Subsequent years saw a string of high-profile corporate fraud cases in India, including the Satyam Computer Services scandal, the Kingfisher Airlines debacle, and more recent incidents involving companies like IL&FS and DHFL. These cases revealed deep-seated problems: inadequate corporate governance, feeble internal controls, and troubling collusion between businesses, financial institutions, and regulators. The Indian government and regulatory bodies like the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and the Ministry of Corporate Affairs have taken action in response to these challenges. They have enacted and strengthened various laws, regulations, and enforcement mechanisms. The Companies Act, 2013, the Prevention of Corruption Act, and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code all aim to establish a more robust legal framework to combat corporate fraud and promote greater transparency and accountability within the corporate sector. However, recent cases serve as a stark reminder that the fight against corporate fraud in India is far from over. Continued vigilance, more vigorous enforcement, and a holistic approach that tackles the underlying systemic issues are all essential. As India’s corporate landscape continues to transform, its legal and regulatory framework must also adapt to ensure the integrity and stability of the nation’s business environment. **TYPES OF CORPORATE FRAUD** Corporate fraud, a pervasive threat, manifests through diverse methods, each posing distinct challenges for organizations and stakeholders. Let’s delve into the key categories and tactics employed by perpetrators: **1.Misappropriation of Asset** This encompasses a range of deceptive activities, including: **Payment Fraud:** Dishonestly diverting funds through unauthorized transactions. **Accounting Fraud:** Manipulating financial records to create a false impression of an entity’s financial health**.** **Schemes to Inflate Share Prices:** Employing misleading tactics to artificially boost a company’s stock value, often to deceive investors. **2.Unauthorized Asset Acquisition:** This involves the illegal appropriation of various assets, including: **Physical Goods:** Theft of tangible assets belonging to an organization. **Intellectual Property:** Misappropriation of intellectual property rights such as copyrights or patents. **Exploiting Assets Through Dummy Payments:** Utilizing fictitious payments to gain unauthorized access to an entity’s assets for personal gain. **3.Corruption:** Corruption encompasses a web of deceitful practices, including: **Fraudulent Payments:** Making or receiving illicit payments to achieve an unlawful objective. **Bribery:** Offering or accepting bribes to public officials or private individuals to influence their actions. **Aiding and Abetting:** Assisting others in committing fraudulent activities. **Politically-Motivated Fraud:**Utilizing political influence to shield fraudulent activities. **4. Dominant Forms of Corporate Fraud:** While corporate fraud encompasses a vast array of tactics, some forms are more prevalent than others. These include: **Financial Fraud:** Deception involving the manipulation of financial records or the misappropriation of funds. **Asset Misappropriation:** The unauthorized seizure of an organization’s assets for personal gain. **Employee Fraud:** Dishonest activities perpetrated by employees within an organization. **Vendor Fraud:** Deception committed by a supplier or vendor in a business transaction. **Customer Fraud:** Deceitful actions by customers aimed at gaining an unfair advantage. **Investment Fraud:** Misrepresentation of information or fraudulent practices related to investments. **These prevalent forms of corporate fraud often involve a combination of deceptive practices such as:** - Theft of various assets, including money, tangible property, or sensitive information. - Misuse of accounts for personal gain. - Procurement fraud involving manipulation of procurement processes. - Payroll fraud involving the manipulation of employee payroll records. - Misrepresentation of financial data through accounting manipulation. - Inappropriate journal entries used to conceal fraudulent activity. - Suspense account fraud involving the misuse of suspense accounts for fraudulent purposes. - Submission of false expense claims for personal gain. - Fabrication of employment credentials to gain unauthorized employment. - Bribery and corruption to influence business decisions or gain an unfair advantage**.** By maintaining vigilance and implementing robust internal controls, organizations can significantly mitigate the risks associated with these prevalent forms of corporate fraud. **LEGISLATIONS THAT DEALS WITH THE CORPORATE FRAUD IN INDIA** 1. **THE COMPANIES ACT, 2013** provides laws for punishment related to an individual who commits fraud against the company. [\[1\]](#_ftn1) **SECTION OF COMPANY ACT DEALS WITH CORPORATE FRAUD** ***Section 447: Punishment for Fraud[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)*** Where the offense of fraud, as established under Section 447 of the Companies Act 2013, has been carried out. The person who has been found guilty of committing such fraud shall be: Imprisoned for a period that may extend to ten years but not less than six months, and Shall be liable to pay a fine that may extend to three times the amount involved in the fraud but not less than the amount involved in the fraud. ***Forgery (Sections 448, 449, & 450)*** These sections address forgery offenses committed against a company. Section 448 specifically deals with creating or altering company documents to contain false or misleading information. Those found guilty of such forgery can be imprisoned for up to seven years and fined ₹5,000. In some cases, the fine may be tripled the amount involved in the fraud. ***Liability for Fraudulent Conduct (Section 542)*** Section 542 deals with the consequences of fraudulent business practices during company liquidation. This section holds those managing the company personally liable for any debts or liabilities arising from such fraudulent conduct. - Thus, Companies Act aims to ensure the accuracy of information submitted and deter fraudulent activities. - Penalties for false statements and forgery can include imprisonment and fines. - Company managers can be held personally liable for debts resulting from fraudulent business practices during liquidation. **2.** **PMLA TARGETS CORPORATE FRAUD AS MONEY LAUNDERING** **THE PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT (PMLA)** treats corporate fraud as a serious offense. It applies when fraud is committed to conceal criminal proceeds or gain benefits from them. PMLA’s Section 3 defines money laundering broadly, encompassing acquisition, possession, or any act that disguises criminal proceeds. Section 4 prescribes penalties for money laundering, including imprisonment for 3 to 7 years and a fine. **3.SEBI: SAFEGUARDING INDIA’S SECURITIES MARKET** Established in 1992, **THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA (SEBI) A**cts as a watchdog, vigilantly monitoring fraud in the securities market. SEBI’s key functions include: \* Protecting investors \* Educating investors about the market \* Overseeing intermediaries \* Facilitating the smooth operation of the market \* Regulating business practices SEBI enforces various regulations to deter fraudulent activities. For instance, Section 12A prohibits manipulative practices and insider trading, while Section 15E penalizes asset management companies for non-compliance with regulations. These measures promote a fair and transparent securities market in India. 4.**INDIAN PENAL CODE** ***Section 409: Criminal Breach of Trust by Public Servant or by Banker, Merchant or Agent*** This section applies when someone entrusted with property, like a public servant, banker, merchant, or agent, dishonestly disposes of it for themselves or someone else. In the context of corporate fraud, this can be relevant in cases where: Company Directors or Employees Embezzle Funds or Assets: “If directors or employees entrusted with company funds or assets misuse them for personal gain, it can be considered a criminal breach of trust under Section 409.” ***Section 420: Cheating*** This section deals with deceiving another person by fraudulent means and inducing them to deliver property or take an action that results in a disadvantage. In the context of corporate fraud, Section 420 can be applied in cases where: False Financial Statements Mislead Investors: “If a company publishes misleading financial statements to attract investors, causing them to invest in the company and suffer losses, it can be considered cheating under Section 420.” - Both sections address fraudulent acts involving entrusted property or deception for wrongful gain. - They can be applied in various corporate fraud scenarios depending on the specific nature of the deception or misuse of property. For a more comprehensive legal framework on corporate fraud, other laws like the Companies Act, 2013, and the Prevention of Corruption Act play a crucial role. These establish stricter oversight and penalties specifically targeting corporate wrongdoings. **CASE LAWS** **M/S. Satyam Computer Services Limited vs Directorate Of Enforcement(2009)** This case involves the high-profile Satyam Computer Services fraud, which was one of the largest corporate scams in India’s history. - **KEY FACTS:** – Satyam Computer Services Limited was an Indian IT services company that was found to have engaged in massive financial fraud, including inflating revenues, profits, and assets, as well as fabricating bank statements and invoices. – The fraud came to light in 2009 when the company’s founder, B. Ramalinga Raju, confessed to the scam in a letter to the company’s board of directors. – The Directorate of Enforcement (ED), the law enforcement agency responsible for investigating financial crimes, initiated proceedings against Satyam and its executives for various offenses under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA). - **KEY ISSUES ADDRESSED:** 1**. Applicability of PMLA**: The Supreme Court had to determine whether the Satyam fraud case was covered under the PMLA, even though the predicate offense (i.e., the original crime that generated the laundered proceeds) occurred before the PMLA came into effect. 2\. **Scope of ED’s Powers:** The court examined the scope of the ED’s powers in investigating and prosecuting cases of corporate fraud, especially in relation to tracing the proceeds of crime. 3. Burden of Proof: The court deliberated on the burden of proof in PMLA cases, particularly regarding the ED’s responsibility to establish a direct link between the predicate offense and the proceeds of crime. - **JUDGMENT**: – The Supreme Court held that the Satyam fraud case was indeed covered under the PMLA, as the offense of money laundering continued even after the PMLA’s enactment. – The court upheld the ED’s powers to investigate and prosecute the Satyam case, emphasizing the need for effective enforcement mechanisms to tackle corporate fraud. – Regarding the burden of proof, the court ruled that the ED must establish a direct nexus between the predicate offense and the proceeds of crime, rather than relying on presumptions. Thus, Satyam case highlighted the importance of robust legal and regulatory frameworks in addressing corporate fraud and the critical role of enforcement agencies in investigating and prosecuting such financial crimes in India. **Punjab National Bank vs. Union of India Thr. Its Secretary (2022**) This case is a follow-up to the previous landmark judgment by the Supreme Court in the Punjab National Bank (PNB) fraud case, which involved the issuance of fraudulent Letters of Undertaking (LoUs) to the diamond merchant Nirav Modi. - **KEY FACTS:** – After the initial PNB fraud case, the bank filed a fresh petition seeking further directions from the court regarding the role and accountability of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) as the banking regulator. – PNB argued that the RBI’s failure to put in place adequate supervisory mechanisms and internal controls contributed to the massive fraud that led to a loss of over ₹13,000 crore for the bank. - **KEY ISSUES ADDRESSED:** **1. Regulatory Oversight and Accountability:** – The court examined the extent of the RBI’s responsibility in ensuring the integrity and stability of the banking system. – It scrutinized the RBI’s role in monitoring and supervising the operations of banks, particularly in relation to the issuance of LoUs. **2. Duty of Regulatory Authorities:** – The court reiterated its earlier stance that regulatory authorities like the RBI have a fundamental duty to safeguard the financial system and cannot absolve themselves of responsibility. – It emphasized the need for robust regulatory frameworks and effective oversight mechanisms to prevent the recurrence of such large-scale frauds. **3. Remedial Measures and Reforms:** – The court directed the RBI and the Union of India to consider implementing comprehensive reforms in the banking and financial sector to address the underlying issues that enable corporate fraud. – It suggested measures such as enhancing the RBI’s regulatory powers, strengthening internal controls within banks, and improving coordination between various enforcement agencies. - **JUDGMENT:** – The Supreme Court upheld its earlier position and held the RBI accountable for its failure to discharge its statutory duties effectively. – The court directed the RBI and the Union of India to take immediate steps to implement the necessary reforms and strengthen the regulatory framework to prevent and address corporate fraud in the banking sector. Thus, this case reinforces the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the critical role of regulatory authorities in ensuring the integrity and stability of the financial system, and their responsibility in preventing and addressing corporate fraud in India. **EFFECT OF CORPORATE FRAUD ON BUSINESSES IN INDIA** Corporate fraud can have extensive and wide-ranging impacts on businesses, including: - **Financial Losses:** Fraudulent activities can result in direct monetary losses through the “theft of funds, misappropriation of assets, and revenue manipulation”. These losses can “undermine profitability, impair liquidity, and jeopardize the financial health of the organization”. - **Reputation Damages**: Corporate fraud “tarnishes the reputation of the company, eroding trust and credibility among customers, investors, suppliers, and other stakeholders”. Once a company’s reputation is compromised, it may struggle to “regain trust and loyalty, leading to loss of business opportunities and market share”. - **Legal Consequences:** Fraudulent actions often “lead to legal investigations, regulatory penalties, and litigation, resulting in significant legal expenses, fines, and settlements”. These “legal battles can drain resources, distract management focus, and damage the company’s standing in the eyes of regulators and the public”. - **Operational Disruption:** Fraudulent schemes can “disrupt normal business operations, causing chaos, confusion, and inefficiency within the organization”. “Investigations, audits, and remediation efforts may divert resources away from core business activities, leading to productivity losses and operational setbacks”. - **Employee Morale:** Corporate fraud “undermines employee morale and trust in the organization’s leadership”. Employees may feel “demoralized, disillusioned, and disengaged, leading to increased turnover, decreased productivity, and a toxic work environment”. **RECENT AMENDMENT IN REGARD TO CORPORATE FRAUD IN INDIA** The Securities Exchange Board of India has introduced new provisions in the Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements Regulations, 2021. These amendments aim to “enforce higher disclosure and standards of corporate governance in public listed companies”. The key change In this amendment is the mandatory “disclosure of fraud, default and arrests”. Listed entities are now obligated to report any “fraud or defaults by the company or subsidiary and any fraudulent activity, default, or arrest of its promoter, director, key managers or any senior management”, regardless of whether these incidents occurred in India or abroad. This new compliance mandate is intended to “increase international security requirements”. **According to Regulation 30(6)**, a listed company must “disclose to the exchange all the material information at the earliest and should not take more than 24 hours from the occurrence of the event or information”. If the information is not disclosed within this timeframe, the company must provide an explanation for the delay. These disclosures must be made within specific timelines, depending on the nature and origin of the event[\[1\]](#_ftn1) – “Within 30 minutes the decision from the board of directors meeting with respect to the event should be disclosed.” – “Within the next 12 hours after the event or information occurred should disclose from which listed entity it originated.” – “Within 24 hours from the occurrence of the event, in cases when it did not originate from within the listed company.” **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** Corporate fraud remains a pervasive challenge in India, despite the nation’s evolving legal and regulatory framework. While recent amendments like the mandatory disclosure of fraud by listed companies are a positive step towards greater transparency, a holistic approach is needed to effectively combat this menace. This multifaceted approach should encompass:1.Strengthening Regulatory Oversight: Regulatory bodies like SEBI and the RBI must enhance their supervisory mechanisms and enforcement capabilities to deter fraudulent activities. 2.**Promoting Robust Corporate Governance:** Companies must prioritize robust corporate governance practices, including strong internal controls, ethical leadership, and a culture of compliance. 3.**Enhancing Whistle-blower Protection:** Robust whistle-blower protection mechanisms are crucial to encourage internal reporting of suspected misconduct. 4.**Public Awareness Campaigns**: Educating the public about the red flags of corporate fraud can empower them to make informed investment decisions and hold companies accountable. 5.By implementing these comprehensive measures, India can create a more robust and ethical business environment, fostering trust and confidence among stakeholders and ensuring the long-term stability and growth of its corporate sector. **REFERENCES** **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** Company law book by Avatar Singh **Online Articles / Sources Referred** - - - - **Cases Referred** M/S Satyam Computers Services vs. Directorate of Enforcement(2011). Kingfisher Airlines Ltd vs. Union of India (2015). Union of India vs. Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services Ltd (2022). **Statutes Referred** 1. Sec- 447,448,449,450,542 of Companies Act,2013 2. Sec-409,420 of Indian Penal Code,1860 3. Sec- 3, 4 of Prevention of money laundering act --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Indian Contract Act 1872, sec-17. **Categories:** Company Law, Contract Law --- ### [LEGAL PROTECTION OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS IN INDIA](https://lawfoyer.in/legal-protection-of-geographical-indications-in-india/) **Published:** July 8, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Authored By – NAMITHASRI.S, CHETTINAD SCHOOL OF LAW Edited By – Rajarshi Tripathi** **INTRODUCTION** A product is said to as having a geographic indication if it has distinctive qualities that come from its original location and make it stand out from other similar products. The protection of goods using GI tags was greatly aided by the TRIPS and Lisbon agreements. In India, there are two legal frameworks implemented by the Indian government to establish proper legal protection for the products that are registered under Geographical Indications. They are, 1. Geographical indications of goods (registration and protection) Act, 1999. 2. Geographical indications of goods (registration and protection) rules, 2002. According to the GI Act of 1999 and the GI Rules of 2002, products that have a GI tag and the users who have authorization to use them are granted protection and certain privileges ***Keywords*:** Geographical Indications, GI Act, GI Rules, TRIPS agreement, Lisbon agreement **CONCEPT AND SIGNIFICANCE** Geographical indicators are distinctive labels applied to goods that are made in a certain area and have certain qualities, reputations, and traits that are exclusive to that location. It helps to identify the goods of a specific geographical place ensures the specific features of those GI-tagged products and also promotes the products of that particular geographical place and its producers. **ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION** The geographical indication protection was first initiated in France by the system called the Appellation Origin system which existed in the early 20th century. This system’s goal is to protect the particular region’s product and its unique features, heritage, and production method and also enhance the same. In those times Geographical Indications were called as Appellation of Origin. Then later on the Lisbon Agreement of 1958 aimed to ensure the legal framework for protecting appellations of origin. The registered member states gain from this agreement by having their products recognized as coming from their nations, and it also defines the phrase “Appellation of Origin”. Appellations of origin are the geographical name of a country, region, or locality, which serves to designate a product originating therein, the quality and characteristics of which are due exclusively or essentially to the geographical environment, including natural and human factors.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) The agreement TRIPS restricts GI tag usage which will amount to misleading the public about the place where the product has originated and it also aimed at the additional protection regarding wines and spirits. Concerning this agreement, India implemented certain rules and acts. **GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS OF GOODS (REGISTRATION AND PROTECTION) ACT, 1999** The TRIPS agreement exerted pressure on the Indian government to enact this act, which provides a suitable legal framework for the protection of items bearing the Geographical Indication mark. Protecting the goods that are registered under geographic indications is the primary goal of this act. This act establishes a clear registration procedure for GI product registration, places limitations on who is eligible to apply for GI tags, and gives authorized users additional rights. This legislation penalizes unauthorized users and provides civil and criminal remedies to persons who have been violated in the event of infringement. **GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS OF GOODS (REGISTRATION AND PROTECTION) RULES, 2002** The government of India enacted these rules to offer guidelines for the execution of the GI Act of 1999. These rules establish specific requirements for the registration, administration, and management of GI-tagged goods protection. **FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED BEFORE REGISTRATION** **ELIGIBILITY FOR REGISTRATION** - Any person, organization, manufacturer, or authority can register for the GI tag of the product. - Interest of the producers should be shown by the applicant. - Application must have been made in the prescribed form and should contain all details about the product. - Application must be made to the registrar of GI with the registration fee. **PRODUCT DOES NOT AMOUNT TO REGISTRATION** - When the product use deceives or is contrary to the law or - When the products consist of obscene content or cause hurt to any religious people. - When the product has been falsely represented which is originated in any other region. **REGISTRATION PROCEDURE** **IDENTIFICATION OF GI** The first step is to pick out a product that is to be registered for a GI tag. The products can be agricultural, industrial, handicrafts, or can also be natural resources but those products should possess unique features and qualities towards the geographical place from where it is been originated, and that product should have some reputation because of its geographical origin. While identifying the product it should ensure the geographical place from where it originated and enough documents should be given to prove the unique quality of the product and its link to the place of origin. **PROCESS RELATED TO APPLICATION FORM: (SECTION 11 OF GI ACT)CONTENTS NEEDED FOR FILING THE APPLICATION** First, the application should be obtained from the concerned authority and the applicant should fill the application with all the necessary information related to the product like its unique quality, features, and place of origin with sufficient documents that stand as evidence for the originality of the product. After filing all these details, the applicant should sign the application, and a statement consisting of all his details should be specified in the application. Later on, the application should be given to the concerned authority. **INSPECTION OF APPLICATION** Once the application is submitted, the authorities scrutinize it, ensuring that it meets all of the necessary standards and thoroughly reviewing it. Authorities assess the product description, quality, features, and place of origin to ensure compliance with all legal norms and regulations. The authorities examine all these with experts’ help and state the specifications’ authenticity and correctness. **NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE: (SECTION 12 OF GI ACT)** Authority after examination if have any clarifications or objections then he can issue the applicant a notice and ask him to show cause the reason for the same. He should also state the grounds for issuing the notice in detail. The applicant on receiving the notice should respond to the notice within 2 months or else the application may also be rejected. Once the register hears the reasons from the applicant then he can decide either to approve or reject the application. Then the applicant can also file for an appeal within 1 month if aggrieved. **PUBLICATION: (SECTION 13 OF GI ACT)** Upon approval of the application, the GI-tagged product should be published in journals, newspapers, or any other online platform. Upon acceptance of the application, the publication should take place within three months. All details regarding the product and its origin should be accurately stated in the advertisement. **OPPOSITION AFTER PUBLICATION: (SECTION 14 OF GI ACT)** Once the application is published, anyone who believes the product is ineligible for the GI tag may file an opposition against it with the register. The register then delivers the applicant a copy of the notification and asks him to respond within two months or the application will be abandoned. If the applicant files the counter-statement then the register should give a copy of the counter-statement to the person who filed the opposition. Then the register should allow to show cause for both sides and can conclude either to accept or reject the application based on the statements and evidence given. **CORRECTIONS AND AMENDMENTS: (SECTION 15 OF CI ACT)** If the applicant found some specifications that need a correction or amendment then he can by stating the grounds apply to the register and then on sufficient reason he may permit the applicant to make certain corrections. The amendments or corrections can be permitted either before or after the acceptance of the application. **REGISTRATION: (SECTION 16 OF GI ACT)** Once the examination and publication are over, then the register after hearing the opposition, if satisfied accepts the application and registers it and the date on which it is registered is called the registration date. After this process, the register gives the authorized user a certificate of the registration and if the registration is not completed within 12 months, on notice to the applicant the register can abandon the application. The register can also make corrections in the certificate in case of any clerical errors. **DURATION, RENEWAL, AND RESTORATION: (SECTION 18 OF GI ACT**) Once the product gets its GI tag then the protection of that product under GI is valid for 10 years. If the applicant needs to continue with the duration of the protection then he can renew it by paying the fee for the renewal before the validity period ends or else the protection gets terminated and the terminated protection can also be restored by paying the fees within the period of 1 year. **APPEAL TO THE APPELLATE BOARDS: (SECTION 31 OF GI ACT)** If the applicant feels that the decision made by the register is wrong then he can appeal against the decision within 3 months. The applicant should state the reasons for the appeal and should give notice with all the essential documents. Then the court allows both sides to show cause and derive the conclusion based on the facts and the evidence given. **RIGHTS OBTAINED AFTER REGISTRATION** - The authorized user on registration enjoys an unlimited right over that particular product and also has the right to restrict the unauthorized user who infringes the GI-tagged products. - The users also have the right to get remedies in case of any unauthorized use and also restrict the imitation of the product. **INFRINGEMENT AND ITS REMEDIES** **INFRINGEMENT: (SECTION 22 OF GI ACT)** If any person who is not an authorized user uses the registered GI tag for goods which is not produced in that specific geographical area and misleads the public or makes any imitation of the product which is registered under GI or else the act done by that person damages the reputation of the product then that leads to the infringement under GI. However, the infringement does not include a person who is not an authorized person but obtains that Gi-tagged product for the further process or packaging of the good. **REMEDIES** - Remedies include civil, criminal, and administrative remedies. - Under civil remedies the aggrieved party claims for the damages with an injunction that can either be temporary or permanent or stop the production or sale of infringing goods. - Under criminal remedies the aggrieved party claims for the fines and imprisonment for infringing the GI-tagged goods. - Under administrative remedies exercised by the register of GI by cancelling the registration of infringing goods. **IMPORTANT CASES AND DISPUTES RELATED TO GI** 1. **Tea Board, India vs. ITC Limited** This case is popularly known as the Darjeeling tea case. **FACTS:** Darjeeling tea has a distinct taste and quality due to its West Bengal origin. The petitioner oversaw the production of Darjeeling tea and obtained protection under Geographical indications for tea produced in Darjeeling, as well as the GI tag Darjeeling tea. The defendant, ITC Limited used the name Darjeeling for the longue services in the hotel which is in Calcutta. So, the petitioner filed a suit against the defendant for using the name Darjeeling for their longue services for the infringement of misleading the public by using GI tagged name. **JUDGEMENT:** The court held that the GI protection is only given for the goods which is registered and not for the services. Here the petitioner has got a GI tag only for the tea produced in Darjeeling but the defendant has used the Darjeeling for his longue services. So there is no passing off occurred and hence the defendant is not liable for the infringement under GI. 2\. **India -us basmati rice dispute** This case is popularly known as the Basmati case. **FACTS:** Basmati is the name given to the rice variety which means the fragrance or the flavor which is widely grown in India and Pakistan. In 1997, the Rice tech company obtained a patent for the rice named basmati which is grown outside India and Pakistan. So, India objected to the patent given to a rice tech company because the name Basmati is known for the rice grown in India and Pakistan and stated that if rice tech uses the Basmati name for other region-grown rice then it will mislead the consumers buying the Basmati Rice from India. **OUTCOME:** As a result of this objection, the rice tech has withdrawn many patent claims in which Basmati is also one and India got a GI tag over Basmati rice. 3\. **Tirupati Laddu controversy** **FACTS:** Laddu which is made in Tirupati Perumal temple is know for its unique taste which is widely spread among the people. So, Tirupati Devasthanam registered and got GI protection for the Tirupati Laddu. But many were against this and filed cases against this as it is widely spread no need for protection under the Geographical indications and also stated that it can’t be restricted by GI protection as it is given to the public domain as prasad. **OUTCOME:** As a result, the court held that the GI registration for Tirupati Laddu can’t be cancelled due to its popularity and public domain issues. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** There were no specific laws for GI protection initially in India. Later by the influence of the TRIPS agreement, the government of India came up with a legal framework for the protection of GI in India which includes the GI Act and GI Rules. The provisions in these acts and rules paves the way for the proper registration of GI and also for the regulation and protection of the rights of the authorized users under GI. Thus India protects GI-tagged products with a proper legal framework established in 1999. **REFERENCES** 1. **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** 1. Law Relating To Intellectual Property Rights: V.K. Ahuja 2. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. 1. 1. - **Cases Referred:** - Tea Board, India vs. ITC Limited - India -us basmati rice dispute - Tirupati Laddu controversy - **Statutes Referred** - Geographical indications of goods (registration and protection) Act, 1999. - Geographical indications of goods (registration and protection) rules, 2002. **Categories:** Articles, Intellectual Property Law --- ### [An Informed Insight: UAPA, 1967](https://lawfoyer.in/an-informed-insight-uapa-1967/) **Published:** July 11, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Srishti Srivastav, Law Student at City Academy Law College, an affiliated college of University of Lucknow, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh** **Introduction** The Unlawful Activities Prevention Act of 1967, also called the UAP Act or UAPA, is an act to prevent anti-terrorism activities across the territory of, the Union of India or, any part India has acquired. The National Investigation Agency, the central counter-terrorism agency, is this act’s enforcement body. The act presents itself as a more effective means of dealing with terrorist activities and other related problems, as well as the prohibition of certain illicit activities carried out by individuals or associations. The UAPA, 1967’s Section 1 Subsection (2) states that the act is applicable throughout the entirety of India and that anyone found to have violated any of its provisions may face legal repercussions. The act also has provisions for every person who commits an offense or omission under this act (Section 1 sub-section (3) of UAPA,1967). Any person who has committed an offense or omission outside India shall be punished as if the act or omission had been committed in India (Section 1 sub-section (4) of UAPA,1967). Any individual, company, firm, organization, association of persons, or body of individuals, whether or not incorporated, as well as any artificial juridical person and any agency, office, or branch owned or controlled by any of the aforementioned individuals, are all considered “persons” under the definition of “person” provided by Section 2 sub-section (ec) of this act. If it is discovered that any person or group is engaged in any terrorist activity as defined by this act, the Indian government has the authority to label them as terrorists or terrorist organizations. Any individual can be detained by the authorities under this act for ninety days which can be extended up to one hundred and eighty days if the investigation has not been completed even without a chargesheet being filed or without the exhibition of evidence. Within the duration of detention, either 90 days or 180 days, the right to bail does not arise. The accused cannot be freed even after the specified period of custody has passed unless the court finds that there are good reasons to believe the charges against them are true in the first place. **The History of UAPA,1967** In 1962, CN Annadurai, founder of the Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK), proposed a separate Tamil nation in his Rajya Sabha speech. But later, due to the Indo-China War of 1962, he let go of this proposal. During this period, the government believed that India already had provisions to deal with external aggression in the form of emergency granted by Article 352 of the constitution but the nation had no law to deal with the domestic crisis. The Unlawful Activities Prevention Act was created in 1967 as a result of the need for an anti-domestic crisis statute. It was formed by setting up a committee by the National Integration Council for national integration and regionalization. On the recommendation of this committee, in 1963, the 16th Constitutional Amendment was made which added the words “sovereignty and integrity of India” as a reasonable restriction in Article 19(2), (3), (4) of the Indian Constitution. Certain fundamental rights granted to people by Article 19(1) were curtailed by this amendment: the freedom of speech and expression, the right to peaceful assembly without the use of force, and the right to organize into cooperative organizations, unions, or associations. UAPA,1967 is the successor of a few anti-terrorism laws of the independent India. After India became a liberal democratic the nation witnessed many domestic crises such as large-scale communal violence, displacement, and internal disturbance as a consequence of partition. Intending to secure the territory of India, its constitution, and the rights of its citizens the Prevention Detention Act of 1950 was formulated. According, to this act the government had the power to detain individuals for 1 year without any charge. The act had a “sunset clause”, i.e., it was made for a temporary period and a specific purpose. Thus, in 1969 the Parliament believed that the purpose of this law was complete and as a consequence, it was lapsed. In the year 1958, the Armed Forces Special Power Act was passed which is still enforced. The Maintenance of Internal Security Act of 1971 was passed two years after the Preventive Detention Act of 1950 expired. The Maintenance of Internal Security Act of 1971 inherited much of the 1950’s Preventive Detention Act’s provisions. It was revoked in 1977 as a result of widespread abuse by Smt. Indira Gandhi’s administration during the emergency in 1975. Additionally, another security measure that is still in effect, the National Security measure of 1980, was created in essentially the same amount of time. In response to the unrest brought about by the Punjab Terror Acts, the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act was created in 1985. It was repealed in 1995 because of its wide misuse. In 2001, after the deadly terrorist attack on the Parliament, Mr. Vajpayee led the NDA government passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2001. It was a draconian law that was being widely misused and hence, was repealed by the UPA government in 2004. **Amendments in UAPA** **1. Amendment of 2004** Repealing the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2001, the system experienced a vacuum that the Amendment of 2004 fulfilled. The majority provisions of the POTA,2001 were shoved into the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act of 1967. This was the first amendment that enhanced the extent of the act and added anti-terrorism provisions to it. Definitions like terrorist acts, terrorist gangs, and terrorist organizations were added. With the amendment, the state might designate any organization as a “terrorist organization” and place them in a schedule without following the proper legal procedures. The amendment included new chapters specifically for the punishment of acts of terrorism. **2. Amendment of 2008** Following the horrific 26/11 assaults in Mumbai, Maharashtra, the UAPA, 1967 underwent its second modification to take action against international terrorism. This amendment can constitute a “Special Court” under the National Investigation Agency Act,2008. The amendment also added the definition of “property” in the act. It enhanced penalties for terrorism-related offenses. The amendment enlarged police custody and jail time for the accused and developed a stricter bail procedure without any chargesheet being filed. **3. Amendment of 2012** This amendment added a few definitions to Section 2 of the act such as economic security, person, and proceeds of terrorism. The amendment altered the duration of the notification from which an organization could be designated as a terrorist organization from two years to five years which means now an organization would be banned for five years instead of two years before judicial review. The government by this amendment is empowered to forfeit the property of the individuals if they are convicted under this act. **4. Amendment of 2019 The most recent amendment in the UAPA Act is the amendment of 2019. It gave the National Investigation Agency the authority to investigate cases under this act. Under this recent amendment, the government can designate any organization as a terrorist organization if it commits, participates, prepares, promotes, or is otherwise involved in any of them. The amendment altered the maximum period of detention from 90 days to 180 days or longer without the right of bail being raised. In general laws, the right to bail is raised after the expiration of the period of 90 days. The new 4thSchedule was added through this amendment wherein the government can brand any individual as a terrorist which will have no designated due process. The individual branded as a terrorist under this Schedule can appeal to such government to de-notify his/her name from the 4th Schedule. **Arguments either for or against** **Arguments in support:** **1. Security of the State-** A nation must preserve its unity and integrity by taking effective measures for safeguarding its security. The act gives authority to the agencies to take preventive actions against the person or organization that is involved or supports the activities that threaten the nation’s integrity. For example- The government, in the Second Schedule of the UAPA has designated several organizations as terrorist organizations such as the People Liberation Army, National Democratic Fund Bodoland, Kanglei Yaol Kanba Lup, etc. **2. International Commitment**– To prevent international terrorism, the United Nations urges in its Charter that all governments adopt the necessary steps. As mandated by the DPSP of Article 51, the supporters of the legislation assert that India’s efforts to counter international terrorism are demonstrated by the UAPA. **3. Preventive Measures-** The Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) empowers the government and law enforcement agencies to proactively target persons and groups that they suspect of engaging in illicit activities before they become apparent. **4. Effectivity against terrorism-** The strict provisions of the act discourage individuals and organizations from engaging in or supporting any act threatening the nation’s security. **5. To counter terrorism activities-** The legislation of UAPA provides the law to the agencies to combat anti-terrorism activities in the nation. It gives authority to designate an individual as a terrorist or an organization as a terrorist organization if they are found to be involved in a terrorist act under this act and make the investigation and prosecution smooth. **Arguments against-** **1. Abrogates Fundamental Rights-** The fundamental rights guaranteed to citizens by the Constitution are compromised by the act. A few Article 19 rights, including the freedoms of speech and expression, assembly without the use of force, and formation of unions and associations, are reasonably restricted by the act. Additionally, it infringes upon the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14 and 21, including the rights to equality, life, and personal liberty. **2. Low Conviction Rate-** According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, in 2018 the number of arrested persons across India was 1,421 out of which 35 were convicted while in 2019, it rose to 1,948 out of which only 34 got convicted. In the year 2020, out of 1,321, the number of convicted persons was 80. Hence, on average, only 3% of the arrested persons were convicted under this act. **3. Rigorous Bail Procedure-** According to the statute, an arrested individual cannot be released on bail for a period of 90 days, although this can be extended to 180 days or more if the court is satisfied with the Public Prosecutor’s report, which states that the investigation into the matter is not yet finished even in the absence of a chargesheet.It is unnecessary to immediately signify the cause of arrest to the person arrested or detained. **4. Centralised Power-** Through this act, the power is centralized in the hands of the central government or the agencies of the central government (National Investigating Agency) to declare any individual as a terrorist if it believes the involvement of such person in any unlawful activity. Any individual may be designated as a terrorist by the government through the Official Gazette. **5. Against the Federal Structure-** The liability of maintaining law and order in a state lies upon the government of such state but the UAPA law encroaches upon such power of the state government. **6. Political Misuse-** Due to the lengthened period of imprisonment even without a chargesheet being filed this counter-terrorism act is misused by the ruling political party or government to suppress the non-consent of the individuals against them. **Judiciary’s View** **1.** In the recent case of **Prabir Purkayastha (2024)** the court decided that the investigative agencies had to notify the person who was arrested under the UAPA of the reasons for their arrest. This way, the person could use the information to effectively consult with his attorney, challenge the police custody remand, and request bail. **2.** In the **Union of India vs. K.A. Najeeb (2021)** the UAPA’s rules, according to the Supreme Court, do not restrict constitutional courts’ authority to issue bail where they determine that the accused person’s fundamental rights have been violated. **3.** In **Arup Bhuyan vs State of Assam (2011),** the Supreme Court ruled that an individual is not automatically guilty just for belonging to a prohibited group. It can be applied when someone uses violence, encourages others to use violence, or engages in any other behavior meant to cause chaos. **4.** In **Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. Union of India (2018**), the court held that an insurrection or protest against parliamentary and governmental measures cannot be deemed illegitimate if it is conducted peacefully and without violence. **Conclusion** Historically, the colonizers used to suppress the dissent of the citizens as they didn’t want them to be opinionated against the rule of the government or the crown. Even after 75 years of independence and separation from colonial governance, the state still finds the urge to stifle the non-consent of the citizens towards the regime. India is a democratic nation and by definition, a democracy is a system in which a varied group of people with a range of viewpoints and the freedom to pursue their own interests and speak for themselves elect leaders. Every nation must have laws to counter terrorism activities to protect the security of the state. Still, while doing so it shall not persistently impact or abrogate the basic fundamental rights of its citizens. The rampant and inconvertible political imprisonment raises the question of why there is such opposition to dissent in a democracy. For the nation’s security, such a bargain of the fundamental rights of the citizens is unjust. By carefully crafting amendments, security and civil liberties must coexist in harmony. **Categories:** Articles --- ### [E-Contracts and Digital Signatures: Legal Challenges in India](https://lawfoyer.in/e-contracts-and-digital-signatures-legal-challenges-in-india/) **Published:** August 4, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Sonam Chahar, Army Institute of Law** **INTRODUCTION** As we all know contracts are agreements that are enforceable by law. This is the meaning of a contract given by laws. The contracts are between the parties who agree with each other on certain terms and conditions. As the technological revolution took place, the electronic contracts overruled the traditional contracts. E-contracts save the time, money, and complications of parties to the contract. The traditional contracts need some essential elements to be fulfilled, similarly, the e-contracts require pre-requisite conditions to be fulfilled. The old contract system dealt with paperwork, parties had to sign contracts physically, and they were time-consuming. However, e-contracts can be made digitally on various apps, websites, and gadgets. Individuals living in any corner can make contracts digitally. For completion of any contract, one needs the consent of the parties to the contract. In traditional contracts, they had to sign the documents related to the object of the contract. But in the technological era along with e-contracts, digital signatures have also evolved. The parties to the contract have the privilege to sign or submit their documents digitally without any hassle of going out. This article deals with the essentials, the advantages, and disadvantages of e-contracts and digital signatures, and their challenges in India. **1. Meaning, Definition & Explanation** The contract is defined in Section 2(h) of the Indian Contract Act,1872 as “*an agreement enforceable by law is a contract”*.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) To constitute a contract as valid certain pre-requisite conditions, need to be fulfilled such as lawful consideration and lawful objects of the contract. E-contracts are defined in Section 10(A) of Information Technology(IT)Act, 2000 as “*Validity of contracts formed through electronic means.—Where in a contract formation, the communication of proposals, the acceptance of proposals, the revocation of proposals and acceptances, as the case may be, are expressed in electronic form or by means of an electronic records, such contract shall not be deemed to be unenforceable solely on the ground that such electronic form or means was used for that purpose.”[**\[2\]**](#_ftn2)* **2. Essentials of contracts** There are some essential elements of the contract under The Indian Contract,1872 which are as follows: 1. The one party must make an offer and the acceptance by the other party. 2. The parties should be competent to enter the contract. 3. The object of the contract must be lawful. 4. The consideration of the contract must be lawful. 5. The parties must enter to the contract with free consent. **Essentials of Electronic Contracts** 1. The offer must be made by one party electronically and accepted by another by the mode prescribed. 2. The object and consideration of the contract must be lawful. 3. The parties must be competent to make the contract. **3. Types of E-Contracts** 1. Shrink wrap agreements These types of agreements are related to the buying of software goods. The customer who is purchasing the software product, along with the product the customer has access to the terms and conditions of the product also. - Web wrap agreements These types of agreements are related to merely accepting the terms and conditions of the software for product purchasing. By clicking the button “OK” agreeing to the conditions of the software will give access the customer to purchase the products from that specific software. The customer has the choice of registration also entering the software. Examples are online shopping, and social media apps. - Browse wrap agreements These types of agreements are between several parties and are binding each other with the usage of the website. Parties must comply with the terms and conditions of the website. **4. Benefits of E- Contracts** 1. Cost and time effective: It reduces the time of making a traditional contract and it is time effective as it saves the time of parties entering into a contract. 2. Security purposes: The e-contracts are protected from any damage to the original contracts. They are also protected from any unauthorized use from other sources which are illegal in nature. 3. Easy accessibility: The e-contracts are easily accessible from various platforms or online tools. 4. Environment-friendly: The e-contracts reduce the paperwork which saves paper. **5. Legal Challenges of e-contract** There are some emerging key challenges of e-contracts. 1. Authentication: The authenticity and legality of documents are essential elements to constitute a contract digitally, without the authenticity, there is the risk of fraudulent activities and tampering of documents. 2. Free consent: Free consent is essential for contracts. The parties should refrain from coercion, misrepresentation, or any type of fraud and give free consent in compliance with the terms and conditions of the contract. 3. Easy accessibility: The e-contracts are digitally made, and every individual does not have access to the internet which refrains them from making contracts digitally without going anywhere. 4. Privacy: The data privacy of individuals comes in danger as they submit all their personal and professional information on online platforms to make contracts online. There is a threat to privacy on online platforms. 5. Transaction: In India, consumers are not very aware of online transaction fraud. They purchase products from various online platforms and make transactions with a single click without going through the terms and conditions of that platform that made their loss. - **DIGITAL SIGNATURE** Digital signatures evolved with time as technological evolution took place. Digital signatures are different from e-signatures. The digital signature is a form of consent given by one person to another person digitally attached to documents. The IT Act, of 2000 section 2(p) defines digital signatures as “digital signature” means authentication of any electronic record by a subscriber using an electronic method or procedure in accordance with the provisions of section 3.”[**\[3\]**](#_ftn3)* Digital signatures are important because they carry the real identity of the individual related to the digital documents. They are equivalent to the handwritten signatures. There are three features of digital signatures which are authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation. The authentication of electronic records is given in section 3 of the IT Act, 2000 as *3. Authentication of electronic records. – (1) Subject to the provisions of this section any subscriber may authenticate an electronic record by affixing his digital signature. (2) The authentication of the electronic record shall be effected by the use of asymmetric crypto system and hash function which envelop and transform the initial electronic record into another electronic record.[**\[4\]**](#_ftn4)* **Benefits of Digital signatures** 1. Save time: The digital signatures save time for the individual who is residing in a different city away from his/her business place. The individual can sign the documents instantly whenever needed from any place; it eventually saves time. 2. Cost-effective: The digital signatures eliminate all the paper formalities. It saves the cost of companies as they no longer invest in paperwork, scanning, printing, delivery of papers, etc. 3. Valid in nature: They are valid in nature as the laws approve it. They are authentic and original in nature. The specific rules and regulations laid down in the IT Act to ensure the legal validity. 4. Efficiency in Workflow: The workflow of companies and businesses has become fast and efficient. Digital signatures save their time and are cost-effective which leads to a smooth flow of work. **Legal Challenges of Digital Signatures** The digital signatures are managed online, and there is a risk of the tempering of documents. There are some legislative rules and regulations that determine who is competent for digital signatures. Some jurisdictions do not consider digital signatures valid. There are fraudulent activities that question the legal validity of digital signatures. - **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The technological revolution introduced e-contracts, digital signatures, electronic signatures, and many more things. The world is slowly moving toward the digital world wholly. Now, electronic contracts become one step ahead of traditional contracts in many aspects, including benefits, etc. To implement these changes effectively in a country, certain rules and regulations and legislative laws like the Information Technology Act, of 2000. - **REFERENCES** - **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** - Bare Act of Information Technology Act, 2000 - **Online Articles / Sources Referred** - [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330281294\_EContracts\_in\_India\_The\_Legal\_Framework\_Issues\_and\_Challenges](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330281294_EContracts_in_India_The_Legal_Framework_Issues_and_Challenges) - mhnlakgilnojmhinhkckjpncpbhabphi/pages/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=https%3A%2F%2Fls.iledu.in%2Fwpcontent%2Fuploads%2F2023%2F08%2FV1I116.pdf - **Statutes Referred** - Information Technology Act, 2000 --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Indian Contract Act,1872 available at ndiacode.nic.in/show-data?abv=CEN&statehandle=123456789/1362&actid=AC\_CEN\_3\_20\_00035\_187209\_1523268996428§ionId=38605§ionno=2&orderno=2&orgactid=AC\_CEN\_3\_20\_00035\_187209\_1523268996428 [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Information Technology Act,2000 available at https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?abv=CEN&statehandle=123456789/1362&actid=AC\_CEN\_45\_76\_00001\_200021\_1517807324077&orderno=14&orgactid=AC\_CEN\_45\_76\_00001\_200021\_1517807324077 [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Information Technology Act,2000 available at https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?abv=CEN&statehandle=123456789/1362&actid=AC\_CEN\_45\_76\_00001\_200021\_1517807324077&orderno=2&orgactid=AC\_CEN\_45\_76\_00001\_200021\_1517807324077 [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Information Technology Act, 2000 available at /mhnlakgilnojmhinhkckjpncpbhabphi/pages/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.indiacode.nic.in%2Fbitstream%2F123456789%2F13116%2F1%2Fit\_act\_2000\_updated.pdf **Categories:** Articles, Contract Law --- ### [Free Online Webinar on Changing Facets of Federalism in 21st Century by LawFoyer: Register by August 23](https://lawfoyer.in/free-online-webinar-on-changing-facets-of-federalism-in-21st-century-by-lawfoyer/) **Published:** August 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** [![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Changing-Facets-of-Federalism-in-21st-Century-724x1024.png)](https://lawfoyer.in/webinar-register-changing-facets-of-federalism/) --- [Register Now](https://lawfoyer.in/webinar-register-changing-facets-of-federalism/) ## Gain In-Depth Knowledge from a Leading Expert LawFoyer presents an exclusive free online webinar – **“Changing Facets of Federalism in 21st Century”** led by Constitutional Law expert **Prof. (DR.) 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Bommai v Union of India. - **Cooperative Federalism:** Discussing the concept of cooperative federalism in India, its importance in solving common problems, and how it has been interpreted by the judiciary. - **Competitive Federalism:** Exploring the emerging concept of competitive federalism, where states compete to attract investment and development, and its implications for center-state relations. - **Progressive Federalism:** Examining the idea of progressive federalism, which allows states greater control over issues typically reserved for the national government. - **Challenges and Opportunities:** Identifying the challenges faced by Indian federalism in the 21st century and the opportunities for strengthening federal principles. - **Center-State Relations:** Analyzing the evolving dynamics between the central government and states, including fiscal relations, administrative coordination, and policy implementation. - **Federalism and Diversity:** Discussing how federalism in India accommodates its cultural and ethnic pluralism, and the role it plays in maintaining national unity. - **Future Trends:** Exploring potential future developments in Indian federalism, including possible constitutional amendments or new interpretations of federal principles. - This webinar will provide a comprehensive overview of the changing nature of federalism in 21st century India, offering insights into its constitutional, legal, and practical aspects. Don’t miss this chance to take your Constitutional Law expertise to the next level. Register now on www.lawfoyer.in or contact at contact@lawfoyer.in or +91 8574723478. --- **Categories:** Events, Webinar --- ### [3RD SANKHLA & ASSOCIATES NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2024](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-sankhla-associates-national-moot-court-competition-2024/) **Published:** August 12, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** The Amikus Qriae (TAQ) is organizing the 3rd edition of Sankhla & Associates National Moot Court Competition 2024 in association with its esteemed joint organizer Sankhla & Associates from 14th September to 17th September 2024 in Virtual mode. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/TAQ-MOOT-POSTER-723x1024.jpg)**About Sankhla & Associates** A full-service business and corporate legal practice with a national and international reach is Sankhla & Associates. Their law practice includes collaboration with some of the top solicitors from Singapore, the United Kingdom, and India. Individuals, firms, and organizations can rely on the legal team’s lawyers and corporate advisors for individualized, custom legal solutions. In the areas of Insurance law, Bankruptcy law, Recovery and Debt Management, Corporate law, Advisory, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Laws, etc., their corporate lawyers, litigation experts, bankruptcy and company experts have a renowned legal background and reputation for competing at the highest level. Since the motto of TAQ coincides with that of this law firm, the Third Edition of the National Virtual Moot Court 2024 aims to uphold and reflect these shared values by providing a premier platform for showcasing legal expertise and fostering professional development. **About Amikus Qriae (TAQ):** The Amikus Qriae (TAQ) is a visionary platform conceived by several legal luminaries and eminent personalities from across the country and the globe. TAQ aims to disseminate legal knowledge and provide an in-depth understanding of various fields of law, ensuring that this knowledge penetrates every corner of the ever-growing legal fraternity. We strive to contribute significantly to contemporary legal issues and the development of the omnipresent field of law through the dedicated efforts of ambitious legal minds nationwide. TAQ is registered under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, and the Ministry of MSME, Government of India. We are proud to be recognized as the 8th largest legal website in India. **Aim of the Competition:** The Third Edition of this prestigious competition aims to enhance the skills of budding lawyers and promote their logical reasoning. Moreover, it helps them cope with the growing standards of success and achievements while preparing them to compete at the highest level in the real world. For further details, please find the Brochure and Moot Proposition of the Third National Virtual Moot Court Competition attached herein. **Eligibility:** Any student pursuing a degree in law, either a five-year course, three-year course, or even LLM students from any recognized institution in India are eligible to participate in the competition. Each team shall consist of a minimum of 2 members (both speakers) and a maximum of 3 members (2 speakers and 1 researcher). We will be permitted a maximum of 04 teams per college to participate. Further, participants in one team may belong to different colleges within the same team, allowing for cross-college participation. **Perks awarded to participants and prize holders:** **NOTE: EVERY PARTICIPANT WILL GET ASSURED VIRTUAL INTERNSHIP OPPORTUNITY AND ASSURED FREE PUBLICATION OPPORTUNITY.** \*Prizes worth up to **Rs. 50,000/- (Fifty-thousand rupees)** will be awarded to specific prize holders and distinguished contestants. 1. The **Winning Team** shall be awarded a prize money of **Rs. 12,000/- (INR)** Along with Internship Opportunities with Chambers of Abhinav Mishra – Advocates and Solicitors, Delhi and Free publication Opportunity at Droit Penale Group bearing ISSN No. \[2456-7280.\] They shall also be awarded with a one-year subscription to CaseMine and access to free courses by our supporting partners. 2. The **Runner-up Team** shall be rewarded with a prize money of **Rs. 10,000/- (INR)** along with an Internship Opportunity at Sankhla & Associates along with a free publication opportunity at Droit Penale Group bearing ISSN No. \[2456-7280.\] They shall also be awarded with a six-month subscription to CaseMine and access to free courses by our supporting partners. 3. The **Second Runner-up Team** shall be awarded a prize money of **Rs. 2000/- (INR)** along with a free publication opportunity at the Indian Journal of Legal Review bearing ISSN No. \[ISSN – 2583-2344\]. They shall also be awarded with a six-month subscription to CaseMine. 4. The **3rd Runner-Up Team** shall be awarded with free book publication opportunity at Lex Scribe. They shall also be awarded with a six-month subscription to CaseMine. 5. The **Best Memorial** shall be awarded with a prize money of INR 2000/ alongwith a free publication opportunity at Indian Journal of Legal Review \[ISSN – 2583-2344\]. They shall also be awarded with a six-month subscription to CaseMine 6. The **Best Speaker** shall be awarded with a prize money of **Rs. 2000/- (INR)** along with a free publication opportunity at Indian Journal of Legal Review \[ISSN – 2583-2344\]. They shall also be awarded with a six-month subscription to CaseMine. 7. The **Best Researcher** shall be awarded with a prize money of **Rs. 2000/- (INR)** along with an Internship Opportunity at Law Offices of India and a free publication opportunity at Lawfoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research \[ISSN No. 2583-7753\]. They shall also be awarded with a six-month subscription to CaseMine and access to free courses by our supporting partners. 8. The **Semi-finalists** shall be awarded with free publication opportunity at Legal Lock Journal ISSN No. 2583-0384. 9. 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The screenshot of the payment receipt shall be attached to the Google form. 4 Teams Per University can Participate in this Competition. **A/C Details for the Payment of Fees-** **Account Holder Name:** Rupam Banerjee **Account Number:** 38137097733 **Bank Name-** State Bank of India **IFSC Code-** SBIN0012401 **Branch name-** Shyampur **For Google Pay/Paytm/PhonePe:** +91 7364006404 **UPI ID: –** 7364006404@ybl **Categories:** Events --- ### [THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT UNDER CRIMINAL LAW](https://lawfoyer.in/theories-of-punishment-under-criminal-law/) **Published:** April 2, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Nighilkumar M, Government Law College, Dharmapuri

INTRODUCTION

There is no specific definition of crime and punishment in Indian laws. the act or omission when contrary to law is crime that is punishable. but there is specific definition about offence and punishment in India Penal Code, 1860 and also Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita,2023. Every crime has punishable by law. The crime and punishment are changing as by the trend, that changes are now, the theories of punishment. let us know the changes of punishment by its period. Keywords: punishment, criminal law, theories of punishment, Indian penal code, bharatiya nyaya sanhita.

Definition of punishment

     In generally, the punishment is giving to the accused for committed the crime. Indian Penal Code denotes that certain amount of punishment for certain offence by different section. but there is no definition of punishment in any law even in Indian Penal Code. Under section 53 of that code says about types of punishment to be punished by the law to the accused. According to that section there are 5 types of punishment such as, death, imprisonment for life, rigorous imprisonment and simple imprisonment, forfeiture of property, fine. No other punishment shall be given other than this code otherwise any specified law provided.

OBJECT OF PUNISHMENT

            The object of punishment is correction of wrongdoer not vengeance on criminal. In India strictly follows the theory of reformative for reform the criminal. Purpose of this punishment is the wrongdoer realise his mistake to correct himself by the theory of reformative and also realise that the wrong-doing is not harmful for the society or the victim and also himself on his future. By this kind of punishment, he realises his wrong-doing in his period of punishment and after released, he comes to the society as a respective person.

Historical Background / Evolution

  • ANCIENT PERIOD
In the Ancient period, the ‘Rex non potest peccare’ principle was followed which means, king can do no wrong. In that period, there is no codified law. king order to do or not to do. there is an oral order not in written and all people were obeying the king’s order. (a) kings can order that killing someone for his crime. that crime even has small offence. if the king ordered, people could be done. there is no appeal, no written judgment and no laws. (b) king can order that move him to another place. In other words, putting something aside from the village. (c) any order to be made by the king even it is not justifiable.
  • MODERN PERIOD
In the Modern period, the “Rule of Law” principle is followed which means No one is above the law. king may do wrong. Only the law can do no wrong. In this period, the laws are written. Even king may do wrong and king can be punished by law. Here is no oral order, order should be written. punishment is defined under the provision of Indian Penal Code.

THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT

There are various theories of punishment followed in India in different period as follows:-
  1. Retributive theory
  2. Deterrent theory
  3. Preventive theory
  4. Reformative theory
Dr. Jacob George v. State of Kerala [1] In this case, the Supreme Court Stated that the purpose of punishment is four-fold. one is retribution for vengeance, another is preventive which is prevent the crime, further is deterrence which gives punishment and furthermore is reformative which is reform the criminals.

RETRIBUTIVE THEORY

     Retributive theory is saying that what the perpetrator done to the victim is equally done the same to the perpetrator too. it also known as ‘theory of vengeance’. This theory is based on the doctrine lex talionis which means an eye for an eye, tooth for tooth. In literal meaning, “You hurt me and I will hurt you”. This kind of punishment is oldest and most ancient justification for punishment.  Retribution means basically that the wrong-doer pays for his wrong-doing. In different way of interpretation may be said that the criminal has by bis crime incurred a debt due to law, and therefore, by suffering punishment he pays it back, dissolving the legal bond forged by his crime. In this moder era, retributive punishment cannot be justification for punishment in this modern society. Punishment is regulated by legislation fixing the punishment and executed by the judges and magistrates.

DETERRENT THEORY

In ordinary meaning of this theory, ‘deterrent’ means abstain from wrong-doing. Object of this theory is restraining the criminal from committing the crime or same in future. This theory explains control the crime by creating the fear of crime before the offender committing the offence. This theory gives us the fear to commit wrong-doing by imposing the punishment. For Example, ‘A’ is committed such offence and punished such imprisonment. People will stop committing such crime because of fear of punishment of ‘A’. Moreover, this theory does not only punish the offender for his crime but also not to commit the offence again. There are two types of deterrents as, specific deterrence and general deterrence. State of Karnataka v. Sharnappa Basangouda Aregoudar [2] “The sentence imposed by the court should act as a deterrent on potential offenders and should be commensurate with the seriousness of the crime”

PREVENTIVE THEORY

     In literal sense, ‘prevent’ means intercept, hinder, frustrate, thwart from happen which means to stop in advance some act. In other way to express about this theory, proverb says that prevention is better than cure.  This theory tries to stop the crime and also prevent him to reoffending. If a person disqualified from driving, it prevented from committing the traffic offences. Preventive theory has two kinds, one is temporary preventive and another one is permanent preventive. temporary preventive means preventive measure is only for such period, i.e., certain amount of fine, certain period of imprisonment. permanent preventive means is unlimited disablement, i.e., life imprisonment, death penalty.

REFORMATIVE THEORY

Reformation is defined as “the effort to a man to society as a better and wiser man and a good citizen”[3] Reformative theory seeks to better the criminal, by removing his errors, faults and defects and maintains that punishment is curative. A crime is a disease and to remove the disease medicine like fine, imprisonment. This theory aims at the actual offender and all legal system are surely moving towards a reformative paradigm. Shanti Lal Meena v. State (NCT of Delhi)[4] Supreme Court observed in this case that in cases of corruption and swindling of public money, there is no serious scope for reformation of public servants as the moment they are convicted they lose their job. Therefore, there is no significance to the theory of reformation and only relevant object of punishment in such cases is denunciation and deterrence.

Types / Kinds of punishment

There are five kinds of punishment under Section 53 of Indian Penal Code, 1860
  1. Death Sentence,
  2. Sentence of Life Imprisonment,
  3. Sentence of a term of imprisonment which may be either simple or rigorous,
  4. forfeiture of property and
  5. fine.

Legal Provisions in IPC & BNS

In Indian Penal Code, Section 53 says about Punishments, “53. Punishments. – The punishments to which offenders are liable under the provisions of this code are, -   First. - Death;   Secondly. - Imprisonnment for life;   Thirdly. - [Repealed by Act 17 of 1949, S. 2];   Fourthly. – Imprisonment, which is of two descriptions, namely: -
  • Rigorous, that is, with hard labour;
  • Simple;
  Fifthly. – Forfeiture of property;   Sixthly. – Fine.” [5] In Section 4 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhit, 2023 says about the punishment as, “4. Punishments. - The punishments to which offenders are liable under the provisions of this Sanhita are— (a) Death; (b) Imprisonment for life, that is to say, imprisonment for remainder of a person’s natural life; (c) Imprisonment, which is of two descriptions, namely: —    (1) Rigorous, that is, with hard labour;    (2) Simple; (d) Forfeiture of property; (e) Fine; (f) Community Service.” [6] These provisions are mentioned above about the punishment. but, Indian Penal Code,1860 is replaced by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. After the date 1st July, 2024 Indian Penal Code will be repealed and Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita will be replaced and enforced. that’s why here we discuss both provisions. In addition, another punishment is included in Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita is community service which is not in Indian Penal Code.

Amendments / Repealing

     In Section 53 of Indian Penal Code has a repealing clause that the third punishment is transportation which was repealed by Act 17 of 1949. But after the moth of July, 2024 the whole Indian Penal Code, 1860 will be repealed and replaced by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.  Because of oldest code which was enacted by the British legistation and made such modification in that code for this modern era.

Future Implications

     the society is change in each day by day but, the laws are not modified in day by day. It is not possible to change the laws by up-to-date. But we can change the laws in between certain period. Indian Penal Code is enacted in the British period. This code does not suitable for this modern period. So, we have to need a new code for this modern era. that’s why today Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita will be enacted and will enforce.  

CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

A penal statute is necessary for a republic country. People make wrong and law correct them by the penal statute. The theories of punishment are nothing but the history of punishment, procedure or manner for punishment.

REFERENCES

  1. Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred
    1. The Indian Penal Code – Ratanlal & Dhirajlal
    2. Indian Penal Code – B.M. Gandhi
    3. Indian Penal Code – S.N. Misra
  2. Online Articles / Sources Referred
    1. indiacode.nic.in
    2. scconline.com
    3. mha.gov.in
    4. prsindia.org
    5. lawtimesjournal.in
    6. indiankanoon.org
  3. Cases Referred
    1. Jacob George v. State of Kerala, 1994 Cr.L.J. 3851 SC.
    2. State of Karnataka v. Sharnappa Basangouda Aregoudar AIR 2002 SC 1529.
    3. Shanti Lal Meena v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2015) 6 SCC 185.
  1. Statutes Referred
    1. India Penal Code, 1860.
    2. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
[1] Dr.Jacob George v. State of Kerala, 1994 Cr.L.J. 3851 SC. [2] State of Karnataka v. Sharnappa Basangouda Aregoudar AIR 2002 SC 1529. [3] Prison Commissioners Report, 1912, p.24. [4] Shanti Lal Meena v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2015) 6 SCC 185.? [5] Indian Penal Code,1860, S.53. [6] Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, S.4 **Content:** **Author-Nighilkumar M, Government Law College, Dharmapuri** ### **INTRODUCTION** There is no specific definition of crime and punishment in Indian laws. the act or omission when contrary to law is crime that is punishable. but there is specific definition about offence and punishment in India Penal Code, 1860 and also Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita,2023. Every crime has punishable by law. The crime and punishment are changing as by the trend, that changes are now, the theories of punishment. let us know the changes of punishment by its period. ***Keywords*:** punishment, criminal law, theories of punishment, Indian penal code, bharatiya nyaya sanhita. #### **Definition of punishment** In generally, the punishment is giving to the accused for committed the crime. Indian Penal Code denotes that certain amount of punishment for certain offence by different section. but there is no definition of punishment in any law even in Indian Penal Code. Under section 53 of that code says about types of punishment to be punished by the law to the accused. According to that section there are 5 types of punishment such as, death, imprisonment for life, rigorous imprisonment and simple imprisonment, forfeiture of property, fine. No other punishment shall be given other than this code otherwise any specified law provided. ### **OBJECT OF PUNISHMENT** The object of punishment is correction of wrongdoer not vengeance on criminal. In India strictly follows the theory of reformative for reform the criminal. Purpose of this punishment is the wrongdoer realise his mistake to correct himself by the theory of reformative and also realise that the wrong-doing is not harmful for the society or the victim and also himself on his future. By this kind of punishment, he realises his wrong-doing in his period of punishment and after released, he comes to the society as a respective person. ### **Historical Background / Evolution** - **ANCIENT PERIOD** In the Ancient period, the ‘*Rex non potest peccare’* principle was followed which means, king can do no wrong. In that period, there is no codified law. king order to do or not to do. there is an oral order not in written and all people were obeying the king’s order. (a) kings can order that killing someone for his crime. that crime even has small offence. if the king ordered, people could be done. there is no appeal, no written judgment and no laws. (b) king can order that move him to another place. In other words, putting something aside from the village. (c) any order to be made by the king even it is not justifiable. - **MODERN PERIOD** In the Modern period, the *“Rule of Law”* principle is followed which means No one is above the law. king may do wrong. Only the law can do no wrong. In this period, the laws are written. Even king may do wrong and king can be punished by law. Here is no oral order, order should be written. punishment is defined under the provision of Indian Penal Code. ### **THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT** There are various theories of punishment followed in India in different period as follows:- 1. Retributive theory 2. Deterrent theory 3. Preventive theory 4. Reformative theory ***Dr. Jacob George v. State of Kerala [\[1\]](#_ftn1)*** In this case, the Supreme Court Stated that the purpose of punishment is four-fold. one is retribution for vengeance, another is preventive which is prevent the crime, further is deterrence which gives punishment and furthermore is reformative which is reform the criminals. ### **RETRIBUTIVE THEORY** Retributive theory is saying that what the perpetrator done to the victim is equally done the same to the perpetrator too. it also known as ‘theory of vengeance’. This theory is based on the doctrine *lex talionis* which means *an eye for an eye, tooth for tooth.* In literal meaning, *“You hurt me and I will hurt you”.* This kind of punishment is oldest and most ancient justification for punishment. Retribution means basically that the wrong-doer pays for his wrong-doing. In different way of interpretation may be said that the criminal has by bis crime incurred a debt due to law, and therefore, by suffering punishment he pays it back, dissolving the legal bond forged by his crime. In this moder era, retributive punishment cannot be justification for punishment in this modern society. Punishment is regulated by legislation fixing the punishment and executed by the judges and magistrates. ### **DETERRENT THEORY** In ordinary meaning of this theory, ‘deterrent’ means abstain from wrong-doing. Object of this theory is restraining the criminal from committing the crime or same in future. This theory explains control the crime by creating the fear of crime before the offender committing the offence. This theory gives us the fear to commit wrong-doing by imposing the punishment. For Example, ‘A’ is committed such offence and punished such imprisonment. People will stop committing such crime because of fear of punishment of ‘A’. Moreover, this theory does not only punish the offender for his crime but also not to commit the offence again. There are two types of deterrents as, specific deterrence and general deterrence. ***State of Karnataka v. Sharnappa Basangouda Aregoudar*** [\[2\]](#_ftn2) “The sentence imposed by the court should act as a deterrent on potential offenders and should be commensurate with the seriousness of the crime” ### **PREVENTIVE THEORY** In literal sense, ‘prevent’ means intercept, hinder, frustrate, thwart from happen which means to stop in advance some act. In other way to express about this theory, proverb says that *prevention is better than cure.* This theory tries to stop the crime and also prevent him to reoffending. If a person disqualified from driving, it prevented from committing the traffic offences. Preventive theory has two kinds, one is temporary preventive and another one is permanent preventive. temporary preventive means preventive measure is only for such period, i.e., certain amount of fine, certain period of imprisonment. permanent preventive means is unlimited disablement, i.e., life imprisonment, death penalty. ### **REFORMATIVE THEORY** Reformation is defined as “the effort to a man to society as a better and wiser man and a good citizen”[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Reformative theory seeks to better the criminal, by removing his errors, faults and defects and maintains that punishment is curative. A crime is a disease and to remove the disease medicine like fine, imprisonment. This theory aims at the actual offender and all legal system are surely moving towards a reformative paradigm. ***Shanti Lal Meena v. State (NCT of Delhi)[\[4\]](#_ftn4)*** Supreme Court observed in this case that in cases of corruption and swindling of public money, there is no serious scope for reformation of public servants as the moment they are convicted they lose their job. Therefore, there is no significance to the theory of reformation and only relevant object of punishment in such cases is denunciation and deterrence. ## **Types / Kinds of punishment** There are five kinds of punishment under Section 53 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 1. Death Sentence, 2. Sentence of Life Imprisonment, 3. Sentence of a term of imprisonment which may be either simple or rigorous, 4. forfeiture of property and 5. fine. ### **Legal Provisions in IPC & BNS** In **Indian Penal Code, Section 53** says about Punishments, *“**53. Punishments.** – The punishments to which offenders are liable under the provisions of this code are, –* *First. – Death;* *Secondly. – Imprisonnment for life;* *Thirdly. – \[Repealed by Act 17 of 1949, S. 2\];* *Fourthly. – Imprisonment, which is of two descriptions, namely: –* - *Rigorous, that is, with hard labour;* - *Simple;* *Fifthly. – Forfeiture of property;* *Sixthly. – Fine.” [**\[5\]**](#_ftn5)* In **Section 4 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhit**, 2023 says about the punishment as, *“4. Punishments. – The punishments to which offenders are liable under the provisions of this Sanhita are—* *(a) Death;* *(b) Imprisonment for life, that is to say, imprisonment for remainder of a person’s natural life;* *(c) Imprisonment, which is of two descriptions, namely: —* *(1) Rigorous, that is, with hard labour;* *(2) Simple;* *(d) Forfeiture of property;* *(e) Fine;* *(f) Community Service.” [**\[6\]**](#_ftn6)* These provisions are mentioned above about the punishment. but, Indian Penal Code,1860 is replaced by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. After the date 1st July, 2024 Indian Penal Code will be repealed and Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita will be replaced and enforced. that’s why here we discuss both provisions. In addition, another punishment is included in Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita is community service which is not in Indian Penal Code. #### **Amendments / Repealing** In Section 53 of Indian Penal Code has a repealing clause that the third punishment is *transportation* which was repealed by Act 17 of 1949. But after the moth of July, 2024 the whole Indian Penal Code, 1860 will be repealed and replaced by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. Because of oldest code which was enacted by the British legistation and made such modification in that code for this modern era. #### **Future Implications** the society is change in each day by day but, the laws are not modified in day by day. It is not possible to change the laws by up-to-date. But we can change the laws in between certain period. Indian Penal Code is enacted in the British period. This code does not suitable for this modern period. So, we have to need a new code for this modern era. that’s why today Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita will be enacted and will enforce. ### **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** A penal statute is necessary for a republic country. People make wrong and law correct them by the penal statute. The theories of punishment are nothing but the history of punishment, procedure or manner for punishment. ### **REFERENCES** 1. **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** 1. The Indian Penal Code – Ratanlal & Dhirajlal 2. Indian Penal Code – B.M. Gandhi 3. Indian Penal Code – S.N. Misra 2. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. [indiacode.nic.in](http://www.indiacode.nic.in) 2. [scconline.com](http://www.scconline.com) 3. [mha.gov.in](http://www.mha.gov.in) 4. [prsindia.org](http://www.prsindia.org) 5. [lawtimesjournal.in](http://www.lawtimesjournal.in) 6. [indiankanoon.org](http://www.indiankanoon.org) 3. **Cases Referred** 1. Jacob George v. State of Kerala, 1994 Cr.L.J. 3851 SC. 2. State of Karnataka v. Sharnappa Basangouda Aregoudar AIR 2002 SC 1529. 3. Shanti Lal Meena v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2015) 6 SCC 185. 4. **Statutes Referred** India Penal Code, 1860 Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. **Endnotes** [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Dr.Jacob George v. State of Kerala, 1994 Cr.L.J. 3851 SC. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) State of Karnataka v. Sharnappa Basangouda Aregoudar AIR 2002 SC 1529. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Prison Commissioners Report, 1912, p.24. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Shanti Lal Meena v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2015) 6 SCC 185.? [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Indian Penal Code,1860, S.53. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, S.4 **Categories:** Articles, Criminal Law --- ### [Mastering the Art of Legal Research: A Comprehensive Certification Course](https://lawfoyer.in/mastering-the-art-of-legal-research-a-comprehensive-certification-course/) **Published:** June 17, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** # ![sticker.png](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/sticker.png) Introducing # Mastering the Art of Legal Research: A Comprehensive Certification Course 👨‍🎓👩‍🎓 Want to learn how to do professional legal research and how to write professional Legal Research papers, Case Analysis, Articles, reports of Empirical research? 🏆 Worry not LawFoyer brings to you the Certification Course in Legal Research Methodology, starting on July 5, 2024. 📅 [ Enroll Now ](https://academy.lawfoyer.in/courses/mastering-the-art-of-legal-research-a-comprehensive-certification-course/) ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/research-course-1024x1024.jpg) # COURSE COMMENCING IN ### Course Duration 15 hours ### Course Starts from 5 July (Live) ### Recordings Validity 2 Years ### Course Fee ₹ 399/- [ Enroll Now ](https://academy.lawfoyer.in/courses/mastering-the-art-of-legal-research-a-comprehensive-certification-course/) ## Frequently Asked Questions [ Do you offer daily live classes? ](#collapse-14514dc6ab2aeb9b0943) No, our course does not include daily live classes. 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[ ](https://wa.me/+918574723478) **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events --- ### [Mehmood Nayyar Azam v. State of Chhattisgarh](https://lawfoyer.in/mehmood-nayyar-azam-v-state-of-chhattisgarh/) **Published:** August 25, 2021 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **In the Supreme Court of India** NAME OF THE CASEMehmood Nayyar Azam v. State of ChhattisgarhCITATIONCivil Appeal No. 5703 of 2012DATE OF THE CASEAugust 3, 2012APPELANTMehmood Nayyar AzamRESPONDENTState of ChhattisgarhBENCH/JUDGEK.S.P. RADHAKRISHNAN & DIPAK MISRASTATUTES/CONSTITUTION INVOLVEDConstitution of India; Indian Penal Code, 1860; Evidence Act, 1872; Human and Civil Rights; Criminal Procedure Code, 1973IMPORTANT SECTIONS/ARTICLESConstitution of India — *A*rts. 21, 19, 14 and 32 Indian Penal Code, 1860, Ss. 499 to 502 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 163, 154, 155 and 157 Evidence Act, 1872 — S. 24 Human and Civil Rights — Right against cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or torture ## **Abstract** In the present case, the appellant doctor who was spreading awareness against the exploitation of weaker and marginalised sections of society became a victim of the local coal mafia, police and persons whose interests were being affected thereby. Many criminal cases were filed against the doctor, and he was admittedly humiliated in police custody. Pursuant to the intervention by the high court, departmental proceedings were initiated, and therefore the erring officials were punished. The high court in its final order referred the concern the Chief Secretary of the State for grant of compensation. Till the present appeal i.e. after 19 years, no compensation had been paid to the appellant albeit the Supreme Court initially gave a chance to the respective state government to think about the issue of compensation. ## **Introduction** In India, defamation is considered both a civil & criminal offence. Civil defamation remedy is covered in the Law of Torts. An individual who is defamed can move either High Court or subordinate courts and seek damages within the sort of monetary compensation from the accused in a civil defamation case. The Indian Penal code, 1860 provides a chance for the defamed person to file a criminal case against the accused. Under sections 499 and 500 of the IPC, an individual guilty of criminal defamation is often sent for imprisonment for a term which can extend two years or fine, or both. In the present case, the writ court isn’t concerned with defamation as given under Section 499 IPC. The writ court is basically concerned with how during a country governed by the rule of law and where Article 21 of the Constitution is treated to be sacred, the dignity and social reputation of citizens have been affected. #### **1. Defamation** **Overview** Defamation is a statement that injures a third party’s reputation. The tort of defamation includes both libel (written statements) and slander (spoken statements). **[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)** **Elements** To prove *prima facie* defamation, a plaintiff must show four things: **[**\[2\]**](#_ftn2)** - A false statement purporting to be fact. - Publication or communication of that statement to a third person. - Fault amounting to at least negligence; and - Damages, or some harm caused to the person or entity who is the subject of the statement. The two-Judge bench within the case of Mehmood Nayyar vs State of Chhattisgarh Stated Article 5 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”**\[3\]** It also stated that any kind of torture, inhuman, or degrading treatment should fall within the scope of Article 21 of the Constitution, whether it is during an investigation, interrogation, or anything else. The most valuable right given to convicts, under-trials, detained persons & other prisoners in custody by Article 21 of the Indian Constitution cannot be refused, except in compliance with the procedure laid down by law. The custodial offences are not only causing physical pain but also the mental agony that a person faces within the lockups, which is of great concern. The degree of trauma an individual experiences in police custody whether it is physical assault or rape is outside the purview of the law. #### 2. Custody and Custodial Torture **Custody**, in the legal context, refers to the detention of an individual by law enforcement authorities, which can be categorized into police custody and judicial custody. While **police custody** allows for interrogation, judicial custody is primarily intended for the safekeeping of the accused. Despite robust constitutional protections and statutory provisions, custodial torture remains a persistent concern in India, challenging the very foundations of the criminal justice system. Landmark judgments by the Supreme Court of India have played a crucial role in shaping the legal landscape concerning custodial rights and the prevention of torture. In the seminal case of ***D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) 1 SCC 416***, the apex court laid down comprehensive guidelines for arrest and detention procedures, emphasizing the need to safeguard the rights of the accused. Similarly, in ***Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993) 2 SCC 746***, the Court unequivocally recognized custodial deaths as a grave violation of fundamental rights, paving the way for compensation to victims’ families and underlining the state’s responsibility in preventing such occurrences. Despite these legal protections, the implementation and enforcement of anti-torture measures face significant challenges. The underreporting of cases due to fear of reprisal and the inherent lack of witnesses in custodial settings complicate the prosecution of offenders. Moreover, the difficulty in proving torture, often due to the absence of physical evidence or the manipulation of medical reports, further hampers justice delivery. Institutional resistance to accountability and the reluctance to prosecute law enforcement officers also contribute to the perpetuation of custodial violence. Recently, the Law Commission of India has recommended the ratification of the United Nations Convention against Torture, which would necessitate comprehensive legislative reforms. Additionally, there has been an increased emphasis on technological solutions, such as the mandatory installation of CCTV cameras in police stations, to deter and document potential abuses of power. ## **FACTS OF THE CASE** The factual matrix, in this case, is that the appellant is a Doctor with a B.A.M.S (Ayurveda) degree, and he uses to practise in West Chirmiri Colliery, Pondi area (State of Chhattisgarh). He used to spread awareness & raise agitations against the exploitation of people belonging to weaker and marginalized sections of the society. As a social activist, he ushered in immense awareness among the down-trodden people which caused discomfort to the people such as trade union leaders, police officers and other persons who were having an interest in the coal mine area. They threatened him with horrible consequences and forced him to refrain from such activities. The petitioner continued the activities although he was being forced to stop those activities. The agitation was gaining strength and momentum and when their attempt failed to silence him a consorted bungling effort was made to frame him in certain criminal offences. “As the factual narration further unfolds, in the initial stage, cases under Section 110/116 of the Criminal Procedure Code were initiated and thereafter crime No. 15*/*92 under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘the IPC’) and crime No. 41/92 under Sections 427 and 379 of the IPC were registered. As the activities gathered further drive and became more pronounced, crime No. 62/90 was registered for an offence punishable under Section 379 of the IPC for alleged theft of electricity. In the said case, the appellant was taken into custody.”[**\[4\]**](#_ftn4) “Although he was presented before the Magistrate on 22/09/1992 for judicial remand and after that, he was supposed to be taken to Baikunthpur Jail, it was evening by the time the order was passed, so he was kept in the lock-up at Manendragarh Police Station. On 24/09/1992, he was required to be shifted to jail but at 9.00 am he was taken to Pondi Police Station instead of being taken to the jail.”[**\[5\]**](#_ftn5) “He was abused and assaulted at the police station &the physical assault was the beginning of ill-treatment. After that, the SHO and ASI, the respondent No. 3 & 4, compelled him to hold a placard on which it was written: ***“******Main Dr. M.N. Azam Chhal Kapti Evam Chorr Badmash Hoon”. (I, Dr. M. N. Azam, am a cheat, fraud, thief, and rascal)*** and took his photograph, they circulated that photograph in public.”[**\[6\]**](#_ftn6) The petitioner submitted a complaint to the National Human Rights Commission because of the said atrocities and the torture by the police as it caused tremendous mental agony and humiliation. Hence the National Human Rights Commission, asked the Superintendent of Police, District Koria to submit a report. “When no action was taken by the respondent or the police, the petitioner was compelled to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh with a prayer for punishing the respondent Nos. 4, 5 & *7* on the foundation that their action was a complete transgression of human rights which affected his fundamental right especially his right to live with dignity as given in Article 21 of the Constitution.”[**\[7\]**](#_ftn7) “On 18.11.2005, the Court was apprised that despite several communications, the Chief Secretary had not yet sent the report. Eventually, the report was filed stating that the appellant was involved in certain cases including the grant of a bogus medical certificate.”[**\[8\]**](#_ftn8) It was also stated in the report that the Sub-Inspector had been imposed punishment of “censure” by the Superintendent of Police on 19/11/2001. It was also set forth that on 3.5.2003, a charge-sheet was served on all the officers that were guilty and a departmental enquiry was held and at last, they had been imposed a major penalty of withholding of one annual increment with cumulative effect for one year commencing 27.5.2004. Also, on 19/07/2005, a case had been registered under Section 29 of the Police Act against the officers that were found guilty. “Pursuant to the intervention by the High Court, departmental proceedings were initiated, and the erring officials were punished. The High Court in its final order referred the matter to the Chief Secretary of the State for grant of compensation. Till the present appeal i.e., after 19 years, no compensation had been paid to the appellant even though the Supreme Court initially gave an opportunity to the State Government to consider the issue of compensation. The High Court in categorical terms has found that the appellant was harassed.”[**\[9\]**](#_ftn9) ## **ISSUE RAISED BEFORE THE COURT** 1. Whether for the custodial humiliation and mental torture under Article 21 of the Constitution a compensation could be awarded or not? 2. Whether the appellant should be asked to initiate a civil action for grant of damages on the foundation that he has been defamed? ## **ARGUMENTS FROM THE APPELANT SIDE - Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that during the pendency of the writ petition, Relief Clause was fulfilled under the directions of this court and now only the compensation part, as claimed in Relief Clause remained there. - In the instant matter, it is an admitted position that the respondent State authorities were made aware of the harassment meted out to the petitioner by erring police officers and launched a departmental investigation into them, following which they were found guilty and sentenced.” - Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the High Court should have granted reasonable compensation after concluding that the appellant was harassed by police officers and that they were found guilty and disciplined in a departmental investigation. - It is further requested by him that the Court should have appointed the officials of the State to present themselves as representations to provide them with the opportunity to have adequate perceptive changes and determine and grant compensation, but there was no constructive outcome, and the attitude of apathy was supreme. He argues that it would not only display non-Page concern for a citizen who has been humiliated at the police station, but that the method in which the representation was denied clearly demonstrates the state’s misguided perception and stone heart. - Mr. Sharma argued that the State authority’s explanation that defamation is such a subject that the issue of compensation must be decided by a competent court and that, in the absence of such a decision, the Government cannot make a decision on compensation reflects a deliberate insensitive approach to the entire fact situation, Because the High Court had found that the allegations were true and that the appellant had been harassed, which amounted to custodial torture, there was no justification to treat it as a case of defamation in the ordinary sense of the term, requiring the appellant to go through another adjudicatory process and obtain a decree from the civil court. ## **ARGUMENTS FROM THE RESPONDENT SIDE** - Mr. Atul Jha, learned counsel appearing for the State, has supported the High Court’s decision as well as the decision of the State’s competent authority, which rejected the submission on the grounds that when the appellant seeks compensation for defamation, he must go to civil court, and so no fault can be found with the State. - The learned counsel for the private respondents has submitted that they have already been penalised in a disciplinary action, thus the issue of granting compensation does not arise, and if it does, it must be decided by the civil court based on the facts adduced to show defamation. ## **Related Provisions** - **Constitution of India** - **Article 21: –** Protection of life and personal liberty No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.[**\[10\]**](#_ftn10) - **Article 14: – (**Equality before law) The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth[**\[11\]**](#_ftn11) - **Article 32: –** Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part - The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed[**\[12\]**](#_ftn12) - The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.[**\[13\]**](#_ftn13) - Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause ( 1 ) and ( 2 ), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause ( 2 )[**\[14\]**](#_ftn14) - The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution[**\[15\]**](#_ftn15) - **Article 19:-** Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech etc.[**\[16\]**](#_ftn16) - **Indian Penal Code, 1860** - **Section 499:- Defamation—** Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter expected, to defame that person.[**\[17\]**](#_ftn17) - **Section 500:** – **Punishment for defamation** —Whoever defames another shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.[**\[18\]**](#_ftn18) - **Section 501:** – **Printing or engraving matter known to be defamatory-**Whoev­er prints or engraves any matter, knowing or having good reason to believe that such matter is defamatory of any person, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.[**\[19\]**](#_ftn19) - **Section 502:** – **Sale of printed or engraved substance containing defamatory matter—**Whoever sells or offers for sale any printed or engraved substance containing defamatory matter, knowing that it contains such matter, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.[**\[20\]**](#_ftn20) - **Criminal Procedure Code, 1973** — Ss. 163, 154, 155 and 157 - **Section 154: –Information in cognizable cases.** - Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read Over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf.[**\[21\]**](#_ftn21) - A copy of the information as recorded under sub- section (1) shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the informant.[**\[22\]**](#_ftn22) - Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an officer in charge of a police station to record the information referred to in subsection (1) may send the substance of such information, in writing and by post, to the Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied that such information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, shall either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him, in the manner provided by this Code, and such officer shall have all the powers of an officer in charge of the police station in relation to that offence.[**\[23\]**](#_ftn23) - **Section 155: –** Information as to non- cognizable cases and investigation of such cases. - When information is given to an officer in charge of a police station of the commission within the limits of such station of a non- cognizable offence, he shall enter or cause to be entered the substance of the information in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf, and refer the informant to the Magistrate.[**\[24\]**](#_ftn24) - No police officer shall investigate a non- cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate having power to try such case or commit the case for trial.[**\[25\]**](#_ftn25) - Any police officer receiving such order may exercise the same powers in respect of the investigation (except the power to arrest without warrant) as an officer in charge of a police station may exercise in a cognizable case.[**\[26\]**](#_ftn26) - Where a case relates to two or more offences of which at least one is cognizable, the case shall be deemed to be a cognizable case, notwithstanding that the other offences are non- cognizable.[**\[27\]**](#_ftn27) - **Section 157: – Procedure for investigation preliminary inquiry.** - If, from information received or otherwise, an officer in charge of a police station has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under section 156 to investigate, he shall forthwith send a report of the same to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such offence upon a police report and shall proceed in person, or shall depute one of his subordinate officers not being below such rank as the State Government may, by general or special order, prescribe in this behalf, to proceed, to the spot, to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case, and, if necessary, to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender; Provided that-[**\[28\]**](#_ftn28) - when information as to the commission of any such offence is given against any person by name and the case is not of a serious nature, the officer in charge of a police station need not proceed in person or depute a subordinate officer to make an investigation on the spot;[**\[29\]**](#_ftn29) - if it appears to the officer in charge of a police station that there is no sufficient ground for entering on an investigation, he shall not investigate the case.[**\[30\]**](#_ftn30) - In each of the cases mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso to sub- section (1), the officer in charge of the police station shall state in his report his reasons for not fully complying with the requirements of that sub- section, and, in the case mentioned in clause (b) of the said proviso, the officer shall also forthwith notify to the informant, if any, in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government, the fact that he will not investigate the case or cause it to be investigated.[**\[31\]**](#_ftn31) - **Section 163:-** No inducement to be offered.[**\[32\]**](#_ftn32) - No police officer or other person in authority shall offer or make, or cause to be offered or made, any such inducement, threat or promise as is mentioned in section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872).[**\[33\]**](#_ftn33) - But no police officer or other person shall prevent, by any caution or otherwise, any person from making in the course of any investigation under this Chapter any statement which he may be disposed to make of his own free will: Provided that nothing in this sub- section shall affect the provisions of sub- section (4) of section 164.[**\[34\]**](#_ftn34) - **Evidence Act, 1872** - **Section 24:-** A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding, if the making of the confession appears to the Court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise,1 having reference to the charge against the accused person, proceeding from a person in authority and sufficient, in the opinion of the Court, to give the accused person grounds, which would appear to him reasonable, for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him.[**\[35\]**](#_ftn35) ## **Judgement** The Hon’ble Court seriously expressed worry that the dignity and social repute of the public have been compromised in a country governed by rule of law and in which Article 21 of the Constitution is considered sacred. At the outset, the Hon’ble Court was convinced and admitted without any reasonable question that the appellant was arrested and harassed in police custody. However, the Court is more concerned with Article 21 rights than with defamation in this case. In **D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal**[**\[36\]**](#_ftn36), the Hon’ble Court referred to Article 21 and stated that the term “life or personal liberty” includes the right to live in dignity, and so includes a guarantee against torture and assault by the State or its agents. The Hon’ble Court stated that if government officials breach the law, it will engender contempt for the law and will encourage lawlessness, and every man will have the tendency to become a law unto himself, resulting in chaos. It’s worth noting that the concern expressed by this Court in **Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P**[**\[37\]**](#_ftn37) was taken into account in the matter of **D.K. Basu**[**\[38\]**](#_ftn38). This Court expressed concern in Joginder Kumar’s case about charges of human rights violations during and after his arrest. This Court held in Bhim Singh, MLA v. State of J&K[**\[39\]**](#_ftn39), that police personnel, as keepers of peace and order, should have the highest regard for citizens’ personal liberty, and that they should not flout the law by engaging in odd acts of lawlessness. It was observed that custodians of law and order should not become depredators of civil liberties, for their duty is to protect and not to abduct. Abuse, according to **Arvinder Singh Bagga v. State of U.P. and others**[**\[40\]**](#_ftn40), does not have to be physical, but can also include mental and psychological torture designed to induce fear of the police’s demands. On the facts of the case, it appears that the appellant was subjected to mental torture by incompetent police officers. He may have campaigned to help the poor and oppressed, but the social humiliation he has received has the potential to demolish his worldview. There is no question that he would get stress condition and anxiety, which will rob him of his willpower’s brilliance and vigour. When the appellant was released from custody and saw his photograph distributed with self-condemning comments scribbled on it, he realised he had been subjected to inhumane treatment. As a result, the basic essence of life, as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution, is eroding. With regard to the many issues that we have examined and taking into account the totality of the facts and circumstances, we are inclined to believe that a sum of Rs.5.00 lacs (Rupees five lacs only) should be awarded to the appellant as compensation, and we so direct. The respondent State must pay the sum within six weeks and recover it from the erring officers in equal proportions from their salaries, as determined by the competent authorities of the State. ## **Conclusion** “It is luculent that the appellant was subjected to mental torture at the hands of insensible police officials,” the Bench ruled. He may need to be stirred in order to ameliorate the explanation for the poor and thus the oppressed, but the social humiliation he has received is capable of eroding the foundations of his philosophy.” As a result, it was decided that a monetary award for custodial humiliation and torture, whether physical or mental, impacting Article 21 rights should be made. In my opinion, the case correctly states that police brutality is not permitted while in detention. It should be the duty and responsibility of police officials to ensure that when a person is in custody, he is not subjected to any inhumane treatment or cruelty, as no one is above the law, and no one, including the state or police authorities, has the authority to abuse or infringe on anyone’s rights. As a result, it should be a top priority to ensure that no one is denied their fundamental rights under Article 21 of the constitution. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Cornell Law School, (last visited August 01,2021) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Cornell Law School, (last visited August 01,2021) [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) United Nations, (Last Visited on August 01,2021) [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Indian Kanoon, [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Case Mine, [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Indian Kanoon, ¶ 6 [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Indian Kanoon, ¶ 7 [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Indian Kanoon, ¶ 8 [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Judicial Training & Research Institute, (last visited on August 02, 2021) [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 21. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 14. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 32(1). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 32(2). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 32(3). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 32(4). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 19 [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) See The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §499. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) See The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §500. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) See The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §501. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) See The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §502. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, §154(1). [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, §154(2). [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, §154(3). [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, §155(1). [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, §155(2). [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, §155(3). [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, §155(4). [\[28\]](#_ftnref28) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, §157(1) [\[29\]](#_ftnref29) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, §157(1)(a). [\[30\]](#_ftnref30) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, §157(1)(b). [\[31\]](#_ftnref31) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, §157(2). [\[32\]](#_ftnref32) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, §163. [\[33\]](#_ftnref33) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, §163(1). [\[34\]](#_ftnref34) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, §163(2). [\[35\]](#_ftnref35) See The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, §24. [\[36\]](#_ftnref36) AIR 1997 sc 610: (1997) 1 sec 416: 1997 sec (Cri) 92 [\[37\]](#_ftnref37) (1994) 4 sec 260 [\[38\]](#_ftnref38) AIR 1997 sc 610: (1997) 1 sec 416: 1997 sec (Cri) 92 [\[39\]](#_ftnref39) (1985) 4 sec 677 [\[40\]](#_ftnref40) AIR 1995 SC 117 **Categories:** Case Analysis **Tags:** #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, case analysis, case summary, lawfoyer, Mehmood Nayyar Azam v. State of Chhattisgarh --- ### [12th UFYLC - RANKA National Moot Court Competition, 2024 | Cash Prizes Pool of Rs. 53,000 | University of Rajasthan, Jaipur | Register by September 5, 2024](https://lawfoyer.in/12th-ranka-ufylc-national-moot-court-competition-2024/) **Published:** June 8, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/LawFoyer-Ranka-Moot-Court-Poster-724x1024.png)University Five Year Law College (UFYLC) invites registration for the 12th UFYLC Ranka National Moot Court Competition scheduled to be held on 05-07 October 2024. # About UFYLC University Five Year Law College was founded by the University of Rajasthan as a Self Financing Institution in 2008. It has been defined by its quality to bring eliciting educated and intellectual scholars to society. With that aim, it has evolved into one of the most prestigious law colleges in India. # About the Competition The Ranka National Moot Court Competition, graciously hosted by the venerable University Five Year Law College in Jaipur, stands as a resounding tribute to the profound vision of the Ranka Public Charitable Trust was established in the year 1980 under the distinguished leadership of the Late Dr. N.M. Ranka, a Senior Advocate of great renown, this trust blazed a trail by introducing the concept of Moot Court Competitions to the legal landscape of Rajasthan. # General Details - Date: 05-07 October, 2024. - Mode: Offline # Eligibility Criteria The competition is open for bonafide students pursuing Five Year Integrated and Three Year LLB courses. # General Rules - Each team shall comprise three members. Under no condition shall a team consisting of more or less than 3 members be allowed to participate. However, the Competition Organisation Committee may allow a team comprising at least 2 members in exceptional circumstances and after hearing the members on merits. The decision of the Competition Organisation Committee, in this regard, shall be final. - Such Team shall designate two of its members as speakers; and shall designate one member, who has not been designated as a speaker, as a researcher. The team must, amongst its members, identify the speakers and the researcher at the time of registration. - Teams shall identify the speakers and researcher during registration. Only those participants, registered as Oralists in the registration form, shall be allowed to speak. - No extra member or observer shall be allowed. No swapping of the designation of the members shall be allowed. - No more than one team shall be allowed to register and participate in the competition from the same College/Institution/University. - Once registered, a team will not be permitted to vary the composition of the team in any manner. Changes, if any, may only be made with the express permission of the Competition Organisation Committee, if due reason is shown for the same. - Arguments shall be in English ONLY. - Each team shall be provided with the memorial of the opposing team by a draw of lots. ## Moot Proposition and Rules - Moot Proposition & Brochure can be accessed here: [Click Here](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/New-Ranka-Brochure-_-1.pdf) - Moot Court Rules and Regulations can be accessed here: [Click Here](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/New-Ranka-Rules-and-Regulations-_-1.pdf) # Registration Details - Click on the link provided below to register. - Link of Registration: - All the teams shall be required to make a payment of INR 5500/- - In this edition of the competition, registration will be open to one team per institute to participate in the competition. - While filling out the Registration Form, the teams have to choose a primary contact person. All communications concerning the Competition will be sent by e-mail to the nominated contact person. The nominated contact person shall be responsible for conveying all the information to the team. - The fee for the competition shall be paid to the bank account/UPI/QR Code mentioned below. After payment of the fee, the candidate/team must ensure that the screenshot is taken. The screenshot shall be used for verification purposes. - All the participating institutions have to confirm participation by attaching a screenshot of the payment receipt in the Google form. - The teams shall be provided a unique team code which shall be used in the preparation of the memorial as stated above. Teams shall only be addressed by this code in the oral rounds. - No change in the names of the participants shall be permitted after the receipt of the Registration Form, except at the sole discretion of the Organizers. - Teams should mention the participant’s name, and contact number, including the year/ semester of study. ## Important Dates - Closing Date of Registration: September 5, 2024. - Last Date of Seeking Clarifications: September 10, 2024. - Release of Clarifications: September 15, 2024. - Last Date of Memorial Submissions in Soft Copy: September 20, 2024. - Last Date of Memorial Submissions in Hard Copy: September 25, 2024. - Oral Rounds: October 6-7, 2024. ## Prizes - Winning Team: The winning team will receive a trophy, certificate of excellence, and a cash prize of 21,000/-. - Runners-Up Award: The 1st runners-up will get a trophy, a certificate of excellence, and a cash prize of 11,000/-. - Best Student Advocate: - The best student Advocate (Appellant) will get a trophy and cash prize of 5100/- - Best Student Advocate (Respondent) will get a trophy and cash prize of 5100/-. This prize will be awarded based on the make acquired in the preliminary round. - Best Student Researcher: - Best Student Researcher will get a trophy and a cash prize of 5100/-. This award will be based on the Researcher’s test marks. - Best Memorial Award: - The best memorial award will get a trophy and cash prize of 6000/-. - Certificates of participation will be given to all the participants. **Location** University Five Year Law College, University of Rajasthan Campus, Jaipur. ## Contact Information All official communication regarding the 12th UFYLC Ranka National Moot Court Competition, 2024 shall be made through mail to: mootufylc@gmail.com. In case of any further queries, please contact: - Anupam Singh Sengar, Convenor (+91 9358713019) - Rakhi Sharma, Faculty Coordinator (+91 9783287821) **Categories:** Events --- ### [Nandini Sundar & Others Vs. The State of Chhattisgarh 2011 (7) SCC 547](https://lawfoyer.in/nandini-sundar-others-vs-the-state-of-chhattisgarh-2011-7-scc-547/) **Published:** June 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author:- Sanjay Kannan B, a law student at Bharath University.** **Edited By:- Rutvij Vyas, a Law student at faculty of Law, GLS University.** 1. ABSTRACT** In this Case Analysis of Nandini Sundar vs the State of Chhattisgarh. In June 2005 the satisfied government created Salva Judas projecting it as a particular people’s woman to take care of the law-and-order situation in the Naxalite-prone Dantewada district its compressors of about 6500 special police officers appointed by the state government with financial support from the central government In May 2006 Nandini Sundar professor of sociology University of Delhi along with Aadhar civil rights activities under look the fact-finding machine to shuttle a spot of interdependencies initiative and Complaints against the activists of Salwa judum, Sundar and other than approached various commissions and Ministries and the allotted them about the Human Rights violation by the Selva judam filing to Alicante and effective response from them they approach the supreme court with the repetition in the year of 2007 Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held that Selva judam policy violated both Article 14 write equality before the law and Article 21 protection of life and personal liberty of those employed as a special police officer as well as the local civilians it ordered the particular state government to disorder special police officers and Desire from using them to counter social activities ***Keywords*: *Supreme Court of India, Writ, Human rights, The Constitution of India*:** 2. CASE DETAILS** 1. ***Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** **Nandini Sundar & Or’s vs State Of Chhattisgarh** 2. *Case Number*** *250/2007*3. *Judgement Date*** ***September -5 -2011***4. *Court*** ***Hon’ble Supreme court of India***5. *Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** ***Single bench***6. *Author / Name of Judges*** ***B. Sudarshan Reddy***7. *Citation*** **AIR** 2011 *SUPREME COURT* 2839, 2011 (7) **SCC** 547, 2011 AIR SCW 4141, (2011) 6 SCALE 839, (2011) 2 *SCALE 37.* 8. *Legal Provisions Involved*** *Constitution of India- 1949* *Article 14,15,19,21* *Police act 1861* 3. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** It’s quite a remote place breathing near to get to you have to take the petitioner is used to keep going on trying to collect affidavits if there was news that there has been a “*major encounter are killing*” then I try to go there and get information by the petitioner the police and parametric forces have made it difficult for anybody to the independent fac**t findings basically was a state-sponsored vigilant operation the government for people to come to rallies and the**n it took them forcefully in processing to other villages and burned those villages. And it also recures villages as a” special police officer so you give young people arms and let them terrorism losses that went around burning a lot of villages killing people on raping women all of this was with *complete Government support fundamental violation*”. in the right to life Ande quality before the law the other thing that the go-to pointed out in its judgements, In **2011** when based on public interest litigations the petitioner was filed that it was also a **violation of the right to equality** after special Police officers under special police aur sab under Paramilitary forces the united youngsters and them to fight the Naxalite put them at risk Tak Human Rights violations generally in this country people are also interested that the higher level of impunity as a fact of 2 years in the national press 5 to 10 articles has been published commissions take noted by ***NHRC.*** 1. FACTS OF THE CASE** - Procedural Background of the Case** Petitioner – Nandini Sundar filed a writ petition directly to the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the year 2006 and the hearing was late and got human rights violation in the year 2006 same month and repetition in the year 2007 and judgement in 2011. 2. Factual Background of the Case** 1. - In May 2006 Nandini Sundar professor of the Sociology University of Delhi along with Aadhar civil rights activities, under look the fact-finding machine to shuttle a spot of interdependencies initiative and wearied Complaints against the activist of Salwa judum, Sundar and others then approached various commissions and Ministries and the allotted them about the Human Rights violation by the Selva judam filing to Alicante and effective response from them they approach the supreme court with the repetition in the year of 2007. 5. LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** - Whether the Union of India has appointed a Special Police Officers (SPOs) for each state to control law and order Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme. - Whether the recruitment of SPOs is firing of camp villagers by Naxals, total 41 attacks by Maoists between 2005 and 2011 result in 47 and 37 injuries. In place of Dantewada, there were 24 attacks, 37, and 26 injuries. - whether Tribal youths joined in the SPO ranks is safeguard to their families and villages in violent assaults. it results a human rights violation. 6. PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsels for Petitioner submitted that the term of a proper challenge in terms of access ability. A special way of must be taken to reach of particular location. The petitioner is known for “*proper collecting affidavits”.* - *Whenever there are a north east west south of a major encounter or killings”*, efforts are made to getting information from the petitioner. Independent fact-finding has become increasingly difficult due to the actions of the police and paramilitary forces. Essentially, it was a government-sanctioned vigilante operation aimed at forcing people to attend rallies, following which they were forcibly taken to other villages that were subsequently set ablaze. The location is quite remote, *“making it challenging to reach. In order to access the area, one must take a specific route.* - *The petitioner is accustomed to persistently attempting to gather affidavits*” Upon hearing news of a significant encounter or killings, I think that to obtain information from the petitioner. The police and paramilitary forces have made it exceedingly difficult for independent fact-finding. **A)** **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that The State of Chhattisgarh astride s that it only getting of tribal youth who “*willingly volunteer for such roles. It further states that many of these young individuals are stepping up due to personal experts of Naxal violence affecting them or their families, or out of a delegation to protect their homes from Naxal attacks.* *It is more difficult for too compared how, even if the get made by the State of Chhattisgarh are impartment”*. these scenes a world of finalized the story of responsibility of the state or allied the human rights concerns surrounding the appointment of these young individuals as SPOs. 7\. RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** - - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1949 ARTICLE 14, 15, 19, 21 - INDIAN POLICE 1876 8\. JUDGEMENT** RATIO DECIDENDI** YES, BINDING TO ALL COURTS WITH IN THE TERRITORY OF INDIA AND OPINION GIVEN BY THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA. 9\. CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The State of Chhattisgarh asserts that it only hires tribal youth who willingly volunteer for such roles. It further states that many of these young individuals are stepping up due to personal experiences of Naxal violence affecting them or their families, or out of a desire to protect their homes from Naxal attacks. It is difficult for us to comprehend how, even if the claims made by the State of Chhattisgarh are accurate, these circumstances would diminish the moral responsibility of the state or alleviate the human rights concerns surrounding the appointment of these young individuals as SPOs and grand proper compensation to the victims and affected public in the state. 10\. REFERENCES** - - Important Cases Referred** - GVK Industries vs ITO. - Important Statutes Referred:-** - H.C. 3451/02, 56(3) P.D., also cited in Aharon Barak: “The Judge in a Democracy” (Princeton University Press, 2003) 1. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Prem Shankar Shukla vs Delhi Administration, AIR 1980 SC 1535](https://lawfoyer.in/prem-shankar-shukla-vs-delhi-administration-air-1980-sc-1535/) **Published:** June 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author:** **TISROTA KAR, BIRLA GLOBAL UNIVERSITY** **Edited By:** **Pooja, Rayat College Of Law,Railmajra (Affiliated to Panjab University, Chandigarh)** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** “*Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly.”-* *Martin Luther King Jr.* In the crucible of the Indian legal system, the case of **Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration** emerges as a beacon of human dignity. The Supreme Court’s 1980 judgment delves deep into the ethos of justice, challenging the practice of handcuffing under-trial prisoners as a norm. This case analysis explores the Court’s affirmation that the presumption of innocence is not a mere legal technicality but a cornerstone of human rights, reflecting the interconnection of our societal fabric articulated by King. It underscores the Court’s stance that the measure of a nation’s commitment to justice is not found in the treatment of its highest echelons but in its compassion for the lowest among us. ***Keywords*** ***(Minimum 5)*:** Handcuffing, Human Rights and Dignity, Under-trial Prisoners, Punjab Police Rules, 1934, Fundamental Rights violation. **CASE DETAILS** ***Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** Prem Shankar Shukla vs Delhi Administration ***Case Number*** ***Judgement Date*** On 29 April 1980 ***Court*** Supreme Court of India ***Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** Justices V.R. Krishniyer, R.S. Pathak, O.Chinnappa Reddy ***Author / Name of Judges*** Justice V.R. Krishnaiyer ***Citation*** AIR 1980 SC 1535 ***Legal Provisions Involved*** Constitution of India, Delhi Prison Act,1894 **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** We know that an accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. So why should a person who is innocent before the law (until proven guilty) be humiliated in front of the entire society by handcuffing them? In the society we are living in, that person is already guilty the moment they see them in the shackles. Even if the person is proven innocent they have already been shamed and humiliated when the person has to face the trial with the handcuff on. Society does not wait for the verdict of the case only seeing someone being pulled from the house with shackles on by the police, the image and the goodwill of the person is tarnished. Here we will talk about a case that deals with this issue. *Prem Shankar Shukla vs Delhi Administration AIR, 1980 SC 1535* – A Landmark case that deals with the human dignity of under-trail prisoners and the legality of handcuffing the accused person during the trial. **FACTS OF THE CASE** The Petitioner Prem Shankar Shukla, an under-trial prisoner at Tihar jail, was taken for trial from Tihar jail to Court in handcuffs. In this issue, he wrote a Writ Petition to the Supreme Court protesting against the humiliating and tormenting practice of using handcuffs, though there were legal precedents which were against this practice and simultaneously challenging the legality of the same. The Supreme Court took cognizance of this case, given the significant concerns it presented the ‘presumption of innocence’ and human dignity. He had prayed for the exemption of handcuffs in his petition because he belonged to a “better class prisoner”( a class division created under Punjab Police Rules, 1934). As per his statement in the petition, this class gives him advantages over others as the prisoners were said to be divided as per their caste, education qualifications etc. Despite the court orders given in Sunil Batra vs Delhi Administration, he was handcuffed oftentimes. The petition sent to the High Court was dismissed. Therefore, the petitioner filed a Habeas Corpus. This complaint threw light on the issues concerning the personal liberty, and dignity of the prisoners which fall under Article14, 19, and 21 and also showed concerns regarding the treatment done in jail. This started a legal battle about whether Handcuffing someone qualifies as cruel, inhuman, or humiliating or not. In short, real conflict arose between Human Rights and Safety Precautions. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** - Whether is it legal to handcuff the under-trial prisoner in the absence of demonstrable risk of escape is against the law? - Whether are there Violation of Fundamental Rights of the under-trail inmates guaranteed under Articles 14,19 and 21 of the Indian Constitution regarding the indiscriminate use of handcuffs? - Whether is important to weigh the preservation of individual human rights against the necessity of security measures like handcuffing, how should the court rule? - Whether it is appropriate to divide inmates into “ordinary” and “better” classes under the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 and does this division hold up to the test of legal equality? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the fundamental rights vested in Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the under-trial prisoners are being violated. This is also violative as per “*Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,1948- It says ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment’”3* The Petitioner argued that handcuffing a prisoner who had not been declared guilty amounts to severe humiliation in society and damage to the entire goodwill of a person in society that they had worked for so hard. Therefore, it was prayed before the court that if a person completely cooperates with the court proceedings and refrains from any type of resistance and until a person is proven guilty that person should not be treated as a prisoner. - The bone of contention in this case is whether one should give more focus on an individual’s Human Rights or Security measures of the society. The petitioner argued that the balance between security measures and the protection of individual human rights was centred on the premise that security cannot override constitutional guarantees of human dignity and personal liberty. The petitioner argued that handcuffs are only to restrain those persons who are suspects or are not cooperating in the process. Security is a legitimate concern it must not be pursued at the expense of human rights. Therefore, a person who has not been proven guilty should not be restrained as the presumption of innocence until proven guilty is a fundamental right principle of justice, and the indiscriminate use of handcuffs undermines the principle. - A person is not stripped of their basic rights when arrested. It continues to protect the person even in jail. Therefore, the petitioner highlighted the treatment of under-trial prisoners must be inconsistent with these constitutional protections. - The petitioner also challenged the classification of prisoners into ‘ordinary and better’ classes under the Punjab Police Rules,1934 to be violative of Article 14 and no valid link was found with the objective sought to be achieved by the law. It is also contrary to the Human Dignity and International Human Rights Norms. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsels for Respondent argued the process of handcuffing was done as per the rules laid down in the Police Act. Nothing was done beyond the legal arena and this rule under the Police Act gives the power to the Police to handcuff any per they deem to be a suspect as a security measure. - The Respondent also argued any prisoner might flee at any time if given the opportunity. This will become a threat to the society. Therefore, handcuffing a prisoner or any suspect is necessary as a security measure. No rights are being violated in this context. The respondent argued that the petitioner was taken from prison to the court under the protection of a special wing of the police force.4 So it is rational to use handcuffs for the prisoner. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** To properly analyse and understand the case, different provisions of C.R.P.C and the Constitution of India should be read. - **Section 49 of C.R.P.C**– *“The person arrested shall not be subjected to more restraint than is necessary to prevent his escape.”* - **Section 50A of C.R.P.C.-** This section talks about the rights of an arrestee. The arrestee should be informed of the grounds of arrest. - **Article 32:-** This article deals with “Remedies for enforcement of rights” conferred by Part III. *“The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.* [*(2)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1566826/)*The Supreme Court shall have the power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs like habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warrant and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.* [*(3)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/618177/)*Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1) and (2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction ill or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2).* [*(4)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/393253/)*The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution.”* **JUDGEMENT** Upon understanding the case and reviewing every argument placed, the court held that: - The categorisation of Prisoners based on their caste, and family background is written under Section 11(2) of the Punjab Prisoners (Attendance In Courts) Rules, 19697. This rule is completely violative of Article 14 of the Indian Constitution which stands for Equality before Law. No one has the right to treat a prisoner based on caste or family background. - Handcuffing an innocent person who is not been held guilty by the Court will be subject to a violation of basic human rights but simultaneously court emphasized the security measures too. The police authorities should have a warrant of arrest and also should convey the grounds of arrest to the arrested person. - Handcuffs are to be used by the authorities if it feels like the prisoner poses a demonstrable risk of escape against the law. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** - In conclusion, this landmark decision reinforced the importance of human dignity and fundamental rights for prisoners. The ruling of the court that handcuffing under-trial prisoners without a demonstrable risk of escape is against the law is unconstitutional and violates Articles 14, 19 and 21 brought a significant change in the inhumane treatment of prisoners in jail. Moreover, the rules followed by the Punjab Police that made them classify the prisoners according to caste, and family background were criticised heavily by the court resulting in striking it down on the grounds of discrimination and being against the principle of equality. This case became a noteworthy precedent that highlights the need to balance security measures and the human rights of every individual and also emphasizes the human treatment of prisoners. - In short, the judgement is a reminder that the law must uphold the dignity of all individuals including those who are deprived of their liberty. **REFERENCES:-** **Important Cases Referred** - Jus Corpus, “PREM SHANKAR SHUKLA v. DELHI ADMINISTRATION” Jus Corpus, 2022 available at: - Prem Shankar Shukla vs Delhi Administration AIR,1980 SC1535 Indian Kanoon, available at - “Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration, AIR, 1980 SC 1535,” Drishti Judiciary available at: (last visited June 7, 2024). - “Prem Shankar Shukla VS Delhi Administration 1980 ~ 1980 0 Supreme(SC) 234,” Supreme Today available at: (last visited June 7, 2024). - “Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration ., Supreme Court of India, Judgment, Law, casemine.com,” at: (last visited June 7, 2024). - “Article 21 And Its Ever Expanding Scope,” available at: (last visited June 7, 2024). - LCI Team, “exploring the extent to which handcuffs can be used as a means of restraint” available at: - PTI, “Vikas Dubey’s killing raises handcuffing issue vis-a-vis SC guidelines on ‘inhuman’ practice” Times of India, 10 July 2020. - Pritam Banik, “Supreme Court’s Mandate against Handcuffing and chaining” Strictly Legal, 2021available at (last visited June 7, 2024). - “Dignity behind bars,” The Hindu, available at by Shashank 17 May 2013. - Sukanya Shetty, “Human rights ‘handcuffed’” The Indian Express, 23 November 2009. - “Report on Terrorism and Human Rights,” available at: https://www.cidh.org/Terrorism/Eng/part.h.htm (last visited June 7, 2024). - “PREM SHANKAR SHUKLA vs DELHI ADMINISTRATION. Supreme Court, 29-04-1980,” vlex *available a*t: (last visited June 7, 2024). - “Case Analysis,” ProBono India is available at: https://probono-india.in/paper.php?id=9 (last visited June 7, 2024). - Editor, “Classification of Prisoners- Is it legal to classify Prisoners in ‘Better’ and ‘Ordinary’ class? ” The Lawmatics, 2022available at (last visited June 7, 2024). - “Genesis of Rights against handcuffs in India,” Sabrang India, 2021 available at: (last visited June 7, 2024). - “Man! You cannot manacle a man,” Hindustan Times by Venugopal Pillai, available at: [https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/man-you-cannot-manacle-a-man/story-ek4Ka4O3BZ9ICQxkk5s2GJ.html17 April 2006](https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/man-you-cannot-manacle-a-man/story-ek4Ka4O3BZ9ICQxkk5s2GJ.html17%20April%202006). **Important statute Reference:** - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - The Constitution of India,1950 - Punjab Police Rules,1934 - The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,1948 **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA(M) VS BHARAT KUMAR & ORS [(1998) 1 SCC 201: AIR 1998 SC 184] ](https://lawfoyer.in/communist-party-of-indiam-vs-bharat-kumar-ors-1998-1-scc-201-air-1998-sc-184/) **Published:** June 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Gopika Khatri, UNIVERSITY OF PETROLEUM AND ENERGY STUDIES.** **Edited By: Pooja, Rayat College Of Law, Railmajra(affiliated to Panjab University, Chandigarh).** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE :** In the landmark case of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) vs. Bharat Kumar & Ors (1997), the Supreme Court of India addressed the constitutional validity of organizing and enforcing “bandhs” (general strikes). The core issue revolved around whether such actions infringed upon the fundamental rights of citizens, particularly the right to freedom and livelihood. The Court held that bandhs, which forcibly prevent citizens from engaging in their daily activities, violate fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 of the Constitution, which guarantee freedom of speech and expression and protection of life and personal liberty, respectively. The judgment emphasized that while peaceful protests are permissible, the coercive nature of bandhs, causing widespread disruption and economic loss, cannot be justified under any circumstances. Consequently, the Court affirmed that state governments have the authority to impose reasonable restrictions to prevent such disruptions and protect public order. This decision marked a significant step in balancing the right to protest with the need to maintain public order and protect individual rights, setting a precedent for the regulation of political activities in India. ***Keywords: –* BANDH, FREEDOM OF SPEECH EXPRESSION, PUBLIC ORDER, RIGHT TO LIFE AND PERSONAL LIBERTY, FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT** **CASE DETAILS** ***Judgement Cause Title / Case Name*** The Communist Party Of India(M) vs Bharat Kumar&Ors ***Case Number*** (1998)1SCC201 ***Judgement Date*** 12/11/1997 ***Court*** THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA ***Quorum / Constitution of Bench*** A3 judge bench of the S.C. comprising of J.S. Verma, C.J., B.N. Kirpal and V.N. Khare JJ. heard the present case (appeal). ***Author / Name of Judges*** B.N. KIRPAL, V.N. KHARE ***Citation*** \[(1998) 1 SCC 201: AIR 1998 SC 184\] ***Legal Provisions Involved*** Article191(a),Article19(b),Article191(c), Article21, public order and governance **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** Civil disobedience hartals and bandhs are common in India because they are recognized as well well-known method of expressing attention of gov on specific demands made by the community and compelling the government to give in to the demands. **According to this case asking for and enforcing a bandh is illegal, as striking or hartal.** **FACTS OF THE CASE** **Procedural Background of the Case** - Initiation of the case: – The legal proceedings were initiated by Bharat Kumar and others who filed a public interest litigation. - High court proceedings: – The legality of the bandh called by political parties in the context of their impact on public life and public property, was before the Kerala High Court. - Judgement by Kerala High Court: – They ruled that bandhs are unconstitutional as they infringe on the fundamental rights of citizens, particularly the right of freedom of movement, and conduct business. - Appeal to the Hon’ble Supreme Court: – CPM and others knocked on the doors of the Supreme Court and challenged the order of Kerala High Court proceedings in the Supreme Court. **Factual Background of the Case** - In this case, the Petitioners were two private individuals and the Chambers of Commerce in the State of Kerala. The State of Kerala, Director General of Police and five registered All India political parties were made respondents. This was on the ground that bandhs should be held unconstitutional as they violate Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution and also because they are inconsistent with the Directive Principles of State Policy and the Fundamental Duties laid down in the Constitution. The petitioners also prayed that the calling and enforcing of bandhs should be declared a crime under the Indian Penal Code. - The Kerala High Court held that the calling for a bandh by any association, organisation or political party and its enforcement, is illegal and unconstitutional. The court also held that the groups that organize and carry out these bandhs are accountable for paying back the government, the general public, and private citizens for any losses they incur as a result of the destruction of both public and private property. In a decision that was upheld on appeal, the Supreme Court simply stated that the High Court’s reasoning was sound and that their intervention was not required. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** : - Whether call for a bandh is distinctive from the call for a strike or a hartal? - Whether there exists a fundamental right of political parties to call or enforce a Bandh under Article 19(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution? - Whether calling or enforcement of a bandh infringes Articles 19(1)(g), 19(1)(d) and 21 of the citizens? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS:** - Counsel for the petitioners argued that the calling of a bandh by the political parties must necessarily result in a blanket imposition of various restrictions upon the rights of the citizens under Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(d) and 21 of the Constitution. Citizens are equally circumscribed in their right to pursue their avocations. - Bandhs, if observed are a loss of a day of production and hence the economy of the country. They further argued that the political parties cannot assert their right to call bandhs and strikes to protest whatever they want to as their fundamental right under Article 19(1) since it impinges on the fundamental rights of the other citizens on the whole. They further argued that the political parties cannot also seek their right to strike and bandhs under Article 19(1) as fundamental rights while ignoring the fundamental rights of other citizens. However, this right does not give a freeway to political parties to exercise the same in any way, in as much as which renders the fundamental rights of others violated. - Further, they argued that political parties cannot exercise their “right to bandhs and strikes as part of their fundamental rights under Article 19(1) at the expense of the fundamental rights of the other citizens. Related to this there is a corollary: This does not mean the political parties have a freeway to do so, in as much as they do this their fundamental rights are violated consequently. A bandh call curtails the freedom of movement for the general population and thus should be made illegal, they argued. They further submitted that when a bandh is called, it necessarily means that there would be destruction to property, safety of human lives and other things done either impliedly and/or expressly can ensue on the streets which thereby impairs the citizen in the free enjoyment of their Fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(a), (d), and (g) and Article 21. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** : - The counsel on behalf of the appellant in this case contended that the right to call for or holding of a bandh is a fundamental right protected under Article 19(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution and any restriction on the same would amount to a violation of the fundamental rights of the political parties or of every citizen comprising that party, in this case. - Moreover, they also disputed and denied the respondent/petitioner’s assumption that all bandhs expressly call for violence as such assumption is general and lacks logical basis. - They contended that the mere calling of a bandh for peaceful purposes cannot be declared unconstitutional or illegal. - Furthermore, they argued that only the State had the authority to restrict the freedoms granted under Article 19 via the imposition of reasonable restrictions. Therefore, the Court has no authority to do the same. - The appellants further contended that Article 19(1)(a) grants to every citizen a fundamental right to strike, protest and the right to civil disobedience. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** : - *“Article 19(1)(a): All citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression;* - *Article19(1)(b): All citizens shall have the right to assemble peaceably and without arms;* - *Article19(1)(c): to form associations or unions or co-operative societies;* - *Article19(3): Nothing in sub-clause (b) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests ofthe sovereignty and integrity of India or public order, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause.* - *Article19(1)(d) :to move freely throughout the territory of India;* - *Article 19(4): Nothing in sub-clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests ofthe sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause.* - *Article21: No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”* **JUDGEMENT:** **RATIO DECIDENDI** - The court authorizes the case to proceed and the arguments presented by Mr Harish Soli J. Sorabjee representing the appellant and Mr. Mathai M. Paideday who is the legal counsel for the respondents. - By keeping in view, The Public Order and Governance, Right to Life, Reasonable Restrictions and Natural Justice. The High Court held that bandhs are unconstitutional because they violate the fundamental rights of the citizens. **OBITER DICTA (IF ANY)** - The primary focus of the case was on the legality of bandhs that they are unconstitutional as they violate the fundamental rights of citizens, such as the right to freedom and the right to carry on any trade or business. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The Supreme Court of India’s ruling in the case of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) vs. Bharat Kumar & Others (1997) marked a significant judicial stance on the issue of bandh calls and their impact on public life. The Court concluded that bandhs, which involve the coercion of citizens to stop their activities and result in the shutdown of services, violate fundamental rights, particularly the right to freedom of movement and the right to carry on trade and business. The judgment emphasized that while the right to protest is essential in a democracy, it must not infringe upon the rights of others. The ruling reinforced the need for balancing political expression with public order and individual freedoms. It also highlighted the judiciary’s role in safeguarding constitutional rights against actions that disrupt the societal order and infringe upon personal liberties. This landmark decision has since served as a precedent in addressing similar issues of public disruption caused by political activities in India. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** - Railway Board v. Niranjan Singh 1969 AIR 9667 - Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India 1984 AIR 8028 - A.K. Gopalan v. State AIR 1950 SC 279 - Saghir Ahamad v. State AIR 1961 ALL 507 10 - Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 59711 **Important Statutes Referred** - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA: -Article 19(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), Article 21, Article 32, Article 226 **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Amar Singh Ji & Ors Vs State of Rajasthan, AIR 1955 SC 504](https://lawfoyer.in/amar-singh-ji-ors-vs-state-of-rajasthan-air-1955-sc-504/) **Published:** June 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Ajay Pratap Singh, Law Student at Amity University** **Edited By: Naman Jain, Law Student at Galgotias University** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** *Amar Singh Ji & Ors Vs State of Rajasthan AIR 1955 SC 504*: From the fact given this backdrop of the judgment where the treatment of the subject matter of land acquisition and the quantum of the compensation provided to the landowners were the critical issues before the Supreme Court of India. Amar Singh Ji, a big landowner, the petitioner, contended its validity alleging that the jeep was acquired land under the Land Acquisition Act, and the amount of compensation awarded to him was grossly inadequate as it did not come close to the fair market value. He argued that the actions of the state were arbitrary and constituted an infringement of his property rights; they did not amount to fair compensation as the Act required. Through the judgment, the Supreme Court of India has laid down fundamental legal principles on the right of the State to acquire land and the need to provide adequate compensation, without pointing to one or all of the following two judgments. The Court emphasized that there should be fair compensation which is reflective of the fair market value of the land and that the state should follow the due process of law whenever the state acquires land so that there is no misuse of power. This ruling made it clear that the judiciary would protect the citizens from their own state yet again and that the excessive use of force by the state could not be successful every time. The judgment has since become a seminal precedent in Indian jurisprudence with respect to all cases involving Right to Land and compensation disputes. ***Keywords:** Land Acquisition, Compensation, Property Rights, Fair Market Value, Due Process, State Power.* **CASE DETAILS** 1. i) Judgement Cause Title / Case Name: Thakur Amar Singhji vs State Of Rajasthan(And Other Petitions) 2. ii) Judgement Date: April 15, 1955 iii) Court: Supreme Court of India 1. iv) Quorum / Constitution of Bench: Aiyyar, T.L. Venkatarama Mukherjee, Bijan Kr. (cj) Das, Sudhi Ranjan Bhagwati, Natwarlal H. Imam, Syed Jaffer 1. v) Author / Name of Judges: Justice Venkatarama Ayyar (delivering the judgment) 2. vi) Citation: AIR 1955 SC 504 vii) Legal Provisions Involved: Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act (1952) Constitution of India: Article 31(2), Article 31A, Article 14 **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** Amar Singh Ji v. State of Rajasthan is a landmark judgment by the Supreme Court of India on matters pertaining to land acquisition and the adequacy of compensation payable to the owners of such land. This case arose when India was caught between rapid industrialization and balancing public interest with private property rights. The main legal issue in this case was whether or not the Land Acquisition Act could be interpreted to mean that fair compensation principles and due process must be followed by state authorities taking over private land. Amar Singh Ji, who was also known as the petitioner, had his property confiscated by Rajasthan Government. The petitioner’s claim was that he deserved a better payment than what he received from the government because it was not the fair market price for his property. **Background** The government enacted the Land Acquisition Act to give a legal framework for it to buy private land for public purposes. It also required that the owners of the land were adequately compensated for what was acquired. In this case, Amar Singh Ji argued that he was not given sufficient compensation by the state and therefore his rights under the Act were violated. He alleged that the manner in which his properties were valued was arbitrary and non-transparent hence subjecting him to material undervaluation. This is an important case because it indicates how conflicting are states’ interests in development with individuals’ rights to own property. The Supreme Court’s decision in this matter played a key role in setting a precedent on how compensation should be done and what process should be followed during land acquisition cases hence making these requirements mandatory. It only confirmed that fair compensation is inevitable and further affirmed due process thereby safeguarding landowners from irrational state actions. **FACTS OF THE CASE** 1. i) Procedural Background of the Case 2. Initial Filing: The petitioner, Amar Singh Ji filed a legal suit against the State of Rajasthan about a compensation that was given upon acquiring his land under Land Acquisition Act. The argumentation of the petitioner dwelt on the inadequacy and as such shortfall in true/market value for his property. This case initially filled at lower courts but later reached the Supreme Court with regard to its significance on land acquisition legislations and rights over property. 1. Appeal to Supreme Court: The petitioner appealed to the supreme court after receiving several negative judgments from lower courts. It wanted to look into this matter because it raised critical questions relating to fair recompense and due procedures during land acquisitions. 1. ii) Factual Background of the Case 2. Land Acquisition: Under the law of Land Acquisition Act, The state of Rajasthan took Amar Singh Ji’s piece of property. The land was being acquired for a public purpose, as stated in the act that justified the state’s action. However, he got compensation far below what he believed to be the fair market valuation of his property. 1. Compensation Dispute: Amar Singh Ji argued that the compensation amount set by the state was just a random amount that did not reflect his land’s actual value after adding that it had used opaque and unfair principles in determining its offer leading to an unfair evaluation that did not mirror his land’s real worth. 1. Legal Arguments: The petitioner claimed that the state had violated the principles of acquisition when it failed to provide him with appropriate remuneration as required by law. He approached the Supreme Court asking for reconsideration of compensation based on fair market value and adherence to due process. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Fair Compensation: Whether the compensation awarded by the State of Rajasthan for the land acquired from Amar Singh Ji was fair and reflective of the land’s fair market value. 1. Due Process: Whether the procedures followed by the State of Rajasthan in determining and awarding compensation adhered to the principles of due process as mandated by the Land Acquisition Act. iii. Arbitrariness of State Action: Whether the actions of the State of Rajasthan in acquiring the land and determining compensation were arbitrary and capricious, thus violating the rights of the petitioner. 1. Interpretation of the Land Acquisition Act: How should the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act be interpreted and applied to ensure just and fair compensation for landowners? 1. Judicial Oversight: To what extent should courts exercise oversight over state actions in land acquisition cases to prevent misuse of power and ensure compliance with legal standards? 1. **F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 2. Inadequate Compensation: mar Singh Ji, the counsel for the petitioner argued that the compensation when it comes to the acquisition of land was grossly inadequate. They stated that this amount did not represent a fair market value of the property, which resulted in a situation where the land was undervalued signifying financial harm for the petitioner. 1. Violation of Fair Compensation Principles: The petitioner’s legal team placed great emphasis on the fact that the Land Acquisition Act required fair compensation to be made to landowners whose lands were being acquired for public purposes. It was their view that since this compensation did not follow those principles then this implied non-compliance with statutory requirements under which the said act was enacted. iii. Arbitrary Valuation Process: It is submitted that there had been arbitrariness and lack of transparency in the determination of compensation by the State of Rajasthan. The Petitioner contended that the valuation method used by Rajasthan State does not conform to any uniform or reasonable basis for fixing the price, making it an unfair one. 1. Lack of Due Process: According to counsel representing the appellant, due process was not followed in acquiring land and determining its value. They argued that there were no procedural safeguards taken into account by the state in order to protect the interests of landowners resulting in an unfair evaluation. 1. Right to Property: The petitioner argued that the inadequate compensation infringed upon his constitutional right to property. The legal team highlighted that the right to property, though not a fundamental right, still demands protection against arbitrary state actions and requires fair treatment under the law. 1. Judicial Intervention: The counsel for Amar Singh Ji urged the Supreme Court to intervene and correct the injustice by reassessing the compensation. They sought the Court’s directive for the state to award compensation that genuinely reflects the market value of the land, ensuring that the petitioner is fairly compensated as per the legal standards. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. Legal Compliance of the Land Acquisition Act: The State of Rajasthan contended that the compensation awarded to Amar Singh Ji was in strict accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. All the statutory procedures and guidelines were followed with meticulous commitment both in the process of land acquisition and compensation determination. 1. Reflective of the Fair Market Value: The respondents alleged that the compensation reflected the fair market value of the land at the time of acquisition. They further argued that the valuation was done by competent authorities using established methods and principles. Therefore, the amount awarded was just and reasonable. iii. No Arbitrariness: The counsel team of the state resisted any arbitrariness in the valuation process. They specifically claimed that the process was transparent and founded on objective facts. They further argued that the compensation was determined fairly and impartially, and, as such, the petitioner’s claims are just unfounded allegations of arbitrary actions on the part of the respondents. 1. Due Process Procedural Adherence: The respondents maintained that due process was followed throughout the land acquisition proceedings. It was submitted that all the necessary notices were served, hearings were conducted, and the petitioner was given ample opportunity to put forward objections and claims. 1. Public Purpose Justification: The counsel for the State emphasized that the acquisition of land was for a legitimate public purpose. It furthered that the public purpose served by the acquisition outweighed any claims of the petitioner for higher compensation. 1. Judicial Deference: The respondents appealed to the apex court for deference to the findings and decisions of the lower courts and the valuation authorities. They averred that the judicial system should respect the administrative expertise that comes from valuing land and should not intervene unless a clear legal or procedural violation was manifest. vii. Sufficiency of Compensation: The State’s counsel submitted that the awarded compensation was adequate and sufficient, given the circumstances and legal regime. They added that the claim for more significant amounts by the petitioner was untenable in law and fact. **JUDGEMENT** 1. **RATIO DECIDENDI** 2. Adequate Compensation and Market Value: The Supreme Court held that the compensation determined for land acquisition should reflect the fair market value of the property at the time of acquisition. The Court emphasized that the state should ensure that landowners are adequately compensated to prevent any monetary loss from the acquisition. 1. Procedural Guarantee in Land Acquisition: The Court reiterated the fact that the process laid down for the determination of compensation is transparent, fair, and just and ensures that the rights of landowners are protected throughout the process of land acquisition. iii. Guarding Against Arbitrary Action of the State: In this judgment, the Court has echoed that state actions in land acquisition should not be whimsical or capricious in nature. A mere tendency of arbitrariness in the process of valuation and determination of compensation, the Court has held, will attract judicial intervention for the protection of the rights of the affected landowners. 1. Justification for State Action with Judicial Oversight and Protection of Rights: The Court upheld the well-established principle, i.e., the role of the judiciary is to keep a check on state action, so as to ensure that such power is not misused. It has been observed that the judiciary has to intervene when there is evidence of arbitrary or mala fides or capricious state actions in land acquisition matters to ensure that the standards of law are met and the property rights of people are protected. 1. **OBITER DICTA** 2. Balancing between Development and Rights: The Court balanced the concern of land acquisition for a public purpose, citing the necessity of according to individual property rights vis-a-vis the state’s development goals. Balanced with proper compensation and due process is required according to the Court. 1. Suggestions regarding Future Legislation: The Court suggested that in the future, amendments to the Land Acquisition Act should provide clearer guidelines and mechanisms to ensure adequate compensation and prevent state arbitrariness. It was suggested that the law in respect of land acquisition should be refined progressively. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The ruling of the Supreme Court in Amar Singh Ji v. State of Rajasthan is a landmark judgment, which has long affected Indian jurisprudence concerning land acquisition and compensation. The various principles which the judgment declared aimed at ensuring fair compensation to the landowners and, at the same time, the prevention of arbitrary state actions. **Key Takeaways-** **Compensation:** The Supreme Court emphasized that the compensation given for acquiring land should reflect the fair market value of the property. This principle aims at ensuring that the landowners are not financially disadvantaged by the acquisition. **Due Process:** Fairly emphasized by the court was the following of due process in land acquisition proceedings. It is due process and fair procedures that would save the rights of the landowners and ensure just compensation. **Judicial Review:** The judgment reiterated the need for the courts to reexamine the state’s exercise of power to prevent misuse of power. The Court made it clear that the state action with regard to matters of land acquisition shall definitely call for judicial intervention when there is evidence of arbitrariness or capriciousness. **Public Interest vs. Private Rights:** The Court emphasized that while land acquisition is necessary for public purposes, it also requires a balance between public interest and the individual rights to property. And, fair compensation and due process are the two vital components to affect this balance. COMMENTS: The case of Amar Singh Ji v. State of Rajasthan is a landmark case in Indian law relating to the acquisition of land and compensation therefor. The principles enunciated by the Supreme Court of India, in this case, have continued to be the guiding light for later pronouncements in similar matters and have ensured that the rights of landowners are kept sacrosanct and the state actions are held under high standards of fairness and transparency. This judgment has been a landmark in the way land acquisition cases have been dealt with in India. It has established strong guidelines in judging the adequacy of compensation and whether state actions in land acquisition are legal or illegal. The guidelines in the case help prevent misuse of power and ensure that individuals get fair treatment under the law. In a word, the case is very important because it calls to the fore the role the judiciary plays in ensuring that individual rights are not compromised by state actions. It calls for a framework that balances state interest with individual rights, which ensures that development does not come at a cost of justice and fairness. **REFERENCES** 1. Important Cases Referred 2. *State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh* Citation: AIR 1952 SC 252 Significance: This case dealt with compensation principles and the rights of landowners under the Land Acquisition Act. 1. *Raja Anand Brahma Shah v. State of Uttar Pradesh* Citation: AIR 1967 SC 1081 Significance: This case addressed issues of fair compensation and due process in land acquisition. 1. Important Statutes Referred 2. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 Sections involved: Sections 4, 5A, 6, 9, 11, 12, 18, 23, and 24 1. Constitution of India Article 226: Power of High Courts to issue certain writs. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Arrest under CRPC and Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita(BNSS): Provisions, Precedents, and Procedures](https://lawfoyer.in/arrest-under-crpc-and-bhartiya-nagarik-suraksha-sanhitabnss-provisions-precedents-and-procedures/) **Published:** June 22, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** Author: **Smriti Verma,(Amity University Lucknow)** Edited By: **Pooja, Rayat College Of Law,Railmajra (Affiliated to Panjab University, Chandigarh)** **INTRODUCTION** An arrest involves legally restricting a person’s ability to move freely using authority. Typically, an arrest requires the presence of an arrest warrant. If there is probable cause and exigent circumstances, an arrest can be made without a warrant at the time of the arrest. Probable cause is the police officer’s justifiable belief in the suspect’s guilt, formed from facts and information before making an arrest. For example, a warrantless arrest could be considered valid when the police officer believes reasonably that the suspect has either already committed a crime or is going to commit one. The police officer may additionally detain the suspect to stop their potential flight or safeguard evidence. Nonetheless, an arrest without a warrant could be deemed invalid if the officer did not show urgent situations and reasonable cause. In the Indian Criminal Justice system, Arrests are primarily carried out by the police. Scholars and activists in India strongly criticize the practice of arrests, yet many still argue that ‘the power to arrest’ is a necessary aspect of policing. The BNSS of 2023 aims to substitute the CrPC of 1973. The CrPC outlines the process for arrest, prosecution, and bail. **Arrest under the Criminal Procedure Code:** A person may be placed under arrest under the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) if there are good reasons to suspect that they have committed a crime that is punishable by law. During an arrest, the police are required by law to adhere to due process, which includes notifying the subject of the arrest of their rights, the reason for the arrest, and the preparation of an arrest document. If a magistrate approves, a person may be detained in police custody for up to 24 hours at a time; in rare cases, this period may be extended to 15 days. The CrPC provides instructions on how to be arrested, prosecuted, and granted bail. The BNSS emphasizes criminal procedures that are centred around citizens and aims to update and simplify criminal justice practices. BNSS has implemented rules to safeguard elderly or incapacitated individuals when arrested without a warrant. The BNSS permits a law enforcement officer to utilize handcuffs when arresting or presenting the suspect in court under certain circumstances. It offers instructions on the prosecution of crimes, the establishment of criminal courts and offices, and the imprisonment of individuals awaiting trial as per the regulations outlined in BNSS. ***Keywords*:** Criminal Procedure Code, Police, Arrest, BNSS, Law enforcement **ARREST UNDER CRPC** **Arrest in pursuance of a warrant** A police officer is unable to detain an individual without a warrant if they commit a non-arrestable crime or offence. An arrest warrant gives the authority to arrest someone or to confiscate their property. Each arrest warrant is authorized by a Judge or a Magistrate on the state’s behalf. As per Section 70 of the CrPC, 1973, each arrest warrant from a Court must be written, signed by the presiding officer, and stamped with the Court’s seal. Furthermore, the warrant must continue to be valid until it is revoked by the issuing Court or until it is enforced. **Arrest without warrant** Just like the name implies, ‘Arrest without warrant’ allows a police officer to detain an individual without needing a warrant for a crime that warrants an arrest. Section 41 of the CrPC outlines specific situations in which a police officer can detain a person without a Magistrate’s order or a warrant. As per this part, a law enforcement officer has the authority to detain an individual if they: - commits a cognizable crime. - has been declared a criminal either by the State Government’s directive or under CrPC. - has the stolen items in their possession. - prevents a law enforcement officer from carrying out their duties or flees or trying to flee from legal detention. - is believed to have deserted from any branch of the Indian Armed Forces, - a former prisoner violates a regulation. - is implicated in any crime that took place outside of India, and - The person to be arrested and the reason for the arrest is specified by another police officer who has submitted a request for their arrest. **Arrest on refusal to give name and residence** Section 42 of CrPC addresses a different scenario in which a police officer can apprehend an individual, known as ‘Arrest on refusal to provide name and address’. According to this Section, if someone refuses to reveal their name or address, or gives false information when accused of a non-cognizable offence, the police can make an arrest. This also demonstrates that once the correct name and address of the individual are known, they will be set free after signing a bond to appear before a Magistrate when needed. If a person’s true identity and location cannot be determined within 24 hours or they are unable to sign a bond or provide enough guarantors, they must be taken to the closest Magistrate. **Arrest by a private person** This implies that an individual can apprehend anyone who commits a non-bailable and cognizable offence in front of them. Section 43 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 pertains to the ‘Arrest by private person and procedure on such arrest’. One private individual has the authority to detain another individual in certain circumstances. - He/she engages in a crime that is not eligible for bail and is recognizable by law enforcement. - the individual has been declared as a wanted criminal. If there is suspicion that the individual falls within the boundaries of Section 41 of CrPC, law enforcement should detain them again. According to Section 43(3), a person suspected of a non-cognizable offence must provide their name and address to a police officer upon request. If they refuse or provide false information, they will be dealt with according to section 42. If there is no sufficient reason to believe they have committed an offence, they will be released immediately. **Arrest by Magistrate** Section 44 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, discusses the ‘Arrest by Magistrate’, referring to both Judicial and Executive Magistrates. Its first part explains that if a crime occurs in front of a Magistrate, whether they are an Executive or Judicial Magistrate in their area of jurisdiction, they have the authority to arrest the offender or instruct someone else to do so. They can then, depending on bail regulations, detain the offender. Clause (2) affirms that any Magistrate has the authority to apprehend or order someone within their local jurisdiction to arrest a person in his presence. Section 45 of the CrPC protects Armed Forces members from arrest in connection with their official duties without approval from the Central Government. **HOW IS AN ARREST MADE?** There is no code specifically outlining the process of arrest, while Section 46 of the CrPC, 1973 explains the procedure of making an arrest. Under Section 46(1) of the CrPC, the arresting officer or individual must physically touch or restrain the person being arrested. It also mentions that if a woman is going to be arrested, it is assumed that her compliance with a verbal notice of arrest is sufficient unless the situation suggests otherwise. In addition, the police officer should not physically touch the woman during her arrest unless necessary or if the officer is a female. If someone tries to avoid being arrested or resists arrest by force, the police can use any amount of force necessary to make the arrest. As per Section 46(3), no authority is given by this section to deliberately cause the death of a person not charged with a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment. Furthermore, it is stated in Section 46(4) of the CrPC, 1973 that no woman should be detained between sunset and sunrise. **CONDITIONS ASSOCIATED WITH ARREST** As per **DK Basu v. State of Bengal,** wherein the Supreme Court gave guidelines of how arrest shall be made, certain conditions are to be met for a lawful arrest, some of them are enumerated as follows: - When arrest is not necessary, notice must be given before proceeding with the arrest. - Per Section 41B of CrPC, every police officer must follow certain guidelines when making an arrest. - Display a precise, easily readable, and clear labelling of his name. - Create a written record of the arrest, with verification from one witness and approval from the arrested individual. - Advise the individual who has been arrested about their right to have a family member notified. - Control rooms for police will be set up in each district and at the state level as per Section 41C of the CrPC. - A person who has been arrested has the right to consult with a lawyer during questioning, but not constantly, as stated in Section 41D of the CrPC. - A Police Officer can, in addition to making an arrest, utilize the following powers: – - Authorities have the right to search a location where the person being sought for arrest has entered. - May follow any individual to any location within India. - Must not impose additional constraints on individuals beyond what is essential. - Advise the individual in custody about the reasons for their arrest. - Advise the individual who has been arrested about their right to post bail. - Is required to notify a designated individual about the arrest. - Look for the individual who has been taken into custody. - Grab an aggressive tool. - Medical evaluation of defendant as requested by law enforcement officer. - Medical assessment of individuals facing accusations of sexual assault. - Medical assessment of an individual who has been taken into custody. - The person responsible for custody must ensure the health and safety of the arrested person by taking appropriate precautions. - An individual who has been arrested must be presented to the magistrate within 24 hours of the arrest under Section 57 of the CrPC. - The officer in command must inform the District Magistrate of every arrest made without a warrant. - Individuals taken into custody will be released on their recognizance by posting bail or through a special order from the magistrate. - Authority to chase and recover in the event of fleeing. - Any arrest must adhere strictly to the CrPC as outlined in Section 60A. - In the case of **[Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/2982624/)**[**,**](http://%2C/) the Supreme Court of India instructed that police officers should not arrest the accused without sufficient reason and that magistrates should not approve detention in such circumstances. **ARREST UNDER BNSS** - The new rule regarding elderly/sick individuals being detained without a warrant is now under Section 35 of the BNSS, combining Sections 41 and 41A of the CrPC. A new provision has been added for elderly and disabled individuals in addition to the current provisions in the CrPC. According to Section 35(7) of the BNSS, individuals who are elderly or infirm and the offence they committed is punishable by less than three years imprisonment cannot be arrested without authorization from a Deputy Superintendent of Police. - The range of individuals who receive information about an arrest has been expanded: According to the CrPC, only the police officer could inform the person’s relative or friend about the arrest. Information can now be shared with a person’s chosen relative, friend, or other named individual under the BNSS. - The additional requirement concerning the information about an arrest: If a person is arrested with a warrant, Section 82(2) of the BNSS now requires the arresting officer to immediately provide details about the arrest and the location of where the arrested individual is being held to the designated police officer, as well as to a police officer in the district where the arrested person usually lives. Furthermore, Section 48 of the BNSS now states that details of the arrest and location of the detainee must be reported to the assigned police officer in the area. - Keeping records of arrested individuals and showing it: Section 41C of the CrPC states that the State Government must ensure that the names and addresses of arrested persons, as well as the names and positions of the arresting police officers, are posted on notice boards outside control rooms in each district. Section 37 of the BNSS outlines the details of that particular necessity. The State Government must assign a police officer, at least an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, in each district and police station to keep records of arrested individuals’ names, addresses, and charges. It is necessary to have this displayed prominently at district headquarters and police stations, including using digital methods. - Arrest for not providing name and address or providing incorrect information: According to Section 42 of the CrPC, a person could be released by signing a bond, with or without sureties, in these instances. According to Section 39 of the BNSS, a person who is arrested in these cases can be set free with a bond or bail bond, as specified in the codified ‘bail bond’. - The new time limit for private individuals to hand over arrested individuals to authorities: Under the amended Section 40(1) of the BNSS, those who make an arrest must bring the arrested person before a police officer within six hours or take them to the closest police station. Section 43(1) of the CrPC previously indicated the need to produce the person without any unnecessary delay, and this timeframe is now better defined. - Individuals who are arrested without a warrant should not be held for longer than 24 hours (regardless of whether the Magistrate has authority or not). Section 57 of the CrPC states that a police officer cannot keep a person in custody for an excessively long period, which should not surpass 24 hours (excluding the time needed to travel from the place of arrest to the Magistrate) unless directed otherwise by a Magistrate. Changes to Section 58 of the BNSS include the addition of “whether having jurisdiction or not” at the provision’s end, mandating that the arresting officer must promptly present the detainee before the closest Magistrate regardless of the Magistrate’s jurisdiction. **Changes have been made to bail provisions and detention periods for under-trial prisoners in the BNSS:** The new approach is more lenient towards first-time offenders, allowing them to seek release on bond after serving one-third of the maximum imprisonment period for their offence. The jail superintendent can now request bail for undertrial prisoners who have completed either one-half or one-third of the specified period. Tougher conditions apply for undertrial prisoners with multiple offences or cases. When someone is involved in multiple offences or cases, bail cannot be granted by the court. As a result, the chances of getting bail decrease when dealing with multiple cases brought against a person by a complainant. In any case, the individual must not be held longer than the specified maximum prison term for that offence under the law during the legal process. Offences with the death penalty or life imprisonment as potential punishments are excluded from this rule. Section 436A of the CrPC corresponded to Section 479 of the BNSS. **CONCLUSION** For the law of arrest to be successful, police officers must be knowledgeable. up to date on arrest laws and guidelines. Supreme Court rulings related to the apprehension. afforded equal rights throughout the legal process. provided with all the rights that have been granted and acknowledged by the law. The police officer must exercise care, particularly while arresting the women and children. It is said that Justice should not just be carried out but should also appear to be carried out. Justice involves achieving equilibrium. the concern for both the people and the society. Being one of the complicated tasks, it is observed that very Often, individual freedom may need to be given up to protect the welfare of the community, especially. with occurrences of increasing violence and criminal activity within homes and across state borders. Yet, considering the most recent NHRC investigation. The police must adhere to specific guidelines, which often restrict their operations. Stringent procedures are adhered to in urban areas. REFERENCES - https://indiankanoon.org/doc/2982624 Important Statutes: - The Code of Criminal Procedure(1973) - Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (2023) **Categories:** Articles, Criminal Procedure Law --- ### [13th National Quiz on Indian Contract Act & Law of Torts by LawFoyer: Register by 15th June](https://lawfoyer.in/13th-national-quiz-on-indian-contract-act-law-of-torts-by-lawfoyer-register-by-15th-june/) **Published:** May 10, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/13th-national-quiz-724x1024.png) ## Dates - **Date of Quiz:- 16/06/2024** **(5 Pm)** - **Last Date to Apply:-** **15/06/2024, 11:59 pm** - **Result Declaration:-** **20/06/2024** [Final Answer Key](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Updated-Answer-Key-13th-Quiz.pdf) --- [Check Results](https://lawfoyer.in/results-of-13th-national-quiz-on-indian-contract-act-law-of-torts/) --- [Download E-Certificates](https://lawfoyer.in/download-certificates-of-13th-national-quiz-on-indian-contract-act-law-of-torts/) --- ## Prizes - **1st prize- Rs 1500 + Winner Trophy** - **2nd prize- Rs 1000 + 1st Runner Up Trophy** - **3rd prize- Rs 500 + 2nd Runner Up Trophy** - **4th-10th Prize- Rs 150 + Certificate of Excellence** - **FREE Practice E-Book with 1000+ MCQs for Practice** - **Free 2 AI Plagiarism Report by Turnitin.** - **Appreciation Certificate for All the Participants** - **Top 10 Rank will get Free access to Certification Course on Indian Evidence Act.** [Click here to know more about course](https://academy.lawfoyer.in/index.php/courses/mastering-the-indian-evidence-act-a-10-day-certification-course/) **Note:-** The Winners Trophy will be dispatched to the designated recipients’ physical address without any additional charges. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/WhatsApp-Image-2024-01-22-at-01.00.07_ac7cf468-1024x576.jpg "WhatsApp-Image-2024-01-22-at-01.00.07_ac7cf468 | LawFoyer | LawFoyer")## **Registration Fees** - **Rs 99/- Only** ## **Important Guidelines** - **Format of Quiz:** Quiz shall take place online, and a paper will include multiple-choice questions**.** - The participant can take this exam on their laptop or mobile phone. - The platform for the quiz will be google Forms, Microsoft Forms, etc. - In the case of the same marks, time will be considered (a person who submits early will be given preference). - The link will be shared 24 hours prior to the start of the quiz. ## **Rules & Regulations** - **60 MCQ(s) \[30 question on Indian Contract Act & 30 questions on Law of Torts\].** - The time allotted will be **25** minutes. (This includes time for filling the basic details like Name, email, etc.) - **Every question carries 04 marks & there will be no negative marking.** - The Result will be declared on **20th June 2024**([www.lawfoyer.in](https://lawfoyer.in/)). --- ## Registration Form [Register Now](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=3) --- **Categories:** Quiz **Tags:** contract, law, lawfoyer, legal, legalquiz, quiz --- ### [RE BERUBARI UNION CASE (AIR 1960 SC 845)](https://lawfoyer.in/re-berubari-union-case-air-1960-sc-845/) **Published:** June 20, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Devi Prasad Mishra, Law Student at Lajpat Rai Law College, Sambalpur University** **Edited By: Manik Tindwani, Law Student at University Five Year Law College, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur** **ABSTRACT** Berubari union case was instituted by a special reference made by the president of India to the Supreme Court. It clarified the constitutional provision relating to the territorial reorganization of the state by parliament. While prime ministers of Pakistan and India agreed to settle border disputes between them, the question arose whether any legislative action was necessary to enforce an agreement. It set a precedent to follow a due legislative procedure when it comes to national boundaries. Also, it made it clear that the constitution is a living document and it needs to be interpreted and amended where necessities arise. ***Keywords:*** *Territorial dispute, Parliament, Article 3, Constitution of India, Special reference* **CASE DETAILS** ***i)* *Judgement Cause Title / Case Name***Re, Berubari Union Case, 1960 ***ii)* *Case Number***Special reference number 1 of 1959 ***iii)* *Judgement Date***1st April, 1959 ***iv)* *Court***Supreme Court ***v)* *Quorum***### B.P. Sinha, A.K. Sarkar, J.C. Shah, K.C. Das Gupta, K. Subba Rao, M. Hidayatullah, P.B. Gajendragadkar, S.K. Das ***vi)* *Author*** Gajendragadkar J. ***vii)* *Citation***AIR 1960 SC 845, \[1960\] 3 SCR 250***viii)* *Legal Provisions Involved***Part1, Article 368 of the Constitution of India**INTRODUCTION** Article 143 empowers the president of India to consult the Supreme Court to seek its opinion on any question of law or fact of such importance. Re Beubari union was such a case where the then president Dr. Rajendra Prasad consulted the Supreme Court to execute the Nehru-Noon agreement to settle the border dispute between India and Pakistan. **BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The Re Berubari Union case, otherwise known as the Berubari Union case, was a landmark case held by the Supreme Court of India in the year 1960. The case settled the dispute between India and Pakistan over the division of the Berubari Union, a town located in the district of Jalpaiguri in the West Bengal state of India. The court addressed important questions such as the power of parliament to amend the constitution and transfer any territory to a foreign state. This case also deals with the status of the preamble of the constitution of India. **FACTS OF THE CASE** 1. The dispute over Berubari emerged after the demarcation of boundaries between India and Pakistan, after partition, by Sir Radcliffe. In that commission partition of the Berubari region was not explicitly mentioned, despite the commission, it was administered by West Bengal state after the enactment of the Constitution. 2. In 1952, Pakistan claimed the region and to be given to East Pakistan. 3. In 1958, by way of the Nehru-Noon agreement both prime ministers agreed to divide the territory of Berubari into two parts. 4. Since there were doubts arising out of this agreement, the president of India referred this matter to the Supreme Court. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** In the above case, three legal issues were raised 1. The first issue was regarding the necessity of any legislative action in order to enforce an agreement signed by two states. 2. Secondly whether the parliament has the power to give any part of the territory under Article 3? 3. Whether the case where there is such a requirement is a law of parliament in relation to Article 3 of the Constitution of India, 1950 sufficient for the purpose or is an amendment of the constitution according to Article 368 of the constitution necessary **PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS** The counsel representing the union government submitted before the court that the agreement simply acknowledges the previously decided boundary line, it does not create any new or alter the existing boundary of the state. Further, it was submitted that it was a formal setup for border dispute settlement and not surrender of any Indian territory to another state. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsel against of government submitted that the preamble of the constitution confers no power on parliament over any territory to transfer it. Also under Article 1 (3) territory of India can be extended but it cannot be cessed. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** In the present case, the following legal provisions were discussed. The court discussed the relevant articles of the constitution in order to resolve the dispute **Article 1 in the Constitution of India** ***‘1. Name and territory of the Union;*** [*(1)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1200881/)*India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States.* [*(2)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1629443/)*The States and the territories thereof shall be as specified in the First Schedule.* [*(3)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1062009/)*The territory of India shall comprise-*[*(a)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/490632/)*The territories of the States;*[*(b)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1444445/)*the Union territories specified in the First Schedule; and*[*(c)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/125352/)*such other territories as may be required.’* ## Article 2 in the Constitution of India ### *‘2. Admission or establishment of new States* *Parliament may by law admit into the Union, or establish, new States on such terms and conditions, as it thinks fit, territories as may be acquired.’* ## Article 3 in the Constitution of India ### *‘3. Formation of new States and alteration of areas, boundaries, or names of existing States* *Parliament may by law-*[*(a)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/531335/)*Form a new State by separation of territory from any State or by uniting two or more States or parts of States or by uniting any territory to a part of any State;*[*(b)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/45318/)*increase the area of any State;*[*(c)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1470645/)*diminish the area of any State;*[*(d)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1725440/)*alter the boundaries of any State;*[*(e)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1799986/)*alter the name of any State.’* ## Article 4 in the Constitution of India ### *‘4. Laws made under articles 2 and 3 to provide for the amendment of the First and the Fourth Schedules and supplemental, incidental, and consequential matters* [*(1)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/989492/)*Any law referred to in Article 2 or Article 3 shall contain such provisions for the amendment of the First Schedule and the Fourth Schedule as may be necessary to give effect to the provisions of the law and may also contain such supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions (including provisions as to representation in Parliament and in the Legislature or Legislatures of the State or States affected by such law) as Parliament may deem necessary.* [*(2)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1244046/)*No such law as aforesaid shall be deemed to be an amendment of this Constitution for the purposes of article 368.’* ## Article 368 in the Constitution of India ### *‘368. The power of Parliament to amend the Constitution and procedure therefor* [*(1)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/528655/)*Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, Parliament may in exercise of its constituent power amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any provision of this Constitution in accordance with the procedure laid down in this article.*[*(2)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1389240/)*An amendment of this Constitution may be initiated only by the introduction of a Bill for the purpose in either House of Parliament, and when the Bill is passed in each House by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House present and voting, it shall be presented to the President who shall give his assent to the Bill and thereupon the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill:Provided that if such amendment seeks to make any change in–*[*(a)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/498530/)*article 54, article 55, article 73, article 162 or article 241, or*[*(b)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/386420/)*Chapter IV of Part V, Chapter V of Part VI, or Chapter I of Part XI, or*[*(c)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1836100/)*any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, or*[*(d)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1339490/)*the representation of States in Parliament, or*[*(e)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/482214/)*the provisions of this article. the amendment shall also require to be ratified by the Legislatures of not less than one-half of the States by resolution to that effect passed by those Legislatures before the Bill making provision for such amendment is presented to the President for assent.* [*(3)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/145429/)*Nothing in Article 13 shall apply to any amendment made under this article.* [*(4)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1929205/)*No amendment of this Constitution (including the provisions of Part III) made or purporting to have been made under this article whether before or after the commencement of section 55 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 shall be called in question in any court on any ground.* [*(5)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/252025/)*For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that there shall be no limitation whatever on the constituent power of Parliament to amend by way of addition, variation or repeal the provisions of this Constitution under this article.’* **JUDGEMENT** - **Ratio Decedendi** After hearing the arguments from both counsels the court held that executive action alone is insufficient to transfer any territory of the state without parliamentary approval. It was also decided that the Berubari Union was part of West Bengal and not East Bengal, and therefore, it was necessary to cede a part of the territory according to laws and not through treaties or agreements. On the other hand, the parliament has the power to amend the Constitution under Article 368, including the power to cede territories of India to a foreign state. Parliament cannot cede a part of India in favor of a foreign state under Article 3 of the Constitution unless it is amended - **Obiter Dictum** While addressing one of the arguments the court was of the opinion that the Preamble to the Constitution is not a part of the Constitution itself, rather it is the key to opening the mind of the constitution makers. It shows the general purpose of making several provisions in the Constitution. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS :** The case clarified the constitutional provisions related to the territorial reorganization of the state. The case set a precedent of protecting citizen’s rights when any territorial dispute is being settled by the state. The decision underscores the importance of following due legislative process while the executive is dealing with national boundaries. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the decision concluded that changing Article 1 in response to cession of any portion of Indian territory to any foreign country does not activate the safeguards under any proviso of Article 368 **REFERENCES** **Important Statutes Referred** Constitution Of India,1950 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Privacy Unplugged: Balancing Technology and Human Rights](https://lawfoyer.in/privacy-unplugged-balancing-technology-and-human-rights/) **Published:** June 19, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Eekshitha Gutta**, **Second Year Law Student of B.A.LL.B. Hons.at Lovely Professional University** **Introduction** The fine line between fundamental human rights and technology breakthroughs has become increasingly important in an increasingly linked society. As we make our way through the digital world, concerns about protecting privacy while using technology’s advantages come up. We will examine the complex link between technology and human rights in this blog, looking at both the problems and possible remedies. **What is Technology?** In today’s world, technology is the result of the dynamic interaction of scientific understanding, useful instruments, and creative processes. It includes a wide range of innovations that impact our day-to-day activities, from the tangible devices we use to the intangible algorithms controlling our online interactions. Every aspect of our lives is impacted by technology, whether it is the smartphone we carry around in our pockets, the artificial intelligence that analyses data, or the infrastructure that facilitates international communication. Fundamentally, technology stands for advancement—the never-ending search for answers to problems, big or little. It gives us the ability to accomplish previously unthinkable things, but it also presents moral conundrums. We must balance this dual responsibility as we examine the complex link between technology and human rights—preserving individual liberty while maximizing its advantages. Some of the Key Aspects of the Technology are Innovation, Tools & Machines, Automation, Information and Communication, and, Data Processing. **What are Human Rights?** Human rights are essential privileges that every person has only by existing. All people are entitled to these rights, which are unalienable and universal, irrespective of their race, nationality, religion, or any other attribute. Achieving a balance between protecting individual rights and technical progress becomes crucial in the context of technology and privacy. **1. Right to Privacy:** A fundamental component of human rights is the right to privacy. It includes the freedom of an individual to control their private life, communications, and personal information. This right confronts hitherto unheard-of difficulties in the digital age because of the widespread use of technology. It’s critical to strike a balance between the advantages of technical progress and the requirement to preserve privacy. **2. Freedom of Expression:** One of the fundamental rights of individuals is the ability to freely express one’s thoughts, ideas, and knowledge as well as to take part in public conversation. Global communication has made this right even more possible thanks to technology. To strike a balance, though, requires tackling problems that might restrict this freedom, such as hate speech and disinformation on the internet and spying. **3. Right to Data Protection:** People have the right to decide how their information is used, especially when technology gathers enormous volumes of personal data. By promoting data-driven innovations while protecting privacy, data protection laws and regulations seek to achieve a balance. To achieve this balance, transparency, consent, and accountability are essential. **4. Right to Access Information:** People now have never-before-seen access to information thanks to technology, which enables them to study, participate, and make wise decisions. However, equitable access may be hampered by the digital divide. Technology balancing entails closing this gap and making sure that everyone takes use of the possibilities and information that the digital world has to offer. **5. Right to Anonymity:** The freedom to express oneself without worrying about retaliation is facilitated by anonymity. Technology balancing is protecting anonymity while addressing issues with cyberbullying, online abuse, and illegal activity made possible by anonymity. **6. Right to Security:** People are entitled to both physical and digital security. Through cybersecurity, monitoring, and encryption, technology improves security. Finding a balance between maintaining public safety and avoiding overzealous surveillance that violates people’s right to privacy is necessary, nevertheless. **7. The Right to Be Free from Discrimination:** Technology must not support prejudice against people based on their gender, race, religion, or any other attribute. Promoting inclusion, preventing prejudice in algorithms, and guaranteeing equitable opportunity for all are all part of balancing technology. **Historical Aspect** 1. **Technology** Technological developments and privacy issues have always crossed. Certain technologies generated concerns about secrecy and personal information even before the advent of the digital age. Ideas circulated quickly because printed materials were widely available. It did, however, also give rise to worries about the unlawful sharing of private data. Immediate long-distance communication was made possible by the telegraph. However, it also prompted concerns over the privacy of communications sent across wires. The telephone transformed communication, but it also brought out new issues related to privacy. Concerns arose around wiretapping and eavesdropping. Significant technical advances, particularly those in the area of monitoring, were made throughout the 20th century. Governments monitored communications throughout World War II using code-breaking devices, wiretaps, and other instruments. Discussions over how to strike a balance between privacy and security were spurred by these advances. The internet and computers brought about a revolution in privacy dynamics. The 1970s saw a rise in awareness of data privacy thanks to personal computers and databases. Data management is guided by the Fair Information Practices (FIPs) standards. Encryption technologies became widely used in the 1980s, giving people the ability to safeguard their digital communications. Public access to the Internet began in the 1990s. As more people engaged in internet activities, privacy worries increased. Social networking sites and mobile devices made it more difficult to distinguish between private and public information in the 2000s. Artificial intelligence, biometrics, and security cameras are examples of modern technology that nonetheless influence privacy. It is still difficult to strike a balance between individual rights and technical advancement. - **Human Rights** Human rights have a long history. Magna Carta, an English charter from the Middle Ages, guaranteed rights including protection from arbitrary arrest and due process. Individual rights, including privacy, were promoted by intellectuals such as Voltaire and John Locke during the Enlightenment (18th century). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was a historic statement that the United Nations enacted in 1948 following World War II, highlighting the importance of fundamental rights for all people. Article 12 addresses The right to privacy is acknowledged in the Universal Declaration. “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy,” according to Article 12. The European Convention on Human Rights (1950) (ECHR) has impacted privacy legislation worldwide and expressly guarantees privacy (Article 8). Article 17 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees the right to privacy. **Advancements in Technology** In our globalized society, technology has a significant impact on how we live. Innovations have completely changed how people connect, communicate, and work—from cell phones to smart cities. This quick development raises an important issue, though: how to protect privacy while upholding human rights? Technological progress gives rise to a dilemma. On the one hand, we experience never-before-seen efficiency and convenience. However, our personal information is continuously gathered, examined, and valued. There is a clear conflict between technical advancement and privacy. Tools for surveillance are used by businesses and governments to support law enforcement and national security. Although location monitoring, biometrics, and facial recognition are important tools, their careless application might violate people’s right to privacy. Policies such as the CCPA and GDPR place a strong emphasis on responsibility, transparency, and user permission. These regulations seek to achieve a balance between protecting individual rights and fostering innovation. End-to-end encryption is used by messaging apps like Signal and WhatsApp to protect conversations. Limiting communication accessibility to only those who are meant to see it, improves privacy. The Tor network routes internet traffic via many servers to allow anonymous browsing. Users’ identities are safeguarded and they are kept safe from prying eyes. Blockchain technology provides decentralized, unchangeable data storage that goes beyond money. It guarantees user control over personal data and has the potential to transform identity management. A decentralized web is envisioned by projects such as Solid. The data that users provide specific access to applications and services is still their own. Devices and safe transactions can be unlocked using fingerprint and face recognition technology. Despite its convenience, worries about abuse and privacy continue. It is essential to guarantee fairness and openness in AI systems. Bias-free models shield people from prejudice and uphold human rights. From the beginning, engineers and designers need to incorporate privacy issues. Privacy should be given priority in default settings so that consumers are empowered to make wise decisions. It is crucial to spread knowledge about privacy dangers and acceptable practices. Users with more power can demand technology that respects their privacy. **Hindrance to Human Rights** While technological advancements have made life easier than before, they also seriously jeopardize human rights. Let’s examine a few of the major obstacles: The spread of monitoring technology puts personal liberties and privacy at risk. Unauthorized data gathering, face recognition technology, and widespread monitoring all threaten our right to privacy. Governments and corporations gather enormous volumes of personal information. This data is frequently utilized for manipulation, profiling, and targeted advertising. Our autonomy is undermined by the lack of openness and control over our data. Even if AI algorithms are strong, prejudice and discrimination might still exist in them. Biassed algorithms have the potential to violate human rights in the criminal justice system, employment, and lending by escalating already-existing disparities. Not everyone has access to technology in the same way. The digital gap keeps underprivileged populations from reaping the rewards of technological advancement due to factors like geography, socioeconomic position, or educational attainment. Platforms and governments have authority over internet material. Overreach can stifle free expression and restrict access to information, even while certain limits are appropriate (such as those about hate speech). Cyber risks are evolving along with technology. Cyberattacks, identity theft, and data breaches jeopardize our security and privacy, violating our fundamental rights. Despite the enormous influence that tech corporations have, accountability measures are sometimes insufficient. It is difficult to hold these organizations accountable when infractions happen. Online anonymity is becoming less common. Because our digital footprints are traced, we are open to monitoring and possible danger. Biometric identification, DNA databases, and facial recognition all give rise to worries about possible abuse and violation of privacy. Striking a balance between privacy and security is difficult. Security precautions can occasionally infringe on people’s rights, creating moral conundrums. **National Policies** 1. **Right to Privacy** National constitutions or legal frameworks should expressly recognize the right to privacy as a basic human right. With this acknowledgment, people are guaranteed legal protection from unauthorized access to their private life. It should be illegal for governments and other organizations to conduct widespread monitoring without a valid reason. It is crucial to strike a balance between the demands of individual privacy rights and national security. To stop arbitrary surveillance, there should be legal protections in place, including warrants. - **Transparency and Accountability** Companies that gather personal information are required to be open and honest about their data policies. Users should be informed about data collection, processing, and storage through their succinct and unambiguous privacy policies. Organizations should be held responsible for data breaches. It is vital to have reporting guidelines and sanctions for improper handling of personal data. Trust between users and data controllers is strengthened by transparency. - **Biometric Data Regulation** The usage of biometric information such as DNA, fingerprints, and face recognition—for identification and verification is growing. Policies ought to balance the needs of individual privacy protection with those of technical innovation. Biometric data should be collected, stored, and used following regulations. Before having their biometric information gathered, people must give their informed consent. It is important to have explicit policies regarding the usage and security of this data. - **Cross-border data flows** Maintaining uniform privacy rules is critical when data moves across national borders. Cross-border data transfers should be covered by national policies. Sufficient security measures have to be implemented to preserve private data even during its transit outside the nation. - **Ethical use of AI and Surveillance Technologies** The ethical ramifications of surveillance technology and artificial intelligence (AI) should be addressed by policy. It is difficult yet vital to strike a balance between the demands for privacy protection and security. Privacy rights should be protected when surveillance technologies, such as CCTV cameras, are used, according to policies. It’s crucial to have explicit policies on data access, retention, and supervision. - **Collaboration with International Bodies** Participating in international organizations enables nations to work together on global privacy standards. A strong privacy framework may be established by exchanging best practices and learning from one another. Involvement in privacy standards debates helps to guarantee that national regulations follow international trends. **International Law** 1. **UN Report on Spyware and Surveillance** The United Nations (UN) has drawn attention to the risks that contemporary networked digital technologies pose to human rights and privacy. These technologies may be oppressive even if they are effective instruments for monitoring and controlling people. The necessity of effective regulation founded on international human rights legislation and norms is emphasized in the study. It concentrates on three important areas: State agencies frequently misuse spyware programs, and convert cell phones into round-the-clock monitoring apparatuses. To stop spyware from spreading, immediate action is required. This includes calling for a ban on using and selling spyware until sufficient security measures are in place. Strong encryption techniques are essential for safeguarding online human rights. States should refrain from utilizing techniques like backdoors or routine device scanning to erode encryption. Extensive monitoring is made possible by digital identification systems, biometric databases, and large-scale automated data collecting and processing. Governments are required to prevent the misuse of surveillance instruments and to notify the public about surveillance operations. - **OHCHR Reports on AI and Privacy** The wide-ranging effects of artificial intelligence (AI) on privacy and related rights have been investigated by the UN Human Rights Office (OHCHR). The papers emphasize how urgently sufficient protections must be put in place before AI technologies that pose major dangers to human rights may be sold or used. AI programs that violate international human rights legislation ought to be prohibited. **Conclusion** In conclusion, maintaining a careful balance between technology and privacy is still a major difficulty in our globally interconnected society. We must protect human rights while utilizing innovation as we traverse the digital realm. Our future course needs to be determined by frameworks of ethics, accountability, and transparency. Let’s work towards a time where privacy is fundamental to the advancement of technology, not an afterthought. **References** 1. How are today’s biggest tech trends affecting our human rights?, *available at:* https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/12/how-are-today-s-biggest-tech-trends-affecting-human-rights/ (Last Visited on April 14, 2024). 2. Technological Advancements affect the future of Human rights, *available at:* https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/carr/programs/technology-human-rights (Last Visited on April 14, 2024). 3. The Promise and Peril of Human Rights Technology, *available at:* https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge core/content/view/17A00746377B91341F684D4F28D48221/9781107179639c1\_120.pdf/the-promise-and-peril-of-human-rights-technology.pdf (Last Visited on April 14, 2024). 4. Technology and Human Rights, *available at:* https://www.openglobalrights.org/technology/ (Last Visited on April 14, 2024). 5. Introduction to International Human Rights Law, *available at:* https://humanrightsconnected.org/international-human-rights-law/ (Last Visited on April 14, 2024). 6. A Brief Primer on International Law and Cyber Space, *available at:* https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/14/brief-primer-on-international-law-and-cyberspace-pub-84763 (Last Visited on April 14, 2024). 7. International Law Handbook, *available at:* https://legal.un.org/avl/studymaterials/handbook/english/book\_1.pdf (Last Visited on April 14, 2024). 8. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, *available at:* https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights (Last Visited on April 14, 2024). 9. International Bill of Human Rights, *available at:* https://www.ohchr.org/en/what-are-human-rights/international-bill-human-rights (Last Visited on April 14, 2024). 10. Human Rights, *available at:* https://www.britannica.com/topic/human-rights (Last Visited on April 14, 2024). **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law, Human Rights --- ### [USE OF INTERPRETATION PRINCIPLES IN LANDMARK CASES SUCH AS AYODHYA JUDGMENT & OTHER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS](https://lawfoyer.in/use-of-interpretation-principles-in-landmark-cases-such-as-ayodhya-judgment-other-recent-developments/) **Published:** June 13, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## **INTRODUCTION** #### **Background on interpretation principles** In the realm of legal jurisprudence, interpretation principles play a pivotal role in guiding judges and legal scholars as they navigate complex cases and strive to uphold the rule of law. These principles serve as essential tools for deciphering the intent behind legal provisions, determining their applicability to specific situations, and arriving at just and equitable decisions. The significance of interpretation principles cannot be overstated, as they form the bedrock upon which landmark judgments are built and shape the evolution of legal systems across the globe. At its core, the process of legal interpretation involves a meticulous examination of the language employed in legal texts, be it constitutions, statutes, or judicial precedents. The primary objective is to ascertain the true meaning and purpose behind these provisions, taking into account the historical context, societal norms, and the overarching goals of the legal system. Interpretation principles provide a structured framework for this analysis, ensuring that judges approach cases with consistency, objectivity, and a commitment to fairness. One of the fundamental interpretation principles is the literal rule, also known as the plain meaning rule. This principle dictates that when the language of a legal provision is clear and unambiguous, it should be interpreted according to its ordinary and natural meaning. The literal rule serves as a starting point for interpretation, promoting certainty and predictability in the application of the law. However, it is important to recognize that language is not always straightforward, and there may be instances where a strict literal interpretation leads to absurd or unjust results. To address such situations, judges often rely on the golden rule of interpretation. This principle allows for a departure from the literal meaning when it would lead to an absurdity or manifest injustice. The golden rule enables judges to consider the context and purpose of the legal provision, ensuring that the interpretation aligns with the underlying intent of the lawmakers. By applying this principle judiciously, courts can prevent the mechanical application of the law and instead strive for a more nuanced and equitable approach. Another crucial interpretation principle is the mischief rule, which focuses on identifying the mischief or defect that the legal provision aims to remedy. This principle requires judges to examine the historical background and the circumstances that led to the enactment of the law. By understanding the mischief that the law seeks to address, courts can interpret the provision in a manner that effectively tackles the identified problem. The mischief rule ensures that the interpretation of the law remains faithful to its original purpose and prevents loopholes or unintended consequences. The purposive approach to interpretation goes beyond the literal meaning of the words and delves into the broader objectives and values that the legal system seeks to promote. This principle recognizes that the law is not merely a collection of rules but an instrument for achieving social, economic, and political goals. Judges applying the purposive approach consider the spirit and intention behind the law, striving to interpret it in a way that advances the underlying objectives. This approach allows for a more dynamic and adaptive interpretation of the law, ensuring that it remains relevant and responsive to the evolving needs of society. In recent years, the application of interpretation principles has been at the forefront of several landmark cases in India. The [Ayodhya judgment](https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2010/36350/36350_2010_1_1502_18205_Judgement_09-Nov-2019.pdf "Ayodhya judgment"), for instance, required the Supreme Court to navigate complex historical, religious, and legal issues. The court relied on various interpretation principles to determine the ownership of the disputed land, considering evidence, testimonies, and the principles of justice, equity, and good conscience. Similarly, in the case of the abolition of Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, which criminalized consensual same-sex relationships, the court employed a purposive interpretation to uphold the fundamental rights of the LGBTQ+ community. By looking beyond the literal meaning of the provision and considering the evolving societal values and constitutional principles, the court struck down the discriminatory law. These examples underscore the crucial role that interpretation principles play in shaping the outcomes of landmark cases. They demonstrate how judges, armed with these principles, can navigate complex legal terrain, balance competing interests, and arrive at decisions that uphold the values of justice, equality, and human rights. As legal systems continue to evolve and face new challenges, the application of interpretation principles will remain indispensable in ensuring that the law remains a living, breathing entity that responds to the needs and aspirations of the society it serves. - **Significance of landmark cases in Indian law** Landmark judgments hold immense significance in the Indian legal system, as they serve as guiding beacons for interpreting and applying the law in subsequent cases. These judgments carry the weight of precedent, shaping the course of jurisprudence and influencing the trajectory of legal discourse. The impact of landmark cases transcends mere legal technicalities; they often reflect societal values, address pressing issues, and catalyze societal transformations. One such landmark case that has etched its name in the annals of Indian legal history is the Ayodhya judgment. This long-standing dispute, centered around the Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid site, had been a contentious and emotive issue for decades. The Supreme Court’s verdict in this case was not only a resolution of a property dispute but also a testament to the judicial system’s ability to navigate complex issues with sensitivity and impartiality. The judgment’s impact extended beyond the legal realm, as it sought to promote communal harmony and uphold the principle of secularism enshrined in the Indian Constitution. Another seminal case that redefined the boundaries of individual liberty and rights is the decriminalization of consensual same-sex relationships. The Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in [***Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India***](https://lawfoyer.in/navtej-singh-johar-vs-union-of-india/ "Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India") struck down Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, which had criminalized homosexuality. This decision marked a watershed moment in the struggle for LGBTQ+ rights in India, recognizing the fundamental right to privacy, dignity, and equality. The Court’s interpretation of constitutional principles and its progressive stance on individual autonomy have paved the way for a more inclusive and tolerant society. Beyond these well-known cases, the Indian judiciary has delivered numerous other landmark judgments that have shaped the legal landscape. [The Vishakha Guidelines](https://lawfoyer.in/vishaka-ors-vs-state/ "The Vishakha Guidelines"), for instance, laid the foundation for addressing sexual harassment in the workplace, establishing a comprehensive framework for prevention, redressal, and deterrence. This judgment not only filled a legislative vacuum but also demonstrated the judiciary’s proactive role in addressing societal issues. Landmark cases often involve the interpretation and application of constitutional principles, statutory provisions, and legal doctrines. The principles of interpretation employed by the judiciary in these cases hold immense significance, as they guide the interpretation and implementation of laws. For example, the Ayodhya judgment drew upon the principles of constitutional secularism, the doctrine of essential religious practices, and the concept of a “non-retrogressive” interpretation of religious freedom. The abolition of Section 377, on the other hand, hinged on the interpretation of fundamental rights, such as the right to equality, privacy, and dignity, as enshrined in the Indian Constitution. The Court’s reliance on the principles of substantive equality, non-discrimination, and the “transformative” interpretation of constitutional rights paved the way for this landmark decision. Furthermore, landmark cases serve as catalysts for legal reforms and policy changes. The Vishakha Guidelines prompted the enactment of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, demonstrating the judiciary’s ability to influence legislative action. Similarly, the decriminalization of same-sex relationships has opened the door for further discussions and reforms related to LGBTQ+ rights, such as the recognition of same-sex marriages and adoption rights. ## **AYODHYA JUDGMENT** #### **Overview of the case** The Ayodhya Judgment, delivered by the Supreme Court of India on November 9, 2019, marked the culmination of a decades-long legal battle and a watershed moment in the country’s history. This landmark case, which centered around the disputed Ramjanmabhoomi-Babri Masjid site in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, had been a contentious and emotive issue, deeply rooted in the nation’s socio-political fabric. At the heart of the dispute lay the question of ownership and possession of the disputed site, which held immense religious significance for both Hindus and Muslims. The former believed it to be the birthplace of Lord Ram, while the latter asserted that the Babri Masjid, a 16th-century mosque, stood on the site until its demolition in 1992, an event that ignited widespread communal tensions across the country. The legal battle over the disputed site had been a long and arduous journey, spanning multiple forums and courts. In 2010, the Allahabad High Court had attempted to resolve the dispute by partitioning the land among the Hindu and Muslim parties. However, this judgment was appealed in the Supreme Court, setting the stage for the historic Ayodhya Judgment. In a unanimous decision delivered by a five-judge constitutional bench, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Hindu parties, paving the way for the construction of a Ram temple on the disputed site. The Court based its decision on the findings of the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI), which had identified the remains of a Hindu structure beneath the demolished Babri Masjid. However, the judgment went beyond the mere resolution of a property dispute. It delved into the intricate interplay between law, religion, and history, addressing complex issues of constitutional secularism, the doctrine of essential religious practices, and the concept of a “non-retrogressive” interpretation of religious freedom. The Court’s interpretation of the principle of constitutional secularism was particularly noteworthy. It emphasized that secularism is not an anti-thesis to religious practice but rather a means to protect and nurture the rich diversity of faith in India. The Court recognized that the State’s duty of neutrality towards religion does not preclude it from taking steps to protect and promote the fundamental right to profess, practice, and propagate religion. Furthermore, the judgment grappled with the contentious issue of the doctrine of essential religious practices, which had been a cornerstone of the Court’s jurisprudence in matters of religious freedom. While acknowledging the significance of this doctrine, the Court adopted a nuanced approach, recognizing that the determination of what constitutes an essential religious practice is a complex and context-specific exercise. Perhaps one of the most significant aspects of the Ayodhya Judgment was the Court’s emphasis on the principle of a “non-retrogressive” interpretation of religious freedom. This principle advocates for a progressive and inclusive interpretation of religious rights, ensuring that they evolve with the changing needs and aspirations of society. The Court’s recognition of this principle marked a departure from a narrow and static understanding of religious freedom, paving the way for a more dynamic and responsive jurisprudence. Beyond the legal intricacies, the Ayodhya Judgment carried immense symbolic weight, representing the judiciary’s ability to navigate complex and emotionally charged issues with sensitivity and impartiality. The Court’s decision sought to promote communal harmony and national unity, acknowledging the need for healing and reconciliation in the aftermath of the long-standing dispute. While the judgment brought closure to the legal battle, it also acknowledged the pain and suffering endured by both communities throughout the protracted conflict. In a remarkable display of empathy and wisdom, the Court directed the acquisition of an alternate site for the construction of a mosque, recognizing the religious sentiments of the Muslim community. The Ayodhya Judgment stands as a testament to the Indian judiciary’s commitment to upholding the principles of the Constitution and the rule of law, even in the face of deeply divisive and politically charged issues. It serves as a reminder of the vital role that landmark cases play in shaping the course of jurisprudence and addressing societal challenges, often transcending the confines of mere legal discourse. - **Key issues and arguments** The Ayodhya Judgment, a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of India, grappled with a multitude of complex issues that had far-reaching implications for the country’s socio-political landscape. At the crux of this case lay the contentious dispute over the ownership and possession of the Ramjanmabhoomi-Babri Masjid site in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh. One of the central issues that the Court addressed was the question of whether the disputed site was the birthplace of Lord Ram, as claimed by the Hindu parties. This issue carried immense religious and historical significance, as it would determine the legitimacy of the claim over the site. The Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) played a pivotal role in this regard, conducting extensive excavations and presenting evidence of the existence of a Hindu structure beneath the demolished Babri Masjid. Another key issue revolved around the doctrine of essential religious practices and its application in determining the legitimacy of claims over the disputed site. The Court grappled with the intricate task of evaluating whether the belief in the birthplace of Lord Ram constituted an essential religious practice for Hindus, thereby meriting legal protection under the right to freedom of religion enshrined in the Indian Constitution. Furthermore, the Court delved into the complex interplay between the principles of constitutional secularism and the right to religious freedom. The Hindu parties argued that the construction of a Ram temple on the disputed site was a matter of religious faith and should be protected under the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion. Conversely, the Muslim parties contended that the State’s obligation to maintain secularism precluded it from favoring one religion over another in the resolution of this dispute. The Court’s interpretation of the concept of constitutional secularism was a crucial aspect of this case. The judges grappled with the question of whether secularism necessitated a strict separation between religion and state, or whether it allowed for the protection and promotion of religious practices within the bounds of the Constitution. Another significant issue that emerged during the legal proceedings was the applicability of the doctrine of adverse possession. The Muslim parties claimed that they had acquired ownership of the disputed site through continuous and uninterrupted possession for centuries, dating back to the construction of the Babri Masjid in the 16th century. In contrast, the Hindu parties argued that the concept of adverse possession could not be invoked in cases involving places of worship, as religious sentiments were inextricably tied to such sites. The Court also had to grapple with the complex task of balancing competing claims and rights, particularly in the context of a deeply divisive and emotionally charged issue. The judges had to navigate the delicate line between upholding the rule of law, respecting religious sentiments, and promoting communal harmony and national unity. Throughout the legal proceedings, both parties presented a wealth of historical evidence, including archaeological findings, textual references, and eyewitness accounts, to bolster their respective claims over the disputed site. The Court’s evaluation of this extensive body of evidence and its interpretation of historical records played a crucial role in shaping the final judgment. Moreover, the Court had to contend with the contentious issue of the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992, an event that had ignited widespread communal tensions and violence across the country. The Muslim parties argued that the demolition constituted a flagrant violation of the rule of law and should be factored into the Court’s decision-making process. In addition to these substantive issues, the Court also grappled with procedural matters, such as the admissibility of evidence, the interpretation of statutory provisions, and the application of legal principles and doctrines relevant to the case. The Ayodhya Judgment, with its intricate web of religious, historical, and legal complexities, presented the Supreme Court with an unprecedented challenge. The Court’s task was not merely to resolve a property dispute but to navigate the intricate interplay between law, religion, and history, while upholding the principles of the Constitution and promoting communal harmony in a deeply divided society. - **Interpretation principles applied** The Ayodhya Judgment, a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of India, involved the application of various interpretation principles that hold significant implications for the country’s jurisprudence. In navigating the complex legal and socio-religious issues at stake, the Court drew upon a range of interpretative tools to arrive at a reasoned and well-founded judgment. One of the key principles applied by the Court was the principle of constitutional secularism. The Court grappled with the intricate task of interpreting the concept of secularism enshrined in the Indian Constitution, recognizing that it did not necessarily mandate a strict separation between religion and state. Instead, the Court adopted a nuanced approach, emphasizing that secularism is not antithetical to religious practice but rather a means to protect and nurture the rich diversity of faith in India. The Court’s interpretation of secularism was guided by the principle of non-retrogression, which advocates for a progressive and inclusive understanding of religious rights. This principle allowed the Court to move away from a narrow and static interpretation of religious freedom, paving the way for a more dynamic and responsive jurisprudence that evolves with the changing needs and aspirations of society. Furthermore, the Court delved into the doctrine of essential religious practices, a cornerstone of its jurisprudence in matters of religious freedom. While acknowledging the significance of this doctrine, the Court adopted a context-specific approach, recognizing that the determination of what constitutes an essential religious practice is a complex exercise that requires careful consideration of the particular circumstances of each case. In evaluating the claims over the disputed site, the Court relied heavily on the principle of evidence-based decision-making. The Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) played a crucial role in this regard, providing extensive evidence through excavations and surveys of the site. The Court’s interpretation of this evidence, coupled with historical records and eyewitness accounts, formed the basis for its findings on the existence of a Hindu structure beneath the demolished Babri Masjid. The Court also applied the principle of balancing competing claims and rights, a principle that is particularly relevant in cases involving deeply divisive and emotionally charged issues. The judges had to navigate the delicate line between upholding the rule of law, respecting religious sentiments, and promoting communal harmony and national unity. In this context, the Court drew upon the principle of restorative justice, recognizing the need for healing and reconciliation in the aftermath of the long-standing dispute. This principle guided the Court’s decision to direct the acquisition of an alternate site for the construction of a mosque, acknowledging the religious sentiments of the Muslim community and seeking to foster a spirit of inclusivity and unity. The Court’s interpretation of statutory provisions and legal doctrines, such as the doctrine of adverse possession, played a crucial role in shaping the final judgment. The judges carefully examined the applicability of these legal principles to the specific circumstances of the case, ensuring that their interpretation was consistent with the overarching principles of the Constitution and the spirit of the law. Throughout the judgment, the Court emphasized the principle of upholding the rule of law and the primacy of the Constitution. The judges recognized that their role was not merely to resolve a property dispute but to navigate the intricate interplay between law, religion, and history, while upholding the principles of the Constitution and promoting communal harmony in a deeply divided society. The Court’s application of these interpretation principles was not without criticism, with some legal scholars and commentators questioning the consistency and coherence of the Court’s reasoning. Nevertheless, the Ayodhya Judgment stands as a testament to the judiciary’s commitment to interpreting and applying the law in a manner that is faithful to the Constitution and responsive to the evolving needs of society. By employing a range of interpretation principles, the Court sought to strike a delicate balance between respecting religious sentiments, upholding the rule of law, and promoting communal harmony. The judgment’s impact extends far beyond the resolution of a single dispute, as it has set precedents and shaped the trajectory of legal discourse on issues of religious freedom, secularism, and the role of the judiciary in navigating complex socio-religious conflicts. ## **OTHER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS** #### **Sabarimala Temple Entry Case** - **Overview of the case** The Sabarimala Temple Entry Case, also known as the [***Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala***](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/163639357/ "Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala"), is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of India that addressed the contentious issue of gender discrimination in religious practices. The case centered around the centuries-old tradition of the Sabarimala temple in Kerala, which prohibited women of menstruating age (between 10 and 50 years) from entering the temple premises. The controversy originated when the Indian Young Lawyers Association, a non-governmental organization, filed a petition in the Supreme Court challenging the ban on women’s entry into the Sabarimala temple. The petitioners argued that the ban violated the fundamental rights enshrined in the Indian Constitution, particularly Article 14 (right to equality), Article 15 (prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth), and Article 25 (freedom of conscience and free profession, practice, and propagation of religion). In a highly divisive and polarizing judgment delivered on September 28, 2018, a constitutional bench of the Supreme Court, by a 4:1 majority, ruled that the ban on women’s entry into the Sabarimala temple was unconstitutional and discriminatory. The majority opinion, authored by the then Chief Justice Dipak Misra, held that the exclusion of women from the temple violated their fundamental rights to equality, dignity, and freedom of religion. The majority judgment invoked the principles of substantive equality and the transformative nature of the Constitution, emphasizing that religious practices must conform to constitutional morality and the overarching principles of gender equality and non-discrimination. The court reasoned that the exclusion of women based on menstrual status was rooted in patriarchal notions and stereotypical beliefs about impurity, which violated the dignity of women and perpetuated gender discrimination. However, the lone dissenting opinion by Justice Indu Malhotra argued that the court should respect the age-old traditions and customs of the temple, as they were an integral part of the religious faith and beliefs of the devotees. Justice Malhotra expressed concerns about the judicial overreach in matters of religious practices and emphasized the need for a balanced approach that respects both constitutional rights and religious freedoms. The Sabarimala judgment sparked widespread debates and protests across the country, with supporters and opponents voicing their opinions vehemently. While some hailed the judgment as a progressive step towards gender equality and the realization of constitutional ideals, others criticized it as an infringement on religious autonomy and an encroachment on the rights of devotees to follow their faith and traditions. The implementation of the Supreme Court’s verdict faced significant challenges, with protests and violence erupting in Kerala as women attempted to enter the temple premises. The state government initially struggled to enforce the court’s order, leading to further legal battles and the involvement of various stakeholders, including religious organizations, political parties, and civil society groups. The Sabarimala case highlighted the complex interplay between constitutional rights, religious freedoms, and societal traditions in India’s diverse and pluralistic society. It sparked discussions on the boundaries of judicial intervention in religious matters, the interpretation of fundamental rights, and the delicate balance between individual liberties and collective religious practices. The case also highlighted the need for a nuanced and contextual approach to resolving such conflicts, taking into account the specific circumstances, historical contexts, and the evolving societal values and norms. The Sabarimala judgment serves as a significant precedent in the ongoing discourse on gender equality, religious autonomy, and the role of the judiciary in interpreting and upholding constitutional principles in a diverse and complex nation like India. - **Interpretation principles applied** The Sabarimala Temple Entry Case presented a complex interplay between constitutional rights, religious freedoms, and societal traditions, requiring the Supreme Court to navigate through intricate legal principles and interpretive approaches. In their landmark judgment, the majority employed several crucial interpretation principles to arrive at their conclusions, demonstrating the judiciary’s role in upholding constitutional values while respecting religious autonomy. Let us delve into the key interpretation principles applied in this landmark case. 1. **Principle of Substantive Equality and Non-Discrimination:** The majority judgment heavily relied on the principle of substantive equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 15 of the Indian Constitution. The court recognized that the prohibition on women’s entry into the Sabarimala temple based on their menstrual status perpetuated stereotypical notions of impurity and inferiority, thereby violating their fundamental right to equality and non-discrimination. The court emphasized that formal equality is not enough; true equality demands the elimination of all forms of discrimination, including those rooted in deep-seated societal beliefs and practices. 2. **Transformative Interpretation of Constitutional Rights:** The majority adopted a transformative interpretation of fundamental rights, recognizing that the Constitution is a living document that must evolve with changing societal values and norms. The court held that religious practices and traditions must conform to constitutional morality and the overarching principles of gender equality and non-discrimination. This transformative approach allowed the court to reinterpret and redefine the scope of religious freedoms in light of contemporary understandings of equality and human dignity. 3. **Harmonious Construction and Balancing of Rights:** The court sought to strike a balance between the competing rights of religious freedom and gender equality by employing the principle of harmonious construction. The majority acknowledged the importance of religious autonomy but maintained that such autonomy is not absolute and must operate within the boundaries of constitutional rights and morality. By harmonizing the rights of religious freedom and gender equality, the court aimed to uphold both sets of rights without compromising the core principles of the Constitution. 4. **Doctrine of Essential Religious Practices:** The court engaged with the doctrine of essential religious practices, which holds that the Constitution protects only those religious practices that are integral and essential to the religion in question. The majority found that the exclusion of women from the Sabarimala temple was not an essential religious practice but rather a discriminatory practice rooted in patriarchal notions and societal attitudes. 5. **Constitutional Morality and Dignity:** The majority judgment placed significant emphasis on the concept of constitutional morality, which demands that all laws, practices, and traditions conform to the overarching principles of the Constitution, including equality, liberty, and human dignity. The court recognized that the exclusion of women from the temple violated their inherent dignity and perpetuated gender-based stereotypes, which ran counter to the core values of the Constitution. 6. **Purposive Interpretation of Fundamental Rights:** The court employed a purposive interpretation of fundamental rights, focusing on the broader objectives and values enshrined in the Constitution. The majority interpreted the right to equality and the right to freedom of religion in a manner that promoted gender equality, non-discrimination, and the realization of human dignity, rather than adopting a narrow or literal interpretation. 7. **Evolutive Interpretation and Expanding Frontiers of Rights:** The majority judgment recognized that rights and freedoms must be interpreted in an evolutive manner, taking into account the changing social, cultural, and legal landscapes. The court expanded the frontiers of constitutional rights by interpreting them in light of contemporary understandings of gender equality, human dignity, and non-discrimination, thereby ensuring the continued relevance and adaptability of the Constitution. The Sabarimala Temple Entry Case demonstrated the Supreme Court’s willingness to engage in a nuanced and contextual interpretation of constitutional principles, balancing religious autonomy with fundamental rights and upholding the transformative spirit of the Indian Constitution. The application of these interpretation principles not only advanced the cause of gender equality and non-discrimination but also reinforced the judiciary’s role as the guardian of constitutional values and the protector of individual liberties in a diverse and pluralistic society. ## **ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION** The Ayodhya Judgment and the abolition of Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code stand as two landmark cases that have profoundly shaped the legal landscape of India. These cases not only resolved complex legal disputes but also grappled with intricate issues of constitutional interpretation, religious freedom, and individual liberty. The interpretation principles employed by the Supreme Court in these cases hold immense significance, as they reflect the judiciary’s approach to navigating complex socio-legal challenges and upholding the tenets of the Constitution. In the Ayodhya Judgment, the Court’s interpretation of the principle of constitutional secularism was a pivotal aspect of its reasoning. By adopting a nuanced understanding of secularism, the Court departed from a narrow, strict separation between religion and state. Instead, it emphasized that secularism is a means to protect and nurture the rich diversity of faith in India, allowing for the protection and promotion of religious practices within the bounds of the Constitution. This interpretation was guided by the principle of non-retrogression, which advocates for a progressive and inclusive interpretation of religious rights, ensuring that they evolve with the changing needs and aspirations of society. By embracing this principle, the Court signaled a shift towards a more dynamic and responsive jurisprudence, one that recognizes the fluid nature of religious practices and their importance in shaping societal values. Moreover, the Court’s application of the doctrine of essential religious practices demonstrated its willingness to engage with complex religious and cultural issues. While acknowledging the significance of this doctrine, the Court adopted a context-specific approach, recognizing that the determination of what constitutes an essential religious practice is a nuanced exercise that requires careful consideration of the particular circumstances of each case. In the case of the abolition of Section 377, the Court’s interpretation of fundamental rights, such as the right to equality, privacy, and dignity, played a pivotal role. The Court’s reliance on the principles of substantive equality and non-discrimination marked a departure from a narrow, formalistic interpretation of the right to equality. Instead, the Court embraced a transformative interpretation of constitutional rights, recognizing that true equality requires addressing systemic discrimination and societal prejudices. The Court’s emphasis on the right to privacy and dignity was particularly noteworthy, as it recognized the inherent dignity of individuals, regardless of their sexual orientation. By striking down Section 377, the Court affirmed the fundamental right of LGBTQ+ individuals to live with autonomy, free from the stigma and criminalization of their identities. Both the Ayodhya Judgment and the abolition of Section 377 demonstrated the Court’s commitment to upholding the rule of law and the primacy of the Constitution. In the Ayodhya case, the Court navigated the complex interplay between law, religion, and history, while in the Section 377 case, it addressed the tension between individual liberty and societal morality. However, the interpretation principles employed by the Court in these cases have also been subject to critique and debate. Some legal scholars and commentators have questioned the consistency and coherence of the Court’s reasoning, particularly in the Ayodhya Judgment. Critics have argued that the Court’s interpretation of constitutional secularism and the doctrine of essential religious practices may have far-reaching implications for the separation of religion and state, potentially opening the door for increased state involvement in religious matters. Similarly, the Court’s interpretation of the right to equality and non-discrimination in the Section 377 case has raised questions about the extent to which these principles should be applied in other contexts, such as the recognition of same-sex marriages or the adoption rights of LGBTQ+ individuals. Despite these criticisms, the interpretation principles employed in these landmark cases have undoubtedly shaped the trajectory of legal discourse in India. The Court’s willingness to engage with complex socio-legal issues and its commitment to upholding constitutional values have set important precedents for future cases. As Indian society continues to evolve, the role of the judiciary in interpreting and applying the law will become increasingly pivotal. The interpretation principles employed in landmark cases such as the Ayodhya Judgment and the abolition of Section 377 will serve as guideposts for future decisions, ensuring that the law remains responsive to the changing needs and aspirations of society while upholding the fundamental principles enshrined in the Constitution. ## **CONCLUSION** The Ayodhya Judgment and the abolition of Section 377 stand as pivotal moments in the legal history of India, reflecting the judiciary’s commitment to upholding the principles enshrined in the Constitution while navigating complex socio-legal challenges. These landmark cases have not only resolved long-standing disputes but have also shaped the trajectory of legal discourse and societal transformation. In the Ayodhya Judgment, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of constitutional secularism and the doctrine of essential religious practices set important precedents for the delicate balance between religious freedom and the rule of law. By embracing a nuanced understanding of secularism and a context-specific approach to essential religious practices, the Court signaled its willingness to engage with the intricate interplay between law, religion, and history. The Court’s application of the principle of non-retrogression in this case marked a departure from a narrow and static interpretation of religious rights, paving the way for a more dynamic and responsive jurisprudence that evolves with the changing needs and aspirations of society. This principle holds immense significance as India grapples with the complexities of a diverse and pluralistic society, where religious beliefs and practices are deeply interwoven with cultural identities. In the case of the abolition of Section 377, the Court’s transformative interpretation of fundamental rights, such as the right to equality, privacy, and dignity, was a resounding affirmation of individual liberty and autonomy. By striking down the draconian law that criminalized same-sex relationships, the Court recognized the inherent dignity of LGBTQ+ individuals and their right to live free from discrimination and societal prejudice. The Court’s reliance on the principles of substantive equality and non-discrimination in this case marked a departure from a narrow, formalistic interpretation of the right to equality. It recognized that true equality requires addressing systemic discrimination and societal prejudices, ensuring that marginalized communities are afforded equal protection under the law. These landmark cases have not only had a profound impact on the legal landscape but have also catalyzed societal transformations. The Ayodhya Judgment, while resolving a long-standing dispute, sought to promote communal harmony and national unity, acknowledging the need for healing and reconciliation in the aftermath of the conflict. Similarly, the decriminalization of same-sex relationships has opened the door for further discussions and reforms related to LGBTQ+ rights, such as the recognition of same-sex marriages and adoption rights. These cases have empowered marginalized communities and challenged deeply entrenched societal norms, fostering a more inclusive and tolerant society. While the interpretation principles employed by the Court in these cases have been subject to critique and debate, they have undoubtedly shaped the future of legal discourse in India. The Court’s willingness to engage with complex socio-legal issues and its commitment to upholding constitutional values have set important precedents for future cases. As Indian society continues to evolve, the role of the judiciary in interpreting and applying the law will become increasingly pivotal. The interpretation principles employed in these landmark cases will serve as guideposts for future decisions, ensuring that the law remains responsive to the changing needs and aspirations of society while upholding the fundamental principles enshrined in the Constitution. In conclusion, the use of interpretation principles in landmark cases such as the Ayodhya Judgment and the abolition of Section 377 reflects the judiciary’s commitment to navigating complex socio-legal challenges while upholding the tenets of the Constitution. These cases have not only resolved long-standing disputes but have also shaped the trajectory of legal discourse and societal transformation, catalyzing a more inclusive, tolerant, and just society. While debates and critiques may continue, these landmark cases stand as testament to the resilience of the Indian legal system and its ability to adapt and evolve in response to the changing needs and aspirations of society. As India continues on its path of progress, the interpretation principles employed in these landmark cases will serve as beacons, guiding the judiciary in its pursuit of upholding the rule of law, protecting individual liberties, and promoting the values enshrined in the Constitution. **Categories:** Articles, Interpretation of Statutes --- ### [Sakshi v. Union of India (2004)](https://lawfoyer.in/sakshi-v-union-of-india-2004/) **Published:** June 2, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ### A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The case of **Sakshi vs. Union of India** (2004) involves a writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India by Sakshi, an NGO advocating for victims of sexual abuse. The petition sought a broader interpretation of “sexual intercourse” under Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) to include various forms of penetration beyond penile/vaginal intercourse. The Supreme Court examined whether such an expanded definition could be judicially interpreted or required legislative amendment. The petition also highlighted the need for protective measures for child victims during trials. The Court acknowledged the necessity for a broader understanding but emphasized that such changes should be made by the legislature, not through judicial interpretation. The judgment led to procedural guidelines for better protection of victims in court. **Keywords**: Sexual Intercourse, Judicial Interpretation, Indian Penal Code, Child Abuse, Victim Protection ### B) CASE DETAILS **i) Judgement Cause Title**: Sakshi vs. Union of India **ii) Case Number**: Writ Petition (Crl.) 33 of 1997 **iii) Judgement Date**: 26/05/2004 **iv) Court**: Supreme Court of India **v) Quorum**: Rajendra Babu CJ & G.P. Mathur **vi) Author**: G.P. Mathur **vii) Citation**: 2004 Supp(2) SCR 723 **viii) Legal Provisions Involved**: Sections 354, 375, 376, 376A-D, 377 IPC, Article 32, 14, 15(3), 21 of the Constitution of India ### C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The case arose from a writ petition filed by Sakshi, an NGO focused on providing support for victims of sexual abuse. The organization sought a declaratory relief to broaden the definition of “rape” under Section 375 IPC to include all forms of non-consensual penetration, including penile/oral, penile/anal, finger/vaginal, finger/anal, and object/vaginal penetration. Sakshi argued that the narrow interpretation of rape under current laws failed to protect many victims, particularly children, and was inconsistent with contemporary understandings of sexual violence and international commitments. ### D) FACTS OF THE CASE Sakshi, noticing an increase in sexual violence against women and children, filed a public interest litigation (PIL) seeking a judicial declaration that various forms of penetration should be included under the definition of rape in Section 375 IPC. They highlighted that the existing trend of law enforcement was to treat non-penile/vaginal penetrative acts as lesser offenses under Sections 354 or 377 IPC. Sakshi contended that such interpretations failed to acknowledge the severe trauma experienced by victims of these forms of abuse, which could be as harmful as penile/vaginal rape. ### E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED **i) Whether the definition of “sexual intercourse” in Section 375 IPC should be expanded to include various forms of penetration.** **ii) Whether non-consensual penetrations such as penile/oral, penile/anal, finger/vaginal, finger/anal, and object/vaginal should be subsumed under Section 375 IPC.** **iii) Whether a restrictive interpretation of penetration in Section 375 defeats the legislative intent of providing adequate protection against sexual abuse.** **iv) Whether the narrow interpretation of rape violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution by denying adequate redress to victims.** **v) Whether special procedural protections should be provided to child victims of sexual abuse during trials.** ### F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Petitioner submitted that the current definition of rape under Section 375 IPC was outdated and did not reflect the contemporary understanding of sexual violence, which views rape as an act of humiliation and violation rather than merely penile/vaginal penetration. They argued that the term “sexual intercourse” was not explicitly defined in the IPC and should, therefore, be judicially interpreted to include all forms of penetration to ensure justice for all victims of sexual abuse. They also emphasized the severe psychological trauma caused by non-penile/vaginal penetrations, which deserved to be classified as rape. ### G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Respondent submitted that Sections 375 and 376 IPC had been significantly amended by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1983, providing clear definitions and stringent punishments for various sexual offenses. They contended that non-penile/vaginal penetrations were appropriately covered under Section 377 IPC as unnatural offenses, which also carried severe punishments. The Respondents argued that judicial reinterpretation of the term “sexual intercourse” was unnecessary and could lead to legal uncertainty. They maintained that any changes in the law should be made by the legislature. ### H) JUDGEMENT **a. Ratio Decidendi** The Supreme Court held that the definition of rape under Section 375 IPC could not be expanded through judicial interpretation to include all forms of penetration. It emphasized that such an interpretation would require the substitution of words, which is not permissible under the principles of statutory interpretation. The Court acknowledged the petitioner’s concerns but concluded that any change in the definition of rape should be made through legislative action rather than judicial interpretation. **b. Obiter Dicta** The Court recognized the severe trauma caused by various forms of sexual penetration and the need for broader protection under the law. It expressed hope that the legislature would take urgent steps to amend the law to address these issues comprehensively. Additionally, the Court issued procedural guidelines to protect child victims during trials, such as allowing videotaped statements, testimony via closed-circuit television, and avoiding direct confrontation with the accused. ### I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment in Sakshi vs. Union of India highlights the limitations of judicial interpretation in addressing evolving social issues. While the Supreme Court empathized with the plight of sexual abuse victims and acknowledged the need for broader legal protection, it maintained that substantial changes to criminal laws should be the domain of the legislature. This case underscores the importance of legislative reforms in ensuring comprehensive legal protection against all forms of sexual violence. ### J) REFERENCES **a. Important Cases Referred** - **State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh**, \[1996\] 2 SCC 384 - **Vishaka vs. State of Rajasthan**, \[1997\] 6 SCC 241 - **Lakshmi Kant Pandey vs. Union of India**, \[1984\] 2 SCC 244 - **S. Gopal Reddy vs. State of A.P.**, \[1996\] 4 SCC 596 - **State of Maharashtra vs. Dr. Praful B Desai**, \[2003\] 4 SCC 601 **b. Important Statutes Referred** - Indian Penal Code, Sections 354, 375, 376, 376A-D, 377 - Constitution of India, Articles 14, 15(3), 21, 32 - Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1983 - UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Articles 17(e) and 19 - UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases, Criminal Law Cases, POCSO Cases --- ### [Moser Baer Karamchari Union vs Union Of India on 2 May, 2023](https://lawfoyer.in/moser-baer-karamchari-union-vs-union-of-india-on-2may-2023/) **Published:** June 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE In the case “Moser Baer Karamchari Union Thr. President Mahesh Chand Sharma vs Union of India and Ors.,” decided on May 2, 2023, the Supreme Court of India addressed the constitutionality of Section 327(7) of the Companies Act, 2013. This provision excludes the applicability of Sections 326 and 327 of the Companies Act during liquidation under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). The petitioners argued that this exclusion was arbitrary and violated Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, as it disadvantaged workmen’s dues in liquidation proceedings. The Court examined the legislative history and rationale behind the IBC, noting its objective to create a uniform insolvency framework. It upheld Section 327(7) as constitutionally valid, emphasizing the IBC’s comprehensive approach and the balanced treatment of workmen’s dues within the liquidation process. Keywords: Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, Companies Act, workmen’s dues, liquidation, constitutionality, Supreme Court of India. ## B) CASE DETAILS i) Judgement Cause Title: Moser Baer Karamchari Union Thr. President Mahesh Chand Sharma vs Union of India and Ors. ii) Case Number: Writ Petition (C) No. 421 of 2019 iii) Judgement Date: May 2, 2023 iv) Court: Supreme Court of India v) Quorum: Justice M.R. Shah vi) Author: Justice M.R. Shah vii) Citation: \[2023\] 1 SCC 421 viii) Legal Provisions Involved: Section 327(7) of the Companies Act, 2013; Section 53 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The Moser Baer Karamchari Union, representing the workmen of Moser Baer, filed a writ petition challenging the constitutionality of Section 327(7) of the Companies Act, 2013. This provision excludes the applicability of Sections 326 and 327 in the event of liquidation under the IBC. The petitioners contended that this exclusion unfairly disadvantaged the workmen by altering the priority of their dues in liquidation proceedings, thereby violating their fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The IBC, enacted in 2016, introduced a new framework for insolvency resolution and liquidation of corporate entities. It replaced multiple earlier laws, aiming for a time-bound resolution process. The petitioners argued that the IBC’s provisions, particularly Section 53, which outlines the priority of claims, unjustly relegated workmen’s dues by ranking them pari passu with secured creditors who relinquished their security interests. They sought a declaration that Section 327(7) was unconstitutional and that workmen’s dues should be prioritized above all other claims in liquidation. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The Moser Baer Karamchari Union filed the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, seeking to strike down Section 327(7) of the Companies Act, 2013, and to exclude workmen’s dues from the purview of the IBC’s waterfall mechanism. The petitioners emphasized that under the Companies Act, 2013, workmen’s dues had higher priority, which the IBC altered. The Union of India, represented by the Additional Solicitor General, defended the legislative changes, arguing that the IBC was designed to create a uniform and efficient insolvency resolution framework. The respondent contended that the changes were made after extensive consultation and aimed at balancing the interests of all stakeholders, including workmen, creditors, and the economy at large. The Court also considered the legislative history of the Companies Act and the IBC, the reports of various committees, and the objectives behind the insolvency reforms. The judgment required a detailed analysis of whether the exclusion of Sections 326 and 327 during IBC liquidation violated constitutional guarantees and whether the prioritization mechanism under the IBC was just and reasonable. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i) Whether Section 327(7) of the Companies Act, 2013, which excludes the application of Sections 326 and 327 during liquidation under the IBC, is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. ii) Whether the IBC’s provision of pari passu treatment of workmen’s dues with secured creditors in liquidation is unconstitutional. ## F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Petitioner submitted that the exclusion of Sections 326 and 327 by Section 327(7) of the Companies Act, 2013, was arbitrary and unconstitutional. They argued that this exclusion violated Articles 14 and 21 by diminishing the priority of workmen’s dues, which previously had higher priority under the Companies Act. They contended that the IBC’s waterfall mechanism, particularly Section 53, unfairly ranked workmen’s dues on par with secured creditors who relinquished their security, undermining the workmen’s financial security and welfare. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Respondent submitted that the IBC aimed to create a comprehensive and time-bound insolvency resolution framework, balancing the interests of all stakeholders. They argued that the exclusion of Sections 326 and 327 was necessary to avoid conflicting provisions and to ensure a uniform insolvency process. They emphasized that the IBC’s provisions were designed after extensive consultation and were intended to maximize asset value and revive distressed companies, which ultimately benefited workmen as well. ## H) JUDGEMENT a. RATIO DECIDENDI The Supreme Court held that Section 327(7) of the Companies Act, 2013, was not arbitrary and did not violate Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The Court emphasized that the IBC was a comprehensive code designed to address insolvency and bankruptcy in a time-bound and efficient manner. It noted that the legislative intent behind the IBC was to balance the interests of all stakeholders, including workmen, and that the exclusion of Sections 326 and 327 was to ensure a uniform insolvency process. b. OBITER DICTA The Court observed that while the workmen’s dues were ranked pari passu with secured creditors in the IBC, this did not undermine their rights but was part of a broader objective to maximize the value of assets and ensure fair distribution among all creditors. The Court also noted that the provident fund, pension fund, and gratuity fund were excluded from the liquidation estate, thus protecting the core financial interests of workmen. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The Supreme Court’s decision upheld the constitutionality of Section 327(7) of the Companies Act, 2013, affirming that the IBC’s provisions did not violate constitutional rights. The judgment reinforced the IBC’s objective to create a uniform and balanced insolvency resolution framework. The decision highlighted the Court’s deference to legislative judgment in economic matters, recognizing the complex considerations involved in insolvency law. This ruling underscores the importance of a cohesive insolvency framework and the need to balance competing interests to achieve economic stability and growth. ## J) REFERENCES a. Important Cases Referred i) Manish Kumar vs Union of India (2021) 5 SCC 1 ii) Swiss Ribbons Private Limited and Anr. vs Union of India and Ors. (2019) 4 SCC 17 iii) Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited vs Satish Kumar Gupta and Ors. (2020) 8 SCC 531 iv) Ghanashyam Mishra and Sons Private Limited vs Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited (2021) 9 SCC 657 v) Allahabad Bank vs Canara Bank and Anr. (2000) 4 SCC 406 vi) Andhra Bank vs Official Liquidator and Anr. (2005) 5 SCC 75 b. Important Statutes Referred i) Companies Act, 2013 ii) Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 iii) Constitution of India **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases, Corporate Law Cases, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code --- ### [Meaning, Definition, Nature, Scope and Applicability of Law of Torts](https://lawfoyer.in/law-of-tort/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Jahnvi Goel, Amity University, Lucknow

Introduction

One moment you are strolling down the road and the other you unexpectedly slip into a pit left open by the Municipal Corporation. Without glancing around, you stand up quickly to cover up the embarrassment it may have caused. But what can you do? Is there anyone who could be blamed for this? I have sustained injuries so I should be more careful from the next time. However, there was a responsibility of Municipality in this situation. They were negligent in fulfilling their duty. This is what law of torts talks about and much more.

Meaning and definition of Tort

Tort defines its meaning in the word civil wrong. The word Tort means twisted or crooked. It is of French origin and is comparable to the English word wrong. It is often used to define a breach of duty amounting to a civil wrong. Some of the important definitions include Salmond’s who defined Tort as a civil wrong for which the remedy is an action for damages and which is not exclusively the breach of contract or the breach of trust or breach of merely  equitable obligation[1]. A tort becomes apparent due to an individual’s duty to others in generally which is created by one law or the other. An individual who commits a tort is known as a tortfeaser, or a wrongdoer. They are called joint tortfeaser where they are more than one. Tortuous act is their wrongdoing and they are liable to be sued jointly as well as severally. The main objective of the Law of tort is compensation of sufferer or their dependants. Deterrence of wrong doers is also another objective of the law of tort. Some other important definitions, which throw light on the nature of tort include Winfield’s who described Tort as a Tortious liability which arises from the breach of a duty primarily fixed the law,  this duty is towards the persons generally and its breach is redressible by an action for unliquidated damages. According to Clark and Lindsell, “Tort is a wrong independent of contract for which the appropriate remedy is a common law action."  In addition to, Section 2(m), the Limitation Act, 1963 states that Tort is a civil wrong which is not exclusively a breach of contract or breach of trust.

Why does Tort law exist?

Tort law serves at least three purposes. First, it facilitates compensation for injuries resulting from wrongful conduct. Second, it can deter persons from wrongful behavior that may produce harm. Third, it can provide a way of punishing people who wrongfully injure others.

Development and evolution of law of torts

Tort law evolved in three phases mainly which are the Ancient Era, the Medieval Era, and the Modern Era. Unlike England, there is less tort litigation in India, the reasons include lack of consciousness and awareness  about one’s rights and the spirit of toleration, issue of recognition of the action by courts, and, awarding of very low compensation. Hence, a number of cases of violation of legal right or injury in India like unlawful detention, injury to or the death of people due to adulterated foodstuffs, liquor, medicine, etc., loss due to power cut, noise and other pollutions, etc. are tolerated without bringing an action in a court of law or to a higher authority.

Tort existed in Hindu and Muslim law to deal with wrongful acts but it could be said that tort was formally introduced by the Crown in India. It is primarily based on the principles of equity, justice, and good conscience. The law of torts is based on the principles of ‘common law’ which is generally the English law of torts. The exercise of the law of tort is applied selectively in Indian courts keeping in mind if it suits the elements and situations of Indian society.

Justice Bhagwati in M.C Mehta v. Union of India observed that: “We have to evolve new principles and lay down new norms which will adequately deal with new problems which arise in a highly industrialized economy. We cannot allow our judicial thinking to be constructed by reference to the law as it prevails in England or for the matter of that in any foreign country. We are certainly prepared to receive light from whatever source it comes but we have to build our own jurisprudence.”

Nature of Torts

●       Tort and crime:

Initially tort had its roots in criminal procedure. There is a punitive element in some aspects of the rules on damages even today. However, tort is a kind of civil injury or wrong. The nature of the remedy provided by law differentiates civil and criminal wrongs. At times, the same wrong is capable of being made the subject of proceedings of both crime and tort. For example assault, libel, theft, negligence, conspiracy, malicious injury to property etc. in such cases the wrong doer may be penalized criminally and also compelled in a civil action to make compensation or restitution, the victim can sue the wrongdoer under civil liability or initiate criminal proceedings against the offender under criminal law. If a defamatory article about another person has been published in a newspaper, the defamatory publication will demand both criminal prosecution for libel as well as a civil action claiming damages may be taken against him. In P.Rathinam. v. Union of India (Hansaria, 1844, 1994 SCC ), the Supreme Court observed, In a way there is no distinction between crime and a tort, inasmuch as a tort harms an individual whereas a crime is supposed to harm a society. But then, a society is made of individuals. Harm to an individual is ultimately the harm to the society.

●       Tort and contract:

The definition given by P.H. Winfield clearly highlights the distinction between tort and contract. It says, Tortious liability arises from the breach of a duty primarily imposed by law; which is owed to the general public and its breach is redressible by an action for unliquidated damages. On the other hand, A contract is that species of agreement which establishes legal obligation between the parties. It is a legal relationship, the nature, content and consequence of which are determined and defined by the agreement between the parties. According to Salmond, a contract arises out of the exercise of the autonomous and voluntary legislative authority entrusted by the law to private persons to declare and define the nature of mutual rights and obligations. At the present day, the key distinction between tort and contract lies in the source of duties in the former are mainly fixed by law while in the latter they are fixed by the parties themselves. Agreement is the basis for all contractual duties and responsibilities.

●       Tort and Quasi-Contract:

Those cases where a person is held liable to another without any agreement is covered by Quasi Contract, for money or benefit received by him to which the other person is better entitled. According to the Orthodox view the judicial basis for the duties and responsibilities under a quasi contract is the existence of a hypothetical contract which is implied by law. However, the Radical view is that the duties and responsibilities in a quasi contract is sui generis and its basis is prevention of unjust enrichment.

Scope of Tort Law

The main purpose of implementing tort law was to use it as a tool to make people to follow the conduct of a reasonable prudent man and to make them respectful towards each other’s rights and obligations. In order to achieve its purpose, law of torts allows the sufferer to claim and demand compensation for the infringement of his legal right. To constitute a tort,
  1. There should be commission of wrongful act by a person;
  2. The nature of the unlawful act should be such to have a resort to legal remedy and
  3. Unliquidated damages should be the legal remedy for the unlawful act caused.
Legal Damage is an important ingredient in constituting a tort. In order to prove an action for tort, the plaintiff has to prove that there was a wrongful act, an act or omission which caused the violation of a legal right vested in the plaintiff. If there has been a violation of a legal right, the same is actionable whether the plaintiff has suffered any loss or not. This is indicated by the maxim, "Injuria sine damnum”, 'Injuria' refers to infringement of a legal right and the term 'damnum' implies substantial harm, loss or damage. The term 'sine' means without. However, if there is no violation of a legal right, no action can lie in a court despite of the loss, harm or damage to the plaintiff caused by the defendant. This is expressed by the maxim 'Damnum sine injuria’. The detailed discussion of these two maxims is as follows:
  • Injuria sine damnum:
This doctrine implies infringement or violation of a legal private right of a person even if no actual loss or damage is evident. In such a case the person whose right is infringed has a good cause of action and such infringements are generally punishable under the law. It is not necessary for him to prove any special damage. Thus, in cases of assault, battery, false imprisonment,  libel etc., the mere wrongful act is actionable without proof of special damage. The court is  bound to award to the plaintiff at least nominal damages if no actual damage is proved. Thus, this maxim provides for, (1) infringement of a legal right of a person. (2) no actual loss or damage is required to prove. (3) infringement of a private right is actionable per se. In Ashby Verses White (Holt CJ, 1703), the plaintiff was a qualified voter at a Parliamentary election, but the defendant, a returning officer, wrongfully refused to take plaintiffs vote. No loss was suffered by such refusal because the candidate for whom he wanted to vote won the election. Plaintiff succeeded in his action since there was a violation of his legal right.
  • Damnum sine injuria:
This maxim signifies an actual and substantial loss without infringement of any legal  right. In such a case no action lies. There are numerous harms of which loss takes no account and mere loss of money's worth does not by itself constitute a legal damage. There are many forms of harm of which the law takes no account, (1)Loss inflicted on individual traders by competition in trade, (2)Where the damage is done by a man acting under necessity to prevent a greater evil, (3)Damage caused by defamatory statements made on a privileged occasion, (4)Where the harm is too trivial, too indefinite or too difficult of proof, (5)Where the harm done may be of such a nature that a criminal prosecution is more  appropriate for example, in case of public nuisance or causing of death, (6)There is no right of action for damages for contempt of court. In Gloucester Grammar School Case (Hillary, 1410), The defendant, a schoolmaster, set up a rival school to that of the plaintiff. Because of the competition, the plaintiff had to reduce their fees and initiated legal proceedings demanding compensation for the financial loses incurred. Held, the plaintiff had no remedy for the loss suffered by them. Hence, the essential requirement is the violation of a legal right.

Conclusion

Thus to conclude, Tort law has made firm roots in the legal showground and it’s primary aim is to impose liability on parties responsible for the harm, to provide relief to injured parties for harms caused by others, and to serve as a deterrent against wrongful acts. Torts can also shift the burden of loss to the party who is at fault or better suited to bear the burden of loss from the injured party. It also enables citizens to seek redress for the minor and major damage caused to them. Thus, it could be said that Tort has gained much confidence among the laymen in acting as the backbone of civil justice. [1] Iyer, S. (1933). The Law of Torts. Harvard Law Review, 46, 882. Hansaria, B. (1844, 1994 SCC ). P.Rathinam vs Union Of India on 26 April, 1994. 394. Holt CJ, P. J. (1703). Ashby v White. 92 ER 126. Hillary, J. Y. (1410). GLOUCESTER GRAMMAR SCHOOL CASE. IV of 47. **Content:** **Author-Jahnvi Goel, Amity University, Lucknow** ### Introduction One moment you are strolling down the road and the other you unexpectedly slip into a pit left open by the Municipal Corporation. Without glancing around, you stand up quickly to cover up the embarrassment it may have caused. But what can you do? Is there anyone who could be blamed for this? I have sustained injuries so I should be more careful from the next time. However, there was a responsibility of Municipality in this situation. They were negligent in fulfilling their duty. This is what law of torts talks about and much more. ### **Meaning and definition of Tort** Tort defines its meaning in the word civil wrong. The word Tort means twisted or crooked. It is of French origin and is comparable to the English word wrong. It is often used to define a breach of duty amounting to a civil wrong. Some of the important definitions include Salmond’s who defined Tort as a civil wrong for which the remedy is an action for damages and which is not exclusively the breach of contract or the breach of trust or breach of merely equitable obligation[\[1\]](#_ftn1). A tort becomes apparent due to an individual’s duty to others in generally which is created by one law or the other. An individual who commits a tort is known as a tortfeaser, or a wrongdoer. They are called joint tortfeaser where they are more than one. Tortuous act is their wrongdoing and they are liable to be sued jointly as well as severally. The main objective of the Law of tort is compensation of sufferer or their dependants. Deterrence of wrong doers is also another objective of the law of tort. Some other important definitions, which throw light on the nature of tort include Winfield’s who described Tort as a Tortious liability which arises from the breach of a duty primarily fixed the law, this duty is towards the persons generally and its breach is redressible by an action for unliquidated damages. According to Clark and Lindsell, “Tort is a wrong independent of contract for which the appropriate remedy is a common law action.” In addition to, Section 2(m), the Limitation Act, 1963 states that Tort is a civil wrong which is not exclusively a breach of contract or breach of trust. ### **Why does Tort law exist?** Tort law serves at least three purposes. First, it facilitates compensation for injuries resulting from wrongful conduct. Second, it can deter persons from wrongful behavior that may produce harm. Third, it can provide a way of punishing people who wrongfully injure others. ### Development and evolution of law of torts Tort law evolved in three phases mainly which are the Ancient Era, the Medieval Era, and the Modern Era. Unlike England, there is less tort litigation in India, the reasons include lack of consciousness and awareness about one’s rights and the spirit of toleration, issue of recognition of the action by courts, and, awarding of very low compensation. Hence, a number of cases of violation of legal right or injury in India like unlawful detention, injury to or the death of people due to adulterated foodstuffs, liquor, medicine, etc., loss due to power cut, noise and other pollutions, etc. are tolerated without bringing an action in a court of law or to a higher authority. Tort existed in Hindu and Muslim law to deal with wrongful acts but it could be said that tort was formally introduced by the Crown in India. It is primarily based on the principles of equity, justice, and good conscience. The law of torts is based on the principles of ‘common law’ which is generally the English law of torts. The exercise of the law of tort is applied selectively in Indian courts keeping in mind if it suits the elements and situations of Indian society. Justice Bhagwati in *M.C Mehta v. Union of India* observed that: *“We have to evolve new principles and lay down new norms which will adequately deal with new problems which arise in a highly industrialized economy. We cannot allow our judicial thinking to be constructed by reference to the law as it prevails in England or for the matter of that in any foreign country. We are certainly prepared to receive light from whatever source it comes but we have to build our own jurisprudence.”* ### Nature of Torts #### ● Tort and crime: Initially tort had its roots in criminal procedure. There is a punitive element in some aspects of the rules on damages even today. However, tort is a kind of civil injury or wrong. The nature of the remedy provided by law differentiates civil and criminal wrongs. At times, the same wrong is capable of being made the subject of proceedings of both crime and tort. For example assault, libel, theft, negligence, conspiracy, malicious injury to property etc. in such cases the wrong doer may be penalized criminally and also compelled in a civil action to make compensation or restitution, the victim can sue the wrongdoer under civil liability or initiate criminal proceedings against the offender under criminal law. If a defamatory article about another person has been published in a newspaper, the defamatory publication will demand both criminal prosecution for libel as well as a civil action claiming damages may be taken against him. In P.Rathinam. v. Union of India (Hansaria, 1844, 1994 SCC ), the Supreme Court observed, In a way there is no distinction between crime and a tort, inasmuch as a tort harms an individual whereas a crime is supposed to harm a society. But then, a society is made of individuals. Harm to an individual is ultimately the harm to the society. ## ● Tort and contract: The definition given by P.H. Winfield clearly highlights the distinction between tort and contract. It says, Tortious liability arises from the breach of a duty primarily imposed by law; which is owed to the general public and its breach is redressible by an action for unliquidated damages. On the other hand, A contract is that species of agreement which establishes legal obligation between the parties. It is a legal relationship, the nature, content and consequence of which are determined and defined by the agreement between the parties. According to Salmond, a contract arises out of the exercise of the autonomous and voluntary legislative authority entrusted by the law to private persons to declare and define the nature of mutual rights and obligations. At the present day, the key distinction between tort and contract lies in the source of duties in the former are mainly fixed by law while in the latter they are fixed by the parties themselves. Agreement is the basis for all contractual duties and responsibilities. #### ● Tort and Quasi-Contract: Those cases where a person is held liable to another without any agreement is covered by Quasi Contract, for money or benefit received by him to which the other person is better entitled. According to the Orthodox view the judicial basis for the duties and responsibilities under a quasi contract is the existence of a hypothetical contract which is implied by law. However, the Radical view is that the duties and responsibilities in a quasi contract is sui generis and its basis is prevention of unjust enrichment. ### Scope of Tort Law The main purpose of implementing tort law was to use it as a tool to make people to follow the conduct of a reasonable prudent man and to make them respectful towards each other’s rights and obligations. In order to achieve its purpose, law of torts allows the sufferer to claim and demand compensation for the infringement of his legal right. To constitute a tort, 1. There should be commission of wrongful act by a person; 2. The nature of the unlawful act should be such to have a resort to legal remedy and 3. Unliquidated damages should be the legal remedy for the unlawful act caused. Legal Damage is an important ingredient in constituting a tort. In order to prove an action for tort, the plaintiff has to prove that there was a wrongful act, an act or omission which caused the violation of a legal right vested in the plaintiff. If there has been a violation of a legal right, the same is actionable whether the plaintiff has suffered any loss or not. This is indicated by the maxim, ***“Injuria sine damnum”, ‘Injuria’*** refers to infringement of a legal right and the term ***‘damnum’*** implies substantial harm, loss or damage. The term ***‘sine’*** means without. However, if there is no violation of a legal right, no action can lie in a court despite of the loss, harm or damage to the plaintiff caused by the defendant. This is expressed by the maxim ***‘Damnum sine injuria’****.* The detailed discussion of these two maxims is as follows: - ***Injuria sine damnum***: This doctrine implies infringement or violation of a legal private right of a person even if no actual loss or damage is evident. In such a case the person whose right is infringed has a good cause of action and such infringements are generally punishable under the law. It is not necessary for him to prove any special damage. Thus, in cases of assault, battery, false imprisonment, libel etc., the mere wrongful act is actionable without proof of special damage. The court is bound to award to the plaintiff at least nominal damages if no actual damage is proved. Thus, this maxim provides for, (1) infringement of a legal right of a person. (2) no actual loss or damage is required to prove. (3) infringement of a private right is actionable *per se.* In **Ashby Verses White** (Holt CJ, 1703), the plaintiff was a qualified voter at a Parliamentary election, but the defendant, a returning officer, wrongfully refused to take plaintiffs vote. No loss was suffered by such refusal because the candidate for whom he wanted to vote won the election. Plaintiff succeeded in his action since there was a violation of his legal right. - ***Damnum sine injuria:*** This maxim signifies an actual and substantial loss without infringement of any legal right. In such a case no action lies. There are numerous harms of which loss takes no account and mere loss of money’s worth does not by itself constitute a legal damage. There are many forms of harm of which the law takes no account, (1)Loss inflicted on individual traders by competition in trade, (2)Where the damage is done by a man acting under necessity to prevent a greater evil, (3)Damage caused by defamatory statements made on a privileged occasion, (4)Where the harm is too trivial, too indefinite or too difficult of proof, (5)Where the harm done may be of such a nature that a criminal prosecution is more appropriate for example*,* in case of public nuisance or causing of death, (6)There is no right of action for damages for contempt of court. In **Gloucester Grammar School Case** (Hillary, 1410), The defendant, a schoolmaster, set up a rival school to that of the plaintiff. Because of the competition, the plaintiff had to reduce their fees and initiated legal proceedings demanding compensation for the financial loses incurred. Held, the plaintiff had no remedy for the loss suffered by them. Hence, the essential requirement is the violation of a legal right. ### **Conclusion** Thus to conclude, Tort law has made firm roots in the legal showground and it’s primary aim is to impose liability on parties responsible for the harm, to provide relief to injured parties for harms caused by others, and to serve as a deterrent against wrongful acts. Torts can also shift the burden of loss to the party who is at fault or better suited to bear the burden of loss from the injured party. It also enables citizens to seek redress for the minor and major damage caused to them. Thus, it could be said that Tort has gained much confidence among the laymen in acting as the backbone of civil justice. [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Iyer, S. (1933). The Law of Torts. *Harvard Law Review*, 46, 882. Hansaria, B. (1844, 1994 SCC ). P.Rathinam vs Union Of India on 26 April, 1994. 394. Holt CJ, P. J. (1703). Ashby v White. 92 ER 126. Hillary, J. Y. (1410). GLOUCESTER GRAMMAR SCHOOL CASE. IV of 47. **Categories:** Articles, Law of Torts --- ### [Determination of Age under Section 15 of the Juvenile Justice Act](https://lawfoyer.in/determination-of-age-under-section-15-of-the-juvenile-justice-act/) **Published:** May 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** #### Introduction to Section 15 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, plays a critical role in determining how juveniles in conflict with the law are treated. A key aspect of this legislative framework is Section 15, which details the procedure for the preliminary assessment of juveniles aged between 16 and 18 who are accused of committing heinous offences. This assessment decides whether a juvenile should be tried as an adult, incorporating a comprehensive evaluation of both mental and physical capacity to commit such offences. #### Historical Evolution of Juvenile Legislation The evolution of juvenile justice legislation in India saw a significant turn with the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, which was later amended to the current version in 2015 following the public outcry from the Nirbhaya case in 2012. This incident notably shifted public sentiment towards harsher punishments for juveniles committing severe crimes, leading to the introduction of the provision for trying juveniles as adults under certain conditions. The legal framework was further supported by recommendations from the Justice J.S. Verma Committee and judgments like *Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Raju* which influenced the legislative amendments. #### Core Provisions of Section 15: Preliminary Assessment Section 15 stipulates a two-step process for handling cases involving juveniles accused of heinous offences: 1\) **Eligibility for Assessment**: - Only juveniles aged between 16 and 18 years are eligible. - The offence in question must be classified as a heinous offence under Section 2(33), which generally refers to crimes punishable with a minimum of 7 years imprisonment. 2\) **Assessment Procedure**: - The Juvenile Justice Board is tasked with the assessment. - The process involves determining the juvenile’s mental and physical capacity to commit the crime. - Assistance from psychologists, psycho-social workers, or other experts may be sought. #### Role and Functions of the Juvenile Justice Board The Juvenile Justice Board (JJB) plays a pivotal role under Section 15. This multidisciplinary body performs the initial assessment and decides the subsequent legal proceedings for the juvenile. The JJB’s decisions can range from counseling and community service to recommending the trial of a juvenile as an adult in severe cases. #### Judicial Interpretations and Case Law Several landmark cases have shaped the interpretation and application of Section 15: - **Barun Chandra Thakur vs. Master Bholu (2022)**: The Supreme Court emphasized that the preliminary assessment should strictly adhere to the legal procedures established, with the JJB having the sole authority to decide on the trial of juveniles as adults. - **Shilpa Mittal vs. State of NCT of Delhi (2020)**: The Supreme Court clarified that not all offences with severe penalties qualify as heinous offences unless the law explicitly states a minimum sentence of 7 years, influencing how juveniles are assessed under Section 15. - **Smt. Durga vs. State of Rajasthan (2019)**: The case highlighted issues around the application of juvenile justice laws, especially in contexts involving severe domestic conflicts leading to crime, where the juvenile’s background and circumstances were taken into consideration for their defense. #### Constitutional and Ethical Considerations The application of Section 15 raises significant constitutional and ethical issues, such as: - **Violation of Right to Equality**: Questions arise regarding the differentiation between juveniles below and above 16 years of age, challenging the principles under Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. - **Right Against Self-Incrimination**: The involvement of psychological assessments could potentially lead to self-incriminating evidence, conflicting with Article 20(3) of the Constitution which protects against self-incrimination. #### Conclusion: Balancing Justice with Juvenile Welfare The determination of age and the subsequent application of the Juvenile Justice Act require a careful balance between ensuring public safety and upholding the rights and welfare of juveniles. The law must navigate between the retributive demands of society and the reformative needs of the juvenile, ensuring that the legal responses are both just and compassionate. This complex interplay of legal standards, ethical considerations, and societal expectations continues to evolve, as seen in the recent judicial decisions and ongoing legislative discussions, ensuring that the juvenile justice system remains responsive and relevant to the needs of both juveniles and society. **Categories:** Articles, Criminal Law, Juvenile Justice Act --- ### [Introduction to the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), 1908](https://lawfoyer.in/introduction-to-the-civil-procedure-code-cpc-1908/) **Published:** April 23, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** The Civil Procedure Code (CPC) of 1908 is a comprehensive legal framework that governs the conduct of civil litigation in India. It is designed to ensure the administration of justice is both fair and efficient, adhering to the principles of natural justice. The CPC is foundational to the procedural law in India, defining how civil matters are to be filed, heard, and adjudicated in courts. ### Classification of Law: Substantive and Procedural **Substantive Law:** This branch of law determines the rights and duties of individuals and collective entities. It includes laws that define, create, or confer substantive legal rights or statuses, such as the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Substantive laws are primarily prospective in their application, laying down the legal groundwork that governs society. **Procedural Law:** Also known as Adjective Law, this area governs the mechanisms and methods through which substantive laws are enforced and administered. Unlike substantive law, procedural laws can sometimes be retrospective, although the CPC typically operates prospectively. This includes legislations like the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and the CPC itself. Procedural laws are essential as they provide the “machinery” for the enforcement of rights. ### Overview of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 **Enactment and Amendments:** The CPC was enacted on January 1, 1909, and has been amended several times, notably by the Amendment Acts of 1976, 1999, and 2002, to improve efficiency and adapt to contemporary needs. **Purpose of the CPC:** The main objectives of the CPC are to ensure a fair trial in accordance with the principles of natural justice, to expedite the process of justice, to simplify the procedure, and to make justice accessible to all, irrespective of socio-economic status. ### Major Reforms in CPC **Justice Malimath Committee’s Recommendations:** The amendments in 1999 and 2002 were largely influenced by this committee, which proposed several key changes: - Time limits for various stages of litigation, such as for summons, written statements, and judgments. - Inclusion of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms under Section 89 to encourage settlements out of court. - Limitation on the number of adjournments to avoid unnecessary delays. - Provisions for recording of evidence by commissioners and the filing of written arguments. These reforms aimed to streamline procedures and reduce the backlog of cases. ### Key Provisions and Stages of Civil Litigation Under the CPC **Jurisdiction:** Defined under various sections, jurisdiction refers to the legal authority of a court to hear and decide cases. This is classified into subject-matter, territorial, and pecuniary jurisdictions, which determine which court has the authority to hear a case. **Stages of a Civil Suit:** 1. **Filing of Plaint:** The process begins with the plaint, where the plaintiff states the facts and claims against the defendant. 2. **Written Statement by Defendant:** The defendant responds to the plaint by filing a written statement. 3. **Framing of Issues:** The court identifies the issues to be addressed during the trial. 4. **Trial Process:** Involves the presentation and examination of evidence. 5. **Judgment and Decree:** Concludes with the court delivering a judgment and issuing a decree based on the findings. ### Stages of a Civil Suit Under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 The following is a detailed list of the stages in a civil lawsuit under the CPC, including the relevant sections, orders, and rules that govern each stage: **Filing of Plaint** - **Section 26**: Institution of suits. - **Order 7**: Pertains to the specifics of what should be included in a plaint. **Written Statement by Defendant** - **Order 8**: Governs the filing of the written statement, set-off, and counter-claims. **Framing of Issues** - **Order 14**: Relates to the settling of issues and determination of the suit on issues of law or on issues agreed upon by the parties. **Discovery and Inspection** - **Order 11**: Deals with discovery and inspection of documents and other material objects relevant to the lawsuit. **Admission** - **Order 12**: Provides for the admission of facts, simplifying the trial by establishing certain ground truths that need not be argued. **Production, Impounding and Return of Documents** - **Order 13**: Concerns the handling of documents during the trial, including their submission, safekeeping, and eventual return. **Examination of Parties by the Court** - **Order 10**: Pertains to the court’s authority to orally examine parties to ascertain the truth or clarify matters relevant to the case. **Hearing of the Suit and Oral Arguments** - **Order 18**: Regulates the hearing of the suit and the procedure for submission of oral arguments. **Recording of Evidence** - **Section 33** and **Order 18**: Govern the recording of evidence when the examination of witnesses occurs. **Judgment** - **Section 33**: Discusses the court’s obligation to pronounce judgment. - **Order 20**: Details the procedure for the pronouncement of judgment. **Decree** - **Section 2(2)**: Defines what constitutes a decree. - **Section 33** and **Order 20**: These sections and order also encompass the issuance of the decree following the judgment. **Execution of Decree** - **Sections 36 to 74**: Outline the procedures for the execution of decrees. - **Order 21**: Provides detailed rules on the execution process, including attachment and auction of property, and arrest and detention in civil prison. **Appeal** - **Sections 96 to 112**: Set out the laws regarding appeals to higher courts. - **Order 41**: Provides the procedure for filing appeals, including what should be contained in the appeal, how it should be presented, and how the courts will handle it. **Review** - **Section 114** and **Order 47**: Deal with the application for review of judgment by the same court that issued the original judgment. **Revision** - **Section 115**: Provides for the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court over the decrees and orders of subordinate courts. **Reference** - **Section 113** and **Order 46**: Regulate the procedure when a court feels that a case involves a question of law concerning the interpretation of the constitution, requiring it to refer the question to a higher court. Each of these stages is crucial for the proper functioning of civil proceedings, ensuring that every aspect of a case is thoroughly considered and adjudicated upon based on legal principles and evidence. ### Comparative Legal Framework Comparing the CPC with procedural laws in other jurisdictions, such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the United States or the Civil Procedure Rules in the United Kingdom, highlights its unique blend of detailed procedural guidance and flexibility. This flexibility is crucial in allowing the courts to interpret and apply the law in a manner that promotes justice. ### Judicial Interpretations and Case Laws Significant case laws that have shaped the interpretation of the CPC include: - **Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal**: Emphasized that procedural laws should not be a hindrance to justice but should aid its realization. - **Saiyad Mohd. v. Abdul Habib**: Highlighted that procedural laws should be interpreted flexibly to prevent miscarriages of justice. ### Future Directions and Reforms The evolution of the CPC continues as the legal system confronts new challenges such as the integration of technology in judicial processes. The move towards digital courts and online procedures could significantly impact the efficiency and accessibility of civil justice. ### Conclusion The Civil Procedure Code, 1908, is more than just a set of procedural rules; it is a dynamic framework that adapts to the legal, social, and technological changes in society. Its purpose is not only to govern the conduct of civil litigation but also to ensure that justice is delivered in an efficient, effective, and equitable manner. As legal reforms continue to evolve, the CPC remains central to the administration of civil law in India, reflecting the balance between procedural detail and the overarching goal of justice. **Categories:** Articles, Civil Procedure Law --- ### [Hearing of Suit under CPC](https://lawfoyer.in/hearing-of-suit-under-cpc/) **Published:** May 22, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## Right to Begin (Order 18 Rule 1) ### Explanation and Scope The plaintiff typically has the right to begin unless the defendant admits the facts alleged by the plaintiff and argues that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief based on legal points or additional facts. In such scenarios, the defendant may start first. The determination of the right to begin relies on the rules of evidence. Generally, the party bearing the burden of proof starts. For instance, in **Mirza Niamat Baig v. Sk. Abdul Sayeed, 2009(1) CCC 75 (Ori.)**, it was held that since the plaintiff raised allegations of fraud, he had to begin first as per Order 18, Rule 1 of CPC. In another case, **Associate Auto Agencies Automobiles Dealers and Engineers v. M/s. Chhotabhai Jithabhai and Co., 1993(2) C.C.C. 175 (M.P.)**, the defendant had to prove the delivery of a car after admitting the plaintiff’s payment, thereby bearing the burden of proof and leading evidence first. This rule ensures fairness in the trial process by aligning the presentation of evidence with the party who needs to substantiate their claims or defenses. ## Statement and Production of Evidence (Order 18 Rule 2) ### Procedure On the hearing day, the party with the right to begin must state their case and produce supporting evidence for the issues they are required to prove. The opposing party will then state their case and present any evidence they have, followed by a general address to the court on the entire case. The initial party can then reply generally on the whole case. Oral arguments may be supplemented with written arguments if permitted by the court, forming part of the record, as seen in **Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3353**. ### Scope and Importance The procedure ensures systematic and orderly presentation of cases, enabling the court to comprehensively understand each party’s stance. Dismissal of a suit due to a plaintiff’s failure to produce evidence after multiple opportunities, as in **Manohar Lal Ahuja v. Nand Lal Ahuja, AIR 2008 (NOC) 347 (Del.)**, underscores the importance of adherence to these rules. ## Party to Appear Before Other Witnesses (Order 18 Rule 3A) If a party wishes to appear as a witness, they must do so before examining other witnesses unless the court allows otherwise for recorded reasons. This rule ensures the witness’s credibility and immediate relevance of their testimony. ## Recording of Evidence (Order 18 Rule 4) ### Examination-in-Chief and Cross-Examination Examination-in-chief must be on affidavit, with copies provided to the opposing party. Cross-examination and re-examination are conducted by the court or a commissioner appointed for the task. The commissioner’s recorded evidence, including remarks on witness demeanor, forms part of the suit’s record. For instance, the validity and applicability of Order 18, Rule 4 were upheld in **Salem Advocate Bar Association’s case**. ### Scope and Interpretation Order 18, Rule 4(2) allows discretion for evidence recording by a commissioner, maintaining the right of cross-examination and ensuring the trial’s integrity. Complex cases may prompt courts to record cross-examinations themselves to observe witness demeanor directly, as discussed in **Harish Vithal Kulkarni v. Pradeep Mahadev Sabnis, AIR 2010 Bom.178 (Full Bench)**. The rule mandates that cross-examinations must occur, but it is the court’s discretion whether they happen before the court or a commissioner. ## Production of Documents with Affidavit (Order 18 Rule 4(1)) Parties can produce documents with their affidavits, but the court must decide on their admissibility before they are exhibited as evidence, preventing postponement of such decisions until case disposal. This principle was emphasized in **Durga Shankar S. Trivedi v. Babubani Bhulabhai Parekh, AIR 2003 Bom. 487**. ## Video Conferencing and Electronic Recording Evidence can be recorded through video conferencing, and audio-visual recordings can form part of the record. This modern approach aligns with efficient case management, reducing delays and logistical constraints. This was supported in **Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India, 2002(8) Supreme 55**. ## Commissioner’s Power and Role A commissioner can record objections during evidence collection but cannot declare a witness hostile. The court retains this discretion under Section 154 of the Evidence Act. If required, parties must obtain the court’s permission to treat a witness as hostile. This distinction ensures judicial control over critical aspects of witness examination, as clarified in **Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3353**. ## Applicants’ Appearance in Court Applicants filing affidavits must appear in court to testify. Affidavits without the witness’s presence in the witness box do not constitute evidence, as noted in **F.D.C. Ltd v. Federation of Medical Representatives Association India (FMRAI), AIR 2003 Bombay 371**. The Supreme Court confirmed this in **Ameer Trading Corporation v. Shapoorji Data Processing Ltd. (2004) 1 SCC 702**. ## Remarks on Witness Demeanor (Order 18 Rule 12) The court can record material remarks about a witness’s demeanor during examination. This practice aids in evaluating witness credibility and overall evidence reliability. ## Immediate Examination of Witnesses (Order 18 Rule 16) If a witness is about to leave the court’s jurisdiction or for other sufficient reasons, the court may immediately take their evidence. Such urgency was justified in **Samuel H. Joseph & Ors. v. Dr. Johan C. Taylor, 1991(1) CCC 595**, where the plaintiff’s imminent departure warranted immediate testimony. ## Court’s Power to Recall and Examine Witness (Order 18 Rule 17) The court can recall any witness at any stage to clarify issues or doubts. This power, primarily for judicial clarification, was underscored in **K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palaanisamy, 2011 (2) CCC 28 (SC)**. However, it does not extend to further examination or introducing new evidence. ## Issuing Commission to Examine Witness (Order 26 Rule 1) Courts can issue commissions for examining witnesses unable to attend due to sickness or other infirmities. Advanced age can also be a valid reason for this provision, as recognized in **Om Prakash Kajaria v. Circular Investment Trust Ltd., AIR 2009 Cal. 66**. The court must monitor the commission’s proceedings to prevent delays and ensure efficient evidence collection, as highlighted in **M/s Fashion Linkers & Ors. v. Mrs. Savitri Devi & Anr., 1995 (3) CCC 604 (Del.)**. These procedural rules under the CPC aim to streamline the hearing process, ensure fair presentation of evidence, and maintain judicial efficiency while safeguarding the rights of the parties involved. ## Key Cases Referred / Cited 1. Mirza Niamat Baig v. Sk. Abdul Sayeed, 2009(1) CCC 75 (Ori.) 2. Associate Auto Agencies Automobiles Dealers and Engineers v. M/s. Chhotabhai Jithabhai and Co., 1993(2) C.C.C. 175 (M.P.) 3. Manohar Lal Ahuja v. Nand Lal Ahuja, AIR 2008 (NOC) 347 (Del.) 4. Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3353 5. Harish Vithal Kulkarni v. Pradeep Mahadev Sabnis, AIR 2010 Bom.178 (Full Bench) 6. Durga Shankar S. Trivedi v. Babubani Bhulabhai Parekh, AIR 2003 Bom. 487 7. Samuel H. Joseph & Ors. v. Dr. Johan C. Taylor, 1991(1) C.C.C. 595 8. K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palaanisamy, 2011 (2) CCC 28 (SC) 9. Akash v. Gian Singh, AIR 2010 H.P. 93 10. Om Prakash Kajaria v. Circular Investment Trust Ltd., AIR 2009 Cal. 66 11. M/s Fashion Linkers & Ors. v. Mrs. Savitri Devi & Anr., 1995 (3) CCC 604 (Del.) **Categories:** Articles, Civil Procedure Law --- ### [Warrant Trials under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973](https://lawfoyer.in/warrant-trials-under-the-criminal-procedure-code-1973/) **Published:** May 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ### Meaning of Warrant Trials Warrant trials in India are governed by Sections 238 to 250 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), 1973. These trials deal with more serious offences compared to summons cases, involving crimes punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for a term exceeding two years. The fundamental distinction between warrant and summons cases lies in the severity of punishments involved, affecting the procedural intricacies of each trial type. ### Initiation of Warrant Trials A warrant trial typically commences upon the registration of a First Information Report (FIR) at a police station or directly through a complaint to a magistrate. These trials are categorized based on how they are instituted: either on a police report (Section 173, CrPC) or otherwise. The process varies slightly depending on the initiation mechanism but fundamentally follows a structured sequence to ensure justice. #### Trials Instituted on a Police Report 1. **Initial Steps and Supply of Copies**: Following the FIR, the police investigate and submit a charge sheet to the magistrate (Section 207, CrPC). The accused must be furnished with all documents including the police report, to prepare a defense. 2. **Discharge of Accused**: If the magistrate finds the charges baseless after reviewing the initial evidence and hearing the parties, the accused may be discharged under Section 239. 3. **Framing of Charge**: If there is sufficient ground, a formal charge is framed against the accused (Section 240). The charge is then read and explained to the accused. 4. **Conviction on Plea of Guilty**: If the accused pleads guilty, the magistrate may convict them immediately (Section 241). #### Presentation and Recording of Evidence - **Prosecution’s Evidence**: The prosecution presents its evidence first, calling witnesses and submitting other evidentiary materials (Section 242). The magistrate records all evidence deemed relevant. - **Defense’s Evidence**: After the prosecution, the defense has the opportunity to present its evidence and witnesses (Section 243). #### Judgment - Following the presentation of evidence from both sides, the magistrate passes a judgment of either acquittal or conviction based on the evidence and its legal scrutiny. ### Trials Instituted Otherwise than on a Police Report 1. **Preliminary Hearing and Discharge**: Similar initial steps are followed where the magistrate conducts a preliminary hearing. If the accusations appear groundless, the accused can be discharged (Sections 245 to 247). 2. **Framing of Charge and Further Proceedings**: If not discharged, the charge is framed and the trial proceeds similarly to police report cases, with evidence presentation and eventual judgment. ### Key Legal Principles and Cases - **Case Law**: The principles laid out in cases such as *State vs Sitaram Dayaram Kachhi (1957)* and *State of Himachal Pradesh vs Krishan Lal Pradhan (1987)* illustrate the courts’ approach to discharging an accused and the importance of prima facie evidence in framing charges. - **Importance of Section 243 and 244, CrPC**: These sections underline the procedural fairness provided to the accused in presenting their defense effectively. ### Procedural Nuances - **Evidence Management**: The magistrates’ role in examining and recording evidence is crucial. This involves a careful balancing of the testimonies, documentary evidence, and legal requirements to ensure a fair trial. - **Judicial Discretion in Conviction and Sentencing**: The magistrate’s discretion in recording a guilty plea or in deciding on a conviction post-trial highlights the personalized nature of legal judgments, factoring in the specifics of each case. ### Conclusion Warrant trials under the CrPC, 1973, serve a critical function in the Indian judicial system by addressing serious offences through a comprehensive procedural framework. The emphasis on detailed evidence presentation, judicial discretion in discharge and conviction, and the rights of the accused to a fair defense, all contribute to the overarching goal of justice. **Categories:** Articles, Criminal Procedure Law --- ### [Ilavarasan v. State](https://lawfoyer.in/ilavarasan-v-state/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** By – **Peuli Chakraborty** (**The University of Burdwan, West Bengal**) **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** This case, Ilavarasan v. State, was dealt by the Supreme Court of India. The appellant, Ilavarasan, claimed that his wife, Mathithra, had been taken away by her parents and compelled to get married to her maternal uncle, which was against her will. He initially filed a petition before the High Court, stating that he got married to her, in compliance with section 7A of the Hindu Marriage Act. The High Court straightforwardly set aside the habeas corpus petition, stating the legitimacy of sec 7A of Hindu Marriage Act, in terms of certifying the marriage by the advocates. He then appealed to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court consequently directed the District Legal Service Authority, for the recording of the statement of Mathithra. Mathithra revealed that she married Ilavarasan, aggreably. The Apex Court then interpreted sec 7A of the HMA, and held that the public declaration isn’t at all essential for the solemnization of a legitimate marriage. The Court concluded the willingness of Mathithra, pertaining to living with Ilavarasan and ensured their reconciliation. ***Keywords*** – ***Ilavarasan, Supreme Court, The Writ of Habeas Corpus, The Hindu Marriage Act, Sec 7*A.** **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***Ilavarasan v. The Superintendent Of Police & Ors.*Case Number***Cr. Appeal No. 6534 of 2023*Judgement Date***August 28,2023*Court***The Supreme Court of India*Quorum***Aravind Kumar, S. Ravindra Bhat*Author***S. Ravindra Bhat*Citation***SC 1120*Legal Provisions Involved***The Writ of Habeas Corpus, Article 21 ( Right to Privacy), Sec 7A of HMA,1955.**NTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** Marriage is a consecrate fastening, instituted between a man and a woman, called husband and wife ( AKA Spouses). The Husband and Wife are promise bound, with the help of marriage, to carry out and honour this relationship, physically, mentally as well as socially. In accordance with Hindu Law, marriage is a sacred or consecrate ritual, to be taken into account, where both the bride and the groom performs SAPTAPADI ( a ritual, pertaining to taking up seven steps before the sacred fire, by the bridegroom) and subsequently they turn out be spouses and the marriage is solemnised**.** In accordance with the Hindu Law, bride is required to be at the eighteen years of age and the groom is required to be at twenty one years of age, while marrying each other. Apart from this, for the solemnization of an effective marriage, both the parties must have displayed their free consent. However, if one parties were compelled getting married or could not demonstrate his/her consent due to mental illness or unsoundness of mind, then the marriage shall be voidable, at the option of such party. The issue raised, in this specific case law, was with regard to the validity of the solemnization of marriage.The Apex Court held that the public declaration is not required for the solemnization of a valid marriage. **FACTS OF THE CASE** In this case, the appellant, named Ilavarasan, had filed a habeas corpus writ petition, under Art. 226, before the Madras High Court and had alleged that he married Mathithra ( his legally wedded wife), a 21 – year- old lady, in compliance with sec 7A of the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955. The marriage was solemnized in the presence of advocates and the other social workers. As per his statements and allegations, his wife Mathithra had been confined forcefully by her parents, despite their legitimate marriage, which had been solemnized, in compliance with sec 7-A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The petitioner included that he and Mathithra fell in love with each other and were determined of getting married. However his ladylove, was a minor by that time ( when they fell in love) and due to which, both of them was determined to get married later on. However, her parents, in this time period, went for a child marriage and compelled her to get married to her maternal uncle. She opposed and declined getting married to him and emphasized her feelings for Ilavarasan. She then abandoned her maternal house with the intent to live with her paramour. Subsequently, both the petitioner and Mathithra got married discreetly, in the presence of Advocates and other social workers employed at the Trade Union. They complied with sec 7-A of the Hindu Marriage Act, which exerted the performance of their licit marriage. Despite the solemnization of their legitimate marriage, Mathithra had once again been taken back by her parents and the petitioner filed a writ petition consequently, praying for her prompt release. This writ petition was discarded by Madras High Court, stating their incapacity to get rendered with certifying marriages under sec 7-A of the Hindu Marriage Act. Consequently the petitioner moved to the Apex Court filing the current appeal. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** - Whether a marriage, that has been taken place in secrecy, without a public declaration, is valid or not, in the eye of law? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS ( Before the Madras High Court)** The learned counsel, **Mr. R. Alagumani** contented on behalf of the petitioner before the Madras High Court, that, the detenue opposed to the child marriage, initiated earlier, by her parents and she let her parents know about her philanderer by emphasizing her willingness to live with him. She then joined her philanderer and a special marriage, between them, took place in secrecy, in the presence of the advocates and certain social workers. The marriage was solemnised in accordance with sec 7-A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, which was legitimate in the eye of law. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS ( Before the Madras High Court)** The additional public prosecutor contended on the behalf of the respondents by submitting that, the petitioner kidnapped Mathithra twice and had already been alleged for the same beforehand. The counsel for respondents further added that in order to dissimulate his kidnapping, he filed a writ petition displaying his fake love towards Mathithra, which he actually pretended. The counsel contented that the petitioner harassed both Mathithra and her parents by filing the habeas corpus petition. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** **The Constitution of India** **1. The Writ of Habeas Corpus –** *“The “Great Writ” of habeas corpus is a fundamental right in the Constitution that protects against unlawful and indefinite imprisonment. Translated from Latin it means “show me the body.” Habeas corpus has historically been an important instrument to safeguard individual freedom against arbitrary executive power”.* **2.** **The Right against Infringement of Privacy –** *“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to a procedure established by law.”* Right against the abasement of privacy, is intrinsic to Right to Life and Personal Liberty and is inherently shielded under Art. 21 of the Indian Constitution. **The Hindu Law** **1. Sec 7A of the Hindu Marriage Act –** *“This special provision legalised self-respect and secular marriages between two Hindus who meet the minimum age requirement for marriage”* **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio decidendi or the rationale or legal principle, as delivered by the Court, emphasizes that, for the solemnization of a valid and lawful marriage, under the Hindu Marriage Act ( sec 7A) 1955, a public declaration or dissemination is not required. The Court, afterwards held that, the couples’, who are getting married, might get confronted with certain hazards and family pressures, on account of the solemnization of the marriage, wherefore, for the purpose of safeguarding their conjugal lives, they opt for the public involvement. Apart from this, Court interpreted sec 7A of the HMA, 1955, to be compatible, in terms of getting married privately, even though there is the presence of a fewer people, in the form of witnesses. The above mentioned elaboration or interpretation unravels the Fundamental Rights, enshrined under **Article 21** of the Indian Constitution, which denotes the **Right to Privacy**, to every individual, in the form of a Fundamental Right. **OBITER DICTA** The antecedent decision of the Madras High Court was looked through by the Court, in the case **Balakrishnan Pandiyan v. Inspector of Police (2014)** , which demonstrated that the solemnization of a marriage, in secrecy, by ensuring fewer witnesses, shall neither amount to a valid marriage nor solemnization would constitute, under sec 7 and 7A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. However, the above mentioned perspective was held to be inaccurate. In addition to this, the Court emphasized the magnitude of the celebration of a marriage along with the declaration of being married. The Court interpreted that, proponents of **suyamariyathai** or **seerthiruththa** form of marriage didn’t visualise the performance of marriage in secrecy. The Court, thereaftermanifested the weightiness of marriage celebration as well as the public recognition. The Court subsequently cited the case **S. Nagalingam v. Shivagami**, and clarified that, the solemnization of an effective marriage needs to take place, in the presence of the family, relatives and the friends, where a priest is not essential. The basic rituals, such as exchanging of garlands, putting vermillion ( Sindur ) or exchanging of rings are more than sufficient for the completion of a valid and legitimate marriage, under sec 7A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. **CONCLUSION& COMMENTS** It was observed by the Court, that the parties may conceal the solemnization of their marriage on account of several reasons, especially if both the parties are adult. The marriage might have been hidden due to the family pressure of the bride Mathithra, who was compelled to get married to her maternal uncle and she turned out to be terror haunted of getting confined by her parents once again. The court further demonstrated regarding the abasement of the Art. 21, that came up in this case. The court emphasized that every single individual possesses the right to choose his/her life partner, which has been guaranteed by Art.21 of the Indian Constitution. The court further stated that solemnization of their marriage in the presence of the Advocates, doesn’t imply anything illicit in nature. The advocates are recognised to be the Officers of ther Court possessing innumerable authorities. They cannot proceed with being the witnesses during the solemnization of marriage, when they’re in the course of their profession. If the advocates attend a wedding privately being the witnesses of the same, that activity cannot be declared ineffective. After analysing the above mentioned fact of case along with the judgement, it must be included that we do belong to a narrower and illiberal society, where the women are compelled to get married against her will and it’s quite prevalent even in this twenty first century. It’s quite noticeable even now, that women are coerced by their parents, to get married by immolating their personal choices and career at the same time. Therefore, in this twenty first century and the era of Artificial Intelligence, where the women are discovered to be quite conceptual and analytical in their career and lives, this type of activities are indeed unanticipated from the parents. An individual ( irrespective of the gender) has the authority to opt for his/her congruous life partner and the parents are expected to embrace such decision, in lieu of opposing it. Henceforth, the above expounded humiliation by Mathithra’s parents is abominable and whimsical at the same time. We’d be craving for such Indian Society where everysingle individual would be rewarded with the opportunity to opt for their life partners, without the occurance of any perplexity in the family. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** 1. ***S. Nagalingam v. Sivagami* (2001) 7 SCC 487*S.*** 2. ***Balakrishnan Pandiyan v Inspector of Police* 2014 (7) MadLJ 651** **Important Statutes Referred** - **The Writ of Habeas Corpus, Indian Constitution.** - **The Right Against Infringement of Privacy, Article 21, Constitution of India.** - **Sec 7A of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955.** **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases, Family Law Cases --- ### [Mohd.Naushad vs State Of NCT, Delhi 2023](https://lawfoyer.in/mohd-naushad-vs-state-of-nct-delhi-2023/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** By – **CHITRA** (**University Five Year Law College, Jaipur**) **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The criminal appeal named” Mohd Naushad vs State Of(Govt. Nct, Delhi)” was a significant case that was heard in the Supreme Court of India, with the judgment being delivered on July 6, 2023. The case revolves around a series of bomb blasts that were carried out on May 21, 1996, at a bustling central request in Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi. The charge distance professing conspiracy and prosecution of the bomb blast with the intention of destabilizing the country was presented by the execution. The State Government of the National Capital Territory( NCT) of Delhi was the replier in this case, while Mohd. Naushad was the complainant. Multiple indicted persons were involved in the case, with some of them being declared placarded malefactors and escaping trial. The remaining indicted individualities faced trial for colorful offenses under different correctional vittles of the law. The judgment was delivered by the Trial Court on April 8, 2010, performing in persuasions and clearings for the indicted parties. latterly, felonious prayers challenging the Trial Court’s judgment were filed in the Supreme Court by the complainant. The criminal prayers were reviewed by a bench comprising Sanjay Karol, Vikram Nath, and B.R.Gavai in the Supreme Court. The court’s decision is anticipated to give pivotal interpretations and judgments regarding the issues raised in the prayers, slipping light on the legal aspects of the case and potentially impacting the persuasions and clearings handed down by the Trial Court. ***Keywords*** – *Criminal appeal, Bomb blasts, conviction, conspiracy, Destabilizing the Country, Lajpat Nagar New Delhi, Mohd Naushad, Trial Court.* **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***Mohd Naushad vs State Of (Govt. Nct, Delhi)*Case Number***Criminal Appeal No. 1269 of 2013 , 1270-1271 0f 2013, 6447-6451 of 2013*Judgement Date***6 July ,2023*Court***Supreme court of India*Quorum***Sanjay Karol, Vikram Nath, Bhushan Ramkrishna Gavai*Author***Sanjay Karol*Citation***2023INSC605*Legal Provisions Involved***IPC-1860, The Explosive Substances Act-1908, The Indian Evidence Act-1872**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The judgment named” Mohd Naushad vs State Of(Govt. Nct, Delhi) on 6 July, 2023″ was delivered by a bench comprising judges Sanjay Karol, Vikram Nath, andB.R. Gavai in the Supreme Court of India. The judgment, bearing Felonious AppealNo. 1269 of 2013, was pronounced on 6th July 2023. The case pertained to two First Information Reports( FIRs) registered in 1996. The execution presented a challan in connection with FIRNo. 517 of 1996, which contended a conspiracy to commit lemon blasts in order to destabilize the country. As per the charge- distance, 17 individualities, linked as A1 to A17, were indicted of being involved in the conspiracy and carrying out a blast on 21st May 1996 in a crowded request in Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi. Another challan was presented in connection with FIRNo.286/1996, which related to the theft in connection with the same main crime involving four out of the seventeen indicted persons. It’s important to note that out of the seventeen indicted, one existent( A13) had passed down, and seven individualities( A11 to A17) were declared placarded malefactors and hadn’t faced trial. The remaining nine indicted persons were facing trial for colorful offenses under different correctional vittles of the law. The judgment provides a irregular form presenting the names of the indicted and the charges against them. Each indicted faced charges under sections similar as IPC 120B( felonious conspiracy), 124- A( sedition), 302( murder), 307( attempt to murder), and 436( mischief by fire or explosive substances). also, charges were filed under colorful sections of the Explosive Substances Act and Arms Act. The Trial Court, through a common judgment dated 8th April 2010, pronounced the verdict on the indicted facing trial. The judgment redounded in persuasions and clearings, along with the corresponding corrections awarded. The table in the judgment outlines the persuasions, clearings, and the corrections awarded for each indicted. For case, A1( Farooq Ahmed Khan@ Anwar Sadat) was condemned under the Explosive Substances Act and Arms Act and doomed to rigorous imprisonment for five times. A2( Farida Dar@ Bahanji) was condemned under the Explosive Substances Act and awarded imprisonment for the formerly experienced period. A3( Mohd. Naushad) was condemned under colorful sections, including IPC 302( murder), 307( attempt to murder), 436( mischief by fire or explosive substances), and doomed to death. The judgment also mentioned that A4( Mirza Iftqar Hussain@ Saba) was acquitted of the charges. The judgment provides detailed information on the persuasions, clearings, and corrections awarded to each indicted. In conclusion, the judgment in the case of Mohd Naushad vs State Of(Govt. Nct, Delhi) on 6 July, 2023, delivered by the Supreme Court of India, addressed the charges against the indicted individualities involved in a conspiracy to commit lemon blasts. The judgment outlined the persuasions, clearings, and corrections awarded to each indicted grounded on the substantiation and charges presented during the trial. The Trial Court had delivered its judgment on 8th April 2010, and the Supreme Court’s judgment acted as an appellate decision affirming or modifying the persuasions and corrections awarded by the lower court. **FACTS OF THE CASE** The facts of the case on 6th July 2023, between Mohd Naushad and State Of(Govt. Nct, Delhi), were as follows: Two First Information Reports( FIRs) were filed in 1996. FIRNo. 517 of 1996 contended a conspiracy to commit bomb blasts with the intention of destabilizing the country. It was contended that on 21st May 1996, a blast passed in a crowded request in Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi, and 17 individualities, linked as A1 to A17, were indicted of being part of this conspiracy. FIRNo.286/1996 related to theft connected to the same main crime involving four out of the seventeen indicted persons. Among the indicted, one existent( A13) had passed down, and seven individualities( A11 to A17) were declared placarded malefactors who had finessed trial. The remaining nine indicted were facing trial for colorful offenses under different sections of the law, including IPC 120B( felonious conspiracy), 124- A( sedition), 302( murder), 307( attempt to murder), 436( mischief by fire or explosive substances), as well as vittles of the Explosive Substances Act and Arms Act. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether The validity of the substantiation presented by the execution? 2. Any procedural irregularities or legal crimes committed during the trial? 3. Whether the indicted individualities were involved in the conspiracy to commit lemon blasts and the posterior blast in Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi? 4. Whether the charges leveled against the indicted individualities under various sections of the law were substantiated by the substantiation presented during the trial? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** i. The counsels for Petitioner/ Appellant submitted that They challenged the validity of the substantiation presented against them, claiming that it was inadequate to prove their involvement in the contended conspiracy and the posterior blast. ii. They argued that there were inconsistencies and disagreement in the execution’s case, casting mistrustfulness on the trustability of the substantiation. iii. The supplicant/ complainant contended that their rights to a fair trial and due process were violated during the proceedings. **RESPONDENT ’S ARGUMENTS** i. The counsels for Respondent submitted that It contended the substantiation presented during the trial established the involvement of the indicted individualities in the conspiracy and the blast. ii. They argued that the execution had produced substantial substantiation, including substantiation testaments, forensic reports, and other factual substantiation, which established the guilt of the indicted persons. iii. The respondent emphasized that the trial court had precisely examined the substantiation and arrived at the correct conclusions. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** **1. Indian Penal Code( IPC):** Various sections of the IPC were applied in the case to establish the felonious liability of the indicted individualities. - **Section 120B( Felonious Conspiracy) –** The offense of felonious conspiracy was invoked to establish that the indicted persons were involved in a conspiracy to commit felonious acts. - **Section 124- A( Sedition) –** The offense of sedition was charged against the indicted individualities for their alleged involvement in conditioning aimed at overthrowing the government or creating public complaint. - **Section 302( Murder) –** The charge of murder was applied to the indicted individualities for their alleged involvement in causing the death of another person. - **Section 307( Attempt to Murder) –** The offense of attempt to murder was invoked against the indicted persons for their alleged involvement in trying to cause the death of another person. - **Section 411( Dishonestly entering Stolen Property) –** The indicted individualities were charged under this section for their alleged involvement in dishonestly entering stolen property. 1.6 Section 436( Mischief by Fire or Explosive Substance) – The offense of mischief by fire or explosive substance was applied to the indicted individualities for their alleged involvement in causing damage or destruction by using snares. **2. Explosive Substances Act:** The Explosive Substances Act was invoked in the case to deal with offenses related to explosive substances. - **Section 4 ( Possession or Control of Explosive Substances with Intent to Endanger Life or Property) –** The indicted individualities, including Mohd. Naushad, were charged under this section for their alleged involvement in the possession and control of explosive substances with intent to jeopardize life or property. **3. Arms Act :** The Arms Act was invoked in the case to deal with offenses related to the possession, use, and trade of arms. - **Various sections of the Arms Act –** The indicted individualities faced charges under specific sections of the Arms Act for their alleged involvement in the illegal possession of arms. 4\. **Other applicable legal vittles –** Depending on the specific details of the case, other applicable legal vittles may have been invoked by the execution to establish the felonious liability of the indicted individualities. **Identification and operation of fresh legal vittles –** The court, grounded on the substantiation and arguments presented, may have linked and applied fresh legal vittles to determine the guilt or innocence of the indicted individualities. Please note that the specific operation and interpretation of these legal vittles were done by the court during the trial and posterior proceedings. The court examined the substantiation, arguments, and applicable legal vittles to arrive at its findings and judgments. **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** The case involved multiple indicted persons who were charged with colorful offenses, including conspiracy and bomb blasts. The execution presented a challan in connection with FIRNo. 517 of 1996, which stated that 17 persons conspired and conducted a blast in Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi. Another challan was presented for theft in connection with FIRNo.286/1996. Out of the 17 indicted, one expired, and seven were declared placarded offenders and didn’t face trial. The remaining nine indicted faced trial for several offenses under different correctional vittles. The charges against each indicted and the offenses they were charged with are handed in a irregular form. The Trial Court, in a common judgment, condemned and acquitted the indicted grounded on the offenses they were charged with. The judgment also awarded the needful discipline. The ratio decidendi of the case can be deduced from the Court’s findings and the persuasions and clearings of the indicted. The Court’s decision to condemn or acquit each indicted is grounded on the substantiation and legal vittles applicable to their separate cases. The rate decidendi establishes the legal principles and logic that led to the Court’s decision in each case. **OBITER DICTA** Obiter dicta refers to the incidental or fresh reflections made by the Court that aren’t directly applicable to the decision in the case. It includes compliances, commentary, or opinions expressed by the Court, which may not have a list effect but can give perceptivity into the Court’s logic. In this case, the obiter dicta may include the Court’s commentary on the nature of the offenses, the impact of the crimes on society, or the need for strict corrections to discourage analogous acts in the future. These reflections, although not forming part of the rate decidendi, can give guidance and perspective on the Court’s overall view of the case and the beginning legal issues. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd Naushad vs State Of(Govt. Nct, Delhi) on 6 July 2023 was pronounced byHon’bleMr. Justice Sanjay Karol, along withHon’bleMr. JusticeB.R. Gavai andHon’bleMr. Justice Vikram Nath. The judgment was granted leave. The Felonious AppealNo.1269/2013 and Felonious AppealNos. 1270- 1271 of 2013 were dismissed, while the Crl.A. Nos.@ SLP( Crl.)Nos. 6447- 6451 of 2013 were allowed, as per the signed judgment. The operative part of the judgment states that the common judgment dated22.11.2012 rendered by the High Court of Delhi in Death Sentence ReferenceNo. 2 of 2010 and Felonious AppealNos. 948, 949, 950, and 951 of 2010 is set away. The prayers preferred by indicted Mohd. Naushad( Felonious AppealNo.1269/2013) and Javed Ahmed Khan( Felonious AppealNos. 1270- 1271 of 2013) were dismissed. The appeal preferred by the State(Govt. NCT of Delhi),Crl.A.@ SLP( Crl.)Nos. 6447- 6451 of 2013, was allowed. As a result, A3- Mohd. Naushad was condemned under Sections 302, 307, 411, 436, and 120B IPC as well as Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act. A5- Mirza Nissar Hussain@ Naza and A6- Mohd. Ali Bhatt@ Killey were condemned under Sections 302, 307, 436, 411, and 120B IPC, and A9- Javed Ahmed Khan was condemned under Sections 302, 307, 436, and 120B IPC. Considering the inflexibility of the offense performing in the deaths of innocent persons and the part played by each indicted person, all these indicted persons were doomed to imprisonment for life, without absolution, extending to natural life. The indicted, if on bail, were directed to incontinently surrender before the Court concerned, and their bail bonds stood cancelled. A5- Mirza Nissar Hussain@ Naza and A6- Mohd. Ali Bhatt@ Killey were directed to rendition forthwith. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** 1. Major Puran v. The State of Punjab was observed. 2. Kottaya v. Emperor was held. 3. M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra was observed. 4. Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra was held. 5. Hari Charan Kurmi & Jogia Hajam v. State of Bihar was observed. 6. Kehar Singh & Ors. v. State of Delhi Administration was observed. 7. Kashmira Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh was held. 8. Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor was observed. 9. Jaffar Hussain Dastagir v. State of Maharashtra was held.s 10. Bhuboni Sahu v. R. was observed. 11. Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra was held. 12. Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab was held. 13. Pradeep Narayan Madgaonkar & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra was held. 14. Ram Singh v. Central Bureau of Narcotics was referred. 15. Suresh was referred. **Important Statutes Referred** 1. Sections 120-A, 120-B, 124-A, 302, 307 and 436 r/w Section 120B Indian Penal Code (‘IPC) were referred. 2. Sections 25, 27 and 30 of the Indian Evidence Act were referred. 3. Sections 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act were referred. 4. Section 3 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act were referred. 5. Section 164 Cr.P.C. was referred. 6. Section 10 of the Evidence Act was referred. 7. Section 120-A IPC was referred. **REFERENCES** 1. 2. 3. 4. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### ["Juris Femme: Reframe the Reality," hosted by the Uttar Pradesh Judicial Reform Council (UPJRC), an organization under the NJRC, WICCI on  21st April 2024, (Online)](https://lawfoyer.in/juris-femme-reframe-the-reality-hosted-by-the-uttar-pradesh-judicial-reform-council-upjrc-an-organization-under-the-njrc-wicci-on-21st-april-2024-online/) **Published:** April 17, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **UTTAR PRADESH JUDICIAL REFORMS COUNCIL** The Uttar Pradesh Judicial Reforms Council is a non-profit organization working under the aegis of the **National Judicial Reforms Council**, **WICCI**. Established in **March 2023**, our council is committed to identifying and addressing gaps in the judicial system, with a focus on expediting the delivery of justice. We are a women-led organization working with the objective to bring judicial reforms to the existing Indian Judicial System. The idea behind setting up of the council was the upliftment of the deprived sections of the society with the help of legal reforms. We aim to monitor the implementation of laws, advocate for economic equality among all, promotion of fair and just practices and realization of potential of all. **WORK DONE BY THE COUNCIL SINCE ITS INCEPTION** The UPJRC has conducted various webinars, panel discussions and awareness drives since its inception. We work tirelessly to advocate for the needs of the citizens, empower them and create a more equitable world for them. One of our major roles is to ensure that the justice system is accessible to everyone, regardless of income or social status. We conduct events, webinars, and panel discussions to guide those who are facing domestic violence, sexual harassment, discrimination and violation of their rights; and create awareness among them. In addition to these activities, we also promote education and leadership among the citizens of the country. We provide opportunities to develop their skills, gain knowledge, and network with others. We also encourage them to take on leadership roles in the organization and improve their skills. In the past year, we hosted a successful webinar focusing on LLM for law students and the opportunities relating to it. We are also engaged in posting newsletters and inviting open discussions on various contemporary legal issues of importance and thereby strive to constantly implement and achieve the objectives for which the Council was formed. **AMENDMENT DYNAMIC COMPETITION** The UPJRC is organizing a Legislation Amendment Competition titled – ‘Juris Femme: Reframe the Reality’ on the theme of women-related laws. It will be conducted on 21 st April 2024, Sunday in online mode. We are thrilled to extend an invitation to law students, law graduates and legal professionals from across the country to participate in the competition. This event is designed to harness legal acumen and innovative thinking towards the advancement of women-related laws. As we strive for gender equality and empowerment, your participation in this competition can pave the way for a more just and equitable society. **KEY DETAILS** ● TITLE – Juris Femme: Reframe the Reality ● DATE – 21st April 2024, Sunday ● TIME – 12:00 p.m. onwards ● THEME – Women-related laws ● MODE – online **STRUCTURE OF THE COMPETITION** - The participants will be called upon to present their ideas for amendment in legislations. - The amendments shall be pertaining to laws relating to women. - Only individual participation is allowed. - Each participant will be given 5 minutes to present their ideas and answer the questions - put forth by the judges. - Participants may present their ideas through a PowerPoint presentation. - The participants will be marked on two factors: 1. Knowledge of Law 2. Creativity and Innovation in the idea presented. **RULES AND GUIDELINES** - The participants need to adhere to the time allotted. - The participants will be required to be formally dressed. - The participants will have to have their cameras switched on throughout the event. - The participants must ensure proper network bandwidth on their end. - The decision of the judges shall be binding. - The proposed amendments shall not be offensive or derogatory to any community, caste or section of the society. 2. **PERKS OF PARTICIPATION** - Certificates to all participants. - Letter of Appreciation to the Winner **REGISTRATION** Follow this link to register yourself as a participant: [**https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScGWFNqAwIZvJ\_FgQbpv3cu6x2SvMN5EocDIs- kMd9Ki0tywA/viewform?usp=sf\_link**](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScGWFNqAwIZvJ_FgQbpv3cu6x2SvMN5EocDIs- kMd9Ki0tywA/viewform?usp=sf_link) **CONTACT INFORMATION** For queries and further information, reach out to the following 1. **Kashish Khanna** – +91 97529 74899 2. **Diya Vinekar** – +91 99000 92248 We are also available at [**upjrcwicci@gmail.com**](mailto:upjrcwicci@gmail.com) [Download Poster](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/POSTER-FOR-COMPETITION.jpg) **Categories:** Events, Interpretation of Statutes, Legal Subjects, Legislation Amendment Competitions, Practice Quizes --- ### [12th National Quiz Competition on Indian Constitutional Law by LawFoyer: Register by 20th April](https://lawfoyer.in/12th-national-quiz-competition-on-indian-constitutional-law-by-lawfoyer-register-by-20th-april/) **Published:** March 17, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Quiz-Poster-12th-819x1024.jpg) [Download Answer Key](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/ANSWER-KEY.pdf) --- [Check Results](https://lawfoyer.in/results-of-12th-national-quiz-competition-on-indian-constitutional-law/) --- [Download Certificate](https://lawfoyer.in/download-certificates-of-12th-national-quiz-competition-on-indian-constitutional-law/) ## Dates - **Date of Quiz:- 21/04/2024** **(5 Pm)** - **Last Date to Apply:-** **20/04/2024, 11:59 pm** - **Result Declaration:-** **25/04/2024** ## Prizes - 1st prize- Rs 1500 + Winner Trophy - 2nd prize- Rs 1000 + 1st Runner Up Trophy - 3rd prize- Rs 500 + 2nd Runner Up Trophy** - 4th-10th Prize- Rs 150 + Certificate of Excellence** - **FREE Practice E-Book with 1000+ MCQs for Practice** - **Free 2 AI Plagiarism Report by Turnitin.** - **Appreciation Certificate for All the Participants** - **Top 10 Rank will get Free access to Certification Course on Indian Evidence Act.** [Click here to know more about course](https://academy.lawfoyer.in/index.php/courses/mastering-the-indian-evidence-act-a-10-day-certification-course/) **Note:-** The Winners Trophy will be dispatched to the designated recipients’ physical address without any additional charges. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/WhatsApp-Image-2024-01-22-at-01.00.07_ac7cf468-1024x576.jpg "WhatsApp-Image-2024-01-22-at-01.00.07_ac7cf468 | LawFoyer")## **Registration Fees** - **Rs 99/- Only** ## **Important Guidelines** - **Format of Quiz:** Quiz shall take place online, and a paper will include multiple-choice questions**.** - The participant can take this exam on their laptop or mobile phone. - The platform for the quiz will be google Forms, Microsoft Forms, etc. - In the case of the same marks, time will be considered (a person who submits early will be given preference). - The link will be shared 24 hours prior to the start of the quiz. ## **Rules & Regulations** - **60 MCQ(s).** - The time allotted will be **25** minutes. (This includes time for filling the basic details like Name, email, etc.) - **Every question carries 04 marks & there will be no negative marking.** - The Result will be declared on **25th April 2024**([www.lawfoyer.in](https://lawfoyer.in/)). --- ## Registration Form --- **Categories:** Events, Quiz --- ### [Meaning, Definition & Explanation of Res Sub Judice](https://lawfoyer.in/meaning-definition-explanation-of-res-sub-judice/) **Published:** April 23, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Res sub judice** is a Latin term that translates to “a matter under judgment.” This doctrine is codified in Section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, which governs the stay of suits in Indian law. Section 10 prevents the courts from simultaneously processing two parallel litigations concerning the same issue, subject matter, and relief sought. The principle underpinning this provision is to avoid multiple and potentially conflicting judgments on the same matter, thereby conserving judicial resources and maintaining consistency in legal proceedings. ### Legal Framework and Applicability of Section 10 The application of Section 10 is contingent upon several conditions being satisfied: 1. **Existence of Two Suits:** There must be a previously instituted suit and a subsequently instituted one. 2. **Common Matters in Issue:** The matter contested in the subsequent suit must be directly and substantially in issue in the prior suit. 3. **Commonality of Parties:** The parties or their representatives involved must be the same in both suits. 4. **Jurisdiction and Pendency:** The previously instituted suit must be pending in a court with appropriate jurisdiction, whether in India or a foreign jurisdiction established or continued by the Central Government. 5. **Same Relief Sought:** The court where the previous suit is pending must have jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed in the subsequent suit. 6. **Litigating Under Same Title:** The parties must be litigating under the same title in both suits. Upon these conditions being met, the court is mandated to stay the proceedings of the subsequent suit. ### Interpretation and Judicial Decisions Significant case law elucidates the application and interpretation of Section 10: - **National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences v. C Parameshwara (2005 SC):** Highlighted the policy to prevent conflicting verdicts and conserve judicial resources. - **Radha Devi v. Deep Narayan (2003 SC):** Stated that if the decision in the previously instituted suit would operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit, then the latter must be stayed. - **Aspi Jal and another v. Khushroo Rustom Dadyburjor (2013 SC):** Emphasized that Section 10 applies when the entire subject matter in controversy is the same across both suits. ### Exceptions and Exclusions Section 10 specifically addresses the trial of suits but does not extend to appeals or applications. The provision is designed not to bar the institution of a suit but to postpone its trial. Therefore, while a subsequent suit cannot be dismissed outright, it must be stayed pending the resolution of the earlier suit. This rule is applicable even if the earlier suit is vexatious or seemingly infringing upon contractual terms, as per Manohar Lal v. Seth Hira Lal (AIR 1962 SC). ### Waiver and Inherent Powers Parties involved in litigation can waive the applicability of Section 10 by consenting for the court to proceed with the subsequent suit. This waiver must be explicit, and post-waiver, parties cannot challenge the validity of the proceedings based on Section 10. Moreover, courts retain inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code to stay proceedings to meet the ends of justice, even if the conditions of Section 10 do not strictly apply, as demonstrated in cases like P.V. Shetty v. B.S. Giridhar (1982 SC). ### Practical Implications and Critical Analysis Section 10 serves as a crucial procedural tool to streamline litigation, prevent judicial contradiction, and reduce unnecessary litigation, aligning with the broader objectives of efficient judicial administration. However, the application of this section requires precise alignment with its stringent conditions, which calls for careful judicial consideration to balance the principles of justice, efficiency, and legal consistency. **Categories:** Articles, Civil Procedure Law --- ### [Rule against Perpetuity under Section 14 of Transfer of Property Act](https://lawfoyer.in/rule-against-perpetuity-under-section-14-of-transfer-of-property-act/) **Published:** April 14, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Ritesh Singh Shekhawat, Mahatma Jyoti Rao Phoole University, Jaipur, Rajasthan** #### Emergence and Objective of the Rule Against Perpetuities The rule against perpetuities, codified under Section 14 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, addresses the duration within which property interests must vest. The rule is aimed at preventing the indefinite tying up of property and ensuring that it does not remain inalienable for extended periods. Historically, the rule emerged from the Duke of Norfolk’s case (1682), where attempts were made to control property disposition beyond the settlor’s lifetime, influencing several generations. The legal principle dictates that no interest in property should subsist beyond 21 years after a life in being at the time of the property transfer, plus the period of gestation, where applicable. #### Legal Mechanisms and Scope The primary legal mechanism under this rule is the prevention of future interests in property from vesting beyond an allowed timeframe. Specifically, this applies to transfers that could extend beyond the lifetime of living persons at the transfer time, plus the minority of any person alive at the period’s expiration. The rule’s scope extends to both movable and immovable property but excludes personal contracts that do not create property interests, thereby avoiding undue restrictions on property utility and exchange. #### Key Legal Cases and Interpretations Several cases have shaped the interpretation and application of the rule against perpetuities in India. In “R Kempraj v Burton Son and Co. (AIR 1970 SC 1872),” the Supreme Court addressed the application scope regarding property interests, emphasizing the rule’s objective to facilitate property alienation within reasonable timeframes. Furthermore, “Jagar Nath v Cheddi Dhobi (AIR 1973 All 307)” clarified that transactions not involving property transfer are not subjected to these perpetuity restrictions. #### Comparisons with English Law Differences between Indian and English law on perpetuities primarily lie in the treatment of the gestation period and the fixed period extensions beyond a life in being. Unlike English law, which allows a fixed additional 21-year period irrespective of minority, Indian law restricts extensions strictly to the minority of the beneficiaries concerned without additional time. The gestation period, if relevant, is added at the beginning of the period under English law but is not extended at the end under Indian law, reflecting a more stringent approach to ensuring property vesting within predictable periods. #### Modern Applications and Legal Reasoning The modern application of the rule against perpetuities continues to influence property transfers, where conditions that might indefinitely delay interest vesting are rendered void. This is illustrated in scenarios involving complex family trusts or where property interests are contingent upon long-term conditions being fulfilled, which could potentially exceed the stipulated vesting period. In legal reasoning, the rule is employed to assess whether property transfers align with statutory limitations, ensuring no undue delay affects the property’s alienation or utilisation rights. Courts evaluate whether potential future events, as stipulated in property agreements, could lead to vesting delays beyond the permissible limit, thereby preserving the underlying legal intent to prevent property from being unalienable indefinitely. #### Conclusion The rule against perpetuities remains a fundamental legal principle in Indian property law, ensuring that property remains within the commerce and control of living persons within a reasonable timeframe. It reflects a balance between respecting the intentions of property owners and preventing the stagnation of property utility and ownership, thus facilitating more dynamic and equitable property relations in society. The rule’s consistent evolution through case law and statutory amendments highlights its critical role in adapting to changing social and economic landscapes, ultimately guiding legal practitioners and property owners in structuring transfers that comply with legal standards and societal needs. #### References 1. “Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Section 14.” 2. S N Shukla, “Transfer of Property Act” (27th Edn 2009). 3. R Kempraj v Burton Son and Co. AIR 1970 SC 1872. 4. Jagar Nath v Cheddi Dhobi AIR 1973 All 307. 5. Mulla, “Transfer of Property Act” (10th Edn 2008). 6. Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 349 (5th ed. 1979). **Categories:** Articles, Property Law --- ### [Paschimanchal Vidhyut Vitran Nigam Ltd . V . Raman Ispat Private Limited & Ors](https://lawfoyer.in/paschimanchal-vidhyut-vitran-nigam-ltd-v-raman-ispat-private-limited-ors/) **Published:** April 14, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Ritesh Singh Shekhawat** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE In the case of Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. vs Raman Ispat Private Limited, the Supreme Court of India adjudicated on the applicability of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016, vis-à-vis the Electricity Act, 2003, specifically addressing the issue of priority of claims in the liquidation process of a corporate debtor. This judgment is significant as it clarifies the interplay between sector-specific statutes like the Electricity Act and a general statute like the IBC concerning financial dues and the recovery process. The court’s decision highlights the nuanced approach required in the adjudication of conflicts between special and general laws in the context of insolvency proceedings. **Keywords**: Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, Electricity Act, Priority of Claims, Corporate Debtor, Liquidation, Secured Creditors, Operational Creditors. ## B) CASE DETAILS i) **Judgement Cause Title**: Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. vs Raman Ispat Private Limited ii) **Case Number**: Civil Appeal Nos. 7976 of 2019 iii) **Judgement Date**: 17 July 2023 iv) **Court**: Supreme Court of India v) **Quorum**: Dipankar Datta, S. Ravindra Bhat vi) **Author**: S. Ravindra Bhat vii) **Citation**: 2023 INSC 625 viii) **Legal Provisions Involved**: Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Electricity Act, 2003; Uttar Pradesh Electricity Supply Code, 2005. ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The judgment arises from a dispute regarding the priority of claims under the IBC in the context of dues claimed by Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. (PVVNL), a state-run electricity distribution company, against Raman Ispat Private Limited, which was under liquidation. The primary legal question involved was whether the provisions of the IBC would override the rights and remedies provided under the Electricity Act, 2003, and related regulations, specifically regarding the recovery of electricity dues. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE PVVNL had supplied electricity to Raman Ispat under an agreement stipulating that unpaid dues would constitute a charge on the assets of Raman Ispat. Due to non-payment, PVVNL initiated measures to recover the dues by attaching the assets of Raman Ispat. However, during the insolvency proceedings of Raman Ispat, the NCLT and subsequently the NCLAT ordered the release of the attached assets to facilitate liquidation, prompting PVVNL to appeal to the Supreme Court. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED Whether the provisions of the Electricity Act, which allow for the recovery of dues as a charge on the assets of the debtor, have an overriding effect over the IBC. ## F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the specific provisions of the Electricity Act should prevail over the general provisions of the IBC, ensuring the priority of electricity dues over other claims in the liquidation assets. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Respondent submitted that the IBC establishes a comprehensive framework for resolving insolvency which includes a statutory mechanism for the distribution of assets, and that this framework should take precedence over the Electricity Act in the context of insolvency proceedings. ## H) JUDGEMENT a) **RATIO DECIDENDI** The Supreme Court held that while the Electricity Act provides a mechanism for the recovery of dues, it does not specifically create a priority over claims made under the IBC. Thus, the IBC’s framework for the distribution of assets during liquidation proceedings, including the priority of claims, applies notwithstanding the provisions of the Electricity Act. b) **OBITER DICTA** (IF ANY) The court observed that the harmonious interpretation of the IBC with other laws is essential for the effective resolution of insolvencies and suggested that amendments to clarify these interactions would be beneficial. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment underscores the supremacy of the IBC in insolvency-related matters and affirms the structured approach to the resolution of financial distress within corporate entities. It ensures that all creditors are treated equitably according to the statutory scheme of distribution, emphasizing the balance between sector-specific statutory rights and the objectives of the IBC. ## J) REFERENCES a) **Important Cases Referred**: Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai vs. Indian Oil Corporation b) **Important Statutes Referred**: Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Corporate Law Cases --- ### [REGISTRATION AND INCORPORATION OF COMPANIES](https://lawfoyer.in/registration-and-incorporation-of-companies/) **Published:** April 14, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author**: **Sangamithirai. V**, **Chettinad School of Law** **INTRODUCTION** The Article “Registration and Incorporation of Companies” provides an in-depth discussion of the steps, prerequisites, and importance of establishing and incorporating a business. It functions as a comprehensive resource that covers a range of corporation formation topics, such as the makeup of shareholders, directors, and members for various company forms. In addition to the discussion of the formation procedure, the document offers comprehensive insights into the significance of choosing a suitable and compatible company name, emphasizing the legal consequences and limitations associated with name selections. It also highlights how important it is to stay in compliance with national rules and keep clear of issues involving registered trademarks.The article also discusses the process of drafting important documents, including the Articles of Association (AoA) and Memorandum of Association (MoA).In addition, the article provides a detailed flowchart that describes every step of the registration process, including all of the forms, declarations, and paperwork that need to be turned in to the registrar. It also discusses the responsibilities that follow registration, such as the necessity of keeping lines of communication open and adhering to legal regulations. and the case laws has been disscussed all these infromation provided with respect to companies act 2013. **Keywords:** Registration, company, Incorporation, MOA, AOA **Formation of company:** To form a company there must be adequate members and the limit should attain : In case of one person company maximum one person. In case of a Private company sec(68) of companies act 2013, there must be minimum 2 and maximum 200 members, minimum of two directors and two shareholders. The minimum paid up capital is 1 lakh. In case of a Public company sec 2(71) of comoanies act 2013, there must be minimum 7 and maximum it si unlimited, minimum of three directors and seven subscribers for the company. The minimum paid up Capital is 5 lakh. **Naming of the company:** The company’s name must be chosen by the promoters. According to Section 4 of the Companies Act, a business’s name cannot be the same as or very similar to the name of an already-existing company. Furthermore, the name must not look unpleasant to the national government, nor should using the name violate any national laws. For instance, the company’s name shouldn’t conflict with a registered trademark. An organization gains the exclusive right to use a name once it registers it. After then, no other business may register under the same or a similar name. The company’s name is regarded as a vital component of its public image. A corporation may only alter its name with the Central Government’s prior consent, according to Section 13 of the Companies Act. **Documents to be prepared:** The MoA and AoA are the important documents to be prepared at the time of registration. MoA memorandum of associations: A company’s constitution is sometimes referred to as the Memorandum of Association (MoA). It establishes the range of what a business can do. The purpose of the company’s establishment, the authorized share capital that the business can raise, the level of liability that the members pay, and other details like the company name and registered office location are all stated in the Memorandum of Association. A public company’s memorandum of association (MoA) must be signed by a minimum of seven individuals, but a private company’s must be signed by at least two. The people who sign the Memorandum of Association (MoA) are referred to as subscribers, and each subscriber is required to own a minimum of one share in the company’s capital. AoA articles of associations: A company’s regulations, or articles of association (AoA), specify how it will be run and managed. They stand for the promoters’ morals and principles. The AoA must be signed by each subscriber to the MoA. It is important to remember that the MoA is the document that overrides the AoA. Should there be any provisions inconsistencies between the AoA and MoA, the MoA would take priority. The purpose for which the company is founded is stated in the MoA, and the means by which the purpose is to be fulfilled is included in the AoA. **Procedure for Registration of Company: Section 7 of Companies Act,2013[\[1\]](#_ftn1) defines the technique to be followed for incorporating a company. It explains that (1)While incorporation of company it must be filed to the registrar where the control falls as where the company is positioned. To incorporate a company the upcoming documents are needed to be proposed by the company. a)Firstly the memorandum and articles of the association must be engaged by the persons who are the subscribers to the memorandum or article . b)A pronouncement must be given by the an chartered accountant, by an advocate, cost accountant in a prearranged form given by the person such a manager, director of the company. c)Each of the subscribers to the memorandum must give affirmation and the persons who are named as first directors in the article must state that they are not convicted by any offence which is interconnected to the materialization of the company, upgrade of the company or handling the company. And the persons must not be guilty of any offence or there must not be any kind of breach of duty happened while incorporating a company. And also the company must certify that all the documents proposed to registrar must be fair and given by them in knowledge d)there must be address for communication till the new company is being amalgamated. e)All the particulars of the person who is incorporating the company must be given such as surname,residential address, nationality must be mentioned. Also the person who contributed to the memorandum must also give their proof of identity. f)Also the persons who are named as first directors must give their nationality,surname,residential address and also other particulars such as proof of identity, Director identification number must be succumbed. g)The interested persons to the article of the company must submit their sufferance to act as a director in the company. **CASELAWS:** **Moosha v Ibrahim [**\[2\]**](#_ftn2)** A company was being incorporated and later it was found out that the company has contravened some of the rules and regulations while incorporating the company as the Memorandum of association was endorsed by the guardian of five members. Finally the court held that the incorporation certificate for the company is cogent. **Steps for incorporation of companies** 1. To discover a name for the company: A company can be identified by the name given to the registrar. The memorandum of the company consist the name of the company. 2. The memorandum of Associations and Articles of Association must be prepared The memorandum reside the objectives of the company, the field of the company. The memorandum consists of different clauses. - Name clause - Registered office clause - Object clause - Liability clause - Capital clause The article is involve of the rights and duties of the members and it is binding on all the members of company. 3)The memorandum of articles must be printed and be stamped endorsed by the members. The articles must be endorsed individually in front of witnesses. 4)For the incorporation of the company the promoter will take on the power of attorney as the person who has take on as power of attorney will be given the authority to act on behalf of the company. Also the person prearranged as power of attorney have the authority to make changes in the memorandum. 5)the declaration must be made by the members as per the essentials of Company act. 6)During the course of incorporation of the companies the recommended amount must be paid to the registrar. 8)After all the process and commended are fulfilled the company will receive a certificate for the known as “incorporation certificate” **Post Registration:** - Based on the type of company or business undertaken the licence for the company will be postulated. - The company incorporated must have a positioned office in India. It have access to all kinds of transactions. - The board of directors and shareholders meetings must be conducted as an when needed. - The companies must affirm records of accounts and ts Financial status and it must comply with the rules and regulations as prescribed by the act. - The newly incorporated company must register for GST registration when the business is related to goods and services supply. - The company may protect its copyrights,patents,trademarks,trade secrets by registering for Intellectual Property protection. **Principle of Registration of company:** The registration and incorporation of company is set up , the registered company has - Separate legal entity[\[3\]](#_ftn3) - Transferable of shares - Limited liability - Suing and flexibilty - When a company is being registered it will get apparent legal identity. And the believability of the companies gets increased it attracts more investors, clients and even customers. - The company gets limited liability fortification when it is being registered. As it considered as a separate legal entity the company’s liability is not on shareholders and on directors. This is profited in a way that the personal asset cannot be taken when the company becomes bankrupt. - When a company is registered it has better access to funding resources such as angel investment ,banking, venture capital. - A company which is enumerated has a perpetual succession which means that the company is not dependent on the founders or representatives of the company. If in case the company existing memberships change or new membership add on to the company the management of the company is unremitting. - For a registered company the shares of the company is easily exchangeable is laidback for the existing members to exist and also magnetizes new potential investors. - For the enhancement of the economic growth the government provides tax incentives for the registered company. **Disadvantages of registration of company:** - There is lot of legal complex techniques to be followed and there is high expense while incorporating a company. This may disuade the persons from incorporating a company. - As the company is a legal entity it will not be apparent and it will not disclose any kind of information to the low-members of the company. There are always circumscribed to give certain access. - The small company shareholders have no authority over the company like making decisions for the company. There is split up of control from ownership. - If it is a enlarges incorporated company they have a burden of contributing to the society and they must follow the rules and regulations stringently. - There will be advanced tax rate imposed when it is a huge incorporated company. In **Gilford Motor Co. v. Horne**[\[4\]](#_ftn4), the court held that a firm could not take encounter where its primary shareholder was liege to a covenant of restraint and had formed a company solely to get around the restriction. **Difference between Registration and Incorporation of companies:** Registration does not conclude in having a separate legal entity. The furthest step of registration is Incorporation of companies. For incorporation of company the company will be known as a separate legal entity and it contains its own assets and own debts in the name of the company. **Non compliance to Statutory authority** - The penalties enforced for the companies which have been incorporated various on its jurisdiction as to where the company is registered. - The statutory authority will entail monetary penalties when there is any breach transpired while incorporating the company. - If the company is involved in repeated violations. Or noncomplying with the rules and regulations inflict legal action can be taken against the companies or the members of the company can be held accountable for the breach done. - In a company if a director has done any kind of breach of duty it may lead to the ineligability of the directors from the company. - In some cases due to the non-compliance of authority the court may order the company to windup . - By not obeying the rules and regulations the company may subject to loss of Limited liability protection ie. When the company is being dissolved or insolvent the debts can be paid off from the owners of the company. - Due to continuous breach of duty the company may loss its character with the clients, investors,stakeholders etc. **Pre incorporation contract:** A firm is not subject to lawsuits based on per-incorporation agreements when it first forms. In English and Colonial Produce Co., Re., a lawyer[\[5\]](#_ftn5) produced the company’s documents and expended time and money registering it at the promoters’ request. However, the business was not found to be obligated to cover those costs and services. Agents may be held personally liable: The agents hired by a proposed business may be held personally liable. In **Kelner v. Baxter**[\[6\]](#_ftn6), the plaintiff’s wine was bought by the organizers of a proposed hotel business. The corporation was founded, however it entered liquidation before making a payment. The plaintiff held them personally accountable. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS:** The process of registering and incorporating a company is essential to creating a legal entity with rights, responsibilities, and credibility. Following the rules outlined in the Companies Act of 2013 guarantees that businesses function within a framework that encourages responsibility, transparency, and investor trust. Companies can establish a strong basis for their operations by carrying out the required processes, such as establishing a company with the right number of members, choosing a distinctive and legal name, and drafting the key documents like the Memorandum of Association (MoA) and Articles of Association (AoA). A few benefits of registration and incorporation include: distinct legal company status; limited liability protection for shareholders; financing source access; perpetual succession; and improved share marketability. It is essential to remember that the registration and incorporation processes can be difficult and expensive. Nevertheless, these difficulties are outweighed by the long-term advantages and legal safeguards provided to registered companies. In summary, registering and incorporating a business gives it legal recognition, credibility, development potential, and the ability to draw in clients and investors. Through adherence to legislative mandates and meeting post-registration responsibilities, businesses can function within a regulated environment that promotes stability, accessibility, and sustainable business methods. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1)requirements of incorporation of company [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) 26 June 1912 [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) salomon v.salomon & Co. Ltd. (1897)Established the principle of separate legal entity for a properly incorporated company. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Gilford Motor Co. v. Horne (1993) ch 935 [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) (1906) 2 Ch.435 [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) \[1866\] LR 2 CP 174 **Categories:** Articles, Company Law --- ### [Charan Singh @Charanjith Singh V State of Uttarakhand](https://lawfoyer.in/charan-singh-charanjith-singh-v-state-of-uttarakhand/) **Published:** April 8, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: SANGAMITHIRAI.V** **(Chettinad School of Law)** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE:** In the current case the appellant is the husband of the deceased woman. He has been convicted of rigorous punishment below section 304 B for 10 years below 498A for 2 years and section201 for 2 years below the Indian Penal Code and the appellant is challenging his conviction by an appeal. The husband, mother-in-law, and brother-in-law have allegedly been suspected of killing the deceased for not fulfilling the demand for a motorcycle which was asked on account of dowry. The appellant and two other accused were declared guilty by the trial court however the mother-in-law and brother-in-law were realized not guilt-ridden by the High Court which maintained the appellant’s conviction. But below 304B of IPC the high court lowered the appellant’s verdict from 10 years to 7 years. The respondents contended that there was inadequate proof to prove the appellants’ culpability below sections 304B and 498A of IPC. ***Keywords*:** *Dowry death, Brutality by husband and relatives**,** Indian Penal Code**,** Indian Evidence Act**,** Section113B of IEA* **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***Charan Singh @Charanjith Singh V State of Uttarakhand*Case Number***Criminal Appeal no 447 of 2012*Judgement Date***20th April 2023*Court***Supreme Court of India*Quorum***Abhay S.Oka, Rajesh Bindal *Author***Rajesh Bindal*Legal Provisions Involved***Section 304B ,498A,201 of IPC Section 113A of IEA**INTRODUCTION** In India, there are many cases relating to dowry death. If a woman dies within 7 years of the commencement of marriage there can be sufficient cause that the death happened due to dowry death. The appellant, Charan Singh also as known as Charanjith Singh has filed a petition stimulating his verdict and sentence below sections 304B,498A and 201 of the Indian Penal Code. The dispute case of Criminal Appeal no.447 of 2012. The appellant, the deceased spouse challenged the trial court verdict and sentenced him to ten years of rigorous labour below section 304B, two years below section 498A and 2 years below section 201 of IPC. The marriage of the appellants and the Chhilo Kaur which happened in 1993 is at the centre of this case. There have been claims that the appellants and his family members tormented the deceased and made demands for the dowry. The trial court found the appellant and the other two accused parties guilty after the trial. However, the mother-in-law and the brother-in-law’s conviction and punishment were quashed upon appeal to the Supreme Court, culminating in their acquittal. On the other hand, below section 304B of IPC, the High Court sustained the appellants’ conviction but decreased his sentence from ten years to seven years. Below sections 304B or 498A IPC, the defence argues that the evidence used in the trial did not support the appellants’ guilt. They assert that there is insufficient proof of brutality or harassment toward the deceased related to dowry demands soon before the death. **Essentials of Dowry Death[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)** - The woman must be imperilled to brutality or agitation by her husband or relatives. - Within 7 years of marriage, the death must occur. - The demise of the woman must be by blisters or by any bodily injury otherwise other than normal circumstances. - Such brutality must be met soon before the death of the woman. **Section 498A of IPC[**\[2\]**](#_ftn2)–**Brutality by husband or relatives The woman must be exposed to any brutality by their husband or by her relatives and may be punished for 3 years and also liable for a fine. **BACKGROUND OF THE JUDGEMENT:** The appellant in this case is Charan Singh who is also known as Charanjith Singh. The complaint is the husband of the dead Chilo Kaur. The death of Chilo Kaur took place in the State of Uttarakhand. Chilo Kaur got married to Charan Singh in the year 1993. After two months her in-laws started to demand her motorcycle as a dowry and Chilo Kaur when she visited her parental family informed her father about the dowry which she asked for. Her father pacified her and sent her back to her matrimonial home and promised that he would buy a motorcycle when he became financially capable. This demand was continued for a long time and later in addition, the appellant family also started to demand land from the Chilo Kaur family as dowry. On June 23 a person from that village Jagir Singh informed Chilo Kaur’s father that she had been murdered by her in-laws. They have immolated the body without informing the plaintiff. When the parents of the deceased visited the village, they came to know that their daughter had been strangled to death by her husband Charan Singh, mother-in-law Santo Kaur, and Brother-in-law Gurmeet Singh. Chilo Kaur’s father complained to the police based on this information and a probe was carried out. Below the “Section 304B (dowry death),498A (brutality to the married woman) and 201 (causing disappearance of evidence) of the Indian Penal Code(IPC)” ” the trial court found Charan Singh, Gurmeet Singh and Santo Kaur guilty parties filed an appeal with the Uttarakhand High Court, which maintained Charan Singh’s conviction but cleared Gurmeet Singh and Santo Kaur from conviction. The High Court did, however, shorten Singh’s sentence from 10 years to 7 years under section 304B of IPC. This appeal resulted from a challenge made to the High Court’s decision to reduce Charan Singh’s sentence before the Supreme Court of India. **FACTS OF THE CASE:** The plaintiff and the dead Chhilo Kaur were married in the year 1993. In the marriage, the dead of the father had given enough dowry to the appellant. But after two months the appellant started asking for a motor vehicle, and the deceased father promised that he would buy him when he was able to buy new a one. The deceased has been repeatedly sent to her parental home demanding dowry. Later the family of the appellant also started demanding land. The previous day on 23/06/1995 in the village of Bhojpuri Dam Jagir told the plaintiff that his daughter had been murdered by her in-laws. After receiving this knowledge the complaint along with his wife came to the Bhojpuri Dam village on 24.06.1995 and were extremely shocked to know that on 22.06.1995 at morning 8.00 am the plaintiff’s daughter was beaten up and garrotted to death by her husband Charan Singh, mother-in-law Santo Kaur, brother-in-law Gurmeet Singh. The marriage was only two years old, and the deceased was reduced to ashes without even informing her father. Her maternal grandma and two of her uncles were present at the time of cremation had seen wound marks and her teeth were wrecked. She was killed due to the non-satisfaction of the demand for the dowry of the motor vehicle and the land. The matter was investigated by the police and a charge sheet was filed against Charan Singh, Santo Kaur, and Gurmeet Singh. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether the appellant’s conviction and sentence below 304 B,498A is legally sustained? 2. Whether the evidence submitted by the plaintiff establishes brutality and harassment towards the deceased for the demand of dowry immediately before death. **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant succumbed that the verdict and sentence cannot be legally persistent either below section 304B or 498A of IPC as none of the witnesses has Stated that they were any harassment or brutality or demand for dowry was made soon before the death. Also, even the parents of the deceased, maternal grandmother and two maternal uncles Stated that she was subjected to brutality. The maternal grandmother and two maternal uncles were active at a distance near the village of the deceased, and they were also present at the time of cremation, and they did not raise any complaint to the police. It is further Stated that indication was also given to the father of the deceased who was living 290 km from the village. Further argued that Jagir Singh who was named by the plaintiff in the Fir was not produced by the hearing in evidence. He was the person who resided in the village of the deceased and informed about the death to the father of the deceased. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent succumbed that it is a case in which a young woman was assassinated by her in-laws in the yearning for dowry. The death of the woman was very unnatural, and the marriage was only two years old. The cremation happened without even informing the father of the deceased, The maternal grandmother and the two of her maternal uncles were present at the time of immolation and saw certain injury marks on the woman and also her tooth was broken. The maternal grandmother and two of her uncles did not complain to the police as they were being threatened. Also, there is a sufficient material record in the form of Statements provided by the witnesses that the family was demanding for dowry very repeatedly. There is sufficient indulgence by the High Court as they reduced the sentence of the appellant from 10 years to 7 years as provided below in “section 304B of IPC”. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS:** **“304B of Indian Penal Code 1860**[\[3\]](#_ftn3). Dowry death -When a woman’s death is initiated by bodily injury or burns or occurs due to circumstances other than normal and within 7 years of her marriage it must be shown that it must have happened soon before her death and the woman must be subjected to brutality or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband or in connection with any kind of demand for dowry. Such kind of death is known as dowry death and the husband shall be deemed to have the person who caused the death. **Explanation:** Dowry death will have the same meaning in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act 1961, and whoever commits the dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than 7 years and the term may extend to life imprisonment.” “**489A of Indian Penal Code 1860[**\[4\]**](#_ftn4). Husband or relative of the husband of a woman subjecting her to brutality:** When the husband or relatives of the husband subjects a woman to brutality the person can be punished for a term that may extend to 3 years and they can also be liable to fine. Explanation-the word brutality means. a) any kind of wilful conduct that is likely to drive a woman to suicide or cause any kind of grave injury or danger to life health or limb(can be mental or physical) b) harassment of the woman to coerce her or any person relating to or valuable security or account of failure by her or any person related to meet such demand.” “**Section 113B of Indian Evidence Act 1872[**\[5\]**](#_ftn5).Presumption as to dowry death** there is a question arising whether a person has committed dowry death and it is very much evident that soon before the demise such women have been subjected to brutality or harassment or in connection with any demand of dowry the court shall presume that such person had caused dowry death. Explanation-For the purpose of this section “dowry death” shall have the same meaning as in section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)” **JUDGEMENT** **a. RATIO DECIDENDI:** The petitioner contested the judgment and sentencing by Sections 304B, 498A, and 201 IPC. The defence contended that there was insufficient evidence to establish a presumption of dowry death because the dead had not been imperilled to any abuse or aggravation in the moments leading up to her death. Additionally, the defence claimed that the prosecution had failed to present a relevant witness who could have offered vital evidence. The prosecution argued that there was enough evidence in the file to back up the appellant’s frequent demands for dowry and acts of brutality. After hearing the arguments, the Supreme Court reviewed the available data. The Court found that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction below Section 304B or 498A IPC. The Court noted that none of the witnesses had mentioned that the deceased had been subjected to abuse or harassment, or that she had been asked for a dowry right before she passed away. The deceased’s uncles and maternal grandmother, who were present during the cremation, did not object or file a complaint, the court further Stated. The prosecution was judged to have failed to meet the requirements essential to cultivate an impertinence of dowry death, according to the court. Below sections 304B and 498A of the IPC, the Court quashed the appellant’s conviction and punishment. The appellant was cleared of all charges after the High Court’s decision was overruled. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** Charan Singh and Chilo Kaur were spouses. Chilo Kaur has been subjected to brutality in her in-law’s home for dowry by her husband and in-laws. Suddenly one day Chilo Kaur passed away. So the parents of Chilo Kaur filed a complaint against Charan Singh below section 304B,498A,201 of IPC. The prosecution side argued that the woman passed away only because of the dowry torture. The trial court, the defence side argued that there were no proper witnesses to prove the brutality and gave sentences of “two years below section 498A,2 years below section 201 and 10 years of hard imprisonment below section 304B of IPC”[\[6\]](#_ftn6).But on the appeal on High Court maintained Charan Singh’s sentence from 10 years to 7 years below section 304B. On the challenging of this judgement, they went for an appeal to the Supreme Court as there were no sufficient reasons to make Charan Singh liable below sections 304B,498A and 201 of IPC. Thus Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s verdict. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** **Sindo vs State of Punjab (2011)11SC 517[**\[7\]**](#_ftn7):** The court while looking into the scope of the purport of Section 304B if IPC and Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act presumption is contingent on the fact and the ingredients of Section 304B are satisfied to this current case. **Ranjeev Kumar vs State of Haryana (2013) 16 SC 640[**\[8\]**](#_ftn8):** The court overpowering that one of the main indispensable components of dowry death is that the woman must be subjected to brutality soon before she dies in connection with the demand of dowry. And also it must be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. In the current case the deceased was subject to brutality as severe injuries were seen before her death. **Prema.S.Rao vs Yadla Srinivasa[**\[9\]**](#_ftn9):** The court in this case also witnessed that the foremost component is that brutality or aggravation must occur soon before demise. **Baijnath v. State of M. P[**\[10\]**](#_ftn10):** The interpretation of 304B and 498A of IPC was considered in this case. **Ingredients:** - There must be bodily marks or any other cause other than usual conditions. - It must be within 7 years from marriage. - Brutality occurred soon before the demise. **Section 498A:** Below this section, brutality means wilful conduct that could drive a woman to suicide And also includes harassment towards the woman for meeting such demand. **Important Statutes Referred** “Indian Penal Code,1860” “Indian Evidence Act,1872” --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Essentials of Dowry Death section 304B of IPC [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Section 498A of IPC [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) 304B of Indian Penal Code 1860 [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) 489A of Indian Penal Code 1860 [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Section 113B of Indian Evidence Act 1872 [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) 304B of Indian Penal Code 1860,489A of Indian Penal Code 1860,201 of Indian Penal Code 1860 [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Sindo vs State of Punjab (2011)11SC 517 [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Ranjeev Kumar vs State of Haryana (2013) 16 SC 640 [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Prema.S.Rao vs Yadla Srinivasa [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Baijnath v. State of M.P **Categories:** Case Analysis, Criminal Law Cases --- ### [Breach of Contract: Meaning, Essentials, Principles, Cases and Remedies under Indian Contract Act, 1872](https://lawfoyer.in/breach-of-contract-meaning-essentials-principles-cases-and-remedies-under-indian-contract-act-1872/) **Published:** April 8, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Monika Gurjar, Dharmashastra National Law University, Jabalpur** **INTRODUCTION** The history of contract dates-back to ancient times where people used to enter into contract especially for domestic purposes. With the advancement of society and its need the nature of contract has also changed and had become complex. In a modern world, every individual is dependent on other, such interdependence is visible in modern complex market structure. Due to such interdependence, the consequences of breach (violation) of contract sometimes becomes grave. To regulate this, and to prevent such grave losses, the government came with the Indian Contract Act which provides remedy to the innocent parties of the contract. The Act in its Section 2 (h) says contract is as an agreement which is enforceable by law, which means the parties to the contract are legally bound to perform the promise made. The infringement or non-performance of the terms and conditions of the contract is called breach of contract. ***Keywords*:** contract, breach, damages, liquidated, unliquidated **INSTANCES OF BREACH OF CONTRACT** After the formation of contract fulfilling all the prerequisites provided under section 10 (agreements that became contract), the parties to the contract becomes bound to perform the promises made to each other in the form of terms & conditions in the contract. The act under its Section 37 mentions the right and duties of the parties to the contract. And any deviation or omission to perform the conditions of contract leads to the infringement of contract. The refusal of the either party to perform the promise made in the contract wholly, or if party is partially performing the contract and the other party does not give acquiescence to it, in such cases the party partially performing the promise becomes liable of breach of contract as provided in section 39 of the act. When there is a time bound contract (time is of essence of contract) between the parties, where the obligations need to be performed within the prescribed time limit, if any party who enters the contract fails to discharge his obligations within that fixed time limit, then such failure leads to breach of contract according to section 55 of the contract act. **REMEDIES UNDER INDIAN CONTRACT ACT** There are three kinds of remedy that are available to the party suffering from the breach of contract. These are; 1. **Compensation** In case of non-performance (breach) of contract, the remedy available to the non- breaching party is compensation for the actual loss caused to the party. Under the Indian contract act, this compensation is mentioned as damages which is present in two forms; 1. **Liquidated Damages:** As the term indicate liquidates damages is the amount to be paid in case of breach which is decided or determined by the parties before suffering the breach or during the time of formation of contract. Section 74 of the act says that if there is genuine pre estimate amount decided by the parties then, in such kind of cases actual loss to the party is not required to be proved, and mere breach of conditions of contract gave rise to damages under this section. 2. **Unliquidated Damages:** There are cases of violation of conditions of contract where the party had not decided the amount that will be payable if either partybreaches the contract, in such conditions reasonable compensation is decided by the court by taking into consideration the actual loss suffered, mitigating factors and the relation of loss with the act of breach. The aforementioned is given in section 73 of Indian Contract Act, 1872. 3. **Penalty** Section 74 deals with the case where the parties to the contract had stipulated the compensation or amount as penalty then the actual loss caused to the aggrieved party needs to be proved. The reason for penalty in the contract is to deter the parties and to ensure the performance of the contract. - **Specific Performance** The other remedy available to the aggrieved party is provided under section 10 of specific relief act whereby the party can get the decree of specific performance of contract from the court, to compel the party (breaching party) to perform the contract. The circumstances where such remedy can be given by the court is provided under the specific relief act. **RECENT DEVELOPMENTS** **1. M/s Devchand Construction v. Union of India[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)** In the case M/s Devchand Construction v. Union of India, the Kerala high court held that mere breach or failure to properly perform the terms of contract does not automatically give right to seek compensation in section 73 and 74 of Indian contract Act, but such breach shall cause actual damage or loss to the aggrieved party. Therefore, the section 73, 74 and 75 cannot be invoked if the party had not suffered any loss. **2. The Indian Hotels Company Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors**[**\[2\]**](#_ftn2) In case of “The Indian Hotels Company Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors”, the Delhi high court repeated the settled law that “section 74” of the Indian contract act which provides for liquidated damages cannot be invoked at stage of pre-formation of contract. **3. The Chairman, Coal India Limited & ors vs Star Cement Limited[**\[3\]**](#_ftn3)** The Meghalaya High Court, in **“The Chairman, Coal India Limited & ors vs Star Cement Limited” held that in event of breach of contract, the party claiming compensation from the party in breach is only entitled to the amount to the extent of loss suffered by it, unless there is** genuine pre-estimate **decided by the parties. **4.Emerge Tech Global Services P Ltd. v. Mr M.R. Vindhyasagar & Anr **In case of** “Emerge Tech Global Services P Ltd. v. Mr M.R. Vindhyasagar & Anr” the madras high court had made a distinction between the restitutionary damages and the compensatory damages. It further said that the purpose of compensatory damages is to made the good the loss caused to the aggrieved party and are provided in cases where the damages are identifiable. However, restitutionary damages are awarded to disgorge the benefit received by the breaching party at the expense of non- breaching party. **CONCLUSION** The idea behind the contract act is to prevent the parties of the contract from injustice and exploitation. In a contemporary scenario, contracts are made on days-to-days basis at different levels such as the contract between big corporate firms which involves a large amount of money. In such cases, breach of conditions of contract by any party puts the other party into great loss, which is unjust for that party. The Indian contract act by following the principle of natural justice provided appropriate remedy to the parties. The section 74 of the act creatively protects the interest of both the sides. **REFERENCES** **Online Articles / Sources Referred** > [But-for rule in Contract Law](https://blog.ipleaders.in/rule-contract-law/) Adjudication of claim for damages under Sections 73, 74 and 75 of Indian Contract Act, 1872 B. V. R. Sarma **Cases Referred** Devchand Construction v. Union of India The Indian Hotels Company Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors **The Chairman, Coal India Limited & ors vs Star Cement Limited Emerge Tech Global Services P Ltd. v. Mr M.R. Vindhyasagar & Anr **Statutes Referred** Indian Contract Act, 1872 --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Devchand Construction v. Union of India, (2022) SCC OnLine Ker 826 [\[2\]](#_ftnref2)The Indian Hotels Company Ltd. v. Union of India And Ors. 2022 LiveLaw (Del) 287 [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Coal India Ltd. v. Star Cement Ltd., (2023) SCC OnLine Megh 323 **Categories:** Articles, Contract Law --- ### [B.K. Pavitra v. Union of India, (2019) 16 SCC 129](https://lawfoyer.in/b-k-pavitra-v-union-of-india-2019-16-scc-129/) **Published:** March 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Gaurav Katiyar**, **University of Lucknow** ABSTRACT** The decision of B.K. Pavitra v. Union of India is one of the most important legal decisions in Indian history. The case is a consideration of the reservation system in public employment in Karnataka before a constitution bench. The toughest question was about promotion policy reserved for other backward classes in public service. In its judgment, the apex court reiterates constitutional mandate towards equal opportunity in public employment while recognizing the need for affirmative action to uplift historically marginalized communities. Reservations became more complicated with empirical evidence and indicators of backwardness as the basis for their designing. It stressed on states conducting periodic reviews and data collection to determine if reservations are still relevant considering changing social economic conditions. B.K. Pavitra v. Union of India is an epoch-making decision that upheld constitutional principles pertaining to reservation policies in public employment thereby guiding policymakers and courts on affirmative action while maintaining equality as well as justice. ***Keywords*:** B.K. Pavitra v. Union of India, Consequential seniority, public employment, Constitution, Reservation System. - CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***BK Pavitra and others v. Union of India*Case Number***Civil Appeal No. 2368 of 2011*Judgement Date***May 10, 2019*Court***SUPREME COURT OF INDIA*Quorum***Two-judge bench*Author***Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J*Citation***(2017) 4 SCC 620*Legal Provisions Involved***Article 16(4A), Article 14 of Constitution of India Section 3, Section 4 of Reservation Act 2018- INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** No cases in the history of Indian jurisprudence have created as much controversy and debate as the case of BK Pavitra vs. Union of India. This legal saga at its core traverses through a complex landscape of reservation policies particularly regarding reservations in promotions for Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) in government employment which is a bone of contention. It all began when this matter reached the prestigious chambers of Supreme Court of India where it became evident that there were very deep questions with regard to promoting social justice for historically marginalized communities, on one hand, and ensuring efficiency and meritocracy within public institutions, on the other. The originators behind this matter are understood to have relied upon constitutional provisions such as Articles 16(4A) and 16(4B) Constitution which empower State to make reservations with respect to promotions for SCs and STs if they are not adequately represented in public services. However, these provisions have been contested in interpretation and implementation leading to litigation that resonates far beyond courtrooms, resonating with socio-political fabric. In the backdrop of these developments, a number of policemen including BK Pavitra, a constable in the Karnataka State Reserve Police Force, have challenged the constitutionality of the Karnataka Extension of Consequential Seniority to Government Servants Promoted on the Basis of Reservation (to the Posts in the Civil Services of the State) Act, 2018. Inevitably, this act led to heated debates about equality, fairness and efficiency in public employment. The subsequent legal proceedings brought forth a subtle conversation on several aspects of reservation policies such as creamy layer concept, reservation versus efficient administration and judicial review scope in policy formulation. The case which traversed through various levels in India’s judicial hierarchy was widely watched by scholars on law, national policy makers and other stakeholders that marked it out as an important breaking point in evolving Indian reservation jurisprudence. In the end, BK Pavitra vs. Union of India’s verdict did not only solve the immediate legal problem, but also created everlasting case laws that have far-reaching implications on India’s affirmative action policies and general social justice talks. As attorneys we should carefully examine this breakthrough case with a view to decoding its doctrinal complexities, jurisprudential foundations and societal impacts. The aim is to extract knowledge from this analysis which can enlighten us about law as well as help in our quest for a better world characterized by fairness and equal distribution of resources. - FACTS OF THE CASE** - In the year 2002, Karnataka State passed a law which stated that practical seniority would be applied on promotion of SC/ST employees in public offices. This implies that an employee from a reserved category could be promoted before a general category senior employee. - By 2007, Supreme Court had ruled that the statute passed by Government of Karnataka was inconsistent with the Nagraj case’s guideline and therefore unconstitutional. - Afterwards, the government of Karnataka constituted a committee to verify fulfilment of requirements outlined under Nagraj Case namely; - 1. present backwardness of SC/ST - 2. scant representation and - 3. effect on administrative efficiency and re-enacted the former legislation again - LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** - Constitutional Validity: The main issue that arose was whether Karnataka’s policy providing reservation in promotions with consequential seniority to employees belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes was constitutionally valid. A provision of Article 16(4-A) empowers the state to provide for such reservations while still being subject to certain conditions. - Interpretation of Article 16(4-A): This was a central issue in the case. It sought to establish what powers were vested on the state as far as making provisions for promotion within its jurisdiction is concerned given particularly by words like “if the State considers necessary” and their implications for policy formulation and judicial review. - Affirmative Action: This case was all about affirmative action and how it helps to uplift groups that have historically been oppressed. It was incumbent upon the court to ensure equality of opportunity but also gave special protections for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. - Empirical Data and Backwardness Indicators: Another legal aspect raised by this matter is the significance of empirical data and backwardness indicators in framing reservation policies. The court considered whether states need to constantly collect data and undertake periodic reviews How could they know if these policies are effective? - Designing Reservation Policies: Another angle considered by the court was whether or not reservations should be tailored according to needs of changing social-economic scenarios. In doing so, it examined why such interventions ought to take into account changing circumstances as well as new needs among previously marginalized communities. - APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** - **Constitutional Violation**: The complainants maintained that the policy of Karnataka which reserved promotions on consequential seniority was a breach of equality, non-discrimination and equal opportunities principles as enshrined in Articles 14, 15 and 16 respectively of the Indian constitution. - **Merit-Based Promotion**: They were of the view that the reservation policy had led to the automatic promotion of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes resulting in undermining the efficiency and effectiveness of the merit based promotion system thus neglecting the constitutional command to maintain meritocracy. - **Indirect Discrimination**: It was alleged by them that this provision of its policy for consequential seniority amounted to indirect discrimination against employees belonging to other communities who were denied promotions which were given solely on behalf their cast, but not on basis their individual merits or qualifications entitling them among others. - **Violation of Fundamental Rights**: It was claimed that this reservation policy violated fundamental rights since it disadvantaged employees who suffered from its operation by denying them equal opportunity for advancement and exposing them to discriminatory treatment based purely on their caste. - **Constitutional Limits on Reservation**: According to the petitioners, Article 16(4-A) of the Constitution should be read in a nuanced manner and they submitted that though states were allowed by the law to make provisions for reservations in promotions, such provisions must not violate the principles of equality, efficiency and non-discrimination. - **Administrative Efficiency**: The respondents have shown how this policy has been adversely affecting administration efficiency. They claim that automatically giving seniority to those promoted from reserved categories regardless of their performance levels and qualifications limits the effectiveness of public institutions and is against public interest. - RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** - **Constitutional Mandate**: The defendants argued that reservation policy for promotions was in compliance with the constitutional mandate to secure social justice and representation of historically disadvantaged communities in public employment. They stated that Article 16(4-A) of the Constitution gives power to the State make reservations in promotion “if the state so deems necessary” giving it a wide discretion in forming such policies. - **Historical Injustice**: The respondents pointed out how these people had been discriminated against historically, put at a socio-economic disadvantage and never given an equal chance to compete for any job opportunities within the government. They therefore said, however, that reservation in promotion along with consequential seniority was necessary to remove the deeply rooted inequalities and uplift these communities allowing them upward mobility and socio-economic empowerment. - **Remedial Measure for Consequential Seniority**: The respondents pointed out that the provision for consequential seniority was justified as a remedial measure to ameliorate the cumulative disadvantages that the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes employees have been suffering as a result of historical injustices meted on them. They said that refusal to grant consequential seniority would mean continuing their under-representation in higher posts and further marginalizing them. - **Constitutional Guarantees of Equality**: The respondents stressed that reservation policy did not violate constitutional guarantees of equality under Articles 14, 15, and 16. They submitted that reservation was an affirmative action sanctioned by the constitution to address systemic inequities and guarantee substantive equality of opportunities for all citizens. - **Administrative Efficiency**: The respondents asserted that reservation policy on promotions in no way conflicted with administrative efficiency or meritocracy. They argued that diversity and inclusiveness in public institutions were important ingredients of quality governance while affirming necessity for reservations to enhance representation bureaucracy capable of addressing wide demands from society. - RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** - **Section 3 of the 2018 Reservation Act**– provides for reservation in promotion - **Section 4** **of the 2018 Reservation Act**– validates consequential seniority, backdated to 24th April 1978. - **Article 16(4B) of the Indian Constitution-** provides that reserved promotion posts for SCs and STs that remain unfilled can be carried forward to the next year. It also ensures that the ceiling on the reservation quota – capped at 50% by *Indra Sawhney* for these carried forward unfilled posts doesn’t apply to subsequent years. - **Article 16 (1)** **of the Indian Constitution-** there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters regarding employment or appointment to any office under the State. - **Article 335** **of the Indian Constitution-** The claims of the member of the Scheduled Castes and therefore the Scheduled Tribes shall be taken into consideration, consistently, with the maintenance of efficiency of administration within the making of appointments to services and posts in reference with the affairs to the Union or a State. - **Article 341 and 342** **of the Indian Constitution-** These articles define who would be Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes concerning any State or Union Territory. - JUDGEMENT** - RATIO DECIDENDI** - Based on the caste, consequential seniority is a privilege only for SC/ST employees in terms of promotions in public employment by Karnataka State which has been held as unconstitutional. - Article 16(4-A) allows for reservation of promotions to SC/ST employees but does not provide for automatic outcome of promotion. - The reservations in promotion should redress long years of injustice and inequalities while at the same time respecting the rights of non-reserved category workers. - For all employees, it should be explained why seniority should be based on merit and suitableness rather than caste considerations. - In order to promote overall efficiency in administration and accommodate different interests at stake, states are allowed by law some lee-way when making decision on whether reservation or promotions is proper or not. - The judgment highlights that affirmative action must be balanced with meritocracy and efficiency in governance. - Reservation policies must conform to constitutional norms; these principles will assist them in maintaining social justice and integrity within public institutions. - **OBITER DICTA** - Affirmative Action and Equality: - The signification of affirmative action measures for historical injustices. - Proactive steps to uplift marginalized communities and ensure their meaningful participation in public life have been recognized. - Merit and Efficiency: - The importance of meritocracy ion public administration was acknowledged by this court. - While efficiency was important, it was also deemed necessary to balance it with social justice, through reservation policies. - Consequential Seniority: - Condemned the automatic grant of consequential seniority to SC/ST promotees as unconstitutional. - Performance should decide who is senior rather than birth into a particular caste only. - State Discretion: - It emphasized on the discretionary nature of state power to provide reservations for promotions - Considering overall efficiency and interests of all stakeholders, discretion must be exercised judiciously. - Judicial Review: - Reaffirmed that judicial review plays a significant role in ensuring adherence to constitutional values - This court upheld that judiciary has its responsibility in protecting constitutional rights especially concerning reservation policies. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Sakal Papers Ltd. V. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 305](https://lawfoyer.in/sakal-papers-ltd-v-union-of-india-air-1962-sc-305/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** By – **Madhu Sri Chepuri** (Sri Padmavati Mahila Visva Vidyalayam) **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** According to the Constitution of India Article 19 is a fundamental right. It provides protection of rights related to freedom of speech etc. *Article 19 1(a) provides the right to freedom of speech and expression*[***\[1\]***](#_ftn1) *Article 19 1(g) provides the right to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business[**\[2\]**](#_ftn2)* . These are the rights which are provided to the citizens of India. Article 19 1(a) grants the rights to citizens to express their opinions,thoughts and odeas freely. The freedom to express includes speech, expressions, writing ,printing, visual representations etc. In the case of *Romesh Thappar vs state of Madras*[***\[3\]***](#_ftn3) ,the CJ Patanjali shastri observed that freedom to press is a part of article 19 and and there should be not interference from the state or any public authority and the right is not absolute which has some restrictions which are mentioned under article 19 2 of the Indian constitution. In *Prabhu dutt vs union of India*[\[4\]](#_ftn4), the Supreme court held that the right to know the information and news regarding the government administration is also included in the freedom of press. Article 19 1(g) provides that the citizens have the right and freedom to choose and practice the occupation,trade of their own choice but there are certain restrictions regarding in the interests of the general public,professional Qualifications or the sovereignty and integrity of India. In the landmark Judgement, *chindamanrao vs state of M.P. AIR 1951*[\[5\]](#_ftn5), the court held that the act made by the government is arbitrary and doesn’t fall under the reasonable restrictions. In the present case, the petitioner plead that his rights are violated under the provisions of The Newspaper Act 1956 and the Newspaper Order 1960. The Supreme Court of India in this case decided that the provisions made under those impugned acts are unconstitutional and they are violating the rights of citizens under Article 19 1(a),(g). In its Judgement the Supreme Court of India said that the law should not make any Acts which restricts the liberty of citizens. Any acts made should be reasonable and it should not violate any right which is given to the citizens under the Constitution of India. ***Keywords*** – **Freedom of speech and expression**, **Newspaper Regulation**, **Newspaper (Price and Page) Act, 1956**, **Daily Newspaper (Price and Page) Order,1960**, **Constitutional validity**, **Availability of newspaper**, **Article 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g)** **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. V. Union of India Civil Appeal No. 1168 of 1966*Case Number***Petition numbers 331 of 1960 and 67-68 of 1961*Judgement Date***25 September, 1961*Court***Supreme Court of India*Quorum*** J.R. Mudholkar, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, A.K. Sarkar, K.C. Das Gupta, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar*Author***J.R. Mudholkar*Citation***1962 AIR 305,1962 SCR (3) 842, AIR SUPREME COURT 305*Legal Provisions Involved***Constitution of India- Article 19(1)(a),19(1)(g) Newspaper (Pric and Page) Act,1956 Daily Newspaper (Price and Page) Order,1960 **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The Sakal Papers case is considered as a landmark case which revolves around the article 19 1(a) and 19 1(g) of the Indian constitution. The Judgement was a 5bench Judgement which consists of justices J.R. Mudholkar, Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, A.K. Sarkar, K.C. Das Gupta, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar. The bench had made significant observations on the law made by the government which is related to newspapers. It involved Sakal paper company and the state regarding the dispute of violation of article 19 guaranteed under constitution of India due to the provisions made under the impugned act and order. *Article 19 1(a) provides the right to freedom of speech and expression.* *Article 19 1(g) provides the right to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business .* The Newspaper Act, 1956: This act was passed by the central government which regulates the price of the paper and also the number of pages to be in the Newspaper . Section 3 states that the central government has the power to regulate prices and pages of newspapers. The Newspaper Order, 1960: This was made under the authority of the Act 1956. The court had preceded over the cases like *Romesh Thappar vs state of Madras, Prabhu dutt vs union of India* and gave a landmark decision . The bench had delivered the milestone Judgement stating that the provisions made by the government under the Newspaper Act 1956 and the Newspaper Order 1960 were unconstitutional. And also said that the freedom of press is included in the freedom of speech and expression. The Supreme Court of India said that government should make the laws which are according to the citizens and it shouldn’t restrict the liberty of citizens in any manner. **FACTS OF THE CASE** - Sakal paper is a daily newspaper published in Marathi language. - It is a private newspaper company named as SAKAL. - The company provides a total of 6pages in its Daily newspaper ie., on 5 weekdays and 4pages on 1day with 7np price. - It publishes newspapers with 10pages on Sundays by charging 12np. - The company allocated 40% space for advertising and rest for news. - The petitioner was the private company who has filed a Challenging petition against the acts which was passed by the government according to which the newspaper company has to charge the paper based upon the number of pages they provided. - There are total 3 petitions filed. - The first petition filed by the SAKAL paper company and the rest 2 petitions were filed by the readers of Daily newspaper. - In the writ petition, they challenged the provisions of 1956,1960 Act and order as they are violating the fundamental right which is given under Article 19 of the Constitution of India. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether the freedom of speech and expression include the freedom of publishing and circulation? 2. Whether the impugned Act and order is violation of right of the petitioners guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** - The petitioner’s counsels argued that the Newspaper Act and Newspaper Order violate the right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian constitution. - They contended that enforcing the impugned Act and order would force them to either raise the price from 7 nP to 8 nP per day or reduce the total number of pages to 24, thus violating Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. - They asserted that reducing the number of pages would curtail news content, affecting the circulation of the company. - Additionally, they highlighted that while currently all newspapers can issue any number of supplements as they choose, the Order would prevent them from doing so without government permission. - They argued that the Order would effectively compel them to increase prices or reduce pages for practically every newspaper in the country, while also restricting them from publishing supplements without extraneous restrictions, as they currently do. - They further emphasized that publishing advertisements is a trading activity that needs differentiation from an activity falling under Article 19(1)(a). **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** - The Respondent’s counsels argued that the Act aims to regulate newspaper prices relative to their pages. - They acknowledged that the impugned Order limits space for news and ideas but suggested newspapers could expand by raising prices. - They contended that the Act and Order address unfair competition and monopolies, promoting free speech. - The Respondent asserted that raising prices wouldn’t harm circulation, justifying restrictions in the public interest. They highlighted that newsprint imports are tied to 1957 page averages, limiting page increases. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** - **Article 19 1(a) of the Indian constitution: “***Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc. – (1) All citizens shall have the right-* - *(a) to freedom of speech and expression”.* - **Article 19 1(g) of the Indian constitution: “** *to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business”.* - **The Newspaper Act,1956: “***An Act to provide for the regulation of the prices charged for newspapers in relation to their pages and of matters connected therewith for the purpose of preventing unfair competition among newspapers so that newspapers may have fuller opportunities of freedom of expression”.* - **The Newspaper Order, 1960:** This was made by the central government which says that ” *fixing the maximum number of pages that might be published by a newspaper according to the charged price and prescribing the number of supplements that could be issued”.* **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** The bench had went by the petition made by the Sakal paper company and accepted the petition. They gone through the provisions of the 1956 Act and 1960 order and said that those provisions were violating the rights of citizens. In ***Romesh Thappar vs state of Madras*** the Supreme Court held that freedom of speech and expression also includes freedom of press and that right should not be violated by anyone. In ***Prabhu dutt vs union of India**,* the Supreme court held that the right to know the information and news regarding the government administration is also included in the freedom of press. By taking these cases as precedence, the Honourable Supreme Court delivered it’s Judgement as the provisions made by the government under the 1956,1960 Act and order were not reasonable and they are violating the rights which are guaranteed under constitution of India. In this case , the court had dismissed the claims due to lack of Evidence. The court had struck down the provisions of those impugned act and order and held them as unconstitutional. Further it stated that, the government should not make any laws which restricts the freedom of citizens and their fundamental rights. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** In the Sakal Papers case, the Supreme Court of India struck down the provisions of the 1956 and 1960 Acts, holding them unconstitutional. This case marked a milestone in the development of constitutional law in India, specifically concerning the freedom of speech and expression. It involved the violation of the fundamental right guaranteed to citizens under the Constitution. The right to freedom of speech and expression, including the freedom of the press, publication, circulation, and dissemination of opinions, is integral to our democratic society. Hence, the government should refrain from enacting any laws that interfere with citizens’ rights. **Important Cases Referred** 1. *Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras(1950 SCR 594, 607; AIR 1950 SC 124)* 2. *Patanjali Sastri, J.* 3. *Prabhu dutt vs union of India* **Important Statutes Referred** 1. Article 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g). 2. Section 3,4 of the Newspaper Act 1956. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Article 19 1(a) ,of the Indian constitution [http://https://www.bareactslive.com/ACA/ACT401.HTM](http://https:/www.bareactslive.com/ACA/ACT401.HTM) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Article 19 1(g), of the Indian constitution [http://https://www.bareactslive.com/ACA/ACT401.HTM](http://https:/www.bareactslive.com/ACA/ACT401.HTM) [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Romesh Thappar vs state of Madras[http://https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1218090/](http://https:/indiankanoon.org/doc/1218090/) [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Prabhu Dutt vs Union of India [https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1218090/](http://https:/indiankanoon.org/doc/1218090/) [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Chindamanrao VS State of M.P.AIR 1951[http://https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1218090/](http://https:/indiankanoon.org/doc/1218090/) **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [R Rajgopal V State Of Tamil Nadu 1994 6 SCC 632](https://lawfoyer.in/r-rajgopal-v-state-of-tamil-nadu-1994-6-scc-632/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** By – **SATPATHY GAYATREE GEETASWAROOP** ( BIRLA SCHOOL OF LAW, BIRLA GLOBAL UNIVERSITY, BHUNHANESHWAR) **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** This landmark judgment is about an auto driver and an autobiography writer who had been sentenced to death for murder during his life imprisonment he shared about the details of his illegal connections with prison and public officials involving in all sorts of illegal activities; as the writing revealed the truth behind the person in bar, his publication was attempted to being stopped to safeguard rights of petitioners through article 191a of the indian constitution as it had defamatory content to get published with an intention to defend themselves irrespective any true facts the court carefully discussed about the solitude rights of the citizen and decided the case by keeping both sides of the coin in mind which definitely has a crystal clear reflection on the judgment of it where the honble court held that even the higher authority or the government has no absolute right to infringe prior commentary which became an image of necessity of right to privacy and hence maintained the supremacy of law. ***Keywords*** – ***Right to privacy, freedom of press, defamation, auto Shankar, prior restraint***. **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***R Rajgopal V State Of Tamil Nadu*Case Number***Civil Writ Petition No. 264*Judgement Date***07th of October 1994*Court***The Supreme Court of India*Quorum***Hon’ble Shri Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy, Justice S.C. Sen*Author***Hon’ble Shri Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy*Citation***1995 AIR 264 1994 SCC(6)632 JT 1994(6) 514 1994 SCALE(4) 494*Legal Provisions Involved***Article 19(1)(a) r/w Article 19(2), Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, Section 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code and Official Secrets Act, 1923**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The case of R. Rajgopal and Ors v. State of Tamil Nadu established a pivotal precedent at the junction of freedom of speech, privacy rights, and the role of the press. It centered around Auto Shankar, a death row prisoner seeking to block the publication of his autobiography. The court’s ruling balanced the fundamental right to freedom of expression with the protection of individual privacy and matters of public interest. It emphasized the critical role of the press in scrutinizing public officials while upholding dignity and privacy. This landmark case highlighted the intricate principles guiding media authority and individuals’ rights, setting a precedent for courts to navigate disputes concerning freedom of speech while respecting privacy rights and public interest. **FACTS OF THE CASE** 1. The case centralized on Shankar an Auto driver, who was accused of murder and death sentence was declared for him. 2. While in the prison, he wrote an autobiography and mentioned everything about his activities and life including all about illegal connections with state officials involved in all sorts of unlawful activities. 3. Before his death sentence Shankar wrote requesting that to issue his biography in the entitled magazine. 4. The moment where the prisoner personnel got to know this immediately, the prison official warned the petitioner that his book contained absolutely false and defamatory information. 5. They threatened him that if the book gets published he will take required legal action against him. 6. Unwanted interference from higher authorities showed that they sought of tried to protect their freedom to publish under Article 19 of the Indian Constitution. 7. Despite their enormous efforts the High Court dismissed their petition as a result they brought the matter in front of the Supreme Court under Article 32 praying to preclude respondents from infringing the publication. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether any citizen of India can be prevented from publishing any others biography? 2. Whether the freedom of press qualifies the media to publish an unofficial content of a citizen’s life? 3. Whether the state public officers are qualified to assess a beforehand restraint on the media to forestall their defamation? 4. Whether the prison executives are entitled to prohibit the printing of a prisoner’s biography on the ground the that he is behind the bars and cannot use any legal remedies in order to protect his rights and thus they are authorized to act on behalf? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that, it’s the petitioner right to publish his biography. 2. The announcement of issuing was fragmented as his illegal connections with the state officials was disclosed. 3. Various instances happened where petitioner’s press was raided. 4. Apprehension occurred in petitioner about the damage that might be caused by the police. 5. They also contended that, the petitioner was free to publish his writing under Article 19(a) of the Indian Constitution. 6. Also argued that the communications made in the book are not true and shouldn’t be relied hence, it was a clear cut defamatory for the state. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsels for Respondent submitted that, the prisoner absolutely denied publishing any sort of book and he didn’t entitle any authority to his advocate for publishing the book or biography. - The publication is a fundamental right given in the Constitution of India but these has some restrictions too and these were violated in this case. - Allegations made about the prisoner officials that they have tortured him and had no sufficient, reasonable and valid grounds to justify it. - The book was written by Shankar himself hence all the facts and incidents mentioned in it were true. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** - **The Constitution of India** **Article 19(1)(a) –** All citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression. - **The Indian penal Code** **Section 499 – Defamation:** Anybody who tries to impute anyone by words, either by spoken, reading, signs or by visible representations intends to harm somebody’s reputation is said to be defaming that person. **Section 500 – Punishment for defamation:** Anybody who defames anybody will be punished with simple imprisonment for two years or with fine or both. **JUDGEMENT** The writing publication is not at all valid which means the state has the right to sue for defamation but preventing the publication before hand is not admissible also stated that auto Shankar has public records about his activities which was disrupting for the public in general so publication can be done with or without his consent but when it comes to his personal life if they publish something regarding this they will be invading and violating his privacy rights same is applicable to the public officials who had illegal connections with him have no right to stop publishing before time. **RATIO DECIDENDI** The Hon’ble Court held on the basis that articles books or stories can be published about Shankar because he has public records but when it comes to publishing about his personal private life including his family affairs consent must be taken prior to publishing regarding this because if not done so they are disregarding his or her right to privacy no body not even the state has no right to stop its countrymen from employing solitude rights. **OBITER DICTA** Right to privacy is the highlight of this decision therefore it ruled that every Indian citizen has the right except any kind of intervention and it is a crucial element of Article 21 so everybody can fully enjoy this right lawfully. **CONCLUSION& COMMENTS** From the above analysis we can say conclude that judgement for this case was quite tough to say as it was dealing with the fundamental right of an individual although the court did a fair and reasonable justice to this case but it would have been much better if the court could have decided to rename the book instead of a autobiography it could have been published just to make the public in general aware about the officials in their state. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** 1. Kharak Singh v the State of UP 1962 2. Govind v the State of MP 1975 3. Griswold v Connecticut 1965 4. Roe v Wade 1973 **Important Statutes Referred** 1. Official Secrets Act, 1923 2. The Constitution of India 3. The Indian Penal Code, 1860 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug & Ors v. Union Of India](https://lawfoyer.in/aruna-ramchandra-shanbaug-ors-v-union-of-india/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** By – SHAURYA SINGH KARASI (Chandigarh University) **ABSTRACT/HEADNOTE** The landmark case of Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug vs. Union Of India & Ors, decided on March 7, 2011, marked a significant turning point in the legal discourse surrounding euthanasia. It centered on the plight of Aruna Shanbaug, who tragically fell victim to a brutal assault in 1973 and has since remained in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) for 37 years, igniting a profound ethical and legal debate about her right to a dignified death. The court meticulously examined Aruna’s medical condition, acknowledging her irreversible brain damage caused by a hypoxic-ischemic injury, while also recognizing her minimal signs of consciousness and responsiveness. Furthermore, the judgment explored the global legal landscape regarding euthanasia, drawing upon examples from countries such as the United States, France, and Montana, where laws regarding physician-assisted death vary. Ultimately, the court affirmed the legality of passive euthanasia under specific circumstances, acknowledging the right of individuals or their designated caregivers to make decisions in the best interest of the patient’s well-being. The court also commended the dedicated care provided by the staff at KEM Hospital to Aruna over the years, underscoring the importance of compassionate healthcare for individuals in vulnerable states. In its decision, the court emphasized the sanctity of life while also affirming the principles of human dignity and autonomy in end-of-life care. **KEYWORDS** – : *Physician-assisted suicide, Euthanasia, Passive euthanasia, Mercy killing, Permanent vegetative state*. **CASE DETAILS** i) Judgment Clause TitleAruna Ramchandra Shanbaug vs. Union Of India & Orsii) Case NumberWrit Petition (Criminal) No. 115 of 2009Iii) Judgment Date March 7, 2011iv) CourtSupreme Courtv) Quorum2 Judgesvi) Author Justice Markandey Katju.vii) Citation(2011) 4 SCC 454viii)Legal Provisions Involved1. Article 21 of the Indian Constitution 2. Article 32 of the Indian Constitution 3. Article 226 of the Indian Constitution**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE JUDGMENT** Supreme Court of India inAruna Ramchandra Shanbaug v. Union of India & Ors took up the examination of moral and legal issues related to the right to death and euthanasia on 7 March 2011. At the center of this problem is Aruna Shanbaug, who suffered a stroke in 1973 and remained in a vegetative state for more than thirty years. Because of its personal nature, this case raises further questions about end-of-life care, patient management, and the ethics of caregivers. The crux of the case is a medical evaluation by a team of reputable doctors to assess Aruna’s physical and mental health. The findings confirmed that he was in a long-term coma and met the criteria for a stable vegetative state (PVS). Although Aruna is biological, he is not aware of himself and his environment and has no reactions or responses to stimuli.The decision also reflects the determination of the medical team at KEM Hospital in Mumbai, who worked tirelessly for 10 years to care for Aruna. almost forty years. Their unwavering commitment to their well-being despite the challenges reflects the complexity of the case and ethical considerations. The decision examines international practice and law regarding euthanasia and assisted suicide, providing a comprehensive overview of various practices around the world. Finally, the court’s decision not only resolves specific allegations against Arunashanbaug, but also establishes important principles that guide end of life decisions and protect the rights of patients in similar situations. context. This document is important in Indian law as it influences debates on euthanasia, patient autonomy and the right to die with dignity. **FACTS OF THE CASE** 1\. Aruna Shanbaug, a dedicated nurse at KEM Hospital in Mumbai, suffered unexpected beatings and injuries at the hands of her colleagues, resulting in brain damage and physical disability. 2. Aruna, who begins to fall into a coma after the attack, later transforms into a normal body, having not yet shown any consciousness, interaction or purposeful movement. This is surprising to those who know his heart. 3\. A team of compassionate doctors appointed by the Supreme Court conducted the medical examination of Aruna Shanbaug to better understand her condition. Their analysis showed that the plant permanently experiences the features of its state, the fine art of its struggle, without awareness of itself or its environment. 4\. Although she survived, Aruna’s physical health declined over time; Her reliance on bottle feeding for health and the stress of stomach and bladder incontinence remind people that her condition once caused a huge impact on her life. 5\. This case sparked a huge debate about the juxtaposition of legal and ethical aspects of euthanasia, patient freedom, and the fundamental right to die with dignity. The petitioner’s request to discontinue feeding Aruna is based on the belief that Aruna’s prolonged crop failure constitutes a serious violation of her dignity and freedom. 6\. In considering ethical issues, the Court carefully considers the principles of medical ethics, respect for the sanctity of the patient’s liberty, and the need for compassion in the face of the complexities inherent in hospital decision-making. . Such a desire. 7\. The judgment examines the finer laws surrounding euthanasia in India and abroad, finding that euthanasia remains illegal in India and many other countries around the world, unless there are special circumstances prescribed by law. Consider the evolution of social ethics. 8\. Additionally, the Court discussed the concept of brain death and its serious implications for end-of-life care and organ donation, with reference to the Human Organ Transplantation Act 1994; This means it is not possible for the dead brain to perform surgery. . Each nerve stalk demonstrates the importance of morality, dealing with matters of life and death. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. This case delves into the profound ethical, medical, and legal complexities surrounding euthanasia, specifically exploring the differences between active euthanasia, where lethal substances are intentionally administered to end a person’s life, and passive euthanasia, which involves withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatments. 2. At the heart of the legal discourse lies the fundamental question of an individual’s right to die with dignity, particularly when confronted with irreversible medical conditions like a persistent vegetative state (PVS). The court meticulously examines the extent to which this right is safeguarded under constitutional principles, including the cherished rights to life and personal liberty. 3. In light of the patient’s incapacitated state, the case prompts reflection on who should hold authority in making decisions concerning her medical care. The court delves into the role of surrogate decision-makers and the legal frameworks governing such decisions, particularly in cases where the patient’s preferences are not explicitly known. 4. Throughout its deliberations, the judgment carefully considers a myriad of medical ethics guidelines, international legal precedents, and legislative frameworks pertaining to euthanasia and end-of-life care. It scrutinizes how these standards intersect with domestic laws and constitutional provisions in India. 5. A nuanced examination of constitutional rights, notably Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty), unfolds within the context of end-of-life care and the withdrawal of life support. The court meticulously weighs the delicate balance between preserving life and honoring individual autonomy and dignity. 6. Central to the case are interpretations of medical terms such as brain death and persistent vegetative state. Drawing upon medical evidence and expert opinions, the court endeavors to establish clear criteria for diagnosing these conditions and determining appropriate medical interventions. 7. The judgment casts a discerning eye on the diverse array of laws and practices concerning euthanasia and end-of-life care observed in other jurisdictions, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and various European nations. It ponders the far-reaching implications of international practices in shaping legal frameworks and ethical considerations within the Indian context. **PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS** 1\. The petitioner’s legal counsels contended that Article 21 of the constitution of India inherently encompasses the right to die with dignity, at once hard the translation set forth inside the Gian Kaur vs. State of Punjab case. In Gian Kaur, it was established that the right to life does now not expand to include the right to die, a viewpoint vehemently contested with the aid of the petitioner in this case. 2\. notwithstanding acknowledging the procedural requirements of the court, the petitioner’s representatives underscored the paramount importance of addressing the center issue of the right to die with dignity, particularly in the poignant situation of people enduring a permanent vegetative state. Their emphasis on this fundamental element displays a heartfelt plea for recognition and redressal of what they perceive as a profound ethical imperative. 3\. The petitioner sensitively highlighted the tragic trajectory leading to Aruna Ramachandra Shanbaug’s plight, emphasizing the brutality of the attack and strangulation she persisted inside the hospital’s confines in 1973. This narrative, probably intended to awaken empathy, served to underscore the gravity and injustice of her quandary. 4\. Arguments likely revolved round Aruna Shanbaug’s dwindled high-quality of lifestyles and the absence of meaningful existence because of her incapacitating condition. The petitioner likely contended that artificially prolonging her existence simply perpetuates her struggling without imparting any tangible prospect of development, compelling the court docket to take into account the ethical implications of such prolongation. five. The petitioner in all likelihood marshaled medical evidence and professional evaluations declaring that Aruna Shanbaug’s condition satisfies the criteria warranting consideration for passive euthanasia. important to this argument will be the irrevocable nature of her country and the conspicuous absence of attention, compelling the court docket to confront the stark realities of her enduring ordeal. 6\. In maintaining the fundamental principle of autonomy and self-determination, the petitioner in all likelihood endorsed for people’ inherent proper to dictate choices regarding their personal lives, consisting of the prerogative to relieve their struggling thru passive euthanasia. This plea for autonomy underscores the vital of respecting man or woman organisation and dignity in topics of profound non-public importance. 7\. Moreover, the petitioner might also have drawn upon international legal precedents and practices concerning euthanasia and the right to die with dignity, searching for to contextualize their argument within a broader worldwide framework. through invoking evolving worldwide standards, the petitioner aimed to persuade the court to adopt a forward-thinking approach aligned with present day notions of human rights and dignity. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels representing the Respondents presented compelling arguments against the legalization of euthanasia, grounding their stance in the compassionate and familial fabric of Indian society. They voiced apprehensions regarding the potential for abuse, cautioning against scenarios where familial interests might collude with medical professionals to expedite the end of a patient’s life, perhaps for inheritances. Additionally, they highlighted the optimistic prospect of future medical breakthroughs that could potentially cure conditions deemed incurable today, urging caution in making irreversible decisions. 2. The Respondents emphasized the absence of any expressed wishes or directives from Aruna Shanbaug regarding life-sustaining treatments for her condition. They underscored the necessity for decisions regarding her care to be entrusted to a surrogate, given the profound uncertainty surrounding her preferences. 3. On the pivotal matter of determining the best course of action for a patient in a persistent vegetative state, the Respondents stressed the importance of entrusting such weighty decisions to a responsible and competent body of medical professionals, who possess the requisite expertise to navigate complex medical and ethical considerations. 4. The withdrawal of life support was characterized as an omission rather than an affirmative action to terminate life, aligning with advancements in medical technology that have shifted the paradigm of death away from traditional markers like breathing and heartbeat, toward criteria involving the functionality of the brain stem. 5. The Respondents argued for the primacy of expert medical opinion in determining the cessation of life-sustaining treatments, highlighting the potential for unforeseen medical advancements that could potentially revive patients in the near future, underscoring the need for cautious deliberation. 6. An objection was raised against Ms. Pinky Virani’s assertion of being the next friend of Aruna Shanbaug, contending that the true next friend should be considered as the dedicated staff of KEM Hospital, given their intimate involvement in her care and well-being over the years. 7. The principle of parens patriae jurisdiction was invoked, emphasizing the sovereign’s duty, in the interest of the public, to safeguard individuals under disability who lack a natural guardian. This underscored the State’s obligation to oversee and protect vulnerable individuals from exploitation or harm. 8. The Respondents proposed a procedural framework involving the establishment of a committee comprising medical experts, coupled with notifications to the State and close relatives of the patient. They suggested that a verdict be rendered by a High Court bench, pending legislative enactment by Parliament on this sensitive subject, reflecting a cautious approach to the evolving legal and ethical landscape surrounding euthanasia. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** Article 21 of the Indian Constitution stands as a cornerstone, safeguarding the cherished rights to life and personal liberty. While the judiciary has expansively interpreted this provision to encompass diverse facets of human dignity and quality of life, pivotal judicial precedents, such as Gian Kaur vs. State of Punjab, 1996(2) SCC 648, have clarified that the right to life does not explicitly encompass the right to die. This constitutional backdrop shapes the legal terrain concerning euthanasia and end-of-life decisions, delineating the boundaries within which such matters are evaluated. 2\. Article 32 of the Indian Constitution confers upon individuals the invaluable right to Constitutional Remedies, empowering them to directly seek redressal from the esteemed Supreme Court of India for the enforcement of their fundamental rights. However, unlike Article 226, which pertains to the jurisdiction of High Courts, Article 32 necessitates that a petitioner substantiate a violation of fundamental rights. This constitutional provision significantly influences the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, particularly in cases pertaining to euthanasia and the right to a dignified death. 3\. The judgment draws upon legal principles and precedents from diverse jurisdictions, notably the United States and England, to offer comparative insights into euthanasia laws and practices surrounding end-of-life care. These cross-jurisdictional references enrich the discourse by shedding light on the varied legal frameworks and approaches embraced by other nations grappling with analogous issues. 4\. Although not explicitly delineated in the provided excerpt, considerations of medical ethics and professional standards invariably intersect with legal deliberations concerning euthanasia. The court may rely upon expert medical opinions and ethical guidelines to navigate the intricate medical dimensions of the case, discerning the appropriateness of euthanasia or end-of-life care decisions in consonance with prevailing professional norms. 5\. Surrogate decision-making assumes paramount significance in cases where incapacitated patients necessitate medical determinations on their behalf. The excerpt intimates discussions concerning the relevance of surrogate perspectives, particularly in instances where the patient’s own wishes cannot be ascertained. Legal principles and standards guide these deliberations, ensuring that decisions are made in the best interests of the patient while respecting their autonomy and dignity. **JUDGMENT** **Ratio Decidendi:** 1\. The court asserts that decisions concerning the treatment of Aruna Shanbaug, who resides in a permanent vegetative state, should be entrusted to a surrogate due to her inability to express her own preferences. Recognizing the longstanding care provided by the staff of KEM Hospital, the court designates them as appropriate surrogates. 2\. Reaffirming the illegality of active euthanasia in India, the court deems it a criminal offense under the Indian Penal Code. It acknowledges the divergence in euthanasia laws worldwide, citing examples such as Belgium, where it is permissible under stringent conditions. 3\. Acknowledging the evolving understanding of death, the court expands its definition beyond mere cardiopulmonary function to encompass brain function. It discusses the legal principle of parens patriae, wherein the state assumes the role of protector for individuals with disabilities. **Obiter Dicta:** 1\. The judge expresses apprehension regarding societal readiness to embrace euthanasia or mercy killing, citing concerns over potential misuse. The judge advocates for a compassionate society that prioritizes the welfare of its vulnerable members. 2\. The judge advocates for the repeal of Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code, which criminalizes attempted suicide. Instead, the judge suggests a paradigm shift toward offering assistance and support to individuals struggling with suicidal tendencies. 3\. Emphasizing the state’s duty to safeguard individuals with disabilities, the court underscores the evolution of parens patriae jurisdiction from feudal times to a contemporary state responsibility. This highlights the state’s obligation to protect vulnerable individuals and uphold their rights in modern society. **CONCLUSION AND COMMENTS** In the case of Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug vs. Union Of India & Ors on March 7, 2011, the court delves deeply into the intricate web of legal, medical, and ethical questions surrounding euthanasia and the right to life. It carefully scrutinizes Aruna Shanbaug’s medical condition, shedding light on the complexities involved in assessing her level of consciousness and awareness. The court notably points out the absence of specific legislation governing euthanasia in India, emphasizing the urgent need for a clear legal framework to guide end-of-life care decisions. Furthermore, the judgment elucidates fundamental principles such as patient autonomy, beneficence, and surrogate decision-making, underlining the importance of honoring the wishes of individuals who are unable to make decisions for themselves. It also touches upon the doctrine of Parens Patriae, highlighting the state’s responsibility in safeguarding the interests of those who are unable to fend for themselves. Recognizing the invaluable role played by the compassionate staff of KEM Hospital in Aruna Shanbaug’s life, the court underscores the profound significance of human dignity and compassion in the realm of medical decision-making. By doing so, it emphasizes the importance of upholding the dignity and welfare of patients in vulnerable situations. In essence, the judgment offers profound insights into the complex moral and legal considerations surrounding end-of-life care, serving as a guiding light for future cases grappling with similar issues, both within India and on a global scale. **REFERENCES** a. **Important Cases Referred** 1. Vikram Deo Singh Tomar vs. State of Bihar, 1988 (Supp) SCC 734 2. P. Rathinam vs. Union of India and another (1994) 3 SCC 394 3. Charan Lal Sahu vs. Union of India (1990) 1 SCC 613 b. **Important Statutes Referred** 1. Indian Penal Code (IPC): Referred to regarding the legality of euthanasia and assisted suicide. 2. Article 21 of the Constitution: Discussed in the context of the right to life with human dignity. 3. Section 309 IPC: Dealing with the attempt to commit suicide. 4. Law Commission of India, 2006: Referred to in the context of ‘Medical Treatment to Terminally Ill Patients.’ **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [BHAGWAN SINGH VS DILIP SINGH](https://lawfoyer.in/bhagwan-singh-vs-dilip-singh/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** By – **Sushree sangita Panda** (**BIRLA GLOBAL UNIVERSITY, BHUBANESWAR**) **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** This case is based on Special Leave Petition, which has been arise from the order of the High Court that grants bail to the accused (respondent) who were alleged of gang rape of a minor girl. Not only gang rape but also threatening and extorting her for the same. This case has been filed by the uncle of that minor girl (appellant) on challenging the granting of bail by High Court and arguing about the seriousness or depth of the offences, the risk and possibility of evidence tampering and threatening to the evidence etc. The Respondent has argued that there is political motivation behind the case and also claimed their guilt freeness. By considering all the factors like nature of accusation, chance of tampering and threatening evidence etc. the Supreme Court examine the bail petition. This step of Supreme Court shows the importance of fair trial, and effect of the same in the society as well as the role of the court to avoid miscarriage of justice. Subsequently the Apex court throws away the granted bail and ordered the respondents to hand themselves over to the judiciary by stressing over the requirement of a comprehensive review of facts and evidences. ***Keywords*** – Gang rape, extortion, special leave petition, political motivation, discretion, witness depositions, minor girl **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***“Bhagwan Singh vs. Dilip Kumar @ Deepu @ Deepak.”*Case Number***6199 of 2023*Judgement Date***23rd august 2023*Court***Supreme Court of India*Quorum***Aravind Kumar, S. Ravindra Bhat*Author***Aravind Kumar*Citation***2023SCC online SC 1059*Legal Provisions Involved***Sec 376 D, 384, AND 506 of IPC Sec 326, 376 (2)(n), 376 DA of POCSO Sec 439 of CrPC Sec 66 of IT Act, 2000**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF CASE** Bhagwan Singh v. Dilip Kumar @ Deepu @ Deepak involves severe charges of gang rape, threats, and extortion against a juvenile girl. The appellant, Bhagwan Singh, petitioned the Supreme Court for special permission to challenge a High Court ruling which granted bail to the respondents in the case. The case has important legal and cultural ramifications for the granting of bail in situations involving horrendous crimes against kids. Vivek, Deepak, and Netram raped Bhagwan Singh’s niece and warned her not to tell anybody about the occurrence. Netram and Vivek were charged, with and Deepak later implicated. Despite the gravity of the offences and the probable harm to witnesses and evidence tampering, the High Court granted the respondent’s bail. This result caused the appellant to file an appeal with the Supreme Court, seeking the annulment of the High Court’s bail order. The case involves difficult legal concerns related to bail, witness protection, and the pursuit of justice in situations involving crimes against minors. It emphasises the requirement for a fair trial and the seriousness of offences while ruling on bail petitions. **FACTS OF THE CASE** This is a case which is based on gangrape to a juvenile/minor girl. In this case, the respondents were alleged of gang rape to a minor girl. In the case it has been alleged that the accused VIVEK, one of the accused, seduced the minor girl and took her to a hotel. After that he along with the co accused namely Deepak and Netram drugged her. When she was unconscious, they gang raped her along with shoot the video of that work. After getting her consciousness back, The girl tried to go back her home and during that time she had been threatened to not disclose anything in front of anyone. If she does anything like that, they will make the rape video viral and this will damage the family of her. Primarily the girl remained silent and didn’t say anything about the occurrence. During the family function at her home, the accused had threatened and extorted money and jewellery from her as well. After this incident the girl spoke out everything in front of her family and on the basis of her words the appellant, uncle of the victim had filed a complaint in the police station. The case went to trial and during the trial period the High Court grant bail to the accused. By challenging the decision of the High Court, victim’s uncle filled and Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court of India. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether the High Court’s grant of bail to the respondents was warranted considering the nature of the accused offences, which include gang rape, extortion, and threat? 2. Whether the probable danger of tampering with evidence and frightening witnesses appropriately weighed by the High Court while granted bail to the respondents? 3. Whether the court should consider the societal effect and sensitivity surrounding cases of sexual offences against minors when considering whether to grant bail to the accused? 4. Whether the bail granted to the respondents should be cancelled to guarantee a fair trial, safeguard the victim’s rights, and maintain public faith in the legal system? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that; 1. The petitioner claims that the charges against the accused are exceedingly serious, including gang rape, threats, and extortion against a minor girl. These offences have grave legal consequences and need close judicial investigation. 2. 2. He also submitted that the victim’s remarks recorded under Sections 161 and 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) and her deposition before the court establishes a prima facie case against the accused. The victim’s persistent statements about the accused’s involvement in the offences are adequate grounds for conviction. 3. The petitioner emphasises the considerable danger of witness intimidation presented by the defendants, particularly considering their claimed threats and aggressive techniques. The victim’s and her family members’ safety and security, as well as those of other prospective witnesses, are top priorities that the court must carefully examine. 4. The petitioner highlights concern regarding suspected evidence tampering, such as missing entries in hotel registers and erased CCTV video, calling into question the investigation’s integrity and the credibility of the defence’s evidence. 5. While conceding the delay in submitting the complaint, the petitioner claims that genuine grounds exist for the delay, such as the victim’s fear of retaliation and the accused’s repeated threats. The delay should not impair the credibility of the claims or diminish the gravity of the crimes committed. 6. The petitioner also emphasises the necessity of securing a fair trial for all parties concerned and protecting the public interest in pursuing horrific crimes, particularly those involving assault against minors. Granting bail to the accused may jeopardise the judicial process and undermine justice for the victim and family. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that; 1. The respondent denies the allegations, emphasising that one of the accused, Deepak, had no direct link to the rape and extortion episode. They claim he was unfairly implicated to settle political scores, as proven by the absence of evidence tying him to the crimes. 2. The respondents argue that there is insufficient evidence to implicate them in the alleged crimes. They emphasise the lack of definitive evidence, such as retrieved CCTV video or other supporting evidence, to back up the prosecution’s case against them. 3. The responses provide an alternate narrative that contradicts the prosecution’s account of events. 4. The respondents also raised points about the delay in bringing the complaint, questioning the intentions behind the timing of the charges and claiming that it may damage the prosecution’s case. They contend that the delay calls into question the truth of the charges and demonstrates the complainant’s lack of urgency or sincerity. 5. The respondents emphasise the basic premise of presumption of innocence, asserting their entitlement to fair treatment under the law and arguing against pre-judgment or discriminatory treatment based on untested charges. They ask for a fair and balanced approach to the matter while protecting their rights as accused persons. 6. Finally, the respondents highlighted the probable repercussions of long-term detention before trial, such as disruptions to their life and livelihood. They advocate for their right to liberty and fair treatment in the court process, opposing pretrial imprisonment without adequate proof of guilt. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** This case involves the following legal provisions: 1. Sections 376D, 384, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) address offences such as rape, extortion, and criminal intimidation, respectively. 2. provision 66D of the Information Technology Act of 2000 – This provision addresses the penalties for cheating by personation while utilising a computer resource. 3. Section 66 of the Information Technology Act of 2000 addresses computer-related offences such as hacking and data theft. 4. provision 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) – This provision addresses the competence of the High Court and the Court of Sessions to issue bail. 5. Sections 376(2)(n) and 376DA of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) deal with severe types of rape. 6. provision 326 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act – Under the POCSO Act, this provision addresses the punishment for causing grave harm by an acid assault, among other things. **JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court of India ruled in the matter of Bhagwan Singh v. Dilip Kumar @ Deepu @ Deepak on August 23, 2023 and overturned the High Court ruling granted bail to the accused/respondents. While deciding the matter, the Apex court ruled against the decision of High Court. The court held that the grant of bail by the High Court is not justified and it has been rejected on the same ground. The Apex Court after setting aside this also directed the accused/respondents to surrender before the court having competent jurisdiction oof the matter, within 2 weeks of this judgement. If they fail to do so, they will be taken into custody as directed by the Supreme Court of India. Supreme Court also stated that the respondents will also be in the liberty to seek bail from the competent court only after the completion of rest procedure of the case. As directed by the Apex Court the High Court will decide this case on its own merit and decide the final verdict of the case without being influenced by anyone. The jurisdictional court was admonished not to be swayed by the observations made in the judgement. - **RATIO DECIDENDI** While the respondent argued about the delay in making the complaint, the court observed its practicality and understood the submission from the appellant side and held that delay in making complaint doesn’t diminish the gravity of case. The court highlighted bail’s discretionary character while also protecting the rights of victims and the impartiality of the criminal justice system. It also addressed the significance of ensuring a fair trial for everyone concerned, as well as safeguarding witnesses from intimidation and coercion. By considering the age of the victim the court understood the practicality of the situation and approved the appeal as well as order the High Court to decide the case without being biased to anyone. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The decision of the Supreme court in this case proves the fairness and transparency of the judicial system in India. By quashing the bail order of the high court after observing the whole fact, is a great example of dedication of the judiciary towards equal and fair justice.This decision concluded that the balance between both rights of victim and safeguard of them are equally important to decide a case. By denying the bail order of the High Court, Apex court also shows how important it is to analyse every fact critically and give the judgement on the same. This judgement also mentioned about the basis of judgement which is the concept of Natural Justice without being biased towards anyone. And finally, this verdict again made the public to believe on the judicial system as it serves justice with the most transparent way possible. **Important statute referred** 1. The Constitution of India 2. Indian Penal Code,1860 3. Protection Of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act,2012 4. Information and Technology Act,2000 5. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 --- 1. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Right To Education under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution](https://lawfoyer.in/right-to-education-under-article-21-of-the-indian-constitution/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Hemant Jarwal, University Five Year Law College, University Of Rajasthan

INTRODUCTION

"Knowledge is power. Information is liberating. Education is the premise of progress, in every society, in every family."- Kofi Annan, Former Secretary-General of the United Nations. From the Time a child is born, his or her education begins. At first, education is an informal process in which an infant watches others and learns from them by either copying them or listening to them. As the infant grows into a young child, the process of education becomes more formal by going to preschool. In grade school, academic lessons become the focus of education as a child moves through the school system. But it is not that simple, education is about much more than the simple learning of facts. Education in the bigger picture is the process of encouraging discovery and innovation in different sectors. From the time we are born, humans keep learning and still learning and will continue learning in the future. Sometimes consciously and many times subconsciously. Education is an effective method in different fields of acquiring knowledge, values, skills, habits, and beliefs. So after knowing and considering all the factors that tell us why education is so important and how can it change our life and our society's thinking or enhance their perspective from narrow mind to broad mind and how it can help in the overall growth and development of the nation. That’s why To eradicate education poverty, the government of India proposed the Right to Education Act (RTE) in 2009. It came into effect on 1 April 2010. It aims to provide free and compulsory education to children aged six to fourteen years under Article 21-A. Ensure that every child has his or her right to get a quality elementary education. This right also ensures the provision of fundamental or primary education for those who have not completed their basic education. Right to education includes the right to free, compulsory primary education for all, an obligation to develop secondary education accessible to all and an obligation to develop equitable access to higher education. India has a total of 19% of the children population in the world and almost one-third of the illiterate population in the world. But India can change this fact and figures by becoming the most educated population by using its resources to educate its youth. Education is a powerful tool for the uneducated population to grow and fully participate as citizens. And the Right to Education is also universally recognized by the main international instrument, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as a basic human right to right to education in Article 26 “Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit”.

Keywords : Right to Education, Article 21-A, Article 21  Constitution of India, Article 45, 86th Constitutional Amendment Act, UDHR, Right to Education Act.

Meaning, Definition & Explanation

Education is the way that gives us the ideas, skills, techniques, information, and knowledge to know, understand, and respect the duties we have towards our society, families, and nation. Education helps a person to get knowledge and enhance their confidence in life. It can help us to improve our careers and our personal growth. And as an educated person can become a great citizen in society and in the end educated persons help in the development and growth of society and nation. It helps you to make the right decisions in life. Therefore education is very important in life is because it helps everyone develop a good perspective of looking at the world and our society. Education helps us in getting new ideas and exploring new ideas. An uneducated person can never be fully aware of his/her responsibilities towards each other as human beings and the world as a whole. As human beings, we have to give back to the society that we have used and where we live in so that we can make it a better place to live for everybody. Proper education teaches an individual to think beyond their interests and helps them in developing an ability to make the world a happier, safer place for the next generation. It is difficult to give the answer of the question  What is education in a few lines. Because the Definition of education is given differently by different people at different times. Therefore, education cannot be defined or described by one's precise or perfect definition. The definitions given by different educators about its education are given below:
  1. According to Socrates "Education means the bring out of the ideas of universal validity which are latent in the mind of every man."
  2. According to Plato "Education is the capacity to feel pleasure and pain at the right moment it develops in the body and in the soul of the student all the beauty and all the perfection which he capable of."
  3. According to Aristotle "Education is the creation of a sound mind in a sound body it develops men's faculty especially his mind so that he may be able to enjoy the implementation of supreme court goodness and beauty of which perfect happiness essentially consists."

Historical Background / Evolution of Education:

The importance of education in India has been seen from the ancient times. Human education in India can be traced back to ancient times when the Gurukul system was working. In this Guru-Shishya (teacher-disciple) system, those who wanted to study would go to teachers and request to be accepted as a disciple. If they were accepted then the disciple had to stay at the teacher’s place, and apart from learning, he also had to help in other household chores. This system made a strong tie between the Guru and Shishya, and it also taught the disciple that how to run a household. Teachers of that era taught all the subjects in open classrooms like under shadow of trees, under the sun. Languages like Sanskrit and holy scripture, as well as metaphysics and mathematics, were part of the learning process. Learning was based more on the understanding their surroundings and nature, not just memorizing verses or shlokas. This education system got an impetus and developed with universities like Nalanda, Ujjain, Takshashila, and Vikramshila. Lord Thomas Babington Macaulay brought the modern form of education and the English language to India in the 1830s. The development of education in India was started by classroom confinement, and by teaching modern subjects like science and maths were part of this curriculum. Subjects like metaphysics and philosophy were deemed unnecessary or not important at that time. And you know what The right to education was initially not included as a fundamental right in the constitution but was included as a Directive Principle under Article 45 which states that it is the duty of the state to endeavor to provide, within a period of 10 years from the commencement of the constitution, for free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of 14 years. The directive in Article 45 was not limited to merely primary education rather it extends up to providing free education up to the age of 14 years, whatever the stage of education it came to. Therefore, education for children of this age group should have been free. During this period the Supreme Court also held that  the ‘Right to education' get from other Articles of the Constitution such as Articles 21, 24, 30(i), and 39(e) & (f). The Court emphasized that the primary obligation placed on the state by Article 45 is “to provide for free and compulsory education for children” and it can be discharged through government and aided school and that Article 45 does not required that obligation to be discharged at the expense of the minority communities.

Comparison of Right to Education with other Countries:

Status of Right to Education in India:

Like in India the Right to Education is mentioned under the Constitution of India by The 86th  Constitutional Amendment Act, 2002 which is made with objective to protect the citizen’s rights of education, as well as to overcome the challenges in India regarding education. The 86th Amendment act 2002, makes three exact provisions in Constitution to provide understanding of free and compulsory education to children’s of age between 6 to 14 years as a Fundamental Right. These are as follows:-
  1. Adding Article 21A in part III initiated that every child has a right to full time elementary education of satisfactory and equitable quality in a formal school which satisfies certain essential norms and standards.
  2. Bring alteration and modification in Article 45 and substituted as the state shall endeavors to assure early childhood care and free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of 6 years.
  3. The insertion of new clause in Article 51 A, clearly mandates the parents or guardians to furnish opportunities for education of their children between the age group of 6 to 14 years.[Article 51A (k)].

Status of Right to Education in the United States of America:

The right to an education is guaranteed and recognized as a fundamental or basic Human right by the  International law in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Similarly, UNESCO’s Constitution sets out the right to an education as necessary in order to “prepare the children of the world for the responsibilities of freedom.” However — and this might come as a surprise to many Americans — The U.S. Constitution mentions no such right nor has the U.S. Supreme Court recognized one. But All kids living in the United States have the right to a free public education. And the Constitution requires that all kids be given equal educational opportunity no matter what their race, ethnic background, religion, or sex, or whether they are rich or poor, citizen or non-citizen. Even if you are in this country illegally, you have the right to go to public school. In addition to this constitutional guarantee of an equal education, many federal, state and local laws also protect students against discrimination in education based on sexual orientation or disability, including pregnancy and HIV status. In fact, even though some kids may complain about having to go to school, the right to an equal educational opportunity is one of the most valuable rights you have. The Supreme Court said this in the landmark Brown v. Board of Education case when it struck down race segregation in public schools. Many people assume that the Federal Court had found a federal Right to Education in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). However the court in that case did not held that all students had a right to an education. Rather, it held only that where a state makes public education available, it cannot withhold access to education based on race. Further, it espoused — or at least suggested the possibility of — an individual right to an education. The Federal court came closer to recognizing a federal right to education in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). There, the state of Texas had foreclosed public school education for undocumented students, and plaintiffs had made an Equal Protection claim. The court found that even though education was not a fundamental right, the state did not have a sufficient interest to withhold education from students whose parents had brought them to this country illegally. Since education is not specifically mentioned as a right or a power of the federal government, Congress does not have the authority to directly regulate education. Education is not currently recognized as a fundamental right in the United States. In 1973’s San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court found that education is not explicitly protected under the U.S. Constitution, and its precedent has remained unchallenged at the Supreme Court for over 30 years. Advocates for the right to public education have offered divergent strategies to overcoming the ruling, but none has found success in federal court.

Types / Kinds of Education in India:

Education means the development of the learning and thinking process. And It is not limited to the walls of the classroom but it goes beyond the four walls of the classroom. It is all about gaining experience and therefore we can divide education into three main types:
  1. Formal Education.
  2. Informal Education.
  3. Non-formal Education.
  • Formal Education: This is also known as formal learning which usually takes place within the premises of the school. It is the type of education where the basic academic knowledge that a child learns in a formal manner.This continues from an elementary school to secondary school and further on to colleges. Such type of education is provided by specially qualified teachers who are efficient enough with the art of instruction.Here both the student and the teacher are both aware of the facts and involve themselves into a process of education. Some of the examples of formal education are classroom learning, Institute grading/certification, or planned education of different subjects with a proper syllabus acquired by attending an institution.
  • Informal Education: This is the type of education where a parent teach his/her child things that are beyond academics like preparing a meal or riding a bicycle. People can also get informal education through books or educational websites. This is an education that is not taught in schools through a proper learning method. It is not pre-determined nor deliberate. It is an experience that an individual feel by undergoing regular practice and observing others. Some of the examples are like by teaching a child with some basic personality traits, learning a mother tongue, performing certain extracurricular activities, etc.
  • Non-formal Education: It is a type of education where a person learn about adult basic education, adult literacy education, or skill development. It can take different forms of learning, which is consistently and systematically provided in order to develop a particular skill or ability in an individual.This type of education is highly flexible and it includes a wide range of activities. Some of the examples may be fitness programs, community-based adult education courses, and free courses on different platforms, etc.

Constitutional Provisions Related to the Right to Education

The right to education is a constitutionally protected right in India. The Constitutional provisions which supports and protected the right to education under the constitution of India are:
  1. Article 21-A: It was included to make the right to education a Fundamental rightfor children aged 6 to 14. It states that “The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of six to fourteen years in such manner as the State may, by law, determine”.This provision was not included in the Constitution of India 1950. It was inserted by the Constitution (Eighty-sixth Amendment) Act, 2010.
  2. Article 45: It talks about the provision for free and compulsory education for children. It states that “The State shall endeavour to provide, within a period of ten years from the commencement of this Constitution, for free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years”.
  3. Article 46: It talks about the Promotion of educational and economic interests of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other weaker sections under which it is clearly stated that “The State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation”.
  4. Article 51-A(k): was added as the fundamental duties under Part IV of the Indian Constitution which states that “who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child or, as the case may be, ward between the age of six and fourteen years”.

Legislative Acts Related to the Right to Education:

Right to Education (RTE) Act 2009

The Parliament has enacted the Right to Education Act 2009 (RTE Act) with the objective of regulating the degradation of the standard of the education system and uplifting the education imparting procedure by implementing specific provisions that required certain reformations to live up to the spirit of catering a quality and equitable education irrespective of caste, creed, gender economic and social background. The Act was enacted on 4th August 2009 and came into force on 1st April 2010. The principal features of the Act are as follows:
  1. The Act clearly mentions that education is the Fundamental Right of every child.
  2. Private schools must keep 25% of seats reserved for children belonging to the backward classes in terms of social background.
  3. The Act also provide educational rights for dropout students.
  4. Unrecognized schools are barred and are not allowed from interviewing a child or a parent for admission.
  5. Schools are barred and are not allowed to charge any capitation fees at any step while providing admission to a child.
  6. The Children who are pursuing elementary or primary education shall not be expelled, held back, or pressured to pass a board examination.
  7. The Act mandates that every government and aided schools should create a School Management Committee which composed of 75% of members as parents or guardians.
  8. The Act strictly prohibited physical punishment, mental harassment and private tuition by the teachers.
  9. The Act states that the provisions for a child’s admission to an appropriate class should be based on his/her age in the event that child has never been admitted to any school. And in order To help the child to keep up with other students, provisions relating to special training have also been mentioned in the Act.
The RTE Act 2009 acted as a tool in accelerating and developing the spirit of imparting free and compulsory elementary education to children between the age group of 6 to 14 years. Subsequent to the enforcement of the Act, a drastic change came about in the standard of education both in access and enrolment levels; literacy rates of the states and also enhanced at large. However, lately, due to a lack of an appropriate regulatory framework, the practical application and compliance with the provisions of the Act are facing repeated failure.

Landmark Cases and Judgement

 Case: - 1 Mohini Jain vs State of Karnataka(1992). In this case Miss Mohini Jain, a resident of Meerut applied for the admission in the MBBS course in a session which was commencing from 1991 in a private medical college located in the state of Karnataka. The college management asked her to deposit a sum of Rs 60000/- as the tuition fee for the first year and also to show a bank guarantee of the amount equal to the fee for the remaining year. When Miss Jain’s father questioned the management that the asked amount was beyond his reach, the management denied Ms. Jain’s admission to the medical college. Then Miss Jain informed the court that the management demanded an additional amount of Rs 450000/- however the management denied the allegation. Issues
  1. Whether “Right to Education” is guaranteed to the people of India under the constitution?
  2. Whether the charging of Capitation fees is violation of Article 14 and 21?
Judgment In this case the honourable Supreme Court held that although the right to education is as such has not been guaranteed as a fundamental right under the Indian constitution But it becomes clear from the preamble of the constitution and its Directive Principles contained in part 4 because the framers of the constitution intended that it the duty of  the state to provide education for its citizens. The court also held that the charging of a capitation fee by the private educational institutions violated the right to education as implied from the right to life and human dignity and the right to equal protection of the law. In additional the court held that the private institutions, which are acting as agent of the state have a duty to ensure equal access to and non discrimination the delivery of higher education. Thus we can conclude that The Court, in the absence of any Constitutional Provision for the Right to Education, held that the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 also includes the Right to Education as education is required for the overall development of personality, without which one would not be able to have the enjoyment of his right to life. The purpose of the right to life is baseless without the Right to Education. Case:-2 Unni Krishnan, J.P & Ors vs State of Andhra Pradesh(1993) The case comes into existence through petitions filed by private educational institutions to challenge the state laws. These state laws were enacted with the objective of regulating the capitation fee charges in the states of Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra. These Laws mentioned that any person who is involved in the management and taking additional fees will be considered as capitation fees. Issues Whether Right to Education under Article 21 extend to technical education? Judgment In this case the Supreme Court with a Constitutional bench held that the education up to the age of 14 years to be a fundamental right and “It would be therefore incumbent up on the state to provide facilities and opportunity as enjoined under Article 39 (e) and (f) of the constitution in order to prevent exploitation of their childhood due to indigence and vagary”. In this case the Supreme Court By narrowing the approach taken by it in the Mohini Jain case, that the Right to Education is undoubtedly a Fundamental Right under Article 21. However, the right to free education is available to children until they attain the age of 14 years; after that, the obligation of the state to provide education is subject to economic capacity and development. Case:-3 Avinash Mehrotra vs Union of India(2009) In this case, The Court held that it is a fundamental right to have access to education free from the fear of security and shall have appropriate safety measures in case of any threat to life. Therefore, the right to education also includes providing safe schools in accordance with Articles 21 and 21A of the Indian Constitution. No matter where a family seeks to educate its children, even if it is a private institution, then the state must ensure that children shall not suffer any  harm while exercising their fundamental right to Education.

Amendments to Achieve Right to Education

86th Constitutional Amendment (2002)  In 2002, The constitution was amended by the 86th Amendment act with the objective to provide the Right to Education as a fundamental right.This Constitutional Amendment is made with the intent to protect the citizen’s rights to education, as well as to estimate the forthcoming and existing challenges in India concerning education. The Three main provisions in Constitution that 86th Amendment, 2002 incorporates and which promotes free and compulsory education to children between the age 6 to 14 years. They are as follows:-
  1. Article 21A: it was incorporated under the Fundamental Right which are mentioned under (Part III) of the Indian Constitution has expressly mentioned the right of every child to have access to full-time elementary education that would attain the standard of equality and quality through a formal school which would be satisfactory in terms of setting the norms and standard of the education.
  2. Article 45 was Altered and modified: Before the 86th Amendment 2002, Article 45 of Directive Principles of State Policy stated that free and compulsory education shall be provided to children up to the age of 14 years old. However, subsequent to the amendment, Article 45 was altered and modified, which states that “the state shall endeavour to impart early childhood care and education for every child till the age of 6 years instead of 14”. The age limit has been reduced to emphasize the prominence of early childhood care and education.
  3. Article 51-A(k): It was added as the fundamental duties under part IV of the Indian Constitution that it is the duty of the parents and guardians to provide and facilitate the opportunities for education to their children who are between the age group of 6 to 14 years.

CONCLUSION

Thus we can say that now The right to education is recognized today as a fundamental right under the Constitution of India. And This is a relatively recent development. The Constituent Assembly only included that it is the obligation of the state to provide free and compulsory primary education under Article 45 of the Constitution. But this is a Directive Principle of State Policy, which was not enforceable by courts. Articles 29 and 30, however, they are justifiable fundamental rights but they only prevent the state from discriminating against minority groups in access to education or in the establishment of educational institutions. So we all should say thank you to the honorable Supreme Court because it also plays an important role in directly reaching the journey of article 21 A by giving landmark judgments like the Mohini Jain judgment, Unni Krishnan judgment and many more which encourages and motivated the Indian Government to take necessary steps in order to provide Right to Education under Indian Constitution like 86th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2002 and enforcing laws like Right to Education Act, 2009 and many more So Because all of this The right to receive basic elementary education is one of the most important rights. And we can also say that the Right to Education is one of the best legislation in our country. And As per the layman’s perspective, the provision is either good or bad but the law holds the accountability, more.  And once A famous philosopher has said that “law is the public conscience” – Thomas Hobbes. Law is made for the welfare of society and not for the purpose of making the welfare of oneself.

REFERENCES

  1. Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred
    1. J N Pandey,”Constitutional Law of India”p.382 Central Law Agency, Allahabad 2022.
    2. Agrawal, Tushar. “Right to Education Act and Educationally Backward States in India.” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012, doi:10.2139/ssrn.1985122.
    3. Gursharan Singh Kainth “Right to education” Bharti publications Delhi 2014, page no. 29.
  1. Online Articles / Sources Referred
    1. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342734746_right_to_education_with_special_reference_to_Article_21A
    2. https://www.aclu.org/documents/your-right-equality-education
    3. https://kappanonline.org/underwood-education-american-right/
    4. https://law.vanderbilt.edu/a-novel-argument-for-the-right-to-public-education/
    5. https://eduhutch.blogspot.com/2021/07/definition-of-education.html
    6. https://en.unesco.org/themes/education/sdgs/material/04
    7. https://www.escr-net.org/caselaw/2009/mohini-jain-v-state-karnataka-1992-air-1858
    8. https://www.escr-net.org/caselaw/2006/unni-krishnan-jp-ors-v-state-andhra-pradesh-ors-cited-1993-air-217-1993-scr-1-594-1993
    9. https://www.cuemath.com/learn/3-types-of-education/
    10. https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/right-education-india/
    11. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/India-joins-list-of-135-countries-in-making-education-a-right/article13666115.ece
    12. https://lawbhoomi.com/development-of-education-as-a-right-in-india/
  1. Cases Referred
    1. AIR 1992 SC 1858
    2. AIR 1993 SC 2178
    3. 6 SCC 398 (2009)
  1. Statutes Referred
    1. Article 21-A of the Constitution of India, 1950
    2. Article 45 of Constitution of India, 1950
    3. Article 51A(k) of Constitution of India, 1950
    4. RTE Act, 2009
    5. 86th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2002
**Content:** **Author-Hemant Jarwal, University Five Year Law College, University Of Rajasthan** ### **INTRODUCTION** ***“Knowledge is power. Information is liberating. Education is the premise of progress, in every society, in every family.”**–* *Kofi Annan**,* *Former Secretary-General of the United Nations.*** From the Time a child is born, his or her education begins. At first, education is an informal process in which an infant watches others and learns from them by either copying them or listening to them. As the infant grows into a young child, the process of education becomes more formal by going to preschool. In grade school, academic lessons become the focus of education as a child moves through the school system. But it is not that simple, education is about much more than the simple learning of facts. Education in the bigger picture is the process of encouraging discovery and innovation in different sectors. From the time we are born, humans keep learning and still learning and will continue learning in the future. Sometimes consciously and many times subconsciously. Education is an effective method in different fields of acquiring knowledge, values, skills, habits, and beliefs. So after knowing and considering all the factors that tell us why education is so important and how can it change our life and our society’s thinking or enhance their perspective from narrow mind to broad mind and how it can help in the overall growth and development of the nation. That’s why To eradicate education poverty, the government of India proposed the Right to Education Act (RTE) in 2009. It came into effect on 1 April 2010. It aims to provide free and compulsory education to children aged six to fourteen years under Article 21-A. Ensure that every child has his or her right to get a quality elementary education. This right also ensures the provision of fundamental or primary education for those who have not completed their basic education. Right to education includes the right to free, compulsory primary education for all, an obligation to develop secondary education accessible to all and an obligation to develop equitable access to higher education. India has a total of 19% of the children population in the world and almost one-third of the illiterate population in the world. But India can change this fact and figures by becoming the most educated population by using its resources to educate its youth. Education is a powerful tool for the uneducated population to grow and fully participate as citizens. And the Right to Education is also universally recognized by the main international instrument, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as a basic human right to right to education in Article 26 **“*Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit*”.** #### ***Keywords* : Right to Education, Article 21-A, Article 21 Constitution of India, Article 45, 86th Constitutional Amendment Act, UDHR, Right to Education Act.** ### **Meaning, Definition & Explanation** Education is the way that gives us the ideas, skills, techniques, information, and knowledge to know, understand, and respect the duties we have towards our society, families, and nation. Education helps a person to get knowledge and enhance their confidence in life. It can help us to improve our careers and our personal growth. And as an educated person can become a great citizen in society and in the end educated persons help in the development and growth of society and nation. It helps you to make the right decisions in life. Therefore education is very important in life is because it helps everyone develop a good perspective of looking at the world and our society. Education helps us in getting new ideas and exploring new ideas. An uneducated person can never be fully aware of his/her responsibilities towards each other as human beings and the world as a whole. As human beings, we have to give back to the society that we have used and where we live in so that we can make it a better place to live for everybody. Proper education teaches an individual to think beyond their interests and helps them in developing an ability to make the world a happier, safer place for the next generation. It is difficult to give the answer of the question What is education in a few lines. Because the Definition of education is given differently by different people at different times. Therefore, education cannot be defined or described by one’s precise or perfect definition. The definitions given by different educators about its education are given below: 1. **According to Socrates** “Education means the bring out of the ideas of universal validity which are latent in the mind of every man.” 2. **According to Plato** “Education is the capacity to feel pleasure and pain at the right moment it develops in the body and in the soul of the student all the beauty and all the perfection which he capable of.” 3. **According to Aristotle** “Education is the creation of a sound mind in a sound body it develops men’s faculty especially his mind so that he may be able to enjoy the implementation of supreme court goodness and beauty of which perfect happiness essentially consists.” ### **Historical Background / Evolution of Education:** The importance of education in India has been seen from the ancient times. Human education in India can be traced back to ancient times when the Gurukul system was working. In this Guru-Shishya (teacher-disciple) system, those who wanted to study would go to teachers and request to be accepted as a disciple. If they were accepted then the disciple had to stay at the teacher’s place, and apart from learning, he also had to help in other household chores. This system made a strong tie between the Guru and Shishya, and it also taught the disciple that how to run a household. Teachers of that era taught all the subjects in open classrooms like under shadow of trees, under the sun. Languages like Sanskrit and holy scripture, as well as metaphysics and mathematics, were part of the learning process. Learning was based more on the understanding their surroundings and nature, not just memorizing verses or shlokas. This education system got an impetus and developed with universities like Nalanda, Ujjain, Takshashila, and Vikramshila. **Lord Thomas Babington Macaulay** brought the modern form of education and the English language to India in the 1830s. The development of education in India was started by classroom confinement, and by teaching modern subjects like science and maths were part of this curriculum. Subjects like metaphysics and philosophy were deemed unnecessary or not important at that time. And you know what The right to education was initially not included as a fundamental right in the constitution but was included as a Directive Principle under **Article 45** which states that it is the duty of the state to endeavor to provide, within a period of 10 years from the commencement of the constitution, for free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of 14 years. The directive in Article 45 was not limited to merely primary education rather it extends up to providing free education up to the age of 14 years, whatever the stage of education it came to. Therefore, education for children of this age group should have been free. During this period the Supreme Court also held that the ‘Right to education’ get from other Articles of the Constitution such as **Articles 21, 24, 30(i), and 39(e) & (f).** The Court emphasized that the primary obligation placed on the state by Article 45 is **“to provide for free and compulsory education for children”** and it can be discharged through government and aided school and that Article 45 does not required that obligation to be discharged at the expense of the minority communities. ### **Comparison of Right to Education with other Countries:** #### **Status of Right to Education in India:** Like in **India** the **Right to Education** is mentioned under the Constitution of India by **The 86th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2002** which is made with objective to protect the citizen’s rights of education, as well as to overcome the challenges in India regarding education. The 86th Amendment act 2002**,** makes three exact provisions in Constitution to provide understanding of free and compulsory education to children’s of age between 6 to 14 years as a Fundamental Right. These are as follows:- 1. **Adding Article 21A in part III** initiated that every child has a right to full time elementary education of satisfactory and equitable quality in a formal school which satisfies certain essential norms and standards. 2. Bring alteration and modification in **Article 45** and substituted as the state shall endeavors to assure early childhood care and free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of 6 years. 3. The insertion of new clause in **Article 51 A**, clearly mandates the parents or guardians to furnish opportunities for education of their children between the age group of 6 to 14 years.**\[Article 51A (k)\]**. #### **Status of Right to Education in the United States of America:** The right to an education is guaranteed and recognized as a fundamental or basic Human right by the International law in the **Universal Declaration of Human Rights**. Similarly, **UNESCO’s Constitution** sets out the right to an education as necessary in order to **“prepare the children of the world for the responsibilities of freedom.”** However — and this might come as a surprise to many Americans — The U.S. Constitution mentions no such right nor has the U.S. Supreme Court recognized one. But All kids living in the United States have the right to a free public education. And the Constitution requires that all kids be given **equal educational opportunity no matter what their race, ethnic background, religion, or sex, or whether they are rich or poor, citizen or non-citizen.** Even if you are in this country illegally, you have the right to go to public school. In addition to this constitutional guarantee of an equal education, many federal, state and local laws also **protect students against discrimination in education based on sexual orientation or disability, including pregnancy and HIV status.** In fact, even though some kids may complain about having to go to school, **the right to an equal educational opportunity is one of the most valuable rights you have.** The Supreme Court said this in the **landmark *Brown v. Board of Education* case** when it struck down race segregation in public schools. Many people assume that the **Federal Court** had found a federal **Right to Education** in ***Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)***. However the court in that case did not held that all students had a right to an education. Rather, it held only that where a state makes public education available, it cannot withhold access to education based on race. Further, it espoused — or at least suggested the possibility of — an individual right to an education. The Federal court came closer to recognizing a federal right to education in ***Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)*.** There, the state of Texas had foreclosed public school education for undocumented students, and plaintiffs had made an Equal Protection claim. The court found that even though education was not a fundamental right, the state did not have a sufficient interest to withhold education from students whose parents had brought them to this country illegally. Since education is not specifically mentioned as a right or a power of the federal government, Congress does not have the authority to directly regulate education. Education is not currently recognized as a fundamental right in the United States. In **1973’s *San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez***, the Supreme Court found that education is not explicitly protected under the U.S. Constitution, and its precedent has remained unchallenged at the Supreme Court for over 30 years. Advocates for the right to public education have offered divergent strategies to overcoming the ruling, but none has found success in federal court. ### **Types / Kinds of Education in India:** Education means the development of the learning and thinking process. And It is not limited to the walls of the classroom but it goes beyond the four walls of the classroom. It is all about gaining experience and therefore we can divide education into three main types: 1. Formal Education. 2. Informal Education. 3. Non-formal Education. - **Formal Education:** This is also known as formal learning which usually takes place within the premises of the school. It is the type of education where the basic academic knowledge that a child learns in a formal manner.This continues from an elementary school to secondary school and further on to colleges. Such type of education is provided by specially qualified teachers who are efficient enough with the art of instruction.Here both the student and the teacher are both aware of the facts and involve themselves into a process of education. Some of the examples of formal education are classroom learning, Institute grading/certification, or planned education of different subjects with a proper syllabus acquired by attending an institution. - **Informal Education:** This is the type of education where a parent teach his/her child things that are beyond academics like preparing a meal or riding a bicycle. People can also get informal education through books or educational websites. This is an education that is not taught in schools through a proper learning method. It is not pre-determined nor deliberate. It is an experience that an individual feel by undergoing regular practice and observing others. Some of the examples are like by teaching a child with some basic personality traits, learning a mother tongue, performing certain extracurricular activities, etc. - **Non-formal Education:** It is a type of education where a person learn about adult basic education, adult literacy education, or skill development. It can take different forms of learning, which is consistently and systematically provided in order to develop a particular skill or ability in an individual.This type of education is highly flexible and it includes a wide range of activities. Some of the examples may be fitness programs, community-based adult education courses, and free courses on different platforms, etc. ### **Constitutional Provisions Related to the Right to Education** The right to education is a constitutionally protected right in India. The Constitutional provisions which supports and protected the right to education under the constitution of India are: 1. **Article 21-A:** It was included to make the right to education a **Fundamental right**for children aged 6 to 14. It states that ***“The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of six to fourteen years in such manner as the State may, by law, determine”***.This provision was not included in the Constitution of India 1950. It was inserted by the Constitution (Eighty-sixth Amendment) Act, 2010. 2. **Article 45:** It talks about the provision for free and compulsory education for children. It states that ***“The State shall endeavour to provide, within a period of ten years from the commencement of this Constitution, for free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years”.*** 3. **Article 46:** It talks about the **Promotion of educational and economic interests of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other weaker sections under which it is clearly stated that *“The State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation”.*** 4. **Article 51-A(k):** was added as the fundamental duties under Part IV of the Indian Constitution which states that ***“who is a parent or guardian to provide opportunities for education to his child or, as the case may be, ward between the age of six and fourteen years”.*** ### **Legislative Acts Related to the Right to Education:** #### **Right to Education (RTE) Act 2009** The Parliament has enacted the Right to Education Act 2009 (RTE Act) with the objective of regulating the degradation of the standard of the education system and uplifting the education imparting procedure by implementing specific provisions that required certain reformations to live up to the spirit of catering a quality and equitable education irrespective of caste, creed, gender economic and social background. The Act was enacted on 4th August 2009 and came into force on 1st April 2010. The principal features of the Act are as follows: 1. The Act clearly mentions that education is the Fundamental Right of every child. 2. Private schools must keep 25% of seats reserved for children belonging to the backward classes in terms of social background. 3. The Act also provide educational rights for dropout students. 4. Unrecognized schools are barred and are not allowed from interviewing a child or a parent for admission. 5. Schools are barred and are not allowed to charge any capitation fees at any step while providing admission to a child. 6. The Children who are pursuing elementary or primary education shall not be expelled, held back, or pressured to pass a board examination. 7. The Act mandates that every government and aided schools should create a School Management Committee which composed of 75% of members as parents or guardians. 8. The Act strictly prohibited physical punishment, mental harassment and private tuition by the teachers. 9. The Act states that the provisions for a child’s admission to an appropriate class should be based on his/her age in the event that child has never been admitted to any school. And in order To help the child to keep up with other students, provisions relating to special training have also been mentioned in the Act. The RTE Act 2009 acted as a tool in accelerating and developing the spirit of imparting free and compulsory elementary education to children between the age group of 6 to 14 years. Subsequent to the enforcement of the Act, a drastic change came about in the standard of education both in access and enrolment levels; literacy rates of the states and also enhanced at large. However, lately, due to a lack of an appropriate regulatory framework, the practical application and compliance with the provisions of the Act are facing repeated failure. ### **Landmark Cases and Judgement** Case: – 1 Mohini Jain vs State of Karnataka(1992).** In this case Miss Mohini Jain, a resident of Meerut applied for the admission in the MBBS course in a session which was commencing from 1991 in a private medical college located in the state of Karnataka. The college management asked her to deposit a sum of Rs 60000/- as the tuition fee for the first year and also to show a bank guarantee of the amount equal to the fee for the remaining year. When Miss Jain’s father questioned the management that the asked amount was beyond his reach, the management denied Ms. Jain’s admission to the medical college. Then Miss Jain informed the court that the management demanded an additional amount of Rs 450000/- however the management denied the allegation. **Issues** 1. Whether “Right to Education” is guaranteed to the people of India under the constitution? 2. Whether the charging of Capitation fees is violation of Article 14 and 21? **Judgment** In this case the honourable Supreme Court held that although the right to education is as such has not been guaranteed as a fundamental right under the Indian constitution But it becomes clear from the preamble of the constitution and its Directive Principles contained in part 4 because the framers of the constitution intended that it the duty of the state to provide education for its citizens. The court also held that the charging of a capitation fee by the private educational institutions violated the right to education as implied from the right to life and human dignity and the right to equal protection of the law. In additional the court held that the private institutions, which are acting as agent of the state have a duty to ensure equal access to and non discrimination the delivery of higher education. Thus we can conclude that The Court, in the absence of any Constitutional Provision for the Right to Education, held that the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 also includes the Right to Education as education is required for the overall development of personality, without which one would not be able to have the enjoyment of his right to life. The purpose of the right to life is baseless without the Right to Education. **Case:-2 Unni Krishnan, J.P & Ors** **vs State of Andhra Pradesh(1993)** The case comes into existence through petitions filed by private educational institutions to challenge the state laws. These state laws were enacted with the objective of regulating the capitation fee charges in the states of Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra. These Laws mentioned that any person who is involved in the management and taking additional fees will be considered as capitation fees. **Issues** Whether Right to Education under Article 21 extend to technical education? **Judgment** In this case the Supreme Court with a Constitutional bench held that the education up to the age of 14 years to be a fundamental right and “It would be therefore incumbent up on the state to provide facilities and opportunity as enjoined under Article 39 (e) and (f) of the constitution in order to prevent exploitation of their childhood due to indigence and vagary”. In this case the Supreme Court By narrowing the approach taken by it in the Mohini Jain case, that the Right to Education is undoubtedly a Fundamental Right under Article 21. However, the right to free education is available to children until they attain the age of 14 years; after that, the obligation of the state to provide education is subject to economic capacity and development. **Case:-3 Avinash Mehrotra vs Union of India(2009)** In this case, The Court held that it is a fundamental right to have access to education free from the fear of security and shall have appropriate safety measures in case of any threat to life. Therefore, the right to education also includes providing safe schools in accordance with Articles 21 and 21A of the Indian Constitution. No matter where a family seeks to educate its children, even if it is a private institution, then the state must ensure that children shall not suffer any harm while exercising their fundamental right to Education. ### **Amendments to Achieve Right to Education** **86th Constitutional Amendment (2002) In 2002, The constitution was amended by the 86th Amendment act with the objective to provide the Right to Education as a fundamental right.This Constitutional Amendment is made with the intent to protect the citizen’s rights to education, as well as to estimate the forthcoming and existing challenges in India concerning education. The Three main provisions in Constitution that 86th Amendment, 2002 incorporates and which promotes free and compulsory education to children between the age 6 to 14 years. They are as follows:- 1. **Article 21A:** it was incorporated under the Fundamental Right which are mentioned under (Part III) of the Indian Constitution has expressly mentioned the right of every child to have access to full-time elementary education that would attain the standard of equality and quality through a formal school which would be satisfactory in terms of setting the norms and standard of the education. 2. **Article 45 was Altered and modified:** Before the 86th Amendment 2002, Article 45 of Directive Principles of State Policy stated that free and compulsory education shall be provided to children up to the age of 14 years old. However, subsequent to the amendment, Article 45 was altered and modified, which states that “the state shall endeavour to impart early childhood care and education for every child till the age of 6 years instead of 14”. The age limit has been reduced to emphasize the prominence of early childhood care and education. 3. **Article 51-A(k): It** was added as the fundamental duties under part IV of the Indian Constitution that it is the duty of the parents and guardians to provide and facilitate the opportunities for education to their children who are between the age group of 6 to 14 years. ### **CONCLUSION** Thus we can say that now The right to education is recognized today as a fundamental right under the Constitution of India. And This is a relatively recent development. The Constituent Assembly only included that it is the obligation of the state to provide free and compulsory primary education under Article 45 of the Constitution. But this is a Directive Principle of State Policy, which was not enforceable by courts. Articles 29 and 30, however, they are justifiable fundamental rights but they only prevent the state from discriminating against minority groups in access to education or in the establishment of educational institutions. So we all should say thank you to the honorable Supreme Court because it also plays an important role in directly reaching the journey of article 21 A by giving landmark judgments like the ***Mohini Jain*** judgment, ***Unni Krishnan*** *judgment and many more which encourages and motivated the Indian Government to take necessary steps in order to provide Right to Education under Indian Constitution like 86th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2002 and enforcing laws like Right to Education Act, 2009 and many more So Because all of this* The right to receive basic elementary education is one of the most important rights. And we can also say that the Right to Education is one of the best legislation in our country. And As per the layman’s perspective, the provision is either good or bad but the law holds the accountability, more. And once A famous philosopher has said that “law is the public conscience” – Thomas Hobbes. Law is made for the welfare of society and not for the purpose of making the welfare of oneself. ### **REFERENCES** 1. **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** 2022. J N Pandey,”Constitutional Law of India”p.382 Central Law Agency, Allahabad 2022. 2023. Agrawal, Tushar. “Right to Education Act and Educationally Backward States in India.” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012, doi:10.2139/ssrn.1985122. 2024. Gursharan Singh Kainth “Right to education” Bharti publications Delhi 2014, page no. 29. 2. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342734746\_right\_to\_education\_with\_special\_reference\_to\_Article\_21A](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342734746_right_to_education_with_special_reference_to_Article_21A) 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 3. **Cases Referred** 1. AIR 1992 SC 1858 2. AIR 1993 SC 2178 3. 6 SCC 398 (2009) 4. **Statutes Referred** 1. Article 21-A of the Constitution of India, 1950 2. Article 45 of Constitution of India, 1950 3. Article 51A(k) of Constitution of India, 1950 4. RTE Act, 2009 5. *86th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2002* **Categories:** Articles --- ### [DIVORCE](https://lawfoyer.in/divorce/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Muskan Srivastav, Amity University, Lucknow

ABSTRACT

Divorce is a source through which a husband and wife officially and legally can end their marriage. It is a formal process of ending a marriage, it's not like a temporary separation. If someone gets a divorce it means that their marriage has ended and is officially over. Divorce carries out both emotions happy and sad. it's not necessary in everyone's case that divorce is peace but in some cases it is. Now, that's another thing no one values the emotion of marriage and uses divorce as a toy. whatever law is made in India or in any country it has both positive and negative impacts with it, divorce is also like this. There are many grounds for divorce. There are many reasons why one can decide to take a divorce either because of constant conflict or because of other things like going to die soon because of a disease or getting caught cheating, and let's not assume that the reason for all this will always be men, no it's not always men, sometimes it's women who misuses their rights and cheat and then lead to divorce. Both men and women are equally responsible for the mishap in the society. But at the end of the day, divorce is the only way to end a toxic relationship which could be dangerous for the couples and children in the future. Keywords (Minimum 5): divorce, emotion of marriage, ending of toxicity, misuse rights, positive and negative impact

INTRODUCTION

If two people can’t compromise with each other and are victims of a toxic or forced relationship they need to be separated, and for that law exists. Divorce, it’s a mean or a way for a person to escape from a forced and stressful relationship through a legal and formal process, if they are separated in the eye of the law then no one can dare to interfere in their matter or force them to stay in a relationship. In earlier days it was not possible to get a divorce or get separated from an unwanted or toxic partner, it is one of the main reasons why domestic violence took place in large numbers in every household. Divorce is nothing new it has been coming in power for years to years but there is this difference that divorce was not mutual in earlier days, it was all up to the man, if he wants to stay with his wife he will and if he doesn’t then he would simply send their wife back to their home, they are not official separated but living separately. In other countries, the divorce system was famous and was enacted, but in India, it took time for women to realize their rights and to take a stand for themselves. Because in India it was taught to every girl that their husband is their everything and that they should just follow their husband’s order and accept their toxic and immoral behavior as they are their “Pati Parmeshwar” and that they should worship them. But that’s a relief that now women in India are aware of their rights they know what is wrong and what is right, if they should stay or just let it go.

Meaning & Explanation

Divorce is a source and an act by which a valid marriage can turn into void and null in the eye of the law. The main motive of divorce is to free the other party to live their life as they want or remarry if they plan to do so. Divorce generally imposes the nullification or restructures of the legal duties and obligations of marriage. It can be said as a lawful conclusion of a marriage by the court or other qualified body. People decide to get divorced when things get too tangled up and out of control. If two people cannot compromise for an hour, a second, or a day there is no chance that they would be able to spend the rest of their lives together. By keeping all this in mind that this not compatible individual’s life would become hell in the future if lived together, a law was formed known as Divorce. Divorce declares a marriage null and void in the eye of the law. Divorce is surely needed as a safety law, everyone needs to compromise with their partner in married life but compromise includes things like trust, giving independence, mutual understanding, compromising with each other’s unexperienced habits if have one, letting each other live their life as they want, and no single dominant partner, both to be treated equally. These are some of the things which are needed between a married couple but the main thing is mutual understanding, if this is not between the couple then the marriage is long ago over. If two individuals in a marriage are not compatible it is hard for them to live, it would feel like jail or hell for them every day as if they are prisoned in a forced relationship, and that’s why they need to be separated and for that a legal formal process ‘DIVORCE’ has been made. Though in India it is not just a paper away work, it took a lot of courage to come to this decision because some religions or societies still don’t accept a divorcee in a society, and they get a lot of backlash for being a divorcee.

Background & Evolution

Divorce known as a legal way for separation, was found and practiced in British India in the year 1869 and this law was not really for Indians it was generally made for Christians who were looking for a way to end marriage lawfully, resulting in divorce. In India it was not easy to generalize the system of divorce, Indian society would never accept a divorcee in a society so they would not let a couple end their relationship. Even if they are in a toxic relationship, they need to stay just like this and bear with it for the rest of their life. This later on resulted in an increasing rate of domestic violence. In India divorce was not normalized at that time they gave a lot of importance to the patriarchy and women were not educated enough to be aware of their rights. Later on, in the year 1955, an act was formed known as the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. It was made to let people file for divorce under this act. The Hindu Marriage Act is established to help both bride and groom to safeguard their fundamental rights and right to live without any violence and discomfort. Several laws were made under this act in favor of women, and that was needed because in earlier times women tended to suffer a lot more than men. sometimes men also suffer in a relationship but the majority are always women. After the act was made women started getting aware of their rights and started to take a stand for themselves. They realized that they don’t need to be in a toxic relationship forcefully they can end things if it’s getting overboard. It doesn’t mean that a husband or wife is cheating on their partner and for remarriage they need to let go of their partner so they file for divorce, if such a case happens the other partner can reach out to the court for restitution of conjugal rights if the reason of divorce is not a reasonable and legal excuse, they can reach court for that. The process of divorce has evolved a lot in the present time the rate of divorce is also getting high in India which was not possible in earlier times, but it doesn’t mean that it only has a positive impact, it has both positive and negative. Positive because now both individuals can live freely and however, they want, and negative because by all these divorce processes children suffer a lot they get childhood trauma, they get the incomplete love of parents, as they experience the pain of separation from loved ones in a very young age. Divorce has evolved a lot over time, everyone is now aware of the process of ending a toxic relationship that they won’t dare to spend the rest of their life.

Comparison with other Countries

India has the lowest rate of divorce worldwide. Generally, western societies traditionally have higher divorce rates than Asians. It’s not a great thing that India has the lowest rate of divorce because it means that they are forced to stay in an unwanted relationship. After all, they are afraid of the backlash they would get if they get a divorce. India is a diverse country and values their culture a lot, it is a country where people still decide to stay in a joint family and depend on each other. On the other hand in Western culture, no one stays in a joint family even teens start living on their own by coming to an age, when they don’t care much about society culture, and norms they do what they like and feel like to do without thinking of society, in western societies an individual’s decision is respected they won’t get judged by the society they don’t fear society’s thought process that much. In India, it is hard for a divorcee to live freely because society would look down on that person rather than feel sympathetic for them and demotivate them by their words. Unlike in other countries where love marriage is normalized, every individual has the right to marry whoever they want irrespective of their caste, creed, or religion. India is not at all like this, Indian culture doesn’t support love marriage, inter cast, or inter religion much. The majority of Indian weddings are arranged and in arranged marriages, individuals don’t know each other that much which results in a lack of intimacy and love which makes them stay with their partner longer. Another difference is the financial dependency of women on men, In western culture very few females are dependent financially on their husbands, the majority are financially independent while in India majority of females are dependent on their husbands financially, nowadays this thing is changing and women in India is also getting financially independent on their own but majorities are not really financially independent, they depend on their husband, this is the reason why the divorce rate in western countries is much more in comparison to India. In India divorce generally takes place in rich class family, middle class people avoid getting divorced as much as they can.

GROUNDS

In India, divorce is granted mainly on various grounds. These are Adultery, Desertion, Cruelty, mental disorders, chronic disease leprosy; venereal disease, etc. These grounds for divorce in India are mentioned under the Hindu Marriage Act, of 1955.

ADULTERY

Adultery is an act where a person is involved in any kind of sexual relationship, also intercourse outside marriage. If husband or wife is cheating on each other by committing an act of adultery then this single act is enough for the petitioner to get a divorce. Adultery is known as a criminal offense and requires considerable proof to establish it.

CRUELTY

In marriage, if the partner gives physical or mental injury to their partner then a spouse can file a divorce case. The cruelty under the Hindu Marriage Act includes any type of false allegation, excessive demand of dowry, an injury that causes danger to life, perverse sexual act, mental torture, and such types of cruel offenses are defined under this act.

DESERTION

In a marriage if the husband or wife by their own choice disowns his/her partner for some time such as two to three years, then the abandoned spouse can file a divorce case.

MENTAL DISORDER

If one of the partners is suffering from any type of mental disorder that in incurable and results in insanity which may harm the spouse in the future and they won’t be able to stay till last together, then the spouse can file for divorce on the grounds of mental disorder.

VENEREAL DISEASE

If one of the partners is suffering from a serious disease that can be transmitted easily and is communicable, such as AIDS is considered as venereal disease. Then the spouse can file a divorce on the grounds of venereal disease. There are many more grounds for divorce these were some of them explained in short.

PRINCIPLE

There are certain rules and principles for divorce in India under the Hindu Marriage Act, of 1955, which apply only to Hindu religious people. Every religion has its customs and culture, so some laws are made differently by keeping the religion and customs in mind. Nowadays, even in India, the partners don’t hesitate much to get a divorce and move on in their lives. According to section 13 B (2), if the married couple moves to the court for divorce with mutual consent, a mandatory six-month period is given to them in case they change their mind in these six months. this rehabilitation six-month period was necessary to give, but now there is a change in the rule and it’s not that mandatory anymore, now it depends on the court’s discretion. A civil court can only give the order for divorce. there are other rules and principles which help to understand the divorce process clearly, it helps to understand all the process. CASE LAWS
  • Akanksha vs Anupam Mathur
In this case, it was observed by the supreme court that the couple had made a voluntary decision to divorce and that there was no need to make the couple wait another 6 months for divorce. the court decided to dismiss the 6-month time limit and conclude the marriage.
  • Sangamitra Ghose Vs. Kajal Kumar Ghosh
In this case, the court states that they are fully satisfied that the marriage between the couple has irretrievably broken down because of inconsistency of personality. there has been a total vanishing of an emotional framework in the marriage.
  • Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (2006)
This divorce case is based on the ground of cruelty, the Supreme Court restates that if a marriage has broken down hopelessly or irretrievably and there is no possible sign of reunion, then it can be considered a reasonable ground for divorce. The court noticed and concluded that it was a waste to force parties to live together as it would only lead to great disaster.

Statistical Analysis / Data Analysis

  • India has the lowest divorce rate worldwide.
  • 108 divorces in 2021(0.077)
  • 315 divorces in 2020 (0.022)
Because of patriarchy, male-dominated society, culture, norms, and women’s financial dependency, the divorce rate in India is lowest.

CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

Divorce is not just an ordinary social importance; it is a serious social and psychological significance.in India, it was not easy to get divorced or even think about getting a divorce. Divorce is an escape for those spouses who suffer every minute and hour of suffering in the guilt of living with someone toxic or not compatible with them. Divorce affects the personal and social life of the partner and the whole family members. To safeguard the divorce process from getting misused by any spouse, several grounds were made. These grounds help decide the valid reason for granting a divorce. After 1955 when the reformers introduced the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, it became easy for the parties to resolve any dispute going on in their married life, and could leave if things got too complicated and hard to handle for the rest of their life. Before 1955, there was no provision for separation or leaving the partner legally. Divorce rates are now increasing because of changes in the mindset of an individual, people are getting educated about their rights and know how to fight for themselves, they come forward and take a stand for themselves and move on in their lives. Though divorce rate of India used to be the lowest and still is the lowest compared to other countries.

REFERENCES

  1. Online Articles / Sources Referred
    1. https://www.lexisnexis.in/blogs/divorce-under-hindu-marriage-act/#:~:text=A%20brief%20history%20of%20the,divorce%20or%20allow%20for%20it
    2. https://divorce.com/blog/divorce-rates-in-the-world/#:~:text=Lowest%20Divorce%20Rate%20Country,)%20and%202021%20(0.077
    3. https://aishwaryasandeep.in/concept-of-irretrievable-breakdown-of-marriage/#:~:text=Case%3A%20Sangamitra%20Ghose%20vs.,emotional%20substratum%20in%20the%20marriage
  1. Cases Referred
    1. Akanksha vs Anupam Mathur
    2. Sangamitra Ghose Vs. Kajal Kumar Ghosh
    3. Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (2006)
  1. Statutes Referred
    1. Hindu Marriage Act, 1995
**Content:** **Author-Muskan Srivastav, Amity University, Lucknow** ### **ABSTRACT** Divorce is a source through which a husband and wife officially and legally can end their marriage. It is a formal process of ending a marriage, it’s not like a temporary separation. If someone gets a divorce it means that their marriage has ended and is officially over. Divorce carries out both emotions happy and sad. it’s not necessary in everyone’s case that divorce is peace but in some cases it is. Now, that’s another thing no one values the emotion of marriage and uses divorce as a toy. whatever law is made in India or in any country it has both positive and negative impacts with it, divorce is also like this. There are many grounds for divorce. There are many reasons why one can decide to take a divorce either because of constant conflict or because of other things like going to die soon because of a disease or getting caught cheating, and let’s not assume that the reason for all this will always be men, no it’s not always men, sometimes it’s women who misuses their rights and cheat and then lead to divorce. Both men and women are equally responsible for the mishap in the society. But at the end of the day, divorce is the only way to end a toxic relationship which could be dangerous for the couples and children in the future. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*:** divorce, emotion of marriage, ending of toxicity, misuse rights, positive and negative impact ### **INTRODUCTION** If two people can’t compromise with each other and are victims of a toxic or forced relationship they need to be separated, and for that law exists. Divorce, it’s a mean or a way for a person to escape from a forced and stressful relationship through a legal and formal process, if they are separated in the eye of the law then no one can dare to interfere in their matter or force them to stay in a relationship. In earlier days it was not possible to get a divorce or get separated from an unwanted or toxic partner, it is one of the main reasons why domestic violence took place in large numbers in every household. Divorce is nothing new it has been coming in power for years to years but there is this difference that divorce was not mutual in earlier days, it was all up to the man, if he wants to stay with his wife he will and if he doesn’t then he would simply send their wife back to their home, they are not official separated but living separately. In other countries, the divorce system was famous and was enacted, but in India, it took time for women to realize their rights and to take a stand for themselves. Because in India it was taught to every girl that their husband is their everything and that they should just follow their husband’s order and accept their toxic and immoral behavior as they are their “Pati Parmeshwar” and that they should worship them. But that’s a relief that now women in India are aware of their rights they know what is wrong and what is right, if they should stay or just let it go. ### **Meaning & Explanation** Divorce is a source and an act by which a valid marriage can turn into void and null in the eye of the law. The main motive of divorce is to free the other party to live their life as they want or remarry if they plan to do so. Divorce generally imposes the nullification or restructures of the legal duties and obligations of marriage. It can be said as a lawful conclusion of a marriage by the court or other qualified body. People decide to get divorced when things get too tangled up and out of control. If two people cannot compromise for an hour, a second, or a day there is no chance that they would be able to spend the rest of their lives together. By keeping all this in mind that this not compatible individual’s life would become hell in the future if lived together, a law was formed known as Divorce. Divorce declares a marriage null and void in the eye of the law. Divorce is surely needed as a safety law, everyone needs to compromise with their partner in married life but compromise includes things like trust, giving independence, mutual understanding, compromising with each other’s unexperienced habits if have one, letting each other live their life as they want, and no single dominant partner, both to be treated equally. These are some of the things which are needed between a married couple but the main thing is mutual understanding, if this is not between the couple then the marriage is long ago over. If two individuals in a marriage are not compatible it is hard for them to live, it would feel like jail or hell for them every day as if they are prisoned in a forced relationship, and that’s why they need to be separated and for that a legal formal process ‘DIVORCE’ has been made. Though in India it is not just a paper away work, it took a lot of courage to come to this decision because some religions or societies still don’t accept a divorcee in a society, and they get a lot of backlash for being a divorcee. ### **Background & Evolution** Divorce known as a legal way for separation, was found and practiced in British India in the year 1869 and this law was not really for Indians it was generally made for Christians who were looking for a way to end marriage lawfully, resulting in divorce. In India it was not easy to generalize the system of divorce, Indian society would never accept a divorcee in a society so they would not let a couple end their relationship. Even if they are in a toxic relationship, they need to stay just like this and bear with it for the rest of their life. This later on resulted in an increasing rate of domestic violence. In India divorce was not normalized at that time they gave a lot of importance to the patriarchy and women were not educated enough to be aware of their rights. Later on, in the year 1955, an act was formed known as the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. It was made to let people file for divorce under this act. The Hindu Marriage Act is established to help both bride and groom to safeguard their fundamental rights and right to live without any violence and discomfort. Several laws were made under this act in favor of women, and that was needed because in earlier times women tended to suffer a lot more than men. sometimes men also suffer in a relationship but the majority are always women. After the act was made women started getting aware of their rights and started to take a stand for themselves. They realized that they don’t need to be in a toxic relationship forcefully they can end things if it’s getting overboard. It doesn’t mean that a husband or wife is cheating on their partner and for remarriage they need to let go of their partner so they file for divorce, if such a case happens the other partner can reach out to the court for restitution of conjugal rights if the reason of divorce is not a reasonable and legal excuse, they can reach court for that. The process of divorce has evolved a lot in the present time the rate of divorce is also getting high in India which was not possible in earlier times, but it doesn’t mean that it only has a positive impact, it has both positive and negative. Positive because now both individuals can live freely and however, they want, and negative because by all these divorce processes children suffer a lot they get childhood trauma, they get the incomplete love of parents, as they experience the pain of separation from loved ones in a very young age. Divorce has evolved a lot over time, everyone is now aware of the process of ending a toxic relationship that they won’t dare to spend the rest of their life. ### Comparison with other Countries India has the lowest rate of divorce worldwide. Generally, western societies traditionally have higher divorce rates than Asians. It’s not a great thing that India has the lowest rate of divorce because it means that they are forced to stay in an unwanted relationship. After all, they are afraid of the backlash they would get if they get a divorce. India is a diverse country and values their culture a lot, it is a country where people still decide to stay in a joint family and depend on each other. On the other hand in Western culture, no one stays in a joint family even teens start living on their own by coming to an age, when they don’t care much about society culture, and norms they do what they like and feel like to do without thinking of society, in western societies an individual’s decision is respected they won’t get judged by the society they don’t fear society’s thought process that much. In India, it is hard for a divorcee to live freely because society would look down on that person rather than feel sympathetic for them and demotivate them by their words. Unlike in other countries where love marriage is normalized, every individual has the right to marry whoever they want irrespective of their caste, creed, or religion. India is not at all like this, Indian culture doesn’t support love marriage, inter cast, or inter religion much. The majority of Indian weddings are arranged and in arranged marriages, individuals don’t know each other that much which results in a lack of intimacy and love which makes them stay with their partner longer. Another difference is the financial dependency of women on men, In western culture very few females are dependent financially on their husbands, the majority are financially independent while in India majority of females are dependent on their husbands financially, nowadays this thing is changing and women in India is also getting financially independent on their own but majorities are not really financially independent, they depend on their husband, this is the reason why the divorce rate in western countries is much more in comparison to India. In India divorce generally takes place in rich class family, middle class people avoid getting divorced as much as they can. ### **GROUNDS** In India, divorce is granted mainly on various grounds. These are Adultery, Desertion, Cruelty, mental disorders, chronic disease leprosy; venereal disease, etc. These grounds for divorce in India are mentioned under the Hindu Marriage Act, of 1955. #### **ADULTERY** Adultery is an act where a person is involved in any kind of sexual relationship, also intercourse outside marriage. If husband or wife is cheating on each other by committing an act of adultery then this single act is enough for the petitioner to get a divorce. Adultery is known as a criminal offense and requires considerable proof to establish it. #### **CRUELTY** In marriage, if the partner gives physical or mental injury to their partner then a spouse can file a divorce case. The cruelty under the Hindu Marriage Act includes any type of false allegation, excessive demand of dowry, an injury that causes danger to life, perverse sexual act, mental torture, and such types of cruel offenses are defined under this act. #### **DESERTION** In a marriage if the husband or wife by their own choice disowns his/her partner for some time such as two to three years, then the abandoned spouse can file a divorce case. #### **MENTAL DISORDER** If one of the partners is suffering from any type of mental disorder that in incurable and results in insanity which may harm the spouse in the future and they won’t be able to stay till last together, then the spouse can file for divorce on the grounds of mental disorder. #### **VENEREAL DISEASE** If one of the partners is suffering from a serious disease that can be transmitted easily and is communicable, such as AIDS is considered as venereal disease. Then the spouse can file a divorce on the grounds of venereal disease. There are many more grounds for divorce these were some of them explained in short. ### **PRINCIPLE** There are certain rules and principles for divorce in India under the Hindu Marriage Act, of 1955, which apply only to Hindu religious people. Every religion has its customs and culture, so some laws are made differently by keeping the religion and customs in mind. Nowadays, even in India, the partners don’t hesitate much to get a divorce and move on in their lives. According to section 13 B (2), if the married couple moves to the court for divorce with mutual consent, a mandatory six-month period is given to them in case they change their mind in these six months. this rehabilitation six-month period was necessary to give, but now there is a change in the rule and it’s not that mandatory anymore, now it depends on the court’s discretion. A civil court can only give the order for divorce. there are other rules and principles which help to understand the divorce process clearly, it helps to understand all the process. **CASE LAWS** - **Akanksha vs Anupam Mathur** In this case, it was observed by the supreme court that the couple had made a voluntary decision to divorce and that there was no need to make the couple wait another 6 months for divorce. the court decided to dismiss the 6-month time limit and conclude the marriage. - **Sangamitra Ghose Vs. Kajal Kumar Ghosh** In this case, the court states that they are fully satisfied that the marriage between the couple has irretrievably broken down because of inconsistency of personality. there has been a total vanishing of an emotional framework in the marriage. - **Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (2006**) This divorce case is based on the ground of cruelty, the Supreme Court restates that if a marriage has broken down hopelessly or irretrievably and there is no possible sign of reunion, then it can be considered a reasonable ground for divorce. The court noticed and concluded that it was a waste to force parties to live together as it would only lead to great disaster. ### **Statistical Analysis / Data Analysis** - India has the lowest divorce rate worldwide. - 108 divorces in 2021(0.077) - 315 divorces in 2020 (0.022) Because of patriarchy, male-dominated society, culture, norms, and women’s financial dependency, the divorce rate in India is lowest. ### **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** Divorce is not just an ordinary social importance; it is a serious social and psychological significance.in India, it was not easy to get divorced or even think about getting a divorce. Divorce is an escape for those spouses who suffer every minute and hour of suffering in the guilt of living with someone toxic or not compatible with them. Divorce affects the personal and social life of the partner and the whole family members. To safeguard the divorce process from getting misused by any spouse, several grounds were made. These grounds help decide the valid reason for granting a divorce. After 1955 when the reformers introduced the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, it became easy for the parties to resolve any dispute going on in their married life, and could leave if things got too complicated and hard to handle for the rest of their life. Before 1955, there was no provision for separation or leaving the partner legally. Divorce rates are now increasing because of changes in the mindset of an individual, people are getting educated about their rights and know how to fight for themselves, they come forward and take a stand for themselves and move on in their lives. Though divorce rate of India used to be the lowest and still is the lowest compared to other countries. ### **REFERENCES** 1. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. 2. 3. 3. **Cases Referred** 1. Akanksha vs Anupam Mathur 2. Sangamitra Ghose Vs. Kajal Kumar Ghosh 3. Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (2006) 4. **Statutes Referred** 1. Hindu Marriage Act, 1995 **Categories:** Articles --- ### [Compensation to the Victims of Crime under Criminal Law](https://lawfoyer.in/compensation-to-the-victims-of-crime-under-criminal-law/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Chaitanya Sharma, National Forensics Sciences University, Delhi 

INTRODUCTION

Providing compensation to the victim is a very important aspect of any criminal justice system. Especially in India where there is a very high crime rate requires significant attention from the legislature as well as from the judiciary to take appropriate actions. Victims who go through with the crime suffer from physical as well as mental injury. To alleviate their sufferings victim compensation is provided to them with a sense of justice and make them assure that they will get speedy justice. In this article firstly we will go through who is a victim under the scheme of victim compensation then legal provisions dealing with victim compensation, and hurdles in getting compensation after this we will dive into the recent developments going on in the victim compensation scheme and what is the mechanism framed for getting compensation and finally, we will conclude. Keywords: Victim Compensation, Code of Criminal Procedure, Victim, Accused, Criminal Justice System

Who Qualifies as a Victim of Crime?

Any person, group, or entity that has suffered harm, which can be of any type including mental, physical, economic, or other. The beauty of the Indian legal system is that it considers victims to those people also whose perpetrators are absconding or not yet prosecuted. If someone is dead as a result of a crime the family members of the deceased will be regarded as the victims and they will be provided all the facilities which are provided to the victim itself. A victim can be defined as “a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused person has been charged and the expression victim includes his or her guardian or legal heir”[1] Another definition of victim is as follows “Persons who individually or collectively have suffered harm including physical and mental injury emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights through acts or omissions that are violation of criminal law”[2]

Legal Provisions Dealing with Victim Compensation:

Constitutional laws:
  • Article 14: “The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”[3]
  • Article 21: “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”[4]
Criminal Procedure Code,1973:
  • Section 357: “When a Court imposes a sentence of fine or a sentence (including a sentence of death) of which fine forms a part, the Court may, when passing judgment, order the whole or any part of the fine recovered to be applied---
(a) in defraying the expenses of properly incurred in the prosecution; (b) in the payment to any person of compensation for any loss or injury caused by the offence, when compensation is, in the opinion of the Court, recoverable by such person in a Civil Court; (c) when any person is convicted of any offence for having caused the death of another person or of having abetted the commission of such an offence, in paying compensation to the persons who are, under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 (13 of 1855), entitled to recover damages from the person sentenced for the loss resulting to them from such death; (d) when any person is convicted of any offence which includes theft, criminal misappropriation, criminal breach of trust, or cheating, or of having dishonestly received or retained, or of having voluntarily assisted in disposing of, stolen property knowing or having reason to believe the same to be stolen, in compensating any bona fide purchaser of such property for the loss of the same if such property is restored to the possession of the person entitled thereto.”[5]
  • Section 357A: “Every State Government in co-ordination with the Central Government shall prepare a scheme for providing funds for the purpose of compensation to the victim or his dependents who have suffered loss or injury as a result of the crime and who require rehabilitation.”[6]
  • Section 358: “(1) Whenever any person causes a police officer to arrest another person, if it appears to the Magistrate by whom the case is heard that there was no sufficient ground for causing such arrest, the Magistrate may award such compensation, not exceeding 1[one thousand rupees], to be paid by the person so causing the arrest to the person so arrested, for his loss of time and expenses in the matter, as the Magistrate thinks fit.”
(2) In such cases, if more persons than one is arrested, the Magistrate may, in like manner, award to each of them such compensation, not exceeding 1 [one thousand rupees], as such Magistrate thinks fit. (3) All compensation awarded under this section may be recovered as if it were a fine, and, if it cannot be so recovered, the person by whom it is payable shall be sentenced to simple imprisonment for such term not exceeding thirty days as the Magistrate directs, unless such sum is sooner paid.”[7]
  • Section 359: “Whenever any complaint of a non-cognizable offence is made to a Court, the Court, if it convicts the accused, may, in addition to the penalty imposed upon him, order him to pay to the complainant, in whole or in part, the cost incurred by him in the prosecution, and may further order that in default of payment, the accused shall suffer simple imprisonment for a period not exceeding thirty days and such costs may include any expenses incurred in respect of process-fees, witnesses and pleader's fees which the Court may consider reasonable.
(2) An order under this section may also be made by an Appellate Court or by the High Court or Court of Session when exercising its powers of revision.”[8]

Hurdles in Getting Compensation:

  • Every state has its own victim compensation scheme which creates non-uniformity across all states and they don’t abide by central government guidelines and by these discrepancies victims have to suffer.
  • Wide umbrella terms have been made by the state government which includes several crimes under one ambit and they have already set a prerequisite amount of compensation which is an injustice to the victims.
  • Each state has its own theory to allocate victim compensation, some states regard nature of crime as primary fact for compensation while other states regard age as a fact of awarding compensation.
  • Due to increase in crime rate in India, the recipient of victim compensation has increased to an alarming level which directly affects the state treasury.
  • The process of awarding the compensation is very lengthy which takes a large number of times to allocate the compensation.

Measures:

  • Victimology must be introduced in the Indian criminal justice system and judges and lawyers need to understand that giving harsher punishment will not benefit the victim, rather actions which are reparative in nature will help them start their new life again.
  • A new mechanism must be made to assess the impact of the crime on the victim and after assessing all the factors than victim must be awarded the compensation.
  • Proper implementation of laws must be taken place sections 357 and 357A of the Crpc talks about compensation but their implementation is very important in mainstream to compensate the victims.

Recent developments:

  • Ministry of Home Affairs in 2018 established victim compensation scheme, which aims to provide financial assistance to victims and made the process transparent as well as speedy. This scheme works on the theory of restorative justice and help the victim to mitigate his financial burden.
  • In year 2015 the central government set up the Central Victim Compensation Fund Scheme. The main aim of this scheme is to support the various schemes going on in various states and UTs. It talks about the budget allocation, particularly for victim compensation and if any state was lacking funds central government helped the respective state by allocating the funds.
  • Supreme Court of India in its various judgements has reiterated various guidelines and orders to state as well as executive agencies to comply with it some of the landmark judgements of the Supreme Court are as follows:
  1. Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v State of Maharashtra (2013)6 SCC 770: The Supreme Court of India in this landmark judgement made it compulsory for trial courts to consider grant of interim compensation and specifically give reasons for not awarding the interim compensation
  1. Rudal Sah V State of Bihar AIR 1983 SC 1086: The petitioner in this case was illegally detained for more than 14 years and after due deliberation he was released and a writ petition was filed by the petitioner and Supreme Court awarded the petitioner with a compensatory amount of 30,000 Rs. It was the first case in India where a writ court in India awarded compensation for illegal detention.
  1. MC Mehta V Union of India AIR 1987 SC 965: The Supreme Court held that its power under Article 32 is not just confined to preventive measures when there is a violation of fundamental right but it has its scope to remedial measures which also includes compensation where rights of the victim have already been violated.
  1. Hitendra Vishnu Thakur Vs State of Maharashtra (1994 )4 SCC 602: It was held by Supreme Court that “…A procedural statute should not generally speaking be applied retrospectively where the result would be to create new disabilities or obligations or to impose new duties…”
  2. Suresh v. State of Haryana (2015) 2 SCC 227: The Supreme Court held that “It is the duty of the courts, on taking cognizance of a criminal offence, to ascertain whether there is tangible material to show commission of crime, whether the victim is identifiable and whether the victim of crime needs immediate financial…relief.” The gravity of offence committed towards the victim and the condition of victim are the grounds to decide the compensation.

CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

Victim compensation under criminal law has witnessed systematic and fast progress in awarding compensation to the victims. Though the legal provisions in criminal law are hard to comprehend and checking the credibility of the victim is still a challenge the Supreme Court of India has played a vital role in this regard and by its myriad judgements tried to bridge the gap between courts, executive agencies and financial institutions. Lack of funds is a very serious problem states going through but the Central Government by its various initiatives tried to release the load over state. Regular auditing of funds should be done to check the progress in compensating the victims. By prioritize the victim compensation India can move towards a victim centric criminal justice system which not only punish the criminals but also compensate the victims and help them to get justice speedily and without any financial Hurdle.

REFERENCES

  1. Online Articles / Sources Referred
    1. efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://docs.manupatra.in/newsline/articles/Upload/6F5E12E5-2A56-49A9-BF1B-CBE1DF4F8726.2-F__criminal.pdf
    2. https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-6103-a-critical-study-on-victim-compensation-under-various-laws-of-india.html
    3. https://www.livelaw.in/tags/victim-compensation
    4. https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2024/01/10/delhi-government-published-amendment-in-delhi-victims-compensation-scheme-legal-news/
  1. Cases Referred
    1. Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v State of Maharashtra (2013)6 SCC 770
    2. Rudal Sah V State of Bihar AIR 1983 SC 1086
    3. MC Mehta V Union of India AIR 1987 SC 965:
    4. Hitendra Vishnu Thakur Vs State of Maharashtra (1994 )4 SCC 602
    5. Suresh v. State of Haryana (2015) 2 SCC 227:
  2. Statutes Referred
    1. Code of Criminal Procedure
    2. Constitution of India
    3. Section 2 (wa) - Code of Criminal Procedure,1973
    4. UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for victims of crime, including those law proscribing criminal abuse of power, 1985
    5. Constitution of India,1950
    6. Constitution of India,1950
    7. Order to pay compensation., https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC_CEN_5_23_000010_197402_1517807320555§ionId=22766§ionno=357&orderno=399.
    8. Victim compensation scheme., https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC_CEN_5_23_000010_197402_1517807320555&orderno=400.
    9. Compensation to persons groundlessly arrested, https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC_CEN_5_23_000010_197402_1517807320555&orderno=403.
    10. Order to pay costs in non-cognizable cases., https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC_CEN_5_23_000010_197402_1517807320555&orderno=40
**Content:** **Author-Chaitanya Sharma, National Forensics Sciences University, Delhi** ### **INTRODUCTION** Providing compensation to the victim is a very important aspect of any criminal justice system. Especially in India where there is a very high crime rate requires significant attention from the legislature as well as from the judiciary to take appropriate actions. Victims who go through with the crime suffer from physical as well as mental injury. To alleviate their sufferings victim compensation is provided to them with a sense of justice and make them assure that they will get speedy justice. In this article firstly we will go through who is a victim under the scheme of victim compensation then legal provisions dealing with victim compensation, and hurdles in getting compensation after this we will dive into the recent developments going on in the victim compensation scheme and what is the mechanism framed for getting compensation and finally, we will conclude. ***Keywords*:** *Victim Compensation, Code of Criminal Procedure, Victim, Accused, Criminal Justice System* ### **Who Qualifies as a Victim of Crime?** Any person, group, or entity that has suffered harm, which can be of any type including mental, physical, economic, or other. The beauty of the Indian legal system is that it considers victims to those people also whose perpetrators are absconding or not yet prosecuted. If someone is dead as a result of a crime the family members of the deceased will be regarded as the victims and they will be provided all the facilities which are provided to the victim itself. A **victim can be defined as** “*a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused person has been charged and the expression victim includes his or her guardian or legal heir*”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Another definition of **victim** is as follows “*Persons who individually or collectively have suffered harm including physical and mental injury emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights through acts or omissions that are violation of criminal law”[**\[2\]**](#_ftn2)* ### **Legal Provisions Dealing with Victim Compensation:** **Constitutional laws:** - **Article 14:** “*The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India*.”[\[3\]](#_ftn3) - **Article 21:** “*No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.*”[\[4\]](#_ftn4) **Criminal Procedure Code,1973:** - **Section 357:** “*When a Court imposes a sentence of fine or a sentence (including a sentence of death) of which fine forms a part, the Court may, when passing judgment, order the whole or any part of the fine recovered to be applied—* *(a) in defraying the expenses of properly incurred in the prosecution;* *(b) in the payment to any person of compensation for any loss or injury caused by the offence, when compensation is, in the opinion of the Court, recoverable by such person in a Civil Court;* *(c) when any person is convicted of any offence for having caused the death of another person or of having abetted the commission of such an offence, in paying compensation to the persons who are, under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 (13 of 1855), entitled to recover damages from the person sentenced for the loss resulting to them from such death;* *(d) when any person is convicted of any offence which includes theft, criminal misappropriation, criminal breach of trust, or cheating, or of having dishonestly received or retained, or of having voluntarily assisted in disposing of, stolen property knowing or having reason to believe the same to be stolen, in compensating any bona fide purchaser of such property for the loss of the same if such property is restored to the possession of the person entitled thereto.*”[\[5\]](#_ftn5) - **Section 357A:** “Every *State Government in co-ordination with the Central Government shall prepare a scheme for providing funds for the purpose of compensation to the victim or his dependents who have suffered loss or injury as a result of the crime and who require rehabilitation*.”[\[6\]](#_ftn6) - **Section 358:** “(1) *Whenever any person causes a police officer to arrest another person, if it appears to the Magistrate by whom the case is heard that there was no sufficient ground for causing such arrest, the Magistrate may award such compensation, not exceeding 1\[one thousand rupees\], to be paid by the person so causing the arrest to the person so arrested, for his loss of time and expenses in the matter, as the Magistrate thinks fit.”* *(2) In such cases, if more persons than one is arrested, the Magistrate may, in like manner, award to each of them such compensation, not exceeding 1 \[one thousand rupees\], as such Magistrate thinks fit.* *(3) All compensation awarded under this section may be recovered as if it were a fine, and, if it cannot be so recovered, the person by whom it is payable shall be sentenced to simple imprisonment for such term not exceeding thirty days as the Magistrate directs, unless such sum is sooner paid*.”[\[7\]](#_ftn7) - **Section 359:** “*Whenever any complaint of a non-cognizable offence is made to a Court, the Court, if it convicts the accused, may, in addition to the penalty imposed upon him, order him to pay to the complainant, in whole or in part, the cost incurred by him in the prosecution, and may further order that in default of payment, the accused shall suffer simple imprisonment for a period not exceeding thirty days and such costs may include any expenses incurred in respect of process-fees, witnesses and pleader’s fees which the Court may consider reasonable.* *(2) An order under this section may also be made by an Appellate Court or by the High Court or Court of Session when exercising its powers of revision*.”[\[8\]](#_ftn8) ### **Hurdles in Getting Compensation:** - Every state has its own victim compensation scheme which creates non-uniformity across all states and they don’t abide by central government guidelines and by these discrepancies victims have to suffer. - Wide umbrella terms have been made by the state government which includes several crimes under one ambit and they have already set a prerequisite amount of compensation which is an injustice to the victims. - Each state has its own theory to allocate victim compensation, some states regard nature of crime as primary fact for compensation while other states regard age as a fact of awarding compensation. - Due to increase in crime rate in India, the recipient of victim compensation has increased to an alarming level which directly affects the state treasury. - The process of awarding the compensation is very lengthy which takes a large number of times to allocate the compensation. ### **Measures:** - Victimology must be introduced in the Indian criminal justice system and judges and lawyers need to understand that giving harsher punishment will not benefit the victim, rather actions which are reparative in nature will help them start their new life again. - A new mechanism must be made to assess the impact of the crime on the victim and after assessing all the factors than victim must be awarded the compensation. - Proper implementation of laws must be taken place sections 357 and 357A of the Crpc talks about compensation but their implementation is very important in mainstream to compensate the victims. ### **Recent developments:** - Ministry of Home Affairs in 2018 established victim compensation scheme, which aims to provide financial assistance to victims and made the process transparent as well as speedy. This scheme works on the theory of restorative justice and help the victim to mitigate his financial burden. - In year 2015 the central government set up the Central Victim Compensation Fund Scheme. The main aim of this scheme is to support the various schemes going on in various states and UTs. It talks about the budget allocation, particularly for victim compensation and if any state was lacking funds central government helped the respective state by allocating the funds. - Supreme Court of India in its various judgements has reiterated various guidelines and orders to state as well as executive agencies to comply with it some of the landmark judgements of the Supreme Court are as follows: 1. *Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v State of Maharashtra (2013)6 SCC 770:* The Supreme Court of India in this landmark judgement made it compulsory for trial courts to consider grant of interim compensation and specifically give reasons for not awarding the interim compensation 2. *Rudal Sah V State of Bihar AIR 1983 SC 1086:* The petitioner in this case was illegally detained for more than 14 years and after due deliberation he was released and a writ petition was filed by the petitioner and Supreme Court awarded the petitioner with a compensatory amount of 30,000 Rs. It was the first case in India where a writ court in India awarded compensation for illegal detention. 3. *MC Mehta V Union of India AIR 1987 SC 965:* The Supreme Court held that its power under Article 32 is not just confined to preventive measures when there is a violation of fundamental right but it has its scope to remedial measures which also includes compensation where rights of the victim have already been violated. 5. *Hitendra Vishnu Thakur Vs State of Maharashtra (1994 )4 SCC 602*: It was held by Supreme Court that “*…A procedural statute should not generally speaking be applied retrospectively where the result would be to create new disabilities or obligations or to impose new duties…*” 6. *Suresh v. State of Haryana (2015) 2 SCC 227: The* Supreme Court held that “*It is the duty of the courts, on taking cognizance of a criminal offence, to ascertain whether there is tangible material to show commission of crime, whether the victim is identifiable and whether the victim of crime needs immediate financial…relief*.” The gravity of offence committed towards the victim and the condition of victim are the grounds to decide the compensation. ### **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** Victim compensation under criminal law has witnessed systematic and fast progress in awarding compensation to the victims. Though the legal provisions in criminal law are hard to comprehend and checking the credibility of the victim is still a challenge the Supreme Court of India has played a vital role in this regard and by its myriad judgements tried to bridge the gap between courts, executive agencies and financial institutions. Lack of funds is a very serious problem states going through but the Central Government by its various initiatives tried to release the load over state. Regular auditing of funds should be done to check the progress in compensating the victims. By prioritize the victim compensation India can move towards a victim centric criminal justice system which not only punish the criminals but also compensate the victims and help them to get justice speedily and without any financial Hurdle. ### **REFERENCES** 1. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 8726. efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://docs.manupatra.in/newsline/articles/Upload/6F5E12E5-2A56-49A9-BF1B-CBE1DF4F8726.2-F\_\_criminal.pdf 8727. 8728. 8729. 3. **Cases Referred** 1. *Ankush* *Shivaji* *Gaikwad* *v* *State* *of Maharashtra (2013)6* *SCC* *770* 2. *Rudal Sah V State of Bihar AIR 1983 SC 1086* 3. *MC Mehta V Union of India AIR 1987 SC 965:* 4. *Hitendra* *Vishnu* *Thakur* *Vs* *State* *of Maharashtra (1994* *)4* *SCC* *602* 5. *Suresh v. State of Haryana (2015) 2 SCC 227:* 4. **Statutes Referred** 1. Code of Criminal Procedure 2. Constitution of India 3. Section 2 (wa) – Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 4. UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for victims of crime, including those law proscribing criminal abuse of power, 1985 5. Constitution of India,1950 6. Constitution of India,1950 7. [](#_ftnref5)Order to pay compensation., https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC\_CEN\_5\_23\_000010\_197402\_1517807320555§ionId=22766§ionno=357&orderno=399. 8. Victim compensation scheme., https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC\_CEN\_5\_23\_000010\_197402\_1517807320555&orderno=400. 9. Compensation to persons groundlessly arrested, https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC\_CEN\_5\_23\_000010\_197402\_1517807320555&orderno=403. 10. Order to pay costs in non-cognizable cases., https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC\_CEN\_5\_23\_000010\_197402\_1517807320555&orderno=40 **Categories:** Articles --- ### [MUTUAL DIVORCE UNDER HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955](https://lawfoyer.in/mutual-divorce-under-hindu-marriage-act-1955/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Satpathy Gayatree Geetaswaroop, Birla School of Law, Birla Global University, Bhubaneswar

INTRODUCTION

Marriage brings two people together and unites them as a life partner socially or legally or both which strongly establishes their rights, duties and obligations between them and definitely with their children. Marriage also involves emotional, mutual commitments, friendship, partnership, financial, social and legal duties. Marriage as a social and formal institution that has ‘n’ number of things apart from mentioned above included in it; among the spouses aiming to stay together, creating a healthy, stable and happy family. But sometimes, destiny has it’s own plans. Everything can’t never happen the way we want and same is for marriage. Disturbance between couples is a clear cut reflection of their disagreements, miscommunications, misunderstandings and emotional distance etc. Ill arguments leading to separation of spouses is a common scenario. Some face very hectic separation, on the other hand some opt for mutual divorce on the ground that they were unable to live together and mutually agreed to dissolve the marriage. Keywords:Consent, Mutual agreement, Joint petition, Divorce, Hindu law

MEANING:

In simple words; spouses seeking or getting divorced with mutual agreement or consent.

EXPLANATION:

Mutual divorce or divorce by mutual consent is a process where both the parties or spouses in a marriage agree together to terminate their marital relationship amicably and legally as a result they file a joint petition in the court expressing their will to dissolve their marriage in which it is mentioned that, both the parties have agreed mutually to get separated due to incapability or incompatibilty to stay together.

EVOLUTION OF DIVORCE IN HINDU MARRIAGE LAW:

From the ancient times, marriage in Hindus has always been considered as pious, sacramental form of union between two opposite genders; i.e. a man and a woman. The concept or idea that lies behind marriage in Hindus is to stay committed and dedicated for lifetime cooperating with all ups and downs while maintaining love, harmony and togetherness. Divorce was neither a choice nor an option for the spouses at that time as they were bound to fulfill their commitments regardless of any obstructions in their marital relationship. Legal Hindu textbook ‘Manusmirti’ has never explicitly talked about divorce as the belief of a persistent marriage was practiced. Slowly and gradually as the society grew and evolved, laws needed amendments too. When it comes to divorce laws in India, the Indian society has never made itself broad enough to accept a divorced couple; especially a divorced woman. Legalising divorce was definitely a challenge for the Indian law but also a great and effective move to make the Indian society evolve in a much better way resulting in women empowerment and evolvement of law in all aspects. Hence the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 was enacted approving divorce laws in India.

WHAT CAUSED TO LEGALIZE DIVORCE IN INDIA?

In India it was observed that individuals in a marital relationship were facing issues to continue their marriage further and if they wanted to do so, there was no proper way or a channel to follow to get separated. There were women who suffered a lot mentally, physically and emotionally by staying in a disturbing marriage. According to various surveys, women didn’t get the life that they had thought of before getting into a marriage. They even mentioned that, the married life they entered into was just only a one day of celebration and not a lifelong commitment. Not only women, men were also facing various issues regarding their bitter relationship with their wives which ultimately gave rise to bring divorce laws in India.

PROVISIONS TO DISSOLVE A MARRIAGE UNDER HINDU LAW:

  • A solemnized marriage on the interest of the parties or the spouses can be dissolved by Judicial separation and Divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA).
  • JUDICIAL SEPARATION UNDER HMA, 1955: Judicial separation is considered lesser cruel than divorce because it has chances of reconciliation. It is not dissolution of marriage rather it suspends all marital duties, rights and obligations of the parties; the husband and the wife. Judicial separation has been mentioned under section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 in which it is stated that, either of the party if want can present a petition before the court of law stating for a decree of judicial separation on any of the grounds suitable to the party mentioned u/s 13(1) and 13(2) of them HMA. Once the decree of judicial separation is passed, parties or the spouses are no longer obligatory to stay together.
  • DIVORCE UNDER HMA, 1955: Divorce has been mentioned under section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 which states that any marriage solemnized before or after the enactment of this act, the parties in the marriage can dissolve their marriage by a decree of divorce on presenting a petition; any of the either spouse can present the petition. The following grounds should be kept in mind to file a divorce petition:
  • Adultery: u/s 13(1)(ia); having or had voluntary sexual intercourse with any other individual other than his or her spouse.
  • Cruelty: u/s 13(1)(ib); this includes both mental cruelties in which the exchange of thoughts, kindness, and understanding gets lost between the partners resulting in adverse issues disturbing the mental and physical cruelty; where one of the spouses causes injuries on body of the other spouse making her or him weak to do any task physically.
For example-
  1. communication gap between husband and wife
  2. disrespecting either of the spouse even by a mini humour
  3. not respecting either of the spouses family
  4. indecent and indiscipline lifestyle of either of the spouses
  • Conversion: 13(1)(ii) states that either of the spouse has ceased to be Hindu by conversion to any other religion
  • Unsoundness of mind: u/s 13(1)(iii) either of the spouse had unsound mind, or suffering constantly from mental disorder to a such extent that it made difficult for either of the spouse to live with him or her.
  • Veneral Disease: u/s 13(1)(v) states either of the spouse can seek for divorce if any one of them is suffering from a communicable venereal disease.
  • Renounciation: 13(1)(vi) says that either of the spouse has renounced the world.
  • Assumption or Presumption of death: 13(1)(vii) states if either of the spouse has not been heard of being alive for seven years or more and this information is authorized in regarding who might have heard it naturally.

DIVORCE BY MUTUAL CONSENT UNDER HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955:

This is probably the best and the most advisable ground to take a divorce. Divorce by mutual consent was inserted by (Act 68 of 1976, Section 8). In HMA it has been mentioned under section 13(B) where it states that parties can jointly file a petition before the district court on the following grounds mentioned:
  • Living separately for a period of one year or more: Here “living separately” means that parties were not anymore living as a husband and wife neither under the same roof or different houses.
  • Had not been able to live together: This means breaking of marriage irretrievably.
  • Mutually agreed to dissolve the marriage: Decided to have a mutual settlement amicably.
  1. PROCEDURE: Grounds mentioned above in point ‘G’ of this article shows the eligibility to file petition for divorce. Keeping these grounds in mind there’s a hierarchy for the parties to follow to get divorced, which are as follows:
  • After presenting the petition, parties need to wait for six months but not more than eighteen months.
  • Six months from the date of petition presented and not later than eighteen months after the date has been declared.
  • The parties need to move a motion in the court stating that a decree of divorce to dissolve their marriage be passed.
  • The parties are absolutely free to withdraw their petition but this is only possible within the period of six to eighteen months and not after that.
  • If not withdrawn, the Court will be satisfied that the parties don’t want to continue their marriage further and the facts mentioned in the petition are true, the decree of divorce will be passed effectively from the date of decree.
Note: The motto of providing six to eighteen months (also known as cooling-off period) to the spouses or parties to make them reconsider about their marital relationship dissolution; if they ever think to change their minds to re-unite, they have to do this within the period of six to eighteen months given to them.

UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF CONSENT BY ONE PARTY IN MUTUAL DIVORCE:

Yes, in a case the Delhi High Court in 2018, held that either of the party can unilaterally withdraw his or her consent not to opt for mutual divorce only in exceptional cases with valid and reasonable grounds.

LANDMARK CASE LAW:

  • Manish Goyal vs Rohini Goyal (2010) 4 SCC 393
Facts of the case: Both the parties; Manish and Rohini filed a petition for divorce by mutual consent and satisfied the court that there is no chance of reconciliation and they both strongly agreed the facts metioned in their petition where as subsequently submitted another application to the court to waive of their six month timeline for filing the final petition to get divorced. The District Court denied it and eventually the petition was presented in the Supreme Court. Issues raised in the case:
  1. Whether the timeline of six to eight months specified in section 13-B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955 is mandatory?
  2. Whether the waiving off the six-month window period is only mandatory in exceptional cases?
Judgement: The Supreme Court held that, legal requirement of waiting for six months before granting divorce under section 13-B(2) in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is not mandatory but directory. However, the Supreme Court also mentioned that power to unwind the mandatory requirement of six months waiting period can only be exercised by the Supreme Court only under Article 142 of the Indian Constitution in which “extent of executive power of State” has been stated.

CONCLUSION& COMMENTS

Divorce has always been considered as the most disturbing phase for any couple in their whole marital life. It has adverse effects on families of the spouses including their children but sometimes situation can be worst to a such extent that termination of marriage becomes the only solution to solve the problem. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 has various provisions for individuals whether it is a man or a woman that wants to get divorced and in this act it has given, meaning, explanation and definition, procedure, precedents and theories supporting dissolution of marriage. The Hindu Marriage Act wisely and reasonably justifies remedies for spouses getting divorced. Resolving disturbance or disputes between spouses in not an easy task but legislation did its best to give some relief to the spouses or the parties. Last but not the least, divorce by mutual consent is by far the most amicable way of handling and tackling a serious issue like divorce. REFERENCES
  1. Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred
    1. Family Law, Dr. Paras Diwan
  2. Online Articles / Sources Referred
    1. Indian kanoon
    2. SCC online
  3. Cases Referred
    1. Raj Vinod vs Smt. Durga Devi 2002
    2. Jayashree Vs Ramesh, AIR 1984 BOM HC
    3. Santhosh Kumari vs Virendra Kumar AIR 1986
    4. Akhil Kumar Jain vs Maya Jain (2009) 10 SCC 415
    5. Ajay Bhikulal Gujar vs Shyamati Gujar AIR 2021 SC 3341
    6. Kaizer Basu vs Mahua Basu AIR 2014 Cal 180
    7. Davinder Singh Narula vs Meenakshi Nangia AIR 2012 SC 2890
  4. Statutes Referred
    1. Hindu laws (Bare Act)
    2. The Constitution of India (Bare Act)
    3. The Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976
    4. Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001
**Content:** **Author-Satpathy Gayatree Geetaswaroop, Birla School of Law, Birla Global University, Bhubaneswar** ### **INTRODUCTION** Marriage brings two people together and unites them as a life partner socially or legally or both which strongly establishes their rights, duties and obligations between them and definitely with their children. Marriage also involves emotional, mutual commitments, friendship, partnership, financial, social and legal duties. Marriage as a social and formal institution that has ‘n’ number of things apart from mentioned above included in it; among the spouses aiming to stay together, creating a healthy, stable and happy family. But sometimes, destiny has it’s own plans. Everything can’t never happen the way we want and same is for marriage. Disturbance between couples is a clear cut reflection of their disagreements, miscommunications, misunderstandings and emotional distance etc. Ill arguments leading to separation of spouses is a common scenario. Some face very hectic separation, on the other hand some opt for mutual divorce on the ground that they were unable to live together and mutually agreed to dissolve the marriage. ***Keywords*:*Consent, Mutual agreement, Joint petition, Divorce, Hindu law*** ### **MEANING:** In simple words; spouses seeking or getting divorced with mutual agreement or consent. ### **EXPLANATION:** Mutual divorce or divorce by mutual consent is a process where both the parties or spouses in a marriage agree together to terminate their marital relationship amicably and legally as a result they file a joint petition in the court expressing their will to dissolve their marriage in which it is mentioned that, both the parties have agreed mutually to get separated due to incapability or incompatibilty to stay together. ### **EVOLUTION OF DIVORCE IN HINDU MARRIAGE LAW:** From the ancient times, marriage in Hindus has always been considered as pious, sacramental form of union between two opposite genders; i.e. a man and a woman. The concept or idea that lies behind marriage in Hindus is to stay committed and dedicated for lifetime cooperating with all ups and downs while maintaining love, harmony and togetherness. Divorce was neither a choice nor an option for the spouses at that time as they were bound to fulfill their commitments regardless of any obstructions in their marital relationship. Legal Hindu textbook ‘Manusmirti’ has never explicitly talked about divorce as the belief of a persistent marriage was practiced. Slowly and gradually as the society grew and evolved, laws needed amendments too. When it comes to divorce laws in India, the Indian society has never made itself broad enough to accept a divorced couple; especially a divorced woman. Legalising divorce was definitely a challenge for the Indian law but also a great and effective move to make the Indian society evolve in a much better way resulting in women empowerment and evolvement of law in all aspects. Hence the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 was enacted approving divorce laws in India. ### **WHAT CAUSED TO LEGALIZE DIVORCE IN INDIA?** In India it was observed that individuals in a marital relationship were facing issues to continue their marriage further and if they wanted to do so, there was no proper way or a channel to follow to get separated. There were women who suffered a lot mentally, physically and emotionally by staying in a disturbing marriage. According to various surveys, women didn’t get the life that they had thought of before getting into a marriage. They even mentioned that, the married life they entered into was just only a one day of celebration and not a lifelong commitment. Not only women, men were also facing various issues regarding their bitter relationship with their wives which ultimately gave rise to bring divorce laws in India. ### **PROVISIONS TO DISSOLVE A MARRIAGE UNDER HINDU LAW:** - A solemnized marriage on the interest of the parties or the spouses can be dissolved by Judicial separation and Divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA). - **JUDICIAL SEPARATION UNDER HMA, 1955**: Judicial separation is considered lesser cruel than divorce because it has chances of reconciliation. It is not dissolution of marriage rather it suspends all marital duties, rights and obligations of the parties; the husband and the wife. Judicial separation has been mentioned under section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 in which it is stated that, either of the party if want can present a petition before the court of law stating for a decree of judicial separation on any of the grounds suitable to the party mentioned u/s 13(1) and 13(2) of them HMA. Once the decree of judicial separation is passed, parties or the spouses are no longer obligatory to stay together. - **DIVORCE UNDER HMA, 1955**: Divorce has been mentioned under section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 which states that any marriage solemnized before or after the enactment of this act, the parties in the marriage can dissolve their marriage by a decree of divorce on presenting a petition; any of the either spouse can present the petition. The following grounds should be kept in mind to file a divorce petition: - **Adultery:** **u/s 13(1)(ia)**; having or had voluntary sexual intercourse with any other individual other than his or her spouse. - **Cruelty: u/s 13(1)(ib)**; this includes both mental cruelties in which the exchange of thoughts, kindness, and understanding gets lost between the partners resulting in adverse issues disturbing the mental and physical cruelty; where one of the spouses causes injuries on body of the other spouse making her or him weak to do any task physically. **For example-** 1. communication gap between husband and wife 2. disrespecting either of the spouse even by a mini humour 3. not respecting either of the spouses family 4. indecent and indiscipline lifestyle of either of the spouses - Conversion: 13(1)(ii) states that either of the spouse has ceased to be Hindu by conversion to any other religion - Unsoundness of mind: u/s 13(1)(iii) either of the spouse had unsound mind, or suffering constantly from mental disorder to a such extent that it made difficult for either of the spouse to live with him or her. - Veneral Disease: u/s 13(1)(v) states either of the spouse can seek for divorce if any one of them is suffering from a communicable venereal disease. - Renounciation: 13(1)(vi) says that either of the spouse has renounced the world. - Assumption or Presumption of death: 13(1)(vii) states if either of the spouse has not been heard of being alive for seven years or more and this information is authorized in regarding who might have heard it naturally. ### **DIVORCE BY MUTUAL CONSENT UNDER HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955:** This is probably the best and the most advisable ground to take a divorce. Divorce by mutual consent was inserted by (Act 68 of 1976, Section 8). In HMA it has been mentioned under section 13(B) where it states that parties can jointly file a petition before the district court on the following grounds mentioned: - Living separately for a period of one year or more: Here “living separately” means that parties were not anymore living as a husband and wife neither under the same roof or different houses. - Had not been able to live together: This means breaking of marriage irretrievably. - Mutually agreed to dissolve the marriage: Decided to have a mutual settlement amicably. 1. PROCEDURE: Grounds mentioned above in point ‘G’ of this article shows the eligibility to file petition for divorce. Keeping these grounds in mind there’s a hierarchy for the parties to follow to get divorced, which are as follows: - After presenting the petition, parties need to wait for six months but not more than eighteen months. - Six months from the date of petition presented and not later than eighteen months after the date has been declared. - The parties need to move a motion in the court stating that a decree of divorce to dissolve their marriage be passed. - The parties are absolutely free to withdraw their petition but this is only possible within the period of six to eighteen months and not after that. - If not withdrawn, the Court will be satisfied that the parties don’t want to continue their marriage further and the facts mentioned in the petition are true, the decree of divorce will be passed effectively from the date of decree. *Note: The motto of providing six to eighteen months (also known as cooling-off period) to the spouses or parties to make them reconsider about their marital relationship dissolution; if they ever think to change their minds to re-unite, they have to do this within the period of six to eighteen months given to them.* #### **UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF CONSENT BY ONE PARTY IN MUTUAL DIVORCE:** Yes, in a case the Delhi High Court in 2018, held that either of the party can unilaterally withdraw his or her consent not to opt for mutual divorce only in exceptional cases with valid and reasonable grounds. ### **LANDMARK CASE LAW:** - **Manish Goyal vs Rohini Goyal (2010) 4 SCC 393** **Facts of the case:** Both the parties; Manish and Rohini filed a petition for divorce by mutual consent and satisfied the court that there is no chance of reconciliation and they both strongly agreed the facts metioned in their petition where as subsequently submitted another application to the court to waive of their six month timeline for filing the final petition to get divorced. The District Court denied it and eventually the petition was presented in the Supreme Court. **Issues raised in the case:** 1. Whether the timeline of six to eight months specified in section 13-B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955 is mandatory? 2. Whether the waiving off the six-month window period is only mandatory in exceptional cases? **Judgement:** The Supreme Court held that, legal requirement of waiting for six months before granting divorce under section 13-B(2) in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is not mandatory but directory. However, the Supreme Court also mentioned that power to unwind the mandatory requirement of six months waiting period can only be exercised by the Supreme Court only under Article 142 of the Indian Constitution in which “extent of executive power of State” has been stated. ### **CONCLUSION& COMMENTS** Divorce has always been considered as the most disturbing phase for any couple in their whole marital life. It has adverse effects on families of the spouses including their children but sometimes situation can be worst to a such extent that termination of marriage becomes the only solution to solve the problem. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 has various provisions for individuals whether it is a man or a woman that wants to get divorced and in this act it has given, meaning, explanation and definition, procedure, precedents and theories supporting dissolution of marriage. The Hindu Marriage Act wisely and reasonably justifies remedies for spouses getting divorced. Resolving disturbance or disputes between spouses in not an easy task but legislation did its best to give some relief to the spouses or the parties. Last but not the least, divorce by mutual consent is by far the most amicable way of handling and tackling a serious issue like divorce. **REFERENCES** 1. **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** 1. Family Law, Dr. Paras Diwan 2. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. Indian kanoon 2. SCC online 3. **Cases Referred** 1. Raj Vinod vs Smt. Durga Devi 2002 2. Jayashree Vs Ramesh, AIR 1984 BOM HC 3. Santhosh Kumari vs Virendra Kumar AIR 1986 4. Akhil Kumar Jain vs Maya Jain (2009) 10 SCC 415 5. Ajay Bhikulal Gujar vs Shyamati Gujar AIR 2021 SC 3341 6. Kaizer Basu vs Mahua Basu AIR 2014 Cal 180 7. Davinder Singh Narula vs Meenakshi Nangia AIR 2012 SC 2890 4. **Statutes Referred** 1. Hindu laws (Bare Act) 2. The Constitution of India (Bare Act) 3. The Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 4. Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001 **Categories:** Articles --- ### [Tangled Webs: White Collar Scams in India](https://lawfoyer.in/tangled-webs-white-collar-scams-in-india/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Pooja, Rayat College of Law, Railmajra

INTRODUCTION

For many decades, the news headlines about scams and frauds committed by individuals and corporations have become more prevalent in India. Unfortunately, several people are unaware of these scams like Phishing calls, Telegram fraud, custom duty scams, financial scams and more. However, these practices are still ongoing, and offenders are taking advantage of loopholes in the statutes due to the negligence of lawmakers during the creation of laws. Nobody dares to question these practices till the day when news headlines reveal that ‘A’ person fled to ‘B’ Country before any legal action can be taken as he has committed default in repaying such amount i.e., raised or borrowed money by him from multiple sources from the past ‘X’ years. When an aggrieved party or parties file the petition before the court then it’s already too late to administer justice to them because defaulters know very well how to defeat the law as the judiciary has no jurisdiction beyond the country even if all the evidence shows yes, it is a scam. For example, if the Judiciary gives judgment against the offender but during the time of execution of the decree in general question arises how we can recover that money as the Offender did not leave any sufficient property as all the properties belonged to him at ‘B’ country, where the offender currently resides. All the victims are not able to get their funds back due to the typical procedure established by the committee and not a proper channel of communication to listen to the queries of the victims because of the incomplete investigation from the side of the authorities. No doubt, many people will say that they have official data to prove that people getting refunds, but the reality is much different from the data. Normally. data is just a formality nothing else because a large number of people commit suicides[1] and lose hope in the justice system. We can see that on the surface everything is going on very smoothly but if we dive into reality then we will see there is an ocean of corruption and laziness from the side of the authorities. In the end, Authorities treat the victims in such a manner which makes them believe that they are the root cause of the problem, not the defaulters because justice is in the hands of such people and there is no one to address their miseries. That’s why, reality is too harsh and beyond the way. Now, we can understand that it is a very well-planned tactic and generally played by the many offenders at every time because they believe that no one can restrict such activities as they have the power in their hands till they have money which is sufficient to feed the mouth of corrupted officials and for that sake, such officials will protect them as far as possible. However, On the other side, many officials are honest and dedicated to their profession. Still, they do have not the power to restrain such corrupt practices that are adopted in the world of the corporate. Even Today, there is no specific legislation to deal with, regulate and provide adequate relief against such practices. Ultimately, these practices are increasing at a higher pace. In this article, we will understand the meaning, statutory provisions, Problems and remedies to prevent such Crimes in the interest of justice. Keywords (Minimum 5): Corruption, Money 'Power, Loopholes in Statutes, Lack in the implementation of Law, Defeat of Justice, Corporate Crime and Scams.

Meaning, and Definition:

White-collar scams fall under the umbrella term of white-collar crime. White-collar scams are one of the white-collar crimes. It means the scope of white-collar crime is much greater than white-collar scams. A “scam” generally refers to a deceptive, manipulative or fraudulent scheme. These scams are designed to cheat someone out of money or assets. When this type of fraudulent activity is adopted by individuals or entities in positions of authority, trust, or influence. This is how scams become white-collar scams[2][3] "Crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status during his occupation."                                                                      -------------- Edwin Sutherland In other words, White-collar crimes denote non-violent, illegal activities, financially motivated and tricks like deception, fraud, or manipulation particularly committed by individuals of high social status, such as professionals, business executives, or government officials, during their occupation or profession.

Historical Background

In 1930, The Sociologist and Criminologist Edwin Sutherland coined and popularised the concept of white-collar crime. Before this, there was a myth that individuals from the upper social class never indulge in such unethical and immoral practices. Sutherland challenged this notion and brought attention to the involvement of respected individuals in illegal activities[4]. Since then, various theories and approaches have been developed to analyse and address issues concerning such crimes. Over time, Due to technological advancement and globalization, these crimes have become more sophisticated because of the complex financial schemes and regulatory challenges[5]. “The Santhanam Committee's report showed a wide picture of white-collar crimes committed by respectable individuals such as businessmen, industrialists, contractors, and suppliers, as well as corrupt public officials. The motivation for committing a crime is not always based on necessity.[6]” It includes Businessmen, Industrialists, Contractors, Suppliers and not surprisingly corrupt Public Officials. In May 1958, the government appointed a Board of Enquiry headed by Justice Vivian Bose[7]. In 1963, The Reports of the Vivian Bose Commission[8] investigated the affairs of the Dalmia Jain group of companies and drew attention towards the Businessmen who often indulge themselves in White Collar Crimes such as Forgery, Fraud, Falsification of accounts, Tampering with records for personal gains and Tax evasion etc. Consequently, the problems like huge financial, social, and psychological suffering by the victims and society at large[9].

 Principles and Doctrines:

  • Strict Construction and Interpretation of Criminal Statutes - The idea behind this principle is that there must not be a formality when the laws are enacted but every provision contained in the statutes must address the issues and the procedures in the concised form. Therefore, criminal statutes must be construed strictly and interpreted precisely by keeping in view the practical application of the laws.
  • The Tricks of Deceit and Concealment - This doctrine states that in this AI era, it is an easy task to access information because lack of security issues and data is bought and sold by such persons who do not have the authority to do so but this is the reality and lack of the vigilance from the side of the authorities. Hence, criminals often employ fraudulent schemes, misrepresentations, or false information, to accomplish their objectives.
  • Causes behind the criminal intent of the Individual - This concept is very helpful to understanding and investigating the criminal behaviour of individuals, such as rule-violating nature, greed, lack of awareness among people, lack of strict rules and laws, lack of accountability, peer support, loopholes of legal structure, technological and industrial development[10].
Therefore, this list is not limited but understanding of these factors aids in identifying and combating such crimes. As, there are various theories such as rational choice, social control, strain etc, that can be applied to explain the motivations and tactics behind white-collar crimes. This is how researchers and policymakers can understand the root causes of such offences.

Essentials / Elements / Pre-requisites:

  • One of the most essential points is that there must be the presence of the Intention to deceive
  • The statement by the person that he/she is from an ‘X’ company 'agent or your relative’ friend is like impersonating themselves to gain the trust of the individual. Such act known as Breach of trust,
  • The intention to deceive someone only because there is an existence of financial motive,
  • In scams, the most common element is to operate illegal activities by showing that these activities are complying with the law. This is called the concealment of illegal activities.
Note: A thorough investigation is required to uncover the scams may involve complex schemes and multiple parties.

Exceptions:

  • There must be a lack of intention to deceive the victim to gain undue financial advantage.
  • When there is no meeting of mind that leads to the mistake of fact.
  • No usage of manipulative tricks to trap the victims to do such acts which they ordinarily resist to do so. It is known as
  • There must not be use of force of any type over the victim to do such an act. Such acts count as
However, proving these defences can be challenging due to the nature of white-collar scams and the evidence required to establish guilt.

Forms / Modes [11]

Some common types of white-collar scams[12]:
  • Fund Embezzlement: The misuse of funds by the executives within organizations that are entrusted under the care of the individual.
  • Fraud[13]: “Fraud occurs when someone knowingly lies to obtain a benefit or advantage to which they are not otherwise entitled, or someone knowingly denies a benefit that is due and to which someone is entitled”[14]. In other words, there must be a presence of an intention to deceive to secure unfair or unlawful financial gain, which can include:
  • Investment Fraud, Insurance Fraud, Forgery, Credit Card Fraud, Securities Fraud, Bank Fraud, Online Auction Fraud etc
  • For example, in the case of Punjab National Bank Fraud (2018): Over Rs 14,000 crores was defrauded by Nirav Modi (Billionaire Jeweller) and this fraud was committed via the issuance of fraudulent Letters of Undertaking by a subordinate clerk at a single Mumbai branch.
  • Insider Trading: “This practice that often blurs the line between legitimate investment activities and unlawful behaviour. It happens when individuals or entities buy or sell securities in a company based on non-public, material information about that company. This practice can lead to unfair advantages, market distortions, and loss[15].
For example, In the Re Harshad Mehta Scam (1992) case: This is one of the biggest securities scams in Indian history and it involved fraudulent brokerage practices and over Rs.6,000 crores in bank funds being siphoned off.
  • Ponzi Schemes: In this scheme, at first, the funds are collected from new investors then these funds are used to pay returns to their earlier investors, creating the illusion of profit when no legitimate business activity is occurring.
For example, In the Re Rose Valley Chit Fund Scam (2012-13) case: An estimated Rs 15,000 crores Ponzi scheme defrauded lakhs of small investors across India.
  • Pyramid Schemes: This scheme is familiar with the Ponzi scheme, where participants are recruited to make payments to those above them in a hierarchy, promising future profits based on recruiting more participants.
Example: In the Re PACL Ponzi scam case (2014): In the Re PACL Ponzi scam case (2014): PACL collected over Rs 45,000 crores through its instalment payment plan and cash down payment plan as part of its collective investment scheme. The investors were lured by promises of an interest rate of 12.5 per cent on deposits are much better option instead of investing in the Fds and depositing in the savings bank account, besides free accidental insurance and income tax-free maturity. Sebi passed an order asking the company to refund Rs 49,100 crores, with promised returns.[16]
  • Phishing Scams: This is a method of sending fake emails or messages to trick individuals into providing sensitive information, such as passwords or credit card numbers. Afterwards, this information is used for identity theft or financial fraud.
  • Tech Support Scams: Tech support personnel convince victims to provide remote access to their computers as they impersonate themselves so that individual will believe their words and do such acts that scammers want them to do. That‘s why, it is easier for scammers to steal personal information or install malware.
  • Business Email Compromise and Phishing Calls: Scammers use compromised email accounts and phone numbers to impersonate executives or employees, tricking others into transferring funds or sensitive information.
  • Identity Theft: In this era, both online and offline at some official platforms sharing of personal data is very common but our data are sold/leaked by the sources to whom we give access to have our data. That’s how Scammers Illegally obtain and use someone else's data, such as Social Security numbers or credit card information, for financial gain.
  • Loan Scams: Offering fraudulent loans with unrealistic terms and prerequisite conditions is upfront fees or personal information that can be used for identity theft[17].

Legal Provisions and Regulations

India's legal framework addresses white-collar scams with specific statutes and provisions: Statutes:
  • “Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) Act, 1946 - The CBI is the premier investigating agency in India to investigate major crimes, including white-collar crimes. The CBI Act empowers the agency to investigate offences across state borders”[18].
  • “Banking Regulation Act, 1949 [19]- Sections 33A, 34A, 35 dealing with banking related fraudulent transactions, falsification of accounts”[20].
  • “Income Tax Act, 1961[21] - This act includes provisions related to tax evasion, which is a common aspect of white-collar crimes. Evading taxes through fraudulent means is punishable under this act”.
Havells India Ltd Tax Evasion (2016): Tax evasion of over Rs 500 crores by under-reporting sales and profit figures over several years.
  • “Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) Act, 1992” [22]
The Securities and Exchange Board of India Act regulates the securities market and aims to prevent market manipulation and insider trading. Amendments: Amendments have been made to the SEBI Act to enhance regulatory oversight and enforcement against insider trading and market abuse.
  • Indian Penal Code (IPC)[23]
Sections 403 to 409 deal with offences related to criminal breach of trust, misappropriation, and cheating. Sections 463 to 468 cover forgery and counterfeiting. Sections 471 to 474 address the use of forged documents as genuine. Amendments: The IPC has undergone various amendments over the years to strengthen provisions against white-collar crimes. Notable amendments include updates to punishment clauses for fraud, misappropriation, and financial offences. [24].
  • Information Technology Act, 2000[25]- With the rise of cybercrimes related to white-collar offences, this act provides legal provisions for electronic fraud, data theft, and hacking.
  • Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002[26]: This Act focuses on dealing with corruption involving public officials and public servants.
Commonwealth Games Scam (2010): Large-scale inflated expenses and corruption during preparation for the games with over ₹70,000 crores estimated to have been laundered. Amendments: Amendments to this Act have introduced stricter penalties for corruption, bribery, and illegal gratification.
  • Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003[27]: This act enhances vigilance in public sector organizations[28]
  • “Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013[29]: Establishes Institutions to Combat Corruption[30] The Act provides for the establishment of Lokpal at the central level and Lokayuktas at the state level to inquire into allegations of corruption against public officials.”
“The Lokpal and Lokayuktas (Amendment) Act, 2016[31],2019 and, 2020, introduced provisions for declaring assets and liabilities of public servants and their family members. Also amended various sections to enhance transparency, streamline procedures for filing complaints, protect whistleblowers and for the extension of the time limit for public servants to declare their assets and liabilities.” “The objectives behind these amendments are to strengthen the functioning of Lokpal and Lokayuktas, increase accountability, and expedite the resolution of corruption cases. It covers various offences related to corruption and misconduct by public servants.”
  • Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988[32]
“The Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018[33], introduced stringent provisions against corruption, including criminalizing giving bribes and punishing commercial organizations for bribery.” The objectives are to ensure speedy trial and enhanced punishment for offenses related to bribery, corruption and curb corruption and promote transparency in governance. This Act complements the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act by defining various offences related to corruption involving public officials and public servants. and prescribing penalties Amendments: The Act has undergone amendments to enhance penalties and widen the scope of offences, to complement the objectives of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act.”
  • “Foreign Contribution Regulation Act, 2010[34]: Regulates foreign contributions and targets financial misconduct[35].”
  • “Companies Act (2013)[36]: The fraud committed by officers of a company falls under the Sections 447 and 448 like financial statement fraud falls under this. One more thing is that there is no specific definition of Fraud in the Companies Act, of 1956”.
  • “Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015[37] - Sections - Deals with non-disclosure of foreign assets, tax evasion on undisclosed foreign income and assets.”
  • “Fugitive Economic Offenders Act, 2018[38]: To deal with the economic offenders who fly to another country from India[39] .”

Case Laws:

  • V Senthil Balaji v State[40]-In this Special Leave Petition case reported in 2023, the Tamil Nadu chief minister was involved in the Cash for Job scam. the Supreme Court provided insights into white-collar crimes and their legal implications[41].
  • Rahul Dinesh Surana vs. Senior Assistant Director[42][43]- The Madras High Court held to grant imprisonment to the former CEO of Surana Group of Companies in a Rs 10,000 Crores fraud case highlights the seriousness of white-collar crimes in India.
  • Vijay Madanlal Choudhary vs Union Of India [44][45]- A case discussing the constitutional aspects of the procedure under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), shedding light on legal safeguards in white-collar crime investigations.
  • 2G Spectrum Scam (2008): Mobile frequencies allocation scam involving underpricing that led to an estimated loss of ₹1.76 lakh crores to the exchequer[46].
  • Satyam Scam (2009) India's biggest accounting fraud involving fictitious assets and inflated cash balances worth ₹7,800 crores by its chairman.[47]

 Amendments /  Repealing :

  • Amendments to PMLA: The Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) was amended in 2023 by the Central Government to include provisions related to the punishment for forgery and falsification of accounts[48].
  • Repeal of IPC: The enactment of three new acts aimed at reforming criminal laws, The Indian Penal Code, 1860 replaced by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita Bill, 2023, the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 replaced by the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita Bill, 2023 and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 replaced by the Bharatiya Sakshya Bill, 2023[49].

CONCLUSION & COMMENTS (Recommendations and Remedies)

This article paints the real picture of the current legal framework and obstacles within the judicial process while dealing with white-collar scams in India. This study emphasises that the consequences are beyond financial losses, affecting businesses, consumers, and the overall economy. Likewise, the Mundhra scam (1950) case marked independent India’s first big financial fraud. The famed Harshad Mehta Scam- Stock market and Money laundering scam (1992), Satyam Scam-White collar scam (2008), Sahara Scam (2013) - In this case, Option bonds were collected over Rs. 24000 crores from the public without authorisation of proper regulatory authorities, Bhushan steel scam- Money Laundering (2019), Dewan Housing Finance Limited-Bank scam ( 2021), ABG Shipyard-Bank scam (2022) are frauds keep growing on with an alarming frequency following every decade and many more. To deal with such scams/crimes, there is a huge need to adopt a comprehensive mechanism. There are some recommendations such as Principles of transparency, accountability, integrity, and ethical conduct, that must be adopted. Remedies include reviewing laws governing economic offences, engaging knowledgeable prosecutors, expediting trials through exclusive courts, simplifying court procedures, and establishing a special penal code for white-collar crime prevention. In lump sum, the study calls for a stringent approach to address white-collar crimes in India, advocating for legal reforms, judicial efficiency enhancements, and preventive measures to combat these complex forms of criminal activities effectively and efficiently. Therefore, it is high time for our constitutional machinery to focus on the enactment of stringent laws that will be helpful to deter offenders and prevent such crimes by tightening bail provisions to prevent economic offenders from being released easily and a special penal code dedicated to preventing white-collar crime to expedite justice, combat and prevent misconduct, promote corporate responsibility, and maintain public trust in institutions.

REFERENCES

Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred
  1. https://kbsaa.org/journal/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Saptarshi-Ganguly-and-Amit-Majumder.pdf
  2. https://ijirl.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/A-CRITICAL-STUDY-OF-WHITE-COLLAR-CRIMES.pdf
Online Articles / Sources
  1. com - Legislations Against White Collar Crimes
  2. com - White-Collar Crime 2023
  3. LiveLaw - Reathed all Latest Updates on and about White Collar Crimes
  4. LinkedIn - White Collar Crime in India
  5. JSTOR - Corrupting the Harm Requirement in White Collar Crime
  6. com/library/detail.aspx
  7. India code
  8. Hindustan Times
  9. Outlook.com
Cases Referred
  1. https://www.livemint.com/Companies/UJ4F8Dyx6L9CEmLYME3o6K/Mundhra-scam-Indias-first-big-corporate-fraud-case.html
  2. https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2012/20230/20230_2012_Judgement_17-Apr-2012.pdf
  3. https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2012/20230/20230_2012_Judgement_17-Apr-2012.pdf
  4. https://www.livemint.com/Companies/UJ4F8Dyx6L9CEmLYME3o6K/Mundhra-scam-Indias-first-big-corporate-fraud-case.html
  5. https://www.rediff.com/business/report/bhushan-steel-case-a-classic-example-of-crony-capitalism/20200528.html.
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[36]https://www.google.com/urlsa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiNroHojduEAxWFcGwGHZulBloQFnoECCAQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.mca.gov.in%2FMinistry%2Fpdf%2FCompaniesAct2013.pdf&usg=AOvVaw0gT0arPjCTG3CrZBD8LC6A&opi=89978449 accessed on March4,2024 [37] https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/2147?view_type=search&sam_handle accessed on March 3,2024 [38] https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/ accessed on March 3,2024 [39] https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a815f6b0-048e-4d93-ba3d-28023e6f057 accessed on March 2,2024. [40] https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2023/28176/28176_2023_7_1501_45841_Judgement_07-Aug-2023.pdf accessed on March 2,2024. [41] SLP(Crl) No. 013929 of 2023. [42] https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/rahul-dinesh-surana-v-senior-assistant-director-441450.pdf accessed on March2,2024. [43] Crl.O.P.No.21728 of 2022 [44]https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/633-vijay-madanlal-choudhary-v-union-of-india-27-july-2022-428134.pdf accessed on March 2,2024. [45] AIR 2022 (SC) 633 [46] https://www.indiatoday.in/fyi/story/what-is-2g-scam-in-india-2g-scam-verdict-upa-a-raja-cbi-judge-op-saini-verdict-things-to-know-1113444-2017-12-21accessed on March 2024. [47]https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304441053_Revisiting_the_Satyam_Accounting_Scam_A_Case_Study accessed on Maech 3,2024. [48] CLG - Business Crime Laws and Regulations Report 2024 India accessed on March2,2024 [49]https://www.outlookindia.com/national/govt-announces-implementation-of-three-new-criminal-laws-from-july-1-2024 accessed on 4 March,2024. **Content:** **Author-Pooja, Rayat College of Law, Railmajra** ### INTRODUCTION For many decades, the news headlines about scams and frauds committed by individuals and corporations have become more prevalent in India. Unfortunately, several people are unaware of these scams like Phishing calls, Telegram fraud, custom duty scams, financial scams and more. However, these practices are still ongoing, and offenders are taking advantage of loopholes in the statutes due to the negligence of lawmakers during the creation of laws. Nobody dares to question these practices till the day when news headlines reveal that ‘A’ person fled to ‘B’ Country before any legal action can be taken as he has committed default in repaying such amount i.e., raised or borrowed money by him from multiple sources from the past ‘X’ years. When an aggrieved party or parties file the petition before the court then it’s already too late to administer justice to them because defaulters know very well how to defeat the law as the judiciary has no jurisdiction beyond the country even if all the evidence shows yes, it is a scam. For example, if the Judiciary gives judgment against the offender but during the time of execution of the decree in general question arises how we can recover that money as the Offender did not leave any sufficient property as all the properties belonged to him at ‘B’ country, where the offender currently resides. All the victims are not able to get their funds back due to the typical procedure established by the committee and not a proper channel of communication to listen to the queries of the victims because of the incomplete investigation from the side of the authorities. No doubt, many people will say that they have official data to prove that people getting refunds, but the reality is much different from the data. Normally. data is just a formality nothing else because a large number of people commit suicides[\[1\]](#_ftn1) and lose hope in the justice system. We can see that on the surface everything is going on very smoothly but if we dive into reality then we will see there is an ocean of corruption and laziness from the side of the authorities. In the end, Authorities treat the victims in such a manner which makes them believe that they are the root cause of the problem, not the defaulters because justice is in the hands of such people and there is no one to address their miseries. That’s why, reality is too harsh and beyond the way. Now, we can understand that it is a very well-planned tactic and generally played by the many offenders at every time because they believe that no one can restrict such activities as they have the power in their hands till they have money which is sufficient to feed the mouth of corrupted officials and for that sake, such officials will protect them as far as possible. However, On the other side, many officials are honest and dedicated to their profession. Still, they do have not the power to restrain such corrupt practices that are adopted in the world of the corporate. Even Today, there is no specific legislation to deal with, regulate and provide adequate relief against such practices. Ultimately, these practices are increasing at a higher pace. In this article, we will understand the meaning, statutory provisions, Problems and remedies to prevent such Crimes in the interest of justice. Keywords (Minimum 5): Corruption, Money ‘Power, Loopholes in Statutes, Lack in the implementation of Law, Defeat of Justice, Corporate Crime and Scams. ### Meaning, and Definition: White-collar scams fall under the umbrella term of white-collar crime. White-collar scams are one of the white-collar crimes. It means the scope of white-collar crime is much greater than white-collar scams. *A “scam” generally refers to a deceptive, manipulative or fraudulent scheme. These scams are designed to cheat someone out of money or assets. When this type of fraudulent activity is adopted by individuals or entities in positions of authority, trust, or influence. This is how scams become white-collar scams*[**\[2\]**](#_ftn2)[**\[3\]**](#_ftn3) **“***Crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status during his occupation*.” **————– Edwin Sutherland** In other words, White-collar crimes denote non-violent, illegal activities, financially motivated and tricks like deception, fraud, or manipulation particularly committed by individuals of high social status, such as professionals, business executives, or government officials, during their occupation or profession. ### Historical Background In 1930, The Sociologist and Criminologist Edwin Sutherland coined and popularised the concept of white-collar crime. Before this, there was a myth that individuals from the upper social class never indulge in such unethical and immoral practices. Sutherland challenged this notion and brought attention to the involvement of respected individuals in illegal activities[\[4\]](#_ftn4). Since then, various theories and approaches have been developed to analyse and address issues concerning such crimes. Over time, Due to technological advancement and globalization, these crimes have become more sophisticated because of the complex financial schemes and regulatory challenges[\[5\]](#_ftn5). *“The Santhanam Committee’s report showed a wide picture of white-collar crimes committed by respectable individuals such as businessmen, industrialists, contractors, and suppliers, as well as corrupt public officials. The motivation for committing a crime is not always based on necessity.[**\[6\]**](#_ftn6)” It includes Businessmen, Industrialists, Contractors, Suppliers and not surprisingly corrupt Public Officials.* In May 1958, the government appointed a Board of Enquiry headed by Justice Vivian Bose[\[7\]](#_ftn7). In 1963, The Reports of the **Vivian Bose Commission**[\[8\]](#_ftn8) investigated the affairs of the Dalmia Jain group of companies and drew attention towards the Businessmen who often indulge themselves in White Collar Crimes such as Forgery, Fraud, Falsification of accounts, Tampering with records for personal gains and Tax evasion etc. Consequently, the problems like huge financial, social, and psychological suffering by the victims and society at large[\[9\]](#_ftn9). ### **Principles and Doctrines:** - ***Strict Construction and Interpretation of Criminal Statutes*** – The idea behind this principle is that there must not be a formality when the laws are enacted but every provision contained in the statutes must address the issues and the procedures in the concised form. Therefore, criminal statutes must be construed strictly and interpreted precisely by keeping in view the practical application of the laws. - ***The Tricks of Deceit and Concealment*** – This doctrine states that in this AI era, it is an easy task to access information because lack of security issues and data is bought and sold by such persons who do not have the authority to do so but this is the reality and lack of the vigilance from the side of the authorities. Hence, criminals often employ fraudulent schemes, misrepresentations, or false information, to accomplish their objectives. - ***Causes behind the criminal intent of the Individual*** – This concept is very helpful to understanding and investigating the criminal behaviour of individuals, such as rule-violating nature, greed, lack of awareness among people, lack of strict rules and laws, lack of accountability, peer support, loopholes of legal structure, technological and industrial development[\[10\]](#_ftn10). Therefore, this list is not limited but understanding of these factors aids in identifying and combating such crimes. As, there are various theories such as rational choice, social control, strain etc, that can be applied to explain the motivations and tactics behind white-collar crimes. This is how researchers and policymakers can understand the root causes of such offences. ### Essentials / Elements / Pre-requisites: - One of the most essential points is that there must be the presence of the **Intention to deceive** - The statement by the person that he/she is from an ‘X’ company ‘agent or your relative’ friend is like impersonating themselves to gain the trust of the individual. Such act known as **Breach of trust**, - The intention to deceive someone only because there is an existence of f**inancial motive**, - In scams, the most common element is to operate illegal activities by showing that these activities are complying with the law. This is called the **concealment of illegal activities.** Note: A thorough investigation is required to uncover the scams may involve complex schemes and multiple parties. ### Exceptions: - There must be a **lack of intention to deceive** the victim to gain undue financial advantage. - When there is no meeting of mind that leads to the **mistake of fact**. - No usage of manipulative tricks to trap the victims to do such acts which they ordinarily resist to do so. It is known as - There must not be use of force of any type over the victim to do such an act. Such acts count as However, proving these defences can be challenging due to the nature of white-collar scams and the evidence required to establish guilt. ### Forms / Modes [\[11\]](#_ftn11) Some common types of white-collar scams[\[12\]](#_ftn12): - **Fund Embezzlement:** The misuse of funds by the executives within organizations that are entrusted under the care of the individual. - **Fraud[\[13\]](#_ftn13):** “*Fraud occurs when someone knowingly lies to obtain a benefit or advantage to which they are not otherwise entitled, or someone knowingly denies a benefit that is due and to which someone is entitled”*[\[14\]](#_ftn14). In other words, there must be a presence of an intention to deceive to secure unfair or unlawful financial gain, which can include: - **Investment Fraud, Insurance Fraud, Forgery, Credit Card Fraud, Securities Fraud, Bank Fraud, Online Auction Fraud etc** - For example, in the case of Punjab National Bank Fraud (2018): Over Rs 14,000 crores was defrauded by Nirav Modi (Billionaire Jeweller) and this fraud was committed via the issuance of fraudulent Letters of Undertaking by a subordinate clerk at a single Mumbai branch. - **Insider Trading:** “*This practice that often blurs the line between legitimate investment activities and unlawful behaviour. It happens when individuals or entities buy or sell securities in a company based on non-public, material information about that company. This practice can lead to unfair advantages, market distortions, and loss*[\[15\]](#_ftn15). For example, In the **Re Harshad Mehta Scam (1992)** case: This is one of the biggest securities scams in Indian history and it involved fraudulent brokerage practices and over Rs.6,000 crores in bank funds being siphoned off. - **Ponzi Schemes:** In this scheme, at first, the funds are collected from new investors then these funds are used to pay returns to their earlier investors, creating the illusion of profit when no legitimate business activity is occurring. For example, In the Re **Rose Valley Chit Fund Scam (2012-13) case**: An estimated Rs 15,000 crores Ponzi scheme defrauded lakhs of small investors across India. - **Pyramid Schemes:** This scheme is familiar with the Ponzi scheme, where participants are recruited to make payments to those above them in a hierarchy, promising future profits based on recruiting more participants. Example: **In the Re PACL Ponzi scam case (2014**): In the Re PACL Ponzi scam case (2014): PACL collected over Rs 45,000 crores through its instalment payment plan and cash down payment plan as part of its collective investment scheme. The investors were lured by promises of an interest rate of 12.5 per cent on deposits are much better option instead of investing in the Fds and depositing in the savings bank account, besides free accidental insurance and income tax-free maturity. Sebi passed an order asking the company to refund Rs 49,100 crores, with promised returns.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) - **Phishing Scams:** This is a method of sending fake emails or messages to trick individuals into providing sensitive information, such as passwords or credit card numbers. Afterwards, this information is used for identity theft or financial fraud. - **Tech Support Scams:** Tech support personnel convince victims to provide remote access to their computers as they impersonate themselves so that individual will believe their words and do such acts that scammers want them to do. That‘s why, it is easier for scammers to steal personal information or install malware. - **Business Email Compromise and Phishing Calls:** Scammers use compromised email accounts and phone numbers to impersonate executives or employees, tricking others into transferring funds or sensitive information. - **Identity Theft:** In this era, both online and offline at some official platforms sharing of personal data is very common but our data are sold/leaked by the sources to whom we give access to have our data. That’s how Scammers Illegally obtain and use someone else’s data, such as Social Security numbers or credit card information, for financial gain. - **Loan Scams:** Offering fraudulent loans with unrealistic terms and prerequisite conditions is upfront fees or personal information that can be used for identity theft[\[17\]](#_ftn17). ### Legal Provisions and Regulations **I**ndia’s legal framework addresses white-collar scams with specific statutes and provisions: **Statutes:** - ***“Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) Act, 1946*** *– The CBI is the premier investigating agency in India to investigate major crimes, including white-collar crimes. The CBI Act empowers the agency to investigate offences across state borders”[**\[18\]**](#_ftn18).* - ***“Banking Regulation Act, 1949*** [***\[19\]***](#_ftn19)*– Sections 33A, 34A, 35 dealing with banking related fraudulent transactions, falsification of accounts”[**\[20\]**](#_ftn20).* - ***“Income Tax Act, 1961***[***\[21\]***](#_ftn21) *– This act includes provisions related to tax evasion, which is a common aspect of white-collar crimes. Evading taxes through fraudulent means is punishable under this act”.* *Havells India Ltd Tax Evasion (2016): Tax evasion of over Rs 500 crores by under-reporting sales and profit figures over several years.* - ***“Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) Act, 1992”*** [***\[22\]***](#_ftn22) *The Securities and Exchange Board of India Act regulates the securities market and aims to prevent market manipulation and insider trading.* *Amendments: Amendments have been made to the SEBI Act to enhance regulatory oversight and enforcement against insider trading and market abuse.* - ***Indian Penal Code (IPC)***[***\[23\]***](#_ftn23) *Sections 403 to 409 deal with offences related to criminal breach of trust, misappropriation, and cheating.* *Sections 463 to 468 cover forgery and counterfeiting.* *Sections 471 to 474 address the use of forged documents as genuine.* *Amendments: The IPC has undergone various amendments over the years to strengthen provisions against white-collar crimes. Notable amendments include updates to punishment clauses for fraud, misappropriation, and financial offences.* [***\[24\]***](#_ftn24)*.* - ***Information Technology Act, 2000[\[25\]](#_ftn25)****– With the rise of cybercrimes related to white-collar offences, this act provides legal provisions for electronic fraud, data theft, and hacking.* - ***Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002***[***\[26\]***](#_ftn26)*: This Act focuses on dealing with corruption involving public officials and public servants.* *Commonwealth Games Scam (2010): Large-scale inflated expenses and corruption during preparation for the games with over ₹70,000 crores estimated to have been laundered.* *Amendments: Amendments to this Act have introduced stricter penalties for corruption, bribery, and illegal gratification.* - ***Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003[\[27\]](#_ftn27):*** *This act enhances vigilance in public sector organizations[**\[28\]**](#_ftn28)* - ***“Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013***[***\[29\]***](#_ftn29)*: Establishes Institutions to Combat Corruption[**\[30\]**](#_ftn30) The Act provides for the establishment of Lokpal at the central level and Lokayuktas at the state level to inquire into allegations of corruption against public officials.”* *“The Lokpal and Lokayuktas (Amendment) Act, 2016[**\[31\]**](#_ftn31),2019 and, 2020, introduced provisions for declaring assets and liabilities of public servants and their family members. Also amended various sections to enhance transparency, streamline procedures for filing complaints, protect whistleblowers and for the extension of the time limit for public servants to declare their assets and liabilities.”* *“The objectives behind these amendments are to strengthen the functioning of Lokpal and Lokayuktas, increase accountability, and expedite the resolution of corruption cases. It covers various offences related to corruption and misconduct by public servants.”* - ***Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988***[***\[32\]***](#_ftn32) *“The Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018[**\[33\]**](#_ftn33), introduced stringent provisions against corruption, including criminalizing giving bribes and punishing commercial organizations for bribery.”* *The objectives are to ensure speedy trial and enhanced punishment for offenses related to bribery, corruption and curb corruption and promote transparency in governance.* *This Act complements the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act by defining various offences related to corruption involving public officials and public servants. and prescribing penalties* *Amendments: The Act has undergone amendments to enhance penalties and widen the scope of offences, to complement the objectives of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act.”* - ***“Foreign Contribution Regulation Act, 2010***[***\[34\]***](#_ftn34)*: Regulates foreign contributions and targets financial misconduct[**\[35\]**](#_ftn35).”* - ***“Companies Act (2013****)[**\[36\]**](#_ftn36): The fraud committed by officers of a company falls under the Sections 447 and 448 like financial statement fraud falls under this. One more thing is that there is no specific definition of Fraud in the Companies Act, of 1956”.* - ***“Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015***[***\[37\]***](#_ftn37) *– Sections – Deals with non-disclosure of foreign assets, tax evasion on undisclosed foreign income and assets.”* - ***“Fugitive Economic Offenders Act, 2018[\[38\]](#_ftn38)****: To deal with the economic offenders who fly to another country from India[**\[39\]**](#_ftn39) .”* ### Case Laws: - ***V Senthil Balaji v State[\[40\]](#_ftn40)****-In this Special Leave Petition case reported in 2023, the Tamil Nadu chief minister was involved in the Cash for Job scam. the Supreme Court provided insights into white-collar crimes and their legal implications[**\[41\]**](#_ftn41)**.*** - ***Rahul Dinesh Surana vs. Senior Assistant Director***[***\[42\]***](#_ftn42)[***\[43\]***](#_ftn43)*– The Madras High Court held to grant imprisonment to the former CEO of Surana Group of Companies in a Rs 10,000 Crores fraud case highlights the seriousness of white-collar crimes in India.* - ***Vijay Madanlal Choudhary vs Union Of India [\[44\]](#_ftn44)[\[45\]](#_ftn45)****– A case discussing the constitutional aspects of the procedure under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), shedding light on legal safeguards in white-collar crime investigations.* - ***2G Spectrum Scam (2008):*** *Mobile frequencies allocation scam involving underpricing that led to an estimated loss of ₹1.76 lakh crores to the exchequer[**\[46\]**](#_ftn46).* - ***Satyam Scam (2009)*** *India’s biggest accounting fraud involving fictitious assets and inflated cash balances worth ₹7,800 crores by its chairman.[**\[47\]**](#_ftn47)* ### Amendments / Repealing ***:*** - ***Amendments to PMLA:*** *The Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) was amended in 2023 by the Central Government to include provisions related to the punishment for forgery and falsification of accounts[**\[48\]**](#_ftn48).* - ***Repeal of IPC:*** *The enactment of three new acts aimed at reforming criminal laws, The Indian Penal Code, 1860 replaced by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita Bill, 2023, the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 replaced by the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita Bill, 2023 and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 replaced by the Bharatiya Sakshya Bill, 2023[**\[49\]**](#_ftn49).* ### CONCLUSION & COMMENTS (Recommendations and Remedies) This article paints the real picture of the current legal framework and obstacles within the judicial process while dealing with white-collar scams in India. This study emphasises that the consequences are beyond financial losses, affecting businesses, consumers, and the overall economy. Likewise, the Mundhra scam (1950) case marked independent India’s first big financial fraud. The famed Harshad Mehta Scam- Stock market and Money laundering scam (1992), Satyam Scam-White collar scam (2008), Sahara Scam (2013) – In this case, Option bonds were collected over Rs. 24000 crores from the public without authorisation of proper regulatory authorities, Bhushan steel scam- Money Laundering (2019), Dewan Housing Finance Limited-Bank scam ( 2021), ABG Shipyard-Bank scam (2022) are frauds keep growing on with an alarming frequency following every decade and many more. To deal with such scams/crimes, there is a huge need to adopt a comprehensive mechanism. There are some recommendations such as Principles of transparency, accountability, integrity, and ethical conduct, that must be adopted. Remedies include reviewing laws governing economic offences, engaging knowledgeable prosecutors, expediting trials through exclusive courts, simplifying court procedures, and establishing a special penal code for white-collar crime prevention. In lump sum, the study calls for a stringent approach to address white-collar crimes in India, advocating for legal reforms, judicial efficiency enhancements, and preventive measures to combat these complex forms of criminal activities effectively and efficiently. Therefore, it is high time for our constitutional machinery to focus on the enactment of stringent laws that will be helpful to deter offenders and prevent such crimes by tightening bail provisions to prevent economic offenders from being released easily and a special penal code dedicated to preventing white-collar crime to expedite justice, combat and prevent misconduct, promote corporate responsibility, and maintain public trust in institutions. ### REFERENCES **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** 1. 2. https://ijirl.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/A-CRITICAL-STUDY-OF-WHITE-COLLAR-CRIMES.pdf ***Online Articles / Sources*** 1. com – Legislations Against White Collar Crimes 2. com – White-Collar Crime 2023 3. LiveLaw – Reathed all Latest Updates on and about White Collar Crimes 4. LinkedIn – White Collar Crime in India 5. JSTOR – Corrupting the Harm Requirement in White Collar Crime 6. com/library/detail.aspx 7. India code 8. Hindustan Times 9. 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[\[30\]](#_ftnref30) https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a815f6b0-048e-4d93-ba3d-28023e6f057 accessed on March 2,2024 [\[31\]](#_ftnref31) [https://dopt.gov.in/sites/default/files/407\_16\_2016-AVD-IV-LP-10082016.pdf](https://dopt.gov.in/sites/default/files/407_16_2016-AVD-IV-LP-10082016.pdf) accessed on March 3,2024. [\[32\]](#_ftnref32) accessed on March3,2024. [\[33\]](#_ftnref33) accessed on March 3,2024. [\[34\]](#_ftnref34) [https://fcraonline.nic.in/Home/PDF\_Doc/FC-RegulationAct-2010-C.pdf](https://fcraonline.nic.in/Home/PDF_Doc/FC-RegulationAct-2010-C.pdf) accessed on March3,2024. [\[35\]](#_ftnref35) https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a815f6b0-048e-4d93-ba3d-28023e6f057 Accessed on March 2,2024. [\[36\]](#_ftnref36)[https://www.google.com/urlsa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiNroHojduEAxWFcGwGHZulBloQFnoECCAQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.mca.gov.in%2FMinistry%2Fpdf%2FCompaniesAct2013.pdf&usg=AOvVaw0gT0arPjCTG3CrZBD8LC6A&opi=89978449](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiNroHojduEAxWFcGwGHZulBloQFnoECCAQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.mca.gov.in%2FMinistry%2Fpdf%2FCompaniesAct2013.pdf&usg=AOvVaw0gT0arPjCTG3CrZBD8LC6A&opi=89978449) accessed on March4,2024 [\[37\]](#_ftnref37) [https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/2147?view\_type=search&sam\_handle](https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/2147?view_type=search&sam_handle) accessed on March 3,2024 [\[38\]](#_ftnref38) accessed on March 3,2024 [\[39\]](#_ftnref39) accessed on March 2,2024. [\[40\]](#_ftnref40) [https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2023/28176/28176\_2023\_7\_1501\_45841\_Judgement\_07-Aug-2023.pdf](https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2023/28176/28176_2023_7_1501_45841_Judgement_07-Aug-2023.pdf) accessed on March 2,2024. [\[41\]](#_ftnref41) [SLP(Crl) No. 013929 of 2023.](https://main.sci.gov.in/officereport/2023/43833/43833_2023_2023-10-30_1419.html) [\[42\]](#_ftnref42) [https://www.livelaw.in/pdf\_upload/rahul-dinesh-surana-v-senior-assistant-director-441450.pdf](https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/rahul-dinesh-surana-v-senior-assistant-director-441450.pdf) accessed on March2,2024. [\[43\]](#_ftnref43) Crl.O.P.No.21728 of 2022 [\[44\]](#_ftnref44)https://www.livelaw.in/pdf\_upload/633-vijay-madanlal-choudhary-v-union-of-india-27-july-2022-428134.pdf accessed on March 2,2024. [\[45\]](#_ftnref45) AIR 2022 (SC) 633 [\[46\]](#_ftnref46) on March 2024. [\[47\]](#_ftnref47)[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304441053\_Revisiting\_the\_Satyam\_Accounting\_Scam\_A\_Case\_Study](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304441053_Revisiting_the_Satyam_Accounting_Scam_A_Case_Study) accessed on Maech 3,2024. [\[48\]](#_ftnref48) CLG – Business Crime Laws and Regulations Report 2024 India accessed on March2,2024 [\[49\]](#_ftnref49)https://www.outlookindia.com/national/govt-announces-implementation-of-three-new-criminal-laws-from-july-1-2024 accessed on 4 March,2024. **Categories:** Articles --- ### [CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY UNDER CRIMINAL LAW](https://lawfoyer.in/criminal-conspiracy-under-criminal-law/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Priyanshi Jaiswal, University of Lucknow, Lucknow

INTRODUCTION

The word ‘Conspiracy' is generally signified for an illegal or bad act. In common parlance, ‘Conspiracy' i.e (षडयंत्र) means a kind of secret plan between two or more persons in pursuance of any act. A conspiracy between any person is not merely held in their mind but it must also be made explicitly in their agreement to do an unlawful or overt act, so from this, we can determine that mere intention is not indictable under a conspiracy. One of the most essential elements present in Conspiracy is an agreement between parties to commit any act that is unlawful in nature. In toto, the whole crux of this offence is the ‘Combination' means the agreement between the persons to commit an act. In the Indian Penal Code, 1860[1] Criminal Conspiracy is defined as a substantive offence, earlier when an accused is charged with criminal conspiracy, there must also be the presence of any other charges of substantive offences. In 1913, Chapter - V A  was inserted in the Indian Penal Code which deals with the ‘Criminal Conspiracy’, the provisions and punishments for the same are given under Section 120A and 120B respectively. Throughout this article, we shall be dealing with each and every aspect of the Criminal Conspiracy discussed under criminal law. Keywords (Minimum 5):
  1. Criminal Conspiracy.
  2. Agreement for unlawful purposes.
  3. Section 120A of Indian Penal Code.
  4. Legal act by illegal means.
  5. Joint Liability.

MEANING OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY

In our society both crime and criminality are looked upon with the greatest hatred by everyone, but it can't be denied that it is one of the most interesting branches of Jurisprudence. According to Stephen, “Crime is an act forbidden by law and which at the same time revolting to the moral sentiments of the society." [2] Criminal Conspiracy is defined under Indian Penal Code as inchoate crime because it approaches toward the suspects for the prevention of the suspected crime at any particular time or place. Conspiracy holds nothing but the mere combination of minds or agreement between the parties to constitute an offence is enough to punish the offenders for such an act. Here, the agreement means the meeting of two minds with an intent for a particular instance, there shall not be presence of criminal conspiracy until there is any interchanging of plans or matters regarding the commission of such act. The origin of conspiracy took place in early years of ancient time for executing false cases  against one. However  it was mainly recognised in the case of Poulterer’s case (1611)  in which for the first time criminal conspiracy was regarded as a criminal offence of substantive nature.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY

In the year 1913, the Criminal Law Amendment Act inserted Chapter V-A of the Indian Penal Code which made conspiracy a substantive offence. Earlier to this, there was no such statutory provisions related to the conspiracy between any persons for the commission of any offence, they were only punishable when such act amounted to an offence in pursuance thereof. Under the Indian Penal Code, Criminal Conspiracy is defined under Section 120A as follows - “Section 120A : Definition of Criminal Conspiracy When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done, –
  • an illegal act, or
  • an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy.”[3]
The Proviso attached to this section explains that all such agreements for the commission of an offence shall amount to criminal conspiracy. When the object of such conspiracy is to commit an act that is not amount to offence, in such case some overt act is necessary. It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to that object.

PRE-REQUISITES OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY

The followings are the prerequisites of the offence of criminal conspiracy under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 :-
  1. Presence of agreement between two or more than two persons who conspired together.
  2. That agreement must be made with an intention -
  • to commit an illegal act, or
  • to commit a legal act but by illegal means.
3. Presence of joint evil intent of parties. In the case of K. Hasim v/s State of Tamil Nadu[4], it was laid that the most important element of criminal conspiracy is the unlawful combination and the offence shall be completed when the act is reached at the stage of combination. For example - A and B planned together to persuade C to kill D. They accordingly persuaded C and he agreed to do so. In such a case A and B shall be liable for abetment to commit murder whereas C will be liable for the offence of conspiracy under Section 120A of the Indian Penal Code. EVIDENCE OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY In the Criminal Justice System, the concept of ‘Evidence’ holds the greatest importance for investigating any facts of the case. Generally, it is of two types: (i) direct evidence and (ii) circumstantial evidence. In the case of criminal conspiracy, the act or any offence is usually executed secretly so the proof for the evidence in such a case can not be made easily from the  direct evidence as compared to the circumstantial evidence. Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872[5] states the doctrine of agency which says that if the case is proved to be of criminal conspiracy, the act of one of the conspirator becomes the act of the another involved in such conspiracy and anything done or written by any of one of such persons in further of common intention would be seems to be conspired together and then each one shall be liable. Followings are the certain conditions for this section:-
  • Presence of reasonable ground.
  • Everything that is done, written or said by any one of them expressly showing their common intention shall be covered under the ambit of evidence.
In the case of Ram Narain Popli v/s CBI[6], the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the evidences of mere agreement between the parties are sufficient to prove the case of conspiracy. PUNISHMENT FOR CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY UNDER CRIMINAL LAW According to Bentham, “Punishment is an empirical question of desire and of the infliction of sufficient pain to provide an effective deterrent[7]." The quantum of punishment for the offence of  criminal conspiracy under this section is split into two parts, namely,
  1. If the offences are of severe nature, here the punishment for the conspiracy shall be the same as given under the punishment for the commission of such offences, and
  2. and the secondly for the less severe offences where express provisions are made for their punishments.
The Indian Penal Code provides punishment of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B as follows – “Section - 120B - Punishment for criminal conspiracy.
  • Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term Anything said, written or done by any one of them about their common intention will be evidence against each other.
  • two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manyas if he had abetted such offence.
  • Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both.”[8]
In the recent case, Praveen v/s State of Haryana[9], it was observed by the court that it is not the compliance of the provisions of Section 120B of IPC without the presence of sufficient evidence shows the prior meeting of mind or agreement between them. DEFENCES UNDER CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY There are following two types of defence available in the case of criminal conspiracy -
  1. Abandonment or withdrawal - Generally seen in the cases of attempt, if it is proved that before the commission of the offences, the accused withdrew the case or abandoned himself then he shall not be guilty of such offences. In the same way we can provide defence if we prove that the conspirator withdrew from such a conspiracy at the very initial stage.
  2. Entrapment - As the name suggests ‘something that is entrapped’. In this the conspirator is entrapped by a law enforcement officer or government agent to be involved in such a conspiracy.
DEMARCATION BETWEEN ABETMENT AND CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY
  1. Criminal Conspiracy is a substantive offence whereas the Abetment is not a substantive offence.
  2. Criminal Conspiracy is dealt under Section 120A of IPC whereas the provisions for the Abetment is covered under Section -107 of IPC.
  3. The mode of commission of offence varies, in the criminal conspiracy agreements are made between the parties for such an offence however in the latter one one person instigates or provokes another for the commission of any offence.
  4. Mere combination is the gist of the criminal conspiracy but in abetment the act must be committed.
  5. The term ‘Conspirator’ is used for the offender in criminal conspiracy and in abetment, ‘Abettor’ is used.
  6. Abetment is the ‘genus’ whereas criminal conspiracy is ‘species’.
  7. In any case the abettor can not be the principal offender (accused) but the conspirator can be the accused for the case.
  8. The offences under the criminal conspiracy can be said as a part of offences under Abetment.
CONCLUSION Due to its gravity of nature, criminal conspiracy is exempted from the essentials of the crime, a crime includes two things i.e actus reus and mens reus  however in  the criminal conspiracy the actus reus is the exception. The aim before inclusion of this act was to prevent the criminal activities before its actual commission but this approach is not accomplished nowadays. It has also been observed the misuses of the provisions of conspiracy in a number of cases where innocents are tortured and humiliated. It seems that there is a need to pay attention to the provisions of conspiracy during investigation or trial, due diligence must also be shown from the side of judges in courtrooms.
  1. REFERENCES
  2. Books -
    1. Indian Penal Code by Prof. S. N. Mishra
  3. Online Articles / Sources Referred
    1. https://www.justia.com/criminal/offenses/inchoate-crimes/conspiracy/
    2. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3309198
  4. Cases Referred
    1. B.I. v/s V.C. Shukla[10]
    2. State of Tamil Nadu v/s Nalini[11]
    3. Topandas v/s State of Bombay [12]
    4. Kuldeep Sharma v/s State of Himachal Pradesh[13]
  5. Statutes Referred
    1. Section 120A and 120B of Indian Penal Code.
    2. Section 107 of Indian Penal Code.
    3. Section 43 of Indian Penal Code.
[1] The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act no. 45 of 1860). [2] Stephen, General View of Criminal Law of England, p. 3. [3] The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act no. 45 of 1860). [4] K. Hasim v/s State of Tamil Nadu (2005) Cr LJ 143 SC. [5] The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Act no. 1 of 1872). [6] Ram Narain Popli v/s CBI (2003) 3 SCC 641. [7] Bentham, Rationale of Punishment 29 (1830). [8] The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act no. 45 of 1860). [9] Praveen v/s State of Haryana (2021) Cr Appeal no. 1571 of 2021. [10] C.B.I v/s V.C. Shukla AIR 1998 S.C 1406. [11] State of Tamil Nadu v/s Nalini (1999) Cr LJ 3124 (SC) [12] Topandas v/s State of Bombay (1955) 2 SCR 881. [13] Kuldeep Sharma v/s State of Himachal Pradesh AIR 2011 SC 1895. **Content:** **Author-Priyanshi Jaiswal, University of Lucknow, Lucknow** ### **INTRODUCTION** The word ‘Conspiracy’ is generally signified for an illegal or bad act. In common parlance, ‘Conspiracy’ i.e (षडयंत्र) means a kind of secret plan between two or more persons in pursuance of any act. A conspiracy between any person is not merely held in their mind but it must also be made explicitly in their agreement to do an unlawful or overt act, so from this, we can determine that mere intention is not indictable under a conspiracy. One of the most essential elements present in Conspiracy is an agreement between parties to commit any act that is unlawful in nature. In toto, the whole crux of this offence is the ‘Combination’ means the agreement between the persons to commit an act. In the Indian Penal Code, 1860[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Criminal Conspiracy is defined as a substantive offence, earlier when an accused is charged with criminal conspiracy, there must also be the presence of any other charges of substantive offences. In 1913, Chapter – V A was inserted in the Indian Penal Code which deals with the ‘Criminal Conspiracy’, the provisions and punishments for the same are given under Section 120A and 120B respectively. Throughout this article, we shall be dealing with each and every aspect of the Criminal Conspiracy discussed under criminal law. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*:** 1. Criminal Conspiracy. 2. Agreement for unlawful purposes. 3. Section 120A of Indian Penal Code. 4. Legal act by illegal means. 5. Joint Liability. ### **MEANING OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY** In our society both crime and criminality are looked upon with the greatest hatred by everyone, but it can’t be denied that it is one of the most interesting branches of Jurisprudence. According to Stephen, *“Crime is an act forbidden by law and which at the same time revolting to the moral sentiments of the society.” [**\[2\]**](#_ftn2)* Criminal Conspiracy is defined under Indian Penal Code as inchoate crime because it approaches toward the suspects for the prevention of the suspected crime at any particular time or place. Conspiracy holds nothing but the mere combination of minds or agreement between the parties to constitute an offence is enough to punish the offenders for such an act. Here, the agreement means the meeting of two minds with an intent for a particular instance, there shall not be presence of criminal conspiracy until there is any interchanging of plans or matters regarding the commission of such act. The origin of conspiracy took place in early years of ancient time for executing false cases against one. However it was mainly recognised in the case of *Poulterer’s case (1611) in* which for the first time criminal conspiracy was regarded as a criminal offence of substantive nature. ### **STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY** In the year 1913, the Criminal Law Amendment Act inserted Chapter V-A of the Indian Penal Code which made conspiracy a substantive offence. Earlier to this, there was no such statutory provisions related to the conspiracy between any persons for the commission of any offence, they were only punishable when such act amounted to an offence in pursuance thereof. Under the Indian Penal Code, Criminal Conspiracy is defined under Section 120A as follows – ***“Section 120A : Definition of Criminal Conspiracy*** *When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done, –* - *an illegal act, or* - *an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy.”[**\[3\]**](#_ftn3)* The Proviso attached to this section explains that all such agreements for the commission of an offence shall amount to criminal conspiracy. When the object of such conspiracy is to commit an act that is not amount to offence, in such case some overt act is necessary. It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to that object. ### **PRE-REQUISITES OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY** The followings are the prerequisites of the offence of criminal conspiracy under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 :- 1. Presence of agreement between two or more than two persons who conspired together. 2. That agreement must be made with an intention – - to commit an illegal act, or - to commit a legal act but by illegal means. 3\. Presence of joint evil intent of parties. In the case of *K. Hasim v/s State of Tamil Nadu[**\[4\]**](#_ftn4)*, it was laid that the most important element of criminal conspiracy is the unlawful combination and the offence shall be completed when the act is reached at the stage of combination. **For example –** A and B planned together to persuade C to kill D. They accordingly persuaded C and he agreed to do so. In such a case A and B shall be liable for abetment to commit murder whereas C will be liable for the offence of conspiracy under Section 120A of the Indian Penal Code. **EVIDENCE OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY** In the Criminal Justice System, the concept of ‘Evidence’ holds the greatest importance for investigating any facts of the case. Generally, it is of two types: (i) direct evidence and (ii) circumstantial evidence. In the case of criminal conspiracy, the act or any offence is usually executed secretly so the proof for the evidence in such a case can not be made easily from the direct evidence as compared to the circumstantial evidence. **Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872[\[5\]](#_ftn5)** states the doctrine of agency which says that if the case is proved to be of criminal conspiracy, the act of one of the conspirator becomes the act of the another involved in such conspiracy and anything done or written by any of one of such persons in further of common intention would be seems to be conspired together and then each one shall be liable. Followings are the certain conditions for this section:- - Presence of reasonable ground. - Everything that is done, written or said by any one of them expressly showing their common intention shall be covered under the ambit of evidence. In the case of *Ram Narain Popli v/s CBI[**\[6\]**](#_ftn6)*, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the evidences of mere agreement between the parties are sufficient to prove the case of conspiracy. **PUNISHMENT FOR CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY UNDER CRIMINAL LAW** According to Bentham, *“Punishment is an empirical question of desire and of the infliction of sufficient pain to provide an effective deterrent[**\[7\]**](#_ftn7).”* The quantum of punishment for the offence of criminal conspiracy under this section is split into two parts, namely, 1. If the offences are of severe nature, here the punishment for the conspiracy shall be the same as given under the punishment for the commission of such offences, and 2. and the secondly for the less severe offences where express provisions are made for their punishments. The Indian Penal Code provides punishment of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B as follows – ***“Section – 120B – Punishment for criminal conspiracy.*** - *Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term* Anything said, written or done by any one of them about their common intention will be evidence against each other. - *two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manyas if he had abetted such offence.* - *Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both.”[**\[8\]**](#_ftn8)* In the recent case, *Praveen v/s State of Haryana[**\[9\]**](#_ftn9)*, it was observed by the court that it is not the compliance of the provisions of Section 120B of IPC without the presence of sufficient evidence shows the prior meeting of mind or agreement between them. **DEFENCES UNDER CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY** There are following two types of defence available in the case of criminal conspiracy – 1. **Abandonment or withdrawal –** Generally seen in the cases of attempt, if it is proved that before the commission of the offences, the accused withdrew the case or abandoned himself then he shall not be guilty of such offences. In the same way we can provide defence if we prove that the conspirator withdrew from such a conspiracy at the very initial stage. 2. **Entrapment –** As the name suggests ‘something that is entrapped’. In this the conspirator is entrapped by a law enforcement officer or government agent to be involved in such a conspiracy. **DEMARCATION BETWEEN ABETMENT AND CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY** 1. Criminal Conspiracy is a substantive offence whereas the Abetment is not a substantive offence. 2. Criminal Conspiracy is dealt under Section 120A of IPC whereas the provisions for the Abetment is covered under Section -107 of IPC. 3. The mode of commission of offence varies, in the criminal conspiracy agreements are made between the parties for such an offence however in the latter one one person instigates or provokes another for the commission of any offence. 4. Mere combination is the gist of the criminal conspiracy but in abetment the act must be committed. 5. The term ‘Conspirator’ is used for the offender in criminal conspiracy and in abetment, ‘Abettor’ is used. 6. Abetment is the ‘genus’ whereas criminal conspiracy is ‘species’. 7. In any case the abettor can not be the principal offender (accused) but the conspirator can be the accused for the case. 8. The offences under the criminal conspiracy can be said as a part of offences under Abetment. **CONCLUSION** Due to its gravity of nature, criminal conspiracy is exempted from the essentials of the crime, a crime includes two things i.e actus reus and mens reus however in the criminal conspiracy the actus reus is the exception. The aim before inclusion of this act was to prevent the criminal activities before its actual commission but this approach is not accomplished nowadays. It has also been observed the misuses of the provisions of conspiracy in a number of cases where innocents are tortured and humiliated. It seems that there is a need to pay attention to the provisions of conspiracy during investigation or trial, due diligence must also be shown from the side of judges in courtrooms. 1. **REFERENCES** 2. **Books –** 1. Indian Penal Code by Prof. S. N. Mishra 3. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. 2. 4. **Cases Referred** 1. B.I. v/s V.C. Shukla[\[10\]](#_ftn10) 2. State of Tamil Nadu v/s Nalini[\[11\]](#_ftn11) 3. Topandas v/s State of Bombay [\[12\]](#_ftn12) 4. Kuldeep Sharma v/s State of Himachal Pradesh[\[13\]](#_ftn13) 5. **Statutes Referred** 1. Section 120A and 120B of Indian Penal Code. 2. Section 107 of Indian Penal Code. 3. Section 43 of Indian Penal Code. [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act no. 45 of 1860). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Stephen, General View of Criminal Law of England, p. 3. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act no. 45 of 1860). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) K. Hasim v/s State of Tamil Nadu (2005) Cr LJ 143 SC. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Act no. 1 of 1872). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Ram Narain Popli v/s CBI (2003) 3 SCC 641. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Bentham, Rationale of Punishment 29 (1830). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act no. 45 of 1860). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Praveen v/s State of Haryana (2021) Cr Appeal no. 1571 of 2021. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) C.B.I v/s V.C. Shukla AIR 1998 S.C 1406. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) State of Tamil Nadu v/s Nalini (1999) Cr LJ 3124 (SC) [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Topandas v/s State of Bombay (1955) 2 SCR 881. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Kuldeep Sharma v/s State of Himachal Pradesh AIR 2011 SC 1895. **Categories:** Articles --- ### [ACT OF GOD AS A DEFENCE UNDER LAW OF TORTS](https://lawfoyer.in/act-of-god-as-a-defence-under-law-of-torts/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Himani Choudhary, University Five Year Law College, University of Rajasthan

INTRODUCTION

An act of god is a general defense under the Law of Torts when the act is such a nature over which the defendant has no control and the damage is caused due to the working of natural forces. An act of god is defined as a circumstance where no human foresight can foresee the event and humans have no control over the circumstances. The act must be something that is extraordinary and something that cannot be foreseen and usually does not occur. The act must be of such a nature that even after applying all forces and due care it cannot be prevented. In such a case the defendant can take the defense of an act of god and can save himself from the liability and harm caused to the plaintiff. It is an absolute defense under the law of torts.

MEANING:

An act of god or Vis Major is a defense under the law of torts when the act is caused by the working of natural forces that is extraordinary, uncommon, direct, sudden, and cannot be foreseen by a reasonable man and if foreseen cannot be prevented even after taking all precautions and due care by the defendant. This includes earthquakes, floods, wildfires, etc.  In this case, the defendant can take the defense of an act of god and can prevent himself from the liability arising after proving that he had done everything that a reasonable and a prudent person could do in such a scenario. It is an absolute defense under the law of torts.

DEFINITION:

According to Salmond, an act of god include those acts which a man cannot avoid by taking reasonable care. Such accidents are the result of natural forces and are incoherent with the agency of man. According to Lord Mansfield, an act of god is define as it is something in opposition to the act of man. Vis is a Latin word meaning any kind of force, violence or disturbance to person or property. Vis major is an act of God. The doctrine states that a person is absolved of liability if it was directly caused by vis major.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

An act of god is one of the general defense of the law of torts. General defenses are framed from time to time as per the need arises in court of law to prevent the defendant from the tortious liability arises from his act. To get the benefit of these defense defendant had to prove all the essentials required to get the defense. These defences were framed from time to time to keep up with the very basis of imposition of tortious liability on an individual i.e, creating a sense of deterrence while keeping up with the basic values of justice. An act of god is one which has been there since the existence of our planet, earth, we have been facing and witnessing natural calamities since the existence of mankind and this include Earthquakes, floods, tornadoes, wildfire etc. In such occurrences lives are lost, properties are destroyed and significantly damaged when the forces of the nature strike harshly and suddenly.

ELEMENTS OF ACT OF GOD

  • NATURAL CAUSES:
An act of God is an uncommon, extraordinary and unforeseen manifestation of the forces of nature, or a misfortune or accident arising from inevitable necessity. An act of god cannot prevent by reasonable human foresight and care. The effect of ordinary causes may be foreseen and avoided by the exercise of human care. For example, the fact that rain will leak through a defective roof is foreseeable by an ordinary man. In case of foreseeable causes, failure to take the necessary precautions constitutes negligence, and the party injured in the accident may be entitled to damages. An act of God, therefore, is so extraordinary and devoid of human agency that reasonable care would not avoid the consequences. Therefore in such cases the injured party has no right to damages.
  • AN OCCURRENCE NOT REASONABLY FORESEEABLE
The basic and prime element of an act of god is the happening of an unforeseeable event. For this, if the harm or loss was caused by a foreseeable accident that could have been prevented, the party who suffered the injury has the right to compensation. However, the damage caused by an unforeseen and uncontrollable natural event is not compensable as it could not have been prevented or avoided by the foresight or prudence of man. Moreover, courts are of the opinion that the act of God defense exists only if the event is so exceptional and could not have been anticipated or expected by the long history of climate variations in the locality. It is constructed by only the memory of man i.e. recorded history. The courts may demand expert testimonies to prove that an event was unforeseeable. It is IMPOSSIBLE TO PREVENT BY ANY REASONABLE PRECAUTIONS AND ABSENCE OF HUMAN AGENCY CAUSING THE ALLEGED DAMAGE: It means practically impossible to resist. Negligence constitutes failure to take the necessary precautions. In an incident where a human factor was present, even though the harm could not be prevented, the fact that the human factor exercised reasonable care and precautions to prevent the harm has to be proved if the defence of act of God has to prevail. If negligence is alleged and proved, then the defence of act of God will fail. If an owner was negligent in properly maintaining a tree that fell on a passerby, he cannot be exempted from liability by act of God principle.

CASE LAWS

  1. In the case of NICHOLS V. MARSHLAND [1] the defendant has a number of artificial lakes on his land. Extraordinary rain such as had never been witnessed in living memory caused the banks of the lakes to burst and the escaping water carried away four bridges belonging to the plaintiff. It was held that the plaintiff's bridges were swept by an act of God and the defendant was not liable.
  2. In the case of BLYTH V. BIRMINGHAM WATER WORKS CO [2] the defendants had constructed water pipes which were reasonably strong enough to withstand severe frost. There was an unprecented severe frost that year causing the pipes to burst resulting in severe damage to the plaintiff's property. It was held that though frost is a natural phenomenon, the occurrence of an unforeseen severe frost can be attributed to an act of God, thus the relieving the defendants of any liability.
  3. In the case of RAMALINGA NADAR V. NARAYANA REDDIAR [3] the plaintiff had booked goods with the defendant for transportation. The goods are looted by a mob, the prevention of which was beyond control of defendant. It was held that event beyond control of the defendant cannot be said Act of God. It was held that the destructive acts of an unruly mob cannot be considered an Act of God.

CONCLUSION

Although the act of God defense - that a defendant is insulated from liability for personal injury or property damages caused by a natural cause is rarely used, it may become more common and general in the future if predictions of disastrous weather events caused by global warming prove true. One prediction related to global warming is that catastrophic weather events such as hurricanes, tornados, and torrential rains will occur more often. All of these have the potential to cause extensive personal injury and property damage and consequently mental trauma. **Content:** **Author-Himani Choudhary, University Five Year Law College, University of Rajasthan** ### **INTRODUCTION** An act of god is a general defense under the Law of Torts when the act is such a nature over which the defendant has no control and the damage is caused due to the working of natural forces. An act of god is defined as a circumstance where no human foresight can foresee the event and humans have no control over the circumstances. The act must be something that is extraordinary and something that cannot be foreseen and usually does not occur. The act must be of such a nature that even after applying all forces and due care it cannot be prevented. In such a case the defendant can take the defense of an act of god and can save himself from the liability and harm caused to the plaintiff. It is an absolute defense under the law of torts. ### **MEANING:** An act of god or Vis Major is a defense under the law of torts when the act is caused by the working of natural forces that is extraordinary, uncommon, direct, sudden, and cannot be foreseen by a reasonable man and if foreseen cannot be prevented even after taking all precautions and due care by the defendant. This includes earthquakes, floods, wildfires, etc. In this case, the defendant can take the defense of an act of god and can prevent himself from the liability arising after proving that he had done everything that a reasonable and a prudent person could do in such a scenario. It is an absolute defense under the law of torts. ### **DEFINITION:** According to Salmond, an act of god include those acts which a man cannot avoid by taking reasonable care. Such accidents are the result of natural forces and are incoherent with the agency of man. According to Lord Mansfield, an act of god is define as it is something in opposition to the act of man. Vis is a Latin word meaning any kind of force, violence or disturbance to person or property. Vis major is an act of God. The doctrine states that a person is absolved of liability if it was directly caused by vis major. ### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND** An act of god is one of the general defense of the law of torts. General defenses are framed from time to time as per the need arises in court of law to prevent the defendant from the tortious liability arises from his act. To get the benefit of these defense defendant had to prove all the essentials required to get the defense. These defences were framed from time to time to keep up with the very basis of imposition of tortious liability on an individual i.e, creating a sense of deterrence while keeping up with the basic values of justice. An act of god is one which has been there since the existence of our planet, earth, we have been facing and witnessing natural calamities since the existence of mankind and this include Earthquakes, floods, tornadoes, wildfire etc. In such occurrences lives are lost, properties are destroyed and significantly damaged when the forces of the nature strike harshly and suddenly. ### **ELEMENTS OF ACT OF GOD** - **NATURAL CAUSES**: An act of God is an uncommon, extraordinary and unforeseen manifestation of the forces of nature, or a misfortune or accident arising from inevitable necessity. An act of god cannot prevent by reasonable human foresight and care. The effect of ordinary causes may be foreseen and avoided by the exercise of human care. For example, the fact that rain will leak through a defective roof is foreseeable by an ordinary man. In case of foreseeable causes, failure to take the necessary precautions constitutes negligence, and the party injured in the accident may be entitled to damages. An act of God, therefore, is so extraordinary and devoid of human agency that reasonable care would not avoid the consequences. Therefore in such cases the injured party has no right to damages. - **AN OCCURRENCE NOT REASONABLY FORESEEABLE** The basic and prime element of an act of god is the happening of an unforeseeable event. For this, if the harm or loss was caused by a foreseeable accident that could have been prevented, the party who suffered the injury has the right to compensation. However, the damage caused by an unforeseen and uncontrollable natural event is not compensable as it could not have been prevented or avoided by the foresight or prudence of man. Moreover, courts are of the opinion that the **act of God** defense exists only if the event is so exceptional and could not have been anticipated or expected by the long history of climate variations in the locality. It is constructed by only the memory of man i.e. recorded history. The courts may demand expert testimonies to prove that an event was unforeseeable. It is **IMPOSSIBLE TO PREVENT BY ANY REASONABLE PRECAUTIONS AND ABSENCE OF HUMAN AGENCY CAUSING THE ALLEGED DAMAGE:** It means practically impossible to resist. Negligence constitutes failure to take the necessary precautions. In an incident where a human factor was present, even though the harm could not be prevented, the fact that the human factor exercised reasonable care and precautions to prevent the harm has to be proved if the defence of **act of God** has to prevail. If negligence is alleged and proved, then the defence of **act of God** will fail. If an owner was negligent in properly maintaining a tree that fell on a passerby, he cannot be exempted from liability by act of God principle. ### **CASE LAWS** 1. In the case of **NICHOLS V. MARSHLAND** \[1\] the defendant has a number of artificial lakes on his land. Extraordinary rain such as had never been witnessed in living memory caused the banks of the lakes to burst and the escaping water carried away four bridges belonging to the plaintiff. It was held that the plaintiff’s bridges were swept by an act of God and the defendant was not liable. 2. In the case of **BLYTH V. BIRMINGHAM WATER WORKS CO** \[2\] the defendants had constructed water pipes which were reasonably strong enough to withstand severe frost. There was an unprecented severe frost that year causing the pipes to burst resulting in severe damage to the plaintiff’s property. It was held that though frost is a natural phenomenon, the occurrence of an unforeseen severe frost can be attributed to an act of God, thus the relieving the defendants of any liability. 3. In the case of **RAMALINGA NADAR V. NARAYANA REDDIAR** \[3\] the plaintiff had booked goods with the defendant for transportation. The goods are looted by a mob, the prevention of which was beyond control of defendant. It was held that event beyond control of the defendant cannot be said Act of God. It was held that the destructive acts of an unruly mob cannot be considered an Act of God. ### **CONCLUSION** Although the act of God defense – that a defendant is insulated from liability for personal injury or property damages caused by a natural cause is rarely used, it may become more common and general in the future if predictions of disastrous weather events caused by global warming prove true. One prediction related to global warming is that catastrophic weather events such as hurricanes, tornados, and torrential rains will occur more often. All of these have the potential to cause extensive personal injury and property damage and consequently mental trauma. **Categories:** Articles --- ### [ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL: COMPOSITION, JURISDICTION , APPOINTMENT](https://lawfoyer.in/arbitration-tribunal-composition-jurisdiction-appointment/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Anurupa Pal, Techno India University, Kolkata

INTRODUCTION

We all know that “litigation” is a process that is both time-consuming and requires monetary effort for the parties involved as a result many people tend to avoid such a process and believe in the out-of-court settlement and thus most of the time justice is not served properly. Hence to bridge the gap between the Judiciary and the citizens of India as well as reduce the burden of cases led to the passing of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, with the main aim to consolidate and amend the law relating to domestic arbitration and also to provide for a law relating to conciliation and related matters. It aims to ensure the smooth settlement of domestic and international commercial disputes. Arbitration in simple words means the settlement of an argument or disagreement between two parties, outside the course of the court by a neutral third party known as the arbitrator or more than one person known as “Arbitral Tribunal” or “Arbitration Tribuna”l. The decision made by the same is binding on both the parties. To go to the process of arbitration both parties need to sign a written agreement which can be in the form of an I) Arbitral clause II) A contract or III) in the form of a separate legal agreement known as an “Arbitration Agreement”. Keywords (Minimum 5): Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996, Arbitration, Binding decision, Composition, Arbitral tribunal, Appointment, Jurisdiction

Meaning, Definition & Explanation

The term ‘Arbitration means the determination or settlement of a dispute by the decision of one or more persons called “Arbitrator” or “Arbitral Tribunal” In the case of [1]Amar Chand Vs. Ambika Jute Mills ( 1966) held that arbitration is “Judging of a dispute between parties or group of people by someone not involved in the dispute and whose decision both the parties agree to accept. Here, an Arbitrator is a person to whom the parties submit the matters in dispute and whose functions are more or less judicial thus giving equal justice to all. When the parties in dispute appoint more than one arbitrator, it is called an Arbitral Tribunal. In [2]Satyendra Kumar Vs. Hind Construction Ltd. (1852) it was held that where the parties to dispute refer the matter to a person and such person holds a judicial inquiry in deciding that dispute and comes to a judicial decision, such person is called an “arbitrator” An arbitration tribunal, also known as an arbitral tribunal, is a panel of unbiased adjudicators or arbitrators assembled to resolve disputes through the arbitration procedure. These courts, which include one or more arbitrators, play an important role in settling disputes between the parties concerned. Unlike judges in domestic courts, an arbitral tribunal's authority, powers, and obligations are determined by the appropriate legal framework rather than national laws and procedures. Typically, these tribunals have the jurisdiction to rule on substantive disputes, assign expenses, weigh precedents, and carry out their tasks within the agreed-upon scope of powers.

COMPOSITION

According to Section 10 (1) of the Act of 1996, the parties to dispute are free to appoint a sole arbitrator or more than one arbitrator The number of arbitrators should always be odd and never an even number. If the parties fail to determine the number the arbitral tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator. If the number of arbitrators is three, the third appointed arbitrator shall act as a “Presiding Arbitrator”.

QUALIFICATIONS OF AN ARBITRATOR

  1. He should be Indian
  2. He must be impartial
  3. He must not be interested in the subject matter or the parties
  4. There should not be any dispute as to his professional Qualification
  5. He should not buy any claim of the parties
  6. He holds the quasi-judicial position, he should not be biased.

APPOINTMENT

1) Appointment by Parties - The general rule followed is the Appointment by parties where the right to appoint the members of the arbitral tribunal. The parties may agree to appoint a sole or more than one arbitrator. If both parties do not name their arbitrator, they may agree that arbitrators or arbitrators may be appointed by a third designated person. When one parties fail to appoint. 2) Appointment by Court - Where both parties have appointed two arbitrators each but are unable to appoint a third arbitrator, within the time frame of 30 days, the chief justice or any other person or institution or authority to whom the chief justice may delegate this function will appoint the Arbitrator or third arbitrator.

JURISDICTION

  • The jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal is derived from the agreement between the parties, as stated in their arbitration agreement. The arbitration agreement must be in writing and may be in the form of a separate agreement or a clause within a contract.
  • An arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction is restricted to the area of the dispute specified in the contract of arbitration. Tribunals have the authority to rule on issues affecting their jurisdiction, such as whether the arbitration agreement exists or is legal.
  • A plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not later than the submission of the statement of defence.
  • A plea that the arbitral tribunal is exceeding the scope of its authority shall be raised as soon as the matter alleged to be beyond the scope of its authority is raised during the arbitral proceedings.
  • The decision passed by the arbitral tribunal shall be binding on both parties which is popularly known as the arbitral award.

CONCLUSION

The composition, jurisdiction, and characterization of an arbitration panel are all significant components of the arbitration process. The establishment of the arbitral tribunal plays an essential role in the arbitration process since it involves the appointment of arbitrators by the relevant parties or appointed organisations. If the authorised entity fails to select an arbitrator, the High Court or Supreme Court may intervene. The membership of the tribunal, or the selection of a solitary arbitrator, is a key aspect of arbitration that influences the course and outcome of the proceedings. In some cases, such as those regarding investment treaty protection, arbitrators may be appointed by institutions such as the ICC International Court of Arbitration. Jurisdiction is another important aspect of the arbitral tribunal's job. The arbitral panel can decide on its jurisdiction, including the determination of objections to the existence or legality of the arbitration agreement. This authority guarantees that the tribunal can effectively assess its ability to manage disputes. In conclusion, knowing the structure, jurisdiction, and definition of an arbitral tribunal is essential for navigating the complexities of arbitration. The selection of arbitrators, resolution of jurisdictional issues, and recognition of arbitral tribunals' role in conflict settlement are essential elements that promote the effectiveness and integrity of arbitration proceedings. Understanding these fundamental factors allows stakeholders to engage in arbitration with clarity and confidence, encouraging a fair and quick settlement of disputes.

REFERENCES

  1. Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred
    1. Book - Lectures on Arbitration, conciliation and A.D.R Systems, Author - Dr. Rega Surya Rao
  2. Online Articles / Sources Referred
    1. LoginUniversitofLucknow, https://udrc.lkouniv.ac.in/Content/DepartmentContent/SM_367aca78-6e00-4cb5-82f6-18ed4d3299d4_30.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2024).
    2. Terminating arbitration: lessons from India, Global Arbitration Review, https://globalarbitrationreview.com/review/the-asia-pacific-arbitration-review/2024/article/terminating-arbitration-lessons-india (last visited Mar. 4, 2024).
    3. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - An Overview, Search eLibrary:: SSRN, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3582896 (last visited Mar. 4, 2024).
    4. https://www.coursesidekick.com/law/3626445#:~:text=The%20person%20by%20whom%20the,to%20move%20to%20the%20court. (last visited Mar. 4, 2024).
  3. Cases Referred
    1.  M/S. Amarchand Lalitkumar vs Shree Ambica Jute Mills Ltd on 3 May 1962, Indian Kanoon - Search engine for Indian Law, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1371659/#:~:text=The%20appellant's%20case%20was%20that,were%20either%20directly%20or%20indirectly (last visited Mar. 4, 2024).
    2. Satyendra Kumar vs Hind Constructions Ltd. on 14 August 1951, Indian Kanoon - Search engine for Indian Law, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1333612/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2024).
[1] M/S. Amarchand Lalitkumar vs Shree Ambica Jute Mills Ltd on 3 May, 1962, Indian Kanoon - Search engine for Indian Law, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1371659/#:~:text=The%20appellant's%20case%20was%20that,were%20either%20directly%20or%20indirectly (last visited Mar. 4, 2024). [2] Satyendra Kumar vs Hind Constructions Ltd. on 14 August, 1951, Indian Kanoon - Search engine for Indian Law, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1333612/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2024). **Content:** **Author-Anurupa Pal, Techno India University, Kolkata** ### **INTRODUCTION** We all know that “litigation” is a process that is both time-consuming and requires monetary effort for the parties involved as a result many people tend to avoid such a process and believe in the out-of-court settlement and thus most of the time justice is not served properly. Hence to bridge the gap between the Judiciary and the citizens of India as well as reduce the burden of cases led to the passing of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, with the main aim to consolidate and amend the law relating to domestic arbitration and also to provide for a law relating to conciliation and related matters. It aims to ensure the smooth settlement of domestic and international commercial disputes. Arbitration in simple words means the settlement of an argument or disagreement between two parties, outside the course of the court by a neutral third party known as the arbitrator or more than one person known as “Arbitral Tribunal” or “Arbitration Tribuna”l. The decision made by the same is binding on both the parties. To go to the process of arbitration both parties need to sign a written agreement which can be in the form of an I) Arbitral clause II) A contract or III) in the form of a separate legal agreement known as an “Arbitration Agreement”. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*:** *Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996, Arbitration, Binding decision, Composition, Arbitral tribunal, Appointment, Jurisdiction* ### **Meaning, Definition & Explanation** The term ‘Arbitration means the determination or settlement of a dispute by the decision of one or more persons called “Arbitrator” or “Arbitral Tribunal” In the case of [\[1\]](#_ftn1)***Amar Chand Vs. Ambika Jute Mills ( 1966)*** held that arbitration is “Judging of a dispute between parties or group of people by someone not involved in the dispute and whose decision both the parties agree to accept. Here, an Arbitrator is a person to whom the parties submit the matters in dispute and whose functions are more or less judicial thus giving equal justice to all. When the parties in dispute appoint more than one arbitrator, it is called an Arbitral Tribunal. In [\[2\]](#_ftn2)***Satyendra Kumar Vs. Hind Construction Ltd. (1852)*** it was held that where the parties to dispute refer the matter to a person and such person holds a judicial inquiry in deciding that dispute and comes to a judicial decision, such person is called an “arbitrator” An arbitration tribunal, also known as an arbitral tribunal, is a panel of unbiased adjudicators or arbitrators assembled to resolve disputes through the arbitration procedure. These courts, which include one or more arbitrators, play an important role in settling disputes between the parties concerned. Unlike judges in domestic courts, an arbitral tribunal’s authority, powers, and obligations are determined by the appropriate legal framework rather than national laws and procedures. Typically, these tribunals have the jurisdiction to rule on substantive disputes, assign expenses, weigh precedents, and carry out their tasks within the agreed-upon scope of powers. ### **COMPOSITION** According to Section 10 (1) of the Act of 1996, the parties to dispute are free to appoint a sole arbitrator or more than one arbitrator The number of arbitrators should always be odd and never an even number. If the parties fail to determine the number the arbitral tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator. If the number of arbitrators is three, the third appointed arbitrator shall act as a “Presiding Arbitrator”. ### **QUALIFICATIONS OF AN ARBITRATOR** 1. He should be Indian 2. He must be impartial 3. He must not be interested in the subject matter or the parties 4. There should not be any dispute as to his professional Qualification 5. He should not buy any claim of the parties 6. He holds the quasi-judicial position, he should not be biased. ### **APPOINTMENT** 1\) ***Appointment by Parties*** – The general rule followed is the Appointment by parties where the right to appoint the members of the arbitral tribunal. The parties may agree to appoint a sole or more than one arbitrator. If both parties do not name their arbitrator, they may agree that arbitrators or arbitrators may be appointed by a third designated person. When one parties fail to appoint. 2\) ***Appointment by Court*** – Where both parties have appointed two arbitrators each but are unable to appoint a third arbitrator, within the time frame of 30 days, the chief justice or any other person or institution or authority to whom the chief justice may delegate this function will appoint the Arbitrator or third arbitrator. ### **JURISDICTION** - The jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal is derived from the agreement between the parties, as stated in their arbitration agreement. The arbitration agreement must be in writing and may be in the form of a separate agreement or a clause within a contract. - An arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction is restricted to the area of the dispute specified in the contract of arbitration. Tribunals have the authority to rule on issues affecting their jurisdiction, such as whether the arbitration agreement exists or is legal. - A plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not later than the submission of the statement of defence. - A plea that the arbitral tribunal is exceeding the scope of its authority shall be raised as soon as the matter alleged to be beyond the scope of its authority is raised during the arbitral proceedings. - The decision passed by the arbitral tribunal shall be binding on both parties which is popularly known as the arbitral award. ### **CONCLUSION** The composition, jurisdiction, and characterization of an arbitration panel are all significant components of the arbitration process. The establishment of the arbitral tribunal plays an essential role in the arbitration process since it involves the appointment of arbitrators by the relevant parties or appointed organisations. If the authorised entity fails to select an arbitrator, the High Court or Supreme Court may intervene. The membership of the tribunal, or the selection of a solitary arbitrator, is a key aspect of arbitration that influences the course and outcome of the proceedings. In some cases, such as those regarding investment treaty protection, arbitrators may be appointed by institutions such as the ICC International Court of Arbitration. Jurisdiction is another important aspect of the arbitral tribunal’s job. The arbitral panel can decide on its jurisdiction, including the determination of objections to the existence or legality of the arbitration agreement. This authority guarantees that the tribunal can effectively assess its ability to manage disputes. In conclusion, knowing the structure, jurisdiction, and definition of an arbitral tribunal is essential for navigating the complexities of arbitration. The selection of arbitrators, resolution of jurisdictional issues, and recognition of arbitral tribunals’ role in conflict settlement are essential elements that promote the effectiveness and integrity of arbitration proceedings. Understanding these fundamental factors allows stakeholders to engage in arbitration with clarity and confidence, encouraging a fair and quick settlement of disputes. ### **REFERENCES** 1. **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** 1. *Book – Lectures on Arbitration, conciliation and A.D.R Systems, Author – Dr. Rega Surya Rao* 2. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. LoginUniversitofLucknow, [https://udrc.lkouniv.ac.in/Content/DepartmentContent/SM\_367aca78-6e00-4cb5-82f6-18ed4d3299d4\_30.pdf](https://udrc.lkouniv.ac.in/Content/DepartmentContent/SM_367aca78-6e00-4cb5-82f6-18ed4d3299d4_30.pdf) (last visited Mar. 4, 2024). 2. *Terminating arbitration: lessons from India*, Global Arbitration Review, (last visited Mar. 4, 2024). 3. *Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – An Overview*, Search eLibrary:: SSRN, [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3582896](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3582896) (last visited Mar. 4, 2024). 4. (last visited Mar. 4, 2024). 3. **Cases Referred** 1. *M/S. Amarchand Lalitkumar vs Shree Ambica Jute Mills Ltd on 3 May 1962*, Indian Kanoon – Search engine for Indian Law, [https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1371659/#:~:text=The%20appellant’s%20case%20was%20that,were%20either%20directly%20or%20indirectly](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1371659/#:~:text=The%20appellant's%20case%20was%20that,were%20either%20directly%20or%20indirectly) (last visited Mar. 4, 2024). 2. *Satyendra Kumar vs Hind Constructions Ltd. on 14 August 1951*, Indian Kanoon – Search engine for Indian Law, (last visited Mar. 4, 2024). [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) *M/S. Amarchand Lalitkumar vs Shree Ambica Jute Mills Ltd on 3 May, 1962*, Indian Kanoon – Search engine for Indian Law, [https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1371659/#:~:text=The%20appellant’s%20case%20was%20that,were%20either%20directly%20or%20indirectly](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1371659/#:~:text=The%20appellant's%20case%20was%20that,were%20either%20directly%20or%20indirectly) (last visited Mar. 4, 2024). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) *Satyendra Kumar vs Hind Constructions Ltd. on 14 August, 1951*, Indian Kanoon – Search engine for Indian Law, (last visited Mar. 4, 2024). **Categories:** Articles --- ### [Gender Dynamics on Inheritance Rights: A Study of Succession Laws](https://lawfoyer.in/gender-dynamics-on-inheritance-rights-a-study-of-succession-laws/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Jagrit Singla, Baba Farid Law College, Faridkot

Abstract:

This article delves into the succession/inheritance rights of the male and female legal heirs of the deceased person by exploring the different personal laws prevailing in Indian society. This article talks about the shares inherited by the son, daughter, spouse, mother, or other legal heirs under the different customs of different religions like Hindus, Muslims, Christians, and Parsis and the laws followed by them. This article also delves into the challenges being faced in society due to different customary norms prevailing in creating the impact of gender dynamics on inheritance rights and how these challenges can be overcome for future growth which helps in equalizing inheritance rights in society.  Keywords (Minimum 5): Inheritance, Joint Property, Succession Laws, Coparceners, Legal Heirs, Ancestral Property, Self-acquired Property, Customary Practices, Gender Equality, Legal Heirs

INTRODUCTION:

Inheritance is a convention of passing or transferring the properties, rights, titles, interests as well as the obligations and debts to the legal heirs of the deceased person. The inheritance rights thus, refer to the legal entitlement of the individuals /legal heirs to inherit the property, wealth, and assets from the deceased member of the family, which was in the ownership of such deceased person. The inheritance rights are governed by the succession laws which may vary across different jurisdictions and are influenced by the different cultures, religion, and other factors. In India, the succession or inheritance laws differ according to the different cultures and religions, for instance the Inheritance in Hindus is governed by “Hindu Succession Act, 1956,” in Muslims it is governed by the Muslim Laws, etc. The property, assets, wealth, etc. can be inherited by the legal heirs in the following two ways: -
  • Wills/ Testament;
  • Intestate Succession Laws (person dying Intestate, i.e., without making Will)

Meanings and Explanation:

  • Legal Heirs: Legal Heirs means the individuals who are entitles to inherit the property, assets, and wealth of a deceased person according to the provisions of the customs and laws. Legal heirs mainly include spouses, children, parents and other relatives of the deceased as specified in the succession laws.
  • Succession: Succession means the process by which the rights, duties, properties, titles, or obligations are transferred from one person to another. According to the inheritance laws, succession refers to the transmission of property, assets, and other interests upon the death of an individual.
  • Co-parceners: The concept of the coparceners is found in the Hindu Laws and pertains to the joint ownership of property in Hindu Undivided Family (HUF). Coparceners means the individuals who jointly hold an undivided interest in an inherited ancestral property.

Historical Background:

The inheritance laws are personal laws which exists from the ancient times, so as the old-fashioned laws, the equal rights were not given to the women. In many cultures, the right over the entitlement of the joint property was inherited to the sons only, sons were considered as the prior legal heirs and daughters have no or limited right to inheritance; which perpetuates the economic disparities and gender inequality. The Hindu Succession Act, was enacted in the year 1956 and that time the women had no right to inherent the properties of her father dying intestate. After passing the “Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005,” the equal rights are provided to the daughters as well in the coparcenary property. After the said amendment, the daughters shall have the same rights by birth as that of a son in the Joint Hindu Family as a co-parcener and thus, have the right to claim by survivorship. Case: “Prakash vs. Phulavati,” (2016)[1], in this case the Supreme Court held that, the living daughters of living coparceners as on 9th September, 2005 can claim the inheritance rights irrespective of when the daughter was born. Any prior disposition or alienation including partition will remain unaffected.

Legal Reforms and Progress:

The legal reforms are made for the welfare and development of the society and these legal frameworks progress over time to cope with the new ages and thus, amendments are done. In the traditional period there exists gender inequality regarding the inheritance rights between the males and females. But as time changes legal reforms are made to address the gender disparities in inheritance rights. Many countries amended their inheritance and succession laws to promote the gender equality and give the same rights to both the males and females by eliminating the discrimination in inheritance laws. In India also, the legal reforms progress which provide equal rights to females of the society.

Types of Properties:

The property which can be inherited among the legal heirs can be classified into two categories:
  1. Self -Acquired Property: The property which is acquired or purchased by a person with his own income or resources and it is not subject to the rules of coparcenary or family lineage.
  2. Ancestral Property: The property which is inherited through successive generations within a family. The property inherited from last four generations, i.e., father, father’s father, or great grandfather will be ancestral property.[2] The ancestral property is governed by the succession laws.
Case: “Sarvamma vs. U.R. Virupakshaiah,”[3] in this case the Court held that the property will be considered as ancestral property only when it is inherited from last four generations in the male lineage without partition and division.

Inheritance Laws in different Religions and Cultures:

  • Hindu Inheritance Laws: The succession/inheritance in Hindus are governed by “Hindu Succession Act, 1956” and the term Hindus include Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, and Arya Samaj. The property of the person dying intestate in Hindus are distributed among the legal heirs as classified into followed classes: -
  • Firstly, Class I heirs,
  • Secondly, Class II heirs,
  • Thirdly, Agnates, and then
  • Fourthly, Cognates.
Under the Hindu Succession laws the property is first distributed among the legal heirs in Class-I category and if none is available in Class-I then, the property goes to the legal heirs of Class-II, and then to Agnates and then, lastly to the Cognates. After the amendment of 2005, the daughters are also included in the legal heirs of Class-I and the whole property of the deceased will be equally distributed among son, daughter, mother, widow, and any other living person included in Class-I category. Case: “Arunachala Gounder vs. Ponnusamy,”[4] in this case the Supreme Court held that in addition to the coparcenary property inherited by the daughter of the deceased through partition, the daughter also has the right to inherit the self-acquired property of a Hindu male who dies intestate, i.e., without making a Will.   
  • Muslim Inheritance Laws: Unlike Hindu inheritance law, the Muslim inheritance law does not distinguish between the self-acquired property and ancestral property. The inheritance under Islamic laws or culture are governed by the “Shias and Sunnis” customs and rules. In the Shias, all the heirs of the deceased get equal share while in Sunnis, the shares are divided based on branches. The property of deceased is distributed among the heirs only after paying all the outstanding debts and charges related to funeral rites.
However, under the Muslim laws, there is some gender inequality while the inheriting the property among the legal heirs as the son is supposed to get double share of what the daughter will have. And in case of the widows, the widow is entitled to share of one-fourth of the property if she has no child; and one-eighth share if she has children.
  • Parsi Inheritance Laws: The inheritance in the Parsis is governed by “The Indian Succession Act, 1925” under Sections 50 to 56. Under the Parsi laws, no distinction is made between the legal heirs who were born in the lifetime of a person deceased or who were only conceived in the womb, at the time of the death of the said person.[5] According to the provision of Section 51 of the Act, the property of the person dying intestate shall be divided equally among the widow/widower, sons, and daughters.
  • Christian Inheritance Laws: The Christian inheritance laws are also governed by “The Indian Succession Act, 1925” under Section 31 to 49. It also does not create any inequality based on gender at the time of inheritance. The property of the deceased dying intestate will be divided among widow/widower and children or any other lineal descendants. The one-third share of the property shall belong to the widow/widower and the remaining two-third shall be equally inherited among the children or lineal descendants of the deceased.[6]

Rights of Women:

  • The women were given unequal rights regarding the inheritance of property. The right of inheritance enjoy by women/daughters are different in different religions and customs, which are explained as follows:
  1. Under Hindu Succession Act, the daughters were not giving equal rights as that of sons. But, after 2005 an amendment has been made and it provides that, daughter shall inherent equal share to that of a mother, grandmother, and brother in the property of her father dying intestate.
  2. After amendment in the Hindu Succession Act, not only the unmarried daughters but, the married daughters also have the right of inheritance in the property of her father.
  • As per Muslim Laws, the women have lesser rights and shares in the property of her husband and father.
  1. The Christian and Parsi Laws provide equal rights and shares to the women and daughters in the property as that of men.

Rights of Natural and Adopted Children:

  1. The natural children have the right of inheritance in the ancestral property by birth, unless a will has been made which opposes it.
  2. The child in the womb of the mother at the time of the death of the person also has the right of inheritance in the ancestral property.
  • The child adopted has the same rights and share as that of the natural child in the property of the adoptive father dying without making a Will.
  • The illegitimate child cannot acquire the property rights.

Challenges and Ongoing Struggle:

Despite the various legal reforms and promotions of gender equality, there still exists some discrepancy among the different cultural and societal norms, which poses as a challenge and hurdles in shaping the impact of gender dynamics on equal inheritance rights. The various backward beliefs are deep-rooted regarding the gender biasness, family structures, property ownerships, etc. within the communities. Various challenges are being faced while implementing and achieving the full gender equality in the inheritance rights. The legal reforms alone are not sufficient to tackle the challenges faced such as backward thinking of the societies and to create the impact of gender dynamics on the inheritance rights. Other challenges related to different class, religions, castes, race, and ethnicity are being faced which follow their own customary and cultural practices and hinders the progress of gender equality in inheritance laws. In some regions, the customary laws prevail over the statutory laws, which leads to different inheritance practices.

Future Directions:

Gender dynamics stimulus the rights of inheritance by giving equal rights to both male and female heirs and demolishing the impact of historical biasness which favours the males over the females. However, many legal frameworks are established which promotes the equality but still efforts are need to be made to tackle the challenges and complexities of the gender dynamics and inheritance/succession rights. So, to create the impact of gender dynamics on inheritance rights following things can be done in the future: -
  • Uphold the principle of gender equality and protect the rights of all heirs whether male or female;
  • Raising awareness on equal inheritance rights;
  • Promoting education;
  • Nurturing the value of female heirs and their rights in the society by challenging the communities’ harmful stereotypes.

CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The impact of gender dynamics on inheritance rights is being made but still there are various challenges that need to be tackled for future growth. The succession laws in India are governed by different personal laws according to the cultures and religious practices. However, amendments are being made to encourage the rights of inheritance of the female heirs like the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 which create the equal rights of the daughters as that of the sons in the property of her father. Still, the legislative reforms need to be improved and cultural norms and biasness should be addressed for achieving the full gender equality in the inheritance laws by enhancing the legal awareness and promoting the education towards fostering equitable inheritance rights in India.

REFERENCES

  • Online Articles / Sources Referred
  1. The Article: Inheritance Laws in India- All You Need to Know, written by Pawni Mishra and the link of the article is https://www.magicbricks.com
  2. The Article: All about Property Inheritance Law in India, written by Adv. Priyanka Sampathy and the link of the article is https://www.ezylegal.in
  3. The Article:- “Inheritance Rights of Women: How to Protect them and how succession laws vary,” written by Riju Mehta and the link of the article is https://m.economictimes.com/wealth/plan/inheirtance-rights-of-women-how-to-protect-them-and-how-succession-laws-vary/articleshow/70407336.cms
  4. https://indiankanoon.org
  5. https://scconline.com
  • Cases Referred
  1. Prakash vs. Phulavati AIR 2016 SC 769
  2. Gurdip Kaur Ghamand Singh, 1964 SCC Online Punj 180
  3. Sarvamma vs. U.R. Virupakshaiah 2010 SCC Online Kar 136
  4. Arunachala Gounder vs. Ponnusamy (2022) 11 SCC 520
  • Statutes Referred
  1. Hindu Succession Act, 1956
  2. Indian Succession Act, 1925
  3. LexisNexis, Universal’s, Bare Act Hindu Laws, 2020
[1] AIR 2016 SC 769 [2] Gurdip Kaur vs. Ghamand Singh, 1964 SCC Online Punj 180 [3] 2010 SCC Online Kar 136 [4] (2022) 11 SCC 520 [5] Section 50(a), Indian Succession Act, 1925 [6] Section 33(a), The Indian Succession Act, 1925 **Content:** **Author-Jagrit Singla, Baba Farid Law College, Faridkot** ### **Abstract:** *This article delves into the succession/inheritance rights of the male and female legal heirs of the deceased person by exploring the different personal laws prevailing in Indian society. This article talks about the shares inherited by the son, daughter, spouse, mother, or other legal heirs under the different customs of different religions like Hindus, Muslims, Christians, and Parsis and the laws followed by them. This article also delves into the challenges being faced in society due to different customary norms prevailing in creating the impact of gender dynamics on inheritance rights and how these challenges can be overcome for future growth which helps in equalizing inheritance rights in society.* ***Keywords* : *Inheritance, Joint Property, Succession Laws, Coparceners, Legal Heirs, Ancestral Property, Self-acquired Property, Customary Practices, Gender Equality, Legal Heirs*** ### **INTRODUCTION:** Inheritance is a convention of passing or transferring the properties, rights, titles, interests as well as the obligations and debts to the legal heirs of the deceased person. The inheritance rights thus, refer to the legal entitlement of the individuals /legal heirs to inherit the property, wealth, and assets from the deceased member of the family, which was in the ownership of such deceased person. The inheritance rights are governed by the succession laws which may vary across different jurisdictions and are influenced by the different cultures, religion, and other factors. In India, the succession or inheritance laws differ according to the different cultures and religions, for instance the Inheritance in Hindus is governed by *“Hindu Succession Act, 1956,”* in Muslims it is governed by the Muslim Laws, etc. The property, assets, wealth, etc. can be inherited by the legal heirs in the following two ways: – - Wills/ Testament; - Intestate Succession Laws (person dying Intestate, i.e., without making Will) ### **Meanings and Explanation:** - ***Legal Heirs:*** Legal Heirs means the individuals who are entitles to inherit the property, assets, and wealth of a deceased person according to the provisions of the customs and laws. Legal heirs mainly include spouses, children, parents and other relatives of the deceased as specified in the succession laws. - ***Succession:*** Succession means the process by which the rights, duties, properties, titles, or obligations are transferred from one person to another. According to the inheritance laws, succession refers to the transmission of property, assets, and other interests upon the death of an individual. - ***Co-parceners:*** The concept of the coparceners is found in the Hindu Laws and pertains to the joint ownership of property in Hindu Undivided Family (HUF). Coparceners means the individuals who jointly hold an undivided interest in an inherited ancestral property. ### **Historical Background:** The inheritance laws are personal laws which exists from the ancient times, so as the old-fashioned laws, the equal rights were not given to the women. In many cultures, the right over the entitlement of the joint property was inherited to the sons only, sons were considered as the prior legal heirs and daughters have no or limited right to inheritance; which perpetuates the economic disparities and gender inequality. The Hindu Succession Act, was enacted in the year 1956 and that time the women had no right to inherent the properties of her father dying intestate. After passing the ***“Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005,”*** the equal rights are provided to the daughters as well in the coparcenary property. After the said amendment, the daughters shall have the same rights by birth as that of a son in the Joint Hindu Family as a co-parcener and thus, have the right to claim by survivorship. ***Case: “Prakash vs. Phulavati,” (2016)[\[1\]](#_ftn1),*** in this case the Supreme Court held that, the living daughters of living coparceners as on 9th September, 2005 can claim the inheritance rights irrespective of when the daughter was born. Any prior disposition or alienation including partition will remain unaffected. ### **Legal Reforms and Progress:** The legal reforms are made for the welfare and development of the society and these legal frameworks progress over time to cope with the new ages and thus, amendments are done. In the traditional period there exists gender inequality regarding the inheritance rights between the males and females. But as time changes legal reforms are made to address the gender disparities in inheritance rights. Many countries amended their inheritance and succession laws to promote the gender equality and give the same rights to both the males and females by eliminating the discrimination in inheritance laws. In India also, the legal reforms progress which provide equal rights to females of the society. ### **Types of Properties:** The property which can be inherited among the legal heirs can be classified into two categories: 1. *Self -Acquired Property*: The property which is acquired or purchased by a person with his own income or resources and it is not subject to the rules of coparcenary or family lineage. 2. *Ancestral Property:* The property which is inherited through successive generations within a family. The property inherited from last four generations, i.e., father, father’s father, or great grandfather will be ancestral property.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) The ancestral property is governed by the succession laws. ***Case: “Sarvamma vs. U.R. Virupakshaiah,”[\[3\]](#_ftn3)*** in this case the Court held that the property will be considered as ancestral property only when it is inherited from last four generations in the male lineage without partition and division. ### **Inheritance Laws in different Religions and Cultures:** - ***Hindu Inheritance Laws:*** The succession/inheritance in Hindus are governed by “Hindu Succession Act, 1956” and the term Hindus include Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, and Arya Samaj. The property of the person dying intestate in Hindus are distributed among the legal heirs as classified into followed classes: – - Firstly, Class I heirs, - Secondly, Class II heirs, - Thirdly, Agnates, and then - Fourthly, Cognates. Under the Hindu Succession laws the property is first distributed among the legal heirs in Class-I category and if none is available in Class-I then, the property goes to the legal heirs of Class-II, and then to Agnates and then, lastly to the Cognates. After the amendment of 2005, the *daughters* are also included in the legal heirs of Class-I and the whole property of the deceased will be equally distributed among son, daughter, mother, widow, and any other living person included in Class-I category. ***Case: “Arunachala Gounder vs. Ponnusamy,”[\[4\]](#_ftn4)*** in this case the Supreme Court held that in addition to the coparcenary property inherited by the daughter of the deceased through partition, the daughter also has the right to inherit the self-acquired property of a Hindu male who dies intestate, i.e., without making a Will. - ***Muslim Inheritance Laws:*** Unlike Hindu inheritance law, the Muslim inheritance law does not distinguish between the self-acquired property and ancestral property. The inheritance under Islamic laws or culture are governed by the “*Shias and Sunnis”* customs and rules. In the Shias, all the heirs of the deceased get equal share while in Sunnis, the shares are divided based on branches. The property of deceased is distributed among the heirs only after paying all the outstanding debts and charges related to funeral rites. However, under the Muslim laws, there is some gender inequality while the inheriting the property among the legal heirs as the son is supposed to get double share of what the daughter will have. And in case of the widows, the widow is entitled to share of one-fourth of the property if she has no child; and one-eighth share if she has children. - ***Parsi Inheritance Laws:*** The inheritance in the Parsis is governed by *“The Indian Succession Act, 1925”* under Sections 50 to 56. Under the Parsi laws, no distinction is made between the legal heirs who were born in the lifetime of a person deceased or who were only conceived in the womb, at the time of the death of the said person.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) According to the provision of Section 51 of the Act, the property of the person dying intestate shall be divided equally among the widow/widower, sons, and daughters. - ***Christian Inheritance Laws:*** The Christian inheritance laws are also governed by *“The Indian Succession Act, 1925”* under Section 31 to 49. It also does not create any inequality based on gender at the time of inheritance. The property of the deceased dying intestate will be divided among widow/widower and children or any other lineal descendants. The one-third share of the property shall belong to the widow/widower and the remaining two-third shall be equally inherited among the children or lineal descendants of the deceased.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) ### **Rights of Women:** - The women were given unequal rights regarding the inheritance of property. The right of inheritance enjoy by women/daughters are different in different religions and customs, which are explained as follows: 1. Under Hindu Succession Act, the daughters were not giving equal rights as that of sons. But, after 2005 an amendment has been made and it provides that, daughter shall inherent equal share to that of a mother, grandmother, and brother in the property of her father dying intestate. 2. After amendment in the Hindu Succession Act, not only the unmarried daughters but, the married daughters also have the right of inheritance in the property of her father. - As per Muslim Laws, the women have lesser rights and shares in the property of her husband and father. 1. The Christian and Parsi Laws provide equal rights and shares to the women and daughters in the property as that of men. ### **Rights of Natural and Adopted Children:** 1. The natural children have the right of inheritance in the ancestral property by birth, unless a will has been made which opposes it. 2. The child in the womb of the mother at the time of the death of the person also has the right of inheritance in the ancestral property. - The child adopted has the same rights and share as that of the natural child in the property of the adoptive father dying without making a Will. - The illegitimate child cannot acquire the property rights. ### **Challenges and Ongoing Struggle:** Despite the various legal reforms and promotions of gender equality, there still exists some discrepancy among the different cultural and societal norms, which poses as a challenge and hurdles in shaping the impact of gender dynamics on equal inheritance rights. The various backward beliefs are deep-rooted regarding the gender biasness, family structures, property ownerships, etc. within the communities. Various challenges are being faced while implementing and achieving the full gender equality in the inheritance rights. The legal reforms alone are not sufficient to tackle the challenges faced such as backward thinking of the societies and to create the impact of gender dynamics on the inheritance rights. Other challenges related to different class, religions, castes, race, and ethnicity are being faced which follow their own customary and cultural practices and hinders the progress of gender equality in inheritance laws. In some regions, the customary laws prevail over the statutory laws, which leads to different inheritance practices. ### **Future Directions:** Gender dynamics stimulus the rights of inheritance by giving equal rights to both male and female heirs and demolishing the impact of historical biasness which favours the males over the females. However, many legal frameworks are established which promotes the equality but still efforts are need to be made to tackle the challenges and complexities of the gender dynamics and inheritance/succession rights. So, to create the impact of gender dynamics on inheritance rights following things can be done in the future: – - Uphold the principle of gender equality and protect the rights of all heirs whether male or female; - Raising awareness on equal inheritance rights; - Promoting education; - Nurturing the value of female heirs and their rights in the society by challenging the communities’ harmful stereotypes. ### **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The impact of gender dynamics on inheritance rights is being made but still there are various challenges that need to be tackled for future growth. The succession laws in India are governed by different personal laws according to the cultures and religious practices. However, amendments are being made to encourage the rights of inheritance of the female heirs like the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 which create the equal rights of the daughters as that of the sons in the property of her father. Still, the legislative reforms need to be improved and cultural norms and biasness should be addressed for achieving the full gender equality in the inheritance laws by enhancing the legal awareness and promoting the education towards fostering equitable inheritance rights in India. ### **REFERENCES** - **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. The Article: Inheritance Laws in India- All You Need to Know, written by Pawni Mishra and the link of the article is 2. The Article: All about Property Inheritance Law in India, written by Adv. Priyanka Sampathy and the link of the article is 3. The Article:- “Inheritance Rights of Women: How to Protect them and how succession laws vary,” written by Riju Mehta and the link of the article is 4. 5. - **Cases Referred** 1. Prakash vs. Phulavati AIR 2016 SC 769 2. Gurdip Kaur Ghamand Singh, 1964 SCC Online Punj 180 3. Sarvamma vs. U.R. Virupakshaiah 2010 SCC Online Kar 136 4. Arunachala Gounder vs. Ponnusamy (2022) 11 SCC 520 - **Statutes Referred** 1. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 2. Indian Succession Act, 1925 3. LexisNexis, Universal’s, Bare Act Hindu Laws, 2020 [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) AIR 2016 SC 769 [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Gurdip Kaur vs. Ghamand Singh, 1964 SCC Online Punj 180 [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) 2010 SCC Online Kar 136 [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) (2022) 11 SCC 520 [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Section 50(a), Indian Succession Act, 1925 [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Section 33(a), The Indian Succession Act, 1925 **Categories:** Articles --- ### [MEANING AND STAGES OF CRIME IN CRIMINAL SYSTEM](https://lawfoyer.in/meaning-and-stages-of-crime-in-criminal-system/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Mansi, University Five Year Law College, University of Rajasthan

INTRODUCTION

“Laws are like cobwebs, which may catch small flies, but let wasps and hornets break through.”-Jonathan Swift The current era is full of so many occupations. So, because of it, we found so many crimes in each and every situation. Some persons are not aware properly of these crimes. Now, rape and cybercrime is a very major issue nowadays. But first of all, we have to know about the meaning of crime and what are the stages to consider an act as a crime. Therefore, in this article, I tried to explain the meaning and stages of crime in an easy way.

MEANING OF CRIME

We know that every country or state is full of customs, religions and rules and regulations. Nowadays, when we disobey these customs, and regulations of any society, then it is considered as a crime. However, according to legal definition, “crime is any kind of act or omission which is declared to be socially detrimental with respect to the State and is forbidden by law, by the imposition of some punishment.” Blackstone stated crime as “an act committed or omitted in violation of public law forbidding or commanding it”. Glanville Williams says that “a crime is a legal wrong that can be followed by criminal proceedings which may result in punishment”. Professor Kenny defined crimes in the these terms: “Crime is a harmful human conduct that sovereign desires to prevent.” Salmond defines as “an act deemed by law to be harmful to society in general even though its immediate victim is an individual”. John Austin defines crime “a wrong which is pursued by the sovereign or his subordinates is a crime.” Crime is derived from Latin word – ‘krimos’  which means ‘to accuse’. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Harpreet Kaur v. State of Maharashtra, states that “crime is a revolt against the whole society and an attack on the civilization of the day.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court in another case titled, Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India,  held that every criminal action consists of followings characters:
  1. Human being who commits a crime and with.
  2. Law gives punishment to accused and prevented the any other person to commits a crime.
Thus, supreme court gives the best definition of crime.

ELEMENTS OF CRIME

The cardinal elements of crime is contained in this maxim ‘actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea’. This maxim contains two words ‘actus reus’ and ‘mens rea’. It means that crime will not be considered as crime without guilty mind. Intention plays a major role to commit any crime. ACTUS REUS Actus reus means to commit a crime. A wrongful act which is done by any person and this act falls down under the ambit of crime prescribed by law of any nation. A crime can be an immoral act but every immoral act can’t considers as crime. For example, not care aged parents is an immoral act but not is a crime. MENS REA Mens Rea means ‘a guilty mind’. The legal maxim  ‘actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea’ defines that any act not considers as crime without any guilty mind. Thus, it means that for committing a crime intention plays a major role. For example, a starving child was crying and her mother had not money and food to give him. So, he theft some food from any shopkeeper. Thus, the intention is not malafide, so because of it, it is not considers as crime.

STAGES OF CRIME

  1. INTENTION – Intention is the very first stage to commit a crime. Because intention will converts into act and act will considers as crime. Thus, it is very first and crucial stage.
  2. PREPARATION – Preparation is second stage to commit a crime. When a person got intention to commit a crime and aftermath he collects some measures and equipments or conspiracy for intention converts into reality.
  3. ATTEMPT- Attempt is the third stage to commencement of crime aftermath preparation. To commit a crime is also an offence by law. Thus, it means that when a person reached at this stage, then he will known as a criminal. There have three main essentials –
  • Guilty intention.
  • Act done for commits a crime.
  • The act fall down under the ambit of an offence which is prescribed by law.
  1. ACCOMPLISHMENT OR COMPLETION – It is the large stag fir commencement of a crime. When a person is successful to commit a crime, then he is a criminal and idlf he is unsuccessful to commits a crime, then he did a commit a crime.
Thus, these are the stages of a crime.

CONCLUSION

Thus, we found that a crime is a very wide area to read and understand. It’s have very deep concerns. There are four stages to commit a crime. A person can commit a crime with innocence it means that he is not aware about the consequences of his act.

REFERENCES

     Books-
  • Criminal law, PSA Pillai
Journals –
  • NUJS Law review
     Online resources –
  1. https://epgp.inflibnet.ac.in/
  2. https://www.mondaq.com/india/crime/878294/general-criminal-defences-insanity-infancy-and-intoxication-part-1
  3. https://blog.ipleaders.in/
  4. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1641007/
  5. manupatra.com
**Content:** **Author-Mansi, University Five Year Law College, University of Rajasthan** ### **INTRODUCTION** “Laws are like cobwebs, which may catch small flies, but let wasps and hornets break through.”-**Jonathan Swift** The current era is full of so many occupations. So, because of it, we found so many crimes in each and every situation. Some persons are not aware properly of these crimes. Now, rape and cybercrime is a very major issue nowadays. But first of all, we have to know about the meaning of crime and what are the stages to consider an act as a crime. Therefore, in this article, I tried to explain the meaning and stages of crime in an easy way. ### **MEANING OF CRIME** We know that every country or state is full of customs, religions and rules and regulations. Nowadays, when we disobey these customs, and regulations of any society, then it is considered as a crime. However, according to legal definition, “crime is any kind of act or omission which is declared to be socially detrimental with respect to the State and is forbidden by law, by the imposition of some punishment.” Blackstone stated crime as “an act committed or omitted in violation of public law forbidding or commanding it”. Glanville Williams says that “a crime is a legal wrong that can be followed by criminal proceedings which may result in punishment”. Professor Kenny defined crimes in the these terms: “Crime is a harmful human conduct that sovereign desires to prevent.” Salmond defines as “an act deemed by law to be harmful to society in general even though its immediate victim is an individual”. John Austin defines crime “a wrong which is pursued by the sovereign or his subordinates is a crime.” Crime is derived from Latin word – ‘krimos’ which means ‘to accuse’. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Harpreet Kaur v. State of Maharashtra, states that “crime is a revolt against the whole society and an attack on the civilization of the day.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court in another case titled, Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, held that every criminal action consists of followings characters: 1. Human being who commits a crime and with. 2. Law gives punishment to accused and prevented the any other person to commits a crime. Thus, supreme court gives the best definition of crime. ### **ELEMENTS OF CRIME** The cardinal elements of crime is contained in this maxim ‘***actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea’.*** This maxim contains two words ‘actus reus’ and ‘mens rea’. It means that crime will not be considered as crime without guilty mind. Intention plays a major role to commit any crime. **ACTUS REUS** Actus reus means to commit a crime. A wrongful act which is done by any person and this act falls down under the ambit of crime prescribed by law of any nation. A crime can be an immoral act but every immoral act can’t considers as crime. For example, not care aged parents is an immoral act but not is a crime. **MENS REA** Mens Rea means ‘a guilty mind’. The legal maxim ***‘actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea’*** defines that any act not considers as crime without any guilty mind. Thus, it means that for committing a crime intention plays a major role. For example, a starving child was crying and her mother had not money and food to give him. So, he theft some food from any shopkeeper. Thus, the intention is not malafide, so because of it, it is not considers as crime. ### **STAGES OF CRIME** 1. **INTENTION –** Intention is the very first stage to commit a crime. Because intention will converts into act and act will considers as crime. Thus, it is very first and crucial stage. 2. **PREPARATION –** Preparation is second stage to commit a crime. When a person got intention to commit a crime and aftermath he collects some measures and equipments or conspiracy for intention converts into reality. 3. **ATTEMPT-** Attempt is the third stage to commencement of crime aftermath preparation. To commit a crime is also an offence by law. Thus, it means that when a person reached at this stage, then he will known as a criminal. There have three main essentials – - Guilty intention. - Act done for commits a crime. - The act fall down under the ambit of an offence which is prescribed by law. 4. **ACCOMPLISHMENT OR COMPLETION –** It is the large stag fir commencement of a crime. When a person is successful to commit a crime, then he is a criminal and idlf he is unsuccessful to commits a crime, then he did a commit a crime. Thus, these are the stages of a crime. ### **CONCLUSION** Thus, we found that a crime is a very wide area to read and understand. It’s have very deep concerns. There are four stages to commit a crime. A person can commit a crime with innocence it means that he is not aware about the consequences of his act. ### **REFERENCES** **Books-** - Criminal law, PSA Pillai **Journals –** - NUJS Law review **Online resources –** 1. [**https://epgp.inflibnet.ac.in/**](https://epgp.inflibnet.ac.in/) 2. [**https://www.mondaq.com/india/crime/878294/general-criminal-defences-insanity-infancy-and-intoxication-part-1**](https://www.mondaq.com/india/crime/878294/general-criminal-defences-insanity-infancy-and-intoxication-part-1) 3. [**https://blog.ipleaders.in/**](https://blog.ipleaders.in/) 4. [**https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1641007/**](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1641007/) 5. [**manupatra.com**](http://www.manupatra.com) **Categories:** Articles --- ### [LOVE WITHOUT BOUNDARIES: THE TIMELESS JOURNEY OF SAME MEX MARRIAGE FROM HISTORY TO HOPE](https://lawfoyer.in/love-without-boundaries-the-timeless-journey-of-same-mex-marriage-from-history-to-hope/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Diya Dhall, Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies - Technical Campus

INTRODUCTION

India has long struggled with addressing the question of homosexual marriage due to its diverse cultural fabric. Homosexual marriages are those that unite two individuals who share the same sex legally and biologically. These have been a very controversial issue in the worldwide context, which permits or prohibits it based on it being seen as either legal, religious or customary. Legal and social responses have varied from recognition to outright condemnation. By 2023, thirty-four countries with a combined population of more than one billion people have legalized and recognized same-sex marriage. In India, the supreme Court has held there is no fundamental right to marry. The court has also held that it cannot legislate on queer marriages. Keywords: Same-sex marriages, special marriage act, unnatural, legal, decriminalized, section 377, transgender, LGBTQIA+.

The Past: A History of Struggle

Throughout history many societies stigmatized and criminalized homosexuality. However, in the late twentieth century, a gradual sea change began undermining discriminatory norms. India’s third and fourth wave feminists’ particularly advocated for equal rights for members of LGBTQIA+ community since they began campaigning for gender justice in 90s. In 2001, this country made history by becoming the first to approve gay marriage thereby creating a milestone in equality struggle against discrimination on sexual orientation grounds. You could say that the NALSA v. Union of India (2014) case has nothing to do with marriage. However, it was able to acknowledge transgender people’s rights by endorsing the principles of equality, and anti-discrimination. It established a precedent for recognizing different gender identities and expressions. The journey in terms of law towards LGBTQ+ rights in India has been characterized by Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code which made consensual same-sex relationships illegal, among other “unnatural offenses.” The historic Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) case represented a breakthrough. In this landmark decision, the Supreme Court decriminalized consensual homosexual acts while affirming that sexual orientation is an inherent facet of privacy.

The Present: Global Progress and Remaining Challenges

Now let us move forward to where we are at present when substantial headway has been made in this area. Today many countries all over the globe accept and legalize same marriages between males or females. For instance, America witnessed a historic judgement by its highest court that declared all homosexual unions legal on 25th June 2015 signalling a turning point in LGBTQ+ movement. Other nations have followed suit albeit to varyingly uncertain extents for LGBT people regarding their status as human beings before society and law. Challenges, however, continue. Nevertheless, there are still places whereby same-sex relationships are outlawed and societies as well as individuals remain unwilling to change. India does not recognize the marriage of people from the same-sex or civil unions. On October 17, 2023, a prayer was dismissed by the Supreme Court for queer persons to be allowed to marry, and on that day itself it was decided unanimously in opposition. The court concurred that marriage is not a fundamental right. The court also said that the Special Marriage Act 1954 cannot conceive of queer marriages. Discrimination and prejudice continue to impact LGBTQ+ lives necessitating sustained advocacy and education.

The Future: Anticipating Legal Recognition

India’s potential future for legalizing gay marriage appears bright due to indications of a gradual shift toward its acceptance within this country’s legislature. Public opinion has changed over time revealing an emerging trend for equality across different courts in India. There is hope among many people who await this matter being dealt with directly by courts interpreting equal protection principles under the Indian constitution which guarantees non-discrimination clauses when it comes down to same-sex marriages.

Challenges faced by Queer community-

The problems queer people are forced to deal with can differ and depend on the individual’s place of living, cultural environment, and legal situation. The rights of gay marriage have not been legally recognized in many countries, which means that they can be subject to legal discrimination. Homophobia, biphobia, and transphobia are the main causes that lead to social stigma and discrimination. Queer individuals can experience prejudice, exclusion, or even violence due to their sexual orientation or gender identity. Difficulty in receiving healthcare that is sensitive to the needs and requirements of queer individuals is one of the challenges that queer individuals might face. Queer individuals, particularly youngsters, can be bullied and harassed by people in their schools, colleges, or communities. Conversion therapy, which is recognized as a deleterious method that strives to alter a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity, still persists in some parts of the world. The result can be highly destructive and cause grave harm on the mental and emotional side. Several instances have been documented where adolescents belonging to the queer community have attempted suicide due to this reason.

Examining Perspectives: Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage

One of the most common arguments against same-sex marriage comments about the social values and religious beliefs. It is argued by many that marriage is an integral part of social organization and believed that the traditional meaning of institution of marriage exist for thousands of years purposefully socialize individuals into sex roles specifically whereas man is groomed to be a leader and women is to be subordinate. In addition to that, they are afraid that any change will cause the irreversible ripples that could change the nature of fundamental principles of the relationship. In my opinion, it is not a credible argument as no society is static nor stationary and is always being changed and going on with the needs of people dynamic. The same trend of changing can be followed by institution of marriage as it depends on the needs of people as well . Other opponents also say that being raised in a mother and a father home is important for a child's development since they need both men and women to grow and become matured. This argument can be disproven for the reason that love and affection are the factors that impacts on the growth and development of a child in their early years and who parents a child does not matter whether they are a homosexual or a heterosexual couple.

Conclusion: A Journey Unfinished

The past, present, and future developments of same-sex marriage in India reflect a journey towards inclusivity and equality. With landmark decisions and changing societal attitudes, there is hope that India will continue to progress towards recognizing the rights of the LGBTQ+ community, including the right to marry and provide them the equal status as others in the society. The story of same-sex marriage is one of progress, but the journey is far from complete. There is still a long way to go. While many strides have been made; there is still work to be done to ensure equal rights and acceptance for all including the members of the LGBTQIA+ community. As we navigate the future, it is essential to remain vigilant in advocating for inclusivity, understanding, and respect, fostering a world where love knows no boundaries.

REFERENCES

  1. Cases Referred
    1. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018)
    2. NALSA v. Union of India (2014)
    3. Supriyo v. Union of India (2023)
  2. Statutes Referred
    1. Special marriage Act,1954
**Content:** **Author-Diya Dhall, Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies – Technical Campus** ### **INTRODUCTION** India has long struggled with addressing the question of homosexual marriage due to its diverse cultural fabric. Homosexual marriages are those that unite two individuals who share the same sex legally and biologically. These have been a very controversial issue in the worldwide context, which permits or prohibits it based on it being seen as either legal, religious or customary. Legal and social responses have varied from recognition to outright condemnation. By 2023, thirty-four countries with a combined population of more than one billion people have legalized and recognized same-sex marriage. In India, the supreme Court has held there is no fundamental right to marry. The court has also held that it cannot legislate on queer marriages. ***Keywords*:** Same-sex marriages, special marriage act, unnatural, legal, decriminalized, section 377, transgender, LGBTQIA+. ### **The Past: A History of Struggle** Throughout history many societies stigmatized and criminalized homosexuality. However, in the late twentieth century, a gradual sea change began undermining discriminatory norms. India’s third and fourth wave feminists’ particularly advocated for equal rights for members of LGBTQIA+ community since they began campaigning for gender justice in 90s. In 2001, this country made history by becoming the first to approve gay marriage thereby creating a milestone in equality struggle against discrimination on sexual orientation grounds. You could say that the NALSA v. Union of India (2014) case has nothing to do with marriage. However, it was able to acknowledge transgender people’s rights by endorsing the principles of equality, and anti-discrimination. It established a precedent for recognizing different gender identities and expressions. The journey in terms of law towards LGBTQ+ rights in India has been characterized by Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code which made consensual same-sex relationships illegal, among other “unnatural offenses.” The historic Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) case represented a breakthrough. In this landmark decision, the Supreme Court decriminalized consensual homosexual acts while affirming that sexual orientation is an inherent facet of privacy. ### **The Present: Global Progress and Remaining Challenges** Now let us move forward to where we are at present when substantial headway has been made in this area. Today many countries all over the globe accept and legalize same marriages between males or females. For instance, America witnessed a historic judgement by its highest court that declared all homosexual unions legal on 25th June 2015 signalling a turning point in LGBTQ+ movement. Other nations have followed suit albeit to varyingly uncertain extents for LGBT people regarding their status as human beings before society and law. Challenges, however, continue. Nevertheless, there are still places whereby same-sex relationships are outlawed and societies as well as individuals remain unwilling to change. India does not recognize the marriage of people from the same-sex or civil unions. On October 17, 2023, a prayer was dismissed by the Supreme Court for queer persons to be allowed to marry, and on that day itself it was decided unanimously in opposition. The court concurred that marriage is not a fundamental right. The court also said that the Special Marriage Act 1954 cannot conceive of queer marriages. Discrimination and prejudice continue to impact LGBTQ+ lives necessitating sustained advocacy and education. ### **The Future: Anticipating Legal Recognition** India’s potential future for legalizing gay marriage appears bright due to indications of a gradual shift toward its acceptance within this country’s legislature. Public opinion has changed over time revealing an emerging trend for equality across different courts in India. There is hope among many people who await this matter being dealt with directly by courts interpreting equal protection principles under the Indian constitution which guarantees non-discrimination clauses when it comes down to same-sex marriages. ### **Challenges faced by Queer community-** The problems queer people are forced to deal with can differ and depend on the individual’s place of living, cultural environment, and legal situation. The rights of gay marriage have not been legally recognized in many countries, which means that they can be subject to legal discrimination. Homophobia, biphobia, and transphobia are the main causes that lead to social stigma and discrimination. Queer individuals can experience prejudice, exclusion, or even violence due to their sexual orientation or gender identity. Difficulty in receiving healthcare that is sensitive to the needs and requirements of queer individuals is one of the challenges that queer individuals might face. Queer individuals, particularly youngsters, can be bullied and harassed by people in their schools, colleges, or communities. Conversion therapy, which is recognized as a deleterious method that strives to alter a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity, still persists in some parts of the world. The result can be highly destructive and cause grave harm on the mental and emotional side. Several instances have been documented where adolescents belonging to the queer community have attempted suicide due to this reason. ### **Examining Perspectives: Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage** One of the most common arguments against same-sex marriage comments about the social values and religious beliefs. It is argued by many that marriage is an integral part of social organization and believed that the traditional meaning of institution of marriage exist for thousands of years purposefully socialize individuals into sex roles specifically whereas man is groomed to be a leader and women is to be subordinate. In addition to that, they are afraid that any change will cause the irreversible ripples that could change the nature of fundamental principles of the relationship. In my opinion, it is not a credible argument as no society is static nor stationary and is always being changed and going on with the needs of people dynamic. The same trend of changing can be followed by institution of marriage as it depends on the needs of people as well . Other opponents also say that being raised in a mother and a father home is important for a child’s development since they need both men and women to grow and become matured. This argument can be disproven for the reason that love and affection are the factors that impacts on the growth and development of a child in their early years and who parents a child does not matter whether they are a homosexual or a heterosexual couple. ### **Conclusion: A Journey Unfinished** The past, present, and future developments of same-sex marriage in India reflect a journey towards inclusivity and equality. With landmark decisions and changing societal attitudes, there is hope that India will continue to progress towards recognizing the rights of the LGBTQ+ community, including the right to marry and provide them the equal status as others in the society. The story of same-sex marriage is one of progress, but the journey is far from complete. There is still a long way to go. While many strides have been made; there is still work to be done to ensure equal rights and acceptance for all including the members of the LGBTQIA+ community. As we navigate the future, it is essential to remain vigilant in advocating for inclusivity, understanding, and respect, fostering a world where love knows no boundaries. ### **REFERENCES** 1. **Cases Referred** 1. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) 2. NALSA v. Union of India (2014) 3. Supriyo v. Union of India (2023) 2. **Statutes Referred** 1. Special marriage Act,1954 **Categories:** Articles --- ### [How to Draft Excellent Contracts: Best Practices, Procedure, Principles, Important Cases](https://lawfoyer.in/how-to-draft-excellent-contracts-best-practices-procedure-principles-important-cases/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Aman Tyagi, University Five Year Law College, University of Rajasthan

INTRODUCTION-

In this comprehensive article, my primary aim is to thoroughly explain the fundamental aspects of a contract, aiming to provide clear and concise definitions accessible to both lay individuals and legal professionals alike. Throughout the discussion, I have precisely outlined the crucial components inherent in contracts, with a dedicated focus on examining pertinent precedents and case laws to enhance understanding. Diving further, we have delved into the foundational element’s integral to the art of drafting, offering insights on streamlining the process by diligently considering essential factors. To conclude, I've exactly crafted a detailed, step-by-step guide to empower you in the creation of excellent contracts. Additionally, I've included a collection of supplementary tips, ideally placed to be helpful factors during the detailed task of creating contracts.

What is a contract?

Let's start with defining contract in the most laymen's terms “A contract is a legally binding agreement at least between two parties to create mutual obligations that businesses and individuals use to protect their business or personal interests. They also aim to outline the engagement for a transaction. They can also dictate legal consequences if a party tries to break the agreement.”[1] Contracts can be written or verbal. Generally, most businesses favor written contracts as they can easily be referred to in future matters. Written contracts are also less ambiguous, hence eliminating any future enforcement problems. After defining it in simple terms let's also define it in the Lawmen language don’t worry this won’t mean that it can’t be understood in this language but it requires you to use more of your legal aptitude. To define it legally Sir William Anson defines a contract as “a legally enforceable agreement between two persons wherein two or more persons get a legal right and some have to fulfil corresponding legal responsibilities”[2]. To put it simply a contract is an agreement that interprets the obligations of various parties involved in it. Henceforth a contract is an agreement between two or more competent parties based on mutual promises, to do or refrain from doing a particular that is neither illegal nor impossible. Taking into consideration the perspective of India let's also define contracts according to Indian Contracts Act 1872, ICA 1872 Section 2(h) defines a contract as an “agreement enforceable by law”[3]. This denotes that there are two main ingredients of a contract: an agreement and enforceability. Only a valid contract is enforceable by law and a contract must fulfil certain conditions to be valid. After reading the above-discussed definitions a doubt might have arisen in your mind whether contracts and agreements are the same. To clear this let’s, distinguish between the two and take into consideration relevant examples to help us understand this fully.

Contracts and Agreements distinguished?

The terms contracts and agreements are often used interchangeably but in the legal landscape differences though minor are important to be taken into consideration to avoid any future legal hassle. They can be distinguished on the following grounds:-
    Features  Agreement  Contract 
Definition  An arrangement (usually informal and unwritten) between two or more parties that is not enforceable by law. A formal arrangement between two or more parties(usually written) that, by its terms and elements, is enforceable by law.
Does it need to be in writing? An agreement is not required to be written.  A contract also doesn’t necessarily require to be written however in some cases it's a legal necessity for them to be written for enforceability. These are often referred to as “statute of frauds” requirements. Examples of contracts that typically fall under the statute of fraud and must be in writing include: Contracts involving the sale or transfer of real estate, Contracts that cannot be performed within one year from the date of formation, Contracts to pay the debt of another person, etc.
Consideration requirements An agreement doesn’t require consideration. A contract requires the presence of consideration in a contractual agreement.
 Relevant examples You agree with your friend to buy their car for Rs 5,00,000. This is a mutual understanding or arrangement between you and your friend, but it might not be legally binding if it lacks essential elements or if it's merely a casual conversation. You and your friend draft a written agreement specifying the terms of the car sale, including the price, payment method, and any conditions. Both parties sign the document. Now, it has become a legally binding contract.
Hence these were the differences that might have aided you in understanding though minor but important differences between contracts and agreements. Concluding our discussion about the differences between the two, it's a legally accepted principle that “While every contract is an agreement, every agreement is not a contract.”[4] This statement has been propagated by Anson. Moving forward in the discussion of contracts we must know the essentials of contracts and also its essential requirements to make a legally comprehensive enforceable contract.

Essentials of Contracts – 

To make an agreement a validly enforceable contract in law certain essentials are needed to be satisfied. Henceforth let's delve into the explanation of the required essentials for a contract along with some decided case laws to understand them holistically. The essentials of a contractual agreement(as per ICA 1872) are as follows: -
  1. Offer and Acceptance - “There must be a clear offer by one party and a corresponding acceptance by the other party. Generally, the written contract only unfolds when the other party accepts the offer by one party and is definite in all senses. The offer or agreement must be clear and complete in all senses. Both parties should communicate to ensure there is no lapse in the contract act. Both the offer and acceptance must be "consensus ad idem", meaning( meeting of the minds), to put it simply both parties must comply with the same thing.” [5]
Mere silence is not constituted as acceptance of to offer. An offeree is not generally obligated to respond to an offer and their silence does not imply agreement. One more important thing to consider is that an invitation to offer is not an offer in itself. Taking an example of decided case law in “Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots Cash Chemists (1953): Goods displayed on shelves in a store are an invitation to customers to make an offer to purchase.”[6] Some Relevant case laws on offer and acceptance  - Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Company (1893)-
  • Facts: The Carbolic Smoke Ball Company advertised a product that they claimed could prevent influenza. They offered a reward to anyone who used the smoke ball according to the instructions and still got the flu.
  • Legal Issue: Was the advertisement a valid offer, and was Mrs Carlill entitled to the reward for using the product as directed and still contracting influenza?
  • Judgement: The court held that the advertisement was an offer, and Mrs. Carlill was entitled to the reward as she had accepted the offer by using the product as instructed and suffering from influenza.”[7]
Felthouse v Bindley (1862)-
  • Facts: Felthouse wanted to purchase a horse from his nephew. He wrote to his nephew, stating, "If I hear no more about him, I consider the horse mine at £30." The nephew intended to sell the horse but failed to respond to the letter.
  • Legal Issue: Did the nephew's silence amount to acceptance of the offer, and was a contract formed?
  • Judgement: The court held that there was no contract. Silence does not constitute acceptance unless there is a prior agreement that silence would amount to acceptance. In this case, the nephew's failure to respond meant that there was no acceptance, and therefore, no contract was formed.” [8]
  1. Intention to Create a Legal Relationship- “To bind, both parties should have a specific intention that can create a legal relationship, resulting in an agreement. Agreements of a social or household nature are not contracts because parties do not intend to build legal relationships.” [9]
Relevant case law on this essential is as follows: Balfour v. Balfour (1919)-
  • Facts: Mr Balfour promised to pay his wife a monthly allowance while he was working abroad, but the relationship later turned sour, and the payments ceased.
  • Legal Issue: Did the parties intend for their agreement to have legal consequences, or was it a domestic arrangement without legal intent?
  • Judgement: The court held that in domestic agreements, there's a presumption against legal intent. In this case, there was no intention to create a legal relationship, and the agreement was a domestic arrangement.” [10]
  1. The Intent of Legal Obligations- “One of the essential elements of a valid offer is that both parties subject to a contract must be clear with the intent to create a legal relationship. This also means that agreements that are not enforceable by the law like agreements between relatives are enforceable in the court of law.”[11]
Relevant case law on this essential is as follows: Merritt v. Merritt (1970)-
  • Facts: Mr and Mrs Merritt, who were separated, made an agreement in writing regarding the transfer of the family home to Mrs Merritt.
  • Legal Issue: Was there an intention to create legal obligations in their written agreement, despite being separated?
  • Judgement: The court held that in this case, there was an intention to create legal relations. The written agreement, made during the separation, indicated a clear intention to be legally bound, and Mrs. Merritt was entitled to enforce the agreement.”[12]
  1. Possibility of Performance of Agreement- “An agreement should be possible to perform for example suppose two people decide to undergo an agreement where person A agrees to bring person B’s dead relative back to life, this will not fall under the legal contract act because bringing back the deceased person alive is an impossible task. Thus, the agreement does not stand valid.”[13]
Relevant case law on this essential is as follows: Taylor v. Caldwell (1863)-
  • Facts: Caldwell hired Taylor's hall for musical performances, but the hall was later destroyed by fire before the event.
  • Legal Issue: Was it possible for Taylor to perform the contract when the hall was destroyed through no fault of either party?
  • Judgement: The court held that the contract was frustrated due to the unforeseen event of the hall's destruction. Since performance became impossible, the contract was discharged.” [14]
  1. Legal Formalities- “In a contractual agreement, if there is any uncertainty and both parties are not capable of finding the right path, then it is deemed void. As a part of the essentials of a valid consideration, the terms and conditions of the contract should be concrete”[15]. Any contract, that is uncertain in any sense, can be termed void. The terms mentioned in the agreement should be capable of performing specific actions or obligations.
Relevant case law on this essential is as follows: Smith v. Hughes (1871)-
  • Facts: Smith sold oats to Hughes, who inspected them without noticing they were of a lower quality. Smith argued that the contract was void because Hughes did not inspect the oats as required by the Sale of Goods Act.
  • Legal Issue: Did the failure to inspect the goods in the prescribed manner render the contract void?
  • Judgement: The court held that the contract was valid. The legal formality of inspection was not essential to the agreement, and Hughes' actions indicated acceptance, making the contract binding”[16].
  1. Consideration- “Consideration means the moral value given for the performance of the promise. It should not be only limited to money, but there should be some value to what has been agreed upon”[17]. One of the essentials of valid consideration is that it should not be adequate, but should carry some value in the eyes of law.
Relevant case law on this essential is as follows: Ward v. Byham (1956)-
  • Facts: " Byham promised to send her child regularly to live with Mr. Ward, who was the child's father. In return, Mr. Ward promised to take good care of the child and provide a suitable home.
  • Legal Issue: Was there valid consideration for Ms. Byham's promise to send the child to live with Mr. Ward?
  • Judgement: The court held that there was valid consideration. The mother derived a benefit from the promise that the child would be well cared for, and the father derived a benefit from having the child live with him. The mutual promises constituted valid consideration.”[18]
Henceforth, these are the required essentials and relevant case laws that might have helped you understand the intricacies of contract law in much more detail. Moving on, we must understand the nitty-gritty of contract drafting and how we can draft an excellent contract by keeping in mind the universal best practices.

Essential elements and drafting of a contractual agreement -

Sometimes it looks like the whole world revolves around contracts. They are a crucial part of how all companies interact and how individuals engage in business relations yet drafting can be a daunting task if not done efficiently. In this segment, I have tried covering minor though important things to consider while drafting a contract so that it is holistic, makes sense, and is even legally enforceable. You might be wondering if anyone can write a contract. Honestly speaking, there are no specific requirements for you to be a legal practitioner to draft a contract, so you can stop losing sleep now. As we discussed earlier, a contract is simply a written agreement between two or more people. So, why do people and firms invest so much in consulting counsels for help in drafting contracts? This is because some legal experience and consultancy are beneficial if you want to create a contract that is future-proofed and sealed. Therefore, it is advisable for firms and individuals to seek legal help when drafting a contractual agreement.

Non-negotiable elements of a contract -

  1. Agreement - “Contracts are not merely written for the sake of it; they all carry significance. This is why the most crucial element of any contract is the agreement.”[19] Essentially, the agreement is what defines the contract. For instance, in a contract between a seller and a manufacturer, there would be an agreement stating that the seller has committed to purchasing goods from the manufacturer/seller.
It's important to emphasize that the placement of this information doesn't affect its importance; what matters is its inclusion in the document. Additionally, it's crucial to express the contractual agreement as clearly as possible to prevent any potential legal complications or ambiguity in interpretation.
  1. The parties- Including the parties in the agreement is essential for a legally enforceable contract. In the case of an agreement between a buyer and a seller, it is crucial to include the names and addresses of the respective parties. This inclusion facilitates the identification of the contracting parties and enables one party to contact the other in case of any future legal issues.
  2. Consideration- Sometimes people mistake consideration to be something of monetary value and proportionate in nature however section 2(d) of the ICA 1872 defines consideration as “where the Promisor or anyone else has done or promised not to do or do anything. Such restriction or promise is called a consideration.” [20] It is based on the term “quid-pro-quo” which means “something in exchange”.Two essentials are needed to be satisfied for a valid consideration:
  3. “Consideration must move in the direction of the promisor’s desire: In a contract, the promisor promises something to the promisor in exchange for a subsequent act or restraint. As a result, the promisee must only perform his part of the promise at the ‘will’ of the promisor.
  4. Consideration on the promisee’s or anyone else’s behalf: If the counterparty has any objections, or if the promisor has any. It can also be transferred to a non-contracting third party. Under Indian law, the consideration does not have to be given solely by the promisee; it can be given by the promisee or any other person.”[21]
Looking at the definition and its interpretation it's clear that a consideration need not be of some monetary value or proportional to the consideration by the other party rather it should be lawful in the eyes of the law and agreed by both the parties to fall under the category of a valid consideration. “Therefore insertion of consideration into the contract is crucial if you want to make sure that the paying party will be legally bound to make payments.”[22]
  1. Terms and conditions - This is typically the segment that proves most tiresome to draft and read. Nevertheless, it is a pivotal section that makes it clear what the parties are agreeing to. Therefore, the incorporation of this section into our contractual agreement is significant, as it aids in outlining the party's obligations and rights comprehensively.
  2. Acknowledgement of parties' competence to contract - For an agreement to be legally valid, all of the individuals who signed the agreement must have “contractual capacity to enter into contracts”[23]. Contractual capacity is a legal term that refers to the minimum mental capacity which is required to enter into a contractual agreement. In other words, we can say that individuals who lack contractual capacity are presumed to not know what they are doing and they can set aside the contract if required. For your contract to be legally valid your document must include a statement recognizing that each party has the capacity to sign the contract.
  3. Space for date and signature- “A contract without a signature isn’t worth the paper it’s printed on.”[24]  To put it simply a contractual agreement becomes legally enforceable only with the signature of each party involved in the agreement. Hence you shouldn’t forget to include space for every party to sign on the contracting document. “As well as a lot of contracts essentially require to be dated .”[25]  This is important to avoid any issues in the future between the contracting parties.

How to draft a contract between two parties: A step-by-step guide -

Till now you might be clear about what you need to include in a contract, now it is time we shed some light on drafting. Follow the step-by-step guide mentioned below to aid you in drafting a contract with confidence:
  1. Check out the parties - “The parties to a contract are the most important element; without them to enact the terms of the agreement, there’s no point in even writing the contract.” [26]  If you are drafting a contract on behalf of parties you must know the intention of the contracting parties inside out and accordingly draft an agreement keeping their intention in your mind. For example - You can make sure whether they are competent to participate or not such as if they are over 18 (the minimum age for entering into a contract) and not under the influence of alcohol while entering the agreement.
  2. Negotiate and Finalize Terms- Start your contract with clear and direct language. This makes managing the contract down the line easier and simplifies the drafting process. Ensure everyone's on the same page before putting pen to paper. If needed, gather the parties for a face-to-face agreement. Yet, for straightforward contracts,  written intentions from all parties would suffice.
  3. Define the Duration of the Agreement- Imagine I promised to clean your car, and I did just that, spending the entire day to make it shine. Seems fair, right?
But if someone were really into legal battles, they might argue that I never specified when I'd finish washing your car – technically, I could be stuck in your driveway forever. While this may sound far-fetched, it highlights why it's crucial to set a clear endpoint in the contract once you've laid out the terms. Many contracts involve ongoing tasks, yet even these should have a termination clause, providing the same could also be used by parties to end a contract prematurely.
  1. Clearly specify the consequences - “Contracts are an expression of good faith – however, not everything goes exactly to plan.”[27] After you have completed drafting and defining the duration of your contractual agreement your next task should involve making the parties clear about the consequences they might face in case of a breach.
“The specifics will vary based on the type of contract you're creating. For a rental agreement, for example, you'll likely need to outline what happens if a tenant doesn't pay rent on time or causes damage to the property.”[28]  Without these sorts of mentions the value of the contractual agreement becomes futile.
  1. Establish the framework for Dispute Resolution - It is inevitable that despite the inclusion of penalty clauses in the commercial agreement parties will disagree on failures to enact the obligations of the contractual agreement.
It is advised by legal counsels that apart from the inclusion of civil litigation, parties should also include methods of ADR(Alternative dispute resolutions) such as mediation, arbitration, etc as a mode for speedy and inexpensive dispute resolution. Putting this into our agreement will ensure that every dispute will be treated fairly and it will be easy to resolve.
  1. Respecting confidentiality of parties - At times, the contract contents must be kept confidential, as they may involve sensitive personal data or company secrets. “If this is the case you should insert a confidentiality clause into the agreement .”[29] Henceforth breaching of the confidentiality clause is in itself equivalent to a breach of contract.
  2. Keeping check of the contract’s legality- To be sure that your contract is legally valid and enforceable it is crucial that it should be within the local laws or regulations and if there seems to be a breach of the same there should be an according reformation of the same.
  3. Open it up for negotiation - Finally after taking into consideration all the above-stated steps in mind the contracting parties might ask you to reframe or scrap something completely from the agreement hence your contract should be open to negotiations before it is signed by both the parties. This will ensure that everyone is happy and content when it ultimately comes to signing the final agreement.

Some final Tips to make your contract make sense:

  1. Keep it simple - “A legal agreement is not the place to pull out your best Shakespeare impression”[30] Therefore it is advisable to keep it simple and use plain English throughout avoiding unnecessary use of complex vocabulary, legalese, or jargon as that will only make things difficult for you.
  2. Use modals wisely - “Verbs like ‘may’, ‘shall’, and ‘will’ need to be handled carefully when you’re drafting a contract.”[31]As they all might carry different meanings being a little more vigilant with them will ensure a hassle-free contractual agreement.
  3. Avoid using Synonyms- “Usually, we try to mix up our vocabulary when writing; however, it’s better to stick to the same old words and phrases throughout a contract.”[32] This ensures that the meaning of your contractual terms is clear, you should try defining them at the start of the contract.
  4. Divide and triumph - While drafting contracts your main aim should be ease and clarity of contractual terms. “Dividing the contract into multiple sections and subsections will help you simplify the agreement.”[33] It is advisable to avoid large blocks of text and use bullet points or sub-points whenever possible.

CONCLUSION & COMMENTS:

Contracts are essential to business relations and personal dealings. As highlighted throughout this article a valid enforceable contract requires specific essential elements like competent parties, contractual relations, consideration, concrete and clear terms and conditions, and the presence of signature and dates on the contractual document to make it legally valid. While contract drafting might seem, a complex task following certain basic guidelines on the same including clearly defined duties, rights, dispute resolution processes, and respecting party confidentiality can create balanced, legally binding agreements between parties. Ensuring agreements comply with policy regulations and allowing room for negotiations can also lead to the formation of mutually beneficial contracts. To conclude, I would say contracts, in itself, is a huge subject. A single article on the web can't provide a comprehensive understanding of such a vast topic. Henceforth, I recommend you to surf the web and explore additional articles/blogs on the subject to gain a clearer and more comprehensive understanding. My piece is just a bucket in the vast ocean, so get going before settling on this one.

REFERENCES :

  • Online Articles / Sources Referred –
  1. Ownr Blog (2023) "How to Build a Contract for Your Small Business."
  2. Indian Legal Solution (2020) "Definition and types of contracts."
  3. Legal Katta (2021) "'All Contracts Are Agreements but All Agreements Are Not Contracts.'"
  4. Legal Service India (Date not provided) "Essentials of a valid contract under the Indian Contract Act, 1872: A Comprehensive Analysis."
  5. Laws Study (2021) "Define Consideration and its Essential Elements ICA 1872."
  6. Svitlana Omelia Blog (2023) "A comprehensive guide on how to draft a contract."
  • Cases Referred-
  1. Great Britain v Boots Cash Chemists (1953) 1 QB 401
  2. Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company ([1893] 1 QB 256), (legalservicesindia.com)
  3. Balfour v Balfour [1919] 2 KB 571
  4. Merritt v Merritt [1970] 2 All ER 760
  5. Taylor v Caldwell (1863) 3 B & S 826, LawLex.Org
  6. Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597
  7. Ward v Byham [1956] 1 WLR 496
  • Statutes Referred-
  1. Section 2(h) in The Indian Contract Act, 1872
  1. Section 2(d) in The Indian Contract Act, 1872
[1]  Team, O. (2023) How to Build a Contract for Your Small Business, Ownr Blog. Available at: https://www.ownr.co/blog/how-to-build-a-contract/ (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [2]  Solution, I.L. (2020) ‘Definition and types of contract’, Indian Legal Solution, 5 July. Available at: https://indianlegalsolution.com/definition-and-types-of-contract/ (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [3] Section 2(h) in The Indian Contract Act, 1872 (no date). Available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1890444/ (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [4] All Contracts Are Agreements But All Agreements Are Not Contracts’ (2021), 7 March. Available at: https://legalkatta.in/all-contracts-are-agreements-but-all-agreements-are-not-contracts/ (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [5]  Essentials of a valid contract under the Indian Contract Act,1872: A Comprehensive Analysis-https://legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-5512-essentials-of-a-valid-contract-under-the-indian-contract-act-1872-a-comprehensive-analysis.html (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [6]  Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots Chemists – Case Summary (2020) IPSA LOQUITUR. Available at: https://ipsaloquitur.com/contract-law/cases/pharmaceutical-society-great-britain-v-boots-cash-chemists/ (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [7]Carlill v/s Carbolic Smoke Ball Company (no date). Available at: https://legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-6570-carlill-v-s-carbolic-smoke-ball-company.html (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [8]  Felthouse v Bindley – Case Summary (2020) IPSA LOQUITUR. Available at: https://ipsaloquitur.com/contract-law/cases/felthouse-v-bindley/ (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [9]   Essentials of a valid contract under the Indian Contract Act,1872: A Comprehensive Analysis-https://legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-5512-essentials-of-a-valid-contract-under-the-indian-contract-act-1872-a-comprehensive-analysis.html (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [10]  Balfour v Balfour – Case Summary (2020) IPSA LOQUITUR. Available at: https://ipsaloquitur.com/contract-law/cases/balfour-v-balfour/ (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [11] Essentials of a valid contract under the Indian Contract Act,1872: A Comprehensive Analysis-https://legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-5512-essentials-of-a-valid-contract-under-the-indian-contract-act-1872-a-comprehensive-analysis.html (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [12]  Merritt v Merritt, [1970] 2 All ER 760 | England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division), Judgment, Law, casemine.com (no date) https://www.casemine.com. Available at: https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/5a8ff87960d03e7f57ec1097 (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [13]  Merritt v Merritt, [1970] 2 All ER 760 | England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division), Judgment, Law, casemine.com (no date) https://www.casemine.com. Available at: https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/5a8ff87960d03e7f57ec1097 (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [14]   Jaggi, N. (2020) ‘Case Summary: Taylor v. Caldwell’, LawLex.Org, 15 July. Available at: https://lawlex.org/lex-bulletin/case-summary-taylor-v-caldwell/24748 (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [15]  Essentials of a valid contract under the Indian Contract Act,1872: A Comprehensive Analysis-https://legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-5512-essentials-of-a-valid-contract-under-the-indian-contract-act-1872-a-comprehensive-analysis.html (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [16]  Smith v Hughes – Case Summary (2020) IPSA LOQUITUR. Available at: https://ipsaloquitur.com/contract-law/cases/smith-v-hughes/ (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [17]  Essentials of a valid contract under the Indian Contract Act,1872: A Comprehensive Analysis-https://legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-5512-essentials-of-a-valid-contract-under-the-indian-contract-act-1872-a-comprehensive-analysis.html (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [18] Ward v Byham, [1956] 2 All ER 318 | England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division), Judgment, Law, casemine.com (no date) https://www.casemine.com. Available at: https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/5a8ff87860d03e7f57ec107d (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [19]  svitlanaomelia (2023) A comprehensive guide on how to draft a contract, Blog. Available at: https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/ (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [20] Section 2(d) in The Indian Contract Act, 1872 (no date). Available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/877630/ (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [21] ‘Define Consideration and its Essential Elements ICA 1872 - LAWS STUDY’ (2021), 10 August. Available at: https://lawsstudy.com/define-consideration-and-its-essential-elements-ica-1872/ (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [22]   svitlanaomelia (2023) A comprehensive guide on how to draft a contract, Blog. Available at: https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/ (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [23]   svitlanaomelia (2023) A comprehensive guide on how to draft a contract, Blog. Available at: https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/ (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [24]   svitlanaomelia (2023) A comprehensive guide on how to draft a contract, Blog. Available at: https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/ (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [25] svitlanaomelia (2023) A comprehensive guide on how to draft a contract, Blog. Available at: https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/ (Accessed: 2 March 2024) [26]   svitlanaomelia (2023) A comprehensive guide on how to draft a contract, Blog. Available at: https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/ (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [27]   svitlanaomelia (2023) A comprehensive guide on how to draft a contract, Blog. Available at: https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/ (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [28]   svitlanaomelia (2023) A comprehensive guide on how to draft a contract, Blog. Available at: https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/ (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [29]   svitlanaomelia (2023) A comprehensive guide on how to draft a contract, Blog. Available at: https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/ (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [30]   svitlanaomelia (2023) A comprehensive guide on how to draft a contract, Blog. Available at: https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/ (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [31]   svitlanaomelia (2023) A comprehensive guide on how to draft a contract, Blog. Available at: https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/ (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [32]   svitlanaomelia (2023) A comprehensive guide on how to draft a contract, Blog. Available at: https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/ (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [33]   svitlanaomelia (2023) A comprehensive guide on how to draft a contract, Blog. Available at: https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/ (Accessed: 2 March 2024). **Content:** **Author-Aman Tyagi, University Five Year Law College, University of Rajasthan** ### **INTRODUCTION-** In this comprehensive article, my primary aim is to thoroughly explain the fundamental aspects of a contract, aiming to provide clear and concise definitions accessible to both lay individuals and legal professionals alike. Throughout the discussion, I have precisely outlined the crucial components inherent in contracts, with a dedicated focus on examining pertinent precedents and case laws to enhance understanding. Diving further, we have delved into the foundational element’s integral to the art of drafting, offering insights on streamlining the process by diligently considering essential factors. To conclude, I’ve exactly crafted a detailed, step-by-step guide to empower you in the creation of excellent contracts. Additionally, I’ve included a collection of supplementary tips, ideally placed to be helpful factors during the detailed task of creating contracts. ### **What is a contract?** Let’s start with defining contract in the most laymen’s terms *“A contract is a legally binding agreement at least between two parties to create mutual obligations that businesses and individuals use to protect their business or personal interests. They also aim to outline the engagement for a transaction. They can also dictate legal consequences if a party tries to break the agreement.”[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)* Contracts can be written or verbal. Generally, most businesses favor written contracts as they can easily be referred to in future matters. Written contracts are also less ambiguous, hence eliminating any future enforcement problems. After defining it in simple terms let’s also define it in the Lawmen language don’t worry this won’t mean that it can’t be understood in this language but it requires you to use more of your legal aptitude. To define it legally Sir William Anson defines a contract as “*a legally enforceable agreement between two persons wherein two or more persons get a legal right and some have to fulfil corresponding legal responsibilities*”[\[2\]](#_ftn2). To put it simply a contract is an agreement that interprets the obligations of various parties involved in it. Henceforth a contract is an agreement between two or more competent parties based on mutual promises, to do or refrain from doing a particular that is neither illegal nor impossible. Taking into consideration the perspective of India let’s also define contracts according to Indian Contracts Act 1872, ICA 1872 Section 2(h) defines a contract as an “agreement enforceable by law”[\[3\]](#_ftn3). This denotes that there are two main ingredients of a contract: an agreement and enforceability. Only a valid contract is enforceable by law and a contract must fulfil certain conditions to be valid. After reading the above-discussed definitions a doubt might have arisen in your mind whether contracts and agreements are the same. To clear this let’s, distinguish between the two and take into consideration relevant examples to help us understand this fully. ### **Contracts and Agreements distinguished?** The terms contracts and agreements are often used interchangeably but in the legal landscape differences though minor are important to be taken into consideration to avoid any future legal hassle. They can be distinguished on the following grounds:- **Features** **Agreement** **Contract** **Definition** An arrangement (usually informal and unwritten) between two or more parties that is not enforceable by law.A formal arrangement between two or more parties(usually written) that, by its terms and elements, is enforceable by law.**Does it need to be in writing?**An agreement is not required to be written. A contract also doesn’t necessarily require to be written however in some cases it’s a legal necessity for them to be written for enforceability. These are often referred to as “statute of frauds” requirements. Examples of contracts that typically fall under the statute of fraud and must be in writing include: Contracts involving the sale or transfer of real estate, Contracts that cannot be performed within one year from the date of formation, Contracts to pay the debt of another person, etc. **Consideration requirements**An agreement doesn’t require consideration.A contract requires the presence of consideration in a contractual agreement. **Relevant examples**You agree with your friend to buy their car for Rs 5,00,000. This is a mutual understanding or arrangement between you and your friend, but it might not be legally binding if it lacks essential elements or if it’s merely a casual conversation.You and your friend draft a written agreement specifying the terms of the car sale, including the price, payment method, and any conditions. Both parties sign the document. Now, it has become a legally binding contract.Hence these were the differences that might have aided you in understanding though minor but important differences between contracts and agreements. Concluding our discussion about the differences between the two, it’s a legally accepted principle that “*While every contract is an agreement, every agreement is not a contract.*”[\[4\]](#_ftn4) This statement has been propagated by Anson. Moving forward in the discussion of contracts we must know the essentials of contracts and also its essential requirements to make a legally comprehensive enforceable contract. ### **Essentials of Contracts –** To make an agreement a validly enforceable contract in law certain essentials are needed to be satisfied. Henceforth let’s delve into the explanation of the required essentials for a contract along with some decided case laws to understand them holistically. The essentials of a contractual agreement(as per ICA 1872) are as follows: – 1. **Offer and Acceptance** – *“There must be a clear offer by one party and a corresponding acceptance by the other party. Generally, the written contract only unfolds when the other party accepts the offer by one party and is definite in all senses. The offer or agreement must be clear and complete in all senses. Both parties should communicate to ensure there is no lapse in the contract act. Both the offer and acceptance must be “consensus ad idem”, meaning( meeting of the minds), to put it simply both parties must comply with the same thing.” [**\[5\]**](#_ftn5)* Mere silence is not constituted as acceptance of to offer. An offeree is not generally obligated to respond to an offer and their silence does not imply agreement. One more important thing to consider is that an invitation to offer is not an offer in itself. Taking an example of decided case law in “*Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots Cash Chemists (1953): Goods displayed on shelves in a store are an invitation to customers to make an offer to purchase.”[**\[6\]**](#_ftn6)* Some Relevant case laws on offer and acceptance – ***Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Company (1893)-*** - ***Facts:*** *The Carbolic Smoke Ball Company advertised a product that they claimed could prevent influenza. They offered a reward to anyone who used the smoke ball according to the instructions and still got the flu.* - ***Legal Issue:*** *Was the advertisement a valid offer, and was Mrs Carlill entitled to the reward for using the product as directed and still contracting influenza?* - ***Judgement:*** *The court held that the advertisement was an offer, and Mrs. Carlill was entitled to the reward as she had accepted the offer by using the product as instructed and suffering from influenza.”[**\[7\]**](#_ftn7)* ***Felthouse v Bindley (1862)-*** - ***Facts:*** *Felthouse wanted to purchase a horse from his nephew. He wrote to his nephew, stating, “If I hear no more about him, I consider the horse mine at £30.” The nephew intended to sell the horse but failed to respond to the letter.* - ***Legal Issue:*** *Did the nephew’s silence amount to acceptance of the offer, and was a contract formed?* - ***Judgement:*** *The court held that there was no contract. Silence does not constitute acceptance unless there is a prior agreement that silence would amount to acceptance. In this case, the nephew’s failure to respond meant that there was no acceptance, and therefore, no contract was formed.” [**\[8\]**](#_ftn8)* 2. **Intention to Create a Legal Relationship-** *“To bind, both parties should have a specific intention that can create a legal relationship, resulting in an agreement. Agreements of a social or household nature are not contracts because parties do not intend to build legal relationships.” [**\[9\]**](#_ftn9)* Relevant case law on this essential is as follows: ***Balfour v. Balfour (1919)-*** - ***Facts:*** *Mr Balfour promised to pay his wife a monthly allowance while he was working abroad, but the relationship later turned sour, and the payments ceased.* - ***Legal Issue:*** *Did the parties intend for their agreement to have legal consequences, or was it a domestic arrangement without legal intent?* - ***Judgement:*** *The court held that in domestic agreements, there’s a presumption against legal intent. In this case, there was no intention to create a legal relationship, and the agreement was a domestic arrangement.” [**\[10\]**](#_ftn10)* 3. **The Intent of Legal Obligations-** *“One of the essential elements of a valid offer is that both parties subject to a contract must be clear with the intent to create a legal relationship. This also means that agreements that are not enforceable by the law like agreements between relatives are enforceable in the court of law.”[**\[11\]**](#_ftn11)* Relevant case law on this essential is as follows: ***Merritt v. Merritt (1970)-*** - ***Facts:*** *Mr and Mrs Merritt, who were separated, made an agreement in writing regarding the transfer of the family home to Mrs Merritt.* - ***Legal Issue:*** *Was there an intention to create legal obligations in their written agreement, despite being separated?* - ***Judgement:*** *The court held that in this case, there was an intention to create legal relations. The written agreement, made during the separation, indicated a clear intention to be legally bound, and Mrs. Merritt was entitled to enforce the agreement.”[**\[12\]**](#_ftn12)* 4. **Possibility of Performance of Agreement-** “*An agreement should be possible to perform for example suppose two people decide to undergo an agreement where person A agrees to bring person B’s dead relative back to life, this will not fall under the legal contract act because bringing back the deceased person alive is an impossible task. Thus, the agreement does not stand valid.”[**\[13\]**](#_ftn13)* Relevant case law on this essential is as follows: ***Taylor v. Caldwell (1863)-*** - ***Facts:*** *Caldwell hired Taylor’s hall for musical performances, but the hall was later destroyed by fire before the event.* - ***Legal Issue:*** *Was it possible for Taylor to perform the contract when the hall was destroyed through no fault of either party?* - ***Judgement:*** *The court held that the contract was frustrated due to the unforeseen event of the hall’s destruction. Since performance became impossible, the contract was discharged.” [**\[14\]**](#_ftn14)* 5. **Legal Formalities-** “*In a contractual agreement, if there is any uncertainty and both parties are not capable of finding the right path, then it is deemed void. As a part of the essentials of a valid consideration, the terms and conditions of the contract should be concrete”[**\[15\]**](#_ftn15).* Any contract, that is uncertain in any sense, can be termed void. The terms mentioned in the agreement should be capable of performing specific actions or obligations. Relevant case law on this essential is as follows: ***Smith v. Hughes (1871)-*** - ***Facts:*** *Smith sold oats to Hughes, who inspected them without noticing they were of a lower quality. Smith argued that the contract was void because Hughes did not inspect the oats as required by the Sale of Goods Act.* - ***Legal Issue:*** *Did the failure to inspect the goods in the prescribed manner render the contract void?* - ***Judgement:*** *The court held that the contract was valid. The legal formality of inspection was not essential to the agreement, and Hughes’ actions indicated acceptance, making the contract binding”[**\[16\]**](#_ftn16).* 6. **Consideration-** “*Consideration means the moral value given for the performance of the promise. It should not be only limited to money, but there should be some value to what has been agreed upon”[**\[17\]**](#_ftn17).* One of the essentials of valid consideration is that it should not be adequate, but should carry some value in the eyes of law. Relevant case law on this essential is as follows: ***Ward v. Byham (1956)-*** - ***Facts: “*** *Byham promised to send her child regularly to live with Mr. Ward, who was the child’s father. In return, Mr. Ward promised to take good care of the child and provide a suitable home.* - ***Legal Issue:*** *Was there valid consideration for Ms. Byham’s promise to send the child to live with Mr. Ward?* - ***Judgement:*** *The court held that there was valid consideration. The mother derived a benefit from the promise that the child would be well cared for, and the father derived a benefit from having the child live with him. The mutual promises constituted valid consideration.”[**\[18\]**](#_ftn18)* Henceforth, these are the required essentials and relevant case laws that might have helped you understand the intricacies of contract law in much more detail. Moving on, we must understand the nitty-gritty of contract drafting and how we can draft an excellent contract by keeping in mind the universal best practices. ### **Essential elements and drafting of a contractual agreement –** Sometimes it looks like the whole world revolves around contracts. They are a crucial part of how all companies interact and how individuals engage in business relations yet drafting can be a daunting task if not done efficiently. In this segment, I have tried covering minor though important things to consider while drafting a contract so that it is holistic, makes sense, and is even legally enforceable. You might be wondering if anyone can write a contract. Honestly speaking, there are no specific requirements for you to be a legal practitioner to draft a contract, so you can stop losing sleep now. As we discussed earlier, a contract is simply a written agreement between two or more people. So, why do people and firms invest so much in consulting counsels for help in drafting contracts? This is because some legal experience and consultancy are beneficial if you want to create a contract that is future-proofed and sealed. Therefore, it is advisable for firms and individuals to seek legal help when drafting a contractual agreement. ### **Non-negotiable elements of a contract –** 1. **Agreement – *“****Contracts are not merely written for the sake of it; they all carry significance. This is why the most crucial element of any contract is the agreement.”[**\[19\]**](#_ftn19)* Essentially, the agreement is what defines the contract. For instance, in a contract between a seller and a manufacturer, there would be an agreement stating that the seller has committed to purchasing goods from the manufacturer/seller. It’s important to emphasize that the placement of this information doesn’t affect its importance; what matters is its inclusion in the document. Additionally, it’s crucial to express the contractual agreement as clearly as possible to prevent any potential legal complications or ambiguity in interpretation. 2. **The parties-** Including the parties in the agreement is essential for a legally enforceable contract. In the case of an agreement between a buyer and a seller, it is crucial to include the names and addresses of the respective parties. This inclusion facilitates the identification of the contracting parties and enables one party to contact the other in case of any future legal issues. 3. **Consideration-** Sometimes people mistake consideration to be something of monetary value and proportionate in nature however section 2(d) of the ICA 1872 defines consideration as *“where the Promisor or anyone else has done or promised not to do or do anything. Such restriction or promise is called a consideration.*” [\[20\]](#_ftn20) It is based on the term “quid-pro-quo” which means “something in exchange”.Two essentials are needed to be satisfied for a valid consideration: 4. ***“Consideration must move in the direction of the promisor’s desire:*** *In a contract, the promisor promises something to the promisor in exchange for a subsequent act or restraint. As a result, the promisee must only perform his part of the promise at the ‘will’ of the promisor.* 5. ***Consideration on the promisee’s or anyone else’s behalf:*** *If the counterparty has any objections, or if the promisor has any. It can also be transferred to a non-contracting third party. Under Indian law, the consideration does not have to be given solely by the promisee; it can be given by the promisee or any other person.”[**\[21\]**](#_ftn21)* Looking at the definition and its interpretation it’s clear that a consideration need not be of some monetary value or proportional to the consideration by the other party rather it should be lawful in the eyes of the law and agreed by both the parties to fall under the category of a valid consideration. “*Therefore insertion of consideration into the contract is crucial if you want to make sure that the paying party will be legally bound to make payments.*”[\[22\]](#_ftn22) 4. **Terms and conditions –** This is typically the segment that proves most tiresome to draft and read. Nevertheless, it is a pivotal section that makes it clear what the parties are agreeing to. Therefore, the incorporation of this section into our contractual agreement is significant, as it aids in outlining the party’s obligations and rights comprehensively. 5. **Acknowledgement of parties’ competence to contract –** For an agreement to be legally valid, all of the individuals who signed the agreement must have *“contractual capacity to enter into contracts”[**\[23\]**](#_ftn23)*. Contractual capacity is a legal term that refers to the minimum mental capacity which is required to enter into a contractual agreement. In other words, we can say that individuals who lack contractual capacity are presumed to not know what they are doing and they can set aside the contract if required. For your contract to be legally valid your document must include a statement recognizing that each party has the capacity to sign the contract. 6. **Space for date and signature-** “*A contract without a signature isn’t worth the paper it’s printed on.”*[\[24\]](#_ftn24) To put it simply a contractual agreement becomes legally enforceable only with the signature of each party involved in the agreement. Hence you shouldn’t forget to include space for every party to sign on the contracting document. “*As well as a lot of contracts essentially require to be dated .*”[\[25\]](#_ftn25) This is important to avoid any issues in the future between the contracting parties. ### **How to draft a contract between two parties: A step-by-step guide –** Till now you might be clear about what you need to include in a contract, now it is time we shed some light on drafting. Follow the step-by-step guide mentioned below to aid you in drafting a contract with confidence: 1. **Check out the parties –** “*The parties to a contract are the most important element; without them to enact the terms of the agreement, there’s no point in even writing the contract.” [**\[26\]**](#_ftn26)* If you are drafting a contract on behalf of parties you must know the intention of the contracting parties inside out and accordingly draft an agreement keeping their intention in your mind. For example – You can make sure whether they are competent to participate or not such as if they are over 18 (the minimum age for entering into a contract) and not under the influence of alcohol while entering the agreement. 2. **Negotiate and Finalize Terms-** Start your contract with clear and direct language. This makes managing the contract down the line easier and simplifies the drafting process. Ensure everyone’s on the same page before putting pen to paper. If needed, gather the parties for a face-to-face agreement. Yet, for straightforward contracts, written intentions from all parties would suffice. 3. **Define the Duration of the Agreement-** Imagine I promised to clean your car, and I did just that, spending the entire day to make it shine. Seems fair, right? But if someone were really into legal battles, they might argue that I never specified when I’d finish washing your car – technically, I could be stuck in your driveway forever. While this may sound far-fetched, it highlights why it’s crucial to set a clear endpoint in the contract once you’ve laid out the terms. Many contracts involve ongoing tasks, yet even these should have a termination clause, providing the same could also be used by parties to end a contract prematurely. 4. **Clearly specify the consequences –** “*Contracts are an expression of good faith – however, not everything goes exactly to plan.”[**\[27\]**](#_ftn27)* After you have completed drafting and defining the duration of your contractual agreement your next task should involve making the parties clear about the consequences they might face in case of a breach. “*The specifics will vary based on the type of contract you’re creating. For a rental agreement, for example, you’ll likely need to outline what happens if a tenant doesn’t pay rent on time or causes damage to the property.*”[\[28\]](#_ftn28) Without these sorts of mentions the value of the contractual agreement becomes futile. 5. **Establish the framework for Dispute Resolution –** It is inevitable that despite the inclusion of penalty clauses in the commercial agreement parties will disagree on failures to enact the obligations of the contractual agreement. It is advised by legal counsels that apart from the inclusion of civil litigation, parties should also include methods of ADR(Alternative dispute resolutions) such as mediation, arbitration, etc as a mode for speedy and inexpensive dispute resolution. Putting this into our agreement will ensure that every dispute will be treated fairly and it will be easy to resolve. 6. **Respecting confidentiality of parties –** At times, the contract contents must be kept confidential, as they may involve sensitive personal data or company secrets. “*If this is the case you should insert a confidentiality clause into the agreement .”[**\[29\]**](#_ftn29)* Henceforth breaching of the confidentiality clause is in itself equivalent to a breach of contract. 7. **Keeping check of the contract’s legality-** To be sure that your contract is legally valid and enforceable it is crucial that it should be within the local laws or regulations and if there seems to be a breach of the same there should be an according reformation of the same. 8. **Open it up for negotiation –** Finally after taking into consideration all the above-stated steps in mind the contracting parties might ask you to reframe or scrap something completely from the agreement hence your contract should be open to negotiations before it is signed by both the parties. This will ensure that everyone is happy and content when it ultimately comes to signing the final agreement. ### **Some final Tips to make your contract make sense:** 1. **Keep it simple –** *“A legal agreement is not the place to pull out your best Shakespeare impression”[**\[30\]**](#_ftn30)* Therefore it is advisable to keep it simple and use plain English throughout avoiding unnecessary use of complex vocabulary, legalese, or jargon as that will only make things difficult for you. 2. **Use modals wisely –** *“Verbs like ‘may’, ‘shall’, and ‘will’ need to be handled carefully when you’re drafting a contract.”[**\[31\]**](#_ftn31)*As they all might carry different meanings being a little more vigilant with them will ensure a hassle-free contractual agreement. 3. **Avoid using Synonyms-** *“Usually, we try to mix up our vocabulary when writing; however, it’s better to stick to the same old words and phrases throughout a contract.”[**\[32\]**](#_ftn32)* This ensures that the meaning of your contractual terms is clear, you should try defining them at the start of the contract. 4. **Divide and triumph –** While drafting contracts your main aim should be ease and clarity of contractual terms. *“Dividing the contract into multiple sections and subsections will help you simplify the agreement.”[**\[33\]**](#_ftn33)* It is advisable to avoid large blocks of text and use bullet points or sub-points whenever possible. ### **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS:** Contracts are essential to business relations and personal dealings. As highlighted throughout this article a valid enforceable contract requires specific essential elements like competent parties, contractual relations, consideration, concrete and clear terms and conditions, and the presence of signature and dates on the contractual document to make it legally valid. While contract drafting might seem, a complex task following certain basic guidelines on the same including clearly defined duties, rights, dispute resolution processes, and respecting party confidentiality can create balanced, legally binding agreements between parties. Ensuring agreements comply with policy regulations and allowing room for negotiations can also lead to the formation of mutually beneficial contracts. To conclude, I would say contracts, in itself, is a huge subject. A single article on the web can’t provide a comprehensive understanding of such a vast topic. Henceforth, I recommend you to surf the web and explore additional articles/blogs on the subject to gain a clearer and more comprehensive understanding. My piece is just a bucket in the vast ocean, so get going before settling on this one. ### **REFERENCES :** - **Online Articles / Sources Referred –** 1. Ownr Blog (2023) “How to Build a Contract for Your Small Business.” 2. Indian Legal Solution (2020) “Definition and types of contracts.” 3. Legal Katta (2021) “‘All Contracts Are Agreements but All Agreements Are Not Contracts.'” 4. Legal Service India (Date not provided) “Essentials of a valid contract under the Indian Contract Act, 1872: A Comprehensive Analysis.” 5. Laws Study (2021) “Define Consideration and its Essential Elements ICA 1872.” 6. Svitlana Omelia Blog (2023) “A comprehensive guide on how to draft a contract.” - **Cases Referred-** 1. Great Britain v Boots Cash Chemists (1953) 1 QB 401 2. Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company (\[1893\] 1 QB 256), (legalservicesindia.com) 3. Balfour v Balfour \[1919\] 2 KB 571 4. Merritt v Merritt \[1970\] 2 All ER 760 5. Taylor v Caldwell (1863) 3 B & S 826, LawLex.Org 6. Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597 7. Ward v Byham \[1956\] 1 WLR 496 - **Statutes Referred-** 1. Section 2(h) in The Indian Contract Act, 1872 1. Section 2(d) in The Indian Contract Act, 1872 [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Team, O. (2023) *How to Build a Contract for Your Small Business*, *Ownr Blog*. Available at:[ https://www.ownr.co/blog/how-to-build-a-contract/](https://www.ownr.co/blog/how-to-build-a-contract/) (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Solution, I.L. (2020) ‘Definition and types of contract’, *Indian Legal Solution*, 5 July. Available at:[ https://indianlegalsolution.com/definition-and-types-of-contract/](https://indianlegalsolution.com/definition-and-types-of-contract/) (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) *Section 2(h) in The Indian Contract Act, 1872* (no date). Available at:[ https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1890444/](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1890444/) (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) All Contracts Are Agreements But All Agreements Are Not Contracts’ (2021), 7 March. Available at:[ https://legalkatta.in/all-contracts-are-agreements-but-all-agreements-are-not-contracts/](https://legalkatta.in/all-contracts-are-agreements-but-all-agreements-are-not-contracts/) (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) *Essentials of a valid contract under the Indian Contract Act,1872: A Comprehensive Analysis*– (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) *Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots Chemists – Case Summary* (2020) *IPSA LOQUITUR*. Available at:[ https://ipsaloquitur.com/contract-law/cases/pharmaceutical-society-great-britain-v-boots-cash-chemists/](https://ipsaloquitur.com/contract-law/cases/pharmaceutical-society-great-britain-v-boots-cash-chemists/) (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7)*Carlill v/s Carbolic Smoke Ball Company* (no date). Available at:[ https://legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-6570-carlill-v-s-carbolic-smoke-ball-company.html](https://legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-6570-carlill-v-s-carbolic-smoke-ball-company.html) (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) *Felthouse v Bindley – Case Summary* (2020) *IPSA LOQUITUR*. Available at:[ https://ipsaloquitur.com/contract-law/cases/felthouse-v-bindley/](https://ipsaloquitur.com/contract-law/cases/felthouse-v-bindley/) (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) *Essentials of a valid contract under the Indian Contract Act,1872: A Comprehensive Analysis*– (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) *Balfour v Balfour – Case Summary* (2020) *IPSA LOQUITUR*. Available at:[ https://ipsaloquitur.com/contract-law/cases/balfour-v-balfour/](https://ipsaloquitur.com/contract-law/cases/balfour-v-balfour/) (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) *Essentials of a valid contract under the Indian Contract Act,1872: A Comprehensive Analysis*– (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) *Merritt v Merritt, \[1970\] 2 All ER 760 | England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division), Judgment, Law, casemine.com* (no date) *https://www.casemine.com*. Available at:[ https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/5a8ff87960d03e7f57ec1097](https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/5a8ff87960d03e7f57ec1097) (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) *Merritt v Merritt, \[1970\] 2 All ER 760 | England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division), Judgment, Law, casemine.com* (no date) *https://www.casemine.com*. Available at:[ https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/5a8ff87960d03e7f57ec1097](https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/5a8ff87960d03e7f57ec1097) (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Jaggi, N. (2020) ‘Case Summary: Taylor v. Caldwell’, *LawLex.Org*, 15 July. Available at:[ https://lawlex.org/lex-bulletin/case-summary-taylor-v-caldwell/24748](https://lawlex.org/lex-bulletin/case-summary-taylor-v-caldwell/24748) (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) *Essentials of a valid contract under the Indian Contract Act,1872: A Comprehensive Analysis*– (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) *Smith v Hughes – Case Summary* (2020) *IPSA LOQUITUR*. Available at:[ https://ipsaloquitur.com/contract-law/cases/smith-v-hughes/](https://ipsaloquitur.com/contract-law/cases/smith-v-hughes/) (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) *Essentials of a valid contract under the Indian Contract Act,1872: A Comprehensive Analysis*– (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) *Ward v Byham, \[1956\] 2 All ER 318 | England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division), Judgment, Law, casemine.com* (no date) *https://www.casemine.com*. Available at:[ https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/5a8ff87860d03e7f57ec107d](https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/5a8ff87860d03e7f57ec107d) (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) svitlanaomelia (2023) *A comprehensive guide on how to draft a contract*, *Blog*. Available at:[ https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/](https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/) (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) *Section 2(d) in The Indian Contract Act, 1872* (no date). Available at:[ https://indiankanoon.org/doc/877630/](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/877630/) (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) ‘Define Consideration and its Essential Elements ICA 1872 – LAWS STUDY’ (2021), 10 August. Available at:[ https://lawsstudy.com/define-consideration-and-its-essential-elements-ica-1872/](https://lawsstudy.com/define-consideration-and-its-essential-elements-ica-1872/) (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) svitlanaomelia (2023) *A comprehensive guide on how to draft a contract*, *Blog*. Available at:[ https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/](https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/) (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) svitlanaomelia (2023) *A comprehensive guide on how to draft a contract*, *Blog*. Available at:[ https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/](https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/) (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) svitlanaomelia (2023) *A comprehensive guide on how to draft a contract*, *Blog*. Available at:[ https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/](https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/) (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) svitlanaomelia (2023) *A comprehensive guide on how to draft a contract*, *Blog*. Available at:[ https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/](https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/) (Accessed: 2 March 2024) [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) svitlanaomelia (2023) *A comprehensive guide on how to draft a contract*, *Blog*. Available at:[ https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/](https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/) (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) svitlanaomelia (2023) *A comprehensive guide on how to draft a contract*, *Blog*. Available at:[ https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/](https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/) (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[28\]](#_ftnref28) svitlanaomelia (2023) *A comprehensive guide on how to draft a contract*, *Blog*. Available at:[ https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/](https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/) (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[29\]](#_ftnref29) svitlanaomelia (2023) *A comprehensive guide on how to draft a contract*, *Blog*. Available at:[ https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/](https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/) (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[30\]](#_ftnref30) svitlanaomelia (2023) *A comprehensive guide on how to draft a contract*, *Blog*. Available at:[ https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/](https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/) (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[31\]](#_ftnref31) svitlanaomelia (2023) *A comprehensive guide on how to draft a contract*, *Blog*. Available at:[ https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/](https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/) (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[32\]](#_ftnref32) svitlanaomelia (2023) *A comprehensive guide on how to draft a contract*, *Blog*. Available at:[ https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/](https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/) (Accessed: 2 March 2024). [\[33\]](#_ftnref33) svitlanaomelia (2023) *A comprehensive guide on how to draft a contract*, *Blog*. Available at:[ https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/](https://www.pandadoc.com/blog/how-to-draft-a-contract/) (Accessed: 2 March 2024). **Categories:** Articles --- ### [AYODHYA RAM MANDIR VERDICT: CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES & IMPACT ON PEOPLE](https://lawfoyer.in/ayodhya-ram-mandir-verdict-constitutional-principles-impact-on-people/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Khushi, University Institute of Legal Studies, Panjab University

INTRODUCTION

Sites that are sacred have great power.  They hold great symbolic meaning for both outsiders and members of the communities that regard them as sacred. Sometimes they begin to act as communal spaces unless it hold special significance for only one individual, who need not share it with others who have other interests. It might be necessary for members of a single, cohesive religious group to share it with one yet another. Many of the most well-known disputes over holy locations involve locations that are contested by several religious groups; one such example is the ongoing dispute in Israel on the Noble Sanctuary/Temple Mount , sometimes Even nonreligious sharing can also spark controversy; in the UK, for example, there have been disputes regarding Stonehenge’s historical and religious purposes. The article concentrates on the legal ramifications of one very long-running dispute, disagreement on Ayodhya Ram Temple/ Babri Masjid. North Indian town Ayodhya is located in the Uttar Pradesh state’s Faizabad district. Every major religion practiced in India has some link to it. Still, For our purposes, the relationships that Hindus and Muslims have with the location.

Various beliefs related to structure

Ayodhya was a Saivic centre for Hindus for many centuries, and in the seventeenth  Century developed became a major Vaishnavite hub in the century. Specifically, Ayodhya is viewed by Hindus are the people as birth place of Hindu God Rama. Similar to the Hindu accounts of belief , the Islamic account of Ayodhya’s history emphasizes how old the relationship between religion and the location is, dating back much longer than any conventional history could. Muslims contend that they have been connected to Ayodhya from Pre-Islamic era, when Noah and Seth, one of Adam and Eve’s children, were buried at Ayodhya , a  sizable number of religious tourists are still drawn to both grave sites. Ayodhya’s monarch was vanquished in combat by the first Mughal Emperor, and in 1528, his administrator erected a mosque in the city. Ayodhya’s numerous Muslim holy sites make it known as a “Khurd Mecca,” or little Mecca. The pre-1528 history of the site,  differs considerably between the two communities. The Hindu community asserts that  for the purpose of constructing a masjid first Mughal Emperor demolished an ancient and magnificent Ram temple and on the remains of temple, mosque was built . Whereas Muslims assert that it was vacant land and nothing was demolished for any such construction. Keywords : Ayodhya Ram Lalla Virajman, Babri Masjid, Religion, Status quo , secularism

Legal Analysis of the issue

The groundwork for the settlement of these and other communal disputes by legal means was laid with the start of the British Crown’s direct administration over the region in 1856. A Hindu priest created a chabutra, or elevated platform for idols, in 1857 on a portion of the Babri Masjid property. Local Muslims objected to this, but the disagreement was settled by agreeing to build a wall between the mosque and the  Chabutra, subsequently dubbed the Janmastan Temple. Nonetheless, Muslims protested against the building of a clay chabutra in a petition to the local magistrate on November 30, 1858. In 1860, the Babri Masjid was formally recognized as a Muslim place of worship & decision to let the Janmastan priest to build a temple above the Chabutra were turned down in 1883–1885.21 The matter came before the District Court in 1886. There were three reasons why the judge rejected the petition. First of all, It is regrettable that a masjid was constructed on land that Hindus specifically hold sacred, but because the incident happened 356 years ago, there is no way to address the issue. Second, any alteration can have the opposite effect of what is intended and destabilize the system. Thirdly, the Hindu priest’s assertion that he was the landowner was unsupported by any documentation. The Judicial Commissioner of Avadh upheld the District Court’s decision, stating in his ruling dated November 1, 1886, that the plaintiff’s claim was quickly dismissed by the executive and Civil Courts. The appeal was dismissed,the parties were asked to maintain status quo. An internal Muslim dispute in 1943 -45 was also promptly resolved, with a legislative inquiry concluding that a Sunni Muslim founded the Babri  Masjid, later observation citing that such site was being used by both Shias & Sunnis,  still being led by Sunni Waqf board. The controversy changed course in  Dec, 1949.As claimed by Muslims ,a group of Sadhus  lightened sacred flames around graveyard of mosque to support their claims Later, idols believed to have been placed there miraculously by Hindus—Ram, Lakshmana, and Sita—were found inside the mosque. Gould stated it as a cause of sensation between both communities. The local authorities ordered the Babri Masjid gates to be locked and forbade both communities from using it because they believed that the dispute would likely cause a breach of the peace, since the argument increased tensions in the community. An appointed receiver made arrangements for protection of contested property and assumed control of it on January 5, 1950. Many lawsuits and countersuits ensued, which were eventually combined into a one lawsuit in 1964. The primary lawsuit was filed in 1961 by The Sunni Central Board of Waqf, UP, seeking the declaration and regaining of ownership of the mosque and cemetery following removal of idols. Death of receiver in 1970 created a fresh dispute that could only come to an end in 1987. A Hindu nationalist group called Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) started a campaign in 1984 to “liberate” the Ram Janmabhumi and reconstruct the beautiful Ram temple in Ayodhya.  In 1986, a Hindu intervenor who was not involved in any of the primary lawsuits obtained an order that gave him permission to enter the building freely for prayer, something that was prohibited by the interim order of 1950 ,this time Hon’ble Judge K.M. Gupta stated that opening the gates and allowing the idols within to be seen will not, under any circumstances, have an impact on the Muslims or any other members of the other group. The tension between both the groups accelerated when the UP State government acquired 2.77 acres of disputed land on 7 October 1991. The government argued that this was to promote tourism and provide amenities for pilgrims. The acquisition was challenged on the basis that the land was Waqf property, and so could not be acquired under the relevant legislation; and that the exercise of power was colourable having malafide intention for Muslims, whereas looking upon merits and facts of the case , an interim order of Hon’ ble High court allowed the acquisition. Since both the parties were in eager urge to actual title holder of disputed Land , and no such decision was being given by Hon’ble courts in order to prevent breach of peace. Dharma Sansad, on 31st of October 1992 announced resumption of Karseva. As a consequence of the then  Prime Minister, PV Narsimha Rao’s continuous appeal to Hon’ble supreme court to intervene , the occasion being of symbolic importance was allowed , along with efforts being ensured to prevent any miscarriage of peace .The  UP State Government assured the Court the protection of mosque & The High Court appointed a District Judge as an observer who would report periodically. Despite all these assurances, the Babri Masjid stood demolished on 6 Dec,1992. Following the demolition, the World Hindu Lawyers Association, a lesser-known forum, petitioned the High Court in a Writ Petition, asking for the deity’s blessing in the temporary Hindu temple. They asked the judge to grant them permission to use their constitutional freedom to practice one’s religion. In the prersuance , Justices H.N. Tilhari and A.N. Gupta ordered in their ruling that the orders imposed under  Section 144 CrPC  be relaxed, and further ordered state officials to permit the petitioners, who are Hindus and followers of Ram, to receive darshan in the temporary Ayodhya temple, decision being challenged in Hon’ble supreme court in order to maintain status quo.Following the ruling of the Supreme Court on October 24, 1994, the High Court’s proceedings were restarted in January 1996 and lasted until the Allahabad High Court rendered a decision in September 2010.Delay has been described as the ‘pathology of the Indian legal system’ and has been a cause of concern. Even though it has always existed in the Indian judicial system, delays typically last between ten and fifteen years. But in the Ayodhya dispute, without even a preliminary trial, the delay was prolonged to 42 years . In such lengthy litigations , interim relief ,has been always crucial that has also spanned generations , whereas on the other hand, each decision of title centred around maintenance of status quo . After a drawn-out trial, three rulings totalling over 8000 pages were issued ,but all the three judges noted undesirability of very long period which could have been resolved before 1986 unlocking order, ultimately marking tripartite sharing between two communities: 2/3 to Hindus and 1/3 to Muslims. Besides , nothing matched then govt’s attempts to extinguish the sacredness of the place were beyond its competence.  The verdict was delayed by the Supreme Court in May 2011 because they deemed it to be “strange and surprising.” It was specifically mentioned that none of the parties had requested the relief that the High Court had given, which was partition. Rather, each party had pursued exclusive rights throughout the whole precinct. The status quo was mandated by the Supreme Court until the matter was decided by the Supreme Court. In February 2018 ,the Supreme Court made it clear it would approach the case as a pure land dispute and began to hear the substance of the case on 23rd March 2018.The writers of the Constitution understood that secular principles were necessary for maintaining social cohesion and religious peace in a multi-ethnic and multireligious nation such as India. The fundamental human rights of all Indian citizens, particularly those of the minority groups, were to be safeguarded on the basis of these principles. Indian secularism attempted to address some of the injustices that existed in Indian culture, Jacobsohn described it as “ameliorative secularism.”

Ayodhya verdict by Hon’ble Supreme court

Legal issues framed

  • First, what precisely are the boundaries of a Hindu idol’s legal personality? Stated differently, how close is the legal personality of a real person to the artificial legal personality that courts have bestowed upon a Hindu idol ( Bhagwan Sri Ram Virajman)
Thus, two tenets used by courts support the validity of the Hindu idol as a legal or “juristic” person. The first is to acknowledge the testator’s religious intent as a legal body that is able to own property in an ideal sense in the absence of  establishment of a trust. In order to guarantee that the pious aim is fulfilled, the second step involves combining the pious purpose itself with the idol that represents it. The Hindu idol is a legitimate person as it is conceived.
  • Whether property of corporeal nature (Asthan Shri Ram Janam Bhumi Ayodhya) be ascribed legal personality?
The Apex court here held that In this instance, all competing ownership rights to the in question land would be annihilated with the recognition of “Asthan Sri Ram Janam Bhumi” as a juristic person. The awarding of “absolute title” as a consequence of the awarding of legal personality on land) would, in actuality, negate the significance of title altogether. Furthermore, opposing claims would be eliminated solely on the grounds of the devotees’ faith and belief rather than as a result of established legal rules. This is not permissible under law. Further , referring to case of  THE MOSQUE, MASJID SHAHID GANJ V. SHIROMANI GURUDWARA PRABANDHAK , Apex court held that conferring legal personality on immovable property leads to consequences that fundamentally have no Nexus to limited purpose for which juristic personality is conferred. The Supreme Court decided that if the adherence to constitutional ideals is to be maintained, the adjudication of civil disputes pertaining to private property must continue to be under the purview of the courts. Hence , decided it couldn’t be attributed a juristic personality.
  • Whether suit filed by Nirmohi Akhara was barred by limitation?
Limitation Act of 1908 was in force on the day of Institution of suit , i.e. why Hon’ble High court held in split verdict 2:1 that the suit by Nirmohi Akhara  was barred by limitation, Justice S.U. Khan presenting dissenting opinion.
  • Nature and scope of section 145 ,crpc?
Section 145 is recognised to be a branch of preventive jurisdiction of Magistrate , mere CUSTODIA LEGIS , as it is only invoked if Magistrate satisfies that issue is such that has potential to likely cause breach of peace. The section donot purports to decide party’s title or possession of land .Actual substantive right to decide such title or possession vests with civil courts in civil proceedings. It also constitutes a reason why Nirmohi Akhara cannot take plea that since no order was passed under section 145, crpc i.e. why no limitation period commenced.
  • The suit of 1885 and Res judicata barring subsequent suits ?
Held, There is absolutely no merit in the contention that the principles of constructive res judicata will bar the subsequent suits. The parties were distinct. The claim in the earlier suit was distinct. The basis of the claim was indeed not that which forms the subject matter of the subsequent suits.
  • Evidentiary Value of The Reliance On Travelogues, Gazetteers And Books?
Held ,while Gazetteers have been noticed in several decisions of this Court, it is equally important to note that the reliance placed on them is more in the nature of corroborative material. The evidentiary value to be ascribed to their contents necessarily depends upon the context and is subject to a careful evaluation of their contents.
  • Concept of Possession and Adverse Possession?
A person who sets up a plea of adverse possession must establish both possession which is peaceful, open and continuous – possession which meets the requirement of being “nec vi nec claim and nec precario.” To substantiate a plea of adverse possession, the character of the possession must be adequate in continuity and in the public because the possession has to be to the knowledge of the true owner in order for it to be adverse. Held, The evidence in the records indicate that Hindus, post the setting up of the railing have, in any event, been in possession of the outer courtyard. On this basis alone, the plea of adverse possession set up by the plaintiffs in respect of the entirety of the area must fail.
  • Is doctrine of lost grant applicable?
Since a plea of adverse possession is predicated on title vesting in someone other than the purported grantee, it would be interpreted against the application of the doctrine of lost grant . The  Privy Council's and this Court’s rulings acknowledging the doctrine as a rule of evidence demonstrate that the concept needs to be used cautiously. The concept is an evidence-based guideline rather than an independent, substantive basis for the recognition of titles. According to Section 110 of the Evidence Act of 1872, it is the burden of proof to establish ownership when there is a doubt as to whether a person in possession of something is its rightful owner. The theory of lost grant must inevitably follow that it has no applicability in this particular instance in the absence of any pleadings or evidence that may be used to support an assumption that the doctrine is applicable.
  • Analysis on Muslim claim of possession?
The travelogues (chiefly Tieffenthaler and Montgomery Martin) provide a detailed account both of the faith and belief of the Hindus based on the sanctity which they ascribed to the place of birth of Lord Ram and of the actual worship by the Hindus at the Janmasthan; William Finch (1608-11) and Tieffenthaler who visited India between 1743-1785 provided an account of Ayodhya. Conspicuous in both the accounts are references to worship by the Hindus to Lord Ram. The positive account of Hindu worship to Lord Ram is of probative value. There is no evidence to the contrary by the Muslims to indicate that their possession of the disputed structure of the mosque was exclusive and that the offering of namaz was exclusionary of the hindus. FINAL VERDICT On 9th of November 2019, the  final case of M.SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS V. MAHANT SURESH DAS AND ORS. Settled unanimously , pronouncing a judgement of 1045 pages by five judge bench of Hon’ble supreme court led by then ,Chief justice of India , Ranjan Gagoi where The Indian government was given a three-month deadline by the court to establish a board of trustees and establish a trust to construct the Ram Mandir temple. The Indian government will be the owner of the contested land, which will thereafter be given to the Trust upon its establishment. The Court directed that the full 2.77 acres of contested land be set aside for the construction of a temple, and that the Uttar Pradesh Sunni Central Waqf Board be given 5 acres of alternative land to be used for the construction of a mosque at a suitable location in Ayodhya. The division of the contested land by the Allahabad High Court in 2010 was deemed erroneous by the Court. Further, ASI submission that Masjid was built atop the structure that was indigenous and non Islamic was taken as an ordinary opinion owing to dissenting submissions by Muslim claimants . Review petitions Review petitions were filed in reaction to the Ayodhya ruling, which was overturned on December 12, 2019, since the court found no basis on which “to entertain review petitions” even after “carefully going through” the supplied papers that were attached. However, the disagreement was settled through an adjudication process in which a fair legal system was established and all parties were given an equal opportunity to submit their case. This procedure as a whole deserves to be praised as a secularist win. It is never thought that criticism of judgement is unwarranted; rather, it is a fundamental tenet of a robust democracy. The idea of inviolability and inevitability, which must be presented as a secularist advantage to stop violence or strife.

SECULARISM – TOP TIER IN INDIA

The Indian constitution has always been inherently secular, which is why Hon. Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi said on the day of the ruling that "the verdict should not be seen as win or loss for anybody. We have the essential essence of Rashtra Bhakti, whether we are practicing Ram or Rahim bhakti.” Also inaugurating world’s third largest temple  in Asia on 22nd of January,  2024 , at  its  Pran pratistha (consecration ceremony) Prime Minister Narendra Modi remarked  “ Influence of Rama is global and stands tall as unity of India  and shaping new India with social Harmony , economic prosperity and scientific progress.  The event itself grabbed very tightly nerves of unity as  100 dignitaries from 55 nations including Akhbar Taj, Justice Nazeer, user Ahmad Illyasi were invited sending  messages of peace and brotherhood  among  all and reiterating  the concept of VASUDEV KATUMBAKAM. Impact of Ram Mandir has been no less than a Messiah for a region said to steeping in poverty and backwardness.

Impact on INDIAN ECONOMY

Reports of foreign brokerage firm Jefferies underlines that event doesn’t possess only spiritual significance but also substantial economic impact .$10 billion makeover encompassing new airport,  railway station,  road connectivity is anticipated to make multiplier impact. Ayodhya is no less than a catalyst with influx of tourists with projections reacting  over 50 millions annually, transforming it from a quiet town to spirituality destination akin to Mecca and Vatican. Moreover  , Acc.to  SBI research reports, Indian economy is posed to achieve a milestones of $5trillion economy with growths rate surpassing 7%where Uttar Pradesh is expected to command second highest weightage in Indian economy, surpassing Norway in terms of GDP. The temple also posed commendable impact on telecommunication sector. CONCLUSION No doubt ,India strives testimony of providing justice to its citizens at any cost . Any such imuendo that such revival is against secular credentials has  no legs to stand upon, as it is not so distant future when a new mosque would adore the region being largest mosque in Asia and the city Ayodhya being hub of two religious destinations. The city has potential to become symbol of Hindu Muslim amity and showcase SARVA DHARAM SAMBHAVA to entire globe .However , it stands prudent to let local people take the lead how they wish to go about their lives in changed environment. Politicians from outside world are best advised to keep away and not to polarize region with their viscous politics.

REFERENCES

  1. Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred
    • Ayodhya :Prof Peter W Edge & Dr M.C. Rajan.
    • Ayodhya issue : jaffrelot
  1. Cases Referred
    • SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS V. MAHANT SURESH DAS AND ORS,
    • AIRONLINE 2019 SC 1420, 2020 (1) SCC 1, (2019) 15 SCALE 1,
    • The Mosque Masjid Shahid Ganj V. Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak committee , Amritsar,AIR 1940 PC 116
  1. Statutes Referred
    1. Constitution of India
    2. Places of worship Act 1991
    3. Ayodhya Land acquisition act
**Content:** **Author-Khushi, University Institute of Legal Studies, Panjab University** ### **INTRODUCTION** Sites that are sacred have great power. They hold great symbolic meaning for both outsiders and members of the communities that regard them as sacred. Sometimes they begin to act as communal spaces unless it hold special significance for only one individual, who need not share it with others who have other interests. It might be necessary for members of a single, cohesive religious group to share it with one yet another. Many of the most well-known disputes over holy locations involve locations that are contested by several religious groups; one such example is the ongoing dispute in Israel on the Noble Sanctuary/Temple Mount , sometimes Even nonreligious sharing can also spark controversy; in the UK, for example, there have been disputes regarding Stonehenge’s historical and religious purposes. The article concentrates on the legal ramifications of one very long-running dispute, disagreement on Ayodhya Ram Temple/ Babri Masjid. North Indian town Ayodhya is located in the Uttar Pradesh state’s Faizabad district. Every major religion practiced in India has some link to it. Still, For our purposes, the relationships that Hindus and Muslims have with the location. ### ***Various beliefs related to structure*** Ayodhya was a Saivic centre for Hindus for many centuries, and in the seventeenth Century developed became a major Vaishnavite hub in the century. Specifically, Ayodhya is viewed by Hindus are the people as birth place of Hindu God Rama. Similar to the Hindu accounts of belief , the Islamic account of Ayodhya’s history emphasizes how old the relationship between religion and the location is, dating back much longer than any conventional history could. Muslims contend that they have been connected to Ayodhya from Pre-Islamic era, when Noah and Seth, one of Adam and Eve’s children, were buried at Ayodhya , a sizable number of religious tourists are still drawn to both grave sites. Ayodhya’s monarch was vanquished in combat by the first Mughal Emperor, and in 1528, his administrator erected a mosque in the city. Ayodhya’s numerous Muslim holy sites make it known as a “Khurd Mecca,” or little Mecca. The pre-1528 history of the site, differs considerably between the two communities. The Hindu community asserts that for the purpose of constructing a masjid first Mughal Emperor demolished an ancient and magnificent Ram temple and on the remains of temple, mosque was built . Whereas Muslims assert that it was vacant land and nothing was demolished for any such construction. ***Keywords* :** Ayodhya Ram Lalla Virajman, Babri Masjid, Religion, Status quo , secularism ### ***Legal Analysis of the issue*** The groundwork for the settlement of these and other communal disputes by legal means was laid with the start of the British Crown’s direct administration over the region in 1856. A Hindu priest created a chabutra, or elevated platform for idols, in 1857 on a portion of the Babri Masjid property. Local Muslims objected to this, but the disagreement was settled by agreeing to build a wall between the mosque and the Chabutra, subsequently dubbed the Janmastan Temple. Nonetheless, Muslims protested against the building of a clay chabutra in a petition to the local magistrate on November 30, 1858. In 1860, the Babri Masjid was formally recognized as a Muslim place of worship & decision to let the Janmastan priest to build a temple above the Chabutra were turned down in 1883–1885.21 The matter came before the District Court in 1886. There were three reasons why the judge rejected the petition. First of all, It is regrettable that a masjid was constructed on land that Hindus specifically hold sacred, but because the incident happened 356 years ago, there is no way to address the issue. Second, any alteration can have the opposite effect of what is intended and destabilize the system. Thirdly, the Hindu priest’s assertion that he was the landowner was unsupported by any documentation. The Judicial Commissioner of Avadh upheld the District Court’s decision, stating in his ruling dated November 1, 1886, that the plaintiff’s claim was quickly dismissed by the executive and Civil Courts. The appeal was dismissed,the parties were asked to maintain status quo. An internal Muslim dispute in 1943 -45 was also promptly resolved, with a legislative inquiry concluding that a Sunni Muslim founded the Babri Masjid, later observation citing that such site was being used by both Shias & Sunnis, still being led by Sunni Waqf board. The controversy changed course in Dec, 1949.As claimed by Muslims ,a group of Sadhus lightened sacred flames around graveyard of mosque to support their claims Later, idols believed to have been placed there miraculously by Hindus—Ram, Lakshmana, and Sita—were found inside the mosque. Gould stated it as a cause of sensation between both communities. The local authorities ordered the Babri Masjid gates to be locked and forbade both communities from using it because they believed that the dispute would likely cause a breach of the peace, since the argument increased tensions in the community. An appointed receiver made arrangements for protection of contested property and assumed control of it on January 5, 1950. Many lawsuits and countersuits ensued, which were eventually combined into a one lawsuit in 1964. The primary lawsuit was filed in 1961 by The Sunni Central Board of Waqf, UP, seeking the declaration and regaining of ownership of the mosque and cemetery following removal of idols. Death of receiver in 1970 created a fresh dispute that could only come to an end in 1987. A Hindu nationalist group called Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) started a campaign in 1984 to “liberate” the Ram Janmabhumi and reconstruct the beautiful Ram temple in Ayodhya. In 1986, a Hindu intervenor who was not involved in any of the primary lawsuits obtained an order that gave him permission to enter the building freely for prayer, something that was prohibited by the interim order of 1950 ,this time Hon’ble Judge K.M. Gupta stated that opening the gates and allowing the idols within to be seen will not, under any circumstances, have an impact on the Muslims or any other members of the other group. The tension between both the groups accelerated when the UP State government acquired 2.77 acres of disputed land on 7 October 1991. The government argued that this was to promote tourism and provide amenities for pilgrims. The acquisition was challenged on the basis that the land was Waqf property, and so could not be acquired under the relevant legislation; and that the exercise of power was colourable having malafide intention for Muslims, whereas looking upon merits and facts of the case , an interim order of Hon’ ble High court allowed the acquisition. Since both the parties were in eager urge to actual title holder of disputed Land , and no such decision was being given by Hon’ble courts in order to prevent breach of peace. Dharma Sansad, on 31st of October 1992 announced resumption of Karseva. As a consequence of the then Prime Minister, PV Narsimha Rao’s continuous appeal to Hon’ble supreme court to intervene , the occasion being of symbolic importance was allowed , along with efforts being ensured to prevent any miscarriage of peace .The UP State Government assured the Court the protection of mosque & The High Court appointed a District Judge as an observer who would report periodically. Despite all these assurances, the Babri Masjid stood demolished on 6 Dec,1992. Following the demolition, the World Hindu Lawyers Association, a lesser-known forum, petitioned the High Court in a Writ Petition, asking for the deity’s blessing in the temporary Hindu temple. They asked the judge to grant them permission to use their constitutional freedom to practice one’s religion. In the prersuance , Justices H.N. Tilhari and A.N. Gupta ordered in their ruling that the orders imposed under Section 144 CrPC be relaxed, and further ordered state officials to permit the petitioners, who are Hindus and followers of Ram, to receive darshan in the temporary Ayodhya temple, decision being challenged in Hon’ble supreme court in order to maintain status quo.Following the ruling of the Supreme Court on October 24, 1994, the High Court’s proceedings were restarted in January 1996 and lasted until the Allahabad High Court rendered a decision in September 2010.Delay has been described as the ‘pathology of the Indian legal system’ and has been a cause of concern. Even though it has always existed in the Indian judicial system, delays typically last between ten and fifteen years. But in the Ayodhya dispute, without even a preliminary trial, the delay was prolonged to 42 years . In such lengthy litigations , interim relief ,has been always crucial that has also spanned generations , whereas on the other hand, each decision of title centred around maintenance of status quo . After a drawn-out trial, three rulings totalling over 8000 pages were issued ,but all the three judges noted undesirability of very long period which could have been resolved before 1986 unlocking order, ultimately marking tripartite sharing between two communities: 2/3 to Hindus and 1/3 to Muslims. Besides , nothing matched then govt’s attempts to extinguish the sacredness of the place were beyond its competence. The verdict was delayed by the Supreme Court in May 2011 because they deemed it to be “strange and surprising.” It was specifically mentioned that none of the parties had requested the relief that the High Court had given, which was partition. Rather, each party had pursued exclusive rights throughout the whole precinct. The status quo was mandated by the Supreme Court until the matter was decided by the Supreme Court. In February 2018 ,the Supreme Court made it clear it would approach the case as a pure land dispute and began to hear the substance of the case on 23rd March 2018.The writers of the Constitution understood that secular principles were necessary for maintaining social cohesion and religious peace in a multi-ethnic and multireligious nation such as India. The fundamental human rights of all Indian citizens, particularly those of the minority groups, were to be safeguarded on the basis of these principles. Indian secularism attempted to address some of the injustices that existed in Indian culture, Jacobsohn described it as “ameliorative secularism.” ### ***Ayodhya verdict by Hon’ble Supreme court*** #### ***Legal issues framed*** - First, what precisely are the boundaries of a Hindu idol’s legal personality? Stated differently, how close is the legal personality of a real person to the artificial legal personality that courts have bestowed upon a Hindu idol ( Bhagwan Sri Ram Virajman) Thus, two tenets used by courts support the validity of the Hindu idol as a legal or “juristic” person. The first is to acknowledge the testator’s religious intent as a legal body that is able to own property in an ideal sense in the absence of establishment of a trust. In order to guarantee that the pious aim is fulfilled, the second step involves combining the pious purpose itself with the idol that represents it. The Hindu idol is a legitimate person as it is conceived. - **Whether property of corporeal nature (Asthan Shri Ram Janam Bhumi Ayodhya) be ascribed legal personality?** The Apex court here held that In this instance, all competing ownership rights to the in question land would be annihilated with the recognition of “Asthan Sri Ram Janam Bhumi” as a juristic person. The awarding of “absolute title” as a consequence of the awarding of legal personality on land) would, in actuality, negate the significance of title altogether. Furthermore, opposing claims would be eliminated solely on the grounds of the devotees’ faith and belief rather than as a result of established legal rules. This is not permissible under law. Further , referring to case of THE MOSQUE, MASJID SHAHID GANJ V. SHIROMANI GURUDWARA PRABANDHAK , Apex court held that conferring legal personality on immovable property leads to consequences that fundamentally have no Nexus to limited purpose for which juristic personality is conferred. The Supreme Court decided that if the adherence to constitutional ideals is to be maintained, the adjudication of civil disputes pertaining to private property must continue to be under the purview of the courts. Hence , decided it couldn’t be attributed a juristic personality. - **Whether suit filed by Nirmohi Akhara was barred by limitation?** Limitation Act of 1908 was in force on the day of Institution of suit , i.e. why Hon’ble High court held in split verdict 2:1 that the suit by Nirmohi Akhara was barred by limitation, Justice S.U. Khan presenting dissenting opinion. - **Nature and scope of section 145 ,crpc?** Section 145 is recognised to be a branch of preventive jurisdiction of Magistrate , mere CUSTODIA LEGIS , as it is only invoked if Magistrate satisfies that issue is such that has potential to likely cause breach of peace. The section donot purports to decide party’s title or possession of land .Actual substantive right to decide such title or possession vests with civil courts in civil proceedings. It also constitutes a reason why Nirmohi Akhara cannot take plea that since no order was passed under section 145, crpc i.e. why no limitation period commenced. - **The suit of 1885 and Res judicata barring subsequent suits ?** Held, There is absolutely no merit in the contention that the principles of constructive res judicata will bar the subsequent suits. The parties were distinct. The claim in the earlier suit was distinct. The basis of the claim was indeed not that which forms the subject matter of the subsequent suits. - **Evidentiary Value of The Reliance On Travelogues, Gazetteers And Books?** Held ,while Gazetteers have been noticed in several decisions of this Court, it is equally important to note that the reliance placed on them is more in the nature of corroborative material. The evidentiary value to be ascribed to their contents necessarily depends upon the context and is subject to a careful evaluation of their contents. - **Concept of Possession and Adverse Possession?** A person who sets up a plea of adverse possession must establish both possession which is peaceful, open and continuous – possession which meets the requirement of being “nec vi nec claim and nec precario.” To substantiate a plea of adverse possession, the character of the possession must be adequate in continuity and in the public because the possession has to be to the knowledge of the true owner in order for it to be adverse. Held, The evidence in the records indicate that Hindus, post the setting up of the railing have, in any event, been in possession of the outer courtyard. On this basis alone, the plea of adverse possession set up by the plaintiffs in respect of the entirety of the area must fail. - **Is doctrine of lost grant applicable?** Since a plea of adverse possession is predicated on title vesting in someone other than the purported grantee, it would be interpreted against the application of the doctrine of lost grant . The Privy Council’s and this Court’s rulings acknowledging the doctrine as a rule of evidence demonstrate that the concept needs to be used cautiously. The concept is an evidence-based guideline rather than an independent, substantive basis for the recognition of titles. According to Section 110 of the Evidence Act of 1872, it is the burden of proof to establish ownership when there is a doubt as to whether a person in possession of something is its rightful owner. The theory of lost grant must inevitably follow that it has no applicability in this particular instance in the absence of any pleadings or evidence that may be used to support an assumption that the doctrine is applicable. - **Analysis on Muslim claim of possession?** The travelogues (chiefly Tieffenthaler and Montgomery Martin) provide a detailed account both of the faith and belief of the Hindus based on the sanctity which they ascribed to the place of birth of Lord Ram and of the actual worship by the Hindus at the Janmasthan; William Finch (1608-11) and Tieffenthaler who visited India between 1743-1785 provided an account of Ayodhya. Conspicuous in both the accounts are references to worship by the Hindus to Lord Ram. The positive account of Hindu worship to Lord Ram is of probative value. There is no evidence to the contrary by the Muslims to indicate that their possession of the disputed structure of the mosque was exclusive and that the offering of namaz was exclusionary of the hindus. ***FINAL VERDICT*** On 9th of November 2019, the final case of M.SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS V. MAHANT SURESH DAS AND ORS. Settled unanimously , pronouncing a judgement of 1045 pages by five judge bench of Hon’ble supreme court led by then ,Chief justice of India , Ranjan Gagoi where The Indian government was given a three-month deadline by the court to establish a board of trustees and establish a trust to construct the Ram Mandir temple. The Indian government will be the owner of the contested land, which will thereafter be given to the Trust upon its establishment. The Court directed that the full 2.77 acres of contested land be set aside for the construction of a temple, and that the Uttar Pradesh Sunni Central Waqf Board be given 5 acres of alternative land to be used for the construction of a mosque at a suitable location in Ayodhya. The division of the contested land by the Allahabad High Court in 2010 was deemed erroneous by the Court. Further, ASI submission that Masjid was built atop the structure that was indigenous and non Islamic was taken as an ordinary opinion owing to dissenting submissions by Muslim claimants . ***Review petitions*** Review petitions were filed in reaction to the Ayodhya ruling, which was overturned on December 12, 2019, since the court found no basis on which “to entertain review petitions” even after “carefully going through” the supplied papers that were attached. However, the disagreement was settled through an adjudication process in which a fair legal system was established and all parties were given an equal opportunity to submit their case. This procedure as a whole deserves to be praised as a secularist win. It is never thought that criticism of judgement is unwarranted; rather, it is a fundamental tenet of a robust democracy. The idea of inviolability and inevitability, which must be presented as a secularist advantage to stop violence or strife. ### ***SECULARISM – TOP TIER IN INDIA*** The Indian constitution has always been inherently secular, which is why Hon. Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi said on the day of the ruling that “the verdict should not be seen as win or loss for anybody. We have the essential essence of Rashtra Bhakti, whether we are practicing Ram or Rahim bhakti.” Also inaugurating world’s third largest temple in Asia on 22nd of January, 2024 , at its Pran pratistha (consecration ceremony) Prime Minister Narendra Modi remarked “ Influence of Rama is global and stands tall as unity of India and shaping new India with social Harmony , economic prosperity and scientific progress. The event itself grabbed very tightly nerves of unity as 100 dignitaries from 55 nations including Akhbar Taj, Justice Nazeer, user Ahmad Illyasi were invited sending messages of peace and brotherhood among all and reiterating the concept of VASUDEV KATUMBAKAM. Impact of Ram Mandir has been no less than a Messiah for a region said to steeping in poverty and backwardness. ### ***Impact on INDIAN ECONOMY*** Reports of foreign brokerage firm Jefferies underlines that event doesn’t possess only spiritual significance but also substantial economic impact .$10 billion makeover encompassing new airport, railway station, road connectivity is anticipated to make multiplier impact. Ayodhya is no less than a catalyst with influx of tourists with projections reacting over 50 millions annually, transforming it from a quiet town to spirituality destination akin to Mecca and Vatican. Moreover , Acc.to SBI research reports, Indian economy is posed to achieve a milestones of $5trillion economy with growths rate surpassing 7%where Uttar Pradesh is expected to command second highest weightage in Indian economy, surpassing Norway in terms of GDP. The temple also posed commendable impact on telecommunication sector. **CONCLUSION** No doubt ,India strives testimony of providing justice to its citizens at any cost . Any such imuendo that such revival is against secular credentials has no legs to stand upon, as it is not so distant future when a new mosque would adore the region being largest mosque in Asia and the city Ayodhya being hub of two religious destinations. The city has potential to become symbol of Hindu Muslim amity and showcase SARVA DHARAM SAMBHAVA to entire globe .However , it stands prudent to let local people take the lead how they wish to go about their lives in changed environment. Politicians from outside world are best advised to keep away and not to polarize region with their viscous politics. ### **REFERENCES** 1. **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** - Ayodhya :Prof Peter W Edge & Dr M.C. Rajan. - Ayodhya issue : jaffrelot 2. **Cases Referred** - SIDDIQ (D) THR LRS V. MAHANT SURESH DAS AND ORS, - AIRONLINE 2019 SC 1420, 2020 (1) SCC 1, (2019) 15 SCALE 1, - The Mosque Masjid Shahid Ganj V. Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak committee , Amritsar,AIR 1940 PC 116 3. **Statutes Referred** 1. Constitution of India 2. Places of worship Act 1991 3. Ayodhya Land acquisition act **Categories:** Articles --- ### [Article 16 of the Indian Constitution](https://lawfoyer.in/article-16-of-the-indian-constitution/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Naman Jain, Galgotias University

INTRODUCTION

All Indian citizens are guaranteed fundamental human rights under Part III of the Indian Constitution, and certain non-citizens are also entitled to these rights. These rights are referred to be "fundamental rights" because they are justified in nature and because anyone who feels that their rights have been violated may file a lawsuit. The United States Bill of Rights served as a major source of inspiration for those who drafted our Constitution, which established India's fundamental rights. This Article gives the outline for the appointment of employee in public office and the equality of opportunity for them. through this article the employment for general public is given to everyone without any kind of dispute as well as certain exception was also provided which was necessary for the public. The goal of Article 16 of the Indian Constitution is to give all people of the country equal opportunities for employment and official posts. The Article's first two sentences make it clear that there will be no discrimination against Indian citizens in the workplace. These clauses establish equitable job opportunities by outlawing discrimination on the basis of religion, race, caste, gender, place of birth, or any other criteria. Keywords (Minimum 5): Public Employment, Reservation, Promotion, SCs and STs,           

Reservation for EWS

Context of this Articles

(1) “There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State.”[1] (2) “No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any employment or office under the State.”  (3)” Nothing in this article shall prevent Parliament from making any law prescribing, in regard to a class or classes of employment or appointment to an office[2] [under the Government of, or any local or other authority within a state or Union Territory, any requirement as to residence within that state or Union Territory] prior to such employment or appointment” (4) “Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State.  “[3][(4A) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for reservation [4][in matters of promotion, with consequential seniority, to any class] or classes of posts in the services under the State in favour of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes which, in the opinion of the State, are not adequately represented in the services under the State.]” “[5][(4B) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from considering any unfilled vacancies of a year which are reserved for being filled up in that year in accordance with any provision for reservation made under clause (4) or clause (4A) as a separate class of vacancies to be filled up in any succeeding year or years and such class of vacancies shall not be considered together with the vacancies of the year in which they are being filled up for determining the ceiling of fifty per cent. reservation on total number of vacancies of that year.]” (5) “Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any law which provides that the incumbent of an office in connection with the affairs of any religious or denominational institution or any member of the governing body thereof shall be a person professing a particular religion or belonging to a particular denomination.” [6](6) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointment or post in favour of any economically weaker section of citizen other than the classes mentioned in clause (4), in addition to the existing reservation and subject to a maximum of Ten Percent of the post in each Category.

Explanation of Articles

Article 16 (1) The right to equality of opportunity in matters pertaining to public employment is covered by Article 16 of the Indian Constitution. Only citizens of India are officially guaranteed this right. Equality of opportunity is guaranteed in situations pertaining to "appointment" or "employment" to any office under the State by Article 16 (1). It only applies to positions held by or associated with the State or Government. Article 16(2) No citizen shall face discrimination in any employment or office under the State on the grounds of race, caste, gender, place of birth, residence, or descent, Article 16 (3), the Parliament may pass any laws mandating residency in a state or union territory in order to be considered for a specific job or appointment within that state or union territory, as well as in local government or other authorities within it. Article 16 (4) gives the State the authority to pass laws reserving positions in the public sector or jobs for people from underrepresented backgrounds, if the State determines that these groups have not been sufficiently represented in state services. The national government decided that the reservation in the advancement of SCs and STs should not be impacted and should continue, as the Indra Sawhney case exclusively pertains to the backward classes. But in order to allow the Parliament to reserve seats for SCs and STs in promotion positions, the 77th Amendment Act, 1995 was passed, adding clause 4-A to Article 16 of the Constitution. By the 81st Amendment, 2000, Clause (4-B) was inserted to the Indian Constitution under Article 16 in place of Clause (4-A). It was added to the Constitution with the intention that the backlog of open positions that could not be filled in a previous year because there were no eligible candidates from the SEBC category would not be combined with the 50% reservation for SCs, STs, and Other Backward Classes on the total number of openings in the following year. Article 16(5) law is excluded from the application of clauses (1) and (2), which stipulate that the occupant of any position must be qualified for appointment based on religion, under this clause Article 16(6) The 103rd Amendment, 2019, which went into effect on January 14, 2019, added clause (6) to Article 16 and gave the State the authority to reserve some positions for members of the Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) of society when they are appointed to government positions. But these clauses, in addition to the current reservations, have to stay below the 10% cap.

Important Committees for this Article

  • Kalelkar Committee
Affirmative action for the "Depressed Classes," or the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, was implemented after India obtained its independence. This program helped the most marginalized and backward sections of Indian society. Nevertheless, no benefits were provided, nor was there a list of the other backward classes in the nation, which, while not as politically and socially backward as the ST/SCs, were nevertheless marginalized in society and lagged behind forwarding castes in the areas of economic development, employment, and education. In 1953, the nation's first Backward Classes Commission was established under the leadership of Kaka Kalelkar to solve this issue. The Kalelkar Commission was another name for this. [7] “When the commission submitted its findings in 1955, it said that there were 2399 backward groups in India, of whom 837 were considered to be "most backward," and that caste was the main indicator of backwardness”. But the Union Government disregarded them because it wanted to eventually establish a casteless society. But this was Rejected by the Government due to some problems.
  • Indra Sawhney[8] Case known as Mandal Commission
In the well-known "Mandal Commission case," Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 447, the Hon'ble Supreme Court carefully considered the parameters of Article 16(4) in this landmark decision. The case's facts were as follows:
  • Under Article 340, the government appointed the second backward classes commission on January 1, 1979, with Sri B.P. Mandal serving as its chair. This Commission was tasked with looking into the socially and educationally disadvantaged groups living on Indian territory and recommending to the government ways to help them progress, including the need to set aside funds for them to be given preference for positions in state employment.
  • In December 1980, the Commission published its report, which classified 3743 castes as socially and educationally inferior groups. Additionally, the Commission suggested that the government give these classes a 27% reservation.
  • In the meantime, the Congress Party took control of the Centre when internal disputes caused the collapse of the Janta Dal Government. It wasn't until 1989 that the Congress Party carried out the Mandal Commission's recommendations. After defeating the Congress Party in the legislative elections in 1989, Janta Dal reestablished its hold on power and decided to carry out the Commission's report's recommendations as promised to the voters.
  • Based on the Mandal commission report, the Indian government subsequently issued the Office Memoranda (OM) on August 13, 1990, reserving 27% of seats for members of the underprivileged classes in the State and Government services. Following the nation's approval of the Mandal Commission Report, there was a violent anti-reservation movement that lasted for about three months and claimed a great deal of lives and property. The Supreme Court Bar Association simultaneously filed a writ petition, arguing that the OM was invalid and requesting a stay of execution. The Five-Judge Bench of the Court halted the OM's operations until the case's resolution, which was rendered on October 1, 1990.
Judgement for this Case
  • In rulings of 6:3 Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy, C.J.I. M.H. Kania, M.N. Venkatachalam, A.M. Ahmadi, SR Pandian, and SB Sawant, along with the other members of the Supreme Court's Constitution Bench, held that the Union Government's decision to reserve 27% of government jobs for members of the lower classes was constitutionally valid as long as the socially advanced individuals—the creamy layer among them—were removed.
  • The Supreme Court clarified its position by ruling that seat reservations should be restricted to initial appointments only, not promotions, and that the overall reservation amount should not be more than 50%. The Congress Government's OM, which reserved 10% of government posts for upper classes that were economically disadvantaged, was overruled by the Court. The majority also concurred that no more than 50% of the reservation should be made.
  • The scope and extent of Article 16(4) of the Indian Constitution were carefully scrutinized by the Court. It made clear the different points on which earlier courts had disagreed. The majority ruling of the Supreme Court can be summed up as follows:
  1. Caste is not the only factor to be taken into account when identifying a backward class of individuals, as stated in Article 16 Clause 4; nonetheless, caste cannot be the exclusive foundation for consideration.
  2. According to the majority, Article 16(4) of the Constitution is an independent clause rather than an exception to Article 16(1). Instead, similar to the Doctrine of Equality stated under Article 14, reservations may be made under clause (1) of Article 16 on the basis of reasonable classification.
  3. It is necessary to remove the creamy layer from the lower grades.
  4. It was found that the backward classes may be categorized as "backward and more backward" under Article 16(4) of the Constitution. The argument went on to say that classifying citizens as backward only on the basis of their economic status would undermine the very goal of Article 16(4), which is to give underrepresented groups adequate representation in state services to alleviate or elevate them as well as to give those who have been excluded from state power due to social, educational, and economic backwardness their rightful share.
  5. Backward class reservations cannot be made for more than 50% of the total.
  6. A provision enacted pursuant to Article 16(4) may only be implemented by executive order, subject to parliamentary approval.
  7. Not to be reserved for promotions.
  8. The Union government, State governments, and Union territories have appointed a permanent statutory committee to look into complaints regarding the inclusion or exclusion of certain groups, sectors, and classes from the list of other backward classes.
  9. About the Mandal Commission Report, no viewpoint was voiced.
  10. Rule laid down in this Article
  11. Carry forward Rule
In [9]“T. Devadasan v. Union of India” the Supreme Court examined the application of Article 16(4) (1964). In this instance, the question was whether the government's "carry forward rule," which governed the appointment of members of the underprivileged classes to positions involving state services, was constitutionally valid. According to this rule, any unfilled positions would be considered unreserved and would be filled by newly available candidates if a sufficient number of candidates from the SC and ST classes were not available for appointment to the reserved quota. In addition to their reserved quota for the following year, a corresponding number of posts would be reserved for SCs and STs in the following year. As a result, the unused balance and open positions from the second and third years were carried over all at once. In reality, SCs and STs were allocated 68% of the available positions. The carry forward rule was declared unconstitutional by the Honourable Supreme Court, which ruled 4:1 that the government could not use its authority under Article 16(4) to deny members of classes other than the backward classes a reasonable opportunity in matters of public employment. “The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, overruled Devadasan v. Union of India on the point and held the “carry forward rule” valid as long as it did not, in a particular year, exceed 50 percent of vacancies.”
  • Catch Up Rule
[10]Following the constitutional recognition of reservation in promotion, the reserved category candidates who were promoted ahead of their general class counterparts became their seniors due to their earlier promotion. The Hon’ble Supreme Court addressed this anomaly by introducing the concept of a catch-up rule in two cases: [11]Union of India v. Virpal Singh (1995) and [12]Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab (1996). According to this rule, the senior general category candidates who were promoted after SC/ST candidates would regain their seniority over general category candidates who were promoted earlier. Candidates in the reserved category can keep their seniority over their counterparts in the general category through consequential seniority. To put it another way, the State may stipulate that a candidate who was promoted ahead of time due to the reservation rule will not be entitled to seniority over his senior in the general category and that a general candidate who was promoted ahead of him will regain his seniority over the reserved candidate even if he is promoted later to the reserved candidate. The ideas of consequential seniority and the catch-up rule are neither implicit in Article 16 clauses (1) and (4), nor are they constitutional constraints. Neither are they constitutional requirements. Articles 14, 15, and 16 of the Constitution establish an equality law that remains unchanged even if these regulations are eliminated. Article 16's clause (1) cannot stop the state from considering the compelling interests of the socially excluded. Article 16's clause (4) relates to affirmative action through reservation, which allows the government to grant reserve if it determines that there is insufficient representation of underrepresented classes in the service based on verifiable statistics.

CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The most significant fundamental right guaranteed to every person by the Indian Constitution is the right to equality. By elevating particular societal segments or classes, it seeks to accomplish social and economic fairness. Equal opportunity is guaranteed by Article 16 when it comes to hiring or appointment to positions in the government. The drafting committee did, however, substitute several measures for a reservation of government posts for members of the socially and educationally backward classes (SEBC) of society. By bringing them forward and offering them the chance to represent in state jobs, the same aimed to give opportunities to those who have always been in the dark (i.e., the vulnerable sections of society), who had previously been outside the state administration. The Indian Constitution was drafted with consideration for the inequality that existed at the time, which peaked in the 1990s. They saw that the nation was separated into two classes: the rich and the backward, and that these provisions were necessary to bring the two classes together and promote the nation's general development.

REFERENCES

  1. Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred
    1. “The Constitution of India”
  2. Online Articles / Sources Referred
    1. https://legislative.gov.in/constitution-of-india/
    2. https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/15240/1/constitution_of_india.pdf
    3. https://byjus.com/free-ias-prep/right-to-equality/
    4. https://blog.ipleaders.in/article-16-of-indian-constitution/
    5. https://lawbhoomi.com/equality-of-opportunity-in-matters-of-public-employment-under-article-16/
  3. Cases Referred
    1. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 447
    2. Devadasan v. Union of India, (1964) 4 SCR 680
    3. Union of India vs Virpal Singh 1996 AIR 448
    4. Ajeet Singh vs State of Punjab SLP (Crl.) no.147 of 2017)
[1]https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/15240/1/constitution_of_india.pdf [2] Substituted by the Constitution 7th Amendment [3] Inserted by the constitution through 77th Amendment [4] Substituted By the Constitution through 85th Amendment [5] Inserted By the Constitution through 81st Amendment [6] Inserted By the Constitution through 103rd Amendment [7] https://www.ncbc.nic.in/Writereaddata/AR%202012-13%20Pandey635705824205955927.pdf [8] Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 447 [9] Devadasan v. Union of India, (1964) 4 SCR 680 [10] https://blog.ipleaders.in/article-16-of-indian-constitution/ [11]Union of India vs Virpal Singh 1996 AIR 448 [12] Ajeet Singh vs State of Punjab SLP (Crl.) no.147 of 2017) **Content:** **Author-Naman Jain, Galgotias University** ### **INTRODUCTION** All Indian citizens are guaranteed fundamental human rights under Part III of the Indian Constitution, and certain non-citizens are also entitled to these rights. These rights are referred to be “fundamental rights” because they are justified in nature and because anyone who feels that their rights have been violated may file a lawsuit. The United States Bill of Rights served as a major source of inspiration for those who drafted our Constitution, which established India’s fundamental rights. This Article gives the outline for the appointment of employee in public office and the equality of opportunity for them. through this article the employment for general public is given to everyone without any kind of dispute as well as certain exception was also provided which was necessary for the public. The goal of Article 16 of the Indian Constitution is to give all people of the country equal opportunities for employment and official posts. The Article’s first two sentences make it clear that there will be no discrimination against Indian citizens in the workplace. These clauses establish equitable job opportunities by outlawing discrimination on the basis of religion, race, caste, gender, place of birth, or any other criteria. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*: Public Employment, Reservation, Promotion, SCs and STs,** ### **Reservation for EWS** #### **Context of this Articles** *(1) “There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State.”[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)* *(2) “No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any employment or office under the State.”* *(3)” Nothing in this article shall prevent Parliament from making any law prescribing, in regard to a class or classes of employment or appointment to an office[**\[2\]**](#_ftn2) \[under the Government of, or any local or other authority within a state or Union Territory, any requirement as to residence within that state or Union Territory\] prior to such employment or appointment”* *(4) “Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State. “[**\[3\]**](#_ftn3)\[(4A) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for reservation [**\[4\]**](#_ftn4)\[in matters of promotion, with consequential seniority, to any class\] or classes of posts in the services under the State in favour of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes which, in the opinion of the State, are not adequately represented in the services under the State.\]”* *“[**\[5\]**](#_ftn5)\[(4B) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from considering any unfilled vacancies of a year which are reserved for being filled up in that year in accordance with any provision for reservation made under clause (4) or clause (4A) as a separate class of vacancies to be filled up in any succeeding year or years and such class of vacancies shall not be considered together with the vacancies of the year in which they are being filled up for determining the ceiling of fifty per cent. reservation on total number of vacancies of that year.\]”* *(5) “Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any law which provides that the incumbent of an office in connection with the affairs of any religious or denominational institution or any member of the governing body thereof shall be a person professing a particular religion or belonging to a particular denomination.”* [***\[6\]***](#_ftn6)*(6) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointment or post in favour of any economically weaker section of citizen other than the classes mentioned in clause (4), in addition to the existing reservation and subject to a maximum of Ten Percent of the post in each Category.* ### **Explanation of Articles** Article 16 (1) The right to equality of opportunity in matters pertaining to public employment is covered by Article 16 of the Indian Constitution. Only citizens of India are officially guaranteed this right. Equality of opportunity is guaranteed in situations pertaining to “appointment” or “employment” to any office under the State by Article 16 (1). It only applies to positions held by or associated with the State or Government. Article 16(2) No citizen shall face discrimination in any employment or office under the State on the grounds of race, caste, gender, place of birth, residence, or descent, Article 16 (3), the Parliament may pass any laws mandating residency in a state or union territory in order to be considered for a specific job or appointment within that state or union territory, as well as in local government or other authorities within it. Article 16 (4) gives the State the authority to pass laws reserving positions in the public sector or jobs for people from underrepresented backgrounds, if the State determines that these groups have not been sufficiently represented in state services. The national government decided that the reservation in the advancement of SCs and STs should not be impacted and should continue, as the Indra Sawhney case exclusively pertains to the backward classes. But in order to allow the Parliament to reserve seats for SCs and STs in promotion positions, the 77th Amendment Act, 1995 was passed, adding clause 4-A to Article 16 of the Constitution. By the 81st Amendment, 2000, Clause (4-B) was inserted to the Indian Constitution under Article 16 in place of Clause (4-A). It was added to the Constitution with the intention that the backlog of open positions that could not be filled in a previous year because there were no eligible candidates from the SEBC category would not be combined with the 50% reservation for SCs, STs, and Other Backward Classes on the total number of openings in the following year. Article 16(5) law is excluded from the application of clauses (1) and (2), which stipulate that the occupant of any position must be qualified for appointment based on religion, under this clause Article 16(6) The 103rd Amendment, 2019, which went into effect on January 14, 2019, added clause (6) to Article 16 and gave the State the authority to reserve some positions for members of the Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) of society when they are appointed to government positions. But these clauses, in addition to the current reservations, have to stay below the 10% cap. ### **Important Committees for this Article** - **Kalelkar Committee** Affirmative action for the “Depressed Classes,” or the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, was implemented after India obtained its independence. This program helped the most marginalized and backward sections of Indian society. Nevertheless, no benefits were provided, nor was there a list of the other backward classes in the nation, which, while not as politically and socially backward as the ST/SCs, were nevertheless marginalized in society and lagged behind forwarding castes in the areas of economic development, employment, and education. In 1953, the nation’s first Backward Classes Commission was established under the leadership of Kaka Kalelkar to solve this issue. The Kalelkar Commission was another name for this. [\[7\]](#_ftn7) “*When the commission submitted its findings in 1955, it said that there were 2399 backward groups in India, of whom 837 were considered to be “most backward,” and that caste was the main indicator of backwardness”*. But the Union Government disregarded them because it wanted to eventually establish a casteless society. But this was Rejected by the Government due to some problems. - **Indra Sawhney[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Case known as Mandal Commission** In the well-known “Mandal Commission case,” Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 447, the Hon’ble Supreme Court carefully considered the parameters of Article 16(4) in this landmark decision. **The case’s facts were as follows:** - Under Article 340, the government appointed the second backward classes commission on January 1, 1979, with **Sri B.P. Mandal** serving as its chair. This Commission was tasked with looking into the socially and educationally disadvantaged groups living on Indian territory and recommending to the government ways to help them progress, including the need to set aside funds for them to be given preference for positions in state employment. - In December 1980, the Commission published its report, which classified 3743 castes as socially and educationally inferior groups. Additionally, the Commission suggested that the government give these classes a 27% reservation. - In the meantime, the Congress Party took control of the Centre when internal disputes caused the collapse of the Janta Dal Government. It wasn’t until 1989 that the Congress Party carried out the Mandal Commission’s recommendations. After defeating the Congress Party in the legislative elections in 1989, Janta Dal reestablished its hold on power and decided to carry out the Commission’s report’s recommendations as promised to the voters. - Based on the Mandal commission report, the Indian government subsequently issued the Office Memoranda (OM) on August 13, 1990, reserving 27% of seats for members of the underprivileged classes in the State and Government services. Following the nation’s approval of the Mandal Commission Report, there was a violent anti-reservation movement that lasted for about three months and claimed a great deal of lives and property. The Supreme Court Bar Association simultaneously filed a writ petition, arguing that the OM was invalid and requesting a stay of execution. The Five-Judge Bench of the Court halted the OM’s operations until the case’s resolution, which was rendered on October 1, 1990. **Judgement for this Case** - In rulings of 6:3 Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy, C.J.I. M.H. Kania, M.N. Venkatachalam, A.M. Ahmadi, SR Pandian, and SB Sawant, along with the other members of the Supreme Court’s Constitution Bench, held that the Union Government’s decision to reserve 27% of government jobs for members of the lower classes was constitutionally valid as long as the socially advanced individuals—the creamy layer among them—were removed. - The Supreme Court clarified its position by ruling that seat reservations should be restricted to initial appointments only, not promotions, and that the overall reservation amount should not be more than 50%. The Congress Government’s OM, which reserved 10% of government posts for upper classes that were economically disadvantaged, was overruled by the Court. The majority also concurred that no more than 50% of the reservation should be made. - The scope and extent of Article 16(4) of the Indian Constitution were carefully scrutinized by the Court. It made clear the different points on which earlier courts had disagreed. The majority ruling of the Supreme Court can be summed up as follows: 1. Caste is not the only factor to be taken into account when identifying a backward class of individuals, as stated in Article 16 Clause 4; nonetheless, caste cannot be the exclusive foundation for consideration. 2. According to the majority, Article 16(4) of the Constitution is an independent clause rather than an exception to Article 16(1). Instead, similar to the Doctrine of Equality stated under Article 14, reservations may be made under clause (1) of Article 16 on the basis of reasonable classification. 3. It is necessary to remove the creamy layer from the lower grades. 4. It was found that the backward classes may be categorized as “backward and more backward” under Article 16(4) of the Constitution. The argument went on to say that classifying citizens as backward only on the basis of their economic status would undermine the very goal of Article 16(4), which is to give underrepresented groups adequate representation in state services to alleviate or elevate them as well as to give those who have been excluded from state power due to social, educational, and economic backwardness their rightful share. 5. Backward class reservations cannot be made for more than 50% of the total. 6. A provision enacted pursuant to Article 16(4) may only be implemented by executive order, subject to parliamentary approval. 7. Not to be reserved for promotions. 8. The Union government, State governments, and Union territories have appointed a permanent statutory committee to look into complaints regarding the inclusion or exclusion of certain groups, sectors, and classes from the list of other backward classes. 9. About the Mandal Commission Report, no viewpoint was voiced. 10. Rule laid down in this Article 11. Carry forward Rule In [\[9\]](#_ftn9)“**T. Devadasan v. Union of India**” the Supreme Court examined the application of Article 16(4) (1964). In this instance, the question was whether the government’s “carry forward rule,” which governed the appointment of members of the underprivileged classes to positions involving state services, was constitutionally valid. According to this rule, any unfilled positions would be considered unreserved and would be filled by newly available candidates if a sufficient number of candidates from the SC and ST classes were not available for appointment to the reserved quota. In addition to their reserved quota for the following year, a corresponding number of posts would be reserved for SCs and STs in the following year. As a result, the unused balance and open positions from the second and third years were carried over all at once. In reality, SCs and STs were allocated 68% of the available positions. The carry forward rule was declared unconstitutional by the Honourable Supreme Court, which ruled 4:1 that the government could not use its authority under Article 16(4) to deny members of classes other than the backward classes a reasonable opportunity in matters of public employment. *“The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, overruled Devadasan v. Union of India on the point and held the “carry forward rule” valid as long as it did not, in a particular year, exceed 50 percent of vacancies.”* - **Catch Up Rule** [\[10\]](#_ftn10)Following the constitutional recognition of reservation in promotion, the reserved category candidates who were promoted ahead of their general class counterparts became their seniors due to their earlier promotion. The Hon’ble Supreme Court addressed this anomaly by introducing the concept of a catch-up rule in two cases: [\[11\]](#_ftn11)Union of India v. Virpal Singh (1995) and [\[12\]](#_ftn12)Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab (1996). According to this rule, the senior general category candidates who were promoted after SC/ST candidates would regain their seniority over general category candidates who were promoted earlier. Candidates in the reserved category can keep their seniority over their counterparts in the general category through consequential seniority. To put it another way, the State may stipulate that a candidate who was promoted ahead of time due to the reservation rule will not be entitled to seniority over his senior in the general category and that a general candidate who was promoted ahead of him will regain his seniority over the reserved candidate even if he is promoted later to the reserved candidate. The ideas of consequential seniority and the catch-up rule are neither implicit in Article 16 clauses (1) and (4), nor are they constitutional constraints. Neither are they constitutional requirements. Articles 14, 15, and 16 of the Constitution establish an equality law that remains unchanged even if these regulations are eliminated. Article 16’s clause (1) cannot stop the state from considering the compelling interests of the socially excluded. Article 16’s clause (4) relates to affirmative action through reservation, which allows the government to grant reserve if it determines that there is insufficient representation of underrepresented classes in the service based on verifiable statistics. ### **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The most significant fundamental right guaranteed to every person by the Indian Constitution is the right to equality. By elevating particular societal segments or classes, it seeks to accomplish social and economic fairness. Equal opportunity is guaranteed by Article 16 when it comes to hiring or appointment to positions in the government. The drafting committee did, however, substitute several measures for a reservation of government posts for members of the socially and educationally backward classes (SEBC) of society. By bringing them forward and offering them the chance to represent in state jobs, the same aimed to give opportunities to those who have always been in the dark (i.e., the vulnerable sections of society), who had previously been outside the state administration. The Indian Constitution was drafted with consideration for the inequality that existed at the time, which peaked in the 1990s. They saw that the nation was separated into two classes: the rich and the backward, and that these provisions were necessary to bring the two classes together and promote the nation’s general development. ### **REFERENCES** 1. **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** 1. “The Constitution of India” 2. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. 2. [https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/15240/1/constitution\_of\_india.pdf](https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/15240/1/constitution_of_india.pdf) 3. 4. 5. https://lawbhoomi.com/equality-of-opportunity-in-matters-of-public-employment-under-article-16/ 3. **Cases Referred** 1. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 447 2. Devadasan v. Union of India, (1964) 4 SCR 680 3. Union of India vs Virpal Singh 1996 AIR 448 4. Ajeet Singh vs State of Punjab SLP (Crl.) no.147 of 2017) [\[1\]](#_ftnref1)[https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/15240/1/constitution\_of\_india.pdf](https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/15240/1/constitution_of_india.pdf) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Substituted by the Constitution 7th Amendment [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Inserted by the constitution through 77th Amendment [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Substituted By the Constitution through 85th Amendment [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Inserted By the Constitution through 81st Amendment [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Inserted By the Constitution through 103rd Amendment [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 447 [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Devadasan v. Union of India, (1964) 4 SCR 680 [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) [\[11\]](#_ftnref11)Union of India vs Virpal Singh 1996 AIR 448 [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Ajeet Singh vs State of Punjab SLP (Crl.) no.147 of 2017) **Categories:** Articles --- ### [Right to Trade, Commerce and Intercourse under Indian constitution - Article 19(1)(g) and Article 301](https://lawfoyer.in/right-to-trade-commerce-and-intercourse-under-indian-constitution-article-191g-and-article-301/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Posa Venkata Bhavya, Sri Padmavati Mahila Visva Vidyalayam

INTRODUCTION

The Indian constitution, through Article 19(1)(g) and Article 301, establishes the rights related to trade, commerce, and intercourse. These rights allow individuals to engage in business and professions of their choice, while also emphasizing the need to adhere to certain restrictions for the overall well-being and balance of these rights. The right to practice a profession is a fundamental right in the Indian constitution. It is important to ensure that those who have the qualifications and capabilities for a job are able to pursue it without being forced out. This is protected by Article 19(1)(g) of the constitution. Additionally, articles 301-307 address the freedom of trade, commerce, and intercourse and any restrictions related to these rights in the constitution of India. Keywords (Minimum 5): Trade, Commerce, Intercourse, Occupation, Fundamental right and Constitution of India.

Meaning, Definition & Explanation :-

Trade :- Trade involves the exchange of goods for profit, and according to Article 301, it includes any economic activity with a specific purpose and motive. It also requires a balance between exports and imports in a country. Commerce :- The commerce encompasses all modes of transporting goods on a large scale, including air, water, telephone, telegram, and other means. It involves the transportation and communication between individuals, businesses, and nations. Intercourse :- This refers to the movement of goods from one place to another, both commercially and non-commercially. It also involves the exchange and communication between individuals, often described as mutual dealings.

Historical Background :-

Trade and commerce in a country depend largely on geographical and environmental factors. In India, the rich resources, cultural diversity, and strategic location have made it a prominent player in trade throughout history. The trade routes connecting the west and east have enabled India to establish good relations along the Silk Routes. India's strong economy was evident even before the British era, with trade coins and products being exported globally. The Mauryan era saw development in infrastructure, such as road building and warehouses, which provided security to traders. During the Delhi Sultan period, India further expanded its international trade relations, enhancing social and economic connectivity. Agriculture has long been the backbone of India, with the development of crops like maize and tobacco leading to advancements such as mulberries and seri-culture. India's agriculture was more advanced than Europe's, and industrial development began with spinning, weaving, and manufacturing companies in Bombay exporting cotton and silk to large markets in America, Africa, Asia, and Europe in the 1750s. India's economic growth expanded through trade and commerce, with exports of precious stones, handmade products, and agricultural goods showcasing the country's trustworthiness, resourcefulness, integrity, and unique products that attracted traders from around the world. This led to a significant increase in India's growth. After the East India company established itself in India, the British controlled 2/3 of the country while the remaining 1/3 was ruled by native states through Princesses. Many states had varying degrees of sovereignty but within limits. The main purpose of Article 301 was to eliminate trade barriers and promote the flow of commerce. Between 1947 and 1950, the Princess states were merged and integrated, removing trade barriers across India. Under British rule, Indian markets shifted towards importing goods rather than exporting. India was known for its handmade products and natural resources before the British brought cheap, mass-produced items that quickly found favor with customers. Instead of continuing to take longer to produce the same products by hand, British cheap products began outpacing Indian products. To combat this, India initiated various movements to promote their own products and textiles and to deter the use of British and foreign products. The goal was to increase domestic trade and promote self-sufficiency in India. Additionally, in the 19th century, industries such as iron, steel, paper, and publication saw significant development in India with the implementation of industrial methods.

Articles on Trade, Commerce and Intercourse:-

Article (19)(1)(g) of the Indian Constitution is a fundamental right that outlines the rights of individuals, including the right to choose any profession or occupation. It is important to note that while this right exists, there are certain restrictions that must be followed. These restrictions should not be random or against the public interest; rather, they should support social values and needs. The freedom to engage in trade is not just about conducting business but also about safeguarding the interests of those involved in the business, as long as it is lawful and does not infringe upon the rights of others. Only citizens have the right to practice any occupation, trade, or business of their choice, as foreign companies do not possess this fundamental right. Citizens can seek legal recourse under Article 19(1)(g) of the Indian constitution if their profession is impeded. Economic unity and stability are vital for a nation's advancement, with free movement and absence of trade barriers elevating the economic standards. Case law :- TMA Pai Foundation Vs. State of Karnataka The case revolves around the right of private educational institutions to independently govern themselves without government interference in their rules, fees, administration, and staff selection. The institutions argue they have established their own self-governing bodies rather than following government directives to uphold their rights under the constitution. The opposing party believes the government should have a say in the operations of educational institutions to ensure fair and ethical management practices that uphold the integrity of the institutions. While private educational institutions may excel in technology, academic standards, innovation, and creativity, it is still necessary for them to adhere to government guidelines. The court emphasized the importance of transparent and merit-based admission criteria, fair fees structure, and the merit-based selection of staff. Educational institutions must also maintain accountability, fairness, and follow regulations to ensure a standardized and regulated system, despite having their own unique approach to teaching. Sukumar Mukherjee vs. state of West Bengal :- In this scenario, teachers employed in the West Bengal medical educational service were not allowed to practice privately. The restriction applied to teacher doctors specifically and not all doctors. Government employees were prohibited from engaging in private practice until they no longer held their government position, whether through suspension or retirement. This rule was in place to ensure that government employees followed the regulations and guidelines set forth by the government, requiring them to focus solely on their government role without engaging in outside work. Article 301 of the Constitution:- Article 301 of India's constitution guarantees freedom of trade, commerce, and communication within the country. This article can be utilized by citizens, non-citizens, or states in cases of discrimination or preference. All states in India should be considered as one when it comes to economic activities to benefit the country's economy. Each state should have equal rights, privileges, and responsibilities when conducting business in India. Additionally, Article 301 includes restrictions to protect public safety and the dignity of the country. This text discusses the importance of Article 301, which ensures the free movement of goods. It specifies that this article cannot be contested in relation to traffic regulations, vehicle licensing, marketing and health regulations, minimum wages, social and economic planning, or admission into educational institutions. Article 301 is a constitutional right that applies to the entire country, unlike Article 19(1)(g), which is a fundamental right specific to individual persons. Case law :- Atiabari Tea Co. Vs State of Assam The tea was taken to Calcutta via the Assam route where the Assam people imposed a tax on the transportation which hindered the free movement of goods, violating Article 301. Therefore, the tax imposed by the Assam people for allowing the goods to reach Calcutta was considered null and void. B.R. Enterprises Vs State of Uttar Pradesh The petitioner argued that the lotteries regulation act 1998, enacted by Uttar Pradesh, contravened Articles 301, 302, and 303 of the Indian Constitution. However, the Supreme Court stated that lotteries are akin to gambling and not a legitimate business based on effort and hard work. Therefore, Uttar Pradesh did not infringe on Article 301 of the Indian constitution. Article 301 of the Constitution outlines three main rules:
  1. The promotion of free trade, commerce, and communication within and between states is essential.
  2. Regional interests cannot be overlooked.
  3. The Union has the power to intervene in cases of crisis that may arise in any part of India.
It should be noted that while freedom of trade is important, there are restrictions and regulations in place. For example, when transporting goods on roads or bridges, additional fees may be required at checkpoints along the way. CONCLUSION & COMMENTS :- Trade and commerce have been prevalent in India since ancient times, starting from the Mauryan era, through the British era, and into the present day. Article 301 emphasizes the importance of free movement of trade without any barriers, aiming to unite India's many states into a cohesive national economy. Article 19(1)(g) grants individuals the freedom to choose their occupation, trade, and business. However, this right is subject to certain restrictions that are in place to ensure public safety and protect everyone's rights. If there are any disputes regarding the violation of this right in business or trade, individuals can seek remedy under Article 32 for violation of fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g). On the other hand, Article 301 does not allow for a writ petition. The restrictions outlined in Article 19(1)(g) are covered under Article 19(6) of the Indian constitution, while those in Article 301 fall under Article 302-307.
  1. Books / Commentaries:-
  • The Constitution of India - D.J.DE ( Volume 1and 3)
  • The Constitution of India - MJL's volume 3
  • The Constitutional Law of India - H.M. Seervai.
  1. Online Articles / Sources Referred
    1. https://interstatecouncil.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/CHAPTERXVIII.pdf
    2. https://www.centurylawfirm.in/blog/freedom-of-trade-commerce-and-intercourse-under-the-indian-constitution-1950/
    3. https://blog.ipleaders.in/freedom-trade-commerce-intercourse-articles-301-307-indian-constitution/
    4. https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-12002-trade-commerce-and-intercourse-arts-301-305-.html
    5. https://unacademy.com/content/upsc/study-material/polity/all-about-inter-state-trade-and-commerce/
    6. https://www.clearias.com/inter-state-trade-and-commerce/
  1. Cases Referred
  •  TMA Pai Foundation Vs State of Karnataka
  •  Sukumar Mukherjee versus state of West Bengal
  •  Atiabari Tea Co. Vs State of Assam
  •  B.R. Enterprises Vs State of Uttar Pradesh
  •  State of Bombay Vs R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla
  1. Statutes Referred
    1. The Constitution of India
**Content:** **Author-Posa Venkata Bhavya, Sri Padmavati Mahila Visva Vidyalayam** ### **INTRODUCTION** The Indian constitution, through Article 19(1)(g) and Article 301, establishes the rights related to trade, commerce, and intercourse. These rights allow individuals to engage in business and professions of their choice, while also emphasizing the need to adhere to certain restrictions for the overall well-being and balance of these rights. The right to practice a profession is a fundamental right in the Indian constitution. It is important to ensure that those who have the qualifications and capabilities for a job are able to pursue it without being forced out. This is protected by Article 19(1)(g) of the constitution. Additionally, articles 301-307 address the freedom of trade, commerce, and intercourse and any restrictions related to these rights in the constitution of India. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*: Trade, Commerce, Intercourse, Occupation, Fundamental right and Constitution of India.** ### **Meaning, Definition & Explanation :-** **Trade :-** Trade involves the exchange of goods for profit, and according to Article 301, it includes any economic activity with a specific purpose and motive. It also requires a balance between exports and imports in a country. **Commerce :-** The commerce encompasses all modes of transporting goods on a large scale, including air, water, telephone, telegram, and other means. It involves the transportation and communication between individuals, businesses, and nations. **Intercourse :-** This refers to the movement of goods from one place to another, both commercially and non-commercially. It also involves the exchange and communication between individuals, often described as mutual dealings. ### **Historical Background :-** Trade and commerce in a country depend largely on geographical and environmental factors. In India, the rich resources, cultural diversity, and strategic location have made it a prominent player in trade throughout history. The trade routes connecting the west and east have enabled India to establish good relations along the Silk Routes. India’s strong economy was evident even before the British era, with trade coins and products being exported globally. The Mauryan era saw development in infrastructure, such as road building and warehouses, which provided security to traders. During the Delhi Sultan period, India further expanded its international trade relations, enhancing social and economic connectivity. Agriculture has long been the backbone of India, with the development of crops like maize and tobacco leading to advancements such as mulberries and seri-culture. India’s agriculture was more advanced than Europe’s, and industrial development began with spinning, weaving, and manufacturing companies in Bombay exporting cotton and silk to large markets in America, Africa, Asia, and Europe in the 1750s. India’s economic growth expanded through trade and commerce, with exports of precious stones, handmade products, and agricultural goods showcasing the country’s trustworthiness, resourcefulness, integrity, and unique products that attracted traders from around the world. This led to a significant increase in India’s growth. After the East India company established itself in India, the British controlled 2/3 of the country while the remaining 1/3 was ruled by native states through Princesses. Many states had varying degrees of sovereignty but within limits. The main purpose of Article 301 was to eliminate trade barriers and promote the flow of commerce. Between 1947 and 1950, the Princess states were merged and integrated, removing trade barriers across India. Under British rule, Indian markets shifted towards importing goods rather than exporting. India was known for its handmade products and natural resources before the British brought cheap, mass-produced items that quickly found favor with customers. Instead of continuing to take longer to produce the same products by hand, British cheap products began outpacing Indian products. To combat this, India initiated various movements to promote their own products and textiles and to deter the use of British and foreign products. The goal was to increase domestic trade and promote self-sufficiency in India. Additionally, in the 19th century, industries such as iron, steel, paper, and publication saw significant development in India with the implementation of industrial methods. ### **Articles on Trade, Commerce and Intercourse:-** Article (19)(1)(g) of the Indian Constitution is a fundamental right that outlines the rights of individuals, including the right to choose any profession or occupation. It is important to note that while this right exists, there are certain restrictions that must be followed. These restrictions should not be random or against the public interest; rather, they should support social values and needs. The freedom to engage in trade is not just about conducting business but also about safeguarding the interests of those involved in the business, as long as it is lawful and does not infringe upon the rights of others. Only citizens have the right to practice any occupation, trade, or business of their choice, as foreign companies do not possess this fundamental right. Citizens can seek legal recourse under Article 19(1)(g) of the Indian constitution if their profession is impeded. Economic unity and stability are vital for a nation’s advancement, with free movement and absence of trade barriers elevating the economic standards. **Case law :- TMA Pai Foundation Vs. State of Karnataka** The case revolves around the right of private educational institutions to independently govern themselves without government interference in their rules, fees, administration, and staff selection. The institutions argue they have established their own self-governing bodies rather than following government directives to uphold their rights under the constitution. The opposing party believes the government should have a say in the operations of educational institutions to ensure fair and ethical management practices that uphold the integrity of the institutions. While private educational institutions may excel in technology, academic standards, innovation, and creativity, it is still necessary for them to adhere to government guidelines. The court emphasized the importance of transparent and merit-based admission criteria, fair fees structure, and the merit-based selection of staff. Educational institutions must also maintain accountability, fairness, and follow regulations to ensure a standardized and regulated system, despite having their own unique approach to teaching. **Sukumar Mukherjee vs. state of West Bengal :-** In this scenario, teachers employed in the West Bengal medical educational service were not allowed to practice privately. The restriction applied to teacher doctors specifically and not all doctors. Government employees were prohibited from engaging in private practice until they no longer held their government position, whether through suspension or retirement. This rule was in place to ensure that government employees followed the regulations and guidelines set forth by the government, requiring them to focus solely on their government role without engaging in outside work. **Article 301 of the Constitution:-** Article 301 of India’s constitution guarantees freedom of trade, commerce, and communication within the country. This article can be utilized by citizens, non-citizens, or states in cases of discrimination or preference. All states in India should be considered as one when it comes to economic activities to benefit the country’s economy. Each state should have equal rights, privileges, and responsibilities when conducting business in India. Additionally, Article 301 includes restrictions to protect public safety and the dignity of the country. This text discusses the importance of Article 301, which ensures the free movement of goods. It specifies that this article cannot be contested in relation to traffic regulations, vehicle licensing, marketing and health regulations, minimum wages, social and economic planning, or admission into educational institutions. Article 301 is a constitutional right that applies to the entire country, unlike Article 19(1)(g), which is a fundamental right specific to individual persons. **Case law :- Atiabari Tea Co. Vs State of Assam** The tea was taken to Calcutta via the Assam route where the Assam people imposed a tax on the transportation which hindered the free movement of goods, violating Article 301. Therefore, the tax imposed by the Assam people for allowing the goods to reach Calcutta was considered null and void. **B.R. Enterprises Vs State of Uttar Pradesh** The petitioner argued that the lotteries regulation act 1998, enacted by Uttar Pradesh, contravened Articles 301, 302, and 303 of the Indian Constitution. However, the Supreme Court stated that lotteries are akin to gambling and not a legitimate business based on effort and hard work. Therefore, Uttar Pradesh did not infringe on Article 301 of the Indian constitution. **Article 301 of the Constitution outlines three main rules:** 1. The promotion of free trade, commerce, and communication within and between states is essential. 2. Regional interests cannot be overlooked. 3. The Union has the power to intervene in cases of crisis that may arise in any part of India. It should be noted that while freedom of trade is important, there are restrictions and regulations in place. For example, when transporting goods on roads or bridges, additional fees may be required at checkpoints along the way. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS :-** Trade and commerce have been prevalent in India since ancient times, starting from the Mauryan era, through the British era, and into the present day. Article 301 emphasizes the importance of free movement of trade without any barriers, aiming to unite India’s many states into a cohesive national economy. Article 19(1)(g) grants individuals the freedom to choose their occupation, trade, and business. However, this right is subject to certain restrictions that are in place to ensure public safety and protect everyone’s rights. If there are any disputes regarding the violation of this right in business or trade, individuals can seek remedy under Article 32 for violation of fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g). On the other hand, Article 301 does not allow for a writ petition. The restrictions outlined in Article 19(1)(g) are covered under Article 19(6) of the Indian constitution, while those in Article 301 fall under Article 302-307. 1. **Books / Commentaries:-** - The Constitution of India – D.J.DE ( Volume 1and 3) - The Constitution of India – MJL’s volume 3 - The Constitutional Law of India – H.M. Seervai. 2. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. https://interstatecouncil.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/CHAPTERXVIII.pdf 2. https://www.centurylawfirm.in/blog/freedom-of-trade-commerce-and-intercourse-under-the-indian-constitution-1950/ 3. https://blog.ipleaders.in/freedom-trade-commerce-intercourse-articles-301-307-indian-constitution/ 4. https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-12002-trade-commerce-and-intercourse-arts-301-305-.html 5. https://unacademy.com/content/upsc/study-material/polity/all-about-inter-state-trade-and-commerce/ 6. https://www.clearias.com/inter-state-trade-and-commerce/ 3. **Cases Referred** - TMA Pai Foundation Vs State of Karnataka - Sukumar Mukherjee versus state of West Bengal - Atiabari Tea Co. Vs State of Assam - B.R. Enterprises Vs State of Uttar Pradesh - State of Bombay Vs R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla 4. **Statutes Referred** 1. The Constitution of India **Categories:** Articles --- ### [RAPE](https://lawfoyer.in/rape/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Vartika Tripathi, Amity University, Lucknow

ABSTRACT

We have come a long way with are achivements building technology , reaching to moon and many more but still failing at the  safety of our women and providing them a free and safe environment .  you can add many reasons when you hear about a rape on news channels through social media , newspapers  and people around you ( society  can add many reasons for a rape attempted against a women may be “ she was wearing a short dresses” or “going late at night” but what would be the answer for a rape against a 6 months old child , a 6 year old girl going to school, a 12 year old girl being at her home  , a women going to a movie with her boyfriend and  a 75 year old lady being at her home , and sometimes it can be your family member  and just day before I am writing this heard about a gangrape against a women who came to see a different country and explore but later the trip made everything go change . Rape is the most comman  and heinous crime perpetuated  against a women  . The national crime records bureau (NCRB) reports shows  that a women is raped in every 16 minutes  the cases get increased by 4 % every year  32,033  rapes cases were registered across the country and  an average of 88 cases daily are being registered  . These are just the number , there are many cases which doesn’t come into light . Keywords – rape , criminal law , psychological effects , reasons etc .

INTRODUCTION

RAPE – ITS MEANING- “ as per Section 375 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 defines rape as that if a  man is said to commit "rape" if he— (a) penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (b)inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (c)manipulates any part of the body of a woman so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of such woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (d)applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person,under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions:— (First.)— Against her will. (Secondly.) — Without her consent. (Thirdly.) — With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt Fourthly.) — With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married. (Fifthly.) — With her consent when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent. (Sixthly.) — With or without her consent, when she is under eighteen years of age. (Seventhly.) — When she is unable to communicate consent. Explanation 1.— For the purposes of this section, "vagina" shall also include labia majora Explanation 2.— Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act Provided that a woman who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity. Exception 1.— A medical procedure or intervention shall not constitute rape. Exception 2.— Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.”

 BHANWARI DEVI CASE 1992

According to Bhanwari Devi, at 6 pm on 22 September 1992, while she and her husband were working in their field, five men of her village attacked her husband Mohan Lal, leaving him unconscious. The five men whom she named were: Ram Karan, Ram Sukh, Gyarsa, Badri and Shravan Sharma. When she came to her husband's rescue, she said, Gyarsa and Badri raped her, while the other three pinned her down on the ground. Bhanwari reported the incident to Rasila Sharma, the pracheta (block-level worker), who took her to the Bassi police station to lodge a First Information Report (FIR). The FIR was lodged after surmounting police scepticism and indifference, a phenomenon several rape complainants have faced in the Indian context.

 JUGDEMENT

Five judges were changed, and it was the sixth judge who ruled that the accused were not guilty, stating inter alia that Bhanwari's husband couldn't have passively watched his wife being gang-raped. The judge infamously stated, “Since the offenders were upper-caste men and included a brahmin, the rape could not have taken place because Bhanwari was from a lower caste.” A state MLA organised a victory rally in the state capital Jaipur for the five accused declared not guilty, and the women's wing of his political party attended the rally to call Bhanwari a liar.The State Government decided to appeal against the judgment. The judgement led to a nationwide campaign for justice for Bhanwari Devi. However, by 2007, 15 years after the incident, the Rajasthan High Court held only one hearing on the case and two of the accused were dead.

THE NIRBHAYA CASE

A  23-year-old medical student was returning after a movie with her friend and took a bus. On the bus, she was gang-raped by six people and was brutally assaulted. After the rape, she along with her friend were thrown out of the bus naked. The girl died later . Judgment In this case, the Supreme The court awarded death penalty to four of the accused among six. One of them being a juvenile was convicted by the Juvenile Justice Board and sent to the correctional home. The other one committed suicide before the judgment was delivered. After this case, the need to amend certain provisions of Section 375 was felt so the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 was brought into effect. Under the newly amended section, the punishment of rape is at least seven years which may extend to life imprisonment. Any man who is a police officer, medical officer, public officer, or public servant may be imprisoned for at least 10 years if commits rape. Where rape leads to the death of the victim or entered into a vegetative state the punishment of life imprisonment extending to death has been prescribed. The punishment for gang rape is at least 10 years.

THE KATHUA  RAPE CASE 2018

6 of the 7 men accused in the 2018 rape and murder of an 8-year-old girl in Kathua, J&K were convicted by a special court in Pathankot, Punjab.  The case involves an 8-year-old girl from Kathua, J&K who was abducted, drugged, raped and killed. Notably, the deceased is a Muslim girl and the accused are Hindus, which has made it an issue of communal politics. The formation of a group called the Hindu Ekta Manch in support of those arrested added to this. Also, the role played by members of the Bharatiya Janata Party, including two Ministers in the then J&K government, had added to the communal politics. The case was thus transferred from J&K to Punjab by the Supreme Court for a fair trial. JUDGEMENT Six of the seven men accused in the case were convicted. Three of the men got life term, and the other three got five-year imprisonment. The court sentenced to life imprisonment  the mastermind, Sanji Ram, a retired government official and priest of the temple where the crime took place ii. special police officer Deepak Khajuria iii. Ram’s nephew Parvesh Kumar Special Police Officer (SPO) Surender Verma, head constable Tilak Raj, and sub-inspector Anand Dutta were awarded 5 years in prison for destroying evidence. The court acquitted the seventh accused, Vishal  son of Sanji Ram, giving him the “benefit of doubt”. The crime branch filed the charge sheet against 8 persons, including a 'juvenile'. While the time , place , and age of the victims vary across these three cases one thing remains constant that is the act of rape and the perpetrators mindset . A sexual assaulter can be any kind of person . There isn’t one specific type who commits such kinds of crime . These men have diverse backgrounds , social status , different personalities and mentalities. What can actually be the motive behind them engaging in these kinds of act is the question which can't be answered easily.

Punishments according to law

Indian penal code section 376 (1) states about the punishment for rape “Indian penal code section 376 (2) states that if the persons in authority commit rape, they will also be liable to the same punishment. Indian penal code section 376 (3) states that if any person rapes a woman under the age of 16 years , he will be liable to be punished for twenty years, which may extend to Life Imprisonment” But as far as I see I observe few points which can be reasons
  • Lack of education ( the basic learning of morals , values and ethics )
  • A lack of empathy
  • Toxic masculinity (patriarchal conceptions of men control over women bodies )
  • Hostility towards women ( seeing women as sex object )
  • Sexual trauma
  • Westernizations
  • Society environment
  • Sex education
  • Gender gap ( in india if a women sits with a boy or if they sit together it is perceived in a inappropriate way and the intention of it is misjudged )
  • Misperceptions about women (“if she is wearing a short dress then definitely that means she wants sex”) but one similar view can also be like that if the women is walking alone at night , going to pubs getting drunk can be triggering point and a provoking step )
But then what about a rape against a 6 month old newborn ? does even clothes matter .
  • Attitudes towards law – the increase in the rape and crime against women the law against the culprits comes with several loop holes the court takes years to decide the punishment for a rapist which is evident
The change of escaping from the crime is high .this motivates them to do the crime.

The psychological aspects a women survivor faces

In Most of the cases the rapist makes sures that the women does not stay alive they make her condition worst as they can but if my luck she survives it gives her . A life time trauma, low self esteem , suicidal thoughts , self blame ,hatred etc.

Conclusion

There is a thought which prevails in the society that is “ I am powerful so I am right”. Which comes from the patriarchal society and still is prevailing . This toxic masculinity harms men , men and women are only different in terms of there physical and biological behavaiours The ability to love ,care be responsible is same We always feel that toxic masculinity only harms a women but greatly  it harms and affects  the man . Hence toxic masculinity which is in today’s  generation  being glamorised can be a main reason towards the growing rates of crime “Power benefits but humanity  loses” Once in a interview , activist kamla bhasin said “when she got raped ,people said I lost my honour .. but how did I lose my honour ? my honour is not my vagina .. which makes me think that How come this society sets parameter that if a girl is being raped her identity is lost , and that rape will define the honour of the community . It’s the rapist who’s indentity gets lost and his honour . The courts and laws need to get more strict and provide death sentence to such convicts in order to make the graph go down . the task of law agencies should get more responsible The legislature has to make any and every amendments if the rape laws are to be any deternce . Women have to be more strong and responsible,have to come forward and fight The education of both men and women get more and more to understand the both good and bad and what is actually right and wrong . “ tell your story to someone or to yourself. The more you tell it the less pain you feel”

References

**Content:** **Author-Vartika Tripathi, Amity University, Lucknow** ### ABSTRACT We have come a long way with are achivements building technology , reaching to moon and many more but still failing at the safety of our women and providing them a free and safe environment . you can add many reasons when you hear about a rape on news channels through social media , newspapers and people around you ( society can add many reasons for a rape attempted against a women may be “ she was wearing a short dresses” or “going late at night” but what would be the answer for a rape against a 6 months old child , a 6 year old girl going to school, a 12 year old girl being at her home , a women going to a movie with her boyfriend and a 75 year old lady being at her home , and sometimes it can be your family member and just day before I am writing this heard about a gangrape against a women who came to see a different country and explore but later the trip made everything go change . Rape is the most comman and heinous crime perpetuated against a women . The national crime records bureau (NCRB) reports shows that a women is raped in every 16 minutes the cases get increased by 4 % every year 32,033 rapes cases were registered across the country and an average of 88 cases daily are being registered . These are just the number , there are many cases which doesn’t come into light . **Keywords –** *rape , criminal law , psychological effects , reasons etc .* ### INTRODUCTION **RAPE** – ITS MEANING- “ as per Section 375 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 defines rape as that if a man is said to commit “rape” if he— [(a)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/31616571/) penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or [(b)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/32890307/)inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or [(c)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/32992331/)manipulates any part of the body of a woman so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of such woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or [(d)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/7199582/)applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person,under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions:— (First.)— Against her will. (Secondly.) — Without her consent. (Thirdly.) — With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt Fourthly.) — With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married. (Fifthly.) — With her consent when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent. (Sixthly.) — With or without her consent, when she is under eighteen years of age. (Seventhly.) — When she is unable to communicate consent. Explanation 1.— For the purposes of this section, “vagina” shall also include labia majora Explanation 2.— Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act Provided that a woman who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity. Exception 1.— A medical procedure or intervention shall not constitute rape. Exception 2.— Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.” #### **BHANWARI DEVI CASE 1992** According to Bhanwari Devi, at 6 pm on 22 September 1992, while she and her husband were working in their field, five men of her village attacked her husband Mohan Lal, leaving him unconscious. The five men whom she named were: Ram Karan, Ram Sukh, Gyarsa, Badri and Shravan Sharma. When she came to her husband’s rescue, she said, Gyarsa and Badri raped her, while the other three pinned her down on the ground. Bhanwari reported the incident to Rasila Sharma, the pracheta (block-level worker), who took her to the Bassi police station to lodge a [First Information Report](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Information_Report) (FIR). The FIR was lodged after surmounting police scepticism and indifference, a phenomenon several rape complainants have faced in the Indian context. ### JUGDEMENT Five judges were changed, and it was the sixth judge who ruled that the accused were not guilty, stating inter alia that Bhanwari’s husband couldn’t have passively watched his wife being gang-raped. The judge infamously stated, “Since the offenders were upper-caste men and included a brahmin, the rape could not have taken place because Bhanwari was from a lower caste.” A state [MLA](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Member_of_the_Legislative_Assembly_%28India%29) organised a victory rally in the state capital [Jaipur](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jaipur) for the five accused declared not guilty, and the women’s wing of his political party attended the rally to call Bhanwari a liar.The State Government decided to appeal against the judgment. The judgement led to a nationwide campaign for justice for Bhanwari Devi. However, by 2007, 15 years after the incident, the Rajasthan High Court held only one hearing on the case and two of the accused were dead. #### **THE NIRBHAYA CASE** A 23-year-old medical student was returning after a movie with her friend and took a bus. On the bus, she was gang-raped by six people and was brutally assaulted. After the rape, she along with her friend were thrown out of the bus naked. The girl died later . **Judgment** In this case, the Supreme The court awarded death penalty to four of the accused among six. One of them being a juvenile was convicted by the Juvenile Justice Board and sent to the correctional home. The other one committed suicide before the judgment was delivered. After this case, the need to amend certain provisions of Section 375 was felt so the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 was brought into effect. Under the newly amended section, the punishment of rape is at least seven years which may extend to life imprisonment. Any man who is a police officer, medical officer, public officer, or public servant may be imprisoned for at least 10 years if commits rape. Where rape leads to the death of the victim or entered into a vegetative state the punishment of life imprisonment extending to death has been prescribed. The punishment for gang rape is at least 10 years. #### **THE KATHUA RAPE CASE 2018** 6 of the 7 men accused in the 2018 rape and murder of an 8-year-old girl in Kathua, J&K were convicted by a special court in Pathankot, Punjab. The case involves an 8-year-old girl from Kathua, J&K who was abducted, drugged, raped and killed. Notably, the deceased is a Muslim girl and the accused are Hindus, which has made it an issue of communal politics. The formation of a group called the Hindu Ekta Manch in support of those arrested added to this. Also, the role played by members of the Bharatiya Janata Party, including two Ministers in the then J&K government, had added to the communal politics. The case was thus transferred from J&K to Punjab by the Supreme Court for a fair trial. **JUDGEMENT** Six of the seven men accused in the case were convicted. Three of the men got life term, and the other three got five-year imprisonment. The court sentenced to life imprisonment the mastermind, Sanji Ram, a retired government official and priest of the temple where the crime took place ii. special police officer Deepak Khajuria iii. Ram’s nephew Parvesh Kumar Special Police Officer (SPO) Surender Verma, head constable Tilak Raj, and sub-inspector Anand Dutta were awarded 5 years in prison for destroying evidence. The court acquitted the seventh accused, Vishal son of Sanji Ram, giving him the “benefit of doubt”. The crime branch filed the charge sheet against 8 persons, including a ‘juvenile’. While the time , place , and age of the victims vary across these three cases one thing remains constant that is the act of rape and the perpetrators mindset . A sexual assaulter can be any kind of person . There isn’t one specific type who commits such kinds of crime . These men have diverse backgrounds , social status , different personalities and mentalities. What can actually be the motive behind them engaging in these kinds of act is the question which can’t be answered easily. #### **Punishments according to law** Indian penal code section 376 (1) states about the punishment for rape “Indian penal code section 376 (2) states that if the persons in authority commit rape, they will also be liable to the same punishment. Indian penal code section 376 (3) states that if any person rapes a woman under the age of 16 years , he will be liable to be punished for twenty years, which may extend to Life Imprisonment” But as far as I see I observe few points which can be reasons - Lack of education ( the basic learning of morals , values and ethics ) - A lack of empathy - Toxic masculinity (patriarchal conceptions of men control over women bodies ) - Hostility towards women ( seeing women as sex object ) - Sexual trauma - Westernizations - Society environment - Sex education - Gender gap ( in india if a women sits with a boy or if they sit together it is perceived in a inappropriate way and the intention of it is misjudged ) - Misperceptions about women (“if she is wearing a short dress then definitely that means she wants sex”) but one similar view can also be like that if the women is walking alone at night , going to pubs getting drunk can be triggering point and a provoking step ) But then what about a rape against a 6 month old newborn ? does even clothes matter . - Attitudes towards law – the increase in the rape and crime against women the law against the culprits comes with several loop holes the court takes years to decide the punishment for a rapist which is evident The change of escaping from the crime is high .this motivates them to do the crime. ### **The psychological aspects a women survivor faces** In Most of the cases the rapist makes sures that the women does not stay alive they make her condition worst as they can but if my luck she survives it gives her . A life time trauma, low self esteem , suicidal thoughts , self blame ,hatred etc. ### **Conclusion** There is a thought which prevails in the society that is “ ***I am powerful so I am right***”. Which comes from the patriarchal society and still is prevailing . This toxic masculinity harms men , men and women are only different in terms of there physical and biological behaviors The ability to love ,care be responsible is same We always feel that toxic masculinity only harms a women but greatly it harms and affects the man . Hence toxic masculinity which is in today’s generation being glamorized can be a main reason towards the growing rates of crime **“Power benefits but humanity loses”** Once in a interview , activist kamla bhasin said “when she got raped ,people said I lost my honour .. but how did I lose my honour ? my honour is not my vagina .. which makes me think that How come this society sets parameter that if a girl is being raped her identity is lost , and that rape will define the honour of the community . It’s the rapist who’s indentity gets lost and his honour . The courts and laws need to get more strict and provide death sentence to such convicts in order to make the graph go down . the task of law agencies should get more responsible The legislature has to make any and every amendments if the rape laws are to be any deternce . Women have to be more strong and responsible,have to come forward and fight The education of both men and women get more and more to understand the both good and bad and what is actually right and wrong . “ tell your story to someone or to yourself. The more you tell it the less pain you feel” ### **References** - [**www.indiankannon**](http://www.indiankannon) - [**www.google.in**](http://www.google.in) - **Indian penal code** **Categories:** Articles --- ### [CONDUCT OF ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS](https://lawfoyer.in/conduct-of-arbitral-proceedings/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Rishita Khare, Rani Durgavati Vishwavidyalaya, Jabalpur

INTRODUCTION

Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms are becoming a more popular choice for parties, especially for commercial disputes. In India, these concepts are not new. This process had been practised traditionally by village councils. The Britishers created the Indian Arbitration Act of 1940. After independence, The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was enacted to ensure speedy, flexible and efficient dispute resolution. This not only provides a less complicated procedure but also ensures expertise in giving decisions which could not be attained in traditional ligation. Keywords (Minimum 5): Arbitration, Conduct of Arbitration proceedings, Arbitration Procedure, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), Arbitral Tribunal

Meaning of Arbitration

According to Section 2(1)(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, “arbitration means any arbitration whether or not administered by permanent arbitral institution.”[1] According to Halsbury—Arbitration means "the reference of dispute or difference between not less than two parties, for determination, after hearing both sides in a judicial manner, by a person or persons other than a Court of competent jurisdiction."[2] Arbitration is generally preferred over traditional court litigation. Parties agree to resolve disputes with a neutral third party in arbitration. Its decisions are binding and equivalent to the court judgments. It is regulated and enforced by the courts. Awards from arbitration can be challenged only under certain conditions.

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a modern as well as a comprehensive enactment based on the UNCITRAL Model Law and Rules. It covers both domestic and international arbitration in India. The Act reduces court intervention in arbitration processes, allowing parties to choose laws, venues, and arbitrators freely. It mandates the tribunal to justify its awards and stay within its jurisdiction which did not exist in the previous laws of 1940. The Act requires the arbitral tribunal to provide reasons for its award and allows for the use of mediation and conciliation to settle disputes. Settlement agreements through conciliation have the same status as arbitral awards under this Act which is an improvement from the previous laws which lacked such options and flexibility. This act also allows the process of conciliation and mediation along with the arbitration process to settle disputes. This has made the settlement of disputes in India at par with global standards.

Kinds of Arbitration

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act provides 7 different kinds of arbitration.
  • Ad-hoc arbitration occurs when parties in a commercial transaction seek arbitration without prior agreement or involvement of a specific institution.
  • Institutional arbitration involves parties with a prior agreement to resolve disputes through a named institution.
  • Contractual arbitration includes an arbitration clause in any of its commercial agreements for dispute resolution.
  • Statutory arbitration is one which is mandatory and binding by law.
  • Domestic arbitration takes place within India under Indian law.
  • International arbitration involves a foreign element and can be governed by foreign or Indian law.
  • Foreign arbitration is conducted outside India, which results in any foreign award needing enforcement in India.
Each type of arbitration has its own unique process and rules, with parties agreeing to the terms based on their specific situation and requirements.[3]

Principles involved in the Conduct of arbitration proceedings

Arbitration proceedings are guided by key principles:
  • Independence, Impartiality, and Objectivity of arbitrators
  • Party Autonomy in setting arbitration rules
  • Equal Treatment for all parties
  • Confidentiality in dispute resolution
  • Finality of Awards.

CHAPTER 5- CONDUCT OF ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS

SECTION 18- EQUAL TREATMENT OF PARTIES

According to section 18. “The parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given a full opportunity to present this case.” The principle of “the audi alteram partem rule which means ‘hear the other side’” is to be followed.[4] The principles of natural justice must be followed to conduct a fair procedure. These emphasize that a person cannot be a judge in their own case, and a person's defence must always be heard impartially. Even if the arbitrator is not bound by technical rules of procedure, it still cannot ignore principles of natural justice. Hence arbitrators must be impartial and unbiased. They have a binding obligation to ensure a fair trial in arbitration proceedings, going beyond just treating parties equally. Fair trial includes giving each party a reasonable chance to present their case. Parties must be aware of the evidence presented and given a chance to defend themselves against it. If any of the parties was not properly notified of the appointment of the arbitrator or arbitration proceedings an award from such a proceeding may be set aside per Section 34(2)(a)(ii) of the act. [5]

SECTION 19- DETERMINATION OF RULES OF PROCEDURE

Section 19 says that-“The arbitral tribunal shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872)” Constraining the arbitral proceedings by the rigidity of the Evidence Act or the CPC is not the legislative intent of this act. Parties have the freedom to set rules for arbitration proceedings and allows them to customize it to their needs The arbitral tribunal has discretionary powers to determine the proceedings if they do not agree. This flexibility in choosing procedural rules is an appealing factor for parties that are considering arbitration for dispute resolution as held in Henry Sotheran Ltd. v. Norwich Union Life Assurance Society.[6] Section 19(4) of the Act gives the tribunal the discretion to conduct proceedings as it sees fit, including deciding on the admissibility, relevance, materiality, and weight of any evidence as held in Steel Authority of India Ltd. vs. Salzgitter Mannesmann international GMBH.[7] In Punjab State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., vs. Sunil K. Kansal[8] it was held that while recording the evidence in a case the tribunal is not bound by the Indian Evidence Act. It can use a fair, equitable, and reasonable procedure. If evidence is needed, parties can submit affidavits and allow cross-examination of deponents on such affidavits. If no procedure is agreed upon, the Act's provisions apply to the proceedings.

SECTION 20- PLACE OF ARBITRATION

The place of arbitration is crucial as it determines the applicable laws for the arbitral process. Parties can choose the place of arbitration, and institutional rules may designate the seat of arbitration as well according to the convenience of the parties. The seat and place of arbitration differ: the place is the physical location, while the seat determines legal jurisdiction, governing law, and supervisory courts. Thus, the seat of the arbitration does not change even if the place of arbitration is changed. The place of arbitration has to be decided as per the terms of the contract.[9] In Enercon (India) Limited and others v. Enercon GMBH and another it held that “The Supreme Court held that “the location of the seat will determine the courts that will have exclusive jurisdiction to oversee the arbitration proceedings. It was further held that the seat normally carries with it the choice of that country’s arbitration law”[10]

SECTION 21- COMMENCEMENT OF ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS

According to Section 21, the arbitration process commences when the respondent receives a formal request to arbitrate that dispute unless agreed otherwise.[11] This means that if there is a disagreement between parties the process begins once the party being sought for arbitration receives a request. The request for arbitration does not have to be explicitly written; it can also be implied through the parties' conduct. However, the notice or request must be sufficient to prompt the other party to take action. Failure to receive or recognize this notice as a formal request for arbitration will prevent the commencement of arbitration proceedings. This principle was emphasized in the Nea Agrex SA vs. Baltic Shipping Co. Ltd. (1976) case, where the first notice demanding arbitration was deemed crucial in invoking Section 21.[12] It is important to determine the date of receipt, as outlined in Section 3 of the Act, which details how written communication is considered received. The commencement date plays a significant role in calculating time limits and adhering to time-bar clauses within arbitration agreements. The request for arbitration must clearly outline the dispute, initiating the formal arbitration proceedings. Ultimately, Section 21 ensures that arbitration proceedings officially start upon the respondent receiving a clear request, paving the way for resolution. The limitation for a counter-claim must adhere strictly to Section 43(1) of the Act with Section 3(2)(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963 as decided in Voltas Limited vs. Rolta India Limited. The date for figuring out the limitation period is when the arbitration request is made, especially when the respondent initiates the process and raises counterclaims.[13]

SECTION 22- LANGUAGE TO BE USED IN THE ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS

“This section provides that parties can mutually agree on the language to be used in arbitration proceedings.” The arbitral tribunal shall decide the language to be used if no agreement is reached by the parties. All written submissions, hearings, awards, decisions, and all other communications from the tribunal will be affected accordingly in a dispute. The tribunal may also order the translation of documents into the agreed language. The tribunal must ensure impartiality and fairness in language determinations to guarantee understanding and fairness for all parties involved in the proceedings.

SECTION 23- STATEMENT OF CLAIM AND DEFENCE

Under Section 23 the claimant is required to submit a statement of claim with supporting facts, points at issue, and relief sought within the agreed timeframe. The respondent must then file a statement of defence addressing each claim and may provide additional information. Both parties can submit relevant documents with their statements or refer to them later. Parties can amend their pleadings unless rejected by the tribunal for causing delay in proceedings. The procedure allows for flexibility in timing and elements of pleadings, enabling parties to adopt rules from arbitral institutions or civil procedure codes. After the tribunal is established, parties exchange and file their pleadings to present their case and respond to each other's claims, ensuring a fair and transparent arbitration process.[14] The failure of a claimant to file a statement of claim within the specified time may result in the termination of proceedings by the arbitral tribunal, as per Section 25(a) of the 1996 Act. However, if the claimant provides a valid reason for the delay, the proceedings need not be terminated.[15]

SECTION 24- HEARINGS AND WRITTEN PROCEEDINGS

Section 24 of the Act, 1996 covers the conduct of hearings and written proceedings in arbitration. The arbitral tribunal decides whether oral hearings are necessary, but must hold them upon request unless agreed otherwise. The notice of hearings and meetings must be given to parties in advance and communication of statements and documents is required. Evidence can be presented in various forms, following guidelines from the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Fair trial principles are emphasized throughout the process to ensure transparency and communication between parties and the tribunal. Overall, Section 24 aims to facilitate fair arbitration proceedings with opportunities for oral hearings, document inspections, and effective communication, guided by the principles of fairness and equity outlined in the Indian Evidence Act and the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.[16] In litigation, facts are proven through witness testimony and documentary evidence. In arbitrations, evidence is primarily presented through documents, which is considered more efficient. Documents not in the arbitration language require translations agreed upon by both parties. Witness evidence is usually taken under the arbitrator's direction, but written affidavits may be accepted to save time. Witnesses must speak to facts, not opinions. The arbitral tribunal has wide powers, including inspecting the subject matter and determining the admissibility of evidence. The burden of proof lies on the party wishing to present evidence, particularly if the fact is within their knowledge.[17] Application of production of documents and order passed therein by the arbitrator there cannot be interfered by the High Court by way of writ when alternative remedy is provided under Section 37 as held in Radiant Info Systems Ltd. vs. Karnataka SRTC Ltd.[18]

SECTION 25-DEFAULT OF A PARTY

Section 25 says that if the claimant fails to submit their statement of claim on time, then the tribunal can end the proceedings. Whereas, if the respondent fails to submit their statement of defence, the tribunal can still proceed without assuming that the allegations are true. If either party does not attend a hearing or provide evidence, the tribunal can still make an award based on existing evidence. Section 25 also outlines the repercussions of failing to do so without a valid excuse, promoting fairness and efficiency in the process.[19] After pleadings are completed, parties must present documentary evidence. If a party fails to appear at an oral hearing or provide evidence without cause, Section 25(c) allows the arbitral tribunal to proceed and make a decision based on existing evidence. This was seen in M/s. Auto Craft Engineers vs. Akshar Automobiles Agencies Pvt. Ltd.[20], decided by the Bombay High Court.

SECTION 26- EXPERT APPOINTMENT BY ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL

Section 26 of the Act allows the arbitral tribunal to appoint experts to help with technical issues. The arbitral tribunal can appoint one or more experts as per need since they are experts in specific fields. Experts can be asked to report on specific issues determined by the tribunal, with parties providing necessary information or access to documents, goods, or property. This helps the tribunal make informed decisions.  The appointed expert may participate in an oral hearing if requested by a party or deemed necessary by the tribunal, and parties can question the expert and present their own expert witnesses. The expert must make all relevant information available upon request. Hence, this section enables the tribunal to get technical assistance through expert appointments, ensuring a fair consideration of technical matters in arbitration proceedings.[21]

SECTION 27- COURT ASSISTANCE IN TAKING EVIDENCE

“Section 27 allows the arbitral tribunal or a party, with the tribunal’s approval, to seek court assistance in obtaining evidence.” The application to the court must detail the parties' names, claim nature, relief sought, and required evidence. The court can issue processes for evidence provision, penalizing witnesses for non-compliance. Processes" include summons and commissions for witness examination and document production. This section allows parties to ensure a fair arbitration process by involving the court in obtaining necessary testimony and documents for dispute resolution. Since it is the court only which can issue them. Non-compliance or contempt towards the tribunal may lead to consequences. Court assistance can be requested for recording evidence, with details like parties' names and claim nature required. While the court can assist in recording evidence, it cannot directly order production. If the arbitrator denies the court approach, objections can be filed under Section 34.[22]

CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Arbitration proceedings in the above act are driven by providing greater autonomy to the parties as well as allowing them to decide procedural aspects. This includes selecting the applicable laws, the place of arbitration and the language used to be used. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996 in India restricts judicial interference in arbitration which further emphasizes autonomy, confidentiality, and efficient dispute resolution. It empowers parties to customize the arbitration process to meet their unique requirements, promoting a more adaptable and effective resolution method beyond traditional legal modes of litigation.

REFERENCES

  1. Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred
    1. Sc Tripathi, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (6th ed. Central Law Publications, 2012)
    2. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Prepared by Chandrashekhar U, Senior Faculty Member, Karnataka Judicial Academy) (30.06.2022)
  2. Online Articles / Sources Referred
    1. Manupatra- Chapter 5 Conduct of Arbitration Proceedings http://student.manupatra.com/Academic/Abk/Arbitration-and-ADR/CHAPTER-5.htm
    2. Garg R and Law L, “Live Law” (Live Law, October 3, 2022)
    3. Parina Katyal, Order Passed by The Arbitrator Allowing Meetings As Per Convenience Of Parties, Would Not Change The Seat Of Arbitration: Delhi High Court, Live Law, 7 June 2022 2:00 PM, https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/delhi-high-court-justice-v-kameswar-rao-arbitration-and-conciliation-act-arbitrator-ongc-201044?infinitescroll=1
    4. Priyanshi Bhageria Arbitral Tribunal’s Power To Recall: A Hasty Judicial Creation?RMLNLU Arbitration Law Blog
    5. https://www.indiacode.nic.in/
    6. https://indiankanoon.org/
  3. Cases Referred
    1. Henry Sotheran Ltd. v. Norwich Union Life Assurance Society. [1992] ADRLJ 245
    2. Authority of India Ltd. vs. Salzgitter Mannesmann international GMBH. 2012 (2) Arb LR 296 (Delhi).
    3. Punjab State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., vs. Sunil K. Kansal2013 (1) Arb LR 327 (P&H) (DB)
    4. Enercon (India) Limited and others v. Enercon GMBH and another (2014) 5 SCC 1
    5. Nea Agrex SA vs. Baltic Shipping Co. Ltd. (1976) [1976] 2 All ER 842
    6. Voltas Limited vs. Rolta India Limited (2014) 4 SCC 516: 2014 (1) Arb LR 343 (SC): AIR 2014 SC 1772.)
    7. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. vs. Jyothi Turbopower Services P. Ltd., 2017 (1) Arb LR 289 (Mad) (DB): (2016) 4 CTC 1
    8. Radiant Info Systems Ltd. vs. Karnataka SRTC Ltd. (2018) SCC Online Kar 1209
    9. M/s. Auto Craft Engineers vs. Akshar Automobiles Agencies Pvt. Ltd Arbitration Petition Nos. 556/2014 & 680/2014
  1. Statutes Referred
    1. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
[1] Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 [2] DR. SC TRIPATHI, ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996 (6TH ed. CENTRAL LAW PUBLICATIONS, 2012) [3] DR. SC TRIPATHI, ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996 (6TH ed. CENTRAL LAW PUBLICATIONS, 2012) [4] https://kjablr.kar.nic.in/assets/articles/Arbitration%20and%20Conciliation%20Act,%201996.pdf [5] https://kjablr.kar.nic.in/assets/articles/Arbitration%20and%20Conciliation%20Act,%201996.pdf [6] [1992] ADRLJ 245 [7] 2012 (2) Arb LR 296 (Delhi). [8] 2013 (1) Arb LR 327 (P&H) (DB) [9] Parina Katyal, Order Passed by The Arbitrator Allowing Meetings As Per Convenience Of Parties, Would Not Change The Seat Of Arbitration: Delhi High Court, Live Law, 7 June 2022 2:00 PM, [10] (2014) 5 SCC 1 [11] Garg R and Law L, “Live Law” (Live Law, October 3, 2022) [12] [1976] 2 All ER 842 [13] Voltas Limited vs. Rolta India Limited. (2014) 4 SCC 516: 2014 (1) Arb LR 343 (SC): AIR 2014 SC 1772.) [14] https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1460737/ [15] Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. vs. Jyothi Turbopower Services P. Ltd., 2017 (1) Arb LR 289 (Mad) (DB): (2016) 4 CTC 1 [16] https://indiankanoon.org/doc/569211/ [17] https://kjablr.kar.nic.in/assets/articles/Arbitration%20and%20Conciliation%20Act,%201996.pdf [18] 2018 SCC Online Kar 1209 [19] Law VAPBSFEIA, “Arbitral Tribunal’s Power to Recall: A Hasty Judicial Creation?” (RMLNLU Arbitration Law Blog, May 24, 2023) [20] Arbitration Petition Nos. 556/2014 & 680/2014 [21] https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1752162/ [22]“Arbitration and ADR - Chapter 5 - Conduct of Arbitral Proceedings” **Content:** **Author-Rishita Khare, Rani Durgavati Vishwavidyalaya, Jabalpur** ### **INTRODUCTION** Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms are becoming a more popular choice for parties, especially for commercial disputes. In India, these concepts are not new. This process had been practised traditionally by village councils. The Britishers created the Indian Arbitration Act of 1940. After independence, The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was enacted to ensure speedy, flexible and efficient dispute resolution. This not only provides a less complicated procedure but also ensures expertise in giving decisions which could not be attained in traditional ligation. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*: Arbitration, Conduct of Arbitration proceedings, Arbitration Procedure, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), Arbitral Tribunal** ### **Meaning of Arbitration** According to Section 2(1)(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, *“arbitration means any arbitration whether or not administered by permanent arbitral institution.”[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)* According to Halsbury*—Arbitration means “the reference of dispute or* *difference between not less than two parties, for determination, after hearing* *both sides in a judicial manner, by a person or persons other than a Court* *of competent jurisdiction.”[**\[2\]**](#_ftn2)* Arbitration is generally preferred over traditional court litigation. Parties agree to resolve disputes with a neutral third party in arbitration. Its decisions are binding and equivalent to the court judgments. It is regulated and enforced by the courts. Awards from arbitration can be challenged only under certain conditions. ### **Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996** The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a modern as well as a comprehensive enactment based on the UNCITRAL Model Law and Rules. It covers both domestic and international arbitration in India. The Act reduces court intervention in arbitration processes, allowing parties to choose laws, venues, and arbitrators freely. It mandates the tribunal to justify its awards and stay within its jurisdiction which did not exist in the previous laws of 1940. The Act requires the arbitral tribunal to provide reasons for its award and allows for the use of mediation and conciliation to settle disputes. Settlement agreements through conciliation have the same status as arbitral awards under this Act which is an improvement from the previous laws which lacked such options and flexibility. This act also allows the process of conciliation and mediation along with the arbitration process to settle disputes. This has made the settlement of disputes in India at par with global standards. ### **Kinds of Arbitration** The Arbitration and Conciliation Act provides 7 different kinds of arbitration. - Ad-hoc arbitration occurs when parties in a commercial transaction seek arbitration without prior agreement or involvement of a specific institution. - Institutional arbitration involves parties with a prior agreement to resolve disputes through a named institution. - Contractual arbitration includes an arbitration clause in any of its commercial agreements for dispute resolution. - Statutory arbitration is one which is mandatory and binding by law. - Domestic arbitration takes place within India under Indian law. - International arbitration involves a foreign element and can be governed by foreign or Indian law. - Foreign arbitration is conducted outside India, which results in any foreign award needing enforcement in India. Each type of arbitration has its own unique process and rules, with parties agreeing to the terms based on their specific situation and requirements.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) ### **Principles involved in the Conduct of arbitration proceedings** Arbitration proceedings are guided by key principles: - Independence, Impartiality, and Objectivity of arbitrators - Party Autonomy in setting arbitration rules - Equal Treatment for all parties - Confidentiality in dispute resolution - Finality of Awards. ### **CHAPTER 5- CONDUCT OF ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS** #### **SECTION 18- EQUAL TREATMENT OF PARTIES** According to section 18. *“The parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given a full opportunity to present this case.”* The principle of *“the audi alteram partem rule which means ‘hear the other side’*” is to be followed.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) The principles of natural justice must be followed to conduct a fair procedure. These emphasize that a person cannot be a judge in their own case, and a person’s defence must always be heard impartially. Even if the arbitrator is not bound by technical rules of procedure, it still cannot ignore principles of natural justice. Hence arbitrators must be impartial and unbiased. They have a binding obligation to ensure a fair trial in arbitration proceedings, going beyond just treating parties equally. Fair trial includes giving each party a reasonable chance to present their case. Parties must be aware of the evidence presented and given a chance to defend themselves against it. If any of the parties was not properly notified of the appointment of the arbitrator or arbitration proceedings an award from such a proceeding may be set aside per Section 34(2)(a)(ii) of the act. [\[5\]](#_ftn5) #### **SECTION 19- DETERMINATION OF RULES OF PROCEDURE** Section 19 says that-*“The arbitral tribunal shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872)”* Constraining the arbitral proceedings by the rigidity of the Evidence Act or the CPC is not the legislative intent of this act. Parties have the freedom to set rules for arbitration proceedings and allows them to customize it to their needs The arbitral tribunal has discretionary powers to determine the proceedings if they do not agree. This flexibility in choosing procedural rules is an appealing factor for parties that are considering arbitration for dispute resolution as held in *Henry Sotheran Ltd. v. Norwich Union Life Assurance Society.*[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Section 19(4) of the Act gives the tribunal the discretion to conduct proceedings as it sees fit, including deciding on the admissibility, relevance, materiality, and weight of any evidence as held in Steel *Authority of India Ltd. vs. Salzgitter Mannesmann international GMBH.*[\[7\]](#_ftn7) In *Punjab State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., vs. Sunil K. Kansal*[\[8\]](#_ftn8) it was held that while recording the evidence in a case the tribunal is not bound by the Indian Evidence Act. It can use a fair, equitable, and reasonable procedure. If evidence is needed, parties can submit affidavits and allow cross-examination of deponents on such affidavits. If no procedure is agreed upon, the Act’s provisions apply to the proceedings. #### **SECTION 20- PLACE OF ARBITRATION** The place of arbitration is crucial as it determines the applicable laws for the arbitral process. Parties can choose the place of arbitration, and institutional rules may designate the seat of arbitration as well according to the convenience of the parties. The seat and place of arbitration differ: the place is the physical location, while the seat determines legal jurisdiction, governing law, and supervisory courts. Thus, the seat of the arbitration does not change even if the place of arbitration is changed. The place of arbitration has to be decided as per the terms of the contract.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) In *Enercon (India) Limited and others v. Enercon GMBH and another* it held that *“The Supreme Court held that “the location of the seat will determine the courts that will have exclusive jurisdiction to oversee the arbitration proceedings. It was further held that the seat normally carries with it the choice of that country’s arbitration law”[**\[10\]**](#_ftn10)* #### **SECTION 21- COMMENCEMENT OF ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS** According to Section 21, the arbitration process commences when the respondent receives a formal request to arbitrate that dispute unless agreed otherwise.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) This means that if there is a disagreement between parties the process begins once the party being sought for arbitration receives a request. The request for arbitration does not have to be explicitly written; it can also be implied through the parties’ conduct. However, the notice or request must be sufficient to prompt the other party to take action. Failure to receive or recognize this notice as a formal request for arbitration will prevent the commencement of arbitration proceedings. This principle was emphasized in the *Nea Agrex SA vs. Baltic Shipping Co. Ltd. (1976)* case, where the first notice demanding arbitration was deemed crucial in invoking Section 21.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) It is important to determine the date of receipt, as outlined in Section 3 of the Act, which details how written communication is considered received. The commencement date plays a significant role in calculating time limits and adhering to time-bar clauses within arbitration agreements. The request for arbitration must clearly outline the dispute, initiating the formal arbitration proceedings. Ultimately, Section 21 ensures that arbitration proceedings officially start upon the respondent receiving a clear request, paving the way for resolution. The limitation for a counter-claim must adhere strictly to Section 43(1) of the Act with Section 3(2)(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963 as decided in *Voltas Limited vs. Rolta India Limited*. The date for figuring out the limitation period is when the arbitration request is made, especially when the respondent initiates the process and raises counterclaims.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) #### **SECTION 22- LANGUAGE TO BE USED IN THE ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS** *“This section provides that parties can mutually agree on the language to be used in arbitration proceedings.”* The arbitral tribunal shall decide the language to be used if no agreement is reached by the parties. All written submissions, hearings, awards, decisions, and all other communications from the tribunal will be affected accordingly in a dispute. The tribunal may also order the translation of documents into the agreed language. The tribunal must ensure impartiality and fairness in language determinations to guarantee understanding and fairness for all parties involved in the proceedings. #### **SECTION 23- STATEMENT OF CLAIM AND DEFENCE** Under Section 23 the claimant is required to submit a statement of claim with supporting facts, points at issue, and relief sought within the agreed timeframe. The respondent must then file a statement of defence addressing each claim and may provide additional information. Both parties can submit relevant documents with their statements or refer to them later. Parties can amend their pleadings unless rejected by the tribunal for causing delay in proceedings. The procedure allows for flexibility in timing and elements of pleadings, enabling parties to adopt rules from arbitral institutions or civil procedure codes. After the tribunal is established, parties exchange and file their pleadings to present their case and respond to each other’s claims, ensuring a fair and transparent arbitration process.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) The failure of a claimant to file a statement of claim within the specified time may result in the termination of proceedings by the arbitral tribunal, as per Section 25(a) of the 1996 Act. However, if the claimant provides a valid reason for the delay, the proceedings need not be terminated.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) #### **SECTION 24- HEARINGS AND WRITTEN PROCEEDINGS** Section 24 of the Act, 1996 covers the conduct of hearings and written proceedings in arbitration. The arbitral tribunal decides whether oral hearings are necessary, but must hold them upon request unless agreed otherwise. The notice of hearings and meetings must be given to parties in advance and communication of statements and documents is required. Evidence can be presented in various forms, following guidelines from the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Fair trial principles are emphasized throughout the process to ensure transparency and communication between parties and the tribunal. Overall, Section 24 aims to facilitate fair arbitration proceedings with opportunities for oral hearings, document inspections, and effective communication, guided by the principles of fairness and equity outlined in the Indian Evidence Act and the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) In litigation, facts are proven through witness testimony and documentary evidence. In arbitrations, evidence is primarily presented through documents, which is considered more efficient. Documents not in the arbitration language require translations agreed upon by both parties. Witness evidence is usually taken under the arbitrator’s direction, but written affidavits may be accepted to save time. Witnesses must speak to facts, not opinions. The arbitral tribunal has wide powers, including inspecting the subject matter and determining the admissibility of evidence. The burden of proof lies on the party wishing to present evidence, particularly if the fact is within their knowledge.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) Application of production of documents and order passed therein by the arbitrator there cannot be interfered by the High Court by way of writ when alternative remedy is provided under Section 37 as held in *Radiant Info Systems Ltd. vs. Karnataka SRTC Ltd.[**\[18\]**](#_ftn18)* #### **SECTION 25-DEFAULT OF A PARTY** Section 25 says that if the claimant fails to submit their statement of claim on time, then the tribunal can end the proceedings. Whereas, if the respondent fails to submit their statement of defence, the tribunal can still proceed without assuming that the allegations are true. If either party does not attend a hearing or provide evidence, the tribunal can still make an award based on existing evidence. Section 25 also outlines the repercussions of failing to do so without a valid excuse, promoting fairness and efficiency in the process.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) After pleadings are completed, parties must present documentary evidence. If a party fails to appear at an oral hearing or provide evidence without cause, Section 25(c) allows the arbitral tribunal to proceed and make a decision based on existing evidence. This was seen in *M/s. Auto Craft Engineers vs. Akshar Automobiles Agencies Pvt. Ltd*.[\[20\]](#_ftn20), decided by the Bombay High Court. #### **SECTION 26- EXPERT APPOINTMENT BY ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL** Section 26 of the Act allows the arbitral tribunal to appoint experts to help with technical issues. The arbitral tribunal can appoint one or more experts as per need since they are experts in specific fields. Experts can be asked to report on specific issues determined by the tribunal, with parties providing necessary information or access to documents, goods, or property. This helps the tribunal make informed decisions. The appointed expert may participate in an oral hearing if requested by a party or deemed necessary by the tribunal, and parties can question the expert and present their own expert witnesses. The expert must make all relevant information available upon request. Hence, this section enables the tribunal to get technical assistance through expert appointments, ensuring a fair consideration of technical matters in arbitration proceedings.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) #### **SECTION 27- COURT ASSISTANCE IN TAKING EVIDENCE** *“Section 27 allows the arbitral tribunal or a party, with the tribunal’s approval, to seek court assistance in obtaining evidence*.*”* The application to the court must detail the parties’ names, claim nature, relief sought, and required evidence. The court can issue processes for evidence provision, penalizing witnesses for non-compliance. Processes” include summons and commissions for witness examination and document production. This section allows parties to ensure a fair arbitration process by involving the court in obtaining necessary testimony and documents for dispute resolution. Since it is the court only which can issue them. Non-compliance or contempt towards the tribunal may lead to consequences. Court assistance can be requested for recording evidence, with details like parties’ names and claim nature required. While the court can assist in recording evidence, it cannot directly order production. If the arbitrator denies the court approach, objections can be filed under Section 34.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) ### **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The Arbitration proceedings in the above act are driven by providing greater autonomy to the parties as well as allowing them to decide procedural aspects. This includes selecting the applicable laws, the place of arbitration and the language used to be used. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996 in India restricts judicial interference in arbitration which further emphasizes autonomy, confidentiality, and efficient dispute resolution. It empowers parties to customize the arbitration process to meet their unique requirements, promoting a more adaptable and effective resolution method beyond traditional legal modes of litigation. ### **REFERENCES** 1. **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** 1. Sc Tripathi, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (6th ed. Central Law Publications, 2012) 2. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Prepared by Chandrashekhar U, Senior Faculty Member, Karnataka Judicial Academy) (30.06.2022) 2. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 5. Manupatra- Chapter 5 Conduct of Arbitration Proceedings http://student.manupatra.com/Academic/Abk/Arbitration-and-ADR/CHAPTER-5.htm 6. Garg R and Law L, “Live Law” (Live Law, October 3, 2022) 7. Parina Katyal, Order Passed by The Arbitrator Allowing Meetings As Per Convenience Of Parties, Would Not Change The Seat Of Arbitration: Delhi High Court, Live Law, 7 June 2022 2:00 PM, https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/delhi-high-court-justice-v-kameswar-rao-arbitration-and-conciliation-act-arbitrator-ongc-201044?infinitescroll=1 8. Priyanshi Bhageria Arbitral Tribunal’s Power To Recall: A Hasty Judicial Creation?RMLNLU Arbitration Law Blog 9. https://www.indiacode.nic.in/ 10. https://indiankanoon.org/ 3. **Cases Referred** 1. *Henry Sotheran Ltd. v. Norwich Union Life Assurance Society.* *\[1992\] ADRLJ 245* 2. *Authority of India Ltd. vs. Salzgitter Mannesmann international GMBH.* *2012 (2) Arb LR 296 (Delhi).* 3. *Punjab State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., vs. Sunil K. Kansal2013 (1) Arb LR 327 (P&H) (DB)* 4. *Enercon (India) Limited and others v. Enercon GMBH and another (2014) 5 SCC 1* 5. *Nea Agrex SA vs. Baltic Shipping Co. Ltd. (1976)* *\[1976\] 2 All ER 842* 6. *Voltas Limited vs. Rolta India Limited (2014) 4 SCC 516: 2014 (1) Arb LR 343 (SC): AIR 2014 SC 1772.)* 7. *Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. vs. Jyothi Turbopower Services P. Ltd., 2017 (1) Arb LR 289 (Mad) (DB): (2016) 4 CTC 1* 8. *Radiant Info Systems Ltd. vs. Karnataka SRTC Ltd.* *(2018) SCC Online Kar 1209* 9. *M/s. Auto Craft Engineers vs. Akshar Automobiles Agencies Pvt. Ltd Arbitration Petition Nos. 556/2014 & 680/2014* 4. **Statutes Referred** 1. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) DR. SC TRIPATHI, ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996 (6TH ed. CENTRAL LAW PUBLICATIONS, 2012) [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) DR. SC TRIPATHI, ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996 (6TH ed. CENTRAL LAW PUBLICATIONS, 2012) [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) https://kjablr.kar.nic.in/assets/articles/Arbitration%20and%20Conciliation%20Act,%201996.pdf [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) https://kjablr.kar.nic.in/assets/articles/Arbitration%20and%20Conciliation%20Act,%201996.pdf [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) \[1992\] ADRLJ 245 [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) 2012 (2) Arb LR 296 (Delhi). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) 2013 (1) Arb LR 327 (P&H) (DB) [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Parina Katyal, Order Passed by The Arbitrator Allowing Meetings As Per Convenience Of Parties, Would Not Change The Seat Of Arbitration: Delhi High Court, Live Law, 7 June 2022 2:00 PM, [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) (2014) 5 SCC 1 [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Garg R and Law L, “Live Law” (Live Law, October 3, 2022) [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) \[1976\] 2 All ER 842 [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Voltas Limited vs. Rolta India Limited. (2014) 4 SCC 516: 2014 (1) Arb LR 343 (SC): AIR 2014 SC 1772.) [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1460737/ [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. vs. Jyothi Turbopower Services P. Ltd., 2017 (1) Arb LR 289 (Mad) (DB): (2016) 4 CTC 1 [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) https://indiankanoon.org/doc/569211/ [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) https://kjablr.kar.nic.in/assets/articles/Arbitration%20and%20Conciliation%20Act,%201996.pdf [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) 2018 SCC Online Kar 1209 [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Law VAPBSFEIA, “Arbitral Tribunal’s Power to Recall: A Hasty Judicial Creation?” (RMLNLU Arbitration Law Blog, May 24, 2023) [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Arbitration Petition Nos. 556/2014 & 680/2014 [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1752162/ [\[22\]](#_ftnref22)“Arbitration and ADR – Chapter 5 – Conduct of Arbitral Proceedings” **Categories:** Articles --- ### [Accident as defence under Law of torts: Meaning, Principles and Cases](https://lawfoyer.in/accident-as-defence-under-law-of-torts-meaning-principles-and-cases/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Shruti Mayur, Amity University

INTRODUCTION

Tort is a wrongful act for which the defendant gives the compensation to the individual who have suffered harm or injury due to his/her actions. According to Salmond, “Tort is a civil wrong for which the remedy is common law action for unliquidated damages and which is not exclusively the breach of contract or the breach of a trust or other merely equitable obligation.” The word ‘tort’ derives from the Latin word ‘Tortum’ which means to twist. It is a violation of right in rem leading to legal injury and redressable by unliquidated damages. If a plaintiff sues a defendant for a specific wrongful act, providing the existence of all the essentials of that act as a tort, the defendant will be held liable. However, there are certain situations where the defendant can escape from his liability by taking the defences available. There are many defences in the law of tort which are categorized further in two parts i.e. General defences and Specific defences. Some of the general defences available for the tort are:
  1. Volenti non fit injuria
  2. Plaintiff, the wrongdoer
  3. Inevitable accident
  4. Act of God
  5. Private Defence
  6. Mistake
  7. Necessity
  8. Statutory Authority
This article deals with the topic of an accident as defence under the law of tort in detail. Keywords:  Tort law, Defences, Unavoidable, Inevitable accident, Liability. 

Meaning and Definition

An accident can be defined as an unforeseen incident, often sudden and unintentional event, that results in harm or injury to people property and the environment and may entitle the affected party to legal compensation, even if caused by carelessness lack of knowledge or a combination of factors. When the accident is an unforeseeable and unavoidable incident that results in harm then it is known as inevitable accident in the law of tort and used as defence by the defendant for which he is not held liable. It is a specific defence strategy used to completely absolve the defendant of responsibility for the accident’s consequences. Sir Federick Pollock defined accident as an inevitable accident “not avoidable by any such precautions as a reasonable man, doing such an act then there, could be expected to take.”

 Types of an accident:

The very first thought that comes to mind after hearing the word “accident” is a road accident. But there are many types of accidents such as:
  1. Motor vehicle accident
  2. Mechanical failure
  3. Pedestrian injury accident
  4. Workplace accident
  5. Fire safety accidents
  6. Collisions
  7. Falling
  8. Medical malpractice
  9. Repetitive stress injuries
  10. Slip and fall injuries etc.

Nature of an accident:

Causes: -    Accidents can be caused by various factors such as:
  1. Human error – It is the leading cause of accidents, often stemming from factors like negligence, recklessness, distracted behaviours and a lack of situational awareness.
  2. Mechanical failure - Such as malfunctions, defects, or improper maintenance in vehicles, machinery and other equipment is another significant contributor to accidents.
  3. Environmental factors- It includes natural disasters, adverse weather conditions and unsafe environments which can significantly increase the risk of accidents.
  4. Unforeseen events- Events such as sudden medical emergencies or unpredictable animal behaviour can sometimes trigger accidents even when beyond human control.
Foreseeability: -
  1. Foreseeable- These accidents are potentially foreseeable and preventable with the exercise of proper care and the implementation of appropriate safety measures.
  2. Unforeseeable- These accidents constitute truly unforeseeable events which are impossible to anticipate under the unique circumstances.
Intentionality: -
  1. Unintentional- These events occur in an unintentional manner, devoid of any premeditation or intent to inflict harm.
  2. Rarely intentional-In rare instances, accidents may stem from deliberate actions, often falling within the purview of criminal law rather than tort law.
Outcome: -
  1. Property damage- This involves damage to vehicles, buildings, or other belongings.
  2. Personal injury- This involves injuries ranging from minor to life threatening or fatal consequences.
  3. Emotional distress- Accidents can cause psychological trauma and emotional suffering.
  4. Financial loss-This can include medical bills, lost wages, and other costs associated with the accident.
Legal Implications: - Depending upon the nature of the accident, various legal considerations may arise, including: -
  1. Tort law- This legal domain focuses on resolving claims for compensation arising from injuries or losses caused by the negligence or misconduct of others
  2. Criminal law- In certain cases, criminal charges may be brought if the accident involved intentional acts or gross negligence.
For the defendant to use the accident as defence i.e., inevitable accident which is general defence in the law of tort, it is necessary to show the nature of the accident. Inevitable accident means the unavoidable accident that is harm or injury caused due to the unforeseeable circumstances and was not preventable. For example-
  1. If a man was driving a car and he was all in his senses and took all due care, but suddenly due to mechanical part failure his car loses his balance and hits a passer-by. In this case, a man would not be held liable as he took all precautions from his side. The accident was unavoidable.
  2. Sam was driving a car with all the reasonable care from his part. Suddenly due to heavy rain and storm the road collapsed and Sam’s car hit many pedestrians. Here also Sam would not be held liable as it was completely out of his hand.

Types of Inevitable Accident:

Inevitable accident may be classified into two categories: -
  1. Accidents which are caused by the elementary forces of nature apart from human agency or other causes. The term “Act of God” is used to describe such acts.
  2. Accidents which are entirely or partially the outcome of human agency, whether by the acts of commission or omission, misdeeds, or inactions or through any other causes unrelated to the action of natural agencies.

Principles/Essential of Inevitable accident:

  1. Unforeseeable- The accident must be impossible to predict or anticipate, beyond human control.
  2. Unavoidable- The accident could not have been prevented even with the reasonable care and safety measures. The defendant can argue that he exercised all reasonable care to avoid the accident, regardless of its ultimate outcome.
  3. No alternative action- The defendant, acting reasonably, had no alternative course of action available that could have prevented the accident.
Exceptions to Inevitable Accident: The defence of inevitable accident is inapplicable to: -
  1. Intentional torts - The wrongful acts such as assault, battery trespass are committed deliberately. In these acts intent is a key element, so the concept of an unavoidable accident or inevitable accident does not apply and the plaintiff bears burden of proof.
  2. Strict/Absolute Liability- The defence of inevitable accident is not applicable as the liability arises regardless of negligence, carelessness, intent to do the act, knowledge of the act and so on due to the inherently risky nature of the activity. Ex- keeping dangerous animals, engaging in abnormally dangerous activities like storing explosives or operating nuclear power plant. This doctrine was established in the case of M.C Mehta v. Union of India.
  3. Negligence- The defence of inevitable accident is inadmissible in negligence proceedings as the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff.
 Landmark cases: In the case, Holmes v. Mather, a runway horse incident on a public road caused an injury. The defendant’s servant, who was leading the horses, lost control of them when a dog barked. Despite the servant’s best efforts, the horses bolted and struck the plaintiff, causing serious harm. So, the court ruled that the accident was unavoidable or inevitable and the defendant was not held liable. In the case, Stanley v. Powell, the plaintiff and defendant were shooting members who went for a pheasant shooting party. The defendant aimed the gun to shoot at a pheasant, but the bullet was ricocheted by an oak tree and struck the plaintiff, who got injured. The plaintiff filed the case wherein the defendant argued and took the defence of inevitable accident. The court agreed, finding the defendant could not have predicted the bullets ricochet and the plaintiff’s injury. In the case, Brown v. Kendall, both Brown, the plaintiff and Kendall, the defendant owned dogs that got into a fight. Kendall tried to break them up by swinging a large stick. Brown who had been keeping his distance, walked behind Kendall as the dogs moved away. Unfortunately, Kendall didn't see brown and accidentally struck him in the eye with the stick during his swing, causing serious injuries. Brown sued Kendall for assault and battery to which court held that it was purely an inevitable accident and dismissed the case. In the case of Fardon v. Harcourt-Rivington, the defendant left a dog unattended inside a parked car. Despite the dog’s initial quiet demeanor, it became agitated and ultimately shattered a car window. Unfortunately, a passerby, the plaintiff, was struck in the eye by a shard of glass from the broken window and subsequently filed a lawsuit against the defendant seeking compensation for the injury. Lord Dunedin, however, ruled in favor of the defendant, finding them not liable for accident. His reasoning centered on the concept of remoteness and foreseeability. He stated that while individuals hold a responsibility to guard against reasonably anticipated dangers, they are not obligated to foresee and prevent entirely improbable occurrences. In this specific case, the court deemed the dog’s actions and the resulting injury to be so unlikely that they did not constitute a foreseeable danger. He further emphasized this distinction by declaring, “People must guard against reasonable probabilities, but they are not bound against fantastic probabilities.” In the case, Padmavati v. Dugganaika, two strangers accepted a ride in a Jeep. Tragically, during the journey, a critical malfunction occurred. A bolt securing the right front wheel to the axle became dislodged. this critical failure caused the jeep to loose control and overturn, resulting in severe injuries to both passengers, with one sadly succumbing to their wounds. The plaintiff’s, likely relatives of the deceased and injured passengers, filed a lawsuit against the driver and owner of the jeep, seeking compensation for the injuries incurred. However, the court ultimately ruled in favor of the defendants. The court’s reasoning centered on the nature of the accident, which they classified as a sheer accident. In simpler terms, the court determined that the event was entirely unforeseen and unavoidable. Critically, the defect that caused the accident, the loose bolt, was not reasonably detectable through standard maintenance procedures. Therefore, the court concluded that the driver and owner exhibited no negligence. Since they could not have foreseen or prevented the failure that caused the accident, they were not held liable for the unfortunate outcome.

CONCLUSION

In tort law, accident can be used as defence i.e. inevitable accident by proving the nature of an accident. The defendant can escape from his liability if the nature of the accident caused by him was unforeseeable, unintentional that could not be avoided despite all reasonable care by the defendant. Thus, the inevitable accident is significant defence in the law of tort which involves accidents that could not have been prevented by the parties although there was an exercise of reasonable care, caution, and skill. It is also known as unavoidable accident defence.

REFERENCES

  1. Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred
    1. R. K Bangia, Law of Torts (Allahabad Law Agency 2023)
  2. Online Articles / Sources Referred
    1. https://lawcorner.in/inevitable-accident-in-tort/#Types_of_Inevitable_Accident_in_Tort
    2. https://lawessential.com/miscellaneous/f/inevitable-accidents-in-law-of-torts?blogcategory=Miscellaneous#:~:text=Holmes%20v.,efforts%2C%20they%20injured%20the%20plaintiff.
    3. https://lawbhoomi.com/inevitable-accident/
    4. manupatra.com
    5. https://gemini.google.com/app
  1. Cases Referred
    1. Holmes v. Mather, (1875) LR 10
    2. Stanley v. Powell, 1 QB 86 (1891
    3. Brown v. Kendall,60 Mass.292 (1850)
    4. Fardon v. Harcourt-Rivington, (1932) 146 Lt 391
    5. Padmavati v. Dugganaika (1975)
**Content:** **Author-Shruti Mayur, Amity University** ### **INTRODUCTION** Tort is a wrongful act for which the defendant gives the compensation to the individual who have suffered harm or injury due to his/her actions. According to Salmond, “*Tort is a civil wrong for which the remedy is common law action for unliquidated damages and which is not exclusively the breach of contract or the breach of a trust or other merely equitable obligation*.” The word ‘tort’ derives from the Latin word ‘Tortum’ which means to twist. It is a violation of right in rem leading to legal injury and redressable by unliquidated damages. If a plaintiff sues a defendant for a specific wrongful act, providing the existence of all the essentials of that act as a tort, the defendant will be held liable. However, there are certain situations where the defendant can escape from his liability by taking the defences available. There are many defences in the law of tort which are categorized further in two parts i.e. General defences and Specific defences. Some of the general defences available for the tort are: 1. Volenti non fit injuria 2. Plaintiff, the wrongdoer 3. Inevitable accident 4. Act of God 5. Private Defence 6. Mistake 7. Necessity 8. Statutory Authority This article deals with the topic of an accident as defence under the law of tort in detail. ***Keywords*: Tort law, Defences, Unavoidable, Inevitable accident, Liability. ### **Meaning and Definition** An accident can be defined as an unforeseen incident, often sudden and unintentional event, that results in harm or injury to people property and the environment and may entitle the affected party to legal compensation, even if caused by carelessness lack of knowledge or a combination of factors. When the accident is an unforeseeable and unavoidable incident that results in harm then it is known as inevitable accident in the law of tort and used as defence by the defendant for which he is not held liable. It is a specific defence strategy used to completely absolve the defendant of responsibility for the accident’s consequences. Sir Federick Pollock defined accident as an inevitable accident “*not avoidable by any such precautions as a reasonable man, doing such an act then there, could be expected to take.”* ### **Types of an accident:** The very first thought that comes to mind after hearing the word “accident” is a road accident. But there are many types of accidents such as: 1. Motor vehicle accident 2. Mechanical failure 3. Pedestrian injury accident 4. Workplace accident 5. Fire safety accidents 6. Collisions 7. Falling 8. Medical malpractice 9. Repetitive stress injuries 10. Slip and fall injuries etc. ### **Nature of an accident:** Causes: – Accidents can be caused by various factors such as: 1. Human error – It is the leading cause of accidents, often stemming from factors like negligence, recklessness, distracted behaviours and a lack of situational awareness. 2. Mechanical failure – Such as malfunctions, defects, or improper maintenance in vehicles, machinery and other equipment is another significant contributor to accidents. 3. Environmental factors- It includes natural disasters, adverse weather conditions and unsafe environments which can significantly increase the risk of accidents. 4. Unforeseen events- Events such as sudden medical emergencies or unpredictable animal behaviour can sometimes trigger accidents even when beyond human control. **Foreseeability: –** 1. Foreseeable- These accidents are potentially foreseeable and preventable with the exercise of proper care and the implementation of appropriate safety measures. 2. Unforeseeable- These accidents constitute truly unforeseeable events which are impossible to anticipate under the unique circumstances. **Intentionality: –** 1. Unintentional- These events occur in an unintentional manner, devoid of any premeditation or intent to inflict harm. 2. Rarely intentional-In rare instances, accidents may stem from deliberate actions, often falling within the purview of criminal law rather than tort law. **Outcome: –** 1. Property damage- This involves damage to vehicles, buildings, or other belongings. 2. Personal injury- This involves injuries ranging from minor to life threatening or fatal consequences. 3. Emotional distress- Accidents can cause psychological trauma and emotional suffering. 4. Financial loss-This can include medical bills, lost wages, and other costs associated with the accident. **Legal Implications: –** Depending upon the nature of the accident, various legal considerations may arise, including: – 1. Tort law- This legal domain focuses on resolving claims for compensation arising from injuries or losses caused by the negligence or misconduct of others 2. Criminal law- In certain cases, criminal charges may be brought if the accident involved intentional acts or gross negligence. For the defendant to use the accident as defence i.e., inevitable accident which is general defence in the law of tort, it is necessary to show the nature of the accident. Inevitable accident means the unavoidable accident that is harm or injury caused due to the unforeseeable circumstances and was not preventable. For example- 1. If a man was driving a car and he was all in his senses and took all due care, but suddenly due to mechanical part failure his car loses his balance and hits a passer-by. In this case, a man would not be held liable as he took all precautions from his side. The accident was unavoidable. 2. Sam was driving a car with all the reasonable care from his part. Suddenly due to heavy rain and storm the road collapsed and Sam’s car hit many pedestrians. Here also Sam would not be held liable as it was completely out of his hand. ### **Types of Inevitable Accident:** Inevitable accident may be classified into two categories: – 1. Accidents which are caused by the elementary forces of nature apart from human agency or other causes. The term “Act of God” is used to describe such acts. 2. Accidents which are entirely or partially the outcome of human agency, whether by the acts of commission or omission, misdeeds, or inactions or through any other causes unrelated to the action of natural agencies. ### **Principles/Essential of Inevitable accident:** 1. Unforeseeable- The accident must be impossible to predict or anticipate, beyond human control. 2. Unavoidable- The accident could not have been prevented even with the reasonable care and safety measures. The defendant can argue that he exercised all reasonable care to avoid the accident, regardless of its ultimate outcome. 3. No alternative action- The defendant, acting reasonably, had no alternative course of action available that could have prevented the accident. **Exceptions to Inevitable Accident:** The defence of inevitable accident is inapplicable to: – 1. Intentional torts – The wrongful acts such as assault, battery trespass are committed deliberately. In these acts intent is a key element, so the concept of an unavoidable accident or inevitable accident does not apply and the plaintiff bears burden of proof. 2. Strict/Absolute Liability- The defence of inevitable accident is not applicable as the liability arises regardless of negligence, carelessness, intent to do the act, knowledge of the act and so on due to the inherently risky nature of the activity. Ex- keeping dangerous animals, engaging in abnormally dangerous activities like storing explosives or operating nuclear power plant. This doctrine was established in the case of M.C Mehta v. Union of India. 3. Negligence- The defence of inevitable accident is inadmissible in negligence proceedings as the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff. **Landmark cases:** In the case, **Holmes v. Mather**, a runway horse incident on a public road caused an injury. The defendant’s servant, who was leading the horses, lost control of them when a dog barked. Despite the servant’s best efforts, the horses bolted and struck the plaintiff, causing serious harm. So, the court ruled that the accident was unavoidable or inevitable and the defendant was not held liable. In the case, **Stanley v. Powell,** the plaintiff and defendant were shooting members who went for a pheasant shooting party. The defendant aimed the gun to shoot at a pheasant, but the bullet was ricocheted by an oak tree and struck the plaintiff, who got injured. The plaintiff filed the case wherein the defendant argued and took the defence of inevitable accident. The court agreed, finding the defendant could not have predicted the bullets ricochet and the plaintiff’s injury. In the case, **Brown v. Kendall**, both Brown, the plaintiff and Kendall, the defendant owned dogs that got into a fight. Kendall tried to break them up by swinging a large stick. Brown who had been keeping his distance, walked behind Kendall as the dogs moved away. Unfortunately, Kendall didn’t see brown and accidentally struck him in the eye with the stick during his swing, causing serious injuries. Brown sued Kendall for assault and battery to which court held that it was purely an inevitable accident and dismissed the case. In the case of **Fardon v. Harcourt-Rivington,** the defendant left a dog unattended inside a parked car. Despite the dog’s initial quiet demeanor, it became agitated and ultimately shattered a car window. Unfortunately, a passerby, the plaintiff, was struck in the eye by a shard of glass from the broken window and subsequently filed a lawsuit against the defendant seeking compensation for the injury. Lord Dunedin, however, ruled in favor of the defendant, finding them not liable for accident. His reasoning centered on the concept of remoteness and foreseeability. He stated that while individuals hold a responsibility to guard against reasonably anticipated dangers, they are not obligated to foresee and prevent entirely improbable occurrences. In this specific case, the court deemed the dog’s actions and the resulting injury to be so unlikely that they did not constitute a foreseeable danger. He further emphasized this distinction by declaring, “*People must guard against reasonable probabilities, but they are not bound against fantastic probabilities*.” In the case, **Padmavati v. Dugganaika,** two strangers accepted a ride in a Jeep. Tragically, during the journey, a critical malfunction occurred. A bolt securing the right front wheel to the axle became dislodged. this critical failure caused the jeep to loose control and overturn, resulting in severe injuries to both passengers, with one sadly succumbing to their wounds. The plaintiff’s, likely relatives of the deceased and injured passengers, filed a lawsuit against the driver and owner of the jeep, seeking compensation for the injuries incurred. However, the court ultimately ruled in favor of the defendants. The court’s reasoning centered on the nature of the accident, which they classified as a sheer accident. In simpler terms, the court determined that the event was entirely unforeseen and unavoidable. Critically, the defect that caused the accident, the loose bolt, was not reasonably detectable through standard maintenance procedures. Therefore, the court concluded that the driver and owner exhibited no negligence. Since they could not have foreseen or prevented the failure that caused the accident, they were not held liable for the unfortunate outcome. ### **CONCLUSION** In tort law, accident can be used as defence i.e. inevitable accident by proving the nature of an accident. The defendant can escape from his liability if the nature of the accident caused by him was unforeseeable, unintentional that could not be avoided despite all reasonable care by the defendant. Thus, the inevitable accident is significant defence in the law of tort which involves accidents that could not have been prevented by the parties although there was an exercise of reasonable care, caution, and skill. It is also known as unavoidable accident defence. ### **REFERENCES** 1. **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** 1. R. K Bangia, Law of Torts (Allahabad Law Agency 2023) 2. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. [https://lawcorner.in/inevitable-accident-in-tort/#Types\_of\_Inevitable\_Accident\_in\_Tort](https://lawcorner.in/inevitable-accident-in-tort/#Types_of_Inevitable_Accident_in_Tort) 2. . 3. 4. [manupatra.com](http://www.manupatra.com) 5. 3. **Cases Referred** 1. Holmes v. Mather, (1875) LR 10 2. Stanley v. Powell, 1 QB 86 (1891 3. Brown v. Kendall,60 Mass.292 (1850) 4. Fardon v. Harcourt-Rivington, (1932) 146 Lt 391 5. Padmavati v. Dugganaika (1975) **Categories:** Articles --- ### [SALE UNDER TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT: PROVISIONS, ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLE AND CASES](https://lawfoyer.in/sale-under-transfer-of-property-act-provisions-essential-principle-and-cases/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Rituparna Panda, Birla Global University Bhubneswar

INTRODUCTION

The integral component of Indian Property Law is the Transfer of Property Act 1882. It supervises the transfer of ownership of immovable property by various means which includes sale. According to the Transfer of Property Act Sale succinctly means “Transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised, or part paid or part promised”[1]. If we bifurcate this definition, it highlights the three substantial elements of sale i.e., Transfer of ownership which means the person who sells the property voluntarily yields over the ownership of the said property to the purchaser, Second element that this definition put lights on is Price as the transfer is done some monetary value is received in return. Lastly it concentrates on the payment terms which says that the price of the purchase can be settled as a whole, in instalments, or can be partially paid with a remainder pledged for later. Following each sale, the buyer receives full ownership rights to the property as specified in the 'selling agreement'. Ideally, every sale is registered with the sub-registrar's office. A verbal contract is legal alongside the written contract, albeit it is not recommended. Stamp duty is incurred on each selling transaction, based on the selling price or sale value of the property.
  • Keywords (Minimum 5): Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TPA), Sale of immovable property, Ownership transfer, Consideration (price), Registration of sale deed.

Historical Background / Evolution

Prior to the implementation of TPA 1882, property transfer in India was done in a very complicated procedure-
  • Personal Laws- As we know India is called the ‘Land of Diversity’, having various religious community like Hindu and Muslim and they having their own personal laws and rules regarding the transfer of property resulting in discrepancies and lack of standardization throughout the country.
  • Civil Procedure Code 1859- This code offered a primitive foundation for carrying out the court rulings which at a time involved property transfers. However, it somehow lacked behind in framing the regulations that will govern sales transaction.
  • Indian Contract Act 1872- This act was established to govern the principles of contract law, which also has some rules and regulations utilised for sale agreement to some extent. However it did not covered the specifics of property transfer.
This decentralised legal system led to ambiguity and discrepancies, making it challenging for the buyers and sellers to foresee the transaction outcomes. This resulted in a lot of disagreements ultimately leading to limitless lawsuits. This lead to an urge of having an universal laws that will facilitate secured property transactions across the country, thereby meeting the requirements for clarity and standardization. It was the time when British Colonial Administration came into the picture and adopted TPA 1882 to codify the existing laws and principle that regulates the property transfers. It streamlined the sales procedure by identifying the key aspects, rights and duties for both the parties involved. The TPA was designed in an uniform system for registering the sale deeds, that not only ensures the public record but also strengthens the legal protection. This key milestone in Indian property law, with subsequent revisions and court interpretations, forms the foundation of property transfer legislation today.

Comparison with other Countries

While TPA in India provides a codified framework, while other nations have their own legal frameworks for regulating the property sales. Here are some of ideas for comparison-
  • Property Transaction in common Law jurisdictions, such as England and the United States, are influenced by the common law concepts.
    • Fraud Statutes- These jurisdictions, like TPA, demand that certain transactions (like as land sales) be in writing.
    • Recording Systems-To provide openness and legal certainty, several countries establish public land registries.
  • Civil Law jurisdictions such as France and Germany.
  • Notarial System- Notaries are important in transfer of property in territories where civil law prevails.
  • Formalities- Strict procedure are often need to be followed for property transactions.
  • Publicity- The public record consists of the details about ownership of property.
  • Country Specific Practices-
  • United States- Each has a unique set of property laws, such as those governing sales, deeds and title transfers.
  • United Kingdom- The land registry handles property records, guaranteeing openness and efficiency in the conveyancing process.
  • Germany- Notaries regulates the property transfers, and registration is required for legal validity.

Types / Kinds 

There are two kinds of sale-
  • Conditional Sale
  • Sale with Leaseback
  • Conditional Sale- Certain criteria, such as getting government clearances or resolving title problems, must be met before the transaction may go through.
  • Sale with Leaseback- Under a lease arrangement, the seller leases the property to the buyer while retaining ownership for a set amount of time.

Forms / Modes 

The mode is dependent on the value of the property-
  • Registration- For immovable property worth Rs.100 or more, the sale needs to be registered under the Registration Act 1908 for lawfully transfer of ownership.
  • Delivery of Possession (Limited)- For the properties worth less than Rs. 100, an authorized sale can be accomplished merely by handling over the actual possession of the property to the purchaser. However, for greater legal protection registration act as a best safeguard.

Essentials / Elements / Pre-requisites

The Transfer of Property Act (TPA) defines numerous basic requirements for a legitimate sale of immovable property-
  • Competent Parties-
  • Seller (Transferor)- The seller must be legally authorized to transfer the ownership. This essentially means that they needs to be of sound mind, an adult (above 18 years of age), and must not be disqualified by any law.
  • Buyer (Transferee)- Similarly like the transferer the transferee requires to be competent to get involved in such kind of contract.
  • Transferrable Subject Matter-
The agreement to purchase involves immovable property, which includes land, buildings, and anything permanently linked to the earth.
  • Price (Consideration)-
The considerations needs to be first set and it needs to be determinable. Mostly the consideration is monetary in nature but it may also include other types of significant reimbursements, which needs to be agreed by both the parties.

Contract Of Sale-

A Contract for Sale under section 54 of TPA is defined as an agreement between an seller and buyer that a certain immovable property would be sold on the terms and conditions agreed upon between them. The aforementioned contract does not transfer the ownership of the property but instead it defines the parameters and circumstances for a future transfer.
  • Essentials-
  1. Competent Parties- Both the seller as well as buyer needs to be legally competent i.e., they must be of sound mind and must be above the age of 18, and must not be disqualified by any law.
  2. Transferrable Subject Matter- The immovable property means the property which are permanently linked to the earth like land, buildings etc, must be the subject matter of the agreement.
  3. Definite and determinable Price- The agreement made for the property must be in exchange of a definite amount of consideration which can be paid fully or in instalments.
  4. Terms and Conditions- The agreement needs to have the terms and conditions clearly-
  • The description of the property should be precise enough to identify it individually.
  • The timing and parameters under which the buyer will take physical possession of the property.
  • The agreement also specifies about who will be responsible for any loss or damages occurred in the property before the completion of the transaction.
  • Any extra criteria required needs to be completed before the sale took place. Like- getting permissions or resolving title difficulties etc.
  • Importance of Contract for Sale-
  • A well drafted contract gives the clarity and certainty that helps in protecting both buyer and seller, by clearly elaborating them their rights and duties and reducing the conflicts that may arise in future.
  • It also helps in legally enforcing, if either parties violates the term of the contract.
  • It helps in formally transfer of title upon registration and the provisions agreed upon acts as a foundation of the final sale deed.
It is a very critical task to analysis and recall that a contract of sale under this act generates ‘Right in Personam’[2] for the buyer which means it may be enforced against the seller only. The seller retains title of the property until the transaction is finalised by registering the selling deed, which creates a ‘Right in Rem’[3] that is enforceable against everyone.

Case Laws / Precedents / Overrulings

  • VIDYADHAR V. MANIKRAO (1999)[4] 
In this case the supreme court ruled that ‘a sale’ required the intention of the party to transfer the ownership of the property. The purpose is derived from the disclosures in the sale deed, the parties actions and the evidence on file.
  • COMMISIONER OF INCOME TAX V. M/S MOTOR AND GENERAL STORES (1967)[5]
In this case the Supreme Court held that the price, in the general terms refers to monetary gains for the sale of the property. It was also additionally determined that if any other consideration is retained, then the transaction will not be considered as a sale rather it will be determined as exchange or barter.
  • HAKIM SINGH V. RAM SNEHI (2001)[6]
In this case the Allahabad court held that insufficiency in payment is not a significant factor in sale. Even if the court discovers that the price or the consideration given is less than the property’s worth in the market, the sale nonetheless will be considered to be legitimate.

Doctrines / Theories 

While the TPA 1882 has not given any specific emphasis on the “doctrines” in relation to sale but here are some of the frequently referred doctrines which are applicable to sales-
  • Doctrine of Estopple-
This theory strictly prohibits a person from rejecting or contradicted to its opinion that they had already mentioned and if the other party acted according to it and had faced a huge damage as result of it. Under sale this may be very important in case where the seller makes any misleading claim regarding the property, causing the buyer to engage into the transaction and then attempting to back out from the same. In such circumstances this doctrine will act as a boon for the buyers as it will prevent the seller from refuting its representation because of buyer’s trust and possible loss.
  • Doctrine of Caveat Emptor-
This doctrine especially gives an idea which means “let the buyer beaware” typically expressing that the buyer will be responsible for investigating and ensuring the condition of the property that they are buying. While not specifically stated, the TPA's emphasis on "caveat venditor" (let the seller beware) through mandated disclosures and potential penalties for seller misrepresentations offers a framework that somewhat mitigates the strictness of "caveat emptor."
  • Doctrine of Election[7] -
This idea came into existence when the person has the right to claim the same property under two or more contradictory titles. Here the individual can select only one title, not entitle for both.

CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Transfer of Property Act 1882, is an important regulation in India that serves seamless and safely sale of immovable property. It safeguards the rights and interests of purchasers and sellers by setting an unambiguous structure for ownership transfer. Understanding the characteristics enables people to navigate the sales procedure with assurance and protect their interests. Further research into current events and upcoming trends might assist negotiate the intricacies of selling under the TPA.

REFERENCES

  1. Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred
    1. THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT BY-DR. R.K. SINHA
  2. Online Articles / Sources Referred
    1. https://www.coursehero.com/file/92741157/Sale-and-Exchange-under-Transfer-of-Property-Actdocx/
    2. https://blog.ipleaders.in/sale-under-transfer-of-property-act-1882/
  1. Cases Referred
    1. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1332419/
    2. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1798885/
    3. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1898632/
    4. https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5767b11ae691cb22da6d3514
  2. Statutes Referred
    1. Transfer of Property Act 1882
    2. The Indian Contract Act 1872
[1] Section 54 of Transfer of Property Act 1882. [2] It gives the person rights against one person or party to the contract. [3] It gives the right that relates to a specific property and can be enforced against anyone who interferes with the property. [4] AIR 1999 SC 1441 [5] 1968 AIR 200 [6] (1908) ILR 30 ALI 248 [7] Section 40 of TPA 1882 **Content:** **Author-Rituparna Panda, Birla Global University Bhubneswar** ### **INTRODUCTION** The integral component of Indian Property Law is the Transfer of Property Act 1882. It supervises the transfer of ownership of immovable property by various means which includes sale. According to the Transfer of Property Act Sale succinctly means “Transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised, or part paid or part promised”[\[1\]](#_ftn1). If we bifurcate this definition, it highlights the three substantial elements of sale i.e., Transfer of ownership which means the person who sells the property voluntarily yields over the ownership of the said property to the purchaser, Second element that this definition put lights on is Price as the transfer is done some monetary value is received in return. Lastly it concentrates on the payment terms which says that the price of the purchase can be settled as a whole, in instalments, or can be partially paid with a remainder pledged for later. Following each sale, the buyer receives full ownership rights to the property as specified in the ‘selling agreement’. Ideally, every sale is registered with the sub-registrar’s office. A verbal contract is legal alongside the written contract, albeit it is not recommended. Stamp duty is incurred on each selling transaction, based on the selling price or sale value of the property. - ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*:** Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TPA), Sale of immovable property, Ownership transfer, Consideration (price), Registration of sale deed. ### **Historical Background / Evolution** Prior to the implementation of TPA 1882, property transfer in India was done in a very complicated procedure- - Personal Laws- As we know India is called the ‘Land of Diversity’, having various religious community like Hindu and Muslim and they having their own personal laws and rules regarding the transfer of property resulting in discrepancies and lack of standardization throughout the country. - Civil Procedure Code 1859- This code offered a primitive foundation for carrying out the court rulings which at a time involved property transfers. However, it somehow lacked behind in framing the regulations that will govern sales transaction. - Indian Contract Act 1872- This act was established to govern the principles of contract law, which also has some rules and regulations utilised for sale agreement to some extent. However it did not covered the specifics of property transfer. This decentralised legal system led to ambiguity and discrepancies, making it challenging for the buyers and sellers to foresee the transaction outcomes. This resulted in a lot of disagreements ultimately leading to limitless lawsuits. This lead to an urge of having an universal laws that will facilitate secured property transactions across the country, thereby meeting the requirements for clarity and standardization. It was the time when British Colonial Administration came into the picture and adopted TPA 1882 to codify the existing laws and principle that regulates the property transfers. It streamlined the sales procedure by identifying the key aspects, rights and duties for both the parties involved. The TPA was designed in an uniform system for registering the sale deeds, that not only ensures the public record but also strengthens the legal protection. This key milestone in Indian property law, with subsequent revisions and court interpretations, forms the foundation of property transfer legislation today. ### **Comparison with other Countries** While TPA in India provides a codified framework, while other nations have their own legal frameworks for regulating the property sales. Here are some of ideas for comparison- - Property Transaction in common Law jurisdictions, such as England and the United States, are influenced by the common law concepts. - Fraud Statutes- These jurisdictions, like TPA, demand that certain transactions (like as land sales) be in writing. - Recording Systems-To provide openness and legal certainty, several countries establish public land registries. - Civil Law jurisdictions such as France and Germany. - Notarial System- Notaries are important in transfer of property in territories where civil law prevails. - Formalities- Strict procedure are often need to be followed for property transactions. - Publicity- The public record consists of the details about ownership of property. - Country Specific Practices- - United States- Each has a unique set of property laws, such as those governing sales, deeds and title transfers. - United Kingdom- The land registry handles property records, guaranteeing openness and efficiency in the conveyancing process. - Germany- Notaries regulates the property transfers, and registration is required for legal validity. ### **Types / Kinds** There are two kinds of sale- - Conditional Sale - Sale with Leaseback - Conditional Sale- Certain criteria, such as getting government clearances or resolving title problems, must be met before the transaction may go through. - Sale with Leaseback- Under a lease arrangement, the seller leases the property to the buyer while retaining ownership for a set amount of time. ### **Forms / Modes** The mode is dependent on the value of the property- - Registration- For immovable property worth Rs.100 or more, the sale needs to be registered under the Registration Act 1908 for lawfully transfer of ownership. - Delivery of Possession (Limited)- For the properties worth less than Rs. 100, an authorized sale can be accomplished merely by handling over the actual possession of the property to the purchaser. However, for greater legal protection registration act as a best safeguard. ### **Essentials / Elements / Pre-requisites** The Transfer of Property Act (TPA) defines numerous basic requirements for a legitimate sale of immovable property- - Competent Parties- - Seller (Transferor)- The seller must be legally authorized to transfer the ownership. This essentially means that they needs to be of sound mind, an adult (above 18 years of age), and must not be disqualified by any law. - Buyer (Transferee)- Similarly like the transferer the transferee requires to be competent to get involved in such kind of contract. - Transferrable Subject Matter- The agreement to purchase involves immovable property, which includes land, buildings, and anything permanently linked to the earth. - Price (Consideration)- The considerations needs to be first set and it needs to be determinable. Mostly the consideration is monetary in nature but it may also include other types of significant reimbursements, which needs to be agreed by both the parties. ### **Contract Of Sale-** A Contract for Sale under section 54 of TPA is defined as an agreement between an seller and buyer that a certain immovable property would be sold on the terms and conditions agreed upon between them. The aforementioned contract does not transfer the ownership of the property but instead it defines the parameters and circumstances for a future transfer. - Essentials- 1. Competent Parties- Both the seller as well as buyer needs to be legally competent i.e., they must be of sound mind and must be above the age of 18, and must not be disqualified by any law. 2. Transferrable Subject Matter- The immovable property means the property which are permanently linked to the earth like land, buildings etc, must be the subject matter of the agreement. 3. Definite and determinable Price- The agreement made for the property must be in exchange of a definite amount of consideration which can be paid fully or in instalments. 4. Terms and Conditions- The agreement needs to have the terms and conditions clearly- - The description of the property should be precise enough to identify it individually. - The timing and parameters under which the buyer will take physical possession of the property. - The agreement also specifies about who will be responsible for any loss or damages occurred in the property before the completion of the transaction. - Any extra criteria required needs to be completed before the sale took place. Like- getting permissions or resolving title difficulties etc. - Importance of Contract for Sale- - A well drafted contract gives the clarity and certainty that helps in protecting both buyer and seller, by clearly elaborating them their rights and duties and reducing the conflicts that may arise in future. - It also helps in legally enforcing, if either parties violates the term of the contract. - It helps in formally transfer of title upon registration and the provisions agreed upon acts as a foundation of the final sale deed. It is a very critical task to analysis and recall that a contract of sale under this act generates ‘Right in Personam’[\[2\]](#_ftn2) for the buyer which means it may be enforced against the seller only. The seller retains title of the property until the transaction is finalised by registering the selling deed, which creates a ‘Right in Rem’[\[3\]](#_ftn3) that is enforceable against everyone. ### **Case Laws / Precedents / Overrulings** - **VIDYADHAR V. MANIKRAO (1999)[\[4\]](#_ftn4)** In this case the supreme court ruled that ‘a sale’ required the intention of the party to transfer the ownership of the property. The purpose is derived from the disclosures in the sale deed, the parties actions and the evidence on file. - **COMMISIONER OF INCOME TAX V. M/S MOTOR AND GENERAL STORES (1967)[\[5\]](#_ftn5)** In this case the Supreme Court held that the price, in the general terms refers to monetary gains for the sale of the property. It was also additionally determined that if any other consideration is retained, then the transaction will not be considered as a sale rather it will be determined as exchange or barter. - **HAKIM SINGH V. RAM SNEHI (2001)[\[6\]](#_ftn6)** In this case the Allahabad court held that insufficiency in payment is not a significant factor in sale. Even if the court discovers that the price or the consideration given is less than the property’s worth in the market, the sale nonetheless will be considered to be legitimate. ### **Doctrines / Theories** While the TPA 1882 has not given any specific emphasis on the “doctrines” in relation to sale but here are some of the frequently referred doctrines which are applicable to sales- - Doctrine of Estopple- This theory strictly prohibits a person from rejecting or contradicted to its opinion that they had already mentioned and if the other party acted according to it and had faced a huge damage as result of it. Under sale this may be very important in case where the seller makes any misleading claim regarding the property, causing the buyer to engage into the transaction and then attempting to back out from the same. In such circumstances this doctrine will act as a boon for the buyers as it will prevent the seller from refuting its representation because of buyer’s trust and possible loss. - Doctrine of Caveat Emptor- This doctrine especially gives an idea which means “let the buyer beaware” typically expressing that the buyer will be responsible for investigating and ensuring the condition of the property that they are buying. While not specifically stated, the TPA’s emphasis on “caveat venditor” (let the seller beware) through mandated disclosures and potential penalties for seller misrepresentations offers a framework that somewhat mitigates the strictness of “caveat emptor.” - Doctrine of Election[\[7\]](#_ftn7) – This idea came into existence when the person has the right to claim the same property under two or more contradictory titles. Here the individual can select only one title, not entitle for both. ### **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The Transfer of Property Act 1882, is an important regulation in India that serves seamless and safely sale of immovable property. It safeguards the rights and interests of purchasers and sellers by setting an unambiguous structure for ownership transfer. Understanding the characteristics enables people to navigate the sales procedure with assurance and protect their interests. Further research into current events and upcoming trends might assist negotiate the intricacies of selling under the TPA. ### **REFERENCES** 1. **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** 1. THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT BY-DR. R.K. SINHA 2. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. 2. 3. **Cases Referred** 1. 2. 3. 4. https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5767b11ae691cb22da6d3514 4. **Statutes Referred** 1. Transfer of Property Act 1882 2. The Indian Contract Act 1872 [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Section 54 of Transfer of Property Act 1882. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) It gives the person rights against one person or party to the contract. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) It gives the right that relates to a specific property and can be enforced against anyone who interferes with the property. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) AIR 1999 SC 1441 [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) 1968 AIR 200 [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) (1908) ILR 30 ALI 248 [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Section 40 of TPA 1882 **Categories:** Articles --- ### [MORTGAGE UNDER TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT](https://lawfoyer.in/mortgage-under-transfer-of-property-act/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Sushree Sangita Panda, Birla Global University, Bhubaneswar

INTRODUCTION

Mortgage is one of the most significant components of property law as it gives permission to people to receive funds or loans to purchase property. Simply Mortgage is something when a person gives a specific immovable property to another person and receives money against that property as a loan amount. That property acts as a security for the payment of future debt. It is a transfer of Partial interest for future payment which creates a pecuniary liability on the same. In India, Transfer of Property Act, 1882 governs the creation, redemption, enforcement, functions etc of the mortgage. Transfer of Property act 1882 also governs various typer of property transfer as well among which Mortgage is one. This research article dives into the elaborating description of the concept ‘MORTGAGE’ along with its principles, essentials, components, effects etc. The rules regulating mortgages under the TP Act incorporate important elements from property law, such as the redemption and priority principles. This study investigates key case laws and academic interpretations to gain insight into the actual implementation and interpretation of mortgage law under the TP Act. Keywords (Minimum 5): Mortgage, Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Property law, Immovable property, pecuniary Liability, Repayment of future debt.

Meaning, Definition & Explanation

According to section 58 of Transfer of Property Act 1882, “Mortgage is the transfer of an interest of an immovable property for the purpose of securing money in advanced, an existing or future debt or the performance of an engagement which may give rise to a pecuniary liability.” Simply we can say mortgage is one kind of security given by the borrower who is also known as a Mortgager to another party which is known as Mortgagee, on for paying back the loan amount. This concept of Mortgage is only applicable in Immovable of property.  By giving Mortgage, the Mortgager does not transfer the ownership right but only Transfers some right over that specific immovable property to the Mortgagee like In case the borrower fails to pay back the loans the mortgagee has the right to the authority over that property or to sale it for receiving its debt back. Furthermore, more often Mortgage is subjected to certain legal requirements such as registration the instrument to assure their legitimacy and enforceability.

Historical Background / Evolution

The concept “mortgage” has very ancient historical roots which can be traced back in various ancient civilizations. In the clay tablets which were received from Ancient Mesopotamia Civilization has also some traces of Mortgage. In that era also people used to give their property as collateral for loans. This method was also way too much common in ancient Egypt civilization. In Egypt civilization people used to lent their property to temples or rich person to get loans and when they pay the amount back, they used to receive their property back. In 1750 BCE, in BABYLON there was the first legal system which had framed some rules which were related to security for Loans. In ancient India there was also the practice of Mortgage which has been traced in “ ARTHASHASTRA” which talks about different types of loans which were secured by some guarantees. Another Ancient legal sculptures known as “DHARMASASHTRA” also addresses the issue of Mortgage in it along with the rights and liability of Borrowers and Lenders. Thus, the ancient practice of Mortgage unfolds the utilization of property as a collateral for loans by representing the universal requirement of security against the loans.

Comparison with other Countries

A comparison of Mortgage statues in various countries indicates a wide diversity of legislative structure and methods of governing property financing and security arrangement for the same. Although the legislative framework for rules and regulation of every nation is different from each other and every nation has its own peculiarities and antecedents, but a strong yet deep examination of mortgage laws all across the globe reveals its universal concept and theme of the procedure. The followings are some brief details about Mortgage laws of different countries;
  • UNITED STATES
The Mortgage regulation in US is governed by state laws. But certain federal rules like TILA[1] and RESPA[2] also plays a pivotal role to governing those Mortgage laws. The extensive usage of mortgaged-backed securities and secondary mortgage market are two specific features which Distinguishes the US mortgage system from the mortgage system of other nations. The eviction procedure in US differs from state to state. Some states require judicial foreclosure while some states permit non judicial foreclosure as well.
  • UNITED KINGDOM
In UK mortgage laws are regulated by two statues The Law of Property Act 1925 and Land Registration Act 2002. In UK market there are various types of options available for Mortgages like fixed-rate mortgages, variable-rate mortgages, interest only Mortgages etc.  For safeguarding the rights of Borrowers, the foreclosure procedure in UK includes judicial hearings and strong regulatory rules.
  • CANADA
The Mortgage regulation in Canada is overseen by Provincial laws and some federal rules like CMHC[3] and Bank Acts etc also plays significant Role and Impact on Mortgage laws. The Canadian Mortgage market stands out from the crowd for its high percentage of Homeownership and a diverse range of mortgage which comprises of fixed-rate, variable rate and hybrid mortgages. The procedure of foreclosure in Canada is similar to US.
  • INDIA
The Mortgage laws in India is controlled by TPA[4] and SARFAESI[5] act. Mortgage market in India offers a variety of mortgage merchandise like basic mortgage, conditional sale mortgage, Usufructuary mortgage etc. In India the process of foreclosure includes both Judicial and non-judicial approaches.

ESSENTIALS OF MORTGAGES UNDER TP ACT

The Transfer of Property Act,1882 Defines a certain legislative framework to regulate the procedures of Mortgages. Hence, there are certain essential conditions which needs to be fulfilled for the transaction mortgage. Such as;
  • TRANSFER OF INTEREST
As per the definition under the Act, Mortgage is a transmission of stake(interest) of a specific immovable property from borrower(mortgager) to the lender(mortgagee) for a specific amount of consideration. This transfer does not mean the entire transfer of Ownership but it generates certain rights to the lender as a security interest. In case of default, the lender of money has the right to acquire or sale the property for foreclosure of the debt.
  • THERE SHOULD BE A SPECIFIC IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
The property which will be mortgaged should be the specific and immovable one. There should not be any ambiguous about which property is mortgaged. Everything should be crystal clear about that particular property.
  • RIGHT TO SALE
By transferring the rights, the borrower gives certain rights to the lender to exercise over that particular mortgaged property. This right also includes Right to sale for foreclosure of the amount.
  • REDEMPTION RIGHT
The Transfer of Property Act also Recognizes the right of the Mortgager to REDEEM his property after repaying the debt amount. When the mortgager will fully pay the debt amount, he has the right to claim his property back. This right protects the interest of Borrower from loosing their property permanently just because of their temporary financial problem.

TYPES OF MORTGAGES UNDER TP ACT

The Transfer of Property Act highlights different types of mortgages in India. Each of them is different from each other as per characteristics and everything. They are;
  • SIMPLE MORTGAGE
Simple mortgage is dealt under section 58(b) of TP act. This is the most prevalent category of mortgage in India in which the borrower keeps the control over the collateral with him while transferring the right to sale to the lender. In the event of default, the mortgaged property will be sold by the other party to recover the debt amount.  In this case property can also be sold with the permission of court while there is a default in payment of the debt.
  • MORTGAGE BY CONDITIONAL SALE
This type of Mortgage is dealt under section 58(c) of Transfer of Property Act 1882. Mortgage by conditional sale means temporary change of ownership of the specific property by mortgager to the mortgagee. When the party pays back the debt amount the mortgaged property will be reverted back to its original owner. Furthermore, any condition which will prevent the mortgager to redeem his property back, will be considered as invalid.
  • MORTGAGE BY DEPOSIT OF TITLE DEED
Under section 58(f) of TP Act deals with ‘Mortgage by deposit of title deed’ which is also known as an equitable mortgage. In this type of mortgage, the mortgager deposits the deed of title of the property to the mortgagee as security. However, the ownership still remains with the mortgager and the deposit of title doesn’t grant the permission to the mortgagee to right to sale the property, automatically. In case of default, the mortgagee can only sale the property if there is a separate deed about the sale. This method is primarily used for short term loans or temporary securities.
  • USUFRUCTUARY MORTGAGE
This type of mortgage is defined under section 58(d) of Transfer of Property act 1882. This is one of the less prevalent kinds of mortgage, which states that the mortgagee can obtain the possession over the mortgaged property within the loan period. In exchange the mortgagee receives the right to collect rent from that mortgaged property which he will use as an interest amount. Although, the risk of repayment of loan is borne completely by the mortgager.
  • ANOMALOUS MORTGAGE
This type of mortgage is dealt under section 58(g) of Transfer of Property Act,1882. This is one type of special arrangement which is made on the basis of specific agreement which is created between Mortgager and Mortgagee. Sometimes, this type of mortgage involves components of different types of mortgages within it. In short, those types of mortgages which are not been mentioned under any of the other above-mentioned types, those will be covered under this Anomalous mortgage category. In this type of Mortgage is it crucial understand rights and duties of each party as this type of mortgage is based special agreement between the two parties. So before entering into this type of mortgage, legal advice is a must.
  • ENGLISH MORTGAGE
This is a type of mortgage which has been defined under section 58(e) of Transfer of Property Act,1882. In this type, there is an absolute transfer of property to the mortgagee but there is a condition that the debt amount needs to be paid in one particular date and after the completion of this procedure the mortgagee will re-transfer the property back to the mortgagor. In this type of mortgage, the mortgager by giving the absolute right over property to the mortgagee creates a binding force upon himself to repay the debt within that decided period. And it is also necessary that the specific decided date should be mentioned in the contract o which the debt should be return back.

MODES OF COMPLETING MORTGAGES

The process of mortgage is simple both simple and crucial at the Same time. For completion there are various modes and methods through which the transaction needs to be passed for getting formalized and finalized. These methods or modes are generally dependable upon the rules and legal requirements of various jurisdiction. They are;
  • REGISTRATION
  • DELIVERY OF POSSESSION
  • DEPOSIT OF TITLE DEEDS
  • APPROVAL FROM REGULATORY AUTHORITY
REGISTRATION As we know as per the general rule of TP Act, every transaction of immovable property more than amount of 100 Rs need to be registered. But there is one exception to this which is ‘Mortgage by deposits of title deeds’. Except this type this general rule of registration applies to every other type of mortgage. When registration is necessary, the mortgage must be in writing and should be attested with 2 or more witnesses. It also needs to be signed and registered as per the provision of registration. DELIVERY OF POSSESSION Mere delivery of possession of the property is sufficient to constitute a valid mortgage. Delivery of possession is one of the ground which constructs a valid mortgage and it includes, delivery of possession from mortgagor to mortgagee. DEPOSIT OF TITLE DEEDS Mortgage where title deed is deposited, this type of mortgage doesn’t need registration. In this type of mortgage, a person takes some amount as a loan and deposits the title deed of the mortgaged property. This mode of transaction is generally done in the matters which are related to real estate or immovable property. APPROVAL OF REGULATORY AUTHORITY In certain cases, execution of mortgage involves approval from the regulatory authority as well. it generally happens when the transaction is involved in financial institutions or regulatory sectors.

CASE LAW

  • GLORY AND ANOTHER VS MURUGAN AND ANOTHER[6]
In this case it was held that it is necessary to mention in the mortgage dee that whether that particular transaction is for the mortgage or not. Or else the transaction will be treated as a sale, rather than a mortgage by conditional sale.
  • SYNDICATE BANK VS M. SIVARUDRAPPA[7]
In this case the mortgager has claimed that he has mortgaged his property by executing a memorandum of deposits of title deeds. But the Mortgagee, which is the bank, denied the same on the ground of discrepancy in signature of the witnesses who were there for attesting. In this case the Karnataka High Court held that, the suit for recovery of money is to be dismissed as the mortgagor failed to prove the originality and enforceability of the mortgage deed.

CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

Mortgage is one of the basic yet crucial type of transfer which is dealt under Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It is used in the everyday life of individuals, whenever they need financial help. Mortgage in itself is a very wide concept which gives rise to various rights and circumstances. For determining whether a transaction is a mortgage transaction or not, it need to examine properly that all the essential conditions of the mortgage transaction is fulfilled or not. Hence, in case of mortgage transaction another important factor is intention of the party. However, there is no transaction of ownership in mortgage but temporary possession is there.

REFERENCES

  1. Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred
    1. The Transfer of Property act by DR. R.K. SINHA
  2. Online Articles / Sources Referred
    1. https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-6078-mortgage.html
    2. https://blog.ipleaders.in/mortgage-and-charge-of-immovable-property-under-transfer-of-property-act-1882/
  3. Statutes Referred
    1. Transfer of Property Act, 1882
[1] Truth in Lending Act [2] Real Estate Settlement Procedure Act [3] Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation [4] Transfer of Property Act,1882 [5] Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 [6] AIR 2019 Mad 346 [7] AIR 2003 Kant. 210 **Content:** **Author-Sushree Sangita Panda, Birla Global University, Bhubaneswar** ### **INTRODUCTION** Mortgage is one of the most significant components of property law as it gives permission to people to receive funds or loans to purchase property. Simply Mortgage is something when a person gives a specific immovable property to another person and receives money against that property as a loan amount. That property acts as a security for the payment of future debt. It is a transfer of Partial interest for future payment which creates a pecuniary liability on the same. In India, Transfer of Property Act, 1882 governs the creation, redemption, enforcement, functions etc of the mortgage. Transfer of Property act 1882 also governs various typer of property transfer as well among which Mortgage is one. This research article dives into the elaborating description of the concept ‘MORTGAGE’ along with its principles, essentials, components, effects etc. The rules regulating mortgages under the TP Act incorporate important elements from property law, such as the redemption and priority principles. This study investigates key case laws and academic interpretations to gain insight into the actual implementation and interpretation of mortgage law under the TP Act. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*:** Mortgage, Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Property law, Immovable property, pecuniary Liability, Repayment of future debt. ### **Meaning, Definition & Explanation** According to section 58 of Transfer of Property Act 1882, “Mortgage is the transfer of an interest of an immovable property for the purpose of securing money in advanced, an existing or future debt or the performance of an engagement which may give rise to a pecuniary liability.” Simply we can say mortgage is one kind of security given by the borrower who is also known as a Mortgager to another party which is known as Mortgagee, on for paying back the loan amount. This concept of Mortgage is only applicable in Immovable of property. By giving Mortgage, the Mortgager does not transfer the ownership right but only Transfers some right over that specific immovable property to the Mortgagee like In case the borrower fails to pay back the loans the mortgagee has the right to the authority over that property or to sale it for receiving its debt back. Furthermore, more often Mortgage is subjected to certain legal requirements such as registration the instrument to assure their legitimacy and enforceability. ### **Historical Background / Evolution** The concept “mortgage” has very ancient historical roots which can be traced back in various ancient civilizations. In the clay tablets which were received from Ancient Mesopotamia Civilization has also some traces of Mortgage. In that era also people used to give their property as collateral for loans. This method was also way too much common in ancient Egypt civilization. In Egypt civilization people used to lent their property to temples or rich person to get loans and when they pay the amount back, they used to receive their property back. In 1750 BCE, in BABYLON there was the first legal system which had framed some rules which were related to security for Loans. In ancient India there was also the practice of Mortgage which has been traced in “ ARTHASHASTRA” which talks about different types of loans which were secured by some guarantees. Another Ancient legal sculptures known as “DHARMASASHTRA” also addresses the issue of Mortgage in it along with the rights and liability of Borrowers and Lenders. Thus, the ancient practice of Mortgage unfolds the utilization of property as a collateral for loans by representing the universal requirement of security against the loans. ### **Comparison with other Countries** A comparison of Mortgage statues in various countries indicates a wide diversity of legislative structure and methods of governing property financing and security arrangement for the same. Although the legislative framework for rules and regulation of every nation is different from each other and every nation has its own peculiarities and antecedents, but a strong yet deep examination of mortgage laws all across the globe reveals its universal concept and theme of the procedure. The followings are some brief details about Mortgage laws of different countries; - **UNITED STATES** The Mortgage regulation in US is governed by state laws. But certain federal rules like TILA[\[1\]](#_ftn1) and RESPA[\[2\]](#_ftn2) also plays a pivotal role to governing those Mortgage laws. The extensive usage of mortgaged-backed securities and secondary mortgage market are two specific features which Distinguishes the US mortgage system from the mortgage system of other nations. The eviction procedure in US differs from state to state. Some states require judicial foreclosure while some states permit non judicial foreclosure as well. - **UNITED KINGDOM** In UK mortgage laws are regulated by two statues The Law of Property Act 1925 and Land Registration Act 2002. In UK market there are various types of options available for Mortgages like fixed-rate mortgages, variable-rate mortgages, interest only Mortgages etc. For safeguarding the rights of Borrowers, the foreclosure procedure in UK includes judicial hearings and strong regulatory rules. - **CANADA** The Mortgage regulation in Canada is overseen by Provincial laws and some federal rules like CMHC[\[3\]](#_ftn3) and Bank Acts etc also plays significant Role and Impact on Mortgage laws. The Canadian Mortgage market stands out from the crowd for its high percentage of Homeownership and a diverse range of mortgage which comprises of fixed-rate, variable rate and hybrid mortgages. The procedure of foreclosure in Canada is similar to US. - **INDIA** The Mortgage laws in India is controlled by TPA[\[4\]](#_ftn4) and SARFAESI[\[5\]](#_ftn5) act. Mortgage market in India offers a variety of mortgage merchandise like basic mortgage, conditional sale mortgage, Usufructuary mortgage etc. In India the process of foreclosure includes both Judicial and non-judicial approaches. ### **ESSENTIALS OF MORTGAGES UNDER TP ACT** The Transfer of Property Act,1882 Defines a certain legislative framework to regulate the procedures of Mortgages. Hence, there are certain essential conditions which needs to be fulfilled for the transaction mortgage. Such as; - **TRANSFER OF INTEREST** As per the definition under the Act, Mortgage is a transmission of stake(interest) of a specific immovable property from borrower(mortgager) to the lender(mortgagee) for a specific amount of consideration. This transfer does not mean the entire transfer of Ownership but it generates certain rights to the lender as a security interest. In case of default, the lender of money has the right to acquire or sale the property for foreclosure of the debt. - **THERE SHOULD BE A SPECIFIC IMMOVABLE PROPERTY** The property which will be mortgaged should be the specific and immovable one. There should not be any ambiguous about which property is mortgaged. Everything should be crystal clear about that particular property. - **RIGHT TO SALE** By transferring the rights, the borrower gives certain rights to the lender to exercise over that particular mortgaged property. This right also includes Right to sale for foreclosure of the amount. - **REDEMPTION RIGHT** The Transfer of Property Act also Recognizes the right of the Mortgager to REDEEM his property after repaying the debt amount. When the mortgager will fully pay the debt amount, he has the right to claim his property back. This right protects the interest of Borrower from loosing their property permanently just because of their temporary financial problem. ### **TYPES OF MORTGAGES UNDER TP ACT** The Transfer of Property Act highlights different types of mortgages in India. Each of them is different from each other as per characteristics and everything. They are; - **SIMPLE MORTGAGE** Simple mortgage is dealt under section 58(b) of TP act. This is the most prevalent category of mortgage in India in which the borrower keeps the control over the collateral with him while transferring the right to sale to the lender. In the event of default, the mortgaged property will be sold by the other party to recover the debt amount. In this case property can also be sold with the permission of court while there is a default in payment of the debt. - **MORTGAGE BY CONDITIONAL SALE** This type of Mortgage is dealt under section 58(c) of Transfer of Property Act 1882. Mortgage by conditional sale means temporary change of ownership of the specific property by mortgager to the mortgagee. When the party pays back the debt amount the mortgaged property will be reverted back to its original owner. Furthermore, any condition which will prevent the mortgager to redeem his property back, will be considered as invalid. - **MORTGAGE BY DEPOSIT OF TITLE DEED** Under section 58(f) of TP Act deals with ‘Mortgage by deposit of title deed’ which is also known as an equitable mortgage. In this type of mortgage, the mortgager deposits the deed of title of the property to the mortgagee as security. However, the ownership still remains with the mortgager and the deposit of title doesn’t grant the permission to the mortgagee to right to sale the property, automatically. In case of default, the mortgagee can only sale the property if there is a separate deed about the sale. This method is primarily used for short term loans or temporary securities. - **USUFRUCTUARY MORTGAGE** This type of mortgage is defined under section 58(d) of Transfer of Property act 1882. This is one of the less prevalent kinds of mortgage, which states that the mortgagee can obtain the possession over the mortgaged property within the loan period. In exchange the mortgagee receives the right to collect rent from that mortgaged property which he will use as an interest amount. Although, the risk of repayment of loan is borne completely by the mortgager. - **ANOMALOUS MORTGAGE** This type of mortgage is dealt under section 58(g) of Transfer of Property Act,1882. This is one type of special arrangement which is made on the basis of specific agreement which is created between Mortgager and Mortgagee. Sometimes, this type of mortgage involves components of different types of mortgages within it. In short, those types of mortgages which are not been mentioned under any of the other above-mentioned types, those will be covered under this Anomalous mortgage category. In this type of Mortgage is it crucial understand rights and duties of each party as this type of mortgage is based special agreement between the two parties. So before entering into this type of mortgage, legal advice is a must. - **ENGLISH MORTGAGE** This is a type of mortgage which has been defined under section 58(e) of Transfer of Property Act,1882. In this type, there is an absolute transfer of property to the mortgagee but there is a condition that the debt amount needs to be paid in one particular date and after the completion of this procedure the mortgagee will re-transfer the property back to the mortgagor. In this type of mortgage, the mortgager by giving the absolute right over property to the mortgagee creates a binding force upon himself to repay the debt within that decided period. And it is also necessary that the specific decided date should be mentioned in the contract o which the debt should be return back. ### **MODES OF COMPLETING MORTGAGES** The process of mortgage is simple both simple and crucial at the Same time. For completion there are various modes and methods through which the transaction needs to be passed for getting formalized and finalized. These methods or modes are generally dependable upon the rules and legal requirements of various jurisdiction. They are; - REGISTRATION - DELIVERY OF POSSESSION - DEPOSIT OF TITLE DEEDS - APPROVAL FROM REGULATORY AUTHORITY ***REGISTRATION*** As we know as per the general rule of TP Act, every transaction of immovable property more than amount of 100 Rs need to be registered. But there is one exception to this which is ‘Mortgage by deposits of title deeds’. Except this type this general rule of registration applies to every other type of mortgage. When registration is necessary, the mortgage must be in writing and should be attested with 2 or more witnesses. It also needs to be signed and registered as per the provision of registration. ***DELIVERY OF POSSESSION*** Mere delivery of possession of the property is sufficient to constitute a valid mortgage. Delivery of possession is one of the ground which constructs a valid mortgage and it includes, delivery of possession from mortgagor to mortgagee. ***DEPOSIT OF TITLE DEEDS*** Mortgage where title deed is deposited, this type of mortgage doesn’t need registration. In this type of mortgage, a person takes some amount as a loan and deposits the title deed of the mortgaged property. This mode of transaction is generally done in the matters which are related to real estate or immovable property. ***APPROVAL OF REGULATORY AUTHORITY*** In certain cases, execution of mortgage involves approval from the regulatory authority as well. it generally happens when the transaction is involved in financial institutions or regulatory sectors. ### **CASE LAW** - GLORY AND ANOTHER VS MURUGAN AND ANOTHER[\[6\]](#_ftn6) In this case it was held that it is necessary to mention in the mortgage dee that whether that particular transaction is for the mortgage or not. Or else the transaction will be treated as a sale, rather than a mortgage by conditional sale. - SYNDICATE BANK VS M. SIVARUDRAPPA[\[7\]](#_ftn7) In this case the mortgager has claimed that he has mortgaged his property by executing a memorandum of deposits of title deeds. But the Mortgagee, which is the bank, denied the same on the ground of discrepancy in signature of the witnesses who were there for attesting. In this case the Karnataka High Court held that, the suit for recovery of money is to be dismissed as the mortgagor failed to prove the originality and enforceability of the mortgage deed. ### **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** Mortgage is one of the basic yet crucial type of transfer which is dealt under Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It is used in the everyday life of individuals, whenever they need financial help. Mortgage in itself is a very wide concept which gives rise to various rights and circumstances. For determining whether a transaction is a mortgage transaction or not, it need to examine properly that all the essential conditions of the mortgage transaction is fulfilled or not. Hence, in case of mortgage transaction another important factor is intention of the party. However, there is no transaction of ownership in mortgage but temporary possession is there. ### **REFERENCES** 1. **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** 1. The Transfer of Property act by DR. R.K. SINHA 2. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. 2. 3. **Statutes Referred** 1. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Truth in Lending Act [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Real Estate Settlement Procedure Act [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Transfer of Property Act,1882 [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) AIR 2019 Mad 346 [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) AIR 2003 Kant. 210 **Categories:** Articles --- ### [VICARIOUS LIABILITY](https://lawfoyer.in/vicarious-liability/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Innama Haider, Amity University

INTRODUCTION

Vicarious liability is a liability where one person instead of being liable himself  for his own faults  he or she will be liable for the wrongful act done  by another . For being liable for the torts committed by other , there should be  some existing relation between both the parties . The liability is joint and several. For example : The employer will be liable for the torts committed by his employee , parents are  liable for the tort committed by their children .Also for a person to be liable under vicarious liability the tort committed  should be under the course of employment. Keywords : Vicarious liability, torts ,master, servant, independent contractor, responsibility , unlawful , employment. Vicarious liability makes other person liable for the wrongful acts done by one person because that other person who is liable  is in superior state to prevent that harmful act which is caused by second person . There are certain relationships which are jointly liable for each other’s act  such as :
  • Principal and Agent
  • Master and servant
  • Employer and employee
Generally vicarious liability which involves cases in it in which one person is in the state of superiority and can exercise his or her control accordingly . In this liability one person gets blamelessly liable for the wrongs other person has committed . There are 2 maxims which are of utmost important in this concept of vicarious liability:  "Qui facit per alium facit per se" means "he who does an act through another is deemed in law to be have done it himself.” “Respondeat superior” is a legal doctrine, most commonly used in tort, that holds an employer or principal legally responsible for the wrongful acts of an employee or agent, if such acts occur within the scope of the employment or agency.”  To be liable under vicarious liability , malicious intention is not always necessary. To be liable under vicarious liability the tort should be committed under the course of employment Course of employment includes :
  • Wrongful act should be authorized by master.
  • The mode in which act has been performed is unlawful .

Who is  a servant?

A servant is someone on whom the master can exercise his control , who is paid by the master  , can suspend or dismiss by his master , and on whom the master   has the power to select him .

Difference between Servant and Independent Contractor

  • A servant is someone who is bound by the orders of the master but independent contractor is someone who is bound by the terms of the contract .
  • A servant is someone who is controlled by master but independent contractor is not controlled by anyone .
  • A master is liable for the acts of the servant but not on independent contractor.

Course of employment

For making the master liable the servant should act under the course of employment Which involves that the servant should do the unauthorized act under the control of master and in an unlawful manner. There are various principal ways in which a master becomes  liable for the wrong done by servants in the course of their employment.

1)      “Wrong done as a natural consequence of an act by Servant for Master with due care

    2)Wrong due to Negligence of Worker

    3)Wrong by excess or mistaken execution of a lawful authority

  4)Wrong committed wilfully by a servant with the intention of serving the purpose of the master

 5)Wrong by Servant’s Fraudulent Act”

Vicarious liability in medical care

For any wrong which is done by the staff members of hospital under the course of employment such as any mistake done by lab assistant or any other employee of the hospital , any act which prove that they were negligent while performing their duty will make the doctor or the hospital vicariously liable .

Types of Liability:

Principal Liability: Where one person who is in a superior state in any act of business , and ask his agent or orders him to do any wrongful or any unlawful act will make the principal liable , because only the principal can prevent the agent or his servant to do any harmful act . But to make the principal liable for the faults of his agent , the wrongful act should be committed under the course of employment . Parental Liability Whereby any such circumstances of the case which proves that parents provided children with  any platform which make him do the wrongful act will make the parents vicariously liable for the acts of their children because it will be assumed that the particular act has been done under their supervision and the facts will prove the superior responsible because its only the superior who can prevent them doing that act. Government Liability In Torts Vicarious Liability of the State “The term ‘administration’ is used here synonymously with ‘state’ or ‘Government’. To what extend the administration would be liable for the torts committed by its servants is a complex problem especially in developing countries with ever widening State activities. The liability of the government in tort is governed by the principles of public law inherited from British Common law and the provisions of the Constitution. The whole idea of Vicariously Liability of the State for the torts committed by its servants is based on three principles:
  • Respondeat superior (let the principal be liable).
  • Quifacit per alium facit per se (he who acts through another does it himself).
  • Socialization of Compensation.”

Evolution in India

“As there is no legislation which specifies the vicarious liability of the state for the torts committed by its servants, it is under Article 300 of The Constitution of India, 1950 by which enumeration of the right to file a suit comes from. Art. 300 gives the right to the public to sue the state. While it came into force after the implementation of the Constitution in 1950, similar provisions were also there in Government of India (hereafter GOI) Act of 1935 under article 176 which has similar provision as in GOI Act of 1915 and of 1858 under Articles 32 and 65 respectively. Article 65 of the GOI Act of 1865 read, “All persons and bodies politic shall and may have and take the same suits, for India as they could have done against the said Company.” As the Government succeeded the company in administration i.e. East Indian Company, the liability of the government similar as it was with the company before 1858.”

CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

Generally in law people are liable for their wrongful act but vicarious liability is a form of liability where one person is liable for the wrongful acts done by another . In this form of liability generally the superior party or the master is liable because he is the one on whose direction the servant works . But for this type of liability to arise there should be some sort of relation between both the parties  also the wrongful act should be done under the course of employment . Only the acts  of  servant or the employee makes the  master liable ,no act of an independent contractor will make the master liable. Vicarious liability is a type of joint and several liability.

REFERENCES

  1. Online Articles / Sources Referred
    1. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/respondeat_superior
    2. https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-6602-qui-facit-per-alium-facit-per-se.html
    3. https://blog.ipleaders.in/vicarious-liability-case-master-servant-relationship-tort-law
    4. https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/vicarious-liability-state/
    5. https://blog.ipleaders.in/constitutional-tort-law-deals-vicarious-liability-state/
  1. Cases Referred
    1. Baldeo Raj Verses Deowati
    2. Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company v. Secretary of State for India
  1. Statutes Referred
    1. Article 300 of the Indian Constitution ,1950
    2. Article 176 of the Government of India Act, 1935
    3. Articles 32 in the Government of India Act 1915
    4. Article 65 in the Government of India Act 1858
    5. Article 65 in the Government of India Act 1865
**Content:** **Author-Innama Haider, Amity University** ### **INTRODUCTION** Vicarious liability is a liability where one person instead of being liable himself for his own faults he or she will be liable for the wrongful act done by another . For being liable for the torts committed by other , there should be some existing relation between both the parties . The liability is joint and several. For example : The employer will be liable for the torts committed by his employee , parents are liable for the tort committed by their children .Also for a person to be liable under vicarious liability the tort committed should be under the course of employment. ***Keywords* : Vicarious liability, torts ,master, servant, independent contractor, responsibility , unlawful , employment.** Vicarious liability makes other person liable for the wrongful acts done by one person because that other person who is liable is in superior state to prevent that harmful act which is caused by second person . There are certain relationships which are jointly liable for each other’s act such as : - Principal and Agent - Master and servant - Employer and employee Generally vicarious liability which involves cases in it in which one person is in the state of superiority and can exercise his or her control accordingly . In this liability one person gets blamelessly liable for the wrongs other person has committed . There are 2 maxims which are of utmost important in this concept of vicarious liability: *“**Qui facit per alium facit per se**” means “he who does an act through another is deemed in law to be have done it himself.”* *“**Respondeat superior**” is a legal doctrine, most commonly used in* [*tort*](https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/tort)*, that holds an employer or* [*principal*](https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/principal) [*legally responsible*](https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/liable) *for the wrongful acts of an employee or* [*agent*](https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/agent)*, if such acts occur within the scope of the employment or agency.”* To be liable under vicarious liability , malicious intention is not always necessary. To be liable under vicarious liability the tort should be committed under the course of employment Course of employment includes : - Wrongful act should be authorized by master. - The mode in which act has been performed is unlawful . ### **Who is a servant?** A servant is someone on whom the master can exercise his control , who is paid by the master , can suspend or dismiss by his master , and on whom the master has the power to select him . ### **Difference between Servant and Independent Contractor** - A servant is someone who is bound by the orders of the master but independent contractor is someone who is bound by the terms of the contract . - A servant is someone who is controlled by master but independent contractor is not controlled by anyone . - A master is liable for the acts of the servant but not on independent contractor. ### **Course of employment** For making the master liable the servant should act under the course of employment Which involves that the servant should do the unauthorized act under the control of master and in an unlawful manner. There are various principal ways in which a master becomes liable for the wrong done by servants in the course of their employment. #### *1)* “***Wrong done as a natural consequence of an act by Servant for Master with due care*** #### ***2)Wrong due to Negligence of Worker*** #### ***3)Wrong by excess or mistaken execution of a lawful authority*** #### ***4)Wrong committed wilfully by a servant with the intention of serving the purpose of the master*** #### ***5)Wrong by Servant’s Fraudulent Act”*** ### ***Vicarious liability in medical care*** For any wrong which is done by the staff members of hospital under the course of employment such as any mistake done by lab assistant or any other employee of the hospital , any act which prove that they were negligent while performing their duty will make the doctor or the hospital vicariously liable . ### ***Types of Liability:*** ***Principal Liability:*** Where one person who is in a superior state in any act of business , and ask his agent or orders him to do any wrongful or any unlawful act will make the principal liable , because only the principal can prevent the agent or his servant to do any harmful act . But to make the principal liable for the faults of his agent , the wrongful act should be committed under the course of employment . ***Parental Liability*** Whereby any such circumstances of the case which proves that parents provided children with any platform which make him do the wrongful act will make the parents vicariously liable for the acts of their children because it will be assumed that the particular act has been done under their supervision and the facts will prove the superior responsible because its only the superior who can prevent them doing that act. ***Government Liability In Torts*** ***Vicarious Liability of the State*** *“The term ‘administration’ is used here synonymously with ‘state’ or ‘Government’. To what extend the administration would be liable for the torts committed by its servants is a complex problem especially in developing countries with ever widening State activities. The liability of the government in tort is governed by the principles of public law inherited from British Common law and the provisions of the Constitution. The whole idea of Vicariously Liability of the State for the torts committed by its servants is based on three principles:* - *Respondeat superior (let the principal be liable).* - *Quifacit per alium facit per se (he who acts through another does it himself).* - *Socialization of Compensation.”* ### **Evolution in India** “*As there is no legislation which specifies the vicarious liability of the state for the torts committed by its servants, it is under Article 300 of The Constitution of India, 1950 by which enumeration of the right to file a suit comes from.* *Art. 300 gives the right to the public to sue the state. While it came into force after the implementation of the Constitution in 1950, similar provisions were also there in Government of India (hereafter GOI) Act of 1935 under article 176 which has similar provision as in GOI Act of 1915 and of 1858 under Articles 32 and 65 respectively. Article 65 of the GOI Act of 1865 read, “All persons and bodies politic shall and may have and take the same suits, for India as they could have done against the said Company.”* *As the Government succeeded the company in administration i.e. East Indian Company, the liability of the government similar as it was with the company before 1858.”* ### **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** Generally in law people are liable for their wrongful act but vicarious liability is a form of liability where one person is liable for the wrongful acts done by another . In this form of liability generally the superior party or the master is liable because he is the one on whose direction the servant works . But for this type of liability to arise there should be some sort of relation between both the parties also the wrongful act should be done under the course of employment . Only the acts of servant or the employee makes the master liable ,no act of an independent contractor will make the master liable. Vicarious liability is a type of joint and several liability. ### **REFERENCES** 1. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. [https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/respondeat\_superior](https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/respondeat_superior) 2. 3. 4. 5. 2. **Cases Referred** 1. Baldeo Raj Verses Deowati 2. Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company v. Secretary of State for India 3. **Statutes Referred** 1. Article 300 of the Indian Constitution ,1950 2. Article 176 of the Government of India Act, 1935 3. Articles 32 in the Government of India Act 1915 4. Article 65 in the Government of India Act 1858 5. Article 65 in the Government of India Act 1865 **Categories:** Articles --- ### [MARITAL RAPE- LEGAL CONCERNS](https://lawfoyer.in/marital-rape-legal-concerns/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Romika Narotra, Amity University, Noida

Introduction

The divine value of marriage is frequently utilised to cover up the horrifying reality:     marital rape. Although marital rape is a serious violation of bodily autonomy and dignity, it is still a legal grey area in India. Marital Rape is having sexual intercourse with a spouse without his/her consent. In India, the law does not clearly define marital rape as a crime. An exception to Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) states that sexual intercourse between a man and his wife who is under 18 years of age is not rape. This law allows perpetrators of marital rape to go unpunished and separates victims from justice For centuries the institution of marriage in all the laws be it Hindu law, Muslim law etc, sexual intercourse after marriage has been seen as necessary and important for creation of family. Our society has developed a lot from many years but the image of importance of having a child after marriage and a husband showing all sexual rights over his wife has been so much normalised that even if a women is being forced to copulate after marriage has not been protected specifically under any law except the domestic violence act and under sec 375 IPC where forced sex after marriage is seen as a crime only when the women is below the age of 15 still in this 21st century India there is no law that fully criminalizes marital rape.

Background / Evolution

In ancient times, women were not considered separate legal entities and it was believed that if a woman married a man, he would accept this marriage. In the 19th century, feminists began challenging men's right to force their wives to have sex. Feminists have been campaigning against marital violence since the 1960s. In the United States, the state of Michigan criminalizes adultery only when a couple files for divorce and separation. South Dakota banned same-sex marriage from 1975 to 1977. These instances were the start that showed people’s awareness towards marital rape.

History of Marital Rape in India

The Delhi High Court has been hearing arguments in the case since 2015. In January 2022, two judges of the Delhi High Court started hearing the case. Inevitable demands from individuals and public organizations. By May 2022, they had reached a controversial decision. While one judge upheld marital rape because it violated a woman's right to consent, another objected, saying marriage "essentially" amounts to consent . Later, the issue was brought to the Supreme Court. The need to evacuate the marital rape exception was prior rejected by the Law Commission of India in 2000 . In 2012, the Justice JS Verma Committee was entrusted with proposing revisions to India's rape laws. Whereas a few of its suggestions made a difference shape the Criminal Law (Alteration) Act passed in 2013, a few proposals, counting that on marital rape, were not acted on. The issue has been brought up in Parliament as well. Upon being addressed in a Parliament session in 2015, the thought of criminalizing marital rape was rejected with the see that "marital rape cannot be applied within the nation since marriage was treated as a holy observance or sacrosanct within the Indian society". In September 2022, Supreme Court administering on women’s right to secure premature births notwithstanding of marital status held that for the purposes of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, the definition of rape ought to incorporate marital rape. Government’s Stand: The Central Government at first protected the rape exception and afterward changed its stand and told the court that it was checking on the law, on which wider consultations are required on the issue. The Delhi government contended in support of holding the marital rape exception. The government’s contentions crossed from securing men from possible abuse of the law by wives, to protecting the institution of marriage

Legal provisions/ Challenges

The lack of legal protection against marital rape perpetuates a culture of impunity and silence. Victims often suffer physical and psychological damage due to silence, fear of stigma, family discrimination and legalization. Marital status and expectations of obedience make victims even more vulnerable, hindering their ability to seek help or report abuse. One of the biggest problems with the criminalization of marital violence in India lies in the basic principles of relationship and marital behaviour between men and women. Old ideas often  believing that women are the property of their husbands and are not free over their own bodies and choices. This patriarchal ideology normalises marital rape and prevented the development of law. In expansion, legitimate issues such as burden of confirmation and need of prove make genuine issues in prosecuting marital rape. The security of the marriage ceremony and the absence of witnesses make it difficult to recognize non-consensual sexual intercourse. Also, victims are hesitant to come forward due to fear of striking back or social backfire, making the lawful handle difficult. Criminalising marital rape is critical for the advancement of the rights and dignity of people in marriage. Usually an issue of gender equality, bodily autonomy and human rights. It gives a legitimate prepare for casualties to look for equity, get to support administrations and hold culprits accountable for their actions. Furthermore, criminalising marital rape is additionally in line with India's universal commitments and commitments beneath various conventions and agreements, including the Tradition on the Disposal of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). India's disappointment to criminalize marital rape has weakened its validity within the world and failed to convey on its commitment to combat gender-based violence.

Case law

In case of The Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrima Das . The Supreme Court held that rape is not only an offense under the Indian Penal Code but also a crime that affects the entire society. Another case of Kharak Singh v. State of U.P  has adopted the implied protection of the right to privacy under Article 21. According to Article 21, the right to privacy includes the right to be free from intrusion and unreasonable access. Sexual freedom is an important part of this law and not all sexual intercourse is allowed to violate sexual privacy. The idea of ​​avoiding marriage through rape violates a woman's right to sexual privacy by forcing sexual intercourse against her will. In Independent Though v. Union of India , Delhi High Court in 1986 said that exemption of marital rape under Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code was unconstitutional. The document addresses the need to criminalize marital rape and provide legal protection to women within marriage. Another important case was Sakshi v. Union of India. In 1999, the Supreme Court of India upheld forced sexual intercourse by the husband. The court said that marriage does not necessarily imply consent to sexual intercourse and that women have the right to refuse sexual intercourse in marriage.

Why Marital Rape is not criminalised in India?

The new law, which will be published in July, does not criminalize marriage. The government said marital rape can lead to marital discord and become a tool to harm husbands. Exceptions to marriage are generally based on two views: Permanent consent, that is, when a woman gets married, she gives permanent consent and cannot withdraw it. Legislators reiterated that it is a woman's responsibility to have sexual intercourse with her husband and that the institution of marriage essentially waives a woman's right to consent. Consent is defined under the Crimes Act 2003 as “a person giving consent if he or she chooses to do so and is free and competent to make that choice.” Courts have made clear that consent is voluntary and does not require evidence of objection.

Conclusion:

As a result, legal recognition and criminalization of marital rape is important for solving the problem of gender-based violence in marriage. This should be achieved through a variety of means, including legal reform, public awareness and support for victims. Legislators, legislators, NGOs and communities must work together to create a society where all human rights and freedoms are respected and protected, regardless of care. Now is the time to make fair and equal decisions for everyone.

REFERENCES

  1. Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred
    1. IPC Bare Act
    2. Criminal Manuel
  2. Online Articles / Sources Referred
    1. Garg, S. and Singh, N. (2022) Marital rape: Historical and comparative analysis, My Lawman Socio Legal Review. Available at: https://mslr.pubpub.org/pub/vlo7anq8/release/1 (Accessed: 06 March 2024).
    2. Institute for the Sociology of Law A critical analysis of the standard of consent in rape law in India: Oñati Socio-Legal Series, A critical analysis of the standard of consent in rape law in India | Oñati https://opo.iisj.net/index.php/osls/article/view/1647/1992 (Accessed: 06 March 2024).
    3. Sachdev, V. (2022) Explained: Why marital rape is not a crime in India (yet),The Quint. https://www.thequint.com/news/law/marital-rape-not-recognised-as-crime-in-india-explainer (Accessed: 06 March 2024).
  3. Cases Referred
    1. The Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrima Das
    2. Kharak Singh v. State of U.P.
    3. Independent Though v. Union of India
    4. Sakshi v. Union of India
**Content:** **Author-Romika Narotra, Amity University, Noida** ### **Introduction** The divine value of marriage is frequently utilised to cover up the horrifying reality: marital rape. Although marital rape is a serious violation of bodily autonomy and dignity, it is still a legal grey area in India. Marital Rape is having sexual intercourse with a spouse without his/her consent. In India, the law does not clearly define marital rape as a crime. An exception to Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) states that sexual intercourse between a man and his wife who is under 18 years of age is not rape. This law allows perpetrators of marital rape to go unpunished and separates victims from justice For centuries the institution of marriage in all the laws be it Hindu law, Muslim law etc, sexual intercourse after marriage has been seen as necessary and important for creation of family. Our society has developed a lot from many years but the image of importance of having a child after marriage and a husband showing all sexual rights over his wife has been so much normalised that even if a women is being forced to copulate after marriage has not been protected specifically under any law except the domestic violence act and under sec 375 IPC where forced sex after marriage is seen as a crime only when the women is below the age of 15 still in this 21st century India there is no law that fully criminalizes marital rape. ### **Background / Evolution** In ancient times, women were not considered separate legal entities and it was believed that if a woman married a man, he would accept this marriage. In the 19th century, feminists began challenging men’s right to force their wives to have sex. Feminists have been campaigning against marital violence since the 1960s. In the United States, the state of Michigan criminalizes adultery only when a couple files for divorce and separation. South Dakota banned same-sex marriage from 1975 to 1977. These instances were the start that showed people’s awareness towards marital rape. ### History of Marital Rape in India The Delhi High Court has been hearing arguments in the case since 2015. In January 2022, two judges of the Delhi High Court started hearing the case. Inevitable demands from individuals and public organizations. By May 2022, they had reached a controversial decision. While one judge upheld marital rape because it violated a woman’s right to consent, another objected, saying marriage “essentially” amounts to consent . Later, the issue was brought to the Supreme Court. The need to evacuate the marital rape exception was prior rejected by the Law Commission of India in 2000 . In 2012, the Justice JS Verma Committee was entrusted with proposing revisions to India’s rape laws. Whereas a few of its suggestions made a difference shape the Criminal Law (Alteration) Act passed in 2013, a few proposals, counting that on marital rape, were not acted on. The issue has been brought up in Parliament as well. Upon being addressed in a Parliament session in 2015, the thought of criminalizing marital rape was rejected with the see that “marital rape cannot be applied within the nation since marriage was treated as a holy observance or sacrosanct within the Indian society”. In September 2022, Supreme Court administering on women’s right to secure premature births notwithstanding of marital status held that for the purposes of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, the definition of rape ought to incorporate marital rape. Government’s Stand: The Central Government at first protected the rape exception and afterward changed its stand and told the court that it was checking on the law, on which wider consultations are required on the issue. The Delhi government contended in support of holding the marital rape exception. The government’s contentions crossed from securing men from possible abuse of the law by wives, to protecting the institution of marriage ### **Legal provisions/ Challenges** The lack of legal protection against marital rape perpetuates a culture of impunity and silence. Victims often suffer physical and psychological damage due to silence, fear of stigma, family discrimination and legalization. Marital status and expectations of obedience make victims even more vulnerable, hindering their ability to seek help or report abuse. One of the biggest problems with the criminalization of marital violence in India lies in the basic principles of relationship and marital behaviour between men and women. Old ideas often believing that women are the property of their husbands and are not free over their own bodies and choices. This patriarchal ideology normalises marital rape and prevented the development of law. In expansion, legitimate issues such as burden of confirmation and need of prove make genuine issues in prosecuting marital rape. The security of the marriage ceremony and the absence of witnesses make it difficult to recognize non-consensual sexual intercourse. Also, victims are hesitant to come forward due to fear of striking back or social backfire, making the lawful handle difficult. Criminalising marital rape is critical for the advancement of the rights and dignity of people in marriage. Usually an issue of gender equality, bodily autonomy and human rights. It gives a legitimate prepare for casualties to look for equity, get to support administrations and hold culprits accountable for their actions. Furthermore, criminalising marital rape is additionally in line with India’s universal commitments and commitments beneath various conventions and agreements, including the Tradition on the Disposal of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). India’s disappointment to criminalize marital rape has weakened its validity within the world and failed to convey on its commitment to combat gender-based violence. ### **Case law** In case of ***The Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrima Das*** . The Supreme Court held that rape is not only an offense under the Indian Penal Code but also a crime that affects the entire society. Another case of ***Kharak Singh v. State of U.P*** has adopted the implied protection of the right to privacy under Article 21. According to Article 21, the right to privacy includes the right to be free from intrusion and unreasonable access. Sexual freedom is an important part of this law and not all sexual intercourse is allowed to violate sexual privacy. The idea of ​​avoiding marriage through rape violates a woman’s right to sexual privacy by forcing sexual intercourse against her will. In ***Independent Though v. Union of India*** , Delhi High Court in 1986 said that exemption of marital rape under Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code was unconstitutional. The document addresses the need to criminalize marital rape and provide legal protection to women within marriage. Another important case was ***Sakshi v. Union of India*. In 1999**, the Supreme Court of India upheld forced sexual intercourse by the husband. The court said that marriage does not necessarily imply consent to sexual intercourse and that women have the right to refuse sexual intercourse in marriage. ### **Why Marital Rape is not criminalised in India?** The new law, which will be published in July, does not criminalize marriage. The government said marital rape can lead to marital discord and become a tool to harm husbands. Exceptions to marriage are generally based on two views: Permanent consent, that is, when a woman gets married, she gives permanent consent and cannot withdraw it. Legislators reiterated that it is a woman’s responsibility to have sexual intercourse with her husband and that the institution of marriage essentially waives a woman’s right to consent. Consent is defined under the Crimes Act 2003 as “a person giving consent if he or she chooses to do so and is free and competent to make that choice.” Courts have made clear that consent is voluntary and does not require evidence of objection. ### **Conclusion:** As a result, legal recognition and criminalization of marital rape is important for solving the problem of gender-based violence in marriage. This should be achieved through a variety of means, including legal reform, public awareness and support for victims. Legislators, legislators, NGOs and communities must work together to create a society where all human rights and freedoms are respected and protected, regardless of care. Now is the time to make fair and equal decisions for everyone. ### **REFERENCES** 1. **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** 1. IPC Bare Act 2. Criminal Manuel 2. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. Garg, S. and Singh, N. (2022) Marital rape: Historical and comparative analysis, My Lawman Socio Legal Review. Available at: [https://mslr.pubpub.org/pub/vlo7anq8/release/1](https://mslr.pubpub.org/pub/vlo7anq8/release/1%20) (Accessed: 06 March 2024). 2. Institute for the Sociology of Law A critical analysis of the standard of consent in rape law in India: Oñati Socio-Legal Series, A critical analysis of the standard of consent in rape law in India | Oñati [https://opo.iisj.net/index.php/osls/article/view/1647/1992](https://opo.iisj.net/index.php/osls/article/view/1647/1992%20) (Accessed: 06 March 2024). 3. Sachdev, V. (2022) Explained: Why marital rape is not a crime in India (yet),The Quint. [https://www.thequint.com/news/law/marital-rape-not-recognised-as-crime-in-india-explainer](https://www.thequint.com/news/law/marital-rape-not-recognised-as-crime-in-india-explainer%20) (Accessed: 06 March 2024). 3. **Cases Referred** 1. *The Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrima Das* 2. *Kharak Singh v. State of U.P.* 3. *Independent Though v. Union of India* 4. *Sakshi v. Union of India* **Categories:** Articles --- ### [CYBER CRIME : MEANING, HISTORY, TYPES, SECURITY MEASURES AND IMPORTANT CASES](https://lawfoyer.in/cyber-crime-meaning-history-types-security-measures-and-important-cases/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Tanishka Saxena, Amity University, Lucknow

INTRODUCTION

CRIME is as old as human society, crime in any form which adversely affects the individuals living in the society is known as crime. In the era of digitalization, everything has been changed by the internet giving rise to criminal activities. The excessive use and reliance on the internet leads to an increase the criminal activities. The word “cybercrime” is used for criminal activities with the use of computers such as fraud, violating privacy, etc. Cybercrime affects people, companies, government and even threatens the national security of the country. Several illegal activities are committed over the internet by technically skilled criminals. Cybercrime is an uncontrollable evil based on the misuse of growing dependence on computers in modern life.

What is cybercrime

“Cyber” is a prefix that is used to describe a person, thing, or idea, as a part of a computer and information taken from the Greek word ‘kubernetes’. Cybercrime is also known as computer crime, the use of the computer as an instrument for illegal purposes such as hacking, cracking, fraud, stealing identities, child pornography, extortion, money laundering, intellectual property, etc. Cybercrime is the most prevalent crime playing a devastating role in modern India.

Historical Background

Cybercrime started in the 1960s and 1970s when there were only transistor-based computer systems which were smaller in size and less expensive than vacuum tube-based machines and crimes only related to the physical damage to computer systems and stored data in the computer. In the 1970s, the method and use of computers and data has been changed there was a major shift from Manual to computer-related fraud. The very FIRST and known incident of cybercrime was the creation of the CREEPER VIRUS which foretold the potential of viruses that come in the future and cause grave damage to computer systems. After the 1970s, the MORRIS WORM caused extensive disruption and made people aware of harmful cyber activities in the 1980s. In the 1990s, a significant increase in cybercrime was observed, and the infamous Melissa virus was a notable cyber incident during this period which infected over 100,000 computers from all over the world. Further advancement in cybercriminal advancement was observed in the early 2000s and cyber criminals started launching denial-of-service (DDOS) attacks and spamming mails. In the present era, cyber crimes are much more changed, and new highly sophisticated methods of committing crimes. This decade highlighted the importance of cybersecurity measures and awareness and the evolving threats posed by cybercrime.

TYPES OF CYBERCRIME

Some of the most common types of cybercrime:-
  1. HACKING –Without permission taking access to someone else’s computer systems or networks to steal or gain information or modify data.
  2. WEB HIJACKING – Web hacking means taking control of another person’s website, with the consent of the owner, and eventually the owner loses control.
  3. MALWARE – In malware, harmful software has been made to sneak around on someone else’s computer systems. This includes viruses, spyware, worms, etc. It can be used to gain bank details, sensitive business data, or information to conduct social engineering attacks.
  4. IDENTITY THEFT- To act like some other individual by Stealing their information such as their name, social security number, or financial details, for financial gain to commit fraud or crimes.
  5. CYBER STALKING AND HARASSMENT – Cyber Stalking means repeating the acts of harassing, threatening, or intimidating individuals by sending repeated or unwanted messages or distributing the personal information of the individual without the consent of the person by using the internet. Both kinds of Stalkers i.e., Online & Offline – have the desire to control the victim's life.
  6. ONLINE SCAMS AND FRAUD - Many Fraudulent schemes were conducted over the internet time such as investment scams, scams of lottery, fee fraud of advance rupees, fake websites, romance scams, credit card frauds, etc. to take money or valuable information.
  7. DATA BREACHES - People get the information without the permission of the owner of the website and get access to sensitive data stored by the person or institution such as personal information, financial records, or corporate secrets, resulting in the exposure of personal or financial information.
  8. PHISHING – Phishing is the sending of fraudulent messages that appear as real entities in emails and messages. That email directs the user to visit that website where they have to update certain sensitive information such as passwords, credit card numbers, or social security numbers which will be used for identity theft.
  9. CHILD EXPLOITATION – The use of the Internet for Child exploitation become a common practice. Child pornography and engaging minors in sexual activities and provided on the internet on various platforms.

PREVENTIVE MEASURES TO PROTECT FROM CYBER SECURITY:-

  • Keep software and operating system updated
  • Use any anti-virus software and keep it updated from time to time
  • Use strong passwords
  • Never open attachments in spam emails
  • Do not click on links in spam mail or untrusted websites
  • Be mindful of which website URLs you visit
  • Keep an eye on bank statements

IMPORTANT CASES OF CYBERCRIME

  1. Shreya Singhal vs Union of India [1]
In this case, The validity of section 66A of the Information Technology Act was challenged before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that section 66A of the Information Technology Act is unconstitutional and violates article 19(1)(a) of the Indian constitution and the court upheld the importance of freedom of speech and expression and the need for clearly defined laws to prevent misuse and necessity to defined laws precisely to avoid the abuse and guarantee the protections of citizens right in the era of digitalization. This judgment set a significant precedent for online freedom of expression in India.
  1. Shankar vs State of Rep[2]
In this case, A charge sheet was issued against the petitioner under section 483 of CrPc. Petitioner approached the Supreme Court to quash this charge sheet. He secured unauthorized access to the protected system the legal advisor of the directorate of Vigilance and anti–corruption (DVAC). He was also charged under sections 66,70, and 72 of the Information Technology Act. The court held that the charge sheet filed against the petitioner could not be quashed by the law concerning the non-granting of sanction of prosecution under Section 72 of the IT Act.
  1. Shreekanth C. Nair vs Licensee/ Developer[3]
In this case, the issue revolved around a student of ASCL who encountered a website called ‘ www.incometaxpune.com.’ he led to a pornographic site. As a result, the complainant sought a court order to block the offensive website. This website is undoubtedly pornographic and must be shut down in the public interest as well as in contravention of section 67 of the IT Act. It raised concerns about the responsibility of website developers and operators for the content available on these websites. The court held that these types of websites should be blocked because they hold inappropriate content. This decision shows that the court wants to keep the internet safe for everyone, especially from harmful content. And also directed the owner to be aware of what is on their website and what they link to. This case is important because it shows how the law helps to protect people online.

CONCLUSION

Cybercrime is one of the complex and evolving issues that has a significant impact on individual organizations and society. It affects the individuals who fall victim to scams and frauds, and businesses that suffer heavy financial losses and even a threat to the government and national security. To deal with cybercrime we have to take certain measures like strong passwords, Keeping software and operating systems updated, Using any anti-virus software, etc. Certain efforts have to be made to strengthen cybersecurity, promote digital literacy, and enforce laws and regulations that can significantly reduce its prevalence and impact. everyone needs to remain vigilant adopt best practices for online security and stay informed about emerging threats to protect themselves and contribute to a safer digital environment.

[1]Shreya Singhal vs Union of India AIR 2015 SC 1523

[2] Shankar vs State of Rep Crl. O.P. No. 6628 of 2010 [3] Shreekanth C. Nair vs Licensee/ Developer Crl. Rev. Pet. No. 2900 of 2008 **Content:** **Author-Tanishka Saxena, Amity University, Lucknow** ### **INTRODUCTION** CRIME is as old as human society, crime in any form which adversely affects the individuals living in the society is known as crime. In the era of digitalization, everything has been changed by the internet giving rise to criminal activities. The excessive use and reliance on the internet leads to an increase the criminal activities. The word “cybercrime” is used for criminal activities with the use of computers such as fraud, violating privacy, etc. Cybercrime affects people, companies, government and even threatens the national security of the country. Several illegal activities are committed over the internet by technically skilled criminals. Cybercrime is an uncontrollable evil based on the misuse of growing dependence on computers in modern life. ### What is cybercrime “Cyber” is a prefix that is used to describe a person, thing, or idea, as a part of a computer and information taken from the Greek word ‘kubernetes’. Cybercrime is also known as computer crime, the use of the computer as an instrument for illegal purposes such as hacking, cracking, fraud, stealing identities, child pornography, extortion, money laundering, intellectual property, etc. Cybercrime is the most prevalent crime playing a devastating role in modern India. ### **Historical Background** Cybercrime started in the 1960s and 1970s when there were only transistor-based computer systems which were smaller in size and less expensive than vacuum tube-based machines and crimes only related to the physical damage to computer systems and stored data in the computer. In the 1970s, the method and use of computers and data has been changed there was a major shift from Manual to computer-related fraud. The very FIRST and known incident of cybercrime was the creation of the **CREEPER VIRUS** which foretold the potential of viruses that come in the future and cause grave damage to computer systems. After the 1970s, the **MORRIS WORM** caused extensive disruption and made people aware of harmful cyber activities in the 1980s. In the 1990s, a significant increase in cybercrime was observed, and the infamous Melissa virus was a notable cyber incident during this period which infected over 100,000 computers from all over the world. Further advancement in cybercriminal advancement was observed in the early 2000s and cyber criminals started launching denial-of-service (DDOS) attacks and spamming mails. In the present era, cyber crimes are much more changed, and new highly sophisticated methods of committing crimes. This decade highlighted the importance of cybersecurity measures and awareness and the evolving threats posed by cybercrime. ### **TYPES OF CYBERCRIME** Some of the most common types of cybercrime:- 1. **HACKING –**Without permission taking access to someone else’s computer systems or networks to steal or gain information or modify data. 2. **WEB HIJACKING –** Web hacking means taking control of another person’s website, with the consent of the owner, and eventually the owner loses control. 3. **MALWARE –** In malware, harmful software has been made to sneak around on someone else’s computer systems. This includes viruses, spyware, worms, etc. It can be used to gain bank details, sensitive business data, or information to conduct social engineering attacks. 4. **IDENTITY THEFT**– To act like some other individual by Stealing their information such as their name, social security number, or financial details, for financial gain to commit fraud or crimes. 5. **CYBER STALKING AND HARASSMENT –** Cyber Stalking means repeating the acts of harassing, threatening, or intimidating individuals by sending repeated or unwanted messages or distributing the personal information of the individual without the consent of the person by using the internet. Both kinds of Stalkers i.e., Online & Offline – have the desire to control the victim’s life. 6. **ONLINE SCAMS AND FRAUD** – Many Fraudulent schemes were conducted over the internet time such as investment scams, scams of lottery, fee fraud of advance rupees, fake websites, romance scams, credit card frauds, etc. to take money or valuable information. 7. **DATA BREACHES –** People get the information without the permission of the owner of the website and get access to sensitive data stored by the person or institution such as personal information, financial records, or corporate secrets, resulting in the exposure of personal or financial information. 8. **PHISHING –** Phishing is the sending of fraudulent messages that appear as real entities in emails and messages. That email directs the user to visit that website where they have to update certain sensitive information such as passwords, credit card numbers, or social security numbers which will be used for identity theft. 9. **CHILD EXPLOITATION –** The use of the Internet for Child exploitation become a common practice. Child pornography and engaging minors in sexual activities and provided on the internet on various platforms. ### **PREVENTIVE MEASURES TO PROTECT FROM CYBER SECURITY:-** - Keep software and operating system updated - Use any anti-virus software and keep it updated from time to time - Use strong passwords - Never open attachments in spam emails - Do not click on links in spam mail or untrusted websites - Be mindful of which website URLs you visit - Keep an eye on bank statements ### **IMPORTANT CASES OF CYBERCRIME** 1. **Shreya Singhal vs Union of India** [\[1\]](#_ftn1) In this case, The validity of section 66A of the Information Technology Act was challenged before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that section 66A of the Information Technology Act is unconstitutional and violates article 19(1)(a) of the Indian constitution and the court upheld the importance of freedom of speech and expression and the need for clearly defined laws to prevent misuse and necessity to defined laws precisely to avoid the abuse and guarantee the protections of citizens right in the era of digitalization. This judgment set a significant precedent for online freedom of expression in India. 2. **Shankar vs State of Rep[\[2\]](#_ftn2)** In this case, A charge sheet was issued against the petitioner under section 483 of CrPc. Petitioner approached the Supreme Court to quash this charge sheet. He secured unauthorized access to the protected system the legal advisor of the directorate of Vigilance and anti–corruption (DVAC). He was also charged under sections 66,70, and 72 of the Information Technology Act. The court held that the charge sheet filed against the petitioner could not be quashed by the law concerning the non-granting of sanction of prosecution under Section 72 of the IT Act. 3. **Shreekanth C. Nair vs Licensee/ Developer[\[3\]](#_ftn3)** In this case, the issue revolved around a student of ASCL who encountered a website called ‘ www.incometaxpune.com.’ he led to a pornographic site. As a result, the complainant sought a court order to block the offensive website. This website is undoubtedly pornographic and must be shut down in the public interest as well as in contravention of section 67 of the IT Act. It raised concerns about the responsibility of website developers and operators for the content available on these websites. The court held that these types of websites should be blocked because they hold inappropriate content. This decision shows that the court wants to keep the internet safe for everyone, especially from harmful content. And also directed the owner to be aware of what is on their website and what they link to. This case is important because it shows how the law helps to protect people online. ### **CONCLUSION** Cybercrime is one of the complex and evolving issues that has a significant impact on individual organizations and society. It affects the individuals who fall victim to scams and frauds, and businesses that suffer heavy financial losses and even a threat to the government and national security. To deal with cybercrime we have to take certain measures like strong passwords, Keeping software and operating systems updated, Using any anti-virus software, etc. Certain efforts have to be made to strengthen cybersecurity, promote digital literacy, and enforce laws and regulations that can significantly reduce its prevalence and impact. everyone needs to remain vigilant adopt best practices for online security and stay informed about emerging threats to protect themselves and contribute to a safer digital environment. ### [\[1\]](#_ftnref1)Shreya Singhal vs Union of India AIR 2015 SC 1523 [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Shankar vs State of Rep Crl. O.P. No. 6628 of 2010 [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Shreekanth C. Nair vs Licensee/ Developer Crl. Rev. Pet. No. 2900 of 2008 **Categories:** Articles --- ### [Doctrine of Strict Liability and Absolute Liability](https://lawfoyer.in/doctrine-of-strict-liability-and-absolute-liability/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Velagada Mounika, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar College of Law, Andhra University

INTRODUCTION :

Generally, Strict liability and Absolute liability comes to play when there is a negligence resulting in causing environmental pollution. These liabilities are based on, No Fault Liability which means when a harm caused by a person ,who is liable to another person despite he is not negligent in causing harm or no intention to cause harm or he was careful. In 19th century (England) the principle of Strict liability was evolved in Ryland V. Fletcher case, the strict liability famously known as “The Rules in Ryland V. Fletcher case”[1]. And the evolution of absolute liability in Mc Mehta v. Union of India case here it raises the standard and decree of liability, making it an “absolute,” one. These civil law principles transforming environmental and constitutional principles, and also from recognition of civil rights to fundamental rights. This is why the no fault liability plays a important role in claiming compensation from the defendant.

KEYWORDS:

1.No fault liability 2.strict liability 3. absolute liability 4.Non natural use of land 5.Polluter pay 6.principal pay 7.Environmental pollution

STRICT LIABILITY:

Meaning:

It means that an individual who keeps  harmful substances or Dangerous thing in his place  then he will be liable for the damage of plaintiff if it is escapes from his premises in any manner. For the application of strict liability there are essentials if all are satisfied then it comes under the Strict liability. Historical Background : Strict liability is the  principle that, first foundation laid from the case  Ryland V. Fletcher[2] in the year 1868 FACTS OF THE CASE: In a place there were two men one is Ryland and another is Fletcher, who lived each  other. Fletcher who had a mill which requires Huge  energy to work. So, in his land Defendant constructed a reservoir and  he appointed a engineer. In Ryland's land there were old mine shafts which was unnoticed by the engineer. And due to the negligence of engineer later construction, water from the reservoir break out and rushed into the mine shafts of plaintiff. Ryland filed sue against fletcher in Trail court, Court held that Fletcher was unaware of the abandoned mine shaft and he is not negligent. So, fletcher is not liable. Then Ryland goes on appeal to the higher court. Issues:
  1. whether the respondent is held legally responsible for the act done by Servant and without his negligence?
  2. Whether the construction of reservoir in fletcher’s land comes under natural use of land ?
Judgement : The house of lords gave decision in favour of Plaintiff and held that the defendant is liable, And for the acts done by the servant, Master is liable. The construction of reservoir is not natural use of land. Sic utere tuo it alienum non laedas which means everyone should use his land for natural use so, that you don’t injure other people. Strict liability Principle was originated from this case and the Rule had essentials and exceptions. After this case many cases are solved under this Rule of strict liability. This principal says if there is no negligence on his side then the defendant has to prove his innocence and this burden always  lies on defendant.

Essentials / Elements / Pre-requisites

1.Dangerous thing : Here this word “dangerous” means that it may cause any harm if it is escapes from the premises of respondent. It simply states that liability for the damages on the defendant when the thing escaped from the  land or premises of the defendant should be dangerous thing In Ryland V. Fletcher case the water stored in the reservoir is considered as the dangerous thing on defendant’s land. So, this principle states that the dangerous thing can be any poisonous gases, venomous fumes electricity, Chemicals and so on can be termed as dangerous things.
  1. Escape :
It is the 2nd  Essential of strict liability, which plays a key role in the cases. Here escape means the thing causing harm must breakout or run out of the premises of the defendant premises. It means that the escaped object was outside the area and control of defendant. Ponting v. Noakes Case [3] Here  the ponting horse was entered into the Noake’s fence and ate few leaves from  yew trees, which is a venomous tree. And the plaintiff’s horse was died and he sued the defendant in the court. The bench had lay down that the defendant was not liable under Strict liability because there was a full confine of yew trees and There is no escape from the defendant’s land.   Read v. Lyons & Co., [4]     Similarly there  was no escape and, therefore, there was no liability under the rule. In this case, the plaintiff was an employee in the defendant’s ammunition factory. inside the defendant’s premises she was working, while performing her duties a shell, which was being Manufactured there, exploded.
  1. Non natural use of land :
Here in the  Ryland V. Fletcher case huge amount water stored  in reservoir is non natural use of land and the use of land should be in natural way like keeping water for domestic purpose. Sochacki v. Sas[5] In this case court held that the fire in a house in a grate is an ordinary purpose and every days natural use. If this fire spreads the neighbouring premises ,then there is no applicability of strict liability. T.C. Balakrishnan Menon v. T.R. Subramanian, [6] In this case court held that the use of explosives in open ground even on festival days .it come under the non natural use of land and the defendant held liable. The above are the three essentials of Strict liability. Act done by independent contractor: Generally, an employer is not liable for the wrong committed by the independent contractors. However it is not a defence in the rule of strict liability in which the damage caused by the independent contractor. In Ryland V. Fletcher Case court held that the defendant was held liable even though he get his work done by independent contractors.

Defences / Exceptions :

The following are the recognised exceptions or defences by the Ryland V. Fletcher case and they are:
  1. Plaintiff’s own default :
  It was a good defence for the defendant, if plaintiff entered voluntarily into the defendant’s land  and causes damage by himself then the defendant is not liable. In this case Ponting v. Noakes  court said that the horse itself entered into the defendant’s land and died due to nibbled of yew tree leaves and here in this the defendant is not held liable because there is no escape of any Harmful substance. 2. Act of God or vis major or Damnum fatale The Harm which directly results from the natural causes and that can’t be foreseen and controlled by human beings. In relevance to the principle of strict liability; if the act was unpredictable,  without any human intervention and  caused by some super natural forces then there is no liability on defendant. Winfield and Pollock : “Act of God may be defined as an operation of natural forces unexpected that no human foresight or skill could reasonably be expected anticipate it.” [7] Nichols v. Marsland,[8] Here  the defendant constructed a dam with a normal flow  on his land. That year’s rainfall was heavy and unforgettable . Due to heavy rains the embankment of lakes burst and rushed out into the plaintiff’s four bridges. And the plaintiff sued defendant. The court ruled that there was no liability on defendant. 3. Consent of plaintiff In this exception, where plaintiff agreed expressly or impliedly of bringing any Harmful thing on his land which cause injury to him  at a subsequent time. Then the defendant is not liable and it comes under the principle of Volenti non fit injuria  which means no wrong is done to the person who gave his consent voluntarily.
  • Common benefit
 When the injury  is caused to the petitioner by the act or escape of Dangerous thing which was Kept for the benefit of the both petitioner and Respondent then it is called as common benefit. Here the rule of strict liability is inapplicable because they both are benefiting from it. Hence they both are not liable. Anderson v. Oppenheimer [9] In this case the plaintiff lessees floor in the defendant house , the tank in the house was burst and flooded the floor. The defendant is not liable here because the tank is used for the benefit of both.
  • Act of third party
  It means that when damage is caused due to acts done by the third person and the defendant has no control over him; no Master and Servant relation. If the act done by the stranger can be predictable then the Respondent should take care to avoid damages Box v. Jab[10] Here In this case defendant had a reservoir  and a overflow Of water from it due to the blockage of water by the stranger. And hence court held  here the defendant is not liable.
  • Statutory Authority:
 It is considered as a strong defence But if the defendant while under statutory authority he  has any negligence on his part, it was not applicable. Green v. Chelsea co (1864) In this case the defendant had a  duty to continuous maintain of water supply and without any negligence of the company it’s main belonging was burst and the place of the plaintiff was flooded with water. Court decided that there no negligence on behalf of company, hence it is not liable. The above mentioned are the defences for the defendant from the Strict liability.

ABSOLUTE LIABILITY:

  1.Meaning:

  In simple  Absolute liability  =  Strict liability  - Exceptions or defences The enterprises which is engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous activity, while operation of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity results in damage or harm of anyone on account of an  accident. Then the enterprise is strictly and absolutely  liable and to compensate to all those who were affected by accident.

  1. Historical Background/ Evolution:

    The Rule of absolute liability is took reference from the strict liability , here supreme court made this principle more strict without the exceptions in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India case. This is a  turning point  case in Indian history. Facts of the case: In Delhi which is the capital city of India , In 1985 on 4th and 6th December there was a severe gas leakage and  This was happened in one of the unit of Shriram foods and fertilizers Industries which is belongs to the Delhi Cloth Mill limited. Due to this an advocate was died who is practicing in This Hazari Court  and many other people also affected by this incident. This action was brought by M.C. Mehta through public interest litigation. Judgement: A strong decision was taken by supreme court  to evolve a new principle which suitable for the present social and economic conditions of India. In this case the court ruled that the company had to pay 20 lakhs compensation. Supreme court explanation: Supreme court justified the rule of absolute liability on basis of two reasons: a.Any enterprise which is carrying hazardous activities with a motive of profits have social responsibility to compensate victims from any accident , the company should absorb such loss and take the responsibility.
  1. The enterprises should discover the resources which guard against the hazardous and dangerous.
The measure of the compensation is based on how larger and prosperous enterprise; if it is larger and more prosperous then the compensation is also greater for the harm caused by the dangerous or hazardous activity by accident. Union carbide corporation v. Union of India  (Bhopal Gas tragedy) It is considered as world’s worst industrial disaster. The new rule laid in  oleum gas leakage case was applied in the Bhopal Gas tragedy by supreme court. In the city of Bhopal which is in Madhya Pradesh, India had a union carbide corporation India limited plant for manufacture of pesticides. Here on 2nd December 1984 at night a sever leakage of methyl isocyanate and other gases.  The company was designed with unproven and untested technology. It is a multinational company of U.S.A and this tragedy resulted in death of 3000 people and many people were injured. Some people lost of their hearing sense , disorders relating to neurological, permanent loss of eyesight. And after this tragedy , the public insurance Act 1991 was passed with a purpose of  immediate relief for the victims without any delay. Which was caused by the enterprise handling with hazardous substances. Public insurance Act 1991: The main motive of this act is to provide immediate relief to the victims, who were affected by the hazardous substances which was handled by the enterprises. This act was totally based on no fault liability principle. This act speaks  , the owner who is dealing with Harmful substances should take insurance where the owner will get the insurance against the liability in case of any death or injury to the victim caused by hazardous substance. Hazardous substances means chemical or physic chemical substance which cause harm to the living beings as human beings, animals, micro organisms , plants, water air land and environment. Handling means  manufacturing, transporting, packing , storing and so on in relation with hazardous substances.

The Distinction between Strict liability and Absolute liability

                   Strict liability                Absolute Liability
1.In strict liability the rules are strict but not absolute in nature  because it has exceptions. 1. In absolute liability the rules are strict and absolute, both in nature because it doesn’t have any exceptions.
2.The damages awarded by the court are may be ordinary or compensatory. 2. The damages awarded by the court are exemplary.
3.The escape of dangerous thing is necessary from the premises of defendant. 3. The escape of hazardous or dangerous thing is not necessary from the premises of the defendant. Which means the person injured within the premises and outside the premises. The defendant will be liable.
4.There should be non natural use of land. 4. Here Even it dangerous substance may be a natural use of land ,if it escapes then the defendant is liable, and there is no compulsory requirement of non natural use of land.

Absolute liability and Environment pollution:

Indian council enviro- legal Action V. Union of India [11] In this case the court made compulsory of  Polluter pay principle which means that the polluter must pay for the pollution made by him and the compensation should be used to the improvement of environment and the local residential areas. In this case also the absolute liability principle was followed by the supreme court. Visakhapatnam Gas leakage Case(2020): (Andhra Pradesh State) In this case a styrene gas was exploded from L.G polymers enterprise due to this 11 people were died and thousands of  people are hospitalized. Here also Court applied absolute liability.

Maxims / Principles

  a.sic utere tuo it alienum non laedas  “Use your own property in such a way that you do not injured other people’s: a maxim often used in cases of nuisance. It is misleading, since only an unreasonable interference with a neighbour’s property is actionable as a nuisance..”[12] b.volenti non fit injuria “No wrong is done to one who consent”.[13]
  1. Damnum fatale
“Damage ordained by fate. Damage caused by a force majeure(greater force), such as war, shipwreck, or natural catastrophic ( natural disasters)”. Vis major a Latin word which means  a greater force.

CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

Any way  the rule of absolute liability is a turning point judgement and supreme court reached its milestone. In jurisprudence we study sources of law as legislation, precedent and custom. In these three legislation is the best source of law. So the absolute liability not only remain as precedent but also legislation should be made.  And the provisions will give the rights to the people which helps them in speedy justice. If the Legislation is made then it undergo all the problems and give solutions before arise of problem in the society.

 REFERENCES

  1. Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred
  •           DR. R.k. BANGIA
  • Dr. N. Maheshwara Swamy
  • P.S.A. PILLAI
2. Cases Referred 1.Ryland V. Fletcher UKHL 1, L.R. 3 H.L. 330. 2.M.C Mehta V. Union of India 3.Ponting v. Noakes1894-2 Q. B. 281 : (63 L. J. Q. B. 549) 4.Read v. Lyons & Co., (1974 )A.C. 156 5.Sochacki v. Sas (1947) 1 All E.R. 344 6.T.C. Balakrishnan Menon v. T.R. Subramanian A.I.R. 1968 Kerala, 151 7.Nichols v. Marsland(1876) 2 Ex. D. 1 8.Balak Glass emporium v. United India  insurance co ltd AIR 1993 Ker 342 9.Anderson v. Oppenheimer 1880 5 QB 602 10.Box v. Jab1879 4 Ex D76 11.Green v. Chelsea co (1864) 12.Indian council enviro- legal Action V. Union of India AIR 1996 SC 1446 13.Visakhapatnam Gas leakage Case 2020
  1. Statutes Referred
i.The public insurance Act 1991 [1] Ryland V. Fletcher UKHL 1, L.R. 3 H.L. 330. [2] UKHL 1, L.R. 3 H.L. 330. [3] Indian kanoon ; Ponting v. Noakes; 1894-2 Q. B. 281 : (63 L. J. Q. B. 549) [4] DR. R K. BANGIA; Read v J Lyons & Co(1974 )A.C. 156 [5] (1947) 1 All E.R. 344. [6] A.I.R. 1968 Kerala, 151. [7] https://onlyjudiciary.com/act-of-god-vis-major-general-defences-in-tort/ [8] (1876) 2 Ex. D. 1 [9] 1880 5 QB 602, P.S.A Pillai [10] 1879 4 Ex D76 [11] AIR 1996 SC 1446 [12] https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100504563 [13] Oxford law Dictionary **Content:** **Author-Velagada Mounika, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar College of Law, Andhra University** ### **INTRODUCTION :** Generally, Strict liability and Absolute liability comes to play when there is a negligence resulting in causing environmental pollution. These liabilities are based on, No Fault Liability which means when a harm caused by a person ,who is liable to another person despite he is not negligent in causing harm or no intention to cause harm or he was careful. In 19th century (England) the principle of Strict liability was evolved in Ryland V. Fletcher case, the strict liability famously known as “*The Rules in Ryland V. Fletcher case*”[\[1\]](#_ftn1)***.*** And the evolution of absolute liability in Mc Mehta v. Union of India case here it raises the standard and decree of liability, making it an “*absolute*,” one. These civil law principles transforming environmental and constitutional principles, and also from recognition of civil rights to fundamental rights. This is why the no fault liability plays a important role in claiming compensation from the defendant. #### **KEYWORDS:** 1.No fault liability 2.strict liability 3\. absolute liability 4.Non natural use of land 5.Polluter pay 6.principal pay 7.Environmental pollution ### **STRICT LIABILITY:** ### **Meaning:** It means that an individual who keeps harmful substances or Dangerous thing in his place then he will be liable for the damage of plaintiff if it is escapes from his premises in any manner. For the application of strict liability there are essentials if all are satisfied then it comes under the Strict liability. **Historical Background :** Strict liability is the principle that, first foundation laid from the case **Ryland V. Fletcher[\[2\]](#_ftn2)** in the year 1868 **FACTS OF THE CASE:** In a place there were two men one is Ryland and another is Fletcher, who lived each other. Fletcher who had a mill which requires Huge energy to work. So, in his land Defendant constructed a reservoir and he appointed a engineer. In Ryland’s land there were old mine shafts which was unnoticed by the engineer. And due to the negligence of engineer later construction, water from the reservoir break out and rushed into the mine shafts of plaintiff. Ryland filed sue against fletcher in Trail court, Court held that Fletcher was unaware of the abandoned mine shaft and he is not negligent. So, fletcher is not liable. Then Ryland goes on appeal to the higher court. **Issues:** 1. whether the respondent is held legally responsible for the act done by Servant and without his negligence? 2. Whether the construction of reservoir in fletcher’s land comes under natural use of land ? **Judgement :** The house of lords gave decision in favour of Plaintiff and held that the defendant is liable, And for the acts done by the servant, Master is liable. The construction of reservoir is not natural use of land. **Sic utere tuo it alienum non laedas** which means everyone should use his land for natural use so, that you don’t injure other people. Strict liability Principle was originated from this case and the Rule had essentials and exceptions. After this case many cases are solved under this Rule of strict liability. This principal says if there is no negligence on his side then the defendant has to prove his innocence and this burden always lies on defendant. ### **Essentials / Elements / Pre-requisites** **1.Dangerous thing :** Here this word “dangerous” means that it may cause any harm if it is escapes from the premises of respondent. It simply states that liability for the damages on the defendant when the thing escaped from the land or premises of the defendant should be dangerous thing In Ryland V. Fletcher case the water stored in the reservoir is considered as the dangerous thing on defendant’s land. So, this principle states that the dangerous thing can be any poisonous gases, venomous fumes electricity, Chemicals and so on can be termed as dangerous things. 2. **Escape :** It is the 2nd Essential of strict liability, which plays a key role in the cases. Here escape means the thing causing harm must breakout or run out of the premises of the defendant premises. It means that the escaped object was outside the area and control of defendant. ***Ponting v. Noakes Case [\[3\]](#_ftn3)*** Here the ponting horse was entered into the Noake’s fence and ate few leaves from yew trees, which is a venomous tree. And the plaintiff’s horse was died and he sued the defendant in the court. The bench had lay down that the defendant was not liable under Strict liability because there was a full confine of yew trees and There is no escape from the defendant’s land. ***Read v. Lyons & Co., [\[4\]](#_ftn4)*** Similarly there was no escape and, therefore, there was no liability under the rule. In this case, the plaintiff was an employee in the defendant’s ammunition factory. inside the defendant’s premises she was working, while performing her duties a shell, which was being Manufactured there, exploded. 3. **Non natural use of land :** Here in the Ryland V. Fletcher case huge amount water stored in reservoir is non natural use of land and the use of land should be in natural way like keeping water for domestic purpose. ***Sochacki v. Sas*[\[5\]](#_ftn5)** In this case court held that the fire in a house in a grate is an ordinary purpose and every days natural use. If this fire spreads the neighbouring premises ,then there is no applicability of strict liability. ***T.C. Balakrishnan Menon v. T.R. Subramanian, [\[6\]](#_ftn6)*** In this case court held that the use of explosives in open ground even on festival days .it come under the non natural use of land and the defendant held liable. The above are the three essentials of Strict liability. **Act done by independent contractor:** Generally, an employer is not liable for the wrong committed by the independent contractors. However it is not a defence in the rule of strict liability in which the damage caused by the independent contractor. In **Ryland V. Fletcher** Case court held that the defendant was held liable even though he get his work done by independent contractors. ### **Defences / Exceptions :** The following are the recognised exceptions or defences by the Ryland V. Fletcher case and they are: 1. **Plaintiff’s own default :** It was a good defence for the defendant, if plaintiff entered voluntarily into the defendant’s land and causes damage by himself then the defendant is not liable. In this case ***Ponting v. Noakes*** court said that the horse itself entered into the defendant’s land and died due to nibbled of yew tree leaves and here in this the defendant is not held liable because there is no escape of any Harmful substance. **2. Act of God or vis major or Damnum fatale** The Harm which directly results from the natural causes and that can’t be foreseen and controlled by human beings. In relevance to the principle of strict liability; if the act was unpredictable, without any human intervention and caused by some super natural forces then there is no liability on defendant. **Winfield and Pollock :** “Act of God may be defined as an operation of natural forces unexpected that no human foresight or skill could reasonably be expected anticipate it.” [\[7\]](#_ftn7) ***Nichols v. Marsland,*[\[8\]](#_ftn8)** Here the defendant constructed a dam with a normal flow on his land. That year’s rainfall was heavy and unforgettable . Due to heavy rains the embankment of lakes burst and rushed out into the plaintiff’s four bridges. And the plaintiff sued defendant. The court ruled that there was no liability on defendant. **3. Consent of plaintiff** In this exception, where plaintiff agreed expressly or impliedly of bringing any Harmful thing on his land which cause injury to him at a subsequent time. Then the defendant is not liable and it comes under the principle of **Volenti non fit injuria** which means no wrong is done to the person who gave his consent voluntarily. - **Common benefit** When the injury is caused to the petitioner by the act or escape of Dangerous thing which was Kept for the benefit of the both petitioner and Respondent then it is called as common benefit. Here the rule of strict liability is inapplicable because they both are benefiting from it. Hence they both are not liable. ***Anderson v. Oppenheimer* [\[9\]](#_ftn9)** In this case the plaintiff lessees floor in the defendant house , the tank in the house was burst and flooded the floor. The defendant is not liable here because the tank is used for the benefit of both. - **Act of third party** It means that when damage is caused due to acts done by the third person and the defendant has no control over him; no Master and Servant relation. If the act done by the stranger can be predictable then the Respondent should take care to avoid damages ***Box v. Jab[\[10\]](#_ftn10)*** Here In this case defendant had a reservoir and a overflow Of water from it due to the blockage of water by the stranger. And hence court held here the defendant is not liable. - **Statutory Authority:** It is considered as a strong defence But if the defendant while under statutory authority he has any negligence on his part, it was not applicable. ***Green v. Chelsea co (1864)*** In this case the defendant had a duty to continuous maintain of water supply and without any negligence of the company it’s main belonging was burst and the place of the plaintiff was flooded with water. Court decided that there no negligence on behalf of company, hence it is not liable. The above mentioned are the defences for the defendant from the Strict liability. ### **ABSOLUTE LIABILITY:** ### **1.Meaning:** In simple **Absolute liability = Strict liability – Exceptions or defences** The enterprises which is engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous activity, while operation of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity results in damage or harm of anyone on account of an accident. Then the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable and to compensate to all those who were affected by accident. 2. ### **Historical Background/ Evolution:** The Rule of absolute liability is took reference from the strict liability , here supreme court made this principle more strict without the exceptions in **M.C. Mehta v. Union of India** case. This is a turning point case in Indian history. **Facts of the case:** In Delhi which is the capital city of India , In 1985 on 4th and 6th December there was a severe gas leakage and This was happened in one of the unit of Shriram foods and fertilizers Industries which is belongs to the Delhi Cloth Mill limited. Due to this an advocate was died who is practicing in This Hazari Court and many other people also affected by this incident. This action was brought by M.C. Mehta through public interest litigation. **Judgement:** A strong decision was taken by supreme court to evolve a new principle which suitable for the present social and economic conditions of India. In this case the court ruled that the company had to pay 20 lakhs compensation. **Supreme court explanation:** Supreme court justified the rule of absolute liability on basis of two reasons: a.Any enterprise which is carrying hazardous activities with a motive of profits have social responsibility to compensate victims from any accident , the company should absorb such loss and take the responsibility. 1. The enterprises should discover the resources which guard against the hazardous and dangerous. The measure of the compensation is based on how larger and prosperous enterprise; if it is larger and more prosperous then the compensation is also greater for the harm caused by the dangerous or hazardous activity by accident. **Union carbide corporation v. Union of India (Bhopal Gas tragedy)** It is considered as world’s worst industrial disaster. The new rule laid in oleum gas leakage case was applied in the Bhopal Gas tragedy by supreme court. In the city of Bhopal which is in Madhya Pradesh, India had a union carbide corporation India limited plant for manufacture of pesticides. Here on 2nd December 1984 at night a sever leakage of methyl isocyanate and other gases. The company was designed with unproven and untested technology. It is a multinational company of U.S.A and this tragedy resulted in death of 3000 people and many people were injured. Some people lost of their hearing sense , disorders relating to neurological, permanent loss of eyesight. And after this tragedy , the public insurance Act 1991 was passed with a purpose of immediate relief for the victims without any delay. Which was caused by the enterprise handling with hazardous substances. **Public insurance Act 1991:** The main motive of this act is to provide immediate relief to the victims, who were affected by the hazardous substances which was handled by the enterprises. This act was totally based on **no fault liability** principle. This act speaks , the owner who is dealing with Harmful substances should take insurance where the owner will get the insurance against the liability in case of any death or injury to the victim caused by hazardous substance. Hazardous substances means chemical or physic chemical substance which cause harm to the living beings as human beings, animals, micro organisms , plants, water air land and environment. Handling means manufacturing, transporting, packing , storing and so on in relation with hazardous substances. ### **The Distinction between Strict liability and Absolute liability** **Strict liability** **Absolute** **Liability**1.In strict liability the rules are strict but not absolute in nature because it has exceptions.1. In absolute liability the rules are strict and absolute, both in nature because it doesn’t have any exceptions.2.The damages awarded by the court are may be ordinary or compensatory.2. The damages awarded by the court are exemplary.3.The escape of dangerous thing is necessary from the premises of defendant.3. The escape of hazardous or dangerous thing is not necessary from the premises of the defendant. Which means the person injured within the premises and outside the premises. The defendant will be liable. 4.There should be non natural use of land.4. Here Even it dangerous substance may be a natural use of land ,if it escapes then the defendant is liable, and there is no compulsory requirement of non natural use of land.### **Absolute liability and Environment pollution:** **Indian council enviro- legal Action V. Union of India [\[11\]](#_ftn11)** In this case the court made compulsory of Polluter pay principle which means that the polluter must pay for the pollution made by him and the compensation should be used to the improvement of environment and the local residential areas. In this case also the absolute liability principle was followed by the supreme court. **Visakhapatnam Gas leakage Case(2020): (**Andhra Pradesh State) In this case a styrene gas was exploded from L.G polymers enterprise due to this 11 people were died and thousands of people are hospitalized. Here also Court applied absolute liability. ### **Maxims / Principles** **a.*sic utere tuo it alienum non laedas*** *“Use your own property in such a way that you do not injured other people’s: a maxim often used in cases of nuisance. It is misleading, since only an unreasonable interference with a neighbour’s property is actionable as a nuisance*..”[\[12\]](#_ftn12) **b.*volenti non fit injuria*** *“No wrong is done to one who consent”*.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) 1. ***Damnum fatale*** “*Damage ordained by fate.* *Damage caused by a force majeure(greater force), such as war, shipwreck, or natural catastrophic ( natural disasters)”. **Vis major** a Latin word which means a greater force.* ### **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** Any way the rule of absolute liability is a turning point judgement and supreme court reached its milestone. In jurisprudence we study sources of law as legislation, precedent and custom. In these three legislation is the best source of law. So the absolute liability not only remain as precedent but also legislation should be made. And the provisions will give the rights to the people which helps them in speedy justice. If the Legislation is made then it undergo all the problems and give solutions before arise of problem in the society. ### **REFERENCES** 1. **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** - DR. R.k. BANGIA - Dr. N. Maheshwara Swamy - P.S.A. PILLAI **2. Cases Referred** 1.Ryland V. Fletcher UKHL 1, L.R. 3 H.L. 330. 2.M.C Mehta V. Union of India 3.Ponting v. Noakes1894-2 Q. B. 281 : (63 L. J. Q. B. 549) 4.Read v. Lyons & Co., (1974 )A.C. 156 5.Sochacki v. Sas (1947) 1 All E.R. 344 6.T.C. Balakrishnan Menon v. T.R. Subramanian A.I.R. 1968 Kerala, 151 7.Nichols v. Marsland(1876) 2 Ex. D. 1 8.Balak Glass emporium v. United India insurance co ltd AIR 1993 Ker 342 9.Anderson v. Oppenheimer 1880 5 QB 602 10.Box v. Jab1879 4 Ex D76 11.Green v. Chelsea co (1864) 12.Indian council enviro- legal Action V. Union of India AIR 1996 SC 1446 13.Visakhapatnam Gas leakage Case 2020 3. **Statutes Referred** i.The public insurance Act 1991 [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Ryland V. Fletcher UKHL 1, L.R. 3 H.L. 330. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) UKHL 1, L.R. 3 H.L. 330. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Indian kanoon ; Ponting v. Noakes; 1894-2 Q. B. 281 : (63 L. J. Q. B. 549) [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) DR. R K. BANGIA; Read v J Lyons & Co(1974 )A.C. 156 [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) (1947) 1 All E.R. 344. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) A.I.R. 1968 Kerala, 151. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) (1876) 2 Ex. D. 1 [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) 1880 5 QB 602, P.S.A Pillai [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) 1879 4 Ex D76 [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) AIR 1996 SC 1446 [\[12\]](#_ftnref12)[ https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100504563](https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100504563) [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Oxford law Dictionary **Categories:** Articles --- ### [Emergency provision under Indian Constitution](https://lawfoyer.in/emergency-provision-under-indian-constitution/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Naveena K., Chettinad School of Law

INTRODUCTION

The Indian Constitution[1] has the features of both federal and unitary, Emergency provisions are the unitary features. During the emergency situations the central government holds the power and it will demand the states to do the functions .Constitution of India Part XVII deals with the Emergency provisions[2] Article 352 to 360 these provisions enables the Central government to meet any abnormal situations effectively. Three  types of Emergency
  1. (Art 352)- National Emergency
  2. (Art 356)- State Emergency
  3. (Art 360)-Financial Emergency
The President has the power to imposing the all three emergencies. During this emergencies period the Fundamental rights has been suspended except Art 20 and 21. The kind of Political System is Federal during normal time and unitary during emergency. In this article, lets see about the Types of Emergencies,Ground of Proclamation of emergencies,Procedures of parliamentary approval and duration of emergencies,Revocation of emergencies, effects of emergencies and the related case laws and some doctrines. Keywords(Minimum5):Constitution,National Emergency, State Emergency,Financial Emergency,War, External aggression, Proclamation, Judicial Review, President.

TYPES OF EMERGENCIES

National Emergencies- Due to war ,external aggression or armed rebellion State Emergencies   -    Due to failure of constitutional machinery in states. Financial Emergencies- Unexpected situations that impact Financial stability. NATIONAL EMERGENCIES President of India can declare the national emergencies in the situation were the security of India or a part of India threatened by the war or armed rebellion or external aggression, before their actual occurrences. Emergency declared on external aggression known as external emergency, Emergency declared on armed rebellion known as internal emergency. A period of emergency may be proclaimed for the entire nation or just a part of it. Grounds of national emergencies:
  1. War- When a country declares war against India and violence by armed forces
  2. External aggression - When country attack the country without any formal declarations of war
  3. Armed rebellion-When a group of individuals rebel against the government and cause destruction of property and life.
Procedure for Proclamation of Emergency President can proclaim a national emergency only after receiving the recommendation from the cabinets ,means only on the concurrence of the cabinets not merely on the PM. 44th amendment 1978 introduced  safeguards to eliminate any possibilities of PM alone taking the regards. “Minervamills Case[3]” The Supreme Court ruled that there is no barrier to   Judicial review of the validity of a Presidential Proclamation. Thus, the Proclamation of Emergency can be challenged in court on the grounds of malafide, or the proclamation was founded entirely on false and irrelevant Parliamentary approval and duration: Originally the Proclamation of emergency was 2 month for approval by 44th amendment it has been reduced to 1 month. The Proclamation must be approved by both the house of Parliamentary within 1 month of date of issue. If the  Loksabha has been dissolved during the 1 month without approving the proclamation. After the reconstitution of loksabha the proclamation survives until 30 days from the 1st sitting. Once the parliament approved proclamation of emergency it shall remain in force for period of 6 months from the date of passing. Further extension of emergency beyond period of 6 months ,for about every six months approval of parliament is needed Every resolution approving POE ,& continuance must be done by either house of parliament by special majority process. Revocation of Emergency:
  • The President can revoke the emergency at any time , the parliamentary approval is not required.If the loksabha passes the resolution to disapproving its continuation the President must revoke the Proclamation.
  • 1/10 of the loksabha members should give a written notice to the speaker if the house in session , if houses in not in session to the President .Special sitting is held within 14 days of notice for the purpose of considering a resolution disapproving the continuation of proclamation.
Disapproval of proclamation Continuation of proclamation
Resolution passed by Loksabha Resolution passed by both house
Adopted by simple majority Adopted by special majority

Effects of Proclamation of emergency

1.Centre state relations: Extension of Center's Executive Power(353): During national emergency the power of the central extends, Central can direct the any state regarding manner which extends the power. State executive will not suspended .Central has complete control. Legislative(353 (b)) : During the national emergency centre can make law on state subjects, although the legislative power of states does not suspended. The law made by the parliament on the states subject during emergency becomes inoperative in 6 months. Financial Controls (354): President can make changes in distribution of revenues between centre& states, thus president can either reduce or cancel the transfer of finances.
  1. Effect of life of loksabha and the State assembly( 83 (2)):
During national emergency the term of loksabha has been extended beyond five years. and state legislative assembly can also have their extension of term.
  1. Effect of Fundamental rights:
There is no need of separate order to be passed to suspend the Fundamental Rights.The six Fundamental rights enshrined in Art 19 gets automatically suspended if the national emergency had been issued. Art 358 and Art 359 describes the effects of national emergency.
ARTICLE 358 ARTCLE 359
l   Fundamental Right guaranteed by Article 19 completely on Suspension. l  Automatically suspends l  Art 19 suspends up-to the emergency exists I l  Extends to entire country l  Operates in case of external emergency l  Suspension of  Other  Fundamental Rights (except 20 ,& 21) l  On the Presidents declaration of specified fundamental rights suspends. l  Fundamental rights suspended for the period specified by President. l  It may extends to entire country or the part of it. l  Operates in case of  both external and internal emergency.
MakkanSingh vs State of Punjab[4] Suspension of right to move court for the enforcement of Art 14,21,22, under the Proclamation of emergency during Indo-China war has been challenged. The SC ruled that the rights were suspended only for those who were legally detained, not those who were unfairly detained under the Prevention Detention Law. The Supreme Court stated that if a citizen's imprisonment was mala fide, he would not be deprived the right to petition the court for a writ of habeas corpus. M Jabalpur vs S.Shukla[5] The Supreme Court ruled in the case  that during national emergency an individual moving to the Court for enforcement of Fundamental rights is suspended. also, including right to life and liberty.

PRESIDENTS RULE

Presidents rules can be also termed as “Constitutional Emergency” or “ State Emergency” Grounds of Impositions: Art 356 -According to the President, there is a situation where the Governor cannot carry out the duties of the State Government in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Art 365 -Whenever State fails to comply with order of Centre the Presidents rule will arise. Parliamentary Approval and Duration: Proclamation of imposing President’s rule ,both the house of parliament must approve within 2 months  from the date of its issuance. At the time of proclamation loksabha dissolves or dissolution take places during the time period of 2 months , then the proclamation survive for about 30 days from the first sitting of loksabha after its reconstitution. Rajyasabha should approves it in the mean time Proclamation operates on period of six months, it can be extended only up to 3 years not beyond that. Every 6 months Parliament approval is required by simple majority. 44th amendment[6]- 2 Condition must be fulfilled to extended the President’s rule for 6 months.
  1. National Emergency operates in India, may be imposed in whole of territory or party of state.
  2. If there is report submitted that elections in the state assembly is not possible.
Revocation: The revocation do not require the approval of both the houses, The President can revoke at any time. This occurs when the leader of political party indicating the majority support for him in the assembly. SR bommai vs UOI[7] This case decided by the Supreme court of India, that the President’s Rule is subject to Judicial Review. Court can question and enquire about the grounds for imposing the Presidents rule. SC laid down the rules regarding Presidents rule  ,listed below;
  • President do not have an absolute power to dismiss the State Government.
  • President should use the power only after the approval of Parliament, until then president can suspend only the Legislative Assembly.
  • In case of Proclamation does not get approval by the both houses, it lapses after the 2 months and the dismissed government is revived. Suspended legislative assembly get reactivated.
  • These provisions should use only in the exceptional circumstances.
  • President’s Rule can be imposed on ground if the State Governor work against Secularism.
  • This provision under eye of judicial review it will the prevent arbitrariness.
Effect of President’s Rule :
  • The President will taken up the functions of State he become the deciding authority, and the power vested to governor.
  • The decisions will be taken by Parliament instead of a State Assembly.
  • During Presidents Rule the power of high court remains same. President cannot suspend the power of High Court.
  • President can also suspend the constitution provision relates to state if it is necessary.
  • President can also dismisses the State council of minister headed by CM. The State Administration can be carry out by the Governor on behalf of President.

FINANCIAL EMERGENCIES

Article 360 of Indian Constitution  says about the Financial Emergencies. This can be imposed by President on the approval of Parliament. 38th Amendment [8] states that the President's declaration of a financial emergency is final and conclusive, and can be challenged in court on any grounds. This was subsequently repealed by the 44th Amendment Act of 1978, which stated that the president's satisfaction is subject to judicial review. Ground of imposition: Art 360- Allows the President to declare a financial emergency in India if the country's financial stability is threatened. Approval and Duration :
  • The Proclamation of emergency it should be approved by the Both the houses of Parliament on on simple majority within in the 2 months from the date of issuance.
  • The loksabha dissolve during the period of 2 months without approving, after the reconstitution of loksabha from the 30 days of first sitting it must be approved. Rajyasabha should approve in its mean time.
Revocation: The emergency can be revoked by the president at any time. No maximum period is prescribed, for the continuation of emergency parliamentary approval is not needed. Effects of Financial Emergency: The center's executive jurisdiction extends to directing any state to follow such financial propriety standards. There is the reduction of salaries and allowances for the person serving in state. The president may reserve the money bill and financial bill  for considerations The salary and allowances of the person serving in the Union ( Judges of SC & HC)also reduced. Criticisms
  • President act as a dictator
  • The democratic foundation of the constitution will be shattered, and fundamental rights will become meaningless.
  • The federal nature of the constitution reduces and the union emerges all powerful.
  • The Union executive will have the exclusive power of state.
  • State Financial autonomy will be nullified.
There are some doctrines to be discussed in the Emergency Provision.
  • Doctrine of Sovereignty :The executive head of the state (President) has an power to declare the Emergency in certain situations. This is to protect the Sovereignty,unity, integrity, security of Constitution of India.
  • Doctrine of Unitary State : The federal structure becomes unitary when the emergency situation arises, the central government taken the power state government should comply with the law made by centre.
  • Doctrine of Judicial Review: Judicial review ensures that constitutional rights are upheld even during emergencies by acting as a check on possible abuses of emergency powers.

CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

India is a quasi federal country it is federal structure with unitary features, when it comes to the situation of emergency the President may Proclaim the emergency with the approval of both houses of Parliament, There are procedures for the approval and revocation of Emergencies. President do not hold the absolute power on the Emergencies. The fundamental rights of the citizen also suspended during the emergency , the fundamental rights and period are specified by the President. The Emergency provision under Judicial review to prevent the arbitrariness and malafide intention.

REFERENCES

Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred Constitution Law of India: Dr.J.N Pandey Indian Polity : M.Laxmikanth Online Articles / Sources Referred
  1. Emergency provisions. (n.d.). Drishti IAS. Retrieved March 16, 2024, from https://www.drishtiias.com/to-the-points/Paper2/emergency-provisions
  2. Prep, B. E. (2023, October 17). BYJU’S exam prep. BYJU’S Exam Prep. https://byjusexamprep.com/upsc-exam/emergency-provisions-in-indian-constitution
  3. Team, C. (2022, October 19). ClearIAS. ClearIAS. https://www.clearias.com/emergency-provisions/
Cases Referred
  1. Minerva mills vs UOI
  2. SR Bommai vs UOI
  3. Makkan Singh vs State of Punjab
  4. D.M Jabalpur vs S.Shukla
Statutes Referred
    1. Constitution of India 1949
[1] Enact on Nov 26  1949, enforcement on Jan 26 1950 [2] Influenced by  the country Germany [3] AIR 1980 SC 1789 [4] AIR 1964 SC 381 [5] AIR 1976 SC 1207 [6] 44th amendent act 1978 [7] 1994 3SCC 1 [8] 1975 **Content:** **Author-Naveena K., Chettinad School of Law** ### **INTRODUCTION** The Indian Constitution[\[1\]](#_ftn1) has the features of both federal and unitary, Emergency provisions are the unitary features. During the emergency situations the central government holds the power and it will demand the states to do the functions .Constitution of India Part XVII deals with the Emergency provisions[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Article 352 to 360 these provisions enables the Central government to meet any abnormal situations effectively. Three types of Emergency 1. (Art 352)- National Emergency 2. (Art 356)- State Emergency 3. (Art 360)-Financial Emergency The President has the power to imposing the all three emergencies. During this emergencies period the Fundamental rights has been suspended except Art 20 and 21. The kind of Political System is Federal during normal time and unitary during emergency. In this article, lets see about the Types of Emergencies,Ground of Proclamation of emergencies,Procedures of parliamentary approval and duration of emergencies,Revocation of emergencies, effects of emergencies and the related case laws and some doctrines. ***Keywords(Minimum5)*:**Constitution,National Emergency, State Emergency,Financial Emergency,War, External aggression, Proclamation, Judicial Review, President. ### **TYPES OF EMERGENCIES** **National Emergencies-** Due to war ,external aggression or armed rebellion **State Emergencies –** Due to failure of constitutional machinery in states. **Financial Emergencies-** Unexpected situations that impact Financial stability. **NATIONAL EMERGENCIES** President of India can declare the national emergencies in the situation were the security of India or a part of India threatened by the war or armed rebellion or external aggression, before their actual occurrences. Emergency declared on external aggression known as external emergency, Emergency declared on armed rebellion known as internal emergency. A period of emergency may be proclaimed for the entire nation or just a part of it. **Grounds of national emergencies:** 1. War- When a country declares war against India and violence by armed forces 2. External aggression – When country attack the country without any formal declarations of war 3. Armed rebellion-When a group of individuals rebel against the government and cause destruction of property and life. **Procedure for Proclamation of Emergency** President can proclaim a national emergency only after receiving the recommendation from the cabinets ,means only on the concurrence of the cabinets not merely on the PM. 44th amendment 1978 introduced safeguards to eliminate any possibilities of PM alone taking the regards. **“Minervamills Case**[**\[3\]**](#_ftn3)**”** The Supreme Court ruled that there is no barrier to Judicial review of the validity of a Presidential Proclamation. Thus, the Proclamation of Emergency can be challenged in court on the grounds of malafide, or the proclamation was founded entirely on false and irrelevant **Parliamentary approval and duration:** Originally the Proclamation of emergency was 2 month for approval by 44th amendment it has been reduced to 1 month. The Proclamation must be approved by both the house of Parliamentary within 1 month of date of issue. If the Loksabha has been dissolved during the 1 month without approving the proclamation. After the reconstitution of loksabha the proclamation survives until 30 days from the 1st sitting. Once the parliament approved proclamation of emergency it shall remain in force for period of 6 months from the date of passing. Further extension of emergency beyond period of 6 months ,for about every six months approval of parliament is needed Every resolution approving POE ,& continuance must be done by either house of parliament by special majority process. **Revocation of Emergency:** - The President can revoke the emergency at any time , the parliamentary approval is not required.If the loksabha passes the resolution to disapproving its continuation the President must revoke the Proclamation. - 1/10 of the loksabha members should give a written notice to the speaker if the house in session , if houses in not in session to the President .Special sitting is held within 14 days of notice for the purpose of considering a resolution disapproving the continuation of proclamation. **Disapproval of proclamation****Continuation of proclamation**Resolution passed by LoksabhaResolution passed by both houseAdopted by simple majorityAdopted by special majority### **Effects of Proclamation of emergency** 1**.Centre state relations:** Extension of Center’s Executive Power(353): During national emergency the power of the central extends, Central can direct the any state regarding manner which extends the power. State executive will not suspended .Central has complete control. Legislative(353 (b)) : During the national emergency centre can make law on state subjects, although the legislative power of states does not suspended. The law made by the parliament on the states subject during emergency becomes inoperative in 6 months. Financial Controls (354): President can make changes in distribution of revenues between centre& states, thus president can either reduce or cancel the transfer of finances. 2. **Effect of life of loksabha and the State assembly( 83 (2)):** During national emergency the term of loksabha has been extended beyond five years. and state legislative assembly can also have their extension of term. 3. **Effect of Fundamental rights:** There is no need of separate order to be passed to suspend the Fundamental Rights.The six Fundamental rights enshrined in Art 19 gets automatically suspended if the national emergency had been issued. Art 358 and Art 359 describes the effects of national emergency. ARTICLE 358ARTCLE 359l Fundamental Right guaranteed by Article 19 completely on Suspension. l Automatically suspends l Art 19 suspends up-to the emergency exists I l Extends to entire country l Operates in case of external emergency l Suspension of Other Fundamental Rights (except 20 ,& 21) l On the Presidents declaration of specified fundamental rights suspends. l Fundamental rights suspended for the period specified by President. l It may extends to entire country or the part of it. l Operates in case of both external and internal emergency. **MakkanSingh vs State of Punjab**[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Suspension of right to move court for the enforcement of Art 14,21,22, under the Proclamation of emergency during Indo-China war has been challenged. The SC ruled that the rights were suspended only for those who were legally detained, not those who were unfairly detained under the Prevention Detention Law. The Supreme Court stated that if a citizen’s imprisonment was mala fide, he would not be deprived the right to petition the court for a writ of habeas corpus. **M Jabalpur vs S.Shukla**[**\[5\]**](#_ftn5) The Supreme Court ruled in the case that during national emergency an individual moving to the Court for enforcement of Fundamental rights is suspended. also, including right to life and liberty. ### **PRESIDENTS RULE** Presidents rules can be also termed as “Constitutional Emergency” or “ State Emergency” **Grounds of Impositions:** Art 356 -According to the President, there is a situation where the Governor cannot carry out the duties of the State Government in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Art 365 -Whenever State fails to comply with order of Centre the Presidents rule will arise. **Parliamentary Approval and Duration:** Proclamation of imposing President’s rule ,both the house of parliament must approve within 2 months from the date of its issuance. At the time of proclamation loksabha dissolves or dissolution take places during the time period of 2 months , then the proclamation survive for about 30 days from the first sitting of loksabha after its reconstitution. Rajyasabha should approves it in the mean time Proclamation operates on period of six months, it can be extended only up to 3 years not beyond that. Every 6 months Parliament approval is required by simple majority. 44th amendment[**\[6\]**](#_ftn6)– 2 Condition must be fulfilled to extended the President’s rule for 6 months. 1. National Emergency operates in India, may be imposed in whole of territory or party of state. 2. If there is report submitted that elections in the state assembly is not possible. **Revocation:** The revocation do not require the approval of both the houses, The President can revoke at any time. This occurs when the leader of political party indicating the majority support for him in the assembly. **SR bommai vs UOI**[**\[7\]**](#_ftn7) This case decided by the Supreme court of India, that the President’s Rule is subject to Judicial Review. Court can question and enquire about the grounds for imposing the Presidents rule. SC laid down the rules regarding Presidents rule ,listed below; - President do not have an absolute power to dismiss the State Government. - President should use the power only after the approval of Parliament, until then president can suspend only the Legislative Assembly. - In case of Proclamation does not get approval by the both houses, it lapses after the 2 months and the dismissed government is revived. Suspended legislative assembly get reactivated. - These provisions should use only in the exceptional circumstances. - President’s Rule can be imposed on ground if the State Governor work against Secularism. - This provision under eye of judicial review it will the prevent arbitrariness. **Effect of President’s Rule :** - The President will taken up the functions of State he become the deciding authority, and the power vested to governor. - The decisions will be taken by Parliament instead of a State Assembly. - During Presidents Rule the power of high court remains same. President cannot suspend the power of High Court. - President can also suspend the constitution provision relates to state if it is necessary. - President can also dismisses the State council of minister headed by CM. The State Administration can be carry out by the Governor on behalf of President. ### **FINANCIAL EMERGENCIES** Article 360 of Indian Constitution says about the Financial Emergencies. This can be imposed by President on the approval of Parliament. 38th Amendment **[\[8\]](#_ftn8)** states that the President’s declaration of a financial emergency is final and conclusive, and can be challenged in court on any grounds. This was subsequently repealed by the 44th Amendment Act of 1978, which stated that the president’s satisfaction is subject to judicial review. **Ground of imposition:** Art 360- Allows the President to declare a financial emergency in India if the country’s financial stability is threatened. **Approval and Duration :** - The Proclamation of emergency it should be approved by the Both the houses of Parliament on on simple majority within in the 2 months from the date of issuance. - The loksabha dissolve during the period of 2 months without approving, after the reconstitution of loksabha from the 30 days of first sitting it must be approved. Rajyasabha should approve in its mean time. **Revocation:** The emergency can be revoked by the president at any time. No maximum period is prescribed, for the continuation of emergency parliamentary approval is not needed. **Effects of Financial Emergency:** The center’s executive jurisdiction extends to directing any state to follow such financial propriety standards. There is the reduction of salaries and allowances for the person serving in state. The president may reserve the money bill and financial bill for considerations The salary and allowances of the person serving in the Union ( Judges of SC & HC)also reduced. **Criticisms** - President act as a dictator - The democratic foundation of the constitution will be shattered, and fundamental rights will become meaningless. - The federal nature of the constitution reduces and the union emerges all powerful. - The Union executive will have the exclusive power of state. - State Financial autonomy will be nullified. There are some doctrines to be discussed in the Emergency Provision. - **Doctrine of Sovereignty** :The executive head of the state (President) has an power to declare the Emergency in certain situations. This is to protect the Sovereignty,unity, integrity, security of Constitution of India. - **Doctrine of Unitary State** : The federal structure becomes unitary when the emergency situation arises, the central government taken the power state government should comply with the law made by centre. - **Doctrine of Judicial Review:** Judicial review ensures that constitutional rights are upheld even during emergencies by acting as a check on possible abuses of emergency powers. ### **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** India is a quasi federal country it is federal structure with unitary features, when it comes to the situation of emergency the President may Proclaim the emergency with the approval of both houses of Parliament, There are procedures for the approval and revocation of Emergencies. President do not hold the absolute power on the Emergencies. The fundamental rights of the citizen also suspended during the emergency , the fundamental rights and period are specified by the President. The Emergency provision under Judicial review to prevent the arbitrariness and malafide intention. ### **REFERENCES** **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** Constitution Law of India: Dr.J.N Pandey Indian Polity : M.Laxmikanth **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. *Emergency provisions*. (n.d.). Drishti IAS. Retrieved March 16, 2024, from 2. Prep, B. E. (2023, October 17). *BYJU’S exam prep*. BYJU’S Exam Prep. 3. Team, C. (2022, October 19). *ClearIAS*. ClearIAS. **Cases Referred** 1. Minerva mills vs UOI 2. SR Bommai vs UOI 3. Makkan Singh vs State of Punjab 4. D.M Jabalpur vs S.Shukla **Statutes Referred** 1. 1. Constitution of India 1949 [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Enact on Nov 26 1949, enforcement on Jan 26 1950 [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Influenced by the country Germany [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) AIR 1980 SC 1789 [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) AIR 1964 SC 381 [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) AIR 1976 SC 1207 [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) 44th amendent act 1978 [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) 1994 3SCC 1 [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) 1975 **Categories:** Articles --- ### [NATIONAL SECURITY LAWS OF INDIA & FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: PROVISION, PRINCIPLES, PROCEDURES AND CASES](https://lawfoyer.in/national-security-laws-of-india-fundamental-rights-under-the-indian-constitution-provision-principles-procedures-and-cases/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Rutvij Vyas, Faculty of Law, GLS University

 Introduction

National security or National defence is a comprehensive attempt of a government to ensure the security over its territory and its people through the application of economic, political, diplomatic and military power. National security includes the overall efforts of providing security to its citizens, economy, and its institutions. As per Chanakya’s arthashastra, It is the duty of government/state to ensure the safety and well beings of tis citizens. For that every government in all due course of time enacts several legislations to ensure the national security. This article explores the effort of State in enacting the laws for ensuring the security. There are 2 major types of National security i.e Internal and external security. Internal security refers to all the measures taken by the State to protect itself from threats originating within its territory. It includes protection of law and order and also removing and resolving conflicts as well as risks that threaten the nation’s sovereignty1. External security refers to all the measures taken by the Government to protect itself from all the threats originating from outside its territory, it was originally perceived as security against military attack from enemy state, however in reference to current times it also includes the external aggression from non- state actors, such as terrorists. The concept of external security includes tackling conflicts and risks emerging outside the territory2, the external security can be further classified to symmetric and asymmetric external security. The Constitution makers were well aware of the concept of internal and external security, and the constitution provides a dedicated framework for ensuring the internal and external security of a nation, including provisions for the defence forces (u/a:- 33, 34), emergency powers (u/a:- 352 to 360), security of the state as a reasonable restriction to a fundamental right, and the role of the government in ensuring security. As per notable Jurist, Harold laswell (1950), “The distinctive meaning of the national security means freedom from foreign dictation” thus it can be asserted in purview of national security, that the ultimate aim of national security is to secure the sovereignty of State.

Keywords:- National Security, preventive detention, Fundamental rights & Judicial Scrutiny

Fundamental Rights under the Indian Constitution vis-a-vis internal and external security

Fundamental rights enshrined under articles 12 to 35 (part 3) of the Constitution are the cornerstone of the Indian Constitution3, providing citizens with fundamental protections of rights and liberties. They guarantee individual freedoms and ensure the personal liberty, dignity, equality, and justice of each person4. This article explores the interplay between fundamental rights and the security concerns faced by India; We can observe a clear balance between national security and fundamental rights, as the State has the power to preserve its national interest and to maintain its national security, but the action of government must be ultra vires and shouldn’t be violative of fundamental rights (article 13). In the leading case of People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India (2003)5 - The Hon’ble Supreme Court i.e. the Apex Court has emphasised that national security concerns should not be used as a pretext to violate fundamental rights. It was held that ‘any restrictions on fundamental rights must be necessary, proportionate, reasonable and conform to the principles of rule of law’. The Fundamental rights outline the reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order, sovereignty, and integrity of India, friendly relations with foreign states, and security of the state, however, such terms are subject to individual facts and circumstances, which makes the interpretation of courts important. In the case of K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)6- (also called as right to privacy verdict) The Supreme Court recognised that the right to privacy is a fundamental right under Article 21, as stated byJs DY Chandrachud, this rights are not an absolute right and can be restricted for legitimate state interests, such as national security, and such right would not be violated to take counterterrorism measures and to ensure the security and safety of the people. In the case of Romesh Thapper v. State of Madras (1950)7 , where a fundamental right of freedom of speech was at concern, the Supreme Court differentiated between ‘Security of State’ and ‘maintenance of public order’, and held that the liberty of the press is an essential part of freedom of speech and is foundation stone of all democratic functioning, and the state has no power to contravene it using the reasonable restrictions. The Constitution articles 352 to 360 (Part 18) deals with emergencies. As stated in Article 352, the President can declare a state of National emergency, if there is a threat of external aggression or internal- armed rebellion. The President, in the situation when the Governor of state proposes the collapse of constitutional government, might take over the affairs of that state by assumption, under Article 356. The Constitution, under Articles 358 and 359, allows for the suspension of fundamental rights during a state of emergency. However, the rights under articles 20 and 21 can’t be suspended during an emergency; in the landmark case of ADM Jabalpur v. Shiv Kant Shukla8 (1976), it was held that the right to life and personal liberty can be suspended during a national emergency. While this decision was then overturned by the court in subsequent judgements, it came to be later overruled under the 44th Amendment Act, 1978.

National Security Laws of India

National security laws play a crucial role in safeguarding the State’s security and territorial sovereignty. The Indian parliament has enacted numerous laws and legislations to ensure the security of every person living in the Country.
  1. The Foreigners Act, 1946 is a legislation that regulates & governs the entry, stay, and departure of non-citizens in India. Under section 3 of the act provides the power to the central government to make order with regards to the prohibition-restriction and regulation of the entry and departure of the foreigners. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in a leading case of Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India9 examined the issue of illegal immigration from People’s Republic of Bangladesh into the State of Assam and the constitutional validity of the Foreigners Act was also challenged. In the Majority judgement delivered by Js G.P. Mathur upheld the constitutional validity of the Foreigners Act.
  2. The Official Secrets Act, 1923 is a colonial anti-espionage law, it aims to protect sensitive information and prevent its unauthorised disclosure. This act was highly effected by the OSA,1911 and the scenario of ongoing Independence struggle during that times. The OSA, 1923 provides for non-liniant and stringent punishments for offences made under this act.
The Apex court in S. Nambi Narayanan V. Siby mathews & ors.10 (also called as ISRO espionage case) whereby a prominent ISRO scientist S. Nambi Narayanan was alleged in 1994 of committing cries under official secrets act. In the leading case, the apex court examined the importance of balancing concerns of Personal liberty over National Security & Professional integrity, furthermore, the bench led by the then CJI Dipak Mishra, held that this law should be used sensibly and arrests of the accused shouldn’t be made only on the grounds of suspicion.
  1. The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) is a crucial legislation enacted in 1967, later amended in 2019 as a substantial National security law and Anti-terror law designed & formulated to counter anti-national and unlawful activities that endanger the State’s security. This law empowers the Union government to declare any organisation or any person to be "unlawful" and to take any preventive action to combat their unlawful activities. In the landmark precedent of Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam11 whereby the Supreme Court of India took upon the issue of constitutional validity of several sections of UAPA, which includes the arbitrary authority of Union government to ban any organisation or declare it to be unlawful which also makes granting bail difficult, which may be misused to attain political vendetta. The bench duly concluded, that this Act's provisions must be rigidly interpreted by judicial scrutiny and the provisions of UAPA do not violate the fundamental rights and henceforth the bench upheld the constitutional validity of UAPA. In recent times many notable persons were arrested under UAPA such as, Binayak Sen(Doctor and Human right activist), Arun Ferreira, mammal Khan, Kamran Yousuf (Photojournalist), Shoma Sen (Professor), Sudha Bharadwaj, Masrat Zehra, Meeran Haider, Umar Khalid, Stan Swamy (jesuit religious leader), Yasin Malik, Khurram Parvez.
  2. The Army Act 1950 is a law that regulates the Indian Army and other land security forces and also forms a well disciplined structure to administer the justice where martial law is declared, maintain discipline, and ensure effective conduct of all army personnel .This code provides a series of description of all kinds of offences, as well as the establishment of a procedure for trial by Military Court with their legal authority and structured Jurisdiction. This act is further supported by the Border Security Force Act, of 1968. In the latest verdict of Lt. Col. Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. Union of India12, the Apex Court has adjudicated on what extent armed forces personnel can be prosecuted for terrorism and insurgency-related offences.
  3. The Air Force Act 1950 is a crucial law which is responsible for the legal regulation of the Indian Air Force and other air security forces. This crucial legislation gave a well structured framework for the administration of justice where air force personnel are involved, this act also provides for maintenance of discipline and the conduct of Air Force personnel.
  4. The Indian Navy Act 1957, is the law of administration naval justice and this act also provides for well structured framework of naval security forces which ensures the discipline of naval officers. This act also lays a legal course for the hearings of naval crimes and other misconduct of Navy servicemen. The court in Union of India v. Rajbir Singh13 (2015) sought to test whether the military court martial could award capital punishment under offences committed by naval servicemen. A notable case related to crime done by Naval officer is commander Kavas Mankshaw Nanavati V. State of Maharashtra in 1960, whereby a naval officer was alleged of murder of lover of his wife.
  5. National Security Act, 1980- This is an important preventive detention legislation enacted in the year 1980, to ensure national security and Law and public order. As per a well accepted definition, Preventive Detention refers to an action of the state; confining an individual to prevent them from engaging in future criminal activities and/or evading future legal proceedings14. The National Security Act (NSA) empowers the Union and/or state governments to arrest or detain a person for acts that may endanger national security in addition to maintaining law and public order or ensuring the continuity of essential goods nd services of the area under the essential commodities act of 1955. In terms of imprisonment, the maximum period of imprisonment under the NSA is 12 months i.e. 1 year. This act also provides for the creation of a three-tier National Security Council (NSC) chaired by the prime minister, which includes a National Security Advisor, Chief of defence staff, Deputy National Security Advisors, Ministers of Home Affairs, Ministers of Defence, Minister of Finance, Vice Chairman of the NITI Aayog, Ministers of External Affairs. The NSA has been criticised by many scholars due to its lack of transparency, misuse of power, violation of human rights and limited effectiveness15. This act should be further read with, the National Investigation Agency Act, which was enacted in 2008, after the 26/11 terror attacks in Mumbai.
In the apex court’s precedent of Vijay Narain Singh V. State of Bihar16, Hon’ble Mr Js A.P Sen in their dissenting opinion said, “The detention of individuals without trial for any length of time, however short, is wholly inconsistent with the basic ideas of our government and the gravity of the evil to the community resulting from anti-social activities can never furnish an adequate reason for invading the personal liberty of the citizens except under the procedure established by law.”
  1. Preventive Detention Act is an important law enacted in 1950, This is also a preventive legislation that was enacted in order to detain any person who may threaten or endangers the security of State or its citizen. In the leading case of AK Gopalan v. State of Madras17, whereby a Communist-Socialist leeader was detained, the Supreme Court in 5 judges bench agreed and upheld to the constitutionality of the Preventive Detention Act and the judgement delivered by Js. HJ Kania widened the scope of Article 22 of the Constitution in providing a well-structured and procedural safeguard for preventive detention to maintain law and order, harmony and internal security. Again when a socialist leader of UP was detained and the detention was questioned was raised before the Apex Constitutional court, Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, the larger bench made a lucid-clear distinction between the words “security of the state”, “law and order” & “public order”. It was held that the legislative intent behind PDA was completely for maintaining law and order, and any other ground would make the detention order void.
  2. Armed Forces (Special Power) Act, 1958:- This is a crucial military legislation which traces its roots to the colonial law of Armed Forces (Special Power) Act of 1941. This law continues to be used by the Government in insurgency-ridden areas such as Kashmir,Northeast, etc. The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, of 1958 is an effective legislation to combat terrorism and organisations that support terrorism18. This law provides special powers to members of the armed forces in disturbed areas in the State of [Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura]. Under Section 3 of this act, which provides the power to declare any area, as a disturbed area to the governor, administrator, or the central government. In the aftermath of Inderjit Barua v.State of Assam19 , such agovernor order can’t be challenged on the grounds of the absence of legislative guidelines, and such absence of guidelines would not make this order arbitrary. In Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India20, the Supreme Court decided the time limit/ periodic review of this act as 6 months. This act provides all discretionary powers to the armed force, to maintain law and order, if the officer may feel necessary may also fire upon any person. The union government has established 3 major committees to review this act, i.e. Justice Reddy, Justice Hegde and Justice Verma Committee.

Conclusion

"Having survived numerous security challenges since independence, India is on course to emerge as a major power, however, the path would be difficult21 ”. To handle this difficulty, the parliament of India has made and enacted several legislations such as the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act of 1958, The Police Act of 1861, The Data Protection Law, the National Security Act etc. When it comes to Police services, we rely on 19th-century legislation, and 20th-century weapons to solve 21st-century problems. To ensure national security, every district's safety is vital, and the police play a crucial role. Police reforms have been on the agenda of central & state Governments for almost 75 years, the police are seen as selectively efficient, and unsympathetic to the underprivileged & marginalised communities. It is further accused of criminalisation & politicisation22. As per a report, “ the security legislations have damaged constitutional constraints by making human rights abuses easier by the State, and to reinforce constitutional checks and balances, reforms are needed23”. Notwithstanding anything said in this report, the ordinary masses have no direct problem with the absence of checks and balances, what ordinary citizens are satisfied with, is our unified nation. Irrespective of the question of whether our national security laws are arbitrarily used by the state, they have successfully ensured our national security from various threats, such as the Khalistani movement, Kashmir terrorism, and other separatist forces.

REFERENCES

  1. Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred
  • Gupta A, How India Manages Its National Security (Penguin Random House India Private Limited 2018)
  • Chopra, S. (2016). National Security Laws in India: The Unraveling of Constitutional Constraints. Social Science Research Network.
  • Jaiswal A, ‘The Draconian AFSPA, 1958’ (International Journal of Law Management & Humanities) accessed 4 March 2024
  • Kartikay Agarwal and Arjun Sharma, ‘National Security Act, 1980 – Iniquitous Act and Constitutional Tyranny or a Justified Piece of Legislation’ (jurist.org2020) www.jurist.org/commentary/2020/05/agarwal-sharma-national-security-act-1980/>
  • Aditi Dhamdhere, ‘OVERVIEW of NATIONAL SECURITY ACT, 1980 by Aditi Dhamdhere – JOURNAL for LAW STUDENTS and RESEARCHERS’ (Journal for law students and researchers2020) jlsrjournal.in/overview-of-national-security- act-1980-by-aditi-dhamdhere/> accessed 4 March 2024
22 Ministry of Home Affairs, ‘Status Note on Police Reforms in India’ www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/ files/PoliceReforms%28E%29181013.pdf> 23 Chopra, S. (2016). National Security Laws in India: The Unraveling of Constitutional Constraints. Social Science Research Network.
  • Austin, Granville (1999). The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. p. 390. ISBN 0-19-564959-1
  • Tayal, B. B.;Jacob, A. (2005). Indian History, World Developments and Civics. Avichal Publishing Company.

2.      Online Articles / Sources Referred

  • NN Vora, ‘National Governance and Internal Security | Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses’ (idsa.inMay 2008) www.idsa.in/jds 2_1_2008_NationalGovernanceandInternalSecurity_NNVohra> accessed 2 March 2024
  • Bhamati Sivapalan And Vidyun Sabhaney, ‘In Illustrations: A Brief History of India’s National Security Laws’ (The Wire 27 June 2019)

3.      Cases Referred

  • People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India (2003)
  • KS Puttasamy V. Union Of India (2017)
  • Inderjit Barua v.State of Assam (1983)
  • Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India (1998)
  • Vijay Narain Singh V. State of Bihar
  • AK Gopalan V. State of Madras (1950)
  • Col. Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. Union of India
  • Union of India V. Rajbir Singh
  • Arup Bhuyan V. Sate of Assam
  • Sarbanada Sonowal V. State of Assam
  • Nambi Narayanan V. State of Kerala
  • Romesh Tahppar V. State of Madras (1950)
  • ADM Jabalpur v. Shiv Kant Shukla (1976)
**Content:** **Author-Rutvij Vyas, Faculty of Law, GLS University** ### Introduction National security or National defence is a comprehensive attempt of a government to ensure the security over its territory and its people through the application of economic, political, diplomatic and military power. National security includes the overall efforts of providing security to its citizens, economy, and its institutions. As per Chanakya’s arthashastra, It is the duty of government/state to ensure the safety and well beings of tis citizens. For that every government in all due course of time enacts several legislations to ensure the national security. This article explores the effort of State in enacting the laws for ensuring the security. There are 2 major types of National security i.e Internal and external security. Internal security refers to all the measures taken by the State to protect itself from threats originating within its territory. It includes protection of law and order and also removing and resolving conflicts as well as risks that threaten the nation’s sovereignty[1](#_3znysh7). External security refers to all the measures taken by the Government to protect itself from all the threats originating from outside its territory, it was originally perceived as security against military attack from enemy state, however in reference to current times it also includes the external aggression from non- state actors, such as terrorists. The concept of external security includes tackling conflicts and risks emerging outside the territory[2](#_3dy6vkm), the external security can be further classified to symmetric and asymmetric external security. The Constitution makers were well aware of the concept of internal and external security, and the constitution provides a dedicated framework for ensuring the internal and external security of a nation, including provisions for the defence forces (u/a:- 33, 34), emergency powers (u/a:- 352 to 360), security of the state as a reasonable restriction to a fundamental right, and the role of the government in ensuring security. As per notable Jurist, Harold laswell (1950), “The distinctive meaning of the national security means freedom from foreign dictation” thus it can be asserted in purview of national security, that the ultimate aim of national security is to secure the sovereignty of State. #### Keywords:- National Security, preventive detention, Fundamental rights & Judicial Scrutiny ### **Fundamental Rights under the Indian Constitution *vis-a-vis* internal and external security** Fundamental rights enshrined under articles 12 to 35 (part 3) of the Constitution are the cornerstone of the Indian Constitution[3](#_1t3h5sf), providing citizens with fundamental protections of rights and liberties. They guarantee individual freedoms and ensure the personal liberty, dignity, equality, and justice of each person[4](#_4d34og8). This article explores the interplay between fundamental rights and the security concerns faced by India; We can observe a clear balance between national security and fundamental rights, as the State has the power to preserve its national interest and to maintain its national security, but the action of government must be *ultra vires* and shouldn’t be violative of fundamental rights (article 13). In the leading case of People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India (2003)[5](#_17dp8vu) – The Hon’ble Supreme Court i.e. the Apex Court has emphasised that national security concerns should not be used as a pretext to violate fundamental rights. It was held that ‘any restrictions on fundamental rights must be necessary, proportionate, reasonable and conform to the principles of rule of law’. The Fundamental rights outline the reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order, sovereignty, and integrity of India, friendly relations with foreign states, and security of the state, however, such terms are subject to individual facts and circumstances, which makes the interpretation of courts important. In the case of K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)[6](#_26in1rg)– (also called as right to privacy verdict) The Supreme Court recognised that the right to privacy is a fundamental right under Article 21, as stated byJs DY Chandrachud, this rights are not an absolute right and can be restricted for legitimate state interests, such as national security, and such right would not be violated to take counterterrorism measures and to ensure the security and safety of the people. In the case of Romesh Thapper v. State of Madras (1950)[7 ](#_lnxbz9), where a fundamental right of freedom of speech was at concern, the Supreme Court differentiated between ‘Security of State’ and ‘maintenance of public order’, and held that the liberty of the press is an essential part of freedom of speech and is foundation stone of all democratic functioning, and the state has no power to contravene it using the reasonable restrictions. The Constitution articles 352 to 360 (Part 18) deals with emergencies. As stated in Article 352, the President can declare a state of National emergency, if there is a threat of external aggression or internal- armed rebellion. The President, in the situation when the Governor of state proposes the collapse of constitutional government, might take over the affairs of that state by assumption, under Article 356. The Constitution, under Articles 358 and 359, allows for the suspension of fundamental rights during a state of emergency. However, the rights under articles 20 and 21 can’t be suspended during an emergency; in the landmark case of ADM Jabalpur v. Shiv Kant Shukla[8](#_44sinio) (1976), it was held that the right to life and personal liberty can be suspended during a national emergency. While this decision was then overturned by the court in subsequent judgements, it came to be later overruled under the 44th Amendment Act, 1978. ### National Security Laws of India National security laws play a crucial role in safeguarding the State’s security and territorial sovereignty. The Indian parliament has enacted numerous laws and legislations to ensure the security of every person living in the Country. 1. **The Foreigners Act, 1946** is a legislation that regulates & governs the entry, stay, and departure of non-citizens in India. Under section 3 of the act provides the power to the central government to make order with regards to the prohibition-restriction and regulation of the entry and departure of the foreigners. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in a leading case of Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India[9](#_2jxsxqh) examined the issue of illegal immigration from People’s Republic of Bangladesh into the State of Assam and the constitutional validity of the Foreigners Act was also challenged. In the Majority judgement delivered by Js G.P. Mathur upheld the constitutional validity of the Foreigners Act. 2. **The Official Secrets Act, 1923** is a colonial anti-espionage law, it aims to protect sensitive information and prevent its unauthorised disclosure. This act was highly effected by the OSA,1911 and the scenario of ongoing Independence struggle during that times. The OSA, 1923 provides for non-liniant and stringent punishments for offences made under this act. The Apex court in S. Nambi Narayanan V. Siby mathews & ors.[10](#_3j2qqm3) (also called as ISRO espionage case) whereby a prominent ISRO scientist S. Nambi Narayanan was alleged in 1994 of committing cries under official secrets act. In the leading case, the apex court examined the importance of balancing concerns of Personal liberty over National Security & Professional integrity, furthermore, the bench led by the then CJI Dipak Mishra, held that this law should be used sensibly and arrests of the accused shouldn’t be made only on the grounds of suspicion. 3. **The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act** (UAPA) is a crucial legislation enacted in 1967, later amended in 2019 as a substantial National security law and Anti-terror law designed & formulated to counter anti-national and unlawful activities that endanger the State’s security. This law empowers the Union government to declare any organisation or any person to be “unlawful” and to take any preventive action to combat their unlawful activities. In the landmark precedent of Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam[11](#_4i7ojhp) whereby the Supreme Court of India took upon the issue of constitutional validity of several sections of UAPA, which includes the arbitrary authority of Union government to ban any organisation or declare it to be unlawful which also makes granting bail difficult, which may be misused to attain political vendetta. The bench duly concluded, that this Act’s provisions must be rigidly interpreted by judicial scrutiny and the provisions of UAPA do not violate the fundamental rights and henceforth the bench upheld the constitutional validity of UAPA. In recent times many notable persons were arrested under UAPA such as, Binayak Sen(Doctor and Human right activist), Arun Ferreira, mammal Khan, Kamran Yousuf (Photojournalist), Shoma Sen (Professor), Sudha Bharadwaj, Masrat Zehra, Meeran Haider, Umar Khalid, Stan Swamy (jesuit religious leader), Yasin Malik, Khurram Parvez. 4. **The Army Act 1950** is a law that regulates the Indian Army and other land security forces and also forms a well disciplined structure to administer the justice where martial law is declared, maintain discipline, and ensure effective conduct of all army personnel .This code provides a series of description of all kinds of offences, as well as the establishment of a procedure for trial by Military Court with their legal authority and structured Jurisdiction. This act is further supported by the Border Security Force Act, of 1968. In the latest verdict of Lt. Col. Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. Union of India[12](#_1ci93xb), the Apex Court has adjudicated on what extent armed forces personnel can be prosecuted for terrorism and insurgency-related offences. 5. **The Air Force Act 1950** is a crucial law which is responsible for the legal regulation of the Indian Air Force and other air security forces. This crucial legislation gave a well structured framework for the administration of justice where air force personnel are involved, this act also provides for maintenance of discipline and the conduct of Air Force personnel. 6. **The Indian Navy Act 1957, is** the law of administration naval justice and this act also provides for well structured framework of naval security forces which ensures the discipline of naval officers. This act also lays a legal course for the hearings of naval crimes and other misconduct of Navy servicemen. The court in Union of India v. Rajbir Singh[13](#_2bn6wsx) (2015) sought to test whether the military court martial could award capital punishment under offences committed by naval servicemen. A notable case related to crime done by Naval officer is commander Kavas Mankshaw Nanavati V. State of Maharashtra in 1960, whereby a naval officer was alleged of murder of lover of his wife. 7. **National Security Act, 1980**– This is an important preventive detention legislation enacted in the year 1980, to ensure national security and Law and public order. As per a well accepted definition, Preventive Detention refers to an action of the state; confining an individual to prevent them from engaging in future criminal activities and/or evading future legal proceedings[14](#_3as4poj). The National Security Act (NSA) empowers the Union and/or state governments to arrest or detain a person for acts that may endanger national security in addition to maintaining law and public order or ensuring the continuity of essential goods nd services of the area under the essential commodities act of 1955. In terms of imprisonment, the maximum period of imprisonment under the NSA is 12 months i.e. 1 year. This act also provides for the creation of a three-tier National Security Council (NSC) chaired by the prime minister, which includes a National Security Advisor, Chief of defence staff, Deputy National Security Advisors, Ministers of Home Affairs, Ministers of Defence, Minister of Finance, Vice Chairman of the NITI Aayog, Ministers of External Affairs. The NSA has been criticised by many scholars due to its lack of transparency, misuse of power, violation of human rights and limited effectiveness[15](#_147n2zr). This act should be further read with, the National Investigation Agency Act, which was enacted in 2008, after the 26/11 terror attacks in Mumbai. In the apex court’s precedent of Vijay Narain Singh V. State of Bihar[16](#_3o7alnk), Hon’ble Mr Js A.P Sen in their dissenting opinion said, “T*he detention of individuals without trial for any length of time, however short, is wholly inconsistent with the basic ideas of our government and the gravity of the evil to the community resulting from anti-social activities can never furnish an adequate reason for invading the personal liberty of the citizens except under the procedure established by law*.” 8. **Preventive Detention Act** is an important law enacted in **1950**, This is also a preventive legislation that was enacted in order to detain any person who may threaten or endangers the security of State or its citizen. In the leading case of AK Gopalan v. State of Madras[17](#_23ckvvd), whereby a Communist-Socialist leeader was detained, the Supreme Court in 5 judges bench agreed and upheld to the constitutionality of the Preventive Detention Act and the judgement delivered by Js. HJ Kania widened the scope of Article 22 of the Constitution in providing a well-structured and procedural safeguard for preventive detention to maintain law and order, harmony and internal security. Again when a socialist leader of UP was detained and the detention was questioned was raised before the Apex Constitutional court, Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, the larger bench made a lucid-clear distinction between the words “security of the state”, “law and order” & “public order”. It was held that the legislative intent behind PDA was completely for maintaining law and order, and any other ground would make the detention order void. 9. **Armed Forces (Special Power) Act, 1958:**– This is a crucial military legislation which traces its roots to the colonial law of **Armed Forces (Special Power) Act of 1941.** This law continues to be used by the Government in insurgency-ridden areas such as Kashmir,Northeast, etc. The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, of 1958 is an effective legislation to combat terrorism and organisations that support terrorism[18](#_41mghml). This law provides special powers to members of the armed forces in disturbed areas in the State of \[Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura\]. Under Section 3 of this act, which provides the power to declare any area, as a disturbed area to the governor, administrator, or the central government. In the aftermath of Inderjit Barua v.State of Assam[19](#_2grqrue) , such agovernor order can’t be challenged on the grounds of the absence of legislative guidelines, and such absence of guidelines would not make this order arbitrary. In Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India[20](#_vx1227), the Supreme Court decided the time limit/ periodic review of this act as 6 months. This act provides all discretionary powers to the armed force, to maintain law and order, if the officer may feel necessary may also fire upon any person. The union government has established 3 major committees to review this act, i.e. Justice Reddy, Justice Hegde and Justice Verma Committee. ### Conclusion “Having survived numerous security challenges since independence, India is on course to emerge as a major power, however, the path would be difficult[21 ](#_1v1yuxt)”. To handle this difficulty, the parliament of India has made and enacted several legislations such as the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act of 1958, The Police Act of 1861, The Data Protection Law, the National Security Act etc. When it comes to Police services, we rely on 19th-century legislation, and 20th-century weapons to solve 21st-century problems. To ensure national security, every district’s safety is vital, and the police play a crucial role. Police reforms have been on the agenda of central & state Governments for almost 75 years, the police are seen as selectively efficient, and unsympathetic to the underprivileged & marginalised communities. It is further accused of criminalisation & politicisation[22](#_2u6wntf). As per a report, “ the security legislations have damaged constitutional constraints by making human rights abuses easier by the State, and to reinforce constitutional checks and balances, reforms are needed[23](#_19c6y18)”. Notwithstanding anything said in this report, the ordinary masses have no direct problem with the absence of checks and balances, what ordinary citizens are satisfied with, is our unified nation. Irrespective of the question of whether our national security laws are arbitrarily used by the state, they have successfully ensured our national security from various threats, such as the Khalistani movement, Kashmir terrorism, and other separatist forces. ### REFERENCES 1. **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** - Gupta A, *How India Manages Its National Security* (Penguin Random House India Private Limited 2018) - Chopra, S. (2016). National Security Laws in India: The Unraveling of Constitutional Constraints. *Social Science Research Network*. - Jaiswal A, ‘The Draconian AFSPA, 1958’ (*International Journal of Law Management & Humanities*) accessed 4 March 2024 - Kartikay Agarwal and Arjun Sharma, ‘National Security Act, 1980 – Iniquitous Act and Constitutional Tyranny or a Justified Piece of Legislation’ (*jurist.org*2020) - Aditi Dhamdhere, ‘OVERVIEW of NATIONAL SECURITY ACT, 1980 by Aditi Dhamdhere – JOURNAL for LAW STUDENTS and RESEARCHERS’ (*Journal for law students and researchers*2020) accessed 4 March 2024 [22](#_4f1mdlm) Ministry of Home Affairs, ‘Status Note on Police Reforms in India’ [23](#_4f1mdlm) Chopra, S. (2016). National Security Laws in India: The Unraveling of Constitutional Constraints. *Social Science Research Network*. - Austin, Granville (1999). *The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. p. 390. ISBN 0-19-564959-1 - Tayal, B. B.;Jacob, A. (2005). Indian History, World Developments and Civics. Avichal Publishing Company. #### 2. Online Articles / Sources Referred - NN Vora, ‘National Governance and Internal Security | Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses’ ([idsa.inMay](http://www.idsa.inmay/) 2008) accessed 2 March 2024 - Bhamati Sivapalan And Vidyun Sabhaney, ‘In Illustrations: A Brief History of India’s National Security Laws’ (The Wire 27 June 2019) ### 3. Cases Referred - People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India (2003) - KS Puttasamy V. Union Of India (2017) - Inderjit Barua v.State of Assam (1983) - Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India (1998) - Vijay Narain Singh V. State of Bihar - AK Gopalan V. State of Madras (1950) - Col. Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. Union of India - Union of India V. Rajbir Singh - Arup Bhuyan V. Sate of Assam - Sarbanada Sonowal V. State of Assam - Nambi Narayanan V. State of Kerala - Romesh Tahppar V. State of Madras (1950) - ADM Jabalpur v. Shiv Kant Shukla (1976) **Categories:** Articles --- ### [Constitutional Validity of Euthanasia and Right to Die: Analysis in Light of Constitutional Principles and Landmark Cases](https://lawfoyer.in/constitutional-validity-of-euthanasia-and-right-to-die-analysis-in-light-of-constitutional-principles-and-landmark-cases/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Rachi Chavan, Amity University,Mumbai

INTRODUCTION

Every human being is entitled to human rights provided under the Universal Declaration of Human rights (UDHR). The rights are cornerstone of ethical and legal framework, inherent dignity of every individual. Whereas, fundamental rights guaranteed in the constitution of India specifically article 21 let an individual enjoy the right to life and right to die. Every aspect of this rights has been through various judicial scrutiny over the period of 75 years post-independence. Right to die is an interpreted right under Right to life. Thus so far, in the context of right to die, euthanasia is still a debatable topic. It poses a profound challenges to the right to life and human rights. At the heat of the debate, there lies a balance between both the rights and dignity of an individual. Euthanasia conscious ending of an individual’s life to reduce the suffering, raise morals, philosophical and legal questions which intersect with the rights enshrined in UDHR. In this article, we articulate the complex intersection of right to life and right to die in the context of Euthanasia. Various definitions, Historical background, different types, comparison with various countries, legal precedents and various interpretations. We aim to provide a deeper understanding of this topic which reflects on legal and moral compass of life and death. Keywords: Euthanasia, right to life, right to death, UDHR, fundamental rights, Article 21 etc.

DEFINITION

According to Black's Law Dictionary, “euthanasia is the act of causing or hastening the death of a person who is suffering from an incurable or terminal disease or condition especially a painful one, for reason for mercy.” According to Merriam-Webster dictionary, “Euthanasia means the act or practise of killing or permitting the death of hopelessly sick or injured individuals in a relatively painless way for reasons of mercy. It can be also seen as ‘mercy killing.” According to this practice, the patient or an individual or any other person oh the patient’s behalf, chooses death for himself for the colossal reason of medical condition. Euthanasia in simple terms means an act of ending an individuals’ life who is suffering from an incurable disease or in a situation where it is painful for an individual to stay alive. It common words, euthanasia means intentionally killing an individual who suffers from a painful disease by doing an act or omission of certain act.

EVOLUTION OF EUTHANASIA

‘It were better to die once and for all than to drag out my lingering days in anguish by Aeschylus (father of tragedy). Euthanasia is a classified under Applied Ethics, a branch of Philosophy. Applied ethics were introduced in 1970s’, when the philosophical and political actors begun to look into topics such as, euthanasia, abortion, cloning, etc. The words euthanasia is derived from two different words Greek origin “eu” and “Thanatos”, which in English means Euthanasia. It was prevalent in Greek society during the early period of renaissance. Greeks used to consider mercy killing or good death as an act of rationale, if an individual feel that the life is not useful. The increase in the advocacy of euthanasia throughout North America and European countries along with increasing awareness of human rights led to countries creating laws which penalized the suicide and abetment to suicide. Hence, Euthanasia was also declared unlawful. Over the years, understanding of euthanasia evolved and words like mercy killings, assisted dying, death with dignity, painless death, peace attaining, etc. were referred.

COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

History has been witness to the evolution of Euthanasia, it has gain momentum many times throughout history and it almost attained legal validity. There was eccentric pattern of euthanasia followed in different countries. Switzerland had most recent amendment in 2021 when “suicide machine” an euthanasia machine which was coffin shape hence the name suicide machine, which can be operated and was legalized.  Canada had legalized assisted suicide and euthanasia only in certain cases pertaining to factors such as physical conditions, mental conditions etc. which will ultimately led to an individuals’ death. In 2021 the scope was increased by considering the individuals sufferings from serious disability which will lead them to their death. Australia has four states in which euthanasia is legalised after 2017 and it was available to an individual who suffers from incurable and progressive disease and will die within one year. USA had legalized euthanasia in various states through judicial rulings and legislations. The process which is followed is a doctor has to write a prescription of the fatal drugs with the professional when the drugs are injected to the individuals. France had not legalised euthanasia as the bill was proposed in 2021 but palliative sedation is legal in France. In Netherlands assisted dying and euthanasia is legalised from individuals suffering from terminal illness and eventually die. In 2020 assisted dying was made legalised for children from the age of 1-12 years who are terminally ill.

TYPES / KINDS OF EUTHANASIA

  • BASED ON METHOD USED:
Passive Euthanasia: when an individual is abstain from the medical treatment necessary for his survival. It means, the professional who provides care, do not do the act which is necessary or stop providing the treatment which is necessary to keep the patient alive. In simple terms, passive euthanasia is an act which can be contented as a doctors not actively killing the patient; they are simply not doing anything to save the patient. Active Euthanasia: When medical personnel or anybody else purposefully performs a positive deed, like injecting a deadly dose of medication or overdosing the victim with medication, the victim dies a medicine would not have caused death if it weren't for the overdose, which caused the victim to pass away such act is called active euthanasia.
  • BASED ON CONSENT
Voluntary Euthanasia: The individual requests that euthanasia be carried out. The patient requests euthanasia verbally or in writing if they would rather die than live in agony. Thus, it is possible to carry out both passive and aggressive euthanasia upon voluntary request. Involuntary Euthanasia: This kind of an individual is incapable of giving their consent for euthanasia. As a result, this approach covers scenarios including coma patients, brain dead people, etc. Non-voluntary: In this case, an individual is making the decision to end their life is competent but does not consent to it. This is unquestionably direct homicide.

LEGAL PROVISIONS

In the constitution of India Article 21 as a fundamental is enshrined in Part III it has stated that every citizen has right to life along with rights such as right to privacy, right to dignity, right of autonomy, right to personal liberty etc. In fact, inclusion of right to die under article 21 was controversial and various case laws are proof of that, because sections such as section 306 and section 309 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 which has provisions which states that abetment to suicide or attempt is illegal  and punishable offence under the code.

LANDMARK JUDGEMENTS RELATED TO EUTHANASIA:

ARUNA RAMCHANDRA SHANBAUG V. UNION OF INDIA The landmark judgment in  Aruna Shanbaug v. Union of India (2011) by the Supreme Court of India significantly advanced the legal discourse surrounding passive euthanasia in the country. This case analysis explores the Court's reasoning and its subsequent establishment of procedural guidelines for passive euthanasia applications. Factual Background Aruna Shanbaug, a nurse, was brutally attacked in the hospital where she worked, rendering her in a permanent vegetative state for 36 years. Ms. Pinki Virani, claiming to be Aruna's friend, petitioned the Court on the grounds that Aruna's right to die with dignity under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution was being violated due to her irreversible condition. Court's Reasoning and Decision The Court meticulously evaluated the medical reports and the definition of brain death enshrined in the Human Organ Transplant Act, 1994.  It concluded that Aruna was not brain dead,  demonstrating residual brain function through her ability to breathe unassisted and respond to stimuli.  Furthermore, the Court determined that Ms. Virani lacked the legal standing to make such a request on Aruna's behalf, as the decision-making authority resided with the KEM Hospital staff responsible for her care. While acknowledging the absence of hope for recovery, the Court distinguished between passive euthanasia (withdrawing life-sustaining treatment) and the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration, which Indian law did not equate with euthanasia.  Therefore, the Court dismissed the petition for euthanasia in Aruna's specific case. Significance and Procedural Guidelines Despite the denial of euthanasia in this instance, the Court's judgment held immense significance. It undertook a comprehensive examination of passive euthanasia, ultimately establishing a detailed framework for future applications.  This framework emphasizes stringent safeguards to prevent potential misuse. The established procedure mandates the filing of an application by a competent individual.  The relevant Chief Justice then constitutes a tribunal of at least two judges, empowered to authorize euthanasia orders.  This tribunal must also consult a three-member medical committee chosen in consultation with relevant medical professionals.  Following the committee's appointment, the judicial commission issues notices to the state, the patient's family (including parents, spouse, siblings, or friends in their absence), and accompanies these notices with the committee's report.  The final decision on granting euthanasia rests solely with the Supreme Court. The Aruna Shanbaug case serves as a pivotal precedent in India's legal landscape on passive euthanasia.  The Court's meticulous analysis and the subsequent creation of procedural guidelines offer a much-needed framework for navigating these complex and sensitive situations. MARUTI SHRIPATI DUBAL V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA Factual Background A police officer, suffering from a documented history of mental illness including schizophrenia, depression, and instability, attempted suicide by self-immolation. He was subsequently charged under Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for attempting to take his own life. Legal Issue The Bombay High Court challenged the constitutionality of Section 309 of the IPC, raising the question of whether criminalizing attempted suicide violates Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Indian Constitution. Reasoning of the Court The Court held that Section 309 was unconstitutional for the following reasons: Violation of Article 19:  The right to life under Article 19 encompasses a negative aspect, as recognized in precedents like Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1962), and Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (1980). This right encompasses personal liberty and the protection of life itself. Interconnectedness of Articles 19 and 21:  Articles 19 and 21 are to be interpreted together and in relation to each other. Violation of Article 14:  Section 309 lacks a legal definition of "suicide," leading to ambiguity. The concept carries varying interpretations across different groups, with some cultures even praising certain forms of suicide. The Court further distinguished between ending one's life "unnaturally" and due to the exhaustion of the will to live. The latter, the Court reasoned, could not be considered unnatural but rather an act of life arising from specific circumstances. The Court declared Section 309 unconstitutional due to its violation of Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Indian Constitution. Consequently, the proceedings against the petitioner were dismissed, and he was acquitted of the charge under Section 309. GIAN KAUR V. STATE OF PUNJAB Factual information Gian Kaur and her husband were found guilty of assisting their daughter's suicide and were convicted under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The trial court sentenced them to six years in prison and a fine of Rs. 2,000, with an additional nine months of imprisonment if the fine couldn't be paid. The plaintiff appealed the decision to the High Court, which upheld the conviction but reduced the prison sentence to three years. Issues raised The main issues before the court were whether Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is constitutionally valid and whether Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. In the case of Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab (1996), a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India observed that the 'right to life' under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution does not include the 'right to die'. The court emphasized that the right to life also encompasses the right to live with dignity until death, and this should be accompanied by a natural and worthy dying process. The court made it clear that the 'right to die' with dignity at the end of one's life should not be confused with an unnatural 'right to die'. It held that any action that accelerates a person's natural death is unlawful under Section 21. The Supreme Court also addressed the constitutionality of Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and ruled that both attempted suicide and assisted suicide are punishable. The court stated that this provision serves to minimize the inherent risk associated with the absence of such a law, considering the greater good of society. Furthermore, in the case of P. Rathinam v. Union of India (1994), the court repealed the provisions of Sections 306 and 309 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, thereby affirming their constitutionality and holding the accused liable for abetment of suicide. The Supreme Court concluded that Article 21, which pertains to the 'right to life', does not include the 'right to die'. The arguments based on Article 14 of the Indian Constitution were found to be inconsistent with the main issues of the case.

DOCTRINES RELATED TO EUTHANASIA IN INDIA

  • Doctrine of Parens Patriae: This doctrine states that, the state has right to intervene to protect the rights of an individuals who cannot make decisions for themselves. This doctrine is used for cases of euthanasia where the patients are unable to make the decisions for themselves.
  • Doctrine of Medical Ethics: Medical Council of India has provided medical ethics under four category that are principles of non-maleficence, beneficence, autonomy, and justice. These medical ethics makes sure that medical professional are unbiased and makes decisions which has best interest of patient.
  • Living will Doctrine: Living wills are document which stated the wishes of an individual regarding ending their lives under medical treatment. It is recognised by Supreme Court of India in 2018.
  • Doctrine of Sanctity of Life: This doctrines is based on religious and moral compass which upholds the value of life and its sanctity. It therefore, opposed the assisted dying or terminating lives of human beings on the ground that it disturbs and violated the sanctity of life.

Maxims

  • Volenti non fit injuria: “the one who is willing, no harm is done” it means that if the patients is willing then no harm is caused to him.
  • Salus aegroti suprema lex: “welfare of the patients is the highest law” it simply means whatever that is in the best interest of patient shall be considered legal and just.
  • Actus curiae neminem gravabit: “the act of court shall prejudice no one” it means that the court shall be unbiased and impartial while making decisions for the cases of euthanasia.

FUTURE IMPLICATIONS IF EUTHANASIA IS LEGALISED [NEGATIVES]

If euthanasia is legalised in India the impact of such act can be more of negative than positive as majority of human tendency is to seek benefit for ourselves than others. Hence, the consequences can be negative than positive. Some of them are: Corruption as many professionals can be of corrupt nature and hence can authorise euthanasia in return of money, Child killing foe example children who has some disability or disease which need to be taken care for can be victims of euthanasia, Organ selling is one of the biggest racket on going in India hence, euthanasia will only help it grow, Dowry deaths, mischiefs by any relative for some property, female child killings, high death rate of Senior citizens, etc.

 CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

In conclusion, the euthanasia has quite a legal battle ongoing which is deeply rooted by the principles of various fields such as ethics, morals, law, philosophical etc. Throughout historical judgements we can see that culture and legal system have grappled with the complexities of the euthanasia, while some individuals choose the rights to life some individuals choose right to die. Though many arguments and contentions were placed before various high court and Supreme Court we still do not have proper legislation for euthanasia but in the near future we can have a proper legal guidelines, laws and implementations of such laws.

REFERENCES

  1. Online sources
    1. AC.IN
    2. SCC ONLINE.COM
    3. COM
    4. IPLEADERS BLOGS.COM
    5. LEGAL SERVICES INDIA.COM
    6. RESEARCH GATE.COM
  2. Sources Referred
    1. NATIONAL LIBRARY OF MEDICINE: EUTHANASIA: AN INDIAN PERSPECTIVE
    2. CENTER FOR LAW & POLICY RESEARCH: EUTHANASIA AND THE RIGHT TO DIE IN INDIA
    3. VERYWELL HEALTH: EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED SUICIDE HAVE IMPORTANT DISTINCTIONS
  3. Cases Referred
    1. ARUNA SHANBAUG V. UNION OF INDIA (2011)
    2. GIAN KAUR V. STATE OF PUNJAB (1996)
    3. COMMON CAUSE V. UNION OF INDIA (2014)
    4. CHANDRAKAMT NAYANROA TANDALE V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (2020)
    5. B. KARIBASAMMA V. UNION OF INDIA (2012)
  4. Statutes Referred
    1. CONSTITUION OF INDIA
    2. INDIAN PENAL CODE
    3. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
    4. THANSPLANTATION OF HUMAN ORGANS ACT
    5. UNIVERSAL DECLARATIO OF HUMAN RIGHTS
    6. INDIAN MEDICAL COUNCIL’S ACT
**Content:** **Author-Rachi Chavan, Amity University,Mumbai** ### **INTRODUCTION** Every human being is entitled to human rights provided under the Universal Declaration of Human rights (UDHR). The rights are cornerstone of ethical and legal framework, inherent dignity of every individual. Whereas, fundamental rights guaranteed in the constitution of India specifically article 21 let an individual enjoy the right to life and right to die. Every aspect of this rights has been through various judicial scrutiny over the period of 75 years post-independence. *Right to die* is an interpreted right under *Right to life*. Thus so far, in the context of right to die, euthanasia is still a debatable topic. It poses a profound challenges to the right to life and human rights. At the heat of the debate, there lies a balance between both the rights and dignity of an individual. Euthanasia conscious ending of an individual’s life to reduce the suffering, raise morals, philosophical and legal questions which intersect with the rights enshrined in UDHR. In this article, we articulate the complex intersection of right to life and right to die in the context of Euthanasia. Various definitions, Historical background, different types, comparison with various countries, legal precedents and various interpretations. We aim to provide a deeper understanding of this topic which reflects on legal and moral compass of life and death. ***Keywords*: Euthanasia, right to life, right to death, UDHR, fundamental rights, Article 21 etc.** ### **DEFINITION** According to Black’s Law Dictionary, “euthanasia is the act of causing or hastening the death of a person who is suffering from an incurable or terminal disease or condition especially a painful one, for reason for mercy.” According to Merriam-Webster dictionary, “Euthanasia means the act or practise of killing or permitting the death of hopelessly sick or injured individuals in a relatively painless way for reasons of mercy. It can be also seen as ‘*mercy killing.*” According to this practice, the patient or an individual or any other person oh the patient’s behalf, chooses death for himself for the colossal reason of medical condition. Euthanasia in simple terms means an act of ending an individuals’ life who is suffering from an incurable disease or in a situation where it is painful for an individual to stay alive. It common words, euthanasia means intentionally killing an individual who suffers from a painful disease by doing an act or omission of certain act. ### **EVOLUTION OF EUTHANASIA** *‘It were better to die once and for all than to drag out my lingering days in anguish by Aeschylus (father of tragedy).* Euthanasia is a classified under Applied Ethics, a branch of Philosophy. Applied ethics were introduced in 1970s’, when the philosophical and political actors begun to look into topics such as, euthanasia, abortion, cloning, etc. The words euthanasia is derived from two different words Greek origin *“eu”* and *“Thanatos”,* which in English means Euthanasia. It was prevalent in Greek society during the early period of renaissance. Greeks used to consider mercy killing or good death as an act of rationale, if an individual feel that the life is not useful. The increase in the advocacy of euthanasia throughout North America and European countries along with increasing awareness of human rights led to countries creating laws which penalized the suicide and abetment to suicide. Hence, Euthanasia was also declared unlawful. Over the years, understanding of euthanasia evolved and words like mercy killings, assisted dying, death with dignity, painless death, peace attaining, etc. were referred. ### **COMPARISON WITH OTHER COUNTRIES** History has been witness to the evolution of Euthanasia, it has gain momentum many times throughout history and it almost attained legal validity. There was eccentric pattern of euthanasia followed in different countries. *Switzerland* had most recent amendment in 2021 when “suicide machine” an euthanasia machine which was coffin shape hence the name suicide machine, which can be operated and was legalized. *Canada* had legalized assisted suicide and euthanasia only in certain cases pertaining to factors such as physical conditions, mental conditions etc. which will ultimately led to an individuals’ death. In 2021 the scope was increased by considering the individuals sufferings from serious disability which will lead them to their death. *Australia* has four states in which euthanasia is legalised after 2017 and it was available to an individual who suffers from incurable and progressive disease and will die within one year. *USA* had legalized euthanasia in various states through judicial rulings and legislations. The process which is followed is a doctor has to write a prescription of the fatal drugs with the professional when the drugs are injected to the individuals. *France* had not legalised euthanasia as the bill was proposed in 2021 but palliative sedation is legal in France. In *Netherlands* assisted dying and euthanasia is legalised from individuals suffering from terminal illness and eventually die. In 2020 assisted dying was made legalised for children from the age of 1-12 years who are terminally ill. ### **TYPES / KINDS OF EUTHANASIA** - ***BASED ON METHOD USED:*** Passive Euthanasia: when an individual is abstain from the medical treatment necessary for his survival. It means, the professional who provides care, do not do the act which is necessary or stop providing the treatment which is necessary to keep the patient alive. In simple terms, passive euthanasia is an act which can be contented as a doctors not actively killing the patient; they are simply not doing anything to save the patient. Active Euthanasia: When medical personnel or anybody else purposefully performs a positive deed, like injecting a deadly dose of medication or overdosing the victim with medication, the victim dies a medicine would not have caused death if it weren’t for the overdose, which caused the victim to pass away such act is called active euthanasia. - ***BASED ON CONSENT*** Voluntary Euthanasia: The individual requests that euthanasia be carried out. The patient requests euthanasia verbally or in writing if they would rather die than live in agony. Thus, it is possible to carry out both passive and aggressive euthanasia upon voluntary request. Involuntary Euthanasia: This kind of an individual is incapable of giving their consent for euthanasia. As a result, this approach covers scenarios including coma patients, brain dead people, etc. Non-voluntary: In this case, an individual is making the decision to end their life is competent but does not consent to it. This is unquestionably direct homicide. ### **LEGAL PROVISIONS** In the constitution of India Article 21 as a fundamental is enshrined in Part III it has stated that every citizen has right to life along with rights such as right to privacy, right to dignity, right of autonomy, right to personal liberty etc. In fact, inclusion of right to die under article 21 was controversial and various case laws are proof of that, because sections such as section 306 and section 309 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 which has provisions which states that abetment to suicide or attempt is illegal and punishable offence under the code. ### **LANDMARK JUDGEMENTS RELATED TO EUTHANASIA:** **ARUNA RAMCHANDRA SHANBAUG V. UNION OF INDIA** The landmark judgment in Aruna Shanbaug v. Union of India (2011) by the Supreme Court of India significantly advanced the legal discourse surrounding passive euthanasia in the country. This case analysis explores the Court’s reasoning and its subsequent establishment of procedural guidelines for passive euthanasia applications. Factual Background Aruna Shanbaug, a nurse, was brutally attacked in the hospital where she worked, rendering her in a permanent vegetative state for 36 years. Ms. Pinki Virani, claiming to be Aruna’s friend, petitioned the Court on the grounds that Aruna’s right to die with dignity under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution was being violated due to her irreversible condition. Court’s Reasoning and Decision The Court meticulously evaluated the medical reports and the definition of brain death enshrined in the Human Organ Transplant Act, 1994. It concluded that Aruna was not brain dead, demonstrating residual brain function through her ability to breathe unassisted and respond to stimuli. Furthermore, the Court determined that Ms. Virani lacked the legal standing to make such a request on Aruna’s behalf, as the decision-making authority resided with the KEM Hospital staff responsible for her care. While acknowledging the absence of hope for recovery, the Court distinguished between passive euthanasia (withdrawing life-sustaining treatment) and the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration, which Indian law did not equate with euthanasia. Therefore, the Court dismissed the petition for euthanasia in Aruna’s specific case. Significance and Procedural Guidelines Despite the denial of euthanasia in this instance, the Court’s judgment held immense significance. It undertook a comprehensive examination of passive euthanasia, ultimately establishing a detailed framework for future applications. This framework emphasizes stringent safeguards to prevent potential misuse. The established procedure mandates the filing of an application by a competent individual. The relevant Chief Justice then constitutes a tribunal of at least two judges, empowered to authorize euthanasia orders. This tribunal must also consult a three-member medical committee chosen in consultation with relevant medical professionals. Following the committee’s appointment, the judicial commission issues notices to the state, the patient’s family (including parents, spouse, siblings, or friends in their absence), and accompanies these notices with the committee’s report. The final decision on granting euthanasia rests solely with the Supreme Court. The Aruna Shanbaug case serves as a pivotal precedent in India’s legal landscape on passive euthanasia. The Court’s meticulous analysis and the subsequent creation of procedural guidelines offer a much-needed framework for navigating these complex and sensitive situations. **MARUTI SHRIPATI DUBAL V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA** Factual Background A police officer, suffering from a documented history of mental illness including schizophrenia, depression, and instability, attempted suicide by self-immolation. He was subsequently charged under Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for attempting to take his own life. Legal Issue The Bombay High Court challenged the constitutionality of Section 309 of the IPC, raising the question of whether criminalizing attempted suicide violates Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Indian Constitution. Reasoning of the Court The Court held that Section 309 was unconstitutional for the following reasons: Violation of Article 19: The right to life under Article 19 encompasses a negative aspect, as recognized in precedents like Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1962), and Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (1980). This right encompasses personal liberty and the protection of life itself. Interconnectedness of Articles 19 and 21: Articles 19 and 21 are to be interpreted together and in relation to each other. Violation of Article 14: Section 309 lacks a legal definition of “suicide,” leading to ambiguity. The concept carries varying interpretations across different groups, with some cultures even praising certain forms of suicide. The Court further distinguished between ending one’s life “unnaturally” and due to the exhaustion of the will to live. The latter, the Court reasoned, could not be considered unnatural but rather an act of life arising from specific circumstances. The Court declared Section 309 unconstitutional due to its violation of Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Indian Constitution. Consequently, the proceedings against the petitioner were dismissed, and he was acquitted of the charge under Section 309. **GIAN KAUR V. STATE OF PUNJAB** Factual information Gian Kaur and her husband were found guilty of assisting their daughter’s suicide and were convicted under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The trial court sentenced them to six years in prison and a fine of Rs. 2,000, with an additional nine months of imprisonment if the fine couldn’t be paid. The plaintiff appealed the decision to the High Court, which upheld the conviction but reduced the prison sentence to three years. Issues raised The main issues before the court were whether Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is constitutionally valid and whether Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. In the case of Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab (1996), a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India observed that the ‘right to life’ under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution does not include the ‘right to die’. The court emphasized that the right to life also encompasses the right to live with dignity until death, and this should be accompanied by a natural and worthy dying process. The court made it clear that the ‘right to die’ with dignity at the end of one’s life should not be confused with an unnatural ‘right to die’. It held that any action that accelerates a person’s natural death is unlawful under Section 21. The Supreme Court also addressed the constitutionality of Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and ruled that both attempted suicide and assisted suicide are punishable. The court stated that this provision serves to minimize the inherent risk associated with the absence of such a law, considering the greater good of society. Furthermore, in the case of P. Rathinam v. Union of India (1994), the court repealed the provisions of Sections 306 and 309 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, thereby affirming their constitutionality and holding the accused liable for abetment of suicide. The Supreme Court concluded that Article 21, which pertains to the ‘right to life’, does not include the ‘right to die’. The arguments based on Article 14 of the Indian Constitution were found to be inconsistent with the main issues of the case. ### **DOCTRINES RELATED TO EUTHANASIA IN INDIA** - Doctrine of Parens Patriae: This doctrine states that, the state has right to intervene to protect the rights of an individuals who cannot make decisions for themselves. This doctrine is used for cases of euthanasia where the patients are unable to make the decisions for themselves. - Doctrine of Medical Ethics: Medical Council of India has provided medical ethics under four category that are principles of non-maleficence, beneficence, autonomy, and justice. These medical ethics makes sure that medical professional are unbiased and makes decisions which has best interest of patient. - Living will Doctrine: Living wills are document which stated the wishes of an individual regarding ending their lives under medical treatment. It is recognised by Supreme Court of India in 2018. - Doctrine of Sanctity of Life: This doctrines is based on religious and moral compass which upholds the value of life and its sanctity. It therefore, opposed the assisted dying or terminating lives of human beings on the ground that it disturbs and violated the sanctity of life. ### **Maxims** - *Volenti non fit injuria*: “the one who is willing, no harm is done” it means that if the patients is willing then no harm is caused to him. - *Salus aegroti suprema lex*: “welfare of the patients is the highest law” it simply means whatever that is in the best interest of patient shall be considered legal and just. - *Actus curiae neminem gravabit*: “the act of court shall prejudice no one” it means that the court shall be unbiased and impartial while making decisions for the cases of euthanasia. ### **FUTURE IMPLICATIONS IF EUTHANASIA IS LEGALISED \[NEGATIVES\]** If euthanasia is legalised in India the impact of such act can be more of negative than positive as majority of human tendency is to seek benefit for ourselves than others. Hence, the consequences can be negative than positive. Some of them are: Corruption as many professionals can be of corrupt nature and hence can authorise euthanasia in return of money, Child killing foe example children who has some disability or disease which need to be taken care for can be victims of euthanasia, Organ selling is one of the biggest racket on going in India hence, euthanasia will only help it grow, Dowry deaths, mischiefs by any relative for some property, female child killings, high death rate of Senior citizens, etc. ### **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** In conclusion, the euthanasia has quite a legal battle ongoing which is deeply rooted by the principles of various fields such as ethics, morals, law, philosophical etc. Throughout historical judgements we can see that culture and legal system have grappled with the complexities of the euthanasia, while some individuals choose the rights to life some individuals choose right to die. Though many arguments and contentions were placed before various high court and Supreme Court we still do not have proper legislation for euthanasia but in the near future we can have a proper legal guidelines, laws and implementations of such laws. ### **REFERENCES** 1. **Online sources** 1. AC.IN 2. SCC ONLINE.COM 3. COM 4. IPLEADERS BLOGS.COM 5. LEGAL SERVICES INDIA.COM 6. RESEARCH GATE.COM 2. **Sources Referred** 1. NATIONAL LIBRARY OF MEDICINE: EUTHANASIA: AN INDIAN PERSPECTIVE 2. CENTER FOR LAW & POLICY RESEARCH: EUTHANASIA AND THE RIGHT TO DIE IN INDIA 3. VERYWELL HEALTH: EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED SUICIDE HAVE IMPORTANT DISTINCTIONS 3. **Cases Referred** 1. ARUNA SHANBAUG V. UNION OF INDIA (2011) 2. GIAN KAUR V. STATE OF PUNJAB (1996) 3. COMMON CAUSE V. UNION OF INDIA (2014) 4. CHANDRAKAMT NAYANROA TANDALE V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (2020) 5. B. KARIBASAMMA V. UNION OF INDIA (2012) 4. **Statutes Referred** 1. CONSTITUION OF INDIA 2. INDIAN PENAL CODE 3. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 4. THANSPLANTATION OF HUMAN ORGANS ACT 5. UNIVERSAL DECLARATIO OF HUMAN RIGHTS 6. INDIAN MEDICAL COUNCIL’S ACT **Categories:** Articles --- ### [RIGHT TO PRIVATE DEFENCE UNDER CRIMINAL LAW: PROVISIONS, PRINCIPLES AND CASES](https://lawfoyer.in/right-to-private-defence-under-criminal-law-provisions-principles-and-cases/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-M. Yesaswini Sai Nikitha, Dr.B.R.Ambedkar College of Law, Andhra University

INTRODUCTION-

In India, the Indian Penal Code, 1860 governs crimes, defences and punishments. The general defences and exceptions are explained by Sec.76 to 106 of Chapter –IV, IPC. The concept of right of private defence is also described with relevant provisions from Sec.96 to 106 extensively below the aforesaid chapter. The types, principles and limitations to right of private defence of the person and property were provided in this part of IPC. These sections permit the individuals to use required force against an assailant  or wrongdoer to safeguard their own body and property, as well as that of others, when rapid support from the public authorities can’t be taken. In such instances, the persons cannot be made liable for the acts done in self-defence. Self-Help is treated as the foremost principle in law governing crimes. The right of private defence is crucial for any citizen to secure his/her life, liberty or property which is diligently regulated by the law. Keywords : Right of Private Defence, Indian Penal Code,1860, concept of self-defence, In defence of person, In defence of property, limitations, defensive right, Sec.96 to 106 of IPC.

Meaning of the right of private defence :

Private Defence refers to using unlawful acts to protect oneself, another person, or property or to prevent criminal activity. The right of private defence is considered as inherent right of man. “The term “Body” refers to one’s own physical body or other person body, whereas the “property” indicates both movable and immovable possessions of oneself or of others.”[1] Sec.96 of the IPC elucidates the provision of things done in private defence. The acts done by the individual in the exercise of their right of private defence against the attackers are not considered as offences, only if they fall under the specified criteria. The aforesaid right can be exercised only when there is a forthcoming danger and when aid from the statutory authorities is unavailable. In simple terms, private defence refers to the exercise of actions which are prohibited but performed to protect oneself, another human being or property or to prevent any criminal activity. In this purview, the right of private defence is granted to Indian citizens to endure threats or dangers without delay and secure their bodies. Article-21 of the Constitution of India,1950 guarantees the right to life and personal liberty to all persons, in accordance of this fundamental right, a person can utilise the right of private defence under IPC,1860.

Nature of the right of private defence :

According to Eminent jurist, Bentham, “A man owes a duty to society to protect person and property of others. It concerns the public safety that every honest man should consider himself as the natural protector of every other.”[2] It is rightly said that the self- help is treated as the best help that a person could do for himself. The ultimate aim of a state is the welfare and protection of the people, but it cannot deploy police officers everywhere to safeguard its citizens from harm or injury. So the state empowers the people to save themselves through the right of private defence.  A fundamental duty is imposed on the state to secure public property and renounce public violence by Art.51(a)(i)[3] of the Constitution of India ,1950.  The protection of the body and property should often considered as his primary responsibility. In the exercise of his foremost duty, if the person commits any unlawful act it doesn’t generate a reciprocal right of private defence, if that illegal action taken by the defender is in genuine self-defence. In democratic countries, the citizens should be provided with the aforesaid privilege to protect themselves from unavoidable danger when state assistance is unavailable or no reasonable time to take recourse to police authorities.

Essential components of the right of private defence :

The elements of the right of private defence can be compiled under the following heads:
  • Apprehension of danger: The aforesaid right can be exercised where a reasonable fear of harm or danger arises to a person or other person or property, but the harm must be impending and not merely uncertain and hypothetical.
  • Unlawful act: The right of private defence can be invoked only in defence of an unlawful act by another person that includes assault, criminal trespass, housebreaking, mischief or robbery.
  • Proportionate force: The reasonable force used by a person to defend himself, should be in accordance with the threat faced and the person while defending himself should try to decrease the harm done to the assailant.
  • No alternative remedy: This privilege can be used in a situation when there is no time to take recourse from legal authorities or to seek protection from public authorities.
  • Continuity of the threat: This right can be invoked until the threat or harm continues to exist, but once the harm is ceased, its exercise beyond the threat is not justified.
  • Absence of aggression: While exercising this privilege, to protect oneself from impending danger or harm, the person should not do such acts in aggression and later plead for the right of private defence.
  • No excessive force: The reasonable force used by the defender should not exceed the required force to prevent imminent harm.

Interpretation of the Legal Provisions involved :

Sec.96 of IPC, 1860 – “Things done in private defence-Nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence.”[4]

Under Sec.96 of IPC, it is explained that all citizens have the right of private defence. However, it is not absolute but qualified by Sec.99 which states that this right will not apply to the case in which more harm is caused than it is actually required to defend himself. The burden of proving that a particular act is done in self defence is on the person who pleads it. The accused can be absolved on the plea of aforesaid right even if not pleaded by the him. The right of private defence, as the name signifies, is an act of defence but not an act of offence. In a free quarrel, when the mutual parties fight, this right cannot be pleaded by any of the parties as both parties are responsible for their actions. Even if the act is result of the aggression of the accused then under the aforesaid privilege, the accused cannot be safeguarded. To know whether the act was committed under self-defence or aggression, the court has to look into the facts and incidents keenly, and should not rely on any unreasonable presumptions. The court may apply any limitations to the case if necessary. A person by merely assuming the probability of threat and without reasonable cause, cannot exercise the defensive right. The distance between the attacker and the accused can also be a deciding factor to determine whether the act is done under aggression or self-defence. There is no certain measuring stick to determine that distance, whether it is done based on the facts and circumstances of the case or not.
  • 97 of IPC,1860- “Right of private defence of the body and of property.—Every person has a right, subject to the restrictions contained in section 99, to defend—
(First)— His own body, and the body of any other person, against any offence affecting the human body; (Secondly)— The property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other person, against any act which is an offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to commit theft, rob­bery, mischief or criminal trespass.”[5] Sec.97 of IPC, 1860 authorises all the citizens to protect themselves and others from any immediate danger. Further, this provision expressly states that a person can protect his body, property as well as others property, regardless of whether it is movable or immovable, by exercising this right. An individual can protect himself from offences including theft, mischief or criminal trespass, robbery or an attempt to commit the above said offences by exercising this right. Under this section, even a stranger can utilise this privilege to safeguard the body and property of others with whom he is not having any relationship before.
  • 98 of IPC,1860- “Right of private defence against the act of a person of unsound mind, etc.— When an act, which would otherwise be a certain offence, is not that offence, by reason of the youth, the want of maturity of understanding, the unsoundness of mind or the intoxication of the person doing that act, or by reason of any misconception on the part of that person, every person has the same right of private defence against that act which he would have if the act were that offence.”[6]
Sec.98 of IPC, explains the factors, depending on which the defensive act is not considered as an offence, which would be considered as an offence under normal circumstances. “The determining factors are:
  • Youth
  • Lack of maturity of understanding
  • Unsoundness of mind
  • Intoxication
  • Any misconception existing on the part of the attacker.”[7]
So if the act is performed by an individual under the above factors, in such instances this right can be invoked. This section further states that in the exercise of this right, the physical or mental capacity of the person, against whom the right is exercised, is not considered as a bar to its exercise. Therefore, one can utilise this privilege against the attackers regardless of their motive, legal status or any other exception, only when there is an actual fear of threat or harm.
  • 99 of IPC,1860- “Acts against which there is no right of private defence.—
There is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that act, may not be strictly justifiable by law. There is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by the direction of a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that direction may not be strictly justifiable by law. There is no right of private defence in cases in which there is time to have recourse to the protection of the public authorities.  Extent to which the right may be exercised.—The right of private defence in no case extends to the inflicting of more harm than it is necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence.”[8] Limitations to exercise of the right of private defence: Sec.99 of IPC provides the extent to which the right can be exercised and the restrictions on exercise of this privilege. The limitations can be explained as: (1)“The right of private defence cannot be exercised if the act doesn’t result in real apprehension of death or grievous hurt. (2) This right can’t be invoked in the case where the act is done or attempted to be done by a public servant acting in good faith during his official duty. (3)The right of private defence cannot be exercised when the act is performed under the direction of public authority in good faith while discharging his lawful duty. (4)This right can’t be invoked when there is a reasonable time to take recourse to public authorities.”[9] In this section, good faith, defined under Sec.52[10] of IPC,1860, is treated as the deciding factor to consider whether the act done or attempted to be done by the statutory authority or under the direction of public authority falls under Sec.99 or not. The extent to which the right may be invoked is discussed in this section.
  • This privilege can be exercised only in a situation where the act by the attacker is treated as a specified offence under IPC,1860 or otherwise as stated under any other circumstances.
  • The right can be invoked in the case when the assailant’s act results in actual fear, threat or danger and that danger should be real, impending or resulting in criminal activity.
  • The privilege is itself defensive but not for the sake of imposing punishment or retribution.
  • This right cannot be exercised to shield an act of aggression of the accused.
  • This privilege cannot be invoked in a situation where there is reasonable means and time to seek protection from public authorities.

Sec.100 of IPC,1860- “When the right of private defence of the body extends to causing death.—

The right of private defence of the body extends, under the restrictions mentioned in the last preceding section, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to the assailant, if the offence which occasions the exercise of the right be of any of the descriptions hereinafter enumerated, namely:— (First)— Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that death will otherwise be the consequence of such assault; (Secondly)— Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehen­sion that grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such assault; (Thirdly)— An assault with the intention of committing rape; (Fourthly)— An assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust; (Fifthly)— An assault with the intention of kidnapping or abduct­ing; (Sixthly)— An assault with the intention of wrongfully confining a person, under circumstances which may reasonably cause him to apprehend that he will be unable to have recourse to the public authorities for his release. (Seventhly)— An act of throwing or administering acid or an attempt to throw or administer acid which may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such act.”[11] Under Sec.100 of IPC, this privilege safeguards the accused whose defensive act resulted in death or grievous hurt to the assailant. “But this Sec.100 shall be applicable if it falls under the following circumstances:
  • Assault that reasonably causes the real apprehension of death.
  • Assault that reasonably causes the real apprehension of grievous hurt.
  • Assault to commit rape.
  • Assault to gratifying lust.
  • Assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting.
  • An assault with the intention of wrongfully confining a person in the circumstances making the person not to take recourse to any public authority.
  • An act of throwing acid or attempt to administer the acid causing reasonable apprehension of grievous hurt.”[12]
Essentials of Sec.100 of IPC, 1860: To utilise this right under Sec.100, the essential factors are
  • The defender must not be at any fault like aggression while taking the self-defence.
  • There must be apprehension of imminent, actual and real harm or danger.
  • No other means and time to take recourse to statutory authorities.
  • There is no other option rather than defending the attacker.

Sec.101 of IPC, 1860- “When such right extends to causing any harm other than death.—

If the offence be not of any of the descriptions enu­merated in the last preceding section, the right of private defence of the body does not extend to the voluntary causing of death to the assailant, but does extend, under the restric­tions mentioned in section 99, to the voluntary causing to the assailant of any harm other than death”[13]. This section explains that if the prohibited act cannot be brought under the factors stated in the earlier provision, the right of private defence can’t be extended to an act causing death or grievous hurt, but extends to the acts other than causing death specified under Sec.99.

Sec.102 of IPC,1860- “Commencement and continuance of the right of private defence of the body.—

The right of private defence of the body commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit the offence though the of­fence may not have been committed; and it continues as long as such apprehension of danger to the body continues.”[14] This section explains that the aforesaid privilege can be utilised as soon as the reasonable fear for the harm or injury of the act starts to exist, even if the act resulting harm was not yet committed. The self-defence can be exercised until the act inflicting harm ceases. But it is crucial that the actual attack must take place and the harm arising out of it must be immediate.

Sec.103 of IPC, 1860 –“When the right of private defence of property extends to causing death.—

The right of private defence of property extends, under the restrictions mentioned in section 99, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to the wrong-doer, if the offence, the committing of which, or the attempting to commit which, occasions the exercise of the right, be an offence of any of the descriptions hereinafter enumerated, namely:—(First)— Robbery; (Secondly)— House-breaking by night; (Thirdly)— Mischief by fire committed on any building, tent or vessel, which building, tent or vessel is used as a human dwell­ing, or as a place for the custody of property; (Fourthly)— Theft, mischief, or house-trespass, under such circum­stances as may reasonably cause apprehension that death or griev­ous hurt will be the consequence, if such right of private de­fence is not exercised.”[15] Sec.103 of IPC, 1860 provides the right of private defence of property extending to cause death. The act done in self-defence of property within the limitations specified in Sec.99 causing death of the attacker is allowed under this provision if the act can be brought under some conditions. These circumstances include robbery, house-breaking by night, mischief by fire committed on any building, tent or vessel that is considered as a human dwelling place, mischief, theft, or house-trespass that raises a rational fear of causing death or grievous hurt. Sec. 100 of IPC explains that the aforesaid right can be used by a person to secure his or some others body, whereas Sec.103 of IPC describes about right of an individual to defend his or others property.This right cannot be exercised against the person who has the title or possession over that property.

Sec.104 of IPC,1860-“When such right extends to causing any harm other than death.—

If the offence, the committing of which, or the attempt­ing to commit which, occasions the exercise of the right of private defence, be theft, mischief, or criminal trespass, not of any of the descriptions enumerated in the last preceding section, that right does not extend to the voluntary causing of death, but does extend, subject to the restrictions mentioned in section 99, to the voluntary causing to the wrong-doer of any harm other than death.”[16] According to this section, the above said right upon property cannot be extended to cause death or grievous hurt, but applied in case of theft, criminal trespass and not under any conditions mentioned in the previous provision. However, it is subjected to the limitations prescribed under Sec.99. As per Sec.104, if the defender while utilising this privilege causes death or grievous hurt of the attacker then he is liable under Sec.304 of IPC.

Sec.105 of IPC,1860 - “Commencement and continuance of the right of private defence of property.—

The right of private defence of property commences when a reasonable apprehension of danger to the property com­mences. The right of private defence of property against theft continues till the offender has effected his retreat with the property or either the assistance of the public authorities is obtained, or the property has been recovered. The right of private defence of property against robbery contin­ues as long as the offender causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint or as long as the fear of instant death or of instant hurt or of instant personal re­straint continues. The right of private defence of property against criminal tres­pass or mischief continues as long as the offender continues in the commission of criminal trespass or mischief. The right of private defence of property against house-breaking by night continues as long as the house-trespass which has been begun by such house-breaking continues.”[17] This section provides about that the commencement and continuance of right depends on the nature of the act. The time period for the privilege to be utilised and the specified acts for exercising the right are summarised as follows:
  • “In the case of criminal trespass or mischief, the right of private defence continues as long as the offender is engaged in the commission of trespass or mischief.
  • In the case of robbery, the right of private defence continues as long as the offender is causing or attempting to cause death, hurt, or wrongful restraint to any person.
  • In the case of theft, the right of private defence continues until the offender has retreated with the property, until assistance from public authorities is obtained, or until the property has been recovered.
  • In the case of house-breaking by night, the right of private defence continues as long as the house trespass, which began with the act of house-breaking, continues.”[18]
The right of private defence can be exercised only if there is no reasonable time to seek protection from statutory authorities, and once a trespasser gets the lawful possession of that property, the right of private defence can’t be exercised by the person who has the possession till then.

Sec.106 of IPC,1860- “Right of private defence against deadly assault when there is risk of harm to innocent person.—

If in the exercise of the right of private defence against an assault which reasonably causes the apprehension of death, the defender be so situated that he cannot effectually exercise that right without risk of harm to an innocent person, his right of private defence extends to the running of that risk.”[19] This provision empowers a citizen to protect himself by using this right against a group of attackers or a mob. This privilege can also be exercised by an individual even though the group consists of fault less people involving reasonable possibility of harm or injury to the defender. So causing harm to innocent people who are not involved in the attack is not a bar to the defender to save his life by exercising this right.

Relevant Case Laws :

  • 96 of IPC -
In Thangavel case[20], it is highlighted that the common proverb or principle that “necessity knows no law” cannot be applied to modern jurisprudence. It is also stated that even though the right of self defence is inherent it should not be utilised in such a way disturbing others rights. It prevents the persons from expressing their aggression against innocent people in the name of self-defence. In the case of Laxman Vs. State of Orissa[21], it was held that the aforesaid right is available only to one who is suddenly encountered with the prompt necessity of averting an imminent danger but not of his own creation. In the case of Gordhan Vs. State of Rajasthan[22] , the court ruled that the plea for the right of private defence should not be readily assumed merely because the accused had suffered meagre injuries.
  • 97 of IPC -
Right of private defence to be pleaded- In the case of Munshi Ram Vs. Delhi Administration[23], it is explained that generally, the accused must plead for the above said right, but even if he does not plead for self-defence, it is open to the court to consider the plea of private defence if it arises from materials on record. In defence of person – In the case of Sonelal Vs. State[24], the Apex Court held that the right of private defence begins when there is reasonable apprehension about the injury to the human body. In the case of Kishan Vs. State of M.P.[25], the court decided that Mere intimidation will not constitute a valid ground for the exercise of the right of private defence and to use this privilege he should not be an aggressor. In defence of property-The Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. Vs. Niyami[26], ruled that the aforesaid right is used not only to protect oneself but also for securing the body or property of others.
  • 99 of IPC -
In the case of Emperor Vs. Mammun[27], a group of five individuals armed with weapons, who were accused in the present case, attacked a person who was cutting rice from their field, consequently, he got severely injured and died. The accused pleaded for the right of private defence, but the court dismissed it on the ground that there is a reasonable time to seek protection from police authorities under Sec.99.
  • 100 of IPC –
In the case of State of Orissa Vs. Nirupama panda[28], there was a quarrel took place between the accused and the deceased as he entered her house to rape her, consequently, she stabbed him and he died. The accused pleaded for the right of private defence and the court held she was not guilty of the offence.
  • 102 of IPC-
In the case of Sitaram Vs. Emperor[29], the court decided that the person could exercise this defensive right until he finds himself secured from danger.
  • 103 of IPC-
In the case of Jagan Ram Vs. State[30], the court ruled that the defender need not be the owner of the property in order to use this privilege, however the same can’t be pleaded when the act is done under aggression.

New Legislation in the recent period :

Recently the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita bill was passed by the Parliament in December, 2023 and it also received the President’s assent and was enacted in December, 2023. This Act will come into force from 1st July, 2024. This new Criminal Act replaces the Indian Penal Code which was enacted in 1860. After coming into force, this new act governs the offences, punishments, and exceptions in India. Chapter-3 of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, deals with the General Exceptions. Under this part of General Exceptions, the right of private of defence is covered from Sec.34 to 44.

CONCLUSION-

In my opinion, this right of private defence can be considered like armour granted to the citizens by Indian Penal Code, 1860. But in this exercise of this right, the citizens must also be aware of its limitations so that the misuse of the privilege can be mitigated. The concept of “self-help is the best help” that a person can do to himself is strongly reflected in the concept  defensive right. There are some determining factors like reasonable apprehension of real harm or imminent danger by an attacker, no reasonable time to take recourse to the statutory authorities, and act should not be performed under aggression to use the aforesaid right. So, this right should be effectively utilised by the Indian citizens for defending themselves or their property or that of others. However, there are some difficulties in determining the case under this right, the proportionate force should be used while protecting and whether the act was performed in good faith or not. In spite of all this, the right of private defence is a good right granted to the people for their self-defence.

REFERENCES-

  1. Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred :
    1. N.V.Paranjape, Indian Penal Code ,p.no.143(Central Law Publications, 4th edition, Prayagraj, 2019).
  • S.N.Misra, Indian Penal Code, p.no.214 and 219 (Central Law Publications,12th edition, Allahabad,2004).
  1. Online Articles / Sources Referred :
    1. https://lawbhoomi.com/private-defence-in-ipc/
    2. https://www.legalserviceindia.com/article/l470-Private-Defence.html
    3. https://blog.ipleaders.in/to-what-extent-can-you-exercise-your-right-of-private-defence/
    4. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1569253/
  2. Cases Referred :
    1. Thangavel Case.
    2. Laxman Vs. State of Orissa, AIR 1988 SC 83.
    3. Gordhan Vs. State of Rajasthan, 1987 Cri.L.J.541(Raj.)
    4. Munshi Ram Vs. Delhi Administration, AIR 1968 SC 702
    5. Sonelal Vs. State, AIR 1981 SC 1379
    6. Kishan Vs. State of M.P. , AIR 1975 SC 244
    7. State of U.P. Vs. Niyami , AIR 1987 SC 1652
    8. Emperor Vs. Mammun Case.
    9. State of Orissa Vs. Nirupama Panda , 1989 CRILJ 621.
    10. Sitaram Vs. Emperor, 1973 SC 473
    11. Jagan Ram Vs. State, 2014 CrLJ NOC 483.
  3. Statutes Referred :
    1. Indian Penal Code,1860
[1] Private Defence in IPC. (2023, June 24). LawBhoomi. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://lawbhoomi.com/private-defence-in-ipc/ [2] Principles of the Penal Code, p.269 [3] Art.51(1)(a). (n.d.). Indiankannon. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/854952/ [4] Indian Penal Code,1860. (n.d.). Indiankannon. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/777353/ [5] Indian Penal Code,1860. (n.d.). Indiankannon. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1499794/ [6] Indian Penal Code,1860. (n.d.). Indiankannon. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1159920/ [7] Private Defences in IPC,1860. (2023, June 24). LawBhoomi. Retrieved March 13, 2024, from https://lawbhoomi.com/private-defence-in-ipc/ [8] Indian Penal Code,1860. (n.d.). Indiankannon. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/650803/ [9] Indian Penal Code ,1860. (2023, June 24). LawBhoomi. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://lawbhoomi.com/private-defence-in-ipc/ [10] Indian Penal Code,1860. (n.d.). Indiankannon. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1180351/ [11] Indian Penal Code,1860. (n.d.). Indiankannon. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/714464/ [12] Private Defences in IPC,1860. (2023, June 24). LawBhoomi. Retrieved March 13, 2024, from https://lawbhoomi.com/private-defence-in-ipc/ [13] Indian Penal Code,1860. (n.d.). Indiankannon. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/399205/ [14] Indian Penal Code,1860. (n.d.). Indiankannon. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1985227/ [15] Indian Penal Code,1860. (n.d.). Indiankannon. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/860501/ [16] Indian Penal Code,1860. (n.d.). Indiankannon. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1409246/ [17] Indian Penal Code,1860. (n.d.). Indiankannon. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1944062/ [18] Indian Penal Code,1860. (2023, June 24). LawBhoomi. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://lawbhoomi.com/private-defence-in-ipc/ [19] Indian Penal Code ,1860. (n.d.). Indiankannon. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1606852/ [20] Thangavel Case. (2023, June 24). LawBhoomi. Retrieved March 5, 2024, from https://lawbhoomi.com/private-defence-in-ipc/ [21] AIR 1988 SC 83 [22] 1987 Cri. L.J. 541 (Raj.) [23] AIR 1968 SC 702 [24] AIR 1981 SC 1379 [25] AIR 1975 SC 244 [26] AIR 1987 SC 1652 [27] Emperor vs. Mammun  Case. (2023, June 24). LawBhoomi. Retrieved March 5, 2024, from https://lawbhoomi.com/private-defence-in-ipc/ [28] 1989 CRILJ 621 [29] 1973 SC 473 [30] 2014 CriLJ NOC 483 **Content:** **Author-M. Yesaswini Sai Nikitha, Dr.B.R.Ambedkar College of Law, Andhra University** ### **INTRODUCTION-** In India, the Indian Penal Code, 1860 governs crimes, defences and punishments. The general defences and exceptions are explained by Sec.76 to 106 of Chapter –IV, IPC. The concept of right of private defence is also described with relevant provisions from Sec.96 to 106 extensively below the aforesaid chapter. The types, principles and limitations to right of private defence of the person and property were provided in this part of IPC. These sections permit the individuals to use required force against an assailant or wrongdoer to safeguard their own body and property, as well as that of others, when rapid support from the public authorities can’t be taken. In such instances, the persons cannot be made liable for the acts done in self-defence. Self-Help is treated as the foremost principle in law governing crimes. The right of private defence is crucial for any citizen to secure his/her life, liberty or property which is diligently regulated by the law. ***Keywords* :** Right of Private Defence, Indian Penal Code,1860, concept of self-defence, In defence of person, In defence of property, limitations, defensive right, Sec.96 to 106 of IPC. ### **Meaning of the right of private defence :** Private Defence refers to using unlawful acts to protect oneself, another person, or property or to prevent criminal activity. The right of private defence is considered as inherent right of man. “*The term “Body” refers to one’s own physical body or other person body, whereas the “property” indicates both movable and immovable possessions of oneself or of others.”[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)* Sec.96 of the IPC elucidates the provision of things done in private defence. The acts done by the individual in the exercise of their right of private defence against the attackers are not considered as offences, only if they fall under the specified criteria. The aforesaid right can be exercised only when there is a forthcoming danger and when aid from the statutory authorities is unavailable. In simple terms, private defence refers to the exercise of actions which are prohibited but performed to protect oneself, another human being or property or to prevent any criminal activity. In this purview, the right of private defence is granted to Indian citizens to endure threats or dangers without delay and secure their bodies. Article-21 of the Constitution of India,1950 guarantees the right to life and personal liberty to all persons, in accordance of this fundamental right, a person can utilise the right of private defence under IPC,1860. ### **Nature of the right of private defence :** According to Eminent jurist, Bentham, “*A man owes a duty to society to protect person and property of others. It concerns the public safety that every honest man should consider himself as the natural protector of every other.*”[\[2\]](#_ftn2) It is rightly said that the self- help is treated as the best help that a person could do for himself. The ultimate aim of a state is the welfare and protection of the people, but it cannot deploy police officers everywhere to safeguard its citizens from harm or injury. So the state empowers the people to save themselves through the right of private defence. A fundamental duty is imposed on the state to secure public property and renounce public violence by Art.51(a)(i)[\[3\]](#_ftn3) of the Constitution of India ,1950. The protection of the body and property should often considered as his primary responsibility. In the exercise of his foremost duty, if the person commits any unlawful act it doesn’t generate a reciprocal right of private defence, if that illegal action taken by the defender is in genuine self-defence. In democratic countries, the citizens should be provided with the aforesaid privilege to protect themselves from unavoidable danger when state assistance is unavailable or no reasonable time to take recourse to police authorities. ### **Essential components of the right of private defence :** The elements of the right of private defence can be compiled under the following heads: - **Apprehension of danger**: The aforesaid right can be exercised where a reasonable fear of harm or danger arises to a person or other person or property, but the harm must be impending and not merely uncertain and hypothetical. - **Unlawful act**: The right of private defence can be invoked only in defence of an unlawful act by another person that includes assault, criminal trespass, housebreaking, mischief or robbery. - **Proportionate force:** The reasonable force used by a person to defend himself, should be in accordance with the threat faced and the person while defending himself should try to decrease the harm done to the assailant. - **No alternative remedy:** This privilege can be used in a situation when there is no time to take recourse from legal authorities or to seek protection from public authorities. - **Continuity of the threat:** This right can be invoked until the threat or harm continues to exist, but once the harm is ceased, its exercise beyond the threat is not justified. - **Absence of aggression:** While exercising this privilege, to protect oneself from impending danger or harm, the person should not do such acts in aggression and later plead for the right of private defence. - **No excessive force:** The reasonable force used by the defender should not exceed the required force to prevent imminent harm. ### **Interpretation of the Legal Provisions involved :** #### ***Sec.96 of IPC, 1860* –** “*Things done in private defence*–*Nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence.”*[*\[4\]*](#_ftn4) Under Sec**.**96 of IPC, it is explained that all citizens have the right of private defence. However, it is not absolute but qualified by Sec.99 which states that this right will not apply to the case in which more harm is caused than it is actually required to defend himself. The burden of proving that a particular act is done in self defence is on the person who pleads it. The accused can be absolved on the plea of aforesaid right even if not pleaded by the him. The right of private defence, as the name signifies, is an act of defence but not an act of offence. In a free quarrel, when the mutual parties fight, this right cannot be pleaded by any of the parties as both parties are responsible for their actions. Even if the act is result of the aggression of the accused then under the aforesaid privilege, the accused cannot be safeguarded. To know whether the act was committed under self-defence or aggression, the court has to look into the facts and incidents keenly, and should not rely on any unreasonable presumptions. The court may apply any limitations to the case if necessary. A person by merely assuming the probability of threat and without reasonable cause, cannot exercise the defensive right. The distance between the attacker and the accused can also be a deciding factor to determine whether the act is done under aggression or self-defence. There is no certain measuring stick to determine that distance, whether it is done based on the facts and circumstances of the case or not. - ***97 of IPC,1860****– “**Right of private defence of the body and of property**.—Every person has a right, subject to the restrictions contained in section 99, to defend—* [*(First)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/116325044/)*— His own body, and the body of any other person, against any offence affecting the human body;* [*(Secondly)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/93777918/)*— The property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other person, against any act which is an offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to commit theft, rob­bery, mischief or criminal trespass.”*[***\[5\]***](#_ftn5) Sec.97 of IPC, 1860 authorises all the citizens to protect themselves and others from any immediate danger. Further, this provision expressly states that a person can protect his body, property as well as others property, regardless of whether it is movable or immovable, by exercising this right. An individual can protect himself from offences including theft, mischief or criminal trespass, robbery or an attempt to commit the above said offences by exercising this right. Under this section, even a stranger can utilise this privilege to safeguard the body and property of others with whom he is not having any relationship before. - ***98 of IPC,1860- “**Right of private defence against the act of a person of unsound mind, etc.****— When an act, which would otherwise be a certain offence, is not that offence, by reason of the youth, the want of maturity of understanding, the unsoundness of mind or the intoxication of the person doing that act, or by reason of any misconception on the part of that person, every person has the same right of private defence against that act which he would have if the act were that offence.”[**\[6\]**](#_ftn6)* Sec.98 of IPC, explains the factors, depending on which the defensive act is not considered as an offence, which would be considered as an offence under normal circumstances. “*The determining factors are:* - *Youth* - *Lack of maturity of understanding* - *Unsoundness of mind* - *Intoxication* - *Any misconception existing on the part of the attacker.”[**\[7\]**](#_ftn7)* So if the act is performed by an individual under the above factors, in such instances this right can be invoked. This section further states that in the exercise of this right, the physical or mental capacity of the person, against whom the right is exercised, is not considered as a bar to its exercise. Therefore, one can utilise this privilege against the attackers regardless of their motive, legal status or any other exception, only when there is an actual fear of threat or harm. - ***99 of IPC,1860****– “****Acts against which there is no right of private defence****.—* *There is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that act, may not be strictly justifiable by law. There is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by the direction of a public* *servant acting in good faith under colour of his office,* *though that direction may not* *be* *strictly justifiable by law. There is no right of private defence in cases in which there is time to have recourse to the protection of the public authorities*. ***Extent to which the right may be exercised****.—The right of private defence in no case extends to the inflicting of more harm than it is necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence.”*[***\[8\]***](#_ftn8) **Limitations to exercise of the right of private defence:** Sec.99 of IPC provides the extent to which the right can be exercised and the restrictions on exercise of this privilege. The limitations can be explained as: ***(1)****“The right of private defence cannot be exercised if the act doesn’t result in real apprehension of death or grievous hurt.* ***(2)*** *This right can’t be invoked in the case where the act is done or attempted to be done by a public servant acting in good faith during his official duty.* ***(3)****The right of private defence cannot be exercised when the act is performed under the direction of public authority in good faith while discharging his lawful duty.* ***(4)****This right can’t be invoked when there is a reasonable time to take recourse to public authorities*.”[\[9\]](#_ftn9) In this section, good faith, defined under *Sec.52*[***\[10\]***](#_ftn10) *of IPC,1860*, is treated as the deciding factor to consider whether the act done or attempted to be done by the statutory authority or under the direction of public authority falls under Sec.99 or not. The extent to which the right may be invoked is discussed in this section. - This privilege can be exercised only in a situation where the act by the attacker is treated as a specified offence under IPC,1860 or otherwise as stated under any other circumstances. - The right can be invoked in the case when the assailant’s act results in actual fear, threat or danger and that danger should be real, impending or resulting in criminal activity. - The privilege is itself defensive but not for the sake of imposing punishment or retribution. - This right cannot be exercised to shield an act of aggression of the accused. - This privilege cannot be invoked in a situation where there is reasonable means and time to seek protection from public authorities. #### ***Sec.100 of IPC,1860**–*** *“**When the right of private defence of the body extends to causing death.**—* *The right of private defence of the body extends, under the restrictions mentioned in the last preceding section, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to the assailant, if the offence which occasions the exercise of the right be of any of the descriptions hereinafter enumerated, namely:—* [*(First)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/187894963/)*— Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that death will otherwise be the consequence of such assault;* [*(Secondly)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/76243000/)*— Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehen­sion that grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such assault;* [*(Thirdly)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/107378943/)*— An assault with the intention of committing rape;* [*(Fourthly)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/37795711/)*— An assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust;* [*(Fifthly)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/142496480/)*— An assault with the intention of kidnapping or abduct­ing;* [*(Sixthly)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/40081502/)*— An assault with the intention of wrongfully confining a person, under circumstances which may reasonably cause him to apprehend that he will be unable to have recourse to the public authorities for his release.* [*(Seventhly)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/139492157/)*— An act of throwing or administering acid or an attempt to throw or administer acid which may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such act.”*[***\[11\]***](#_ftn11) Under Sec.100 of IPC, this privilege safeguards the accused whose defensive act resulted in death or grievous hurt to the assailant. *“But this Sec.100 shall be applicable if it falls under the following circumstances:* - *Assault that reasonably causes the real apprehension of death.* - *Assault that reasonably causes the real apprehension of grievous hurt.* - *Assault to commit rape.* - *Assault to gratifying lust.* - *Assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting.* - *An assault with the intention of wrongfully confining a person in the circumstances making the person not to take recourse to any public authority.* - *An act of throwing acid or attempt to administer the acid causing reasonable apprehension of grievous hurt.”*[***\[12\]***](#_ftn12) **Essentials of Sec.100 of IPC, 1860:** To utilise this right under Sec.100, the essential factors are - The defender must not be at any fault like aggression while taking the self-defence. - There must be apprehension of imminent, actual and real harm or danger. - No other means and time to take recourse to statutory authorities. - There is no other option rather than defending the attacker. #### ***Sec.101 of IPC, 1860**–* *“When such right extends to causing any harm other than death.****—* *If the offence be not of any of the descriptions enu­merated in the last preceding section, the right of private defence of the body does not extend to the voluntary causing of death to the assailant, but does extend, under the restric­tions mentioned in section 99, to the voluntary causing to the assailant of any harm other than death”*[***\[13\]***](#_ftn13)*.* This section explains that if the prohibited act cannot be brought under the factors stated in the earlier provision, the right of private defence can’t be extended to an act causing death or grievous hurt, but extends to the acts other than causing death specified under Sec.99. #### ***Sec.102 of IPC,1860**–*** *“**Commencement and continuance of the right of private defence of the body**.—* *The right of private defence of the body commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit the offence though the of­fence may not have been committed; and it continues as long as such apprehension of danger to the body continues.”*[***\[14\]***](#_ftn14) This section explains that the aforesaid privilege can be utilised as soon as the reasonable fear for the harm or injury of the act starts to exist, even if the act resulting harm was not yet committed. The self-defence can be exercised until the act inflicting harm ceases. But it is crucial that the actual attack must take place and the harm arising out of it must be immediate. #### ***Sec.103 of IPC, 1860* *–“**When the right of private defence of property extends to causing death.****—* *The right of private defence of property extends, under the restrictions mentioned in section 99, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to the wrong-doer, if the offence, the committing of which, or the attempting to commit which, occasions the exercise of the right, be an offence of any of the descriptions hereinafter enumerated, namely:—*[*(First)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/18959533/)*— Robbery;* [*(Secondly)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/194543591/)*— House-breaking by night;* [*(Thirdly)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/140301972/)*— Mischief by fire committed on any building, tent or vessel, which building, tent or vessel is used as a human dwell­ing, or as a place for the custody of property;* [*(Fourthly)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/68694017/)*— Theft, mischief, or house-trespass, under such circum­stances as may reasonably cause apprehension that death or griev­ous hurt will be the consequence, if such right of private de­fence is not exercised.”*[***\[15\]***](#_ftn15) Sec.103 of IPC, 1860 provides the right of private defence of property extending to cause death. The act done in self-defence of property within the limitations specified in Sec.99 causing death of the attacker is allowed under this provision if the act can be brought under some conditions. These circumstances include robbery, house-breaking by night, mischief by fire committed on any building, tent or vessel that is considered as a human dwelling place, mischief, theft, or house-trespass that raises a rational fear of causing death or grievous hurt. Sec. 100 of IPC explains that the aforesaid right can be used by a person to secure his or some others body, whereas Sec.103 of IPC describes about right of an individual to defend his or others property.This right cannot be exercised against the person who has the title or possession over that property. #### ***Sec.104 of IPC,1860**-“**When such right extends to causing any harm other than death.****—* *If the offence, the committing of which, or the attempt­ing to commit which, occasions the exercise of the right of private defence, be theft, mischief, or criminal trespass, not of any of the descriptions enumerated in the last preceding section, that right does not extend to the voluntary causing of death, but does extend, subject to the restrictions mentioned in section 99, to the* *voluntary causing to the wrong-doer of any harm other than death.”*[***\[16\]***](#_ftn16) According to this section, the above said right upon property cannot be extended to cause death or grievous hurt, but applied in case of theft, criminal trespass and not under any conditions mentioned in the previous provision. However, it is subjected to the limitations prescribed under Sec.99. As per Sec.104, if the defender while utilising this privilege causes death or grievous hurt of the attacker then he is liable under Sec.304 of IPC. #### ***Sec.105 of IPC,1860* *–*** *“**Commencement and continuance of the right of private defence of property.**—* *The right of private defence of property commences when a reasonable apprehension of danger to the property com­mences. The right of private defence of property against theft continues till the offender has effected his retreat with the property or either the assistance of the public authorities is obtained, or the property has been recovered. The right of private defence of property against robbery contin­ues as long as the offender causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint* *or as long as the fear of instant death or of instant hurt or of instant personal re­straint continues. The right of private defence of property against criminal tres­pass or mischief continues as long as the offender continues in the commission of criminal trespass or mischief. The right of private defence of property against house-breaking by night continues as long as the* *house-trespass which has been begun by such house-breaking continues.”*[***\[17\]***](#_ftn17) This section provides about that the commencement and continuance of right depends on the nature of the act. The time period for the privilege to be utilised and the specified acts for exercising the right are summarised as follows: - *“In the case of criminal trespass or mischief, the right of private defence continues as long as the offender is engaged in the commission of trespass or mischief.* - *In the case of robbery, the right of private defence continues as long as the offender is causing or attempting to cause death, hurt, or wrongful restraint to any person.* - *In the case of theft, the right of private defence continues until the offender has retreated with the property, until assistance from public authorities is obtained, or until the property has been recovered.* - *In the case of house-breaking by night, the right of private defence continues as long as the house trespass, which began with the act of house-breaking, continues.”*[***\[18\]***](#_ftn18) The right of private defence can be exercised only if there is no reasonable time to seek protection from statutory authorities, and once a trespasser gets the lawful possession of that property, the right of private defence can’t be exercised by the person who has the possession till then. #### ***Sec.106 of IPC,1860**–*** *“**Right of private defence against deadly assault when there is risk of harm to innocent person.**—* *If in the exercise of the right of private defence against an assault which reasonably causes the apprehension of death, the defender be so situated that he cannot effectually exercise that right without risk of harm to an innocent person, his right of private defence extends to the running of that risk.”*[***\[19\]***](#_ftn19) This provision empowers a citizen to protect himself by using this right against a group of attackers or a mob. This privilege can also be exercised by an individual even though the group consists of fault less people involving reasonable possibility of harm or injury to the defender. So causing harm to innocent people who are not involved in the attack is not a bar to the defender to save his life by exercising this right. ### **Relevant Case Laws :** - **96 of IPC –** In ***Thangavel case[\[20\]](#_ftn20)***, it is highlighted that the common proverb or principle that “necessity knows no law” cannot be applied to modern jurisprudence. It is also stated that even though the right of self defence is inherent it should not be utilised in such a way disturbing others rights. It prevents the persons from expressing their aggression against innocent people in the name of self-defence. In the case of ***Laxman Vs. State of Orissa[\[21\]](#_ftn21)****,* it was held that the aforesaid right is available only to one who is suddenly encountered with the prompt necessity of averting an imminent danger but not of his own creation. In the case of ***Gordhan Vs. State of Rajasthan[\[22\]](#_ftn22)*** , the court ruled that the plea for the right of private defence should not be readily assumed merely because the accused had suffered meagre injuries. - **97 of IPC –** **Right of private defence to be pleaded**– In the case of ***Munshi Ram Vs. Delhi Administration[\[23\]](#_ftn23)***, it is explained that generally, the accused must plead for the above said right, but even if he does not plead for self-defence, it is open to the court to consider the plea of private defence if it arises from materials on record. **In defence of person** – In the case of ***Sonelal Vs. State[\[24\]](#_ftn24)****,* the Apex Court held that the right of private defence begins when there is reasonable apprehension about the injury to the human body. In the case of ***Kishan Vs. State of M.P.[\[25\]](#_ftn25)***, the court decided that Mere intimidation will not constitute a valid ground for the exercise of the right of private defence and to use this privilege he should not be an aggressor. **In defence of property**-The Supreme Court in the case of ***State of U.P. Vs. Niyami[\[26\]](#_ftn26)***, ruled that the aforesaid right is used not only to protect oneself but also for securing the body or property of others. - **99 of IPC –** In the case of ***Emperor Vs. Mammun[\[27\]](#_ftn27)***, a group of five individuals armed with weapons, who were accused in the present case, attacked a person who was cutting rice from their field, consequently, he got severely injured and died. The accused pleaded for the right of private defence, but the court dismissed it on the ground that there is a reasonable time to seek protection from police authorities under Sec.99. - **100 of IPC –** In the case of ***State of Orissa Vs. Nirupama panda[\[28\]](#_ftn28)***, there was a quarrel took place between the accused and the deceased as he entered her house to rape her, consequently, she stabbed him and he died. The accused pleaded for the right of private defence and the court held she was not guilty of the offence. - **102 of IPC-** In the case of ***Sitaram Vs. Emperor[\[29\]](#_ftn29),*** the court decided that the person could exercise this defensive right until he finds himself secured from danger. - **103 of IPC-** In the case of ***Jagan Ram Vs. State[\[30\]](#_ftn30)***, the court ruled that the defender need not be the owner of the property in order to use this privilege, however the same can’t be pleaded when the act is done under aggression. ### **New Legislation in the recent period :** Recently the **Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita** bill was passed by the Parliament in December, 2023 and it also received the President’s assent and was enacted in December, 2023. This Act will come into force from 1st July, 2024. This new Criminal Act replaces the Indian Penal Code which was enacted in 1860. After coming into force, this new act governs the offences, punishments, and exceptions in India. **Chapter-3** of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, deals with the General Exceptions. Under this part of General Exceptions, the right of private of defence is covered from **Sec.34 to 44**. ### **CONCLUSION-** In my opinion, this right of private defence can be considered like armour granted to the citizens by Indian Penal Code, 1860. But in this exercise of this right, the citizens must also be aware of its limitations so that the misuse of the privilege can be mitigated. The concept of “self-help is the best help” that a person can do to himself is strongly reflected in the concept defensive right. There are some determining factors like reasonable apprehension of real harm or imminent danger by an attacker, no reasonable time to take recourse to the statutory authorities, and act should not be performed under aggression to use the aforesaid right. So, this right should be effectively utilised by the Indian citizens for defending themselves or their property or that of others. However, there are some difficulties in determining the case under this right, the proportionate force should be used while protecting and whether the act was performed in good faith or not. In spite of all this, the right of private defence is a good right granted to the people for their self-defence. ### **REFERENCES-** 1. **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred :** 1. N.V.Paranjape, Indian Penal Code ,p.no.143(Central Law Publications, 4th edition, Prayagraj, 2019). - S.N.Misra, Indian Penal Code, p.no.214 and 219 (Central Law Publications,12th edition, Allahabad,2004). 2. **Online Articles / Sources Referred :** 1. 2. 3. 4. 3. **Cases Referred :** 1. Thangavel Case. 2. Laxman Vs. State of Orissa, AIR 1988 SC 83. 3. Gordhan Vs. State of Rajasthan, 1987 Cri.L.J.541(Raj.) 4. Munshi Ram Vs. Delhi Administration, AIR 1968 SC 702 5. Sonelal Vs. State, AIR 1981 SC 1379 6. Kishan Vs. State of M.P. , AIR 1975 SC 244 7. State of U.P. Vs. Niyami , AIR 1987 SC 1652 8. Emperor Vs. Mammun Case. 9. State of Orissa Vs. Nirupama Panda , 1989 CRILJ 621. 10. Sitaram Vs. Emperor, 1973 SC 473 11. Jagan Ram Vs. State, 2014 CrLJ NOC 483. 4. **Statutes Referred :** 1. Indian Penal Code,1860 [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) *Private Defence in IPC*. (2023, June 24). LawBhoomi. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://lawbhoomi.com/private-defence-in-ipc/ [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Principles of the Penal Code, p.269 [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) *Art.51(1)(a)*. (n.d.). Indiankannon. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/854952/ [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) *Indian Penal Code,1860*. (n.d.). Indiankannon. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/777353/ [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) *Indian Penal Code,1860*. (n.d.). Indiankannon. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1499794/ [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) *Indian Penal Code,1860*. (n.d.). Indiankannon. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1159920/ [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) *Private Defences in IPC,1860*. (2023, June 24). LawBhoomi. Retrieved March 13, 2024, from https://lawbhoomi.com/private-defence-in-ipc/ [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) *Indian Penal Code,1860*. (n.d.). Indiankannon. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/650803/ [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) *Indian Penal Code ,1860*. (2023, June 24). LawBhoomi. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://lawbhoomi.com/private-defence-in-ipc/ [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) *Indian Penal Code,1860*. (n.d.). Indiankannon. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1180351/ [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) *Indian Penal Code,1860*. (n.d.). Indiankannon. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/714464/ [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) *Private Defences in IPC,1860*. (2023, June 24). LawBhoomi. Retrieved March 13, 2024, from https://lawbhoomi.com/private-defence-in-ipc/ [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) *Indian Penal Code,1860*. (n.d.). Indiankannon. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/399205/ [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) *Indian Penal Code,1860*. (n.d.). Indiankannon. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1985227/ [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) *Indian Penal Code,1860*. (n.d.). Indiankannon. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/860501/ [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) *Indian Penal Code,1860*. (n.d.). Indiankannon. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1409246/ [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) *Indian Penal Code,1860*. (n.d.). Indiankannon. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1944062/ [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) *Indian Penal Code,1860*. (2023, June 24). LawBhoomi. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://lawbhoomi.com/private-defence-in-ipc/ [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) *Indian Penal Code ,1860*. (n.d.). Indiankannon. Retrieved March 4, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1606852/ [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) *Thangavel Case*. (2023, June 24). LawBhoomi. Retrieved March 5, 2024, from https://lawbhoomi.com/private-defence-in-ipc/ [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) AIR 1988 SC 83 [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) 1987 Cri. L.J. 541 (Raj.) [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) AIR 1968 SC 702 [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) AIR 1981 SC 1379 [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) AIR 1975 SC 244 [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) AIR 1987 SC 1652 [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) *Emperor vs. Mammun Case*. (2023, June 24). LawBhoomi. Retrieved March 5, 2024, from https://lawbhoomi.com/private-defence-in-ipc/ [\[28\]](#_ftnref28) 1989 CRILJ 621 [\[29\]](#_ftnref29) 1973 SC 473 [\[30\]](#_ftnref30) 2014 CriLJ NOC 483 **Categories:** Articles --- ### [REMEDIES AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE UNDER PROTECTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT,2005](https://lawfoyer.in/remedies-against-domestic-violence-under-protection-of-domestic-violence-act2005/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Choppali Venkata Kalyani, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar College of Law, Andhra University

INTRODUCTION:

Simply, this act is called (DV) Domestic violence. It is not a social issue; doubtlessly, it considered as a violation of fundamental rights. Here, Right to life and personal liberty, ,Right to speech and expression  of the Indian Constitution are infringed. This act has 37 sections; it came into force on 26 October 2006. From Ancient days, it has existed in society. Women from every social background, disregarding of their religion, caste, or class, are victims of domestic violence. Most people think that it was not there in the society, but it is invisible. Mostly victims are coming from villages when compared to cities, a tiny of cases are reported. Married women face this kind of violence more than normal women. Lack of education and poverty are the main causes. In India, 30% of people are facing this Issue .The Vienna Accord of 1994 and Beijing Declaration of 1995 have suggested. When a woman is experienced to cruelty by her husband or relatives, it is considered an illegal/unlawful act. In order to protect women from domestic violence in society, the United Nations recommended the Committee on Convention and Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) suggested the act. It is responsibility to every state to safeguard female from this act. Then government introduced this act. This act provides remedies, medical facilities, shelter homes, and protection to the victims. It appoints service providers and protection officers to take care of the petitioners. It is a civil law. sections 18,19,20,21,22,23 speaks about remedies. Keywords(Minimum 5): Domestic Violence Women Fundamental rights Physical abuse Remedies Husband cruelty Human Rights

Meaning of Domestic violence:

When a woman is experienced to cruelty by her husband or relatives of her husband, it is called as domestic violence. It refers when one mate tries to take control of the other spouse, telling them what to wear, how to wear it, and where to go. It is also called as 'intimate partner violence.' It is a forcibly  action that happens inside the home  can apply to women, mothers, daughters, women those who are  in living relationships, and those in long-standing relationships with sex workers.

Definition of Domestic violence:

(a)Section 3 of the Domestic violence Act, 2005 defines as follows- Section 3 of DV speaks about it forms:
  • PHYSICAL ABUSE:
Any act which is done by a defendant against petitioner which must cause bodily pain, harm, endanger the life of the aggrieved person /likely to do it includes assault, criminal intimidation, criminal force.
  • SEXUAL ABUSE:
If anything done by a respondent against the petitioner which insults the character of women or violates the dignity of a woman it comes under sexual abuse.
  • VERBAL ABUSEAND EMOTIONAL ABUSE:
If any action done by the respondent /humiliates the woman and repeatedly he spoke about not to having a male child, if he creating any threat against petitioner /any person whom the petitioner is intrested.
  • ECONOMICAL ABUSE:
Destitution of all or economic, financial to which the aggrieved person is entitled. Throwing away the household effects any property whether it is movable /immovable, shares, fixed deposits which are belongs to the aggrieved person. Banning to continued access to facilities which are available to the aggrieved person which includes the shared house hold.
  1. Historical Background / Evolution:
In ancient days there is no separate act, remedies, legislations it is considered as a criminal law in previous days there is a relief in Indian Penal Code 1860 Section 498A speaks about cruelty by husband, it is considered as a civil law.
  1. Comparison with other Countries :
It is a universal problem faced by all over the world regardless their caste, creed, religion etc. The UN conducted a survey and revealed that it exists in 71 countries. It is a common problem in the United States, with one in four women and one in nine men meet domestic violence with their spouses. The US government has enacted the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) for the protection of women from this social Evil .In the UK, two million adults experienced per year. They have also implemented laws for protection. The main causes of this are poverty, lack of education, and lack of understanding between partners. Causes : The main causes of DV are lack of education, poverty, misunderstandings between the spouses, societal attitude towards gender roles, mental health issues, substance abuse, lack of stringent punishments, cultural and social factors, dowry, alcoholism, historical causes, low IQ, etc.
  1. Forms :
 Section 3 of DV speaks about it forms:
  • PHYSICAL ABUSE:
Any act which is done by a defendant against petitioner which must cause bodily pain, harm, endanger the life of the aggrieved person /likely to do it includes assault, criminal intimidation, criminal force.
  • SEXUAL ABUSE:
If anything done by a respondent against the petitioner which insults the character of women or violates the dignity of a woman it comes under sexual abuse.
  • VERBAL ABUSEAND EMOTIONAL ABUSE:
If any action done by the respondent /humiliates the woman and repeatedly he spoke about not to having a male child, if he creating any threat against petitioner /any person whom the petitioner is intrested.
  • ECONOMICAL ABUSE:
Destitution of all or economic, financial to which the aggrieved person is entitled. Throwing away the household effects any property whether it is movable /immovable, shares, fixed deposits which are belongs to the aggrieved person. Banning to continued access to facilities which are available to the aggrieved person which includes the shared house hold.
  1. Legal Provisions and interpretations:
According to section 5 of the this act the aggrieved person can file a suit to claim which type of remedies are available to her like compensatory orders, monetary reliefs , protection orders, custody orders, residence orders. Section 18 protection order: If the court is satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, then the forum issues the protection order in favour of the aggrieved person. The magistrate gives a warning to the respondent that they are banned from certain actions: (a) performing any type of domestic violence, (b) assisting in acts of domestic violence, (c) the respondent does not have a chance to enter the  victims home, (d) the respondent should not communicate with the petitioner, (e) the respondent should not separate the property, bank lockers, or cheques that belong to the aggrieved person, and (f) the respondent should not cause any harm to the petitioners relatives .Case law: Smt.Rinamukharjee&Ors.v.state of West Bengal &Anr.AIR 2009(NOC)2841 (cal)[1] Section19 Residence orders:The magistrate can grant a residence order in favour of the aggrieved person. (a) stop the respondent from depriving the property which belongs to both. (b) The court commanded respondent to remove himself from the shared household. (c) The court directed the respondent should not enter the premise[2]s of the victim's home or any relatives of the victim. Not only this, the court imposes additional directions prohibiting certain actions against the petitioner as mentioned in the above section. Case law:Rakesh vs Rajnesh @Manto,2011(4) WLC (Raj) 21 Section 20 Monetary reliefs: The court may directed the respondent to pay monetary relief to meet the expenses which are occurred due to the act of domestic violence by the respondent, He should pay the compensation in the following cases:
  • if the petitioner lost their employment because of the domestic violence caused by the respondent, the replier should pay the expenses,
  • The petitioner should pay the medical expenses,
  • The loss happened because of the petitioner,
  • The respondent should pay the maintenance according to the section 12 of CRPC.
  • The monetary relief granted by the court it should be sufficient, equitable and reasonable.
  • The payments should pay by monthly basis, lumpsum, yearly basis.
  • The respondent should pay the expenses /maintenances under sub section(1).
  • If the respondent failed to pay the monetary relief which was granted by the court then the forum, ordered the employer of the replier and the salary was given to the aggrieved person/magistrate.
Case law:Rajesh kumarvs.safurabai&ors.AIR2009(NOC)813(chh.)[3] Section 21 Custody orders: The court provides the custody order for the child. If the respondent requests the magistrate during the hearing, then the magistrate may pass the order for visitation with the children. If such meet is dangerous to the children or petitioner, the forum can refuse such visits at any time. Case law:oliver Menezes v.Seritatheresemathias (2021) Section 22. Compensation orders: Furthermore the compensation order should be granted by the court application being made by the petitioner , the respondent should pay compensation, damages and injuries which are caused by the respondent.
  1. Power to grant interim and ex parte orders.—(1) “In any proceeding before him under this Act, the Magistrate may pass such interim order as he deems just and proper.
 (2) If the Magistrate is satisfied that an application prima facie discloses that the respondent is committing, or has committed an act of domestic violence or that there is a likelihood that the respondent may commit an act of domestic violence, he may grant an ex parte order on the basis of the affidavit in such form, as may be prescribed, of the aggrieved person under section18, section 19, section 20, section 21 or, as the case may be, section 22 against the respondent”.[4] What is said in Section 23? If the court is satisfied that the application being made under Section 12 is proper, then the court can pass the interim order/ex parte order. If the court is satisfied that an act of domestic violence has really been done, then the court can pass the ex parte order/interim order against the respondent. Case law: Abhijit Bhikaseth Auti vs. state of maharastra&Anr.AIR 2009 (NOC) 808 (bom.)[5]
  • Essentials :
There should be control over the other spouse. (2) It includes a pattern of abusive Behaviour over the spouse by the respondent. (3) The respondent tries to gain power over the other spouse in a domestic relationship. (4) Both spouses should be in a domestic relationship; what type of  requirements are included in section 2(f) of the DV Act, 2005.

Case Laws :

(1)V.D. Bhanot vs. Savitha bhanot ,(2012): In the above case, they got married in the year 1980. The   wife ran off from her marital home. The respondent filed a suit under Section 12 of the DV Act. The magistrate granted interim relief to the replier, and the forum passed protection orders under Section 18. Again, the husband filed a suit to remove his wife from his quarters. The court room said that she has to reside on the 2nd floor while she is living on the 1st floor. The opinion of the bench did not satisfy the respondent. Therefore, she went for an appeal in the High Court, but the application was denied by the Sessions Court because the marriage was solemnized in 1980, while this act came into effect in 2005, and it does not have retrospective effect. Finally, the court of law held that the main intention of the act was to protect women from domestic violence, so the judgment was given in favour of the litigant. (2) Bibi parwanakhatoon vs. State of bihar,(2017) In this case, the wife died by being set on fire by her husband and her in-laws due to dowry demands. The suit was filed by the wife's family members against the husband and in-laws. According to the circumstances of the case, the High Court ruled in favour of the husband and in-laws. Again, the victim's sister-in-law appealed to the Supreme Court. Can “Neither it be proven, based on circumstantial evidence, that the Appellants had any common intention with the deceased’s spouse in the commission of the crime.formerly resided in a separate village.” Furthermore, it is abundantly obvious from the documented evidence.” (3) Inder raj malik vs. Sunitha  Malik(1986) Here, the wife has been ill-treated by her husband and mothers-in-law during festival days. They ordered the appellant to bring more and more money and items as dowry, and they tortured her especially during festivals. They demanded that she sell her property. The victims' relatives then filed a petition, and the court decided that, according to Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, and Section 498A of the IPC, the respondent is held guilty.

Amendments:

The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act was enforced by the parliament on October 26, 2006. Later, it was introduced by the parliament in the year 2022 but it remains as a bill. So, there have been no amendments to this act.

Statistical Analysis :

In India, 32% of married women are victims of domestic violence (sexual abuse 6%, verbal abuse, emotional abuse 14%) by their husbands during their lifetime. West Bengal state reported the highest number of cases of cruelty against women by their husbands in 2021, according to the NCB.

Future Implications:

There should be implications and formulations in the Domestic Violence Act of 2005. Even though we have stringent punishments, domestic violence is happening in society. We need to amend certain provisions in the DV Act of 2005. The punishments should be more stringent. There are many unreported cases; therefore, there should be a committee/commission to scrutinize the rural areas, because most domestic violence cases are reported in rural areas compared to urban areas.

CONCLUSION& COMMENTS:

I think this act has been working well in both rural and urban areas. When compared to urban areas, it must be formulated better in the rural areas. The remedies available to women, like monetary, compensatory, custody, should be implemented properly. The duties of the protection officers were not adequate; in fact, they are working really hard. The service providers' duty was very good. But the provisions of this act have been misused by some women in society, so I would like to determine if there are real victims or not. Some of the women are seeking revenge on their husbands by using the provisions of this act.

REFERENCES

  1. Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred
    1. bare act published  by the commercials law publishers (INDIA) pvt.ltd
    2. Crimes against women and children.
    3. Editors: Asha Shukla
    4. Jaya phooka
    5. Publications serials publications Pvt ltd.newdelhi ( India)
    6. 2015
    7. Law relating to women
  2. Online Articles / Sources Referred:
    1. https://blog.ipleaders.in/the-protection-of-women-from-domestic-violence-act-2005/
    2. https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/15436/1/protection_of_women_from_domestic_violence_act%2C_2005.pdf
    3. https://thelawcommunicants.com/domestic-violence-in-the-uk-usa-russia/v
    4. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10403108/#:~:text=In%20India%2C%2032%25%20of%20ever,%2C%20and%20sexual%20(6%25)
  1. Cases Referred:
  • rinamukharjee&Ors.v.state of westbengal&Anr.AIR 2009(NOC)2841 (cal)
  • Rakesh vs rajnesh @Manto,2011(4) WLC (Raj) 21
  • Rajesh kumarvs.safurabai&ors.AIR2009(NOC)813(chh.)
(4) oliver Menezes v.Seritatheresemathias (2021)
  • AbhijitBhikasethAuti vs. state of maharastra & Anr.AIR 2009 (NOC) 808 (bom.)
  • d. bhanot vs. savithabhanot ,(2012):
  • rajeshkumar&others vs.The state of up,2017.
(8) Bibi parwana khatoon vs. State of bihar,(2017)
  • inder raj malikvs.sunita malik(1986)
Statutes Referred :
    1. Domestic Violence Act,2005.
    2. Domestic Violence rules,2006.
    3. Code of Criminal procedure,1973.
    4. Indian Penal Code,1860.
[1]AIR 2009(NOC)2841 (cal)[1] [2] 2011(4) WLC (Raj) 21 [3] AIR 2009(NOC)813(chh.)[3] [4]https://indiankanoon.org/doc/207919/ [5]AIR 2009 (NOC) 808 (bom.)[5] **Content:** **Author-Choppali Venkata Kalyani, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar College of Law, Andhra University** ### **INTRODUCTION:** Simply, this act is called (DV) Domestic violence. It is not a social issue; doubtlessly, it considered as a violation of fundamental rights. Here, Right to life and personal liberty, ,Right to speech and expression of the Indian Constitution are infringed. This act has 37 sections; it came into force on 26 October 2006. From Ancient days, it has existed in society. Women from every social background, disregarding of their religion, caste, or class, are victims of domestic violence. Most people think that it was not there in the society, but it is invisible. Mostly victims are coming from villages when compared to cities, a tiny of cases are reported. Married women face this kind of violence more than normal women. Lack of education and poverty are the main causes. In India, 30% of people are facing this Issue .The Vienna Accord of 1994 and Beijing Declaration of 1995 have suggested. When a woman is experienced to cruelty by her husband or relatives, it is considered an illegal/unlawful act. In order to protect women from domestic violence in society, the United Nations recommended the Committee on Convention and Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) suggested the act. It is responsibility to every state to safeguard female from this act. Then government introduced this act. This act provides remedies, medical facilities, shelter homes, and protection to the victims. It appoints service providers and protection officers to take care of the petitioners. It is a civil law. sections 18,19,20,21,22,23 speaks about remedies. ***Keywords(Minimum 5)*:** Domestic Violence Women Fundamental rights Physical abuse Remedies Husband cruelty Human Rights ### **Meaning of Domestic violence:** When a woman is experienced to cruelty by her husband or relatives of her husband, it is called as domestic violence. It refers when one mate tries to take control of the other spouse, telling them what to wear, how to wear it, and where to go. It is also called as ‘intimate partner violence.’ It is a forcibly action that happens inside the home can apply to women, mothers, daughters, women those who are in living relationships, and those in long-standing relationships with sex workers. ### **Definition of Domestic violence:** **(a)Section** 3 **of the Domestic violence Act, 2005 defines as follows-** Section 3 of DV speaks about it forms: - PHYSICAL ABUSE: Any act which is done by a defendant against petitioner which must cause bodily pain, harm, endanger the life of the aggrieved person /likely to do it includes assault, criminal intimidation, criminal force. - SEXUAL ABUSE: If anything done by a respondent against the petitioner which insults the character of women or violates the dignity of a woman it comes under sexual abuse. - VERBAL ABUSEAND EMOTIONAL ABUSE: If any action done by the respondent /humiliates the woman and repeatedly he spoke about not to having a male child, if he creating any threat against petitioner /any person whom the petitioner is intrested. - ECONOMICAL ABUSE: Destitution of all or economic, financial to which the aggrieved person is entitled. Throwing away the household effects any property whether it is movable /immovable, shares, fixed deposits which are belongs to the aggrieved person. Banning to continued access to facilities which are available to the aggrieved person which includes the shared house hold. 2. **Historical Background / Evolution:** In ancient days there is no separate act, remedies, legislations it is considered as a criminal law in previous days there is a relief in Indian Penal Code 1860 Section 498A speaks about cruelty by husband, it is considered as a civil law. 3. **Comparison with other Countries :** It is a universal problem faced by all over the world regardless their caste, creed, religion etc. The UN conducted a survey and revealed that it exists in 71 countries. It is a common problem in the United States, with one in four women and one in nine men meet domestic violence with their spouses. The US government has enacted the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) for the protection of women from this social Evil .In the UK, two million adults experienced per year. They have also implemented laws for protection. The main causes of this are poverty, lack of education, and lack of understanding between partners. **Causes :** The main causes of DV are lack of education, poverty, misunderstandings between the spouses, societal attitude towards gender roles, mental health issues, substance abuse, lack of stringent punishments, cultural and social factors, dowry, alcoholism, historical causes, low IQ, etc. 4. **Forms :** **Section 3 of DV** speaks about it forms: - PHYSICAL ABUSE: Any act which is done by a defendant against petitioner which must cause bodily pain, harm, endanger the life of the aggrieved person /likely to do it includes assault, criminal intimidation, criminal force. - SEXUAL ABUSE: If anything done by a respondent against the petitioner which insults the character of women or violates the dignity of a woman it comes under sexual abuse. - VERBAL ABUSEAND EMOTIONAL ABUSE: If any action done by the respondent /humiliates the woman and repeatedly he spoke about not to having a male child, if he creating any threat against petitioner /any person whom the petitioner is intrested. - ECONOMICAL ABUSE: Destitution of all or economic, financial to which the aggrieved person is entitled. Throwing away the household effects any property whether it is movable /immovable, shares, fixed deposits which are belongs to the aggrieved person. Banning to continued access to facilities which are available to the aggrieved person which includes the shared house hold. 5. **Legal Provisions and interpretations:** According to section 5 of the this act the aggrieved person can file a suit to claim which type of remedies are available to her like compensatory orders, monetary reliefs , protection orders, custody orders, residence orders. **Section 18 protection order:** If the court is satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, then the forum issues the protection order in favour of the aggrieved person. The magistrate gives a warning to the respondent that they are banned from certain actions: (a) performing any type of domestic violence, (b) assisting in acts of domestic violence, (c) the respondent does not have a chance to enter the victims home, (d) the respondent should not communicate with the petitioner, (e) the respondent should not separate the property, bank lockers, or cheques that belong to the aggrieved person, and (f) the respondent should not cause any harm to the petitioners relatives .**Case law: Smt.Rinamukharjee&Ors.v.state of West Bengal &Anr.AIR 2009(NOC)2841 (cal)[\[1\]](#_ftn1)** **Section19 Residence orders:**The magistrate can grant a residence order in favour of the aggrieved person. (a) stop the respondent from depriving the property which belongs to both. (b) The court commanded respondent to remove himself from the shared household. (c) The court directed the respondent should not enter the premise[\[2\]](#_ftn2)s of the victim’s home or any relatives of the victim. Not only this, the court imposes additional directions prohibiting certain actions against the petitioner as mentioned in the above section. **Case law:Rakesh vs Rajnesh @Manto,2011(4) WLC (Raj) 21** ***Section*** **20 Monetary reliefs:** The court may directed the respondent to pay monetary relief to meet the expenses which are occurred due to the act of domestic violence by the respondent, He should pay the compensation in the following cases: - if the petitioner lost their employment because of the domestic violence caused by the respondent, the replier should pay the expenses, - The petitioner should pay the medical expenses, - The loss happened because of the petitioner, - The respondent should pay the maintenance according to the section 12 of CRPC. - The monetary relief granted by the court it should be sufficient, equitable and reasonable. - The payments should pay by monthly basis, lumpsum, yearly basis. - The respondent should pay the expenses /maintenances under sub section(1). - If the respondent failed to pay the monetary relief which was granted by the court then the forum, ordered the employer of the replier and the salary was given to the aggrieved person/magistrate. **Case law:Rajesh kumarvs.safurabai&ors.AIR2009(NOC)813(chh.)[\[3\]](#_ftn3)** **Section** **21 Custody orders:** The court provides the custody order for the child. If the respondent requests the magistrate during the hearing, then the magistrate may pass the order for visitation with the children. If such meet is dangerous to the children or petitioner, the forum can refuse such visits at any time. **Case law:oliver Menezes v.Seritatheresemathias (2021)** **Section** **22. Compensation orders:** Furthermore the compensation order should be granted by the court application being made by the petitioner , the respondent should pay compensation, damages and injuries which are caused by the respondent. 23. *Power to grant interim and ex parte orders.—(1) “In any proceeding before him under this Act, the Magistrate may pass such interim order as he deems just and proper.* *(2) If the Magistrate is satisfied that an application prima facie discloses that the respondent is committing, or has committed an act of domestic violence or that there is a likelihood that the respondent may commit an act of domestic violence, he may grant an ex parte order on the basis of the affidavit in such form, as may be prescribed, of the aggrieved person under section18, section 19, section 20, section 21 or, as the case may be, section 22 against the respondent”.[**\[4\]**](#_ftn4)* What is said in Section 23? If the court is satisfied that the application being made under Section 12 is proper, then the court can pass the interim order/ex parte order. If the court is satisfied that an act of domestic violence has really been done, then the court can pass the ex parte order/interim order against the respondent. **Case law: Abhijit Bhikaseth Auti vs. state of maharastra&Anr.AIR 2009 (NOC) 808 (bom.)[\[5\]](#_ftn5)** - **Essentials :** There should be control over the other spouse. (2) It includes a pattern of abusive Behaviour over the spouse by the respondent. (3) The respondent tries to gain power over the other spouse in a domestic relationship. (4) Both spouses should be in a domestic relationship; what type of requirements are included in section 2(f) of the DV Act, 2005. ### **Case Laws :** **(1)V.D. Bhanot vs. Savitha bhanot ,(2012):** In the above case, they got married in the year 1980. The wife ran off from her marital home. The respondent filed a suit under Section 12 of the DV Act. The magistrate granted interim relief to the replier, and the forum passed protection orders under Section 18. Again, the husband filed a suit to remove his wife from his quarters. The court room said that she has to reside on the 2nd floor while she is living on the 1st floor. The opinion of the bench did not satisfy the respondent. Therefore, she went for an appeal in the High Court, but the application was denied by the Sessions Court because the marriage was solemnized in 1980, while this act came into effect in 2005, and it does not have retrospective effect. Finally, the court of law held that the main intention of the act was to protect women from domestic violence, so the judgment was given in favour of the litigant. **(2) Bibi parwanakhatoon vs. State of bihar,(2017)** In this case, the wife died by being set on fire by her husband and her in-laws due to dowry demands. The suit was filed by the wife’s family members against the husband and in-laws. According to the circumstances of the case, the High Court ruled in favour of the husband and in-laws. Again, the victim’s sister-in-law appealed to the Supreme Court. Can *“Neither it be proven, based on circumstantial evidence, that the Appellants had any common intention with the deceased’s spouse in the commission of the crime.formerly resided in a separate village.” Furthermore, it is abundantly obvious from the documented evidence.”* **(3) Inder raj malik vs. Sunitha Malik(1986)** Here, the wife has been ill-treated by her husband and mothers-in-law during festival days. They ordered the appellant to bring more and more money and items as dowry, and they tortured her especially during festivals. They demanded that she sell her property. The victims’ relatives then filed a petition, and the court decided that, according to Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, and Section 498A of the IPC, the respondent is held guilty. ### **Amendments:** The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act was enforced by the parliament on October 26, 2006. Later, it was introduced by the parliament in the year 2022 but it remains as a bill. So, there have been no amendments to this act. ### **Statistical Analysis :** In India, 32% of married women are victims of domestic violence (sexual abuse 6%, verbal abuse, emotional abuse 14%) by their husbands during their lifetime. West Bengal state reported the highest number of cases of cruelty against women by their husbands in 2021, according to the NCB**.** ### **Future Implications:** There should be implications and formulations in the Domestic Violence Act of 2005. Even though we have stringent punishments, domestic violence is happening in society. We need to amend certain provisions in the DV Act of 2005. The punishments should be more stringent. There are many unreported cases; therefore, there should be a committee/commission to scrutinize the rural areas, because most domestic violence cases are reported in rural areas compared to urban areas. ### **CONCLUSION& COMMENTS:** I think this act has been working well in both rural and urban areas. When compared to urban areas, it must be formulated better in the rural areas. The remedies available to women, like monetary, compensatory, custody, should be implemented properly. The duties of the protection officers were not adequate; in fact, they are working really hard. The service providers’ duty was very good. But the provisions of this act have been misused by some women in society, so I would like to determine if there are real victims or not. Some of the women are seeking revenge on their husbands by using the provisions of this act. ### **REFERENCES** 1. **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** 1. bare act published by the commercials law publishers (INDIA) pvt.ltd 2. Crimes against women and children. 3. Editors: Asha Shukla 4. Jaya phooka 5. Publications serials publications Pvt ltd.newdelhi ( India) 6. 2015 7. Law relating to women 2. **Online Articles / Sources Referred:** 1. 2. [https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/15436/1/protection\_of\_women\_from\_domestic\_violence\_act%2C\_2005.pdf](https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/15436/1/protection_of_women_from_domestic_violence_act%2C_2005.pdf) 3. 4. 3. **Cases Referred:** - rinamukharjee&Ors.v.state of westbengal&Anr.AIR 2009(NOC)2841 (cal) - Rakesh vs rajnesh @Manto,2011(4) WLC (Raj) 21 - Rajesh kumarvs.safurabai&ors.AIR2009(NOC)813(chh.) (4) oliver Menezes v.Seritatheresemathias (2021) - AbhijitBhikasethAuti vs. state of maharastra & Anr.AIR 2009 (NOC) 808 (bom.) - d. bhanot vs. savithabhanot ,(2012): - rajeshkumar&others vs.The state of up,2017. (8) Bibi parwana khatoon vs. State of bihar,(2017) - inder raj malikvs.sunita malik(1986) **Statutes Referred :** 1. 2005. Domestic Violence Act,2005. 2006. Domestic Violence rules,2006. 2007. Code of Criminal procedure,1973. 2008. Indian Penal Code,1860. [\[1\]](#_ftnref1)AIR 2009(NOC)2841 (cal)\[1\] [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) 2011(4) WLC (Raj) 21 [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) AIR 2009(NOC)813(chh.)\[3\] [*\[4\]*](#_ftnref4)*https://indiankanoon.org/doc/207919/* [\[5\]](#_ftnref5)AIR 2009 (NOC) 808 (bom.)\[5\] **Categories:** Articles --- ### [CRIMINOLOGY: MEANING, DEFINITION, PROVISION, PRINCIPLES AND IMPORTANT CASES](https://lawfoyer.in/criminology-meaning-definition-provision-principles-and-important-cases/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Hiteishi Sharma, Smt. KG Shah Law School/SNDT University

INTRODUCTION

The field of Criminology primarily deals with understanding the characteristics, causes, and consequences of criminal behaviour, as well as the creation, assessment and evaluation of criminal justice policies and systems. Criminology and criminal justice are related fields that share some commonalities, but they have distinct focuses and approaches. Criminology primarily involves studying the underlying factors that contribute to crime, whereas criminal justice is more concerned with the systems and processes that address crime. Criminology involves developing theories to explain crime and its causes; criminal justice applies these theories into practice. Keywords (Minimum 5): Crime, legal maxims, Sections, Practice, Criminals, Reports, Victims,

Definition &Meaning

“Criminology is the analysis of the nature of crime, the perpetrators of crime, the causes of crime, the formulation of criminal laws and law enforcement and the ways that crime can be controlled[1]”

Nature

Different aspects often intertwine and complement each other in the pursuit of understanding crime and criminal behaviour:
  • Interdisciplinary: Criminology draws from various disciplines such as sociology, law, psychology, biology, economics, and anthropology, as each offers unique perspectives and insights into the complexities of crime and criminal behaviour.
  • Empirical: Empirical research is crucial in criminology, as it involves gathering real-world data and evidence to study criminal behaviour and the criminal justice system. This approach enables criminologists to identify patterns, test theories, and develop evidence-based policies and interventions.
  • Applied: Criminological research is often applied to real-world problems, aiming to improve public safety, inform criminal justice policies, and reduce recidivism.

Scope

Criminology is a complex and multifaceted field as it aims to understand the criminal behaviour its causes, and consequences. It also focuses on finding solutions to prevent and control crime. Here are three main areas mentioned below:
  • Causality of Crime: It involves examining the factors that contribute to criminal behaviour, such as biological, psychological, social, and environmental influences.
  • Penal System: Criminology looks after the functions of the criminal justice system, encompassing aspects of law enforcement, courts, and correctional facilities. It includes understanding the effectiveness of various policies and practices, such as probation and rehabilitation programs. Their goal is to improve the penal system and to make it more efficient, fair, and humane.
  • Criminal Reform and Crime Prevention: A significant part of criminology is dedicated to finding ways to prevent crime and reform criminals. This includes developing and implementing crime prevention strategies, such as community policing, education, and awareness programs.
  • Importance of criminology
  • Diminish criminality: "A disease known is half cured[2]". Criminology assesses the mindsets of criminals to understand the reasons behind their actions, and various factors that influence them. By understanding the reasons behind criminal behaviour, criminologists can develop effective strategies to potentially deter individuals from engaging in criminal activities, and appropriately allocate resource for crime control.
  • Reforms of criminals: Criminology indeed plays a significant role in developing effective rehabilitation programs for individuals who have committed crimes. Criminologist design tailored treatment plans that focus on reformation and rehabilitation. This ultimately contributes to reducing recidivism rates and helps to reintegrate criminals back in society and lead law abiding lives.
  • Reduction in crime: Studying crime is a crucial aspect of understanding its underlying factors and contributing elements. By analysing these causes, criminologists can aid policy makers develop more effective crime reduction policies and initiatives that address the root cause of crime, ultimately promoting a safer society.
  • Enhancing the Criminal Justice System: By examining various components of the system, like law enforcement, courts, prisons, rehabilitation programs, etc. criminologists help identify areas of improvement, develop efficient and fair methods, and promote fairness, fostering public trust and ensuring justice is both served and perceived as fair.
  • Criminological Theories
  • Demonic Perspective
Also known as the "Demonic Possession Theory", this was the very first theory of criminology, and was the only theory till the 17th century. People believed that crime was caused, not as a result of one's free will, but by supernatural forces, such as demonic possession. Extreme measures (torture/death) were carried out, in public, in the belief it would erase any trace of demonic influence, and re-align the community with God. A well-known case that involves demonic possession as a potential explanation for crime is the infamous case of the "Devil's Disciple" - Albert Fish was a notorious American serial killer, who admitted to committing heinous crimes such as child kidnapping, sexual assault, homicide, and cannibalism. He felt that he was controlled by demons, which led to his appalling behaviour
  • Classical Theory (Cesare Beccaria, 1764)
This hypothesis proposes that people endeavour to enhance their personal well-being, and reduce discomfort. They would abstain from engaging in criminal activities solely if the punishment was prompt, definite and stringent. For example, if the punishment for stealing a vehicle is severe enough, a potential thief would most likely not steal it. But if the punishment is perceived as too lenient, the individual might be more inclined to commit theft.
  • Positivist Theory (Cesare Lombroso, 1876)
Lombroso contended that minds of criminal are formed by heredity, and these individuals could be identified by physical characteristics and imperfection, i.e., people committed crimes because they were so called "genetic throwbacks" (this  is similar to racial profiling, which currently is present in the media and entertainment, wherein people of a certain skin colour are generally shown as criminals or "the bad guys").
  • Anomie Theory and Strain Theory (Merton, Rosenfeld & Messner, 1938)
The Anomie Theory suggests that crime occurs due to the nation's heightened emphasis on the economic aspects, as opposed to other values and principles. This hypothesis is supported by studies that demonstrated a correlation between lower crime rates in communities which prioritized other ideals, such as family, education and religion. Offenders are driven by financial achievements and cultural aspirations (which they could not achieve through conventional, legal means), and, at the same time, look legitimate. On the other hand, the Strain theory is quite the opposite - it suggests that people commit crimes due to their inability to achieve their objectives, but they are not driven by cultural aspirations and financial prosperity - they resort to crime as a last means in response to the strain being experienced at that time. For example, to provide for their family, or funds for medical treatment, etc. Indian movies are replete with scripts wherein a child commits theft (of food/money/medicine) to provide for his dear ones (Strain Theory), and later is motivated for monetary success (Anomie Theory)
  • Differential Association (Sutherland and Cressey, 1939)
This theory proposes that criminal behaviour is mainly passed on through personal communication and interactions between people. This theory is related to organized crime, seen with mobs, mafia and gangs. For example, children associating with other delinquent children tend to have a higher chance of adopting delinquent behaviour themselves, as they learn from such actions. The environment in which children are nurtured also influences criminality.
  • White Collar Crime (Sutherland, 1939)
Sutherland formally defined white-collar crimes as “a crime of deceit committed by a person of high social status and respectability in the course of his occupation.” White collar crime also encompasses offenses perpetrated by corporations and other legal entities also. Examples include fraud, money laundering and embezzlement.
  • Deterrence Theory (Stafford & Warr, 1968)
This theory is similar to classical theory, but the deterrent here is that offenders don't want to do with the punishment. There exist two different categories of Deterrence - Specific Deterrence is: when you commit a crime, you are punished, so you don’t repeat (for e.g., you are caught speeding, and are penalized. So, you avoid speeding the next time) General Deterrence is: when someone else commits a crime, that someone is punished, so you don’t commit that crime (for e.g., someone else is caught speeding and penalized; you observe this and eye your speedometer to ensure you are within the speed limit)
  • Broken Windows Theory (Wilson and Kelling, 1982)
This theory aims to explain the reasons why certain urban zones and residential districts experience an increase in criminal activities. The phrase "broken windows" symbolizes disarray in neighbourhoods, suggesting that minor disruptions and impolite behaviour within a community can result in more severe criminal activities in the future. According to this theory, when a window pane in a building is broken and remains unfixed for long duration of time, it signals that no one cares about the area, and does not discourage others from breaking more windows. Going further, it indicates that there is no one around, and encourages theft, and can also attract disreputable people. And so, the house spirals into decline. The theory suggests that if communities and law enforcement agencies focus on fixing broken windows, cleaning up litter, and addressing other signs of disorder, to deter disreputable people from coming in, it can create a sense of pride and safety among residents.
  • Collective Efficacy (Sampson, Raudenbush & Earls, 1997)
This theory is a form of informal social control, suggesting social cohesion and trust within a community would reduce crime - Crime would be higher in areas where there was low residential stability (for e.g., tenants living on rent, for short durations), vis-a-vis residents staying in the neighbourhood for long periods of time, and bonding together. This bonding translates into the willingness of neighbours to intervene in problematic situations, look out for one another, reporting suspicious activities and maintain a sense of order and safety. Routine Activities Theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979) This theory is based on the premise that a combination of three circumstances instigate criminal activity – a motivated perpetrator, a susceptible target and absence of competent guardianship. As the name says, Routine Activities Theory focuses on our routine. For example, if one routinely goes for a morning walk, this (routine) would increase his chances of being a suitable target. If the husband and wife both go to their daily jobs, this could be leveraged by an offender to commit a house theft. So, in this latter example, the house would be a prime target, while the absence of an anti-theft system would be the lack of capable guardianship. All that the intruder requires, is motivation!
  • Rational Choice Theory (Cornish & Clarke, 1986)
This theory considers people to be rational beings, and offenders take a rational decision, based on previous experience, reliable information, first hand surveillance, and weigh out pros and cons in deciding whether they want to engage in crime, and exactly what type of crime they want to engage in. This theory differs from classical theory, in that they make rational decisions based on facts, and weighing pros and cons vis-a-vis being deterred from offending because the  punishment is swift, certain and severe. For example, Rational Choice Theory, when applied to a bank heist, demonstrates the strategic and calculated approach of criminals, assessing various factors such as the potential rewards, risks involved, chances of success, and potential consequences.
  • Modern Evolutionary Theory (Ellish & Walsh, 1997)
According to this theory, certain advantageous traits and behaviour that enhance an individual's chances of survival and reproduction can evolve over generations. This may increase the likelihood of success in criminal activities, as these traits might provide a survival advantage in certain environments.
  • Radical Criminology (Schwendinger, 1970)
Based on Marxist idea, this theory states that laws are established by the influential individuals to serve their own advantage, by suppressing the general population, resulting in crime being caused due to the large difference in wealth and power.

Legal Provisions

  • The Indian Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 The law emphasizes care, protection, and rehabilitation, treating juveniles differently from adults. It provides support like counselling, education, vocational training, and establishes separate Juvenile Justice Boards and Child Welfare Committees for handling juvenile cases. The aim is to rehabilitate and reintegrate them into society, fostering their potential as productive citizens.
  • CRPC Section 360 allows for probation in cases where an offense is committed by a person under the age of 21 years or a woman, and the offense is not punishable with life imprisonment or death penalty. Additionally, if there are no specific provisions for convictions, the court may grant probation for a maximum period of 3 years. This provision aims to provide a more lenient punishment and rehabilitation opportunity for those who fall under these categories.
  • CRPC Section 27 indeed states that if a person below the age of 16 years has committed an offense not punishable with life imprisonment or death penalty, they should be awarded a lenient punishment. This consideration is based on factors such as the individual's character, their history, and the circumstances that led to the commission of the offense. The purpose of this provision is to ensure that young offenders are treated with a certain degree of leniency and rehabilitation, taking into account their age, immaturity, and potential for reform.
  • The Law Commission Reports highlights the importance of addressing crime victims with empathy and understanding. The report suggests that the government should adopt the principle of offering aid and support to these victims using public funds. By doing so, the state can demonstrate its commitment to the welfare of those affected by criminal activities, fostering a more compassionate and just society
  • The Justice Malimath Committee Report focuses on crime victim concerns and criminal justice reforms. A key recommendation is to change the compensation system for victims. Earlier, under Section 357[3],compensation was given only upon successful conviction. The Committee suggests that victims should be compensated if known, regardless of offender identification, acquittal, or other outcomes, to support victims emotionally and make the justice system more empathetic.

Notable White-Collar Cases

  • Rana Ayyub v. Enforcement Directorate
CITATION : (2023) 4 SCC 357 Facts: Rana Ayyub initiated, and ran three crowdfunding campaigns, from 2020 to 2021. The defence argued that since money laundering took place under the jurisdiction of Mumbai, the Special Court, Ghaziabad could not exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. Judgement: The Supreme Court determined that there is no territorial jurisdiction, implying that even if another court acknowledges a scheduled offense, the Ghaziabad Court should have exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction.
  • Balaji v. Karthik Desari
CITATION: (2023 SCC Online SC 645 Facts: From 2014 to 2015, accusations emerged about potential collusion amongst the officials within the Transport Department. These claims involved several prominent government personnel, including Senthil Balaji, a State Government Minister, who was alleged to have received unlawful benefits for facilitating appointments in the Public Transport Corporation. The petitioner's argument was that the identification of proceeds of crime served as a fundamental/jurisdictional prerequisite, and that the Enforcement Directorate could not  issue summons without same. Judgement: The Supreme Court dismissed the claim that the Enforcement Directorate's (ED) investigation lacked proper legal basis or jurisdiction, as they established that the funds involved were indeed connected to money laundering activities.

CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

To foster and maintain Criminology as a significant field of study and practice, collaborative efforts are essential to address gaps and issues. Key players like UGC, ICSSR, and existing institutions should work on establishing centres for excellence, involving government agencies in recruitment, and prioritizing criminology by the UGC and Ministry of Human Resource Development. Supporting organizations like the Indian Society of Criminology should lead initiatives, while separate fund allocation and standard syllabi development should be considered. This collective approach will strengthen Criminology's growth and relevance.

REFERENCES

  1. Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred
    1. Coleman & Clive Norris : Introducing Criminology,2000
  2. Online Articles / Sources Referred
    1. The Law Commission Reports
    2. The Justice Malimath Committee Report.
    3. https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2024/01/08/10-important-white-collar-law-judgments-of-2023/
       3. Cases Referred
  • Rana Ayyub v. Enforcement Directorate
  • Balaji v. Karthik Desari
  1. Statutes Referred
    1. The Indian Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
    2. Code of Criminal Procedure,1973.
[1] Coleman & Clive Norris : Introducing Criminology,2000 [2] Thomas Fuller [3] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 **Content:** **Author-Hiteishi Sharma, Smt. KG Shah Law School/SNDT University** ### **INTRODUCTION** The field of Criminology primarily deals with understanding the characteristics, causes, and consequences of criminal behaviour, as well as the creation, assessment and evaluation of criminal justice policies and systems. Criminology and criminal justice are related fields that share some commonalities, but they have distinct focuses and approaches. Criminology primarily involves studying the underlying factors that contribute to crime, whereas criminal justice is more concerned with the systems and processes that address crime. Criminology involves developing theories to explain crime and its causes; criminal justice applies these theories into practice. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*:** Crime, legal maxims, Sections, Practice, Criminals, Reports, Victims, ### **Definition &Meaning** “*Criminology is the analysis of the nature of crime, the perpetrators of crime, the causes of crime, the formulation of criminal laws and law enforcement and the ways that crime can be controlled[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)*” ### **Nature** Different aspects often intertwine and complement each other in the pursuit of understanding crime and criminal behaviour: - Interdisciplinary: Criminology draws from various disciplines such as sociology, law, psychology, biology, economics, and anthropology, as each offers unique perspectives and insights into the complexities of crime and criminal behaviour. - Empirical: Empirical research is crucial in criminology, as it involves gathering real-world data and evidence to study criminal behaviour and the criminal justice system. This approach enables criminologists to identify patterns, test theories, and develop evidence-based policies and interventions. - Applied: Criminological research is often applied to real-world problems, aiming to improve public safety, inform criminal justice policies, and reduce recidivism. ### **Scope** Criminology is a complex and multifaceted field as it aims to understand the criminal behaviour its causes, and consequences. It also focuses on finding solutions to prevent and control crime. Here are three main areas mentioned below: - **Causality of Crime**: It involves examining the factors that contribute to criminal behaviour, such as biological, psychological, social, and environmental influences. - **Penal System**: Criminology looks after the functions of the criminal justice system, encompassing aspects of law enforcement, courts, and correctional facilities. It includes understanding the effectiveness of various policies and practices, such as probation and rehabilitation programs. Their goal is to improve the penal system and to make it more efficient, fair, and humane. - **Criminal Reform and Crime Prevention**: A significant part of criminology is dedicated to finding ways to prevent crime and reform criminals. This includes developing and implementing crime prevention strategies, such as community policing, education, and awareness programs. - **Importance of criminology** - Diminish criminality: “*A disease known is half cured[**\[2\]**](#_ftn2)*“. Criminology assesses the mindsets of criminals to understand the reasons behind their actions, and various factors that influence them. By understanding the reasons behind criminal behaviour, criminologists can develop effective strategies to potentially deter individuals from engaging in criminal activities, and appropriately allocate resource for crime control. - Reforms of criminals: Criminology indeed plays a significant role in developing effective rehabilitation programs for individuals who have committed crimes. Criminologist design tailored treatment plans that focus on reformation and rehabilitation. This ultimately contributes to reducing recidivism rates and helps to reintegrate criminals back in society and lead law abiding lives. - Reduction in crime: Studying crime is a crucial aspect of understanding its underlying factors and contributing elements. By analysing these causes, criminologists can aid policy makers develop more effective crime reduction policies and initiatives that address the root cause of crime, ultimately promoting a safer society. - Enhancing the Criminal Justice System: By examining various components of the system, like law enforcement, courts, prisons, rehabilitation programs, etc. criminologists help identify areas of improvement, develop efficient and fair methods, and promote fairness, fostering public trust and ensuring justice is both served and perceived as fair. - **Criminological Theories** - ***Demonic Perspective*** Also known as the “Demonic Possession Theory”, this was the very first theory of criminology, and was the only theory till the 17th century. People believed that crime was caused, not as a result of one’s free will, but by supernatural forces, such as demonic possession. Extreme measures (torture/death) were carried out, in public, in the belief it would erase any trace of demonic influence, and re-align the community with God. A well-known case that involves demonic possession as a potential explanation for crime is the infamous case of the “Devil’s Disciple” – Albert Fish was a notorious American serial killer, who admitted to committing heinous crimes such as child kidnapping, sexual assault, homicide, and cannibalism. He felt that he was controlled by demons, which led to his appalling behaviour - ***Classical Theory (Cesare Beccaria, 1764)*** This hypothesis proposes that people endeavour to enhance their personal well-being, and reduce discomfort. They would abstain from engaging in criminal activities solely if the punishment was prompt, definite and stringent. For example, if the punishment for stealing a vehicle is severe enough, a potential thief would most likely not steal it. But if the punishment is perceived as too lenient, the individual might be more inclined to commit theft. - ***Positivist Theory (Cesare Lombroso, 1876)*** Lombroso contended that minds of criminal are formed by heredity, and these individuals could be identified by physical characteristics and imperfection, i.e., people committed crimes because they were so called “genetic throwbacks” (this is similar to racial profiling, which currently is present in the media and entertainment, wherein people of a certain skin colour are generally shown as criminals or “the bad guys”). - ***Anomie Theory and Strain Theory (Merton, Rosenfeld & Messner, 1938)*** The Anomie Theory suggests that crime occurs due to the nation’s heightened emphasis on the economic aspects, as opposed to other values and principles. This hypothesis is supported by studies that demonstrated a correlation between lower crime rates in communities which prioritized other ideals, such as family, education and religion. Offenders are driven by financial achievements and cultural aspirations (which they could not achieve through conventional, legal means), and, at the same time, look legitimate. On the other hand, the Strain theory is quite the opposite – it suggests that people commit crimes due to their inability to achieve their objectives, but they are not driven by cultural aspirations and financial prosperity – they resort to crime as a last means in response to the strain being experienced at that time. For example, to provide for their family, or funds for medical treatment, etc. Indian movies are replete with scripts wherein a child commits theft (of food/money/medicine) to provide for his dear ones (Strain Theory), and later is motivated for monetary success (Anomie Theory) - ***Differential Association (Sutherland and Cressey, 1939)*** This theory proposes that criminal behaviour is mainly passed on through personal communication and interactions between people. This theory is related to organized crime, seen with mobs, mafia and gangs. For example, children associating with other delinquent children tend to have a higher chance of adopting delinquent behaviour themselves, as they learn from such actions. The environment in which children are nurtured also influences criminality. - ***White Collar Crime (Sutherland, 1939)*** Sutherland formally defined white-collar crimes as “*a crime of deceit committed by a person of high social status and respectability in the course of his occupation.*” White collar crime also encompasses offenses perpetrated by corporations and other legal entities also. Examples include fraud, money laundering and embezzlement. - ***Deterrence Theory (Stafford & Warr, 1968)*** This theory is similar to classical theory, but the deterrent here is that offenders don’t want to do with the punishment. There exist two different categories of Deterrence – *Specific Deterrence* is: when you commit a crime, you are punished, so you don’t repeat (for e.g., you are caught speeding, and are penalized. So, you avoid speeding the next time) *General Deterrence* is: when someone else commits a crime, that someone is punished, so you don’t commit that crime (for e.g., someone else is caught speeding and penalized; you observe this and eye your speedometer to ensure you are within the speed limit) - ***Broken Windows Theory (Wilson and Kelling, 1982)*** This theory aims to explain the reasons why certain urban zones and residential districts experience an increase in criminal activities. The phrase “broken windows” symbolizes disarray in neighbourhoods, suggesting that minor disruptions and impolite behaviour within a community can result in more severe criminal activities in the future. According to this theory, when a window pane in a building is broken and remains unfixed for long duration of time, it signals that no one cares about the area, and does not discourage others from breaking more windows. Going further, it indicates that there is no one around, and encourages theft, and can also attract disreputable people. And so, the house spirals into decline. The theory suggests that if communities and law enforcement agencies focus on fixing broken windows, cleaning up litter, and addressing other signs of disorder, to deter disreputable people from coming in, it can create a sense of pride and safety among residents. - ***Collective Efficacy (Sampson, Raudenbush & Earls, 1997)*** This theory is a form of informal social control, suggesting social cohesion and trust within a community would reduce crime – Crime would be higher in areas where there was low residential stability (for e.g., tenants living on rent, for short durations), vis-a-vis residents staying in the neighbourhood for long periods of time, and bonding together. This bonding translates into the willingness of neighbours to intervene in problematic situations, look out for one another, reporting suspicious activities and maintain a sense of order and safety. ***Routine Activities Theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979)*** This theory is based on the premise that a combination of three circumstances instigate criminal activity – a motivated perpetrator, a susceptible target and absence of competent guardianship. As the name says, Routine Activities Theory focuses on our routine. For example, if one routinely goes for a morning walk, this (routine) would increase his chances of being a suitable target. If the husband and wife both go to their daily jobs, this could be leveraged by an offender to commit a house theft. So, in this latter example, the house would be a prime target, while the absence of an anti-theft system would be the lack of capable guardianship. All that the intruder requires, is motivation! - ***Rational Choice Theory (Cornish & Clarke, 1986)*** This theory considers people to be rational beings, and offenders take a rational decision, based on previous experience, reliable information, first hand surveillance, and weigh out pros and cons in deciding whether they want to engage in crime, and exactly what type of crime they want to engage in. This theory differs from classical theory, in that they make rational decisions based on facts, and weighing pros and cons vis-a-vis being deterred from offending because the punishment is swift, certain and severe. For example, Rational Choice Theory, when applied to a bank heist, demonstrates the strategic and calculated approach of criminals, assessing various factors such as the potential rewards, risks involved, chances of success, and potential consequences. - ***Modern Evolutionary Theory (Ellish & Walsh, 1997)*** According to this theory, certain advantageous traits and behaviour that enhance an individual’s chances of survival and reproduction can evolve over generations. This may increase the likelihood of success in criminal activities, as these traits might provide a survival advantage in certain environments. - ***Radical Criminology (Schwendinger, 1970)*** Based on Marxist idea, this theory states that laws are established by the influential individuals to serve their own advantage, by suppressing the general population, resulting in crime being caused due to the large difference in wealth and power. ### **Legal Provisions** - **The Indian Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015** The law emphasizes care, protection, and rehabilitation, treating juveniles differently from adults. It provides support like counselling, education, vocational training, and establishes separate Juvenile Justice Boards and Child Welfare Committees for handling juvenile cases. The aim is to rehabilitate and reintegrate them into society, fostering their potential as productive citizens. - **CRPC Section 360** allows for probation in cases where an offense is committed by a person under the age of 21 years or a woman, and the offense is not punishable with life imprisonment or death penalty. Additionally, if there are no specific provisions for convictions, the court may grant probation for a maximum period of 3 years. This provision aims to provide a more lenient punishment and rehabilitation opportunity for those who fall under these categories. - **CRPC Section 27** indeed states that if a person below the age of 16 years has committed an offense not punishable with life imprisonment or death penalty, they should be awarded a lenient punishment. This consideration is based on factors such as the individual’s character, their history, and the circumstances that led to the commission of the offense. The purpose of this provision is to ensure that young offenders are treated with a certain degree of leniency and rehabilitation, taking into account their age, immaturity, and potential for reform. - **The Law Commission** **Reports** highlights the importance of addressing crime victims with empathy and understanding. The report suggests that the government should adopt the principle of offering aid and support to these victims using public funds. By doing so, the state can demonstrate its commitment to the welfare of those affected by criminal activities, fostering a more compassionate and just society - **The Justice Malimath Committee Report** focuses on crime victim concerns and criminal justice reforms. A key recommendation is to change the compensation system for victims. Earlier, under **Section 357[\[3\]](#_ftn3)**,compensation was given only upon successful conviction. The Committee suggests that victims should be compensated if known, regardless of offender identification, acquittal, or other outcomes, to support victims emotionally and make the justice system more empathetic. ### **Notable White-Collar Cases** - **Rana Ayyub v. Enforcement Directorate** **CITATION : (2023) 4 SCC 357** **Facts**: Rana Ayyub initiated, and ran three crowdfunding campaigns, from 2020 to 2021. The defence argued that since money laundering took place under the jurisdiction of Mumbai, the Special Court, Ghaziabad could not exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. **Judgement**: The Supreme Court determined that there is no territorial jurisdiction, implying that even if another court acknowledges a scheduled offense, the Ghaziabad Court should have exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction. - **Balaji v. Karthik Desari** **CITATION: (2023 SCC Online SC 645** **Facts**: From 2014 to 2015, accusations emerged about potential collusion amongst the officials within the Transport Department. These claims involved several prominent government personnel, including Senthil Balaji, a State Government Minister, who was alleged to have received unlawful benefits for facilitating appointments in the Public Transport Corporation. The petitioner’s argument was that the identification of proceeds of crime served as a fundamental/jurisdictional prerequisite, and that the Enforcement Directorate could not issue summons without same. **Judgement**: The Supreme Court dismissed the claim that the Enforcement Directorate’s (ED) investigation lacked proper legal basis or jurisdiction, as they established that the funds involved were indeed connected to money laundering activities. ### **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** To foster and maintain Criminology as a significant field of study and practice, collaborative efforts are essential to address gaps and issues. Key players like UGC, ICSSR, and existing institutions should work on establishing centres for excellence, involving government agencies in recruitment, and prioritizing criminology by the UGC and Ministry of Human Resource Development. Supporting organizations like the Indian Society of Criminology should lead initiatives, while separate fund allocation and standard syllabi development should be considered. This collective approach will strengthen Criminology’s growth and relevance. ### **REFERENCES** 1. **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** 1. Coleman & Clive Norris : Introducing Criminology,2000 2. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. The Law Commission Reports 2. The Justice Malimath Committee Report. 3. https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2024/01/08/10-important-white-collar-law-judgments-of-2023/ **3. Cases Referred** - Rana Ayyub v. Enforcement Directorate - Balaji v. Karthik Desari 4. **Statutes Referred** 1. The Indian Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 2. Code of Criminal Procedure,1973. [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Coleman & Clive Norris : Introducing Criminology,2000 [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Thomas Fuller [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 **Categories:** Articles --- ### [Cruelty by husband and relatives, Section 498A](https://lawfoyer.in/cruelty-by-husband-and-relatives-section-498a/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Madhu Sri Chepuri, Sri Padmavati Mahila Viswa Vidyalayam

INTRODUCTION

  • Chapter XXA was inserted in the IPC in 1983 by the Criminal Law 2nd Amendment Act,1983.
  • It consists of only 1section that is 498A which deals with cruelty to a wife by the husband or his relatives and it is an offence under IPC.
  • It aims to prevent the torture to a married women and punish the persons responsible to that. It is an offence which is related to marriage.
  • Before this section was inserted it was covered by the general provisions of the IPC but due to increase in violence against women especially young,newly married women , bride burning it was felt that these provisions are not adequate to deal with the atrocities against women.
  • In order to deal with cruelty against married women 498A was introduced.
Keywords (Minimum 5):

Meaning, Definition & Explanation

  • Cruelty-
It is not possible for the Legislature to enumerate all acts amounting to cruelty or to put cruel conduct . The term cruelty is deliberately been left undefined by the statute. Cruelty includes both mental and physical cruelty and its effects may depend upon a number of factors.
  • The word relatives has not been defined. But the case laws reveals that generally, the parents, sisters,brothers of the husband have been prosecuted under 498A.
  • In Anil Kumar vs state of Punjab (1997) , it has been held that a person who is not a relative, but a friend, who is close to the family. [1]
  • According to explanation (a) , any wilful conduct which is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to Cause any devious hurt or mental or physical health of the woman is cruelty.
  • Explanation ( b), harassment of a woman, with a view to coerce her or her relatives, to meet unlawful demand for any dowry is also cruelty.

Historical Background / Evolution 

  • As day by day the violence has been increasing against the women and to tackle this problem,the parliament felt that changes were required at 3 levels.
  1. To define the substantive offence of cruelty to married women
  2. To introduce procedures which make investigation in case of women death as mandatory.
  3. To bring changes in the Evidence Act ,which will make the prosecution easier.
Accordingly, 498A and 304B were added to the IPC, creating separate offences in respect of acts of cruelty to a woman by a husband and relatives and dowry death respectively. In CrPC section 174 was amended and in IEA,1872 Section 113B was added. These 3 changes in the IPC,CrPC and Indian Evidence Act are an improvement to the earlier laws and are important to some extent to safeguard the rights of women.

Types / Kinds (if any)

The Types of cruelty may be: 1. Mental cruelty
  1. Physical cruelty

Essentials / Elements / Pre-requisites

  • For applying 498A, It’s essential that she should be a married woman.
  • That woman must have experienced either brutality or harassment.
  • Such brutal harassment should have been demonstrated by either the spouse or the husband’s family, if not both.

Nature of the offence

  • Conginable
  • Non bailable
  • Non compoundable.

Complaint under 498A

  • A woman who's been the victim of any form of cruelty can make a complaint firstly by filing an FIR .
  • Below is a description of the trial process in detail:
  • One must first file a police complaint or FIR (Initial Information Report) as the first step. The relevant provision of the Criminal Procedure Code is Section 154. An FIR initiates the legal process.
  • After the First Information Report (FIR) is filed, the Investigation Officer will conduct an investigation and submit a report.
  • The officer concludes the investigation and makes preparations for it after conducting all the necessary processes, including looking into the background of the case, gathering evidence, questioning potential witnesses, and so on.
  • The police then present the charge sheet before the magistrate. All of the criminal accusations against the defendant are included in the charge sheet.
  • After the parties have had an opportunity to present their cases and arguments before the Magistrate, the Magistrate will next define the charges and schedule a date for the trial.
  • Section 241 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 addresses the plea of guilty. When the charges have been framed, the accused may enter a plea of guilty. It is the judge’s job to ensure that the plea of guilty was entered voluntarily.
  • Conviction is at the discretion of the court.After the allegations have been laid out and the defendant has entered a plea of not guilty, the Prosecution presents its case in court, bearing the first (and usually greater) burden of proof.
  • Evidence can be presented orally or in writing. The magistrate can issue a witness summons to anyone and require that individual to bring in any evidence.
  • When prosecution witnesses are presented in court, the accused or his or her attorney will have the opportunity to cross-examine them.
  • At this point, the accused may submit any supporting evidence to the courts. He or she is being given the chance to bolster their argument.
  • However, the accused is not compelled to produce evidence because it is the prosecution, or the claimed victim, who has the burden of proof.
  • If the defence presents witnesses, the prosecution will conduct cross-examinations.
  • When all evidence has been given from both sides, the judge or court will reach a verdict.
  • The judgement is almost at hand, and the last stage is oral arguments. Final oral arguments are presented to the judge by both sides (the prosecution first, then the defence).
  • The court then renders a final decision after considering all of the arguments presented and the evidence presented in the case. The court then explains its decision to either exonerate or convict the defendant.
  • The ultimate verdict might result in either an acquittal or a conviction depending on whether or not the accused is found guilty.
  • If the defendant is found guilty, a hearing will be convened to determine the length of his or her sentence in the event of a conviction.
  • If the situation permits it, one may file an appeal with a higher court. The case can be taken all the way to the Supreme Court if the case is lost in the Sessions Court and the High Court.

Case Laws / Precedents / Overrulings 

Sushil Kumar Sharma vs. Union of India and others (2005) Facts
  • Under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution, a petition was filed seeking a declaration that Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is unconstitutional and ultra vires, or, failing that, for the establishment of guidelines to prevent the victimisation of innocent people by those with malicious intent.
  • A further petition asked that whenever the court reaches the verdict and the claims made regarding the conduct of an offence under Section 498A IPC were unsubstantiated, rigorous action should be taken against the individual who made the charges.
Arguments
  • The petitioner claimed that there was no prosecution but rather persecution in these situations.
  • Several judgements were relied upon, in which the rise in the number of fraudulent lawsuits was highlighted.
  • It was argued that the accusers carry more responsibility than the accused. Courts’ compassion in cases of alleged dowry torture is being abused by those who seek to profit from it.
Judgement
  • The Supreme Court of India did not find any merit in the argument that Section 498A does not have any validity in either the law or the Constitution. The court held that there have been numerous occasions where it was shown that the complaints were not genuine and had been made with ulterior motives.
  • Even if found not guilty at trial, the accused may nevertheless feel shame for their ordeal. Sometimes bad press from the media makes things even worse. Thus, the court must inquire as to what corrective steps might be implemented to stop the misuse of the provision.
  • The provision is valid but does not give anyone the authority to utilise it for retaliatory or harassment purposes.
  • Therefore, lawmakers may need to figure out how to effectively punish people who file baseless complaints or claims.
  • Until then, the problem must be handled within the current framework by the Courts.
Neelu Chopra & Anr. vs. Bharati (2009)
  • Appellants Neelu Chopra and Krishan Sarup Chopra are a married couple, and respondent Bharti was their daughter-in-law.
  • Bharati claims that her life as a married woman to Rajesh (appellants’ son) was rough due to his and his parents’ unreasonable expectations for doubt and misbehaviour.
  • Accordingly, Bharati sued her husband and in-laws in 1993 for violating Indian Penal Code Section 498A.
  • Since Rajesh passed away in 2006, his heirs are the sole parties involved in this dispute.
  • The Court noted that the complaint lacked specificity about which defendants were charged with which offences and what specific roles each appellant had in the commission of the alleged crimes.
  • The accusations were more specifically levelled at Rajesh, but he was no longer alive to defend himself.
  • It would be an abuse of process to continue prosecuting Rajesh’s elderly parents on the basis of a generalised complaint that did not specify the specific actions that gave rise to the charges.
  • As a result, the complaint was dismissed

Misuse of 498A

  • A large number of women have taken advantage of the enormous authority afforded to them by the implementation of Section 498A to harass their husbands and in-laws and to gain unfair benefits for themselves.
  • Women seeking vengeance against their spouses use Section 498A to threaten and blackmail their relatives.
  • The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has recognised the increasing trend of males being falsely accused of violating Section 498A, calling it a “phenomenon” and “social ill.”
  • As the Supreme Court put it in the case of Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India and Ors (2005), “Legal Terrorism” describes the abuse of Section 498A. In addition to the husband, innocent third parties like elderly parents or distant relatives are often unfairly implicated and made to undergo enormous hardship as a result of the criminal justice system’s misuse of Section 498A.

Future Implications

Proposals for Reform
  • Law commission of India has offered a couple of major proposals relating to 1. Bigamy
  1. Adultery
3.498A of IPC

CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

  • Violence against women at home is not only a violation of women’s human rights but also a crime under Indian law, which was created to protect the rights of all its citizens.
  • India has accepted several international conventions that recognise women’s unequal status and include special provisions for women to remedy this disparity, including the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).
  • Domestic violence is prohibited in all contexts, including marriage and the family, by the Dowry Prohibition Act (DPA) and the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (PWDA), Sections 498A and 304B of the IPC.
  • But this Section 498A’s exclusive remedy for females has become a contentious topic of discussion lately.
  • Without legislative action, this impasse will grow into a terrifying social menace.
  • For the sake of the public’s faith in the judicial system, this provision should be updated immediately.
  • Unfortunately, not all women who could benefit from this information or services will be aware of them, and even fewer will actually seek help for domestic violence.
  • Unscrupulous women will utilise this rule as another tool in their arsenal. Everyone who relies on a man will suffer if he is expelled from his own home due to charges of domestic violence or cruelty, whether or not those allegations are accurate.
  • The entire family should not be punished even if the accused man is abusive. It is a complex and significant concern that an innocent man and his relatives are often being subjected to unjust legal persecution through this provision.

REFERENCES

  1. Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred
    1. PSA Pillai's Criminal Law- Book Referred.
  2. Online Articles / Sources Referred
    1. Indian khanoon
    2. Ipleaders
    3. Casemine
  3. Cases Referred
    1. Anil Kumar vs state of Punjab (1997)
    2. Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India and Ors (2005)
    3. Neelu Chopra & Anr. vs. Bharati (2009)
  1. Statutes Referred
    1. IPC,1860
    2. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
    3. CrPC
[1] https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5a65cba84a93263320776c4d **Content:** **Author-Madhu Sri Chepuri, Sri Padmavati Mahila Viswa Vidyalayam** ### **INTRODUCTION** - Chapter XXA was inserted in the IPC in 1983 by the Criminal Law 2nd Amendment Act,1983. - It consists of only 1section that is 498A which deals with cruelty to a wife by the husband or his relatives and it is an offence under IPC. - It aims to prevent the torture to a married women and punish the persons responsible to that. It is an offence which is related to marriage. - Before this section was inserted it was covered by the general provisions of the IPC but due to increase in violence against women especially young,newly married women , bride burning it was felt that these provisions are not adequate to deal with the atrocities against women. - In order to deal with cruelty against married women 498A was introduced. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*:** ### **Meaning, Definition & Explanation** - **Cruelty-** It is not possible for the Legislature to enumerate all acts amounting to cruelty or to put cruel conduct . The term cruelty is deliberately been left undefined by the statute. Cruelty includes both mental and physical cruelty and its effects may depend upon a number of factors. - The word relatives has not been defined. But the case laws reveals that generally, the parents, sisters,brothers of the husband have been prosecuted under 498A. - In *Anil Kumar vs state of Punjab (1997) , it has been held that a person who is not a relative, but a friend, who is close to the family.* [\[1\]](#_ftn1) - According to explanation (a) , any wilful conduct which is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to Cause any devious hurt or mental or physical health of the woman is cruelty. - Explanation ( b), harassment of a woman, with a view to coerce her or her relatives, to meet unlawful demand for any dowry is also cruelty. ### **Historical Background / Evolution** - As day by day the violence has been increasing against the women and to tackle this problem,the parliament felt that changes were required at 3 levels. 1. To define the substantive offence of cruelty to married women 2. To introduce procedures which make investigation in case of women death as mandatory. 3. To bring changes in the Evidence Act ,which will make the prosecution easier. Accordingly, 498A and 304B were added to the IPC, creating separate offences in respect of acts of cruelty to a woman by a husband and relatives and dowry death respectively. In CrPC section 174 was amended and in IEA,1872 Section 113B was added. These 3 changes in the IPC,CrPC and Indian Evidence Act are an improvement to the earlier laws and are important to some extent to safeguard the rights of women. ### **Types / Kinds (if any)** The Types of cruelty may be: 1. Mental cruelty 2. Physical cruelty ### **Essentials / Elements / Pre-requisites** - For applying 498A, It’s essential that she should be a married woman. - That woman must have experienced either brutality or harassment. - Such brutal harassment should have been demonstrated by either the spouse or the husband’s family, if not both. ### **Nature of the offence** - Conginable - Non bailable - Non compoundable. ### **Complaint under 498A** - A woman who’s been the victim of any form of cruelty can make a complaint firstly by filing an FIR . - Below is a description of the trial process in detail: - One must first file a police complaint or FIR (Initial Information Report) as the first step. The relevant provision of the Criminal Procedure Code is Section 154. An FIR initiates the legal process. - After the First Information Report (FIR) is filed, the Investigation Officer will conduct an investigation and submit a report. - The officer concludes the investigation and makes preparations for it after conducting all the necessary processes, including looking into the background of the case, gathering evidence, questioning potential witnesses, and so on. - The police then present the charge sheet before the magistrate. All of the criminal accusations against the defendant are included in the charge sheet. - After the parties have had an opportunity to present their cases and arguments before the Magistrate, the Magistrate will next define the charges and schedule a date for the trial. - Section 241 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 addresses the plea of guilty. When the charges have been framed, the accused may enter a plea of guilty. It is the judge’s job to ensure that the plea of guilty was entered voluntarily. - Conviction is at the discretion of the court.After the allegations have been laid out and the defendant has entered a plea of not guilty, the Prosecution presents its case in court, bearing the first (and usually greater) burden of proof. - Evidence can be presented orally or in writing. The magistrate can issue a witness summons to anyone and require that individual to bring in any evidence. - When prosecution witnesses are presented in court, the accused or his or her attorney will have the opportunity to cross-examine them. - At this point, the accused may submit any supporting evidence to the courts. He or she is being given the chance to bolster their argument. - However, the accused is not compelled to produce evidence because it is the prosecution, or the claimed victim, who has the burden of proof. - If the defence presents witnesses, the prosecution will conduct cross-examinations. - When all evidence has been given from both sides, the judge or court will reach a verdict. - The judgement is almost at hand, and the last stage is oral arguments. Final oral arguments are presented to the judge by both sides (the prosecution first, then the defence). - The court then renders a final decision after considering all of the arguments presented and the evidence presented in the case. The court then explains its decision to either exonerate or convict the defendant. - The ultimate verdict might result in either an acquittal or a conviction depending on whether or not the accused is found guilty. - If the defendant is found guilty, a hearing will be convened to determine the length of his or her sentence in the event of a conviction. - If the situation permits it, one may file an appeal with a higher court. The case can be taken all the way to the Supreme Court if the case is lost in the Sessions Court and the High Court. ### **Case Laws / Precedents / Overrulings** **Sushil Kumar Sharma vs. Union of India and others (2005)** Facts - Under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution, a petition was filed seeking a declaration that Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is unconstitutional and ultra vires, or, failing that, for the establishment of guidelines to prevent the victimisation of innocent people by those with malicious intent. - A further petition asked that whenever the court reaches the verdict and the claims made regarding the conduct of an offence under Section 498A IPC were unsubstantiated, rigorous action should be taken against the individual who made the charges. Arguments - The petitioner claimed that there was no prosecution but rather persecution in these situations. - Several judgements were relied upon, in which the rise in the number of fraudulent lawsuits was highlighted. - It was argued that the accusers carry more responsibility than the accused. Courts’ compassion in cases of alleged dowry torture is being abused by those who seek to profit from it. Judgement - The Supreme Court of India did not find any merit in the argument that Section 498A does not have any validity in either the law or the Constitution. The court held that there have been numerous occasions where it was shown that the complaints were not genuine and had been made with ulterior motives. - Even if found not guilty at trial, the accused may nevertheless feel shame for their ordeal. Sometimes bad press from the media makes things even worse. Thus, the court must inquire as to what corrective steps might be implemented to stop the misuse of the provision. - The provision is valid but does not give anyone the authority to utilise it for retaliatory or harassment purposes. - Therefore, lawmakers may need to figure out how to effectively punish people who file baseless complaints or claims. - Until then, the problem must be handled within the current framework by the Courts. **Neelu Chopra & Anr. vs. Bharati (2009)** - Appellants Neelu Chopra and Krishan Sarup Chopra are a married couple, and respondent Bharti was their daughter-in-law. - Bharati claims that her life as a married woman to Rajesh (appellants’ son) was rough due to his and his parents’ unreasonable expectations for doubt and misbehaviour. - Accordingly, Bharati sued her husband and in-laws in 1993 for violating Indian Penal Code Section 498A. - Since Rajesh passed away in 2006, his heirs are the sole parties involved in this dispute. - The Court noted that the complaint lacked specificity about which defendants were charged with which offences and what specific roles each appellant had in the commission of the alleged crimes. - The accusations were more specifically levelled at Rajesh, but he was no longer alive to defend himself. - It would be an abuse of process to continue prosecuting Rajesh’s elderly parents on the basis of a generalised complaint that did not specify the specific actions that gave rise to the charges. - As a result, the complaint was dismissed ### **Misuse of 498A** - A large number of women have taken advantage of the enormous authority afforded to them by the implementation of Section 498A to harass their husbands and in-laws and to gain unfair benefits for themselves. - Women seeking vengeance against their spouses use Section 498A to threaten and blackmail their relatives. - The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has recognised the increasing trend of males being falsely accused of violating Section 498A, calling it a “phenomenon” and “social ill.” - As the Supreme Court put it in the case of *Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India and Ors (2005),* “Legal Terrorism” describes the abuse of Section 498A. In addition to the husband, innocent third parties like elderly parents or distant relatives are often unfairly implicated and made to undergo enormous hardship as a result of the criminal justice system’s misuse of Section 498A. ### **Future Implications** **Proposals for Reform** - Law commission of India has offered a couple of major proposals relating to 1. Bigamy 2. Adultery 3.498A of IPC ### **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** - Violence against women at home is not only a violation of women’s human rights but also a crime under Indian law, which was created to protect the rights of all its citizens. - India has accepted several international conventions that recognise women’s unequal status and include special provisions for women to remedy this disparity, including the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). - Domestic violence is prohibited in all contexts, including marriage and the family, by the Dowry Prohibition Act (DPA) and the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (PWDA), Sections 498A and 304B of the IPC. - But this Section 498A’s exclusive remedy for females has become a contentious topic of discussion lately. - Without legislative action, this impasse will grow into a terrifying social menace. - For the sake of the public’s faith in the judicial system, this provision should be updated immediately. - Unfortunately, not all women who could benefit from this information or services will be aware of them, and even fewer will actually seek help for domestic violence. - Unscrupulous women will utilise this rule as another tool in their arsenal. Everyone who relies on a man will suffer if he is expelled from his own home due to charges of domestic violence or cruelty, whether or not those allegations are accurate. - The entire family should not be punished even if the accused man is abusive. It is a complex and significant concern that an innocent man and his relatives are often being subjected to unjust legal persecution through this provision. ### **REFERENCES** 1. **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** 1. PSA Pillai’s Criminal Law- Book Referred. 2. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. Indian khanoon 2. Ipleaders 3. Casemine 3. **Cases Referred** 1. *Anil Kumar vs state of Punjab (1997)* 2. *Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India and Ors (2005)* 3. *Neelu Chopra & Anr. vs. Bharati (2009)* 4. **Statutes Referred** 1. IPC,1860 2. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 3. CrPC [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) [https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5a65cba84a93263320776c4d](http://https:/www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5a65cba84a93263320776c4d) **Categories:** Articles --- ### [Salient Features of the Indian Constitution: Important Provisions and Cases](https://lawfoyer.in/salient-features-of-the-indian-constitution-important-provisions-and-cases/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Kamaljeet Kaur, University Five Year Law College, University of Rajasthan

INTRODUCTION

"The Indian Constitution is a testament to the values of justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity, enshrining them as the guiding principles of our nation's governance." After a long haul of efforts and back breaking work,  the constitution of india was enacted finally on 26th January 1950, after a long period of 2year 11months and 18days, WE THE PEOPLE OF INDIA  laid down the fundamental framework for the functioning of the government, gaven the rights and duties to ourselves, directive principles of state policy (guidelines for state to  work in a manner). From the the Preamble to the accurate balance of powers between the branches of government, the Indian Constitution assures the commitment of justice, equality, and the rule of law. In its important provisions, the Indian Constitution delineates the salient features that form the intristic example for all other countries.The salient features of the Indian Constitution encompass a robust framework designed to uphold the values of justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity, and also provides ways for the resolution of disputes and the protection of individual liberties. Indian Constitution is centrally focused on important provisions, which provides the powers and responsibilities of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. These provisions of the supreme law of india  establish a system of checks and balances, ensuring that no single entity may misuse and overuse their powers. The fundamental rights, guaranteeing every citizen certain liberties and protections against arbitrary state action. Additionally it lays down directive principles of state policy, and the objectives of  socioeconomic justice and the welfare of the people from which the constitution has been driven. In the que there is also directive principles of state policy that give guidelines to state authorities to not to rule on people but to rule for people. Keywords :Preamble,  Equality, Justice, Liberty, Fraternity

PREAMBLE

“We, the people…adopt enact and give to ourselves this Constitution” The Preamble of the Indian Constitution serves as a beacon of hope, indroductory statement, prologue. It serves as a outlining of the fundamental principles and objectives, also gives light to the provisions upon which the Constitution is based i.e. justice, liberty, equality, fraternity and brotherhood as core values to be upheld by the nation for all its citizens and thus declares india to be a sovereign, socialist, secular, and democratic republic. It abridges the ideals, aspiration, thinking and values of Constitution framers and Indian people, and thus  sought to uphold in the governance of the country. It has been interpreted by the judiciary in its various landmark judgements  ensuring that (Article 13) any amendments that violate its spirit and the basic structure of the constitution are deemed to be  unconstitutional and can be separated apart. It sets the tone and a base for the entire constitutional framework as a introduction to a chapter and serves as a milestone for assessing the constitutionality of laws and actions by the government. Thus preamble is also known as the ‘BACKBONE’ of the constitution due to all these reasons. The Indian Constitution's Preamble was amended in the one and only historic case of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), in which the Supreme Court upheld the concept of the "basic structure" of the document. That is to say while the Parliament can amend the Constitution it cannot alter any of its fundamental components or framework. In reaction to this lawsuit the 42nd Amendment Act of 1976 was passed which altered the Preamble for the first time in its history to include the terms socialist and secular in order to more accurately reflect the ideals of the Indian Constitution. .

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

Citizens fundamental rights are the primary and most significant element of the Indian constitution. No one can imagine a state without the rights given to citizens otherwise it can be called as monarchy or autocracy. Fundamental rights assure citizens a safe a secure life. It  guarantees certain freedoms as a fellow human being and that the exercise of those freedoms is upon oneself with certain restrictions. It can be read in Part III of the Constitution. At the time of enforcement of the constitution there were a total of  7 FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS given to the citizens, but after the 44th Constitutional Amendment  Article 31 (Right to Property) was removed as a fundamental right and only remained as a constitutional right or legal right  that can’t be enforced. Thereafter only 6 Fundamental Rights remained within the hands of the citizens. Those are :-
  • Right to Equality (Article 14-18)
  • Right to Freedom (Article 19-22)
  • Right against Exploitation (Article 23-24)
  • Right to Freedom of Religion (Article 25-28)
  • Cultural and Educational Rights (Article 29-30)
  • Right to Constitutional Remedies (Article 32)
The right to constitutional remedies is regarded as the fundamental component of the Indian constitution since it provides citizens with writs (Habeas Corpus Mandamus Certiorari Quo Warranto and Prohibition) as a means of redress in the event that their rights are infringed upon by an oppressive government. Along with protecting citizens rights over the government it also serves as a barrier against arbitrary state action. The judiciary which constitutes the fourth pillar of democracy has been instrumental in both interpreting the rights accurately over time and in broadening their scope through a number of significant rulings over the years. Thus, it protect and strengthen individual rights in India. Thus the legal or constitutional rights are not enforceable in court unlike the fundamental rights which are as in the case of the right to property after it is formed as a fundamental right (Article 31) to legal right (Article 300A). Within the historic Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) the supreme court established the notion of due process of law broadened the definition of the right to life and personal liberty and in a different case of A. K. Gopalan versus. The State of Madras Supreme Court (1950) outlined the parameters of Article 21 i. e. Right to Life and Personal Liberty and decided that the protection provided by Article 21 is only applicable to preventive measures taken by the executive branch and does not cover preventive measures taken by the legislature. October 2023: Following the Shafin Jahan v. constitutional bench case a five-judge panel declared that there is no such thing as a civil union and that there is no fundamental right to marry under the constitution. KK. m. Article 21s protection of the right to marry as one pleases extends to Asokan cases.

DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICY (DPSP)

In Dr. B. R. Ambedkar’s words, the directive principles are defined as a “new aspect”  of the Indian Constitution. The Directive Principles of State Policy are described in the Part IV of the Indian Constitution from article 36-51 that aim to direct the state and are guidelines in establishing a just society by promoting socioeconomic justice.  DPSP’s  are  not enforceable by courts, these are only fundamentals to govern and serve as a moral obligations for the state in likewise as money will not be concentrated in the hands of a small number of people and to end the big difference between rich and poor, thus aims to establish just, fair and equitable society. They include provisions for equal distribution of wealth, ensuring equal pay for equal work, promoting educational and cultural interests, protecting the environment, and striving towards a welfare state. It emphasize the state's duty to work towards achieving social and economic equality and improving the quality of life of its citizens, protection of enivornment, thereby reflecting the commitment of the Indian Constitution to social justice and welfare.. The four new articles of Directive Principles of State Policy were added by the 42nd amendment act 1976 i.e. Article 39, Article 39 A, Article 43 A, Article 48 A. Supreme court in its landmark judgement of “Raj Narain Singh v. Chairman, Patna Administration Committee (1955)” highlighted the duty of the state to implement DPSP and emphasized that DPSP are not only written declarations but are fundamental to the governance of the country, and the state has a duty to strive towards their good governance.

FEDERAL STRUCTURE WITH UNITARY SPIRIT

As per K C Wheare, the Indian Constitution is "government in structure however unitary in soul" and "semi bureaucratic." The division of abilities between the public government and the states, which finds some kind of harmony among decentralization and solidarity, recognizes the country's variety and provincial goals while maintaining the country's respectability and solidarity, and advances helpful federalism, characterizes the administrative arrangement of government laid out by the Indian Constitution. The bureaucratic design permits the two legislatures to work autonomously inside their particular areas of ward while likewise participating on issues of public significance or intergovernmental issues through establishments, for example, the Between State Committee and the Zonal Chambers, which cultivate coordination and collaboration between the national government and the state legislatures. The Constitution's Seventh Timetable depicts the allotment of abilities between the Association, or focal government, and the states government. The Constitution's Seventh Schedule delineates the allocation of powers between the Union, or central government, and the states. Significant clauses pertaining to the federal system are i. Article 245, which gives the Union and the states legislative authority ii. Article 246 which addresses the division of state and union legislative powers and iii. Article 356 addresses the president's authority in the event that state constitutional machinery malfunctions. Three lists are also included in the Constitution: 1. Union List: It includes topics like foreign policy, military, and currency over which the Union government alone has legislative responsibility. 2. State List: This comprises topics like agriculture, public health, education, communication and law enforcement where state governments alone possess the power to enact laws. 3. Concurrent List: It contains topics like bankruptcy, succession, adoption, wills, criminal law intestacy and marriage that are subject to both federal and state legislation. The Apex Court in a landmark case of  State of West Bengal v. Union of India (1963), held that  the Union government was not at all permitted to compel states to perform these functions against their will where the case was that the state challenged the constitutionality of an act passed by the parliament and. The Harla v. State of Rajasthan (1951) ruling also dealt with the interpretation of the doctrine of repugnancy between federal and state laws. It stated that federal law would take precedence over state law if there was a disagreement on a topic covered by the Concurrent List.

PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM

India got the  parliamentary system of government by the constitution of india from the Part V of the Constitution that trifurcates, the State into three equal constituents’ viz. Executive, Legislature and Judiciary. The parliamentary system  can be said as a relationship between the executive and legislative and other branches of government but in contrast to that is a Presidential form of democracy whereby the executive does not form part of, nor is appointed by, the parliamentary or legislative body. This system is based on the “British model of governance” which means that ministers get their legitimacy from Parliament as it is continuing from the colonization. The parliamentary system of india can be said as based on the Westminster model in which the President is considered as the head of the state (the first man of the country), while the real executive power is vested in the Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister. Prime Minister is appointed by the President after the Lok Sabha Elections and should be the head of the majority or coalition .
  • The Rajya Sabha represents the states and union territories, with members elected by the state legislative assemblies
  • while the Lok Sabha members are directly elected by the people of India.
The parliament consists of The president and the two houses: The Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha. The proceedings in the Parliament begins from introducing a bill in either of the house and later on to passing it as an act. The bill goes through several stages, including introduction- discussion-consideration by a committee-voting. For becoming a bill to law it must be passed by both the houses. The Articles related to parliamentary proceedings are as follows:-
  • The Article 118 of Indian constitution says about powers of  each house of Parliament to make rules for regulating its procedure and conduct of business.
  • Article 105 pertains to the privileges and immunities granted to Members of Parliament (MPs) concerning their speech and voting within the Parliament.
The Supreme Court clarified the governors function in a parliamentary democracy in the Rameshwar Prasad v. case especially with regard to the establishment of the government. Union of India (2006) and further held that the Governor should exercise serious consideration keeping in mind democratic and constitutional principles when using his or her discretionary power to invite a party or coalition to form the government..

JUDICIAL REVIEW

During judicial review a judge will determine the constitutionality of a law or decision made by a public body. Under articles 13, 32 and 226 of the Indian Constitution the judiciary is granted the authority to review or analyze laws. Article 226 specifically indicates that a person can approach high courts on similar grounds even though Article 32 allows a person to petition the Supreme Court for any violation or infringement of their fundamental rights. In this way by keeping an eye and ensuring for the protection of citizens, the judiciary also serves as a watchdog over the legislative and executive branches of government preventing abuse of authority. That is the reason the judiciary is regarded as the protector of the Constitution it makes sure that laws and government actions comply with its provisions and do not violate any citizens fundamental rights. The judiciary retains the power of reversing or overturning the  law or government action if it is found to be unconstitutional. India adheres and follows to the Rule of Law and consequently the Indian Constitution is regarded as the supreme law of the nation. . The scope of judicial review in India is broad it encompasses both the substantive and procedural aspects of laws including executive actions policies administrative decisions and government actions. As a result courts have the authority to assess not only the legitimacy of legislative and executive decisions but also their reasonableness and equity. Additionally the constitution grants courts the authority to issue writs to enforce other legal rights including fundamental rights. The judiciary which has consistently demonstrated through numerous significant rulings that it is the third pillar of democracy has been essential in interpreting the Constitution and defending citizens rights and liberties. By doing so it has strengthened Indias legal system settled constitutional disputes and preserved the values of justice equality and the rule of law. The ruling made by the Supreme Court in Mohammed Ahmed Khan v. By giving Muslim women who had divorced the right to maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure independent of their personal laws Shah Bano Begum (1985) demonstrated the validity of judicial review. This ruling demonstrated the Courts dedication to judicial review in defending fundamental rights by upholding the principles of gender justice equality before the law and the Rule of Law. In a separate Vishaka v. Since sexual harassment of women in the workplace violates their fundamental rights under Articles 14 19 and 21 of the Constitution the Supreme Court of the State of Rajasthan (1997) established guidelines to prevent such harassment. The ruling highlighted how the Court can use judicial review to enforce fundamental rights and correct societal injustices. .

CONCLUSION

"A constitution is not a mere lawyer's document, it is a vehicle of life, and its spirit is always the spirit of the age."                                                                            - by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar We the people of India provided a sense of unity according to the preamble of the Indian Constitution. The constitution which  has been  furnished after a great efforts stands as a bedrock of democratic governance, embodying a series of salient features that define its essence and character, justice, and equality. It reflects the aspirations and values of a diverse by embodying  a robust framework. Numerous notable authors and figures have expressed that the Indian Constitution is a dynamic document that adapts to the evolving needs of society while preserving the core principles it contains. This is so because the judiciary is thought of as the democarcys third pillar.This can be determined by carefully examining its significant provisions and historic judicial pronouncements by the courts. The Constitution is a representation of the aspirations and goals of a diverse country aiming for advancement and prosperity not just a set of legal guidelines. Preamble sets out the ideals and objectives of the Constitution and as a introduction part to the constitution, serving as a guiding light for governance and interpretation of law
  • Fundamental Rights are absolute and ensure the protection of individual liberties and freedoms, while Directive Principles of State Policy guide the state in promoting social and economic justice and are of obligatory nature only.
  • The federal structure balances powers between the Union and states, fostering cooperative federalism and regional autonomy but in the sense of unity in some circumstances.
This is not all but there are many salient features discussed that serves as a roadmap for governance, guiding the state in its duty to serve the people and uphold their rights and freedoms. The  salient features of the Indian Constitution are of  progressive nature, developing nature with tine  aiming to foster a just and equitable society and reflects the aspirations and values of a diverse nation. However, it is important to continue evaluating and evolving these features to address emerging challenges, changing with the need of the time  and ensure the effective functioning of the Constitution in the ever-changing socio-political landscape of the country.

REFERENCES

**Content:** **Author-Kamaljeet Kaur, University Five Year Law College, University of Rajasthan** ### **INTRODUCTION** *“The Indian Constitution is a testament to the values of justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity, enshrining them as the guiding principles of our nation’s governance.”* After a long haul of efforts and back breaking work, the constitution of india was enacted finally on 26th January 1950, after a long period of 2year 11months and 18days, WE THE PEOPLE OF INDIA laid down the fundamental framework for the functioning of the government, gaven the rights and duties to ourselves, directive principles of state policy (guidelines for state to work in a manner). From the the Preamble to the accurate balance of powers between the branches of government, the Indian Constitution assures the commitment of justice, equality, and the rule of law. In its important provisions, the Indian Constitution delineates the salient features that form the intristic example for all other countries.The salient features of the Indian Constitution encompass a robust framework designed to uphold the values of justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity, and also provides ways for the resolution of disputes and the protection of individual liberties. Indian Constitution is centrally focused on important provisions, which provides the powers and responsibilities of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. These provisions of the supreme law of india establish a system of checks and balances, ensuring that no single entity may misuse and overuse their powers. The fundamental rights, guaranteeing every citizen certain liberties and protections against arbitrary state action. Additionally it lays down directive principles of state policy, and the objectives of socioeconomic justice and the welfare of the people from which the constitution has been driven. In the que there is also directive principles of state policy that give guidelines to state authorities to not to rule on people but to rule for people. ***Keywords* :**Preamble, Equality, Justice, Liberty, Fraternity ### **PREAMBLE** **“*We, the people…adopt enact and give to ourselves this Constitution”*** The Preamble of the Indian Constitution serves as a beacon of hope, indroductory statement, prologue. It serves as a outlining of the fundamental principles and objectives, also gives light to the provisions upon which the Constitution is based i.e. justice, liberty, equality, fraternity and brotherhood as core values to be upheld by the nation for all its citizens and thus declares india to be a sovereign, socialist, secular, and democratic republic. It abridges the ideals, aspiration, thinking and values of Constitution framers and Indian people, and thus sought to uphold in the governance of the country. It has been interpreted by the judiciary in its various landmark judgements ensuring that (Article 13) any amendments that violate its spirit and the basic structure of the constitution are deemed to be unconstitutional and can be separated apart. It sets the tone and a base for the entire constitutional framework as a introduction to a chapter and serves as a milestone for assessing the constitutionality of laws and actions by the government. Thus preamble is also known as the ‘**BACKBONE’** of the constitution due to all these reasons. The Indian Constitution’s Preamble was amended in the one and only historic case of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), in which the Supreme Court upheld the concept of the “basic structure” of the document. That is to say while the Parliament can amend the Constitution it cannot alter any of its fundamental components or framework. In reaction to this lawsuit the 42nd Amendment Act of 1976 was passed which altered the Preamble for the first time in its history to include the terms socialist and secular in order to more accurately reflect the ideals of the Indian Constitution. . ### **FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS** Citizens fundamental rights are the primary and most significant element of the Indian constitution. No one can imagine a state without the rights given to citizens otherwise it can be called as monarchy or autocracy. Fundamental rights assure citizens a safe a secure life. It guarantees certain freedoms as a fellow human being and that the exercise of those freedoms is upon oneself with certain restrictions. It can be read in Part III of the Constitution. At the time of enforcement of the constitution there were a total of **7 FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS** given to the citizens, but after the 44th Constitutional Amendment Article 31 (Right to Property) was removed as a fundamental right and only remained as a constitutional right or legal right that can’t be enforced. Thereafter only 6 Fundamental Rights remained within the hands of the citizens. Those are :- - Right to Equality (Article 14-18) - Right to Freedom (Article 19-22) - Right against Exploitation (Article 23-24) - Right to Freedom of Religion (Article 25-28) - Cultural and Educational Rights (Article 29-30) - Right to Constitutional Remedies (Article 32) The right to constitutional remedies is regarded as the fundamental component of the Indian constitution since it provides citizens with writs (Habeas Corpus Mandamus Certiorari Quo Warranto and Prohibition) as a means of redress in the event that their rights are infringed upon by an oppressive government. Along with protecting citizens rights over the government it also serves as a barrier against arbitrary state action. The judiciary which constitutes the fourth pillar of democracy has been instrumental in both interpreting the rights accurately over time and in broadening their scope through a number of significant rulings over the years. Thus, it protect and strengthen individual rights in India. Thus the legal or constitutional rights are not enforceable in court unlike the fundamental rights which are as in the case of the right to property after it is formed as a fundamental right (Article 31) to legal right (Article 300A). Within the historic Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) the supreme court established the notion of due process of law broadened the definition of the right to life and personal liberty and in a different case of A. K. Gopalan versus. The State of Madras Supreme Court (1950) outlined the parameters of Article 21 i. e. Right to Life and Personal Liberty and decided that the protection provided by Article 21 is only applicable to preventive measures taken by the executive branch and does not cover preventive measures taken by the legislature. October 2023: Following the Shafin Jahan v. constitutional bench case a five-judge panel declared that there is no such thing as a civil union and that there is no fundamental right to marry under the constitution. KK. m. Article 21s protection of the right to marry as one pleases extends to Asokan cases. ### **DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICY (DPSP)** In Dr. B. R. Ambedkar’s words, the directive principles are defined as a *“new aspect”* of the Indian Constitution. The Directive Principles of State Policy are described in the Part IV of the Indian Constitution from article 36-51 that aim to direct the state and are guidelines in establishing a just society by promoting socioeconomic justice. DPSP’s are not enforceable by courts, these are only fundamentals to govern and serve as a moral obligations for the state in likewise as money will not be concentrated in the hands of a small number of people and to end the big difference between rich and poor, thus aims to establish just, fair and equitable society. They include provisions for equal distribution of wealth, ensuring equal pay for equal work, promoting educational and cultural interests, protecting the environment, and striving towards a welfare state. It emphasize the state’s duty to work towards achieving social and economic equality and improving the quality of life of its citizens, protection of enivornment, thereby reflecting the commitment of the Indian Constitution to social justice and welfare.. The four new articles of Directive Principles of State Policy were added by the 42nd amendment act 1976 i.e. Article 39, Article 39 A, Article 43 A, Article 48 A. Supreme court in its landmark judgement of “*Raj Narain Singh v. Chairman, Patna Administration Committee (1955)”* highlighted the duty of the state to implement DPSP and emphasized that DPSP are not only written declarations but are fundamental to the governance of the country, and the state has a duty to strive towards their good governance. ### **FEDERAL STRUCTURE WITH UNITARY SPIRIT** As per K C Wheare, the Indian Constitution is “government in structure however unitary in soul” and “semi bureaucratic.” The division of abilities between the public government and the states, which finds some kind of harmony among decentralization and solidarity, recognizes the country’s variety and provincial goals while maintaining the country’s respectability and solidarity, and advances helpful federalism, characterizes the administrative arrangement of government laid out by the Indian Constitution. The bureaucratic design permits the two legislatures to work autonomously inside their particular areas of ward while likewise participating on issues of public significance or intergovernmental issues through establishments, for example, the Between State Committee and the Zonal Chambers, which cultivate coordination and collaboration between the national government and the state legislatures. The Constitution’s Seventh Timetable depicts the allotment of abilities between the Association, or focal government, and the states government. The Constitution’s Seventh Schedule delineates the allocation of powers between the Union, or central government, and the states. Significant clauses pertaining to the federal system are i. Article 245, which gives the Union and the states legislative authority ii. Article 246 which addresses the division of state and union legislative powers and iii. Article 356 addresses the president’s authority in the event that state constitutional machinery malfunctions. Three lists are also included in the Constitution: 1\. Union List: It includes topics like foreign policy, military, and currency over which the Union government alone has legislative responsibility. 2\. State List: This comprises topics like agriculture, public health, education, communication and law enforcement where state governments alone possess the power to enact laws. 3\. Concurrent List: It contains topics like bankruptcy, succession, adoption, wills, criminal law intestacy and marriage that are subject to both federal and state legislation. The Apex Court in a landmark case of State of West Bengal v. Union of India (1963), held that the Union government was not at all permitted to compel states to perform these functions against their will where the case was that the state challenged the constitutionality of an act passed by the parliament and. The Harla v. State of Rajasthan (1951) ruling also dealt with the interpretation of the doctrine of repugnancy between federal and state laws. It stated that federal law would take precedence over state law if there was a disagreement on a topic covered by the Concurrent List. ### **PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM** India got the parliamentary system of government by the constitution of india from the Part V of the Constitution that trifurcates, the State into three equal constituents’ viz. Executive, Legislature and Judiciary. The parliamentary system can be said as a relationship between the executive and legislative and other branches of government but in contrast to that is a Presidential form of democracy whereby the *executive does not form part of, nor is appointed by, the parliamentary or legislative body*. This system is based on the “***British model of governance*”** which means that **ministers get their legitimacy from Parliament as it is continuing from the colonization**. The parliamentary system of india can be said as based on the **Westminster model** in which the President is considered as the head of the state (the first man of the country), while the real executive power is vested in the Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister. Prime Minister is appointed by the President after the Lok Sabha Elections and should be the head of the majority or coalition . - The Rajya Sabha represents the states and union territories, with members elected by the state legislative assemblies - while the Lok Sabha members are directly elected by the people of India. The parliament consists of The president and the two houses: The Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha. The proceedings in the Parliament begins from introducing a bill in either of the house and later on to passing it as an act. The bill goes through several stages, including introduction- discussion-consideration by a committee-voting. For becoming a bill to law it must be passed by both the houses. The Articles related to parliamentary proceedings are as follows:- - The **Article 118** of Indian constitution says about powers of each house of Parliament to make rules for regulating its procedure and conduct of business. - Article 105 pertains to the privileges and immunities granted to Members of Parliament (MPs) concerning their speech and voting within the Parliament. The Supreme Court clarified the governors function in a parliamentary democracy in the Rameshwar Prasad v. case especially with regard to the establishment of the government. Union of India (2006) and further held that the Governor should exercise serious consideration keeping in mind democratic and constitutional principles when using his or her discretionary power to invite a party or coalition to form the government.. ### **JUDICIAL REVIEW** During judicial review a judge will determine the constitutionality of a law or decision made by a public body. Under articles 13, 32 and 226 of the Indian Constitution the judiciary is granted the authority to review or analyze laws. Article 226 specifically indicates that a person can approach high courts on similar grounds even though Article 32 allows a person to petition the Supreme Court for any violation or infringement of their fundamental rights. In this way by keeping an eye and ensuring for the protection of citizens, the judiciary also serves as a watchdog over the legislative and executive branches of government preventing abuse of authority. That is the reason the judiciary is regarded as the protector of the Constitution it makes sure that laws and government actions comply with its provisions and do not violate any citizens fundamental rights. The judiciary retains the power of reversing or overturning the law or government action if it is found to be unconstitutional. India adheres and follows to the Rule of Law and consequently the Indian Constitution is regarded as the supreme law of the nation. . The scope of judicial review in India is broad it encompasses both the substantive and procedural aspects of laws including executive actions policies administrative decisions and government actions. As a result courts have the authority to assess not only the legitimacy of legislative and executive decisions but also their reasonableness and equity. Additionally the constitution grants courts the authority to issue writs to enforce other legal rights including fundamental rights. The judiciary which has consistently demonstrated through numerous significant rulings that it is the third pillar of democracy has been essential in interpreting the Constitution and defending citizens rights and liberties. By doing so it has strengthened Indias legal system settled constitutional disputes and preserved the values of justice equality and the rule of law. The ruling made by the Supreme Court in Mohammed Ahmed Khan v. By giving Muslim women who had divorced the right to maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure independent of their personal laws Shah Bano Begum (1985) demonstrated the validity of judicial review. This ruling demonstrated the Courts dedication to judicial review in defending fundamental rights by upholding the principles of gender justice equality before the law and the Rule of Law. In a separate Vishaka v. Since sexual harassment of women in the workplace violates their fundamental rights under Articles 14 19 and 21 of the Constitution the Supreme Court of the State of Rajasthan (1997) established guidelines to prevent such harassment. The ruling highlighted how the Court can use judicial review to enforce fundamental rights and correct societal injustices. . ### **CONCLUSION** *“A constitution is not a mere lawyer’s document, it is a vehicle of life, and its spirit is always the spirit of the age.”* *– by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar* We the people of India provided a sense of unity according to the preamble of the Indian Constitution. The constitution which has been furnished after a great efforts stands as a bedrock of democratic governance, embodying a series of salient features that define its essence and character, justice, and equality. It reflects the aspirations and values of a diverse by embodying a robust framework. Numerous notable authors and figures have expressed that the Indian Constitution is a dynamic document that adapts to the evolving needs of society while preserving the core principles it contains. This is so because the judiciary is thought of as the democarcys third pillar.This can be determined by carefully examining its significant provisions and historic judicial pronouncements by the courts. The Constitution is a representation of the aspirations and goals of a diverse country aiming for advancement and prosperity not just a set of legal guidelines. Preamble sets out the ideals and objectives of the Constitution and as a introduction part to the constitution, serving as a guiding light for governance and interpretation of law - Fundamental Rights are absolute and ensure the protection of individual liberties and freedoms, while Directive Principles of State Policy guide the state in promoting social and economic justice and are of obligatory nature only. - The federal structure balances powers between the Union and states, fostering cooperative federalism and regional autonomy but in the sense of unity in some circumstances. This is not all but there are many salient features discussed that serves as a roadmap for governance, guiding the state in its duty to serve the people and uphold their rights and freedoms. The salient features of the Indian Constitution are of progressive nature, developing nature with tine aiming to foster a just and equitable society and reflects the aspirations and values of a diverse nation. However, it is important to continue evaluating and evolving these features to address emerging challenges, changing with the need of the time and ensure the effective functioning of the Constitution in the ever-changing socio-political landscape of the country. ### **REFERENCES** - **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** - Introduction to constitution of india by D.D. Basu - Indian polity by M. laxmikanth - **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. 2. 3. 4. com/legal/article-8793-salient-features-of-the-indian-constitution.html - **Cases Referred** - *Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)* - *Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978*) - *K. Gopalan v. State of madras (1950)* - *Raj Narain Singh v. Chairman, Patna Administration Committee (1955)* - *State of West Bengal v. Union of India (1963)* - *Harla v. State of rajasthan (1951)* - *Mohammed Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum (1985)* - *Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (2006* - *Vishakha v. state of rajasthan (1951)* - **Statutes Referred** 1. Articles of Indian Constitution Act,1950 **Categories:** Articles --- ### [ARTICLE-368 AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION](https://lawfoyer.in/article-368-amendment-of-the-constitution/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Priyanshu Tyagi, Mewar Law Institute

India's Dynamic Constitution: Amending for Change

The Constitution of India, as the keystone of the nation's legal system, upholds the necessity for adaptation in the dynamic societal circumstances. This adaptability is expediated by Article 368, which exactly prescribes the process for amending the Constitution. This article analyse the concept of constitutional amendments in India, delving into the  procedures established , types of amendments, their significance, and the criticisms against them. Keywords (Minimum 5):  Article -368 , Amendment Process , Special Majority , State Ratification , Basic Structure Doctrine , Federal Structure

Meaning, Definition & Explanation

  • A constitution's strength often lies in its ability to evolve alongside the society it governs. The Indian Constitution embodies this principle by allowing for amendments. This process involves adding, modifying, or repealing existing provisions while adhering to a well-defined procedure. Amending the Constitution ensures it remains a relevant document, capable of addressing new challenges while preserving its core values.
  • Article 368: The Cornerstone of Change
  • Recognizing the need for adaptability, the Indian Constitution integrated Article 368 in Part XX. This article establishes the framework for amending the Constitution, outlining the permissible extent and the procedure to be followed. It ensures that changes are made thoughtfully and legitimately.

The procedure: Amending India's Constitution

 Article 368 of the Indian Constitution establishes a well-defined procedure for prompting and enacting amendments. Let us discuss the key steps which outlines the established procedure :
  1. Initiation: The amendment procedure of the Indian Constitution under article-368 initiates with the introduction of a bill in either the Lok Sabha (lower house) or the Rajya Sabha (upper house) of the Parliament. The Parliament retains the sole authority to commence proposals for amending the Constitution.
  2. Presentation of bill: After its initiation, the amendment bill can be presented by either a minister in government of India or even a private member of the Parliament. It should be noted that prior approval from the President is not a required for such introductions.
  3. Passage Requirements in Both Houses of Parliament : For an amendment bill to be well enacted as law, it must secure a "special majority" vote in each house of the Parliament. This exacting  requirement sanctions approval from two key components:
  • Majority of Total Membership: The amendment bill must reserve a majority vote exceeding fifty percent of the total membership in each house.
  • Two-Thirds of Members Present and Voting: furthermore, it requires the approval of two-thirds of the members who are present and actively cast their votes in each house.
  1. Absence of a Joint Sitting Mechanism for Dispute Resolution: It is important to note that the Indian Constitution, unlike its approach to resolving disagreements on ordinary bills, does not provide any provision for a joint sitting of both houses of Parliament to address potential disputes concerning an amendment bill. This absence of a joint sitting mechanism signifies that resolving disagreements exclusively relies on negotiations between the houses or the potential desertion of the proposed amendment bill .
  2. State Ratification for Amendments Affecting Federal Structure : The amendment procedure under Article 368 recognizes the rare nature of certain provisions that precisely impact India's federal structure. For such amendments, a supplementary step beyond parliamentary approval is mandated. In these specific cases, the amendment bill requires ratification by a simple majority vote in the legislatures of at least half of the Indian states.
  3. Presidential Assent: Once the bill has well passed by both houses of Parliament and secured ratification by the states (if applicable), it is conferred to the President for assent.. The President is bound by law to grant assent and lacks the authority to withhold approval or return the bill for reconsideration.
  4. Becoming Law: Upon receiving presidential assent, the bill is transformed into a "Constitutional Amendment Act." This Act serves as the official mechanism for modifying the Constitution, accumulating the proposed changes and becoming an fundamental part of the supreme law of the land.

Three Methods for Amending India's Constitution

Article 368 empowers the Indian Parliament to amend the Constitution through three distinct methods, each tailored to the weight and nature of the proposed change:
  1. Simple Majority: Established provisions, governed by separate parliamentary procedures, can be modified by a simple majority vote in Parliament. This mark as approval by more than half (50%) of the members present and voting in each house. Examples include changes related to the creation or boundaries of states, or the establishment of legislative councils within states.
  2. Special Majority: For an extensive range of amendments, a more considerable level of approval is required. This "special majority" entails a subdivided requirement:
  • First, it requires the support of more than half of the total membership of each house of Parliament (Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha).
  • Further , it must be approved by two-thirds of the members present and voting in each house of Parliament.
This kind of majority encloses amendments to Fundamental Rights, Directive Principles of State Policy, and numerous other provisions not covered by the other methods.
  1. Special Majority with State Ratification: Amending provisions regarding India's federal structure entails an additional step. Here, the special majority vote in Parliament must be supported by ratification from half of the state legislatures. Each state legislature votes by a simple majority, means more than half of the members of the parliament present and voted for the same need to approve the amendment.
By marking these three separate methods, Article 368 assures that the amendment process is precisely graded to the significance of the changes being proposed.

The Unshakeable Core: The Basic Structure Doctrine

The interpretation of the basic structure doctrine serves as a shield, safeguarding the crucial principles of the Indian Constitution from being significantly altered or eliminated through amendments established by Parliament. These fundamental elements constitute the very base of the Indian nation:
  • Supremacy of the Constitution: The Constitution reigns supreme as the highest law of the land.
  • Separation of Powers: Power is divided and balanced between the legislature, executive, and judiciary, preventing any one branch from becoming too powerful.
  • Federalism: India functions as a union of states, with power distributed between the central government and the states.
  • Secularism: The state treats all religions with equal respect and does not Favor any particular faith.
  • Democracy: The government derives its authority from the will of the people.
  • Rule of Law: Everyone, including the government, is subject to the law.
Any amendment in the Constitution of India results in  weakening the basic structure under this doctrine will smacked down by the apex court and declared as unconstitutional. The basic structure doctrine assures the Constitution remains a stable and enduring foundation for Indian democracy.

The Doctrine's Evolution

The approach regarding doctrine of basic structure has been consolidated through a series of landmark judgments by the Apex Court of India. These proclamations not only established the concept but also civilized its meaning over the period of  time. The following provides a glimpse into this historical evolution:
  • Shankari Prasad Case (1951): This case marked the first significant brief with the basic structure doctrine in the legal domain. While the Supreme Court recognised Parliament's authority to amend the Constitution under Article 368, it did not exactly limit that power. This led to the indication that Parliament could possibly modify any aspect, including fundamental rights. However, the case did not examined deeply the concept of a basic structure, which would be addressed in later judgments.
  • Golak Nath Case (1967): This landmark judgment laid a stronger foundation for the basic structure doctrine. The Supreme Court well-established a crucial principle inheriting the Parliament with power to amend the Constitution does not expand to fundamental rights. The court asserted that these rights are the core aspect of the Constitution and cannot be taken away or limited through amendments. This decision essentially limited Parliament's power and lead the way for a more persuasive understanding of the basic structure.
  • Kesavananda Bharati Case (1973): Considered as a landmark judgment, the case of  Kesavananda Bharati vs state of Kerala challenged the validity of the 24th Constitutional Amendment Act (1971) . This act intent to restrain judicial review  of constitutional amendments. The pivotal question before the court was whether the 24th CAA violated the basic structure doctrine and should be struck down.
  • In its historic ruling, the Supreme Court confirmed that Parliament has power to amend the Constitution but declared it to be limited. The constitutional bench of 13 judges officially introduced the concept of the "basic structure" and its significant role in safeguarding the Constitution's core principles.

The Enduring Relevance of the Amendment Power

India's vast and dynamic nature necessitates a constitution that can evolve alongside it. The amendment process empowers the constitution to remain relevant and effective in governing the country. Here's how this adaptability fosters a well-functioning democracy:
  • Ensuring Responsive Governance: Constitution guides governance needs updates for change. Amendments ensure responsive governance, protect emerging rights.  Safeguarding the emerging rights is essential for justice. It provides Reflection to society's evolving understanding.
  • Acknowledging and Protecting Emerging Rights: As the Society changes, the constitution must guard new rights. Amendment process ensures safeguarding of emerging rights in inclusive society. Embracing new rights is crucial for a fair society. Constitution should evolve with society's view on fundamental rights.
  • .Reflecting Evolving Legal Interpretations: Judicial interpretations of the constitution always evolving, uncovering the new rights within existing provisions. Modern interpretations of right to life and personal liberty expanding to include right to privacy. Amendment process allows formal changes in constitution to align with evolving legal interpretations. It Ensures constitution to stay relevant in changing social landscape.
  • .Addressing Unforeseen Challenges: State adapts to tackle unforeseen issues from rise of social media and online activism. Constitution can be amended to address challenges and safeguard citizens' rights. This Adaptability empowers state to respond to new realities not anticipated during constitution drafting.
  • Promoting Social Progress: Constitutional reforms break old practices and pave the way for a progressive society. Updates to the constitution reflect the changing values of the governed population. Reforming the constitution can bring about positive social changes. It is important for the constitution to adapt to the people's evolving aspirations.

Concerns Regarding Amending the Indian Constitution

While the amendment process allows the Constitution to adapt, it has also attracted criticism on several fronts:
  • Lack of a Specialized Body: Unlike some nations with dedicated bodies for constitutional amendments, India relies solely on its Parliament and, in specific cases, state legislatures. Critics argue for a dedicated and specialized body to ensure a more intentional and objective approach to amendments.
  • Procedural Similarities : The amendment process features the procedure for passing regular laws, with the exception of a special majority requirement. Critics argue that this correlation could lead to undervaluing constitutional amendments.
  • Limited Initiation Power: The exclusive power to introduce amendments lies with the Parliament itself. State legislatures can only propose amendments related to establishing or abolishing their legislative councils. This, according to critics, weakens the role of states in the amendment process.
  • Parliament's Dominance: A major portion of the Constitution can be amended solely by the Parliament, with state ratification needed only for specific provisions, and even then, only from half the states of India.
  • Deadlock Potential: The absence of a provision for a joint sitting of both houses of Parliament (Lok Sabha & Rajya Sabha) to resolve disputes related to amendment bills can lead to deadlocks situation ,conflicting the amendment process.
  • Uncertainties and Legal Challenges: The lack of definite procedures and details in some aspects of the amendment process leaves room for interpretation and potential legal disagreement . Critics advocated for a more well-defined framework to minimize uncertainties.

Important Amendments in Indian Constitution

AMENDMENTS PROVISIONS
1st  Amendment 1951   The first Amendment Act of 1951 played crucial role by combining the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution. This schedule inserted a list of Central as well as  State laws that are safeguarded  from being challenged in courts.
42nd  Amendment 1976   The 42nd Amendment Act 1976 allowing three new terms i.e. socialist ,secular and integrity to the preamble of constitution of India. Furthermore it also added part 4A Directive Principles of State Policy in the Constitution.
44th  Amendment 1978   The 44th Amendment Act of 1978 replaced the word internal disturbance with armed rebellion under Article-352 Additionally, this amendment removed the Right to Property as Fundamental Right  and made it a legal right under (Article 300A).
73rd  Amendment  1992 The 73rd Amendment Act of 1992 introduced provisions related to Panchayati Raj Institutions.
74th Amendment  1992 The 74th Amendment Act of 1992 introduced provisions related to Urban Local Bodies, such as Municipalities and Municipal Corporations
86th Amendment 2002 The 86th Amendment Act of 2002 assured that the State shall provide free and compulsory elementary  education to all children aged 6 to 14   years of age.
97th  Amendment 2011 The 97th Amendment Act of 2011 provided constitutional status and safeguarding the cooperative societies, recognizing their importance in the socio-economic development of the country.
 101st Amendment 2016 The 101st Amendment Act of 2016 proposed the Goods and Services Tax (GST), an enhanced indirect tax reform aimed at simplifying the tax structure and promoting economic integration and stability.
102nd Amendment 2018 The 102nd Amendment Act of 2018 presented Constitutional Status to the National Commission for the Backward Classes, strengthening the institution's role in safeguarding the rights and interests of backward classes.
103rd Amendment 2019 The 103rd Amendment Act of 2019 proposes a 10% reservation for Economically Weaker Sections (EWS)..
105th Amendment 2021 The 105th Amendment Act of 2021 reestablished the authority of the State Governments to identify Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBCs).
106th Amendment 2023 The 106th Amendment Act of 2023 proposed allotment of one-third of all seats for women in Lok Sabha, State Legislative Assemblies, and the Legislative Assembly of the National Capital Territory of Delhi, including those reserved for SCs and STs.

Conclusion

  • The ability to amend the Indian Constitution stands as a keystone of its continued relevance and effectiveness. This process ensures the Constitution remains adaptable, tending progressive governance and inclusivity. By enabling the recognition of new rights, addressing unforeseen challenges, and facilitating social reform, amendments keep the Constitution in sync with the evolving needs and aspirations of Indian society.
  • These alterations are not mere twists , they shape the very fabric of India's legal framework and governance. They ensure that the Constitution should remain a dynamic document, reflecting the desires, challenges, and changing societal norms of its people. This adaptability guarantees the Constitution's continued significance and effectiveness for generations to come.

References

  1. Online Articles / Sources Referred
  2. net/articles/article-368
  3. org/doc/594125/
  4. ipleaders.in/the-amendment-of-the-constitution-article-368
  5. com/blog/amendment-of-the-constitution/
  1. Cases Referred
    1. Golaknath v. State Of Punjab (AIR 1967 1643 , 1967 SCR (2) 762)
    2. Sri Sankari Prasad Deo v. Union Of India (AIR 1951 S , SCR89)
    3. Kesavananda Bharati v. State Of Kerala (AIR 1973 4 SCC 225)
    4. Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union Of India ( AIR 1980 SC 1789)
  2. Statutes Referred
    1. Article-368 The Constitution Of India , 1949
**Content:** **Author- Priyanshu Tyagi, Mewar Law Institute** ### **India’s Dynamic Constitution: Amending for Change** The Constitution of India, as the keystone of the nation’s legal system, upholds the necessity for adaptation in the dynamic societal circumstances. This adaptability is expediated by Article 368, which exactly prescribes the process for amending the Constitution. This article analyse the concept of constitutional amendments in India, delving into the procedures established , types of amendments, their significance, and the criticisms against them. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*: Article -368 , Amendment Process , Special Majority , State Ratification , Basic Structure Doctrine , Federal Structure** ### **Meaning, Definition & Explanation** - A constitution’s strength often lies in its ability to evolve alongside the society it governs. The Indian Constitution embodies this principle by allowing for amendments. This process involves adding, modifying, or repealing existing provisions while adhering to a well-defined procedure. Amending the Constitution ensures it remains a relevant document, capable of addressing new challenges while preserving its core values. - **Article 368: The Cornerstone of Change** - Recognizing the need for adaptability, the Indian Constitution integrated Article 368 in Part XX. This article establishes the framework for amending the Constitution, outlining the permissible extent and the procedure to be followed. It ensures that changes are made thoughtfully and legitimately. ### **The procedure: Amending India’s Constitution** Article 368 of the Indian Constitution establishes a well-defined procedure for prompting and enacting amendments. Let us discuss the key steps which outlines the established procedure : 1. **Initiation:** The amendment procedure of the Indian Constitution under article-368 initiates with the introduction of a bill in either the Lok Sabha (lower house) or the Rajya Sabha (upper house) of the Parliament. The Parliament retains the sole authority to commence proposals for amending the Constitution. 2. **Presentation of bill:** After its initiation, the amendment bill can be presented by either a minister in government of India or even a private member of the Parliament. It should be noted that prior approval from the President is not a required for such introductions. 3. **Passage Requirements in Both Houses of Parliament** : For an amendment bill to be well enacted as law, it must secure a “special majority” vote in each house of the Parliament. This exacting requirement sanctions approval from two key components: - **Majority of Total Membership:** The amendment bill must reserve a majority vote exceeding fifty percent of the total membership in each house. - **Two-Thirds of Members Present and Voting:** furthermore, it requires the approval of two-thirds of the members who are present and actively cast their votes in each house. 4. **Absence of a Joint Sitting Mechanism for Dispute Resolution:** It is important to note that the Indian Constitution, unlike its approach to resolving disagreements on ordinary bills, does not provide any provision for a joint sitting of both houses of Parliament to address potential disputes concerning an amendment bill. This absence of a joint sitting mechanism signifies that resolving disagreements exclusively relies on negotiations between the houses or the potential desertion of the proposed amendment bill . 5. **State Ratification for Amendments Affecting Federal Structure** **:** The amendment procedure under Article 368 recognizes the rare nature of certain provisions that precisely impact India’s federal structure. For such amendments, a supplementary step beyond parliamentary approval is mandated. In these specific cases, the amendment bill requires ratification by a simple majority vote in the legislatures of at least half of the Indian states. 6. **Presidential Assent:** Once the bill has well passed by both houses of Parliament and secured ratification by the states (if applicable), it is conferred to the President for assent.. The President is bound by law to grant assent and lacks the authority to withhold approval or return the bill for reconsideration. 7. **Becoming Law:** Upon receiving presidential assent, the bill is transformed into a “Constitutional Amendment Act.” This Act serves as the official mechanism for modifying the Constitution, accumulating the proposed changes and becoming an fundamental part of the supreme law of the land. ### **Three Methods for Amending India’s Constitution** Article 368 empowers the Indian Parliament to amend the Constitution through three distinct methods, each tailored to the weight and nature of the proposed change: 1. **Simple Majority:** Established provisions, governed by separate parliamentary procedures, can be modified by a simple majority vote in Parliament. This mark as approval by more than half (50%) of the members present and voting in each house. Examples include changes related to the creation or boundaries of states, or the establishment of legislative councils within states. 2. **Special Majority:** For an extensive range of amendments, a more considerable level of approval is required. This “special majority” entails a subdivided requirement: - First, it requires the support of more than half of the total membership of each house of Parliament (Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha). - Further , it must be approved by two-thirds of the members present and voting in each house of Parliament. This kind of majority encloses amendments to Fundamental Rights, Directive Principles of State Policy, and numerous other provisions not covered by the other methods. 3. **Special Majority with State Ratification:** Amending provisions regarding India’s federal structure entails an additional step. Here, the special majority vote in Parliament must be supported by ratification from half of the state legislatures. Each state legislature votes by a simple majority, means more than half of the members of the parliament present and voted for the same need to approve the amendment. By marking these three separate methods, Article 368 assures that the amendment process is precisely graded to the significance of the changes being proposed. ### **The Unshakeable Core: The Basic Structure Doctrine** The interpretation of the basic structure doctrine serves as a shield, safeguarding the crucial principles of the Indian Constitution from being significantly altered or eliminated through amendments established by Parliament. These fundamental elements constitute the very base of the Indian nation: - **Supremacy of the Constitution:** The Constitution reigns supreme as the highest law of the land. - **Separation of Powers:** Power is divided and balanced between the legislature, executive, and judiciary, preventing any one branch from becoming too powerful. - **Federalism:** India functions as a union of states, with power distributed between the central government and the states. - **Secularism:** The state treats all religions with equal respect and does not Favor any particular faith. - **Democracy:** The government derives its authority from the will of the people. - **Rule of Law:** Everyone, including the government, is subject to the law. Any amendment in the Constitution of India results in weakening the basic structure under this doctrine will smacked down by the apex court and declared as unconstitutional. The basic structure doctrine assures the Constitution remains a stable and enduring foundation for Indian democracy. ### **The Doctrine’s Evolution** The approach regarding doctrine of basic structure has been consolidated through a series of landmark judgments by the Apex Court of India. These proclamations not only established the concept but also civilized its meaning over the period of time. The following provides a glimpse into this historical evolution: - **Shankari Prasad Case (1951):** This case marked the first significant brief with the basic structure doctrine in the legal domain. While the Supreme Court recognised Parliament’s authority to amend the Constitution under Article 368, it did not exactly limit that power. This led to the indication that Parliament could possibly modify any aspect, including fundamental rights. However, the case did not examined deeply the concept of a basic structure, which would be addressed in later judgments. - **Golak Nath Case (1967):** This landmark judgment laid a stronger foundation for the basic structure doctrine. The Supreme Court well-established a crucial principle inheriting the Parliament with power to amend the Constitution does not expand to fundamental rights. The court asserted that these rights are the core aspect of the Constitution and cannot be taken away or limited through amendments. This decision essentially limited Parliament’s power and lead the way for a more persuasive understanding of the basic structure. - **Kesavananda Bharati Case (1973):** Considered as a landmark judgment, the case of Kesavananda Bharati vs state of Kerala challenged the validity of the 24th Constitutional Amendment Act (1971) . This act intent to restrain judicial review of constitutional amendments. The pivotal question before the court was whether the 24th CAA violated the basic structure doctrine and should be struck down. - In its historic ruling, the Supreme Court confirmed that Parliament has power to amend the Constitution but declared it to be limited. The constitutional bench of 13 judges officially introduced the concept of the “basic structure” and its significant role in safeguarding the Constitution’s core principles. ### **The Enduring Relevance of the Amendment Power** India’s vast and dynamic nature necessitates a constitution that can evolve alongside it. The amendment process empowers the constitution to remain relevant and effective in governing the country. Here’s how this adaptability fosters a well-functioning democracy: - **Ensuring Responsive Governance:** Constitution guides governance needs updates for change. Amendments ensure responsive governance, protect emerging rights. Safeguarding the emerging rights is essential for justice. It provides Reflection to society’s evolving understanding. - **Acknowledging and Protecting Emerging Rights:** As the Society changes, the constitution must guard new rights. Amendment process ensures safeguarding of emerging rights in inclusive society. Embracing new rights is crucial for a fair society. Constitution should evolve with society’s view on fundamental rights. - .**Reflecting Evolving Legal Interpretations:** Judicial interpretations of the constitution always evolving, uncovering the new rights within existing provisions. Modern interpretations of right to life and personal liberty expanding to include right to privacy. Amendment process allows formal changes in constitution to align with evolving legal interpretations. It Ensures constitution to stay relevant in changing social landscape. - .**Addressing Unforeseen Challenges:** State adapts to tackle unforeseen issues from rise of social media and online activism. Constitution can be amended to address challenges and safeguard citizens’ rights. This Adaptability empowers state to respond to new realities not anticipated during constitution drafting. - **Promoting Social Progress:** Constitutional reforms break old practices and pave the way for a progressive society. Updates to the constitution reflect the changing values of the governed population. Reforming the constitution can bring about positive social changes. It is important for the constitution to adapt to the people’s evolving aspirations. ### **Concerns Regarding Amending the Indian Constitution** While the amendment process allows the Constitution to adapt, it has also attracted criticism on several fronts: - **Lack of a Specialized Body:** Unlike some nations with dedicated bodies for constitutional amendments, India relies solely on its Parliament and, in specific cases, state legislatures. Critics argue for a dedicated and specialized body to ensure a more intentional and objective approach to amendments. - **Procedural Similarities :** The amendment process features the procedure for passing regular laws, with the exception of a special majority requirement. Critics argue that this correlation could lead to undervaluing constitutional amendments. - **Limited Initiation Power:** The exclusive power to introduce amendments lies with the Parliament itself. State legislatures can only propose amendments related to establishing or abolishing their legislative councils. This, according to critics, weakens the role of states in the amendment process. - **Parliament’s Dominance:** A major portion of the Constitution can be amended solely by the Parliament, with state ratification needed only for specific provisions, and even then, only from half the states of India. - **Deadlock Potential:** The absence of a provision for a joint sitting of both houses of Parliament (Lok Sabha & Rajya Sabha) to resolve disputes related to amendment bills can lead to deadlocks situation ,conflicting the amendment process. - **Uncertainties and Legal Challenges:** The lack of definite procedures and details in some aspects of the amendment process leaves room for interpretation and potential legal disagreement . Critics advocated for a more well-defined framework to minimize uncertainties. ### **Important Amendments in Indian Constitution** **AMENDMENTS****PROVISIONS*****1st Amendment 1951* *The first Amendment Act of 1951 played crucial role by combining the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution. This schedule inserted a list of Central as well as State laws that are safeguarded from being challenged in courts.****42nd Amendment 1976* *The 42nd Amendment Act 1976 allowing three new terms i.e. socialist ,secular and integrity to the preamble of constitution of India. Furthermore it also added part 4A Directive Principles of State Policy in the Constitution.****44th Amendment 1978* *The 44th Amendment Act of 1978 replaced the word internal disturbance with armed rebellion under Article-352 Additionally, this amendment removed the Right to Property as Fundamental Right and made it a legal right under (Article 300A).****73rd Amendment 1992****The 73rd Amendment Act of 1992 introduced provisions related to Panchayati Raj Institutions.* ***74th Amendment 1992****The 74th Amendment Act of 1992 introduced provisions related to Urban Local Bodies, such as Municipalities and Municipal Corporations****86th Amendment 2002****The 86th Amendment Act of 2002 assured that the State shall provide free and compulsory elementary education to all children aged 6 to 14 years of age.* ***97th Amendment 2011****The 97th Amendment Act of 2011 provided constitutional status and safeguarding the cooperative societies, recognizing their importance in the socio-economic development of the country.* ***101st Amendment 2016****The 101st Amendment Act of 2016 proposed the Goods and Services Tax (GST), an enhanced indirect tax reform aimed at simplifying the tax structure and promoting economic integration and stability.****102nd Amendment 2018****The 102nd Amendment Act of 2018 presented Constitutional Status to the National Commission for the Backward Classes, strengthening the institution’s role in safeguarding the rights and interests of backward classes.****103rd Amendment 2019****The 103rd Amendment Act of 2019 proposes a 10% reservation for Economically Weaker Sections (EWS)..****105th Amendment 2021****The 105th Amendment Act of 2021 reestablished the authority of the State Governments to identify Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBCs).****106th Amendment 2023****The 106th Amendment Act of 2023 proposed allotment of one-third of all seats for women in Lok Sabha, State Legislative Assemblies, and the Legislative Assembly of the National Capital Territory of Delhi, including those reserved for SCs and STs.*### **Conclusion** - The ability to amend the Indian Constitution stands as a keystone of its continued relevance and effectiveness. This process ensures the Constitution remains adaptable, tending progressive governance and inclusivity. By enabling the recognition of new rights, addressing unforeseen challenges, and facilitating social reform, amendments keep the Constitution in sync with the evolving needs and aspirations of Indian society. - These alterations are not mere twists , they shape the very fabric of India’s legal framework and governance. They ensure that the Constitution should remain a dynamic document, reflecting the desires, challenges, and changing societal norms of its people. This adaptability guarantees the Constitution’s continued significance and effectiveness for generations to come. ### **References** 1. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 2. *net/articles/article-368* 3. *org/doc/594125/* 4. *ipleaders.in/the-amendment-of-the-constitution-article-368* 5. *com/blog/amendment-of-the-constitution***/** 2. **Cases Referred** 1. *Golaknath v. State Of Punjab (AIR 1967 1643 , 1967 SCR (2) 762)* 2. *Sri Sankari Prasad Deo v. Union Of India (AIR 1951 S , SCR89)* 3. *Kesavananda Bharati v. State Of Kerala (AIR 1973 4 SCC 225)* 4. *Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union Of India ( AIR 1980 SC 1789)* 3. **Statutes Referred** 1. *Article-368 The Constitution Of India , 1949* **Categories:** Articles --- ### [Volenti Non Fit Injuria as a Defence Under Law of Torts](https://lawfoyer.in/volenti-non-fit-injuria-as-a-defence-under-law-of-torts/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Chitra, University Five Year Law College, University of Rajasthan

INTRODUCTION

The expression" Volenti non-fit injuria" means “Injury isn't done to a willing person.” First, let's understand what a tort is. The term" tort" originates from the Latin term " Tortum," which means" to twist." therefore, a tort refers to conduct that's  crooked, crooked, and unlawful, original to the English term ‘wrong.’ Salmond states," Tort is a civil wrong for which the remedy is a common law action for unliquidated damages and which isn't  simply the breach of contract or the breach of a trust or other  simply  indifferent obligation." When the complainant initiates legal action against the defendant for a specific tort, establishing the actuality of all the essential rudiments of that tort, the defendant becomes liable. still, certain vittles can vindicate the defendant from liability, known as general defences. There are eight general defences in the law of torts, and “volenti non-fit injuria”  is one of them. This legal sentential guards defendants in tort cases, allowing them to argue that the complainant, by their own choice, willingly assumed the pitfalls associated with a particular exertion or circumstance. The operation of this doctrine depends on demonstrating that the complainant was apprehensive of the implicit detriment and freely accepted the associated pitfalls.

Meaning and Explanation

It is also known as Defence of Consent. The doctrine of Volenti non-fit injuria means that “no injury is done to a willing person.”  It implies that if a person willingly  warrants to the infliction of  detriment upon themselves, they aren't entitled to any remedies under the Law of Torts. Any  detriment suffered freely by an  existent doesn't amount to legal injury, and  thus, it isn't  practicable under the law of torts. When a complainant gives  concurrence to suffer  detriment upon themselves, they aren't entitled to remedies, and their  concurrence acts as a valid defence for the defendants. For  illustration, if A invites B to their home for  regale, A cannot sue B for trespass because A has willingly foisted  detriment upon themselves. still, it should be noted that an act causing  detriment mustn't exceed the limits of the  concurrence given. In the game of football, players  indicate  concurrence to the normal course of injuries, but it doesn't mean they cannot sue for deliberate injuries caused by other players. A person who freely agrees to the publication of  scandalous matter cannot bring an action for  vilification. No  existent can  apply a right that they've freely waived or abandoned. concurrence to waive one's right can be expressed or  inferred. For the defence of Volenti non-fit injuria to be available, the defendants must prove that the complainant was completely  apprehensive of the  pitfalls involved and their extent. Bare knowledge of the  threat isn't sufficient; the complainant must give  concurrence to sustain that  detriment. The defence of Volenti non-fit injuria was successfully invoked in the case of Padmavati v Dugganika. In this case, two  non-natives took a lift in a jeep while the  motorist was going to fill petrol. suddenly, one of the bolts fixing the right front wheel came out, performing in the two  nonnatives being thrown out of the jeep and seriously injured. One of them indeed  failed as a consequence of the incident. The court held that neither the  motorist nor the  proprietor of the jeep was liable for two reasons first, it was a clear accident, and second, the  non-natives freely entered the jeep, allowing the defence of Volenti non-fit injuria to be successfully  contended. Also, when a trespasser is  apprehensive of the presence of spring  ordnance, they aren't entitled to recover damages if they're injured by those spring  ordnance.

Essentials Elements of Volenti non-fit injura

  1. Defence of consent-
The defence of concurrence, also known as volenti non-fit injuria, is a legal principle where a person who freely warrants the threat of detriment cannot claim damages if they suffer any detriment as a result of the threat they deliberately and willingly accepted. For this defence to succeed, the defendant must prove that the descendant
  • Had full knowledge of the nature and extent of the threat involved
  • Freely accepted the threat with no pressure or compulsion
  • Wasn't under any disability or internal incapability
 Case Hall v. Brooklands Auto Racing Club In this case, the complainant attended a motor auto race held at Brooklands. During the race, a collision passed between two buses, and the observers, including the complainant, were hit, resulting in the complainant's injury. The defendant company that possessed the tracks was sued. The courts held that since the threat was nicely foreseeable, considering the dangerous nature of the sport, the defendant company isn't liable. Case Padmavathi and Ors. v. Dugganaika and Ors.( 1974)  In this case, two non-natives freely accepted a lift in a jeep. Suddenly, due to a mechanical disfigurement, the jeep stumbled, and they sustained injuries. The motorist and proprietor of the jeep were sued. The court held that since the complainants willingly took the lift and the accident wasn't nicely foreseeable, the defendants weren't liable.
  1. Consent Should Not have been given on the basis of Tort or under any compulsion- (i.e consent is not obtained by fraud)
Case:- R v. Williams The defendant, who was the teenage plaintiff's singing schoolteacher, engaged in sexual exertion with her, falsely claiming that his conduct was a system of remedying her breathing and perfecting her singing. The girl agreed to the exertion, under the belief that it was a medical or surgical intervention. The defendant was condemned to rape. He appealed the conviction, arguing that the plaintiff had acceded. The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, stating that the defendant had deceived the plaintiff regarding the nature and quality of his conduct by leading her to believe they weren't sexual. thus, the plaintiff didn't give valid concurrence, as her concurrence was attained through fraud.
  1. No liability only for Consented Act
Take Lakshmi Rajan v Malar Hospital Ltd for example; A 40-year-old woman working at Malar Hospital Ltd found a lump in her pelvis. It does not affect the size of the uterus removed unprotected during surgery. The court said that nursing home officials were responsible for the deficiencies in services. It was also determined that her consent to the surgery was not her consent to the removal of her uterus.
  1. Limitations to this doctrine
  • Rescue Cases
It appears that the defence in this case is  the doctrine of "voluntary compensation", which is a legal right given to the person who receives a threat of damage, and cannot demand compensation for the damage. Disclosures of information are generally considered an exception to this protection. Because a person who enters a dangerous situation to save others during a rescue is not considered to have voluntarily assumed the risk of harm. Instead, the truck driver is deemed reasonable and reasonable and is generally not precluded from receiving compensation for any injuries they suffer. Case - Haynes v Harwood The complainant was police officer Bobby, who worked at a police station on a busy road that was often crowded with people, including children. The defendant had two wagons left on the same road. After the damaged truck, the driver pulled a rope to the bus. For some reason, they rushed out onto the busy road in a minibus, apparently because the grave was thrown onto the horses. Officer Bobby saw them at the police station, got out of his car and tried to stop them but was injured and demanded payment for the damage. The King's Bench ruled against the plaintiff. The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court. A no-injury verdict will not help Police Officer Bobby claim compensation for the injuries he suffered because he refused to acknowledge the threats but followed the legal bridge.
  • Scienti non-fit Injuria
Case -Smith v. Charles Baker and Sons The complainant was a contractor working for the defendant's construction company and was injured on the job. The monument was removed from the plan of the crane and the complainant left the street when he saw the men lift the monument over his head. A colleague began to raise concerns about the dangers of lifting the monument up, and the complainant himself told the crane operator that it was unsafe. Despite these warnings, the complainant hit the shaft while working on the drilling machine, causing serious injuries. There was no warning that the grave would lean in this direction. The plaintiff's complaint was that he was aiming for a hammer and that he was not in a position to protect himself. The tombstone was hung over his head negligently and did not receive enough attention, causing him to fall. At the hearing in the City Courthouse, the defendant's attorney argued that the plaintiff chose to do the job and was concerned about the problem that arose. still, the jury made several findings (1) the machine used for  rooting  the  monuments from the  slice wasn't suitable for the task; (2) the failure to  give an alarm system during gravestone lifting was a fault in the  system, job,  ministry, and planning; (3) the employer or any person responsible for addressing  similar issues was careless in not addressing the  disfigurement; (4) the complainant wasn't careless and didn't willingly accept the  parlous employment with knowledge of its implicit  detriment. The Court of Appeal upheld the appeal primarily because there was no  substantiation of wrongdoing on the part of the defendants. The complainant  also appealed to the House of Lords.

Conclusion

The doctrine of volenti non-fit injuria holds a significant position in the general defence within the realm of tort law. Defendants can  use this doctrine to  vindicate themselves of liability by demonstrating that the complainant willingly acceded to the same. still, certain essential conditions must be met for the doctrine to be successfully applied.   In conclusion, the defence grounded on this doctrine isn't comprehensive but rather has a limited  compass. There are situations where the  operation of volenti non-fit injuria can be  barred,  similar as when the defendant is careless. The limitations mentioned  over in the paper further  circumscribe its  connection. Overall, the defence of volenti non-fit injuria proves to be an effective means of escaping liability.

REFERENCES

Books- R.K. Bangia, The Law of torts E resources:- **Content:** **Author –** Chitra**, (University Five Year Law College, University of Rajasthan)** ### **INTRODUCTION** The expression*” Volenti non-fit injuria”* means **“Injury isn’t done to a willing person.”** First, let’s understand what a tort is. The term” tort” originates from the Latin term ” Tortum,” which means” to twist.” therefore, a tort refers to conduct that’s crooked, crooked, and unlawful, original to the English term ‘wrong.’ **Salmond** states,” Tort is a civil wrong for which the remedy is a common law action for unliquidated damages and which isn’t simply the breach of contract or the breach of a trust or other simply indifferent obligation.” When the complainant initiates legal action against the defendant for a specific tort, establishing the actuality of all the essential rudiments of that tort, the defendant becomes liable. still, certain vittles can vindicate the defendant from liability, known as general defences. There are eight general defences in the law of torts, and “volenti non-fit injuria” is one of them. This legal sentential guards defendants in tort cases, allowing them to argue that the complainant, by their own choice, willingly assumed the pitfalls associated with a particular exertion or circumstance. The operation of this doctrine depends on demonstrating that the complainant was apprehensive of the implicit detriment and freely accepted the associated pitfalls. ### **Meaning and Explanation** It is also known as Defence of Consent. The doctrine of Volenti non-fit injuria means that “no injury is done to a willing person.” It implies that if a person willingly warrants to the infliction of detriment upon themselves, they aren’t entitled to any remedies under the Law of Torts. Any detriment suffered freely by an existent doesn’t amount to legal injury, and thus, it isn’t practicable under the law of torts. When a complainant gives concurrence to suffer detriment upon themselves, they aren’t entitled to remedies, and their concurrence acts as a valid defence for the defendants. For illustration, if A invites B to their home for regale, A cannot sue B for trespass because A has willingly foisted detriment upon themselves. still, it should be noted that an act causing detriment mustn’t exceed the limits of the concurrence given. In the game of football, players indicate concurrence to the normal course of injuries, but it doesn’t mean they cannot sue for deliberate injuries caused by other players. A person who freely agrees to the publication of scandalous matter cannot bring an action for vilification. No existent can apply a right that they’ve freely waived or abandoned. concurrence to waive one’s right can be expressed or inferred. For the defence of Volenti non-fit injuria to be available, the defendants must prove that the complainant was completely apprehensive of the pitfalls involved and their extent. Bare knowledge of the threat isn’t sufficient; the complainant must give concurrence to sustain that detriment. The defence of Volenti non-fit injuria was successfully invoked in the case of Padmavati v Dugganika. In this case, two non-natives took a lift in a jeep while the motorist was going to fill petrol. suddenly, one of the bolts fixing the right front wheel came out, performing in the two nonnatives being thrown out of the jeep and seriously injured. One of them indeed failed as a consequence of the incident. The court held that neither the motorist nor the proprietor of the jeep was liable for two reasons first, it was a clear accident, and second, the non-natives freely entered the jeep, allowing the defence of Volenti non-fit injuria to be successfully contended. Also, when a trespasser is apprehensive of the presence of spring ordnance, they aren’t entitled to recover damages if they’re injured by those spring ordnance. ### **Essentials Elements of Volenti non-fit injura** 1. **Defence of consent-** The defence of concurrence, also known as volenti non-fit injuria, is a legal principle where a person who freely warrants the threat of detriment cannot claim damages if they suffer any detriment as a result of the threat they deliberately and willingly accepted. For this defence to succeed, the defendant must prove that the descendant - Had full knowledge of the nature and extent of the threat involved - Freely accepted the threat with no pressure or compulsion - Wasn’t under any disability or internal incapability **Case Hall v. Brooklands Auto Racing Club** In this case, the complainant attended a motor auto race held at Brooklands. During the race, a collision passed between two buses, and the observers, including the complainant, were hit, resulting in the complainant’s injury. The defendant company that possessed the tracks was sued. The courts held that since the threat was nicely foreseeable, considering the dangerous nature of the sport, the defendant company isn’t liable. **Case Padmavathi and Ors. v. Dugganaika and Ors.( 1974)** In this case, two non-natives freely accepted a lift in a jeep. Suddenly, due to a mechanical disfigurement, the jeep stumbled, and they sustained injuries. The motorist and proprietor of the jeep were sued. The court held that since the complainants willingly took the lift and the accident wasn’t nicely foreseeable, the defendants weren’t liable. 2. **Consent Should Not have been given on the basis of Tort or under any compulsion- (i.e consent is not obtained by fraud)** **Case:- R v. Williams** The defendant, who was the teenage plaintiff’s singing schoolteacher, engaged in sexual exertion with her, falsely claiming that his conduct was a system of remedying her breathing and perfecting her singing. The girl agreed to the exertion, under the belief that it was a medical or surgical intervention. The defendant was condemned to rape. He appealed the conviction, arguing that the plaintiff had acceded. The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, stating that the defendant had deceived the plaintiff regarding the nature and quality of his conduct by leading her to believe they weren’t sexual. thus, the plaintiff didn’t give valid concurrence, as her concurrence was attained through fraud. 3. **No liability only for Consented Act** Take Lakshmi Rajan v Malar Hospital Ltd for example; A 40-year-old woman working at Malar Hospital Ltd found a lump in her pelvis. It does not affect the size of the uterus removed unprotected during surgery. The court said that nursing home officials were responsible for the deficiencies in services. It was also determined that her consent to the surgery was not her consent to the removal of her uterus. 4. **Limitations to this doctrine** - **Rescue Cases** It appears that the defence in this case is the doctrine of “voluntary compensation”, which is a legal right given to the person who receives a threat of damage, and cannot demand compensation for the damage. Disclosures of information are generally considered an exception to this protection. Because a person who enters a dangerous situation to save others during a rescue is not considered to have voluntarily assumed the risk of harm. Instead, the truck driver is deemed reasonable and reasonable and is generally not precluded from receiving compensation for any injuries they suffer. **Case – Haynes v Harwood** The complainant was police officer Bobby, who worked at a police station on a busy road that was often crowded with people, including children. The defendant had two wagons left on the same road. After the damaged truck, the driver pulled a rope to the bus. For some reason, they rushed out onto the busy road in a minibus, apparently because the grave was thrown onto the horses. Officer Bobby saw them at the police station, got out of his car and tried to stop them but was injured and demanded payment for the damage. The King’s Bench ruled against the plaintiff. The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court. A no-injury verdict will not help Police Officer Bobby claim compensation for the injuries he suffered because he refused to acknowledge the threats but followed the legal bridge. - **Scienti non-fit Injuria** **Case -Smith v. Charles Baker and Sons** The complainant was a contractor working for the defendant’s construction company and was injured on the job. The monument was removed from the plan of the crane and the complainant left the street when he saw the men lift the monument over his head. A colleague began to raise concerns about the dangers of lifting the monument up, and the complainant himself told the crane operator that it was unsafe. Despite these warnings, the complainant hit the shaft while working on the drilling machine, causing serious injuries. There was no warning that the grave would lean in this direction. The plaintiff’s complaint was that he was aiming for a hammer and that he was not in a position to protect himself. The tombstone was hung over his head negligently and did not receive enough attention, causing him to fall. At the hearing in the City Courthouse, the defendant’s attorney argued that the plaintiff chose to do the job and was concerned about the problem that arose. still, the jury made several findings (1) the machine used for rooting the monuments from the slice wasn’t suitable for the task; (2) the failure to give an alarm system during gravestone lifting was a fault in the system, job, ministry, and planning; (3) the employer or any person responsible for addressing similar issues was careless in not addressing the disfigurement; (4) the complainant wasn’t careless and didn’t willingly accept the parlous employment with knowledge of its implicit detriment. The Court of Appeal upheld the appeal primarily because there was no substantiation of wrongdoing on the part of the defendants. The complainant also appealed to the House of Lords. ### **Conclusion** The doctrine of volenti non-fit injuria holds a significant position in the general defence within the realm of tort law. Defendants can use this doctrine to vindicate themselves of liability by demonstrating that the complainant willingly acceded to the same. still, certain essential conditions must be met for the doctrine to be successfully applied. In conclusion, the defence grounded on this doctrine isn’t comprehensive but rather has a limited compass. There are situations where the operation of volenti non-fit injuria can be barred, similar as when the defendant is careless. The limitations mentioned over in the paper further circumscribe its connection. Overall, the defence of volenti non-fit injuria proves to be an effective means of escaping liability. ### **REFERENCES** Books- R.K. Bangia, The Law of torts E resources:- - - - [manupatra.com](http://www.manupatra.com) - **Categories:** Articles --- ### [Dina Nath Chamar & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Anr ](https://lawfoyer.in/dina-nath-chamar-ors-vs-state-of-bihar-anr/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE This case analysis delves into the significant legal proceedings of “Dina Nath Chamar & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Anr.” The Patna High Court’s judgment, dated 7th March 2017, hinges on the critical interpretation and application of Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.). This landmark judgment highlights the court’s power to summon witnesses or documents at any trial stage to ensure a just decision, stressing the paramount importance of truth and justice in legal proceedings. Keywords: Dina Nath Chamar & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Anr, Section 311 Cr.P.C., Witness Summons, Judicial Discretion, Criminal Procedure, Fair Trial. ## CASE DETAILS i) Judgment Cause Title: Dina Nath Chamar & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Anr ii) Case Number: Criminal Miscellaneous No.3048 of 2016 iii) Judgement Date: 7 March 2017 iv) Court: High Court of Judicature at Patna v) Quorum: Shivaji Pandey vi) Author: Shivaji Pandey vii) Citation: \[2017\] INSC 184 viii) Legal Provisions Involved: Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ## INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The High Court of Patna, in its judgment on the 7th March 2017, addressed the pivotal issue of the application of Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. in the case of Dina Nath Chamar & Ors versus the State Of Bihar & Anr. This provision grants courts discretionary power to summon or recall witnesses at any stage of a criminal trial, highlighting its utility in ensuring a fair trial. ## FACTS OF THE CASE The case originated from an incident on 8th June 1989, where an alarm was raised about dacoits entering a house in Chauri village. Ram Vinay Singh, while rushing to his home, noticed several individuals, including the petitioners, allegedly involved in the theft of a gun. The police, after investigation, charged the petitioners and commenced the trial as Sessions Trial No. 23 of 2014. During the trial, the prosecution sought to summon Gajadhar Singh, a witness, and exhibit his gun license under Section 311 Cr.P.C. ## LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. The primary legal issue was the application of Section 311 Cr.P.C. for summoning a witness and a document (gun license) at a belated trial stage. ## PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS i. The counsels for the Petitioners/Appellants argued against the late summoning of the witness and the document, stating it was an attempt to fill lacunae in the prosecution’s case, which is not permissible under law. ## RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS i. The State, supporting the summoning of the witness and document, argued that this action was necessary for a just decision, emphasizing the broader objective of Section 311 Cr.P.C. in uncovering the truth. ## RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. Section 311 Cr.P.C. – Power to summon material witness or examine person present at any stage of any inquiry, trial, or other proceeding. ## JUDGEMENT a. RATIO DECIDENDI i. Justice Shivaji Pandey, analyzing Section 311 Cr.P.C., emphasized the court’s discretion and duty to summon any material witness or document when essential for a just decision. The judgment upheld the principle that the pursuit of truth and justice in criminal trials takes precedence over procedural lapses or delays. b. OBITER DICTA (IF ANY) i. The judgment reiterated that the power under Section 311 should not be used to compensate for the prosecution’s inefficiencies or to harass the accused unfairly. ## CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment of Dina Nath Chamar & Ors vs State Of Bihar & Anr underscores the essentiality of Section 311 Cr.P.C. in the Indian legal system as a tool for ensuring justice. It emphasizes that the primary objective of any criminal trial is the discovery of truth and fair administration of justice, even if it requires recalling witnesses or documents at a late stage of the trial. ## REFERENCES a. Important Cases Referred i. Mohanlal Shamji Soni Vs. Union of India & Anr. \[1991\] INSC 280 ii. Rajendra Prasad Vs. Narcotic Cell \[1999\] INSC 350 iii. Zahira Habibullah Sheikh (5) & Anr. Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. \[2006\] INSC 119 b. Important Statutes Referred i. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 311 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Criminal Law Cases --- ### [Schools of Jurisprudence](https://lawfoyer.in/schools-of-jurisprudence-2/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ### Schools of Jurisprudence: An In-Depth Analysis #### Introduction Jurisprudence, the science or philosophy of law, encompasses various schools, each presenting a unique perspective on the legal framework. This analysis delves into the intricacies of different schools of jurisprudence, providing a comprehensive understanding of their foundational concepts and significant contributions. #### The Philosophical School of Jurisprudence **Hugo Grotius (1583-1645)** - **Concept of Natural Law**: Grotius, considered the father of the philosophical school, introduced the concept of natural law derived from man’s social nature and intrinsic sense of righteousness. - **Secularization of Law**: He played a pivotal role in detaching law from theology, emphasizing natural law as a product of eternal reason, independent of theistic beliefs. - **Key Principles**: His natural law focused on societal harmony, emphasizing principles like respecting others’ rights, fulfilling promises, and administering just punishment. **Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804)** - **Critical Method**: Kant’s approach marked a shift from empirical methods to focusing on human consciousness as the basis of rationality and morality. - **Categorical Imperative**: His concept emphasized ethical postulates, stressing the freedom of self-determination. **Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814)** - **Transcendental Idealism**: Fichte’s philosophy highlighted the role of human consciousness in shaping perceptions, advocating for human activism and the power of intelligence. - **Legal Philosophy**: He saw law as a means to harmonize individual freedoms, stressing mutual respect among free individuals. **George Del Vecchio** - **Law’s Concept vs. Ideal**: Del Vecchio distinguished between the concept of law (objective coordination based on ethical principles) and the ideal of law (its qualitative progress towards autonomy). - **Evolutionary Perspective**: He viewed law as a phenomenon of nature, emphasizing its evolution and individualization. **Hegel (1770-1831)** - **Evolutionary State and Law**: Hegel introduced the concept of evolution in social life, including law, as a dynamic process involving thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. - **Law as an Instrument of Freedom**: He argued that law facilitates freedom, not in the sense of unrestrained action but as a life governed by reason and respect for others. #### The Historical School of Jurisprudence **Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861)** - **Law as Organic Growth**: Savigny opposed codification, emphasizing law as a product of a nation’s spirit and a manifestation of the general consciousness. - **Stages of Legal Development**: He outlined the progression from spontaneous law development to jurists’ technical refinement. - **Opposition to Codification**: Savigny argued that codification hampers law’s natural growth, advocating for law to conform to popular consciousness. 1. **George Fredrick Puchta (1798-1856)** - **Evolution of Law**: Puchta expanded on Savigny’s theories, linking law’s origin to the conflict between individual and general will, eventually forming the state. - **Customary Law Superiority**: He regarded customary law as the truest expression of people’s convictions. **Joseph Kohler (1849-1919)** - **Cultural Aspect of Law**: Kohler emphasized law’s role in cultural evolution, advocating adaptability to changing societal conditions. - **Synthesis of Individualism and Collectivism**: He called for balancing individual freedom with social cohesion, recognizing the need for cooperative effort. #### The Analytical School of Jurisprudence 1. **John Austin** - **Law as Sovereign Command**: Austin defined law as a command from a sovereign, enforceable through sanctions. - **Generality of Law**: He emphasized that only general commands qualify as law. - **Critique of Austin’s Theory**: Critics argue that Austin’s theory overlooks customs, judge-made law, and lacks a place for laws conferring privileges. **Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832)** - **Founder of Modern Positivism**: Bentham introduced utilitarianism, defining law in terms of its utility in maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain. - **Codification and Legal Reforms**: He advocated for systematic law reform and codification, criticizing judge-made law. **H.L. Hart** - **Critique of Austin’s Conception**: Hart rejected the notion of law solely based on coercive orders, proposing a dual system of primary and secondary rules. - **Primary and Secondary Rules**: Primary rules impose duties, while secondary rules relate to the creation, change, and application of primary rules. - **Rule of Recognition**: Hart introduced this concept as a standard for identifying valid laws within a legal system. #### Conclusion The diverse schools of jurisprudence offer rich perspectives on understanding law and its evolution. From Grotius’ natural law to Hart’s rule of recognition, each school contributes significantly to our comprehension of legal systems. Their collective insights form a robust foundation for legal scholarship and practice, underscoring law’s dynamic and multifaceted nature. **Categories:** Articles, Jurisprudence --- ### [COPYRIGHT UNDER THE COPYRIGHTS ACT, 1957](https://lawfoyer.in/copyright-under-the-copyrights-act-1957/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Samruddhi Naik,St. Wilfred's College of Law, Panvel

INTRODUCTION

             Copyright is the sum of literary and artistic work. Intellectual creation of work such as electronic databases, music, literature, sculptures and paintings are protected with copyright. Copyright is the shield that defends the exclusive rights of the creator of the intellectual artistic work. It is an encouragement and relief to the artists, producers, composers and authors to create original work. Copyright is governed by the international convention i.e. Berne Convention, it is the oldest international convention providing protection to copyright. Keywords: copyright, exclusive rights, moral rights, intellectual property, original work, berne convention

 Meaning

    Copyright protects the rights of the inventors of artistic and literary work by providing them exclusive rights. Copyright protects the works which is novel and showcase the ‘expression of thoughts’. As mentioned above Copyright is regulated by ‘Berne Convention’ which was first assembled in 1886 to protect the work (artistic and literary) and rights of the authors. Copyright need not to be registered as it is protected upon its invention. Copyright tops the list of the other items which comprise Intellectual property. Copyright law provides various rights to the creator such as moral rights and economic rights.

International Agreements Concerning Copyrights

  • Berne Convention, 1886
Berne convention is a treaty that was first established in 1886, with the intention to protect the literary and artistic work along with derivative work. Under this convention, the work is protected for 50 years from the end of the year of the author’s death. But in the case of photographic work the term of protection is 25 years from the work created
  • TRIPS Agreement, 1994
As literary and artistic work is protected under Berne Convention, TRIPS Agreement ensures to protect the computer programs and provide guidelines to protect databases under Berne Convention.
  • WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), 1996
WCT is a special agreement under Berne Convention established to deal with protection of work and rights of authors in digital era.
  • The Marrakesh Treaty, 2013
The Marrakesh Treaty was established in the year 2013 by World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) with the intention of providing access of published work to the people who are visually impaired, blind or print disabled.

Essentials of Copyright

  • Novelty
Copyright only determines original work. No one can claim copyright in case of duplicate or similar work.
  • Expression of thoughts
As mentioned before, the expression of thoughts is the most essential element as the copyright focuses on protecting the ‘expression of thoughts’ and not just an ‘idea’.
  • Registration
Though the work is protected upon creation, it is always beneficial to register the work.

Types of work covered under copyright

  • Literary work i.e. Books, Novels, Articles etc
  • Artistic work i.e. Paintings, Sculptures etc
  • Derivative work i.e. Adaptations and Translations of existing copyrighted work
  • Musical compositions i.e. Songs, Tunes, Music albums
  • Computer programs & compilations i.e. Software, Databases etc

Rights protected by copyright

  • Economic rights- Economic rights are those rights through which the owner of rights can receive monetary benefit from the use of his work by others. They are transferable and can be assigned ownership rights to others for a sum of money or royalties.
  • Moral rights- Moral rights are the rights that always reside with the owner of the work. They are non-transferable, unlike economic rights. Moral rights protect the integrity of the author of the work.

Infringement of copyrights

Section 51 of the Act deals with infringement of copyright. Infringement of copyright means any person without any license exercises the rights of the owner of the work without taking him/her into consideration. Basically, un-authorized use of someone’s legitimate work is said to be infringement of work.

Remedies against infringement

The legal maxim ‘Ubi jus ibi remediem’ (where there is a right, there is a remedy) plays a vital role in justifying the remedies against infringement of copyright. There are 3 major remedies provided against infringement of copyright and they are as follows: -
  • Civil Remedies
  • Criminal Remedies
  • Administrative Remedies
In a Civil suit, the remedy is granted to the Copyright holder when the infringer is found guilty. Also, Infringement of copyright is not only a civil wrong, but it is an offence and hence, the legitimate holder of copyright can file a criminal suit in which the infringer can be punishable imprisonment or fine or both. Whereas the grant of administrative remedy vest with the Regulatory Copyright Authority.

CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

Copyright plays a vital role in the life of a creator. Creation of a tune, a literature or a software takes a lot of intellectual effort which needs to be protected. Among other items in the list of intellectual property, Copyright safeguards the rights of creators and encourage them to create original work. **Content:** **Author-Samruddhi Naik,St. Wilfred’s College of Law, Panvel** ### **INTRODUCTION** Copyright is the sum of literary and artistic work. Intellectual creation of work such as electronic databases, music, literature, sculptures and paintings are protected with copyright. Copyright is the shield that defends the exclusive rights of the creator of the intellectual artistic work. It is an encouragement and relief to the artists, producers, composers and authors to create original work. Copyright is governed by the international convention i.e. Berne Convention, it is the oldest international convention providing protection to copyright. ***Keywords*:** copyright, exclusive rights, moral rights, intellectual property, original work, berne convention ### **Meaning** Copyright protects the rights of the inventors of artistic and literary work by providing them exclusive rights. Copyright protects the works which is novel and showcase the ‘expression of thoughts’. As mentioned above Copyright is regulated by ‘Berne Convention’ which was first assembled in 1886 to protect the work (artistic and literary) and rights of the authors. Copyright need not to be registered as it is protected upon its invention. Copyright tops the list of the other items which comprise Intellectual property. Copyright law provides various rights to the creator such as moral rights and economic rights. ### **International Agreements Concerning Copyrights** - **Berne Convention, 1886** Berne convention is a treaty that was first established in 1886, with the intention to protect the literary and artistic work along with derivative work. Under this convention, the work is protected for 50 years from the end of the year of the author’s death. But in the case of photographic work the term of protection is 25 years from the work created - **TRIPS Agreement, 1994** As literary and artistic work is protected under Berne Convention, TRIPS Agreement ensures to protect the computer programs and provide guidelines to protect databases under Berne Convention. - **WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), 1996** WCT is a special agreement under Berne Convention established to deal with protection of work and rights of authors in digital era. - **The Marrakesh Treaty, 2013** The Marrakesh Treaty was established in the year 2013 by World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) with the intention of providing access of published work to the people who are visually impaired, blind or print disabled. ### **Essentials of Copyright** - **Novelty** Copyright only determines original work. No one can claim copyright in case of duplicate or similar work. - **Expression of thoughts** As mentioned before, the expression of thoughts is the most essential element as the copyright focuses on protecting the ‘expression of thoughts’ and not just an ‘idea’. - **Registration** Though the work is protected upon creation, it is always beneficial to register the work. ### **Types of work covered under copyright** - Literary work i.e. Books, Novels, Articles etc - Artistic work i.e. Paintings, Sculptures etc - Derivative work i.e. Adaptations and Translations of existing copyrighted work - Musical compositions i.e. Songs, Tunes, Music albums - Computer programs & compilations i.e. Software, Databases etc ### **Rights protected by copyright** - **Economic rights-** Economic rights are those rights through which the owner of rights can receive monetary benefit from the use of his work by others. They are transferable and can be assigned ownership rights to others for a sum of money or royalties. - **Moral rights-** Moral rights are the rights that always reside with the owner of the work. They are non-transferable, unlike economic rights. Moral rights protect the integrity of the author of the work. ### **Infringement of copyrights** Section 51 of the Act deals with infringement of copyright. Infringement of copyright means any person without any license exercises the rights of the owner of the work without taking him/her into consideration. Basically, un-authorized use of someone’s legitimate work is said to be infringement of work. ### **Remedies against infringement** The legal maxim ‘*Ubi jus ibi remediem*’ (where there is a right, there is a remedy) plays a vital role in justifying the remedies against infringement of copyright. There are 3 major remedies provided against infringement of copyright and they are as follows: – - **Civil Remedies** - **Criminal Remedies** - **Administrative Remedies** In a Civil suit, the remedy is granted to the Copyright holder when the infringer is found guilty. Also, Infringement of copyright is not only a civil wrong, but it is an offence and hence, the legitimate holder of copyright can file a criminal suit in which the infringer can be punishable imprisonment or fine or both. Whereas the grant of administrative remedy vest with the Regulatory Copyright Authority. ### **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** Copyright plays a vital role in the life of a creator. Creation of a tune, a literature or a software takes a lot of intellectual effort which needs to be protected. Among other items in the list of intellectual property, Copyright safeguards the rights of creators and encourage them to create original work. **Categories:** Articles, Intellectual Property Law --- ### [SPECIAL MARRIAGE ACT,1954](https://lawfoyer.in/special-marriage-act1954/) **Published:** April 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author-Masooma Naqvi, Amity University, Uttar Pradesh INTRODUCTION India is a country of replete history and culture, which often find themselves intertwined with each other. It is home to 7 major religions of the world and various others. With the kind of diversity that is prevalent in India, it will not be possible nor correct to establish boundaries for love and limit them to one's own religion. Unfortunately, so was not the mindset of the architectures of personal laws. Religion became one of the biggest barriers to love. In most personal laws, be it The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or Sharia which is the codified law for Muslims, inter-faith and even inter-cast marriages are prohibited and are not considered to be valid. These marriages are not formally recognized, which further adds to the deprivation of rights that a married couple is entitled to. Some of these rights include adoption, inheritance, etc. It was through the Special Marriage Act of 1954, that these restrictions were lifted to give love a fair chance. Keywords- Marriage, Inter-Faith, Inter-Caste, Certificate, Personal Autonomy

Meaning, Definition & Explanation

Special Marriage Act permits people belonging to different religions to come together into a bond of marriage. It also upholds the spirit of secularism which is laid down in the constitution and also instills the quality of tolerance among individuals. The Act was passed in 1954 and made on the lines of colonialism, as the legislation was first passed in 1872. Later, when India gained independence the Special Marriage Act of 1954 was passed for newly independent India. The act is a ray of hope for inter-faith couples especially those who struggle to get their marriages recognized by personal laws. The most distinctive feature of the act lies in its inclusivity. It is also open to intra-faith couples to register their marriages outside of their personal laws. It also seeks to give legal status and protection to the marriage of those who are barred by religion and caste. IMPORTANT PROVISIONS- The act extends to the whole of India. It also includes Indian citizens domiciled elsewhere. There are certain requirements that the act requires-                                                                Section 4 of the act talks about these requirements. The marriages do not require any specific religious ceremony to enter into a bond of marriage under this act, however, that choice is upon the individuals to decide. The marriage is entered into in the form of a civil contract. For the purpose of the act, the State Government has the power to appoint one or more marriage officers by notification in the official gazette as mentioned under Section 3 of the Indian Marriage Act of 1954. There are certain requirements that the act lays down                                                               Section 4 of the act talks about these requirements. these include the following:- a] Neither of the parties should have a "living spouse"- The first subclause states that the parties of this union must not already be married to someone who is alive. b] (i) Neither party is “incapable of giving a valid consent to it in consequence of unsoundness of mind[1]”- The parties to the union must be of sound mind in the sense that they should give their valid consent for the union.                                                              (ii) Neither party is though capable of giving valid consent, has been suffering from mental disorder of such a kind or to such an extent as to be unfit for marriage and the procreation of children; - The parties must be competent to enter into the union, in the sense that they must not be suffering from any mental disorder that deems them unfit for fulfilling their respective roles in the union., c] the male must be minimum 21 years of age and woman must be minimum 18 years of age d] the parties should not come under the spectrum of prohibited relationships. Prohibited relations are further defined under section 2(b) of the act. these include relationships between – a) Half blood and Full Blood and Uterine blood- When people have the same father and same mother, they are said to be a full blood relation. When people have the same father but different mothers, they are said to be in a half blood relation. when people have the same mother but different fathers they are said to be related by uterine blood. b) it also includes "illegitimate as well as legitimate blood relations"                                    c) It also includes relation by adoption. Section 5 of the act requires the parties to notify to the District Marriage Officer, and at least one of them have to be residing in the district 30 days prior to this notice. Section 7 of the allows any objection to the marriage from anyone in case it defies any provision mentioned in section 4 of this act, within the period of thirty days. Section 11 of the said act requires the parties and three other witnesses to sign a declaration form and further countersigned by the Marriage Officer. Section 13 of the act requires the Marriage Officer, after the marriage has been solemnized to enter the certificate in the Marriage Certificate Book. The certificate must be signed by the parties and three other witnesses. Section 14 says that if after notifying the marriage officer the marriage has not been solemnized within three months of issuing the notice, the notice shall lapse a new notice has to be filed. The Marriage Officer cannot solemnize the wedding under such circumstances. Section 15 lays down provisions even for those couples that have not been married under this act to get their marriages registered. However, they must fullfill the following conditions. i) They have had their nuptials and have been living together as a married couple since then. ii) They are both above 21 years of age at the time of registration. iii) Their relation is not prohibited. iv) They are of sound mind. v) The marriage should have been a monogamy. Section 23 and Section 27 talk about Judicial Separation and Divorce respectively under this act.

IMPORTANT CASES

Safia Sultana vs State of Uttar Pradesh[2]

The case was concerned with issues of privacy. The Special Marriage Act of 1954 required the parties to compulsorily notify about their marriage. The petitioner under this case pleaded that the above-mentioned subclause was a direct invasion of privacy and should be made a choice for the parties to take. The right to privacy comes within the ambit of the Right to Life and Liberty under Article 21 of the Indian constitution. This clause also invited unnecessary intervention from third parties to add hurdles to the process of marriage. The Allahabad High Court held that must not be mandatory for the parties to issue a public notice but a choice.

Lata Singh vs State of Uttar Pradesh[3]

This case laid emphasis on an individual’s right to choose a partner of their choice. The case revolves around the petitioner who by her own choice married a man, belonging to a different caste. This marriage was objected to by her brothers who even allegedly beat up the husband’s mother and uncle. The Supreme Court gave orders to the police to protect and arrest those who threatened the petitioner and her husband and they were protected under this act.

CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Special Marriage Act to this day continues to be a boon for people who want to enjoy the bliss of marriage but are rendered helpless by the societal barriers that exist. These barriers include not only caste and religion but also superstitions and judgments as well. It serves as a beacon of hope for tolerance and inclusivity in a country as diverse as India. Its inclusive nature is also seen in the fact that the act not only lays down provisions for couples married under this act but also for couples married under their respective personal laws to get their marriages registered. It gives people a chance to solemnize and register their marriages and also grants them protection from all that troubles them from their right to marital bliss. It seeks to protect the secular spirit of the country and also relieve the country from old prejudices. This act also proves to be a pioneering example of the social progress that is being brought in India.

REFERENCES

  1. Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred
    1. Special Marriage Act 1954- Universal/ Lexis Nexis
  2. Online Articles / Sources Referred
    1. https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-analysis/special-marriage-act-1954-4
    2. https://blog.ipleaders.in/special-marriage-act/
    3. https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/15480/1/special_marriage_act.pdf
  1. Cases Referred
  2. a) Safiya Sultana v State of UP (Uttar Pradesh) AIR 2021 All 56 b) Lata Singh vs State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 2006 SC 2522; (2006) 5 SCC 475; 2006 (56) ACC 234
  3. Statutes Referred
    1. Constitution of India 1950
    2. Special Marriage Act 1954
    3. Hindu Marriage Act 1955
    4. Muslim marriage Act 1939
    5. Special Marriage Act 1954 Section 4
    6. Safiya Sultana v State of UP (Uttar Pradesh) AIR 2021 All 56
    7. Lata Singh vs State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 2006 SC 2522; (2006) 5 SCC 475; 2006 (56) ACC 234
**Content:** **Author-Masooma Naqvi,** **Amity University, Uttar Pradesh** **INTRODUCTION** India is a country of replete history and culture, which often find themselves intertwined with each other. It is home to 7 major religions of the world and various others. With the kind of diversity that is prevalent in India, it will not be possible nor correct to establish boundaries for love and limit them to one’s own religion. Unfortunately, so was not the mindset of the architectures of personal laws. Religion became one of the biggest barriers to love. In most personal laws, be it The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or Sharia which is the codified law for Muslims, inter-faith and even inter-cast marriages are prohibited and are not considered to be valid. These marriages are not formally recognized, which further adds to the deprivation of rights that a married couple is entitled to. Some of these rights include adoption, inheritance, etc. It was through the Special Marriage Act of 1954, that these restrictions were lifted to give love a fair chance. ***Keywords*– Marriage, Inter-Faith, Inter-Caste, Certificate, Personal Autonomy** #### **Meaning, Definition & Explanation** Special Marriage Act permits people belonging to different religions to come together into a bond of marriage. It also upholds the spirit of secularism which is laid down in the constitution and also instills the quality of tolerance among individuals. The Act was passed in 1954 and made on the lines of colonialism, as the legislation was first passed in 1872. Later, when India gained independence the Special Marriage Act of 1954 was passed for newly independent India. The act is a ray of hope for inter-faith couples especially those who struggle to get their marriages recognized by personal laws. The most distinctive feature of the act lies in its inclusivity. It is also open to intra-faith couples to register their marriages outside of their personal laws. It also seeks to give legal status and protection to the marriage of those who are barred by religion and caste. **IMPORTANT PROVISIONS-** The act extends to the whole of India. It also includes Indian citizens domiciled elsewhere. There are certain requirements that the act requires- **Section 4** of the act talks about these requirements. The marriages do not require any specific religious ceremony to enter into a bond of marriage under this act, however, that choice is upon the individuals to decide. The marriage is entered into in the form of a civil contract. For the purpose of the act, the State Government has the power to appoint one or more marriage officers by notification in the official gazette as mentioned under Section 3 of the Indian Marriage Act of 1954. There are certain requirements that the act lays down **Section 4** of the act talks about these requirements. these include the following:- a\] Neither of the parties should have a “living spouse”- The first subclause states that the parties of this union must not already be married to someone who is alive. b\] (i) Neither party is “incapable of giving a valid consent to it in consequence of unsoundness of mind[\[1\]](#_ftn1)”- The parties to the union must be of sound mind in the sense that they should give their valid consent for the union. (ii) Neither party is though capable of giving valid consent, has been suffering from mental disorder of such a kind or to such an extent as to be unfit for marriage and the procreation of children; – The parties must be competent to enter into the union, in the sense that they must not be suffering from any mental disorder that deems them unfit for fulfilling their respective roles in the union., c\] the male must be minimum 21 years of age and woman must be minimum 18 years of age d\] the parties should not come under the spectrum of prohibited relationships. Prohibited relations are further defined under section 2(b) of the act. these include relationships between – a) Half blood and Full Blood and Uterine blood- When people have the same father and same mother, they are said to be a full blood relation. When people have the same father but different mothers, they are said to be in a half blood relation. when people have the same mother but different fathers they are said to be related by uterine blood. b) it also includes “illegitimate as well as legitimate blood relations” c) It also includes relation by adoption. **Section 5** of the act requires the parties to notify to the District Marriage Officer, and at least one of them have to be residing in the district 30 days prior to this notice. **Section 7** of the allows any objection to the marriage from anyone in case it defies any provision mentioned in section 4 of this act, within the period of thirty days. **Section 11** of the said act requires the parties and three other witnesses to sign a declaration form and further countersigned by the Marriage Officer. **Section 13** of the act requires the Marriage Officer, after the marriage has been solemnized to enter the certificate in the Marriage Certificate Book. The certificate must be signed by the parties and three other witnesses. **Section 14** says that if after notifying the marriage officer the marriage has not been solemnized within three months of issuing the notice, the notice shall lapse a new notice has to be filed. The Marriage Officer cannot solemnize the wedding under such circumstances. **Section 15** lays down provisions even for those couples that have not been married under this act to get their marriages registered. However, they must fullfill the following conditions. i) They have had their nuptials and have been living together as a married couple since then. ii) They are both above 21 years of age at the time of registration. iii) Their relation is not prohibited. iv) They are of sound mind. v) The marriage should have been a monogamy. **Section 23** and **Section 27** talk about Judicial Separation and Divorce respectively under this act. ### **IMPORTANT CASES** #### ***Safia Sultana vs State of Uttar Pradesh[\[2\]](#_ftn2)*** The case was concerned with issues of privacy. The Special Marriage Act of 1954 required the parties to compulsorily notify about their marriage. The petitioner under this case pleaded that the above-mentioned subclause was a direct invasion of privacy and should be made a choice for the parties to take. The right to privacy comes within the ambit of the Right to Life and Liberty under Article 21 of the Indian constitution. This clause also invited unnecessary intervention from third parties to add hurdles to the process of marriage. The Allahabad High Court held that **must not be mandatory** for the parties to issue a public notice but a choice. #### ***Lata Singh vs State of Uttar Pradesh[\[3\]](#_ftn3)*** This case laid emphasis on an individual’s right to choose a partner of their choice. The case revolves around the petitioner who by her own choice married a man, belonging to a different caste. This marriage was objected to by her brothers who even allegedly beat up the husband’s mother and uncle. The Supreme Court gave orders to the police to protect and arrest those who threatened the petitioner and her husband and they were protected under this act. ### **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The Special Marriage Act to this day continues to be a boon for people who want to enjoy the bliss of marriage but are rendered helpless by the societal barriers that exist. These barriers include not only caste and religion but also superstitions and judgments as well. It serves as a beacon of hope for tolerance and inclusivity in a country as diverse as India. Its inclusive nature is also seen in the fact that the act not only lays down provisions for couples married under this act but also for couples married under their respective personal laws to get their marriages registered. It gives people a chance to solemnize and register their marriages and also grants them protection from all that troubles them from their right to marital bliss. It seeks to protect the secular spirit of the country and also relieve the country from old prejudices. This act also proves to be a pioneering example of the social progress that is being brought in India. ### **REFERENCES** 1. **Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** 1. Special Marriage Act 1954- Universal/ Lexis Nexis 2. **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. 2. 3. [https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/15480/1/special\_marriage\_act.pdf](https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/15480/1/special_marriage_act.pdf) 3. **Cases Referred** 4. a) Safiya Sultana v State of UP (Uttar Pradesh) AIR 2021 All 56 b) Lata Singh vs State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 2006 SC 2522; (2006) 5 SCC 475; 2006 (56) ACC 234 5. **Statutes Referred** 1. 1. Constitution of India 1950 2. Special Marriage Act 1954 3. Hindu Marriage Act 1955 4. Muslim marriage Act 1939 5. Special Marriage Act 1954 Section 4 6. Safiya Sultana v State of UP (Uttar Pradesh) AIR 2021 All 56 7. Lata Singh vs State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 2006 SC 2522; (2006) 5 SCC 475; 2006 (56) ACC 234 **Categories:** Articles, Family Law --- ### [Advent of AI and Need of Legislative Regulation of AI](https://lawfoyer.in/advent-of-ai-and-need-of-legislative-regulation-of-ai/) **Published:** April 2, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Author: Gaurav Katiyar, University of Lucknow

INTRODUCTION

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has marked a turning point in human history, offering ground-breaking improvements in many sectors, but posing some serious concerns on ethical, societal and legal grounds. The rapid growth of AI technologies and their extensive penetration into the everyday life necessitate strong regulatory systems that enable to address new risks and provide for protection of basic principles. There is no denying the fact that AI has changed various aspects of human life and holds great potential. However, the rapid spread of such AI technologies also poses serious concerns about democracy and cybersecurity. The challenge of artificial intelligence’s arrival is therefore dual; it advances in sectors like transportation, finance, and health on one side but threatens democratic principles as well as cyber security frameworks. AI is considered one of the main threats to democracy. These propaganda campaigns controlled by artificial intelligence which are capable to manipulate public opinion, cause disinformation and affect electoral outcomes can undermine democratic processes. Using tailored political messages from an individual perspective in social media platforms that target people through AI algorithms worsens polarization while undermining confidence in democracies. The rapid strides being made In AI technologies have posed hitherto unknown cyber security threats. Bad actors can use AI technology to create more refined malware that can evade the conventional security systems. Critical infrastructure, financial systems and personal data are all at high risk from AI driven malware, phishing scams or hacker-tools automatons. This proliferation of AI based cyber-threats underlines the necessity for strong regulatory frameworks that would ensure ethical development and deployment of these technologies. In order to deal with these issues holistically, it is necessary that we put in place comprehensive regulations that protect democratic ideals while at the same time strengthen cyber resilience. Policymakers can minimize risks associated with AI’s emergence by setting up guidelines for its ethical use; fostering international collaboration on cybersecurity projects and encouraging transparency in decision-making processes. Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Chat GPT, Ethical concerns, Legal frameworks, Artificial Intelligence (AI), Democracy, Cybersecurity

Types of AI:

[AI can be classified into four types based on their capabilities and level of adaptation:
  1. Reactive AI: These systems optimise outputs based on specific inputs, but they lack memory or the ability to learn.
  2. Limited memory AI: This type of AI can adapt based on past experiences or new data. They have a limited memory capacity and update themselves to handle novel situations.
  3. Theory-of-mind AI: These AI systems have extensive learning capabilities and can retain past experiences. They are not self-aware or conscious.
  4. Self-aware AI: This type of AI is just a fiction yet. It would possess self-awareness and consciousness, recognizing its own existence raising ethical concerns of AI dominance in near future.]1

Impact and applications of AI

  • Healthcare: AI can play a vital role in the genome analysis, personalised medication, Early diagnosis hence significantly reducing mortality and morbidity.
  • Natural Language Processing: Various virtual assistants are powered by AI like Siri, Gemini, Alexa and provide features like voice recognition, voice command, service automation, language processing, etc. hence enhancing user experience and control.
  • Financial Services: AI can be useful in providing financial services like fraud detection, risk assessment; algorithmic trading, personalized financial advice etc. due to its enhanced data analysis and processing capabilities.
  • E-commerce and Marketing: AI helps organizations to improve their customer targeting and it is used by businesses to personalize customer experience, make product recommendations, optimize pricing practices and understand the behaviour of shoppers.
  • Education: AI helps in creating personalized learning experiences for students and remote teaching platforms for ease of access to digital education.
  • Agriculture: AI is used for crop monitoring, precision farming, and automated agricultural machinery. It can also play a vital role in the field of Genetically modified plants and organisms.
  • Cybersecurity: Al helps in detecting and responding to cyber threats by analyzing traffic and detecting potential risks like viruses, malware, data hijacking, DDOS attacks etc.

Need of Regulations: Major Areas of concern associated with AI

  1. AI- A threat to Republicanism and Democracy?
It is alleged that in the US presidential elections of 2016, political hackers from Russia, supposedly connected to the Russian Authorities targeted the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and Hilary Clinton’s presidential campaign. They managed to access emails and other classified files which they then distributed through platforms such as WikiLeaks. The purpose of these leaks was to undermine Clinton’s campaign and throw into question people’s trust in the system of conducting election. In a Democratic and Republic country like India, the advent of AI could impact the election process in ways similar to the impact of Russian hackers on the 2016 US elections which in turn could result in failure of Ideals of our nation. Here are some potential scenarios:
  • Disinformation Campaigns: These are manipulative campaigns that rely on AI technology to generate and spread a lot of false information, fake news, and propaganda on social media networks or platforms. In line with the Russian interference during the US elections, this can change public attitude, reduce trust for democratic institutions and alter voter conduct.
  • Micro-targeting and Persuasion: AI is able to scrutinize huge volumes of voter preference details, demographics as well as behaviour to tailor political messages directly towards them. If AI-driven campaigns could send different messages to every voter that were tailored based on their psychological profiles, they might effectively control then influence voting patterns.
  • Social Media Manipulation: Through amplifying divisive contents as well as spreading political propaganda by use of bots and automated accounts among others it leads to coordinated manipulation of online discourse. This may result into echo chambers, polarizing public debates thus distorting the information environment in favour of certain political actors or agendas.
  • Election Tampering: Election infrastructures such as electronic voting machines voter registration databases and tallying systems could be targets of cyber-attacks powered by Artificial Intelligence (AI). By exploiting flaws in these systems malevolent actors would interfere with voting processes perpetrate election fraud.

AI: A threat to humanity?

[“Mitigating the risk of extinction from A.I. should be a global priority alongside other societal-scale risks, such as pandemics and nuclear war,”]2 The unintended consequences of AI can be risky to humanity, such as job displacement, prejudiced decision making and autonomous weapon systems. Lack of care in management may see AI worsen societal inequalities, endanger privacy rights and democratic freedoms while destabilizing the world at large. There is indeed a rapid technological development in AI with limited ethical guidelines thereby leading to misuses, exploitations and unforeseen aftermaths. In order to prevent these risks associated with AI, proactive steps must be taken so that transparency, accountability and responsible use can minimize its likely harm while maximizing its positive aspects to mankind.

AI: an Unforeseen Challenge to Cybersecurity:

In India, AI’s ascent raises issues for cybersecurity:
  • AI-Powered Attacks: This enables AI to create complex cyberattacks that can bypass traditional protection measures.
  • Data Privacy: The use of AI in gathering data has raised privacy concerns.
  • AI System Vulnerabilities: Bad actors can manipulate AI algorithms, which puts critical infrastructure at risk.
  • Bias and Discrimination: Cybersecurity practices based on AI algorithms may have biased results.
  • Cybersecurity Talent Gap: The shortage of skilled personnel hinders the defense against this type of AI-induced threat.

CURRENT POSITION OF INDIA IN AI REGULATIONS

[In India, as of now, there are no specific provisions for AI but the Government is worried about this lack. Recently though, IT Minister Ashwini Vaishnaw acknowledged that in India, there are no regulations on Ai and it would be impossible to have regulation on Ai by Indian government due to many moral and ethical issues pertaining to development of Ai in India. The India government has also established a MeiTY (Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology) office in its own nation.]3 This means that there should be regulations guiding the introduction of AI considering how fundamentally it changes things and their risks for people, society and global stability. In this regard, as AI technologies continue to advance and spread across various sectors, robust regulatory frameworks are essential to make sure that these developments are in conformity with ethical considerations, safety standards and legal requirements. Effective regulation of AI calls for a multi-faceted approach that encompasses multiple aspects including; ethical use; safety standards; transparently , data privacy; bias reduction ; economic impact ; national security among others. To avoid the negative impacts that can arise from open-ended development of AI technology, regulators need to establish clear guidelines and mechanisms towards compliance. Moreover, regulatory interventions are imperative in fostering accountability among developers, users and adopters leading to risk mitigation and trust building around artificial intelligent systems. One can also bring about responsible AI practices via transparency requirements as well as mechanisms for auditing and oversight so that decision-making procedures remain susceptible to scrutiny. Moreover, the international community must come together to address the global consequences of AI governance because it is a multi-national issue. Harmonizing regulatory approaches and promoting cooperation between countries could enable the sharing of best practices, encourage common standards and limit regulatory arbitrage. Simply put, regulations are necessary for managing the responsible creation and application of AI tools in line with societal values, ethical principles and legal rules. Working towards a future where AI facilitates positive change in society but does not pose risks requires the adoption of a proactive collaborative regulation by all stakeholders concerned.

REFERENCES

                Online Articles / Sources Referred
  1. https://cloudacademy.com/blog/types-of-ai/#:~:text=What%20are%20the%204%20main,of%20mind%20and%20self%2Daware
  2. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/30/technology/ai-threat-warning.html
  3. https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-13111-laws-governing-ai-in-india-everything-you-should-know.html
Blogs referred:
  1. https://hbr.org/2021/09/ai-regulation-is-coming
  2. https://emeritus.org/in/learn/ai-and-ml-ai-regulation-trends/
**Content:** **Author: Gaurav Katiyar, University of Lucknow** ### **INTRODUCTION** Artificial Intelligence (AI) has marked a turning point in human history, offering ground-breaking improvements in many sectors, but posing some serious concerns on ethical, societal and legal grounds. The rapid growth of AI technologies and their extensive penetration into the everyday life necessitate strong regulatory systems that enable to address new risks and provide for protection of basic principles. There is no denying the fact that AI has changed various aspects of human life and holds great potential. However, the rapid spread of such AI technologies also poses serious concerns about democracy and cybersecurity. The challenge of artificial intelligence’s arrival is therefore dual; it advances in sectors like transportation, finance, and health on one side but threatens democratic principles as well as cyber security frameworks. AI is considered one of the main threats to democracy. These propaganda campaigns controlled by artificial intelligence which are capable to manipulate public opinion, cause disinformation and affect electoral outcomes can undermine democratic processes. Using tailored political messages from an individual perspective in social media platforms that target people through AI algorithms worsens polarization while undermining confidence in democracies. The rapid strides being made In AI technologies have posed hitherto unknown cyber security threats. Bad actors can use AI technology to create more refined malware that can evade the conventional security systems. Critical infrastructure, financial systems and personal data are all at high risk from AI driven malware, phishing scams or hacker-tools automatons. This proliferation of AI based cyber-threats underlines the necessity for strong regulatory frameworks that would ensure ethical development and deployment of these technologies. In order to deal with these issues holistically, it is necessary that we put in place comprehensive regulations that protect democratic ideals while at the same time strengthen cyber resilience. Policymakers can minimize risks associated with AI’s emergence by setting up guidelines for its ethical use; fostering international collaboration on cybersecurity projects and encouraging transparency in decision-making processes. ***Keywords*: Artificial Intelligence, Chat GPT, Ethical concerns, Legal frameworks, Artificial Intelligence (AI), Democracy, Cybersecurity** ### **Types of AI:** \[AI can be classified into four types based on their capabilities and level of adaptation: 1. **Reactive AI:** These systems optimise outputs based on specific inputs, but they lack memory or the ability to learn. 2. **Limited memory AI:** This type of AI can adapt based on past experiences or new data. They have a limited memory capacity and update themselves to handle novel situations. 3. **Theory-of-mind AI:** These AI systems have extensive learning capabilities and can retain past experiences. They are not self-aware or conscious. 4. **Self-aware AI:** This type of AI is just a fiction yet. It would possess self-awareness and consciousness, recognizing its own existence raising ethical concerns of AI dominance in near future.\]1 ### **Impact and applications of AI** - **Healthcare:** AI can play a vital role in the genome analysis, personalised medication, Early diagnosis hence significantly reducing mortality and morbidity. - **Natural Language Processing:** Various virtual assistants are powered by AI like Siri, Gemini, Alexa and provide features like voice recognition, voice command, service automation, language processing, etc. hence enhancing user experience and control. - **Financial Services:** AI can be useful in providing financial services like fraud detection, risk assessment; algorithmic trading, personalized financial advice etc. due to its enhanced data analysis and processing capabilities. - **E-commerce and Marketing:** AI helps organizations to improve their customer targeting and it is used by businesses to personalize customer experience, make product recommendations, optimize pricing practices and understand the behaviour of shoppers. - **Education:** AI helps in creating personalized learning experiences for students and remote teaching platforms for ease of access to digital education. - **Agriculture:** AI is used for crop monitoring, precision farming, and automated agricultural machinery. It can also play a vital role in the field of Genetically modified plants and organisms. - **Cybersecurity:** Al helps in detecting and responding to cyber threats by analyzing traffic and detecting potential risks like viruses, malware, data hijacking, DDOS attacks etc. ### **Need of Regulations: Major Areas of concern associated with AI** 1. **AI- A threat to Republicanism and Democracy?** It is alleged that in the US presidential elections of 2016, political hackers from Russia, supposedly connected to the Russian Authorities targeted the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and Hilary Clinton’s presidential campaign. They managed to access emails and other classified files which they then distributed through platforms such as WikiLeaks. The purpose of these leaks was to undermine Clinton’s campaign and throw into question people’s trust in the system of conducting election. In a Democratic and Republic country like India, the advent of AI could impact the election process in ways similar to the impact of Russian hackers on the 2016 US elections which in turn could result in failure of Ideals of our nation. Here are some potential scenarios: - **Disinformation Campaigns:** These are manipulative campaigns that rely on AI technology to generate and spread a lot of false information, fake news, and propaganda on social media networks or platforms. In line with the Russian interference during the US elections, this can change public attitude, reduce trust for democratic institutions and alter voter conduct. - **Micro-targeting and Persuasion:** AI is able to scrutinize huge volumes of voter preference details, demographics as well as behaviour to tailor political messages directly towards them. If AI-driven campaigns could send different messages to every voter that were tailored based on their psychological profiles, they might effectively control then influence voting patterns. - **Social Media Manipulation:** Through amplifying divisive contents as well as spreading political propaganda by use of bots and automated accounts among others it leads to coordinated manipulation of online discourse. This may result into echo chambers, polarizing public debates thus distorting the information environment in favour of certain political actors or agendas. - **Election Tampering:** Election infrastructures such as electronic voting machines voter registration databases and tallying systems could be targets of cyber-attacks powered by Artificial Intelligence (AI). By exploiting flaws in these systems malevolent actors would interfere with voting processes perpetrate election fraud. ### **AI: A threat to humanity?** \[“Mitigating the risk of extinction from A.I. should be a global priority alongside other societal-scale risks, such as pandemics and nuclear war,”\]2 The unintended consequences of AI can be risky to humanity, such as job displacement, prejudiced decision making and autonomous weapon systems. Lack of care in management may see AI worsen societal inequalities, endanger privacy rights and democratic freedoms while destabilizing the world at large. There is indeed a rapid technological development in AI with limited ethical guidelines thereby leading to misuses, exploitations and unforeseen aftermaths. In order to prevent these risks associated with AI, proactive steps must be taken so that transparency, accountability and responsible use can minimize its likely harm while maximizing its positive aspects to mankind. ### **AI: an Unforeseen Challenge to Cybersecurity:** In India, AI’s ascent raises issues for cybersecurity: - **AI-Powered Attacks:** This enables AI to create complex cyberattacks that can bypass traditional protection measures. - **Data Privacy:** The use of AI in gathering data has raised privacy concerns. - **AI System Vulnerabilities:** Bad actors can manipulate AI algorithms, which puts critical infrastructure at risk. - **Bias and Discrimination:** Cybersecurity practices based on AI algorithms may have biased results. - **Cybersecurity Talent Gap:** The shortage of skilled personnel hinders the defense against this type of AI-induced threat. ### **CURRENT POSITION OF INDIA IN AI REGULATIONS** \[In India, as of now, there are no specific provisions for AI but the Government is worried about this lack. Recently though, IT Minister Ashwini Vaishnaw acknowledged that in India, there are no regulations on Ai and it would be impossible to have regulation on Ai by Indian government due to many moral and ethical issues pertaining to development of Ai in India. The India government has also established a MeiTY (Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology) office in its own nation.**\]3** This means that there should be regulations guiding the introduction of AI considering how fundamentally it changes things and their risks for people, society and global stability. In this regard, as AI technologies continue to advance and spread across various sectors, robust regulatory frameworks are essential to make sure that these developments are in conformity with ethical considerations, safety standards and legal requirements. Effective regulation of AI calls for a multi-faceted approach that encompasses multiple aspects including; ethical use; safety standards; transparently , data privacy; bias reduction ; economic impact ; national security among others. To avoid the negative impacts that can arise from open-ended development of AI technology, regulators need to establish clear guidelines and mechanisms towards compliance. Moreover, regulatory interventions are imperative in fostering accountability among developers, users and adopters leading to risk mitigation and trust building around artificial intelligent systems. One can also bring about responsible AI practices via transparency requirements as well as mechanisms for auditing and oversight so that decision-making procedures remain susceptible to scrutiny. Moreover, the international community must come together to address the global consequences of AI governance because it is a multi-national issue. Harmonizing regulatory approaches and promoting cooperation between countries could enable the sharing of best practices, encourage common standards and limit regulatory arbitrage. Simply put, regulations are necessary for managing the responsible creation and application of AI tools in line with societal values, ethical principles and legal rules. Working towards a future where AI facilitates positive change in society but does not pose risks requires the adoption of a proactive collaborative regulation by all stakeholders concerned. ### **REFERENCES** **Online Articles / Sources Referred** 1. 2. 3. Blogs referred: 1. 2. **Categories:** Articles, Artificial Intelligence --- ### [Sedition under Section 124-A IPC](https://lawfoyer.in/sedition-under-section-124-a-ipc/) **Published:** April 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** #### Definition and Legal Status Sedition, a term not explicitly mentioned in Section 124-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), embodies actions aimed at inciting disaffection, hatred, or contempt against the government established by law. Sir James Stephen’s definition encapsulates this concept, highlighting the difference between seditious intention and legitimate criticism of the government for reformative purposes. #### Historical Context and Legal Interpretations Sedition has evolved from its common law roots, emphasizing the utterance or publication of seditious words or actions. In India, this law parallels the English law of sedition but diverges in treating abetment of war against the state on par with waging war itself (IPC Section 121). #### Judicial Perspectives on Section 124-A - **Ram Nandan v. State of U.P.** (AIR 1959 Alld. 101): Initially declared Section 124-A as ultra vires for impinging on free speech, but was overruled by the Supreme Court in **Kedarnath Das v. State of Bihar** (AIR 1962 SC 955). - **Tara Singh v. State of Punjab** (AIR 1950 SC 124): Struck down Section 124-A as unconstitutional, later counteracted by the constitutional 1st Amendment Act, 1951. #### Constitutional Compatibility and Public Order The Supreme Court, in **Kedarnath v. State of Bihar**, upheld Section 124-A as intra vires, aligning it with Article 19(1)(a) under reasonable restrictions for maintaining public order and state security. This judgement distinguishes between criticism for reform and acts inciting disaffection or violence. #### Essentials of Sedition 1. Actions inciting hatred, contempt, or disaffection towards the Government of India. 2. Such actions can be through spoken or written words, signs, or visible representations. #### Legal Nuances and Case Laws - **Satyaranjan Bakshi v. Emperor** (AIR 1927 Cal 698) and **Hanumanthaiya v. Govt of Mysore** (1948 52 Mys HCR 265): Emphasize the intention behind seditious speech. - **Paramanand v. Emperor** (AIR 1941 All 156 1941 All LJ 26 42 Cr LJ 46): Discusses the severity of spoken or written words in sedition. - **Naurang Singh** (1986 Cr LJ 846 P&H) and **Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab** (1995 3 SCC 214 1995 SCC (Cri) 432): Highlight the importance of context and intention behind seditious acts. #### Intention: The Core of Sedition The intention is pivotal in determining sedition. It must be proved that the accused intended to incite disaffection, hatred, or contempt against the government. The impact of seditious acts, regardless of whether they incite actual violence, is secondary to the intent behind them. #### Procedural Aspects - A proper complaint under Section 124-A must include the seditious material or its essence. - Section 196 of the Cr.P.C. 1973 mandates prior sanction from the central or state government for cognizance of sedition offenses, ensuring a check on the arbitrary application of this section. #### Concluding Remarks In summary, sedition in India is a complex interplay of the intention behind acts deemed seditious, their contextual interpretation, and the balance between freedom of speech and state security. The judiciary’s nuanced approach seeks to distinguish between constructive criticism and actions genuinely harmful to public order and the integrity of the state. Now, in Bharatiya Nyay Sanhita, 2023 the provision has been repealed with effect from 1st July, 2024. **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law --- ### [THE DOCTRINE OF HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION](https://lawfoyer.in/the-doctrine-of-harmonious-construction/) **Published:** March 31, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** By – **PEULI CHAKRABORTY** (THE UNIVERSITY OF BURDWAN,WEST BENGAL) **INTRODUCTION** The Doctrine of Harmonious Construction is a monumental principle, when it comes to the interpretation of statutes . It intends to resolve out the disputation between the legal provisions or statutes and creates conformity between those. This principle guarantees the reasonable and fair application of the laws, by virtue of the Judiciary. Whenever a noteworthy imbroglio comes forward, either between two legal provisions or statutes, the court is supposed to overlook the controversy and establish a harmonisation between those. However, in case of a difficulty creating the harmonisation between the disputed provisions ( or statues), the Court must interpret those in a manner, so that the both the provisions remains resilient and proportional. ***Keywords:*** *The Doctrine of Harmonious Construction, Monumental Principle, Interpretation of Statutes, Resolve Disputation, Legal Provisions, Statutes, Create Conformity.* **SUB-HEADINGS** Meaning of the Doctrine of Harmonious Construction:[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)** If any conflict arises, between two provisions ( or more than two) that fall under the similar Act or any inconsistency arises between two statutes, then the Court is required to interpret these two ( whether statutes or provisions) so that the harmonisation remains intact. In simple words, when any disputation is observable, either between two statutes or provisions, and both of these cannot be entertained together, then the Court is required to interpret these finely and by maintaining the harmony and consistency, so that the effect could be served to both of those. The doctrine of Harmonious Construction, is one of the crucial rules to the interpretation of statutes. **Historical Background / Evolution[**\[2\]**](#_ftn1)** This doctrine has been emerged from the notable case, Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, where a conflict was noticeable, between Part 3 and Part 4 of the Indian Constitution. However, the Apex Court exercised the Doctrine of Harmonious Construction and held that both the concept of Fundamental Rights as well as the Directive Principles of State Policy are required and indispensable for the public welfare. Afterwards the Apex Court resolved this conflict by employing the rule of Harmonious Construction. Besides that, in C.P and Berar General Clauses Act, the dispute sprung between entries 24 & 25 of the State List ( Indian Constitution). The Court employed the doctrine and interpreted these two in accordance with the predominant subject matter of the provisions. **The Objectives of the Doctrine[**\[3\]**](#_ftn1)** The predominant objectives of the doctrine have been enumerated down below: **•** The fundamental objective of this doctrine is to turn aside the conflict or disputation either between two statutes or provisions and to sustain the harmony or conformity between the controversial statues or provisions. This doctrine specifically emphasizes that the legislature does not create a crookedness in a statue or provision intentionally, so that it can turn out to be complicated. **•** Another objective is to be included that, the perplexities, arise, are not considered to be something intentional, rather that is required to be sanctified by virtue of the Doctrine of Harmonious Construction. **The Legal Principles underlying the Doctrine[**\[4\]**](#_ftn1)** The five principles underlying this doctrine had been expounded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case *CIT v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers (2003).* The principles have been enumerated down below: **1.** The Court is required to ignore the altercation between both the provisions (or statutes) and strive to reconcile those provisions, to constitute harmonisation. **2.** The provision laid down in a section cannot be utilised to dismiss the provision laid down in another section, unless and until the Court fails to sustain the conformity (i.e. harmony) between those. **3.** When the Court perceives that it’s implausible to sustain the conformity between the provisions, the Court is required to interpret the provisions in a manner, so that both the provisions get prioritised within the bounds of possibility. **4.** If, due to the Interpretation, carried out by the court, one of the controversial provisions remains ineffective, then that shall not be regarded as the application of Harmonious Construction, hence, that is supposed to be avoided. **5.** Harmonisation does not imply annihilating the significance of a statutory provision, thus the Court must take the matter into consideration, while interpreting. **The Application of the Doctrine:[**\[5\]**](#_ftn1)** The following dimensions are to be taken into account while employing this doctrine: a) Both the provisions or statutes are required to prioritised by the Court, by reading them as a whole, b) the intricacy and difficulty must be abated, c) if there is a broad and a narrow provision, then the broad provision ( i.e. the superior one) must be taken into consideration and search for any other consequence. If the consequence emphasizes harmonisation, then the scrutiny is not at all required anymore. **Latin Maxims related to this Doctrine:** - **Generalia Spacialibus Non Derogant[**\[6\]**](#_ftn1)** If any conflict arises between two statutes or provisions, then the latter shall nullify the initial or the previous one. Basically, the special provisions are more preferred by the Court, than general provisions and the literal meaning of this maxim is *general things do not go against special things.* - **Generalibus Specialia Derogant[**\[7\]**](#_ftn1)** In simple words, this particular latin maxim specifies that, general provisions are not entertained in a statute, if there is a presence of a special provision. Basically the general provisions in a statute/statutes are superintended by the special provisions. Theapplicability of the general provisions is referenced by the special provisions, in a statute. **The Landmark Judicial Interpretations pertaining to this Doctrine:** - **Venkatramana Devaru v. State of Mysore[**\[8\]**](#_ftn1)** There was a conflict, between Article 25(2)(b) and Article 26(b) of the Indian Constitution, pertaining to the Right to worship of all the Hindus, under the Madras Temple Entry Authorization Act, along with … The hon’ble Court interpreted this issue by sustaining the harmony between these two provisions and stated that denominational institutions are deemed to be public institutions and every individual, who is a Hindu, is permitted to enter into the sanctum of the temple, to worship. - **Raj Krushna v. Binod Kanungo[**\[9\]**](#_ftn1)** In this case, both the provisions, under the Representation of the People Act were in- controversy. Sec 33(2) of this Act denoted that a government servant can nominate or second an individual in election. Contrariwise, sec 123(8) displayed that a government servant is ineligible to assist any election candidate, unless and until he casts his vote. However, the doctrine of Harmonious Construction was employed by the Court and it was held that, the government servant is authorised to proceed in accordance with sec 33(2) of this, along with that, he reserves the right to vote as well. However it was held that the government servant cannot assist a candidate in any other manner. - **Union of India v. Dileep Kumar[**\[10\]**](#_ftn1)** In this case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the provisions of the statutes are required to be gone through as a whole and harmoniously. Afterwards, if it is found to be extremely controversial and the conflict looks irreparable, then the superior or leading and the subordinate provisions are to be searched for and proceed accordingly. - **Shankari Prasad v. Union of India[**\[11\]**](#_ftn1)** The actual disputation in this renowned case was whether Article 13(2) of the Indian Constitution bars the power of parliament to amend the Part 3 of the Indian Constitution, as Article 368 doesn’t possess any exception on its own, in terms of amending the Constitution. The Supreme Court took this matter into account and harmoniously interpreted the provisions, stating that, the fundamental rights can be amended by Article 368, since there is no such exception with regard to this and it’s a sovereign power. However, Article 368 can neither take away nor diminish the fundamental rights, as guaranteed under the Indian Constitution. - **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala[**\[12\]**](#_ftn1)** This case does not require any introduction. It is considered to be the most landmark judgement in the Constitution of India. The Apex Court, in this case, stated that Art. 368 possesses the authority to amend the provisions of the Indian Constitution, however this authority cannot be exercised, when it comes to the basic structure of the Constitution. To facilitate, the basic structure of the Indian Constitution cannot be amended by Article 368. - **East India Hotels ltd. v. Union of India[**\[13\]**](#_ftn1)** The Apex Court held that an Act is required **to be read as a whole** and afterwards all the different provisions should be harmonised altogether. **CONCLUSION** The Doctrine of Harmonious Construction, being one of the most emergent doctrines to the Interpretation of Statutes, intends to relinquish the disputation between two statutes or provisions. Rather, it pays attention to creating the coordination and harmony between those conflicting statutes or provisions. It demonstrates that, the statutes or provisions are to be read as a whole, as the legislature, while embellishing it, had a specific purpose behind it. Therefore, on the arrival of any intricacy between those, that should not be considered to be a clamor, on the part of the legislature, which is deliberate. Hence, if any inconsistency arises, the judiciary is required to rectify the inconsistency, by employing the Harmonious Construction. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Ismail N, Legal Maxim – Generalibus Specialia Derogant, [(DOC) Legal Maxim – Generalibus Specialia Derogant | Ismail N – Academia.edu](https://www.academia.edu/10272106/Legal_Maxim_Generalibus_Specialia_Derogant), (Last visited on March 4,2024) [\[2\]](#_ftnref1) Glossary, Generalia specialibus non derogant, [Generalia specialibus non derogant | Practical Law (westlaw.com)](https://content.next.westlaw.com/practical-law/document/Id50051cae1b011e698dc8b09b4f043e0/Generalia-specialibus-non-derogant?viewType=FullText&transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)#:~:text=A%20Latin%20term%20literally%20meaning,the%20specific%20provision%20will%20prevail), (Last visited on March 4,2024) [\[3\]](#_ftnref1) Lawbhoomi, Doctrine of Harmonious Construction, [Doctrine of Harmonious Construction (lawbhoomi.com)](https://lawbhoomi.com/doctrine-of-harmonious-construction/#Application_of_the_Doctrine_of_Harmonious_Construction_in_in_Interpretation_of_Statutes), (Last visited on March 4,2024) [\[4\]](#_ftnref1) *Commissioner of Income Tax v. M/S. Hindustan Bulk Carriers* (2003)3 SCC 57 [\[5\]](#_ftnref1) Zara Suhail Ahmed, Doctrine of Harmonious Construction, [Doctrine of Harmonious Construction – Law Corner](https://lawcorner.in/doctrine-of-harmonious-construction/#google_vignette), (Last visited on March 4,2024) [\[6\]](#_ftnref1) Ashutosh Singh and Pruthvi Singh, All about the Doctrine of harmonious construction, [All about the Doctrine of harmonious construction – iPleaders](https://blog.ipleaders.in/all-about-the-doctrine-of-harmonious-construction/), (Last visited on March 4, 2024) [\[7\]](#_ftnref1) What is doctrine ofHarmonious Construction?, [Whatis doctrine of harmonious construction? Answer at BYJU’S IAS (byjus.com)](https://byjus.com/ias-questions/what-is-doctrine-of-harmonious-construction/#:~:text=According%20to%20this%20doctrine%2C%20a,so%20as%20to%20harmonize%20them), (Last visited on March 4,2024) [\[8\]](#_ftnref1) *Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore* (1958) SCR 895 [\[9\]](#_ftnref1) *Raj Krushna Bose v. Binod Kanungo & Ors.* (1954) SC 202 [\[10\]](#_ftnref1) *Union of India & Ors.v Dileep Kumar Singh* (2015) C.A. Nos. 2466-2467 [\[11\]](#_ftnref1) *Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. UOI* (1951) SC 458 [\[12\]](#_ftnref1) *Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru & Ors. v. the State of Kerala & Anr.* (1973) SC 1461 [\[13\]](#_ftnref1) *East India Hotels Ltd. & Anr v. UOI & Anr* (2001) SC 231 **Categories:** Articles, Constitutional Law, Interpretation of Statutes --- ### [CHIRANJIT LAL CHOUDHATMRY V. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS](https://lawfoyer.in/chiranjit-lal-choudhatmry-v-union-of-india-and-others/) **Published:** March 31, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** By – **MANSI** (UNIVERSITY FIVE YEAR LAW COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY OF RAJASTHAN, JAIPUR) **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The case Chiranjit lal choudhary v. Union of India case is a critical case in Indian protected law. This case includes a shareholder of the Sholapur Turning and Weaving Company Restricted challenging the sacred legitimacy of the Bihar Arrive Changes Act, 1950. The Act pointed to cancel the zamindari framework and redistribute arrive to the tillers. The solicitor contends that the Act abuses their essential rights beneath Articles 14, 19(1)(f), and 31 of the Indian Structure. They fight that the Act sums to obligatory securing of their property without fair recompense. The case raises vital lawful issues with respect to the strife between principal rights of property possession and the state’s control to order arrive change enactment. The judgment of the court will decide the defendability of the Bihar Arrive Changes Act, 1950 and may have noteworthy suggestions for arrive change arrangements in India. **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***Chiranjit lal choudhary v. union of India and others*Case Number***72 of 1950*Judgement Date***4 December, 1950*Court***Supreme court*Quorum***Hiralal J. Kania, Saiyid Fazal Ali, B.K. Mukherjea*Author*** Hiralal J. Kania*Citation***1951 AIR 41, 1950 SCR 869, AIR 1951 SUPREME COURT 41, 1964 MADLW 47*Legal Provisions Involved***Article 31, 32, 14 and 19 of the constitution of India, Sholapur spinning company emergency act, indian companies act**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** This case is a noteworthy legitimate case that has cleared out an permanent check on the lawful scene of its time. This case, which begun in the mid-20th century, holds authentic and lawful significance due to its far-reaching suggestions and the crucial questions of law it looked for to address. The case, which came some time recently the court in 1950, included a request that raised basic issues relating to person rights, sacred elucidation, and the adjust of control between the government and its citizens. At the heart of this case lies a complex legitimate debate that captured the consideration of legitimate researchers, specialists, and the common open alike. The solicitors, who stay central figures in this lawful adventure, drawn nearer the court looking for change for what they accepted to be an encroachment upon their naturally ensured rights. Their request challenged the legitimacy of a particular law ordered by the government, contending that it abused their essential freedoms cherished in the constitution. The case not as it were dug into the translation of sacred arrangements but too touched upon broader questions of equity, value, and the limits of state specialist. The legitimate contentions put forward in this case activated a significant examination of sacred standards, requiring the court to hook with the fragile adjust between person rights and the state’s control to direct and govern. Throughout the course of this case investigation, we will dive into the complexities of the lawful contentions displayed, the court’s thinking, and the extreme choice rendered. By investigating the verifiable and legitimate setting, we point to shed light on the centrality of this case in forming lawful tenets and impacting ensuing jurisprudence. This case serves as a confirmation to the persevering control of the law and the significant affect that a single case can have on the lawful texture of a country. It stands as a update of the crucial part of the legal in defending person rights, guaranteeing protected amazingness, and maintaining the standards of equity and reasonableness. Through this investigation, we look for to disentangle the complexities of this point of interest case and look at its enduring bequest in the chronicles of legitimate history. **FACTS OF THE CASE** In Request the case of Chiranjit lal choudhary v. union of India case, the applicant, a shareholder of the Sholapur Turning and Weaving Company Constrained, challenges the protected legitimacy of the Bihar Arrive Changes Act, 1950. The Act pointed to annul the zamindari framework and disseminate arrive to the tillers. The solicitor fights that the Act damages their principal rights beneath Articles 14, 19(1)(f), and 31 of the Indian Structure. They contend that the Act sums to obligatory procurement of their property without fair compensation. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Issue raised here that whether the actions of the central government infringes the equality before law and equality of law Article and article 19 (1)(f) of Indian constitution. 2. The first issue raised here regarding the article 14 of Indian constitution. First, the act of central government was infringed the equality before law of holders of sholapur company. Secondly, the Petitioner was successful to show that the act of central government really contrary of article 14. **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The solicitor presents a few contentions challenging the protected legitimacy of the Bihar Arrive Changes Act, 1950: 1\. Infringement of Right to Uniformity (Article 14): The applicant contends that the Act abuses their right to balance some time recently the law. They fight that the Act treats shareholders of the Sholapur Turning and Weaving Company Restricted in an unexpected way from other landowners, subsequently making an subjective classification. The applicant states that such differential treatment is not based on any sensible basis and is, in this manner, unconstitutional. 2\. Infringement of Right to Hold and Arrange of Property (Article 19(1)(f)): The applicant contends that the Act encroaches upon their right to hold and arrange of property. They fight that the Act coercively takes absent their property rights without their assent. The applicant attests that the Act confines their flexibility to utilize, appreciate, and exchange their property, in this way damaging their essential right ensured beneath Article 19(1)(f) of the Indian Constitution. 3\. Need of Fair Emolument (Article 31): The solicitor contends that the Bihar Arrive Changes Act, 1950, falls flat to give for fair recompense. They fight that if the state looks for to procure their property for open purposes, it must give reasonable and satisfactory recompense. The solicitor states that the Act, in Its current shape, does not guarantee legitimate recompense for the seizure of their property, which damages their right to property as revered in Article 31 of the Indian Constitution. 4\. Procedural Inconsistencies: The solicitor may too raise contentions with respect to procedural inconsistencies in the sanctioning or execution of the Bihar Arrive Changes Act, 1950. They may point out any lacks in the authoritative prepare or procedural infringement that might affect the defendability of the Act. The applicant looks for a affirmation from the court that the Bihar Arrive Changes Act, 1950, is Illegal and void. They ask fitting help, counting an directive against the requirement of the Act and remuneration for the infringement of their essential rights. The petitioner’s contentions center on the assurance of their property rights and the affirmed insufficiencies in the Act’s arrangements. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The respondent, speaking to the Union of India, presents contentions protecting the protected legitimacy of the Bihar Arrive Changes Act, 1950. Whereas the particular points of interest of the respondent’s contentions are not accessible, a few common contentions that seem be raised include: 1\. Advancement of Social Equity: The respondent may contend that the Bihar Arrive Changes Act, 1950, pointed to advance social equity by nullifying the zamindari framework and redistributing arrive to the tillers. They might fight that the Act was sanctioned to address chronicled imbalances and guarantee impartial dissemination of arrive resources. 2\. SubstantialWork out of Authoritative Control: The respondent may attest that the Act falls inside the administrative competence of the state government. They might contend that arrive change enactment is a genuine work out of the state’s control to sanction laws for the welfare of the individuals and the improvement of society. 3.Sensible Confinements on Property Rights: The respondent may fight that the Act forces sensible limitations on the right to hold and arrange of property in the intrigued of the common open. They seem contend that arrive change measures are fundamental to address financial incongruities and accomplish social welfare goals. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** This judgement is related to following articles- 1. Article 31 It is related to “No person shall be deprived of his personal liberty.” 2. Article 14 It is related to “the state shall not deny to any persons equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.” 3. Article 19(1)(f) It relates to “the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property.” 4. Article 32 The Petitioner filed a writ of mandamus under this article of Indian constitution. 5. Indian companies act : These acts deal with the regulation and policies of arbitrary companies. 6. Sholapur spinning and weaving company (emergency Provisions act),1950.This acts take off the regulation of sholapur company under the central government. **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** The court’s judgment in Request No. 72 of 1950 sets up the proportion decidendi, which is the lawful guideline or run the show upon which the choice is based. Be that as it may, since particular subtle elements of the case are not accessible, the correct proportion decidendi cannot be decided. **OBITER DICTA** Similarly, the obiter dicta, which alludes to explanations made by the court that are not specifically pertinent to the choice, cannot be decided without particular data approximately the case. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** In conclusion, the case of Chiranjit lal choudhary v. union of India includes a shareholder of the Sholapur Turning and Weaving Company Constrained challenging the protected legitimacy of the Bihar Arrive Changes Act, 1950. The solicitor contends that the Act abuses their principal rights, counting the right to correspondence, the right to hold and arrange of property, and the right to fair remuneration. The respondent, speaking to the Union of India, protects the Act, emphasizing its objective of advancing social equity and contending that it is a substantial work out of authoritative control. The particular judgment, counting the proportion decidendi and obiter dicta, cannot be given without nitty gritty data on the case. The court’s choice will decide the defendability of the Act and may have noteworthy suggestions for arrive change arrangements in India. **REFERENCES** 1. **Important Cases Referred** Army v. Dateziel Darnell v. Indianna 2. **Important Statutes Referred** Constitution of India Sholapur spinning company emergency Provisions act **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [B.R. Enterprises Etc, Etc vs State of the U.P. And Grs. Etc: Etc ](https://lawfoyer.in/b-r-enterprises-etc-etc-vs-state-of-the-u-p-and-grs-etc-etc/) **Published:** March 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** By –**TANISHKA SAXENA** (AMITY UNIVERSITY, LUCKNOW) **ABSTRACT** In this case, an order was passed by the state of UP banning the state lotteries of the other state from using the power that was provided under section 5 of the impugned ordinance act. After the order affected states invigorated the provision in different state’s high courts. While the Gujarat High Court upheld the legality, the Guwahati High Court held that several of its sections were ultra vires. The Supreme Court quashed the high court’s decision and upheld the legality of the impugned provisions. The court applied the legal regulations of the 16th century and emphasized the need to perceive the legislation’s historical context purpose and intent. In this case, multiple parties and common issues resulted in a composite decision. The role of the union government was also highlighted particularly regarding with relation to Article 302’s requirement for demonstrable public interest. ultimately. the court resolved the legal dispute around state lotteries and Ultimately, the Court’s arrangement resolved the legal disputes surrounding state lotteries and declared the opposing provisions to be constitutional and lawful. **CASE DETAILS** ***i)*** ***Judgement Cause Title***B.R. Enterprises Etc, Etc v. State of U.P. and Grs. Etc: Etc***ii)*** ***Case Number***Appeal ( civil ) 2747 of 1999***iii)*** ***Judgement Date*** 07/05/1999***iv)*** ***Court***Supreme court***v)*** ***Quorum***K Venkataswami and A.P. Misra***vi)*** ***Author***K Venkataswami and A.P. Mishra***vii)*** ***Citation***1999 9 SCC 700***viii)*** ***Legal provisions involved****Lotteries (Regulation) Ordinance, 1997* *The Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998* *Section5 of The impugned Ordinance Act* *Constitution of India* *Article 14Article 19(g)Article 301Article 303***INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE JUDGMENT** In India, the lottery has been a continuous issue with other states because it is used as a source of revenue generation while also facing issues related to its legality and regulation. The case of B.R. Enterprises v. State of U.P. Etc sheds light on the dispute between states over the control and regulation related to lotteries and the constitutional legality of certain provisions in the Act of 1998 and the 1997 Lotteries (Regulation) Ordinance. This case raises questions about the extent of state freedom in these such matters, the impact of conflicting laws on inter-state trade and commerce, and the power of the union government to enact laws in this regard. ***The Lotteries*** ***(Regulation) Act, 1998, under Entry 40, List I of the Constitution of India*** “*A lottery organized by a state must be realized to refer to a lottery lawfully organized by a state, and if a lottery is not lawfully organized by a state, it would not fall within Entry 40 of List I but would fall under the heading ‘gambling’ under Entry 34 of List II, and the state legislature would then be empowered to legislate regarding the same. Where the State Legislature could thus legislate, the State Government could take executive action concerning lotteries organized by another state if they were unlawful.”*[***\[1\]***](#_ftn1) The legal arguments presented in this case revolve around the issue of constitutional provisions including articles 301, and 303 which govern trade, commerce, and restrictions on such activities between states. The case also touched on the historical context of lotteries in India, the difference between public and private states, and the implications of restrictions on lottery ticket sales organized by different states. Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the impugned provisions and the Act, quashing any contrary decisions or interim orders. The judgment expressed gratitude to the counsels for their contributions and imposed costs on the parties. **FACTS OF THE CASE** 1\. The State of Uttar Pradesh passed the order banning the state lotteries of other states by power which are entrusted under section 5 of the impugned ordinance Act. 2\. After this order, affected states opposed this ban in different high courts across the country. Then, the validity was upheld by the Gujarat High Court, and the Guwahati High Court declared its provisions to be Ultra vires 3\. The fundamental question that was raised in this case that what is the character of state lotteries and whether they could be considered as trade and business within the constitution of India. 4\. The arguments presented by the parties focused on the nature of lotteries, the impact of state authority on their pernicious nature, and the constitutional validity of the provisions under scrutiny. 5. The court considered the historical perspective on lotteries, the legal and regulatory environment around gaming, and the interpretation of important parts of the constitution, such as parts 301, 302, and 303. 6\. The issue focuses on the distribution of legislative power, discrimination, and the distinction between state and private lotteries about trade and commerce. 7\. Upon resolution of the case, the court ruled that the provisions of the Lotteries (Regulation) Act 1998 and the Lotteries (Regulation) Ordinance 1997 that were challenged were legitimate. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED IN THE CASE** 1. Whether the character of state lotteries could be considered as trade and business. 2. Whether the provisions related to the validity of the Lotteries ordinance were acceptable with the Indian Constitution and the laws governing lotteries. **PETITIONER ’S ARGUMENTS** The petitioner’s counsel submitted that 1. A prohibition on lottery ticket sales violates basic rights, such as the freedom of trade and enterprise (Article 19(1)(g)) and the right to equality (Article 14). 2. The lotteries are only the responsibility of the Union Government, the state government is without the legislative authority to control or prohibit lotteries held by other states. 3. The ban on lotteries by the state of U.P. targets only some specific states and that is discrimination and violates the equality before the law. **RESPONDENT ARGUMENTS** Counsel for the Respondent submitted that 1. The state government has the authority to control lotteries on issues related to morals, public welfare, or revenue generation. 2. To safeguard its financial stability and commercial interests, the state government can govern, protect, and prohibit candidates from participating in lotteries in other states. 3. To prevent gambling-related problems and protect people from the harmful effects of lottery addiction, lotteries must be prohibited in other states. **Court’s Decision** The Supreme Court of India, after considering the arguments which were presented by the parties provided a comprehensive judgment. The court observed that in this case, various states and the Union Government were involved, and it decided to give judgment of all the petitions in a single judgment. The court determined the validity of the impugned section of the Lotteries (Regulation) Act 1998 and the Lotteries (Regulation) Ordinance 1997 and The court maintained the Gujarat High Court’s legality and overturned the Guwahati High Court’s decision, finding that multiple of its provisions were beyond the bounds of law. Any judgments or temporary orders that went against the Court’s decision were quashed. The various petitions transferred to the Court were disposed of in terms of the Court’s decision. The Court praised the experienced lawyers for their contributions to the case. There were also fees imposed on each of the parties. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** - India’s constitution - ***Article 14: (Equality before law):*** *“The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”*[***\[1\]***](#_ftn1) - ***Article 19****: “*Protecting certain rights about freedom of speech and trade, etc*.”*[***\[2\]***](#_ftn2) - ***Article 301****: “Freedom of trade, commerce, and intercourse shall be free throughout the territory of India.”[**\[3\]**](#_ftn3) - **Article 303**: Restrictions on the Union’s and the State’s ability to enact laws of trade and commerce”.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) **JUDGEMENT** - The Supreme Court held that state lotteries are a form of trade and commerce and are protected under the Constitution of India. - The Lotteries (Regulation) Act of 1998 concluded that there was no discrimination and that Article 14 of the Constitution was not violated. - However, Section 5 of the impugned OrdinanceAct, which empowers the state to prohibit lotteries conducted by others, was found to violate Articles 301 and 303 of the Constitution. This section restricts free trade and commerce. - The authority granted to the state to prohibit lotteries operated by other states was deemed to be an excessive amount of delegation and without specific guidelines. **RATIO DECIDENDI** **1. Federalism and State Lotteries**: - In this case, several states argued over the legality of clauses about state lotteries. - The issue was confined to state lotteries under Entry 40, List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. - The Union Government also joined the issue with one such set of states for upholding this act **2.** **Validity:** - The Supreme Court held that the state lotteries are a form of trade and commerce and deserve constitutional protection. - The Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998, was found not to be discriminatory and did not violate Article 14 of the Constitution. **3.** **The Act’s Section 5**: - However, Section 5 of the Act, which empowers the state to prohibit lotteries conducted by others, was declared to violate Articles 301 and 303 of the Constitution. - The Court found this section to be an excessive delegation of power without clear guidelines. **OBITER DICTA** 1. **State Lotteries as a Form of Trade and Commerce**: - The Court emphasized that state lotteries are a legitimate form of trade and commerce. - This recognition was crucial in establishing their constitutional protection. - Overextending of Power** - The Court found Section 5 of the Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998 to be an instance of excessive delegation. - Another concern was the lack of clear regulations prohibiting lotteries conducted by others. - **Articles-301 and 303 - The Court invoked Articles 301 and 303 of the Constitution while assessing the validity of the Act. - These articles deal with freedom of trade and commerce and restrictions on state powers. **CONCLUSION** - The Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998, but declared Section 5 of the Act to be violative of Articles 301 and 303 of the Constitution - State lotteries have been recognized to be valid commercial activities deserving full constitutional protection. **REFERENCE** **Important Case References:** 1\. The State of Bombay vs. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala[\[1\]](#_ftn1) 2\. H. Anraj & Ors. Vs. State of the Maharashtra[\[2\]](#_ftn2) 3 . Sesha Ayyar vs. Krishna Iyer [\[3\]](#_ftn3) **Important Statutes and Legal Provisions:** 1. The 1997 Lotteries (Regulation) Ordinance 2. Act of 1998 Regarding Lotteries (Regulation) 3\. The Constitution of India – Article 19(1)(g), Article 14, Article 301 and Article 303 --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) *The State Of Bombay vs R. M. D. Chamarbaugwala on 9 april, 1957*. (n.d.). Retrieved March 24, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/212098/ [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) *H. Anraj and others etc vs state of maharashtra on 23 january, 1984*. (n.d.). Retrieved March 24, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/358833/ [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) *H. Anraj and others etc vs state of Maharashtra on 23 January, 1984*. (n.d.). Retrieved March 24, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/358833/ --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Article 14, constitution of India (1950) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Article 19, constitution of India (1950) [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Article 301, constitution of India (1950) [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Article 303, constitution of India (1950) --- [**\[1\]**](#_ftnref1) **The Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998, under Entry 40, List I of the Constitution of India https://indiankanoon.org/doc/358833/ **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [M/S. Shree Vishnu Constructions Vs. The Engineer in Chief Military Engineering Services & Ors.](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-shree-vishnu-constructions-vs-the-engineer-in-chief-military-engineering-services-ors/) **Published:** March 30, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** By – **M. Yesaswini Sai Nikitha** (Dr.B.R.Ambedkar College of Law, Andhra University) **ABSTRACT** In the present case, both the appellant and the respondent entered into an agreement regarding the renovation of floors and modifications to be made to the mess in the Tech area, at Air Force Academy, Hyderabad. After finishing the work, the appellant furnished a final bill to the respondent. Later, the respondent settled the full bill in one year, and consequently, the appellant furnished a “no further claim certificate” to confirm that transaction. Later, the appellant served a notice to the respondent, invoking the arbitration clause mentioned within the agreement. The appellant filed an application before the High Court of Telangana to appoint an arbitrator under Sec.11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (herein after referred to as the Principal Act). But the High Court declined to nominate an arbitrator, held that the provisions of the Principal Act shall be applicable to the arbitration proceedings under Sec.21 and Sec.26, commenced before the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, (herein after referred to as the Amendment Act). So, the appellant approached the Supreme Court under appellate jurisdiction. The appellant pleaded that the above provisions of the Amendment Act, 2015 shall be applied to the present case and requested to nominate an arbitrator. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of the Principal Act shall be applied to the current matter. The Apex Court upheld the High Court decision in the present matter. ***Keywords*:** Appointment of arbitrator, Arbitral proceedings, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, The Supreme Court, Civil Appellate Jurisdiction, Secs.11(6),21,26. **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***M/S Shree Vishnu Constructions vs. The Engineer in Chief Military Engineering Services & Ors.*Case Number***CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3461 OF 2023*Judgement Date***09 May, 2023*Court***The Supreme Court of India*Quorum***C.T.RAVIKUMAR(J), M.R.SHAH(J)*Author***M.R.SHAH*Citation***2023 SCC Online SC 600*Legal Provisions Involved***The Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996-Sec.11(6),Sec.21 The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act,2015-Sec.11(6-A), Sec.26**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** In this case, Arbitration is the chief subject matter. In India, the process of arbitration is defined and regulated through the legislation of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Later the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 was enacted by making some changes. The method of Arbitration is defined under Sec.2(1)(a) of the Principal Act as *“arbitration means any arbitration whether or not administered by permanent arbitral institution*”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) The arbitration agreement is defined under Sec.7 of the Principal Act. The Supreme Court and the High Courts are empowered to designate, arbitral institutions, from time to time as provided in,Sec.11(3-A) of the aforesaid act and it is also provided that these Courts also have the competent jurisdiction to appoint the arbitrators under Sec.11 of the Principal Act . In case of any dispute, any of the parties by invoking The arbitration clause in the agreement,could approach the courts under the appropriate jurisdiction to get an arbitrator appointed under Sec.21 and 26 of the aforesaid Act. In the current matter, the petitioner had requested the High Court to appoint an arbitrator but the Court had dismissed the petition as the payment of the bill was made by the respondents in the due time and on the ground of accord and satisfaction. Then the petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court for the appointment of the arbitrator under Secs.11(6),21, and 26 of the Principal Act, and Sec.11(6-A) of the Amendment Act. The major issue is whether the provisions of The Principal Act or Amendment Act should be applied to this present case. **FACTS OF THE CASE** In this case**,** the factual matrix, is that the appellant and the respondent entered into a formal agreement on July 22nd , 2010 for the renovation to floors and modifications to senior non-commissioned officers mess in the tech area at Air Force Academy, Hyderabad. After completion of the work, the petitioner furnished a final bill on July 10th, 2012, the payment of that bill was paid to the appellant on April 29th, 2013; consequently, the appellant issued a “no further claim certificate.” Further, the petitioner sent a notice invoking the arbitration clause, to the respondent on December 20th, 2013 and, Subsequently he filed an application to nominate an arbitrator under Sec.11(6) of the Principal Act, before the Telangana High Court on April 27th,2016. The Court dismissed the application on the ground of “accord and satisfaction” and as the payment of the bill was already made to the appellant on 29th April ,2013. The Court denied to nominate an arbitrator under Sec.26 read with Sec.21 of the Principal Act and held that the provisions of the aforesaid Act shall be applied to the present matter. In this context, the petitioner had appealed the Supreme Court and requested to nominate an arbitrator in the current case under the provisions of Sec.11(6-A), Sec.26 read with Sec.21 of the Amendment Act. The challenged order is the subject matter of the present appeal. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** (1)Whether Sec.11(6-A) of the Amendment Act,2015 can be applied to the judicial and arbitral proceedings initiated before the amendment ? (2)Whether the provisions of the Principal Act or the Amendment Act can be applied for the arbitral proceedings initiated before the amendment? (3)How the Sec.26 of the Amendment act affect the proceedings initiated after the amendment? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** - It was submitted by the council for Petitioner, that in the view of the Amendment Act, through which Sec.11(6A) is incorporated, while deciding the application under Sec.11(6), the court will have very finite jurisdiction and should consider only that the agreement contains an arbitration clause or not, without any further inquiry. The learned counsel for the petitioner pleaded that the provisions of the Amendment Act are to be applied in the present matter. - The learned counsel for the appellant, Mr.K.Parameshwar, has strenuously submitted that the question of applicability of Sec.11 (6A) and other amended provisions to the proceedings initiated after the amendment are covered in the case[\[1\]](#_ftn1)**,** in which the Supreme Court ruled that the provisions of the Amendment Act shall be applied to the arbitral matters initiated before the amendment and that the provisions of this act can be applied prospectively. In the above case, the court also stated that the Sec.26 of the Act[\[2\]](#_ftn2) can be divided into two parts. The first part is related to the arbitral proceedings before the arbitrator and the second part applies to the judicial proceedings concerning arbitral matters. And the commencement date of these proceedings cannot be controlled by the application of Sec.21of the Principal Act. In this case, it was also held that Sec.21 of the Act[\[3\]](#_ftn3) forms the subject matter of the first part of Sec.26 and pleaded to consider the findings of this case. - It was submitted that by the council for appellant that in the case[\[4\]](#_ftn4) without observing the decision in the BCCI case, the court ruled that the date when the request for the appointment of an arbitrator was made is considered as the relevant date for applying Sec.26 of the Amendment Act. This decision was considered while deciding the case[\[5\]](#_ftn5),not following the judgement of the case[\[6\]](#_ftn6) as the context is related to Sec.11 and different from the context of the BCCI case. - The learned counsel for the appellant contended that in the case[\[7\]](#_ftn7) the court by following the judgement of the BCCI case highlighted that the provisions of the Amendment Act would be applied to court proceedings arising out of arbitral matters, irrelevant whether commenced, before or after the amendment. It is further submitted that the findings of the case[\[8\]](#_ftn8) were considered in deciding the subsequent cases of case[\[9\]](#_ftn9) and case[\[10\]](#_ftn10). The counsel for the appellantrequested to allow the current appeal considering the findings of the BCCI Case. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** - The learned counsel for Respondent contended that as per Sec.26 read with Sec.21 of the Act[\[1\]](#_ftn1), the Amendment Act shall not apply to the arbitral proceedings as per Sec.21, if the commencement occurs before the amendment. - It was submitted by the counsel for the Respondent that the notice invoking the arbitration clause was furnished by the appellant much before, the Amendment Act and the application was filed under Sec.11(6) of the Principal Act, much after the amendment. It was further contended that the provisions of the Principal Act shall be applied to the present appeal, as under Sec.26 of the Amendment Act, the arbitral proceedings can be said to have initiated much before the amendment. - The learned counsel for the Respondent had contended that the BCCI Case and the subsequent cases which followed the judgement of the above case are related to the context of matters under Sec.34 and Sec.36 of the Principal Act and related to the court proceedings under Sec.26 of the Amendment Act, which is entirely distinct from the subject matter of the present appeal. - It was further submitted by the counsel for the Respondent, in the case[\[2\]](#_ftn2), the court ruled that the provisions of the Principal Act shall be applied when the issue was related to the application under Sec.11(6) of the aforesaid Act, where the notice was issued before the Amendment. This decision was followed in the subsequent case of Pradeep Vinod Construction Company. In the above case, the findings of case[**\[3\]**](#_ftn3) were considered. In reliance on the above judgements, the counsel for the respondent requested to dismiss the present appeal. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** - **The Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996** - **Sec. 11(6*)-*** Appointment of Arbitrators-“*Where, under an appointment procedure agreed upon by the parties.* [*(a)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/234911/)*a party fails to act as required under that procedure; or* [*(b)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1466040/)*the parties, or the two appointed arbitrators, fail to reach an agreement expected of them under that procedure; or* [*(c)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1758564/)*a person, including an institution, fails to perform any function entrusted to him or it under that procedure, a \[the appointment shall be made, on an application of the party, by the arbitral institution designated by the Supreme Court*, *in case of international commercial arbitration, or by the High Court, in case of arbitrations other than international commercial arbitration, as the case may be\] \[Substituted by Act No. 33 of 2019, dated 9.8.2019.\] to take the necessary measure, unless the agreement on the appointment procedure provides other means for securing the appointment.”*[***\[1\]***](#_ftn1) **Sec.21**–***Commencement of arbitral proceedings****.-“Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral proceedings in respect of a particular dispute commence on the date on which a request for that dispute to be referred to arbitration is received by the respondent.”[**\[2\]**](#_ftn2)* **The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act,2015** - **Sec.11(6-A)-** “[*(6A)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/63461877/)*\[ \*\*\*\] \[Omitted ‘(6A) The Supreme Court or, as the case may be, the High Court, while considering any application under sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) or sub-section (6), shall, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court, confine to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement’ by Act No. 33 of 2019, dated 9.8.2019.\]”*[***\[3\]***](#_ftn3) - **Sec.26-Expert appointed by arbitral tribunal- *“*[*(1)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/815190/)*Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal may* [*(a)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1555811/)*appoint one or more experts to report to it on specific issues to be determined by the arbitral tribunal, and* [*(b)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/499421/)*require a party to give the expert any relevant information or to produce, or to provide access to, any relevant documents, goods or other property for his inspection* [*(2)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1664361/)*Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, if a party so requests or if the arbitral tribunal considers it necessary, the expert shall, after delivery of his written or oral report, participate in an oral hearing where the parties have the opportunity to put questions to him and to present expert witnesses in order to testify on the points at issue.* [*(3)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/138391/)*Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the expert shall, on the request of a party, make available to that party for examination all documents, goods or other property in the possession of the expert with which he was provided in order to prepare his report.”*[***\[4\]***](#_ftn4) **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** The Honourable Supreme Court first of all considered the issue of applicability of the Amendment Act, 2015 provisions to the present matter. In the case[\[1\]](#_ftn1)**,**the court observed that whether the Supreme Court or High Court while considering any application under Secs.11(4) to 11(6), is to confine itself to observe only whether the arbitration clause existed or not, nothing more, nothing less, leaving other issues to the arbitrator. The court in the BCCI Case, while interpreting Sec.26 of the Amendment Act, observed that the Amendment Act is prospective in nature and shall be applied to arbitral proceedings whether commenced on or after the Amendment Act,2015. The Supreme Court then referred to Parmar Construction Company Case, and analysed that when Sec.21 of the Principal Act read with Sec.26 of the Amendment Act, the provisions of the Amendment Act shall not apply to the arbitral proceedings initiated under Sec.21 of the principal Act unless the parties otherwise agree[\[2\]](#_ftn2), and further observed that without having recourse to the Amendment Act, the applications made under Sec.11(6) of the principle Act deserved to be examined with reference to the aforesaid act . The Supreme Court in this present case didn’t consider the case[\[3\]](#_ftn3) in the view that the context of that case is related to court matters under Secs.34 and 36 which is irrelevant to the current case. The Court also ruled that the decisions of the Parmar Construction Company Case andPradeep Vinod Construction Case cannot be said to be inconsistentwith the decision of BCCI Case. The Supreme Court considered the decisions of the Parmar Construction Company case, Pradeep Vinod Construction Company case and S.P. Singla Constructions Private Limited case to facts and findings in the present case, and held that *“the law prevailing prior to the Amendment Act,2015 shall be applicable and the High Court has rightly entered into the question of “accord and satisfaction” and has rightly dismissed the application under Sec.11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996”[**\[4\]**](#_ftn4)*. The Court held that the provisions of the Principal Act shall be applicable in a case where the notice invoking arbitration clause is furnished before the amendment and the application under Sec.11 and Sec.21 of the aforesaid Act for the appointment of an arbitrator is filed after the amendment. Consequently, the Supreme Court had dismissed the appeal and upheld the judgement given by High Court as the issues on the ground of accord and satisfaction, is not necessary to be sent for arbitration. **CONCLUSION& COMMENTS** In this case, the main issues dealt with the applicability of the provisions of the Principal Act and Amendment Act. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of the Amendment Act cannot be applied to a dispute, when the arbitration clause is invoked by one of the parties, and the notice is furnished before the Amendment , under Sec.11(6) and Sec.21 of the Principal Act. The date when the notice is issued is considered as the commencement date of the arbitral proceedings under Sec.26 of the Principal Act. In my opinion, the Apex Court correctly upheld the judgement given by the High Court and dismissed the current appeal. REFERENCES** - Important Cases Referred** - Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) Vs. Kochi Cricket Private Limited & ors.,(2018) 6 SCC 287 - Union of India Vs. Parmar Construction Company (2019),15 SCC 682 - Union of India Vs. Pratap Vinod Construction Company (2020),2 SCC 464 - Government of India Vs. Vedanta Limited , (2020) 10 SCC 1 - Patel Engineering Limited Vs. North Eastern Electric Power Corporation Limited ,(2020) 7 SCC 167 - Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Company Limited Vs. National Highways Authority of India, (NHAI),(2019) 15 SCC 131 - S.P.Singla Constructions Private Limited vs. State of Himachal Pradesh &Anr., (2019) 2 SCC 488 - Mayawati Trading Vs. Pradyut Debbarman, (2019) 8 SCC 714 - **Important Statutes Referred** - The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. - The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act,2015 --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Mayawati Trading Vs. Pradyut Debbarman (2019) 8 SCC 714 [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) (2019) 15 SCC 682 (See para 26) [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) BCCI Case [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) (2023) SCC Online SC 600 --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) *sec.11(6)*. (n.d.). indiankannon. Retrieved February 27, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/605764/ [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) *sec.21 of arbitration and conciliation act,1996*. (n.d.). India Code. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) *sec.11(6-A)*. (n.d.). indiankannon. Retrieved February 27, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1841764/ [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) *sec.26*. (n.d.). indiankannon. Retrieved February 27, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1752162/ --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act,2015 (Act 3 of 2016) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Parmar Construction Company Case [\[3\]](#_ftnref3)S.P.Singla Constructions Private Limited Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr. (2019) 2 SCC 488 --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) Vs. Kochi Cricket Private Limited & Ors.(2018) 6 SCC 287 (see paras 37 and 39) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act,2015(Act 3 of 2016) [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996(Act 26 of 1996) [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Union of India Vs. Parmar Construction Company (2019) 15 SCC 682 (see paras 25-27) [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Union of India Vs. Pratap Vinod Construction Company (2020) 2 SCC 464 [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) BCCI Case [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Government of India Vs. Vedanta Limited (2020)10 SCC 1 [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) BCCI Case [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Patel Engineering Limited Vs. North Eastern Electric Power Corporation Limited (2020) 7 SCC 167 (See para15) [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Company Limited Vs. National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) (2019) 15 SCC 131 --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) *sec.2(1)(a)*. (n.d.). indiankannon. Retrieved February 27, 2024, from https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1804257/ **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-uttaranchal-v-balwant-singh-chaufal/) **Published:** March 28, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** In ‘State Of Uttaranchal vs Balwant Singh Chaufal & Ors,’ the Supreme Court addresses constitutional nuances. Focusing on Advocate General appointment criteria, it delves into Articles 165 and 217. This judgment is a pivotal interpretation in public interest litigation, setting new legal precedents. Keywords: Constitution, Advocate General, Articles 165 and 217, Public Interest Litigation, Supreme Court. **B) CASE DETAILS** i) Case Title: State Of Uttaranchal vs Balwant Singh Chaufal & Ors. ii) Case ID: Civil Appeal Nos. 1134-1135 of 2002. iii) Judgment Date: 18th January 2010. iv) Venue: Supreme Court of India. v) Bench: Justices Mukundakam Sharma, Dalveer Bhandari. vi) Author: Justice Dalveer Bhandari. vii) Reference: AIR 2010 SC 2550, 2010 AIR SCW 1029. viii) Laws Involved: Indian Constitution, Article 165, Article 217. **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND** The case explores Advocate General appointment rules. Uttaranchal State challenges High Court orders. These question appointing an Advocate General over 62 years. Central to this are Articles 165 and 217, shaping qualifications and tenure for Advocate General and High Court judges. **D) CASE FACTS** Originating from a Public Interest Litigation in Uttaranchal High Court. It questioned L.P. Nathani’s Advocate General role. The issue was his age, over 62, the High Court judge’s retirement age under Article 217. The High Court demanded a state response. **E) LEGAL ISSUES** Does a High Court judge’s age limit under Article 217 affect the Advocate General’s appointment as per Article 165? **F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The State of Uttaranchal, represented by Shri Dinesh Dwivedi, emphasized past judicial interpretations which had established that the age limit for High Court judges does not apply to the Advocate General. The appellant referenced previous rulings including G.D. Karkare v. T.L. Shevde & Others (AIR 1952 Nagpur 330) and Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. Sonepat v. Their Workmen (1962 Supp. (3) SCR 89), asserting the independence of the Advocate General’s office from age restrictions. **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The respondents, by not appearing in the Supreme Court, displayed a lack of commitment to the case. This non-serious approach suggested a weak stance on their end regarding the challenged appointment of the Advocate General. **B) RELEVANT LAWS** i. Key legal provisions are Articles 165 and 217. Article 165 governs state Advocate General appointments. Article 217 defines High Court judges’ terms, including retirement age. **H) JUDGMENT** a. RATIO DECIDENDI i. The Supreme Court backed the appellant’s view. It clarified that the Advocate General’s appointment is not limited by the High Court judges’ age rule in Article 217. The court underscored the Advocate General’s unique, independent role. **b. OBITER DICTA** i. The court condemned public interest litigation misuse. It highlighted the strain such actions put on the judicial system, overshadowing genuine cases. **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The decision confirms the Advocate General’s independence from judiciary age limits. It reinforces constitutional separation of roles and warns against public interest litigation abuse. **J) REFERENCES** a. Case References i. G.D. Karkare v. T.L. Shevde, AIR 1952 Nagpur 330. ii. Atlas Cycle Industries v. Their Workmen, 1962 Supp. (3) SCR 89. iii. People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, (1982) 3 SCC 235. iv. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 1086. v. Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P., AIR 1985 SC 652. b. Statute References i. Constitution of India, Articles 165 and 217. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Islamic Academy Of Education vs State Of Karnataka And Others (2003)](https://lawfoyer.in/islamic-academy-of-education-vs-state-of-karnataka-and-others-2003/) **Published:** March 28, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ### A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The case of *Islamic Academy Of Education vs State Of Karnataka And Others* (2003) delves into the nuanced interpretation of educational rights under Article 30 of the Indian Constitution. Central to the dispute is the autonomy of unaided minority educational institutions in setting admission criteria and fee structures, juxtaposed against regulatory measures by the State to uphold academic standards and prevent maladministration. This landmark judgment addresses the fine balance between institutional autonomy and governmental oversight, delineating the permissible extent of State intervention in the administration of private unaided educational institutions, including those established by minorities. **Keywords:** Autonomy, Unaided Institutions, Minority Rights, Educational Administration, State Regulation, Article 30, Admission Criteria, Fee Structure, Supreme Court Judgment. ### B) CASE DETAILS - **Judgement Cause Title:** Islamic Academy Of Education And … vs State Of Karnataka And Others. - **Case Number:** Writ Petition (civil) 350 of 1993. - **Judgement Date:** 14/08/2003. - **Court:** Supreme Court of India. - **Quorum:** V. N. Khare, S. N. Variava, K. G. Balakrishnan, Arijit Pasayat, S.B. Sinha. - **Author:** V. N. Khare. - **Citation:** 2003 6 SCC 697. - **Legal Provisions Involved:** Article 30 of the Indian Constitution, and related education laws and regulations. ### C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The judgment in Islamic Academy Of Education vs State Of Karnataka emanates from the interpretation of the rights of minority educational institutions under Article 30 of the Indian Constitution. The roots of this case trace back to varying interpretations of the T.M.A. Pai Foundation judgment. Discrepancies in understanding led to diverse State regulations impacting the autonomy of unaided private educational institutions, particularly in admissions and fee structures. This case aimed to resolve these ambiguities, providing clarity on the extent of the regulatory authority of the State over unaided private and minority educational institutions. ### D) FACTS OF THE CASE The petitioners in this case, primarily unaided private educational institutions, contended that their autonomy was being unduly restricted by various state-imposed regulations. These included limitations on the administration’s freedom in student admissions and fee determination. The State, defending its regulations, argued for necessary oversight to maintain educational standards, prevent maladministration, and ensure access for economically weaker sections. This clash of interests between institutional autonomy and state control formed the crux of the case. ### E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED 1. Whether unaided private educational institutions have complete autonomy in their administrative decisions, particularly in matters of student admissions and fee structures. ### F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The petitioners argued for maximal autonomy for private unaided educational institutions. They emphasized their right to self-regulation in admissions and fee determinations, citing Article 30 of the Indian Constitution. The petitioners contended that state regulations imposed unfair limitations on their administrative freedom, contradicting the essence of being unaided institutions. ### G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The State argued for the necessity of regulatory oversight over unaided educational institutions to ensure merit-based admissions, prevent capitation fees, and protect the interests of economically and socially disadvantaged students. The State asserted that such regulation was essential for maintaining educational standards and public interest. ### H) JUDGEMENT #### a. RATIO DECIDENDI The Supreme Court held that while unaided educational institutions, including minority institutions, enjoy autonomy, this right is not absolute. The Court upheld that regulatory measures by the State are permissible, provided they ensure fair and merit-based admissions and prevent profiteering. The judgment distinguished between the rights of minority and non-minority institutions, with minority institutions enjoying certain privileges under Article 30. However, it affirmed that both types of institutions must adhere to reasonable regulations ensuring educational standards. #### b. OBITER DICTA The Court observed the critical role of education in national development and the need for a balanced approach that safeguards institutional autonomy while ensuring educational quality and social justice. ### I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The Supreme Court’s judgment in Islamic Academy Of Education vs State Of Karnataka establishes a harmonious balance between the autonomy of unaided educational institutions and the State’s role in regulating educational standards. The decision underscores the principle that while autonomy is vital, it must coexist with accountability and adherence to norms ensuring quality education and social equity. ### J) REFERENCES #### a. Important Cases Referred - T.M.A. Pai Foundation vs State of Karnataka - St. Stephen’s College vs University of Delhi - Unni Krishnan, J.P. and Ors. vs State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. - The Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society vs State of Gujarat and Anr. #### b. Important Statutes Referred - The Indian Constitution, particularly Article 30. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Frank Anthony Public School vs Union Of India](https://lawfoyer.in/frank-anthony-public-school-vs-union-of-india/) **Published:** March 28, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **A) ABSTRACT** The Supreme Court, in Frank Anthony Public School vs Union Of India & Ors, tackled a crucial question. It examined whether sections 8 to 11 and 12 of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973, infringed upon Article 30 rights of unaided minority schools. The case struck a balance between self-administration rights of these institutions and the State’s regulatory role in education. The Court invalidated Section 12, highlighting that self-governance does not include mismanagement. Key Terms: Minority Educational Institutions, Delhi School Education Act, Article 30, Supreme Court, Unfair Discrimination, Education Quality, Regulatory Oversight. **B) CASE PARTICULARS** i) Case Title: Frank Anthony Public School vs Union Of India & Ors. ii) Case ID: Civil Writ Petition No. 587 of 1984. iii) Decision Date: 17th November 1986. iv) Court: Supreme Court of India. v) Bench: Justices O. Chinnappa Reddy and G.L. Oza. vi) Opinion by: Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy. vii) Reference: 1987 AIR 311, 1986 SCC (4) 707. viii) Legal Framework: Article 30, Indian Constitution; Sections 8-12, Delhi School Education Act, 1973. **C) CASE ORIGIN AND CONTEXT** The case emerged from Frank Anthony Public School Employees Association’s challenge. They claimed Section 12 of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973, was unconstitutional. This section exempted unaided minority schools from standard pay and employment terms. Such exemption caused salary and service condition disparities, prompting the Association to seek parity. **D) CASE FACTS** Frank Anthony Public School, a private minority institution, grappled with unequal pay and work conditions compared to public schools. This stemmed from Section 12’s exclusion of such schools from Delhi School Education Act’s sections 8-11. The petitioners sought equal pay and conditions, alleging Section 12’s unconstitutionality. **E) LEGAL ISSUES AT STAKE** The central legal query was whether Section 12 of the Delhi School Education Act violated Article 14’s equality principle and impinged on Article 30 rights for minorities. **F) PETITIONERS’ STANCE** Petitioners labeled Section 12 discriminatory, breaching Article 14. They argued that it caused unequal employee treatment in unaided minority schools. Their view was these sections didn’t infringe Article 30 rights, but were necessary regulatory measures for educational quality. **G) RESPONDENTS’ POSITION** Respondents defended Section 12 as a legitimate differentiation, preserving administrative autonomy under Article 30. They feared removing it could financially strain unaided minority schools like Frank Anthony Public School, forcing closure due to increased salaries and allowances. **H) COURT’S FINDINGS** **a. DECISION REASONING** The Court deemed Section 12 of the Delhi School Education Act unconstitutional and biased. It exempted unaided minority schools from crucial fair employment and education quality provisions. The verdict emphasized that self-administration doesn’t imply the right to mismanage. Imposing regulations for educational excellence and fair employment was considered appropriate and not in conflict with Article 30. **b. ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS** In its obiter dicta, the Court highlighted the intricate balance between minority institution autonomy and State educational oversight. It stressed that managing educational institutions, especially concerning teacher quality and employment terms, directly influences education quality. This is vital for public interest and national prosperity. **I) ANALYSIS & PERSPECTIVES** The Supreme Court’s judgment in Frank Anthony Public School vs Union Of India & Ors marks a pivotal clarification. It delineates permissible regulatory measures under Article 30 for minority institutions. The Court invalidated Section 12 of the Delhi School Education Act, advocating against discrimination and affirming the State’s responsibility in guaranteeing fair employment and consistent educational standards across all schools, including private minority ones. **J) SOURCES AND REFERENCES** **a. Key Case Citations:** - In re Kerala Education Bill, 1957 \[1958\] SCR 995. - Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai et al. v. State of Bombay et al. \[1963\] 3 SCR 837. - State of Kerala etc. v. Mother Provincial etc. \[1971\] 1 SCR 734. - The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Anr. \[1975\] 1 SCR 173. - All Saints High School etc. v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh A.I.R. 1980 SC 1042. **b. Relevant Statutes Referenced:** - Delhi School Education Act, 1973. - The Indian Constitution. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [ADR Drafting and Literary Society of Faculty of law, University of Lucknow, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh are organizing 2nd National Law fest (Virtual)](https://lawfoyer.in/adr-drafting-and-literary-society-of-faculty-of-law-university-of-lucknow-lucknow-uttar-pradesh-are-organizing-2nd-national-law-fest-virtual/) **Published:** March 20, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **About the University** The University of Lucknow or Lucknow University is a government-owned Indian research university based in Lucknow. Founded in 1867, the University of Lucknow is one of the oldest government-owned institutions of higher education in India. **About the Society** ADR, Drafting and Literary Society (ADLS) is an academic body that was constituted in 2022. It is a dedicated society that aims to provide a platform for students to enhance requisite skills. The Society conducts training programs and workshops, honing the drafting and argumentation skills of nascent legal minds. It organizes through its faculty and student body, various competitions, thereby enabling students to participate in external competitions organized both nationally and internationally. **About the event** The ADR, Drafting and Literary Society is going to host the Second National Law Fest, at the dawn of this summer, in virtual mode from 5th April to 7th April, 2024. **List of the competitions:** - Negotiation Competition - Client Counselling Competition - Debate - Article Writing Competition - Quiz **The brochure of the same is available through the link given below**: [https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/2nd-National-Online-Law-Fest2024-4.pdf-compressed-1.pdf](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/2nd-National-Online-Law-Fest2024-4.pdf-compressed-1.pdf "Brochure") **Important Dates:** - **Last date to register** is **29th of March 2024** - **Date of Competition** is **5th to 7th April 2024** **Contact Info-** - **Nilansh Pathak–** 8765510008 - **Shreeya Singh-** 7355632380 - **Utkarsh Mishra –** 6388773916adr **Categories:** Events, Quiz --- ### [6th National Moot Court Competition by Gitarattan International Business School on 29th & 30th March 2024](https://lawfoyer.in/6th-national-moot-court-competition-by-gitarattan-international-business-school-on-29th-30th-march-2024/) **Published:** March 10, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Flyer-1-1024x1024.jpg) [Download Brochure](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/NMC-2024-Brochure-1.pdf) ## **ABOUT GIBS** Gitarattan International Business School was established in 2004 under the aegis of the Rohini Educational Society. The society is proudly running various other successful institutions in Delhi, like the Gitarattan Institute of Advanced Studies and Training, the Gitarattan Jindal Public School, and the Sovereign School. ## **ABOUT NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION** It gives us immense pleasure to announce that the ‘Courtroom- The Law Society of Centre for Legal Studies, Gitarattan International Business School is organizing **its 6th National Moot Court Competition on 29th & 30th March 2024**. It brings together students from different law schools of the country to compete in a fast-paced and challenging professional environment. It aims at giving exposure to law students on important issues arising in contemporary socio-economic and legal environments. Mooting is one of the most essential skills for any law professional. Moot courts or mock trials are usually based on hypothetical cases, involving emerging or unsettled areas of law. Law students, who participate in these activities, are given the opportunity to develop their research, legal writing and oral advocacy skills in a mock courtroom setting. Additionally, moot court presentation inculcates professional legal etiquettes in the students which equip them to adapt with courtroom practices. ## **Eligibility** Students pursuing their full-time 3-year LLB or 5-year LLB program (1 team per program per institute) from a university or Institute recognized by the Bar Council of India, are eligible to apply. ## **Date of Event** 29th and 30th March 2024 ## **Registration Fees** REGISTRATION FEE PER TEAM – 3000 Rs. /- (without accommodation ) **Please refer to the brochure for more details** **Last Date to Register- 16th March 2024** **Registration Link-** [**https://rzp.io/l/nmc2024**](https://rzp.io/l/nmc2024) **Brochure Link-** [**https://gitarattan.edu.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/NMC-2024-Brochure-1.pdf**](https://gitarattan.edu.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/NMC-2024-Brochure-1.pdf) ## **Awards and Rewards** **Winner Team-** Rs.35,000+ Trophy + Certificate of Merit + Hamper + Internship **Runner-Up Team –**Rs.25,000+ Trophy + Certificate of Merit + Hamper + Internship **Best Mooter –**Rs.10,000+ Trophy + Certificate of Merit + Internship **2nd Best Mooter-** Certificate of Merit **Best Researcher –**Rs.10,000+ Trophy + Certificate of Merit + A Free Publication in Journal **2nd Best Researcher –**Certificate of Merit **Best Memorial Petitioner –**Rs.5,000 + Trophy + Certificate of Merit + Internship **Best Memorial Respondant –**Rs.5,000 + Trophy + Certificate of Merit + Internship ## **Venue** Campus grounds of CLS GIBS in Rohini ## **Contact Information** In case of any queries, please mail us at nmc@gitarattan.edu.in Or Contact Bhumika Gupta (President)- +91 99719 34206 Ayush Sharma (Vice President)- +91 99539 43663 **Categories:** Events --- ### [Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narayan, AIR 1975 SC 2299](https://lawfoyer.in/indira-nehru-gandhi-v-raj-narayan-air-1975-sc-2299/) **Published:** March 10, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **NIGHILKUMAR M** (Government Law College, Dharmapuri) Affiliated to Tamil Nadu Dr Ambedkar Law University, Chennai, Tamil Nadu. **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** This paper is analysing the case *Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain,* also known as election case*.* This case discusses the validity of 39th Constitutional Amendment Act, validity of Article 329A and the matter of electoral malpractice. The case is discussed by the Article 14, 31-B, 368, 329(A) of the Constitution of India and Section 123(7) of the Representation of People’s Act. Fact of this case is the Lok Sabha election was held in 1971. In this election Indira Gandhi was won and Raj Narain who is candidate against her, alleged against her for electoral malpractice. The case was filed before the High Court of Allahabad. The High Court was passed an order against Indira Gandhi that the election of Indira Gandhi is void on the ground of corrupt practice and she misused the Government vehicle. Indhira Gandhi was appealed before the Supreme Court of India against the judgment of High Court of Allahabad. The Apex Court after heard both side arguments passed the Judgment that the Article 329A which was inserted by 39th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1975, was repealed by the 44th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1978 and the election of Indira Nehru Gandhi is valid. ***Keywords*:** emergency case, election case, electoral malpractice, article 329A, indira gandhi, 39th amendment act, constituion of india, representative of peoples act, supreme court of india 1. CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain &Anr.*Case Number***Appeal (Civil) 887 of 1975*Date of Judgement***07.11.1975*Court***Supreme Court of India*Quorum***A.N. Ray (CJ) & H.R. Khanna & K.K. Mathew & M.H. Beg & Y.V. Chandrachud*Author***A.N. Ray*Citation***AIR 1975 SC 2299*Legal Provisions Involved***Article 14, 31-B, 368, 329(A) of the Constitution of India. Section 123(7) of the Representation of People’s Act.INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** In this case dealing with the legal concept of constitutional validity of Article 329A and electoral malpractice or corrupt practice Article 329A says about Special Provision as to elections to parliament in the case of Prime Minister and Speaker. This Article speaks about no jurisdiction to exercise the matter of Prime Minister and Speaker and it was inserted in 39th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1975. After the judgment passed by the Court this provision was repealed by the 44th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1978. FACTS OF THE CASE** - In 1971, Lok Sabha General Election was conducted. Raj Narain was one of the candidates of that election who the political contender against Indira Gandhi for Rae Bareilly constituency. - In this election, Indira Gandhi and her party were won by securing 352 out of 518 seats. Raj Narain filed a case to nullify the election and against Indira Gandhi as accused for corrupt practise to her victory in that election. He alleged that Indira Gandhi used government vehicle, armed force and local police, distributed the liquor to vote for her. - Allahabad High Court declared that election of Indira Gandhi was void on the ground of corrupt practice and she misused the Government vehicle under Section 123(7) of Representative of People’s Act, 1951 and further she was barred from contesting the election for another six years.Indira Gandhi was aggrieved by the decision of High Court of Allahabad. She appeals to Supreme Court of India against the decision of that High Court and questioned about validity of Article 329A which amended by 39th Constitutional (Amendment) Act, 1975 was challenged, about Special provision as to elections to Parliament in the case of Prime Minister and Speaker. 1. LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** There are three main issues of this case to be framed by the Honourable Supreme Court of India as follows, 1. Whether clause 4 of Article 329A of the Constitution of India is constitutionally valid or not? 2. Whether Representation of People’s (Amendment) Act, 1974 and Election Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 are constitutionally valid or not? 3. whether Indira Gandhi’s election is valid or not? APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Appellant submitted that, - The Attorney General, representing on behalf of the petitioner, argued that the ***Keshavnanda Bharti***case is not a relevant precedent to determine if judicial review is essential for ensuring free and fair elections. They emphasized that the aforementioned case focused on the amendment process of the Constitution, not the conduct of elections. - The said Article and Representation of People’s Act were passed for taking away the petitioner’s legal right. these acts were violating the free and fair election. Judiciary has power to interfere the election dispute. Amendments were violating the basic structure and especially, the principle of equality. So, these acts are unconstitutional. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that, - The respondent challenged the amendment act, arguing it violated the “basic structure doctrine” established by the Supreme Court in ***Kesavananda Bharati v. Union of India***. This doctrine limits Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution, ensuring it cannot alter its core principles. - The respondent further argued that while Article 368 grants Parliament the ability to amend the Constitution, this power is not absolute. The 39th Constitutional Amendment Act of 1975, by removing the courts’ jurisdiction over Prime Minister and Speaker elections, allegedly undermines the separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution. This separation is crucial, as the judiciary acts as the guardian of fundamental rights through judicial review, ensuring fair elections, a cornerstone of any democracy.Finally, the respondent contended that the amendment’s passage was illegal due to the detention of opposition MPs, violating the principle that even a two-thirds majority cannot grant Parliament the power to exercise executive or judicial functions. RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** - Article 329A of the Constitution of India denote that Special Provision as to elections to parliament in the case of Prime Minister and Speaker. – Repealed. - Article 14, 31-B, 368, 329(A) of the Constitution of India. - Section 123(7) of the Representation of People’s Act. JUDGEMENT** The Honourable Supreme Court of India pronounced the judgment of this case by majority that, *Amendment Act, 1951 and 1974 and Clause 4 of Article 329A of the Constitution of India is void:* - The Amendment Act, 1951 and 1974 were violated the basic structure of the Constitution. So, these amendment acts were struck down on the grounds that takes the power of jurisdiction of the court of law and hampers the judicial review. Clause 4 of Article 329A also struck down because of, The issue falls outside the scope of Parliament’s authority as it impinges upon the core, basic structure of the Indian Constitution. - This Honourable Supreme Court of India declared that Article 329A (4) of the Constitution of India is constitutionally void by using the landmark case ***Kesavananda Bharati***. *Indira Gandhi election is valid:* - Indira Gandhi was filed nomination on 1st February, 1971. Yashpal Kapoor was work under the government service. he terminated his job on 13th January, 1971. After on that date, he gave his speech in favour of Indira Gandhi and violated the provision of the Act, 1951. The Court observed that he delivered his speech after terminated his job on 13th January and so it does not part of corrupt practice under the Act, 1951. - The court cited Section 77(b) of the Representation of the People’s Act, 1951, clarifying that a political party’s election expenses are not the candidate’s individual expense. This section also specifies that government services used under Section 123(7) are not considered authorized by the candidate. Therefore, the court argues that Indira Gandhi, the contesting candidate, cannot be solely held liable for Shri. Yashpal Kapoor’s speech. - The Representative of the People’s Act of 1974 (Amendment) and the Election Laws Act of 1975 (Amendment) Act are consistent with the Constitution and are considered legal without any weakness. - Indira Gandhi elections in the Rae Bareli constituency was considered to be valid. CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** Indeed, this case is celebrated and land mark case. also known as election case. Again, and again court has proved that protection of rights of citizen or people by the Constitution of India, rule of law and especially ensured that the citizens are not deprived of free and fair elections. 1. REFERENCES** 1. Important Cases Referred** - Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain[\[1\]](#_ftn1) - Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala[\[2\]](#_ftn2) - Important Statutes Referred** - Constitution of India, 1950. - Representation of the People (Amendment) Act, 1974. - Election Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [MATHEWS J.NEEDUMPARA AND OTHERS VS UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS]  2023 SCC ONLINE SC 1339](https://lawfoyer.in/mathews-j-needumpara-and-others-vs-union-of-india-and-others-2023-scc-online-sc-1339/) **Published:** March 10, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **CHOPPALI .VENKATA KALYANI, (DR. B R AMBEDKAR COLLEGE OF LAW, ANDHRA UNIVERSITY**) 1. **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** This case was related to rights and privileges of senior advocates as well as the designation of senior advocates. Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Indian Constitution are involved in this case. Sections 16 and 23(5) of the Advocates Act, 1961, are involved in this case. Here, the petitioner is practicing as an advocate in the Supreme Court of India. He argued that all are equal before the law according to the Indian Constitution, so why should special privileges and rights be given to Senior Advocates? Needumpara and other advocates who are practicing as advocates filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution for a declaration that the designation of advocates as senior advocates under Section 16 and 23(5) of the Advocates Act, 1961, as well as under Rule 2 of Order IV of Supreme Court Rules, 2013, creating special rights, privileges, and status not available to ordinary advocates, is unconstitutional and violative of Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. It will also affect meritorious lawyers. According to the Advocates Act, 1961, advocates can be classified into 2 types: senior advocates and other advocates. Those who are working in the Supreme Court and High Court confer senior designation. Section 2(a) of the Advocates Act, 1961 d”an advocate as a person who has enrolled in any bar” according to this act. On May 19, 1961, this act was passed by the parliament. This act has 60 sections and contains 7 chapters. This case dealt with the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, Rule 2 of Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013. ***Keywords*:** *Section 16, section 23(5) of advocates act 1961, Article 14 of the Indian constitution, Article 19 of the Indian constitution, Article 21 of the Indian constitution, Designations , Rights and privileges of senior advocates, Advocates, The supreme court rules, 2013, The contempt of courts act,1971* 1. CASE DETAILS:** *Judgement Cause Title***Mathews j.Needumpara and others vs. .union of India and others*Case Number***Writ petition Number (c):32 of 2023*Judgement Date***16/10/2023*Court***Supreme court of India*Quorum\\* Justice Mr.Sanjaykishankushal Justice Mr.Ravikumar Justice Mr.Sudhanshu Dhulia *Author***Justice Mr.Sanjaykishankushal*Citation***2023 SCC Online SC1339*Legal Provisions Involved***Article 14 and 32 of Indian constitution, Section 16 and 23(5) of Advocates Act ,1961 ,Rule 2 of Order Ⅳ of the Supreme court Rules,2013.1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT:** This case was totally dealt with Articles 14, which speak about the right to equality. In simple words, it speaks about all the citizens, 19, 21 of the Indian Constitution. It dealt with the Advocates Act, 1961, the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, and the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It speaks about rights, designations, and privileges of the Advocates Act, 1961. The petitioner contended that in the case of Indira Jaisingh vs. Supreme Court of India, the court said that there must be implications and formulations regarding sections 16, 23(5) of the Advocates Act, 1961. The petitioner was sentenced for 2 years for doing a wrong act, and the court imposed a sentence on him. The constitutional validity has been challenged regarding fundame td **.**of this court said that if any decision we said that classification is proper then it must be based on the reason but not arbitrary if we are taking the second hand the reason need not be a good one and it is immaterial. And the court again observed that the legislation had a broad discretion in the matter of legislation. This act does not discriminate the advocates .ntal rights in the case of State of A.P. v. McDowell & Co. \[(1996) 3 SCC 709\]. What type of classification was made by the court in the previous judgments is now settled in the catena of decisions in the case of Union of India v. Nitdip Textile processors l. The court stated that if a decision asserts a classification is proper, it must be based on reason rather than being arbitrary. When considering the second classification, the reason does not have to be good, and it is immaterial. The court also noted that the legislation had broad discretion in the area of legislation. This act does not discriminate against advocates. 1. FACTS OF THE CASE:** Here The petitioner is practicing as an advocate in the Supreme Court of India. They argued that everyone is equal before the law according to the Indian Constitution, so why should special privileges and rights be given to senior advocates? Needumpara and other advocates practicing as advocates filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution for a declaration that designating advocates as senior advocates under Section 16 and 23(5) of the Advocates Act, 1961, as well as under Rule 2 of Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, creating special rights, privileges, and status not available to ordinary advocates, is unconstitutional and violates Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. This will affect meritorious lawyers. According to the Advocates Act, 1961, advocates can be classified into two types: senior advocates and other advocates. Those working in the Supreme Court and High Court receive senior designation.Section 2(a) of the Advocates Act,1961 defines Advocate A person who has enrolled in any bar according to this act is known as advocate. On May 19 ,1961 this act was passed by the parliament. This act has 60 sections and it contains 7 chapters. This case dealt with the Supreme court Rules,2013 Rule 2 of order Ⅳ of Supreme court Rules,2013. LEGAL ISSUES RAISED:** 1. Whether the classification of Advocates under Section 16 and 23(5) of Advocates act, 1961 ,rule 2 of Order Ⅳ of Supreme rules,2013 is the violative of Article 14 Indian constitution ? 2. Whether the act really showed any variation between senior and junior advocates ? 3. Whether this act has given any special status to senior advocates as mentioned by the petitioner? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS:** The petitioner stated that the Designation of senior advocates under section 16 .23(5) of Advocates act, 1961 o**f** the Act was illegal and unconstitutional and it is a clear violation of fundamental rights (Article 14,19,21) of the Indian constitution.It was also stated that special privileges and status was provided only for the a class of advocates which are not available to all the ordinary advocates making it unconstitutional in nature.So this eventually resulted in dominance class of advocates over the other laudable advocates leaving them behind unfair treatment. - The petitioner stated that the Supreme court in the previous case of **Indira Jai Singh vs UOI** through secretary general and others one, upheld the provisions of the aforesaid act designation of advocates as a senior advocates.it could further in the reliance of aforesaid provisions which is unfair in nature would amount to the enactment of judicial legislation. - The petitioner contended that we cannot adopt the English law or Roman law which is feudal in nature which was followed back from 18th century. - It is further contended by the petitioner destroyin the foremost of the afore said act which aims single unified bar for the entire country. - The petitioner contended that the lawyers have lost the faith in the system of merit ,character knowledge found that granted by the court them a title of senior advocate is alone treated by them as a sign of prosperity in their profession. - Even politicians and other high ranking bureaucrats have their desire to get their kinfolk as senior Advocates. - The petitioner also submitted that the present petition is filed for ensuring the judicial transparency sought to take over the proceedings initiated by the petitioners. - The Above act was come into existence to smoothen the working of legal system. And the act is completely destroys the laudable purpose .The Lawyers shouldn’t go extreme dishonor of having to apply for the designation. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS: **A)Legal provisions involved in this case:** **THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA-** ***ARTICLE14:****“The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”* ***ARTICLE 19:****Freedom of Speech and Expression: “Article 19 of the Constitution provides freedom of speech which is the right to express one’s opinion freely without any fear through oral/written/electronic/broadcasting/pres”* *“**SECTION 16**. Senior and other advocates.—* *(1) There shall be two classes of advocates, namely, senior advocates and other advocates. *(2) An advocate may, with his consent, be designated as senior advocate if the Supreme Court or a High Court is of opinion that by virtue of his ability \[standing at the Bar or special knowledge or experience in law\] he is deserving of such distinction* *“ (i) senior advocates shall have pre-audience over other advocate.* *(3) Senior advocates shall, in the matter of their practice, be subject to such restrictions as the Bar Council of India may, in the interest of the legal profession, prescribe.* *(4) An advocate of the Supreme Court who was a senior advocate of that Court immediately before the appointed day shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to be a senior advocate: \[Provided that where any such senior advocate makes an application before the 31st December, 1965, to the Bar Council maintaining the roll in which his name has been entered that he does not desire to continue as a senior advocate, the Bar Council may grant the application and the roll shall be altered accordingly.”* ***SECTION 23****. Right of pre-audience.— (5) Subject as aforesaid—* *ates, and (ii) the right of pre-audience of senior advocates inter se and other advocates inter se shall be determined by their respective seniority.”* ***SECTION 24A****: “It states that a person, who is convicted of an offence which involves moral turpitude, cannot be enrolled as an advocate. This applies till two years of elapsing since the expiry of the sentence. While this is a disqualification for enrolment, the Supreme Court has held that if the disqualification is incurred after enrolment then the advocate must be disbarred for two years.”* ***SECTION 29****: “This Section states that advocates are the only recognised class of persons who are entitled to practise law. From the day they are appointed, only the class of ‘advocates’ are allowed to practise the profession of law.”* ***SECTION 30****: “This Section defines the right of advocate to practise. This Act allows an advocate, the right to practise throughout the territory, before all the courts and tribunals.”* ***SECTION 35****: “This Section defines the punishment of advocates for misconduct. It states that when a receipt of a complaint is submitted or a State Bar Council has* *reason to believe that any advocate on its roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct, then it shall refer the case for disposal to its Disciplinary Committee. The Disciplinary Committee of a State Bar Council would then fix a date for the hearing of the case and shall cause a notice thereof to be given to the advocate concerned and to the Advocate-General of the State.”* **JUDGEMENT:** The court said that in the case of Indira Jai Singh vs. Supreme Court of India, what type of provisions are mentioned in this act regarding the designation of senior advocates and advocates that are provided illegally, leading to judicial activism. Not only this, but there should also be alterations and changes in the above-mentioned act. The court also stated that the petitioner’s argument was inappropriate. The petitioner’s arguments completely discriminate against the lawyers and the working system of lawyers; he insults the entire judiciary system. It was alleged that the lawyers in the post-liberalization period were not recognized for their knowledge and skills but for their wealth and connections. The petitioner did not stop his allegations on lawyers; the bench had lost its patience as well as self-reliance. The petitioner not only accuses advocates but also government officials and bureaucrats. He continues to blame meritious lawyers. It is not at all correct to spoke like this about advocates and senior advocates, it is a duty of every citizen should give respect the others. Petitioner had crossed his limits here the court was ready to take action against petitioner under the Contempt of courts act,1971 and the court declared ineligible and he doesn’t had chance to argue in the court. The court found that the arguments made by the petitioner completely lack value and apology; the petitioner made allegations against all kinds of professionals and bureaucrats. Due to his allegations, people think that there is no justice happening in the courts. No one is ready to enter the legal profession, as they don’t show interest. This will impact the youngest lawyers, some of whom come from national universities and schools. If any provision violates the fundamental rights or any provision of the Indian Constitution, it may affect people and not just the provision. The court referred to this point in the case of Public Services Tribunal Bar Association VS. State Of UP and State Of A.P. vs. Mcdowell. The classification of advocates and senior advocates under section 16 should be made by the legislature. The legislature has all powers to make any law for such classifications; the classification must have a reason, though the reason does not need to be a good one. The court dismissed the petition without any costs awarded. **RATIO DECIDENDI :** - The court said that in the case of **Indira Jai Singh vs Supreme Courtof India**, what type of provisions said in this act regarding designation of senior advocates and advocates which are provided illegally and that leads to judicial activism. Not only this but also there should be alterations and wording in the above said act. The court also stated that arguments of the petitioner was in inappropriate way. The arguments of the petitioner completely discriminating the lawyers and the working system of lawyers he insults the entire judiciary system. It was alleged that the lawyers in the post liberalisation period there not found for their knowledge and skills but for the manifestation wealth and propinquity. - The court found that the arguments made by the petitioner completely lack of value and apology, made allegations on all kinds of professionals and bureaucrats. because of his allegations people think that there is no justice happen in the courts . And no one is ready to enter into legal profession they doesn’t show interest to enter into legal profession. It will impact on youngest lawyers and some of them come from nation la universities and schools. Classification of advocates doesn’t violates the principles the Indian constitution. - The court dismissed the petition with no order as to costs. **CONCLUSION& COMMENTS:** In my opinion, there is no classification between advocates and senior advocates in the Advocates Act, 1961. I would like to recommend that there should be a committee/commission to take action against this kind of petitioners. I think the classification of advocates does not violate the provisions of the Indian Constitution. These types of lawyers should be dismissed by the Bar Council of India, but it will not affect The Supreme Court Rules, 2013. I would request all lawyers not to raise such petitions because it will affect future generations of lawyers. People do not believe in lawyers and the legal profession. - **REFERENCES** - **Important Cases Referred:** - Indira jaisingh vs supreme court of india wp(c) no. 454 OF 2015 - Public services tribunal bar association vs State of up wp No.803(sb) of 1998 - State of ap vs MC Dowell 1996 (3) JT (sc) 679 - Important Statutes Referred** - The Advocates act,1961. - The contempt of courts act, 1971. - The supreme court rules,2013. - The Indian constitution. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [National Legal Service Authority v. Union of India, AIR 2014 SC 1863](https://lawfoyer.in/national-legal-service-authority-v-union-of-india-air-2014-sc-1863/) **Published:** March 10, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **JAHNVI GOEL** (AMITY UNIVERSITY, LUCKNOW) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** This particular case was a landmark decision that assured and gave guarantee to the rights and protection of the transgender community in India for the very first time and discussed “gender identity” and “third gender” at great length. The first petition was filed by the National Legal Services Authority of India (NALSA) to give legal recognition to people who tend to fall outside the classification of male/female gender binary, including persons who identify themselves as “third genders”. The court recognizes the discrimination and violation of rights in this case faced by transgender individuals on an everyday basis due to societal norms and lack of public awareness. Also, the violation of rights guaranteed by Articles 14, 15, 16, 19, and 21 of the Indian Constitution. The court mandated and held the right to gender identification beyond the given traditional binary system, legally recognizing the existence and identity of a third gender and providing legal protections and opportunities for this marginalized group. The identification of one’s gender identity for one’s pride and human dignity was directed and followed by courts. It referred to the international human rights, such as the Yogyakarta Principles which gives light to gender orientation and identity at great length. Overall, the judgment ensured responsibilities for both Governments (state and central) to ensure the rights of the TG community are being maintained and respected in the society and also to provide equal status and protection to them. To recognize the unified importance of the right to privacy and the right to gender identity, and maintain equality and inclusion for all under the law, the court held a precedent. ***Keywords*:** Transgender persons, gender identity, right to life, human rights. Marginalized community, equality under the law. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** To safeguard and emphasize the rights of persons belonging to the transgender community in India two writ petitions were filed by the National Legal Services Authority. The first petition (Writ Petition No. 400 of 2012) was submitted by the National Legal Services Authority, formed under the Legal Services Authority Act, 1997. Following this, a second petition (Writ Petition No. 604 of 2013) was filed by the Poojya Mata Nasib Kaur Ji (Women Welfare Society), an association dedicated to safeguard the rights of the Transgender ( kinnar) persons. Moreover , Laxmi Narayan Tripathi, who also identified himself as Hijra, was involved in the case and therefore, approached the court as well. Laxmi Narayan Tripathi brought to light that as a Hijra, his rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Indian Constitution were being infringed. He encouraged the court to take a step to put a stop to more discrimination against himself and other vulnerable members of the marginalized community. FACTS OF THE CASE** Tracing the historical background of the third gender identity in India and the position accorded to them in the Hindu Mythology, Vedic and Puranic literatures, and the prominent role played by them in the royal courts of the Islamic world etc, the first reference to transgenders in Hindu mythology is Mohini, the female avatar of Vishnu, who appears in the Mahabharata and Vishnu Purana, also mentioned in the Ramayana, transgender individuals (hijras) demonstrate loyalty to Lord Rama during his exile, leading him to grant them the power to confer blessings on auspicious occasions. They are further mentioned in the Mahabharata, where Aravan is put forward as a sacrifice for victory in the battle of Kurukshetra war, he was the son of Ulupi and Arjuna in the historical text (Mahabharata), Lord Krishna, who disguised himself as Mohini, offers to marry Aravan,thus, arriving to the tradition of transgenders (hijras) in Tamil Nadu calling themselves as Aravanis. Therefore , Hindu mythology always held and accepted transgender persons in a status equal to other genders and showed them equal respect and importance. In this particular case, two writ petitions were filed to safeguard and protect the rights of the transgender persons in India. The first petition was put forward by the National Legal Services Authority (NALSA), Following this petition, another petition was submitted by the Poojya Mata Nasib Kaur Ji, from Women Welfare Society, which fights for the rights and protection of the transgender community, especially the “kinnar” community. Lakshmi Narayan Tripathi, also urged the court to take a step to end the discrimination against the community for good since his rights under article 14 and 21 are being violated. As a result, the TG community was recognized and legally entitled to fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, 16, 19(1)(a), and 21 of the Indian Constitution, with a special reference to international human rights treaties such as the Yogyakarta Principles which specifically recognize freedom of sexual orientation and identity as part of human rights, The Court further held that certain programs were required to be set up for public awareness and consciousness to tackle and prevent the stigma and societal notions against the TG community and gave importance to the recognition of the “third gender” in official government documents. Moreover, the court addressed the state and central governments to provide opportunities and resources in education and public sectors and to set up social welfare schemes for the upliftment of the transgender community. LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether non-recognition of the gender identity of the members of the transgender community result in the infringement of their rights as guaranteed by Article 14, Article 15, Article 16, Article 19 and Article 21 of the Constitution? 2. Whether persons who do not fit under the traditional male/female gender binary can be legally acknowledged as “third gender” persons? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioners submitted that: 1. Binary gender norms infringe upon fundamental rights such as the Right to Equality (Article 14), Right to Life and Personal Liberty (Article 21), and Freedom of Expression (Article 19). 2. Due to the non-identification of individuals as the third gender, the basic human dignity of such individuals is violated which marginalizes them and forces them to live on the fringes of society for no fault of theirs. 3. The right to choose one’s gender identity is integral to the right to lead a dignified life, which is guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 4. Legal recognition of gender identity should not be contingent upon medical procedures like sex reassignment surgery or sterilisation or hormonal therapy, nor should individuals be pressured to conceal, suppress or deny their sexual orientation or gender identity. 5. Transgender persons should have the right to choose their gender classification, whether male, female, or transgender, within established rules, regulations or protocols. 6. Legal Recognition of Third Gender is essential as it enabled transgender persons to assert their identity in official documents and access government welfare schemes and entitlements since the community also faces discrimination to contest election, right to vote, employment, to get licences etc. and, in effect, treated as an outcast and untouchable. RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that: 1. The state had already established an “Expert Committee on Issues Relating to Transgender” to address all kinds of opinions and concerns and to improve the lives of transgender individuals. The expert Committee aimed to initiate a number of diverse opinions, including petitioners, to further implement and form comprehensive policies and structures. 2. Several states and union territories have already taken steps for the betterment of the lives of the transgender community. 3. The problems highlighted by transgender individuals in the petitions are regarded as sensitive human rights issues and the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment is responsible for addressing these concerns and will consider input from the Expert Committee and petitioners during the consultation process. **JUDGEMENT** - **RATIO DECIDENDI** The Supreme Court, in response to NALSA’s submissions, affirmed the gender neutrality of Article 14 and Article 19(1)(a) also the provisions under Articles 15, 16, and 21 of the Indian Constitution, applying to all individuals, including transgender persons. The Court mandated and directed to prevent discrimination against the marginalized community, considering it an infringement of rights guaranteed by Articles 15 and 16. - **OBITER DICTA** Constitutional provisions, particularly Articles 19 (freedom of expression) and 21 (right to life and dignity), were interpreted to protect gender identity as part of the right to dignity and freedom.The Court acknowledged the umbrella term “transgender” encompassing various identities and experiences, including pre-operative, post-operative, and non-operative individuals and historical discrimination against transgender communities, such as Hijras, Eunuchs, Kothis, Aravanis, Jogappas, and Shiv-Shakthis, was acknowledged. Public awareness programs, social welfare schemes, improved medical care, and the implementation of the Expert Committee’s recommendations were among the directives provided by the Court.International instruments like the Yogyakarta Principles, affirming the right to privacy regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity, were cited. The State was directed to recognize transgender persons’ self-identification and as the ‘third gender’ and acknowledge their right to be treated with the same fundamental rights, also to extend reservations for their social and educational backwardness in the eyes of the law and address issues like sexual and mental health. CONCLUSION& COMMENTS** Since India has historically lacked awareness regarding gender identity and issues, transgender persons have always faced a certain denial of their rights as evident in societal attitudes and legal framework. This is a landmark decision where issues like right to identify as a “third gender” was cleared and a set of guidelines were maintained and looked into for the first time. The case not only helped legalize non binary gender identities but also the fundamental rights the community deserves. Both the central and the state government took certain measures to protect and safeguard the rights of transgender persons as a part of the Court’s judgment. 1. **REFERENCES** 1. **Important Cases Referred** 1. Shivani Bhat vs State Of Nct Of Delhi & Ors on 5 October, 2015 1. 1. Arunkumar vs The Inspector General Of Registration on 22 April, 2019 1. Important Statutes Referred** 1. Constitution of India- Article 14, 15, 16, 19(1)(a), and 21 1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)- Article 6 1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)- Article 16 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Pavana Dibbur v. Enforcement Directorate, Criminal Appeal NO.2779 OF 2023](https://lawfoyer.in/pavana-dibbur-v-enforcement-directorate-criminal-appeal-no-2779-of-2023/) **Published:** March 10, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Rajita** (VMS College of Law) **ABSTRACT:** The case of Pavana Dibbur v. Enforcement Directorate, Criminal Appeal No. 2779 of 2023 is an example of the legal issues nearby the actions of the Enforcement Directorate (ED) of India. Pavana Dibbur, who is filing this appeal, objected to the provisions imposed by the ED. The document does not clearly state the specific nature of these measures or the grounds on which Pavan’s appeal is made. However, it may be inferred that this appeal is probably concerned with allegations about procedural improprieties, legal mistakes or constitutional breaches committed by Enforcement Directorate. This outcome has implications for regulatory enforcement practices and individual liberties within its jurisdiction because; depending on how the court decides this matter, this process could affect procedural standards and legal boundaries that govern enforcement agencies whereby both governmental authority and individual protections are then involved. This case underscores why a balance should exist between regulatory oversights as well as protection of rights in individuals subjected to enforcement actions with potential broader implications beyond the facts surrounding this appeal to wider legal and regulatory frameworks. **Keywords:** *Pavana Dibbur, Enforcement Directorate, Criminal Appeal, Procedural irregularities, Regulatory enforcement.* ###### CASE DETAILS ***i)****Judgement Cause Title***Pavana Dibbru v. The Directorate of Enforcement***ii)****Case Number***Criminal Appeal No.27779 OF 2023***iii)****Judgement Date***November 29, 2023***iv)****Court***SUPREME COURT OF INDIA***v)****Quorum***Pankaj Mithal, Abhay S.oka***vi)****Author***Abhay S.oka***vii)****Citation***Criminal Appeal No.2779 of 2023***viii)****Legal Provisions Involved***Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), Section 3–Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 482–Income Declaration Scheme, 2016–Indian Penal Code , 1860, Section 120-B ###### INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The appeal arose out of a complaint filed by the Enforcement Directorate under the PMLA in a case titled Pavana Dibbur v. Enforcement Directorate. The issue in dispute here revolves around whether the appellant’s acquisition can be labeled as “proceeds of crime”. It also raises relevant concerns about an individual’s involvement in money laundering without any apparent conviction during the initiation of substantive criminal charges.. Further, this case involves interpretation in relation to scheduled offenses under PMLA, particularly read with Section 120-B of the IPC. The court’s analysis is an important milestone in understanding the PMLA in India as it provides essential insight into the major arguments, judicial interpretations and implications that followed that decision. Remarkably, the appellant emerges victorious in the end. ###### FACTS OF THE CASE In the above legal case the respondent Pavana Dibbur v. Enforcement Directorate started by filing a complaint alleging Pavana Dibbur that she has violated the Act under the jurisdiction of Bangalore. The events were as follows: Pavana Dibbur acquired another property from Alliance Business School in 2011 and another property from Madhukar Angur in 2019. Then again, in 2017 Madhukar Angur was sued for obtain by force money from students. It is to the point to note that the appellant held the post of Vice-Chancellor in the University during those years in the middle of 2011 to 2015. In 2020, the ED begin a instance against Madhukar Angur and others for money laundering. This resulted in the attachment of the assets and in 2021 a complaint was filed against Pavana Dibber under the case, alleging her involvement in Madhukar Angur’s involvement in fraudulent bank accounts through which she funded her universities. Transacted money related to the financial condition of and thereby involves him in activities which are claimed to be illegal. On March 17, 2022, therefore as a result, the Special Court heard the objection and thus the appellant filed a discharge petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before the Karnataka High Court. On September 27, 2022 however; The High Court discharge his application to quash the complaint. Presently, the appellant is in appeal against that settlement of the High Court to quash the criminal proceedings begin against her under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2000. ###### LEGAL ISSUES The raised questions are as follows: 1. Do the appellant’s acquired properties fall within the definition of “proceeds of crime” as per the law? 2. Can someone be accused of money laundering while not being specifically mentioned in initial criminal charges? 3. What is the legal position on charging those who are not indicted in the underlying criminal act? 4. Is there any relevance and validity for a list of scheduled offences stipulated under Prevention of Money Laundering Act, which is applicable to this case? ###### APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS Counsel for the appellant advanced several arguments before the Apex Court in response to the case made by the respondent. It was held that none of the two properties in question fall within the definition of “proceeds of crime” under the Prevention of (PMLA). The appellant clarified that the first property was brought to the crime before he scheduled it. Secondly, it was claim on behalf of the appellant that in relation to the reply to the police blotter filed by the respondent, in reality no case was made out against the appellant under Section 3 PMLA and more distant, the appellant was also not named as an accused. Was done A person subject to any scheduled offense under PMLA. Thirdly, it was contended that the offense in respect of which the main charge of conspiracy was framed in the charge sheet related to only one of the four scheduled offenses under Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. Essential to the offense was the allegation that the accused had conspired to commit an offense under any of the four specified Scheduled offences, and such a charge under the PMLA would not lie unless so alleged in the charge sheet. ###### RESPONDENT ARGUMENTS On behalf of the respondent, it was contended that the learned representative of the Enforcement Directorate is now contesting the arguments made by the appellant in the National Court. Also appeared before the Supreme Court as Additional Solicitor General. The first submission is whether the appellant had the financial ability to acquire the second property cannot be determined at this stage . The alleged proceeds of crime were not per se “tainted” but it cannot be denied that they were not used to acquire other property. It should have been seen at the trial stage. Further, they added that it is now re-settled that if the appellant is in possession of any property involved in the offense under Section 201 IPC, he shall be prosecuted as an offense under Section 3 of the PMLA. Can shall be committed, even if he is not guilty of the original offense caused by the above. Thirdly, on the appellant’s plea on interpretation of Scheduled Offenses under PMLA, it was submitted that the Scheduled Offenses have to be read as they are and cannot be read to remove or alter them. Counsel contended that there is no warrant to interfere with the contempt order. ###### RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS The legal provision regarding commission of the offence of money laundering by a person not accused in a ground offense is under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), which reads as under: “Whosoever right or incidentally attempts to spoil or knowingly assists or deliberately is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, purchase or use and projecting or claiming it as unstained property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering.” This provision successfully means people can be charged with money laundering even when they have not been an. accused in the original criminal offense that generated the proceeds of crime. It widen liability under PMLA to try the accused involved in the laundering of proceeds of crime even when they were not directly involved in the primary criminal activity. ###### JUDGEMENT The main dispute being made is that if all the people accused of a crime are found not guilty or if the charges for a specific crime are dissolve, then that crime no longer exists. Therefore, according to this outlook, nobody can bring actin against under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) because there are no taking from criminal activities. However, the rival view argues that an individual who is accused in a PMLA case and is involved in hiding or using money obtained from criminal activities can still be prosecuted under the PMLA as long as the original crime is still valid. Therefore, the argument that the appellant (the person appealing the case) was not mentioned as an accused in the chargesheets for the original crimes is rejected. Besides, the argument based on the explanation of the Schedule is addressed, stating that there is no claim of a criminal conspiracy for any offense in the organize beyond Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, it is state that the crime does not exist, and as a result, the appellant cannot be seek redress under Section 3 of the PMLA. ###### RATIO DECIDENDI Ratio is the decisive legal principle or reasoning that the court uses to make its decision. In this particular case, the ratio decidendi is likely to relate to how the court make clear and applies the provisions relating to determined by law under “Proceeds of Crime”. Prevention of (PMLA), and their relationship with Section 120-B of the (IPC). The court’s final decision on these matters forms the main legal basis for its decision. ###### CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The final decision of the Courts in the case of Pavana Dibbur v. Enforcement Directorate has rejected two contentions of the appellant. Emphasizes the importance of the third argument raised by his legal representative. The order provides an interpretation of the term “proceeds of crime” and lists specific offenses under the Prevention of (PMLA) in relation to Section 120(B) of (IPC). This in-depth examination not only clarifies the appellant’s position but also represents a significant advance in understanding how the specified offense and criminal conspiracy are linked within the money laundering law. This judgment marks a development in shaping the changing landscape of jurisprudence on PMLA. **REFERENCES** ###### Important Cases Referred 1. [](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/43352147/) - 1https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2022/42568/42568\_2022\_8\_1501\_4865 7\_Judgement\_29-Nov-2023.pdf ###### Important Statutes Referred 1. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 - Indian Penal Code,1860 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Association for Democratic Reforms v/s Union of India](https://lawfoyer.in/association-for-democratic-reforms-v-s-union-of-india/) **Published:** March 6, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Hiteishi Sharma, KG Shah Law School / SNDT University** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** *“If the people who are elected are capable and men of character and integrity….. If they are lacking in these, the Constitution cannot help the country ….. , and India needs today nothing more than a set of honest men …[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)“* Yes, the founding fathers of the Indian Constitution and the initial Members of Parliament did aim to establish a strong and just democratic system. However, the Indian citizens were not made aware of the background of the candidates contesting for elections, which stands to be their fundamental right by Article 19(1)(a)[\[2\]](#_ftn2). This contributed to the Indian democracy seeing a steady increase in the level of criminalization creeping into the politics. This “criminalization of politics”, over time, limited the choice of voters to elect a suitable candidate, affected good governance, affected the integrity of public servants, and introduced a culture of violence in society. Today, the public faith in the efficacy of India’s democratic process has diminished, and accepted criminalization in politics as an unavoidable circumstance. This issue is further aggravated by the inadequacy of legal frameworks to prohibit convicted criminals from engaging in elections. To regain the trust of the citizens, it is crucial to strengthen the existing laws, ensure stricter enforcement, promote transparency in political funding and the decision-making processes, and promote accountability among political leaders. The Association for Democratic Reforms highlights the need for transparency in an election candidate’s criminal background, making this information accessible to the public, print, and electronic media to facilitate a more informed electorate and potentially encourage cleaner politics. ***Keywords*:** *Election Commission, democratic reforms, Constitution, information, criminal, candidate.* **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***Association for Democratic Reforms V/S Union of India*Case Number***Civil appeal 880 of 2017*Judgement Date***2nd November, 2002*Court***Delhi High Court*Quorum***Anil Dev Singh*Author***Anil Dev Singh*Citation***AIR 2001 DELHI 126, 2000 (57) DRJ 82, AIR 2001 DELHI 126, (2001) 1 PUN LR 54, (2001) 57 DRJ 82, (2001) 99 DLT 291*Legal Provisions Involved***Article19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution, Article 324 of the Indian Constitution. Section 4A of Representation of the People Act, 1951.**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** Due to high costs associated with contesting elections, political powers looked up to criminals for funding. Subsequently, the criminal themselves joined the election fray and often even got elected. This situation not only undermined the democratic values but also threatened the well-being of society – the rapid spread and growth of criminalization of politics resulted in: - Criminal gangs, drug Mafias, smuggling groups, and other illicit entities establishing a vast network of connections with local government officials, politicians, and strategically placed individuals in the non-government sector. This significantly jeopardized the smooth functioning of the administration and the safety of life and property of the common man - The big smuggling syndicates, with their extensive international connections, permeating and contaminating numerous economic and financial undertakings, inflicting severe harm to the economic fabric of the nation. - Narcoterrorism networks emerging in regions like the north-western states of India - The Bombay bomb blast case and the subsequent communal riots in Surat and Ahmedabad have highlighted the concerning exploitation of India’s underworld by foreign entities, such as Pakistan’s ISI and international networks. These incidents have brought to light the intricate connections between the underworld and various sectors of Indian society Despite the valid concerns raised by government bodies and influential individuals, successive governments have not taken any significant action. Therefore, an NGO named **Association for Democratic Reforms** filed a petition in the Delhi High Court to compel implementation of certain recommendations regarding how to make the electoral process in India more fair, transparent and equitable. **FACTS OF THE CASE** - The Vohra Committee Report[\[3\]](#_ftn3) studied the problem of the nexus among criminals, politicians and bureaucrats in India.. - The Parliament had shown a great deal of concern about the increasing criminalization of politics (special session, August, 1997) - The Election Commission, issued an order under **Article 324 of the Constitution**, that all candidates for elections to Parliament and State Legislatures to file affidavits about their convictions in cases covered by Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. It also suggested to disqualify persons from standing in the elections charged with serious offences. - The Commission illustrated the case of a rapist, convicted and sentenced to ten years imprisonment, being disqualified only for six years and being free to contest elections, even while in prison serving the last four years of his sentence[\[4\]](#_ftn4). - In the 1957 general elections, repoll was ordered only in 65 booths, in 1989 it was ordered in 1670 booths2. - In 1991, Bihar alone repoll was ordered in 1046 booths and in 2173 booths in 19962. - In 1984, Lok Sabha elections 33 persons were killed – this figure rose to 130 in 1989 and 198 for the 1991 Lok Sabha Poll.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) - A pre-assembly election report (1996), prepared by a top police official, identified 136 gangs of criminals, 55 of which were patronized by political parties. Almost 500 of the candidates who contested had criminal backgrounds. - The Election Commission revealed that in August 1997, 40 sitting MPS and 700 MLA’s had criminal records. - The Supreme Court in **Gadakh Yashwantrao Kankarrao v. E.V. alias Balasaheb Vikhe Patil**, has also lamented the criminalization of politics which is the result of growing influence of money power during elections. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether Election Commission is empowered to issue directions as ordered by the High Court? 1. Whether the right to information of electoral candidates is under fundamental right to freedom of expression or not? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Petitioner seek a direction to insert a new **Section 4-A Representation of the People Act, 1951[**\[6\]**](#_ftn6)**, as the Election Commission cites it is not empowered to do so. 2. The Petitioner submitted that inter alia seeks an informed right of voting for the voters of this country based on information and knowledge about candidates seeking election to Parliament and in order to direct respondent No. 2 to put together the information on criminality of all the candidates for an election and make this information available to public and print and electronic media for wide dissemination. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Respondent have expressed their inability to make the suggested amendments at this time and can neither commit to a specific timeline for doing so. However, they assure that they will work towards introducing a comprehensive Electoral Reforms Bill. 1. Electoral Reforms acknowledges receiving a message from the Ministry of Home Affairs concerning the necessity for candidates to disclose their assets, as well as those of their immediate family members.. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** **Constitution of India.** - Article 19(1)(a): *“Right to freedom of speech and expression”.* It comprehends right to know- right to receive information regarding matters of public concern. - Article 324: *“Superintendence, direction and control of elections to be vested in an Election Commission”* **Representation of the People Act,1951** - Section 4-A.: A person shall not be qualified to file his nomination forcontesting any election for a seat in the House of the People, the Council of States, Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State unless he or she files – (a) a declaration of all his assets (movable/immovable) possessed by him/her, his/ her spouse and dependent relations, duly supported by an affidavit, and (b) a declaration as to whether any charge in respect of any offence referred to in Section 88 has been framed against him by any Criminal Court. **JUDGEMENT (RATIO DECIDENDI)** The High Court mandated the Election Commission to obtain and disclose to the public background information relating to candidates running for office, including information on their assets, criminal records, and educational background. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** For a healthy democracy, it is essential that the voter is knowledgeable about the background of the candidates. so that he can make an informed decision in casting his vote. **REFERENCES** 1. Important Cases Referred** Gadakh Yashwantrao Kankarrao v. E.V. alias Balasaheb Vikhe Patil. Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. v. Union of India. - Important Statutes Referred** Constitution of India, Book by S.S Gill on *“Pathology of Corruption”* Representation of the People Act, 1951. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1)India’s first President, Dr. Rajendra Prasad’s remark in his valedictory address to the Constituent Assembly [\[2\]](#_ftnref2)Right to receive information regarding matters of public concern. \[**Article 19(1)(a): “Right to freedom of speech and expression”.**\] [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The **Vohra Committee Report** was submitted by the former Indian Home Secretary, N. N. Vohra, in October 1993 [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) letter written by the Chief Election Commissioner to the then Prime Minister in Sept. 1997 [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Book titled “**The Pathology of Corruption**”, S.S. Gill [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) In consonance with the recommendations of the Law Commission contained in its 170th Report **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Sondur Gopal v. Sondur Rajini](https://lawfoyer.in/sondur-gopal-v-sondur-rajini/) **Published:** March 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **AUTHOR: HEMANT JARWAL, UNIVERSITY OF FIVE YEAR LAW COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY OF RAJASTHAN** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** In the present case, The husband (Appellant) and the Wife (Respondent) got married and left for Sweden. They were granted Sweden citizenship and In the same year, they moved to Mumbai, and then they shifted to Sydney and stayed there for about 3 years. After losing his job, the Husband moved back to Sweden with his family and after getting a new job in Sydney, the couple along with their children stayed in Australia from January to December 2003. then after some time the Wife, along with the children, came back to India and refused to return to Sydney. Then the Wife filed a Petition before the Family Court, Bandra seeking judicial separation and custody of the children and the Husband questioned the maintainability of the Petition and contended that the couple was a citizen of Sweden, domiciled in Australia, which was their domicile of choice, and hence, the jurisdiction of any of the Indian Courts was barred under Section 1(2) of The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Therefore the Family Court on the same grounds and reasoning held that the Petition of the Wife was not maintainable. Aggrieved by the decision of the Family Court, the Wife further filed an appeal in the High Court. However, None of these convinced the Supreme Court, and the Appeal was thereby dismissed. SC held, “In the absence of acquiring citizenship it is difficult to accept that the Appellant-Husband and his family decided to reside permanently in Australia” Thus, the High Court was correct and shifting residence to Australia with mere citizenship and lack of property in Sweden reverted domicile from what was in truth irrevocable Swedish, to the original Indian. Thereby the writ petition for judicial separation by the respondent’s wife is maintainable. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*:** Indian Constitution, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 , Domicile, Judicial separation, Custody of children, Maintainability, Jurisdiction, Marriage. **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***Sondur Gopal v. Sondur Rajini*Case Number***Civil Appeal No. 4629 of 2005*Judgement Date***15th July 2013*Court***Supreme Court of India*Quorum***The bench consisted of two judges, namely V. Gopala Gowda and Chandramauli Kr. Prasad.*Author***Justice Chandramauli Kr. Prasad.*Citation***AIR 2013 SC 2678*Legal Provisions Involved***Constitution of India — *A*rticle 245(2) Hindu Marriage Act, 1955— Section 1(2), 2(1), 10, 19. **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** In India,The Hindu Marriage Act guides Hindus to be in a systematic marriage bond. It gives meaning to marriage, cohabiting rights for both the bride and groom and safety for their family and children so that they do not suffer from their parental issues. The laws governing Hindu marriage, restitution of conjugal rights, judicial separation, divorce, annulment of marriage, maintenance, and guardianship are included in the Hindu Marriage Act, of 1955, which was passed by the legislature. The Hindu Marriage Act is an Act of the Indian Parliament that was approved on May 18, 1955. The Hindu Marriage Act, of 1955 was passed to protect the legal rights of Hindu brides and grooms who are joined by the holy bond of marriage. A person may have no home but he cannot be without a domicile. In order to make the rule effective, law assigns a domicile of origin to every person at birth. This prevails until a new domicile has been acquired – the domicile of choice. The only intention required for a proof of a change of domicile is an intention of permanent residence. In other words, what is required to be established is, the person who is alleged to have changed his domicile of origin has voluntarily fixed the habitation of himself and his family in the new country, not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it his permanent home and Residence alone, unaccompanied by this state of mind, is insufficient proof. 1. **Applicability of Hindu Marriage Act:** Section 2 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 states that this act applies to any person who is a Hindu by birth or who has changed his/her religion to either any of its forms such as Virashaiva, a Lingayat, or a follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya Samaj. Any person who is a Buddhist, Jain, or Sikh also comes under this act. It also applies to any person living outside this territory except who is a Muslim, Christian, Parsi, or Jew by religion or it is proved that such person is being governed by Hindu law**.** The Hindu Marriage Act of 1955 applies to Hindus by religion, including those who are Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs. It applies to any person who is a Hindu by birth or who has converted to Hinduism. The Act also applies to any person who is a Hindu under the definition provided in the Act. This holds even if they are not Indian citizens or reside outside India. The Act covers marriages where both parties are Hindus. It also covers marriages where one party is a Hindu, and the other party is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi, or Jew. It is important to note that the Act does not apply to marriages of Muslims, Christians, Parsis, or Jews. They are governed by their respective personal laws. The Act applies to all Hindu marriages solemnized in India or abroad as long as they fulfill the conditions specified in the Act. It applies to both men and women. It provides provisions for divorce, maintenance, custody of children, and other related matters. 2. **Domicile:** A person is said to have a domicile in a country in which he/she is considered to have his/her permanent home. A person cannot have more than one domicile. Domicile is the country in which a person has a permanent residence. In terms of domicile, the residence does not relate to the physical aspect of maintaining a house or residence. It relates to the intention of a person to remain in a place forever unless circumstances should occur to change his/her intentions. Hence, maintenance of a residence or home does not serve to establish domicile, though it could add credence. For instance, if an Indian person moved to the USA temporarily on an H1B visa for employment purposes, his/her domicile would continue to be India, as the permanent residence of the person is still India. 3. Types of Domicile:** 4. **Domicile by Birth:** Domicile by birth or origin is the domicile of a person that he/she acquires it at birth from parents. The domicile of birth or origin is involuntary and continues to be the domicile of the person until the person chooses to create a permanent residence elsewhere. Most persons retain domicile by birth as their domicile, even long after moving abroad for job or education purposes. 5. **Domicile by Choice:** A person can take on a domicile by choice by taking up fixed residence in a country different from the domicile of birth. If an Indian national moves to the USA temporarily on an H1B visa, and then obtains citizenship or Green Card to stay in the USA indefinitely with no intention of returning to India, then it could be said that he/she has adopted a new domicile by choice. The person is required to prove his/her intention by acts or declaration for changing domicile. Hence, a forced residence abroad as a political refugee, fugitive, or for any other reason does not require to change in the domicile of the person, unless it is followed by voluntary adoption of the new domicile. **FACTS OF THE CASE The factual matrix, in this case, is that the Appellant Husband and the Respondent Wife got married on 25th of June, 1989 according to the Hindu rites at Bangalore. It was registered under the provision of the Hindu Marriage Act also. After the marriage the husband left for Sweden in the first week of July, 1989 followed by the wife in November, 1989. They were blessed with two children namely, Natasha and Smyan. Natasha was born on 19th of September, 1993 in Sweden. She is a down syndrome child. The couple purchased a house in Stockholm, Sweden in December, 1993. Thereafter, the couple applied for Swedish citizenship which was granted to them in 1997. In June, 1997, the couple moved to Mumbai as, according to the wife, the employer of the husband was setting up his business in India. The couple along with child Natasha lived in India between June, 1997 and mid 1999. In mid 1999, the husband’s employer offered him a job in Sydney, Australia which he accepted and accordingly moved to Sydney, Australia. The couple and the child Natasha went to Sydney on sponsorship visa which allowed them to stay in Australia for a period of 4 years. While they were in Australia, in the year 2000, the husband disposed of the house which they purchased in Stockholm, Sweden. The second child, Smyan was born on 9th February, 2001 at Sydney. The husband lost his job on 7th July, 2001 and since he no longer had any sponsorship, he had to leave Australia in the second week of January, 2002. The couple and the children shifted to Stockholm and lived in a leased accommodation till October, 2002 during which period the husband had no job. On 2nd of October, 2002, the husband got another job at Sydney and to join the assignment he went there on 18th of December, 2002. But before that on 14th of December, 2002, the wife along with children left for Mumbai. Later, on 31st of January, 2003, the wife and the children went to Australia to join the appellant- husband. However, the wife and the children came back to India on 17th of December, 2003 on a tourist visa whereas the husband stayed back in Sydney. According to the husband, in January, 2004 he was informed by his wife that she did not wish to return to Sydney at all and, according to him, he came back to India and tried to persuade his wife to accompany him back to Sydney. According to the husband, he did not succeed and ultimately the wife filed petition before the Family Court, Bandra inter alia praying for a decree of judicial separation under Section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act and for custody of the minor children Natasha and Smyan. But the Husband questioned the maintainability of the Petition and contended that the couple was a citizen of Sweden, domiciled in Australia, which was their domicile of choice, and hence, the jurisdiction of any of the Indian Courts was barred under Section 1(2) of The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The Family Court on the same grounds and rationale held that the Petition of the Wife was not maintainable. Aggrieved by the decision of the Family Court, the Wife further filed an appeal in the High Court. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether the Hindu Marriage Act apply to all Hindus from around the world, irrespective of their domicile? 2. Whether the claim of the husband that the marriage cannot be dissolved under HMA due to Swedish domicile is right? 3. Whether by Considering the proofs brought by the Husband to the court, the Husband can be said to be domiciled in India or not? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Appellant submitted that he was served with notice of judicial separation and he then filed a counter-petition in the family court in Bandra, saying that such notice was by itself void as it was not maintainable. 2. Learned counsel of the appellant contended that they had Indian citizenship but were later domiciled in Sweden, and while he was currently residing in Australia his citizenship of Sweden along with similar conditions for his family members existed. 3. He contented that with no proper residence in India and a mix of other citizenship’s, there existed no Indian domicile. This unique point of view expounded in court was that the domicile of the husband would be the domicile of the wife and that moving away by choice from India after marriage, the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act no longer applied. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant stated that the judicial separation offered under Section 10, along with custody of children, was void and he was not looking to domicile in India. 5. Things got a little subjective and personal, and the husband declared in an affidavit that he had premarital been fascinated by Stockholm, Sweden and that he had established in his mind that this would be his land of choice unto death, thereby making it his domicile irrefutably, (at least at first). He also argued that on a different and chronologically isolated note, following his wife’s (initial and alleged) desire to move to an English-speaking country, he retained his Swedish citizenship but almost immediately shifted domicile to Australia. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Respondent submitted that the domicile of the family remained Indian even though they moved to Sweden and then Australia. 1. The learned counsel for the respondent stated that the Hindu Marriage Act itself shall apply to all Hindus irrespective of domicile. 1. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that even if the respondent’s domicile had Also changed to Swedish then their move to Australia and residence there cancels said domicile out reverting the original place of birth as ‘domicile’. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** 1. Constitution of India —** ***A*****rticle 245(2):** It states that “No law made by Parliament shall be deemed to be invalid on the ground that it would have the extra-territorial operation”. 1. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955— Section 1(2):** It states that “It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir , and applies also to Hindus domiciled in the territories to which this Act extends who are outside the said territories”. 1. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955— Section 2(1):** It states that “This Act applies: 2. to any person who is a Hindu by religion in any of its forms or developments, including a Virashaiva, a Lingayat, or a follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana, or Arya Samaj, 3. to any person who is a Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh by religion, and 4. to any other person domiciled in the territories to which this Act extends who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi, or Jew by religion unless it is proved that any such person would not have been governed by the Hindu law or by any custom or usage as part of that law in respect of any of the matters dealt with herein if this Act had not been passed. Explanation. The following persons are Hindus, Buddhists, Jainas , or Sikhs by religion, as the case may be: (a) any child, legitimate or illegitimate, both of whose parents are Hindus, Buddhists, Jainas, or Sikhs by religion; (b) any child, legitimate or illegitimate, one of whose parents is a Hindu, Buddhist, Jaina, or Sikh by religion and who is brought up as a member of the tribe, community, group, or family to which such parent belongs or belonged; and (c) any person who is a convert or re-convert to the Hindu, Buddhist, Jaina, or Sikh religion”. 1. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955— Section 10:** It states that “Judicial separation.- (1) Either party to a marriage, whether solemnized before or after the commencement of this Act, may present a petition praying for a decree for judicial separation on any of the grounds specified in sub-section (1) of section 13, and in the case of a wife also on any of the grounds specified in sub-section (2) thereof, as grounds on which a divorce petition might have been presented. (2) Where a decree for judicial separation has been passed, it shall no longer be obligatory for the petitioner to cohabit with the respondent, but the court may, on the application by petition of either party and on being satisfied with the truth of the statements made in such petition, rescind the decree if it considers it just and reasonable to do so” - Hindu Marriage Act, 1955— Section 19:** It states that “Court to which petition shall be presented.- Every petition under this Act shall be presented to the district court within the local limits of whose ordinary original civil jurisdiction: (i) the marriage was solemnized, or (ii) the respondent, at the time of the presentation of the petition, resides, or (iii) the parties to the marriage last resided together, or (iiia) in case the wife is the petitioner, where she is residing on the date of presentation of the petition, or (iv) the petitioner is residing at the time of the presentation of the petition, in a case where the respondent is, at that time, residing outside the territories to which this Act extends, or has not been heard of as being alive for seven years or more by those persons who would naturally have heard of him if he were alive”. . **JUDGEMENT (RATIO DECIDENDI)** 1. The First thing which the Honorable Court decided on was that the Hindu Marriage Act applies only to Hindus who are domiciled within the territory of India. Section 1(2) of the Act has an extra-territorial operation. It, however, would make no sense if the applicability of the Act was so wide that it could be enacted even when the issue had no nexus with India. It was hence, held that the Act would have an application beyond the Indian territory only when the necessary party(ies) have an Indian Domicile. This is the ‘Doctrine of Territorial-Nexus’ which lays down that it is not necessary that the parties must be physically located within the territories, but that the Act must have a sufficient territorial connection. And in the case of **Prem Singh v. Sm. Dulari Bai and Anr**. There is a relevant portion where of read as follows: “On a fair reading of the above provisions, it seems clear from the first section that the Act is in operation in the whole of India except in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and applies also to Hindus, domiciled in the territories to which this Act extends, who are outside the said territories. This section read with Section 2(1)(a)(b) makes it equally clear that as regards the inter-territorial operation of the Act it applies to all Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, or Sikhs irrespective of the question of whether they are domiciled in India or not.” And this case was also take as a reference which was **Nitaben v. Dhirendra Chandrakant Shukla & Anr.** Here it was said that that section 1 of the Act refers to the extension of the Act to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir and also to the territories to which the Act is applicable, and further to all those persons who are domiciles of those territories but who are outside the said territories. Yet another decision to which reference has been made is the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in **Varindra Singh & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan** where it was said that Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of [Section 2](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1922953/) of the Act of 1955 makes the Act of 1955 applicable to all persons who are Hindu by religion irrespective of the fact where they reside. Therefore, Section 2 of the Act of 1955 is very wide enough to cover all persons who are Hindu by religion irrespective of the fact where they are residing and whether they are domiciled in Indian territories or not” Lastly, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on a judgment of the **Kerala High Court in Vinaya Nair & Anr. v. Corporation of Kochi.** Such a law is valid and is saved by Article 245(2) of the Indian Constitution. - The court also held that the contention of the appellant was specifically that Australia was his domicile of choice: The appellant to establish Australia as the domicile of choice relied on a residential tenancy agreement for 18 months; the enrollment of his child to a school; and the commencement of proceedings for permanent resident status. None of these however convinced the SC and the Appeal was thereby dismissed.Therefore SC held, “In the absence of acquiring citizenship it is difficult to accept that the Appellant-Husband and his family decided to reside permanently in Australia”. - Thus the Supreme Court held that The High Court was correct and shifting residence to Australia with mere citizenship and lack of property in Sweden reverted domicile from what was in truth irrevocable Swedish, to the original Indian. Thereby the writ petition for judicial separation by the respondent’s wife is maintainable. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** Therefore it was concluded that both the husband and wife were considered to be the domicile of India and in furtherance of that they were covered by the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and the petition for judicial separation was entertained. And in My Opinion the case correctly states that If the marriage has been Solemnized as per the provisions of a particular Act, then that Act would continue to apply for as long as the marriage exists. It is a universally recognized rule that applies and also affects the personal status of a person who must continue to be governed by the same law, irrespective of factors like his change in citizenship or residence. If this were not to apply, then the husband would be able to reject every petition by the wife by changing his domicile status leaving the wife with no judicial remedy, which goes against the basic structure of our constitution. The court also laid down that it would be unjust if one party could escape the petition merely because he/she has changed his domicile by his/her ‘unilateral decision’. Only if one of the parties in the case has changed the domicile doesn’t mean that it will take away the jurisdiction of the Indian Courts. **REFERENCES** 1. Important Cases Referred** AIR 1973 Cal 425. I (1984) D.M.C.252. RLW 2005(3) Raj. AIR 2006 Ker. 275 - Important Statutes Referred** The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 245(2). See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, § 1 (2). See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, § 2 (1). See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, § 10. See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, § 19. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [GOVT. OF ANDHRA PRADESH V. CH. GANDHI](https://lawfoyer.in/govt-of-andhra-pradesh-v-ch-gandhi/) **Published:** March 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **AUTHOR: AYUSHI MAHAWAR, VES COLLEGE OF LAW, MUMBAI** **ABSTRACT** In the case of the Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. Ch. Gandhi, disciplinary actions were taken against Ch. Gandhi, a senior accountant, that led to his demotion and the suspension of further promotions. Whether the penalty is in line with the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services Rules, especially in light of the revisions, and whether the new rules may be enforced retroactively are the main legal questions. The case explores the rights of employees in disciplinary situations as well as the substantive and procedural components of such processes. In the end, the Supreme Court upheld the disciplinary proceedings, concluding that the penalty was appropriate in light of the new guidelines. **KEYWORDS Disciplinary proceedings, Andhra Pradesh Civil Services Rules, Retrospective application, Vested rights. **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***The Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others Vs. Ch. Gandhi*Case Number***Civil Appeal No. 1427-1428 of 2013*Judgement Date***FEBRUARY 19, 2013*Court***Supreme Court Of India*Quorum***K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.*Author***DIPAK MISRA, J.*Citation***\[2013\] 2 S.C.R. 20*Legal Provisions Involved***Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1991**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT-** The case Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. Ch. Gandhi is where the disciplinary actions were taken against the Sub-Treasury Senior Accountant, Ch. Gandhi. As a consequence of the disciplinary action, Ch. Gandhi was demoted to the position of Junior Accountant for a two-year term, with any future increments being suspended during this term. The High Court reversed the punishment after the State Administrative Tribunal affirmed this decision, leading to an appeal to the Indian Supreme Court. Whether Ch. Gandhi’s punishment was in line with the unamended or amended Rules was the main issue in this case. Although the punishment was given under the replaced sub-rule (vii) of Rule 9 of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control, and Appeal) Rules, 1991[\[1\]](#_ftn1), the disciplinary procedures were started under the unamended Rules. Gandhi maintained that the punishment he received was unfair and against the law, while the State Government maintained that the sentence was lawful and consistent with the regulations. The Court had to decide whether the penalty may be applied in line with the unamended or amended Rules, taking into account the legal guidelines about procedural and substantive legislation as well as the retroactive impact of the Rule substitution. The disciplinary processes, and the nature of the allegations against Ch. Gandhi, the decision of the authority to impose the punishment, and the ensuing legal challenges that resulted in the Supreme Court appeal are all thoroughly examined before giving the judgment. The case brings up significant issues regarding the enforcement of disciplinary policies, the retroactive implementation of rule amendments, and the rights of employees during disciplinary actions. **FACTS OF THE CASE** 1\. A disciplinary hearing was held against Ch. Gandhi, a senior accountant at the Office of the Sub-Treasury, Nakrekal, in accordance with Rule 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1991[\[2\]](#_ftn2). 2\. Ch. Gandhi was accused of the following: a. Being absent during a surprise inspection conducted by the Deputy Director of the District Treasury in Nalgonda. b. Not keeping up with the mandatory maintenance of the movement register and signing the attendance register. c. Neglecting to endorse transactions and keep up to date the money chest book. d. Passing checks, challans, and invoices without the required authorization. e. Poor upkeep of the strong entrants’ registry. f. Giving shared custodian keys to third parties so they can access the monetary chest. g. Not submitting daily sheets and currency chest slips to the Reserve Bank of India. 3\. The accusations against Ch. Gandhi were verified in the report provided by the Enquiry Officer who was assigned to look into the matter. 4\. The disciplinary authority imposed the penalty of demoting Ch. Gandhi to the position of Junior Accountant for two years with a postponement of future increments. 5\. Ch. Gandhi, who felt unfairly punished, filed a complaint with the State Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No. 923 of 2006, contesting the start of the investigation, the way it was carried out, and the appropriateness of the penalty. 6\. The Tribunal discovered no illegality or irregularity in the way the investigation was carried out, the accusations that were made, or the disciplinary action that was started. It further ruled that the penalty was appropriate given the seriousness of the accusations. 7\. The Tribunal rejected Ch. Gandhi’s first plea, which sparked further legal actions and an appeal to the Indian Supreme Court. The disciplinary actions against Ch. Gandhi and the subsequent legal challenges regarding the imposition of the penalty under the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services Rules are highlighted in the case of The Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. Ch. Gandhi. These facts serve as the basis of the legal dispute. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether the punishment given to Ch. Gandhi comply with the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services Rules? 2. Whether the amended rules can be applied retrospectively to the disciplinary action initiated under the unamended rules. 3. Whether Ch. Gandhi had a vested right to a specific punishment under the unamended rules. 4. Whether the reversion penalty and the postponement of future increments were appropriate to the accusations made against Ch. Gandhi. **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsel for Petitioner/Appellant submitted that Ch. Gandhi was punished in line with the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services Rules, 1991 by being demoted to Junior Accountant for two years and having his future raises delayed. This is consistent with the disciplinary action permitted under the Rules. 1. The counsel for Petitioner/Appellant submitted that the amended rules can be applied retrospectively to the disciplinary action initiated under the unamended rules. The imposition of the penalty under the substituted sub-rule (vii) of Rule 9 of the amended Rules was justified and lawful. 1. The counsel for Petitioner/Appellant submitted that in accordance with the unamended rules, Ch. Gandhi had no legal claim to a particular penalty. The disciplinary authority was within its powers to apply the penalty in accordance with the modified Rules, as Rule 9(vii) allowed for a new kind of penalty. 1. The counsel for Petitioner/Appellant submitted that the reversion penalty, along with delaying further increases, was appropriate to the charges against Ch. Gandhi. Given the seriousness of the accusations, the disciplinary penalty was appropriate and a valid response. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsel for the Respondent submitted that Ch. Gandhi’s penalty was not in accordance with the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services Rules of 1991. The contention was that the fine was unlawful under the Rules since it amounted to two substantial punishments. 2. The counsel for the Respondent submitted that the amended rules should not be applied retrospectively to the disciplinary action initiated under the unamended rules. The disciplinary proceedings were initiated before the amendment, and therefore, the punishment should have been in accordance with the unamended Rules. 3. The counsel for the Respondent submitted that under unamended rules Ch. Gandhi had a vested right to a specific punishment. The regulations that were in effect at the time of the offense should have guided the disciplinary action. 4. The counsel for the Respondent submitted that the reversion penalty, along with the postponement of future increments, was disproportionate to the charges against Ch. Gandhi. Considering the seriousness of the alleged misbehavior, it seems that this punishment was excessive and unjustified. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** 1. Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control, and Appeal) Rules, 1991: Rule 9- Deals with major penalties and disciplinary actions, and Rule 11- Pertains to imposing penalties in disciplinary proceedings[\[3\]](#_ftn3). 2. Article 309 of the Constitution of India deals with recruitment and conditions of service of persons serving the Union or a State[\[4\]](#_ftn4). **JUDGEMENT** **a. RATIO DECIDENDI:** In Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. Ch. Gandhi, the court ruled that the disciplinary authority’s decision to punish Gandhi by reverting him to the position of Junior Accountant for two years and delaying his subsequent promotions complied with the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services Rules, 1991. Since the revised Rule 9(vii) was legally replaced and directed the disciplinary action’s consequences, the changed rules can be applied retroactively to the disciplinary action that was started under the original rules. Under the unaltered rules, Ch. Gandhi had no legal claim to a particular punishment, and the disciplinary authority had good reason to apply the penalty in accordance with the revised Rules. The amended rules can be applied retrospectively to the disciplinary action initiated under the unamended rules, as the amended Rule 9(vii) was lawfully substituted and guided the consequences of the disciplinary action. Under the unamended rules, Ch. Gandhi had no legal claim to a particular punishment, and the disciplinary authority had good reason to apply the penalty in accordance with the revised Rules. Taking into account the severity of the wrongdoing and the revised Rules, it was decided that the punishment of reversion with a postponement of future increments was proportionate to the charges against Ch. Gandhi. **b. OBITER DICTA:** There are no particular obiter dicta referenced in the ruling in this instance. The judgment mainly focuses on three points: the penalty’s proportionality, the applicability of the revised rules to the disciplinary proceeding that were initiated under unamended rules, and the lack of vested rights for a particular punishment under the unamended regulations. **CONCLUSION** The Supreme Court affirmed the disciplinary proceedings against Ch. Gandhi in Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. Gandhi, wherein the latter was demoted to the position of Junior Accountant for two years and further increments were postponed. The Court decided that the modified Andhra Pradesh Civil Services Rules, 1991 warranted the imposition of this punishment. The disciplinary authority operated within its jurisdiction in applying the penalty in compliance with the revised rules, since it was found that Ch. Gandhi had no vested entitlement to a specific punishment under the unamended regulations. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred:** - *Union of India and Others v. K.V. Jankiraman and Others* (1991)[\[5\]](#_ftn5) - *Delhi Development Authority v. H.C. Khurana* (1993)[\[6\]](#_ftn6) - *Union of India and Others v. Sangram Keshari Nayak* (2007)[\[7\]](#_ftn7) - *Marripati Nagaraja and Others v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others* (2007)[\[8\]](#_ftn8) **Important Statutes Referred:** 1. Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1991[\[9\]](#_ftn9) 2. Article 309 of the Constitution of India[\[10\]](#_ftn10) 3. Various statutory provisions and rules governing disciplinary proceedings and service conditions were also referred to in the judgment to determine the legality and applicability of the penalties imposed on Ch. Gandhi. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1)‘APCS(CCA) Rules, 1991.Pdf’ <> accessed 27 February 2024. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) ‘APCS(CCA) Rules, 1991.Pdf’ <> accessed 27 February 2024. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) ibid. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) ‘Article 309 in Constitution of India’ <> accessed 27 February 2024. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) ‘Union Of India Etc. Etc vs K.V. Jankiraman Etc. Etc on 27 August, 1991’ accessed 27 February 2024. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) ‘Delhi Development Authority vs H.C. Khurana on 7 April, 1993’ accessed 27 February 2024. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) ‘Union Of India & Ors vs Sangram Keshari Nayak on 27 April, 2007’ accessed 27 February 2024. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) ‘Marripati Nagaraja & Ors vs The Government Of Andhra Pradesh & Ors on 12 October, 2007’ accessed 27 February 2024. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) ‘APCS(CCA) Rules, 1991.Pdf’ (n 2). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) ‘Article 309 in Constitution of India’ (n 4). **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [SAJJAN SINGH Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN](https://lawfoyer.in/sajjan-singh-vs-state-of-rajasthan/) **Published:** March 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **AUTHOR: ANURUPA PAL, TECHNO INDIA UNIVERSITY, KOLKATA** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The “Sajjan Singh vs State Of Rajasthan” case is centred on the legitimacy of the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act of 1964, which tried to protect the legality of legislative provisions related to agricultural reform that were being challenged. The petitioners contended before the Supreme Court that the Seventeenth Amendment Act was legally unsound. They claimed that the procedural procedures indicated in the proviso to Article 368, which required ratification by a particular number of states, should have been observed since the powers outlined in Article 226 (relating to the powers of high courts) were likely to be affected. The court ruled that the Amendment Act fits within the substantive portion of Article 368 and fails to activate the proviso. It held that the amendment’s impact on Article 226 was subsidiary and of minor relevance, as the Act sought to remove obstacles to executing a socioeconomic programme. ***Keywords:*** *Article 368, Fundamental Rights, Constitutional Validity, Land Legislation, Judicial review, Constitutional amendments, The Constitution of India, Supreme Court of India* **CASE DETAILS** ***Judgement Cause Title***SAJJAN SINGH Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN***Case Number***AIR 1965 SC 845***Judgement Date***31st MARCH 1965***Court***THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA ***Quorum***Chief Justice P.B Gajendragadhkar Justice K.N. Wanchoo Justice M. Hidayatullah Justice Raghubar Dayal Justice J.R Mudholkar***Author***Chief Justice P.B Gajendragadhkar ***Citation***1965 AIR 845, 1965 SCR (1) 933, AIR 1965 SUPREME COURT 845, 1965 (1) SCR 933, 1965 (1) SCJ 377, 1965 (1) SCWR 593 ***LegalProvisions Involved***Article 368 of the Constitution Of India The 17th ( Seventeenth) Amendment Act 1964 Article 31 A and Article 31 B**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The main background of the case deals with the First Constitution Amendment Act 1951 which was challenged in the case of [\[1\]](#_ftn1)***Shankari Prasad Vs. Union Of India*** where during the judgement Article 31(A) and Article 31(B) were added to the Constitution Of India thereby restricting the individual’s Right To Property. Another major decision was that any law under the 9th schedule of the Constitution would be immune to judicial review. Mr. Shankari Prasad challenged the amendment stating that the basic Fundamental rights must not be allowed to be amended since they are a vital part of the constitution. This case paves the way for the Particular case we are dealing with which includes[\[2\]](#_ftn2) ***Sajjan Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan*** **FACTS OF THE CASE** During the year 1964, the Rajasthan Government passed the Land Reforms Act which was later also followed by the parliament with the 17th Constitutional Amendment Act under Article 31(A) expanded the legal term “estate”. Due to this amendment the power to acquire the land also increased and was eventually put under the 9th schedule because any law under it cannot be challenged in front of the courts. Here is our petitioner Sajjan Singh, the ruler of the princely state of Rajasthan which was later added to the Indian Union. In the year 1949 Sajjan Singh signed an agreement with the Indian Government which granted him certain privileges including an amount for the monarch”s expenses. However, after the changes, the right to hold a certain amount of land was also added to a ceiling amount. Sajjan Singh challenged the validity of the 17th Amendment Act in the Supreme Court saying that it violated the Fundamental rights guaranteed to him under the Indian Constitution. Later many Landlords also challenged the same and filled a writ petition using Article 32 in front of the Supreme Court. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i) Whether the Parliament can amend the Fundamental Rights using Article 368? ii) Whether the parliament can bring a constitutional amendment voiding Fundamental rights using Article 368? iii)Whether a constitutional amendment comes under the meaning of “Law” given in Article (2)? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the powers under Article 368 were misused to overpower the rights given to the state judiciary ( High Courts) through Article 226 of the Indian Constitution. 2. All laws relating to the possession of “land” are matters included under the state list. However, the union legislature has dismissed the same by amending the fundamental rights of people. 3. The petitioner asserted that the 26th Amendment Act was not justiciable since it was a constitutional amendment and thus outside the purview of judicial review. The petitioner said that the change was a matter of political expediency and policy and that the courts had no authority to intervene with it. 4. The petitioner asserted that abolishing privy purses infringed the basic right to property protected by Article 31 of the Constitution. The petitioner contended that the privy purses were part of the past monarchs’ property, and their removal represented coercive seizure without compensation. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Respondent submitted that the privileges which were given to the petitioner were given to him due to his birth status which violated one major fundamental right of equality before law, thus this step was taken to at least try to follow the democratic structure of the country. 2. They also argued that the clauses were signed by the British Government and not by the Indian Government post-independence hence, the Indian Government was not bound to continue these privileges after the union of the princely into an Indian Union. 3. The respondent argued that the abolition was a necessary step and it did not violate the fundamental rights under the Constitution of India. These could not be considered as rights, as a result of which abolition did not violate any fundamental right of the petitioner. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** 1. ***Article 368*** – deals with the power of the parliament to deal with any change in the constitution 2. ***17th (Seventeenth)Amendment Act*** – To preserve the legality of several agricultural reform-related laws, this Act, added 44 Acts to the Ninth Schedule and changed Article 31A of the Indian Constitution. 3. ***Article 31A –***This provision, which was inserted into the Constitution by the 1951 Constitution (First Amendment) Act, protects Acts listed in the Ninth Schedule from ever being declared void and invalid. 4. ***Article 31B*** -states that no act included in the 9th Schedule shall be deemed invalid because it infringes against Part III rights, and no judicial review shall be available. The actions listed in the schedule are applicable retroactively. **JUDGEMENT** ***Ratio Decidendi*** 1. The Supreme Court of India passed the judgement through a 3:2 majority decision. They also mentioned that constitutional amendment is not included in the term “law” given under Article 13 and if the parliament wanted they could bring some changes through constitutional amendments. Land Reforms Act is constitutionally valid. 2. The Supreme Court disagreed with the argument of the appellant that the 17th Amendment Act violates the rights of the High Court under Article 226. 3. It also mentioned that the Central Government only intended to protect the state acts on the said matter from Judicial review by putting them in the 9th Schedule through the 17th Amendment Act. 4. The Supreme Court of India finally stated that Fundamental Rights can be amended through Constitutional amendments. ***Obiter Dicta*** 1. There were two important dissenting opinions from the bench out of five members two had a different opinion which included Justice M. Hidayatullah and Justice J.R Mudholkar 2. Justice M. Hidayatullah mentioned that “ Fundamental rights cannot be amended by Constitutional Amendment s they are a basic necessity for humans and parliament can’t play with them. 3. Justice J.R Mudholkar mentioned that “Every constitution has some basic elements which cannot be amended”. 4. Both of them gave the opinion that Constitutional Amendments can also form a part of the “law” under Article 13 of the Indian Constitution. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The petitioners presented several defences against the Act’s legality under the Seventeenth Amendment. They contested that the special procedure should be followed when altering basic rights and potentially affecting the High Court’s authority under Article 226. They also questioned the applicability of Article 368 and its proviso. The petitioners also said that the Act was unconstitutional because it allegedly gave Parliament the power to enact laws about land, a power they did not think Parliament had. They expressed concerns over the Act’s ability to overrule decisions made by competent courts, which they believed to be unconstitutional. This case also became the background structure for[\[3\]](#_ftn3)***I.C. Golaknath Vs. State Of Punjab*** and [\[4\]](#_ftn4)***Kesavananda Bharti Vs. State of Kerala.*** These two cases were highly influenced by this particular case. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) *Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Deo vs Union Of India And State Of Bihar(And … on 5 October, 1951*, . [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) *Sajjan Singh vs State Of Rajasthan(With Connected … on 30 October, 1964*, [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases, Uncategorised --- ### [Kithota Hollohan V. Zachillhu, AIR 1993 SC 412](https://lawfoyer.in/kithota-hollohan-v-zachillhu-air-1993-sc-412/) **Published:** March 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **AUTHOR: ANIRUDH YADAV, UNIVERSITY FIVE YEAR LAW COLLEGE** **BACKGROUND OF THE CASE** A constitution can be defined as a written document containing rules, laws and regulations in order to govern a country. The Indian Constitution is considered as the supreme or “grundnorm” law of the land. Its preamble is about the sovereignty of people, democratic polity, justice, liberty, equality and fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the nation. The Preamble is said to be adopted from Nehru’s principles which became the basis of the formation of the constitution. After the constitution was created, it did not take long for political functionaries to manipulate Indian framers. Following the departure of Nehru, the country witnessed a fall in political morality and an unfortunate growth of varying types of political corruption. The unruly floor crossing was a blow to the electorate system and undermined the three organs of the government. Greed for power, position and money were behind these defections. The observation made was that disturbance of the socio-economic processes has a devastating impact on cultural processes in politics. It was thus discouraged and attempts were made to eradicate this through the Constitutional Amendment Bills of 1973 and 1978. In early 1985, however, the government initiative gaining the opposition support worked and the Parliament enacted the Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act outlawing defections to maintain democratic structure. The reason the author is writing this paper is to analyse the views expressed by the Supreme Court judges in this case. **CASE DETAILS :** 1. COURT – Supreme court of india 2. CITATION- 1992 SCR (1) 686, 1992 SCC Supl. (2) 651 3. CASE TITLE – Kihoto Hollohan vs Zachillhu And Others 4. APPELANT- KIHOTO HOLLOHAN 5. RESPONDENT- ZACHILLHU AND OTHERS 6. BENCH- Sharma, L.M. (J), Venkatachalliah, M.N. (J), Verma, Jagdish Saran (J), Reddy, K. Jayachandra (J), Agrawal, S.C. (J) **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT**– 1. In the case of Kihoto Hollohan vs. Zachillhu, it was contended that the anti-defection law is incompatible with freedom of speech, dissent, and conscience. The Supreme Court concluded that the statute is intended to handle unprincipled defections that are not protected by freedom of conscience, right to dissent, or intellectual liberty. As a result, while this rule has certain unintended implications, it is vital in today’s world when dealing with political issues. The decision in Kihoto Hollohon vs. Zachillhu and others addresses a few questions and problems raised by this law. The court subsequently decided that the law did not violate any free speech rights or the parliamentary popular government’s essential structure. 2. The court emphasized that the managing official is the lone person with authority over the selection, and that the final decision is contingent on legal audit once the selection is defined and affected. 3. It was held in the case of Ravi S Naik v. Union of India2 that “deliberately abandoning membership has greater significance.” A conclusion can also be made from the member’s regulation that he has voluntarily renounced his party membership.” The Court rejected the argument that failing to comply with the disqualification conditions constituted a violation of constitutional obligations. Elevating norms to the status of constitutional provisions, they believed, should be disallowed. The disqualification rules were devised by the Speaker in the exercise of his responsibilities under Article VIII of the Constitution, hence they cannot be compared to constitutional regulations. **FACTS OF THE CASE-** 1. In this situation, many applications were heard at the same time. 2. In the case of Kihota Hollohon v. Zachilhu and Ors., the validity of the Tenth Schedule established by the Constitution (Fifty Second Amendment) Act, 1985 was questioned. The Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act replaced four articles of the Constitution with the tenth schedule, namely 101(3)(a), 102(2), 190(3)(a). 3. In a 3:2 decision, the Supreme Court confirmed the Anti-Defection Law’s constitutional constitutionality. The majority was made up of Justices M.N. Venkatachaliah, K.J. Reddy, and S.C. Agrawal, while the minority was made up of Justices L.M. Sharma and J.S. Verma. 4. At the same time, the Supreme Court determined that the speaker’s orders under the legislation prohibiting an MLA from serving due to defection are subject to Judicial Review. **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED –** 1. Is it true that the Speaker should have such broad powers only if there is always a reasonable chance of prejudice? 2. Are the modifications to the 52nd Amendment constitutionally valid? 3. Whether or not Judicial Review is available before a decision is made by the Speaker/Chairman. 4. Does Judicial Review apply to the Rules outlined in the tenth schedule. **ARGUMENTS OF THE PETITIONERS** 1. The petitioners contended that every person in the Parliament must have the right to follow his own spirit and sense of judgment and not necessarily with the policy of his political party. This according to the petitioners is deemed to be a fundamental principle of parliamentary democracy, freedom of speech and the right to dissent and the freedom of conscience. 2. The right of a parliamentarian is not an absolute right and is thus can be subjected to reasonable restrictions. The right of a parliamentarian to the freedom of speech is provided for under Article 105(2). This, as contended by Shri Sharma, arguing on the side of the petitioners, is places even above the fundamental right as guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Political defections induced to grab power and money is also a corrupt practice, and therefore does not fall within the immunity granted to a member of the house. 3. Another contention raised by counsel for petitioners is that the distinction between ‘defection’ and ‘split’ in the Tenth Schedule is very minimal. The differences on which the distinction rests are indeed outrageous defiance of logic. In response to the arguments made by the petitioners, the Court gave the opinion that the rule for exemption of split is advocated for because of the fact that 1/3rd members at the same time cannot be driven towards dishonest intentions. 4. The petitioners also referred to paragraph 7 to substantiate the point that in terms and in effect brings about a change in the operation and effect of Articles 136, 226 and 227 thus attracting the clause (2) of the Article 368 needing ratification. The court after looking at it has given an opinion that the words of paragraph 7 have wide interpretations and leave no viable choices. The same idea is reinforced by going through the history of the defection law and the debates in the house which suggests that paragraph 7 was introduced with the very purpose of restricting jurisdiction. The court has distinguished the present case from the cases of **Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India and State of Bihar**[\[1\]](#_ftn1)and **Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan**[\[2\]](#_ftn2) that were relied upon to urge that there is no relation to the clause (2) of the Article 368. 5. The petitioners claimed that the ‘finality clause’, under the paragraph 6 of the 10th Schedule, excludes the court’s jurisdiction which made the speaker immune from Judicial Review. In India, the position is such that whatever authority resolves disputes must be vested with some sort of judicial authority. Looking at the present case, the authority to decide impugned disqualification under para 6(1) is pre-eminently a judicial complexion. In the present case, the majority has held that the Speaker or the chairman is tribunal and that the finality clause does not oust the jurisdiction of the courts under Articles. 136, 226 and 227. Instead, the finality clause just limits them. **ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPONDENTS** 1. Being in favour of the constitutionality of the Amendment, the respondents urged that the Tenth Schedule creates a non-justiciable constitutional area dealing with certain complex political issues which have no strict adjudicatory disposition. New rights and obligations are created for the first time inflate by the Constitution and the Constitution itself has envisaged a distinct constitutional machinery for the resolution of those disputes. These rights, obligations and remedieswhich are not amenable to judicial processes and the Tenth Schedule has merely recognised this complex character of the issues and that the non-inclusion of this area is constitutionally upheld by ensuring a sense of finality to the decisions of the Speaker or the Chairman and by deeming the whole proceedings as proceedings within Parliament or within the Houses of Legislature of the States envisaged in Articles 122 and 212, respectively, and also by explicitly excluding the Courts’ jurisdiction under Paragraph 7. 2. In constitutional and legal theory, it is observed that there is really no removal of jurisdiction of Courts or of Judicial Review as the subject-matter itself by its inherent character and complexities is not agreeable to and outside judicial power and that the restriction towards jurisdiction under Paragraph 7 is merely a consequential constitutional recognition of the non-amenability of the subject-matter to the judicial power of the State, the analogy of which is that the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be, exercising powers under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule function not as a tribunal with statutory backing, but as a section of the State’s Legislative branch. It is urged that no question of the discharge of jurisdiction of the Courts would at all arise in the first place, having regard to the political nature of the issues, the subject-matter is itself not amenable to judicial power. It is understood thatthe last pointis about the Constitution, and the fact that the Legislature is entitled to deal with it exclusively. 3. The Tenth Schedule is part of the Constitution and attracts the same canons of construction as are applicable to the expounding of the fundamental law. One constitutional power is necessarily conditioned by the others as the Constitution is one “coherent document”. learned Counsel for the petitioners accordingly say that the Tenth Schedule should be read subject to the basic features of the Constitution. The Tenth Schedule and certain inevitable democratic events cannot co-exist. In clarifying the processes of the fundamental law, the Constitution must be valued as a whole. A constitutional document explains only broad and general principles that can be easily subjected to flexible application to adapting circumstances – a distinction which differentiates a statute from a Charter under which all statutes are made. Cooley on “Constitutional Limitations” has said that:“Upon the adoption of an amendment to a constitution, the amendment becomes a part thereof; as much so as if it had been originally incorporated in the Constitution; and it is to be construed accordingly.” 4. The respondents’ counselreferred to the points contended by Shri Ram Jethmalani and Shri Sharma that the provisions of the Tenth Schedule constitute a blatant violation of those fundamental principles and values which are basic to the survival of the systematic uprising of a parliamentary democracy. The Tenth Schedulenegates those very foundational assumptions of Parliamentary democracy; of freedom of speech; of the right to dissent and of the freedom of conscience. It is urged that unprincipled political defections may be an evil, but it will be the beginning of much greater evils if the remedies, graver than the disease itself, are adopted. The Tenth Schedulemirrors the meanderings of a troubled conscience on issues of political morality and to punish an elected representative for what gives way to an expression of conscience quashesthe very democratic principles which the Tenth Schedule is supposed to preserve and sustain. The advocates also referred to the famous Speech to the Electors of Bristol, 1774, by Edmund Burke to substantiate this point. **JUDGEMENT** **1. The Preponderance of the Evidence** Speakers/Chairmen are the protectors of the House’s rights and privileges, and they play an important role in Parliamentary democracy. They are expected to, and do, make key decisions in a Parliamentary democracy. Because they have been given the power to decide questions under the Tenth Schedule, they should not be considered exceptionable. **2. Minority Point of View:** The Speaker’s tenure as the authority to decide this disagreement under the Tenth Schedule is conditional on the House’s ongoing support, hence he does not fit the qualification for such **an independent adjudicatory power.** **3. It was also determined that paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule** does not create a non-justiciable zone. The Speaker/power Chairman’s to resolve disagreements can also be viewed as judicial. **4. The Election Commission took a similar approach**, based on the views of Justices L.M. Sharma and J.S. Verma. In 1977, it made recommendations and suggested that defection-related disqualifications be referred to the Election Commission for an opinion to be extended to the President or Governor, as the case may be, and that the President or Governor act on the Election Commission’s similar opinion, as was the case with other disqualifications related to articles 102 and 191 of the constitution. **CONCLUSION** In the case of *Kihoto Hollohan vs.Zachillhu* (supra), it was argued that the anti-defection law is against freedom of speech, the right to dissent and the freedom of conscience. Supreme Court ruled that the law is targeted at addressing unprincipled defections, which cannot be protected under freedom of conscience or the right to dissent or intellectual freedom. Therefore, this law has certain dysfunctional consequences however it is necessary in the present era when dealing with political corruption is an important area of electoral reforms. **REFERENCES** - *Kihota Hollohon*v. *Zachilhu and Ors*., AIR 1993 SC 412. - *Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India and State of Bihar,* 1951 AIR 458, 1952 SCR 89. - *Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan,* 965 AIR 845, 1965 SCR (1) 933.*Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India*, 1994 AIR 1558, 1994 SCR (1) 754. - *Cohens v. Virginia*, 5 L. Ed. 257, 291 (1821). - *State of Madras v. V.G. Row*, 1952 SCR 597. - *Brundaban Nayak v. Election Commission of India*, 1965 AIR 1892, 1965 SCR (3) 53. - *Union of India v. Jyoti Prakash Mitter*, 1971 AIR 1093, 1971 SCR (3) 483. - *Mayawati v. Markandeya Chand & Ors.,*1998 INSC 493.D*r. Kashinath G. Jalmi&Anr. v. The Speaker &Ors.,* 1993 AIR 1873, 1993 SCR (2) 82 --- [](#_ftnref1) [](#_ftnref2) **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur And Ors. Vs The State Of Punjab (1955) 2 SCR 225](https://lawfoyer.in/rai-sahib-ram-jawaya-kapur-and-ors-vs-the-state-of-punjab-1955-2-scr-225/) **Published:** March 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Aish, RIMT School Legal Studies, RIMT UNIVERSITY** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** No right is absolute in nature. This does not only apply to the citizens of the country but also to the governing body such as administrative agencies and governments as well. This is important to ensure that there is no arbitrariness during the administration of justice. Similarly, article 19 (1) (g) of the Indian Constitution shall also be subject to restrictions under 19(2). It is also provided that whenever there is a question of public interests and for the welfare of the people arises, the private rights are brought back little while interpreting the matter concerned. This analysis deals with one such landmark judgement , Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur & Ors v. State of Punjab (1955) , issue where the private right was said to have been infringed by the government. But, the court found otherwise and dismissed the case. ***Keywords*:** *Writ petition, Freedom to trade, Constitution of India, Article 32, Ultra/Intra Vires* **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***Scope and Extent of Executive powers*Case Number***71 to 77 and 85 of 1955.*Judgement Date***12 April , 1955.*Court***SUPREME COURT OF INDIA*Quorum***Hon’ble Justice C.J Mukherjee , Justice V Bose , Justice Jagannadhadas , Justice V Ayyar , Justice Imam.*Author***Hon’ble Justice C.J Mukherjee*Citation***AIR 1955 SUPREME COURT 549*Legal Provisions Involved***Article 19(1)(g) , 19(1)(6) , 31(2) , 32 , 33 , 73 , 162 , 202 , 203 , 204 , 266 (3) , 298 , **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** With respect to the first question on whether there was a violation of fundamental rights of the petitioners through the act by the state government, the court refused to accept the petitioners argued that there was a violation of fundamental rights under article 19(1) (g). It observed that, when it comes to school books, it is the school who should suggest the kind of books, and it is not the right of publishers to insist the students or school for acceptance of their books as textbooks. It noted that when a trader is lucky enough in the market, his goods would be secured, but if he loses any such trade, then he or she shall not state that his or her fundamental right to have the customers has been violated. Thus, it stated and held that the scopes of such chances are incidental to each business, and there is no fundamental right in the present case. Lastly, With respect to the second issue, the court firstly the importance of articles 73 and 162 of the Indian Constitution as it deals with executive powers and the extent to which parliament and state powers are executed. In that way, it was observed by the court that a modern state should be expected to engage in all the activities that are required for the welfare of the people of the country. It also observed that in order to carry on particular trade or business, it is indeed required that special legislation is enacted for additional requirement of powers other than what has been provided to an executive as per law. In that situation, special legislation would be required to encroach upon the privacy rights, for that matter. As the question of whether there was a violation of the fundamental rights of petitioners was dismissed, it is also immaterial to state whether the government could, in a way, have powers to establish a monopoly without law under article 19(6) of the constitution shall remain immaterial as well. Thus the petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court of India. **FACTS OF THE CASE** 1. This is a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, preferred by six people, who imply to carry on the business of preparing, printing distributing and selling course books for various classes in the schools of Punjab, especially for the primary and middle classes, under the name and style “Uttar Chand Kapur and Sons. 2. It is affirmed that the Education Department of the Punjab Government has incompatibility of their purported strategy of nationalization of reading material given a progression of notices beginning around 1950 in regards to the printing, publication and sale of these books which have not just positioned inappropriate limitations upon the freedoms of the applicants to carry on their business yet have essentially removed them and other individual brokers from the business out and out. 3. In the State of Punjab, all perceived schools must follow the course of review supported by the Education Department of the Government and the utilization, by the students, of the reading material endorsed or approved by the Department is a condition point of reference to the allowing of acknowledgement to a school. 4. For an extensive stretch before 1950, the technique took on by the Government for determination and endorsement of course readings for perceived schools were usually known as the elective strategy and the method followed was right away this: Books on significant subjects, by the standards set somewhere near the Education Department, were ready by the distributors with their own cash and under their plans and they were submitted for endorsement of the Government. 5. The Education Department later appropriate examination chose books numbering somewhere in the range of 3 and 10 or significantly to a greater degree toward each subject as elective reading material, passing on it to the carefulness of the Head Masters of the various schools, to choose any of the elective books on a specific subject out of the endorsed list. 6. The Government fixed the costs just as the size and substance of the books and when these things were done it was passed on to the distributers to print, distribute and offer the books to the students of various schools as indicated by the decision made by their particular Head Masters. 7. Authors, who were not distributers, could likewise submit books for endorsement and on the off chance that any of their books were supported, they needed to make plans for distributing something similar and as a rule, they used to choose a person of the distributors currently on the line to accomplish the work. 8. This procedure, which was in vogue since 1905, was altered in material particulars on and from May 1950. 9. By specific goals of the Government passed approximately that time, the entire of the region of Punjab, as it stayed in the Indian Union later parcel, was isolated into three Zones. The reading material on specific subjects like farming, history, social examinations, and so on, for every one of the zones, were ready and distributed by the Government without welcoming them from the publishers. 10. Concerning the leftover subjects, offers were as yet welcomed from “distributers and writers” yet the elective framework was surrendered and just a single reading material regarding each matter for each class in a specific zone was chosen. One more change presented as of now was that the Government charged, as to eminence, 5% on the deal cost of the relative multitude of supported course readings. 11. Changes of an undeniably more extreme person anyway were presented in the year 1952 by a notice of the Education Department gave on the ninth of August, 1952 and it is against this notice that the protests of the solicitors are chiefly coordinated. This warning discarded “publishers” out and out and welcomed just the “author” and others” to submit books for endorsement by the Government. 12. These “authors and others, ” whose books were selected, had to enter into agreements in the form prescribed by the Government and the principal terms of the agreement were that the copyright in these books would vest absolutely in the Government and the “authors and others” would only get a royalty at the rate of 5% on the sale of the textbooks at the price or prices specified in the list. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. What is the Scope and Extent of Executive powers ? 2. Whether the Government of a state has the power under the constitution of India to carry on a trade or business without any legislative sanction? 3. Whether the Government of Punjab , is creating a monopoly in the business of printing and publishing school textbooks , violated the Fundamental Rights of the petitioners enshrined under Article 19(1)(g) ? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the actions of the Government of Punjab without the prior sanction of legislative were incompetent and violative of the article 19(1)(g) and was ultra vires to the power vested in the public authority. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that activity was covered under the ambit of their inferred leader powers as attributable to the evolving period , the chief currently has an expanded ambit of abilities and capacities instead of the customary capacity of keeping up with the state security and respectability. The counsel further contended that they acted under the procedure required and hence not only making it completely intra vires their power but also in the line with the fundamental rights of the petitioner. **JUDGEMENT** The Judge said that as in our view, the solicitors have no key directly in the current case which can be said to have been encroached by the activity of the Government, the request will undoubtedly bomb on that ground. This being the position, the other two focuses raised by Mr Pathak don’t need to be thought by any means. As the candidates have no major right under **Article 19(1)(g)** of the Constitution, whether or not the Government could build up an imposing business model with no regulation under **Article 19(6)** of the Constitution is by and largely insignificant. Again, a simple possibility or prospect of having specific clients can’t be supposed to be a right to property or any interest in an endeavour inside the importance of **Article 31(2**) of the Constitution and no inquiry of instalment of remuneration can emerge because the candidates have been denied of something similar. The Appeal was dismissed with costs **RATIO DECIDENDI** While managing the issues of the case , the court neede to answer the idea of the leader power and the degree of the elements of chief. To decide the idea of chief influence , the court alluded to the two Australian instances of The Commonwealth and the Central wool Committee Vs The Colonial Combing , Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. , and Attorney-General for Victoria Vs. The Commonwealth. According to the Court , the Australian Constitution explicitly characterizes chief influence to incorporate just upkeep of the constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth. **CONCLUSION& COMMENTS** This case is to be sure a significant one in India with regards to understanding the constitutions administrative constructions and division of power among the 3 wings of the government , i.e , the Legislature , Executive and Judiciary. The case is likewise significant for understanding the extension to which an executive body can meddle in a private right with next to no particular official support. The doctrine of separation of power, in contemporary occasions, isn’t limited to the severe division of power among different organs of the State yet remembers the exercise of such power for the standard of “Governing rules” implying the way that none of the organs of Government ought to usurp the fundamental elements of different organs. The case encourages the comprehension of the division of force by securing those demonstrations of an organ that may seem to infringe upon the powers and elements of different organs yet is simply accidental to its fundamental powers or capacities. Henceforth, despite the fact that it takes into account a circumstance where an organ may infringe upon the powers of the other, it maintains the freedom of every organ too. This comprehension of the connection between the three organs of the State becomes pertinent in contemporary occasions all through the world attributable to the increment in the intricacy of elements of every one of the organs. **REFERENCES** Important Cases Referred** 1. 1\. The Commonwealth and the Central wool Committee Vs The Colonial Combing , Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. 31 C.L.R 421 2\. Attorney-General for Victoria Vs. The Commonwealth 52 C.L.R 533 3\. Motilal Vs. The Government of State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1951 AII 257 Important Statutes Referred** Constitution of India , 19(1)(g) , 19(1)(6) , 31(2) , 32 , 33 , 73 , 162 , 202 , 203 , 204 , 266 (3) , 298 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [State Of Bihar and Ors vs Chandreshwar Pathak](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-bihar-and-ors-vs-chandreshwar-pathak/) **Published:** March 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **AMAN TYAGI, UFYLC, JAIPUR, RAJ.** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE –** This case analysis scrutinizes the Supreme Court judgement in State of Bihar and Ors vs Chandreshwar Pathak. The case includes the termination of Chandreshwar Pathak from the post of constable in Bihar police , which he had secured temporarily in 1988 without undergoing any selection process or advertisement as mandated by law henceforth violating basic constitutional principles like Article 14 and 16 . The case also raises issues about the constitutional validity of backdoor appointments made without adhering to the established norms of equality and non-discrimination . It also explores whether employees like Mr. Pathak who have been appointed through improper/illegal means can invoke principles of equity and natural justice to retain their jobs based on years served. (Which in the present case was 16 years ) The Supreme Court in its final judgement ruled that Pathak’s appointment was void ab initio and unconstitutional in nature . Hence his termination order was valid . The court opined that years of service cannot validate what is fundamentally illegal and unjust . The judgement served as a crucial precedent against backdoor hiring specially in government jobs and also emphasised on adhering to the constitutional principles of equality and non-discrimination it also advocated to follow the requisite rules of appointment while employing any individual in the public sector . **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***State Of Bihar and Ors vs Chandreshwar Pathak*Case Number***Civil Appeal No. 7392*Judgement Date***7th August , 2014*Court***Supreme Court of India*Quorum***Division Bench – Adarsh Kumar Goel, TS Thakur.*Author***Adarsh Kumar Goel*Citation***AIR 2014 SC 3752*Legal Provisions Involved***Article 14 of the Constitution (Right to Equality) Article 16 of the Constitution (Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment) Article 311 (Procedural safeguards relating to dismissal )**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT-** - This particular case deals with the validity of the appointment and subsequent termination of Chandreshwar Pathak as a constable in Bihar Police . It raises important questions such as the constitutional requirements for employing an individual while refereeing Article 14 and 16 which deals with ‘right to equality’ and ‘prohibition of discrimination in employment in any government office’ respectively . - This case also serves as an example of blatant disregard of the acceptable employment practises .As we see the temporary appointment of Chandreshwar Pathak as a constable by the Inspector General of police on **14.01.1998** was made without any due process of advertisement and selection , henceforth showing a disregard for employment practises and constitutional principles. **FACTS OF THE CASE** - On **14.01.1988** , Chandreshwar Pathak was temporarily appointed as a constable by the inspector General of police , Criminal investigation department , Patna , Bihar without following the due process of advertisement or selection. - On **04.09.2000**, The Department of Home (Police), Government of Bihar issued directions to police headquarters, Bihar to review irregular appointments made without following any due process of law such as backdoor appointments and remove such appointees from service from immediate effect. - On **10.09.2003** , After thorough investigation a show cause notice was issued to Chandreshwar Pathak (Respondent) asking why his appointment should not be cancelled . Despite his reply , an order was passed on **26.09.2003** terminating his services . - Mr. Pathak challenged his termination order before the High Court by filing a writ petition . On **09.04.2010** , the learned single bench judge of the high court dismissed Pathak’s writ petition . - Mr. Pathak subsequently appealed against the single bench order . On **05.01.2012**, the division bench allowed Pathak’s appeal and quashed the earlier passed termination order . - Aggrieved by the division bench judgment , State of Bihar (Appellant) appealed to the Supreme Court. The major issue before the Supreme court was whether the temporary appointment of Mr. Pathak on **14.01.1988** without following any due process of selection or advertisement was valid or not . - On **07.08.2014** , the supreme Court allowed the appeal of the State of Bihar , set aside the order of the division bench of the High Court , and restored the single judge order dismissing Pathak’s writ petition against his termination . **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. The primary legal issue was whether Mr. Pathak’s initial appointment as a constable in 1988 without any advertisement or selection process was valid and constitutionally permissible under Article 14 (Right to Equality) and Article 16 ( Prohibition of discrimination in matter of public employment ) . 1. The case also raised the issue of backdoor appointments and how this is a clear example of violation of constitutional principles and non-adherence to already established selection process . 2. This case also examined whether Mr. Pathak’s appointment , being irregular , was protected under Article 14 (equality before law ) and Article 311 ( Procedural safeguards relating to dismissal ) of the constitution . 3. One more major issue raised was whether employees who were illegally/improperly appointed, but worked for many years (In the present case for 16 years) , could claim reinstatement (being taken back to service) on grounds of natural justice, despite their initial appointment itself being illegal. **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS-** The arguments made by the petitioner’s side to substantiate their point with regards to the illegal/improper appointment of Mr. Pathak and also to quash the division bench order are stated as follows – The present case was a blatant backdoor appointment of the respondent(Mr. Pathak ) without any advertisement or selection process. The appointment order itself mentions that it was temporary in nature which could be terminated without serving a notice . The Petitioner’s counsel also relied on the Hemkant Jha case, presenting the important details of the case – *“It was a group of identical matters in front of the Patna High Court on termination of services of police constable without any selection process , the High Court upheld the termination noting that the appointments were backdoor without following procedures in rules for selection the court observed that such backdoor appointments do not confer any rights and the court cannot confer benefits like regularisation or reengagement , Even the SLPs filed against the judgement of the High court were dismissed by the supreme court .” [**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)* The petitioner counsel also contested that the High Court erred in not considering that the respondent’s appointment was illegal and without following any due process as required under Article 14 and 16 of the constitution to substantiate this point the counsel relied on another case law State of Orissa v. Mamta Mohanty, presenting the important details of the case – *“The Supreme court held that no valid appointments can be made without inviting applications from eligible candidates through advertisements .Calling names form employment exchange alone is not sufficient , advertisement is mandatory as per Article 14 and 16 . Such appointment without due process deprives eligible candidates from being considered and a person so employed is not entitled to any relief like salary. Compliance with equality clause in Article 16 requires every appointment to be made through open advertisement to allow all eligible persons to compete on merit.”[**\[2\]**](#_ftn2)* **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS-** The primary argument on the basis of which the respondent’s counsel argues against the termination of his client (Mr. Pathak) is statedas **“***Learned counsel for the respondent supported the impugned order and submitted that having regard to the fact that the respondent had already served for 15 years, termination of his services was not called for*.”[\[3\]](#_ftn3) So essentially the respondent’s counsel argued that though his client’s initial appointment was illegal /improper , he should be allowed to continue in service considering the long duration of 16 years that he had already served .This argument seems to be based on the principle of natural justice and equity. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS-** 1. Article 14 –***“The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”* **[**\[4\]**](#_ftn4)** 1. Article 16** – Article 16 of the Indian constitutiontalks about the right of equal opportunity in the matters of public employment. It states that:-“1*. There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State.* *2. No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any employment or office under the State.* *3. Nothing in this article shall prevent Parliament from making any law prescribing, in regard to a class or classes of employment or appointment to an office under the Government of, or any local or other authority within, a State or Union territory, any requirement as to residence within that State or Union territory prior to such employment or appointment.* *4. Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State.* *(4A) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for reservation in matters of promotion, with consequential seniority, to any class or classes of posts in the services under the State in favour of Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes which in the opinion of state are not adequately represented in the services under the State.* *(4B) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from considering any unfilled vacancies of a year which are reserved for being filled up in that year in accordance with any provision for reservation made under clause (4) or clause (4A) as a separate class of vacancies to be filled up in any succeeding year or years and such class of vacancies shall not be considered together with the vacancies of the year in which they are being filled up for determining the ceiling of fifty per cent, reservation on total number of vacancies of that year.* *5. Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any law which provides that the incumbent of an office in connection with the affairs of any religious or denominational institution or any member of the governing body thereof shall be a person professing a particular religion or belonging to a particular denomination.”[**\[5\]**](#_ftn5)* ***(iii) Article 311*** *–* This article specifically deals with the dismissal , removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the state or union *.*It states that *–* *“(1)No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a Slate shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed.* *(2)No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges;* *Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed:* *Provided further that this clause shall not apply–* *(a)where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or* *(b)where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or* *(c)where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold such inquiry.* *(3)If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, a question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry as is referred to in clause (2), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank shall be final.”[**\[6\]**](#_ftn6)* **JUDGEMENT-** The Supreme court allowed the appeal filed by the State of Bihar , set aside the order of division bench of the Patna High court dated 05.01.2012 , and restored the order of the single judge of the High Court dated 09.04.2010 dismissing the writ petition filed by Chandreshwar Pathak challenging his termination from service . In its conclusive ruling, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Pathak’s employment, pointing out that his initial appointment as a constable in 1988 violated constitutional principles outlined in articles 14 and 16. The Court emphasized the absence of any advertisement or proper selection process during his initial hiring, thereby reinforcing the violation. **RATIO DECIDENDI** 1. Public posts should be filled through a rigorous process, adhering to the constitutional requirement of equality in public employment. 2. Appointments made without proper advertisement or a selection process are illegal and void ab initio (no legal effect from inception) . Individuals appointed through such means have no entitlement to the position. 3. Those unlawfully appointed cannot seek protection under Article 14 (Right to Equality) or 311 (safeguards against dismissal) of the constitution. 4. The duration of service after an unlawful appointment is inconsequential and does not grant the employee the right to seek remedies such as absorption, regularisation, or reinstatement. 5. CONCLUSION & COMMENTS-** The case, being an order of the apex court, sets a precedent for deciding cases with a similar set of facts or issues. This case involves the violation of basic constitutional principles such as Article 14 and 16, which also form part of the fundamental rights guaranteed to us by our constitution. Furthermore, the case delves into the issue of backdoor appointments and how they can significantly impact the selection process. Finally, the case also engages in a discussion on natural justice and its potential role as a basis for reappointment in the present case. I believe the apex court did justice to this case by permitting the appeal filed by the State of Bihar and ultimately deciding the cases based on merits rather than relying on irrelevant facts or issues. The court, in reinstating the judgment of the single judge bench and subsequently overturning the order of the division bench, contributed to instilling faith in the apex judiciary and its legal wisdom. **REFERENCES-** **Important Cases Referred-** 1. Secretary, State of Karnataka vs. Uma Devi \[(2006) 4 SCC 1\] 1. Delhi Development Horticulture Employees’ Union v. Delhi Admn. \[Citation not provided\] 1. State of Haryana v. Piara Singh 1. Excise Supdt. v. K.B.N. Visweshwara Rao 1. Arun Tewari. v. Zila Mansavi Shikshak Sangh 1. Binod Kumar Gupta v. Ram Ashray Mahoto \[(2005) 4 SCC 209\] 1. National Fertilizers Ltd. v. Somvir Singh 1. Telecom District Manager v. Keshab Deb 1. State of Bihar v. Upendra Narayan Singh 1. State of M.P. v. Mohd. Ibrahim 1. Amrendra Singh vs. State of Bihar \[1999 (3) PLJR 984\] 1. Hemkant Jha etc. etc. vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. \[L.P.A. No. 625 of 2003 etc. decided on 18.7.2007\] 1. Sudhir Kumar case 1. State Of Orissa & Anr vs Mamata Mohanty **Important Statutes Referred** 1. Article 14 of the Constitution of India (Deals with the Right to Equality) 2. Article 16 of the Constitution of India (Deals with Equality of Opportunity in Public Employment) 3. Article 311 of the Constitution of India (Deals with Safeguards against Dismissal of Government Employees) --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) *Hemkant Jha And Ors. Etc. Etc. vs The State of Bihar And Ors. on 18 July, 2007* (no date). Available at: (Accessed: 26 February 2024). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) *State Of Orissa & Anr vs Mamata Mohanty on 9 February, 2011* (no date). Available at: (Accessed: 26 February 2024). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) *State Of Bihar and Ors vs Chandreshwar Pathak on 7 August, 2014* (no date). Available at: (Accessed: 26 February 2024). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) *Article 14 in Constitution of India* (no date). Available at: (Accessed: 26 February 2024). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) *Article 16 of the Indian Constitution* (no date). Available at: (Accessed: 26 February 2024). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) *Article 311 in Constitution of India* (no date). Available at: (Accessed: 26 February 2024). **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [RMDC V/S UNION OF INDIA](https://lawfoyer.in/rmdc-v-s-union-of-india/) **Published:** March 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Advait Sharma, University Five Year Law College, Jaipur** **ABSTRACT:** The case of R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, commonly known as the RMDC case, was a landmark judgment by the Supreme Court of India in 1957. The case involved a constitutional challenge to the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, which prohibited certain forms of gambling in the state of Bombay. The Supreme Court held that the Act was valid and did not violate the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Indian Constitution. The Court reasoned that the Act was enacted to protect public morals and prevent social evils associated with gambling. It also noted that the state had the power to regulate activities that were considered harmful to society. This case case highlighted the delicate balance between individual rights and societal interests in the context of legislative regulation. It underscored the importance of upholding public welfare while respecting fundamental rights, setting a significant legal precedent in Indian jurisprudence. **CASE DETAILS:** Case TitleR. M. D. Chamarbaugwalla vs Union of India \[RMDC vs Union of India\]Citation1957 AIR 628, 1957 SCR 930Date of Judgement09/04/1957CourtSupreme Court Of IndiaAppellantR. M. D ChamarbaugwallaRespondentThe Union of IndiaBenchCJI Sudhi Ranjan Das, Bhuvaneshwar P. Sinha, P. B. Gajendragadkar,T. L. Venkatarama Iyer.ReferredArticle 19 (1),(6), Prize Competition Act,1955 **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE CASE:** The case involved M/S R.M.D.C., who had been operating prize competitions in Mysore since 1948 under the Mysore Lotteries and Prize Competitions Control and Tax Act, 1951. Section 2(d) of the act was challenged. A central legislation called the Prize Competition Act, 1955 was subsequently enacted following appeals from various states, including Mysore, which welcomed the act. However, the State of Mysore later passed an ordinance to amend certain provisions of the act and assume taxation powers. R.M.D.C., the petitioners, argued that the State’s action was beyond its legislative competence and constituted colourable legislation. They contended that the State of Mysore was indirectly trying to control prize competitions by appropriating taxation powers. The constitutional validity of Article 19(6) of the Indian Constitution was also questioned in the case. The respondents countered the petitioners’ claims by arguing that the lottery and gambling business conducted by R.M.D.C. did not fall under trade and therefore did not violate any fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution. The case was presented before the Apex Court, with Mr. Palkhivala representing the petitioners and Mr. Seervai representing the respondents. Both parties presented their arguments and contentions. The issue of severability, determining the validity of different parts of the Prize Competition Act, was a crucial aspect of the case. In summary, the case involved the challenge to the State of Mysore’s amendment of the Prize Competition Act and the constitutional validity of Article 19(6) in relation to prize competitions. The arguments focused on legislative competence, colourable legislation, and the classification of the lottery and gambling business under trade. **FACTS OF THE CASE:** A petition is filed by the applicant on the ground of their violation of the fundamental rights under Article 32 of the constitution challenging that Article 19(6) has been violated as a restriction is imposed on carrying on their business by the respondents. Further it was contended: - A petition is filed by the applicant on the ground of their violation of the fundamental rights under Article 32 of the constitution challenging that Article 19(6) has been violated as a restriction is imposed on carrying on their business by the respondents. - Further it was contended by the respondents that Section 2(d) of the Prize Competition Act, 1955 doesn’t cover the competitions related to the gambling but the petitioners were of the view that the definition of prize competition under Section 2(d) of the Act is very wide and it not only covers the competitions of the gambling nature but also those in which success depended to a substantial degree on skill, which was a part of the petitioner’s business. - Further, On behalf of the Union of India this was controverted and it was contended by the respondents that the definition, properly construed, meant and included only such competitions as were of a gambling nature, and even if that was not so, the impugned provisions, being severable in their application, were valid as regards gambling competitions. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED:** The issues raised in R. M. D. Chamarbaugwalla vs Union of India were: - Whether the provisions of the Prize Competitions Act (42 of 1955) apply to competitions requiring substantial skill, not falling under the category of gambling, as per the definition of “prize competition” in Section 2(d). - If the Act does apply, whether the provisions of Section 4 and 5, along with Rule 11 and 12, which are conceded to be invalid, can be enforced selectively through the principle of doctrine of severability in the context of competitions categorized as gambling. **APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS:** - The counsels for the Appellant submitted that they were actively involved in promoting and conducting prize competitions across various Indian states, contested the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 5 of the Prize Competitions Act (42 of 1955), along with Rules 11 and 12 framed under Section 20 of the Act. - Their argument rested on the interpretation of “prize competition” as defined in Section 2(d), asserting that it encompassed not only gambling competitions but also those reliant on a substantial degree of skill. - They contended in RMDC vs Union of India that these provisions infringed upon their fundamental right to conduct business under Article 19(6) of the Constitution. Additionally, they argued that the provisions formed a single inseverable enactment, necessitating the entire Act’s invalidation. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS:** The counsels for the Respondent submitted that that the definition, when properly construed, only included competitions of a gambling nature. - The respondents argued that ‘prize competition’ as defined in s. 2(d) of the Act, properly constructed, means and includes only competitions in which success does not depend to any substantial degree on skill and gambling activities are not trade or business. - The petitioners cannot file the petition under Article 32 as there has been no violation under Art. 19(1)(g), and that accordingly the petitioners are not entitled to invoke the protection of Art. 19(6). - It was contented by the respondents even if some part of the Prize Competition Act is invalid that should be removed but the valid part should stand valid and the whole Act should not be entirely void. **JUDGEMENT:** In R.M.D.C. v. Union of India case, the issue revolved around Section 2(d) of the Prize Competition Act, 1955 whether that section provided there covers all kinds of competitions including the gambling which the petitioners owned. In this case, the violation of Art. 19(6) was contended by the petitioners because of some of the impugned provisions in this Act. The Apex Court said that the question of violation of the fundamental rights would not stand valid as the gambling is not covered under the trade and hence no violation of the fundamental right. The Apex Court considering all aspects held that the doctrine of severability would apply here and the provisions which are invalid would be excluded from the Act and the valid part will been forceable. Giving this judgment the court laid down the various rules on the doctrine of severability that were a part of American Courts as how to judge and draw a line between the valid and invalid parts of the statute. Rules laid down for Severability: - If the valid and invalid provisions are totally mixed up with each other and hence cannot be separated then the whole Act would be invalid. - The determining factor in deciding whether the valid part of the statute can be separated from the invalid parts or not, is the intention of the legislature only. - If the valid and invalid parts of the statute are different and can be separated then the valid part which remains can form a complete code independent of the rest, will be checked. Then only it will be upheld. - Even when the provisions which are valid, are distinct and separate from those which are invalid form part of a single scheme which is intended to be operative as a whole, then also the invalidity of a part will result in the failure of the whole. - When the valid and invalid parts of the Statute are independent and do not form any part of the Scheme but what is left after excluding the invalid part is so thin and curtailed as to be in substance different from what it was when it emerged out of the legislature then also the entire part will be rejected. - The severability of the valid and invalid provisions of the Statute does not rely on whether the provisions are enacted in the same or different, it is not the form but the substance of the matter that is material and that has to be ascertained on the examination of the Act as a whole and of the settings of the relevant provisions therein. - If after the invalid part is obliterated from the statute, and what is left cannot be enforced without making the modifications and alterations, then the whole Act would be declared as void otherwise it would lead to judicial legislation. - To determine the legislative intent on the question of severability, it would be authorized to consider the history of the legislation, title, preamble and the purpose of it. **Conclusion:** In the landmark case of RMDC v. Union of India, the petitioner challenged the constitutionality of provisions in the Prize Competitions Act (42 of 1955) related to gambling competitions. The court, following the precedent set in The State of Bombay v. R. M. D. Chamarbaugwala, held that the restrictions under Sections 4 and 5 were not challengeable under Article 19(6) of the Constitution, as gambling did not fall under Article 19(1)(g). The court interpreted the Act to apply specifically to gambling competitions and ruled that even if it included skill-based contests, the contested provisions were severable, valid for gambling competitions, and not void. **References:** R.M.D.C. v. Union of India, (1957) AIR SC 628 A.K Gopalan v. State of Madras, (1950) AIR SC27 State of Bombay v. F.N Balsara, (1951) AIR SC 318 Minerva Mills v. Union of India, (1980) AIR SC 178 Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, (1992) SCR (1) 686 State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India Ltd), (1953) AIR 252 D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) AIR SC 130 Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1951) AIR 118 Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Company Ltd, (1894) AC 535 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Common Cause a Regd. Society vs Union of India 2023 SCC OnLine SC 99](https://lawfoyer.in/common-cause-a-regd-society-vs-union-of-india-2023-scc-online-sc-99/) **Published:** March 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Masooma Naqvi, Amity University, Uttar Pradesh** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE-** The following case includes the appellant which is Indian Society of Critical Care Medicine, who sought to seek clarifications on the judgement given in ***Common Cause (A Registered Society) v. Union of India and Another (2018) 5 SCC 1.*** The matter was referred to a five-judge bench in the Supreme Court and was filed under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution. The applicant argued that the guidelines laid down in the 2018 judgement were cumbersome and needed streamlining. In the following case the learned bench made numerous modifications with the intention to ease the process of administering passive euthanasia to terminally ill patients, who have no hope to recover and make it less time consuming. The Court also made clarifications on the question of Advance Directives. It further stated that as opposed to the guidelines of 2018 which required attestation by the judicial magistrate for a living will, the new guidelines would require a notary, or a gazetted officer to validate a living will. The case was disposed of by the Supreme court. ***Keywords*–** Passive Euthanasia, Writ Petition, Supreme Court, Article 21, Terminally Ill Patients, Two- tiered process, Advance Medical Directives **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***Supreme court, Common Cause vs Union of India 2023*Case Number***MA No. 1699/ 2019 in WP (C) No. 215/ 2005*Judgement Date***24th, January, 2024*Court***Supreme Court*Quorum***C.T. Ravikumar, Hrishikesh Roy, Aniruddha Bose, Ajay Rastogi, K.M. Joseph*Author***K.M. Joseph*Citation***SCC OnLine SC 99*Legal Provisions Involved***Article 21, Article 32, Constitutuion of India, 1950.**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** We must first understand what Advanced directives are. “Advance Directives is a general name for several kinds of documents you can sign to help ensure that your wishes about medical treatment is known and respected if you are unable to communicate for yourself.”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) In 2005, Common cause which is a registered society approached the Supreme court under article 32, praying to recognize the right to die with dignity within the ambit of article 21 of the Indian Constitution. Article 21 speaks about ‘Right to Life and Liberty’. The petitioner argued that the patients who have had prolonged treatment going on, and have no hope to improve their condition must have the right to die with dignity, through Passive Euthanasia. “Passive euthanasia is the act of withholding or withdrawing medical treatment, such as withholding or withdrawing life support, with the intention of allowing a person to die.”[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Later, Indian Society of Critical Care Medicine filed an application before the supreme court to get clarification of the judgment reported in ***Common Cause (A Registered Society) v. Union of India and Another (2018) 5 SCC 1.*** **FACTS OF THE CASE** The petition seeks to modify some of the guidelines prescribed in the 2018 Judgement, to ease the procedure for terminally ill patients to exercise their right to die with dignity as the procedure mentioned in the act was rather complicated. The right to Die with Dignity was first recognized in Common Cause vs Union of India in its 2018 Judgement. The main takeaway was that a person should not be given further medical care if they do not demand. Although this issue was initially brought before a three-judge Bench, where it was transferred to a Constitution Bench because of conflicting precedents about the law governing the right to die in India. In the present case, the applicant came before the court to sought clarifications on some of the guidelines and praying to modify some of these guidelines as the process was very slow paced and cumbersome. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. “Whether the Court should issue suitable directions or set in place norms to provide for what is described as Advance Directives? 2. Whether even in the absence of Advance Directives, when a person is faced with a medical condition with no hope of recovery and is continued on life support system/medicines, life support system should be withdrawn?”[\[3\]](#_ftn3) **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** Since Common Cause a Regd. Society vs Union of India 2023 SCC OnLine SC 99 is based on the guidelines issued in its original application of 2018, it becomes important for us to also briefly touch upon the 2018 judgement arguments as well. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant in the original case of Common Cause vs Union of India 2018 submitted that every individual has the autonomy to decide to continue or discontinue their life, provided they are terminally ill, on prolonged medications, and have no hope to recover. This is applicable in cases where a person has reached a permanent irreversible state where death is not far away. The petitioner also argued that Death with dignity is a far better option that allowing a person to continue to suffer in their vegetative state. Further the petitioners argued that individual autonomy or the right to decide comes within the ambit of Right to Privacy and hence should be sustained. In the case of Common Cause vs Union of India 2023 SCC OnLine SC 99, the applicant held that the difficulties due to the nature of the guidelines of 2018 were being voiced by a large numbers of doctors as well and hence it became a matter of importance for the court to address. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent in the original case of Common cause vs Union of India 2018 submitted that- 1. The right to Life and Liberty mentioned under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution does not include the Right to die as its facet, but rather means availability of food, shelter, and health. Protecting the life of the people is believed to be the primary function of the state, and hence including the right to die with dignity will directly go against the basic right mentioned in the Constitution. 1. The Counter Affidavit in Common Cause a Regd. Society vs Union of India 2023 SCC OnLine SC 99 submitted that *“As we have noticed, this is an application seeking clarification. Ordinarily, be it an MA No. 1699/ 2019 in WP (C) No. 215/ 2005 application lodged in this Court blessed as it is with powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we would have thought that the application should not receive further consideration. However, we notice that there has been a subsequent development. The development is in the form of orders evidencing an attempt being made by the respondent also to evolve/agree to certain changes.”*[\[4\]](#_ftn4) **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** Section 92, Indian Penal Code 1860. Article 21, Indian Constitution 1950. **JUDGEMENT** **RATIO DECIDENDI** 1. The learned bench made several modifications in the 2018 case with the intention of making the process less cumbersome and time consuming. 1. With regards to issue 1 “198.2.1. It should clearly indicate the decision relating to the circumstances in which withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment can be resorted to.” 1. With regards to issue 2, the court held that “It is necessary to make it clear that there will be cases where there is no Advance Directive. The said class of persons cannot be alienated. In cases where there is no Advance Directive, the procedure and safeguards are to be same as applied to cases where Advance Directives are in existence and in addition there to, the following procedure shall be followed: 199.1. *“In cases where the patient is terminally ill and undergoing prolonged treatment in respect of ailment which is incurable or where there is no hope of being cured, the physician may inform the hospital which, in turn, shall constitute a Hospital Medical Board in the manner indicated earlier. The Hospital Medical Board shall discuss with the family physician and the family members and record the minutes of the discussion in writing. During the discussion, the family members shall be apprised of the pros and cons of withdrawal or refusal of further medical treatment to the MA No. 1699/ 2019 in WP (C) No. 215/ 2005 patient and if they give consent in writing, then the Hospital Medical Board may certify the course of action to be taken. Their decision will be regarded as a preliminary opinion.”* 199.2. “*In the event the Hospital Medical Board certifies the option of withdrawal or refusal of further medical treatment, the hospital shall immediately inform the jurisdictional Collector. The jurisdictional Collector shall then constitute a Medical Board comprising the Chief District Medical Officer as the Chairman and three experts from the fields of general medicine, cardiology, neurology, nephrology, psychiatry or oncology with experience in critical care and with overall standing in the medical profession of at least twenty years.”* 1. In 2018, the Court declared Section 309 IPC ultra vires and held that it deserved to be effaced from the statute book to humanize our penal laws. “Delving into the facet of committing suicide, the larger Bench observed that when a man commits suicide, he has to undertake certain positive overt acts and the genesis of those acts cannot be traced to or be included within the protection of the right to life under Article 21.” In the case of ***Common Cause vs Union of India 2023 SCC OnLine SC 99,*** the Hon’ble court made certain modifications of the guidelines issued in the 2018 case, some of which include the following- A) Para 198.3.1 which earlier required a Judicial Magistrate of First Class appointed by the concerned Judicial Magistrate, to countersign the documents, signed by two independent witnesses, it now has been amended. The condition now requires countersign by notary and official gazette as appointed by the concerned judicial magistrate. B) Para 198.4.5 Which earlier talked about a single medical board now talk about 2 Medical Boards, Primary and Secondary Medical Boards. “The primary medical board certifies that the instructions contained in the advance directives ought to be carried out, the hospital shall them immediately constitute a Secondary Medical board comprising one registered practitioner nominated by the Chief Medical Officer of the District atleast two subject experts with atleast five years of experience.” Para .198.6.4 Where the Hospital Medical Board takes a decision not to follow an Advance Directive while treating a person, then it shall make an application to the medical board constituted by the collector and for appropriate consideration on the advance directive. It now stands amended. Now the persons mentioned in the advance directive may ask the hospital to refer the case to the secondary medical board. These are some of the modifications that were made. The reasoning behind it was to make the process more speedy and hassle free. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The amendment of the guidelines established by the court in 2018 was necessary as Right to Die with Dignity is not only based on the right to choose for oneself and personal autonomy but it prolongs the sufferings of the terminally ill people. It however is not limited to the terminally ill people themselves but also extends to their families. There is a constant financial pressure on them and they suffer themselves seeing their loved ones in peril. Hence, the process of passive euthanasia should be convenient, hassle free and speedy. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** *Common Cause (A Registered Society) vs Union of India*[\[5\]](#_ftn5) *Gian Kaur V. State of Punjab case[**\[6\]**](#_ftn6)* **Important Statutes Referred** *Article 21, Indian Constitution, 1950* *Section 92, Indian Penal Code 1860* *Law Commission’s 241st report – ‘Passive Euthanasia’* --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) “Understand and Complete Your Advance Directives” (*The Joint Commission*) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) “SC Eases Norms for Passive Euthanasia” (Drishti IAS) [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Explained| Supreme Court’s Order Modifying Guidelines given in 2018 Euthanasia Judgment | SCC Times” (*SCC Times*, February 4, 2023) [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Common Cause (A Regd. Society) Director ..vs Union Of India (A) Ministry Of Health 2023. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) AIR 2018 SUPREME COURT 1665, AIR 2018 SC (CIV) 1683, (2018) 3 MAD LJ 503, (2018) 4 SCALE 1, (2018) 1 CRIMES 184, (2018) 1 CURCC 448, 2018 (5) SCC 1, 2018 (2) KLT SN 47 (SC), 2018 (1) KCCR SN 65 (SC) [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) 1996 AIR 946 1996 SCC (2) 648, JT 1996 (3) 339 1996 SCALE (2)881 **Important Online Sources Referred** *[https://www.livelaw.in/pdf\_upload/79-common-cause-v-union-of-india-24-jan-2023-457290.pdf](https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/79-common-cause-v-union-of-india-24-jan-2023-457290.pdf)* **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [State (Through CBI ) v Santosh Kumar Singh](https://lawfoyer.in/state-through-cbi-v-santosh-kumar-singh/) **Published:** March 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Nida, Christ (deemed to be) University Lavasa, Pune** ## INTRODUCTION This judge’s decision to let the accused go free in the Priyadarshini Mattoo case shows that our justice system is not working properly. People are upset because it seems like powerful people can get away with crimes. Corruption and political influence have made our courts unfair. It’s like when someone says that having a lot of power can make people do bad things. It’s strange that even though the Judiciary is supposed to be really powerful, they can still be influenced by wealthy and persuasive people.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) It’s sad that most of the rules and protections against judges doing bad things are no longer working. ## FACTS A long time ago, a girl named Priyadarshini Mattoo was killed in her uncle’s home in Delhi. The police found out that she had been hurt badly and someone had choked her. They suspected Santosh Kumar Singh, who was a senior of Priyadarshini at college, to be the person who did it. Priyadarshini had told the police before that Singh had been following and bothering her. At first, the police didn’t do a good job investigating the case. But later, the Central Bureau of Investigation took over and looked into it. In 1999, Singh was cleared of the charges by a lower court because there wasn’t enough proof. But the CBI didn’t agree and appealed the decision in the Delhi High Court. In 2006, the High Court found Singh guilty of both assault and murder, and he was sentenced to death. Singh didn’t agree with the High Court’s decision and appealed again. In 2010, the High Court upheld Singh’s conviction, but changed his punishment to life imprisonment instead of death. An FIR was filed at the Vasant Kunj Police Station under [\[2\]](#_ftn2)Section 302 of the Indian Criminal Code (IPC). According to the statement recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.PC[\[3\]](#_ftn3), the deceased’s mother, Rajeshwari Mattoo, suspected the offender and so joined the inquiry. ## LEGAL ISSUES - Whether the police do a good job at first when they were investigating Priyadarshini Mattoo’s murder, even though they made some mistakes? - whether it worry us that someone older and more powerful at school might have hurt Priyadarshini, and that this could happen because of how people with power can sometimes behave badly? - Whether they remember when Priyadarshini Mattoo told people that someone was bothering her and following her? This shows that we should do more to stop this from happening and make sure people are safe. - Can the police get in trouble if they forget to record what an important witness says? - Can a DNA test prove if someone is guilty or not? - If we can prove without a doubt that the accused person is guilty and there is enough evidence to support it, should they be found guilty of the crime they committed? ## ANALYSIS The prosecution in the trial had a hard time because the investigation was done poorly and the evidence was tampered with. But they were able to prove that Santosh hurt himself and broke his helmet when he attacked Mattoo. Mattoo also complained to the police many times about Santosh bothering her, and people saw Santosh near Mattoo’s house before she was killed. The accused tried to say his injuries were old, but a doctor said they looked recent. The court didn’t agree with the prosecution’s evidence and let the accused go free. [\[4\]](#_ftn4)This made a lot of people angry and they protested for justice. The media also found problems with the case and showed how Mattoo didn’t get the justice she deserved. The public demanded that the case be looked at again, and the CBI filed an appeal in a higher court. Finally, in 2006, Santosh was found guilty and sentenced to death. But later, his sentence was changed to life in prison. This case shows that justice may have been delayed, but it was not denied. ## CONCLUSION Abuse can occur when any institution, whether legislative, executive, judicial, or bureaucratic, exceeds its legal jurisdiction and powers. In certain circumstances, such as judicial activism, extra-legal actions might really be beneficial. Along with the media trial, like revolutionary sting operations, is a praiseworthy effort to monitor police investigations and acts. However, it must maintain self-restraint and prioritize fair trials and judicial procedures, with a sense of responsibility. The media should acknowledge that their content has a huge impact on the audience. While television journalism has improved in terms of audience interaction and response, there are still issues around agenda setting. Citizens or news media. As watchers, we might easily succumb to the media’s influence and follow its predefined path of involvement. Media impact may be subtle, especially when the cause appears noble. When democracy fails, the media’s role in public involvement should be carefully considered. The channels’ promises of justice and empowerment often rely on media power, which may be vague and confusing. The judicial and the media are separate bodies with distinct functions that do not overlap. Both parties should not rely on each other to fulfill their commitments. The media should only carry out journalistic duties and not act as a special agency for the court. Prejudiced media coverage undermines freedom of speech and expression because it interferes with the delivery of justice. The media has a moral obligation to deliver the truth at the right time. Print media has reached saturation and adheres to legal and ethical requirements, whereas electronic media is still in its early stages of experimentation. Use the “trial and error” method to determine what to exhibit and what not to expose. There will come a day when electronic media will be strictly managed by self-censored conventions, and we will still have a “totally free press.” ## RELEVANT PROVISIONS ## *The Indian Penal Code, 1860*[***\[5\]***](#_ftn5) **•Section 302** According to Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, a person who commits murder shall be punished with the death penalty or a life sentence in jail as well as a heavy fine. No one is exempted from the crime of murder under the IPC **•Section 354** Anyone who assaults or uses unlawful force on a woman with the intent to offend or knowing that doing so will likely offend her modesty is punishable by imprisonment of either kind for a time that may extend to two years, by fine, or by both. **•Section 376: Punishment for rape** Those who commit rape, except for those covered by subsection (2), are subject to fines and imprisonment of either kind for a duration that may not be less than seven years but maybe for life or for a term that may extend to ten years. If the victim of the rape is the offender’s wife and she is not under the age of twelve, he or she is subject to imprisonment of any description for a term that may extend to two years. With the caveat that the court may impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than seven years for sufficient and unique grounds to be indicated in the ruling. ## *The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*[***\[6\]***](#_ftn6) **•Section 313: Power to examine the accused** 1\. in every inquiry or trial, to enable the accused personally to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, the Court- 2\. May at any stage, without previously warning the accused, put such questions to him as the Court considers necessary; 3\. shall, after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before he is called on for his defense, question him generally on the case: Provided that in a summons- case, where the Court has dispensed with the personal attendance of the accused, it may also dispense with his examination under clause (b). 4 The accused shall not render himself liable to punishment by refusing to answer such questions, or by giving false answers to them. 5\. The answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offense which such answers may tend to show he has committed. ## *The Indian Evidence Act, of 1872*[***\[7\]***](#_ftn7) **Section 6** Regardless of whether they happened at the same time and location or at different times and locations, facts that, while not in dispute, are sufficiently related to a fact in dispute to form a component of the same transaction are significant. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Legal India, Case Comment on Priyadarshini Matoo case, Legalservicesindia.com *Case Comment on Priyadarshini Matoo case*. (n.d.). Www.legalservicesindia.com. Retrieved February 29, 2024, from http://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/644/Case-Comment-on-Priyadarshini-Matoo-case.html [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Trivedi, H. D., & India. (1981). *Indian Penal Code, 1860.* Eastern Book Co. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Durga Das Basu, & Mallick, M. R. (1997). *Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 : Act No. 2 of 1974*. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Legal India, Case Comment on Priyadarshini Matoo case, Legalservicesindia.com *Case Comment on Priyadarshini Matoo case*. (n.d.). Www.legalservicesindia.com. http://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/644/Case-Comment-on-Priyadarshini-Matoo-case.html [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Trivedi, H. D., & India. (1981). *Indian Penal Code, 1860.* Eastern Book Co. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Durga Das Basu, & Mallick, M. R. (1997). *Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 : Act No. 2 of 1974*. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) James Fitzjames Stephen. (2019). *The Indian Evidence Act (I. of 1872): With an Introduction on the Principles of Judicial Evidence*. Alpha Edition. **Categories:** Uncategorised --- ### [Godawat Pan Masala Products Private Ltd. v. Union of India](https://lawfoyer.in/godawat-pan-masala-products-private-ltd-v-union-of-india/) **Published:** March 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **AUTHOR: NAVEENA K, CHETTINAD SCHOOL OF LAW** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The case involved writ petitons and appeals the all of the case has be issued the same issue with different state.The main issue was the validity of notification issued by Food (Health) Authority under the Prevention of food adulteration act 1954.Banning of panamasal and gutka tobacco products for diferent period in various states.The appeal has been filed by the appeallants after the dismissal of case in Highcourt of Judicature of BombayThe Supreme Court admitted the special leave petitions and the writ petition and decided to hear them together due to the similarity of the legal issues involved.Further it was decided that the State food authority has no longer power,the order has been quashed,it is violating the art 19,14 is being unconstitutional and the act is ultravires works beyond the power.The impunged notification has been cancelled.The COTPA act 2003 prevails over the Prevention of food adulteration act 1954. ***Keywords*:** Food (Health) Authority, Prevention of food adulteration act 1954,Panmasla gutka, Ban, public health, Writ petition, Validity, Highcourt of Judicature of Bombay. **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***Ghodawat Pan Masala Products and Ors. V Union of India*Case Number***Appeal (civil) 4674/2004*Judgement Date***02/08/2004*Court***Supreme Court Of India*Quorum***K.G. Balakrishnan, B.N. Srikrishna*Author***Gauri Fatangare*Citation***(2004)7SCC 68*Legal Provisions Involved***Sec7(iv),Sec23,Sec24- Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,1954. Sec 6 – Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (prohibition of Advertisement and Regulation of Trade and Commerce,Production supply and Distribution)Act 2003.**INTRODUCTION** Food is most essential to human and its should be fresh,pure and healthy without any adulteration.Pan masala & Gutka are very bad to people using ,it causes cancer and they are very harmful substances which affect all the organs of the body.cheap in cost high risk factor. In the case **“Godawat Pan Masala Products & Ors v. UOI ”**.State had issued the notification on 23rd July to banning the manufactures, sales,storage and distribution of pan masala and gutkas by the Food health Authority under Sec 7 (iv) of Prevention of food Adulteration. act 1954.The validity of notification been challenged by the manufacturing and selling companies of Pan masala and Gutka[\[i\]](#_edn1). 4 states had challenged the notification -Tamilnadu,Maharashtra,Andhra Pradesh ,&Goa: 1. By Notification dated **19th Nov,2001** issued by Director for Public Health and Preventive Medicine and State Food (Health) Authority ,**Govt of Tamilnadu**, under sec 7(iv) of act that no person shall himself or by person on his behalf manufacture for sale or store, sell or distribute i) chewing tobacco, ii) pan masala, iii) gutka, containing tobacco in any form or any other ingredients injurious to health, under whatever name of description in the State of TN. The petitioner also challenged the notification. 2. By Notification dated **23rd July,2002** issued by the Commissioner , Food and Drug Administration and Food (Health) Authority for **State of Maharastra**,the manufactures, sales, storages and distribution of Pan masala and gutka were banned period of 5 years effect from **1st Aug, 2002**. 3. By notification dated **19th Feb 2002** issued by the Food (Health) Authority, State of Andhra Pradesh, prohibiting the sale of pan masala under any brand name with an emblem of gutka, containing tobacco, within the state of Andhra Pradesh, with immediate effect. 4. By another notification dated **27th Feb 2002**, issued by same authority of State of AP under Sec 7(iv) of the Act, sale of all brands of pan masala containing tobacco and chewing tobacco /zarda/khaini under any brand name is prohibited. 5. By notification dated **24th January, 2003** issued by the Directorate of Food and Drugs Administration and Food (Health) Authority for the **State of Goa** under Section 7(iv) of the Act, the “sale of gutka and pan masala, containing tobacco or not containing tobacco, by whatever name called,” is prohibited within the state of Goa and it is directed that, “*no person shall himself or any person on his behalf, shall manufacture for sale or store, sell or distribute gutka or pan masala, containing tobacco or not containing tobacco, by whatever name called*.” Those above all 4 states notifications were challenged by appellants before high courts.The high courts had given the Judgments, that dismissed the WP upholding checking the validity of the notification. So being the aggrieved party these appellants filed the appeal before the Supreme Court of India. **BACKGROUND OF THE JUDGEMENT Sec 7( iv) of the act is not an independent source of power of the state authority. The power of banning the food articles used as ingredient of food, on the ground that is injurious to health , belongs appropriately to the Central Government to be exercised in accordance with rules made under Sec 23 of the act ,sub section (1A)(f). The power of food (Health) Authority under the rules is only of transitory nature and intended to deal with local emergencies and can last only for shirt period with emergency cases lasts. The impunged notification had been act of Ultravires and it is bad in law,the notification is held to be unconstitutional and void abridging the Fundamental Rights of the appellants guaranteed under Art 14 and Art 19 of the Indian Constitution. In the decisions of Supreme court Central Government only ban the food either by parliamentary under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,1954 (food act).The court found that states do not have the power to ban even if the states invoke the provisions of the food act.The court quashed the order of Highcourts, the Supreme court also maintained that it could not agree with petitioners contentions that pan masala and gutka are not food. **FACTS OF THE CASE** The case involve multiple appeals and WP these all petitions were arises in different areas or states but all the issues were raises the similar legal issues,banning of manufacturing , selling,storages, distributing of panmasala and gutka (containing tobocco products) by the Food ( health ) Authority in the different states for the different periods. Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 24449 of 2002. In one instance, the appellants (Godawat Pan Masala Products I.P. Ltd. & Anr.) challenged a notification issued by the Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration and Food (Health) Authority for the State of Maharashtra. The notification issues in the date of 23rd July,2002 banned the manufactures,sales,storages distribution of pan masala and gutka products, for the period of five years, this taken into effect from Aug 1st,2002. then the appellant filed the WP in high court of Bombay,it has been dismissed. The appeal has been filed in the Supreme court against the decisions of high court. In another instances,Petitioners Nos. 1 to 5 are associations and cooperative societies of arecanut growers, petitioners Nos. 6 and 7 are engaged in the manufacture and sale of pan masala and gutka in the State of Karnataka had been challenged. Civil Appeal arising out of SLP No. 24292 of 2002 The appellant carry on the business of manufacture and sale of pan masala, gutka and other tobacco related items. Civil Appeals arising out of S.L.P. Nos. 23635/02, 24292/02, 533/03, 834/03 and 2186/03 The appellants are engaged, inter alia, in the manufacture and trade of pan masala and gutka, pan masala containing tobacco and other allied tobacco products. The petitioners also challenged notifications issued by the Director for Public Health and Preventive Medicine and State Food (Health) Authority, Government of Tamil Nadu, and the Directorate of Food and Drugs Administration and Food (Health) Authority for the State of Goa. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether sec 7(iv) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 has as independent source of power or not? 2. Whether the notifications issued by the Food (Health) Authority under Section 7(iv) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 is valid or not in all the cases? 3. Whether the Food (health) Authority of the State has the power to banned the manufactures,sale, storages,distribution of food articles injurious to health or not? 4. Whether the COTPA 2003 act prevails over the Prevention of food adulteration act ,1954 or not? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the validity of the notification issued by Food(health) Authority under sec 7(iv) is challenged, said they have no declaratory power. The appellant contended that the notifications of banning of the manufacture,sale,storage,and distribution of panmasala and gutka is violated their rights,and cause of business.In due of notification the appellant business and their live hood were affected by the ban of panmasala and facing of financial loss. Although the special act dealing tobacco COTPO act 2003 act does not ban the tobacco products completely, there is restriction place below the age of 18 years it should not be sale. The cancel of license is arbitrary an procedurally unfair, The State Food (health) Authority does not confer the powers.The Central government has its whole power and procedure establish in law. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that Sec 7 of the act is an independent source of power. “In the interest of public health”the State Authority had banned in the view of preventing the outbreaking or spread of infectious diseases.The respondent contented that the notification were issued after considering scientific evidence and expert opinions regarding the adverse health effects of consuming pan masala.The respondent emphasized that the act of banning is necessary to protect the health risk associated with these products. The matter of public health are essentially matters of policy decision,legislative or administrative, are well planned and executed in the greater interest of public health by the Government and the court should not interfere with such policy matters. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** 1. Sec 7 (iv) Prevention of Food Adulteration act 1954-In the interest of pubic, this section gives power to the Food (health) Authority to prohibit the food articles deemed to be unsafe and harmful. 1. Sec 22 A Prevention of Food Adulteration act 1954- The Central Government may give such directions as it may deem necessary to a State Government regarding the carrying into execution of all or any of the provisions of this Act and the State Government shall comply with such directions 1. Sec 23 Prevention of Food Adulteration act 1954- The central government has power to make rules,it has a power to declare any substances which is injurious to health. 1. Sec 24 Prevention of Food Adulteration act 1954 -The State Government may, after consultation with the Committee and subject to the condition of previous publication, make rules for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this Act in matters not falling within the purview of section 23. 1. The Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (Prohibition of Advertisement and Regulation of Trade and Commerce, Production, Supply and Distribution) Act, 2003 (Act 34 of 2003) – This central legislation regulates the advertisement, trade, production, supply, and distribution of tobacco products. **JUDGEMENT (RATIO DECIDENDI)** Considering all above the facts,issues raised and principle of natural justice the held that: - Section 7(iv) of the Act is not independence source of power for the state authority. - The State Food (health) Authority power mentioned in Sec 24 of the act, under that the rules are only transitory nature, can be applied on local emergencies. - Section 23 of the act, Central Government has a power of banning an article of food or an article used as ingredient of food, on the ground that is injurious to health, this should be exercised in accordance with rules made under sec 23(1A)(f). - The State Food(health)Authority has no power to banned manufacture for sale,storage,sale,or distribution of any article. Such that power can only arise as result of policy decision or from Parliamentary legislation or by exercise of the powers by the Central Government by framing rules under Sec 23 of the act. - The provision of COTPO Act 2003 and Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 have some inconsistency and conflicts thus the special law COTPO act will prevail. - The notification impunged are done beyond its legal power, it is act of Ultravires , and its unconstitutional and void as abridging the fundamental right of the appellants guaranteed under Article 14 and 19 of Constitution. - As the result the Judgement pronounced under the division bench of Bombay High Court and Andhra Pradesh High Court was quashed,and the notification impunged are also quashed and it is unenforceable against the appellants. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** Panmasala and Gutka are the highly consumed and easily available and consumed in India.Intaking of this substances causes injurious to health and oral cancer.The youngsters and being addictive and influencing in use of Gutka and Panmasala.As the Judgement said that State Authorities do not have power to ban panmasala and gutka(containing or not containing tobocco). But in the view of realising the serious consequences of tobacco it is also necessary that State Authority holds the power to ban the Pan masala at Gutka. The conflict when arise between general and special law , the special statutes will prevail. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** 1\) **U.P State Electricity Board and Ors v. Hari Shanker Jain & ors[**\[ii\]**](#_edn2)** In this it was referred that there is conflict between Special law and General law, the both the laws are enacted by the same legislative body.if there is conflict with special and general law the special law must prevail.The maxim applied by the court in this case generalia specialibus non derogant. In the case of Ghodawat Pan Masala vs UOI there is the conflict between Prevention of Food Adulteration act 1954 (general law) and COTPA act 2003(special law).Therefore COTPA act 2003 is prevail over the Prevention of Food Adulteration act 1954. 2\) **Khoday Distilleries Ltd .And Ors v. State of Karnataka and Ors[**\[iii\]**](#_edn3)** In this case the concept of res extra commercium was explained.By referring this case the bench concluded that Pan masala and Gutka are not res extra commercium, they are not injurious to health,safety,and welfare of the general publuc and are on trade or business in activities which are immoral and criminal. - State of Tamil Nadu v. K.Sabanayagam and Anr.[**\[iv\]**](#_edn4)** In this instance, it was noted that the delegate may be needed to take into account which parties may be impacted by the use of power, even when performing a legislative role.In view of this, it was decided that the appellants who would likely be impacted by the prohibition order should have received access to all relevant information possessed by the Food (Health) Authority prior to making a judgement regarding the contested notification. They should have had a chance to face these facts, according to the natural justice concept. In the current instance, this has not been done. This is another reason why the notice is invalid under the law. **Important Statutes Referred** 1. Prevention of Food Adulteration Act,1954 1. Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (Prohibition of Advertisement and Regulation of Trade and Commerce, Production, Supply and Distribution) Act, 2003 1. Constitution of India[\[v\]](#_edn5) --- ### [\[i\]](#_ednref1) **Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955,Appendix B para A.30** [\[ii\]](#_ednref2) 1980 AIR 65, 1979 SCR (2) 355 [\[iii\]](#_ednref3) 1996 AIR 911, JT 1995 (9) 449 [\[iv\]](#_ednref4) AIR 1998 SC 344 [\[v\]](#_ednref5) Adopted 1949 enforcement 1950 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [ARUNA ROY V. UNION OF INDIA AIR 2002 SC 3176](https://lawfoyer.in/aruna-roy-v-union-of-india-air-2002-sc-3176/) **Published:** March 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **AUTHOR: RITUPARNA PANDA**, **BIRLA GLOBAL UNIVERSITY, BHUBANESWAR** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** This case mainly relies on a writ suit bought by Ms. Aruna Roy and others against the Union of India and Others over the execution of the National Curriculum framework for School Educations 2000 (NCFSE) without the approval of the Central Advisory Board of Education (CABE). This petition mostly emphasizes on the constitutional concerns about the potential outcomes in the near future of the education of children and the significance of the CABE with regards to educational planning. It delves into the roles and enduring significance of CABE as well as more border topics about the educational affairs and goals, such as creation of peace, shared brotherhood, and fundamental principles. The respondents provided arguments claiming that there was no legal obligation to consult CABE and that it had not been properly reformed.The Supreme Court finally rejected the petition, emphasizing the importance of teaching the aforementioned principles in their educational institutions. And also discards the case stating that it cannot be resolved through a writ petition under Article 32. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*:** National Curriculum Framework for School Education (NCFSE), Central Advisory Board Of Education (CABE), Writ Petition, Constitutional Importance, Article 32, Educational Policy. **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***Writ Petition (civil) 98 of 2002 – Ms. Aruna Roy and others Vs. Union of India and others.*Case Number***Writ Petition (civil) 98 of 2002 *Judgement Date***12/09/2002 *Court***Supreme Court of India*Quorum***M.B. SHAH *Author***M.B. SHAH *Citation***AIR 2002 SC 3176*Legal Provisions Involved***Article 32 of Indian Constitution, National Curriculum Framework for School Education 2000 (NCFSE)**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF CASE** The court proceeding focuses on a writ suit filed by Ms. Aruna Roy and others against the Union of India and other parties. The petition seeks to implement the National Curriculum Framework for School Education 2000 (NCFSE) without permission from the Central Advisory Board of Education (CABE). It emphasises significant constitutional uncertainties about the progression of children’s education and the use of legal procedures in developing educational policy. The petitioners argued that the enactment of the NCFSE requires CABE’s permission, given its longstanding significance and expected engagement in educational decisions since its creation in 1935. They contend that CABE has regularly been considered prior to the formulation of new educational policies, and that its approval is critical to the validity of such programmes. In contrast, the defendants argue that there is no statutory obligation to obtain CABE endorsement for the NCFSE. They argue that CABE has not been properly reconstituted after its claimed expiration in 1994, therefore removing the need for its permission to implement the NCFSE. The case also delves into broader issues about the values and goals of education, such as encouraging unity, fraternity, and universal ideals. These discussions examine the role of education in fostering communal unity, preserving cultural traditions, and furthering secular ideas. **FACTS OF THE CASE** The issue revolves on a writ petition (civil) brought by Ms. Aruna Roy and others against the Union of India and others. The petitioners argue that the National Curriculum Framework for School Education 2000 (NCFSE) cannot be administered without clearance from the Central Advisory Board of Education (CABE). They say that CABE, which was created in 1935, has historically been consulted prior to the development of new policies regarding education, and that its approval is required for such policies to be legitimate. The petitioners allege that the respondents failed to secure CABE’s endorsement for the NCFSE, so violating recognised processes in educational policy creation. They argue that CABE’s function has important constitutional weight, particularly in terms of children’s education. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that there is no legal requirement for CABE to be involved in the NCFSE approval process. They argue that CABE’s alleged failure to reconstitute properly since 1994 makes its support useless for implementing the NCFSE. The case also addresses wider issues about the ideas and goals of education, such as pushing for unity, fraternity, and internationally recognised values. These talks highlight the role of education in creating communal harmony, preserving cultural heritage, and upholding secular principles. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether the implementation of the National Curriculum Framework for School Education 2000 (NCFSE) required clearance from the Central Advisory Board of Education. 2. Whether CABE, founded in 1935, has constitutional relevance in educational planning, and whether its approval is required for the legality of educational measures such as the NCFSE. 3. Whether the inability to get CABE approval for the NCFSE violates established educational policymaking processes. 4. Whether the Supreme Court has the authority to rule on the constitutional implications of the petition and the legitimacy of the NCFSE’s implementation without CABE permission. **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that - The argument that the implementation of the National Curriculum Framework for School Education 2000 (NCFSE) requires clearance from the Central Advisory Board of Education. They claim that CABE’s historical consultation prior to the formation of new educational policies has substantial constitutional significance in educational policymaking. - The petitioner contends that CABE approval is required for the legality of educational policies such as the NCFSE, emphasising the serious constitutional consequences for the future of children’s education. - They stress the respondents’ refusal to obtain CABE permission for the NCFSE, arguing that this breaches established educational policymaking norms and weakens CABE’s authority. - The petitioner emphasises CABE’s historical relevance as a consultative group representing many stakeholders in the education sector, arguing that its approval is required to maintain the inclusion and validity of educational policy. In summary, the petitioner’s arguments emphasise the need of obtaining CABE’s approval before implementing educational policies such as the NCFSE, as well as the value of adhering to established procedures in educational planning. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that - There is no legal necessity to acquire clearance from the Central Advisory Board of Education (CABE) before implementing the National Curriculum Framework for School Education 2000. They argue that CABE approval is not required for the execution of educational initiatives. - The respondents contend that CABE wasn’t effectively rebuilt after its supposed expiration in 1994, and hence its power to adopt educational programmes such as the NCFSE is doubtful. - They contend that the non-reconstitution of CABE has no bearing on the legality or legitimacy of educational programmes such as the NCFSE, and that the absence of CABE approval does not render such policies unlawful. - Respondents also emphasised that educational decisions is the responsibility of the executive arm of government, and that CABE’s position, while consultative, does not bestow decision-making authority over educational policies. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** - Article 32 of Indian Constitution - National Curriculum Framework for School Education 2000 (NCFSE) **JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court ruled that the National Curriculum Framework for School Education 2000 (NCFSE) can be implemented without specific clearance from the Central Advisory Board of Education (CABE). It emphasised CABE’s consultative role in educational policies while clarifying that its support is not legally required for policy execution. Regarding CABE’s historical significance, the Court decided that its non-reconstitution since 1994 did not negate the legality or legitimacy of programmes such as the NCFSE. It also emphasised the executive branch’s authority in educational planning and highlighted that CABE’s consultative function does not confer decision-making authority over policies. In short, the decision maintained the legitimacy of adopting educational programmes such as the NCFSE without CABE’s express consent and emphasised the executive branch’s discreation in educational policy making. **RATIO DECIDENDI** 1. The Supreme Court declared that the National Curriculum Framework for School Education 2000 (NCFSE) can be implemented without explicit clearance from the Central Advisory Board of Education (CABE). 2. The Court emphasised that, while CABE can advise on educational affairs, its support is not legally required for policy implementation. 3. The Court recognised CABE’s historical significance, but held that its lack of reconstruction following its putative lapse in 1994 did not undermine the legitimacy or validity of educational initiatives such as the NCFSE. 4. Furthermore, the Court emphasised the executive branch’s role in educational planning and underlined that, while CABE may advise, it does not have decision-making authority over educational policies. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The decision concluded that it is legally possible to adopt the National Curriculum Framework for School Education 2000 (NCFSE) without express consent from the Central Advisory Board of Education (CABE). The Supreme Court ruling highlighted that, while CABE plays a consultative role in educational policymaking, its support is not required for policy execution. Furthermore, the Court’s observations emphasised the executive branch’s role in educational planning and recognised CABE’s historical significance without providing it policymaking authority. In summary, the decision defined the procedural criteria for implementing educational policy and upheld the executive branch’s power in this area. It emphasises the need of balancing consultative methods and administrative authority while developing educational frameworks, guaranteeing effective governance while adhering to constitutional values. **REFERENCES** **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [SELVI V. STATE OF KARNATAKA AIR 2010 SC 1974](https://lawfoyer.in/selvi-v-state-of-karnataka-air-2010-sc-1974/) **Published:** March 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Rutvij Vyas (Faculty of Law, GLS University)** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** *Smt. Selvi V. State of Karnataka*, is a leading case of Hon’ble Supreme court, which answered the question of law, whether the pscyo-scientific techniques such as polygraph test, narcoanalysis, BEAP test, can be used to administer criminal justice. The three judge bench of Js J.M. Panchal, R.V. Raveendran, K.G. Balakrishnan considered the emerging perspectives of such techniques and prohibition of self-incrimination under Article 20 (3) and has held, that no impugned tests can be conducted without the accused’s free and fair consent, which must be obtained in the presence of a judicial magistrate and the accused’s advocate. For the Supreme Court it was not only fight between humanity and technology, but also between easy administration of justice and personal freedom. This judgement is a crucial reminder that while society and the State has a legitimate interest in fighting crime, this must be stabilized with the protection of individual rights. This article explores the facts and background of the case, legal issues raised, arguments of the petitioners and respondents, the judgement and conclusion of the case. ***Keywords*:- Narcoanalysis, Polygraph, BEAP, Self-incrimination, Voluntary administration** **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***Selvi & Ors vs State Of Karnataka & Anr*Case Number***Criminal Appeal No. 1267 of 2004*Judgement Date***5 May, 2010*Court***The Supreme Court of India*Quorum***J.M. Panchal, R.V. Raveendran, K.G. Balakrishnan*Author***K.G. Balakrishnan*Citation***Equivalent citations: AIR 2010 SUPREME COURT 1974, 2010 (7) SCC 263, 2010 AIR SCW 3011, 2010 (3) AIR KANT HCR 19, (2011) 2 BOMCR(CRI) 473, (2010) 3 ALLCRILR 605, (2010) 1 CRILR(RAJ) 510, (2010) 2 CURCRIR 311, (2010) 2 RAJ LW 1688, (2010) 46 OCR 457, (2010) 2 CRIMES 241, 2010 (3) SCC(CRI) 1, 2010 (4) SCALE 690, 2010 CRILR(SC MAH GUJ) 510*Legal Provisions Involved***Article:-21, 20(3)**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** When we consider, the administration of justice, one may contemplate the possible and perpetual ease of determining guilt or innocence by closely examining the brain mapping of the accused, through several psychological testes such as BEAP (Brain electrical activation profile) or polygraph tests or narcoanalysis. However, there are many key considering factors, such as, the Constitution of India’s Article 20(3) puts prohibition on self-incrimination, which puts numerous ethical & legal concerns about administration of Criminal justice through the impugned tests on an individual’s brain without their free and fair consent. The use of techniques/ tests such as narcoanalysis could possibly infringe the privacy of such person to whom test is done. Lastly, relying completely on a single machine for such analysis may result in inaccuracies and improper and false conclusions. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in this case has dealt with the question on whether the involuntary use of scientific & psychological techniques such as narcoanalysis, brain Electrical Activation Profile (BEAP) and polygraph tests, which aim to enhance investigations, falls within the scope of fundamental rights. These discussions are crucial to ensure that while seeking truth and justice, the rights and dignities of the accused are respected. This case discusses a new unexplored area of privacy and the guarantee against self-incrimination, which is protected under the Article 20(3) of the Constitution. When the CJI pronounced this judgment, it was further regarded as the Landmark judgment[\[1\]](#_ftn1). Mr. Rajesh Mahale, Mr. Manoj Goel, Mr. Santosh Paul and Mr. Harish Salve (Sr. Adv) were arguing against the involuntary administration of the techniques. Mr. Goolam E. Vahanvati,(the then Solicitor General of India and former Attorney general of India) and Sr Adv, Anoop G. Choudhari were appearing on behalf of the Union of India. These were further supported by Sr Adv T.R. Andhyarujina who appeared on behalf of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and Adv. Sanjay Hegde, who represented the State of Karnataka. Sr Adv. Dushyant Dave,played a vital role as *amicus curae*. Key terms:- A. Narcoanalysis:- This test involves administering a drug to induce anesthesia, leading the subject to disclose normally hidden information, including fantasies, personal wishes, and conflicts[\[2\]](#_ftn2). B. Brain Electrical Activation Profile (BEAP):- This technique involves using EEG technique by which a suspect’s participation in a crime is detected by eliciting electrophysiological impulses [\[3\]](#_ftn3). C. Polygraph:- The polygraph is a device that measures and records various physiological indicators such as blood pressure, pulse, respiration, and skin conductivity while a person is questioned[\[4\]](#_ftn4). It is based on the belief that deceptive answers will produce distinct physiological responses compared to truthful answers. **FACTS OF THE CASE** In 2004, Smt. Selvi, along with many others, filed a criminal appeal which was followed by more appeals in coming years of 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2010. These appeals were taken up by the Supreme Court of India in May, 2010, based on a special leave petition (SLP) jurisdiction of the hon’ble SC under article 136. The appeals raised objections against instances where the accused, suspects, or witnesses were subjected to various tests without their free and fair consent. However it was argued by the opposition that these procedures do not harm the body and the information obtained is used to improve the investigation and as evidence at trial. They claimed these methods were more humane than the traditional “third-degree methods.” The case involves Selvi’s daughter marrying a man from a *different caste* against her family’s wishes. In 2004, the man was murdered, and Selvi and two others were suspected. The prosecution sought permission to conduct polygraph and brain mapping tests on the suspects, which was granted. When the results showed deception, the prosecution requested narcoanalysis, which was also approved by the Magistrate. The suspects challenged this decision at the Karnataka High Court but were denied relief. They then appealed to the Supreme Court of India. The elementary objection raised in appeals was the use of neuroscientific investigative techniques without the free consent of the accused, suspects, or witnesses. The court examined the future impacts of allowing the contested tests to be utilized in various scenarios. Concerns were raised regarding situations where individuals accused, suspected, or serving as witnesses in an investigation were subjected to these methods without their explicit consent[\[5\]](#_ftn5). **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether the involuntary administration of the impugned techniques violates the ‘right against self-incrimination’ enumerated in Article 20(3) of the Constitution[\[6\]](#_ftn6)? 2. Whether the involuntary administration of the impugned techniques violates substantive due process which is part and parcel of the idea of `personal liberty’ protected by Article 21[\[7\]](#_ftn7)? 3. Whether scientific validity of the impugned techniques are entirely reliable? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that subjecting individuals to neuroscientific procedures under duress violates their right to prevent self-incrimination under Article 20(3). They also suggest that the inclusion of “substantive due procedure” has expanded the scope of “personal liberty” in Article 21. Moreover, the petitioners claim that Article 21 prohibits harsh, inhumane, or humiliating treatment, and they argue that compelling individuals to undergo the contested procedures would violate this provision. Additionally, they contend that the proposed strategies would infringe upon the test subjects’ rights to physical and mental privacy. The petitioners also question the scientific validity of the examinations, emphasizing their confirmatory nature rather than exploratory. They argue that there is no basis to trust the evidence obtained through these procedures and cite empirical studies that raise doubts about the reliability of the justifications provided for these techniques. The petitioners cited, the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in The United States v. Scheffer[\[8\]](#_ftn8), In that case, an eight judge majority decided that Military Rule of Evidence 707 (which made polygraph results inadmissible in court-martial proceedings) did not violate an accused person’s right to present a defence. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that using these tests was crucial for helping investigative authorities gather information for evidence and crime prevention. They also claimed that the tests didn’t cause any physical harm and that the data collected was only used for research. They stressed that the tests were meant for academic purposes only and not for use as evidence in court. The respondents repeated that the main goal was to assist investigations and discourage criminal activities. They also said that administering these tests didn’t harm the subjects and that the data collected was only used for research. The respondents also stated that the techniques in question would not cause physical harm, and the information gathered could only be used to assist in investigations. They emphasized that this information would not be admissible as evidence during trials. ‘These scientific methods are seen as a more humane alternative to the harsh interrogation methods sometimes used by investigators[\[9\]](#_ftn9)’. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS & previous rulings** 1. Article 20(3):- No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. 2. Article 21:- No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. 3. Jaspal v. State of Punjab was related to the effect that finger print examination and its validity as testimony as evidence[\[10\]](#_ftn10). **JUDGEMENT** The court conducted a detailed analysis of the law in question, examining its history, applications, methodologies, and relevant precedents in both criminal justice and international law. In looking at the right against self-incrimination under Article 20(3), the court concluded that forcing individuals to participate in neuroscientific tests would violate the ban on testimonial coercion. To ensure the proper conduct of these tests, the court stated that adherence to the requirements of “substantive due process” alongside those of Article 20(3) would be necessary. It noted that comments made inadvertently were more likely to be false, thus violating a person’s integrity and dignity. The court explained that the right against self-incrimination aimed to maintain the reliability of testimony in trials. Highlighting the connection between the ‘right against self-incrimination’ and the ‘right to a fair trial,’ the court cited Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India[\[11\]](#_ftn11) to emphasize that these rights, along with substantive due process and the right to a fair trial, should be interpreted together. The court reaffirmed the decision in Sharma v. Satish Chandra[\[12\]](#_ftn12), stating that Article 20’s protection against testimonial coercion applied universally to anyone accused of an offense. It clarified that the privilege against self-incrimination extended to all, including those formally charged, suspects questioned in criminal cases, and witnesses worried about potential criminal charges. Addressing M.P. Sharma’s argument that being a witness applied to all voluntary activities, not just oral testimony, the court referred to the standard set in State of Bombay vs. Kathi Kalu Oghad & Others[\[13\]](#_ftn13). It affirmed that imparting knowledge through oral or written statements affecting relevant facts would invoke the right under Article 20(3). The court concluded that involuntarily using neuroscientific methods would result in testimonial reactions falling within the scope of the right under Article 20(3) of the Indian Constitution. While acknowledging the relevance of evidence laws in privacy-related cases, the court emphasized that they could not be used to compel individuals to give up their privacy through physical intrusion. It viewed the elimination of self-incrimination as essential to “personal liberty” under Article 21, highlighting the intersection of Article 20(3) and the right to privacy. The court considered it a violation of privacy rights to subject individuals to such techniques against their will. When we discuss the evolution of the right to privacy, the court noted that the Indian Constitution did not explicitly mention a “right to privacy” compared to the fourth Amendment act of the United States constitution (1868). It referenced key cases such as State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kharak Singh[\[14\]](#_ftn14), People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India[\[15\]](#_ftn15), Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh[\[16\]](#_ftn16), R. Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh[\[17\]](#_ftn17), and Raj Gopal v. State of Tamil Nadu[\[18\]](#_ftn18). The court the importance of the Sharda v. Dharampal[\[19\]](#_ftn19) case, recognizing that the right to privacy could be restricted in the face of conflicting interests. In Sharda v. Dharampal[\[20\]](#_ftn20), the court in light of the difference between testimonial acts and tangible evidence, considering contemporary circumstances. It concluded that the right to privacy, aimed at protecting the body and geographic locations from invasive state actions, should also consider the potential impact on Article 20(3). The court unequivocally stated that subjecting individuals to disputed practices infringed on their right to privacy. Additionally, it held that using such tests against an individual’s will, even if they were not accused of a crime, would violate their Article 21 right to liberty and protection from humiliating and brutal treatment. The court ruled that no tests could be conducted without the accused’s consent, which must be obtained in the presence of a judicial magistrate and the accused’s legal representative. The resulting statement would not be considered a confession but rather akin to a statement made to the police. The examination would be conducted by an impartial organization, in the presence of a lawyer, and thoroughly documented. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The hon’ble Supreme Court’s judgement in the subject of criminal-Psychology is a significant milestone in fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution with respect to personal freedom. The use of impugned techniques, is a violation of the right against self-incrimination under article 20(3) of the Indian constitution, as well as the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21, the bench had concluded on the affirmative aspects of impugned techniques and has provided with the detailed guidelines for the same. The Court’s recognition of the interaction between the right to self-incrimination and the right to a fair trial underscores the importance of ensuring that individuals are not compelled to disclose incriminating information. In addition, the Court emphasizes the right to privacy as an important part of personal freedom in Article 21, emphasizing the need to protect people’s autonomy in mental processes and decision-making. In conclusion, it was held no individual should be forcibly subjected to any of the techniques in question, whether in the context of investigation in criminal cases or otherwise. While upholding the dignity and integrity of the individual, the Court’s judgment sets a clear standard for the protection of fundamental rights in the face of evolving investigative techniques. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** *State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kharak Singh[**\[21\]**](#_ftn21),* *People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India[**\[22\]**](#_ftn22),* *Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh[**\[23\]**](#_ftn23),* *R. Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh[**\[24\]**](#_ftn24),* *Raj Gopal v. State of Tamil Nadu[**\[25\]**](#_ftn25).* *Sharda v. Dharampal[**\[26\]**](#_ftn26),* *State of Bombay vs. Kathi Kalu Oghad & Others[**\[27\]**](#_ftn27).* *Sharma v. Satish Chandra[**\[28\]**](#_ftn28),* *Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India[**\[29\]**](#_ftn29),* *The United States v. Scheffer[**\[30\]**](#_ftn30),* **Important Statutes Referred** *The Constitution of India, 1950* *Criminal Procedure code, 1973* *Indian Evidence Act, 1862* --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) ‘Selvi v. State of Karnataka a Critical Analysis by Saikat Bhattacharya’ accessed 21 February 2024 [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Prof.Suresh Bada Math, ‘Supreme Court Judgment on Polygraph, Narco-Analysis & Brain-Mapping: A Boon or a Bane’ (2011) 134 The Indian Journal of Medical Research 4 [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Gaudet, Lyn M. 2011. “BRAIN FINGERPRINTING, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, AND DAUBERT: A CAUTIONARY LESSON FROM INDIA.” Jurimetrics: The Journal of Law, Science & Technology 51(3):293–318. Retrieved [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) J P Rosenfeld (1995). “Alternative Views of Bashore and Rapp’s (1993) alternatives to traditional polygraphy: a critique”. Psychological Bulletin. 117: 159–166. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Chidige Sai Varshitha, ‘SELVI v. STATE of KARNATAKA 2010(7) SCC 263’ (allindialegalforum.com8 September 2021) <> accessed 22 February 2024 [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Parveen G, ‘The Right to Remain Silent: A Case Commentary on Smt. Selvi v State of Karnataka’ (iPleaders31 October 2019) accessed 22 February 2024 [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) 2010 (7) SCC 263 [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) 523 US 303 (1998). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Chidige Sai Varshitha, ‘SELVI v. STATE of KARNATAKA 2010(7) SCC 263’ (allindialegalforum.com8 September 2021) accessed 22 February 2024 [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) A.I.R. 1979 S.C 1708 [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) 1978 1 SCC 248 [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) 1954 SCR 1077 [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) 1962 3 SCR 10 [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) AIR 1963 SC 1295 [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) AIR1997SC568 [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) 1975 2 SCC 148 [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) 1975 AIR 1378 [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) 1994 6 SCC 632 [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) (2003) 4 SCC 493 [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) (2003) 4 SCC 493 [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) AIR 1963 SC 1295 [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) AIR1997SC568 [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) 1975 2 SCC 148 [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) 1975 AIR 1378 [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) 1994 6 SCC 632 [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) (2003) 4 SCC 493 [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) 1962 3 SCR 10 [\[28\]](#_ftnref28) 1954 SCR 1077 [\[29\]](#_ftnref29) 1978 1 SCC 248 [\[30\]](#_ftnref30) 523 US 303 (1998). **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases, Criminal Law Cases --- ### [NTPC LTD. VERSUS M/S SPML INFRA LTD.](https://lawfoyer.in/ntpc-ltd-versus-m-s-spml-infra-ltd/) **Published:** March 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **AUTHOR: PRIYANSHU TYAGI, MEWAR LAW INSTITUTE** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** In the Current case, National Thermal Plant Corporation Ltd or NTPC Ltd.( the appellant) approached The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India challenging the decision of Delhi High Court dated 08.04.2021 in favour of M/s SPML Infra Ltd. ( the respondent) which allowed the respondent’s application to constitute the Arbitral Tribunal under section-11(6) of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act , 1996. NTPC Ltd. filed civil appeal challenging Whether the High Court had the power and jurisdiction to refer the parties to arbitration under Section – 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act , 1996, after the parties had entered into a Settlement Agreement which recorded that there were no subsisting issues pending between the parties. After hearing both the parties, the bench of HMJ Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha of supreme court set aside the High court of Delhi decision of 08.04.2021 and ruled in favour of the appellant (NTPC Ltd.) clarifying the purview of the pre-referral jurisdiction under Section-11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996 and pronounced its judgement on 10 May 2023. ***Keywords*:** Settlement Agreement , Arbitration Agreement , Bank Guarantees , Economic Duress, Arbitration application , Repudiation , Prima facie test, Completion Certificate , Writ Petition. **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***NTPC LTD. vs. M/S SPML INFRA LTD.*Case Number***Civil Appeal – 4778 of 2022*Judgement Date***April 10 , 2023*Court***Supreme Court of India*Quorum***HMJ Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha*Author***CJI Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud HMJ Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha*Citation***SCC OnLine SC 389*Legal Provisions Involved***Article-226 The Constitution of India Section-11(6) The Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** - NTPC Ltd. (Appeallant) and M/S SPML Infra Ltd. (Respondent) entered into a contract for establishment of station piping package at the Simhadri Super Thermal Power Project Stage – 2 in Vishakhapatnam Andhra Pradesh. - As a part of contractual obligations, SPML supplied performance bank guarantees and advanced bank guarantees totalling INR 14,96,89,136/- to secure NTPC. - Upon favourable completion of the Project-2 at Simhadri, NTPC issued accomplishment certificate to SPML Infra. - Further NTPC informed SPML that the definitive payment would be given upon SPML’s issuance of no-demand guarantee. - M/S SPML Infra Ltd. issued the no-demand certificate and NTPC Ltd. freed the definitive amount of INR 1,40,00,000/-. However NTPC Ltd. concealed the bank guarantees on account of pending liabilities and disputes related to other projects at Bongaigon, Barh and Korba. - Upon this operation of NTPC Ltd., SPML disapproved and demanded a sum of INR 72,01,53,899/- from NTPC as recoverable debts. - For resolution of the pending disputes, SPML Infra Ltd. requested NTPC Ltd. to appoint an Adjudicator for dispute resolution as specified in contract. - NTPC Ltd. not taken any action regarding this request. As a result of SPML Infra Ltd. approached Delhi High Court by filing writ petition under Article-226 of Indian Constitution seeking the release of guarantees. - The Delhi High Court directed NTPC Ltd. not to invoke bank guarantees. - While the writ petition was pending before the High Court of Delhi, both the parties settled their disputes and entered into a settlement agreement and NTPC Ltd. freed the bank guarantees according to agreement. - However, after 3 weeks after releasing of the bank guarantees and after 2 months of the settlement agreement , SPML Ltd. issued a letter of repudiation , alleging coercion and economic duress during the settlement agreement’s execution. - As a consequence, SPML Ltd. rejected the settlement agreement and filed an application under Section -11(6) of the arbitration and conciliation act,1996 before the Hon’ble Delhi High Court on October 10th, 2020. **FACTS OF THE CASE** 1. NTPC Ltd. (the appellant) and SPML Infra Ltd. (the respondent) entered into a contract for Installation Services for Station Piping Package for Simhadri Super Thermal Power Plant Project Stage-II at NTPC at **Simhadri Vishakhapatnam Andhra Pradesh.** 2. Afterwards successful project accomplishment , NTPC issued an Accomplishment Certificate to M/S SPML Infra Ltd. 3. NTPC professed that there was no subsisting disputes between the parties on account of a settlement agreement **dated May 27, 2020.** 4. SPML Ltd. approached the Delhi High Court by filing writ petition seeking the release of Bank Guarantees that NTPC had concealed. 5. In the Arbitration petition, SPML Infra alleged that the execution of settlement agreement was done under coercion and economic duress. 6. The Delhi High Court allowed SPML’s application under Section-11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, for the constitution of an Arbitral Tribunal. 7. NTPC asserted that the arbitration application was a reconsideration and abuse of proceedings. 8. NTPC appealed the decision of Delhi High Court in the Supreme Court. 9. The Supreme Court set aside the Delhi High Court’s decision. 10. The Supreme Court held that High Court of Delhi should have examined the issue of the final settlement of disputes in the context of the principles laid down in the case of ***Vidya Drolia and Ors. Vs. Durga Trading Corporation.*** **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** Whether the High Court had the power and jurisdiction to refer the parties to arbitration under Section – 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act , 1996, after the parties had entered into a Settlement Agreement which recorded that there were no subsisting issues pending between the parties. **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the settlement agreement, which freed NTPC from all its liabilities, were not right. They contend that it was signed under economic coercion because it was dependent upon the release of bank guarantees that NTPC had concealed for several years. 2. Counsel for petitioner raised concerns about the circumstances surrounding the execution of the settlement agreement and asserted that it was not freely entered into. 3. The petitioner’s counsel submitted that NTPC persisted to withhold the bank guarantees even after the settlement agreement was executed. 4. The petitioner’s counsel also submitted that SPML faced financial constraints due to the concealed bank guarantees, which affected their ability to fulfil their contractual obligations. 5. The petitioner’s counsel argued that SPML’s consequent rejection of the settlement agreement was unjustified, and these actions were inconsistent and raised questions about their bona fides of their rejection. 6. The petitioner’s counsel challenged SPML’s application under Section-11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 7. The petitioner’s counsel contended that the learned High Court should have exercised the prima facie test to screen out meritless and dishonest litigation. 8. The final submission by petitioner counsel was that the settlement agreement had stamped out all claims and disputes between the parties, rendering the arbitration application was baseless. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsel for respondent submitted that the settlement agreement, which freed NTPC from all liabilities was valid. 1. The counsel for respondent contended that settlement agreement was executed voluntarily and without any coercion or duress. 1. The respondent’s counsel sustained that the settlement agreement substituted any prior disputes and resolved all issues between the parties. 1. The respondent’s counsel indicated that NTPC concealed the bank guarantees even after the settlement agreement was executed. 1. The respondent’s counsel also submitted that bank guarantees were unfairly concealed, causing financial strain to SPML. 1. The respondent’s counsel maintained that bank guarantees should have been freed instantly upon the completion of the project. 1. The respondent’s counsel defended the SPML Ltd. application under Section-11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act , 1996. 1. The respondent’s counsel finally submitted that settlement agreement did not excluded SPML from seeking arbitration for distinguishing claims and sustained that the High Court uprightly referred the parties to arbitration based on the existing dispute between the parties. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** ***SECTION -11(6) THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT,1996 :*** Where, under an appointment procedure agreed upon by the parties, — 1. (a) a party fails to act as required under that procedure; or 1. (b) the parties, or the two appointed arbitrators, fail to reach an agreement expected of them under that procedure : or 1. (c) a person, including an institution, fails to perform any function entrusted to him or it under that procedure, 13\[the appointment shall be made, on an application of the party, by the arbitral institution designated by the Supreme Court, in case of international commercial arbitration, or by the High Court, in case of arbitrations other than international commercial arbitration, as the case may be\] to take the necessary measure, unless the agreement on the appointment procedure provides other means for securing the appointment. **JUDGEMENT** ***Ratio Decidendi*** 1. The Apex Court emphasized that since in its judgement in ***SBP & Co. vs. Patel Engg.Ltd****.* and ***National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Boghara Polyfab Pvt.Ltd.*** had comprehended the scope of enquiry under section 11 of the Arbitration Act, the parliament amended the Arbitration Act in 2015, thereby presenting Section-11(6A). 2. Under Section-11(6A) of the Arbitration Act, the court while exercising referral jurisdiction would be required to limit itself “*to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement”.* The Supreme Court cited its judgement in Duro Felguera,S.A vs. Gangavaram Port Ltd. and observed that following the insertion of Section-11(6A), the referral jurisdiction of the court “*is limited to examining whether an arbitration agreement exists between the parties-nothing more, nothing less”.* 3. The Supreme Courts holds that the High Court has committed an error in allowing the application under Section-10(6) of the Act. 4. High Court ought to have examined the issue of the final settlement of disputes in the context of the principles laid down in Vidya Drolia (supra). 5. In ***Vidya Drolia vs. Durga Trading Corporation.,*** The Supreme Court asserted that the court must undertakes a “ prima facie review” at the referral stage. The prima facie review is not entire review but a basic review to check out evidently and ex-facie non-existent and invalid arbitration agreement and non-arbitrable disputes. 6. For the reasons stated above, the decision of the High Court of Delhi in Arbitration Petition No.477 of 2020, dated 08.04.2021, is set aside, and Civil Appeal No.4778 of 2022 stands allowed. 7. The Supreme Court also held that the parties shall bear their own costs. ***Obiter Dicta*** 1. The Apex Court pointed out that the court should not act mechanically but scrutinize the cases through the **“eye of the needle”** , which in the opinion of the Supreme Court is “necessary and compelling.” 1. The eye of the needle approach involves a two-fold inquiry : 2. The Primary inquiry involves a thorough examination of the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement. 3. The Secondary inquiry involves to arbitrability and a prima facie review of the facts including an examination of the bona fides of the assertion on arbitrability. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** - The Supreme court in its series of judgements from Vidya Drolia case till the present case , seems to have been amplifying the scope of review at the pre-referral stage from a basic verification of the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement and arbitrability of the subject matters to further involve an examination of the bona fides of the claim. - Abovementioned extensive examination is assumed to take up extensive time of the already overburdened judiciary on account of such precedents it might enhance troublesome for the courts to confine their jurisdiction to solely examining the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement and the arbitrability of the subject matter. - Further in the light of the current development in ***N.N Global Mercantile Pvt limited vs. Indo Unique Flame*** the pre referral jurisdiction of the courts has also been expanded to taking a prima facie view on the sufficiency of stamping as well parties determining to delay for prevent an arbitration may use this position to pamper to their monetary interest by lifting up diversified issues relating to the benefits of the claim at the pre referral stage itself hence the widening scope of the pre referral jurisdiction could be potentially be used in the form of dilatory tactic thereby lowering the efficiency of arbitration process. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** *SBP & Co. vs. Patel Engg.Ltd* *National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Boghara Polyfab Pvt.Ltd**.** (2009) 1 SCC 267* *Vidya Drolia and Ors, vs. Durga Trading Corporation (2021) 2 SCC 1* *N.N Global Mercantile Pvt limited vs. Indo Unique Flame (2023) SCC Online SC 495* **Important Statutes Referred** *Section-11(6) The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996* *Article-226 The Constitution Of India 1949* *Section-14 The Indian Contact Act 1872* **Categories:** Arbitration and Conciliation Law, Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [V. SENTHIL BALAJI VERSUS THE STATE REPRESENTED BY DEPUTY DIRECTOR AND ORS.](https://lawfoyer.in/v-senthil-balaji-versus-the-state-represented-by-deputy-director-and-ors/) **Published:** March 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **AUTHOR: MONIKA GURJAR, DHARMASHASTRA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, JABALPUR** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** In the present case, a case was registered against the appellant and a search was conducted by enforcement directorate under section 19 of PMLA 2002. The accused was taken to hospital due to medical reasons; his wife filed the writ of habeas corpus under 226, and it was directed to shift him to hospital meanwhile the respondent filed application for judicial custody in the court of principal session judge and an order of remand for 8 days was granted to the respondent with certain condition imposed on investigating authority. The respondent again files application seeking a direction that the first 15 days custody period should not come in the way of actual period of custody, before the learned Principal Sessions Judge as the condition imposed in the previous order hindered the investigation. The matter came before the division bench of high court to decide the maintainability of writ petition and plea for exclusion of period of treatment from period of custodial interrogation, in which the judges of the division bench differed in their opinion. As a result, the matter came to the Supreme court, who dismissed the writ petition of appellant and allowed the exclusion of period of treatment from period of custodial interrogation. ***Keywords*:** *remand, judicial custody, investigation,commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet, actus curiae neminem gravabi,* **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***V. SENTHIL BALAJI versus THE STATE REPRESENTED BY DEPUTY DIRECTOR AND ORS. *Case Number***Criminal Appeal Nos. 2284-2285 of 2023SLP (Criminal) Nos. 8939-8940 of 2023 *Judgement Date***07 August, 2023*Court***Supreme Court*Quorum***A.S. BOPANNA, M. M. SUNDRESH*Author***M.M. Sundresh*Citation***V. Senthil Balaji v. State, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 934*Legal Provisions Involved***Constitution of India- Art. 21, Art. 226. Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 -S.4, S.5, S.41A, S.167. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002- S. 19, S.65, S. Legal Maxims- *commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet, actus curiae neminem gravabi***INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The word ‘custody’ has been derived from the Latin word “custodia” which means “keeping a watch or guard.” It means to apprehend someone for a reason which could either be to prevent the person from committing a crime or for the safety of a person. In Indian Legal system, there are two types of custody; judicial and police. In judicial custody, the accused is kept in jail and is under the control of judicial magistrate. In police custody the accused person is kept in prison or cell of police station under the supervision of officer for the purpose of investigation. The maximum time period of custody is fifteen days as provided under section 167(2) of Crpc. The custody in this section is interpreted by courts differently in different cases. In the present case the court is dealing with such interpretation and the calculation of the maximum period of such custody **FACTS OF THE CASE** A case was registered by enforcement directorate against the accused and as the accused was non cooperative, he was arrested by under section 19 of PMLA 2002. The accused was taken to hospital due to medical reasons; his wife filed the writ of habeas corpus under 226, meanwhile the respondent filed application for fifteen days judicial custody which was granted by the court of principal session judge. The respondent then applies for bail but was dismissed. and an order of remand for 8 days was granted to the respondent with certain condition imposed on investigating authority. The writ petition was considered by the court and directions were given to shift the accused to the hospital. Thereafter, respondent applies for custody in the principal session judge’s court and eight days custody was granted with some conditions to the respondent investigating agency. The respondent again files application seeking a direction that the first 15 days custody period should not come in the way of actual period of custody, before the learned Principal Sessions Judge as the condition imposed in the previous order hindered the investigation. Since, the matter of maintainability of writ was pending before the Highcourt, the session court adjourned the application. During the pendency of writ petition, additional ground challenging the order granting judicial and police remand of principal session judge was taken by the petitioner. On 22.06.2023, the respondent then files application before high court of Madras seeking the exclusion of period of treatment of accused from period of custodial investigation. On 04.07.2023, Highcourt decided the following issues: 1. Whether the writ petition was maintainable or not? 2. Whether the period of treatment of the accused shall be excluded from the period of custodial interrogation? In which the division bench differed in their opinion, Justice Nisha Banu allowed the writ petition, and dismissed the plea of respondent for exclusion of treatment period and held that respondent investigating agency do not have power to seek police custody under PMLA,2002. In contrast to this Justice D. Bharata Chakravarty dismissed the writ petition and allowed the exclusion of treatment period from period of custody. As a result, reference was made to the third judge who ruled in favour of the respondent aggrieved by which the appellant files special appeal petition before the Supreme Court. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether the term custody under section 167(2) is restricted to custody by the police officer only? 2. Whether the writ of habeas corpus is maintainable after a judicial order of remand is passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction? 3. Whether the period of treatment of the accused after arrest shall be excluded from period of custody under the enforcement directorate? 4. Whether section 41 A is applicable on cases of arrest under PMLA, 2002? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that – 1. The appellant argues that the officials of enforcement directorate do not have the power to seek custody under PMLA,2002. 2. The officers of enforcement directorate are not police officer, and only police officer can get the custody under section **167(2) of CRPC, 1973**. 3. The order of principal session judge that granted the custody to enforcement directorate is wrong as further custody in favour of officer of enforcement directorate cannot be granted after completion of 24 hours from the arrest. 4. The respondent agency had not followed the procedure of **section 41 A of CRPC**. 5. The principal session judge by giving the order had failed to considered the fact of non- compliance of **Section 19 of PMLA, 2002.** 6. The appellant by relying on decision of **CBI v. Anupam J. Kulkarni** argued that court cannot extend the limit of 15 days for police custody as prescribed in the section 167(2), and the provisions of both Crpc and PMLA must be interpreted strictly in light of Article 21 and 22 of constitution. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that – 1.The writ petition is not maintainable as the arrest was lawful, and the accused was already produced in the court of principal session judge before the hearing of the writ petition by the Highcourt. 2\. The condition attached with the remand order hindered the investigation by the agency, as provided under PMLA. Therefore, period of treatment shall be excluded from investigation period. 3\. PMLA is special act, and had overriding effect over Crpc as mentioned under section 65 of PMLA, Therefore, compliance of section 19 of PMLA is sufficient. 4.The reliance of the appellant on caseAnupam J. Kulkarni is wrong as the fact of that case is different from the present case. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** **Constitution of India, 1950** **“*Article 226-*** *Power of High Courts to issue certain writs* *1)Notwithstanding anything in article 32 every High Court shall have powers, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories, directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warrantor and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.* *2)The power conferred by clause-* *(1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the scat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.* *3)Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1), without-* *(a)furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order; and* *(b)giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated.* *4)The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of article 32”*[***\[1\]***](#_ftn1)*.* **Prevention of Money Laundering Act,2002** **Section 19:** *“Power to arrest.–(1) If the Director, Deputy Director, Assistant Director, or any other officer authorized in this behalf by the Central Government by general or special order, has on the basis of material in his possession reason to believe (the reason for such belief to be recorded in writing) that any person has been guilty of an offence punishable under this Act, he may arrest such person and shall, as soon as may be, inform him of the grounds for such arrest. (2) The Director, Deputy Director, Assistant Director or any other officer shall, immediately after arrest of such person under subsection (1), forward a copy of the order, along with the material in his possession, referred to in that sub-section, to the Adjudicating Authority, in a sealed envelope, in the matter, as may be prescribed and such Adjudicating authority shall keep such order and material for such period, as may be prescribed. (3) Every person arrested under sub-section (1) shall within twenty-four hours, be taken to a \[Special Court or\] Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, having jurisdiction: Provided that the period of twenty-four hours shall exclude the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the \[Special Court or\] Magistrate’s Court.”[**\[2\]**](#_ftn2)* **Section 65**: “*Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to apply-The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) shall apply, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, to arrest, search and seizure, attachment, confiscation, investigation, prosecution and all other proceedings under this Act.*”[\[3\]](#_ftn3) **Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973** **Section 4** *“4. Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws. — (1) All offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained. (2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences.” [**\[4\]**](#_ftn4)* **Section 5** *“5. Saving. —Nothing contained in this Code shall, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, affect any special or local law for the time being in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by any other law for the time being in force.”[**\[5\]**](#_ftn5)* **Section 41A** *“41A. Notice of appearance before police officer. — (1) The police officer shall, in all cases where the arrest of a person is not required under the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 41, issue a notice directing the person against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence, to appear before him or at such other place as may be specified in the notice. (2) Where such a notice is issued to any person, it shall be the duty of that person to comply with the terms of the notice. (3) Where such person complies and continues to comply with the notice, he shall not be arrested in respect of the offence referred to in the notice unless, for reasons to be recorded, the police officer is of the opinion that he ought to be arrested. (4) Where such person, at any time, fails to comply with the terms of the notice or is unwilling to identify himself, the police officer may, subject to such orders as may have been passed by a competent Court in this behalf, arrest him for the offence mentioned in the notice.”[**\[6\]**](#_ftn6)* **Section 167** *“167. Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours.—(1) Whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody, and it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by Section 57, and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well-founded, the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of sub inspector, shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall at the same time forward the accused to such Magistrate.* *(2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction: Provided that—* *(a) the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person, otherwise than in the custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding, —* *(i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years;* *(ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence, and, on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this sub-section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter;* *(b) no Magistrate shall authorise detention of the accused in custody of the police under this section unless the accused is produced before him in person for the first time and subsequently every time till the accused remains in the custody of the police, but the Magistrate may extend further detention in judicial custody on production of the accused either in person or through the medium of electronic video linkage;* *(c) no Magistrate of the second class, not specially empowered in this behalf by the High Court, shall authorise detention in the custody of the police.* *Explanation I.—For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared that, notwithstanding the expiry of the period specified in paragraph (a), the accused shall be detained in custody so long as he does not furnish bail.* *Explanation II. —If any question arises whether an accused person was produced before the Magistrate as required under clause* *(b), the production of the accused person may be proved by his signature on the order authorising detention or by the order certified by the Magistrate as to production of the accused person through the medium of electronic video linkage, as the case may be.* *Provided further that in case of a woman under eighteen years of age, the detention shall be authorised to be in the custody of a remand home or recognised social institution.* *(3) A Magistrate authorising under this section detention in the custody of the police shall record his reasons for so doing.”* **LEGAL MAXIMS RELATED TO THE CASE** 1. *commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet*– The maxim means that convenience cannot accrue to a party from his own wrong[\[7\]](#_ftn7). 2. *actus curiae neminem gravabi*– The maxim means that no party should be allowed to suffer for the fault of the court.[**\[8\]**](#_ftn8) **JUDGEMENT** The honorable court held that the writ of habeas corpus is not maintainable as it is issued in cases of illegal detention or arrest. In the present case, the arrest was legal as all procedure are followed by the authority and the accused was presented before the magistrate within 24 hours, who granted the custody which makes arrest legal. The order of the magistrate can only be challenged by following the provision of the statue and not by writ petiton. Therefore, the writ petition on behalf of person who is in remand pursuant to the order of the magistrate cannot be maintained as decided in **Saurabh Kumar v. Jailor, Koneila Jail**[\[9\]](#_ftn9), and **Manubhai Ratilal Patel v. State of Gujarat**.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) The PMLA is a special legislation that has overriding effect on Crpc as per section 4 of Crpc. Section 19 of PMLA clearly provides the procedure to be followed for arrest which makes section 41A irrelevant and inapplicable in light of section 65 of PMLA. Further th application of the 41A would only defeat the process of investigation under PMLA. Thus, section 41A of the Crpc is not applicable in cases of PMLA. The apex court held that the meaning of the term “such custody” under section 167 (2) of Crpc, 1973 is wide, it is not only restricted to police custody but also that of other investigating agencies, and held that enforcement directorate can take the custody of the accused as per section 167 (2). The courts says that the period of treatment of accused shall stand excluded, as the investigating was prevented from interrogation. And the exclusion of period of treatment will lead to violation of the doctrine commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet, which means no party ought to have advantage of his own wrong, therefore the accused cannot get the advantage of his medical condition to avoid custodial investigation. The court further relied on the maxim *actus curiae neminem gravabi* which means the act of the court shall prejudice no one, as the remand order with the conditions attached of the principal session judge has hindered the investigation by the respondent authority. Therefore, it is exclusion of treatment period from custodial period is correct. The court held that the period of custody other than judicial custody give under section 167(2) of Crpc which is subjected to limitation period of 15 days does not refers to the first fifteen days of custody, but the whole period of investigation. It further discussed the calculation of 15 day of police custody under section 167(2), and held that the period of 15 days will start from day of actual (physical) custody and the period of 15 days being the maximum period that can be granted in favour of the police would span from time to time with the total period of 60 or 90 days as the case may be. **RATIO DECIDENDI** 1. The term custody under 167(2) refers to the actual physical custody. 2. The court decided that the prescribed period of 15 days of police custody under section 167(2) might consist of a combination of shorter periods of custody requested during the course of the investigation, which could span 60 or 90 days. **3.CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** This judgement is an important judgement that had questioned the precedent CBI v. Anupam J. Kulkarni, which held that police custody is not permissible beyond first 15 days of remand, which was often used by the accused to hinder investigation. The present judgement with its interpretation cured the defect of the previous precedent, thus balancing the rights of the accused as well as efficiency of investigation by the authorities **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** State of Maharashtra v. Tasneem Rizwan Siddiquee, (2018) 9 SCC 745 Saurabh Kumar v. Jailor, Koneila Jail, (2014) 13 SCC 436 Manubhai Ratilal Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2013) 1 SCC 314 Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, 2022 (10) SCALE State of Rajasthan v. Basant Agrotech (India) Ltd., (2013) 15 SCC 1 Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal (2020) 8 SCC 129, n A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602 A. Arunagiri Nadar v. S.P. Rathinasami, 1970 **Important Statutes Referred** Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Constitution of India, 1950, Article 226 [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 Section 19 [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Prevention of Money Laundering Act,2002 Section 65 [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 4 [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 5 [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 41 A [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) -https://indiankanoon.org/doc/112730824/ [\[8\]](#_ftnref8)https://r.search.yahoo.com/\_ylt=AwrKBXDlTOBlZjcqQTy7HAx.;\_ylu=Y29sbwNzZzMEcG9zAzEEdnRpZAMEc2VjA3Ny/RV=2/RE=1709227366/RO=10/RU=https%3a%2f%2fwww.legalserviceindia.com%2flegal%2farticle-9820-the-maxim-actus-curiae-neminem-gravabit-an-act-of-the-court-shall-prejudice-no-man-.html/RK=2/RS=K5RboIZg8inaNSMbE6RQRxD3gYY- [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Saurabh Kumar v. Jailor, Koneila Jail\[9\], (2014) 13 SCC 436: (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 702 [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Manubhai Ratilal Patel v. State of Gujarat,\[10\] (2013) 1 SCC 314: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 475. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases, Criminal Law Cases **Tags:** #law, #lawfoyer, #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, case analysis, lawfoyer --- ### [People’s Union for Democratic Rights and Ors Vs Union of India and Ors](https://lawfoyer.in/peoples-union-for-democratic-rights-and-ors-vs-union-of-india-and-ors/) **Published:** March 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author**: **Posa Venkata Bhavya, Sri Padmavati Mahila Visva Vidyalayam** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The mission of the People’s Union for Democratic Rights is to defend the legal rights of laborers and workers under labor laws. The petitioners have called for equal pay for all workers without regard to gender, health precautions for workers in dangerous jobs like construction sites, and safety measures for employees at work. In this instance, these rights were contested. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*: Labourers, workers, employers, employees, Article 32, Article 24, PIL, Fundamental Rights, Contract, Wages, Construction, responsibility.** **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***Writ Petition*Case Number***Writ Petition No. 8143 of 1981 *Judgement Date***18th September 1982*Court***Supreme Court of India*Quorum***3 – Bench Judges*Author*** P.N. Bhagawati, Islam, Baharul (J)*Citation***AIR 1982 SC 1473*Legal Provisions Involved***Legal Provisions and acts Involved: – Article 32, Article 24 of the Constitution of India, Contract Labor (Regulation and Abolition) act 1970, Employment of Children act, Equal Remuneration act, 1976, Minimum Wages act 1948.Inter-state migrant workers(Regulation of Employment and conditions of service) at 1979 .**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** This case is a landmark judgement deals with workers rights regarding minimum wages work condition at their working area and safety precautions at workplace. This act involved in the case or contract labour regulation and abolition act 1970 , Employment of Children act, Equal Remuneration act, 1976, Minimum Wages act 1948. This case shows the workers condition at workplace as well the safety and health measures, Social Security , child labour etc. The petitioner wrote a letter to Bhagwati J that letter was treated as public interest litigation and this case expanded the scope of article 32 by assuring people in the society as court belongs to everyone if violation of peoples beneficial rights as labour law is violated it to be treated as deprivation of fundamental rights. This case, which resulted in a historic ruling, addresses the rights of workers with relation to minimum pay, working conditions in their locations, and workplace safetymeasures. This act dealt with cases involving the Employment of Children Act, the Equal Remuneration Act of 1976, the Minimum Wages Act of 1948, and the Contract Labour Regulation and Abolition Act of 1970. This case illustrates the working conditions for employees as well as safety and health precautions, child labour, and Social Security. In a letter addressed to Bhagwati J, the petitioner requested that the case be classified as public interest litigation. This case broadened the application of article 32 by guaranteeing that everyone in society would be treated equally in court if their beneficial rights under labour law were violated. **FACTS OF THE CASE :-** 1. In 1982, India was set to host the Asian Games, which was a significant event for the country. The Government of India took responsibility for organizing the games, which involved building projects to meet international standards. The construction of infrastructure such as stadiums, hotels, swimming pools, and flyovers was necessary to reach these standards. 2. The Delhi Development Authority, New Delhi Administration, and New Delhi Corporation were assigned the responsibility of construction by the government. These authorities then appointed contractors to carry out the construction projects under the terms of the Contract Labour Regulation and the Abolition Act of 1970, Section 7, acting as principal employers. The private contractors hired zamedars to oversee the construction and hired labourers from various states such as Orissa, West Bengal, and Andhra Pradesh. 3. The workers employed in the construction projects for the Asian Games faced several issues related to their wages and working conditions. Men were paid Rs. 9.25 per day, while women were paid only Rs. 7 per day, which was a violation of the Equal Remuneration Act. 4. Children under the age of 14 were also employed as labourers, which was a violation of the Child Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act of 1970. The zamedars openly withheld a commission of Rs. 1 from the workers’ wages, which was a violation of the Minimum Wages Act that fixed a daily wage of Rs. 9.25. The workers were only paid Rs. 8.25 per day for men after the deduction of the commission by the zamedars. 5. Apart from the issues related to wages, the workers also faced terrible working conditions that made them feel like they had a fever and had to work. They experienced gender discrimination at work, with the zamedars forcing employees to work beyond their working hours. 6. Children suffered from a lack of nutritious food and became malnourished, among many other horrifying acts of the zamedars. The workers lacked basic safety precautions, set working hours, adequate health care, and were pressured to complete the job as quickly as possible. In August 1981, the People’s Union Democratic Rights visited several construction sites and wrote a letter to Bhagwati J., which was stated as a PIL and case filed on November 16, 1981. The PIL was not against the employers but aimed to attain the labourers’ rights and avoid inequality and forced child labour. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether the acts of workers violated if yes what are the acts violated ? 2. Whether PIL can be filed for enforcement of rights in such case? 3. Whether Article 21 of the constitution of India applies in this case is human dignity and right of livelihood essential in it or not ? 4. Whether the writ petition maintainable against private individuals under Article 32 of the Constitution of India? 5. Whether this petition violated workers ordinary rights under labour law rather than fundamental rights in constitution ? 6. Whether Article 24 was violated in the instant case? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Appellant submitted that This case is valid under Article 32 of the Constitution of India as well as violation of statutory rights as well as fundamental rights can satisfy this writ petition .In this case Article 14 Right to Equality is not maintained due to unequal distribution of remuneration this discrimination violated the fundamental right of the Constitution of India so in this case Article 32 petition is applicable. 2. The Government of India entrusted the construction work of Asian games to the Delhi Administration, Delhi Development authority and Union of India those authorities assigned the above work to employed contracts under Section 7 of Contract Labour act 1970 to the registered principle employers . . This contract recruited jamadar and they further assigned those work to the workers with less wages the work divided among many people but the contractors should be responsible to follow the rules of labour. So PIL could be filed to enforce labor rights which are essential to the workers these rights been mentioned in Fundamental Rights so this writ can be filed. 3. This case is valid under Article 32 of the Constitution of India as well as violation of statutory rights as well as fundamental rights can satisfy this writ petition. In this case Article 14 Right to Equality is not maintained due to unequal distribution of remuneration this discrimination violated the fundamental right of the Constitution of India so in this case Article 32 petition is applicable. 4. The Government of India entrusted the construction work of Asian games to the Delhi Administration, Delhi Development authority and Union of India those authorities assigned the above work to employed contracts under Section 7 of Contract Labour act 1970 to the registered principle employers. This contract recruited jamadar and they further assigned those work to the workers with less wages the work divided among many people but the contractors should be responsible to follow the rules of labour. So PIL could be filed to enforce labour rights which are essential to the workers these rights been mentioned in Fundamental Rights so this writ can be filed. 5. The acts involved in this case are violation of minimum wages act as employers hasn’t paid sufficient wages. So, This is right against exploitation under constitution of India . 6. The basic medical and safety measures were not taken this violates the provisions of Contract Labour Regulation and Abolition act 1970. 7. This case violates Equal Remuneration act 1976 as mentioned mens and women’s were treated differently as of the men’s wages are Rs 8.25/- per day and women’s wages are Rs 7/- per day the gender discrimination can be seen . So Article 14 of the constitution of India is violated. 8. The child below 14 years of age should not work under hazardous circumstances this violates Article 24 of constitution of India and Section 3 (3) of Employment of Children Act 1938. 9. As of Inter-state migrant workers(Regulation of Employment and conditions of service) at 1979 due to no medical care and safety to employees. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Respondent submitted that Petitioner has no locus standi to maintain this Writ petition and in this case, there was no violation of rights as the workers right it doesn’t relate to petitioner. So the petitioners can’t file this petition. 2. The workers whose rights are violated those are not related to the respondent as they were assigned by the contractors so respondent or not parties in this case. 3. No Writ petition to be filed for violation of workmen’s rights as their rights can be filed under statutory laws with different provisions in those acts. So, in this case Writ petition can’t be filed as there are no violation Fundamental Rights. 4. There was no complaint received regarding Child labour so the Section 3 (3) of Child employment act 1938 is not applicable in this case. 5. Jamadar deducted Rs 1/- from workers’ wages was clearly admitted by the Union of India. 6. The Inter-state Migrant Workers Act of 1979 was enforced on July 14, 1981, but the rules under this act were not finalized until June 4, 1982. This means that the act does not have a retrospective effect and therefore does not apply to the current case filed on November 16, 1981. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS :-** 1. Article 32 and Article 24 of the Constitution of India. 2. Contract Labor (Regulation and Abolition) act 1970. 3. Employment of Children act. 4. Equal Remuneration act, 1976. 5. Minimum Wages act 1948. 6. Inter-state migrant workers(Regulation of Employment and conditions of service) at 1979 . **JUDGEMENT (RATIO DECIDENDI)** 1. The court extended the scope of Article 21 as humans have the Right to Life and Right with basic Human Dignity the various labour laws on the rights are part of human dignity. So this case violated the fundamental right the court upheld through this case if they violated the rights of labour they can knock the doors of the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the constitution of India to attain their rights as workers. 2. Article 23 forms of bonded labour due to unfavourable hardships in life the employees were forcing themselves to work for low wages this benefited to employers but those contractors doesn’t have choice rather to work to led their life . So, court give Fundamental Rights to people to have the basic conditions to work in a safe environment with reasonable wages. 3. Article 24 deals with a child below 14 years of age can’t be employed if employed it violates the fundamental rights of the Constitution of India 4. The government can’t reduce their burden or escape by saying that they were not directly hired by the employers and it was responsible for contractors to facilitate basic needs and equality at the employees workplace . 5. The petitioners knocked the door of justice with the good and pure intention to fight for the worker’s rights so they have the locus standi to fight for workers’ rights. So, this case can be filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the violation of the fundamental rights. 6. Right to Equality is violated as women and men not to be differentiated at paying of wages. 7. The court rejected respondent plea as there are violation of fundamental rights. So this Writ petition to be filed and rights violated in this case are Article 14, Article 17, Article 23 and Article 24 of the Constitution of India and many other acts related to workers rights. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The forced labour has always been a problem in the past few decades this is only because the labourers worried on their lives as if they fight against the employers they might have lost this jobs they will become unemployed. So of it led their families suffer to prevent such the employees might face many atrocities at their workplace but they accept it without any fight to survive in the society. As the people with bona fide intention speaks on rights of workers in their favour or probably rare and great so such of them needed to be encouraged . The judgement favouring the rights of workers raise the motivation to all the people to fight for their rights if those people are vulnerable then others can rise their voice against the injustice happening to that other rights. This can protect so many peoples lives not only them but also to their families the judgement in this case is fully correct and I agree to their judgement. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** Maneka Gandhi Vs Union of India 1978 AIR 597 Keshavananda Bharati Vs State of Kerala AIR 1973SC 1461 SP Gupta Vs Union of India (1981) Supp SCC 87. **Important Statutes Referred** Constitution of India, Contract Labor (Regulation and Abolition) act 1970, Employment of Children act, Equal Remuneration act, 1976, Minimum Wages act 1948. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [UNION OF INDIA vs AIR COMMODORE N.K SHARMA, 2023 SCC ONLINE SC 1673](https://lawfoyer.in/union-of-india-vs-air-commodore-n-k-sharma-2023-scc-online-sc-1673/) **Published:** March 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **AUTHOR: SAMRUDDHI P NAIK, ST. WILFRED’S COLLEGE OF LAW, PANVEL** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** In a democratic country like India, where the nation has diversified economically, financially, and socially. There are few intolerant behaviors in terms of the Rights of citizens granted by The Constitution of India to the society. In this Modern Era, where Skills are appreciated before Favour and talent is appreciated before Nepotism, we will also advocate several cases that are ignorant towards deserving talent/candidate. This case is one of the examples of unnoticed cruelty in the workplace; Discrimination towards caste, race or sex is unacceptable. ***Keywords:*** *promotion, air vice marshal, fundamental rights, discrimination, violation of constitutional rights* **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***Union of India vs Air Commodore N.K Sharma*Case Number***14524 OF 2015*Judgement Date***December 14, 2023*Court***Supreme Court of India*Quorum***Hrishikesh Roy, Sanjay Karol*Author***Sanjay Karol*Citation***Union of India & Ors vs Air Commodore NK Sharma (17038)*Legal Provisions Involved***Air Force Act,1950, Constitution of India- Article 226, 227 & Code of Civil Procedure,1908 **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The case ***Union of India v/s Air Commodore N.K Sharma*** revolves around the promotion of N.K Sharma within the Indian Air Force. Primarily, the case revolves around whether the Tribunal had the authority to direct the government to mount a guideline to secure the position of Judge Advocate General (AIR) in the rank of AVM. The disagreement arose after the denial of the promotion of N.K Sharma to the rank of Air Vice Marshal (AVM) regardless of meeting the eligibility criteria. Article 14 of COI i.e. Equality before the Law and Equal Protection of Law & Article 16 i.e. the Prohibition of Discrimination in Employment in any government office are enshrined. In this case, the Supreme Court of India directed the Tribunal to consider N.K Sharma for the promotion to the position of Judge Advocate General (JAG) within the Indian Air Force. Also, the court clarified that any Tribunals cannot provide orders to the government to formulate policies. **FACTS OF THE CASE** 1. N.K Sharma the Respondent was serving in the JAG (Judge Advocate General) department along with took training for AVM (Air Vice Marshal), intending to be appreciated with a promotion of AVM. 2. Regardless, being eligible for the promotion, no promotion board was formed to fill the vacant position. 3. Then, the dispute arose, and the Respondent took to the Supreme Court that his Fundamental Rights are violated by not considering him for the promotion. 4. The Armed Force Tribunal served a decision in favour of the respondent, directing the government to form a policy for filling the vacant position and considering Air Commodore N.K Sharma for the promotion. 5. The Supreme Court of India supported the decision of the Tribunal and stated that denial of his promotion violated his fundamental rights under the Indian Constitution. 6. Also, the Supreme Court addressed the limitations of Tribunals in formulating Government Policies. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. *“Whether the respondent’s rights were violated due to the failure to convene a promotion board despite meeting promotion criteria upon the retirement of the previous JAG (Air)”*[\[1\]](#_ftn1) 2. *“Whether the Supreme Court’s ruling adequately balances the powers of quasi-judicial bodies like the Air Force Tribunal with governmental policy prerogative*s”[\[2\]](#_ftn2) 3. “Whether a tribunal can direct the framing of policy to the government”[**\[3\]**](#_ftn3) **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that non consideration despite being eligible for promotion had violated the fundamental rights of the Appellant. 2. It was submitted that the Ministry of Defence refused the promotion of appellant and deprived him from his Fundamental Rights. 3. The Petitioner submitted that the Indian Air Force failed to appoint a Promotion Board to fill up the vacancy of JAG AVM). **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Respondent submitted that the Indian Air Force failed to formulate a policy to fill the vacancies. 1. It was submitted that the Tribunal did not declared promotion to the appellant but emphasized the right to consider him for the promotion. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** 1. Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 **“***The Armed Forces Tribunal Act 2007, was passed by the Parliament and led to the formation of AFT with the power provided for the adjudication or trial by Armed Forces Tribunal of disputes and complaints with respect to commission, appointments, enrolments and conditions of service in respect of persons subject to the Army Act, 1950, The Navy Act, 1957 and the Air Force Act, 1950*.”[\[4\]](#_ftn4) 1. Constitution of India** **“***The **Constitution of India** is the supreme* [*law of India.*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_India) *It was adopted by the* [*Constituent Assembly of India*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constituent_Assembly_of_India) *on 26 November 1949 and became effective on 26 January 1950. The constitution replaced the* [*Government of India Act 1935*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_of_India_Act_1935) *as the country’s fundamental governing document, and the* [*Dominion of India*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dominion_of_India) *became the* [*Republic of India*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/India)*. The constitution declares India a* [*sovereign*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereign_state)*,* [*socialist*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gandhian_socialism)*,* [*secular*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secular)*,*[*\[11\]*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_India#cite_note-11) *and* [*democratic*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy) [*republic*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic)*, assures its citizens* [*justice*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Justice)*,* [*equality*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equality_before_the_law)*, and* [*liberty*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberty)*, and endeavours to promote* [*fraternity*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fraternity_(philosophy))*.”[**\[5\]**](#_ftn5)* 1. Air Force Act, 1950** **“***The* [*Air Force Act, 1950*](https://www.mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/AFAct.pdf) *was enacted on 18th May 1950 and came into force on 22nd July 1950. It is an act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the governance of the Air Force.”[**\[6\]**](#_ftn6)* *“The pivotal significance of the act lies in the application of the act to its particular subjects.* [*Section 2*](https://www.mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/AFAct.pdf) *of the Act states that the following persons shall be subject to this Act, wherever they may be, namely: ***(a)*** *officers and warrant officers of the Air Force; ***(b)*** *persons enrolled under this Act; ***(c)*** *persons belonging to the Regular Air Force Reserve the* [*Air Defence Reserve*](https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/2161/1/195262.pdf) *or the Auxiliary Air Force, in the circumstances specified in section 26 of the* [*Res*](https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/2161/1/195262.pdf)*erve and Auxiliary Air Forces Act, 1952; ***(d)*** *persons not otherwise subject to air force law, who, on active service, in camp, on the march, or at any frontier post specified by the Central Government by notification on this behalf, are employed by, or are in the service of, or are followers of, or accompanying any portion of the Air Force. *The act is insofar as its application is concerned, a Special Law. Besides the general law, there are certain kinds of the special law which operate upon and affect only a fraction of people. They are assigned for a particular purpose and are restricted to a particular field. They are called* [*jus special*](https://law.jrank.org/pages/7937/Jus.html#:~:text=%5BLatin%2C%20right%3B%20justice%3B,is%20used%20in%20two%20meanings%3A&text=Or%20it%20may%20designate%20some,%2C%20jus%20gentium%2C%20jus%20proetorium.)*. The Air Force Act is thus, a special law, as it does not apply to the general public.* [*Section 2*](https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/2161/1/195262.pdf) *of the act restricts its application to a certain class of people, i.e., those who are specifically mentioned as the subjects under the said section. *The rationale behind its special status is also contained in* [*Section 139 of The Indian Penal Code*](https://lawrato.com/indian-kanoon/ipc/section-139#:~:text=According%20to%20section%20139%20of,for%20any%20of%20the%20offences)*; which clarifies that the defence personnel who are subject to the* [*Army Act,*](https://indianarmy.nic.in/writereaddata/documents/ARMYACTS190216.pdf) [*the Navy Act*](https://www.mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/NavyAct1957.pdf)*, and the* [*Air Force Act*](https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/2161/1/195262.pdf) *shall not be subject to punishment under that chapter. Such persons would be governed by the Act to which they are subjected to and punished more severely than the civilians for the same offence. *Furthermore, the Air Force Act, being a special law has extra-territorial application as a person subject to it continues to be so subject at all times irrespective of the place where he is serving, whether he is in India or elsewhere. The subjection to the act and hence the liability to punishment under the act is unaffected by the place where he is stationed or the place where the offence is committed.”[**\[7\]**](#_ftn7) 1. Air Force Instructions (AFI)** **“** *An **Air Force Instruction** (**AFI**) is a documented instruction for members of the* [*United States Air Force*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Air_Force) *intended for use by active duty, guard, and reserve members and associated civilians. It is one of many forms of directives published by the Air Force Departmental Publishing Office (AFDPO).*[*\[1\]*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Force_Instruction#cite_note-E-Pub_About_Us-1) *In almost all cases, an Air Force Instruction is a form of a* [*general order*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_order)*; and violation of the AFI by an* [*Airman*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airman) *subject to it can be punished under the UCMJ* [*Uniform Code of Military Justice*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uniform_Code_of_Military_Justice)*.”[**\[8\]**](#_ftn8)* - Air Force Orders (AFO)** **“ *Orders issued by the CAS on various matters for general administration of the IAF”[**\[9\]**](#_ftn9)* **JUDGEMENT (RATIO DECIDENDI)** The Court directed the government to formulate a policy for filling a vacant position and reconsider Sharma and grant an opportunity by establishing a separate Promotional Board. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** In my opinion, the decision of the Armed Force Tribunal and Supreme Court of India was overwhelming, because promotion is one of the ways of appreciating someone. To be rewarded for the contribution made for the welfare of the society is the right of every citizen working on it. N.K Sharma was truly a deserving candidature for the vacancy of JAG (AVM). There are several such cases, that remains unnoticed in the society, but ***Union of India v/s Air Commodore N.K Sharma*** will always address such cases. **REFERENCES** **Important Statutes Referred** AIR FORCE ACT, 1950 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA AIR FORCES TRIBUNAL ACT, 2007 --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) [Union Of India vs Air Commodore Nk Sharma on 14 December, 2023 (indiankanoon.org)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/147304448/) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) [Union Of India vs Air Commodore Nk Sharma on 14 December, 2023 (indiankanoon.org)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/147304448/) [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) [www.aftdelhi.nic.in](http://www.aftdelhi.nic.in) [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) [Constitution of India – Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_India) [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) [Overview Of The Air Force Act, 1950 | JudicateMe](https://judicateme.com/overview-of-the-air-force-act-1950/#:~:text=The%20Air%20Force%20Act%2C%201950%20was%20enacted%20on,relating%20to%20the%20governance%20of%20the%20Air%20Force.) [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) [Overview Of The Air Force Act, 1950 | JudicateMe](https://judicateme.com/overview-of-the-air-force-act-1950/#:~:text=The%20Air%20Force%20Act%2C%201950%20was%20enacted%20on,relating%20to%20the%20governance%20of%20the%20Air%20Force.) [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) [Air Force Instruction – Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Force_Instruction#:~:text=An%20Air%20Force%20Instruction%20%28AFI%29%20is%20a%20documented,the%20Air%20Force%20Departmental%20Publishing%20Office%20%28AFDPO%29.%20) [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) [UPDATED-RTI-HANDBOOK-30-SEP-22.pdf (indianairforce.nic.in)](https://indianairforce.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/UPDATED-RTI-HANDBOOK-30-SEP-22.pdf) **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases **Tags:** #law, #lawfoyer, #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, case analysis, case summary, lawfoyer --- ### [State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. v. K Shyam Sunder & Ors., (2011) 8  SCC 737](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-tamil-nadu-ors-v-k-shyam-sunder-ors-2011-8-scc-737/) **Published:** March 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **AUTHOR: SHRUTI MAYUR, AMITY UNIVERSITY** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** In 2011, the Supreme Court of India ruled in State of Tamil Nadu & Ors vs K Shyam Sunder that a child’s right to education includes the right to a quality education without discrimination. The court also found fault with the report of an expert committee and struck down Section 3 of the Amendment Act 2011. The court directed the state to distribute textbooks printed under the uniform system of education to enable teachers to start classes. The case was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner sought a Writ of Declaration to declare that the substituted Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Uniform System of School Education (Amendment) Act, 2011 was ultra vires the Constitution. The right to education is a fundamental 2010 held that the provisions of Sections 11, 12 and 14 were unconstitutional and struck down the same while the Court issued elaborate directions for implementation of the common syllabus and the textbooks for Standards I and VI by the academic year 2010-11; and for all other Standards by the academic year 2011-12 right under Article 21-A of the Constitution. ***Keywords*:** Education Act, Constitution of India Education Board system, Standing committee. **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.v. K Shyam Sunder & Ors*Case Number***Civil Appeal Nos. 6015-6027/2011*Judgement Date***August 09 ,2011*Court***Supreme Court of India*Quorum***J.MPanchal,DeepakVerma,B.S Chauhan*Author***B.S Chauhan*Citation***(2011) 8 SCC 737*Legal Provisions Involved***Sec 3, 29, and 34 of Tamil Nadu Uniform System of Education (Amendment) Act,2011. Article 14, 21-A 226 of the Constitution of India Section 3,3(b) of the Uniform System of Education Act,2010 **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The Government of Tamil Nadu sought to implement a uniform system of school education in the state through the Tamil Nadu Uniform System of School Education Act, 2010. However, the Private Schools’ Association challenged the Act on various grounds, including interference with the right of children to choose their preferred system of education. The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petitions filed by the aggrieved parties, uphold- ing the judgment of the Division Bench. The uniform syllabus and common textbooks for Standards I and VI were already being followed from the Academic Year 2010-2011. **FACTS OF THE CASE** 1. Additionally, the State was instructed to list acceptable texts that private, independent schools could select as appropriate for their settings. In addition, the Court ordered the Government to revise the Act so that it would no longer apply to co-curricular subjects and would only cover the five required curricular topics—English, Tamil, Mathematics, Science, and Social Science—that the schools were required to teach. This Court properly accepted the aforementioned judgment on September 10, 2010, issuing a spoken order dismissing many of the SLPs that had been filed in opposition to it. 2. 2.The Amendment Act of 2011 went into effect on July 6, 2011, and the new academic year was scheduled to start on January 6, 2011. Numerous writ petitions contesting the aforementioned modification were submitted. By order dated 10.6.101, a Division Bench of the High Court suspended the implementation of the Amendment Act of 2011, but allowed the State Government to carry out an extensive examination of the common syllabus and textbooks. The order also made it clear that the State Government would have the right to add, amend, replace, or change any chapter, paragraph, or section of the textbooks, among other things. Additionally, the order allowed private school managements to submit their list of books to the government for approval. 3. On the other hand, the respondents’ attorneys, Prashant Bhushan and N.G.R. Prasad, as well as senior advocates Shri T.R. Andhyarujina, Basava Prabhu S. Patil, R. Viduthalai, Dhruv Mehta, M.N. Krishnamani, and Ravi Verma Kumar, have argued that the Amendment Act is a political fallout from the change in government. On May 16, 2011, the new government was sworn in. On February 25, 2011, the Cabinet made the solely political decision to forgo implementing the uniform education system because they had any supporting documentation to determine that the Act of 2010 could not be implemented. 4. By decree dated 25.5.2011, the academic session, which was scheduled to begin on 1.6.2011, was postponed, extending the summer break until 15.6.2011. On January 6, 2011, the Cabinet’s decision was contested in the High Court through the filing of writ petitions. While these cases were pending, the Amendment Act of 2011 was hastily passed, an act that was entirely arbitrary and unjustified and was motivated solely by political expediency. On 7.6.2011, the Amendment Act 2011 was officially enacted. It went into force retroactively on 22.5.2011, the day the Cabinet decided not to carry out the Act 2010 as planned. 5. The appeals lack merit and are liable to be dismissed 6. No child should be required to pay tuition since it would satisfy the needs of parents who make an average living and enable them to send their kids to such institutions. In 1991, the Yashpal Committee reaffirmed and accepted the Kothari Commission’s recommendations. In this context, the general population in Tamil Nadu has been calling for the implementation of a universal education system for all children. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether the committee constituted to examine the implementation of the Uniform System of Scholl Education Act was biased and exceeded its mandate? 2. Whether the Amendment Act ,which put the implementation of the Uniform System of Education on hold,is unconstitutional? 3. Whether the textbooks already printed should be discrded? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that If the contested Amending Act were to take effect, it would raise a number of unpleasant questions and endanger children’s interests more broadly. 2. Thus, it is evident from the overwhelming evidence that the repealed Act will automatically reappear after it is repealed and the amending Act is declared invalid by the court for being ultra vires/unconstitutional due to legislative incompetence. This argument was made by learned senior counsel on behalf of the respondents. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Respondent submitted thatThe committee members were divided on whether the shared textbooks and consistent syllabus should be abandoned starting with the current school year. Every participant has identified various flaws and made suggestions for additions and modifications. 1. The textbooks and prices for the books of Standards VIIIth, IXth, and Xth were approved by the Secretary of the Government of Tamil Nadu School Education Department, who was given the authority to advocate on behalf of the State, by a Government Order dated 9.5.2011. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** 1. Sec 3, 29, and 34 of Tamil Nadu Uniform System of Education (Amendment) Act,2011. 2. Article 14, 21-A, & 226 of the Constitution of India 3. Section 3,3(b) of the Uniform System of Education Act ,2010 **JUDGEMENT (OBSERVATIONS & RATIO DECIDENDI)** The Supreme Court had examined the records and taken into account the opposing submissions from the parties’ knowledgeable attorneys and observed that: 1. Government-authorized textbooks in all subjects, both curricular and extracurricular, are produced and acknowledged by the government. The report submitted by the so-constituted Committee may not have been warranted in advocating for the omission of the existing text books and the complete replacement of the universal education system. The Expert Committee made a mistake in determining its course since it should have focused on looking into how to establish the universal system of education. Intriguingly, the Committee determined in its final report that no textbook could be utilized for the 2011–12 academic year. 1. In order to comply with the directive issued earlier on 30.4.2010, the High Court ordered the Government to notify the approved text books after conducting the study in the ruling dated 10.6.2011. This directive has been issued to the schools so that students may select from a variety of text books. But the State has disregarded these directives and orders. 1. In the event that the law was enacted merely on record but, in reality, served to accomplish an unapproved purpose, the court would have the right to lift the curtain and conduct a judicial examination of the matter. 1. The government must shun window-dressing and rise above the intersection of nepotism and vested interests. “The principles of governance have to be tested on the touchstone of justice, equity, fair play and if a decision is not based on justice, equity and fair play and has taken into consideration other matters, though on the face of it, the decision may look legitimate but as a matter of fact, the reasons are not based on values but to achieve popular accolade, that decision cannot be allowed to operate” . (vide- Union of India & Anr. v. Onkar Lal Bajaj et al., AIR 2003 SC 2562). 1. When enacting a statute, the legislature’s motivation is irrelevant: “Malice or motive is beside the point, and it is not permissible to suggest parliamentary incompetence on the score of mala fides.” 1. Although it might not be needed to examine all of these points in-depth given that the High Court has already addressed them in great length, the current case needs to be reviewed in the context of the aforementioned established legal principles. 1. The Act 2010 was enacted to enforce the uniform education system in the State of Tamil Nadu in order to impart quality education to all children, without any discrimination on the ground of their economic, social or cultural background. 1. The Act itself provided for its commencement giving the academic years though, in phased programme i.e. for Standards I to VI from the academic year 2010-2011; and for other Standards from academic year 2011-2012, thus, enforcement was not dependent on any further notification. 1. The Act’s legitimacy was contested by a number of people, organizations, and societies, including parents of kids, but mostly by private school associations that opposed the state’s common education program. The Act’s legitimacy was upheld by the dismissal of the writ petitions. Nonetheless, the High Court invalidated a few provisions—specifically, Sections 11, 12, and 14—in a ruling and order dated April 30, 2010. A spoken order from this Court dated 10.9.2010 duly approved the aforementioned High Court verdict. Executive directives might have been issued in order to comply with the instructions provided by the High Court in the aforementioned judgment. Furthermore, it was possible to comply with the High Court’s directives even by altering the schedule as provided in the judgment dated 30.4.2010 itself. 1. The High Court’s interim orders were contested before this court, and the appeals were resolved with a judgment and order dated 14.6.2011. The court issued numerous directives, one of which was to form an Expert Committee to investigate potential enforcement strategies for the Common Education System. The evidence presented by the respondents in front of this court shows that standards were known and that the Tamil Nadu Curriculum 2009 was used to apply the NCF 2005. 1. It was necessary to take action to eliminate the disparity considering the aforementioned, the appeals are without substance. The case’s facts and circumstances don’t offer any unique characteristics that call for this Court to become involved. Consequently, the appeals are denied. Within ten days of today, the appellants are required to enforce the High Court judgment that is being contested. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** Every factual aspect is the subject of claims and counterclaims, and the High Court has, in Supreme Court’s opinion, gone into unnecessary detail while addressing each one. The Supreme Court aslo observed in the case that with regard to the legal concern associated with the modification of policy in connection with a change in the government’s validated legislation unless an appeal or review overturns the decision, the judgment remains in place where a legislative act retroactively modifies the factual or legal circumstances. The judicial power would be violated if legislation were introduced to overturn a competent court’s decision. Additionally, no legislation could be passed to overturn a court’s mandamus ruling, even if the amended statute might not mention such an objection. If one crore twenty lacs students are now to revert back to the multiple syllabus with the syllabus and textbooks applicable prior to 2010 after the academic term of 2011-12 has begun, they would be utterly confused and would be put to enormous stress. It is not necessary to subject students to such extreme pressure and stress. As a result, the government’s overall operation is capricious, prejudiced, and harsh against parents, instructors, and pupils. The supreme court also observed that the State Government should have acted bearing in mind that “*destiny of a nation rests with its youths*“. Personality of a child is developed at the time of basic education during his formative years of life. Their career should not be left in dolorific conditions with uncertainty to such a great extent. The younger generation has to compete in global market. Education is not a consumer service nor the educational institution can be equated with shops, therefore, “*there are statutory prohibitions for establishing and administering educational institution without prior permission or approval by the authority concerned.*“ **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** State of Orissa v. Mamta Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436 Osmania University Teachers’ Assn. v. State of A.P. & Anr., AIR 1987 SC 2034 State of Karnataka & Anr. v. All India Manufacturers Organisation & Ors., AIR 2006 SC 1846 State of U.P. & Anr. v. Johri Mal, AIR 2004 SC 3800 State of Haryana v. State of Punjab & Anr., AIR 2002 SC 685 M.I. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. V. Radhey Shyam Sahu & Ors., AIR 1999 SC 2468 Deep Chand & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1959 SC 648 Behram Khurshid Pesikaka v. State of Bombay AIR 1955 SC 123 Mahendra Lal Jaini v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. AIR 1963 SC 1019 **Important Statutes Referred** Tamil Nadu Uniform System of Education Act, 2010 Tamil Nadu Uniform System of Education (Amendment)Act,2011 Constitution of India, 1950 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases **Tags:** #lawfoyer, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, article, case analysis, case summary, K Shyam Sunder, lawfoyer, state of tamil nadu --- ### [Dr Yogesh Bharadwaj v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1991 SC 356](https://lawfoyer.in/dr-yogesh-bharadwaj-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-air-1991-sc-356/) **Published:** March 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **AUTHOR: VELAGADA MOUNIKA, DR. B. R.AMBEDKAR COLLEGE OF LAW \[ ANDHRA UNIVERSITY\]** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** In the present case the appellant was nominated by Himachal Pradesh to undergo B.D.S degree in Uttar Pradesh he stayed over 5 years for the completion of his course and successfully secured his degree later he applied for the M.D.S course at king George Medical College. Here his subject of choice is oral surgery but the subject they offered is periodontics denying due to providing of reservation of seats for residential qualifications. In the Notification dated August 19, 1983. Issued under section 28(5) of the U.P. State University Act , 1974. The appellant though not a party to the proceedings,filed a writ petition in high court for clarification and modification on the earlier said judgement but the high court rejected the application holding that clause 2 of Notification Stipulates two conditions i. Institutional and ii. Residential And that the appellant doesn’t fulfill the Second requirement ,viz bona fide resident within the meaning of clause(4) of notification. Mere purpose of study wouldn’t satisfy the requirement of bona fide resident. The supreme court said that the minimum period of five years and for the definite purpose of education then he satisfies the definition of bona fide resident and unreasonable restrictive thus conflict of constitutional right and the notification clause 4 sub clause (b) is unsustainable. Supreme court set aside the impunged order of High court and allow the appeal with costs of the appellant here and in High court. ***Keywords*:** Section 28(5), Uttar Pradesh State University Act 1974, Subject of choice (oral surgery), Residential qualification, Subject offered (periodontics), Supreme court, High court **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***Dr Yogesh Bharadwaj v. State of Uttar Pradesh*Case Number***Civil Appeal No : 62 of 1990*Judgement Date***24.04.1990*Court*** Supreme court of India*Quorum*** T.k. Thommen, (J)*Author*** T.k.Thommen, (J) , L.M. Sharma (J)*Citation*** AIR 1991 SC 365*Legal Provisions Involved***Section 28(5), Uttar Pradesh State Act 1975and Private international law**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT:** In India there is no state wise domicile within the territory And people of all states recognised as Indian domicile. “*Under the Constitution, India is a Union of States. Every part of every State is an integral and inseverable part of India*” said Justice Banerjee In this case was dealt with the interpretation of bona fide resident and analysed the Applicability of domicile. In general domicile meaning **permanent home.** A person is domiciled in the country in which he is considered to Have his permanent home. His domicile is of the whole country, being Governed by common rules of law, and not confined to a part of it. **No one Can be without a domicile and no one can have two domiciles. Key elements of domicile are:** intention ( to remain their indefinitely ) **+** residence (physical presence).Residence is the most significant connecting factor of the case. **KINDS OF DOMICILE** **Domicile by origin** It is the domicile every person acquires at birth and the domicile is determined by the Domicile of Father ( Still alive while the birth of child ); Mother ( when father died or illegitimate child ); where the child is born. **Domicile by choice** It is the domicile where an individual choose or decides to live rather than the Domicile of origin or birth place. **Domicile by operation of law** Even though in this case the Supreme court said domicile is irrelevant for better understanding of residence first we should know about domicile and its difference from residence Domicile of origin is more enduring, it hold stronger and less easily shaken off[\[1\]](#_ftn1). If Domicile of choice is abandonment then the person push back to domicile of origin until he attains a new Domicile of choice. **RESIDENCE** Residence means an act / a fact of dwelling in one place for some time. In simple way it was only a bodily presence and there is no intention of making that place has his Permanent home but resides or lives for a settled period **Habitual Residence:** it is a place where a person resides for some span with an Intention to reside in that place. **Bona Fide Resident:** the word bona fide means real or genuine or good faith. It is used to verify whether the person is genuinely associated with the place and for a definite purpose or not. **FACTS OF THE CASE** The appellant was nominated (permanent resident)by the state of Himachal Pradesh to undergo the B.D.S course in Uttar Pradesh , successfully completed and secured his B.D.S Degree. For this purpose he had stayed in that state for over a period of five years. Later, he applied for admission to M.D.S course at king George Medical College, Lucknow and the Subject of his choice was oral surgery but the Subject that was offered to him was periodontics. The denying of his subject of choice is due to the providing for reservation of seats and prescribing the residence qualification in the Notification dated August 19, 1983. Issued under section 28 (5) of Uttar Pradesh state university Act 1974. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i.Whether the appellant fulfilled the requirement of bona fide resident of Uttar Pradesh ? ii. Whether the domicile is relevant or irrelevant to the interpretation of clause 4 sub clause (b) of notification? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The Counsel for the Petitioner contended that a person should be treated as a bona fide resident of Uttar Pradesh in terms notification of clause 4 Sub-clause: 1. a citizen of India, the domicile of whose father is in Uttar Pradesh and who himself is Domiciled in Uttar Pradesh; or 1. a citizen of India, the do father was not domiciled in the state and who himself resided for not less than five years in the state. So the concept of domicile is irrelevant to the expression of sub-clause (b) and all that requires is his residence. 2. The Counsel for the Petitioner further submitted that here the appellant satisfied the sub-clause (b) of clause 4 of the notification. The appellant resided in Uttar Pradesh for the requisite period lawfully and bona fide. While residence, absence of any allegations that the appellant manner was opposed to law of land, lack of good faith and his residence was neither casual nor fleeting but over a period of minimum five years and for definite purpose of education so he satisfies the definition of bona fide resident. 3. The Counsel for the Petitioner submited that the construction placed by High court upon sub- clause (b) of clause 4 of the notification was unfeasible. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. It was contended by the Counsel for Respondents that the appellant came barely on purpose of education to Uttar Pradesh and after Completion of his course, he will return back to his own state so he is not bonafide resident of Uttar Pradesh. 2. It was contended by the Counsel for Respondents that the High court in its judgement held that the residence barely for the purpose of studies without more did not bring a person within the ambit of the notification. Those candidates who joined the B.D.S course on basis of nominations made by the Central Government or their own state, They were not bona fide residents of Uttar Pradesh. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISION** **Section 28(5) of U.P. State University Act 1974 states that:** *“\[ Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act,-* *(a)Reservation of seats for admission in any course of study in University, Institute, constituent college, affiliated college or associated college for the students belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes of citizens may be made and regulated by such orders as the State Government may, by notification, make in that behalf;* *Provided that reservation under this clause shall not exceed fifty percent of the total number of seats in any course of study :* *Provided further that reservation under this clause shall not apply in the case of an institution established and administered by minorities referred to in clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution :* *Provided also that the reservation under this clause shall not apply to the category of Other Backward Classes of citizens specified in Schedule II to the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes) Act, 1994,* *(b)Admission to medical and engineering colleges and to courses of instruction for degrees in education and Ayurvedic or Unani systems of medicine (including the number of students to be admitted), shall subject to clause (a), be regulated by such orders (which if necessary may be with retrospective effect, but not effective prior to January 1, 1979) as the State Government may by notification, make in that behalf:* *Provided that no order regulating admission under this clause shall be inconsistent with the rights of minorities in the matter of establishing and administering educational institutions of their choice;* *(C) In making an order under clause (a), the State Government may direct that any person who wilfully acts in a manner intended to contravene, or defeat the purposes of the order shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or with fine not exceeding one thousand rupees, or with both, as may be specified in the order”* **JUDGEMENT** (**RATIO DECIDENDI)** The Honourable court has given the verdict in favour of appellant it stating that the domicile concept in private international law is irrelevant to the construction of clause 4 sub-clause (b)[\[3\]](#_ftn3) All that it requires his residential qualification. On the basis of facts the appellant’s subject of choice was denied due to residential preference but he stayed in Uttar Pradesh for over five years to complete his B.D.S. Degree. The high court in the writ petition filed for clarification and modification of the previous judgement by the appellant who is not party to the proceedings. But adversely affected by it. Mere purpose of study wouldn’t satisfy the requirement of the residential qualification in terms of notification for this supreme court rejected the petition. Domicile of origin is more enduring, it hold stronger and less easily shaken off[\[4\]](#_ftn4) If Domicile of choice is abandonment then the person push back to domicile of origin until he attains a new Domicile of choice. It is immaterial for this purpose that the residence is for a short duration, provided it is Coupled with the requisite state of the mind, namely the intention to reside there permanently. “*If a Man intends to return to the land of his birth upon a clearly foreseen and reasonably anticipated Contingency*”, Re Fuld’s Estate (No. 3) 1968 (P) 675. Such as, the end of his studies, he lacks the Intention required by law. His “*tastes, habits, conduct, actions, ambitions, health, hopes, and Projects*”, **Casdagli v.** **Casdagli**, **\[1919\] AC 145** [\[5\]](#_ftn5), 178 are keys to his intention. “*That place is Properly the domicile of a person in which he has voluntarily fixed the habitation of Himself and his family, not for a mere special and temporary purpose, but with a Present intention of making it his permanent home, unless and until something (which is unexpected or the happening of which is uncertain) shall occur to induce him to adopt some other permanent home”.* **Udny v. Udny, \[1869\] LR 1 Sc & Div 441,[**\[6\]**](#_ftn6)** “He is ‘domiciled’ in the Whole of this country, even though his permanent home may be located in a Particular spot within it.” **H.L.; Bell v. Kennedy, \[1868\] LR 1 Sc & Div 307, H.L.** [\[7\]](#_ftn7) “*The expression, as understood in private International law, makes no sense in the context of Clause 4, for Indian domicile Cannot be limited to any particular State within India. The full import of ‘domicile’ is, There- fore, inapplicable to the construction of clause 4. We would in this connection Recall the words of this Court in* [\[8\]](#_ftn8)” Where residence is prescribed as qualifying condition within the territory of India , the expression have a wider And capable of full enjoyment of the right of equality before the law, Any construction which cause to the disadvantage of the citizens lawfully seeking avenues of progress within the country will be out of harmony and that construction should be avoided . Here the supreme court set aside the impunged order of High court and allow the appeal with the costs of the appellant here and in the High court. **CONCLUSION& COMMENTS** It is luculent that the appellant was bona fide resident of Uttar Pradesh the Bench ruled. The unreasonable restrictions can amount to the violation of constitutional rights of appellant. In my opinion the Supreme court correctly states that every one has a right of equality before the law, any construction which cause to the disadvantage of the citizens lawfully seeking avenues of progress within the country will be out of harmony and that construction should be avoided. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** Casdagli v. Casdagli, \[1919\] AC 145 Udny v. Udny, \[1869\] LR 1 Sc & Div 441 H.L.; Bell v. Kennedy, \[1868\] LR 1 Sc & Div 307, H.L **Important Statutes Referred** Uttar Pradesh State University Act 1974 Private International law --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Per Lord Macnaghten, Winans v.A.G., ..\[1904\] AC 287 [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) A citizen of India, the domicile of whose father was not in Uttar Pradesh but who himself has resided in Uttar Pradesh for not less than five years at the time of making the application. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Per Lord Macnaghten, Winans v.A.G., ..\[1904\] AC 287 [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Indian kanoon [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Indian kanoon [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Indian kanoon [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Dr. Pradeep Jain & Ors. V. Union of India & Ors., \[1984\] 3 SCC 654 at 668, D.P. Joshi v. The State of Madhya Bharat and Another, \[1955\] 1 SCR 1215: **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Batliboi Environmental Engineers Ltd. v. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd.,2023](https://lawfoyer.in/batliboi-environmental-engineers-ltd-v-hindustan-petroleum-corpn-ltd-2023/) **Published:** March 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **AUTHOR: KAMALJEET KAUR, UNIVERSITY FIVE YEAR LAW COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY OF RAJASTHAN** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** This case of Batliboi Environmental Engineers Limited(BEEL)v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited and Another(HPCL) delves into a contractual dispute between the plaintiff (BEEL), and the defendants (HPCL) and Ar. This case revolves around the interpretation of some facts of a contract for some construction work that was entered by both the parties. Later on after some time, HPCL and Ar.was alleged by BEEL contending that it had breached the contract by failing to provide access to the construction site, as a consequence of delays and financial losses. Contrary to that, HPCL and Ar. alleged that BEEL’s claim was invalid due to its failure to fulfill certain conditions outlined in the contract signed by both the parties. The case analysis examines the contractual provisions, legal arguments and factual circumstances presented by both parties. Ultimately, the court’s ruling sheds light on the principles of contract interpretation, emphasizing the significance of clear and unambiguous contractual language. The analysis of case highlights the importance of precisely contract drafting and adherence to contractual obligations to avoid disputes and mitigate risks in commercial transactions undertaking the acts of Arbitration and Conciliation and contract act. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*:** Contract, Arbitration & Conciliation, Batliboi Environmental Engineers Ltd., Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., environmental legal dispute **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title****Batliboi Environmental Engineers Ltd. vs Hindustan Petroleum Corp.Ltd. And Anr.* *Case Number******Civil Appeal No. 1968 of 2012****Judgement Date******21ST September,2023****Court******Supreme Court Of India****Quorum******Justices M.M. Sundresh and Sanjiv Khanna****Author******M.M. Sundresh****Citation****2023INSC850**Legal Provisions Involved******Indian Contract Act 1872, Special Relief Act 1963, Indian Evidence Act 1872*****INTRODUCTION** The case of Batliboi Environmental Engineers Ltd. v. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. is a significant legal dispute in the that revolves around contractual obligations, arbitration & conciliation and the interpretation of clauses in a commercial agreement. BEEL, a reputable engineering firm specializing in environmental solutions, entered into a contract with HPCL, a prominent oil and gas corporation for the purpose of providing certain services and equipment related to environmental compliance and pollution control at Hindustan Petroleum’s manufacturing facilities which it failed to fulfill its obligations as a consequence resulted in loss and financial setbacks. After going through arbitration, Both parties approached the court seeking resolution. The legal battle is of divergent interpretations of contractual clauses, particularly those pertaining to indemnity provisions and the scope of responsibilities regarding environmental compliance As now a days environmental consciousness becomes increasingly central to business operations, this case serves as a poignant reminder of the importance of clarity in contractual agreements and the need for meticulous adherence to environmental standards. **BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** Batliboi Environmental Engineers Ltd., (BEEL) a engineering firm named for environmental solutions, signed a contract with Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., (HPCL) a major player in the oil and gas industry in india. The contract was to supply Batliboi’s services and equipment related to environmental compliance and pollution control at HPCL to facilitate manufacturing. Unfortunately, after some time issues emerged during the course of the contract’s execution, resulted in breakdown of the relationship between the two parties. HPCL claimed that BEEL for not fulfilling its contractual obligations due to which Hindustan Petroleum suffered financial losses and operational setbacks. On the other hand, Batliboi denied the argument for not fulfilling the contractual obligations and argued that issues that arose were due to Hindustan Petroleum’s failure to provide necessary cooperation, maintain appropriate working conditions, or comply with the agreed-upon terms. Both parties approached the judiciary to solve dispute . The court diligently examined the the contract, corss examined the evidences, actions and conduct of both parties. The judgment established important legal principles that would guide the courts in future contractual disputes and serve as a precedent in shaping the understanding and application of contract law in subsequent cases. It will also provide clarity on matters such as contractual interpretation, liability and performance standards. **FACTS OF THE CASE** 1\. Batliboi Environmental Engineers Ltd., an engineering firm specializing in environmental solutions, signed a contract with Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., a prominent oil and gas corporation on 27.02.1992 for the purpose engineering civil and structural design, supply and erection, testing and commissioning of 23 MLD capacity sewage water reclamation plant in mehul refinery area. The contract signed valued Rs. 574.35 lakhs and for a period of 18 months from the date of intent that was 28.08.1993 2\. There was delay in completion and the time for completion was extended two times on the request of BEEL on account of that three revisions were also issued by the HPCL, last of that was dated 20.09.1994 that extended completion for 10 months. 3\. BEEL worked till 30.03.1996 which was 80% of the total work done and after that abandoned the work. 4\. HPCL’s General Manager of Mahul Refinery appointed Mr. K. Narayan as the sole arbitrator to adjudicate upon the dispute. First claim was filed by BEEL and later on by HPCL. Between the period of 12.03.1998 and 07.01.1998 a total of 14 hearings were held. 5\. A site inspection was also conducted on 24.12.1997 and other oral arguments were addressed throughout the period. The arbitral award dated 23.02.1999 allowed overhead and profit loss of 1,57,37,666.00, compensation for idle equipment and machinery Rs. 84,59,615.00, compensation for extra work Rs. 19,00,225.00 which were claim Nos. 1,2,3 of claimants. 6\. The court was tasked with interpreting the relevant contractual clauses, assessing the performance of both parties, and determining the rights and liabilities of each side. The former award dismissed on the counter claim on the ground that the delay caused by the omissions and commissions of HPCL and not taking timely actions in removal of various impediments and obstacles stood in way of completing the project Claims were denied on the ground that it relate to future work not fall within the ambit of arbitration. 7\. HPCL preferred an arbitration petition challenging the Award before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, which was dismissed by the Ld. Single Judge. Thereafter, HPCL filed an appeal and in departure from the findings of Ld. Single Judge, the Arbitral Award was set aside by the Division Bench of the Hon’ble High Court exercising power under Section 37 read with Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. 8\. Thereafter, HPCL filed an appeal and in departure from the findings of Ld. Single Judge, the Arbitral Award was set aside by the Division Bench of the Hon’ble High Court exercising power under Section 37 read with Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 9\. The SC judgement in *‘Batliboi Environmental Engineers Limited v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited and Another’* upholds the decision in of the Division Bench and dismisses the civil appeal filed by BEEL. 10\. The decision helpwd in shaping the understanding and application of contract law in subsequent cases and served as a precedent judgement providing clarity on contractual disputes in the field of environmental solutions and pollution control. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether BEEL breached its contractual obligation to HPCL 2. Whether the interpretation of clauses by the courts required to determine either party deviated from the contractual duties. 3. Whether the BEEL be held liable for any financial losses or setbacks experienced by HPCL. 4. Whether the BEEL met the quality and standaerd of equipments and services as of the conract. 5. Whether the compliance of the contract was done fully by both the parties. **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that HPCL breached the contract by delaying approval and decision, not adhering upon agreed timelines, not providing necessary resources, not providing payment in stipulated time frame causing financial strain and also argued the court to consider only strict obligations and not the expectations. It also stressed on the emden formula widely used by American courts. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that foundation of arbitration is party autonomy, parties are free to settle their disputes by an arbitral award whose decision is binding on the parties and purpose of arbitration is fast and quick therefore post award interference by the court is un warranted and an anathema that undermine fundamental edifice of arbitration hence this process is informal and unlegastic. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** 1. Section 31(3)(a) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996:*“The arbitral award shall state the reasons upon which it is based, unless [*(a)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1626309/) the parties have agreed that no reasons are to be given.”* 1. Section 34(2) in The Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996: *An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if* 1. [*(a)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1831758/)*the party making the application establishes on the basis of the record of the arbitral tribunal that:* 1. *a party was under some incapacity; or* 1. *the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or* 1. *the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or* 1. *the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration: Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or* 1. *the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or* 1. *the Court finds that* 1. *the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or* 1. *the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India.\[Explanation 1. \[Substituted by* [***\[1\]***](#_ftn1)*Act* [*No. 3 of 2016*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/47062758/) *dated 31.12.2015.\] – For the avoidance of any doubt, it is clarified that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only if,-* 1. *the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of section 75 or section 81; or* 1. *it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law; or* 1. *it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice.* 1. Section 55 of Indian Contract Act,1872: *“ Effect of failure to perform at a fixed time, in contract in which time is essential.—When a party to a contract promises to do a certain thing at or before a specified time, or certain things at or before specified times, and fails to do any such thing at or before the specified time, the contract, or so much of it as has not been performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promisee, if the intention of the parties was that time should be of the essence of the contract. “* 1. Section 73 of Indian Contract Act,1872: “ *Compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract.—“When a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive, from the party who has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby, which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach, or which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it.Such compensation is not to be given for any remote and indirect loss or damage sustained by reason of the breach.Compensation for failure to discharge obligation resembling those created by contract.—When an obligation resembling those created by contract has been incurred and has not been discharged, any person injured by the failure to discharge it is entitled to receive the same compensation from the party in default, as if such person had contracted to discharge it and had broken his contract” 1. Section 75 of The Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996[\[2\]](#_ftn2): “*Confidentiality.– Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the conciliator and the parties shall keep confidential all matters relating to the conciliation proceedings.* *Confidentiality shall extend also to the settlement agreement, except where its disclosure is necessary for purposes of implementation and enforcement*.” 1. Section 81 of The Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996: *“ Admissibility of evidence in other proceedings.* *The parties shall not rely on or introduce as evidence in arbitral or judicial proceedings, whether or not such proceedings relate to the dispute that is the subject of the conciliation proceedings,*[*(a)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/905193/)*views expressed or suggestions made by the other party in respect of a possible settlement of the dispute;*[*(b)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/508451/)*admissions made by the other party in the course of the conciliation proceedings;*[*(c)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/20138/)*proposals made by the conciliator;*[*(d)*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1521572/)*the fact that the other party had indicated his willingness to accept a proposal for settlement made by the conciliator.”* **JUDGEMENT** The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of *Batliboi Environmental Engineers Ltd. vs Hindustan Petroleum Corp.Ltd. And Anr.* has extensively analysed the findings in the Award and *inter alia* discussed the principles and formulae for computing a claim for increased overheads and loss of profit in a works contract as done by substantial courts and emphasized on the need for giving reasoning and justification for the amount of damages awarded by the Arbitral Tribunal and upheld setting aside of the Award for the lack thereof. Hon’ble Justices on account of calculation done by arbitration stated- *“Furthermore the Emden formula, in common with the Hudson formula (see Hudson on Building Contracts, (11th edn, 1995) paras 8–182 et seq) and with its American counterpart the Eichleay formula, is dependent on various assumptions which are not always present and which, if not present, will not justify the use of a formula. For example the Hudson formula makes it clear that an element of constraint is required (see Hudson para 8.185) ie in relation to profi t, that there was profi t capable of being earned elsewhere and there was no change in the market thereafter aff ecting profi tability of the work. It must also be established that the contractor was unable to deploy resources elsewhere and had no possibility of recovering cost of the overheads from other sources, eg from an increased volume of the work. Thus 19 (1995) 76 BLR 59. BATLIBOI ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERS LTD v. HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORP. LTD. \[SANJIV KHANNA, J.\] 464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS \[2023\] 12 S.C.R. such formulae are likely only to be of value if the event causing delay is (or has the characteristics of) a breach of contract.”* The Supreme Court has noted that the loss towards overheads and profits/profitability is to be computed on the payments due for the un-executed work, and should exclude [\[3\]](#_ftn3)the payments received/receivable for the work that has already been executed. Delay in payment on execution of the work has to be compensated separately. It also opined that computation should not be whimsical, disingenuous and absurd resulting in a windfall and bounty for one party at the expense of the other. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that even to ascertain the loss of overheads and profits if formulae such as the Hudson’s, Emden’s, or Eichleay’s formulae are applied, the factual assumptions should be examined while applying a particular equation or method and laid down a more stringent criteria for determination of the quantum of damages by the arbitral tribunal for such claims of loss of profit. Hon’ble Supreme Court has analysed the Hudson’s formula which is widely used for computation of such claims and observed that Hudson’s formula, is couched on three assumptions. First, that the contractor is not habitually or otherwise underestimating the cost when pricing; secondly the profit element was realistic at that time; and thirdly, there was no fluctuation in the market conditions and the work of the same general level of profitability would be available to her/him at the end of the contract period. The Court also noted that the Eichleay’s Formula is more precise and accurate in calculating loss of profits since it requires the contractor to itemise and quantify the total fixed overheads during the contract period. It takes into consideration all the contracts during the delay period to determine the proportionate fraction of the total fixed overheads. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The case of Batliboi Environmental Engineers Limited v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited and Ar. marks as an important judgement for fair and just computation of damages in arbitration disputes. The court focused that the computation of damages should not be whimsical, disappropriate or disingenuous, but rather commensurate with the loss sustained. The High Court set aside the arbitral award due to disproportionate damages awarded without any basis. Further, the case underscores the significance of due process and procedural fairness in arbitral proceedings. Arbitration is a private form of dispute resolution constituted by the statute, the court has the power under the arbitration and conciliation act to intervene if the outcome is unfair, arbitrary, or perverse. The court emphasized that the conduct of arbitral proceedings should be of the juristic requirements The Hon’ble Supreme Court discusses the usage of formulae to compute damages in contractual disputes. This case highlights the need for careful examination of factual assumptions and adherence to fair and just computation principles when applying formulae such as Hudson’s, Emden’s, or Eichleay’s formulae for the substantial courts. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Company Limited and Others (2006) 11 SCC 181 Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority (2015) 3 SCC 49: A.T Brij Paul Singh and Others v. State of Gujarat (1984) 4 SCC 59; Vidya Drolia and Others v. Durga Trading Corporation and Others, (2021) 2 SCC 1 ONGC Limited. v. Saw Pipes Limited. (2003) 5 SCC 705 Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. Friends Coal Carbonisation (2006) 4 SCC 445 Centrotrade Minerals and Metals Inc. v. Hindustan Copper Limited (2006) 11 SCC 245 Delhi Development Authority v. R.S. Sharma and Co (2008) 13 SCC 80 J.G. Engineers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India and Another (2011) 5 SCC 758:\[2011\] 8 SCR 486 Union of India v. L.S.N. Murthy (2012) 1 SCC 718:\[2011\] 13 SCR 295; Renusagar Power Co. Limited v. General Electric Co 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644:\[1993\] 3 Suppl. SCR 22 Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. Dewan Chand Ram Saran (2012) 5 SCC 306:\[2012\] 4 SCR 1 ONGC Ltd. v. Western Geco International Ltd., (2014) 9 SCC 263:\[2014\] 12 SCR 1 Excise and Taxation Offi cer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police (1999) 2 SCC 10:\[1998\] 3 Suppl. SCR 594[\[5\]](#_ftn5) MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd. (2019) 4 SCC 163:\[2019\] 3 SCR 1023; Ssangyong Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. National Highways Authority of India (2019) 15 SCC 131 **Important Statutes Referred** **(a) Hudson Formula:** In Hudson’s Building and Engineering Contracts, Hudson Formula is stated in the following terms: “Contract head office overhead and profi t percentage × Contract sum Contract period × Period of delay” In the Hudson Formula, the head office overhead percentage is taken from the contract. Although the Hudson Formula has received judicial support in many cases, it has been criticised principally because it adopts the head office overhead percentage from the contract as the factor for calculating the costs, and this may bear little or no relation to the actual head offi ce costs of the contractor. **(b) Emden Formula:** In Emden’s Building Contracts and Practice, the Emden Formula is stated in the following terms: “Head office overhead and profit × Contract sum × Period of delay” 100 Contract period Using the Emden Formula, the head office overhead percentage is arrived at by dividing the total overhead cost and profit of the contractor’s organisation as a whole by the total turnover. This formula has the advantage of using the contractor’s actual head offi ce overhead and profit percentage rather than those contained in the contract. **(c) Eichleay Formula:** The Eichleay Formula was evolved in America and derives its name from a case heard by the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, Eichleay Corporation. It is applied in the following manner: Step 1: Contract billings × Total over head for contract period = Overhead allocable to the contract Total billings for contract period Step 2: Allocable overhead = Daily overhead rate Total days of contract Step 3: Daily contract overhead rate × Number of days of delay = Amount of unabsorbed overhead” This formula is used where it is not possible to prove loss of opportunity and the claim is based on actual cost. It can be seen from the formula that the total head office overhead during the contract period is first determined by comparing the value of work carried out in the contract period for the project with the value of work carried out by the contractor as a whole for the contract period. A share of head office overheads for the contractor is allocated in the same ratio and expressed as a lump sum to the particular contract. The amount of head office overhead allocated to the particular contract is then expressed as a weekly amount by dividing it by the contract period. The period of delay is then multiplied by the weekly amount to give the total sum claimed. The Eichleay Formula is regarded by the Federal Circuit Courts of America as the exclusive means for compensating a contractor for overhead expenses. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1)\[1\] https:indiankanoon.org/doc/1034395 [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) https:indiankanoon.org/doc/1034395 [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) [a55a6f573ac695e9213d43ada28f15229ddfa600e4b1f33c6ef919d086f56aaa1708872010.pdf](file:///C:/Users/AA/OneDrive/Desktop/a55a6f573ac695e9213d43ada28f15229ddfa600e4b1f33c6ef919d086f56aaa1708872010.pdf) [\[4\]](#_ftnref4)\[4\]\[4\] [a55a6f573ac695e9213d43ada28f15229ddfa600e4b1f33c6ef919d086f56aaa1708872010.pdf](file:///C:/Users/AA/OneDrive/Desktop/a55a6f573ac695e9213d43ada28f15229ddfa600e4b1f33c6ef919d086f56aaa1708872010.pdf) [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) [a55a6f573ac695e9213d43ada28f15229ddfa600e4b1f33c6ef919d086f56aaa1708872010.pdf](file:///C:/Users/AA/OneDrive/Desktop/a55a6f573ac695e9213d43ada28f15229ddfa600e4b1f33c6ef919d086f56aaa1708872010.pdf) **Categories:** Arbitration and Conciliation Law, Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases, Contract Law --- ### [Ramlila Maidan v. Home Secretary, Union of India, (2012) 5 SCC 1](https://lawfoyer.in/ramlila-maindan-union-of-india-case/) **Published:** March 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **AUTHOR: DEEPTI, MERI PROFESSIONAL AND LAW INSTITUTE** **ABSTRACT** In this landmark case, the fundamental right to peaceful assembly was granted under the constitution of India. The case begins with a violent protest which was meant to be peaceful gathering at Ramlila Maidan which is situated in Delhi. The court mentioned the significance of right to peaceful assembly and emphasized that it is the duty of the state to make possible such assemblies rather than stifle them. The importance for balance between public order and freedom of individual, cautioning against the lots of restrictions on the right to peaceful assembly. Adding to it, the court mentioned the importance of the duty of the state to safeguard the exercise of fundamental rights, including that proper facilities, needs and securities are necessary to be provided for well and peaceful protest. The ruling set a landmark for future cases involving the right to peaceful gathering, accentuate the role of judiciary in screening democratic utility and protecting rights of citizens to express disagreement peacefully. **CASE DETAILS** Judgment cause titleProtection of Fundamental right to peaceful assembly.Case numberCivil Appeal No. 7207 of 2012Judgment dateMay 9, 2012CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumB.S. Chauhan and Swatanter KumarAuthorSwatanter KumarCitation(2012) 5 SCC 1Legal provisions InvolvedArticle 19(1)(b) Article 21**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE JUDGMENT** In the case ‘Ramlila Maidan v. Home Secretary, Union of India’ it is covered that the fundamental right to peaceful assembly/gathering under Article 19(1)(b) of the Indian constitution. The background of the judgment covers the case of a peaceful protest which was held at Ramlila Maidan located at Delhi, where followers of Baba Ramdev gathered at Ramlila Maidan to show their dissent against advocates for reforms and corruption. During the whole scenario, Delhi Police tried to disperse the gathering by using force under the order given by Home secretary of Union of India, which resulted in a lot of chaos and violence. The petitioner Ramlila Maidan, approached for relief from the Supreme Court, arguing that the right to peaceful assembly was violated by the actions performed by the respected authorities. The judgment investigates the importance of right to peaceful gathering in the Indian society. It also stated that there should be a balance between someone’s freedom and social order. The Supreme Court’s judgment in this case reaffirms the significance of this right and establishes guidelines for the state to make sure the protection and facilitation of the fundamental right and also maintaining pubic security at the same time. **FACTS OF THE CASE** On 27th February 2011, Baba Ramdev and his followers led a rally at Ramlila Maidan in New Delhi against corruption, in which over 1 Lakh people participated after few months Baba Ramdev got permission to rent the Ramlila Maidan to organize a yoga training camp. Afterwards Baba Ramdev made Public his decision of protesting against corruption and got permission to show his dissent at Jantar Mantar with people not extending 200 in number on 4th June 2011. But on 4th instead of organizing yoga training camp, he staged the protest and its gathering in the Ramlila Maidan, in which over 50,000 people protested along with hunger strike. Seeing this, a team of police officials reached Baba Ramdev and told him that the permission he took for the camp will be withdrawn. After that Delhi police along with Central Reserve Police Force and Rapid Action force were sent to use force to end the protest and to arrest Baba Ramdev. To break the protest many weapons were used like tear gas, batons and water cannons to disperse the gathering. Almost all of the supporters of Baba Ramdev left the Ramlila Maidan. Baba Ramdev disappeared from the dais and was arrested by the police near Ranjit Singh Flyover. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether the imposition of section 144 of the code of criminal procedure, 1973 at the rally gave rise to violation of the right to free speech and expression, the right to assembly and right to life, as protected under the Articles 19 and 21. 2. Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of Ramdev Baba’s Followers and trust. **APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. Organizers argued that they have the fundamental right to assemble peacefully and protest under the Article 19(1)(b). 2. The protest was done against corruption and for the enactment of effective anti-corruption legislation, which would benefit the nation as a whole. 3. The protest was not in favour of violence and did not resulted in any threat to security and public order. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The imposition of section 144 crpc was necessary to maintain safety of public. 2. Stressed the need to prevent the inconvenience that might have caused to the residents because of the gathering. **JUDGMENT** *Ratio Decidendi*: The court highlights the importance of fundamental rights mentioned under the Indian constitution. While affirming the right to peaceful assembly, the court said that this right is not absolute and can be an important subject to reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order and security. The court assessed the proportionality of restrictions which were imposed by the government under section 144 of crpc. Considering that there should be a balance between in protesting and maintaining public order and security. *Obiter Dicta*: Proper balance between interests of individuals and interests of society should be maintained. Also, democratic values like right to dissent and peaceful protest should be given value and importance. **CONCLUSION AND COMMENTS** The court warned against the excessive force used by authorities in dispersing peaceful gathering and mentioned state’s responsibility to respect the dissent of citizens. This ruling case set a precedent involving right to peaceful gathering, establishing clear guidelines for the State. Overall the judgment reflects the crucial and important role of judiciary in safeguarding the democratic values and ensuring the protection of fundamental rights of citizens. It serves as a reminder for the responsibility of the judiciary to serve as a watchdog against arbitrary exercise of power and to maintain the principles of justice, fairness, and constitutionalism. **REFERENCES** 1. Important cases referred** - Maneka Gandhi v. union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248 - Himat Lal K. Shah v. Commissioner of police (1973) 1 SCC 227 - People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India (2003) 4 SCC 399 - Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar AIR 1962 SC 955 2. **Important statutes referred** - The Constitution of India, 1947 - The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - The Police Act, 1861 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [MANOJ KUMAR SONI V. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH](https://lawfoyer.in/manoj-kumar-soni-v-the-state-of-madhya-pradesh/) **Published:** March 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **AUTHOR: CHELIMELA LAKSHMI, DR.B.R. AMBEDKAR COLLEGE OF LAW, ANDHRA UNIVERSITY** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** In the case of Manoj Kumar Soni V. The state of Madhya Pradesh with Kallu@Habib V. The state of Madhya Pradesh, there were six accused persons namely Suleman, Arif, Jaihind, Manoj Kamar Soni, Kallu@Habib and a minor. Except minor remaining accused persons were convicted and sentenced for five different offences under Indian Penal Code,1860 by the Additional Sessions Judge \[‘Trail Court’, hereafter\] dated 28/11/2022. The judgement given by the Trail Court was the accused person that is Manoj Kumar Soni was assailed for the offence punishable under section 411 of Indian Penal Code ,1860 and other accused that is Kallu @Habib was assailed for the offence punishable under section120B of Indian Penal Code, 1860.The High Court Of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Jabalpur affirmed the judgement given by the Trail Court. Therefore, the five accused preferred Special Leave Petition before the High Of Madhya Pradesh. However the Special Leave Petitions of Suleman, Asif, Jaihind were dismissed and Manoj Kumar Soni’s and Kallu @Habib petitions were accepted. However judgement given by the Trail Court was overturned by the Supreme Court and said that a judgement cannot be passed by considerering only the disclosure statements given by the co-accused. **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***Manoj Kumar Soni V. The State Of Madhya Pradesh with Kallu@Habib V. The State Of Madhya Pradesh*Case Number***Criminal Appeal Number.1030/2023 Criminal Appeal Number.1458/2023*Judgement Date***August 11,2023*Court***The Supreme Court Of India*Quorum***One*Author***Dipankar Datta*Citation***2023 SCC Online SC 1227*Legal Provisions Involved***Section 392, 394 ,411,120B of IPC,1860 and Section 114 of Indian Evidence Act,1872.**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** In this case, there were five accused persons but the entire case revolves around the conviction of Manoj Kumar Soni and Kallu @Habib for the offence of Robbery under section 392 of IPC,1860. The Judgement given by the Trail Court was challenged by the appellants in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh and in the Supreme Court of India through criminal appeals. According to the complainant, four members were entered into their house and committed the offence of Robbery, By the process of investigation, it was revealed that Kallu was the complainant’s former driver and Manoj Kumar Soni allegedly purchased stolen articles from the other accused. However, the complainant identified the three of the accused persons namely Suleman, Arif and Jaihind and fourth person was unidentified but in the investigation it was revealed that, the fourth person was a minor. Manoj Kumar Soni and Kallu were arrested only on the basis of disclosure statements given by the co-accused persons. **FACTS OF THE CASE** In this case, the complainant and servant were in the house and while they were doing their works, four persons rang the doorbell. When the servant opened the door, the four persons armed with a pistol forcefully entered into the house. The four persons tied up the hands and legs of complainant and servant and they threatened to kill them and they started to rob the silver and gold jewellery, cash and other valuables by taking the keys to the locker. The four persons remained at the complainant’s house till 2:30pm before escaping. Therefore an FIR has been filed at around 4:30pm against four unknown persons under section 394 of IPC,1860 and they were subsequently arrested. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether the disclosure statements were sole basis of conviction? 2. Whether the judgement given by the Trail Court and affirmed by the High Court Of Madhya Pradesh was justified based on the evidence presented? 3. Whether the appellants involvement in the robbery and conspiracy were proven beyond reasonable doubt? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the four independent witnesses who were present at the Manoj’s house turned hostile and failed to support the prosecution case of seizure. 2. The prescribed procedure was not followed in respect of seizure of property. 3. There was a procedural flaw in the statement of the complainant and PW19\[Tahsildar\]. 4. There was no proper evidence regarding the ornaments which were recovered from the possession of Manoj, whether the recovered ornaments belong to the complainant. Therefore, the presumptions made under section 114 of Indian Evidence Act,1872 was erroneously drawn. There was a serious lapse in the identification process. 5. The Trail Court did not consider the statement recorded under section 313 of CrPC. 6. The Trail Court completely relied on the statements of the police witnesses without additional statements pf independent seizure witnesses, who were subsequently turned hostile. 7. No proper evidence was presented regarding the offence under section 120A of IPC,1860, punishable under section 12B of IPC,1860. 8. Kallu was arrested based on two reasons only. They were: 1. Firstly, that Rs3000 was recovered from him during the investigation based on information provided by the accused namely, Jaihind. 1. Secondly, Kallu used to be the complainant’s driver one year ago. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Respondent submitted that The Trail Court and The High Court Of Madhya Pradesh deeply look into the materials on record and the both courts did not find and any contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witness while considering the evidence. 1. There were no procedural flaws, so there was no reason to interfere with the judgement and order passed by the Trail Court and affirmed by The High Court. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** 1. Section 411,392,394,120B of IPC,1860 2. Section 313 of Crpc,1973 3. Section 27,114 of IEA,1872 **JUDGEMENT (RATIO DECIDENDI)** The Supreme Court overturned the appellants convictions and said that disclosure statements of co-accused lacked credibility and supporting evidence. **CONCLUSION & COMMENT** Honourable Supreme Court of India has held that the evidenciary value of disclosure statements under section 27 of IEA,1872 made by the accused himself has to be established. However, no judgement should be given solely relied on disclosure statements. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** Suresh Kumar Bahri V. State of Bihar Pulukuri Kottaya V. Emperor Shiv Kumar V. State of Madhya Pradesh Tapondas V. State of Bombay Haricharan Kurmi Jogia Hajam V. State of Bihar **Important Statutes Referred** Indian Penal Code,1860 Code of Criminal Procedure code ,1973 Indian Evidence Act,1872 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases **Tags:** #law, #lawfoyer, #lawyer, #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, article, case analysis, case summary, lawfoyer, MANOJ KUMAR SONI V. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH --- ### [E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu](https://lawfoyer.in/e-p-royappa-v-state-of-tamil-nadu/) **Published:** March 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author:** **Konda Lakshmi Pravalika**, **Sri Padmavati Mahila Visvavidyalayam** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE*)*** Equality before the law implies that no individual, regardless of their status or position, is above the law. It ensures that everyone is subject to the same legal principles and processes, without any special privileges. On the other hand, equal protection of laws requires that laws be applied equally and without discrimination to all individuals in similar circumstances. A Pivotal precedent was established by the landmark ruling of the Supreme Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu[\[1\]](#_ftn1). A bench comprising Chief Justice A.N. Ray, Justice D.G. Palekar, Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, Justice P.N. Bhagwati, and Justice V.R. Krishnaiyer, emphasized: *“Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be ‘cribbed cabined and confined’ within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact, equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; while one upholds the rule of law in a republic, the other aligns with the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch.”* The Supreme Court articulated that equality is a dynamic concept with various dimensions. It asserted that equality and arbitrariness are fundamentally incompatible, with arbitrariness being contrary to both political logic and constitutional law. Acts of arbitrariness are deemed unequal and thus violate Article 14[\[2\]](#_ftn2) of the Constitution. The Court has emphasized that differentiation is not inherently discriminatory as long as there is a rational basis for it. The court acknowledged that Article 14 prohibits class legislation but allows for reasonable classification. Any statute failing to meet the essential requirements of Article 14 would be deemed void, and no legislative act could be considered “arbitrary.” An order lacking a valid determining principle would be deemed arbitrary, with valid classification serving as the determining principle. Article 14 does not guarantee freedom from arbitrariness, rather, it ensures that classification follows norms laid down by the Supreme Court to avoid arbitrariness. *Keywords:* Equality, arbitrariness, public servant, Mala fide, Supreme Court, Constitution. **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***E.P.Royappa vs State of Tamil Nadu & Anr*Case Number***Writ Petition No. 284 of 1972*Judgement Date***23 November, 1973*Court***Supreme Court of India*Quorum***A.N.Ray, D.G.palekar, Y.V. Chandrachud, V.R. Krishnaiyer*Author***A.N. Ray*Citation***AIR 1974 SCC 555*Legal Provisions Involved***Constitution of India — Arts. 14, 16, and 32 Indian Administrative Service (Pay) Rules, 1954 – Rule 9(1) Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954 – Rule 4(2) **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** In the landmark case of *‘E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1973)*‘, the Supreme Court, comprising *justices Y. V. Chandrachud, P. N. Bhagwati, and V. R. Krishna Iyer,* made significant observations on Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. The Court emphasized that Article 16 embodies the fundamental guarantee of equality of opportunity in matters concerning employment or appointment to any office under the State. While Art. 16 stands as a distinct fundamental right due to its crucial role in ensuring equality of opportunity in public employment, it is, in essence, an application of the broader concept of equality enshrined in Article 14. Article 14 serves as the overarching principle, while Art. 16 is a specific instance applying the doctrine of equality to public employment. Both articles are rooted in the principle of equality and the prohibition of discrimination. The Court stressed that equality is not to be narrowly construed but is instead a dynamic concept with multiple dimensions, resistant to being confined within rigid limits.The Court further asserted that equality and arbitrariness are inherently opposed. While equality is fundamental to the rule of law in a republic, arbitrariness aligns with the whims of an absolute monarch. Acts of arbitrariness are inherently unequal and thus violate both Art. 14 and Art. 16. State actions must be based on relevant principles applicable uniformly to all similarly situated individuals, without being influenced by extraneous or irrelevant considerations. Any deviation from this principle constitutes a mala fide exercise of power, prohibited by both Art. 14 and Art. 16. The Court clarified that the scope of Art. 14 and Art. 16 extends beyond cases where a public servant has a right to a particular post. Even in cases of officiating positions, a public servant can allege a violation of Article 14 and 16 if they have been subjected to arbitrary or unfair treatment or a mala fide exercise of power by the State machinery[\[3\]](#_ftn3). **FACTS OF THE CASE** - The petitioner, a member of the Indian Administrative Service in Tamil Nadu, was assigned to act as Additional Chief Secretary on July 11, 1969, when the post was temporarily created for a duration of one year. - In November 1969, when the position of Chief Secretary to the State became vacant, the petitioner was selected for the role, being deemed the most suitable candidate. - Approval for the appointment was granted by the Chief Minister after reviewing the draft order. - Upon the State Government’s recommendation to consider the Chief Secretary and the First Member of the Board of Revenue as interchangeable selection posts, the Central Government, through a notification dated January 14, 1970, equated the pay of the First Member, Board of Revenue to that of the Chief Secretary. - Subsequently, by notification dated August 31, 1970, the Government of India elevated the pay, rank, and status of the Chief Secretary’s post to that of the Secretary to the Government of India, surpassing all other cadre posts in the State, including that of the First Member, Board of Revenue. - On April 17, 1971, the State Government sanctioned the creation of a temporary post of Deputy Chairman in the State Planning Commission at the Chief Secretary grade for one year, appointing the petitioner to the role with entitlements equivalent to those of the Chief Secretary. However, the petitioner did not assume this position and instead went on leave. - Upon the petitioner’s return from leave, the post of Deputy Chairman was reestablished for another one-year term at the Chief Secretary grade, and the petitioner was appointed to the role. However, the petitioner contested the extension of the Deputy Chairman’s tenure beyond one year, citing Rule 4(2) of the Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954. - Subsequently, the State Government created a temporary position of Officer on Special Duty to streamline and rationalize the Sales Tax Act, at the Chief Secretary grade, and appointed the petitioner to that role. However, the petitioner did not assume this position and instead proceeded on leave. - After transferring the petitioner from the Deputy Chairman role in the Planning Commission to the Officer on Special Duty position for revising Sales Tax laws, the State Government abolished the previously sanctioned Deputy Chairman post and created a new Deputy Chairman post at the grade of First Member, Board of Revenue, with a monthly pay of Rs. 3000. A First Member of the Board of Revenue was appointed to this new post. - Additionally, upon the petitioner’s transfer from the Chief Secretary position, a person junior to the petitioner was promoted as Chief Secretary and confirmed in that role. - The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, seeking a mandamus or any other appropriate writ to challenge the validity of his transfer from the Chief Secretary position to the Deputy Chairman role and then to the Officer on Special Duty position. - The petitioner argues that these transfers were violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, as the Deputy Chairman and Officer on Special Duty roles were inferior in rank and status compared to that of Chief Secretary. - Furthermore, the petitioner alleges that these transfers were made in a mala fide manner, not due to the necessities of administration or public service, but rather because the second respondent was displeased with the petitioner and sought to remove him from his position. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether the petitioner’s transfers to subsequent positions contrary to the proviso of Rule 4(2) of the Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954, and Rule 9\[sub-r.(1)\] of the Indian Administrative (Pay) Rules, 1954? 2. Whether the transfers violate Article 14 and Article 16 of the Constitution of India? 3. Whether the respondent’s act of transferring the petitioner done in a mala fide manner or not? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the appointment was in contradiction to the proviso to rule 4(2) of the Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954, and rule 9 (sub-rule 1) of the Indian Administrative Service (Pay) Rules 1954. 2. Additionally, the petitioner contended that the appointment violated fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. They argued that the roles of Deputy Chairman, State Planning Commission, and Officer on Special Duty were considered to be of lower rank and status compared to the position of Chief Secretary, thereby infringing upon the principle of equality and equal opportunity. 3. Furthermore, the petitioner alleged that the appointment was driven by ulterior motives and personal grudge rather than genuine administrative requirements. They claimed that the second respondent(the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu), was displeased with the petitioner due to various incidents detailed in the petition. As a result, the appointment was perceived as a means to sideline or remove the petitioner from their position, rather than being made in the interest of effective governance or public service. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Respondent submitted that the petitioner was appointed in an acting capacity to the position of Chief Secretary, and this appointment was justified under Fundamental Rule 9(19)[\[4\]](#_ftn4). According to this rule, a government servant officiates in a post when they perform the duties of a position held by another individual or when the government deems it appropriate to appoint a government servant to act in a vacant position that no other government servant holds. 1. The respondents argued that the actions taken by respondent number 2 were not hasty and were not driven by malicious intent. Therefore, they asserted that the petitioner’s argument lacks merit. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** 1. **Article 14 of the Indian Constitution : “***The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India*[\[5\]](#_ftn5).**”** 1. Article 16 of the Indian constitution : “***Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment[**\[6\]**](#_ftn6).**”*** 1. Article 32 of the Indian constitution : “***Article 32 grants every individual the right to move the Supreme Court for the enforcement of their fundamental rights. This means that if someone believes their fundamental rights have been violated, they can approach the Supreme Court directly for relief. It also ensures that not only do individuals have the right to move the Supreme Court, but the Court also has the power to issue appropriate orders, directions, or writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights[**\[7\]**](#_ftn7).**”*** 1. Rule 9(1) of Indian Administrative Service (Pay) Rules, 1954 : *“****No member of the Service shall be appointed to a post other than a post specified in Schedule III, unless the State Government concerned in respect of posts under its control, or the Central Govt. in respect of posts under its control as the case may be, make a declaration that the said post is equivalent in status and responsibility to a post specified in the said schedule[**\[8\]**](#_ftn8).**”*** 1. **Rule 4(2) of Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954: “***The Central Government shall, ordinarily at the interval of every five years, re-examine the strength and composition of each such cadre in consultation with the State Government or the State Governments concerned and may make such alterations therein as it deems fit: Provided that nothing in this sub-rule shall be deemed to affect the power of the Central Government to alter the strength and composition of any cadre at any other time: Provided further that State Government concerned may add for a period not exceeding two year and with the approval of the Central Government for a further period not exceeding three years, to a State or Joint Cadre one or more posts carrying duties or responsibilities of a like nature to cadre posts[**\[9\]**](#_ftn9).**”*** **JUDGEMENT**: The bench rejected the petition unanimously. 1**.** Justices Bhagwati, Chandrachud, and Krishna Iyer clarified that the petitioner’s promotion to Chief Secretary was temporary, indicated in the authenticated order. Chief Justice Ray and Justice Palekar highlighted the previous Chief Secretary’s retention of lien until retirement, preventing substantive filling of the position. 2\. Justices Bhagwati, Chandrachud, and Krishna Iyer affirmed that the State of Tamil Nadu lacked authority to introduce new posts like Deputy Chairman, State Planning Commission, and Officer on Special Duty into the Cadre, while Chief Justice Ray stated this alteration violated the Cadre Rules. 3\. Justice Bhagwati noted discrepancies in ranking for Deputy Chairman and Officer on Special Duty but stated the petitioner’s acceptance precluded challenging their validity. Violation of Rule 9(1) did not constitute an infringement of fundamental rights. 4\. Justice Bhagwati dismissed the argument of arbitrary transfers and promotions as lacking sufficient evidence. The petitioner’s allegations of malice against the Chief Minister were deemed baseless. 5\. The burden of proving malice fell heavily on the petitioner, with the Court dismissing their allegations against the Chief Minister due to lack of evidence. 6\. Consequently, the petition was dismissed based on the aforementioned findings. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The Supreme Court determined that both positions required individuals of high competence, viewing them as equally important as the petitioner’s top-tier cadre posts. The petitioner’s expertise led to their appointment as Officer on Special Duty, with both roles considered equal in status and responsibility. The government’s actions were found to lack ill intent, as the petitioner diligently fulfilled their duties without objection. No evidence supported the petitioner’s allegations against the Chief Minister, resulting in the dismissal of the petition. The verdict rendered by the honorable justices remains a well-regarded judgment in law and continues to be applicable. Both the verdict and the justices’ opinions hold a significant place in Indian jurisprudence. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1)E.P.Royappa v. State of Tamilnadu, [\[2\]](#_ftnref2)Article 14, of the Indian Constitution. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3)What the Supreme Court said on Article 14 in E P Royappa Case? (last visited Feb.25, 2024). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4)Fundamental Rule 9(19), [http://www.bareactslive.com](http://www.bareactslive.com/NER/NER562.HTM#:~:text=an%20ordinary%20year) [\[5\]](#_ftnref5)Article 14, of the Indian Constitution, [\[6\]](#_ftnref6)Article 16, of the Indian Constitution, [\[7\]](#_ftnref7)Article 32, of the Indian Constitution, [\[8\]](#_ftnref8)Rule 9(1) of Indian Administrative Service (Pay) Rules, 1954, [https://mahaias.maharashtra.gov.in/mahaias/rules/pay\_rule.htm](https://mahaias.maharashtra.gov.in/mahaias/rules/pay_rule.htm) [\[9\]](#_ftnref9)Rule 4(2) of Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954, [https://dopt.gov.in/sites/default/files/Revised\_AIS\_Rule\_Vol\_II\_IAS\_Rule\_01\_0.pdf](https://dopt.gov.in/sites/default/files/Revised_AIS_Rule_Vol_II_IAS_Rule_01_0.pdf) **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 355](https://lawfoyer.in/t-m-a-pai-foundation-v-state-of-karnataka-air-2003-sc-355/) **Published:** March 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: **Diya Dhall, Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies – Technical Campus**** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment in T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 252 of 1979) was delivered by the Supreme Court of India on October 31, 2002. The case dealt with the interpretation of Article 30 of the Indian Constitution regarding the rights of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions. The court clarified that minorities, both religious and linguistic, have the right to establish and manage educational institutions of their choice. It held that admission to unaided minority institutions cannot be regulated by the state or university, and minorities have the autonomy to determine admission procedures, provided they are fair and merit-based. The court also ruled on various related legal issues raised in the case, including the definition of minorities, the scope of Article 30, and the applicability of certain precedents. ***Keywords*:** Minority, Fundamental Rights, Religion, Educational Institution, Linguistic Minority, Establishment and Administration. **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***T.M.A. Pai Foundation V. State of Karnataka*Case Number***Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 252 of 1979*Judgement Date***31 October, 2002*Court***Supreme Court of India*Quorum***B.N.Kirpal,CJI & G.B.Pattanaik & V.N.Khare & S.Rajendra Babu & S.S.M.Quadri*Author***V.N. Khare*Citation***AIR 2003 SUPREME COURT 355*Legal Provisions Involved***Article 14 of the Indian Constitution Article 19 of the Indian Constitution Article 25 of the Indian Constitution Article 26 of the Indian Constitution Article 29 of the Indian Constitution Article 30 of the Indian Constitution**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** In Part III of the Indian Constitution, there is Article 30 which provides for the rights of minorities in establishing and managing educational institutions. It is often called the “Constitutional Rights of Academics”. According to this article, every minority community has the right to establish and administer its own educational institutions of their choice. Language or religion should not be a barrier to any minority group’s decision in setting up and running educational institutions. The fact that Article 30 is very useful for minorities makes it quite crucial as well. According to Article 30 of the Indian Constitution, all minorities have the right to set up and manage educational institutions based on their religion or language. The government cannot deny aid to an institution solely on the grounds of it being run by a minority, even if there is no language or religious basis for such support. **FACTS OF THE CASE** The Academy of General Education was founded by Dr. T.M.A. Pai as an academic institution under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 in Manipal, which was then a part of the state of Madras but later became a part of the state of Karnataka after the states were recognized. The governor enacted Karnataka Educational Institutions Ordinance, 1984 which provided that no capital charge should be imposed and forbidden to charge excess fees from students without any ethical justification. A writ petition was filed challenging the constitutional validity of this statute and also order dated July 19, 1984 passed by the State Government putting limit on number admissions to colleges and setting apart 40% seats for government quota. During pendency of this petition, The Karnataka Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1984 came into force which prescribed rates for capitation fee and tuition fee for private unaided educational institutions who received no aid from government. Because it did not receive any financial assistance from the State Government, this college was classified as unaided private educational institution. In 1993 a writ petition was filed by Islamic Academy Of Education along with connected petitions before a Bench consisting of five Judges. These cases were subsequently referred to Bench consisting of seven judges and finally the case was placed before a Bench of 11 Judges which further leads to the present case in which the court tries to answer the 11 questions presented before it. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. What is the meaning and content of the expression “minorities” in Article 30 of the Constitution of India? 2. What is meant by the expression “religion” in Article 30(1)? Can the followers of a sect or denomination of a particular religion claim protection under Article 30(1) on the basis that they constitute a minority in the State, even though the followers of that religion are in majority in that State? 3. Whether the admission of students to minority educational institution, whether aided or unaided, can be regulated by the State Government or by the University to which the institution is affiliated? 4. Whether the minority’s rights to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice will include the procedure and method of admission and selection of students? 5. Whether the minority institutions’ right of admission of students and to lay down procedure and method of admission, if any, would be affected in any way by the receipt of State aid? 6. Whether it would be correct to say that only the members of that minority residing in State ‘A’ will be treated as the members of the minority vis–vis such institution? 7. Whether the member of a linguistic non-minority in one State can establish a trust/society in another State and claim minority status in that State? 8. Whether the ratio laid down by this Court in the St. Stephen’s case (St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi is correct? 9. Whether the decision of this Court in Unni Krishnan J.P. v. State of A.P. (except where it holds that primary education is a fundamental right) and the scheme framed thereunder required reconsideration/modification and if yes, what? 10. Whether the non-minorities have the right to establish and administer educational institution under Article 21 and 29(1) read with Articles 14 and 15(1), in the same manner and to the same extent as minority institutions? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Petitioner submitted that the Karnataka Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1984 contravened Article 30 of the constitution which provides for the right of religious and linguistic minorities to establish and administer their own educational institutions. 2. The counsels for Petitioner submitted that Konkani was spoken by only a small fraction of the people living in that state; hence it was a minority language. 3. The counsels for Petitioner submitted that since TMA Pai spoke Konkani as his mother tongue, so after he died a Konkani medium institution should be set up in memory of him and for continuation of his aims. Also, under this article is covered the minority language, Konkani of Karnataka. 4. The counsels for Petitioner submitted that it includes no interference by the State with nominations to Governing Bodies, admission policies for students, fee structures and appointment of teachers among other things with regards to private education institutions. In light of this therefore private educationists are to have total freedom over their administration. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Respondent submitted that since Article 30 is not an unalienable or absolute right, the government is entitled to impose reasonable restrictions and limitations on the private educational institutions owned by minorities in the name of efficient and just administration. 1. The counsels for Respondent submitted that purpose of the Act’s passage was to prohibit the practice of commercializing education and imposing capitation fees. Therefore, neither Articles 30, 14, or 19 of the Constitution are violated by the Act’s provisions. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** 1. Article 14 of the Indian Constitution 2. Article 19 of the Indian Constitution 3. Article 25 of the Indian Constitution 4. Article 26 of the Indian Constitution 5. Article 29 of the Indian Constitution 6. Article 30 of the Indian Constitution **JUDGEMENT (RATIO DECIDENDI)** 1. The Court held that the term ‘minority’ under Article 30 include both religious and linguistic minority. The minorities are to be considered state wise as the states in India are reorganised on the basis of language. 1. The Court held that the Article 30 of the Indian Constitution gives both linguistic and religious minority to establish and administer educational institution of their choice. It includes professional educational institutions. 1. The Court held that admission of students to unaided minority educational institutions cannot be regulated by the State or the University as Right to admit students is an essential facet of right to administer educational institutions of their choice, the State Government or the University may not be entitled to interfere with that right in respect of unaided minority institutions. 1. The court held that admission of students in an aided educational institution cannot be denied on the grounds of religion, caste, race, language or any of them. 1. The court held that the minority institution can have its own procedure and method od admission and of selection of students, but such procedure has to be fair and transparent and it should be based on merit. 1. The court held that the decision laid down in St. Stephen’s College case is not correct. 1. The court held that the scheme framed by the Court in Unni Krishnan’s case and the direction to impose the same, except where it holds that primary education is a fundamental right, is unconstitutional. 1. The court held that the term ‘education’ in the article of the Indian constitution means and includes education at all levels from primary to post graduate level. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment in T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka reaffirms the foundational principles of minority rights in education under the Indian Constitution. By recognizing the autonomy of minority institutions and protecting their rights to establish and manage educational institutions, the court upholds the diversity and inclusivity enshrined in the Constitution. The decision provides clarity on the scope and application of Article 30, ensuring that minority communities have the freedom to preserve and promote their cultural and linguistic heritage through education. It sets a crucial precedent for future cases involving minority rights, fostering a more equitable and inclusive educational landscape in India. The judgment serves as a testament to the judiciary’s commitment to upholding constitutional values and safeguarding the rights of all citizens, regardless of religious or linguistic affiliation. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi Gandhi Faizeam College v. Agra University D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab State of Kerala v. Very Rev. Mother Provincial Rev. Bishop S.K. Patro v. State of Bihar Rev. Sidharjbahi Sabhai v. State of Bombay State of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society and Ors. The State of Madras v. Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan **Important Statutes Referred** Constitution of India,1950 The Karnataka Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1984 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Delhi Cloth And General Mills & Ors. v.Union Of India & Ors. on 21st July 1983](https://lawfoyer.in/delhi-cloth-and-general-mills-ors-v-union-of-india-ors-on-21st-july-1983/) **Published:** March 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Khushi** (University Institute of Legal Studies, Panjab University, Chandigarh) **ABSTRACT** The petitioners/appellants challenged the constitutional validity of both s. 58A and r. 3A mainly on the ground that the obligation imposed by r. 3A contravened the rights guaranteed under Arts. 14 and 19(1) (g). The respondents raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petitions on the ground that an incorporated company, being not a citizen, could not complain of denial or deprivation of the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19(1) (g) and that the situation was not improved by joining either a shareholder or a director as co-petitioner. The apex court after looking upon facts and merits of the case Dismissed the petitions and appeals. **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***DECLARING s. 58 A and RULE 3A of companies( acceptance of deposit rules 1975) UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 19(1) (g)*Case Number***Civil appeal 4832*Judgement Date***21 July 1983*Court***Hon’ble Supreme Court of India*Quorum***3 bench judgement*Author***Hon’ble justice . DA DESAI*Citation***1983 AIR 937 1983 SCC(4) 166*Legal Provisions Involved***Section 58 A Rule 3A ( companies – Acceptance of deposit rules, 1975)**FACTS OF THE CASE** The Central Government is authorized by Section 58A of the Companies Act, 1956 to establish, among other things, the terms and conditions under which a company may solicit or receive deposits from the general public or its members.In addition, a company inviting deposits is required by Sub-rule (1) of Rule 3A of the Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules, 1975 to deposit or invest, by the 30th day of April of each year, a sum not to exceed 10% of the total amount of its deposits maturing during the year ending on the 31st day of March of the following year, using any one or more of the methods specified In that sub-rule. Furthermore, sub-rule (2) of r. 3A stipulates that the money invested or deposited may only be utilized to repay deposits that mature within the year mentioned in sub-rule (1).The petitioners/appellants claimed that Articles 14 and 19 of the Indian Constitution are violated by Section 58 A and Rule 3 A. In contrast, the Respondents raised a challenge at the preliminary phase against the maintainability of the writ petitions themselves. The reason for this is that an integrated corporation cannot claim that it has been denied a basic right protected by Article 19(1)(g) because it is not a citizen. Additionally, the replies claimed that adding a shareholder or director as a co-petitioner would not help the position. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether Section 58A of the Companies Act, 1956 (referred to as the “Act”) and Rule 3A of the Companies (Acceptance of Deposit) Rules, 1975, as well as the Companies (Amendment) Act, 1974 are constitutionally valid? 2. Whether the legislature possess the authority to implement Section 58A? 3. Whether an incorporated company file a complaint alleging that its fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g) and Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution have been violated? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant ( Mr. ST desai) submitted that if section 58A is broadly interpreted to cover how the firm’s money are used, then deposits made with the corporation will be included. Then, because Section 58A exceeds the permissible bounds of delegated legislation, it will be declared unconstitutional. Mr. S.T. Desai further argued that Rule 3A cannot be preserved as a regulatory measure since a regulatory measure needs to accomplish a goal that Rule 3A does not, namely, protect depositors, and the court should avoid taking a dogmatic or doctrinaire approach when reviewing the case. 2. On behalf of the petitioners, Mr. O.P. Malhotra brought up yet another argument: since the legislation relates to Entry 30 in the State List (Money lending and money lenders) rather than Entries 43 and 44 of the Union List, Parliament lacked the legislative authority to enact Sec. 58A and ipso facto Rule 3A. 3. Mr. G.A. Shah further brought up the further argument that Rule 3A is beyond the scope of section 58A and the Constitutions to the extent that it is limited retrospectively. 4. Mr. A. Subba Rao argued that the requirement to deposit 10% of the total amount of deposits maturing in a given year is extra vires the Constitution and should be repealed since it amounts to a temporary deprivation of property without any balancing responsibility or benefit. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Respondent – learned Attorney General (UOI) submitted that When it came to the maintainability of the Writ Petition, made a preliminary objection. The Attorney General argued that because the incorporated firm is not a citizen, it is not entitled to bring a writ petition alleging fundamental rights violations under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. The Attorney General further argued that as the Company has a legal personality separate from both the shareholders and the Directors, the situation will not improve simply by including the name of a shareholder or a director as one of the petitioners in the action. Additionally, the Attorney General requested Section 58A to implement legislative policy. The Legislature, not the Court, should decide whether the policy is wise or necessary. The Attorney General also argued that the legislative policy supporting the provision was created after seeking advice and consultation from the Reserve Bank of India, an expert organization, making the accusations of excessive delegation unsupportable. Aside from that, the Parliament, which had ultimate authority over the regulations and any exemptions or exclusionary clauses, was presented with the pertinent provisions in this case. 1. The Respondents also made an alternative position, arguing that since the exemption clause is severable and its invalidity would not impact the remainder of the plan even if it were otherwise lawful, the Court does not need to investigate its validity. 1. Ultimately, the Attorney General argued that even though the current rule restricts the fundamental right to conduct commerce or business, it is still reasonable because it is a regulatory measure designed to safeguard depositors from economically and socially disadvantaged backgrounds who might otherwise be taken advantage of by wealthy and powerful corporations. **JUDGEMENT** The Central Government has acted within its regulatory authority, the court ruled in this case. Protecting the interests of depositors and preventing misuse are the goals of Rule 3A. Rule 3 A requires the corporation to have liquid finances, which would allow it to fulfill its commitment when the deposits mature. As a result, Rule 3 A Is considered intra vires of Section 58 A. The Court noted that the money placed in accordance with Rule 3 A is still the company’s property. Therefore, Rule 3 A is not inherently confiscatory. Additionally, the Court stated that one should consider the provision’s immediate goal rather than its long-term effects. As a result, the Court rejected the petitioner’s allegations, according to which the Act was passed to increase deposits in nationalized banks. The Court further stated that the argument that a better provision could have been drafted than the one in place does not allow for an exception to be made. The reason for this is that the legislative determines what kind of regulatory action is permissible, and the Court would not investigate wisdom of legislature except to Article 13 of constitution. The Court further ruled that Rule 3 A is not irrelevant to the goal or intention for which the Central Government was granted authority under Section 58 A. When authority is granted to accomplish a goal and specific requirements are attached, the requirements must be just and reasonable and pertinent to the goal being pursued. In The requirements may be rejected on the grounds of arbitrariness in the absence of such causal linkages. Nonetheless, in this instance, the Central Government’s authority granted by Section 58 A to specify the conditions, methods, and upper bounds within which non-banking businesses may receive or solicit deposits has a clear goal. Preserving depositors and curbing corporate sector misuse were the main goals. Since the mischief was known, this regulatory measure served as a remedy. The court further stated that the State has a fundamental duty to defend the economically and socially vulnerable groups in society against the exploitation of the wealthy. Additionally, the Court decided that the Companies Act’s restrictions regarding authority transfer had not been broken (particularly Section 58 A). In this instance, the legislative policy is unambiguous and explicit with regard to providing safeguards against the power of the corporate sector. The Court further held that in cases involving Pith and Substance, if a piece of legislation falls under one entry but incidentally touches on or may enter a field covered by another List, it must be deemed valid in its entirety even though it may touch on subjects outside of its purview. On this instance, Entries 43 and 44 on the Union List are relevant to Section 58 A and thus the enactment cannot be viewed as a legislation on Money Lenders and Money- Lending \[Entry 30 of State List\]. The Parliament has the competency to enact Section 58 A. Ten percent of the deposits maturing during the year had to be deposited in the way specified by Rule 3 A, as per the mandate. Certain deposits would mature in the current scenario between April 1, 1978, and March 31, 1979. A proviso was included to provide for such sporadic circumstances, and the Court ruled that this did not render the Rule retroactive. In addressing the question of whether an Incorporated Company may file a complaint alleging that its fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g) and Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution have been violated, the Court declared that the law is unclear in this respect. The current situation is moving toward the view that, when it comes to the fundamental freedoms protected by Article 19, a shareholder’s rights and the rights of the company that the shareholders have formed are coextensive, and that to deny one would be to deny the other. It is therefore time to settle this dispute, but the petitions cannot be rejected at the threshold under the current legal system. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The Apex Court’s three-judge panel delivered a historic ruling in the area of corporate law. Applying a variety of legal grounds, the court in this case has correctly concluded that the Companies (Amendment) Act of 1974 introduced section 58A of the Companies Act, 1956 (referred to as the “Act”) and Rule 3A of the Companies (Acceptance of Deposit) Rules, 1975 are constitutionally lawful. This is due to the fact that the government created regulations that were designed to safeguard depositors from economically and socially marginalized groups who may otherwise be taken advantage of by wealthy and influential corporations. The benefits of this amendment to society have outweighed the drawbacks of Section 58 A that has even now been incorporated in 2013 act under section 73-76 of the act. In this instance, the Court could have appropriately addressed whether an incorporated company could have filed a complaint alleging that its fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g) and Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution were violated, but they chose not to. Nevertheless, even though this judgment has some flaws, overall, both the judgment and the government’s policy are positive steps because, according to Article 38 of the Indian Constitution, the state must work to advance the welfare of the populace by securing and defending a social order that ensures social, economic, and political justice permeates all facets of national life. These regulations merely serve to provide a semblance of security for the week and marginalized against notorious economic abuse of power by corporate sector. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** D.S.NAKARA V UNION OF INDIA (1983) 1 SCC 305 R.K GARG V UNION OF INDIA (1982) 1 SCR 947 R.C .COOPER V UOI (1970)3 SCR 530 STATE TRADING CORPORATION OF INDIA V. COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER ,VISHAKAPATNAM (1964) 4 SCR 99 BENNETT COLEMAN AND CO. V UNION OF INDIA (1973) 2 SCR 757 **Important Statutes Referred** Companies Act 1956 Companies(acceptance of deposit rules ) 1975 Constitution of India **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641](https://lawfoyer.in/indian-express-newspapers-v-union-of-india-1985-1-scc-641/) **Published:** March 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Romika Narotra, Amity University Noida** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** On December 6, 1984, the Supreme Court of India heard his case and had carefully considered legal issues regarding freedom of speech and expression and freedom of the press. The applicants Indian Newspapers (Mumbai) Private Limited and Others protested the government’s decision to export the printed material, claiming that it violated the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The court made a comprehensive assessment of various issues, including the functioning of customs, notifications issued under the Customs Act 1962 and the impact of payment duty on information and knowledge. He emphasized the state’s responsibility to promote popular education through the press and the need to strike a balance between taxation and constitutional freedom. Finally, the court ruled in favor of the petitioners, ruling that the tax imposed on foreign publications was illegal because it violated their rights to speech and expression. The controversial decision reiterates the important role of the media in democratic societies and emphasizes the need to comply with the rule of law when making policy. **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India*Case Number***1 SCC 641*Judgement Date***06/12/1984*Court***Supreme court of India*Quorum***VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) SEN, A.P*Author***E. S. Venkataramiah*Citation***1986 AIR 515*Legal Provisions Involved***Constitution of India Article 19(1)(a) Article 13(2) Customs Act, 1962**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** Legal information of Indian Express Newspapers (Mumbai) Pvt Ltd. Ltd. v. Union of India \[AIR 1985 SC 641\] is an important judicial decision on the order of importation of newspapers and its impact on freedom of expression and belief. Plaintiffs say this regulation undermines media freedom and reduces sales. Therefore, this decision is considered the most important decision because it establishes a link between freedom of the press and the principles of democracy. This relationship shows the important role of the media in protecting human rights. While Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and expression, Article 19(2) imposes some restrictions. The correctness of this decision lies in the recognition that freedom of the press is the foundation of democracy and an important element of checks and balances in the administrative process. **FACTS OF THE CASE** Indian Newspapers presentation (Mumbai) Pvt Ltd v. Union of India marked an important era in the field of Indian law regarding the decision of newspapers. The petitioners, including renowned newspapers and their employees, protest that these taxes violate the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression as defined in the Constitution of India. They argue that increases in newspaper prices lead to a decline in circulation, preventing the public from accessing important information and ideas, thus leading to the importance of freedom of content and the role of the media in healthcare. The document demonstrates the balance between economic policy and legal freedom and demonstrates the important role of the decision in supporting fundamental freedom. The court’s decision by the petitioners underscores the importance of upholding freedom of the press as a form of freedom and sets a precedent for future judicial review of the relationship between tax law and law in India. To understand the nuances of this case, a general analysis of the sociopolitical context is necessary. The Indian government’s decision to ban newspaper imports is seen as a way to curb the spread of information and propaganda. This law, considered a restriction of media freedom and an attack on independent media, was widely condemned by the media and non-governmental organizations. The legal battle not only resolves the issue of major import tariffs, but also raises important questions about the nature of democracy and the media’s role in managing government contracts. By challenging these provisions in the law, the petitioners have sought to reaffirm the importance of the media as a fourth medium and protect it from the interference effect of non-interference, while upholding the ideals of freedom and expression in the Constitution of India. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether the imposition of import duty on newsprint violates the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution by placing an unreasonable burden on the press. 2. Whether the imposition of import duty on newsprint disproportionately affects smaller and regional newspapers compared to larger publications, thereby violating the principle of equality under Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. 3. Whether the government’s power to levy taxes under Article 265 of the Indian Constitution can be exercised in a way that effectively stifles the freedom of the press, even if not explicitly mentioned as a permissible restriction under Article 19(2) of the Constitution. **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** In the landmark case of Indian Express (Mumbai) Pvt Ltd v. Union of India, the plaintiff’s lawyer argued that the newspaper’s decision violated the Constitutional bridge regarding recognition of freedom of speech and expression. They argue that these taxes have an impact on the media, increasing operating costs, hindering their ability to disseminate information to a wider audience, and undermining the core values of press freedom. The petitioners also challenged the legality of import under the Indian Customs Act, 1934, saying some items were not exempt from import, thus posing a burden on the printing industry. While the petitioners acknowledged the government’s right to tax newspapers, they said the tax should be reasonable and should not burden the media given their independent role in society. Therefore, the court asked the Indian government to re-examine the tax policy to ensure that it complies with the provisions of the law and does not burden newspapers. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** Responding to the petition, the respondents’ counsel, Union of India, argued that the newspaper’s decision was in the public interest and would save the government money. They argued that the necessity was to increase government revenue, so it had a legitimate purpose other than restricting press freedom. In addition, the Union of India appears to defend the imposition of import duty as a legal prerogative, claiming that the government has the right to control the duty as per the will of the law. They can also emphasize the need to balance freedom of the press with the exercise of financial rights, that is, this need is not too expensive for the media and does not violate the basic principles of freedom of speech and expression. **JUDGEMENT** 1. RATIO DECIDENDI** Indian Express (Bombay) Private Limited v. The Supreme Court of India, Union of India, issued an order to the central government on December 6, 1984, directing the gazetteer to reconsider the tax policy on water exports. The court emphasized that it should be examined whether tax laws violate the rights of speech and expression, especially freedom of the press. The proportionality of the clause represents the principle of adjudication that links freedom of speech and expression with the enduring role of the media in a democratic society. The decision emphasizes the importance of ensuring that government measures, including taxation, do not limit or hinder the media’s ability to fulfill their important duties in democratic structures. - OBITER DICTA** In Indian Express Newspapers (Mumbai) Pvt Ltd v. Union of India , the Supreme Court’s obiter judgment reflected the impact of import duties on newspapers on freedom of speech and expression. The Court recognized that these obligations could suppress information and ideas in newspapers and thus affect social order. However, these observations are cautionary statements made by the Court when discussing the general implications of the case and are not at the heart of the decision. **REFERENCES** 1. Global Freedom of Expression 2. Vidhi Legal Policy 3. Indian Kanoon 4. Indian Law Portal **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Ramesh Sanka Vs. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 589](https://lawfoyer.in/ramesh-sanka-vs-union-of-india-2019-3-scc-589/) **Published:** March 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Vinishalakshmi (SMT.K.G. Shah Law School / SNDT University)** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** In this present case the appellate (Ramesh Sanka) filed a Writ petition Under Article 32 of Indian Constitution Seeking for the issuance of Writ of Mandamus and CBI’S investigation into allegations against respondent. The petitioner alleged that the activities of Respondent i.e. (a company) had caused significant loss to the public exchequer and warranted prosecution for serval offences. The Respondent i.e. (the Company) countered the petition arguing it lacked bonafides and including personal issues and pending civil suits between the parties. The company denied the allegations and claimed that the petition did not involve any violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Indian Constitution. The Case addressed issues related to validity of the Writ Petition the allegations made against the company and the jurisdiction of the court to intervene in the matter. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*: Article 32 of Constitution of India, Writ of Mandamus, CBI Investigation, Writ Petition, Public exchequer.** **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***WRIT PETITION (Crl.) No. 142 of 2018*Case Number***W.P.(Crl.) No.000142/2018*Judgement Date***January 25th 2019*Court***Supreme Court*Quorum***Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre*Author***Hon’ble Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre & Hon’ble Justice Dinesh Maheshwari*Citation***AIRONLINE 2019 SC 28*Legal Provisions Involved***Article 32 of the Constitution of India.1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** In this case the petitioner/ Appellant (Ramesh Sanka) filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the constitution of India seeking relief against Respondent No. 12 (a Company) and others. The Petitioner/ Appellant (Ramesh Sanka) a former employee of Respondent No. 12 (a Company) raised grievances regarding the company’s business operations, financial dealings, and alleged irregularities. The petitioner/ Appellant (Ramesh Sanka) also implicated individuals and entities associated with Respondent No. 12 (a Company) in these matters. The Judgement outlines the proceedings, including responses from the respondent (a Company), arguments presented by all parties, and the court’s assessment of the case. Additionally, the Judgment addresses legal issues regarding the jurisdiction of Article 32 the nature of relief sought, and the appropriate forum for resolving disputes of this nature. 1. Writ of Mandamus:** The Latin Phrase **“Writ of** **Mandamus” [**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)** means ***“We Command”***. This Writ is used by the court to order public official who has failed to perform his duty or refused to do his duty, to resume his work. Besides public officials, Mandamus can be issued against any public body, corporation, an inferior court, a tribunal, or government for the same purpose. Only the High Court and Supreme Court in India have the authority to issue Writs. Article 226 of the Indian Constitution grants the High Courts the authority to issue Writs, and Article 32 of the Indian constitution grants the Supreme Court the Authority to do so. **Facts abouts Writ of Mandamus:** - Mandamus cannot be issued against a private individual. - Mandamus cannot be issued in the following cases: - To enforce departmental instruction that does not possess statutory force. - To Order someone to work when the kind of work is discretionary and not mandatory. - To enforce contractual Obligations. - Mandamus can’t be issued against the Indian President or State Governors. - Against the Chief Justice of a High Court acting in a Judicial capacity. - FACTS OF THE CASE** - Ramesh Sanka, the former Chief Executive Officer of a Limited Company, served in his position from June 2014 until December 31, 2016. - The petitioner Claims that Respondent No. 12(a company) and its directors and employees have engaged in financial misconduct in their business transactions with numerous entities in India and Overseas allegedly breaching several laws and regulations. - The petitioner asserts that they have actively communicated their concerns regarding certain irregularities. - The Petitioner contends that these activities have caused significant losses to the public exchequer and may constitute prosecutable offenses under relevant Acts. - The Writ Petition was brought to the attention of the Supreme Court initially limited to Specific Official Respondents (Respondent Nos. 7to 11) (Company), who submitted a status report in a sealed cover. - Respondent No.12 (a Company) made an appearance and submitted a petition requesting the dismissal of the Writ Petition on legal and factual grounds, alleging that it was not genuine and driven by personal motives. They argue that the petitioner, is attempting to resolve a personal matter through former employee aims to settle personal the petition. - The Petitioner (Ramesh Sanka) denies these allegations, ascertaining that there has been no suppression of material facts. - Several individuals and Organisations filed applications seeking remedies against Respondent No. 12 ( a Company) regarding their dealings with the company. - After Considering all parties involved, the Supreme Court declines to grant relief under Article 32. It states that the Article 32 is not the appropriate remedy for disputes arising from personal contractual rights between an employee and an employer. Such grievances should be addressed through civil suits or other civil law remedies. - The Court emphasizes that the ongoing civil suits between the parties should be pursued in accordance with the law. - The Court acknowledges that the Official respondents (Company) are conducting inquiries in their respective jurisdictions, and appropriate action will be taken based on the outcomes of these inquiries. - The Court dismisses the Writ Petition and Clarifies that its decision does not impact the ongoing inquiries or proceedings. It also dismisses various applications seeking relief against Respondent No. 12 (Company), directing applicants to pursue their grievances through appropriate judicial forums. - LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** - Whether the Petitioner/Appellant’s (Ramesh Sanka) Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India warrants the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus or any other Writ directing the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to investigate the allegations against Company (Respondent No.12)? - Whether the dealings and activities highlighted by the petitioner (Ramesh Sanka) regarding Company i.e. (Respondent No. 12) have caused significant losses to the public exchequer and rendered those involved liable for prosecution under various Acts? - Whether the allegations made by Mr. Ramesh Sanka against the Respondent No. 12 to 22(Company) are substantial and necessitate investigation by the CBI? - Whether the pendency of Civil Suits between the Petitioner/ Appellant (Ramesh Sanka) and Respondent no. 12 (Company) affects the validity or consideration of the Writ Petition under Article 32? - Whether the pendency of Civil suits between the petitioner (Ramesh Sanka) and Respondent No. 12(Company)affects the validity or consideration of the Writ Petition under Article 32? - PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the Petitioner or Appellant was the CEO of Respondent NO. 12 was a limited company working from June 2014 to December 2016. His grievances primarily concern the conduct of Respondent No. 12 and its management. He alleges that the company through its directors and employees has engaged in various financial irregularities in its business dealing both domestically and intentionally. - According to Petitioner/ Appellant these financial irregularities have violated numerous ACTS, Rules, and regulations. Despite his efforts to bring these matters to the attention of statutory authorities through complaints and representations they have gone unnoticed. Therefore, Ramesh Sanka (The Petitioner/Appellant) contends that there is a compelling need for investigation into the activities of Respondent NO.12(Company) to uncover the alleged misconduct and ensure accountability for their actions. - RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsels for Respondent submitted that On July 11th 2018 the court issued notice of the Writ Petition but limited it to Official respondent, Specifically Respondent No. 7 to 11. These respondents have submitted a status report, which was filed in a sealed cover. Additionally, one Official respondent has filed an Affidavit. - The Respondents, represented by Respondent No. 12 Company argues against the petition’s validity. They claim that the Writ Petition Lacks bonafide and is motivated by Personal Issues rather than genuine concerns for Public Interest. Respondent No.12 asserts that the petition is an attempt by a former employee to settle personal dispute with the company, noting the existence of civil suits between the parties. Furthermore, they allege that the petitioner has suppressed crucial facts in the petition, including the ongoing civil suits, and assert that the petition is filed with Ulterior Motives to tarnish (damage) the company’s image in the market. Additionally, the respondents argue that the Petition does not involve any violation of Fundamental Rights Guaranteed under the Constitution of India. They deny all allegations made by the Petitioner, deeming them baseless. - RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** - ***“Article 32 of the constitution of India (Right to Constitutional remedies”):*** It is a fundamental right which states that individuals have the right to approach the Supreme Court (SC) seeking enforcement pf other fundamental rights recognised by the constitution. - The Legal Provisions relevant to this case include Article 32 of Indian Constitution – Allows Individuals to seek enforcement of fundamental rights through writ petition before supreme court. Additionally, the judgment refers to the jurisdiction of the civil court for adjudicating disputed related to contractual rights and civil law remedies available to parties in such case. - JUDGEMENT** The Hon’ble Court has emphasized its intention to thoroughly review whether Ramesh Sanka has established a prima facie case of illegal activity that would justify a CBI investigation against company (Respondent No. 12) taking into account the appropriateness of CBI’s involvement and exhaustion of other available remedies. The Court will examine evidence of substantial losses to the public exchequer allegedly caused by company’s actions, which could result in liability under relevant laws. The court will assess the gravity of the allegations against the company in conjunction with the need for CBI intervention, balancing public interest and the existing redressal mechanisms. Although the presence of ongoing civil suits involving the parties does not render the Writ Petition under Article 32 invalid, the court will analyze the overlap of issues, the stage of proceedings, and alternative remedies before proceeding. The court’s decision on the validity and considerations of the Writ Petition will be influenced by judicial economy and the adequacy of civil remedies. **Lalita Kumari Vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 2 SCC 1**: In this case, the Supreme court of India laid down guidelines regarding the registration of FIRs by police authorities. It held that when information about the commission of a cognizable offence is received, the police must register an FIR,[\[2\]](#_ftn2) subject to certain exceptions. The court emphasised that the discretion of the police to conduct a preliminary inquiry before registering an FIR should not be used as a tool to avoid their duty to investigation. The judgment underscores the importance of promptly initiating investigation into allegations of illegal activity to ensure effective enforcement of the law. This case provides a framework for assessing the necessity of CBI intervention in cases where prima facie evidence suggests wrongdoing, aligning with the considerations highlighted in the scenario. - CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** In conclusion, that court states that it has not expressed any opinion on the various factual issues alleged and denied by the parties in the Writ Petition and related applications. It emphasis that its order will not influence any ongoing inquiries or proceedings which must be handled impartially. The court decides that it is unnecessary to entertain the numerous applications filed by different parties seeking relief against Respondent No. 12 (Company). Instead, it grants the applicants the freedom to pursue their grievances individually or collectively before an appropriate judicial forum in accordance with the law. With these considerations, the court finds no merit in the petitioner (Mr. Ramesh Sanka’s) Writ petition and dismisses it accordingly. - REFERENCES** - Important Cases Referred** - State of Uttaranchal Vs. Balwant Singh Chaufal & Ors. (2010 (3) SCC 402). - K.D. Sharma Vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Ors. (2008(12) SCC 481). - Arun Kumar Agrawal Vs. Union of India & Ors. (2014(2) SCC 609). - Lalita Kumari Vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 2 SCC 1. - Important Statutes Referred** - The Constitution of India The Companies Act 2013 by Avatar Singh --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) “Writ of Mandamus” Important case law – - **Sohanlal Vs. Union of India (1957).** - **Rashid Ahmad Vs. Municipal Board (1950).** - **Sharif Ahmad Vs. HTA Meerut (1977).** - **SP Gupta Vs. Union of India (1981).** - **C.G. Govindan Vs. The State of Gujarat (1991).** [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) “Lalita Kumari Vs. Government Of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 2 SCC 1. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Right To Maintenance Under Criminal Law: Provisions, Principles, And Cases](https://lawfoyer.in/right-to-maintenance-under-criminal-law-provisions-principles-and-cases/) **Published:** March 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author: Vinishalakshmi, SMT. K.G. Shah Law School Affiliated to SNDT University** **INTRODUCTION** Maintenance means giving necessary supplies to a person for survival. It includes Shelter, food, clothing and every aspect of human life. It is an Economic Umbrella to the Weaker having no sufficient means to maintain themselves. Section 3(b) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956 defines the term ‘Maintenance as it includes(i) In all cases provisions for food, clothing, residence, education and medical attendance and treatment and (ii) In case, of an Unmarried daughter it includes reasonable expenses of her marriage). It is the duty of every \[person to maintain his wife, children and parents who are unable to live on their own. Chapter IX containing sections 125 to 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 lays downs the provisions relating to the maintenance of dependent wife, children and parents. ***Keywords*:** Section 125 of Crpc, Chapter IX, Section 3(b) of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, Alimony, Maintenance. **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** - **Meaning:** In Simple WordsMaintenance means giving necessary supplies to a person for survival. It includes shelter, food, clothing and every aspect of human life.It is an economic Umbrella to the weaker having no sufficient means to maintain themselves. - **Definition:** Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 empowers the magistrate of First class to Order **1.** If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain: 1. His legally wedded wife, unable to maintain herself. 1. His minor son, legitimate or illegitimate**.** 1. His unmarried daughter,legitimate or illegitimateof any age (whether a minor or major). 1. His son or daughter, legitimate or illegitimateof any age who is physically or mentally disabled. 1. His parents (both father and mother) who are unable to maintain himself or herself, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, at such monthly rate as magistrate thinks fit, and no pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct: Provided that the Magistrate may order the father of a minor female child referred to in Clause (b) to make such allowance, until she attains her majority, if the magistrate is satisfied that the husband of such minor female child, if married, is not possessed of sufficient means. Provided further that the Magistrate may, during the pendency of the proceeding regarding monthly allowance for maintenance under this sub-section, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the interim maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, and expenses of such proceedings which the which the magistrate considers reasonable, and to pay the same to such persons as the magistrate may from time to time direct: Provided also that an application for the monthly allowance for the interim maintenance and expenses of proceedings under the **Second Proviso** shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within Sixty days (60 days) from the date of service of the notice of application to such person. (Inserted by Amendment Act 2001(50 of 2001) S.2 (w.e.f. 24-09-2001). - **Explanation– For the purpose of this Chapter-** - “minor” means a person who, under the provisions of the Indian Majority Act, 1875 (9 of 1875) is deemed not to have attained his majority.** - “Wife” includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not remarried.** - Any such allowance for the maintenance or interim maintenance and expenses for proceeding shall be payable from the date of the order, or, if so ordered, from the date of the application for maintenance or interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be. - If any person so ordered fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, any such magistrate may, for every breach order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person, for the whole or any part of each month’s ( allowance for the maintenance or the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be,) remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until the payment if sooner made: Provided that no warrant shall be issued for the recovery of any amount due to under this section unless application be made to the court to levy such amount within aa period of one year from the date on which it became due: Provided further that if such person offers to maintain his wife on condition of her living with him, and she refuses to live with him, such Magistrate may consider any grounds of refusal stated by her, and may make an order under this section notwithstanding such offer, if he is satisfied that there is just ground for so doing. **Explanation: If a husband has contracted married with another woman or keeps a mistress, is shall be considered to be just ground for his wife’s refusal to live with him.** - No wife shall be entitled to receive an (allowance for the maintenance or the interim maintenance and expenses of proceedings, as the case may be), from her husband under this section if she is living in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual consent. - On Proof that any wife in whose favour an order has been made under this section is living in adultery, or that without sufficient reason she refuses to live with her husband, or that they are living Separately by mutual consent, the Magistrate shall cancel the order. This section provides speedy relief and protects the deserted/ neglected wife, children or parents from starvation and has nothing to do with conjugal rights. **WHO CAN CLAIM MAINTENANCE UNDER SECTION 125?** As Stated above, the following person are entitled to claim maintenance under section 125 (1) are: 1. Wife** 2. Child/ Minor Child** 3. Parents (Father and Mother or Both)** **MAINTENANCE TO WIFE** For the Purpose of section 125 of Crpc **‘Wife’** means a legitimate or legally wedded wife. It also included divorced wife till she gets remarried. Section 125 of Crpc is a special provision and it is applicable to the married women of all religions. For the purpose of claiming maintenance under Section 125 of Crpc the wife must be an **‘abandoned wife’** (i.e., husband left her without reasonable cause), but not an **‘abandoning wife’** (i.e., the wife, who left her husband without reasonable cause). - **Provisions/Conditions: –** To invoke relief (Claim Maintenance) under Section 125 of Crpc by the married women (wife) the following conditions are to be satisfied: 1. The marriage must be legally wedded marriage as per their religion. 2. She must not refuse to live with her husband without reasonable cause. 3. She must not be Unchaste/live in adultery or remarried and 4. She must not live separately by mutual consent. **Exceptions: –** 1. No Allowances if the wife is living in “Adultery”. 2. If the wife without sufficient reason refuse to live with her husband. 3. If wife is living separately by mutual consent. If the above-mentioned exceptions are proved the interim maintenance order stands Cancelled. **MAINTENANCE TO MUSLIM WOMAN** The Code of Criminal Procedure is a territorial law and is applicable to all irrespective of their religion. Section 125 of Crpc is a special provision applicable to the married women of all religions including the Muslim Woman. The **Supreme Court** Upheld the Maintenance under **Section 125 Crpc** to Muslims Woman in a landmark case of **Mohammed Ahmed Khan Vs. Shah Bano Begum, AIR 1985 SC 945**. **MAINTENANCE TO CHILD/ MINOR CHILD** According to Section 125 of Crpc Children are entitled to maintenance. The “Word” child is not defined in the code. It means a child below **18 years** of age unable to maintain himself/herself by virtue or reason of physical or mental abnormality and need not necessarily be a minor. - A Minor child whether legitimate or illegitimate. - An unmarried daughter of any age. - A son or daughter of any age, who suffers from physical or mental disability. According to Section 3 of the Indian Majority Act, 1875 a minor is a person who has not completed eighteen years (18) of Age. The Minority extends to 21 years if a guardian is appointed to look after the minor’s person or property. In simple words Minor means a person under the Provisions of the Indian **Majority Act 1875** is deemed not have attained his majority. i.e., Who has not completed the age of 18 years. The Minority extends to 21 years if a guardian is appointed to look after the minor person. Section 125 Of Crpc is applicable to the Children of Muslim parents also.[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1) **MAINTENANCE TO PARENTS (FATHER AND MOTHER OR BOTH)** It is a Social and Pious Obligation to maintain parents. A Father or Mother unable to Maintain himself/herself is entitled to claim maintenance from his/her son. There is a Conflict of Opinion among various High Courts with regard to the question whether daughter has an obligation to maintain her parents? This question has been resolved by the court in:[**\[2\]**](#_ftn2) The Expression father or mother includes adoptive father or Mother and it does not include step father or step mother. If there are two or more children the parents may claim maintenance from one of them or all of them. A petition against any person in any district- - Where he reside. - Where he or his wife reside. - Where they both last resided. In the Case of **Pandurang Bhaurao Dabhade Vs. Baburao Bhaurao Dabhade,** the Bombay High Court ruled that if a parent is unable to support himself, they may seek maintenance under Section 125(1) (d). However, its also crucial to remember that if t parents ask for maintenance from their children (son/ daughter) the children (son/ daughter) must have the money to support them even if they ignore or refuse to support their parents. **IMPORTANT CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS** 1. Mohammed Ahmed Khan Vs. Shah Bano Begum AIR 1985 SC 945.** 2. **Facts of the Case:** Mohammed Ahmed Khan got married to Shah Bano Begum. After 45 years of their marriage Ahmed Khan divorced Shah Bano begum by Pronouncing **‘Triple Talaq’** (i.e., Talak Talak Talak). Shah Bano Begum filed a petition against her husband for maintenance under section 125 of Crpc. - **Held:** In this Case The Trial Court and Madhya Pradesh High Court upheld the Petition by a Muslim Woman Shah Bano for maintenance on the ground that Section 125 of Crpc is applicable to all including the Muslim Women. Ahmed Khan Preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court contending that he had no obligations to pay maintenance beyond the Iddat Period. But the Supreme Court did not admit his contention and upheld the Maintence to Shah Bano. - Noor Saba Khatoon Vs. Mohd Quasim (1997) CrLJ 3972 (SC)** In this Case, it was held that the children of Muslim parents are entitled to claim maintenance under section 125 of Crpc for the period till they attain majority or are able to maintain themselves whichever is earlier, and in case of a female, till they get married. - Vijaya Manohar Arbat Vs. Kashirao Rajaram Sawai,1987 CrLJ 977 (SC)** In this Case, it was held that, the daughter whether married or not is liable to maintain her parents. Before passing the order of maintenance in favour of parents against their daughter, the court must be satisfied that the daughter has sufficient means of her own irrespective of her husband’s income. (If a married woman/ wife has separated from her husband in order to feed/ maintain her parents, it may be regarded as a “reasonable cause” and she may be entitled to claim maintenance from her husband. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The protection of the rights of the divorced wife, children, and elderly parents depends on Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is designed to safeguard them against strange means of living. Everyone with the necessary resources has a responsibility to maintain their property. There are serval provisions connected to maintenance included in this Chapter of the Cr.P.C. such as who is entitled to maintenance, necessary requirements for awarding maintenance, procedure for maintenance, modification of the prior order, enforcement of order of maintenance etc. **REFERENCES** 1. Books / Commentaries / Journals Referred** 1. Ratanlal and Dhirajlal The Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. 2. Cases Referred** 1. Mohammed Ahmed Khan Vs. Shah Bano Begum AIR 1985 SC 945 (Popularly Known as ‘Shah Bano Case’). 1. Noor Saba Khatoon Vs. Quasim (1997) Cr.L.J.3972 (SC). 1. Vijaya Manohar Arbat Vs. Kashirao Rajaram Sawai 1987 Cr.L.J. 977 (SC). 3. Statutes Referred** 1. The Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (Bare Act). --- [**\[1\]**](#_ftnref1) **Noor Saba Khatoon Vs. Mohd Quasim (1997) CrLJ 3972 (SC).** [**\[2\]**](#_ftnref2) **Vijaya Manohar Arbat Vs. Kashirao Rajaram Sawai, 1987 CrLJ 977 (SC).** **Categories:** Articles, Criminal Procedure Law --- ### [CPL Ashish Kumar Chauhan v. Commanding Officer](https://lawfoyer.in/cpl-ashish-kumar-chauhan-v-commanding-officer/) **Published:** March 2, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **AUTHOR: INNAMA HAIDER (AMITY UNIVERSITY)** **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** In this present case a appellant who was a radar technician who was serving with Indian Army Officer who were deployed at Indo-Pak border for Parakram Operation after tension heightened between India and Pakistan because of the attack on Indian Parliament (i.e. on 13 December 2001). The appellant who was facing weakness ,anorexia and high colored urine then advised by one of the physician for the blood transfusion . He was tested HIV positive in year 2014 after the blood transfusion at the Military Hospital in Samba takes place in the year 2002. When his health got deteriorates and he got admitted in one of the naval establish hospital in Mumbai in 2014 where he got to know about his HIV thing . The Supreme Court of India in case of Medical Negligence made both the IAF and Army Officers vicariously liable and ask for the compensation of Rs.1.55 crore to the appellant. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*: Medical negligence, compensation, guidelines, mental agony, vicarious liability, Supreme court, HIV Act** **CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***CPL Ashish Kumar Chauhan v. Commanding Officer*Case Number***CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 7175 OF 2021*Judgement Date***26/09/2023*Court***Supreme Court of India*Quorum***Justice S Ravindra Bhat Justice Dipankar Datta*Author***S. Ravindra Bhat*Citation***2023 LawSuit(SC) 948*Legal Provisions Involved***Sections 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20 of the HIV Act.**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The present case deals with ‘ law of negligence basically means when the doctor has not taken the standard of care a prudent professional would take in that circumstances according to the science available at that time , was not reasonable and careful during his acts . Medical negligence is always a complaint done by plaintiff and defendant or the respondent always have the burden of proof on himself . In other words a doctor would never be negligent if whatever he has done was the act which should be done by high professionals. Our law has been advanced and should adopt the patient centric approaches and also the consent of medically stable person is very important in law for doing his treatment it can’t be denied that in present case where the situation in which transfusion took place was critical but it has to done accordingly. Secondly there was also seen that the blood bank was not licensed the materials used for storing was they good or not Thirdly it was not mentioned anywhere that what kind of markers were used to see the transfused blood and also this case shows about the mental agony , trauma , disdain the appellant faced **FACTS OF THE CASE** After the attack on Indian Parliament, (i.e., on 13 December 2001) the tension between the two countries heightened which led to Operation Parakram in 2002 . The appellant who was radar technician with the Indian Army Force were serving for the Operation Parakram on Indo -Pak border . There was a need of appellant and he got posted at Pathankot. Where he got sick and fell like, weakness and also his urine was high colored so he got admitted to the military hospital in Samba. Where then in an ongoing treatment one of the physician advised for blood transfusion where the military hospital did not have license for blood bank was not licensed but can be use by the Indian Army without consulting any of the experts and they didn’t tested the blood which was transfused with virus of HIV they did the transfusion and his reports were under the commanding officer But when the appellant health got deteriorate again and again firstly he was admitted in Gandhinagar in 2014 where HIV test reports were negative but there were some complications in his treatment so at first he shifted to Ahmedabad and then again on further deteriorate he was transferred to one of the hospital in Mumbai which was an Indian Naval establishment. Then in an undergoing test it came out that he was suffering from HIV .(Human Immunodeficiency Virus) . By knowing about the detection of HIV virus first medical board held in 2014 but which says that the infection of HIV was made – non attributable to the service . On being dissatisfied with the decision he by doing certain past analysis the appellant remembered about where his blood transfusion got placed, so then he started to do the research about that military hospital in Samba of 2002 but he didn’t got any information as an evidence because the staff denied by saying unavailability of that account. Then again in 2015 in Ahmedabad he got hospitalized so when one of the respondent on the request of appellant wrote the letter to Indian Army about the appellant’s report of 2002 transfusion so it came out in his medical reports that the transfusion was done , but the blood which got transfused it’s test report were being absent . Afterwards when the medical board was held in 2014 and 2015 in which it was said that the appellant disability was attributable to the service and also the appellant alleges that a condition was insisted upon him to sign on the proceedings of the release medical board and also he was not given his medical records despite it was essential for his treatment In Addition the appellant was denied many more things such as extension and was discharged from services was denied ECHS card further 15000 got deducted from his dues owed to him post retirement in ECHS card’s absence and for the ongoing treatment. He was also been denied of his disability certificate. A series of directions to the central and state Governments to frame guidelines relationg to diagnostic facilities diagnostic facilities, Antiretroviral therapy and opportunistic Infection Management, and welfare schemes for the people affected by HIV/AIDS. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether the consent of the appellant was taken before the blood transfusion? 2. Whether the risks were disclosed and whether the appellant consented to those risk? 3. Whether the blood test was done before the blood transfusion? 4. Whether the fundamental rights to his health were violated? 5. Whether his bodily integrity was compromised? 6. Whether it was state’s responsibility to protect the well-being of his military personnel? 7. Whether the Court of Inquiry was biased ? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The learned counsel stated that the onus of proof is on the respondents which is Indian Army Force and Army Officers that the staff in the military hospital was negligent 2. The learned counsel also stated about one of the respondent stated this in writing that the blood bank was not authorized or licensed to use 3. The appellant also referred to RTI where he came to know that there was no expert of transfusion available and also there were no test reports 4. The learned counsel also stated that the respondent failed to give any material evidence such as blood that has been transfused to appellant and also was it tested 5. And also it stated that before any transfusion take place a test of ELISA is important for HIV negative patient about which they don’t have any report . and also if the standard care has taken or not. 6. Also the learned counsel stated that no written consent or signature has been taken of respondent before the transfusion , also when the negative report of HIV came it can’t be confirmed whether it was true or a fraud because the report of negative HIV came after seven days without ant proper procedure. And also when it was accused on the appellant that he concealed he argued that it was in respondent’s possession and appellant was denied taking it . 7. It was also further argued that him being HIV positive he lost his job in the Indian Air Force and when employed in Food Corporation then again lose his job because of this then became a divorcee and lost his family. 8. The learned counsel along with the appellant also argued that no proper care was taken while the transfusion and also it was contended that the court should give all the monetary relief and other compensations. 9. Also it was argued that the appellant present condition is of dependency on a supporter because of the facts that he was denied his medical copies he was not ask for a consent before his transfusion which leads him to a situation of mental agony for what compensation should be warranted 10. Also it was argued about the respondent’s attitude towards the appellant was not according to the applicable rules which eroded his confidence and therefore court should issue suitable directions and also to continue with medical treatment. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. It was argued that once the respondent side admitted that whatever the disability was faced by appellant was because of respondents side no further deliberation was needed . 1. It was also further argued that only for surgical treatment the consent is needed and transfusion is not one of them . 1. It was also been argued that the appellant was having anaemia before his transfusion and anaemia being one of the reason of HIV which means he didn’t knew that if HIV was because of the transfusion and not because of any other source. 1. It was also further argued that no interference was done by respondent’s to the appellant reports and also they don’t have to preserve appellant reports for more than a period of 3 years according to IMC Professional Conduct even also the military hospital where the transfusion took place was not permanent. 1. It was also argued that the appellant was wrong in blaming the respondents because of his divorce which is mutual consent of both the parties. 1. And also it was no where shown even on the affidavits of IAF that he was being discharged of his duties. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** 1. *“Under Section 14 (1) of the HIV Act, the measures to be taken by the Central Government and all the State Government are, to provide, (as far as possible), diagnostic facilities relating to HIV or AIDS, Antiretroviral therapy and Opportunistic Infection Management to people living with HIV or AIDS”* 2. *“Under Section 15 (1) & (2) of the HIV Act, the Central government and every State Government shall take measures to facilitate better access to welfare schemes to persons infected or affected by HIV or AIDS. Both the Central and State Governments shall frame schemes to address the needs of all protected persons.”* 3. *“Under Section 16 (1) of the HIV Act, the Central and all the State Governments, shall take appropriate steps to protect the property of children affected by HIV or AIDS. By reason of Section 16 (2) of the HIV Act, the parents or guardians of children affected by HIV and AIDS, or any person acting for protecting their interest, or a child affected by HIV and AIDS may approach the Child Welfare Committee \[within the meaning of that expression under Section 29 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000\] for the safe keeping and deposit of documents related to the property rights of such child or to make complaints relating to such child being dispossessed or actual dispossession or trespass into such child’s house”* 4. *“The Central Government shall formulate guidelines \[under Section 18(1) of the HIV Act\] for care, support and treatment of children infected with HIV or AIDS; in particular, having regard to Section 18 (2) “notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force”, the Central Government, or the State governments shall take active measures to counsel and provide information regarding the outcome of pregnancy and HIV- related treatment to the HIV infected women. “* 5. “*The Central Government shall also notify HIV and AIDS policy for establishments in terms of Section 12 of the HIV Act. It is further directed that under Section 19 of the HIV Act, every establishment, engaged in the healthcare services and every such other establishment where there is a significant risk of occupational exposure to HIV, for the purpose of ensuring safe working environment, shall (i) provide, in accordance with the guidelines, firstly, universal precautions to all persons working in such establishment who may be occupationally exposed to HIV; and secondly training for the use of such universal precautions; thirdly post exposure prophylaxis to all persons working in such establishment who may be occupationally exposed to HIV or AIDS; and (ii) inform and educate all persons working in the establishment of the availability of universal precautions and post exposure prophylaxis.”* 6. *“By reason of Section 20 (1) of the HIV Act, the provisions of Chapter VIII of the HIV Act apply to all establishments consisting of one hundred or more persons, whether as an employee or officer or member or director or trustee or manager, as the case may be. “* 7. *“In keeping with proviso to Section 20 (1) of the HIV Act, in the case of healthcare establishments, the said provision shall have the effect as if for the words “one hundred or more”, the words “twenty or more” were substituted.”* 8. *“Every person who is in charge of an establishment, mentioned in Section 20 (1) of the HIV Act, for the conduct of the activities of such establishment, shall ensure compliance of the provisions of the HIV Act. Every establishment referred to in Section 20 (1) of the HIV Act has to designate someone, as the Complaints Officer who shall dispose of complaints of violations of the provisions of the HIV Act in the establishment, in such manner and within such time as may be prescribed. The rules in this regard may be formulated by the Central Government at the earliest, preferably within a week”.* **JUDGEMENT** **Ratio Decidendi** - The hon’ble supreme court ordered to issue the guidelines for Central and State government regarding HIV , welfare schemes and infection management and also to grant compensation of 1.55 crore thousand to the appellant from IAF and Army officers who are vicariously liable for their act of medical negligent and also to compensate for the medical agony caused to the appellant. It was seen that when the appellant was suffering from amenia from starting and also he asked for his medical reports when one of the respondent mailed to IAF and ask commanding officer to give the report as per the request of the appellant in which it was the report of the test of the “blood” which got transfused was absent . - Also it is stated in the guidelines of HIV that how much the consent of the person is important for HIV testing. - Medical negligence was done as appellant’s case not deal with any experts - Reliance was also placed on the medical reports which came in Ahmedabad and was HIV negative - The facts of the case also constraints the jurisdiction of courts under A 32 and A.226 **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** Whatever the mental agony was suffered by the appellant because of the denial of the reports and because of his condition is respondent fault and for that appellant should be compensated but whatever the pre retirement was and the personal issues was of appellant like divorce with wife and losing the job in the food corporation was not reasons for which the respondent should be compensated for . Further it was also seen that when the appellant lost hi job , then the IAF could do something regarding that but all these lead to the increase of mental agony of the appellant for which he should be compensated 50 lakhs rupees In addition to the mental agony there was also medical negligence for which both the Indian Air force and Indian Army are vicariously liable because it can’t be pinpointed who was individually liable and for this negligence it was ordered by court that the appellant should be compensated for 1 crore 54 lakh 73 thousand rupees within six weeks and also the disability pension too should be disbursed to appellant within six weeks and also the anti – retroviral therapy to the people living with aids The central and state government issued guidelines regarding the management facilities, anti – retroviral therapy measures and also property protection to the children who’s parents are suffering with HIV , welfare scheme should be adopted All these measures should be taken within 3 months through dissemination of information through media press etc and also there should be expert’s hired regarding the same and the programmes should be spread accordingly education should be provided which should not be discriminated. **REFERENCES** **Important Cases Referred** Smt. Savita Garg vs. The Director, National Heart Institute Fakruddin versus Principal Pani Ram vs. Union of India C. Laxman Thamappa Kotgiri **Important Statutes Referred** Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 Section 135 of the Army Act, 1950 Article 14 of Indian Constitution Articles 32 and 226 of Indian Consitution **Other References** **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases **Tags:** #law, #lawyer, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, article, case analysis, case summary, Commanding Officer, CPL Ashish Kumar Chauhan, CPL Ashish Kumar Chauhan v. Commanding Officer, lawfoyer --- ### [3rd AIU National Moot Court Competition, hosted by D Y Patil Deemed to be University School of Law, Navi Mumbai. Register by 10th March, 2024.](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-aiu-national-moot-court-competition-hosted-by-d-y-patil-deemed-to-be-university-school-of-law-navi-mumbai-register-by-10th-march-2024/) **Published:** March 2, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **About Association of Indian Universities** The Association of Indian Universities is an Apex Advisory Body on Higher Education mandated by the Ministry of Education, to determine the equivalence of foreign degrees and conduct Youth Affairs & Sports Activities in the Higher Education Sector in India. At present, AIU has about 985 member universities (central, Institute of National Importance, state and private universities), including 16 overseas universities, and has been serving the Higher Education Sector for the last 97 years. Many national luminaries have served this organization in different capacities, and the most prominent examples are Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Dr. Zakir Hussain, and Dr. Syama Prasad Mukherjee who have served as Presidents of AIU. The organization has worked as an intellectual resource of the country and has contributed to the policy processes of the government and its agencies. AIU has been annually organizing the Inter- University Youth Festivals (UNIFESTS) since 1985 at the Zonal and National level where a large number of youth artists from member universities and it’s about 45000 affiliated colleges participate. These festivals play a signifi- cant role in promoting in our youth, a pride of Indian culture and an awareness of youth identity. AIU is the only nodal agency in the entire country for organizing the inter-university youth programs for about 39 million youth students of the Higher Education Sector in India. Also, this is the only establishment where the above-cited youth programs can be conceptualized and implemented for the students at the zonal, national, as well as international level. In continuation of our endeavors and addition to the above-mentioned youth festivals, the AIU has launched the organization of Asian University Youth Festival (AUFEST), International Youth Festival, National Women Student Parliament, National Moot Court Competition, National Adventure/Tracking Camp and National Qawwali Competition etc. From the current session, AIU has earmarked the entire country in eight zones for the smooth conduct of Youth Affairs Programs. **About DY Patil Deemed to be University, School of Law** Dr. Vijay D. Patil, Hon’ble Chancellor of D Y Patil University truly believes that in a proliferating global economy, the best way to empower the youth of the country would be to make good educational facilities available to them. He feels that the progress of the future generations is defined by the world we choose to create for them & hence the best way to empower the youth would be to develop an ecosystem that offers opportunities for them to learn, grow and excel. Dr Vijay D Patil shares a special bond with the students, staff and faculty of the institutions of the group. He is an approachable leader, constantly keen to understand the needs of the organization and looking for ways to create a better experience for all, through collaboration and cooperation. It has always been DY Patil University’s goal to enhance the employability of graduates. The programs are backed by research, a sound curriculum and delivered by faculty who have been educated and trained at some of the best educational institutions in the country and abroad. Our university’s academic structure is at par with the best in the world today. **About the opportunity** **D Y Patil Deemed to be University School of Law, Navi Mumbai is hosting 3 rd AIU National Moot Court Competition.** **Dates:** 4 th of April 2024 to 6 th of April 2024 The Association of Indian Universities (AIU) has expanded its wings and added to its activities another feature of holding a National Moot Court Competition. The aim of this competition is to provide undergraduate law students with an opportunity to harness their skills in research and advocacy. The moot proposition is based on a fictional dispute set in areas of law that are unsettled or that have been subject to recent developments. This competition aims to set the highest standards by providing an opportunity to make arguments before eminent academicians, advocates and judges. It encourages healthy competition between the institutes imparting legal education and promotes social bonding among the students. **Eligibility** - Participation is restricted strictly to bona fide law students pursuing the three years or five years LL.B. degree course in any institution in - India. Students doing their LL.M. and Diploma courses are not eligible for participation. - Only one team is permitted to participate from each participating university. - The team must consist of three members; two members shall be designated as ‘Speakers’ and the third member shall be designated as ‘Researcher’. - No change in the name of the participant(s) shall be permitted after the receipt of registration form (hard copy) i.e on 17th March 2024. **Theme** The Moot Problem is based upon Constitutional Law and Electoral Bonds. **Prizes** - The Team winning the final round of the Competition shall be given a trophy, certificates, medals and a cash prize of Rs. 30,000/- (Indian Rupees Thirty Thousand Only). - The first runners-up team in the final round of the Competition shall be given a trophy, certificates, medals and a cash prize of Rs. 20,000/- (Indian Rupees Twenty Thousand Only). - The second runner-up team standing third in the semi-final rounds shall be given a trophy, certificates, medals and a cash prize of Rs. 10,000/- (Indian Rupees Ten Thousand Only). - The team having the highest average written submission score for both sides shall be given a trophy, certificates, and a cash prize of Rs. 10,000/- (Indian Rupees Ten Thousand Only). - The best speaker having the highest score in the preliminary rounds shall be given a trophy, certificate, and a cash prize of Rs. 5,000/- (Indian Rupees Five Thousand Only). - The researcher having the highest score in the researcher’s test shall be given a trophy, certificate, and a cash prize of INR 5,000/- (Indian Rupees Five Thousand Only). **Important Dates** - **Notification of the Competition and Release of the Moot Problem** – 9th February 2024 - **Last date of Seeking Clarification –** 29th February 2024 - **Release of Clarification** – 4th March 2024 - **Last date for registration vide google form link and payment** – 10th March 2024 - **Last Date of Submission of Hard Copies of Registration Forms (Annexure II) –** 17th March 2024 - **Last date for submissions of travel forms- Annexure III (E-Mail)** – 17th March 2024 - **Allotment of Team Codes** – 20th March 2024 - **Last date for submission of soft copy of memorials for both sides** – 21st March 2024 - **Last Date for Submission of Three Hard Copies of memorials for both sides –** 28th March 2024 - **Arrival of Teams and Registration form i.e Annexure I to be carried along. (10:00 AM To 4:00 pm) –** 3rd April 2024 - **Opening Ceremony, Researchers Test, Draw of Lots and Exchange of Memorial** – 4th April 2024 - **Preliminary Round and Quarter Final Round** – 5th April 2024 - **Semi Final Round, Final Round, Award Ceremony and Valedictory Session** – 6th April 2024 - **Departure of Teams** – 7th April 2024 (Within 12:00 PM) **Registration Fee** - The participating team consisting of three students is required to pay Rs. 9,000/- as registration fee. Faculties accompanying (if any) shall pay Rs. 3,000/- Extra. - The registration fees must be paid by scanning the QR code or by paying it directly through the net banking on the below mentioned bank account. - Details or a screenshot of the payment shall be uploaded in the google form. - Non-payment or part payment of Registration Fees shall result in the cancellation of Registration of the Participating Team. - This fee is exclusive of the travel to and from the campus to the airport/ railway station/ bus station. It is the sole responsibility of the teams to arrange for their travel. - Accommodation and food shall be provided. Please refer to the booklet for details. **Account Details** Account Name – **DYPU SCHOOL OF LAW** Name of the Bank – **AXIS BANK LTD** Bank Address – **NERUL , NAVI MUMBAI** Account Number – **923010005603122** IFSC/RTGS/NEFT CODE – **UTIB0003335** MICR CODE – **400211167** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/qr-code.png)**Registration Process** - All the participating teams from the universities have to confirm participation by sending a duly filled google form on or before 10th March 2024. - Please note that only one team can participate from a university on first come first bases. - The duly filled-in hard copy of the Registration Form (Annexure- II) must reach the Organisers by 17th March 2024. **Contact Details** - Email: - **Convenor:** Dr. Karuna Malviya, Director of D Y Patil, School of Law – 9702695610 - **Faculty Convenor:** Mr. Kevin Tauro, Asst. Professor of D Y Patil, School of Law – 9820529060 - **Student Convenor:** Master Satya Nilesh Agarwal – 7020464148 **Important Links** - **For Registration –** [https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSeSKcKjfanXgPPuGdQYt6d7\_ulpcaOSsLpKdbwJSDkS-\_87dA/viewform?pli=1](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSeSKcKjfanXgPPuGdQYt6d7_ulpcaOSsLpKdbwJSDkS-_87dA/viewform?pli=1) - **The 3rd AIU National Moot Court Competition brochure is** – - **Rules, Regulations and Moot Proposition is** –[ https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Rules-Regulations-and-Moot-Proposition-of-the-3rd-National-Moot-Court-Competition-2023-24.pdf](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Rules-Regulations-and-Moot-Proposition-of-the-3rd-National-Moot-Court-Competition-2023-24.pdf) **Categories:** Events --- ### [Balram Singh V. Union of India](https://lawfoyer.in/balram-singh-v-union-of-india/) **Published:** March 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** By – **Jagrit Singla** (Baba Farid Law College, Faridkot) **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** Manual Scavenging is a huge inhuman activity which increases the problem of discrimination in the society. It is a big concern and global issue which needs to be addressed by altering the legislative reforms, increasing penalties and punishments and by spreading the social awareness in the society. This case highlights the methods of demolishing the activities of manual scavenging as this type of forced employment violates the fundamental rights of the workers engaged in manual scavenging. This case also highlights the number of risks involved in the lives of the workers engaged and the compensation which should be awarded by the government to the deceased workers.This case also delves into the action which shall be taken by the government in forming the policies and issuing directions to eradicate the manual scavenging from the society.This case also digs into the measures which must be taken by the Union to eradicate the manual scavenging and the rehabilitation of the manual scavengers, by forming the different Committees at the National, State and District levels. It aims the rights of workers must be protected by issuing the guidelines and policies for the welfare of the manual scavengers. So, by analysing the cases and all the legislative provisions this case analysis highlights the key areas and problems related to the manual scavenging and its impact on the society. ***Keywords*: *Manual Scavenging, Article 32, Constitution of India, Writ Petition, Rehabilitation, Inhuman Practice, Dignified Livelihood, Compensation, Discrimination.*** 1. CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title******Dr. Balram Singh V. Union of India and Others****Case Number******WP/ 324/2020****Judgement Date******20th October, 2023****Court******Supreme Court of India****Quorum***[***Aravind Kumar***](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=benchid:aravind-kumar)***,*** [***S. Ravindra Bhat***](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=benchid:s-r-bhat) *Author***[***S. Ravindra Bhat***](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=benchid:s-r-bhat)*Citation******(2023) SCC Online SC 1386****Legal Provisions Involved******Article 32 of Constitution of India;* *Prohibition of Employment as*** [***Manual Scavengers and Their Rehabilitation Act, 2013***](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/20899571/)***.*****INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** Every person is equal in the eyes of the Law as provided under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, i.e., Equality before Law which provides that the State shall treat every person equally irrespective of their caste, colour, religion, sex, work, etc. To prevent the social evils such as untouchability, forced and involuntary labour practices, discrimination, bondage labour, etc. various other laws are enacted by the Government of India. To specifically deal with the problems of the manual scavenging the government also introduced “[Employment of Manual Scavengers and Construction of Dry Latrines (Prohibition) Act, 1993](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/872156/)” and the “Prohibition of Employment as [Manual Scavengers and Their Rehabilitation Act, 2013](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/20899571/).” With the help of these legislations the civil rights of the labours/ manual scavengers cannot be violated and the proper safety and the rewards are also provided to them, to relinquish the evil of bonded labour from the society. **Manual Scavenging:** Manual Scavenging refers to the hazardous practice of manually cleaning, handling, and disposing of human waste, typically from dry latrines or open drains, without protective equipment or proper sanitation facilities. It is often associated with caste-based discrimination and is illegal in many countries due to its health and human rights implications. For the welfare and upliftment of the manual scavengers a special commission for Safai Karamcharis was formed under the “Safai Karamchari Act, 1993.” ***Bonded Labour:*** In India, “Bonded Labour System Act of 1976” was passed by the Government of India to release bonded labourers and cancel all the bonded debts against such labourers. This system of bondage implies the infringement of basic human rights and destruction of the dignity of human labour. So, to release the bondage the Parliament enacted various legislations; first was the “Civil Rights Act, 1955” and it was amended in the year 1976. And later to penalize such severe forms “[Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/25085007/)” was enacted. To give more strength to the labourers and diminish the untouchability two more Acts namely, “[Employment of Manual Scavengers and Construction of Dry Latrines (Prohibition) Act, 1993](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/872156/)” and the “Prohibition of Employment as [Manual Scavengers and Their Rehabilitation Act, 2013](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/20899571/)” were enacted by the Indian Government. **FACTS OF THE CASE** The government of India enacted various legislations for the welfare and raise the livelihood of the manual scavengers and also to demolish the untouchability from the society. The Act of 1993 and Act of 2013 were introduced to ensure the proper rehabilitation and employment with adequate salaries and compensation. However, the above-mentioned Acts and legislations does not fulfil the objectives and proper measures are not taken by the government of India for the manual scavengers. The Petitioner files the writ petition on the basis that the Union of India (respondents) have not implemented the provisions of the said Acts enacted for the welfare of the manual scavengers and thus, adequate actions must be taken by the government to punish and penalise the persons responsible for the employment of manual scavengers engaged in cleaning and emptying the dry toilets, insanitary latrines, ditches and pits. Also, the various institutions created under the various Acts and commissions constituted under the National Commission for the Safai Karamchari Act, 1993 are not working properly at District, State and Central levels. Some States and Districts does not even constitute the commission as provided under the Act. Due to the said problems faced by the manual scavengers, the present writ petition was filed in the Supreme Court of India. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1. Whether the present petition is maintainable under Article 32 of the Constitution of India? 2. Whether the objects of Article 17, Article 21, and Article 23 of the Indian Constitution are being violated? 3. Whether the Union or appropriate government does not take adequate measures and does not frame policies or issues directions for the welfare of manual scavengers? 4. Whether the Union is responsible for the liabilities and compensations for the negligence and non-compliance of the provisions of the said overt Acts? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the scope of the Acts of 1993 and 2013 should be increased and the families of the persons died in sewerage works, since 1993 must be compensated with the amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- each. - The fundamental rights under the Articles 15,17,23 & 24 of Indian Constitution must be enforced and the dignified employment should be provided to the said oppressed class for their welfare and to raise their standard of livelihood. - The Petitioner further submitted that the State Level Survey Committees (SLSC) and District Level Survey Committees (DLSC) should be formed which shall be responsible for the surveys and publication of the consolidated list of the manual scavengers and adequate information shall be provided by them. - According to the Act of 2013, the Union shall mandate a localised surveys at local levels as well for the rehabilitation of the manual scavengers. The Chief Executive Officer of the municipality or gram panchayat is responsible for the completion of the surveys. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsels for Respondent submitted that the efforts are being made for the identification of the manual scavengers for their rehabilitation and also submitted the report that about 62.81 lakhs sanitary toilets are constructed and 650 districts, out of 766 districts are free of manual scavenging. - The respondents also submitted that any dry latrines existed before 2013 were dismantled and converted into sanitary latrines. Furthermore, compensation has been provided to about 948 families of those who died during the sewerage works. However, there have been no reported deaths due to manual scavenging since 2013. - It was further submitted that due to the limited scope of the National Commission for Safai Karamcharis, the focus is on the rehabilitation of the manual scavengers and it does not have the powers to summon the concerned official as it is neither a constitutional nor statutory body. There is also lack of staff for the fulfilment of adequate functioning and administrative tasks. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** > - ***Article 15 of Indian Constitution:*** *“The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or nay of them.”* > - ***Article 17 of Indian Constitution:*** *“Untouchability is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden. The enforcement of any disability arising out of Untouchability shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law.”* > - ***Article 21 of Indian Constitution:*** *“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”* > - ***Article 23 of Indian Constitution:*** *“Traffic in human beings and beggar and other similar forms of forced labour are prohibited and any contravention of this provision shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law.”* > - ***Section 7 of Manual Scavengers and their Rehabilitation Act, 2013:*** *“No person, local authority or any agency shall, as the State Government may notify, which shall not be later than 1 year from the date of commencement of this Act, engage or employ, either directly or indirectly, any person for hazardous cleaning of a sewer or a septic tank.”* **JUDGEMENT** - The Court held that, the Union should take adequate measures and frame policies, to completely eradicate the manual scavenging from the society, and with the help of appropriate government and statutory bodies the rehabilitation of the manual scavengers should be done, by issuing the proper directions. - The Court directed that the amount of compensation must be increased to 30 lakhs, in case of death of sewer deaths which is to be paid to the deceased family. The compensation shall also to be paid in case of any disability to the worker. - The Government is duty bound to ensure that there is no violation of Constitutional Articles 15,17,23&24 eradicate the manual scavenging completely and help the workers trapped in inhuman conditions. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** In the end, we are of the view that the untouchability, bonded labour, manual scavenging and all the inhuman practices must be eradicated from the society and there should not be any kind of involuntary or forced labour; the workers should be provided with proper salaries for their work. The appropriate government shall ensure that proper committees are created and there shall be coordination between them so that, the eradication of manual scavenging and welfare of the workers and their families can become possible. The proper surveys shall be done by such societies and the government shall also ensure that in case of death of any of the worker engage in the sewerage works the adequate amount of compensation is granted to his/her family. **REFERENCES** 1. **Important Cases Referred** *“Safai Karamchari Andolan vs. Union of India”* *“All India Council of Trade Unions vs. Union of India”* *“People’s Union for Democratic Rights vs. Union of India”* 1. **Important Statutes Referred** Civil Rights Act, 1955. [Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/25085007/). [Employment of Manual Scavengers and Construction of Dry Latrines (Prohibition) Act, 1993](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/872156/). Prohibition of Employment as [Manual Scavengers and Their Rehabilitation Act, 2013](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/20899571/). Safai Karamchari Act, 1993.Constitution of India, 1950. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Damayanti v. Union of India, AIR 1971 SC 9662d](https://lawfoyer.in/damayanti-v-union-of-india-air-1971-sc-9662d/) **Published:** March 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** By – **Naman Jain** (Galgotias University) **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** - In the case of Damayanti vs Union of India, the focus was on the interpretation of Article 19(1)(c) of the Indian Constitution, which guarantees the fundamental freedom to associate. Specifically, the case examined the constitutional validity of the Punjab Prevention of Damage to Public and Private Property Act, 1949. This Act mandated that members of a society must join a Sammelan (association) established under the Act, and failure to do so would result in the dissolution of the society. - The Supreme Court, in its ruling, held that the Act violated the basic right to association as it compelled society members to join the Sammelan against their will. The Court emphasized that any law prohibiting affiliation is unlawful, and that the right to associate includes the right not to associate. Furthermore, the Court found the provision in the Act for the dissolution of the society to be arbitrary and unreasonable. It concluded that interfering with the freedom to form associations was unjustifiable and did not align with the functioning of an association in carrying out its objectives or purposes after its formation. - The Court determined that the complete loss of property resulting from non-compliance with the Act could not be justified as a legitimate restriction in the public interest. The Act went beyond regulating the management of the Society’s property and instead aimed to completely deprive individuals of their right to possess the property. It was established that a law cannot be deemed a reasonable restriction under Article 19(5) if its purpose is not solely to ensure effective management and administration of the property, but also to entirely strip individuals of their property rights. - ***Keywords* : Association, Article 19(1)(c), Constitution of India, Fundamental Rights, Article 19, Democracy** 1. CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***Damayanti v. Union of India*Judgement Date***23/02/1971*Court***SUPREME COURT*Author***Justice BHARGAVA*Citation***1971 AIR 966*Legal Provisions Involved***Article 19 (1)(c), (f) Article 19 (4) (5) of COI (4) and (5)-Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Act, 1962.**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** In Indian constitutional law, the case of Damyanti Naranga v. Union of India, AIR 1971 SC 966, is very important. The crux of this matter lies in the interpretation of Article 19(1)(f) of the Indian Constitution, which safeguards the liberty to form groups or unions. The petitioner in this case, Damyanti Naranga, claimed that the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Act, 1962 was unconstitutional because it infringed upon her basic right to form associations. It is crucial to note, in a formal and professional manner, that this landmark decision examined the relationship between the Indian Constitution’s Article 19(1)(f) right to form associations and the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Act, 1962. The petitioner, Damyanti Naranga, sought to demonstrate that the Act violated her fundamental right to group organization. **FACTS OF THE CASE** - Renowned educators founded the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan in 1910 with the goal of advancing Hindi language proficiency throughout the nation. The Sammelan became a legally recognized society in January 1914 when it was registered in Allahabad under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Its bylaws and regulations outlined its goals and method. - Three categories of members made up the Society: special, permanent, and ordinary members. The working committee of the Society held elections to decide which new members would be admitted into these categories. The Society established a number of organizations, including the Governing Body, Working Committee, and Hindi University Council, to support its initiatives, which include the advancement of Hindi, the promotion of the Devnagari script, holding exams, and awarding degrees. - The Society owned landed properties and buildings in Allahabad and other locations, along with substantial funds dedicated to fulfilling its objectives. It functioned successfully for several years. However, in 1950, disputes arose among members regarding proposed amendments to the Society’s constitution. This resulted in litigation, with three civil suits being filed in the Allahabad court and a receiver being appointed to manage the Society’s affairs. - To address the aforementioned issues, the Uttar Pradesh (UP) Legislature enacted the UP Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Act, 1956, which transferred the management and properties of the Society to a newly established statutory body. Nevertheless, the Allahabad High Court declared the Act unconstitutional, citing a violation of the right to form associations under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution. Subsequently, the central government enacted the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Act, 1962 (referred to as “the Act”), which is now under challenge. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** Whether the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Act, 1962 interfered with the fundamental right of the Society members under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution to form associations. **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The Petitioner/Appellant’s Counsel argued that the Sammelan, which was founded in accordance with the Act, permitted the admission of new members without the approval of current Society members. The members of the Society were not in Favor of this change in Association. ii. This conduct violated the members of the Society’s fundamental freedom to choose the members of their association going forward and to associate only with people they had freely accepted. iii. It’s critical to understand that the freedom to organize includes the authority to choose and manage the association’s future membership and operations. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** i. The respondent’s counsel contended that the relevant Act did not restrict the ability to form associations; rather, it only attempted to govern the Society’s management. As per their submission, membership in the Sammelan was immediately extended to all members of the Society. ii. An alternative argument put forth was that the Act preserved the original Society while establishing a separate Hindi Sahitya Sammelan. Thus, there was no violation of the freedom to organize associations. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** - Article 19(1)(c) of COI guarantees the fundamental right to freedom of association to every citizen, which includes the right to form associations or unions. - Article 19(4) of COI empowers the State to make laws imposing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of this right in the interests of sovereignty and integrity of India, public order, morality etc. - Sections 5-25A of SCA lay down provisions for registration of societies, their rights and liabilities, alteration of objects, dissolution etc. which were relevant for the original Society.Section 2(1) of HSS declared the Society an institution of national importance to confer legislative competence to Parliament. - Sections 4-12 of HSS constituted a new statutory ‘Sammelan’ body and its governing structures, vesting Society’s properties in it. - Section 12(1)(a) Of UPSS empowered the first governing body to frame membership rules of the Sammelan. **JUDGEMENT** RATIO DECIDENDI** 1. Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution guarantees the fundamental freedom to organize associations; this right was breached by the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Act, 1962, according to the ratio decidendi, the legal theory that underpinned the decision. 2. The Sammelan, established under the Act, allowed the admission of new members without the original Society members’ approval, the Court said in its verdict. The Society members’ freedom to choose the association’s current membership and to associate only with voluntarily admitted members was violated by this change in the association’s makeup, which was imposed against their will 3. It was confirmed that the ability to organize associations includes the power to manage and decide the organization’s future structure and operations. The mere inclusion of all Society members in the Sammelan did not negate the infringement, as the Sammelan was a distinct legal entity separate from the original Society. 1. OBITER DICTA (IF ANY)** 2. The following non-binding obiter dicta were included in the judgment: • The right to form associations should not be restricted to the act of founding the association alone, but should also include the right to continue the association with a predetermined membership 3. If the Society survives, the governing body is still entitled to use the property even after the Act takes effect. It is not a fair restriction to completely deny them these rights. The Act would potentially violate the right to property guaranteed by Article 19(1)(f) if its sole goal was to transfer the Society’s properties; alternatively, it raises questions regarding the legislative competence to do so under Entry 63 if its intended purpose was to preserve the Society while forming a separate Sammelan. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The Supreme Court allowed the writ petition and appeal, concluding that the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Act, 1962 was unconstitutional as it violated the fundamental right to form associations under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution. **COMMENTS:** - The judgment established the right to form associations as including the right to determine the continued composition and functioning of the association. This prevented state interference in the internal affairs and composition of voluntary associations. - By striking down attempts to replace the original registered Society with a new statutory body, it protected associational autonomy and identity of voluntary organizations from being altered by legislation. - The Court rejected arguments attempting to justify the Act on the grounds of merely regulating administration, by noting its actual effect and intention was to reconstitute the Society itself. - It took a purposive approach accounting for the substantive effect of provisions rather than just their literal meaning, to prevent circumvention of fundamental rights. - Obiter remarks flagged potential issues had the legislation been framed differently i.e. keeping the Society while constituting Sammelan, or merely transferring properties – hinting at limits of even declaration as institution of national importance. - Provided guidance that reasonable restrictions on associational rights must actually regulate rather than unreasonably interfere with or supplant the association itself. **REFERENCES** 1. **Important Cases Referred** **“O.K. Ghosh and Another v. E. X. Joseph”[\[1\]](#_ftn1)** **“State of Madras v. V. G. Row”[\[2\]](#_ftn2)** **“The Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College, Delhi v. The State of Delhi & Anr.”[\[3\]](#_ftn3)** 1. **Important Statutes Referred** ***“Constitution of India”[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)*** ***“Societies Registration Act, 1860”[**\[2\]**](#_ftn2)*** ***“U.P. Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Act, 1956”[**\[3\]**](#_ftn3)*** --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) [https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/15240/1/constitution\_of\_india.pdf](https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/15240/1/constitution_of_india.pdf) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) O.K. Ghosh and Another v. E. X. Joseph, \[1963\] Suppl. 3 S.C.R. 789 [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) State of Madras v. V. G. Row, \[1952\] S.C. R. 597 [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College, Delhi v. The State of Delhi & Anr. \[1962\] Suppl. I S.C.R. 156 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Hussainara Khatoon V Home Secretary , State of Bihar](https://lawfoyer.in/hussainara-khatoon-v-home-secretary-state-of-bihar/) **Published:** March 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** By – **SUSHMANA PANDEY** (AMITY UNIVERSITY LUCKNOW) **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** Petition was filed for the issue in a form of writ of HABEAS CORPUS. The petitioner declared that plenty of prisoners including men, women as well as children were in prison for years waiting for their trial inside the court. The offence is proved in the court would not warrant punishment for more than not many months. This was the first reported case of PIL(Public Interest Litigation) in India. The urgent accountability of introducing far-reaching legal services programme impressed upon the Government of India as also the State Governments. That is not only mandatory for equal justice which contained in Art. 14 and Right to life and liberty given by Art. 21 but also the duty of the constitutional directive integrates in Art.39A. This landmark judgment displayed the importance of a part of fair trial and enlightens the importance of free legal aid for the poorer section of society. ***Keywords* :** Article 21, Article 39A, Article 14, Public Interest Litigation, Habeas Corpus, Legal aid. 1. CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***Respondent – State of Bihar Appellant – Advocate Pushpa Kapila Hingorani*Case Number***Writ petition no. 57 of 1979*Judgement Date***9 MARCH, 1979*Court***SUPREME COURT OF INDIA*Quorum***JUSTICE P.N. BHAGAWATI JUSTICE R S PATHAK, JUSTICE A D KOSHA*Author***Justice P.N. Bhagwati*Citation***1979 AIR 1369*Legal Provisions Involved***Constitution of India – Article 21 – under trials, right to life – Right to speedy trial. • Constitution of India – Article 39A – Right to free legal aid. • Criminal procedure code – Sec. 309, power to postpone or adjourn proceeding. **INTRODUCTION OF JUDGEMENT** Speedy trial is a Human Right. Speedy trial is conducted according prevailing rules and procedure that takes place without unreasonable or undue delay or within a statutory period. The right to speedy trial is codified in fundamental legal documents in several Jurisdiction and may be further defined by statutory law. No one can deny an accused a speedy trial. It plays a major role in managing the justice system. Hussainara Khatoon & Ors. it is a landmark case. It gives a proper definition of Article 21 of Indian Constitution which stated that a speedy trial is fundamental right of every citizen. **BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT** There was an article which was published in Indian express newspaper in 1979 about the detention of under-trial prisoners in the Bihar jail. Some prisoners were serving in prison for longer period than their actual detention period. Advocate Pushpa Kapila Hingorani was one of the readers of article and filed a case as a public interest litigation (PIL) in the supreme court of India. Advocate Pushpa Kapila Hingorani is called as ‘Mother of Public interest litigation in India.’ This case was about the rights of under trial prisoners on the Habeas Corpus petition. **FACTS OF THE CASE** This case was related to the rights of under trial prisoners on the habeas corpus petition and their following release. The writ petition of Habeaus Corpus under Article 32 of Indian Constitution was files by Advocate Kapila Hingorani on behalf of the undertrial prisoner of Bihar. Many of these prisoners have been charged with petty offences and sentences to several months in prison than usual. The petition states that under trial prisoners who have committed petty offences are suffering in jail for more than 5-10 years, without trial. It was filed on the behalf of woman offender, Hussainara Khatoon. She was detained and held in ‘protective custody’ for four years even though the Indian government had issued direct orders to release prisoners who are detained under the Foreigners Act coming from Bangladesh, on bail. The petition acknowledged that the under- trial prisoners who have done minor offences as they were imprisoned for quite 10 years. Those people were considered to the poorest strata who were not even able to afford an advocate and, they were refused to grant bail. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** 1.Whether right to speedy trial come within the ambit of Article 21? 2\. What is the essence of speedy trial under criminal justice? 3.Whether the state should provide “legal aid” to financially disadvantaged under-trial prisoners? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that: The petitioner, Pushpa Kapila Hingorani’s argument was surrounding around the right of speedy trial which is a part of fundamental right as per the Indian constitution and the provision of legal services to poor people. She fought for the plight of many under trial prisoners who were there in Patna central jail and the Muzaffarpur central jail under detention for many years without trial. Large number of prisoners have been charged with petty offences and was prisoned for several months than usual. Another reason of this was their poverty, which made them impossible to even obtain bail. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Respondent submitted that: Respondent argues that large number of prisoners awaiting trial, petitioners, in this case, held in the Patna Central Jail, the Muzaffarpur Central Jail, and the Ranchi Central Jail regularly appeared before the Magistrates before their release and were subsequently repeatedly remanded to judicial custody by the Magistrates. The respondents were unable to prove the dates on which these under-trial detainees were remanded, hence the Court did not believe this affirmation to be true. The Respondents further argued that the rise in the number of pending cases is a result of the necessity of stopping investigations usually because of a delay in collecting expert opinions. The Court rejected this argument, saying that the state can utilize other methods to achieve the same end. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. Article 21 of Indian constitution ii. Article 39A of Indian constitution **JUDGEMENT** The court observed and directed that the under-trial prisoners who were mentioned in the file by Mrs. Hingorani should be released. It was because the imprisonment was false imprisonment which was considered to be an illegal and violation of fundamental rights given under article 21 of Indian constitution. Another ruling issued by Hon’ble court was to provide free legal aid by the state to under trial convicts accused with bailable charges in the coming days of their trial before the Magistrates. The Judgement have some notable observations: 1\. It was decided that a legislation that keeps a significant number of convicts behind bars for an extended period of time violates article 21’s guarantee for “just, reasonable, and fair” limits. 2\. The apex court strictly mentioned that a fair and speedy trial is one of the vital essences of criminal justice and delay in a fair trial directly implies delay in justice. Though right to speedy trial is not explicitly mentioned in the charter of fundamental rights of Indian Constitution, but has its essence imbibed in the broad interpretation of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. A speedy trial, which is a trial that is sufficiently fast, is an essential component of the basic right to life and liberty guaranteed in Art. 21 **RATIO DECIDENDI** The Court gave order to the release of all under-trial prisoners whose names were there on Mrs Hingorani’s list. The Court also said that detaining them for any length of time would be unconstitutional and certainly violate their fundamental right under Article 21\[5\] as they are being held for a period of time that is far longer than what they could have be awarded if they had been tried and convicted. The Hon’ble Court further governed the State to offer free legal assistance to under-trial convicts accused of bailable offences on their next remand dates before the Magistrates. This was done so that even the poorest under-trial detainees may file a bail application, ensuring that the aim of a speedy trial was met. The Supreme Court further ordered the State Government and the High Court to provide information about the locations of the courts of magistrates and courts of sessions in Bihar, as well as the total number of cases outstanding in each court as of December 31, 1978. If a matter has been outstanding for more than six months, they must also explain the reason which led to the delay in the disposal of the case. **OBITER DICTA** The court said that it is a shame on judicial system which keeps men, women & children behind bars without the commencement of trial. This thing emphasis the urgency and importance of ensuring a speedy trial for all accused persons. This observation highlighted the systematic biases and inequalities in the legal system, particularly affecting those from the disadvantaged backgrounds. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** Justice served to many under trial prisoners and those who were released after this judgment. Importance of public interest litigation (PIL) was also highlighted and got prioritised. Voices were raised against the deprived section of society. It exposes the loopholes in the justice system of the country. Also, the bail system in the India has been unfair to lower class and poor people who cannot afford the cost of legal action. About 40,000 undertrial prisoners were released, which shows that if a person is committed to the welfare of the country, he/she can do it and witness comprehensive results. Although the right to a speedy trial is a Fundamental Right which is mentioned in our Constitution, the case brings gross violation of the same, where undertrial prisoners had to suffer long terms of imprisonment merely because the courts did not have time to either acquit them or award them their proper sentence. **REFERENCES** 1. **Important Cases Referred** Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration 2. **Important Statutes Referred** Constitution of India IPC **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani, AIR 1977 SC 1025](https://lawfoyer.in/nandini-satpathy-v-p-l-dani-air-1977-sc-1025/) **Published:** March 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **SHREEJAL TRIPATHI** (Amity University, Lucknow) **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** Former chief minister of Orissa was the appellant in this case. Many charges of corruption were put against her and in the course of inquiry she was called upon to attend at a police station to answer certain written questions. The appellant declined to answer questions asked and claimed the protection of article 20(3).Under section 179 of IPC she was prosecuted , for refusing to answer questions put forward by the lawful authority (the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance Cuttack).On this ground the accused challenged the rationality of the power of the judicial magistrate by moving to High Court under article 226 of the Indian Constitution and section 401 of Criminal Procedure Code. But the High Court failed to answer the limit of the section 161(2) of the criminal procedure code when an accused imposed article 20(3) during police interrogation because of which the plea of the appellant was rejected. And on receiving a certificate she appealed under article 132(1) in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that for invoking Article 20(3) the party pleading must be accused of an offence, and that she compelled to answer the incriminating questions asked from her, and that calling a woman as a witness to a police station violates section 160(1) and might influence her testimony and that section 161(2) and Article 20(3) immunes the witness from being forced to answer incriminatory questions at the investigation stage itself. 1. CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***Petitioner: Nandini Satpathy Respondent: Dani(P.L.) and Anr*Case Number***SCC(2) 424*Judgement Date***07/04/1978*Court***Supreme Court*Quorum***Justice V.R. Krishnaiyer Justice Jaswant Singh Justice V.D. Tulzapurkar*Author***V.R. Krishnaiyer*Citation***1978 AIR 1025, 1978 SCC (2) 424,1978 SCR (3) 608*Legal Provisions Involved***Article 20(3) of Indian Constitution, Section 161(1) of Criminal Procedure Code, Article 20(1) of Indian Constitution**INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** Article 20(3) of the Constitution guarantees-Right against Self-Incrimination to a person accused of an certain offence. While under Section 161(1) of Criminal Procedure Code, every person whosoever is questioned by the police is required to answer truthfully, sub-clause (2) of the same section provides the right against self-incrimination to the person who is being questioned. In this case, the legality of initiating proceedings under section 179 of IPC which lists down punishment incase someone fails to truthfully answer a question asked by a public officer was been questioned. **FACTS OF THE CASE** The Deputy Superintendent of Police(Vigilance, Cuttack) filed a complaint against the appellant under Section 179, IPC before the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Cuttack, for not answering the questions that were asked from her regarding an accusation of acquiring wealth out of proportion to her legitimate sources of income hinting towards a wrongful source of gain. The Magistrate issued summons to the accused to appear before the court, aggrieved by which the appellant moved to the High Court under Article 226 of the constitution and Section 401 of Criminal Procedure Code where her plea was rejected. So, she appealed to the Supreme Court under Article 132(1). **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** The principal issue to be determined in the present case was the ambit of Article 20 (3) of the Constitution and, that of Section 161 (2) of Criminal Procedure Code. **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that : The Appellant argued that Section 161 Criminal Procedure Code doesn’t apply to an accused person, the questions that formed the chain of circumstance in the prosecution case are inclined to establish the accusation against the accused and thus Article 20 (3) might cover all such questions for being accusative. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Respondent submitted that: The Respondent argued that Article 20 (3) didn’t apply at the stage of investigation . **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** Article 20(3) of the Constitution, Section 179 of IPC and Section 161(1) and 161 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code. **JUDGEMENT** The Court held that for invoking Article 20 (3), the party pleading must be accused of an offence, and that he/she was subjected to a compulsion to answer the incriminating questions asked from them, and that calling a woman as a witness in the police station violates Section 160 (1) and influences her testimony, and that Section 161 (2) and Article 20 (3) immune the witness from being forced to answer incriminatory questions at the investigation stage. Even the Miranda guidelines extended this immunity to the stage of investigation. The Appellant was thus directed to answer all relevant questions which are not self-incriminatory. The Prosecution case was thus dismissed. **RATIO DECIDENDI** The Ratio Decidendi, or the legal principle established in this case, is that the power of arrest should be exercised reasonably and not arbitrarily. The court emphasized that the power to arrest should be used only when it is absolutely necessary and not as a tool for coercion or harassment. It upheld the fundamental rights of individuals and emphasized the importance of respecting their liberty and dignity. **OBITER DICTA** Some of the notable obiter dicta included: - **Importance of Right to Privacy:** The court discussed the importance of right to privacy and emphasized that individuals have the right to refuse to cooperate with the police without having the fear of arbitrary arrest or harassment. This observation highlighted the fundamental rights guaranteed to us by the Indian Constitution. - **Role of Police in Criminal Investigations:** The court commented on the role of the police in criminal investigations, stating that while they have the authority to investigate crimes, they must exercise their powers judiciously and must also respect the rights of individuals. The court cautioned against misuse of power by law enforcement agencies. - **Judicial Oversight:** The court suggested the need for judicial oversight to prevent abuse of power by the police. It emphasized the importance of courts in ensuring that arrests are made in accordance with the law and that the rights of individuals are protected. - **Balancing Individual Rights and State Interests:** The court discussed the delicate balance between individual rights and state interests in maintaining law and order. It recognized the need for effective law enforcement while also stressing the importance of safeguarding individual liberties. **CONCLUSION& COMMENTS** This landmark judgment has well established the rights of an accused concerning the questioning in any case and limits the power of the investigating authorities to prevent exploitation of the accused, mentally or physically. The said case has provided strict guidelines against any third-degree torture by the officials to obtain any statements and any sort of duress to extract self-incriminating evidence by the accused. It has also petrified the provision under Section 160 (1) of Criminal Procedure Code to ensure the safety of women witnesses by exempting them from being called upon at any such place other than their house**.** **REFERENCES** Important Cases Referred** - In the case of Nandini Satpathy vs PL Dani, several legal principles and precedents were referred to by the Supreme Court of India in its judgment. Some of the key cases cited include: - State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh - H.N. Rishbud & Inder Singh v. State of Delhi - State of Maharashtra v. Natwarlal Damodardas Soni - Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar Important Statutes Referred** In the case of Nandini Satpathy vs PL Dani, several statutes were referenced by the Supreme Court of India. i. The Code of Criminal Procedure ii. The Constitution of India **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Call for Blogs: Centre for Law and Urban Development Blog](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-blogs-centre-for-law-and-urban-development-blog/) **Published:** March 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **ABOUT THE CENTRE** **The Centre for Law & Urban Development at National Law University, Delhi**, aims to bring together the students, industries and academia working towards enhancing the understanding and teaching of property, housing, urban development and other related laws. In doing so, the Centre has undertaken a variety of projects and activities, such as the SDG Series, Research Projects and Publications on relevant topics of prime importance and awareness drives through proactive public initiatives and webinars, amongst a multitude of other projects. These projects are driven towards answering some pertinent questions that surround the existing system within today’s society such as the needs, status and standing of the underprivileged in the urban structure and other such key issues that plague the societies in their current form. In an attempt to offer solutions that are not just viable but also sustainable, pragmatic and stakeholder friendly, CLUD has also undertaken projects in the area of affordable housing to ensure housing for all as a facet of urban planning. At CLUD, we understand that Urban Planning is an all-round and holistic field of study that requires the cooperation of professionals and scholars from diverse fields. This will further our aim to also delve into and attempt to tackle issues such as the impact of climate change on sustainable cities, the prospects of smart cities and the scope of Urban Development in its truest sense from the lens of the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals. To further the goals and ambitions of CLUD, we would also collaborate with and work towards initiatives like the HUDCO, NPCC, NBCC, Project AMRUT and the Delhi Development Authority to truly realize the implications of the efforts undertaken and be the change we envision for the future. **THEMES FOR SUBMISSION** - **1. Urban Governance and Legal Frameworks:** Exploring the intersection of law and governance in urban contexts, including issues of decentralization, local administration, and regulatory frameworks. - **2. Sustainable Urban Development:** Analyzing legal strategies and policy interventions for promoting sustainability in urban areas, encompassing topics such as environmental protection, resource management, and climate resilience. - **3. Housing Rights and Affordable Housing:** Investigating legal challenges and solutions concerning housing rights, eviction policies, homelessness, and the provision of affordable housing in urban settings. - **4. Land Use Planning and Zoning Laws:** Examining the role of legal mechanisms in land use planning, urban zoning regulations, land acquisition, and equitable distribution of land resources. - **5. Transportation Law and Urban Mobility:** Addressing legal issues related to urban transportation systems, public transit, infrastructure development, and access to transportation services. - **6. Smart Cities and Technology Regulation:** Discussing the legal implications of technological innovations in urban environments, including data privacy, cybersecurity, and governance of smart city initiatives. - **7. Social Justice and Inclusive Development:** Investigating legal strategies to promote social equity, access to justice, and inclusive urban development, with a focus on marginalized communities and vulnerable populations. **SUBMISSION GUIDELINES** - – Submissions should be original and unpublished work. – Articles should be between **800 to 1500 words.** - – Citations and references should follow **oscola/bluebook format.** - – Authors are encouraged to include relevant case studies, empirical data, or policy analysis to support their arguments. - – Please include a brief author **bio (100 words)** and a high- resolution author photo. - – Submissions should be sent as Word documents to [**clud@nludelhi.ac.in**](mailto:clud@nludelhi.ac.in) with the subject line: ***“Submission for Centre for Law and Urban Development Blog Series.”*** **TIMELINE** - The call for submissions is ongoing, and contributions will be accepted on a rolling basis. Authors will be notified of the status of their submissions within **30 days** - We look forward to receiving your insightful contributions and fostering meaningful dialogue on the critical issues at the intersection of law and urban development. **IMPORTANT LINKS** **1. Link for the Brochure –** [https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/call-for-blogs\_20240228\_200529\_0000.pdf ](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/call-for-blogs_20240228_200529_0000.pdf) **2. For Submission** – with the subject line: **“Submission for Centre for Law and Urban Development Blog Series.”** **Categories:** Call for Blogs, Call for Papers --- ### [Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab](https://lawfoyer.in/bachan-singh-v-state-of-punjab/) **Published:** March 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Chaitanya Sharma** (National Forensic Sciences University, Delhi Campus) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The *Bachan Singh v State of Punjab* [\[1\]](#_ftn1)is a landmark case in constitutional law of India which deal with constitutionality of capital punishment in India under **Article 21** [\[2\]](#_ftn2)of Indian constitution. The following case give birth to the new doctrine named as **“Rarest of Rare”** doctrine which must be applied while dealing with death penalty matters. The 5-judge bench of supreme court heard this matter in 1980 including then CJI Y.C. Chandrachud. After hearing both parties’ arguments and referring various cases of supreme court the bench opined that the death penalty could be imposed in certain circumstances, but with strict guidelines to ensure fairness and proportionality. It was also put emphasis on the background of the accused and the crime committed by him and supreme court also underlined the importance of considering mitigating factors and permitted accused to present his viewpoint in front of the court before confirming his final sentence for death. This landmark judgement also gives a set of guidelines to the other high courts to keep in mind the guidelines while awarding or conforming the death sentence to the accused and only allow the capital punishment in most heinous cases and where life imprisonment would be insufficient to the gravity of crime committed by the offender. This case has given a new direction to the death penalty debate and the jurisprudence concerned with the death penalty in Indian legal system and is widely analysed by various jurist and academicians who are researching on death penalty. ***Keywords*:** *Death Penalty, Article 21, Rarest of Rare Doctrine, Constitutional Validity, Punishment.* CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***Bachan Singh vs State of Punjab *Case Number***Criminal appeal No. 273 of 1979*Judgement Date***9 May, 1980 *Court***Supreme Court of India*Quorum***[Y.V. Chandrachud](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=benchid:y-v-chandrachud), [N.L.Untwalia](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=benchid:n-l-untwalia), [P.N. Bhagwati](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=benchid:p-n-bhagwati), [R.S. Sarkaria](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=benchid:r-s-sarkaria), [A.C. Gupta](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=benchid:a-c-gupta) *Author***[R.S. Sarkaria](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=authorid:r-s-sarkaria) *Citation***AIR 1980 SC 898*Legal Provisions Involved***Section 302 Indian Penal Code, section 354 (3) Criminal Procedure Code, Article 14, 19(2)(3)(4)(5)(6) and 21 of Constitution of IndiaINTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The case takes his origin from the state of Punjab in India. The accused in the following case Mr. Bachan Singh was convicted for murder and trial court sentenced him capital punishment. Not satisfied with the judgement the latter appealed to the apex court of India which is Supreme Court and challenged the constitutional validity of capital punishment in the light of **Article 21** of Indian constitution. This case opened the avenues for the hon’ble Supreme Court to reconsider the constitutional validity of Capital Punishment. The hon’ble Supreme Court established the legal framework and principles that guide the imposition of death penalty in India. FACTS OF THE CASE** - Bachan Singh was a farmer in state of Punjab, India. On July 31st 1979 he got involved in an argument with deceased Basant Singh who was stabbed by Bachan Singh - In evening of the same day accused i.e. Bachan Singh went to the brother of deceased, Darshan Singh and stabbed him also. - The trial court find him guilty of **Section 302[**\[3\]**](#_ftn3)** of **Indian Penal Code,1860** and awarded him with death penalty. - Bachan Singh appealed in the Punjab and Haryana High Court but the application was rejected was sentence was confirmed. - Finally, Bachan Singh appealed to the supreme court of India and challenged the constitutional validity of **Article 21** of Indian Constitution. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** - whether the death penalty violated the right to life and personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Indian Constitution? - whether Section 302 of the Indian Criminal Code, 1860, which stipulates the death sentence as a punishment for murder, unconstitutional? **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsels for Appellant submitted that Death penalty is not accordance with the constitution of India as it violates the **“Right to Life”** which is envisaged in **Article 21** of Constitution of India. - The counsels for Appellant submitted that the awarding the capital punishment is an arbitrary process and due diligence was not carried out and is used unlawfully against the poor strata of the society. - The counsels for Appellant submitted that Bachan Singh can be reformed if provided with proper treatment and care. **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** 1. The counsels for Respondent submitted that death penalty act like a deterrence in the society and will prevent other people and criminal to commit these acts. 1. The counsels for Respondent submitted that society should be protected by the people like Bachan Singh as they are danger for the society as well as state. RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** **Indian Penal Code, 1860** - **Section 302- “**Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death or 1 \[imprisonment for life\], and shall also be liable to fine.” **Code of Criminal Procedure,1973** - **Section 354(3)- “**When the conviction is for an offence punishable with death or, in the alternative, with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of years, the judgment shall state the reasons for the sentence awarded, and, in the case of sentence of death, the special reasons for such sentence.” **Constitution of India** - **Article 14- “**The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.” - **Article 19(2)-** “Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of 4 \[the sovereignty and integrity of India,\] the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.” - **Article 19(3)- “Nothing in sub-clause (b) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of 4 \[the sovereignty and integrity of India or\] public order, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause”. - **Article 19(4)- “Nothing in sub-clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of \[the sovereignty and Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc. integrity of India or\] public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause.” - **Article 19(5)- “**Nothing in 1 \[sub-clauses (d) and (e)\] of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe”. - **Article 19(6)- “**Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, 2 \[nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to,— (i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or (ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise\].” **JUDGEMENT** - **RATIO DECIDENDI** - Death penalty is not per se unconstitutional and can be awarded and it is also not violation any fundamental right specially Article 21 of Indian Constitution as Article 21 is not absolute but has certain exceptions in which death penalty is one of them.The hon’ble Supreme court introduced the new doctrine which is “Rarest of Rare” according to which death punishment can only be awarded in exceptional cases. - OBITER DICTA** - The abolition of death penalty comes in the ambit of legislation. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** In conclusion it can be inferred that *Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab* was a landmark judgement which given a new direction for awarding capital punishment and introduction of the doctrine of Rarest of Rare also helped the judges to decide whether to give capital punishment or not**.** - REFERENCES** - Important Cases Referred** - *Mukesh* v. *State for NCT of Delhi*, (2017) 6 SCC 1 - *Yakub Abdul Razak Memon* v. *State of Maharashtra* Writ Petition (Cri) No. 129 SC, 2015 - *State* v. *Mohd Afzal*, (2003) 71 DRJ 178 - *Md Ajmal Md Amir Kasab @ Abu* v. *State of Maharashtra*, (2012) 9 SCC 1 - Important Statutes Referred** - Indian Penal Code,1860: Section 302 - Code of Criminal Procedure,1973: Section 354(3) - Constitution of India: Article 14, 19(2)(3)(4)(5)(6) and 21 --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) AIR 1980 SC 898,1980 [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death or 1 \[imprisonment for life\], and shall also be liable to fine. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Subhash Desai v. Governor of Maharashtra](https://lawfoyer.in/subhash-desai-v-governor-of-maharashtra/) **Published:** March 1, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** By – **GAUTAM KUMAR** (CENTRAL UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH BIHAR,GAYA) - ABSTRACT** In the case of Subhash Desai vs Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra & Ors[*****\[1\]*****](#_ftn1), the Supreme Court considered a request for a reference to a larger Bench regarding the decision in Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix vs Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly. The issue at hand was whether a Speaker could adjudicate on disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule while facing a notice of removal. Different opinions were presented by the judges involved, with Justices Khehar and Misra holding that the Speaker should refrain from considering such petitions when facing removal intent, while Justice Lokur had a differing view. The Court emphasized that the decision on whether to refer the case to a larger Bench should be made considering the specific facts of the case and its impact on the present situation. The Court decided to determine the need for a reference alongside the case’s merits and scheduled a further hearing for 21st February 2023. The case involved multiple petitions, stay applications, and a significant number of advocates representing the parties. Ultimately, the Court’s decision on the reference and the case’s merits would be crucial in resolving the legal complexities surrounding the Speaker’s role in disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule. ***Keywords)*: tenth schedule, constitution, Supreme Court, disqualification, speaker** - CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***Subhash Desai v. Governor of Maharashtra*Case Number***Writ Petition (Civil) No 493 of 2022*Judgement Date***2023.02.17*Court***THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA*Quorum*** Hon’ble Dr Justice Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud Hon’ble Mr Justice M R Shah Hon’ble Mr Justice Krishna Murari Hon’ble Ms Justice Hima Kohli Hon’ble Mr Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha.*Author***Hon’ble Dr Justice Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud Hon’ble Mr Justice M R Shah Hon’ble Mr Justice Krishna Murari Hon’ble Ms Justice Hima Kohli Hon’ble Mr Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha.*Citation***2023 SCC Online SC 607*Legal Provisions Involved***Constitution of India- Art 179(c ), Art 212, Art 226, Art 32, Art 145(3) Constitution of India- tenth schedule: Anti defection law Doctrine of precedent Rule of law Function and powers of Governor - INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The main issue in this case revolved around the political turmoil and power struggle within the State of Maharashtra, particularly concerning the Shiv Sena party. The case involved disputes over the leadership of the Shiv Sena Legislative Party (SSLP), the appointment of the Group Leader and Chief Whip, and the validity of decisions made by different factions within the party. The Tenth Schedule of the Indian Constitution[*****\[2\]*****](#_ftn2), commonly known as the Anti-Defection Law, was added by the 52nd Amendment Act of 1985 to address the issue of political defections by Members of Parliament and Members of State Legislatures. The primary objective of the Tenth Schedule is to curb the practice of legislators switching parties for personal gain or political opportunism, thereby ensuring stability and integrity in the political system. Key provisions and features of the Tenth Schedule include: **1. Definition of Defection:** The Tenth Schedule defines defection as voluntarily giving up the membership of a political party or disobeying the party whip on a vote. It includes joining another party or forming a new party after leaving the original party. **2. Disqualification:** If a legislator is found to have defected as per the provisions of the Tenth Schedule, they are liable to be disqualified from their membership in the House. This disqualification may be enforced by the Speaker of the House based on a petition filed by the party concerned. **3. Exceptions:** The Tenth Schedule provides certain exceptions to disqualification, such as when a split occurs within a party and one group constitutes at least one-third of the members of the legislative party. **4. Role of the Speaker:** The Speaker of the House plays a crucial role in deciding on disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule. The Speaker’s decision in such matters is subject to judicial review. **5. Timeframe for Disqualification:** The Tenth Schedule specifies a timeframe within which the Speaker must decide on disqualification petitions, ensuring a timely resolution of defection cases. Overall, the Tenth Schedule of the Indian Constitution aims to promote party discipline, prevent unethical political practices, and uphold the democratic principles of accountability and transparency in the functioning of legislative bodies. It serves as a mechanism to deter opportunistic defections and maintain the integrity of the political system in India. - FACTS OF THE CASE** The judgment pertains to a Writ Petition (Civil) No. 493 of 2022 filed by Subhash Desai against the Principal Secretary and Governor of Maharashtra and others. During the hearing, a preliminary submission was made regarding the decision in Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix Vs Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly[*****\[3\]*****](#_ftn3), which was argued to require reconsideration by a Bench of several Judges. Senior Counsels like Mr. Kapil Sibal, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, and Mr. Devadatt Kamat sought a reference to a larger Bench, which was opposed by other learned Senior Counsels representing the other side. The issue revolved around whether a reference should be made to a Bench of seven Judges to reconsider the decision in Nabam Rebia case. In the Nabam Rebia case, three judgments were delivered by a Constitution Bench, with differing opinions on whether the Speaker should abstain from considering a petition for disqualification under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution when a notice indicating an intent to remove him has been moved. Justice J S Khehar and Justice Dipak Misra held that the Speaker should refrain from adjudicating on disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule when a notice of resolution for his own removal from the Office of the Speaker is pending. On the other hand, Justice Madan B Lokur had a different view on the matter. The judgment highlighted the need to consider the impact of the principle formulated in the Nabam Rebia case on the specific facts of the present case. The issue of whether a reference to a Bench of seven Judges should be made was to be determined along with the merits of the case. As a result, the batch of cases was scheduled for a hearing on merits on Tuesday, 21 February 2023, at 10.30 am. **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** - Whether it is constitutionally impermissible for a speaker to adjudicate upon disqualification petitions under the tenth schedule when a notice of resolution for his own removal from the office of the speaker is pending. - The interpretation of Article 179(c[*****\[4\]*****](#_ftn4)) and its relevance to speaker`s action in the context of tenth schedule of the constitution. - The necessity of determining whether a reference to a larger bench is warranted based on the merits of case and the impact of the Nabam Rebia decision on the present circumstances. **PETITIONER ARGUMENTS** - “The counsels for Petitioner submitted that the decision in the case of Nabam Rebai case, Arunachal Pradesh legislative assembly required reconsideration by a bench of seeral judges”. The petitioner, represented by senior counsels like Mr. Kapil Sibal, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi and Mr. Devdatta kamat, sought a reference to a larger bench to re-examine the principles established in Nabam Rebia case. - “The petitioner contention was that the speaker should not be allowed to adjudicate upon disqualification petition under the tenth schedule of constitution when facing a notice of resolution for his own removal from the office of the speaker”. This argument was based on the interpretation of the constitution provisions and the principles of democracy, rule of law, and constitutional adjudication. - **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsels for Respondent, Mr. Harish salve, Mr. Mahesh jethmalani, Mr. Neeraj kishan kaul, Mr. Maninder Singh, and Mr. Siddharth Bhatnagar, along with other learned Senior Counsels, opposed the submission made by Mr. Kapil Sibal, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, and Mr. Devadatt Kamat for seeking a reference to a larger Bench. - Mr. Tushar Mehta, the learned Solicitor General, appeared on behalf of the Governor of the State of Maharashtra. - The respondent argued against the need for a reference to a Bench of seven Judges regarding the decision in Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix vs Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly \[(2016) 8 SCC 1\]. - The respondents emphasized that the issue of whether a reference to a larger Bench is required should be considered in conjunction with the merits of the case. - The respondents did not support the idea of making a reference to a larger Bench in isolation from the specific facts and circumstances of the case. - The respondent highlighted the need for a thorough deliberation on whether the principle established in the Nabam Rebia case impacts the factual position in the present case. - Mr. Tushar Mehta, along with others counsels representing the respondents, participated in the arguments on the issue of whether a reference to a larger Bench should be made, emphasizing the importance of considering the merits of the case simultaneously. - The respondents` stance was that the decision on whether to refer the case to a larger Bench should be made in conjunction with a detailed examination of the facts and legal principles involved in the present case. **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** In the case of *Subhash Desai vs Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra and Ors[****\[5\]****](#_ftn5)*, the following legal provisions were referred to and discussed: **1. Tenth Schedule to the Constitution:** The Tenth Schedule deals with anti-defection provisions in India. It lays down the disqualification criteria for Members of Parliament and State Legislatures on the grounds of defection.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) **2. Article 179(c) of the Constitution:** This article pertains to the removal of the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly. It outlines the procedure for moving a resolution to remove the Speaker from office.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) **3. Constitutional adjudication:** The term refers to the process of interpreting and applying the Constitution by the judiciary to resolve legal disputes and uphold constitutional principles. **4. Rule of Law:** The principle that all individuals and institutions are subject to and accountable under the law, ensuring fairness, equality, and justice in society. **5. Founding Fathers:** Refers to the leaders who played a significant role in the establishment of a nation’s constitution. In this context, it likely refers to the framers of the Indian Constitution. **6. Constitutional values:** The fundamental principles and ideals enshrined in the Constitution, such as democracy, rule of law, equality, and justice. **7. Anathema:** A term used to describe something that is detested or loathed, often in the context of being contrary to established norms or principles. - JUDGEMENT** In the case of Subhash Desai vs Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court of India heard arguments regarding the reconsideration of the decision in the Nabam Rebia case by a larger Bench of Judges. The petitioner, represented by Senior Counsels, contended that the Speaker should not adjudicate on disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution when facing a notice of resolution for his removal. The judgment highlighted the differing views of the Justices in the Nabam Rebia case on this issue. The Court emphasized the need to assess the impact of the principles established in Nabam Rebia and bamang felix v. deputy speaker Arunachal Pradesh legislative assembly and others on the specific facts of the present case before deciding on a reference to a larger Bench. The Court scheduled the batch of cases for a hearing on merits on a specified date to thoroughly examine the legal issues involved and determine the necessity of a reference. The judgment underscored the importance of a contextual analysis in deciding on the appropriateness of a larger Bench in light of the principles set forth in the Nabam Rebia case. - RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio decidendi of the judgment in Subhash Desai vs Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra is that the decision on whether a reference to a larger Bench of seven Judges should be made to reconsider the decision in the Nabam Rebia case is contingent upon a thorough examination of the impact of the principles established in Nabam Rebia on the specific circumstances of the present case. The judgment underscores the importance of not considering the issue of reference in isolation but rather in conjunction with the merits of the case at hand. It emphasizes the need to deliberate on how the principles articulated in Nabam Rebia may affect the factual position in the present case before deciding on the necessity of a larger Bench. The decision to schedule the batch of cases for a hearing on merits on a specified date reflects the court’s approach to ensuring a comprehensive assessment of the legal issues involved. Ultimately, the ratio decidendi highlights the requirement for a contextual and case-specific analysis to determine the appropriateness of a reference to a larger Bench in light of the principles established in the Nabam Rebia case. - **OBITER DICTA** The obiter dicta of this judgment pertains to the consideration of whether a reference of the decision in *Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix vs Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly \[(2016) 8 SCC 1\][****\[8\]****](#_ftn8)* to a larger Bench is necessary. It emphasizes that this determination will be made in conjunction with the examination of the case’s merits. The court highlighted the importance of not isolating the issue of reference from the specific facts of the case at hand. It underscores the need for a comprehensive analysis to ascertain the impact of the principle established in the Nabam Rebia case on the current scenario. The judgment sets a date for the batch of cases to be heard on their merits, indicating that the decision on the reference will be made in conjunction with a thorough evaluation of the case itself. - CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The conclusion of the judgment is that the issue of whether a reference of the decision in *Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix vs Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly \[(2016) 8 SCC 1\][****\[9\]****](#_ftn9)* to a larger Bench is warranted, would be determined together with the merits of the case. Consequently, the batch of cases is set down for hearing on merits on 21 February 2023 at 10.30 am. The words ruled by the judges are as follows: “In terms of the signed order, the issue whether a reference of the decision in *Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix vs Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly \[(2016) 8 SCC 1\]* to a larger Bench is warranted, would be determined together with the merits of the case.” This ruling signifies that the court has acknowledged the request for reconsideration of the decision in *Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix vs Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly \[(2016) 8 SCC 1\]* by a Bench of several judges. The decision in question involves the interpretation of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, specifically regarding the Speaker’s authority to adjudicate upon disqualification petitions while a notice of resolution for his own removal from the Office of the Speaker is pending. The judgment indicates that there are differing opinions among the judges involved in the decision in *Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix vs Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly \[(2016) 8 SCC 1\]*. Justices J S Khehar and Dipak Misra held that it would be constitutionally impermissible for a Speaker to adjudicate upon disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule while a notice of resolution for his own removal from the Office of the Speaker is pending. On the other hand, Justice Madan B Lokur expressed a different view, stating that the issue of the Speaker taking a decision under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution does not arise in the appeals. Given the conflicting opinions, the court has decided to consider the request for a reference to a larger Bench in conjunction with the merits of the case. This approach indicates a thorough and comprehensive consideration of the legal issues at hand, ensuring that the decision is well-informed and takes into account all relevant factors. The decision to set the batch of cases for hearing on merits on 21 February 2023 at 10.30 am demonstrates the court’s commitment to addressing the matter in a timely manner while ensuring that all aspects of the case, including the request for a reference to a larger Bench, are given due consideration. **REFERENCES** - Important Cases Referred** “Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix vs Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly” \[(2016) 8 SCC 1\] - **Important Statutes Referred** Tenth schedule of indian constitution: anti defection law --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) [“Subhash Desai vs Principal Secretary, Governor Of … on 11 May, 2023,”available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/12168609/ (last visited February 24, 2024).](file:///C:/Users/ḥ/Downloads/) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) [WL Staff, “Tenth Schedule – Constitution of India” WritingLaw, 2020available at: https://www.writinglaw.com/tenth-schedule-constitution-of-india/ (last visited February 22, 2024).](file:///C:/Users/ḥ/Downloads/WL%20Staff,%20) [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) [Available at: https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5790b598e561097e45a4e6f1](file:///C:/Users/ḥ/Downloads/Available%20at:%20https:/www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5790b598e561097e45a4e6f1). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) [“Article 179 in Constitution of India,”available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/139447/ (last visited February 21, 2024).](file:///C:/Users/ḥ/Downloads/) [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) [“Subhash Desai vs Principal Secretary, Governor Of … on 11 May, 2023,”available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/12168609/ (last visited February 22, 2024).](file:///C:/Users/ḥ/Downloads/) [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) WL Staff, “Tenth Schedule – Constitution of India” WritingLaw, 2020available at: https://www.writinglaw.com/tenth-schedule-constitution-of-india/ (last visited February 24, 2024). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) [“Article 179 in Constitution of India,”available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/139447/ (last visited February 24, 2024).](file:///C:/Users/ḥ/Downloads/) [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) [nabam rebia bamang,available at: https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5790b598e561097e45a4e6f1](file:///C:/Users/ḥ/Downloads/nabam%20%20rebia%20bamang,available%20at:%20https:/www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5790b598e561097e45a4e6f1). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) [nabam rebia bamang,available at: https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5790b598e561097e45a4e6f1](file:///C:/Users/ḥ/Downloads/nabam%20%20rebia%20bamang,available%20at:%20https:/www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5790b598e561097e45a4e6f1). **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [R.C. Poudyal vs. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 1804](https://lawfoyer.in/r-c-poudyal-vs-union-of-india-air-1993-sc-1804/) **Published:** February 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author:** Sulesh Choudhary (University Five Year Law College, University of Rajasthan **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** In the present case, the constitutional validity of the reservation system was questioned which was in practice from earlier in the state of Sikkim during the reign of King Chogyal when Sikkin was under a hierarchical monarchy. Initially, the reservation system was introduced as a measure to resolve the conflict between the two communities i.e, Bhutia Lepchas who were the original inhabitants of Sikkim, and the Nepali Sikkimese people who migrated in large numbers to Assam in the 19th century. In 1974, when Sikkim became a state under the Union of India, the Parliament considering the peculiar history of the state decided to adopt a similar system of reservation. The Petitioner, a Nepali Sikkimese challenged this reservation as it was being made based on religion and was hence violative of the Article 15 of the Constitution of India. ***Keywords*: Article 371 F, Article 2, Proportional representation, Judicial review, Secularism, Doctrine of Basic Structure** - CASE DETAILS** *Judgement Cause Title***R.C. Poudyal vs. Union of India*Case Number***1993 SCR (1) 891*Judgement Date***February 10, 1993*Court***Supreme Court of India*Quorum***L.M.SHARMA & JAGDISH SARAN VERMA & S.C. AGARWAL $ M.N. VENKATACHALLIAH $ K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY*Author***L.M.SHARMA & JAGDISH SARAN VERMA & S.C. AGARWAL $ M.N. VENKATACHALLIAH $ K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY*Citation***1993 SCR (1) 891*Legal Provisions Involved***Constitution of India- Arts. 2,15,325,371F- INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The case of R.C. Poudyal and Anr. Etc. vs Union Of India and Ors. Etc. was originally filed as a writ petition in the High Court of Sikkim in 1982, challenging the constitutional validity of certain provisions of the Representation of People Act, 1950 and 1951 relating to the reservation of seats in the Legislative Assembly of Sikkim. The case was later transferred to the Supreme Court of India under Article 139A of the Constitution of India. The background of the case relates to the accession of Sikkim into the Indian Union in 1975 as the 22nd state, after the abolition of monarchy through a unanimous resolution of the Sikkim Assembly. Article 371F was inserted in the Constitution to accommodate certain historical aspects in the evolution of Sikkim’s political institutions. This included provisions for the reservation of seats in the Sikkim Assembly for different ethnic and religious groups – 12 seats out of 32 for Sikkimese of Bhutia-Lepcha origin and 1 seat for the Sangha (Buddhist monasteries). The petitioners, who were Sikkimese of Nepali origin, challenged these reservations as unconstitutional and violative of principles of democracy, republicanism, and secularism under the Indian Constitution. They contended that the extent of reservation for Bhutia-Lepchas was disproportionate to their population share. The reservation for the Sangha on purely religious considerations with a separate electoral roll was also challenged. On behalf of the respondents, it was argued that in light of the historical background and to prevent ethnic tensions, these accommodations were transitional provisions justified under Article 371F. Issues of justiciability, the scope of Parliament’s power under Article 2, and the interpretation of Article 371F including the non-obstante clause also arose for consideration. - FACTS OF THE CASE** Post-19th century, a lot of Nepali immigrants started residing in Sikkim changing their demographic profile. Bhutia Lepchas, the indigenous inhabitants were concerned regarding the marginalization of their representation due to the increasing number of immigrants within the state. The state Sikkim, was under a hierarchical monarchy ruled by the King named Chogyal before 1974. The King to resolve the conflicts created councils to distribute the power among the communities. The earlier system provided for the designation of 16 seats out of the 32-member Legislative Assembly to be particularly reserved for Bhutia Lepchas. However several political parties in the state demanded greater democracy leading to the signing of a tripartite agreement whereby Sikkim acceded to India as its 22nd state. Sikkim became a part of the Union of India, that is, a state through Article 2 of the Constitution by the 36th constitutional amendment alongside the insertion of Article 371F, which listed special provisions for the state keeping in mind its peculiar history. Indian Parliament followed the same arrangement and by an amendment to the Representation of People’s Act,1951 reserved 12 seats for the Bhutia Lepchas,1 seat for Buddhist Sanghas,2 seats for Scheduled Castes, and the remaining 17 seats for the General Category. - LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** - Whether the Parliament allowed to make any such reservations while creating any new states under Article 2? - can the legislature enact such laws to reserve seats that are not in proportion to the population of the state and are considerably larger in number as compared to the population? - Whether such provisions of reservations made by the Parliament were violative of the principle of secularism? - Whether the judiciary have the power to review the conditions under which a new state is admitted into the Union? - PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that apart from the power’s invalidity, its exercise in the extent of reservations made for Bhutias-Lepchas has the effect of diminishing correspondingly the value of votes of Sikkimese of Nepali origin. This destroys equality and democratic principles. Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 170 provide for not more than 500 members for a state assembly, chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies. - It was submitted that the powers given under Article 2 of the constitution are subject to the basic structure doctrine as established in the Keshvanand Bharti case. - The petitioners have not challenged the validity of the Constitution (36th Amendment) Act, 1975 inserting Article 371-F. It was contended Article 371-F should be construed consistently with the general philosophy of democracy and secularism in the Constitution. The provisions in the 1976 and 1980 Acts providing 12 seats reservation for Sikkimese of Bhutia and Lepcha origin and one seat for Sanghas were challenged as falling outside Articles 371-F and violating Articles 332, 14, 15, and 325. Reservation for Sanghas amounted to a separate religious electorate, violating the principle of secularism incorporated under Article 15. Alternatively, if Article 371F is widely interpreted, it would be unconstitutional violating basic constitutional features. - It was submitted that 38% seats in the State Legislative Assembly were reserved only for 20% population, violating principles of fair representation. Disproportionate reservation fails to ensure adequate representation as per Articles 330 and 332. - RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsels for Respondent submitted that the writ petitions are not maintainable as the dispute raised is political and the issues are not justiciable. Acquiring fresh territories is an inherent attribute of sovereignty which can be done through conquest, treaty, or other means on conditions the sovereign deems necessary. Any questions relating to this entirely lie in the political realm and are not amenable to the court’s jurisdiction. - Referring to Articles 2 and 4 of the Constitution, it was contended that admission into the Union of India is permissible without a constitutional amendment and the terms and conditions of such admission are not open to court’s scrutiny. Article 371F must be respected and the impugned amendments to the Representation of the People Acts must be held valid due to clause (f) of Article 371F. ## RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS **Constitution of India** **Article 2. Admission or establishment of new States** Parliament may by law admit into the Union, or establish, new States on such terms and conditions, as it thinks fit. **Article 15. Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth** [(1)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1942013/) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth, or any of them. **Article 325. No person to be ineligible for inclusion in, or to claim to be included in a special, electoral roll on grounds of religion, race, caste, or sex** There shall be one general electoral roll for every territorial constituency for election to either House of Parliament or the House or House of the Legislature of a State and no person shall be ineligible for inclusion in any such roll or claim to be included in any special electoral roll for any such constituency on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or any of them. **Article 371 F.** **Special provisions concerning the State of Sikkim** Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,– [(f)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/257264/) Parliament may, for the purpose of protecting the rights and interests of the different sections of the population of Sikkim make provision for the number of seats in the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim which may be filled by candidates belonging to such sections and for the delimitation of the Assembly constituencies from which candidates belonging to such sections alone may stand for election to the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim. - JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court addressed the legality of reservations for ethnic groups in Sikkim’s legislative assembly.The majority opinion of the Court hinged on the observation that in Sikkim, the Sangha community had historically played an active role in the sociopolitical discourse. This historical context was deemed crucial in understanding the community’s significance within Sikkim’s fabric. The Court acknowledged that the Sanghas were not merely a religious identity but also held political relevance. Justice Sharma’s minority opinion is particularly significant. He raised concerns about the potential impact of separate electorates on the **democratic foundation** of the country. The creation of separate electorates, according to Justice Sharma, could undermine the principles of equal representation and democratic participation. The Court held that while **Article 2** granted broad powers to the Parliament, such authority was not immune from review. The **Basic Structure doctrine**, already established, limited the Parliament’s discretion. Additionally, the **Attorney General** argued that **Article 371F**, with its nonstate clause, exempted Sikkim from other constitutional provisions. Nevertheless, this argument was flawed, as the Parliament’s authority could not override fundamental constitutional principles. Thus, the judiciary possesses the necessary power to scrutinize the conditions for admitting a state, especially when inconsistent with existing provisions. The Court further clarified the implications of **Article 2**, emphasizing that a newly admitted state cannot be entirely equal to existing states within the Union. While the Parliament possesses the authority to admit states based on specific conditions, these conditions must align with the established constitutional framework. The term “alien system” was subject to scrutiny, as its vagueness raised concerns. Such ambiguity risks subjective interpretation on an ad hoc basis, potentially leading to discriminatory outcomes. While acknowledging Sikkim’s unique context, the purpose behind electoral law changes was to foster political progress and prevent demographic dominance. However, the minority view, expressed by L.M. Sharma, C.J.I., emphasized the importance of maintaining a ratio between seats and population as per **Article 330(2)** and **Article 332(3)**. Reservations aim for equal status, but this specific reservation may not address inadequate representation. Flexible provisions allow broader discretion to achieve proportionate representation, avoiding excessive favoritism and potential inequality. The majoritarian opinion held that **Article 371F** did not violate the Basic Structure of the Indian Constitution. **RATIO DECIDENDI** 1. While the Parliament has powers under Article 2, they are subject to the basic structure doctrine. The judiciary has the power to review Article 2 admissions within the basic structure limits. Sikkim’s reservation violates the principle of secularism. 2. The court held that the power of the Parliament to admit new states under Article 2 is subject to judicial review and not unlimited. 3. The Basic Structure doctrine limits Parliament’s power to make changes that go against the structure of the Constitution. 4. The judiciary has the authority to review the conditions under which a new state gets admitted into the Union. - **OBITER DICTA** - Newly admitted states can’t deviate from the constitutional framework. Vagueness in an “alien system” allows scope for discrimination.The court emphasized the historical background of Sikkim and its accession to India, including the concerns of different communities in the state. - The reservations made by the Parliament were questioned on the grounds of discrimination based on religion, violating Article 15 of the Constitution.The court discussed the scope of the term “on such terms and conditions as it deems fit” mentioned in Article 2, clarifying that it does not grant unfettered power to the Parliament. - The court highlighted the need for the judiciary to have significant power to review the conditions of admission for new states to ensure consistency with existing constitutional provisions. - CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** Religion undeniably plays a pivotal role in a state’s political discourse. Attempting to disentangle politics from religion proves implausible, as they are inherently intertwined. The Court’s reliance on historical circumstances to bolster an otherwise flawed argument is questionable. This approach opens the door for all newly admitted states to employ similar defenses based on religion. While the arrangement in question pertains specifically to Sikkim, considering the state’s historical context, it is not far-fetched to anticipate its application in other newly admitted states. In light of democratic principles, the Court should have adopted a secularist approach and given due weight to the minority interpretation in reaching its decision. - REFERENCES** - Important Cases Referred** - Keshvanand Bharti vs State of Kerela AIR 1973 SC 1461, 1973 4 SCC 225 - Mangal Singh v. Union of India, \[1967\] 2 S.C.R. - Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. - Important Statutes Referred** - The Constitution of India - – Article 2 - – Article 4 - – Article 333 - – Article 371A - – Article 371F - Representation of Sikkim Subjects Act, 1974 - Government of Sikkim Act, 1974 - The Representation of the People Act,1951 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases **Tags:** #law, #lawfoyer, #lawyer, #SC Judgement, #supreme court judgement, case analysis, case summary, lawfoyer, R.C. Poudyal, R.C. Poudyal vs. Union of India, Union of India --- ### [State of West Bengal v. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of Bagandih, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1149](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-west-bengal-v-chiranjilal-mineral-industries-of-bagandih-2023-scc-online-sc-1149/) **Published:** February 29, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** State of West Bengal v. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of Bagandih, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1149 **Content:** ## ABSTRACT The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal filed by the State of West Bengal against the High Court judgment directing execution of a mining lease in favour of Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of Bagandih \[“Respondent No.1”\]. It set aside the High Court judgment to the extent of balance area except 20.87 acres, which the State owned and agreed to grant lease to Respondent No.1. The Court examined the provisions under Rule 61 of West Bengal Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 2016 and Section 10-A of Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 inserted by the 2015 Amendment Act. It held that Respondent No.1 was not entitled to invoke the proviso to Rule 61. Further, the grant order dated 16.07.2015 was conditional and could not be considered as crystallizing any right in favour of Respondent No.1 or requiring it to alter its position. ## CASE DETAILS **i) Judgement Cause Title:** State of West Bengal v. Chiranjilal (Mineral) Industries of Bagandih **ii) Case Number:** Civil Appeal No. 8238 of 2022 **iii) Judgement Date:** 12 September 2023 **iv) Court:** Supreme Court of India **v) Quorum:** Sanjiv Khanna and Aravind Kumar, JJ. **vi) Author:** Sanjiv Khanna, J. **vii) Citation:** 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1149 **viii) Legal Provisions Involved:** Rule 61 of West Bengal Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 2016 Section 10-A of Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 Section 14-Y of West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 Section 4-C of West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 ## INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The State of West Bengal filed the present appeal against the High Court judgment directing it to execute a mining lease of 76 acres land in favour of Respondent No.1. The issue arose from the applications moved in 1985 and 1998 by West Bengal Mineral Development and Trading Corporation Ltd. \[WBMDTCL\] and Respondent No.1 respectively, seeking a mining lease over the same land. After several intermediate orders and litigation, the High Court allowed Respondent No.1’s writ petition in 2016 challenging conditional grant order dated 16.07.2015 issued to it, directing the execution of lease. The intra-court appeal by the State against it resulted in the impugned judgment, which dismissed the appeal. Hence, the present appeal before the Supreme Court primarily concerning the interpretation and applicability of Rule 61 of West Bengal Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 2016 and Section 10-A of MMDR Act, 1957. ## FACTS OF THE CASE \[1\] WBMDTCL applied for mining leases in the concerned land in 1985 and was granted orders in 1986. \[2\] In 1998, Respondent No.1 applied for a mining lease over the same 76 acres land. Its application was rejected in 2003 on grounds of prior allotment. \[3\] Respondent No.1’s writ petition led to a 2006 order, whereby based on the agreed apportionment between WBMDTCL and Respondent No. 1, 76 acres land was allotted to Respondent No. 1. \[4\] However, the 2006 order was recalled in 2010 as it was passed without considering the pending litigation concerning WBMDTCL’s prior allotment. \[5\] Meanwhile, the High Court allowed Respondent No. 1’s writ petition in 2014 ex-parte without considering the 2010 recalling order. \[6\] In 2015, the State issued a conditional grant order dated 16.07.2015 in favour of Respondent No.1 for 76 acres land. \[7\] Respondent No.1’s writ petition challenging the conditional grant order resulted in the 2016 High Court judgment directing execution of lease in its favour. The State’s intra-court appeal against it was dismissed vide the impugned 2018 judgment. ## LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i) Whether Rule 61 of West Bengal Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 2016 would apply to Respondent No. 1’s 1998 application? ii) Whether Respondent No. 1 was entitled to invoke the proviso to Rule 61? iii) Whether the grant order dated 16.07.2015 amounted to crystallization of any right in favour of Respondent No. 1 so as to require it to alter its position? iv) What is the extent of land for which mining lease could be directed to be executed in favour of Respondent No.1? ## PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS i) The State counsel submitted that Rule 61 of West Bengal Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 2016 would squarely apply to Respondent No.1’s 1998 application, rendering it ineligible for consideration. The proviso could also not be invoked as no right had crystallized in favour of Respondent No.1 under the conditional grant order dated 16.07.2015. ii) They argued the High Court erred in giving precedence to judicial orders passed prior to 2016 Rules since these Rules were framed under a 2015 Amendment Act to usher in a new regime for allotting mining leases through auctioning to improve transparency. Hence Rule 61 ought to apply. iii) It was further submitted that the grant order dated 16.07.2015 was conditional upon fulfilment of several stipulations and could not be considered to have crystallized any right in favour of Respondent No.1 so as to require it to alter its position based on the order. Hence proviso to Rule 61 exempting such cases of altered position was inapplicable. ## RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS i) Respondent No.1 submitted that its 1998 application pre-dated the 2016 Rules. Further, the State had agreed to grant lease to it vide the 2006 order, which was recalled without hearing Respondent No.1. ii) It was submitted the High Court orders in 2014 and 2016 directing grant of lease would prevail over the 2016 Rules. iii) Reliance was placed on Bhushan Power and Steel Ltd. v. State of Odisha case to submit that the recommendation for grant of lease amounted to a letter of intent by whatever name, hence Respondent No. 1’s right stood crystallized by Government orders entitling it to protection under amended Act. ## RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i) Rule 61 of West Bengal Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 2016: It renders all prior pending applications ineligible subject to the proviso that applications which have already been issued grant orders/letter of intent would remain eligible subject to conditions compliance. ii) Section 10-A of MMDR Act, 1957: It contains identical non-obstante clause rendering prior applications ineligible, subject to exceptions where applicants’ position stood altered under previous letters of intent or grant orders. This was inserted to ensure auctioning for transparency in allotment. ## JUDGMENT **Ratio Decidendi** i) Rule 61 of West Bengal Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 2016 would squarely apply to Respondent No.1’s application, subject to the proviso. However, Respondent No.1 had not acquired any crystallized right under the 2006 order in its favour since it was recalled in 2010 without challenge, hence proviso exemption inapplicable. ii) The grant order dated 16.07.2015 was expressly conditional and contingent upon fulfilment of stipulations. Hence, it could not be considered to have crystallized any right in favour of Respondent No. 1 or requiring it to alter its position based thereon so as to attract proviso to Rule 61. iii) The only crystallized right accruing to Respondent No.1 was consideration of its application as per applicable law and judicial orders directing the same did not freeze the law. Rule 61 being the applicable law would render its application ineligible. **Obiter Dicta** i) The Court left open questions whether protection under Section 10-A of MMDR Act, 1957 could be claimed by Respondent No.1 and applicability of provisions of West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. ## CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The Court adopted a strict interpretation approach regarding the proviso to Rule 61 and Section 10-A. It maintained the non-obstante rigor of these provisions to ensure auctioning as the way forward for transparent allotment of mining leases overruling previous ad hoc allotments, unless rights had clearly crystallized under proper orders/letters of intent. It is a strategically balanced verdict, serving the object of law while also preventing arbitrary deprivation of livelihood as evident from the direction to grant lease over 20.87 acres land owned by the State. ## REFERENCES **Cases Referred:** Bhushan Power and Steel Limited v. S.L. Seal, (2017) 2 SCC 125 Bhushan Power and Steel Limited v. State of Odisha, (2012) 4 SCC 246. Thressiamma Jacob v. Geologist, Department of Mining and Geology, (2013) 9 SCC 725 **Statutes Referred:** The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 The West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 The West Bengal Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 2016 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Babulal Parate vs The State of Bombay and Another on (28 August 1959)](https://lawfoyer.in/babulal-parate-vs-the-state-of-bombay-and-another-on-28-august-1959/) **Published:** February 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Author:** Pooja, Rayat College Of Law, Railmajra (Affiliated to Panjab University, Chandigarh) 1. **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** It is a fact that the Constitution is the foundation of all of the laws in our country (India)[\[1\]](#_ftn1). However, we observed or heard the contentions that ‘Y’ Provision of ‘X’ Act is against our Constitution and made before the Apex Court. Then the question arises about the importance of our constitution and where the Doctrine of separation of Power come forth as it divided the powers between Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary and the term used ‘Three organs of the state machinery’. No doubt, all work together but in their sphere of Jurisdiction in order to maintain effectiveness and efficiency in the making of Law, Implementation of Law and Order and for the Administration of Justice. When disputes concerning statutory interpretation or the constitutionality of legal provisions surface, the judiciary takes center stage. Through petitions filed before the Supreme Court, it plays a critical role in deciphering the intent and objective of statutes, recognizing that these can vary depending on the specific case[\[2\]](#_ftn2) (e.g., **State of West Bengal v. Bela Banerjee, AIR 1953 SC 166**)[\[3\]](#_ftn3). In this present case, we will further know in what manner the constitutional validity of Section 8 under the State Reorganisation Act(1956) was determined by the Apex Court, when matter concern to the composition of the State of Bombay instead of formation of three state units as an original proposal in the bill before becoming Act and Legislature Process was in dispute. ***Keywords* *(Minimum 5)*:** Supreme law of land,Role of Legislative Process, Power of Parliament, President Recommendation, Amendment of Original Proposal, Composition of Bombay State, Interpretation of Article 3. - **CASE DETAILS** ***Judgement Case Title***Babulal Parate vs The State of Bombay and Another***Case Number***Civil Appeal No. 342 of 1956***Judgement Date***28/08/1959***Court***Supreme Court of India***Quorum***[S.K. Das](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=benchid:s-k-das),[A.K. Sarkar](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=benchid:a-k-sarkar),[K.N. ](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=benchid:k-n-wanchoo)Wanchoo,[M. Hidayatullah](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=benchid:m-hidayatullah)***Author***[S.K. Das](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=authorid:s-k-das)***Citation***1960 AIR 51, 1960 SCR (1) 605, AIR 1960 SUPREME COURT 51, 1960 (1) SCR 605, 1960 SCJ 107, 1959 MPLJ 1037, 1959 62 BOM LR 58***Legal Provisions Involved***Article 3 of the Indian Constitution[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Article 226 of the Indian Constitution[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Article 132 of the Indian Constitution[\[6\]](#_ftn6) Article 122(1) of the Constitution[\[7\]](#_ftn7) States Reorganisation Act, 1956 (XXXVII Of 1956), s. 8(1)[\[8\]](#_ftn8)- **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** This case talks about the very concerning topic and the primary issue, as per case the Petitioner made the argument that one of the proviso of the States Reorganisation Act(1956) has been contravening the Article 3 of the Indian Constitution and question the Constitutional validity of the States Reorganisation Act(1956) .With due procedure before the act passed, the President recommended States Reorganisation Bill before the parliament and state legislature to give opportunity to express their thoughts and opinions in the matter of the formation of three units as per original proposal: the Union territory of Bombay, the State of Gujrat and the State of the Maharashtra. Subsequently, the new amendment made in relation to the matter in which the composition of the State of Bombay rather than the formation of 3 units out of Part A state decided afterwards bill passed with the Presidents assent. This time, the President did not refer this proposal in relation to such modification before the State legislature[\[9\]](#_ftn9). So, we are dealing in this Case analysis: Why the appeal of this matter put forth under Article 226 before the High Court and dismissed? What’s the judgement made by the Supreme Court on the invocation of its jurisdiction under Article 132 of the Indian constitution?[\[10\]](#_ftn10) - **FACTS OF THE CASE**[\[11\]](#_ftn11) The factual matrix, in this case, is that the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Union Government established the Commission on 29 Dec 1953 under a resolution. The Commission submitted its report on 18 April 1956. This report recommended establishing three separate units in the region: the Union Territory of Bombay, the State of Maharashtra, and the State of Gujrat. Based on the recommendation of the Commission, the States Reorganisation Bill (1956) was introduced in the Lok Sabha for the same proposal as per its report. Thereafter, This Bill was referred to a Joint Select Committee of Parliament, which submitted its report on 16 July 1956 after reviewing the proposal and after certain amendments were made to the clauses of the Bill. On 31 August 1956, Parliament approved the Bill. Eventually, it received assent from the President and became the States Reorganization Act (1956). Section 8(1) of this Act established a composite State of Bombay instead of the three units of the state as per the original proposal. On 12 September 1956, Babulal Parate filed a petition before the Bombay High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Section 8 (1) of the States Reorganization Act, 1956 because the Act passed in contravention of the provisions of Article 3 of the Constitution since the Legislature of Bombay had not been allowed to express its views on the formation of the composite State of Bombay, which amounts to a violation of Article 3. The High Court examined the interpretation of Article 3 of the Constitution with the proviso and held that there was no violation of Article 3. The Court dismissed the petition on 14 September 1956. The appellant then obtained the necessary certificate under Article 132(1) of the Constitution and filed his appeal in this present Apex Court on 18 October 1956, on the strength of that certificate. It led to an appeal at the Supreme Court of India, arguing the composite State of Bombay contravened Article 3 as amended by the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1955. - **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** - Whether the formation of a composite State of Bombay, as one unit instead of the three separate units originally proposed in the Bill, contravened Article 3 of the Constitution, specifically with regard to the requirement for the State Legislature of Bombay to express its views? - Whether the interpretation of the proviso to Article 3, considering the conditions laid down, warranted a new reference to the State Legislature for substantial modifications or if subsequent amendments could be considered without a fresh reference? - **PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant contended that as per the proviso of Article 3, the term “State” includes not only the geographical entity but also the people living in that region. They emphasized a democratic process where the representatives of the people in the State Legislature should have had the opportunity to express views on significant changes to the proposal and include any amendments to the original proposal. The term “Bill” should include any substantial amendment to the proposal and should also be referred back to the State Legislature for their views. Therefore, these two terms “state and bill” should be interpreted broadly. Art. IV, Section 3 of the American Constitution says inter-alia that “no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State, nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States or parts of States without the consent of the Legislatures of the State concerned as well as of the Congress”[\[12\]](#_ftn12). States Reorganisation Act, 1956, specifically Section 8(1), which formed the new State of Bombay by amalgamating territories from various existing states, was passed in contravention of the provisions of Article 3 of the Constitution. The contention was that the Act had not complied with Article 3, which requires certain proposals affecting the area, boundaries, or name of any state to be referred to the State Legislature for their views. The Legislature of the State of Bombay did not have the opportunity to express its views[\[13\]](#_ftn13) on the formation of the composite State of Bombay as a single unit instead of the three separate units initially proposed in the Bill. - The formation of the new composite State of Bombay, as outlined in Section 8(1) of the Act, is different from the original proposal. Thus, it should have required to present a fresh Bill and a fresh reference of the President to the State Legislature. - **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** - The counsels for Respondent submitted that the term “State” refers to the geographical entities specified in the Constitution and the term “Bill” should not be interpreted to include every amendment, especially if it is within the scope of the original proposal. It emphasized that a broad interpretation of the “Bill” to include any amendment could nullify the effect of Article 122(1)[\[14\]](#_ftn14). “States Reorganisation Act”, 1956, Section 8(1) which formed the new State of Bombay, as per the provisions of Article 3 of the Indian Constitution. - - They emphasized that the Act followed the procedure outlined in Article 3, including the referral of the proposal to the State Legislatures for their views. The Bill, which later became the “States Reorganisation Act, 1956” was introduced on the recommendation of the President, as required by Article 3. They highlighted that the President’s recommendation fulfilled the constitutional requirement. During the debates in the State Legislature, several members expressed support for a composite State of Bombay. - Counsel contended that the formation of the composite State of Bombay under Section 8(1) of the Act was a valid amendment to the original proposal. There was no requirement for a fresh reference to the State Legislature every time there was an amendment to the proposal contained in the Bill as per Articles 3 and 122 of the constitution. However, Parliament representing the people of India as a whole, has the exclusive power to admit or establish new States, and the role of State Legislatures is limited to expressing their views on proposals. - **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** **Constitution Of India (1950)**[\[15\]](#_ftn15) *Article 3*: *It empowers Parliament to: - *“Form a new State by separation of territory from any State, uniting two or more States or parts of States, or uniting any territory to a part of any State. - *Increase the area of any State. - *Diminish the area of any State. - *Alter the boundaries of any State. - *Alter the name of any State.”* Article 3 lays down conditions: – - *No Bill for the purpose shall be introduced in Parliament except on the recommendation of the President. - *Where the proposal affects the area, boundaries, or name of any State, the Bill must be referred by the President to the Legislature of that State for expressing its views within a specified period. *Article 226 of the Constitution*: - *“Notwithstanding anything in article 32 every High Court shall have powers, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercise jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warrantor and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.” *Article 132 of the Constitution:* - *“An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order of a High Court in the territory of India, whether in a civil, criminal or other proceeding, if the High Court certifies under article 134A that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution.”* Article 122(1) of the Constitution: - *“It protects the validity of legislative proceedings, and challenges based solely on procedural irregularities may be counterproductive of the Indian Constitution.” ***State Reorganisation Act, 1956:* Section 8(1) - *“Formed a new Part A State known as the State of Bombay, comprising specified territories. This was a modification from the original proposal of three separate units.”* - **JUDGEMENT** 1. **RATIO DECIDENDI** - After the analysis and Interpretation of Article 3 of the Indian Constitution reviewed by the apex court. The key focus was on the proviso to Article 3, that if a proposal in a Bill affects the area, boundaries, or name of any state, the President shall refer the Bill to the concerned State Legislature so that the opportunity to express their views can be given as per constitutional provision. As per Article 3, the 2nd condition requires that the President shall refer the proposal contained in the Bill to the State Legislature only, but not for any subsequent modifications or amendments made by Parliament. The objective of this proviso is to provide an opportunity for State Legislatures to express their views on the original proposal within a specified period. Failure to express views does not invalidate the introduction of the Bill. The court rejected the petitioner’s argument that a broader interpretation should be given to the words “State” and “Bill”. - The reason is the petitioner’s argument to apply a broader interpretation of “State”[\[16\]](#_ftn16) to include its people and to consider any significant modification as requiring a fresh Bill and reference to the State Legislature Bill” to include any amendments stating that such an interpretation would nullify the effect of other constitutional provisions like 122 Article and Parliament’s procedural rules” As per the Process, the State Legislatures have the right to express views on proposals affecting their states, Parliament has the exclusive power to admit or establish new States, and State Legislature views are not binding because Parliament, representing the people of India as a whole, has the authority to make decisions on state formation, with State Legislature views serving as input rather than determinative factors[\[17\]](#_ftn17). - The court examined the formation of the composite State of Bombay under Section 8(1) of the “States Reorganisation Act”, 1956. The President must refer the proposal from the bill to the State Legislature within the specified time for their views, as per the second condition of Article 3 of the Indian Constitution. It is important to highlight that according to the High Court’s ruling, the President should refer the original proposal from the Bill to the State Legislature. The proviso does not specify that if the proposal in the Bill is altered through a proper amendment in Parliament, there is a requirement for a new reference to the State Legislature or a new bill introduction. However, the court determined that this modification was within the scope of an amendment and was relevant to the subject matter of the original proposal[\[18\]](#_ftn18). It was noted that during debates in the State Legislature, various views were expressed, including support for a composite State of Bombay, indicating that the State Legislature did have the opportunity to express its views. Hence, The Appeal was dismissed with Cost[\[19\]](#_ftn19). - **OBITER DICTA (IF ANY)** - The court believed that there would be potential challenges and difficulties, if a broader interpretation were to be applied to the proviso of Article 3. It noted that such an interpretation could lead to conflicting views from different State Legislatures, potentially creating legislative hurdles. Subsequently, the court clarified that any hypothetical amendments unrelated to the matters specified in Article 3 would not impact the validity of the proceedings in Parliament, unless they violated a specific constitutional provision. 1. **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The clarity provided by this case on the process of state reorganization[\[20\]](#_ftn20) in India ensures that future alterations or formalities adhere to established procedures. This, in turn, strengthens confidence among citizens and stakeholders in the legal framework guiding such significant changes. Upholding Parliament’s sovereignty reinforces the federal democratic structure of India, striking a crucial balance between central authority and individual state rights, ultimately contributing to overall federal stability. The case recognizes the valuable role of state legislatures in expressing their views on proposed bills affecting their boundaries, promoting a sense of participation and representation within the legal framework. Additionally, it sets a valuable legal precedent for future cases involving similar issues, serving as a crucial resource for lawyers, lawmakers, and judges navigating complex matters of state reorganization. The case might lead to political discussions and debates on the topic of state reorganization. Political parties and leaders may consider the implications of this judgment when proposing or opposing changes to state boundaries, fostering informed discussions on the topic[\[21\]](#_ftn21). The judgment reflects the historical context of India’s state reorganization post-independence. It provides insights into the challenges and considerations faced by the framers of the Constitution and the subsequent legal evolution in dealing with state boundaries. While legal in nature, cases of this nature can also contribute to public awareness of constitutional principles and the importance of proper procedures in governance. It highlights the significance of constitutional provisions in safeguarding the rights and interests of states and citizens. The impact of the Babulal Parate case on society includes providing clarity on state reorganization, reinforcing the federal structure, promoting state autonomy, setting a legal precedent, stimulating political discussions, offering historical insights, and enhancing public awareness of constitutional principles. - **REFERENCES** - **Important Cases Referred** - accessed on 23 feb 2024 - accessed on 23 feb 2024. - accessed on 23 feb 2024. - **Important Statutes Referred** - Constitution of India,1950 - States Reorganisation Act, 1956 - American Constitution --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) accessed on 24 feb 2024 [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) accessed on 24 feb 2024 [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) accessed on 24 feb2024 [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) accessed on 23 feb 2024 [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) accessed on 23 feb 2024 [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) accessed on 23 feb2024 [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) accessed on 24 feb 2024 [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) accessed on 23 feb 2024 [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) accessed on 24 feb 2024 [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) accesses on 24 feb 2024 [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) https://main.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/325.pdf accessed on 23 feb 2024 [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) accessed on 24 feb 2024 [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) State of Louisiana v. State of Mississipi ([202 U.S. 1 (1906)](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/202/1/#:~:text=The%20State%20of%20Louisiana%2C%20by,observe%20the%20line%20so%20determined.) [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) accessed on 24 feb 2024 [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) [https://lddashboard.legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/COI…pdf](https://lddashboard.legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/COI...pdf) accessed on 22feb 2024 [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) State of Texas v. George W. White (1869) [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) accessed on 24 feb 2024 [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) T. H. Vakil v. Bombay Presidency Radio Club Ltd. AIR 1945 BOMBAY 475 [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) accessed on 24 feb 2024 [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) accessed on 24 feb 2024 [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) accessed on 24 feb 2024 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases **Tags:** #law, #lawfoyer, #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, Babulal Parate, case analysis, case summary, lawfoyer, The State of Bombay and Another --- ### [11th National Quiz Competition on Indian Contract Act by LawFoyer: Register by 16th February](https://lawfoyer.in/11th-national-quiz-competition-on-indian-contract-act-by-lawfoyer/) **Published:** January 22, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/11th-quiz-lawfoyer-724x1024.jpg) [Download Answer Key](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Answer-Key-11th-National-Quiz-Competition-on-Indian-Contract-Act-1872.pdf.pdf) --- [Check Results](https://lawfoyer.in/results-of-11th-national-quiz-competition-on-indian-contract-act-by-lawfoyer/) --- [Download Certificates](https://lawfoyer.in/download11th-national-quiz-competition-on-indian-contract-act-certificates/) --- ## Dates - **Date of Quiz:- 18/02/2024** **(5 Pm)** - **Last Date to Apply:-** **16/02/2024, 11:59 pm** - **Result Declaration:-** **24/02/2024** ## Prizes - 1st prize- Rs 1500 + Winner Trophy - 2nd prize- Rs 1000 + 1st Runner Up Trophy - 3rd prize- Rs 500 + 2nd Runner Up Trophy** - 4th-10th Prize- Rs 150 + Certificate of Excellence** - **FREE Practice E-Book with 1000+ MCQs for Practice** - **Free 2 AI Plagiarism Report by Turnitin.** - **Appreciation Certificate for All the Participants** - **Top 10 Rank will get Free access to Certification Course on Indian Evidence Act.** [Click here to know more about course](https://academy.lawfoyer.in/index.php/courses/mastering-the-indian-evidence-act-a-10-day-certification-course/) **Note:-** The Winners Trophy will be dispatched to the designated recipients’ physical address without any additional charges. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/WhatsApp-Image-2024-01-22-at-01.00.07_ac7cf468-1024x576.jpg) ## **Registration Fees** - **Rs 99/- Only** ## **Important Guidelines** - **Format of Quiz:** Quiz shall take place online, and a paper will include multiple-choice questions**.** - The participant can take this exam on their laptop or mobile phone. - The platform for the quiz will be google Forms, Microsoft Forms, etc. - In the case of the same marks, time will be considered (a person who submits early will be given preference). - The link will be shared 24 hours prior to the start of the quiz. ## **Rules & Regulations** - **60 MCQ(s).** - The time allotted will be **25** minutes. (This includes time for filling the basic details like Name, email, etc.) - **Every question carries 04 marks & there will be no negative marking.** - The Result will be declared on **24th February 2024**([www.lawfoyer.in](https://lawfoyer.in/)). --- --- **Categories:** Events, Quiz --- ### [Sushil Kumar Sharma vs. Union Of India and Ors.](https://lawfoyer.in/sushil-kumar-sharma-vs-union-of-india-and-ors/) **Published:** June 23, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **(By Eeshmitha Ranjani[**\[1\]**](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-admin/post-new.php#_ftn1))** **In supreme court of India** **NAME OF THE CASE****Sushil Kumar Sharma vs. Union Of India and Ors****CITATION**Writ petition (civil) 141 of 2005**DATE OF THE CASE**19 July , 2005**APPEALANT**Sushil Kumar Sharma**RESPONDENT**Union of India and Ors**BENCH/JUDGE RESPONDENT**ARJIIT PASAYAT (J) , H. K . SEMA (J)**STATUES/CONSTITUTION** **INVOLVED**Constitution of India ; Indian Penal Code 1860 ; Indian Evidence Act 1872**IMPORTANT SECTIONS/ARTICLES**Constitution of India – Article 14 , 32 India Penal code 1860- Section 498 , 489 A , 304 -B , 306 Indian Evidence Act – 113B ## **ABSTRACT- A writ petition was filed by the petitioner urging the court, to profess Section 489A to be unconstitutional and ultra vires. He requested to frame substitute guidelines for the safeguard of innocent people who were being falsely alleged by unscrupulous persons with frivolous and ulterior motives, to harass their husbands or their relation, so that the court must take strict action against the people who misused the law for their benefit to ill-treat others. After that, the court mentioned some precedents judgments relating to this case and said that a mere possibility of abuse of the provision was not said to be unconstitutional, the Supreme Court also stated that the provision’s main aim is to avert the cases of dowry menace. And that it was the legislature’s responsibility- to amend or repeal any statutes if they are misused. So the court said that they cannot amend the provisions because it is the legislature who should take remedial measures against misuse of section 498A in the future. At last, the court held that it can’t find any constitutional foundation in this provision and disposed of this petition. ## **INTRODUCTION-** India is a country that follows many religious customs. One of the ancient customs carried out by Indians – is giving dowry to the bridegroom at the time of marriage. This custom is followed in the marriage ceremony by which a certain amount of property, money, or gifts were given to the husband and his family, as maintenance after the marriage. From the ancient period, Dowry became essential in marriages. But it led to many problems like harassment, cruelty, and causing domestic violence in her marital houses, abetting women to suicide and killing her for dowry, etc, considering these incidents giving tocher was prohibited according to the dowry prohibition Act, of 1961[\[2\]](#_ftn2). As dowry killings and the mistreatment of women increased, more incidents of these crimes were reported. In the year 1983, there took the amendment by Criminal Law Act, which inserted Section 498A of Ipc, 1860 – cruelty by husbands or relatives of the husband which sentence with imprisonment up to 3 years and liable to fine. These laws were determined to protect women from being harassed. Later on in the following years section 498A provision has been misused by taking undue advantage to harass their husbands and in-laws with oblique motives. And in this case, a petitioner filed a writ to declare section 498A of IPC to be unconstitutional and ultra vires then the court held that it is not fair ‘as a mere possibility of abuse of provision doesn’t make it unconstitutional’, the main objective of provision was to protect the women from the dowry menace hence misusing it can be seriously punished. ## **ISSUES-** -Whether Section 498A of Ipc, 1860 is considered to be unconstitutional and why? -Whether the mere possibility of abuse of power makes the provision ultra vires and unconstitutional? – Why Section 498A Ipc, 1860 had been inserted by the Criminal law amendment Act, 1983? ## **FACTS OF THE CASE-** A writ petition has been filed by a petitioner under Article 32 of the Indian constitution. Pleading that Section 498A of the Indian penal code, 1860 which was inserted by the criminal law Act, and 1983 should be declared unconstitutional and ultra vires. The appellant said that they were unfair and unconstitutional. He highlighted by showing many instances, as it was being misused by unscrupulous persons for making false and frivolous allegations against their husbands, in-laws, and their relation, with oblique motives to harass them. As an alternative, he prayed the court to frame certain guidelines so that it would discourage the people from coming to the court with unclean hands and ulterior motives. Reliance was also made in the decision by a learned single judge of Delhi high court wherein concern was shown about the rise in the number of false and frivolous allegation cases. In these cases most of the time, the accuser was at fault rather than the accused. section 498A and section 113B which were enacted by the criminal law Act 1983(2nd Amendment) were held to substantive and presumptive laws, both come under the amplitude of past events of cruelty. Other related provisions like section 304B and section 498A which deal with different offenses have the common essential to prove was ‘cruelty’ and 306 of Ipc concerning section 498A have a similar intention of abetment of suicide -where cruelty committed by the husband or his relation drag women to committed suicide. reviewed that the main aim of this section was made in the objectives of the criminal law act 1983, besides that several cases such as **Mafatlal Industries Ltd. And Ors. V. Union of India and Ors.,** it was said that a mere possibility of abuse of the provision doesn’t make it unconstitutional or ultra vires. It was the legislature that can amend or repeal any provision or laws enacted, certain remedial measures should be taken by them so that in the future nobody can use it improperly. Until then the court will deal with the cases up to the existing framework only. The court ordered that section has no substance and that section 498A is unconstitutional, so that petition was disposed of saying that if anything the petitioner wants to prove, can be done in the further trial. ## **ARGUMENTS RELATED TO PETITIONER-** - The learned counsel of the petitioner prayed the Apex court to declare Section 498A of Ipc, 1860 as unconstitutional and ultra vires and in alternative to make some guidelines regarding this section so that the innocent will not be harmed by fake and frivolous allegations alleged by unscrupulous persons, with oblique motives to harass their husband and in-laws. - He argued that ‘these types of cases were persecuted not prosecuted’. For instance, In a case based on the learned single judge of Delhi high court rendered decision showed concern about an increase in cases of false allegations, mainly the accuser was said to be guilty but not the accused. - Petitioner states that the provisions included in the Second Amendment of the criminal law Act, 1983- such as section 498A of the Indian penal code, and section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 had an objective to safeguard the women from dowry death and cruelty, but it turned out to be misused by them to abuse others. And stringent action should be taken against them by the court. ## **RELATED PROVISIONS**– - **Constitution of India-1949** **Article 32 –** Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part (1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed (2) The Supreme Court shall have the power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs like habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part (3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses ( 1 ) and ( 2 ), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause ( 2 ) (4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution[\[3\]](#_ftn3) - **Indian Penal Code, 1860** **Section 304B-** (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or har­assment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation.—For this sub-section, “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961) (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.\][\[4\]](#_ftn4) **Section 306-**Abetment of suicide.—If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) **Section 498 –** Enticing or taking away or detaining with criminal intent a married woman.—Whoever takes or entices away any woman who is and whom he knows or has reason to believe to be the wife of any other man, from that man, or from any person having the care of her on behalf of that man, with the intent that she may have illicit intercourse with any person, or conceals or detains with that intent any such woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) **Section 498A**-Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be pun­ished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.—For this section, “cruelty” means— (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb, or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) - **Indian Evidence Act, 1872** **Section 113B**– Presumption as to dowry death.—When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation. For this section, “dowry death” shall have the same meaning as in section 304B, of the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860).\][\[8\]](#_ftn8) ## **JUDGMENT-** The division bench has given a verdict based on their observations in the case. The main objective of Section 489A is to prevent offenses related to dowry death or dowry menace or cruelty or harassment of women by their husbands and their relation (in-laws). Section 498A of IPC and Section 113 B of IEA, 1872 are considered to be substantive (section 498A) and presumptive provisions (section 113B) inserted in the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1983 both sections also explain the cruelty of women, other powerful sections like 304B and 306 of Ipc also somehow related to the offenses against women like, dowry death, abetment of suicide or cruelty. The only objective of the provision(section 498A) is to suppress the cruelty and harassment suffered by women in their marital houses. In the case-**Thangal kunju musaliar v. M. Venkatachalam potti[**\[9\]**](#_ftn9), Authorised official and Income Tax officer and Anr..,** it was held that “the mere possibility of abuse of law doesn’t per se invalidate the legislation, unless the contrary was proved there will be no application of the provision is done ‘not with an evil eye and unequal hand’ ”. From the foremost cases in India or America one thing is for sure if a statutory provision is Intra vires, constitutional and valid a mere abuse of power given by a provision doesn’t make it invalid and constitutional. **Mafatlal Industries Ltd. and Ors V. Union of India ans Ors.,[**\[10\]**](#_ftn10)** a 9 judges bench observed proclaimed that a mere possibility of abuse of a provision by those in charge of administering it cannot be ground for holding a provision procedurally or substantively unreasonable. Also in other cases like **Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat[**\[11\]**](#_ftn11) , Unique Butle Tube Industries (P) Ltd . v. U.P. Financial Corporation abd Ors.[**\[12\]**](#_ftn12) and Padma Sundara Rago and Ors. V. State** the court expressed that it only interprets the law and cannot make them. When a provision is constitutional and intra vires doesn’t mean it can be used unfairly making innocent to undergo false attributions, that will bring great suffering to them. Until he proved to be an acquittal, up to then the public ignominy the person had suffered, and in addition, the media brings more misery to him. In some cases that may even cause the death of the person. So remedial measures should be taken by the legislature to prevent these false allegations on innocent who are becoming victimized by frivolous person’s malicious acts. The court until then works up to the framework of legislation. Court further stated “It is a provision to intend to work as a shield and not assassins” but on the contrary, they were turned out into “legal terrorism”. The judges proclaimed a statement i.e., “if a ‘wolf cry’ is frequently made there might be no protection available if that wolf really comes.” Court and investigation agencies are ‘watchdogs, not bloodhounds’. It was the court’s effort to make sure innocent not made guilty of unlawful and false allegations. The ultimate aim of the legal system is to ‘arrive at truth, punish the guilty and protect the innocent’. Hence Apex court said there was no need for future investigation and the petition was disposed of. ## **CHANGES IN THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 498A-** - At the initial stage of commencement of this section after filing FIR there used to be ‘automatic arrest’ of the accused, but now first there was proper investigation steps have taken place, and then only the accused was arrested[\[13\]](#_ftn13). - Section 498A added an advantage to grant anticipatory bail based on the precedent **case- Rajesh Sharma vs. The state of Uttar Pradesh (2017).** - Without evidence husband or his relative can’t be arrested under this section. - In addition to that the family welfare committee and district legal aid commission will scrutinize the filed case and report to the authorities. So, these changes will be taken place to not entertain false accusations. ## **CONCLUSION-** Although the plea of this case was disposed of by the supreme court this was the first case to give a thought to think about changes that should be brought into the light while executing section 498A. The investigation and court proceedings which were related to dowry menace, dowry deaths, harassment of women, abetment to suicide of a woman, and cruelty of women based on section-304B, 306, 498A OF IPC,1860, and section 113B of IEA,1872 were changed after this case. Many changes took place in the court proceedings and investigations process of the cases filed under section 498A, Recently in the **Mukesh Bansal v. State of U.P.[**\[14\]**](#_ftn14)** case, it said to be followed some detailed investigation procedures to stop the misused of section 498A provision. My conclusion is that courts and legislature should try to assure that there is no innocent being victimized by an unlawful allegation upon them. Certain precautions should also be taken to give protection to the husband and their relation from these false allegations made to harass them. If legislature doesn’t take care of it this may undermine their faith in the law. Thus those who required this provision should make use of this provision as protection from being harassed. One should not make any false allegation unnecessarily to abuse others. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1)5th Semester Student at Andhra University, Andhra Pradesh [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The Constitution Of India 1949, Art 32. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) The Indian Penal Code , 1860 Section 304B [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) The Indian Penal Code, 1860 Section 306 [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The Indian Penal Code,1860 Section 498. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) The Indian Penal Code , 1860 Section 498-A [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) The Evidence Act, 1872 section 113B [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar vs M. Venkitachalam Potti And …, (1956) AIR 246. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Mafatlal Industries Ltd., … vs Union Of India Etc. (1997) 5 SCC 536. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji v. State Of Gujarat And Another (2004) 6 SCC 672 [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) M/S. Unique Butyle Tube … vs U.P. Financial Corporation & Ors (2003) 2 SCC 455. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Rajesh Sharma vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh(2017) Crl. No. 2013 of 2017. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Mukesh Bansal vs State Of U.P. And Another ( 2022) Crl. revision No. 1187 of 2022. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Criminal Law Cases **Tags:** #lawfoyer, #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, case analysis, case summary, lawfoyer, Sushil Kumar Sharma --- ### [SHAFIN JAHAN VS ASHOKAN K.M. AND OTHERS](https://lawfoyer.in/shafin-jahan-vs-ashokan-k-m-and-others/) **Published:** June 23, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** SHAFIN JAHAN VS ASHOKAN K.M. AND OTHERS **Content:** **BY MISS SHALINI DHYANI[\[1\]](#_ftn1)** **IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA** NAME OF THE CASEShafin Jahan vs Ashokan K.M.CITATIONCRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 366 OF 2018 ( Arising Out Of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.5777 of (2017)DATE OF THE CASEApril 09, 2018APPELLANTShafin JahanRESPONDENT Ashokan K.M. and othersBENCH /JUDGED.Y. Chandrachud, A.M. Khanwilakr J, Arun Mishra J, Dipak MishraSTATUTES/ CONSTITUION INVOLVEDConstitution of India. The Hindu Marriage Act, Special Marriage Act.IMPORTANT SECTIONS/ ARTICLESConstitution of India— Article 19, 21, 226,32 ## ABSTRACT **“Marriage is not about finding the right age; it’s about finding the right person.” —Sophia Bush**[**\[2\]**](#_ftn2) Marriage is a pious union of two souls; it is considered sacrosanct in Hindu marriage and a contract in Muslim law. It is a social institution and an integral part of mankind. Marriage to another religion, caste, or person against your parent’s choice is still taboo in India; it is like making a mountain out of a molehill. Marriage had become a status symbol in society. The concept of marriage has radically changed, either because of wrong notions like dowry, which shows the notion of wealth in marriage, or because of the Special Marriage Act 1955, which provides registration of marriage with no ceremony between a person of a different caste or religion. The present case defines a woman’s right to marry the person of her choice in India. As per Indian society, a marriage is not a union between two souls but a union between two families. Due to this, the choice to get married to a person of one’s choice is subjected to so many restrictions, which are socially sanctioned but not legally. Article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not consider the right to marry a fundamental or constitutional right under the Indian Constitution but has been developed through judicial decisions, which are discussed further. ## **INTRODUCTION** Freedom of choice is an essential part of an individual’s life. The quality of life depends on the freedom one ensures; ensuring freedom of choice and religious freedom is a modern and formal concept. A most popular word has been seen in many circumstances, especially in economics: laissez-faire, which is an idea that defines no government intervention in the affairs of an individual. Freedom can have different meanings for different individuals. Under Article 19 of the Constitution of India, there is freedom of speech, which includes the freedom to speak and the choice to remain silent. Similarly, the constitution guarantees freedom of religion or free exercise of religion, and it is noted that choice is not an integral part of any religion. The case revolves around personal freedom, religious conversion, and individual liberty under Article 21, which also includes the right to privacy as well as the right to choice. ## **BACKGROUND:** The case of Shafin Jahan vs. Ashokan K.M. was infamously known as the Love-Jihad Case by the media. This case refers to a legal controversy in India regarding a young woman named Hadiya (earlier known as Akhila Ashokan) and her decision to convert to Islam. Her decision to convert and marry a Muslim man named Shafin Jahan sparked a series of events that raised several questions on religious freedom, individual liberty, and autonomy. The case came into the limelight due to allegations of forced conversion, Hadiya’s right to marry, and her choice. **WHAT CONSTITUTES FREEDOM OF CHOICE?** No one in present time likes to confined through rules and regulations especially youth, In India we have often see youth rebelling against rules and regulations in the name of freedom of expression or freedom of choice. There main reason behind rebel is that they are grown up and they are capable of making their own choices. From allowing phone to the campus to marry to the person you love choices had been differed. The nature of the freedom which is granted to an individual can be understood through a Principle of Interconnectedness. This is very helpful in understanding that all are interconnected, therefore whatever we do, think affects everyone around us. And that freedom of choice which Do not violate the principle of interconnectedness is considered to be beneficial. **WHAT IS RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN CONSTITUTUION OF INDIA?** ***“There is only one religion, though there hundreds of version of it”. George Bernard Shaw[**\[3\]**](#_ftn3)*** India has been considered as a homeland for many of the religion due to which it is known as land of spiritual belief, cultural diversity. Views on religion varies from individual to individual; it is matter of choice and belief. When it comes to India the people of India has a strong or wide faith in religion. The reason behind wide faith is that religion has holds special place in their lives. Fundamental rights are guaranteed under part III of Indian constitution. Freedom of religion is provided under Article25-28 of Indian Constitution. India is a secular country which allows it’s citizen right to follow their beliefs. When it comes to exercising one’s religious belief India is unbiased, neutral and impartial. No citizen is deprived of his right to practice, profess and propagate his or her religion. It is clearly defined that Indian constitution furnishes Freedom of Religion Not Freedom From Religion. **Essential conditions of valid marriage under Muslim law:** - Both man and women must be of Islam origin. - There should be an offer and acceptance of that offer in the presence of two witnesses. - There should be capacity of parties - There should be free consent - And there should be no legal disability. - Absence of a prohibited degree of relationship. **Essential conditions of a valid Hindu marriage under Hindu marriage Act.** - There should not be any other spouse living at a time of marriage. - There should not be mental incapacity or unsoundness. - Both should attend age of puberty. - Both should not fall into prohibited degree of relationship. - Both should not fall into sapinda relationship.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) ## **FACTS OF THE CASES:** Akhila Ashokan (Hadiya), born in Kerala, Coimbatore, is the only daughter of Ashokan K.M., who was pursuing a BHMS course at Shivraj Homoeopathy Medical College, Salem. She had a close relationship with Miss Jaseena and Miss Faseena, and she learned the principles of Islam. She got influenced by Islam and converted to Islam, being of majority age. She did not want to tell her family about her conversion, as she was brought up in a strict Hindu family. She thought that her father would not let her live after her conversion, so she decided to leave her paternal home. Her father, after this incident, filed a writ of habeas corpus in which he alleged that his daughter was converted to Islam against her will or forcefully by her two friends. But the Kerala High Court in this petition found out that there was no forceful conversion; it was all done according to her will, and it was cleared that she left her home on her own volition. She was directed to stay at the hostel named Markazul Hidaya Satyasarani Educational and Charitable Trust at Karuvambram Manjeri, where she continued her studies. After the disposal of the first writ petition, Ashokan K.M. filed a new writ petition of Habeas Corpus on the grounds of forced conversions and radicalization of Akhila and links of Shafin Jahan and her family with extremist Islamic organisations. Later on, Akhila got married to Shafin Jahan on December 19, 2016, according to Islamic rites. Again, her father challenged the validity of the marriage. Hadiya (Akhila) in her high court proceedings was content that she is an adult, she is not a minor, and she is under 25 years of age, so she is competent enough to make the decision of who is getting married. She was content that marrying Shafin Jhan was of her own volition. On May 24, 2017, High Court Justices Surendra Mohan Kuriakose and Abhram Mathew nullified the marriage and called it a **sham.** Their judgement observes that marriage is an important part of an individual’s life that can be taken only with the active participation and involvement of parents. Here, the justices ignored the fact that a legal adult was not subject to parental custody as they granted Mr. Ashokan custody over her daughter. **This judgement is erroneous on several grounds:** - That the implicated judgement is clearly violative of articles 14, 21, and 25 of Akhila. - There is a violation of the Principle Of Res Judicta as there was no illegal confinement of Akhila at the hostel as she was living there according to her own will. As in Lata Singh v. State Of UP, the Honourable Court held that in a democratic and secular country like India, the choice of whom to marry lies within the individual only, and parents cannot force an individual to marry. The impugned judgement was against this case precedent, so it should be struck down. This impugned judgement harms or insults women’s independence as it takes away their right to think for themselves, branding them as weak people. Subsequently, Hadiya’s husband challenged the judgement and approached the Supreme Court on March 8, 2018. The Supreme Court set aside the Kerala High Court judgement, and on April 9, 2018, the Supreme Court held that a marriage cannot be simply annulled if two consulting adults are entering into the marriage bond by invoking Article 226. Later, Chief Justice Khehar shifted the matter to the National Investigation Agency to investigate Hadiya’s marriage, but this case was shifted to Chief Justice Mishra as former Chief Justice Khehar was retired. Perhaps C.J.I. Mishra recognised the problematic nature of the NIA investigation, and he never called the NIA to present its report during the hearings. ## **ISSUES INVOLVED** - Whether the marriage between Hadiya and Shafin was valid even though they are legal adult and had consent to their marriage? - Whether person has absolute right over their personal life i.e. personal autonomy and choice? - Whether under Article 226 High Court can exercise the writ of Habeas Corpus? ## **ARGUMENTS FROM APPELLANT SIDE**: - On August 7th 2018 argument started with Mr. Haris Beeran, appearing for petitioner side opposed the involvement of NIA in private matter like marriage. But the Bench was dissatisfied with him and held that “This argument gives the impression that he does not want the correct and independent view of the dispute which has emerged before this court.” Court made it cleared that the investigation will be fair and would be done in the presence of retired Supreme Court Judge, Justice R.V. Raveendran. - Mr. Kapil Sibbal stressed upon individual’s right to autonomy, he argued that Hadiya has absolute right to make her own choices and decisions, whether her choice of religion or marriage. - He further argued that Hadiya has right to marry a person of her choice and Court not have any power to withdraw this right from her and also Court cannot decide on her behalf, The Parens Patriae jurisdiction of court cannot be activated unless the person in minor. - He further argued that Habeas Corpus is used for wrongful confinement and not for nullifying a marriage . - Petitioner also contented that Hadiya has made decisions without any undue influence and her choice should be respected. It was further argued that the restrictions imposed on the choice of her spouse is violation of her fundamental rights which includes right to life, liberty and right to equality. - Petitioner also argued that interference of Hadiya’s parents, state authorities to her personal life which includes her religious beliefs , marital choices tends to amount of violation of her right to privacy. - The Counsel for Respondent No.1 has tried to make the present case as a matter of jihad and relate it with communalism which is not the case and such step is taken to distract the law and order of society.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) ## **ARGUMENTS FROM RESPONDENT SIDE:** - **Additional Solicitor General** Maninder Singh opposed the prayer by Mr. Dushyant Dave to remove Hadiya out of her parental custody. - He argued that due to persuasion, Hadiya’s consent cannot be said to free. He pointed out to add persuasion to the list of exception. He brought attention of the court towards NIA report which shows 89 cases of persuasion in Kerala alone. - Mr. Shyama Divan Senior Counsel appearing for Hadiya’s father stressed upon the organizational apparatus , the PFI(popular front of India), who radicalizes youth and vulnerable adults , so it is not only minor but also vulnerable adults who seeks or needed protection. - Mr Divan also urged to court for camera proceedings due to following reasons: first, the task of probing into this could be best achieved in camera; second, an open hearing would contribute to this becoming a very communally charged issue; and third, he suspected that playing of the inciting videos and recorded transcripts by the members of the Popular Front of India could lead to violence.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) - Maninder Singh also argued that meeting of Hadiya to Shafin at matrimonial site was false according to NIA report. - Mr. Shyam Divan argued that High Court is exercising plenary extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 where it could be complete justice as per facts mentioned in the case. This marriage is becoming an interference with the fair administration of justice. ## **RELATED PROVISIONS:** - **Article 226 of the Constitution of India: Power of High Courts to issue certain writs:** Notwithstanding anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have powers, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibitions, quo warranto, and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) - **Article 32 of the Constitution of India:** Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part: The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed. The Supreme Court shall have the power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) - **Article 19 of the Constitution of India:** Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc: All citizens shall have the right - to freedom of speech and expression; - to assemble peaceably and without arms; - to form associations or unions; - to move freely throughout the territory of India; - to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; and - (omitted) - to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) - **Article 21 of the Constitution of India:** Protection of life and personal liberty: No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) Special Marriage Act: Conditions relating to solemnization of special marriages.―Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force relating to the solemnization of marriages, a marriage between any two persons may be solemnized under this Act, if at the time of the marriage the following conditions are fulfilled, namely:― (a) neither party has a spouse living; \[(b) neither party― (i) is incapable of giving a valid consent to it in consequence of unsoundness of mind; or (ii) though capable of giving a valid consent, has been suffering from mental disorder of such a kind or to such an extent as to be unfit for marriage and the procreation of children; or (iii) has been subject to recurrent attacks of insanity 4\* \* \*;\] (c) the male has completed the age of twenty-one years and the female the age of eighteen years; \[(d) the parties are not within the degrees of prohibited relationship: Provided that where a custom governing at least one of the parties permits of a marriage between them, such marriage may be solemnized, notwithstanding that they are within the degrees of prohibited relationship; and\] 6\[(e) where the marriage is solemnized in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, both parties are citizens of India domiciled in the territories to which this Act extends\]. 7\[Explanation.―In this section, “custom”, in relation to a person belonging to any tribe, community, group or family, means any rule which the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf as applicable to members of that tribe, community, group or family: Provided that no such notification shall be issued in relation to the members of any tribe, community, group or family, unless the State Government is satisfied— (i) that such rule has been continuously and uniformly observed for a long time among those members; (ii) that such rule is certain and not unreasonable or opposed to public policy; and iii) that such rule, if applicable only to a family, has not been discontinued by the family.\][\[11\]](#_ftn11) ## **JUDGMENT :** On April 9th, 2018, the Supreme Court delivered its judgement in two separate, simultaneous opinions. The Court set aside the Kerala High Court judgement that nullified Hadiya’s marriage to Shafin. On May 24, 2017, Justices Surendra Mohan Kuriakose and Abraham Mathew of the Kerala High Court nullified Hadiya’s marriage to Shafin Jahan. The High Court held that though a girl is weak and can be exploited in many ways, her marriage is nullified, and the Court gave custody of her to her parents. Later, Shafin filed a Special Leave Petition in response to the judgement. ril 9th, 2018, the Supreme Court delivered its judgement in two separate, simultaneous opinions. The Court set aside the Kerala High Court judgement that nullified Hadiya’s marriage to Shafin. On May 24, 2017, Justices Surendra Mohan Kuriakose and Abraham Mathew of the Kerala High Court nullified Hadiya’s marriage to Shafin Jahan. The High Court held that though a girl is weak and can be exploited in many ways, her marriage is nullified, and the Court gave custody of her to her parents. Later, Shafin filed a Special Leave Petition in response to the judgement. On March 8th, 2018, the Bench comprising Chief Justice Dipak Mishra, Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, and D.Y. Chandrachud nullified the marriage. In this case, the High Court misused Habeas Corpus, which is a remedy against illegal confinement that affects individual liberty and freedom. When Hadiya appeared before the court, she stated that she was not under illegal confinement. SC said that the High Court cannot decide an individual’s correct way of life or the correct person to whom one should get married. She has absolute autonomy over her body and whoever she wants to marry or live with. **The court also made reference to the judicial precedent:** - **In Suresh Kumar Kaushal vs. Naz Foundation:** Here, the court held that Section 377 is not violative of Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution of India and held that carnal intercourse, which means unnatural lust, ought to be punished. Here, the Court recognised the rights of same sex. - **In Shakti Vahini v. Union Of India:** The Honourable Court held that honour killing is a crime and that making a person marry someone other than his own choice is a violation of Article 21. - **In Lata Singh v. State Of Uttar Pradesh:** Court held that right to marry a person of one’s choice based totally on individual and parents cannot force an individual against marriage. - **In Vikas Yadav vs State of Uttar Pradesh:** Court held that women and her choice is individual choice and her individual choice is her self respect, one cannot impose parental choice to individual choice as it is violation of her right. - **In Asha Ranja vs State of Bihar:** In this case court held that women choice of choosing her husband is a fundamental right under Article 19n Of Constitution of India. - **In K.S. Puttaswamy vs Union Of India.** Here court held that autonomy is an intrinsic value in individual’s life to make decisions on important matter of one’s life. Personal autonomy is an integral part of human dignity, which includes one’s mental integrity and privacy which ensures freedom of thought , sexual orientation. With above references High court further guided by social considerations was held by SC. SC expressly said that HC was actually didn’t dealt deep into the legal provisions, it rather dealt upon social considerations. Anticipation of any future activity must not be govern or does not hold any view in the eyes of law. High Court here invoke **the doctrine of Parens Patriae** to take out Hadiya from custody of Shafin Jahan because was apprehended to be an abusive husband, a terrorists so she is given into custody of her father. So state act as parent here. SC cleared that this doctrine can only invoke in an exceptional cases where individual is mentally unsound, underage, or no legal parent or legal guardian, or has abusive one. Here Miss Hadiya neither mentally unsound nor she is underage. She has right to choose her partner as right to choice is mentioned under article 19 of constitution of India. SC held that High Court over exercised its power on constitutional rights, where HC gave importance to social consideration over constitutional rights. Ms. Hadiya and Mr. Jahan are adults and marital status is conferred through law. HC override the right to choose over parental love. The right to marry a person of one’s choice is an integral part of article 21, it is an exclusive domain of individual’s privacy. This judgement recognises the right to marry as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution Of India. ## **Conclusion:** The present case is very well against patriarchy and orthodox mentality, which have restrained the women for several years with the perspective that they are bound to their father, husband, and brother. Whatever is decided for them is only right for their father or husband. But this case is a bang on all these kinds of thinking, which recognised women’s personal autonomy, her love, her marital rights, and her privacy. This case recognised the contradictions faced by society generally due to inter-caste and inter-religious marriages. It simply defines that rights have more weight than social tradition. This case opened the way to several other cases, as this case recognised the right to marry as a fundamental right. Recently, Section 377 was decriminalised with the greater contribution of this case. This case explains an individual’s personal freedom, religious conversions, and interfaith marriage. The case was recognised as a love-jihad case, which has no proof in court as it was cleared that both people got married of their own volition and there was no undue influence. Social morality exists in society, but it is not above constitutionally guaranteed rights and liberties. The patriarchal approach of the court could be justified by the use of the doctrine of parens patriae, which is generally unacceptable in the modern era. That’s why the right to choice is recognised by the court. The right to privacy includes the right to self-determination and the right to personal autonomy; hence, the court is justified in recognising the right to choose a partner and marry whomever a person wants. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) B.A.LL.B. 4th SEMESTER AT VASUDEV COLLEGE OF LAW, LAMACHAUR , HALDWANI , UTTARAKHAND. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Sophia Bush- Marriage is not about age-Bra [https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/sophia\_bush](https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/sophia_bush) (last visited June 20, 2023). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Hadiya Marriage Case : Shafin Jahan vs Ashokan K.M. (last visited June 20, 2023). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) The Hindu Marriage Act 1955, Section 5. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Case Brief: Shafin Jahan vs Ashokan K.M. and Ors.(Hadiya Marriage Case), (last visited June 20, 2023). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Hadiya Marriage Case, (last visited June 20, 2023). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) The Constitution Of India, Article 226. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) The Constitution Of India, Article 32. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) The Constitution Of India, Article 19. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) The Constitution Of India, Article 21. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) The Special Marriage Act, 1954. Section 4, 5,6. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases **Tags:** #lawfoyer, #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, ASHOKAN K.M, case analysis, case summary, lawfoyer, SHAFIN JAHAN --- ### [K.M. NANAVATI V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA](https://lawfoyer.in/k-m-nanavati-v-state-of-maharashtra/) **Published:** June 23, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **MISS. VAISHNAVI KRUSHNA PARATE**[****\[1\]****](#_ftn1) ## **In the Supreme Court of India** **NAME OF THE CASE****K.M. NANAVATI V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA****CITATION****1962 AIR 605, 1962 SCR Supl. (1) 567****DATE OF THE CASE****24th November 1961****PETITIONER****K.M. NANAVATI****RESPONDENT****STATE OF MAHARASHTRA****BENCH/JUDGES****K. SUBBARAO, S.K. DAYAL, RAGHUBAR, K. DAS****CONSTITUTION/STATUTES****THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE****IMPORTANT ARTICLES/SECTIONS****ART. 136, 161 OF INDIAN CONSTITUTION, SECT. 307, 302 OF IPC**## **ABSTRACT** The case has raised the crucial idea of “grave and sudden provocation.” The judgement also emphasises the governor’s power to grant pardons. This important case served as the inspiration for numerous films and books. Some of the films and web series that were influenced by this ruling include the 1973 film Achanak, the 2016 Akshay Kumar-starring film Rustom, and the 2019 web series “The Verdict.” This decision placed focus on several fundamental principles, making it a well-known case at the time that caught the public’s and media’s attention.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) ## **INTRODUCTION** In the Indian judiciary, there is a huge confusion between the concept of murder and culpable homicide. It is very difficult for advocates to prove whether the crime amounts to murder or culpable homicide. The same situation occurred in the present case. An Indian naval officer named Kawas Mankeshaw Nanavati was charged with killing Prem Ahuja, his wife’s lover, in this landmark case that the Supreme Court of India heard in 1959. And although this case’s verdict was delivered on November 24, 1961, it is still fresh in people’s memories. There are many books and films released by taking inspiration from this case. Additionally, this case was the final one in India to be decided by a jury trial. It was one of the significant cases which emphasised the difference between culpable homicide and murder. ## **FACTS** - “K. M. Nanavati was an Indian naval officer, in 1949 he got married to a girl named sylvia, and because of his nature of work, he was shifted to Bombay with his family (wife sylvia and their three children). - Prem Bhagwan Ahuja was a known businessman residing in the same city as his sister Mamie. - In 1956, Ahujas and Nanavatis met each other through their common friends who were Agniks.”[\[3\]](#_ftn3) - Nanavati was often on his trips and away from home because of his work in that period his wife sylvia came close and got intimate with Prem Ahuja. - After returning from work Whenever Nanavati tries to get close to his wife she used to refuse and be rude and also behaves in a very strange way. Because of her behaviour, Nanavati got confused and he doubted. - On April 29, 1959, when Nanavati questioned and interrogated his wife sylvia about her loyalty and faithfulness towards him, she confessed everything that happened between her and Prem Ahuja. - In the sudden anger, Nanavati procure his loaded gun from his ship and went to find Prem Ahuja all around. Firstly, he checked Prem at his office but he was not there then Nanavati turned to his house. - After reaching he asked him to get married to his wife and look after his children as well but Ahuja said, he cannot marry every woman with whom he sleeps, after hearing this Nanavati got very angry he couldn’t control his anger and shot at him. Which led to his death. After that Nanavati surrendered himself to the police station. A case was filed against him. - The high court decided the case as Nanavati was held guilty of murder. The high court of Bombay referred this case under Section 307[\[4\]](#_ftn4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. ## **ARGUMENTS BY APPELLANT** - “The counsel of Nanavati’s legal team put forth that Nanavati planned to commit suicide and end his own life after hearing Sylvia’s confession, but his wife was able to convince him to forget everything that happened and start again.”[\[5\]](#_ftn5) She didn’t tell him whether she and Prem wanted to marry each other or not but Nanavati wanted the answer to this question. - Further he stated that then Nanavati told his wife he is going to get some dog food he left for it and drop his wife and children at the cinema hall. Then he went to his ship where he used to work, he asked ship authorities for a revolver and six bullets and told them the reason that he is going by road to Ahmadnagar thus he wanted it for his safety. - After taking the revolver in the envelope he reached Ahuja’s office, but after not finding him he arrived at Ahuja’s flat, he knocked on the door, and the servant opened the door. He straightly marched to the bedroom of Prem to talk to him and closed the door. But he started provoking him. - Further their argument turned into a big fight Ahuja abruptly reached for the packet, but Nanavati pulled out his revolver and ordered him to put it back. Two shots were accidentally discharged during the struggle, which resulted in the death of Ahuja. - At last petitioner contended After this incident, Nanavati went to the police station and surrendered himself. Hence the act was a result of sudden and grave provocation thus it is culpable homicide, not murder. ## **ARGUMENTS BY RESPONDENT** - The respondent contended that firstly, when the incident occurred, Ahuja was just finished taking a shower and wearing his towel. When his body was found by the police officers, his towel was well intact. If any fight had taken place then his towel would not be in its position. Thus there is no sign of any kind of fight. - Secondly, After the admission of Nanavati’s wife sylvia, a cool and collected Nanavati took his family for an outing and drop them off for a movie, and then under false pretences went to find his gun. This proves that he had sufficient time to cool down, that the incitement was not severe or unexpected, and that Nanavati had already in mind the plan to kill him. - As per the statement of the servant, Anjani who was alone natural witness told, them that she heard Four shots fired and this all happened in just one minute. Even Nanavati did not explain anything to the sister of Ahuja who was in another room of the same flat. - The dept. commissioner of police mentioned that Nanavati admitted his offence. Even told the correction of his name which describes his ability to understand. ## **ISSUES** 1. Whether the High Court lacks the authority required by Section 307[\[6\]](#_ftn6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to review the evidence and assess the suitability of the Sessions Judge’s recommendation. 2. Whether Section 307(3)[\[7\]](#_ftn7) of the Code of Criminal Procedure gave the High Court the authority to invalidate a verdict of the jury due to misdirection in the case. 3. Whether the charge had any misdirections. 4. Whether the murder was premeditated or carried out in “the heat of the moment” 5. Can the pardoning authority of the governor and the Special Leave Petition be combined? ## **JUDGEMENT BY THE HIGH COURT** Shelat and Naik, JJ., made up a division bench of the aforementioned High Court that heard the case. The two erudite Judges reached different conclusions, but they all agreed that the accused should spend the remainder of his life in prison because he violated Indian Penal Code Section 302[\[8\]](#_ftn8) by killing the victim. Shelat, J. assessed all the available information after concluding that the jury had been misled and came to the conclusion that the accused was guilty of murder; alternatively, he expressed the view that the jury’s verdict was perverse, irrational, and, in any case, contrary to the weight of the evidence. Naik, J., decided to base his decision on the alternative claim that no sane person could have arrived at the jury’s verdict.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) ## **JUDGEMENT BY THE SUPREME COURT** - The Hon’ble Supreme Court remarked that under paragraph (1) of section 307[\[10\]](#_ftn10) of the CrPC, the judge may refer the case to the High Court if he disagrees with the jury’s verdict. The following two conditions must be satisfied: - The jury’s decision must be rejected by the court, and he must also think that no reasonable person could have arrived at the jury’s decision. If and only if these two requirements are satisfied, the referral order will be judged competent; if not, it will be deemed incompetent and rejected by the High Court. In the case [**Akhlakali Hayatalli vs The State of Bombay**](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/110119/)[****\[11\]****](#_ftn11) and also in [**Ramanugrah Singh v. Emperor**](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/580016/)[****\[12\]****](#_ftn12) it was stated by the high court that “Under sub-section (1), two conditions, are required to justify a reference. The first, that the Judge must disagree with the verdict of the jury, calls for no comment since it is the foundation for any Preference. The second, ‘that the judge must be “clearly of opinion that it is necessary for, the ‘ends of justice to submit the case” is important, and in their Lord, ships’ opinion provides a key to the ‘interpretation of the section.” - The duties outlined in paragraph (3) of section 307[\[13\]](#_ftn13) of the Criminal Procedure Code must be carried out by the High Court after it decides the order of reference is competent. According to this clause, the High Court must evaluate all the evidence, give the jury and judge’s verdicts appropriate weight, and then declare the accused innocent or guilty. The defence attorney for the defendant argued that the opposite interpretation would defeat the purpose of this section. - The Supreme Court stated that even though the confession of the wife was serious, Prem Ahuja wasn’t present there when it was made, so the factor of the murder being unexpected was absent. The Court reasoned that a normal individual would have had plenty of time to calm down the provocation. The period was of three hours between the confession made by his wife and the incident happened. - Thus, The Court concluded that it was the act of deliberation and the concept of sudden provocation does not apply in this case. As per the supreme court, “the pardoning power of the governor under Art. 161[\[14\]](#_ftn14) and Special Leave Petition (SLP) under Art. 136[\[15\]](#_ftn15) of the Indian Constitution is interconnected to each other. - The Supreme Court held that the decision of the high is just and proper. Thus, it contended that the accused shall be sent for life imprisonment under the charge of murder.”[\[16\]](#_ftn16) ## **CONCLUSION** This case was the most important and conceptual case decided by the judiciary of India. It firmly distinguished the concept of culpable homicide from murder. The approach of the high court and the supreme court was straight and clear. Punishments shouldn’t be undoubtedly presumed. The punishment for a crime should be commensurate with the offence. The Court’s decision was made solely on the gravity of the offence, not the man’s honour or place in society. Given the facts and circumstances of the current case, we must follow the Court’s ruling. Punishments shouldn’t be presumptively meted out or presumed. The punishment for a crime should be commensurate with the offence. There are many aspects which are crucial for any justice system in India. This case teaches us how criminals can escape from the loopholes of the legislature. How to prevent them from doing so. It shows the need for knowledgeable and experienced judges for fair and just decisions. This all can happen only with thorough and deep study or research in the various legal fields and subjects. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) LLB 6TH SEM STUDENT FROM SHRI. NATHMAL GOENKA LAW COLLEGE AKOLA MAHARASHTRA [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) ‘KM Nanavati Vs State Of Maharashtra – Case Analysis’ (7 August 2022) accessed 21 June 2023. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Rachit Garg, ‘K.M. Nanavati v. the State of Maharashtra: Case Analysis’ (*iPleaders*, 20 December 2021) accessed 15 June 2023. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) ‘Section 307 in The Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973’ accessed 23 June 2023. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Ibid. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) ‘Section 307 in The Indian Penal Code’ accessed 21 June 2023. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Ibid. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) ‘Section 302 in The Indian Penal Code’ accessed 21 June 2023. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) ‘KM Nanavati Vs State Of Maharashtra – Case Analysis’ (n 2). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) ‘Section 307 in The Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973’ (n 4). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) (1954) S.C.R. 435 [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) (1946) 48 BOMLR 768 [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) ibid. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) ‘Article 161 in The Constitution Of India 1949’ accessed 21 June 2023. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) ‘Article 136 in The Constitution Of India 1949’ accessed 21 June 2023. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Garg (n 3). **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases, Criminal Law Cases **Tags:** #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, case analysis, case summary, K.M. NANAVATI, K.M. NANAVATI V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, lawfoyer --- ### [Patan Jamal Vali vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh](https://lawfoyer.in/patan-jamal-vali-vs-the-state-of-andhra-pradesh/) **Published:** June 23, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **BY- ANJALI SINGH[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)** **In the High Court of Andhra Pradesh** Name of the CasePatan Jamal Vali vs. The State of Andhra PradeshCitationCriminal Appeal No. 452 of 2021Date of the CaseApril 27, 2021AppellantPatan Jamal ValiRespondent-The State of Andhra PradeshBench/ Judge-Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud. J & M.R. ShahStatutes/ constitution involvedArticle 15 (1) of The Constitution of IndiaImportant Sections/ ArticlesThe Scheduled Caste and The Schedule Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989- Section 3 (2) (v) Indian Penal Code, 1960- Section- 376 (1)## ABSTRACT In the following case, the appellant Patan Jamal Vali appealed to the Supreme Court of India after being aggrieved by the order passed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court as it convicted the accused under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and Section 376(1) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Therefore, the appellant in the following case argued that the ingredients which are mentioned under the Section 3(2)(v) are not established and even the court considered the theory of intersectionality by Kimberly Crenshaw in the U.S.A. **Keywords- Schedule Caste, Schedule Tribes, High Court, Supreme Court, Section.** ## INTRODUCTION The threat of violence is constant for women everywhere in the globe and is easily linked with helplessness and a lack of control. While women from all social, economic, and political backgrounds experience trauma after a horrific crime like rape, some women are more susceptible than others in these circumstances when there may be overlapping elements that exacerbate the trauma. What Kimberly Crenshaw refers to as “intersectionality” is such circumstances of additional oppression and prejudice. The ruling in question is significant because the Supreme Court of India uses the facts of this case as a “launching point” to examine the disturbing trends of violence and oppression experienced by disabled women nationwide. It also establishes the standards for how structural realities will be addressed by Indian courts, where judges will examine cases through an intersectional lens so that they can effectively address situations where there are multiple forms of oppression. It may not be best for everyone to take a unilateral stance in favor of oppression and violence, and it is important to acknowledge the vulnerabilities that certain people may experience more than others. It is also important to note the court’s progressive thinking in how it handled the particular facts and circumstances, where the bench refused to view a person’s impairment as a sign of weakness. The victim’s vision handicap is brought up in court to show how vulnerable the woman is and how the accused would view her as a “soft target” who is more prone to violence. The case at hand is a criminal appeal from a judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh concerning the rape of a visually impaired girl who belonged to the scheduled caste. In that judgment, the accused was found guilty of crimes punishable under sections 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 19892 (the 1989 Act) as well as sections 376(1) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (the IPC). ## FACTS OF THE CASE This appeal is in response to a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court ruling on August 3, 2019. The High Court upheld the appellant’s conviction on charges covered by Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Schedule Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 19891 and Section 376(1) of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant has received a life sentence in jail for each of the aforementioned crimes, with the substantive sentences to run concurrently. The appellant has also been ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000 for each of the offenses, with a possible jail term of six months if he doesn’t. The appellant had been working as a manual laborer for two years and resided in Gajulapalli village at the time of the event. Despite being blind since birth (PW3), PW2 used to live with her mother (PW1) and brother. The offspring of PWI is PW3 and INS. At the same place where the appellant was working, they were also doing manual labor. The prosecution asserts that the appellant, who shared a hamlet with PWI, regularly visited her home after learning of her son’s two-year labor. Despite being blind since birth (PW3), PW2 used to live with her mother (PWI) and brother. The offspring of PWI are PW3 and LW5. At the same place where the appellant was working, they were also doing manual labor. The prosecution asserts that since the appellant knew her boys and resided in the same hamlet as PWI, he frequently visited her home. Around 9 a.m. on March 31, 2011, PWI was conducting domestic chores at a public tap about fifty feet from her home, while her boys were cutting firewood nearby. The PWI allegedly informed the appellant that her husband and sons were chopping firewood and requested him to wait after the appellant enquired about her sons. After a half-hour, she heard her daughter (PW2) calling out for help. She hurried over to the house and saw that the door was locked from the inside. She sounded the alarm, and her husband and sons hastened to the house. The appellant opened the door to escape. but was immediately apprehended. As soon as PWI entered the house, she saw PW2 lying naked on the ground and bleeding from her genitalia. The clothing on PW2 was torn and covered in blood. Despite trying to escape by opening the door, the appellant was immediately apprehended. As soon as PW1 entered the house, she saw PW2 lying naked on the ground and bleeding from her genitalia. PW2’s clothing was torn and covered in blood. According to PW2, when questioned, she said that the appellant came to the house and asked about her brothers before closing the door on her, falling on her, gagging her, and raping her. According to the prosecution, PW4 called the Sub-Inspector of Police (PW9) at the Mahanandi Police Station at 10 a.m. The cousin of PW I hurried over. The Circle Inspector of Police, Nandyal Rural Police Station, who had just arrived, was given the appellant by the residents. PWI gave the police a formal report. which received the designation 28/2011. The victim was taken to the Government Hospital by PWII, where she was examined by the Civil Surgeon of the District Hospital. According to the medical assessment, PW2 was blind. The accused was first found guilty by the session’s judge, and the verdict was then maintained by the High Court. ## ISSUE RAISED - Whether the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Section 3(2)(v), of 19892 will apply to the offense for which the appellant is guilty? - Whether the Indian Penal Code, Section 376(1), will apply to the offense for which the appellant is guilty? ## ARGUMENTS OF THE APPELLANT AND RESPONDENT In this SIP, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that a violation of this provision has not been proven due to the way the phrase “on the ground of that such person who is member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe” should be interpreted in this Court in its decisions is given in Section 3(2)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes which elaborate about the (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989. As a result, it was unlawful to impose a life sentence in connection with a violation of Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code 1860. ## RELATED PROVISION - **Constitution of India** Article 15- Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth. 1. The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth, or any of them. 2. No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth, or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction, or condition about— 1. access to shops, public restaurants, hotels, and places of public entertainment; or 1. the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads, and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public. 3. Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children. 4. Nothing in this article or clause (2) of article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.\] 5. Nothing in this article or sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of Article 19 shall prevent the State from making any special provision, by law, for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes in so far as such special provisions relate to their admission to educational institutions including private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State, other than the minority educational institutions referred to in clause (1) of article 30.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Section- 3 Punishments for offenses and atrocities. (2) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,— (v) commits any offense under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more against a person or property 1 \[knowing that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such member\], shall be punishable with imprisonment for life and with fine.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) - Indian Penal Code, 1960 Section- 376 Punishment for Rape - Whoever, except in the cases provided for in subsection (2), - commits rape, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either description for a term which 1 - \[shall - not be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine\].[\[4\]](#_ftn4) ## JUDGEMENT The conviction of the appellant for crimes punishable by Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 and Section 376(1) of the IPC was upheld by the Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Patan Jamal Vali v. The State of Andhra Pradesh. The appellant was given a life sentence. It was argued in an appeal to the Supreme Court that the elements of the offense under Section 3(2)(v) were not proven. The Court noted that it was unequivocally of the opinion that the offense under Section 376(1) had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt before moving on to analyze such submission. The Court then took into account “intersectionality,” a term coined by Kimberly Crenshaw, about criminality against African-American women in the United States. Intersectionality, according to the Court, is a type of oppression “that \[arises\] out of the combination of various oppressions that, together, produce something unique and distinct from any one form of discrimination standing alone.” The Court cited Navtej Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC, [\[5\]](#_ftn5)noting that the stated decision had interpreted Article 15(1) of the Constitution using an intersectional lens. Additionally, the Report of the Justice JS Verma Committee, which was established in the wake of the Nirbhaya incident and noted how prejudice brought on by intersecting identities, was mentioned increases the level of violence towards specific communities (gender, religion, etc.). The Court addressed the vulnerability of women and girls with disabilities as victims of crime, particularly sexual violence, and held that although changes in the law marked a significant step, much work still needs to be done to ensure that their benefits are realized by those for whose benefit they were brought. The Court also established several guidelines to make the criminal justice system more accessible to people with disabilities. The Court concluded that the offense was not committed “on the ground” that the prosecutrix is a member of a Scheduled Caste following a thorough review of Section 3(2)(v). The conviction of the appellant and the punishment imposed on the offense under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC and ST Act were overturned by the court. However, it upheld the life imprisonment sentence associated with the conviction for the crime under Section 376(1) of the Penal Code. ## CONCLUSION Since there is no proof that the victim was raped because she is a member of the SC community, the court in this case found the defendant guilty under section 376(1) of the IPC rather than section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act. The court gave intersectionality a thorough examination and acknowledged that it should not be interpreted narrowly and that it should take into account social reality. In light of this, the Court declared that even though the accused shall not be found guilty under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, it will have some bearing on the sentencing and that it was a relevant basis for the Sessions Court to find the accused guilty and sentence him to life in prison. The court’s perspectives have been widened by using an intersectional lens to analyze the case’s circumstances. This lens also offers multidimensional viewpoints, allowing the court to consider oppression from various angles, with each disadvantage compounding the others. Given that the judges were sensitive to the victim’s socioeconomic vulnerabilities, the authors’ viewpoint is consistent with the ruling made by the bench. The court gave the prosecutrix’s testimony serious consideration while also taking intersectionality into account. The court was aware of the prosecutrix’s predicament and did not view her condition as merely “add-ons” to it. The court was aware that her physical and social circumstances contributed to her vulnerability as a victim and that, compared to people who share just one or a few of the victim’s traits, she was more at risk and susceptible to such an oppressive situation. The Supreme Court has established a precedent for the country’s courts to consider oppression emanating from many grounds and how the privileged may be perpetrating atrocities on individuals who are more vulnerable than others on social and economic grounds by using the judgment made in this case. While the connection between the accused and the injury experienced must be examined, the condition of the victim enduring the harm produced must also be taken into consideration. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Student at UPES, Dehradun [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 15. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The Scheduled Caste and The Schedule Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, Section-3 (2) (v). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Indian Penal Code, 1960, Section- 376 (1). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) AIR 2018 SC 4321. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases **Tags:** #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, case analysis, case summary, lawfoyer, Patan Jamal Vali, Patan Jamal Vali vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh --- ### [The State of Jharkhand vs Shailendra Kumar Rai @ Pandav Rai](https://lawfoyer.in/the-state-of-jharkhand-vs-shailendra-kumar-rai-pandav-rai/) **Published:** June 23, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **By Ashmit Sen**[\[1\]](#_ftn1) **In the Supreme Court of India** NAME OF THE CASEThe State of Jharkhand vs Shailendra Kumar Rai @ Pandav Rai CITATIONCriminal Appeal No 1441 of 2022 DATE OF THE CASE31st October, 2022APPELLANTThe State of Jharkhand RESPONDENTShailendra Kumar Rai @ Pandav Rai BENCH/JUDGEHon’Ble Justice Dr. Chandrachud, Hon’Ble Justice Ms. Kohli STATUTES INVOLVEDIndian Penal Code, Code of Criminal Procedure, Indian Evidence Act, The Constitution of IndiaIMPORTANT SECTIONS/ARTICLESIndian Penal Code: Sections – 300, 302,307,341, 375, 376,448 Code of Criminal Procedure: Sections – 173,174 Indian Evidence Act: Sections – 32(1), 60 Constitution of India – Article 136 ## **ABSTRACT** In the present case, the respondent was alleged to have raped the victim and after that had pored kerosene on her and set her on fire as a result of such burn injuries, she later died due to septicaemia. The sessions court had convicted the respondent but on an appeal to the High Court of Jharkhand, it had set aside the judgement of the sessions court and had acquitted the respondent on the basis that the victim’s statement before dying did not constitute a dying declaration and no conclusive evidence of any sexual intercourse by rape had been proved to which the State (the appellant) had invoked the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by preferring an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India where the Supreme Court had to decide whether the victim’s statement constituted a dying declaration or not withing the purview of Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act and whether the prosecution had proved the guilt of the respondent beyond reasonable doubt or not and the Supreme Court had decided the case in the affirmative and overturned the judgement of the High Court and restored the judgement of the Sessions Court by convicting the respondent and made a parting remark that the “two-finger test”, used by the Medical Board in this present case to determine whether the victim was habituated to sexual intercourse or not , was an unethical and regressive test which negatively impacts the victim and has no scientific basis and hence should not be performed according to the opinion of the Supreme Court. ## **INTRODUCTION** 1. **Rape** **Overview** Rape has been defined under Section 375 of Indian Penal Code, 1860. According to Merriam-Webster Dictionary, rape is defined as an “unlawful sexual activity and usually sexual intercourse carried out forcibly or under threat of injury against a person’s will or with a person who is beneath a certain age or incapable of valid consent because of mental illness, mental deficiency, intoxication, unconsciousness, or deception[\[2\]](#_ftn2)” Rape is one of the most common crimes against women in India. According to the 2021 annual report of the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), 31,677 rape cases were registered across the country, or an average of 86 cases daily, a rise from 2020 with 28,046 cases, while in 2019, 32,033 cases were registered.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) Of the total 31,677 rape cases, 28,147(nearly 89%) of the rapes were committed by persons known to the victim and the share of victims who were minors or below 18 – the legal age of consent – stood at 10%[\[4\]](#_ftn4). **Elements** To prove the offence of rape, the essential ingredients according to Section 375 of IPC, are as follows[\[5\]](#_ftn5) – 1. There must be sexual intercourse as given within the purview of Section 375(a) to 375(d). 2. Such sexual intercourse should be under any of the seven circumstances: 3. Against her will; 4. Without her consent; 5. With consent obtained under fear of death or hurt; 6. Consent given under misconception of fact that the man is her husband; 7. Consent given because of unsoundness of mind, intoxication, or under influence of any stupefying or unwholesome substance; 8. With a woman under eighteen years of age, with or without her consent; 9. With a woman who is unable to communicate her consent. In the present case[\[6\]](#_ftn6), the two-judge bench of the Supreme Court held that the respondent had committed the offence of rape on the victim within the meaning of Section 375 of IPC. **Overview** Murder has been defined in Section 300 of IPC. According to Merriam-Webster Dictionary, murder is defined as “the crime of unlawfully and unjustifiably killing a person.[\[7\]](#_ftn7)” **Elements** According to Section 300, culpable homicide is murder, if it is done with[\[8\]](#_ftn8) – In the present case, it was alleged that the respondent after raping the victim had poured kerosene on her and set her on fire and as a result of such burn injuries, the victim had died due to septicaemia and the Supreme Court had held that the prosecution had proved the guilt of respondent beyond reasonable doubt and hence the respondent was guilty for the offence of rape and murder within the purview of Section 375 and Section 300 of IPC respectively and thereby convicted the respondent under Sections 302, 341, 376 and 448 of the IPC and sentenced the respondent to rigorous imprisonment for life for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and rigorous imprisonment for 10 years for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC which were directed to run concurrently. ## **FACTS OF THE CASE** The facts of the case were admitted, as a dying declaration of the deceased victim, to the court and the summary of the case was that the respondent entered the house of the victim and deceased in Narangi village, on the afternoon of 7 November 2004 and it was alleged that he pushed her to the ground and committed rape upon her, while threatening to kill her if she sounded an alarm. The respondent allegedly poured kerosene on her and set her on fire on her after she called out for help. The victim’s family after hearing her cries immediately came to help and extinguished the fire and took her to Sadar Hospital, Deoghar, where she was admitted and underwent treatment for the injuries sustained by her. The police officer-in-charge at PS Sarwna, received information regarding the incident and travelled to Deoghar, where he recorded the victim’s statement where she narrated the incident, and a FIR was registered at PS Sarwna based on the statement of the victim and the investigation began. Upon the completion of the investigation, the IO had submitted a charge-sheet under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 for offences under Sections 307, 341, 376 and 448 of the IPC. The victim died on 14 December 2004, leading to the submission of a supplementary charge-sheet against the respondent, with reference to Section 302 of the IPC. The respondent denied his guilt on the basis of which, the case went to trial, where the Sessions Court, by its judgment dated 10 October 2006, convicted the respondent of offences under Sections 302, 341, 376 and 448 of the IPC and sentenced the respondent to rigorous imprisonment for life for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and rigorous imprisonment for 10 years for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC which were directed to run concurrently. After that, the respondent preferred an appeal before the High Court of Jharkhand and by its judgment dated 27 January 2018, the High Court set aside the judgment of the Sessions Court and acquitted the respondent. The appellant, after the judgement given by the Jharkhand High Court, invoked the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India under Article 136 of the Constitution and challenged the decision of the High Court. ## **ISSUES RAISED BEFORE THE COURT** 1. Whether the statement made by the deceased before the Police Officer is relevant as a dying declaration under section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act 1872? ## **ARGUMENTS FROM THE APPELLANT SIDE** It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that the High Court of Jharkhand had not appreciated the evidence correctly as it was stated that Dr. RK Pandey was attending to a patient on the table adjacent to the deceased, and not to a patient in a room adjacent to the one in which the deceased was present which the High Court had misunderstood and the post-mortem examination of the deceased was conducted within 12 hours of the time of death and the report concluded that the cause of death was septicaemia due to the burn injuries sustained by her. ## **ARGUMENTS FROM THE RESPONDENT SIDE** The submissions urged on behalf of the appellant had been opposed by the respondent, whose counsel made the following submissions that although the dying declaration indicated that the respondent had raped the deceased, the Medical Board’s report stated that no definite opinion could be given in this regard and there was no evidence other than the dying declaration to show that the respondent raped the deceased and that the victim died around a month after the occurrence of the incident complained of. Therefore, the statement made by the deceased to the IO was not a dying declaration. ## **RELATED PROVISIONS** - **Indian Penal Code, 1860:** **Section 300 – “**Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or— **Secondly** — If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or— **Thirdly** — If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or— **Fourthly** — If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. **Section 302 – “**Punishment for murder—Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or \[imprisonment for life\], and shall also be liable to fine.”[\[9\]](#_ftn9) **Section 307 –** “Attempt to murder.—Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to \[imprisonment for life\], or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned. Attempts by life convicts — \[When any person offending under this section is under sentence of \[imprisonment for life\], he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.\]”[\[10\]](#_ftn10) **Section 341 –** “Punishment for wrongful restraint —Whoever wrongfully restrains any person shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.”[\[11\]](#_ftn11) **Section 375 – “**A man is said to commit “rape” if he- (a) penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra, or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person[\[12\]](#_ftn12); or (b) inserts, to any extent, any object, or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person[\[13\]](#_ftn13); or (c) manipulates any part of the body of a woman so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus, or any part of body of such woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person[\[14\]](#_ftn14); or (d) applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person, under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions: **First** – Against her will. **Secondly** – Without her consent. **Thirdly** – With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt. **Fourthly** – With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married. **Fifthly** – With her consent when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent. **Sixthly** – With or without her consent when she is under eighteen years of age. **Seventhly** – When she is unable to communicate consent. **Explanation 1** – For the purposes of this section, “vagina” shall also include labia majora. **Explanation 2** – Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by words, gestures, or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act: Provided that a woman who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity. **Exception 1** – A medical procedure or intervention shall not constitute rape. **Exception 2** – Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.[\[15\]](#_ftn15)” **Section 376 –** “Punishment for rape — (1) Whoever, except in the cases provided for by sub-section (2), commits rape shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may be for life or for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine unless the women raped is his own wife and is not under twelve years of age, in which cases, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or with both: Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than seven years.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) (2) Whoever, — (a) being a police officer commits rape— (i) within the limits of the police station to which he is ap­pointed; or (ii) in the premises of any station house whether or not situated in the police station to which he is appointed; or (iii) on a woman in his custody or in the custody of a police officer subordinate to him; or (b) being a public servant, takes advantage of his official position and commits rape on a woman in his custody as such public servant or in the custody of a public servant subordinate to him; or (c) being on the management or on the staff of a jail, remand home or other place of custody established by or under any law for the time being in force or of a woman’s or children’s insti­tution takes advantage of his official position and commits rape on any inmate of such jail, remand home, place or institution; or (d) being on the management or on the staff of a hospital, takes advantage of his official position and commits rape on a woman in that hospital; or (e) commits rape on a woman knowing her to be pregnant; or (f) commits rape on a woman when she is under twelve years of age; or (g) commits gang rape, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years, but which may be for life and shall also be liable to fine: Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment of either description for a term of less than ten years. **Section 448 – “**Punishment for house-trespass — Whoever commits house-tres­pass shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.”[\[17\]](#_ftn17) - **Indian Evidence Act, 1872:** **Section 32(1) – “**When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person’s death comes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question.”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) **Section 60 – “**Oral evidence must be direct — Oral evidence must, in all cases whatever, be direct; that is to say— If it refers to a fact which could be seen, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he saw it; If it refers to a fact which could be heard, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he heard it; If it refers to a fact which could be perceived by any other sense or in any other manner, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he perceived it by that sense or in that manner; If it refers to an opinion or to the grounds on which that opinion is held, it must be the evidence of the person who holds that opinion on those grounds: Provided that the opinions of experts expressed in any treatise commonly offered for sale, and the grounds on which such opinions are held, may be proved by the production of such treatises if the author is dead or cannot be found, or has become incapable of giving evidence, or cannot be called as a witness without an amount of delay or expense which the Court regards as unreasonable: Provided also that, if oral evidence refers to the existence or condition of any material thing other than a document, the Court may, if it thinks fit, require the production of such material thing for its inspection.”[\[2\]](#_ftn2) - **The Constitution of India:** **Article 136 – “**Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) (2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence, or order passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.[\[4\]](#_ftn4)” ## **JUDGEMENT** With respect to the first issue at hand as to whether the statement made by the deceased would constitute a dying declaration within the meaning of Section 32(1) of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 or not, the Supreme Court had held that the statement of the deceased is relevant under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 as a dying declaration and had stated that the High Court of Jharkhand had misinterpreted the facts and had decided the issue incorrectly. The Supreme Court had stated that the reliance of the High Court of Jharkhand on the decision in **Moti Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh**[\[5\]](#_ftn5) to reach the conclusion that the victim’s statement was inadmissible as a dying declaration in the present case, was misplaced as the facts and circumstances of the both the cases were different. According to the Supreme Court, in the present case, the post-mortem report established that the victim died as a result of septicaemia caused by her burn injuries. Therefore, the statement of the victim in the present case was indeed a statement relevant as to the cause of her death and in regard to the circumstances which eventually resulted in her death. Therefore, the Supreme Court stated that the statement satisfied the conditions laid down in sub-clause (1) of Section 32 as it related to both, the cause of death as well as to the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in death because the statement clearly described that the respondent poured kerosene on her and set her on fire and the post-mortem report also concluded that the cause of death was septicaemia caused by the burn injuries sustained by the deceased. In addition, the statement of the deceased disclosed that the respondent raped her before setting her on fire which was a description of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in her death and therefore, satisfied the conditions in Section 32(1) and was itself a relevant fact. The Supreme Court for these reasons had held the statement made by the deceased shall be considered to be a dying declaration for the purpose of adjudicating this appeal. Regarding the admissibility and probative value of the dying declaration, the Supreme Court had stated that there was no rule to the effect that a dying declaration was inadmissible when it is recorded by a police officer instead of a Magistrate. Here, the Supreme Court also relied on its judgement given in **Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay**[\[6\]](#_ftn6), where it had formulated the yardstick against which dying declarations may be evaluated which included that a dying declaration has to be on the same footing as another piece of evidence and has to be judged on the basis of facts and circumstances of each case and to test the reliability of such declaration, focus has to be given on the capacity of the person to remember the facts stated and whether he had been impaired or not, at the time of making the statement, by circumstances beyond his control. The Court had also stated the importance of the statement being consistent throughout and of making the statement at the earliest opportunity so as to eliminate the chance of tutoring by interested parties. The Supreme Court relied on the judgement given in **Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar**[\[7\]](#_ftn7) where it was held that the admissibility or probative value of dying declaration was not impacted if the declaration was not in the form of questions and answers. The Supreme Court stated that “the High Court had incorrectly observed that in his cross- examination, Dr. RK Pandey stated that he was examining another patient in the adjacent room when the victim’s dying declaration was recorded. The record of the cross-examination indicated that Dr. RK Pandey stated that he was examining a patient on the adjacent table and not in the adjacent room as erroneously stated by the High Court and it mistakenly relied on this fact to hold that the victim’s statement could not be treated as her dying declaration. Dr. RK Pandey’s answer to the question he was asked during cross-examination made it clear that the dying declaration could not be rejected on the ground that he was in another room when it was recorded as he was evidently in the same room and the dying declaration was recorded by Lallan Prasad in his presence and both Lallan Prasad and Dr. RK Pandey had attested to this fact during their examinations. Dr. RK Pandey was also satisfied that the deceased was physically and mentally fit to make a statement, and certified the same in writing. The dying declaration was recorded in the victim’s words and read out to her, after which she affixed her signature to it. Therefore, there was no reason to believe that the statement was a result of tutoring or that the deceased was incapable of making a statement and nothing on the record indicated that there was any enmity between the deceased and the respondent, which would lead the deceased to narrate an untrue account of events and falsely implicate the respondent. Further, Lallan Prasad was unable to remember whether the deceased was admitted in the general ward or the ICU. This fact did not impeach the authenticity of the dying declaration because Dr. RK Pandey had testified that it was recorded in his presence.”[\[8\]](#_ftn8) The Supreme Court was therefore satisfied that the dying declaration was made voluntarily and was true and the deceased was in a competent state of mind when she made a statement to the IO, Lallan Prasad. With respect to the second issue as to whether the prosecution had established its case by proving the respondent guilty beyond reasonable doubt or not, the Supreme Court had held that the prosecution has proved its case against the respondent beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court had stated that the dying declaration made it abundantly clear that the respondent had raped the deceased, poured kerosene on her, and set her on fire. The cause of death was septicaemia, which occurred as a result of the burn injuries. Hence, the victim’s death was a direct result of the injuries inflicted upon her by the respondent and there was nothing on record which gave rise to reasonable doubt as to the respondent’s guilt. The report prepared by the Medical Board stated that the possibility of intercourse could not be ruled out although no definite opinion could be given in this regard and a lack of medical evidence as to the commission of rape could not be taken to mean that no rape was committed upon the deceased as her dying declaration stated that the respondent raped her before setting her on fire and there was no rule requiring the corroboration of the dying declaration through medical or other evidence, when the dying declaration was not otherwise suspicious. The Supreme Court also relied on its judgement given in **Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra**, where it was held that a medical expert’s opinion was not conclusive as to the existence of any fact: “The opinion of the Medical Officer is to assist the court as he is not a witness of fact and the evidence given by the Medical Officer is really of an advisory character and not binding on the witness of fact.”[\[9\]](#_ftn9) The Supreme Court also stated that the fact that certain witnesses including the family members of the deceased (PW 1 – 5 and PW 10) were declared hostile was insufficient to cast doubt upon the prosecution’s case as it was not the prosecution’s case that the hostile witnesses were eye witnesses to the crime rather, those witnesses’ testimonies were relevant mainly to show that the deceased had consistently stated that the respondent raped and murdered her, to different persons. The absence of evidence which established the consistency of the dying declaration over a period of time was not fatal to the prosecution’s case as the dying declaration was recorded in the victim’s words and read out to her, after which her signature was affixed on it. For these reasons, the Supreme Court found that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt before the Sessions Court and the High Court should not have overturned the Sessions Court’s judgment. The Supreme Court thus, exercised its power to do complete justice and therefore set aside the High Court’s decision of acquittal dated 27 January 2018 and restored the Sessions Court’s judgment dated 10 October 2006, to prevent miscarriage of justice by convicting the respondent of offences punishable under Sections 302, 341, 376 and 448 of the IPC, as well as its order dated 11 October 2006 sentencing the respondent to rigorous imprisonment for life for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and rigorous imprisonment for 10 years for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC where these sentences were to run concurrently. The Supreme Court in this case had also made certain parting remarks regarding the “two-finger test”. The Court stated in this case that while examining the victim, the Medical Board had conducted what was known as the “two-finger test” to determine whether she was habituated to sexual intercourse, but the Supreme Court had time and again deprecated the use of this regressive test in cases alleging rape and sexual assault as this test has no scientific basis and neither proved nor disproved allegations of rape. It re-victimized and re-traumatized women who may have been sexually assaulted and was an affront to their dignity.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) The “two-finger test” or pre-vaginum test therefore must not be conducted according to the opinion of Supreme Court. ## **CONCLUSION** Rape is not only a crime against a woman, but it is a crime against the entire society, and it destroys the entire psychology of a woman and pushes her into a deep emotional trauma. In the present case, the High Court by misinterpreting the facts of the present case and relying on case laws not relevant to the present, had thereby given an erroneous judgement by acquitting the respondent and had caused injustice to the victim and that injustice has been corrected by the Supreme Court by setting aside the judgement of the High Court and rightly restoring the judgement of the Sessions Court by convicting the respondent for the offences of rape and murder. In my view, the supreme court had rightly pointed out that cases of rape will be there where there might not be sufficient evidence to prove the offence and, in those cases, evidences in the nature of dying declaration have to be considered if they fulfil the criteria given in Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 to prove the guilt of the accused. The parting remark of the Supreme Court regarding the “Two finger Test” is also very valid as there is no scientific basis of the test and it only re-traumatizes and re-victimizes the victim, and such tests should not be performed in my view. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) See The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Sec. 32(1). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) See The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Sec. 60. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 136(1). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 136(2). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Moti Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1964 SCR (1) 688. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay AIR 1958 SC 22. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar AIR 1998 4 SCC 517. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Indian Kanoon, (Last visited on June 17, 2023). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9)Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra AIR 2006 1 SCC 283. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Satbir v. Surat Singh (1997) 4 SCC 192; State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh (2005) 9 SCC 9. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) 4th Semester Student at St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Merriam-Webster Dictionary, (Last visited on June 17, 2023). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The Hindu, [“India lodged average 86 rapes daily, 49 offences against women per hour in 2021: NCRB data”](https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-lodged-average-86-rapes-daily-49-offences-against-women-per-hour-in-2021-government-data/article65833488.ece), 31 August 2022 (Last visited on June 17, 2023). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) The Wire, [“Nearly 20% Increase in Rapes Across India in 2021, Rajasthan Had Highest Cases: NCRB”](https://thewire.in/government/crimes-against-women-rape-cases-india-2021-ncrb-data), 30 August, 2022 (Last Visited on June 17, 2023). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) K I Vibhute, PSA Pillai’s Criminal Law, Page – 833, 14th Edition, 2022. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The State of Jharkhand vs Shailendra Kumar Rai @ Pandav Rai (2022) SCC Online SC 1494. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Merriam-Webster Dictionary, (Last visited on June 17, 2023). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) K I Vibhute, PSA Pillai’s Criminal Law, Page – 657, 14th Edition, 2022. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See The Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sec. 302. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) See The Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sec. 307. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) See The Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sec. 341. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) See The Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sec. 375(a). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) See The Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sec. 375(b). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) See The Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sec. 375(c). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) See The Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sec. 375(d). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) See The Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sec. 376(1). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) See The Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sec. 448. **Categories:** Case Analysis **Tags:** #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, case analysis, case summary, lawfoyer, Pandav Rai, Shailendra Kumar Rai, Shailendra Kumar Rai @ Pandav Rai, The State of Jharkhand vs Shailendra Kumar Rai @ Pandav Rai --- ### [Om Hemrajani v. State of Uttar Pradesh](https://lawfoyer.in/om-hemrajani-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh/) **Published:** June 23, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **By Shramana Paul[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)** **In the Supreme Court of India** NAME OF THE CASEOm Hemrajani v. State of UP & Anr (2005)CITATIONSpecial Leave Petition (crl) 99 of 2004DATE OF THE CASE25/11/2004APPELLANTOm HemrajaniRESPONDENTState of Uttar Pradesh & AnrBENCH/JUDGEY.K Sabharwal, D.K DharmadhikariSTATUTES/CONSTITUTION INVOLVEDIndian Penal Code, 1860 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973IMPORTANT SECTIONS/ARTICLESs. 415; s. 417; s.418; s.420/ s.120 of the Indian Penal Code. s.177; s.178; s.179; s.180; s.181(1); s.183; s.186; s.187; s.188; s.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.## **Abstract** Non-bailable warrants and processes had been issued against the appellant/petitioner by a magistrate in Ghaziabad on a complaint by a Dubai-based bank, whom the appellant had allegedly taken a loan from and then absconded from the UAE without discharging his liability. This previous case was filed in the CBI court by the respondent. In the case at hand, the appellant has filed an appeal against the decision of the High Court in respect of his petition requesting the court to quash the complaint against him as the court of Ghaziabad does not have the jurisdiction to try or take cognizance of the case. The High Court had rejected the contention that the court of Ghaziabad did not have jurisdiction over the case. ## **Introduction** The case we are discussing is a criminal case and falls under the criminal appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and involves a substantial question of all. i.e. interpretation of s.188 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The petitioner has tried to invoke the inherent powers of the court by s.482 of the CrPC to quash the previous complaint made against him. The power to quash a criminal proceeding against any accused is not explicitly provided by the Code in any of its sections but falls under the Inherent Powers of the court. Inherent powers of the court are those powers which even though not mentioned specifically in the statute, the court has to make sure justice prevails and there is fairness in adjudication. The present appeal is against the order of the High Court on the interpretation of s.188 of CrPC which deals with offences committed outside India by a citizen of India or by any person in an Indian aircraft or ship. The Supreme Court of India which is the court of appeal in this case is not concerned with the charges against the appellant but only with the issue of interpretation of s.188 of CrPC and the power of the magistrate to take Cognizance of the previous criminal case along with the jurisdiction of the court of Ghaziabad. The definition of **cheating** as per IPC – “Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”.”[\[2\]](#_ftn2) ## **Facts of the Case** The petitioner in this case filed a petition under s.482 of CrPC to quash a previous complaint that the respondent had filed against him. The respondent is a Dubai-based bank that had filed against the petitioner and another in the Court of Special Judicial Magistrate (CBI) under [Sections 415](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/511697/), [417](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1791573/), [418](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/965532/) and [420](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1099980/) read with [Section 120-B](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1897847/) IPC[\[3\]](#_ftn3). It had been alleged in that complaint that the petitioner obtained loans, executed various documents as proof of his ability to discharge the bank liability, and gave his guarantee. However, he absconded from the UAE without discharging his liabilities after that. The accused cheated and defrauded the bank to obtain loan facilities knowing full well that he had no intention to pay it back and fled from UAE. The magistrate before whom the case was presented took cognizance of the case. The petitioner then filed this current petition challenging the court’s territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint. The initial complaint was filed in the CBI court against the petitioner under s.415, s.417, s.418, s.420/ s.120B of IPC which deals with Cheating, Punishment for cheating, cheating with knowledge that wrongful loss may ensue to a person whose interest offender is bound to protect, Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property and Punishment of criminal conspiracy respectively The main contention of the petitioner was that no cause of action or part thereof had occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the court at Ghaziabad and it was known to the respondent that the petitioner did not reside nor does the respondent have an office in Ghaziabad. It is important here to note that the petitioner has business all over India and abroad and for that purpose travels all over India and abroad. The High Court had rejected the contention that the Magistrate was not empowered to entertain the complaint against him and hence there was a want of jurisdiction. In his petition, the petitioner argues that the court of Ghaziabad which has issued non-bailable warrants against him did not have the jurisdiction to do so by the Code of Criminal Procedure and the High Court’s interpretation of s.188 of CrPC is erroneous and if upheld would cause undue harassment to the him. Ld Senior Advocate had submitted this appeal from the order of the High Court and was representing the petitioner in this case. The main point of adjudication by the Court, in this case, is the interpretation of s.188 of CrPC. ## **Issues Raised** 1. Has s.188 of the Code of Criminal Procedure been properly interpreted in the High Court? 2. Does the Ghaziabad court lack jurisdiction to entertain the primary complaint? 3. Does the responsibility to find the accused lie on the complainant, the police or the court under s.188? ## **Arguments from the Appellant’s Side** 1. Mr Vijay Kotwal learned senior advocate, on behalf of the appellant, submits that the High Court had erroneously construed Section 188 and had come to the conclusion that the Special Judicial Magistrate at Ghaziabad has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. 2. Learned counsel submits that the interpretation placed by the High Court on S. 188 is not legal and, if upheld, it would cause, as in the present case, unnecessary harassment to the accused. Which is not viable. 3. Mr Kotwal contends that when s.188 states that an offence committed outside India by an Indian citizen may be dealt with at any place within India at which the offender may be found, it is implicit that the competent Court at the place where the offender is likely to be found will have jurisdiction and not any court which the complainant may choose. He further says that the likelihood of finding the offender a place will decide whether or not the court having jurisdiction over that place can take cognizance of a complaint against the accused. The complaint should be filed where it is probable that the accused will be found. 4. The main contention placed before the High Court in the original petition had been that no cause of action or part thereof had occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the court at Ghaziabad; the petitioner was not residing within the jurisdiction of that Court nor the complainant had any office at Ghaziabad and, thus, the court at Ghaziabad had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence. ## **Arguments from the Respondent’s** 1. Learned Senior Counsel Mr Vinod A. Bobde who is representing the complainant Bank, submits that unlike civil proceedings the residence of the offender as a concept of part of the cause of action has no relevance in construing the provisions of the Code particularly, Section 188. 2. Learned counsel submits that the scheme of Chapter XIII clearly shows that the expression ‘at which he may be found’ in s.188 only means the place where the accused may either appear voluntarily or may be brought by the Police in execution of the warrants of arrest issued by the court since the responsibility to find the accused, within the meaning of S.188, is only of the court and not that of the complainant or the Police. 3. Learned counsel further submits that the law regarding the interpretation of S.188 has been well settled for over 150 years.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) ## **Related Provisions** - **The Indian Penal Code[**\[5\]**](#_ftn5)** S.120B: *Concealing design to commit offence punishable with imprisonment.* “Whoever, intending to facilitate or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby facilitate the commission of an offence punishable with imprisonment, voluntarily conceals, by any act or illegal omission, the existence of a design to commit such offence, or makes any representation which he knows to be false respecting such design, *if be offence committed; if the offence be not committed*.—shall, if the offence is committed, be punished with imprisonment of the description provided for the offence, for a term which may extend to one-fourth, and, if the offence be not committed, to one-eight, of the longest term of such imprisonment, or with such fine as is provided for the offence, or with both.” S.415: *Cheating-“* Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”.” *“Explanation*.—A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section.” S.417: “*Cheating with knowledge that wrongful loss may ensue to a person whose interest the offender is bound to protect.* Whoever cheats shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or, with fine, or with both.” S.418: “*Cheating with knowledge that wrongful loss may ensue to a person whose interest the offender is bound to protect.* Whoever cheats with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause wrongful loss to a person whose interest in the transaction to which the cheating relates, he was bound, either by law, or by a legal contract, to protect, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.” S.420: “*Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.* Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.” - **The Code of Criminal Procedure[**\[6\]**](#_ftn6)** S.177. “Ordinary place of inquiry and trial-Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.” S.178. Place of inquiry or trial—”(a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or (b) where an offence is committed, partly in one local area and partly in another, or [(c)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/475594/) where an offence, is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or [(d)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1464833/) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.” S.179. “Offence triable where act is done or consequence ensues—When an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued.” S.180. “Place of trial where the act is an offence by reason of relation to another offence-When an act is an offence by reason of its relation to any other act which is also an offence or which would be an offence if the doer were capable of committing an offence, the first- mentioned offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction either act was done.” S.181. “Place of trial in case of certain offences—(1) Any offence of being a thug, or murder committed by a thug, of dacoity, of dacoity with murder, of belonging to a gang of dacoits, or of escaping from custody, may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or the accused person is found.” S.183. “An offence committed on a journey or voyage- When an offence is committed whilst the person by or against whom, or the thing in respect of which, the offence is committed is in the course of performing a journey or voyage, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court through or into whose local jurisdiction that person or thing passed in the course of that journey or voyage.” S.186. “High Court to decide, in case of doubt, the district where inquiry or trial shall take place. Where two or more Courts have taken cognizance of the same offence and a question arises as to which of them ought to inquire into or try that offence, the question shall be decided- [(a)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/909308/) if the Courts are subordinate to the same High Court, by that High Court; [(b)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1571988/) if the Courts are not subordinate to the same High Court, by the High Court within the local limits of whose appellate criminal jurisdiction the proceedings were first commenced 1 Ins. by Act 45 of 1978, s. 15 and thereupon all other proceedings in respect of that offence shall be discontinued.” S.187. *Power to issue summons or warrant for an offence committed beyond local jurisdiction- “*(1) When a Magistrate of the first class sees reason to believe that any person within his local jurisdiction has committed outside such jurisdiction (whether within or outside India) an offence which cannot, under the provisions of sections 177 to 185 (both inclusive), or any other law for the time being in force, be inquired into or tried within such jurisdiction but is under some law for the time being in force triable in India, such Magistrate may inquire into the offence as if it had been committed within such local jurisdiction and compel such person in the manner hereinbefore provided to appear before him, and send such person to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to inquire into or try such offence, or, if such offence is not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and such person is ready and willing to give bail to the satisfaction of the Magistrate acting under this section, take a bond with or without sureties for his appearance before the Magistrate having such jurisdiction. (2) When there are more Magistrates than one having such jurisdiction and the Magistrate acting under this section cannot satisfy himself as to the Magistrate to or before whom such person should be sent or bound to appear, the case shall be reported for the orders of the High Court.” S.188 : *Offence committed outside India—* “When an offence is committed outside India— (a) by a citizen of India, whether on the high seas or elsewhere; or (b) by a person, not being such citizen, on any ship or aircraft registered in India, he may be dealt with in respect of such offence as if it had been committed at any place within India at which he may be found: Provided that, notwithstanding anything in any of the preceding sections of this Chapter, no such offence shall be inquired into or tried in India except with the previous sanction of the Central Government.” S. 482: *Saving the Inherent powers of the High Court*— “Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” ## **Judgement** The provisions of Chapter XIII of the Code which deals with the jurisdiction of the criminal courts in inquiries and trials were examined in this case by the judges. Such provisions include s.177, s.178, s.179, s.180, s.181(1), s.183, s.186 and s.187 along with s.188. Hence s.188 has to be construed keeping in mind the provisions laid out in the mentioned sections of CrPC. Chapter XIII of the Code makes it clear that neither the place of business nor place of residence of the petitioner nor for that matter even the complainant is of any relevance. The relevant factor is the place of commission of the offence. By legal fiction, S.188 which deals with the offence committed outside India, makes the place at which the offender may be found, to be a place of commission of offence. S.188 proceeds on the basis that a fugitive from justice may be found anywhere in India. The finding of the accused has to be by the court where the accused appears. It is not the responsibility of the complainant or the police to find the accused but of the court, hence the place at which the accused is found will not be where the Police have found and arrested him but at the court in which he appears or is made to appear. It is not possible for a victim/complainant to come to India and ascertain the location of the accused/offender before filing a complaint against him in court, in this case, the complainant was a bank based in Dubai so this provision applies to it. The victim’s convenience is of utmost importance to the court and it cannot be compromised. The convenience of a person who is hiding after committing offence abroad and is fugitive from justice is not relevant. As the counsel for the respondent has rightly pointed out the matter in question here i.e. the s.188 has been subject matter of interpretation for about 150 years. The question was first considered in the English case of **Reg. v. Benito Lopez[**\[7\]**](#_ftn7)** which deals with the question of jurisdiction of English courts in respect of offences committed on the high seas by foreigners on board English ships, decision was rendered by 14 Judges (there were total 15 judges in the court). The word ‘found’ was given an extensive scope in this case, this was done so that any court where the accused is found at trial or any court which tries the accused will be deemed to have jurisdiction to do the same. Chief Justice Lord Campbell had said in reference to this case that “a man is ‘found’, within the meaning of that Act, in any place where he is actually present.” The Provision of the Act that has been used here says-‘ If any person being a British subject charged with having committed any crime or offence on board any British ship on the high seas, or in any foreign port or harbour; or if any person, not being a British subject, charged with having committed any crime or offence on board any British ship on the high seas, is found within the jurisdiction of any court of justice in Her Majesty’s dominions, which would have cognizance of such crime or offence if committed within the limits of its ordinary jurisdiction, such court shall have jurisdiction to hear and try the case as if such crime or offence had been committed within such limits.’[\[8\]](#_ftn8) Another pre-independence case which also interpreted the language of this section is **Empress v. Maganlal**[\[9\]](#_ftn9), 1882. It was opined that it was used to confer the jurisdiction to the court of a place where the accused is actually found, i.e., produced before the Court and not where a person is discovered. There have been various other cases in the past stating the same. Since finding the accused is the responsibility of the court and not the police, the place where the accused is ‘found’ will be the court where he appears for trial even if the police have arrested him from an area not falling within the jurisdiction of such a court. The judges had stated that. “*In our opinion, the law has been correctly enunciated in the aforesaid case. The scheme underlying S.188 is to dispel any objection or plea of want of jurisdiction at the behest of a fugitive who has committed an offence in any other country. If such a person is found anywhere in India, the offence can be inquired into and tried by any Court that may be approached by the victim. The victim who has suffered at the hands of the accused on a foreign land can complain about the offence to a Court, otherwise competent, which he may find convenient. The convenience is of the victim and not that of the accused. It is not the requirement of S.188 that the victim shall state in the complaint as to which place the accused may be found. It is enough to allege the accused may be found in India. The Court where the complaint may be filed and the accused either appears voluntarily pursuant to issue of process or is brought before it involuntarily in the execution of warrants, would be the competent Court within the meaning of S.188 of the Code as that Court would find the accused before him when he appears. The finding has to be by the Court. It has neither to be by the complainant nor by the Police. The section deems the offence to be committed within the jurisdiction of the Court where the accused may be found. It is correct that as a result of the aforesaid interpretation, it is possible for a complainant to file a complaint against an accused in any Court in the country. But then we cannot compare the question of convenience of the accused at the cost of the victim’s convenience. Between the two, the convenience of the latter has to prevail*.” They also have addressed the concern of the appellant regarding the ‘abuse of power’ by the victim due to such wide provisions being provided to it and have said that there are various other provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure which protect the right of the accused and hence if there is any undue harassment the accused can take recourse through those sections. The interpretation of the High Court regarding s.188 of CrPC was upheld and the Special Leave Petition was dismissed. Now since s.188 necessarily tells us that if any criminal offence is committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of India, by a citizen of India then the trial and inquiry for that offence will be conducted within the jurisdiction of the Indian courts. So, this means that any court within the jurisdiction of India will have the power to try such an offence, and where the victim will lodge such a complaint is totally at its discretion. This will also apply when a person commits an offence on any ship or aircraft registered in India. The Supreme Court in this case has followed the well-settled law thereby protecting the rights of the victim bank. ## **Conclusion** The court in this case has rightly interpreted s. 188 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the convenience of the accused cannot come at the convenience of the victim who has already suffered a loss allegedly in the hands of the accused in a foreign land. It is the duty of any justice system to grant relief to the person who has suffered harm at the hands of another and look into the convenience of the victim which is of utmost importance. Hence, the foreign bank must be given adequate means to have their grievances redressed without having to worry about the jurisdiction of the court where they are presenting the case and having to run from court to court and face any further harassment than they have already faced. The concern of the defendants regarding abuse of the process and power by the victims is a valid one but there are already various provisions in the Code itself to protect the rights of the accused. This interpretation of the court as per the provisions provided in S. 188 is an exception to the general rights of the accused under sections 50-57 which mentions that the particulars of the arrest have to be communicated to the accused, he must be brought before the magistrate within 24 hours of arrest among other rights which prevents any undue harassment of the accused and also with respect to jurisdiction under S.177 which says ‘Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed, s.178 which deals with cases when the place of commission of the offence is uncertain; s.179 which says “Offence triable where the act is done or consequence ensues”, 180, 181(1) and s.183 which also talks about other situations concerning the jurisdiction of the criminal courts. Hence this case balances out the conveniences and inconveniences of the accused and victim. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) 4th semester student at St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) India Code, [https://www.indiacode.nic.in//](https://www.indiacode.nic.in/) (last visited: June 15th, 2023). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Indian Kanoon, / (Last visited: June 17th 2023). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Indian Kanoon, . [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) See Indian Penal Code,1860, [https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/2263?sam\_handle=123456789/1362](https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/2263?sam_handle=123456789/1362) . [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, [https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/15272/1/the\_code\_of\_criminal\_procedure%2C\_1973.pdf](https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/15272/1/the_code_of_criminal_procedure%2C_1973.pdf) . [\[7\]](#_ftnref7)Reg. v. Benito Lopez, 1858 Cr.L.C. 431. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) The Cambridge Law Journal, [Vol. 58, No. 1 (Mar., 1999)](https://www.jstor.org/stable/i406050). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Empress v. Maganlal, ILR Bom Series (Vol.6) 622. **Categories:** Case Analysis **Tags:** #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, case analysis, case summary, lawfoyer, Om Hemrajani, Om Hemrajani v. State of Uttar Pradesh --- ### [Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra vs State of U.P.](https://lawfoyer.in/rural-litigation-and-entitlement-kendra-vs-state-of-u-p/) **Published:** June 23, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **By Gargee Yadav[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)** **In the Supreme Court of India** NAME OF THE CASERural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra & Others vs State of U.P. & Others CITATION1985 AIR 652DATE OF THE CASEMarch 12, 1985APPELLANTRural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra & OthersRESPONDENTState of U.P. & OthersBENCH/JUDGEP.N. Bhagwati, Amarendra Nath Sen & Rangnath MisraSTATUTES/CONSTITUTION INVOLVEDForest Conservation Act, 1980, Mines Act, 1952, The Constitution of India, The Metalliferous Mines Regulations, 1961IMPORTANT SECTIONS/ARTICLESArticle 21,32,48A& 51A(g) of the Indian Constitution, Section 6 of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 ## ABSTRACT In the case of Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, a writ petition was presented before the Supreme Court, addressing the issue of unauthorized and illegal limestone mining activities in the Mussoorie Hill range, Dehradun, India. The petitioner contended that such mining practices had posed a grave threat to both human life and the fragile ecosystem, potentially resulting in irreparable harm. It was argued that the extraction of limestone had disrupted the delicate balance of the ecosystem. Furthermore, the detrimental impact on the perennial water springs was highlighted as evidence of the adverse consequences caused by the mining activities. During the pendency of the writ petition, the appointment of the Bhargav committee was ordered by the court to conduct a thorough inspection of the limestone mines under consideration. Simultaneously, the government established a separate committee called the Working Group to address the concerns pertaining to the mining activities in that region. The honorable court observed that while industrial development is crucial for the economic growth of the country, it should not come at the cost of endangering human life. It recognized that true economic prosperity cannot be achieved if mining activities are carried out recklessly and without due consideration for the well-being of the environment and the people. The court stressed the importance of striking a balance between development and conservation, thus, highlighting the need to reconcile these conflicting interests in the broader interest of the nation. ## INTRODUCTION With the advent of advanced machinery, the mining industry has expanded its reach to hilly areas that were once deemed inaccessible. The utilization of sophisticated techniques has enabled geologists and miners to explore and exploit every inch of land for mineral extraction. However, it is essential to recognize that mining operations conducted without proper safety measures can have severe consequences. The extraction of metals involves the use of explosive materials to blast hills, resulting in the unlawful displacement of materials deep within the terrain, a violation of Section 3 of the Mines Act of 1952. The potential risks associated with such activities include landslides, the release of hazardous substances, and environmental degradation. To ensure sustainable development, a delicate balance must be struck between economic activities and the preservation of the ecosystem. The Supreme Court, in its judgment, has embraced the principle of sustainable development by addressing these concerns. Moreover, the court’s decision takes into account the welfare of various stakeholders. It not only provided employment opportunities to unemployed workers but also considered the plight of mining lessors. Recognizing the need for a holistic approach, the court allowed the removal of already extracted materials, taking into consideration the interests of all parties involved. By incorporating the principle of sustainable development and balancing the needs of economic progress with environmental preservation, the court’s judgment sought to promote responsible mining practices and ensure the long-term well-being of both the ecosystem along with the people. ## FACTS OF THE CASE During the 1950s, the commencement of limestone mining operations marked a turning point in the Doon Valley area of Mussoorie. The exploitative practices including the use of explosives, indiscriminate tree felling, and extensive mining activities caused significant harm. This period also witnessed a substantial increase in limestone extraction within the Doon Valley, spanning from 1955 to 1965. The forceful detonations used to extract minerals left the valley devoid of lush vegetation, disrupting the delicate ecological balance. With the advent of time, the detrimental consequences of these actions became evident. By the 1980s, the natural beauty of the Doon Valley had significantly diminished, making way for a series of calamities. The once-thriving region faced the ravages of recurrent floods, soaring temperatures, perilous landslides, acute water scarcity, and the alarming obliteration of fertile farmlands. This catastrophic transformation accentuated the urgent need to address the repercussions of uncontrolled industrial activities on fragile ecosystems. The Doon Valley stands as a poignant reminder of the delicate equilibrium that must be maintained between development endeavors and environmental preservation. In 1961, the State Minister of Mines in Uttar Pradesh issued a prohibition on mining industries. However, a year later in 1962, the state government itself granted numerous mining and excavation leases for 20 years, resulting in a resumption of excavation activities. As the leases approached their expiration in 1982, the state government imposed a new prohibition, citing concerns over the ecological devastation caused by mining operations. Despite this decision, mining companies continued to expand their activities, disregarding the government’s stance. The situation took a turn when the Allahabad High Court authorized mining operations in the Doon Valley, prioritizing economic benefits over ecological considerations. In response, Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra (RLEK), a local NGO in Dehradun lodged a complaint against the ecological degradation, submitting a letter of complaint to the Apex Court in 1983. The Supreme Court acknowledged the gravity of the matter and registered the complaint as a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. During the litigation, the esteemed court exercising its discretionary power constituted the Bhargav committee to meticulously inspect the limestone quarries. Simultaneously, the Indian government constituted a Working Group, led by DN Bhargav who was also a member of the court-appointed committee. Bhargav committee had divided mines into 3 categories, namely Category A, Category B & Category C. Category A consisted of those mines that exhibit minimal detrimental impact on the environment.[\[2\]](#_ftn2)Whereas category B relates to those mines that demonstrate a more significant adverse impact on the environment as compared to mines falling under Category A.[\[3\]](#_ftn3)Category C comprised those mines that have the highest degree of adverse impact on the environment.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) On the other hand, the working group classified mines into two categories namely, Category 1 and Category 2. Category 1 consisted of those mines that would have the least adverse impact.[\[5\]](#_ftn5)On the other hand, Category 2 comprised mines that would have a huge adverse impact and need to be closed with immediate effect.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) ## ISSUES RAISED BEFORE THE COURT - Whether the mining operations violated the provisions of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980? - Whether environmental conservation should be given priority over the economic development of the country? - Whether the excavation of limestone deposits affect the perennial water springs? - Whether the lease issued were in accordance with the provisions of the law? ## ARGUMENTS FROM THE APPELLANT SIDE - The petitioner argued that the mining activities violated the provisions of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 as they caused significant damage to the forested areas and ecological balance. Moreover, Section 2 of the act prohibits the use of forest land for non-forest purposes.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) - The petitioner contended that the mining activities were infringing upon their fundamental right to a healthy environment and causing the degradation of spring water sources. The petitioner argued that while economic development is important, it should not come at the expense of irreversible environmental damage. - The petitioner highlighted how the extraction process and associated activities had caused a depletion of water resources, thereby endangering the livelihoods and well-being of the inhabitants reliant on these springs. - The petitioner contended that the mining operations were carried out without proper authorization, resulting in unauthorized and illegal activities. ## ARGUMENTS FROM THE RESPONDENT SIDE - The Respondent vehemently submitted that the writ petition should be dismissed as it lacked merit and was devoid of any substantial legal basis. Furthermore, the Respondent contended that the authority to conduct investigations should be exclusively vested in administrative authorities as mandated by the provisions enshrined within the Environmental Protection Act. - The Respondent argued that the government, not the courts, bears the exclusive responsibility for determining whether the operations in question have the potential to cause environmental harm. - The Respondent asserted that mining activities should not be halted as they are crucial for national interests and safeguarding the government’s foreign revenue position. - The Respondent contended that the closure of mines will lead to the termination of employment for mine workers and laborers, thereby causing a loss of livelihood. In addition to that, all due care has been taken while carrying out the excavation. ## RELATED PROVISIONS - Article 21: “Protection of Life and Personal Liberty: No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”[\[8\]](#_ftn8) - Article 32: – Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part: - The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) - The Supreme Court shall have the power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) - Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (1) and ( 2 ), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2 ).[\[11\]](#_ftn11) - The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) - Article 48A: This Article comes under the Directive principle of the State policy. This article implies that State shall endeavor to protect the environment. It also emphasizes on safeguarding the forests and wildlife of the country. Article 48A imposes a duty on State to protect the environment from pollution by adopting various measures.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) - Article 51A (g): Article 51 A(g) states that it shall be the duty of each and every citizen of India to protect and improve the natural environment that includes lakes, rivers, forests, and wildlife. This Article also focuses on showing compassion for living creatures. This article is similar to Article 48A, but the only difference is that it concentrates on fundamental duty of citizens whereas Article 48A instructs the state to perform its duties and protect the environment.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) ## JUDGEMENT The Court categorically stated that limestone quarries classified under Category C of the Bhargav Committee Report, which have already been closed as per the Committee’s directions should not be permitted to resume operations. Any stay orders obtained by lessees for mining in these quarries will be nullified, and existing leases for these quarries will be terminated without liability against the State of Uttar Pradesh. The limestone quarries in Sahasradhara Block classified under Category B by the Bhargav Committee, should also be immediately closed. Additionally, the Court concurred with the Working Group’s report that limestone quarries classified under Category 2 by the Working Group apart from those in Categories B and C as per the Bhargav Committee, should be closed and prohibited from operating except for the limestone quarries covered by mining leases Nos. 31, 36 and 37 for which the court would give the same direction as will be given regarding the limestone quarries classified as category B in the Bhargav Committee Report.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) Based on the reports of the Bhargava committee and the Working Group, the Court concluded that mining operations can proceed in Categories A and B subject to observance of the relevant rules and regulations, but in case of Category C mining operations must be discontinued with immediate effect. The limestone quarries mentioned in Category A or Category 1 of the Bhargav Committee Report and the Working Group Report respectively are divided into two categories based on their location within or outside the city limits of Mussoorie. The limestone quarries falling within the previously stated category and located outside the city limits of Mussoorie may continue to operate, provided they comply with the Mines Act 1952, the Metalliferous Mines Regulations 1961, and other applicable laws, rules, and regulations. The court directed to cease the mining operations conducted through blasting. The court also acknowledged that mining in the Dehradun Valley forest area violates the forest conservation Act,1980. While emphasizing environmental conservation, the Court further took into account the economic hardships faced by mining operators and laborers. To address this concern, the honorable Court directed that priority be given to the affected mining operators of the valley in the new limestone mines. The honorable court directed, “…*that whenever any other area in the State of Uttar Pradesh is thrown open for grant of lime stone or dolomite quarrying, the lessees who are displaced as a result of this order shall be afforded priority in grant of lease of such area and intimation that such area is available for grant of lease shall be given to the lessees who are displaced so that they can apply for grant of lease of such area and on the basis of such application, priority may be given to them subject, of course, to their otherwise being found fit and eligible*.”[\[16\]](#_ftn16) Additionally, the Central government was directed to provide employment opportunities to workers in reclamation and afforestation projects following the discontinuation of mining operations in category C. ## CONCLUSION The Supreme Court has consistently demonstrated its commitment to upholding fundamental rights and has issued a landmark judgment in response to a petition, emphasizing the imperative of striking a delicate balance between economic advancement and environmental degradation. The Court acknowledged that the Constitution of India guarantees the right to a wholesome environment as a fundamental right under Article 21. It recognized the adverse impact of industrialization on the environment and emphasized the need for sustainable development, which entails integrating developmental and environmental imperatives. It recognized the crucial role of the judiciary in determining the scope of administrative powers and functions and in establishing a harmonious equilibrium between environmental protection and development. The Court highlighted the importance of a balanced approach that considers both economic prosperity and a pollution-free environment. Ultimately, the Court through its verdict issued a clarion call to uphold the process of sustainable development that safeguards the well-being of the present and future generations, recognizing the interdependence of human life and nature. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) 2nd semester student at Amity Law School, Lucknow. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) (1985) 2 SCC 431. [***\[3\]***](#_ftnref3)*Ibid.* [***\[4\]***](#_ftnref4)*Ibid.* [***\[5\]***](#_ftnref5)*Ibid.* [***\[6\]***](#_ftnref6) Ibid.* [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Forest Conservation Act, 1980, §2. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 21. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 32(1). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 32(2). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 32(3). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12)The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 32(4). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 48A. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 51A(g). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) (1985) 2 SCC 431. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) (1985) 2 SCC 431. **Categories:** Case Analysis **Tags:** #law, #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, case analysis, case summary, lawfoyer, Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra, Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra vs State of U.P. --- ### [Independent Thought v. Union of India & Anr.](https://lawfoyer.in/independent-thought-v-union-of-india-anr/) **Published:** June 23, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **By Ayush Upadhyay** **In the Supreme Court of India** **NAME OF THE CASE**Independent Thought v. Union of India & Anr.**CITATION**Writ Petition (Civil) No. 382 of 2013**DATE OF THE CASE**October 11, 2017**APPELLANT**Independent Thought**RESPONDENT**Union of India & Anr.**BENCH/JUDGE**MADAN B. LOKUR & DEEPAK GUPTA**STATUTES/CONSTITUTION INVOLVED**Constitution of India; Indian Penal Code, 1860; Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 **IMPORTANT SECTIONS/ARTICLES**Constitution of India – ­­­Article 14, 15, 21 and 32 Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 375 Protection of Human Right Act, 1993 – Section 2(1)(d) ## **Abstract** In this case, the petitioner Independent Thought a society was registered on 6/8/2009 which has been working in the Welfare of child rights filed writ petition no. 382/2013 resentment on exception 2 of the section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 before the Apex Court to decide the lawfulness of this exception if it was occurred with minor girl child who was married between the age of 15 to 18. The Exception clearly discloses that a man cannot be accused of rape of his wife if she was above the age of 15 years. This exception originated as exclusion of the Marital Rape. The Apex Court on 17 September 2017 extended the period of consensual sexual intercourse from 15 to 18 years in the marriage. As foregoing provision is not criminalised the sexual exploitation by husband with his wife above the age of 15 years. It is totally not in the harmony of the several statutes. This exception was irregular to the other statues like IPC and The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act,2012 Where age of consent is 18 years. The Supreme Court after adjudicated the issue they came to read down the provision, as it was abnormal with the IPC & POCSO where age of consent is 18 years. ## **Introduction** In the present case, Independent Thought v. Union of India & Another. The petitioner/applicant was Independent Thought a recognised and registered society working for the welfare and development of child and women rights and responded were Union of India and National Commission for Women. The matter which has been raised in this case was related to exception 2 of the section 375 of the IPC, defines sexual intercourse by the man with his wife will not be considered as rape if she was above the age of 15 years. The Exception 2 of section 375 of IPC contemplates that marriage occurred in way of tradition at the age of 15 years it should not liable the husband for the offence of rape and he can have sexual intercourse with his wife without consent. The Exception normally known as rape in marital obligation but not concluded in the decision. **Marital rape:** Marital rape as the word in itself defines a kind of sexual violence. Marital rape refers to forcible sexual assault or violence by one spouse towards the other. It is violent and brutal and the use of violence by the husband towards his spouse to have sexual relation with the wife is the essential element of marital rape. Thus, the husband will be liable if he commits an offence is by the use of physical force and the absence of which would not amount to the commission of an act[\[1\]](#_ftn1). In the recent study conducted in Mumbai, Deosthali found that 828 (46.4%) of 1783 women confided to counsellors that they had suffered marital rape while requesting help from domestic violence. The data in contrast, only 18(1.1%) of 1664 women actually reported marital rape to hospital in medicolegal form[\[2\]](#_ftn2). ## **FACTS OF THE CASE** By the criminal law amendment of 2013, the consensual age of sexual intercourse was extended to 18 years provided under section 375 of IPC. But the exception enshrined in the section 375 which permitted husband to do a non-consensual sexual demonstration with his wife between 15 to 18 years old. This exception was inconsistent with the section 3 of the Prevention of Children from Sexual Offences act, 2012. The petitioner Independent Thought an NGO & registered society dealing with the child and human rights. On 11/06/2013 filed a writ petition under the ambit of Article 32 of the Constitution of India, challenging the lawfulness and constitutionality of exception 2 of the section 375 of the IPC as it infringes the rights of married girl child between 15 to 18 years. The Home Ministry of United Progressive Alliance (UPA) was filed counter affidavit in this regard as response to the petition was later adopted by the current government National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in the year 2014. The Child Rights Trust was appreciated on record as intervenor in this case on 28/08/2017. The division bench of the Apex Court agreed on the contention of the applicant & read down this exception. ## **ISSUE RAISED BEFORE THE COURT** **1**. Whether the Exception 2 of Section 375 of IPC was considered discriminatory & arbitrary by which violates Art. 14, 15, 21 of the Constitution? **2**. Whether sexual intercourse between a husband and his wife who is girl of between 15 to 18 years, institute rape? **3**. Whether Exception 2 of section 375 of IPC violates Article 14 by separating between wedded & non- wedded minor girls? ## **ARGUMENTS FROM THE APPELLANT SIDE** **1**. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Exception 2 of the IPC was not aiding in relation with the positive qualification between married and unmarried minor girl. It was also contended that this provision conflicts with the Article 14 and Article 21 that was a fundamental aspect of an individual. **2**. The 84th Law Commission report on 25 April 1980 which stated that the present provision is inconsistent with the age considered for the marriage. Petitioner pointed out that a girl married under 18 years does not institute a maturity of mind, sanity & firmness of mind to think in a rational manner. **3**. Learned counsel for the petitioner informed practicality of the section 375 of the IPC meant to describe that a woman under 18 years as a child and their Exception stated that if sexual violence happens against minor wife in that case the doer(husband) will not be liable. **4**. Exception 2 of the section 375 of IPC is also not in conformity with provision mentioned in Article 15(3) of the Constitution which is for the protection and development for the child and women, but rather to develop it is going to ruin the goal behind it. The Child Rights Trust (intervenor) introduced new issues regarding psychological and mental fitness of the minor girl being hitched. ## **ARGUMENTS FROM THE RESPONDENT SIDE** **1**. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that they were not against the contended provision by the petitioner (Exception 2 of s. 375 of the IPC). The learned counsel for respondent replied that with the Exception2 of s. 375 of the IPC husband would be discharged from criminal liability but he will be charged in other provision E.g., if a man causes harm while sex to her then he will be held liable for offences u/s 323,324&325 of IPC as the case may be. So, it is not fair and reasonable. **2**. The respondent argued that Child Marriage has been an ancient tradition in the Indian society yet it was illegal, but spread everywhere as social norm and the minor girl had also accepted to intimate with her wedded husband. **3.** The counsel for the respondent divulged some statistics that were revealed by National Family Health Survey’s 3rd report in the year 2005. It was mentioned that 46% of women under the ambit of 18 years. Therefore, penalizing these marriages would not be fair as the purpose of the marriage defeated. **4**. The counsel for the respondents contended that the girl child had agreed to have sexual intercourse with her husband either expressly or impliedly. ## **Related Provision** - **Constitution of India** - **Article 14 **Equality before law** The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) - **Article 15** Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth** **(1)** The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) **(2)** No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to **(a) Access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and palaces of public entertainment; or (b)** The use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) **(3)** Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) - **Article 21** **Protection of life and personal liberty** No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) The “right to life” enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution is not just a right to live as animal living. The Court has always held that right to live envisages right to live with human dignity. - **Article 32** **Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part (1)** the right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed[\[8\]](#_ftn8) **(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) - **India Penal Code, 1860** - **Section 375** **Rape** A man is said to commit “rape” if he— (a) penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (b) inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (c) manipulates any part of the body of a woman so as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of such woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or (d) applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person, under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions: — First. —Against her will. Secondly. —Without her consent. Thirdly. —With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt. Fourthly. —With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married. Fifthly. —With her consent when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent. Sixthly. —With or without her consent, when she is under eighteen years of age. Seventhly. —When she is unable to communicate consent. **The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 - **Human Rights** **Section 2(1)(d) of the Protection of Human Rights Act of 1993[**\[11\]**](#_ftn11)** **“**Human Rights” means the rights relating to life, liberty, equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in the International Covenants and enforceable by the courts in India. ## **Judgement** On October 11, 2017 an epoch-making verdict was delivered by the division bench of the Supreme Court of India. The division bench consisted of Justice Madan B. Lokur and Justice Deepak Gupta. The bench considered after reading the Exception 2 of section 375 of the IPC which was in the contention of the petitioner. The section read down as the sexual violence by the man with his wife between 15 to 18 years is not rape. The 2 Judges Bench held that the age of consensual sexual intercourse should be extended to 18 years for wedded couple. This provision was not consistent with several statutes like POCSO, the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, & the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 point out age of child who is under 18 years but this exception is contrary to these acts. The Court observed that person under age of 18 years has a duty not to infringe their wife’s right to bodily liberty & consensual sex. The Court in his opinion determined that exception provided in this section 375 of IPC is unjust, unreasonable & arbitrary in consequence. The 2 Judges Bench came to the determination of the Exception 2 of section 375 of IPC that it violates the minor wedded wife’s right & to be annulled from the effect. The Court further pointed out that it goes contrary to the POCSO’s provision & other statutes. The Supreme Court read down exception 2 of section 375 of IPC as it unpleasant and repugnant in consequences. The Court decided that a child always treated a child whether girl child is legally wedded or not married girl child or a widowed girl child. In addition, consensual age for sexual activity is absolutely 18 years without any doubt. The Court expressed that an early age marriage is detrimental for the girl child’s development. This judgement would not be considered in the scope of Marital Rape. The Court is describing their view on unsatisfied justification made by the public authority for holding consensual age of 15 years. The Bench has held that a minor girl wouldn’t be able to have consent for sexual demonstration with her by means of ditched. The Court in his view implying that a lawful marriage does not stay with accessibility for man to have sexual intercourse irrespective of consent or acceptance from his wife. A Women is allowed to live with dignity, protection and reproductive choice of her provided in these cases: Suchita Srivastava and Anr. v. Chandigarh Administration[\[12\]](#_ftn12), State of Maharashtra and Another v. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar[\[13\]](#_ftn13). ## **Conclusion** By expressing a remarkable and ground breaking verdict in Independent Thought v. Union of India and Another. It has given a better opportunity for female minors to protect her from social evils. In this Case lay hold of an historic step in upholding the development of health and education of minor married girl. The Apex Court rules that exception 2 of section 375 of the IPC which had earlier discharged the doer from criminal liability for rape & permitted him to have sex with his spouse with irrespective of consent. This judgement is astounding significance with regard to develop the law for changing needs of the society. The Court is not intending to create an offence but only detaching the provision was unjust, unfair and unreasonable. The verdict did not discuss on issue where the doer i.e., husband is minor and would be immature too. After considering this case, it provides a specific right to the married girl who supposed to be free from cruel and inhuman behaviour from his partner. Now, we have to focus on implementation of several verdict in favour of women and minor child. According to my view, this verdict will be decreased the demonstration which minor girl has suffered mental disorder, incurable diseases and several other problems. This case does not consider the matter related to marital rape. It refers only among the minor married girl who has been sexually assaulted by her husband between the age of 15 to 18 years. The Court has applied the reasoning for concluding that Exception 2 of section 375 of IPC is violative of fundamental Rights was similarly pertinent to a girl above 18 years old whose right to live with dignity is dishonoured by the vigorous and forceful sexual intercourse. . --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Ketan Tiwari and Mansi Bisht, *Marital Rape: License to Rape or not?,* 4(3), IJLMH 366 – 375 (2021), <> accessed 21 June 2023. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Rao TSS, Shah N, Andrade C., Marital Rape in India, Journal of Psychosexual Health, 4(4), 221-222 (2022), <> accessed 21 June 2023. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 14. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 15(1). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 15(2). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 15(3). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 21. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 32(1). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 32(2). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) See The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §375. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) The Protection of Human Rights Act,1993, No. 10, Acts of Parliament, 1993(India). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Suchita Srivastava and Anr. v. Chandigarh Administration (2009) 9 SCC 1 [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) State of Maharashtra and Another v. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar AIR 1991 SCC 57 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases, Criminal Law Cases **Tags:** #law, #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, case analysis, case summary, Independent Thought, Independent Thought v. Union of India & Anr., lawfoyer --- ### [PT. PARMANAND KATARA VS. UNION OF INDIA](https://lawfoyer.in/pt-parmanand-katara-vs-union-of-india/) **Published:** June 23, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **By Yukta Bissa** CITATION1989 AIR 2039, 1989 SCR (3) 997DATE OF CASE28 August 1989APPELLANTPt. Parmanad KataraRESPONDENTUnion of IndiaBENCH/JUDGEJustice Ranganath MisraSTATUES INVOLVEDConstitution of India,1950 , Indian Penal Code,1860, Criminal Procedure Code,1973 The Medical Ethics Code, 1970.IMPORTANT ARTICLES & SECTIONS INVOLVEDArticle 21 & 32 of the Indian Constitution and Clause 10 and 13 of the Medical Ethics Code, 1970, Section 161 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973## **ABSTRACT** This case is a PIL (Public Interest Litigation) which was filed in general interest of the public, protecting their right to life and heart. The case was contested after the death of a victim of road accident due to the delay in his treatment by the medical practitioners. The doctors at the hospital advised the people with victim to take him to a government hospital which particularly dealt with the such medico-legal cases. The PIL was filed by Pt. Parmanand Katara, a human rights activist, to remove this obstruction of zonal jurisdiction of the hospitals. It was pleaded before the Hon’ble Supreme Court to issue guidelines and give clarification that the doctors at both private and government hospitals much priorities the life of the injured person rather than indulging in the legal formalities first. The legal formalities are important as they are used as an evidence, but not as much as someone’s life. The fear in the minds of the people helping the victim and doctor, regarding the indulgence in interrogation by police officers and cross-examination in the courts should be removed and hence the apex court gave direction for protection of both, the “Good Samaritans” and the doctors. It was ruled that the doctors are bound to use their expertise and skills fully to save lives of the people, especially in the emergency cases and abide by their oath, and must not worry about the litigation process. ## **INTRODUCTION** The present case is related to Public Interest Litigation, this is also known as the Good Samaritan Case. Here a human rights activist, Pandit Paramanad Katara, currently a senior advocate, approached the Supreme Court by filing a PIL. PIL stands for Public Interest Litigation, it is filed in court of law in general interest of the public. It is an effective instrument which works towards social welfare and economic justice. Through PIL judicial activism has flourished in India. In the present case a PIL was filed on the basis of a newspaper article published in the Hindustan Times, in the year 1988, titled ‘the Law helps the injured to die”. As our Constitution guarantees Right to Life under Article 21, it also includes Right to health. This particular case was a landmark judgement in regards to right to health and it enlarged the ambit of jurisprudence of emergency medical care in India, which made it compulsory for doctors both private and public to provide emergency medical services to a victim of road accident. The hospital and doctors cannot make any excuses like this is a police case or referring the patient to some other hospital without even starting the treatment. Finally court established the guidelines that saving life of the patient must be prioritized and not the legal formalities and also ensured prevention of medical practitioners from the legal proceedings of the courts, unless the under necessary circumstances. ## **FACTS OF THE CASE** This PIL was filed by Pandit Paramanad Katara under article 32 of the Indian Constitution. It discussed the circumstances which lead to the death of a scooterist who was hit by a speeding car. Even though he was take to a nearest hospital by an witness of the accident, he was not admitted there and was denied treatment. It was advised to take the victim of the accident to a government hospital, that was some 20 kilometers’ away and which had the authority to particularly attend such medico-legal cases. In this case, the petitioner has prayed that the directions must be issued by the Apex court to the Union of India that every injured person who has been brought to hospital and is in need of emergency treatment, should be instantaneously attended by the doctors and should be given the medical aid to preserve his/her life. The procedure for criminal law and other legal formalities can be completed thereafter to avoid any negligent death. Nevertheless in case of any such negligence, appropriate compensation should be admissible. Nevertheless time was wasted unnecessarily. Unfortunately, he scummed to the injuries on the way to the government hospital. The news report regarding this incident led Pt. Paramanad Katara (Petitioner) to take action against such behaviour and negligence of the doctors and the hospital. Further in the case the protection of the Good Samaritan, i.e., a person without any expectation of payment or reward or having any relationship, voluntarily comes to assist the victim of a road accident or need of emergency medical condition, was also demanded. The secretary, Ministry of health and family welfare of India, the medical council of India and the Indian Medical Association (respondents) also agreed with the petitioner, nevertheless contended with a few important clauses from the Medical Ethics Code, 1970. Here, the necessity to attend the injured people right away without waiting for the police report or completion of the legal formalities was recognized and the Union of India was requested to take requisite steps with immediate effect, to amend various provisions of law which hinder the working of government doctors as well as other doctors in private hospitals or public hospitals in this regard.”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) ## **ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT** - Whether a victim of road accident can be treated by the doctor without prior legal formalities? - Whether there are any such legal provisions which prevent timely treatment of the injured person? ## **ARGUMENTS RAISED BY THE PETITIONER SIDE** The learned Counsel for petitioner submitted that the directions must be issued by the Union of India that every injured person brought to the hospital for emergency treatment, should be attended instantaneous and shall be given the medical aid to preserve the persons life and all the legal formalities and procedure of criminal law should be dealt with later on, in order to avoid negligent death of the patient. Furthermore, in case of any negligence on the part of the medical authorities, appropriate compensation should be paid to the victim or his family. The learned counsel for the petitioner, said that the clause 12 and clause 13 of Code of Medical Ethics, 1970 represent the duty imposed on doctors and practitioners to serve and treat those injured to their best without rescuing themselves from performing their professional duty. The learned counsel emphasised that the medical council itself expects the doctors to perform their duties willfully, without any negligence and priority should be avoiding death of the victim of the accident. Further, the Medical ethics code of 1970, other legislations like Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 did not restrict the medical authorities and practitioners from giving medical aid before fulfillment of all the legal formalities.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Considering the ground reality, the practitioners are in confusion regarding the provisions and always want to steer clear from litigation . This is to be understood that human life is more important than the all the formalities, hence the above mentioned laws & procedures need to be amended and implemented to save the valuables lives of the victim. ## **ARGUMENTS RAISED BY THR RESPONDENT SIDE** The learned counsel for the respondents was in line with the views and demands of the petitioners, they contended with 2 relevant clauses, they are : Firstly, the learned counsel for the respondent stated, clause 10 of Medical Ethics Code, 1970 which states that although a physician is not bound to treat every ailing person, however in an emergency case like that of a road accident, it practitioner becomes duty bound to provide the needed medical aid appropriate. [\[3\]](#_ftn3) And secondly the learned counsel for the respondent said that, Clause 13 of the Medical Ethics Code, 1970, mentions that the freedom of medical practitioners to choose who they want to treat is available to them, except in emergency, cases, where saving life of the injured person becomes the need of the time. It also stated that medical practitioners have no right to withdraw themselves from treatment, in such emergency cases. It was clear on the respondent’s side that Government of India raised no objections, the decisions taken in this regard by the Director – General of Health Services were such as : “It is critical for the medical officer on duty to report to the constable on duty the details of the injured, such as his name, location and time of incident, and so on, if his case falls under the category of medico-legal.” The arrival of police officers or such other legal procedures shall have no bearing on the treatment of the injured. Regardless of the location of the accident, medico-legal proceedings must be handled by the hospital/medical institution (both private as well as public). The government shall not deny anyone medical treatment, on account of the cases being medico-legal in nature.”[\[4\]](#_ftn4) ## **RELATED PROVISIONS:** - **Constitution Of India, 1950** **Article 21 :** “Protection of life and personal liberty No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.” [\[5\]](#_ftn5) **Article 32 :** “Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part 1. The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this part is guaranteed.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) - The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, Prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this part.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) - Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause ( 1 ) and ( 2 ), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause ( 2 ).[\[8\]](#_ftn8) - The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution.” [\[9\]](#_ftn9) - **Medical Ethics Code, 1970** **Clause 10** “Obligation to the Sick – A medical professional is not bound to perform their duties in any emergency case and attend an injured person it is the duty of a medical professional to provide proper treatment and service regarding any kind of delay in the time of need.”[\[10\]](#_ftn10) **Clause 13** “Patients not be Neglected- The freedom of the medical practitioner should not extract himself or attending patients during any kind of delay and secure deliberate commission of dereliction of duty.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) and not neglect the patients who are being treated.” - **Criminal Procedure Code** **Section 161** “Examination of witnesses by police: provides for oral examination of a person by any investigating officer when such person is supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case.”[\[12\]](#_ftn12) ## **JUDGEMENT** As this case dealt with the issues regarding immediate treatment of road accident victims, the erudite judges here recognized that the subject could not be avoided since it was a matter of public health and importance. Article 21 of our Constitution clearly states that it is the duty of the State to preserve the life of all its citizens and provides them the Fundamental Right to health. There can be no doubt that the preservation of human life is of the utmost significance. Once a life is lost, it cannot be resurrected because resurrection is beyond man’s ability. Every doctor, whether at a government hospital or otherwise, has a professional obligation to provide appropriate skills to protect life and when a medical expert is called upon or requested to attend to an injured individual who need immediate medical care, there is no legal restriction. The reason for establishing medical formalities in such circumstances was to keep the evidence intact. However, delays were caused by the procedure’s inherent flaws. The Court also observed that the general public was hesitant to assist those who had been hurt because they were scared of being called to testify as witnesses or appear in court. Hence the court made rules for protection of the “Good Samaritans”. According to the Hon’ble apex court, there were no obstructions generated by the legislative framework that prevented a practitioner from providing therapy. He also stated that it was the public’s and the police’s responsibility to save lives, and that any concerns about this had to be addressed for everyone. To ease practitioners’ deep-seated fear of being summoned to court, the learned judges ruled that practitioners be taken to police stations only in necessary circumstances. It was also emphasised that courts had to disperse cases quickly and not take up too much of practitioners’ time if they were summoned for cross-examination or to present evidence. Thus this landmark judgement stated that every doctor, whether at a government hospital or a private hospital or otherwise, has a professional obligation to protect life by giving immediate medical aid and treatment to the victims of road accidents. No law or state action can be used to evade or postpone the discharge of the primary obligation imposed on members of the medical profession. The Court directed that the verdict in this case be given due publicity by the national media, Doordarshan, and All India Radio, as well as through the High Courts and Sessions Judges. ## **CONCLUSION** Paramanad Katara vs Union Of India is a landmark judgement which ensures preservation of life and makes the life of patients of utmost importance. In the this case, both the parties agreed with each with no objections and changes were made accordingly in the required laws and the procedure regarding them. It is to be noted that the fulfillment legal formalities after a road accident are necessary to be kept as an evidence, which are of importance if there’s to be an actual criminal case. However, undoubtedly, nothing more valuable than a humans’ precious life and the procedural changes were made and it was advised to both, private and government medical professionals, that treatment should be given to the injured person as soon as he or she reaches the hospital. This issue was raised by Pandit Paramanad Katara, his efforts are laudable. He raised this issue to mainly remove the zonal jurisdiction, which acted as an obstruction whenever any medico-legal case arrived at a hospital, like that of the road accidents. The excess legal formalities and fear of police and courts in the minds of both, the people who help the victim by taking him to a hospital and the medical practitioners, makes delays in the beginning of treatment. Unfortunately, due to lack to clarification regarding the laws and codes of medical field, generally doctors extracted themselves from treating the victims of the road accident. This problem was also fixed after this case, as the court order that doctors must be included in the litigation process for interrogation and cross-examination, only the case of necessary circumstances and not otherwise. The courts should make every effort not to summon medical practitioners to give testimony unless the evidence is relevant; but, if they are summoned, every effort should be made not to waste their valuable time. As a result, these observations were taken in order to prevent harassment of healthcare professionals. Also, the statement of witness has to be taken by a police officer orally, if he/she is supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case, according to section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The judgement of this case would help public at large, and would help in smooth and accurate functioning of the medical institutions. They would now do their duties without any fear of getting indulged in court hearing ruckus, and would put their efforts only to perform their foremost duty, i.e., preserving lives of people. The Hon’ble judge’s direction to make the amendments in laws and making this verdict reach to each and every citizen, was a pragmatic solution to this problem. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Indian Kanoon, , (last visited on 19 June, 2023) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Ms.Anamanamudi Sabari Deeksha Choudary, [https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-5314-parmanand-katara-vs-union-of- india.html#:~:text=This%20is%20a%20landmark%20judgment,victim%20of%20a%20road%20accident](https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-5314-parmanand-katara-vs-union-of-%20india.html#:~:text=This%20is%20a%20landmark%20judgment,victim%20of%20a%20road%20accident), (last visited on 19 June 2023). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Scribd.com, (last visited 19 June, 2023). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Blog.Ipleaders, (last visited 19 June, 2023). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 21. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 32(1). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 32(2). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 32(3). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 32(4). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Code of Medical Ethics, 1970, Clause 10. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Code of Medical Ethics, 1970, Clause 13. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Section 161. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Criminal Law Cases **Tags:** #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, case analysis, case summary, PT. PARMANAND KATARA, PT. PARMANAND KATARA VS. UNION OF INDIA --- ### [Mohd. Gulzar v. State](https://lawfoyer.in/mohd-gulzar-v-state/) **Published:** June 24, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **By Ashmit Sen**[\[1\]](#_ftn1) **In the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur** **NAME OF THE CASE****Mohd. Gulzar v. State****CITATION****S.B. Criminal Misc. (Pet.) No. 194 / 2016** **DATE OF THE CASE****15 February, 2018****PETITIONER****Mohd. Gulzar** **S/o Shri Haji Mehboob Khan****RESPONDENTS****1. State of Rajasthan through the Public Prosecutor.** **2. Dhanraj Nai S/o Shri Hardev Nai** **3. Gyanchand Sen S/o Shri Om Prakash Sen,** **4. Khushhal ram S/o Shri Ratna Ram** **5. Naval ram S/o Shri Ghanwar Lal** **6. Rewat Lal Sen S/o Shri Binja Ram** **7. Prakash S/o Shri Hardev Ram** **8. All residents of Rohitnagar, Bap, District Jodhpur.** **BENCH/JUDGE****Hon’ble Justice Mr. Sandeep Mehta** **STATUTES INVOLVED****Code of Criminal Procedure, Indian Penal Code****IMPORTANT SECTIONS/ARTICLES****Code of Criminal Procedure: Sections – 133, 137,138,482** **Indian Penal Code: Section – 268** ## **Abstract** The present case deals with the issue whether an executive magistrate can pass a final order directly on the basis of a complaint of public nuisance without following the provisions of Section 133 of CrPC and when the person against whom, the complaint had been made, had expressly denied the allegations, is it mandatory for the executive magistrate to perform an inquiry according to the provisions of Sections 137 and 138 of CrPC or not. The executive magistrate had not done either of the two things mentioned above and hence, the case went to the High Court challenging the order given by the Executive Magistrate and High Court had held that it was mandatory for the Executive Magistrate to follow the mandatory provisions of Section 133 and 138 of CrPC and therefore, the order given by the executive magistrate was quashed by the High Court. ## **Introduction** **Public Nuisance** According to Section 268 of IPC, public nuisance is defined as an any act or an illegal omission which causes any common injury, danger or annoyance to the public or to the people in general who dwell or occupy property in the vicinity, or any act or illegal omission which necessarily causes injury, obstruction, danger or annoyance to persons who may have occasion to use any public right. Therefore, the essential condition for an act to be called as a public nuisance is that the act or the omission of an act results in causing any common injury, danger or annoyance to the public and people in general or results in an obstruction or an infringement of their public rights. For removal of any public nuisance, Section 133 of CrPC is to be used which states that the Magistrate can draw up a conditional order for removal of such nuisance if he is satisfied that conditions do exist which requires him to draw up such an order. The provisions of this section are deemed to be mandatory and it has to be followed before giving a final order. In this particular case, the residents of the concerned locality had submitted a complaint of public nuisance against Mohd. Gulzar for running a leather business factory in that locality and based on that complaint, the executive magistrate had directly given a final order directing the closure of the leather business without following the procedures of Sections 133, 137 and 138 of CrPC and this order was challenged in the High Court of Rajasthan. ## **Facts of the case** The Petitioner, Mohd. Gulzar, originally from Uttar Pradesh, was the owner of the leather factory in a residential area. The other residents of the locality, on the reason of public nuisance and infringement of public rights, had submitted a complaint to the Executive Magistrate against Mohd. Gulzar under Section 133 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The learned Executive Magistrate had accepted the complaint submitted by the respondents under Section 133 of CrPC. and directed closure of the leather business allegedly being run by the petitioner in a residential area. The Petitioner, Mohd. Gulzar had then approached the High Court of Rajasthan by way of the instant misc. petition under Section 482 of CrPC., challenging the order dated 04.03.2015 passed by the learned SDM, Bap in Case No.05/2014 regarding the order of closure of the leather business factory as well as the order dated on 03.12.2015 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Phalodi in revision whereby the order of the learned Executive Magistrate was affirmed. ## **Issues raised before the Court** 1. Whether it is mandatory for the Executive Magistrate to draw up a preliminary order under Section 133(1) of CrPC before giving out a final order? 2. Whether it is mandatory for the Executive Magistrate to conduct an inquiry as per Sections 137 and 138 CrPC. and to record evidence of the parties before deciding the matter to finality when the petitioner had denied the existence of any public nuisance or infringement of public right? ## **Arguments from the Petitioner** Learned counsel for the Petitioner, Shri D.L.R. Vyas submitted that the order passed by the learned Magistrate was grossly perverse and amounted to a sheer abuse of process of law as the learned Magistrate failed to draw the mandatory preliminary order required under Section 133(1) of CrPC. Furthermore, the petitioner had denied the existence of any public nuisance or infringement of public right and, therefore, it was obligatory for the Executive Magistrate to have made an inquiry as per Sections 137 and 138 of CrPC and to have recorded evidence of the parties before deciding the matter to finality. He further submitted that the learned Magistrate, without considering the fact that the petitioner had been granted a licence for running the leather business, acted in a biased fashion and directed closure of the petitioner’s premises without any justification. As per the petitioner counsel, premises in question were being used for residential purpose and as the petitioner was from Uttar Pradesh, therefore, the residents of the locality were not happy at his taking up of residence in the said locality and therefore, they had misused the proceedings under Section 133 of CrPC. as a device to oust the petitioner from his lawfully owned residential property. The Petitioner Counsel, thus implored the Court to accept the misc. petition and to quash the impugned orders. ## **Arguments from the Respondent** Learned Public Prosecutor and Shri Bhaiya, learned counsel representing the respondents had opposed the submissions advanced by the petitioner’s counsel. They submitted that as two courts of competent jurisdiction had already decided the matter against the petitioner, the High Court should not feel persuaded to exercise its inherent powers so as to interfere in the well-reasoned orders passed by the courts below. The Respondent Counsel argued that the petitioner was causing serious public nuisance by running a leather factory in a residential area which resulted in a serious risk to health of the people living in the neighbouring locality and that amounted to public nuisance. He thus contended that the circumstances did not warrant exercise of inherent powers of the High Court so as to interfere in the order pass by the courts below. ## **Related Provisions** - **Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:** **Section 133 –** “**Conditional order for removal of nuisance.** 1. Whenever a District Magistrate or a Sub- divisional Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate specially empowered in this of behalf by the State Government, on receiving the report of a police officer or other information and on taking such evidence (if any) as he thinks fit, considers- 2. that any unlawful obstruction or nuisance should be removed from any public place or from any way, river or channel which is or may be lawfully used by the public[\[2\]](#_ftn2); or 3. that the conduct of any trade or occupation, or the keeping of any goods or merchandise, is injurious to the health or physical comfort of the community, and that in consequence such trade or occupation should be prohibited or regulated or such goods or merchandise should be removed or the keeping thereof regulated[\[3\]](#_ftn3); or 4. that the construction of any building, or, the disposal of any substance, as is likely to occasion configuration or explosion, should be prevented or stopped[\[4\]](#_ftn4); or 5. that any building, tent or structure, or any tree is in such a condition that it is likely to fall and thereby cause injury to persons living or carrying on business in the neighbourhood or passing by, and that in consequence the removal, repair or support of such building, tent or structure, or the removal or support of such tree, is necessary[\[5\]](#_ftn5); or 6. that any tank, well or excavation adjacent to any such way or public place should be fenced in such manner as to prevent danger arising to the public[\[6\]](#_ftn6); or 7. that any dangerous animal should be destroyed, confined or otherwise disposed of, such Magistrate may make a conditional order requiring the person causing such obstruction or nuisance, or carrying on such trade or occupation, or keeping any such goods or merchandise, or owning, possessing or controlling such building, tent, structure, substance, tank, well or excavation, or owning or possessing such animal or tree, within a time to be fixed in the order- 8. to remove such obstruction or nuisance; or 9. to desist from carrying on, or to remove or regulate in such manner as may be directed, such trade or occupation, or to remove such goods or merchandise, or to regulate the keeping thereof in such manner as may be directed; or 10. to prevent or stop the construction of such building, or to alter the disposal of such substance; or 11. to remove, repair or support such building, tent or structure, or to remove or support such trees; or 12. to fence such tank, well or excavation; or 13. to destroy, confine or dispose of such dangerous animal in the manner provided in the said order; or, if he objects so to do, to appear before himself or some other Executive Magistrate subordinate to him at a time and place to be fixed by the Order, and show cause, in the manner hereinafter provided, why the order should not be made absolute[\[7\]](#_ftn7). 14. No order duly made by a Magistrate under this section shall be called in question in any Civil Court. Explanation- A” public place” includes also property belonging to the State, camping grounds and grounds left unoccupied for sanitary or recreative purposes.[\[8\]](#_ftn8)” **Section 137 –** “**Procedure where existence of public right is denied.** 1. Where an order is made under section 133 for the purpose of preventing obstruction, nuisance or danger to the public in the use of any way, river, channel or place, the Magistrate shall, on the appearance before him of the person against whom the order was made, question him as to whether he denies the existence of any public right in respect of the way, river, channel or place, and if he does so, the Magistrate shall, before proceeding under section 138, inquire into the matter.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) 2. If in such inquiry the Magistrate finds that there is any reliable evidence in support of such denial, he shall stay the proceedings until the matter of the existence of such right has been decided by a competent Court; and, if he finds that there is no such evidence, he shall proceed as laid down in section 138.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) 3. A person who has, on being questioned by the Magistrate under sub- section (1), failed to deny the existence of a public right of the nature therein referred to, or who, having made such denial, has failed to adduce reliable evidence in support thereof, shall not in the subsequent proceedings be permitted to make any such denial.[\[11\]](#_ftn11)” **Section 138 –** “**Procedure where he appears to show cause.** 1. If the person against whom an order under section 133 is made appears and shows cause against the order, the Magistrate shall take evidence in the matter as in a summons-case[\[12\]](#_ftn12). 2. If the Magistrate is satisfied that the order, either as originally made or subject to such modification as he considers necessary, is reasonable and proper, the order shall be made absolute without modification or, as the case may be, with such modification.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) 3. If the Magistrate is not so satisfied, no further proceedings shall be taken in the case.[\[14\]](#_ftn14)” **Section 482 –** “Saving of inherent powers of High Court. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”[\[15\]](#_ftn15) - **Indian Penal Code, 1860:** **Section 268 –** “**Public nuisance. —** A person is guilty of a public nuisance who does any act or is guilty of an illegal omission which causes any common injury, danger or annoyance to the public or to the people in general who dwell or occupy property in the vicinity, or which must necessarily cause injury, obstruction, danger or annoyance to persons who may have occasion to use any public right. A common nuisance is not excused on the ground that it causes some convenience or advantage.”[\[16\]](#_ftn16) ## **Judgement** After hearing the arguments of the counsel and having gone through the impugned orders as well as the original record, the High Court of Rajasthan had stated that the arguments advanced by the Respondent Counsel may have looked attractive superficially but the fact remained that if the proceedings under Section 133 of CrPC. were to be initiated, then the learned Executive Magistrate had to follow the mandatory procedure of drawing up a preliminary order as laid down under Section 133 CrPC as the procedure provided by law could not be ignored or overlooked by the Magistrate. The High Court stated that the manner in which the learned Magistrate had proceeded with the present case clearly indicated towards a draconian misuse of powers by the officer concerned. The complaint was filed under Section 133 CrPC. on 15.09.2014 and the Executive Magistrate directed issuance of notice to the petitioner on the very same day without drawing up a preliminary order as mandated by Section 133(1) of CrPC. The High Court also stated that as the allegation of public nuisance was opposed by the petitioner, the Executive Magistrate was required to conduct an inquiry as warranted under Section 138 of CrPC. before deciding the case to finality. Since the learned Executive Magistrate did not pass a preliminary order in terms of Section 133(1) CrPC., the final order passed by him on 04.03.2015 could not be sustained as the order lacked the foundation of law. The learned revisional court also failed to consider this important legal flaw in proceedings which went to the root of the matter and vitiated the order passed by the Executive Magistrate. Hence, the High Court held that the instant misc. petition deserved to be and was hereby allowed. The order dated 04.03.2015 passed by the learned SDM, Bap as well as the order dated 03.12.2015 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Phalodi affirming the said order were hereby quashed and set aside. The matter was sent back to the learned Executive Magistrate who would draw a preliminary order and decide the proceedings afresh after providing appropriate opportunity of hearing and leading evidence to the parties. The High Court also directed that the disputed premises should not be used for running a leather factory till the proceedings under Section 133 of CrPC. were decided afresh and the learned Executive Magistrate was directed to conclude the de-novo proceedings within a period of six months from the date of receipt of copy of the order given by the High Court. ## **Conclusion** The High Court had rightfully stated that if an order is drawn up without following the mandatory provisions of the Code, then such an order lacked the necessary foundation of law and hence, in this case, the High Court had quashed the order given by the executive magistrate and directed the case to be returned back to the executive magistrate, who had to decide the case by following the mandatory provisions of the code within six months from the date of receipt of copy of the order given by the High Court. In my opinion, the provisions of laws are given so that the procedures can be followed in order to decide a case in a just way and it is the duty of Judges to interpret the provisions in such a way so that the parties get justice and judges should not act in a biased way or interpret the provisions in such a way which clearly indicates towards a draconian misuse of power. The High Court of Rajasthan, in the present case, had also reiterated this very thing and had put emphasis on deciding the case by following the necessary and mandatory provisions of law to arrive at a fair judgement which would provide justice to both the parties. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) 4th Semester Student at St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sec. 133(1)(a). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sec. 133(1)(b). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sec. 133(1)(c). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sec. 133(1)(d). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sec. 133(1)(e). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sec. 133(1)(f). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sec. 133(2). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sec. 137(1). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sec. 137(2). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sec. 137(3). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sec. 138(1). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sec. 138(2). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sec. 138(3). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sec. 482. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) See The Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sec. 268. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Criminal Law Cases **Tags:** #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, case analysis, case summary, High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur, lawfoyer, Mohd. Gulzar v. State --- ### [Lily Thomas, Etc. Etc. vs Union of India & Ors. ](https://lawfoyer.in/lily-thomas-etc-etc-vs-union-of-india-ors/) **Published:** July 7, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **By Ashmit Sen[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)** **In the Supreme Court of India** **NAME OF THE CASE****Lily Thomas, Etc. Etc. vs Union of India & Ors.** **CITATION****AIR 2000 (2) ALD Cri 686****DATE OF THE CASE****5th April, 2000****PETITIONER****Lily Thomas****RESPONDENT****Union of India & Ors.****BENCH/JUDGE****Hon’ble Justice Saiyed Saghir Ahmad and Hon’ble Justice R.P. Sethi** **STATUTES INVOLVED****Code of Criminal Procedure, Indian Penal Code, Constitution of India, Hindu Marriage Act, Code of Civil Procedure, The Special Marriage Act, Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, The Divorce Act, The Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act****IMPORTANT SECTIONS/ARTICLES****Code of Criminal Procedure: Sections – 198** **Indian Penal Code: Sections – 494, 495, 497** **Constitution of India: Articles – 13(1), 15(1), 20(1), 21, 25, 32, 44, 136, 137, 145** **Hindu Marriage Act: Sections – 5, 10, 11, 13, 17, 18** **The Special Marriage Act: Sections – 43, 44** **The Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act: Section – 5** ## **Abstract** The present case is a landmark case which dealt with the offence of bigamy where the respondent no. 3 had changed his religion to Islam only for the reason so that he could marry a second time which was strictly prohibited under Hindu Law. Such action of the respondent had clearly aggrieved the petitioner and resulted in great mental trauma for her and she had no other option but to file a case in the Supreme Court praying for the relief that the court passes the order that the conversion of the respondent to Islam was clearly invalid as it was not because of his change of faith but only because, he wanted to marry a second time and therefore the Court should declare his second marriage to be void. A large number of married women in India have to face these kinds of inhumane circumstances but not all incidents come to light, hence Lily Thomas, learned senior advocate not only presented the arguments on behalf of the petitioner but on behalf of all such aggrieved women in India facing such similar problems and prayed to the court for passing such order which would do justice not only to the petitioner but to all such aggrieved women in India and the Supreme Court had decided the case in favour of the petitioner and declared the conversion invalid and therefore the subsequent second marriage to be void. ## **Introduction** Marriage is a social practice through which two people and their families unite which gives rise to conjugal rights. The word conjugal means rights which arise between husband and wife after marriage. Marriage is one of the oldest sacraments in the society. It is a universal social institution which brings men and women into family life where they are socially permitted to have children. According to Gillin and Gillin, “Marriage is a socially approved way of establishing a family of procreation.”[\[2\]](#_ftn2) The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines Marriage as “the state of being united as spouses in a consensual and contractual relationship recognized by law.”[\[3\]](#_ftn3) The essential elements of a valid Hindu Marriage have been given in Section 5 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 which states that a marriage may be solemnized between any two Hindus, if the following conditions are fulfilled[\[4\]](#_ftn4), namely: – 1. neither party has a spouse living at the time of the marriage; 2. at the time of the marriage, neither party – - (a) is incapable of giving a valid consent to it in consequence of unsoundness of mind; or - (b) though capable of giving a valid consent, has been suffering from mental disorder of such a kind or to such an extent as to be unfit for marriage and the procreation of children; or - (c) has been subject to recurrent attacks of insanity. 3. the bridegroom has completed the age of twenty-one years and the bride has completed the age ofeighteen years at the time of the marriage; 4. the parties are not within the degrees of prohibited relationship unless the custom or usage governing each of them permits of a marriage between the two; 5. the parties are not sapindas of each other, unless the custom or usage governing each of them permits of a marriage between the two. It is when the first condition of a valid marriage i.e., neither party should have a spouse living at the time of marriage, is violated, the offence of bigamy takes place. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines Bigamy as “the act of entering into a marriage with one person while still legally married to another”[\[5\]](#_ftn5) and it is strictly prohibited according to Hindu Law and is a criminal offence according to Section 494 of IPC, 1860. Even though bigamy is prohibited according to Hindu Law but Muslim laws promote polygamous nature of marriage up to four wives and the holy book of Quran, a primary source of Muslim law had also stated that a Muslim man could marry with a maximum number of four wives treating them with equal love and affection. A person can very well change his religion as the constitution has given the right to freedom of religion under Article 25 where the citizens have been given the freedom to choose their own religion and propagate them but the main issue that arose in the present case was whether the conversion of religion of the respondent no. 3 was due to his change of faith or merely because he wanted to marry a second wife for which he tried to change his religion to Islam where polygamous nature of marriage was allowed, which would in fact lead to the violation of the fundamental right of not to be discriminated on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them under Article 15 of the Petitioner. This was the main issue for the Supreme Court to decide which they decided in favour of the petitioner and held the conversion to be invalid and subsequently the second marriage of the respondent no. 3 to be void. ## **Facts of the Case** The fact of the case is that Smt. Sushmita Ghosh, was the lawfully wedded wife of Shri G.C. Ghosh (Mohd. Karim Ghazi) who were married according to Hindu rites on 10th May, 1984 and were living happily together at Delhi. It was on 1st April, 1992, that the Respondent No. 3, Shri G.C. Ghosh (Mohd. Karim Ghazi) told the petitioner, Smt. Sushmita Ghosh that she should agree to their divorce by mutual consent in her own interest as he had taken to Islam so that he could remarry and had already fixed to marry Miss Vanita Gupta, resident of D-152 Preet Vihar, Delhi, a divorcee with two children in the second week of July 1992. On 17th June, 1992, Respondent No. 3 had embraced Islam after a certificate was issued by office of the Maulana Qari Mohammad Idris, Shahi Qazi for this purpose. The petitioner had contacted her father and aunt and told them about her husband’s conversion and intention to remarry and they all had tried to convince the Respondent No. 3 and talk him out of the marriage but he kept on insisting that Sushmita should agree to her divorce otherwise she would have to put up with second wife. It was also stated by the Petitioner that the Respondent No. 3 had converted to Islam solely for the purpose of re-marrying which was prohibited by the Hindu Law and had no real faith in Islam which was also confirmed by Respondent No. 3 himself and that he did not practice the Muslim rites as prescribed and had not changed his name or religion in other official documents. Due to this situation, the petitioner had undergone great mental trauma and she was 34 years of age and was not employed anywhere and hence she decided to file a writ petition in the Supreme Court under Article 32 to assert her fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 15(1) which was not to be discriminated against on the ground of religion and sex alone and she prayed for the following reliefs – “(a) The Court, by an appropriate writ, order or direction, should declare that polygamy marriages by Hindus and non-Hindus after conversion to Islam religion are illegal and void; (b) Issue appropriate directions to Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to carry out suitable amendments in the Hindu Marriage Act so as to curtail and forbid the practice of polygamy; (c) Issue appropriate directions to declare that where a non-Muslim male gets converted to the “Muslim” faith without any real change of belief and merely with a view to avoid an earlier marriage or enter into a second marriage, any marriage entered into by him after conversion would be void; (d) Issue appropriate directions to Respondent No. 3 restraining him from entering into any marriage with Miss Vanita Gupta or any other woman during the subsistence of his marriage with the petitioner; and (e) Pass such other and further order or orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.”[\[6\]](#_ftn6) ## **Issues raised before the Court** 1. Where a non-Muslim gets converted to the ‘Muslim’ faith without any real change or belief and merely with a view to avoid an earlier marriage or to enter into a second marriage, whether the marriage entered into by him after conversion would be void or not? 2. Whether the husband, who had married a second wife, had committed the offence of bigamy or not according to the provisions of Hindu Marriage Act along with Sec. 494 of Indian Penal Code, 1860? 3. Whether there was a violation of fundamental rights under Article 21 or not? 4. Whether the Court can entertain the reliefs prayed by the petitioner in the writ petition? 5. Whether there should be a Uniform Civil Code for all citizens? ## **Arguments from the Petitioner** - Senior Advocate Lily Thomas, representing the petitioner in this case, had submitted that Smt. Sushmita Ghosh, in her Writ Petition, had clearly spelt out that her husband, Shri G.C. Ghosh, had not really converted to ‘Muslim’ faith, but had only feigned conversion to solemnise a second marriage. She also stated that though freedom of religion is a matter of faith, the said freedom could not be used as an excuse for evading other laws where the spouse had converted to ‘Islam’ for the purpose of avoiding the first marriage. It was also argued that the Respondent No. 3 did not practise any Muslim rites and had not changed his name and religion in several official documents such as the birth certificate of the son born out of his marriage with Miss Vanita Gupta, in his visa application for Bangladesh as well as in his electoral roll where the name and religion of the Respondent No. 3 was mentioned as “Gyan Chand Ghosh” and “Hindu” respectively. The learned counsel therefore submitted that the conversion to ‘Islam’ was not the result of exercise of the right to freedom of conscience, but was feigned in order to marry a second wife and hence, was not a valid conversion to ‘Islam’ and the marriage entered into by him after such conversion would be void as the Counsel relied on Section 11 of Hindu Marriage Act which dealt with void marriages and the marriage solemnized between Respondent No. 3 and Miss Vanita Gupta on 3rd September, 1992 would fall under void marriage as it violated the first condition a valid marriage according to Section 5 of Hindu Marriage Act that neither party should have a spouse living at the time of marriage and if that happened, the second marriage would automatically be void-ab-initio. - For the second issue, the counsel had relied on the provisions of Section 494 and 495 of Indian Penal Code along with Section 17 of Hindu Marriage Act which stated the punishment for an offence of bigamy. The counsel argued that as seen in the present case, the second marriage between Respondent No. 3 and Miss Vanita Gupta violated the first condition of a valid marriage under Section 5 of HMA and hence was a void marriage under Section 11. Since, the Respondent had married a second wife in spite of his first marriage with the petitioner not dissolved at the time of the second marriage, an offence of bigamy had been constituted and hence, the offence is punishable according to Sections 494 and 495 of IPC along with Section 17 of HMA. - On the third issue, the counsel had submitted that by having a second marriage, Respondent No. 3 had indeed violated the petitioner’s fundamental right to live with dignity under Article 21 by performing such marriage which was strictly prohibited under Hindu Law and hence caused the petitioner immense mental trauma. - For the issue on Uniform Civil Code, the counsel submitted that measures could be undertaken by the Government regarding the constitution of a Uniform Civil Code to check the abuse of religion by people, who under the cloak of conversion were found to be otherwise guilty of polygamy. - Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that in view of the judgment in **A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and Anr.[**\[7\]**](#_ftn7).**, the Supreme Court had the power to review in a petition under Article 136 or Article 32 or under any other provision of the Constitution of India if the Court was satisfied that its directions have resulted in the deprivation of fundamental rights of a citizen or any legal right of the petitioner because no-one could be forced to suffer because of the mistake of the Court. - Senior Advocate Lily Thomas, thus presented her arguments in this writ petition, in the nature of a review petition, on behalf of all the aggrieved women in India who had to face such inhumane circumstances and prayed to the court for passing such order which would do justice not only to the petitioner but to all such aggrieved women in India. ## **Arguments from the Respondent** - The Learned Counsel, representing the respondents, submitted that there were mainly two essentials to convert into Islamic faith namely that he must be of sound mind and he must have given consent to such conversion. Both the essentials were fulfilled in the present case, and also, a certificate of conversion was obtained by Mohammad Kareem Ghazi (Respondent No. 3) from Maulana Qari Mohammad Idris, Shahi Qazi. The Counsel, also stated that Article 25 of India Constitution guaranteed freedom of religion and hence, one could expressly convert into the other religions expressing their rights of freedom religion given by Constitution of India and therefore, in the present case, the conversion would be valid and thus, there was no question of application section 11 of Hindu Marriage Act, as this act was only applicable on the Hindus but the respondent no. 3 had turned into Islamic faith after the conversion so, only Muslim personal laws could be applied in this matter. The Counsel stated that bigamy was prohibited in Hindu Laws but Muslim laws promote polygamous nature of marriage up to four wives. The holy book of Quran, a primary source of Muslim law also stated that a Muslim man could marry with a maximum number of four wives treating them with equal love and affection. Therefore, the second marriage between Respondent No. 3 and Miss Vanita Gupta would be valid under Muslim Personal Laws. - For the second issue, the Counsel argued that for the application of section 494 and 495 of Indian Penal Code along with Section 17 of Hindu Marriage Act, the marriage must be declared void under the laws but here the Muslim laws binding upon the respondent no. 3 permitted him to have a second wife and thus, no offence of bigamy was constituted and therefore, the said sections of the acts would not be applicable in the present case. - The Counsel argued that there had been no such violation of any fundamental rights given under Article 21 of Indian constitution as the respondent had been charged with the sections of IPC and HMA, which was a matter of personal laws and hence, there was no such question of violation of any fundamental rights. - The Counsel appearing for the respondents, submitted that the prayer in the review and writ petitions were contrary to law in as much as the judgment of the Court given on merits could not be reviewed for the reasons urged on behalf of the petitioners. It was contended that review being the creation of statute, the powers have to be exercised only within the limits prescribed by law. It was further contended that notice in review being limited to Article 20(1) of the Constitution, would not warrant the consideration of the other pleas raised. - The Counsel, on the question of implementation of a Uniform Civil Code in India, submitted before the Court that the Govt. of India did not intend to take any action in this regard on the basis of the judgment alone, in the present case. ## **Related Provisions** - **Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:** **Section 198 –** “**Prosecution for offences against marriage.** 1. No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Chapter XX of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence: Provided that- 2. Where such person is under the age of eighteen years or is an idiot or a lunatic, or is from sickness or infirmity unable to make a complaint, or is a woman who, according to the local customs and manners, ought not to be compelled to appear in public, some other person may, with the leave of the Court, make a complaint on his or her behalf[\[8\]](#_ftn8); 3. Where such person is the husband and he is serving in any of the Armed Forces of the Union under conditions which are certified by his Commanding Officer as precluding him from obtaining leave of absence to enable him to make a complaint in person, some other person authorised by the husband in accordance with the provisions of sub- section (4) may make a complaint on his behalf[\[9\]](#_ftn9); 4. Where the person aggrieved by an offence punishable undersection 494 or section 495 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) is the wife, complaint may be made on her behalf by her father, mother, brother, sister, son or daughter or by her father’s or mother’ s brother or sister, or, with the leave of the Court, by any other person related to her by blood, marriage or adoption[\[10\]](#_ftn10). 5. For the purposes of sub- section (1), no person other than the husband of the woman shall be deemed to be aggrieved by any offence punishable under section 497 or section 498 of the said Code: Provided that in the absence of the husband, some person who had care of the woman on his behalf at the time when such offence was com- mitted may, with the leave of the Court, make a complaint on his behalf.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) 6. When in any case falling under clause (a) of the proviso to subsection (1), the complaint is sought to be made on behalf of a person under the age of eighteen years or of a lunatic by a person who has not been appointed or declared by a competent authority to be the guardian of the person of the minor or lunatic, and the Court is satisfied that there is a guardian so appointed or declared, the Court shall, before granting the application for leave, cause notice to be given to such guardian and give him a reasonable opportunity of being heard[\[12\]](#_ftn12). 7. The authorisation referred to in clause (b) of the proviso to subsection (1), shall be in writing, shall be signed or otherwise attested by the husband, shall contain a statement to the effect that he has been informed of the allegations upon which the complaint is to be founded, shall be countersigned by his Commanding Officer, and shall be accompanied by a certificate signed by that Officer to the effect that leave of absence for the purpose of making a complaint in person cannot for the time being be granted to the husband.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) 8. Any document purporting to be such an authorisation and complying with the provisions of sub- section (4), and any document purporting to be a certificate required by that sub- section shall, unless the contrary is proved, be presumed to be genuine and shall be received in evidence[\[14\]](#_ftn14). 9. No Court shall take cognizance of an offence under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, where such offence consists of sexual intercourse that a man with his own wife, the wife being under fifteen years of age, if more than one year has elapsed from the date of the commission of the offence.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) 10. The provisions of this section apply to the abetment of, or attempt to commit, an offence as they apply to the offence.[\[16\]](#_ftn16)” - **Indian Penal Code, 1860:** **Section 494 – “Marrying again during lifetime of husband or wife. —** Whoever, having a husband or wife living, marries in any case in which such marriage is void by reason of it taking place during the life of such husband or wife, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. (Exception) —This section does not extend to any person whose marriage with such husband or wife has been declared void by a Court of competent jurisdiction, nor to any person who contracts a marriage during the life of a former husband or wife, if such husband or wife, at the time of the subsequent marriage, shall have been continually absent from such person for the space of seven years, and shall not have been heard of by such person as being alive within that time provided the person contracting such subsequent marriage shall, before such marriage takes place, inform the person with whom such marriage is contracted of the real state of facts so far as the same are within his or her knowledge.”[\[17\]](#_ftn17) **Section 495 – “Same offence with concealment of former marriage from person with whom subsequent marriage is contracted. —** Whoever commits the offence defined in the last preceding section having concealed from the person with whom the subsequent marriage is contracted, the fact of the former marriage, shall be punished with imprison­ment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”[\[18\]](#_ftn18) **Section 497 – “Adultery. —** Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person who is and whom he knows or has reason to believe to be the wife of another man, without the consent or connivance of that man, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, is guilty of the offence of adultery, and shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both. In such case the wife shall not be punishable as an abettor.”[\[19\]](#_ftn19) - **Constitution of India, 1950:** **Article 13(1) – “**All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.”[\[20\]](#_ftn20) **Article 15(1) – “**The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.”[\[21\]](#_ftn21) **Article 20(1) – “**No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of the law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence.”[\[22\]](#_ftn22) **Article 21 – “Protection of life and personal liberty –** No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”[\[23\]](#_ftn23) **Article 25 – “Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion** 1. Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion.[\[24\]](#_ftn24) 2. Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law 3. regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice[\[25\]](#_ftn25); 4. providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus Explanation I – The wearing and carrying of kirpans shall be deemed to be included in the profession of the Sikh religion Explanation II – In sub clause (b) of clause reference to Hindus shall be construed as including a reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist religion, and the reference to Hindu religious institutions shall be construed accordingly.[\[26\]](#_ftn26)” **Article 32 – “Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part –** 1. The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.[\[27\]](#_ftn27) 2. The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.[\[28\]](#_ftn28) 3. Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (1) and (2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2).[\[29\]](#_ftn29) 4. The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution.[\[30\]](#_ftn30)” **Article 44 – “Uniform civil code for the citizens –** The State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India.”[\[31\]](#_ftn31) **Article 136 – “Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court –** 1. Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India[\[32\]](#_ftn32) 2. Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.[\[33\]](#_ftn33)” **Article 137 – “Review of judgments or orders by the Supreme Court –** Subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made under Article 145, the Supreme Court shall have power to review any judgment pronounced or order made by it.”[\[34\]](#_ftn34) **Article 145 – “Rules of Court, etc –** 1. Subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament the Supreme Court may from time to time, with the approval of the President, make rules for regulating generally the practice and procedure of the Court including 2. rules as to the persons practising before the Court[\[35\]](#_ftn35), 3. rules as to the procedure for hearing appeals, and other matters pertaining to appeals including the time within which appeals to the Court are to be entered[\[36\]](#_ftn36); 4. rules as to the proceedings in the Court for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III[\[37\]](#_ftn37); cc. rules as to the proceedings in the Court under Article 139A[\[38\]](#_ftn38); - rules as to the entertainment of appeals under sub clause (c) of clause (1) of Article 134[\[39\]](#_ftn39); - any judgment pronounced or order made by the Court may be received and rules as to the conditions the procedure for such review including the time within which applications to the Court for such review are to be entered[\[40\]](#_ftn40); - rules as to the costs of and incidental to any proceedings in the Court and as to the fees to be charged in respect of proceeding therein[\[41\]](#_ftn41); - rules as to the granting of bail[\[42\]](#_ftn42); - rules as to stay of proceedings[\[43\]](#_ftn43); - rules providing for the summary determination of any appeal which appears to the Court to be frivolous or vexatious or brought for the purpose of delay[\[44\]](#_ftn44); - rules as to the procedure for inquiries referred to in clause (1) of Article 317[\[45\]](#_ftn45) - Subject to the provisions of clause (3), rules made under this article may fix the minimum number of Judges who are to sit for any purpose, and may provide for the powers of single Judges and Division Courts[\[46\]](#_ftn46) - The minimum number of Judges who are to sit for the purpose of deciding any case involving a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution or for the purpose of hearing any reference under Article 143 shall be five: Provided that, where the Court hearing an appeal under any of the provisions of this chapter other than Article 132 consists of less than five Judges and in the course of the hearing of the appeal the Court is satisfied that the appeal involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution the determination of which is necessary for the disposal of the appeal, such Court shall refer the question for opinion to a Court constituted as required by this clause for the purpose of deciding any case involving such a question and shall on receipt of the opinion dispose of the appeal in conformity with such opinion[\[47\]](#_ftn47) - No judgment shall be delivered by the Supreme Court save in open Court, and no report shall be made under Article 143 save in accordance with an opinion also delivered in open Court[\[48\]](#_ftn48) - No judgment and no such opinion shall be delivered by the Supreme Court save with the concurrence of a majority of the Judges present at the hearing of the case, but nothing in this clause shall be deemed to prevent a Judge who does not concur from delivering a dissenting judgment or opinion.[\[49\]](#_ftn49)” - **Hindu Marriage Act, 1955:** **Section 5 – “Conditions for a Hindu marriage. –** A marriage may be solemnized between any two Hindus, if the following conditions are fulfilled, namely: – (i) neither party has a spouse living at the time of the marriage[\[50\]](#_ftn50); \[(ii) at the time of the marriage, neither party – (a) is incapable of giving a valid consent to it in consequence of unsoundness of mind; or (b) though capable of giving a valid consent, has been suffering from mental disorder of such a kind or to such an extent as to be unfit for marriage and the procreation of children; or (c) has been subject to recurrent attacks of insanity \[\*\*\*\];\][\[51\]](#_ftn51) (iii) the bridegroom has completed the age of\[twenty-one years\] and the bride, the age of\[eighteen years\] at the time of the marriage[\[52\]](#_ftn52); (iv) the parties are not within the degrees of prohibited relationship unless the custom or usage governing each of them permits of a marriage between the two[\[53\]](#_ftn53); (v) the parties are not sapindas of each other, unless the custom or usage governing each of them permits of a marriage between the two.[\[54\]](#_ftn54)” **Section 10 – “Judicial separation –** 1. Either party to a marriage, whether solemnized before or after the commencement of this Act, may present a petition praying for a decree for judicial separation on any of the grounds specified in sub-section (1) of section 13, and in the case of a wife also on any of the grounds specified in sub-section (2) thereof, as grounds on which a petition for divorce might have been presented.[\[55\]](#_ftn55) 2. Where a decree for judicial separation has been passed, it shall no longer be obligatory for the petitioner to cohabit with the respondent, but the court may, on the application by petition of either party and on being satisfied of the truth of the statements made in such petition, rescind the decree if it considers it just and reasonable to do so.[\[56\]](#_ftn56)” **Section 11 – “void marriages.** – Any marriage solemnised after the commencement of this Act shall be null and void and may, on a petition presented by either party thereto\[against the other party\], be so declared by a decree of nullity if it contravenes any one of the conditions specified in clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of section5.”[\[57\]](#_ftn57) **Section 13 – “Divorce. –** (1) Any marriage solemnised, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party- \[(i) has, after the solemnisation of the marriage, had voluntary sexual intercourse with any person other than his or her spouse; or\] \[(ia) has, after the solemnisation of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty; or\] \[(ib) has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition; or\] (ii) has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion; or \[(iii) has been incurably of unsound mind, or has been suffering continuously or intermittently from mental disorder of such a kind and to such an extent that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent. Explanation. – In this clause, (a) the expression ‘mental disorder’ means mental illness, arrested or incomplete development of mind, psychopathic disorder or any other disorder or disability of mind and includes schizophrenia; (b) the expression ‘psychopathic disorder’ means a persistent disorder or disability of mind (whether or not including sub-normality of intelligence) which results in abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the other party, and whether or not it requires or is susceptible to medical treatment; or\] (iv) hasbeen suffering from a virulent and incurable form of leprosy; or (v) has been suffering from venereal disease in a communicable form; or (vi) has renounced the world by entering any religious order; or (vii) has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more by those persons who would naturally have heard of it, had that party been alive; Explanation. – In this sub-section, the expression ‘desertion’ means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.\] [\[58\]](#_ftn58) \[(1A) Either party to a marriage, whether solemnised before or after the commencement of this Act, may also present a petition for the dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground – (i) that there has been no resumption of cohabitation as between the parties to the marriage for a period of \[one year\] or upwards after the passing of a decree for judicial separation in a proceeding to which they were parties; or (ii) that there has been no restitution of conjugal rights as between the parties to the marriage for a period of\[one year\] or upwards after the passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights in a proceeding to which they were parties.\][\[59\]](#_ftn59) (2) A wife may also present a petition for the dissolution of her marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground, (i) in the case of any marriage solemnised before the commencement of this Act, that the husband had married again before such commencement or that any other wife of the husband married before such commencement was alive at the time of the solemnisation of the marriage of the petitioner: Provided that in either case the other wife is alive at the time of the presentation of the petition; or (ii) that the husband has, since the solemnisation of the marriage, been guilty of rape, sodomy or \[bestiality; or\] \[(iii) that in a suit under section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (78 of 1956), or in a proceeding under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) \[or under the corresponding section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898)\], a decree or order, as the case may be, has been passed against the husband awarding maintenance to the wife notwithstanding that she was living apart and that since the passing of such decree or order, cohabitation between the parties has not been resumed for one year or upwards; or \[(iv) that her marriage (whether consummated or not) was solemnised before she attained the age of fifteen years and she has repudiated the marriage after attaining that age but before attaining the age of eighteen years.\] Explanation. – This clause applies whether the marriage was solemnised before or after the commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 (68 of 1976) \*\][\[60\]](#_ftn60)” **Section 17 – “Punishment of bigamy. –** Any marriage between two Hindus solemnized after the commencement of this Act is void if at the date of such marriage either party had a husband or wife living; and the provisions of sections 494 and 495 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), shall apply accordingly.”[\[61\]](#_ftn61) **Section 18 – “Punishment for contravention of certain other conditions for Hindu marriage. –** Every person who procures a marriage of himself or herself to be solemnised under this Act in contravention of the conditions specified in clauses (iii), (iv),\[and (v)\] of section 5 shall be punishable. \[(a) in the case of contravention of the condition specified in clause (iii) of section 5, with rigorous imprisonment which may extend to two years or with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees, or with both;\][\[62\]](#_ftn62) (b) in the case of a contravention of the condition specified in clause (iv) or clause (v) of section 5, with simple imprisonment which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both[\[63\]](#_ftn63); “ - **Special Marriage Act, 1954:** **Section 43 – “Penalty on married person marrying again under this Act. —** Save as otherwise provided in Chapter III, every person who, being at the time married, procures, a marriage of himself or herself to be solemnized under this Act shall be deemed to have committed an offence under section 494 or section 495 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), as the case may be, and the marriage so solemnized shall be void.”[\[64\]](#_ftn64) **Section 44 – “Punishment of bigamy. —** Every person whose marriage is solemnized under this Act and who, during the lifetime of his or her wife or husband, contracts any other marriage shall be subject to the penalties provided in section 494 and section 495 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860), for the offence of marrying again during the lifetime of a husband or wife, and the marriage so contracted shall be void.”[\[65\]](#_ftn65) **Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936:** **Section 5 – “Punishment of bigamy. —** Every Parsi who during the lifetime of his or her wife or husband, whether a Parsi or not, contracts a marriage without having been lawfully divorced from such wife or husband, or without his or her marriage with such wife or husband having legally been declared null and void or dissolved, shall be subject to the penalties provided in sections 494 and 495 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) for the offence of marrying again during the lifetime of a husband or wife.”[\[66\]](#_ftn66) ## **Judgement** The Supreme Court bench of Saghir Ahmad, J. and Sethi, J., after listening to the arguments of both the sides upheld the decision of [**Smt. Sarla Mudgal, President, Kalyani & Ors. v.** **Union of India & Ors.**](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/733037/ "Smt. Sarla Mudgal, President, Kalyani & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.")**[**\[67\]**](#_ftn67)** and declared that the second marriage of the respondent no. 3 was void despite polygamy being permitted by Muslim Shariat Laws. The court gave its reason that the intention of the respondent No. 3’s conversion was malafide in nature as the sole motive of respondent to be converted into Islam religion was only to enter a second marriage with Miss Vanita Gupta. Since the Hindu law prohibited bigamy, the respondent found a way of conversion to Islam for second marriage as a loophole and thus, his conversion was not deemed to be fit in the eyes of court as he was still living with the Hindu name and Hindu religion in official documents like birth certificate of his child, name in the electoral roll, his account details as well as in his visa application for Bangladesh. The Court also stated that Islam was not only a religion but was also a faith and belief but the respondent had shown no interest in the faith of Islam even after conversion and continued living as a Hindu which clearly violated the basic requirement of conversion to any other religion that one had to forfeit his earlier religious faith which was not done by the respondent in the present case. Even though Quran permitted polygamy, it did not mean that a person of Islamic faith was free to marry four persons as the Quran clearly said that only if one was able to give equal love, affection and rights to all the wives then only could enter into second, third or fourth marriage. On the issue of whether an offence of bigamy had been constituted or not, the Supreme Court relied on the judgement given in **[Gopal Lal v. State of Rajasthan](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1063154/ "Gopal Lal v. State of Rajasthan")**[**\[68\]**](#_ftn68), where it was held that “Where a spouse contracts a second marriage while the first marriage is still subsisting, the spouse would be guilty of bigamy under Section 494 if it is proved that the second marriage was a valid one in the sense that the necessary ceremonies required by law or by custom have been actually performed. The voidness of the marriage under Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act is in fact one of the essential ingredients of Section 494 because the second marriage will become void only because of the provisions of Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act.” In view of the above judgement, the Supreme Court held that if a person married a second time during the lifetime of his first wife, such marriage apart from being void under Section 11 and 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act, would also constitute an offence and that person could be liable to be prosecuted under Section 494 of IPC. The Court also talked about the judgement given in the case of **[Gul Mohammad v. Emperor](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1462245/ "Gul Mohammad v. Emperor")**[**\[69\]**](#_ftn69), where the Nagpur High Court held that the conversion of a Hindu wife to Islam, did not dissolve the marriage with her Hindu husband. It was further held that she could not, during his life-time, enter into a valid contract or marriage with another person and such person having sexual relation with a Hindu wife converted to Islam, would be guilty of adultery under Section 497 IPC as the woman before her conversion was already married and her husband was alive. From the above judgement, the Supreme Court stated that it would be seen that a mere conversion did not bring to an end the marital ties unless a decree for divorce on that ground was obtained from the court and until a decree was passed, the marriage subsisted and any other marriage, during the subsistence of first marriage would constitute an offence under Section 494 of IPC, 1860 read with Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the person, whether ‘husband’ or ‘wife’, in spite of his/her conversion to some other religion, would be liable to be prosecuted for the offence of bigamy. Hence, the Supreme Court, after referring to such relevant judgements, held respondent no. 3 guilty of the offence of bigamy under Section 494 and 495 of IPC, read with Section 17 of HMA and dismissed the entire review petition of the respondent. Regarding the issue of whether there was any violation of article 21 or not, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner’s argument of violation of article 21 in the present case, was misconceived. Article 21 guaranteed that no person should be deprived of his life and personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law but in this case, none of the petitioners had been deprived of any right of life and personal liberty so far and the respondent no. 3 was to be prosecuted for the commission of offence punishable under Section 494 of IPC and hence, it could not be said that they would be deprived of their life and liberty without following the procedure established by law. The procedure established by law, as mentioned in Article 21 of the Constitution, meant the law prescribed by the Legislature and the judgment in Sarla Mudgal’s case[\[70\]](#_ftn70) had neither changed the procedure nor created any law for the prosecution of the person sought to be proceeded with for the alleged commission of the offence under Section 494 of the IPC. For the issue regarding whether the review petition could be entertained by the court or not, the Supreme Court had referred its previous judgements in [**Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner U.P.,** **Allahabad**](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1945293/#:~:text=This%20petition%20was%20admitted%20on,deposit%20a%20security%20of%20Rs. "Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner U.P., Allahabad")[**\[71\]**](#_ftn71) and **[Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of U.P.](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/673012/ "Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of U.P.")**[**\[72\]**](#_ftn72) and concluded that the citizens should not suffer on account of directions of the Court based upon erroneous factors and held that the power of review could be exercised for correction of a mistake and not to substitute a view and such powers could be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The Supreme Court also relied on the judgement given in **[Hari Vishnu Kamath vs Syed Ahmad Ishaque and Others](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1450722/ "Hari Vishnu Kamath vs Syed Ahmad Ishaque and Others")**[**\[73\]**](#_ftn73)**,** where it was held that for a review petition to be entertained, there should be something more than a mere error and it must be one which must be manifested on the face of the record. The Supreme Court, thus, in the present case, had held that the petitioners have not made out any case within the meaning of Article 137 read with Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules and Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC for reviewing the judgment in Sarla Mudgal’s case[\[74\]](#_ftn74) and therefore, the petition was misconceived and bereft of any substance. Regarding the enforcement of a Uniform Civil Code, the Supreme Court relied on its judgement given in [**Pannalal Bansilal Pitti and Ors. v. State of AP. and Anr**.](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1494202/ "Pannalal Bansilal Pitti and Ors. v. State of AP. and Anr.")[\[75\]](#_ftn75), where the Court pointed out that – “The first question is whether it is necessary that the legislature should make law uniformly applicable to all religious or charitable or public institutions and endowments established or maintained by people professing all religions. In a pluralist society like India in which people have faith in their respective religions, beliefs or tenets propounded by different religious or their offshoots, the founding fathers, while making the Constitution, were confronted with problems to unify and integrate people of India professing different religious faiths, born in different castes, sex or Sub-sections in the society speaking different languages and dialects in different religions and provided a secular Constitution to integrate all sections of the society as a united Bharat. The directive principles of the Constitution themselves visualize diversity and attempted to foster uniformity among people of different faiths. A uniform law, though is highly desirable, enactment thereof in one go perhaps may be counter-productive to unity and integrity of the nation. In a democracy governed by rule of law, gradual progressive change and order should be brought about. Making law or amendment to a law is a slow process and the legislature attempts to remedy where the need is felt most acute. It would, therefore, be inexpedient and incorrect to think that all laws have to be made uniformly applicable to all people in one go. The mischief or defect which is most acute can be remedied by process of law at stages.”[\[76\]](#_ftn76) The Supreme Court also referred to the judgement given in **[Maharshi Avadhesh v. Union of India](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/452232/ "Maharshi Avadhesh v. Union of India")**[**\[77\]**](#_ftn77), where the Supreme Court had specifically declined to issue a writ directing the respondents to consider the question of enacting a common Civil Code for all citizens of India holding that the issue raised being a matter of policy, it was for the Legislature to take effective steps as the Court could not legislate in this particular topic. Hence, in the present case, the Supreme Court held that regarding the issue on implementation of a Uniform Civil Code, it was not for the Court to legislate but rather it was a topic for the legislature to take steps upon. Thus, the Supreme Court held that the review petition as also the writ petitions having no substance were hereby disposed of finally with a clarification regarding the applicability of Article 44 of the Constitution and all interim orders passed in these proceedings including the stay of Criminal Cases in subordinate courts, would stand vacated along with no costs. ## **Conclusion** The judgement given by the Supreme Court, hence became a landmark judgement which strictly prohibited the conversion of religion merely for the exploitation of such loopholes like in the present case where bigamy is not allowed in Hindu Law but to exploit that, the responded changed his religion to Islam to practise bigamy, which cannot be held as a valid reason for conversion and hence the court decided it was an invalid conversion. The fact that the respondent did not perform any rites of Islam and kept his Hindu Name and Hindu Religion in most of his official documents further strengthened the decision of the Court to hold it an invalid conversion. Since the conversion was invalid, the actions of the respondent were to be decided in accordance with the provisions of Hindu Law and according to the court, the respondent had in fact, committed the offence of bigamy and was to be punished in accordance to the provisions of Section 494, 495 of IPC, 1860 along with Section 17 of HMA, 1955. The Court had decided in the negative and held there was neither any violation of Article 21 fundamental right in this case nor the petitioners had made out any case for reviewing the judgement of the case of Sarla Mudgal[\[78\]](#_ftn78). However, on the question of Uniform Civil Code, the court refused to answer anything regarding that and held that held that regarding the issue on implementation of a Uniform Civil Code, it was not for the Court to legislate but rather it was a topic for the legislature to take steps upon. In my view, although the Supreme Court, through its judgement, provided justice to the petitioner, as Article 25, which gives the freedom of religion to citizens does not state that one can do anything under the guise of freedom of religion and hence certain restrictions need to be provided so that the fundamental right is not abused and aggrieves other people, but the Court did not provide any long term solution as to how people can be prevented from exploiting such differences in personal laws. To prevent such exploitation, the implementation of a Uniform Civil Code, hence, is the need of the hour where the citizens of India are to be guided by a common code irrespective of their religion in order to avoid the apparent conflict between Common Law and the Personal Laws that exist in India. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) 4th Semester Student at St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Navendu K. Thakur, An Introduction to Sociology, Page 141, 2nd Edition, 2016. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Merriam-Webster Dictionary, (Last visited on June 28, 2023). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Dr. Paras Diwan, Family Law, Page 42, 12th Edition, 2021. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Merriam-Webster Dictionary, (Last Visited on June 28, 2023). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Indian Kanoon, (Last Visited on June 28, 2023). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and Anr. AIR 1988 SCR Supl. (1) 1. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sec. 198(1)(a). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sec. 198(1)(b). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10)See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sec. 198(1)(c). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sec.198(2). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sec.198(3). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13)See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sec.198(4). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sec.198(5). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15)See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sec.198(6). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) See The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sec.198(7). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) See The Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sec. 494. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) See The Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sec. 495. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) See The Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sec. 497. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 13(1). [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 15(1). [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 20(1). [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 21(1). [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 25(1). [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 25(2)(a). [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 25(2)(b). [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 32(1). [\[28\]](#_ftnref28) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 32(2). [\[29\]](#_ftnref29) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 32(3). [\[30\]](#_ftnref30) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 32(4). [\[31\]](#_ftnref31) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 44. [\[32\]](#_ftnref32) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 136(1). [\[33\]](#_ftnref33) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 136(2). [\[34\]](#_ftnref34) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 137. [\[35\]](#_ftnref35) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 145(1)(a). [\[36\]](#_ftnref36) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 145(1)(b). [\[37\]](#_ftnref37) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 145(1)(c). [\[38\]](#_ftnref38) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 145(1)(cc). [\[39\]](#_ftnref39) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 145(1)(d). [\[40\]](#_ftnref40) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 145(1)(e). [\[41\]](#_ftnref41) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 145(1)(f). [\[42\]](#_ftnref42) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 145(1)(g). [\[43\]](#_ftnref43) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 145(1)(h). [\[44\]](#_ftnref44) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 145(1)(i). [\[45\]](#_ftnref45) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 145(1)(j). [\[46\]](#_ftnref46) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 145(2). [\[47\]](#_ftnref47) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 145(3). [\[48\]](#_ftnref48) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 145(4). [\[49\]](#_ftnref49) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 145(5). [\[50\]](#_ftnref50) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 5(i). [\[51\]](#_ftnref51) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 5(ii). [\[52\]](#_ftnref52) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 5(iii). [\[53\]](#_ftnref53) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 5(iv). [\[54\]](#_ftnref54) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 5(v). [\[55\]](#_ftnref55) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 10(1). [\[56\]](#_ftnref56) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 10(2). [\[57\]](#_ftnref57) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 11. [\[58\]](#_ftnref58) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 13(1). [\[59\]](#_ftnref59) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 13(1A). [\[60\]](#_ftnref60) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 13(2). [\[61\]](#_ftnref61) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 17. [\[62\]](#_ftnref62) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 18(a). [\[63\]](#_ftnref63) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 18(b). [\[64\]](#_ftnref64) See The Special Marriage Act, 1954, Sec. 43. [\[65\]](#_ftnref65) See The Special Marriage Act, 1954, Sec. 44. [\[66\]](#_ftnref66) See The Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, Sec. 5. [\[67\]](#_ftnref67) Smt. Sarla Mudgal, President, Kalyani & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1995 SCC (3) 635. [\[68\]](#_ftnref68) Gopal Lal v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1979 SCR (2) 1171. [\[69\]](#_ftnref69) Gul Mohammad v. Emperor AIR 1945 Criminal Appeal No. 120 of 1945. [\[70\]](#_ftnref70) Smt. Sarla Mudgal, President, Kalyani & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1995 SCC (3) 635. [\[71\]](#_ftnref71) Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner U.P., Allahabad AIR 1963 SCR Supl. (1) 885. [\[72\]](#_ftnref72) Smt. Ujjam Bai v. State of U.P. AIR 1963 SCR (1) 778. [\[73\]](#_ftnref73) Hari Vishnu Kamath vs Syed Ahmad Ishaque and Others AIR 1955 SCR (1) 1104. [\[74\]](#_ftnref74) Smt. Sarla Mudgal, President, Kalyani & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1995 SCC (3) 635. [\[75\]](#_ftnref75) Pannalal Bansilal Pitti and Ors. v. State of AP. and Anr. AIR 1996 SCC (2) 498. [\[76\]](#_ftnref76) Indian Kanoon, (Last Visited on June 28, 2023). [\[77\]](#_ftnref77) Maharshi Avadhesh v. Union of India AIR 1994 Supp. (1) SCC 713. [\[78\]](#_ftnref78) Smt. Sarla Mudgal, President, Kalyani & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1995 SCC (3) 635. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases **Tags:** #law, #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, case analysis, case summary, lawfoyer, Lily Thomas --- ### [State of Haryana and Ors vs Ch. Bhajan Lal And Ors](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-haryana-and-ors-vs-ch-bhajan-lal-and-ors/) **Published:** July 7, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **By Chandrika yenugupalli[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)** **In the supreme court of India** NAME OF THE CASE State Of Haryana And Ors vs Ch. Bhajan Lal And Ors CITATION 1992 AIR 604 BENCH/JUDGE PANDIAN, S.R. (J) REDDY, K. JAYACHANDRA (J) APPELLANT STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS. RESPONDENT CH. BHAJAN LAL AND ORS. STATUTES/CONSTITUTION INVOLVED Constitution of India, 1950, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. IMPORTANT SECTIONS/ARTICLES Constitution of India, 1950: Article 226. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Sections 154, 155,156, 157, 159,482 Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947: Section 5 DATE OF THE CASE 21St NOVEMBER,1990## **ABSTRACT** The State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal case stands as a significant judicial milestone in the Indian legal system, specifically addressing the issue of political corruption and the abuse of power. This case analysis aims to provide a concise summary of the case, its background, legal implications, and the impact it has had on the Indian jurisprudence. The case originated from a First Information Report (FIR) filed against Bhajan Lal, a prominent political figure in Haryana, alleging various instances of corruption and misuse of his official position. The petitioner, the State of Haryana, sought a direction from the Supreme Court of India to investigate and prosecute Bhajan Lal under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Supreme Court, in its judgment, recognized the significance of combating political corruption and acknowledged the need for a legal framework to hold public officials accountable. Furthermore, the court laid down a set of guidelines, commonly known as the “Bhajan Lal guidelines,” to guide the law enforcement agencies and the judiciary in dealing with cases of political corruption. These guidelines provided a framework for assessing the veracity of corruption allegations, ensuring fair investigation and prosecution, and preventing misuse of power by political figures. This case analysis highlights the inherent powers of high court in quashing the FIR under section 482 of criminal procedure code. ## **INTRODUCTION** The State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal case is a landmark legal battle that has left an indelible impact on the Indian legal landscape, particularly in the realm of combating political corruption. This high-profile case delved into the allegations of corruption and abuse of power against Bhajan Lal, a prominent political figure in Haryana, shedding light on the intricate relationship between politics and corruption. The genesis of the case lies in the First Information Report (FIR) filed by the State of Haryana, accusing Bhajan Lal of various acts of corruption and misuse of his official position for personal gain. The case attracted widespread attention, not only due to the involvement of a prominent political personality but also due to the significance of addressing systemic corruption within the political domain. The State of Haryana approached the Supreme Court of India, seeking directions to initiate investigations and prosecute Bhajan Lal under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Supreme Court, as the highest judicial authority in the country, recognized the gravity of political corruption and the urgent need to establish a legal framework to hold public officials accountable. In its judgment, the Supreme Court acknowledged that political corruption posed a severe threat to the foundations of democracy and good governance. The court broadened the scope of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) by allowing citizens to directly approach the court with evidence of corruption and abuse of power by political figures. This groundbreaking decision empowered individuals to actively engage in the fight against political corruption and seek justice through the judicial system. The State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal case has had a far-reaching impact on the Indian legal framework concerning political corruption. It served as a catalyst for subsequent cases involving corruption charges against public officials and played a pivotal role in shaping anti-corruption laws and policies in the country. The case marked a paradigm shift, where the judiciary actively embraced its role as a guardian against political corruption and paved the way for a more transparent and accountable political system. In the subsequent sections, we will delve deeper into the legal implications of the State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal case, the significance of the Bhajan Lal guidelines, and the broader influence it has had on the Indian legal system’s approach to combatting political corruption. ## **FACTS OF THE CASE** Bhajan Lal, a prominent figure serving as the Union Minister of Environment and Forests, Devi Lal, who had been elected as the Chief Minister of the State of Haryana, and Dharam Pal, another key player in the political landscape. The circumstances leading up to the case were marked by deep-seated political rivalries and the emergence of criminal allegations against various individuals. The animosity between Bhajan Lal and Devi Lal had been brewing for some time, and this acrimonious relationship played a pivotal role in the events that followed. Notably, during the same election, Respondent 2, Dharam Pal, had faced defeat at the hands of Smt. Jasma Devi, the wife of Bhajan Lal. In the wake of this electoral setback, Dharam Pal lodged a complaint with Chief Minister Devi Lal, leveling serious accusations against Bhajan Lal. The crux of his complaint centered on the allegation that Bhajan Lal had amassed an excessive amount of property and pecuniary resources, far exceeding what could be accounted for by his lawful means of income. In other words, Dharam Pal contended that Bhajan Lal’s accumulation of wealth was disproportionate and indicative of potential corruption. In order to address this serious claim, the Special Officer on Duty in the Chief Minister’s secretariat promptly relayed the message to the Director General of Police, alerting him to the fact that the Chief Minister had requested appropriate action in response to the complaint. Consequently, the complaint was forwarded to the Superintendent of Police (SP) with instructions to take the necessary measures and provide a report on the matter. Following these directives, the SP instructed the Station House Officer (SHO) to register the case and conduct a thorough investigation into the allegations. Subsequently, in November 1987, a case was formally filed against Bhajan Lal under sections 161 and 165 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) as well as Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. These sections of the law pertain to offenses such as bribery, taking gratification other than legal remuneration, and the possession of disproportionate assets. The lodging of the First Information Report (FIR), a formal document that initiates a criminal investigation, was accompanied by its submission to the magistrate, signaling the commencement of the legal process. Bhajan Lal, as the aggrieved party, pursued legal remedies by filing writs of Certiorari and Prohibition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Indian Constitution before the High Court. Bhajan Lal’s plea sought the quashing of the ongoing proceedings in the case on the grounds that the allegations leveled against him did not constitute a cognizable offense, thereby negating the authority of the police to conduct an investigation.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Upon careful consideration of the arguments put forth by both parties, the High Court rendered its judgment in favor of Bhajan Lal. The court concurred with Bhajan Lal’s contention that the allegations lacked the requisite elements to be classified as a cognizable offense, thereby supporting the notion that the police did not possess the authority to proceed with the investigation. To substantiate this ruling, the court referred to the precedent set by the case of Swapan Kumar Guha and the State of Bengal, which likely involved similar legal considerations. In line with its decision to quash the registered FIR and halt the criminal proceedings, the High Court also imposed a substantial fine on respondent 2, Dharam Pal, in order to recover the costs incurred by Bhajan Lal in filing the writ petition. This action serves as a common practice in legal proceedings to ensure that the party found at fault bears the financial burden of the litigation process. Following the judgment of the High Court, the appellants, who were dissatisfied with the outcome, sought recourse by approaching the Supreme Court. They exercised their right to seek special leave, requesting the Supreme Court to review and potentially overturn the ruling of the High Court. The Supreme Court, being the highest judicial authority in the country, possesses the jurisdiction to hear and decide such matters, thereby providing an avenue for further legal scrutiny and potential redress. ## **ISSUES** - Whether allegations against bhajan Lal constitute a cognizable offence? - Whether police exceeded their jurisdiction in initiating the investigation? - Whether the High Court’s decision to quash the First Information Report (FIR) and halt the criminal proceedings against Bhajan Lal was a justifiable action within the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution? ## **ARGUMENTS FROM THE APPELLANT SIDE** - The counsel for the appellant stated that Complainant alleges that Bhajan Lal, previously an ordinary man with no clear source of income before 1969, accumulated substantial wealth and property worth crores after assuming the positions of Chief Minister and Minister of the Central cabinet. - The counsel further stated that the Complainant cites more than 20 instances of alleged corruption as evidence of these claims. - It is argued by the counsel that the instances of corruption, although not publicly visible, collectively, or individually constitute a cognizable offense, justifying the filing of a First Information Report (FIR) as per Section 154(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). - It is contended that the High Court exceeded its authority by quashing the FIR and interfering with the ongoing investigation.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) ## **ARGUMENTS FROM THE RESPONDENT SIDE** - The respondent’s counsel argues that the High Court’s judgment is well-reasoned and should not be questioned by the present court. Referring to the Swapan Kumar Guha case, it is asserted that courts generally refrain from interfering with ongoing criminal investigations. - The counsel emphasizes that the High Court has the authority to quash criminal proceedings if it deems necessary, as supported by legal precedent. - The counsel further highlights that it is claimed that the registration of the case against Bhajan Lal was motivated by personal and political animosity between Devi Lal and Bhajan Lal. This animosity allegedly arose after Devi Lal’s defeat in the 1978-82 general election against Bhajan Lal, where Devi Lal failed to become the Chief Minister of Haryana. - It is argued that Dharam Pal’s complaint is defamatory and maliciously filed against Bhajan Lal. - The defense contends that the investigation was conducted by the Station House Officer, which goes against Section 5(A) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. According to this section, only officers of the rank of Superintendent of Police or higher should handle such investigation. ## **RELATED PROVISIONS** - **The Constitution of India 1949** **Article 226\_** Power of High Courts to issue certain writs (1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have powers, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibitions, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories (3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1), without (a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order; and (b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favor such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the aid next day, stand vacated (4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme court by clause (2) of Article 32[\[4\]](#_ftn4) - **Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973** **154. Information in cognizable cases**.—(1) Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf: 1\[Provided that if the information is given by the woman against whom an offence under section 326A, section 326B, section 354, section 354A, section 354B, section 354C, section 354D, section 376, 2\[section 376A,section 376AB, section 376B, section 376C, section 376D, section 376DA, section 376DB,\] section 376E or section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) is alleged to have been committed or attempted, then such information shall be recorded, by a woman police officer or any woman officer: Provided further that—(a) in the event that the person against whom an offence under section 354, section 354A, section 354B, section 354C, section 354D, section 376, 2 \[section 376A, section 376AB, section 376B, section 376C, section 376D, section 376DA, section 376DB,\] section 376E or section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) is alleged to have been committed or attempted, is temporarily or permanently mentally or physically disabled, then such information shall be recorded by a police officer, at the residence of the person seeking to report such offence or at a convenient place of such person’s choice, in the presence of an interpreter or a special educator, as the case may be;(b) the recording of such information shall be video graphed;(c) the police officer shall get the statement of the person recorded by a Judicial Magistrate under clause (a) of sub-section (5A) of section 164 as soon as possible.\] (2) A copy of the information as recorded under sub-section (1) shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the informant. (3) Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an officer in charge of a police station to record the information referred to in sub-section (1) may send the substance of such information, in writing and by post, to the Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied that such information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, shall either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him, in the manner provided by this Code, and such officer shall have all the powers of an officer in charge of the police station in relation to that offence.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) **155. Information as to non-cognizable cases and investigation of such cases.** —(1) When information is given to an officer in charge of a police station of the commission within the limits of such station of a non-cognizable offence, he shall enter or cause to be entered the substance of the information in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf, and refer the informant to the Magistrate. (2) No police officer shall investigate a non-cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate having power to try such case or commit the case for trial. (3) Any police officer receiving such order may exercise the same powers in respect of the investigation (except the power to arrest without warrant) as an officer in charge of a police station may exercise in a cognizable case. (4) Where a case relates to two or more offences of which at least one is cognizable, the case shall be deemed to be a cognizable case, notwithstanding that the other offences are non-cognizable[\[6\]](#_ftn6) **156. Police officer’s power to investigate cognizable case**. — (1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. (2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. (3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an investigation as above-mentioned.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) **157. Procedure for investigation**. — (1) If, from information received or otherwise, an officer in charge of a police station has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under section 156 to investigate, he shall forthwith send a report of the same to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such offence upon a police report and shall proceed in person, or shall depute one of his subordinate officers not being below such rank as the State Government may, by general or special order, prescribe in this behalf, to proceed, to the spot, to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case, and, if necessary, to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender: Provided that— (a) when information as to the commission of any such offence is given against any person by name and the case is not of a serious nature, the officer in charge of a police station need not proceed in person or depute a subordinate officer to make an investigation on the spot; (b) if it appears to the officer in charge of a police station that there is no sufficient ground for entering on an investigation, he shall not investigate the case. 1\[Provided further that in relation to an offence of rape, the recording of statement of the victim shall be conducted at the residence of the victim or in the place of her choice and as far as practicable by a woman police officer in the presence of her parents or guardian or near relatives or social worker of the locality.\] (2) In each of the cases mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso to sub-section (1), the officer in charge of the police station shall state in his report his reasons for not fully complying with the requirements of that subsection, and, in the case mentioned in clause (b) of the said proviso, the officer shall also forthwith notify to the informant, if any, in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government, the fact that he will not investigate the case or cause it to be investigated.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) **159. Power to hold investigation or preliminary inquiry**. —Such Magistrate, on receiving such report, may direct an investigation, or, if he thinks fit, at once proceed, or depute any Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed, to hold a preliminary inquiry into, or otherwise to dispose of, the case in the manner provided in this Code.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) **482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court. —**Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) - **Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947** **5. Criminal misconduct in discharge of official duty** – (1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct: —(a) if he habitually accepts or obtains on agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person for himself or for any other person, any gratification (other than legal remuneration) as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code; or (b) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain for himself or for any other person; any valuable thing without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate, from any person whom he knows to have been; or to be, or to be likely to be “concerned in any proceeding or business transacted or about to be transacted by him, or having any connection with the official functions of himself or of any public servant to whom he is subordinate, or from any person whom he knows to be interested in or related to the person so concerned, or (c) if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted to him or under his control as a public servant or allows any other person so to do, or (d) if he, by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, or (e) if he or any person on his behalf is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession, for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income. (2) Any public servant, who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine: Provided that the court may, for any special reasons recorded in writing impose a sentence of imprisonment of less than one year. (3) Whoever habitually commits: – (i) an offence punishable under section 162 or section 163 of the Indian Penal Code, or (ii) an offence punishable under section 165 A of the Indian Penal Code, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine: Provided that the court may, for any special reasons recorded in writing, impose a sentence of imprisonment of less than one year. (3A) Whoever attempts to commit an offence referred to in clause (c) or clause (d) of sub-section (1) shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. (3B) Where a sentence of fine is imposed under sub -section (2) or subsection (3) the Court in fixing the ‘amount of line shall take into consideration. The amount or the value of the property if any, which the accused person has obtained by committing the offence or where the conviction is for an offence referred to in clause (e) of sub-section (1), the pecuniary resources or property referred to in that clause for which the accused person is unable to account satisfactorily. (4) The provisions of this section shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other law for the time being in force and nothing contained herein shall exempt any public servant from any proceeding which might apart from this section, be instituted against him.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) ## **JUDGEMENT** The decision of the High Court to quash the First Information Report (FIR) is overturned, as it is deemed legally and factually unsustainable. However, the entire investigation conducted thus far, if any, is nullified due to the lack of valid legal authority vested in the third appellant (Station House Officer) to initiate and proceed with the investigation as stipulated under Section 5A (1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The honorable supreme court referred to the cases P.V. Jagannath Rao & Ors. v. State of Orissa[\[12\]](#_ftn12) & Ors. Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar and Ors.,[\[13\]](#_ftn13) and stated that according to Section 154(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, if any information is brought before an officer-in-charge of a police station regarding a cognizable offense, the officer is obligated to enter the substance of that information in the prescribed form and register a case based on it. While a police officer is not authorized to investigate a non-cognizable offense, they can investigate a non-cognizable offense under the order of a Magistrate who has the power to try such cases or commit them for trial, as stated in Section 155(2) of the Code. However, this is subject to Section 155(3) of the Code. Additionally, the newly introduced Sub-section (4) to Section 155 specifies that if a case involves two offenses, one of which is cognizable, the entire case will be treated as a cognizable case, granting the police officer the same investigation powers as they have for a cognizable offense. The essence of Sections 156, 157, and 159 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is that if a police officer has reasonable grounds to suspect the commission of a cognizable offense, they must proceed with the investigation or direct their subordinate to do so. If the police officer determines that there are insufficient grounds for investigation, they have the authority to dispense with the investigation altogether. The domain of investigation of any cognizable offense lies exclusively with the investigating agencies, and the courts do not have the power to interfere or hinder the ongoing investigation as long as it adheres to the provisions related to investigation. Only when a police officer decides not to investigate an offense can the concerned Magistrate intervene and either direct an investigation or, if deemed appropriate, initiate a preliminary inquiry, or dispose of the case in accordance with the provisions of the Code. The honorable supreme court also delved into the phrase “reason to suspect the commission of an offense.” As mentioned in Section 154(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code implies the ability to logically infer, based on specific and articulated facts presented in the First Information Report (FIR) and any accompanying annexures, if applicable, along with any relevant circumstances, the occurrence of a cognizable offense. It should be noted that this inference does not require definitive proof. In other words, the interpretation of the expression “reason to suspect” should be determined by the facts and circumstances unique to each case, and any doubts regarding the sufficiency of the information provided in the FIR should not arise. The supreme court stated that it is acknowledged that some of the allegations in the FIR may lack clarity and specific details. Additionally, there are no explicit claims that either Respondent No. 1 or his relatives and friends had no legitimate sources of income to acquire the properties registered under their names or that Respondent No. 1 misused his official position to benefit them. These are all matters that can only be examined during the course of the investigation and subsequently by the court based on the evidence collected and presented by the investigating agencies. At this stage, the court cannot determine whether the properties were independently purchased by the relatives and friends of Respondent No. 1 using their own funds or not solely based on the denial statement of Respondent No.1.In essence, the court should not draw conclusive judgments regarding the allegations and counter-allegations at this early stage, as they require thorough investigation and presentation of evidence before a final decision can be made. The honorable court stated that in the instant case, the allegations made in the complaint, do clearly constitute a cognizable offence and this case does not call for the exercise of extraordinary or inherent powers of the High Court to quash the F.I.R. itself. The current stage of the matter is premature, and the investigation has not progressed beyond preliminary efforts conducted during the registration of the case. The gathering of evidence requires a thorough investigation, and it is upon the presentation of such evidence before the court that a conclusion can be reached regarding the allegations of mala fides (bad faith or malicious intent). It is essential to recognize that at this stage, there are only allegations and counter-allegations without any substantial evidence. Therefore, it is not possible for this Court to preemptively anticipate the outcome of the investigation and make a finding on the issue of mala fides based on the currently available materials. Simply alleging personal animosity as the motive for the complaint is not sufficient grounds to dismiss the complaint, especially when it contains serious allegations that need to be examined and evaluated once the evidence is collected. The complaint cannot be disregarded solely on an unsubstantiated claim of mala fides. And also, when granting permission under Section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act to allow a lower-ranked police officer to conduct an investigation, a Magistrate should not treat it as a routine matter. Instead, it is an exercise of the Magistrate’s judicial discretion, considering the underlying policy. The order granting permission should clearly state the reasons for granting such permission. The Superintendent of Police or any higher-ranked police officer, when granting permission to a non-designated police officer under the second provision of Section 5A (1), must ensure that there are valid and sufficient reasons to entrust the investigation to a lower-ranked officer. The granting authority should record their reasons for making such a decision. This requirement is essential because the legislature’s intention in enacting Section 5A is to ensure that investigations of offenses punishable under Sections 161, 165, or 165A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), as well as Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, are primarily conducted by officers designated in clauses (a) to (d) of Section 5A (1). Exceptions to this rule should only be made for justified reasons, which should be clearly stated in the order. Since the issue regarding the legal authority of the SHO has been raised at the initial stage, it is appropriate and necessary that if the investigation is to proceed, it should only do so based on a valid order that strictly complies with the mandatory provisions of Section 5A (1). requirements. ## **CONCLUSION** The State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal case remains an influential legal precedent in the fight against political corruption in India. This high-profile case not only exposed the allegations of corruption and abuse of power by a prominent political figure but also laid the foundation for important legal principles and guidelines to address this pervasive issue. The judgment in this case marked a significant departure from traditional legal approaches, emphasizing the importance of holding public officials accountable for their actions. By expanding the scope of Public Interest Litigation (PIL), the Supreme Court empowered citizens to actively participate in exposing and combatting political corruption. This shift enabled individuals to directly approach the court with evidence, contributing to the overall transparency and integrity of the legal process. The impact of the State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal case extends beyond its immediate context. It set a precedent for subsequent cases involving corruption charges against public officials, influencing the development of anti-corruption laws and policies in India. Moreover, it fostered a more proactive approach by the judiciary in addressing political corruption, reaffirming the court’s commitment to upholding justice and preserving the integrity of the democratic system. In conclusion, the State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal case represents a significant milestone in the Indian legal system’s battle against political corruption. It not only exposed the corrupt practices of a prominent political figure but also set important legal precedents and guidelines. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) 2nd Year law student at NLU Visakhapatnam. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) ‘State Of Haryana And Others v. Bhajan Lal And Others, Supreme Court Of India, Judgment, Law, Casemine.Com’ (*https://www.casemine.com*) accessed 28 June 2023. [](#_ftnref3) [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) The constitution of India,1949, Art.226 [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) The Code of Criminal Procedure Code,1973, S154 [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The Code of Criminal Procedure Code,1973, S155 [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) The Code of Criminal Procedure Code,1973, S156 [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) The Code of Criminal Procedure Code,1973, S157 [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) The Code of Criminal Procedure Code,1973, S159 [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) The Code of Criminal Procedure Code,1973, S482 [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Prevention of corruption Act,1947, S5. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) ‘P. V. Jagannath Rao & Ors vs State Of Orissa & Ors on 16 April, 1968’ accessed 30 June 2023. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) ‘Sheonandan Paswan vs State Of Bihar & Others on 16 December, 1982’ accessed 30 June 2023. **Categories:** Case Analysis **Tags:** #law, #lawfoyer, #lawyer, #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, article, case analysis, case summary, Ch. Bhajan Lal, lawfoyer, State of Haryana and Ors vs Ch. Bhajan Lal And Ors --- ### [CHHATTISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD V. CHHATTISGARH HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION & ORS.](https://lawfoyer.in/chhattisgarh-state-electricity-board-v-chhattisgarh-human-rights-commission-ors/) **Published:** July 7, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **By Ayush Upadhyay[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)** **In the Chhattisgarh High Court** **NAME OF THE CASE**Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board V. Chhattisgarh Human Rights Commission & Others **CITATION**AIR 2018 CHH 53 **DATE OF THE CASE**November 7, 2017 **PETITIONER**Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board **RESPONDENTS**Chhattisgarh Human Rights Commission & Others **BENCH/JUDGE**JUSTICE SANJAY K. AGGARWAL **STATUS/CONSTITUTION INVOLVED**The Constitution of India; The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993; The Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1952 **IMPORTANT SECTIONS/ARTICLES**The Constitution of India – Article 226 The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 – Section 18 The Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 – Section 3 ## **Abstract** Human Rights comprises of rights of human regarding to their life, liberty, equality and also in relation with their properties. Human rights are primary, basic, inherent and inalienable rights to which a person authorized by virtue of being human. In the case that we are going to discuss about the power and jurisdiction of the Chhattisgarh Human Rights Commission in relation with compensatory jurisprudence. In this case the Court perceived that the statute does not give or impose any power to the Commission to make the direction of payment. Concerned Authority petitioner Company has made a writ petition to know the scope and jurisdiction of the human rights commission. As the provision has given in several statutes stating that the Commission is a recommendatory body. Thus, can not make any direction to pay the compensation. As we are by the rule of law and by the fundamental norms of the protection of life and liberty and human dignity under a constitutional order, it will not be open to the State Government to disregard the view of the Commission … The State Government is at liberty to challenge the order of the Commission on merits since no appeal is provided by the Act. But it cannot in the absence of the order being set aside, modified or reviewed disregard the order at its own discretion[\[2\]](#_ftn2). The Court has further evolved the principle of compensatory jurisdiction of the Commission in the violation of human rights of an individual. The Government or authority has power to make payment of compensation to the complainant or the victim or aggrieved or the member as deemed necessary. ## **Introduction** In the present case of Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board V. Chhattisgarh Human Rights Commission & Others, the petitioner Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board (hereinafter termed as Company) and the respondents are Chhattisgarh Human Rights Commission (hereinafter termed as Commission) and others. In this case an issue was sought against the Commission for passing the compensation in violation of human rights by the petitioner. This issue has been occurred when Mr. Jai Shankar Verma/respondent no. 4 filled a complaint in the office of Commission. It was a perfect case for determining the situation where the Commission has made a recommendation, and after that it was treated as impugned order. As the provisions states that it is a recommendatory framework. Thus, how could it make a direction to pay such amount as compensation for the infringement of Human rights of an individual. After the institution of Writ petition under the ambit of Article 226 of the constitution in the Chhattisgarh High Court, it was a fit case for the correctness of the prior cases where same cause of action had arisen. **Recommendatory body** means a body whose recommendations do not bind on the State or Central government authority as the case may be, so that it was only a recommendatory body & may not make a direction in violation of human rights of person. If we see the jurisprudential aspect of the constitution of this body, it doesn’t make sense but in the whole process for obtaining the compensation, aggrieved party must make a complaint in the name of Commission to get suitable recommendation in this behalf. ## **FACTS OF THE CASE** In this case the petitioner Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board has lodged the writ petition under the ambit of Article 226 of the Constitution of India claiming for lawfulness, legitimacy & credibility order dated 19.05.2006 issued by the respondent Chhattisgarh Human Rights Commission, by which the Commission has commanded the petitioner Company to remit Rs. 6,22,000/- to respondent No. 4 as compensatory cost of felonious and contraband insertion of six electricity polls and electricity line in the agricultural area possessed by the Mr. Jai Shankar Verma respondent no. 4. Mr. Jai Shankar Verma in this regard filed an objection to the premise of the Commission that he has owned 2.5 acres of the piece of land at village Amleshwar, Tahsil Patna, District Durg in which he is preparing to have vermiculture plantation, but the petitioner Company has inserted six electricity polls together with electricity line in absence of his permission on his land and in doing so the respondent no. 4 has been distressed to suffer cultivation and endured massive damage and that is contravention of Human Rights of individual. As a consequence, he is well authorised for the cost as compensation under the provisions in this behalf. The Commission in its disputed order observed that the contentions of respondent no. 4 were valid, so he is authorised to get compensation by the Collector of Durg. On 08.05.2007, the Collector evaluated the cost of compensation as Rs. 6,22,000/- and the respondent Commission on 20.06.2007 commanded the petitioner Company to pay Rs. 6,22,000/- as compensatory cost to the respondent no.4 Mr. Jai Shankar Verma. Perceiving disgruntled and discontented with the order, this writ petition has been submitted by the petitioner Company contending additionally that the Commission has no authority and power to award compensation. ## **ISSUE RAISED BEFORE THE COURT** **1.** Whether the Chhattisgarh Human Rights Commission has the authority and jurisdiction to administer order for the payment of compensation? ## **ARGUMENTS FROM THE PETITIONER SIDE** **1.** Learned Counsel for the petitioner argued that Commission has no power and authority to vouchsafe compensation. Therefore, it is only a recommendatory body and can not order to direct the cost to be paid. **2.** Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Commission can only impose recommendation under section 19(a) of the Act of 1993[\[3\]](#_ftn3) to agitated establishment to construct payment. **3.** The petitioner’s counsel concluded his argument by that the Commission is a recommendatory body so that it can not direct to pay the compensation as like it was ordered by the appropriate government to make aforesaid amount in this behalf. ## **ARGUMENTS FROM THE RESPONDENT SIDE** **1.** Learned counsel for the respondent side argued that the Commission has made the order in the consequence of the statutory provision. The provision has imposed the authority to make direction in this behalf. **2.** Learned counsel again stated that the Commission has all authority to direct any kind of payment in relation with the infringement of human rights of an individual. **3.**Learned counsel for the respondent side agreed and supported the disputed order made by the Commission. ## **Related Provision** - **Constitution of India** **Article 32 –** **Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part** - The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed[\[4\]](#_ftn4) - The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part[\[5\]](#_ftn5) - Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (1) & (2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2)[\[6\]](#_ftn6) - The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution[\[7\]](#_ftn7) - **The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993** **Section 18 – Steps during and after inquiry –** The Commission may take any of the following steps during or upon the completion of an inquiry held under this Act, namely: — (a) where the inquiry discloses the commission of violation of human rights or negligence in the prevention of violation of human rights or abetment thereof by a public servant, it may recommend to the concerned Government or authority— (i) to make payment of compensation or damages to the complainant or to the victim or the members of his family as the Commission may consider necessary; (ii) to initiate proceedings for prosecution or such other suitable action as the Commission may deem fit against the concerned person or persons; (iii) to take such further action as it may think fit.”; (b) approach the Supreme Court or the High Court concerned for such directions, orders or writs as that Court may deem necessary; (c) recommend to the concerned Government or authority at any stage of the inquiry for the grant of such immediate interim relief to the victim or the members of his family as the Commission may consider necessary; (d) subject to the provisions of clause (e), provide a copy of the inquiry report to the petitioner or his representative; (e) the Commission shall send a copy of its inquiry report together with its recommendations to the concerned Government or authority and the concerned Government or authority shall, within a period of one month, or such further time as the Commission may allow, forward its comments on the report, including the action taken or proposed to be taken thereon, to the Commission; f) the Commission shall publish its inquiry report together with the comments of the concerned Government or authority, if any, and the action taken or proposed to be taken by the concerned Government or authority on the recommendations of the Commission.\][\[8\]](#_ftn8) - **The Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952** **Section 3 – Appointment of Commission. —** - The appropriate Government may, if it is of opinion that it is necessary so to do, and shall, if a resolution in this behalf is passed by 6 \[each House of Parliament or, as the case may be, the Legislature of the State\], by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance and performing such functions and within such time as may be specified in the notification, and the Commission so appointed shall make the inquiry and perform the functions accordingly: Provided that where any such Commission has been appointed to inquire into any matter— - by the Central Government, no State Government shall, except with the approval of the Central Government, appoint another Commission to inquire into the same matter for so long as the Commission appointed by the Central Government is functioning; - by a State Government, the Central Government shall not appoint another Commission to inquire into the same matter for so long as the Commission appointed by the State Government is functioning, unless the Central Government is of opinion that the scope of the inquiry should be extended to two or more States.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) - The Commission may consist of one or more members appointed by the appropriate Government, and where the Commission consists of more than one member, one of them may be appointed as the Chairman thereof.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) - The appropriate Government may, at any stage of an inquiry by the Commission fill any vacancy which may have arisen in the office of a member of the Commission (whether consisting of one or more than one member).[\[11\]](#_ftn11) - The appropriate Government shall cause to be laid before 6 \[each House of Parliament or, as the case may be, the Legislature of the State\], the report, if any, of the Commission on the inquiry made by the Commission under sub-section (1) together with a memorandum of the action taken thereon, within a period of six months of the submission of the report by the Commission to the appropriate Government.\][\[12\]](#_ftn12) ## **Judgement** In the prominent and leading case of Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board V. Chhattisgarh Human Rights Commission & Others where the power and jurisdiction of the Chhattisgarh Human Rights Commission has been determined by the Apex Court. In the above noted case, has emerged the limitation and restrictions of the state commission in compensatory jurisdiction. The Court has considered that the Commission can only perform the power and authority in relation with recommendatory purpose. As the petitioner had also mentioned that the Human Rights Commission formed for the object of recommendation in the matter of violation of human rights of an individual. Thus, the Court is of opinion that the petitioner’s contentions are legal, valid and legitimate enough to set aside the order given by the Commission dated 19.5.2006 by putting petitioner Company to make payment of Rs. 6,22,000/- to the respondent no. 4. After analysing and substantiating the facts, the Court has made the historic and groundbreaking verdict by which restricting the Commission not to make any order in violation of human rights. The Supreme Court has portrayed the extent of power and jurisdiction of the Human Rights Commission by further various verdicts. In **N.C. Dhoundial v. Union of India & Others[**\[13\]**](#_ftn13)** and in **Power Grid Corporation of India Limited v. Century textiles and Industries Limited and Others[**\[14\]**](#_ftn14),** the Court has enunciated the exact scope and power in regards to direct the order for compensation lies with the District Magistrate. The Commission must perform its act inconformity with statutory provisions enshrined by the Parliament. Finally, the Court has considered the matter and ordered that the Human Rights Commission is only authorized to make a recommendation. It has no jurisdiction in relation with determination of the issue and the concerned government or authority has a responsibility to observe the recommendation in spirit of the Law. Therefore, the disputed order or direction to pay compensation to the respondent no. 4 is set aside & order will be considered as recommendation. The writ petition is allowed by the Supreme Court. ## **Conclusion** By delivering a remarkable and epoch-making judgement in Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board V. Chhattisgarh Human Rights Commission & Others. This case has given a clear verdict in relation with the power and jurisdiction of the State Human Rights Commission. This verdict pronounces limitation on the Commission, by which it can not make an order for compensation in violation of human rights. As the provision stated that the Commission is a recommendatory in character & can not impose direction in this behalf. The Commission has power to make inquiry and incorporate its recommendation after completion. This case contemplates that it is discretion of the concern government or authority to consider it or not. After considering this case, I made a view that the State Human Rights Commission is a unique body in our system which regulates the functions in the matter of any complaint has been made for infringement of human rights. Conclusively, I can say that the infringement of human rights by anyone irrespective of its name or designation would not be considered as ground for escape. The Parliament has made the law in relation with human rights commission also therefore, the commission can not go beyond the power given to it. The recommendations will be treated as inquiry report and upon the discretion of the concerned government whether pertinent its view. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) LL.B.(Hons.) 4th Semester Student at University of Allahabad, Prayagraj, Uttar Pradesh. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Sucheta, Human Rights Commission’s orders awarding compensation/damages not mere recommendations, State duty bound to comply (in absence of order being set aside/modified), (April 30, 2016), <> accessed 03 July 2023. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The Protection of Human Rights Act, No. 10, Acts of Parliament, 1993(India). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 32(1). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 32(2). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 32(3). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 32(4). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, § 18. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) The Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, § 3(1). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) The Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, § 3(2). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11)The Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, § 3(3). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12)The Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, § 3(4). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) N.C. Dhoundial v. Union of India & Others (2004) 2 SCC 579. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Power Grid Corporation of India Limited v. Century textiles & Industries Limited & Others (2017) 5 SCC 143. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases **Tags:** #law, #lawfoyer, #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, case analysis, case summary, CHHATTISGARH HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, CHHATTISGARH STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD V. CHHATTISGARH HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION & ORS., lawfoyer --- ### [SUSHIL KUMARI DANG VS PREM KUMARI](https://lawfoyer.in/sushil-kumari-dang-vs-prem-kumari/) **Published:** July 7, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **BY MISS SHALINI DHYANI[\[1\]](#_ftn1)** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI** NAME OF THE CASESushila Kumari Dang vs Prem KumariCITATIONAIR 1976 Delhi 321, 13 91977) DLT 279 b, 1976 RLR 487DATE OF THE CASEFebruary 11, 1976APPELLANTSushil KumariRESPONDENTPrem KumarBENCH /JUDGEHonorable Justice A. B. RohatgiSTATUTES/ CONSTITUION INVOLVEDThe Hindu Marriage Act 1955and Transfer of Property Act, 1882IMPORTANT SECTIONS/ ARTICLES Section 9, 10 ,23 of HMA and Section 13 of TPA ## **ABSTRACT** One of the basic requirement or necessity of the marriage is that the husband and wife must live together and they should respect each other’s mutual rights. Marriage binds two persons with the certain obligations that cannot be ignored because both are devoted to each other. Right to society exists in only marital relationship and conjugal rights signifies two generally two ideas which are the right to have each other’s society and the right to intercourse. Restitution of conjugal right is only positive remedy which strengthen the marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act 1955, while other reliefs may lead to weaken the marriage. This case defines that the restitution of conjugal rights cannot be taken if it does not show genuine concern and cannot the decree of restitution of conjugal rights cannot be taken on the mala fide intentions. This explains that restitution of conjugal rights is the fundamental rule of matrimonial law. ## **INTRODUCTION** In present case a decree of restitution of conjugal rights insinuates that the iniquitous party instructed to live with the aggrieved party. Restitution of conjugal right is only remedy to save the marriage on the front foot, this generally used when one of the spouses is not fulfilling basic requirement of marriage such as co-habitation or if they are having children so not taking care of them and left the house without any proper excuse then this decree can be granted. This remedy is not only available to Hindus but also to Muslims under their general law, **under section 32 and 33 of Indian divorce act,1869 the Christians can take remedy and under Section 36 of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936 also Section 22 of Special Marriage Act, 1954 remedy is available irrespective of religion, caste.** Interpretation of laws under Hindu Marriage Act remains always in question, it puts every layman into a dilemma and even sometimes Courts take into another route where parties don’t agree with the decisions which often gives rise to conflicts. Therefore, the provisions give equal rights to husband and wife the equity is maintained between them. In the case of **Narayan Ganesh Dastane v. Sucheta Narayan Dastane**, the husband contended about witnessing cruelty from wife, such instances can also be noticed so in whole sole the provisions bring equity between husband and wife.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) - **The Restitution of Conjugal Rights and its Origin** The meaning of term restitution of conjugal rights means to restore back the marital rights This decree can only be passed in case of valid marriages. It is a matrimonial remedy it is a positive remedy that it requires both the parties of the marriages to live together and cohabit. The complete meaning of this term is that when either the husband or wife withdraws from the society or circle of other party without any justification, then as per section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955, the person that has been mistreated may apply a decree of restitution of conjugal rights to the district court and the court can proclaim this decree it is find that representations made in the petition are effective and there is no valid protection. This principle has been originated from England, where is considered as property deal and wife is considered as man’s property. The remedy for restitution for conjugal rights owes its origin to the Ecclesiastical Courts of the West. Such courts by decree of restitution of conjugal rights compelled the recalcitrant spouse to discharge the due obligation towards the complaining spouse. Later in England, the remedy was recognized by the various Matrimonial Causes Acts passed from time to time. From England, these rights passed on to her various colonies onto which her Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence was grafted and India was no exception in this regard. The provision was never a part of Hindu, Sikh, Muslim or Parsi Law, but the British imported it into India, through judicial pronouncements, thus in the absence of any statutory law, the Indian courts passed decrees for restitution of conjugal rights for all religious communities.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) In India this principle introduced with a case of **Moonshee Buzloor Vs Shumsoonissa** Begum, where such actions were regarded as considerations for specific performance. Explanation: Where a question arises whether there has been reasonable excuse for withdrawal from the society, the burden of proving reasonable excuse shall be on the person who has withdrawn from the society. The restitution of conjugal rights is often regarded as a matrimonial remedy. The remedy of restitution of conjugal rights is a positive remedy that requires both parties to the marriage to live together and cohabit[\[4\]](#_ftn4). In **Abdul Kadir vs Salima,** the Allahabad High Court held that the decree of restitution of marriage should be based on the Principle of Muslim law and not on the basis of justice, equity and good conscience. The texts of Hindu Law recognized the principle, “**let mutual fidelity continue until death**”. Hindu Law enjoined on the spouses to have the society of each other while the old Hindu Law stressed on the wife’s implicit obedience to her husband, it did not lay down any procedure for compelling her to return to her husband against her will.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) - **Essential of Section -9:** Restitution of conjugal right When either the husband or the wife has, without reasonable excuse, withdrawn from the society of the other, the aggrieved party may apply, by petition to the district court, for restitution of conjugal rights and the court, on being satisfied of the truth of the statements made in such petition and that there is no legal ground why the application should not be granted, may decree restitution of conjugal rights accordingly. \[Explanation. where a question arises whether there has been reasonable excuse for withdrawal from the society, the burden of proving reasonable excuse shall be on the person who has withdrawn from the society. There are essentials of the restitution of conjugal rights which are as follows. - There should be a valid marriage - Any of the spouse has withdrawn from the society of other spouse - Withdrawn from the society must be unreasonable. - The court should be convinced that the facts stated by the petitioner are true. - The court should be convinced that there is no legal ground exists to refuse the case. - **Constitutional validity of section-9** There were a lot of debates in the parliament against and for including the provision for restoration of marital rights in Special Marriage Act of 1954 and The Hindu Marriage Act of 1955. Through various cases this can be discussed. In **Sareetha Vs T. VenkataSubbaiah** the Andhra Pradesh High Court challenged the constitutionality of marital restitution arguing that it violates Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Court held Section 9 of The Hindu Marriage Act is unconstitutional because it denies the women right to freedom of their bodies use for procreation and evolution. The Constitution provides social measures to protect women’s rights, liberty and equality of opportunity. Later this judgment was overruled in the case **Harvinder Kaur Vs Harmandir Singh Choudhary it was held by Justice A.B. Rohatgi** addressed misconceptions about section-9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, he held that marriage in India is considered as an ancient and tradition which should be preserved. If any party withdraws without giving any valid reason from the society of other party, then a petition can be filed in the District Court. The court found that section 9 does not violate Article 21 as it aims to preserve marriage and promote cohabitation between married couples. Now further final judgment was given in this case which will be discussed further. - **Limitations of restitution of conjugal rights:** Conjugal rights are not absolute they are subjected to certain limitations which are discussed as below. - The guilty spouse must wait for a year even if the decree of restitution of conjugal rights is rejected. - The divorce petition cannot be filed by the petitioner for return of restitution of conjugal rights. - The petition for the restitution of conjugal rights can be filed in the district court where petitioner or both parties resided together, therefore if a petitioner has moved to different state, then he/ she cannot file a petition in the court of that district. - The burden of proof lies on petitioner to prove that other spouse has withdrawn from society without any reason. Hence restitution of conjugal rights are the rights which are created by the marriage, those are subjected to various essentiality and limitations, the restitution of conjugal rights can become a progressive theory of marriage which was also tried in this case which states that marriage is not made upon the ceremonies, but upon the autonomy of the two individuals. ## **FACTS OF THE CASE** The petitioner Sushil Kumari on 25th of February 1970 married to the respondent Prem Kumar they both lived together till July 15th, 1970, they both had salary of RS 400 and RS 450 as they both were lower division clerk. The husband contention was here was that on 16th July, 1970 the wife left his house in the morning for office purpose and she did not come back to his house in the evening as usual she used to come. Thereafter she never came back to her matrimonial homeW. In February 1971, when both of the parties were living separately, they both get blessed with a baby girl, the wife was living with her mother and the daughter at that time was of 5 years old. On 13th July 1971, the husband a petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for restitution of the conjugal rights, where the husband alleged that the wife left his house without any reasonable cause and against his consent and she was regularly refusing to come back after the husband made a lot of efforts. The wife opposed the contention of the husband she opposed the said petition by the husband in the additional district judge she alleged that she was maltreated and beaten and turned out from her matrimonial house by her husband. She further contended that the anticipation of mistreatment made a reasonable cause that it will cause harm to her life or injurious to her to live with her husband. She also contended that the petition of husband is based on mala fide intention and husband had no intention to live with her. On 30th January, 1974 the Trial Court held that without any reasonable or just cause the wife had left her matrimonial house and granted a decree of the restitution of conjugal right under Section 9 of the said act in the favor of the husband, on 8th February 1974, the husband filed a petition under Section 10 of the said act in the subordinate court for obtaining judicial separation. Aggrieved by the order of the Trial court, the wife filed an appeal in the High Court of Delhi in which there was the stay. ## **ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT** - Whether the petition filed under Section 9 of the said Act is bona fide or mala fide? - Whether the respondent was honest for the court to approve an order of restitution of conjugal rights? ## **ARGUMENTS FROM THE PETITIONER SIDE** - The petitioner contends that a series of distressing events, culminating in her forceful eviction from their shared residence, has led her to reasonably anticipate further harm and has rendered it injurious for her to continue living with her husband. - Firstly, it is crucial to acknowledge the petitioner’s claim of cruelty and maltreatment. Such conduct, as described by the petitioner, represents a clear violation of the sanctity and integrity of their marital relationship. The petitioner’s assertion that she has been subjected to cruel treatment by her husband deserves careful consideration and warrants protection under the law. - Furthermore, the petitioner’s account of being forcibly walked out of her own house highlights a distressing event that cannot be taken lightly. This action not only demonstrates a lack of respect for the petitioner’s rights and dignity but also creates an atmosphere of fear and apprehension. The petitioner’s reasonable anticipation of further harm stemming from such an incident is entirely justified, as it is natural for her to fear for her safety and well-being in the presence of a person who has previously demonstrated such behavior. - In light of these circumstances, it is evident that the petitioner’s plea to be freed from the burden of living with her husband is a reasonable one. The actions described by the petitioner, including the alleged cruelty and maltreatment, as well as her forced eviction from the marital home, collectively contribute to an environment that is detrimental to her physical and emotional well-being. It is a fundamental principle of justice that no individual should be compelled to endure such injurious circumstances within the confines of a marriage. The petitioner further contended that the previous appeal filed by the husband before the Trial Court was not genuine and was based on mala fide intention. The husband was having no genuine intention to cohabit with her. - Moreover, the petitioner argued that her husband often used to drink a lot and he used to come drunk and many times he along with a girl used to come to the house, she claimed that he used to snatch her salary and used to torture her for dowry. - The petitioner further argued that when she was turned out from her marital house, she was refused to provide 10,000 Rs from her father. - The learned counsel of the behalf of the petitioner argued that there was no evidence shown by the husband that he wanted his wife back to her matrimonial house. For this submission he relies on **Sm. Reharani v Ashit,** - The Petitioner argued that her husband used to accused her for having an illicit relations with the person named Lalit Nayyar after which it had become more difficult for her to move to her matrimonial house. - The petitioner argued that husband is of fickle minded that one side he is charging his wife for having illicit relation and on the other hand he wants his wife to come back. the petitioner’s reasonable anticipation of harm and considers it injurious for her to continue living with her husband. The court’s intervention and appropriate action in this matter will not only safeguard the petitioner’s rights but also uphold the principles of justice and equity that form the bedrock of our legal system. ## **ARGUMENTS FROM THE RESPONDENT SIDE** - The counsel for the respondent argued that the wife has left the matrimonial house without any reasonable excuse or just reasons and does not want to come back. - The counsel argued that the petitioner had failed to mention the narrated acts of cruelty in her written statements. - Moreover, the respondent argued that on putting several efforts by the husband the petitioner was not prepared to come back to the matrimonial house. He argued that the petitioner asked to him to stay at her father’s home if he wants her company. - Learned counsel argued that the petitioner was failed to prove the allegations that the day on which the respondent pleaded that is 14th and 15th of July, the wife was ill and she was on medical leave. Even next day she didn’t attend the office because she was - The respondent argued that on the advice of her father and Lalit Nayyar, she is preparing not to get back to the petitioner’s house and continuously after putting so many efforts she is refusing to return back. ## **RELATED PROVISIONS** - **Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955** Restitution of conjugal right When either the husband or the wife has, without reasonable excuse, withdrawn from the society of the other, the aggrieved party may apply, by petition to the district court, for restitution of conjugal rights and the court, on being satisfied of the truth of the statements made in such petition and that there is no legal ground why the application should not be granted, may decree restitution of conjugal rights accordingly. \[Explanation. where a question arises whether there has been reasonable excuse for withdrawal from the society, the burden of proving reasonable excuse shall be on the person who has withdrawn from the society.\][\[6\]](#_ftn6) - **Section 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955** Decree in proceedings (1) in any proceeding under this Act, whether defended or not, if the court is satisfied that (a) Any of the grounds for granting relief exists and the petitioner \[except in cases where the relief is sought by him on the ground specified in sub-clause (a), sub-clause (b) or sub-clause (c) of clause (ii) of section 5\] is not in any way taking advantage of his or her own wrong or disability for the purpose of such relief, and (b) where the ground of the petition is the ground specified in clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section 13, the petitioner has not in any manner been accessory to or connived at or condoned the act or acts complained of, or where the ground of the petition is cruelty, the petitioner has not in any manner condoned the cruelty, and \[(bb) when a divorce is sought on the ground of mutual consent, such consent has not been obtained by force, fraud or undue influence, and\] (c) The petition (not being a petition presented under section 11)\] is not presented or prosecuted in collusion with the respondent, and (d) There has not been any unnecessary or improper delay in instituting the proceeding, and (e) There is no other legal ground, why relief should not be granted, then, and in such a case, but not otherwise, the court shall decree such relief accordingly. (2) Before proceeding to grant any relief under this Act, it shall be the duty of the court in the first instance, in every case where it is possible so to do consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case, to make every endeavour to bring about reconciliation between the parties: \[Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply to any proceeding wherein relief is sought on any of the grounds specified in clause (ii), clause (iii), clause (iv), clause (v), clause (vi) or clause (vii) of sub-section (1) of section 13.\] (3) For the purpose of aiding the court in bringing about such reconciliation, the court may, if the parties so desire or if the court thinks it just and proper so to do, adjourn the proceedings for a reasonable period not exceeding fifteen days and refer the matter to any person named by the parties in this behalf or to any person nominated by the court if the parties fail to name any person, with directions to report to the court as to whether reconciliation can be and has been, effected and the court shall in disposing of the have due regard to the report. (4) In every case where a marriage is dissolved by a decree of divorce, the court passing the decree shall give a copy thereof free of cost to each of the parties.\][\[7\]](#_ftn7) **Section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955** Judicial separation.1\[(1) Either party to a marriage, whether solemnised before or after the commencement of this Act, may present a petition praying for a decree for judicial separation on any of the grounds specified in sub-section (1) of section 13, and in the case of a wife also on any of the grounds specified in sub-section (2) thereof, as grounds on which a petition for divorce might have been presented.\] (2) Where a decree for judicial separation has been passed, it shall no longer be obligatory for the petitioner to cohabit with the respondent, but the court may, on the application by petition of either party and on being satisfied of the truth of the statements made in such petition, rescind the decree if it considers it just and reasonable to do so.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) **Section 13 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882** Transfer for benefit of unborn person. Where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created for the benefit of a person not in existence at the date of the transfer, subject to a prior interest created by the same transfer, the interest created for the benefit of such person shall not take effect, unless it extends to the whole of the remaining interest of the transferor in the property. Illustration A transfers property of which he is the owner to B in trust for A and his intended wife successively for their lives, and, after the death of the survivor, for the eldest son of the intended marriage for life, and after his death for A’s second son. The interest so created for the benefit of the eldest son does not take effect, because it does not extend to the whole of A’s remaining interest in the property.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) ## **JUDGMENT** The court observed that so long as the husband is proceeding with the petition for annulment of the marriage, the wife cannot attempt to comply with the order for restitution of conjugal rights and it is doubtful whether any sincere efforts have been made to do so. The husband petition of restitution of conjugal rights which has been granted by the Trial Court was set aside by the High Court and allowed the appeal. Section 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 says that the judge has to be satisfied on the possibilities of probabilities of matters occurred in clause (a) to (e) of this section. It is based on the court that if court is satisfied then the Court confers the power to pass a decree. The Court cited the case of **[Ishwar Chandra Ahluwalia Vs Pomilla Ahluwalia](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1354356/#:~:text=The%20petitioner%20alleged%20that%20after,the%20passing%20of%20the%20decree. "Ishwar Chandra Ahluwalia Vs Pomilla Ahluwalia")** in this case after the passage of decree of restitution of conjugal rights, the husband filed a petition for nullifying of marriage under section 12(1) (c) of the Hindu Marriage Act. After expiration of the two years period from the date of passing of a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights and also after dismissal of the filed petition, the husband now filed a fresh petition under section 13 for dissolution of marriage on the ground of non- compliance of the decree by the wife. The Court also referred to the case of **[Dastane Vs Dastane](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/198827109/ "Dastane Vs Dastane")** where it was aid that the legislature has emphasized that if the court is satisfied with grounds (a) to (e) then the relief may be granted[\[10\]](#_ftn10). In **[Mister Gurudev Kaur Vs Swarn Singh](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/943240/ "Mister Gurudev Kaur Vs Swarn Singh")** the court held that the order of the restitution of the conjugal rights can be refused if it becomes impossible for the two parties to live together. The husband claimed the decree of restitution on the ground that his wife is having illicit sexual intercourse, he was prepared to take back his wife without any condition but he didn’t mention anywhere that he will forgive or forget the past or he is no more interested in old charges, The judge here stated that the husband choice of remedy was unfortunate. Instead for filing judicial separation, he should sued for restitution with best known reasons. Here the husband had to wait for 2 years to give chance to wife to join him and to obey a decree of restitution but the husband within 7 days of the passed decree he brought another case against her. By making such step he closed the door for himself, In **[Gollins Vs Gollins](https://vlex.co.uk/vid/gollins-v-gollins-792869097 "Gollins Vs Gollins")**, Lord Reid held that in order to evaluate the conduct of the parties the Judge must try to read the minds of the parties. In matrimonial case the judges are not concerned with the man, as they are in the case of negligence. They are dealing with the both man and woman for that they have to make the assumptions better. Hence it is concluded that the decree of constitutional rights can not be taken for the granted , if any ulterior motives goes beyond preservation of marriage, then it is impossible to grant a decree because this would break the close or intimate relationship of the marriage and make carrying out obligations intolerable. ## **CONCLUSION** This case set an example to prevent the marriage in any situation as here we saw that the husband was not showing any effort to preserve his marriage as he filed the decree of judicial separation, The court keeping this in mind that concluded that the decree of restitution of conjugal right can only be granted if there is a positive motive shown by any of the party. Preservation of the marriage is the sole duty of the decree of the restitution of conjugal right. Which is the basic fundamental of the marriage. The Court here has given a finest decision by dismissing the decree as there was no genuine intention of husband present behind this. A marriage between two people is a soul union or a sacred union where the interests of both the parties should be protected. The sacrosanctity of marriage can be preserved only when both the parties have equal right in all marital obligations. Unnecessarily intervention in matter of marriage can lead to time a time when a person has zero autonomy. It is unbelievable that hoe Apex court failed to recognize the dangerous unfair reality of women in India. With the gradual understanding that there is need of interference of law in family matters and to protect the individual’s rights, there has been a lot of time when restitution of conjugal rights is criticized across the world like in United Kingdom, Australia, Ireland and South Africa. Now it is high time for India to abolish the restitution of conjugal rights because at present the restitution of conjugal right has lost its relevance and as society changes over time, the cases of violence and abuse are increasing so this section does not create the appropriate effect, initially it sought to have but it ends up doing harm than good. This is a blatant breach of the right to privacy it represents. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) B.A.LL.B. 4th SEMESTER AT VASUDEV COLLEGE OF LAW, LAMACHAUR, HALDWANI, UTTARAKHAND. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Smt. Saroj Rani vs Sudarshan Kumar, (last visited June 25, 2023). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Case Analysis of Smt. Saroj Rani Vs Sudarshan Kumar Chadha Air 1984,[https://probono-india.in/Indian-Society/Paper/409\_CASE%20ANALYSIS.docx](https://probono-india.in/Indian-Society/Paper/409_CASE%20ANALYSIS.docx) (last visited June 25, 2023). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Restitution of Conjugal Rights, (last visited June 25 2023). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Ibid. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Section 9. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Section 23. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Section 10. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) The Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Section 13. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Sushil Kumari Dang Vs Prem Kumar, ( last visited June 29, 2023). **Categories:** Case Analysis, Civil Law Cases **Tags:** #law, #lawfoyer, #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, case analysis, case summary, lawfoyer, PREM KUMARI, SUSHIL KUMARI DANG, SUSHIL KUMARI DANG VS PREM KUMARI --- ### [Kishore Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1981 SC 62](https://lawfoyer.in/kishore-singh-v-state-of-rajasthan-air-1981-sc-62/) **Published:** February 23, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The case involves a habeas corpus petition filed on behalf of three prisoners who were kept in solitary confinement with cross-bar fetters for extended periods ranging from 8-11 months in Jaipur Central Jail on grounds like loitering, insolent behavior etc. The Court held that keeping prisoners in solitary confinement and putting fetters violates their fundamental rights under Article 21. Prison authorities cannot take such punitive actions without complying with principles of natural justice like giving the prisoners a hearing. Section 46 of Prisons Act and relevant prison rules allow solitary confinement and fetters but cannot be read absolutely. Rules have to be read down subject to constitutional protections and prisoners’ rights laid down in previous Supreme Court judgments. The case reiterates human rights of prisoners and disciplines prison authorities’ powers, subjecting their discretion to judicial review. **Keywords**: Solitary confinement, prison authorities, cross-bar fetters, natural justice, human rights ## B) CASE DETAILS i) Judgement Cause Title: [Kishor Singh Ravinder Dev Etc vs State Of Rajasthan](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/48937/) ii) Case Number: Writ Petition No. 5287 of 1980 (Under Article 32 of the Constitution) iii) Judgement Date: 04/11/1980 iv) Court: Supreme Court of India v) Quorum: V.R. Krishna Iyer, J and R.S. Pathak, J vi) Author: V.R. Krishnaiyer vii) Citation: 1981 AIR 625, 1981 SCR (1) 995 viii) Legal Provisions Involved: [Article 21](https://lawfoyer.in/article-21-guardian-of-right-to-life-and-personal-liberty-under-indian-constitution/), Section 46 of Prisons Act 1894, Rule 79 and Rule 1(f) of Rajasthan Prison Rules 1951 ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The case originated from a telegram sent by three prisoners from Jaipur Central Jail to a Supreme Court judge complaining that they have been kept in solitary confinement with cross-bar fetters for over 8 months. This violated the Constitution and amounted to illegal detention. The Court treated it as a habeas corpus petition and passed immediate orders directing jail authorities to release them from solitary confinement. When produced before Court, one prisoner showed injuries caused by police escorts. Court passed strong remarks against police brutality and directed medical examination and filing of FIR. Thereafter, the Court examined legality of solitary confinement and fetters imposed by jail authorities. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE Three prisoners kept in Jaipur Central Jail were imposed solitary confinement for extended periods ranging from 8 months to 11 months by the jail superintendent. One prisoner Kishore Singh was also put in cross-bar fetters for several days. The superintendent justified the punishments on grounds like the prisoners were loitering in jail, behaving insolently and tearing off history tickets. One prisoner sent a telegram to the Supreme Court judge complaining of illegal detention. Treating it as habeas corpus petition, the Court immediately ordered their release from solitary confinement. When produced in Court, one prisoner showed injuries caused by police escorts taking him from jail. Court directed medical examination and filing of FIR against concerned policemen. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i) Whether solitary confinement and fetters imposed by prison authorities violated fundamental rights of prisoners under Article 21? ii) Whether prison authorities can take punitive actions like solitary confinement without principles of natural justice like hearing the prisoners? iii) Whether Section 46 of Prisons Act and relevant Prison Rules allow absolute discretion to authorities on solitary confinement and fetters? iv) Whether Prison Rules and administration are subject to constitutional protections? ## F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Petitioners submitted that: - Keeping prisoners in solitary confinement for 8-11 months and putting fetters violates their fundamental right to life and personal liberty under Article 21. - Such punitive actions cannot be taken by simply treating prisoners as non-persons at absolute mercy of prison authorities. - Natural justice principles like giving prisoners’ hearing before punishment has to be followed. - Section 46 of Prisons Act and Rules do not give unfettered discretion to impose solitary confinement and fetters. Rules have to be read down subject to constitutional rights of prisoners. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Respondent submitted that: - Rules allow Superintendent discretion to take actions for prison security. He ensured all precautions were reasonably sufficient. - Superintendent heard the prisoners before punishing them under the Rules. - Separate cell confinement is different from solitary confinement. Rules do not put absolute bar. - In extreme cases for security concerns, fetters can be used subject to authorities’ discretion. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i) Article 21 of Constitution of India protects right to life and personal liberty. As held in previous judgments, it applies to prisoners as well. ii) Section 46 of Prisons Act 1894 allows Superintendent to impose solitary confinement and fetters as punishments. iii) Rule 79 and Rule 1(f) of Rajasthan Prison Rules 1951 also provide for solitary confinement and fetters for security concerns and discipline. ## I) JUDGEMENT **Ratio Decidendi**: i) Keeping prisoners in solitary confinement for long periods upto 11 months and putting bar fetters violates their fundamental rights under Article 21. ii) Natural justice principles of fair hearing apply before imposing punishments within prison. There must be an appeal to higher judicial authority. iii) Section 46 of Prisons Act and Rules allowing solitary confinement are subject to constitutional protections. They cannot be read in absolutist manner giving unlimited discretion to prison authorities. iv) Sunil Batra judgment laid down rights of prisoners within jails. Later Rakesh Kaushik judgment gave binding directions for compliance. These Supreme Court rulings apply to all prisons nationally. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment is a strong reiteration of human rights of prisoners held in State custody. It disciplines the prison administration by restricting their punitive powers and discretion over prisoners. Solitary confinement and fetters cannot be imposed arbitrarily just based on authorities’ whims like prisoner loitering or tearing history ticket. Natural justice and constitutional protections apply within prison walls as well. Rulings enhance human dignity of prisoners and accountability of prison officials by subjecting them to judicial scrutiny. However, prisons still remain closed institutions and more transparency is needed. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i) Sunil Batra vs Delhi Administration, \[1979\] 1 SCR 392 ii) Sunil Batra vs Delhi Administration, \[1980\] 2 SCR 557 iii) Rakesh Kaushik vs B.L. Vig, \[1980\] 3 SCR 929 **b) Important Statutes Referred** i) Constitution of India – Article 21 ii) Prisons Act 1894 – Section 46 iii) Rajasthan Prison Rules 1951 – Rule 79 and Rule 1(f) **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Smt. SAROJ RANI VS SUDHARSHAN KUMAR](https://lawfoyer.in/smt-saroj-rani-vs-sudharshan-kumar/) **Published:** July 7, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **BY MISS SHALINI DHYANI[\[1\]](#_ftn1)** **IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA** NAME OF THE CASE Smt. Saroj Rani vs Sudharshan KumarCITATION AIR 1984 SC 1562, 1985 SCR (1) 303DATE OF THE CASEAugust 8, 1984APPELANT Smt. Saroj RaniRESPONDENTSudharshan kumarBENCH /JUDGEJustice Sabyasachi, Justice Syed Murtaza Fazl Ali.STATUTES/ CONSTITUION INVOLVEDThe Constitution of India, 1950, The Hindu Marriage Act,1955IMPORTANT SECTIONS/ ARTICLES The Constitution of India—Article 13, 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950, Section 9, 23 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.## **ABSTRACT** Marriage in all personal laws is considered to be a sacred union of two souls which is subjected to marital duties and obligations by both the parties as well as legal rights. Marriage is considered to be an essential element of Indian society, which can only get successful with the participation of both the parties and so, if any party or spouse deserts his or her husband without any proper reason or excuse, it allows the state to interfere in between them. The main purpose of marriage is to remain devoted to each other. Hindus are governed through The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 under which a section is present i.e. Section 9 which states restitution of conjugal rights which aims towards to save the marriage anyhow because India is a society which believes in preventing the marriage it is not like western society where in every one day a couple is getting divorced. The section works only when one of the spouses deserted another spouse without any reasonable ground. However it has been also heard that state interference is compelling couple to stay together which in itself violates the fundamental rights of people such as right to privacy and right to live with human dignity. In this case the constitutionality of Section 9, along with aim and objective of the state to frame this section has been discussed. ## INTRODUCTION In present case a decree of restitution of conjugal rights insinuates that the iniquitous party instructed to live with the aggrieved party. The restitution of conjugal rights means to restore back the marital rights, because marriage is recognized as wedlock or a social contract between two parties so there are certain rights and obligation that are rely on both the parties. Restitution of conjugal right is only remedy to save the marriage on the front foot, this generally used when one of the spouse is not fulfilling basic requirement of marriage such as co-habitation or if they are having children so not taking care of them and left the house without any proper excuse then this decree can be granted. This remedy is not only available to Hindus but also to Muslims under their general law, **Under section 32 and 33 of Indian divorce act,1869 the Christians can take remedy and under Section 36 of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936 also Section 22 of Special Marriage Act, 1954 remedy is available irrespective of religion, caste.** Interpretation of laws under Hindu Marriage Act remains always in question, it puts every layman into a dilemma and even sometimes Courts take into another route where parties don’t agree with the decisions which often gives rise to conflicts. Therefore, the provisions give equal rights to husband and wife the equity is maintained between them. In the case of **Narayan Ganesh Dastane v. Sucheta Narayan Dastane**, the husband contended about witnessing cruelty from wife, such instances can also be noticed so in whole sole the provisions bring equity between husband and wife.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) ### The Restitution of Conjugal Rights and its Origin The meaning of term restitution of conjugal rights means to restore back the marital rights This decree can only be passed in case of valid marriages. It is a matrimonial remedy, it is a positive remedy that it requires both the parties of the marriages to live together and cohabit. The complete meaning of this term is that when either the husband or wife withdraws from the society or circle of other party without any justification, then as per section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955, the person that has been mistreated may apply a decree of restitution of conjugal rights to the district court and the court can proclaim this decree it is find that representations made in the petition are effective and there is no valid protection. This principle has been originated from England, where is considered as property deal and wife is considered as man’s property. The remedy for restitution for conjugal rights owes its origin to the Ecclesiastical Courts of the West. Such courts by decree of restitution of conjugal rights compelled the recalcitrant spouse to discharge the due obligation towards the complaining spouse. Later in England, the remedy was recognized by the various Matrimonial Causes Acts passed from time to time. From England, these rights passed on to her various colonies onto which her Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence was grafted and India was no exception in this regard. The provision was never a part of Hindu, Sikh, Muslim or Parsi Law, but the British imported it into India, through judicial pronouncements. Thus in the absence of any statutory law, the Indian courts passed decrees for restitution of conjugal rights for all religious communities.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) In India this principle introduced with a case of **Moonshee Buzloor Vs Shumsoonissa** Begum, where such actions were regarded as considerations for specific performance. Explanation: Where a question arises whether there has been reasonable excuse for withdrawal from the society, the burden of proving reasonable excuse shall be on the person who has withdrawn from the society.”The restitution of conjugal rights is often regarded as a matrimonial remedy. The remedy of restitution of conjugal rights is a positive remedy that requires both parties to the marriage to live together and cohabit[\[4\]](#_ftn4). In **Abdul Kadir vs Salima,** the Allahabad High Court held that the decree of restitution of marriage should be based on the Principle of Muslim law and not on the basis of justice, equity and good conscience. The texts of Hindu Law recognized the principle, “**let mutual fidelity continue until death**”. Hindu Law enjoined on the spouses to have the society of each other while the old Hindu Law stressed on the wife’s implicit obedience to her husband, it did not lay down any procedure for compelling her to return to her husband against her will.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) **Essential of Section -9:** Restitution of conjugal right When either the husband or the wife has, without reasonable excuse, withdrawn from the society of the other, the aggrieved party may apply, by petition to the district court, for restitution of conjugal rights and the court, on being satisfied of the truth of the statements made in such petition and that there is no legal ground why the application should not be granted, may decree restitution of conjugal rights accordingly. \[Explanation. where a question arises whether there has been reasonable excuse for withdrawal from the society, the burden of proving reasonable excuse shall be on the person who has withdrawn from the society\]. There are essentials of the restitution of conjugal rights which are as follows. - There should be a valid marriage - Any of the spouse has withdrawn from the society of other spouse - Withdrawn from the society must be unreasonable. - The court should be convinced that the facts stated by the petitioner are true. - The court should be convinced that there is no legal ground exists to refuse the case. **Constitutional validity of section-9** There were a lot of debates in the parliament against and for including the provision for restoration of marital rights in Special Marriage Act of 1954 and The Hindu Marriage Act of 1955. Through various cases this can be discussed. The debate of constitutionality of the restitution of conjugal rights emerged from the case **Gobind Vs State of Madhya Pradesh** where the Supreme Court held that right to privacy is not explicit but can be implied under Article 21 of the Constitution Of India. In **Sareetha Vs T. Venkatasubbaiah** the Andhra Pradesh High Court challenged the constitutionality of marital restitution arguing that it violates Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Court held Section 9 of The Hindu Marriage Act is unconstitutional because it denies the women right to freedom of their bodies use for procreation and evolution. The Constitution provides social measures to protect women’s rights, liberty and equality of opportunity. Later this judgment was overruled in the case **Harvinder Kaur Vs Harmander Singh Choudhary it was held by Justice A.B. Rohatagi** addressed misconceptions about section-9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, he held that marriage in India is considered as an ancient and tradition which should be preserved. If any party withdraws without giving any valid reason from the society of other party then a petition can be filed in the District Court. The court found that section 9 does not violate Article 21 as it aims to preserve marriage and promote cohabitation between married couples. Now further final judgment was given in this case which will be discussed further. ## **FACTS OF THE CASE** The petitioner and respondent got married on January 1975 with proper rituals and customs at Jalandhar. On 4th January 1976 they both had a daughter named Menka after a year of marriage. On October 1977, the wife filed a suit under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for restitution of conjugal right and alleged her husband that he mistreated her after the birth of their second daughter on 28thFebruary 1977 named Guddi but unfortunately she died on 6th August 1977 at her father’s residence. It was contended by the petitioner that on 16thMay 1977 when their last cohabitation took place her husband withdraw her from the society. And she also claimed that she was ill-treated by her in laws also. The husband however denied the abuse claim and gave his consent allow the decree for damages pass. After one month of the decree being passed, the wife was taken to house and husband cohabitated with her and after two days she want turned out of the house. Furthermore, after one year the husband filed a petition divorce petition under Section 13 (1 A) of the Hindu Marriage Act, he gave arguments while filing divorce petition that he and his wife had been living separately for last one year and there was no cohabitation taken place between them as per the decree of the restitution of conjugal rights which was earlier passed by the court. After considering the above facts, the District Court held that divorce petition cannot be filed by the husband as the decree of conjugal rights was passed on the consent of the parties. The husband then was followed by an appeal to the High court which declares that a decree was not passed with the consent of the parties and claimed that fraudulent decree preventing the restitution of marriage of the petitioner. Court held that a consent decree could not be termed to be a collusive, decree so as to disentitle the petitioner to a decree for the restitution of the conjugal rights, and in that view of the language of Section 23 if the court had tried to make conciliation between the parties and the conciliation had been ordered, the husband was not dissented to get a decree.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) The High Court also held that as per Section 23 of The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 if the court had tried to make amends between the parties and if reconciliation had been ordered, then the husband was entitled to get a decree. Hence, the appeal was allowed and the husband was granted the right to a divorce.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) The division bench held under the purview of **Joginder Singh v. Smt. Pushpa,** that the order which was passed for restitution of conjugal is not termed collusive and if the district judge has taken the view under the Section of 23 Hindu Marriage Act that the conciliation has been ordered then the husband would not disentitle him for a decree of divorce, therefore, the appeal was allowed by the division bench and decree of divorce was passed.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) The appeal for the same was filed by petitioner as she was aggrieved by the High Court’s decision in the Supreme Court. ## **ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT** - Whether the husband is entitled to a decree of divorce or not? - Whether Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act is constitutionally valid or not? Whether section 9 violates Article 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution? ## ARGUMENTS FROM PETITIONER SIDE** - The petitioner stated that her husband and in-laws subjected her to mistreatment and cruelty, which prompted her to seek a decree of restitution of marriage. - The petitioner mentioned that she was granted maintenance of Rs 185 as pendente lite (temporary maintenance) and Rs 300 for litigation expenses on March 21, 1978. Additionally, a decree of restitution of conjugal rights was mutually decided upon. - The petitioner argued that in response to her petition for restitution of conjugal rights, the respondent accepted some facts stated in the petition but denied others. Specifically, the respondent claimed that he never made any demands, mistreated, ostracized, or threw the petitioner out of the house, as alleged by the petitioner. - The petitioner further argued that after the decree of restitution was passed, she went to the respondent’s house and lived there as a normal husband and wife for two days. However, the court did not consider this fact. ## **ARGUMENTS FROM RESPONDENT SIDE** - The respondent filed a divorce petition under Section 13 of the mentioned act, citing the absence of cohabitation between him and his wife for a year after the decree of restitution. This indicates a breakdown in the marital relationship and suggests that efforts at reconciliation have been unsuccessful. Therefore, it is reasonable to grant the divorce petition as the parties have not been living together as husband and wife, which is essential for a healthy marriage. - The respondent stated that he was willing to take his wife back to his house, demonstrating his willingness to reconcile and save the marriage. This shows that he is open to resolving the issues between them and giving the relationship another chance. Therefore, it would be fair to consider the respondent’s intention to reconcile and assess the feasibility of reconciliation before making a final decision on the divorce petition. - The respondent refuted certain allegations made by his wife. This implies that there might be conflicting claims and issues of credibility between the parties. In such cases, it becomes crucial to thoroughly evaluate the evidence presented by both sides to determine the truthfulness of the allegations. The court should consider the respondent’s denial and weigh it against the evidence provided by the wife to ensure a fair and unbiased judgment. - The respondent argued that there is no collusion between the parties as consent decrees in marital affairs are not collusive. Collusion refers to a deliberate agreement between the parties to deceive or defraud the court. By highlighting that consent decrees are not collusive, the respondent suggests that their intention is genuine and not aimed at deceiving the court. Therefore, the court should consider this argument and not dismiss the divorce petition on grounds of collusion without proper examination of the facts. - The respondent further argued that at the time the decree was passed, Section 13(B) was not applicable. This indicates that the grounds for divorce invoked by the husband might not fall under the specific provisions outlined in Section 13(B) of the act. However, it is crucial to assess the overall circumstances and applicable sections of the act to determine if there are other valid grounds for divorce under which the husband’s petition can be accepted. ## **RELATED PROVISIONS** **Article 13 of the Constitution of India** 1\) All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void. (2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. (3) In this article, unless the context otherwise requires,—(a) “law” includes any Ordinance, order, bye-law rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law, (b) “Laws in force” includes laws passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India before the commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed, notwithstanding that any such law or any part thereof may not be then in operation either at all or in particular areas. \[(4) Nothing in this article shall apply to any amendment of this Constitution made under article 368.\][\[9\]](#_ftn9) **Article 14 of the Constitution of India** The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) **Article 15 of the Constitution of India** (1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. (2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, b e subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to— (a) Access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment; or (b) The use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public. (3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children. \[(4) Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.\] \[(5) Nothing in this article or in sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of article 19 shall prevent the State from making any special provision, by law, for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes in so far as such special provisions relate to their admission to educational institutions including private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State, other than the minority educational institutions referred to in clause (1) of article 30.\][\[11\]](#_ftn11) **Article 21 of the Constitution of India** No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. **Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act** Restitution of conjugal right When either the husband or the wife has, without reasonable excuse, withdrawn from the society of the other, the aggrieved party may apply, by petition to the district court, for restitution of conjugal rights and the court, on being satisfied of the truth of the statements made in such petition and that there is no legal ground why the application should not be granted, may decree restitution of conjugal rights accordingly. \[Explanation.—where a question arises whether there has been reasonable excuse for withdrawal from the society, the burden of proving reasonable excuse shall be on the person who has withdrawn from the society.\][\[12\]](#_ftn12) **Section 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act** Decree in proceedings.—(1) in any proceeding under this Act, whether defended or not, if the court is satisfied that (a) Any of the grounds for granting relief exists and the petitioner \[except in cases where the relief is sought by him on the ground specified in sub-clause (a), sub-clause (b) or sub-clause (c) of clause (ii) of section 5\] is not in any way taking advantage of his or her own wrong or disability for the purpose of such relief, and (b) where the ground of the petition is the ground specified in clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section 13, the petitioner has not in any manner been accessory to or connived at or condoned the act or acts complained of, or where the ground of the petition is cruelty the petitioner has not in any manner condoned the cruelty, and \[(bb) when a divorce is sought on the ground of mutual consent, such consent has not been obtained by force, fraud or undue influence, and\] (c) The petition (not being a petition presented under section 11)\] is not presented or prosecuted in collusion with the respondent, and (d) There has not been any unnecessary or improper delay in instituting the proceeding, and (e) There is no other legal ground why relief should not be granted, then, and in such a case, but not otherwise, the court shall decree such relief accordingly. (2) Before proceeding to grant any relief under this Act, it shall be the duty of the court in the first instance, in every case where it is possible so to do consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case, to make every endeavor to bring about reconciliation between the parties: \[Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply to any proceeding wherein relief is sought on any of the grounds specified in clause (ii), clause (iii), clause (iv), clause (v), clause (vi) or clause (vii) of sub-section (1) of section 13.\] (3) For the purpose of aiding the court in bringing about such reconciliation, the court may, if the parties so desire or if the court thinks it just and proper so to do, adjourn the proceedings for a reasonable period not exceeding fifteen days and refer the matter to any person named by the parties in this behalf or to any person nominated by the court if the parties fail to name any person, with directions to report to the court as to whether reconciliation can be and has been, effected and the court shall in disposing of the have due regard to the report. (4) In every case where a marriage is dissolved by a decree of divorce, the court passing the decree shall give a copy thereof free of cost to each of the parties.\][\[13\]](#_ftn13) ## **JUDGMENT** The Supreme Court held that A consent decree cannot be said to be a conspiratorial decree, thereby depriving the petitioner of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, and in view of the language of section 23, if the Court had tried to bring about a reconciliation between the parties and reconciliation was ordered, the husband was not entitled to obtain a decree. The court upheld the judgment of Punjab Haryana High court. An appeal was accepted and the husband granted a decree of divorce. And whereas the Apex Court attempted to draw the attention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent-husband had from the very beginning intended to obtain a decree of divorce and therefore did not oppose the passing of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights, which he knew about the fact that it would result in misleading the wife and the court and this fact was not known to nor was presented in any of the pleadings challenging the facts of cohabitation after the matrimonial order was passed Subsequently, on this point the learned counsel for the appellant prayed before the Apex Court to allow him to amend his petition, which further dismissed the application for amendment. Here Apex Court failed to reasonably justify granting divorce to the husband, here Court failed to take facts into account that husband took advantage of law and satisfy his goal of taking divorce ultimately. The entire point of debate was to prevent the sanctity of marriage but here we can see that how husband used his own wrong of abandoning his wife as ground to divorce which held valid. Also in case **[Shakila Banu Vs Gulam Mustafa](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1844557/ "Shakila Banu Vs Gulam Mustafa")**, here in this case the court was failed to improve the status of women as same done here, the court wrongfully justifies Sareetha judgment and held the concept of restitution of marriage is regressive and barbaric. Here Court directed to husband to pay the maintenance to his wife of Rs 200 per month and Rs 300 to Daughter per month until she remarries and maintains one living daughter of the marriage. In the view of that whether section 9 is constitutionally valid or not or whether it violates Article 13, 14, 15 and 21 of the Indian Constitution the court gave further judgment or observation. Starting from the Sareetha judgment the Court held a bifurcating view to this case because this judgment held section 9 constitutionally valid and non violation of Article 21. As Article 21 guarantees the right to privacy which ensures autonomy of an individual and considered as fundamental right. When a couple is forced to live together and cohabitation occurs between them forcefully means when one party against the will of other party cohabits then it violates basic human dignity and right to privacy of that individual. In Saroj Rani, the court avoids seeing how problematic the compensation decree is by justifying it as social assistance. It criticizes the Andhra Pradesh High Court judgment which holds the view that Section 9 violates basic rights of women. Here Supreme Court held that or explains that forcible sexual intercourse is not what section 9 means or holds this section is just provided in order to preserve the sanctity of their marriage and live in unity. The remedy of restitution aimed at syndicate and cohabitation and only sexual relationship. This judgment overruled the **[Sareetha judgment](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1987982/ "Sareetha judgment").** From here it can be believed that sexual desire is not entirety of a marriage but sexual autonomy is an essential tight that everyone holds and this cannot be violated. The court here took the precedent of earlier case of **[Harvinder Vs Harmander Singh](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/191703/ "Harvinder Vs Harmander Singh")** where court held that remedy of constitutional right does not violate Article 13, 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution. Here this case bring limitations to sexual relationship and held that decree of restitution is for the purpose to draw a mutual understanding between husband and wife so that they both can lead to a happy married life. Here the court also cited the case named **[Geeta Laxmi Vs G.V.R.K. Sarveswara Rao](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/942175/ "Geeta Laxmi Vs G.V.R.K. Sarveswara Rao")** where in that case the husband also maltreated his wife and turned out her from the house which resulted in disentitled of divorce decree and in the present case the element of maltreatment was absent no such evidence was produced. Moreover, While in the issue of where Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act violated Articles 21 and 14 of the Constitution, the Court contemplated the expression “conjugal” by taking reference **of Shorter Oxford English Dictionary**, **the meaning of ‘conjugal’ as “of or pertaining to marriage or husband and wife in their relations to each other”** and **“Conjugal rights” interpreted well in the Dictionary of English Law, defines ‘conjugal rights’ as: “The right which husband and wife have to each other’s society and marital intercourse. The suit for restitution of conjugal rights is a matrimonial suit, cognizable in the Divorce Court, which is brought whenever either the husband or the wife lives separate from the other without any sufficient reason, in which case the court will decree restitution of conjugal rights (Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950), but will not enforce it by attachment, substituting however for attachment if the wife is the petitioner, an order for periodical payments by the husband to the wife. Conjugal rights cannot be enforced by the act of either party, and a husband cannot seize and detain his wife by force (R.V. Jackson)”. The importance of ” conjugal rights” can also be seen as per Indian version Commission-71st Report on the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955- “Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage as a Ground of Divorce,** where it is stated as “*Moreover, the essence of marriage is a sharing of common life, a sharing of all the happiness that life has to offer and all the misery that has to be faced in life, an experience of the joy that comes from enjoying, in common, things of the matter and the spirit and from showering love and affection on one’s offspring. Living together is a symbol of such sharing in all its aspects. Living apart is a symbol indicating the negation of such sharing. It is indicative of a disruption of the essence of marriage-“breakdown” and if it continues for a fairly long period, it would indicate destruction of the essence of marriage- “irretrievable breakdown”. [**\[14\]**](#_ftn14)* Hence the Supreme Court held by considering the views of the honorable High Court of Andhra Pradesh and Delhi High Court where single judge bench held that Section 9 of the HMA did not violate Article 21 and Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Here the court rejected the contentions of **T Sareetha case** and accepted the views of the case **[Harvinder Vs Harmander Kaur](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/191703/ "Harvinder Vs Harmander Kaur")** by considering section 9 non- violative of HMA. Although, the court the court didn’t explicitly explained the right to privacy, in overruling **T Sareetha case.** The Court granted a decree of divorce to the respondent and held that the husband would continue to pay maintenance to his wife after the final of the divorce decree, till she remarries. The court determined that protecting the integrity of marriage superseded constitutional assault, and that property attachment was the appropriate response in the event of disobedience. ## **CONCLUSION** The main aim of the restitution of conjugal rights is to save marriage and maintain harmony. In case of Martial rape, the husband take the a decree of restitution as a defence by stating that Marital rape is not criminalized in the institution of marriage and allows forced sex with their wife. However there is a ray of hope in darkness that a divorce petition can be filed on the ground of cruelty. As in a judgment Kerala High Court stated that while deciding a case of doctor where the court held that while marital rape is not recognized under criminal law, it can still be a ground for divorce in a form of cruelty. It was further held that violation or disrespect of one’s body integrity would amount to violation of individual’s autonomy. A marriage between two people is a soul union or a sacred union where the interests of both the parties should be protected. The sacrosanctity of marriage can be preserved only when both the parties have equal right in all marital obligations. Unnecessarily intervention in matter of marriage can lead to time a time when a person has zero autonomy. It is unbelievable that hoe Apex court failed to recognize the dangerous unfair reality of women in India. With the gradual understanding that there is need of interference of law in family matters and to protect the individual’s rights, there has been a lot of time when restitution of conjugal rights is criticized across the world like in United Kingdom, Australia, Ireland and South Africa. Now it is high time for India to abolish the restitution of conjugal rights because at present the restitution of conjugal right has lost its relevance and as society changes over time, the cases of violence and abuse are increasing so this section does not create the appropriate effect, initially it sought to have but it ends up doing harm than good. This is a blatant breach of the right to privacy it represents. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) \[1\] B.A.LL.B. 4th SEMESTER AT VASUDEV COLLEGE OF LAW, LAMACHAUR, HALDWANI, UTTARAKHAND. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Smt. Saroj Rani vs Sudarshan Kumar, (last visited June 25, 2023). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Case Analysis of Smt. Saroj Rani Vs Sudarshan Kumar Chadha Air 1984,[https://probono-india.in/Indian-Society/Paper/409\_CASE%20ANALYSIS.docx](https://probono-india.in/Indian-Society/Paper/409_CASE%20ANALYSIS.docx) (last visited June 25, 2023). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Restitution of Conjugal Rights, (last visited June 25 2023). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Ibid. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Smt. Saroj Raani vs Susarshan Kumar, (last visited June 26, 2023) [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Ibid. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Ibid. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) The Constitution of India, 1950, Article 13. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) The Constitution of India, 1950, Article 14. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) The Constitution of India, 1950 , Article 15. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Section 9. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Section 23. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Ibid. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Civil Law Cases **Tags:** #law, #lawfoyer, #SC Judgement, #supreme court judgement, case analysis, case summary, lawfoyer, Smt. SAROJ RANI, Smt. SAROJ RANI VS SUDHARSHAN KUMAR, SUDHARSHAN KUMAR --- ### [NEELU CHOPRA & Anr v. BHARTI (2009)](https://lawfoyer.in/neelu-chopra-anr-v-bharti-2009/) **Published:** July 7, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **By Shramana Paul[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)** **Before the Supreme Court of India** NAME OF THE CASE Neelu Chopra & Anr v. BhartiCITATIONCRIMINAL APPEAL No. 949 OF 2003 DATE OF THE CASE 7th October 2009APPELLANTNEELU CHOPRA & ANR. RESPONDENTBHARTI BENCH/JUDGEJustice V.S. Sirpurkar, Justice Deepak VermaSTATUTES/CONSTITUTION INVOLVEDThe Indian Penal Code, 1860 The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973IMPORTANT SECTIONS/ARTICLESS.406, 498A and S. 114 of IPC S.482 of CrPC## **Abstract** The current appeal has been filed against the decision of the High Court in the matter of quashing a complaint under S.482 of CrPC. The High Court was of the view that there was material evidence to proceed against the appellants and hence refused to quash the complaint. The main contention is whether or not a complaint can be entertained when particulars of the offence are absent. The Appellants are the parents of Rajesh who is the husband of the complainant Bharti. The main allegations are against Rajesh, who expired on 6/1/2006. ## **Introduction** The case at hand is a criminal appeal case before the Supreme Court of India against the Punjab and Haryana High Court’s decision refusing the quashing of a complaint under S.482. The Supreme Court has the power to hear the present appeal by its criminal appellate jurisdiction under articles 132(1), 133(1) and 134 of The Constitution of India. The petitioners had been charged with- criminal breach of trust; Cruelty to the wife; and abetment of all the mentioned offences. \[S.406, S.498A/S.114 respectively\]. **Cruelty** to the wife according to S.498A of the Indian Penal Code is:-[\[2\]](#_ftn2) a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. In this case, the respondent Bharti had filed a complaint against her husband Rajesh and his parents along with his sister Rakhee nine years after her marriage. The respondent/complainant alleged that due to demands of unreasonable dowry and misbehaviour by Rajesh and his parents her married life had not been smooth and peaceful. Rakhee was later removed from the list of accused due to her not living in the house where Bharti resided. Rajesh had reportedly expired on 6th January 2006. The Judicial Magistrate of 1st Class, Gidderbaha took cognizance of the complaint under the above-mentioned sections on 25.1.1994. ## **Facts** In the case of Neelu Chopra & Anr v. Bharti, the petitioners Neelu Chopra and Krishan Saroop Chopra are husband and wife who have preferred this present appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India for quashing of the complaint made by the respondent Bharti, their daughter-in-law under S.406 and 498A/S.114 of IPC. Quashing of complaints can be done under s.482 by trying to invoke the inherent powers of the Court. Bharti, the respondent, married Rajesh, the son of the current appellants, in the year 1984. However, according to the respondent, Rajesh and his parents, who are the appellants in this case, made exorbitant dowry demands and misbehaved with her, which made her married life difficult. Finally, a complaint was brought before the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Gidderbaha, on December 24, 1993. The learned Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the offences under Sections 406, 498A read with 114 IPC by his order dated 25.1.1994, and the complaint was accepted. The accused people contested this order of cognizance. According to reports, Rajesh passed away on June 6, 2006. But the High Court declined to dismiss the case but did mention that the material on record was insufficient to proceed against the appellants. The court also gave the magistrate the discretionary power to dispense with the personal appearance of the appellants in the case. ## **Issues Raised** 1. Can a complaint be quashed due to the absence of the particulars of the offence in the complaint? 2. Will the prosecution of an accused against whom there is no evidence or allegations that support the crime with which they have been charged, serve the goals of justice? ## **Arguments of the Appellants** 1. Learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellants Mr M.N.Krishnamani narrated the contents of the original complaint along with the present contentions and the allied facts relevant for the determination of the present controversy. 2. The counsel points out that the marriage between Bharti and Rajesh had taken place way back in 1984 and the complaint was filed by the complainant 9 years later on 24.12.1993. 3. He further informs the court that the complainant along with her two daughters from her marriage to Rajesh i.e. the son of the appellants resides in the same house just on another floor. 4. The learned senior counsel says that the complaint against the present appellants is vague and no concrete allegations are there against them. He brings to the notice of the court that the present appellants are aged 76 and 80 respectively. ## **Arguments of the Respondents** In spite of the service of notice by the Hon’ble court, the complainant was not present before the court and also did not have any counsel representing her. ## **Related Provisions** - **Indian Penal Code, 1860[**\[3\]**](#_ftn3)** S.114: “Abettor present when the offence is committed—Whenever any person, who is absent would be liable to be punished as an abettor, is present when the act or offence for which he would be punishable in consequence of the abetment is committed, he shall be deemed to have committed such act or offence.” S.406: “Punishment for criminal breach of trust—Whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, with a fine, or with both.” S.498A: “Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty—Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be pun­ished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation—For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means— [(a)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1776697/) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or [(b)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1824991/) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.” - **The Code of Criminal Procedure,1973[**\[4\]**](#_ftn4)** S.482: “Saving of inherent powers of High Court. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” ## **Judgement** It is clear that the issue became a concern within six months of the marriage. According to the complaint, all of the accused visited the complainant’s parents’ home in Gidderbaha and asked them for more gold and other items as dowry threatening to leave her there otherwise and get Rajesh married again. Rajesh is the subject of the complaint since he allegedly urged the complainant to give his parents the jewellery and clothing so they wouldn’t go misplaced. When the complainant requested the return of the jewellery upon arrival in Delhi, they were not given back. *“When we see the complaint as a whole it is basically against the accused Rajesh. All the allegations are against Rajesh. There is undoubtedly some reference to the present appellants, but what strikes us is that there are no particulars given as to the date on which the ornaments were handed over, as to the exact number of ornaments or their description and as to the date when the ornaments were asked back and were refused. Even the weight of the ornaments is not mentioned in the complaint and it is a general and vague complaint that the ornaments were sometimes given in the custody of the appellants and they were not returned.”[**\[5\]**](#_ftn5)* The judges observed that no particulars were mentioned in the complaint. The type or number of ornaments that were given for safekeeping, the date of when they were given to the appellants or when they were asked back, not even the value and weight of the ornaments were mentioned in the complaint, nothing describing the clothes which were allegedly handed over to Rakhee, the daughter of the appellants was mentioned in the complaints. The witness statements of Dharampal and Bhagwati attesting to the fact that the clothes were indeed handed over to Rakhee were also very vague and could not provide any essential details. The complainant had filed a medical certificate from AIIMS to support her claim that she had been hit. But no date or the name of the person by whom she was beaten or any other particulars of her injury were mentioned in the official complaint. Nothing in the complaint shows what offence the appellants have committed or how exactly can they be charged with the offences that they have been accused of. Rakhee has already been removed from the list of accused on account of her living in a separate house. The charges against Rajesh are however more precisely framed hence a case can be made out against him. The court did not find any material or allegation worth the name against the present appellants, all the allegations appear to be against Rajesh. Keeping in mind the age of Rajesh’s parents who are the present appellants the court rules that allowed the case to proceed would be an abuse of process of law especially when the complainant even after getting directions from the court did not appear or was not represented by any counsel. The order of the High Court and that of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the case is accordingly set aside and the complaint is quashed under S.482 of CrPC ## **Conclusion** A proper complaint must have all the particulars of the offence that is being reported including time, place, date, description and other particulars that constitute the offence and that have occurred in the scenario being reported- mere mentioning of certain sections and their definitions is not enough. Everything that has constituted the offence and every act in connection with it has to be brought to the notice of the court for the case to stand. All of these ‘particulars’ and information were missing in the complaint which had been filed in the case of Neelu Chopra v Bharti. Along with this, the absence of the complainant in spite of a notice from the court showed a lack of vigilance on the part of the complainant. Hence due to all these reasons coupled with the old age of the appellant’s Court rightly quashed the complaint in question thereby setting aside the orders of the High Court and the Magistrate taking cognizance of the case. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) 4th Semester student, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) See S.498A, Indian Penal Code, 1860 [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) See the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Indiakanoon, Last Visited: 23/6/23, 15:41pm **Categories:** Case Analysis, Civil Law Cases **Tags:** #law, #lawfoyer, #lawyer, #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, BHARTI, case analysis, case summary, lawfoyer, NEELU CHOPRA, NEELU CHOPRA & Anr v. BHARTI (2009) --- ### [SALOMON V. SALOMON & CO. LIMITED](https://lawfoyer.in/salomon-v-salomon-co-limited/) **Published:** July 7, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **By Ayush Upadhyay** [\[1\]](#_ftn1) **In the House of Lords** **NAME OF THE CASE**Salomon V. Salomon & Co. Ltd. **CITATION**\[1897\] AC 22, \[1896\] UKHL 1 **DATE OF THE CASE**November 16, 1896 **APPELLANT**Salomon **RESPONDENT**Salomon & Co. Ltd. **BENCH/JUDGE**LORD HALSBURY, LORD HERSCHELL, LORD MACNAGHTEN **STATUS/CONSTITUTION INVOLVED**The Companies Act of 1862 **IMPORTANT SECTIONS/ARTICLES**The Companies Act, 1862 — Section – 6, 8 & 30 ## **Abstract** The core principle involved in Company Law is Separate Legal Personality, out of which the legal structure of modern business was instituted. Corporate veil protects the shareholder’s private assets and gives a method for the limitation of liability which is necessary to increase business development & international trade. Separate Legal Personality (SLP) is one of the most contested facet and stringent produce of Company Law, entrenched a century old principle in Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd. Case. Sometimes a rigid principle may cause damage to the rights of concerned parties who deal with this institution because controllers of the corporation may be utilizing the principle as a defense to accomplish wrong. Thus, the court given some exception to this principle which permits for ‘lifting of the veil’ of the stringent form as furnished in Salomon’s case. However, this principal is distinguished as, the most deep and constant edict of jurisprudential aspect of a corporation. The principle produced in Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd. is still prevailing and forming in modern company law not only in England but also in global governance. ## **Introduction** Separate Legal Personality (SLP) is the initial precept on which company law is formed. Creating the foundation of basic functions and rules that viewed as earnest legal ethics. The Company law is based on a general rule that it is an artificial person, discrete and independent from its directors and shareholders. The directors & shareholders are not personally responsible for the levant of the company. The basic rule dates prior to a century and was evidently set forth in the recognized English case of **Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd.** **Separate Legal Personality –** The concept of SLP generally provides that when a corporate company obtains a document of incorporation it has a ‘distinct legal personality’. In legal aspect, the company embellish a juristic person by its own right. It means basically that if one begins a trade as a limited liability company, then corporation is a distinct legal entity separate from its members or shareholders. Legal personality is a well-known concept of company law. It can set foot into a contract in its own name, sue and be sued by others. When a company is incorporated, it is treated as a separate “legal entity distinct” from its shareholders, promoters, directors, members and employees; and the concept of the corporate veil, separating those parties from the corporate body, has arisen. The issue of “lifting the corporate veil” has been considered by courts and commentators for many years and there are instances in which the courts have negated from the strict application of this doctrine[\[2\]](#_ftn2). ## **FACTS OF THE CASE** In this case, Mr. Salomon continued a business as a leather dealer of boot making. At first run as a single proprietorship. In the year 1892, he established the corporation “Salomon & Co. Ltd.” He included himself, his wife and five of his children in this corporation. The members of the family took the shares for Mr. Salomon because the statute of England related to company law demanded at that time of transfer must be seven shareholders. Mr. Salomon was having true intent with regards to Companies Act, 1862 as a businessman. He proposed to limit his liability and takes the preference debenture-holder over other unsecured creditors, to vend his trade to a limited corporation comprising of himself & six other members of his family. The freshly embodied company acquired the sole leather business. The business of Mr. Salomon was assessed at €39,000. It showed Mr. Salomon’s success in his business. The money was financed €10,000 for the debentures, allowing a possibility over all the assets of corporation. €20,000 shares of €1 apiece, the remaining of €9,000 was given to Salomon in cash. Mr. Salomon at this point took €20,001 shares in the corporation & his family member took the remaining 6 shares. Thus, he was a second creditor as he held debenture. Therefore, his personal liability of the debt of trade had turned absolutely from limitless to limited liability. Mr. Salomon no longer responsible personally, as he had also managed director of the corporation. Thus, if the company failed, not only would Mr. Salomon have no personal liability for the debts of the company, but whatsoever assets were left, would be claimed by him to pay off the company’s debt to him[\[3\]](#_ftn3). Therefore, things did not good for leather boot making business, and under one-year, Appellant Mr. Salomon had to vend his debenture to secure the trade. On liquidation, the price of assets was distinguished as €6,000 for liability, €10,000 for debentures, & €7,000 for unsecured creditors. Therefore, after remitting to the debenture holders no money would be remain for the unsecured debts. This company did not have the required outcome, and the corporation was located in insolvent liquidation. The liquidator on account of unsecured creditors claimed that the corporation was not more than “alias” or agent of Mr. Salomon, therefore he was personally responsible for the debt of the corporation. ## **ISSUE RAISED BEFORE THE COURT** **1**. Whether Salomon & Co. Ltd. was legally incorporated company? **2**. Whether Mr. Salomon was personally responsible for the debts of the Corporation? ## **ARGUMENTS FROM THE APPELLANT SIDE** **1**. Learned Solicitor on behalf of Mr. Salomon argued that he was not personally responsible for the debts of the corporation because the company was a distinct legal entity from its members, as perceived by the Companies Act, 1862. **2**. Learned Solicitor again argued that the rule of limited liability enshrined and applied to the shareholders, and therefore, he was only responsible for the sum of his share capital. **3.** Learned Solicitor contended that my client Mr. Salomon was not liable merely on the ground of having majority of shares in the company. Therefore, I request honourable My Lords to remove the wrong allegation made by respondents earlier in lower courts. ## **ARGUMENTS FROM THE RESPONDENTS SIDE** **1**. Learned Solicitor for the appellant side argued that Mr. Salomon had utilized the company for evading personal responsibility for the debts of the corporation. Therefore, he should be liable to pay the estimate amounts of debts occurred upon the corporation. **2**.Learned Solicitor claimed that the appellant had a majority of shares in the company, and that he was formed this so-called company for avoiding his risk. Solicitor continued that appellant had intentionally construct the company to deceive his unsecured creditors. **3.** Solicitor of respondent side made the contention that Mr. Salomon had never wanted to create this company for enhancement of profit of members. Therefore, his intention was centred on avoiding to pay debts. **4.** Learned Solicitor on behalf of respondent side contended that the Company was a fake and deceptive institution which had deviously taken money from the creditors to put risk on them. ## **Related Provision** - **The Companies Act, 1862[**\[4\]**](#_ftn4)** **Section 6 – Mode of forming company – Any seven or more persons associated for any lawful purpose may, by subscribing their names to a memorandum of association, and otherwise complying with the requisitions of this Act in respect of registration, form an incorporated company, with or without limited liability[\[5\]](#_ftn5). **Section 8 – Memorandum of association of a company limited shares –** Where a company is formed on the principle of having the liability of its members limited to the amount unpaid on their shares, hereinafter referred to as a company limited by shares, the Memorandum of Association shall contain the following things’ the third of which was ‘objects for which the proposed company is to be established[\[6\]](#_ftn6). **Section 30 – No entry of trusts on register – No notice of any trust, expressed, implied, or constructive, shall be entered on register, or be receivable by registrar, in the case of companies under this Act and registered in England or Ireland[\[7\]](#_ftn7). ## **Judgement** Finally, after the long run, the House of Lords disagreed the allegations of the opposite party, and upheld the appellant’s statement that the Company was separate legal personality from its members and shareholders by slight majority of 3/2. The House of Lords also vindicated strongly the doctrine of legal personality, as mentioned in the Companies Act, 1862, by that creditors of insolvent corporation would not have right to solicit the company’s shareholders to pay their debts. My Lordships also accentuated that the company incorporated in adherence with the rule of the Companies Act is a distinct person and not an agent of its owner or controller. In their decision my Lordships also averred that the exert of debentures in lieu of shares can facilitate investors risk. The House of Lords, on appeal, overturned the Court of Appeal’s judgement, and concertedly opined that, as the corporation was aptly enunciated, it is a distinct & independent person. My Lordships observed that Mr. Salomon accompanied the essential approach to form the company. Mr. Salomon has legally incorporated since the company Act solely required 7 members taking minimum one share apiece. The Court accompanied that the members and shareholders of the company were contingent to the doctrine of limited liability & could not be responsible personally for the debts of the firm mor than the value of their shares. Thus, in the case of **Jennings v. Crown Prosecution Service[**\[8\]**](#_ftn8)** held that the legal fiction of “corporate veil” between the company and its owners/controllers was firmly created by the Salomon case. In the words of **Lord Halsbury, Either the limited company was a legal entity or it was not. If it was, the business belonged to it and not to Mr. Salomon, who is often referred to as Salomon. If it was not, there was no person and nothing to be an agent at all; and it is impossible to say at the same time that there is a company and there is not[\[9\]](#_ftn9). In the words of **Lord Herschell,** He noted and reasoned his approach on Court of Appeal’s logic and that earlier many companies had been formed in which more that one share holders were not interested person who did not hold any impact over the corporation. So that, any person merchandising with such type of company was definitely acquainted of its character, and could by conferring the record of shareholders become sensible of the division of share proprietorship out of shareholders. In the words of **Lord McNaughten, My Lordship asked what was wrong with appellant picking benefit of the particular provisions enshrined in the Act, as he was absolutely legitimate to do. It was not a concern of the Judges to convey limitation in the Act so that, if the laws of particular land permitted, they were deserving severe criticism. In the case of **Macaura v. Northen Assurance Co**.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) held that property of the company affiliates to it & not with sole members, by that even if its majority shareholder has no absolute interest in the assets of the corporation. For these aforesaid reasons, My Lordships are of opinion that the appellant’s claim should be allowed and order of the Court of Appeal altered & cross appeal dismissed with costs. ## **Conclusion** The landmark case on company law Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd. entrenched the key principle of separate legal entity and limited liability of the corporations. These important doctrines have had extensive connotations for administration of company, protection of minority shareholders, and use of defrauding. As has been enunciated, once a corporation has applied with the provisions of the Companies Act, it will definitely be formed. The concept of lifting of the corporate veil was established after the epoch-making verdict in Salomon’s case where no person could escape behindhand the company’s distinct entity to do fraud and evade any responsibility. In this case it was observed that no wrong or illegal act has been caused by appellant and he was legitimately the sole creditor of the firm and has an absolute right to be financed while ending of the company ahead of the unsecured creditors as Mr. Salomon’s debt was annexed by levy in regard to the company’s assets. Soon after the judgement in Salomon’s case was pronounced, the Parliament responded by passing **§ 2** and **3** of **the Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Amendment Act, 1897[**\[11\]**](#_ftn11).** This case has evolved a groundbreaking effort in administration of modern company law, and that verdict has been antecedent in several issues in the world. Conclusively, I can say that this famous case has established key immunity for the stockholders and creditors, and has also encourage the various sources for lucrative growth in investments. In the extending prospective of jurisprudential aspects of the company, it is permissible to raise the corporate veil. However, it will depend upon several aspects in relation with the management and administration in company. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) LL.B.(Hons.) 4th Semester Student at University of Allahabad, Prayagraj, Uttar Pradesh. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Dahal, Rajib, Salomon v Salomon: Its Impact on Modern Laws on Corporations, SSRN, (April 26, 2018), <> accessed 25 June 2023. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Oladotun Gbolagunte, Salomon v Salomon: Relevance to modern Company Law, LinkedIn, (December 8, 2016), <> accessed 25 June, 2023. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) The Companies Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 89), Acts of Parliament, 1862(United Kingdom). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) See The Companies Act, 1862, § 6. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) See The Companies Act, 1862, § 8. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) See The Companies Act, 1862, § 30. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Jennings v. Crown Prosecution Service, 2008 UKHL 29. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Wikipedia contributors, Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd. Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, (March 10, 2023), <[https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Salomon\_v\_A\_Salomon\_%26\_Co\_Ltd&oldid=1143862578](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Salomon_v_A_Salomon_%26_Co_Ltd&oldid=1143862578)> accessed 26 June, 2023. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Macaura v. Northen Assurance Co. (1925) AC 626. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) The Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Amendment Act, 1897, (60 & 61 Vict. c. 19), Acts of Parliament, 1897(United Kingdom). **Categories:** Case Analysis, Corporate Law Cases **Tags:** #lawfoyer, #lawyer, #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, case analysis, case summary, lawfoyer, SALOMON V. SALOMON, SALOMON V. SALOMON & CO. LIMITED --- ### [Gajanan Dashrath Kharate VS. State Of  Maharashtra](https://lawfoyer.in/gajanan-dashrath-kharate-vs-state-of-maharashtra/) **Published:** July 7, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **(By Eeshmitha rajani**[\[1\]](#_ftn1)**)** **(IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA)** **NAME OF THE CASE****GA Gajanan Dashrath Kharate VS. State of Maharashtra** **CITATION**Criminal Appeal No.2057 of 2010**DATE OF THE CASE**26 February 2016**APPELLANT** GAGajanan Dashrath Kharate **RESPONDENT**State Of Maharashtra**BENCH/JUDGE**T.S.THAKUR (J) , R. BANUMATI (J)**STATUES/CONSTITUTION** **INVOLVED**Indian Penal Code 1860; Indian Evidence Act 1872**IMPORTANT SECTIONS/ARTICLES**India Penal Code 1860- Section-302 Criminal procedure code,1973 – Section-313 Indian Evidence Act –section-106 ## **ABSTRACT–** This was a murder case in which the victim was slain by his son, the complaint was filed at police stations against him via the Prosecution Witnesses (PW-1) who lived next door to the deceased Who was also his cousin. , and while the accused had been arrested and interrogated by police, he made a statement that resulted in the recovery of crucial evidence, namely, the accused clothes were covered with blood stains, on analysis the blood groups on the clothes matched the blood type of the deceased. When the case was heard in court, based on all of the facts and seven witnesses produced by the prosecution, the court affirmed the verdict and sentenced him to life imprisonment with a certain fine. Dissatisfied, the accused filed an appeal in the high court also denied the petition, retaining the lower court’s decision. As a result, the accused approached the Supreme Court. After hearing both sides’ arguments, and reviewing the prosecution’s testimonies, and oral evidence of witnesses, the court held that according to section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, the court said it is the accused responsibility to explain how his father sustained injuries. Since the accused refuses to speak, he is presumed to be the one at fault. The Supreme Court has provided cases that illustrate when Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act of 1872 is applicable. Additionally, it was decided that since both lower courts had rendered appropriate judgment, the Supreme Court did not need to get involved. The accused appeal was likewise denied, and the penalty will continue. ## **INTRODUCTION–** In criminal cases the burden of proof plays a vital it was provided in Chapter VII of the Indian Evidence Act,1872 explains the burden of proof. In civil case burden of proof always lies on the petitioner and in criminal cases, the defendant/prosecution are bound to prove the facts. The Legal maxim-[Res Ipsa Loquitor](https://www.legalserviceindia.com/articles/Res_Ipsa_Loquitur.htm#:~:text=Res%20Ipsa%20Loquitur%20is%20a,proof%20shifts%20to%20the%20defendant.) means ‘The thing speaks it selves was applied in the burden of proof. In a Simplified way, it means the court that- Responsibility is laid on a party to prove the facts or claims of certain issues in legal proceedings. **BURDEN OF PROOF-** Scope of the burden of proof changes as per the circumstances of the case. Various section of the Evidence Act is applicable depending on the situation of the fact. Section 101 of the Evidence Act, of 1872 explains that “Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist”[\[2\]](#_ftn2). It was said that in criminal cases prosecution would have the burden of proving the fact but in the present case interpreted that as per the evidence exhibited by the prosecution, the court said according to section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act,1872 accused has burden to prove the facts or claim, in other words, he has to explain his father’s death. Therefore not Receiving any clarification from the appellant side, the court confirmed the guilt of the convict based on the evidence and dismissed the appeal, and ordered him to continue the sentence imposed on him by the below court. ## **ISSUES OF THE CASE-** – Whether responsibility to prove the claim also relies on the appellant or not? – What are the circumstances for implementing section-106 of the Indian Evidence Act? ## **FACTS OF THE CASE-** The foundation of the current appeal rest upon the emerging facts of the case- Nagoarao Kharate PW-1(Prosecution witness) who was a resident of dapura village, lives beside the house of the named Dashrath(deceased), and his son- Gajanan Kharate (accused-appellant). Nagoarao Kharate was also the cousin brother of the victim. On 08.04.2002 evening at 5:00 Nagoarao Kharate who was acquainted with the Dashrath filed an FIR in boregoan manju police station that on 7-04-2002 around 8:30 P.M., he overheard an argument between appellant-accused Gajanan Kharate and his father Dashrath, till up to 10’o clock in the night he listened to the cry of Dashrath. He didn’t intervene in the middle of the fight because such fights were recurrent in their house. But on 8.04.2002 morning, Madhukar Kharate (PW-4) informed Nagoarao Kharate (PW-1) that Dashrath was died and was blood-soaked on the floor of his house. He immediately rushed to check on him, Nagoarao found him on the ground lifeless. He was lying down on the floor, covered with a pool of blood, and beside him, there was a stone splotched in blood. Then he immediately rushed to boregoan manju, police station to give a complaint for an offence under section 302 of IPC. The accused of the case the victim’s son Gajanan was arrested on 9.04.2002. Hanuman Rathod (PW-7) who was investigating the case and in charge of the police station took the statements of witnesses. The autopsy was done by Dr. Prashant Agrawal, he had stated in the report that the person had passed away due to the severe injuries on his head and his crucial organs. While the accused was under police custody he made a confession statement which lead to getting the clothes of the accused which has blood stains. While they were sent for chemical analysis it was confirmed that the clothes have ‘B’ group blood, which was identical to the victim’s blood group. This turned out to be crucial evidence. After the investigation was done a charge sheet was filed against Gajanan the accused-appellant for the offence under section 302 of IPC, 1860 in the session’s court. The prosecution had meticulously examined seven witnesses of this particular case and several circumstantial evidence were preceded before the court to prove the conviction of the appellant. According to [section 313](https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC_CEN_5_23_000010_197402_1517807320555&orderno=356) of Cr.p.c, 1973, the accused was questioned regarding the produced circumstance and evidence about the murder of his father. But he denied all the allegations and said that false evidence was produced to set him up. Relied upon the oral evidence and circumstances, besides the accused reluctance to explain the death of his father, the session court sentenced the appellant-accused to life imprisonment and a fine up to Rs 1000 under section 302 of I.P.C. The accused being indignant, placed an appeal before the high court of Mumbai, but the court denied the appeal confirming the crime done by the accused-appellant and again imposed life imprisonment. The accused has now filed an appeal with the Supreme Court. Taking into account the appellant’s and prosecution’s contentions, as well as the oral statements of the witnesses plus several evidences produced by the prosecution to prove the crime of the accused, the apex court stated that according to section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 burden of proof is not always dependent on the prosecution but also on the member residing in the house. ## **ARGUMENTS OF APPELLANT-** - The learned counsel of the appellant- Mr. Praveen Chaturvedi argued on a point that the court had not noticed, Nagoarao Kharate (pw-1) and his wife (pw-2) were not the direct eyewitnesses of the incident because on 08.04.2002 morning, Nagorarao -PW-1 came to know about the death of the deceased by PW-4 madhukar Kharate who said ‘deceased was lying on the floor died, in a pool of blood’. - The appellant’s counsel brought a predominant issue about the delay in reporting the FIR at the police station, the delay in filing of FIR given raised suspensions on the prosecution. He stated that the prosecution didn’t give any response on this point. ## **ARGUMENTS OF RESPONDENT-** - The learned counsel of respondent- Mr. Kunal Cheema representing the state, contented that the below courts have correctly viewed PW-1 and PW-2 as the eyewitnesses of this conviction, as both witnesses’ testimonies of the conviction were relevant to each other. - The Prosecution witness-1 (PW-1) said the accused was habituated to drinking and gambling. Used to demand money from his parent so thinking this dispute was common and also with fear didn’t interfere in the quarrel. - He continued to say that, according to the prosecution’s evidence, the appellant-accused was in the house on 7.04.2002 night. When questioned about how the deceased incurred injuries, the prosecution received nothing but silence from the appellant. Along with that prosecution, clearly with evidence of PW-1 elucidated the delay in lodging the complaint at the police station. ## **RELATED PROVISIONS-** - **India Penal Code 1860**– **Section-302:** **Punishment for murder**.—whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or 1\[imprisonment for life\], and shall also be liable to fine[\[3\]](#_ftn3). - **Criminal Procedure Code, 1973-** **Section-313:** **Power to examine the accused**– - In every inquiry or trial for the purpose of enabling the accused personally to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, the court- - may at any stage, without previously warning the accused, put such questions to him as the Court considers necessary; - shall, after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before he is called on for his defence, question him generally on the case: Provided that in a summons- case, where the Court has dispensed with the personal attendance of the accused, it may also dispense with his examination under clause (b). - No oath shall be administered to the accused when he is examined under sub-section(1) - The accused shall not render himself liable to punishment by refusing to answer such questions, or by giving false answers to them. - The answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which such answers may tend to show he has committed[\[4\]](#_ftn4). - **Indian Evidence Act, 1872:** **Section 106:** **Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge-** When any fact is especially within the knowledge of person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him[\[5\]](#_ftn5). ## **JUDGMENT-** The judges on the bench have thoroughly examined the facts presented in the case and have concluded that “As stated in the prosecution’s evidence, Dashrath (deceased), his wife Manakarnabai, and his son (the appellant-accused) were living together. Nagoarao Kharate (PW-1) lived adjacent to their house and was also the deceased’s cousin. On 7.02.2002, Dashrath’s wife went to another village, Dahigaon. The prosecution has successfully proven that the accused was at home with his father on that night. In cases like a murder committed privately within a house, the prosecution bears the primary burden of proof. But besides that According to Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, the court said in that cases the occupants of the house are required to provide a plausible explanation regarding how the crime was committed. Remaining silent or offering no response is not an excuse, as the burden lies on the accused to explain. Since the accused-appellant did not provide any clarification regarding his father’s death, it was considered strong evidence that he had committed the murder. This principle was explained in the case of [**Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v.** **State of Maharashtra**](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/845834/ "Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra")[\[6\]](#_ftn6), “where it was noted that if the accused fails to offer an explanation for their spouse’s injuries or provides a false explanation, it becomes a strong indication of their guilt”. Similarly, in the case of **[Nika Ram v. State of H.P](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/866760/#:~:text=The%20Judgment%20of%20the%20Court,and%20was%20sentenced%20to%20death. "Nika Ram v. State of H.P")**[\[7\]](#_ftn7)**.,** it was observed that “the accused was alone with his wife in his house when she was murdered with a “khukuri.” The strained relationship between the accused and his wife, coupled with the absence of any plausible explanation, pointed to his guilt.” In **[Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/410114/#:~:text=The%20Trial%20Court%20acquitted%20all,has%20preferred%20the%20present%20appeal. "Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra")**[\[8\]](#_ftn8)**,** the Supreme Court held that “according to Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr. P.C), 1973, the appellant must provide a reasonable explanation for denying the prosecution’s case. The absence of an explanation was deemed inconsistent with the accused innocence but consistent with the hypothesis that the appellant is the prime accused in the murder of his wife.” After examining relevant cases, including oral evidence and the circumstances surrounding the recovery of blood-stained clothes belonging to the accused, and considering the accused refused to provide any justification, the court, in agreement with the trial court and high court’s concurrent findings, appropriately punished the appellant-accused for the offense under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860. The court sees no reason to disagree with the impugned judgment.” ## **CONCLUSION-** The application of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, which was considered an exception to both Section 101 and the general rule of burden of proof. This section applies when knowledge about a specific fact is solely possessed by a particular individual. It is important to note that if there is even a slight possibility of someone else having knowledge of the claim, this section will not be invoked. In the present case, the prosecution has established that the accused was the inside the house with his father on 7th night . Therefore, he had an absolute obligation to prove his claim regarding the cause of his father’s death. In my conclusion I would say that, the apex court correctly applied Section 106 in this case, which became a crucial factor leading to the conviction of the appellant. In the recent case of **[Sabitri Samantaray vs. State of Odisha](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/105371585/ "Sabitri Samantaray vs. State of Odisha")**[\[9\]](#_ftn9)**,** the Supreme Court provided a comprehensive explanation of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, stating that it applies when the prosecution establishes a chain of events connecting the accused. This section ensures that the accused cannot remain silent when they have a duty to prove their claim. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) 5th Semester Student at Andhra University, Andhra Pradesh [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) See The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Section 101. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See The Indian Penal Code,section 302, . [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) See in The Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973,Section 313 . [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) See The Indian Evidence Act, 1872,section 106. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Trimukh Maroti Kirkan vs State Of Maharashtra(2006) 10 SCC 681 . [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Nika Ram vs The State Of Himachal Pradesh (1972) 2 SCC 80. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Ganeshlal vs State Of Maharashtra(1992) 3 SCC 106 . [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Sabitri Samantaray vs The State Of Odisha (2017) Crl App No.988 of 2017. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases **Tags:** #law, #lawfoyer, #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, case analysis, case summary, Gajanan Dashrath Kharate, Gajanan Dashrath Kharate VS. State Of  Maharashtra, lawfoyer --- ### [Khujji @ Surendra Tiwari vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh](https://lawfoyer.in/khujji-surendra-tiwari-vs-the-state-of-madhya-pradesh/) **Published:** July 7, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** by Shramana Paul[\[1\]](#_ftn1) **Before the Supreme Court of India** NAME OF THE CASEKhujji @ Surendra Tiwari vs The State of Madhya PradeshCITATION1991 SCR (3) 1DATE OF THE CASE16th July 1991APPELLANTKHUJJI @ SURENDRA TIWARI RESPONDENTTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH BENCH/JUDGEJustice Ahmadi, A.M.STATUTES/CONSTITUTION INVOLVEDIndian Evidence Act, 1872 Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 Indian Penal Code,1860IMPORTANT SECTIONS/ARTICLESArticle 136, The Constitution of India, S.27, S.34, S.149 of the Indian Evidence Act, S. 34,149,302,324 of the Indian Penal Code; S.174, S.313, S.386 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure## **ABSTRACT** The current appeal had been filed against the decision of the High Court convicting the accused Khujji. The Supreme Court has the power to hear the appeal under Art.136 of the Constitution of India, which deals with special leave petitions. Khujji had been granted a Special Leave to Appeal by the apex Court of India against the order/judgement of the High Court. The questions of law which had come up before the Supreme Court were whether the accused’s conviction under S.302 was sustainable and whether he could be convicted with the aid of S.34 and S.149 when his co-accuseds’ had been released. ## **INTRODUCTION** ‘Murder’ is the act of killing a person with the intention to kill. The case discussed here is one of Murder, where the appellant has been convicted under S.302 of the Indian Penal Code by both the Trial court and the High Court of Madhya Pradesh for the murder of a man named Gulab. Certain companions of Khujji had also been accused of the same but they had been acquitted by the Trial court and no appeal had been preferred against their conviction by the State. Murder has been defined under S.300 of IPC as- “Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or— *2ndly*.—If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or— *3rdly*.—If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or— *4thly*.—If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.”[\[2\]](#_ftn2) Gulab had been chased and struck with a knife by Khujji and his companions several times and had succumbed to his injuries at the murder spot itself. Gulab’s companion Ramesh, rickshaw puller Kishan Lal and another resident of the area were eyewitnesses to the incident. ## **FACTS OF THE CASE** Khujji alias Surendra Tiwari, the appellant was found guilty in both the trial court and the High Court and hence has preferred this present appeal before the Supreme Court of India with the special leave of the court. The accused has been charged with S.302 of IPC for killing one Gulab at Sujji Mohalla. The deceased Gulab and his friend PW4 Ramesh Chander hired a Rickshaw on the evening of May 20, 1978, to travel to Dr. Mukherjee’s dispensary, according to the circumstances that led to this appeal. In Suji Mohalla, close to Panchsheel Talkies, PW 3 Kishan Lal was driving the Rickshaw when the appellant and his companions surrounded the vehicle and attacked the deceased and his companion.The first person to be hurt by a cycle chain was PW 4. PW 4 and Gulab both leapt when they sensed peril. The PW4 ran towards Panchsheel Talkies while the deceased Gulab ran towards Sujji Mohalla where the assailants followed him and stabbed him to death. His friend Ramesh was lucky to escape with a few injuries but Gulab succumbed to his injuries on the spot. The medical report and the evidence of Dr Nagpal showed that Gulab had received 3 major injuries- (i) Damage in the Intercostal area and a penetrating stab wound on the right rib. (ii) a piercing stab wound 8cms below the scapular bone and 8cms outside the vertebral column (iii) Another incised deep wound was found on the frontal auxiliary line on the left hipocardium region. Dr Nagpal who is PW 12 and had performed the post-mortem of Gulab stated that injury (i) which had struck the heart of the victim was enough to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Hence it is clear that Gulab had died a homicidal death. The First Information Report had been filed by Ramesh (PW4) immediately after the incident and the same was noted by PW 13 Ramji Singh, the investigating officer, at around 9.15 p.m. PW 4 provided information about the incident and provided the names of all six attackers in the aforementioned first information report. The investigating officer visited the scene of the incident shortly after the initial information report was filed and created the Panchnama, from which a preliminary plan was created. The police were unable to trace the appellant and some of his companions till May 22, 1978, after which they were interrogated. The Investigating Officer called two witnesses, PW 5 Panna Lal and Rajinder, to serve as Panch witnesses after the appellant and his companions indicated a readiness to find the weapons used in the crime. ## **ISSUES RAISED** - Does the conviction of the appellant under S.302 of IPC have sufficient grounds? ## **ARGUMENTS OF APPELLANTS/ DEFENDANTS** 1. Mr. Lalit, the counsel for the appellant went over the entire evidence presented by the prosecution and argued that the prosecution’s version of the incident, particularly the appellant’s involvement, is highly improbable because Ramesh, who had filed the First Information Report and had been a witness to the events preceding Gulab’s death had himself disowned statements he had made in the FIR thereby put a question on its correctness and reliability. 2. It is further submitted that PW 1 Komal Chand’s presence at the scene of the incident at that time was exceedingly improbable, and his behaviour in remaining silent and refusing to assist the victim only served to confirm this suspicion. The said witness lived at a distance of two furlongs from the place where the tragedy took place and he claims to have witnessed it from a point which was 22 feet away. the sketch of the locality which has been provided makes it clear that nothing could have been clearly seen from such a great distance due to the conditions of the locality in question. Since the High Court had upheld the appellant’s conviction on the basis of PW1’s statements hence it is not sustainable. 3. Mr. Lalit contended that the High Court ought not to have interfered with the appreciation of his evidence by the trial court. It can be proved that PW5 is a stock witness for the prosecution in court as he (PW5) and Rajinder had been used for every Panchama of discovery as well as the attachment of the appellant’s garments and other things. Also, it was Tulsi Ram the brother of the deceased who had chosen him as he was closely associated with the family of the deceased and was close to Babulal another brother of the deceased. Therefore, he said, there could be no reliance on PW 5’s testimony, and as a result, the discovery of human blood on the weapon and the pants loses any probative value. 4. The counsel contends that his substantive conviction under section 302 cannot be upheld in the absence of conclusive proof that injury No. 1(which could have caused death under natural conditions) was exclusively the result of the appellant’s fault. The simple discovery of human blood on the appellant’s firearm and pants, according to Mr. Lalit, is of absolutely no significance because the serologist’s report does not identify the blood group of the stains. He places reliance on the Supreme Court cases of [Kansa Behera v. State of Orissa](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1594055/)[\[3\]](#_ftn3), in which the court observed ***“few small bloodstains could be of the appellant himself and in the absence of evidence regarding blood group it cannot conclusively connect the bloodstains with the blood of the deceased. In these circumstances this Court refused to draw any inference of guilt on the basis of the said circumstance since it was not ‘conclusive’ evidence”[**\[4\]**](#_ftn4)*** and [Surinder Singh v. State of Punjab](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/38598075/)[\[5\]](#_ftn5) which states, ***“the evidence regarding the find of human blood on the knife sufficient to convict the appellant in the absence of determination of blood group”.[**\[6\]**](#_ftn6)*** In that scenario, he may only be found guilty of causing hurt under Section 324 of the IPC. He further argued that he could not be found guilty under sections 34 or 149 IPC because his friends were exonerated and the State did not file an appeal against their exoneration. The acquittal of the co-accused creates a legal bar against the conviction of the appellant on the ground that they were privy to the crime notwithstanding their acquittal and this legal bar cannot be got over by reappreciation of evidence. To support this claim the counsel brings to the notice of the court the five-judge bench decision of [Krishna Govind Patil V. State of Maharashtra](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/939953/)[\[7\]](#_ftn7), which is given by a bench larger than the Brathi’s case. 5. However, the appellant’s counsel also submits that a string of cases by this Court have established the law and that if all named accused are exonerated save one, the latter cannot be convicted under sections 34 or 149 of the IPC. He also submitted a few judgments in support of his such claim, namely- The State of Orissa[\[8\]](#_ftn8), [Kasturi Lal v. The State of Haryana](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1431584/)[\[9\]](#_ftn9), Chandubhai Shanabhai Parmar v. State of Gujarat[\[10\]](#_ftn10) and [Sukh ](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/127034617/)[\[11\]](#_ftn11). 6. Lastly the counsel contends that there is incredibly flimsy and insufficient evidence to support a conviction, especially given that the trial court disregarded the testimony of all three eyewitnesses and cast doubt on the facts in the initial information report. The High Court erred by ignoring PW 1 Komal Chand’s cross-examination statement, which indicated that his testimony regarding the appellant’s identification was highly dubious. The High Court was not justified in drawing the premature conclusion that the accused party had been successful in swaying him by coercion or other means just because there was a lag between his examination-in-chief and his cross-examination. *“**Not a single witness had deposed that the fatal injury was caused by the appellant.”*** ## **ARGUMENTS OF RESPONDENTS/PROSECUTION** 1. The counsel for the respondent mainly placed reliance on the statements of the eye-witnesses including the victim’s friend Ramesh (PW4), the rickshaw puller Kishan Lal (PW3) and an onlooker Komal Chand (PW1) along with the blood discovered on the weapon on the appellant’s instance and on the clothing he was wearing when he was arrested. 2. The prosecution’s argument is that the appellant and his companions made specific confessional admissions in front of these witnesses under section 27 of the Evidence Act, which allowed for the finding of the criminally used weapons. The Prosecution alleges that the appellant Khujji discovered a (Chhura) knife in his garage which had bloodlike stains. Chemical analysis revealed that those were human-blood stains. His other two companions, Parsu and Guddu were also found to possess a knife and chura. 3. Khujji’s shirt and trousers had what appeared to be blood stains on them. According to the investigation and chemical report, there were human blood spots on the trousers. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh has come to the conclusion that the witnesses who had turned hostile had been won over or succumbed to the threat of the appellants. This conclusion was drawn based on PW3’s statements in which he states ***“he was severely beaten on the night previous to his appearance in court as a witness.” [**\[12\]**](#_ftn12)*** 4. The trial court erred in rejecting PWs 3 and 4’s testimony simply because they were labelled hostile, as according to Mr. Prithvi Singh, the learned counsel for the State, who argued that their testimony was not completely against the prosecution on that basis. He argued that just because the prosecution chose to classify them as hostile on the narrow topic of who the attackers were, their testimony could not be considered to have been erased from the record. Their evidence regarding the occurrence of the crime and the number of people involved in the commission can be relied upon along with that of PW 1’s. he however agreed with the High Court in brushing off the statements of these witnesses during the cross-examination. 5. Counsel argued that because the inquest report was only being prepared to record the physical condition of the body and any visible signs of harm at the time, it was not legally required to include the names of the witnesses. Regarding the value that should be assigned to the testimony of Panch Witness PW 5, counsel argued that there was no evidence against this witness and that the appellant had not explained in his statement recorded in accordance with Section 313 of the Code the reason for there being human blood on the weapon and the trousers attached from him. 6. Regarding the offence committed by the appellant, counsel made a submission stating that if it is established that more than one person engaged in the assault, section 34 or section 149 of the IPC may be used to convict the appellant of killing the victim, even it the conviction is not sustainable under S.302, if the court determines that more than one person—possibly six or seven of them—launched the attack on the deceased. In this regard, he argued that the Supreme Court is not constrained by the Trial Court’s or even the High Court’s evaluation of the evidence, so it is possible for it to come to its own conclusion about the number of people who attacked the deceased despite the Trial Court’s acquittal of others. To support his contention the counsel relied on on this Court’s recent decision in [Brathi v. State of Punjab](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/247105/)[\[13\]](#_ftn13). ## **RELATED PROVISIONS** - **The Constitution of India[**\[14\]**](#_ftn14)** Article 136: Special Leave to Appeal by the Supreme Court “(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India (2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.” - **The Indian Penal Code[**\[15\]**](#_ftn15)** S.34: “*Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.—*When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.” S.149: ‘*Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object*.’ “If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.’’ S.302: ‘‘*Punishment for murder***.** Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death or \[imprisonment for life\], and shall also be liable to fine.’’ S.324: ‘*Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means.*’ “Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.” - **The Code of Criminal Procedure[**\[16\]**](#_ftn16)** S.174: “ *Police to enquire and report on suicide, etc.* (1) When the officer in charge of a police station or some other police officer specially empowered by the State Government in that behalf receives information that a person has committed suicide, or has been killed by another or by an animal or by machinery or by an accident, or has died under circumstances raising a reasonable suspicion that some other person has committed an offence, he shall immediately give intimation thereof to the nearest Executive Magistrate empowered to hold inquests, and, unless otherwise directed by any rule prescribed by the State Government, or by any general or special order of the District or Sub-divisional Magistrate, shall proceed to the place where the body of such deceased person is, and there, in the presence of two or more respectable inhabitants of the neighbourhood, shall make an investigation, and draw up a report of the apparent cause of death, describing such wounds, fractures, bruises, and other marks of injury as may be found on the body, and stating in what manner, or by what weapon or instrument (if any); such marks appear to have been inflicted. (2) The report shall be signed by such police officer and other persons, or by so many of them as concur therein, and shall be forthwith forwarded to the District Magistrate or the Sub-divisional Magistrate. (3)1\[When– (i) the case involves suicide by a woman within seven years of her marriage; or (ii) the case relates to the death of a woman within seven years of her marriage in any circumstances raising a reasonable suspicion that some other person committed an offence in relation to such woman; or (iii) the case relates to the death of a woman within seven years of her marriage and any relative of the woman has made a request in this behalf; or (iv) there is any doubt regarding the cause of death; or (v) the police officer for any other reason considers it expedient so to do, he shall\], subject to such rules as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf, forward the body, with a view to its being examined, to the nearest Civil Surgeon, or other qualified medical man appointed in this behalf by the State Government, if the state of the weather and the distance admit of its being so forwarded without risk of such putrefaction on the road as would render such examination useless. (4) The following Magistrates are empowered to hold inquests, namely, any District Magistrate or Sub-divisional Magistrate and any other Executive Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government or the District Magistrate.” S.313: *Power to examine the accused.* “(1) In every inquiry or trial, for the purpose of enabling the accused personally to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, the Court– (a) may at any stage, without previously warning the accused put such questions to him as the Court considers necessary; (b) shall, after the witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and before he is called on for his defence, question him generally on the case: Provided that in a summons-case, where the Court has dispensed with the personal attendance of the accused, it may also dispense with his examination under clause (b). (2) No oath shall be administered to the accused when he is examined under sub-section (1). (3) The accused shall not render himself liable to punishment by refusing to answer such questions, or by giving false answers to them. (4) The answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which such answers may tend to show he has committed. \[(5) The Court may take help of Prosecutor and Defence Counsel in preparing relevant questions which are to be put to the accused and the Court may permit filing of written statement by the accused as sufficient compliance of this section.\]” S.386(1)b: *Powers of the Appellate Court* “After perusing such record and hearing the appellant or his pleader, if he appears, and the Public Prosecutor if he appears, and in case of an appeal under section 377 or section 378, the accused, if he appears, the Appellate Court may, if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering, dismiss the appeal, or may— (b) in an appeal from a conviction— (i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused, or order him to be re-tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such Appellate Court or committed for trial, or (ii) alter the finding, maintaining the sentence, or (iii) with or without altering the finding, alter the nature or the extent, or the nature and extent, of the sentence, but not so as to enhance the same” - **The Indian Evidence Act[**\[17\]**](#_ftn17)** S.27: *How much of information received from accused, may be proved.* “Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police-officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.” S.34: *Entries in books of account when relevant.* “\[Entries in the books of account, including those maintained in an electronic form\], regularly kept in the course of business, are relevant whenever they refer to a matter into which the Court has to inquire, but such statements shall not alone be sufficient evidence to charge any person with liability.” S.148: *Court to decide when question shall be asked and when witness compelled to answer.* “If any such question relates to a matter not relevant to the suit or proceeding, except in so far as it affects the credit of the witness by injuring his character, the Court shall decide whether or not the witness shall be compelled to answer it, and may, if it thinks fit, warn the witness that he is not obliged to answer it. In exercising its discretion, the Court shall have regard to the following considerations: — (1) such questions are proper if they are of such a nature that the truth of the imputation conveyed by them would seriously affect the opinion of the Court as to the credibility of the witness on the matter to which he testifies; (2) such questions are improper if the imputation which they convey relates to matters so remote in time, or of such a character, that the truth of the imputation would not affect, or would affect in a slight degree, the opinion of the Court as to the credibility of the witness on the matter to which he testifies; (3) such questions are improper if there is a great disproportion between the importance of the imputation made against the witnesss character and the importance of his evidence; (4) the Court may, if it sees fit, draw, from the witnesss refusal to answer, the inference that the answer if given would be unfavourable.” S.149: *Question not to be asked without reasonable grounds.* “No such question as is referred to in section 148 ought to be asked, unless the person asking it has reasonable grounds for thinking that the imputation which it conveys is well-founded.” ## **JUDGEMENT** The appeal was considered to have no merits and hence was dismissed. After much deliberations and consideration, the judges came to the conclusion that- It is not significantly challenged that an incident of the kind described by the prosecution took place on May 20, 1978, at around 8:20 p.m., and that the incident’s location actually occurred. The State’s counsel is correct when he claims that part of a witness’s testimony that has been declared hostile remains on the record and can still be used if it is otherwise admissible. (PW3 and PW4) The cases of [Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1027045/)[\[18\]](#_ftn18), [Rabinder Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/194959/)[\[19\]](#_ftn19), \[1976\] 4 SCC 233 and Syed lqbal v. State of Karnataka[\[20\]](#_ftn20), which state that ***“ the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. The evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether but the same can be accepted to the extent their version is found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof.”[**\[21\]**](#_ftn21)*** In the present case, the two eyewitnesses- the companion Ramesh and rickshaw-puller Kishan Lal had refused to name or identify the assailants while giving their statements during the trial while at the dock, hence the prosecution challenged the evidence of these witnesses and treated them as hostile. The judges had agreed with the submission of the learned counsel for the State and held that it was abundantly obvious from their testimony that PW 4 had ridden in PW 3’s rickshaw to the scene of the encounter with the dead. PW 4 had been hurt during the event that took place at the spot mentioned by the prosecution. It is therefore impossible to dispute his presence there with the dead at the time of the incident. PW 4 had gone to the police station and filed the initial information report less than an hour after the event. They stated that although it is true that the initial information report provides only circumstantial evidence, PW 4 had gone to the police station right away and reported the incident there before any outside interference. It is impossible to think that the investigating officer had made up the details in the initial information report and wrote the document. Since the PW4, Ramesh admitted that it was his signature on the FIR, where he had narrated all the facts in detail an attempt to disown the document shows a departure from his earlier behaviour for reasons unknown to the court. Hence the court refused to discredit the FIR as erroneous in spite of it being contradictory to the evidence given by PW4 on the witness stand and the presence of PW4 at the crime scene is accepted. Once PW4’s presence is accepted the presence of PW3 Kishan Lal at the place cannot be doubted. After careful examination of the testimony of the two eyewitnesses, PWs 3 and 4, the judges held that the deceased and PW 4 arrived at the scene in the rickshaw of PW3. Additionally, they felt that it was undeniably established that when they had arrived at the scene of the incident, they were encircled by some people, and an assault had been launched against them in which PW 4 was hurt and Gulab perished. Regarding the identities of the attackers, they simply recanted from their earlier testimonies and refused to support the prosecution. Since he lived in Suji Mohalla, and the incident occurred there, therefore his appearance in the market could not be seen as out of the ordinary. It is not unusual for persons who are working to buy vegetables at that time, therefore his reason for his presence cannot be ruled out as a lie. Even though PW 1 claims he witnessed the incident from the square, the sketch map created by PW 11 Gaiser Prasad reveals that he was just about 22 feet away when the incident occurred. He may have known who the attackers were because the crime took place in a public area and there was a lamppost close by. During his examination in chief PW1 had identified all the assailants and had further mentioned that the appellant Khujji and his companions Gudda and Parsu were armed with knives and ‘Chura’ and when Khujji had tried to assault PW 4 with a knife, Gopal had shouted: “***Khujji that man is not Gulab.**”*** In his cross-examination 6 months later however PW1 refused to identify the perpetrators saying that they had their backs towards them and said that his identification was based on the inference he had drawn that the persons whose backs he had seen were Khujji and his companions. The hon’ble court in agreement with the decision of the High Court held that in the months that passed between the date of the cross and chief examination, something happened that caused him to change his testimony on the identity issue in favour of the appellant. The judges observed that his remark during cross-examination regarding the identification of the appellant and his company was an obvious attempt to backpedal from what he had said earlier during his examination-in-chief. The Supreme Court admitted the evidence of PW1 and followed the pronouncement of this Court in [**Pedda Narain v. State of Andhra Pradesh**](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1081747/)[\[22\]](#_ftn22), whereby the submission that the evidence of the eyewitnesses could not be considered due to their names being absent at the initial inquest report was disregarded. The objective of the inquest report is to ascertain whether a person has died under suspicious circumstances or an unnatural death and if so what is the apparent cause of the death, any other details need not be a part of the same[\[23\]](#_ftn23). It was held that simply because the same group of Panch witnesses were called to testify to all three discoveries and the attachment of the appellant and his companions’ clothing, PW5’s testimony could not be disregarded because nothing had come up during cross-examination to cast doubt on it. The court is in agreement with the utilisation of PW5 Pannalal’s testimony by the lower courts in accordance with the rule set out in [**Himachal Pradesh Administration v. Om Prakash**](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1583528/)[\[24\]](#_ftn24). Limited use of this evidence is made, no part admissible as evidence under S.27 of the Evidence Act is used. Just the fact that the incriminating weapon was discovered in his garage and that he was unable to explain why human blood was on it is used as evidence against the appellant. The court is of the opinion that the cases cited by the counsel for the appellant ***“do not lay down a general proposition that in the absence of determination of blood group the find of human blood on the weapon or garment of the accused is of no consequence.”[**\[25\]**](#_ftn25)*** The evidence of PW1 that he witnessed the appellant striking the dead with a knife gets further credence from the discovery of human blood on the appellant’s weapon and trousers of the appellant. Mr. Lalit is however correct when he asserts that the prosecution’s evidence fails to show that the appellant delivered the fatal blow that resulted in injury No. 1. This argument is predicated on the notion that another person delivered the deadly blow. By doing so, it is proven that multiple individuals took part in the crime’s commission. Based on their own evaluation of the testimony of the three eyewitnesses, PW 1 Komal Chand, PW 3 Kishan Lal, and PW 4 Ramesh, the court came to the conclusion that other people were involved in the crime’s commission. The court also stated that from PW 1 Komal Chand’s testimony it becomes clear that some of the co-accused, particularly Gunda, Parsu, and Gopal, had taken part in the crime. In the absence of a State appeal, the High Court could not, and this court cannot interfere with their acquittal. However, as was correctly noted in the case of Brathi[\[26\]](#_ftn26), this Court is not bound by the facts found proved on the basis of the appreciation of the evidence by the courts below and is, in law, entitled to reach its own conclusion different from the one recorded by the court’s below after a review of the evidence. In light of this, the court held that the appellant’s conviction can be upheld using either section 34 or 149 of the IPC, depending on the circumstance. With the use of section 34 of the IPC, it is safe to confirm the appellant’s conviction in the case being discussed. With the aid of section 34, the court affirmed the appellant’s conviction under section 302 of the IPC and upheld the sentence that was given to him. ***“For the above reasons we see no merit in this appeal and dismiss the same.”*** ## **CONCLUSION** The main question of law here is whether the facts that have been put before the court are enough to charge the accused with S.302 of IPC and sentence him accordingly. The court has rightly admitted that it is impossible to infer from the visual evidence that the appellant was the cause of that fatal damage. In contrast, the testimony of PW 1 Komal Chand shows that it is quite likely that injury No. 2 was caused by the appellant’s stab wound, even if that damage was insufficient on its own to result in death in the normal course of nature. Also, the cases cited by the appellant’s counsel even though landmark cases having larger bench than those cited by the respondent are not consistent with the facts of this case where the High Court has disagreed with the assessment of evidence by the Trial Court. In none of the cases listed on behalf of the appellant was it demonstrated that the appellate court had disagreed with the Trial Court’s assessment of the evidence and its recording of the facts and circumstances which is the case in the case of Brathi cited by the respondent. Hence the court is justified in not relying on or looking into those decisions while delivering the judgement for the case at hand. The way the witnesses have completely departed from their original statements during the trial and cross-examination makes it clear that they have been manipulated or have been promised or threatened in some way hence the conviction of the appellant y the Hon’ble Court is the only way justice would have been served and relief could have been given to the family of the deceased. Conviction of the friends of the appellant would also have been fair but since the State had not preferred an appeal against their acquittal the hands of the apex court are tied in that matter. On the whole, the Supreme court has served the ‘ends of justice’. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Student of 4th Semester, St.Xaviers University, Kolkata. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) See the Indian Penal Code,1860. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) [Kansa Behera v. State of Orissa](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1594055/), \[1987\] 3 SCC 480. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) IndianKanoon, Last Visited: 1/7/23. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) [Surinder Singh v. State of Punjab](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/38598075/), \[1989\] Suppl. 2 SCC 21. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) IndianKanoon, Last Visited: 1/7/23. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) [Krishna Govind Patil V. State of Maharashtra](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/939953/), \[1964\] 1 SCR 678. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) The State of Orissa, \[1973\] 2 SCC 432. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) [Kasturi Lal v. The State of Haryana](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1431584/), \[1976\] 3 SCC 570. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Chandubhai Shanabhai Parmar v. State of Gujarat, \[1981\] Suppl. SCC 46. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) [Sukh Ram v. State of MP](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/127034617/), \[1989\] Suppl. 1 SCC 214. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) IndianKanoon, Last Visited: 1/7/23. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) [Brathi v. State of Punjab](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/247105/), \[199 1\] 1 SCC 519. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) See the Constitution of India. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) See the Indian Penal Code,1860, India Code[https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/2263?sam\_handle=123456789/1362](https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/2263?sam_handle=123456789/1362) last visited-1/7/23. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) See the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) See the Indian Evidence Act,1872. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) [Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1027045/), \[1976\] 2 SCR 921. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) [Rabinder Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/194959/), \[1976\] 4 SCC 233. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Syed lqbal v. State of Karnataka, \[1980\] 1 SCR 95. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) Indiankanoon, Last Visited: 1/7/23. [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) [Pedda Narain v. State of Andhra Pradesh](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1081747/), \[1975\] Supp. SCR [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) See S.174, Code of Criminal Procedure. [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) [Himachal Pradesh Administration v. Om Prakash](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1583528/),’ \[1972\] 2 SCR 765 [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) IndianKanoon, Last Visited 1/7/23. [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) [Brathi v. State of Punjab](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/247105/), \[199 1\] 1 SCC 519 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases **Tags:** #law, #lawfoyer, #lawyer, #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, case analysis, case summary, Khujji, Khujji @ Surendra Tiwari, Khujji @ Surendra Tiwari vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh, lawfoyer --- ### [Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha and Another vs. State of Gujarat](https://lawfoyer.in/gujarat-mazdoor-sabha-and-another-vs-state-of-gujarat/) **Published:** July 7, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **By Sonali** **In the Supreme court of India** Name of the caseGujarat Mazdoor Sabha vs. State of Gujarat CitationWrit Petition no.708 of 2020Date of case1 October,2020AppellantGujarat Mazdoor SabhaRespondentState of Gujarat Bench/JudgeDr. Dhananjaya Y.Chandrachud, Indu Malhotra and KM Joseph, JJStatutes/ ConstitutionConstitution of India, 1950Factories act , 1948Important Sections/Articles InvolvedConstitution of India, 1950 Ar.352 Ar.142 Ar. 23 Ar. 21 Ar.14 Ar.355 Ar.356 Factories act , 1948 Sec.5 Sec.51 Sec.54 Sec.55 Sec.56 Sec.65(2)## **Abstract** In this case, the appellant is a trade union which is registered under the Trade Union Act, 1926. This trade union have thousands of workers as a part of this union. The trade union here seeks to quash the notification passed by the labour and employment department of the state of Gujarat. As this notification is alleged to curtail certain rights of the labourers which are given to them in the Factories Act of 1948. The appellant here on behalf of all the workers who were suffering from that issued notification by the state, files the writ petition in the Supreme Court of India so that the notification can be quashed. ## **Introduction** During the Covid-19 pandemic when the whole world was suffering from economic crisis, India was also a part of that crisis. In India during nationwide lockdown in 2020, the production and economic activities came to a halt or significantly got minimised resulting in message shut down of many factories. As India was suffering, many states on their level started controlling this economic crisis on their own way. In Gujarat, the labour and employment department of the state issued a notification under section.5 of the Factories Act, 1948 stating improvised and temporary directions regarding the working condition of the labourers. Section.5 of the Factories Act, 1948 provides that during the time of public emergency, the state has the power to exempt any factory from all or any of the provisions of the act. The act is a product of history of a long struggle of workers unions to secure the right to human dignity in work places that ensure their safety and well-being. With the industrial development in India, the ultimate sufferers were the labour class with no act or legislature to protect and provide for them. The Factories act, 1948 ensure the material and physical well-being of workers by putting responsibilities and liabilities on the employers. In the three bench case of Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha and Another vs. State of Gujarat stated that for the appliance of the section. 5 of the Factories Act, 1948 the one condition to be fulfilled is the condition of ‘Public Emergency.’ If the conditioned is not fulfilled then section.5 of the Factories Act cannot be invoked. ## **Facts of the case** On 24 March 2020, a nationwide lockdown was declared by the central government to prevent the spread of COVID-19 pandemic. Due to this nationwide lock down the economic activities that were going on came to a standstill. This lock down was further extended many times like the second time the lockdown was imposed on 14 April 2020. On 17 April 2020, there was a notification issued by the labour and employment department of the state of Gujarat under section.5 of the Factories Act. This notification exempted all the factories registered under the act from various provisions relating to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest etc., for adult workers. This notification was from 20 April 2020 till 19 July 2020. The notification that was issued on 17 April was for a period of four months, but the state government of Gujarat again issued another notification on 20 July 2020, this notification too had similar content and intended to extend the exemption granted to the factories from 20 July 2020 till 19 October 2020. ## **Issue raised before the court** 1. Whether the notification issued by the state government under section.5 of the Factories Act, 1948 was valid or not? ## Arguments from the Appellant’s side - The learned counsel from the appellant’s side contends that the notifications issued by the state government under section.5 of the Factories Act or invalid. Sec.5 of the said act can only be invoked if there is a situation of *‘Public Emergency’.* Sec.5 itself have the explanation for ‘Public Emergency’ as a ‘Grave Emergency’, which threatens the security of India or any part of the territory by war, external aggression or internal disturbance. - The counsel further contends that the ‘Pandemic’ or ‘lockdown’ cannot be included in the meaning of ‘Public or Grave Emergency’. Although sec.5 of the Factories Act and ar.352 of the Constitution, both have the expression ‘Internal disturbance’ but are significantly different as in ar.352 of the Constitution, the involvement of the President is required but on the other hand in sec.5 of the Factories act, it can be exercised during the objective conditions mentioned and should in turn make the conditions better. - The counsel alleges that the notification exempted all the factories under sec.5 of the Factories Act, 1948 but instead sec.65 (2) states the suspension of sections 51, 52, 54 and 56 when there is exceptional pressure of work and this condition was not existing at the time of the lockdown as the state exempted all the factories without knowing what kind of work these factories are doing or what type of manufacturing work is required to be done by the labourers and took all the factors in one blanket only doing injustice to all the labourers. - The counsel from the appellant side highlighted the point of payment of wages during overtime. The wages to be paid during overtime are the double of the normal wages as the labourers are putting in extra work and doing more from the hours that are fixed, yet the notification proportionate the overtime wages to the existing wages which violates the fundamental rights of the labourers under article 23, 21 and 14 of the Constitution and also fails the minimum wages act, 1948 as it amounts to forced labour. ## **Arguments from the respondent side** - The counsel from the respondent’s side contends that the notification issued by the state government under sec.5 of the Factories Act is valid and neither have they violated the fundamental rights under articles 23, 21 and 14 of the Constitution. The notification issued by the government under sec.5 of the Factories Act states that the state me exempt any factory or class of factories from all or any provisions of the act in a ‘Public Emergency’. - Continuing the previous argument, the counsel justifies the term ‘Public Emergency’ in context with the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic is a public emergency as it has disrupted the “social order of the country.” Emergency measures were introduced so that the existence and integrity of the state can be protected. - The counsel further highlights that the notification was issued under sec.5 of the factories act so that the minimum production levels in the factors were observed. There is no exceptional pressure of work in the factory so sec.65 (2) is not the basis for issuance of the notification. - The counsel from the respondent side further alleges that the labourers were only allowed to work three additional hours and employers were also going to proportionally compensate them for the same. It also observed that the employers are also facing financial problems due to this lockdown so, the conditions are being applied. - The counsel further gives a reference of the Pfizer Private Limited, Bombay vs. workmen[\[1\]](#_ftn1) stating that during the time of the emergency, all the important steps should be taken so that the industrial production of the nation can be enhanced. ## **Related provisions** - **Constitution of India, 1950** **Ar.352: (Proclamation of Emergency) –** (1) If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or armed rebellion, he may, by Proclamation, made a declaration to that effect \[in respect of the whole of India or of such part of the territory thereof as may be specified in the Proclamation. \[Explanation.- A Proclamation of Emergency declaring that the security of India or any part of the territory thereof is threatened by war or by external aggression or by armed rebellion may be made before the actual occurrence of war or of any such aggression or rebellion, if the President is satisfied that there is imminent danger thereof.\] (2) A Proclamation issued under clause (I) may be or revoked by a subsequent proclamation. (3) The President shall not issue a Proclamation under clause (I) or a Proclamation varying such Proclamation unless the decision of the Union Cabinet (that is to say, the Council consisting of the Prime Minister and other Ministers of Cabinet rank under Article 75) that such a Proclamation may be issued has been communicated to him in writing. (4) Every Proclamation issued under this article shall be laid before each House of Parliament and shall, except where it is a Proclamation revoking a previous Proclamation, cease to operate at the expiration of one month unless before the expiration of that period it has been approved by resolutions of both Houses of Parliament. *Provided* that if any such Proclamation (not being a Proclamation revoking a previous Proclamation) is issued at a time when the House of the People has been dissolved, or place during the period of one month referred to in this clause, and if a resolution approving the Proclamation has been passed by the Council of States, but no resolution with respect to such Proclamation has been passed by the House of the People before the expiration of that period, the Proclamation shall cease to operate at the expiration of thirty days from the date on which the House of the People first sits after its reconstitution, unless before the expiration of the said period of thirty days a resolution approving the Proclamation has been also passed by the House of the People. (5) A Proclamation so approved shall, unless revoked, cease to operate on the expiration of a period of six months from the date of the passing of the second of the resolutions approving the proclamation under clause (4); *Provided* that if and so often as a resolution approving the continuance in force of such a Proclamation is passed by both Houses of Parliament the Proclamation shall, unless revoked, continue in force for a further period of six months from the date on which it would otherwise have ceased of operate under this clause. *Provided* further that if the dissolution of the House of the People takes place during any such period of six months and a resolution approving the continuance in force of such Proclamation has been passed by the House of the People during the said period, the Proclamation shall cease to operate at the expiration of thirty days from the date on which the House of the People first sits after its reconstitution unless before the expiration of the said period of thirty days, a resolution approving the continuance in force of the proclamation has been also passed by the House of the People. (6) For the purpose of clause (4) and (5), a resolution may be passed by either House of Parliament only by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House present and voting. (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing clauses, the President shall revoke a Proclamation issued under clause (l) or a Proclamation varying such Proclamation if the House of the People passes a resolution disapproving, or, as the case may be, disapproving the continuance in force of, such Proclamation. (8) Where a notice in writing signed by not less than one-tenth of the total number of members of the House of the People has been given of, their intention to move a resolution for disapproving, or, as the case may be, for disapproving the continuance in force of, a Proclamation issued under clause (l) or a Proclamation varying such Proclamation, – (a) to the Speaker, if the House is in session; or (b) To the President, if the House is not in session, a special sitting of the House shall be held within fourteen days from the date on which such notice is received by the Speaker, or as the case may be, by the President, for the purpose of considering such resolution. (9) The power conferred on the President by this article shall include the power to issue different Proclamations on different grounds, being war or external aggression or \[armed rebellion\] or imminent danger of war or external aggression or \[armed rebellion\], whether or not ‘here is a Proclamation already issued by the President under clause (l) and such Proclamation is in operation.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) **Ar.142: (Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme Court and unless as to discovery, etc) –** (1) The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or orders so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe. (2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects the whole of the territory of India, have all and every power to make any order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person, the discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) **Ar.355: (Duty of the Union to protect States against external aggression and internal disturbance) –**It shall be the duty of the Union to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance and to ensure that the government of every State is carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution. **Ar.356: (Provisions in case of failure of constitutional machinery in State)-** (I) If the President, on receipt of report from the Governor of the State or otherwise, is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, the President may be Proclamation- (a) assume to himself all or any of the functions of the Government of the State and all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by the Governor or anybody or authority in the State other than the Legislature of the State; (b) Declare that the powers of the Legislature of the State shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament; (c) make such incidental and consequential provisions as appear to the president to be necessary or desirable for giving effect to the objects of the Proclamation, including provisions for suspending in whole or in part the operation of any provisions of this constitution relating to anybody or authority in the State. *Provided* that nothing in this clause shall authorize the President to assume to himself any of the powers vested in or exercisable by a High Court, or to suspend in whole or in part the operation of any provision of this Constitution relating to High Courts. (2) Any such Proclamation may be revoked or varied by a subsequent Proclamation. (3) Every Proclamation issued under this article except where it is a Proclamation revoking a previous Proclamation, cease to operate at the expiration of two months unless before the expiration of that period it has been approved by resolutions of both Houses of Parliament. Provided that if any such Proclamation (not being a Proclamation revoking a previous Proclamation) is issued at a time when the House of the People is dissolved or the dissolution of the House of the People takes place during the period of two months referred to in this clause, and if a resolution approving the Proclamation has been passed by the Council of States, but no resolution with respect to such Proclamation has been passed by the House of the People before the expiration of that period, the Proclamation Shall cease to operate at the expiration of thirty days from the date on which the House of the People first sits after its reconstitution unless before the expiration of the said period of thirty days a resolution approving the Proclamation has been also passed by the House of the People. (4) A Proclamation so approved shall, unless revoked, cease to operate on the expiration of a period of six months from the date of issue of the Proclamation: Provided that if and so often as a resolution approving the continuance in force of such a Proclamation is passed by both Houses of Parliament, the Proclamation shall, unless revoked, continue in force for a further period of six months from the date on which under this clause it would otherwise have ceased to operating, but no such Proclamation shall in any case remain in force for more than three years: *Provided* further that if the dissolution of the House of the People takes place during any such period of six months and a resolution approving the continuance in force of such Proclamation has been passed by the Council of States, but no resolution with respect to the continuance in force of such Proclamation has been passed by the House of the People during the said period, the Proclamation shall cease to operate at the expiration of thirty days from the date on which the House of the People first sits after its reconstitution unless before the expiration of the said period of thirty days a resolution approving the continuance in force of the Proclamation has been also passed by the House of the People. (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (4), a resolution with respect to the continuance in force of a Proclamation approved under clause (3) for any period beyond the expiration of one year from the date of issue of such proclamation shall not be passed by either House of Parliament unless- (a) a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, in the whole of India or, as the case may be, in the whole or any part of the State, at the time of the passing of such resolution, and (b) The Election Commission certifies that the continuance in force of the Proclamation approved under clause (3) during the period specified in such resolution is necessary on account of difficulties in holding general elections to the Legislative Assembly of the State concerned: *Provided* that in the case of the Proclamation issued under clause (1) on the 6th day of October, 1985 with respect to the State of Punjab, the reference in this clause to “any period beyond the expiration of two years”.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) **Ar.23 🙁 Prohibition of traffic in human beings and forced labour) –** (1) Traffic in human beings and begar and other similar forms of forced labour are prohibited and any contravention of this provision shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law. (2) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from imposing compulsory service for public purpose, and in imposing such service the State shall not make any discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste or class or any of them.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) **Ar.21: (Protection of life and personal liberty) –**No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) **Ar.14: (Equality before law) –** The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India, Prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) - **Factories Act, 1948** **Sec.5: (Power to exempt during public emergency) –**In any case of public emergency the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, exempt any factory or class or description of factories from all or any of the provisions of this Act 20\[except section 67\] for such period and subject to such conditions as it may think fit: *PROVIDED* that no such notification shall be made for a period exceeding three months at a time. \[Explanation: For the purposes of this section “public emergency” means a grave emergency whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or internal disturbance.\][\[8\]](#_ftn8) **Sec.51: (Weekly hours) –**No adult worker shall be required or allowed to work in a factory for more than forty-eight hours in any week.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) **Sec.54: (Daily hours) –**Subject to the provisions of section 51, no adult worker shall be required or allowed to work in a factory for more than nine hours in any day: \[*PROVIDED* that, subject to the previous approval of the Chief Inspector, the daily maximum specified in this section may be exceeded in order to facilitate the change of shifts.\][\[10\]](#_ftn10) **Sec.55 🙁 Intervals for rest) –**(1) \[The periods of work\] of adult workers in a factory each day shall be so fixed that no period shall exceed five hours and that no worker shall work for more than five hours before he has had an interval for rest of at least half an hour. \[(2) The State Government or, subject to the control of the State Government, the Chief Inspector, may, by written order and for the reasons specified therein, exempt any factory from the provisions of sub-section (1) so however that the total number of hours worked by a worker without an interval does not exceed six.\][\[11\]](#_ftn11) **Sec.56: (Spread over) –**The periods of work of an adult worker in a factory shall be so arranged that inclusive of his intervals for rest under section 55, they shall not spread over more than ten and a half hours in any day: *PROVIDED* that the Chief Inspector may, for reasons to be specified in writing, increase the spread over up to twelve hours\].[\[12\]](#_ftn12) **Sec.65 (2): ( Power to make exempting orders) –**(2) The State Government or, subject to the control of the State Government, the Chief Inspector may, by written order exempt, on such conditions as it or he may deem expedient, any or all of the adult workers in any factory or group or a class or description of factories from any or all of the provisions of section 51, 52, 54 and 56 on the ground that the exemption is required to enable the factory or factories to deal with an exceptional press of work.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) ## **Judgement** The honourable court stated that, “this court is cognizant that the respondent aimed to ameliorate the financial exigencies that were caused due to the pandemic and the subsequent lockdown. However, financial losses cannot be offset on the weary shoulders of the labouring workers who provide the backbone of the economy. Sec.5 of the Factories Act could not have been invoked to issue a blanket notification that exempted all factories from complying with human working conditions and adequate compensation for overtime. As a response to a pandemic that did not result in an internal disturbance of a nature that post a grave emergency whereby the security of India is threatened. In any event no factory/classes of factory could have been exempted from compliance with provision of the Factories Act unless an internal disturbance causes a grave emergency that threatens the security of the state so as to constitute a public emergency within the meaning of sec.5 of the Factories Act.” The court further stated that, “as a consequence of the judgement and in the interest of doing complete justice under article.142 of the Constitution, we direct that over time wages shall be paid in accordance with the provision of section.59 of the Factories act to all eligible workers who have been working since the issuance of the notification.” The court while delivering the judgement referred to a case in relation with the ‘internal disturbance’ ‘public emergency’ and ‘public order’. In case of [Naga People’s movement of human right vs. union of India](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1072165/ "Naga People’s movement of human right vs. union of India")[\[14\]](#_ftn14) it was held there in that, “thought an internal disturbance is a cause for concern, it does not threaten the security of the country or a part thereof unlike an armed rebellion which could pose a threat to the security of country or a part thereof.” In another case of [Anuradha Bhasin vs. union of India](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/82461587/ "Anuradha Bhasin vs. union of India")[\[15\]](#_ftn15), a three Judge Bench of this court considered the definition of the expression ‘public emergency’ and interpret this as situations pertaining to ‘sovereignty and integrity of India’, ‘friendly relations with foreign states’, ‘public order’ and ‘preventing incitement’ to the commission of an offense, which is not present in the definition of ‘public emergency’ in the sec.5 of the Factories Act, 1948. The court further pointed out a case represented by the respondent’s counsel of the Pfizer private limited Bombay vs. workman.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) The court expressed that the dispute was between the employer and workmen, which was concerned with the problem of onerous working condition by the factory owner. The case was a private dispute and don’t coincide with the sec.5 emergency under the Factories Act, 1948. The notification issued by the labour and employment department of the Gujarat State was quashed as the writ petition was allowed; along with this the employers had to pay the wages for the extra hours put in by the labourers. ## **Conclusion** It is very clear that the applicant were treated as forced labour without giving the extra wages for the overtime they have put in. As a result, the decision was in the favour of the appointment, and they were granted those extra wages and the notification was also quashed. According to me, the decision of the learned court should be appreciated, as during the time of the lockdown the most affected strata of the society were labourers. As these labourers leave their hometown and go to urban areas for work. These labourers were adversely affected by this lockdown due to COVID-19 but still they were working for their employers. Those extra hours put in by the labourers were also putting extra strain on the health of the labour, so the award of this hard work was given to them, which is very well deserved by them. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Pfizer Private Limited, Bombay vs. Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1103 [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) INDIA CONST. art.352 [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) INDIA CONST. art.142 [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) INDIA CONST. art.356 [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) INDIA CONST. art.23 [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) INDIA CONST. art.21 [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) INDIA CONST. art.14 [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) The Factories Act, S.5, No.63, Labour Govt. of Clement Atlee, 1948 (India) [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) The Factories Act, S.51, No.63, Labour Govt. of Clement Atlee, 1948 (India) [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) The Factories Act, S.54, No.63, Labour Govt. of Clement Atlee, 1948 (India) [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) The Factories Act, S.55, No.63, Labour Govt. of Clement Atlee, 1948 (India) [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) The Factories Act, S.56, No.63, Labour Govt. of Clement Atlee, 1948 (India) [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) The Factories Act, S.65(2), No.63, Labour Govt. of Clement Atlee, 1948 (India) [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Naga People’s movement of human rights vs. Union of India, AIR 1998 SC 431 [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Anuradha Bhasin vs. Union Of India, AIR 2020 SC 1308 [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Pfizer Private Limited, Bombay vs. Workmen, AIR 1966 SC 740 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases **Tags:** #law, #lawfoyer, #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, case analysis, case summary, Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha, Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha and Another vs. State of Gujarat, lawfoyer --- ### [ANURADHA BHASIN VS UNION OF INDIA](https://lawfoyer.in/anuradha-bhasin-vs-union-of-india/) **Published:** July 7, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **BY MISS SHALINI DHYANI[\[1\]](#_ftn1)** # IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA NAME OF THE CASEAnuradha Bhasin v. Union Of IndiaCITATION AIR 2020 SC 1308\[1\]sDATE OF THE CASEJanuary 10, 2020APPELANTAnuradha Bhasin and others.RESPONDENTUnion Of India and others.BENCH /JUDGEJustice N. V. Ramana, R. Subhash Reddy and B.R. Gavai.STATUTES/ CONSTITUION INVOLVEDThe Constitution of India, Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, Information Technology Act 2000, The Telegraph Act 1885, The Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services (Public Emergency or Public Safety) Rules, 2017.IMPORTANT SECTIONS/ ARTICLES The Constitution of India—Article 19, CRPC Section-144# ABSTRACT Modernity is something that society needs, to become modern means, in the sense of technology, in the field of education and to become modern through the mind. The basic need in today’s world that we saw during the pandemic was that the Internet, which was the only medium at that time, became useful for many of us. It is very useful in digital technologies, as the COVID-19 pandemic has increased the use of digital tools. This case focused on the right to internet access, technical judicial standards to interpret the issues relating to Article 19 (1) (a) and (g), and the impact of such standards on the scope of restriction under clauses (2) and (6), respectively. Further, the case discussed political, social, and technological developments at the same time, which necessarily affect the judicial endeavor. The main points to be discussed here are the medium of the internet and the exercise of rights by individuals. # INTRODUCTION “*Once a government is committed to the principle of silencing the voice of opposition, it has only one way to go, and that is down the path of increasingly repressive measures, until it becomes a source of terror to all its citizens and creates a country where”–***Harry S. Truman**[\[2\]](#_ftn2) A society can develop or grow when an individual present in it has the liberty to express one’s opinion or thought without any restriction, especially without penalties. Only then can the concept of a free society emerge. Freedom of speech and expression is an integral part of an individual’s life; it is a basic part of human rights. Under **Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India,** freedom of speech and expression are enshrined. The Indian Judiciary played an operating role in interpreting the fundamental rights, and with time, the ambit of the fundamental rights has increased. This freedom of speech and expression has been categorized or mentioned as one of the golden threats along with Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which run across the fabric of the Constitution of India. It is the bedrock of any democracy because this right is recognized not only by Constitutions but also internationally, i.e., in **Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as a basic right of an individual.** And a democracy becomes a democracy only by virtue of the freedom of speech and expression of its citizens. ## **BACKGROUND** This case challenged the legality of internet shutdown and movement restriction in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The state of Jammu and Kashmir has seen a lot of political disturbance or instability since a very long time, especially since the enforcement of the Constitution when its status was not fully decided by constituent assembly and it was given a legal status. hardly there was political stability in Jammu and Kashmir, after the removal of Article 370 from Jammu and Kashmir there was an apprehension that the people of Kashmir would come out to create havoc in the state and so based upon this constructive and presumed apprehension, the government while anticipating such danger shut down the internet and also restricted the movement. This case is not the first case over the internet access there are also other cases where court held that right to access internet is a fundamental right. **PURPOSE OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION** Freedom of speech and expression does not means to sing along with the tunes of government , this type of freedom is also available under monarchy or dictatorship , it is not that if one has ability to speak he is allowed to speak . The actual meaning of freedom of speech and expression is when one have right to dissent with the government democratically but there is a thin line difference between freedom of speech and expression and sedition that should be maintained. The ambit of freedom of speech and expression with time has been increased, there are lot of cases with molded the freedom of speech and expression**. In Romesh Thappar Vs State of Madras** it was held that freedom of press is a part of freedom of speech and expression. **In Sakal Papers Ltd. VS Union of India and in Bennett Coleman Vs Union of India** the validity of the newspaper control order, which has fixed the number of pages was struck down by Apex court of India declaring it as a violation of Article 19 (1) (a) and does not fall into reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2). *“**Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties”.*** – **John Milton**[\[3\]](#_ftn3) John argued that without human freedom there can be no progress in science, law or politics, which according to him required free discussion of opinion. Mill’s on Liberty, published in 1859 became a classic defense of the right to freedom of expression. Democracy is based essentially on free debate and open discussion, for that is the only corrective of government action in a democratic setup. If democracy means government of the people by the people and for the people, it is obvious that every citizen must be entitled to participate in the democratic process and in order to enable him to intelligently exercise his right of making a choice, free and general discussion of public matters is absolutely essential.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Freedom of speech and expression can be understood with instrumentalist and non instrumentalist side, in the case **Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. & Ors. V. Union of India & Ors.** The honorable Supreme Court held that “*Freedom of expression, as learned writers have observed, has four broad social purposes to serve: (i) it helps an individual to attain self-fulfillment (ii) it assists in the discovery of truth, (iii)it strengthens the capacity of an individual in participating in decision-making and (iv) it provides a mechanism by which it would be possible to establish a reasonable balance between stability and social change. All members of society should be able to form their own beliefs and communicate them freely to others.”[**\[5\]**](#_ftn5)* In this case right to know was brought into the ambit of Article 19(1) (a) which shows the instrumentalist side. **HISTORICAL SKETCHING OF INTERNET ACCESS AND NEED FOR INTERNET ACCESS TO HUMAN RIGHTS** Internet access is not a new concept it has been a part of debate for a long time but now it is recognized as a fundamental right but there was brief history of internet access to become as a part of fundamental right .It was all started on 4August 2018 when in Jammu and Kashmir there was an internet shutdown due to security concern and it was remained for 213 days then in September a case named **Faheema Shirin R.K .Vs State Of Kerala** where the girls of hostel were not allowed to use phone after 10 pm in the hostel which was challenged and here Court held that right to internet access is fundamental right as right to privacy and right to education is a fundamental right. Freedom of speech and expression includes right to express opinion with variety of medium. UN report outlined with Internet Access already mentioned “Right to Communication” and “Right to seek, receive and impart information”. 1. **Right to communicate:** The idea of right to communicate was first articulated by late UN Official Jean d’Arcy in 1969. This right was later given much importance by the United Nation Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”), which brought the idea to right to communicate in 1980 in the general conference in Belgrade. It was recognized as “right of the public, of ethnic and social groups and of individuals to have access to information sources and to participate actively in the communication process” 17and this was further recognized in 1981 and 1983. But this right couldn’t succeed in getting a better support for recognition from other international organization thus the movement to codify it as a right internationally failed. One of the reasons for this to become a failure was the needs for a positive recognition for this right and also the implementation of this right require obligation on state to provide a means for communication which was not supported by many states due to lack of resources. However, the failure of this movement provided a stepping stone for internet access right as given importance in the UN Rapporteur.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) 2. **Right to seek , receive and impart information:** The central idea for the UN Report 2011 was the right to seek, receive and impart information which was drawn from Article19(2) of the ICCPR which is: “*Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference and everyone shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression; the right shall include freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers either orally or the form of writing or print, in the form of art, or through any other media of their choice”.[**\[7\]**](#_ftn7)* ### INTERNET ACCESS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS Internet plays an important role in communicating and expressing their ideas and opinion through the medium of freedom of speech and expression. People are connected even though there is presence of physical barrier through internet access. The United Nation human commission also recognized free speech though internet as a medium of communication. Also, Article 19 of UDHR and Article 19(1) of ICCPR also provides for freedom of speech and expression even in case of internet. However, internet is not only regarded as just a medium for communication but it is also considered as a source of information, global business and social platform. • Internet has been regarded as a vital source of information which provides people with wide range of resources thus helps in promoting education. • Internet plays a crucial role in promoting one global economy as it eliminates the hindrances caused due to physical boundaries. Need for internet access as a separate right has also been recognized by international institutions. United nation has always been upfront in supporting internet access.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) # FACTS OF THE CASE Jammu and Kashmir is the Indian state which occupies Indian territorial bordering with Pakistan which has been remained the subject of debate for long term between two countries. Under Article 370 of Constitution of India, the territory acknowledges special status of the state in matter of its autonomy and its power to frame laws for its permanent residents. This Article 370 stated that the State had its own Constitution and Indian citizens were not allowed to settle there. i.e. they were not allowed to buy land or property there. On August 5, 2019, an order was passed by the Indian government Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 2019, which deprived Jammu and Kashmir from its special status which had been enjoyed since 1954 by it and all provisions of the Constitution of India were made applicable to Jammu and Kashmir by amending Article 367 of the Indian Constitution. The order dissected the state of Jammu and Kashmir into two Union territories which are Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh. On 4 August, 2019 in the view of danger or threat to public order and security to the state, the state imposed restrictions on internet shutdown. All mobile connective, telecom were shutdown. Further the government was so frightened that not even two people should be allowed to gather or to stand together in any place of market. Every single person, every single individual in the state must be confine to their homes, no person should go to office, no children or youth should go to education institution because government was apprehending a lot of turbulence and political dramas in the state and it was preventing people from meeting each other, so they restricted the movement by applying Section 144 of CRPC. Miss Anuradha Bhasin a journalist, an executive editor of Kashmir Times of Srinagar Edition being a petitioner in this case raised the crucial constitutional issues about the essentiality of the internet for modern press. She pointed out that as from 6 August, 2019 the newspaper had not been published, so this could lead to an end to print media without internet. She argued that without a valid reason the government cannot suspend such right under Suspension Rules, the government should have valid reason for suspension it cannot be done capriciously or whimsically. She further contended that the government needs to find a way to balance the measures necessary to maintain national security and rights of the citizens. She further contended that earlier imposition as temporarily but now this imposition occurs for more than 100 days. Now a second writ petition was filed by a member of parliament Mr. Ghulam Nabi Azad, he argued that state cannot claim any kind of privilege before the court for reiterating such order. He also argued that the government has created national emergency kind of situation because there was nothing going in the state still government resumed it on its own that there might be some political disturbance in the state and based on this baseless or unreasonable the government has created an emergency like situation in the state because there was neither internal nor external disruption present in the state. He contended that there might be a group of people who wants to disturb public peace and tranquility so in order to restrict certain group the government cannot compromise the freedom of speech and expression of the entire state. Imposing restrictions on internet not only impacts freedom of speech and expression but also impacts freedom to carry on any trade, profession or business under Article 19 (1) (g) of Constitution of India. In reply to this the government argued that Jammu and Kashmir militancy situation has to be taken into account as there has been militancy since a very long time, Armed forces Special Power Act has been in continuous affect and there has been complete destruction of public peace and order. It was also held that order of restrictions on movement and internet shutdown were imposed after taking proper circumstances and was not capriciously. If this preventive measure would not be taken than this would have created an external and internal militancy and which would have been known in the history and could lead to a huge barbarity. These circumstances were compared with 2016 terrorist attack and said that similar actions were taken by the officials. It was further held by the government that protecting citizens is foremost duty of the state and in order to protect the peace there need to issue of such kind of orders. It was also contended that segregating agitators from peacemakers is an impractical approach, it was concluded by the government that all the orders were passed were according to the procedure mentioned in the suspension rules and intention behind restricting internet was not only about social media but also about dark web. # ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT - Whether the freedom speech and expression and freedom to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business over internet is a part of the fundamental rights protected by Article (19) (1) (a) and Article (19) (1) (g) of the Indian Constitution.? - Whether freedom of the press of the petitioner was violated due to the restrictions? - Whether restrictions imposed under Section 144 CRPC were valid? Whether the government can claim exemption from producing all of the restrictions orders? - Whether prohibition on internet access by the government is valid or not? # ARGUMENTS FROM PETITIONER SIDE - Ms. Vrinda Grover representing petitioner contended that due to several restrictions imposed on the press the petitioner is not able to function properly as petitioner is an executive editor in Kashmir Times. She contended that print media bog down due to inaccessibility of internet, which is absolutely necessary for modern press. - Restriction on internet is halting the right to free speech and it should be tested on the basis of proportionality and reasonability or test of essentiality. She further contented that public order and law and order are not same. - Mr. Kapil Sibbal argued that the authority orders should be produced before the court and cannot be subjected to privileges. - He argued that emergency can be declare by Union of India only I limited circumstances but here neither any internal disturbance nor external aggression were present for imposing restrictions. With respect to Section 144 of Cr. P.C. the learned Senior Counsel argued that such an order is made with law and order but there is no violation of any law and order. - He argued that the Magistrate order under Section 144 of Cr. Pc. Can’ not be passed to public in general rather it must be specifically against the people and it is necessary for a state to identify the person. - He further argued that the imposition on internet are made under Indian Telegraph Act 1885 needs to follow the provisions of section 5 of telegraph act in the view of Article 19 of the Constitution. - He argued that restriction not only impact freedom of speech and expression but also violates right to trade. He also focused on less restrictive measure such as restricting only social media website like Facebook and Whatsapp could have been passed as it has been done in India already in case of human trafficking and child abuse website. - Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi argued that order under Section 144 should be based on the objective material and mot merely on speculation. Lastly it was submitted that the restrictions are imposed for temporary but remain lasted for 100 days which should be taken into account. - Ms. Meenakshi Arora pointed on the Proportionality principle relied on the case **of K. S. Puttaswamy Vs. Union of India** where the test of proportionality was upheldtherefore she contended that proportionality of measure must be determine while imposing restrictions. # ARGUMENTS FROM RESPONDENT SIDE - Mr. Attorney General K.K. Venugopal argued that the background of terrorism in the state of Jammu and Kashmir be taken into account, he relied upon **National Investigation Agency Vs Zahoor Ahmed Shah Watali,** he submitted that this court has taken the problem of terrorism in the state before while deciding the above mentioned case. - The learned Solicitor General Tushar Mehta submitted that the background of the state of Jammu and Kashmir has seen a lot of physical digital cross terrorism. He also argued that petitioner was incorrect in submitting that public movement was restricted, he justified that by submitting that individual movement had never been restricted. - He further pointed out that whole region were imposed with restrictions, Ladakh region were exempted from restrictions, he argued that people were leading their ordinary lives, like all newspaper, television, radio channels were functioning including Srinagar from where the petitioner Ms. Anuradha Bhasin working. - He argued that order passed under section 14 were preventive in nature and were in order to safeguard public security. On its own knowledge the Magistrate can pass the order on the basis of his previous knowledge and history or background of the state. - He further contended that there were enough facts in the knowledge of the Magistrate on which facts he passed the orders under Section 144, he argued that there were provocative speeches and messages were being transmitted. And which was valid reason for imposing orders. - He further submitted that internet was never restricted in Jammu and Ladakh region, he refers to various photographs, tweets and messages of political leaders of Kashmir which are misleading and found against the sovereignty and integrity of the country. - H lastly argued that that order of restriction were passed under Suspension Rules and are in compliance with it. # RELATED PROVISIONS **Article 19 of the Constitution of India (1) All citizens shall have the right**— **(a) To freedom of speech and expression;** (b) To assemble peaceably and without arms; (c)To form associations or unions; (d) To move freely throughout the territory of India; (e) To reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; \[and\] 2\* \* \* \* \* **(g) To practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.** \[(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of \[the sovereignty and integrity of India,\] the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.\] (3) Nothing in sub-clause (b) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of \[the sovereignty and integrity of India or\] public order, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause. (4) Nothing in sub-clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of \[the sovereignty and integrity of India or\] public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause. (5) Nothing in 1\[sub-clauses (d) and (e)\] of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe. (**6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restriction**.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) **Section 144 of Criminal Procedure Code** . Power to issue order in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger .—(1) In cases where, in the opinion of a District Magistrate, a Sub-divisional Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf, there is sufficient ground for proceeding under this section and immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable, such Magistrate may, by a written order stating the material facts of the case and served in the manner provided by section 134, direct any person to abstain from a certain act or to take certain order with respect to certain property in his possession or under his management, if such Magistrate considers that such direction is likely to prevent, or tends to prevent, obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed, or danger to human life, health or safety or a disturbance of the public tranquility, or a riot, or an affray. (2) An order under this section may, in cases of emergency or in cases where the circumstances do not admit of the serving in due time of a notice upon the person against whom the order is directed, be passed ex parte. (3) An order under this section may be directed to a particular individual, or to persons residing in a particular place or area, or to the public generally when frequenting or visiting a particular place or area. (4) No order under this section shall remain in force for more than two months from the making thereof: Provided that, if the State Government considers it necessary so to do for preventing danger to human life, health or safety or for preventing a riot or any affray, it may, by notification, direct that an order made by a Magistrate under this section shall remain in force for such further period not exceeding six months from the date on which the order made by the Magistrate would have, but for such order, expired, as it may specify in the said notification. (5) Any Magistrate may, either on his own motion or on the application of any person aggrieved, rescind.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) **Section 5 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885,** Power for Government to take possession of licensed telegraphs and to order interception of messages. (1) On the occurrence of any public emergency, or in the interest of the public safety, the Central Government or a State Government or any officer specially authorized in this behalf by the Central Government or a State Government may, if satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do, take temporary possession (for so long as the public emergency exists or the interest of the public safety requires the taking of such action) of any telegraph established, maintained or worked by any person licensed under this Act. (2) On the occurrence of any public emergency, or in the interest of the public safety, the Central Government or a State Government or any officer specially authorized in this behalf by the Central Government or a State Government may, if satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of an offence, for reasons to be recorded in writing, by order, direct that any message or class of messages to or from any person or class of persons, or relating to any particular subject, brought for transmission by or transmitted or received by any telegraph, shall not be transmitted, or shall be intercepted or detained, or shall be disclosed to the Government making the order or an officer thereof mentioned in the order: Provided that press messages intended to be published in India of correspondents accredited to the Central Government or a State Government shall not be intercepted or detained, unless their transmission has been prohibited under this sub-section. ## **COURT’S DECISION WITH REASONING AND JUDGMENT** **Court while addressing the first issue** held that freedom of speech and expression is an integral part of Article 19 (1) (a). Here court used the judicial precedent- **Indian Express V Union of India** which declared the freedom of print media is an important right under Article 19 (1) (a) also used the case of **Odyssey Communications Pvt. Ltd. V Lokvidhyan Sanghatana** in which it was held that the right of citizens to exhibit film is covered under Article19 (1) (a). Court held that internet is one of the most vital medium to broadcast information and hence freedom of speech and expression through internet is a fundamental right and government can impose restrictions only if it falls under reasonable restrictions under Article 19 (2). The Court further held that the right to freedom of speech and expression and right to carry on business, trade or occupation under Article 19 (1) (a) and Article 19 (1) (g) using internet as a medium are constitutionally protected. It was proclaimed that there should be reasonable ground behind restricting the internet access and should be laid down by Article 19 (2) and Article 19 (6). **Court while addressing second issue** rejected this plea because the order of restriction did not contain any stoppage of publication of any newspaper. Therefore the Court couldn’t discover the legitimacy and since the petitioner has resumed publications, hence Court held that it is not violating the freedom of press of the petitioner and government is protecting freedom of the press. **In Channing Arnold Vs The Emperor**, (1914) the Privy Council stated that: “the freedom of the journalist is an ordinary part of the freedom of the subject and to whatever length, the subject in general may go, so also may the journalist, but apart from the statute law his privilege is no other and no higher. The range of his assertions, his criticisms or his comments is as wide as, and no wider than that of any other subject.” It was thus not doubted that the freedom of the press is a valuable and sacred right protected by the Indian Constitution.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) **Court while addressing third issue** held that power cannot overthrow legitimate expression of idea or exercise of any democratic right, Court held that the section 144 can only be imposed in case of emergency and held that small disturbance does not lead to breach of public order. Only the local administration and state government can decide whether there is any threat to public peace or not, as public order, crime are state subjects. The state must provide relevant information which is needed to the public as Article 19 along with freedom of speech and expression includes right to information. The state does not have any right to pass law based on anticipation of danger. Hence it could not be valid ground to refuse the production of order. **Court while addressing fourth issue** held that in order to determine the Constitutional legality of the internet shutdown there should be considered two elements i.e. Procedural elemental and substantive element. The Suspension Rules under Section 7 of Telegraph act was passed in 2107 and allowed restriction on the internet for safety measures. These safeguards were that first, the suspension orders may be issued only by the Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry of Home Affairs or by the Secretary to the State Government in charge of the Home Department. In unavoidable circumstances another official not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to the Government of India may issue the orders provided that the competent authority approves the orders within 24 hours of its issuance. Without approval the suspension must be lifted within 24 hours. The orders must include reasons for the suspension and its copy must be sent to a Review Committee consisting of senior State officials. The reasons should not only explain the necessity of the suspension but also the “unavoidable” circumstance which necessitated the order.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) In addition Section 5 (2) of Telegraph act permitted suspension orders only in case of public emergency i.e. presence of emergency is required for passing the order of internet shutdown. However Suspension rule did not defines maximum duration of suspension order. The Court held that government cannot hide anything from public domain section 144 is imposed by the government. The Court recognizes internet as a vital element in today’s life or time and declares freedom of speech and expression as a part of fundamental right. Court ordered to follow the test of proportionality to satisfy that there is no violation of natural justice. The Court did not deflected the restriction on internet and movement of citizen however the judges widened the scope of freedom of speech and expression by including the right to access to internet as a fundamental right and it can only be restricted under the circumstances of national security. Court held that suspension should follow proper safeguard. # CONCLUSION In this case we particularly learned about “technical judicial standards” to interpret and decide the problems related to Article 19 (1) (a) and Article 119 (1) (g) and its impact to clause (2) and (6) respectively. The use of section 144 can’ not be done to suppress the opinion or any democratic right which ensures that freedom of speech and expression can’ not be violated for any political gain or by whims of the authorities. This judgment has opened the door for the judicial review of restrictions. Here the court focused on the importance of internet in today’s time, this case is ray of hope in darkness as this case recognized freedom of speech and expression over internet as a fundamental right. The Court in this case focused upon the balance between individual liberty and national security by ensuring right to know. There is a problem with the judgment that it does not talked about constitutionality of the suspension rule. But this judgment directly emphasizing principles of reasonability, proportionality and necessity, as the Magistrate is bound to the balance of limitation and rights. The judgment also recognized the freedom of press within the ambit of freedom of speech and expression. Internet being most crucial in modern time where it is being used in almost all fields so depriving its access would hamper so many opportunities, information and many new things. At the most, it becomes an academic exercise and coherence can probably be achieved by future pronouncements of the Court. The importance of the Internet from strategic to mundane affairs cannot be downplayed. In conclusion, the following observations of the Honorable Supreme Court warrant attention – *“Law should imbibe the technological development and accordingly mould its rules so as to cater to the needs of society. Non-recognition of technology within the sphere of law is only a disservice to the inevitable*.”[\[13\]](#_ftn13) # --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) B.A.LL.B. 4th SEMESTER AT VASUDEV COLLEGE OF LAW, LAMACHAUR, HALDWANI, UTTARAKHAND. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Special Message to The Congress on The Internal Security of The United States, (last visited June 23, 2023). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Freedom Of Speech On Campus- ERC, (last visited June 23,2023). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Freedom of Speech and Expression,[https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-77-freedom-of-speech-and expression.html](https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-77-freedom-of-speech-and%20expression.html) (last visited June 23, 2023). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay)(P) Ltd. & Ors. V. Union of India & Ors (1985) 1 S.C.C. 641. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Internet Access and COVID-19: A Constitutional Argument To Right, (last visited June 23, 2023). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Ibid. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Ibid. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) The Constitution of India, 1950, Article 19. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1974, Section 144. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Bhasin vs. Union of India- Global Freedom of Expression, (last visited June 24, 2023). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Ibid. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Indian Law Journal,(last visited June 25, 2023). **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases **Tags:** #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, ANURADHA BHASIN, case analysis, case summary, lawfoyer --- ### [Chinnaya vs. Ramayya](https://lawfoyer.in/chinnaya-vs-ramayya/) **Published:** July 7, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **By Yukta Bissa** **In Madras High Court** CITATION ILR (1876-82) 4 Mad 137.DATE OF CASE21st October 1987 APPELLANTVenkata ChinnayaRESPONDENTVenkata Ramayya Garu BENCH/JUDGEInnes J. and Kindersely J. STATUES INVOLVEDSection 2(d) and Section 10 of the Indian Contracts Act, 1872 IMPORTANT ARTICLES AND SECTIONS INVOLVEDIndian Contracts Act, 1872 ## **ABSTRACT** **‘**Lawful consideration’ is one of the requirements for a valid contract under Section 10 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, but what constitutes a valid consideration and can such a consideration come from a third party who is not a party to a contract or would the concept of privity of consideration be applied similarly to English Law?[\[1\]](#_ftn1) According to Section 2(d) of the Indian Contracts Act of 1872 the term ‘consideration’ is described as follows “When, at the desire of the promisor, the promisee or any other person has done or abstained from doing, or does or abstains from doing, or promises to do or to abstain from doing, something, such act or abstinence or promise is called a consideration for the promise”. Simply put, it means that “consideration” can be regarded as “a favour given in exchange for something.” ‘Quid-Pro-Quo’ is the legal word for consideration, which refers to the exchange of something between two parties in order to create a legally binding contract. According to the common law principle known as privity of contract, a contract cannot confer rights to or compel the compliance of a third party who is not a party to it. It implies that the obligations of a contract are limited to those who sign it. It shields third parties from unexpected legal obligations. It is impossible to overstate the significance of consideration as a part of a contract. ## **INTRODUCTION** The present discusses the Privity of Consideration, which actually means “stranger to consideration”, stating that a stranger to consideration cannot sue and the consideration must move from the promisee only, and not any third party. Unlike English Law such notion was not applicable here in the Indian scenario. It is essential that one understands that privity of contract is mandated by contract law. The idea can be viewed as an essential component of English law that denotes the applicability of the rights and obligations of a contract’s parties only to themselves. The divide between the law of contracts and the law of property is likewise based on this idea. The concept of privity of consideration stands in contrast to the concept of privity of contract because the Privity of Consideration is not an essential part to a valid contract. In this case an elderly lady gift her daughter her entire property on a condition that she would pay some annuity to her aunt every month. After the old lady’s death, her daughter refuses to do so and hence a law suit is filed by her aunt. Here the ‘promise’ to pay the annuity to aunt is considered as a ‘lawful consideration’ and the daughter is made liable to pay the annuity and court expenses of her aunt. ## **FACTS** In this case, an old lady owned some estate which she wanted to transfer it her daughter (the respondent, Venkata Ramayya Garu), before her death. The transfer was to be made by means of a ‘Gift Deed’ on the condition that Ramayya would pay an amount of Rs 653/- every year to the sister (the appellant, Venkata Chinnaya Rau) of the old lady.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) The elderly lady called upon her daughter to her home and informed her of her dying request. The daughter (Ramayya) agreed to the condition and promised to pay the annuity amount to her aunt (Chinnaya). Ramayya and Chinnaya ratified the formal contract. However, after the death of that old lady and the acquisition of her estates, her daughter (Ramayya) refused to pay the annuity sum to her aunt Chinnaya. Chinnaya subsequently went to court in order to have the contract enforced. ## **ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT** 1. Can the plaintiff sue the defendant for the amount promised in a contract if the consideration for the promise is provided by someone other than the plaintiff? 2. Whether the notion of “Privity of Consideration” applicable in the Indian context? ## **ARGUMENTS** - **Arguments by the Appellant Side :** The learned counsel from the appellants’ side contended that when the respondent’s mother transferred her whole property to her daughter (respondent), the consideration for her mother was the respondent’s agreement to pay the appellant (mother’s sister) a specified sum annually.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) The learned counsel also claimed that under the Indian Contract Law, the appellant has the right to file a lawsuit against the respondent and recover the sum of money signed and promised by the respondent in the contract. - **Arguments by the respondents’ side :** The learned counsel from the respondents’ side contented that the property or the estate which is being referred here was received by the plaintiff from her mother as a gift, and thus the respondent here has no obligation to pay any amount or annuity as a consideration to her aunt (the appellant). The learned counsel also contented before the Hon’ble court that the contract which is being referred here was actually signed between the respondent and her mother, so the appellant has no right to interfere in such a contract after the death of the old lady i.e., the mother of the respondent. Additionally, the counsel contented even if there was a contract between the appellant and the respondent, the respondent didn’t get anything as a consideration from her aunt (appellant), which is a necessity for valid contract under section 10 of the Indian Contracts Act. And the gifted property cannot be considered as a valid consideration because the appellant was a total stranger to the property. ## **RELATED PROVISIONS** **Section 2(d) of the Indian Contracts Act, 1872** “When, at the desire of the promisor, the promisee or any other person has done or abstained from doing, or does or abstains from doing, or promises to do or to abstain from doing, something, such act or abstinence or promise is called a consideration for the promise;”[\[4\]](#_ftn4) **Section 10 of the Indian Contracts Act, 1872** “What agreements are contracts.—All agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object, and are not hereby expressly declared to be void. Nothing herein contained shall affect any law in force in \[India\] and not hereby expressly repealed by which any contract is required to be made in writing or in the presence of witnesses, or any law relating to the registration of documents.”[\[5\]](#_ftn5) ## **JUDGEMENT** The Court concluded in this instance that a consideration does not have to come from a party to the contract in order to be valid. Innes J. decided that a third party can shift the consideration on behalf of someone who is completely unfamiliar with that consideration by referencing the words ‘promisee or any other person’ as provided in Section 2(d) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Thereby, even if the appellant was entirely not acquainted with the gifted property and it was not gifted by her to the respondent, it would be considered a valid consideration since that property was gifted as consideration by that old lady (the third person) on behalf of her sister Chinnaya (appellant). [\[6\]](#_ftn6) The gifted property and the respondent’s pledge to pay an annuity of Rs 653, according to Kindersley J., might be regarded as components of the equitable agreement. Therefore, the respondent’s promise to pay the appellant Rs 653 in annuity and later refusal to do so after the old lady passed away would be regarded as a breach of contract, giving the appellant the legal right to file a lawsuit against the respondent and sue her in order to receive the promised sum. As a result, the respondent was ordered to pay the annuity sum to the appellant and the contract between Chinnaya (the appellant) and Ramayya (the respondent) was deemed legitimate and enforceable. Thus, the Hon’ble Judges held that that the strangers to a contract cannot sue a person who is a party to the contract, however a stranger to consideration can file a lawsuit if he/she is a beneficiary in contract and can also recover the promised amount. And it was established that the notion of privity to consideration is not applicable in the Indian Context through the Indian Contracts Act, 1872, and a stranger to contract can also provide for a valid consideration for the contract. ## **CONCLUSION** The case of Chinnaya vs. Ramayya, is a landmark case in the history of Indian Contracts. This case has clarified the applicability and concept of the “Privity to consideration” mainly in the Indian Context. In the present case, if we include the deed of gift signed by the old woman to the respondent and the promise made by the respondent to the appellant, it was a transaction proposed by Judge Kindersley in which the old woman had already made the consideration on behalf of the appellant as a deed of gift. Therefore, the respondent had to pay the appellant the annual amount in accordance with the terms of contract. Since the defendant did not do this, the plaintiff could demand the fulfillment of commitment even if she had not paid the consideration herself. The erudite judges here, Kindersely J. and Innes J. were on the same page when it came to payment of annuity to the appellant by the respondent and upheld the legal right of the appellant to file a law suit for the same. The decision by the judges was a pragmatic one as it clearly held that a stranger to contract may not be able to sue, however a beneficiary of the contract can file the case against the party to a contract if his/her benefits are hindered or the promised amount or any other asset is not timely provided to him/her according to the contractual obligations. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) iPleaders Blog, , (Last accessed on 28th June 2023) [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Rumela Biswas, Jus Corpus Law Journal, juscorpus.com (last accessed on 28th June 2023) [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) SimpleKanoon.Com, , (Last accessed on 28th June 2023) [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) The Indian Contracts Act, 1872, Section 2(d). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) The Indian Contracts Act, 1872, Section 10. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) iPleaders Blog, (Last accessed on 28th June 2023) **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases **Tags:** #law, #lawfoyer, #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, case analysis, case summary, Chinnaya, Chinnaya vs. Ramayya, lawfoyer, Ramayya --- ### [Smt. Seema vs Ashwani Kumar](https://lawfoyer.in/smt-seema-vs-ashwani-kumar/) **Published:** July 7, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **By Ashmit Sen[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)** **In the Supreme Court of India** **NAME OF THE CASE****Smt. Seema vs Ashwani Kumar**CITATION** **Transfer Petition (civil) 291 of 2005****DATE OF THE CASE****14th February, 2006****PETITIONER****Smt. Seema****RESPONDENT****Ashwani Kumar****BENCH/JUDGE****Hon’ble Justice Arijit Pasayat & Hon’ble Justice S.H. Kapadia****STATUTES INVOLVED****The Constitution of India, The Hindu Marriage Act, The Special Marriage Act, The Registration Act, The Foreign Marriage Act, The Divorce Act, The Indian Christian Marriage Act, The Bombay Registration of Marriages Act (applicable to Maharashtra and Gujarat), The Karnataka Marriages (Registration and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, The Himachal Pradesh Registration of Marriages Act, The Andhra Pradesh Compulsory Registration of Marriages Act, The Assam Moslem Marriages and Divorce Registration Act, The Orissa Muhammadan Marriages and Divorce Registration Act, The Bengal Muhammadan Marriages and Divorce Registration Act****IMPORTANT SECTIONS/ARTICLES****The Constitution of India: Article – 16(2)** **The Hindu Marriage Act: Sections – 3, 5, 8**## **Abstract** The present case is a landmark case where the Supreme Court upheld the mandatory registration of marriages of all the religion in their respective States. The case was originally a petition between Smt. Seema (Petitioner) and Ashwani Kumar (Respondent) which was first filed before the Haryana District Court in 2005 due to their constant fights and arguments which was then sent to the Supreme Court as a transfer petition with the concern that a large number of cases had been taking place where the existence of marriage was being denied and people were taking advantage of the situation that most of the States did not have any official record of the marriages. The Supreme Court thus, was to decide on the case with respect to the main question that whether registration of marriages should be made compulsory or not and the Court had decided the question in the affirmative. ## **Introduction** Marriage is a social practice through which two people and their families unite which gives rise to conjugal rights. The word conjugal means rights which arise between husband and wife after marriage. Marriage is one of the oldest sacraments in the society. It is a universal social institution which brings men and women into family life where they are socially permitted to have children. According to Gillin and Gillin, “Marriage is a socially approved way of establishing a family of procreation.”[\[2\]](#_ftn2) The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines Marriage as “the state of being united as spouses in a consensual and contractual relationship recognized by law.”[\[3\]](#_ftn3) The essential elements of a valid Hindu Marriage have been given in Section 5 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 which states that a marriage may be solemnized between any two Hindus, if the following conditions are fulfilled[\[4\]](#_ftn4), namely: – 1\. neither party has a spouse living at the time of the marriage; 2\. at the time of the marriage, neither party – (a) is incapable of giving a valid consent to it in consequence of unsoundness of mind; or (b) though capable of giving a valid consent, has been suffering from mental disorder of such a kind or to such an extent as to be unfit for marriage and the procreation of children; or (c) has been subject to recurrent attacks of insanity. 3\. the bridegroom has completed the age of twenty-one years and the bride has completed the age ofeighteen years at the time of the marriage; 4\. the parties are not within the degrees of prohibited relationship unless the custom or usage governing each of them permits of a marriage between the two; 5\. the parties are not sapindas of each other, unless the custom or usage governing each of them permits of a marriage between the two. A marriage registration certificate is an official testimony which states that two people are married. Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines a marriage certificate as “a legal document that shows that a marriage has taken place.”[\[5\]](#_ftn5) A marriage which has already been solemnised can be registered either under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or under the Special Marriage Act, 1954. The Hindu Marriage Act is applicable in cases where both husband and wife are Hindus, Buddhists, Jains or Sikhs or where they have converted into any of these religions. Where either of the husband or wife or both are not Hindus, Buddhists, Jains or Sikhs, the marriage is registered under the Special Marriage Act, 1954. In the present case, the petition was taken up by the Supreme Court to decide whether the registration of marriages should be made compulsory or not. ## **Facts of the case** The original petition which was between Smt. Seema (Petitioner) and Ashwani Kumar (Respondent) was first filed before the Haryana District Court in 2005 due to their constant fights and arguments. The matter was then pending in the Court of Additional District Judge Delhi, when an interim order dated 15th April 2005 was passed, putting a stay on the proceedings and the petition was transferred to the Supreme Court with the concern that a large number of cases had been taking place where the existence of marriage was being denied and people were taking advantage of the situation that most of the States did not have any official record of the marriages. Notice was therefore issued to various States and Union Territories and learned Solicitor General and Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel were requested to act as Amicus Curiae to assist the Court in laying down guidelines in the matter of registration of marriages and on the basis of that notice, all the States and the Union Territories indicated their stand to the effect that registration of marriages was highly desirable. The case was thus to be decided by the Supreme Court on the main question that whether the registration of marriages should be made mandatory or not to prevent such abuse of loopholes in the legal system. ## **Issues raised before the court** 1. Whether the registration of marriage should be a mandatory provision or not and whether such mandate is constitutional or not? ## **Related Provisions** - **The Constitution of India, 1950:** **Article 16(2) – “**No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect or, any employment or office under the State.”[\[6\]](#_ftn6) - **The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955:** **Section 3 – “Definitions. –** In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, – (a) the expressions ‘custom’ and ‘usage’ signify any rule which, having been continuously and uniformly observed for a long time, has obtained the force of law among Hindus in any local area, tribe, community, group or family: Provided that the rule is certain and not unreasonable or opposed to public policy; and provided further that in the case of a rule applicable only to a family it has not been discontinued by the family[\[7\]](#_ftn7); (b) ‘district court’ means, in any area for which there is a city civil court, that court, and in any other area the principal civil court of original jurisdiction, and includes any other civil court which may be specified by the State Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, as having jurisdiction in respect of the matters dealt with in this Act[\[8\]](#_ftn8); (c) ‘full blood’ and ‘half-blood’ – two persons are said to be related to each other by full blood when they are descended from a common ancestor by the same wife and by half-blood when they are descended from a common ancestor but by different wives[\[9\]](#_ftn9); (d) ‘uterine blood’ – two persons are said to be related to each other by uterine blood when they are descended from a common ancestress but by different husbands[\[10\]](#_ftn10); Explanation. – In clauses (c) and (d), ‘ancestor’ includes the father and ‘ancestress’ the mother; (e) ‘prescribed’ means prescribed by rules made under this Act[\[11\]](#_ftn11); (f) (i) ‘sapinda relationship’ – with reference to any person extends as far as the third generation (inclusive) in the line of ascent through the mother, and the fifth (inclusive) in the line of ascent through the father, the line being traced upwards in each case from the person concerned, who is to be counted as the first generation[\[12\]](#_ftn12); (ii) two persons are said to be ‘sapindas’ of each other if one is a lineal ascendant of the other within the limits of sapinda relationship, or if they have a common lineal ascendant who is within the limits of sapinda relationship with reference to each of them[\[13\]](#_ftn13); (g) ‘degrees of prohibited relationship’ – two persons are said to be within the “degrees of prohibited relationship – (i) if one is a lineal ascendant of the other[\[14\]](#_ftn14); or (ii) if one was the wife or husband of a lineal ascendant or descendant of the other[\[15\]](#_ftn15); or (iii) if one was the wife of the brother or of the father’s or mother’s brother or of the grandfather’s or grandmother’s brother of the other[\[16\]](#_ftn16); or (iv) if the two are brother and sister, uncle and niece, aunt and nephew, or children of brother and sister or of two brothers or of two sisters[\[17\]](#_ftn17); Explanation. – For the purposes of clauses (f) and (g), relationship includes – (i) relationship by half or uterine blood as well as by full blood; (ii) illegitimate blood relationship as well as legitimate; (iii) relationship by adoption as well as by blood; and all terms of relationship in those clauses shall be construed accordingly.” **Section 5 – “Conditions for a Hindu marriage. –** A marriage may be solemnized between any two Hindus, if the following conditions are fulfilled, namely: – (i) neither party has a spouse living at the time of the marriage[\[18\]](#_ftn18); \[(ii) at the time of the marriage, neither party – (a) is incapable of giving a valid consent to it in consequence of unsoundness of mind; or (b) though capable of giving a valid consent, has been suffering from mental disorder of such a kind or to such an extent as to be unfit for marriage and the procreation of children; or (c) has been subject to recurrent attacks of insanity \[\*\*\*\];\][\[19\]](#_ftn19) (iii) the bridegroom has completed the age of\[twenty-one years\] and the bride, the age of\[eighteen years\] at the time of the marriage[\[20\]](#_ftn20); (iv) the parties are not within the degrees of prohibited relationship unless the custom or usage governing each of them permits of a marriage between the two[\[21\]](#_ftn21); (v) the parties are not sapindas of each other, unless the custom or usage governing each of them permits of a marriage between the two.[\[22\]](#_ftn22)” **Section 8 – “Registration of Hindu marriages. –** (1)For the purpose of facilitating the proof of Hindu marriages, the State Government may make rules providing that the parties to any such marriage may have the particulars relating to their marriage entered in such manner and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed in a Hindu Marriage Register kept for the purpose.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the State Government may, if it is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do, provide that the entering of the particulars referred to in sub-section (1) shall be compulsory in the State or in any part thereof, whether in all cases or in such cases as may be specified, and where any such direction has been issued, any person contravening any rule made in this behalf shall be punishable with fine which may extend to twenty-five rupees.[\[24\]](#_ftn24) (3) All rules made under this section shall be laid before the State Legislature, as soon as may be, after they are made.[\[25\]](#_ftn25) (4) The Hindu Marriage Register shall at all reasonable times be open for inspection, and shall be admissible as evidence of the statements therein contained and certified extracts therefrom shall, on application, be given by the Registrar on payment to him of the prescribed fee.[\[26\]](#_ftn26) (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, the validity of any Hindu marriage shall in no way be affected by the omission to make the entry.[\[27\]](#_ftn27)” ## **Judgement** The Supreme Court stated that by compiling relevant legislations in respect of registration of marriages, it appeared that there were only four Statutes which provided for compulsory registration of marriages which were : (1) The Bombay Registration of Marriages Act, 1953 (applicable to Maharashtra and Gujarat), (2) The Karnataka Marriages (Registration and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1976, (3) The Himachal Pradesh Registration of Marriages Act, 1996, and (4) The Andhra Pradesh Compulsory Registration of Marriages Act, 2002. Except these four statutes, registration of marriages was not compulsory in any of the other States. The Court also pointed out that provisions had been made for voluntary registration of Muslim marriages in Assam, Orissa and West Bengal through the “Assam Moslem Marriages and Divorce Registration Act, 1935,” the “Orissa Muhammadan Marriages and Divorce Registration Act, 1949” and the “Bengal Muhammadan Marriages and Divorce Registration Act, 1876” respectively. In Uttar Pradesh, the State Government had also announced a policy providing for compulsory registration of marriages by the Panchayats and maintenance of its records relating to births and deaths. The Court also took notice that rules regarding the registration of marriages with regards to Hindu Marriages and Muslim Marriages had not been made and enforced in Jammu and Kashmir. The Court then took notice of the certain statutes relating to marriage existing in India – under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 which applied to Indian citizens irrespective of their religion, each marriage was to be registered by the Marriage Officer specially appointed for the purpose while the registration of marriages was compulsory under the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872 where the entries were made in the marriage register of the concerned Church soon after the marriage ceremony along with the signatures of bride and bridegroom, the officiating priest and the witnesses. The Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936 made registration of marriages compulsory but under Section 8 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, it was up to the discretion of the contracting parties to either solemnize the marriage before the Sub-Registrar or register it after performing the marriage ceremony in conformity with the customary beliefs. However, the Act made it clear that the validity of the marriage would in no way be affected by omission to make the entry in the register. The Hindu Marriage Act enabled the State Government to make rules with regard to the registration of marriages and under Sub-section (2) of Section 8, it was stated that if the State Government was of the opinion that such registration should be made compulsory, then the State Government could provide for such measures and in the event, any person contravening any rule made in this regard would be punishable with fine. The Court also took notice that the vital statistics including registration of deaths and births was covered by Entry 30, List III of Schedule VII and the registration of marriages would come within the ambit of the expression ‘vital statistics’. The Court then examined the affidavit filed on behalf of the National Commission for Women which indicated that the Commission was of the opinion that non-registration of marriages affected women the most and hence, if registration of marriages would be made compulsory, then it would help in solving important women-related issues such as – “(a) prevention of child marriages and to ensure minimum age of marriage. (b) prevention of marriages without the consent of the parties. (c) Check illegal bigamy/polygamy (d) Enabling married women to claim their right to live in the matrimonial house, maintenance, etc. (e) Enabling widows to claim their inheritance rights and other benefits and privileges which they are entitled to after the death of their husband. (f) Deterring men from deserting women after marriage. (g) Deterring parents/guardians from selling daughters/young girls to any person including a foreigner, under the garb of marriage.”[\[28\]](#_ftn28) After studying the provisions and examining the affidavits filed, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that the disputes concerning solemnization of marriages between two persons could be greatly avoided if record of such marriages were kept. The Court agreed with the National Commission for Women that non-registration of marriages affected women the most. Registration of marriages would also provide evidence of the marriage and would provide a rebuttable presumption of the marriage having taken place. Though, the registration itself could not be a proof of valid marriage but it would have a great evidentiary value in the matters of custody of children, right of children born from the wedlock of the two persons whose marriage was registered and the age of parties to the marriage. The Court was of the opinion that it would be in the interest of the society if marriages were made compulsorily registrable and as a natural consequence, the effect of non-registration of marriages would be that the presumption which was available from registration of marriages would be denied to a person whose marriage was not registered. Therefore, the Court was of the view that marriages of all persons who were citizens of India belonging to various religions should be made compulsorily registrable in their respective States, where the marriage was solemnized and the Court gave directions to the States and the Central Government to take the following steps: “(i) The procedure for registration should be notified by respective States within three months from today. This can be done by amending the existing Rules, if any, or by framing new Rules. However, objections from members of the public shall be invited before bringing the said Rules into force. In this connection, due publicity shall be given by the States and the matter shall be kept open for objections for a period of one month from the date of advertisement inviting objections. On the expiry of the said period, the States shall issue appropriate notification bringing the Rules into force. (ii) The officer appointed under the said Rules of the States shall be duly authorized to register the marriages. The age, marital status (unmarried, divorcee) shall be clearly stated. The consequence of non-registration of marriages or for filing false declaration shall also be provided for in the said Rules. Needless to add that the object of the said Rules shall be to carry out the directions of this Court. (iii) As and when the Central Government enacts a comprehensive statute, the same shall be placed before this Court for scrutiny. (iv) Learned counsel for various States and Union Territories shall ensure that the directions given herein are carried out immediately.”[\[29\]](#_ftn29) The Supreme Court then directed the Registry to handover a copy of the order to the learned Solicitor General for necessary follow-up action and the Court recorded their appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by Mr. G.E. Vahanvati, the Solicitor General and Mr. Ranjeet Kumar, senior advocate, who appeared as amicus curiae. ## **Conclusion** The Supreme Court through its judgement in the present case, had set a landmark when it held that it was of the view that marriages of all persons who were citizens of India belonging to various religions should be made compulsorily registrable in their respective States, where the marriage was solemnized. In my view, I agree with the court’s opinion when it agreed with the view presented by the National Commission for Women that non-registration of marriages affect women the most and if such registration of marriages were to be made compulsory, it would not only help a lot of aggrieved women who face such circumstances where the husband had denied the validity of their marriage due to the absence of any official record of such marriage, but would also be of great evidentiary value in in the matters of custody of children, right of children born from the wedlock of the two persons whose marriage was registered and the age of parties to the marriage, which has also been stated out by the Supreme Court in this case and thereby the Supreme Court’s decision of making registration of marriages compulsory is of such great importance and it will surely help in preventing a lot of people to try and abuse the loopholes of the legal system in India. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) 4th Semester Student at St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Navendu K. Thakur, An Introduction to Sociology, Page 141, 2nd Edition, 2016. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Merriam-Webster Dictionary, (Last visited on June 28, 2023). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Dr. Paras Diwan, Family Law, Page 42, 12th Edition, 2021. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) Merriam-Webster Dictionary, (Last Visited on June 29, 2023). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 16(2). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 3(a). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 3(b). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 3(c). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 3(d). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 3(e). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 3(f)(i). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 3(f)(ii). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 3(g)(i). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 3(g)(ii). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 3(g)(iii). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 3(g)(iv). [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 5(i). [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 5(ii). [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 5(iii). [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 5(iv). [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 5(v). [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 8(1). [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 8(2). [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 8(3). [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 8(4). [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 8(5). [\[28\]](#_ftnref28) Indian Kanoon, (Last Visited on June 30, 2023). [\[29\]](#_ftnref29) Indian Kanoon, (Last Visited on June 30, 2023). **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases **Tags:** #law, #lawfoyer, #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, Ashwani Kumar, case analysis, case summary, lawfoyer, Smt. Seema, Smt. Seema vs Ashwani Kumar --- ### [NILABATI BEHERA V. STATE OF ORISSA AND ORS.](https://lawfoyer.in/nilabati-behera-v-state-of-orissa-and-ors/) **Published:** July 7, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **By Ayush Upadhyay[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)** **In the Supreme Court of India** **NAME OF THE CASE**NILABATI BEHERA V. STATE OF ORISSA & ORS. **CITATION**1993 AIR 1960, 1993 SCR (2) 581 **DATE OF THE CASE**March 24, 1993 **APPELLANT**SMT. NILABATI BEHERA @ LALITA BEHERA **RESPONDENT**STATE OF ORISSA AND ORS. **BENCH/JUDGE**J. S. VERMA, ANAND A.S., VENKATACHALA S **STATUS/CONSTITUTION INVOLVED**The Constitution of India The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 **IMPORTANT SECTIONS/ARTICLES**The Constitution of India – Article 21 and 32 The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 176 ## **Abstract** In Indian Constitution every person is authorized to avail imprescriptible fundamental right. However, our citizens do takes basic rights whether codified or not are requisite for him to enjoy their secured rights. This case analysis is considering the liability of State on executive measures in regards to fundamental rights enshrined under Indian Constitution. The present case acknowledged as paramount case on important questions of compensation to victim for infringing the essential right to life enshrined under Article 21, and that liability upon State to protect custodial death and police atrocities. This case emerged, when a letter submitted by appellant Nilabati Behera to the Apex Court, the Court agreed and considered as Writ Petition under ambit of Article 32 of the Constitution of India for ascertaining the appeal of compensation upon the death of appellant’s son Suman Behera, aged 22 years, in police custody. The prayer made by the appellant is for reward of compensation to the petitioner, the mother of Suman Behera, for transgression of the enshrined fundamental right to life given under Article 21 of the Constitution. ## **Introduction** The custodial death is a very brutal form of violence. The major concern of custodial deaths is a deplorable problem for any developing countries like India. The issue of custodial death is not new in our society but evidences of its genesis from the English dominion too. In the colony of the British period initiated many assassinations, involving myriad freedom fighters. It has been derived from the averment of Nityananda Rai, the Union Minister of State for Home Affairs, it has been declared that an aggregate of 146 cases of custodial death was recorded from 2017 to 2018, followed by 136 cases between 2018-2019, 112 cases in 2019-2021, 100 cases in 2020-2021 and 175 cases in 2021-2022[\[2\]](#_ftn2). We know that the institution of emergency disreputable noted as the dark time of our Indian Democracy. It was used as a weapon for searing Parliamentary motif of a Nation. In the meantime, an unmarked number of custodial homicides was happened. **Custodial Death** means an assassination of impeded person in custody of police, prison or other authorities, for the meaning of custody, there are 3 kinds: 1- Police Custody 2- Judicial Custody 3- Parliamentary Custody From time to time, the Supreme Court enunciated compensatory philosophy in regards to custodial violence, as Indian Constitution does not specifically enshrine this issue. The legal ameliorate includes yielding compensation to the persons, who have distressed of their fundamental rights. ## **FACTS OF THE CASE** In this case, Suman Behera son of appellant, aged 22 years, was inculpated of the offence of theft u/s 378[\[3\]](#_ftn3). On December 1, 1987, the deceased was taken into custody by the police (Sarat Chandra Barik, ASI), at about 8 a.m. from his house in Police Station Bisra in District Sundergarh in Orissa. He was apprehended under police establishment. The appellant was notified that her son Suman Behera’s dead body was revealed on the Railway track near Jaraikela train station on December 2, 1987. After this incident, when a letter submitted by the appellant/petitioner on September 14, 1988, which was contemplated as a writ petitioner by the Supreme Court under ambit of article 32 of the Constitution. The petitioner has alleged her son’s death was not a natural death. Hence, it was considered as a custodial death, which indicating numerous injuries on the deceased endured. It was further alleged that deceased sustained various wounds when he was in the police outpost, after that his body throwed on the railway track. The appellant has applied for reward of compensation for infringement of Right to Life provided under Article 21. The respondents denied the accusation of custodial violence in respect of Suman Behera’s death by elaborating that on night of December 1st and 2nd, 1987, the deceased vamoosed from the outpost of police where he was being detained for alleged of theft. He suggested that on the next day, he was collided by passing train on the track. Due to this contended issue of death, the Apex Court directed on March 4th, 1991, directing District Judge of Sundergarh in Orissa to initiate an investigation & disclose the Compte rendu on this behalf. On September 4th, 1991, the District Court adduced inquiry report, which extrapolated that Suman Behera died due to numerous wounds and injuries sustained while being in the outpost of police station. ## **ISSUE RAISED BEFORE THE COURT** **1.** Whether the Appellant’s claim of custodial death is justifiable and corroborated by presented evidences? **2.** Whether the Constitutional Courts are empowered to award monetary loses in regards to compensation for infringement of Civil Rights? ## **ARGUMENTS FROM THE APPELLANT SIDE** **1.** Learned counsel for the appellant argued that Suman Behera died as an outcome of several abrasion & wounds imposed to him when he was in police custody. Therefore, it is a case of custodial torture that reflects a custodial death of a youth. **2.** The appellant’s counsel contended that deceased has to face severe cruelty by the police officers, and that violence threatening his basic civil right to live with dignity. He mentioned that a person is having a right to equal treatment irrespective of accused person or innocent person. **3.** Learned counsel in behalf of petitioner submitted that on September 4th, 1991, the inquiry report made by the District Court serving the directions by the Apex Court. In the report presented by the Court suggested that Suman Behera had died by several injuries sustained by him while undergone custody of police premise. **4.** Learned counsel requested that my client should be given some monetary relief in this regard to live with basic need as her son was the only source of income. ## **ARGUMENTS FROM THE RESPONDENT SIDE** **1.**Learned counsel for the respondent side argued that appellant’s son Suman Behera vamoosed from premise of police custody on the next day after detained. Therefore, in order to escape with police authorities, he ran away hurriedly and died by crashing with train. **2.** Learned counsel appeared for the respondent side denying the fact that had stated by the petitioner’s counsel. He again argued that the deceased could not perceived in search conducted by the officers. **3.** The respondent’s counsel contended strongly that the liability of the police officials stopped the time when he escaped from the outpost of police premise. **4.** Learned counsel appealed that Suman Behera died while collided with passing train and imposed severe injuries that caused his death. Further, he contended that there were more options to inflicts wounds by fall on the railway line. ## **Related Provision** - **The Constitution of India** **Article 21 – Protection of life and personal liberty** No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law[\[4\]](#_ftn4). **Article 32 –** **Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part** - The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed[\[5\]](#_ftn5) - The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part[\[6\]](#_ftn6) - Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (1) & (2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2)[\[7\]](#_ftn7) (4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution[\[8\]](#_ftn8). - **Indian Penal Code, 1860** **Section 176 – Inquiry by Magistrate into cause of death.** - When any person dies while in the custody of the police or when the case is of the nature referred to in clause (i) or clause (ii) of sub- section (3) of section 174\] the nearest Magistrate- empowered to hold inquests shall, and in any other case mentioned in sub- section (1) of section 174, any Magistrate so empowered may hold an inquiry into the cause of death either instead of, or in addition to, the investigation held by the police officer; and if he does so, he shall have all the powers in conducting it which he would have in holding an inquiry into an offence[\[9\]](#_ftn9). (2) The Magistrate holding such an inquiry shall record the evidence taken by him in connection therewith in any manner hereinafter prescribed according to the circumstances of the case[\[10\]](#_ftn10). (3) Whenever such Magistrate considers it expedient to make an examination of the dead body of any person who has been already interred, in order to discover the cause of his death, the Magistrate may cause the body to be disinterred and examined[\[11\]](#_ftn11). (4) Where an inquiry is to be held under this section, the Magistrate shall, wherever practicable, inform the relatives of the deceased whose names and addresses are known, and shall allow them to remain present at the inquiry. Explanation. – In this section, expression” relative” means parents, children, brothers, sisters and spouse[\[12\]](#_ftn12). ## **Judgement** In the famous groundbreaking case of Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa and Others, where the compensatory jurisprudence evolved as a core product of its decision. The Bench of the Apex Court was adjudicated through the facts and evidences offered by both the parties. The Supreme Court observed that there is no explicit evidence of search in order to discover appellant’s son after vamoose from police station’s premise. The Court further stated that the report of doctor has suggested the injuries could not imposed in train tragedy, it had been feasible to inflict wounds by the lathi blows. It is inferred that the reward of monetary damages as compensation under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution may be ameliorate for the public administration, confirmed strict liability for demonstration of fundamental rights, where relief does not approve. The Court has enunciated the principle that awarding compensation can be essential for complete justice and effectuating civil rights. The Court mentioned that it is the duty of the State to protect the rights of individual under Article 21 of the Constitution of India cannot be denied to an accused person. The State will be responsible for the illicit wrong happened by police authorities. In this situation the principle of sovereign immunity does not impose. Further the Court mentioned that the police officers have a strict duty towards the citizens in the outpost of police premise. Honourable Apex Court leaned on Article 9(5) of ICCPR, 1966, which determines that implementation of monetary costs is not only an international aspect. Article 9(5) reads – “Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation[\[13\]](#_ftn13).” The Court’s adjudication was involved various judgements in order to substantiate the case of appellant’s deceased son. In **[Rudal Shah v. State of Bihar](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/810491/ "Rudal Shah v. State of Bihar")[**\[14\]**](#_ftn14),** the Court held that compensation might be given under the ambit of Article 32 but the petitioner could have exiled the primary remedy if it was absolutely disputed. In order to reach the true fraction, the Court cited case of **[Sebastian Hongray v. Union of India](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1046642/#:~:text=Willful%20disobedience%20to%20a%20writ,a%20Court%20constitutes%20civil%20contempt. "Sebastian Hongray v. Union of India")[**\[15\]**](#_ftn15)**, ideal costs were given by the Court in the disability of authorities to produce the person, and that they told us all person had died due to unnatural demise. The Court cited another case of **[Bhim Singh v. State of J&K](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1227505/ "Bhim Singh v. State of J&K")[**\[16\]**](#_ftn16),** where adjudicated that an unlawful detention, illegality could not be cleaned by releasing the person. Finally, the Supreme Court has granted the compensation to the appellant for her son’s demise while in care and protection of police authority. The court is of opinion that there are no particulars to check the precision. The District Judge submitted that the deceased had a monthly payment between 1200/- to 1500/- rupees. The Supreme Court ordered the respondent, the State of Orissa to pay appellant amount of One Lakh Fifty Thousand rupees as inferred ideal compensation, along with an extra Ten Thousand rupees to Legal Aid committee of Supreme Court. ## **Conclusion** The epoch making and groundbreaking verdict has been pronounced by the Honourable Apex Court. Therefore, this decision made the State could be responsible for any such wrong or illicit exploitation in public law. It is the duty of the State to ensure the citizen from illegal & unlawful activity by its officers. The provision of Article 21 is enough to provide every person live with dignity and free from all demonstration performed by the State. If the current scenario is to be considered, it is very difficult to say that there will be any improvement regarding custodial deaths. There is a need for stringent legal action which will be solely dedicated to punishing the personnel who misused their power and whose brutal force led to a loss of life. For ensuring the reduction of instances of custodial death, the guidelines laid down in the landmark cases of ***[D.K. Basu v. State of Bengal](https://www.alec.co.in/judgement-page/dk-basu-v-state-of-west-bengal "D.K. Basu v. State of Bengal")***[**\[17\]**](#_ftn17) **and *[Prakash Singh v. Union of India](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1090328/ "Prakash Singh v. Union of India")*[**\[18\]**](#_ftn18)** need to be strictly implemented[\[19\]](#_ftn19). The Highest Court of the India enunciated the remedy in this behalf for the violation of individual right involved in the Article 21 of the Constitution. Though, implementation of this principle of compensatory jurisprudence could strongly expediate the extrapolation of right to endeavour suitable compensation, in the present scenario, it is needed to make legislation that imposed smooth process for taking compensation by the aggrieved person. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) LL.B.(Hons.) 4th Semester Student at University of Allahabad, Prayagraj, Uttar Pradesh. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Mahendra Singh Manral, At 80, highest no. of custodial deaths reported in Gujarat in last five years, Rajya Sabha told, (*The Indian* *Express,* 14 February, 2023) <[https://indianexpress.com/article/india/custodial-deaths-highest-in-gujarat-last-5-years-maharashtra–up-tamil-nadu-bihar-rajya-sabha-8441974/](https://indianexpress.com/article/india/custodial-deaths-highest-in-gujarat-last-5-years-maharashtra--up-tamil-nadu-bihar-rajya-sabha-8441974/)> accessed 28 June 2023. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) See The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 378. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 21. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 32(1). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 32(2). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 32(3). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 32(4). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 176(1). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 176(2). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 176(3). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 176(4). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 Article 9(5). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Rudal Shah v. State of Bihar (1983) AIR 1086. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Sabastian Hongray v. Union of India & Others (1984) AIR 1026. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Bhim Singh, MLA v. State of J&K & Others (1985) 4 SCC 677. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (AIR 1997 SC 610). [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Prakash Singh v. Union of India (1998) 1 SCC 226. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Mohammad Sahil Khan, Custodial deaths, ipleader, (July 22, 2023), <.> accessed 30 June 2023. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases **Tags:** #lawfoyer, #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, case analysis, case summary, lawfoyer, NILABATI BEHERA, NILABATI BEHERA V. STATE OF ORISSA AND ORS. --- ### [JD Jain vs. Management of SBI](https://lawfoyer.in/jd-jain-vs-management-of-sbi/) **Published:** July 7, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **By Sonali** **In the Supreme Court of India** Name of the caseJ.D. Jain VS Management of State Bank of India & another.CitationCivil Appeal No. 495(L) of 1979Date of the case17 December, 1981AppellantJ.D. JainRespondentManagement of State bank of India & Another.Bench/judgeIslam Baharul (J) Talzapurkar, V.D Varadarajan , A.(J) Statutes/Constitution involvedConstitution of India , 1950Industrial Disputes Act,1947The Indian Evidence act,1872Important Sections/articlesConstitution of India , 1950 Article.226 Article.227 Industrial Disputes Act,1947 Section.11A The Indian Evidence act,1872 Section.60## **Abstract** In the case on hand, the appellant was a cashier in one of the branch of the State Bank of India. There was a mishap with one of the depositor/account holder of the bank and there was extra withdrawal of money. The appellant was given the ‘letter of authority’ by the depositor to withdraw Rs.500 but instead there was an entry of withdrawal of Rs.1500. Further the bank referred the case to the agent of the bank and he made a disciplinary authority with an enquiry officer. The enquiry officer held that the applicant was guilty and was terminated from the services to challenge this termination the appellant moved to the Industrial tribunal, Delhi and the tribunal held the case in favour of the appellant by awarding him the full payment from the day of the termination and reinstated him. The respondent on the other hand went to the High Court to quash the award and was successful to do so, again the appellant appealed in the Supreme Court against the order of the High Court. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court and dismissed the appeal. ## **Introduction** As India is a country which is rapidly towards more and more Industrialisation every day where the working class are labourers, these labourers make up the most of the working class in an industry setup. There are also many disputes which arise between the employers and employees that are the labourers. So the industrial Disputes act, 1947 was introduced. ***Industrial disputes act, 1947*** As the employer and the workers most of the time has very different viewpoints which often result in conflict between the workmen and the employer so this act was enacted to eradicate such conflict. One of the main features of the act is that a separate tribunal is set up known as the ‘industrial tribunal’ where all the industrial disputes are filed. In the present case of JD Jain vs. Management of State bank of India & Another, the worker/appellant move to the industrial tribunal for the relief where he was awarded relief but the employer further appealed in the High Court. One thing to be noticed here is that even if a separate industrial tribunal is set up by the government, but its decision is not final High Court as well as Supreme Court also have to the jurisdiction and can entertain the appeal on a reasonable basis, like if any error is committed by the tribunal. ## **Facts of the case** The factual matrix in this case is that the appellant was a cashier working in the State bank of India in the Meerut city branch. On February 8, 1971 – Dishan Prakash Kansal who had a saving bank account in the bank withdraw Rs.500 through the appellant. On June 12, 1971, the account holder came to the bank to receive his passbook. On checking the passbook the account holder claimed that he withdrew only Rs.500, but the entered amount in the passbook was Rs.1500. When the account holder was taken up to the supervisor R.P Gupta and there too account holder told his concern. On further examining the documents, it was then found that the account holder had given a ‘letter of authority’ to the Appellant in to withdraw money of Rs.500 only but the money withdrawn was of Rs.1500. From the documents it was clearly deciphered that there was extra ‘1’ added with different ink and handwriting in the document before ‘500.’ On September 18, 1972 the Bank/respondent served charges on the appellant as he was the one who altered the letter of authority in his own handwriting and with a different ink. A disciplinary committee was set up with an enquiry officer Mr. Rajendra Prasad The committee submitted its respond stating that the appellant confessed as well as accepted that he was the one who altered the document with his own handwriting and paid only Rs.500 to the account holder and received Rs.1000 in excess. On December 7, 1973, the bank by its memorandum discharged the appellant from service with effect from December 22, 1973, then the appellant and went to the industrial tribunal where he was granted the award but the respondent here then approached the High Court where the award was quashed yet again the appellant and has approached the Supreme Court for the relief. ## **Issue raised before the court** 1. Whether a proper and valid domestic enquiry was held by the Bank and what was its effect? 2. Whether the management of State bank of India justifies in discharging from service. Shri J.D Jain, cashier of Meerut branch with effect from December 22, 1973? If not to what relief is he entitled? ## **Arguments from the appellant’s side** - First of all the council from the Appellant ‘s side contended that the industrial tribunal tried this case with the power which was conferred upon it by section 11-A of the industrial disputes act, but the High Court has no power under article 266/227 of the Constitution. According to which it can’t try this case that is it has no jurisdiction to interfere with the decision made by the tribunal. - The counsel further said that the evidence provided by the learned counsel of the respondent was not reliable. Evidence was just hearsay as the account holder Mr. Dishan Prakash Kansal was not examined so, the appellant cannot be held guilty when the evidence was not examined. - The appellants counsel highlighted the point stating that in an application of the writ of *certiorari* under article.226 of the Constitution for quashing an award of an industrial tribunal, the jurisdiction of the High Court is limited as to exercise the power of quashing the award, the High Court have to point out an error committed by the tribunal on the face of the record or when the tribunals facts are unacceptable or unreasonable. - The appellant’s counsel further pointed out that the order held by the tribunal that although the alteration were made by the appellant but the question still remains that whether it was done without the consent or knowledge of the account holder or not, as there is no evidence to prove the same. ## **Arguments from the respondent side** - The council from the respondent side professed that departmental enquiry was carried out by the bank. The disciplinary committee was set up with an enquiry officer. There were six witnesses among which only one witness did not support the case as he was a leader of the employees union. - Further, the counsel stated that the appellant confessed and agreed to the claims that were made against him that he forged the document with his own handwriting and withdrew Rs.1500 instead of Rs.500. The confession was made in the presence of the witnesses including one of the higher officers. So the report of the disciplinary committee stated all the true facts which were made after the inquiry into the matter and the appellant was held guilty. - The counsel further pointed out that the evidence was being examined in the domestic enquiry and not in a criminal prosecution, in cases of domestic enquiry, three type of proceedings against the accused were possible: - Departmental proceeding and action. - Criminal prosecution for forgery and misappropriation. - Civil proceedings for recovery of the amount alleged to be misappropriated. The respondent followed course (i) so the principle of tribunal that the guilt should be established is not applicable. - The counsel from the respondent’s side further proposed that in the case of domestic enquiry, strict rules of evidence are not applicable as well as the word ‘hearsay’ is used in various senses sometime it means whatever a person is heard to say; sometimes it means whether a person declares on information given by someone else. ## **Related Provisions** 1. **Constitution of India, 1950** **Ar.226: (Power of High Courts to issue certain writs)-** (1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have powers, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercise jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibitions, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. (3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1), without- (a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order; and (b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or , as the case may be, the expiry of the aid next day, stand vacated. (4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of Article 32.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) **Ar.227: (Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court) –** (1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories interrelation to which it exercises jurisdiction. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions, the High Court may – (a) call for returns from such courts; (b) Make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts; and (c) Prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such courts. (3) The High Court may also settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff and all clerks and officers of such courts and to attorneys, advocates and pleaders practicing therein: *Provided* that any rules made, forms prescribed or tables settled under clause (2) or clause (3) shall not be inconsistent with the provision of any law for the time being in force, and shall require the previous approval of the Governor. (4) Nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on High Court powers of superintendence over any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) - **Industrial Disputes Act, 1947** **Sec.11-A: (Powers of Labor Court Tribunal, and National Tribunal to give appropriate relief in case of discharge or dismissal of workmen)** Where an industrial dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of a workman has been referred to a Labor Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for adjudication and, in the course of the adjudication proceedings, the Labor Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award, set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require: *PROVIDED* that in any proceeding under this section the Labor Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall rely only on the materials on record and shall not take any fresh evidence in relation to the matter.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) - **Indian Evidence Act, 1872** **Sec.60: (Oral evidence must be direct) –** Oral evidence must, in all cases whatever, be direct; that is to say— if it refers to a fact which could be seen, it must be the evidence of a witness who says who says he saw it; If it refers to a fact which could be heard, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he heard it; If it refers to a fact which could be perceived by any other sense or in any other manner, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he perceived it by that sense or in that manner; If it refers to an opinion or to the grounds on which that opinion is held, it must be the evidence of the person who holds that opinion on those grounds: *Provided* that the opinions of experts expressed in any treatise commonly offered for sale, and the grounds on which such opinions are held, may be proved by the production of such treatises if the author is dead or cannot be found, or has become incapable of giving evidence, or cannot be called as a witness without an amount of delay or expense which the Court regards as unreasonable: *Provided* also that, if oral evidence refers to the existence to the existence or condition of any material thing other than a document, the Court may, if it thinks fit, require the production of such material thing for its inspection.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) ## **Judgement** The Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld the judgement of the High Court which quashed the award of reinstatement by the industrial tribunal and also stated that the High Court was fully in his jurisdiction in quashing the award of the tribunal. The court further made distinction between the domestic enquiry and the criminal prosecution evidence. Section.60 of the Indian Evidence act, 1872, clearly states that hearsay evidence is not admissible, but the evidence stated in this case was not hearsay, but was relevant as it was direct evidence. The court referred to the case of State of Haryana vs. Rattan Singh[\[5\]](#_ftn5) where it was held “It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry, direct and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence, provided it has reasonable Nexus and credibility.” In another case of Privy Council, Subramanian vs. Public Prosecutor,[\[6\]](#_ftn6) it was observed that “the evidence of a statement made to a witness who is not himself called as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible, when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made. The fact that it was made quite apart from its truth is frequently relevant in considering the mental state and conduct thereafter of the witness or some other persons is whose presence these statements are made.” The court said that the tribunal has made several errors in the fact of the case and these errors invoke the power of article 226/227 of the Constitution and give the jurisdiction power to the High Court. The High court took the necessary time to verify the facts of this case and as a result the appeal of the appellant was dismissed. The appellant remained discharged from the duties of the cashier and the services were terminated as well. ## **Conclusion** It was obvious from the facts and evidences present that the appellant forged the documents with his own handwriting and violated the conduct of a worker; the Bank/respondent only proceeded with the departmental enquiry and did not proceed with the criminal prosecution as forging document is a crime. In my view point, the termination of the appellant service was the right decision as he breached the confidence which a consumers vests in their sellers/service provider. This breach of confidence puts the whole organisation in front of a big question mark and makes their services questionable as well as undesirable. Also, there is difference between domestic enquiry and criminal prosecution and the form of evidence admissible are also different. So the evidence in this case was not hearsay, but they were admissible in the court of law. The distinction should be made in these two types of proceedings. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) INDIA CONST. art.226 [\[2\]](#_ftnref2)\[2\] INDIA CONST. art.227 [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The Industrial Disputes act, S.11-A, No. 14, Act of Parliament, 1947 (India) [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) The Indian Evidence Act, S.60, No.1, British Parliament, 1872 (India) [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) State of Haryana vs. Rattan Singh, AIR 1977 SC 1512 [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Subramanian vs. Public Prosecutor, (1956) 1 WLR 965 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases **Tags:** #lawfoyer, #lawyer, #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, case analysis, JD Jain, JD Jain vs. Management of SBI, lawfoyer --- ### [K. Rama Krishna vs. Union of India](https://lawfoyer.in/k-rama-krishna-vs-union-of-india/) **Published:** July 7, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **By Sonali** **In the High court of Andhra Pradesh** Name of the caseK. Rama Krishna vs. Union of India CitationWrit Petition (PIL) No. 101 of 2020Date of the case22 May, 2020AppellantK. Rama KrishnaRespondentUnion of IndiaBench / JudgeD.V.S.S. Somayajulu, Lalitha KannegantiStatutes / Constitution involvedConstitution of India , 1950Civil Procedure Code, 1908Important Sections/ articlesConstitution of India, 1950 Article.14 Article.19 Article.21 Article.226 Civil procedure Code,1908 Section.151## **Abstract** In the present case, the appellant /K. Rama Krishna filed public interest litigation. The litigation was filed in Andhra Pradesh High Court under article.226 of the constitution which deals with writ petition and section.151 of Civil Procedure Code; the labourers of Andhra Pradesh were not allowed to leave the city’s in which they were working as labourers/workers. These labourers decided to go to their native place or village in Andhra Pradesh. Due to Covid restrictions, they were going back to the home town on foot or by bicycle and they were not provided with any transportation facilities so the appellant urged the court to pass orders so that the necessary facilities should be given to these migrating labourers. ## **Introduction** During the time of Covid-19, many sections of the society suffered, one such section who suffered was of workers/ labourers as in 2020 the Covid-19 cases were on the rise and lockdown was being followed. The working opportunities were also not present at that time because of the ongoing lockdown so, the labourers who came from small villages to the cities to earn were forced to go back to their hometown but because of this lockdown and rising cases, the situation became more and more difficult. The judiciary had to come in between and resolve this condition. The writ was filed under section.151 of civil procedure code and article.226 of the Indian constitution for the relief. By filing petition under section.151, the aim is to focus the attention of the court towards a mistake and in case of article.226 of the Constitution the petition is filed under writ of MANDAMUS which is used to order any authority to carry out the public obligations given to them. The labourers in this case were stranded in Vijayawada, Guntur and other parts of the state of Andhra Pradesh, due to lockdown. These labourers should be provided with every facility which is required for their travelling back to the home town. ## **Facts of the case** The crux of the case is as; the appellant filed a Public Interest Litigation under writ petition of mandamus in article.226 of the Constitution. The appellant pleads here that the workers who were working in the cities of Andhra Pradesh were suffering as due to Covid 19, there was no work and they were not able to move back to their hometowns. These labourers started moving to their hometowns without any transportation and facilities. These workers were trekking towards their hometown with such hot weather without any food and water. This lack of facilities in turn violates their fundamental right enshrined under article 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. These workers are also entitled to be tested for Covid-19 before moving toward their hometown as health is a part of fundamental rights. ## **Issue raised before the court** 1. Are the respondents, which include the Union of India and the State of Andhra Pradesh, legally allowed to deny migrant workers the right to return to their hometowns and villages after conducting necessary testing for COVID-19 and to arrange for their safe travel by providing necessary transportation? ## **Related provisions** - Constitution of India, 1950 **Ar.14: (Equality before law) –** The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) **Ar.19: (Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech etc) –** (1) All citizens shall have the right- (a) to freedom of speech and expression; (b) To assemble peaceably and without arms; (c) To form associations or unions; (d) To move freely throughout the territory of India; (e) To reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; and (f) Omitted (g) To practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. (2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. (3) Nothing in sub-clause (b) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause. (4) Nothing in sub-clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause. (5) Nothing in sub-clauses (d) and (e) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe. (6) Nothing in sub-clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to,- (i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practicing any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or (ii) The carrying on by the state or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) **Ar.21: (Protection of life and personal liberty) –** No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) **Ar.226: (Power of High Courts to issue certain writs)-** (1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have powers, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercise jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibitions, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. (3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1), without- (a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order; and (b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or , as the case may be, the expiry of the aid next day, stand vacated. (4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of Article 32.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) - **Civil procedure code, 1908** **Sec.151: (Saving of inherent powers of Court)-** Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) ## **Judgement** The honourable court notices that “the labourers who have left their ancestral homes/villages and moved to the cities for better livelihood to ensure that all of us living in comfort are on the roads today. They represent the people, who are working in hundreds of different trades, callings etc., and all of them together ensure that we lead a happy and comfortable life. If at this stage, this court does not react and past these orders, the court would be falling in its role as a protector and alleviator of suffering. Their pain has to be alleviated at this stage. The ever expanding scope of “life” under ar.21 of the Constitution of India will take into account the situation also. They deserve more help, particularly when they are trekking back with their heads high instead of living at someone’s Mercy.” The court also stated that even if the counter affidavit is filed and the submissions made it is clear that the state government is rendering help to the migrant labourers and the labourers who are on the move, but more is needed to be done as the number of labourers on the move is vast. The court further directed the government to set some of these facilities with immediate effort. 1. **Medical:** There should be adequate stock of good drinking water, oral dehydration salts and glucose packet. Trained paramedical volunteers and/or doctors and ambulance should be present. 2. **Toilets/change rooms:** There should be temporary toilets with hygienic conditions should be set up with sanitary pad dispensing machines. 3. **Food:** Adequate arrangements for food should be made and same should be distributed. 4. **Transportation:** The vehicles used for patrolling should be used for transporting the migrant labourers to the nearest shelter in addition to the buses provided by the government. 5. **Pamphlets:** There should be pamphlets given to labourers in Hindi and Telugu, having phone numbers to be contacted in case of emergencies. 6. **Safety measures:** Adequate police personnel should be posted it every food stall/shelter and should ensure social distancing and discipline. 7. **Services:** The district collector of Each district and the superintendent of police should appoint a nodal officer, so that they can supervise every activity taking place in these shelters, food stalls etc. In case of shortage of staff, they can take people from NSS, NCC, Bharath Scouts and guides, Red Cross, Lions Clubs, Rotary club or such other organisations. The compliance with these interim measures should be made and reported to this court with clear details. ## **Conclusion** It is very clear that the appellant filed the petition in public interest as large numbers of labourers were migrating and were on the move to travel to their hometown. During the time of Covid 19, when every person was in comfort of their home, these labourers were suffering in the harsh and hot weather by walking hundred kilometres of distance. The intrim measures adopted by the court were of utmost necessity as despite the summer, the migrant labourers with their children and baggage were walking on the national highways. In my opinion, the interim measures given by the High Court are on point as these labourers needed immediate help. As in the COVID-19 phase many organisations and people on individual level came forward to help these migrants but at the same time state needs to put more efforts as there were vast number of labourers with their children with them. The weather is extremely hot, there were female workers who would have been menstruating, some of them would have been pregnant and these females too were trekking towards their hometown which is miles away. This is absolutely violating their right to life. These labourers should be assisted in every way possible. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) INDIA CONST. art.14 [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) INDIA CONST. art.19 [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) INDIA CONST. art.21 [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) INDIA CONST. art.226 [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) The Civil Procedure Code, S.151, No. 5, Imperial Legislative Council, 1908 (India) **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases **Tags:** #law, #lawfoyer, #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, case analysis, case summary, K. Rama Krishna, K. Rama Krishna vs. Union of India, lawfoyer --- ### [Rajiv Thapar vs. Madan Lal Kapoor](https://lawfoyer.in/rajiv-thapar-vs-madan-lal-kapoor/) **Published:** July 7, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **By Sonali** **In the Supreme Court of India** Name of the CaseRajiv Thapar VS Madan Lal KapoorCitationCriminal appeal No.174 of 2013Date of the caseJanuary 23,2013AppellantRajiv ThaparRespondentMadan Lal KapoorBench/JudgeD.K. Jain and J.S. Khehar, JJ.Statutes/constitution involvedConstitution of India,1950 The Criminal Procedure Code 1973. The Indian Penal Code,1860 The Indian Evidence Act,1872Important – Sections/ArticlesThe Constitution Of India,1950- Ar.226 The Criminal Procedure code,1973 -Sec.482,Sec.202,Sec.227 The Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sec.304-B ,Sec. 498-B,Sec.306, Sec.120-B, Sec.109 The Indian Evidence Act, 1872- Sec.45, Sec.59, Sec.60,## **Abstract** The case in hand is regarding the quashing of the first information report by High Court with the power vested in them by the Constitution of India, 1950 and the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. In the case appellant was residing in Surat with his wife. After a year of marriage, the wife had some serious heart issues and expired. The family of the expired wife alleged that the appellant who was responsible for the death of the wife so they complained against him under sections of Indian penal code. When there was not sufficient evidence to support the claims made by the deceased wife’s family, then the Appellant was released of the charges, but the charge sheet against him was not quashed so the appellant had come to Supreme Court with the appeal that his charge sheet should be quashed ## **Introduction** According to information available on National Judicial Data Grid (NJDG)[\[1\]](#_ftn1) , there are 59, 87,477 cases pending in high courts across the country as on February 1, 2023. By looking at this data one can easily conclude that judiciary system in India is over burdened at the time, it is also very clear that every minute of judiciary is of great importance and value. To preserve this time and value, Sec.482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 is invoked which deals with ‘saving of inherent powers of high court’. If a case is filed against a person and the learned court can satisfy it that there is no substance and evidence in the case and person cannot be convicted even if the trial takes place, can quash the chargesheet suo motto. To exercise the power of sec.482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the high courts have to satiate it with some guidelines/steps. 1. Step one: Whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable and indubitable, that is, the material is on Sterling and impeccable quality? 2. Step two: Whether the material relied upon by the accuse should rule out the assertion contained in the charges levelled against the accused that is the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint that is the material is such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusation as false? 3. Step three: Whether the material relied upon by the accused has not been refuted by the prosecution/ complaint and/ or the material is such that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? 4. Step four whether the proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court and would not serve the end of justice The two bench judge in the case of Rajiv Thapar vs. Madan Lal Kapoor also observed that the guidelines/steps should be fulfilled by the high court only then it can quash a chargesheet. This is essential so that there is no abuse of the process of the court. It is pertinent to say that there is no statutory limitation of the sec.482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 as it is established in this case of Rajiv Thapar vs. Madan Lal Kapoor. ## **Facts of the case** The appellant was married to the daughter of the respondent on 30/11/1991. The appellant is the member of the Indian Revenue Services at Ahmedabad and the wife of the appellant was a doctor and doing diploma course in gynaecology in Surat. So, the appellant transferred from Ahmedabad to Surat. On 16/09/1992 while both the appellant and the wife were living together, the wife fell ill. She was admitted to the Mahavir Hospital, Surat. She was suffering from Malaria, she was discharged on 20/ 09 /1992, but again after two days, she again fell ill on 22/09/1992 and was diagnosed with a large hole in her heart. She was shifted to Urmil Heart and Lung Centre, Surat on 24/09/1992, when she was at Urmil Heart and lung Centre Surat; she allegedly suffered a heart attack and died on 26/09/1992. The news was conveyed to the family member to the deceased wife and the body was transported to Delhi in rail. When the family of the deceased received the dead body, the face of the body was blue so the father/respondent suspected that she has been administered with poison show. So, Madan Lal Kapoor made a complaint against the appellant that he was demanding dowry from the deceased wife and tortured her mentally and physically leading to her illness and also conspired against her with his mother and was given some poisonous substance that is why the face of the dead body was blue. The accused were charged under section 304-B, 120-B, 498-A, 406 and 109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. But according to the medical report, it was clearly stated that the death of the deceased was due to the cardiac decomposition (the heart’s incapability to deliver oxygenated blood to meet the body’s metabolic needs). So appellant appealed to the Supreme Court that the chargesheet should be quashed which was not quashed by the High Court. ## **Issue raised before the court** 1. Whether the inherent power of the High Court given under Section.482 in the Criminal Procedure Code can be invoked suo motto or not? ## **Argument from the appellant side** - The counsel from the appellant’s side contends that the diseased wife of the appellant was a doctor and took admission in a diploma course in Surat after their marriage. After a year of their marriage, the deceased wife fell ill and was diagnosed with a large hole in her heart after two-three days from diagnosis she suffered heart attack and died. - The counsel further contents that on the suspicion of the respondent; the dead body of the deceased was given for post-mortem examination. A medical board was set up which constituted of - Dr. Bharat Singh Medical Superintendent, Civil Hospital, Delhi. - Dr. L.T Ramani, Chief Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Delhi - Dr. Veena Malhotra Professor Cardiothoracic Surgery, G.B. Pant Hospital, New Delhi. - Dr. Amit Banerjee, professor, Cardiothoracic Surgery, G.B. Pant Hospital, New Delhi. - The counsel further highlighted the point that, the medical board concluded that the deceased has died of cardiac decomposition. With this sample of stomach, intestine, kidney blood etc., was also taken which were also negative. - The counsel further alleged that the relationship between the deceased family as well as the respondents family were harmonious and cordial as it can be confirmed by the telephone bill, and the letter by the brother of the diseased just before four days from the death of the deceased where he has praised the family of appellant. - Moreover, the counsel says that the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi and Sub-divisional Magistrate both was satisfied with the evidence and accordingly discharged the appellant. - Counsel from the appellant side pointed out that the statement made by the respondent before the Additional Sessions regarding the suspicion of the death of the deceased was different from the allegation that was put forward the first time. Firstly he alleged that poison was administered to the deceased but the statement was changed to the strangulation later. From this, it can be clearly seen that the respondent himself was not known with the facts. ## **Arguments from the respondent side** - The counsel from the respondent side alleged that when the body of deceased arrived, the face of the deceased was blue. The question here arises that why the colour of the deceased face was blue. Was she was poisoned or was strangled, as the face becomes blue because of these two activities. - The counsel further alleges that the deceased was not suffering from any disease, but due to the constant harassment which was physical as well as mental, her health became bad and she fell ill. Her death was due to this Continuous harassment for not fulfilling the demand of the dowry from the side of the appellant. Appellant was demanding a Maruti car and cash after one year of marriage. - The counsel states that the respondent was not informed of the disease the deceased was suffering from or what type of treatment was given to her in hospital. The appellant and his mother both conspired against the respondant’s daughter as she didn’t fulfil the demand of the dowry. ## **Related Provisions** - **Constitution of India,1950** **Ar. 226: (Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.)** — (1) notwithstanding anything in article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of *habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto* *And certiorari* or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. (3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1), without— (a) Furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order; and (b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, Makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated. (4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of article 32.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) - **The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973** **Sec.482: (Saving of inherent powers of High Court**.)— Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) **Sec.227 (Discharge)—** If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) **Sec.** **202: (Postponement of issue of process) —** (1) Any Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorised to take cognizance or which has been made over to him under section.192, may, if he thinks fit, and shall, in a case where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which he exercises his jurisdiction, postpone the issue of process against the accused, and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding: *Provided* that no such direction for investigation shall be made,— (a) Where it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session; or (b) Where the complaint has not been made by a Court, unless the complainant and the witnesses present (if any) have been examined on oath under section.200. (2) In an inquiry under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, take evidence of witnesses on oath: *Provided* that if it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath. (3) If an investigation under sub-section (1) is made by a person not being a police officer, he shall have for that investigation all the powers conferred by this Code on an officer in charge of a police station except the power to arrest without warrant.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) - **The Indian Penal Code, 1860** **Sec. 304-B (Dowry death)-** (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) **Sec.120-B: (Punishment of criminal conspiracy)-** (1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence. (2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) **Sec.498-A: (Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty)** Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation- For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means- (a) Any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) **Sec. 306: (Abetment of suicide)-** If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) **Sec. 109: (Punishment of abetment if the act abetted is committed in consequence, and where no express provision is made for its punishment) –** Whoever abets any offence shall, if the act abetted is committed in consequence of the abetment, and no express provision is made by this Code for the punishment of such abetment, be punished with the punishment provided for the offence. Explanation- An act or offence is said to be committed in consequence of abetment, when it is committed in consequence of the instigation, or in pursuance of the conspiracy, or with the aid which constitutes the abetment. Illustrations- (a) A offers a bribe to B, a public servant, as a reward for showing A some favour in the exercise of B’s official functions. B accepts the bribe. A has abetted the offence defined in section 161. (b) A instigates B to give false evidence. B, in consequence of the instigation, commits that offence. A is guilty of abetting that offence, and is liable to the same punishment as B. (c) A and B conspire to poison Z. A in pursuance of the conspiracy, procures the poison and delivers it to B in order that he may administer it to Z B, in pursuance of the conspiracy, administers the poison to Z in A ‘s absence and thereby causes Z’s death. Here B is guilty of murder. A is guilty of abetting that offence by conspiracy, and is liable to the punishment for murder.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) - **The Indian Evidence Act, 1872** **Sec. 45: (Opinions of experts)-** When the Court has to form and opinion upon a point of foreign law or of science or art, or as to identity of handwriting or finger impressions, the opinions upon that point of persons specially skilled in such foreign law, science or art, or in questions as to identity of handwriting or finger impressions are relevant facts. Such persons are called experts. Illustrations- (a) the question is, whether the death of A was caused by poison. The opinions of experts as to the symptoms produced by the poison by which A is supposed to have died, are relevant. (b) The question is, whether A, at the time of doing a certain act, was, by reason of unsoundness of mind, incapable of knowing the nature of the Act, or that he was doing what was either wrong or contrary to law. The opinions of experts upon the question whether the symptoms exhibited by A commonly show unsoundness of mind, and whether such unsoundness of mind usually renders persons incapable of knowing the nature of the acts which they do, or of knowing that what they do is either wrong or contrary to law, are relevant. (c) The question is, whether a certain document was written by A. Another document is produced which is proved or admitted to have been written by A. The opinions of experts on the question whether the two documents were written by the same person or by different persons are relevant.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) **Sec. 59: (Proof of facts by oral evidence)** – All facts, except the contents of documents or electronic records, may be proved by oral evidence.[\[12\]](#_ftn12) **Sec**. **60: (Oral evidence must be direct)-** Oral evidence must, in all cases whatever, be direct; that is to say— if it refers to a fact which could be seen, it must be the evidence of a witness who says who says he saw it; If it refers to a fact which could be heard, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he heard it; If it refers to a fact which could be perceived by any other sense or in any other manner, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he perceived it by that sense or in that manner; If it refers to an opinion or to the grounds on which that opinion is held, it must be the evidence of the person who holds that opinion on those grounds: *Provided* that the opinions of experts expressed in any treatise commonly offered for sale, and the grounds on which such opinions are held, may be proved by the production of such treatises if the author is dead or cannot be found, or has become incapable of giving evidence, or cannot be called as a witness without an amount of delay or expense which the Court regards as unreasonable: *Provided also* that, if oral evidence refers to the existence to the existence or condition of any material thing other than a document, the Court may, if it thinks fit, require the production of such material thing for its inspection.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) ## **Judgement** The Honourable Court held that, “High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under sec.482 must make just and rightful choice. At this stage, neither truthfulness of allegations levelled by complainant can be evaluated, nor can weight of defence evidence be determined, where allegations bring out all ingredients of charge(s) levelled and material placed before court prima facie shows truthfulness of allegations, trial must proceed even when accused is successful in raising some suspicion or doubt in allegations levelled. This is so because it would result in giving finality to the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without allowing the prosecution or the complainant to adduce evidence to substantiate the same. Further the court remarked that, “to invoke its inherent jurisdiction to quash proceedings on basis of defence material High Court has to be fully satisfied that material produced or relied on by accused (a) leads to conclusion that his/her defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; (b) rules out and displaces assertions contained in charges levelled against accused without necessity of recording any evidence; (c) should not have been refuted or alternatively cannot be justifiably refuted, being of sterling and impeccable quality i.e., a reasonable man should be persuaded to dismiss and condemn actual basis of accusations as false; and (d)whether proceedings with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice.” Highlighting the unlimited powers of High court under sec.482, the case referred is, Rukmini Narvekar vs. Vijaya Satardekar.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) In the main order it was observed that the width of the powers of the high court under Sec.482 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 and also under ar.226 of the constitution is unlimited. The court could make such orders as may be necessary to prevent the abuse of the process of any court, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Further in same context stated above another case was referred, State of Orissa vs. Debendra Nath Padhi.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) The learned court observed that the court can make orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice within the parameters laid in Bhajan Lal case.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) Regarding the authentication of evidence the court stated that the statement made in inquest proceedings can only be relied upon if the statement is recorded by the court on oath and the witness has to be cross examined and oral testing formally being proved cannot be relied upon under Evidence act, 1872 Section.59, 60, 45, and 3. As a consequence, the chargesheet against the accused was quashed and the court again said that the high court when satisfied with the guidelines/steps should quash the chargesheet suo motto to preserve the time of the court. ## **Conclusion** It was clear from the evidences present in this case that the accused will not be held guilty if the trial was to be proceeded further. The quashing of the charge sheet should take place before the commencement of the actual trial like at the initiation of the prosecution or at the stage of issuing process or at the stage of committal or even at the stage of framing charges. The matter at hand should have been assessed based on the guideline given in the Bhajan lal case[\[17\]](#_ftn17) that if he filed the case with malice and ulterior motive for taking revenge from the accused with a view to spite him because of some personal grudge. As a result the Supreme Court upheld the appeal and quashed the charge sheet and also directed the high court that when the guidelines laid to invoke sec. 482 of the Criminal Procedure code are satisfied then the charge sheet should be quashed suo motto. From my perspective the charge sheet should have been quashed earlier only as the time of the court is precious and should not be wasted. By looking at the evidence it was clear that the accused would not have been found guilty of the act as the evidence clearly pointed towards natural death. This case was active for six-seven years which was a waste of time as there was not enough or reliable evidence from the side of the respondent and the High Court should have quashed the charge sheet of the accused. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) National Judicial Data Grid, (last visited December 31, 2020). [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) INDIA CONST. art. 226. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) The Criminal Procedure Code, s.482, No.2 Act of Parliament, 1973 (India). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) The Criminal Procedure Code, s. 227, No.2 Act of parliament, 1973 (India). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) The Criminal Procedure Code, s.202, No. 2 Acts of Parliament, 1973 (India). [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The Indian Penal Code, S.304-B, No.45, British Law Commission, 1860 (India). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) The Indian Penal Code, S.120-B, No.45, British Law Commission, 1860 (India). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) The Indian Penal Code, S.498-A, No.45, British Law Commission, 1860 (India). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) The Indian Penal Code, S.306, No.45, British Law Commission, 1860 (India). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) The Indian Penal Code, S.109, No.45, British Law Commission, 1860 (India). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) The Indian Evidence Act, S.45, No.1, British Parliament, 1872 (India). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) The Indian Evidence Act, S.59, No.1, British Parliament, 1872 (India). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) The Indian Evidence Act, S.60, No.1, British Parliament, 1872 (India). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Rukmini Narvekar vs. Vijaya Satardekar, AIR 2008 SCC 1. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) State of Orissa vs. Debendra Nath Padhi, AIR 2005 SCC 568. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SCC (Cri) 426. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SCC (Cri) 426. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases **Tags:** #law, #lawfoyer, #lawyer, #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, case analysis, case summary, lawfoyer, Madan Lal Kapoor, Rajiv Thapar, Rajiv Thapar vs. Madan Lal Kapoor --- ### [Romesh Thappar vs The State of Madras](https://lawfoyer.in/romesh-thappar-vs-the-state-of-madras/) **Published:** July 9, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **By Gargee Yadav** **In the Supreme Court of India** NAME OF THE CASERomesh Thappar vs The State of MadrasCITATION1950 AIR 124, 1950 SCR 594DATE OF THE CASE26 May, 1950 APPELLANTROMESH THAPPARRESPONDENTTHE STATE OF MADRASBENCH/JUDGEJustice Saiyid Fazal Ali; Justice Harilal Kania (CJI); Justice M. Patanjali Sastri; Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan; Justice B.K. Mukherjea; STATUTES/CONSTITUTION INVOLVEDThe Constitution of India, The Madras Maintenance of Public Order, Act, 1949 (Madras Act XXIII of 1949), Indian Penal Code;IMPORTANT SECTIONS/ARTICLESThe Constitution of India- Article 12, 13(1),19 (1)(a), 19(2), 32, 226The Madras Maintenance of Public Order, Act, 1949 (Madras Act XXIII of 1949) – 9 (1-A)Indian Penal Code- Section 124A ## ABSTRACT The case of Romesh Thapar vs State of Madras was the first case in the history of independent India recognizing the freedom of speech and expression. It acted as a precedent in the subsequent rulings and legal developments and helped in further expansion and recognition of this fundamental right as enshrined in Part III of the Constitution. In the state of Madras, a ban was imposed on the sale, distribution, and circulation of a Bombay-based English journal called CrossRoads on the pretext of violating public safety and public order as per Section 9 (1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order, 1945. Consequently, a writ petition was filed under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution by Romesh Thappar, the printer, publisher, and editor of the journal, and contested the ban to be violative of the freedom of speech and expression. On the other hand, the Advocate-General of Madras on behalf of the state of Madras argued that the restriction was reasonable in view of securing public safety and maintaining public order which would be included under ‘the security of the state’, thus, ensuring the validity of the impugned Act. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of India upheld the petitioner’s right to freedom of speech and expression and held the Madras Maintenance of Public Order, 1945 to be void and unconstitutional. The court further recognized that only in specific circumstances such as severe threat to the security of the state, could the restriction on freedom of speech and expression be imposed. The court also affirmed that freedom of propagation of ideas and freedom of circulation is ensured by the freedom of speech and expression. ## INTRODUCTION “Everyone is in favour of Free Speech. Hardly, a day passes without its being extolled, but some people’s idea of it is that they are free to say what they like, but if anyone else says anything back, that is an outrage”. – Sir Winston Churchill Freedom of speech is considered to be one of the most cherished rights in a democratic country. It is the lifeblood of a democracy. The Preamble of the Constitution provides its subjects the liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith, and worship as a basic concept, which demonstrates that the main objective of our Constitution is to ensure the accessibility of the liberty to express one’s ideas and expressions freely. This freedom has been accorded the highest pedestal among almost all the countries worldwide and is rightly regarded as the mother of all the other liberties. It is an essential condition for a thriving democracy because without freedom of thought, there can be no progress in the intellect of a human being. This freedom arouses in a person the ability to broaden the horizons of thinking, which would not only help in an individual’s growth but it would also act as a catalyst in the development of a democratic setup through mutual exchange of ideas between individuals. The scope of freedom of speech and expression is not just restricted to freedom to express one’s ideas and expressions but through dexterous judicial interpretations and precedents, its horizon has been expanded, which includes: - Freedom of Press; - Freedom of Publication & Broadcasting; - Freedom of Commercial Speech; - Right to Criticize; - Right to Information; - Right to Internet; - Right to remain Silent; - Right to fly the National Flag by Indian citizen; - Right to participate in Sports Main characteristics of Article 19(1)(a) are: 1\. Freedom of speech and expression is accessible only to citizens of India. 2\. This right includes the freedom to express and communicate one’s ideas and opinions on any topic through writing, speaking, gesticulating, etc. 3\. This right is not absolute in nature consisting of eight reasonable restrictions that are imposed. They are- interests of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the state, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency and morality, contempt of court, defamation, and incitement to an offence. The press is the fourth pillar of democracy and is considered to be the soul of democracy. It plays an instrumental role in the formation of public opinion. The free press keeps a constant vigil on the administration and functioning of the country, precluding the government from becoming arbitrary. Recently, in the World Press Freedom Index released by the Paris-based organization, Reporters without Borders, India’s rank slipped to 161st rank out of 180 countries. “Indian law is protective in theory but charges of defamation, sedition, contempt of court and endangering national security are increasingly used against journalists critical of the government, who are branded as “anti-national””[\[1\]](#_ftn1), the report notes. The present state of affairs duly qualifies for what James Madison said: “a popular government without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to farce or a tragedy or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance. People who mean to be their own governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives”. Therefore, the free flow of information is vital for the foundation of a vibrant democracy, which would empower individuals to make informed decisions and actively engage in the democratic process. ## FACTS OF THE CASE Romesh Thapar, who belonged to the realm of Marxian ideology was the petitioner. He was the printer, publisher, and editor of an English journal known as Cross Roads, which was printed and published in Bombay. The petitioner brought forth a writ petition before the Supreme Court challenging the prohibition imposed by the state of Madras with effect from 1st March, 1950 on the entry and circulation of the aforementioned journal in that state, under section 9(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949. The challenged order was officially published in the Fort St. George Gazette, and the notification was expressed as follows: – “In exercise of the powers conferred by section 9 (I-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order, Act, 1949 (Madras Act XXIII of 1949) His Excellency the Governor of Madras, being satisfied that for the purpose of securing the public safety and the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, hereby prohibits, with effect on and from the date of publication of this order in the Fort St. George Gazette the entry into or the circulation, sale, or distribution in the State of Madras or any part thereof of the newspaper entitled Cross Roads, an English weekly published at Bombay.” On behalf of the petitioner, C.R. Pattabhi Raman challenged the constitutionality of the aforementioned order and contested that it constituted an excessive constraint on the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution of India, thereby, challenging the legitimacy of section 9 (1-A) of the impugned Act and asserted it as being void under Article 13(1) of the Constitution, by virtue of its being inconsistent with the previously mentioned fundamental right.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) K. Rajah Ayyar, the Advocate-General of Madras from the respondent’s side argued that the state of Madras imposed the concerned restrictions in the interest of “securing public safety” and the “maintaining public order”. It was further asserted that these restrictions were promulgated in order to safeguard the “security of the State”, which qualifies as a reasonable restriction on the freedom of expression as envisaged in Article 19(2).[\[3\]](#_ftn3) ## ISSUES RAISED BEFORE THE COURT 1. Whether it is permissible to approach the Supreme Court directly under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution in case of violation of fundamental rights, thus, bypassing the requirement to approach the respective state High Court under Article 226 at the first instance? 2. Whether the order passed by the government under section 9(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949 violates the freedom of speech and expression or comes under the restrictions enunciated under clause two of the said right? 3. Whether Section 9(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949 is rendered void under Article 13(1) of the Constitution by virtue of it being contradictory to the fundamental right? ## ARGUMENTS FROM THE APPELLANT SIDE - The counsel for the petitioner, C.R. Pattabhi Raman argued against the order issued by the Governor of Madras, which imposed a ban on the entry, publication, and circulation of Cross Roads journal within the State of Madras infringes upon the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression as enshrined under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. - The counsel further contended that Section 9(1-A) of The Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949 violated Article 13(1) of the Indian Constitution because it (impugned Act) was violative of the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression as enshrined in Article 19(1)(a). ## ARGUMENTS FROM THE RESPONDENT SIDE - K. Rajah Ayyar, the Advocate-General of Madras, appearing on behalf of the respondent, raised a preliminary objection that the petitioner instead of directly resorting to the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India should have approached the High Court at Madras as a first resort which under Article 226 of the Constitution has concurrent jurisdiction(where two or more courts from different systems simultaneously have jurisdiction over a specific case) with respect to the concerned matter. He cited instances like criminal revision petitions (Section 435 of CrPC), applications for bail, and applications for transfer (Section 24 of CPC), where the High Court and a lower court were given concurrent jurisdiction. It was argued that as per established practice, a party should first seek relief from the lower court before approaching the High Court. He cited the case of *Emperor v. Bisheswar Prasad Sinha[**\[4\]**](#_ftn4)* where a similar practice was followed in a criminal revision case, and also referred to American decisions such as *Urquhart v. Brown* [\[5\]](#_ftn5)and *Mooney v. Holohan[**\[6\]**](#_ftn6)*. It was demonstrated by these cases that generally, at the first instance, it was required to exhaust the available judicial remedies in Federal and State Courts before approaching the Supreme Court, in cases such as habeas corpus or certiorari. - It was further contended that in order to protect the “security of the state” as per Article 19(2), it was imperative to include section 9(1-A) in the Act, which refers to “securing the public safety” and “the maintenance of public order”. - It was claimed that section 9(1-A) could not be declared completely unconstitutional because, under Article 13(1), an existing law that is in contravention of any fundamental right is void only to the extent of its contradiction and not beyond that. It was further contended that as per the impugned Act, in the process of “securing public safety” or “maintaining public order”, the ‘security of the state’ would also be influenced, which would fall within the scope of Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution. Therefore, it was argued to hold the impugned Act to be valid. ## RELATED PROVISIONS 1. **Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949** **Section 9 (1-A):** It allowed the state of Madras “for the purpose of securing the public safety or the maintenance of public order, to prohibit or regulate the entry into or the circulation, sale or distribution in the Province of Madras or any part thereof of any document or class of documents.” - **Constitution of India **1) Article 19 (1)**: “All citizens shall have the right - to freedom of speech and expression; - to assemble peaceably and without arms; - to form associations or unions; - to move freely throughout the territory of India; - to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; and - omitted - to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business;”[\[7\]](#_ftn7) **2) Article 19 (2)**: “Nothing in sub clause (a) of clause ( 1 ) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.”[\[8\]](#_ftn8) **3) Article 13**: “Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights - All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void - The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void - In this article, unless the context otherwise requires law includes any Ordinance, order, bye law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usages having in the territory of India the force of law; laws in force includes laws passed or made by Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India before the commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed, notwithstanding that any such law or any part thereof may not be then in operation either at all or in particular areas - Nothing in this article shall apply to any amendment of this Constitution made under Article 368 Right of Equality.”[\[9\]](#_ftn9) **4) Article 32**: “Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part - The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed - The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part - Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (1) and (2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2) - The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution.”[\[10\]](#_ftn10) **5) Article 226**: “Power of High Courts to issue certain writs - Notwithstanding anything in Article 32 every High Court shall have powers, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibitions, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose - The power conferred by clause (1 ) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories - Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1 ), without - furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order; and - giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the aid next day, stand vacated - The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of Article 32.”[\[11\]](#_ftn11) **(6) Indian Penal Code**: - **Section 124A**: Sedition.—”Whoever, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise, brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards, 102 \[\*\*\*\] the Government estab­lished by law in 103 \[India\], \[\*\*\*\] shall be punished with 104 \[im­prisonment for life\], to which fine may be added, or with impris­onment which may extend to three years, to which fine may be added, or with fine. Explanation 1. —The expression “disaffection” includes disloyalty and all feelings of enmity. Explanation 2.—Comments expressing disapprobation of the meas­ures of the Government with a view to obtain their alteration by lawful means, without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection, do not constitute an offence under this section. Explanation 3.—Comments expressing disapprobation of the admin­istrative or other action of the Government without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection, do not constitute an offence under this section.\]”[\[12\]](#_ftn12) ## JUDGEMENT The court categorically observed, “freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of propagation of ideas, and that freedom is ensured by the freedom of circulation.” The honourable Supreme Court was of the view that the petitioner had the right to decide whether to seek redress under Article 32 or 226 of the Indian Constitution keeping in view his state of affairs. The court underlined that Article 32 provides a “guaranteed” remedy for the enforcement of fundamental rights, which is itself considered a fundamental right. Therefore, it is the duty of the Supreme Court to entertain such applications seeking protection against the infringement of fundamental rights because of the reason that the concerned court acts as the protector and defender of fundamental rights. The court further observed, “No *similar provision is to be found in the Constitution of the United States and we do not consider that the American decisions are in point.*” Thus, responding to the contentions raised by the respondent while citing ***[Urquhart v. Brown](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/205/179/ "Urquhart v. Brown")[**\[13\]**](#_ftn13)*** *and **[Mooney v. Holohan](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/294/103/ "Mooney v. Holohan")[**\[14\]**](#_ftn14).*** The court referred to ***[LoveIl v. City of Griffin(s)](https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/277/lovell-v-city-of-griffin#:~:text=City%20of%20Griffin%20(1938)&text=The%20Supreme%20Court%20in%201938,Amendment's%20freedom%20of%20the%20press. "LoveIl v. City of Griffin(s)")*[**\[15\]**](#_ftn15)** in which it was observed, “Liberty of circulation is as essential to that freedom as the liberty of publication. Indeed, without circulation the publication would be of little value “.For the purpose of inquiring the validity of section 9(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949, which allowed the state government, “for the purpose of securing the public safety or the maintenance of public order, to prohibit or regulate the entry into or the circulation, sale or distribution in the Province of Madras or any part thereof of any document or class of documents”, the court elucidated the meaning of the terms “public order”, “public safety” and “undermines the security of the State”. The court defined public order as “the state of tranquillity which prevails among the members of a political society as a result of the internal regulations enforced by the government” whereas “public safety” in the words of the court, “ordinarily means security of the public or their freedom from danger”, which was included within the broader concept of “public order” and indicated a close relationship between the two. However, the court highlighted, “In the context of the statute, relating to law and order ‘securing public safety’ may not include the securing of public health, it may well mean securing the public against rash driving on a public way and the like, and not necessarily the security of the State”. Thus, underling that the danger to public safety may not necessarily lead to endangering the ‘security of the State’. The court further explained that undermining the security of the State under Article 19(2) meant *“nothing less than endangering the foundations of the State or threatening its overthrow.”*[***\[16\]***](#_ftn16) *The court also took reference to Entry 3 of List III (Concurrent List) of the Seventh Schedule, which differentiated between the ‘security of the State’ and the ‘maintenance of public order’. Thus, it was recognized that the aforementioned terms are separate and independent subjects of legislation as observed by the honourable court- “The Constitution thus requires a line to be drawn in the field of public order or tranquillity marking off, may be, roughly, the boundary between those serious and aggravated forms of public disorder which are calculated to endanger the security of the State and the relatively minor breaches of the peace of a purely local significance”[**\[17\]**](#_ftn17),* highlighting that only when there would be a threat of severe nature, which would be ‘undermining the security of the state’, could the curtailment of the rights to freedom of speech and expression be justified. The honourable Supreme Court noted that initially, the draft Constitution included “sedition” as a reasonable restriction on the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(2). However, at the time of drafting of the final version of the Constitution, the word “sedition” was eliminated. The Court observed, “*Deletion of the word “sedition” … shows that criticism of Government exciting disaffection or bad feelings towards it is not to be regarded as a justifying ground for restricting the freedom of expression and of the press, unless it is such as to undermine the security of or tend to overthrow the State. … Thus, very narrow and stringent limits have been set to permissible legislative abridgement of the right of free speech and expression, and this was doubtless due to the realisation that freedom of speech and of the press lay at the foundation of all democratic organizations*.” [\[18\]](#_ftn18) With regard to the offence of ‘sedition’, the court also referred to ***[Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. The King Emperor](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/256394/ "Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. The King Emperor")[**\[19\]**](#_ftn19)*** where it was held that -“the acts or words complained of must either incite to disorder or must be such as to satisfy reasonable men that that is their intention or tendency”, but it was overruled by the Privy Council ***[King Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/748350/ "King Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao")[**\[20\]**](#_ftn20)*** to the effect that “the offence consists in exciting or attempting to excite in others certain bad feelings towards the Government and not in exciting or attempting to excite mutiny or rebellion, or any sort of actual disturbance, great or small.” Consequently, the court observed that a restriction could be imposed on the freedom of speech and expression by the legislative-made law only if its sole objective was to prevent the “undermining or overthrow of the security of the State”, otherwise it would be deemed to be unconstitutional even if the main intention for the imposition of such a law was for the general maintenance of public order. Therefore, Section 9(1-A) of the impugned Act, which allowed for restrictions related to “public safety” or “the maintenance of public order”, was declared invalid and unconstitutional by the honourable court because it went beyond the authorized restrictions. The court invoked the ‘doctrine of severability’ as enunciated in Article 13 of the Indian Constitution to check the validity of section 9(1-A) of the impugned Act. It was noted that the applicable law encompassed both permissible and impermissible restrictions. Therefore, the impugned Act was declared to be invalid because of its non-severable nature and also because of the possibility of it being applied for unconstitutional purposes. Therefore, the impugned Act was held to be void and unconstitutional by the honourable court. ## CONCLUSION Romesh Thappar’s constitutional battle for freedom of speech and expression is one that has altered history books worldwide. It has established legal frameworks for journalists and press, becoming a global symbol of the freedom of press. The verdict was significant enough to prompt the passing of the first-ever constitutional amendment in June 1951, including clauses such as ‘public order,’ ‘friendly relations with foreign states’ & ‘incitement to an offence’ – under Article 19(2). Undoubtedly, the judgment has remained steadfastly valid and has formed the basis of several courtroom decisions, including the most regarded case of Shreya Singhal v. Union of India which recognized that mere discussion or advocacy of an idea even if it is of unpopular nature cannot be termed as a violation of Article 19(2), it comes into play only when it leads to the incitement that Article 19(2) kicks in[\[21\]](#_ftn21). It highlighted the importance of dissent and public discourse in the functioning of a robust democracy. Romesh Thappar’s precedent intensifies the protection of free expression rights while also highlighting how critical their safeguarding is for spaces that encourage healthy dialogue. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Reporters Without Borders, ‘World Press Freedom Index 2023′\[2023\] <> accessed 28 June 2023. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Romesh Thappar vs The State of Madras, (1950) AIR 124. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) *Id*. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) (1934) ILR56ALL1047. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) **Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U.S. 179 (1907).** [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Mooney v. Holohan*,* 294 US 103 (1935). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 19(1). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 19(2). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 13. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 32. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 226. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §124A. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) **Urquhart (n 5).** [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Mooney (n 6). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Romesh (n 2). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) *Id.* [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) *Id*. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Niharendu Dutt Majumdar And Ors. vs Emperor, AIR 1939 Cal 703. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) King Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao, (1944) 46 BOMLR 459. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21)Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, AIR 2015 SC 1523. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases **Tags:** #law, #lawfoyer, #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, case analysis, case summary, lawfoyer, Romesh Thappar, Romesh Thappar vs The State of Madras, The State of Madras --- ### [SUPRIYO V. UNION OF INDIA WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1011 OF 2022 + CONNECTED MATTERS](https://lawfoyer.in/supriyo-v-union-of-india-i-writ-petition-civil-no-1011-of-2022-connected-matters/) **Published:** October 22, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## **ABSTRACT** This abstract aims to provide a concise yet comprehensive overview of the key aspects discussed in the 366-page Supreme Court judgement pertaining to the constitutional validity of excluding LGBTQ+ individuals from marriage under Indian laws. The petition was filed by several LGBTQ+ individuals and organizations seeking a declaration that exclusion from marriage on the basis of sexual orientation is a violation of fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21 of the Indian Constitution. The Union of India defended the existing marriage laws by arguing that the institution of marriage has traditionally only contemplated heterosexual unions, and granting marriage rights to LGBTQ+ couples would require major amendments to be made in various statutes. The Supreme Court evaluated whether sexual orientation is a “core trait” that cannot form a reasonable classification under Article 14, and also examined if such exclusion amounts to discrimination on the basis of “sex” under Article 15. While striking down the discriminatory provisions, the Court read down certain terms in marriage laws like “spouse”, “husband”, “wife” in a gender-neutral manner to include LGBTQ+ couples. However, it refrained from directly reading in same-sex marriage. The five-judge Constitution bench unanimously held that sexual orientation is a natural phenomenon and LGBTQ+ individuals have the same rights as others, though one of the judges dissented on the issue of same-sex marriage. ## **INTRODUCTION** The present batch of writ petitions and transfer cases involve important questions regarding the rights of LGBTQIA+ individuals in India. At the outset, it is pertinent to understand some key aspects about the petitioners and the issues raised by them to get a comprehensive view of the matter. The petitioners include members from the LGBTQIA+ community such as lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons who have approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court seeking legal recognition of their relationships. A brief glimpse into their lives and struggles will help appreciate the discrimination they have faced due to the absence of such recognition. One of the petitioners is a public figure who has openly talked about facing rejection from her family members and societal isolation due to her gender identity. She has courageously raised awareness about transgender rights. Another petitioner living in a small town narrates facing societal disapproval for being attracted to persons of the same sex. Such experiences bring to light the hardships caused due to non-acceptance of LGBTQIA+ individuals. The petitioners have challenged several provisions of the [Hindu Marriage Act, 1955](https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/1560?locale=en "Hindu Marriage Act, 1955"), [the Special Marriage Act, 1954](https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/15480/1/special_marriage_act.pdf "the Special Marriage Act, 1954") and [the Foreign Marriage Act, 1969 ](http://ncwapps.nic.in/acts/TheForeignMarriageAct1969.pdf "the Foreign Marriage Act, 1969 ")on the grounds that they do not recognize same-sex marriages and marriages of transgender persons, thereby violating their fundamental rights to equality, life with dignity, freedom of expression and religion. They have argued that the exclusion of LGBTQIA+ individuals from these marriage statutes indirectly discriminates against them based on their sexual orientation and gender identity. It is their contention that the right to marry a partner of their choice is a core element of personal liberty guaranteed under the Constitution. The petitioners have also questioned certain rules framed under the [Juvenile Justice Act, 2015](https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/2148?sam_handle=123456789/1362 "Juvenile Justice Act, 2015") which require married couples to adopt children, thereby effectively barring same-sex couples and live-in partners from the option of adoption. They have alleged that such rules infringe upon the rights of LGBTQIA+ individuals and children. Additionally, some petitioners have raised the issue of facing violence and coercion from their natal families for being in same-sex relationships, seeking protection of their life and liberty in this regard. The matters involve the interpretation of fundamental rights such as right to equality, life with dignity, freedom of speech and expression, religion and movement guaranteed under Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21 of the Constitution in the context of rights of LGBTQIA+ persons. They require examining whether the exclusion of same-sex relationships and marriages from the ambit of the marriage statutes amounts to discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity. It also necessitates an analysis of whether such exclusion infringes upon the personal liberty of individuals to make intimate choices without fear of societal sanction. The petitions have far-reaching consequences as they deal with the very institution of marriage and what it means to different sections of society. On one hand, a decision granting legal recognition to same-sex marriages would secure the rights of LGBTQIA+ individuals to freely choose their partners without stigma. On the other hand, it may invite opposition from those believing that marriage should remain a union between biological man and woman. The Court will have to balance these competing claims while adjudicating on the issues. The matters assume great significance as they come in the backdrop of the historic [Navtej Singh Johar judgment](https://lawfoyer.in/navtej-singh-johar-vs-union-of-india/ "Navtej Singh Johar judgment") of 2018 which decriminalized consensual homosexual acts, yet members of the community continue facing discrimination. While the judgment struck down the stigma of unnaturalness from homosexuality, its social acceptance remains a work in progress. A ruling from the Supreme Court settling the question of marriage rights will further the cause of equality by ensuring LGBTQIA+ persons can access all benefits associated with a legally recognized union. At the same time, the Court will have to carefully craft its orders keeping in mind the diversity of views existing in society on this sensitive topic. In light of the above, it is evident that the petitions involve determining the extent of constitutional protection available to the rights of LGBTQIA+ individuals, especially with regard to marriage. They provide an opportunity for the Supreme Court to secure the right to intimate personal choices without fear of sanction, while appreciating the nuanced social realities. It remains to be seen how the Court balances civil liberties with social conservatism in this most awaited verdict. A judicious decision will aid the inclusion of all genders and sexualities as equal citizens before the law. ## **FACTS OF THE CASE** The present batch of writ petitions concerns the constitutional rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex (LGBTQIA+) persons in India. At the outset, it is important to understand the factual background that led to the filing of these petitions. A perusal of the documents reveals a long history of discrimination and oppression faced by the LGBTQIA+ community in India. For over a century, section 377 of the Indian Penal Code criminalized any sexual activities “against the order of nature.” This colonial provision was used by the authorities to violate the basic dignity and autonomy of LGBTQIA+ individuals. Merely for engaging in consensual same-sex relationships, many were subjected to public ridicule, social ostracization, and legal persecution. The LGBTQIA+ community lived under constant fear of prosecution due to their sexual orientation. This took a huge toll on their mental health and prevented them from living freely as equal citizens. In 2009, a batch of petitions was filed before the Delhi High Court challenging the constitutional validity of section 377. It was argued that criminalizing private homosexual conduct between consenting adults violated fundamental rights like life, liberty, and privacy. After a decade-long legal battle, a five-judge Supreme Court bench unanimously struck down section 377 in the landmark Navtej Singh Johar judgment of 2018. While this decriminalized same-sex relationships, discrimination and oppression continued in other forms. The petitioners in the present case are members of the LGBTQIA+ community who continue to face economic, social and political marginalization on account of their sexual orientation and gender identity. They are denied equal status and subjected to violence by state authorities and society. For instance, the transgender community lacks access to education, healthcare, and employment opportunities. They are often forced into sex work for survival. The police and prison officials regularly inflict violence on the queer community with impunity. At a deeper level, LGBTQIA+ individuals struggle with lack of familial and social acceptance. Many are coerced into marriages or rehabilitation centers by their own families. Their movements are monitored and privacy violated. The petitioners argue that this stems from non-recognition of their relationships by the state. While same-sex relationships are legal, same-sex couples are denied the right to marry or enter into registered domestic partnerships. The petitioners have challenged this exclusion from the Special Marriage Act, 1954 and the Foreign Marriage Act, 1969 which govern civil marriages of individuals without access to religious rites. They contend this violates their fundamental rights to equality, life, liberty, dignity, privacy, and freedom of expression. It deprives them of social welfare benefits associated with marital status. The petitioners seek a declaration of their right to marry and recognition of their relationships under these statutes. This brief factual background provides the necessary context to understand the nature of claims and reliefs sought in the present batch of petitions. It highlights the long-standing discrimination faced by the LGBTQIA+ community and ongoing issues of social hostility, familial rejection, and lack of legal protection that prevent them from living with dignity as equal citizens. The petitioners have approached the Supreme Court as the last resort to remedy these violations of their fundamental rights. ## **ISSUE RAISED** The present writ petitions raise important issues concerning the rights of LGBTQIA+ individuals in India. The petitions challenge discriminatory laws and seek remedies from the Supreme Court. **Here are the key issues raised for consideration:** - Do members of the LGBTQIA+ community have the fundamental right to choose a partner, including a partner of the same sex or gender? The petitioners argue that restricting this choice based on sexual orientation or gender identity violates Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. - Do LGBTQIA+ individuals have the right to enter into a union with a partner of their choice and receive legal recognition of such unions? The denial of recognition is argued to infringe upon the petitioners’ rights to dignity, expression, and life with their loved ones. - Are provisions of the Special Marriage Act that do not recognize same-sex marriages unconstitutional? The petitioners claim this exclusion violates rights to equality and non-discrimination. - Is the Foreign Marriage Act unconstitutional in not recognizing overseas marriages of LGBTQIA+ citizens of India? This is contended to deprive citizens of their right to marry and violate Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21. ## **ARGUMENTS FROM PETITIONER** The petitioners have made several well-reasoned arguments before the Hon’ble Court in support of their case. They contend that the exclusion of LGBTQ individuals from the institution of marriage violates fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution. Firstly, the petitioners argue that the right to choose a life partner is integral to the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21. They assert that the ability to enter into a committed relationship of one’s choice and have it recognized allows individuals to develop their personalities and realize their potential. Denying LGBTQ persons the right to marry solely on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity infringes on this core aspect of personhood. Secondly, the petitioners submit that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the ambit of marriage laws like the Special Marriage Act violates the right to equality before law and equal protection of laws under Article 14. While sexual orientation forms a reasonable classification, there is no intelligible differentia between heterosexual and homosexual individuals to warrant differential treatment in the context of marriage. Further, no legitimate state aim is served by this discrimination. Thirdly, the petitioners claim that the denial of marital rights amounts to an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a), as well as the freedoms of association and assembly under Article 19 19 19(1)(b). A relationship is a form of personal bond and expression that deserves protection. The state has not been able to demonstrate that exclusion of LGBTQ couples from marriage is a reasonable restriction in the interests of the general public. Fourthly, the petitioners argue that the bar on same-sex marriage infringes the right to dignity of LGBTQ individuals under Article 21. It treats them as unequal moral beings and denies them the ability to publicly commit to their partners. The state cannot claim that queer relationships do not warrant legal recognition or that marriage must remain heteronormative. In light of these detailed and well-founded arguments, the petitioners pray that this Hon’ble Court may recognize the rights of LGBTQ persons to marry and enter into committed into committed into committed relationships of their choice. They have established a strong prima facie case for relief and the matter requires consideration. ## **ARGUMENTS FROM RESPONDENTS** The respondents in the case put forth several arguments against recognizing same-sex marriages and queer relationships under the law. Their primary contention was that marriage, as an institution, has traditionally only been understood as a union between a man and a woman. They argued that the very conception of marriage envisages procreation as one of its aims, which is only possible in heterosexual relationships. However, others pointed out that procreation has never been an essential characteristic of marriage and many heterosexual marriages also do not result in children. It was further argued by the respondents that the institution of marriage occupies a central role in sustaining society and moving it forward. According to them, the State recognizes and regulates relationships only when there is a legitimate public interest involved. They believed the State interest lies in legally recognizing opposite-sex unions for procreation, which ensures the survival of society. However, critics highlighted that many States globally have moved beyond such narrow interests and now protect diverse family forms equally. The respondents also emphasized that granting recognition to same-sex marriages could open the floodgates for other relationships like incestuous or polygamous ones to also demand acceptance. But legal experts clarified that courts can continue to regulate relationships based on principles of consent, autonomy and harm. Comparatively, same-sex unions involve consenting adults and hence do not cause the same harms. It was submitted that marriage is a public institution involving certain rights and responsibilities of the partners towards each other as well as any children they may have. However, supporters of queer rights pointed out that same-sex couples also remain committed to their partners and want to care for any children they may have through adoption or other means. There is no data to suggest that the interests of such children would be adversely impacted. The respondents further said that providing marital benefits to same-sex couples would require amending numerous laws which are premised on the heterosexual concept of marriage. But legal experts argued that courts are fully empowered to read sexuality-neutral interpretations of statutes and address any implementation challenges on a case-by-case basis. A few intervenors also raised concerns about implications for strategic sectors like the armed forces but did not provide substantial reasoning to back this. ## **JUDGEMENT** The judgement section of the case provides a detailed and thorough analysis of the arguments made by all parties involved. The Supreme Court bench, led by the Chief Justice, evaluated submissions made from over 30 lawyers representing the petitioners, intervenors and respondents. In a landmark ruling, the bench recognized the fundamental rights of LGBTQIA+ individuals to form unions of their choice and seek equal treatment under the law. The judges acknowledged the discrimination and stigma faced by the community while balancing various legal and social factors. Let us examine the key aspects of the well-reasoned judgement in detail. To start with, the Court recognized the diversity within the queer community in India. It noted that LGBTQIA+ identities are not new phenomena and have existed in our country for centuries. Historical texts and ancient scriptures make references to people of “third-gender” and same-sex relationships. However, colonial laws like Section 377 of the IPC criminalized such relationships and imposed an alien notion of morality. The judgement also highlighted that queerness transcends class, religion, geography and is not restricted to urban areas. Relying on past studies and news reports, it showed examples of people from all walks of life – from rural villages to metros – who identified as part of the community. This helped dispel the misconception that it is a “western import” or phenomenon seen only among privileged urban elites. While examining the right to form “unions”, the Court delved into the meaning of key constitutional concepts like life, liberty, dignity, equality, freedom of speech & expression, and right to residence. It opined that the denial of legal recognition for same-sex relationships infringes upon these fundamental rights. The bench also agreed with petitioners that the “right to life” must include the right to choose a partner and seek fulfillment through an intimate association. The judges then focused their attention on the institution of marriage itself. After detailed deliberations, they concluded that marriage is an evolving concept defined differently in personal, religious and statutory laws. There is no universal definition and what constitutes a marriage depends on the consenting parties. As long as legal preconditions are met, the law recognizes it as a valid union. The content and purpose is an individual choice. The Court also acknowledged that over the decades, certain practices which were considered “normal” in marriages like Sati, child marriage and dowry were later banned by statutes. This showed marriage as an institution adapts to social changes. It cannot remain static and must keep pace with evolving notions of equality and dignity. The bench emphasized that the exclusion of LGBTQIA+ people from marriage amounts to discrimination. While examining arguments against same-sex marriage, the Court disagreed with the notion that it would dilute the institution of heterosexual marriage or open floodgates for other “unnatural” relationships. It said the decriminalization of homosexual acts and recognition of rights in Navtej Singh Johar has not led to such consequences. The judges were also not convinced that such unions would render other statutes unworkable. The bench acknowledged the difficulties in achieving a workable solution but was of the view that it cannot deny fundamental rights due to such challenges. It said the power of judicial review includes not just striking down laws but also issuing directions to remedy rights violations. The Court does not have to wait for legislative action, especially when rights of vulnerable groups are at stake. In conclusion, the judges utilized principles of progressive interpretation to read down discriminatory provisions and expand the scope of marriage equality. They issued detailed directions to extend marriage and allied benefits to LGBTQIA+ individuals while safeguarding the interests of all parties. The well-reasoned judgement balanced civil liberties with legal, social and institutional concerns – a true testament to the transformative role of the judiciary. This landmark ruling sets the much-needed precedent of an inclusive society based on constitutional principles of equality. It will go a long way in securing rights of the queer community and fostering greater social acceptance. While non-discrimination is yet to be fully realized, the judgement has sown seeds for an equitable future where everyone can live and love with dignity. The Court has upheld the spirit of justice through this transformative and progressive verdict. ## **CONCLUSION** At the outset, it is evident that the institution of marriage in India has evolved significantly from its historical roots. Practices that were once entrenched such as child marriage, sati and denial of widow remarriage have been unequivocally condemned and outlawed. This establishes that marriage is a dynamic institution that must keep pace with the changing social ethos of inclusiveness, equality and dignity for all. It is also clear from the various perspectives shared in this case that there exists no universal definition of marriage. Different communities, religions and personal laws in India perceive marriage in diverse ways. As long as certain basic prerequisites are fulfilled under applicable statutes, a marriage is valid regardless of the presence or absence of other characteristics. This allows couples the flexibility to define the contours of their relationship while still availing of the legal benefits of a union. A crucial takeaway is that the Constitution does not mandate a uniform concept of marriage or restrict the legislature’s role in regulating relationships. However, any restrictions imposed by the State must have a legitimate basis and not violate the fundamental rights of citizens. Specifically, the rights to life, liberty, equality, freedom of expression and dignity enshrined under Articles 14, 19 and 21 cannot be abridged due to one’s sexual orientation or gender identity. The deliberations have clarified that same-sex relationships and transgender identities are natural phenomena that have historically existed in India. They cannot be dismissed as so-called ‘Western imports’. When individuals from diverse social, economic and educational backgrounds provide accounts of their queerness in different parts of the country, it shows that this is not an urban phenomenon either. The denial of legal recognition to same-sex and transgender unions amounts to unconstitutional discrimination. It is evident that substantive directives are necessary from the Court to address violations of fundamental rights, rather than just striking down laws. Positive obligations must be cast upon the State to emancipate the LGBTQIA+ community from the shackles of deep-rooted social oppression. Comprehensive legal reform is required to ensure equality, dignity and non-discrimination in accessing all benefits associated with marriage. However, the nuanced policy considerations involved in restructuring statutory frameworks are best addressed through consultative processes in the legislature and executive. In conclusion, a balanced approach is imperative. While protecting basic rights and rectifying clear violations, due regard must be given to the legitimate roles of the other organs of the State. The judiciary cannot assume the function of enacting comprehensive legal reforms but has to enable participatory and inclusive democratic governance in line with constitutional values of justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases **Tags:** #law, #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, case analysis, case summary, lawfoyer, SUPRIYO, SUPRIYO V. UNION OF INDIA, WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1011 OF 2022 --- ### [SHILPA SAILESH V. VARUN SREENIVASAN](https://lawfoyer.in/shilpa-sailesh-v-varun-sreenivasan/) **Published:** October 23, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Citation:** Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 544, decided on 01-05-2023. ## **ABSTRACT** This case involves petitions filed before the Supreme Court of India under Article 142 of the Constitution seeking to waive the stipulated six-month waiting period for divorce by mutual consent under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. A two-judge bench doubted the correctness of previous SC judgments in Anjana Kishore and Manish Goel which held that the mandatory waiting period cannot be waived under Article 142. Thus, a reference was made to a larger bench to examine the scope of SC’s powers under Article 142 to do “complete justice” in matrimonial cases. The Constitution Bench, in this landmark ruling, extensively analyzed the scope and limitations of Article 142 powers. It held that Article 142 enables SC to deviate from procedural laws and also substantive law provisions based on considerations of fundamental public policy. However, it cannot disregard substantive statutory mandates based on core legislative policy. Applying this test, SC can invoke Article 142 powers to grant divorce decrees by mutual consent without the six-month waiting period under Section 13B, if it furthers the interests of justice. It can also simultaneously dispose other connected proceedings between parties. Further, SC clarified that it can grant divorce on ground of irretrievable marriage breakdown under Article 142 despite opposition by one spouse. This discretion must be exercised with caution satisfying that the marriage is unviable and forcing parties to remain married would prolong agony. Parameters like failed mediation attempts, long period of separation etc. must be considered. The decision settles the debate on scope and applicability of Article 142 in matrimonial cases. It balances procedural law compliance with doing complete justice given the unique status of marriage. By providing clarity, it prevents fragmentation of opinion and ensures consistency in invoking inherent Article 142 powers in future. ## **INTRODUCTION** The Supreme Court has time and again emphasized the sanctity of marriage as a sacrosanct societal institution. However, the stark realities of modern life with increasing interpersonal conflicts have made irreconcilable breakdown of marriage a frequent occurrence. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 provides detailed grounds for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce under Section 13. It also introduced divorce by mutual consent under Section 13B which requires the parties to wait for a stipulated period of 6-18 months between the first and second motions. The mandatory waiting period under Section 13B is based on sound public policy reasoning to provide time for reflection and reconciliation as divorce has permanent consequences. However, in exceptional cases of irreparable marital breakdown with no chances of reunion, the waiting period prolongs mutual agony without any purpose. Thus, a delicate balance needs to be maintained between the sanctity of marriage and recognising when prolonging it is futile. The Supreme Court has often been approached under Article 142 to do “complete justice” in such exceptional situations by waiving the waiting period for mutual consent divorce. However, varying Benches took conflicting views on whether mandatory statutory procedures under Hindu Marriage Act can be overridden using inherent Article 142 powers. This resulted in conflicting opinions on whether the cooling-off period under Section 13B can be relaxed under Article 142, especially if all mediation attempts have failed and parties have been living separately for long periods. Related issues like simultaneously disposing connected criminal and civil proceedings between parties based on divorce settlements were also considered inconsistently by different Benches. To settle these issues and lay down authoritative guidance for future, a Constitution Bench reference was made in the case of Shilpa Shailash v. Varun Sreenivasan. This Constitution Bench verdict comprehensively examines the contours and limitations of Supreme Court’s powers under Article 142. It balances the inherent power to do complete justice in exceptional situations with the sanctity of institutional marriage under Hindu law. The doctrinal clarity provided by revisiting diverse judicial opinions settles key issues plaguing matrimonial litigation and is a significant step in evolving Indian family law jurisprudence. ## **Facts Of The Case** The present case arises out of Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 1118 of 2014 filed before the Supreme Court of India along with connected transfer petitions. The petitioner, Ms. Shilpa Shailesh, had filed a transfer petition seeking transfer of divorce proceedings going on between her and her husband, Mr. Varun Sreenivasan, from the Family Court in Kerala to the Family Court in Mumbai. Ms. Shilpa and Mr. Varun had gotten married in 2007 in Mumbai as per Hindu rites and customs. After marriage, they shifted to Thiruvananthapuram in Kerala where Mr. Varun was employed. Differences arose between them and Mr. Varun filed a divorce petition in 2010 before the Family Court in Thiruvananthapuram on grounds of cruelty. Ms. Shilpa contested the divorce petition. During the pendency of proceedings, the parties explored the possibility of dissolution of marriage by mutual consent under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act. However, certain connected proceedings remained pending before courts in Kerala. These included domestic violence proceedings initiated by Ms. Shilpa against Mr. Varun and his family members, proceedings under Section 125 CrPC filed by Ms. Shilpa claiming maintenance from Mr. Varun, and criminal complaints filed by Mr. Varun and his family members against Ms. Shilpa alleging offences under Section 498A IPC. To avoid multiplicity of proceedings and to dissolve the marriage by mutual consent, the parties entered into a settlement agreement in 2014. As per the settlement, Mr. Varun agreed to pay Rs. 50 lakhs to Ms. Shilpa towards full and final settlement of all her claims. Based on this settlement, Ms. Shilpa filed the present transfer petition before the Supreme Court seeking transfer of proceedings and dissolution of marriage by mutual consent under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. During the pendency of the transfer petition, a two judge bench of the Supreme Court exercised its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 and passed a decree dissolving the marriage between Ms. Shilpa and Mr. Varun by mutual consent vide order dated 06.05.2015. However, the Court did not finally decide the important legal issues regarding the scope and ambit of power of the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution to dissolve marriages by mutual consent under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act. Therefore, while disposing of the transfer petitions filed by Ms. Shilpa, the two judge bench formulated certain substantial questions of law on the scope and exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution. These questions were referred to a larger bench of the Supreme Court for consideration. The present case thus raises important issues regarding the scope and contours of the plenary power vested with the Supreme Court under Article 142 to do “complete justice” and the interplay between this power and the statutory scheme for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act. The case offers the Supreme Court an opportunity to authoritatively lay down principles on whether and in what circumstances it may invoke Article 142 to pass decrees of divorce by mutual consent without strict adherence to the procedures under Section 13B of the Act. In sum, the facts of the case centre around the matrimonial dispute between Ms. Shilpa and Mr. Varun, the multiplicity of proceedings between them before different courts, their settlement agreement to mutually dissolve the marriage, and the reference to the larger Constitutional bench on the scope of power under Article 142 to grant such divorces. The present case thus has wide ramifications on the exercise of extraordinary Constitutional powers by the Supreme Court to iron out creases in matrimonial disputes. ## **ISSUE RAISED** The key questions framed for consideration were: 1. The scope and ambit of powers under Article 142 to do “complete justice”. 2. Whether under Article 142, the Court can grant mutual consent divorce decree without Section 13B waiting period based on settlement between parties and dispose other connected proceedings. 3. Whether divorce can be granted under Article 142 on ground of irretrievable breakdown despite opposition by one party. ## **Arguments** The appellant, Ms. Shilpa Shailesh, had filed the present transfer petition seeking transfer of the divorce proceedings from the Family Court in Kerala to the Family Court in Mumbai. The main arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant were as follows: - It was submitted by the counsel for the appellant that the Supreme Court has wide powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. Relying on previous judgments, it was argued that the Court can pass any decree or order as may be necessary to meet the ends of justice. - It was contended that the statutory period of 6 months for moving the second motion under Section 13B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act is only directory and not mandatory in nature. The Court has discretion to waive or reduce this period in deserving cases where parties have been litigating for long and reconciliation is impossible. - The appellant argued that the object of the 6 months period is to provide time for reflection and reconsideration before divorce. However, in cases where the marriage has irretrievably broken down with no chances of reconciliation, this period only prolongs mental agony and trauma for parties. - It was submitted that the Supreme Court, in exercise of powers under Article 142, can grant divorce decree by mutual consent without waiting for the statutory period under Section 13B(2), as continuation of marital ties would be unjust and inequitable in such cases. - The appellant relied on previous Supreme Court judgments like Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur and Amit Kumar v. Suman Beniwal to contend that the statutory cooling off period can be waived in deserving cases to do complete justice. - It was argued that in the present case, the marriage between the parties had completely broken down with no chances of revival. The statutory period of 6 months would only extend the mental trauma and hardship already suffered by the parties during long drawn litigation. - The appellant submitted that the settlement arrived at mutually dissolving the marriage may kindly be recorded by invoking extraordinary powers under Article 142 to do complete justice, especially since proceedings were pending in Supreme Court. ## **RELATED PROVISIONS** The present case involves interpretation of the following key legal provisions: - **Article 142 of the Constitution of India** Article 142(1) states that the Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or order as is necessary to do complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. Further, any decree or order passed under this provision shall be enforceable throughout India. This provision vests wide powers in the Supreme Court to pass any order to do complete justice in matters before it. The Court can even pass decrees and orders which may be at variance with statutory provisions, if required in the interests of complete justice. - **Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955** Section 13B provides for divorce by mutual consent between parties on the ground that they have been living separately for atleast one year, have not been able to live together and have mutually agreed to dissolve the marriage. Section 13B(2) states that on a joint motion by both parties after 6 months but before 18 months of the initial motion, if the petition is not withdrawn, the Court shall pass a decree of divorce if satisfied regarding the averments. This in effect requires a ‘cooling off’ period of 6 months for divorce by mutual consent. - **Doctrine of Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage** The doctrine of irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a ground for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act. However, it has been applied by the Supreme Court in various cases using its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to dissolve marriages where reconciliation was impossible. The Court has in cases like Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli granted divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage by invoking Article 142 even if one party opposes divorce, in deserving cases where marriage is beyond repair. - **Doctrine of Harmonious Construction** As per this doctrine, different statutory provisions should be construed harmoniously without creating any conflict. The Supreme Court must make an effort to read apparently conflicting provisions in a harmonious manner, giving effect to all provisions instead of striking down any provision or rendering it useless. This doctrine will be relevant in interpreting whether Section 13B can be harmoniously construed with the Court’s powers under Article 142. - **Principle of directories and mandatories** Procedural statutes may be directory where substantial compliance suffices and breach does not result in invalidity. Mandatory statutes are those which must be strictly observed and non-compliance leads to invalidity. Classification of Section 13B(2) as directory or mandatory will have bearing on whether cooling off period can be waived under Article 142. - **Principle of Severability** As per this principle, if a part of statute is inconsistent with the Constitution, only that part may be severed while retaining the Constitutional remainder. This principle may be relevant if the cooling off period under Section 13B(2) is held unconstitutional when applied strictly. Instead of striking down Section 13B(2) entirely, the period of 6 months could be ‘severed’ and read down under Article 142. - **Doctrine of Stare Decisis** As per this doctrine, a principle of law laid down by a competent court is binding and should be followed in subsequent cases involving identical matters. The Supreme Court’s previous judgments on scope of Article 142 like Manish Goel and conflicting views on waiving cooling off period under Section 13B will be relevant. ## **JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court undertakes a comprehensive examination of the scope and contours of its extraordinary power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution to do complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. Tracing the evolution of Article 142(1) jurisprudence, the Court refers to previous Constitution Bench decisions like[ I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab (1967)](https://lawfoyer.in/golaknath-state-of-punjab/) which had characterized this power as wide and elastic to deliver equitable relief by moulding remedies beyond the limits of statutory provisions. Relying on Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India (1991), the Court holds that prohibitions in ordinary laws cannot act as restrictions on the constitutional powers under Article 142, unless they embody some fundamental public policy. Thereby, the Court asserts supremacy of its special powers under Article 142 over statutory restraints. Analyzing the mandatory waiting period of 6 months under Section 13B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for a decree of divorce by mutual consent, the Court concludes that this does not fetter its discretion under Article 142. Relying on [Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (2017)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/79830357/ "Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (2017)"), the Court holds that it can waive the waiting period by invoking its equitable jurisdiction under Article 142(1), if the marriage has irretrievably broken down without chances of reconciliation. On the issue of exercise of Article 142 powers to grant divorce decree despite non-compliance with process under Section 13B, the Court expressly overrules the conflicting views in [Anjana Kishore v. Puneet Kishore (2002)](https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56b48d29607dba348fff141c "Anjana Kishore v. Puneet Kishore (2002)") and [Manish Goel v. Rohini Goel (2010)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/432882/ "Manish Goel v. Rohini Goel (2010)"). Thereby, the Court dispels doubts around use of its special powers under Article 142(1) to decree divorce between consenting parties without procedural compliance under statutory law. Citing precedents like [Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (2006)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1643829/ "Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (2006)"), [Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Bipin Zaveri (1997)](https://main.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/14256.pdf "Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Bipin Zaveri (1997)") and exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142(1), the Court grants legitimacy to the doctrine of irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a ground for divorce, despite absence of any such provision under the Hindu Marriage Act. Thereby, the Court adapts the law to social reality and contemporary jurisprudential thinking by expanding the grounds of divorce to encompass de facto spousal separation. Relying on foreign precedents like [Owens v. Owens (2018)](https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/uksc-2017-0077.html "Owens v. Owens (2018)") which recognize the shortcomings of fault-based divorce law, the Court holds that assigning blame for marriage breakdown is often difficult and inequitable. In such cases, forcing an estranged couple to stay wedded forever constitutes injustice. Thereby, the Court moves away from archaic notions of matrimony by laying down progressive jurisprudence for dissolving marriages with irretrievable breakdown. In conclusion, the Court decisively expands the horizon and scope of its special powers under Article 142(1) to cut through procedural fetters and deliver complete restorative justice in deserving cases. While exercising such powers, the Court shall adopt a cautious case-by-case approach based on facts and equities involved. Thereby, the Court bridges the gap between law and life by moulding reliefs to meet the ends of justice. ## **CONCLUSION** In conclusion, the Supreme Court has taken a progressive stand in this landmark judgment by expanding the horizons of its special remedial powers under Article 142(1) of the Constitution. While reaffirming the sanctity of marriage as an institution, the Court has also recognized the need for pragmatic legal solutions when faced with dead and estranged marriages. The Court has prudently laid down guiding principles and safeguards for exercise of its extraordinary powers under Article 142(1) to decree divorce in deserving cases involving irretrievable breakdown of marriage. Thereby, the Court aims to prevent undue prolonging of traumatic matrimonial litigation which serves no purpose but to exacerbate the misery of estranged couples. At the same time, the Court has rightfully cautioned that powers under Article 142 must be invoked judiciously on a cautious case-by-case basis, weighing all facts and circumstances. Thereby, the Court has struck a balanced approach preserving the sanctity of the institution of marriage, while also expanding divorce grounds to include de facto separation under its equitable powers. Overall, this progressive decision marks a notable departure from archaic notions of matrimony by acknowledging the ground realities of broken marriages. The Court has adapted itself to changing social mores and jurisprudential thinking around the world. Thereby, this landmark verdict aims to remedy injustice inflicted on trapped couples through procedural fetters, while upholding constitutional morality and values of justice, liberty and dignity. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases **Tags:** #law, #lawfoyer, #lawyer, #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, Article 142, case analysis, case summary, cooling period for divorce, Divorce by mutual consent, divorce in India, Divorce law, lawfoyer, Marriage, separation --- ### [Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)](https://lawfoyer.in/kesavananda-bharati-v-state-of-kerala-1973/) **Published:** November 3, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) **Content:** ## Preliminary Details of the Case **Court:** Supreme Court of India **Bench:** 13 Judges Case Citation: (1973) 4 SCC 225 **Date of Judgement:** 24 April 1973 **Petitioner/Appellant:** Kesavananda Bharati **Respondent:** State of Kerala **Constitution Involved:** Constitution of India **Important Articles Involved:** Articles 13, 368, 31C ## Abstract The Kesavananda Bharati case established the basic structure doctrine of the Indian Constitution. By a thin majority of 7:6, the Supreme Court held that parliament has the power to amend any provision of the Constitution under Article 368, but this amending power does not enable parliament to alter or destroy the basic structure or framework of the Constitution. The basic structure constitutes the core fundamental features that provide identity and coherence to the Constitution. This historic case marked a defining moment in Indian constitutional law by upholding rule of law and limiting arbitrary exercise of power by parliament through judicial review. **Keywords:** basic structure, constitutional amendment, parliament’s amending power, judicial review, rule of law ## Facts of the Kesavananda Bharati Case In 1970, Swami Kesavananda Bharati, head of a Hindu mutt in Kerala, challenged land reform laws enacted by the Kerala government that imposed restrictions on management of religious properties. The challenge was made under Article 26 of the Constitution that protects the right to manage religiously-owned property. The main legal question raised was whether parliament’s power to amend the Constitution under Article 368 was unlimited and extends to altering fundamental rights. Article 368 provides the procedure for amendment but does not specify any limitations on the amending power. A 13-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, the largest ever constituted at the time, heard arguments in the case. The key issues involved were the scope and extent of parliament’s amending power, whether it was subject to any implied limitations, and if fundamental rights could be abridged or taken away by a constitutional amendment. By overruling the [**Golaknath case (1967),**](https://lawfoyer.in/golaknath-state-of-punjab/#:~:text=Golaknath.,by%20the%20Constitution%20of%20India.) parliament sought to regain unlimited amending powers through the 24th Constitutional Amendment in 1971. Other amendments like 25th and 29th were also enacted to overcome previous judgements that had struck down land reform and bank nationalization laws. ## Legal Issues Raised in Kesavananda Bharati Case The main legal issues raised before the Court were: - Scope of amending power under Article 368 – whether unlimited or subject to implied limitations. - Whether parliament can amend, abrogate or alter fundamental rights under Part III. - Nature of Article 368 – does it confer power or only procedure for amendment. - Validity of 24th, 25th and 29th Constitutional Amendment Acts. - Constitutional validity of Article 31C inserted by Section 3 of 25th Amendment. ## Petitioner’s Arguments On behalf of the petitioner, it was argued that: - Article 368 does not confer power to alter, amend or abrogate fundamental rights or basic features of the Constitution.\[1\] - The word ‘amendment’ implies that the identity or framework of the Constitution cannot be changed or destroyed by the exercise of amending power.\[2\] - Article 368 merely prescribes the procedure for amendment. The power to amend flows from the Constitution itself and is subject to inherent and implied limitations.\[3\] - Parliament cannot exercise Article 368 powers to damage or emasculate the basic elements or fundamental principles of the Constitution.\[4\] - Constitutional amendments under Article 368 are ‘law’ within the meaning of Article 13. An amendment violating fundamental rights would be void.\[5\] ## Respondent’s Arguments On behalf of the respondents, it was contended that: - Article 368 confers unlimited and absolute power on parliament to amend any part of the Constitution without any exception.\[6\] - The term ‘amendment’ in Article 368 encompasses the power to add, alter, repeal or abrogate any provision of the Constitution.\[7\] - The only limitations on the amending power are procedural as laid down in Article 368. There are no implied or inherent limitations.\[8\] - Parliament is fully competent to abrogate or abolish fundamental rights by a constitutional amendment in exercise of its constituent power.\[9\] - Parliament represents the supreme will of the people and can reshape the fundamental law according to the requirements of the times.\[10\] ## Related Legal Provisions and Doctrines The relevant legal concepts and doctrines involved were: - Basic structure doctrine – certain basic features of the Constitution are unamendable.\[11\] - Article 13(2) – Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of fundamental rights are void.\[12\] - Article 368 – Power of parliament to amend the Constitution and procedure therefor.\[13\] - Doctrine of implied limitations on amending power as laid down in I.C. Golak Nath vs State of Punjab (1967).\[14\] - Principle of constitutional supremacy and rule of law.\[15\] - Theory of prospective overruling as propounded in Golak Nath case.\[16\] - Principle of separation of powers between legislature, executive and judiciary.\[17\] ## Judgement (Ratio Decidendi) of Kesavananda Bharati Case By a thin majority of 7:6, the Court held that: - Parliament has wide powers to amend the Constitution under Article 368 but it does not have absolute power to alter or destroy the basic structure or framework of the Constitution. \[18\] - The Constitution contains certain basic features that are its foundational principles giving it identity and overall coherence. These constitute the basic structure which cannot be abrogated even by exercise of amending power under Article 368. \[19\] - Though there are no express limitations on the amending power, there are implied limitations arising from the very nature of the Constitution. The basic structure binds and limits parliament’s amending powers. \[20\] - Principles like supremacy of the Constitution, republican and democratic form of government, secular character of the Constitution, separation of powers etc. are part of the basic structure and cannot be amended. \[21\] - Judicial review is part of basic structure. Article 31C was unconstitutional since it excluded judicial review and violated basic structure. \[22\] - 24th and 29th Amendments were held valid. Section 2 and first part of Section 3 of 25th Amendment were upheld while the second part of Section 3 was struck down. \[23\] Majority upheld Golak Nath prospectively and overruled it only for future amendments. Constitutional amendments were to be tested on the anvil of basic structure from Kesavananda Bharati onwards. Though there were concurrent findings on certain broad principles, there was divergence over the concept, scope and content of the basic structure doctrine due to conflicting reasoning given by different judges. The case did not deliver a single unanimous ratio decidendi but laid down guiding principles. ## Conclusion and Comments Kesavananda Bharati was a significant milestone in the evolution of constitutional law and judicial review in India. The case marked a power shift in favor of the judiciary by checking unfettered parliamentary power and upholding rule of law and supremacy of the Constitution. The doctrine of basic structure strengthened judicial review of constitutional amendments by subjecting parliament’s amending powers to inherent limitations. It enabled the Supreme Court to strike down any amendment altering or violating the basic structure of the Constitution. This ensured that the core foundational principles were protected despite changing Needs and circumstances.\[24\] However, critics argue that the doctrine is undemocratic and hinders social reform by restricting parliament’s powers. Lack of clarity on basic structure allows for subjective interpretation by judges. Conflicting opinions in Kesavananda have resulted in confusion and uncertainty regarding the scope and application of the doctrine.\[25\] Over the years, the doctrine has been reaffirmed in cases like[ **Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain**](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/936707/), [**Minerva Mills v. Union of India**](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1939993/) etc. and applied to strike down amendments that violated democracy, judicial independence, secularism and other basic features. It remains a cornerstone of constitutional interpretation. The innovative judicial craftsmanship and constitutional statesmanship demonstrated by the Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati significantly bolstered the Constitution’s resilience and durability. It established rule of law and constitutional supremacy as enduring basic norms.\[26\] ## References \[1\] Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala, para 296, 316. \[2\] Ibid, para 567. \[3\] Ibid, para 787. \[4\] Ibid, para 1256. \[5\] Ibid, para 233. \[6\] Ibid, para 676. \[7\] Ibid, para 682. \[8\] Ibid, para 672. \[9\] Ibid, para 701. \[10\] Ibid, para 700. \[11\] Ibid, para 316. \[12\] The Constitution of India, Article 13(2). \[13\] The Constitution of India, Article 368. \[14\][ I.C. Golak Nath v State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643.](https://lawfoyer.in/golaknath-state-of-punjab/#:~:text=Golaknath.,by%20the%20Constitution%20of%20India.) \[15\] Kesavananda Bharati, para 811. \[16\] Ibid, para 1643. \[17\] Ibid, para 686. \[18\] Ibid, para 316. \[19\] Ibid, para 567. \[20\] Ibid, para 787. \[21\] Ibid, para 29. \[22\] Ibid, para 1256. \[23\] Ibid, Headnote. \[24\] Granville Austin, Working A Democratic Constitution (1999). \[25\] Pratap Bhanu Mehta, ‘The Inner Conflict of Constitutionalism: Judicial Review and the Basic Structure’ in India’s Living Constitution (2002). \[26\] UPENDRA BAXI, THE INDIAN SUPREME COURT AND POLITICS (Eastern Book Company, 1980). **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Akhil Bandhu Saha v. The State of West Bengal & Others (AIR 2020 SC 232)](https://lawfoyer.in/akhil-bandhu-saha-v-the-state-of-west-bengal-others-air-2020-sc-232/) **Published:** December 5, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **ABSTRACT** The case of Akhil Bandhu Saha v. The State of West Bengal & Others deals with the interpretation of the term “legal services” under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (LSA Act) and whether it includes bearing the expenses for travel and accommodation of an aided litigant to have effective access to justice. The Calcutta High Court delivered a detailed judgment examining the Constitutional provisions, purpose and object of the LSA Act as a beneficent legislation, and principles of interpretation. It held that in appropriate cases, legal services would include bearing minimum travel fare and accommodation expenses to enable the aided person to provide instructions and have access to the legal service advocate. However, it left the detailed policy formulation to the concerned authorities. 1. **PRIMARY DETAILS OF THE CASE** Name of the Case: Akhil Bandhu Saha v. The State of West Bengal & Others Citation: AIR 2020 SC 232 Court: Calcutta High Court Bench: Justice Dipankar Datta Decided on: 20th March 2014 2. **BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE** The petitioner had invoked the writ jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court against the bank’s action under the SARFAESI Act relating to his property. His writ petition was dismissed earlier with liberty to approach the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT). He filed successive writ petitions which were also dismissed, and ultimately filed the present writ petition seeking relief including direction to the State Government to arrange for his travel fare and accommodation to enable him to attend the Supreme Court where a Special Leave Petition against the order was pending.\[1\] The Court examined whether legal services under the LSA Act would include bearing expenses for travel and accommodation of an aided litigant to provide instructions and access to the legal service advocate.\[2\] 3. ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE CASE I. Whether legal services under Section 2(1)(c) of the LSA Act includes bearing minimum travel fare and accommodation expenses of an aided litigant to access the legal service advocate and justice delivery system?\[3\] II. Whether legal services is restricted only to the specific modes under the relevant Regulations or has a wide connotation to achieve the object of access to justice?\[4\] 4. **ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES** **Petitioner’s Arguments:** - Term ‘legal services’ under LSA Act has to be interpreted liberally to fulfil the Constitutional mandate of access to justice under Article 39A.\[5\] - ‘Any service’ shows wide meaning intended for legal services, not just representation in courts.\[6\] - The relevant Regulations providing modes of legal services are not exhaustive.\[7\] **Legal Services Authorities’ Arguments:** - Legal services confined to conduct of case, does not include travel/accommodation expenses.\[8\] - Regulations specifically provide that aided person must bear own expense for attendance.\[9\] - Lack of resources to meet additional expenses if widely interpreted.\[10\] 5. LEGAL ASPECTS INVOLVED - Interpretation of a beneficent legislation like LSA Act\[11\] - Understanding purpose and context of the term ‘legal services'\[12\] - Achieving Constitutional goals and mandate of access to justice\[13\] - Scope of subordinate legislation vis-a-vis principal legislation\[14\] - Purposive interpretation to fulfil legislative object\[15\] 6. **JUDGEMENT IN BRIEF** The Court held that legal services under Section 2(1)(c) of the LSA Act has necessarily to be understood contextually and purposively. Given the Constitutional goals and obligation under Article 39A as well as LSA Act’s object, it would include bearing minimum travel fare and accommodation expenses to enable access to the legal service advocate in appropriate cases.\[16\] However, detailed guidelines have to be formulated by the concerned authorities to ensure only genuine aided persons receive this.\[17\] 7. COMMENTARY The judgement undertakes a comprehensive analysis of the concept of legal services under the LSA Act keeping in mind the legislation’s welfare objective as well as Constitutional vision of access to justice. By interpreting legal services to include ancillary expenses that facilitate access, the Court attempts to bridge the gap between law and reality so that guarantees on paper do not fail in practice. Although framing detailed guidelines is left to the authorities, the Court provides guidance on how policies must not lose sight of the problems of marginalised litigants. Overall, it progressive development of access to justice jurisprudence. 8. **IMPORTANT CASES REFERRED** - State of Maharashtra v. Manubhai Pragaji Vashi, (1995) 5 SCC 730\[18\] - Manoharan v. Sivarajan, Civil Appeal No. 10581 of 2013\[19\] - M/s. Girdhari Lal & Sons v. Balbir Nath Mathur, (1986) 2 SCC 237\[20\] REFERENCES \[1\] Akhil Bandhu Saha v. State of West Bengal, Para 4 \[2\] Id., Para 17 \[3\] Id. \[4\] Id. \[5\] Id., Para 11 \[6\] Id., Para 42 \[7\] Id., Para 53 \[8\] Id., Para 14 \[9\] Id., Para 59 \[10\] Id., Para 64 \[11\] Id., Paras 28-35 \[12\] Id., Paras 36-50 \[13\] Id., Paras 21-25 \[14\] Id., Para 53 \[15\] Id., Para 19 \[16\] Id., Para 68 \[17\] Id., Para 69 \[18\] Id., Para 22 \[19\] Id., Para 24 \[20\] Id., Para 19 **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Khatri and Others v. State of Bihar and Others ((1981) 1 SCC 627)](https://lawfoyer.in/khatri-and-others-v-state-of-bihar-and-others-1981-1-scc-627/) **Published:** December 5, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **ABSTRACT** The case of Khatri and Others v. State of Bihar and Others ((1981) 1 SCC 627) revolved around the constitutional right to free legal aid under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court declared that free legal services is an essential ingredient of the right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21. It chastised the State of Bihar for failing to provide legal representation to poor and illiterate undertrials, despite the Court’s earlier judgment in Hussainara Khatoon v State of Bihar. 1. **PRIMARY DETAILS OF THE CASE** Name of the Case: Khatri and Others v. State of Bihar and Others Citation: (1981) 1 SCC 627 Date of Judgment: 19 December 1980 Bench: Justice P.N. Bhagwati and Justice A.P. Sen 2. **BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE** In 1979, several undertrial prisoners lodged in Bhagalpur Central Jail, Bihar had their eyes blinded by the police officials, allegedly to prevent them from identifying the police personnel \[1\]. Habeas corpus petitions were filed in the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution by and on behalf of these blinded prisoners (called ‘Khatri’ and ‘Others’) against the State of Bihar and others. The State filed counter-affidavits giving details about the blinded prisoners as required by the Court. It was revealed that most blinded prisoners were unrepresented and were not provided free legal aid, despite the Court’s ruling in Hussainara Khatoon case in 1979, as they had not asked for it. The judicial magistrates had also not informed them about the availability of free legal services \[2\]. 3. **ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE CASE** A) Whether free legal aid is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution? B) At what stages should the State provide free legal aid to the accused persons? C) Whether the State can avoid its obligation to provide legal aid on grounds of financial constraints? D) Whether the magistrate is duty-bound to inform the accused about availability of free legal aid? 4. **ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES** **Petitioners:** A) Right to free legal aid is essential for fair procedure under Article 21. State must provide a lawyer if required in the interests of justice, irrespective of accused’s poverty \[3\]. B) Obligation to provide legal aid arises when accused is first produced before magistrate and also at bail stage. Denial at these stages violates Article 21 \[4\]. C) Poverty no excuse to avoid constitutional duty to provide legal aid. State must do whatever is required \[5\]. D) Legal aid meaningless unless magistrate informs accused about it. People are mostly illiterate about their rights \[6\]. **State of Bihar:** A) Admitted legal aid necessary under Article 21 in light of Court’s ruling. But State may find it difficult due to financial constraints \[7\]. B) Investigation still underway. Not yet clear police blinded prisoners. Compensation claim untenable now \[8\]. 5. **LEGAL ASPECTS INVOLVED IN THE CASE** A) Scope of ‘right to life and personal liberty’ under Article 21 B) State’s obligations under Article 21 C) Role of judiciary in expanding scope of fundamental rights D) Concept of ‘procedure established by law’ under Article 21 E) Right of undertrials and other accused persons F) Constitutional remedies for violation of fundamental rights 6. **JUDGEMENT IN BRIEF** A) Right to free legal services is fundamental right under Article 21. State must provide lawyer to accused if required for fair trial \[9\]. B) Obligation to provide legal services arises when accused first produced before magistrate and also during remand. This is vital stage \[10\]. C) Poverty no ground to deny legal aid. State must provide services irrespective of financial constraints \[11\]. D) Magistrate must inform accused about availability of free legal aid. People are mostly unaware of their rights \[12\]. E) Constitutional duties under Article 21 cannot be avoided citing financial inability \[13\]. F) 24 hours arrest-production rule must be followed scrupulously \[14\]. G) Blinded prisoners to be housed outside Bhagalpur jail till next hearing \[15\]. H) Arguments on compensation for Article 21 violation deferred till next hearing \[16\]. 7. **COMMENTARY** By holding that Article 21 embodies the right to free legal services, the Court expanded the scope of fundamental rights. It adopted a creative interpretation of Article 21, building on its earlier landmark judgments. The case is a milestone in criminal jurisprudence regarding rights of the accused, especially poor and marginalized sections. It laid down procedural safeguards like mandatory disclosure of availability of legal aid. The judgment promoted access to justice and equality before law. Its directions continue to serve as guiding principles. However, the actual impact in improving legal aid has been mixed. The majority of underprivileged undertrials still remain unaware of their legal rights. The free legal aid system suffers from lack of funds, proper management and quality lawyers \[17\]. But the judgment has inspired civil society and lawyers to provide pro bono legal services as well as the later enactment of legislation like Legal Services Authorities Act 1987. 8. IMPORTANT CASES REFERRED Hussainara Khatoon v State of Bihar, (1979) 3 SCR 532 Rhem v Malcolm, 377 F Supp. 995 Jackson v Bishop, 404 F Supp 2d 571 REFERENCES \[1\] Para 1, Khatri v State of Bihar (1981) \[2\] Paras 3 and 4, Khatri v State of Bihar (1981) \[3\] Para 2, Khatri v State of Bihar (1981) \[4\] Para 3, Khatri v State of Bihar (1981) \[5\] Para 5, Khatri v State of Bihar (1981) \[6\] Para 7, Khatri v State of Bihar (1981) \[7\] Para 5, Khatri v State of Bihar (1981) \[8\] Para 2, Khatri v State of Bihar (1981) \[9\] Para 4, Khatri v State of Bihar (1981) \[10\] Para 6, Khatri v State of Bihar (1981) \[11\] Para 5, Khatri v State of Bihar (1981) \[12\] Para 7, Khatri v State of Bihar (1981) \[13\] Para 5, Khatri v State of Bihar (1981) \[14\] Para 10, Khatri v State of Bihar (1981) \[15\] Para 1, Khatri v State of Bihar (1981) \[16\] Para 2, Khatri v State of Bihar (1981) \[17\] Accountability Initiative, Legal Aid in India – A Study of the Challenges and the Way Forward (2019). **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Suk Das v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh ((1986) 2 SCC 401)](https://lawfoyer.in/suk-das-v-union-territory-of-arunachal-pradesh-1986-2-scc-401/) **Published:** December 5, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **ABSTRACT** The case of Suk Das v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh \[(1986) 2 SCC 401\] is a landmark judgment by the Supreme Court of India on the fundamental right to free legal aid under Article 21 of the Constitution. It establishes that free legal assistance at state cost is a fundamental right of a person accused of an offence which may involve jeopardy to their personal liberty. This right is implicit in the right to fair procedure under Article 21. 1. **PRIMARY DETAILS OF THE CASE** Name of the Case: Suk Das & Anr v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh Citation: (1986) 2 SCC 401 Date of Judgment: 10 March 1986 Bench: Chief Justice PN Bhagwati, Justice DP Madon & Justice GL Oza 2. **BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE** In this case, the appellant Suk Das and 5 other accused were charged with threatening an Assistant Engineer under Sections 506 and 34 IPC. The appellant was unable to afford a lawyer due to poverty. The Additional Deputy Commissioner did not inform him of his right to free legal aid or provide him with a lawyer. As a result, he could not effectively defend himself and was convicted along with one other accused, while the rest were acquitted. His appeal to the Gauhati High Court was dismissed on grounds that he did not apply for free legal aid. This appeal followed in the Supreme Court. 3. **ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE CASE** I. Whether free legal assistance at state cost is a fundamental right under Article 21 of a person accused of an offence involving personal liberty? II. Whether it is obligatory for the Court/Magistrate to inform such accused of this right suo motu? III. If the accused is not so informed and consequently deprived of legal representation, does it vitiate the trial under Article 21? 4. **ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES** **Appellant:** - Free legal aid is part of right to fair trial under Article 21. State must provide lawyer to accused who can’t afford one where personal liberty is at stake. - Courts must inform accused of this right, else it makes the right meaningless as they may not know. Failure to so inform violates Article 21. **Respondent:** - Appellant did not apply for legal aid. So failure to provide aid does not vitiate trial. 5. **LEGAL ASPECTS INVOLVED IN THE CASE** I. Whether the right to free legal aid for poor accused where liberty is at jeopardy is part of Article 21 right to fair trial? II. Whether this right under Article 21 imposes suo motu duty on Courts to inform accused of this entitlement without necessitating a request? III. If such information is not given, does trial violate Article 21? 6. **JUDGEMENT IN BRIEF** The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and held: I. Free legal aid at state cost is a fundamental right under Article 21 where offence involves personal liberty and accused cannot afford lawyer. II. It would make the right meaningless if left to accused to ask for it. Most accused are unaware of their rights. Courts must inform accused of this right suo motu. III. As appellant was not so informed in the present case, deprivation of legal aid violated Article 21. Conviction set aside. 7. **COMMENTARY** This landmark judgment makes the Article 21 right to free legal assistance real and effective. By placing burden on Courts to inform accused of availability of aid, it ensures that lack of legal awareness does not come in way of fair trial. It prevents violations based on mere technicality of accused not having applied for aid. Expanding Article 21 to make right to legal aid fundamental where liberty is at stake furthers access to justice. 8. **IMPORTANT CASES REFERRED** i) Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979) ii) MH Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra (1978) iii) Khatri v. State of Bihar (1981) **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Meena Pradhan and Others v. Kamla Pradhan and Others](https://lawfoyer.in/meena-pradhan-and-others-v-kamla-pradhan-and-others/) **Published:** November 18, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Court****Supreme Court of India**BenchAbhay S. Oka, Sanjay KarolCitation2023INSC847Date of Judgement21 September, 2023Petitioner/AppellantMeena Pradhan & OrsRespondentKamla Pradhan & AnrConstitution Involved–Important Articles Involved–Related ProvisionsSection 63, Indian Succession Act 1925Section 68, Indian Evidence Act 1872## Abstract This case involves the validity of a will executed by Bahadur Pradhan in favor of his second wife Kamla Pradhan and daughter Ritu. After Bahadur’s death, his first wife Meena Pradhan challenged the will’s validity. The Supreme Court examined whether there were sufficient grounds to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts upholding the will’s validity. It discussed the requirements under the Indian Succession Act 1925 for valid will execution, including signing by the testator, attestation by two witnesses, and testamentary capacity. Relying on testimony of one attesting witness who stated that Bahadur had executed the will in his presence, the Supreme Court found statutory compliance. It held the will was duly executed by Bahadur out of his own free will, with a sound disposing mind, without any suspicious circumstances or undue influence. Allegations regarding Bahadur’s mental state were unsubstantiated. Dismissing the appeal, the Court upheld the will’s validity as proven under settled legal principles. It refrained from examining the allegation of bigamy, limiting review to the will’s validity. This abstract summarizes the Court’s reasoning and conclusion in affirming the will based on evidence meeting statutory requirements. ## INTRODUCTION This case involves an appeal filed before the Supreme Court challenging a High Court judgment that upheld the validity of a will executed by one Bahadur Pradhan. Bahadur had two wives – Meena Pradhan and Kamla Pradhan. He executed a will seven days before his death bequeathing property to Kamla and their daughter Ritu. After Bahadur’s death, Meena challenged the will’s validity and sought succession certificate in her favor. The executing court initially granted a certificate to Meena, but the High Court set it aside and directed proceeding under the Indian Succession Act to determine the will’s validity. Kamla initiated probate proceedings. Meena contested the proceedings alleging the will was forged. The executing court relied on the testimony of one attesting witness to uphold the will’s validity and granted probate in favor of Kamla and Ritu. Meena appealed unsuccessfully before the High Court. The Supreme Court was thus presented with the question whether there were sufficient grounds for interference with the concurrent findings of the two lower courts. The Court discussed the relevant provisions under the Indian Succession Act 1925 and Evidence Act 1872 related to execution and proof of wills. It summarized the principles laid down in its earlier judgments regarding statutory compliance and evidentiary requirements for proving a will’s validity and execution. The Court’s analysis focused on whether the will in question satisfied the legal test of due execution without any suspicious circumstances. This detailed introduction summarizes the factual background, issues, and legal provisions involved in this case pertaining to the validity of a will. It sets the context for the Supreme Court’s examination of whether there were adequate grounds to overturn the lower courts’ concurrent decisions upholding the will based on statutory and evidentiary requirements. ## Facts of the Case The deceased, Bahadur Pradhan, had married Meena Pradhan, with whom he had two children – Ravi Kumar and Sushma. It was alleged that Bahadur divorced Meena and later solemnized marriage with another woman, Kamla Pradhan, with whom he had a daughter named Ritu. On 30.07.1992, just seven days prior to his death on 07.08.1992, Bahadur Pradhan executed a Will bequeathing his property and assets in favor of his second wife Kamla Pradhan and their daughter Ritu. The Will was attested by two witnesses, namely Lok Bahadur Thapa (who was not examined later) and Suraj Bahadur Limboo. After the demise of Bahadur, his first wife Meena Pradhan filed a case seeking to receive the outstanding dues of the deceased husband. Consequently, the VI Additional District Judge, Jabalpur granted a Succession Certificate in favor of Meena vide order dated 05.07.1995 in the said proceedings. This order of the executing court was challenged by Kamla Pradhan and daughter Ritu before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. The High Court set aside the order dated 05.07.1995 by its judgment dated 17.11.1995, thereby quashing the entire proceedings regarding issuance of Succession Certificate. The High Court directed that the authenticity and genuineness of the Will left behind by Bahadur Pradhan would have to be adjudicated in appropriate proceedings under the relevant law. Thereafter, Kamla Pradhan, claiming to be the second wife of the deceased Bahadur Pradhan initiated proceedings under Section 276 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 seeking a Grant of Probate or Letters of Administration on the basis of the Will dated 30.07.1992. In the said proceedings, Meena Pradhan, the first wife, contested the Will and also disputed the marriage of Bahadur with Kamla. The 6th Additional District Judge, Jabalpur vide judgment dated 11.12.2001 upheld the validity of the Will relied on the deposition of the attesting witness Suraj Bahadur Limboo. It issued Letters of Administration in favor of Kamla Pradhan and daughter Ritu, as mentioned in the Will. Aggrieved by the order, Meena Pradhan filed an appeal before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. The High Court by its detailed judgment dated 25.03.2010 examined the relevant provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Indian Evidence Act, 1872 along with applying the principles laid down in various decisions of the Supreme Court. It concurred with the findings of the executing court and dismissed the appeal, affirming and upholding the validity of the Will executed by Bahadur Pradhan. This propelled Meena Pradhan to approach the Supreme Court by way of present appeal against the High Court order dated 25.03.2010, essentially disputing the concurrent findings of fact by the two courts below. ## Issue Raised - Whether the Supreme Court could interfere with the concurrent findings of fact by the courts below which had upheld the validity of the will executed by Bahadur Pradhan in favor of his second wife and daughter? - Whether the appellate court could overturn the concurring judgments of the executing court and High Court based on the settled legal position regarding requirements for due execution and proof of wills under the Indian Succession Act, 1925? ## Arguments on Behalf of the Appellant - The learned counsel on behalf of the appellant Meena Pradhan submitted that the will executed by Bahadur Pradhan was forged and invalid. - It was argued that the attesting witness examined by the executing court could not conclusively prove the due execution of the will as per the requirements under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The witness did not depose adequately to show that the testator Bahadur had signed the will in a sound disposing state of mind without any undue influence. - It was further submitted that Bahadur was not in a fit mental condition and stable health at the time of execution of the purported will, which should have raised suspicion. The will was executed under suspicious circumstances favoring only the second wife Kamla and depriving the lawful heirs including the appellant and her children. - The learned counsel argued that the propounder of the will, Kamla Pradhan did not dispel the suspicious circumstances surrounding its execution by providing a credible explanation, as required by settled law. The courts below erred in not drawing adverse inference based on the suspicious circumstances. - Additionally, it was contended that the allegation regarding the second marriage and its validity ought to have been examined by the Court, being a relevant factor for adjudicating on the will’s validity. The appellant questioned the bequest in favor of the second wife when the legality of second marriage itself was doubtful. ## Arguments on Behalf of the Respondent - The learned counsel on behalf of the respondent, Kamla Pradhan submitted that the execution of the Will dated 30.07.1992 has been duly proved before the executing Court by examining one of the attesting witnesses, as sufficient under law. - It was argued that the attesting witness categorically deposed that Bahadur Pradhan had signed the Will in his presence and both of them signed in each other’s presence, thereby fulfilling the requirements for valid attestation under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. - The respondent’s counsel contended that there is no evidence on record to show that the testator was not in a fit state of mind or acted under any undue influence. The allegations of suspicious circumstances surrounding the Will made by the appellant are merely conjectures without any basis. - It was submitted that the onus was on the appellant to prove fraud, undue influence or fabrication, which she failed to discharge. In the absence of real and germane suspicious circumstances, the Will could not be declared invalid. - Furthermore, it was argued that the testator possessed the requisite testamentary capacity and Soundness of mind at the time of executing the impugned Will, which conferred upon him the right to bequeath his self-acquired properties to anyone he desired. - Finally, it was submitted that the concurrent findings of fact by the two courts below were based on a detailed assessment of evidence, both oral and documentary. The respondent prayed that the validity of the Will be upheld, being in conformity with the statutory requirements and settled legal position. ## Related provisions **Indian Succession Act, 1925** - Section 63 – This provision lays down the procedure for execution of unprivileged wills. Key requirements are: - Testator to sign or affix thumb impression himself or have another person sign in his presence and as per his direction. - Signature/mark of testator/other person signing for him should demonstrate intention to give effect to the text as will. - Will must be attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom has either seen the testator sign/affix mark or has seen another person sign the will in testator’s presence and as per his direction. - Witnesses should have received personal acknowledgment from testator about his signature or that of person signing for him. - Each witness must sign the will in testator’s presence, not necessarily at same time. No specific form of attestation is required. - Section 276 – This section provides for grant of probate or letters of administration in proceedings initiated by beneficiary/claimant to establish a will’s validity and their entitlement to benefits under it. **Indian Evidence Act, 1872** - Section 68 – Deals with proof of wills required to be attested. Mandates that an attested will cannot be used as evidence until at least one attesting witness has been examined to prove its execution, if such witness is alive and subject to court’s jurisdiction. **Supreme Court Precedents** The Court relied on previous decisions that laid down following principles: - Compliance with Section 63 requirements, though mathematical precision not essential. - Testator signed of own free will with sound disposing mind and memory must be proved. - At least one attesting witness must be examined, who speaks about testator’s signature and witnesses signing in testator’s presence. - If one witness proves will, examining others not required. Where one fails, others can lend assurance. - Presence of suspicious circumstances obligates propounder to dispel doubts by credible explanation. - Factors creating suspicion must be real, pertinent and reasonable, not imaginary. - Burden to prove fraud, coercion etc lies on who alleges it. - Test of judicial conscience applied in suspicious cases to examine awareness, volition, testamentary capacity etc. The Court assessed whether requirements under Section 63 were fulfilled based on witness testimony. It considered principles from precedents regarding volition, capacity, suspicious circumstances and evidentiary standards to determine if the will was validly executed. ## Judgements The Supreme Court examined whether there were adequate grounds for interference with the concurrent findings of fact by the courts below which had upheld the validity of the will executed by Bahadur Pradhan. At the outset, the Court referred to the relevant provisions under the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Indian Evidence Act, 1872 that prescribe the procedure for execution and proof of wills. It discussed previous judgments that had laid down principles regarding statutory compliance, testamentary capacity, volition, suspicious circumstances and evidentiary standards to be applied for determining the validity of wills. On analyzing the facts of the present case, the Court found that the will had been duly executed by Bahadur Pradhan in the presence of two attesting witnesses, as deposed by one of them during trial. Based on this testimony, it held that the requirements under Section 63 of the 1925 Act regarding signature of testator and attestation by witnesses had been fulfilled. The Court relied on the precedent in Shivakumar v. Sharanabasappa to reiterate that compliance need not be proved with mathematical precision, but to the satisfaction of a prudent mind. Referring to the principles laid down in Venkatachala Iyengar v. Thimmajamma, the Court stated that the propounder had satisfactorily established that Bahadur signed the will out of his own volition with a sound disposing mind, without any undue influence or suspicious circumstances casting doubts. The Court dismissed the allegations regarding Bahadur’s unsound mental state as unsubstantiated, with no evidence on record. It endorsed the High Court’s reasoning that in the absence of pertinent suspicious circumstances, the will could not be termed invalid. On the issue of non-examination of the other attesting witness, the Court applied the rule laid down in Janki Narayan Bhoir v. Kadam that evidence of even one attesting witness was sufficient to prove due execution, if found reliable and trustworthy. The Court declined to entertain allegations about the second marriage, limiting review to only the will’s validity, following the approach in Yumnam Ongbi Tampha Ibema Devi v. Yumnam Joykumar Singh. Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the two courts below by applying the settled legal position on execution, attestation and proof of wills. It held the will to be duly proved based on compliance with statutory requirements and evidentiary standards established through judicial precedents. ## Conclusion In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the concurrent findings of the courts below which had affirmed the validity of the will executed by Bahadur Pradhan in favor of his second wife Kamla Pradhan and daughter Ritu. The Court analyzed the relevant provisions under the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Evidence Act, 1872 pertaining to execution and proof of wills. Applying the principles laid down in its earlier decisions, it held that the propounder had been able to prove due execution as per statutory requirements. The attesting witness examined during trial deposed about the testator signing in his presence and the witnesses signing in the testator’s presence, thereby fulfilling the mandates under Section 63 of the 1925 Act. In the absence of any real suspicious circumstances, the Court found no reason to declare the will as invalid. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the two courts below that the will had been duly executed by Bahadur Pradhan with testamentary capacity and soundness of mind, out of his own volition, without undue influence. The appeal was dismissed as the appellant could not demonstrate sufficient grounds to overturn the concurrent decisions of the lower courts. In essence, the Court conclusively upheld the will’s validity after analyzing it in light of statutory compliance and principles evolved through precedents. The requirements for due execution and proof having been met, it rightly preserved the sanctity given to a will as the last testament of a testator. **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [10th Professor V.S. Mani Memorial International Law Moot Court Competition- 2024 | 14th -16th March, 2024](https://lawfoyer.in/10th-professor-v-s-mani-memorial-international-law-moot-court-competition-2024-14th-16th-march-2024/) **Published:** February 18, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## **About the Organizer** Jaipur National University, established on 22 October 2007, is a private university located in the Jaipur district of Rajasthan, India. ## **About the Event** Jaipur National University, Jaipur, at its Seedling School of Law and Governance, Rajasthan is organising the 10th Professor V.S. Mani Memorial International Law Moot Court Competition- 2024 **Dates:** 14th -16th March, 2024 ## Eligibility The Competition is open to all students, enrolled bonafide on a regular basis in an undergraduate Law course (5 years integrated Law course/3 Year L.L.B Course) or its equivalent conducted by any recognized Institution/College/University of any country. No Institution/College/University shall enter the Competition with more than one team. A cap of 50 teams is reserved for the Competition, and teams will be selected by first come first serve basis. Each Team shall comprise of a minimum of two members and a maximum of three members. In a Team comprising of two members, both the members shall be designated as Speakers. In a Team comprising of three members, the third member of the team shall be designated as Researcher. Any additional member or team coach of any team shall not formally be recognized and will not be entitled to a certificate from the University. ## **Location** Seedling School of Law & Governance, Jaipur National University, Main Campus, Jaipur, Agra By-pass, Near New RTO Office, Jagatpura, Jaipur Rajasthan-302017. ## **Registration Procedure** Each team shall complete the registration within the stipulated time. The registration is a two-step process comprising of filling up of the registration form and payment of the registration fee as provided in Rule 7. Registration will be open till 28th Feb , 2024 (11.59 P. M. IST). The registration form can be downloaded from below. The Teams are required to send a bonafide letter issued by the appropriate authority of their College or University along with the duly filled registration form. Click here to register: [Registration Link](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1t9KH8ayfDylaGR5DMgp7hd0C4io-S7uPeFEmX0_NiFE/edit) ## **Registration Procedure** Read the registration procedure here: [Moot Proposition](https://shorturl.at/gmwI1) ## **Fee Details** The Registration Fee is INR 5,000/- Indian teams. All other Teams shall pay US $ 100 or its equivalent excluding service charge (if any) in Euro as registration fee. ## **Payment of Registration Fee** Indian Teams must make payment by Online Payment/Demand Draft. The procedure for the same has been provided in the Annexure to the Competition Rules. Payment by all other teams must be made by Online Payment/Bank Transfer. The procedure for the same has been provided in the registration form. All the formalities concerning the registration process should be completed by January 17, 2023. The decision of the Director shall be final in this regard. ## **Awards and Accolades** 1. The Winning Team shall be awarded a Trophy and a cash prize of 30000/- INR. 2. The Runner-ups Team shall be awarded a cash prize of 20000/- INR. 3. The Best Written Submission award carries a Plaque and cash prize of 7000/- INR. 4. The Best Speaker shall be awarded a Plaque and a cash prize of 6000/- INR. 5. The Best Researcher shall be awarded a Plaque and a cash prize of 5000/- INR. ***Note: The Prize Money can be increased depending upon the sponsorship***. ## **Contact Info**rmation **E-mail:** ## Moot Court Committee **Mr. Amar Anshul** Faculty Convener **Contact:** +91-7838393814 **Mr. Keshav Gaur** Faculty Co-Convener **Contact:** +91-8094520659 **Special thanks to the following authors of the Moot Preposition** 1. Mr. Thibault Wieglet, Assistant Professor, Jindal Global University. 2. Mr. Daniel Stein, Assistant Professor, Jindal Global University. 3. Ms. Chhaya Bhardwaj, Associate Professor, Jindal Global University and Alexander Von Humboldt Fellow, 2024. ## **Important Documents** [Official-Invitation-Letter](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/wpforms/3577-b568d3031b7cbef6ca00df710adebe23/Official-Invitation-Letter-1-1-627b2018701ee033d3e40685e222282a.pdf) [Rules-of-the-Competition-10th-VS-MANI-MEMORIAL-INTERNATIONAL-LAW-MCC-2024-1.docx](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/wpforms/3577-b568d3031b7cbef6ca00df710adebe23/Rules-of-the-Competition-10th-VS-MANI-MEMORIAL-INTERNATIONAL-LAW-ea38e0c157ba37d259e61fa458e6607c.docx) [MOOT-PROBLEM-VSMMILMCC24-1.docx](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/wpforms/3577-b568d3031b7cbef6ca00df710adebe23/MOOT-PROBLEM-VSMMILMCC24-1-36487c6f68077b9328f4596011aca421.docx) **Categories:** Events --- ### [Free Online Webinar on Gender Equality and Constitution addressing legal perspective by LawFoyer: Register by March 16](https://lawfoyer.in/free-online-webinar-on-gender-equality-and-constitution-addressing-legal-perspective-by-lawfoyer/) **Published:** February 18, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Webinar-Poster-director-sir-Medium-1-724x1024.png) --- [Register Now](https://lawfoyer.in/constitutional-law-webinar-registration-form/) ## Gain In-Depth Knowledge from a Leading Expert LawFoyer presents an exclusive free online webinar – **“Gender Equality and Constitution addressing legal perspective”** led by Constitutional Law expert **Prof. (DR.) J.P. Yadav**, Director, Amity Law School Lucknow campus. ## Important Details - **Date:** Sunday, 17 March 2024, 7 pm onwards. - **Platform:** Google Meet/Zoom Meetings - **Completely Free Registration** ## Perks for Participants: - E-Certificate of Participation - **Free access to Certification Masterclass on Mediation Law of India (For More info [click here](https://academy.lawfoyer.in/courses/free-online-masterclass-on-mediation-law-of-india/ "click here"))** - Get 10 % discount on our upcoming National Quiz competition. - Interactive Q&A sessions. - Priority access to future LawFoyer Events. [Register Now](https://lawfoyer.in/constitutional-law-webinar-registration-form/) ## Why You Should Attend: - ***Constitutional Framework*:** Examining how the constitution of a country addresses issues of gender equality, including provisions related to non-discrimination, equal protection, and fundamental rights. - ***Legal Protections*:** Discussing the legal protections available to promote gender equality, such as anti-discrimination laws, gender-based violence legislation, and laws ensuring equal access to education and employment. - ***Judicial Interpretations*:** Analyzing how courts interpret constitutional provisions and apply them in cases related to gender equality, including landmark decisions that have shaped legal precedent in this area. - ***Enforcement Mechanisms*:** Exploring the mechanisms in place to enforce gender equality laws and hold perpetrators of gender-based discrimination and violence accountable, including the role of law enforcement agencies, courts, and human rights commissions. - ***Challenges and Gaps*:** Identifying challenges and gaps in the legal framework for gender equality, such as inadequate legal protections, barriers to access to justice, and cultural biases that may impede progress towards gender equality. - ***International Perspectives*:** Comparing the legal frameworks for gender equality across different countries and regions to highlight best practices, areas for improvement, and opportunities for cross-border collaboration. - ***Policy Implications*:** Discussing the policy implications of legal decisions and legislative reforms related to gender equality, including strategies for advancing gender-responsive governance and ensuring the effective implementation of gender equality laws. - ***Empowerment and Advocacy*:** Exploring avenues for empowering women and marginalized gender groups through legal advocacy, community mobilization, and grassroots activism aimed at promoting gender equality and challenging discriminatory laws and practices. Don’t miss this chance to take your Constitutional Law expertise to the next level. Register now on www.lawfoyer.in or contact at contact@lawfoyer.in or +91 8574723478. --- **Categories:** Events, Webinar --- ### [Godhra Electricity Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1975 SC 32](https://lawfoyer.in/godhra-electricity-co-ltd-v-state-of-gujarat-air-1975-sc-32/) **Published:** February 20, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** This case involved the constitutional validity of certain provisions of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 which allowed the State Electricity Board to take over an electricity licensee’s undertaking before determining and paying the purchase price. The Supreme Court held that Section 6(6) of the Act, which required the licensee to deliver the undertaking to the State Electricity Board pending determination and payment of the purchase price, violated the fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(f) and 19(1)(g). It was unreasonable to deprive the licensee of the undertaking without payment or interest on the purchase price. Though the Board was liable to pay interest under general law, the arbitrator under Section 7A had no power to award interest. Requiring delivery without compensation was invalid. A shareholder, whose rights were diminished by the state action, could challenge the constitutional validity even though the company itself had no fundamental rights. **Keywords:** Electricity Act, Compulsory Acquisition, Fundamental Rights, Licensee’s Rights, Shareholder’s Rights **B) CASE DETAILS** *i) Judgement Cause Title:* [Godhra Electricity Co. Ltd. & Anr vs The State Of Gujarat And Another](https://indiankanoon.org/docfragment/737188/?formInput=ambiguity) *ii) Case Number:* Civil Appeal No. 2016 of 1973 *iii) Judgement Date:* 12 September, 1974 *iv) Court:* Supreme Court of India *v) Quorum:* Kuttyil Kurien Mathew and A.N. Ray, JJ. *vi) Author:* Kuttyil Kurien Mathew, J. *vii) Citation:* AIR 1975 SC 32 *viii) Legal Provisions Involved:* Articles 14, 19(1)(f), 19(1)(g) and 31 of the Constitution of India; Sections 6, 7 and 7A of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The case involved the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 which empowered the State Electricity Board to purchase electricity licensees’ undertakings. Section 6 allowed the Board to serve a purchase notice on licensees. Section 6(6) required licensees to deliver undertakings pending determination and payment of price. The appellants’ license was granted in 1922 for 50 years. In 1971, the Board issued a purchase notice under Section 6(1). The State Government took over the undertaking’s management and handed it to the Board without paying the price. The appellants challenged the notice and constitutional validity of Sections 6, 7 and 7A as violating fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(f) and (g). The High Court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal on limited grounds. **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** - In 1922, a 50 year license was granted to the appellants’ predecessor to supply electricity. - In 1971, the Board issued notice under Section 6(1) to purchase the undertaking on expiry of 50 years, i.e., on 15 November 1972. - In 1972, the State Government took over the undertaking’s management and handed it to the Board without paying the price. - The appellants filed a writ petition challenging the notice and vires of Sections 6, 7 and 7A. - The High Court dismissed the petition. **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** *i)* Whether the license period expired on 15 November 1972 as per the Board’s notice? *ii)* Whether Section 6(6) requiring delivery of undertaking before payment violated fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(f) and (g)? **F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the Appellants submitted: - The license commenced on 23 November 1922 when notification was published. Hence 50 years did not expire on 15 November 1972. The Board’s notice was illegal. - Section 6(6) unreasonably postponed price payment and violated fundamental rights by depriving income without compensation. - Though interest liability existed, the arbitrator under Section 7A could not award interest. This was unreasonable. **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the Respondents submitted: - The license commenced on 16 November 1922 when it was granted. Date of publication was not relevant. Hence notice was valid. - After purchase notice, the licensee had no right to continue business. Hence Section 6(6) did not affect any fundamental right. - Obligation to pay interest was implicit. Licensee could claim it separately. **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** The Indian Electricity Act, 1910: - Section 6(1): Purchase option & notice procedure - Section 6(6): Delivery of undertaking before price determination - Section 7A: Arbitration for price disputes **I) JUDGEMENT** **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** *i)* Date of commencement was date of granting license on 16 November 1922, not publication. Period expired on 15 November 1972. Notice was valid. *ii)* Section 6(6) violated Article 19(1)(f) and (g) by allowing deprivation of property without compensation. Taking over undertaking without paying price or interest was unreasonable. **b) OBITER DICTA** Subsequent conduct may be considered to interpret the document if there is latent ambiguity. **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The Court upheld the Board’s notice but struck down Section 6(6) as unconstitutional. It balanced the state’s power to nationalize assets with individual rights and compensation. The law was amended accordingly. This case is cited to support shareholders’ rights against state action affecting companies. **J) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** *i)* Gujarat Electricity Board v. Shantilal R. Desai, (1959) 1 SCR 580 *ii)* [R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 3 SCR 530](https://lawfoyer.in/ordinance-promulgation-power-of-the-president-under-article-123-of-the-indian-constitution/) *iii)* Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, (1973) 2 SCR 757 **b) Important Statutes Referred** *i)* The Constitution of India: Articles 14, 19(1)(f), 19(1)(g) and 31 *ii)* The Indian Electricity Act, 1910: Sections 6, 7 and 7A **Categories:** Case Analysis, Constitutional Law Cases --- ### [Amity Law School, Noida, Amity University, Uttar Pradesh is organizing a technical event named, “Udhbhav-2024” under the Amity Youth Fest 2024 on 29th February 2024](https://lawfoyer.in/amity-law-school-noida-amity-university-uttar-pradesh-is-organizing-a-technical-event-named-udhbhav-2024-on-29th-feb2024/) **Published:** February 14, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## About the Organizer Amity University is a leading research private university established in 2005 under a State Act. It is recognized by the University Grants Commission (UGC) and accredited by the National Assessment and Accreditation Council (NAAC) with an “A+” grade. The Law School is committed to preparing the next generation of fully equipped legal professionals to face the profession’s demands. It is focused on the student experience and aims to provide an intellectually stimulating learning environment for its nearly five thousand students. The Law School’s curriculum integrates learning about legal concepts with practical training, and its legal academics work collaboratively toward achieving these goals. The Law School presently offers three undergraduate five-year LLB programs: BA LLB (H), BBA LLB (H) and B. Com LLB (H). It also provides a three-year LLB along with an LLM and PhD. ## About Hindi Manch Society Hindi Manch Society was established in the beginning of the current decade. It added a valuable link like Hindi Moot Court Competition to the program series of Hindi Manch. Hindi Manch had published a book titled ‘Postcolonial Language and Hindi’. Hindi Manch is now in the hands of Dr. Prempal, former researcher of Hyderabad University and Dr. Shilpi Gupta, research critic of Hyderabad University. It was for the first time under his chairmanship and vice-chairmanship that about 1400 students of Amity Law School nominated Hindi language as their subject instead of choosing foreign languages. In this sequence of development, Hindi Manch organizes Hindi Moot Court Competition, Essay Competition, debate competition, autobiography writing, National Hindi Day, International Hindi Day, Kavi Sammelan etc every year.It is noteworthy that our objective behind the formation of Hindi Forum is to strengthen the constitutional status of Hindi as well as other languages of India and the importance of including the said languages in the legal process to make justice inclusive and social justice a reality to spread awareness about. --- ## Date of the Competition - **Date:** 29th February 2024 - **Time:** 09:00 A.M. to 05:00 P.M. --- ## Competitions Under Udbhav-2024 **Client Counselling Event:** Client Counselling is a flagship event of Hindi Manch Society which is conducted every year to promote legal aspects along with empowering Hindi language amongst youth. Under this competition, participants will be required to act like an advocate whereby they will be subjected to a client with a problem and they will need to counsel the client. Based on their performance, their ideas, the way they will treat that client (like not being judgmental, being empathetic or sympathetic etc.) they will be judged and marked. **Debate:** Join us for a riveting Debate Competition where minds clash, ideas ignite, and champions emerge. Engage in structured debates, sharpen your critical thinking, and enhance your communication skills. Whether you’re a seasoned debater or a newcomer, seize this opportunity to showcase your intellect and passion. Register now to be part of an electrifying celebration of dialogue and discovery. **Poetry Competition:** In the poetry competition, the participants will need to submit poem by 20th February 2024, and after reviewing of the quality and content of the poem, few poems will be shortlisted. Then, on the day of Udbhav-2024, participants will present their poem to the judges, and based on their content, presentation and meaning the poem reflects, participants will be judged and marked. **Photography:** The photography competition will be organized in tie ship with a leading newspaper and will offer participants a chance to showcase their love and passion for photography and will offer a chance to standby their photography skills. In this competition, participants will be required to take photographs as per the allotted session room. Based on the quality of their photographs and moment captured, they will be shortlisted. After which, shortlisted participants will present their photographs and will be marked accordingly for photograph and its representation. --- ## Eligibility The competition is open to any student from any discipline who are duly enrolled in any recognized university/institution. Multiple entries from the same University/ College/ Institute shall be entertained. By applying for the competition, the teams shall be deemed to have accepted the terms and conditions of the organizing committee. --- ## Prizes **Prizes worth Rs. 1,00,000 to winners.** --- ## Registration Details All the students who desire to participate in the competition shall fill the registration form. - **Registration Fee Individual participant:** Rs. 500 along with 18% GST (INR 590 Only/-) (Registration Link: - **Registration Fee upto 4 participants:** Rs. 1,000 along with 18% GST (INR 1180 Only/-) (Registration Link: ) - **Also fill the form**: - Certificates to all participants --- ## Important Links - **Registration link:** - **Brochure Link:** --- ## Contact Details **Faculty Coveners** 1\) Dr. Prempal 2\) Dr. Shilpi Gupta **Student Conveners** 1\) Ms. Anushka Tyagi (9917990662) 2\) Mr. Archit Talwar (8377075660) **Categories:** Events, Quiz --- ### [Empowering STEM: Celebrating Women and Girls in Science Leadership](https://lawfoyer.in/empowering-stem-celebrating-women-and-girls-in-science-leadership/) **Published:** February 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **AUTHOR: RITESH SINGH SHEKHAWAT[ \[1\]](#_ftn1)** ## **Introduction** Evidence of Dark Matter in the Universe. The elements radium and polonium The double helix structure of DNA What do these findings have in common? They were all discovered by women. Women have made significant contributions to science, technology, engineering, and mathematics throughout history. In several First Nations communities, women were responsible for agriculture and food-collecting, making them among the world’s first farmers. However, being a woman in STEM is challenging, but at the end of the day, the appreciation is worth it. ## **Women at STEM** Women scientists have made significant contributions over the ages towards the understanding, formation, and growth of scientific thought in society. Throughout the past few decades, we have seen and continue to see monumental breakthroughs in scientific contributions made by women. Women have designed aircraft, developed the algorithm that captured the first ever image of a black hole, and led the charge in developing COVID-19 vaccines. Every year, more women enter STEM jobs. This includes women who are majoring in STEM at universities, as well as women who serve on boards and in c-suite positions in STEM organizations. This is not to say that we should abandon our efforts to encourage more women to pursue STEM careers; rather, it serves as a reminder of how hard women before us worked to get us where we are now. My generation still has a lot of work to do, and I need to think of new methods to expand on those efforts that go beyond the normal after-school or summer programs. It’s actually been shown that simply putting more girls into the pipeline does not solve the problem; they just seem to be leaking out at an even faster rate. For example, having more girls attend such camps is not the greatest and only method to demonstrate the effect of STEM areas; rather, we must target women at all levels, including schools, universities, and workplaces. Now, I’m going to focus on workplaces to remember that women before us had hardships and even lost their lives so that we could pursue careers in STEM, making it an even more essential cause to continue fighting for. What comes next for us? So, there are a few things we can start with. ***Menstruation at the workplace*:** Large organizations are now transitioning to full-time remote work and embracing the concept of a digital workplace via metaverse. Women, more than ever, should be allowed to work from home a few days every month during menstruation. Menstrual leave may be beneficial to the health of people who have mild, moderate, or severe menstrual discomfort, as well as those who suffer from menstrual cycle-related illnesses such dysmenorrhea, endometriosis, and mood disorders. For some women, menstrual symptoms may interrupt their daily lives, making it more difficult to participate in normal activities. I personally know women who fainted at an on-site field meeting due to the stabbing menstrual pain, so it’s a serious matter that needs to be considered. In fact, there are a few large companies in India, namely Zomato, that offer their employees menstrual leads, and in Australia, the Victoria Women’s Trust offers their staff a menstrual policy that extends to employees in menopause, making it the first of its kind. A cross-sectional study with participants reported that 72 percent of women believed that dysmenorrhea was a normal part of a woman’s life and, on average, reported that their menstrual symptoms moderately affected their daily lives. ***Quiet rooms:*** You know, with the widespread resignation caused by the pandemic, firms are fighting to attract fresh talent and maintain current ones, so I was recently asked, if i were a woman and recent engineering graduate, what I look for in a company. Assume for a while, If i am a practicing Muslim woman, one of the most important things I look for in a workplace is a peaceful space to pray. Honestly, everyone can benefit from a quiet place to recharge. I got you, introverts. A silent area is not out of reach, just as hammocks and nap pods are common in huge modern organizations. I mean, if I plan to spend most of my day at the workplace, then I need to be able to pray my daily prayers. After all, we do spend one-third of our lives working. This is critical, especially when it means a great deal to me and my fellow Muslim employees. It really is a difference between a good and a bad day, and according to the Mental Health Foundation in the UK, workplaces with high levels of mental well-being are statistically more productive, so it’s a win-win. Some pictures I got off of LinkedIn where people shared their quiet rooms or multi-faith centers in their workplaces. To the left is the one from Facebook, or now Meta offices in Dublin, and the photo on the right is of a local accounting firm in the UK. ***Employers need to provide specialized women’s personal protective equipment:*** Employers must supply customized women’s personal protection equipment (ppe), which fits in a variety of situations. It has been established that the ppe for women is not specifically created for women, but rather is simply a smaller version of the men’s ppe. Numerous studies have shown that women require different PPs than males due to differences in anatomy. This leads to potential health issues in the future due to poor fitness. There are several cases of this happening for different kinds of ppe as well, so ppe is used in hospitals, construction sites, and so on. It was reported by the Trades Union Congress, or TUCC, that when women found the ppe uncomfortable or coming in the way of doing their job, they were likely to not use the ppe altogether. This puts women at a greater risk of injury and health effects in the long term. These are only a few things we could start advocating for in the workplace. There are, of course, many more things we as a society can do to encourage women to pursue and stay in STEM fields, because I believe that they will be able to solve the world’s most complex problems. ## **Conclusion** At the end, the most interesting stories are not of those who had it easy; we rise and fall, but what’s important is that we find our inner strength and stand tall. Women know your value. Wear your crown and write your own story. We believe there’s no limit to what you can accomplish. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Fourth Year Law Student, Mahatma Jyoti Rao Phoole University, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur **Categories:** Articles --- ### [XV National Amity Moot Court Competition 2024 at Amity University, Lucknow [Feb 29-March 2; Prizes of Rs. 50k]: Register by Feb 10](https://lawfoyer.in/xv-national-amity-moot-court-competition-2024-at-amity-university-lucknow-feb-29-march-2-prizes-of-rs-50k-register-by-feb-10/) **Published:** February 2, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER** Amity Law School, Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Campus is organizing the XV National Amity Moot Court Competition ’24. Since its inception in 2007, this competition has become one of the most highly regarded events of its kind in India. The competition aims to inspire educational excellence and legal intellect among law students across the nation. ## ABOUT THE EVENT National Moot Court Competition organized by Amity Law School, Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Campus promises once again to unite some of the finest and brightest law student in India. Since its inception in the year 2007, this competition has grown to become one of the most highly regarded events of its kind in India. The recorded footfall of the competition across the Nation has made the competition’s impact widespread in all regions of the country. Amity Law School, Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Campus through this event aims to inspire the educational excellence and legal intellect of law students across the Nation. Amity Law School strongly believes that the present legal education should be beyond the books; Amity Law School has inspired legal education with a collegial intellectual community. The faculties and authorities in Amity Law School have long upheld the principle that law must be studied within the context of its ultimate nature, to serve justice and humanity. Students at Amity Law School thrive in a diverse and resource-rich atmosphere that is intellectually invigorating, professionally supportive and forward thinking. This is precisely why this institution is known for producing well-rounded lawyers and accomplished practitioners. Students learn and improve their advocacy skills by participating in the National Moot Court Competition. These are the reasons that Amity Law School is dedicated towards organizing these kinds of events and set a benchmark every year. Amity Law School wholeheartedly welcomes all the participants into the vibe of competition and wish them all the luck and success for this competition. ## **Eligibility** - The Competition is open to all students, enrolled bonafide, on a regular basis in an undergraduate law course (3 years/5 years) conducted by any recognized College/ Institution/ University. - A recognized College/Institution/University is entitled to send a maximum of 3 teams to the competition. - Each team shall comprise a minimum of two members and a maximum of three members. In a team comprising of two members, both members shall be designated as Orators. In a team comprising three members, two members shall be designated as Orators and the third member shall be designated as a Researcher. - Teams shall not disclose their identity or that of their institution. However, the speakers can disclose their names only to the bench during the oral arguments. ## **General Rules** - Teams are requested to submit 10 hard copies (Petitioner-5 and Respondent-5) at the time of formal registration at the venue on 29th February 2024. - The language to be used during the rounds is English. - The Competition shall consist of the following rounds: Preliminary Round I and Preliminary Round II., Quarter- Finals., Semi- Finals. and Finals. - During each of the above-mentioned rounds, the order in which the teams shall present their arguments is as follows: Petitioner Speaker 1, Petitioner Speaker 2, Respondent Speaker 1, Respondent Speaker 2, Rebuttal: Petitioner – Any one of the two Speakers and Sur-rebuttal: Respondent – Any one of the two Speakers **Note:** The detailed rules & regulations of the competition may be found in a separate document. ## **Important Dates** - 10th February, 2024: Last date of provisional registration - 13th February, 2024: Last date to seek clarifications - 15th February, 2024: Release of clarifications - 20th February, 2024: Last date for submitting the softcopy of the memorial - 29th February, 2024: Last date for submitting the hardcopy of the memorial ## **How to Register?** Interested candidates can register via the link given at the end of the post. ## **Fee** The registration fee is Rs. 4,500/- + GST and is non-refundable. The reporting time is 10:00 a.m. on 29th February 2024 at the competition venue. ## **Contact Details** **For further information, please contact:** Amity Law School, Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Campus Malhaur (near railway Station), PO: Chinhat, Lucknow, U.P.- 226028 Tel: **+91-92-369-09051, 99-184-77666, 0522-2399418, 6525676** E-mail: **admissionlko@amity-edu** [Register Now](https://amity.edu/lucknow/paymentgateway/mootcourt2024/) --- [Download Moot Problem](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Moot-Proposition-draft.docx) --- [Download Brochure](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Lucknow-Amity-Moot-Court-Competition-brochure-1-1.pdf) --- **Categories:** Events **Tags:** lawfoyer --- ### [Call for Blogs: CEA Environmental Law and Policy Blog](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-blogs-cea-environmental-law-and-policy-blog/) **Published:** February 4, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** [Download Brochure](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Special-Call-February-2024.pdf) **The Collective for Environmental Action**, a student initiative on environmental issues under the auspices of the **Centre for Environmental Law, Policy and Research, National Law University, Delhi** is opening monthly calls for its flagship environmental law and policy blog on the theme **“Global South Challenges to Climate Change : India in Focus”.** The best entry would be considered for publication in the inaugural newsletter of the centre. ## About the Centre for Environmental Law, Policy and Research The Centre for Environment Law, Policy and Research, established in August 2016, seeks to promote legal education, research and extension activities in the field of Environmental Law. The Centre aims to take up projects to herald the confluence of academic and expert insights on environmental issues pertinent to contemporary times. A major goal of the Centre is to support academic and policy-oriented dialogue that paves the way to critical insights and constructive outcomes in the area of environmental law. ## About the Collective for Environmental Action The Collective for Environmental Action, launched under the aegis of the Centre, provides an avenue for the student body to channel efforts on environmental issues, with special emphasis on policy and climate change issues. The collective, while closely cooperating with the Centre, aims to raise awareness about climate change, through regular reading circles and the CEA blog, amongst others. The collective, shortly, plans to conduct an e-survey of the carbon footprints of higher education institutions across India, starting with the Delhi-NCR region. ## Introduction Addressing the urgent need for climate conservation, this blog series delves into the gap between theory and reality in India’s environmental laws and policies. It emphasizes the importance of bridging the loopholes and implementing effective solutions to tackle the pressing water crisis faced by the country and the globe. With a focus on the legal community’s role, the series aims to foster discussion and propose legal solutions for a sustainable future. The submissions are, however, not restricted to the aforesaid sub-themes, provided they fall within the ambit of the main theme and pertain to the current environmental scenario of India. Through critical analysis and legal perspectives, this blog series aims to shed light on the gaps in environmental policies and their implementation in India. By encouraging discourse and proposing practical solutions, it seeks to contribute to the ongoing efforts of bridging the gap between environmental laws and their effective execution. Together, let us strive for a sustainable future that safeguards our environment while ensuring socio-economic development. ## SUBMISSION GUIDELINES - The word limit is 1500-1600 words. - Authors are required to send an abstract and a brief about themselves along with the article. - Co-authorship of up to two authors is allowed and encouraged. - Submissions should be the original work of contributors. In a case, where a submission is found plagiarized, the article will be summarily rejected. - The author is responsible for ensuring the accuracy of statements of facts, opinions, or views in submission. · In submitting the article, the author/s undertake that such article has not been published before and would not be published in any other publication. ## **FORMATTING GUIDELINES** - Font: Times New Roman; Size,12; Line Spacing:1.5. Paragraph Spacing:0-6. - The authors should hyperlink relevant sources in the text. Where hyperlinks are not possible, consistent endnotes in either the Bluebook or OSCOLA are permitted. endnotes must be kept at a minimum if at all. - Submission must only be in a doc/docx format. The file name must be “Title\_CEA Blog”. The short title must capture the essence of the submission and should not be longer than ten words. - Metadata of the file or the submission body must in no event disclose identification of any kind, including the name and institutional affiliation of the author. - Submissions must be made only by filling in this [Google Form](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSckdsydq84LS5334EerFRNPmEIqLYS0wR2FaJvoW6wnYeTrWA/viewform). Submissions made through any other medium will be summarily rejected. ## **DEADLINE** The last date to submit blog pieces on the above-mentioned theme is 29th February, 2024. ## **CONTACT US** **In case of any query, contact at** [**blog.cea@nludelhi.ac.in**](mailto:blog.cea@nludelhi.ac.in) **. Visit us:** [ceanludelhi.wixsite.com/ceablog](http://ceanludelhi.wixsite.com/ceablog) Hoping to receive a positive response from your institution. In case of any queries related to the blog, please write to us at In case of general queries regarding the collective, please write to us at Visit us at to learn more about CEA and the blog. **Categories:** Call for Papers, Events --- ### [Saveetha School of Law, SIMATS, Chennai Organizes the 1st edition of – INK n’ INDEX -ஒரு-மையின்-உர- A National Inter College Electoral Competition: Register By 11 Feb, 2024 January 25, 2024](https://lawfoyer.in/saveetha-school-of-law-simats-chennai-organizes-the-1st-edition-of-ink-n-index/) **Published:** January 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/INK-N-INDEX-d60a8f810eabff9f5e44c9064a3d13dd-733x1024.webp) ## About The Organizer Saveetha School of Law established in 2009 aims to strive for Quality Legal Education and maintains higher standards of Legal Research and Training. With its academic autonomy together with flexibility for innovation in teaching in pursuant of excellence, the school is striving to emerge as one of the Best Institutions in the field of Legal education. Our journey has been remarkable and has grown in leaps and bounds in every possible angle. SSL also encourages students’ active participation in various extra – curricular activities such as Moot Court, Client Counseling, Community outreach programmes, Mock Trial, Seminars. Besides teaching, the school imparts special skills to the students relevant to their professional pursuit and makes them as a holistic personality. ## About the Event The deciding factor that uplifts a civilised society into an egalitarian one is the type of governance that persists in that society. All along the past and around the globe, many forms of government existed in and out, but the form that stood out and has been universally accepted is ‘of the people, by the people, for the people’. Not all the civilised community that ratified democracy theoretically, have efficiently transformed it into practice; sometimes, portraying it as a myth. Nonetheless, it has been stamped firmly as the most coherent form among many. What streamlines this is when it gets coupled with literacy. Yes, Education and Awareness strengthens democracy. Saveetha School of Law proudly brings in National Inter-college Electoral Competition’ under the head ‘INK n’ INDEX’ with the following objectives: - to efficiently analyze the political reality with the existing laws. - to impart electoral awareness among the participants. - to inculcate the spirit of participative governance among the youth. ## **Dates of the Competition** 29th February, 2024 ## **Eligibility** Students pursuing three-year / five-year undergraduate courses or postgraduate courses from a recognized Law College/University in India; Number of teams from an institution shall not exceed 3. ## **Theme** Election and politics ## **Prizes** - Winner: Cash Prize + Certificate - Runner up: Cash Prize + Certificate - Certificates of Participation shall be awarded to the participants upon completion of the competition. ## **Important Dates** - **Last Date of Provisional Registration:** February 11, 2024 - Last Date of Final Registration: February 11, 2024 - Dates of the Competition: February 29 , 2024 ## **Registration Process:** - The participating team should comprise 2 members. - The Competition is open for students pursuing three/ five-year undergraduate courses or postgraduate courses from a recognized Law College/University in India, subject to fulfilment of the registration formalities. The team members shall be students of the same institution. - Number of teams from an institution shall not exceed 3, subject to the maximum limit for the competition mentioned below. - The teams shall first make a provisional registration in the link given below. - **Provisional Registration link:** - After provisional registration, the team would receive a confirmation mail from the organizing committee, consisting of – Team code, Final Registration Link and payment details. The teams can proceed with the payment, only after the communication of confirmation mail. - After payment, the participating teams shall fill the final registration form shared via confirmation mail - Registration for the competition will be based on the FIRST COME FIRST SERVE rule. The maximum number of teams that can register and participate in the competition is 20. The Organizing Committee has the discretion to increase the number of teams. - The registration fee for the competition is Rs. 1,200/- per team. \[Rupees One Thousand and two hundred only\] - The registration fee includes lunch and refreshments on the day of competition for the team members only. - The registration shall be complete only upon successful payment and submission of the final registration form. The fee once paid is non-refundable. ## **Registration Fee** - The registration fee for the competition is Rs. 1,200/- per team. \[Rupees One Thousand and two hundred only\] - The registration fee includes lunch and refreshments on the day of competition for the team members only. - The registration shall be complete only upon successful payment and submission of the final registration form. The fee once paid is non-refundable. ## **Important Links** - **Provisional Registration Link:** - **Brochure Link:** [https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1fV09udwy8PbGCMhR\_hMOgFHoUtWIkIhB?usp=drive\_link](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1fV09udwy8PbGCMhR_hMOgFHoUtWIkIhB?usp=drive_link) ## **Contact Information** - **Email Address for all Communications:** inknindex2024.ssl@gmail.com - **Faculty Coordinator:** Assistant Prof. Arun Kumar. R, Contact: 97917 16883, Mail ID: arunkumarr.ssl@saveetha.com ## Student Organisers: - Meera Rahunaathan: 97905 20539 - Goutham Prakash R: 82480 50078 **Categories:** Events **Tags:** INK n’ INDEX, lawfoyer, Saveetha School of Law, SIMATS --- ### [Notes on Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/notes-on-administrative-law/) **Published:** January 21, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Administrative-Law-1024x1024.png)Notes on Administrative Law - Module 1: [Definition, Nature, and Scope of Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/definition-nature-and-scope-of-administrative-law/) - Module 2: [Reasons for Growth of Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/reasons-for-growth-of-administrative-law/) - Module 3: [Constitutional Law v. Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/constitutional-law-v-administrative-law/) - Module 4: [Droit Administratif and Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/droit-administratif-and-administrative-law/) - Module 5: [Montesquieu’s Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/montesquieus-doctrine-of-separation-of-powers-and-administrative-law/) - Module 6: [Delegated Legislation and Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/delegated-legislation-and-administrative-law/) - Module 7: [Quasi Legislation and Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/quasi-legislation-and-administrative-law/) - Module 8: [Principles of Natural Justice and Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/principles-of-natural-justice-and-administrative-law/) - Module 9: [Administrative Functions under Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/administrative-functions-under-administrative-law/) - Module 10: [Quasi Judicial Functions and Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/quasi-judicial-functions-and-administrative-law/) - Module 11: [State Liability under Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/state-liability-under-administrative-law/) - Module 12: [Judicial Review of Administrative Actions under Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/judicial-review-of-administrative-actions-under-administrative-law/) - Module 13: [Writs and Writ Jurisdiction under Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/writs-and-writ-jurisdiction-under-administrative-law/) - Module 14: [Ombudsman, CVC, Lokpal, and Lokayukt](https://lawfoyer.in/ombudsman-cvc-lokpal-and-lokayukt/) - Module 15: [Administrative Discretion under Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/administrative-discretion-under-administrative-law/) **Categories:** Administrative Law, Articles, Legal Subjects --- ### [Montesquieu's Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/montesquieus-doctrine-of-separation-of-powers-and-administrative-law/) **Published:** January 14, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** The concept of separation of powers finds its origin in the political philosophies of Locke and Montesquieu. As Montesquieu notes in The Spirit of Laws (1748), “There can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates.” This core idea evolved into the doctrine of separation of powers, which asserts that the major institutions of state – legislative, executive, and judicial – should be functionally independent. ## Foundation of the Doctrine Montesquieu’s doctrine rests on two basic principles: 1. *To prevent arbitrary rule and safeguard individual liberties, governmental powers must be separated and balances amongst various institutions.*** The Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights (2010) held that the essence of this doctrine lies in having checks and balances to protect individuals from potential excesses by any one institution. - *Each organ of the government must be confined to the exercise of its own function and not allowed to encroach upon the functions of other organs.*** As noted in ***Ram Jawaya v. State of Punjab (1955)***, the Indian Constitution does not recognize rigid separation of powers but broadly demarcates them to ensure smooth governance. Still, encroachment by one organ on the domain of another is forbidden. **Also Read: [Notes on Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/category/articles/administrative-law/)** ## Three Rules of Separation Montesquieu structured separation across three rules: 1. One organ should not interfere with the working of another organ. This promotes specialization and efficiency in governance. 2. One organ must not exercise functions belonging to another. In ***Government of A.P. v. P. Laxmi Devi (2008)***, the Supreme Court held that judicial functions cannot be exercised by the legislature or executive. 3. The same person should not form part of more than one organ. This prevents conflict of interest and abuse of power. ## Benefits of the Doctrine 1. Montesquieu envisioned several benefits from separating functions, including: 2. Preventing tyranny and safeguarding individual freedom 3. Promoting specialization of roles across institutions 4. Ensuring accountability as one check on the other 5. Improving efficiency in governance As the Supreme Court noted in ***Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)***, this doctrine protects against “unfettered social control” by any one institution. ## Modifications for Practical Governance While the core principles hold merit, some modifications have been required in practice: The Council of Ministers is drawn from the legislature, deviating from the rule against belonging to multiple organs. As Granville Austin notes, the Indian Constitution creates a “*blurred separation of powers.*“ The executive is accountable to the Parliament and its acts can be questioned there. Delegated legislation allows the executive to exercise limited legislative powers. Similarly, in exercising quasi-judicial functions the executive applies judicial expertise over specialized subjects. As the Supreme Court held in ***In re Delhi Laws Act (1951),*** some overlap of functions is permitted out of “necessities and convenience” of administration. Complete separation is neither possible nor prudent. A harmony between the organs allows “*community of action*” for effective governance. ## Conclusion In conclusion, Montesquieu’s doctrine retains high relevance as it sets a principled foundation for efficient and accountable governance. However, pragmatic modifications permit constructive overlap where strictly bifurcated roles would hamper coordinated functioning across organs. Our Constitution incorporates a balanced separation of powers, upholding liberty while also supporting good governance. **Categories:** Administrative Law, Articles --- ### [Delegated Legislation and Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/delegated-legislation-and-administrative-law/) **Published:** January 14, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** The modern state performs a vast variety of functions, necessitating a large body of laws and rules to govern these spheres. It is not practical for the legislature to enact all such rules itself. Delegated legislation refers to the laws made by bodies like the executive, judiciary, or statutory entities under the powers delegated to them by the legislature. The concept occupies an important position in administrative law. ## Definition of Delegated Legislation Delegated legislation can be defined as “*that form of legislation where the legislature, instead of making the law itself, delegates its law-making powers to some other authority*”. The laws directly made by Parliament or state legislatures are termed as Supreme or Superior legislation, while laws made through delegation are called Subordinate legislation. The subordinate law-making bodies function as delegates of the legislature. **Also Read: [Notes on Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/category/articles/administrative-law/)** ## Need for Delegated Legislation There are several factors that make delegation of legislative power in modern times a practical necessity: 1. **Increasing Legislative Burden:** With the adoption of the welfare state model and expansion of governmental functions, the range of laws needed has amplified manifold. The Parliament does not have the time or resources to enact the mountain of regulations needed today. Delegation enables sharing of the legislative load. 2. **Need for Expert Knowledge:** The executive has various departments like commerce, finance, defense etc. manned by specialized personnel. They possess expert knowledge regarding the technical aspects that need to be regulated under law. The legislature lacks such expertise. 3. **Flexibility and Expedition:** Circumstances change frequently. The executive can amend and issue fresh rules more quickly through delegated authority to suit the changing needs without awaiting Parliament nod each time. 4. **Emergency Situations:** Rapid action may be required at times to deal with unforeseen contingencies and crises. Ordinances are a common method used to empower authorities to promulgate urgent laws. 5. **Secrecy Needs:** Certain regulations concerning defense equipment, installations, war strategy etc. need confidentiality which the executive is better placed to maintain. Broadcasting details can hamper security interests. 6. **Convenience in Administration:** As the executive has to implement the laws, involving it in rule making on aspects incidental to the legislation policy facilitates administration. ## Constitutional Validity of Delegated Legislation Earlier judicial decisions had invalidated delegation of legislative power on two main grounds: 1. **Violation of Separation of Powers:** Making laws is the exclusive domain of the legislature. Allowing the executive to frame laws results in encroaching on legislature’s functioning thereby breaching separation of powers between institutions. 2. **Delegatus Non Potest Delegare:** The legislature being a delegate itself (of the people’s sovereignty) cannot further delegate, as per this principle. However, on account of the multifarious advantages offered by delegated legislation, the courts changed their stance. In India, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Re: Delhi Laws Act case upheld constitutional validity of delegation subject to three safeguards: 1. **Essential Legislative Functions cannot be delegated –** Functions like determining the legislative policy and formally enacting that policy into laws constitutes the ‘essence’ of legislative power, and rests solely with the legislature. 2. **Adequate Guidelines Must be Provided –** The parent statute itself must chalk out proper guidance to steer the delegatee on exercising the delegated authority. 3. **Limits should be placed –** Wherever feasible, the boundaries within which delegated powers can be used should be set out, for instance fixing upper limits for penalties to be imposed by rules. Thus, barring core aspects of lawmaking like framing policies and setting standards, delegation of ancillary legislative powers is now constitutionally permissible in India. ## Types of Delegated Legislation There exist several modes adopted by the legislature for delegating law-making functions which can be categorized under: 1. **Skeleton Legislation:** Here the legislature simply outlines the bare bones structure of the law in the Act, while leaving the rule-making body to flesh out details through subordinate legislation. **Example:** Sec. 3 of Essential Supplies Act defined purposes for which rules can be framed but did not provide exhaustive elaboration, which was delegated. In Harishankar Bagla v. State of MP, creation of such skeletal legislation with adequate safeguards was upheld. - **Power of Inclusion/Exclusion:** The parent law contains lists or schedules of entities like organizations, individuals, goods etc. to which it applies. The subordinate agency is thereafter empowered to add or remove entries to this list thereby expanding or shrinking the Act’s ambit. **Example:** Where an Act specified industries for which minimum wages were fixed and permitted government to update the schedule by adding more industries, it was upheld in ***Edwad Mills v. Ajmer***. - **Power to Modify Statute:** Enabling the executive to extend statutes to different areas or allow incorporation of specific provisions from one law into another is a form of delegating amendatory authority. Judicial interpretation is required to ensure modifications do not amount to unauthorized substantive changes. **Example:** Sec. 7(2) of Punjab Reorganization Act that empowered center to repeal/amend laws concerning divided assets/liabilities was upheld in ***Bhaiya Lal v. Harikishan Das*** by reading it narrowly to allow minor adjustments only. - **Taxation Powers:** Here substantive power remains with legislature in imposing a tax, while delegated legislation provides for rate fixation and associated aspects. Such delegation for ancillary matters has been allowed by courts. **Example:** Upholding customs duties imposed on imported coal under the Coal Mines Act through delegated legislation in Union of India v. Delhi Cloth &General Mills Ltd., the SC held such delegation was only to implement taxation already sanctioned by the law. ## Control Over Delegated Legislation Delegated authorities cannot be allowed unbridled powers. Adequate mechanism to check possible misuse is required, hence subordinate legislation is put under varied controls: 1. Judicial Control** Using the tool of judicial review courts ensure delegated legislation does not overstep boundaries by applying the principle of ultra vires to invalidate transgressing rules. Grounds include violation of constitutional provisions or parent statute itself. **Example:** Where rule prohibiting coal business without license was struck down in ***Dwarak Prasad v. Bareilly*** as violating freedom under Article 19(1)(g). - **Legislative Control:** Parliamentary scrutiny of delegated law making is maintained through devices like laying rules before Houses or conditioning commencement of rules upon legislative approval. Further, Parliament committees also examine delegated legislation. **Example:** The Committee on Subordinate Legislation oversees whether rules contradict parent act or trespass into essential legislative domain. - **Procedural Control:** To ensure rule-making powers are carefully exercised various procedural safeguards have been evolved like requirements of prior publication and consultation with affected interests. Breach of mandatory procedures can invalidate rules. In ***Raza Buland Sugar Co. v. Municipal Board Rampur***, the SC held that when a law stated rules ‘shall’ be published in Hindi, using Urdu papers was valid as object of publicizing the law was met. Other Aspects of Delegated Legislation Certain other facets concerning delegated legislation as discussed in judicial decisions are: 1. **Retrospective Operation-** Legislature can enact laws having retrospective effect (except in criminal law). But subordinate legislation is prospective by nature. In ***ITC Bhadrachalam Paper Boards v. MRO***, arbitrarily made retrospective rules resulting in tax liability for past periods were struck down by the SC. 2. **Excluding Judicial Review-** Being quintessential to upholding rule of law and constitution, power of courts to review laws cannot be barred. In India legislative provisions barring review have been read down to uphold judicial authority. 3. **Delay in Framing Rules-** Inordinate delay in framing essential rules can severely hamper implementation of the law itself. Courts have had to intervene and issue directions to fill such temporary vacuum. In ***T.K. Rangarajan v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu***, the SC pointed out that GST delay in notifying forms under statutes paralyzes machinery under the law. 4. **Waiver of Rules-** Relaxation in application of rules has to be in conformity with the parent law itself. Authorities cannot ignore or override statutory requirements through administrative instructions, notifications etc. as held in ***DTC v. BPL***. ## Conclusion In today’s regulatory state delegated legislation has become indispensable, yet adequate control mechanisms are essential to prevent misuse and safeguard democratic values. The higher judiciary in India has had a defining role in evolving interpretative principles to keep this sphere of subordinate law making within constitutional bounds. With increasing powers being delegated even by legislatures, continuing vigilance is needed so that the delicate balance between expediency and propriety remains intact while using delegated legislation. **Categories:** Administrative Law, Articles --- ### [Quasi Legislation and Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/quasi-legislation-and-administrative-law/) **Published:** January 14, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** In modern administrative states, executive authorities have to discharge a variety of functions. For effective discharge of these functions, they require certain flexibility and freedom. At the same time, individual interests also need protection from potential executive excess. Quasi legislation constitutes an unique tool that aims to strike a balance between these two objectives in administrative law. ## Concept of Quasi Legislation Executive authorities often issue general orders, rules, regulations, notifications, schemes etc. to regulate the conduct of their subordinates across the country. Since these instruments resemble law in their general application, they are termed quasi legislation. However, they are administrative directions that do not constitute actual legislation. Quasi legislation facilitates standardized and efficient discharge of executive functions by laying down norms, principles and guidelines for executive authorities. They introduce an element of uniformity, certainty and continuity in governance. **Also Read: [Notes on Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/category/articles/administrative-law/)** ## Distinction from Delegated Legislation Quasi legislation needs to be distinguished from the concept of delegated legislation in administrative law. Delegated legislation refers to the rules, regulations etc. made by the executive branch of government under the authority of law making power delegated to it by the legislature. For instance, the Essential Commodities Act empowers the central government to make orders and rules to regulate production, supply and distribution of essential commodities. This is delegated legislation. It has the force of law since the executive makes it with authority delegated by the Parliament. On the other hand, quasi legislation is made by the executive in exercise of its inherent administrative functions, not any delegated power. For instance, a departmental circular laying down guidelines for its officers is quasi legislation. It does not constitute valid legislation. It is purely an administrative direction for standardizing intra-departmental functioning. Hence the key difference lies in the source of authority. Delegated legislation has its source in a legislative act delegating law-making authority. Quasi legislation is based on inherent executive power to regulate its administrative functioning. Consequently, delegated legislation has the force of law while quasi legislation does not have such binding force. ## Identification of Quasi Legislation It is often difficult to clearly identify whether an instrument is delegated legislation or quasi legislation. Nomenclature is not a reliable indicator for this purpose. Quasi legislation appears in a variety of forms like order, circular, regulation, notice, scheme etc. with considerable variation across different authorities. For instance, the ‘Grant in Aid Code’ was held to be quasi legislation in ***Regina case*** while ‘Karnataka Medical Colleges Admission Rules’ were held as directions in ***Prabhakar Reddy case***. Hence, the source of authority is more relevant. If the instrument mentions the specific provision empowering the authority to make it, delegated nature is indicated. Further, if mandatory procedure like prior publication is followed in making that instrument, legislated nature is reinforced. But when the authority and procedure for making the instrument are unclear, four crucial questions guide determination of its nature: 1. Does it create obligations and duties for private individuals? 2. Is it confined to laying down administrative procedures? 3. Does it cast duties on the administration and its officers? 4. Does it confer particular rights or privileges upon private individuals? If the instrument satisfies the first two conditions, courts prefer to designate it as quasi legislation in line with the object of protecting individual interests. If the latter two conditions are met, enabling enforceability guides the judicial preference to term it as delegated legislation. For instance, in ***Niranjan Singh case***, the court held Chapter XI of the U.P Police Regulations dealing with criminal investigation by police to be quasi legislation. But disciplinary regulations for the police force were held to be delegated legislation in ***Babu Ram case***. ## Enforceability of Quasi Legislation The defining hallmark of quasi legislation lies in its administrative status rather than legislative force. Hence, breach of quasi legislation does not generally give rise to legal causes of action before courts. The aggrieved party is supposed to pursue normal administrative remedies instead of judicial remedies. For example, violation of salary provisions in the ‘Grant in Aid Code’ was held to be non-justiceable in the ***Kumari Regina case***. Similarly, deviation from guidelines for locating mandal headquarters did not constitute enforceable breach according to the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the ***Raghupathy case***. Quasi legislation remains binding only within the administrative machinery. However, there are several exceptions to this norm of non-enforceability of quasi legislation laid down in judicial precedents. ## 1. Breach that also violates Law Violation of quasi legislation directions will give rise to enforceable claims where such violation simultaneously constitutes breach of statutory laws as well. For instance, the Supreme Court enforced an executive direction regarding consideration of interests of public at large while granting transport licenses since ignoring it violated Section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act as well in the ***Shanmugam case***. ## 2. Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation Quasi legislation directions followed widely, consistently and for long duration give rise to legitimate expectation among citizens that the norms laid down will be adhered to. Failure to apply such beneficial norms to any particular party violates the doctrine of legitimate expectation, affecting the rights of that party. For example, consistent adherence to office memorandum regarding seniority over many years gave rise to binding legitimate expectation that was breached arbitrarily as per the court in ***Baleshwar Dass case***. ## 3. Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel Under this doctrine, executive authorities are prohibited or estopped from violating promises or representations made by them to citizens even though such promises are not legally enforceable otherwise. For instance, the denial of prescribed incentives for textile exporters under the Export Promotion Scheme violated the doctrine of promissory estoppel, hence was judicially enforced in the Indo ***Afghan Agencies case***. ## 4. Discrimination & Arbitrariness Violation of quasi legislation may be judicially cognizable where such selective non-compliance or deviation amounts to hostile discrimination, irrational categorization or arbitrariness in violation of Article 14. For example, in ***Mannalal Jain case***, preferential quasi legislation norms for co-operative societies were selectively diluted in favor of a particular society, constituting discriminatory violation of Article 14. ## 5. Directions replacing Service Rules To retain administrative flexibility, government authorities frequently issue executive directions and office memorandums containing service conditions and entitlements instead of formal statutory rules. But courts enforce such executive directions as equivalent to statutory service rules in light of the substantial impact of service matters on livelihoods of government staff, as evidenced in ***K.P Joseph and Soma Sundaram cases***. ## 6. Interpretational Directions Quasi legislation is often adopted to fill gaps in existing statutes and rules by issuing clarifications, supplements or interpretations to facilitate administrative enforcement. Such directions are legally valid if the following conditions are fulfilled – - The directions are meant to genuinely fill gaps and clarify ambiguities rather than nullify or materially modify the essential statutory provision. - The directions are issued by the specific authority designated by the statute for making rules on that subject matter. As per the Supreme Court ruling in ***Naga People’s Movement case***, executive instructions satisfying both these conditions have binding legal force. They get incorporated into the concerned rules or regulations. For instance, the power to relax service rules specifically resided with the government as per the Maharashtra government rules in the ***Jagannath case***. Consequently, executive instructions restricting relaxations were held to be contradicting the rules by the Supreme Court. ## Conclusion Quasi-legislation constitutes a unique legal innovation for reconciling administrative flexibility and efficiency with individual rights protection in modern regulatory states. It promotes standardized governance practices while keeping administrative options open to the executive. Enforceability of quasi legislation is limited to exceptional cases involving discrimination, rights violations or estoppel considerations rather than any general binding force. While complex legal analysis is often involved, overall quasi legislation facilitates governance processes and broader public interest. **Referred Cases:** 1. Anil Kumar Bhattacharya v. Union of India (1990) 3 GLR 388 2. B. Rajagopala Naidu v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras AIR 1972 SC 60 3. Baleshwar Dass v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1996) 6 SCC 337 4. Darshuit Singh Grewal v. Union Territory Chandigarh (1996) 9 SCC 332 5. Director General of Posts v. B. Ravindran 2002 (3) ALD 752 6. Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1975 SC 1378 7. J. R. Raghupathy v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1962 AP 199 8. K.M. Shanmugam v. The Superintending Engineer, Southern Railway Construction, Villupuram and Others (1969) 2 SCC 300 9. Kumari P. Regina v. Approved Schools, Dehradun and Ors. AIR 1958 All 650 10. Mannalal Jain v. State of Assam 1962 SCR (3) 703 11. N.K. Panjaka Kshan Nair v. P.V. Jayaraj 1990 Supp SCC 119 12. Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India AIR 1998 SC 431 13. Niranjan Singh Narain Singh Patel v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1962 SC 195 14. Periakaruppan v. State of Tamil Nadu (1971) 2 SCC 303 15. Prabhakar Reddy v. State of Karnataka AIR 1986 Kant 69 16. S.K. Agarwal v. State of Orissa AIR 1957 Ori 10 17. State of Maharashtra v. Jagannath 2016 (1) Bom CR 604 18. Union of India v. Indo-Afghan Agencies AIR 1968 SC 718 19. Union of India v. K.P. Joseph AIR 1973 SC 303 20. Union of India v. N.P. Ayyar’s Navigation Pvt Ltd Calcutta and Ors. (1974) 1 SCC 228 21. Union of India v. S.L. Abbas (Dead) by Lrs. And Ors. (1993) 4 SCC 357 22. Uttar Pradesh v. Kishori Lal AIR 1964 SC 416 23. V.T. Khanzode v. Reserve Bank of India (1982) 2 SCC 7 **Categories:** Administrative Law, Articles --- ### [Principles of Natural Justice and Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/principles-of-natural-justice-and-administrative-law/) **Published:** January 14, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** Natural justice refers to the basic principles of fair procedure that should be followed by administrative authorities while making decisions that affect rights of individuals. The principles of natural justice ensure that the process of decision making is fair and reasonable. These principles are deeply rooted in common law and form an integral part of administrative law in India. The three main pillars of natural justice are: 1. ***Nemo judex in causa sua:*** No one should be a judge in his own cause 2. ***Audi alteram partem:*** Hear the other side 3. ***Reasoned Decision*** These principles are flexible and their application depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. They apply not only to quasi-judicial functions but also to administrative and executive functions to a limited extent, especially where such functions affect rights of individuals. **Also Read: [Notes on Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/category/articles/administrative-law/)** ## Rule Against Bias The rule against bias flows from the maxim nemo judex in causa sua which means that no person can be the judge in his own cause. It requires that the authority deciding a case must not be biased in favor of one party and against the other. The test is whether there is a reasonable apprehension in the mind of one party that the decision making authority will be biased. The Supreme Court has laid down that justice should not only be done, but it must manifestly appear to be done. The appearance of bias is sufficient to vitiate the decision even if there is no actual bias. If right minded persons reasonably apprehend bias, then such apprehension is conclusive evidence of likelihood of bias. **There are several forms of bias:** 1. **Personal bias:** Where the deciding authority has some personal interest in the outcome of the proceedings or is related to one of the parties. Presence of personal bias renders the decision void. 2. **Pecuniary bias:** Where the deciding authority has some financial or monetary interest in the proceedings. Even a small pecuniary interest is enough to disqualify the authority if there is a reasonable likelihood that it will influence the decision. 3. **Bias as to subject matter:** Mere support or opposition to some ideology or philosophy by itself does not indicate bias unless the authority has predetermined the case due to such reasons. Courts usually do not interfere on grounds of subject matter bias alone unless evidence shows the authority had a closed mind. 4. **Departmental bias:** Possibility of bias in favor of a government department over private citizens. But mere fact that decision making authority belongs to same department is not enough. There must be real likelihood of bias. 5. **Pre-conceived notion bias:** Mere holding of an opinion or belief on some issue does not disqualify an authority from deciding a case. One cannot expect authorities to have blank minds. There must be real likelihood that the pre-conceived notions will adversely affect fair hearing. ## Right to Fair Hearing Audi alteram partem is the second principle of natural justice which means that no one should be condemned unheard. Both sides must be heard before passing an order affecting rights of parties. The components of fair hearing are: 1. **Right to notice:** Adequate and proper notice must be given to the affected party before initiating action. The notice must clearly set out the charges and mention the action proposed to be taken. Ambiguous notice leads to denial of reasonable opportunity. 2. **Right to legal representation:** Presence of lawyers is generally not integral to administrative hearings. But right to legal representation may be necessary in certain situations depending on facts of each case e.g. where one has to face criminal charges or the matter involves complex questions of law. 3. **Right to present case:** A reasonable opportunity must be afforded enabling the affected party to effectively present its case including written submissions and oral arguments. What constitutes reasonable opportunity depends on facts of each case. 4. **Right to rebut evidence:** Any material or evidence brought on record by opposite party must be disclosed and reasonable opportunity given to rebut such evidence. This includes right to cross examine witnesses. Reliance on evidence collected behind the back of a party is breach of natural justice. ## Right to Reasoned Decision In addition to the twin pillars of natural justice i.e. *nemo judex in causa sua* and *audi alteram partem*, administrative law jurisprudence has evolved a third principle requiring reasoned decisions from authorities exercising quasi-judicial functions. The basis for such a right can be found in Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution which mandate fairness, non-arbitrariness and justness in State actions. An unreasoned order is an arbitrary order as one does not know the rationale behind such order or what material was considered while arriving at the decision. The Supreme Court has read an implied duty to give reasoned decisions while exercising statutory power which (a) affects fundamental rights of citizens; (b) imposes penal consequences; or (c) determines rights and liabilities of parties. Reasons provide the link between the decision and the mind of the decision maker. The right to reasoned order has the following implications: 1. Where statute requires, the authority must record reasons in support of its decision. This requirement cannot be dispensed with. 2. Even where the statute does not require reasons, reasons may still have to be given in line with principles of natural justice under Article 14 and 21 especially in cases involving civil liberties and penalties. However, reasons need not be elaborate. 3. If one statutory authority records detailed reasons and the decision is affirmed by the appellate authority, the appellate authority need not give detailed reasons again. Concurrence with reasons given by lower authority is sufficient. 4. The concept of reasoned orders is an evolving jurisprudence. In exceptional situations it may be relaxed if adherence will obstruct or delay actions in public interest. The touchstone is balancing administrative efficiency with basic fairness. Thus, there exists a general rule requiring administrative authorities to pass reasoned orders so that citizens can understand the rationale behind the orders affecting their rights and liberties. However, exceptions can be made based on legitimate goals where giving detailed reasons is not feasible or will impede public administration. ## Exceptions to Natural Justice The principles of natural justice are not absolute. Courts have carved out exceptions where adherence to such principles is not required depending on justifiability and necessity: 1. **Emergencies:** Requirement of hearing may be excluded when prompt action is required to cope with emergent situations. But such exclusion must be proportional to the need i.e. only to the extent absolutely necessary. 2. **Confidential matters:** Principles of natural justice have no application in matters of confidential and classified information related to national security, defence etc. Disclosure may be against public interest. 3. **Impracticability:** Where it is impractical or impossible to give hearing the rule may be excluded e.g. riots, natural disasters requiring immediate action. 4. **Statutory exclusion:** Principles of natural justice apply unless expressly or impliedly excluded by a statute. Such exclusion must be strictly interpreted. 5. **Where hearing is meaningless:** If the affected party has nothing useful to say or hearing would be an empty formality, the right to hearing may be denied. ## Effect of Violation of Natural Justice Failure to comply with principles of natural justice renders the decision or order void and not voidable. Such decisions are nullities and *non-est* in the eye of law. They have no existence in law and thus no legal consequences. Even when natural justice is excluded by statute, violation of basic principles of fair hearing may still invalidate decisions under Article 14 or 21 especially when such violation leads to arbitrariness or unreasonableness. Principles of natural justice have constitutional foundations and form part of basic structure of the Constitution. They cannot be arbitrarily violated without legitimate public purpose even by a statute. ## Conclusion Principles of natural justice underpin fair decision making in administration. They inject an element of rationality and protect against arbitrary exercise of power. Courts have expanded the horizons of natural justice to uphold rule of law and reasonableness in State actions underlining its dynamic nature. However, at the same time, exclusion of such principles is justified in certain exceptional situations. The question in each case is one of proportion. The extent of exclusion must have a reasonable nexus with the objective sought to be achieved. **Categories:** Administrative Law, Articles --- ### [Administrative Functions under Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/administrative-functions-under-administrative-law/) **Published:** January 14, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** Administrative functions refer to the residue of governmental activities that remain after legislative and judicial functions are excluded. They comprise policy making, rule making, adjudication, licensing, investigation, etc. Characteristics of such functions include a certain degree of discretion, subjectivity, flexibility in procedures and preponderance of policy considerations over strict legality. ## Classification of Administrative Functions For the purpose of judicial review, administrative functions may be broadly classified into two categories: 1. Discretionary functions 2. Ministerial functions Discretionary powers involve policy oriented decision making with a wide latitude of choice in arriving at a determination. Courts normally do not interfere with the manner of exercise of such powers. Ministerial functions, on the other hand, provide little flexibility or discretion to the authority. They involve routine application of law rather than policy making. Courts can review ministerial actions on grounds of legality and propriety. **Also Read: [Notes on Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/category/articles/administrative-law/)** ## Judicial Review of Discretionary Functions ## Doctrine of Ultra Vires Discretionary powers must be exercised within the four corners of the statute conferring such powers. Any action beyond statutory boundaries is ultra vires and liable to be struck down. The doctrine of ultra vires allows courts to demarcate the scope of discretionary authority and confine them to their statutory orbit. Grounds on which exercise of discretionary power may be challenged include: (i) Lack of jurisdiction (ii) Fettering of discretion (iii) Dictation by superior authorities (iv) Failure to exercise discretion (v) Improper exercise on irrelevant grounds ## Conferment of Discretionary Power The first stage at which the exercise of discretion is controlled is the point of conferment itself. Wide and unfettered discretion without any standard or policy guidance violates equality under Article 14. In ***State of West Bengal v Anwar Ali***, the law empowered government to refer any case to special courts without prescribing any guidelines. This unguided discretion was struck down as arbitrary and discriminatory. Conferment of discretionary authority must be guided by an intelligible differentia having rational nexus with objectives sought to be achieved. Policy guidance could be provided through statutory rules as in case of Delegated Legislation or executive instructions as held in case of ***Hamdard Dawakhana v Union of India***. Where discretion relates to fundamental freedoms under Article 19, reasonability of restrictions must be judged in light of guiding principles and safeguards against abuse. Exercise of Discretionary Power Where policy guidance exists, its actual translation into decisions constitutes the second stage vulnerable to judicial scrutiny. The grounds on which courts can interfere include: (i) Failure to exercise discretion (ii) Improper exercise of discretion ## Failure to Exercise Discretion This implies total abdication where authority does not apply its mind and remains oblivious to need for taking a decision. Relevant grounds include: 1. Passing stereo-type orders without application of mind. 2. Dictation by superior authorities contrary to rules of business. 3. Delegation of powers beyond enabling provision. However, seeking assistance from subordinates is permitted. 4. Imposing fetters like prototypes restricting case to case consideration. 5. Premature exercise before relevant facts emerge. 6. Not taking decision where coupled with a duty. The discretion has to be exercised by the designated authority after due application of mind to facts and circumstances of each case. Any total abdication would amount to failure warranting judicial interference. ## Improper Exercise of Discretion Even where some discretion is exercised, courts can interfere if it is based on: 1. Extraneous considerations having no nexus with objective 2. Ignoring relevant considerations or materials 3. Ultra vires exercise beyond jurisdiction 4. Imposing unreasonable restrictions violating fundamental rights 5. Mala fide exercise to serve oblique ends 6. Harsh, oppressive and capricious decisions Impropriety could also arise due to dictation, delegation, undue haste, abuse of purpose, etc. However, courts adopt a self-imposed reluctance to interfere with merits based on unreasonableness alone unless decisions are grossly perverse. **Categories:** Administrative Law, Articles --- ### [Quasi Judicial Functions and Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/quasi-judicial-functions-and-administrative-law/) **Published:** January 14, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## Introduction Administrative authorities are often empowered to make decisions that affect the rights and liabilities of individuals. Though not acting in a purely judicial capacity, such authorities take on a quasi-judicial role when discharging these functions. Understanding the nature of quasi-judicial functions, how they differ from administrative and judicial functions, and the associated procedural requirements is key in administrative law. This blog analyses the characteristics, advantages and issues related to quasi-judicial functions of administrative bodies along with relevant case laws and statutory provisions. **Also Read: [Notes on Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/category/articles/administrative-law/)** ## Characteristics of Quasi-Judicial Functions The following attributes help identify and distinguish a quasi-judicial function: - Lis Inter Partes** A lis or dispute between two or more contesting parties is usually involved, similar to a judicial proceeding. For example, a rent tribunal determining ‘fair rent’ between a landlord and tenant. - Provision for Administrative Appeal** Decisions of quasi-judicial bodies are often appellable to administrative appellate authorities. However, a statutory appeal provision alone may not conclusively establish the quasi-judicial nature if the appeal is intended to be administrative in nature (State of Gujarat v Shantilal Mangaldas, AIR 1969 SC 634). - Powers akin to a Civil Court** If the body is vested with certain powers similar to those of a civil court, it indicates its quasi-judicial role. Eg. Summoning witnesses, administering oath, examining parties, etc. - Consequences on Civil Rights and Liabilities** If the decision substantially impacts or determines civil rights and liabilities, as opposed to purely administrative outcomes, the function assumes a quasi-judicial character. - Duty to Act Judicially** This is widely accepted as the most reliable test for recognizing a quasi-judicial function. It requires the body to objectively examine the facts and evidence while hearing parties to the lis before arriving at a reasoned decision within the letter of the law. ## Administrative v Quasi and Judicial Functions Purely administrative functions are distinguishable from judicial and quasi-judicial ones based on the below key aspects: - Object and Purpose** Administrative actions aim to effectively and efficiently discharge governmental responsibilities, maintenance of law and order, etc. whereas judicial adjudications seek to uphold rights and dispense justice through interpretation and application of the law. Quasi-judicial decisions exhibit an overlap between the two purposes. - Impact on Rights and Liabilities** Judicial and quasi-judicial decisions directly impact and alter rights and liabilities in personam as opposed to consequences of administrative actions which tend to be in rem. - Manner of Disposal** Judicial disposals follow substantive and procedural laws strictly. Pure administrative adjudications are guided by departmental policies and devoid of elaborate procedures. Quasi-judicial disposals fall in between by and large adhering to principles of natural justice though not bound by strict codes of procedure and evidence. - Discretionary Power** Administrative adjudicators enjoy greater flexibility and discretionary latitude over rights, liabilities and implementation of orders. Judicial authorities have relatively limited discretion while determining issues based on established facts and settled questions of law. Quasi-judicial authorities have an intermediary position. ## Advantages of Quasi-Judicial Decision Making Quasi-judicial mechanism in administrative adjudication brings several benefits: - Socialization of Law** It makes rule of law concepts more accessible and applicable in spheres of governmental operation outside regular courts. - Quick and qualitatively satisfactory remedial mechanism** Quasi-judicial redress tends to be more expeditious and contextually nuanced. It obviates the need to resort to lengthy, expensive and overworked court processes. - Preventive rather than only curative action** It allows for timely and more effective preventive interventions when compared to post-facto judicial remedies. - Functional approach** Quasi judicial process allows factoring in of policy considerations, contemporary developments and special circumstances – as long as judicially guided discretion is not breached. Regular courts may lack this flexibility. - Rich experience** Quasi-judicial bodies focused on specific sectors and regulatory operations tend to gain unparalleled experience and insights over time. ## Issues in Quasi-judicial Functioning While quasi-judicial structures offer advantages, several concerns challenge their efficacy and accountability: - Lack of uniform appeal process** One central quasi-judicial appellate body would be ideal. Instead appeals currently lie before a multitude of authorities in different areas increasing confusion. - Inadequate reasoning and transparency** Quasi-judicial orders often lack detailed reasoning regarding facts and evidence weighing preventing effective assessment. Reasoned decisions uphold principles of fairness and justice while facilitating accountability. - Risk of bias** Executives exercising adjudicatory powers in own administration increases the possibility of institutional bias – violating natural justice expectations of impartiality. - Exclusion of legal representation** Disallowing party representation by legal counsel inhibits fair opportunity to present one’s case fully. - Plea bargaining tendencies** Permitting withdrawal of complaints or proposals pending decision incentivizes extraneous pressure and other considerations contaminating objective adjudication. The above lacunae demand greater ‘judicialization’ – importing court like safeguards without compromising the advantages of quasi-judicial processes. ## Case Laws - Need for quasi-judicial functions** In ***Mahabir Jute Mills Ltd. v S.L. Saxena (1998) 6 SCC 310***, the Supreme Court took 40 years to decide the matter of wrongful dismissal of workmen highlighting the inability of regular courts to address such issues expeditiously – thus requiring quasi-judicial industrial tribunals focused on labour-management disputes. - When enquiry permissible against quasi-judicial authority** ***Union of India v KK Dhawan AIR 1993 SC 1769*** laid down that quasi-judicial authorities must not be interfered with or subjected to disciplinary enquiries unless recklessness, misconduct or mala fides in performance of duties is prima facie evident. Principles of independence of quasi-judicial functioning require reasonable threshold conditions to be met for initiating enquiry proceedings. - Constitutional validity of statutory administrative tribunals** Court struck down clauses in Administrative Tribunal Act 1985 excluding jurisdiction of constitutional courts (***S.P. Sampath v Union of India AIR 1987 SC 386***) while also holding Tribunal members not to be judges and their decrees not judicial orders (***State of T.N. v T. Valsaraj AIR 1996 SC 3032***). This exemplifies stringent review by judiciary regarding legislative attempts to replace it with statutory quasi-judicial bodies. Need for course correction where quasi-judicial model compromises principles of constitutional justice. ## Conclusion Quasi-judicial set up attempts to infuse adjudicatory flavour into administrative decision making while retaining executive discretion appropriate for public administration. However, the ongoing tug of war between contending considerations with judicial primacy keeps quasi-judicial mechanisms precariously balanced. Addressing structural, functional and attitudinal limitations besieging quasi-judiciary remains imperative for a mutually respectful and productive administrative jurisprudence. Ability to harmoniously blend policy sensitivity with judicially tested procedural robustness will define the future evolution of quasi-justice in administrative governance. **Categories:** Administrative Law, Articles --- ### [State Liability under Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/state-liability-under-administrative-law/) **Published:** January 14, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** The liability of the state is an important concept in administrative law. It deals with the extent to which the state is legally responsible for the acts and omissions of its agencies and officials. ## Constitutional Provisions on State Liability Articles 298, 299 and 300 of the Indian Constitution deal with state liability in contracts. Article 300 specifically provides that the liability of the Union and state governments will be the same as that of the pre-constitutional Government of India, as laid down in the Government of India Acts of 1915, 1935 and 1858. This ultimately refers back to the liability of the East India Company, which did not enjoy sovereign immunity from legal liability. **Also Read: [Notes on Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/category/articles/administrative-law/)** ## Contractual Liability In addition to the constitutional requirements under Articles 298-300, government contracts are also subject to the provisions of the Indian Contract Act 1872. Hence, the essential elements of a valid contract under section 10 have to be fulfilled. Provisions relating to consideration, damages, etc. would also apply. Article 299 prescribes three mandatory conditions for government contracts: 1. Expressed as made on behalf of the President/Governor 2. Executed on behalf of the President/Governor 3. Executed by a person authorized by the President/Governor These conditions are mandatory and non-compliance can invalidate the contract, as held in ***Karamshi v. State of Bombay***. However, the Supreme Court has relaxed the rigour of some of these requirements, holding that even implied authorization may suffice, as seen in ***State of Bihar v. Karamchand Thaper & Brothers***. Where the government has derived benefit under an invalid contract, it will still be liable under the doctrine of unjust enrichment embodied in Section 70 of the Contract Act, as held in ***New Marine Lines Construction Company v. Government of India***. ## Tortious Liability Prior to the Constitution, there was some uncertainty on whether the state enjoyed sovereign immunity against tortious liability. Some decisions had indicated that immunity would apply to acts done in exercise of “*sovereign powers*”, but others rejected any such immunity. Article 300 resolved this by equating the state’s liability to that of the East India Company. Hence sovereign immunity has not survived in India. This was affirmed in State decisions like ***State of Rajasthan v. Vidhyawati***, which held the state vicariously liable for torts committed by its employees. The issue of sovereign functions was revisited in ***Kasturilal Ralia Ram v. State of UP***, where the Supreme Court conferred immunity for acts done in discharge of sovereign powers like police functions. However, subsequent Constitution Bench decisions have rejected the sovereign-non-sovereign distinction altogether. In ***N. Nagendra Rao v. State of AP***, the Supreme Court held that this distinction is outdated and should no longer apply to determine state liability. Thus, the state can no longer claim immunity from tortious liability solely on the ground of an act being done in discharge of sovereign functions. At the same time, certain primary functions like administration of justice and maintenance of law and order do enjoy some degree of immunity. Barring such exceptional cases, the general rule is that the state will be vicariously liable for torts committed by its employees under the misfeasance in public office doctrine. ## Constitutional Torts A constitutional tort is one that involves violation of Fundamental Rights under the Constitution. The concept of sovereign immunity has no application to such torts. In ***Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa***, the Supreme Court awarded compensation against the State for custodial death caused due to its negligence. Such liability exists irrespective of whether the state action relates to a sovereign function or not. ## Distinction between Sovereign and Non-Sovereign Functions The classification of governmental functions into sovereign and non-sovereign functions was an important factor historically in determining the liability of the state. Sovereign Functions refer to core, primary functions that are intrinsically connected with the state’s sovereign powers. These include: 1. Functions related to external sovereignty like defense, war, foreign affairs etc. 2. Maintenance of law and order 3. Administration of justice 4. Legislation 5. Powers like taxation which represent sovereign attributes Non-Sovereign Functions comprise the welfare, regulatory and commercial functions undertaken by the modern state as part of governance. These include: 1. Running of public utilities likes railways, posts and telegraphs etc. 2. Social welfare measures 3. Public health 4. Education 5. Commerce and trade The key distinction between the two was that traditionally, the doctrine of sovereign immunity protected the state from legal liability arising out of acts done in discharge of sovereign functions. So the state would be immune from tortious liability if a tort was committed by say, the armed forces during wartime operations. However, no such immunity would be available where the state undertaking was in the nature of a non-sovereign or commercial activity. ## Post Constitutional Developments in the Sovereign Immunity This demarcation was subjected to criticism over time. It was argued that most activities of the modern welfare state cannot be strictly classified into narrow traditional heads of sovereign and non-sovereign functions. Interpretational issues also plagued the classification exercise. The Supreme Court noted this criticism in ***N. Nagendra Rao v. State of AP.*** It held that the distinction has largely lost relevance under modern notions of state responsibility. Instead, the crucial test is the nature and manner of exercise of power – if it involves political questions or falls under primary functions of governance like law and order, the scope for judicial intervention may be limited. Barring such exceptional cases where some degree of immunity applies even now, the state is liable for torts committed by its employees under the misfeasance in public office doctrine. The state cannot escape liability merely on the sovereign functions defense. Thus, post-constitutional developments in India have rendered the traditional sovereign-non sovereign classification largely redundant. The state’s liability today is determined on grounds like the degree of policy discretion available and not based on this functional distinction. ## Creation of Statutory Corporations The increasing liability imposed on the state paved the way for establishing statutory corporations with distinct legal personalities. Being independent corporate entities, they have better autonomy in decision making and are not subject to political interference. Moreover, they enjoy limited liability under law, unlike state governments that have unlimited fiscal liability. This has facilitated the state’s venture into commercial activities. ## Conclusion The privileged position of the state as enjoying sovereign immunity has substantially disappeared over time. This accords with the human rights framework of the Constitution. Effective remedies in contract and tort are now available against the Union and state governments to compensate for and prevent harm caused by abuse of state power. Certain core governance functions may still be accorded differential treatment, but the scope of such exceptions is very limited. Through wider liability as well as statutory corporations, administrative law in India has delineated an optimal balance between state autonomy and legal accountability towards citizens. **Categories:** Administrative Law, Articles --- ### [Judicial Review of Administrative Actions under Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/judicial-review-of-administrative-actions-under-administrative-law/) **Published:** January 14, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** Judicial review is the power of the courts to examine the actions of administrative bodies to determine whether they are consistent with the law. Through judicial review, courts act as a check on administrative power to safeguard against abuse of power and violation of rights. Judicial review aims to ensure that the executive and administrative arms of government operate within their constitutionally and statutorily prescribed limits of power. The source of power of judicial review lies in the Constitution – Articles 32, 226 and the power of High Courts to issue writs. Over the years, courts have developed rules and doctrines to maintain judicial control over administrative excesses and keep the administration within legal bounds without impinging on the government’s policy-making role. The exercise seeks to balance individual rights and larger public interest. This article examines key aspects concerning judicial review of administrative actions under administrative law jurisprudence evolved by Indian higher judiciary. **Also Read: [Notes on Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/category/articles/administrative-law/)** ## Doctrines Governing Exercise of Judicial Review Powers Certain doctrines have developed through judicial decisions that govern how courts exercise powers of judicial review of administrative actions. These help regulate intervention in policy or discretionary domains of administration. Important ones are: 1. **Doctrine of Procedural Propriety:** Failure to comply with important procedural safeguards like hearing, notice, or times limits could invalidate administrative decisions. But inconsequential technical flaws may not justify interference. Courts use balancing tests to decide based on harm caused. 2. **Wednesbury Principles of Reasonableness:** Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation, (1948) laid down that courts will not intervene to examine merits or correctness of administrative decisions. But judicial review is permissible on limited grounds like irrationality, perversity, and patent unreasonableness in decision. This means that the decision is so outrageous or absurd that no sensible person applying his mind could have arrived at it. 3. **Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation:** Where a regular practice creates reasonable expectation that an authority will follow a certain procedure, courts may intervene if such legitimate expectation is violated without overriding public interest. Courts however don’t secure legal rights but only procedural protections. 4. **Doctrine of Proportionality:** Punitive actions of authorities should not be excessive but proportionate to faults or infractions to comply with this doctrine. Disproportionate orders that violate this ground are liable to be set aside judicially. Courts in India have also evolved concepts like epistolary jurisdiction, continuing mandamus and constitutional torts, expanding the idea of judicial review itself. Public interest litigation has made access to review remedies easier, especially for underprivileged sections. ## Distinction between Public Law and Private Law Review There are two broad regimes through which judicial review over administration is undertaken: 1. **Public Law Review:** Here, review happens through writ petitions before High Courts under Article 226 and Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. Grounds for intervention include violation of constitutional rights or statutory powers through mechanical exercise of jurisdiction, total absence of jurisdiction, violations of principles of natural justice, bias, mala fides etc. Remedies include issue of directions and prerogative writs. Focus is on public duties imposed under Constitution and statutes. 2. **Private Law Review:** Under this review, powers emanate from ordinary laws like Contract, Tort etc. Subordinate civil courts or consumer forums approach administrative actions like contractual disputes, tortious liability where government is in same position as a private party before law. Issues relate to determinations of private rights and corresponding liabilities/remedies like damages, injunctions and declarations. The choice depends on nature of administrative action impugned and type of grievance raised. Rule of law requires that administration should remain bound by ordinary laws even in dealing with private parties. Attempt is to balance public interest with protection of individual rights. ## Writ Jurisdiction of High Courts and Supreme Court The High Courts and Supreme Court derive power of judicial review from the Constitution of India. While Article 32 of the Constitution vests power of an activist kind exclusively in the Supreme Court for enforcement of fundamental rights, Article 226 confers a discretionary power on all High Courts in the country to issue writs including for any non-fundamental rights violations. Some leading cases highlighting expansive understanding taken by courts regarding constitutional powers of judicial review through writs are: 1. In ***State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal, (2010) 3 SCC 402***, the Supreme Court held that power under Article 32 stands widely recognized as a guarantor and protector of fundamental human rights and universal access to justice is its integral aspect. 2. In ***L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261***, it was held that power of High Courts under Article 226 and Supreme Court under Article 32 is paramount and shall always prevail over ordinary statutes. Jurisdiction under Articles 32 and 226 is a basic feature of the Constitution. 3. In ***Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1954) SCR 803***, the Supreme Court highlighted that Article 226 confers very wide discretionary and equitable jurisdiction on High Courts to issue writs against any authority for enforcement of fundamental as well as ordinary legal rights. While the Supreme Court can take cognizance only when there is substantial violation of a fundamental right, under Article 226, a writ petition can be moved before the High Court both for violation of fundamental rights as well as where non-fundamental rights are at stake. ## Types of Writs under Judicial Review Jurisdiction The constitutional courts chiefly exercise judicial review powers by issuance of five types of writs under Articles 32, 226 and also 227. Important writ remedies evolved are: 1. **Habeas Corpus:** This commands production of illegally detained person before court to adjudicate legality of such detention. Grounds include absence of jurisdiction, violation of principles of natural justice, mala fide exercise of power etc. In ***Kanu*** ***Sanyal v. District Magistrate***, it was held that physical appearance is not mandatory if it threatens public peace. 2. **Mandamus:** This is issued to direct statutory and public authorities to perform mandatory duties owed to an individual if prerequisites like demand, refusal etc. exist. It aims to remedy inaction or failure to act. However, in ***UoI v. T.R. Varma, (1958) SCR 499,*** the Supreme Court made it clear that mandamus cannot issue to enforce contractual obligations between parties. 3. **Prohibition:** The Supreme Court or High Court can pass this writ directing an inferior court or tribunal exercising quasi-judicial functions not to proceed on a matter without or in excess of its jurisdiction or in contravention of principles of natural justice etc. The difference from certiorari is that it is available at a pre-decision stage if statutory authority is threatening to overstep authority. 4. **Certiorari:** Under this, higher courts quash decisions of authorities reached while acting without or in excess of jurisdiction or in violation of principles of natural justice or that are manifestly perverse and patently illegal. Certiorari operates post an impugned decision. It is a limited form of review – courts can only quash but not substitute decisions or assessments made. 5. **Quo Warranto:** Through this writ, judiciary inquires into legality of claim of a person to public office. Prerequisite conditions include office being public exhibiting government control, substantive in nature and person already occupying office. In ***University of Mysore v. C.D. Govinda Rao, (1965)*** it was held that E.C. cannot intervene to remove on grounds of procedural lapses in appointment. Recourse to these writs depends on timing of intervention sought, grounds raised and type of public office or action involved etc. Courts also blend remedies with interlocutory directions based on case exigencies. ## Key Procedural Doctrines Governing Judicial Review Over the course of time, judiciary has itself laid down certain doctrines and rules regulating exercise of its own judicial review powers under writ jurisdiction. Following are among the notable ones: 1. **Exhaustion of Alternative Remedies:** Based on equity principle that extraordinary constitutional powers must be exercised with restraint, locus standi rules initially mandated that the party must first exhaust other remedies before invoking writ. However, in Chief Controller of Imports v. Mohanlal, (1975) 2 SCC 836, the Supreme Court held that while existence of alternative remedies is relevant for writ exercise, efficacy of such remedies will determine whether constitutional powers under Article 226 may be invoked ignoring available statutory modes of redressal. 2. **No Mandamus for Contract Enforcement:** Courts generally don’t issue mandamus for securing contractual rights, damages claims or specific relief through writs. The domain of enforcing contractual obligations is meant for ordinary civil courts, not constitutional courts exercising public law powers. However, writ can issue where substantial public interest is involved. 3. **Rule Against Bias and Principles of Natural Justice:** Violation of principles of impartial hearing and fair administrative procedure constitute common grounds for exercise of judicial review powers and writ jurisdiction. Thus over the years, while reticence marked initial period, judiciary later expanded contours of review powers through doctrines like continuing mandamus, substantive due process, public accountability etc. Reasonableness, good faith and larger public good have guided evolution of principles regulating review processes. ## Private Law Remedies Complementing Judicial Review The scope of judicial review mechanisms extends beyond writ remedies under constitutional law to incorporate within its fold dispute adjudication powers of ordinary courts under specific statutes or common law principles, providing dual protection to citizens. When government or its instrumentalities function in the same way as private entities, jurisdiction of civil courts can be invoked to enforce accountability and legal compliance like any citizen through private law remedies. These operate as supplementary avenues for securing judicial review over administration. Main remedies include: 1. **Injunctions:** These are discretionary equitable remedies ordering a party to do or desist from doing a certain act. Both permanent prohibitory injunctions and temporary injunctions are suited to check administrative actions. Courts apply ‘balance of convenience’ tests to determine whether to grant injunction against public authorities. 2. **Declarations:** These clarify legal position between parties without directly providing any actual relief or remedy. They accrue precedential value guiding future conduct. Requires consequential reliefs too. 3. **Damages:** Compensate plaintiff for loss suffered due to acts of omission or commission of defendants. To avoid multiplicity, in constitutional torts (violation of fundamental rights), courts may award compensation if facts are undisputed and chain of causation is established. The presence of efficacious remedies like injunctions adds to the array of options available before judiciary in keeping administration within legal bounds and thus furthers the objective of accountability that judicial review seeks to secure. ## Concluding Analysis Administrative law jurisprudence has seen significant advance across both procedural and substantive aspects of judicial review law. While earlier excessive judicial activism witnessed recalibration, continuing mandamus and structural injunctions have allowed nuanced interventions balancing review with restraint. Tests of proportionality and legitimate expectation have brought substantive depth. The basic objective is to achieve reasoned decision making where discretionary choices incorporate filtered influences of law, policy, ethics, pragmatism and experience. This mediatory approach preserves semantic unity of rule of law in letter and spirit, best exemplified through integrated exercise of constitutional and statutory review mechanisms – weaving a holistic accountability web for citizens and governments alike. Easy accessibility, contextual understanding and dynamic remedies hold the key to a responsive review framework. Innovation of existing doctrines coupled with articulation of new standards reflecting socio-political realities will shape future evolution of judicial review guiding interplay of power, justice and rights in a democracy. **Categories:** Administrative Law, Articles --- ### [Writs and Writ Jurisdiction under Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/writs-and-writ-jurisdiction-under-administrative-law/) **Published:** January 14, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## Introduction The Constitution of India under Article 32 and 226 provides the right to move the Supreme Court and High Courts respectively for enforcement of fundamental rights through appropriate writs. This extraordinary jurisdiction empowers the highest judicial bodies to issue binding orders and directions to any person or authority in the territory of India for upholding the Constitution. The purpose is to act as a check on administrative authorities, tribunals and even legislative bodies to ensure rule of law and protect fundamental rights. ## Habeas Corpus The literal meaning of habeas corpus is ‘to produce the body’. It is issued to secure release of a person who is illegally deprived of his personal liberty through detention. The court can examine legality of detention orders under preventive detention law or in case of minors, insane persons, women detained by relatives etc. In ***Kanu Sanyal v District Magistrate, Darjeeling***, the Supreme Court held that for reasons of public order, it is not mandatory to physically produce the detained person in court. But the legality of detention has to be justified. The procedural requirements for filing have also been relaxed in habeas corpus petitions. In ***Ichhu Devi Choraria v Union of India, 1980 AIR 1436***, the Supreme Court held that even a postcard written to the court was enough to invoke habeas jurisdiction. Strict rules of pleadings and burden of proof are not followed given the urgency involved regarding personal liberty. In ***Rudul Sah v State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 1086,*** the principle of res judicata was also held inapplicable as multiple habeas petitions can be filed if detention is found illegal. This writ can be claimed as a matter of right and not at discretion of the court unlike others. **Also Read: [Notes on Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/category/articles/administrative-law/)** ## Mandamus Mandamus literally means ‘we command’. It is issued against any public body or authority to enforce performance of public duties cast by law. The duty must be mandatory and not discretionary in nature and the petitioner must have a legal right to claim performance of such duty. In ***Union of India v Tarachand Gupta***, the Supreme Court observed that there should be a demand and corresponding refusal before mandamus is issued. Failure to respond promptly to a demand could also constitute refusal. If the authority has a discretion, court can order exercise of discretion but not the manner of exercise in a particular way. This writ does not lie for enforcement of contractual obligations as held in ***State of Himachal Pradesh v Himachal Techno Engineers***. However, where a statutory body enters into a contract while discharging a statutory duty, the obligation becomes a statutory one enforceable by mandamus as held in ***U.P. Warehousing Corp. v Vijay Narain***. In the landmark case of ***Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala***, mandamus was issued to the Kerala Government to not pursue land reform legislations that were held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. ## Certiorari Certiorari means ‘to be certified’. It is prayed for to quash orders passed by administrative agencies, quasi-judicial bodies or judicial authorities acting in excess of their jurisdiction. The grounds include errors of law apparent on face of the record, violation of natural justice, excess of jurisdiction and *mala fides*. It can only be issued after the order is passed. In ***Hari Vishnu Kamath v Syed Ahmad Ishaque***, the Supreme Court observed that an error of law which is apparent ex facie is one which does not require detailed examination or argument to establish it. If the error is not self-evident but requires demonstration, certiorari is not available. ## Prohibition The writ of prohibition is available at a stage before the impugned action is taken while certiorari is for quashing the same after it is already done. For instance, if a tribunal is about to hear a matter in violation of natural justice, it can be prohibited from doing so through this writ. Else the hearing order would have to be quashed by certiorari which causes unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings. The grounds for prohibition are essentially same as of certiorari like lacking of or acting in excess of jurisdiction, violation of natural justice etc. In ***Re Special Reference No. 1 of 1964***, the Supreme Court prohibited the Punjab Legislative Assembly from expelling a member since it had no jurisdiction to regulate its internal proceedings after President’s Rule was imposed. ## Quo Warranto The writ of quo warranto which means ‘by what authority’ calls upon the public office holder to show under which authority of law he holds office. It can be claimed when a person is illegally occupying a public office or when the appointment itself is contrary to statutory provisions. Office must also be substantive i.e. permanent in nature and person should be actually occupying it. In ***University of Mysore v C.D. Govinda Rao, 1964 AIR 469***, the Supreme Court clarified that ‘public office’ means an office created by the Constitution, law or by executive power of State. It must entail independent responsibilities except to superior authority. The Court can examine if statutory requirements and procedure for appointment were followed or not through this writ. ## Distinction between Injunction and Mandamus Though mandamus is a public law and injunction a private law remedy, there are some similarities. Both are equitable remedies aimed at compelling performance or preventing action. However injunction can be claimed only against private bodies under specific statutes while mandamus lies against public authorities or those discharging public functions. Monetary compensation is possible under injunction but not mandamus. Statutory bar does not apply and procedural requirements u/s 80 CPC don’t have to be followed for the latter. Courts have held that constitutional remedies enjoy primacy over ordinary statutory ones. ## Writ Jurisdiction of Supreme Court and High Courts Article 32 provides the right to move the Supreme Court directly for enforcing fundamental rights while Article 226 confers power (not right) on High Courts to issue writs based on violation of any legal right. Territory wise jurisdiction of HC’s is wider as against the pan-India SC jurisdiction. Alternative remedy does not bar the SC but writ can be refused by HC under discretionary jurisdiction if efficacious alternative remedy exists or owing to inordinate delay etc. Under 226, even private bodies discharging public functions can be made liable unlike under Article 32 where only State authorities are covered. Orders under 32 cannot be ordinarily appealed against making SC the final court for fundamental rights while writs under 226 can be challenged before division bench of HC and then SC. Thus, the writ mechanism forms an indispensable part of Indian administrative law framework for protecting rule of law and checking abuse of power through immediate judicial intervention, irrespective of status of the violator. Ordinary remedies under law often prove inadequate to tackle high handedness of State agencies and the extraordinary writs aptly fit this purpose. ## Conclusion The writ system has enabled the common man to directly approach the highest constitutional courts and seek reliefs and directions against most powerful governmental authorities within a short span of time. Gradually, writ jurisdiction expanded to cover even non-statutory bodies and now private institutions discharging public functions. Scope was further enhanced by Public Interest Litigations which relaxed procedural bottlenecks. This shows evolution of writ remedies as the true guardians of people’s rights and sentinel to uphold justice. **Categories:** Administrative Law, Articles --- ### [Ombudsman, CVC, Lokpal, and Lokayukt](https://lawfoyer.in/ombudsman-cvc-lokpal-and-lokayukt/) **Published:** January 14, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** An ombudsman, central vigilance commission (CVC), Lokpal, and Lokayukt are important institutions aimed at ensuring accountability, transparency and efficient grievance redressal in public administration in India. They investigate complaints of corruption, maladministration and abuse of power against public officials and authorities. This blog analyzes the key features, roles, appointment processes, limitations of the ombudsman, CVC, Lokpal and Lokayukt in detail. ## OMBUDSMAN The ombudsman, derived from Swedish word “ombuds” meaning agent or representative, is an independent and impartial quasi-judicial institution that investigates complaints of citizens against administrative actions and inactions of public functionaries. The Administrative Reforms Commission in 1966 first recommended establishing the institution to supplement the overburdened courts in ensuring administrative justice. **Also Read: [Notes on Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/category/articles/administrative-law/)** ## Functions and Powers The key functions of the ombudsman include: 1. Investigating allegations of corruption, maladministration, abuse of power and discretion against government officials based on complaints. 2. Recommending disciplinary or remedial action where necessary. 3. Mediating fair settlements and redressal between citizens and administration. 4. Undertaking suo moto investigations and inspections. The wide-ranging powers of the ombudsman include examining witnesses, ordering production of documents, conducting spot inspections, appointing experts for assistance and suggesting systemic improvements. As per the Andhra High Court ruling in A.P. Ombudsman Vs. Sri Kutumba Rao, the ombudsman also has power to award compensation to aggrieved citizens. ## Appointment and Removal The ombudsman is appointed by the state government in consultation with the chief justice of the High Court. The person appointed must be either a retired Supreme Court or High Court judge or an officer qualified for such judgeship. To ensure independence, security of tenure is provided wherein the ombudsman can be removed only through the same process as a high court judge. ## Limitations The non-binding recommendations of the ombudsman are the main limitations. While regularly published investigation reports naming erring officials build public pressure, the concerned government departments often ignore the recommendations without adequate explanation or justification. Lack of awareness among citizens about the institution also hinders its optimal impact. ## THE CENTRAL VIGILANCE COMMISSION The Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) was established in 1964 based on the recommendations of the Santhanam Committee to advise and guide central government agencies in vigilance related matters. It has the status of an autonomous statutory body. ## Functions 1. The key functions performed by CVC include: 2. Overseeing and coordinating vigilance activities under central government. 3. Advising various authorities on planning and executing reforms to address corruption and maladministration. 4. Inquiring into complaints of corruption, misconduct and abuse of power against central government officials based on complaints as well as suo moto. 5. Overseeing functioning of Central Bureau of Investigation with respect to cases referred for inquiry to CBI. ## Appointment and Removal The central vigilance commissioner and other commissioners are appointed by the President on recommendation of a committee consisting of the Prime Minister, Home Minister and Leader of Opposition in Lok Sabha. They can be removed by the President on grounds of misbehaviour or incapacity, only after a Supreme Court inquiry on reference by the President. ## Limitations CVC’s recommendations are advisory in nature and government departments can reject them without sufficient justification. It lacks adequate resources and financial autonomy. CVC also cannot direct investigations suo moto against senior officials above joint secretary rank without departmental permission, thus hindering its independent functioning. ## LOKPAL The Lokpal is an anti-corruption authority envisioned as an independent body to inquire into allegations of corruption against public functionaries in the Union Government with its roots in the 1966 ARC report. However, the long delays in its operationalization led the Supreme Court to intervene and issue directives for establishing Lokpal by framing a law. ## Composition and Appointment As per the Lokpal Act 2013, the Lokpal is chaired by a former Chief Justice or Judge of Supreme Court and includes judges, Chief Justice of High Court, officers with impeccable integrity and at least two eminent persons nominated by a high-level selection committee. 50% of the Members are Judicial Members. The Lokpal chairperson and members are appointed by the President on recommendations of a selection committee comprising the PM, Lok Sabha Speaker, Leader of Opposition, Chief Justice of India and an eminent jurist nominated by the President. ## Jurisdiction and Powers The Lokpal has jurisdiction over offences involving public servants under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Its powers include superintendence over Delhi Special Police Establishment, conducting preliminary inquiry and full investigation through any agency, prosecution of cases, and recommendation of penalties and punishments. Appeals against Lokpal orders lie directly in Supreme Court. ## Limitations While the operationalization of Lokpal is a landmark step in anti-corruption efforts, concerns persist such as non-inclusion of prime minister under Lokpal ambit except regarding international treaties, discretionary exclusion of certain public servants notified by the government, lack of financial and functional autonomy from government control. ## LOKAYUKTA Inspired by Sweden’s Ombudsman system, the Lokayukta or Ombudsman system was established at State-level in India to redress citizens’ grievances against public functionaries and check corruption, nepotism and maladministration. The 1973 Rajasthan Lokayukta law was the first such law. ## Composition and Appointment Lokayukta is generally headed by a former Supreme Court or High Court Chief Justice or Judge, and includes members with impeccable integrity and special knowledge of law or public administration. In some states, Lokayukta chairperson has the rank of a Supreme Court Judge and members rank of High Court Chief Justice. Lokayukta members are appointed by the Governor on advice of Chief Minister, Chief Justice of the High Court and in consultation with the State Leader of Opposition. ## Powers and Functions The Lokayukta’s functions involve probing administrative actions and allegations of corruption, favoritism, abuse of power and misconduct based on complaints or suo moto, and recommending suitable action to concerned competent authorities. The Lokayukta Act in many states empowers it to ensure satisfactory public service delivery and address systemic deficiencies and maladministration. Its quasi judicial powers include issuing search warrants, attachment and confiscation of property, ordering compliance and levying penalties. ## Limitations While the Supreme Court has termed state Lokayuktas as ‘watchdogs against corruption’, many states have failed to establish an independent and empowered Lokayukta. Non-binding recommendations which are frequently disregarded by the government without repercussion, inadequate staffing, lack of financial autonomy are some limitations impeding its effective functioning in many states. ## Suggested Reform Measures To enhance independence and effectiveness of these anti-corruption institutions, reform measures are imperative such as: 1. Independent, merit-based and transparent appointment process under Lokpal Act. 2. Establishing adequate infrastructure, financial, and staffing support systems. 3. Vesting adequate enforcement and sanction powers for autonomous functioning. 4. Strengthening capacity to utilize technology and innovative methods in investigation. 5. Conducting regular independent performance audits. 6. Addressing delays in selection committees and appointments. 7. Expanding authority over wider range of public servants. 8. Enacting Whistleblower Protection Act. 9. Increasing awareness among citizens regarding legal rights and duties. ## Conclusion An empowered and independent anti-corruption framework safeguards citizens’ rights in public services, ensures accountability and effectiveness of administration. Thus apart from facilitating inclusive growth, establishing robust institutions like ombudsman, CVC, Lokpal and Lokayukt boosts transparency, checks abuse of power and upholds constitutionalism. However, much ground needs to be covered in terms of optimal resourcing and true autonomy of these bodies. As the Supreme Court asserted, “If Lokpal is to be effective, it needs to be appropriately empowered and enabled to discharge its onerous duties”. **Categories:** Administrative Law, Articles --- ### [Administrative Discretion under Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/administrative-discretion-under-administrative-law/) **Published:** January 15, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## Introduction Administrative discretion refers to the flexibility and autonomy given to administrators and executive authorities while applying broad policies to individual situations. It allows them to assess each case based on its unique circumstances and take decisions they deem fit instead of mechanically following set rules. However, unfettered discretion can lead to arbitrariness and injustice. Therefore, administrative discretion needs to be kept in check through political and legal controls. ## Evolution of the Concept The foundations of administrative discretion can be traced back thousands of years to the principles of ethical decision-making laid down by Greek philosophers like Socrates. In modern history, its emergence can be seen during President Andrew Jackson’s tenure when he started appointing his supporters to government positions, leading to the “*spoils system.*” This enabled administrators to exercise significant discretion in hiring federal employees. The New Deal programs under President Franklin D Roosevelt’s administration also relied heavily on administrative discretion to disburse welfare benefits. Subsequently, the passing of the Administrative Procedure Act, 1946 in the United States formally recognized the role of discretion while also putting in place statutory safeguards against its misuse. **Also Read: [Notes on Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/category/articles/administrative-law/)** ## Need for Administrative Discretion Administrative discretion has become indispensable today with the state performing a multiplicity of functions. As the Supreme Court noted in Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State of West Bengal, “*In a welfare state the primary duty of the government is to secure the welfare of the people.*“ To fulfill this duty, the state deals with complex socio-economic problems like poverty, healthcare, education etc. that require case-by-case analysis rather than a “one size fits all” approach. Direct legislation is not feasible for every administrative action. Discretion needs to be conferred to officials involved in grassroot implementation for optimum utilization of resources. As Wade notes, “*If the state is to care for its citizens from the cradle to the grave…it needs a huge administrative apparatus. Relatively little can be done by merely passing Acts of Parliament and leaving it to the courts to enforce them…There must be discretionary power.*“ ## Forms of Administrative Discretion Administrative discretion manifests itself in diverse forms across the expansive state machinery: 1. **Licensing and Permits:** Authorities have the discretion to grant/deny licenses based on prescribed conditions. 2. **Investigation:** Agencies can decide whether investigation is warranted in a particular case. 3. **Inspections:** Authorities determine frequency/methods of inspections. 4. **Allotment of Government Resources:** Resources allotted based on officials’ assessment of public interest. 5. **Public Procurement Contracts:** Relative weighting given to factors like cost v/s quality is discretionary. 6. **Tax Assessment:** Complex tax calculations involve discretion of assessing officers. 7. **Conducting Elections:** Election Commission decides on code violations, use of force, re-polls etc. based on its judgment. As noted in ***Ram Jawaya Kapoor v. State of Punjab***, these types of “*residuary*” functions requiring case-by-case decision making comprise a bulk of modern administrative activity. Unchecked discretion has the potential for misuse and arbitrary exercise of power. Thus, it is imperative to put in place control mechanisms. ## Control over Administrative Discretion The key methods to control administrative discretion are political control via the legislature/Parliament and legal control through judicial review. ## Parliamentary Control The executive remains accountable to the Parliament in India’s democratic structure. The Parliament can frame policies, rules and guidelines restricting discretion available to administrators. MPs can also raise grievances regarding administrative high-handedness through questions, debates etc. forcing the executive to respond. However, parliamentary control has limitations as the legislature lacks the time for examining individual instances of misuse of discretion. Complete policy straitjacketing through parliamentary legislation is also not feasible. The intricacies of implementation ultimately need to be left to the administrators’ judgment. ## Judicial Control Judicial review of administrative action flows from the basic structure of the Constitution as held in the Kesavananda Bharati case. It is the most effective control mechanism keeping administrators within legal bounds and ensuring rule of law. Through writ remedies and appeals, high courts and the Supreme Court can quash administrative acts found to be illegal, irrational, vitiated by procedural impropriety or disproportional. As ***Lord Diplock*** notes in ***Council of Civil Services Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service***, judicial review ensures authorities act lawfully and fairly, follow correct procedure, exercise discretion reasonably and proportionately, respect legitimate expectations created vis-a-vis individuals through previous conduct, respect human rights and give everyone an equal right to be heard before deciding anything that affects them detrimentally. ## Important Grounds for Judicial Review Some key grounds based on which courts can strike down unreasonable exercise of administrative discretion are: 1. Exceeding jurisdiction 2. Denial of natural justice 3. Acting arbitrarily/in bad faith 4. Fettering discretion through rigid self-created rules 5. Taking irrelevant considerations into account 6. Failure to take relevant factors into account 7. Abuse of discretion amounting to mala fides 8. Violation of legitimate expectations In cases like ***S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India*** and ***Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India***, the Supreme Court has warned all authorities that statutory discretion does not mean absolute, arbitrary power. It has to be exercised judicially, objectively and in public interest. Citizens have a right to good governance and discretion needs to facilitate it, not obstruct it. ## Balancing Administrative Efficiency with Judicial Safeguards While reviewing discretion, courts have to strike a practical balance between administrative efficiency and legal safeguards against the “drunken driver” misusing his power. Blind judicial interference guided solely by abstract notions of ultra vires could bring governance to a standstill. As ***Lord Greene*** notes in ***Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation***, courts must realize that discretion can be properly exercised in more than one way and only “*a very extreme case*” would warrant judicial intervention. Similarly, in election cases, while dealing with alleged misuse of discretion in violating the election code, the Supreme Court has clarified that only substantial illegalities and procedural improprieties will merit setting aside electoral results. Not every minor breach allows courts to nullify people’s mandate. ## Conclusion In conclusion, administrative discretion has to be structured in a way that balances expediency with responsibility. Officials require flexibility to adapt policies to ground realities. But flexibility cannot extend to absolutism. It is a “*power plus responsibility*” model that is squared by accountability. Mechanisms like judicial review, audits, RTI and public participation offer the restraints needed to channelize discretion constructively and fulfill constitutional ideals of a just, equitable and responsible state. Ultimately, utmost probity and wisdom has to be cultivated within every link of the bureaucratic machinery. This remains an unceasing challenge and pursuit for good governance. **Categories:** Administrative Law, Articles --- ### [Court Mannerism and Oral Arguments in Moot Court](https://lawfoyer.in/court-mannerism-and-oral-arguments-in-moot-court/) **Published:** December 9, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** Effective court mannerism and oral advocacy are crucial skills for moot court competitions. In this blog post, we will discuss best practices for conduct, etiquette, speech, handling judges’ questions, and other aspects of strong moot court argumentation. [**Also Read: 12 Steps to Win any Moot Court**](https://lawfoyer.in/12-steps-to-win-any-moot-court-competition/) ## **Understanding Courtroom Etiquette** Knowing proper decorum in the courtroom setting establishes credibility and conveys respect for the court. Here are key areas to focus on: **Appearance** – Dress professionally in a suit and tie, with polished shoes. Avoid distracting jewelry or accessories. Project confidence through posture and facial expressions. **Introductions** – When addressing the judge, use formal titles such as “Your Honor” or “Your Lordship” or “Your Ladyship”. Speak clearly and make eye contact. **Speech** – Speak slowly, loudly, and clearly enough to be heard by the entire courtroom. Avoid filler words like “um” and don’t rush through arguments. **Materials** – Arrange documents neatly. Reference documents or exhibits smoothly without fumbling. Ask permission before approaching the bench. **Reactions** – Act respectfully towards judges and opponents at all times, even when questioned intensely. Never interrupt the judge. ## **Preparing Airtight Oral Arguments** Meticulous preparation is required for oralist to persuasively convey key points: **Know Case Cold** – Oralists must have complete mastery over the facts of the case, applicable laws, previous rulings, counter-arguments, and more with no reliance on notes. **Lead Strong** – Grab attention immediately by highlighting the critical legal question and summary of argument. State the rule, application, and conclusion clearly. **Emphasize Key Points** – Return to the strongest 1-3 arguments frequently. Draw connections using transition words like “additionally” and “given that”. **Tell a Story** – Structure the arguments to build logically on one another. Weave in descriptive details. Judges should feel engrossed. **Anticipate Questions** – Prepare questions judges may ask and appropriate responses tying back to overall theory of the case. **Practice Extensively** – Refine content, cadence, tone, and body language through many practice moots under time constraints against peers posing as evaluators. ## **Handling Judges’ Questions** Judges employ questions to challenge arguments, get clarification, and assess understanding of issues. Effective responses involve: **Listening Fully** – Let the judge complete the question without interrupting. Break down the components and consider implied assumptions. **Buying Time** – Use brief fillers like “Thank you for the Question your Lordship” to gather thoughts before responding. However, don’t stall excessively. **Answering Directly** – Provide a direct response tailored to the specifics of the question, not generic platitudes. Quote exact statutory language if useful. **Transitioning Gracefully** – Once the question is addressed, use transitions like “now to build further on your point…” to tie the response into the overall oral argument. **Conceding When Appropriate** – If the question reveals a genuine weakness in an argument, acknowledge it honestly while minimizing damage. ## **Mastering Speech and Delivery** Oral presentation must complement strong preparation and content: **Vocal Variety** – Convey excitement and confidence through inflection, projection, modulation, and strategic pacing. **Eye Contact** – Frequently make eye contact with the judges to connect. Glance occasionally at notes. **Body Language** – Use purposeful hand gestures and facial expressions. Avoid distracting mannerisms or fidgeting. **Tone and Demeanor** – Come across as polished, assured, and vested in arguments without being arrogant or dismissive. **Compression Without Confusion** – Cover maximum ground concisely within strict time limits while retaining clarity. **Passion and Persuasion** – Argue positions vigorously like one is convinced of winning to compel judges. ## **Impromptu Speaking Techniques** Despite thorough planning, some spontaneity will be required during oral presentations: **Buy Time to Think** – Use brief pauses or phrases like “Thank you for the question your Lordship” to mentally organize next statements. **Bridge Back to Central Theme** – Bring the focus back to 2-3 core well-prepared arguments. **Extrapolate Intelligently** – If asked an entirely unexpected question, apply existing arguments by analogy or principle to the new situation. **Admit Knowledge Gaps** – If unable to develop an argument, acknowledge limits honestly without damaging credibility. **Get Back on Track** – After an impromptu response, smoothly transition back to the prepared roadmap using links like “As previously submitted before…” By following these best practices around courtroom etiquette, speech, handling judges’ questions, and honing arguments through extensive practice, mooters can thoroughly prepare for success during oralist presentations. Let’s build further on leveraging these techniques by examining common mistakes to avoid. ## **Common Oralist Mistakes to Avoid** Even experienced mooters can fall prey to issues like inadequate preparation, poor speech habits, failing to handle questions effectively, and more. Being cognizant of these common errors can help oralists sidestep pitfalls: **Not Knowing Case Details Cold** – Fumbling over facts or unable to answer basic questions undermines credibility. **Failure to Listen to Judges** – Forging ahead with arguments without registering input demonstrates weak advocacy. **Inappropriate Courtroom Conduct** – Overfamiliarity, interrupting judges, pacing, frantic gesturing, etc. diminishes presentation. **Disorganization and Rambling Arguments** – Keep the speech to the point and concise because Judges tune out without clear structure signposting key takeaways. **Forgetting Previous Arguments** – Inconsistent positions from research, written briefs, and oral versions reduce reliability. **Evading Difficult Queries** – Dodging questions or providing tangential responses wrecks robust engagement. **Information Overload** – Cramming excessive complexity leaves judges perplexed instead of persuaded. **Poor Improvisation Techniques** – Grappling unsuccessfully with spontaneous arguments makes one appear unprepared. Through awareness and practice, oralists can recognize situations potentially triggering these troublesome tendencies and develop skills to sidestep them. ## **Integrating Researcher and Advocate Roles** Mooters play a dual role encompassing both legal research and oral advocacy. Blending theseOutputs strengthens overall moot court skill set: **Researcher Becomes Judge** – Rigorously scrutinize own side’s memorial from an evaluator lens to uncover every weak point. **Question Preparation and Anticipation** – Brainstorm queries judges may pose about intricate aspects and devise explanatory answers. **Only Application in Oration** – Train to showcase full grasp over legal principles through flexible application to shifting scenarios. **Find Memorial Loopholes** – Detect flaws in opponent’s submission related to legal understanding, logical coherence, technical errors, omissions, etc. **Correct Loopholes Hand-in-Hand** – Systematically remedy memorial vulnerabilities while refining strengths, ensuring air-tight content. **Add Relevant Materials** – Introduce additional legal precedents, scholarly interpretations or evidence uncovered during ongoing review to further bolster positions. By continually looping between the researcher and oral advocate orientations – evaluating arguments, probing assumptions, eliminating inconsistencies and enhancing quality – mooters amplify capacities on both fronts. ## **Pro Tips for Courtroom Success** Incorporate these proven professional insights for moot court excellence: **“Looks Sell”** – Memorial drafting reflects earnestness and preparation level. Impress judges upfront with meticulous work product. **“Show More, Speak Less”** – Demonstrate unpacking complex principles in written submissions. Cover just key applications concisely during speech. **“Specific is Terrific”** – Utilize precise factual references and concrete examples over generic statements while orating. Prevent ambiguity. **“Eye to Eye Shows Confidence”** – Holding gaze unflinchingly conveys conviction in arguments and finesse with material. **“Speak from the Heart”** – Deep familiarity with topics enables organic, smooth expression aligned to inner beliefs during speeches. **“Solve Smaller Issues – Solve Bigger Issues”** – Address sub-questions thoroughly through rigorous practice. Tackle main issues effectively during finals. **Convert Petitioner Structure into Respondent Framework** – Leverage petitioner side framework as base blueprint to extrapolate corresponding respondent case theory. By internalizing such strategic pointers as shared by legal veterans, oralists embarking on moot court journeys can sidestep common obstacles and accelerate competitive competence development. ## **Conclusion** Moot court mastery emerges through assimilating multifaceted capabilities – research proficiency, written persuasiveness, rhetorical flair and responsive thinking. We covered best practices around court conduct, speech preparation, handling queries, overcoming mistakes and integrating roles for aspirants determined to excel as powerhouse moot court performers through passion and diligent efforts. **Categories:** Articles, Moot (Articles) --- ### [Drafting of Moot Court Memorial and Framing of Arguments](https://lawfoyer.in/drafting-of-moot-court-memorial-and-framing-of-arguments/) **Published:** December 8, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** The memorial is the most critical component of any moot court competition. It reflects the depth of your research, the strength of your arguments, and the overall quality of your advocacy skills. Drafting a compelling memorial while also framing solid legal arguments is no easy feat. It requires diligence, attention to detail, creativity, and immense practice. This blog post breaks down the vital aspects of drafting exceptional memorials and framing winning arguments to help you moot with utmost confidence. [**Also Read: 12 Steps to Win any Moot Court**](https://lawfoyer.in/12-steps-to-win-any-moot-court-competition/) **Perform Extensive Research in Parallel with Drafting** Research and drafting for a moot court go hand-in-hand. You cannot draft arguments in isolation without backing them up with substantive research. At the same time, you cannot endlessly research without using those findings to build your arguments. Hence, researching and drafting become an integrated parallel process. **How to draft a Well Structured Argument?** Refer to the IRAC method to develop well-structured arguments: I – Issue/s to be Addressed R – Supporting Research A – Legal Analysis of Research C – Conclusion/s Derived **The research component would include:** - **Relevant Legal Provisions:** Cover all relevant sections from the primary legislation along with connected subordinate legislations. - **Judicial Precedents:** Find at least one precedent that supports your arguments on a particular issue. Analyze the factual matrix and legal reasoning behind the order/judgment. - **Supplementary Materials:** Include commentaries, law commission reports, journal articles etc. to strengthen your arguments. - **Factual Evidence:** Use the facts provided in the moot problem to back your application of legal provisions to the specific case. Ensure your research materials align with and reinforce the arguments. Any superfluous information will only obscure the length. Hence, stay focused on the relevance and quality of research rather than the quantity. Review one source at a time instead of tackling multiple materials together. **Craft “Killer” Arguments** Merely researching without applying those learnings to build arguments will not win you the moot. The distinguishing factor is how ingeniously you frame your legal contentions. Your arguments must display exemplary legal acumen to demolish the opposition. The hallmarks of crafting “killer arguments” include: - **Fortifying Your Case Theory:** Structure arguments that ardently promote your client’s case theory across diverse factual considerations. Address the main issues from every dimension. - **Defending Against Opponent’s Case Theory:** Anticipate potential arguments the opposite side may present and make counter-arguments to eliminate their case theory’s effectiveness. Think from both sides of the matter. - **Eliminating Loopholes:** Assess your own arguments objectively from the opponent’s shoes to identify gaps that can get exploited. Accordingly, fortify your arguments and eliminate every minor loophole. - **Grounding in Facts and Laws:** Avoid making bald assertions in your arguments. Substantiate every contention with factual evidence from the moot problem and legal backing from research materials. - **Attacking Opponent’s Assumptions:** Sharpen arguments that challenge the underpinning assumptions and perceived weaknesses in opponent’s case theory to deliver a fatal blow. **Winning Rebuttals** The rebuttal/sur-rebuttal round provides the last window to demolish the other side’s case theory. Prepare winning rebuttals beforehand by: - **Finding Legal Loopholes:** Scan their application of legal provisions to spot inaccuracies you can capitalize on. - **Challenging Factual Exactitudes:** Refute their interpretation of facts from the moot problem to create doubt. - **Targeting Vulnerabilities:** Determine the weakest points of their arguments and direct your rebuttals to discredit those links. - **Undercutting Legal Reasoning:** Critically analyze how they reasoned through various issues to expose faulty derivations. A compelling rebuttal that decisively breaks down the opponent’s arguments can clinch you the win. Hence, invest significantly in crafting impactful sur-rebuttals. **Cite Judiciously** With memorials often stretching over dozens of pages containing extracts from various secondary sources, diligent referencing and citation become imperative. Plagiarism can attract grave penalties. Follow these citation best practices: - **Use Citation Tools:** Platforms like Zotero, Mendeley, and Monica help quickly generate citations and bibliographies in accurate formats. They enhance efficiency and minimize errors. - **Cite Ideas:** Place citations whenever presenting a contention, data, reasoning, etc. inspired from an external source, even when not quoting verbatim. This sufficiently credits ideas to avoid plagiarism allegations. - **Follow Style Guidelines:** Stick to the style mandated for citations and footnotes as per competition guidelines, whether Harvard Bluebook, ILI, OSCOLA or any other. Observe consistency. - **Identify Verbatim Texts:** When quoting word-to-word, place the extract in quotation marks, italicize it, and adjust the spacing to differentiate. In toto, cite judiciously by acknowledging borrowed ideas/words with citations positioned optimally to disrupt the reading flow minimally. **Structure Preliminary Pages** The starting pages preceding the arguments set the first impression about your memorial’s structuring, quality and depth of research. Spend time perfecting the following components: - **Cover Page:** Contains team details, party represented and case title aesthetically presented. Adhere to specifications on font, spacing, margins etc. - **Table of Contents:** List section headings, sub-headings and page numbers in a neat tabular format for quick navigation to arguments. - **Index of Authorities:** Compile all referenced authorities like case laws, statutes, books, websites etc. alphabetically. - **List of Cases:** Separately list cases cited also in alphabetical order along with citation particulars. - **Statement of Jurisdiction:** Specify the basis of conferring jurisdiction to hear the dispute, like writ petitioner under Article 32 or 226 etc. - **Summary of Arguments:** Provide a tight recap of the case theory and key arguments advanced, within the prescribed word limit. - **Arguments Advanced**: Write detailed issue-wise arguments under this head with proper IRAC Content and citations. - **Prayer:** Prepare the ideal reliefs and directions sought by your side after concluding arguments. These sections demonstrate your attention to detail, research depth and aids user-friendly access to the arguments. Hence, perfect them. **Proofread & Refine Iteratively** Typos, formatting defects, ambiguous content or stunted analysis can severely undermine all your other efforts. Allocate time for iterative rounds of proofreading and refinement focusing on: - **Logical Progression:** Assess if arguments follow in cogent chains applying IRAC consistently. - **Grammar and Syntax:** Scan for errors in sentence formation, punctuation misuse, syntax accuracy. - **Citation Perfection:** Verify citation formats, precise positioning and linkages with verbatim quotes. - **Formatting Consistency:** Review document aesthetics like spacing, indentations, headings format etc. comply with guidelines. Additionally, run the draft through plagiarism tools, peer reviews and seek feedback from coaches. Thereafter, use the inputs to bolster research and sharpen arguments until you have a polished set of compelling arguments encased in an impeccably formatted memorial. **Conclusion** Drafting arguments and memorials is central to putting up a winning performance. Follow a structured approach sticking to the IRAC format while extracting the most pertinent research materials to build solid arguments. Craft forceful, loophole-free arguments addressing issues multidimensionally to advance your case theory firmly. Frame pre-emptive rebuttals and conclude memorials sharply. Finally, intensify the memorial’s strength through rigorous refinement and proofreading cycles for optimal impact. Adopting these strategies will undoubtedly perfect your memorial drafting proficiencies to help you moot with utmost confidence and success! **Categories:** Articles, Moot (Articles) --- ### [Legal Research for a Moot Court Problem](https://lawfoyer.in/legal-research-for-a-moot-court-problem/) **Published:** December 8, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** Legal research is the foundation of any successful moot court preparation. Thorough and meticulous research sets the groundwork for crafting persuasive legal arguments before the court. This blog provides a step-by-step guide to conducting efficient legal research tailored specifically for moot court problems. [**Also Read: 12 Steps to Win any Moot Court**](https://lawfoyer.in/12-steps-to-win-any-moot-court-competition/) **Understanding the Moot Problem** The first step is to read and comprehend the moot proposition and the facts of the case. Carefully analyze: - The sequence of events - Timeline of incidents - Key stakeholders involved - Prayers and reliefs sought It is vital to read between the lines and grasp the crux of the dispute. Making a sketch or flowchart of case events can aid better understanding. **Identifying Legal Issues and Relevant Laws** The next step is spotting the legal issues involved and identifying relevant laws applicable. Some strategies include: 1. **Recognizing Legal Keywords:** Spot legal keywords like contract, negligence, IP rights etc. to identify potential areas of law. 2. **Mapping Fact Scenario to Laws:** Map the fact scenario to provisions of law. For instance, death of a person would invoke s.299 IPC. 3. **Consulting Peers:** Discuss with teammates to ensure no issue is missed out. Seniors’ guidance on identification of issues proves invaluable. 4. **Using Tools like SCC Online, Manupatra, HeinOnline, e-SCR, Indian Kanoon, Casemine etc. :** Useful for finding the most relevant case laws and connecting facts to laws. Saves research time. **Sources for Research** Reliable sources are crucial for substantiated legal arguments. Some useful sources are: 1. **Legislation:** Bare Acts, Updated Rules, Amendments 2. **Commentaries:** Expert interpretations illuminating laws 3. **Government Reports:** Crucial for policy-heavy laws 4. **Law Commission Reports:** Provide context for law reforms 5. **Cases:** Binding precedents – use reliable law reporters like SCC, SCR, AIR etc. 6. **Journal Articles:** Provide academic perspective and critique of laws **Using Online Legal Databases** Free Case Law finding databases like e-SCR, Indian Kanoon, CaseMine etc. and Subscription-based legal databases like SCC Online, Manupatra, HeinOnline etc. contain an organized, searchable repository of laws and cases. Extremely useful for efficient research. Key features include: 1. Powerful search filters and tags to find most relevant cases 2. Related citation tools providing links of important referred cases 3. Customizable alerts for tracking legal developments 4. Ability to highlight, annotate and archive vital legal content **Research Tools and Techniques** In the modern day world where the technology is pacing ahead of humans, in this world of AI numerous AI tools can be used for Quicker Citations and Quicker Analysis of large Documents like case judgments. Some of such softwares, chrome extensions, and web services are: Harpa AI, Monica AI, Zotero, ChatPDF, ChatDoc, Chat Forefront, Chat GPT 4-Turbo, Poe.com, Claude 2.1 etc. (some are free and some are paid). Employing the right techniques and tools lends depth: 1. Cite sources 2. Summarize large judgments and other legal documents 3. Identify ratio decidendi accurately 4. Distinguish cases correctly on facts and laws 5. Compare contradictory rulings using legal analysis 6. Validate strengths and weaknesses of cited cases 7. Evaluate the relative applicability of cited cases 8. Gauge overruling impacts of precedents Use tools like online citators and cross-referencers to assess judicial treatment of cases. Further enhance efficiency via AI-enabled applications. **Organizing Research** Systematize research in labelled folders, bookmark vital resources and maintain organized citations. Creating personalized glossaries of important terms also assists in recall. Research is the Alpha and Omega of mooting. Meticulous analysis and application of the research finally reflects in the quality of memorials and oral arguments ultimately. Consistently evolving laws coupled with their precise interpretation for the moot case requires continuous learning even for experienced mooters. The one who researches better – argues better and wins! **Conclusion** Structured legal research tailored to the moot proposition forms the backbone of written and oral advocacy. Gaining mastery over relevant laws, binding precedents and their applicability to moot facts requires sharp legal acumen and logical reasoning skills. Efficiency is endowed via reliable sources, savvy use of technology, organized research protocols and staying continually updated. With robust research, advocating successfully before the judges and emerging victorious becomes a natural outcome in any moot court. **Categories:** Articles, Moot (Articles) --- ### [Reading a Moot Court Problem and Framing of Legal Issues](https://lawfoyer.in/reading-a-moot-court-problem-and-framing-of-legal-issues/) **Published:** December 8, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** Analyzing a moot court problem and identifying the legal issues is one of the most critical first steps in preparing for a moot competition. It lays the foundation for strong legal arguments and effective advocacy. This process requires careful reading, issue-spotting, and framing skills. Here is a step-by-step guide: **How to do it?** **a. Read the Problem** **i. Primary Reading** 1. **Read with a blank mind** – like reading a story: Initially read through the moot problem from start to finish, almost as if reading a story. Avoid analyzing or making judgments. Simply comprehend the sequence of events. 2. **Read like a layman** – as if you don’t know the law: Next, read through again, this time from the perspective of someone unfamiliar with law. Focus on grasping the literal meaning without interpreting legal implications. 3. **Try to memorize each line and events listed with timeline:** Go through the problem once more, consciously memorizing the key details – parties involved, timeline, events, statements, evidence etc. Understanding the case facts is crucial. 4. **Avoid making arguments in mind while reading:** As far as possible, read without forming opinions or arguments. The objective is neutral comprehension. ii. **Secondary Reading** 1. **Read the same way at least 4 times:** To deeply imprint the details, read the problem multiple times attentively in the manner described above – blank mind, layman perspective, memorizing, neutrality. Repetition builds familiarity. 2. **Write the problem while reading:** An effective technique is to hand write the problem verbatim while reading it carefully at least once. This adds an element of actively processing the information instead of passive reading. **iii. After reading, instantly draft the Statement of Facts:** With the details fresh, immediately prepare a factual summary covering the parties, events in chronological order, evidence etc. This Statement of Facts will provide the foundation for analysis. **b. Analyze it** **i. Find and List Down all Relevant Statutes:** Scrutinize the details and timeline of events. Identify the applicable laws based on the cause of action. List out the specific legislation and provisions that are relevant. **ii. Read all the Listed Relevant Provisions:** Retrieve and thoroughly read every provision of law identified to understand the legal requirements and tests to establish a cause of action. **c. Identify Issues and Divide them into sub-issues:** The next crucial step is spotting the legal issues i.e. debatable points involving application of law. Examine from both parties’ standpoints. Also formulate sub-issues by breaking down main issues into legal elements. **d. Follow IRAC Method for Framing, Research and Drafting each Issue:** **i. I – Issues:** 1. **How to Identify Issues?** **a. Find the Break-Even Points:** **i. Burden and Standard of Proof:** The first pivot is which party carries the burden of proof and the applicable standard – balance of probabilities or beyond reasonable doubt. Identify legal issues on basis of burden. **ii. Framing of Issues:** Also analyze the problem from the angle of how issues would be framed formally before a court of law. Pose substantive propositions of fact/law requiring determination. Generally issues like Maintainability, Commission of a Violation of Law / Crime etc., Procedural Deficiency, etc. are framed. **b. Where a dispute arises** – Spot the Issues: Closely evaluate every stage of events, facts, evidence, and examine where disagreements on application of law may potentially arise between parties. These indicate legal issues requiring resolution. 2. **How to Make Sub-Issues?** **a. Break them down into smaller issues using:** Take the major legal issues and break them down into more specific, constituent issues on basis of essential elements, defenses and exceptions. **b. Types of Sub-Issues:** **i. Essential Sub-Issues:** These relate to establishing essential legal ingredients central to cause of action e.g. negligence requires proving duty, breach and causation. Frame sub-issues examining existence or non-existence of each ingredient. **ii. Defensive/Counter-Defensive Sub-Issues:** These arise from defenses, exceptions and counter-claims available in law. E.g. immunity, contributory negligence etc. **iii. Procedural Sub-Issues:** Issues questioning procedural compliance/deficiencies vis-a-vis limitation period, jurisdiction, cause of action etc fall under this category. **iv. Fact-Based Sub-Issues:** These involve debating factual aspects – evidentiary standards, facts contested, varying interpretations of statements, witness credibility etc. 3. **Example Case Problem:** A was involuntarily drugged by D, resulting in him negligently omitting to feed his niece B who died of starvation. B’s father C sues A for negligence. **Major Legal Issue:** Whether A committed the offence of death by negligence? **Sub-Issues:** i. Whether legal duty existed between A and B? (Essential issue testing ingredients of negligence) ii. If so, whether A acted negligently i.e. failed to adhere to standard of care? (Essential issue) iii. Whether A’s ommission only was the reason for injury suffered by B? (Essential Issue) iv. Whether drugged condition gives A immunity from liability for negligence? (Defense issue) Thus, by delving into the facts, timeline and law, moot court problems can be systematically analyzed to developing a legal framework for arguments and submissions. [**Also Read: 12 Steps to Win any Moot Court**](https://lawfoyer.in/12-steps-to-win-any-moot-court-competition/) **Categories:** Articles, Moot (Articles) --- ### [Preparations for a Moot Court](https://lawfoyer.in/preparations-for-a-moot-court/) **Published:** December 8, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** The preparations for a Moot Court involve choosing the Right Moot Court and building a good Mooting team. **Choosing the Right Moot Court – Golden Rules** **a. Do NOT Choose a Moot Court of a field of Law you are NOT interested in.** Picking a moot court competition in an area of law you have no interest in or previous knowledge of will only set you up for frustration. You won’t be motivated to put in the long hours of research and preparation required. Choose an area you are passionate about – it will make all the difference. **b. Do NOT Choose a Local Moot Court organized by Local Organizations.** While convenient, local moot court events organized by regional law schools or bar associations should not be your first choice. They tend to be less prestigious and the quality of competition experience is lower. Prioritize nationally or internationally recognized moot court competitions to gain maximum experience. **c. Do NOT Choose a Moot Court just because you are INFLUENCED.** Making your moot court decision based on pressure from peers or professors diminishes the value of the experience. This is your education – take ownership over it. Select a competition because it genuinely interests you and aligns with your goals. **Team Building** **a. Factors to take care of choosing mooting allies** **i. Discipline** – Consistency in preparation and practice is key. Allies with self-discipline will show up and put in the work. **ii. Dedication** – Mooting requires sacrifice – long nights of research and rehearsal. Dedicated allies will put in the time. **iii. Love for Law in General** – A passion for the law and legal analysis powers you through exhausting case study. Choose allies who live and breathe this stuff. **iv. Love for Law in Specific (Law related to the Moot being considered for Participation)** – Niche interest in the moot court area ensures allies actually want to research and argue it. Pick teammates fascinated by that specific domain. **v. Result Oriented Motivation for Participating** – Mooting is tremendously demanding. Allies focused on winning keep spirits high during intense preparation. **vi. Team Spirit** – Mooting is collaborative. Positive, supportive allies create a healthy team dynamic amid high stress. **vii. Will to work harder and smarter to make the Team win** – Moot court victories require grit and resourcefulness from all allies. Select teammates determined to go the extra mile. **viii. No Self-Centeredness, Egoism, Sadism, or Envy** – These traits breed resentment and fracture preparation. Vet potential allies for genuine collegiality. **ix. No Previous Experience Required as Such but if has previous experience its preferable to approach the person provided other factors are satisfied –** Don’t limit your options. Allies need not have mooted before if other indicators are strong. That said, experience is useful when available. **b. Do NOTs while choosing mooting allies** i. All aforementioned factors shall be borne in mind while choosing mooting allies ii. If you have friends who want to do moot with you but without the Qualities of a Good Mooter then they must be avoided or you lose before participating iii. People with Self-Interests must be avoided. **c. What Role to Assign to which person?** **i. Qualities of a Good Researcher** 1. **Good at Drafting** – Concise, logically structured writing is critical for mooting success. Select allies with demonstrated writing chops. 2. **Good at Briefing** – Distilling research into usable formats requires precision. Choose researchers adept at summarizing key takeaways. 3. **Good at Summarizing Law** – Researchers need to boil down case law to pivotal passages. Strong candidates excel at abstraction. 4. **Good at Finding Relevant Paragraphs from Relevant Judgements** – Navigating dense legal libraries is fundamental. Allies should have sharp search skills. 5. **Good at Anticipation of Supporting**-Arguments and Counter Arguments – Building airtight cases demands forecasting rebuttals. Top researchers can preempt opposition moves. **ii. Qualities of Speaker 1** 1. **Good Orator and Impact Creator** – Presence and style capture attention, lend credibility. Pick dynamic allies. 2. **Concerned about Time** – Rambling loses judges. Select speakers with discipline to stay on schedule. 3. **Good Oration Speed** – Monotone delivery fails to engage. Seek fluid, lively allies. 4. **Person of Few but Powerful Words** – Every statement should serve the case. Choose allies who eschew fluff. 5. **Good Presenter** – Posture, gestures, and eye contact complement substance. Consider stage presence in selections. 6. **A Person not dependent completely on the Script but the One who speaks from the Heart –** Over-reliance on notes looks robotic. Passionate, adaptable allies perform best. 7. **A Person good at Answering Counter Questions from the Judges Confidently with good extempore** – Quick thinking makes or breaks during cross-examination. reactions. 8. **Good Analytical and Reasoning Skills** – Argument construction consistency earns points. Choose rational, methodical allies. 9. **Good at the Application of Law on Facts** – Elucidating case relevance is vital. Select allies able to connect dots. 10. **Has Good Memory and Instincts** – Recall of details and judgment of room dynamics increase sway. Consider allies with these talents. **iii. Qualities of Speaker 2** 1. No much difference b/w Speaker 1 & Speaker 2. 2. Must have all qualities of Speaker 1 too. 3. But, the one speaks with slow oration rate among both the Speakers must be Speaker 2. Picking complementary speakers arms a team to control pacing, optimize dynamics, and manage judge. [**Also Read: 12 Steps to Win any Moot Court**](https://lawfoyer.in/12-steps-to-win-any-moot-court-competition/) **Categories:** Articles, Moot (Articles) --- ### [Moot Court and Mooting](https://lawfoyer.in/moot-court-and-mooting/) **Published:** December 8, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** 1. **What is Mooting and Moot Court?** Moot courts are simulated court proceedings where students argue fictional legal cases in front of judges. Mooting is the activity of participating in a moot court competition by arguing a simulated legal case. Mooting is the art of legal argumentation, oration, and drafting. It involves three key aspects: - **Argumentation:** Crafting strong legal arguments to support your position on the issues in the moot problem. This includes identifying relevant laws, precedents, analysis and application to the facts. - **Oration:** Presenting oral arguments in a persuasive manner during the moot court sessions, including handling questions from the judges. Strong communication skills are vital. - **Drafting:** Preparing high quality written submissions, known as memorials, outlining the arguments in depth. Attention to detail in memorial drafting is critical. **What are National and International Moot Courts?** National and international moot courts are simulated court proceedings focusing on appellate advocacy, where students argue fictional legal cases in front of judges. Key attributes are: 1. **Competitive Platforms:** Moot courts serve as competitive platforms for law students to showcase their legal abilities in arguing complex issues of law. Teams from law colleges across the country or across the world compete. 2. **Appealing Legal Issues:** The moot problems feature appealing legal issues, often on cutting-edge topics drawing from recent real world cases and developments in the law. 3. **Prestigious Venues:** National moots are often hosted in the courtrooms of Supreme Court or High Court benches. International moots held in iconic global locations add to the grandeur. 4. **Eminent Judges:** Senior lawyers, High Court justices and even Supreme Court judges volunteer as moot court judges, attracted to intellectual legal discussions with sharp young minds. 5. **Intense Oral Rounds:** Core activity is students presenting oral arguments across multiple rounds – preliminary, quarter finals, semi finals and finals, arguing from both sides with quick turnarounds. 6. **Memorial Writing:** Teams prepare detailed written submissions called memorials, outlining their substantive legal arguments – an essential moot court component. While nerve-wracking, participating in national and international moots builds legal skills, expands global networks and looks great on resumes! They embody rigorous academic competition blended with glamour and prestige. 2. **Real Court vs Moot Court** While moot courts aim to simulate real court proceedings, there are some key differences: a. **Scope is limited to select facts and laws**: Moot courts provide a limited set of facts and identify specific legal issues to be addressed. Real cases can be far more complex. b. **Going beyond the facts is unacceptable:** Teams must work within the given fact pattern – arguing beyond it breaks fundamental moot court principles. Real lawyers argue facts as well as law. c. **Real Courts:** i. **Do not wrap proceedings in a single day:** Real cases can last weeks, months or even years. Moots compress arguments into a short, intense timeline. ii. **Do not involve direct final hearings:** There are typically multiple hearings and procedural aspects in a real legal case spread over time. Moots directly jump to final arguments. iii. **Do not limit the factual matrix:** Real cases develop new facts over time through investigation and discovery processes. Moots close the factual record. 3. **Moot Court vs Trial Advocacy** While moot court focuses on appellate advocacy, trial advocacy simulates lower court proceedings: a. **Moot Court:** i. **Final Proceedings:** Moots involve arguing appeals, writs or final hearings to reach a legal judgement. ii. **Appeal/Writ/Civil/Criminal:** Moots can use appeal cases, writ petitions, civil suits or criminal cases at the appellate level. b. **Trial Advocacy:** i. **Criminal Trial Courts:** Trial advocacy focuses specifically on simulating criminal trial court proceedings. ii. **Witness Examination:** Key skills are examining witnesses and evidence presentation, unlike the purely legal arguments of moots. 4. **All Steps of Mooting in a Nutshell** a. [Find an appropriate moot court competition](https://lawfoyer.in/preparations-for-a-moot-court/) b. [Assemble a competent team](https://lawfoyer.in/preparations-for-a-moot-court/) c. [Read and analyze the moot problem in-depth](https://lawfoyer.in/reading-a-moot-court-problem-and-framing-of-legal-issues/) d. [Identify and frame the legal issues](https://lawfoyer.in/reading-a-moot-court-problem-and-framing-of-legal-issues/) e. [Research arguments for both sides exhaustively ](https://lawfoyer.in/legal-research-for-a-moot-court-problem/) f. [Draft high-quality written submissions (memorials)](https://lawfoyer.in/drafting-of-moot-court-memorial-and-framing-of-arguments/) g. [Proofread and finalize memorials](https://lawfoyer.in/drafting-of-moot-court-memorial-and-framing-of-arguments/) h. [Practice oration and handle judge questions](https://lawfoyer.in/court-mannerism-and-oral-arguments-in-moot-court/) i. [Update memorials to address gaps in arguments](https://lawfoyer.in/drafting-of-moot-court-memorial-and-framing-of-arguments/) j. [Tighten oration, practice until polished](https://lawfoyer.in/court-mannerism-and-oral-arguments-in-moot-court/) k. [Final proofreading and good luck!](https://lawfoyer.in/court-mannerism-and-oral-arguments-in-moot-court/) 5. **Key Skills** Mooting requires expertise in multiple spheres: a. Finding relevant cases b. Drafting convincing arguments c. Analyzing Supreme Court judgments d. Applying the law accurately to case facts e. Using legal research platforms effectively f. Formatting memorials to specifications g. Citing sources correctly using standard methodologies h. Proofreading memorials for perfection i. Using modern technology & tools productively [**Also Read: 12 Steps to Win any Moot Court**](https://lawfoyer.in/12-steps-to-win-any-moot-court-competition/) **Categories:** Articles, Moot (Articles) --- ### [The Importance of Reading Comprehension for CLAT Success](https://lawfoyer.in/the-importance-of-reading-comprehension-for-clat-success-for-2025/) **Published:** January 16, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** Reading comprehension is a critical skill for achieving success on the CLAT exam. With lengthy and complex passages across diverse topics, students must read quickly and grasp the essence to accurately answer comprehension questions in the limited time provided. However, reading legal texts requires going beyond surface-level understanding; students must analyze issues, evaluate arguments, and comprehend nuanced terminology. This demands focused reading strategies tailored to the CLAT format. This guide provides a structured approach to elevate reading and comprehension for CLAT. We will cover proven techniques to read faster without sacrificing retention, while building legal awareness. Practical exercises will help ingrain these skills for exam day confidence. Let us get started. ## **Mastering the Art of Speed Reading** for CLAT Skimming effectively is vital for CLAT preparation. The reading comprehension section contains lengthy passages with 5-6 questions each – completing this in just 120 minutes requires fast reading. However, comprehending legal analysis also demands close reading at points. We will build flexibility through different techniques: • **Scanning** – Rapidly go over paragraphs by focusing only on key sentences and transition words. Scan introductions and conclusions. • **Chunking** – Break dense paragraphs into smaller portions for easier processing. • **Keyword identification** – Spot factual keywords and legal concepts without getting overwhelmed by complex wording. • **Pacing** – Use a pointer to guide eyes faster without regression. Maintain speed by limiting re-reading. • **Comprehension checks** – Test ongoing understanding with periodic recall of main arguments. With disciplined practice, these skills will become second nature. Being able to toggle between speed reading and close analysis is critical for CLAT success. Let us now cover frameworks for deeper comprehension. ## **Analyzing Passages Like a Law Student** Reading facts and arguments is insufficient; students must evaluate the logical structure and validity of reasoning. This requires going beyond surface-level comprehension to analyze issues critically. Key skills include: • **Identifying premises and conclusions** – Analyze whether conclusions follow logically from provided facts. • **Assessing reasoning methods** – Determine if arguments rely on precedent, statutory authority, public policy etc. • **Evaluating assumptions** – Question unstated assumptions that may influence arguments. • **Linking to overall theme** – Relate specific points to the passage’s broader legal context. • **Understanding persuasive intent** – Identify rhetorical devices designed to convince the reader. Developing legal awareness is equally crucial for comprehension. Students must comprehend specialized terminology and link passages to foundational legal principles. Maintaining concentrated focus despite complex wording is critical. With regular practice, these analysis frameworks become second nature. ## **Ingraining Techniques through Targeted Exercises** With conceptual clarity on acceleration and analytical reading tactics, the next step is real-world application. Practice must simulate actual exam conditions for effective preparation; this requires a organized system. Key elements include: • Using officially released CLAT reading comprehension passages for authenticity. • Tracking speed and comprehension metrics over time – aim for improvement. • Limiting passage reading time to build exam-style constraints. • Answering questions afterward without re-verifying – reliance purely on comprehension. Additionally, focused drills on issues like argument analysis, assumption evaluation and vocabulary building prepare students for different complexities within passages. Over time, integrating skills into a cohesive approach facilitates smooth application in exam conditions. ## **Crafting an Optimal Strategy for the Reading Comprehension Section** The final step is utilizing strengths developed across reading, comprehension and passage analysis for maximizing scores on the actual CLAT exam. Key strategic elements include: • Prioritizing comprehension over speed for tricky passages – allocate time dynamically. • Skimming questions before passage reading to prime analytical focus. • Annotating question booklets for cross-referencing ease. • Eliminating choices based on premise-conclusion inconsistencies. With continued practice, students integrate these strategies into their intuitive exam approach rather than as mechanical steps. The end outcome is enhanced comprehension, speed and accuracy even for unfamiliar passages under time constraints. In conclusion, advancing reading comprehension for CLAT requires a structured training process targeting speed, analysis and strategy. With diligent effort over time, skills develop into subconscious reflexes on exam day. Our layered techniques equip students to dissect complex legal passages easily for accomplishing score goals confidently. Now gear up to embark on this accelerated improvement journey one step at a time! **Categories:** CLAT --- ### [Droit Administratif and Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/droit-administratif-and-administrative-law/) **Published:** January 14, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** Droit Administratif refers to the body of administrative law in France that governs the organization and functioning of public administration. It also regulates the relations between the administration and citizens. Droit Administratif differs from administrative law in common law countries in its conception and evolution. ## Evolution of Droit Administratif Droit Administratif originated from the theory of separation of powers adopted during the French revolution. It led to a separation between courts and administrative bodies in France. The traditional Bonapartists supported executive dominance even in judicial matters concerning administration while reformist parliaments argued for jurisdiction of ordinary courts. The 1790 Law on separation of powers curtailed the executive’s power. Napoleon established the Conseil d’Etat in 1799 primarily to provide relief against administrative excesses. Over time, the Conseil d’Etat acquired judicial powers for adjudicating administrative disputes. The Blanco Judgement in 1873 firmly established the jurisdiction of administrative courts over administrative liability matters. ## Key Features of Droit Administratif The key rules under Droit Administratif relate to: 1. Administrative authorities and officials concerning status, salary, appointments etc. 2. Functioning of public services to serve citizen needs under state supervision. 3. Dispute settlement mechanism before administrative courts like the Conseil d’Etat. The system of administrative courts evolved to prevent perceived judicial encroachment over the executive domain. Jurisdictional conflicts between administrative and ordinary courts are resolved by the Tribunal des Conflits. ## Administrative Law in India Indian administrative law regulates the executive, public bodies and administrative agencies. It ensures accountability for the exercise of public power. With constitutionalism and judicial review, administrative discretion gets checked against procedural propriety. Principles of natural justice guide administrative process and decisions. Enactments like the Administrative Tribunals Act regulate administrative adjudication. Laws and judicial decisions subject administrative actions to judicial review through constitutional writs. Administrative and ordinary courts possess concurrent jurisdiction. However, higher courts can transfer cases between them to balance administrative autonomy and justice dispensation. ## Conclusion Droit Administratif and Indian administrative law share common aspects like executive regulation and administrative dispute resolution. However, Indian administrative law operates in a common law framework with greater integration between courts. Constitutional safeguards and judicial review also circumscribe administrative discretion more widely in comparison. **Categories:** Administrative Law, Articles --- ### [Constitutional Law v. Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/constitutional-law-v-administrative-law/) **Published:** January 14, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** Administrative law is a subset and corollary of constitutional law, delineating the structure and powers of administrative authorities within a constitutional framework. Though intersecting, they differ across important dimensions: ## Supremacy of Constitutional Law Constitutional law is supreme law, flowing directly from the Constitution whereas administrative law draws validity from constitutional provisions and statutes. If conflict arises, constitutional law prevails. ## Genus vs Species Constitutional law sets the overarching principles defining state organization and powers. Administrative law particularizes these for administrative bodies. Constitutional law is thus the genus, with administrative law the species. ## Structure vs Function Orientation Constitutional law focuses on governmental structure – separation of powers across branches, centre-state allocation etc. Administrative law regulates functioning, detailing powers and duties of administrative authorities when implementing policies. ## Comprehensiveness vs Specificity Constitutional law encompasses guidelines on state structure, powers, function, and officials’ duties across branches. Administrative law narrowly covers administrative units, mechanisms, discretion, and liability. ## Static vs Dynamic Makeup The cumbersome constitutional amendment process lends it relative inflexibility. Administrative law is more dynamic, adapting procedures, mechanisms, and accountability paradigms to evolving governance needs through statute. ## Fundamental Rights Interface By upholding fundamental rights and circumscribing absolute power, constitutional law imposes negative and positive obligations on administration – the former on refraining from transgressions and latter on effectuating welfare. Administrative adherence is thus mandatory. ## International Dimension Constitutional law incorporates directives on foreign affairs while administrative law focuses domestically on agencies’ powers, responsibilities, and operational mechanisms in policy execution. ## Constitutional Demarcation of Ministerial Status Whereas constitutional law defines precise hierarchical status between political executive (Ministers) and career bureaucracy for checks on absolute power, administrative law regulates organizations within the administrative setup. ## Guidelines vs Ground Rules Constitutional law sets overall guiding principles on power contours, administrative responsibility and state-citizen interface. Administrative law creates specific ground rules for administrative functioning, prescribing limits, duties, transparency, accountability and judicial review mechanisms. ## Degree of Control As the supreme law, constitutional strictures reign supreme, compelling administrative compliance. Administrative law norms draw sustenance from and cannot violate constitutional principles though they allow functional autonomy within circumscribed domains. ## Overlaps – The Watershed Despite differences, administrative decisions involving rule formation and individual rights interfaces constitute the watershed where both overlap. Constitutional rights litigation in administrative matters underscores this interconnect. Sound administrative rules and actions upholding constitutionality is thus crucial. ## The French Model In civil law countries like France, specialized quasi-judicial bodies called Tribunals adjudicate public administration disputes, applying principles of separate administrative law (*droit administratif*). This dual system contrasts common law traditions fusing administrative adjudication within the regular court system under ordinary law. ## Conclusion Administrative law operationalizes constitutional principles to facilitate governance while preventing authoritarian excess. Both aid responsive, rights-compliant public administration. As Justice Bhagwati noted, “The Constitution is a constitutive document, administrative law a regulative one, but intertwined in purpose – governance according to rule of law”. **Categories:** Administrative Law, Articles --- ### [Reasons for Growth of Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/reasons-for-growth-of-administrative-law/) **Published:** January 14, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** The scope and importance of administrative law has grown tremendously over the past few decades. There are several factors that have contributed to this rapid growth and development of administrative law. ## Change in Philosophy of Role of State There has been a radical change in the philosophy regarding the role of the state. The laissez-faire policy of minimal state interference has been replaced by the welfare state model which believes that the state has positive obligations towards citizens. As held in ***Unni Krishnan v. State of AP (1993)***, the Indian Constitution envisions a welfare state model. This has resulted in the state undertaking a wide variety of functions like healthcare, education, infrastructure, housing etc. Performance of these functions requires framing of schemes, rules, regulations by administrative bodies thereby expanding the scope of administrative law. ## Urbanization Industrialization and economic development has led to rapid urbanization with people migrating from rural areas in search of livelihoods. This has created need for better housing, sanitation, transportation and other civic amenities in urban areas. As noted in ***R.D. Shetty v. International Airports Authority (1979)***, in a modern society service-oriented agencies like housing, supply of essentials etc. are necessities which the state has to provide. To effectively discharge these functions and framing suitable policies and schemes for urban development, administrative law has progressively gained importance. ## Dealing With Emergency Situations The legislative process of enacting statutes is often time-consuming. On the other hand, administrative authorities can promptly formulate schemes, rules to deal with emergency situations through administrative law. As per doctrine of necessity as laid down in ***Attorney General for India v. Amratlal Prajivandas (1994)***, administrative bodies can take actions in emergency situations which may not strictly conform with legal provisions. Such flexibility makes administrative law indispensable. ## Overburdened Judiciary Judicial avenues often involve complex procedures, excessive costs and delays which render them inadequate to redress many grievances. To make dispute redressal simpler and speedier, specialized tribunals and other authorities are established. They follow flexible procedures laid down in administrative law. As per ***S.P. Sampath Kumar v. UOI (1987)***, establishment of administrative tribunals is valid. Their functioning is governed by principles of administrative law thereby accentuating its relevance. ## Drawbacks of Legislative Process Parliament and state legislatures have limited time to deliberate and lack expertise to formulate meticulous, technically sound legislations covering every relevant detail. As per doctrine of separation of powers, policy formulation is legislature’s function but working out minute details is generally delegated to administrative bodies as held in ***Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd. v. State of MP (2007)***. This increases relevance of delegated administrative law making. ## Experimentation Administrative procedures allow greater flexibility to formulate rules and then modifying or repealing them after testing their efficacy for reasonable time periods which is not permitted in formal legislative enactments adding to importance of administrative law. ## Informal Functioning Judicial authorities are bound by strict procedural and evidentiary rules leading to delays and complexities which administrative bodies can avoid by relatively informal functioning, as laid down in ***Managing Director v. Shivakumar (2011)***, leading to quicker redressal. ## Preventive Mechanism As noted by Supreme Court in ***Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985)***, administrative law aims to prevent harm by mechanisms like licensing, inspections, grading etc. unlike criminal law which imposes penalties post occurrence of harm. Such preventive functions necessitate administrative setups guided by principles of administrative law. ## Better Enforcement For enforcing preventive mechanisms like cancelling or suspending licences in case of violations or destroying harmful products, administrative bodies like pollution control boards are better equipped than traditional judiciary. Hence administrative law assumes great significance. ## Conclusion Thus, the reasons elucidated above have contributed to steady expansion of administrative law. As state aims to ensure social welfare, equitable development and good governance, importance of administrative law will continue to grow manifold. With changing socio-economic conditions, administrative law is bound to evolve further. **Categories:** Administrative Law, Articles --- ### [Definition, Nature, and Scope of Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/definition-nature-and-scope-of-administrative-law/) **Published:** January 14, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** Administrative law governs the activities of administrative agencies of the government. It deals with the decision-making of administrative units like tribunals, boards or commissions that are part of a regulatory scheme. With the increase in government regulations in diverse sectors, administrative law has expanded substantially in the 20th century across countries. ## What is Administrative Law? As government functions expand qualitatively and quantitatively, a satisfactory definition of administrative law remains elusive. The most widely accepted definition is by **Sir Ivor Jennings** – “*Administrative Law is the law relating to the administrative authorities*.” However, this definition is too broad, blurring the distinction between constitutional law (which grants powers to agencies) and administrative law (which deals with how agencies exercise those powers). According to **Kenneth Culp Davis**, administrative law concerns “*the powers and procedures of administrative agencies, including the law governing judicial review of administrative action*.” This definition rightly focuses on the procedures followed by agencies in exercising powers. However, it excludes other non-quasi-judicial, non-rulemaking functions. As per **I.P. Massey**, administrative law deals with “*the organisation and powers of administrative and quasi-administrative agencies and prescribes principles and rules followed in official actions related to individual liberty and freedom.*” This indicates the focus areas – conferment of powers to agencies, principles guiding official actions, and safeguarding individual rights. The essential pillars of administrative law are checking abuse of power, ensuring impartial adjudication, protecting citizen rights and making administration accountable. The ambit covers rule-making, rule/dispute adjudication and other actions like investigation, supervision and prosecution incidental to the primary functions. ## Nature and Scope Administrative law is public law, unlike private law governing relationships between individuals. It is an uncodified judge-made law. It studies the organization and powers of administrative agencies and development of principles like natural justice, reasonableness and fairness that guide official actions. The actions covered within the scope of administrative law include: 1. quasi-legislative actions (rule-making); 2. quasi-judicial actions (dispute adjudication); 3. administrative actions (rule application); 4. ministerial actions (pure administrative). The incidental functions include investigation, supervision, advice, and prosecution related to the primary functions. A key focus area is the procedure established by statute or code which agencies must follow in decision-making impacting citizen rights and liabilities. The mechanisms to keep agencies within legal bounds also form part of the study of administrative law – judicial review, legislative control, procedural control, executive control and social control. With government regulations expanding in diverse areas like police, trade, manufacturing, environment and transport, administrative law has grown substantially to deal with decisions of tribunals and regulators in these complex domains of socio-economic activity. ## Conclusion Administrative law deals with a vital area of public law. Its continuing evolution is imperative for checks and balances in the modern regulatory state so that citizen rights and liberties remain protected even as complex policy objectives are pursued. **Categories:** Administrative Law, Articles --- ### [Getting Ready for CLAT 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/getting-ready-for-clat-2025/) **Published:** January 8, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/CLAT-2025-1024x1024.png)The Common Law Admission Test, better known as CLAT, is one of the most popular law entrance exams in India. Conducted jointly by the 22 National Law Universities (NLUs), CLAT offers admission into their highly coveted five-year integrated law programs. With thousands of aspirants competing for limited seats, proper preparation and planning are crucial for success. As you gear up for [CLAT 2025](https://consortiumofnlus.ac.in/clat-2024/ug-syllabus.html), here’s a comprehensive guide to help you craft a winning strategy. ## **Understanding CLAT 2025 Exam Pattern** First, familiarize yourself with the exam pattern and syllabus. This will help structure your preparation accordingly. [CLAT 2025 ](https://consortiumofnlus.ac.in/clat-2024/ug-syllabus.html)will likely follow previous years’ format comprising 5 sections: 1\. English Language 2\. Current Affairs 3\. Logical Reasoning 4\. Legal Reasoning 5\. Quantitative Techniques English language tests reading comprehensions, verbal ability and verbal reasoning. Current affairs covers general knowledge about latest happenings. Logical reasoning evaluates analytical skills through topics like arrangements, deductions and inferences. Legal reasoning contains questions on law basics from the Constitution, IPC, Contract Act etc. Lastly, quant tests numerical ability topics like ratios, permutations, numbers system. There will be 120 multiple choice questions carrying 1 mark each. Negative marking of 0.25 applies for wrong answers. The paper is for 2 hours. Sectional timing restrictions may also apply. Keeping all this in mind will help plan your study schedule better. ## **Crafting Your CLAT 2025 Study Plan** Success depends on scientific planning and execution. Ideally start preparations 12-18 months before the exam. Create a realistic schedule balancing all sections without overstressing. Depending on current skill levels, allocate more time to weaker areas. Aim to study for 2-4 hours daily and 8-10 on weekends including self-study plus coaching. Stick to fixed slots to avoid procrastination or irregularities. Take short breaks to remain focused and productive. Simultaneously solve previous years’ papers, mock tests plus model test series specially for CLAT exam pattern. Analyze results to identify strengths and problem topics for working on. Stay motivated towards the end goal. With effective time management and implementation, cracking CLAT 2025 can become easier. ## **Boosting English Language Skills** for CLAT 2025 As the biggest component, mastering English is indispensable for acing CLAT. Enhance vocabulary by reading editorials, articles, novels etc. Learn new words everyday and use them in sentences to remember. Brush grammar rules and syntax. Practice reading comprehensions from past CLAT papers and other resources. Read actively, grasp central theme, tone, meanings and flow. Improve speed without compromising accuracy. Highlight key points, make notes and summarize in own words. Know different RC styles like fact based, narrative, persuasive etc. For verbal ability, attempt model question sets. Learn concepts like analogies, antonyms, synonyms and apply them. Strengthen verbal reasoning skills through assumptions, conclusions, arguments analysis. Constant revision is essential for retaining what you cover. ## **Staying Updated on Current Affairs** for CLAT 2025 Current affairs constitute nearly 20-25% questions. Read newspapers, news sites and magazines daily especially The Hindu, Indian Express, Business Standard. Create monthly CA planners to track latest happenings in – politics, economy, environment, sports, global etc narrowed to exam relevance. Frame current affairs notes subject-wise including static and dynamic parts. Static portion contains basics whereas dynamic covers latest events. Update notes regularly while revising previous content too. Practice current affairs quizzes and test series. Brush international current affairs too selectively considering past paper trends. Sufficient CA preparation with dynamic revision helps score higher here. ## **Enhancing Logical Reasoning Abilities** for CLAT 2025 In the CLAT exam, the domain of logical reasoning encompasses activities such as drawing inferences, reinforcing or weakening premises and conclusions, establishing relationships and analogies, spotting contradictions and equivalences, and evaluating the efficacy of arguments within the paragraphs provided in the paper. Learn to solve fast yet accurately. Avoid errors. Identify patterns and apply logic appropriately. Develop sharp analytical abilities to attempt new problems correctly by applying concepts. ## **Getting to Grips with Legal Aptitude** This tests basic knowledge of law principles relevant to CLAT exam. Revise key topics from – Indian Constitution, Contract Act 1872, criminal laws and codes especially Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Study previous year questions to identify commonly tested areas. Refer select study material covering legal definitions, doctrines, articles and sections explanation from exam perspective. Learn basic fundamentals only given the limited time. Practice sample legal aptitude questions from mocks regularly. Gradually analysis and application based questions can also be attempted. ## **Strengthening Quantitative Techniques** Quantitative ability tests how efficiently you can solve math problems. Study CLAT level quant topics like ratios, averages, percentages, profit-loss, speed-time-distance, simple interest, graphs, geometry etc. know formulas, shortcuts and frequently used principles. But concepts clarity is more important rather than just mugging up. Practice calculations to improve speed and accuracy especially during exams. Solve previous year papers and mock tests questions within allotted time. Identify weaker areas and improve them. ## **Using Mocks for Assessment** Mock tests are highly critical for gauging performance and preparedness levels. Get comprehensive feedback on – strong and weak zones, question solving approach, ability to deliver under exam conditions etc. They also help simulate actual exam day environment reducing nervousness and fear. Start attempted mocks 6 months beforehand. Increase frequency gradually as exams near. Aim to solve 30-50 complete mocks before final exam. Limit tests to avoid exhaustion or demotivation. Analyze solutions to improve constantly. Let mocks steer your overall strategy and study plan. ## **Final Month Strategizing** With exams nearing, here are some final month tips – 1\. Revise thoroughly but avoid exhaustive study 2\. Focus maximum on weak areas 3\. Keep revising current affairs 4\. Practice more model test papers 5\. Ensure sufficient revision not new topics 6\. Maintain fitness, avoid stress 7\. Attempt remaining mock tests 8\. Stick to early sleeping habits Even on exam day, stay composed and focused. Time permitting revise high weightage portions. Read questions carefully and answer only what you know correctly without panic guessing. Objective selection and elimination skills help maximize attempts. Balance sectional timing too using your best judgement. ## **Summing Up** Preparing for CLAT 2025 requires meticulous planning, rigorous effort and perseverance over long duration. Follow the comprehensive strategies across – understanding exam pattern, making feasible study schedule, boosting English skills, tracking current affairs, honing reasoning ability and legal aptitude, getting quant concepts right and taking sufficient mocks. Stay motivated towards end goal without overstressing. Consistent effort with dynamic revision will help achieve success in CLAT 2025. **Best of luck!** **Categories:** CLAT --- ### [10th National Quiz Competition on Indian Evidence Act by LawFoyer: Register by 5th January](https://lawfoyer.in/10th-national-quiz-indian-evidence-act/) **Published:** December 3, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/10th-Ntional-Quiz-IEA-Medium-1-724x1024.jpg) ## **Clarifications in Answer Key (Released)** **Claimed Question Number****Previous Answer Key****Updated Answer Key**Q10DCQ11DNO CHANGEQ21BNO CHANGEQ31BCQ39DNO CHANGEQ48BNO CHANGE--- [Download Answer Key](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/10th-National-Quiz-Answer-Key.pdf) --- [Check Results](https://lawfoyer.in/results-of-10th-national-quiz-competition-on-indian-evidence-act-by-lawfoyer/) --- [Download Certificates](https://lawfoyer.in/download-10th-national-quiz-competition-on-indian-evidence-act-certificates/) ## Dates - **Date of Quiz:- 07/01/2024** **(5 Pm)** - **Last Date to Apply:-** **05/01/2024, 11:59 pm** - **Result Declaration:-** **12/01/2024** ## Prizes - 1st prize- Rs 1500 + Winner Trophy - 2nd prize- Rs 1000 + 1st Runner Up Trophy - 3rd prize- Rs 500 + 2nd Runner Up Trophy** - 4th-10th Prize- Rs 150 + Certificate of Excellence** - **FREE Practice E-Book with 1000+ MCQs for Practice** - **Free 2 AI Plagiarism Report by Turnitin.** - **Appreciation Certificate for All the Participants** - **Top 10 Rank will get Free access to Certification Course on Indian Evidence Act.** [Click here to know more about course](https://academy.lawfoyer.in/index.php/courses/mastering-the-indian-evidence-act-a-10-day-certification-course/ "Click here to know more about course") Note:- The Winners Trophy will be dispatched to the designated recipients’ physical address without any additional charges. ## **Registration Fees** - **Rs 99/- Only** ## **Important Guidelines** - **Format of Quiz:** Quiz shall take place online, and a paper will include multiple-choice questions**.** - The participant can take this exam on their laptop or mobile phone. - The platform for the quiz will be google Forms, Microsoft Forms, etc. - In the case of the same marks, time will be considered (a person who submits early will be given preference). - The link will be shared 24 hours prior to the start of the quiz. ## **Rules & Regulations** - **60 MCQ(s).** - The time allotted will be **25** minutes. (This includes time for filling the basic details like Name, email, etc.) - **Every question carries 04 marks & there will be no negative marking.** - The Result will be declared on **12st January 2024**([www.lawfoyer.in](https://lawfoyer.in/)). ## Contact In case you are facing any technical issues, Please get in touch with us via WhatsApp on [+91 8574723478 or click here.](https://wa.me/+918574723478 "+91 8574723478 or click here.") --- --- **Categories:** Events, Quiz **Tags:** #evidence, #evidencelaw, #indianevidencequiz, #law, #lawfoyer, #quiz, #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, case analysis, case summary, lawfoyer --- ### [When Gods were Summoned to the Courtroom](https://lawfoyer.in/when-gods-were-summoned-to-the-courtroom/) **Published:** January 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Gods-in-Courts-1024x307.png)## Introduction In recent times, [Indian courts have passed some intriguing orders](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-35629805#:~:text=In%20India%2C%20many%20devout%20Hindus,have%20been%20hauled%20into%20court.) summoning Hindu gods as parties in legal disputes. In a Chhattisgarh civil court, Lord Shiva was summoned in a land dispute involving a temple. Meanwhile, a Bihar court ordered the appearance of Lord Hanuman in a case concerning the proper management of a temple. These developments made headlines for their novelty. On the other hand, contrasting incidents reveal the sensitivities involved in legal matters impinging on religious beliefs. A judge in the Calcutta High Court ordered for removal of a Shivling but the person who was drafting the order fainted. The judge saw this as a divine sign and promptly withdrew the order. This highlights that courts have to act cautiously when dealing with matters of faith while upholding the rule of law. Thus, the idea of making deities party to legal proceedings remains a complex and controversial issue. While Indian courts have recognized limited juristic rights of temple idols, directly summoning Gods as legal entities raises tricky questions. This blog examines the key Indian cases where gods were summoned to the courtroom and analyzes the legality, validity and implications of such novel judicial actions that test the boundaries between law and faith. ## Shree Ram Janm Bhoomi Dispute – Making the Hindu Deity a Party The Ram Janmabhoomi dispute in Ayodhya involved determining the ownership and rights over the disputed land where the Babri Masjid once stood, before being demolished in 1992.\[1\] In lawsuits filed by both Hindu and Muslim parties, the Hindu deity Ram Lalla Virajman was made a party to the case. In 2019, the Supreme Court delivered a landmark judgment on the dispute, upholding the juristic personality of the deity Ram Lalla. The deity was represented by a friend, former Attorney General of India K Parasaran, as a defendant in the lawsuits. The judgment recognized the deity as a perpetual minor entitled to pursue litigation through a friend or guardian. Making Ram Lalla a party enabled adjudication of the deity’s claim as the owner of the disputed land. The Supreme Court relied on the legal precedent of the Utkal Thakur case, wherein courts had recognized the juristic status of Hindu idols.\[2\] Upholding the deity’s juristic personality paved the way for the disputed land to be allotted for construction of a Ram temple, the deity’s legitimate claim being found most appropriate. However, the move to make a divine entity party to a civil dispute was criticized by some as blurring the line between law and faith. Overall, enshrining the rights of the deity marked an important precedent with implications for Hindu religious institutions. Also Read: [The Impact of the Ayodhya Verdict Analyzing: The Legal Reasoning](https://lawfoyer.in/the-impact-of-the-ayodhya-verdict-analyzing-the-legal-reasoning/) ## Suing God – An Exercise in Futility? In 2016, advocate Chandan Kumar Singh filed a curious lawsuit against Lord Ram in a Bihar court alleging mistreatment of Sita in exile.\[3\] The case grabbed headlines for its absurdity and audacity in questioning the actions of a revered deity. Singh’s case was promptly dismissed as the judge termed it untenable and filed only for publicity. Several inherent contradictions expose the futility of dragging God to court as defendant. How does one serve notice upon the Divine, an eternal omnipresent entity? Even if God is called to court, no human judge can sit in judgment over God’s actions as an equal. Our limited human understanding cannot fathom the cosmic wisdom behind events we perceive as unjust. Moreover, the omniscient God is aware of the grievance anyway, without a court notice! Such gimmick lawsuits trivialize legal proceedings, wasting precious judicial time. They cannot pass the basic test of a valid cause of action against an identifiable party. These publicity stunts only amplify the plaintiff’s personal opinions and cannot result in any meaningful remedy. Singh’s protest lawsuit attempted to question Lord Ram’s divine nature itself indirectly. Thankfully, the judiciary recognizes the need to uphold certain rational boundaries. ## The Farcical Trial of God in Bihar Court Chandan Kumar Singh’s 2016 lawsuit against Lord Ram highlights why making Gods party to legal disputes mocks the dignity of the judiciary.\[4\] Singh’s grouse was Ram’s alleged cruelty to Sita in banishing her, an action that questioned Ram’s divine nature. Dragging God to the witness box implies He is answerable to human plaintiffs and courts can sit in judgment over the Almighty. Nothing can be more farcical. Moreover, how can a human judge decide if events in scriptures actually happened and if they were unjust? Legal evidence and proof have no bearing over matters of faith and theology. Such lawsuits demonstrate an inability to distinguish the temporal legal domain from the Divine spiritual realm. They reduce revered Gods to ordinary human defendants in legal wrangles. Importantly, no meaningful legal remedies can emerge from suing God. At best, the case will be dismissed as absurd. The plaintiff succeeds only in getting publicity. Unfortunately, such gimmick cases trivialize legal institutions and impede access to justice for genuine causes by clogging precious court time. Singh’s lawsuit was rightly dismissed at the outset as publicity oriented and procedurally untenable. ## Upholding the Property Rights of Deities Courts in India have recognized deities and idols installed in temples as legal persons capable of holding property and bringing lawsuits. In landmark cases like Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick (1925) and Yogendra Nath Naskar v. Commr. of I.T. (1969), the judiciary upheld the juristic personality of idols.\[5\] In the Utkal Thakur case (2010), the Orissa High Court reiterated the rights of an idol as a legal person. Here, the valid claim of a deity over land had to be protected when the state government tried to take over the land forcibly. Upholding the deity’s rights prevented arbitrary state action. Similar logic prevailed in the Ram Janmabhoomi case where Ram Lalla’s ownership claims over the disputed land had to be preserved. Through such judgments, Indian courts have shown pragmatism in protecting legal rights over property even when the owner is an abstract divine entity. By recognizing idols installed in temples as juristic entities, the judiciary prevents their rights and interests from being harmed or appropriated by other parties when the property has no human managers. ## The Pragmatic Need for Recognizing Deities’ Juristic Personality Temple deities are invested with juristic personality to preserve their legitimate property interests in pragmatic terms.\[6\] Legally speaking, the consecrated idol is a distinct juristic entity, not the Supreme Divine itself. Temples often have no human owners or managers. Hence, the deity or idol has to be the juristic person who can be party to legal proceedings relating to that temple. This prevents the state from arbitrarily taking over temple properties by legally vesting property rights in the deity. Moreover, the deity’s interests have to be protected in disputes with private parties also. Similar logic prevailed in the Ram Janmabhoomi case, where Ram Lalla had to be made a party to preserve the claim over the disputed land. Critics may argue that idols have no life or consciousness, so granting legal personality is illogical. However, the law recognizes companies, minors, undisclosed principals etc. as juristic persons lacking full legal capacity, mainly for preserving bona fide property interests. Deities are also juristic entities with restricted legal capacity, being perpetual minors. Overall, the jurisprudence recognizes the need for balanced pragmatism. ## Curbing Arbitrary Action by Making Deities Party to Proceedings The Utkal Thakur case exemplifies how recognizing the juristic status of deities prevents the state from arbitrarily taking over temple properties, thereby preserving communal harmony.\[7\] Here, the deity Jagannath was made party to thwart the Orissa government’s attempt to gain control over temple land. The High Court held that endowing the idol with juristic personality was necessary to protect the interest of the deity and devotees in the property. This declaration of law prevented the government from arbitrarily using its authority to override religious rights and protected the deity’s property from being transferred without proper legal procedures. Similar logic prevailed in the Ram Janmabhoomi case where the deity Ram Lalla had to be made a party to preserve claims over the disputed land. Overall, the courts have acted pragmatically in investing idols with juristic personality to curb arbitrary actions detrimental to their interests. However, critics argue this blurs the secular legal-religious divide. ## Critiquing the Granting of Legal Personality to Deities While Indian courts have often endowed Hindu deities with juristic personality, this practice has its share of critics. Questions have been raised about the rationale of granting legal entity status to divine abstractions and idol figures without biological existence or full legal capacity.\[8\] Does making a deity party not undermine secularism by mixing law with faith? Moreover, critics argue, temples and idols already have associated human devotees and trustees who can represent their interests before the law when needed. Hence, separately recognizing the deity as a juristic person seems redundant. It raises tricky questions regarding the exact nature of the deity’s rights and legal personality. Proponents counter that the practice has emerged pragmatically to protect the interests of religious denominations when they have no clear human claimants or managers. Overall, the law strives for balance – neither favoring nor discriminating against any religious community’s interests. Granting legal personality remains an ad hoc arrangement as deemed necessary based on case specifics. Interestingly, the Madras High Court has also frowned upon a lower court’s order summoning a temple deity. In a recent case, the Kumbakonam court had directed authorities to remove and produce the presiding idol of a Tirupur temple for inspection before the court. However, the Madras High Court intervened and prevented the lifting of the idol, given the sensitives and devotees’ faith involved. The High Court held that the deity cannot be summoned to court as if an inanimate object. Instead, an advocate-commissioner could have inspected the idol at the temple premises. This restrained approach shows courts are averse to summoning deities to courtroom in a manner hurting religious sentiments, unlike summons issued to human parties. The judiciary remains conscious of operating within reasonable limitations when it comes to matters of faith. ## The Slippery Slope of Suing God While Indian courts generally dismiss cases filed against deities as frivolous, some international lawsuits targeting God or holy figures raise tricky questions. For instance, Nebraska senator Ernie Chambers filed a case seeking injunctions against God’s harmful acts!\[9\] Romanian prisoner Pavel M. sued the Church for failing to prevent the Devil from causing him harm!\[10\] Such lawsuits highlight the absurd extremes of making God party to legal proceedings. Expecting the Almighty to respect human court summons or treat Him as an ordinary defendant liable for damages mocks religious sentiments. The plaintiff essentially seeks to sit in judgment over God’s actions and divine will. Nothing can be more preposterous. Moreover, no material legal remedies actually emerge from such cases even if a court entertains them. At best, the plaintiff gets publicity. Wasting precious court resources on futile litigation when getting justice is already difficult hurts public interest. Overall, the judiciary must guard against frivolous publicity lawsuits crossing the line into religious offense under the garb of creative legal activism. Also Read: [When Ghosts Haunted the Courtroom](https://lawfoyer.in/when-ghosts-haunted-the-courtroom-analyzing-indian-case-laws-where-the-defence-of-demonic-hauntings-was-pleaded/) ## Key Takeaways and the Legal Position on Making Gods Party to Lawsuits The critical analysis of relevant Indian and international cases highlights some key principles regarding the propriety of making Gods party to legal proceedings:\[11\] - Deities and idols may be pragmatically invested with juristic personality to preserve bona fide property interests of religious denominations, as done in the Utkal Thakur and Ram Janmabhoomi cases. This prevents arbitrary state takeover of temple properties or disputes impacting the deity’s interests. - Such grant of restricted legal personality is for practical considerations only. Courts do not actually place religious deities at par with biological legal entities. Installed idols are considered juristic entities, not the Divine Absolute itself. - Lawsuits filed directly targeting God or questioning events in religious scriptures will invariably fail on grounds of maintainability. No legal cause of action can lie against God or for miraculous remedies. - Courts will reject publicity stunt lawsuits that cross the line into offense against religious sentiments or amount to wasting court time. The judiciary must guard against misuse of its goodwill in the name of creativity. - A foritori, while the law strives for balance in ad hoc recognition of deities’ rights, granting excessive leeway in making Gods party to legal disputes can undermine the secular judiciary’s rational foundations. ## Conclusion In conclusion, Indian courts have displayed pragmatism in selectively recognizing the juristic personality of deities and idols to preserve bona fide rights and interests of religious denominations. However, this remains a controversial grey area. Sweeping powers to make Gods party to legal wrangling can mock judicial dignity. As human comprehension of the Divine is limited, lawsuits directly questioning God are bound to fail. Overall, the judiciary must ensure a reasoned balance between religious sentiments, secular foundations and practical considerations while invoking the deity’s legal personality in specific cases when absolutely essential. Well-meaning creative activism should not slide into absurdity or undermine the rule of law. **Categories:** Articles --- ### [The Impact of the Ayodhya Verdict Analyzing: The Legal Reasoning](https://lawfoyer.in/the-impact-of-the-ayodhya-verdict-analyzing-the-legal-reasoning/) **Published:** October 9, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **Introduction** The Supreme Court of India delivered a landmark judgment in the long-standing Ayodhya dispute on 9th November 2019, awarding the disputed land to the Hindu parties for construction of a temple while granting 5 acres of alternate land to the Muslim side for a mosque. This verdict attempted to resolve one of the most protracted and contentious legal battles in India’s history, concerning rights over the site claimed by both Hindus and Muslims. The Ayodhya dispute revolved around the ownership of 2.77 acres of land in the city of Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh, regarded by Hindus as the birthplace of Lord Ram. A 16th century mosque, called Babri Masjid, stood at the site until its demolition by Hindu kar sevaks in 1992, triggering nationwide communal riots. \[1\] Multiple lawsuits were filed staking claim to the disputed land, eventually leading up to the Supreme Court settling the issue after decades of inconclusive litigation. This blog analyzes the Supreme Court’s Ayodhya judgment, examining the reasoning applied and its implications for secularism, religious rights and the rule of law in India. **Background of the Dispute** The disputed site in Ayodhya has immense religious significance for both Hindus and Muslims. Hindus believe it to be the birthplace of Lord Ram and contend that a temple commemorating his birth stood there prior to the construction of the Babri Masjid. \[2\] The Babri Masjid was built in 1528 by the first Mughal Emperor Babur’s commander Mir Baqi, allegedly after demolishing a pre-existing Ram temple at the site. \[3\] The mosque stood at the site continuously until 1949 when idols of Lord Ram were surreptitiously placed inside, leading to parts of the mosque being locked. \[4\] The legal dispute over the site dates back to the 1850s when the first lawsuits were filed by Hindus seeking permission for worship there, with limited success. \[5\] After India’s independence, the idols were placed inside the mosque in 1949, precipitating communal tensions. The gates to the mosque were locked but Hindus were allowed to offer prayers in the outer courtyard. \[6\] In 1986, a district court ordered the gates to be opened, allowing Hindu worship inside the mosque too. \[7\] This led to the formation of the Babri Masjid Action Committee by Muslims to oppose Hindu prayers at the site. \[8\] The dispute took a violent turn in 1990 when the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) launched a campaign for construction of a Ram temple at the site. \[9\] This culminated in the demolition of the Babri Masjid by thousands of kar sevaks on 6 December 1992 as the BJP government in Uttar Pradesh allegedly looked the other way. \[10\] Nationwide communal riots followed the demolition, killing over 2000 people. \[11\] The central government acquired 67 acres of land around the site through an ordinance and sought the Supreme Court’s opinion on whether a Hindu temple predated the Babri Masjid. \[12\] The Supreme Court in 1994 upheld the acquisition but declined to answer the historical question, holding it to be within the purview of the Allahabad High Court hearing suits over the title to the disputed land. \[13\] The Allahabad High Court in 2010 divided the disputed land into three parts, allotting one each to the Nirmohi Akhara sect, the Sunni Waqf Board and Ram Lalla Virajman (the deity Ram). \[14\] All parties appealed this decision in the Supreme Court which in 2019 finally settled the issue, awarding the entire disputed land for construction of a Ram temple to the Hindu side and granting 5 acres of alternate land in Ayodhya to the Muslim side for a mosque. **Legal Analysis of the Supreme Court Verdict** The Supreme Court bench hearing the title suits was faced with adjudicating between competing claims over the disputed land based on religious faith and belief. The Hindu side argued that the site was the birthplace of Lord Ram as per faith and tradition, and archaeological evidence showed a structure pre-dating the Babri Masjid at the site. \[15\] The Muslim parties contested these claims, arguing that the mosque was constructed on vacant land and the Hindus had failed to establish exclusive possession prior to 1857 when the British took over. \[16\] The Court examined documentary evidence from travellers and gazetteers going back to the 17th century pointing to the site as being the birthplace of Lord Ram with Hindus worshipping there. \[17\] The Archaeological Survey of India’s excavation report showed remains of a large structure beneath the mosque, along with artefacts associated with Hindu religious structures. \[18\] The Court held that the underlying structure was not Islamic, and the excavated evidence coupled with the documentary records established that the Hindus had been worshipping at the site for centuries before the mosque was built in the 16th century. \[19\] Based on this evidence, the Court concluded that the Hindu side had established their case that the disputed site was the birthplace of Lord Ram as per the faith, belief and tradition of Hindus, and the Muslim side had failed to establish their adverse possession claim. \[20\] While acknowledging the illegal demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992, the Court held that the wrong committed could not be a basis for awarding the land to the Muslim side. \[21\] The balancing of reliefs necessitated granting the disputed land to the Hindus for construction of the Ram temple. The Court invoked its powers under Article 142 to direct the central government to allot 5 acres of land to the Sunni Waqf Board for construction of a mosque in Ayodhya, in the interest of healing relations between the communities. \[22\] This unprecedented exercise of power under Article 142 for a religious purpose has attracted some criticism as being beyond the Court’s jurisdiction. \[23\] However, the Court justified it as a measure to do complete justice. Overall, the legal reasoning focused on weighing the evidence to conclude that the Hindu side had established a claim to the disputed land based on their faith about the site being Lord Ram’s birthplace. **Implications of the Verdict** The judgment has been welcomed by many as helping to resolve this long-festering dispute by enabling a Ram temple to be built at the site while placating the Muslim concerns. However, the verdict has also been critiqued by some for privileging faith over law and for being more concerned with pragmatic outcomes rather than upholding secularism. \[24\] The granting of the entire disputed land to the Hindu side is seen as a victory of faith over facts since the demolition of the mosque was illegal. \[25\] The direction to allot 5 acres for a mosque is also viewed by some as a departure from settled principles of law. The verdict carries mixed implications for Hindu-Muslim relations. While the judgment has been accepted by both communities and helped avoid major outbreaks of violence, it has left some Muslims aggrieved over the Court validating the faith-based Hindu claim despite the illegality involved in demolishing the mosque. \[26\] However, the allotment of land for a new mosque is a reconciliatory gesture. In the long run, the resolution of this dispute through legal means rather than violence is conducive for inter-faith relations. But concerns remain that the perceived surrender to majoritarian sentiments may embolden right-wing groups to make further demands. \[27\] Politically, the verdict is a huge victory for the Hindu nationalist BJP which had long campaigned for construction of a Ram temple at the site. While the BJP has welcomed the decision, it has also critiqued the Court for questioning the faith of Hindus regarding the site being Lord Ram’s birthplace. \[28\] The Congress and other secular parties have expressed concerns over the way the judgment privileges faith but accepted it in the interest of closure. \[29\] The verdict can provide more political mileage to the BJP. However, it also effectively resolves an issue that had fueled its rise. For the Supreme Court, the judgment presented unique challenges in adjudicating between competing religious claims over a site of immense importance for both communities. While the verdict has been praised for its attempt to balance relief and closure, it has also attracted criticism on legal, constitutional and secular grounds. The Court’s extensive reliance on faith and belief to award title has set a new precedent and the implications of this approach will need to be carefully assessed when dealing with such disputes over religious sites in the future. \[30\] **Critique of the Judgment** Several criticisms have been directed at the Supreme Court’s Ayodhya verdict by legal experts, academics and civil society activists. One main critique is that the Court erred in relying extensively on Hindu faith and beliefs regarding the birthplace of Lord Ram to hold that a temple predated the mosque at the site. \[31\] The Court privileged faith over facts and evidence, ignoring that the demolition of the mosque in 1992 was illegal and the perpetrators went unpunished. \[32\] Awarding the disputed land to the very side responsible for this illegality incentivizes majoritarian aggression and undermines the rule of law. \[33\] The Court failed to uphold constitutional secularism by granting the land for construction of a temple based on unproven Hindu beliefs. This preferential treatment for the faith-based claims of one religion has set a wrong precedent. \[34\] The Court should have decided the title dispute by applying settled principles of evidence and property law. The allotment of 5 acres of alternate land for a mosque is also legally untenable and beyond the Court’s powers. Some argue that the Court took a pragmatic approach aimed at providing a resolution to this decades-old dispute by balancing the interests of both communities. \[35\] However, critics contend that pragmatic considerations cannot override constitutional principles and settled law, which the Court failed to uphold. \[36\] The Court’s attempt at mediation between religious communities was beyond its role and jurisdiction. It should have decided the case strictly based on evidence and property law principles, without privileging any faith or attempting to broker a compromise settlement. \[37\] The verdict also sets a dangerous precedent by recognizing claims based merely on the faith of one religious community rather than evidence. This can encourage future demands to reclaim other sites by citing unverifiable religious beliefs. \[38\] Overall, the judgment has undermined the secular constitutional ethos and the spirit of the rule of law. **Conclusion** The Supreme Court’s Ayodhya judgment of 2019 has had far-reaching legal, political and social implications. While the verdict has helped resolve this long-standing dispute and avoid major communal flareups, it has also attracted serious criticism on several grounds. The Court’s reliance on faith over facts and evidence to award the disputed land to the Hindu side has set a controversial precedent of privileging religious beliefs over settled principles of law. This approach compromised constitutional secularism and incentivized majoritarian muscle-flexing. The verdict has provided a huge political boost to the Hindu nationalist BJP. However, the long-term repercussions of the judgment on inter-religious relations, secularism and the rule of law need deeper reflection. **References:** \[1\] S. Roy, “Explained: What is the Ayodhya dispute?,” The Indian Express, Nov. 2019. \[2\] V. D. Savarkar, The Six Glorious Epochs of Indian History. Bal Savarkar, 1963. \[3\] P. Jaffrelot, Religion, Caste, and Politics in India. C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2011. \[4\] S. V. Desika Char, “Ayodhya: A Historical Watershed,” Social Scientist, vol. 38, no. 11/12, pp. 3–15, 2010. \[5\] Z. Hasan, “The Ayodhya judgement: What next?,” The Hindu, Nov. 2019. \[6\] S. Roy, “Explained: What is the Ayodhya dispute?,” The Indian Express, Nov. 2019. \[7\] P. Chatterji, “Hindu Masjids,” in Texts of Power, pp. 84–103, Permanent Black, 2001. \[8\] P. Chatterji, “Hindu Masjids,” in Texts of Power, pp. 84–103, Permanent Black, 2001. \[9\] P. Brass, The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India. University of Washington Press, 2003. \[10\] S. Roy, “Explained: What is the Ayodhya dispute?,” The Indian Express, Nov. 2019. \[11\] M. Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics: 1925 to the 1990s. C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 1999. \[12\] S. Roy, “Explained: What is the Ayodhya dispute?,” The Indian Express, Nov. 2019. \[13\] Z. Hasan, “Building a temple for Ram in Ayodhya: Why now?,” The Hindu, Nov. 2019. \[14\] S. Roy, “Explained: What is the Ayodhya dispute?,” The Indian Express, Nov. 2019. \[15\] Z. Hasan, “The Ayodhya judgement: What next?,” The Hindu, Nov. 2019. \[16\] Supreme Court of India, M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das, O.S. No. 1 of 1989, Judgment, Nov. 2019. \[17\] Supreme Court of India, M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das, O.S. No. 1 of 1989, Judgment, Nov. 2019. \[18\] Archaeological Survey of India, “Ayodhya 2002-03: Excavations,” 2003. \[19\] Supreme Court of India, M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das, O.S. No. 1 of 1989, Judgment, Nov. 2019. \[20\] Supreme Court of India, M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das, O.S. No. 1 of 1989, Judgment, Nov. 2019. \[21\] Supreme Court of India, M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das, O.S. No. 1 of 1989, Judgment, Nov. 2019. \[22\] Supreme Court of India, M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das, O.S. No. 1 of 1989, Judgment, Nov. 2019. \[23\] F. Nariman, “Ayodhya verdict: A solomonic judgment?,” The Hindu, Nov. 2019. \[24\] P.B. Mehta, “Ayodhya judgement: Supreme Court rewarded illegality,” The Indian Express, Nov. 2019. \[25\] R. Sampath, “Ayodhya Verdict: Majoritarian Faith Prevailed Over Facts,” The Wire, Nov. 2019. \[26\] Z. Hasan, “The Ayodhya judgement: What next?,” The Hindu, Nov. 2019. \[27\] P.B. Mehta, “Ayodhya judgement: Supreme Court rewarded illegality,” The Indian Express, Nov. 2019. \[28\] “BJP hails Ayodhya verdict, but says court was not needed,” The Hindu, Nov. 2019. \[29\] “Congress Working Committee on Ayodhya verdict,” The Hindu, Nov. 2019. \[30\] F. Nariman, “Ayodhya verdict: A solomonic judgment?,” The Hindu, Nov. 2019. \[31\] P.B. Mehta, “Ayodhya judgement: Supreme Court rewarded illegality,” The Indian Express, Nov. 2019. \[32\] R. Sampath, “Ayodhya Verdict: Majoritarian Faith Prevailed Over Facts,” The Wire, Nov. 2019. \[33\] P.B. Mehta, “Ayodhya judgement: Supreme Court rewarded illegality,” The Indian Express, Nov. 2019. \[34\] F. Nariman, “Ayodhya verdict: A solomonic judgment?,” The Hindu, Nov. 2019. \[35\] V. Venkatesan, “Faith and law,” Frontline, vol. 36, no. 23, 2019. \[36\] P.B. Mehta, “Ayodhya judgement: Supreme Court rewarded illegality,” The Indian Express, Nov. 2019. \[37\] F. Nariman, “Ayodhya verdict: A solomonic judgment?,” The Hindu, Nov. 2019. \[38\] R. Sampath, “Ayodhya Verdict: Majoritarian Faith Prevailed Over Facts,” The Wire, Nov. 2019. **Categories:** Uncategorised --- ### [When Ghosts Haunted the Courtroom: Analyzing Indian Case Laws Where the Defence of Demonic Hauntings was Pleaded](https://lawfoyer.in/when-ghosts-haunted-the-courtroom-analyzing-indian-case-laws-where-the-defence-of-demonic-hauntings-was-pleaded/) **Published:** January 5, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Ghosts-and-Courtroom-1-1024x307.png)## Defence of Demonic Possession / Hauntings The defence of ghosts, spirits, and demonic possession may seem absurd and outrageous at first glance. However, Indian courts have dealt with several criminal cases where the accused pleaded legal insanity and lack of *mens rea* due to purported haunting by supernatural entities. While such a defence appears ludicrous to the rational mind, the Indian Penal Code recognizes legal insanity due to unsoundness of mind as a valid defence under[ Section 84](https://lawfoyer.in/insanity-as-an-indemnity-section-84-of-the-ipc/). This provision states that nothing is an offence that is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, is by reason of unsoundness of mind, incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law \[1\]. The term “unsoundness of mind” is not defined, but judicial interpretations have established when it can be invoked as a defence. The burden of proving unsoundness of mind lies on the accused under [Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act](https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC_CEN_3_20_00034_187201_1523268871700§ionId=38913§ionno=105&orderno=119) \[2\]. This blog analyzes four Indian cases where the defence of ghosts and spirits being responsible for the crime was taken. It examines the facts of each case, the issues and questions before the court, and the rationale behind the judicial decisions to accept or reject such an unusual defence. The analysis reveals how the courts sought to balance between upholding legal principles and doing substantive justice based on the evidence and circumstances of each case. ## Mr. Mohammed Furkhan Mohammed vs The State of Maharashtra In this 2003 Bombay High Court case \[3\], the accused Mohammed Furkhan was charged with rape of an 18-year old mentally disabled girl. He claimed to be an occult practitioner and alleged that he had sexual intercourse with the victim while trying to exorcise a ghost from her body. The defence pleaded legal insanity and lack of mens rea under Section 84 IPC, arguing that the accused was possessed by a ghost and was of unsound mind. The court had to examine whether such a plea can be entertained when the accused claims ghost possession and commits a crime in an exorcism ritual. The issue was whether the accused lacked the necessary mental capacity and mens rea or intention to commit rape due to unsoundness of mind. The court rejected the defence, holding there was no proof of unsoundness of mind or lack of criminal intent. It ruled that the accused took advantage of the mentally disabled victim under the guise of an exorcism ritual and the defence of ghost possession cannot exonerate him from stringent penal consequences. ## State of Karnataka vs. Hemanth Kumar This 2012 Karnataka High Court case \[4\] involved a man Hemanth Kumar whose wife had committed suicide. The defence argued that Kumar’s deceased wife was under the delusion of being possessed by a ghost. Kumar had taken her to temples and rituals to cure her mental condition. The court had to examine whether the woman’s alleged ghost possession was enough to prove the unsoundness of mind of the accused husband. The issue was whether a superstitious belief in ghosts and spirits can by itself prove legal insanity. The court rejected the defence due to lack of convincing evidence showing the unsoundness of Kumar’s mind. Mere superstitious notions are not enough to absolve an accused of culpability. The defence has to conclusively establish lack of mental capacity and inability to understand the wrongfulness of the act. The court upheld the principle that legal insanity is not established by mere eccentric beliefs and behaviour. ## Sanjay Nagorao Pote vs State of Maharashtra This 2018 Bombay High Court case \[5\] involved peculiar facts. Sanjay Nagorao Pote killed a man named Vitthal, claiming that a god had ordered him to remove a ghost from the victim’s body. He pleaded lack of mens rea due to unsoundness of mind under Section 84 IPC. The court had to examine what is required to prove the defence of unsoundness of mind. The issue was whether superstitious beliefs can by themselves prove lack of criminal intent and moral blameworthiness. The court analyzed the evidence about the accused’s conduct before, during and after the crime. It held that this demonstrated abnormal behaviour indicative of mental instability. The defence was accepted, with the court citing lack of motive, preparation or plan for the murder as corroborating the accused’s inability to comprehend the nature of his actions. The acquittal highlights that the defence of insanity due to ghost beliefs can potentially succeed if there is convincing evidence of mental incapacity negating mens rea. ## State of Orissa vs. Ram Bahadur Thapa This 1959 Orissa High Court case \[6\] involved a Nepali man Ram Bahadur Thapa who attacked and killed certain women, believing them to be ghosts. He claimed protection under Section 79 IPC which exempts acts caused by mistake of fact in good faith. The issue was whether mistake of fact can apply when the mistake stems from a superstitious belief in ghosts. The court examined what constitutes good faith and due care in such cases. It held that the accused was operating under a genuine mistaken belief that he was attacking ghosts and not human beings. Given his background, mental capacity and the circumstances, this mistake was deemed reasonable. The defence of mistake of fact in attacking ghosts was accepted, resulting in acquittal. The verdict demonstrates that superstitious beliefs may provide exoneration in exceptional situations where the accused genuinely and reasonably mistook his victims for ghosts, acting in good faith without due care. ## Analysis and Conclusion These cases reveal how Indian courts have grappled with the issue of unsoundness of mind and mistake of fact defences based on religious or superstitious beliefs. The judgements demonstrate that there are no absolute rules for determining the validity of a “ghost defence”. The facts and evidence of each case guide the legal reasoning on whether the accused had genuinely lost touch with reality and lacked awareness of the wrongfulness of his actions. Mere eccentricity or superstitious notions are not enough. The defence has to convince the court that the supernatural belief was reasonable from the accused’s subjective perspective and he was incapable of knowing the true nature of the act. If the facts show lack of motive, prior enmity, planning, or other circumstances negating criminal intent, the ghost defence has greater chances of success. Ultimately, the courts aim to strike a balance between upholding legal principles and delivering substantial justice based on the totality of circumstances. The ghost may haunt the courtroom, but the judge separates the spectral from the real in the spirit of justice. ## References: \[1\] Section 84, Indian Penal Code, 1860 \[2\] Section 105, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 \[3\] Mr. Mohammed Furkhan Mohammed vs The State of Maharashtra, 2004 (2) MhLj 800 \[4\] State of Karnataka vs. Hemanth Kumar @ Manjunath, Crl. A.No.982/2007 (A) \[5\] Sanjay Nagorao Pote vs State of Maharashtra, CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 148 OF 2016 \[6\] State Of Orissa vs Ram Bahadur Thapa, AIR 1960 Ori 161 **Categories:** Articles --- ### [“LEX CARNIVAL” - Amity Law School is organizing its 3rd Amity National Law Fest- Lex Carnival 2024 to be conducted on January 31st & February 1st, 2024 {Prizes up to Rs. 28,000 cash, letter of recommendation and certificates of participation to all}: REGISTER BY 26TH JANUARY.](https://lawfoyer.in/lex-carnival-amity-law-school-is-organizing-its-3rd-amity-national/) **Published:** January 4, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/lex-poster-pdf-725x1024.jpg) “LEX CARNIVAL” – Amity Law School is organizing its 3rd Amity National Law Fest- Lex Carnival 2024 to be conducted on January 31st & February 1st, 2024 {Prizes up to Rs. 28,000 cash, letter of recommendation and certificates of participation to all}: REGISTER BY 26TH JANUARY. *Amity Law School is organising its 3rd Amity National Law Fest- Lex Carnival 2024 to be conducted on January 31st & February 1st, 2024.* ## **ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION** Amity University, Lucknow Campus is a part of India’s leading educational group established with the objective to impart research and innovation driven education consisting of remarkable infrastructure enabling the latest teaching methodologies. Amity University strives to inculcate a blend of modernity with traditionalism in all its students. ## **ABOUT THE EVENT** Lex carnival strives to provide a dynamic platform for the students across the nation to showcase their socio legal skills and basic acumen. It has a wide variety of completions that invite the participation of students from every field and course including the school students. ## **LIST OF EVENTS** - Skit Competition – - Hit The Buzz – - Lex H.A.M – - Legal Maxim Competition- ## **ELIGIBILITY** - School students (above 14 years of age) - Students from any semester, course, college, university and city. ## **MODE OF EVENT** Offline ## **HOW TO REGISTER** Registrations are open. *Last date of registration* – 26th January 2024 For further details and registration please visit the website ## **PRIZES** - Cash Prizes up to Rs. 28,000/- - Certificate of Merit to all Winners - Certificate to all participants - Letter of Recommendation for selective participants. **WEBSITE**: [www.lexcarnival.in](http://www.lexcarnival.in "www.lexcarnival.in") **BROCURE** [Download Brochure](https://lexcarnival.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Lex-2024-brochure.pdf) ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** - E- mail: - Instagram handle: als.lex.carnival ## Organizing Head - Raghav Agarwal (9696565590) ## Organizing Co-Head - Ayush Kumar Singh (8299644011) **Categories:** Uncategorised --- ### [Free Online Masterclass on Mediation Law of India organized by Lawfoyer: Register by Jan 12](https://lawfoyer.in/free-online-masterclass-on-mediation-law-of-india-organized-by-lawfoyer-register-by-jan-12/) **Published:** December 23, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Webinar-Poster-Medium-1-724x1024.jpg) --- Register Now --- ## Gain In-Depth Knowledge from a Leading Expert LawFoyer presents an exclusive free online masterclass – “Harmonizing Conflicts, Mastering Solutions: Journey Through Mediation Law in India” led by mediation law expert Ms. Anupriya Yadav, Assistant Professor at Amity Law School’s Lucknow campus. Attendees will get valuable insights into Indian mediation law from a seasoned professional. Understand key concepts, acquire practical real-world skills to apply as a mediator, and elevate your expertise. ## Why You Should Attend: - Comprehensive coverage of mediation law topics - Practical knowledge for enhancing effectiveness - Condensed format – depth without compromising time - Boost career opportunities in this specialized field ## Perks for Participants: - Interactive Q&A sessions - Certificate of participation - Priority access to future LawFoyer events - Event Details: ## Important Details - Date: Saturday, 13 January 2024 - Platform: Google Meet/Zoom Meetings - Completely Free Registration Don’t miss this chance to take your mediation law expertise to the next level. Register now on www.lawfoyer.in or contact at contact@lawfoyer.in or +91 8574723478. --- ## Register Now Webinar Registration Form Please enable JavaScript in your browser to complete this form. Full Name \*This field will be used for e-certificate generation. Email \*Email Confirm Email WhatsApp Number \* Designation \*SelectStudentFacultyAdvocateOther If other… \* How did you hear about this webinar? \*- Instagram - WhatsApp Group - Google - Other If other… \* Submit![Loading](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/plugins/wpforms/assets/images/submit-spin.svg) --- **Categories:** Events, Webinar **Tags:** adr, alternate dispute resolution, bootcamp, conflicts, lawfoyer, mediation, mediation law, webinar --- ### [Laws Governing Arbitration and Conciliation in India](https://lawfoyer.in/laws-governing-arbitration-and-conciliation-in-india/) **Published:** December 29, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** The legal framework regulating arbitration and conciliation in India comprises the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Act”) as the primary legislation along with the relevant provisions under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”). \[1\] The Act consolidates the law relating to domestic arbitration, international commercial arbitration, and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. \[2\] It seeks to minimise court intervention in the arbitral process and ensure fairness, expedition and economy in dispute resolution through arbitration. \[3\] The Act is divided into four parts – Part I deals with domestic and international commercial arbitration; Part II deals with enforcement of certain foreign awards under the New York and Geneva Conventions; Part III relates to conciliation; and Part IV contains supplementary provisions on Small Cause Courts and mandatory references by courts to arbitration. \[4\] Some key aspects governed under the Act include – arbitrability of disputes; composition and jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals; conduct of arbitral proceedings; recourse against arbitral awards; and recognition and enforcement of awards. The Act has seen two important amendments in 2015 and 2019, which have significantly altered the arbitration landscape. ## Arbitrability and Validity of Arbitration Agreements Section 7 of the Act gives statutory recognition to arbitration agreements if they are in writing, and defines “arbitration agreement” to include provisions in a contract recognising an arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction to resolve the disputes arising out of such contract. \[5\] Further, Section 8 obligates judicial authorities to refer parties to arbitration if there is an applicable arbitration agreement brought to their notice. The Supreme Court has taken a pro-enforcement approach regarding the validity of arbitration agreements, holding that courts should focus on giving effect to the parties’ commercial understanding rather than adhering to a narrow technical interpretation. \[6\] ## **Composition and Jurisdiction of Arbitral Tribunals** The arbitral tribunal ordinarily comprises either a sole arbitrator or three arbitrators, as agreed between the parties under Section 10. \[7\] Section 11 provides that Supreme Court and High Court judges can appoint arbitrators if there are delays or issues in the nomination process as set out in the arbitration agreement. \[8\] The qualifications, experience, number and nationality of arbitrators can be agreed in writing by the parties. \[9\] Section 12 requires arbitrators to be impartial, independent and disclose any circumstances that may affect their ability to devote sufficient time to complete the arbitral process. \[10\] Tribunals in India have a wide latitude over the procedure to be followed in adjudicating disputes, subject to principles of natural justice under Section 19. \[11\] Their jurisdiction is restricted to the subject matter of the disputes referred to arbitration by the parties. Tribunals continue to function during the pendency of any clarificatory or interim application before a court unless such court passes any order restricting its functioning, under the non obstante clause in Section 5. \[12\] ## Conduct of Proceedings Parties in arbitral proceedings are mandated to submit their statements of claims and defences within the time decided by the tribunal, which is required to treat the parties equally and fairly under Sections 18, 23 and 24. \[13\] Tribunals have the flexibility to determine the rules on admissibility, relevance and weight of any evidence put forth by parties per Section 19. \[14\] They can engage experts and legal consultants with the parties’ consent. \[15\] Tribunals also have powers to award interim measures under Section 17 unless parties have expressly excluded it through contract. \[16\] ## Awards and their Enforcement Domestic awards can be set aside by courts only on limited grounds like incapacity or invalidity of agreement; improper composition of tribunal; jurisdictional error; or non-compliance with principles of natural justice. \[17\] Foreign awards are enforced per Part II of the Act in accordance with the New York or Geneva Conventions. Indian courts cannot review an award’s merits in enforcement proceedings except in case of fraud or corruption in procuring the award or if it violates India’s public policy. \[18\] ## Amendments Strengthening the Arbitral Process The 2015 Amendments introduced new provisions for achieving time-bound disposal of arbitration cases. For instance, Section 29A requires that arbitral tribunals should pass awards within 12 months after their constitution, which may be extended up to 18 months with parties’ consent and subject to Supreme Court guidelines. \[19\] The Amendments also expanded the definition of “public policy violation” to clarify the grounds for setting aside arbitral awards. \[20\] Further, the autonomy of the arbitral process has been enhanced by minimizing court intervention through steps like deemed acceleration of arbitral proceedings in case of frivolous court proceedings. \[21\] The 2019 Amendments sought to further boost institutional arbitration by establishing an independent body called the Arbitration Council of India (“ACI”) with specialized expertise. \[22\] The ACI can frame policies for accrediting arbitrators and arbitral institutions, grading them to maintain credibility. \[23\] For enhancing neutrality of arbitrators, Fifth and Seventh Schedules have been added prescribing the categories of relationships that would make arbitrators ineligible for disputes involving the parties. \[24\] ## Interface Between Arbitration Law and Other Laws Section 89 of the CPC enables courts to direct settlement of disputes through alternative mechanisms including arbitration, mediation or conciliation if elements of settlement exist and parties consent. \[25\] There is no provision for appeals against arbitral awards except in case of enforcement challenges on restricted grounds under Section 34 of the Act. \[26\] Issues like lex arbitri (governing arbitration law) and lex contractus (governing contract law) in the case of foreign-seated arbitrations are complex, especially regarding differing approaches taken by Indian courts pre- and post- the BALCO judgment on foreign award enforceability. \[27\] ## Institutional Arbitration Framework Out of six major arbitral institutions in India, the Mumbai Centre for International Arbitration (“MCIA”), Delhi International Arbitration Centre (“DIAC”), and Nani Palkhivala Arbitration Centre (“NPAC”) are highly regarded for domain specialization and tested arbitration rules compliant with the UNCITRAL Model Law. \[28\] For instance, MCICA follows best global practices like requiring exchange of only essential documents between parties initially to enhance efficiency. \[29\] DIAC provides infrastructure and assistance to foreign lawyers to present their case in India for promoting New Delhi as an arbitration hub. \[30\] NPAC facilitates expeditious disposal, with majority of arbitrations completed within a year. \[31\] ## International Enforcement of Arbitral Awards The Act gives effect to India’s obligations under the New York Convention regarding enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, subject to certain exclusions like parties lacking capacity or due representation; award debtor not receiving proper notice of proceedings; and where enforcement contravenes public policy or India’s laws. \[32\] Indian courts have interpreted these restrictions narrowly to uphold the pro-enforcement ethos of arbitration law. For instance, “public policy” contravention refers specifically to fraud, corruption or violations of treaty commitments based on internationally accepted principles. \[33\] Over 100 countries have adopted the New York Convention to enable simplified cross-border enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. \[34\] ## Conclusion India has a robust legal framework concerning arbitration and conciliation reflecting global best practices and standards. Judicial interpretations have reinforced validity, fairness, neutrality and timely resolution as key objectives guiding arbitration law and practice in the country. The Act sets up an effective regime for recognition of arbitration agreements, minimizing court intervention in arbitral proceedings, timely disposal of arbitration and limited grounds for challenging awards. Amendments further strengthen party autonomy and streamline institutional roles in the arbitral process. With strong laws and pro-enforcement courts combined with growth of arbitral institutions, India is now positioned as an arbitration and ADR hub for global businesses. ## References: \[1\] Code of Civil Procedure 1908, s 89. \[2\] Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, Preamble. \[3\] Ibid. \[4\] Supra 2. \[5\] Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, s 7. \[6\] Rashid Raza v Sadaf Akhtar, (2019) 8 SCC 710. \[7\] Supra 2, s 10. \[8\] Supra 2, s 11. \[9\] Ibid, s 11(2). \[10\] Supra 2, s 12. \[11\] Supra 2, s 19. \[12\] Supra 2, s 5. \[13\] Supra 2, ss 18, 23, 24. \[14\] Supra 2, s 19. \[15\] Supra 2, s 26. \[16\] Supra 2, s 17. \[17\] Supra 2, ss 34(2), 48(2). \[18\] Renusagar Power Co Ltd v General Electric Co, (1993) Supp (1) SCC 644. \[19\] Supra 2, s 29A. \[20\] Supra 2, s 34. \[21\] Supra 2, s 5. \[22\] Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act 2019, s 43B. \[23\] Ibid, s 43D. \[24\] Ibid, Sch 5 & 7. \[25\] Supra 1, s 89. \[26\] Supra 2, s 37(1)(c). \[27\] Bharat Aluminium v Kaiser Aluminium (BALCO), (2012) 9 SCC 552. \[28\] ‘Best Practices in Commercial Arbitration’ (Institute of Law Nirma University 2018). \[29\] Rules of Arbitration, Mumbai Centre for International Arbitration. \[30\] Delhi International Arbitration Centre (Arbitration Rules). \[31\] Nani Palkhivala Arbitration Centre (Rules). \[32\] Supra 2, ss 44, 48. \[33\] Supra 18. \[34\] United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Status: Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York 1958). **Categories:** Articles --- ### [Arbitration Law in India](https://lawfoyer.in/arbitration-law-in-india/) **Published:** December 28, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** Arbitration has become an increasingly preferred mode of resolving commercial disputes in India. With the ever rising tide of litigation and delays in traditional court proceedings, there has been a gradual shift towards alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”) is the main legislation governing arbitrations in India. It is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration and aims to minimize court intervention in the arbitral process. Over the years, a series of amendments have been introduced to strengthen the legal framework for arbitration and make India an arbitration friendly jurisdiction. However, issues like appointment delays, high costs and lack of consistency in judgments continue to plague arbitration proceedings. This blog analyzes the arbitration law regime, process, scope and key trends in India. ## Legal Framework The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is the primary legislation governing domestic and international commercial arbitrations in India. It covers almost all aspects of arbitration like arbitrability of disputes, appointment/challenge of arbitrators, conduct of proceedings, awards and recourse against awards. In 2015 and 2019, wide-ranging amendments were introduced to facilitate speedier appointment of arbitrators, expedite proceedings, impose stricter timelines, restrict judicial intervention and streamline the law on costs and fees. \[2\] These changes have significantly improved the arbitration ecosystem though effectiveness is debated. \[3\] Some grey areas like scope of “public policy” for setting aside awards, limited appeal against orders and delays due to repeated Section 11 applications still exist. \[4\] Overall, India now has a robust legal framework for arbitration but practical challenges impact the arbitration culture. As per the Act, any “commercial” dispute can be referred to arbitration if there is an arbitration agreement between the parties. \[5\] Commercial disputes cover issues arising from ordinary activities like trade, commerce and intellectual property rights. \[6\] Criminal matters, insolvency proceedings or matters covered by statutory tribunals like consumer/labor courts are generally not arbitrable. \[7\] Domestic arbitrations between Indian parties are governed by Indian substantive law. For international arbitrations, parties can choose the applicable law. This framework demonstrates India’s pro-arbitration stance and progressive arbitration jurisprudence. ## Process and Stages An arbitration commences only when a party serves notice to the other party regarding the disputes and intention to refer it to arbitration. This notice must be in accordance with the pre-agreed arbitration clause/agreement. \[8\] Once a valid arbitration notice is served, the respondent must communicate their nomination of an arbitrator within 30 days. \[9\] If parties cannot mutually appoint arbitrators, they can seek court assistance under Section 11 of the Act. Arbitral tribunals are not bound by strict evidentiary or procedural laws like CPC or Evidence Act. They have flexibility in regulating the proceedings and are only bound by party autonomy and principles of natural justice. \[10\] Proceedings can be oral or documentary based. Evidence rules are also less formal with limited discovery. Interim reliefs are available but seeking court assistance suspends arbitration till reliefs are decided. Ultimately, the arbitral tribunal makes a reasoned award within 12 months which is binding on all parties. \[11\] This award can only be challenged on limited grounds like incapacity, invalidity of agreement, lack of jurisdiction, procedural impropriety or patent illegality. A unique aspect is that Indian law allows for appeal even against interlocutory orders. So both Section 37 and Section 50 provide appeal avenues against orders like interim measures, tribunal decisions on jurisdiction, set aside applications etc. \[12\] This excessive court intervention hampers arbitration progress and efficiency. Further, ad hoc arbitrations where parties mutually appoint arbitrators without institutional supervision remain common. Though flexible, lack of administration and infrastructure constraints impair smooth conduct. Overall, though Indian arbitration law is well-defined, practical challenges lead to delays defeating the core object of expedited dispute resolution. ## Scope and Arbitrability As noted earlier, commercial disputes are generally arbitrable as per Indian arbitration law. \[13\] But categories like criminal matters (Section 5),\[14\] fraud cases, employment disputes,\[15\] insolvency issues are explicitly excluded from arbitration. Further, anti-trust regulator CCI held that only it can rule on competition law disputes. \[16\] Beyond this, the Act does not expressly bar any matters. But the Supreme Court has ruled that disputes involving “public policy” or “public interest” elements like elections, ceiling violations or environmental matters may not be arbitrable. \[17\] However, arbitrability should not be confused with setting aside awards on policy grounds which is still permissible under Section 34. This concept of using “public policy” to restrict arbitration is problematic because it is undefined and vague. Categorizing entire classes of disputes like IP, environment etc. as non-arbitrable directly contradicts party autonomy and creates confusion for commercial parties drafting arbitration clauses. \[18\] Unless there are clear legislative or policy imperatives, there should be no implied non-arbitrable categories, especially when the Act aims to minimise court intervention. Overall, while arbitrability is interpreted strictly by courts as excluding only expressly mentioned cases in Section 34, scope remains ambiguous because of confusing application of amorphous public policy grounds. ## Finality and Enforcement of Awards Arbitration awards can only be challenged under Section 34 of the Act on limited grounds like incapacity or invalidity of agreement, lack of proper notice, jurisdiction issues, due process violations or patent illegality. \[19\] Earlier, “public policy” was inserted as a separate ground but after judicial confusion, an explanation was added confining it to fraud/corruption or conflict with India’s fundamental policy. So currently setting aside is permissible only on the expressly stated grounds in Section 34. However, scope remains ambiguous because courts have used the statutory ground of “patent illegality” to reviews awards on merits.\[20\] This hampers sanctity of awards. Once an award passes Section 34 judicial scrutiny, it can be enforced like a court decree under CPC provisions. \[21\] Generally arbitral awards are easier to enforce than court judgments. Appeal can be made under Section 50 against the order enforcing/refusing to enforce the award.\[22\] Overall, while limited recourse does promote efficacy of arbitration, scope for substantive review of merits through patent illegality coupled with two appeal stages at Sections 37 and 50 allows excessive court intervention. This hampers spirit of alternate dispute resolution. ## Benefits and Limitations A primary benefit of opting for arbitration over traditional litigation is party autonomy in selecting arbitrators. \[23\] Technical experts can be appointed for specialized cases unlike court proceedings with random allotment. Further efficiency is better with faster disposal based on mutual schedules instead of systemic delays in courts plagued by docket overloads. Confidentiality is also higher with limited public access to proceedings or awards. There is also flexibility in use of language, evidence rules and choice of law. \[24\] Recognition of awards under New York Convention facilitates cross-border enforcement. \[25\] Multiple appeal layers increase certainty of outcome. However, binding pre-dispute arbitration clauses in contracts or terms of service often erode consumer/employee rights. \[26\] Absence of strict codes of ethics or standards in the arbitration industry also leads to questions on neutrality. With no avenue for appeal, erroneous decisions cannot be revised. Limited discovery affects case preparation compared to civil trials. \[27\] Enforcement still requires court assistance implying added time and cost. Arbitrator fees and infrastructure expenses imposed on parties also adds to overall costs. \[28\] Multi-arbitrator panels on complex cases also take substantial time affecting speed. Thus, while institutional arbitration addresses limitations of court litigation, ad hoc arbitrations in India remain hindered by infrastructural and cost constraints. ## Trends and Statistics As per Niti Aayog data, India faces alarming judicial delays and pendency with over 3 crore cases pending across various courts. \[29\] Reports suggest that despite 2015 and 2019 amendments leading to improved legal framework for arbitration, substantial delays continue at all stages – appointment of arbitrators, conduct of proceedings and challenge process against awards. \[30\] Cost and lack of robust arbitration institutions remain concerning issues. However, ICC data indicates that India is the fifth highest arbitration service user by origin of parties with 268 cases filed in 2021. \[31\] Domestic arbitration institutions like MCPC, ICA and DIAC are also gaining prominence. \[32\] Overall, while India still ranks poorly on global arbitration indexes, growing acceptability specially in commercial context signals strong future prospects. Statistically, time taken for constitution of arbitral tribunals remains high with over 50% cases taking over 6 months. 33% appointments also require court intervention under Section 11 implying limited party cooperation. \[33\] Once tribunal is appointed, lack of uniform case management protocols lead to delays and increased costs. However, India has strong pool of professionals with domain expertise in areas like projects, technology, IP driving party preference for arbitration. Passing of progressive laws like the 2019 Amendment Act, strong policy support for Alternate Dispute Resolution mechanisms and stress on speedier commercial dispute resolution all indicate positive future trends. ## Conclusion and Suggestions Thus, to conclude, robust policy and legal framework now exists in India facilitating arbitration as efficient substitute for traditional court litigation. Party autonomy, neutrality, expedited disposal and enforceability make arbitration suited for technical commercial disputes. However, ad hoc arbitrations still suffer from lack of administrative support and infrastructure driving delays and high costs. Scope and arbitrability issues also impede smooth progress. Suggestions for strengthening arbitration practice mainly focus on promoting institutional arbitration to replace ad hoc processes. Specialised bodies can formulate ethical codes, offer administrative assistance by maintaining rosters and managing proceedings. \[34\] Creating dedicated arbitration benches in High Courts and Supreme Court will also address delays in challenge proceedings and appeals. Further legislative clarity by defining arbitrability criteria instead of subjective public policy interpretations will help. Changes like making arbitrations mandatory for commercial disputes of high value (over Rs 1 crore) will boost acceptability. \[35\] India also needs robust course correction to prevent excessive court intervention in arbitration matters. Scope of appeals should be narrowed only for significant issues instead of permitting two layers currently. Patent illegality as grounds for challenge should also be clearly defined preventing merits review. Overall framework to recognise more matters as arbitrable coupled with strong legal and policy support for Institutional Arbitration will cement India’s position as an arbitration and ADR hub. The 2019 Amendment Act expanding arbitrability to intellectual property disputes demonstrates legislative intent for progressive reform. \[36\] Creation of specialist arbitration divisions, mandatory timelines for courts to dispose challenges coupled with scope for emergency arbitrators also indicate positive disruption. \[37\] Clarity on party autonomy in foreign seated arbitrations, virtual oral hearings and reducing court intervention in international commercial arbitrations significantly boost投 India’s arbitration ecosystem. \[38\] With strong emphasis on strengthening institutional arbitration facilities and robust policy initiatives like establishing an Arbitration Council of India, India’s arbitration profile continues to rise globally. \[39\] Thus, despite certain limitations, India has strong credentials to emerge as preferred seat for arbitration. Building robust arbitration institutions, creating specialist benches in traditional courts and framing clear guidelines on critical aspects like arbitrability, public policy, patent illegality grounds will help realise this vision. Reducing court interference by rationalising appeals and challenge processes will improve efficiency. With growing economic activity, need for expeditious commercial dispute resolution will inevitably expand Indian arbitration market. Progressive legislative and policy action focused on infrastructure development certainly cement India’s place as arbitration hub. A fortiori, while India faced criticism earlier for excessive court intervention and lack of supportive infrastructure hampering growth of arbitration, paradigm shift in approach is visible. The strong framework in the 1996 Act coupled with radical change introduced through amendments expanding scope, thrust on institutional arbitration and speedier resolution mechanisms pave the way for India emerging as a preferred seat. With relentless push towards promotion of all Alternate Dispute Resolution forums and mechanisms, emergence of positive arbitration culture seems imminent. Concerted efforts on infrastructure advancement and robust policy support will best harvest this opportunity to position India as the top arbitration destination globally. ## References - \[1\] The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 (India); The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019 (India). - \[2\] Vijay Karia & Ors vs Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi Srl & Ors, (2020) 11 SCC 1. - \[3\] BCCI v. Kochi Cricket Pvt. Ltd (2018) 6 SCC 287; Rep of India v. Vedanta Ltd (2020) 10 SCC 1. - \[4\] Emkay Global Financial Services Limited v. Girdhar Sondhi, (2018) 9 SCC 49. - \[5\] Section 7, The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - \[6\] Section 2 (1)(b), The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - \[7\] N. Radhakrishnan v. Maestro Engineers (2010) 1 SCC 72 - \[8\] Section 21, The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - \[9\] Section 11(4), The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - \[10\] Section 19, The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - \[11\] Section 29A, The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - \[12\] Section 37, 50 – The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - \[13\] Supra - \[14\] Section 5, The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - \[15\] Supra - \[16\] Supra - \[17\] Booz Allen Hamilton v. SBI Home Finance (2011) 5 SCC 532. - \[18\] Raffles Design v. Educomp Professional Education, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 5521 - \[19\] Section 34, The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - \[20\] Dyna Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd (2019) 20 SCC 1 - \[21\] Section 36, The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - \[22\] Supra - \[23\] Supra - \[24\] Supra - \[25\] United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 - \[26\] Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010). - \[27\] Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, 473 US 614 (1985) - \[28\] Report No. 246, Law Commission of India, August 2014. - \[29\] Niti Aayog, Para 5.2.15, Strategy for New India @ 75. - \[30\] Supra - \[31\] ICC Dispute Resolution Statistics, 2021. - \[32\] Supra - \[33\] Supra - \[34\] Report No. 246, Law Commission of India, Para 33-37, August 2014. - \[35\] Ibid - \[36\] Section 2(1)(vii), The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2019 - \[37\] Ibid - \[38\] Supra - \[39\] Report No. 246, Law Commission of India, Para 40.1 to 40.3, August 2014 **Categories:** Articles --- ### [Alternative Dispute Resolution in India](https://lawfoyer.in/alternative-dispute-resolution-in-india/) **Published:** December 28, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) refers to mechanisms and processes outside the traditional courtroom litigation for resolving disputes in a cost and time effective manner. ADR has gained immense popularity globally due to the inherent drawbacks of long drawn court battles. With rising case pendency across courts in India, ADR presents an effective approach to unclog the burden on the courts while delivering quick justice to disputing parties. This blog provides a comprehensive overview of the ADR landscape in India across its various mechanisms and use cases. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is the primary legislation governing ADR in India along with amendments concerning arbitration law and guidelines issued by the Indian judiciary from time to time. \[1\] Lok Adalats constituted under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 is another notable ADR mechanism strongly promoted in India to settle disputes through compromise without undergoing the convoluted litigation process. \[2\] Overall, the policy focus is now on mainstreaming ADR to handle more routine disputes thereby improving the efficiency and credibility of India’s legal system. ## Types of ADR Practiced in India **Negotiation as Initial Dispute Resolution Mechanism** Negotiation refers to the voluntary discussion and deliberation between disputing parties or through authorized representatives to reach a mutually agreeable settlement. As the most direct dispute resolution approach without a third-party intervention, negotiation happens regularly in day-to-day life for resolving differences. It essentially entails good communication, understanding different viewpoints and a willingness to compromise for furthering one’s interests. \[3\] In commercial contracts and dealings, negotiation clauses are increasingly being included as the preliminary dispute redressal mechanism before exploring options of mediation and arbitration subsequently. Negotiation is suitable for conflicts in a business relationship where parties intend to operate on long term basis. It provides the flexibility of arriving at creative solutions like future business dealings which may not be possible in adjudicatory processes. Settlement through negotiation also allows the outcome to remain confidential without unneeded publicity. **Mediation as Assisted Negotiation Mechanism** Mediation involves an impartial and neutral third party assisting the disputing sides to negotiate for identifying mutually agreeable solutions. \[4\] As an extension of the negotiation approach, mediation helps in overcoming roadblocks if direct negotiation between parties reached an impasse due to lack of communication. The mediator through specialized communication and facilitation techniques tries re-establishing communication channels and helps parties take a broader conciliatory approach beyond their stated positions. Under Section 89 of the Civil Procedure Code, judges hearing civil cases can direct the matter to mediation if elements of settlement exist and parties consent to this mechanism. \[5\] Mediation has proven useful in matters involving family disputes like divorce and child custody, commercial disputes, landlord-tenant disputes etc. where preserving relationships is important along with settlement of the conflict. Many mediation centers offer specialized domain and technical expertise to facilitate mediated negotiations in cases like medical negligence cases, IP and patent disputes etc. requiring subject matter knowledge. The quick enforcement of decisions, privacy, confidentiality and flexibility makes mediation a more attractive ADR option relative to formal arbitration or court litigation. For instance, celebrity disputes are often mediated to avoid unwanted publicity of court proceedings involving personal details. The Supreme Court as well as High Courts have also been proactively directing parties to undergo mediation through court-annexed mediation centers where feasible to provide faster access to justice. \[6\] **Arbitration for Binding Decisions** Arbitration refers to the adjudicatory process of dispute resolution involving an impartial third party known as arbitrator upon whose decision the disputing parties agree to bind themselves. It is governed by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act which details the arbitration procedures, appointment processes and conditions for enforcement of awards. \[7\] There are well laid out norms for serving notices, submission of statements, evidence taking, hearings and passing of award by the arbitrator. Arbitration commences based on mutual consent expressed through an arbitration agreement or contractual clause between the parties drafted prior to any dispute. Arbitration clauses are increasingly found in commercial contracts, partnership agreements etc. due to the sense of certainty and enforceability it provides for resolution of future disputes relative to mechanisms like mediation and conciliation. Specialised institutions like Indian Council of Arbitration (ICA) and Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) arbitration center provide robust arbitration services and maintain panels covering diverse sectors like insurance, construction, maritime, sports etc. \[8\] Arbitration is also statutorily provided for in areas like industrial disputes, motor accident claims etc. through bodies like labour arbitration tribunals and Motor Accident Claims Tribunals (MACTs). The arbitrator relies on Contract Act provisions and factual evidence provided by parties during the arbitration hearings. The Supreme Court has outlined that arbitral awards can be appealed under restricted and specific grounds only like party incapacity, lack of arbitration agreement validity, not having opportunity for presenting one’s case fully etc. \[9\] This ensures minimal judicial intervention post arbitration increasing certainty around enforceability relative to mediation and conciliation resolutions. **Conciliation for Simple Dispute Resolution** Conciliation represents a less formal type of arbitration aimed at expediting simple dispute resolution through reconciliatory approach. \[10\] As per guidelines, parties appoint conciliators based on mutual consent to assist resolution. Representation of parties’ viewpoints, persuasive discussions, and suggestion of settlement terms are involved similar to mediation attempts. If agreed settlement is reached through recommended terms or mutual negotiations, the signed agreement becomes binding and enforceable on parties. Key advantage of conciliation over mediation is that partial settlements and agreements also acquire legal sanctity compared to an ‘all or nothing’ approach under mediation which imposes heavier burden for total settlement. The conciliator plays a proactive role in furnishing proposals for consideration and in getting parties to re-examine rigid positions through constant engagement. ConciliationSuccess is highly dependent on the personality, negotiation skills and subject expertise of the individual conciliator. Conciliation clauses are increasingly finding place in commercial contracts alongside arbitration for providing a speedier resolution before invoking arbitration which is relatively more complex and expensive. Conciliation works best for disputes involving straightforward claims and issues rather than complex technical and forensic review requiring domain expertise arbitrators. **Lok Adalats – Uniquely Indian ADR Mechanism** The system of Lok Adalats organized by statutory legal services authorities act as an effective ADR mechanism purely based on Indian ethos and jurisprudence. Promoting resolution of pending matters on the basis of conciliation and compromised settlement is the prime objective under it. \[11\] While other ADR methods like arbitration typically involve legal professionals and retired judges, Lok Adalats comprise judicial officers, legal experts, social workers etc. with mandate for satisfied disposal. There is no court fee levied for cases filed directly at Lok Adalat while for matters pending in courts, the fee gets refunded upon settlement without having to undergo the tedious evidence production, cross-examination and arguments standard in traditional court litigation. \[12\] Flexibility pertains not only to resolution approach but also to the execution process like parties approaching Taluk Lok Adalat for reconciliation before initiating court enforcement proceedings in case of award breach. Areas like monetary disputes, bank loans, civil suits, matrimonials, and labour issues coming under Lok Adalat jurisdiction see very high (over 90% in certain categories) settlement rates across states indicating the effectiveness. \[13\] While award given by Lok Adalat judges need not follow strict legal provisions or evidentiary requirements, the final order has the binding effect of a civil court decree. ## **Reach of ADR in Key Indian Sectors** **Commercial Dispute Resolution** Commercial disputes arising over contract breaches, payment claims, partnership fallouts etc. can rarely afford the delays of traditional three-tier Indian court system often running into years. Litigation also drains key resources and hampers business relationships with outcomes remaining continually under suspense. Opting for time-bound ADR procedures thus becomes imperative to resolve such disputes for regaining business momentum. Under the Commercial Courts Act, commercial disputes above INR 3 lacs get referred to arbitration or other ADR mechanisms by courts if substantial parts remain uncontested or parties display readiness to pursue amicable settlement. \[14\] Industries like construction, real estate, logistics etc. are including multi-tier ADR covering negotiation, mediation and arbitration in business contracts conforming to the arbitration law for timely settlement. **Intellectual Property Disputes Resolution** IP disputes related to areas like copyrights, trademark infringements and patent oppositions involve intricate technical and evidentiary issues. Adjudicatory ADR procedures allow specialized subject experts to evaluate merits based on niche domain knowledge. The Delhi High Court has proposed setting up India’s first international arbitration center focused exclusively on IP dispute resolution adopting global best practices. \[15\] Taxation and finance related arbitrations are also growing exponentially with over 250 tax disputes involving amounts totalling to INR 1.75 lakh crores getting covered under the ‘Vivad Se Vishwas’ Direct Tax dispute resolution scheme as on mid-2020. \[16\] The scheme promoted settling tax disputes through conciliatory payments instead of pursuing long arbitration or court battles. **Easing Docket Burden on Judiciary** The Chief Justice of India has strongly advocated for extensive use of ADR mechanisms by courts and tribunals to reduce pendency of cases across all levels. \[17\] Courts have been evolving various routes and guidelines for increased reliance on ADR procedures instead of full-fledged trials. For example, hiding vital facts from mediation to subsequently seek trial in courts will not be permissible where reasonable settlement possibilities exist as per Supreme Court ruling to prevent misuse of court resources. \[18\] The employed and self-employed middle income group got significant relief from long pending labour disputes with the EPF Appellate Tribunal agreeing for structured negotiation settlements. As per ministry data, this helped clearing 93% of the pending 75,000 EPF grievance and dispute cases. \[19\] Likewise, family court matters like annulments and divorce upon mutual consent are being referred by judges for mediation at first instance before taking up meritorious trials. Such steps reinforce India’s commitment towards just and speedy dispute resolution. ## Advantages of Embracing ADR **Win-win for parties** ADR processes allow parties to arrive at innovative and customized solutions aligned to interests rather than getting constrained by positions alone. Settlement terms can preserve relationships and enable sustainable remedies through engaging experts like child counselors and succession planners in case of family and inheritance disputes. \[20\] Parts of agreements can also be kept confidential as suited to business needs unlike rigid courtroom proceedings. **Quicker enforcement** Unlike endless adjournments and lengthy evidence hearings marking regular trials, ADR delivers resolution faster through structured processes like focused hearings and framed issues. Awards get recognition and enforcement as deemed decrees. Even settlement execution can avail simplified procedures like fast track Lok Adalat reconciliation without undergoing civil court execution formalities mandating lawyer representation again. \[21\] **Lower costs** Absence of tedious procedural compliance, lawyer fees for countless hearings and attendance of witnesses makes ADR more affordable. For small businessmen and individuals, opting for arbitration over litigation is 40% cheaper on average as per cost comparison studies. \[22\] Further ADR procedures like fast track arbitration are gaining momentum which economize resolution time and money resource of parties. **Confidentiality** ADR procedures offer confidentiality of proceedings which court trials seriously lack with advocates releasing details openly during case arguments. Protecting client interests by avoiding unwanted publicity remains paramount in disputes involving reputation, underlying medical reasons, family matters and commercial secrets. Online ADR methods are also evolving as customized ODR solutions which elevate privacy aspects. \[23\] **Technological integration** Adoption of technology is revolutionizing conventional ADR through online mediation, e-arbitration platforms, video conference hearings and AI expert bots for evaluation. ODR facilitates out-of-court settlements removing geographical limitations and physical appearance needs during pandemic. Evolving mobile apps even aid document submission, online fee payments, scheduling, and multi-party conferencing. \[24\] ## Challenges Faced in Mainstreaming ADR **Lack of awareness** Limited knowledge among public around adequacy of ADR and associated advantages relative to traditional justice delivery systems hampers adoption levels. Many still perceive them as informal mechanisms lacking statutory teeth and unable to protect rights adequately. Building confidence requires accelerating awareness drives through legal literacy camps, community participation and public-private partnerships. \[25\] **Inadequate infrastructure** India needs more dedicated ADR and mediation centers with panel of accredited experts covering diverse sectors and domains. Training resources for mediators and arbitrators also need enhancement to global standards. The Bangalore Mediation Center managed settlement rate of over 80% in referred cases displays the impact specialized centers make. \[26\] Judicial academies must prioritizeобав vibrant ADR ecosystem. \[27\] **Cost concerns** Though relatively affordable than litigation, growing professional costs of mediators and charges of arbitral institutions hinder sections from embracing ADR fully. Concerns also exist around unpredictable fee splitting, absence of model formats for non-administered arbitrations etc. Framing cost regime guidelines and graded fee structures can improve affordability. \[28\] The Karnataka government has taken welcome steps of recognizing Lok Adalats awards at par with civil court decrees for minimal costs. \[29\] **Reluctance to change** Entrenched socio-legal mindset viewing ADR solutions as informal continues blocking its growth trajectory beyond a certain base. Lawyers also hesitate promoting ADR voluntarily fearing loss of billing, while judges face subtle resistance to change in recommending referral suo moto. Building conviction for mainstreaming ADR as the first resort requires concerted steps. \[30\] ## Future Trajectory for ADR Growth The ADR landscape in India holds strong promise based on the sustained policy push and evolving regulatory architecture to facilitate affordable and timely access to justice. With over 30 million cases pending across Indian courts, ADR adoption becomes crucial for tackling case backlogs. \[31\] By 2024, the arbitration landscape in India is projected to grow into a billion dollar industry as per ASSOCHAM estimates indicating massive headroom for growth. Thrust areas would encompass strengthening arbitral institutions, grooming professionals, improving enforceability climate and fine-tuning arbitration-related regulatory aspects. \[32\] Increased inter-country commercial transactions also augurs well for international arbitration outlook. Having initiated historic judicial reforms like National Judicial Data Grid (NJDG), National Court Management Systems and establishment of commercial courts, embracing ADR wholeheartedly forms the logical next step. It would also bring India at par with evolved ADR ecosystems across countries like Singapore, France and Hong Kong facilitating their faster movement in contract enforcement and dispute resolution indices. \[33\] Overall there lies enormous potential in making ADR the preferred first mechanism to realize the vision of affordable and timely justice reaching the common man through collaborative efforts of the executive, legislature and the judiciary. Rather than undermining the litigation route, systematically easing the pressure on courts through ADR where dispute nature permits, can benefit the constitutional goal of justice delivery the most. ## References \[1\] The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 \[2\] The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 \[3\] Ho, K.Y.I. (2014). Control, Communication & Power: Study on Negotiation & Mediation in Intellectual Property Disputes. Asia Pacific Law Review, 22(2), 185-204. \[4\] Madhok, S. (2013). Role of Mediation: An Analysis. Journal of Legal Studies and Research, 1(5), 26-33. \[5\] Civil Procedure Code Amendment (2002), Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 \[6\] Afcons Infrastructure Ltd vs Cherian Verkay Constructions (P) Ltd (2010) 8 SCC 24 \[7\] The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 \[8\] The Indian Council of Arbitration \[9\] Associate Builders vs Delhi Development Authority (2014) \[10\] The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 \[11\] The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 \[12\] National Legal Services Authority [https://nalsa.gov.in](https://nalsa.gov.in/) \[13\] State Legal Services Authority Reports \[14\] Iram Majid, ADR in Commercial Disputes, Galgotias Journal of Legal Studies 1 (2021) \[15\] Manas Chandan & Sappho D’Souza, India: Delhi High Court’s IP Division Proposes to Establish India’s First International Arbitration Centre, Mondaq (2020) \[16\] Times of India, Nov 2020 [https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/) \[17\] Economic Times, Jul 2019 [https://economictimes.indiatimes.com](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/) \[18\] Afcons Infrastructure Ltd vs Cherian Verkay Constructions (P) Ltd (2010) 8 SCC 24 \[19\] The Times of India, Jul 2019 [https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/) \[20\] Madhok, S. (2013). Role of Mediation: An Analysis. Journal of Legal Studies and Research, 1(5), 26-33 \[21\] The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 \[22\] Jayanth K. Krishnan, Globetrotting Law Firms, 23 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 57 (2010) \[23\] Pavani Diwanji, Online Dispute Resolution: The India Perspective, 8(28) NLSIR 79 (2021) \[24\] Pavani Diwanji, Online Dispute Resolution: The India Perspective, 8(28) NLSIR 79 (2021) \[25\] Ho, K.Y.I. (2014). Control, Communication & Power: Study on Negotiation & Mediation in Intellectual Property Disputes. Asia Pacific Law Review, 22(2), 185-204. \[26\] Bangalore Mediation Centre [https://bangaloremediationcentre.kar.nic.in](https://bangaloremediationcentre.kar.nic.in/) \[27\] Mittal Rishi and Bafna Pallavi, Mediation Training Manual of India, Asia Pacific Mediation Forum 2017 \[28\] SA Ramesh, Arbitration Costs in India – Challenges and Solutions, MDA Consulting (2020) \[29\] Deccan Herald, Nov 2017 [https://www.deccanherald.com](https://www.deccanherald.com/) \[30\] Ho, K.Y.I. (2014). Control, Communication & Power: Study on Negotiation & Mediation in Intellectual Property Disputes. Asia Pacific Law Review, 22(2), 185-204. \[31\] Economic Times, Feb 2020 [https://economictimes.indiatimes.com](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/) \[32\] Times of India, Dec 2018 [https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/) \[33\] Singhania & Partners LLP, Nov 2018 [https://singhania](https://singhania/). **Categories:** Articles --- ### [12 Steps to Win Any Moot Court Competition: A Brief Guide to Mooting for Law Students](https://lawfoyer.in/12-steps-to-win-any-moot-court-competition/) **Published:** July 16, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![Moot Court](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/moot-court.png)Mooting is the art of legal argumentation, oration, and drafting. Mastering moot court requires diligence and dedication. With the right strategy and preparation, any law student can become a moot court champion. Follow these 12 proven steps to develop a winning moot court strategy: ## Step 1: Select the Right Moot Court Competition Choosing the ideal moot court competition is critical. Consider your interests and strengths. Opt for a moot with a problem involving an area of law you enjoy and excel in. If new to mooting, pick a less prestigious local moot to get experience before attempting national or international moots. [Read: Moot Court and Mooting ](https://lawfoyer.in/moot-court-and-mooting/) ## Step 2: Build a Strong Team for the Moot Court Assemble a moot team with complementary skills. Good researchers who love drafting and have strong legal knowledge make excellent researchers. Confident orators who think quickly on their feet are ideal moot speakers. Choose teammates who are disciplined, dedicated, and team players. [Read: Preparations for Moot Court](https://lawfoyer.in/preparations-for-a-moot-court/) ## Step 3: Analyze the Moot Court Proposition Thoroughly Read and re-read the moot problem until you have mastered the facts and committed the timeline to memory. Jot down the factual matrix before identifying legal issues and dividing research. Analyze issues by making sub-issues using elements and defenses. Break the problem down completely before moving to the next steps. [Read: Reading a Moot Problem and Framing of Issues](https://lawfoyer.in/reading-a-moot-court-problem-and-framing-of-legal-issues/) ## Step 4: Identify Issues Methodically Spotting issues accurately is critical. The key is finding where disputes arise between parties. List all potential issues and divide them into sub-issues based on elements, defenses, and procedures. Classify sub-issues as essential, defensive, procedural or factual. Making comprehensive sub-issues prevents important arguments from being missed. [Read: Reading a Moot Problem and Framing of Issues](https://lawfoyer.in/reading-a-moot-court-problem-and-framing-of-legal-issues/) ## Step 5: Research Intelligently Using the IRAC Method for the Moot Court - **I** – Issue - **R** – Research relevant cases, laws, articles - **A** – Analyze and apply the law - **C** – Conclude by summarizing your argument Research only the most relevant parts of materials. Focus on locating cases exactly on point by using filters. Go deep rather than wide. Quality over quantity. Cite a few strong cases rather than many peripheral ones. Synthesize research into tight legal arguments. [Read: Legal Research for Moot Court](https://lawfoyer.in/legal-research-for-a-moot-court-problem/) ## Step 6: Craft Persuasive Arguments in the Moot Court Memorandums Mooting is about persuasive advocacy. Use IRAC to build logical legal arguments. Apply the law precisely to the facts of the case. Support conclusions with binding precedent. Make arguments favoring your client while anticipating and defusing counterarguments. Demonstrate where the opposition is legally and factually wrong. [Read: Drafting of Moot Court Memorials and Framing of Arguments](https://lawfoyer.in/drafting-of-moot-court-memorial-and-framing-of-arguments/) ## Step 7: Draft Moot Court Memorial With Excellent Writing Quality Write clearly, coherently, and concisely. Organize arguments logically with smooth transitions between issues. Use plain English avoiding complex words and convoluted sentences. Edit out redundancies and any unsupported analysis or conclusions. Adhere to all formatting rules and include all required sections per competition guidelines. ## Step 8: Proofread the Moot Court Memorial Meticulously Proofreading is imperative with moot memorials. Check formatting, grammar, citations, and bluebooking thoroughly. Use plagiarism software and have peers review drafts. Refine arguments by addressing flaws peers identify. Verify every citation and quotation. Polish until the memorials are publication-worthy. ## Step 9: Practice Arguing Regularly The researchers should grill the orators using anticipated judges’ questions. Identify weak areas of arguments through practice. Refine responses to diffuse tough questions. Work on style elements like eye contact, posture and voice modulation. Focus replies directly on the legal merits to demonstrate substance over style. [Read: Court Mannerism and Oral Arguments in Moot Court](https://lawfoyer.in/court-mannerism-and-oral-arguments-in-moot-court/) ## Step 10: Refine Written Submissions Use insights gained through oral practice to further improve written submissions. Fix identified gaps in arguments by conducting additional targeted research. Strengthen suspect areas by finding new cases and evidence missed originally. Revise arguments to close loopholes opponents could exploit. ## Step 11: Conduct Final Moots Do multiple complete run-through moots weeks prior to the competition. Ensure all arguments flow logically and every point is supported with the strongest possible authority. Confirm orators can handle hard questions and rebuttals effectively. Internal moots build confidence and identify areas needing last-minute tweaking. ## Step 12: Stay Confident During the Actual Moot By following the first 11 steps diligently, you will be fully prepared when it is time to moot for real. Trust your abilities and have faith in the months of hard work. Stay positive. Do not get flustered by intense grilling. Stick to the arguments and cases in your memorials. Keep calm and moot on! Success at moot court requires immense time and effort. There are no shortcuts. Diligently following these 12 steps from start to finish equips you to moot like a champion. Mooting is challenging but immensely rewarding. Applying these strategies helps you master both written and oral advocacy, so you can triumph at any moot court competition. **CHECK SAMPLE MEMORIALS**: [Sample Memorial 1](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/LawFoyer_SampleMemorial-pdf.pdf) [Sample Memorial 2](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Moot-Memorial_Petitioner_Sample_LawFoyer_Assignment_Adda.pdf) ## References 1\) Wallace, J. Clifford. “The Moot Court Book: A Student Guide to Appellate Advocacy.” Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2017.) 2\) Griffith, J.D. “Championship Moot Court: Preparing for Competition.” Thomson Reuters, 2018. 3\) Martineau, Robert J. et al. “Appellate Advocacy: Principles and Practice.” 5th ed., Thomson Reuters, 2012. 4\) “A Law Student’s Guide to Mooting.” Law Society of Ireland, 2016, 5\) Kayali, Dina. “Handbook on Mooting and Mock Trials.” Middlesex University Dubai, 2015. **Categories:** Articles **Tags:** #law, article, law students, lawfoyer, lawyer, moot court, moot memorial, mooting, supreme court --- ### [MADHAV HAYAWADANRAO HOSKOT V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA](https://lawfoyer.in/madhav-hayawadanrao-hoskot-v-state-of-maharashtra/) **Published:** June 5, 2022 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **By: Gunjan Basrani** **In the Supreme Court of India** NAME OF THE CASE Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra CITATION AIR 1978 SCC 1548, (1978) 3 SCC 544. DATE OF THE CASE 17th August, 1978 APPELLEANT Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot RESPONDENT State of Maharashtra BENCH/JUDGES Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer Justice D.A. Desai Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy LEGAL PROVISIONS Sections 417, 467, 468, 471, and 511 of Indian Penal Code. Section 304 and Section 363 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Articles 19, 21, 22, 136, 142 and 39-A of the Constitution of India. ## **INTRODUCTION** India is a country of wide spread illiteracy and because of the prevailing illiteracy the majority of the people are not aware of their legal system and about their constitutional rights. People who are aware of their legal system and constitutional rights are not in a condition to utilize them because of their economic and social backwardness. They are unable to avail the services of the legal counsel in case of the violation of their rights as it has become the costly affairs. Therefore, the Parliament of India incorporated Article 39-A of the Constitution of India by the 42nd Amendment of Constitution in 1976 to impart free legal aid to the diverse sections of the population. According to P.N. Baghwati, “The legal aid means providing an arrangement in the society so that the missionary of administration of justice becomes easily accessible and is not out of reach of those who have to resort to it for enforcement of its given to them by law, the poor and illiterate should be able to approach the courts and their ignorance and poverty should not be an impediment in the way of their obtaining justice from the courts. Legal aid should be available to the poor and illiterate, who don’t have access to courts. One need not be a litigant to seek aid by means of legal aid.”[\[1\]](#_ftn1) In simple words, Legal Aid implies giving free legal assistance to the poverty-stricken masses who cannot avail the services of a lawyer for the conduct of a case or a legal proceeding in any court, tribunal or before an authority. It is a constitutional right as it is guaranteed by Article 21 and 39-A of the Constitution of India. The landmark judgement in the case of Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra established the importance of the legal aid and assistance in India.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) ## **BACKGROUND** At the time of formulation of Constitution of India, all the aspects, importance, and necessity of human’s life upliftment was considered as the motto of Constitution. Out of all this, the rights and duties of every individual was kept on dominant side. Every person is eligible to live with his rights and justice, what should be granted when needed. Free legal aid and assistance is one of the vital issues that was not properly confronted in the texts of Constitution at the initial stage of formation of Constitution. Several cases were held, several judgments were passed regarding the supremacy of the rights Taking in the view, the precedent, Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, Article 19 along with Article 21 as in the case, the bench observed that fair legal procedures are included in the personal liberty of any individual of India.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) So as in this case what we are going to discuss gave the landmark decision on the free legal aid and assistance that should be provided to the prisoner or any person who is poor or needy. According to the Articles 142 read with Article 21 and 39-A of the Constitution of India that the Constitution gives the power to the Courts to assign a lawyer for the imprisoned individual for full justice if the prisoner sentenced punishment of imprisonment is unable to perform his statutory or constitutional right of appeal including special permission to appear.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) Later on, various cases were discussed on the rights of prisoners and right to live with dignity in jail, for instance, the case of Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar but the main ingredients to all these certain aftermath cases can be solved by this very case of M.H. Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra (1978). ## **FACTS OF THE CASE** The Petitioner, Dr. Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot was a Reader in Saurashtra University who maintained to be a M.Sc and Ph.D holder. He was booked for the felony of venturing to concoct degree-certificates of the University and he was convicted of a grave crime under Sections 417, 467, 471 and 511 of Indian Penal Code, 1860. He was condemned to simple lifetime confinement and a penalty on the ground that he belonged to a middle-class family, that the modern emphasis is on the corrective aspect of punishment which cannot be ignored and that the Public Prosecutor had no objection to the light sentence.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) Thereupon, the Appellant and the State, both lodged discrete appeals in the High Courts. The Appellant argued against his conviction while the State filed the suit for increasing the sentence of imprisonment. The High Court enunciated the judgement in 1973 dismissing the plea of the Appellant and increasing the imprisonment for three years. A Special Leave Petition was filed by the petitioner in the Supreme Court of India after four years of the judgement of the High Court, i.e., in 1978. This delay is reasoned due to the late delivery of the copy of the judgement to the petitioner by the High Court.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) ## **ISSUES RAISED BEFORE THE COURT** 1. Whether the Special Leave Petition by the petitioner is maintainable in the Supreme Court or not? 2. Whether the Right to Free Legal Aid is covered under Article 21 of the Constitution of India? ## **CONTENTIONS** **Arguments from the Petitioner’s Side** 1. The learned counsel from the petitioner’s side contended that on December 10, 1973, the petitioner requested for the copy of the verdict of High Court through the jail administrations under Section 363(2) and Section 387 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, the copy of the judgement was never delivered to him. 2. It was further argued that as a result of non-delivery of the documents the petitioner lost his right to appeal through Special Leave Petition and the petitioner was forced to come up with a condonation petition after obtaining another certified copy from the High Court.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) 3. The learned counsel also highlighted the fact that there was no signature of the petitioner on the register for receiving the copy of the judgement. Hence, it is evident that the copy of the judgement was never handed over to the petitioner. **Arguments from the Respondent’s Side:** 1. The learned counsel from the respondent’s side argued that his client was not responsible for the delay. 2. It was contended that a clerk did dispatch the copy of the verdict of the High Court but later on it was taken back on the grounds that it needs to be enclosed with a mercy petition to the Government for remission of sentence. 3. As a result of the aforementioned fact, the copy of the judgement was delivered to the petitioner in 1978. ## **PROVISIONS RELATED TO THE CASE** **The Constitution of India, 1949** - Article 19 Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India guarantees to the citizens of India the following six fundamental freedoms:[\[8\]](#_ftn8) - Freedom of Speech and Expression - Freedom of Assembly - Freedom to form Association or Unions or Co-operative Societies - Freedom of Movement - Freedom to Reside and Settle - Freedom of Profession, Occupation, Trade or Business The restrictions on these freedoms are provided in clauses 2 to 6 of Article 19 of the Constitution. - Article 21 Article 21 of the Constitution of India guarantees protection of life and personal liberty. It states that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) - Article 22 Article 22 provides protection against arbitrary arrest and detention.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) - Article 39-A The State shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice, on a basis of equal opportunity, and shall, in particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in any other way, to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) - Article 136 Under Article 136, the Supreme Court in its discretion may grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter, passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India. This is called ‘Special Leave Petition’ (SLP).[\[12\]](#_ftn12) **The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973** - Section 304 Legal aid to accused at State expense in certain cases. (1) Where, in a trial before the Court of Session, the accused is not represented by a pleader, and where it appears to the Court that the accused has not sufficient means to engage a pleader, the Court shall assign a pleader for his defence at the expense of the State.[\[13\]](#_ftn13) (2) The High Court may, with the previous approval of the State Government, make rules providing for-[\[14\]](#_ftn14) (a) the mode of selecting pleaders for defence under sub- section (1); (b) the facilities to be allowed to such pleaders by the Courts; (c) the fees payable to such pleaders by the Government, and generally, for carrying out the purposes of sub- section (1). (3) The State Government may, by notification, direct that, as from such date as may be specified in the notification, the provisions of sub- sections (1) and (2) shall apply in relation to any class of trials before other Courts in the State as they apply in relation to trials before Courts of Session**.**[\[15\]](#_ftn15) - Section 363 Copy of judgement to be given to the accused and other persons. (1) When the accused is sentenced to imprisonment, a copy of the judgment shall, immediately after the pronouncement of the judgment, be given to him free of cost.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) (2) On the application of the accused, a certified copy of the judgment, or when he so desires, a translation in his own language if practicable or in the language of the Court, shall be given to him without delay, and such copy shall, in every case where the judgment is appealable by the accused, be given free of cost: Provided that where a sentence of death is passed or confirmed by the High Court, a certified copy of the judgment shall be immediately given to the accused free of cost whether or not he applies for the same.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) (3) The provisions of sub- section (2) shall apply in relation to an order under section 117 as they apply in relation to a judgment which is appealable by the accused.[\[18\]](#_ftn18) (4) When the accused is sentenced to death by any Court and an appeal lies from such judgment as of right, the Court shall inform him of the period within which, if he wishes to appeal, his appeal should be preferred.[\[19\]](#_ftn19) (5) Save as otherwise provided in sub- section (2), any person affected by a judgment or order passed by a Criminal Court shall, on an application made in this behalf and on payment of the prescribed charges, be given a copy of such judgment or order or of any deposition or other part of the record: Provided that the Court may, if it thinks fit for some special reason, give it to him free of cost.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) (6) The High Court may, by rules, provide for the grant of copies of any judgment or order of a Criminal Court to any person who is not affected by a judgment or order, on payment, by such person, of such fees, and subject to such conditions, as the High Court may, by such rules, provide.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) **The Indian Penal Code, 1860** - Section 417 Punishment for cheating: Whoever cheats shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) - Section 467 Forgery of valuable security, will, etc.: Whoever forges a document which purports to be a valuable security or a will, or an authority to adopt a son, or which purports to give authority to any person to make or transfer any valuable security, or to receive the principal, interest or dividends thereon, or to receive or deliver any money, movable property, or valuable security, or any document purporting to be an acquittance or receipt acknowledging the payment of money, or an acquittance or receipt for the delivery of any movable property or valuable security, shall be punished with \[imprisonment for life\], or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.[\[23\]](#_ftn23) - Section 471 Using as genuine a forged \[document or electronic record\]: Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine any \[document or electronic record\] which he knows or has reason to believe to be a forged \[document or electronic record\], shall be punished in the same manner as if he had forged such \[document or electronic record\].[\[24\]](#_ftn24) - Section 511 Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code says that the punishment for attempting to commit offences is punishable with the imprisonment for life or other imprisonments. It says that whosoever attempts to commit an offence will be punishable under this section either with the imprisonment or life imprisonment. If any attempt did for the commission of an offence then there will be no provision made by this Code for the punishment of such attempt, he will be punished for the imprisonment for the provided term which may extend to the one-half for the life or with a fine provided for the offence or by both.[\[25\]](#_ftn25) ## **JUDGEMENT** “One component of fair procedure is natural justice.” In the case of Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra, the concept of free legal was discussed and concluded to be the part of the Indian Constitution. In this case, a Special Leave Petition was filed by the petitioner after four years of the verdict of High Court as the copy of the judgement was furnished to the petitioner after four years of the judgement. The Supreme Court rejected the Special Leave Petition pleaded by the petitioner as the Court could not meddle with the concurrent findings of the two lower Courts. The Court further discussed Article 21 in this reference. It asserted that ‘freedom is what freedom does’ and Article 21 states that “no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law”[\[26\]](#_ftn26) means the procedure which is fair and reasonable. Hence, the first appeal to the High Court from the Sessions Court demonstrates the value sustained in Article 21.[\[27\]](#_ftn27) The Court also accentuated that the fair legal procedures is an essential part of Article 21 as illustrated in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India. Fair legal procedure includes Right to Appeal which consists of two essential ingredients: (1) service of a copy of a judgement to the prisoner in the time enable him to file an appeal, and (2) provision of free legal service to a prisoner who is indigent or otherwise disabled from securing legal assistance and these are the State responsibilities under Article 21.[\[28\]](#_ftn28) Hence, any Jailor who deliberately withholds the copy of the judgement and interfere the process of the Court violates Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Court further laid emphasis on Article 142 read with Article 21 and 39-A of the Constitution which empower the Court to allot lawyer for the imprisoned individual for full justice if the prisoner sentenced punishment of imprisonment is unable to perform his statutory or constitutional right of appeal including special permission to appear.[\[29\]](#_ftn29) ## **CONCLUSION** In the case of Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra, the petitioner was convicted under Sections 417, 467, 471 and 511 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and was condemned to simple lifelong imprisonment till the rising of the Court and a fine. Thereafter, two petitions were filed one by the State and on by the petitioner in the High Court. The High Court dismissed the petition of the petitioner and increased the term of imprisonment to three years. The petitioner knocked the door of the Supreme Court through Special Leave Petition in 1978. Although the High Court gave its judgement in 1973. This delay was due to the late delivery of the copy of the judgement to the petitioner. The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition yet it thought it appropriate to discuss and highlight the provision of free legal aid and assistance. In my opinion, the judgement is pertinent as the case not only discuss about the position of the free legal aid and assistance in India but it goes to an extent and discuss about the right to appeal of the prisoner, duties of the authorities in furnishing the copies of the verdict and the duty of the State to provide legal services. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) \[last visited on May 19, 2022\] [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) \[last visited on May 19, 2022\] [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Supra note 2. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Ibid. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) \[last visited on May 20, 2022\] [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Supra note 2. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Supra Note 3. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India,1949. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Article 21 of the Constitution of India,1949. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Article 22 of the Constitution of India, 1949. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Article 39-A of the Constitution of India, 1949. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Article 136 of the Constitution of India, 1949. [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Section 304(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) Section 304(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) Section 304(3) of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Section 363(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) Section 363(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Section 363(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Section 363(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) Section 363(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) Section 363(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) Section 417 of the Indian Penal Code,1860. [\[23\]](#_ftnref23) Section 467 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. [\[24\]](#_ftnref24) Section 471 of the Indian Penal Code,1860. [\[25\]](#_ftnref25) Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. [\[26\]](#_ftnref26) Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1949. [\[27\]](#_ftnref27) Supra note 2. [\[28\]](#_ftnref28) JN Pandey, Constitutional Law of India, 325 (55th Edition) [\[29\]](#_ftnref29) Supra note 2. **Categories:** Case Analysis **Tags:** #law, #lawfoyer, #lawyer, #MADHAV HAYAWADANRAO HOSKOT, #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, article, case analysis, case summary, lawfoyer --- ### [6th edition of National Moot Court Competition by Amity University Rajasthan: Register by October 5, 2023](https://lawfoyer.in/6th-edition-of-national-moot-court-competition-by-amity-university-rajasthan/) **Published:** September 18, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Poster-889b562e10a6a5c7c719cd8c6d0536cb-Medium.jpg)## **About the Competition:** The Moot Court Society (MCS) of Amity School of Law, Amity University Rajasthan is organizing the 6th edition of National Moot Court Competition on October 31- November 1, 2023. The objective of the competition is to develop academic and advocacy excellence among students and inculcate the spirit of leadership and teamwork, leading to academic and professional excellence. The Moot Court Society (MCS) is a student led initiative that works hand in hand with the college administration to plan, train, and organize moot court-related activities. ## **About Amity Law School, Amity University Rajasthan:** The Amity Law School has been established in the year 2008 approved by the Bar Council of India. ALS is offering courses in Ph.D., LL.M, BA.LL. B(H), B.Com. LL. B(H), B.B.A. LL. B(H). Amity Law School with its holistic approach to legal education provides impetus to law students to evolve into not only legal professionals but also as responsible and socially empathetic citizens of the State. ## **Venue**: Block-D, Amity Law School, Amity University Rajasthan, SP-1 Kant Kalwar, NH11C, RIICO Industrial Area, Rajasthan 303002 ## **Registration Details:** 1. Registration Fees: Rs 2100 + 18 % GST. 2. The participant team can pay the ‘event registration’ **[here](https://www.amity.edu/jaipur/mootcourtjaipur2023/).** Fill in the details asked and choose the ‘Event registration’ to proceed with the registration. Take a screenshot of the payment success page. 3. After the payment, register the team [**here**](https://forms.gle/UbWNZagrPtVdwoYu7) and upload the payment screenshot. The registration shall only be considered complete after filling out this Google form. **Note**: **The first 40 teams would be registered on “first come first serve” basis.** ## **Structure of the Competition:** - **Preliminary & Quarter-Finals Round:** October 31, 2023 - **Semi-Final Round & Final Round:** November 1, 2023 ## **Important Dates:** - **For Seeking Clarifications:** 30th September 2023 - **Releasing of Clarifications:** 4th October 2023 - **Last date of registration:** 5th October 2023 - **For Submission of Memorial (Soft Copy):** 20th October 2023 - **Date of the Competition:** 31st October – 1st November 2023 ## **Awards:** Prizes worth Rs. 1.9 Lakh to be awarded including for the winners. - **Winner**: Trophy, Certificate of Appreciation, Cash Prize and 1 Year complimentary subscription to EBC Learning worth Rs. 14,500 each - **Runners up**: Trophy, Certificate of Appreciation and Cash Prize - **Best Memorial**: Trophy, Certificate of Appreciation and Cash Prize - **Best Speaker** (from Preliminary Rounds): Trophy, Certificate of Appreciation and Cash Prize - **1 month access to the SCC Online Web Edition worth Rs.1099 and participation certificate to each participant.** ## **Contact Information:** For any queries, kindly write to or contact any of the following persons: **Faculty coordinators:** 1\. Dr. Zeeshan Hussain Hashmi: +91-9983991749 2\. Ms. Alisha Verma: +91- 7023865977 **Student Convenors:** 1\. Jhanvi Aggarwal- +91-9817526909 2\. Shreya Nayak- +91-8306696062 **Student coordinators:** 1\. Muskan Gupta- +91-9511311369 2\. Abhishek Bansal- +91-8580625353 For detailed information relating to the competition, refer the [Brochure](https://drive.google.com/file/d/14A71tDoUY1cXNXAXju6S_b5U-sX8gwS1/view?usp=drive_link). [Download Brochure](https://drive.google.com/file/d/14A71tDoUY1cXNXAXju6S_b5U-sX8gwS1/view?usp=drive_link) **Categories:** Events **Tags:** #amity, #Amity University Rajasthan, #law, #moot, lawfoyer --- ### [9th National Quiz Competition on (Indian Constitution + Indian Polity) by LawFoyer](https://lawfoyer.in/9th-national-quiz-competition-on-indian-constitution-indian-polity-by-lawfoyer/) **Published:** November 13, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Quiz-Competition-Poster-Small.jpg) --- [Download Answer Key](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/answer-key-9th-National-Quiz-Competition-on-Constitution-of-India-and-Indian-Polity.pdf) --- [Check Results](https://lawfoyer.in/results-of-9th-national-quiz-competition-on-indian-constitution-indian-polity-by-lawfoyer/) --- [Download Certificates](https://lawfoyer.in/download-9th-national-quiz-competition-on-indian-constitution-indian-polity-certificates/) --- ## Dates - **Date of Quiz:-26/11/2023** **(5 Pm)** - **Last Date to Apply:-** **24/11/2023, 11:59 pm** - **Result Declaration:-** **01/12/2023** ## Prizes - **1st Prize – 2000 Rs** **+ Certificate of excellence** - **2nd Prize – 1000 Rs** **+ Certificate of excellence** - **3rd Prize – 500 Rs** **+ Certificate of excellence** - **4th-10th Prize- 200 Rs** **+ Certificate of excellence** - **FREE Practice E-Books with 1000+ MCQs** - **FREE Mock Test + 1000 FREE Legal Drafts** - **Certificate of Appreciation for All the Participants** - **Free 2 Turnitin Plagiarism Reports worth Rs. 200 for each Participants.** - **Discount Coupons of Assignment Adda by LawFoyer** ## **Registration Fees** - **Rs 99/- Only** - Secure your celebrations with **code”LF15″** and get 15% off! 🛡️🎉. Hurry up offer valid till today only. ## **Important Guidelines** - **Format of Quiz:** Quiz shall take place online, and a paper will include multiple-choice questions**.** - The participant can take this exam on their laptop or mobile phone. - The platform for the quiz will be google Forms, Microsoft Forms, etc. - In the case of the same marks, time will be considered (a person who submits early will be given preference). - The link will be shared 24 hours prior to the start of the quiz. ## **Rules & Regulations** - **50 MCQ(s).** - The time allotted will be **25** minutes. (This includes time for filling the basic details like Name, email, etc.) - **Every question carries 04 marks & there will be no negative marking.** - The Result will be declared on **01st December 2023** ([www.lawfoyer.in](https://lawfoyer.in/)) --- **Categories:** Events, Quiz --- ### [JACOB PULIYEL V. UNION OF INDIA](https://lawfoyer.in/jacob-puliyel-v-union-of-india/) **Published:** June 23, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **MISS VAISHNAVI KRUSHNA PARATE**[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1) NAME OF THE CASE JACOB PULIYEL V. UNION OF INDIA CITATION WP(C) 607 OF 2021DATE OF THE CASE2ND MAY 2022PETITIONERJACOB PULIYELRESPONDENTUNION OF INDIABENCH/JUDGES L NAGESWARA RAO AND MR. BHUSHAN RAMKRISHNA GAVASTATUTES/CONSTITUTION THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIAIMPORTANT SECTIONS/ARTICLES ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA## ABSTRACT The COVID-19 pandemic left very drastic effects on every country of the globe. India is not exempt from the effects of the same, which has inflicted havoc on the entire planet. India has been among the pandemic’s worst-affected nations with over 18 million confirmed cases and over 200,000 fatalities.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) The government made sure that every citizen must be vaccinated for their health concerns. Vaccination is mandatory as a disease prevention measure. The government has made vaccination mandatory to ensure that a larger section of the populace is protected against the virus. This is especially important because India’s healthcare infrastructure is less advanced than that of other nations. “Mass vaccination is essential for preventing the issues caused by the virus and from becoming overworked in a population of over 1.3 billion.”[\[3\]](#_ftn3) ## INTRODUCTION The health of every individual is a major issue for not only a person but also the whole country. In the constitution of India under Article 21 every citizen has been given the right to life. Even under many provisions, there are restrictions imposed as subject to public health and peace. In the given case when India was suffering from the virus attack the government of India was taking all the preventive measures and doing their best to protect people from any kind of disease. On May 2, 2022, the Supreme Court of India rendered a decision in the case of [Jacob Puliyel v. Union of India](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/17990001/).[\[4\]](#_ftn4) The case centred on several aspects of India’s immunisation practises, including the dissemination of clinical trial data, the veracity of emergency vaccine approvals, and the reporting of unfavourable vaccination effects.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) However, “the question of mandatory vaccination of individuals was brought up in a case before the Supreme Court in the form of a writ petition. The protection of individual rights is discussed.” ## FACTS OF THE CASE - Mr Jacob Puliyel, a former member of the National Advisory Technical Group. He filed the public interest litigation before the Hon’ble supreme court. He asked to disclose the data related to trials of the vaccines and also mentioned that compelling vaccination to the citizens is unfair and unconstitutional.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) - Further he contends, the unfavourable effects of India’s emergency vaccine approval, the requirement for transparency when disaggregated clinical trial data for vaccinations are published, the Lack of openness in the regulatory approval process, the expert bodies’ minutes and bylaws, Adverse Events Following Immunisation (AEFIs) (vi) poor evaluation, this is unconstitutional to require vaccinations in the absence of informed consent.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) - In this case the petitioner wants to know, if is vaccination necessary for all or if it is just an exercise of arbitrary power of the government. He requested all the main authorities who are connected with this procedure to provide him with all the details about vaccines. ## ISSUES 1. Are the vaccination requirements in violation of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution? 2. Does the public have access to the separate clinical trial data? 3. Were Adverse Events Following Immunisation (AEFIs) improperly collected and reported? 4. Whether immunisation is safe for children? ## ARGUMENTS OF PETITIONER - The petitioner in this case claimed that the vaccination requirements imposed by the Indian government and several state governments were unlawful and coercive. - Petitioner further stated that vaccines were ineffective against some varieties and may still be spread by both vaccinated and unprotected people & the natural immunity gained after catching COVID-19 was more effective than vaccines.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) - It was also contended by the petitioner that vaccination requirements were put in place for the benefit of the general public and were frequently updated in response to how the pandemic was progressing. - The petitioner claimed that the government lacked a sufficient procedure for reporting adverse events and deaths that occurred after patients got Covid-19 vaccines. The Union of India countered that they adhered to established processes for tracking the negative side effects of vaccinations and that the COWIN portal included tools for reporting any such occurrences.[\[10\]](#_ftn10) The Court discovered that there was a clear procedure in place for gathering information on unfavorable incidents, including reports from private medical professionals.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) According to the petitioner, there may be more risks associated with vaccine administration for youngsters than advantages, and young people have been known to experience negative reactions. Petitioner also pointed that lot of kids have already grown immunity to COVID-19. ## ARGUMENTS OF RESPONDENT[\[13\]](#_ftn13) - Union of India (UOI), the respondent, argued that judicial review should not be used to influence the judgements made by domain specialists concerning vaccinations and related practises. In addition, the UOI argued that the Petitioner’s concerns could exacerbate already present vaccine reluctance in the nation. - The UOI argued that in delicate public health situations like the Covid-19 pandemic and related immunisation, the Court should follow governmental decisions made in light of expert opinion and advice. - The UOI said that while the vaccinations are both safe and effective, any discussion of them will only spread the nation’s already widespread vaccine hesitancy. Additionally, it was asserted that the issuance of vaccination emergency authorizations and any accompanying clinical trials all take place within the boundaries of the nation’s legal system. - The UOI argued that strict adherence to the National Adverse Event Following Immunisation Surveillance Guidelines was required for the monitoring of adverse events following immunisation. The UOI further said that the COWIN portal had set up procedures for reporting all AEFIs. A team of certified topic experts performs timely reviews, analyses, and causality assessments on all cases of severe AEFIs, including reported deaths. It was made clear that until demonstrated otherwise by a causality evaluation analysis, the mere reporting of an AEFI case should not be used to blame the vaccine. ## JUDGEMENT The court found that no one can be forced to receive immunisations by Article 21[\[14\]](#_ftn14) of the Indian Constitution, which protects bodily freedom. People have the freedom to decide whether or not they want to get immunised, as well as the freedom to do anything they choose with their lives and the right to refuse medical treatment. If a person chooses not to get vaccinated, no one can make them. Furthermore, it was found that the government’s restrictions are necessary considering how difficult it will be to control occurrences in such open spaces. Within a year of the conclusion of the study, it was decided that clinical trial results should be publicised and made available to the public. It must be openly available and cost nothing. The court determined that the government’s vaccination campaign was appropriate in the interest of public health notwithstanding the virus’s dynamic character. However, it also ruled that because Article 21 [\[15\]](#_ftn15) protects bodily integrity, citizens cannot be coerced into receiving vaccinations. The court suggested that if there is evidence that unvaccinated people may spread the infection and harm public health, restriction measures may be imposed on them. Additionally, the court advised that all authorities reassess their vaccination requirements and make sure that any limits are reasonable given the COVID-19 scenario.[\[16\]](#_ftn16) When deciding whether or not to get immunized, the public will be well-informed and knowledgeable since they will have access to all meeting information that is related to the public domain. Regarding the third issue, the Court has provided detailed instructions on how to monitor, evaluate, and notify the appropriate authorities of the occurrence of AEF. The Court ensured that the AFI system would not jeopardise the quick review and assessment procedure in operation at the national level. The Union of India is required to make it easier for patients and private doctors to report alleged adverse effects online.[\[17\]](#_ftn17) These reports must be made public after receiving individual identification numbers and not include any private or sensitive information about the people who made them. The government shall take all necessary measures to ensure that this self-reporting mechanism is known and understood from the start of vaccination administration, including hiring and training the essential parties. The Court is unable to decide the security of vaccines and related services, it was decided. “It was determined that the paediatric vaccination complied with the recommendations of other agencies, including WHO and UNICEF, as well as with the general body of scientific knowledge.”[\[18\]](#_ftn18) ## RATIO DECIDENDI The government has the power to take reasonable actions to preserve the public’s health, including requiring vaccination in some circumstances, the court ruled. Although the safety and efficacy of vaccines are a matter of scientific debate, the government has the right to do so. “The court supported the government’s decision to require COVID-19 immunisation for select groups, including frontline workers and healthcare professionals, as being within its powers and not violating any fundamental rights.”[\[19\]](#_ftn19) The court emphasised the necessity of obtaining agreement from patients before giving vaccines, as well as the necessity of ensuring that people are properly educated about the risks and advantages of vaccination. The court dismissed the writ petitioner, ruling that no one can be forced to have a vaccination and that the restrictions put in place on people were not arbitrary.[\[20\]](#_ftn20) The public’s health was the main reason the restrictions were placed in place. The outcomes of the trials ought to be made public while yet respecting each person’s right to privacy. The court had no control over the safety of the immunisations because the vaccination corresponds with the scientific consensus. ## **The court denied the petitioner’s alleged Writ Petition.** Here, it’s crucial to remember that the Court made a particularly thorough comment on personal autonomy and reaffirmed the idea that such autonomy should be respected and that any mandate to the contrary must be well-founded and reasonable.[\[21\]](#_ftn21) This case highlights the current court opinion that any arbitrary interference with personal autonomy would be judged illegal and, to that extent, executive decisions will be subject to judicial review even if they are made about important public concerns. Having said so, it must be emphasised that the court considered both the circumstances of the past and the present while making its observations.[\[22\]](#_ftn22) ## CONCLUSION The court denied the petitioner’s alleged Writ Petition. No one may be forced to have the vaccination, and the government’s present vaccination policy addressing the limitations placed on people is not arbitrary. The government has the power to impose limits on people’s right to bodily autonomy while still protecting the general welfare. The Court ruled that as long as the number of cases is minimal, there should be no barriers preventing people from entering public spaces, and if there are any, they should be removed right away. All information gathered throughout the COVID vaccination trials, including information about upcoming tests, should be made public while still respecting peoples’ right to privacy. The decision of the court was totally in favour of public health and safety. It is the responsibility of the government to take such strict decisions or preventive steps in the pandemic situation for the betterment of the people. Even if sometimes prima facie it deems that such rules or regulations are violating the fundamental rights of an individual but after giving it a second thought or after a deep study a person gets to know the approach and protocols behind such decisions. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) LLB 6TH SEM STUDENT AT SHRI NATHMAL GOENKA LAW COLLEGE, AKOLA MAHARASHTRA [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) ‘Coercive Vaccination! Explaining the Jacob Puliyel v. Union of India Case | India Corporate Law’ accessed 18 June 2023. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Ibid. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) ‘Jacob Puliyel vs Union Of India on 2 May, 2022’ accessed 18 June 2023. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) ‘JACOB PULIYEL VS UNION OF INDIA’ (*The Amikus Qriae*, 29 September 2022) accessed 18 June 2023. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) Ibid. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Indian Legal Solution, ‘Case Analysis: – Jacob Puliyel v. Union of India’ (*Indian Legal Solution*, 30 April 2023) accessed 18 June 2023. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) Ibid. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Khaitan & Co, ‘Https://Www.Khaitanco.Com/Thought-Leaderships/Supreme-Courts-No-Mandatory-Vaccination-Mandate-What-It-Means-for-Employers’ (*Khaitan & Co*) accessed 18 June 2023. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Jacob Puliyel, ‘IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION’. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) Ibid. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) ‘JACOB PULIYEL VS UNION OF INDIA’ (n 5). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Jacob Puliyel, ‘IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION’. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) ‘Article 21 in The Constitution Of India 1949’ accessed 5 June 2023. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) ibid. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) ‘Coercive Vaccination! Explaining the Jacob Puliyel v. Union of India Case | India Corporate Law’ (n 2). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) ‘Jacob Puliyel vs Union Of India on 2 May, 2022’ (n 4). [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Ibid. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) Solution (n 7). [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) ‘Coercive Vaccination! Explaining the Jacob Puliyel v. Union of India Case | India Corporate Law’ (n 2). [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) Puliyel (n 15). [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) Ibid. **Categories:** Case Analysis **Tags:** #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, case analysis, case summary, JACOB PULIYEL, JACOB PULIYEL V. UNION OF INDIA, lawfoyer --- ### [Smt. Aneeta And Another vs State of U.P. And 3 Others](https://lawfoyer.in/smt-aneeta-and-another-vs-state-of-u-p-and-3-others/) **Published:** June 22, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **By Ashmit Sen[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)** **In the Allahabad High Court** **NAME OF THE CASE****Smt. Aneeta And Another vs State of U.P. And 3 Others** **CITATION****WRIT – C No. – 14443 of 2021** **DATE OF THE CASE****29 July, 2021.****PETITIONER****Smt. Aneeta And Another** **RESPONDENT****State Of U.P. And 3 Others** **BENCH/JUDGE****Justice Kaushal Jayendra Thaker, Justice Subhash Chand****STATUTES INVOLVED****The Constitution of India, The Hindu Marriage Act****IMPORTANT SECTIONS/ARTICLES****Constitution of India – Articles 21 and 22** **The Hindu Marriage Act – Section 5** ## **ABSTRACT** The present case deals with the issue whether a person, who is already married according to Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 can stay with another person and ask for granting protection, while being in the marriage. According to the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, bigamy is not legal, and it does not give sanctity to illicit relations. The High Court of Allahabad, in this present case, had rightly given the judgement against the petitioners who were asking for protection to be granted to them by denying granting them such protection, even though they were not married, against respondent no. 4 who was the legally wedded husband of petitioner no. 1. ## **INTRODUCTION** Marriage is a social practice through which two people and their families unite which gives rise to conjugal rights. The word conjugal means rights which arise between husband and wife after marriage. Marriage is one of the oldest sacraments in the society. It is a universal social institution which brings men and women into family life where they are socially permitted to have children. According to Gillin and Gillin, “Marriage is a socially approved way of establishing a family of procreation.”[\[2\]](#_ftn2) The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines Marriage as “the state of being united as spouses in a consensual and contractual relationship recognized by law.”[\[3\]](#_ftn3) The essential elements of a valid Hindu Marriage have been given in Section 5 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 which states that a marriage may be solemnized between any two Hindus, if the following conditions are fulfilled[\[4\]](#_ftn4), namely: – 1\. neither party has a spouse living at the time of the marriage; 2\. at the time of the marriage, neither party – (a) is incapable of giving a valid consent to it in consequence of unsoundness of mind; or (b) though capable of giving a valid consent, has been suffering from mental disorder of such a kind or to such an extent as to be unfit for marriage and the procreation of children; or (c) has been subject to recurrent attacks of insanity. 3\. the bridegroom has completed the age of twenty-one years and the bride has completed the age ofeighteen years at the time of the marriage; 4\. the parties are not within the degrees of prohibited relationship unless the custom or usage governing each of them permits of a marriage between the two; 5\. the parties are not sapindas of each other, unless the custom or usage governing each of them permits of a marriage between the two. In the present case, respondent no.4, Devendra Kumar was the legally wedded husband, according to the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955, of the petitioner no.1, Smt. Aneeta, who was not married to petitioner no.2, but she was having a relationship with him because of apathetic and torturing behaviour of respondent no.4. While she was living with him, respondent no.4 had tried to endanger their peaceful lives. Hence, both of them approached the court, as petitioners, for granting them protection under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India by issuing a writ of mandamus against Respondent No. 4 to which the Court had denied granting such protection as it cannot legalise the illicit relationship between petitioner no. 1 and petitioner no. 2 while petitioner no. 1 remained married to respondent no. 4 according to the provisions of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. ## **FACTS OF THE CASE** The fact of the case is that respondent no.4, Devendra Kumar was the legally wedded husband, according to the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955, of the petitioner no.1, Smt. Aneeta, who was not married to petitioner no.2, but she was having a relationship with him because of apathetic and torturing behaviour of respondent no.4. While she was living with him, respondent no.4 had tried to endanger their peaceful lives. Hence, both of them approached the court, as petitioners, for granting them protection under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India by issuing a writ of mandamus against Respondent No. 4. ## **ISSUES RAISED BEFORE THE COURT** 1. Whether the Court can grant protection to Petitioner No. 1 and Petitioner No. 2, who are in an illicit relationship, under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India by issuing a writ of mandamus against Respondent No. 4, who is the legally wedded husband of Petitioner No. 1 according to the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955? ## **ARGUMENTS FROM THE PETITIONER SIDE** Learned counsel for the petitioners had submitted that respondent no.4 was the husband of the petitioner no.1, Smt. Aneeta, who was not married to petitioner no.2, but she was having relationship with him because of apathetic and torturing behaviour of respondent no.4 but as she was living with him, respondent no.4 had tried to endanger their peaceful lives. Hence, it was argued that they should be protected, and the relief prayed before the court was to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent no.2 to protect and enforce the fundamental right of the petitioners to life and personal liberty as guaranteed under Article 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India and to ensure the safety and protection of the petitioners as well to ensure no further hindrance was caused in their happy marital life, and the petitioners should not be harassed in any way by the local police or by the respondent no.4 or his associates in any manner whatsoever. ## **ARGUMENTS FROM THE RESPONDENT SIDE** The Counsel for the respondent side had argued that a person who was already married under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 cannot seek protection of this Court for an illicit relationship, which was not within the purview of social fabric of this country and hence, protection under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India by issuing a writ of mandamus against Respondent No. 4 should not be granted to the petitioners. ## **RELATED PROVISIONS** - **The Constitution of India, 1950:** **Article 21 – “**Protection of life and personal liberty No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”[\[5\]](#_ftn5) **Article 22 – “**Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases 1. No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) 2. Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate.[\[7\]](#_ftn7) 3. Nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall apply (a) to any person who for the time being is an enemy alien; or (b) to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) 4. No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless (a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention.[\[9\]](#_ftn9) 5. When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order[\[10\]](#_ftn10). 6. Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority making any such order as is referred to in that clause to disclose facts which such authority considers to be against the public interest to disclose.[\[11\]](#_ftn11) 7. Parliament may by law prescribe – 8. the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period longer than three months under any law providing for preventive detention without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board in accordance with the provisions of sub clause (a) of clause (4).[\[12\]](#_ftn12) 9. the maximum period for which any person may in any class or classes of cases be detained under any law providing for preventive detention[\[13\]](#_ftn13); and 10. the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board in an inquiry under sub clause (a) of clause (4) Right against Exploitation.[\[14\]](#_ftn14)” - **The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955:** **Section 5 –** “**Conditions for a Hindu marriage. –** A marriage may be solemnized between any two Hindus, if the following conditions are fulfilled, namely: – (i) neither party has a spouse living at the time of the marriage[\[15\]](#_ftn15); \[(ii) at the time of the marriage, neither party – (a) is incapable of giving a valid consent to it in consequence of unsoundness of mind; or (b) though capable of giving a valid consent, has been suffering from mental disorder of such a kind or to such an extent as to be unfit for marriage and the procreation of children; or (c) has been subject to recurrent attacks of insanity \[\*\*\*\];\][\[16\]](#_ftn16) (iii) the bridegroom has completed the age of\[twenty-one years\] and the bride, the age of\[eighteen years\] at the time of the marriage[\[17\]](#_ftn17); (iv) the parties are not within the degrees of prohibited relationship unless the custom or usage governing each of them permits of a marriage between the two[\[18\]](#_ftn18); (v) the parties are not sapindas of each other, unless the custom or usage governing each of them permits of a marriage between the two.[\[19\]](#_ftn19)” ## **JUDGEMENT** The High Court of Allahabad had relied upon the case of **Smt. Premwati and another v. State of U.P. and others**[\[20\]](#_ftn20), where such petition was rejected. The Court, in this present case, had stated that – “We hold that we are not against granting protection to people who want to live together irrespective of the fact as to which community, caste, or sex they belong to. If Devendra Kumar, who is legally wedded husband of petitioner no.1 has barged into the house of petitioner no.2, it is in the realm of criminal dispute for which she can move to the criminal machinery available in the country. But none law abiding citizen who is already married under the Hindu Marriage Act, can seek protection of this Court for illicit relationship, which is not within the purview of social fabric of this country. The sanctity of marriage pre-supposes divorce. If she has any difference with her husband, she has first to move for getting separated from her spouse as per law applicable to the community if Hindu Law does not apply to her.”[\[21\]](#_ftn21) The Court, hence, did not permit the parties to such illegality as in future, petitioners might approach this court conveying that the judges have sanctified illicit relations. The Court further stated that live-in-relationships could not be at the cost of social fabric of this Country and by directing the police to grant protection to the petitioners in this case, might indirectly show that the judges had given their assent to such illicit relations. Hence, the Court dismissed the petition with an exemplary cost of Rs.5,000/- to be deposited by the petitioners within two weeks from the date the judgement was given. However, the Court also made it clear that the Bench was not against live-in-relationships but was against illegal relations. ## **CONCLUSION** The High Court of Allahabad had rightly differentiated between live-in relationships and illicit relations and had given its stand that the Bench was not against live-in-relationships but was against illegal relations. The provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act do not allow a person to have illicit relations with another person, while being legally married to someone else. The facts of the present case show that the respondent no. 4, the husband of petitioner no. 1 had tortured her which forced her to live with petitioner no. 2, but the Court rightly cannot grant protection to them as the relationship between petitioner no. 1 and petitioner no. 2 was not legal as Smt. Aneeta (Petitioner No. 1), was still the lawfully wedded wife of respondent no. 4, Devendra Kumar. The court had also rightly pointed out that first, petitioner no. 1 had to move for getting separated from her husband by divorce, then only can the court grant the petitioners protection under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution otherwise, in future, there might be several cases of such instance where petitioner might pray for legalising their illicit relations which is not all desirable. Hence, protection could not be granted but the petitioners can move to the criminal machinery available as respondent no. 4 had barged into the house of petitioner no. 2. In my view, this decision is absolutely correct otherwise such cases of praying for legalisation of illicit relationships may happen even more in this country if the High Court would have granted the petitioners protection which might have indirectly given the inference that the Court had sanctified the illicit relationship of the petitioners. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) 4th Semester Student at St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Navendu K. Thakur, An Introduction to Sociology, Page 141, 2nd Edition, 2016. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Merriam-Webster Dictionary, (Last visited on June 19, 2023). [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) Dr. Paras Diwan, Family Law, Page 42, 12th Edition, 2021. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 21. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 22(1). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 22(2). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 22(3). [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 22(4). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 22(5). [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 22(6). [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 22(7)(a). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 22(7)(b). [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 22(7)(c). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 5(i). [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 5(ii). [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 5(iii). [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 5(iv). [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) See The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Sec. 5(v). [\[20\]](#_ftnref20)Smt. Premwati and another v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 2021, Writ-C No. 11295 of 2021. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) Indian Kanoon, (Last visited on June 19, 2023). **Categories:** Case Analysis **Tags:** #Supreme court, Aneeta, case analysis, case summary, High Court of Allahabad, lawfoyer, Smt. Aneeta And Another --- ### [The Inauguration of the 5th Faculty Development Program at Amity University in Lucknow](https://lawfoyer.in/the-inauguration-of-the-5th-faculty-development-program-at-amity-university-in-lucknow/) **Published:** June 20, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/7NtAFXnuIw9_FgCRBpWRLlXfSUFzfZO7c45mxNhFfLM_plaintext_638228397507936259-1024x767.jpg) On the date of June 19th, the inauguration of the 5th FACULTY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM at Amity University in Lucknow took place. The program commenced with the blessings of Prof. Dr. J.P. Yadav, the Director of Law, who emphasized the need for conducting such programs continuously for a bright future. The Deputy Pro Vice-Chancellor, Wg. Cdr. (Dr.) Anil Kumar, of Amity University, acknowledged the importance of the program, stating, “I appreciate that Amity Law School is consistently promoting such programs, and praised the significance of the field of law. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/ut3nVR9VGHgo-1pPRmOCWge2SYAJR4Qj-1r0bB-YpiE_plaintext_638228397508216323-1024x694.jpg) In his speech, the chief guest, Prof. Dr. S. Shantakumar, Director of Gujarat National Law University, highlighted the impact of live-in relationships, same-sex marriage, the uniform civil code, the Hindu Marriage Act, and the Muslim Marriage Act in today’s society. He familiarized us with the essential utility of a particular legal English book called “Lord Denning’s Process of Law.” He explained how an integrated course of law for 5 years has been introduced to facilitate students in comprehending legal principles and their connection to society. Continuing the discussion on this topic, he shed light on the understanding of sociology and incorporated other subjects such as history, political science, and economics into the legal framework. Regarding modern technology, he mentioned that as beneficial as it is for us, it can also be detrimental to humanity, like chatbots like GPT. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/LOmQHsRJxwdrZSMs9aTxfGJ0IQM8Bn34578-NQpGkuE_plaintext_638228397508576323-1024x626.jpg) Prof. Dr. Preeti Saxena, the Director of Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar University, our keynote. speaker emphasized the need to incorporate the conference on law with other innovations. She provided insights into the importance of knowledge about other contemporary approaches. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/WhatsApp-Image-2023-06-20-at-11.41.50-1-1024x714.jpg) Dr. Parvez Hayat explained law’s significant role in society and the environment. He stated that it assists in establishing social discipline, justice, and organization. He commented on the importance of green hydrogen and the project, emphasizing the necessity. of approaching climate change and disaster management with sensitivity and a management perspective, seeking solutions without resorting to conflicts. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/NhWDNydhaRwvW_xlJGwrYH5k6dxvrV78izPvKFzmRwc_plaintext_638228397514107472-1024x977.jpg) --- **Categories:** Uncategorised --- ### [BUDDHADEV KARMASKAR V. STATE OF WEST BENGAL](https://lawfoyer.in/buddhadev-karmaskar-v-state-of-west-bengal/) **Published:** June 17, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **BY MISS. VAISHNAVI KRUSHNA PARATE[\[1\]](#_ftn1)** **In the Supreme Court of India** NAME OF THE CASEBUDDHADEV KARMASKAR V. STATE OF WEST BENGALCITATIONCRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 135 OF 2010DATE OF THE CASE14 February 2011APPELLANTBUDDHADEV KARMASKARRESPONDENTSTATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORSBENCH/JUDGEMarkandey Katju, Gyan Sudha MisraSTATUTES/CONSTITUTIONCONSTITUTION OF INDIA, INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1973, IMMORAL TRAFFIC PREVENTION ACT, 1956IMPORTANT SECTIONS/ARTICLESCONSTITUTION OF INDIA- ART. 14, 19, 21, 142 IPC- SECTION. 302, CRPC- SECT. 164, 357C## **ABSTRACT** The case highlights another improvement to [Article 21 of the Indian Constitution](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1199182/),[\[2\]](#_ftn2) the right to live with dignity based on the right to life and individual liberty. It reflects the situation of a sex worker and her family. “It also covers other fundamental rights of sex workers, such as freedom of trade and employment, the right to vote and the right to access public means of fields. [*Buddhadev Karmaskar v. West Bengal*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/145721634/)[***\[3\]***](#_ftn3)is a landmark decision that paved the way for securing the rights of sex workers. “The case exposed the vulnerability of sex workers and the social stigma attached to them. The ruling upheld the right of sex workers to live with dignity enshrined in [Article 21 of the Indian Constitution](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1199182/).”[\[4\]](#_ftn4) ## **INTRODUCTION** A prostitute is someone who performs sexual services for clients in exchange for cash. Prostitution is seen in various ways around the world, and even within one country, with opinions ranging from outright bans to legalisation to regulation in some instances. The laws are the same for both business and sexual entertainment. Prostitution’s shifting legal and social landscape has produced a wide range of global judgements. varied people have quite varied perspectives about prostitution. Others hold a different opinion, seeing “it as a type of barbarism or cruelty against women and children that helps to fuel the growing crime of human trafficking.” Its existence is attested by the past. A prostitute who declined to have sex with him was brutally murdered, and Budhadev Karmaskar was accused of carrying out the horrific crime. “The case was concluded in 2004 when the Calcutta High Court found the appellant guilty of murder.”[\[5\]](#_ftn5) The appellant appealed the punishment meted out to him to the Supreme Court once the judgement of conviction was announced. “Due to the Supreme Court’s affirmation of the decision of the Calcutta High Court and its Suo Motto move of changing the appeal into a Public Interest Litigation, Criminal Appeal No. 135 was dismissed in 2010.”[\[6\]](#_ftn6) ## **FACTS** A sick sex worker in Calcutta’s red-light area was brutally beaten on the head by the appellant Budhadev Karmaskar in 1999 after she declined to have a sexual encounter with him. The decedent was brutally killed by having her head repeatedly slammed on the floor of a room to preserve her sanity and dignity. “The appellant was charged with assault resulting in death as a result of this act, and she was found guilty of the horrific crime of murdering a sex worker.”[\[7\]](#_ftn7) The late Chaya Rani Pal, better known as Buri, was a sex worker in Kolkata’s entertainment district Jorgen Datta Lane. On the night of September 17, 1999, she slept outside her room, near the second-floor stairs of a three-story apartment building in the entertainment district of Jogen Datta Alley. The defendant, Budadev Karmaskar, went to him around 9 pm and brutally attacked the dead with his fists and feet. The deceased then fell to the first floor as the defendant pulled his hair and pushed his head against the wall. She had 11 injuries to her face and was bleeding profusely.” Enraged by the other residents, she fled. One resident, Asha Khatun, witnessed the whole incident. Buri was immediately taken to the Medical College Hospital, where he died. A few hours later, at around 2:00 am, the suspect was arrested by the police only on Jogen Datta Street. ## **ISSUES** 1. How should Article 21’s reach and its definition of “life” be applied to guarantee that sex worker and their progeny have access to the right to live with dignity? 2. Whether the accused can be booked under section. 302 of the Indian penal code? 3. How can sex workers be rehired, saved, and rehabbed in a safer setting? ## **ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE APPELLANT [**\[9\]**](#_ftn9)** - The learned advocate of the appellant vigorously refused all of the prosecutor’s allegations. - The learned advocate submitted the statement of the eye witness, Asha Khatun during the chief examination is not admissible under sec. 164 of the criminal procedure code, 1973 also she was not present at the time of cross-examination. - The learned advocate mentioned the case of [Raghubir Singh v. Uttaranchal High Court](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/146448773/), for vindicating the same. - It was also clearly stated that none of the inhabitants of the area witnessed the crime. This reason proves very effective to overshadow the case imposed on the appellant. ## **ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE RESPONDENT** **[**\[10\]**](#_ftn10)** - The learned counsel of the deceased questioned and suggested that the relationship between the deceased and the accused were sour and they quarrelled at intervals. - The statement was given by Abeda, that she heard the noise of an extreme fight she ran to the second floor and saw that the accused was dragging the deceased and also banging her head on the wall. - The counsel case presented the report of injuries made by a competent physician stating that the accused had beaten the deceased through legs and fists. - As per the report, there was a total of 11 injuries in various parts of the body of the deceased as the face, head and also forehead which is enough to cause the death. - Also, they stated that out of 11 injuries 8 were sufficient to cause the death of any ordinary person. ## **JUDGEMENT** In this case, the appeal was dismissed by the Calcutta High Court. “The court dismissed the applicant’s objection that the testimony of eyewitness Asha Khatun, who was absent from cross-examination under [section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/497457/),[\[11\]](#_ftn11) should not be considered.” The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment by the High District Court. In 2011, the Supreme Court appointed a panel of senior attorneys and judges to consider ways to protect sex workers and their professions[\[12\]](#_ftn12). The committee is looking for ways to improve the affected women’s lives. “The court also expressed dissatisfaction over the fact that there was no explanation as to why the accused had an injury near his left eye while the defence’s case was in complete denial.”[\[13\]](#_ftn13) - **The SC institution approves of the sex labour sector.** In India, sexual servitude is not against the law. Sexual service providers ought to get the same respect and legal safeguards as everyone else. The Supreme Court’s (SC) three-judge panel made this decision in this case. It is a landmark decision. For the sexual service providers who experience acute exploitation, it’s a big relief.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) - **In India, paid sexual labour is not prohibited.** The Indian Supreme Court has ruled that everyone has a fundamental right to a decent existence, regardless of occupation, and that authorities must take this protection into account when enforcing immoral traffic control legislation.[\[15\]](#_ftn15) - **Human Sexual Worker Rights** In addition to being the oldest profession in the world, prostitution is also held in the highest regard by society, and sex workers in particular are seen as the weed that needs to be eradicated. “The judiciary has repeatedly stepped in to defend the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III[\[16\]](#_ftn16) of the Constitution in the absence of legislation and negligent performance by the executive branch.” According to reports, “Police enforcement regularly treats sex workers violently and hostilely. As if they are a member of an unacknowledged group whose rights are disregarded.” The police and other law enforcement organisations should be instructed to respect the rights of all sex workers, which are equally guaranteed by the constitution as those of every other citizen[\[17\]](#_ftn17). This entails updating or overhauling current regulations as well as developing new policies and initiatives for sex workers. ## **CONCLUSION** It is time to understand that eliminating prostitution workers and outlawing prostitution-related activities won’t make their plight any better; on the contrary, they will be forced to work in secret and will endure mistreatment in all circumstances because prostitution won’t be recognised by the law. “Rehiring those who have been exploited in the sex industry, whether they are prostitutes, sex workers, or victims of the sex trade, is a matter of right and not of sympathy or privilege since the act of prostitution won’t be recognised by the law and there is no legal status that will facilitate benefiting from and correcting the wrongs.”[\[18\]](#_ftn18) This landmark ruling is a shocking example of sex workers being abused and murdered by those who demonize them as mere objects. It conveys a social message that such inhumane acts should not be tolerated in a civilized society. The case highlights the plight of sex workers who are driven by poverty rather than working for pleasure. Just because their work carries a social stigma doesn’t mean they don’t have the right to live with dignity. According to Article 21 of the Indian Constitution[\[19\]](#_ftn19), everyone has a fundamental right to life and personal liberty. It does not mean only the existence of animals. But society’s conservative thinking is making this nearly impossible. Until prostitution is legally recognized as an occupation, sex workers will continue to be exploited by those who look down on them. To help prevent such heinous crimes, the Supreme Court took note of the issue and issued guidelines to protect the rights of sex workers. The decision not only shook the public conscience but also inspired and changed society. ## **ANALYSIS** “This case was the first to make the courts and the state think about the inhumane conditions of sex workers and make some changes and orders regarding their rights.” However, some other rights are still denied. The Immoral Trafficking Prevention Act, of 1956[\[20\]](#_ftn20) contains several provisions that are grossly inappropriate for the basic right of Indian citizens to engage in commerce in India. It may sound a little immoral, but in a broader sense, if we accept it as a profession, then the places where that profession is practised should also be accepted, so that such is not done at home or in a bar, so it’s even classified. etc “[Section 4](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/91704683/)[\[21\]](#_ftn21) of the Immoral Traffic and Prevention Act, of 1956 is very vague.” Certainly, “he wanted to crack down on such people who forced women into prostitution and made money from it, but with family involvement, it becomes worthless if the children of sex workers have access to higher education. or study at a university where they are punished. This is a warning for their bright future and a violation of their basic rights.” “[Article 8](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/27208336/)[\[22\]](#_ftn22) is a violation of the fundamental right of free contract, the act of sex workers is an act of soliciting an offer, and each person is free to decide whether or not to make an offer. There is no coercion or pressure to accept it.” --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) LLB 6th SEM STUDENT AT SHRI. NATHMAL GOENKA LAW COLLEGE, AKOLA MAHARASHTRA [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) ‘Article 21 in The Constitution Of India 1949’ accessed 5 June 2023. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) ‘Budhadev Karmaskar vs The State of West Bengal on 19 May 2022’ accessed 5 June 2023. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) ‘Article 21 in The Constitution Of India 1949’ (n 1). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) ‘Budhadev Karmaskar vs State of West Bengal on 14 February 2011’ accessed 10 June 2023. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) ‘Budhadev Karmaskar vs The State of West Bengal on 19 May 2022’ (n 3). [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) Ibid. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) ‘Budhadev Karmaskar vs. State of West Bengal’ accessed 5 June 2023. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Ibid. [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Ibid. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) ‘Section 164 in The Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973’ accessed 5 June 2023. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) ‘BUDHADEV KARMASKAR V. STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS.’ (n 5). [\[13\]](#_ftnref13) Ibid. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) ‘Budhadev Karmaskar vs The State Of West Bengal on 19 May, 2022’ (n 3). [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) ‘Rights of Indian Sex Workers- Analyzing Budhadev Karmaskar v State of WB’ (*Lexpeeps*, 6 September 2022) accessed 5 June 2023. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) ‘Fundamental Rights (Articles 12-35) | UPSC Polity Notes’ accessed 10 May 2023. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) ‘Sex Work: How Far A Profession In Light Of Budhadev Karmaskar v/s West Bengal’ accessed 5 June 2023. [\[18\]](#_ftnref18) Ibid. [\[19\]](#_ftnref19) ‘Article 21 in The Constitution Of India 1949’ (n 1). [\[20\]](#_ftnref20) ‘Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 – An Overview – Law Corner’ (23 May 2021) accessed 6 March 2023. [\[21\]](#_ftnref21) ‘Section 4 in The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956’ accessed 5 June 2023. [\[22\]](#_ftnref22) ‘Section 8 in The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956’ accessed 5 June 2023. **Categories:** Case Analysis **Tags:** #law, #SC Judgement, #Supreme court, #supreme court judgement, BUDDHADEV, BUDDHADEV KARMASKAR, lawfoyer, Markandey Katju --- ### [XXX Vs. State Of Kerala](https://lawfoyer.in/xxx-vs-state-of-kerala/) **Published:** June 16, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **By Anmol Saini[**\[1\]**](#_ftn1)** **In the High Court of Kerela** NAME OF THE CASEXXX Vs. State Of KeralaCITATIONCRL. REV. PET NO. 433 OF 2022DATE OF JUDGMENTJune 5, 2023PETITIONERXXXRESPONDENTState Of KeralaBENCH/JUDGEJustice Kauser EdappagathSTATUTES/ CONSTITUTION INVOLVEDThe Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 The Information Technology Act, 2000; The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. (“POCSO Act”); The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.IMPORTANT SECTIONS/ ARTICLESThe Code of Criminal Procedure,1973—S. 227 The Information Technology Act, 2000– S. 67B (a),(b),(c). The POCSO Act, 2012– S. 10 r/w 9(n), 14 r/w 13(b) and 15. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015– S. 75. ## **Abstract** The Kerela High Court has delivered a significant ruling regarding nudity, the female body, and obscenity. In the case at hand, the petitioner who was a women’s rights activist posted a video on her social media platform where her minor son aged fourteen was seen painting on her naked torso, and her minor daughter of eight years was seen playing nearby. The video was uploaded on YouTube and was shared through her personal Facebook account, which attracted a huge number of viewers. Several of the viewers slammed her for subjecting her children to obscene and vulgar acts and posting the same to the world. The petitioner was charged under several sections of the POCSO Act, IT Act, and Juvenile Justice Act. The prosecution failed to take into consideration the context sent along the video and solely based their charges on the visuals of the content. The Hon’ble court on the matter held that none of the charges filed against the Petitioner are evidently proven or even draw any prima facie for the alleged offences, acquitting the petitioner. ## **Introduction** The interpretation and application of the terms such as “obscene” and “indecent” within the Indian Legal framework have long been subjected to debate. The statutory definition is vague that has caused an uprising in the varied interpretation of the terms in different contexts for the purpose of decisions making in India. Other than this the concept of obscenity has long been a subject of intense debate and scrutiny as it interwinds itself with the core issues of gender equality, bodily autonomy, and the limits imposed on artistic expressions of the artists in their art forms. Further, “obscenity” as described in Black’s Law Dictionary is something that is extremely offensive under the contemporary community standards of morality and decency, or something which is grossly repugnant to the generally accepted notions of what is appropriate and what is not.[\[2\]](#_ftn2) The Black’s Law Dictionary further explained that obscenity involves being morally abhorrent or socially taboo particularly when referring to or depicting sexual or excretory functions. Further “indecent” is defined as offensive to modesty and good taste, lacking propriety, and appearing vulgar or unseemly, by the New Webster’s dictionary. Moreover, “indecency” is defined as the state or condition of being outrageously offensive, and that too particularly in a vulgar or sexual manner.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) In this case, the concept of obscenity got entangled with the notions of bodily autonomy, gender equality, and artistic expression. Tracing bac to the early 1970’s a powerful slogan, “My body, my choice” emerged as a railing cry for Women’s Right Activists which emphasized the fundamental right that individuals have to make decisions about their own bodies. Despite the significant advancements in the fight for bodily autonomy the freedom of women to cover their own bodies continues to face challenges and restrictions in Patriarchal societies. The case discussed as followed elaborates on how the concept of obscenity got entangled with the notions of bodily autonomy, gender equality, and artistic expression. The following case highlights the struggle faced by a mother who sought to challenge societal stereotypes through an artistic project involving her own children, however, it did not end well for her and landed her in criminal prosecution on charges of obscenity and indecency. Bodily autonomy encompasses the fundamental right of individuals to exercise control over their own bodies. This right lies at the core of personal freedom and self-determination. Further, it recognizes that the body of an individual is the most fundamental space for one and thus the autonomy of one over one’s own body has to be absolute. Implying that the right to bodily autonomy shall be irrespective of gender and every person should be entitled to make decisions about their own body safeguarding their physical integrity and making personal choices. However, a stark contrast is evident when considering the right of bodily autonomy of a male and a female. The bare chest of a male is rarely subjected to scrutiny or considered inherently obscene or sexual and is often perceived as a normative representation of the male body. Conversely, if a woman’s bare chest is exposed, it frequently becomes associated with obscenity, and objectification, and sexualization reinforcing societal biases and perpetuating gender inequalities. Such differential treatment based on gender reflects deeply ingrained biases and double standards which are prevalent in our societies. Often the autonomy of a woman over her body is denied or diminished while the male bodies are granted greater freedom without any question. As presented in this case an innocent artistic expression, which was a mother’s effort to normalize the naked upper body of a female among her children, is viewed as a criminal act involving obscenity and indecency. ## **Facts of the case** The case involves a 33-year-old women’s rights activist who gained recognition in Kerala for her progressive views. She posted a video on her social media platforms that depicted her two minor children, a 14-year-old boy and an 8-year-old girl, painting on her partially nude torso with the hashtag ‘Body Art and Politics.’ The video was posted on YouTube and shared on her personal Facebook account, causing widespread outrage. Many people criticized her for subjecting her children to what they considered an obscene and vulgar act and then broadcasting it to the rest of the world. The petitioner justified her actions as an act of self-expression and an attempt to break down societal and cultural taboos that restrict women’s bodies. Due to public outrage, the police filed a case against her. A final report was filed in the Additional Sessions Court in Ernakulam, following an investigation, charging the petitioner with offences under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act), the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act), and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (JJ Act). The petitioner appeared in the lower court and was granted bail. She filed an application for discharge under Section 227 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) on the ground that there is insufficient evidence to proceed against her. However, the court below dismissed her application, stating that there were grounds to presume her guilt. In the current revision petition, the petitioner challenges this order. A careful examination of the FIR, First Information Statement (FIS), witness statements, and other documents, according to the petitioner’s counsel, would reveal that none of the alleged offences were established. The counsel further contended that the uploaded video should not be viewed in isolation but should be understood in the context of the accompanying message, which aimed to normalize the female body and challenge societal double standards regarding sexualization. The defense also asserted that body art involving nudity is protected under Article 19(1)(a) and Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. The Senior Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, contended that the final report contained enough evidence to conclude that the petitioner has committed the alleged offences. The video depicted the petitioner as semi-nude, wearing half trousers and exposing her upper body. The 14-year-old minor son was made to touch her breasts and other parts of the body in order to draw a picture. The prosecution claimed that this was a sexually explicit act involving a child, and that the video’s content was obscene and pornographic. The prosecutor pointed out that the truthfulness or falsity of the claims must be established during the trial and cannot be predicted at this stage. It was argued that violating statutory prohibitions on specific uses of children is not justified under the guise of protest. The petitioner’s application for discharge was denied by the lower court, resulting in the current revision petition. ## **Issues Raised before the court** - Whether there is any sexual intent on the part of the petitioner involved in the act? ## **Arguments from the Petitioner Side** - Sri Renjith B. Mara, the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner argued that on careful examination of the First Information Report, the First Investigation Report as well asthe statement of the witness and other related documents none of the offenses charged against the petitioner is proved to be true. - Further the learned counsel argued that the intention of the petitioner was to normalize the views of society surrounding the female body and to spread the message of not distorting the default idea of sexualization of the female body in comparison to a male body. - The counsel also filed an application of discharge under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. stating that there exists no sufficient ground to carry out the proceedings against the petitioner, arguing that body art in the form of nudity is an expression protected under Article 19(1)(a) when read with the article 21 of the Constitution of India. ## **Arguments from the Respondent Side** - The learned Senior Public Prosecutor Smt. T.V. Neema on behalf of the respondent submitted that there exist materials in the final report which create the presumption that the petitioner has committed the alleged offences. - Prosecution argued that the content of the video is prima facie obscene and pornographic since it depicts the petitioner as semi-nude exposing her torso to her minor son of fourteen ears who for the act of painting was caused to touch the breast and other body parts of the lady. - Further it was said that if a statute prohibits the use of children in any manner for a certain act then it cannot be prohibited in the name of protest. ## **Related Provisions** **The Constitution of India, 1950** - **Article 19(1)(a): –** (1) All citizens shall have the right (a)to freedom of speech and expression;[\[4\]](#_ftn4) - **Article 21: –** Protection of life and personal liberty No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.[\[5\]](#_ftn5) - **The Code of Criminal Procedure,1973** - **Section 227: –** **Discharge** – If, upon consideration of the records of the case and documents submitted therewith, and after the hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reason for so doing.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) - **The Information Technology Act, 2000** - **Section 67B: – Punishment for publishing or transmitting of material depcting children in sexually explicit act, etc., in electronic form – Whoever, –** - Publishes or transmits or causes to be published or transmitted material in any electronic form which depicts children engaged in sexually explicit act or conduct; or - creates text or digital images, collects, seeks, browses, downloads, advertises, promotes, exchanges or distributes material in any electronic form depicting children in obscene or indecent or sexually explicit manner; or - cultivates, entices or induces children to online relationship with one or more children for and on sexually explicit act or in a manner that may offend a reasonable adult on the computer resource; - facilitates abusing children online, or; - records in any electronic form own abuse or that of others pertaining to sexually explicit act with children, shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years and with fine which may extend to ten lakh rupees and in the event of second or subsequent conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years and also with fine which may extend to ten lakh rupees: Provided that provisions of section 67, section 67A and this section does not extend to any book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting representation or figure in electronic form– - the publication of which is proved to be justified as being for the public good on the ground that such book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting representation or figure is the interest of science, literature, art or learning or other objects of general concern; or - (ii) which is kept or used for bona fide heritage or religious purposes. Explanation–For the purposes of this section, ―children‖ means a person who has not completed the age of 18 years. - **The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012** - **Section 9(n): – Aggravated Sexual Assault –** whoever, being a relative of the child through blood or adoption or marriage or guardianship or in foster care, or having domestic relationship with a parent of the child, or who is living in the same or shared household with the child, commits sexual assault on such child;[\[7\]](#_ftn7) - **Section 10: – Punishment for Aggravated Sexual Assault –** Whoever, commits aggravated sexual assault shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) - **Section 13(b) – Use of child for pornographic purposes –** (b) usage of a child engaged in real or simulated sexual acts (with or without penetration);[\[9\]](#_ftn9) - **Section 14: – Punishment for using child for pornographic purposes** [\[10\]](#_ftn10)\[(1) Whoever uses a child or children for pornographic purposes shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years and shall also be liable to fine and in the event of second or subsequent conviction with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years and also be liable to fine. (2) Whoever using a child or children for pornographic purposes under sub-section (1), commits an offence referred to in section 3 or section 5 or section 7 or section 9 by directly participating in such pornographic acts, shall be punished for the said offences also under section 4, section 6, section 8 and section 10, respectively, in addition to the punishment provided in sub-section (1).\][\[11\]](#_ftn11) - **Section15: – Punishment for storage of pornographic material involving child** – - [\[12\]](#_ftn12)\[ Any person, who stores or possesses pornographic material in any form involving a child, but fails to delete or destroy or report the same to the designated authority, as may be prescribed, with an intention to share or transmit child pornography, shall be liable to fine not less than five thousand rupees and in the event of second or subsequent offence, with fine which shall not be less than ten thousand rupees. - Any person, who stores or possesses pornographic material in any form involving a child for transmitting or propagating or displaying or distributing in any manner at any time except for the purpose of reporting, as may be prescribed, or for use as evidence in court, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. - Any person, who stores or possesses pornographic material in any form involving a child for commercial purposes shall be punished on the first conviction with imprisonment of either description which shall not be less than three years which may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both and in the event of second or subsequent conviction, with imprisonment of either description which shall not be less than five years which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.\][\[13\]](#_ftn13) ## **Judgment** The hon’ble court emphasized that every parent tries their best to educate their children all about life and for that purpose, they have every right to raise the child in that environment they wish. It was further pointed out that a child learns what is wrong and right through the impressions left on him or her by their parents. Thus, there is nothing wrong with a mother allowing her body to be used as a canvas by her children to paint to sensitize them to the concept of viewing nude bodies as normal and thinking about them as more than just sexual objects only.[\[14\]](#_ftn14) Stating that such an act of education cannot be termed as one performed with any sexual intent. Therefore, the basic ingredient of the offence under section 9(n) r/w 10 of the POCSO Act is not attracted. Further, the allegations under section 13(b) punishable under section 14 of the said act are not standing since the act of painting the upper body of a mother by her own child can neither be characterized as an act of real or simulated sexual act nor the same can be inferred as an act performed the purpose of sexual gratification. Designating the act of innocent artistic expression as the usage of the child in real or simulated sexual acts unduly severe. Further, nothing in the video clarifies that the children were used for pornography. Since no pornography is depicted in the video section 15 cannot be attracted. Further section 67B(a)(b) and (c)of the IT act, which criminalizes the publication or transmission of any material depicting children explicitly involved in sexual acts cannot be attracted since no sexually explicit act has taken place and no evidence exists for the happening of the same. Merely painting on the upper body of a person be it a man or woman does not constitute a sexually explicit act, rendering 67B(a) unattracted. Moreover, the application of subsection (c) is not possible since there exists no cultivation or enticement, or inclusion of children in any form of online relationship as required for the charges to prevail. Moving toward subsection (b), which is attracted when the material in question depicts children in any indecent, obscene, or explicit manner. The hon’ble court states that the video uploaded is neither obscene nor indecent when viewed with the context in which the Petitioner posted it, in order to propagate her views on the default sexualization attached to the naked female body. And further held that her act was protected under the freedom of speech and expression including the freedom to propagate one’s thoughts, ideas, opinions, and views. Regarding section 75 of the Juvenile Justice Act, in order to attract this section, the child should incur mental or physical suffering due to the assault, abandonment, abuse, or willfully neglected act of the accused. Evidently, there seems to be no assault or abandonment of the children, and no abuse or exposition, or neglect of the child is visible, rendering the offence under section 75 of the JJ act unattracted. Justice Edappagath in the case of XXX vs. the State of Kerela has stated that a woman has all her right to make autonomous decisions related to her body since it is at the very core of her fundamental right to equality and privacy which also falls under the personal liberty guaranteed to her under article 21[\[15\]](#_ftn15) of the Constitution. As stated in [Joseph Shine v. Union of India](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/42184625/ "Joseph Shine v. Union of India")[\[16\]](#_ftn16), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has underlined women’s autonomy as a facet of human dignity. Moreover, in the case of [K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India](https://lawfoyer.in/justice-k-s-puttaswamy-retired-vs-union-of-india-and-ors-2017/ "K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India")[\[17\]](#_ftn17), a panel of nine judges from the Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, acknowledged the right to privacy as a fundamental right protected by the Constitution. The court specifically stated that the freedom to exercise control over one’s body is an essential component of the right to privacy. The act of painting a mother’s upper body as an art project by her own children cannot be classified as a real or simulated sexual act. It cannot be asserted that this act was performed for sexual gratification or for any other sexual intentions. As a result, the categorization of this innocent artistic expression as “usage of a child in a real or simulated sexual act” would be overly harsh and inappropriate. ## **Conclusion** After thorough consideration, the court determined that the petitioner’s intentions were not sexual in nature. The act of allowing her children to paint her body was intended to educate them about body positivity and to sensitize them to the idea that nudity should not solely be associated with sexual objects. The court emphasized that parents have the right to raise their children in environments they deem appropriate, and the act of a mother allowing her body to be used as a canvas for art by her own children was within the bounds of her parental rights. Thus, the petitioner was acquitted of all the alleged charges framed against her. Other than acquitting the petitioner of the charges this case emphasized the default sexualization of the naked female body. It establishes the encouragement for the exploration of diverse perspectives and challenges the societal taboos regarding the naked body of a female as compared to the same of a male. After analyzing this case, it is evident that women continue to face ongoing struggles against societal stereotypes in their quest for rights and equality. This includes the right to bodily autonomy and freedom to make decisions about their own bodies. Furthermore, this case highlights that parents have their inherent right to educate their children and impart life lessons to them using the method they deem beneficial for the well-being of their children. Furthermore, analyzing this case can highlight the significance of considering the context and intent behind an act before labeling it as obscene or indecent. One must understand the importance of promoting education and sensitization regarding gender, nudity, and social taboos related to it. By addressing these points society can strive for an inclusive and informed perspective that respects individual rights and will foster equality and understanding among the citizens. --- [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) 2nd Semester student at Tamil Nadu National Law University, Tiruchirappalli. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Ibid. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 19(1)(a). [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 21. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The Code of Criminal Procedure,1973, §227. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, §9(n). [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, §10. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, §13(b). [\[10\]](#_ftnref10) Subs. by Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act, 2019, s. 7, for section 14, w.e.f. 16.08.2019. [\[11\]](#_ftnref11) The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, §14. [\[12\]](#_ftnref12) Subs. by Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act, 2019, s. 7, for section 14, w.e.f. 16.08.2019. [](#_ftnref13)12 The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, §15. [\[14\]](#_ftnref14) XXX Vs. State of Kerala, CRL. REV. PET NO. 433 OF 2022. [\[15\]](#_ftnref15) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 21. [\[16\]](#_ftnref16) Joseph Shine v. Union of India, AIR 2018 SC 4898. [\[17\]](#_ftnref17) K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India, AIR 2017 SC 4161. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Dr Ram Raj Singh v. Babulal](https://lawfoyer.in/dr-ram-raj-singh-v-babulal/) **Published:** June 15, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** By Harshit Bansal (1) **In the High Court of Allahabad** NAME OF THE CASEDr. Ram Raj Singh v. BabulalCITATION OF THE CASE AIR 1982 All 285DATE OF THE CASESeptember 2, 1981APPELLANTDr Ram Raj SinghRESPONDENTBabulalBENCH/JUDGES.J. HyderCONSTITUTION/ STATUTES ENCOMPASSEDIndian Penal Code, 1860; Constitution of IndiaIMPORTANT ARTICLE(S)/ SECTIONSConstitution of India — *A*rts. 21, 19, 14 and 32 Indian Penal Code, 1860, – Section 268## **ABSTRACT** A nuisance is a form of tort which can be defined as unlawful interference with the peaceful enjoyment of one’s rights. In the present case, Dr. Ram Raj Singh who runs a clinic of his own suffered some form of unlawful interference due to a construction brick grinding machine by the defendant named Babulal. Dr Ram Raj Singh was of the view that he has suffered loss because of the reduction in the number of clients due to constant noise and sound pollution being caused by the machine. On the other hand, the defendant was of the view that he had taken sufficient measures in reducing the pollution caused by the machine. The case is mainly based on the issue that whether Dr Ram Raj Singh has suffered any substantial injury to grant an injunction. The Hon’ble Court decided in the favour of the plaintiff and a permanent injunction was issued against the defendant. # INTRODUCTION Torts are a form of uncodified law that contains numerous wrongs or damages that can be committed by a person like Strict Liability, Vicarious Liability, Negligence, Nuisance, and the like. In all these cases the wrongs are being committed against an individual where damages awarded are in the form of compensation while in the case of criminal law, the crime is being committed against the state. In the case of Nuisance, there have been many instances in which a person in the nearby surroundings tends to cause emotional or physical discomfort to the other person. There have been instances when someone tries to interfere in someone else’s life both in a direct and direct way. In Torts, there has also been a tort defined known as a nuisance. Nuisance can be expounded as unlawful obstruction with the peaceful enjoyment of a person’s right in the form of the right to life, the peaceful use of land, etc. It can be in many forms like in form of light sound, obstruction of land, disease, smell, obstruction, and the like. According to Salmond, Nuisance is defined as a wrong causing or permitting the act of something negative to enter another person’s land without their consent.[\[1\]](#_ftn1) Nuisance can be further categorised into 2 types: - Private Nuisance or Tort of Nuisance - Public or Common Nuisance For the tort of nuisance to be passed, there are a few essentials which need to be considered while passing the judgement. - Some sort of obstructive interference - Interference with the peaceful use or benefit of land - Damage caused to the plaintiff If the plaintiff is not able to prove any of the above contentions or the wrong committed by the defendant, it becomes very difficult for the plaintiff to prove the wrong of damage being committed. # FACTS OF THE CASE The facts of this case are that the plaintiff, who was Dr. Ram Baj Singh was denied the relief, that he sought on the basis that the defendant’s brick grinding machine didn’t cause him any substantial injuries or special damages. The Counsel for the plaintiff had submitted that the two lower courts could not properly understand the significance of the legal terms “substantial injury” and “special damage.” The plaintiff filed the case that resulted in the 2nd appeal asking for a permanent injunction to avert the defendant from operating the grinding machine. The plaintiff was a professional medical practitioner who had constructed a consultancy office much prior to when the defendant had erected the machine. A dispute had erupted between the two parties over whether the consulting chamber was founded in 1962 or 1965. It was true to the fact that the brick machine was electrical propelling and was located at a range of approximately forty feet northeast of the plaintiff’s consultancy chamber. A road was also constructed between the plaintiff’s consultancy chamber and the brick grinding machine. The plaintiff’s main point of contention was that the brick grinding machine has been generating a large number of dirt particles, which caused pollution in the environment and also entered the plaintiff’s consultancy chamber, causing physical discomfort to the plaintiff and his clients who usually come to his clinic. Consequently, this led to a decrease in the number of clients coming to his clinic for consultation causing him losses. As a result of this, the act of the defendant not only caused physical discomfort to the plaintiff but also mental agony in the form of economic distress and regular irritation. It was also claimed that the defendant installed the machine without first obtaining permission or a licence from the Municipal Board. # PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTION According to the plaintiff’s counsel, the legal deduction that could be taken out from the facts of the case found by the two lower courts was that the plaintiff has suffered a considerable and significant damages as a result of the machine’s operation and that special damage was suffered by him. Dr. Ram Raj Singh has suffered significant financial loss and great physical discomfort has been caused to him. The plaintiff was of the view that the he had right to life encompassed under Art. 21 and he has the right to lead a peaceful life devoid of any external constraint and pleaded that the act by the defendant constituted nuisance. The counsel of the defendant, on the other hand, contended that the court of appeals’ findings that the plaintiff-appellant suffered no substantial injury and no special damage are essential findings of facts that can’t be challenged before these court in the 2nd appeal. Moreover, it cannot be agreed with the learned counsel for the respondent’s submission. In *Jugal Kishor* v. *Ram Saran Das*,[\[2\]](#_ftn2) It was claimed that whether specific facts proved to establish a tort of nuisance was a legal matter. # DEFENDANT’S CONTENTION When the defendant contested the suit, the council didn’t deny the fact that the machine was constructed by him in 1965, but he claimed that no dust particles were emitted during the grinding bricks process and that there is no question of any dust particles being arisen in the atmosphere as a result of the dust. He also stated that he was concerned about the environment because the bricks were moistened before being ground, and no dust was produced as a result. He also stated that his machine made no noise and that the erection and operation of the machine did not cause any private or public nuisance. He deducted by stating that the suit was filed against him solely out of ill will and hatred and that the preceding case was not legally viable.[\[3\]](#_ftn3) The defendant’s council has himself relied upon the judgment given in *Behari Lal* v. *James Maclean*.[\[4\]](#_ftn4) In that case, the first court of appeals determined that the acts complained of by the plaintiff were constituting an actionable nuisance. As a result, The demand for a mandatory injunction made on behalf of the plaintiff, in the above mentioned case, was granted by the council. The facts as found by the court of appeal were only accepted as the discovery of facts by the Division Bench of the court. It did not, anyhow, address whether the aforementioned facts constituted an actionable nuisance under the law. In this regard, this court disagreed with the first court of appeals and allowed the defendant-appeal appellant while dismissing the plaintiff’s suit. Only the facts revealed by the first court of appeal have been treated as findings of fact in a number of rulings by several High Courts in this nation. Nonetheless, the High Courts have also considered whether, based on the facts established, a legal inference could be drawn as to whether or not a nuisance was being committed. It is not necessary to impose this decision with references to all of those decisions. # LEGAL ISSUE INVOLVED - Whether the act of the defendant of producing bricks from the machine is constituting a nuisance for the plaintiff. - Whether it is sufficient to consitutute nuisance or the damage has been suffered by him and whether any special damage has been suffered by him for constituting a permanent injunction on the defendant thereby constituting a nuisance. # RELATED PROVISIONS There are various provisions which can be attached to the above facts and issues of the case: - **Constitution of India** - **Article 21:** It states that no human being will be disadvantaged in one’s enjoyment of one’s personal liberty or life excluding the procedures well defined by law.[\[5\]](#_ftn5)**Article 14:** Every person is equal in the eyes of the law and the state will not make any sort of prejudices on the ground of caste, race, sex and the like.[\[6\]](#_ftn6) - **Article 226:** Every High Court may have the authority to issue orders, writs, or directives to any person or authority within the areas within its jurisdiction, including, in suitable circumstances, any governmental body. Writs can be in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose).[\[7\]](#_ftn7) - **The tort of Nuisance:** When there is an obstruction in the peaceful enjoyment of one’s rights in the form of pollution, indirect interference and the like, the tort of nuisance is committed. - **Sec. 268 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC):** Any individual is considered to be committing public nuisance if one commits any illegal acts or omits to do the legal acts which harm, annoy, or endanger members of the community or who own property nearby or those who live in the area, or who obstructs, harm, or endanger those who might need to use public rights. A common nuisance is not defended on the grounds that it offers some convenience or benefit.[\[8\]](#_ftn8) # JUDGEMENT The Court stated that once land has been developed, the owner of the building can’t expect to have the exact quality of air that existed prior to when the building was constructed. The construction of the building inevitably reduces the freshness of the air. The quality of the fresh air would be further diminished and would even become somewhat contaminated if the entire area where the structure is located were to be constructed. However, if the neighbouring land’s owner does something on his own land that is incompatible with physical comfort and basic human existence, the person who is harmed has the right to sue. The neighbour’s behaviour, which he will criticise, would constitute a legal nuisance. In addition to this, a word of warning should be given at this point. A sober and rational thought criteria must once again be used to decide if the air has gotten so polluted that it is no longer fit for human comfort and existence. Elegant and dainty living concepts will be completely out of place. In addition to that, the property’s location is also a relevant circumstance in determining whether the act the defendant complained of provides danger or comfort to mankind’s existence; A person who lives in an industrial area cannot be compared to having as much fresh air as someone who lives in a non-industrial locality. After reviewing numerous decisions, the court in [Ramlal v. Mustafabad Oil and Colton Ginning Factory](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/350057/ "Ramlal v. Mustafabad Oil and Colton Ginning Factory")[\[9\]](#_ftn9)developed a series of guidelines to decide whether or not a complaint of harm qualifies as an actionable nuisance. It was observed in that case that actionable nuisance does not admit to enumeration and that any operation that causes harm to business, comfort, property, health, or public morale would be considered a nuisance. The two lower courts were swayed by the point that the doctor didn’t check out his clients to establish that the dust coming from the defendant-machine respondents actually hurt them physically and his point of contentions was completely baseless. Additionally, they made reference to the plaintiff-statement appellant and found that Dr Ram Raj Singh had acknowledged that the harm done to Dr Ram’s patients was noted in his register but had not been presented. They have drawn an adverse inference against the plaintiff based on this omission and concluded that the plaintiff-appellant has not been able to prove that he suffered any substantial harm or significant harm. The court of appeals ruled that the dust produced by the crushing of bricks constitutes a public hazard that was bound to harm people’s health. It was also determined that dust from bricks entered the plaintiff-consulting appellant’s chamber in sufficient quantity to leave a thin red coating on the clothes of those sitting there. Given these findings, it’s difficult to see how the plaintiff could be said to have failed to prove that the offending brick grinding machine was not causing him special harm. This appeal must be granted for the reasons stated above. As a result, the appeal is granted. The decrees issued by the two lower courts are overturned. The plaintiff’s suit has been decided. For all the reasons stated above, it was concluded that the appeal by the plaintiff must succeed. The defendant was granted a permanent injunction barring him from using his brick grinding machine, which is denoted by the letters Ka, Kha, Ga, and Gha on the sketch map at the foot of the plaint, and the plaintiff’s lawsuit has been decided. Throughout, the court held that plaintiff was entitled to recover his costs. # CONCLUSION A nuisance is a form of tort in which a person unlawfully tries to interfere in another person’s life causing him problems in any form. It can be caused both directly and indirectly. There are some essentials like the breach of duty and suffering of damage by the plaintiff which need to be proved for a tort of Nuisance to be proved. The case Dr Ram Singh v. Babu Lal is one of the most essential judgements which needs to be taken into consideration as a precedent for deciding future cases. It can be deduced from the above reasoning of the Hon’ble court that to get the claim for special damages, special harm must be caused to the plaintiff which no one else, other than the plaintiff has suffered and to cast permanent injunction on the defendant or the other party, the plaintiff must need to prove substantial damage caused to him by the defendant. Any action that could properly be considered to cause harm, suffering, or annoyance to a person would qualify as a private nuisance. In my opinion, it is the duty of every person to prevent any kind of damage caused to someone else’s property. Since every person has the right to lead a peaceful life, it is very essential that no harm is caused to them by any person. As a result, it must be the topmost priority to ensure that noone is denied one’s fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Indian constitution. --- (1) Author is a 2nd year student of Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Patiala, Punjab. [\[1\]](#_ftnref1) Dr. R.K. Bangia, “ Law of Torts”, Allahabad Law Agency, 22nd edn, 2021, Pg. No. 242. [\[2\]](#_ftnref2) *Jugal Kishor* v. *Ram Saran Das*, AIR 1943 Lah 306. [\[3\]](#_ftnref3) Justice G.P. Singh, “ Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s The Law of Torts”, LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur, 24th edn. Reprint 2008” Pg No. 148. [\[4\]](#_ftnref4) *Behari Lal* v. *James Maclean*, AIR 1924 All 392. [\[5\]](#_ftnref5) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 21. [\[6\]](#_ftnref6) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 14. [\[7\]](#_ftnref7) The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 226. [\[8\]](#_ftnref8) See The Indian Penal Code, 1860, §268. [\[9\]](#_ftnref9) Ramlal v. Mustafabad Oil and Colton Ginning Factory. 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(Includes time for filling the basic details like Name, Email etc.) - **Every question carries 04 marks & there will be no negative marking.** - The Result will be declared on **14th June 2023** ([www.lawfoyer.in](https://lawfoyer.in/)) --- Register Now --- **Categories:** Quiz --- ### [Amity Law School, Noida, organizes Value Added Course 2023 on, "Navigating Intellectual Property Rights Vis-à-vis Emerging Concept of Artificial Intelligence":- Register By June 25](https://lawfoyer.in/amity-law-school-noida-organizes-value-added-course-2023/) **Published:** June 12, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Poster-f8827e5e303b86019c1fb4120c9f5acf-1024x819.webp) --- ## About the organizer Amity Law School, Noida is one of the premier law schools in India who has received the award of “South Asia Legal Education Institutional Excellence” by Society of Indian Law Firms, Menon Institute of Legal Advocacy Training and Award and “Most Promising Law School” by Legal Desire Summit and Awards in 2018 besides multiple awards for its teaching and innovative methods for student development in previous years. Amity Education Group is the foremost academic group in the world with over 1,00,000 students studying across 1000 acres of hi-tech campus. Amity University Uttar Pradesh is one of the most important research-oriented private university established in 2005 under a State Act. It is recognized by the University Grants Commission (UGC) and accredited by the National Assessment and Accreditation Council (NAAC) with an “A” grade. ## About the Event Dear Participants, We extend our warm greetings to all of you from Amity Law School, Noida. We are excited to announce the launch of a value-added course on Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) for the year 2023. This course aims to provide comprehensive knowledge and insights into the dynamic field of IPR. The theme for this year’s course is “Navigating Intellectual Property Rights Vis-a-vis the Emerging Concept of Artificial Intelligence.” With the rapid advancements in technology and the increasing integration of artificial intelligence in various industries, it is crucial to understand the implications of AI on intellectual property rights. The course will span six days, with a total duration of 30 hours. We have invited distinguished speakers from industry, academia, and government instrumentalities to share their expertise and experiences in the field of IPR and its relationship with artificial intelligence. This course is open to all law students, postgraduate students, academicians, IP practitioners, and research scholars who have a keen interest in understanding and exploring the complexities of intellectual property rights in the context of emerging AI technologies. By participating in this course, you will gain valuable insights into the interplay between intellectual property and artificial intelligence, explore the legal and ethical challenges, and discover strategies for effective management and protection of IP in the AI era. We invite you to join us for this enriching learning experience and engage in fruitful discussions with experts in the field. This course will not only enhance your understanding of IPR but also provide valuable networking opportunities with professionals and peers. Mark your calendars for the upcoming value-added course on IPR with the theme “Navigating Intellectual Property Rights Vis-a-vis the Emerging Concept of Artificial Intelligence.” We look forward to your active participation and making this course a resounding success. **Date:** 26th June to 1st July, 2023 **Time:** 10:00 A.M. to 03:00 P.M. ## **Registration link:** ## Contact Details: **Faculty Co-ordinator:** 1\) Ms. Alaknanda: 9830015765 2\) Ms. Richa Yadav **Student Coordinators:** 1\) Mr. Chirag: 8368599168 2\) Mr. Sahil: 8595961094 3\) Mr. Arash: 8368402969 4\) Ms. Maria: 8886812267 **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events --- ### [LawFoyer: Important Links](https://lawfoyer.in/links/) **Published:** April 8, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Content:** LawFoyer is a comprehensive platform designed to empower law students, researchers, and professionals through accessible legal knowledge, opportunities, and skill development resources. ## Connect With Us - **LinkedIn (Real-time updates):** - **Instagram (Engaging legal content):** [htt](https://www.instagram.com/lawfoyer/?hl=en)[ps://www.instagram.com/lawfoyer/?hl=en](https://www.instagram.com/lawfoyer/?hl=en) - **Official Website (Daily updates & opportunities):** - **LawFoyer Connect (Jobs & Internships):** - **Research Publication (LIJDLR Journal):** - **LawFoyer Academy (Courses & Certifications):** - **YouTube Channel:** ## Our Offerings - Daily Updates on Legal Events & Opportunities - Free Notes & E-Books (Academic Training) - Free Legal Drafts (Practical Training) - National Quizzes & Mock Tests (Judiciary & Competitive Exams) - Free Giveaways for Personal Growth - Affordable Courses & Skill Training - Free Workshops & Masterclasses ## Publish Your Research Submit your manuscripts and showcase your academic work across **350+ international databases and libraries**: ## Upskill Yourself Join advanced certification programs, workshops, and bootcamps: ## Academic Assistance Services Get expert assistance for assignments and academic work: **Our Team Includes:** - NLU Graduates - Professors - Practicing Lawyers - International Attorneys - TEDx Speakers - Legal Drafting Experts ## Contact Us - Email: lawfoyer@gmail.com - Or DM us on our social platforms ## Our Courses - **Advanced Certification Course on Intellectual Property Laws of India:** **| Early Bird Fee: Law Students: ₹490; Professionals: ₹980** **Early Bird Offer ends tonight at 11 PM. 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College, Lucknow | Register by 30th September 2026:** - **VCPRF – International Moot Court Workshop, 2026 | Organized by Veritas Centre for Policy Research Foundation (VCPRF) | Register by 30 September 2026:** - **10th SGTU Moot Court Competition,2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, School of Law, SGT University | Register by 5th October, 2026:** - **INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON “ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH: TRANSFORMING LAW, MANAGEMENT, COMMERCE AND SOCIETY” | Organized by Geeta Institute of Law (GIL), Panipat, Delhi NCR, India | Submit Abstract by 15th October 2026:** - **CALL FOR ABSTRACTS — CCADR JOURNAL FOR ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION | Organized by Chanakya Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution (CCADR), CNLU | Register by 15th October 2026 | 11:59 p.m.:** - **SYNERGY: WHERE LAW MEETS SOCIETY – CASE STUDY COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by Vivekananda School of Law and Legal Studies (VSLLS), Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies – Technical Campus (VIPS-TC), through the Centre for Social Sciences | Register by 20th October 2026:** [htt](https://lawfoyer.in/synergy-where-law-meets-society-case-study-competition-2026-organized-by-vivekananda-school-of-law-and-legal-studies-vslls-vivekananda-institute-of-professional-studies-techn/)[ps://lawfoyer.in/synergy-where-law-meets-society-case-study-competition-2026-organized-by-vivekananda-school-of-law-and-legal-studies-vslls-vivekananda-institute-of-professional-studies-techn/](https://lawfoyer.in/synergy-where-law-meets-society-case-study-competition-2026-organized-by-vivekananda-school-of-law-and-legal-studies-vslls-vivekananda-institute-of-professional-studies-techn/) - **MEDEXON INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION COMPETITION, 2026 | Organized by Dexon Global | Register by 20 October 2026:** - **Two-Day International Conference on “Forensic Sciences for Advancing Justice: Integrating Law, Medical Science and Technology” | Organized by Integral University, India in collaboration with MenoufiyaUniversity AL Minufiyah, Egypt | Submit Abstract by 20th October 2026:** ## Daily Internship & Job Opportunities **Date: 22nd September 2026** - **Paid Legal Internship at NC Legal, New Delhi | November 2026:** - **Legal Associate / Liaison Officer – Real Estate in Bengaluru:** **Date: 21st September 2026** - **Paid Legal Research Internship at Barytech CAISR International:** - **Secretarial Assistant – Legal & Compliance at Worldwide Flight Services, Bengaluru:** **Date: 19th September 2026** - **Legal Research Internship at Shreyas Global, Gurugram:** - **Legal Associate Internship at Bentham Legal, Hyderabad:** **Date: 18th September 2026** - **Legal Research Internship at the Office of Advocate Pooja Gala, Thane:** - **General / Executive Assistant Opportunity at Ulhasnagar, Thane:** **Date: 16th September 2026** - **Long-Term Legal Internship at Sinha & Company, Advocates, Kolkata:** - **Associate Manager – Labour & Employment Law at HCLTech, Noida:** **Date: 14th September 2026** - **Legal Apprenticeship Opportunity at TCIL, New Delhi:** - **UPSC Recruitment 2026: 144 Legal Vacancies for Assistant Public Prosecutor & Public Law Officer:** ## AIBE Mock Tests **AIBE Mock Test 1:** [Click Here](https://quiz.lawfoyer.in/exams/aibe-mock-test-1) **AIBE Mock Test 2:** [Click Here](https://quiz.lawfoyer.in/exams/aibe-mock-test-2) **AIBE Mock Test 3:** [Click Here](https://quiz.lawfoyer.in/exams/aibe-mock-test-3) **AIBE Mock Test 4:** [Click Here](https://quiz.lawfoyer.in/exams/aibe-mock-test-4) **AIBE Mock Test 5:** [Click Here](https://quiz.lawfoyer.in/exams/aibe-mock-test-5) ## Our Mission To provide a **daily dose of knowledge, opportunities, and growth** for every law aspirant and professional. **Categories:** Uncategorised --- ### [VCPRF - International Moot Court Workshop, 2026 | Organized by Veritas Centre for Policy Research Foundation (VCPRF) | Register by 30 September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/vcprf-international-moot-court-workshop-2026-organized-by-veritas-centre-for-policy-research-foundation-vcprf-register-by-30-september-2026/) **Published:** September 20, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** VCPRF - International Moot Court Workshop, 2026 | Organized by Veritas Centre for Policy Research Foundation (VCPRF) | Register by 30 September 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Untitled-Design-682x1024.jpg) ## **About Veritas Centre for Policy Research Foundation (VCPRF)** The **Veritas Centre for Policy Research Foundation (VCPRF)** is an independent, non-partisan Section 8 Company established with the objective of promoting evidence-based public policy research, governance innovation, institutional development, and technology-driven policy implementation. VCPRF serves as a multidisciplinary platform bringing together researchers, students, academicians, professionals, policymakers, and technologists to develop practical, research-backed solutions for contemporary governance challenges. The Foundation works across diverse domains, including public policy, constitutional governance, legal research, technology and governance, digital public infrastructure, regulatory reforms, and institutional capacity building. Through research publications, stakeholder consultations, academic initiatives, policy dialogues, and technology-enabled governance projects, VCPRF aims to strengthen institutions and contribute to informed policymaking. ## **About the International Moot Court Workshop** The International Moot Court Workshop 2026 is an academic and skill-development initiative organised by VCPRF to provide law students with practical insights into international mooting, legal research, memorial writing, oral advocacy, and courtroom presentation. The workshop will feature speakers who were part of the 2026 Jessup Ukraine National Championship team, providing participants with an opportunity to learn from their experiences in international moot court competitions. The session is designed particularly for students who are interested in International Law, Public International Law, Moot Court Competitions, Legal Research, Advocacy, and pursuing opportunities at national and international moot courts. The workshop will focus on practical strategies, competition experiences, common challenges faced by mooters, and methods for developing effective written and oral advocacy skills. ## **Our Speakers** **Anastasiia Naida** **Research and Memo: How to Become the Authors of the Masterpiece** A session focused on advanced legal research, memorial writing, developing persuasive arguments, and approaching the preparation of an international moot court memorial. **Vladyslava Monia** **Preparing for Oral Pleadings: Building Confidence, Presentation Skills, and Courtroom Delivery** A practical session on preparing for oral rounds, developing confidence, structuring submissions, effective presentation, and courtroom delivery. **Myroslava Kalynovska** **Rounds in Practice: Presenting Your Case and Answering Judges’ Questions** An interactive session focusing on oral advocacy, responding to judges’ questions, presenting arguments effectively, and managing the dynamics of an international moot court round. **Nataliia Aleksyk** **Lessons Learned & Practical Tips** A practical discussion covering experiences from international moot court competitions, lessons learned, common challenges, and useful advice for aspiring mooters. ## **Who Can Participate?** The workshop is open to: - Undergraduate law students - Postgraduate law students - Students interested in International Law - Moot Court enthusiasts - Students preparing for national or international moot competitions - Students interested in legal research and advocacy - Students seeking practical exposure to international mooting Participants from law universities, universities, and colleges across India are welcome to register. ## **Workshop Benefits** Participants will have the opportunity to: - Gain practical insights into international moot court competitions. - Learn research and memorial-writing strategies. - Understand the preparation required for oral pleadings. - Develop courtroom presentation and advocacy skills. - Learn how to effectively respond to judges’ questions. - Understand common mistakes made during moot court competitions. - Gain insights into international mooting opportunities. - Interact directly with experienced international mooters. - Receive an E-Certificate of Participation upon successful participation in the workshop. ## **Workshop Details** **Organisation:** Veritas Centre for Policy Research Foundation (VCPRF) **Event:** International Moot Court Workshop 2026 **Date:** 3 October 2026 **Time:** 3:00 PM – 4:30 PM IST **Mode:** Online **Registration Fee:** **None / Free of Cost** **Certificate:** E-Certificate of Participation will be provided to registered participants who attend the session. ## **Registration Deadline** **30 September 2026 | 11:59 PM IST** **Limited seats are available. Registration is mandatory.** ## **How to Register** Interested participants may register through the official registration form: **Registration Form:** Participants are encouraged to register before the deadline as seats are limited. ## **Contact Information** **Veritas Centre for Policy Research Foundation (VCPRF)** Contact details: 7905013233 Website: LinkedIn: Email: **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events, Moot Courts --- ### [Two-Day International Conference on “Forensic Sciences for Advancing Justice: Integrating Law, Medical Science and Technology” | Organized by Integral University, India in collaboration with MenoufiyaUniversity AL Minufiyah, Egypt | Submit Abstract by 20th October 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/integral-university-india-in-collaboration-with-menoufiyauniversity-al-minufiyah-egypt-organized-by-integral-university-lucknow-submit-abstract-by-20th-october-2026/) **Published:** September 19, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** Integral University, India in collaboration with MenoufiyaUniversity AL Minufiyah, Egypt | Organized by Integral University, Lucknow | Submit Abstract by 20th October 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/POSTER-ON-TWO-DAY-INTERNATIONAL-CONFERENCE-e83cd9e8dafc108f20cba8d58ef80b79.jpg) ## About the organizer Integral University, Lucknow is a state private university established in 2004 and recognised by the University Grants Commission (UGC) under Sections 2(f) and 12(B) of the UGC Act, 1956. The University is accredited A+ by NAAC and recognised as a Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (SIRO) by the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR), Ministry of Science & Technology, Government of India. The University offers more than 240 programmes across 47 disciplines and provides a multidisciplinary academic environment conducive to research, innovation, knowledge exchange and interdisciplinary scholarship. The conference is being organised by the Faculty of Law, Integral University, Lucknow, in collaboration with Menoufiya University, Egypt. ## About the Event **ABOUT THE SEMINAR/CONFERENCE** The **Two-Day International Conference on “Forensic Sciences for Advancing Justice: Integrating Law, Medical Science and Technology”** aims to provide an interdisciplinary platform to examine the evolving **role of forensic sciences in justice, healthcare, research and technological governance.** The conference will bring together **forensic scientists, legal scholars, medical professionals, technologists, researchers, policymakers, law enforcement practitioners, academicians and students** to exchange knowledge and innovative ideas. The conference will explore developments in **forensic medicine, pathology, toxicology, DNA and genetic analysis, digital and cyber forensics, artificial intelligence, deepfakes, synthetic media, biotechnology, data protection, environmental forensics and financial forensics.** **Date:** 20–21 November 2026 **Mode:** Hybrid **Venue:** Main Campus, Integral University, Kursi Road, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh – 226026 ## ABOUT CALL FOR PAPERS The conference invites **original research abstracts** and papers from academicians, researchers, legal professionals, forensic scientists, medical professionals, technologists, policymakers, research scholars and students. Participants may submit papers addressing any suitable issue falling within the broader conference theme. The conference particularly welcomes interdisciplinary, comparative and contemporary research focusing on **law, forensic science, medical science and technology.** Abstracts should be **250–300 words** and must include five keywords. The abstract should cover the research question/problem, central argument, proposed methodology/approach, and expected contribution/conclusion. ## ELIGIBILITY The conference is open to: 1. Undergraduate and Postgraduate Students 2. Research Scholars 3. Faculty Members and Academicians 4. Legal Professionals 5. Forensic Scientists 6. Medical Professionals 7. Researchers 8. Technologists 9. Policymakers 10. Law Enforcement Professionals 11. Professionals from relevant disciplines 12. International/Foreign Participants ## THEME **FORENSIC SCIENCES FOR ADVANCING JUSTICE: INTEGRATING LAW, MEDICAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY** The conference broadly covers the following thematic areas: **Theme I: Law, Justice & Forensic Evidence** 1. Forensic Institutions and Criminal Justice: India–Egypt Perspectives 2. Forensic Evidence: Collection, Preservation, Integrity and Chain of Custody 3. Forensic Science in Investigation, Prosecution and Criminal Advocacy 4. Forensic Evidence in Courts: Admissibility, Evaluation and Expert Testimony 5. Forensic Education, Professional Training and Capacity Building 6. DNA, Digital and Emerging Forensic Technologies: Legal and Judicial Perspectives 7. Forensic Science, Human Rights and Access to Justice 8. Forensic Reliability, Errors, Bias and Wrongful Convictions 9. Forensic Science: Constitutional, Ethical, Privacy and Regulatory Dimensions 10. Cross-Border Forensics, International Cooperation and Future of Forensic Justice **Theme II: Medical & Allied Sciences in Forensic Justice** 1. Forensic Medicine, Law and Justice 2. Death Investigation and Forensic Pathology 3. Clinical Forensics, Injury Documentation and Medico-Legal Practice 4. Forensic Toxicology, Poisoning and Drug-Related Crimes 5. DNA, Serology and Molecular Forensics 6. Human Identification and Disaster Victim Identification 7. Forensic Psychology, Psychiatry and Criminal Behaviour 8. Forensic Science in Sexual Offences and Child Protection 9. Forensic Radiology, Medical Imaging and Emerging Technologies 10. Ethics, Privacy, Quality Assurance and Interdisciplinary Forensic Practice **Theme III: Technology, Innovation & the Future of Forensic Science** 1. AI, Machine Learning and Predictive Forensics 2. Digital and Cyber Forensics 3. Social Media, Deepfakes and Synthetic Media Investigations 4. Blockchain, Cryptocurrency and Financial Forensics 5. Biometrics, Facial Recognition and Digital Identification 6. Geospatial Technology, Drones and Smart Crime Scene Tools 7. 3D Imaging, Digital Reconstruction and Virtual Crime Scenes 8. Robotics, Automation and Next-Generation Crime Scene Investigation 9. Digital Evidence: Integrity, Admissibility and Legal Frameworks 10. Ethics, Privacy, Human Rights and International Cooperation in Forensic Technology The themes are suggestive and not exhaustive. Participants may choose any suitable topic aligned with the overall conference theme, including studies focusing on India, Egypt or broader international perspectives. ## SUBMISSION CATEGORIES **Abstract Submission** Participants are required to submit an original **abstract of 250–300 words** along with **five keywords**. A maximum of **one co-author** is permitted, and each participant may submit only one abstract. **Full Paper Submission** Only participants whose abstracts are selected will be eligible to submit a full paper. The full paper must contain **2,500–3,000 words**, inclusive of title, author details and main text, but exclusive of footnotes. ## FORMATTING GUIDELINES The following formatting requirements shall be followed for full paper submissions: 1. Paper Size: A4 2. Font: Times New Roman 3. Main Text: 12 pt 4. Title/Headings: 14 pt 5. Footnotes: 10 pt 6. Spacing: Single 7. Alignment: Justified 8. Subheadings: Bold and Left-Aligned 9. Citation Style: Authors are encouraged to follow Bluebook, 20th Edition 10. References must be provided through Word footnotes 11. A separate bibliography is not required. ## SUBMISSION GUIDELINES 1. Abstracts must be original and unpublished. 2. Abstracts must not be simultaneously submitted elsewhere. 3. Abstracts must be submitted in English. 4. Abstracts must be submitted in Microsoft Word (.doc/.docx) format. 5. Plagiarism/Similarity must not exceed 10%. 6. AI-generated content must not exceed 10%. 7. Only selected abstracts will be eligible for paper presentation. 8. The full paper must substantially correspond with the accepted abstract. 9. A maximum of two authors is permitted per paper. 10. Selected papers may be considered for publication, subject to applicable editorial and publication requirements. 11. Presentation does not guarantee publication. ## REGISTRATION FEES **UG & PG Students:** - Online – ₹500/- - Offline – ₹800/- **Faculty Members & Research Scholars:** - Online – ₹700/- - Offline – ₹1,200/- **Others:** - Online – ₹700/- - Offline – ₹1,200/- **International/Foreign Participants:** - $15 **Participation Only – No Presentation:** - Online – ₹300/- - Offline – ₹500/- Co-authors are required to register separately and pay the applicable registration fee. No fee shall be refunded if any author fails to attend the conference on the scheduled date. ## REGISTRATION PROCESS Participants may register through the designated Google Form. The current registration process covers abstract submission and audience participation. Following the review and selection of abstracts, accepted presenters will receive further communication regarding final registration and presentation. ## REGISTRATION AND SUBMISSION DEADLINE (IMPORTANT DATES) - **Abstract Submission: 20 October 2026** - Screening & Selection: 25 October 2026 - Registration & Payment: 05 November 2026 - Hybrid Paper Presentation: 20–21 November 2026 - **Full Paper Submission: 31 December 2026** ## SUBMISSION PROCEDURE Participants are required to submit their abstracts exclusively through the designated Google Form. The abstract should be submitted in **Microsoft Word (.doc/.docx)** format and must contain: 1. Author Name(s) 2. Institution/Organisation 3. Designation/Discipline/Year of Study, where applicable 4. E-mail Address 5. Contact Number 6. Postal Address 7. Abstract of 250–300 words 8. Five Keywords 9. Only selected abstracts will be eligible for presentation. ## CONTACT INFORMATION For queries regarding the conference, abstract submission, registration and participation, please contact: - **Dr. Gaurav Gupta, Faculty of Law, Integral University** **Contact:** +91-9415522249 - **Mohd. Ayaz Raza** **Contact:** +91-9044876699 - **Abhinaya Thangaraj** **Contact:** +91-7985121227 **Email:** icforiul2026@gmail.com ## **OFFICIAL LINKS** - [**Abstract Submission**](https://forms.gle/roMRRBys2v6PXjgi6) - [**Participation Registration**](https://forms.gle/ChR35DZ64uMf8gWE6) - [**Brochure Link**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1bN3OKAonbbANk8kqyyiHMv1o0bt9fLUW/view?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Events, Other Competitions --- ### [10th SGTU Moot Court Competition,2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, School of Law, SGT University | Register by 5th October, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/10th-sgtu-moot-court-competition2026-organized-by-moot-court-society-school-of-law-sgt-university-register-by-5th-october-2026/) **Published:** September 19, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 10th SGTU Moot Court Competition,2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, School of Law, SGT University | Register by 5th October, 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/10th-SGTU-MCC-1-966x1024.jpg) ## **About Organisation** Established in 2002, SGT University (NAAC A+ Accredited) is a premier UGC-recognized institution in Gurugram dedicated to research, innovation, and academic excellence. Its constituent School of Law provides quality legal education blending academic learning with practical training. The Moot Court Society, School of Law, SGT University serves as the student-run body responsible for cultivating courtroom advocacy, legal research, and drafting skills to bridge classroom learning and courtroom practice. ## **About the Opportunity** The Moot Court Society, School of Law, SGT University is organizing its flagship event, LOKMANTRA – 10th SGTU Moot Court Competition, 2026. The competition offers a platform for law students across the country to showcase advocacy, research, and analytical skills on critical constitutional and legal issues. The 10th SGTU Moot Court Competition will be held entirely in offline mode, with all preliminary and advanced rounds hosted at the SGT University campus. ## **Theme** Constitutional Governance, Civil Liberties & Digital Rights. The moot proposition revolves around a compromised national entrance examination, public protests, fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21, internet shutdowns, censorship, and limits of state power. ## **Eligibility** - Open to all students pursuing 3-year or 5-year LL.B. degree courses from any recognized university/institution in India. - Each team may consist of 3 members (2 Speakers and 1 Researcher) or 2 members (2 Speakers). - Each institution is permitted to register more than one team. ## **Registration Fee** - With Accommodation: ₹5,000/- per team - Without Accommodation: ₹3,000/- per team ## **Prizes** - Winner: ₹51,000 + Trophy - Runners Up: ₹31,000 + Trophy - Best Memorial: ₹11,000 - Best Speaker: ₹11,000 - Best Researcher: ₹11,000 - Internship Perks: Internship opportunities with partner law firms and organizations for top performers. ## **Important Dates** - Release of Moot Proposition & Registration Opens: 9th September, 2026 - Last Date of Registration: 5th October, 2026 - Last Date to Seek Clarifications: 7th October, 2026 - Release of Clarifications: 10th October, 2026 - Last Date of Memorial Submission (Soft Copy): 17th October, 2026 - Submission of Memorials (4 Hard Copies) & Inaugural: 22nd October, 2026 - Competition Dates: 22nd – 24th October, 2026 ## **Registration Process** Interested teams can register by completing the online registration form and submitting the requisite registration fee via the official payment scanner/gateway provided in the competition links. ## **Contact** - Email: mcs@sgtuniversity.org - Phone Numbers: - +91-7217783003 - +91- 9315728455 ## **Important Links** - Registration Form: [Registration Link](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSckPILwwIwdGf6Xwt_bfalUkv0Tnw0AnSG_kQ_5PGsv6WrFfg/viewform) - Moot Problem: [Moot Problem Link](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1NyKP5iHuAmxN18PdowI2CbVEukT0Zmqb/view?usp=drivesdk) - Rule Book : [Rules and Guidelines Link](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1QQmt-VOS3sTGXI3Aex0dyZEEdiQ82jyt/view?usp=drivesdk) - Brochure: [Brochure Link](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1zETPsooj0gz-om2cnYQ-2U8471Z9jm4B/view?usp=drivesdk) **Categories:** Events, Moot Courts, Other Competitions --- ### [National Legal Hackathon | Organized by School of Law, Forensic Justice and Policy Studies, National Forensic Sciences University (NFSU) | Register by 24 September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/national-legal-hackathon-organized-by-school-of-law-forensic-justice-and-policy-studies-national-forensic-sciences-university-nfsu-register-by-24-september-2026/) **Published:** September 18, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** National Legal Hackathon | Organized by School of Law, Forensic Justice and Policy Studies, National Forensic Sciences University (NFSU) | Register by 24 September 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/POSTER-in-ratio.jpg) ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISERS** **About the Institution** National Forensic Sciences University, established in 2009 as Gujarat Forensic Sciences University and declared an Institution of National Importance and a Central University in 2020. The National Forensic Sciences University (NFSU) offers around forty specialised programs as a premier hub for forensic education, research, and training. Its Delhi Campus extends this mission in the national capital, advancing interdisciplinary legal and forensic education while addressing contemporary challenges in justice administration through academic excellence and practical innovation. **School of Law, Forensic Justice & Policy Studies** The School of Law, Forensic Justice and Policy Studies is dedicated to transforming legal education by integrating forensic science with law and policymaking. It focuses on technology-driven legal studies to prepare legal professionals, policymakers and justice administrators for the complexities of today’s evolving, digital legal landscape. Its programmes blend forensic science with law to support crime prevention and fair, efficient justice, while shaping techno-legal experts who can strengthen governance, uphold the rule of law and contribute to a more just society. ## **DETAILS OF THE EVENT** **Event Title:** National Legal Hackathon, 2026. **Theme/Concept:** A legal problem-solving competition where participants identify existing, real-world problems in the legal ecosystem and develop practical, implementable solutions legal startups, tech-enabled tools, service models, or process innovations. The event is execution-focused, not an abstract innovation challenge. **Organised by:** School of Law, Forensic Justice & Policy Studies, National Forensic Sciences University, Delhi Campus. ## **COMPETITION STRUCTURE** - **Stage 1 — Online Submission:** Structured business idea / legal startup proposal, submitted in PDF format. - **Stage 2 — Shortlisting:** Approximately 20 teams shortlisted from all submissions. - **Stage 3 — Preliminary Round (Offline, 16 October 2026):** All shortlisted teams present their solutions on campus. - **Stage 4 — Final Round (17 October 2026):** Top 5 teams compete for the final placements. ## **WORKSHOP COMPONENT** A complimentary and optional Legal Startup Workshop will be conducted on Day 1 (16 October 2026), led by Dr. Kalpesh Sarwal. ## **ELIGIBILITY** 3. Open to students from **any discipline** — law, technology, management, or others. Participation is not restricted to law students. 4. Interdisciplinary teams are welcome and encouraged. 5. Team composition: 2 to 4 members per team. 6. Teams may consist of students from the same college or from different colleges. 7. The proposed idea or solution must directly relate to and address a real problem within the legal field, relevant to lawyers, the judiciary, law students, or legal processes. ## **LOCATION** **Mode:** Online Submission Round + Offline (On-Campus) Rounds. **Venue:** National Forensic Sciences University, Delhi Campus, Outer Ring Rd, near Jaipur Golden Hospital, Institutional Area, Rohini, Delhi, 110085. ## **REGISTRATION AND SUBMISSION PROCEDURE** **Registration Form:** Teams must register using the official Google Form – **Submission of Proposal:** Teams must submit a structured PDF containing their business idea / legal startup proposal by the deadline below. ## **IMPORTANT DATES AND DEADLINES** - **Last Date for Registration:** 24 September 2026. - **Last Date for Submission:** 26 September 2026. - **Announcement of Shortlisted Teams:** 01 October 2026. - **Preliminary Round (Offline):** 16 October 2026. - **Final Round:** 17 October 2026. ## **FEE DETAILS** **The Registration Fee for Hackathon is ₹2,500** (without accommodation. For Payment Kindly scon the QR Code below: ## **PRIZES AND AWARDS** - **WINNER –** Cash Prize of Rs. 30,000/- + (Memento & Certificate of Merit) - **1 RUNNER UP –** Cash Prize of Rs. 20,000/- + (Memento & Certificate of Merit) ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** **For further queries, contact:** - Pranav Ahuja (Convenor) – +91 9312508454 - Venketesh Jain (Co-Convenor) – +91 9953498791 ## **OFFICIAL LINKS** - **Brochure, Rulebook and Other Details:** [Drive Link](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1PysNbieHCVvK4N_oqxEvFNht05-aMWPG?usp=sharing) - **Registration Form:** - **Instagram Page:** [Insta Handle](https://www.instagram.com/national_legal_hackathon?stkn=c2YyZGVxZWFlM3Bt) **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events, Other Competitions --- ### [CALL FOR ABSTRACTS — CCADR JOURNAL FOR ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION | Organized by Chanakya Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution (CCADR), CNLU | Register by 15th October 2026 | 11:59 p.m.](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-abstracts-ccadr-journal-for-alternate-dispute-resolution-organized-by-chanakya-centre-for-alternative-dispute-resolution-ccadr-cnlu-register-by-15th-october-2026-1159-p-m/) **Published:** September 18, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** CALL FOR ABSTRACTS — CCADR JOURNAL FOR ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION | Organized by Chanakya Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution (CCADR), CNLU | Register by 15th October 2026 | 11:59 p.m. **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-2026-09-18-223330-edited-1.jpg) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER The Chanakya Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution (CCADR), CNLU, is inviting scholarly contributions for **Volume I of the CCADR Journal for Alternate Dispute Resolution**. The call seeks to foster insightful discussions on contemporary developments in mediation and arbitration. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY CCADR invites **abstract submissions** on the theme: **“Navigating the Expanding Role of Mediation and Arbitration in Dispute Resolution”** The Journal welcomes original scholarly contributions addressing contemporary developments in mediation and arbitration. Suggested areas include: - International Commercial Arbitration - Investment Arbitration - Finality of Awards - Policy and Regulatory Developments in Mediation - Technology, AI and Online Dispute Resolution The listed themes are **indicative and non-exhaustive**. Submissions engaging with related or emerging issues are also encouraged. Authors whose abstracts are selected will subsequently be invited to submit the **final manuscript**. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE Abstract submissions are invited from: - Academicians - Legal practitioners - Research scholars - Students A maximum of **two authors** is permitted per manuscript. ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE Authors are required to submit an **abstract of 250–500 words**, accompanied by **five keywords**. ### **Abstract Submission Form:** [Submit Abstract](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSckFB30uWDvRj0ccsS8e2rjY9fRI1Ps4fzyAtRzwbgp2qrNXQ/viewform) Authors whose abstracts are selected will be invited to submit the final manuscript. ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES **Abstract Submission Deadline:** 15th October 2026 | 11:59 p.m. ## OFFICIAL LINK / SUBMISSION GUIDELINES ### **Detailed Submission Guidelines:** [View Detailed Submission Guidelines](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1svLTuOk0rvCdfF7IxiS8urOotF80kyup/view) **Categories:** Call for Blogs, Call for Papers, Events --- ### [How to Register a Trademark and Secure Your Brand Name](https://lawfoyer.in/how-to-register-a-trademark-and-secure-your-brand-name/) **Published:** September 17, 2026 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## **Introduction** A brand name helps customers identify a business, product, or service and distinguish it from competitors. Registering the name as a trademark can provide stronger legal protection and help the owner establish enforceable rights over the mark. In India, [trademark registration](https://vakilsearch.com/trademark-registration) is administered by the Trade Marks Registry under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and the Trade Marks Rules, 2017. The process involves checking availability, selecting the appropriate class, filing an application, responding to examination requirements, and completing the publication and opposition stages before registration. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/image-1024x512.png) ## **What Is a Trademark?** A trademark is a mark used to distinguish the goods or services of one business from those of others. It can include words, names, logos, symbols, slogans, shapes, colour combinations, and sounds, provided the mark meets the applicable legal requirements. A registered trademark can provide clearer legal rights to the proprietor and support enforcement against unauthorised use. Trademark protection is generally linked to the specific goods or services covered by the registration. ## **Why Should You Register Your Brand Name as a Trademark?** Registering a brand name can help a business protect its identity and build long-term value around the name. It can also make it easier to take action against unauthorised use of a confusingly similar mark. The main advantages include: - **Brand protection:** Helps protect the registered mark against unauthorised use. - **Legal rights:** Provides stronger and clearer rights than relying only on an unregistered mark. - **Business value:** A registered trademark can become an important intangible business asset. - **Consumer recognition:** Helps distinguish your products or services from competitors. - **Enforcement:** Registration can support legal action against infringement. - **Expansion:** A protected brand can provide a stronger foundation for licensing, franchising, and business expansion. ## **Who Can Apply for a Trademark?** A trademark application can be filed by individuals, startups, small enterprises, companies, partnership firms, trusts, societies, and foreign applicants, provided they claim proprietorship of the mark. An applicant can file directly or through a registered trademark agent or attorney. The applicant category is relevant because different official fee categories apply to individuals, startups and small enterprises compared with other applicants. ## **How to Register a Trademark in India** The trademark registration process involves several stages, from checking whether the proposed brand name is available to receiving registration after examination and opposition proceedings. ### **Step 1: Choose Your Brand Name or Mark** Start by selecting the exact name, logo, slogan, or other mark you want to protect. The proposed mark should be distinctive and should not be identical or deceptively similar to an existing trademark. Avoid names that are generic, descriptive without sufficient distinctiveness, deceptive, or otherwise prohibited under trademark law. ### **Step 2: Conduct a** [**Trademark Search**](https://trademarks.vakilsearch.com/) Before filing the application, search existing trademarks to identify identical or similar marks. The search should consider both the wording and the relevant goods or services because conflicts can arise from marks that are similar in appearance, sound, meaning, or commercial context. A proper search can help identify potential conflicts at an early stage and reduce the risk of objections or opposition later in the process. IP India also recommends checking existing trademarks and assessing similarity before filing. ### **Step 3: Select the Correct Trademark Class** Trademark protection is based on the goods or services for which the mark is registered. India follows the Nice Classification system, with Classes 1 to 34 covering goods and Classes 35 to 45 covering services. Select the class or classes that accurately cover your business activities. If the brand is used across different categories of goods or services, more than one class may be required. Choosing an inappropriate class can limit the practical scope of protection. ### **Step 4: Determine the Application Category** The applicant must select the appropriate category when preparing the trademark application. IP India recognises categories such as individual, startup, small enterprise, and other applicants for fee purposes. The applicable fee depends on the applicant category and the number of classes and marks covered by the application. An applicant claiming startup or small enterprise status should have the relevant supporting documentation required for that category. ### **Step 5: Prepare the Required Information and Documents** The application should contain accurate applicant details, representation of the trademark, and a clear description of the goods or services for which registration is sought. Where applicable, additional documents such as a user affidavit, supporting proof of prior use, or power of attorney may be required. If the application is based on prior use of the trademark, the applicant should ensure that the required evidence supporting the claimed use is available. ### **Step 6: File Form TM-A** A new trademark registration application is filed using **Form TM-A**. The application can cover one trademark across one or more classes, subject to the applicable requirements and fees. The applicant can submit the application through the Trade Marks Registry’s e-filing system and pay the prescribed fee. As of the current official fee schedule, the e-filing fee for an application is ₹4,500 per class per mark for an individual, startup, or small enterprise and ₹9,000 for other applicants. The applicable official fee should always be verified before filing because government fees and procedures may change. ### **Step 7: Track the Trademark Application** After filing, the application can be tracked through the trademark system. The application moves through stages such as formalities checking, examination, and, where applicable, objection or hearing proceedings. Monitoring the application regularly is important because the Registry may issue an examination report or other communication requiring a response within the applicable period. ### **Step 8: Respond to Trademark Objections** The Registrar examines the application to determine whether the mark meets the applicable requirements. Objections may arise under provisions relating to issues such as lack of distinctiveness or similarity with existing trademarks. If an examination report raises objections, the applicant must respond appropriately within the prescribed period. Depending on the response and circumstances, a hearing may also be scheduled. The application can proceed if the objections are satisfactorily addressed. ### **Step 9: Publication in the Trademark Journal** If the application is accepted, the mark is published in the Trade Marks Journal. This provides an opportunity for third parties to oppose the proposed registration. Under the current IP India filing workflow, third parties may oppose the application within four months of publication. If no opposition is filed within the applicable period, or if an opposition is resolved in favour of the applicant, the application can proceed towards registration. ### **Step 10: Obtain Trademark Registration** Once the application successfully completes examination and opposition requirements, the trademark is registered and the registration certificate is issued. The registration provides the proprietor with statutory protection for the registered mark in relation to the specified goods or services. A registered trademark is valid for **10 years from the date of application** and can be renewed indefinitely for further periods of 10 years by following the prescribed renewal process. ## **Documents Required for Trademark Registration** The documents required can vary depending on the applicant and the nature of the application. Generally, the application may require: - Applicant’s identity and address details - Representation of the proposed trademark - Description of goods or services - Applicant constitution or business details, where applicable - Startup or small enterprise certificate, if claiming the relevant category - User affidavit and supporting evidence, where prior use is claimed - Power of attorney, where an agent is appointed Providing accurate information at the filing stage can help reduce avoidable deficiencies and processing delays. ## **How Much Does Trademark Registration Cost?** The official trademark application fee depends on the applicant category, filing method, number of classes, and number of marks. Under the current IP India fee schedule, e-filing Form TM-A costs ₹4,500 per class per mark for an individual, startup, or small enterprise and ₹9,000 per class per mark for other applicants. Additional fees may apply for matters such as opposition, expedited processing, amendments, renewal, or other requests made during the trademark process. Professional fees are separate from government fees where an applicant engages a trademark agent or legal professional. ## **Common Mistakes to Avoid During Trademark Registration** A carefully prepared application can reduce the risk of unnecessary delays. Some common mistakes include: - Filing without conducting a proper trademark search. - Selecting the wrong trademark class. - Choosing a mark that is descriptive or insufficiently distinctive. - Providing an incomplete description of goods or services. - Claiming prior use without adequate supporting evidence. - Providing inconsistent applicant information. - Failing to monitor the application after filing. - Missing deadlines for responding to examination reports or other notices. - Assuming that filing automatically guarantees registration. ## **How to Protect Your Brand After Registration** Trademark protection does not end when the registration certificate is issued. The proprietor should monitor the market for potentially conflicting marks and take appropriate action when unauthorised use is identified. The registered trademark should also be renewed on time. Since registration is valid for 10 years and can be renewed for successive 10-year periods, maintaining renewal records is important for uninterrupted protection. Businesses should also maintain evidence of genuine trademark use, especially where the mark is actively used in commerce. Consistent use of the registered mark and proper record keeping can support the continued management and enforcement of trademark rights. ## **Conclusion** Registering a trademark is an important step towards securing a brand name and establishing stronger legal protection for a business identity. The process begins with selecting a distinctive mark and conducting a proper search, followed by choosing the appropriate class, preparing the application, filing Form TM-A, and responding to any examination requirements. Once the application is accepted and successfully passes the publication and opposition stages, the trademark can proceed to registration. Businesses should continue monitoring their brand, maintaining proper records, and renewing the registration on time to preserve the protection associated with the mark. **Categories:** Uncategorised --- ### [11th Justice Murtaza Husain Memorial Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Unity Moot Court Committee, Unity P.G. College, Lucknow | Register by 30th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/11th-justice-murtaza-husain-memorial-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-unity-moot-court-committee-unity-p-g-college-lucknow-register-by-30th-september-2026/) **Published:** September 14, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 11th Justice Murtaza Husain Memorial Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Unity Moot Court Committee, Unity P.G. College, Lucknow | Register by 30th September 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Screenshot-2026-09-14-213842.jpg) ## **About Organisation** **Unity P.G. College, Lucknow**, associated with the **University of Lucknow**, is committed to providing quality legal education and developing advocacy skills among law students. The college conducts seminars, conferences, debates and national-level moot court competitions to promote practical legal learning. The **Unity Moot Court Committee** is responsible for fostering and facilitating mooting activities at the institution and has successfully organised the competition over the years. ## **About the Opportunity** The **11th Justice Murtaza Husain Memorial Moot Court Competition, 2026** is a national-level moot court competition organised by the **Unity Moot Court Committee, Unity P.G. College, Lucknow**. The competition will provide law students with an opportunity to develop their **legal research, drafting, analytical reasoning and oral advocacy skills** through a simulated courtroom experience. **Date:** 23rd–25th October 2026 **Venue:** Unity P.G. College, Lucknow ## **Theme** This year’s proposition, titled ‘The Leasing of Sal Van Forest,’ deals with the lease of a Scheduled Area forest to a private mining company without the consent of the local Gram Sabhas. It raises questions around the Forest Rights Act, PESA, the Fifth Schedule, environmental clearances, arbitrary state action, and the rights of displaced Adivasi communities- making it a rich, contemporary problem spanning constitutional law, environmental law, and tribal rights jurisprudence. ## **Eligibility** The competition is open to students currently pursuing: - **3-Year LL.B.** - **5-Year Integrated LL.B.** from recognised institutions in India. Each team shall consist of **two Speakers and one Researcher**. ## **Registration Fee** - **Without Accommodation:** ₹3,500/- per team - **With Accommodation:** ₹6,000/- per team The registration fee is **non-refundable**. ## **Prizes** **Award** **Prize** **Winning Team** ₹20,000 + Trophy **Runner-Up Team** ₹15,000 + Trophy **Best Memorial** ₹6,000 + Trophy **Best Mooter** ₹5,000 + Trophy **Best Researcher** ₹5,000 + Trophy **Participation Certificates** All Participants Awards will be presented during the **Valedictory Ceremony on 25th October 2026**. ## **Important Dates** **Event** **Date** **Commencement of Registration** 1st September 2026 **Last Date for Registration & Travel Form** 30th September 2026 **Last Date to Seek Clarification** 30th September 2026 **Memorial Submission – Soft Copy** 10th October 2026 **Memorial Submission – Hard Copy** 23rd October 2026 **Researcher’s Test** 23rd October 2026 **Preliminary & Quarter-Final Rounds** 24th October 2026 **Semi-Final & Final Rounds** 25th October 2026 **Valedictory Ceremony** 25th October 2026 ## **Registration Process** Teams must complete their registration **by 30th September 2026, 11:59 PM**. Registration requires submission of: 1. Duly filled **Registration Form and Travel Form** 2. **Proof of online payment** of the registration fee 3. **Accommodation requirements**, if applicable The registration form contains details for the institution and the **two Speakers and one Researcher**. **Registration/Official Communication:** **unitymootcourtcommittee@gmail.com** ## **Contact** **Unity Moot Court Committee** **Unity P.G. College, Lucknow** **Email:** unitymootcourtcommittee@gmail.com **Instagram:** @unitymootcourtcommittee **Student Convener:** Yashfeen Zaidi — +91-8853425968 **Student Convener:** Mohd Aamir — +91-6307637800 ## **Important Links** [**DRIVE LNK FOR THE DOCUMENTS**](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1nf2bZRXBhp-vQtboVqzAvAUdmWj_CmnU) **Categories:** Events, Moot Courts, Other Competitions --- ### [Sibgathullah Khan Subaan of Osmania University Receives Commendation Certificate at Telangana Minorities Excellence Summit](https://lawfoyer.in/sibgathullah-khan-subaan-of-osmania-university-receives-commendation-certificate-at-telangana-minorities-excellence-summit/) **Published:** September 13, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Content:** Achievements become truly meaningful when they reflect dedication, patience, and the courage to keep moving forward despite challenges. Adding another proud milestone to the journey is **Sibgathullah Khan Subaan**, an LLB student at **Osmania University**, who has been recognised with a **Commendation Certificate at the Telangana Minorities Excellence Summit**. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/20260816_235010-SIBGHATHULLAH-KHAN-1024x716.jpg) The recognition was presented by the **Minorities Welfare Department, Government of Telangana**, making this achievement a significant moment in Sibgathullah’s academic and personal journey. As a student currently pursuing the second semester of the LLB programme, this recognition comes at an important stage of a legal education journey that is still taking shape. Behind every recognition lies a story of preparation and perseverance. For Sibgathullah, the commendation represents the value of remaining consistent even when the path is not always easy. Setbacks and difficult phases can often test determination, but continuing to learn and improve can gradually turn effort into meaningful results. Sharing reflections on the achievement, Sibgathullah expressed that the recognition at the Telangana Minorities Excellence Summit feels incredible and reflects years of consistent preparation, patience, and staying the course despite setbacks. The commendation also serves as a reminder that sincere hard work does not go unnoticed. For aspiring law students, this journey offers an important lesson. Legal education is not only about academic knowledge. It is also about developing discipline, patience, confidence, and the ability to continue working towards a goal over time. Consistency can be especially valuable during the early stages of a legal career, when every experience contributes to personal and professional growth. Sibgathullah’s message to fellow students is simple yet powerful: **do not rush the process. Keep revising, remain consistent even on days when motivation is low, and trust that effort compounds over time.** Every attempt brings an opportunity to learn something new, and persistence can eventually open the door to success. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/20260816_235130-SIBGHATHULLAH-KHAN-1024x768.jpg) This commendation at the Telangana Minorities Excellence Summit therefore stands as more than just a certificate. It is a reflection of perseverance and a reminder that meaningful progress is built through continued effort. As Sibgathullah continues the LLB journey at Osmania University, this achievement can serve as an encouraging milestone and a source of motivation for the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead. LawFoyer proudly celebrates **Sibgathullah Khan Subaan** for this achievement and wishes continued success in the journey ahead. May this recognition inspire many more milestones in the years to come. **Wish to showcase your achievement to the world and inspire others?** LawFoyer will celebrate your achievement because **every achievement deserves recognition**. Your achievement is our achievement. **Share your achievement with us and become a part of LawFoyer’s Achievers’ Archive:** **Categories:** Achievers Archive --- ### [VIDHIKA – Volume 2 Issue 3 | Organized by Nyaya Shastra | Submit by 20th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/vidhika-volume-2-issue-3-organized-by-nyaya-shastra-submit-by-20th-september-2026/) **Published:** September 12, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** VIDHIKA – Volume 2 Issue 3 | Organized by Nyaya Shastra | Submit by 20th September 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/CfP-VIDHIKA-vol-2-issue-3-1.jpg) ## About Nyaya Shastra Nyaya Shastra is an MSME registered, full-service Law Firm and legal learning platform built on the foundation of integrity, excellence, and service. Established with the vision of bridging the gap between academic legal knowledge and its practical application, we strive to deliver legal solutions that are insightful, effective, and socially responsible. We provide a comprehensive range of services in litigation and dispute resolution, corporate and commercial law, contract drafting and management, regulatory and compliance advisory, and policy research. Representing clients before various judicial and quasi-judicial forums across India, we are committed to offering strategic and result-oriented legal counsel that aligns with the evolving needs of individuals, businesses, and institutions. ## **About VIDHIKA \[ISSN No. 3108-0855\]** VIDHIKA, a quarterly law journal, is an in-house publication of Nyaya Shastra. The journal seeks to create a vibrant intellectual space where students, researchers, academics, practitioners, and policymakers can engage in constructive dialogue on contemporary legal challenges. With a commitment to advancing legal understanding and contributing to informed public debate, VIDHIKA aspires to influence policy development, support legal reforms, and strengthen the broader discourse on justice, rights, and governance. The scope of the journal is broad and interdisciplinary, covering diverse areas such as constitutional law, criminal law, civil and commercial law, human rights, environmental law, family law, labour law, and property law, along with specialized fields like cyber law, artificial intelligence, intellectual property, data privacy, and digital governance. It also welcomes socio-legal research that draws from sociology, economics, political science, and public policy. Reflecting the social-justice orientation of Nyaya Shastra, the journal pays particular attention to themes such as access to justice, women’s and children’s rights, marginalized communities, and tribal customary laws. VIDHIKA accepts various forms of scholarly contributions, including research articles, case comments, legislative analyses, book reviews, essays, and policy briefs, ensuring a comprehensive platform for diverse academic voices. ## **Plagiarism Policy** 10% Plagiarism is permitted. Authors are advised to properly cite the content which they have used from other sources to avoid exceeding the permitted plagiarism limit. ## **Review Policy** Nyaya Shastra follows Peer Review Policy to ensure the quality of the Journal. ## **Submission Guidelines** Submissions are invited for the \[Volume 2 Issue 3\] of VIDHIKA. The interested authors can also send their original & unpublished articles directly at [**office.nyayashastra@gmail.com**](mailto:office.nyayashastra@gmail.com) with the subject line as **SUBMISSION FOR VIDHIKA** before **20th September 2026**. However, any submission does not guarantee the publication of articles but the authors are suggested not to send their submitted articles anywhere else before the this issue of VIDHIKA is released (tentatively in 3rd week of October 2026). If the article is accepted it will be published in the very next issue and non publication of submitted articles means the article has been rejected. ANY COMMUNICATION REGARDING REJECTION OF ARTICLES WILL NOT BE DONE. IF ARTICLES ARE SELECTED, EMAIL WILL BE SENT. ## NO FEE IS CHARGED FOR PUBLICATION The authors are suggested to send their articles or research paper in **Word Format** along with – - Font Size – 12 - Line Spacing 1.15 - Font – Times New Roman - Alignment – Justified - Word Limit – Maximum 2000 words. **Please note that due to large number of submissions, any communication regarding the recipt, acceptance or non acceptance of the submissions will not be done. We request the authors to remain patient all throughout.** **Also note that non compliance to the guidelines as mentioned in this post will result to rejection/non consideration of the submission without any intimation.** **Please attach a Turnitin Similarity Report alongwith the Word File.** **Categories:** Call for Blogs, Call for Papers, Events --- ### [MEDEXON INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION COMPETITION, 2026 | Organized by Dexon Global | Register by 20 October 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/medexon-international-mediation-competition-2026-organized-by-dexon-global-register-by-20-october-2026/) **Published:** September 10, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** MEDEXON INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION COMPETITION, 2026 | Organized by Dexon Global | Register by 20 October 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/MEDEXON-2026_page-0001-1-791x1024.jpg) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY **Dexon Global** is a research-driven, interdisciplinary organisation working across legal education, public policy, sustainability and global academic collaboration. It aims to bridge academia, industry and governance through knowledge creation and capacity building, and conducts international conferences, faculty development programmes, training modules, publications and collaborative research initiatives. The **Dexon Global Centre for Institutional Peacebuilding, ODR, Mediation and Arbitration Training** focuses on Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), Online Dispute Resolution (ODR), mediation and institutional peacebuilding. It seeks to connect theoretical frameworks with practical dispute-resolution skills and promote research, capacity building, policy discourse and international collaboration. **PUC-SP**, founded in 1946, is a leading private university in Brazil, based in São Paulo. It offers undergraduate and graduate programmes across multiple disciplines, with particular strengths in law, humanities, social sciences, economics, communication and health sciences. Its Faculty of Law has an international presence in commercial arbitration and dispute resolution. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY **MEDEXON 2026** is an international mediation competition designed to provide participants with practical and experiential exposure to mediation and alternative dispute resolution. According to the brochure, the competition brings together institutions, practitioners, academics and dispute-resolution professionals from **India, Brazil, the United Kingdom, the United States, Nigeria, Ecuador, New Zealand and Türkiye**. The competition aims to help participants develop skills in: - Communication - Negotiation - Problem-solving - Collaboration - Interest-based dispute resolution - Contemporary approaches to mediation The event also provides opportunities for cross-border learning, professional interaction and knowledge exchange. The competition will be conducted in **two phases**: - **Phase I:** 31 October – 1 November 2026 - **Phase II:** 14 – 15 November 2026 The brochure includes a dedicated **Rule Book** and **Mediation Propositions** for the competition. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE Students pursuing the following programmes are eligible: - **3-Year LL.B.** - **5-Year Integrated Law Programmes**, including B.A. LL.B., B.B.A. LL.B. and other allied integrated courses - **LL.M. programmes** The registration fees are specified for **teams of 3 members**, indicating the team structure mentioned in the brochure. ## MODE OF THE EVENT **Virtual Mode / Online** The brochure specifically identifies MEDEXON 2026 as a **Virtual Mode** competition. ## LOCATION (COUNTRY/STATE/CITY) & VENUE OF THE EVENT No physical venue is specified because the competition is being conducted in **virtual mode**. ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE ### [Registration Link](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScbLk6scvu4akJTbD3bESYKzx3npPh82iVwl5z9kaMg8K4KNg/viewform?usp=send_form) ### [Payment Link](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScbLk6scvu4akJTbD3bESYKzx3npPh82iVwl5z9kaMg8K4KNg/viewform) ## FEE DETAILS ### For Indian Nationals **Early-Bird Team Registration:** INR **3,000/- per team** *(Team of 3 members)* **Standard Team Registration:** INR **5,100/- per team** *(Team of 3 members)* ### For Foreign Nationals / Students of Law Schools Outside India **Early-Bird Team Registration:** USD **90.00 per team** *(Team of 3 members)* **Standard Team Registration:** USD **150.00 per team** *(Team of 3 members)* The brochure states that **no registration fee will be refunded under any circumstances**. ## PRIZES & BENEFITS The brochure lists the following benefits: - **Exclusive cash prizes for the winning team** - **Internship opportunities for the top 4 teams** at top-tier firms and dispute-resolution centres - Internship opportunities at: - **Tirado ADR Ltd** - **Legal League Consulting** - **MedArb International** - **Free publication for all participants** at **Beyond Briefs Law Review (BBLR)** ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES ParticularDateRelease of Brochure**25 August 2026**Early-Bird Registration**25 September 2026**Clarification Date**10 October 2026**Final Registration**20 October 2026**Clarification Response Date**20 October 2026**Phase I**31 October – 1 November 2026**Phase II**14 – 15 November 2026** ## CONTACT INFORMATION Participants are requested to contact the organisers in the following order: **Email:** **1. Mr. Somnath Majhi** **Phone:** +91 6294017498 For queries related to **registration and the registration process**. **2. Ms. Mohona Datta** **Phone:** +91 8777861676 For queries concerning the **number of teams per institution, event, rules, schedule and other event-related matters**. For queries and requests to be a part of **MEDEXON 2026:** **Phone:** +91 6202300514 ## OFFICIAL LINK / BROCHURE / RULES & REGULATIONS ### [Official Links](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1djtdwQOQiNUyG9511vMAeg2vpIAgifPz?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Events, Other Competitions --- ### [K.M. Bashir Memorial Student Constitutional Forum 2026 | Organized by Vakkom Moulavi Foundation Trust (VMFT) | Event on 24 & 25 September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/k-m-bashir-memorial-student-constitutional-forum-2026-organized-by-vakkom-moulavi-foundation-trust-vmft-event-on-24-25-september-2026/) **Published:** September 8, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** K.M. Bashir Memorial Student Constitutional Forum 2026 | Organized by Vakkom Moulavi Foundation Trust (VMFT) | Event on 24 & 25 September 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/IMG-20260812-WA0028-1-812x1024.jpg) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER / FOUNDATION VMFT works towards a society where knowledge overcomes ignorance, fairness overcomes injustice, and opportunity replaces despair. It aims to provide a platform for new ideas and for young people to question, learn and engage with issues shaping their future. Its work spans inclusive governance, education, science and technology, and social and cultural transformation, with a focus on turning knowledge and ideas into meaningful change. The organisation highlights three broad goals: **promoting new ideas, generating knowledge, and impacting lives**. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY The **K.M. Bashir Memorial Student Constitutional Forum** is described as the principal student initiative of the K.M. Bashir Memorial, organised by VMFT. It seeks to foster constitutional understanding, democratic citizenship and informed public reasoning among young people by combining the annual Memorial Lecture with a structured Student Constitutional Forum. The 2026 theme is: **“Has the Constitution Failed Us, or Have We Failed the Constitution?”** The Forum encourages participants to reflect, discuss and engage with contemporary constitutional questions. Possible areas of discussion include the role of public institutions in constitutional governance, protection of vulnerable and marginalised groups, gender equality and social justice, and contemporary challenges to constitutional democracy. #### Objectives - Encourage students to critically study constitutional issues of contemporary importance. - Promote informed, respectful and evidence-based discussion. - Develop constitutional reasoning and the ability to analyse issues from different perspectives. - Foster collaboration among colleges committed to constitutional education and civic engagement. #### Format The Forum is conducted over approximately three hours under an independent Judging Panel and consists of three stages: 1. **Opening Presentation** – A 10-minute oral presentation on the theme, drawing on preparation and the Memorial Lecture. 2. **Assigned Questions** – One undisclosed question is assigned by random draw. Teams get 15 minutes to prepare and up to 8 minutes to present. 3. **Constitutional Dialogue** – A 30-minute structured dialogue among teams, led by the Chair, exploring broader implications of the theme. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE In 2026, **five colleges and university departments from the region** will be invited by VMFT, with selected law colleges and institutions offering political science or other relevant disciplines being considered. Each participating institution has a **two-student team**, preferably one female and one male in co-educational colleges. - Students may be **undergraduate or postgraduate** students. - **Ph.D. scholars are excluded.** - The prize is awarded to the **team**, not to individual students. - Each institution designates a faculty member to guide preparation and attend the Lecture, though the faculty member may not assist the team during the Forum. ## MODE OF THE EVENT **Offline** ## LOCATION & VENUE **Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, India** The brochure gives the VMFT address as: **Vakkam Moulavi Foundation Trust (VMFT)** Vakkam Moulavi Road, Thekkummoodu Junction, Trivandrum – 695035. The cover identifies **VMFT, Thekkummoodu Junction, 695035, Thiruvananthapuram** as the event location. The brochure also states that the **2026 K.M. Bashir Memorial Lecture**, which forms part of the Forum’s preparation, will be held at the **Science and Technology Museum Auditorium, PMG Junction, Thiruvananthapuram, on 24 September 2026 at 4:30 PM**. The Lecture will be delivered by **Shri S. P. Swamy…**, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of India (Retd.), on the Forum theme. A **Constitution and Citizens Prize** will be awarded to the team demonstrating the strongest overall performance in the Forum. ## **Prize Money** **₹10,000** for the winning team. **All participants will receive certificates.** The judging criteria are: - Opening Presentation – **40 marks** - Assigned Questions – **35 marks** - Constitutional Dialogue – **15 marks** - Teamwork – **10 marks** The highest-scoring team receives the prize on the Judging Panel’s recommendation, and the decision of the Judging Panel is final. ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES DateDetails**24 September 2026**K.M. Bashir Memorial Lecture, 4:30 PM**25 September 2026**K.M. Bashir Memorial Student Constitutional Forum, **1:30 PM – 5:30 PM** Before the Lecture, teams are expected to prepare their opening presentation using relevant materials and guidance from their faculty mentor. After the Lecture, teams refine their presentations based on the Lecturer’s ideas. ## CONTACT INFORMATION **Email:** **Phone:** +91 471 2304051 **Contact Person:** Merilin Jacob **Mobile:** +91 95624 58609 **Address:** Vakkam Moulavi Road, Thekkummoodu Junction, Trivandrum – 695035. ### OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / BROCHURE [**Official website**](https://vmft.org/) [**Official Brochure Link**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/16N7kH14HzKsYGWV26ftqr2PCsyk3ERfz/view?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Events, Other Competitions --- ### [Call for Abstracts: International Conference on International Arbitration | Organized by School of Law, Mahindra University, Hyderabad, in collaboration with Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Submit Abstract by 15 September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-abstracts-international-conference-on-international-arbitration-organized-by-school-of-law-mahindra-university-hyderabad-in-collaboration-with-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu/) **Published:** September 6, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** Call for Abstracts: International Conference on International Arbitration | Organized by School of Law, Mahindra University, Hyderabad, in collaboration with Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Submit Abstract by 15 September 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Poster-1-1024x640.jpg) Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur, in collaboration with the School of Law, Mahindra University, Hyderabad, is pleased to announce the **International Conference on International Arbitration – Governing Disputes: International Law, Treaty Frameworks & Commercial Arbitration scheduled to be held on **10–11 October 2026** at HNLU, Raipur. The Conference seeks to bring together scholars, practitioners, adjudicators, policymakers, research scholars, and students to engage with some of the most pressing issues at the intersection of public international law and commercial dispute resolution. The event aims to foster interdisciplinary dialogue on evolving treaty frameworks, investment disputes, arbitration reforms, enforcement challenges, climate-related disputes, and the impact of emerging technologies on international dispute resolution. ## **Themes** The Conference invites submissions under the following broad themes: - Treaty Frameworks and the Future of Investor-State Dispute Settlement - Domesticating the International: National Arbitration Frameworks and Their Global Dimensions - Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Across Jurisdictions - Interaction of International Arbitration with Other Commercial Laws - Climate Change, Digital Economy & the Frontiers of International Dispute Resolution - Trade Regimes, Economic Sovereignty, and Dispute Resolution ## **Eligibility** The Conference invites participation from: - Undergraduate and Postgraduate Students of Law - Academicians and Research Scholars - Policy Experts and Think Tanks - Legal Practitioners - NGOs and Civil Society Organisations - International Organisations and Development Agencies - Doctoral and Post-Doctoral Scholars working in the field of Arbitration **Abstract Submission Link:** [**https://forms.gle/d4JXWsUccA4wGkcQ9**](https://forms.gle/d4JXWsUccA4wGkcQ9) ## **Important Dates** - **Last Date for Abstract Submission:** 15 September 2026 - **Notification of Acceptance:** 18 September 2026 - **Last Date for Registration:** 20 September 2026 - **Submission of Full Papers:** 5 October 2026 - **Conference Dates:** 10–11 October 2026 ## **Abstract Submission Guidelines** - Abstracts must be between **300–500 words**. - Authors must provide **5 keywords**. - Co-authorship is permitted for a maximum of **two authors**. - Abstracts should be submitted through the designated Google Form. ## **Publication Opportunity** Selected papers presented at the Conference will be considered for publication in a **peer-reviewed edited volume with a leading publisher**. For further details and queries: **Conference Secretariat** Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur Email: [**icia@hnlu.ac.in**](mailto:icia@hnlu.ac.in) ## [**Official Brochure Link**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DTsFvr72gfBxHdOPH_U2U6iJIMpl_rZJ/view?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Call for Papers, Events --- ### [SYNERGY: WHERE LAW MEETS SOCIETY – CASE STUDY COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by Vivekananda School of Law and Legal Studies (VSLLS), Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies – Technical Campus (VIPS-TC), through the Centre for Social Sciences | Register by 20th October 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/synergy-where-law-meets-society-case-study-competition-2026-organized-by-vivekananda-school-of-law-and-legal-studies-vslls-vivekananda-institute-of-professional-studies-techn/) **Published:** September 2, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** SYNERGY: WHERE LAW MEETS SOCIETY – CASE STUDY COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by Vivekananda School of Law and Legal Studies (VSLLS), Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies – Technical Campus (VIPS-TC), through the Centre for Social Sciences | Register by 20th October 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Synergy-Case-Competition_-Flyer-CSS_page-0001-1.jpg) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY Vivekananda School of Law and Legal Studies (VSLLS) is a constituent institution of Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies – Technical Campus (VIPS-TC). The event is organised through the **Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies: Centre for Social Sciences**. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY **SYNERGY: Where Law meets Society** is a **National-Level Case Study Competition** designed to provide students with an opportunity to address contemporary legal and societal challenges through innovative and practical solutions. The competition promotes **critical thinking, policy analysis, problem-solving and strategic decision-making**, with an interdisciplinary focus covering law, social sciences, public policy, environmental studies, technology and management. **Theme: Innovation, Law and Justice** Participants must choose **one of two case problems**: 1. **The Neelanadi Effluent Crisis** – focusing on industrial pollution, environmental compliance, livelihoods and innovative regulatory solutions. 2. **The Voice on the Phone** – focusing on AI voice cloning, banking fraud, consumer protection, telecom regulation and AI governance. Each team must develop **one solution** in the form of a business/startup idea, product/technology solution, or law/policy/bill, addressing at least two challenges specified in the selected case. The proposed solution should address: - Problem Diagnosis - Stakeholder Analysis - Legal & Policy Framework - Proposed Strategy - Implementation Roadmap - Financial Plan - Monitoring & Accountability ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE The competition is open to: - School students from **Classes IX–XII** - Undergraduate students - Postgraduate students Participants must be from **recognized institutions across India**. **Team Size:** Minimum 1 member and maximum 3 members. All team members must belong to the **same institution**. ## MODE OF THE EVENT **Offline** ## LOCATION & VENUE **Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies** AU-Block, Outer Ring Road, Pitampura, Delhi – 110034, India **Event Date:** 13th November 2026 ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE Participants must first pay the applicable registration fee and then complete the Google Form. ### [**Registration Link**](https://forms.gle/SCsRwj2iD2GTTPKx7) For the competition submission: - Presentation must be submitted in **both PDF and PPT formats**. - It must contain **5 content slides**, excluding the cover page, thank-you slide and appendix/reference slides. - **Submission Deadline:** 30th October 2026. - File name format: **TeamName\_CSS** (e.g., Innovators\_CSS). - Only one submission per team is permitted. - Only the Team Leader may make the final submission and act as the official point of contact. ## FEE DETAILS - **₹500 per team (1–3 members)** – Early Bird Offer available until **20th September 2026** - **₹800 per team (1–3 members)** – Registration fee after 20th September 2026 The registration fee is **strictly non-refundable**. ## PRIZES - **Winner:** Cash Prize + Gift Hamper + Certificate of Merit - **First Runner-up:** Cash Prize + Gift Hamper + Certificate of Merit - **Best Presenter Award:** Cash Prize + Gift Hamper + Certificate of Merit - **All participants:** Certificate of Participation ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES ParticularDateEarly Bird Registration Fee Valid Till20th September 2026Last Date to Register20th October 2026Submission Deadline30th October 2026Competition13th November 2026Late registrations will not be accepted under any circumstances. ## COMPETITION STRUCTURE The competition will be conducted in two rounds: **Preliminary Round – Case Study Presentation/Pitch** 8-minute presentation followed by a 2-minute Q&A. **Final Round – Innovation Round** Qualifying teams will receive an on-the-spot additional challenge related to their original case and must adapt their solution accordingly. The final pitch will be **10 minutes**, followed by Q&A. The best-performing team from each preliminary-round room will qualify for the Final Round. ## EVALUATION CRITERIA The competition will be evaluated for a total of **100 marks**: - Problem Identification & Analysis – 20 marks - Legal & Policy Soundness – 20 marks - Innovation & Creativity – 15 marks - Feasibility & Scalability – 15 marks - Social Impact & Ethical Considerations – 10 marks - Research & Use of Data – 10 marks - Presentation & Communication – 10 marks ## IMPORTANT RULES - Registration is complete only after the Google Form is filled and the requisite payment is made. - Registration fees are non-refundable. - Submissions must be original. - Plagiarism, AI-generated content and copyrighted content without proper citation are prohibited and may lead to immediate disqualification. - Presentations must be fact-based, legally neutral and non-partisan. - Participants must maintain anonymity throughout the evaluation process. - Changes in team composition are not permitted. - Only registered team members may participate. - Participants must clearly state and justify assumptions. - All data, legal provisions, policies and frameworks must be explicitly cited. - No modifications are permitted after submission, except for teams qualifying for the final round. - Judges’ decisions shall be final and binding. - Official updates will be communicated through official WhatsApp groups and registered email IDs. ## CONTACT INFORMATION **Contact Person:** Ms. Nandini Achhra **Email:** **Organising Team:** - Prof. (Dr.) Namrata Arora – Faculty Convenor, VSLLS - Dr. Garima Maheshwari – Faculty Member - Ms. Srija Sahay – Faculty Member - Ms. Nandini Achhra – Student Convenor - Prof. (Dr.) Rashmi Salpekar – Dean, VSLLS ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / BROCHURE ### [**Registration Link**](https://forms.gle/SCsRwj2iD2GTTPKx7) ### [**Event Brochure Link**](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1jCiTPHkr2ZOXKNR_-fbV8s02pZWh__Id) **Categories:** Events, Other Competitions --- ### [Blackberry Limited v. Controller of Patents and Designs, 2026:DHC:3668](https://lawfoyer.in/blackberry-limited-v-controller-of-patents-and-designs-2026dhc3668/) **Published:** September 5, 2026 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE ***Blackberry Limited v. Controller of Patents and Designs, 2026:DHC:3668*** concerns the refusal of **Patent Application No. 1976/DEL/2008**. The application claimed an invention titled ***“Colour Differentiating a Portion of a Text Message Shown in a Listing on a Handheld Communication Device.”*** The Delhi High Court examined whether colour coding recipients in outgoing messages, based on message address characteristics, constituted a patentable invention. The appellant argued that the invention solved a technical problem. It claimed that the invention improved handheld-device usability. It also relied on ***technical effect*** and ***technical contribution*** under Indian CRI jurisprudence. The Controller resisted the appeal. It submitted that the invention only used software rules. It also argued that the problem was human error, not a technical problem. The Court dismissed the appeal. It held that the claimed invention lacked ***inventive step*** under ***Section 2(1)(j)*** read with ***Section 2(1)(ja)***. It further held that the claims were barred by ***Section 3(k) of the Patents Act, 1970***. The Court upheld the Controller’s refusal under ***Section 15***. **Keywords:** ***Computer Related Inventions***, ***Section 3(k)***, ***technical effect***, ***inventive step***, ***patent refusal***, ***colour coding***, ***handheld communication device***, ***obviousness***. ## B) CASE DETAILS ### i) Judgement Cause Title ***[Blackberry Limited v. Controller of Patents and Designs, 2026:DHC:3668](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/161660179/)***. ### ii) Case Number ***C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 14/2022***. ### iii) Judgement Date ***30 April 2026***. ### iv) Court ***High Court of Delhi at New Delhi***. ### v) Quorum ***Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia***. ### vi) Author ***Tejas Karia, J.*** ### vii) Citation ***2026:DHC:3668***. The Indian Kanoon record also identifies this decision as ***Blackberry Limited v. Controller of Patents and Designs on 30 April 2026***. ([Indian Kanoon](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/161660179/?utm_source=chatgpt.com)) ### viii) Legal Provisions Involved The main provisions were ***[Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Section%20117A%20Patents%20Act%201970)***, ***[Section 15 of the Patents Act, 1970](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Section%2015%20Patents%20Act%201970)***, ***[Section 2(1)(j) of the Patents Act, 1970](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Section%202%281%29%28j%29%20Patents%20Act%201970)***, ***[Section 2(1)(ja) of the Patents Act, 1970](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Section%202%281%29%28ja%29%20Patents%20Act%201970)***, ***[Section 3(k) of the Patents Act, 1970](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Section%203%28k%29%20Patents%20Act%201970)***, ***Section 11A***, and ***Section 77(1)(f)***. The dispute mainly turned on ***inventive step*** and the statutory exclusion of ***computer programs per se or algorithms***. ### ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case No judgment was overruled. The Court applied existing Indian patent law principles. It distinguished patentable CRIs from excluded software or algorithmic claims. ### x) Related Law Subjects This case relates to ***Intellectual Property Law***, ***Patent Law***, ***Computer Related Inventions***, ***Information Technology Law***, ***Administrative Law***, and ***Commercial IP Appellate Jurisdiction***. ### xi) Name of Counsels Appearing for Parties For the appellant, ***Mr. Pravin Anand, Mr. Ashutosh Upadhyaya, and Mr. Sandeep Bhola, Advocates*** appeared. For the respondent, ***Mr. P.S. Singh, CGSC with Mr. Rajneesh Kumar Sharma, Ms. Minakshi Singh, Mr. Ashutosh Bharti, and Ms. Shivangi Sharma, Advocates*** appeared. ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The appeal arose from two refusal orders. The first order was dated ***11 October 2019***. The second order was dated ***5 March 2020***. Both were passed by the ***Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs***. The appellant invoked ***Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970***. It sought quashing of the refusal. The application was filed on ***20 August 2008***. It claimed priority from ***European Patent Application No. 07117003.9*** dated ***21 September 2007***. The invention concerned ***colour differentiation of text message portions on handheld communication devices***. Its object was recipient identification. It sought to reduce mistaken message transmission. The appellant said this was important for handheld devices. Such devices had small screens. Users could not manage recipients as easily as on desktops. The Court treated the dispute as a classic CRI controversy. It examined whether the claimed subject matter crossed the statutory threshold. The appellant framed the invention as a device-level solution. It argued that the invention improved user interaction. It said the colour-coded recipient display allowed quick visual recognition. It further said this saved time and device resources. The respondent framed the claim differently. It said the claimed advance was a software rule. It involved accepting addresses, parsing characteristics, and applying colours. The Court accepted the respondent’s framing. It found no real technical improvement in hardware. It also found no technical effect intrinsic to the computer system. This distinction became decisive under ***Section 3(k)***. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellant, ***BlackBerry Limited***, is a Canadian corporation. It is known for enterprise software, telecommunication solutions, IoT technologies, and earlier BlackBerry smartphones. The application related to handheld wireless communication devices. It focused on limited screen size. According to the appellant, handheld devices required different user interfaces. Users often needed help identifying intended recipients. The invention proposed visual differentiation. Recipient names could be colour coded. The colour would depend on address characteristics. These could include ***host name***, ***domain name***, or ***organisation***. The intended result was easier recognition before sending a message. The Patent Office issued the ***First Examination Report*** on ***10 September 2014***. The FER objected to novelty under ***Section 2(1)(j)***. It cited ***EP1767008(A1)*** as ***D1***. It also cited ***US6671718B1*** as ***D2*** and ***US2003/0084109A*** as ***D3***. The FER also raised ***Section 3(k)*** objections. The appellant filed its reply on ***1 May 2015***. A hearing notice was issued on ***6 August 2019***. During the first hearing, the Controller orally raised ***Section 3(k)***. The appellant filed written submissions on ***4 September 2019***. The application was refused by ***Impugned Order I***. The appellant then filed a review under ***Sections 77(1)(f) and 15***. The review was dismissed through ***Impugned Order II***. The present appeal challenged both orders. The invention was described through device diagrams. Page 19 of the judgment shows ***Figure 1***. It depicts a handheld communication device with a display, keyboard, navigation keys, and trackball. Page 20 shows ***Figure 2***. It depicts a wireless network arrangement. It includes a microprocessor, display, keyboard, receiver, transmitter, memory, and communication subsystems. Page 22 shows ***Figure 7***. It illustrates the screen interface and the handheld device layout. These visuals supported the appellant’s argument that the invention operated in a handheld hardware environment. Yet the Court found that the actual contribution remained algorithmic. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED - The first issue was whether the claimed invention qualified as an ***invention*** under ***Section 2(1)(j)***. This required novelty, inventive step, and industrial application. - The second issue was whether it had ***inventive step*** under ***Section 2(1)(ja)***. That provision requires technical advancement, economic significance, or both. It also requires non-obviousness to a ***person skilled in the art***. The Court had to decide whether D1, D2, and D3 rendered the claim obvious. - The third issue was whether the invention was excluded under ***Section 3(k)***. That provision excludes ***mathematical methods***, ***business methods***, ***computer programs per se***, and ***algorithms***. The real question was whether colour-coding recipients produced a ***technical effect***. The Court also asked whether the claimed solution improved the computer itself. It considered whether better human recognition could become a technical contribution. The Court answered this against the appellant. It held that avoiding wrong recipients was not a technical problem. It was a human-dependent problem. - The fourth issue concerned appellate interference. The Court had to determine whether the Controller’s reasoning was perverse or legally infirm. The appellant alleged hindsight reconstruction. It argued that the Controller combined prior arts without proper motivation. The respondent defended the refusal. It submitted that the combination of D1, D2, and D3 was obvious. ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The appellant submitted that the invention solved a real device-level problem. Handheld communication devices had limited screens. Users could not conveniently apply filters. They could also misidentify recipients. A mistaken recipient could cause confidentiality risks. The invention provided immediate visual identification. It colour coded recipient names using address characteristics. These characteristics could include domain or host information. The appellant argued that this was not a mere presentation rule. It was a technical interaction between messaging software and handheld communication architecture. The appellant relied on ***[Ferid Allani v. Union of India, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 11867](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/90686424/)***. In that case, the Delhi High Court stated that computer-related inventions should be examined for ***technical contribution***. The search result confirms that the case concerned a patent application for a method and device for accessing web-based sources and services. ([Indian Kanoon](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/90686424/?utm_source=chatgpt.com)) The appellant used this case to argue that software involvement is not fatal. It submitted that modern inventions often use computer programs. The proper inquiry is the effect produced. The appellant also relied on ***[Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC v. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs, 2023:DHC:3342](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/52362832/)***. That decision criticised refusals based solely on computer-executable instructions. It emphasised the need to examine technical merit. ([Indian Kanoon](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/52362832/?utm_source=chatgpt.com)) The appellant also attacked the obviousness reasoning. It said ***D1*** concerned received messages. It grouped incoming messages by message attributes. It did not teach colour coding recipients before sending. It said ***D2*** required confirmation boxes. It displayed addresses before transmission. It did not automatically colour differentiate names while drafting. The appellant argued that combining D1 and D2 required hindsight. It relied on ***[Cipla Ltd. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 2015:DHC:9674-DB](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/57798471/)***. That decision is frequently cited for obviousness principles and caution against hindsight. ([Indian Kanoon](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/57798471/?utm_source=chatgpt.com)) The appellant also invoked ***Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Aloys Wobben, Order No. 123/2013***. It argued that known elements do not automatically make an invention obvious. There must be a coherent lead from the prior art. The appellant further submitted that foreign grants supported patentability. It referred to ***EP2275980B1*** and ***US8682394B2***. It argued that similar claims had been granted in major jurisdictions. It also invoked ***Raytheon Company v. Controller General of Patents and Designs, 2023:DHC:6673*** and ***Halliburton Energy Services Inc’s Patent Application, \[2011\] EWHC 2508 (Pat)***. These cases were used to show that improved user interface or better device operation may create technical effect. The appellant’s core argument was simple. The invention reduced human-device steps. It helped prevent unintended communication. It improved handheld communication reliability. Therefore, it was patentable. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The respondent submitted that the claimed invention was obvious. It argued that D1 used message attributes for categorisation. It further argued that D2 addressed mistaken recipients. According to the respondent, a skilled person could combine both teachings. D3 also disclosed visual differentiation of messages for different users. Therefore, colour coding recipients using address characteristics did not involve inventive step. The respondent argued that the change was only algorithmic. It was a change in categorisation logic. It did not create a new technical architecture. The respondent strongly relied on ***Section 3(k)***. It said the alleged feature was not technical. Differentiating recipients and notifying the sender may provide comfort. It may improve convenience. But convenience is not patentable technical effect. The respondent argued that choosing the wrong recipient is a human error. It is not a technical defect in a communication system. A noise problem in a communication channel affects all users similarly. Recipient error varies from person to person. This distinction was central. The respondent said technicality cannot depend on subjective human mistakes. The respondent also argued that colour coding is address-book management. It is a data management style. The claims recited software steps. These included associating colour, accepting message addresses, examining address characteristics, and displaying information. The hardware was ordinary. It was a normal wireless communication device. It executed the program conventionally. There was no improved processor functioning. There was no memory saving. There was no new communication protocol. The respondent therefore said the claims were ***computer program per se*** or ***algorithm***. It relied on ***[Blackberry Limited v. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs, 2024:DHC:6571](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/159530339/)***, where the Delhi High Court discussed non-patentability of computer programs per se. ([Indian Kanoon](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/159530339/?utm_source=chatgpt.com)) ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS ***Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970*** provides the appellate route. It allows appeals against certain Controller orders. The appellant used this provision to challenge refusal orders. ***Section 15*** empowers the Controller to refuse an application. This power applies when an application does not comply with the Act. In this case, refusal rested on ***lack of inventive step*** and ***Section 3(k) exclusion***. ***Section 2(1)(j)*** defines ***invention***. It requires a new product or process. It must involve inventive step. It must also be capable of industrial application. ***Section 2(1)(ja)*** defines ***inventive step***. It requires technical advance over existing knowledge, economic significance, or both. It must also make the invention non-obvious to a skilled person. The Court applied these provisions to D1, D2, and D3. It held that the claimed invention was obvious in light of these prior arts. ***Section 3(k)*** is the decisive exclusion. It says that ***“a mathematical or business method or a computer programme per se or algorithms”*** is not an invention. The Court treated this provision as requiring more than software-based functionality. A CRI must show technical effect. It must improve the system’s functioning. It must solve a technical problem. The Court held that colour coding recipients did not satisfy this standard. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT IN THIS CASE The Court considered ***[Microsoft Technology Licensing LLC, One Microsoft Way v. Assistant Controller of Patents, Patent Office, 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 2785](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Microsoft%20Technology%20Licensing%20LLC%20One%20Microsoft%20Way%20Assistant%20Controller%20of%20Patents%202024%20SCC%20OnLine%20Mad%202785)***. The judgment used it for the proposition that a CRI may survive ***Section 3(k)***. But it must produce a technical effect. It must improve system functioning or provide a technical solution. The Court distinguished the present case. It found no improvement in computer functioning. The appellant relied on ***[Ferid Allani v. Union of India, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 11867](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/90686424/)***. The case supports the principle that software-based inventions should not be rejected mechanically. It requires examination of technical contribution. The Court did not reject that principle. It found the principle inapplicable on facts. Here, the claimed contribution was recipient colour coding. It did not enhance hardware or system operation. The appellant relied on ***[Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC v. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs, 2023:DHC:3342](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/52362832/)***. That case recognised the importance of technical effect and contribution. It cautioned against rejecting CRIs merely because they use algorithms. The search result confirms that the Controller’s reasoning in that matter focused on computer-executable instructions and algorithms. ([Indian Kanoon](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/52362832/?utm_source=chatgpt.com)) The present Court distinguished the appellant’s invention. It held that ordinary execution of a colour-coding algorithm is insufficient. The appellant relied on ***[Cipla Ltd. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 2015:DHC:9674-DB](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/57798471/)***. It used this case to resist hindsight analysis. The Court still held that D1, D2, and D3 supplied enough teaching. It found the claimed invention obvious. The respondent relied on ***Vincent Panikurlangara v. Union of India, (1987) 2 SCC 165*** and ***Dr. Shivarap Shantaram Wagle v. Union of India, (1988) 2 SCC 115***. These cases cautioned judicial restraint in specialised scientific matters. The Court’s final reasoning, however, rested mainly on statutory patentability. ## H) JUDGEMENT #### a) RATIO DECIDENDI The ratio is that ***a software-implemented colour-coding method for recipient identification is not patentable*** when it does not produce a genuine technical effect. The Court held that the invention lacked inventive step. D1 disclosed message attribute-based visual categorisation. D2 addressed prevention of unintended recipients. D3 disclosed visually distinguishable message formats for different users. Together, these disclosures made the claimed invention obvious to a skilled person. The shift from received messages to outgoing recipients did not create inventiveness. The Court treated it as a predictable algorithmic modification. The second ratio concerns ***Section 3(k)***. The Court held that the invention’s real contribution lay in algorithmic rules. The claimed steps accepted message addresses, examined address characteristics, and displayed colour-coded names. These were software limitations. The ordinary handheld device executed them conventionally. There was no hardware improvement. There was no improvement in memory, processor efficiency, communication throughput, network reliability, or device architecture. The Court therefore held that the invention was a ***computer program per se or algorithm***. The Court also held that avoiding recipient mistakes was not a technical problem. It was a user-dependent problem. A technical problem must be intrinsic to the system. It must not vary merely because different users behave differently. The Court gave the example of communication noise. Noise affects users using the same system. Wrong-recipient selection depends on human conduct. Therefore, the solution remained administrative or convenience-based. It did not become technical merely because implemented on a handheld communication device. #### b) OBITER DICTA The Court’s broader observations clarify Indian CRI law. A CRI is not excluded only because software is involved. The decisive test remains ***technical effect*** or ***technical contribution***. But this effect must be real. It must improve system functionality. It must be intrinsic to the machine or technical process. Improved user comfort is not enough. Better visual perception is not enough. Reduced embarrassment or confidentiality risk is not enough. These may be business or administrative benefits. They do not automatically become technical effects. The Court also observed that reliability must be technical reliability. It must improve the computer or system itself. The appellant argued that the invention improved communication reliability. The Court rejected this. It said the user may still err. If many recipients have similar names, colour coding may still fail. A user may forget what colour corresponds to which recipient. Therefore, reliability improvement was external and user-dependent. It was not intrinsic to the device. #### c) GUIDELINES The Court did not issue formal guidelines. Yet the judgment provides practical guidance. A CRI patent claim should identify a technical problem within the device or system. It should show a technical solution. It should demonstrate an improvement beyond ordinary software execution. It should not merely improve user convenience. It should not merely reorganise data presentation. It should not rely only on address-book management, colour tagging, alerts, or interface display rules. For inventive step, the judgment shows that prior arts may be combined when they address related problems. D1 taught attribute-based visual categorisation. D2 taught recipient verification before sending. D3 taught visual differentiation for users. The Court accepted this combination. Therefore, applicants should explain why a skilled person would not combine prior arts. They must identify a concrete technical barrier. They must avoid relying only on functional differences. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The decision is important for Indian patent law. It narrows the route for user-interface CRI patents. The Court did not deny that software inventions can be patentable. It accepted the technical effect doctrine. Yet it demanded a strict connection between the claimed contribution and system improvement. This is significant. Many digital inventions improve user experience. Many reduce user effort. Many improve compliance or reduce human error. This judgment says such benefits are not enough. They must translate into technical improvement. The Court’s approach is persuasive in one sense. Patent law should not protect every interface choice. Colour coding is often an information-design technique. It may be useful. It may be commercially valuable. But usefulness is not always inventiveness. The respondent successfully framed the invention as ordinary algorithmic categorisation. Once framed that way, ***Section 3(k)*** became difficult to overcome. The appellant’s strongest point was small-screen handheld context. But the Court considered the hardware conventional. It found no special interaction between colour coding and device architecture. The judgment also reflects a stricter approach than some earlier CRI cases. ***Ferid Allani*** and ***Microsoft Technology Licensing*** encouraged examination of technical contribution. This case applies that test against the applicant. It shows that citing technical effect is not enough. The specification and claims must demonstrate it. A patent applicant should draft claims around concrete system performance improvements. These may include memory saving, latency reduction, protocol improvement, bandwidth reduction, security architecture, processor optimisation, or hardware interaction. Merely preventing user mistakes may fail. The case also warns against overclaiming user-interface conveniences. The Court treated the invention as data management. It used the human-error nature of the problem to reject technicality. This reasoning may influence future Patent Office refusals. Applicants may need to show that the problem arises from computer functioning, not human behaviour. They may also need to prove that the claimed method changes how the computer operates. The decision therefore strengthens the Indian exclusion for ***computer programs per se***. It also keeps open the door for genuine CRI patents. ## J) REFERENCES ### a) Important Cases Referred 1. ***[Blackberry Limited v. Controller of Patents and Designs, 2026:DHC:3668](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/161660179/)***. 2. ***[Ferid Allani v. Union of India & Ors., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 11867](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/90686424/)***. 3. ***[Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC v. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs, 2023:DHC:3342](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/52362832/)***. 4. ***Microsoft Technology Licensing LLC, One Microsoft Way v. Assistant Controller of Patents, Patent Office, 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 2785***. 5. ***[Cipla Ltd. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. & Anr., 2015:DHC:9674-DB](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/57798471/)***. 6. ***Enercon (India) Limited v. Aloys Wobben, Order No. 123/2013 in ORA/08/2009/PT/CH***. 7. ***Raytheon Company v. Controller General of Patents and Designs, 2023:DHC:6673***. 8. ***Halliburton Energy Services Inc’s Patent Application, \[2011\] EWHC 2508 (Pat)***. 9. ***Vincent Panikurlangara v. Union of India, (1987) 2 SCC 165***. 10. ***Dr. Shivarap Shantaram Wagle v. Union of India, (1988) 2 SCC 115***. 11. ***[Blackberry Limited v. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs, 2024:DHC:6571](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/159530339/)***. 12. ***[Blackberry Limited v. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs, 2024:DHC:6572](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/197519539/)***. ### b) Important Statutes Referred 1. ***The Patents Act, 1970***. 2. ***Section 2(1)(j), Patents Act, 1970***. 3. ***Section 2(1)(ja), Patents Act, 1970***. 4. ***Section 3(k), Patents Act, 1970***. 5. ***Section 11A, Patents Act, 1970***. 6. ***Section 15, Patents Act, 1970***. 7. ***Section 77(1)(f), Patents Act, 1970***. 8. ***Section 117A, Patents Act, 1970***. 9. ***The Patent Rules, 2003***. 10. ***Article 52(2)(c), European Patent Convention***. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [R.G. Anand v. M/s Delux Films & Ors., AIR 1978 SC 1613; (1978) 4 SCC 118; 1979 SCR (1) 218 ](https://lawfoyer.in/r-g-anand-v-m-s-delux-films-ors-air-1978-sc-1613-1978-4-scc-118-1979-scr-1-218/) **Published:** August 19, 2026 **Author:** Jaya Dubey **Content:** # A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE ***[R.G. Anand v. M/s Delux Films & Ors., AIR 1978 SC 1613; (1978) 4 SCC 118; 1979 SCR (1) 218](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1734007/)*** is a landmark Supreme Court decision on ***copyright infringement, idea-expression distinction, substantial copying, and cinematic adaptation of dramatic works***. The appellant, ***R.G. Anand***, a playwright and dramatist, alleged that the respondents’ film ***“New Delhi”*** copied his Hindi play ***“Hum Hindustani”***. Both works dealt with ***provincialism***. The appellant claimed that the film substantially reproduced his dramatic work. The respondents argued that no copyright exists in an idea, theme, or subject. They asserted that provincialism was common property. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. It held that copyright protects only the ***form, arrangement, treatment, and expression*** of an idea. It does not protect the idea itself. The Court laid down seven enduring tests for infringement. It held that the film and play shared a common theme. Yet the film contained material differences, wider treatment, additional social evils, and distinct dramatic development. Therefore, no actionable piracy was proved. **Keywords:** ***Copyright Infringement***, ***Idea-Expression Dichotomy***, ***Substantial Similarity***, ***Dramatic Work***, ***Cinematograph Film***, ***Colourable Imitation***, ***Provincialism***, ***Literary Piracy***. # B) CASE DETAILS The judgment cause title is ***R.G. Anand v. M/s Delux Films & Ors.*** The case was decided by the ***Supreme Court of India***on ***18 August 1978***. The case number was ***Civil Appeal No. 2030 of 1968***. It arose from the judgment and decree dated ***23 May 1968*** of the Delhi High Court in ***R.F.A. No. 147-D of 1968***. The quorum consisted of ***Syed Murtaza Fazal Ali, J.***, ***Jaswant Singh, J.***, and ***R.S. Pathak, J.*** The main judgment was authored by ***Syed Murtaza Fazal Ali, J.*** Separate concurring opinions were delivered by ***Jaswant Singh, J.*** and ***R.S. Pathak, J.*** The reported citations are ***AIR 1978 SC 1613***, ***(1978) 4 SCC 118***, and ***1979 SCR (1) 218***. The counsel for the appellant were ***S.N. Andley, Mahinder Narain and Rameshwar Nath***. The counsel for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were ***Hardyal Hardy, H.S. Parihar and I.N. Shroff***. The legal provisions involved were principally the ***Copyright Act, 1911***, especially ***Section 1(2)(d)*** and ***Section 2(1)***. The cause of action arose before the Indian Parliament enacted the later copyright legislation governing the field. The judgment also concerns principles now reflected in the ***[Copyright Act, 1957](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/337836/)***, especially provisions protecting ***literary works***, ***dramatic works***, ***cinematograph films***, and infringement remedies. No judgment was overruled by this case. The case belongs to ***Intellectual Property Law***, ***Copyright Law***, ***Entertainment Law***, ***Media Law***, ***Civil Law***, and ***Law of Damages***. Its most important doctrinal contribution is the formulation of Indian copyright tests for deciding whether a later work unlawfully copies an earlier protected work. # C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The case arose from a conflict between a playwright and film producers. The appellant, ***R.G. Anand***, was an architect by profession. He was also a playwright, dramatist and producer of stage plays. Before ***“Hum Hindustani”***, he had written and produced plays such as ***“Des Hamara”***, ***“Azadi”*** and ***“Election”***. The play ***“Hum Hindustani”*** was written in Hindi in 1953. It was first staged on ***6, 7, 8 and 9 February 1954*** at Wavell Theatre, New Delhi, under the auspices of the Indian National Theatre. The play gained public appreciation and press recognition. It was later staged again in 1954, 1955 and 1956. The appellant believed that the play had sufficient dramatic strength to be filmed. The respondents were connected with the film ***“New Delhi”***. Respondent No. 2, ***Mohan Sehgal***, was a film director and proprietor of ***Delux Films***. In November 1954, he wrote to the appellant requesting a copy of the play. He stated that he wished to consider its suitability for film production. The appellant instead invited him to see the play in Delhi. Later, the appellant alleged that the respondents came to Delhi, heard the play narrated, discussed its film potential, and then produced ***“New Delhi”*** by dishonestly imitating it. The film was released in Delhi in September 1956. After seeing it, the appellant claimed that it was entirely based on his play. He filed a suit seeking damages, accounts of profits, and permanent injunction restraining exhibition of the film. # D) FACTS OF THE CASE The plaintiff’s case was that ***“Hum Hindustani”*** was an original dramatic work. Its central subject was ***provincialism and parochialism***. The play showed how Indians called themselves Hindustani, yet behaved as Punjabis, Bengalis, Madrasis, Marathas, Gujaratis, Sindhis and members of separate provincial groups. The dramatic conflict arose through two families. One was Punjabi. The other was Madrasi. They lived cordially until a romantic relationship developed between their children. Once marriage across provincial lines became possible, their friendliness collapsed. The plaintiff argued that the respondents borrowed this plot, emotional structure, and dramatic arrangement. He relied on similarities between the play and the film. He asserted that the respondents committed literary piracy and violated his copyright. The defendants denied infringement. They accepted that Defendant No. 2 had met the plaintiff and heard the play. Yet they contended that the play was inadequate for a full-length commercial motion picture. They argued that the idea of ***provincialism*** could not be monopolised. It was a social theme open to all authors. They further pleaded that ***“New Delhi”*** was materially different in content, spirit, plot, treatment, climax and message. They stated that any similarities arose because both works used a common public theme. The trial court framed issues on ownership and infringement. It held that the appellant owned copyright in ***“Hum Hindustani”***. But it found no infringement. The Delhi High Court affirmed that conclusion. The Supreme Court then considered whether the legal principles applied by the courts below were correct. # E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED The central legal issue was whether the respondents’ film ***“New Delhi”*** infringed the appellant’s copyright in the play ***“Hum Hindustani”***. This issue required the Court to decide whether copyright can be claimed in a theme such as ***provincialism***. The Court had to distinguish between ***an idea*** and ***the expression of that idea***. The appellant could not succeed merely by showing that both works dealt with provincialism. He had to show that the respondents copied the protected expression. That expression could include the arrangement of incidents, dramatic development, sequence, characters, situations, and treatment. The issue was therefore not whether the film was inspired by the same social problem. The issue was whether the film unlawfully appropriated a substantial and material part of the play. A second issue concerned the correct test for infringement where a stage play is allegedly copied into a film. A film has wider scope. It may contain more locations, subplots, characters, songs, visual effects, and social commentary. Therefore, the plaintiff’s burden becomes more complex. The Court had to decide whether broad similarity in theme and some parallel scenes could prove piracy. It also had to decide whether material dissimilarities could negate copying. A third issue concerned appellate restraint. Both the trial court and the High Court had concurrently found no infringement. The Supreme Court considered whether it should disturb those findings. It ultimately held that it should be slow to interfere with concurrent factual findings, especially after independently examining the play and film. # F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the lower courts misunderstood copyright infringement. They argued that the similarities between the play and the film were close, numerous, and revealing. According to the appellant, these similarities created an unmistakable impression that the film was copied from the play. The appellant stressed that Respondent No. 2 had access to the play. He had sought a copy. He had heard the play narrated. He then produced a film on the same central theme. The appellant therefore urged that access, similarity, and timing together proved copying. The appellant relied on English, American, and Indian authorities. He argued that exact verbal copying is not necessary. Dramatic situations and incidents may also be protected when they form the expression of a dramatic work. The appellant also argued that the film’s treatment showed colourable imitation. He pointed to several similarities. Both works dealt with ***provincialism***. Both used Punjabi and Madrasi families. Both had the Madrasi father named ***Subramanyam***. Both were located in New Delhi. Both showed cordial relations disturbed by an inter-provincial love affair. Both showed parental resistance. Both depicted the girl’s fondness for music and dancing. Both portrayed the hero as cowardly. Both involved a suicide letter. Both reached reconciliation after a suicide-related shock. The appellant submitted that such cumulative similarity could not be accidental. He argued that the respondents had appropriated the heart of his dramatic work. He therefore sought damages, profits, and injunction. # G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents submitted that the courts below correctly applied copyright law. They argued that ***no copyright can exist in an idea, theme, subject, or social problem***. Provincialism was a public social issue. Every writer and filmmaker was free to portray it. The respondents argued that the appellant was trying to monopolise a general idea. They accepted that there were certain similarities. Yet they submitted that such similarities naturally arise when two works deal with the same subject. They further argued that the film was much broader than the play. It included the problem of accommodation discrimination in New Delhi. It also dealt with ***caste prejudice*** and ***dowry***. These themes were absent from the play. Therefore, the film had an independent treatment, structure, and climax. The respondents also relied on the concurrent findings of the District Judge and Delhi High Court. Both courts had examined the evidence. Both had found that there was no infringement. The respondents submitted that the Supreme Court should not reopen factual findings in a special leave appeal. They further argued that the differences between the works were material and broad. In the play, provincialism surfaced mainly through the marriage dispute. In the film, provincialism appeared from the beginning when the hero faced refusal of accommodation because of provincial identity. The film included more families, different dramatic turns, and a different resolution. Hence, the respondents submitted that any resemblance was incidental and caused by the common theme. # H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS The applicable law was the ***Copyright Act, 1911***. At the time when the cause of action arose, the later Indian copyright statute was not the controlling law for the controversy. ***Section 1(2)(d) of the Copyright Act, 1911*** defined copyright in relation to literary, dramatic, and musical works. It included the sole right to make a cinematograph film or other contrivance by which the work may be mechanically performed or delivered. The appellant’s play was a dramatic work. Therefore, it fell within the protected category. ***Section 2(1)*** provided that copyright is infringed when a person, without the owner’s consent, does anything which only the copyright owner has the right to do. The Court accepted that the appellant owned copyright. The dispute was whether the respondents had infringed it. The principles now correspond with the modern ***Copyright Act, 1957***. ***Dramatic works***, ***literary works*** and ***cinematograph films*** are protected under Indian copyright law. Yet protection remains limited to expression. The legal maxim ***de minimis non curat lex*** is also relevant. The law does not concern itself with trivial similarities. The Court also applied the maxim behind copyright protection, reflected by the moral idea that no person should steal another’s labour. However, this moral principle does not permit ownership over common ideas. The law protects original expression because it represents labour, skill and judgment. It does not protect abstract ideas because ideas must remain free for public use, cultural growth, and future creativity. # I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT IN THIS CASE The Court referred to English authorities on copyright. ***[Hanfstaengl v. W.H. Smith & Sons, \[1905\] 1 Ch D 519](https://www.cipil.law.cam.ac.uk/virtual-museum/hanfstaengl-v-wh-smith-sons-macgillivray-1905-1910-pp-8-9)*** was used to explain that a copy is something that comes so near the original as to suggest the original to the mind of the viewer. [***Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd., \[1964\] 1 All ER 465*** ](https://www.cipil.law.cam.ac.uk/virtual-museum/ladbroke-v-william-hill-1964-1-all-er-465)supported the principle that the work must be considered as a whole. It is improper to dissect a work into small fragments and deny protection to each fragment separately. ***[Donoghue v. Allied Newspapers Ltd., \[1937\] 3 All ER 503](https://www.drishtijudiciary.com/intellectual-property-rights/donoghue-v-allied-newspapers-ltd-1937-3-all-er-503)*** confirmed that there is no copyright in an idea until it is expressed in tangible form. ***Harman Pictures N.V. v. Osborne, \[1967\] 1 WLR 723*** was cited for the difference between unprotected ideas and protectable incidents or situations. The Court also referred to American authorities. ***[Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49](https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/81/49/1475281/)*** recognised that a defendant cannot escape liability merely by avoiding exact language if the dramatic substance has been copied. ***[Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 100 F.2d 533](https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/100/533/1485398/)*** stressed the impression created on the audience. ***[Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 216 F.2d 945](https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/216/945/159026/)*** and other United States decisions helped the Court consider substantial copying, common sources, and expressive appropriation. The Court also cited ***[Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/210/339/)***for broader copyright principles. These decisions guided the Court in balancing two values. Authors must be protected from piracy. But public themes and ideas must remain free. The Court also referred to Indian authorities. ***[Macmillan & Co. Ltd. v. K. & J. Cooper, 51 IA 109](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1257788/)*** dealt with originality and infringement. ***[N.T. Raghunathan v. All India Reporter Ltd., AIR 1971 Bom 48](https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56e149c8607dba389662775d)***, ***[K.R. Venugopala Sarma v. Sangu Ganesan, 1972 Cri LJ 1098](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/480081/)***, ***[The Daily Calendar Supplying Bureau v. The United Concern, AIR 1967 Mad 381](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1613396/)***, ***[C. Cunniah & Co. v. Balraj & Co., AIR 1961 Mad 111](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/800341/)***, ***[Mohendra Chandra Nath Ghosh v. Emperor, AIR 1928 Cal 359](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/710165/)***, ***[S.K. Dutt v. Law Book Co., AIR 1954 All 570](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/146202/)***, ***[Romesh Chowdhry v. Kh. Ali Mohammad Nowsheri, AIR 1965 J&K 101](https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5ac5e2dc4a932619d90307c4)***, and ***[Mohini Mohan Singh v. Sita Nath Basak, AIR 1931 Cal 238](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/754335/)*** were also referred. These authorities supported the broader doctrine that copyright protects originality in expression, not mere ideas or common subjects. # H) JUDGEMENT #### a. RATIO DECIDENDI The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. It held that ***there can be no copyright in an idea, subject matter, theme, plot, historical fact, or legendary fact***. Copyright violation in such cases is confined to the form, manner, arrangement, and expression of the idea. Where the same idea is developed differently, similarities are bound to occur. Courts must examine whether similarities relate to fundamental or substantial aspects of expression. A literal imitation with minor changes amounts to infringement. But a different treatment of the same idea does not. The copy must be substantial and material. It must lead to the conclusion that the defendant committed piracy. The Court laid down seven tests. First, ideas, themes, plots and subject matter are not protected. Only expression is protected. Second, when a common idea is differently developed, similarities naturally arise. The court must see whether substantial expression was copied. Third, the safest test is the impression of the ordinary viewer. If the viewer, after seeing both works, unmistakably feels that the later work is a copy, infringement may be found. Fourth, where the same theme is treated differently and the later work becomes new, there is no infringement. Fifth, material and broad dissimilarities may negative intention to copy. Sixth, piracy must be proved by clear and cogent evidence. Seventh, where a stage play is allegedly copied into a film, the plaintiff’s burden is harder because films have a wider canvas. Yet if the viewer’s total impression is that the film is largely a copy, infringement may still be proved. Applying these tests, the Court held that the film ***“New Delhi”*** was not a substantial or material copy of ***“Hum Hindustani”***. The central idea of provincialism was common. But the film’s treatment was different. In the play, provincialism arose mainly when marriage between the Punjabi and Madrasi children became an issue. In the film, provincialism was introduced at the beginning through refusal of accommodation. The film included additional themes of ***caste prejudice*** and ***dowry***. It had more characters and different dramatic incidents. Its climax was different. The similarities were not enough to prove colourable imitation. Therefore, the respondents did not infringe the appellant’s copyright. #### b. OBITER DICTA The Court made important observations on the moral foundation of copyright. It stated that copyright infringement resembles a form of theft because it appropriates another’s labour, time, energy and ability. This observation gives copyright law an ethical dimension. It recognises that creative works require skill and effort. Yet the Court did not convert that moral protection into excessive monopoly. It balanced the author’s labour with public freedom to use common ideas. This balance is central to copyright law. It prevents both piracy and creative suffocation. Another important observation concerns stage plays and films. The Court stated that a film has a broader perspective, wider field, and bigger background than a stage play. A film may introduce many incidents and give a different colour to the same idea. Therefore, proving infringement of a play by a film may be more difficult. This does not mean that films can freely copy plays. It means that courts must compare total treatment, not isolated similarities. If the film, viewed as a whole, appears to be a copy, infringement will be established. This observation remains valuable for modern adaptation disputes involving books, plays, web series, songs, scripts, and films. #### c. GUIDELINES The case gives detailed practical guidelines. Courts must first identify the protected work. They must then identify the original elements of expression. They must exclude unprotectable ideas, themes, stock situations, emotions, and common social issues. Courts must then compare the two works as a whole. They should not rely on a mechanical count of similarities. They must consider whether similarities are substantial, material, and fundamental. They must also consider whether dissimilarities are broad enough to show independent treatment. The ordinary viewer test must be applied. The question is whether a reasonable viewer gets an unmistakable impression that the later work copies the earlier one. In disputes involving films and plays, courts should be even more careful. A stage play is often compact. A film is expansive. It may contain songs, subplots, settings, supporting characters, comedy tracks, visual sequences, and social commentary. Therefore, similarity in theme is insufficient. Similarity in some scenes is also insufficient if those scenes flow from a common subject. The plaintiff must prove substantial appropriation of expressive structure. Clear and cogent evidence is required because copyright infringement is treated as piracy. Access to the work is relevant. But access alone does not prove copying. Similarity must still be substantial. These guidelines form the backbone of Indian copyright infringement analysis. #### d. DISSENTING OPINION There was no dissenting opinion. However, ***R.S. Pathak, J.*** delivered a notable concurring opinion. He observed that the authors of the film appeared to have been influenced to some degree by salient features of the play. He acknowledged that the film authors were aware of the scheme of the play. Yet he agreed that the appeal should be dismissed because two courts below had concurrently found no infringement. His concurrence contains a warning. He stated that a person may try to disguise plagiarism by widening the field of the later work, introducing immaterial changes, and creating apparent dissimilarity. Courts must look strictly at not only blatant copying but also reprehensible attempts at colourable imitation. This observation is extremely important. It prevents wrongdoers from believing that cosmetic differences can defeat copyright. ***Jaswant Singh, J.*** also concurred. He compared the play and film and found some resemblances. Yet he held that they were not material or substantial. He stated that the film’s major incidents, episodes and dramatic situations were substantially different. He also noted that the film dealt with two social evils, ***caste system*** and ***dowry system***, which did not figure in the appellant’s play. He therefore agreed that there was no breach of the appellant’s copyright. These concurring opinions strengthen the judgment. They show judicial caution. The Court was not blind to similarities. It simply found them insufficient under the law. # I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The decision remains the leading Indian authority on copyright infringement in creative works. It clearly establishes the ***idea-expression dichotomy***. This doctrine is essential for creativity. If themes could be copyrighted, authors could monopolise love, revenge, patriotism, poverty, migration, caste, dowry, corruption, family conflict, or provincialism. That would make literature and cinema impossible. The Court therefore correctly held that ideas remain free. Only their original expression receives protection. The judgment is also fair to authors. It does not allow plagiarists to escape through clever disguise. The Court recognised that infringement need not be verbatim. Dramatic incidents, expressive sequence, and total impression may prove copying. It also accepted that unconscious copying may be actionable. Therefore, the judgment protects both authors and future creators. It prevents overprotection and underprotection at the same time. The case is especially relevant for Indian cinema. Films often draw from social issues, folklore, theatre, novels, public life, and news events. Many works may share broad plots. Family opposition, social prejudice, inter-community romance, suicide attempts, and reconciliation are common dramatic devices. The Court’s test prevents litigation based on vague resemblance. At the same time, it allows relief when the later work appropriates the heart of the earlier work. The decision’s strongest feature is its ordinary viewer test. Courts should not dissect works like mathematical charts. Creative works produce total impressions. A viewer can often sense whether one work has copied another. Still, courts must combine that impression with legal discipline. They must examine protectable expression, substantiality, materiality, and dissimilarity. This mixed method is practical and just. The judgment also has continuing relevance in the age of web series, OTT films, digital scripts, YouTube content, remakes, adaptations, and AI-generated works. The core rule remains the same. A theme is free. An expression is protected. A creator may use the same social problem. But he cannot steal the concrete form another author has built from that problem. Thus, ***R.G. Anand*** remains a durable authority because it protects creative labour without imprisoning creative imagination. # J) REFERENCES ## a. Important Cases Referred 1. ***R.G. Anand v. M/s Delux Films & Ors., AIR 1978 SC 1613; (1978) 4 SCC 118; 1979 SCR (1) 218***. 2. ***Hanfstaengl v. W.H. Smith & Sons, \[1905\] 1 Ch D 519***. 3. ***Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Isidor Straus, 210 U.S. 339***. 4. ***West v. Francis, (1822) 1 B & Ald 737***. 5. ***Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd., \[1964\] 1 All ER 465***. 6. ***Corelli v. Gray, 29 TLR 570***. 7. ***Hawkes & Son (London) Ltd. v. Paramount Film Service Ltd., \[1934\] 1 Ch D 593***. 8. ***Harman Pictures N.V. v. Osborne, \[1967\] 1 WLR 723***. 9. ***Donoghue v. Allied Newspapers Ltd., \[1937\] 3 All ER 503***. 10. ***Bobl v. Palace Theatre Ltd., 28 TLR 72***. 11. ***Tate v. Fullbrook, 77 Law Journal Reports 577***. 12. ***Frederick B. Chatterton v. Joseph Arnold Cave, (1878) 3 AC 483***. 13. ***Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49***. 14. ***Shipman v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 100 F.2d 533***. 15. ***Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 216 F.2d 945***. 16. ***Macmillan & Co. Ltd. v. K. & J. Cooper, 51 IA 109***. 17. ***N.T. Raghunathan v. All India Reporter Ltd., AIR 1971 Bom 48***. 18. ***K.R. Venugopala Sarma v. Sangu Ganesan, 1972 Cri LJ 1098***. 19. ***The Daily Calendar Supplying Bureau v. The United Concern, AIR 1967 Mad 381***. 20. ***C. Cunniah & Co. v. Balraj & Co., AIR 1961 Mad 111***. 21. ***S.K. Dutt v. Law Book Co., AIR 1954 All 570***. 22. ***Romesh Chowdhry v. Kh. Ali Mohammad Nowsheri, AIR 1965 J&K 101***. 23. ***Mohini Mohan Singh v. Sita Nath Basak, AIR 1931 Cal 238***. ## b. Important Statutes Referred 1. ***Copyright Act, 1911***: ***Section 1(2)(d)*** and ***Section 2(1)***. 2. ***Copyright Act, 1957***, by present doctrinal relevance to ***dramatic works***, ***literary works***, ***cinematograph films***, and infringement principles. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Banyan Tree Holding (P) Limited v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy & Anr., CS (OS) No. 894/2008, Delhi High Court](https://lawfoyer.in/banyan-tree-holding-p-limited-v-a-murali-krishna-reddy-anr-cs-os-no-894-2008-delhi-high-court/) **Published:** August 19, 2026 **Author:** Jaya Dubey **Content:** # A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE ***Banyan Tree Holding (P) Limited v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy & Anr., CS (OS) No. 894/2008, Delhi High Court, decided on 23 November 2009*** is a leading Indian judgment on territorial jurisdiction in internet-based passing off and infringement disputes. The Division Bench, speaking through ***Dr. Justice S. Muralidhar***, examined whether a Delhi court could assume jurisdiction merely because a defendant’s website was accessible in Delhi. The plaintiff was based in Singapore. The defendants were based in Hyderabad. Neither party was located within Delhi. The plaintiff alleged passing off through the defendants’ use of ***“Banyan Tree Retreat”*** and a banyan tree device on a website. The Court rejected the broad proposition that mere accessibility of a website confers jurisdiction. It held that the plaintiff must show ***purposeful availment***, ***specific targeting***, a real or intended ***commercial transaction*** with forum users, and resulting injury within the forum. It overruled ***Casio India Co. Ltd. v. Ashita Tele Systems Pvt. Ltd., 2003 (27) PTC 265 (Del)*** to that extent. It also held that a solitary trap transaction cannot create jurisdiction. **Keywords:** ***Territorial Jurisdiction***, ***Passing Off***, ***Internet Jurisdiction***, ***Purposeful Availment***, ***Specific Targeting***, ***Section 20 CPC***, ***Trap Transactions***, ***Website Accessibility***. # B) CASE DETAILS The judgment cause title is ***Banyan Tree Holding (P) Limited v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy & Anr.*** The case number is ***CS (OS) No. 894/2008***. The judgment date is ***23 November 2009***. The court is the ***High Court of Delhi at New Delhi***. The matter was heard by a Division Bench consisting of ***Hon’ble the Chief Justice*** and ***Hon’ble Dr. Justice S. Muralidhar***. The judgment was authored by ***Dr. Justice S. Muralidhar***. The plaintiff was ***Banyan Tree Holding (P) Limited***. The defendants were ***A. Murali Krishna Reddy*** and another. The plaintiff was represented by ***Mr. Praveen Anand*** with ***Mr. Sagar Chandra, Advocate***. The uploaded judgment does not record appearances for the defendants in the opening cause-title portion. Therefore, no counsel name for the defendants can safely be supplied. The citation may be written as ***Banyan Tree Holding (P) Limited v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy & Anr., CS (OS) No. 894/2008, Delhi High Court, decided on 23 November 2009***. The principal legal provisions involved were ***[Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1856656/)***, ***[Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1848053/)***, and ***[Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/337836/)***. The judgment also mentioned the absence of a general Indian long-arm statute for internet-based jurisdiction. No judgment was overruled entirely. However, the proposition in ***Casio India Co. Ltd. v. Ashita Tele Systems Pvt. Ltd., 2003 (27) PTC 265 (Del)*** that mere website accessibility in Delhi was sufficient for jurisdiction was expressly held not to be good law. The case relates to ***Intellectual Property Law***, ***Trade Mark Law***, ***Passing Off***, ***Civil Procedure***, ***Private International Law***, ***Cyber Law***, and ***Internet Jurisdiction***. # C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The case emerged from a legal problem created by internet commerce. A plaintiff may find that a defendant’s website is visible everywhere. Yet the defendant may not reside or carry on business in the forum where the suit is filed. The question then becomes difficult. Should every court where the website is visible get jurisdiction. Or should jurisdiction require something more concrete. ***Banyan Tree*** answered this question for Indian passing off and infringement actions. The case is especially important because the plaintiff was not located in Delhi. The defendants were also not located in Delhi. Therefore, ordinary jurisdiction under ***Section 20(a)*** and ***Section 20(b) CPC*** was unavailable. The plaintiff had to rely on ***Section 20(c) CPC***. It had to show that a part of the cause of action arose in Delhi. The dispute concerned the mark ***“Banyan Tree”***. The plaintiff was a Singapore company engaged in hospitality. It claimed use of the word mark ***“Banyan Tree”*** and a banyan tree device since 1994. It also maintained websites such as ***[www.banyantree.com](http://www.banyantree.com/)*** and ***[www.banyantreespa.com](http://www.banyantreespa.com/)*** since 1996. The defendants were from Hyderabad. They allegedly used ***“Banyan Tree Retreat”*** for a project advertised on ***[www.makprojects.com/banyantree](http://www.makprojects.com/banyantree)***. The plaintiff alleged dishonest adoption and passing off. It stated that the defendants were attempting to ride on its goodwill. It further argued that the defendants’ website was accessible in Delhi and had interactive features. The learned Single Judge referred jurisdictional questions to a Division Bench. The reference was necessary because existing Indian case law had not clearly settled internet jurisdiction. # D) FACTS OF THE CASE The plaintiff, ***Banyan Tree Holding (P) Limited***, was a company with its registered office in Singapore. It claimed to be part of a hospitality group. It adopted and used the word mark ***“Banyan Tree”*** and a banyan tree device from 1994. According to the plaintiff, continuous and extensive use gave the mark secondary meaning and distinctiveness. It asserted that the mark had become associated with the plaintiff and its group. It had no registered trade mark in India at the relevant time. Its registration application was stated to be pending. Since 2002, it claimed collaboration with the Oberoi Group for operating spas across India. In October 2007, it learnt that the defendants had started a project called ***“Banyan Tree Retreat”***. The defendants were located in Hyderabad. Defendant No. 1 was the promoter of Defendant No. 2. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ word mark and device were deceptively similar to its mark and device. It alleged dishonest adoption. It also alleged an attempt to encash upon the plaintiff’s goodwill and reputation. The defendants advertised their project through ***[www.makprojects.com/banyantree](http://www.makprojects.com/banyantree)***. The plaintiff filed a passing off suit for injunction. In the plaint, it claimed Delhi jurisdiction under ***Section 20 CPC***. It pleaded that the defendants solicited business in Delhi through the impugned mark. It stated that the website was accessible in Delhi. It further stated that the website was not passive because it gave contact information and sought feedback through an interactive webpage. The plaintiff also relied on one alleged instance of a brochure being sent to a Delhi resident for sale of property. # E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED The Division Bench reframed three issues. First, in a passing off action or infringement action where the plaintiff is not carrying on business within the court’s jurisdiction, the Court had to decide when a universally accessible website gives jurisdiction to the forum court. Second, where the defendant is sued because its website is accessible in the forum state, the Court had to decide the plaintiff’s prima facie burden for establishing jurisdiction. Third, the Court had to decide whether such prima facie jurisdiction could be established through ***trap orders*** or ***trap transactions***. These questions were foundational. They determined when internet visibility becomes a part of cause of action under ***Section 20(c) CPC***. The issues were framed against a specific procedural background. The plaintiff did not sue for trade mark infringement while carrying on business in Delhi. Had that been the case, ***Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999*** might have assisted it. That provision, like ***Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957***, is a limited long-arm provision. It allows certain plaintiffs to sue where they carry on business. But the present action was a passing off action. Neither side resided or carried on business in Delhi. Therefore, the Court had to interpret ***Section 20(c) CPC*** in the internet context. The central legal question was whether online accessibility, interactivity, targeting, commercial transaction, and harm could together create jurisdiction. # F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the defendants’ website gave Delhi jurisdiction. The plaintiff relied on three factors. These were the nature of the website, the intention of the host to market its product in Delhi, and the effect of the defendants’ action in Delhi. The plaintiff argued that websites could be passive, interactive, or active. It suggested that even a passive website could become ***“passive plus”*** if the defendant did not block access to Delhi viewers. The plaintiff also argued for ***purposeful avoidance***. According to this argument, unless the website owner placed filters or blocked viewers outside its own territory, viewers elsewhere should be treated as targeted. This argument tried to shift the burden to the website owner. The plaintiff also argued that interactivity mattered. Since the defendants’ website sought feedback and inputs, it could not be treated as a merely passive online brochure. The plaintiff submitted that the defendants’ services were offered to customers in Delhi because of the ubiquity, universality, and utility of the internet. The plaintiff also relied on the alleged brochure sent to a Delhi resident. It argued that this showed solicitation or commercial reach into Delhi. To support its case, the plaintiff cited several Indian and foreign decisions. It urged the Court to adopt an expansive jurisdictional approach. That approach would protect trade mark owners from evasive online wrongdoers. It would also prevent defendants from escaping liability merely by operating outside Delhi while targeting Delhi consumers through the internet. # G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The uploaded judgment mainly records the plaintiff’s submissions in detail because the matter arose on a reference about jurisdiction. Still, the defendants’ jurisdictional position can be understood from the questions and the Court’s analysis. The defendants resisted Delhi jurisdiction. Their broad position was that neither the plaintiff nor the defendants were located in Delhi. The defendants were based in Hyderabad. The plaintiff was based in Singapore. Mere access to a website from Delhi could not create jurisdiction under ***Section 20(c) CPC***. Otherwise, every website would expose its owner to suits in every Indian court. That would be unfair, uncertain, and commercially oppressive. The defendants’ position therefore aligned with the principle that jurisdiction requires a real connection. The respondent-side reasoning found support in the Court’s final holding. The Court rejected mere accessibility. It also rejected mere interactivity. It treated those features as insufficient unless combined with targeting and commercial activity. This reasoning protects defendants from being sued anywhere merely because the internet is borderless. It also reflects fairness in civil procedure. Jurisdiction should not arise through random, accidental, or fortuitous contact. The forum must have a legally meaningful connection to the defendant’s conduct. The Court’s acceptance of ***purposeful availment*** over ***purposeful avoidance*** substantially favoured this disciplined approach. The defendant may show avoidance later. But the initial burden remains on the plaintiff. # H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS ***Section 20 CPC*** was the principal provision. It provides that a suit may be instituted where the defendant resides, carries on business, personally works for gain, or where the cause of action wholly or partly arises. In this case, ***Section 20(a)***and ***Section 20(b)*** did not apply because the defendants were not in Delhi. The plaintiff therefore invoked ***Section 20(c)***. The Court had to decide whether website accessibility and interactivity created part of the cause of action in Delhi. The phrase ***“cause of action”*** became decisive. It means a bundle of essential facts that the plaintiff must prove. The Court held that mere online visibility is not an essential fact sufficient for jurisdiction. Something more is required. That “something more” is targeting, commercial transaction, and injury within the forum. ***Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999*** was discussed because it gives a special jurisdictional advantage to plaintiffs in infringement suits. It allows a plaintiff to sue where it resides or carries on business. The Court described it as a limited long-arm provision. But it was not helpful here because the suit was for passing off and the plaintiff was not carrying on business in Delhi. ***Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957*** was mentioned by analogy. It similarly allows a copyright plaintiff to sue where it resides or carries on business. These provisions showed that Parliament can create special jurisdiction where it wishes. In the absence of such benefit, the plaintiff had to satisfy ordinary civil procedure under ***Section 20 CPC***. The Information Technology Act was mentioned in the referred questions. However, the decision did not rest on a substantive provision of that Act. The case was decided through ***Section 20 CPC*** and common law jurisdictional principles. The Court considered international principles such as ***minimum contacts***, ***purposeful availment***, ***Zippo sliding scale***, ***Calder effects test***, ***targeting***, and ***real and substantial connection***. These were not Indian statutes. They were comparative tools. The Court used them to shape Indian law in a field where the CPC had to be applied to internet conduct. This method is doctrinally sound. It respects Indian statutory text while learning from jurisdictions that faced similar problems earlier. # I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT IN THIS CASE The Court analysed several United States decisions.[ ***International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 340 (1945)***](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/326/310/)introduced the idea of ***minimum contacts*** and fairness. It required purposeful direction of activities towards the forum. [***Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985)*** ](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/471/462/)developed ***purposeful availment***. It held that random or fortuitous contacts are insufficient. The defendant must create a substantial connection with the forum. ***[Asahi Metal Industries v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987)](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/480/102/)*** cautioned that mere placement of goods into the stream of commerce is not enough. These cases supplied the fairness foundation for internet jurisdiction. The Court then examined internet-specific decisions. ***[Inset Systems Inc. v. Instruction Set Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996)](https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/937/161/2250607/)*** represented an early expansive approach. A website and toll-free number were held enough to show purposeful availment. [***Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)*** ](https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/937/295/2250411/)took a narrower view. It held that merely creating a website accessible everywhere is not an act purposefully directed to the forum. ***CompuServe Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996)*** found purposeful availment because the defendant deliberately transmitted software through the plaintiff’s system. ***[Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening Inc., 282 F.3d 883 (6th Cir. 2002)](https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/282/883/581897/)*** treated website interaction with residents and actual business as relevant. These cases helped the Court distinguish passive presence from deliberate commercial connection. The Court analysed ***[Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997)](https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/952/1119/1432344/)***. That case created the famous ***sliding scale test***. Websites may be passive, interactive, or integral to business. Jurisdiction becomes stronger when a website conducts commercial activity with forum residents. The Delhi High Court accepted the usefulness of this test but did not apply it mechanically. It noted difficulties in measuring interactivity. Many websites are interactive today. Therefore, the Court shifted attention to the nature of the activity and whether it results in commercial transactions with forum users. The Court also considered the [***Calder effects test*** from ***Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)***.](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/465/783/) That case allowed jurisdiction where tortious conduct was expressly aimed at the forum and the brunt of harm was suffered there. The Court referred to the French ***Yahoo!*** litigation where harmful online content accessible in France attracted French jurisdiction. It also discussed the difficulty of applying the effects test to trade mark cases. Corporations do not suffer harm in the same geographic manner as individuals. Therefore, in trade mark and passing off cases, effects must be coupled with specific targeting. The Delhi High Court adopted this tighter version. The Court reviewed ***[Toys “R” Us v. Step Two, 318 F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 2003)](https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/318/446/608357/)***. That case warned that operating a commercially interactive website should not subject a defendant to jurisdiction everywhere in the world. There must be evidence of purposeful availment by direct targeting, knowing interaction with forum residents, or other related contacts. The Delhi High Court found this approach persuasive. It also referred to scholars like ***Thomas Schultz*** and ***Michael Geist***. Their writings supported ***targeting*** as a middle path. Targeting is more than mere effects. It is less than physical presence. This helped the Court craft a balanced Indian rule. The Court examined common law decisions from Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia. [***Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, \[1990\] 3 SCR 1077*** ](https://decisions.scc-csc.ca/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/700/index.do)used the ***real and substantial connection*** test. ***Patrick Desjean v. Intermix Media Inc., 2006 FC 1395*** refused Canadian jurisdiction where the defendant’s Canadian connection was weak. ***[1-800 Flowers Inc. v. Phonenames, \[2002\] FSR 12 CA](https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/5a8ff7b360d03e7f57eb1512)*** held that website accessibility in the United Kingdom did not by itself amount to trade mark use there. ***[Dow Jones & Co. Inc. v. Gutnick, (2002) HCA 56](https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1334&context=wilj)*** was discussed as an Australian defamation case involving a long-arm rule. These authorities showed that mature legal systems rejected universal jurisdiction based on mere internet access. The Court analysed Indian precedents. ***[Casio India Co. Ltd. v. Ashita Tele Systems Pvt. Ltd., 2003 (27) PTC 265 (Del)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/418389/)***had held that accessibility of a website from Delhi was enough to invoke jurisdiction. The Division Bench rejected that proposition. It expressly stated that ***Casio*** was not good law to that extent.[ ](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1043775/&ved=2ahUKEwjszsGgxKyWAxX6kuEIHbpxNRwQFnoECBoQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3q1Q__z-UiM9RYyMTAxYcl " India TV Independent News Service Pvt. Ltd. v. India Broadcast Live LLC, 2007 (35) PTC 177 (Del) ")[***India TV Independent News Service Pvt. Ltd. v. India Broadcast Live LLC, 2007 (35) PTC 177 (Del)*** ](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1043775/)was treated as closer to the correct position. It recognised that mere accessibility is not enough and considered interactivity, subscription, targeting, and India-focused services. The Division Bench refined the law further by requiring purposeful availment, targeting, commercial transaction, and injury. # H) JUDGEMENT #### a. RATIO DECIDENDI The ratio decidendi is that ***mere accessibility of a website in the forum state does not confer territorial jurisdiction***. Even a website that is interactive will not automatically confer jurisdiction. The plaintiff must show that the defendant ***purposefully availed*** itself of the forum court’s jurisdiction. This means that the defendant’s website activity must be directed at the forum with an intention to conclude a commercial transaction with users there. The plaintiff must also show that this specific targeting caused injury or harm to the plaintiff within the forum. The Court therefore applied the ***effects test*** together with the ***sliding scale test***. Accessibility, interactivity, targeting, commercial transaction, and injury must be read together. For ***Section 20(c) CPC***, the plaintiff must plead and produce material to show that a part of cause of action arose in the forum through internet activity. The website may be called passive plus or interactive. Labels do not decide jurisdiction. The plaintiff must show specific targeting of forum viewers for commercial transactions. It must also show that some commercial transaction using the website was entered into by the defendant with a user located in the forum. This transaction must result in harm to the plaintiff in the forum. The Court therefore rejected abstract jurisdiction based on internet universality. It insisted on concrete facts. The ratio on trap transactions is equally important. A solitary trap transaction cannot establish purposeful availment. It is not a real instance of the defendant choosing the forum. It may be engineered by the plaintiff. Therefore, it cannot alone create jurisdiction. If the plaintiff relies on a series of trap transactions, they must be obtained by fair means. The plaintiff must plead them unambiguously. It must place supporting material before the Court. Even then, the Court must examine whether the transactions genuinely show targeting and commercial dealing. This prevents plaintiffs from manufacturing jurisdiction through artificial purchases. #### b. OBITER DICTA The Court’s discussion on comparative law contains persuasive observations. It explained that the internet is not legally borderless in an absolute sense. States may regulate web-based activity when a sufficient connection exists. Yet the Court also warned against unlimited jurisdiction. If accessibility alone were enough, every website owner could be sued anywhere. That would be unfair and commercially chaotic. This reasoning has broad relevance beyond trade mark law. It applies to online contracts, e-commerce, defamation, consumer disputes, and platform disputes. Courts must identify a principled connection between forum, defendant conduct, and plaintiff injury. Another important observation concerns ***purposeful avoidance***. The plaintiff argued that defendants should be treated as targeting Delhi unless they blocked Delhi users. The Court rejected this burden-shifting. It held that the plaintiff must first prove purposeful availment. The defendant’s efforts to avoid a forum may become relevant later. But avoidance cannot replace the plaintiff’s initial burden. This is a valuable procedural safeguard. It prevents plaintiffs from saying that every unblocked jurisdiction was targeted. Such a rule would punish ordinary internet publication. The Court therefore preserved fairness and predictability. #### c. GUIDELINES The Court framed practical criteria for internet jurisdiction. First, the plaintiff must show more than accessibility. A website visible in Delhi is not enough. Second, the plaintiff must show more than interactivity. A feedback form, contact page, or brochure download is not enough by itself. Third, the defendant must have specifically targeted viewers in the forum. Targeting may be inferred from language, currency, advertising, services, shipping, subscriptions, forum-specific content, or actual dealings. Fourth, the defendant’s online conduct must be linked to commercial transactions with forum users. Fifth, the plaintiff must show injury to its business, goodwill, or reputation within the forum. Sixth, the plaintiff must plead these facts clearly and support them with prima facie material. The guidelines on trap transactions are stricter. Trap orders may be useful evidence in trade mark and passing off disputes. However, courts scrutinise them carefully. The plaintiff must act fairly. Written evidence is preferable. Ambiguity must be avoided. The defendant should have a fair chance to investigate. A single trap transaction is insufficient for jurisdiction because it does not show purposeful availment. A series of trap transactions may be considered only if obtained fairly and supported by proper pleadings. The Court drew from cases such as ***California Fig Syrup Company v. Taylor’s Drug Company Ltd., (1897) 14 RPC 564***, ***Carr & Sons v. Crisp & Co. Ltd., (1902) 19 RPC 497***, ***C.C. Wakefield & Co. Ltd. v. Purser, (1934) 51 RPC 167***, and ***Showerings Ltd. v. Fern Vale Brewery Coy Ltd., \[1958\] RPC 484***. #### d. DISSENTING OPINION There was no dissenting opinion. The judgment was delivered by ***Dr. Justice S. Muralidhar*** for the Division Bench. The Bench answered the referred questions and sent the matter back to the learned Single Judge. The Single Judge was directed to determine, on the facts of the suit, whether the plaintiff had prima facie shown Delhi jurisdiction in light of the law laid down. The Division Bench did not finally decide the suit. It decided the legal standards governing jurisdiction. The matter was listed before the Single Judge on ***7 December 2009***. # I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment is a cornerstone of Indian internet jurisdiction law. It refused two extremes. It rejected the extreme plaintiff-friendly rule that mere website accessibility is enough. It also rejected the idea that internet wrongs cannot be controlled unless the defendant is physically present. The Court created a middle path. It required ***purposeful availment*** and ***specific targeting***. This approach protects both trade mark owners and defendants. It gives plaintiffs a remedy where real forum-directed online conduct exists. It protects defendants from arbitrary suits in distant courts where their website is merely visible. The ruling is particularly strong because it understands the nature of online presence. Almost every website is accessible everywhere. Many websites are interactive in some way. If those features alone created jurisdiction, the rule would become unworkable. A hotel in Hyderabad, a shop in Jaipur, or a consultant in Kochi could be sued anywhere merely because a website form is visible there. The Court avoided that absurd result. It looked for commercial intention and actual connection. That approach respects the logic of ***Section 20 CPC***. A cause of action must be based on meaningful facts, not technological possibility. The judgment also strengthens procedural fairness. Jurisdiction is not a technical nuisance. It protects defendants from being dragged to inconvenient forums without adequate connection. It also protects judicial discipline. Courts should not assume power merely because harm is alleged. The plaintiff must show that the forum is connected to the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury. This is why the Court adopted the combined ***Zippo-Calder-targeting*** approach. It made internet jurisdiction fact-sensitive. It avoided rigid categories and encouraged practical inquiry. The treatment of ***[Casio India Co. Ltd. v. Ashita Tele Systems Pvt. Ltd., 2003 (27) PTC 265 (Del)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/418389/)*** is also significant. The Court expressly overruled it to the extent it held that accessibility alone was sufficient. This restored balance in Delhi trade mark litigation. Delhi is a major commercial court forum. Without this correction, many plaintiffs could file suits in Delhi despite weak connections. The ruling therefore prevented forum shopping. It also aligned Indian law with comparative global standards. The case remains relevant even after later developments in digital commerce. Websites now use targeted advertisements, location-based services, app downloads, payment gateways, delivery networks, and algorithmic marketing. The ***Banyan Tree*** test remains useful because it focuses on targeting and commercial transaction. Modern plaintiffs can show jurisdiction through geo-targeted ads, delivery to forum users, forum-specific pricing, user analytics, subscription records, or actual sales. Modern defendants can resist jurisdiction by showing absence of targeting, absence of transactions, or only passive visibility. The judgment also offers a careful approach to trap transactions. Trap orders are often necessary in passing off cases. Wrongdoing may be difficult to prove otherwise. Yet trap transactions can be misused to manufacture jurisdiction. The Court therefore required fairness and substance. A plaintiff cannot create jurisdiction by sending its own agent to trigger a transaction that would not otherwise occur. This protects defendants from artificial litigation strategies. It also preserves the credibility of investigative evidence. The maxim ***ubi jus ibi remedium*** supports remedies for online passing off. Yet the maxim must operate with forum discipline. ***Banyan Tree*** achieves that balance. It says that where a defendant truly targets the forum and causes harm there, the court may act. Where the defendant merely hosts a globally accessible website, the court should not assume jurisdiction. This is a mature and principled rule. It remains one of the most cited Indian authorities on online jurisdiction in intellectual property disputes. # J) REFERENCES ## a. Important Cases Referred 1. ***Banyan Tree Holding (P) Limited v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy & Anr., CS (OS) No. 894/2008, Delhi High Court, decided on 23 November 2009***. 2. ***Casio India Co. Ltd. v. Ashita Tele Systems Pvt. Ltd., 2003 (27) PTC 265 (Del)***. 3. ***India TV Independent News Service Pvt. Ltd. v. India Broadcast Live LLC, 2007 (35) PTC 177 (Del)***. 4. ***International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 340 (1945)***. 5. ***Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985)***. 6. ***Asahi Metal Industries v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987)***. 7. ***Inset Systems Inc. v. Instruction Set Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996)***. 8. ***Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)***. 9. ***Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997)***. 10. ***Cybersell Inc. v. Cybersell Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997)***. 11. ***Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)***. 12. ***Toys “R” Us v. Step Two, 318 F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 2003)***. 13. ***Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, \[1990\] 3 SCR 1077***. 14. ***Patrick Desjean v. Intermix Media Inc., 2006 FC 1395***. 15. ***1-800 Flowers Inc. v. Phonenames, \[2002\] FSR 12 CA***. 16. ***Dow Jones & Co. Inc. v. Gutnick, (2002) HCA 56***. 17. ***California Fig Syrup Company v. Taylor’s Drug Company Ltd., (1897) 14 RPC 564***. 18. ***Carr & Sons v. Crisp & Co. Ltd., (1902) 19 RPC 497***. 19. ***C.C. Wakefield & Co. Ltd. v. Purser, (1934) 51 RPC 167***. 20. ***Showerings Ltd. v. Fern Vale Brewery Coy Ltd., \[1958\] RPC 484***. 21. ***Marie Claire Album SA v. Hartstone Hosiery Ltd., \[1993\] FSR 693***. 22. ***Hilti AG v. Ucan Development Ltd., \[1963\] 7 RPC 160***. ## b. Important Statutes Referred 1. ***Code of Civil Procedure, 1908***: ***Section 20***. 2. ***Trade Marks Act, 1999***: ***Section 134(2)***. 3. ***Copyright Act, 1957***: ***Section 62(2)***. 4. ***Information Technology Act, 2000***, referred in the jurisdictional questions. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Neetu Singh & Anr. v. Telegram FZ LLC & Ors., CS (COMM) 282/2020, Delhi High Court](https://lawfoyer.in/neetu-singh-anr-v-telegram-fz-llc-ors-cs-comm-282-2020-delhi-high-court/) **Published:** August 19, 2026 **Author:** Jaya Dubey **Content:** # A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE ***Neetu Singh & Anr. v. Telegram FZ LLC & Ors., CS (COMM) 282/2020, Delhi High Court, decided on 30 August 2022*** is a significant Indian decision on copyright enforcement against digital intermediaries. The judgment was delivered by ***Justice Prathiba M. Singh***. The dispute arose from unauthorised circulation of educational videos, lectures, books, notes, and course material belonging to ***Ms. Neetu Singh*** and ***K.D. Campus Pvt. Ltd.*** through multiple Telegram channels. The plaintiffs sought disclosure of channel creators’ identities. Telegram resisted disclosure by invoking privacy, foreign server location, Singapore data protection law, intermediary status, ***Section 72A of the Information Technology Act, 2000***, and the ***Information Technology Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code Rules, 2021***. The Delhi High Court held that takedown alone was insufficient. It directed Telegram to disclose details of infringing channels, devices, mobile numbers, IP addresses, email addresses, creators, and operators in sealed cover. The Court harmonised copyright remedies, intermediary obligations, privacy principles, and cross-border data storage realities. **Keywords:** ***Copyright Infringement***, ***Telegram Channels***, ***Intermediary Liability***, ***Digital Piracy***, ***Privacy***, ***Discovery***, ***John Doe Defendants***, ***Cross-Border Data***. # B) CASE DETAILS The judgment cause title is ***Neetu Singh & Anr. v. Telegram FZ LLC & Ors.*** The case number is ***CS (COMM) 282/2020***. The application decided was ***I.A. 8461/2020 under Order XI CPC***. The judgment was reserved on ***12 April 2022***. It was pronounced on ***30 August 2022***. The court was the ***High Court of Delhi at New Delhi***. The quorum consisted of ***Justice Prathiba M. Singh*** sitting singly. The author was ***Justice Prathiba M. Singh***. The plaintiffs were ***Ms. Neetu Singh*** and ***K.D. Campus Pvt. Ltd.*** The principal defendant was ***Telegram FZ LLC***. The second defendant was ***John Doe***, meaning unknown persons operating infringing channels. The citation may be stated as ***Neetu Singh & Anr. v. Telegram FZ LLC & Ors., CS (COMM) 282/2020, Delhi High Court, decided on 30 August 2022***. The uploaded judgment records the appearance of ***Ms. Rajeshwari H.*** and ***Ms. Swapnil Gaur*** for the plaintiffs. It records ***Mr. Amit Sibal, Senior Advocate***with ***Ms. Anushka Sharda, Mr. Madhav Khosla, Ms. Smriti Nair, Mr. Vinay Tripathi, Mr. Madhav Chitale, Mr. Aishwary Vikram and Mr. Saksham Dhingra*** for ***Defendant No. 1***. The legal provisions involved were ***[Order XI Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/777426/)***, ***[Sections 2(f), 2(ff), 2(hh), 2(m), 2(o), 2(t), 14, 55, 58, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66 and 69 of the Copyright Act, 1957](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/337836/)***, ***[Sections 72A and 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1965344/)***, ***Rules 3 and 4 of the Information Technology Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code Rules, 2021***, ***[Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 of the Constitution of India](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1199182/)***, ***Section 17 of Singapore’s Personal Data Protection Act, 2012***, ***Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1886***, and ***TRIPS Agreement, 1995***. No earlier judgment was overruled. The case relates to ***Intellectual Property Law***, ***Copyright Law***, ***Information Technology Law***, ***Constitutional Law***, ***Civil Procedure***, ***Private International Law***, and ***Digital Platform Regulation***. # C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The litigation emerged from a modern copyright enforcement problem. ***Ms. Neetu Singh*** is a well-known author and teacher. Her educational material trains students for competitive examinations. These included ***SSC, Bank PO, CDS, NDA and similar examinations***. She founded ***K.D. Campus Pvt. Ltd.***. The company runs coaching centres and online courses. The plaintiffs alleged that their valuable educational works were copied and circulated through Telegram channels. These works included ***course material, lectures, videos, notes, tutorials, books and PDFs***. The book ***“Plinth to Paramount”*** was specifically mentioned. The plaintiffs alleged daily dissemination. They also alleged that infringers charged students discounted amounts. Therefore, the case was not only about copying. It was also about organised digital commercial exploitation of copyrighted educational content. Telegram was not sued as the author of the infringing material. It was sued as the platform through which infringers operated. The plaintiffs first reported infringement to ****** and ******. Telegram removed some channels. Yet new channels appeared almost immediately. The new channels used small changes in names. These changes included altered spellings, added underscores, changed numbers, capital letters, or shuffled words. The Court noted that blocking alone was proving ineffective. The plaintiffs therefore sought discovery of the persons operating infringing channels. This was crucial because damages and final reliefs could not be pursued against unknown infringers. The case thus converted a copyright dispute into a broader question of platform accountability, anonymity, privacy, and access to justice. # D) FACTS OF THE CASE The plaintiffs filed the commercial suit seeking ***permanent injunction***, ***damages***, ***costs***, and related reliefs. They alleged unauthorised reproduction, publication, distribution, sale, circulation, and use of their copyrighted works on Telegram. Several channels used names closely connected with the plaintiffs. The judgment records examples such as ***“Neetu maam course”***, ***“English by Neetu Singh”***, ***“KD Campus Live”***, ***“Paid Video Free Course”***, ***“Neetu Singh English”***, and other similar channels. The plaintiffs pleaded that lectures by ***Plaintiff No. 1*** were uploaded daily. They also pleaded that books and notes were circulated in PDF form. The pleadings showed clear commercial injury. The content was being distributed without permission. It was also being monetised by unidentified persons. The Court first dealt with interim protection. On ***28 July 2020***, it noted Telegram’s statement that offending channels would be taken down within ***36 hours*** of intimation. Later, on ***23 September 2020***, the Court directed Telegram to take down channels mentioned at serial numbers ***1 to 201***, whether private or public. The plaintiffs then moved ***I.A. 8461/2020***under ***Order XI Rule 10 CPC***. They sought discovery of details of channel creators. They explained that masked private channels defeated ordinary enforcement. They also demonstrated how earlier channels resurfaced with minimal changes. For example, a number changed from ***1212*** to ***1213***. A name changed by adding a digit. Such repetitive relaunching made takedown an inadequate remedy. The application therefore requested disclosure of identities behind infringing channels. # E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED The central legal issue was whether ***Telegram could be directed to disclose the identities of creators and operators of infringing channels***. This included details of devices, mobile numbers, IP addresses, email addresses, and related information. The issue arose within a civil copyright suit. It was connected to discovery under ***Order XI CPC***. The Court framed the matter as a short but vexed question. It asked whether Telegram could be compelled to disclose persons who unauthorisedly disseminated copyrighted works. The question required balancing copyright enforcement against user privacy. It also required assessing whether foreign data storage could defeat Indian court orders. A second legal issue concerned the nature of Telegram’s intermediary status. Telegram claimed that its duty was limited to takedown. It relied on the ***Information Technology Act, 2000*** and ***IT Rules, 2021***. The plaintiffs argued that takedown was inadequate. They needed the infringers’ identities to claim damages and pursue legal remedies. A third issue concerned territorial jurisdiction. Telegram argued that its servers were located outside India, especially in Singapore. The Court had to decide whether this fact limited the Delhi High Court’s power. A fourth issue concerned privacy under ***Article 21*** and expression under ***Article 19(1)(a)***. The Court had to decide whether anonymous infringers could invoke those rights to avoid disclosure after prima facie copyright infringement. # F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the plaintiffs submitted that Telegram’s own policies recognised abuse reporting and copyright complaints. They relied on Telegram’s privacy clauses and FAQs. They argued that when illegal channels repeatedly disseminated copyrighted works, Telegram had to assist enforcement. The plaintiffs submitted that infringing channels continued to emerge despite takedowns. These channels used trivial name modifications. This allowed infringers to continue piracy with speed and anonymity. The plaintiffs argued that the identity of channel creators was exclusively available with Telegram. Without disclosure, the plaintiffs could not sue the actual wrongdoers. They could not claim damages. They could not obtain meaningful final relief. Therefore, discovery was necessary and proportionate. The plaintiffs also argued that Singapore law could not prevent an Indian court from directing disclosure. Telegram offered services in India. It had a large Indian user base. The infringement occurred in India. The copyrighted material was designed for Indian competitive examinations. The plaintiffs resided and carried on business in Delhi. Therefore, the Delhi High Court had jurisdiction under ***Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957***. The plaintiffs contended that private contractual privacy terms could not shield infringers. They also argued that data protection law did not protect illegal conduct. Their case was anchored in a simple proposition. Anonymity may protect lawful speech. It cannot become armour for commercial copyright piracy. # G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Telegram submitted that the existing takedown arrangement was sufficient. Telegram claimed it had blocked several channels. It was willing to remove infringing content when reported. It argued that disclosure of subscriber information was not permissible under its privacy policy, except where a court order confirmed a terror suspect. Telegram relied on [***Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1***.](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/91938676/) It argued that privacy forms part of ***Article 21 of the Constitution***. It submitted that disclosure of user data required legal authority. Telegram also invoked ***Article 19(1)(a)***. It suggested that disabling or exposing channel creators could affect freedom of speech. Telegram further relied on foreign server location. It stated that its data servers were located in Singapore. It argued that encrypted data could not be disclosed except under Singapore law. It relied on Singapore’s ***Personal Data Protection Act, 2012***. It contended that a Singapore “Court” meant a court in Singapore. Therefore, an Indian court could not compel disclosure. Telegram also relied on ***Section 72A of the Information Technology Act, 2000***. It argued that disclosure in breach of contractual privacy obligations could attract criminal consequences. Telegram also invoked the ***IT Rules, 2021***. It submitted that originator identification under Rule 4 could be ordered only for specific serious offences. Copyright infringement, according to Telegram, did not fall within that narrow list. # H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS ***Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957*** was relevant to jurisdiction. It allows a copyright owner to sue where the owner resides or carries on business. The plaintiffs resided and carried on business in Delhi. The Court also found that infringement occurred in Delhi because copyrighted works circulated there. Further, the educational material concerned Indian examinations. This made India, and specifically Delhi, a natural forum. ***Section 2(o)*** covered literary works. The Court treated course material, books, notes, question papers, and teaching material as literary works. ***Section 2(f)*** covered cinematograph films. The Court treated videos of lectures as protected cinematograph films. ***Section 14*** granted exclusive rights, including reproduction, storage by electronic means, issuing copies, and communication to the public. ***Section 2(m) of the Copyright Act*** defined infringing copies. The Court held that electronic copies circulated on Telegram fell within this definition. ***Section 2(ff)*** covered communication to the public. Circulation through Telegram channels therefore amounted to communication. ***Section 55*** allowed injunction, damages, accounts, and other civil remedies. ***Section 58*** treated infringing copies and plates as property of the copyright owner. ***Sections 63 to 66*** created criminal consequences and seizure powers. The Court relied on these provisions to stress that copyright infringement is serious. It also held that smart phones, computers, servers, and similar devices could fall within broad statutory concepts of plates and duplicating equipment. This interpretation preserved copyright remedies in a digital environment. ***Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000*** was relevant to intermediary safe harbour. The Court treated safe harbour as conditional. It did not treat intermediary status as blanket immunity. ***Rule 3 of the IT Rules, 2021*** required intermediaries to remove unlawful information after receiving actual knowledge through court orders or competent governmental notice. ***Rule 4*** concerned identification of first originators by significant social media intermediaries providing messaging services. Telegram relied on Rule 4’s narrower language. The Court held that these rules did not extinguish copyright remedies. The IT Act and the Copyright Act had to be harmonised. ***Section 72A of the IT Act*** was also discussed. Telegram invoked it to resist disclosure. The Court rejected that defence where disclosure was directed by a court for enforcement of legal rights. # I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT IN THIS CASE The Court discussed ***[Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/127517806/)*** because Telegram invoked privacy. Telegram argued that subscriber data was protected under ***Article 21***. The Court did not deny privacy as a constitutional value. It held that privacy cannot protect infringers from legal consequences. The reasoning is important. ***Puttaswamy***recognises privacy as fundamental. Yet fundamental rights are not absolute shields for unlawful commercial acts. Here, disclosure was sought under a court order. It was not a private fishing enquiry. It was connected with identified copyright infringement. Thus, privacy yielded to lawful, proportionate, rights-based enforcement. The Court relied on[ ***My Space Inc. v. Super Cassettes Industries Ltd., (2017) 236 DLT 478 (DB)***](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/12972852/)[.](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/12972852/&ved=2ahUKEwj83NKBwqyWAxWMjuEIHfadJHkQFnoECBkQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3WaBz703wQdkkxB59vP7gv "My Space Inc. v. Super Cassettes Industries Ltd., (2017) 236 DLT 478 (DB).") That decision held that ***Section 79 of the IT Act*** gives measured privilege to intermediaries. It does not curtail rights under the Copyright Act. Safe harbour is an affirmative defence. It is not blanket immunity. The Delhi High Court used this principle to reject Telegram’s argument that takedown exhausted its obligations. The Court reasoned that disclosure did not automatically impose liability on Telegram. It merely enabled identification of infringers. This preserved intermediary protection while allowing copyright owners to proceed against actual wrongdoers. The Court referred to ***M/s Knit Pro International v. State of NCT of Delhi, Criminal Appeal No. 807 of 2022, decided on 20 May 2022***[.](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/180042115/&ved=2ahUKEwiN1IGMwqyWAxXym-EIHUxeIAQQFnoECBoQAQ&usg=AOvVaw2HdYzIjzlhpxu2aUcbgTdq "M/s Knit Pro International v. State of NCT of Delhi, Criminal Appeal No. 807 of 2022, decided on 20 May 2022.") The Supreme Court held that an offence under ***Section 63 of the Copyright Act*** is cognizable and non-bailable. The Delhi High Court used this authority to underline the seriousness of copyright infringement. The point strengthened the disclosure order. If copyright infringement can trigger serious criminal consequences, courts cannot treat digital piracy as a minor private inconvenience. It also showed that identifying infringers was central to civil and criminal enforcement. The Court cited[ ***Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd., (1996) 5 SCC 550*** and ***Krishan Yadav v. State of Bihar, AIR 1994 SC 2166***.](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/89564/) These cases were relied on for the inherent powers of courts. The Court stated that High Courts possess powers to secure obedience to their process and give effective relief. This principle was essential because a court order must not become futile. If infringers can defeat orders by hiding behind platforms, the judicial process weakens. Therefore, disclosure became necessary for effective adjudication. The Court also referred to ***\[[A.K. Aggarwal v. Shanti Devi, CM(M) Appeal Nos. 154 and 155 of 1995, Delhi High Court, decided on 17 October 1995\]](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1906992/)*** and ***[Tara Batra v. Punam A. Kumar, CM(M) No. 925/2019, Delhi High Court, decided on 10 September 2021](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/73549455/)***. These cases supported liberal use of interrogatories and discovery. The Court emphasised that discovery can reduce evidentiary burden. It can also shorten litigation. The identity of infringing channel operators was directly material. It was not collateral. It went to the plaintiffs’ right to damages, accounts, and enforcement. # H) JUDGEMENT #### a. RATIO DECIDENDI The ratio decidendi is that ***a digital intermediary operating in India can be directed by an Indian court to disclose identifying information of users operating infringing channels, when such disclosure is necessary to enforce copyright remedies***. Telegram could not refuse disclosure merely because its servers were located outside India. It could not rely on privacy, foreign data law, or intermediary status to leave copyright owners remediless. The Court held that the Delhi High Court had jurisdiction because the plaintiffs resided and carried on business in Delhi. The infringement occurred in India. The material related to Indian examinations. Telegram had massive Indian operations. Therefore, Indian courts were competent to pass effective orders. The Court held that takedown orders were inadequate in the facts. The infringing channels were described as hydra-headed. They kept reappearing with small name changes. Blocking one channel did not stop the wrong. It only delayed it. The plaintiffs’ right to claim damages under ***Section 55 of the Copyright Act*** would become meaningless without the identities of wrongdoers. Therefore, disclosure was not excessive. It was relevant and material to the suit. The Court directed Telegram to disclose details of channels, devices, mobile numbers, IP addresses, email addresses, creators, operators, devices, servers, and networks used for dissemination. The information was to be filed in sealed cover. This protected confidentiality while enabling judicial supervision. #### b. OBITER DICTA A significant obiter concerns territoriality in cloud computing. The Court observed that conventional ideas of territoriality cannot be strictly applied in modern data storage. Cloud computing makes data accessible across jurisdictions. Telegram’s own policies suggested data sharing across group entities in Dubai and the British Virgin Islands. Therefore, mere physical server location cannot defeat Indian copyright enforcement. This reasoning has wide importance. It may guide future cases involving cloud platforms, social media, encrypted messaging, and foreign-hosted services. It shows that courts may focus on operations, users, harm, accessibility, and legal remedies rather than only server geography. Another important observation concerns privacy and illegality. The Court stated that ***Article 21 privacy*** and ***Article 19(1)(a) expression*** cannot be used to escape consequences of illegal acts. This does not diminish privacy generally. It limits abusive invocation of privacy by prima facie infringers. The Court also observed that intellectual property violations would go unchecked if foreign platforms could avoid disclosure by locating servers abroad. This observation gives strong public policy weight to copyright enforcement. It recognises that authors and teachers lose economic incentive when piracy becomes anonymous and repetitive. #### c. GUIDELINES The Court issued operational directions. Telegram was directed to disclose details of infringing channels and devices. The disclosure had to include ***mobile numbers, IP addresses, email addresses, creators, operators, devices, servers and networks*** used for uploading and communicating infringing material. The plaintiffs were permitted to submit any further list of infringing channels to Telegram within one week. Telegram had to disclose the relevant data within two weeks thereafter. The information was not to be openly published immediately. It had to be filed in sealed cover before the Court. After perusing it, the Court would pass further directions after hearing parties. This method balanced copyright enforcement with privacy concerns. The judgment also supplies practical principles for future cases. A copyright owner must show prima facie infringement. The requested disclosure must be relevant to the suit. The intermediary’s safe harbour cannot defeat civil remedies under the Copyright Act. Foreign server location is not conclusive against Indian jurisdiction. Takedown may be insufficient where infringing channels repeatedly reappear. Discovery can be ordered when identity information is exclusively with the platform. Privacy claims weaken when users exploit anonymity for commercial infringement. Courts may use sealed cover procedures to prevent unnecessary public exposure of personal data. #### d. DISSENTING OPINION There was no dissenting opinion. The judgment was delivered by a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court. Therefore, no separate dissent or concurring opinion exists. The respondent’s position, however, reflected a structured opposing view. Telegram argued for privacy, foreign law compliance, intermediary safe harbour, and limited disclosure obligations. The Court rejected those arguments in the present factual context. It did not hold that privacy is irrelevant. It held that privacy cannot immunise prima facie infringers from lawful court-directed discovery. # I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment is important because it treats copyright enforcement as meaningful, not decorative. The Court understood the practical weakness of repetitive takedown orders. Infringers could create fresh channels almost instantly. They could slightly modify names. They could continue collecting money. In such circumstances, an injunction without identity disclosure becomes weak. The Court therefore protected the plaintiffs’ statutory right to damages. This approach respects the commercial value of educational content. It also protects teachers, authors, publishers, and digital course providers from anonymous piracy. The ruling also correctly harmonises technology law and copyright law. ***Section 79 of the IT Act*** does not erase the Copyright Act. Safe harbour protects neutral intermediaries from automatic liability. It does not create a sanctuary for infringers. The decision makes this distinction clear. Telegram was not held liable merely because infringing content existed. It was directed to assist the Court by producing information. That is a narrower and more balanced order. It preserves platform neutrality while preventing deliberate blindness. The privacy analysis is persuasive but sensitive. The Court did not allow privacy to become a shield for wrongdoing. Yet it protected disclosure through sealed cover. That safeguard matters. Personal data should not be casually released. Court-supervised disclosure ensures that enforcement remains proportionate. The judgment therefore follows a practical middle path. It avoids both extremes. It does not permit lawless anonymity. It also does not authorise uncontrolled public exposure of user information. The international law discussion is also noteworthy. The Court referred to the ***Berne Convention*** and ***TRIPS***. It emphasised automatic protection of copyright across member countries. It also examined Singapore’s ***PDPA*** and found exceptions for proceedings and investigations. This prevented foreign data law from becoming an easy escape route. The reasoning is useful for cross-border digital disputes. Platforms increasingly store data outside the country where harm occurs. Courts must respond without surrendering jurisdiction. The decision may influence future cases involving encrypted services, social media platforms, cloud storage, online marketplaces, and content piracy networks. Its broader lesson is clear. Digital infrastructure cannot defeat substantive rights. Courts must adapt remedies to technological realities. The maxim ***ubi jus ibi remedium*** applies strongly here. Where there is a right, there must be a remedy. The Delhi High Court ensured that copyright owners were not left with hollow orders against unknown ghosts. # J) REFERENCES ## a. Important Cases Referred 1. ***Neetu Singh & Anr. v. Telegram FZ LLC & Ors., CS (COMM) 282/2020, Delhi High Court, decided on 30 August 2022***. 2. ***Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1***. 3. ***My Space Inc. v. Super Cassettes Industries Ltd., (2017) 236 DLT 478 (DB)***. 4. ***M/s Knit Pro International v. State of NCT of Delhi, Criminal Appeal No. 807 of 2022, Supreme Court, decided on 20 May 2022***. 5. ***Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd., (1996) 5 SCC 550***. 6. ***Krishan Yadav v. State of Bihar, AIR 1994 SC 2166***. 7. ***A.K. Aggarwal v. Shanti Devi, CM(M) Appeal Nos. 154 and 155 of 1995, Delhi High Court, decided on 17 October 1995***. 8. ***Tara Batra v. Punam A. Kumar, CM(M) No. 925/2019, Delhi High Court, decided on 10 September 2021***. ## b. Important Statutes Referred 1. ***Copyright Act, 1957***: ***Sections 2(f), 2(ff), 2(hh), 2(m), 2(o), 2(t), 14, 55, 58, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66 and 69***. 2. ***Information Technology Act, 2000***: ***Sections 72A and 79***. 3. ***Information Technology Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code Rules, 2021***: ***Rules 3 and 4***. 4. ***Code of Civil Procedure, 1908***: ***Order XI Rule 10***. 5. ***Constitution of India, 1950***: ***Articles 19(1)(a) and 21***. 6. ***Personal Data Protection Act, 2012, Singapore***: ***Section 17***. 7. ***Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1886***. 8. ***Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1995***. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [State through CBI v. S.J. Choudhary, 1996(1) BLJR 563](https://lawfoyer.in/state-through-cbi-v-s-j-choudhary-19961-bljr-563/) **Published:** August 19, 2026 **Author:** Jaya Dubey **Content:** # A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE ***State through CBI v. S.J. Choudhary, 1996(1) BLJR 563*** is a significant Constitution Bench ruling on ***expert evidence under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872***. The Supreme Court decided one narrow but important issue. It examined whether ***a typewriter expert’s opinion*** is legally admissible. The case arose during a criminal trial involving ***Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860*** and ***Sections 3 and 4 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908***. The prosecution wanted to prove incriminating facts through the identity of a typewriter. The trial court and Delhi High Court rejected such evidence. They relied on observations in [***Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 343***.](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/204632/) The Supreme Court held that those observations were based on concession. They were not binding law on this issue. The Court adopted a purposive and updating interpretation. It held that ***“science” in Section 45*** includes the scientific study of typewriting. Therefore, ***typewriter expert opinion is admissible evidence***. The ruling expanded forensic admissibility without rewriting the statute. It remains important for scientific evidence and technological interpretation. **Keywords:** ***Expert Evidence***, ***Section 45 Evidence Act***, ***Typewriter Expert***, ***Scientific Evidence***, ***Forensic Document Examination***, ***Updating Construction***, ***Criminal Trial***. # B) CASE DETAILS The judgement cause title is[ ***State through CBI v. S.J. Choudhary***.](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/389295/) The case was decided by the ***Supreme Court of India***on ***13 February 1996***. The available judgment describes the matter as a criminal appeal by special leave. Another report identifies the case as ***Criminal Appeal No. 461 of 1987***. The quorum was a ***Constitution Bench***. The Bench comprised ***J.S. Verma, G.N. Ray, N.P. Singh, Faizan Uddin and G.T. Nanavati, JJ.*** The judgment was authored by ***J.S. Verma, J.***The reported citation supplied in the uploaded text is ***1996(1) BLJR 563***. The Indian Kanoon version is available as ***State through CBI v. S.J. Choudhary***. The legal provisions involved were ***Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872***, ***Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860***, and ***Sections 3 and 4 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908***. The case clarified the evidentiary scope of ***expert opinion***. It did not overrule [***Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 343*** ](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/204632/)as a whole. It declared only the specific observation on typewriter expert evidence to be no longer good law. The law subjects involved are ***criminal law***, ***law of evidence***, ***forensic science***, ***statutory interpretation***, and ***criminal procedure***. The uploaded judgment does not specify the names of counsels appearing for the parties. Therefore, those names cannot be safely supplied. # C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The judgment arose from a trial before the ***Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi***. The respondent, ***S.J. Choudhary***, faced trial in ***Sessions Case No. 36 of 1983***. The charges were serious. They included ***murder under Section 302 IPC*** and offences under ***Sections 3 and 4 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908***. During prosecution evidence, the State sought to examine ***a typewriter expert***. The object was to connect a material document with a particular typewriter. This connection was allegedly incriminating. The defence objected. It argued that such expert opinion was inadmissible under ***Section 45 of the Evidence Act***. The trial court accepted the objection. The Delhi High Court also dismissed the prosecution’s revision. The prosecution then approached the Supreme Court. The Division Bench doubted the correctness of the earlier understanding from ***[Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 343](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/204632/)***. The matter was referred to a larger Bench because the question affected criminal trials, document examination, and forensic science. The background is important because ***Section 45 of the Evidence Act*** was enacted in 1872. At that time, typewriters were not in ordinary use. The Court noted that the first practical typewriter appeared around 1874. Therefore, the absence of the word “typewriting” in the statute could not decide the issue. The Court refused to treat an old statute as frozen in time. It treated the Evidence Act as an ongoing law. This approach allowed the Court to preserve the original legislative intent. The original intent was to admit expert opinion on specialised matters. The judgment therefore sits at the intersection of ***forensic science*** and ***dynamic statutory interpretation***. It answers a narrow procedural question. Yet its reasoning carries wider importance. It shows how courts may read old statutes in light of new technology. It also protects trials from avoidable exclusion of relevant scientific material. # D) FACTS OF THE CASE The material facts were confined to admissibility. The respondent was standing trial for ***murder*** and ***explosive substance offences***. The prosecution relied on a document. It claimed that the document was typed on a particular typewriter. It wanted to prove that connection through ***expert opinion based on typewriting comparison***. The expert’s proposed evidence was not ordinary factual testimony. It was specialised opinion. The expert would examine peculiarities in the typed impressions. The opinion would assist the court in deciding whether the questioned document came from the same machine. The defence resisted this route. It argued that ***Section 45*** did not include typewriter experts. The trial court agreed. The prosecution filed ***Criminal Revision No. 105 of 1987*** before the Delhi High Court. The High Court dismissed the revision. The Supreme Court then examined whether the exclusion was legally correct. The factual controversy also depended on ***[Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 343](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/204632/)***. In that case, some observations suggested that typewriter expert evidence was not admissible. Those observations had influenced the trial court and High Court. The Supreme Court carefully examined the passage. It found that the admissibility point had not been contested in ***Hanumant***. The earlier decision proceeded on concession. It did not contain a reasoned adjudication on the meaning of ***Section 45***. Therefore, it could not govern the present controversy. This factual posture made the case unusual. The Court was not merely applying precedent. It was deciding whether a precedent actually existed on the legal point. The answer was negative. The Constitution Bench therefore approached ***Section 45*** afresh. This method reflects the doctrine that a decision is binding only for what it decides. It is not binding for assumptions accepted without argument. # E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED The central legal issue was whether ***the opinion of a typewriter expert is admissible under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872***. This issue required the Court to interpret the words ***“science”*** and ***“handwriting”*** in the provision. The Court had to decide whether the scientific examination of typewritten material was a recognised field of expert opinion. It also had to decide whether the earlier observations in ***[Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 343](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/204632/)*** prevented such admissibility. The issue was not whether the expert’s opinion was conclusive. It was only whether the opinion was relevant and admissible. The evidentiary weight would remain for the trial court. This distinction is vital. Admissibility decides entry into the record. Weight decides final reliance after cross-examination and judicial scrutiny. A connected issue was the proper method of interpreting old laws. The Court had to decide whether the ***Evidence Act of 1872*** must be read literally by reference to technology existing in 1872. It rejected such rigidity. The Court treated the Act as always speaking. It relied on Francis Bennion’s principle of ***updating construction***. That principle states that ongoing statutes must adapt to changes in technology, language, and social conditions. The Court applied that principle to forensic document examination. It reasoned that typewriting became common after the Evidence Act. Therefore, silence about typewriters could not amount to exclusion. The legal issue therefore carried two layers. The first concerned ***expert evidence***. The second concerned ***modern interpretation of nineteenth-century legislation***. Both layers supported admissibility. # F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the petitioner and appellant submitted that ***typewriter expert evidence falls within Section 45***. Their argument was based on the breadth of the word ***“science”***. A typewriter expert studies mechanical peculiarities. He compares questioned typing with admitted typing. He identifies individual features in impressions. These features may include alignment, defects, spacing, pressure, damaged letters, and distinct typeface irregularities. Such examination requires special skill. It is not ordinary lay observation. Therefore, it fits the statutory phrase ***“persons specially skilled”***. The prosecution further submitted that excluding such evidence would defeat the purpose of Section 45. The provision exists because courts often need assistance on specialised matters. Typewriter identification is one such matter. The prosecution also challenged the reliance on ***Hanumant***. It argued that the earlier observation was not a reasoned ruling. The Supreme Court accepted this broad submission. The appellant’s position was strengthened by forensic literature. The Court considered recognised texts by ***Albert S. Osborn***, ***Charles C. Scott***, ***J. Newton Baker***, and ***Billy Prior Bates***. These works described typewriting identification as scientific comparison. They treated every typewriter as capable of acquiring individuality. The Court found this reasoning persuasive. It accepted that scientific study may identify a machine through peculiar marks. The petitioner’s argument was therefore not speculative. It rested on forensic methodology. The prosecution was not asking the Court to accept guilt based on expert evidence. It was asking the Court to admit relevant scientific assistance. This distinction supported fairness. The accused could still cross-examine the expert. The trial court could still reject weak opinion. But a blanket exclusion would deny the prosecution a relevant mode of proof. That was the core appellant position. # G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent submitted that ***typewriter expert opinion was inadmissible***. Their argument relied chiefly on ***[Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 343](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/204632/)***. In that case, the Court had recorded that typewriter experts did not fall within ***Section 45***. The respondent treated this observation as binding. The respondent also relied on the statutory text. ***Section 45*** expressly mentions foreign law, science, art, handwriting, and finger impressions. It does not expressly mention typewriting. The respondent’s argument therefore followed a strict textual approach. It suggested that courts cannot add new categories. If Parliament wanted typewriter experts included, it could have amended the law. This argument appealed to legal certainty. It also reflected caution about expert evidence in criminal trials. The respondent’s submission was ultimately rejected. Yet it was not frivolous. Criminal trials require careful control over opinion evidence. Expert testimony can appear persuasive even when its method is weak. The Court did not deny this concern. It answered it through admissibility standards. The expert must be ***specially skilled***. The opinion must concern a point of ***science*** or specialised knowledge. The court remains free to assess value. The respondent’s reliance on ***Hanumant*** also failed because the earlier case did not decide the issue after contest. The Supreme Court treated the relevant passage as concession-based. Therefore, it could not operate as binding ratio. The respondent’s textual argument also failed because ***“science”*** is wide. The Court held that it naturally includes systematic knowledge, technical study, and applied forensic comparison. # H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS The controlling provision was ***Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872***. It makes expert opinions relevant when the court must form an opinion on foreign law, science, art, identity of handwriting, or finger impressions. The provision calls such specially skilled persons ***experts***. Its purpose is practical. Judges are trained in law. They may lack technical knowledge in science, art, or forensic identification. Section 45 therefore permits specialised assistance. The judgment gives special importance to the word ***“science”***. It holds that typewriting identification is a branch of scientific study. It does not require forcing typewriting into handwriting. Still, the Court observed that ***“handwriting”*** may also receive an updating interpretation. The provision therefore became wide enough to include typewriting on two alternative grounds. The case also refers to ***Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860***. That provision punishes murder. The respondent was tried under it. The judgment does not examine ingredients of murder. It mentions Section 302 only as the background charge. The case further refers to ***Sections 3 and 4 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908***. These provisions concern explosive offences. Again, the judgment does not analyse their ingredients. Their relevance is procedural. They show why the prosecution considered the document important. In a serious criminal trial, incriminating documentary evidence may become decisive. The Evidence Act determines whether such evidence can enter the trial. Thus, ***Section 45*** supplied the decisive rule. The penal provisions supplied the factual setting. This separation must be maintained while reading the judgment. # I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT IN THIS CASE The principal precedent analysed was ***[Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 343](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/204632/)***. The earlier case had contained observations that typewriter expert evidence was inadmissible. However, the Supreme Court noted a crucial limitation. The point had not been contested before the Court in ***Hanumant***. The earlier statement was therefore concession-based. It did not represent a reasoned determination of Section 45. The Constitution Bench held that ***Hanumant*** could not be treated as deciding the present point. This analysis is doctrinally important. It follows the familiar rule that ***ratio decidendi*** arises from reasons necessary for the decision. A proposition accepted without argument cannot control future cases. The Court therefore treated the relevant observation as no longer good law on this narrow point. It did not disturb the wider authority of ***Hanumant*** on circumstantial evidence. The Court also relied on interpretive authority rather than only Indian precedent. It referred to ***Francis Bennion, Statutory Interpretation, Second Edition, Section 208***. The Court used the principle of ***updating construction***. This principle presumes that Parliament intends an ongoing Act to apply to future conditions. The Act must be treated as always speaking. The Court described the ***Indian Evidence Act, 1872*** as an ongoing Act. This reasoning allowed the Court to accommodate technological change. The Court also drew an analogy from earlier judicial construction where ***“telegraph”*** had been read to include ***“telephone”*** in old legislation. That analogy supported the treatment of ***typewriting***within either ***science*** or an expanded idea of writing. The Court’s precedent analysis was therefore both doctrinal and interpretive. It did not merely distinguish ***Hanumant***. It built a modern method for reading evidentiary law. # H) JUDGEMENT #### a. RATIO DECIDENDI The ratio decidendi is clear. ***The opinion of a typewriter expert is admissible under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872***. Such opinion falls within the word ***“science”***. A typewriter expert applies systematic and specialised knowledge. The expert studies peculiar features of the questioned typewriting. The expert compares them with admitted typewriting from a known machine. The conclusion concerns machine identity. This is not guesswork. It is based on recognised principles of forensic document examination. Therefore, the expert is a person ***specially skilled*** in a branch of science. His opinion is a relevant fact. The Court expressly held that the contrary views of the trial court and Delhi High Court were erroneous. It allowed the appeal. It set aside the impugned orders. A further part of the ratio concerns ***[Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 343](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/204632/)***. The Supreme Court held that the observation in ***Hanumant*** did not correctly state the law. It was based on concession. It should be treated as no longer good law on this specific point. The Court did not need to decide whether ***“handwriting”*** includes typewriting. It held that ***“science”*** was enough. Yet it added that an updating construction could also permit such inclusion. This dual reasoning strengthens the decision. The narrow legal rule is admissibility. The larger interpretive rule is that old evidentiary statutes must not become obsolete merely because technology changes. Courts may read general words like ***science*** and ***art*** in their natural and contemporary sense. This preserves legislative purpose. #### b. OBITER DICTA The Court’s observations on ***“handwriting” including typewriting*** may be treated as supplementary. The main holding rested on ***“science”***. The Court stated that it was unnecessary to rely on handwriting. Still, it observed that typewriting could also fall within handwriting by updating construction. This part is persuasive obiter. It explains how language evolves. In 1872, ordinary writing meant writing by hand. Later, typewriting became more common. The Court suggested that statutory language must respond to such changes. This observation is valuable for later cases involving computers, printers, electronic records, and digital forensic tools. It teaches that the absence of a modern word does not automatically create exclusion. Courts must ask whether the general statutory category already covers the new phenomenon. Another important obiter concerns the nature of typewriter identification. The Court discussed forensic literature at length. It referred to the individuality of typewriters. It noted that each machine may develop peculiar marks. These peculiarities may arise from use, misuse, defects, wear, or mechanical differences. The Court accepted that comparison may establish identity with strong certainty when samples are clear and adequate. This discussion goes beyond the bare admissibility issue. It guides trial courts on the scientific foundation of such evidence. Yet it does not make every expert opinion conclusive. The court must still examine qualifications, method, samples, clarity, and cross-examination. Thus, the obiter balances openness to science with judicial caution. #### c. GUIDELINES The judgment does not frame formal guidelines. However, several practical principles emerge from its reasoning. First, the court must see whether the witness is ***specially skilled***. A person cannot become an expert by assertion alone. The expertise must relate to the relevant branch of science. Second, typewriter identification should be based on scientific comparison. The expert must compare disputed typewriting with admitted specimens. Third, sufficient and clear material should exist. Weak samples may reduce value. Fourth, the expert’s conclusion should depend on collective peculiarities. It should not rest on a few isolated similarities. Fifth, admissibility under ***Section 45*** does not equal proof beyond reasonable doubt. The court must still weigh the opinion with other evidence. The judgment also implies interpretive guidelines. Old statutes should receive ***updating construction*** when their language is broad. General words like ***science*** and ***art*** should not be artificially narrowed. Courts should not assume exclusion merely because technology was unknown when the statute was enacted. At the same time, courts should not rewrite the statute. They must remain within the words used by Parliament. In this case, the word ***science*** provided the textual anchor. That anchor made the interpretation legitimate. The maxim ***ut res magis valeat quam pereat*** supports this approach. A statute should be interpreted to make it effective, not redundant. The Evidence Act must continue to serve trials in changing technological conditions. #### d. DISSENTING OPINION There was no dissenting opinion in the uploaded judgment. The decision was delivered by ***J.S. Verma, J.*** for the Constitution Bench. The reasoning appears unanimous. The Court allowed the prosecution appeal. It set aside the trial court and High Court orders. It held that the expert’s opinion was admissible. Since no separate dissent exists, no contrary judicial reasoning can be extracted. Any imagined dissent would be improper. The respondent’s argument, however, supplies the best possible opposing view. That view favoured strict textual reading and caution in criminal trials. The Bench rejected it because ***Section 45*** already contained a broad scientific category. # I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The decision is doctrinally sound. It prevents forensic evidence from being excluded by outdated literalism. It also respects statutory boundaries. The Court did not invent a new evidentiary category. It located typewriter identification within ***science***. This is important because ***Section 45*** uses broad language. The word ***science*** cannot be confined to nineteenth-century sciences. The Court’s approach is especially persuasive in India. The Evidence Act is a general code of proof. It must function across generations. If courts refuse technological adaptation, criminal justice would suffer. Documents, machines, electronic devices, and scientific methods constantly evolve. The decision therefore preserves the usefulness of evidence law. The judgment also improves the law of precedent. It correctly distinguishes between a binding ratio and a concession-based observation. ***Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 343*** remains a leading case on circumstantial evidence. Yet its incidental statement on typewriter evidence could not bind future courts. The Constitution Bench showed discipline. It did not casually overrule an earlier decision. It carefully identified the exact point. It then declared the observation no longer good law only on that point. This method protects certainty and flexibility together. It ensures that precedent remains authoritative without becoming mechanical. The ruling has wider relevance for modern forensic evidence. The typewriter may now be outdated. But the principle is alive. Courts face issues involving printers, scanners, metadata, CCTV, mobile devices, electronic signatures, and artificial intelligence outputs. The reasoning in this case supports admitting specialised evidence when it rests on organised technical knowledge. It also reminds courts that admissibility is not blind acceptance. Expert evidence must remain testable. The defence must be allowed cross-examination. The judge must assess reliability. The final conviction cannot rest on aura or authority. This approach harmonises ***fair trial rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India*** with truth-seeking in criminal procedure. The case also aligns with comparative evidentiary policy. Many jurisdictions admit forensic document examination as expert evidence. The Court’s reliance on standard texts shows that it did not act on intuition. It examined the scientific basis of typewriting identification. This is useful. Indian courts often cite expert evidence without analysing methodology. Here, the Court explained why the method qualifies as science. It referred to individuality, comparison, peculiarities, and probability. Such reasoning makes the judgment more robust. It also gives trial courts a framework for scrutiny. The decision should therefore be read as a gateway ruling. It opens the door to relevant expert evidence. It does not guarantee the strength of that evidence. # J) REFERENCES ## a. Important Cases Referred 1. ***State through CBI v. S.J. Choudhary, 1996(1) BLJR 563***. Supreme Court of India. 13 February 1996. Available on Indian Kanoon. 2. ***Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 343***. Supreme Court of India. 3. [***Murari Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1980 SC 531***.](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/813088/&ved=2ahUKEwj24u-6wKyWAxVl4zgGHWhmK30QFnoECCEQAQ&usg=AOvVaw306_Vc9Tmgtn9u664AkdkC "Murari Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1980 SC 531.") Supreme Court of India. This later-adjacent principle confirms that expert evidence under Section 45 is relevant but must be judicially weighed. ## b. Important Statutes Referred 1. ***Indian Evidence Act, 1872***, ***Section 45***. 2. ***Indian Penal Code, 1860***, ***Section 302***. 3. ***Explosive Substances Act, 1908***, ***Sections 3 and 4***. 4. ***Constitution of India, 1950***, ***Article 21***, relevant to fair trial analysis. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Lt. Col. Pooja Pal and Others v. Union of India and Others, 2026 INSC 281](https://lawfoyer.in/lt-col-pooja-pal-and-others-v-union-of-india-and-others-2026-insc-281/) **Published:** September 3, 2026 **Author:** Jaya Dubey **Content:** # A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE ***[Lt. Col. Pooja Pal and Others v. Union of India and Others, 2026 INSC 281](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/116790694/)*** is a vital judgment on gender equality in the Indian Army. The Supreme Court examined the denial of ***Permanent Commission*** to women ***Short Service Commission Officers***. The appellants belonged mainly to early women officer batches commissioned between ***September 2010 and March 2012***. They were considered with male counterparts by the regular ***No. 5 Selection Board***. Their challenge was not merely against individual non-selection. It attacked the fairness of the evaluative framework itself. The Court held that women officers had suffered systemic disadvantage. Their ***Annual Confidential Reports*** were written when they were treated as officers without long-term career prospects. They also lacked equal access to ***criteria appointments*** and career-enhancing courses. These factors affected comparative merit. The Court rejected male officers’ plea of legitimate expectation. It held that equality cannot yield to a gender-exclusive expectation. The Court granted relief under ***Article 142***. It protected existing Permanent Commissions. It granted pensionary relief to released women officers. It also directed Permanent Commission for eligible serving women officers meeting the 60% cut-off. **Keywords:** ***Permanent Commission***, ***Short Service Commission Women Officers***, ***Indirect Discrimination***, ***Annual Confidential Reports***, ***Article 14***, ***Article 16***, ***Article 142***, ***Legitimate Expectation***, ***Gender Equality***. # B) CASE DETAILS **i) Judgement Cause Title:** ***[Lt. Col. Pooja Pal and Others v. Union of India and Others](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/116790694/)***. **ii) Case Number:** ***Civil Appeal Nos. 9747–9757 of 2024*** with connected civil appeals. **iii) Judgement Date:** ***24 March 2026***. **iv) Court:** ***Supreme Court of India, Civil Appellate Jurisdiction***. **v) Quorum:** ***Chief Justice Surya Kant***, ***Justice Ujjal Bhuyan***, and ***Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh***. **vi) Author:** ***Surya Kant, CJI***. **vii) Citation:** ***2026 INSC 281***. **viii) Legal Provisions Involved:** ***[Article 14 of the Constitution of India](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Article%2014%20Constitution%20of%20India)***, ***[Article 15](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Article%2015%20Constitution%20of%20India)***, ***[Article 16](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Article%2016%20Constitution%20of%20India)***, ***[Article 32](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Article%2032%20Constitution%20of%20India)***, ***[Article 136](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Article%20136%20Constitution%20of%20India)***, ***[Article 142](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Article%20142%20Constitution%20of%20India)***, ***[Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Section%2012%20Army%20Act%201950)***, ***policy circular dated 15 January 1991***, ***file noting dated 22 January 1991***, and ***policy dated 24 February 2012***. **ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case:** No judgment was expressly overruled. The judgments of the ***Armed Forces Tribunal dated 03 July 2024 and 04 September 2024*** were modified. **x) Related Law Subjects:** ***Constitutional Law***, ***Service Law***, ***Military Law***, ***Administrative Law***, ***Gender Justice***, ***Equality Jurisprudence***, and ***Armed Forces Tribunal Law***. **xi) Name of Counsels Appearing for Parties:** For the appellants, the judgment records ***Ms. V. Mohana***, ***Ms. Rekha Palli***, ***Dr. Menaka Guruswamy***, and ***Mr. Abhinav Mukherji***, learned Senior Counsel. It also records ***Ms. Pooja Dhar***, Advocate-on-Record, and ***Mr. Sudhanshu S. Pandey***, learned Counsel. For the respondents, ***Ms. Aishwarya Bhati***, learned Additional Solicitor General of India, appeared. # C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The judgment arises from a long constitutional struggle concerning women officers in the Indian Army. The appellants were roughly ***73 Short Service Commission Officers***. Most were women seeking ***Permanent Commission***. Their dispute centred on the fairness of their consideration by the Army. The controversy has roots in older exclusionary service structures. For many years, women were allowed to enter limited Army cadres. Yet, they were denied equal career permanence. Men could move from Short Service Commission to Permanent Commission. Women, except in limited cadres, were treated as temporary personnel. This unequal structure produced deep institutional effects. It affected postings, courses, confidential reports, and career perception. The Court understood this clearly. It refused to examine the case as a dry service dispute. It treated it as a constitutional equality case. The matter followed earlier milestones.[ ***Babita Puniya v. Secretary, 2010 SCC OnLine Del 1116***](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56090d17e4b0149711178d98&ved=2ahUKEwiArrfr09CWAxXMj-EIHfLHOQIQFnoECB4QAQ&usg=AOvVaw0Bz4BnLSmEFnMMzopt4IA8) first recognised the right of women officers to be considered for Permanent Commission.[ ***Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya, (2020) 7 SCC 469*** ](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/117198144/&ved=2ahUKEwjAhMD109CWAxVvkeEIHfulAt8QFnoECB4QAQ&usg=AOvVaw2RRw3knC86aF9_djBDBKxi)affirmed that constitutional promise. ***[Lt. Col. Nitisha v. Union of India, (2021) 15 SCC 125](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Lt%20Col%20Nitisha%20v%20Union%20of%20India%202021%2015%20SCC%20125)*** exposed structural discrimination in evaluation. The present judgment carries that equality project forward. It focuses on women officers from later batches who were formally considered with men. The legal question was whether formal consideration cured the past discrimination. The Supreme Court answered in the negative. # D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellants included ***Short Service Commission Women Officers*** from ***Course Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7***. They were commissioned in ***September 2010, March 2011, September 2011, and March 2012***. Some intervenor-appellants belonged to later courses. Male Short Service Commission Officers from corresponding batches also joined the litigation. The respondents were the ***Union of India through the Ministry of Defence***, the ***Chief of Army Staff***, and the ***Military Secretary***. The women officers formed early batches considered for Permanent Commission through the regular ***No. 5 Selection Board*** with their male counterparts. This appeared to be formal parity. Yet, the appellants argued that their service records were built under unequal conditions. Their ACRs were written when most women were not considered eligible for Permanent Commission. Their officers knew that their long-term career progression was limited. The women claimed that this led to casual or middling grading. They also claimed unequal access to ***criteria appointments*** and professional courses. These opportunities mattered in the Board’s holistic assessment. The Army’s Permanent Commission framework was shaped by the ***policy circular dated 15 January 1991***. It fixed a maximum of ***250 SSCOs per year*** for Permanent Commission. It required a minimum acceptable cut-off of ***60%***. It also provided competitive selection on merit when eligible officers exceeded available slots. The ***policy dated 24 February 2012*** structured evaluation. It assigned ***95 marks*** to computerised evaluation. It reserved ***5 marks*** for value judgment. Within computerised evaluation, ***ACRs carried 75 marks***. Courses carried ***10 marks***. Honours, achievements, recommendations, and weak points also played roles. The Board considered anonymised Member Data Sheets. The Army argued that anonymisation prevented discrimination. The Court rejected that argument. It held that discrimination had entered earlier. It entered when reporting officers graded women under a restricted career regime. A later anonymised Board could not erase years of unequal record-building. # E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED The first issue was whether the ***ACRs of SSCWOs*** were graded casually. The Court had to decide whether those gradings were influenced by earlier ineligibility for Permanent Commission. It also had to examine whether those gradings harmed comparative merit. The second issue concerned unequal access to ***criteria appointments*** and ***additional or optional courses***. The appellants argued that these opportunities affected the service profile presented to the Board. The third issue concerned the ***250-vacancy cap***. The Court had to determine whether the cap was rigid. It also had to decide whether vacancies were calculated incorrectly. The fourth issue involved male officers. They claimed a legitimate expectation of competing only against other male SSCOs. They argued that the sudden inclusion of women enlarged the competition pool. The Court had to decide whether such an expectation could survive equality principles. These issues involved ***Article 14*** and ***Article 16***. They also involved the doctrine of ***indirect discrimination***. The case also required review of military policy. Courts usually show caution in military cadre matters. Yet, military discretion cannot violate constitutional equality. The Court balanced institutional autonomy with constitutional discipline. This balance is central to Indian service jurisprudence. # F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The women officers argued that ***ACRs carried 75 marks*** out of 100. Therefore, ACRs largely determined Permanent Commission outcomes. They submitted that Army ACR grading followed a bell-curve. Under that system, very high grades were reserved for limited officers. Since women were then not treated as future Permanent Commission officers, they were not graded with the same seriousness. Their career ceiling shaped their evaluation. The appellants said that reporting officers routinely gave women moderate grades. High grades were concentrated among men. Men were known to be in the running for Permanent Commission. The appellants also relied on the ***MS Branch letter dated 23 October 2020***. It instructed officers to fill ACRs of women officers carefully. The appellants treated this as an implied admission. They argued that even after ***Babita Puniya***, reporting officers were still marking “NA” for Permanent Commission recommendations. The appellants further argued that they were denied equal access to ***criteria appointments***. These were important for career visibility. Such appointments involved higher responsibility. They also influenced pen pictures and value judgment. Women officers were not systematically detailed for such appointments. Some women served in operational or sensitive areas. Yet, those postings were not properly reflected in their ACRs. The appellants also complained of unequal course access. They pointed to the ***Junior Command Course***. Male officers could attend it after the sixth year. Women were not similarly detailed because they were not seen as future Permanent Commission officers. The appellants challenged the rigid use of the ***250-vacancy cap***. They argued that the cap had been breached earlier in ***1999, 2000, 2001, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007***. They submitted that a cap born in an all-male model could not be used to perpetuate discrimination. Male appellants also argued legitimate expectation. They said they had expected consideration against male-only vacancies. The women officers, however, sought relief similar to ***Lt. Col. Nitisha v. Union of India, (2021) 15 SCC 125***. # G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The Union defended the AFT judgments. It argued that the ***No. 5 Selection Board*** process was anonymised. Names, identification numbers, and revealing details were removed. The Board saw only the Member Data Sheet, course profile, gradings, honours, awards, and appointments. Therefore, the Union said no gender bias could be inferred. It also submitted that recommendations for Permanent Commission were removed from the MDS. Hence, negative endorsements or “NA” entries did not prejudice the appellants. The Union argued that criteria appointments were not mandatory for Permanent Commission. They were relevant for later promotion to Colonel through the ***No. 3 Selection Board***. It also argued that course marks depended only on average performance. The number or nature of courses did not affect numerical course marks. Therefore, unequal course exposure could not alter the computerised score. The Union strongly defended the ***250-vacancy cap***. It described the cap as a cadre management measure. The Army, it submitted, must preserve operational efficiency. It must maintain a proper ratio between permanent and support cadres. The Union relied on the ***A.V. Singh Committee Report***. It submitted that excessive Permanent Commissions would create a bulge. This could disturb the pyramidal structure of the Army. It could affect future promotions and cadre morale. The Union accepted that the cap had been breached earlier. Yet, it said those were exceptional years. They related to the ***Kargil War***, ***Operation Parakram***, or transitional policy changes. The Union also argued that later batches were different from officers in ***Nitisha***. According to it, these women were considered contemporaneously with men. Their case was therefore not one of delayed consideration. The Union opposed pension or Permanent Commission relief. It said non-selection resulted from lower comparative merit, not discrimination. # H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS ***Article 14 of the Constitution*** guarantees equality before law. It prohibits arbitrary State action. In this case, equality was not confined to identical treatment. The Court examined whether identical assessment after unequal preparation produced unequal outcomes. This is the heart of indirect discrimination. ***Article 16*** guarantees equality of opportunity in public employment. The Army is not outside this guarantee. Discipline and operational need are relevant. Yet, they cannot justify structural gender disadvantage. ***Article 15*** also supports anti-discrimination reasoning, though the judgment mainly operates through service equality principles. ***Article 136*** allowed Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction against the AFT-related determinations. ***Article 142*** became crucial at the relief stage. The Court used it to do complete justice. It did not merely declare discrimination. It moulded practical relief. ***Section 12 of the Army Act, 1950*** is also relevant. Historically, it restricted female enrolment unless the Central Government issued notifications. The ***15 February 1992 notification*** opened limited officer entry for women. Later notifications extended tenure. Yet, women remained excluded from Permanent Commission in most cadres. The ***policy circular dated 15 January 1991*** fixed the 250-vacancy cap and 60% cut-off. The ***file noting dated 22 January 1991***explained vacancy apportionment. The ***policy dated 24 February 2012*** created the evaluation formula. It gave major weight to ACRs. It reserved 5 marks for value judgment. These provisions and policies together formed the legal frame. The Court did not abolish military discretion. It tested the use of discretion against constitutional fairness. # I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT IN THIS CASE ***[Babita Puniya v. Secretary, 2010 SCC OnLine Del 1116](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Babita%20Puniya%20v%20Secretary%202010%20SCC%20OnLine%20Del%201116)*** was the starting point. The Delhi High Court held that women officers inducted into cadres could not be denied equal opportunities available to men in those cadres. It directed consideration of women officers for Permanent Commission where male SSCOs were considered. This case mattered because all present women appellants were commissioned after that judgment. Therefore, the male officers could not reasonably believe that women would remain excluded. ***[Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya, (2020) 7 SCC 469](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/117198144/&ved=2ahUKEwjss62t1NCWAxUzleEIHTA6G1EQFnoECB4QAQ&usg=AOvVaw2RRw3knC86aF9_djBDBKxi)*** affirmed the constitutional claim of women officers. The Supreme Court rejected stereotypical assumptions about women in the Army. It directed consideration of serving women SSCOs for Permanent Commission. The present case uses that judgment as a constitutional foundation. It treats women’s Permanent Commission as an equality mandate, not a concession. [***Lt. Col. Nitisha v. Union of India, (2021) 15 SCC 125*** ](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/190567716/&ved=2ahUKEwjb5f-i1NCWAxVHmeEIHULHGZMQFnoECA8QAQ&usg=AOvVaw2_43TaZLYFZykpdEbfDeE_)was the closest precedent. It held that apparently neutral criteria can produce disproportionate harm. It recognised that years of casual grading and unequal opportunities affected women officers. It directed relief for women officers considered by the Special No. 5 Selection Board. The present judgment extends similar reasoning. It applies the same constitutional lens to later women officers considered by regular boards. [***K. Purushottam Reddy v. Union of India and Others, (2025) 9 SCC 722*** ](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/156059035/&ved=2ahUKEwjH2Kib1NCWAxVQlOEIHRY2NDUQFnoECB0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw1yMo6Yy44Dl2SpgaLfTfFZ)was cited on legitimate expectation. The Court reiterated that legitimate expectation cannot override law or the Constitution. This precedent defeated the male officers’ claim. Their expectation of male-only competition was not legally sustainable. It conflicted with constitutional gender equality. # H) JUDGEMENT #### a) RATIO DECIDENDI The ratio is clear. A facially neutral evaluation can still be constitutionally unfair. It is unfair when it uses records created under a discriminatory institutional background. The Supreme Court held that women officers’ ACRs were adversely affected. Those ACRs were written before ***17 February 2020***. At that time, women outside ***JAG*** and ***AEC*** were presumed ineligible for Permanent Commission. Reporting officers knew this. They evaluated women as officers without long-term Army futures. Under a bell-curve system, higher grades naturally flowed toward officers perceived to have career progression. These were mostly men. Therefore, women’s lower comparative merit was not purely individual. It was institutionally shaped. The Court also held that unequal access to appointments and courses affected the ***5-mark value judgment***. It rejected the argument that courses and appointments were irrelevant. They may not have changed numerical course marks. Yet, they influenced holistic assessment. The Court used a race analogy. Participants cannot be judged equally when only some receive professional training beforehand. This analogy captures indirect discrimination. The Court further held that the ***250-vacancy cap*** was not sacred. It had been relaxed earlier. It could be relaxed when rigid use would perpetuate inequality. However, the Court accepted the Union’s method of vacancy calculation. It held that vacancies were correctly apportioned between batches considered in the same calendar year. The male officers’ legitimate expectation claim failed. They could not expect women to remain outside competition after binding equality directions. #### b) OBITER DICTA The judgment contains strong observations on institutional discrimination. The Court noted that anonymisation at the final stage cannot cure discrimination embedded earlier. This is a crucial insight. Bias often enters through record creation. It need not appear at final decision-making. The Court’s camera-lens analogy is powerful. It said later procedural safeguards cannot repair an image captured badly years earlier. This observation may influence future service matters. It will matter wherever records are created under unequal conditions. The Court also made important comments about military policy. It recognised that courts should not casually interfere with cadre structure. The Army’s operational needs require specialised judgment. Yet, military autonomy is not constitutional immunity. Policy may receive deference. Discrimination receives scrutiny. This distinction is valuable. It preserves national security discretion without abandoning equality. The Court also warned against legitimate expectations that conflict with constitutional values. No officer can claim an expectation that women remain excluded. Equality cannot be treated as an administrative inconvenience. This statement gives the judgment moral force. #### c) GUIDELINES / DIRECTIONS The Court allowed the appeals filed by ***Appellant-SSCWOs***. It dismissed the appeals filed by ***Appellant-male SSCOs***. It modified the AFT judgments dated ***03 July 2024*** and ***04 September 2024***. First, it protected officers already granted Permanent Commission by the ***No. 5 Selection Boards*** of ***2020 and 2021*** and by the AFT. Their appointments were not disturbed. Second, as a one-time measure, released appellant and intervenor women officers were deemed to have completed ***20 years of substantive qualifying service***. They became entitled to pension and consequential benefits. They were not granted arrears of pay. Third, pension was to be fixed on the deemed 20-year service date. Arrears, if any, were payable only from ***01 January 2025***. This direction did not apply to women officers from ***JAG*** and ***AEC*** cadres, since they were already eligible for Permanent Commission since 2010. Fourth, serving women officers protected by orders dated ***09 May 2025*** and ***19 May 2025*** became entitled to Permanent Commission if they met the ***60% cut-off***. This was subject to medical criteria, disciplinary clearance, and vigilance clearance. Fifth, women officers aggrieved by later Boards could pursue legal remedies. Sixth, the method of evaluating ACRs and cut-offs had to be reviewed for future batches, following ***Lt. Col. Nitisha***. #### d) DISSENTING OPINION There was no dissenting opinion. The judgment was unanimous. This strengthens its precedential value. The Court spoke through a three-judge Bench led by the Chief Justice of India. The absence of dissent is important because the case concerned military policy. It also concerned gender equality in a sensitive institution. The Court’s unified position gives clarity to future tribunals and authorities. It confirms that women officers’ disadvantage was systemic. It also confirms that formal equal consideration is insufficient. Equality must account for the history behind records, postings, and opportunities. The unanimous ruling also clarifies relief. Women officers received tailored relief. Male officers did not. Existing Permanent Commissions were protected. Future grievances were left to regular remedies. Thus, the judgment avoids administrative chaos while giving constitutional repair. The Court used ***Article 142*** carefully. It did not create a general automatic entitlement. It gave a one-time corrective remedy for a historically distorted selection process. # I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS This judgment is a mature equality decision. It understands that discrimination is not always visible. It may operate through ordinary service tools. ACRs, courses, postings, and value judgments can appear neutral. Yet, they can carry the weight of past exclusion. The Supreme Court rightly asked a deeper question. Were women assessed on a record built fairly. The answer was no. This finding is the heart of the case. The Court avoided simplistic formalism. It did not say women and men were treated equally merely because they appeared before one Board. It examined the pipeline before the Board. That is where inequality had already worked. The decision is also balanced. It respects Army structure. It does not abolish the vacancy cap. It does not recalculate all selections. It does not disturb officers already granted Permanent Commission. It accepts that cadre management is largely executive. Yet, it also says constitutional equality cannot be sacrificed to administrative rigidity. The remedy is carefully crafted. Released women officers get pensionary protection. Serving women officers who crossed the 60% cut-off get Permanent Commission, subject to medical and vigilance requirements. Male officers’ appeals fail because their claim rested on exclusion. A legitimate expectation cannot be built on an unconstitutional structure. The judgment also advances the doctrine of indirect discrimination in Indian law. It follows the path of ***Nitisha***. It shows that equality analysis must consider effect, not only form. A rule may be neutral in wording. It may still perpetuate historic disadvantage. This principle has wide relevance. It can apply to service records, promotions, institutional evaluations, academic assessments, and professional opportunities. The judgment is especially important for women in uniform. It acknowledges that their service was real. Their disadvantage was also real. It gives them dignity without disrupting the entire institution. In that sense, ***Lt. Col. Pooja Pal*** is not merely a service law case. It is a constitutional correction. # J) REFERENCES ## a) Important Cases Referred 1. ***[Lt. Col. Pooja Pal and Others v. Union of India and Others, 2026 INSC 281](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/116790694/)***. 2. ***[Babita Puniya v. Secretary, 2010 SCC OnLine Del 1116](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Babita%20Puniya%20v%20Secretary%202010%20SCC%20OnLine%20Del%201116)***. 3. ***[Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya, (2020) 7 SCC 469](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Ministry%20of%20Defence%20v%20Babita%20Puniya%202020%207%20SCC%20469)***. 4. ***[Lt. Col. Nitisha v. Union of India, (2021) 15 SCC 125](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Lt%20Col%20Nitisha%20v%20Union%20of%20India%202021%2015%20SCC%20125)***. 5. ***[K. Purushottam Reddy v. Union of India and Others, (2025) 9 SCC 722](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=K%20Purushottam%20Reddy%20v%20Union%20of%20India%202025%209%20SCC%20722)***. ## b) Important Statutes and Policies Referred 1. ***[Constitution of India, 1950](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Constitution%20of%20India%201950)***. 2. ***[Article 14, Constitution of India](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Article%2014%20Constitution%20of%20India)***. 3. ***[Article 15, Constitution of India](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Article%2015%20Constitution%20of%20India)***. 4. ***[Article 16, Constitution of India](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Article%2016%20Constitution%20of%20India)***. 5. ***[Article 32, Constitution of India](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Article%2032%20Constitution%20of%20India)***. 6. ***[Article 136, Constitution of India](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Article%20136%20Constitution%20of%20India)***. 7. ***[Article 142, Constitution of India](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Article%20142%20Constitution%20of%20India)***. 8. ***[Army Act, 1950](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Army%20Act%201950)***. 9. ***[Section 12, Army Act, 1950](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Section%2012%20Army%20Act%201950)***. 10. ***Government of India policy circular dated 15 January 1991 on Permanent Commission for SSCOs***. 11. ***File noting dated 22 January 1991 on vacancy apportionment***. 12. ***Army policy dated 24 February 2012 on No. 5 Selection Board evaluation***. 13. ***General Instructions dated 01 August 2020 for Special No. 5 Selection Board***. 14. ***General Instructions dated 14 August 2020 for regular No. 5 Selection Board***. 15. ***MS Branch letter dated 23 October 2020 concerning careful completion of women officers’ ACRs***. ## c) International Instruments 1. ***[Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=CEDAW%201979%20gender%20equality)***. 2. ***[Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Universal%20Declaration%20of%20Human%20Rights%20equality)***. 3. ***[International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=International%20Covenant%20on%20Civil%20and%20Political%20Rights%20equality)***. 4. ***[International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=International%20Covenant%20on%20Economic%20Social%20Cultural%20Rights%20equal%20opportunity)***. 5. ***[ILO Discrimination Employment and Occupation Convention, 1958](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=ILO%20Discrimination%20Employment%20Occupation%20Convention%201958)***. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Padam Mehta and Another v. State of Rajasthan and Others, 2026 INSC 476](https://lawfoyer.in/padam-mehta-and-another-v-state-of-rajasthan-and-others-2026-insc-476/) **Published:** September 3, 2026 **Author:** Jaya Dubey **Content:** # A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE ***[Padam Mehta and Another v. State of Rajasthan and Others, 2026 INSC 476](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/68996283/)*** is a significant Supreme Court judgment on ***mother tongue-based education***, ***linguistic dignity***, and ***constitutional access to meaningful learning***. The appeal arose from a dismissed public interest litigation before the Rajasthan High Court. The appellants sought inclusion of ***Rajasthani language*** in the ***REET-2021*** syllabus and directions for education in Rajasthani or the relevant local language. The Supreme Court held that the REET-specific relief had become infructuous because the recruitment process had concluded. Yet, the broader constitutional questions survived. The Court treated language as central to identity, comprehension, participation, and educational equality. It relied on ***Articles 19(1)(a), 21, 21A, 41, 45, 51A(k), and 350A of the Constitution***, ***Section 29(2)(f) of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009***, and ***National Education Policy, 2020***. The Court set aside the High Court order. It directed Rajasthan to formulate a comprehensive policy for mother tongue-based education. It also directed phased introduction of ***Rajasthani as a subject***in government and private schools. **Keywords:** ***Mother Tongue Education***, ***Rajasthani Language***, ***Article 19(1)(a)***, ***Article 21A***, ***Article 350A***, ***RTE Act, 2009***, ***NEP 2020***, ***Linguistic Minority***, ***Quality Education***. # B) CASE DETAILS **i) Judgement Cause Title:** ***[Padam Mehta and Another v. State of Rajasthan and Others](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/68996283/)***. **ii) Case Number:** ***Civil Appeal No(s). of 2026, arising out of SLP (C) No. 1425 of 2025***. **iii) Judgement Date:** ***12 May 2026***. **iv) Court:** ***Supreme Court of India, Civil Appellate Jurisdiction***. **v) Quorum:** ***Justice Vikram Nath*** and ***Justice Sandeep Mehta***. **vi) Author:** The judgment records ***Mehta, J.*** as the author. **vii) Citation:** ***2026 INSC 476***. **viii) Legal Provisions Involved:** ***[Article 136 of the Constitution of India](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Article%20136%20Constitution%20of%20India)***, ***[Article 14](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Article%2014%20Constitution%20of%20India)***, ***[Article 19(1)(a)](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Article%2019%281%29%28a%29%20Constitution%20of%20India)***, ***[Article 21](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Article%2021%20Constitution%20of%20India)***, ***[Article 21A](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Article%2021A%20Constitution%20of%20India)***, ***[Article 41](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Article%2041%20Constitution%20of%20India)***, ***[Article 45](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Article%2045%20Constitution%20of%20India)***, ***[Article 51A(k)](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Article%2051A%28k%29%20Constitution%20of%20India)***, ***[Article 350A](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Article%20350A%20Constitution%20of%20India)***, ***[Part XVII of the Constitution](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Part%20XVII%20Constitution%20of%20India)***, ***[Eighth Schedule](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Eighth%20Schedule%20Constitution%20of%20India)***, and ***[Section 29(2)(f) of the RTE Act, 2009](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Section%2029%282%29%28f%29%20Right%20of%20Children%20to%20Free%20and%20Compulsory%20Education%20Act%202009)***. **ix) Judgments Overruled:** No precedent was expressly overruled. The impugned High Court order dated ***27 November 2024*** was set aside. **x) Law Subjects:** ***Constitutional Law***, ***Education Law***, ***Language Rights***, ***Administrative Law***, ***Public Interest Litigation***, ***Child Rights***, and ***Cultural Rights***. **xi) Counsels Appearing:** The uploaded judgment refers to learned counsel for the appellants and respondents. It does not provide their individual names. # C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The judgment begins from a profound constitutional premise. ***Language is not treated as a mere tool of communication***. It is treated as a bridge between thought, identity, dignity, and participation. The Court observed that understanding and being understood in one’s own language is not a matter of convenience. It is connected with existential rights. This reasoning gives the case a wider constitutional colour. It moves the dispute beyond a recruitment syllabus. It places the controversy within the larger promise of Indian constitutionalism. The appellants approached the Supreme Court under ***Article 136 of the Constitution*** after the Rajasthan High Court dismissed their public interest litigation. The High Court had held that mandamus required an enforceable right and a corresponding statutory duty. The Supreme Court accepted that the particular REET-2021 relief had lost practical force. Yet, it refused to treat the case as wholly academic. The Court recognised that language in education affects equality, access, comprehension, cultural continuity, and public employment. This approach is consistent with [***State of Karnataka v. Associated Management of English Medium Primary and Secondary Schools, (2014) 9 SCC 485***,](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/112137424/&ved=2ahUKEwiPsdHw0dCWAxUTkuEIHV9bGzYQFnoECBsQAQ&usg=AOvVaw2mF8Dw9fxWyyVP2HNNX0US) where the Supreme Court linked medium of instruction with ***Article 19(1)(a)***. It is also reinforced by[ ***Devesh Sharma v. Union of India, (2023) 18 SCC 339***](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/65160769/&ved=2ahUKEwjgz9X60dCWAxW5leEIHYV7J_YQFnoECBoQAQ&usg=AOvVaw0WivXzYApotpZQ5udpcMbo), where quality education was viewed as the real object of the ***RTE Act, 2009***. # D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellants filed a public interest litigation before the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur. They sought directions against the State and its authorities. Their primary demand was inclusion of ***Rajasthani language*** in the syllabus for recruitment to the post of ***Teacher, Grade III, Level I and Level II*** under ***Rajasthan Eligibility Examination for Teachers, 2021***. They also sought a broader direction that children should receive education in ***Rajasthani language***or the relevant local language. The High Court dismissed the petition through its final order dated ***27 November 2024***. It reasoned that a writ of mandamus could be issued only when the petitioners established an enforceable legal right and a matching statutory failure by the State. The appellants then approached the Supreme Court. During the appeal, the Court noted that the REET-2021 recruitment process had already concluded. Therefore, relief concerning that specific examination could not be granted without disturbing finalised recruitment. Yet, the Supreme Court held that the matter raised issues beyond one examination. The factual controversy involved a deeper question. Could Rajasthan avoid steps for mother tongue-based education merely because ***Rajasthani is not in the Eighth Schedule***. The Court answered this through constitutional interpretation. It considered that ***Rajasthani is taught at universities in Rajasthan***. These included Jai Narain Vyas University, Maharaja Ganga Singh University, and University of Rajasthan. This fact weakened the State’s objection that Rajasthani lacked institutional acceptance. # E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED The first legal issue was whether the appellants could obtain a direction for inclusion of ***Rajasthani language*** in the REET-2021 syllabus after the examination process had concluded. The Supreme Court held that this specific relief had become infructuous. It could not be granted without unsettling completed recruitment. The second issue was wider and more important. It asked whether the State had a constitutional obligation to adopt measures for ***mother tongue-based education*** and local language instruction. This issue required examination of ***Articles 19(1)(a), 21, 21A, 41, 45, 51A(k), and 350A***. It also required reading ***Section 29(2)(f) of the RTE Act, 2009*** with the ***National Education Policy, 2020***. The third issue was whether Rajasthan could justify non-action on the ground that only Eighth Schedule languages were being taught in schools. The Court rejected that technical defence. The fourth issue concerned judicial review. The Court had to decide whether issuing directions would amount to policy-making. It held that courts must not frame policy. Still, courts must ensure that constitutional guarantees do not become ornamental. This reasoning resembles[ ***Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 1***,](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/154958944/&ved=2ahUKEwjDjdCG0tCWAxUgk-EIHSQBF30QFnoECB0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw1lFPQI7hTf2MZ7xFcQRhY5) where the ***RTE Act, 2009*** was upheld as a measure for meaningful and quality education. # F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The appellants submitted that ***Rajasthani-speaking persons fall within the meaning of linguistic minority*** for ***Article 350A of the Constitution***. Their argument was not based on numerical insignificance alone. It was based on the position of Rajasthani in relation to the dominant official language of Rajasthan. Since Hindi is the principal official language of the State, Rajasthani was argued to be a distinct mother tongue with a separate cultural and linguistic identity. The appellants further submitted that the right to choose a medium of instruction is implicit in ***Article 19(1)(a)***. Freedom of speech and expression includes meaningful receipt of information. Education becomes hollow when the child cannot understand the language of instruction. When ***Article 19(1)(a)*** is read with ***Article 21A***, the State must ensure education that is not merely formal. It must be intelligible, effective, and inclusive. The appellants also invoked ***Article 14***. They argued that languages like ***Gujarati, Punjabi, and Sindhi*** were included in school curricula, while ***Rajasthani*** was excluded despite its wide use in Rajasthan. This was alleged to be hostile discrimination. The appellants also relied on ***NEP 2020***, which strongly favours education in the home language, mother tongue, local language, or regional language during early schooling. Their argument drew strength from ***Associated Management of English Medium Primary and Secondary Schools, (2014) 9 SCC 485***, where the Supreme Court accepted that choice of medium at the primary level falls within ***Article 19(1)(a)***. # G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The respondents argued that recruitment and education were being managed only for languages formally recognised in the ***Eighth Schedule to the Constitution***. Since ***Rajasthani is not presently included in the Eighth Schedule***, the State had not created any administrative framework for its adoption. The respondents submitted that no policy decision had been taken to make Rajasthani a medium of instruction or a compulsory subject. They further argued that ***Article 350A*** was not applicable because Rajasthani speakers were not a linguistic minority within Rajasthan. According to them, ***Article 350A***is directory. It requires only an endeavour by the State. It does not create a judicially enforceable right capable of mandamus. The State also argued that ***NEP 2020*** is an executive policy. It does not have statutory force. Therefore, it cannot create enforceable duties. This argument attempted to preserve executive discretion in curriculum design and recruitment syllabi. The Supreme Court rejected the State’s defensive posture. It held that non-existence of policy cannot become a justification for constitutional inaction. This reasoning is important for administrative law. It clarifies that discretion cannot be converted into inertia. Policy space belongs to the executive. Yet, constitutional minimums remain judicially enforceable when rights are diluted through non-action. # H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS ***Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution*** became central to the Court’s reasoning because expression includes communication, reception, comprehension, and meaningful understanding. A child does not merely need access to a classroom. The child needs access to knowledge. This is impossible when the instructional language creates fear, alienation, or mechanical learning. ***Article 21A*** guarantees free and compulsory education for children between six and fourteen years. The Court read this provision substantively. It treated education as meaningful only when it has quality and intelligibility. ***Article 21***supports the same conclusion because dignity and personal development require real educational access. ***Articles 41 and 45*** reflect the State’s constitutional obligation to promote education and early childhood care. ***Article 51A(k)*** casts a duty on parents and guardians to provide educational opportunities. ***Article 350A*** specifically requires every State and local authority to endeavour to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage for children belonging to linguistic minority groups. ***Section 29(2)(f) of the RTE Act, 2009*** strengthens this framework. It states that the academic authority must consider that the medium of instruction shall, as far as practicable, be in the child’s mother tongue. The words “as far as practicable” do not permit total State indifference. They require practical, phased, and reasoned implementation. The ***NEP 2020*** further recommends use of the home language, mother tongue, local language, or regional language up to at least Grade V, preferably up to Grade VIII and beyond. # I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT IN THIS CASE The Court relied on ***[S](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=State%20of%20UP%20v%20Anand%20Kumar%20Yadav%202018%2013%20SCC%20560)***[***tate of U.P. v. Anand Kumar Yadav, (2018) 13 SCC 560*** ](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/184818950/&ved=2ahUKEwjC29Sb0tCWAxXujuEIHfkRFi0QFnoECBsQAQ&usg=AOvVaw0ku8wvaugWjUra05foNFnh)to emphasise that the right to education means the right to quality education. That case recognised education as a gateway right. A child without education may not even understand other constitutional rights. This principle was relevant because language determines educational quality. The Court then referred to ***[Devesh Sharma v. Union of India, (2023) 18 SCC 339](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Devesh%20Sharma%20v%20Union%20of%20India%202023%2018%20SCC%20339)***. That case explained the purpose of the ***RTE Act, 2009***. It held that the Act was not enacted merely to provide free classrooms. It was enacted to ensure meaningful and satisfactory education. The Court also noticed[ ***Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 1*** ](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/154958944/&ved=2ahUKEwiAyLDh0tCWAxX5OS4FHehiMksQFnoECCIQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1lFPQI7hTf2MZ7xFcQRhY5)through the discussion in ***Devesh Sharma***. That case upheld the constitutional validity of the RTE Act and stressed quality education. The Court further relied on [***English Medium Students Parents Association v. State of Karnataka, (1994) 1 SCC 550***.](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1832025/&ved=2ahUKEwiU8tH00tCWAxXpj-EIHQnNGWUQFnoECBkQAQ&usg=AOvVaw0VcURgyYXxpNkFmL69Nmm-) That decision recognised the importance of mother tongue instruction for young children. It treated early education in an alien medium as artificial and burdensome. Finally, the Court placed strong reliance on ***State of Karnataka v. Associated Management of English Medium Primary and Secondary Schools, (2014) 9 SCC 485***. That case held that ***Article 19(1)(a)*** includes the freedom of a child or parent to choose the medium of instruction at the primary stage. The present judgment uses that principle to link language, choice, comprehension, and constitutional freedom. # H) JUDGEMENT #### a) RATIO DECIDENDI The ratio of the judgment is that ***mother tongue-based education is not a mere policy preference***. It is connected with constitutional rights, statutory duties, and educational quality. The Court held that the specific prayer for inclusion of Rajasthani in ***REET-2021*** could not be granted because the examination and recruitment process had concluded. However, the broader issue survived because it concerned the constitutional status of language in education. The Court held that education must be intelligible to be meaningful. A child cannot enjoy ***Article 21A*** if teaching occurs in a language that obstructs comprehension. Likewise, ***Article 19(1)(a)*** includes not only the right to speak but also the right to receive and understand information. The Court rejected the State’s argument that only Eighth Schedule languages could be taught. It found that ***Rajasthani is already taught in universities across Rajasthan***. Therefore, the State’s refusal to consider it at school level was overly technical. The Court directed Rajasthan to formulate a comprehensive policy for effective implementation of mother tongue-based education. It also directed the State to recognise and accord due status to ***Rajasthani as a local or regional language for educational purposes***. It further directed phased introduction of Rajasthani as a subject in all schools, government and private. The appeal was allowed, and the High Court’s order was set aside. #### b) OBITER DICTA The judgment contains powerful observations on the nature of language. The Court stated that language is the medium through which thought takes shape and identity gains recognition. This observation is not merely decorative. It guides the constitutional analysis. The Court also observed that a right existing only on paper is effectively no right at all. This is an important constitutional warning. It tells governments that policy announcements cannot replace implementation. The Court also commented on the gap between normative declarations and lived experience. It said that constitutional governance requires measurable delivery, not only elegant principles. These observations are wider than the narrow relief. They will influence future litigation concerning education, linguistic inclusion, and administrative delay. The Court’s concern with executive inaction resembles the broader doctrine of constitutional accountability. Courts may not write policy in ordinary circumstances. Yet, they may direct policy formulation when governmental inertia makes fundamental guarantees illusory. The Court’s remarks also strengthen the idea of transformative constitutionalism. Rights must reach children in classrooms. They cannot remain confined to statutes, speeches, policies, or government files. #### c) GUIDELINES / DIRECTIONS The Supreme Court issued specific directions to the ***State of Rajasthan***. The State was directed to formulate an appropriate and comprehensive policy for effective implementation of the constitutional mandate relating to ***mother tongue-based education***. This policy must be framed particularly in the backdrop of ***National Education Policy, 2020***. The State was also directed to take necessary measures to recognise and accord due status to ***Rajasthani language*** as a local or regional language for educational purposes. The Court further directed progressive facilitation of Rajasthani as a medium of instruction. This process must begin at the foundational and preparatory stages. It may then move progressively to higher levels. The State was also directed to introduce and provide ***Rajasthani as a subject*** in all schools. This direction covers both government and private schools. The implementation may occur in a phased and progressive manner. The State was directed to file a compliance affidavit by ***25 September 2026***. The matter was listed on ***30 September 2026*** for receiving the compliance affidavit. These directions are significant because they combine constitutional principle with administrative feasibility. The Court did not immediately impose a rigid model. It required concrete, time-bound, and phased action. #### d) DISSENTING OPINION There was no dissenting opinion in the judgment. The decision appears to be unanimous. Both judges agreed that the High Court’s order required interference. The absence of dissent is legally important. It gives the judgment a clear institutional voice on mother tongue-based education. The Court did not divide on whether language rights are enforceable through constitutional adjudication. It also did not divide on the point that Rajasthan’s Eighth Schedule argument was inadequate. The judgment therefore stands as a coherent two-judge Bench pronouncement. It affirms that linguistic access to education has constitutional depth. It also clarifies that State inaction cannot be sheltered behind lack of policy. Since no dissent exists, the ratio must be read from the operative directions and the reasoning preceding them. The operative core is straightforward. The State must move from passive recognition to active implementation. It must treat Rajasthani as a legitimate local or regional language for educational purposes. It must create a policy framework. It must progressively introduce Rajasthani as subject and medium. It must report compliance within the timeline fixed by the Court. # I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment is constitutionally important because it transforms language from a cultural claim into an educational rights issue. Its strength lies in its simple premise. Education without comprehension is not meaningful education. The Court does not say that every language demand must be accepted immediately. It instead requires reasoned, phased, and serious governmental action. This is a balanced approach. It respects the executive’s policy domain. It also prevents executive inaction from defeating constitutional rights. The Court’s reasoning is persuasive because it harmonises ***Part III rights***, ***Directive Principles***, ***Fundamental Duties***, ***RTE Act, 2009***, and ***NEP 2020***. It also uses precedent carefully. ***Anand Kumar Yadav*** supplies the principle of quality education. ***Devesh Sharma*** explains the remedial purpose of the RTE Act. ***English Medium Students Parents Association*** supports mother tongue-based early learning. ***Associated Management of English Medium Primary and Secondary Schools*** connects language choice with ***Article 19(1)(a)***. The decision also has practical importance for Rajasthan. It recognises that ***Rajasthani already has university-level academic presence***. Therefore, the State cannot portray it as pedagogically unworkable at school level. The judgment may influence future claims involving regional languages outside the Eighth Schedule. It suggests that constitutional educational duties are not limited to scheduled languages alone. The Eighth Schedule gives formal recognition. It does not exhaust India’s linguistic reality. This case therefore strengthens linguistic pluralism, educational inclusion, and child-centred constitutional interpretation. # J) REFERENCES ## a) Important Cases Referred 1. ***[Padam Mehta and Another v. State of Rajasthan and Others, 2026 INSC 476](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/68996283/)***. 2. ***[State of U.P. and Another v. Anand Kumar Yadav and Others, (2018) 13 SCC 560](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=State%20of%20UP%20v%20Anand%20Kumar%20Yadav%202018%2013%20SCC%20560)***. 3. ***[Devesh Sharma v. Union of India and Others, (2023) 18 SCC 339](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Devesh%20Sharma%20v%20Union%20of%20India%202023%2018%20SCC%20339)***. 4. ***[Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 1](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Society%20for%20Unaided%20Private%20Schools%20of%20Rajasthan%20v%20Union%20of%20India%202012%206%20SCC%201)***. 5. ***[English Medium Students Parents Association v. State of Karnataka and Others, (1994) 1 SCC 550](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=English%20Medium%20Students%20Parents%20Association%20v%20State%20of%20Karnataka%201994%201%20SCC%20550)***. 6. ***[State of Karnataka and Another v. Associated Management of English Medium Primary and Secondary Schools and Others, (2014) 9 SCC 485](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=State%20of%20Karnataka%20v%20Associated%20Management%20of%20English%20Medium%20Primary%20Secondary%20Schools%202014%209%20SCC%20485)***. 7. ***[Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India v. Cricket Association of Bengal, (1995) 2 SCC 161](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Ministry%20of%20Information%20Broadcasting%20v%20Cricket%20Association%20of%20Bengal%201995%202%20SCC%20161)***. ## b) Important Statutes Referred 1. ***[Constitution of India, 1950](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Constitution%20of%20India%201950)***. 2. ***[Article 14, Constitution of India](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Article%2014%20Constitution%20of%20India)***. 3. ***[Article 19(1)(a), Constitution of India](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Article%2019%281%29%28a%29%20Constitution%20of%20India)***. 4. ***[Article 21, Constitution of India](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Article%2021%20Constitution%20of%20India)***. 5. ***[Article 21A, Constitution of India](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Article%2021A%20Constitution%20of%20India)***. 6. ***[Article 41, Constitution of India](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Article%2041%20Constitution%20of%20India)***. 7. ***[Article 45, Constitution of India](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Article%2045%20Constitution%20of%20India)***. 8. ***[Article 51A(k), Constitution of India](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Article%2051A%28k%29%20Constitution%20of%20India)***. 9. ***[Article 350A, Constitution of India](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Article%20350A%20Constitution%20of%20India)***. 10. ***[Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Right%20of%20Children%20to%20Free%20and%20Compulsory%20Education%20Act%202009)***. 11. ***[Section 29(2)(f), Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Section%2029%282%29%28f%29%20Right%20of%20Children%20to%20Free%20and%20Compulsory%20Education%20Act%202009)***. 12. ***[Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Constitution%20Seventh%20Amendment%20Act%201956%20Article%20350A)***. 13. ***[National Education Policy, 2020](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=National%20Education%20Policy%202020%20mother%20tongue%20education)***. ## c) International Instruments 1. ***[Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Universal%20Declaration%20of%20Human%20Rights%20right%20to%20education)***, Article 26, recognising education as a human right. 2. ***[International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=International%20Covenant%20on%20Economic%20Social%20and%20Cultural%20Rights%20Article%2013%20education)***, Article 13, recognising the right to education. 3. ***[Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Convention%20on%20the%20Rights%20of%20the%20Child%20education%20language)***, Articles 28, 29, and 30, recognising education, cultural identity, and minority language interests. 4. ***[UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education, 1960](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=UNESCO%20Convention%20against%20Discrimination%20in%20Education%201960)***, relevant for equal access to education without discriminatory exclusion. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [6th RFMLR – TT&A Demystifying Series: Certificate Course on Cross Border M&A and Foreign Investment | Organized by RGNUL Financial and Mercantile Law Review (RFMLR), Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab (RGNUL) | Event on 9th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/6th-rfmlr-tta-demystifying-series-certificate-course-on-cross-border-ma-and-foreign-investment-organized-by-rgnul-financial-and-mercantile-law-review-rfmlr-rajiv-gandhi-natio/) **Published:** August 29, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 6th RFMLR – TT&A Demystifying Series: Certificate Course on Cross Border M&A and Foreign Investment | Organized by RGNUL Financial and Mercantile Law Review (RFMLR), Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab (RGNUL) | Event on 3 September 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Demystifying-Series-9th-August-Poster-1.jpg) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY The **Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab (RGNUL)** is an autonomous National Law University established under the RGNUL Act, 2006. 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[Click here to access the platform](https://quiz.lawfoyer.in/student "Click here to access the platform") - Participants may attempt the Quiz through a laptop, desktop, or mobile phone. However, participants are advised to use a laptop or desktop with a stable internet connection for a smoother experience. - It is **mandatory for every participant to create a free account** on LawFoyer’s Quizzing Platform before attempting the Quiz. - Participants must create their account using the **same email ID** which was used at the time of registration. The Quiz will be visible only on the dashboard of registered participants using the same registered email ID. - No unregistered participant shall be allowed to attempt the Quiz. - **The Quiz will be conducted in Secure Exam Mode with fullscreen monitoring and browser restrictions.** - **Participants will be required to enter fullscreen mode before starting the Quiz.** - ***The platform will detect and record tab switching, window switching, copy, paste, cut, right-click, and other restricted browser activities during the attempt.*** - **Participants must keep the quiz tab active throughout the attempt and must not refresh the page, switch tabs, copy, paste, right-click, or use any unfair means unless specifically permitted by the administrator.** - In case of the same marks, submission time shall be considered, and preference shall be given to the participant who submits earlier. - The Quiz link will be made available on the participant’s dashboard and may also be shared through the official communication group as per the announced schedule. ## Before You Start - Use a stable internet connection and keep this tab active throughout the Quiz. - Enter fullscreen mode when prompted before starting the Quiz. - Do not refresh the page, switch tabs, open another window, copy, paste, cut, or right-click during the Quiz. - Review your answers carefully before final submission. - The proctoring system will monitor your activity throughout the Quiz. - You will receive warnings for violations during the Quiz. - A maximum of **5 violations** shall be permitted during the attempt. If the participant reaches or exceeds the violation threshold, the Quiz may be auto-submitted by the platform and no request to restart or reattempt will be entertained. - Any attempt involving suspicious activity, unfair means, or repeated violation of instructions may lead to auto-submission, cancellation of attempt, disqualification, or removal from the rank list, as decided by the organizing team. ## **Rules & Regulations** - The Quiz shall consist of **100 MCQ(s) \[100 Questions on Indian Contract Act\].** - The total time allotted for the Quiz shall be **45 minutes**.Each question shall carry **04 marks**. - There shall be **negative marking of 01 mark for every wrong answer.** - The Quiz will be conducted through a secure platform with advanced examination security and proctoring features. - Participants must not use unfair means, external assistance, additional devices, AI tools, search engines, notes, or any unauthorized material during the Quiz. - In case two or more participants secure the same marks, the submission time shall be considered, and preference shall be given to the participant who submits earlier. - The Result will be declared on **8th August 2026** ([www.lawfoyer.in](https://lawfoyer.in/)). ## Registration Form 28th LawFoyer Quiz on (Indian Contract Act 1872)Full Name Email WhatsApp Number From where did you hear about this event? – Select –LawFoyer WhatsApp GroupEmail CampaignInstagramLinkedInLive Law please mention Registration Fees Price: ₹149.00 Register Now --- **Categories:** Quiz **Tags:** contract, contract law, contractquiz, lawfoyer, quiz --- ### [INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION | Organized by Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Register by 20 September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-international-arbitration-organized-by-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur-register-by-20-september-2026/) **Published:** September 1, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION | Organized by Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Register by 20 September 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Poster-1024x640.jpg) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY **Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur**, established in 2003, is described in the brochure as an institution committed to academic excellence, interdisciplinary research and socially engaged legal education. The University promotes scholarship, policy discourse, community engagement and international cooperation, with research interests spanning areas including constitutionalism, environmental governance, sustainable development and intellectual property rights. The brochure also highlights HNLU’s **R-HaS (Research-Hub and Spoke)** model, comprising five interdisciplinary Schools of Law and specialised Centres focusing on emerging research areas. The **School of Law at Mahindra University** follows a rigorous, interdisciplinary and practice-oriented approach to legal education, offering programmes including B.A. LL.B. (Honours), B.B.A. LL.B. (Honours), B.Tech. LL.B. (Honours), LL.B. and Ph.D. in Law. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY The **International Conference on International Arbitration** is scheduled for **10–11 October 2026**. The conference focuses on the intersection of **public international law, treaty frameworks and commercial arbitration**, under the broad theme: **“Governing Disputes: International Law, Treaty Frameworks & Commercial Arbitration.”** According to the brochure, the conference seeks to bring together scholars, practitioners, adjudicators and policymakers to examine contemporary issues in international dispute resolution. Key objectives include: - Fostering interdisciplinary dialogue between public international law, treaty frameworks and commercial arbitration. - Examining international legal frameworks concerning investment, trade, climate and the digital economy. - Providing a platform for academicians, practitioners, adjudicators and policymakers. - Exploring the institutional architecture of international adjudication, including courts, tribunals and arbitral bodies. - Encouraging research-driven scholarship and policy-oriented discussion. The conference invites papers across themes including **investor-state dispute settlement, domestic arbitration frameworks, enforcement of arbitral awards, commercial laws, climate change and digital economy, and trade regimes and dispute resolution**. The brochure states that the listed sub-themes are illustrative and not exhaustive. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE The conference invites participation from: - Undergraduate and postgraduate students of law - Academicians and research scholars - Policy experts and think tanks - Legal practitioners - NGOs and civil society organisations - International organisations and development agencies - Doctoral and post-doctoral scholars working in the field of arbitration ## MODE OF THE EVENT **Offline** The programme is scheduled at the HNLU campus, with registration, inaugural and valedictory ceremonies, panel discussions and technical sessions taking place during the two-day conference. ## LOCATION & VENUE **Country:** India **State:** Chhattisgarh **City:** Raipur **Venue:** **Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU) Campus, Sector 40, Nava Raipur Atal Nagar, Raipur, Chhattisgarh – 493661.** The brochure notes that HNLU is situated in the educational hub of Nava Raipur–Atal Nagar and is connected by air, rail and road. ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE For **paper presenters**, participants are required to first submit an abstract through the Google Form provided in the brochure. **Abstract submission:** [Google Form for Abstract Submission](https://forms.gle/d4JXWsUccA4wGkcQ9) The abstract must contain the paper title, author details, institutional affiliation, designation, email address, contact number, abstract body/content and keywords. It should be **300–500 words**, excluding the title and keywords, and must include **5 relevant keywords**. The abstract should be formatted in **Times New Roman, 12 pt, 1.5 line spacing, justified alignment and 1-inch margins**, and submitted as a Microsoft Word file (.doc/.docx). The title should be in bold and uppercase. Authors whose abstracts are accepted must subsequently submit a full paper. The mode of full-paper submission will be communicated separately to selected paper presenters. For participants attending **without paper presentation**, the brochure instructs interested participants to email **icia@hnlu.ac.in** for the relevant registration details. ## FEE DETAILS Delegate CategoryPaper PresentersAttendees**International Delegates – Academicians/Working Professionals**USD 50USD 35**International Delegates – Ph.D. Scholars/PG/UG Students**USD 25USD 20**Domestic Delegates – Academicians/Working Professionals**₹4,000₹2,500**Domestic Delegates – Ph.D. Scholars/PG/UG Students**₹1,500₹1,000 The registration fee is **non-refundable**. For co-authored papers, a maximum of two authors is permitted and **each author must register individually**. The registration fee includes access to technical and plenary sessions, certificate of participation/presentation, lunch, dinner and refreshments during the conference, networking opportunities and a conference kit. Accommodation and travel expenses are **not included** in the registration fee. No TA/DA will be provided. ## PRIZES **Selected papers will be published in a peer-reviewed edited volume with a leading publisher**. ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES ParticularDate**Last Date for Abstract Submission**15 September 2026**Notification of Acceptance of Abstracts**18 September 2026**Last Date for Registration**20 September 2026**Submission of Full Papers**5 October 2026**Conference Dates**10–11 October 2026 The programme schedule is tentative. On **10 October**, the programme includes registration, inaugural ceremony, panel discussions and Technical Sessions I–IV. On **11 October**, Panel Discussion III, Technical Sessions V–VI and the valedictory ceremony are scheduled. ## CONTACT INFORMATION **Conference Secretariat** Hidayatullah National Law University Sector 40, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur – 493661, Chhattisgarh **Email:** icia@hnlu.ac.in **Website:** ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / BROCHURE The official brochure provided for the conference contains the conference details, themes, important dates, registration fee structure, abstract and full-paper guidelines, accommodation information, travel directions and contact details. ### [Link for Abstract Submission](https://forms.gle/d4JXWsUccA4wGkcQ9) ### [**Official website**](https://hnlu.ac.in/) ### [**Conference brochure**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DTsFvr72gfBxHdOPH_U2U6iJIMpl_rZJ/view?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events, Other Competitions --- ### [CALL FOR PAPERS – CAPITAL LAW REVIEW | Organized by Capital Law Review | Submit by 4 September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-papers-capital-law-review-organized-by-capital-law-review-submit-by-4-september-2026/) **Published:** August 30, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** CALL FOR PAPERS – CAPITAL LAW REVIEW | Organized by Capital Law Review | Submit by 4 September 2026 **Content:** ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISATION/ JOURNAL** *Capital Law Review* is a peer-reviewed academic law journal that is committed to making published scholarship freely accessible, with the objective of contributing to the ever-evolving dialogue of law. The journal provides a forum where students, scholars, practitioners, and jurists can engage with law to challenge assumptions, interrogate established precedents, and analyse law’s role in securing liberty, dignity, and justice in the society. *Capital Law Review* places particular emphasis on academic focus, editorial independence, doctrinal rigour, and openness to diverse perspectives. In pursuance of the same, the Journal welcomes submissions that engage with contemporary legal questions while remaining attentive to the larger social, political, institutional and theoretical contexts within which law operates. ## **ABOUT CALL FOR PAPERS** *Capital Law Review* invites original and unpublished submissions for its **Inaugural Issue (Volume I Issue I)**. The Journal seeks contributions that demonstrate originality of thought, analytical rigour, clarity of expression, and meaningful engagement with legal questions. We particularly welcome submissions that do more than describe the existing state of law and instead interrogate, critique, develop, or reimagine legal doctrine, policy, precedents and institutions. We encourage submissions engaging with contemporary developments related to law, justice, rights, governance, institutions and legal theory, in the following formats: 1. Research Article 2. Short Article 3. Case notes and Legislative Commentary 4. Book Review 5. *Margin Notes* ## **ELIGIBILITY** The Call for Papers is open to: - Undergraduate and postgraduate law students; - Research scholars and doctoral candidates; - Academicians and researchers; - Advocates and legal practitioners; and - Professionals and scholars from other disciplines whose work substantially engages with questions centred on law. Submissions may be made individually, or in co-authorship, with co-authorship permitted for up to 03 authors. ## **THEME** The Journal maintains an open theme, encouraging scholarship across the full spectrum of law and policy. **SUBMISSION CATEGORIES** *Capital Law Review* invites contributions in the following categories: 1\) Research Article**:** 4,000 to 8,000 words 2\) Short Article: 1,500 to 4,000 words 3\) Case Notes and Legislative Commentary: 2,000 to 5,000 words 4\) Book Review: 1,500 to 3,000 words The aforementioned word limit is exclusive of footnotes. It is to be noted that up to 3 authors are allowed for each category. For ***Margin Notes*:** - **Anecdotes, satires, Poems, short stories, personal reflections, parody, or even a slice of courtroom humour or any other creative work with a legal flavour that doesn’t fall into the traditional forms of article/ research paper writing, bearing a nexus to law and contemporary developments in the field of law:** up to 2000 words ## **FORMATTING GUIDELINES** Authors are requested to adhere to the following formatting specifications: - **Main Text** - Font: Times New Roman - Font Size: 12 pt - Line Spacing: 1.5 - Alignment: Justified - Margins: Standard (1 inch on all sides is preferred) - Page Numbers: Consecutively numbered - **Footnotes** - Font: Times New Roman - Font Size: 10 pt - Line Spacing: Single (1.0) **Citation Style** All references must be provided only in the form of footnotes. The journal accepts citations in any one of the following citation styles: - Harvard Bluebook (21st Edition); or - Indian Law Institute (JILI) Citation Style; or - OSCOLA (Oxford Standard for the Citation of Legal Authorities); or - APA (6th and 7th editions) Authors should use one citation style consistently throughout the manuscript. Mixing citation styles within the same submission is discouraged. ## **SUBMISSION GUIDELINES** In addition to the aforementioned formatting, citation and word limits: - All papers must be submitted in English only. - Word limits are to be strictly adhered. - Submissions must be in a Word Doc (.doc/.docx) - Adherence to the submissions guidelines is encouraged. The same can be found at: ## **SUBMISSION DEADLINE** The last date for submissions for the Inaugural Issue is **04th September, 2026** ## **SUBMISSION PROCEDURE** Manuscripts must be submitted thorough the Google Form attached in the ‘Publish Now’ page of the website, reproduced here: Alternatively, manuscripts can also be emailed at: Submissions made through any other mode will not be accepted. ## **SUBMISSION CHARGES** No fee is charged at the time of submission. ## **CERTIFICATION CHARGES** E-certificates will be provided free of cost. ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** For any queries, kindly write to us at: ## **OFFICIAL LINKS** ### [Manuscript Submission Link](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScqAw4jdQfvT4gHpeHYfHHmxdb6Pi73iy3WwbSoU01GZZ69cQ/viewform) ### [Submissions Guidelines](https://capitallawreview.in/submission-guidelines.html) For more information, visit *Capital Law Review* at: **Categories:** Call for Papers, Events --- ### [Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Government of India & Ors., 2026 INSC 97 ](https://lawfoyer.in/dr-jaya-thakur-v-government-of-india-ors-2026-insc-97/) **Published:** August 26, 2026 **Author:** Jaya Dubey **Content:** # A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE is a landmark constitutional judgment on menstrual dignity, school infrastructure, adolescent girls’ education, and substantive equality. The petitioner invoked ***Article 32 of the Constitution of India*** and sought directions for ***free sanitary pads for girl children studying in Classes VI to XII***, ***separate toilets for girls in government, aided, and residential schools***, cleaners, menstrual health awareness, and safe menstrual waste disposal. The Supreme Court held that the absence of ***gender-segregated toilets***, ***menstrual absorbents***, ***privacy***, ***water***, ***soap***, and ***safe disposal systems*** is not a mere administrative failure. It is a constitutional failure. The Court connected menstrual hygiene management with ***Articles 14, 21, and 21A***. It held that menstrual health forms part of dignity, privacy, reproductive autonomy, equal participation, equal opportunity, and quality education. The Court issued binding directions to all States and Union Territories for functional toilets, free oxo-biodegradable sanitary napkins, MHM corners, safe disposal mechanisms, curriculum reform, teacher training, and annual inspection by District Education Officers. **Keywords:** Menstrual dignity, Article 21, Article 21A, substantive equality, menstrual hygiene management, right to education, girl child, RTE Act, gender-segregated toilets, reproductive health. ## B) CASE DETAILS ### i) Judgement Cause Title ***Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Government of India & Ors.*** The petitioner was ***Dr. Jaya Thakur***. The respondents were the ***Government of India***, the concerned Union Ministries, States, and Union Territories. The proceeding was filed as a public interest litigation under ***Article 32 of the Constitution of India***. The petition sought a writ of mandamus for free sanitary pads, separate toilets for girls, cleaner appointment, menstrual awareness, and safe waste disposal in schools. The Court treated the petition as involving constitutional access to education, not merely sanitation policy. The issues were framed around ***equality under Article 14***, ***dignity and health under Article 21***, and ***free and compulsory education under Article 21A***. The Court expressly stated that the lack of menstrual hygiene management measures creates absenteeism and drop-outs among girl students. ### ii) Case Number The case number is ***Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1000 of 2022***. The judgment is marked ***Reportable*** and bears the neutral citation ***2026 INSC 97***. It was decided in the Supreme Court’s original civil jurisdiction. The judgment records that the petition was filed in public interest. It concerned school-going adolescent girls, especially those studying between Classes VI and XII. The petitioner sought institutional remedies rather than individual compensation. The case therefore belongs to the tradition of Indian social rights litigation. It uses fundamental rights to compel State action where vulnerable groups face structural exclusion. The Court’s directions apply broadly to government-run and privately managed schools in urban and rural areas. ### iii) Judgement Date The judgment was delivered on ***30 January 2026***. The date is important because the Court examined current policy measures, including the ***Menstrual Hygiene Policy for School Going Girls*** placed before it by the Union. The judgment noted that there was no dearth of policies, schemes, and programmes. Yet it found that implementation was uneven and inconsistent. The Court therefore moved beyond policy acknowledgment. It converted constitutional principles into enforceable directions. The judgment is especially significant for post-***Article 21A*** jurisprudence because it treats menstrual hygiene as part of the real conditions needed for meaningful education. It rejects a narrow idea of schooling based only on admission or enrolment. ### iv) Court The judgment was delivered by the ***Supreme Court of India*** in its ***Original Civil Jurisdiction***. The Court exercised jurisdiction under ***Article 32***. It was not merely reviewing executive policy. It was deciding whether lack of menstrual hygiene facilities in schools violates enforceable fundamental rights. The Court held that education cannot be separated from dignity, health, privacy, participation, and infrastructure. It also relied on international human rights law. It invoked ***UDHR***, ***ICESCR***, ***CEDAW***, ***CRC***, and ***UNESCO*** materials. The Court used these instruments to interpret Indian constitutional and statutory duties consistently with India’s international commitments under ***Article 51 of the Constitution***. ### v) Quorum The Bench comprised ***J.B. Pardiwala, J.*** and ***R. Mahadevan, J.*** The judgment is a joint opinion. There is no dissent. The Bench structured the judgment into context, basics, submissions, issues, analysis, conclusion, and directions. The analysis itself is divided into constitutional themes. These include education as a human right, substantive equality, menstrual dignity under ***Article 21***, participation and opportunity under ***Article 14***, education under ***Article 21A*** and the ***RTE Act***, and the role of men in menstruation. This structure shows that the Court treated menstrual hygiene as a constitutional ecosystem. It did not treat it as a single welfare scheme. ### vi) Author The judgment is authored jointly by ***J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.*** The language is rights-oriented and reformative. The Court begins with Melissa Berton’s statement that a period should end a sentence, not a girl’s education. The opinion uses simple but powerful constitutional reasoning. It treats menstrual poverty as both financial and infrastructural. It defines ***MHM*** through national and international standards. It then links menstrual hygiene to equality, dignity, privacy, reproductive health, and education. The judgment is also notable for explicitly involving boys and male teachers in menstrual awareness. It states that menstrual health must be treated as a shared responsibility, not only a woman’s issue. ### vii) Citation The full citation is ***[Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Government of India & Ors., 2026 INSC 97](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/101264378/&ved=2ahUKEwjJoP3m9L2WAxVJieEIHdioDFQQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw0Bvr4WYDKBCe_lg5gUEgK0 "Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Government of India & Ors., 2026 INSC 97"), Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1000 of 2022, Supreme Court of India, decided on 30 January 2026***. Important Indian cases discussed include ***[Mohini Jain (Miss) v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 3 SCC 666](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/40715/&ved=2ahUKEwihpeP79L2WAxWWm-EIHdVyFrcQFnoECBsQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3bjmBL1p4Q4HK1yAfGscSG "Mohini Jain (Miss) v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 3 SCC 666")***, ***Unni Krishnan, [J.P. v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1775396/&ved=2ahUKEwi76bqJ9b2WAxV1jOEIHXHVIokQFnoECBkQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3NL-HJH8gihf8XiShkJAE- "J.P. v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645")***, ***T.M.A. [Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/512761/&ved=2ahUKEwj1_IeZ9b2WAxWrjOEIHSR8LLoQFnoECBkQAQ&usg=AOvVaw2kZZeuJggVgj5BXZ2bc16U "Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481")***,[ ***Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39***](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/42184625/&ved=2ahUKEwjOjoGt9b2WAxXijuEIHUMSH6MQFnoECBsQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3Oc7xYjStISMmQXBK0PiCz " Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39"), ***[Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India, (2023) 5 SCC 1](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/98959833/&ved=2ahUKEwiZj6G39b2WAxUBm-EIHd8tDAoQFnoECBwQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1O3HDAIPCTx7pzJN_CpvBf "Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India, (2023) 5 SCC 1")***,[ ***Rajiv Raturi v. Union of India, (2024) 16 SCC 654***](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/98908321/&ved=2ahUKEwjfu_bH9b2WAxWri-EIHfqwL8cQFnoECCAQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1TDH4f-p0aijJCph1I95S- " Rajiv Raturi v. Union of India, (2024) 16 SCC 654"), ***[Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Services, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3130](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/117705061/&ved=2ahUKEwiszb7U9b2WAxV9keEIHSt3NPYQFnoECBsQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1XgJE6kFyEq8WZsy2wwVFl "Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Services, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3130")***, and [***X2 v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 9 SCC 433***.](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/139834634/&ved=2ahUKEwiE_drd9b2WAxWJm-EIHV_OETAQFnoECBwQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3lABWRqiFfAI96jCG-9Ewd "X2 v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 9 SCC 433.") ### viii) Legal Provisions Involved The judgment principally concerns ***Article 14***, ***Article 21***, ***Article 21A***, and ***Article 32 of the Constitution of India***. It also discusses ***Article 15(3)***, ***Article 38***, ***Article 41***, ***Article 45***, and ***Article 51***. Statutorily, the judgment relies on the ***Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009***. It particularly discusses ***Section 3***, ***Section 8***, ***Section 9***, and ***Section 19*** of the RTE Act, together with the Schedule prescribing school norms and standards. It also refers to ***Rule 26 of the RTE Rules*** concerning child helpline dissemination. For waste disposal, it invokes compliance with the latest ***Solid Waste Management Rules***. For disability, it relies on the logic of the ***Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016***. ### ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case No judgment was overruled by this case. The Court applied, extended, and harmonised existing constitutional doctrine. It followed the education-right line of[ ***Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161***,](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/595099/&ved=2ahUKEwjgtczt9b2WAxW4kuEIHYFXGPQQFnoECB0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw2a78WKpWCEdU8mNC7xuj2M " Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161,") [***Mohini Jain (Miss) v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 3 SCC 666***,](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/40715/&ved=2ahUKEwjRv-L49b2WAxUMleEIHdvMDyUQFnoECBgQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3bjmBL1p4Q4HK1yAfGscSG "Mohini Jain (Miss) v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 3 SCC 666,") and ***Unni [Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645]()***. It acknowledged that ***[T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/512761/&ved=2ahUKEwjI9pXR9r2WAxUcieEIHYp8CfIQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw2kZZeuJggVgj5BXZ2bc16U "T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481")*** overruled ***Unni Krishnan*** only regarding the admissions and fee scheme. It did not disturb the principle that primary education is fundamentally important. The judgment also notes that ***[Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 1](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/154958944/&ved=2ahUKEwih2JPZ9r2WAxUNjOEIHZLHIAUQFnoECBoQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1lFPQI7hTf2MZ7xFcQRhY5 "Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 1")*** was later overruled by ***Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust*** only regarding applicability of the RTE Act to aided or unaided minority institutions. ### x) Case Related to Which Law Subjects The case relates to ***constitutional law, education law, gender justice, child rights, health law, disability rights, human rights law, social welfare law, administrative law, environmental sanitation law, and public interest litigation***. It also has a strong connection with ***feminist constitutionalism*** and ***substantive equality jurisprudence***. The judgment is not limited to school toilets. It treats menstruation as a constitutional issue because it intersects with dignity, bodily autonomy, reproductive health, access to education, privacy, and equal participation. It also applies an intersectional lens. The Court recognised that disability and gender may compound disadvantages during menstruation. Thus, school washrooms must also be accessible for children with disabilities. ### xi) Name of Counsels Appearing for Parties The extracted text provided in the uploaded judgment does not contain the list of counsel names. The judgment records submissions on behalf of the ***Union of India*** and the ***States and Union Territories***. It does not disclose complete counsel details in the visible portions provided. Therefore, the counsel names cannot be safely supplied from the uploaded text. It would be improper to invent names. The reliable statement is that counsel appeared for the petitioner, the Union, and the State and Union Territory respondents, and that the Court considered affidavits and submissions filed by those authorities. ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The petitioner approached the Court because menstruating girls in schools face barriers that boys do not face. These barriers include lack of menstrual absorbents, lack of toilets, lack of water, lack of privacy, lack of disposal systems, and lack of awareness. The petition sought free sanitary pads for girls studying from Classes VI to XII. It also sought separate girls’ toilets in government, aided, and residential schools. It further sought cleaners, menstrual health education, removal of taboos, sanitation facilities, subsidised or free menstrual products, and safe menstrual waste disposal. The Court accepted that the case raised a two-fold problem. The first was absenteeism. The second was dropping out of school due to lack of menstrual hygiene management measures. Thus, the petition concerned continuity of education, not only availability of sanitary products. The Court began by explaining menstruation and menstrual hygiene management. It recorded that menstruation is the regular discharge of blood and mucosal tissue from the uterus. It noted that menarche usually occurs between the ages of eight and fifteen. The Court relied on the ***National Guidelines for Menstrual Hygiene Management*** of the Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation. Those guidelines define MHM as awareness, confidence, safe hygienic materials, water, washing spaces, bathing spaces, soap, and disposal with privacy and dignity. The Court also referred to the World Health Organization’s Joint Monitoring Programme definition. This definition emphasises clean menstrual material, privacy while changing, soap and water, safe disposal, and knowledge of the menstrual cycle. These definitions shaped the Court’s understanding of constitutional adequacy. The Court also defined menstrual poverty. It stated that menstrual poverty or period poverty means the financial burden and obstacles women face in affording sanitary products. It clarified that the concept extends beyond products. It includes inadequate ***WASH*** facilities. The Court therefore refused to treat sanitary napkins alone as the solution. It understood MHM as a chain of enabling conditions. A girl needs absorbents, water, privacy, disposal systems, spare clothes, awareness, and a non-hostile school environment. The Union acknowledged that menstruation is clouded by taboos and socio-cultural restrictions. It accepted limited access to sanitary products and lack of safe sanitary facilities. It also acknowledged unhealthy practices, such as using old cloth, ash, and straw, which affect hygiene and reproductive health. The Union placed before the Court the ***Menstrual Hygiene Policy for School Going Girls***. The policy aimed to mainstream menstrual hygiene in government and government-aided schools. It intended to improve knowledge, attitudes, and behaviour among schoolgirls. It also aimed to provide access to safe and low-cost menstrual products, environmentally safe disposal, clean and gender-segregated sanitation, and menstrual education in school curricula. Various schemes were cited. These included ***Jan Aushadhi Kendras***, ***Scheme for Promotion of Menstrual Hygiene***, ***Samagra Shiksha***, ***Promotion of MHM and Pad Kranti***, ***Swachh Bharat Mission-Gramin***, ***Swachh Vidyalaya Initiative***, and ***Ministry of Jal Shakti IEC initiatives***. Yet the Court found that policies existed but implementation remained inconsistent. Several States also described their own schemes. Assam, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Kerala, Maharashtra, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, Uttarakhand, Tamil Nadu, Telangana, West Bengal, and Ladakh placed material on schemes. These included free or subsidised sanitary napkins, vending machines, incinerators, awareness programmes, MHM corners, school health programmes, toilet maintenance funds, and disposal systems. Some States offered cash incentives. Some provided sanitary pads through teachers or ASHA workers. Others installed vending machines and incinerators. However, the Court noted that Uttar Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Goa, Haryana, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Rajasthan, Sikkim, Tripura, and several Union Territories did not file affidavits. This reinforced the Court’s concern about uneven implementation. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The facts show that the petitioner did not allege an isolated failure. She placed before the Court a national problem affecting school-going adolescent girls. The Court noted that lack of MHM measures causes absenteeism and drop-outs. It relied on research showing that more than half of girls lacked information about menstruation before menarche. It also noted that lack of sanitation facilities prevents girls from managing menstruation safely and with dignity. The ***Clean India: Clean Schools Handbook*** showed that although schools with drinking water and toilets increased, poor maintenance made many facilities inaccessible. Reasons included lack of dedicated funds, poor management, weak construction quality, and absence of water. The Court recorded concern that water for cleaning and flushing remained a major issue and that MHM was absent in many schools. The Court also relied on research from North India. That study found that nearly one-third of adolescent girls were absent from school during menstruation. Among about 500 students, 29.2 percent were absent during menstruation. The reasons included dysmenorrhea, restrictions at home, fear of staining clothes, and difficulty changing sanitary pads at school. Girls in government schools were more likely to be absent than those in private schools. Girls using hygienic methods reported lower absenteeism. The Court used these findings to show that menstrual hygiene is not a private inconvenience. It is a structural educational barrier. It reduces attendance, concentration, participation, and continuation. Therefore, MHM measures level the playing field by addressing unequal starting points. The petition therefore raised four constitutional questions. First, whether absence of gender-segregated toilets and menstrual absorbents violates equality under ***Article 14***. Second, whether dignified menstrual health forms part of ***Article 21***. Third, whether lack of MHM measures violates participation and equality of opportunity under ***Article 14***. Fourth, whether such lack violates ***Article 21A*** and the ***Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009***. The Court answered these questions through a substantive equality lens. It held that formal access to school is inadequate when practical barriers prevent regular attendance. Education must be meaningful, continuous, and non-discriminatory. Mere enrolment does not satisfy the constitutional right when menstruating girls cannot participate equally. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED The first issue was whether lack of gender-segregated toilets and menstrual absorbents violates ***Article 14***. The Court held that it does. It reasoned that equality is not only formal equal treatment. It is substantive equality. A menstruating girl child is not placed equally with others when school conditions ignore menstruation. Equal treatment without considering menstrual needs perpetuates inequality. The Court relied on ***[Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/42184625/&ved=2ahUKEwis86fu9r2WAxXrlOEIHdoJEgIQFnoECBkQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3Oc7xYjStISMmQXBK0PiCz "Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39")*** to show that substantive equality eliminates individual, institutional, and systemic discrimination. It also relied on [***Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India, (2023) 5 SCC 1***, ](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/98959833/&ved=2ahUKEwiw8ML59r2WAxWjkOEIHVnbIVQQFnoECBkQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1O3HDAIPCTx7pzJN_CpvBf "Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India, (2023) 5 SCC 1, ")where the Court recognised affirmative action as a means of substantive equality. Thus, the State must remove MHM barriers through positive measures. The second issue was whether menstrual health forms part of ***Article 21***. The Court held that the right to life includes dignity, privacy, decisional autonomy, reproductive health, and menstrual health. It reasoned that inability to access menstrual absorbents may force girls to use unsafe materials. Lack of clean water and soap may impair bodily hygiene. Poor menstrual hygiene may cause reproductive tract infections. Lack of menstrual knowledge affects bodily autonomy and reproductive choices. The Court relied on ***X2 v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 9 SCC 433***, which held that reproductive rights include access to education and information about sexual health. It concluded that the State bears a positive obligation to protect menstrual health through effective MHM measures. The third issue concerned participation and equality of opportunity. The Court held that equality includes the right to participate on equal terms. It relied on ***Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1***, which emphasised inclusion and full participation. Menstruating girls who lack toilets, water, absorbents, and disposal facilities cannot participate equally in school. They may leave school early, miss classes, avoid activities, or drop out. The Court stated that absence of MHM measures converts a biological reality into structural exclusion. It prevents girls from competing, advancing, and realising potential. Therefore, menstrual hygiene is not an accessory to education. It is a condition for equal participation and opportunity. The fourth issue was whether lack of MHM measures violates ***Article 21A*** and the ***RTE Act***. The Court held that the right to education includes free, compulsory, and quality education. Quality education includes conditions enabling effective learning and continuity. The Court relied on [***Devesh Sharma v. Union of India, (2023) 18 SCC 339*** ](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/65160769/&ved=2ahUKEwiQ1cCG972WAxXfluEIHUemG0UQFnoECBsQAQ&usg=AOvVaw0WivXzYApotpZQ5udpcMbo "Devesh Sharma v. Union of India, (2023) 18 SCC 339 ")to say that any compromise on quality violates ***Article 21A***. It also relied on[ ***Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 1*** ](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/154958944/&ved=2ahUKEwiZ5O2S972WAxWaleEIHW7eHGYQFnoECBsQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1lFPQI7hTf2MZ7xFcQRhY5 " Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 1 ")for the meaning of “free” as removal of financial barriers. It held that MHM costs can become financial barriers. It further held that ***Section 19*** and the Schedule to the RTE Act require separate toilets and barrier-free access. ## F) PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS The petitioner submitted that school-going girls need free sanitary pads from Classes VI to XII. She argued that without menstrual absorbents, adolescent girls face indignity, health risks, absenteeism, and drop-outs. The prayer sought a mandamus to provide free sanitary pads, separate girls’ toilets, cleaners for toilets, menstrual awareness, subsidised or free sanitary products, and efficient sanitary waste disposal. The petition treated menstrual hygiene as a public law issue. It was not framed as charity or welfare. It was framed as enforcement of fundamental rights. The petitioner’s case gained strength from the Union’s own acknowledgement that menstruation remains surrounded by taboos and socio-cultural restrictions. It also gained strength from research connecting menstrual hygiene gaps to absenteeism and school drop-outs. The petitioner’s core constitutional argument was that lack of menstrual hygiene infrastructure prevents girls from accessing education on equal terms. A boy may attend school without concern for menstrual absorbents, changing space, disposal, staining, or menstrual stigma. A menstruating girl cannot. Therefore, equal admission to school is insufficient. Equal treatment in form becomes inequality in practice. The petitioner’s demand for sanitary pads and toilets therefore rested on ***substantive equality under Article 14***. It also rested on ***dignity and health under Article 21***. The argument was not that menstruating girls need special favour. It was that the State must remove a gender-specific barrier that the school system has historically ignored. This is classic substantive equality reasoning. The petitioner also invoked the right to education. She argued that free and compulsory education is hollow when girls cannot attend regularly due to menstruation. ***Article 21A*** cannot be satisfied by enrolment alone. The ***RTE Act*** requires meaningful schooling, infrastructure, and barrier-free access. MHM expenses also operate as financial barriers for poor girls. If sanitary products are unaffordable, girls either stay home or use unhygienic substitutes. If toilets lack water and privacy, girls avoid school during menstruation. If disposal facilities are absent, school becomes unsafe and humiliating. Thus, the petitioner asked the Court to treat menstrual hygiene as part of educational infrastructure. The Court accepted this broad constitutional framing and issued systemic directions. ## G) RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENTS The Union of India did not deny the problem. It admitted that menstruation and menstrual practices are clouded by taboos and socio-cultural restrictions. It acknowledged limited access to sanitary products and lack of safe sanitary facilities. It also recognised that unhygienic practices affect reproductive health. The Union placed the ***Menstrual Hygiene Policy for School Going Girls*** before the Court. It submitted that this policy sought to mainstream menstrual hygiene within government and government-aided schools. It also highlighted national schemes. These included subsidised pads at ***Jan Aushadhi Kendras***, financial assistance under menstrual hygiene schemes, ***Samagra Shiksha*** support for vending machines and toilets, ***Swachh Bharat Mission-Gramin*** funds for incinerators and awareness, and ***Swachh Vidyalaya***funds for separate toilets. Several States submitted that they had programmes addressing sanitary napkins, toilets, disposal, and awareness. Assam referred to vending machines, incinerators, training, and routine supply. Bihar referred to free sanitary napkins for girls aged twelve to eighteen. Andhra Pradesh referred to monthly entitlements of ten free biodegradable pads, school health awareness, peer education, and toilet maintenance. Gujarat referred to gender-segregated toilets, vending machines, maintenance grants, MHM corners, and curriculum integration. Kerala referred to the ***She-Pad Project*** and menstrual awareness. Punjab referred to free sanitary napkins for girls from standards VI to XII. Tamil Nadu referred to free sanitary napkin distribution in rural and urban areas. Telangana referred to six free pads per month for girls in standards VIII to XII. However, the Court found that these submissions did not solve the constitutional issue. Many respondents had no affidavit. Existing schemes were uneven. Implementation was inconsistent. The Court observed that there was no dearth of policies, schemes, and programmes. What was lacking was effective and consistent implementation. Later, the Court observed that one swallow does not make the summer. This meant isolated initiatives could not substitute for a nationwide implementation mechanism. The Court therefore did not reject the respondents’ policy efforts. It constitutionalised them. It turned scattered welfare measures into enforceable minimum standards. It also extended obligations to both government-run and privately managed schools. This was necessary because rights follow children, not school ownership structures. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS ***Article 14 of the Constitution*** guarantees equality before law and equal protection of laws. The Court interpreted it substantively. It held that equality requires attention to social, economic, cultural, gendered, and contextual barriers. Menstruation creates a school-specific barrier when toilets, water, sanitary pads, and disposal mechanisms are absent. The Court reasoned that affirmative measures may be constitutionally necessary to produce real equality. ***Article 15(3)***supports special provisions for women and children. The judgment’s logic harmonises ***Articles 14 and 15(3)***. It rejects the idea that menstrual measures are concessions. They are constitutional tools for equal citizenship, equal education, and equal participation. The Court’s reliance on ***Joseph Shine*** and ***Janhit Abhiyan*** strengthened this approach. ***Article 21*** protects life and personal liberty. The Court held that it includes dignity, privacy, decisional autonomy, health, reproductive health, and menstrual health. Dignity requires conditions that allow girls to live without humiliation, exclusion, and avoidable suffering. Privacy requires safe changing spaces and dignified disposal. Health requires access to safe absorbents, water, soap, and menstrual knowledge. Reproductive autonomy requires body literacy and access to sexual health information. The judgment therefore expands health rights in a grounded way. It does not create an abstract right. It links menstrual health to specific school conditions. The absence of MHM measures harms physical health, mental well-being, dignity, and autonomy. ***Article 21A*** guarantees free and compulsory education for children aged six to fourteen. The Court read it with the ***RTE Act, 2009***. ***Section 3*** guarantees the right to free and compulsory education. The Court treated “free” as removal of financial barriers. Menstrual absorbents can become a recurring cost preventing attendance. ***Sections 8 and 9*** impose duties on appropriate governments and local authorities to provide infrastructure, monitor admission, attendance, and completion, and ensure quality education. ***Section 19*** requires schools to comply with norms and standards. The Schedule requires separate toilets for boys and girls. The Court held that these norms are not procedural. They are integral to the realisation of ***Article 21A***. International law also played a key role. ***Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights*** recognises education as a human right. ***Article 13 of the ICESCR*** protects education and requires non-discrimination. ***CEDAW*** requires elimination of discrimination against women in education and action to reduce female drop-outs. ***Article 28 of the CRC***recognises every child’s right to education and requires regular attendance and reduced drop-outs. ***UNESCO*** materials describe education as a multiplier right. The Court invoked ***Article 51 of the Constitution*** to justify interpreting domestic law consistently with international obligations. This strengthens the judgment’s human rights foundation. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT IN THIS CASE ***[Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka Shawnee County Kan Briggs, 1954 SCC OnLine US SC 44](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/347/483/&ved=2ahUKEwjw-ZWi972WAxUmkOEIHZ2vHCsQFnoECCAQAQ&usg=AOvVaw2iB1Guw6lKOzDdzr1avoEA "Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka Shawnee County Kan Briggs, 1954 SCC OnLine US SC 44")*** was cited to show that education is central to citizenship and equal opportunity. The United States Supreme Court held that education must be made available to all on equal terms once the State provides it[. ***Plyler v. J.R. Doe Texas, 1982 SCC OnLine US SC 118***](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/457/202/&ved=2ahUKEwiuye-w972WAxUjm-EIHZvsNmcQFnoECBoQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1LeMQIALLISr_OufyveMcQ ". Plyler v. J.R. Doe Texas, 1982 SCC OnLine US SC 118") was cited for the lasting disadvantage caused by denial of education. The Indian Supreme Court used these cases comparatively. It did not import American doctrine mechanically. It used them to show that courts across jurisdictions recognise education as foundational to citizenship, dignity, and life chances. ***[Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/595099/&ved=2ahUKEwilkL-4972WAxX6jeEIHfKlAeUQFnoECAUQAQ&usg=AOvVaw2a78WKpWCEdU8mNC7xuj2M "Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161")*** held that the right to live with dignity includes educational facilities. [***Mohini Jain (Miss) v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 3 SCC 666*** ](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/40715/&ved=2ahUKEwjT0_fK972WAxUMj-EIHYxkAIMQFnoECBoQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3bjmBL1p4Q4HK1yAfGscSG "Mohini Jain (Miss) v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 3 SCC 666 ")held that the right to education forms part of ***Article 21*** because dignity cannot be realised without education. ***[Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1775396/&ved=2ahUKEwikmdHV972WAxWdluEIHQnCKLsQFnoECBwQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3NL-HJH8gihf8XiShkJAE- "Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645")***affirmed that the right to education flows from the right to life. ***T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481*** later overruled the admissions and fee scheme in ***Unni Krishnan***, but it did not reject the importance of primary education. These cases anchor the judgment’s education-right reasoning. ***[Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/42184625/&ved=2ahUKEwiqjKDg972WAxURkOEIHUlgDvsQFnoECAUQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3Oc7xYjStISMmQXBK0PiCz "Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39")*** was used for substantive equality. It rejected formal equality where law sustains women’s subordination. ***[Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India, (2023) 5 SCC 1](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/98959833/&ved=2ahUKEwjU2bnr972WAxUIm-EIHYg4MnUQFnoECB4QAQ&usg=AOvVaw1O3HDAIPCTx7pzJN_CpvBf "Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India, (2023) 5 SCC 1")*** was used to show that substantive equality may require affirmative action. [***Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India, (2025) 1 SCC 641*** ](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/46300019/&ved=2ahUKEwjA5tT5972WAxXbm-EIHfUoHuwQFnoECCAQAQ&usg=AOvVaw12QFEhtwOfWXmt67BFfWx6 "Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India, (2025) 1 SCC 641 ")reiterated that substantive equality eliminates individual, institutional, and systemic discrimination.[ ***Jane Kaushik v. Union of India, (2026) 1 SCC 336***](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/109624343/&ved=2ahUKEwjUu4KE-L2WAxXOlOEIHeqjFN8QFnoECBcQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3LDPA-LRhzHLuD1dFQL-ou " Jane Kaushik v. Union of India, (2026) 1 SCC 336") was used for intersectionality and reasonable accommodation. Together, these cases support the proposition that menstrual barriers must be actively removed. Neutrality is insufficient where disadvantage is structural. [***Rajiv Raturi v. Union of India, (2024) 16 SCC 654*** ](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/98908321/&ved=2ahUKEwjc99ON-L2WAxUqjuEIHTedJXkQFnoECBsQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1TDH4f-p0aijJCph1I95S- "Rajiv Raturi v. Union of India, (2024) 16 SCC 654 ")was used to connect accessibility with ***Articles 14, 19, and 21***. The Court observed that accessibility enables full participation in education, employment, healthcare, and civic life. ***[Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Services, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3130](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/117705061/&ved=2ahUKEwi7j4u0-L2WAxXemuEIHb16KFYQFnoECBoQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1XgJE6kFyEq8WZsy2wwVFl "Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Services, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3130")*** was used to explain reasonable accommodation as a facet of substantive equality. These authorities were important because menstruating girls with disabilities face compounded barriers. Accessible washrooms are essential for inclusion. The judgment therefore does not treat girl students as a uniform category. It recognises intersectionality. A girl with disability needs menstrual infrastructure that is both gender-responsive and disability-accessible. ***X2 v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 9 SCC 433*** was central for reproductive rights. It held that reproductive rights include access to education and information about contraception and sexual health. The Court used this to hold that menstrual health forms part of reproductive health under ***Article 21***. [***Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 1*** ](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/154958944/&ved=2ahUKEwi5rMXS-L2WAxX2iuEIHWLFErwQFnoECBkQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1lFPQI7hTf2MZ7xFcQRhY5 "Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 1 ")was used for the meaning of “free” education under the RTE Act. ***[Devesh Sharma v. Union of India, (2023) 18 SCC 339](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/65160769/&ved=2ahUKEwir_5Dd-L2WAxWziuEIHVvlK6EQFnoECAsQAQ&usg=AOvVaw0WivXzYApotpZQ5udpcMbo "Devesh Sharma v. Union of India, (2023) 18 SCC 339")*** was used to emphasise quality education.[ ***Deepak Rana v. State of Uttarakhand, 2016 SCC OnLine Utt 2454*** ](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5b1a212b4a932631a5a08ba7&ved=2ahUKEwjCtfPm-L2WAxV3keEIHUNvO4MQFnoECBsQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1E33y2V18P093MDuPXkwqZ " Deepak Rana v. State of Uttarakhand, 2016 SCC OnLine Utt 2454 ")and ***[State of W.B. v. Krishnendu Biswas, 2025 SCC OnLine Cal 2888](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/151963331/&ved=2ahUKEwiVgobw-L2WAxWcjuEIHXsiARwQFnoECBcQAQ&usg=AOvVaw378pAaXu_6l20YazomL_Wc "State of W.B. v. Krishnendu Biswas, 2025 SCC OnLine Cal 2888")*** were referred to on school infrastructure and girls’ drop-outs due to poor sanitation. ## H) JUDGEMENT #### a) RATIO DECIDENDI The first ratio is that the lack of menstrual hygiene management measures in schools violates ***Article 14***. The Court held that equality cannot be confined to identical treatment. Menstruating girls face a gender-specific biological and social reality. When schools lack toilets, absorbents, water, soap, disposal mechanisms, and privacy, girls are not placed on equal footing. This violates substantive equality. The State must remove structural barriers that prevent equal educational participation. The Court treated menstrual hygiene measures as affirmative action, not charity. This is important. It means constitutional equality requires material conditions that make rights real. A classroom without menstrual support may be formally open. Yet it remains substantively inaccessible for menstruating girls. The second ratio is that ***Article 21*** includes the right to dignified menstrual health. Dignity, privacy, bodily autonomy, and reproductive health require access to safe menstrual absorbents, clean water, soap, private changing spaces, and safe disposal. Menstruation cannot be treated as shameful or invisible. If girls are forced to use unsafe materials or avoid school because of fear of staining, discomfort, or humiliation, their dignity is impaired. The Court’s reasoning links bodily realities with constitutional rights. It recognises that privacy is not only protection against State intrusion. It also imposes a positive duty on the State to create conditions where privacy can be exercised. Menstrual dignity therefore becomes an enforceable aspect of the right to life. The third ratio is that lack of MHM measures violates the right to participate and equality of opportunity under ***Article 14***. Education is not meaningful if a girl cannot attend school continuously. Absenteeism during menstruation affects learning outcomes. Drop-outs affect future employment, representation, autonomy, and social participation. The Court described this as a domino effect. Denial of education later becomes denial of participation in all walks of life. Thus, MHM measures are not peripheral welfare facilities. They are preconditions for equal citizenship. This reasoning broadens equality doctrine. It connects school infrastructure with long-term constitutional participation. It also treats menstrual stigma as a barrier equal in seriousness to physical absence of infrastructure. The fourth ratio is that ***Article 21A*** and the ***RTE Act*** include free, compulsory, and quality education. Quality education includes enabling conditions. MHM gaps disrupt attendance, concentration, and continuity. The Court held that ***Section 3***of the RTE Act includes removal of financial barriers. Menstrual products can become such a barrier. The Court also held that ***Section 19*** and the Schedule require schools to comply with norms and standards, including separate toilets. These norms are integral to ***Article 21A***. Non-compliance by private schools can lead to de-recognition under the RTE Act. Non-compliance by government schools makes the State accountable. The Court stated that failure to provide barrier-free access is not merely administrative. It is constitutional. #### b) OBITER DICTA A major observation concerns the role of men. The Court held that providing toilets and sanitary napkins is not enough. Menstrual exclusion is also cultural. A school may have infrastructure, but a hostile environment can make it useless. Boys, male teachers, and male staff are part of the school ecosystem. If they remain unsensitised, menstrual stigma will continue. The Court stated that boys must be educated about menstruation as a biological reality. Male teachers must treat restroom requests and menstrual emergencies with sensitivity. The judgment’s phrase that ignorance breeds insensitivity and knowledge breeds empathy captures its social reform ambition. This observation is not merely rhetorical. It supports the direction for gender-responsive curricula and teacher sensitisation. Another important observation is that menstrual health is a shared responsibility. The Court rejected the idea that menstruation is only a “women’s issue”. Awareness must extend to boys, parents, teachers, and staff. When menstruation is discussed openly in schools, it ceases to be a source of shame. This is a significant constitutional statement. It moves menstruation from secrecy to public reason. It treats silence as part of the barrier. The Court’s reasoning is socially transformative because it identifies stigma itself as a constitutional concern. Even perfect infrastructure can fail if girls fear harassment, mockery, intrusive questioning, or shame. Therefore, menstrual health requires both physical facilities and cultural change. #### c) GUIDELINES / DIRECTIONS The Court issued detailed directions. First, all States and Union Territories must ensure that every school, whether government-run or privately managed, in urban and rural areas, has functional gender-segregated toilets with usable water connectivity. Existing and newly constructed toilets must ensure privacy and accessibility, including for children with disabilities. All school toilets must have functional handwashing facilities with soap and water at all times. These directions directly operationalise ***Articles 14, 21, and 21A***. They also give concrete meaning to the Schedule of the ***RTE Act***. The Court did not leave compliance to broad policy discretion. It specified the minimum infrastructure required. Second, all States and Union Territories must ensure that every school provides ***oxo-biodegradable sanitary napkins***manufactured in compliance with ***ASTM D-6954 standards*** free of cost. These napkins must be readily accessible to girl students. Preferably, they must be available inside toilet premises through vending machines. Where vending machines are not immediately feasible, they must be kept at a designated place or with a designated authority in the school. Every school must also establish ***Menstrual Hygiene Management corners***. These corners must include materials such as spare innerwear, spare uniforms, disposable bags, and other necessary materials for menstruation-related exigencies. This direction recognises that menstrual emergencies require immediate school-based support. Third, every school must have a safe, hygienic, and environmentally compliant mechanism for disposal of sanitary napkins in accordance with the latest ***Solid Waste Management Rules***. Each toilet unit must have a covered waste bin for sanitary material. Cleanliness and regular maintenance of these bins must be ensured at all times. Fourth, ***NCERT*** and ***SCERT*** must incorporate gender-responsive curricula on menstruation, puberty, and related health concerns such as ***PCOS*** and ***PCOD***. The objective is to break stigma and taboo. All teachers, male and female, must be trained and sensitised on menstrual hygiene. Information about ***Jan Aushadhi Suvidha Oxo-Biodegradable Sanitary Napkins*** must be widely disseminated through social media, print media, radio, television, cinema, and outdoor publicity. Fifth, the child helpline created by the ***National Commission for Protection of Child Rights*** under ***Rule 26 of the RTE Rules*** must be disseminated through social media, print media, radio, television, cinema, and other means. Sixth, the ***District Education Officer*** must conduct periodic inspections, preferably once a year, of school infrastructure. These inspections must cover toilet and washing facilities, menstrual absorbent availability, sanitary waste disposal mechanisms, and training or awareness measures. The annual inspection requirement is crucial. The Court found that policies were already present. The missing element was monitoring. Therefore, the Court created a compliance mechanism through District Education Officers. This converts rights into operational accountability. #### d) DISSENTING OPINION There was no dissenting opinion. The judgment was delivered jointly by ***J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.*** The absence of dissent gives the decision a unified constitutional voice. The judgment is strong because it combines doctrinal analysis with direct implementation orders. It does not merely declare menstrual health to be important. It identifies precise deficiencies and imposes concrete duties. It also connects rights to enforcement through annual inspections. The lack of dissent also means that the Court’s conclusions on ***Articles 14, 21, 21A***, and the ***RTE Act*** stand as the authoritative holding of the Bench. The judgment should be read as a rights-based infrastructure decision, not only as a welfare or sanitation case. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment’s central contribution is its recognition that menstruation can become a constitutional barrier when institutions ignore it. The Court does not treat menstruation as a private biological event detached from law. It treats school systems as constitutionally accountable spaces. When toilets lack water, when pads are unavailable, when disposal is unsafe, and when boys or teachers stigmatise menstruation, girls are pushed out of education. The Court rightly identifies this as a violation of equality, dignity, health, and education. The judgment is persuasive because it joins lived experience with constitutional doctrine. It explains how a seemingly small school facility can affect attendance, learning, self-esteem, health, and future opportunity. The judgment also strengthens substantive equality. It holds that the State cannot simply open school gates and claim equality. Rights must be usable. A girl who has a right to attend school but no safe place to change a pad does not enjoy equal education. A student with disability who cannot access a toilet does not enjoy barrier-free schooling. A poor student who cannot afford menstrual absorbents does not enjoy free education. The Court’s approach is therefore deeply material. It looks at the actual conditions under which rights are exercised. This is consistent with Indian constitutionalism after ***Joseph Shine***, ***Navtej Singh Johar***, ***Janhit Abhiyan***, and disability-rights cases. It also furthers social justice under the Preamble and Directive Principles. The recognition of menstrual health under ***Article 21*** is equally important. The Court connects menstrual hygiene to dignity, privacy, reproductive health, and bodily autonomy. This is a mature rights approach. It avoids moral discomfort around menstruation. It names the issue directly. It recognises that silence and stigma can themselves harm constitutional rights. By directing curriculum reform and male teacher sensitisation, the Court addresses the cultural dimension of menstrual exclusion. The judgment therefore goes beyond infrastructure. It aims to transform the school environment. That is essential because girls may still avoid school if infrastructure exists but stigma remains. The judgment is also significant for ***Article 21A*** and the ***RTE Act***. It clarifies that quality education includes enabling conditions for continuity. The right to education is not exhausted by admission, textbooks, or classrooms. It includes toilets, water, hygiene, safety, and dignity. The Court’s statement that non-compliance is constitutional rather than merely administrative is powerful. It means that school infrastructure is no longer a matter of budgetary discretion alone. The State cannot plead financial convenience against minimum educational standards. This reasoning may influence future litigation on disability access, transport, nutrition, digital access, safety, and health conditions in schools. The Court’s directions are concrete and measurable. This is a strength. Functional toilets, water, soap, free pads, vending machines, MHM corners, covered bins, safe disposal systems, gender-responsive curricula, teacher training, helpline publicity, and annual inspections are verifiable obligations. However, implementation will determine the judgment’s success. The Court itself recognised that India does not lack policies. It lacks consistent enforcement. The annual inspection direction is therefore crucial. Yet more may be needed. Public dashboards, budgetary allocations, grievance portals, student feedback, and independent audits could improve compliance. Still, the judgment lays a robust constitutional foundation. It affirms that a girl’s education cannot be interrupted by period poverty, stigma, or infrastructural neglect. ## J) REFERENCES ### a) Important Cases Referred 1. ***Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Government of India & Ors., 2026 INSC 97.*** 2. ***Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka Shawnee County Kan Briggs, 1954 SCC OnLine US SC 44.*** 3. ***Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161.*** 4. ***Plyler v. J.R. Doe Texas, 1982 SCC OnLine US SC 118.*** 5. ***Mohini Jain (Miss) v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 3 SCC 666.*** 6. ***Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645.*** 7. ***T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481.*** 8. ***Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 SCC OnLine ZACC 17.*** 9. ***R.D. Upadhyay v. State of A.P., (2007) 15 SCC 337.*** 10. ***Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v. Ahmed Asruff Essay N.O., 2011 SCC OnLine ZACC 13*** 11. ***Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39.*** 12. ***Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India, (2023) 5 SCC 1.*** 13. ***Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India, (2025) 1 SCC 641.*** 14. **Jane Kaushik v. Union of India, (2026) 1 SCC 336.** 15. ***Jane Kaushik v. Union of India, (2026) 1 SCC 336.*** 16. ***Rajiv Raturi v. Union of India, (2024) 16 SCC 654.*** 17. ***Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Services, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3130.*** 18. ***X2 v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 9 SCC 433.*** 19. ***Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1.*** 20. ***Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 1.*** 21. ***Devesh Sharma v. Union of India, (2023) 18 SCC 339.*** 22. ***Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust v. Union of India, (2014) 8 SCC 1*** 23. ***Deepak Rana v. State of Uttarakhand, 2016 SCC OnLine Utt 2454.*** 24. ***State of W.B. v. Krishnendu Biswas, 2025 SCC OnLine Cal 2888.*** 25. ***Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217.*** 26. ***Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241.*** 27. ***Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India, (1996) 5 SCC 647.*** 28. ***Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, (1999) 1 SCC 759.*** ### b) Important Statutes and Instruments Referred 1. ***Constitution of India, Article 14.*** 2. ***Constitution of India, Article 15(3).*** 3. ***Constitution of India, Article 21.*** 4. ***Constitution of India, Article 21A.*** 5. ***Constitution of India, Article 32.*** 6. ***Constitution of India, Article 38.*** 7. ***Constitution of India, Article 41.*** 8. ***Constitution of India, Article 45.*** 9. ***Constitution of India, Article 51.*** 10. ***Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, Section 3.*** 11. ***Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, Section 8.*** 12. ***Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, Section 9.*** 13. ***Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, Section 19.*** 14. ***Schedule to the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009.*** 15. ***Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Rules, Rule 26.*** 16. ***Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, Section 3.*** 17. ***Solid Waste Management Rules.*** 18. ***Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 26.*** 19. ***International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 13.*** 20. ***Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.*** 21. ***Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 28.*** 22. ***UNESCO Constitution.*** 23. ***National Guidelines for Menstrual Hygiene Management.*** 24. ***Menstrual Hygiene Policy for School Going Girls.*** 25. ***Samagra Shiksha.*** 26. ***Swachh Bharat Mission-Gramin.*** 27. ***Swachh Vidyalaya Initiative.*** 28. ***Jan Aushadhi Suvidha Oxo-Biodegradable Sanitary Napkin Scheme.*** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [The Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)](https://lawfoyer.in/the-associated-press-v-meltwater-u-s-holdings-inc-931-f-supp-2d-537-s-d-n-y-2013/) **Published:** August 26, 2026 **Author:** Jaya Dubey **Content:** # A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE ***The Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)*** is a significant copyright judgment on digital news monitoring, online scraping, search-engine analogies, and fair use. The plaintiff, ***The Associated Press***, alleged that ***Meltwater*** copied protected expression from AP news stories and delivered excerpts to paying subscribers through its media monitoring service. Meltwater argued that it functioned like an internet search engine and that its copying was transformative. The Court rejected that defence. It held that Meltwater was closer to a commercial news clipping service than a public search engine. Meltwater reproduced titles, ledes, and hit sentences, charged substantial subscription fees, had extremely low click-through rates, and competed with AP and AP licensees. The Court granted AP’s summary judgment motion on direct copyright infringement, rejected Meltwater’s fair use, implied licence, equitable estoppel, laches, and copyright misuse defences, and denied Meltwater’s motion on secondary infringement without prejudice. The case remains important for AI, aggregation, snippets, media monitoring, and digital publishing disputes. **Keywords:** Fair use, news aggregation, media monitoring, copyright infringement, search engine, transformative use, news clipping, lede, licensing market, click-through rate. ## B) CASE DETAILS ### i) Judgement Cause Title ***The Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc.; Meltwater News U.S., Inc.; and Meltwater News U.S. 1, Inc.***The plaintiff was ***The Associated Press***, a long-established news cooperative. The defendants were collectively referred to as ***Meltwater***. The dispute concerned Meltwater’s use of automated programs to scrape online news articles, copy content, index it, and deliver excerpts to subscribers. AP’s claim was principally that Meltwater infringed copyrights in published AP news stories. Meltwater did not seriously dispute that it copied protected expressive content. Instead, it relied on affirmative defences, particularly fair use. The Court considered cross-motions for summary judgment. The judgment is therefore a merits-stage decision on the infringement claim and fair use defence, unlike a preliminary pleading order. It is important because it separates genuine search functionality from commercial substitution through news clipping. ### ii) Case Number The case number was ***12 Civ. 1087 (DLC)***. The matter was decided by the ***United States District Court for the Southern District of New York***. The opinion addressed AP’s motion for summary judgment and Meltwater’s cross-motion for summary judgment. AP sought judgment on its copyright infringement claim and Meltwater’s implied licence defence. Meltwater sought judgment based on fair use and also moved on AP’s secondary infringement claims. The Court applied ***Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56***. It examined whether genuine disputes of material fact existed and whether either party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court held that AP had established infringement and that Meltwater’s affirmative defences failed. Meltwater’s motion on secondary infringement was denied without prejudice because AP was entitled to additional discovery. ### iii) Judgement Date The judgment was delivered on ***March 20, 2013***. The date matters because the case was decided before the later Second Circuit decision in ***Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015)***. Still, it remains highly relevant. It shows that courts do not accept every “search engine” defence merely because a service uses crawlers or algorithms. Meltwater tried to analogise itself to internet search engines. The Court assumed for purposes of the opinion that internet search engines may be transformative. Even so, it held that Meltwater’s service was not protected. The factual architecture mattered. Meltwater was a closed subscription system. It delivered excerpts rather than merely directing users to sources. The judgment therefore remains important for modern disputes about snippets, AI retrieval outputs, and commercial aggregation. ### iv) Court The Court was the ***United States District Court for the Southern District of New York***. This district has deep copyright and media law experience. It has decided several major disputes involving publishers, technology platforms, and digital copying. The decision is a federal district court judgment, not a Supreme Court or appellate ruling. Yet it is widely cited because of its detailed fair use analysis. It is especially useful in evaluating commercial services that copy news excerpts. For Indian legal analysis, it is persuasive rather than binding. Indian courts would apply the ***Copyright Act, 1957*** and the fair dealing framework under ***Section 52***. Still, the reasoning is useful when deciding whether excerpts substitute for the original and whether the copier has taken the heart of journalistic expression. ### v) Quorum The matter was decided by a single judge, ***Denise Cote, District Judge***. Since it was a district court summary judgment opinion, no bench or multi-judge panel was involved. The single-judge ruling contains a detailed factual narrative and legal analysis. The Court assessed AP’s business, Meltwater’s business, the registered articles, the summary judgment standard, direct infringement, fair use, implied licence, equitable estoppel, laches, copyright misuse, secondary infringement, and evidentiary objections. The structure shows a methodical approach. The Court first found that AP had established copyright ownership and copying. It then shifted to Meltwater’s affirmative defences. This is legally correct because fair use is an affirmative defence. Meltwater carried the burden and failed to satisfy it. ### vi) Author The opinion was authored by ***Judge Denise Cote***. The writing is direct and commercially realistic. It examines how Meltwater’s product actually functioned, not merely how it described itself. The Court scrutinised Meltwater’s marketing, subscription fees, crawler system, excerpts, News Reports, analytics, archiving, newsletters, newsfeeds, and click-through evidence. The Court’s method is important for technology cases. It avoids accepting labels. Meltwater called itself a search engine. The Court looked at use, design, market effect, and consumer behaviour. That approach is relevant for artificial intelligence and search-related disputes. Courts must examine whether a system truly enables discovery or instead substitutes for protected content. Functional labels cannot replace evidentiary proof. ### vii) Citation The principal citation is ***The Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)***. The case appears in the uploaded document as ***The Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc. et al., 12 Civ. 1087 (DLC), Opinion and Order***. The judgment cites important authorities including ***[Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/510/569/&ved=2ahUKEwiWifrw6b2WAxUmxzgGHTDFOSsQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw3_MLOs3XUtJcV7QpA12B-6 "Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)")***, ***[Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/471/539/&ved=2ahUKEwiy4Ln_6b2WAxX24jgGHQmcDMEQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw32IiqKL3CBFf_LMfevFIWl "Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985)")***, [***Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007)***,](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/intellectual-property-law/intellectual-property-keyed-to-merges/copyright-law/perfect-10-inc-v-amazon-com-inc/&ved=2ahUKEwifvtiH6r2WAxUN1zgGHTq-MgoQFnoECB8QAQ&usg=AOvVaw1MPN-vmhSZaNEwDi8V5YkL "Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007),") ***[Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/336/811/468703/&ved=2ahUKEwjw5caR6r2WAxXUyDgGHeXUK-oQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw36hwCT40yFuHnr7A5rwpqY "Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003)")***, ***Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999)***, and [***Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998)***.](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/150/104/571630/&ved=2ahUKEwjQ_Pmd6r2WAxVUwTgGHalvO7MQFnoECBsQAQ&usg=AOvVaw28FqsWBbGUaDHEWHnzx_jp "Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998).") ### viii) Legal Provisions Involved The main provision was ***17 U.S.C. § 106***, which gives copyright owners exclusive rights, including reproduction, display, distribution, performance, and derivative work rights. The principal defence arose under ***17 U.S.C. § 107***, the American fair use provision. The Court also referred to ***17 U.S.C. § 507(b)*** on limitation for copyright claims, ***17 U.S.C. § 512(c)***concerning the DMCA safe harbour counterclaim not decided in this opinion, and ***Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56***concerning summary judgment. For Indian comparison, the closest statutory framework includes ***Section 14 of the Copyright Act, 1957*** for exclusive rights, ***Section 51*** for infringement, ***Section 52*** for fair dealing exceptions, ***Section 55***for civil remedies, and ***Section 63*** for criminal consequences in appropriate cases. ### ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case No judgment was overruled. The Court applied existing law to a new factual setting. It distinguished search-engine cases such as [***Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007)*** ](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.casebriefs.com/blog/law/intellectual-property-law/intellectual-property-keyed-to-merges/copyright-law/perfect-10-inc-v-amazon-com-inc/&ved=2ahUKEwjywuuq6r2WAxXP1DgGHYDXKy8QFnoECCYQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1MPN-vmhSZaNEwDi8V5YkL "Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) ")and ***Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003)***. Those cases involved thumbnail images used by search engines. Meltwater relied on them to argue transformation. The Court held that those cases provided little comfort. The works there were images, indivisible by nature. The thumbnails were reduced and low-resolution. They did not substitute for the originals. Meltwater, by contrast, took text, including the lede and hit sentence, and provided it in a commercial clipping service. Therefore, the Court distinguished but did not overrule them. ### x) Related Law Subjects The case relates to ***copyright law, fair use, digital media law, internet law, news aggregation, search-engine law, licensing markets, civil procedure, media monitoring, and unfair competition policy***. It also connects with ***artificial intelligence law*** by analogy. Modern AI systems may scrape, index, retrieve, summarise, or reproduce news content. This case teaches that courts will examine whether the use genuinely improves access to original sources or substitutes for them. It also relates to ***database licensing*** and ***hot news misappropriation***, although the hot news claim was not decided in this opinion. For India, the dispute may connect with ***copyright in literary works***, ***fair dealing for reporting current events***, ***commercial clipping services***, ***database aggregation***, and ***platform liability***. ### xi) Name of Counsels Appearing for Parties For AP, the counsel listed were ***Elizabeth McNamara, Alison Brooke Schary, Colin James Peng-Sue, and Linda Jane Steinman*** of ***Davis Wright Tremaine LLP***. For Meltwater, the counsel listed were ***David Kramer, Brian Willen, Catherine Grealis, and Tonia Klausner*** of ***Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati***. Several amici appeared. ***Charles S. Sims***of ***Proskauer Rose LLP*** appeared for amici supporting AP, including ***The New York Times Company, Advance Publications, Inc., Gannett Co., Inc., The McClatchy Company, the Newspaper Association of America, and BurrellesLuce***. ***Julie A. Ahrens*** and others appeared for ***Electronic Frontier Foundation*** and ***Public Knowledge***supporting Meltwater. ***Kathleen M. Sullivan*** and others appeared for ***Computer & Communications Industry Association*** in support of neither party. ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT AP is a major news cooperative established in 1846. It was owned by over 1,400 newspapers across the United States and employed around 3,700 people. The Court recorded that AP produced between 1,000 and 2,000 news articles on a given day. The opinion carefully recognised the creative labour involved in news writing. AP reporters and editors choose topics, sift through leads, write and revise stories, and make decisions about completeness, clarity, balance, and accuracy. The Court paid special attention to the ***lede***. It found that AP’s breaking news style traditionally uses the inverted triangle structure. The lede carries the heart of the story. This mattered because Meltwater automatically took the lede from AP stories. The Court treated that taking as qualitatively important, not a trivial extraction of bare facts. AP’s business model was licensing-driven. Most articles written by AP reporters were published by members or licensees, not by AP itself. AP earned hundreds of millions of dollars annually in licensing fees. Its digital and commercial licensing agreements accounted for more than $75 million in annual gross revenue. The Court noted that AP licensed full articles, archives, search functionality, excerpts, snippets, and monitoring-related uses. Some competitors of Meltwater held AP licences. One licence permitted AP text scraped from third-party AP licensee websites, links, and excerpts. Another permitted snippets of AP articles in aggregated feeds for media monitoring and public relations professionals. AP also offered ***AP Exchange***, a platform allowing licensees to search AP stories using keywords and receive alerts. These facts strongly supported market harm. Meltwater operated an internet media monitoring service called ***Meltwater News***. It sold subscriptions costing thousands of dollars annually to businesses, non-profit organisations, and government agencies. It used automated crawlers to scan approximately 162,000 online news websites from over 190 countries each day. It scraped articles, indexed them, and delivered verbatim excerpts to customers through News Reports. Its marketing targeted communications and public relations professionals. Yet some sales materials also presented Meltwater News as a tool to stay informed about general news developments. The Court noted damaging internal and promotional statements. One employee described Meltwater reports as customised news digests. Another suggested telling customers that an excerpt saves time because they need not read the full article. This evidence undermined the search-engine analogy and supported substitution. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The specific copyright claim concerned ***thirty-three registered AP articles***. Meltwater scraped those articles from about 1,200 websites, including AP licensee websites and AP Hosted. Meltwater delivered excerpts from all thirty-three articles to its customers through News Reports generated by agent searches. For twenty-four registered articles published within six months of Meltwater’s discovery response, Meltwater calculated that it made at least ***22,297 excerpts*** available to United States customers. The percentage of each AP article copied varied. It likely ranged from ***4.5% to slightly over 60%***. AP showed that some excerpts copied more than thirty percent of an article and one copied sixty-one percent. This factual range was central to the third factor. The Court found both quantitative and qualitative taking. Meltwater took not only words but the story’s central expressive opening. A typical Meltwater News Report contained a banner, a report overview, agent query categories, and responsive results. Each result generally included the article headline, a hyperlink, source information, and two excerpts. The first excerpt consisted of up to 300 characters from the opening text or lede. The second was the ***Hit Sentence***, about 140 characters around a matched keyword. If the keyword appeared in the lede, the lede could be repeated twice. Meltwater also provided translation, sharing, and archiving icons. Customers could create standing agent searches and receive reports every weekday. They could also perform ad hoc searches. The format of ad hoc search results was the same, though not saved unless archived. Meltwater’s product therefore delivered selected expressive content in recurring professional reports. It was not simply an index of links. Meltwater’s system had additional features. Subscribers could archive search results in personal archives. The archive stored the headline, URL, source description, excerpt, and user notes. Meltwater also offered an ***Article Editor*** that allowed subscribers to copy and paste content from other websites into Meltwater fields such as title, opening text, body text, URL, publisher, and country. For additional fees, Meltwater helped subscribers create newsletters. Archived material could be incorporated into newsletters and sent to third parties. Subscribers could also use Newsfeeds on internal or external websites. The Court did not finally resolve secondary liability in this opinion. Yet these features mattered because AP alleged contributory and vicarious infringement based on customer copying, storing, and redistributing content. Meltwater’s motion on those claims was denied without prejudice because AP deserved more discovery. Click-through evidence severely damaged Meltwater’s defence. Meltwater claimed to direct users to original articles. But subscribers clicked through to only seven of the thirty-three registered AP articles. The average click-through rate was roughly ***0.08%***. For twenty-six articles, no clicks were found. Meltwater did not provide other useful click-through measures. The Court noted that Meltwater resisted AP’s requests for further click-through data. It therefore could not fairly rely on unsupported raw numbers. This evidence allowed the Court to conclude that Meltwater did not systematically drive users to third-party websites. Instead, it acted as a substitute for AP-operated or AP-licensed news sites. The Court contrasted this with evidence that Google News Alerts were shorter and did not systematically include the lede. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED The first issue was whether AP established direct copyright infringement. The Court held that it did. AP owned valid copyrights in the registered articles. Meltwater copied protected expression. Meltwater did not meaningfully dispute that excerpts were taken word-for-word from the AP articles. The Court recognised that facts are not protected. But original expression in news articles is protected. This follows ***Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999)***. News articles may be factual, but their descriptions, selection, arrangement, and language may contain protectable expression. AP’s certificates supported ownership and originality. Meltwater copied constituent elements by reproducing ledes, titles, and hit sentences. Therefore, the case turned on Meltwater’s defences, not on whether copying occurred. The second issue was whether Meltwater’s use was fair under ***17 U.S.C. § 107***. Meltwater argued that its service was like a search engine. It claimed that it transformed AP articles into an information-location tool. The Court assumed that internet search engines may be transformative. Yet it found that Meltwater was not functioning like one. Its system was closed, commercial, subscription-based, and designed to deliver news excerpts. It copied AP content to make money directly from protected material. It added no commentary or insight to News Reports. It had extremely low click-through rates. It took the lede systematically. It competed with AP and AP licensees. Therefore, the first, third, and fourth fair use factors strongly favoured AP. The second factor favoured Meltwater only modestly because news is factual and published. The third issue was whether Meltwater had an implied licence. Meltwater argued that AP or its licensees made content publicly available on the internet and did not block crawlers through robots.txt. The Court rejected the argument. It held that where a crawler makes fair use, it does not need implied licence. Where the use is not fair, failure to use robots.txt does not create an implied licence. Meltwater did not show that AP intended Meltwater to copy and distribute excerpts commercially. The Court also found Meltwater did not use features like cached page removal in the way search-engine cases had described. The absence of technological exclusion did not amount to consent. This point is highly relevant for web scraping and AI dataset disputes. Public accessibility is not automatic authorisation. The fourth issue was whether equitable estoppel, laches, or copyright misuse barred AP. Meltwater said AP failed to put content behind paywalls, failed to use robots.txt, and remained silent. The Court rejected equitable estoppel. AP had no duty to take those protective measures before enforcing copyright. Meltwater could not reasonably rely on silence. The Court also found Meltwater had notice of risk because websites contained terms prohibiting commercial use and AP had sued a competitor. Laches failed because the Copyright Act contains a three-year limitation period and Meltwater did not show the necessary prejudice. Copyright misuse failed because Meltwater did not show AP abused copyright to control competition beyond copyright’s policy. NewsRight allegations did not establish misuse. ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsel for AP submitted that Meltwater copied protected expression from registered AP articles and sold that expression as part of commercial monitoring reports. AP argued that its articles were not bare facts. They reflected editorial judgment, selection, structure, wording, and journalistic craft. AP emphasised that the lede was the heart of the story. By systematically taking the title, lede, and keyword-surrounding sentence, Meltwater captured the essential value of short news articles. AP’s argument was strengthened by the example of the modern pentathlon article, where Meltwater’s excerpt reproduced a large part of the short story’s expressive content. AP also argued that Meltwater’s copying was not transformative. It did not criticise, comment, analyse, or add new expression in the News Reports. It repackaged AP reporting for paying subscribers. AP further submitted that Meltwater acted as a substitute for AP’s own licensing products and licensed clipping markets. AP showed that it licensed excerpts and snippets to media monitoring companies. It also offered searchable platforms through AP Exchange and licensed content to services like LexisNexis and Factiva. Meltwater competed with AP and its licensees. It had won business from an AP licensee and bid against AP for news delivery contracts. AP’s strongest point was that Meltwater did not meaningfully drive readers to AP-licensed sources. The extremely low click-through rate proved that users consumed the excerpt rather than visiting the source. AP therefore argued that the fourth fair use factor, market harm, strongly favoured it. This was not hypothetical licensing. AP had an actual market for the very type of use Meltwater made. AP also opposed Meltwater’s implied licence and estoppel defences. It argued that failure to deploy robots.txt, paywalls, or registration gates did not create permission. Copyright law does not require owners to lock up their works before suing infringers. AP’s content appeared online through licensees for public reading, not for commercial scraping and redistribution by third-party monitoring services. AP also argued that Meltwater was on notice that AP objected to unlicensed commercial reuse. The Court accepted this reasoning. The evidence showed that many licensee websites prohibited commercial use. AP had sued Moreover Technologies for similar scraping and redistribution. AP had publicly announced initiatives to protect online news content. Therefore, Meltwater could not claim reasonable belief that AP consented to its conduct. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsel for Meltwater submitted that Meltwater News functioned like a search engine. It used crawlers, indexed online content, responded to user queries, and supplied links to source pages. Meltwater argued that search engines transform content by helping users locate information. It relied heavily on ***Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007)*** and ***Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003)***. Those cases protected thumbnail image search results. Meltwater contended that its excerpts were analogous to search results. The Court rejected this analogy. It held that use of crawlers and algorithms does not immunise a defendant. A service must still prove its particular copying qualifies as fair use. Meltwater’s closed, paid clipping service did not function like the public search engines in those cases. Meltwater also argued that its service had analytic and research functions. It offered dashboards, tone analysis, word clouds, geographic maps, coverage trends, and publication rankings. Meltwater said these features transformed copied content into new information. The Court treated analytics separately. AP had not challenged the display of Meltwater’s analytics. The challenged conduct was copying and redistributing article excerpts. Analytics did not make the excerpt delivery transformative. This distinction is important. A service may perform some transformative functions while also committing infringement through another function. The existence of lawful analytics does not legalise unlicensed reproduction of protected expression. For modern AI tools, this reasoning is powerful. A product may generate statistical insights lawfully while its reproduction or output features still require independent legal analysis. Meltwater further relied on implied licence, equitable estoppel, laches, and copyright misuse. It argued that AP left content freely available online and did not use robots.txt to block crawling. It also argued that AP remained silent before litigation. The Court rejected these arguments. Meltwater failed to show AP intended to authorise copying and redistribution. It failed to show any relationship imposing a duty on AP to speak. It failed to show diligent reliance. It also failed to show that AP’s participation in NewsRight constituted misuse or anticompetitive copyright abuse. The Court stated that AP did not control news itself or restrict entry into the business of reporting news. Competitors remained free to license their own content. Therefore, the affirmative defences did not prevent summary judgment for AP. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS ***17 U.S.C. § 106*** grants copyright owners exclusive rights over protected works. These include reproduction, distribution, public display, public performance, and derivative works. AP relied on these rights because Meltwater copied and distributed excerpts from AP articles. The Court described copyright as a bundle of exclusive rights. It also quoted the principle that copyright encourages creative works by attaching enforceable property rights to them. Under Indian law, this resembles ***Section 14 of the Copyright Act, 1957***, which defines copyright in literary works, including the right to reproduce, issue copies, perform, communicate, and make adaptations or translations. AP’s registered news articles would be treated broadly as literary works. In India, copying expressive parts of news reports for commercial monitoring could implicate reproduction and communication rights. ***17 U.S.C. § 107*** codifies fair use. It requires consideration of purpose and character, nature of the copyrighted work, amount and substantiality, and market effect. The Court applied all four factors. The first factor favoured AP because Meltwater was non-transformative and commercial. The second favoured Meltwater because news articles were factual and published. The third favoured AP because Meltwater took substantial and important portions, especially ledes. The fourth favoured AP because Meltwater harmed AP’s licensing markets and substituted for AP content. Indian law differs. ***Section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957*** lists specific fair dealing and permitted-use categories. India has no open-ended fair use equivalent. A commercial clipping service would need to fit a statutory exception. Merely claiming public access or search utility would not be enough. ***Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56*** governed summary judgment. The Court asked whether the evidence showed no genuine dispute of material fact and whether a party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. AP succeeded because the material facts were largely undisputed. Meltwater’s characterisation did not create a genuine issue. This procedural posture matters. Fair use can be decided on summary judgment where facts are not genuinely disputed. The Court also referred to ***17 U.S.C. § 507(b)*** for the three-year limitation period and ***17 U.S.C. § 512(c)*** because Meltwater had a DMCA safe harbour counterclaim not decided in this opinion. In Indian procedure, analogous summary disposal may arise through commercial court mechanisms, admissions, or applications where infringement and defences are clear. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT IN THIS CASE ***Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)*** supplied the central transformative use framework. The Court used ***Campbell*** to ask whether Meltwater merely superseded AP’s works or added new expression, meaning, or message. It found that Meltwater did not transform AP articles in its News Reports. ***[Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/471/539/&ved=2ahUKEwi9gNq5672WAxUJleEIHZj8ONsQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw32IiqKL3CBFf_LMfevFIWl "Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985)")*** shaped commerciality and market harm. It also supported the idea that taking the heart of a work can be substantial even if the amount is not large. ***[Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/448/605/637042/&ved=2ahUKEwiAg9fJ672WAxVtlOEIHYAyDpYQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw2TkwXTZfeLcQsB0P5OHXRV "Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006)")*** was cited for transformative purpose and proportionality. These authorities formed the doctrinal core of the fair use analysis. ***Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999)*** was especially relevant because it involved news abstracts. The Court used it to show that factual news reporting contains protectable expression and that summaries or abstracts may infringe when they substitute for original expression. ***[Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/150/104/571630/&ved=2ahUKEwiH7KjT672WAxXJjuEIHek3Oo8QFnoECBgQAQ&usg=AOvVaw28FqsWBbGUaDHEWHnzx_jp "Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998)")*** supported the proposition that repackaging or format-shifting is not necessarily transformative. ***[Los Angeles News Service v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1992](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/973/791/386577/&ved=2ahUKEwjM6tPc672WAxV6jOEIHb-MEk0QFnoECBgQAQ&usg=AOvVaw35tnkVOTgz53IueUcYZMqB "Los Angeles News Service v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1992"))*** and[ ***Pacific & Southern Co., Inc. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1984)***](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/749/733/359274/&ved=2ahUKEwiB45OC7L2WAxWKiuEIHeCSJQkQFnoECBsQAQ&usg=AOvVaw0giybGtrCX_9ajon8fjnbK " Pacific & Southern Co., Inc. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1984)") supported the treatment of news clipping services as non-transformative substitutes. These cases strengthened AP’s position that Meltwater was a modern clipping service, not a transformative search engine. ***Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007)*** and ***Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003)*** were relied on by Meltwater. The Court distinguished them. Those cases concerned reduced, low-resolution thumbnail images in public search engines. The thumbnails served as pointers and did not substitute for full images. Meltwater’s excerpts were textual, commercially delivered, and often captured the essence of short news articles.[ ***Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003)***](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/342/191/515519/&ved=2ahUKEwih7tmN7L2WAxXNleEIHSRfAqAQFnoECBYQAQ&usg=AOvVaw0-n7cJpiFy0GPRTobe4dd8 " Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003)") was also relevant for clip previews and copyright misuse. The Court used these cases to stress that technology alone is not transformative. The exact market function and substitutive risk determine the legal outcome. For affirmative defences, the Court cited [***Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 2002)*** ](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/310/280/495699/&ved=2ahUKEwicoYOa7L2WAxVVkeEIHSZWBfYQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw1OTMv7DYpZMJ5y_jeTxvBX "Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 2002) ")for equitable estoppel, [***Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2011)*** ](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914af58add7b0493474c6ac&ved=2ahUKEwiXgISo7L2WAxXYlOEIHRycHl4QFnoECBkQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1Z6AATqmkRZdmREs2fPuDG "Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2011) ")for reliance, ***In re Becker, 407 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2005)*** for diligence, and ***[Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Associates, P.C., 274 F.3d 706 (2d Cir. 2001](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/274/706/474926/&ved=2ahUKEwj8sZbO7L2WAxUfjOEIHbwBGdIQFnoECBoQAQ&usg=AOvVaw123xCjScp6be8yoF8wvWmY "Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Associates, P.C., 274 F.3d 706 (2d Cir. 2001"))*** for silence where a duty to speak exists. On copyright misuse, the Court discussed[ ***Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990***](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/911/970/143762/&ved=2ahUKEwiE5fb07L2WAxWsjOEIHeC2LrgQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw3lV4PWthTZxvjQUJCoH9iL " Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990")***)*** and ***[Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2011)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/10-15113/10-15113-2011-09-28.html&ved=2ahUKEwiV5Irt7L2WAxVOmuEIHa5YGqgQFnoECBkQAQ&usg=AOvVaw0NdQQGH0W2eEM1SR3SEd4_ "Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2011)")***. It concluded that Meltwater had not shown misuse, even assuming the defence existed in the circuit. ## H) JUDGEMENT #### a) RATIO DECIDENDI The principal ratio is that Meltwater’s copying and distribution of AP excerpts was not fair use. Meltwater copied protected expression from AP articles and sold it to subscribers through a closed commercial service. Its News Reports did not add commentary, criticism, or new meaning. They captured and republished designated segments of AP stories. Meltwater’s use directly exploited the value created by AP’s journalism. Its marketing presented the service as “News at a glance” and “News brought to you.” The Court found that Meltwater’s business model depended on the undiluted commercial use of AP’s expression. It was not merely an incidental technology use. Therefore, the first fair use factor strongly favoured AP. The Court’s core message is that a business cannot become transformative simply by using crawlers, indexing, or automated search-like tools. The second ratio is that taking the lede of a news article is qualitatively significant. Meltwater took between 4.5% and 61% of the registered articles. More importantly, it automatically took the lede. The Court accepted AP’s explanation that the lede conveys the heart of the story. It requires journalistic skill. It is not randomly equivalent to any other sentence. For short articles, Meltwater’s excerpt could give subscribers a large portion of the full story. Because Meltwater did not prove that it took no more than necessary to perform a search function, the third factor strongly favoured AP. This reasoning is important for snippet cases. A small word count may still be substantial if it captures the core expressive and informational value of the work. The third ratio concerns market harm. Meltwater’s service substituted for AP and AP-licensed services. AP had actual licensing markets for excerpts, snippets, searchable news products, media monitoring companies, and archives. Meltwater competed with AP and AP licensees. Its extremely low click-through rate showed that subscribers did not use the excerpts mainly to visit source pages. Meltwater could not rely on a search-engine theory while refusing to provide useful click-through evidence. The Court held that Meltwater harmed AP’s potential and actual licensing market. This fourth factor strongly favoured AP. When combined with non-transformative purpose and substantial taking, it defeated fair use. The Court granted AP’s motion for summary judgment, subject only to later briefing on retrospective injunctive relief. #### b) OBITER DICTA A significant observation was that search engines and news reporting are complementary public goods. The Court recognised the strong public interest in internet search engines. It accepted that search engines help deliver knowledge to users globally. Yet it also recognised the strong public interest in protecting news gathering. The Internet would be poorer without professional reporting. The Court refused to create a false conflict between search engines and journalism. This observation is important. It prevents the judgment from being misread as anti-technology. The Court did not condemn crawling or indexing as such. It condemned Meltwater’s particular commercial substitution. The distinction is valuable for modern AI, search, and aggregation disputes. Law should protect discovery tools without permitting uncompensated commercial extraction of journalistic value. Another important observation concerns robots.txt. The Court stated that where a crawler is making fair use, it does not need implied licence. Where it is not making fair use, the website’s failure to use robots.txt does not create implied licence. This is a powerful principle. It means copyright owners are not forced to deploy technical barriers as a condition of enforcement. Public availability does not equal consent to all automated copying. In Indian law, a similar argument may arise in scraping disputes. The absence of paywalls, login systems, or crawler exclusions should not automatically authorise commercial reuse. Consent must be assessed from conduct, terms, context, and statutory law. The Court’s reasoning therefore protects open web publication from being converted into involuntary commercial licensing. #### c) GUIDELINES The judgment does not issue formal guidelines. Still, practical principles emerge. First, a service using crawlers is not automatically a search engine for fair use purposes. Second, the Court will examine function, market role, click-through behaviour, and user consumption. Third, recurring commercial delivery of article excerpts may resemble news clipping. Fourth, taking a lede is qualitatively serious because it often conveys the heart of a news story. Fifth, actual licensing markets for excerpts and snippets matter under the fourth factor. Sixth, low click-through rates may show substitution rather than source discovery. Seventh, analytics features do not legalise separate infringing excerpt delivery. Eighth, failure to use robots.txt does not create implied licence. Ninth, copyright owners need not use paywalls before suing. Tenth, fair use analysis remains fact-specific. For Indian use, these principles should be adapted to ***Section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957***. India follows fair dealing and enumerated exceptions, not the open American fair use doctrine. A commercial media-monitoring entity cannot assume legality merely because it offers search-like functions. It must examine whether copying falls within permitted uses such as private or personal use, criticism, review, reporting current events, judicial proceedings, education, or library-related exceptions. Commercial redistribution to clients will often be difficult to justify if it substitutes for a licensing market. Indian courts would also consider originality under[ ***Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1***](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1062099/&ved=2ahUKEwj48oeA7b2WAxXSleEIHQloG_cQFnoECBkQAQ&usg=AOvVaw0BMOfulPRi0lc6GU9U7kpq " Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1") and substantial similarity under [***R.G. Anand v. Deluxe Films, (1978) 4 SCC 118***.](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1734007/&ved=2ahUKEwjwlrWJ7b2WAxVWjOEIHXqhKxAQFnoECA4QAQ&usg=AOvVaw3FXsSrd5X6Zir1Q5uV7XQ1 "R.G. Anand v. Deluxe Films, (1978) 4 SCC 118.") #### d) DISSENTING OPINION There was no dissenting opinion. The decision was issued by a single district judge. Therefore, no concurring or dissenting judicial reasoning exists. The absence of dissent is procedurally normal. It does not transform the ruling into binding appellate law. However, the opinion has persuasive value because it is detailed and evidence-driven. The Court did not decide every claim in the litigation. It did not decide AP’s hot news misappropriation claim or copyright management information claim in this opinion. It also did not finally decide secondary infringement. Meltwater’s motion on contributory and vicarious infringement was denied without prejudice. The Court granted AP’s direct copyright claim and rejected Meltwater’s defences. The parties were given another opportunity to address retrospective injunctive relief. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment is a strong protection of journalistic licensing markets in the digital environment. Its most important contribution is the difference it draws between search and substitution. Meltwater used crawler technology. But the Court looked beyond technology. It studied the commercial product. Meltwater’s customers paid for curated excerpts. They rarely clicked through to original stories. Meltwater systematically provided titles, ledes, and keyword sentences. That gave subscribers the heart of many articles. The Court therefore refused to let a search-engine label obscure a news clipping business. This reasoning remains persuasive for modern aggregation and AI retrieval systems. If a tool provides users with enough protected expression to avoid visiting or licensing the original, fair use becomes difficult. Technology cannot convert extraction into transformation by vocabulary alone. The decision is also important because it protects the economics of news production. AP’s journalism required reporters, editors, selection, verification, and stylistic craft. Copyright revenue supported that work. The Court treated this as a public-interest issue, not merely a private commercial dispute. It reasoned that allowing Meltwater to free ride would weaken AP’s ability to perform a democratic function. That observation may be debated, but it is doctrinally significant. It places professional journalism within copyright’s public purpose. The Court did not deny that media monitoring serves clients. It simply held that this commercial function did not outweigh copyright enforcement. The result favours licensing. Competitors who paid AP should not be undercut by a service that copies without paying. For Indian legal researchers, this case offers a useful framework for analysing news aggregation under Indian law. Indian courts would begin with the ***Copyright Act, 1957***. News articles are literary works when they contain original expression. Facts remain free. But the expression, selection, arrangement, and lede may be protected. A commercial service copying excerpts and selling them to subscribers may infringe ***Section 14*** rights and trigger ***Section 51***. It would then need to prove a statutory exception under ***Section 52***. The American fair use doctrine cannot be imported directly. Yet the factual analysis is helpful. Courts should ask whether the use is substitutive, whether it takes the heart, whether it harms licensing markets, whether it drives users to original sources, and whether the defendant’s business model depends on copied expression. The case also has modern AI relevance. AI tools may scrape, index, summarise, and reproduce news content. Some may claim to be search tools. Others may deliver answers that reduce traffic to original publishers. ***AP v. Meltwater*** suggests that courts should demand evidence. If the service genuinely improves discovery and sends users to originals, the argument is stronger. If it supplies the core expressive content and users rarely click through, the argument weakens. If the service competes with existing licensing markets, market harm becomes powerful. If the service copies ledes or summaries that capture the article’s essence, substantiality becomes serious. Thus, the judgment is not anti-search. It is anti-substitution. That distinction is likely to remain central in copyright litigation involving generative AI, retrieval systems, and automated media monitoring. ## J) REFERENCES ### a) Important Cases Referred 1. ***The Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).*** 2. ***Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).*** 3. ***Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).*** 4. ***Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).*** 5. ***Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).*** 6. ***Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999).*** 7. ***Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998).*** 8. ***Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006).*** 9. ***American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).*** 10. ***Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006).*** 11. ***Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).*** 12. ***Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc., 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003).*** 13. ***Los Angeles News Service v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1992).*** 14. ***Pacific & Southern Co., Inc. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1984).*** 15. ***Iowa State University Research Foundation, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980).*** 16. ***Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).*** 17. ***New Era Publications International, ApS v. Carol Publishing Group, 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1990).*** 18. ***Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986).*** 19. ***NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Institute, 364 F.3d 471 (2d Cir. 2004).*** 20. ***Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).*** 21. ***Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).*** 22. ***Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).*** 23. ***Azrielli v. Cohen Law Offices, 21 F.3d 512 (2d Cir. 1994).*** 24. ***Arista Records v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2010).*** 25. ***Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Publishing Co., 240 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2001).*** 26. ***Scholz Design, Inc. v. Sard Custom Homes, LLC, 691 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2012).*** 27. ***Boisson v. Banian, 273 F.3d 262 (2d Cir. 2001).*** 28. ***Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 2002).*** 29. ***Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2011).*** 30. ***Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Associates, P.C., 274 F.3d 706 (2d Cir. 2001).*** 31. ***Merchant v. Levy, 92 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1996).*** 32. ***Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).*** 33. ***Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 658 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2011).*** 34. ***R.G. Anand v. Deluxe Films, (1978) 4 SCC 118.*** 35. ***Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1.*** ### b) Important Statutes Referred 1. ***17 U.S.C. § 106.17 U.S.C. § 107.*** 2. ***17 U.S.C. § 507(b).*** 3. ***17 U.S.C. § 512(c).*** 4. ***Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.*** 5. ***Copyright Act, 1957, Section 14.*** 6. ***Copyright Act, 1957, Section 51.*** 7. ***Copyright Act, 1957, Section 52.*** 8. ***Copyright Act, 1957, Section 55.*** 9. ***Copyright Act, 1957, Section 63.*** 10. ***Information Technology Act, 2000.*** 11. ***Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.*** 12. ***Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights*** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Bartz et al. v. Anthropic PBC, No. C 24-05417 WHA](https://lawfoyer.in/bartz-et-al-v-anthropic-pbc-no-c-24-05417-wha/) **Published:** August 26, 2026 **Author:** Jaya Dubey **Content:** # A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE ***Bartz et al. v. Anthropic PBC*, No. C 24-05417 WHA** concerns a copyright class action against ***Anthropic PBC*** arising from alleged copying of books from pirate libraries for artificial intelligence inputs. The order is not a final merits judgment on copyright infringement. It is a ***Memorandum Opinion on Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement***. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted preliminary approval to the settlement, the plan of distribution, and the plan for notice. The Court found that the settlement was likely to satisfy ***Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2)*** at final approval. The proposed class concerned copyright owners of books listed in the ***Works List*** from versions of ***LibGen*** or ***PiLiMi*** downloaded by Anthropic. The settlement offered destruction of covered pirate-library copies, a release limited to past AI input claims, and about ***$3,000 per work*** before costs and fees. The opinion is significant for AI copyright litigation, settlement governance, class notice, statutory damages, and digital piracy claims. **Keywords:** Copyright class action, artificial intelligence inputs, Anthropic, LibGen, PiLiMi, preliminary approval, Rule 23, settlement notice, statutory damages. ## B) CASE DETAILS ### i) Judgement Cause Title ***Andrea Bartz and Kirk Wallace Johnson, individually, and Andrea Bartz, Inc., Charles Graeber, and MJ + KJ, Inc., individually and as representatives of the class v. Anthropic PBC***. The plaintiffs sued ***Anthropic PBC*** in a copyright action concerning alleged copying of books. The order specifically addressed preliminary approval of a proposed class settlement. It did not finally adjudicate liability. It did not finally approve the settlement. It memorialised the main points behind preliminary approval. The Court also addressed changes to notice documents, because preliminary approval depended on those changes. The order therefore belongs to the settlement stage. Its legal value lies in its careful treatment of class certification, fairness review, notice, release scope, allocation, and settlement administration in a major AI copyright case. ### ii) Case Number The case number is ***No. C 24-05417 WHA***. The document is ***Document 437***. It was filed in the ***United States District Court for the Northern District of California***. The case is styled as ***Bartz et al. v. Anthropic PBC***. The order records that the plaintiffs brought suit on ***August 19, 2024***. The parties signed a term sheet on ***August 25, 2025***. They signed the proposed settlement agreement on ***September 5, 2025***. The Court held hearings on ***September 8 and September 25***. The second hearing ended in preliminary approval. These dates show a fast but extensive litigation path. The Court noted major discovery before settlement. ### iii) Judgement Date The memorandum opinion is dated ***October 17, 2025***. The fairness hearing was scheduled for ***noon on April 23, 2026***. This timing is important. The order granted preliminary approval only. Final approval remained pending. Class members still had to receive notice. They also had opportunities to object, opt out, submit claims, or contest allocation. The Court repeatedly reserved final assessment until after notice and objections. Thus, the October 17 order should not be cited as final approval. It is a preliminary approval order. It concludes that final approval is likely, not certain. It also directs the parties and appointees to implement the notice and distribution plan carefully. ### iv) Court The Court was the ***United States District Court for the Northern District of California***. The matter was before ***United States District Judge William Alsup***. This is a federal district court order. It is not an appellate judgment. Its persuasive strength comes from its detailed settlement scrutiny. The Court examined ***Rule 23*** standards, class certification, the settlement release, distribution mechanics, notice content, claims administration, and appointment of settlement officials. For Indian readers, this case is useful not as binding law but as comparative guidance. Indian class action mechanisms differ. Yet the order gives insight into judicial control over mass copyright settlements involving AI companies and large groups of authors and publishers. ### v) Quorum The matter was decided by a single district judge, ***William Alsup, United States District Judge***. The rendered image on page 14 shows the judge’s signature and the concluding direction that preliminary approval was granted and notice was directed. The page also records appointments, including ***JND Legal Administration*** as settlement administrator, proposed appointment of ***Attorney Naomi Jane Gray*** as special master for settlement claims upon satisfactory declaration and order, and continuation of ***Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP*** and ***Susman Godfrey LLP*** as class counsel. This single-judge structure is ordinary for federal district class settlement approval. There is no dissent or concurring opinion. ### vi) Author The author is ***United States District Judge William Alsup***. The opinion is concise but analytically dense. It separates legal standards, preliminary approval, best practicable notice, further notice upon work-specific actions, appointments, and conclusion. The author’s approach is supervisory. He does not merely endorse counsel’s agreement. He tests the settlement against the class action rules. He examines whether the class is likely certifiable for judgment purposes. He evaluates settlement fairness under implied and express factors. He also insists on notice changes. This gives the order a governance character. It shows that AI copyright settlements require careful court management because absent rightsholders may be affected by releases and allocation decisions. ### vii) Citation The citation may be stated as ***Bartz et al. v. Anthropic PBC, No. C 24-05417 WHA, Document 437, Memorandum Opinion on Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, United States District Court for the Northern District of California, October 17, 2025***. The order cites ***Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(1)(B)***, ***Rule 23(e)(2)***, ***Rule 23(c)(2)(B)***, ***17 U.S.C. §§ 410(c), 412(2), 501(b), 504(c), and 508(a)***, and several class settlement authorities. It also references[ ***Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011***](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/13-4829/13-4829-2015-10-16.html&ved=2ahUKEwjSrcr0472WAxXZXWwGHbljAL4QFnoECBgQAQ&usg=AOvVaw0pdrfbVINFsHB_iDKmi-7e " Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011")***)*** while comparing settlement value. ### viii) Legal Provisions Involved The central procedural law was ***Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23***. The Court applied ***Rule 23(e)(1)(B)*** for preliminary settlement approval. It also applied ***Rule 23(e)(2)*** for likely final approval. It applied ***Rule 23(c)(2)(B)*** for best practicable notice. Copyright provisions included ***17 U.S.C. § 410(c)***, concerning registration certificates as evidence, ***17 U.S.C. § 412(2)***, concerning statutory damages timing, ***17 U.S.C. § 501(b)***, concerning infringement actions and notice to interested copyright claimants, ***17 U.S.C. § 504(c)***, concerning statutory damages, and ***17 U.S.C. § 508(a)***, concerning notice to the Copyright Office. Indian comparison may involve ***Section 14*** and ***Section 51 of the Copyright Act, 1957***. However, the uploaded order itself is based on United States law. ### ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case No judgment was overruled. The order did not overrule any authority. It applied class settlement precedents. It relied on ***Churchill Village, [L.L.C. v. General Electric, 361 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 2004)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/churchill-village-v-general-893091902&ved=2ahUKEwiXobuD5L2WAxWrTGwGHYw5CecQFnoECBoQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1Iy6L7NHGkURXsju-4opCo "L.L.C. v. General Electric, 361 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 2004)")*** for implied settlement factors. It referred to[ ***Briseño v. Henderson, 998 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2021)***](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/19-56297/19-56297-2021-06-01.html&ved=2ahUKEwix6aiX5L2WAxWsTWwGHUrnFT8QFnoECBkQAQ&usg=AOvVaw2ItkEfiwIUiZQ2-sH7BkyM " Briseño v. Henderson, 998 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2021)") and ***In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liability Litigation, 654 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2011)*** for collusion concerns. It cited ***Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006)*** and[ ***Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950)***](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/339/306/&ved=2ahUKEwizodOh5L2WAxVCTWcHHWk6AJoQFnoECBUQAQ&usg=AOvVaw0RAMCO1zKpOu94EUt7P9VX " Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950)") for notice. It distinguished no major case in a merits sense. The order is administrative and settlement-focused. ### x) Related Law Subjects The case relates to ***copyright law, class actions, artificial intelligence law, civil procedure, statutory damages, settlement administration, notice, digital piracy, author rights, publisher rights, and technology litigation***. It also relates to evidence and claims administration because class members must prove ownership of reproduction rights. The order is important for AI law because the Court expressly stated that ***“This case concerned AI inputs, not AI outputs.”*** That distinction is critical. It means the settlement release covered past input-related claims, not output-related claims. It also excluded future conduct after ***August 25, 2025***. This makes the case important for separating training-input copying, pirate-library downloading, future AI conduct, and output-based infringement claims. ### xi) Name of Counsels Appearing for Parties The order does not list all individual advocates in the captioned manner usually seen in merits opinions. It identifies class counsel as ***Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP*** and ***Susman Godfrey LLP***. It also records that counsel recommended ***JND Legal Administration*** after reviewing competing bids from four firms. It states that plaintiffs’ counsel committed to bear administrator costs if the settlement fails. The order does not provide a full list of defence counsel names. Therefore, it would be inaccurate to invent names. The safe statement is that class counsel remained the two named firms. The Court dealt with counsel’s notice revisions and commitments during preliminary approval. ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The case arose from alleged copyright violations linked to ***Anthropic’s downloading of books from pirate libraries***. The settlement class covered copyright owners of qualifying books appearing on the ***Works List***. The class definition required ownership of the exclusive right to reproduce copies of any book in the versions of ***LibGen*** or ***PiLiMi*** downloaded by Anthropic. The work also needed an ***ISBN or ASIN***. It also needed timely registration with the United States Copyright Office. The Court clarified that only works on the Works List were in the class. This was not a cosmetic clarification. It solved notice and release problems. If a work was outside the list, its owner was outside the class for that work. This avoided future ambiguity about released claims. The settlement followed extensive litigation. The Court noted that discovery included ***tens of depositions***, ***hundreds of thousands of pages***, and ***terabytes of data***. Discovery was close to completion when the term sheet was signed. The parties were therefore reasonably informed. This supported preliminary approval. The Court also referred to its prior rulings. It had ruled that Anthropic’s reproduction of named plaintiffs’ books during LLM training was fair use. It had also ruled that converting purchased print copies into digital copies for a central library, for space-saving and searchability, was fair use. But the Court had ruled that Anthropic’s downloading of millions of books from pirate libraries and assembling them into a central library was not fair use on the summary judgment record. This background shaped settlement value. The settlement therefore rested on risk. Plaintiffs had a strong case on pirate-library downloading. But victory was not assured. At trial, plaintiffs would need to prove facts to a jury. They would also need to prove willfulness for higher statutory damages. The Court noted that damages could range from ***$150,000 per work*** down to ***$200 per work*** under ***17 U.S.C. § 504(c)***. A jury award could also be reduced after trial if unsupported. Appeals could follow. Against that uncertainty, the settlement provided prompt closure. It offered injunctive relief and an approximate ***$3,000 per-work award*** before costs and fees. The Court described this as the largest copyright class action settlement in history because it resolved nearly half a million works at once. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The named plaintiffs included ***Andrea Bartz***, ***Kirk Wallace Johnson***, ***Andrea Bartz, Inc.***, ***Charles Graeber***, and ***MJ + KJ, Inc.***. They acted individually and as class representatives. The defendant was ***Anthropic PBC***. The class representatives remained ***Andrea Bartz, Inc., Charles Graeber, and MJ + KJ Inc.*** at the end of the order. The class consisted of beneficial or legal copyright owners of reproduction rights in listed books. These books had to be in the relevant ***LibGen*** or ***PiLiMi*** versions downloaded by Anthropic. They also needed copyright registration within the stated timing. Excluded persons included Anthropic’s directors, officers, and employees, federal agency personnel, and district court personnel. The Works List became central to class identity and settlement administration. The parties stipulated, for settlement purposes only, that listed works met the works-related criteria. This included timing of registration, publication, and downloading. This mattered because class members then had to prove only ownership of relevant reproduction rights. Authors and publishers could both be class members. The Court noted that no publishers were serving as representatives. It did not treat that as fatal at preliminary approval. It stated that authors appeared to be advocating for all, as anticipated by the class certification order. Still, it recognised a possible problem. The absence of publisher representatives, or representatives for some subset, could surface through claims and objections. This careful observation protects adequacy review. It shows that preliminary approval was conditional and open to later objections. The release was tailored. Class members would release claims broadly related to ***past AI inputs***. These included past pirating and copying of their works up to the point of AI output. The Court expressly stated that class members did ***not***release claims about ***past AI outputs***. They also did not release any claims about ***future conduct*** on or after ***August 25, 2025***. In return, Anthropic had to destroy copies of class works derived from ***LibGen*** and ***PiLiMi***, unless legal preservation requirements applied. Class members also received the per-work monetary award. This narrow release was a major reason for preliminary approval. It avoided the problem seen in the rejected ***Authors Guild v. Google*** settlement, where future claims were released. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED The first legal issue was whether the Court would likely certify the settlement class for judgment. Under ***Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(1)(B)***, preliminary approval requires likely ability to approve the proposal finally and certify the class for judgment. The Court found classwide resolution likely proper. It relied on reasons from the class certification order. The clarified class remained substantially the same as certified. The Works List removed uncertainty. It also ensured that excluded works did not create ambiguous future releases. This was important because absent class members must know whether their works and claims are included. A vague class definition could impair due process. The Court found the clarified definition workable enough for preliminary approval. The second legal issue was whether the settlement was likely fair, reasonable, and adequate under ***Rule 23(e)(2)***. The Court considered the Ninth Circuit’s implied factors from ***Churchill Village, L.L.C. v. General Electric, 361 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 2004)***. It examined discovery, litigation risk, settlement value, counsel quality, and likely class reaction. It found discovery extensive. It found plaintiffs had a strong downloading claim, but trial risk remained. It noted the potential range of statutory damages. It also valued prompt closure. The settlement gave injunctive relief and meaningful per-work compensation. Therefore, the Court found the settlement within the range likely to receive final approval. Final approval still required notice and objections. The third issue was whether the settlement showed signs of collusion. The Court applied concerns from ***In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liability Litigation, 654 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2011)*** and[ ***Briseño v. Henderson, 998 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2021)***.](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/19-56297/19-56297-2021-06-01.html&ved=2ahUKEwjblp-_5L2WAxXYaHADHfdODUcQFnoECBoQAQ&usg=AOvVaw2ItkEfiwIUiZQ2-sH7BkyM " Briseño v. Henderson, 998 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2021).") It found likely absence of collusion. Anthropic would not receive money back unless the settlement failed. The release would also fail if the settlement collapsed. Class counsel’s fee request was capped at ***25 percent*** before costs and expenses. Service fees were also capped and required judicial approval. Counsel committed to receive fees in step with distributions to class members, not merely money entering the fund. The Court also addressed side-deal concerns about rightsholder re-inclusion. The fourth issue was notice. The Court had to order the ***best notice practicable*** under ***Rule 23(c)(2)(B)***. Notice had to be reasonably calculated to inform absent class members. The Court relied on ***Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006)*** and [***Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950)***.](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/339/306/&ved=2ahUKEwinn_HK5L2WAxXPT2wGHZegIXcQFnoECCAQAQ&usg=AOvVaw0RAMCO1zKpOu94EUt7P9VX "Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950).") The notice plan had indirect and direct components. Indirect notice included print media, earned media, social media, web advertisements, and a searchable website. Direct notice used registries, author and publisher group data, interested-party information, commercial locating methods, First Class mail, email, and follow-up procedures. The Court also required improvements in notice language, release disclosure, opt-out instructions, and special master consent. ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The plaintiffs supported preliminary settlement approval. They relied on the strength of their claims concerning ***Anthropic’s downloading from pirate libraries***. Their position gained force from the Court’s earlier ruling that, on the summary judgment record, Anthropic’s downloading of millions of books from pirate libraries and assembling them into a central library was not fair use. The plaintiffs could argue that the copying was large-scale, unauthorised, and commercially significant. They could also argue that classwide treatment was proper because the Works List and common evidence identified the works. For copyright law, this theory connects strongly to ***17 U.S.C. § 501***, which enables copyright owners to sue for infringement. It also connects to ***17 U.S.C. § 504(c)***, which provides statutory damages. The plaintiffs also supported the settlement’s monetary and injunctive benefits. The per-work award of about ***$3,000*** was above the ordinary statutory minimum of ***$750*** and far above the innocent infringement minimum of ***$200***. The Court noted that the amount was four times the ordinary minimum and fifteen times the innocent minimum. The plaintiffs could therefore present the settlement as a practical recovery despite trial risk. The injunctive relief was also important. Anthropic had to destroy covered copies derived from ***LibGen*** and ***PiLiMi*** unless preservation duties applied. This addressed the specific pirate-library source issue. The plaintiffs’ settlement position was not merely monetary. It sought removal of allegedly unlawful input copies from Anthropic’s retained collections. The plaintiffs further accepted a tailored release. This was strategically important. The release covered past input-related claims. It did not cover past output claims. It did not cover future conduct after ***August 25, 2025***. This protected class members from overbroad waiver. The Court treated this as a central reason for likely fairness. The plaintiffs also supported a notice and distribution plan designed to locate authors, publishers, and other rightsholders. They accepted mechanisms for opt-outs, opt-backs, claims, competing claims, special master review, and payment allocation. Their position therefore combined legal risk management with practical administration. In a case involving nearly half a million works, perfect individual certainty was impossible. The plaintiffs promoted reasonable and layered notice. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS Anthropic’s position, as reflected in the order, was that settlement was preferable to continued litigation. The Court recorded that Anthropic had obtained important prior rulings. It had succeeded on fair use regarding reproductions of named plaintiffs’ books in the process of training large language models. It had also succeeded on fair use for one-to-one conversion of purchased print copies into digital copies for its central library, when done for space-saving and searchability. These rulings gave Anthropic litigation strength. At trial, plaintiffs still had to prove facts before a jury. Anthropic could contest willfulness. It could also argue reasonable belief in fair use to reduce damages. It could appeal adverse rulings. These risks supported settlement from Anthropic’s side. Anthropic also obtained a release of past AI-input-related claims. This gave finality for historical conduct involving pirating and copying up to the point of AI output. However, the release was not unlimited. It did not release output claims. It did not release future claims. Anthropic therefore received meaningful peace, but not total immunity. This limitation made the settlement more acceptable to the Court. Anthropic also avoided trial risk on statutory damages. The Court noted that a plaintiffs’ victory could vary widely, including up to ***$150,000 per work*** for willful infringement. Given nearly half a million works, theoretical exposure could be enormous. The settlement allowed Anthropic to resolve historical claims with defined payment, destruction duties, and no admission reflected in this order. Anthropic also participated in the notice and distribution structure. The Court required clarity that money would not revert to defendant unless the settlement failed. It also required rules against improper side deals. The long-form notice had to warn that rightsholders were prohibited from negotiating any ***quid pro quo*** for re-inclusion. Demands for payment in exchange for re-inclusion would be reported to the Court. This protected absent rightsholders and settlement integrity. Anthropic’s settlement posture therefore accepted broad administration, notice, claims review, and judicial oversight. It also accepted destruction of pirate-source copies. These obligations were weighed against the benefit of avoiding a complex trial and appeals. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS ***Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(1)(B)*** governs preliminary approval. It requires the Court to find that it will likely be able to approve the settlement under ***Rule 23(e)(2)*** and certify the class for judgment. ***Rule 23(e)(2)*** governs final approval factors. These include adequacy of representation, arm’s-length negotiation, adequacy of relief, and equitable treatment among class members. ***Rule 23(c)(2)(B)*** requires the best practicable notice, including individual notice to identifiable members through reasonable effort. These procedural rules were central. The Court did not treat settlement as a private bargain alone. It treated it as a judicially supervised compromise affecting absent persons. That is the core function of class action settlement review. ***17 U.S.C. § 504(c)*** was important because statutory damages framed settlement value. The Court stated that plaintiffs could potentially recover from ***$150,000 per work*** down to ***$200 per work*** depending on findings and willfulness. The ordinary statutory minimum of ***$750*** was used as a benchmark. The settlement’s approximate ***$3,000 per-work award***compared favourably at preliminary approval. ***17 U.S.C. § 410(c)*** and ***17 U.S.C. § 412(2)*** were relevant to registration timing and evidentiary consequences. The class definition required timely registration so works could use registrations as evidence of certain facts and pursue statutory damages. The Court therefore tied class membership to copyright registration rules. This made administration more objective. ***17 U.S.C. § 501(b)*** was relevant to notice. The Court considered whether the section required attaching the complaint to direct notice. It concluded that attaching the complaint was not necessary. It found sufficient a class notice summarising the amended complaint and released claims, while directing recipients to case documents and making copies available upon request. ***17 U.S.C. § 508(a)*** was also relevant. Plaintiffs’ counsel filed materials needed to effect notice to the Copyright Office. For Indian comparison, ***Section 14 of the Copyright Act, 1957*** defines copyright rights, including reproduction. ***Section 51*** defines infringement. ***Section 55*** concerns civil remedies. ***Section 62*** concerns jurisdiction. Indian law does not replicate United States class action settlement procedure. Yet the order is useful for mass-rights settlement design. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT IN THIS CASE ***Churchill Village, L.L.C. v. General Electric, 361 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 2004)*** supplied implied settlement fairness factors. The Court used it to examine discovery, risks, value, counsel’s experience, and likely class reaction. ***Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268 (9th Cir. 1992)*** supported the relevance of informed settlement after meaningful discovery. ***Briseño v. Henderson, 998 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2021)*** guided settlement scrutiny and express factors. ***In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liability Litigation, 654 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2011)*** guided collusion analysis. These cases show that courts must test whether a class settlement is truly fair. They cannot simply defer to counsel. The order applied these principles carefully. ***[Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/547/220/&ved=2ahUKEwi3op3y5L2WAxXXSGwGHd7OEqIQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw1YKIbXWY_Jq18ZOAddeFci "Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006)")*** and ***Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950)*** were central to notice. They express the due process principle that notice must be reasonably calculated to inform absent persons. The Court used them to assess what a person actually desirous of informing absentees would do. ***Roes, 1–2 v. SFBSC Management, LLC, 944 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2019)*** was cited for the idea that low claim submissions may indicate notice failure. ***[Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d 1449 (9th Cir. 1994)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/591487d2add7b049344ea491&ved=2ahUKEwi-3LX75L2WAxXZS3ADHb9OOkMQFnoECBwQAQ&usg=AOvVaw05ja3s8ROvq3WV91_bwan4 "Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d 1449 (9th Cir. 1994)")*** supported that actual notice to every member is not required. Together, these cases shaped the direct, indirect, and follow-up notice plan. ***Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)*** was used comparatively. The Court noted that the Bartz settlement’s per-work amount was far greater than the maximum proposed for books in the rejected Google Books settlement. It also noted that the Google Books settlement was rejected for releasing future claims. This comparison mattered. It showed why the tailored release here was preferable. The Court also cited [***Drazen v. Pinto, 106 F.4th 1302 (11th Cir. 2024)*** ](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/drazen-v-pinto-1056099790&ved=2ahUKEwjDgu2F5b2WAxXYTWwGHd_cMJwQFnoECBkQAQ&usg=AOvVaw24nfj9AQrNTPEydJKlx643 "Drazen v. Pinto, 106 F.4th 1302 (11th Cir. 2024) ")regarding express Rule 23 factors. These precedents together show that the order is grounded in class settlement law, not merely copyright law. Its most important doctrinal contribution lies in settlement administration for AI copyright claims. ## H) JUDGEMENT #### a) RATIO DECIDENDI The ratio decidendi is that the proposed settlement was likely certifiable and likely approvable under ***Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23***. The Court found that the clarified class remained substantially the same as the previously certified class. The Works List made class scope definite. It also removed ambiguity about release. The parties stipulated, for settlement only, that Works List titles met works-related criteria. Therefore, individual class members needed to prove only ownership of the relevant reproduction rights. This supported manageability. The Court also found that final judgment would likely be appropriate classwide. Potential ownership disputes might arise, but the claims process could address them. The possibility of later ownership disputes did not defeat preliminary approval. The Court also held that the settlement was within the range likely to receive final approval. It relied on extensive discovery, serious litigation risk, quality counsel, prompt closure, tailored release, injunctive relief, and meaningful per-work recovery. Plaintiffs had strength on downloading claims. Yet trial risk remained. Anthropic had fair use rulings on LLM training reproductions and print-to-digital conversions. Willfulness and damages were uncertain. Appeals could follow. The settlement avoided prolonged complexity. It gave class members about ***$3,000 per work*** before costs and fees. It required destruction of ***LibGen*** and ***PiLiMi*** derived copies subject to legal preservation duties. These benefits justified preliminary approval. The Court also found likely absence of collusion. The Court’s third ratio concerns notice. It found the notice plan to be the best practicable under the circumstances. The plan combined broad indirect notice and individualized direct notice. It used copyright registries, commercial registries, publisher cooperation, author groups, First Class mail, email, web advertisements, earned media, social media advertisements, and a searchable website. It also included follow-up mechanisms for returned mail, bounced emails, unopened receipts, low claim submissions, opt-outs, opt-backs, claims, and competing claims. The Court required notice content improvements. It insisted on clear release language, opt-out instructions, and special master consent. The notice plan therefore satisfied due process and ***Rule 23(c)(2)(B)*** at preliminary stage. #### b) OBITER DICTA The order contains important observations about AI copyright litigation. The most notable is that ***“This case concerned AI inputs, not AI outputs.”*** This statement is not merely descriptive. It clarifies the settlement’s legal boundary. It means the case concerned past copying and pirating used as inputs. It did not compromise claims about generated outputs. It also did not release future claims. This observation may influence future AI settlements. Parties must specify whether they are resolving input claims, output claims, future training, future licensing, or all of them. Overbroad releases risk judicial rejection. The rejected ***Google Books*** settlement stood as a warning. The Court’s insistence on narrow release protects absent class members from losing unknown future rights. Another significant observation concerns settlement size. The Court described the settlement as the ***largest copyright class action settlement in history***. This was because nearly ***482,460 works*** were identified, leading to about ***$3,100*** per work before adjustments. The statement reflects the scale of AI-era copyright litigation. AI companies may interact with massive corpora. Traditional one-work infringement suits may be inadequate. Class actions may become a major procedural vehicle. However, class actions also raise ownership, notice, allocation, and representation problems. The Court recognised this. It warned that absence of publisher representatives or certain subsets could become a problem if objections reveal conflicts. This observation is prudent. It keeps the fairness inquiry open until class member responses arrive. #### c) GUIDELINES The order does not issue formal guidelines. Yet practical principles emerge. First, AI copyright settlements must define whether they cover ***inputs***, ***outputs***, or both. Second, future claims should not be casually released. Third, a Works List can make class membership and release scope definite. Fourth, settlement-only stipulations can reduce proof burdens while preserving litigation positions if settlement fails. Fifth, per-work equality may be fair where the infringement theory treats works similarly. Sixth, allocation among co-owners can be handled through claims processes. Seventh, notice must combine registry data, commercial tracing, media, web search tools, direct mail, email, and follow-up procedures. Eighth, fee payment should track class payment to avoid misalignment. Ninth, side deals among rightsholders must be prohibited. Tenth, courts should remain alert to absent publishers, authors, and co-owners. For Indian legal policy, these principles offer comparative value. India lacks a direct analogue to United States copyright class action settlements. Still, mass copyright disputes may arise through representative suits, public interest claims, assignment disputes, or collective licensing. AI companies may face claims from authors, publishers, photographers, musicians, and film producers. Indian courts and policymakers may need mechanisms for notice, opt-outs, claim verification, and allocation. ***Section 14*** and ***Section 51 of the Copyright Act, 1957*** would frame infringement. ***Section 55***would frame civil remedies. ***Order I Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908*** may become relevant for representative suits. This order shows how procedural design can determine substantive fairness in mass IP disputes. #### d) DISSENTING OPINION There was no dissenting opinion. The order was issued by one district judge. No concurring opinion exists. The absence of dissent is normal at the district court level. It does not transform preliminary approval into final approval. The Court repeatedly left room for later objections. It stated that class members’ reactions were premature to assess. It promised to consider all objections before final approval. It also recognised possible issues concerning publisher representation and ownership allocation. Therefore, the order’s authority is preliminary. It is strong as a settlement-screening order. It is not a final merits decision. It should not be cited as holding that Anthropic infringed copyright. It should be cited as holding that the settlement was likely fair enough to justify notice and further proceedings. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS This order is important because it shows how courts may manage AI copyright disputes at scale. The dispute concerned alleged copying of books from pirate libraries. The settlement did not try to solve every AI copyright issue. It focused on past AI inputs. That focus made the release acceptable. The Court’s approach is careful and rights-sensitive. It recognised plaintiffs’ strong case on downloading. It also recognised Anthropic’s litigation defences and prior fair use victories. It understood that statutory damages could be enormous or modest. It therefore treated settlement as a rational compromise. The settlement gave money, destruction of covered copies, and prompt closure. It avoided trial and appeals. Yet it preserved output claims and future claims. That balance is the order’s strongest feature. The opinion is also a model for notice in complex copyright settlements. Authors and publishers are often difficult to locate. Ownership may be divided. Publishing contracts may allocate proceeds differently. Some works may have multiple rightsholders. Some claims may conflict. The Court responded with layered notice and staged follow-up. It required a searchable Works List. It required direct mail, email, broad advertising, press outreach, and commercial tracing. It required additional notice when opt-outs, opt-backs, or claims identify new rightsholders. It required checks to be sent to identified owners even if some had not filed claims. These procedures reflect due process. They also reflect practical realism. Perfect notice is impossible. Reasonable, persistent, and adaptive notice is required. That is the central procedural lesson. For Indian scholars, the case is significant in two ways. First, it shows that AI copyright disputes may divide into separate legal categories. Training, pirate downloading, lawful purchase conversion, retention, output generation, and future use are not identical issues. Each needs separate legal analysis. Second, it shows that settlement architecture matters. An overbroad settlement may fail. A narrow settlement may succeed. In India, courts and policymakers may need to develop procedures for mass copyright claims involving AI datasets. They may need rules for notifying authors, publishers, performers, producers, and collecting societies. They may also need mechanisms for claim verification and allocation. ***Bartz et al. v. Anthropic PBC*** is therefore not merely an American settlement order. It is a practical blueprint for rights-sensitive AI dispute resolution. ## J) REFERENCES ### a) Important Cases Referred 1. ***Bartz et al. v. Anthropic PBC, No. C 24-05417 WHA, Document 437, Memorandum Opinion on Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Oct. 17, 2025.*** 2. ***Briseño v. Henderson, 998 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2021).*** 3. ***Churchill Village, L.L.C. v. General Electric, 361 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 2004).*** 4. ***Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268 (9th Cir. 1992).*** 5. ***In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liability Litigation, 654 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2011).*** 6. ***Drazen v. Pinto, 106 F.4th 1302 (11th Cir. 2024).*** 7. ***Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006).*** 8. ***Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).*** 9. ***United States v. Rivera-Valdes, No. 21-30177, 2025 WL 267255 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2025).*** 10. ***Roes, 1–2 v. SFBSC Management, LLC, 944 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2019).*** 11. ***Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d 1449 (9th Cir. 1994).*** 12. ***Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).*** 13. ***R.G. Anand v. Deluxe Films, (1978) 4 SCC 118.*** 14. ***Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1.*** 15. ***University of Oxford v. Rameshwari Photocopy Services, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6229.*** ### b) Important Statutes Referred 1. ***Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(1)(B).*** 2. ***Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2).*** 3. ***Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2)(B).*** 4. ***17 U.S.C. § 410(c).*** 5. ***17 U.S.C. § 412(2).*** 6. ***17 U.S.C. § 501(b).*** 7. ***17 U.S.C. § 504(c).*** 8. ***17 U.S.C. § 508(a).*** 9. ***Treasury Regulation Section 1.468B-1.*** 10. ***Copyright Act, 1957, Section 51.*** 11. ***Copyright Act, 1957, Section 55.*** 12. ***Copyright Act, 1957, Section 62.*** 13. ***Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order I Rule 8.*** 14. ***Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.*** 15. ***Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.*** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015)](https://lawfoyer.in/authors-guild-v-google-inc-804-f-3d-202-2d-cir-2015/) **Published:** August 26, 2026 **Author:** Jaya Dubey **Content:** # A) ABSTRACT ***Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015)*** is a leading United States fair use judgment. It concerned Google’s mass digitisation of books through the ***Google Books*** and ***Library Project*** programmes. Google scanned millions of books from major libraries. It created searchable digital text. It also displayed limited snippets to users. The plaintiff authors alleged copyright infringement. They argued that full-book copying, snippet view, library distribution, and digital storage violated their rights. The Second Circuit rejected these claims. The Court held that Google’s use was ***transformative*** under[ ***Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)***](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/510/569/&ved=2ahUKEwjz8-Wg4L2WAxWT1zgGHZ-vOZIQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw3_MLOs3XUtJcV7QpA12B-6 " Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)"). It found that search and snippet functions gave information about books. They did not provide meaningful substitutes for the books. The Court also held that commercial motivation alone could not defeat fair use. The decision is crucial for copyright, digital libraries, search engines, and AI-era text mining debates. It is persuasive for Indian copyright discussions under ***Sections 14, 51, and 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957***. **Keywords:** Fair use, transformative use, Google Books, digital scanning, snippet view, copyright, text mining, derivative rights, market harm, library digitisation. ## B) CASE DETAILS ### i) Judgement Cause Title ***The Authors Guild, Betty Miles, Jim Bouton, Joseph Goulden, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Google Inc.*** The case also named several other plaintiffs. These included ***Herbert Mitgang, Daniel Hoffman, Paul Dickson, The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., Pearson Education, Inc., Simon & Schuster, Inc., Association of American Publishers, Inc., Canadian Standard Association, and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.*** The operative appeal was brought by plaintiff-authors. They challenged the judgment granted in favour of Google. The dispute concerned Google’s scanning, indexing, retaining, searching, displaying, and distributing digital book copies. The Court treated the matter as a major copyright case. It stated that the dispute tested the boundaries of fair use. The central issue was whether unauthorised mass digitisation could be lawful when used for search and limited snippets. ### ii) Case Number The docket number was ***13-4829-cv***. The appeal arose from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The district judge was ***Chin, J.*** The district court had granted summary judgment to Google. It held that Google’s copying was fair use under ***17 U.S.C. § 107***. The plaintiffs appealed. The Second Circuit reviewed the matter ***de novo***. It drew reasonable factual inferences in favour of the non-moving party. Yet it found no material factual dispute defeating fair use. This procedural posture is vital. The case was decided on summary judgment. It was not merely a pleading-stage decision. The appellate court affirmed dismissal with prejudice. That makes the ruling stronger than a motion-to-dismiss order. ### iii) Judgement Date The case was argued on ***December 3, 2014***. It was decided on ***October 16, 2015***. The date matters because the judgment predates modern generative AI disputes. Yet it remains central in AI copyright debates. It supports searchable indexing and text mining. It does not automatically validate generative outputs. The Court repeatedly stressed limited public display and lack of substitution. That limitation is important. Google did not offer full books to users. It gave search results and controlled snippets. The decision therefore protects certain informational uses. It does not create a blanket licence for expressive reproduction. Indian courts may find this distinction important when considering AI training and output generation. ### iv) Court The judgment was delivered by the ***United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit***. The appeal came from the ***United States District Court for the Southern District of New York***. The Second Circuit is influential in American copyright law. It has decided several important fair use cases. Its judgments often shape digital copyright doctrine. The Court’s reasoning is not binding in India. Yet it carries strong persuasive value. Indian courts may consider it while interpreting digital research, indexing, preservation, and data analysis uses. However, India follows ***fair dealing*** under ***Section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957***. It does not follow open-ended American fair use. Hence, Indian adoption must be careful and statute-sensitive. ### v) Quorum The quorum comprised ***Leval, Cabranes, and Parker, Circuit Judges***. The panel was unanimous. No dissent was delivered. The opinion was authored by ***Leval, Circuit Judge***. This is notable because Judge Pierre Leval is closely associated with the transformative use doctrine. His analysis emphasised purpose, market substitution, and public knowledge. The Court examined every fair use factor. It also considered derivative rights, security risks, library copies, and contributory infringement. The judgment is doctrinally rich. It balances author incentives with public access to knowledge. It does not treat copyright as an absolute private monopoly. It treats copyright as an instrument serving public learning. ### vi) Author The author was ***Leval, Circuit Judge***. His opinion placed fair use within copyright’s constitutional purpose. It observed that copyright exists to promote progress. It rewards authors so the public receives knowledge. The judgment relied heavily on ***Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)***. It explained that transformative use adds a new purpose. It does not merely supersede the original. The Court also warned against reading “transformative” too literally. A derivative work may transform form. Yet that is not always fair use. This distinction is central. A film adaptation of a novel may transform form. Still, it remains within derivative rights. A search index transforms function. That may support fair use. ### vii) Citation The full citation is ***Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015)***. The district court judgment below was ***Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)***. The proposed settlement decision was ***Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)***. The class certification decision was ***Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 282 F.R.D. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)***. The related HathiTrust appeal was ***Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014)***. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment. It held that Google’s search and snippet functions constituted non-infringing fair use. ### viii) Legal Provisions Involved The core provision was ***17 U.S.C. § 107***. It codifies fair use. The Court also referred to ***17 U.S.C. § 101***. That provision defines derivative works. It also referred to ***17 U.S.C. § 106***. That section grants exclusive rights to copyright owners. Jurisdiction arose under ***28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a)***. Appellate jurisdiction arose under ***28 U.S.C. § 1291***. For Indian comparison, the closest provisions are ***Section 14 of the Copyright Act, 1957***, defining copyright rights. ***Section 51***defines infringement. ***Section 52*** contains fair dealing and permitted uses. ***Section 52(1)(a)*** concerns fair dealing for certain purposes. ***Section 52(1)(zb)*** and other library-related provisions may become relevant in digital library debates. ### ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case No judgment was overruled. The Court affirmed the district court. It followed and developed existing fair use precedents. It applied ***Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)***. It followed ***Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014)*** on searchable databases. It distinguished ordinary derivative works from transformative search tools. It limited the force of the dictum in [***Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)***. ](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/464/417/&ved=2ahUKEwjHqtnn4L2WAxWEg2MGHRdDL5YQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw1drJ9LZvGfakqrdFwX2CdG "Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). ")The Court stated that commercial use is not presumptively unfair. That understanding came from ***Campbell***. Therefore, the case clarified doctrine. It did not formally overrule precedent. ### x) Related Law Subjects The case relates to ***copyright law, fair use, digital libraries, search engines, data mining, text mining, internet law, information law, technology law, and civil procedure***. It is also related to ***artificial intelligence law*** by later analogy. The case concerns machine-readable corpora. It discusses n-grams and research over millions of digitised books. It also concerns access controls and snippet restrictions. The dispute raises questions about public knowledge, private rights, and technological transformation. In India, it would connect with ***copyright law, information technology law, education law, library law, and intellectual property policy***. Internationally, it has relevance to the ***Berne Convention*** and ***TRIPS Agreement***. These instruments protect authors while permitting national exceptions. ### xi) Name of Counsels Appearing for Parties For the plaintiff-appellants, ***Paul M. Smith of Jenner & Block LLP, Washington, DC*** appeared. The brief also named ***Edward H. Rosenthal, Jeremy S. Goldman, Anna Kadyshevich, and Andrew D. Jacobs of Frankfurt Kurnit Klein & Selz PC, New York***. For Google, ***Seth P. Waxman of Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Washington, DC***appeared. The brief also named ***Louis R. Cohen, Daniel P. Kearney Jr., Weili J. Shaw, Daralyn J. Durie, and Joseph C. Gratz***. The judgment specifically records these names. They should be cited exactly. Counsel details matter because the case involved sophisticated copyright litigation. It was argued at a high appellate level. ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The dispute arose from ***Google Books*** and the ***Google Library Project***. Google entered bilateral agreements with major research libraries. These libraries selected books from their collections. Google then scanned those books. It created digital images, machine-readable text, and searchable indexes. Google retained scanned images to improve optical character recognition. Since 2004, it scanned, rendered machine-readable, and indexed more than twenty million books. The corpus included copyrighted works and public domain works. Most books were non-fiction. Many were out of print. Google stored the data on protected servers. This factual matrix was essential. The Court did not consider Google as merely republishing books. It considered Google as building a search and research infrastructure. The purpose was informational identification. That purpose shaped the fair use outcome. The public could use Google Books to search for words or terms. The system returned books containing those terms. It also showed how often the terms appeared. It provided rudimentary information about books. It sometimes linked users to online purchase options. It also identified libraries holding the books. Google displayed no advertisements to users of the search function. Nor did it receive payment through purchase links. The search system also enabled ***text mining*** and ***data mining***. Google’s ***ngrams*** tool allowed statistical analysis of word and phrase usage across centuries. Researchers could examine linguistic change, thematic patterns, and historical usage. These functions were central to transformation. The Court considered them new utilities. They did not duplicate the expressive experience of reading the books. They allowed users to learn about books and language patterns. The contested feature was ***snippet view***. Google displayed a maximum of three snippets for a search term. A snippet was usually one-eighth of a page. Google used several restrictions. It showed the same snippets for the same search term. Repeated searches from different computers did not increase access. It blacklisted one snippet per page. It also blacklisted one entire page out of every ten. It disabled snippet view for dictionaries, cookbooks, and short-poem books. Those works could be harmed by tiny excerpts. Since 2005, Google allowed rights holders to remove books from snippet view. These restrictions strongly influenced the judgment. The Court held that snippet view added value to search. It helped users decide whether a book was relevant. Yet it did not provide a meaningful substitute for the book itself. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The plaintiff authors owned copyrights in published books. ***Jim Bouton*** authored ***Ball Four***. ***Betty Miles*** authored ***The Trouble with Thirteen***. ***Joseph Goulden*** authored ***The Superlawyers: The Small and Powerful World of the Great Washington Law Firms***. Their books were scanned without permission. Google made them searchable. It also made snippet view available. The plaintiffs sued for copyright infringement. They sought injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and damages. Google pleaded fair use. The district court accepted Google’s defence. It granted summary judgment. The plaintiffs appealed. They argued that full-book copying and snippet display were not transformative. They also argued that Google’s commercial motivation defeated fair use. They claimed lost licensing opportunities, security risks, and wrongful distribution to libraries. The Second Circuit rejected every major contention. The plaintiffs objected to several connected activities. First, Google copied entire books. Second, Google retained digital copies. Third, Google displayed snippets. Fourth, Google enabled public search. Fifth, Google gave digital copies back to participating libraries. The libraries could download copies only of books they had submitted. The agreements required libraries to comply with copyright law. They also required precautions against public dissemination. One agreement required technological measures, including robots.txt restrictions. The plaintiffs said these arrangements created infringement risks. They feared library misuse and hacking. The Court found these fears speculative on the record. It reasoned that fair use searches by libraries were lawful. It also reasoned that speculative misuse by libraries could not make Google a contributory infringer. Evidence of encouragement or knowledge could matter in another case. It was absent here. The procedural history was long. The suit began in 2005 as a putative class action. A proposed settlement was reached after years of negotiation. The district court rejected it in 2011. It considered the settlement unfair to class members. The plaintiffs later filed the operative fourth amended complaint. The district court certified a class in 2012. Google appealed class certification. It also moved for summary judgment on fair use. The Second Circuit provisionally vacated certification. It said fair use resolution could inform or moot class issues. In 2013, the district court granted Google summary judgment. It held that the use was transformative. It also held that display was properly limited. It found no impermissible market substitute. The Second Circuit affirmed that reasoning in 2015. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED The first issue was whether Google’s full-book scanning was fair use. This required application of ***17 U.S.C. § 107***. The Court examined the four statutory factors. It placed special emphasis on transformative purpose and market substitution. The search function was held highly transformative. It gave users information about books. It did not give the books themselves. Complete copying was necessary for reliable full-text search. Copying less than the entire book would make search incomplete. The Court therefore rejected a rigid rule against full copying. It relied on [***Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014)***.](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/12-4547/12-4547-2014-06-10.html&ved=2ahUKEwiYt8334L2WAxWN1TgGHdnFOSEQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw170vSoquIdXkDXCLEf5svp "Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014).") That case treated a full-text searchable database as quintessentially transformative. This issue matters for digital research and indexing. It also matters for AI training debates. The second issue was whether snippet view destroyed fair use. The plaintiffs argued that snippets let users read copyrighted text. They said snippets could substitute for books. The Court accepted that text display could affect fair use. It said quantity, control, and coherence matter. The more text revealed, the greater the substitution risk. Yet Google’s snippet system was heavily restricted. It showed tiny fragments. It blacklisted portions permanently. It prevented repeated searches from increasing access. It disabled snippet view for vulnerable books. The plaintiffs’ researchers could not access even sixteen percent of the books. The revealed text was scattered and non-sequential. The Court held that scattered fragments did not communicate the sense of the original. Therefore, snippet view did not create a significant market substitute. The third issue was whether Google’s commercial purpose defeated fair use. The plaintiffs argued that Google benefited commercially. They claimed Google strengthened its search-market dominance. The Court accepted that Google was profit-motivated. But it rejected a presumption against commercial fair use. It treated the old ***Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)*** dictum as overstated. It followed ***Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)***. The more transformative the use, the less commerciality matters. The Court also noted that many fair uses are commercial. These include commentary, reporting, review, scholarship, and parody. Since Google’s use was highly transformative and non-substitutive, commercial motivation did not defeat fair use. The fourth issue involved derivative rights and licensing markets. The plaintiffs argued that Google took their right to license search functions. They claimed lost markets for book search and snippets. The Court rejected that argument. It held that copyright owners do not possess exclusive rights over information about their works. A search index does not become a derivative work merely because it is useful. The Court distinguished derivative transformations from transformative fair use. A translation, film adaptation, audiobook, or abridgement may fall within derivative rights. A search tool providing information about books is different. The Court also rejected speculative market arguments. Copyright cannot be expanded to control every paid licensing possibility. The fourth factor concerns traditional, reasonable, and likely markets for protected expression. It does not protect markets for transformative information tools. ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the plaintiff-appellants submitted that Google copied entire copyrighted books without permission. They argued that complete digitisation exceeded fair use. They said Google retained full digital copies permanently. They also argued that snippet view disclosed expressive text to the public. This, according to them, allowed users to consume portions without payment. They stressed that copyright owners hold exclusive rights under ***17 U.S.C. § 106***. Google’s conduct allegedly violated reproduction and distribution rights. They further argued that ***Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)*** did not protect Google. In their view, Google’s use did not comment on or criticise the books. It merely exploited them. The Court rejected this narrow view. It held that providing information about originals can also be transformative. The appellants also argued that Google’s commercial motivation weighed heavily against fair use. They accepted that Google did not charge users for Google Books search. They also accepted that no advertising appeared beside search results. Yet they argued that Google benefited indirectly. They said the project strengthened Google’s dominance in internet search. They also argued that Google gained data, goodwill, and market power. The Court did not deny commercial motivation. It found it insufficient. Under ***Campbell*** and [***Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013)***,](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/11-1197/11-1197-2013-04-25.html&ved=2ahUKEwjg8dSH4b2WAxUYxDgGHazENm8QFnoECCIQAQ&usg=AOvVaw10ADgfvwlGu6-_3lq6ZG_F "Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013),") commerciality is only one factor. It cannot defeat a strong transformative purpose by itself. The appellants’ argument therefore failed because they could not show meaningful substitution. Commercial gain matters most when copying captures revenue directly from protected expression. The appellants further submitted that Google invaded licensing markets. They argued that authors could license searchable databases or snippet services. Google allegedly usurped those markets. They also raised derivative rights. They claimed that search functions were derivative uses. The Court rejected this broad derivative-right theory. It explained that derivative works usually recast expression into another expressive form. Examples include translation, adaptation, fictionalisation, abridgement, and condensation. Google’s search did not recast the books for expressive consumption. It enabled users to identify books. It supplied information about the books. The appellants also feared security breaches. They argued that stored digital copies could be hacked. The Court required evidence, not speculation. Google showed security precautions. The plaintiffs failed to rebut that showing adequately. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Google submitted that its copying was fair use under ***17 U.S.C. § 107***. They argued that full scanning was essential to search. A search tool cannot reliably identify word usage without complete text. Google also argued that search served a new purpose. It did not allow users to read the books. It allowed users to find books and analyse word usage. Google stressed public benefit. The programme helped scholars, researchers, readers, and libraries. It made hidden information discoverable. It allowed text mining and data mining. These functions could not be performed through manual reading at scale. The Court accepted this reasoning. It found the search function highly transformative. It also treated n-grams as a new research tool. The copying expanded utility without replacing the books. Google also argued that snippet view was carefully limited. It showed only tiny fragments. It did not reveal pages, chapters, or coherent sections. It blacklisted material. It disabled snippets for categories vulnerable to substitution. It allowed rights holders to opt out. Google submitted that snippets helped users decide whether a book was relevant. A bare search result may show a word’s presence. It may not reveal context. Snippets supply enough context to evaluate relevance. The Court accepted this functional justification. It held that snippet view added value to search. It did not provide enough protected expression to replace books. The Court’s analysis turned on architecture. Google’s technical limits were legally important. Fair use was supported because the system was designed against substitution. Google further submitted that library copies were lawful. Participating libraries supplied books they already owned. Google created digital copies for them. The agreements required lawful use and security precautions. The libraries could use copies for fair use searches. The Court accepted that a library could itself digitise books for fair use search. Google did not infringe merely by making the copy for the library. The plaintiffs’ concerns about future misuse were speculative. There was no evidence that Google encouraged infringement. There was no proof that libraries would distribute books unlawfully. The Court left open future liability if evidence existed. But on the present record, contributory infringement was not established. This reasoning protects lawful technological assistance. It also preserves liability where actual encouragement or knowledge exists. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS ***17 U.S.C. § 107*** was the governing provision. It lists four fair use factors. The first concerns purpose and character. This includes commercial or nonprofit nature. The second concerns the nature of the copyrighted work. The third concerns amount and substantiality used. The fourth concerns market effect. The Court treated these factors holistically. It followed ***Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)***. It emphasised that fair use has no bright-line rules. The Court gave strong weight to transformative purpose and market substitution.[ ***Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985)***](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/471/539/&ved=2ahUKEwjf1K6S4b2WAxW3hWMGHX0-BPgQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw32IiqKL3CBFf_LMfevFIWl " Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985)") was relevant for market harm. Yet the Court did not treat the fourth factor mechanically. It evaluated whether snippets meaningfully replaced the original books. ***17 U.S.C. § 101*** was relevant because it defines derivative works. The Court distinguished derivative works from transformative fair uses. A derivative work changes form while still exploiting protected expression. A translation, film, abridgement, or audiobook often remains within owner control. A search index may transform function instead. It gives information about the original. It does not recreate the original’s expressive market. ***17 U.S.C. § 106*** was also relevant. It grants exclusive rights. These include reproduction and derivative-work rights. Google’s scanning implicated reproduction. The case therefore turned on whether ***17 U.S.C. § 107*** excused that copying. The Court held that it did. Jurisdiction came under ***28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a)***. Appeal jurisdiction came under ***28 U.S.C. § 1291***. For Indian comparison, ***Section 14 of the Copyright Act, 1957*** defines exclusive rights. ***Section 51*** defines infringement. ***Section 52*** contains exceptions. India does not use open-ended fair use. It uses fair dealing and specific permitted acts. The Indian Supreme Court in [***Civic Chandran v. Ammini Amma, 1996 SCC OnLine Ker 63***, ](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1533621/&ved=2ahUKEwjSvMGd4b2WAxVT4jgGHR45DjIQFnoECBoQAQ&usg=AOvVaw0o5GTZFIAeP-Ig4o5N-ZnT "Civic Chandran v. Ammini Amma, 1996 SCC OnLine Ker 63, ")though from the Kerala High Court, discussed transformative parody. ***[R.G. Anand v. Deluxe Films, (1978) 4 SCC 118](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1734007/&ved=2ahUKEwiVmqyt4b2WAxX2xTgGHWlsGI4QFnoECA4QAQ&usg=AOvVaw3FXsSrd5X6Zir1Q5uV7XQ1 "R.G. Anand v. Deluxe Films, (1978) 4 SCC 118")*** remains important for idea-expression distinction. [***Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1*** ](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1062099/&ved=2ahUKEwjguPC24b2WAxWQhGMGHRvuAsYQFnoECBkQAQ&usg=AOvVaw0BMOfulPRi0lc6GU9U7kpq "Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1 ")discusses originality.[ ***University of Oxford v. Rameshwari Photocopy Services, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6229*** ](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/57dc3003bc41683b3d081873&ved=2ahUKEwiDlt3E4b2WAxUOxjgGHdBnMH0QFnoECCIQAQ&usg=AOvVaw2X4tMaCN4mdAU2TKo23aXf " University of Oxford v. Rameshwari Photocopy Services, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6229 ")considered educational copying. These Indian authorities would guide analogous analysis. Yet Indian courts must remain bound by ***Section 52*** rather than American fair use. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT IN THIS CASE ***Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)*** was the central authority. It explained transformative use. A secondary use may be fair when it adds something new. It must not merely supersede the original. The Court used ***Campbell*** to assess Google’s search and snippet functions. ***Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985)*** was important for market harm. It treated the fourth factor as highly significant. ***[Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi%3Farticle%3D1155%26context%3Djipl&ved=2ahUKEwjwzZvb4b2WAxUX4TgGHa3XIG4QFnoECCYQAQ&usg=AOvVaw2uvDefitzmDZ8tn6oZzSY9 "Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)")*** supplied early fair use reasoning. It looked to purpose, quantity, value, and market prejudice. ***Cary v. Kearsley, 170 Eng. Rep. 679 (1802)*** was cited for the maxim against putting “manacles upon science.” ***Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014)*** strongly influenced the ruling. It held that full-text searchable databases can be fair use. It treated word search as different in purpose from reading books. Google’s case differed because it included snippets and involved a commercial company. Still, HathiTrust supported full copying for search. ***[A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914b1c5add7b0493475b863&ved=2ahUKEwjWvon04b2WAxWV1zgGHXnWNO0QFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw24uJ1jpH--pyKONkZS9L7Y "A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009)")*** supported complete copying for plagiarism detection. ***Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007)*** and ***Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003)*** supported transformative image search. These cases showed that complete digital copying may be fair when the function differs from the original. ***Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)*** was discussed on commerciality. Its dictum suggested commercial uses were presumptively unfair. The Court held that later doctrine had overtaken that broad statement. ***Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013)*** and ***Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998)*** supported the view that commerciality is not decisive. ***Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006)*** supported whole-work copying where necessary. ***American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994)*** was relevant because fair use is an affirmative defence. Google bore the burden. ***Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 721 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2013)*** appeared in procedural history. It provisionally vacated class certification. It said fair use resolution could affect class issues. ***Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)*** rejected the proposed settlement. ***Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 282 F.R.D. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)*** certified the class. ***Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)*** granted summary judgment to Google. The Second Circuit affirmed that judgment. The procedural path shows the case’s complexity. It moved from settlement, to class certification, to fair use summary judgment, to appellate affirmation. ## H) JUDGEMENT #### a) RATIO DECIDENDI The ratio decidendi is that Google’s unauthorised digitisation of copyright-protected books, creation of search functionality, and display of limited snippets constituted fair use. The use was highly transformative. It enabled users to identify books containing search terms. It enabled statistical and linguistic research. It did not offer the public a meaningful substitute for the books. The Court held that full copying was justified because it was necessary for search. The amount copied must be assessed against purpose. Copying an entire work is not automatically unfair. The crucial question is whether the copying is reasonably necessary and non-substitutive. Google copied whole books internally. It did not reveal whole books publicly. This difference carried decisive weight. The public received limited information, not the expressive work itself. The Court further held that snippet view did not defeat fair use. Snippets helped users evaluate relevance. They added context to search. Yet Google imposed strong limits. Snippets were tiny, fixed, blacklisted, scattered, and non-sequential. Users could not assemble coherent substitutes. Google disabled snippets for special categories. Rights holders could request exclusion from snippet view. These limits protected authors’ markets. The Court’s ratio therefore depends on controlled access. If a future system revealed coherent substantial portions, the answer could differ. The Court expressly indicated that a coherent sixteen percent block would raise a different question. Thus, the judgment is not a blanket approval of all excerpt systems. It approves this specific architecture because it avoided substitutive harm. The Court also held that Google’s commercial motivation did not defeat fair use. Commerciality is relevant but not conclusive. Many accepted fair uses are commercial. A strong transformative purpose reduces the significance of commercial gain. The absence of meaningful substitution mattered more. The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ derivative market argument. Authors do not have an exclusive right to control information about their works. Copyright protects expression, not every tool that helps users find or study expression. Google’s provision of digital copies to participating libraries was also non-infringing. The libraries owned the physical books. They agreed to use copies lawfully. Speculative misuse or hacking could not establish contributory infringement. Evidence of encouragement or knowledge might change another case. It was absent here. #### b) OBITER DICTA The Court’s broader observations are highly influential. It stated that copyright’s ultimate goal is public knowledge. Authors benefit because rewards encourage creation. But the final beneficiary is the public. This philosophy shaped the judgment. The Court also warned that transformative use cannot be reduced to mere change. A derivative work can also transform form. Yet it may remain owner-controlled. The real question is purpose and substitution. This observation is important in modern AI law. A model output may be “new” in form. But it may still substitute protected expression. Conversely, a database may copy everything internally. Yet it may be fair if it reveals only non-substitutive information. The judgment therefore provides a nuanced analytical framework. It avoids both technological panic and technological exceptionalism. The Court also made important observations about factual works. It refused to treat factual books as weakly protected. Facts and ideas are not protected. But expression of facts is protected. The Court noted that news reports are factual works. That does not mean others may freely copy and redistribute them. This observation is especially relevant today. It prevents misreading the case as a licence for copying factual materials. The fair use finding rested on transformative search and limited display. It did not rest on the idea that non-fiction books lack protection. Indian law follows a similar idea-expression distinction. In ***Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1***, originality required skill and judgment. Factual compilations can receive protection for original arrangement and expression. #### c) GUIDELINES The judgment does not issue formal guidelines. Yet several working principles emerge. First, complete digitisation can be fair where necessary for a transformative technological function. Second, public display must remain limited. Third, snippet or excerpt systems should prevent reconstruction of the original. Fourth, blacklisting, fixed snippets, category exclusions, and opt-out mechanisms reduce substitution risk. Fifth, commercial motivation does not defeat fair use automatically. Sixth, courts must examine actual market substitution, not abstract licensing possibilities. Seventh, copyright owners cannot monopolise information about their works. Eighth, derivative rights should not swallow transformative fair use. Ninth, speculative hacking risks require evidence. Tenth, library copies may be lawful where libraries own source books and undertake lawful use. These principles are not statutory rules. They are judicial reasoning points. For Indian application, these principles require adaptation. Indian courts cannot import ***17 U.S.C. § 107*** wholesale. ***Section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957*** is more specific. Yet courts can use the reasoning while interpreting fairness, research, education, library use, and market harm. A digital index that reveals no expressive substitute may be easier to justify. A generative AI system producing coherent expressive passages may be harder to justify. The decisive questions should be purpose, necessity, access control, market harm, and expressive substitution. Indian courts may also consider constitutional values. ***Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India*** protects speech and access to information. Yet ***Article 300A*** protects property interests. Copyright disputes must balance both values through statute. #### d) DISSENTING OPINION There was no dissenting opinion. The panel was unanimous. ***Leval, Circuit Judge*** authored the judgment. ***Cabranes and Parker, Circuit Judges*** joined. The absence of dissent strengthens the judgment’s authority within the Second Circuit. It also shows a clear judicial consensus on the facts presented. However, unanimity should not be misunderstood. The Court did not approve all digitisation. It approved Google’s specific design. The search function was transformative. Snippet display was limited. Market substitution was absent. Library distribution was controlled. Security concerns were speculative. A case with broader text display, paid access to expressive passages, weaker restrictions, or proven market displacement could be decided differently. The judgment is powerful because it is fact-sensitive. It is not a universal safe harbour. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment is a landmark for digital copyright. It establishes that searchability can be transformative. It also establishes that complete internal copying may be lawful where necessary. The core idea is functional transformation. Google did not invite users to read books for free. It helped them find books. It helped scholars study language at scale. It helped users decide whether books were relevant. These benefits aligned with copyright’s public purpose. The Court’s reasoning is persuasive because it protects both access and authorship. It does not deny copyright. It protects markets for expressive reading. It refuses to create markets for every possible informational tool. This distinction is doctrinally elegant. It ensures copyright remains a progress-promoting system. It does not become a veto over knowledge infrastructure. The case is also important for AI and machine learning debates. Google copied books into a machine-readable corpus. It enabled search, n-grams, and text mining. These uses resemble some non-generative computational uses. Yet modern generative AI is different. A system that outputs expressive substitutes may not fit Google Books. A system that reveals long coherent passages may create market harm. A system that competes with books or articles may be harder to defend. Therefore, ***Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015)*** should not be overstated. It supports computational analysis and limited display. It does not automatically approve training, memorisation, or expressive generation. The judgment’s own limits are clear. Fair use depends on purpose, design, quantity, and substitution. Those elements must be proved, not assumed. For Indian law, the decision offers persuasive reasoning but not direct authority. India’s ***Copyright Act, 1957*** does not contain American fair use. It contains fair dealing and enumerated exceptions. Courts must begin with statutory text. Still, the policy insights are valuable. Search engines, digital libraries, and AI systems may claim public benefit. Rights holders may claim market harm and unauthorised reproduction. The correct approach is not automatic prohibition. It is also not automatic permission. Courts should examine whether the use replaces the work. They should examine whether the copied expression reaches the public. They should examine safeguards. They should examine whether the use serves research or access. They should also protect licensing markets for expressive works. This balanced method makes the judgment highly useful for Indian legal researchers. ## J) REFERENCES ### a) Important Cases Referred 1. ***Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015).*** 2. ***Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013*** 3. ***Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).*** 4. ***Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 282 F.R.D. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).*** 5. ***Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 721 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2013).*** 6. ***Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014).*** 7. ***Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).*** 8. ***Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).*** 9. ***Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).*** 10. ***Cary v. Kearsley, 170 Eng. Rep. 679 (1802).*** 11. ***Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).*** 12. ***Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).*** 13. ***Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).*** 14. ***American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).*** 15. ***A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009).*** 16. ***Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).*** 17. ***Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).*** 18. ***Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006).*** 19. ***Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).*** 20. ***Nuñez v. Caribbean International News Corp., 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000).*** 21. ***Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 2003).*** 22. ***Ty, Inc. v. Publications International, Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002).*** 23. ***Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014).*** 24. ***Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).*** 25. ***Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).*** 26. ***Ment Bros. Iron Works Co., Inc. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 702 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2012).*** 27. ***R.G. Anand v. Deluxe Films, (1978) 4 SCC 118.*** 28. ***Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1.*** 29. ***University of Oxford v. Rameshwari Photocopy Services, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6229.*** 30. ***Civic Chandran v. Ammini Amma, 1996 SCC OnLine Ker 63.*** ### b) Important Statutes Referred 1. ***17 U.S.C. § 101.*** 2. ***17 U.S.C. § 106.*** 3. ***17 U.S.C. § 107.*** 4. ***28 U.S.C. § 1291.*** 5. ***28 U.S.C. § 1331.*** 6. ***28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).*** 7. ***United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 8.*** 8. ***Copyright Act, 1957, Section 14.*** 9. ***Copyright Act, 1957, Section 51.*** 10. ***Copyright Act, 1957, Section 52.*** 11. ***Copyright Act, 1957, Section 52(1)(a).*** 12. ***Information Technology Act, 2000.*** 13. ***Constitution of India, Article 19(1)(a).*** 14. ***Constitution of India, Article 300A.*** 15. ***Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.*** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Advance Local Media LLC et al. v. Cohere Inc., 25-cv-1305 (CM)](https://lawfoyer.in/advance-local-media-llc-et-al-v-cohere-inc-25-cv-1305-cm/) **Published:** August 25, 2026 **Author:** Jaya Dubey **Content:** A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE ***Advance Local Media LLC et al. v. Cohere Inc.*, 25-cv-1305 (CM)** concerns a major artificial intelligence copyright and trademark dispute. The plaintiffs are prominent news and digital publishers. They alleged that ***Cohere Inc.*** copied copyrighted articles for training and retrieval-based outputs. They also alleged that Cohere’s AI product, ***Command***, generated full copies, substantial excerpts, and substitutive summaries of protected works. The Court, through ***Judge Colleen McMahon***, denied Cohere’s partial motion to dismiss. The ruling held that the publishers had plausibly pleaded direct copyright infringement, secondary copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and false designation of origin. The decision is important because it treats AI-generated summaries, hallucinated articles, retrieval tools, and trademark attribution as legally serious issues. It does not decide final liability. It only holds that the claims deserve discovery. The judgment is significant for Indian legal researchers because it closely resembles future disputes under ***Section 14, Section 51, and Section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957***, and passing-off principles under Indian trademark law. **Keywords:** Copyright infringement, Artificial intelligence, Large language models, Substitutive summaries, Secondary liability, Lanham Act, Trademark confusion, Retrieval Augmented Generation. ## B) CASE DETAILS ### i) Judgement Cause Title ***Advance Local Media LLC, Advance Magazine Publishers Inc. d/b/a Conde Nast, The Atlantic Monthly Group LLC, Forbes Media LLC, Guardian News & Media Limited, Insider, Inc., Los Angeles Times Communications LLC, The McClatchy Company, LLC, Newsday LLC, Plain Dealer Publishing Co., Politico LLC, The Republican Company, Toronto Star Newspapers Limited, and Vox Media LLC v. Cohere Inc.*** The plaintiffs were described collectively as ***“Publishers.”*** The defendant was ***Cohere Inc.*** The dispute arose from alleged AI copying, reproduction, display, distribution, and trademark misuse. The Court treated the complaint as one among many lawsuits challenging artificial intelligence companies. These lawsuits question whether copyrighted works may be copied for large language models. The case was not decided after trial. It arose at the pleading stage. Cohere filed a partial motion to dismiss. The Court denied that motion. The judgment therefore preserves the publishers’ claims for discovery. It does not finally decide infringement, damages, fair use, or defences. ### ii) Case Number The case number is ***25-cv-1305 (CM)***. The document was filed as ***Document 59*** in the United States District Court. The Court’s order specifically removed ***Docket No. 49*** from the list of open motions. The procedural posture is essential. The Court was not weighing final evidence. It was deciding whether the complaint contained plausible allegations. That distinction matters deeply. Under ***Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)***, factual allegations are accepted as true. Reasonable inferences favour the non-moving party. This allowed the publishers’ detailed examples to carry weight. It also prevented premature rejection of AI-output infringement theories. ### iii) Judgement Date The judgment is dated ***November 13, 2025***. The date matters because the decision belongs to the fast-developing AI copyright litigation wave. The Court noted that more than fifty lawsuits were already pending. These lawsuits challenge the use of copyrighted works by AI companies. The decision therefore sits inside a larger legal movement. It addresses how courts may evaluate AI model outputs at the pleading stage. It also shows judicial caution. The Court refused to dispose of complex factual issues too early. This is particularly relevant for Indian courts. Indian courts may face similar claims involving news articles, LLM training, and subscription-based content. ### iv) Court The Court was the ***United States District Court for the Southern District of New York***. This forum is highly significant. The Southern District of New York has long handled copyright, media, technology, and publishing disputes. It also has growing experience with AI-related litigation. The Court applied American copyright and trademark principles. Yet its reasoning is comparative useful for India. Indian courts may not follow it as binding precedent. Still, they may find it persuasive. The reasoning on substantial similarity, secondary infringement, and passing off can guide Indian analysis. This is especially true where AI systems reproduce expressive content or falsely attribute outputs to publishers. ### v) Quorum The matter was decided by a single judge. The presiding judge was ***McMahon, J.*** The judgment reflects a district court decision. It is not a Supreme Court ruling. It is also not an appellate ruling. Its value lies in persuasive reasoning. The Court examined the pleadings, the complaint, incorporated documents, and alleged examples. It did not conduct a trial. It did not make final factual findings. It treated the allegations as true only for Rule 12(b)(6). This approach is legally orthodox. It protects plaintiffs from dismissal where hidden technical systems require discovery. The Court recognised that AI infringement may occur behind closed digital systems. ### vi) Author The author of the judgment is ***Judge Colleen McMahon***. The order is titled ***“Decision and Order Denying Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss.”*** The writing style is direct and issue-focused. The Court first summarised the background. It then stated the pleading standard. It finally addressed direct copyright infringement, secondary copyright infringement, and Lanham Act claims. The judgment is structured around Cohere’s objections. Each objection was rejected. The Court found that the complaint plausibly pleaded infringement theories. This does not mean the publishers will certainly win. It only means their legal theories survive dismissal. Discovery will test evidence, causation, copying, user behaviour, and defences. ### vii) Citation The citation is ***Advance Local Media LLC et al. v. Cohere Inc., 25-cv-1305 (CM), Document 59, United States District Court, Southern District of New York, November 13, 2025***. The judgment cites several American authorities. Important cases include[ ***Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)***](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/556/662/&ved=2ahUKEwidnOWbnryWAxW8aHADHbpwC64QFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw3-ciUa7nDxoVgCcWua-YOb " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)"),[ ***Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)***](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/550/544/&ved=2ahUKEwivvdOrnryWAxXUU2wGHW76B5AQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw3ssyGnherxP4gBE3YvqCaf " Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)"),[ ***Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)***](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/499/340/&ved=2ahUKEwiKmqq0nryWAxUASWwGHfMVH5IQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw1N-7wMWpfZjdOJPigmrsfX " Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)"), ***[Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/summaries/nihonkeizai-comline-2ndcir1999.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwitgOK_nryWAxU6UGwGHdpqHjMQFnoECBsQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3-OZEIRIHLGeAHxoGfMEHr "Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999)")***, ***[Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/545/913/&ved=2ahUKEwjAo_vTnryWAxUuT2cHHfpzNeIQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw3AnsWK51iD63-ugoLakWWB "Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005)")***, and [***Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003)***.](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/539/23/&ved=2ahUKEwihlYjenryWAxWzWHADHeOJEIAQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw1kS5WT3H5CtMpNFGkq2v_t "Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).") ### viii) Legal Provisions Involved The main provisions were ***17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), 106(2), 106(3), 106(5), and 501***. These provisions concern reproduction, derivative works, distribution, public display, and infringement. The trademark claims arose under ***15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)***and ***15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A)***. These are Lanham Act provisions. They address trademark infringement and false designation of origin. The procedural rule was ***Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)***. For Indian comparison, the closest provisions are ***Section 14*** and ***Section 51 of the Copyright Act, 1957***. Trademark confusion would resemble ***Sections 29 and 30 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999***. ### ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case No judgment was overruled. The Court did not overturn any prior decision. It distinguished and applied earlier authorities. It rejected Cohere’s reliance on ***[Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publishing Co., 158 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/158/674/544791/&ved=2ahUKEwj53__rnryWAxVzbmwGHQvaAAcQFnoECBoQAQ&usg=AOvVaw2nxMOw7hDNJntl8KK0MaI0 "Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publishing Co., 158 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998)")*** at the pleading stage. It also declined to apply ***[Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/464/417/&ved=2ahUKEwji0-zznryWAxU2XWwGHcGuEsoQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw1drJ9LZvGfakqrdFwX2CdG "Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)")*** in the broad manner suggested by Cohere. The Court read ***Sony*** through later principles, including [***Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005)***.](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/545/913/&ved=2ahUKEwiPz_T7nryWAxXqTWcHHV0lM_QQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw3AnsWK51iD63-ugoLakWWB "Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).") It held that the complaint alleged active conduct and intentional design. That made the case different from mere sale of a lawful technology. ### x) Related Law Subjects The case relates to ***copyright law, trademark law, technology law, artificial intelligence law, media law, unfair competition law, civil procedure, internet law, and digital platform liability***. It also has relevance for ***constitutional free speech debates*** and ***international intellectual property law***. It intersects with the ***Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works*** and the ***TRIPS Agreement*** at a broader level. These instruments protect authors’ rights internationally. They also permit national systems to create limitations and exceptions. The case does not directly apply these instruments. Still, they provide the global legal background. The dispute concerns the balance between innovation and creative labour. ### xi) Name of Counsels Appearing for Parties The provided judgment states that the order was sent ***“BY ECF TO ALL COUNSEL.”*** It does not list the individual counsel names in the extracted decision. Therefore, counsel names cannot be accurately supplied from this document. It would be unsafe to invent names. The only reliable statement is that counsel appeared through the federal electronic filing system. The analysis must remain faithful to the judgment. Where the judgment is silent, the researcher should state that silence. This is especially important in legal writing. Accuracy is more important than decorative completeness. ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The dispute arose from Cohere’s development and licensing of large language models. Its main product was the ***Command Family of models***. Cohere marketed Command as a ***“knowledge assistant”*** suited to business users. The plaintiffs alleged that Command was designed to shortcut research and content analysis. They also alleged that Cohere promoted Command as a tool for receiving the latest news. This factual background mattered. The Court treated news access as central to the business model alleged in the complaint. The plaintiffs claimed that Cohere copied internet text through crawlers and bots. They also alleged use of the ***Common Crawl*** dataset. That dataset allegedly contained copyrighted materials and public domain content together. The complaint further alleged that Cohere crawled specific publisher websites. These allegations supported claims of direct copying. They also supported knowledge-based secondary liability. The Court did not decide whether copying actually occurred. It held that the allegations were plausible enough for discovery. The technical feature at the centre was ***Retrieval Augmented Generation***, or ***RAG***. The judgment explains that LLMs are trained on original datasets. They may lack current information. RAG allegedly permits Command to access external data sources while generating responses. The plaintiffs claimed that Cohere used publisher websites as content sources for RAG. According to the complaint, when RAG was active, Command reproduced copyrighted content. It allegedly delivered full copies, substantial excerpts, and substitutive summaries. The Court considered these allegations legally meaningful. It did not accept Cohere’s framing that summaries were only factual restatements. The complaint pleaded expressive copying. The publishers alleged that Command copied phraseology, organisation, writing style, punctuation, and paragraphs. This distinction between facts and expression became decisive. Under ***[Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/499/340/&ved=2ahUKEwipx_yKn7yWAxV-WXADHXatJiQQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw1N-7wMWpfZjdOJPigmrsfX "Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)")***, facts are not protected. But original expression in factual writing can be protected. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The plaintiffs are major publishers operating news, magazine, and digital platforms. They alleged that their copyrighted works were copied by Cohere. Cohere is a Canadian artificial intelligence company. It develops, operates, and licenses AI models. Its funders included large technology companies. The complaint focused on Cohere’s ***Command*** models. Users could access Command through chat interfaces. They could pay based on prompt and output length. They could also deploy their own instances under agreements. Cohere also offered free trials. The plaintiffs alleged that the free trial helped Cohere convert users into paying customers. The ***Playground*** interface included an ***“Under the Hood”*** feature. That feature allegedly allowed users to view sources used by Command. It could also show full copies of documents used to generate outputs. This was crucial. It strengthened display and reproduction allegations. It also raised concern about paywalled articles. The publishers alleged two different operational harms. First, with ***RAG turned on***, Command allegedly reproduced actual copyrighted content. This included full verbatim articles, substantial excerpts, and substitutive summaries. The outputs allegedly appeared even when users made ordinary natural-language queries. Users did not always request a specific article. Some prompts asked generally about a subject. Still, Command allegedly delivered protected expression. The complaint contained seventy-five examples. Fifty allegedly included verbatim copying. Twenty-five allegedly involved close paraphrasing and some verbatim copying. One cited example involved a prompt about the unknowability of undecided voters. Command allegedly copied eight of ten paragraphs from a ***New Yorker*** article with minor changes. Second, with ***RAG turned off***, Command allegedly hallucinated article text. It falsely attributed fabricated articles to publishers by using their marks. This created trademark and false designation concerns. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED The first issue was whether the publishers plausibly pleaded ***direct copyright infringement*** under ***17 U.S.C. §§ 106 and 501***. The Court had to decide whether alleged ***substitutive summaries*** could be substantially similar to protected expression. Cohere argued that summaries were legally insufficient. It said they only used abstracted facts. The Court rejected dismissal. It held that the complaint alleged more than factual repetition. It alleged expressive copying, close paraphrasing, and near-identical outputs. The issue was not whether every summary infringed. The issue was whether some pleaded examples plausibly did. The Court answered yes. This approach is consistent with ***Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999)***. Quantitative copying must be viewed with qualitative significance. There is no rigid word-count rule. The second issue was whether the publishers plausibly pleaded ***secondary copyright infringement***. They advanced three theories. These were contributory infringement by material contribution, contributory infringement by inducement, and vicarious infringement. Cohere argued that no underlying direct infringement was adequately alleged. It also argued that the complaint lacked actual knowledge of specific third-party infringement. The Court rejected both arguments. It held that investigator examples may support plausibility. Infringement through AI systems may happen privately. Users’ interactions are not visible to third parties. The Court also applied the Second Circuit standard. Under[ ***Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2010)***,](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/09-0905/09-0905-cv_opn-2011-03-27.html&ved=2ahUKEwiR8PSWn7yWAxWMZmwGHb8FEsoQFnoECBoQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3HJKCH0qLxcdhtPc6i5LMH " Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2010),") knowledge is objective. Liability may arise when a defendant knows or has reason to know of direct infringement. Specific actual knowledge was not required at this stage. The third issue concerned ***trademark infringement*** and ***false designation of origin*** under the ***Lanham Act***. The publishers alleged that Command hallucinated articles while using publisher marks. Cohere argued lack of use in commerce. It also argued lack of likely confusion. Finally, it invoked nominative fair use. The Court rejected dismissal. It held that the complaint plausibly alleged use in commerce. The marks were allegedly displayed to consumers through free trials designed to generate paying customers. The Court also found plausible confusion. The marks were allegedly indistinguishable from the publishers’ marks. Users could believe hallucinated articles were authentic. The Court rejected early application of nominative fair use. False attribution is not merely identification. A trademark cannot be used to pass off fabricated content as another’s work. ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the plaintiffs submitted that Cohere copied their protected works at multiple stages. They alleged copying for training datasets. They also alleged copying through RAG-based retrieval. They stated that Command could provide full articles, large excerpts, and substitutive summaries. These summaries allegedly copied expression, structure, style, and sentence choices. The publishers relied on seventy-five examples. These examples were central to pleading plausibility. They argued that AI outputs were not mere factual digests. They were close substitutes for original articles. This mattered commercially. A user receiving the output may not visit the publisher’s site. The publisher may lose subscription revenue, advertising revenue, licensing value, and reader engagement. The plaintiffs’ theory reflects the copyright principle that facts remain free. But original expression does not. This is close to Indian law under[ ***R.G. Anand v. Deluxe Films, (1978) 4 SCC 118***,](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1734007/&ved=2ahUKEwiGzfykn7yWAxXJamwGHVoKDqEQFnoECA4QAQ&usg=AOvVaw3FXsSrd5X6Zir1Q5uV7XQ1 " R.G. Anand v. Deluxe Films, (1978) 4 SCC 118,") where substantial similarity and overall impression matter. The plaintiffs also submitted that Cohere knowingly facilitated third-party infringement. They alleged that Cohere marketed Command as a news-access tool. They pointed to promotions describing access to latest news and summaries. They also alleged that Cohere had notice through copyright notices, terms of service, robots.txt instructions, and a cease-and-desist letter. These facts were used to show knowledge and inducement. The plaintiffs further argued that ***[Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/464/417/&ved=2ahUKEwi0_Ziun7yWAxWicWwGHc82M7EQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw1drJ9LZvGfakqrdFwX2CdG "Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)")*** did not protect Cohere. Their case was not based merely on a tool capable of lawful and unlawful uses. It was based on alleged intentional design and delivery of copied publisher content. This distinction follows ***Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005)***. Active encouragement may create liability even when a technology has lawful uses. On trademark, the plaintiffs submitted that Cohere’s hallucinations injured source identification. When Command fabricated articles and placed publisher marks on them, users could believe the publishers authored or approved the text. This was not a harmless label. It created false attribution. It could damage editorial reputation. It could also mislead consumers about source, sponsorship, affiliation, or approval. The publishers argued that Cohere’s use was commercial because Command was part of a monetised service. Even the free trial served customer acquisition. This made the use connected with commerce. The plaintiffs also argued that nominative fair use could not apply. A party may identify a genuine product by its name. But it may not attribute fake goods to the trademark owner. This resembles Indian passing-off doctrine. Under ***[Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 73](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1114158/&ved=2ahUKEwjbqOm9n7yWAxWqUGcHHQEVAPAQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw0BpIEHUsCQ7yIoe-5IDrM- "Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 73")***, confusion must be assessed from market realities and consumer perception. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsel for Cohere submitted that the direct infringement claim should fail insofar as it concerned ***substitutive summaries***. Cohere argued that summaries were not substantially similar as a matter of law. It said the outputs used abstracted facts and new sentences. Since facts are not copyrightable, Cohere argued that summary outputs could not infringe. It relied on the principle in ***Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)***. It also relied on ***Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999)*** to argue that copying limited portions may not constitute infringement. The Court rejected this narrow view. It held that the complaint alleged copying beyond facts. It also noted that ***Nihon*** did not create a fixed twenty-percent rule. Qualitative value remains important. Cohere also submitted that secondary infringement claims were defective. It argued that the publishers had not adequately pleaded direct infringement by ordinary users. It said investigator-generated outputs did not show typical use. It relied on ***Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publishing Co., 158 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998)***. The Court found that case distinguishable. It was decided after discovery. This case was at the pleading stage. Cohere further argued that actual knowledge of specific infringement was required. The Court rejected that standard for this Circuit. Cohere also argued against inducement. It said marketing a product as a latest-news tool was not inducement. The Court disagreed at the pleading stage. The allegations included promotional conduct, system design, and delivery of copied works. That was enough for plausibility. On the Lanham Act claims, Cohere submitted that outputs were not used in commerce. It argued that users purchased API access, not specific outputs. It also argued that one-off responses were not shared publicly. Cohere further contended that the complaint lacked real-world confusion. It sought application of the ***[Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/287/492/317079/&ved=2ahUKEwj3lsrIn7yWAxUpTmwGHdRtD8IQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw2ZfVL4eA8US6jwAc-PKSk- "Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961)")*** factors. Cohere also invoked nominative fair use. It argued that marks merely identified requested content. Finally, Cohere relied on ***[Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/539/23/&ved=2ahUKEwj52bjRn7yWAxXCR2wGHX8rBb0QFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw1kS5WT3H5CtMpNFGkq2v_t "Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003)")*** to resist trademark claims over communicative products. The Court rejected dismissal. It held that false attribution of hallucinated articles could constitute classic passing off. It also held that ***Dastar*** did not bar passing-off claims. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS The copyright provisions were ***17 U.S.C. § 106(1)***, ***17 U.S.C. § 106(2)***, ***17 U.S.C. § 106(3)***, ***17 U.S.C. § 106(5)***, and ***17 U.S.C. § 501***. These provisions protect reproduction, derivative works, distribution, public display, and infringement remedies. The plaintiffs alleged that Cohere reproduced copyrighted articles, distributed outputs, displayed copies, and created derivative or substitutive forms. Indian law contains a comparable structure. ***Section 14 of the Copyright Act, 1957*** gives exclusive rights. ***Section 51*** defines infringement. ***Section 52*** provides exceptions. In an Indian AI dispute, the key questions may include reproduction during scraping, storage, training, retrieval, and output generation. Courts would also examine fair dealing. Indian fair dealing is narrower than American fair use. Therefore, the Indian analysis may differ sharply from American doctrine. The trademark provisions were ***15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)*** and ***15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A)***. These provisions protect against unauthorised use of marks and false designation of origin. The Lanham Act also defines ***“use in commerce”*** under ***15 U.S.C. § 1127***. The Court examined whether marks were displayed to consumers in connection with commercial transactions. Indian equivalents include ***Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999*** for infringement. ***Section 30*** addresses limits on effect of registered marks. Passing off remains preserved under ***Section 27(2)***. If an Indian AI tool generated fabricated articles under a publisher’s mark, both infringement and passing off may arise. Reputation-based harm would be serious. The doctrine in[ ***Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah, (2002) 3 SCC 65***](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1299452/&ved=2ahUKEwj_qpzbn7yWAxV_S2cHHfKHLs8QFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw0zB5XN2ah4-Mk74swN2_V8 " Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah, (2002) 3 SCC 65") would support protection against deceptive trade representation. The procedural rule was ***Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)***. The standard resembles Indian rejection of plaint principles only in limited ways. Under American law, the complaint must state a plausible claim. The Court relied on ***[Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/556/662/&ved=2ahUKEwikjojjn7yWAxVFUGcHHQCTB1MQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw3-ciUa7nDxoVgCcWua-YOb "Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)")*** and ***[Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/550/544/&ved=2ahUKEwiwq6frn7yWAxU_TWwGHV3ADvYQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw3ssyGnherxP4gBE3YvqCaf "Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)")***. The Court accepted pleaded facts as true. It drew reasonable inferences for the publishers. It asked whether discovery could reveal supporting evidence. In India, ***Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908*** allows rejection of plaint in specific circumstances. Indian courts also avoid deciding disputed facts prematurely. Thus, the reasoning has comparative value. Complex AI system behaviour requires technical discovery. Early dismissal may be inappropriate where facts are hidden inside proprietary systems. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT IN THIS CASE ***Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)*** and ***Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)*** governed pleading sufficiency. The Court used them to test plausibility. A claim need not prove liability at the pleading stage. It must contain enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation of discovery. ***Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)*** separated facts from expression. The Court applied that separation to AI summaries. ***[Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2003)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/338/127/550044/&ved=2ahUKEwjr8vW2oLyWAxUBa2wGHSS0FgYQFnoECBkQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1naUFVzxvuzX0zp6VmwMNY "Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2003)")*** explained actual copying and substantial similarity. ***[Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262 (2d Cir. 2001)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914b7c1add7b0493478103f&ved=2ahUKEwjuoc2-oLyWAxWta2wGHbDhHXIQFnoECBsQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1BAfKf4gJMIenTrAZLYOyt "Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262 (2d Cir. 2001)")*** supported the more discerning ordinary observer test. Together, these cases framed whether Command copied protected expression, not merely facts. ***Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999)*** was central. It involved translated and summarised news materials. The Court used it carefully. Cohere wanted a quantitative rule. The Court rejected that. ***Nihon*** did not hold that copying twenty percent can never infringe. It held that qualitative nature matters[. ***Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997)*** ](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/126/70/497885/&ved=2ahUKEwizjcHKoLyWAxXud2wGHcQ7Fx4QFnoECA4QAQ&usg=AOvVaw0Ssj06sxnIk6R1CemJX4cx ". Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997) ")also supported qualitative and quantitative assessment. ***Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publishing Co., 158 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998)*** was distinguished. That case arose after discovery. This case arose at the pleading stage. The Court also cited ***[Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 124 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2007cv08822/314590/312/&ved=2ahUKEwi1tJ7VoLyWAxXlV2wGHaRhMlEQFnoECBkQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3GQxIFw-2eBfTJ7Lc9h0JA "Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 124 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)")*** for investigator-based proof. For secondary liability, the Court discussed ***Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2010)***. It stated the objective knowledge standard. A defendant may be liable where it knows or has reason to know. The Court also relied on [***The New York Times Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 777 F. Supp. 3d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2025)***. ](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2023cv11195/612697/514/&ved=2ahUKEwj6z7n2oLyWAxVkd2wGHbzeOrcQFnoECBoQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3rBjnQ8MUg28FYq07wzwFk "The New York Times Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 777 F. Supp. 3d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2025). ")That case rejected an actual-knowledge-only standard in similar AI litigation. ***[Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 910 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2018)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/16-2321/16-2321-2018-12-12.html&ved=2ahUKEwj7zpb-oLyWAxWuTGwGHXqWF7wQFnoECBwQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1wFMFNdW57wbUB_s05liox "Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 910 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2018)")*** supported the business-model inference.[ ***Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)***](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/464/417/&ved=2ahUKEwiRiKuIobyWAxWMRWwGHZNuFMQQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw1drJ9LZvGfakqrdFwX2CdG " Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)") was limited. ***Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005)*** supported liability for active inducement. For trademark law, the Court cited ***[Camelot SL LLC v. ThreeSixty Brands Group LLC, 632 F. Supp. 3d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2022)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2021cv08232/567610/71/&ved=2ahUKEwjDt_6ZobyWAxX4UGwGHWi9GF4QFnoECCMQAQ&usg=AOvVaw2-KU5vQGpfWM-e3AfWYIEF "Camelot SL LLC v. ThreeSixty Brands Group LLC, 632 F. Supp. 3d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2022)")***. It stated the basic Lanham Act elements. [***Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009)*** addressed](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/06-4881/06-4881-cv-20w-20errata2-2011-03-27.html&ved=2ahUKEwjPh7mjobyWAxUFTmwGHT7qGOwQFnoECCYQAQ&usg=AOvVaw35uBNhKhEqmvzxHLT4f09J "Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009) addressed") use in commerce. ***Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295 (2d Cir. 2013)*** supported commercial display analysis.[ ***Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961)***](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/287/492/317079/&ved=2ahUKEwjJi-GtobyWAxWrzzkIHUnJNYIQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw2ZfVL4eA8US6jwAc-PKSk- " Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961)") supplied confusion factors. But the Court noted that identical marks may not require mechanical factor analysis. ***[Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/08-3947/08-3947-cv_opn-2011-03-27.html&ved=2ahUKEwiSpIa1obyWAxUzS3ADHZknDF8QFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw2lbmN6AMbwYeD4QrhbdXA4 "Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010)")***explained nominative use. ***[Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/539/23/&ved=2ahUKEwinlOK8obyWAxXiUGwGHcvfJscQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw1kS5WT3H5CtMpNFGkq2v_t "Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003)")*** did not bar the pleaded passing-off theory. ## H) JUDGEMENT ### a) RATIO DECIDENDI The ratio is that the publishers plausibly pleaded actionable copyright and trademark claims. The Court held that AI-generated ***substitutive summaries*** cannot be dismissed merely because they are called summaries. The true question is substantial similarity. If the output copies protected expression, organisation, phrasing, or style, infringement may be plausible. The Court stressed that facts are not protected. But expression is protected. It found the complaint pleaded copying that was both quantitatively and qualitatively significant. The seventy-five examples mattered. The alleged New Yorker example was especially powerful. It showed near-identical copying of several paragraphs. Therefore, whether the summaries infringe is a factual issue. It cannot be decided merely on Cohere’s characterisation. This reasoning is important. It prevents AI defendants from escaping scrutiny through labels like summary, paraphrase, or abstraction. The law looks at substance over terminology. The Court’s second ratio concerns secondary infringement. It held that underlying direct infringement was plausibly pleaded. Investigator-generated examples could support the claim. The Court recognised that AI infringement may be hidden from third parties. Users interact privately. Outputs are not always publicly visible. This makes discovery important. The Court also held that the publishers plausibly pleaded Cohere’s knowledge. The Second Circuit does not require actual knowledge of specific acts at this stage. Objective knowledge is enough. The publishers alleged copyright notices, terms of service, robots.txt restrictions, and a cease-and-desist letter. They also alleged that Cohere designed Command to deliver copied publisher works. These facts created an inference that Cohere knew or had reason to know. The Court also found inducement plausible. Marketing Command as a tool for accessing latest news supported active encouragement. The Court’s third ratio concerns trademark and false designation. It held that Cohere’s alleged use of publisher marks could be ***use in commerce***. The free trial was not merely private experimentation. It served customer acquisition. Command’s outputs were part of a commercial service. The Court also held that likely confusion was plausible. The marks were allegedly indistinguishable. The hallucinated articles allegedly appeared under publisher identities. Users could believe that fabricated articles were real publisher content. The Court further rejected early nominative fair use. Nominative use protects truthful identification. It does not protect false attribution. The Court treated the allegation as classic passing off. This ratio may shape future AI hallucination cases. It recognises that AI hallucinations can create trademark harm. Fabricated content under a real mark can injure goodwill, trust, and source integrity. ### b) OBITER DICTA The Court made several observations beyond the narrow holding. It observed that this case forms part of more than fifty lawsuits challenging AI companies. This statement gives institutional context. It shows judicial awareness of a wider transformation in copyright litigation. The Court also observed that deciding substantial similarity through simple word counts is improper. This is not merely procedural. It is a substantive warning. AI outputs may copy value without copying massive quantities. Conversely, small copying may be important when qualitative elements are taken. The Court’s discussion of hidden infringement is also important. It recognised that AI user interactions occur behind closed doors. This supports a practical evidentiary approach. In Indian law, such reasoning may support discovery, interrogatories, and technical audits. Courts should not demand impossible public proof where systems are proprietary. Another important observation concerns ***Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003)***. Cohere tried to rely on communicative-products reasoning. The Court rejected an overbroad reading. It clarified that ***Dastar***prevents copyright-like claims disguised as trademark claims in some reverse passing-off situations. It does not immunise false attribution. The Court also expressed doubt about nominative fair use on these facts. It did not finally decide the defence. It only held that the complaint alleged facts capable of defeating it. This observation matters for AI outputs. A system that fabricates text and labels it with a real publisher’s mark does more than identify content. It may misrepresent origin. That misrepresentation can damage both consumers and publishers. The legal wrong is not only copying. It is also deception about source. ### c) GUIDELINES The judgment does not issue formal guidelines. Still, several practical principles emerge from its reasoning. First, AI summaries must be assessed for protected expression. Courts should not assume summaries are lawful. Second, factual content remains free. But expressive selection, arrangement, phrasing, and style may be protected. Third, AI-output infringement may be pleaded through investigator examples. Plaintiffs need not produce public user examples at the initial stage. Fourth, knowledge may be inferred from notices, robots.txt restrictions, cease-and-desist letters, design choices, and commercial marketing. Fifth, marketing an AI system as a latest-news tool may support inducement. Sixth, hallucinated content under real marks may create trademark confusion. Seventh, nominative fair use cannot protect false attribution. Eighth, dismissal is improper where discovery may reveal technical evidence. These principles are not binding guidelines. They are doctrinal signals. Indian courts may adapt them cautiously under Indian copyright and trademark statutes. ### d) DISSENTING OPINION There was no dissenting opinion. The matter was decided by a single district judge. Therefore, no separate judicial opinion exists. There is also no concurring opinion. The judgment speaks through one judicial voice. The absence of dissent is procedurally expected. A district judge decides motions individually. The lack of dissent does not make the decision final on merits. It only means the partial motion to dismiss was denied. Cohere may still contest copying, substantial similarity, causation, knowledge, fair use, damages, and trademark confusion later. The ruling preserves the claims. It does not predetermine the final result. This distinction is vital for legal research. A pleading decision has persuasive force. But it does not establish final infringement. It establishes that the pleaded case is legally and factually plausible enough to proceed. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment is important because it refuses to reduce AI copyright disputes into simple slogans. It does not say that all training is unlawful. It does not say that every AI summary infringes. It also does not accept that summaries are automatically lawful. The Court carefully asks whether protected expression was copied. This is the correct analytical path. Copyright does not protect facts, ideas, systems, or abstract knowledge. It protects original expression. News reporting contains facts. But it also contains expressive choices. Those choices include structure, emphasis, arrangement, tone, and language. Where an AI system reproduces these choices, infringement may become plausible. The Court’s refusal to dismiss protects the evidentiary process. It allows technical discovery into model design, retrieval systems, source copying, logs, user prompts, output patterns, and internal knowledge. This is necessary in AI litigation. Without discovery, plaintiffs may never access the system evidence needed to prove their case. From an Indian perspective, the case is highly instructive. Indian copyright law gives authors and owners exclusive rights over reproduction, communication, adaptation, and issuing copies. If an Indian AI system copied protected publisher works and generated substitute outputs, courts would examine ***Section 14*** and ***Section 51 of the Copyright Act, 1957***. The fair dealing defence under ***Section 52*** would be central. However, Indian fair dealing is purpose-specific. It is not identical to American fair use. Training and commercial retrieval may face narrower protection in India. Indian courts would also examine moral rights under ***Section 57*** where attribution or distortion harms reputation. For trademarks, false attribution of hallucinated articles could trigger ***Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999*** and passing off. Indian cases like ***R.G. Anand v. Deluxe Films, (1978) 4 SCC 118*** and ***Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 73*** would help frame similarity and confusion. The judgment therefore offers persuasive comparative reasoning for Indian AI disputes. The most significant feature is the Court’s treatment of hallucination. AI hallucination is often discussed as a technical weakness. This judgment treats it as a legal risk. When hallucinated content carries a real publisher’s trademark, the harm is not imaginary. It may mislead readers. It may degrade brand trust. It may falsely connect publishers to content they never authored. That injury resembles classic passing off. The Court’s Chanel analogy, adopted from the publishers’ argument, is powerful. A trader cannot label non-Chanel handbags as Chanel. Likewise, an AI system cannot safely label fabricated articles as works of real publishers. This insight will matter globally. AI systems increasingly generate plausible but false content. Where that content uses protected marks, law must protect both consumers and brand owners. The ruling does not punish innovation. It demands legal accountability. That balance is likely to shape future AI governance. ## J) REFERENCES ### a) Important Cases Referred 1. ***Advance Local Media LLC et al. v. Cohere Inc.*, 25-cv-1305 (CM), Document 59, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, Nov. 13, 2025.** 2. ***Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).** 3. ***Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).** 4. ***Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.*, 499 U.S. 340 (1991).** 5. ***Tufenkian Import/Export Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc.*, 338 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2003).** 6. ***Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, Inc.*, 166 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999)** 7. ***Boisson v. Banian, Ltd.*, 273 F.3d 262 (2d Cir. 2001).** 8. ***Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc.*, 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997).** 9. ***Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publishing Co.*, 158 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998).** 10. ***Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3*, 604 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2010).** 11. ***Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc.*, 633 F. Supp. 2d 124 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)** 12. ***UMG Recordings, Inc. v. RCN Telecom Services, LLC*, 2020 WL 5204067 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2020).** 13. ***Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Payne*, 2006 WL 2844415 (W.D. Tex. July 17, 2006).** 14. ***The New York Times Co. v. Microsoft Corp.*, 777 F. Supp. 3d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2025).** 15. ***Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc.*, 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 910 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2018).** 16. ***Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.*, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).** 17. ***Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.*, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).** 18. ***Andersen v. Stability AI Ltd.*, 744 F. Supp. 3d 956 (N.D. Cal. 2024).** 19. ***Camelot SL LLC v. ThreeSixty Brands Group LLC*, 632 F. Supp. 3d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2022).** 20. ***Lopez v. Nike, Inc.*, 2021 WL 128574 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2021).** 21. ***1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. JAND, Inc.*, 119 F.4th 234 (2d Cir. 2024).** 22. ***Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc.*, 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009).** 23. ***Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey*, 717 F.3d 295 (2d Cir. 2013).** 24. ***1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc.*, 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005).** 25. ***Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp.*, 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).** 26. ***Ryan v. Volpone Stamp Co.*, 107 F. Supp. 2d 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).** 27. ***C=Holdings B.V. v. Asiarim Corp.*, 992 F. Supp. 2d 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).** 28. ***Hectronic GmbH v. Hectronic USA Corp.*, 2020 WL 6947684 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2020).** 29. ***Municipal Credit Union v. Queens Auto Mall, Inc.*, 126 F. Supp. 3d 290 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).** 30. ***Savin Corp. v. Savin Group*, 391 F.3d 439 (2d Cir. 2004).** 31. ***Star Industries, Inc. v. Bacardi & Co.*, 412 F.3d 373 (2d Cir. 2005).** 32. ***Pulse Creations, Inc. v. Vesture Group, Inc.*, 154 F. Supp. 3d 48 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).** 33. ***Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. International Securities Exchange, Inc.*, 451 F.3d 295 (2d Cir. 2006).** 34. ***Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc.*, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).** 35. ***Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.*, 539 U.S. 23 (2003).** 36. ***Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co.*, 66 F. Supp. 3d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).** 37. ***Williams v. Cavalli*, 2015 WL 1247065 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2015).** 38. ***Grand v. Schwarz*, 2016 WL 2733133 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2016).** 39. ***International Council of Shopping Centers, Inc. v. Info Quarter, LLC*, 2018 WL 4284279 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2018).** 40. ***R.G. Anand v. Deluxe Films*, (1978) 4 SCC 118.** 41. ***Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd.*, (2001) 5 SCC 73.** 42. ***Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah*, (2002) 3 SCC 65.** ### b) Important Statutes Referred 1. ***17 U.S.C. § 106(*** 2. ***17 U.S.C. § 106(2).*** 3. ***17 U.S.C. § 106(3).*** 4. ***17 U.S.C. § 106(5).*** 5. ***17 U.S.C. § 501.*** 6. ***15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).*** 7. ***15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A).*** 8. ***15 U.S.C. § 1127.*** 9. ***Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).*** 10. ***Copyright Act, 1957, Section 14.*** 11. ***Copyright Act, 1957, Section 51.*** 12. ***Copyright Act, 1957, Section 52.*** 13. ***Copyright Act, 1957, Section 57.*** 14. ***Trade Marks Act, 1999, Section 27(2).*** 15. ***Trade Marks Act, 1999, Section 29.*** 16. ***Trade Marks Act, 1999, Section 30.*** 17. ***Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order VII Rule 11.*** 18. ***Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.*** 19. ***Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.*** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [2nd International Conference on Human Rights | Organized by Xavier Law School, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata | Abstract Submission Deadline by15th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/2nd-international-conference-on-human-rights-organized-by-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-abstract-submission-deadline-by15th-september-2026/) **Published:** August 25, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 2nd International Conference on Human Rights | Organized by Xavier Law School, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata | Abstract Submission Deadline by15th September 2026 **Content:** ## **About the Conference** For decades, the international human rights regime has been built on a presumption of universality. The idea that a single, homogenous framework can and should be applied identically across the globe has been the norm. However, in the process of decolonisation, this ‘universalist’ approach is increasingly recognised as an imposition rather than a mere neutral baseline. The twenty-first-century discourses have exposed the profound contradictions at the core of the international legal order. While the literature on human rights suggests a concept of universal liberation, the structure of international law, deeply rooted in colonial history and Western jurisprudence, often serves to protect global capital and to establish systemic inequalities. The international legal order often enforces Western liberal priorities, such as ‘hyper-individualism’, absolute private property, anthropocentric capitalism, *etc*., while delimiting alternative ways of being. The concept of pluriversality is based on the three foundational pillars. *Firstly*, shifting from individualism to collectivism. In a pluriversal human rights framework, collective rights, which are frequently displaced by multinationals, such as the rights of indigenous communities, are elevated. *Secondly*, decentering humans and recognising the rights of Nature. In a pluriversal legal movement, ecosystems are recognised as right-bearing entities. *Thirdly*, developing epistemic disobedience in international law. In the context of human rights, pluriversality is not cultural relativism; rather, it is the recognition that there are multiple, equally valid ways to understand human dignity, justice, and our relationship with the world(s). The three-day international conference aims to explore new directions in human rights scholarship by engaging with diverse intellectual frameworks, experiences, and priorities of (ex)colonial voices in the global south and other non-Western contexts. The conference critically examines the premise that decolonisation is not merely a historical event of statehood, but an ongoing, urgent requirement for the whole international legal order. As post-colonial states navigate the complex webs of widening global inequalities, geopolitical instabilities and ecological collapse, the traditional doctrines of international law are increasingly experiencing a legitimacy crisis. By bringing together perspectives from law, social sciences, and humanities, the conference aims to foster interdisciplinary dialogue, explore synergies and divergences in the meaning and scope of decolonial research, and reimagine rights, self-determination, and political organisation by destabilising anthropocentric and humanist assumptions. The conference invites us to propose transformative alternatives to Eurocentric foundations of knowledge systems, human rights and justice within the pluriversal tapestry of entanglement and relational coexistence. We welcome original manuscripts on the following indicative subthemes: **Subthemes:** 1. Decolonial frameworks, methods, and vocabularies in Law, Humanities and Social Sciences 2. Corporate Accountability & Decolonial Commerce 3. Decolonising Education: Curriculum, Pedagogy and Praxis 4. Decolonising Crime, Policing, Prisons 5. Decolonising Health and Ethics of Care 6. Indigenous Rights and Cultural Heritage 7. Posthumanism and Literary Studies 8. Feminist perspectives from the Global South 9. Jurisprudential Foundations and Epistemic Justice: TWAIL and Decolonising Courts 10. Political Economy of International Law & Global Capital 11. Climate action in the Global South 12. Environmental Governance in More-than-Human Worlds 13. Trade Sovereignty & The Decolonisation of Investment 14. Technology and New Legal Subjectivities: Rights of the Future and Non-humans 15. Enforcement, Institutions, and Future of the Legal Order ## **Mode of Conference** Hybrid ## **Submission Guidelines** We encourage submissions from Law as well as from a diverse array of disciplines, including but not limited to Sociology, Anthropology, Economics, International Relations, Political Science, History, Literature and Cultural Studies. Submissions from scholars based in the Global South, specialising in human rights, are especially welcome. ## **Participants** Full papers shall be accepted from Academicians, Professionals, Research Scholars and Post-graduate Students. Postgraduate students will be eligible only for offline poster presentations. The other participants will be presenting their papers in offline or online mode. ## **Abstracts** Please submit an extended abstract of no more than **500 words**, along with a brief biography (maximum 150 words) and your institutional/organisational affiliation. ## **First Draft** Notified authors shall submit a first draft (working paper). The first draft shall reflect work in progress and be aligned with the research problem, objective(s), research question(s), methodology, findings significance, *etc.* ## **Format** - Submissions should clearly reflect (but may not be subtitled as) research question(s), methodology, and the specific subtheme it addresses. - The document should be submitted as an MS Word file. - All texts in the submission, including headings, sub-headings and footnotes, should be in Font Type- Times New Roman. The Title should be Bold with font size 14 and Centre Alignment; the full text should be font size 12. The footnotes should be Font Size- 10. The Line Spacing of the main text and footnotes should be 1.5 and 1, respectively. Headings: Justified Alignment, Bold, and Font Size-12; Subheadings: Justified Alignment, Italic, Bold, and Font Size-12. - Tables and Figures (if any) should be clearly labelled and numbered sequentially and placed within the text of the manuscript. The names of the tables and figures should be on the top and bottom of the tables and figures, respectively. - Supplementary material (if any) can be submitted as a separate file. - All citations and references must strictly adhere to the OSCOLA (Oxford University Standard for Citation of Legal Authorities) 4th Edition. Please ensure all references are carefully checked for completeness, accuracy, and consistency. ## **Poster Presentation Guidelines for PG Students** - **Poster Size and Layout**: - Poster size should be 4 feet in length and 3 feet in width. - Include clear visuals, figures, charts, and graphics to maintain a visual flow of ideas and results. - Use large fonts (minimum 24 pt for text) and consistent formatting - Use concise explanations and bullet points. - Recommended sections: Introduction / Objectives – Methods – Results – Discussion - **Poster Content:** Each poster must include the following items clearly displayed: - Track Name and Number - Title, authors, and affiliations displayed in the top section - Logo(s) of Affiliated Institution(s) - Poster Title - Author Name(s) and Affiliation(s) - Logo of SXUK and conference name at the bottom of the poster ## **Procedure of Presentation** Presenters are to remain in the venue with their poster during the assigned session to answer questions and be evaluated by judges. **Please submit your abstracts via email directly to** [**ichr.sxuk@gmail.com**](mailto:ichr.sxuk@gmail.com) **with the subject line:** ## **Registration Fees** - **For Academicians and Professionals:** - **Offline Paper Presentation:** - Single Authored: Rs. 2500 **(Early Bird Registration: Rs. 2000)** - Co-Authored: Rs. 3500 **(Early Bird Registration: Rs. 3000)** - **Online Paper Presentation:** - Single Authored: Rs. 1500 **(Early Bird Registration: Rs. 1000)** - Co-Authored: Rs. 2500 **(Early Bird Registration: Rs. 2000)** - **For Research Scholars:** - **Offline/Online Paper Presentation:** - Single Authored: Rs. 1500 **(Early Bird Registration: Rs. 1000)** - Co-Authored: Rs. 2500 **(Early Bird Registration: Rs. 2000)** - **For PG Students (Poster Presentation):** - Single Authored Submission: Rs. 1500 (**Early Bird Registration: Rs. 1000)** - Co-Authored Submission: Rs. 2000 **(Early Bird Registration: Rs. 2000)** - **Foreign Scholars (including SAARC nations): USD 60** Registration includes a Conference kit, Morning Tea/Coffee, Lunch, Evening Tea/Coffee, and access to all conference sessions for three days. Accommodation costs are not included. A limited number of subsidised accommodation options will be available to interested attendees. Please note that the full registration fee will apply to co-authored registrations by PG students and academicians/professionals. ## **Important Dates** - **Deadline for Abstract Submission:** 15th September 2026 - **Notification of Acceptance:** 20th September 2026 - **Submission of First Draft:** 31st October 2026 - **Notification of Acceptance:** 10th November 2026 - **Conference Registration** - **Early Bird:** 12th November 2026 – 30th November 2026 - **Standard:** 1st December 2026 – 10th January 2027 - **Last date of Registration:** 10th January 2027 - **Deadline for Full Paper Submission (5,000 – 8,000 words):** 15th January 2027 **The best selected papers will be published as an edited book by a reputable publisher (to be notified shortly), with an ISBN, and some papers will be published in a special issue of Xavier Law Review volume III(2).** ## [OFFICIAL BROCHURE](https://drive.google.com/file/d/19vcd8ju8JYk_qrJsO4Dy-kXa7ZwCnZpx/view?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Call for Blogs, Call for Papers, Events --- ### [ALL INDIA 1ST MOCK TRIAL COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by SCHOOL OF LAW, IILM UNIVERSITY, GREATER NOIDA | Register by 20th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/all-india-1st-mock-trial-competition-2026-organized-by-school-of-law-iilm-university-greater-noida-register-by-20th-september-2026/) **Published:** August 20, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** ALL INDIA 1ST MOCK TRIAL COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by SCHOOL OF LAW, IILM UNIVERSITY, GREATER NOIDA | Register by 20th September 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Screenshot-2026-08-20-191817.png) ## **About the University** IILM was established in 1993 under the aegis of the Ram Krishan & Sons Charitable Trust. With more than 28 years of experience in training future entrepreneurs and managers, it has emerged as one of the distinguished universities in the Delhi NCR area. IILM University, Greater Noida, has been established under the Uttar Pradesh Private University (Amendment) Act, 2022. It is located at Knowledge Park-II, Greater Noida, with a built-up area of over 26 acres and provides state-of-the-art facilities. The University also has campuses in New Delhi and Gurugram. ## **About the School of Law** IILM Law School is a pathway not only to the legal profession but also to diverse leadership roles in society. The School aims to educate, train and develop students by fostering an in-depth understanding of law and the legal profession. The School places emphasis on practical training to enhance students’ personal and professional abilities to adapt and grow with the changing legal environment. IILM Law School, Greater Noida, commenced its journey in 2022 with the B.A. LL.B. and LL.M. programmes and subsequently introduced the B.B.A. LL.B. and LL.B. programmes. The School has developed expertise in areas including Corporate Law, Alternative Dispute Resolution, Legal Writing and Intellectual Property Rights, while continuing to focus on practical and professional legal education. ## **About the Mock Trial Society** The IILM Mock Trial Society was established in 2026 under the aegis of the School of Law, IILM University, Greater Noida. The Society has been founded with the objective of providing law students with a platform to experience and understand the intricacies of courtroom practice through simulated trial proceedings. The Society aims to bridge the gap between theoretical legal education and real-world litigation skills by developing critical lawyering skills such as legal drafting, advocacy, client counselling, oral arguments and witness examination. Through regular mock trial competitions, workshops, guest lectures by practising advocates and judges, and training sessions focused on trial advocacy techniques, the Society seeks to develop students’ technical knowledge, confidence, strategic thinking and professional ethics. ## **About All India 1st Mock Trial Competition 2026** The All India 1st Mock Trial Competition 2026 is organised by the IILM Mock Trial Society, School of Law, IILM University, Greater Noida. The Competition is centred around the theme of male victimisation, aiming to highlight the often-overlooked struggles faced by men in various legal and social contexts. The Competition seeks to facilitate practical learning and knowledge-building by engaging students with real-world legal issues relating to male victimisation. It further aims to encourage critical analysis of gender-neutral laws and explore the unique challenges faced by male victims within the legal system and society. The Competition also seeks to prepare participants for diverse professional environments by equipping them with the skills required to handle gender-sensitive matters with empathy, neutrality and legal precision. ## **Leadership & Organising Committee** **Patron : Dr. Jayasankar Variyar** Vice-Chancellor, IILM University **Chairperson (Execution) : Prof. (Dr.) Babita Singh Parasain** Director, School of Law **Event Patron : Prof. (Dr.) Arun Gupta** Dean, School of Law **Convenor : Dr. Swati Bajaj Seth** Associate Professor **Co-Convenor: Ms. Garima Prasad** Assistant Professor **Faculty Co-Convenor: Mr. Harshit Mohan** Assistant Professor **Faculty Co-ordinator – Judges & Evaluation: Mr. Rachit Sharma** Assistant Professor **Faculty Co-ordinator – Logistics & Hospitality: Ms. Sadiya Zehra** Assistant Professor **Faculty Co-ordinator – Sponsorships & Partnerships: Dr. Bhavana Dhoundiyal** Assistant Professor ## **Important Dates** **Particulars** **Date** **Mode** Release of Proposition 19/08/2026 — Early Bird Registration 05/09/2026 — Last Date of Registration 20/09/2026 — Last Date to Seek Clarification 30/09/2026 — Release of Clarifications 02/10/2026 — Inaugural Ceremony 14/10/2026 Online Researcher Test 15/10/2026 Online Preliminary Rounds 15/10/2026 Online Quarter-Final Rounds 16/10/2026 Online Semi-Final Rounds 03/11/2026 Offline Final Round 04/11/2026 Offline Valedictory Ceremony 04/11/2026 Offline ## **Participation and Eligibility** Students pursuing either a 3-year or a 5-year LL.B. degree from any Law School/College/University recognised by the Bar Council of India are eligible to participate. Team members must be bonafide students of the institution they are representing. Teams participating in the Competition must be duly authorised by the Mock Trial Society / Faculty-in-charge / Dean of their respective institution. Once registered after Final Registration, a team shall not be permitted to vary its composition in any manner. No University/Institution can send more than two teams for the Competition. The official language of the Competition shall be English. ## **Team Composition** The participating team shall comprise five (5) members, namely: 1. 2 Speakers 2. 1 Researcher 3. 2 Witnesses Each team shall be allotted a Team Code. Teams shall not disclose their identity, the identity of their institution, city or any other personal details during the Oral Rounds. Such disclosure may invite penalties, including disqualification. The Organising Committee reserves the right to bar any team from participating in the Competition. ## **Role of Witnesses** Each team shall bring its own two witnesses, who shall be cross-examined by the opposing team. The two witnesses shall form part of the original five-member team composition. A witness may or may not be a law student, but must be a student of a recognised institution or university. The role of the witnesses shall be allotted before the respective rounds as prescribed in the Competition Rules. ## **Structure of the Competition** 1. Researcher Test: 15/10/2026 – Online 2. Preliminary Rounds: 15/10/2026 – Online 3. Quarter-Final Round: 16/10/2026 – Online 4. Semi-Final Round: 03/11/2026 – Offline 5. Final Round: 04/11/2026 – Offline The Competition shall be conducted in Hybrid Mode, with the Preliminary and Quarter-Final Rounds being conducted online and the Semi-Final and Final Rounds being conducted offline. ## **Oral Rounds** The language used during all Oral Rounds shall be English. During the Preliminary Rounds, each team shall argue once for the Prosecution and once for the Defence. In the Quarter-Final, Semi-Final and Final Rounds, each side shall receive a maximum of 45 minutes. Each Speaker shall conduct either the Examination-in-Chief or Cross-Examination and shall deliver either the Opening Statement or Closing Statement, as prescribed under the Competition Rules. ## **Written Submission** There shall be no mandatory requirement for prior written submissions. However, teams may submit written submissions directly to the Judges, if they wish to do so. ## **Registration Fees** **Early Bird Registration: Rs. 3,500/-** **Standard Registration: Rs. 4,000/-** Participants are required to fill the Google Form and pay the applicable registration fee. Participants must also mandatorily fill the physical registration form attached to the Competition brochure, get it signed and sealed by their University/Institution and upload the same with the Google Form. ### [**Registration Form**](https://forms.gle/ZNsAKEYS9C3yb3c4A) **IT IS MANDATORY TO FILL THE GOOGLE FORM TO COMPLETE THE REGISTRATION PROCESS.** ## **Clarifications** Clarifications relating to the Proposition may be sought by sending an email to: [**mocktrialsociety.gn@iilm.edu**](mailto:mocktrialsociety.gn@iilm.edu) **Last Date for Seeking Clarifications:** 30/09/2026 **Release of Clarifications:** 02/10/2026 Clarifications shall be communicated to the registered email address of the participating team. ## **Awards** **Award** **Cash Prize** **Winning Team** **Rs. 51,000/-** **Runner-Up Team** **Rs. 31,000/-** **Best Counsel** **Rs. 5,100/-** **Best Witness** **Rs. 5,100/-** **Best Researcher** **Rs. 5,100/-** ## **For Detailed Brochure** For detailed rules, regulations, competition structure, proposition, registration guidelines and other information, please visit the link below: ### [**CLICK HERE TO VIEW THE DETAILED BROCHURE**](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1BgpNI98w14USPkzbgKJ0OOFLmrUnKjXu?usp=drive_link) ## **Contact Information** **For Any Queries, Please Contact** **Dr. Swati Bajaj Seth**: +91 8860859625 **Mr. Harshit Mohan**: +91 9891678133 **Yedik Purohit**: President – B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) +91 6375450702 **Khanak Jain**: Vice-President – B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) +91 8587009471 **Email:** [**mocktrialsociety.gn@iilm.edu**](mailto:mocktrialsociety.gn@iilm.edu) *Subject Heading – Query* **Categories:** Events, Moot Courts, Other Competitions --- ### [Eastern Book Company & Ors. v. D.B. Modak & Anr., AIR 2008 SC 809; (2008) 1 SCC 1; 2008 AIR SCW 49 ](https://lawfoyer.in/eastern-book-company-ors-v-d-b-modak-anr-air-2008-sc-809-2008-1-scc-1-2008-air-scw-49/) **Published:** August 19, 2026 **Author:** Jaya Dubey **Content:** # A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE ***[Eastern Book Company & Ors. v. D.B. Modak & Anr., AIR 2008 SC 809; (2008) 1 SCC 1; 2008 AIR SCW 49](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1062099/)*** is a leading Supreme Court decision on ***copyright in law reports, derivative works, originality, public domain material, and copy-edited judgments***. The appellants, publishers of ***Supreme Court Cases***, claimed copyright in their copy-edited versions of Supreme Court judgments. The respondents published legal software on CD-ROMs, namely ***“Grand Jurix”***and ***“The Laws”***. The appellants alleged verbatim copying of SCC text, sequencing, paragraph numbers, footnotes, cross-references, formatting, and editorial inputs. The Supreme Court held that Supreme Court judgments are ***government works*** and their reproduction is protected by ***Section 52(1)(q)(iv) of the Copyright Act, 1957***. It rejected the low ***“sweat of the brow”*** test as sufficient by itself. It adopted a middle standard requiring ***skill and judgment with a minimal flavour of creativity***. The Court partly allowed the appeals. It protected SCC headnotes, editorial notes, footnotes, editor-created paragraphing, and editorial labels like ***concurring*** or ***partly dissenting***. It denied monopoly over raw judgments. **Keywords:** ***Copyright***, ***Originality***, ***Derivative Work***, ***Law Reports***, ***Public Domain***, ***Government Work***, ***Skill and Judgment***, ***Supreme Court Cases***. # B) CASE DETAILS The judgment cause title is ***Eastern Book Company & Ors. v. D.B. Modak & Anr.*** The principal case number is ***Civil Appeal No. 6472 of 2004***. It was decided with ***Civil Appeal No. 6905 of 2004*** and ***Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 158 of 2006 in Civil Appeal No. 6472 of 2004***. The judgment date is ***12 December 2007***. The court is the ***Supreme Court of India***. The quorum consisted of ***B.N. Agrawal, J.*** and ***P.P. Naolekar, J.*** The judgment was authored by ***P.P. Naolekar, J.***The petitioners were ***Eastern Book Company & Ors.*** The respondents were ***D.B. Modak & Anr.*** in the principal appeal. The reported citations include ***AIR 2008 SC 809***, ***(2008) 1 SCC 1***, ***2008 AIR SCW 49***, ***(2008) 36 PTC 1***, and ***2007 (14) SCALE 191***. The legal provisions involved were ***[Sections 2(k), 2(o), 2(y), 13, 14, 17, 51 and 52(1)(q)(iv) of the Copyright Act, 1957](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/337836/)***. The case concerned ***original literary works***, ***compilations***, ***government works***, ***exclusive rights***, ***ownership of copyright***, ***infringement***, and ***permitted reproduction of judgments***. No judgment was overruled. However, the Supreme Court modified the Delhi High Court’s relief by granting additional protection for certain SCC editorial inputs. The case relates to ***Intellectual Property Law***, ***Copyright Law***, ***Legal Publishing***, ***Information Technology and Legal Databases***, ***Public Law Information***, and ***Civil Law***. The uploaded judgment does not provide counsel names in the available opening page. Therefore, counsel names are not supplied. # C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The dispute arose from the legal publishing industry’s transition into electronic databases. ***Eastern Book Company***publishes ***Supreme Court Cases***, commonly known as ***SCC***. SCC began publication in 1969. It reports Supreme Court judgments, non-reportable judgments, short orders, practice directions, and records of proceedings. The appellants obtained raw judgments from the Supreme Court Registry. They then copy-edited them. Their editorial team added cross-citations, verified case names, corrected formatting, numbered paragraphs, inserted footnote references, prepared headnotes, supplied editorial notes, and standardised legal presentation. The appellants argued that these additions required skill, labour, judgment, expertise, infrastructure, and investment. They claimed that their version of the judgments constituted an ***original literary work*** under ***Section 13 of the Copyright Act, 1957***. The respondents produced legal database products on CD-ROMs. One respondent brought out ***“Grand Jurix”***. Another brought out ***“The Laws”***. The appellants alleged that the respondents copied SCC modules verbatim. They claimed copying of the copy-edited judgments, sequencing, arrangement, paragraph numbers, footnote numbers, cross-references, formatting, and style. They sought interim injunctions before the Delhi High Court. The learned Single Judge refused interim relief. The Division Bench permitted the respondents to sell CD-ROMs containing Supreme Court judgments, provided they did not copy SCC headnotes, editorial notes, or footnotes. The appellants approached the Supreme Court. The central question became whether copy-edited judgments, based on public domain judicial pronouncements, attracted copyright and to what extent. # D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellants were legal publishers. ***Eastern Book Company*** was a registered partnership firm. ***EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.*** was a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. They published legal material, especially the law report ***Supreme Court Cases***. ***Surendra Malik*** prepared headnotes for SCC. The appellants did not claim ownership over raw Supreme Court judgments. They accepted that certified copies of judgments could be obtained from the Registry. Their claim was narrower. They asserted copyright in their copy-edited version of the text and in the SCC publication as a whole. This included headnotes, editorial notes, footnotes, case selection, case sequence, arrangement, index, table of cases, cross-references, and paragraph numbers. The respondents produced electronic legal databases. The appellants claimed that the respondents reproduced SCC materials and copied SCC’s copy-edited judgments. They alleged copying not merely of judicial text but of SCC’s editorial inputs. The respondents denied that SCC could monopolise Supreme Court judgments. They argued that judgments were government works. They relied on ***Section 52(1)(q)(iv)***, which permits reproduction or publication of any judgment or order of a court, tribunal, or judicial authority unless prohibited. They argued that accepting SCC’s broad claim would privatise public law. It would make access to judgments dependent on a publisher’s editorial layer. The controversy therefore required the Court to separate public domain judicial text from copyrightable editorial labour. # E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED The first legal issue was the standard of originality applicable to copy-edited judgments. The Court framed the question as whether ***skill, labour and capital*** alone were enough, or whether derivative works require something more. It had to decide whether Indian law should follow the low ***sweat of the brow*** standard, the high ***creativity*** standard, or a middle approach. The second issue was whether the entire copy-edited SCC version of Supreme Court judgments could be treated as an original literary work because SCC’s inputs were inseparably mixed with the raw text. The third issue was whether only some specific inputs, such as headnotes, footnotes, editorial notes, paragraphing, and labels showing judicial opinions, could be protected. The case also raised a public access issue. Supreme Court judgments are judicial pronouncements. They are essential legal materials. If a publisher could claim copyright in judgments because it added editorial improvements, future publishers might be prevented from reproducing important court decisions. This would frustrate the purpose of placing judgments in the public domain. The Court therefore had to balance two interests. The first was the publisher’s right to protect genuine editorial labour. The second was the public’s right to access law. The final question was whether the respondents could use Supreme Court judgments in their CD-ROMs while being restrained from copying SCC’s original editorial additions. # F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that SCC was not a mere reproduction of raw judgments. They argued that the SCC version involved substantial editorial effort. The appellants added cross-citations where only one citation existed. They supplied case names where only citations were given. They supplied citations where only case names appeared. They inserted citation references in case histories. They standardised repeated case references in SCC style. They provided precise page and paragraph references to quoted material. They added margin headings to quoted statutory extracts. They supplied section, rule, article, and paragraph numbers to extracts. They indicated whether judges were ***concurring***, ***partly dissenting***, ***dissenting***, or ***supplementing***. They also identified judges on whose behalf opinions were delivered. The appellants further argued that their paragraphing of judgments required legal understanding. They broke long raw paragraphs into separate paragraphs and assigned numbers. They verified quotations, supplied omitted portions, corrected case names and citations, followed corrigenda, expanded abbreviations, changed formatting, and improved readability. They contended that these inputs were selected, coordinated and arranged through legal skill and editorial judgment. They did not claim copyright in raw judgments. They claimed copyright in their edited version. They argued that the respondents could publish Supreme Court judgments after obtaining them independently. But they could not take SCC’s version and reproduce SCC’s editorial labour. The appellants therefore sought protection against copying their copy-edited text and related inputs. # G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents submitted that Supreme Court judgments are ***government works*** under ***Section 2(k)(iii)***of the Copyright Act. They argued that, by virtue of ***Section 17(d)***, the Government is the first owner of copyright in such works, absent an agreement to the contrary. More importantly, ***Section 52(1)(q)(iv)*** permits reproduction or publication of judgments unless such reproduction is prohibited by the court. Therefore, any person may publish Supreme Court judgments. The respondents submitted that SCC’s claim, if accepted broadly, would defeat public access. It would allow private monopoly over judicial pronouncements. This would be contrary to copyright policy and rule of law. The respondents further argued that SCC’s additions were mostly factual, mechanical, limited, or obvious. Adding citations, correcting names, inserting paragraph numbers, changing punctuation, standardising abbreviations, and formatting text did not create a new original work. These acts were not creative. They involved facts that could be expressed only in limited ways. The respondents relied on the argument that a derivative work must show independent skill and judgment beyond trivial editorial labour. They submitted that SCC’s inputs did not possess even minimal authorial creativity when considered as a whole. They accepted that headnotes, editorial notes, and footnotes may have protection when they are independently created. But they resisted copyright over the entire copy-edited text of judgments. # H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS ***Section 2(k) of the Copyright Act, 1957*** defines ***government work***. It includes work made or published by or under the direction or control of any court, tribunal or judicial authority in India. Supreme Court judgments therefore fall within this category. ***Section 17(d)*** provides that, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, the Government is the first owner of copyright in a government work. ***Section 52(1)(q)(iv)*** provides that reproduction or publication of any judgment or order of a court, tribunal, or judicial authority does not constitute infringement unless such reproduction or publication is prohibited. These provisions formed the public domain foundation of the judgment. The Court held that judicial pronouncements of the Supreme Court are reproducible and publishable by anyone, unless prohibited. ***Section 2(o)*** defines ***literary work*** to include computer programmes, tables and compilations including computer databases. This was relevant because SCC and the respondents’ CD-ROMs involved compilation and legal database features. ***Section 13*** provides copyright protection for original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works. Therefore, originality was essential. ***Section 14*** defines copyright as an exclusive right to reproduce, issue copies, communicate, adapt or translate the work. ***Section 51*** deals with infringement. The appellants invoked these provisions to argue that SCC’s copy-edited version was an original literary work and that reproduction in electronic databases infringed their rights. The Court accepted copyright only in those SCC inputs that crossed the originality threshold. # I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT IN THIS CASE The Court examined English authorities on originality. ***[University of London Press Ltd. v. University Tutorial Press Ltd., \[1916\] 2 Ch 601](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.cipil.law.cam.ac.uk/virtual-museum/university-london-press-v-university-tutorial-1916-2-ch-601&ved=2ahUKEwj3_Knsx6yWAxU-j-EIHdkNIwoQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw26zRTI9141Mlnqj8u3L4NK "University of London Press Ltd. v. University Tutorial Press Ltd., [1916] 2 Ch 601")*** held that originality does not mean novelty or inventive thought. It means that the work must originate from the author and not be copied.[ ***Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd., \[1964\] 1 All ER 465***](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.cipil.law.cam.ac.uk/virtual-museum/ladbroke-v-william-hill-1964-1-all-er-465&ved=2ahUKEwjsqoP2x6yWAxVukOEIHbuLEbMQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw1RyUbUGOMSnzQxvAJvF-al " Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd., [1964] 1 All ER 465")emphasised that a compilation should be considered as a whole, not dissected into isolated fragments. ***Hogg v. Scott, LR 18 Eq 444*** expressed the principle that a defendant may not take the result of another person’s labour.[ ***Designers Guild Ltd. v. Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd., \[2000\] 1 WLR 2416 (HL)*** ](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/5b46f1f62c94e0775e7ef199&ved=2ahUKEwiFn7WKyKyWAxVWkOEIHXxRG7YQFnoECCcQAQ&usg=AOvVaw0O4iP3qrtFtXJFnkj0k2sv " Designers Guild Ltd. v. Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd., [2000] 1 WLR 2416 (HL) ")reaffirmed that copyright protects the product of skill and labour in an original work. These cases represented the traditional skill and labour approach. The Court also examined American authorities.[ ***Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)***](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/499/340/&ved=2ahUKEwib2uSVyKyWAxWyleEIHQYMCDgQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw1N-7wMWpfZjdOJPigmrsfX " Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)") rejected the pure ***sweat of the brow*** doctrine. It held that originality requires independent creation and at least a minimal degree of creativity. Facts are not protected. Only selection and arrangement may be protected if original.[ ***Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publishing Co***](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/158/674/544791/&ved=2ahUKEwik2cygyKyWAxWGjOEIHVpSB44QFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw2nxMOw7hDNJntl8KK0MaI0 " Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publishing Co")***.*** and related authorities concerning West’s case reports were discussed for the proposition that judicial opinions in the public domain cannot be monopolised through obvious editorial alterations. The Court noted that trivial variations, mechanical additions, and routine factual rearrangements do not earn copyright protection. The Court placed significant reliance on Canadian law. ***[CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 (1) SCR 339](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.canlii.org/en/commentary/doc/2005CanLIIDocs95&ved=2ahUKEwjGuLWoyKyWAxUjjeEIHb0QMC8QFnoECCUQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1XZFzVO1iD62hbf_8p0RTk "CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 (1) SCR 339")*** adopted a middle standard. It rejected both extremes. The sweat of the brow standard was too low because it excessively favoured owners and restricted public dissemination. The creativity standard was too high because it imported patent-like novelty and non-obviousness into copyright. The Canadian test required the work to originate from the author and be the product of ***skill and judgment***. The exercise of skill and judgment must not be so trivial that it becomes purely mechanical. The Supreme Court of India found this approach suitable for Indian law. The Court also discussed ***[Macmillan & Co. v. K. & J. Cooper, AIR 1924 PC 75](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1257788/&ved=2ahUKEwiM1aS0yKyWAxUWkuEIHXt6IZ8QFnoECBkQAQ&usg=AOvVaw0_BUunga5KNDW5qPS6HZAZ "Macmillan & Co. v. K. & J. Cooper, AIR 1924 PC 75")***. That case stated that copyright protects the product of labour, skill and capital, not the raw material itself. To secure copyright, the labour, skill and capital must impart to the product some quality or character which the raw material did not possess. This principle was crucial. It allowed protection for editorial contribution without allowing ownership over judgments themselves. The Court used this reasoning to separate SCC’s protected editorial layers from public domain judicial text. # H) JUDGEMENT #### a. RATIO DECIDENDI The ratio decidendi is that ***copyright in derivative works based on public domain judgments requires skill and judgment with some distinguishable character or minimal flavour of creativity***. Mere labour, capital, or industrious collection is not enough. The Court rejected a pure ***sweat of the brow*** standard. It also refused to require patent-like novelty. It adopted the middle standard from ***[CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 (1) SCR 339](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://casebrief.fandom.com/wiki/CCH_Canadian_Ltd._v_Law_Society_of_Upper_Canada&ved=2ahUKEwiYud69yKyWAxW1juEIHUcKO5MQFnoECB0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw3Wvsg7tQDedl9vw7qaUVst "CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 (1) SCR 339")***. A derivative work must originate from the author. It must not be copied. It must be the product of skill and judgment. That skill and judgment must not be trivial or purely mechanical. It must impart to the raw material some quality or character it did not possess. The Court held that Supreme Court judgments are in the public domain for reproduction and publication. ***Section 52(1)(q)(iv)*** expressly allows publication of judgments unless prohibited. Therefore, no publisher can claim a monopoly over raw judgments. SCC’s entire copy-edited text did not automatically become an original literary work merely because editorial labour was applied. Many SCC inputs were routine, factual, or mechanical. However, some inputs crossed the originality threshold. These included independently prepared headnotes, footnotes, editorial notes, editor-created paragraphing, internal paragraph references based on such paragraphing, and editor’s judgment indicating whether opinions were ***concurring***, ***partly concurring***, ***partly dissenting***, ***dissenting***, or similar. These required careful reading, legal understanding, discernment, judgment and minimal creativity. The appeals were partly allowed. The High Court had already restrained the respondents from copying SCC headnotes, editorial notes and footnotes. The Supreme Court added further restraint. The respondents were also restrained from using SCC’s paragraph numbers created by the appellants for internal references and from using SCC’s editorial judgments regarding judicial opinions, such as ***concurring*** or ***partly dissenting***, on the basis of SCC reports. The respondents remained entitled to sell CD-ROMs containing Supreme Court judgments with their own headnotes and editorial material. No order was passed in the contempt petition. There was no order as to costs. #### b. OBITER DICTA A major observation concerns copyright’s balance. The Court stated that copyright protection is justified by fair play. When a person creates something through skill and labour, another person should not profit from that effort without consent. Yet copyright law must also protect the public domain. It must not privatise facts, law, or judicial pronouncements. Originality therefore acts as the bridge between private reward and public access. This observation is important because legal information is not ordinary commercial data. Judgments declare the law. Citizens, lawyers, judges, scholars and publishers must be free to reproduce them unless lawfully prohibited. Another important observation concerns derivative works. The Court distinguished between ***primary works*** and ***secondary or derivative works***. Primary works are not based on existing material. Derivative works are based on pre-existing material. A derivative work may receive copyright. But it must add something more than routine effort. It must contain selection, coordination, arrangement, or editorial judgment that differentiates it from the raw material. This observation is relevant far beyond law reports. It applies to databases, annotated statutes, digests, commentaries, compilations, educational materials, maps, directories, and digital information products. #### c. GUIDELINES The judgment provides clear guidelines for copyright in law reports and compilations. First, raw Supreme Court judgments may be reproduced and published by anyone, unless prohibited by the court. Second, no publisher can claim copyright merely because it first published a judgment. Third, routine corrections, formatting, citation completion, punctuation, spelling corrections, and standardised presentation may not by themselves give copyright over the entire judgment. Fourth, headnotes, editorial notes, footnotes and independently prepared analytical content can attract copyright. Fifth, paragraph numbers may be protected where they result from careful legal reading and editorial division, not mechanical numbering. Sixth, labels describing judicial opinions, such as ***concurring*** or ***dissenting***, may be protected when they involve legal understanding and editorial judgment. The judgment also provides a general originality test. The work must originate from the author. It must not be copied. It must involve skill and judgment. That skill and judgment must not be trivial. It need not be novel or inventive. But it must have some minimal creative character. The author cannot claim copyright in facts or public domain material. The author may claim copyright in original selection, arrangement, coordination, expression, annotation, and analysis. This guideline prevents unfair copying of editorial labour. It also prevents enclosure of public legal materials. #### d. DISSENTING OPINION There was no dissenting opinion. The judgment was delivered by ***P.P. Naolekar, J.*** for the Bench of ***B.N. Agrawal, J.*** and ***P.P. Naolekar, J.*** The decision partly favoured both sides. It protected SCC’s genuine editorial inputs. It also preserved public access to Supreme Court judgments. The absence of dissent strengthens the clarity of the ruling. It reflects judicial consensus that the correct originality standard lies between pure labour and high creativity. # I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment is one of the most important Indian copyright decisions after ***[R.G. Anand v. Delux Films, AIR 1978 SC 1613; (1978) 4 SCC 118](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1734007/&ved=2ahUKEwiyzd_IyKyWAxXVkeEIHaJ5NHMQFnoECBsQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3FXsSrd5X6Zir1Q5uV7XQ1 "R.G. Anand v. Delux Films, AIR 1978 SC 1613; (1978) 4 SCC 118")***. It refined the meaning of originality in Indian law. It rejected a crude labour-based monopoly. It also avoided an overly demanding creativity test. The chosen standard is practical. It protects serious editorial contribution while keeping public domain material free. This balance is especially vital in legal publishing because judgments are the raw material of justice. The decision is also important for access to law. Supreme Court judgments are not private commodities. They are public legal pronouncements. If one publisher could monopolise the text by adding citations and formatting, legal access would shrink. Lawyers, students, judges and citizens would depend on a single private source. The Supreme Court avoided that danger. It held that judgments may be reproduced. But the independent editorial work of publishers cannot be stolen. This is a fair compromise. The judgment also modernised Indian originality doctrine. It moved away from the old assumption that any expenditure of labour deserves copyright. Labour matters. But labour alone is not enough. Copyright is not a reward for effort alone. It protects original expression. The Court’s adoption of the ***skill and judgment*** test provides a nuanced standard. It is workable for courts. It is also fair to both creators and users. It recognises that legal editors exercise expertise. But it asks whether that expertise produces something distinguishable from the raw text. The decision has strong relevance for digital databases. The respondents’ products were CD-ROM databases. Today, legal publishing has moved to online platforms, search engines, AI tools, e-books, and legal research databases. The same principle applies. Public judgments can be used. But headnotes, editorial summaries, original annotations, curated paragraphing, citators, analytical classifications, and editorial enhancements may attract protection if they meet the originality standard. A database provider cannot merely scrape another publisher’s protected editorial layer. The ruling also prevents a common misconception. Copyright in a law report does not mean copyright in the law. A publisher may own copyright in headnotes, editorial notes, and original arrangement. It cannot own the judicial decision itself. This separation is central to democratic legal culture. Law must remain accessible. Commentary may be protected. The judgment therefore respects both intellectual labour and constitutional transparency. The case’s enduring value lies in its balanced structure. It neither underprotects publishers nor overprotects them. It allows competition in publishing judgments. It also deters parasitic copying of value-added editorial work. The maxim ***sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas*** is useful here. One may use public judgments. But one must not unfairly appropriate another’s original editorial work. The judgment thus harmonises public domain, private effort, and the needs of legal research. # J) REFERENCES ## a. Important Cases Referred 1. ***Eastern Book Company & Ors. v. D.B. Modak & Anr., AIR 2008 SC 809; (2008) 1 SCC 1; 2008 AIR SCW 49; (2008) 36 PTC 1***. 2. ***University of London Press Ltd. v. University Tutorial Press Ltd., \[1916\] 2 Ch 601***. 3. ***Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd., \[1964\] 1 All ER 465***. 4. ***Hogg v. Scott, LR 18 Eq 444***. 5. ***Designers Guild Ltd. v. Russell Williams (Textiles) Ltd., \[2000\] 1 WLR 2416 (HL)***. 6. ***Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)***. 7. ***Key Publications Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enterprises Inc., 945 F.2d 509***. 8. ***Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publishing Co.***. 9. ***CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 (1) SCR 339***. 10. ***Macmillan & Co. v. K. & J. Cooper, AIR 1924 PC 75***. 11. ***R.G. Anand v. Delux Films, AIR 1978 SC 1613; (1978) 4 SCC 118***. ## b. Important Statutes Referred 1. ***Copyright Act, 1957***: ***Sections 2(k), 2(o), 2(y), 13, 14, 17, 51 and 52(1)(q)(iv)***. 2. ***Companies Act, 1956***, referred only for the corporate existence of ***EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.*** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Syndicate of the Press of the University of Cambridge v. B.D. Bhandari & Anr., RFA (OS) No. 21 of 2009 with FAO (OS) No. 458 of 2008, Delhi High Court](https://lawfoyer.in/syndicate-of-the-press-of-the-university-of-cambridge-v-b-d-bhandari-anr-rfa-os-no-21-of-2009-with-fao-os-no-458-of-2008-delhi-high-court/) **Published:** August 17, 2026 **Author:** Jaya Dubey **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE ***Syndicate of the Press of the University of Cambridge v. B.D. Bhandari & Anr., RFA (OS) No. 21 of 2009 with FAO (OS) No. 458 of 2008, Delhi High Court, decided on 3 August 2011***, is a leading Indian copyright judgment on educational guidebooks. The Division Bench examined whether grammar exercises and mathematical questions can receive copyright protection. It also considered whether a prescribed textbook enters the **public domain** merely because a university or school board adopts it. The Court rejected that broad proposition. It held that ***original literary work under Section 13 of the Copyright Act, 1957*** can include carefully structured exercises. It also held that ***Section 52(1)(h) of the Copyright Act, 1957*** does not protect commercial publishers who reproduce questions and answers for profit. Yet the Court dismissed both appeals. It reasoned that a genuine guidebook may be a lawful derivative and transformative work. The guide must assist students through explanation, structure, commentary, or stepwise solutions. It must not merely replace the original textbook. **Keywords:** Copyright, Fair dealing, Educational guidebooks, Public domain, Originality, Derivative work, Transformative use, Textbook infringement. ## B) CASE DETAILS **i) Judgement Cause Title:** ***Syndicate of the Press of the University of Cambridge on behalf of the Chancellor, Masters and Scholars v. B.D. Bhandari & Anr.*** along with ***The Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of Oxford v. Narendra Publishing House and Ors.*** The first appeal concerned Cambridge University Press and MBD guidebooks. The second concerned Oxford University Press and mathematics guidebooks published by Narendra Publishing House. **ii) Case Number:** ***RFA (OS) No. 21 of 2009*** and ***FAO (OS) No. 458 of 2008***. **iii) Judgement Date:** ***3 August 2011***. **iv) Court:** ***High Court of Delhi at New Delhi***. **v) Quorum:** ***Justice A.K. Sikri and Justice Suresh Kait***. **vi) Author:** ***Justice A.K. Sikri***. **vii) Citation:** The judgment is reported online as ***Syndicate of the Press of the University of Cambridge v. B.D. Bhandari & Anr., decided on 3 August 2011, Delhi High Court***. **viii) Legal Provisions Involved:** ***Sections 13, 14, 17, 21, 22, 51, 52(1)(a), and 52(1)(h) of the Copyright Act, 1957***; ***Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2, Order XXXIX Rule 9, Order XXVI Rule 9, and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908***. **ix) Judgments Overruled:** No judgment was expressly overruled. The Court declined to accept broad readings of ***Mohamed Abdul Jalil v. Ram Dayal, AIR 1916 All 216*** and ***Romesh Chowdhry v. Ali Mahomed Nowsheri, AIR 1965 J&K 101*** on public domain. **x) Law Subjects:** Intellectual Property Law, Copyright Law, Education Law, Civil Procedure, Commercial Law, and Comparative Copyright Jurisprudence. **xi) Counsel:** For Cambridge, ***Mr. A.S. Chandhiok, Senior Advocate, Ms. Jyoti Taneja, and Mr. Saurabh Kirpal*** appeared. For B.D. Bhandari, ***Mr. S.K. Dubey, Ms. Sangeeta Goel, Mr. Mohit Goel, and Mr. Sidhant Goel*** appeared. For Oxford, ***Mr. V.P. Singh, Senior Advocate, Mr. Rajiv Bansal, Mr. Saurabh Sinha, and Mr. Harshit Agarwal*** appeared. For Narendra Publishing House, ***Ms. Prathiba M. Singh and Mr. Sudeep Chatterjee*** appeared. ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The judgment arose from two connected educational copyright disputes. Both disputes involved respected university presses. Both involved guidebook publishers. Both required the Court to balance private copyright ownership against educational access. Cambridge University Press claimed copyright in ***“Advanced English Grammar by Martin Hewings”***. That book was prescribed by ***Guru Nanak Dev University*** for undergraduate students. Cambridge alleged that the respondents’ ***MBD English Guide B.A./B.Sc./B.Com Parts I, II, and III*** reproduced grammar exercises and answer keys from its book. Oxford University Press raised a similar claim. It alleged that ***“Teach Yourself Mathematics Fully Solved Part A and Part B”*** copied questions from ***“Oxford Mathematics Part A”*** and ***“Oxford Mathematics Part B”***. Those books followed the Jammu and Kashmir school curriculum. The central question was not whether education mattered. It plainly did. The real question was whether commercial educational guides could reproduce protected exercises. The Court therefore studied originality, public domain, fair dealing, derivative works, and market substitution. It also considered ***[Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, AIR 2008 SC 809; (2008) 1 SCC 1](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1062099/ "Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, AIR 2008 SC 809; (2008) 1 SCC 1")***, where the Supreme Court moved Indian copyright law beyond pure “sweat of the brow.” The case is important because it refuses two extreme positions. It rejects the publisher’s rigid monopoly over every use of textbook questions. It also rejects the guidebook publisher’s claim that prescribed textbooks become free public property. The Court treated copyright as a structured legal balance. It accepted that grammar exercises can involve ***skill, judgment, labour, and creativity***. It accepted that mathematical questions may also attract protection. Yet it treated a genuine guidebook as something more than copying. A guide may explain. It may review. It may reorganise. It may solve problems step by step. It may support students who need help. The Court’s approach echoes the classic idea-expression distinction recognised in ***[R.G. Anand v. Delux Films, AIR 1978 SC 1613; (1978) 4 SCC 118](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1734007/ "R.G. Anand v. Delux Films, AIR 1978 SC 1613; (1978) 4 SCC 118")***. Copyright protects expression. It does not protect ideas, methods, themes, facts, or educational concepts. The Court applied that principle to classrooms, examinations, and publishing markets. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE Cambridge University Press published ***“Advanced English Grammar by Martin Hewings.”*** The work contained 120 grammar units. Each unit used a pedagogic structure. The left page explained grammar concepts. The right page carried practice exercises. The answer key appeared later in the book. The Court noted that the book was not merely a list of sentences. Its structure was designed for advanced South Asian learners. It used examples, symbols, typical errors, exercises, and keys. Cambridge alleged that the respondents reproduced exercises and answer keys in three MBD guidebooks. The respondents did not seriously dispute Cambridge’s copyright in the publication. Their defence was narrower. They argued that their publications were guidebooks. They claimed that the books helped students understand the prescribed syllabus. They also argued that the university prescription placed the relevant questions in the public domain. They relied on ***Section 52(1)(h) of the Copyright Act, 1957***. The Single Judge dismissed Cambridge’s suit. He held that grammar exercises lacked sufficient originality. He also held that prescribed questions and answers fell within the examination-related exception. The Division Bench disagreed with much of that reasoning. Yet it ultimately dismissed Cambridge’s appeal because the guidebook was materially different and did not substitute the original textbook. The Oxford appeal had a different procedural posture. Oxford had obtained an ex parte injunction against Narendra Publishing House. The Single Judge later vacated that injunction. Oxford appealed. Oxford claimed copyright in ***“Oxford Mathematics Part A”*** and ***“Oxford Mathematics Part B.”*** It argued that mathematical exercises were crucial to the textbook. It said exercises are often the operative heart of mathematics education. Narendra Publishing House argued that its guidebooks were fully solved materials. They did not copy theory portions. They provided working, method, and stepwise answers. The Single Judge held that Oxford had not shown sufficient creativity in the questions. He also accepted a fair use defence at the interim stage. The Division Bench partly disagreed. It held that mathematical exercises can be protected in principle. Yet Oxford faced a factual difficulty. The respondents demonstrated that several questions appeared to be taken from other standard textbooks. Therefore, at the interim stage, originality was uncertain. The Court also held that the guidebook offered explanations and stepwise solutions. It therefore affirmed vacation of the injunction. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED The first issue was whether grammar exercises and answer keys in ***“Advanced English Grammar by Martin Hewings”*** constituted ***original literary work under Section 13 of the Copyright Act, 1957***. The Court answered this in Cambridge’s favour. It held that exercises can embody creativity. Their originality lies in selection, arrangement, framing, sequencing, and pedagogic design. The author had used judgment in preparing exercises suitable for specific grammar concepts. The Court relied on ***[University of London Press Ltd. v. University Tutorial Press Ltd., \[1916\] 2 Ch 601](https://www.cipil.law.cam.ac.uk/virtual-museum/university-london-press-v-university-tutorial-1916-2-ch-601 "University of London Press Ltd. v. University Tutorial Press Ltd., [1916] 2 Ch 601")***. That case held that originality concerns expression, not novelty of idea. The Court also relied on ***Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, AIR 2008 SC 809; (2008) 1 SCC 1***. That case required a minimum degree of creativity. Cambridge’s exercises met that threshold. The second issue was whether university prescription placed the work in the public domain. The Court rejected this defence. It held that prescription by a university does not equal relinquishment under ***Section 21 of the Copyright Act, 1957***. Copyright expires under ***Section 22*** only after the statutory term. It does not vanish through academic adoption. The third issue was whether ***Section 52(1)(h) of the Copyright Act, 1957*** protected the respondents. The provision permits reproduction by a teacher or pupil in instruction, as examination questions, or in answers to such questions. The Court held that this clause did not protect commercial guidebook publishers. The respondents were not teachers. They were not pupils. They were not examination setters. Their publications were commercial products. The Court therefore rejected the Single Judge’s reasoning on this clause. The fourth issue was more delicate. It asked whether a guidebook may reproduce textbook questions without infringing copyright. The Court held that such use may be permissible where the guidebook is a genuinely derivative and transformative work. It must not merely supersede the textbook. It must add explanation, commentary, review, analysis, or stepwise solutions. This approach drew support from ***[Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994](https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/510/569/ "Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994"))*** and ***[Hubbard v. Vosper, \[1972\] 2 Q.B. 84](https://uniset.ca/other/cs3/vosper.html "Hubbard v. Vosper, [1972] 2 Q.B. 84")***. Those decisions ask whether the new work adds a different purpose. They also examine quantity, purpose, and market effect. ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Cambridge submitted that ***“Advanced English Grammar by Martin Hewings”*** was an original literary work. They argued that its exercises were not casual sentences. They were carefully framed to teach specific grammar concepts. The author had invested years of academic skill, experience, and research. Cambridge argued that originality does not require novelty like patent law. It requires independent expression. The exercise design, answer key, sequence, unit structure, and pedagogic method were all expressive elements. The appellants relied on ***[Educational Testing Service v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533 (3d Cir. 1986)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F2/793/533/119118/&ved=2ahUKEwjY8M_M56qWAxWOR2wGHW75AtcQFnoECBoQAQ&usg=AOvVaw2IqAmaT9eNw_xFONXhBkhV "Educational Testing Service v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533 (3d Cir. 1986)")***, where test questions were treated as copyrightable. They also relied on[ ***V. Govindan v. E.M. Gopalkrishna Kone, AIR 1955 Mad 391***](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1836871/%3Ftype%3Dprint&ved=2ahUKEwjN1YDp56qWAxVTamwGHfKwNM4QFnoECB8QAQ&usg=AOvVaw1ZKAyMu-09UcBe28l-t2LH " V. Govindan v. E.M. Gopalkrishna Kone, AIR 1955 Mad 391") and [***University of London Press Ltd. v. University Tutorial Press Ltd., \[1916\] 2 Ch 601***.](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.cipil.law.cam.ac.uk/virtual-museum/university-london-press-v-university-tutorial-1916-2-ch-601&ved=2ahUKEwipqun156qWAxUSTGwGHd66JgEQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw26zRTI9141Mlnqj8u3L4NK "University of London Press Ltd. v. University Tutorial Press Ltd., [1916] 2 Ch 601.") These authorities strengthened their claim that examination-style questions can be original literary works. Cambridge also invoked ***[R.G. Anand v. Delux Films, AIR 1978 SC 1613; (1978) 4 SCC 118](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1734007/&ved=2ahUKEwjgiZeN6KqWAxX9T2wGHcm3AzwQFnoECBoQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3FXsSrd5X6Zir1Q5uV7XQ1 "R.G. Anand v. Delux Films, AIR 1978 SC 1613; (1978) 4 SCC 118")***. It argued that the respondents copied protectable expression, not merely grammatical ideas. The appellants further argued that prescription by a university does not destroy copyright. They submitted that the public domain argument confused access with ownership. A textbook may be available to students. It may also be prescribed in a syllabus. Yet it remains protected unless copyright expires, is assigned, or is relinquished. Cambridge stressed ***Section 21 of the Copyright Act, 1957***. Relinquishment requires notice to the Registrar of Copyrights. No such notice existed. Cambridge also challenged reliance on ***Section 52(1)(h)***. It argued that the respondents were commercial publishers. They could not claim the privilege meant for teachers, pupils, and examinations. Oxford made similar submissions in the mathematics appeal. It argued that exercises are central to mathematics teaching. A solved guide that copies all questions exploits the textbook’s most valuable portion. Oxford contended that the respondents’ books were market substitutes. It said students may buy the guide instead of the textbook. Therefore, the use damaged the potential market for the original work. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents submitted that guidebooks perform a different educational function. They argued that Cambridge’s book was a prescribed course book. Students required support materials to understand it. MBD’s guides included broader syllabus material. They were not limited to Cambridge’s grammar book. They contained prose, poetry, comprehension, essays, letters, translations, and examination-oriented assistance. The respondents argued that answers to grammar exercises could not materially differ. If a question has a correct answer, the guide must provide it. They also contended that the arrangement and format differed. Cambridge placed explanations and exercises across unit pages. The guide placed questions and answers together for examination assistance. The respondents also argued that their books were not passed off as Cambridge’s work. They were marketed as guides. They did not copy theoretical explanations. They used only those parts relevant to the university syllabus. They relied on the educational purpose of guidebooks. They also invoked fair dealing and public domain arguments. Narendra Publishing House advanced similar arguments in the Oxford appeal. It said the mathematics guide was not a copy of the textbook. It did not reproduce theory portions. It solved problems step by step. It created a different work for students needing assistance. The respondents also challenged Oxford’s originality. They argued that many mathematical questions came from earlier textbooks by publishers such as R.D. Sharma, S. Chand, and Laxmi Publications. If Oxford had copied many questions from existing sources, it could not assert original authorship over them. The respondents also relied on the idea-expression dichotomy and merger doctrine. They argued that mathematical concepts, laws, and methods cannot be monopolised. Where limited forms of expression exist, copyright protection must be narrow. They relied on ***The Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the [University of Oxford v. Narendra Publishing House, 2008 (38) PTC 385 (Del)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/138192511/&ved=2ahUKEwiMsNOo6KqWAxVYb2wGHUwSMvYQFnoECBoQAQ&usg=AOvVaw396SY5Dv3eE8oakGm_58KL "University of Oxford v. Narendra Publishing House, 2008 (38) PTC 385 (Del)")***, where the Single Judge had declined interim relief on similar reasoning. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS ***Section 13 of the Copyright Act, 1957*** protects original literary, dramatic, musical, and artistic works. It was the foundation of Cambridge’s and Oxford’s claims. The Court held that grammar exercises and mathematics questions may qualify as literary works if they contain sufficient creative expression. ***Section 14*** defines the bundle of exclusive rights flowing from copyright. These include reproduction and publication rights. ***Section 17*** concerns first ownership. It became relevant while discussing question papers and authored educational material. ***Section 21*** permits relinquishment of copyright through notice to the Registrar. The Court used it to reject the public domain argument. Mere university adoption did not amount to statutory relinquishment. ***Section 22*** fixes the term of copyright in literary works. The Court observed that copyright does not enter the public domain until expiry of the statutory term. ***Section 51*** explains infringement. It gives legal meaning to unauthorised acts that invade copyright. These provisions collectively frame the rights-based side of the dispute. ***Section 52(1)(h) of the Copyright Act, 1957*** was central. It states that reproduction of a literary, dramatic, musical, or artistic work is not infringement when done by a teacher or pupil in the course of instruction, as part of questions to be answered in an examination, or in answers to such questions. The Court held that this exception is limited. It does not give commercial publishers a general licence to reproduce textbook exercises. ***Section 52(1)(a)*** also mattered in the Oxford appeal because the Single Judge treated the solved guide as review or fair dealing. The Court did not adopt a mechanical approach. It considered purpose, transformation, proportion, and market substitution. Procedurally, ***Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908*** governed interim injunctions. ***Order XXXIX Rule 9*** was invoked for vacation of injunction. ***Order XXVI Rule 9*** and ***Section 151 CPC*** supported the appointment of a Local Commissioner in the Oxford dispute. These provisions show how copyright claims often depend on early procedural relief. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT IN THIS CASE The Court relied heavily on ***[Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, AIR 2008 SC 809; (2008) 1 SCC 1](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1062099/&ved=2ahUKEwje8snC6KqWAxUKWHADHXBCECcQFnoECBoQAQ&usg=AOvVaw0BMOfulPRi0lc6GU9U7kpq "Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, AIR 2008 SC 809; (2008) 1 SCC 1")***. The Supreme Court in that case rejected pure “sweat of the brow.” It required skill, judgment, labour, and a minimum degree of creativity. The Delhi High Court applied this test to grammar exercises and mathematics questions. It held that such exercises can be original. The Court also cited ***University of London Press Ltd. v. University Tutorial Press Ltd., \[1916\] 2 Ch 601***. That case held that examination papers could be original literary works. It clarified that copyright protects expression of thought, not originality of ideas. ***[Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd., \[1964\] 1 All E.R. 465](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.cipil.law.cam.ac.uk/virtual-museum/ladbroke-v-william-hill-1964-1-all-er-465&ved=2ahUKEwijuaDP6KqWAxWITWwGHeRLI-IQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw1RyUbUGOMSnzQxvAJvF-al "Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd., [1964] 1 All E.R. 465")*** was used to show that compilations may involve protectable selection, arrangement, and presentation. ***R.G. Anand v. Delux Films, AIR 1978 SC 1613; (1978) 4 SCC 118*** supported the idea-expression dichotomy and infringement analysis. The Court also considered older Indian cases on educational materials. ***[Rupendra Kashyap v. Jiwan Publishing House, 1996 (38) DRJ 81](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/134584/&ved=2ahUKEwiP4PDw6KqWAxVZRmwGHW0_M5IQFnoECBoQAQ&usg=AOvVaw2Q2mEmyeZ7AzxM9hFg2SKE "Rupendra Kashyap v. Jiwan Publishing House, 1996 (38) DRJ 81")*** held that CBSE examination question papers could be copyrightable. ***[Agarwala Publishing House v. Board of High School and Intermediate Education, AIR 1967 All 91](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1183558/&ved=2ahUKEwirrqX86KqWAxV6TmwGHal8EToQFnoECBoQAQ&usg=AOvVaw33otPZ8_27gPwSMrwfgxOR "Agarwala Publishing House v. Board of High School and Intermediate Education, AIR 1967 All 91")*** recognised copyright in question papers unless assigned. [***Jagdish Prasad Gupta v. Parmeshwar Prasad Singh, AIR 1966 Pat 33*** ](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/804161/&ved=2ahUKEwizms6L6aqWAxXAd2wGHVP2DE8QFnoECBoQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1Ty7O90j3DYgVV4ox7t_RQ "Jagdish Prasad Gupta v. Parmeshwar Prasad Singh, AIR 1966 Pat 33 ")took a similar approach. The respondents relied on[ ***Mohamed Abdul Jalil v. Ram Dayal, AIR 1916 All 216***](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/333357/&ved=2ahUKEwiKjNKc6aqWAxVOb2wGHTmhN1gQFnoECBwQAQ&usg=AOvVaw30WT1atox2pZBgHT6O3QSS " Mohamed Abdul Jalil v. Ram Dayal, AIR 1916 All 216") and ***Romesh Chowdhry v. Ali Mahomed Nowsheri, AIR 1965 J&K 101***. Those cases suggested that syllabus material may become public in character. The Division Bench limited their use. It held that prescription may invite review, criticism, or guidance. It does not destroy copyright. On guidebooks, the Court referred to[ ***E.M. Forster v. Parasuram, AIR 1964 Mad 331***](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1461268/&ved=2ahUKEwjRo6fU6aqWAxVQUWwGHaqeCZoQFnoECBwQAQ&usg=AOvVaw0XDIfi3wtts3haaftr_WwN " E.M. Forster v. Parasuram, AIR 1964 Mad 331") and [***V. Ramaiah v. K. Lakshmaiah, 1989 PTC 137 (AP)***.](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56e6690f607dba6b534343c9&ved=2ahUKEwi1vsLf6aqWAxV2R2wGHXkXHkgQFnoECB4QAQ&usg=AOvVaw2tA23cXztZ-ICeWJy_LXqr "V. Ramaiah v. K. Lakshmaiah, 1989 PTC 137 (AP).") These cases helped the Court understand guides as commentaries or derivative educational works. It also considered ***[Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/510/569/&ved=2ahUKEwit5I736aqWAxUfSmwGHVs6FJYQFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw3_MLOs3XUtJcV7QpA12B-6 "Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)")***, ***[Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985)](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/471/539/&ved=2ahUKEwjQiOuH6qqWAxV0T2wGHc1uMD4QFnoECA0QAQ&usg=AOvVaw32IiqKL3CBFf_LMfevFIWl "Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985)")***, [***Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146***,](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.bitlaw.com/source/cases/copyright/Perfect-10.html&ved=2ahUKEwjx_cuS6qqWAxVRd2wGHURGFe8QFnoECBgQAQ&usg=AOvVaw0RFu5k0zrdjBBZLNZWzNSa "Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146,") and ***[Hubbard v. Vosper, \[1972\] 2 Q.B. 84](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://uniset.ca/other/cs3/vosper.html&ved=2ahUKEwiNw6Gk6qqWAxVTXWwGHceCCsgQFnoECBsQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1fb_7xZtl3qIjMitin5NVz "Hubbard v. Vosper, [1972] 2 Q.B. 84")*** for fair use and transformation. ## H) JUDGEMENT #### a. RATIO DECIDENDI The Court’s first ratio is that ***grammar exercises and answer keys may be original literary works***. The Court held that originality can exist in pedagogic design. It may lie in framing questions, arranging them with units, selecting grammatical contrasts, designing blanks, and preparing answer keys. The author need not invent grammar itself. He must create an original expression of grammar instruction. This reasoning follows ***Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, AIR 2008 SC 809; (2008) 1 SCC 1*** and ***University of London Press Ltd. v. University Tutorial Press Ltd., \[1916\] 2 Ch 601***. The Court therefore disagreed with the Single Judge’s view that grammar exercises were too ordinary for copyright. The second ratio is that ***a prescribed textbook does not enter the public domain merely by prescription***. The Court treated public domain as a legal status. It arises when copyright protection is unavailable, relinquished, or expired. University prescription is not relinquishment. ***Section 21 of the Copyright Act, 1957*** requires notice to the Registrar. No such notice existed. The third ratio is that ***Section 52(1)(h) of the Copyright Act, 1957*** does not protect commercial guidebook publishers. That provision protects teachers, pupils, examination questions, and examination answers. It does not legalise reproduction by a commercial publisher merely because the work is educational. The fourth and decisive ratio is that a genuine guidebook may still be lawful. The guidebook must be materially different from the textbook. It must not copy theory portions wholesale. It must add explanation, commentary, stepwise reasoning, or a distinct instructional purpose. The MBD guide was not confined to Cambridge grammar. It covered wider syllabus material. It included prose, poetry, comprehension, essays, translations, and examination assistance. It used questions and answers within a larger guide structure. The Court therefore held that it did not infringe Cambridge’s copyright. In Oxford’s appeal, the Court held that mathematics questions can be protected in principle. Yet interim relief was refused because originality was doubtful on facts. Several questions appeared copied from prior sources. The guide also provided stepwise solutions. Both appeals were dismissed. #### b. OBITER DICTA The judgment contains important observations on the social role of guidebooks. The Court recognised that many academics may dislike them. It acknowledged that purists may find guidebooks distasteful. Yet it accepted that guides often help weaker students. This observation is not the narrow ratio. It is a broader educational comment. The Court suggested that copyright law should not become hostile to learning aids. It must prevent plagiarism. It must also allow supportive educational commentary. The Court also observed that once a textbook is prescribed, reviews, criticisms, and guides may naturally arise. This does not mean the textbook becomes public property. It only means educational engagement becomes foreseeable. Another important observation concerns derivative works. The Court indicated that textbook-based guides may themselves attract copyright if they show independent skill, judgment, and creativity. This applies especially where the guide supplies explanations, detailed analysis, or stepwise problem-solving. This obiter is relevant for future disputes involving coaching material, solved papers, companion manuals, and academic commentaries. #### c. GUIDELINES The Court effectively framed practical guidelines for educational guidebook disputes. First, courts must examine whether the original textbook material is copyrightable. ***Originality under Section 13 of the Copyright Act, 1957*** requires independent expression and minimum creativity. Second, courts must ask whether the copied portion is a protectable expression or only an idea, fact, formula, principle, method, or syllabus requirement. Third, prescription by a university or board does not place a work in the public domain. Fourth, ***Section 52(1)(h)*** must be applied narrowly. It protects teachers, pupils, examination setters, and examination answers. It does not automatically protect publishers. Fifth, a guidebook should not be judged by isolated similarities alone. The two works must be compared as a whole. Sixth, the guidebook must be materially different. It should not be a substitute for the textbook. Seventh, the guidebook may reproduce questions when needed to explain answers. Yet it must add explanation, commentary, reasoning, or review. Eighth, courts must assess whether the new work supersedes the market of the original. Ninth, commercial character is relevant. It is not always fatal. Tenth, where the claimant’s own originality is doubtful, interim injunction may be refused. #### d. DISSENTING OPINION There was no dissenting opinion. ***Justice A.K. Sikri*** authored the judgment for the Division Bench. ***Justice Suresh Kait*** concurred. The Bench spoke with one voice. The result was consistent across both appeals. Cambridge succeeded on originality, public domain, and the narrow reading of ***Section 52(1)(h)***. Yet it failed on infringement because the guidebook was treated as materially different and transformative. Oxford succeeded in principle on copyrightability of mathematical exercises. Yet it failed on interim relief because originality was factually uncertain and the guide offered stepwise solutions. The absence of dissent is meaningful. It shows that the Court was not divided between copyright protection and educational access. It constructed a middle path. That middle path protects authored educational expression. It also permits genuine learning aids. The decision therefore functions as a careful balance between publishers, students, teachers, and the public interest in education. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment is persuasive because it avoids formalism. It does not deny copyright merely because the subject is grammar or mathematics. Such denial would weaken educational publishing. Teachers and authors often express old ideas through new learning designs. Their value lies in arrangement, examples, difficulty progression, and explanatory architecture. The Court correctly protected that labour when accompanied by creativity. At the same time, the judgment prevents publishers from using copyright as a weapon against all educational commentary. A textbook prescribed in a syllabus becomes a centre of academic discussion. Students need explanations. Teachers need supporting material. Guidebooks may serve that need. The Court’s test therefore asks whether the guidebook substitutes the textbook or transforms it. This is a pragmatic test. It is also fair. It protects original expression without monopolising learning. The ruling also clarifies ***public domain*** with useful precision. Public domain is not the same as public availability. A book may be widely sold. It may be prescribed. It may be discussed in classrooms. It may still remain protected. The Court’s reading of ***Sections 21 and 22 of the Copyright Act, 1957*** is doctrinally sound. Relinquishment must be deliberate. Expiry must follow statute. This protects authors from accidental loss of rights. The Court’s narrow interpretation of ***Section 52(1)(h)*** is also sound. That provision is meant for instruction and examinations. It is not a blanket licence for commercial reproduction. Yet the judgment leaves some uncertainty. It does not provide a mathematical threshold for permissible copying. That is understandable. Fair dealing is fact-sensitive. Still, future courts must be cautious. A publisher should not escape liability merely by adding thin commentary around copied material. The case remains highly relevant in 2026. Indian education has expanded through coaching centres, digital notes, solved papers, PDFs, online repositories, and AI-generated summaries. The judgment’s principles apply strongly to these contexts. A digital guide that merely reproduces textbook questions and answers may infringe copyright. A guide that explains, analyses, critiques, and teaches may be defensible. The distinction lies in transformation, purpose, and market effect. The judgment also aligns with India’s constitutional values. ***Article 27(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights*** recognises protection of authors’ moral and material interests. ***Article 15(1)(c) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*** similarly protects creators. Yet ***Article 13 of the ICESCR*** protects education. The Delhi High Court’s approach reflects that international balance. It neither worships copyright nor dismisses it. It treats copyright as an instrument of culture, learning, and fairness. ## J) REFERENCES ### a. Important Cases Referred - ***Syndicate of the Press of the University of Cambridge v. B.D. Bhandari & Anr., RFA (OS) No. 21 of 2009 with FAO (OS) No. 458 of 2008, High Court of Delhi, decided on 3 August 2011***. - ***The Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of Oxford v. Narendra Publishing House and Ors., 2008 (38) PTC 385 (Del)***. - ***Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, AIR 2008 SC 809; (2008) 1 SCC 1***. - ***R.G. Anand v. Delux Films, AIR 1978 SC 1613; (1978) 4 SCC 118***. - ***University of London Press Ltd. v. University Tutorial Press Ltd., \[1916\] 2 Ch 601***. - ***Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd., \[1964\] 1 All E.R. 465***. - ***Educational Testing Service v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533 (3d Cir. 1986)***. - ***V. Govindan v. E.M. Gopalkrishna Kone, AIR 1955 Mad 391***. - ***Rupendra Kashyap v. Jiwan Publishing House, 1996 (38) DRJ 81***. - ***Agarwala Publishing House v. Board of High School and Intermediate Education, AIR 1967 All 91***. - ***Jagdish Prasad Gupta v. Parmeshwar Prasad Singh, AIR 1966 Pat 33***. - ***Mohamed Abdul Jalil v. Ram Dayal, AIR 1916 All 216***. - ***Romesh Chowdhry v. Ali Mahomed Nowsheri, AIR 1965 J&K 101***. - ***E.M. Forster v. Parasuram, AIR 1964 Mad 331***. - ***V. Ramaiah v. K. Lakshmaiah, 1989 PTC 137 (AP)***. - ***Nag Book House v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1982 Cal 245***. - ***Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)***. - ***Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985)***. - ***Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146***. - ***Hubbard v. Vosper, \[1972\] 2 Q.B. 84***. ### b. Important Statutes Referred - ***Copyright Act, 1957, Section 13***. - ***Copyright Act, 1957, Section 14***. - ***Copyright Act, 1957, Section 17***. - ***Copyright Act, 1957, Section 21***. - ***Copyright Act, 1957, Section 22***. - ***Copyright Act, 1957, Section 51***. - ***Copyright Act, 1957, Section 52(1)(a)***. - ***Copyright Act, 1957, Section 52(1)(h)***. - ***Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2***. - ***Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order XXXIX Rule 9***. - ***Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order XXVI Rule 9***. - ***Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Section 151***. - ***Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 27***. - ***International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Articles 13 and 15***. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON “ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH: TRANSFORMING LAW, MANAGEMENT, COMMERCE AND SOCIETY” | Organized by Geeta Institute of Law (GIL), Panipat, Delhi NCR, India | Submit Abstract by 15th October 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-seminar-on-artificial-intelligence-for-inclusive-growth-transforming-law-management-commerce-and-society-organized-by-geeta-institute-of-law-gil-panipat-delhi/) **Published:** August 17, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON “ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH: TRANSFORMING LAW, MANAGEMENT, COMMERCE AND SOCIETY” | Organized by Geeta Institute of Law (GIL), Panipat, Delhi NCR, India | Submit Abstract by 15th October 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Screenshot-2026-08-17-201728.png) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY Geeta Institute of Law (GIL), situated on NH-44 (formerly NH-1), G.T. Road, Panipat, Haryana, was established in 2007. It is affiliated with **Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra** and approved by the **Bar Council of India (BCI)**. The institute describes itself as a premier institution for legal education and highlights its focus on academic excellence, quality legal education, research, innovation and professional development. GIL follows a student-centric and practice-oriented approach involving interactive discussions, case-law analysis, moot court competitions, legal drafting and pleading exercises, project-based learning, court visits, internships and legal-aid programmes. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY Geeta Institute of Law is organising an **International Seminar** on the theme: **“Artificial Intelligence for Inclusive Growth: Transforming Law, Management, Commerce and Society”** The seminar will examine how Artificial Intelligence is transforming governance, legal systems, business practices, commerce, education, public administration and social development, while also addressing the legal, ethical, regulatory and societal challenges associated with AI. The seminar aims to provide an interdisciplinary platform for academicians, researchers, legal professionals, policymakers, industry leaders, practitioners, corporate executives and students to exchange research, ideas and best practices concerning AI and inclusive and sustainable development. ### Major Sub-Themes 1. **Artificial Intelligence Law and Justice** – AI governance, digital justice, intellectual property, cyber law, privacy, data protection, AI ethics and human rights. 2. **AI in Management and Leadership** – strategic management, HR analytics, digital-age leadership, organisational behaviour, decision intelligence and business innovation. 3. **AI in Commerce, Finance and Accounting** – financial services and FinTech, accounting and auditing, taxation, digital marketing, blockchain, commerce, supply chain and logistics. 4. **AI, Entrepreneurship and Start-up Ecosystems** – AI-based entrepreneurship, innovation, incubation, MSMEs, business models, venture capital and women entrepreneurship. 5. **AI, Governance and Public Policy** – smart governance, e-governance, public administration, digital democracy, public-service delivery and policy challenges. 6. **AI for Sustainable Development and ESG** – SDGs, climate change, green technologies, circular economy, ESG, smart cities and sustainable business. 7. **AI, Education and Skill Development** – higher education, digital pedagogy, personalised learning, future skills, academic integrity and lifelong learning. 8. **AI, Society and Human Well-being** – mental health, healthcare innovation, social inclusion, diversity, equity and inclusion, social justice and responsible AI. 9. **Emerging Technologies and Digital Innovation** – Generative AI, machine learning, IoT, blockchain, Industry 5.0, cybersecurity and digital resilience. 10. **Multidisciplinary Research Forum** – interdisciplinary AI research, case studies, rural development, ethical AI, future of work and global perspectives on AI and sustainable development. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE The seminar is intended for: - Academicians - Researchers - Legal professionals - Policymakers - Industry leaders - Practitioners - Corporate executives - Students - Participants from across the globe For paper submissions, there can be **one author and one co-author only**. Inclusion of more than one co-author will result in automatic disqualification. ## MODE OF THE EVENT **Hybrid (Online/Offline)** Participants from outside India will present **online through Zoom or Google Meet**. ## LOCATION & VENUE **Country:** India **State:** Haryana **City:** Panipat **Region:** Delhi NCR **Venue:** Geeta Institute of Law, Panipat, Delhi NCR, India. The brochure identifies the institute as being situated on NH-44 (formerly NH-1), G.T. Road, Panipat, Haryana. ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE The brochure provides a **Google Form registration facility through a “Scan to Register” QR code**, but does not provide a direct Google Form URL. ### [Registration Link](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdtfXq4WyqaBDuiZ-c3-Caoo_9oCTqSfnnrLkiEkmq8jFu8QQ/viewform) Participants are required to: 1. Pay the applicable registration fee first. 2. Keep the payment screenshot/receipt. 3. Complete the Google Form registration. 4. Upload the payment screenshot/receipt in the Google Form. ### Abstract Submission The abstract must: - Not exceed **250 words**, including keywords. - Contain **not more than 5 keywords**. - Be accompanied by a cover page containing the sub-theme, paper title, author name(s), email address, postal address and contact number. - Be emailed to [**seminar@geetalawcollege.in**](mailto:seminar@geetalawcollege.in) with the subject: **“SUBMISSION OF ABSTRACT FOR INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR”**. ### Full Paper Submission The full research paper must be **4,000–6,000 words**, exclusive of footnotes. The paper should: - Have only one author and one co-author. - Use Times New Roman, font size 12, with 1.5 line spacing. - Use Times New Roman, font size 10, with single-spaced footnotes. - Maintain one-inch margins on all sides. - Follow **ILI rules of footnoting**. - Be original and unpublished. The full paper must be emailed to [**seminar@geetalawcollege.in**](mailto:seminar@geetalawcollege.in) with the subject: **“SUBMISSION OF FULL PAPER FOR INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR”**. Plagiarism will result in immediate disqualification. ## FEE DETAILS ### Indian Participants CategoryRegistration FeeStudents₹800Research Scholars₹800Academicians and Professionals₹1,500### Participants from Other Countries CategoryRegistration FeeStudentsUSD 20Research ScholarsUSD 30Academicians and ProfessionalsUSD 40The registration fee includes the **seminar kit, tea and lunch**. The registration fee is **non-refundable**. In case of co-authorship, both participants have to pay and register separately. ### Payment Details **Bank:** HDFC Bank, Samalkha, Panipat **Account Holder:** Geeta Institute of Law **Account Number:** 13251450000062 **IFSC:** HDFC0001325 **SWIFT Code for International Payments:** HDFCINBB Payment may be made through RTGS/NEFT or online channels such as Paytm and Google Pay. ## PRIZES / CERTIFICATES The **three best paper presenters (offline)** will receive the **“Certificate of Best Presentation.”** ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES ActivityDateSubmission of Abstract**15 October 2026**Confirmation of Abstract**17 October 2026**Last Date of Payment of Fees & Registration**19 October 2026**Submission of Full Paper**30 October 2026**International Seminar**26 November 2026 (Thursday)**The brochure notes that the above-mentioned dates are to be strictly followed. **Note:** The brochure separately mentions registration through the Google Form “latest by 10th October 2025,” which conflicts with the 2026 seminar schedule and the 19 October 2026 registration deadline. The brochure does not clarify this discrepancy. ## CONTACT INFORMATION **Email:** **Contact Numbers:** - +91 70560-09717 - +91 9650292720 - +91 9996083000 ### Student Core Committee - Chahat Sharma – 81998 09451 - Asmi Malhotra – 81681 25115 - Gauri – 7453-043061 - Niharika - Neha - Aditi - Nirmala ## ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Transport and accommodation facilities **will not be provided** to participants. However, the institution will provide contact numbers of nearby hotels and guest houses. Participants are requested to bring **one hard copy of the original full paper and ID proof** with them. ### [Registration Link](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdtfXq4WyqaBDuiZ-c3-Caoo_9oCTqSfnnrLkiEkmq8jFu8QQ/viewform) ## [OFFICIAL BROCHURE LINK](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1SPhw9UubNsVq1r-CIs00IBB8RPfxuXa2/view?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events, Other Competitions --- ### [Online Certificate Course on Competition Law, Digital Markets & Artificial Intelligence: 4-Week Executive Certificate Programme | Organized by National Law University Delhi | Event Scheduled on 22nd August - 12th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/online-certificate-course-on-competition-law-digital-markets-artificial-intelligence-4-week-executive-certificate-programme-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-event-scheduled-on-22/) **Published:** August 17, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** Online Certificate Course on Competition Law, Digital Markets & Artificial Intelligence: 4-Week Executive Certificate Programme | Organized by National Law University Delhi | Event Scheduled on 22nd August - 12th September 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Screenshot-2026-08-17-195435.png) ## About the Course National Law University Delhi, through FairSquare – The NLU Delhi Competition Law & Market Studies Society, is pleased to announce the Online Certificate Course on Competition Law, Digital Markets & Artificial Intelligence, a four-week executive education programme designed to examine the evolving intersection of competition law, digital market regulation, and artificial intelligence governance. The course brings together leading academics, practitioners, competition law experts, and industry professionals to provide participants with a comprehensive understanding of contemporary antitrust challenges in technology-driven markets. Through live lectures, case studies, and interactive discussions, participants will engage with key developments in digital platform regulation, algorithmic governance, AI-related competition concerns, merger control, compliance, and global regulatory frameworks. The programme is intended to bridge academic rigour with practical insights and equip participants with the analytical tools required to navigate rapidly changing regulatory and market environments. ## About National Law University Delhi National Law University Delhi, established in 2008 under the National Law University Act, 2007, is a premier institution committed to excellence in legal education and research. The University has been consistently ranked 2nd in the Law category of the National Institutional Ranking Framework (NIRF) by the Ministry of Education, Government of India, and has recently entered the QS World University Rankings by Subject 2026 in Law & Legal Studies, securing a place in the 201–250 band globally. NLU Delhi has produced distinguished scholars, including three Rhodes Scholars, and is known for its strong emphasis on interdisciplinary research, constitutional values, and practical legal education. Through its undergraduate, postgraduate, doctoral, and professional programmes, the University seeks to equip students with the knowledge, skills, and vision required to address contemporary legal challenges and contribute meaningfully to society. Read more about NLU Delhi: ## About FairSquare FairSquare – The NLU Delhi Competition Law & Market Studies Society is the first competition law and market studies society at National Law University Delhi. The society seeks to bridge the gap between academic engagement and the practical realities of antitrust law, market regulation, and emerging technologies. Through publications such as MarketChatter and Dialogue, expert lectures, policy discussions, and its podcast series Trust Issues, FairSquare aims to foster research, public awareness, and informed discourse on competition law and the regulation of digital markets. Read more about FairSquare: [fairsquare.nludelhi.ac.in](http://fairsquare.nludelhi.ac.in) ## Patrons - (Dr.) G.S. Bajpai, Vice-Chancellor, National Law University Delhi - (Dr.) Risham Garg, Registrar, National Law University Delhi - Shri Dhanendra Kumar, First Chairperson, Competition Commission of India & Founding Patron-in-Chief - Geeta Gouri, Former Member, Competition Commission of India - Sangeeta Verma, Former Member, Competition Commission of India - Abha Yadav, Course Director & Head, FairSquare ## Board of Advisors - Aparna Mehra, Partner, Trilegal - Toshit Shandilya, Partner, AZB & Partners - Rahul Rai, Partner & Co-Founder, Axiom5 Law Chambers ## Course Objectives The programme enables participants to: - Understand the fundamentals of competition law and economics in the context of digital markets and AI. - Examine anti-competitive agreements, cartel enforcement, abuse of dominance, and merger control in technology-driven markets. - Explore competition compliance, investigations, and enforcement trends involving digital platforms and data-intensive businesses. - Analyse global regulatory developments, including the EU Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the EU AI Act. - Develop practical analytical skills through expert-led case studies and interactive discussion sessions. ## Course Duration & Mode 22 August – 12 September 2026 - 22 August – 12 September 2026: Live online sessions - 13 September 2026 (Optional): In-person Panel Discussion & Immersion Event at Delhi, followed by a networking session with faculty, practitioners, and fellow participants ## Course Structure **Week 1** **22 August 2026** - Inaugural Session - Foundations of Competition Law and Economics in the AI Ecosystem **23 August 2026** - Anti-Competitive Agreements and Cartel Enforcement in AI-Driven Markets - Interactive Case Study & Discussion Session **Week 2** **29 August 2026** - Abuse of Dominance and Digital Platforms, Big Data & AI - Interactive Case Study & Discussion Session **30 August 2026** - Competition Compliance and Investigations in the Digital World - Interactive Case Study & Discussion Session **Week 3** **5 September 2026** - Merger Control and Competition Compliance, including Data and AI Consolidation - Interactive Case Study & Discussion Session **6 September 2026** - Competition Law in Digital Markets - Interactive Case Study & Discussion Session **Week 4** **12 September 2026** - Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Collusion & Competition Law - Interactive Case Study & Discussion Session **13 September 2026** - Concluding Panel Discussion & Social Networking Event (Offline) ## Course Fee - Students: ₹3,999 - Professionals: ₹5,999 - Optional Immersion and Networking Event: ₹500 ## [Registration Link](https://odl.nludelhi.ac.in/register2.0.html) ### [**Brochure Link**](https://odl.nludelhi.ac.in/) ### [**Brochure Page**](https://odl.nludelhi.ac.in/) ## **Contact** **Email:** [compsoc@nludelhi.ac.in](compsoc@nludelhi.ac.in) **Website:** **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events, Other Competitions --- ### [POSH Trainer Certification Programme: Empowering Workplaces, Ensuring Dignity, Building Safe Environments | Organized by Faculty of Law, Manipal University Jaipur, in collaboration with Manipal University Jaipur Teachers Empowerment Center (MUJ TEC) | Event Scheduled on 18th & 19th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/posh-trainer-certification-programme-empowering-workplaces-ensuring-dignity-building-safe-environments-organized-by-faculty-of-law-manipal-university-jaipur-in-collaboration-with-manipal-univer/) **Published:** August 17, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** POSH Trainer Certification Programme: Empowering Workplaces. Ensuring Dignity. Building Safe Environments | Organized by Faculty of Law, Manipal University Jaipur, in collaboration with Manipal University Jaipur Teachers Empowerment Center (MUJ TEC) | Event Scheduled on 18th & 19th September 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Screenshot-2026-08-17-193851.png) ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY The POSH Trainer Certification Programme is designed to transform knowledge into practical impact and prepare participants to become Certified POSH Trainers who can contribute to safer and more inclusive workplaces. The programme covers six sessions: 1. **Decoding Dignity: The Law, Its Roots and Its Reach** — understanding workplace dignity and safety, the origins and scope of the POSH Act, and key legal terminology. 2. **Beyond Bias: Gender, Power and the Modern Workplace** — exploring gender, workplace power structures, hierarchy, unconscious biases and respectful behaviour. 3. **Naming the Line: Recognising, Defining and Responding to Harassment** — identifying sexual harassment, distinguishing inappropriate behaviour from harassment, and understanding newer forms such as online harassment. 4. **Building the Shield: Committees, Composition and Compliance** — understanding workplace committees, their composition and responsibilities, and employer obligations. 5. **From Complaint to Closure: Navigating the Inquiry with Fairness** — examining the complaint process, fair inquiry procedures and the rights of everyone involved. 6. **The Trainer’s Toolkit: Turning Knowledge into Impactful Facilitation** — developing practical skills to become a confident POSH trainer and design effective training sessions. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE The brochure specifies registration fee categories for **Industry and Academicians**, and **Research Scholars and Students**. ## MODE OF THE EVENT **Online** ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE Registration is through the Google Form provided in the brochure: [**Registration Link**](https://forms.gle/xvYiUnhVLBBVWzxJ7) ## FEE DETAILS - **Industry and Academicians:** Rs. 5,000 - **Research Scholars and Students:** Rs. 2,500 ## PROGRAMME SCHEDULE ### Day 1 — Friday, 18 September 2026 - **10:00 AM – 11:00 AM:** Inaugural Session - **11:00 AM – 1:00 PM:** Session 1 — Decoding Dignity: The Law, Its Roots and Its Reach - **1:00 PM – 1:30 PM:** Break - **1:30 PM – 3:30 PM:** Session 2 — Beyond Bias: Gender, Power and the Modern Workplace - **3:30 PM – 3:45 PM:** Break - **3:45 PM – 5:45 PM:** Session 3 — Naming the Line: Recognising, Defining and Responding to Harassment ### Day 2 — Saturday, 19 September 2026 - **10:00 AM – 12:00 PM:** Session 4 — Building the Shield: Committees, Composition and Compliance - **12:00 PM – 12:15 PM:** Break - **12:15 PM – 2:15 PM:** Session 5 — From Complaint to Closure: Navigating the Inquiry with Fairness - **2:15 PM – 2:45 PM:** Break - **2:45 PM – 5:00 PM:** Session 6 — The Trainer’s Toolkit: Turning Knowledge into Impactful Facilitation and Evaluation - **5:00 PM – 6:00 PM:** Valedictory Session ## DISTINGUISHED RESOURCE PERSONS - **Prof. Sairam Bhat**, Professor of Law, NLSIU Bangalore - **Prof. (Dr.) Vijaylaxmi Sharma**, Professor & Director, MUJTEC - **Dr. Shraddha Rajput**, Assistant Professor, HNLU, Raipur - **Dr. Sunita Khatana**, Assistant Professor of Law & Assistant Director, DSW, Manipal University Jaipur - **Dr. Krishna Mehta**, Academician, Legal Consultant, Certified POSH Trainer - **Dr. Amit Yadav**, Associate Professor of Law, Manipal University Jaipur ## CONTACT INFORMATION **Dr. Vedansh Sharma** Assistant Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, Manipal University Jaipur +91-8302965771 **Toshan Chandrakar** Assistant Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, Manipal University Jaipur +91-9770780682 **Avinash Vashistha** Assistant Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, Manipal University Jaipur +91-8000934453 **Official Email:** ## IMPORTANT DATES - **Event Dates:** 18–19 September 2026 - **Day 1:** Friday, 18 September 2026 - **Day 2:** Saturday, 19 September 2026 ## [OFFICIAL BROCHURE](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_176guR5nhtkAB8-I-W0Z3R8KXeUrDa7/view?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events, Other Competitions --- ### [Call for Papers: RGNUL Financial and Mercantile Law Review (RFMLR) Volume XIV Issue I | Organized by Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab (RGNUL) | Submit by September 15, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-papers-rgnul-financial-and-mercantile-law-review-rfmlr-volume-xiv-issue-i-organized-by-rajiv-gandhi-national-university-of-law-punjab-rgnul-submit-by-september-15-2026/) **Published:** August 17, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** Call for Papers: RGNUL Financial and Mercantile Law Review (RFMLR) Volume XIV Issue I | Organized by Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab (RGNUL) | Submit by September 15, 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Screenshot-2026-08-17-192820.png) ## **About Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law** The Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab (RGNUL) is an autonomous National Law University (NLU) established by the RGNUL Act (No. 12 of 2006) passed by the Legislature of the State of Punjab, under the second wave of reforms instituted by the Bar Council of India. Established in 2006, RGNUL has garnered a pan-India reputation as a stellar institution for legal research and education. In May 2015, RGNUL became the first and the only NLU to have been accredited by the National Assessment and Accreditation Council (NAAC) with an ‘A’ grade. The University has been ranked amongst the top law schools in India in the National Institutional Ranking Framework (NIRF), by the Union Ministry of Education, Government of India. ## **About the RGNUL Financial and Mercantile Law Review** The RGNUL Financial and Mercantile Law Review (RFMLR) is a bi-annual, student-run, double-blind peer-reviewed law journal published by RGNUL, Punjab. The journal was first published in the year 2014 and gives an opportunity to the legal academia, legal professionals, and law students to contribute cutting-edge doctrinal and empirical research in the field of business and commercial laws. The Journal is indexed on SCC Online and Manupatra and has been consistently ranked amongst the top 10 most accessed law school journals by SCC Online. The Editorial Board also collaborates with various legal experts and undertakes various academic initiatives to promote study and research in the fields of business and commercial laws. As a part of this endeavour, the Editorial Board hosted the 5th Edition of the Demystifying M&A series with Mr. Pratika Shankar enlightening the participants on the evolving regulatory landscape of M&A and Corporate Governance, October 11th 2025. Additionally, it organised the RFMLR Leadership Summit which brought together distinguished industry leaders, General Counsels, and experts to engage with the pressing challenges shaping the corporate and financial landscape. The board also organised the 4 RGNUL-SAM Conclave on the Emerging Trends in Banking & Finance in India, in collaboration with Shardul Amarchand Mangaldas (SAM) on 9 & 10 November, 2024; RFMLR-CAM Blog Series Competition on the ‘Emerging Trends and Developments in the Competition Law Regime” held on March 22nd, 2024; in collaboration with Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas (CAM) which witnessed an enthusiastic participation pool of industry professionals, as well as students from across the country. The Journal has also received guest articles from leading professionals and academicians from top law firms, and law schools across India, and in our previous issues, the Peer Review Board has been graced by the presence of various legal luminaries. ## **About Volume XIV Issue I** RFMLR has constantly endeavoured to become a trusted platform for scholarly and original ideas put forth by legal practitioners, academics, and law students through the periodic publishing of critical reviews of multiple contemporary issues, focusing on various subjects of commercial legal affairs. In the upcoming issue, the Editorial Board aspires to undertake an evaluation of and publish an array of information on contemporary developments in all areas of commercial law. Hence, for Volume XIV Issue I, the author(s) can make submissions in the domain of Corporate Law, Mergers & Acquisitions, Competition Law, Insolvency, Banking & Finance, Insurance, Capital Markets, Securities, Dispute Resolution, International Trade, Investment Funds, Labour and Employment, Taxation, Intellectual Property, Real Estate, Technology, Media & Telecommunication, and White-Collar Crimes. Submissions encouraging an insightful discourse around any contemporary developments in the field of financial and mercantile laws are also welcome. ## **Eligibility** The Editorial Board invites submissions from legal practitioners, professionals, academics, and law students. ## **Categories of Submission and Word Limit** RFMLR accepts submissions in the following categories: - Article: 6000-12,000 words - Short Note: 4000-6000 words - Case Comment: 3000-5000 words - Book Review: 1500-3000 words The word limit is exclusive of footnotes. ## **Submission Guidelines** - The submissions shall be in English language only. - Co-authorship is limited to a maximum of two authors. - Submissions shall be lucid, contemporarily relevant, and well-researched. They shall contain a novel analysis of the issue by the author(s). The Editorial Board encourages analytical submissions with concrete suggestions over descriptive submissions with generic suggestions. - Any form of [plagiarism](https://www.ugc.ac.in/pdfnews/7771545_academic-integrity-Regulation2018.pdf)is strictly prohibited and the submission shall be original, unpublished, and an outcome of the author’s own efforts. ## **Submission Procedure** - The manuscripts shall be submitted through this Google Form only. Submissions made through any other mode will not be entertained. - Each author is allowed to submit a maximum of 1 manuscript, in .doc or .docx format. - The author(s) shall submit the manuscript along with a duly signed Certificate of Originality and Copyright (in this [format](https://cf9d2836-9a17-4889-b084-bc78a1bb74ee.filesusr.com/ugd/0fa0b3_42886c29b1024a219345d805b7a2c41c.docx?dn=Statement%20of%20Originality%20and%20Copyright.d)). - Upon submission, the author(s) will receive a receipt of acknowledgement of submission along with a code for your manuscript. Kindly quote the same in any future communication. ## **Submission Deadline** - The author(s) shall submit the manuscript via thefollowing Google Form latest by **September 15, 2026.** Google Form for Submission of Manuscript: ## **Contact Details** In case of any queries, please write to the Editorial Board at [submissions\_rfmlr@rgnul.ac.in](mailto:submissions_rfmlr@rgnul.ac.in) ***For further details, please refer to the brochure attached or visit*** [***www.rfmlr.com***](http://www.rfmlr.com/) **Categories:** Call for Blogs, Call for Papers, Events --- ### [Crucial case: ANI Media Pvt. Ltd. v. Open AI Opco LLC CS(COMM) 1028/2024](https://lawfoyer.in/crucial-case-ani-media-pvt-ltd-v-open-ai-opco-llc-cscomm-1028-2024/) **Published:** August 12, 2026 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** ***ANI Media Pvt. Ltd. v. Open AI Opco LLC, CS(COMM) 1028/2024, I.A. 45300/2024, decided by the Delhi High Court on 24 July 2026***, is a landmark Indian decision on ***copyright, artificial intelligence, large language models, training data, fair dealing, and territorial jurisdiction***. The Court considered whether ***Open AI’s alleged storage of ANI’s copyrighted news content for training ChatGPT*** amounted to infringement under the ***Copyright Act, 1957***. It also examined whether ***ChatGPT outputs*** reproduced ANI’s works in a legally substantial manner. Justice Amit Bansal refused interim injunction. The Court held, at a prima facie stage, that ***storage of ANI’s literary works for LLM training fell within Section 52(1)(a)*** as ***private or personal use, including research***. It further held that ANI failed to prove ***memorisation, regurgitation, or substantial reproduction*** in ChatGPT outputs. The decision is important because it interprets old copyright provisions for modern AI systems. It balances authorial rights with innovation, public interest, education, research, and access to information. **Keywords:** ***Copyright Infringement, Artificial Intelligence, Large Language Models, Fair Dealing, Section 52, Training Data, ChatGPT, RAG, Territorial Jurisdiction, Interim Injunction*** ## **B) CASE DETAILS** **i) Judgement Cause Title:** ***[ANI Media Pvt. Ltd. v. Open AI Opco LLC](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/93327052/)***. **ii) Case Number:** ***CS(COMM) 1028/2024, I.A. 45300/2024, I.A. 45301/2024 and I.A. 26192/2025***. **iii) Judgement Date:** ***Judgment reserved on 27 March 2026. Judgment pronounced on 24 July 2026***. **iv) Court:** ***High Court of Delhi at New Delhi***. **v) Quorum:** ***Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal***. **vi) Author:** ***Justice Amit Bansal***. **vii) Citation:** ***ANI Media Pvt. Ltd. v. Open AI Opco LLC, CS(COMM) 1028/2024, I.A. 45300/2024, Delhi High Court, decided on 24 July 2026***. Indian Kanoon identifies the author and bench as ***Amit Bansal, J.*** **viii) Legal Provisions Involved:** ***[Section 13](https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=section%2013%20copyright%20act), [Section 14](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1129646/), Section 17, Section 51, [Section 52(1)(a)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/257434/), Section 62 of the Copyright Act, 1957, and Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908***. The Court mainly interpreted ***Section 14(a)(i), Section 14(a)(iii), Section 51, and Section 52(1)(a)***. **ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case:** No judgment was overruled. The Court distinguished several decisions. It applied existing copyright principles to AI training. **x) Related Law Subjects:** ***Copyright Law, Intellectual Property Law, Artificial Intelligence Law, Technology Law, Civil Procedure, Private International Law, Commercial Litigation, Internet Jurisdiction, and Constitutional Public Interest Principles***. **xi) Counsels Appearing for Parties:** ANI was represented by ***Mr. Sidhant Kumar, Mr. Akshit Mago, Ms. Manyaa Chandok, Ms. Anshika Saxena, and Ms. Lahar Jain***. Open AI was represented by ***Mr. Amit Sibal, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Sanjeev Kapoor, Mr. Nirupam Lodha, Mr. Madhav Khosla, Mr. Gautam Wadhwa, Ms. Moha Paranjpe, Mr. Abhi Udai Singh Gautam, Ms. Rebecca Cardoso, Mr. Hardik Malik, Ms. Vanshika Thapliyal, and Mr. Rajat Bector***. Several intervenors appeared. ***Mr. Adarsh Ramanujan*** and ***Professor Arul George Scaria*** assisted as ***Amici Curiae***. ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The dispute arose because ***ANI alleged unauthorised use of its copyrighted news content by Open AI***. ANI claimed that Open AI copied and stored its works for training ***large language models underlying ChatGPT***. ANI also argued that ChatGPT generated outputs reproducing ANI’s works. The Court treated the case as a difficult meeting point between ***traditional copyright law and modern artificial intelligence***. The judgment records that copyright law has faced similar disruptions before. Printing, broadcasting, photocopying, video recording, streaming, and now AI have each disturbed settled legal arrangements. The Court therefore approached the matter with caution. It did not treat AI as legally exempt. It also did not treat copyright as mechanically prohibiting every technical use of public data. The central task was to read the ***Copyright Act, 1957*** in a technologically updated manner. That approach is visible throughout the judgment. The Court accepted that ***LLMs use enormous text corpora***. It also noted that data may come from publicly available web sources and licensed sources. It then asked whether such use is infringement, fair dealing, or a matter requiring trial. The Court first explained how ***LLMs work***. It stated that an LLM predicts the next word from preceding words. The model is trained on vast text corpora. The data is processed through ***tokenisation*** and ***embedding***. Tokens become numerical representations. During training, the system repeatedly predicts masked words and adjusts its parameters. After training, the model is fine-tuned to follow instructions. A user then interacts with the model through prompts. The Court also discussed ***Retrieval-Augmented Generation, or RAG***. RAG does not rely only on training data. It retrieves current or external information before generating responses. This technical explanation mattered legally. ANI’s claim depended on whether training involved copying. ANI also alleged that outputs showed memorisation. Open AI responded that outputs were not copies but generated responses. The Court’s technical discussion allowed it to separate ***training claim***, ***output claim***, and ***RAG-based responses***. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** ANI is a news agency. It publishes and licenses news reports, articles, interviews, images, videos, and related content. ANI claimed ownership over original literary works published on its platforms. It relied on agreements with professionals to show that copyright vested in ANI. Open AI operates ChatGPT. ChatGPT is a generative AI application based on large language models. ANI alleged that Open AI copied and stored ANI’s works for training ChatGPT. ANI also claimed that ChatGPT outputs reproduced ANI’s content. ANI’s interim application sought restraint against Open AI. The relief effectively required Open AI to stop storing or using ANI’s works and to prevent infringing outputs. Open AI resisted the injunction. It argued that its training happened outside India. It also stated that the specific fourteen ANI works relied upon were published after the relevant training cut-off dates for GPT-4 and GPT-4o. Therefore, those works could not have been memorised during training. The proceedings became larger than an ordinary copyright dispute. Several industry bodies intervened. The ***Federation of Indian Publishers, Digital News Publishers Association, and Indian Music Industry*** broadly supported ANI. ***Flux AI Labs, IGAP Project LLP, and Broadband India Forum*** broadly supported Open AI. The Court appointed two amici. This shows the systemic importance of the case. The matter did not only concern ANI and Open AI. It affected publishers, news businesses, music producers, AI developers, start-ups, users, researchers, and the public. The Court had to decide an interim injunction. It repeatedly clarified that its findings were ***prima facie***. Therefore, the judgment does not finally decide every question of AI copyright liability. It decides whether ANI had shown enough to justify immediate interim restraint. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** The first issue was whether ***storage of ANI’s data for training ChatGPT*** amounted to copyright infringement. This involved ***Section 14(a)(i)***, which includes reproduction in material form and electronic storage. It also involved ***Section 51***, which explains when copyright is infringed. The second issue was whether ***ChatGPT outputs*** infringed ANI’s copyright by reproducing ANI’s works. This required the Court to test ***memorisation, regurgitation, substantial similarity, and communication to the public***. The third issue was whether Open AI could rely on ***fair dealing under Section 52(1)(a)***. Though the framed issue used “fair use”, the Court clarified that Indian law uses ***fair dealing***. The fourth issue was whether Indian courts had jurisdiction when Open AI’s servers were located in the United States. The jurisdiction issue was foundational. If Delhi courts lacked jurisdiction, the remaining questions could not be considered. The output issue was examined before the training and fair dealing issues because it influenced the Court’s understanding of actual harm and reproduction. The Court later considered the training and fair dealing issues together. That method was logical. If storage was reproduction, the next question was whether such storage was protected by ***Section 52(1)(a)***. The Court also had to consider whether interim injunction was justified. This required the familiar triad of ***prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury***. Public interest was treated as an important factor. ## **F) PETITIONER / PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENTS** ANI argued that Open AI used its copyrighted works without permission. It said that ***training an LLM necessarily involves copying and storing copyrighted text***. According to ANI, tokenisation and vectorisation did not remove copyright concerns. They were merely technical forms of converting protected expression into machine-readable form. ANI argued that such conversion still involved reproduction or adaptation. ANI also submitted that Open AI’s model could detokenise or reconstruct language into readable outputs. Therefore, ANI claimed that the entire process showed use of its protected expression. ANI further argued that public availability is not equal to public ownership. A work available on the internet can still be copyrighted. This argument is doctrinally strong. Copyright protects expression even when the work is freely accessible. The Court accepted this broad proposition. It treated ANI’s publicly accessible literary works as capable of copyright protection at the interim stage. ANI also argued that ChatGPT outputs reproduced its works. It relied on examples from the plaint. It said that some outputs were close to ANI articles and interviews. ANI placed emphasis on memorisation and regurgitation. It argued that LLMs can retain training data and reproduce it when prompted. ANI relied on foreign decisions such as ***[The Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)](https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1048&context=historical "The Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)")***, ***[GEMA v. Open AI, Case No. 42 O 14139/24, Munich Regional Court, 11 November 2025](https://chatgptiseatingtheworld.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/GEMA_v_OpenAI_Judgment_Unofficial-English_Translation.pdf "GEMA v. Open AI, Case No. 42 O 14139/24, Munich Regional Court, 11 November 2025")***, and ***[Advance Local Media LLC v. Cohere Inc., 1:25-cv-01305 (S.D.N.Y.)](https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2025cv01305/636920/59/ "Advance Local Media LLC v. Cohere Inc., 1:25-cv-01305 (S.D.N.Y.)")***. ANI submitted that commercial AI companies cannot take protected news content without licence. It also stressed that Open AI had entered licensing arrangements with other news organisations. Therefore, according to ANI, Open AI understood the value of news content but avoided paying ANI. ## **G) RESPONDENT / DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENTS** Open AI argued that ANI failed to show infringement. It stated that the fourteen works relied upon by ANI were published after the relevant training cut-off dates. Therefore, Open AI said those works could not have been included in training data for the models then used by ANI. Open AI also argued that copyright does not protect facts, ideas, events, or news as such. It protects only expression. This principle comes from classic copyright doctrine. It was reinforced through ***[R.G. Anand v. Deluxe Films, (1978) 4 SCC 118](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1734007/)*** and ***[Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1062099/)***. In ***R.G. Anand***, the Supreme Court explained that copyright does not protect ideas. It protects expression, form, arrangement, and treatment. In ***EBC v. Modak***, the Supreme Court rejected mere “sweat of the brow” and required skill and judgment. These cases were important because ANI’s works were news-based. News reporting has protectable expression. Yet the underlying facts remain free. Open AI also argued that ChatGPT was not designed to reproduce training material. It said outputs differ between users and prompts. It submitted that any regurgitation was rare and actively mitigated. Open AI emphasised that ChatGPT generates responses from learned statistical patterns. It also argued that RAG-based search outputs are more like summaries or snippets with source references. On fair dealing, Open AI argued that training was ***private use and research*** under ***Section 52(1)(a)***. It submitted that commercial character does not automatically defeat fair dealing. It also contended that requiring licences for every public web source would seriously harm AI development. On interim relief, Open AI argued that ANI’s claim was compensable in money. ANI had itself offered a licence for USD 7.5 million. Open AI also said it had blocked ANI’s website for training and ChatGPT search/RAG purposes. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** ***Section 13 of the Copyright Act, 1957*** recognises copyright in original literary, dramatic, musical, and artistic works. ANI’s news articles and interviews were treated as original literary works at the interim stage. ***Section 17*** concerns first ownership of copyright. ANI relied on professional services agreements to show ownership in works created by its personnel. ***Section 14(a)(i)*** gives the owner the exclusive right to reproduce a literary work in material form, including storing it electronically. ***Section 14(a)(iii)*** protects communication to the public. ***Section 51*** defines infringement when a person, without licence, does something exclusively reserved to the copyright owner. These provisions formed the base of ANI’s claim. ***Section 52(1)(a)*** was the heart of Open AI’s defence. It protects fair dealing with works, other than computer programmes, for ***private or personal use, including research, criticism or review, and reporting current events***. The Explanation protects electronic storage for those purposes. The Court held that this provision should not be read narrowly. It treated Section 52 not merely as an exception, but as part of the internal balance of copyright law. Copyright rewards authors. It also serves learning, research, education, innovation, and public access. The Court therefore used a ***purpose test*** and ***fairness test***. The purpose test asked whether Open AI’s storage came within ***private or personal use, including research***. The fairness test asked whether Open AI’s use prejudiced ANI’s market and whether ChatGPT served public interest. ## **I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT IN THIS CASE** The Court relied on ***[R.G. Anand v. Deluxe Films, (1978) 4 SCC 118](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1734007/)*** for the core test of copyright infringement. The case holds that copyright protects expression, not ideas. Similarity must be substantial, material, and based on the work as a whole. This helped Open AI because the Court compared ANI articles and ChatGPT outputs as wholes. It found no substantial similarity at the interim stage. The Court referred to ***[Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1062099/)*** for originality. The Supreme Court rejected pure labour-based copyright. It required skill and judgment. This mattered because news content often contains facts. The Court accepted ANI’s copyright in original literary expression. Yet it recognised that facts and events themselves are not monopolised. The Court used ***[Banyan Tree Holding (P) Ltd. v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3780](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/151685239/)*** on internet jurisdiction. It supported the view that purposeful availment and targeting users in a forum may create jurisdiction. Open AI offered services to users in India, including Delhi. This helped ANI on jurisdiction. The Court relied on ***[Neetu Singh v. Telegram FZ LLC, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 2637](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/164684887/)***. That case held that foreign server location cannot defeat Indian copyright remedies where infringement affects India. The Court applied similar reasoning. It held that Open AI could not avoid Indian jurisdiction merely by locating servers abroad. The Court also discussed ***[Syndicate of the Press of the University of Cambridge v. B.D. Bhandari, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 3215](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/565788/ "Syndicate of the Press of the University of Cambridge v. B.D. Bhandari, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 3215")***. That case accepted transformative or derivative use in the context of guidebooks. It helped the Court develop the fairness inquiry. ***Rameshwari Photocopy Services*** was considered for educational copying and Section 52. ***[Blackwood v. A.N. Parasuraman, AIR 1959 Mad 410](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1685540/ "Blackwood v. A.N. Parasuraman, AIR 1959 Mad 410")*** was used for understanding “research”. ***[State through CBI v. S.J. Choudhary, (1996) 2 SCC 428](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/389295/ "State through CBI v. S.J. Choudhary, (1996) 2 SCC 428")*** supported updating construction. Foreign cases such as ***[Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015)](https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/13-4829/13-4829-2015-10-16.html "Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015)")***, ***[Bartz v. Anthropic PBC](https://copyrightalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/Bartz-v.-Anthropic-Order.pdf "Bartz v. Anthropic PBC")***, and ***[Kadrey v. Meta Platforms](https://media.npr.org/assets/artslife/arts/2025/order1.pdf "Kadrey v. Meta Platforms")*** were used cautiously. The Court treated foreign law as persuasive only where compatible with Indian law. ## **H) JUDGEMENT** ### **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment is that, at the interim stage, ***Open AI’s storage of ANI’s original literary works for training LLMs underlying ChatGPT falls within Section 52(1)(a)***. Therefore, it does not amount to infringement under ***Section 51***. The Court held that ***research*** under Section 52(1)(a) must receive an updated interpretation. Research is not limited to human study with books and notes. Machine learning can also be research when it is performed for developing knowledge systems for human benefit. The Court also held that ***private use*** can include use by a private company in a closed technical environment. The training data was not made publicly available in natural language or tokenised form. This made the use private in the Court’s prima facie view. The Court further held that ANI failed to show that ChatGPT outputs were substantially similar to ANI works. The examples relied upon were published after the model training dates. Therefore, they could not establish memorisation from training. The Court found that the outputs were summaries or differently worded responses. It applied ***R.G. Anand*** and examined the whole works. The Court also held that RAG outputs did not amount to infringement because they were not substantially similar. ANI failed to show memorisation or regurgitation. Hence, the output claim failed at the interim stage. Finally, the Court held that Delhi High Court had jurisdiction. ANI had its principal office in Delhi. Open AI targeted Indian users. The alleged outputs were generated in India. Foreign server location was not decisive. ### **b) OBITER DICTA** The judgment contains important observations beyond the narrow refusal of interim injunction. The Court observed that copyright law must adapt to technological change. It recognised AI as a major public-interest technology. It stated that traditional copyright provisions must be interpreted with sensitivity to new technological realities. The Court also observed that Section 52 should receive broad and liberal interpretation because it represents user rights and public interest, not a grudging exception. This observation may influence future copyright cases. The Court also made significant comments on public interest. It noted that AI tools support education, research, translation, software development, accessibility, and knowledge dissemination. It warned that requiring licences from multiple web sources at the interim stage could make LLM development economically unviable. This was not a final policy ruling. Yet it shows judicial concern for innovation. The Court also recognised that copyright owners remain important. Its reasoning therefore rests on balance, not absolute freedom for AI companies. ### **c) GUIDELINES / PRINCIPLES EMERGING FROM THE CASE** First, ***foreign server location does not automatically defeat Indian copyright jurisdiction***. If the plaintiff is based in India, the defendant targets Indian users, and outputs are generated in India, Indian courts may exercise jurisdiction. Second, ***publicly available content may still be copyrighted***. The Court did not hold that internet availability destroys copyright. ANI’s works remained protectable at the interim stage. Third, ***facts and news events are not protected as such***. Only original expression is protected. This is especially relevant for news agencies. Fourth, ***LLM training may involve electronic storage***. The Court accepted that at least temporary storage occurs during training. Fifth, ***Section 52(1)(a) may protect AI training*** where the use is private, research-oriented, fair, non-substitutive, and publicly beneficial. Sixth, ***commercial use does not automatically defeat fair dealing***. The absence of “non-commercial” language in Section 52(1)(a) mattered. Seventh, ***memorisation and regurgitation require evidence***. Mere possibility is insufficient for interim injunction. Eighth, ***substantial similarity must be assessed as a whole***. Isolated similarities are not enough. Ninth, ***public interest matters in AI injunctions***. Courts must consider effects on users, research, innovation, and access to information. Tenth, ***trial remains open***. The findings are prima facie and do not finally decide liability. ### **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The decision is a major starting point for Indian AI copyright law. It does not give AI companies blanket immunity. It does not abolish copyright in news. It does not say that every scraping activity is lawful. Its holding is narrower. On the facts placed at the interim stage, ANI could not prove substantial output infringement. It could not prove memorisation or regurgitation. Its examples were weak because they post-dated the training cut-off dates. The Court also found that Open AI’s internal storage for training was protected by ***Section 52(1)(a)***. This conclusion rests on a broad reading of ***private use*** and ***research***. The judgment is persuasive because it treats AI seriously. It avoids emotional conclusions. It studies how LLMs work. It separates facts from expression. It recognises author rights but also protects innovation. Its strongest contribution is the ***two-step Section 52 test***. The Court first asks whether the purpose fits Section 52. It then asks whether the dealing is fair. For fairness, it considers limited training use, market harm, and public interest. This structure gives Indian courts a workable method for future AI disputes. The judgment also has limits. It is an interim order. Trial evidence may change conclusions. A stronger case involving verbatim outputs, paywalled content, repeated copying, or clear market substitution may be decided differently. The Court’s reasoning may also face appellate scrutiny. Still, the ruling is likely to shape Indian debates on text and data mining. It also places India near global conversations on AI training, fair dealing, and copyright balance. ## **J) REFERENCES** ### **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. ***ANI Media Pvt. Ltd. v. Open AI Opco LLC, CS(COMM) 1028/2024, I.A. 45300/2024, Delhi High Court, decided 24 July 2026***. 2. ***R.G. Anand v. Deluxe Films, (1978) 4 SCC 118***. 3. ***Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1***. 4. ***Banyan Tree Holding (P) Ltd. v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3780***. 5. ***Neetu Singh v. Telegram FZ LLC, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 2637***. 6. ***Syndicate of the Press of the University of Cambridge v. B.D. Bhandari, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 3215***. 7. ***University of Oxford v. Rameshwari Photocopy Services, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6229***. 8. ***Blackwood & Sons Ltd. v. A.N. Parasuraman, AIR 1959 Mad 410***. 9. ***State through CBI v. S.J. Choudhary, (1996) 2 SCC 428***. 10. ***Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015)***. 11. ***Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)***. 12. ***GEMA v. Open AI, Case No. 42 O 14139/24, Munich Regional Court, decided 11 November 2025***. 13. ***Advance Local Media LLC v. Cohere Inc., 1:25-cv-01305 (S.D.N.Y.)***. 14. ***Bartz v. Anthropic PBC, 3:24-cv-05417 (N.D. Cal.)***. 15. ***Kadrey v. Meta Platforms, Inc., N.D. Cal.***. ### **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. ***The Copyright Act, 1957, Section 13***. 2. ***The Copyright Act, 1957, Section 14(a)(i)***. 3. ***The Copyright Act, 1957, Section 14(a)(iii)***. 4. ***The Copyright Act, 1957, Section 17***. 5. ***The Copyright Act, 1957, Section 51***. 6. ***The Copyright Act, 1957, Section 52(1)(a)***. 7. ***The Copyright Act, 1957, Section 62***. 8. ***The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Section 20***. 9. ***Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1886, Article 9***. 10. ***TRIPS Agreement, 1994, copyright enforcement principles and international IP balance***. **Categories:** Articles --- ### [10th Inter-University Moot Court Competition (10th IMCC) | Organized by Moot Court Society, Law College Dehradun, Uttaranchal University | Pre-Memorial Registration by 10 September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/10th-inter-university-moot-court-competition-10th-imcc-organized-by-moot-court-society-law-college-dehradun-uttaranchal-university-pre-memorial-registration-by-10-september-2026/) **Published:** August 10, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 10th Inter-University Moot Court Competition (10th IMCC) | Organized by Moot Court Society, Law College Dehradun, Uttaranchal University | Pre-Memorial Registration by 10 September 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Screenshot-2026-08-10-230832.jpg) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY **Law College Dehradun (LCD)** is an independent law college in Uttarakhand imparting legal education through programmes including B.A. LL.B. (Hons.), B.B.A. LL.B. (Hons.), LL.B. (Hons.), LL.M. and a Doctoral Programme in Law. The college focuses on interdisciplinary legal education, experiential learning, legal research, advocacy skills and preparing practice-ready legal professionals. Its Moot Court Society is a student-run, faculty-advised and monitored body that promotes legal acumen, research and advocacy skills. The Society organises intramural competitions each semester and at least one national-level competition every year. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY The **10th Inter-University Moot Court Competition** is a national-level moot court competition based on **Constitutional Law**, administered by the Moot Court Society of Law College Dehradun. The competition provides law students with an opportunity to develop and demonstrate their legal research, memorial drafting, analytical reasoning and oral advocacy skills. The competition will involve memorial evaluation, a Memorial Elimination Round, Researchers’ Test and multiple oral rounds. The competition will have: - Memorial Elimination Round - Two Preliminary Oral Rounds - Quarter-Final Round - Semi-Final Round - Final Round - Researchers’ Test - Memorial and oral-round evaluation The top **32 teams** based on their Memorial scores will qualify for the Oral Rounds after the Memorial Elimination Round and payment of the applicable post-memorial registration fee. The top **8 teams** from the Preliminary Rounds will advance to the Quarter-Finals. The competition is based on a moot proposition prepared for the competition. The brochure states that the proposition is fictitious and does not intend to resemble any person or incident. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE The competition is open to: - Students pursuing a **three-year or five-year LL.B. course** from any law school, college or university in India recognised by the Bar Council of India (BCI). - **LL.M. students** may also participate, provided they are **not enrolled as advocates with the BCI**. Each institution may nominate **only one team**. ### Team Composition A team must consist of: - **Minimum:** 2 members, both designated as oralists. - **Maximum:** 3 members — 2 oralists and 1 researcher. No additional person is permitted to accompany the team. ## MODE OF THE EVENT **Offline / Physical Event** The competition will be conducted physically from **9 October 2026 to 11 October 2026**. ## LOCATION & VENUE OF THE EVENT **Country:** India **State:** Uttarakhand **City:** Dehradun **Venue:** Law College Dehradun, Uttaranchal University **Address:** Law College Dehradun, Uttaranchal University, Dehradun, Uttarakhand – 248007, India ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE ### Pre-Memorial Registration Teams must register before memorial submission by paying a registration fee of **₹2,000**. ### [**Registration Link**](https://tinyurl.com/IMCCPREMEMORIALREGISTRATION) ### Moot Problem The official Moot Problem is available at: ### [Moot Problem Link](https://tinyurl.com/IMCC2026MOOTPROBLEM) ### Memorial Submission Teams must prepare memorials for both parties — **Petitioner/Applicant and Respondent**. Soft copies of the memorials must be submitted through: **Last date:** 13 September 2026. The top 32 teams qualifying from the Memorial Elimination Round must complete post-memorial registration. ### Post-Memorial Registration **Fee:** ₹4,000 **Registration Link:** ### Sample Memorial Format Teams are required to follow the prescribed sample memorial format: ### Citation Manual Authorities must be cited according to the SILC Manual: ## FEE DETAILS - **Pre-Memorial Registration:** ₹2,000 - **Post-Memorial Registration:** ₹4,000 for teams qualifying for the Memorial Knockout Round. The brochure also states that accommodation and food will be provided to all teams by the administrators, along with conveyance to and from the place of accommodation and the college. Additional charges apply if teams choose to check in earlier or stay beyond the scheduled dates. ## PRIZES ### Winning Team - **₹36,000** - Individual trophy to each member - Winning Trophy - Internships at **S.S. Rana & Co.** ### Runners-Up - **₹25,000** - Individual trophy to each member - Runner-Up Trophy ### Best Memorial - **₹9,000** - Trophy ### Best Counsel (Male) - **₹5,000** - Trophy ### Best Counsel (Female) - **₹5,000** - Trophy ### Best Researcher - **₹5,000** - Trophy A certificate will be awarded to all participating teams. ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES EventDateRelease of Moot Proposition8 August 2026Last Date for Seeking Clarification5 September 2026Release of Clarification8 September 2026Last Date of Pre-Memorial Registration10 September 2026Last Date of Memorial Submission13 September 2026Memorial Knockout Results25 September 2026Last Date of Post-Memorial Registration2 October 2026Last Date to Submit Travel Plan2 October 2026Last Date to Submit Compendium5 October 2026Inaugural Ceremony9 October 2026Preliminary & Quarter-Final Rounds10 October 2026Semi-Final & Final Rounds11 October 2026### Accommodation Schedule - **Check-in:** 9 October 2026, approximately 12:00 noon - **Check-out:** 12 October 2026, until 12:30 noon ## CONTACT INFORMATION **Moot Court Society, Law College Dehradun** Ground Floor, Law College Dehradun, Uttaranchal University **Email:** **Website:** [www.lcdmcs.in](http://www.lcdmcs.in) ### Competition Contacts **Ms. Somya Upadhyay** Chief Executive Officer, LCDMCS Phone: +91 7017047090 **Ms. Sneha Uniyal** Secretary Administration, LCDMCS Phone: +91 7060094799 **Ms. Shivangi Negi** Joint Convenor, LCDMCS Phone: +91 9520956175 **Ms. Khushi Khantwal** Joint Convenor, LCDMCS Phone: +91 8869898303 For clarification regarding the Moot Problem or Rules, queries may be sent to [**lcdmcs@uumail.in**](mailto:lcdmcs@uumail.in) by **5 September 2026**. ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / BROCHURE / RULES & REGULATIONS **Official Website:** [www.lcdmcs.in](http://www.lcdmcs.in) **Moot Problem:** **Pre-Memorial Registration:** **Post-Memorial Registration:** **Memorial Submission:** **Sample Memorial Format:** **SILC Citation Manual:** **Categories:** Moot Courts --- ### [Harshita Singh Patel Secures Second Prize in National-Level Research Paper Writing Competition on Vision for Viksit Bharat](https://lawfoyer.in/harshita-singh-patel-secures-second-prize-in-national-level-research-paper-writing-competition-on-vision-for-viksit-bharat/) **Published:** August 8, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Content:** Academic excellence is not only about marks and degrees. It is also about the courage to explore new ideas, question existing perspectives, conduct meaningful research, and present thoughts with clarity. Demonstrating this spirit of academic curiosity, **Harshita Singh Patel**, a fifth-year LL.B. (Hons.) student at the **Faculty of Law, University of Lucknow**, has secured the **Second Prize in the National-Level Research Paper Writing Competition** organised under **Vision for Viksit Bharat by Bharatiya Shikshan Mandal in 2024**. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/IMG_20260731_111041-Harshita-1024x783.jpg) The achievement reflects Harshita’s growing interest in legal research, advocacy, and the changing landscape of legal practice. Competing at the national level, the research paper writing competition provided an opportunity to engage deeply with an important contemporary theme and present well-researched ideas before a wider academic audience. For a law student, research is an essential skill. The ability to understand legislation, critically analyse legal provisions, follow evolving jurisprudence, and communicate complex ideas in a structured manner forms an important part of becoming a well-rounded legal professional. Through this competition, Harshita gained valuable practical exposure to these aspects of legal scholarship. Reflecting on the experience, Harshita shared that participating in the competition was a surreal experience. The preparation process helped in understanding how to structure a research paper, critically analyse statutes, and study the development of jurisprudence. The competition also provided an opportunity to interact with esteemed guests and fellow participants, making the experience valuable beyond the research paper itself. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/IMG_20260731_110923-Harshita.jpg) The journey towards the achievement also strengthened important qualities such as confidence, discipline, curiosity, and perseverance. These qualities are particularly significant for aspiring legal professionals, where continuous learning and the ability to engage with emerging legal developments play a crucial role. Harshita’s achievement also carries an inspiring message for fellow law students. In an academic environment where students often hesitate to step beyond familiar areas, taking part in competitions, conferences, research initiatives, and scholarly activities can open doors to learning and personal growth. Every such opportunity can become a stepping stone towards discovering one’s strengths and developing a stronger professional identity. Harshita’s approach is beautifully captured in the personal principle shared during the submission: **“embrace every opportunity to learn and speak up.”** The idea reflects the importance of stepping outside one’s comfort zone and allowing curiosity to guide the learning journey. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/image.-Harshita.jpg) The Second Prize at a national-level research paper writing competition is therefore more than a recognition on paper. It represents dedication towards research, willingness to learn, and the confidence to present one’s ideas on a national platform. As Harshita continues the journey through legal education and towards the professional world, this accomplishment stands as a meaningful milestone and an encouragement to pursue further opportunities in research, advocacy, and legal scholarship. LawFoyer’s **Achievers’ Archive** proudly celebrates this accomplishment and recognises Harshita Singh Patel for demonstrating that consistent learning, curiosity, and the courage to participate can turn an academic opportunity into an achievement worth celebrating. **Wish to showcase your achievement to the world and inspire others?** LawFoyer will celebrate your achievement because **every achievement deserves recognition. Your achievement is our achievement.** ##### Share your achievement with us and become a part of **LawFoyer’s Achievers’ Archive**: [LawFoyer Achievers’ Archive](https://lawfoyer.in/category/achievers-archive/) **Categories:** Achievers Archive --- ### [How Legal Assistance Simplifies Property Registration and Ownership Transfer](https://lawfoyer.in/how-legal-assistance-simplifies-property-registration-and-ownership-transfer/) **Published:** August 7, 2026 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ***Discover how legal assistance streamlines property registration and ownership transfer through proper documentation, legal compliance, and expert guidance for secure transactions.*** ## **Introduction** Property registration, ownership transfer… It’s one of those legal steps that basically confirms who really owns immovable property, and yes, it also helps safeguard the interests of both the buyer and the seller. Whether someone is buying a home, leasing a commercial space, or dealing with an inherited asset, getting the registration done right matters a lot. Otherwise, later on, you may run into ownership disputes, messy legal complications, and uncomfortable financial risk. Usually, the work includes checking property documents carefully, drafting the legal paperwork, paying stamp duty and registration fees, and also following the state rules that apply at that time. It can feel tiring, so professional legal help really can make it simpler. A property lawyer can look over title documents, spot possible title defects or other hidden legal issues, steer the client through the whole registration journey, and make sure the transfer happens according to law, not just “as people expect.” In short, this guide covers why legal assistance during property registration and ownership transfer is so important, what challenges commonly come up, and how proper legal support can make a property transaction more secure, less troublesome, and more predictable. ## **Understanding Property Registration and Ownership Transfer** Property registration and ownership transfer are basically core legal processes that set up and acknowledge the lawful ownership of immovable property. If these steps are completed in the right way, it helps safeguard the parties’ rights and also brings down the chances of arguments. At the same time, it supports proper compliance with the property laws that are applicable. ### **What Is Property Registration?** Property registration is basically the legal process by which a property transaction gets recorded with the right government authority. It results in an official paper trail of what happened, gives legal standing to the claimed ownership, and also helps safeguard the buyer’s rights if there are disagreements or rival claims later. Usually, registration is needed for things like property sales, gifts, swaps, some leases and other transfers, depending on what the relevant laws say. ### **What Is Property Ownership Transfer?** Property ownership transfer is basically the legal way of moving ownership rights from one individual to another, in a proper manner. This kind of change can happen through several routes, like a sale, a gift, inheritance, partition, settlement, or other options that the law actually recognises. After the transfer is done, it’s important to update the ownership records too, because that step helps set out the new owner’s legal authority, supports any later dealings, and also makes sure the government records show the real, current status of the property. ## **Common Challenges During Property Registration** Property registration sort of needs a bunch of legal and procedural steps that have to be handled properly, no shortcuts, because otherwise things can go wrong. If you make any errors along the way or just leave out something important, it can easily cause delays, disagreements, or extra complications in proving lawful ownership. ### **Incomplete or Incorrect Documentation** Registration can get postponed when the documents provided are incomplete, wrong, or don’t match the official records. Even small mistakes can trigger objections from the registration office, and then everything kind of stalls. This can happen with errors in sale deeds, agreements, or other documents used for registration. It can also happen if identity proofs are missing, or if ownership records and supporting property documents aren’t included, or are inconsistent in some way. ### **Title Verification Issues** Checking the legal title of a property is an essential step before the transaction gets finalized. If title-related concerns aren’t spotted early, a buyer may end up facing legal disputes later on, sometimes for years. For example, the ownership history might be unclear, or it may be incomplete. Also, there can be ongoing legal disputes, pending litigation, or third-party claims that affect who truly owns the property. Then there are encumbrances, like mortgages, liens, or other legal obligations linked to the property that can complicate the process. ### **Stamp Duty and Registration Compliance** Proper payment of stamp duty, along with compliance with registration laws, is mandatory for getting a proper property transaction done. If the valuation is incorrect or if you miss compliance steps, you might face penalties or experience delays. - Also, making sure the property valuation is accurate for the stamp duty calculation matters a lot. - And, meeting every statutory requirement for property registration is not optional. - Plus, paying the relevant registration fees within the timelines given is essential. - And if those timelines aren’t followed, well, the whole process can drag on. ### **Delays in the Registration Process** Administrative and procedural problems can end up slowing down the completion of property registration, which impacts both buyers and sellers in real life. - You may run into administrative obstacles at the registration office or waiting periods that stretch. - Sometimes documentation gets challenged, minor errors happen, and then corrections or resubmission are needed. - Also, missing statutory deadlines or forgetting appointments can bring even more delays into the picture. ## **How Legal Assistance Simplifies the Process** Professional legal support helps make sure that property registration and the handing over of ownership are finished properly, and yes, in line with the laws that actually apply. They check the paperwork, make sure everything matches the required standards, and handle the process details, so the chances of arguments later, slowdowns, and expensive blunders go down a lot. ## **The Role of Property Lawyers in Ownership Transfer** Property ownership transfer is a bit of a big deal; there are legal, financial, and procedural needs that really should be finished correctly, otherwise you might end up with disputes later on. Property lawyers really matter here; they help make sure the whole move is legally sound, open and transparent, and that it follows the relevant laws that apply to your case. ### **Verifying Ownership and Title** [Property lawyers](https://vakilsearch.com/lawyers/property-lawyers) examine title deeds, previous ownership records, encumbrance certificates, and other relevant documents to confirm that the seller has a valid and marketable title to the property. This verification helps establish that the ownership can be legally transferred. They also spot mismatches in ownership records, pending claims, or any legal limits that could mess with the deal. Doing this kind of title checking early helps stop later ownership arguments, and it also safeguards the buyer’s interests in a more reliable manner. ### **Identifying Legal Risks Before Purchase** Before a property transaction is finished, lawyers do legal due diligence to spot risks that can end up affecting who owns the place or how it can be used. In practice, this means checking approvals, permissions, and various statutory papers, even the boring related ones. They also look into whether the property is entangled in any litigation, whether it is under government restrictions, or if there are encumbrances tied to it. Finding these matters early lets buyers make a smarter call, so they don’t run into sudden legal headaches later on. ### **Advising on Inheritance and Gift Transfers** Property lawyers help people sort out ownership changes that happen because of inheritance, a will, family settlements or a gift deed, sort of thing. They see to it that the legal documents are put together correctly and then signed properly, all in line with the relevant legal rules. They’ll also walk clients through the paperwork stage, then registration and mutation steps, so that ownership can be established lawfully after the transfer. This guidance is meant to lower the chance of later disagreements between beneficiaries or relatives, which can get pretty messy. ## **Benefits of Online Lawyer Consultation for Property Matters** [Online lawyer consultation](https://vakilsearch.com/talk-to-a-lawyer) provides convenient access to legal guidance throughout the property registration and ownership transfer process. It helps buyers and sellers obtain timely advice, review documents, and address legal concerns without the need for frequent in-person meetings. - Quick legal help before you buy or sell something can help spot possible legal hazards, and yeah, make it easier to make a good call before you jump in with the whole transaction. - A convenient look over property documents—like sale deeds, title deeds, encumbrance certificates and agreements—makes it more likely you notice inconsistencies early. Sometimes small things get overlooked, so this part really matters. - Getting answers faster on legal questions, via online consultations, also helps with timely clarification on property rules, registration needs, and ownership-related concerns. - Remote assistance during the registration steps means clients can still get legal support even if they’re not physically nearby or they’re far away, which is kinda the point, honestly. - Secure digital sharing of documents makes verification, drafting, and review of property paperwork way simpler, especially when you need it checked quickly. - Also, timely guidance on legal compliance—stamp duty, registration charges, and statutory documents—helps avoid procedural delays later on. - And then continuous communication, plus case updates, keeps clients in the loop, on the progress of registration and the ownership transfer process, start to finish. ## **Documents Commonly Required for Property Registration** Property registration generally needs a bunch of documents to prove ownership, check who the buyer and seller are, and make sure everything matches the legal stuff, so yeah,h keeping everything lined up in advance really reduces the chances of delays and helps things move more smoothly. - Identity and Address Proof: You’ll typically need proper identity and residence proofs for both buyer and seller. Examples include Aadhaar Card, PAN Card, Passport, Voter ID, or Driving Licence; these are used for identity verification. - Sale Deed or Transfer Deed: The sale deed (or any other relevant transfer deed) acts like the main legal document. It actually documents the transfer of ownership and becomes the base for completing property registration. - Previous Title Documents: Old title deeds and earlier ownership records help build the chain of custody of the property, and they also confirm that the seller has a genuine, transferable title that the market can accept. - Encumbrance Certificate: An Encumbrance Certificate basically checks whether the property is clear of legal or monetary obligations. Like mortgages, loans, or other claims, so you know what you’re getting into. - Property Tax Receipts: Recent property tax receipts show that the due taxes have been paid. This also helps confirm compliance with local municipal rules, which is often necessary at the registration stage. - No Objection Certificates, Where Applicable: Depending on what kind of property it is and how the deal is structured, NOCs might be required. For instance, from a housing society, a bank or other financial institution, a development authority, or some other competent body, before the registration can go through. ## **Conclusion** Property registration and the handover of ownership are key legal processes, and honestly, they need close attention to paperwork, title checks, and statutory compliance stuff. If these steps are done the right way, it helps confirm who actually owns what, and it also cuts down the chances of future legal arguments that might come up later. Getting professional legal help can make things feel a lot easier, step by step. For example, from checking property records and drafting the legal documents, to making sure everything matches the registration rules. Also, getting advice early is useful because buyers and sellers can spot potential problems before they grow into expensive, messy complications. And whether the matter is buying, selling, gifting, or inheriting real property, having legal assistance can help the whole registration effort run more efficiently and with more security. With proper documentation and solid legal guidance, the ownership transfer tends to go more smoothly, while also safeguarding the legal position of everyone involved. **Categories:** Articles, Uncategorised --- ### [Dr. A.C.S. 1st National Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, Faculty of Law, Dr. M.G.R. Educational and Research Institute (Deemed to be University), Chennai | Register by 15th August 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/dr-a-c-s-1st-national-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-moot-court-society-faculty-of-law-dr-m-g-r-educational-and-research-institute-deemed-to-be-university-chennai-register-by-1/) **Published:** August 1, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** Dr. A.C.S. 1st National Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, Faculty of Law, Dr. M.G.R. Educational and Research Institute (Deemed to be University), Chennai | Register by 15th August 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/WhatsApp-Image-2026-08-07-at-6.56.41-PM.jpg) ## Name of the Organiser **Moot Court Society, Faculty of Law, Dr. M.G.R. Educational and Research Institute (Deemed to be University), Chennai**. The competition is organized by the Moot Court Society of the Faculty of Law to promote advocacy, legal research, and practical courtroom skills among law students. ## About the Organiser / College / University Dr. M.G.R. Educational and Research Institute is a private deemed-to-be university located in Maduravoyal, Chennai. Established in 1988 and granted deemed university status in 2003, the institution is accredited with an **NAAC A+ Grade**. It offers undergraduate, postgraduate, and research programmes across disciplines including law, engineering, medicine, dentistry, nursing, management, and humanities. The university is equipped with modern infrastructure, research laboratories, a central library, clinical training facilities, and international collaborations. The Faculty of Law is approved by the **Bar Council of India** and emphasizes experiential legal education through moot courts, legal drafting, internships, legal aid activities, and advocacy training. ## Details About the Event / Opportunity The **Dr. A.C.S. 1st National Moot Court Competition, 2026** is a national-level moot court competition designed to develop participants’ skills in: - Constitutional law research - Memorial drafting - Oral advocacy - Courtroom etiquette - Legal analysis and argumentation - Professional ethics and teamwork The moot proposition is based on the constitutional theme: **“Right to Die with Dignity: Constitutional Autonomy, Medical Ethics and the Limits of State Intervention.”** The proposition explores constitutional questions concerning Article 21, human dignity, medical ethics, advance medical directives, judicial review, and state regulation of end-of-life decisions. The competition aims to bridge the gap between classroom learning and practical courtroom advocacy while promoting legal scholarship and constitutional discourse. ## Who is it For / Eligibility to Participate The competition is open to **bona fide law students** enrolled in: - Three-Year LL.B. Programmes - Five-Year Integrated Law Programmes from any institution or university recognized by the appropriate statutory authority. **Team Composition** - Maximum **3 teams per institution** - Each team must consist of: - Two Speakers - One Researcher ## Mode of the Event **Offline** ## Location & Venue **Faculty of Law** **Dr. M.G.R. Educational and Research Institute** Maduravoyal, Chennai, Tamil Nadu, India. ## Registration / Submission Procedure Participants must: 1. Complete the Google Registration Form. 2. Upload: - Scanned Registration Form - Registration fee payment receipt. 3. Courier the Registration Form and Declaration Form to the university. 4. Submit soft copies of memorials via email. 5. Send hard copies of memorials before the prescribed deadline. ## Fee Details - **Registration Fee:** ₹4,000 per team - **Accommodation (Optional):** ₹2,000 additional (available only for teams from institutions outside Chennai). Food will be provided to all participants. ## Prizes According to the brochure: - **Winner:** ₹50,000 - **Runner-Up:** ₹30,000 - **Best Speaker:** ₹15,000 - **Best Memorial:** ₹15,000 - **Best Researcher:** ₹15,000 - **Best Women’s Team:** ₹15,000 ## Deadlines / Important Dates EventDateRelease of Moot Proposition, Brochure & Rules27th July 2026Registration Opens27th July 2026Last Date for Registration**15th August 2026**Last Date for Seeking Clarifications20th August 2026Release of Clarifications24th August 2026Soft Copy Memorial Submission5th September 2026Hard Copy Memorial Submission7th September 2026Registration & Declaration Form Submission7th September 2026Inaugural Ceremony, Researcher’s Test & Draw of Lots17th September 2026Preliminary Rounds & Quarter Finals18th September 2026Semi-Finals19th September 2026Final Round, Valedictory & Prize Distribution19th September 2026 ## Contact Information ### Faculty Convenors **Mrs. Azimathul Marshiya M** Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law Email: **mcs@drmgrdu.ac.in** **Mr. Venkatesan M** Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law ### Student Coordinators - Shraddha Warrier – 74491 42087 - Harini Sree S – 88380 51449 - Sangavi T – 95666 54299 - Vigasini S – 97513 71132 - Vinoth Raj P – 63830 49485 ## Official Registration / Payment Links The brochure includes the following official links: - [**Google Registration Form**](https://forms.gle/dbdEwpr6w3u16rx27) - [**Payment Link**](https://rzp.io/rzp/flv8EUj) For memorial submission and clarification requests: - **Email:** mcs@drmgrdu.ac.in ## [Official Brochure Link](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Dr_ACS_National_Moot_Court_comp_2026_updated.pdf) **Categories:** Events, Moot Courts --- ### [Jus Novum - AU Nationwide Law Fest, 2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, Apex School of Law, Apex University, Jaipur In Collaboration With District Legal Services Authority, Jaipur (District) | Register by 8th August 2026, 2026 for Hybrid & Online Competitions and 2nd September, 2026 for one day (Offline) Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/jus-novum-au-nationwide-law-fest-2026-organized-by-moot-court-society-apex-school-of-law-apex-university-jaipur-in-collaboration-with-district-legal-services-authority-jaipur-district-reg/) **Published:** June 14, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** Jus Novum - AU Nationwide Law Fest, 2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, Apex School of Law, Apex University, Jaipur In Collaboration With District Legal Services Authority, Jaipur (District) | Register by 31st July, 2026 for Hybrid & Online Competitions and 2nd September, 2026 for one day (Offline) Competitions **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/APEX-UNIVERSITY-JAIPUR-Instagram-Post-45_page-0001.jpg) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY ### **About Apex University, Jaipur** Apex University, Jaipur is a premier institution of higher education established with the vision of fostering academic excellence, innovation, and holistic development. The University is backed by the prestigious Sanjay Shiksha Samiti (established in 1965), one of the oldest and most reputed educational societies in India. The University offers a multidisciplinary learning environment, focusing on skill-based education, research orientation, and professional competence. It aims to nurture future leaders by combining academic rigor with practical exposure. Apex University emphasizes experiential learning through various academic and co-curricular activities such as Seminars, Workshops, Guest Lectures, and National & International Conferences. The institution also facilitates educational visits to prestigious institutions like the Hon’ble Supreme Court, Parliament, High Courts, and Judicial Academies to provide real-world legal exposure. The University is committed to the overall personality development of students by encouraging participation in debates, mock parliaments, and other intellectual forums, thereby preparing them for dynamic professional challenges ### **About Apex School of Law** Apex School of Law, Apex University, Jaipur is a realization of the vision of the great educationist Late Dr. S. M. Juniwal, who believed in transforming legal education through quality and innovation. The institution has emerged as one of the leading centers for legal education in India. The School of Law offers a wide range of programs including: Ph.D. in Law, LL.M (Two-Year Degree Course), LL.B (Three-Year Degree Course), B.A. LL.B (Five-Year Integrated Course). The institution is dedicated to developing competent legal professionals with strong analytical skills, ethical values, and practical knowledge. It integrates theoretical learning with practical training through activities such as Moot Court Competitions, Legal Aid Programs, Mock Trials, Seminars, and Workshops. Apex School of Law provides a platform for students to engage with legal luminaries, academicians, and practitioners, enabling them to gain valuable insights into contemporary legal issues. The focus remains on creating socially responsible legal professionals equipped to contribute meaningfully to the justice delivery system. ### **About District Legal Services Authority, Jaipur (District)** The District Legal Services Authority, Jaipur (DLSA) is constituted under the provisions of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, with the primary objective of ensuring access to justice for all, particularly for the weaker and marginalized sections of society. Functioning under the supervision of the Rajasthan State Legal Services Authority. DLSA Jaipur aims to provide free and competent legal services to eligible persons. It operates through various legal aid clinics, front of ices, and paralegal volunteers to bridge the gap between the legal system and the common public. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY Jus Novum, meaning “New Law,” is a national-level movement hosted by Moot Court Society, Apex School of Law, Apex University, Jaipur, in collaboration with District Legal Services Authority, Jaipur (District). Scheduled for August–September 2026 in a hybrid format, this festival aspires to serve as a premier platform for nurturing India’s most promising legal minds. It is founded on the belief that law extends beyond a profession—it is a powerful instrument for social transformation, justice, and the preservation of human dignity. Through this initiative, we aim to cultivate a generation of legally aware, ethically driven, and socially responsible individuals committed to advancing the rule of law and contributing meaningfully to society. While traditional litigation is our foundation, the true “soul” of Jus Novum lies in Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) and Clinical Legal Skills. We believe that the future of justice—especially for the most vulnerable—resides in speed, empathy, and accessibility. Our flagship competitions are specifically curated to test these virtues: - **Mediation:** Training students to be peacemakers who can navigate the emotional and legal complexities. - **Client Counselling:** Developing the “Human Element” of law, where future advocates learn to provide a safe, informed space for Society. - **Arbitration:** Preparing legal minds to handle high-stakes commercial and civil conflicts with the precision and neutrality required by modern statutes. Through these competitions, we aim to cover every facet of Society—from the historical evolution of personal laws to the modern-day nuances of property rights, digital safety, and constitutional safeguards. We don’t just focus on a few acts; we explore the entire statutory landscape. Moreover, we’ll be having that will be dedicated towards shaping **8 more competitions** mindset of the participants and educating them about the laws and statutes. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE - Students enrolled in either three-year (LL.B) program, five-year (B.A. LL.B) program or two-year (LL.M) program, in any year, from any recognized Law University/School/College/ Department are eligible to participate in Mediation, Client Counselling, Arbitration and Judgment writing Competitions. - The Competitions such as Article writing, Creative Writing and Short Film Making that shall commence in online mode along with the offline competitions such as Poster making, Constitutional Quiz, Essay writing and Debate Competition are open to all the students from 8th class and above as well as the students currently enrolled in undergraduate or Postgraduate programs from any recognised college or university across the nation. ## MODE OF THE EVENT (ONLINE / OFFLINE OR HYBRID) The Jus Novum AU Nationwide Law Fest, 2026 shall commence in a hybrid manner that shall include:- - **Hybrid Events-** Mediation, Client Counselling and Arbitration Competitions - **Offline Events-** Debate Competition, Constitutional Quiz, Poster Making, Essay Writing and Judgment Writing Competition. - **Online Events-** Article Writing, Creative Writing and Short Film Making ## LOCATION (COUNTRY/STATE/CITY) & VENUE OF THE EVENT – The Jus Novum AU Nationwide Law Fest, 2026 shall be hosted at – - Apex University, Sitapura, Jaipur, Rajasthan, India ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE- - **Link for Main Poster of Jus Novum:** [https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1xX43fWDVlqGhj0BSSrMOrnzvGTyh9qav?usp=drive\_link](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1xX43fWDVlqGhj0BSSrMOrnzvGTyh9qav?usp=drive_link) ## FEE DETAILS **Competition Categories** **Registration Fee** Mediation Competition ₹2000 (Early Bird Registrations) & ₹2500 (Standard Registration Fee) Client Counseling Competition ₹2000 (Early Bird Registrations) & ₹2500 (Standard Registration Fee) Arbitration Competition ₹2000 (Early Bird Registrations) & ₹2500 (Standard Registration Fee) Debate Competition ₹600 Judgment Writing Competition ₹600 Article Writing Competition (Online) ₹500 Creative Writing Competition (Online) ₹500 Short Film Making Competition (Online) ₹500 Poster Making Competition ₹500 Constitutional Quiz ₹500 Essay Writing Competition ₹200 ## PRIZES The Jus Novum AU Nationwide Law Fest, 2026 has a **prize pool of 1.5 lakh** apart from the prize pool the overall winner institute of the fest who has performed well in the competitions as well as in the Gala Night shall be awarded with a **Rolling Trophy** that shall have a permanent name engraved of the winner institution in order to represent a legacy that shall be continued in the future. There are also certain perks from the side of our **E-learning Partners** to the winners as well as the participants of our competitions that includes opportunities such as to pursue **internships** under our esteemed E-Learning Partners moreover the participants shall be getting benefits such as **certificate courses** and highly subsidized **publication opportunities** from the side of our E-Learning Partners. ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES - 10th June, 2026 – Release of Brochure & Commencement of Registration - 30th June, 2026 is the last date for Early Bird Registration (Hybrid Events) - 8th August, 2026 is the last date of registration for Hybrid & Online Competitions - Last Date for Submissions of Article Writing, Creative Writing and Short Film Making is 16th of August, 2026 - Online rounds (Preliminary Rounds) of Client Counselling Competition, Mediation Competition, and Arbitration Competition shall be organised on 21st, 22nd and 23rd of August 2026 respectively. - 2nd September 2026 is the last date of registration for one day (Offline) Competitions - Inaugural Ceremony is on 11th September, 2026 - Karwaan Evening is on 11th September, 2026 - Date for Offline Events shall be 11th to 13th of September, 2026 - Gala Night is on 12th September, 2026 - Valedictory Ceremony is on 13th September, 2026 ## CONTACT INFORMATION - **Organizing Secretary-** - Dr. Monika Mishra (HOD, Apex School of Law, Apex University, Jaipur); Mail id- - **Faculty Conveners-** - Dr. Surbhi Dadhich- 8764106325 (Assistant Professor) - Mrs. Kavita Singh- 9785092498 (Assistant Professor) - **Faculty Co-Conveners-** - Ms. Mumal Kanwar – 9782702770 (Assistant Professor) - Mr. Ashish Kumar – 7976797771 (Assistant Professor) - **Student Conveners-** - Mr. Hitendra Singh Bhati- +91 9588996593 (President, Moot Court Society) - Mr. Krish Gaur- +91 6350027145 (Vice President, Moot Court Society) - **Moot Court Society Mail id-** ### OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / LINK OF THE OFFICIAL BROCHURE, RULES & REGULATIONS ETC. - Link for Main Brochure of **the Jus Novum AU Nationwide Law Fest, 2026-** [**https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1UvXywGTEOow7e0BHJGWP09BHoPiYKCKn?usp=drive\_link**](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1UvXywGTEOow7e0BHJGWP09BHoPiYKCKn?usp=drive_link) **Categories:** Events, Other Competitions --- ### [30-Hour Certificate Programme on the Consumer Protection Laws in India and the United Kingdom | Organized by Chair on Consumer Research and Policy (CCRP), National University of Study and Research in Law (NUSRL), Ranchi | Register by 13th August 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/national-workshop-on-code-court-future-the-nuances-applications-and-legal-literacy-surrounding-ai-in-india-organized-by-chair-on-consumer-research-and-policy-ccrp-national-university-of-study/) **Published:** August 1, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** National Workshop on Code.Court.Future: The Nuances, Applications, and Legal Literacy Surrounding AI in India | Organized by Chair on Consumer Research and Policy (CCRP), National University of Study and Research in Law (NUSRL), Ranchi | Register by 13th August 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Screenshot-2026-08-01-133319.jpg) ## Name of the Organiser The programme is jointly organised by the **Chair on Consumer Research and Policy (CCRP), National University of Study and Research in Law (NUSRL), Ranchi** in collaboration with **Sharma Kemp Chambers**. The Organising Secretary is **Mr. Abhinav Gupta**, Chair on Consumer Research and Policy, NUSRL Ranchi. ## About the Organiser / College / University The **National University of Study and Research in Law (NUSRL), Ranchi** is a premier law university established under the National University of Study and Research in Law, Ranchi Act, 2010 by the Government of Jharkhand. The University offers undergraduate, postgraduate, doctoral, and diploma programmes in law and is committed to providing quality legal education through experienced faculty and specialized academic programmes. The **Chair on Consumer Research and Policy (CCRP)** was established at NUSRL in October 2024 by the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Government of India, to promote research, teaching, training, and policy development in Consumer Law. It aims to strengthen consumer awareness, research, and protection through academic and practical initiatives. The programme is also supported by **Sharma Kemp Chambers**, a multidisciplinary law office with expertise in consumer law, commercial litigation, arbitration, constitutional law, insolvency, intellectual property, environmental law, employment law, and regulatory compliance. ## Details About the Event / Opportunity The **30-Hour Certificate Programme on the Consumer Protection Laws in India and the United Kingdom** is a practice-oriented certificate course jointly offered by NUSRL Ranchi and Sharma Kemp Chambers. The programme aims to provide participants with both theoretical knowledge and practical exposure to contemporary consumer protection laws in India and the UK through expert-led sessions. ### Key Highlights - Comparative study of Consumer Protection Laws in India and the United Kingdom. - Sessions conducted by senior academicians, advocates, legal practitioners, and consumer law experts. - Focus on practical skills including: - Consumer dispute resolution - Product liability - Medical negligence - E-commerce regulation - Consumer mediation - Drafting consumer complaints - Client interviewing - Misleading advertisements and dark patterns - Daily evaluation through MCQs and descriptive questions. - Joint Certificate of Completion awarded by **NUSRL Ranchi** and **Sharma Kemp Chambers** upon fulfilling attendance and assessment requirements. The programme will be conducted over **six days (14–23 August 2026)** spread across three weekends. ## Who is it For / Eligibility to Participate The programme is open to: - Law students - Faculty members - Advocates - Researchers - Academicians - Professionals - Government officials - Other interested stakeholders wishing to enhance their knowledge of Consumer Law. ## Mode of the Event **Hybrid** Programme Schedule: - **14 August 2026** – Online - **15 August 2026** – Online - **16 August 2026** – Online - **21 August 2026** – Hybrid - **22 August 2026** – Hybrid - **23 August 2026** – Hybrid The final three days include offline sessions at NUSRL Ranchi while also being broadcast in hybrid mode. ## Location & Venue **Country:** India **State:** Jharkhand **City:** Ranchi **Venue:** National University of Study and Research in Law (NUSRL), Ranchi (for offline sessions). ## Registration / Submission Links & Procedure Participants must: 1. Register through the official Google Form. 2. Pay the applicable registration fee. 3. Fulfil attendance and evaluation requirements to receive the certificate. [**Registration Link**](https://forms.gle/YssMisjtxPdstYtB7) Bank Details: - Account Name: NUSRL, Ranchi - Account Number: 490710110003104 - IFSC: BKID0005900 - Branch: NUSRL – Campus - Account Type: Savings Registration and fulfilment of programme criteria are mandatory for certification. ## Fee Details - Faculty Members / Professionals / Lawyers / Students – **₹1,999** - NUSRL Ranchi Students – **₹499** ## Deadlines / Important Dates - **Last Date for Registration:** 13 August 2026 - **Programme Duration:** 14–23 August 2026 - **Attendance Requirement:** Minimum 80% - **Academic Requirement:** Minimum 66% aggregate marks in daily evaluations. Daily evaluations will consist of: - 20 MCQs (1 mark each) - 2 Descriptive Questions (5 marks each) ## Contact Information The brochure identifies the following organising officials: **Organising Secretary** Mr. Abhinav Gupta Chair on Consumer Research and Policy National University of Study and Research in Law, Ranchi **Student Organising Team** - Convenor – Mr. Subham Sourav - Co-Convenor – Mr. Kritagya Sinha - Event Head – Mr. Aryan Ranjan - Joint Research Heads – Ms. Aditi Vivek Singh and Ms. Pragati Sharma ## Official Link of the Event / Brochure - **[Registration Form](https://forms.gle/YssMisjtxPdstYtB7)** - **[Official Brochure](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1AR3WfTFxo3IUQknnpK3U1N-jwqtEim_i/view?usp=sharing)** **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events --- ### [CALL FOR BLOGS | NITISARA BLOGSPACE | Organized by Kautilya Society, Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-blogs-nitisara-blogspace-organized-by-kautilya-society-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur/) **Published:** August 1, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** CALL FOR BLOGS | NITISARA BLOGSPACE | Organized by Kautilya Society, Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/download-723x1024.jpg) ## Call For Blogs | Nitisara Blogspace | Kautilya Society, HNLU Raipur Kautilya Society of HNLU is currently inviting call for blogs for its Nitisara Blogspace. The Kautilya Society at HNLU is a student-led policy think tank committed to exploring the intersections of law, society, and public policy. As an emerging platform for policy discourse within and beyond the legal fraternity, Kautilya Society aims to foster informed debate, critical thinking, and impactful writing on issues of contemporary relevance. With its expanding presence through research initiatives, surveys, and collaborations, the Society is now opening up its blog to contributions from students, researchers, and policy enthusiasts across the country. We invite original, well-reasoned, and insightful blog submissions that align with our objective of furthering public engagement on legal and policy issues. ## Submission Guidelines 1. Submissions should be between **1000-1500 words** (excluding references). Exceptional pieces exceeding this limit may be considered for publication in multiple parts at the Editorial Team’s discretion. 2. Each submission may include an **abstract** not exceeding **150 words**. 3. Citations should appear primarily as **hyperlinks** within the text. Where hyperlinks aren’t feasible, please use endnotes following the **Harvard’s Bluebook Citation (20th Edition)** format. Speaking footnotes are not permitted. 4. A maximum of **two** authors may collaborate on a single submission. 5. Format all text in **Garamond** **size 12** for main content with **1.5 line spacing** between lines and single spacing between paragraphs. Titles should appear in **Garamond size 14**, **UPPERCASE** and **bold**. 6. Authors may **retract** submissions within **5 days** of the **submission date**. 7. Authors shall send a short bio with their names on the mail, along with their LinkedIn. ## Plagiarism Policy 1. Originality is the utmost priority for us, so we only accept blogs which are authentic. The Editorial Board may exercise discretion in exceptional cases to preserve content quality. **Plagiarism** in the blog shall not exceed **10%**. AI detection percentage will be determined by the editors on a case-by-case basis. 2. The blog should not be submitted elsewhere for submission, in case it is, the author must inform the editors at any time during the review process. **Cross publication** without intimation would lead to **blacklisting** of the author(s) and their submission. ## Submission and Evaluation Process 1. **All submissions** must be made **exclusively** on our mail: **** 2. Our comprehensive **double-blind review** evaluates each submission on merit, relevance, and quality. We strive to complete reviews within three weeks of receipt. 3. All manuscripts must be submitted as Word documents (**‘.doc’ or ‘.docx’**) on our provided mail. To maintain anonymity, please submit an anonymous script, with author information only being on the mail and not the manuscript. 4. The society shall conduct **two** rounds of review during the first stage. 5. The draft, along with any comments or suggested changes, will then be shared with the author (if required). 6. A second round of review will be conducted after the first stage, followed by the final publication. 7. Withdrawal of submission before the end of the stipulated **7-day review** period *or* post communication of acceptance is **not permitted**. We reserve the right to cease collaboration with respective contributors, if they do so. 8. The Editorial Team evaluates only **complete manuscripts**; we do not provide preliminary assessments based on abstracts or proposals. 9. Confirmation of receipt is typically sent within 48 hours. If you don’t receive acknowledgement, please follow-up at our mail. Note: We accept submissions year-round through on our mail. For other inquiries, contact: **** Ansh Parashar & Kalyani Kaushik Convener & Co-Convener Kautilya Society, Hidayatullah National Law University M: +91-9343457001 | +91-945827396 WordPress: **Categories:** Call for Blogs, Call for Papers, Events --- ### [Nyaya Setu – The AI & Justice Policy Convention (3rd Edition) | Organized by SVKM’s Narsee Monjee Institute of Management Studies (NMIMS), Indore | 25th August 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/nyaya-setu-the-ai-justice-policy-convention-3rd-edition-organized-by-svkms-narsee-monjee-institute-of-management-studies-nmims-indore-25th-august-2026/) **Published:** August 1, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** Nyaya Setu – The AI & Justice Policy Convention (3rd Edition) | Organized by SVKM’s Narsee Monjee Institute of Management Studies (NMIMS), Indore | 25th August 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Screenshot-2026-08-01-134258.png) # About the Organisers SVKM’s Narsee Monjee Institute of Management Studies (NMIMS), Indore, is a premier multidisciplinary institution committed to academic excellence, innovation, and social responsibility. The event is organized by **SAMATVA – The Legal Aid & Awareness Cell** of NMIMS Indore is a student-driven initiative founded on the principles of **equality, access to justice, and social empowerment**. The Society aims to bridge socio-economic and informational gaps by providing legal aid, spreading legal awareness, and fostering an informed citizenry. Over the years, SAMATVA has undertaken a wide range of initiatives including **legal aid camps, awareness drives, school outreach programmes, prison visits, Lok Adalat awareness sessions, workshops, seminars, and collaborations with non-profit organizations and legal services authorities**. In addition to its on-ground efforts, SAMATVA actively disseminates legal updates, policy developments, and awareness material through digital platforms, thereby promoting legal literacy among students and the public. The Society remains committed to strengthening access to justice and cultivating a culture of legal responsibility and social consciousness. # Details of the Event Nyaya Setu – The AI & Justice Policy Convention (3rd Edition) is a **National Legal Aid Policy Convention, 2026**, organized by NMIMS Indore in collaboration with the **Centre for Research Excellence in Generative Artificial Intelligence**. This competition provides a unique platform for students to engage in: - Policy drafting and analysis - Structured deliberation and argumentation - Interdisciplinary discussions on law and technology Participants will examine the evolving intersection of **artificial intelligence and access to justice**, and propose innovative policy solutions addressing real-world challenges in India’s justice delivery system. The **Theme** of the Event is: **“Nyaya Setu – The AI & Justice Policy Convention”** The convention focuses on developing policy frameworks to regulate the use of **Generative AI in India’s justice delivery and legal aid systems**. Key areas include: - AI-assisted legal information Systems - Legal document drafting tools - Case assessment mechanisms - Multilingual access to Justice - Research support for legal aid lawyers # The competition involves Multiple Stages: - Preliminary (Policy Concept Note Submission) - Quarterfinals, Semifinals, Finals (Policy Deliberation Rounds) - Special Press Conference Round (For Best Speaker) # Eligibility - Open to **undergraduate students enrolled in any program**. - Participants must be from **UGC-recognized universities or institution across** - Each institution may nominate **up to two teams**. - Cross-university teams are not - Team Composition: - Two members per team - A participant may participate in only one team # Location (Country/State/City) (Offline/Online) - **Country:** India - **City/State:** Indore, Madhya Pradesh # Mode: Hybrid - Preliminary Round – **Online** - Quarterfinals, Semifinals & Finals – **Offline at NMIMS Indore Campus Registration/Submission Procedure** - Teams must register **on or before 25 August 2026** to be - The **registration fee is ₹900 per team (non-refundable)**. - Payment must be made as per the guidelines provided in the - Participants must ensure that all submitted details are accurate, as they will be used for - **Registration is confirmed only after receiving a confirmation email** from the Organising Committee. - **Policy Concept Note must be submitted during registration phase** through mail at [solindore@nmims.edu](mailto:samatva.solindore@nmims.edu) (Preliminary Round) - Any changes in details must be promptly communicated to the Organising - Accommodation details/charge**s** will be shared separately with the Top 8 shortlisted. # Important Dates - **Registration Opens**: July 17,2026 - **Last Date to Register**: August 25, 2026 - **Submission Deadline (Policy Concept Note)**: August 30, 2026 - **Declaration of Results for Top 8 Shortlisted Teams (Preliminary Round)**: September 4, 2026 - **Draw of Lots**: September 17, 2026 - **Final Rounds (Offline at NMIMS Indore)**: September 17-18, 2026 - **Result Declaration (Final Rounds)**: September 18, 2026 # Registration Fee - Registration Fee: **₹900 per team Prizes** - **Winner**: ₹20,000 + Trophy - **First Runner-Up**: ₹12,000 + Trophy - **Best Speaker**: ₹8,000 + Trophy - Participation certificates for all teams # Deadlines / Dates - Registration & Submission Deadline: August 25, 2026 - Submission Deadline: August 25, 2026 - Result Announcement: September 18, 2026 - Offline Event Dates: 17–18 September 2026 # Contact Information All official communication regarding the competition will be conducted via the **organising committee (Samatva, NMIMS Indore)** through: - Email: [solindore@nmims.edu](mailto:samatva.solindore@nmims.edu) - Priyal Saxena (Convenor): 8319135780 - Hasnain Sheikh (Co-Convenor): 9981354252 - Yashvardhan Srivastava (Treasurer): 8795848215 # Official Links - [**Registration link**](https://forms.gle/HsHmHvd1XuPoH43z7) - [**Payment link**](https://nmims.edu/payments/final/dataFrom.php) - [**Official Brochure Link**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1qmvzE7zQ-cgd8t0nctnxUBrHPixSEh8V/view?usp=sharing) # Social Media Handles - **Instagram:** samatva\_nmims - **LinkedIn:** Samatva Legal Aid & CSR Society **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events --- ### [National Workshop on Code.Court.Future: The Nuances, Applications, and Legal Literacy Surrounding AI in India | Organized by Xavier Law School, St. Xavier's University, Kolkata, in association with the Technology Counsel Foundation (TECOF) | Register by 15th August 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/national-workshop-on-code-court-future-the-nuances-applications-and-legal-literacy-surrounding-ai-in-india-organized-by-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-in-association-with-t/) **Published:** August 1, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** National Workshop on Code.Court.Future: The Nuances, Applications, and Legal Literacy Surrounding AI in India | Organized by Xavier Law School, St. Xavier's University, Kolkata, in association with the Technology Counsel Foundation (TECOF) | Register by 15th August 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/CCF-723x1024.jpg) ## **About the Organiser** Code.Court.Future is a national-level workshop organized and convened by Xavier Law School, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata, in association with the Technology Counsel Foundation (TECOF), with the initiative supported by IIT Kharagpur Alumni. The workshop seeks to foster interdisciplinary understanding of Artificial Intelligence by integrating technology, law, ethics, governance, and public policy into a practical learning experience for students. ## **About the Event** Artificial Intelligence is transforming legal research, drafting, compliance, education, governance, and professional practice. As AI increasingly becomes an integral part of academic and professional life, understanding its legal, ethical, and practical implications has become indispensable. **Code.Court.Future** is a one-day National Workshop on **“The Nuances, Applications, and Legal Literacy Surrounding AI in India”**, designed to promote AI literacy alongside legal awareness. The programme combines expert-led sessions, practical demonstrations, interactive simulations, structured debates, and networking opportunities to equip participants with the knowledge and skills necessary to engage responsibly with AI technologies. The workshop is built around three core pillars: - AI Literacy - Understanding AI’s impact on law and professional work - Real-world policy and privacy discussions through structured debate Participants will gain practical exposure to: - Evolution of AI from Classical AI to Agentic AI - Machine Learning, Deep Learning and Generative AI - Practical applications of AI tools in education and professional settings - Effective prompting and responsible AI usage - Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act, 2023 - AI ethics, transparency, accountability and algorithmic bias - Academic integrity while using AI - AI governance and compliance - Hands-on AI demonstrations and workflow automation - Tabletop simulation based on a real-world data breach scenario - Oxford-style panel debate on contemporary AI issues - Networking with legal professionals, academicians and technology experts The workshop has been designed to move beyond theoretical discussions by providing participants with practical skills, critical awareness, and legal literacy surrounding Artificial Intelligence in India. ## **Event Structure** **Morning Session (10:00 AM – 1:30 PM)** **Workshop & Tabletop Exercise** The morning session introduces participants to Artificial Intelligence, its evolution, applications, legal framework, and ethical considerations. It includes discussions on the Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act, 2023, rights of data principals, responsible AI use, academic integrity, AI governance, and practical demonstrations using contemporary AI platforms. The session concludes with a **Tabletop Exercise**, where participants work in teams to analyse and respond to a simulated AI-enabled data breach scenario, applying legal reasoning, compliance principles, and collaborative decision-making. **Lunch Break** **1:30 PM – 2:30 PM** **Post-Noon Session (2:30 PM – 4:00 PM)** **Oxford-Style Panel Debate** Participants will witness and engage in an Oxford-style debate on the motion: **“This House Believes that Artificial Intelligence creates more opportunities than it destroys.”** The debate will examine issues including: - AI and employment - AI surveillance and privacy - Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 - AI in legal practice - Algorithmic bias - AI governance and regulation **Networking Session (4:00 PM – 5:00 PM)** The programme concludes with an interactive networking session and high tea, providing participants with an opportunity to engage with legal professionals, technology experts, faculty members, guest speakers, and fellow participants while exploring future academic and professional opportunities. ## **Objectives** The workshop aims to: - Develop a comprehensive understanding of Artificial Intelligence and its evolution. - Introduce participants to the legal and regulatory framework governing AI in India. - Promote responsible, ethical and legally compliant use of AI. - Provide practical knowledge of the Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act, 2023. - Foster interdisciplinary engagement between law, technology, governance and AI ethics. - Strengthen legal reasoning, critical thinking and advocacy skills. - Equip participants with practical AI skills relevant to academic and professional environments. ## **Who Can Participate? (Eligibility)** The workshop is designed as an **inter-college programme** and is open to: - Undergraduate and postgraduate law students - Students from allied disciplines interested in Artificial Intelligence, technology, governance, public policy and legal studies - Student delegations from colleges and universities across Kolkata and neighbouring institutions ## **Location** **Venue:** Albert Huart Hall, St. Xavier’s University **City:** Kolkata **State:** West Bengal **Country:** India ## **Registration Procedure** Participants may register through any of the following modes: - **Individual Registration** through the official registration channels released by the organising committee. - **Institutional Nominations** through designated faculty coordinators or institutional representatives. - **Institutional Delegations** coordinated directly between the institution and the organising committee. As seats are limited, early registration is encouraged. ## **Registration Fee** - **Early Bird Registration:** ₹250 *(Applicable till 31 July 2026)* - **Standard Registration:** ₹280 *(1 August – 7 August 2026)* - **Late Registration:** ₹320 *(8 August – 15 August 2026)* **Limited seats available.** Participants are encouraged to register early to avail the discounted registration fee. ## **Benefits** Participants will: - Develop practical AI literacy and legal awareness. - Gain hands-on experience through AI demonstrations and simulations. - Understand the Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act, 2023. - Learn responsible and ethical AI practices. - Enhance legal reasoning, debating and advocacy skills. - Build professional networks with experts from law and technology. - Develop career readiness in AI, technology law and governance. - Become informed and responsible users of Artificial Intelligence. ### **AI Training Opportunity** The **best approximately two teams**, as selected by **TECOF**, will receive an opportunity to participate in **hands-on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning training**, conducted in hybrid mode on Saturdays, subject to the availability of the TECOF team. ### **Career Opportunities** The workshop highlights emerging career pathways in: Technology Law, AI Law, Data Protection & Privacy, AI Governance, Responsible AI, Technology Ethics, Legal Consultancy, Regulatory Policy, Compliance, Legal and Technology Research ## **Prizes** No monetary prizes have been announced. However, outstanding teams selected by TECOF will receive an opportunity to participate in advanced hands-on AI and Machine Learning training. ## **Important Dates** - **Workshop Date:** 29 August 2026 - **Time:** 10:00 AM onwards - **Early Bird Registration Deadline:** 31 July 2026 - **Standard Registration:** 1 August – 7 August 2026 - **Late Registration Closes:** 15 August 2026 ## **Contact Information** **Email** - code.court.future.sxuk@gmail.com - anuttammazumdar857@gmail.com - kanzashamim5@gmail.com **Phone** - Anuttam Mazumdar: +91 76058 44876 - Kanza Shamim: +91 98309 57877 ### [**Official Registration Link**](https://forms.gle/gnGewHr4M4KJUgVE8) ## [Official Brochure Link](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1EWtGowO1CjlJONei-g9yn_7OiLr3C72d/view?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events --- ### [TNLRC ESSAY WRITING COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) under WICCI | Register by 26 June 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/tnlrc-essay-writing-competition-2026-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-under-wicci-register-by-26-june-2026/) **Published:** June 14, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** TNLRC ESSAY WRITING COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) under WICCI | Register by 26 June 2026 **Content:** ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC), under WICCI, is dedicated to promoting legal awareness, academic excellence, and social responsibility. Through competitions, workshops, seminars, and awareness programmes, TNLRC encourages legal research, critical thinking, and meaningful discussions on contemporary legal issues while fostering a legally informed and empowered society. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY The **Essay Writing Competition 2026** provides a platform for law students to explore contemporary legal issues through research and critical analysis. The competition is centered on the theme: **“Women and Technology: The Evolving Need for Protective Legislation in Cyber Spaces”** ### Sub-Topics 1. Artificial Intelligence as a Tool: Gendered Discrimination, and the Ethics of AI. 2. Social Media and Protecting Autonomy: Sexual Harassment and Inadequacy in Existing Policy. 3. Progressive Advocacy for and by Women: Digital Activism and Suppressing Dissent. 4. Judiciary and its Role in Digital Regulation: Landmark Judgements, Existing Precedence, and Critical Analysis. ### Objectives The competition aims to: - Encourage legal research and critical thinking. - Promote scholarly engagement with emerging legal challenges in the digital era. - Foster meaningful discussions on cyber law, gender justice, and legal reform. - Promote legal awareness and academic excellence. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE Open to students pursuing: - A **3-Year LL.B. Degree**, or - A **5-Year Integrated Law Degree Programme** from any recognized university or institution in India. ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE ### [Submission Link](https://forms.gle/nUYdtiii4nEZDpo98) ### Submission Guidelines - Essays must be original and unpublished. - Co-authorship is not permitted. - Word Limit: **1,500–2,000 words** (excluding footnotes). - Submission must be in **PDF format only**. - Citations must follow the **ILI format**. - Font: **Times New Roman**, Font Size **12**. - Line Spacing: **1.5**, with justified alignment. - Plagiarism exceeding **10%** will result in disqualification. - AI-generated content exceeding **10%** will result in disqualification. ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES - **Submissions Open:** 15 June 2026 - **Submissions Close:** 26 June 2026 - **Declaration of Results:** 4 July 2026 ## CONTACT INFORMATION - **Ms. Shiny Agnus (Vice President):** +91 86374 79331 - **Ms. Roma Ramcoumar (President):** +91 96001 86366 ## GENERAL RULES - Participants must comply with all instructions issued by the Organising Committee. - The decision of the Judges and Organising Committee shall be final and binding. - The Organising Committee reserves the right to amend the rules if required. ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / RULE BOOK - [**Official Submission Form**](https://forms.gle/nUYdtiii4nEZDpo98) - **[Official Brochure Link](https://drive.google.com/file/d/169SyprRAYLgaMEY-R5hMz9tePpLc-Qxg/view?usp=sharing)** **Categories:** Essay Competitions, Events --- ### [CATALYST 3.0: Startup Law and Policy Summit 2026 | Organized by Centre for Innovation, Incubation and Legal Entrepreneurship (CIILE), Chanakya National Law University (CNLU), Patna | Register by 15th July, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/catalyst-3-0-startup-law-and-policy-summit-2026-organized-by-chanakya-national-law-university-cnlu-patna-register-by-15th-july-2026/) **Published:** June 24, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** CATALYST 3.0: Startup Law and Policy Summit 2026 | Organized by Chanakya National Law University (CNLU), Patna | Register by 15th July, 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Screenshot-2026-06-24-202823.png) ## **About the Organiser** **Chanakya National Law University (CNLU), Patna** was established under the Chanakya National Law University Act, 2006 (Bihar Act No. 24 of 2006) on July 15, 2006. CNLU provides quality multidisciplinary legal education keeping in view the demands of the global economy and the needs of domestic society, and promotes research across branches of law to foster the rule of law and constitutional values. The **Centre for Innovation, Incubation and Legal Entrepreneurship (CIILE)** is a not-for-profit centre at CNLU that encourages startups in Legal and Social Entrepreneurship, motivating innovative thinking and empowering students to apply entrepreneurial abilities for social impact. The **Startup Cell** at CNLU was established by the Department of Industries, Government of Bihar, under the Bihar Startup Policy 2022 and has been ranked 3rd among all startup cells in Bihar by the Department of Industries. CATALYST is CIILE’s flagship national Startup Law and Policy Summit. Following successful editions in 2024 (on emerging tech, IP, cybersecurity and data protection) and 2025 (on tech-centric M&A, valuation and defense-sector compliance, featuring 50+ research proposals and a Pitch Desk Competition with 17 teams), CATALYST 3.0 returns in 2026. This edition is supported by **JSA Advocates & Solicitors** (Internship Partner), **SCC Online** (Knowledge Partner), **SCC Times** (Media Partner), and **LL.B Mania** (Event Partner). ## **About the Event/Opportunity** **CATALYST 3.0: Startup Law and Policy Summit 2026** centers on the intersection of **Banking, Venture Capital, and Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A)**: the three pillars shaping the maturity of India’s startup economy. The summit will bring together banking regulators, venture funds, transaction lawyers and startup founders to examine structured debt, term sheet negotiations, dilution management and cross-border M&A frameworks. Topics span RBI guidelines on venture debt and startup banking, SEBI’s listing norms, FEMA implications in VC round structuring and antitrust scrutiny in serial acquisitions. The summit is structured around two core components: 1. **Paper Presentation:**Authors submit original, unpublished manuscripts under the summit themes. After review, the **top 8 shortlisted teams**will present their manuscripts before experts at CNLU Campus on the day of the summit. 2. **Panel Discussions:**Three high-level panels featuring law firm partners, startup founders, investors and policymakers will explore whether venture debt/private credit can rival traditional VC, how startups navigate RBI/SEBI/FEMA/competition law compliance, and whether IPOs, acquisitions, or insolvency-led exits offer the most sustainable growth pathways. **Suggested Sub-Themes (indicative only, participants may choose any topic under Banking & Finance or M&A)** 1. Bank-Financed Acquisitions and the Liberalisation of Acquisition Finance in India. 2. Leveraged Buyouts, Structured Debt and Acquisition Financing in Corporate Transactions. 3. Distressed Acquisitions and Resolution-Based Deal-Making under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. 4. External Commercial Borrowings (ECB), Cross-Border Capital Flows and Financing of Corporate Acquisitions. 5. Regulatory Interface in Corporate Deal-Making: RBI, SEBI, CCI and MCA Oversight in Complex Transactions. 6. Digital Lending, FinTech Regulation and the Evolving Architecture of Credit Markets in India. 7. Private Credit, Alternative Capital Structures and the Transformation of Corporate Financing. 8. Banking Governance, Risk Management and Regulatory Accountability in Contemporary Financial Systems. 9. Financial Inclusion, Neo-Banking and Technology-Driven Innovation in Banking Regulation. 10. Shadow Banking, NBFC Regulation and Systemic Stability in India’s Financial Sector. ## **Who is it For / Eligibility** - Open to students pursuing **undergraduate, postgraduate or PhD programmes** at any recognized university in India. - Participants must produce a **university-issued ID card or bonafide certificate** confirming enrolment. - **Team Composition:** Maximum of **two authors** per team. Cross-institutional teams are permitted. - All submissions and presentations must be in **English**. ## **Location** Chanakya National Law University, Patna, Bihar, India (in-person summit; final paper presentation round held on campus). ## **Registration / Submission Procedure** - Register via the official registration & payment links (separate links for CNLU and Non-CNLU students. Registration and Payment link for Non-CNLU students: [https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSflOVKM\_fKxVWSbH3lqmTsUF8IUV4sPfE0Rcw43WdqwPDIjPQ/viewform](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSflOVKM_fKxVWSbH3lqmTsUF8IUV4sPfE0Rcw43WdqwPDIjPQ/viewform) Registration and Payment link for CNLU students: [https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSemjrh5UGlpWDcCN5I7d2NhL8ZVhXAarfnhkEbJd\_33w7nnBQ/viewform](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSemjrh5UGlpWDcCN5I7d2NhL8ZVhXAarfnhkEbJd_33w7nnBQ/viewform) - Refer to the Event Brochure for Payment Details. - Full paper submission link and team code will be emailed to registered participants **three days before the submission deadline**. - **Manuscript format:** - Submit in MS Word (.doc/.docx) - Abstract word limit: 150-250 words, with 5 keywords - Word count of Manuscript: 2,500-3,000 words (exclusive of footnotes) - Font: Times New Roman, Size 12, 1.5 line spacing, justified alignment, 1-inch margins on all sides - Title: Times New Roman, Size 14, CAPITALS, Bold, centre-aligned - Footnotes: Times New Roman, Size 10, single line spacing, justified & **OSCOLA (4th Edition)** citation style only - Manuscript must **not** disclose author identity (though citing one’s own prior published work is allowed) - **Originality:** Must be unpublished, original work; **10% plagiarism limit** (zero-tolerance policy; submissions exceeding this are rejected outright). - **Use of AI is strictly prohibited** for this competition. - Manuscripts submitted here cannot be submitted elsewhere simultaneously; however, authors not on the merit list are free to pursue publication elsewhere afterward. ## **Fee Details** **For NON-CNLU Students:** - Single Author: INR 800 - Co-Authors: INR 1,500 **For CNLU Students:** - Single Author: INR 600 - Co-Authors: INR 1,100 **Cross-institutional teams** (one CNLU + one non-CNLU student): Fee applicable is the **Co-Authorship rate under “For CNLU Students”** (INR 1,100). **For Finalists:** Each finalist author must additionally pay **INR 2,000** towards accommodation and food expenses. *Registration fees are non-refundable.* ## **Prizes and Awards** **Prizes:** - **Publication Opportunity:** Top 15 manuscripts to be published in an ISBN-bearing book by a National/International Publisher - Top 8 manuscripts invited for final presentation rounds at CNLU Campus - Certificate of Merit for Top 15 Manuscripts - Certificate of Achievement for Top 8 Finalists **Awards:** - **Winner:** INR 30,000 Cash Prize + Internship Opportunity with **J. Sagar Associates (JSA)** + Gold Medal + Trophy and Certificate of Achievement - **Runner-Up:** INR 20,000 Cash Prize + Internship Opportunity with **J. Sagar Associates (JSA)** + Silver Medal + Trophy and Certificate of Achievement *Note: JSA reserves all rights to determine the office, dates, and team under which the internship is granted.* ## **Deadlines / Important Dates** **Event** **Date** Commencement of Registration & Brochure Release 19th June 2026 Deadline of Registration & Payment of Registration Fee 15th July 2026 Submission of Full Paper 20th July 2026 Declaration of Result & Intimation to Top 8 Teams 12th August 2026 Paper Presentation & Panel Discussion (Summit Day) 22nd August 2026 ## **Contact Information** - **Ujjawal Priyadarshi** (Convenor): +91 8620001879 - **Tanushree Singhal** (General Secretary): +91 9060728668 - **Aman Raj** (Event Head): +91 9631408898 - **Email:** ## **Official Link / Brochure** Brochure: [https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/15cq\_sfLpOotyPGdj1NPjyyCUbzGh1Rvk?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/15cq_sfLpOotyPGdj1NPjyyCUbzGh1Rvk?usp=sharing) For any query, please contact the organizers at the above details or refer to CIILE, CNLU Patna’s official social media handles :- Website: LinkedIn: Instagram: [https://www.instagram.com/ciile\_cnlu/](https://www.instagram.com/ciile_cnlu/) Twitter/X: [https://x.com/ciile\_cnlu](https://x.com/ciile_cnlu) **Categories:** Call for Blogs, Call for Papers, Events --- ### [INTERNATIONAL FACULTY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME ON GOVERNANCE, LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY | Organized by Amity Law School, Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Campus | Register by 04 July 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-faculty-development-programme-on-governance-law-and-sustainability-in-the-21st-century-organized-by-amity-law-school-amity-university-uttar-pradesh-lucknow-campus-register-by-04-j/) **Published:** July 2, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** INTERNATIONAL FACULTY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME ON GOVERNANCE, LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY | Organized by Amity Law School, Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Campus | Register by 04 July 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Screenshot-2026-07-02-204729.jpg) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER / COLLEGE / UNIVERSITY Amity Law School, Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Campus is committed to excellence in legal education, research, and policy discourse. The institution focuses on nurturing competent legal professionals, researchers, academicians, and policymakers capable of addressing contemporary legal and governance challenges through interdisciplinary approaches. With a strong emphasis on innovation, sustainability, governance, and global legal developments, the institution regularly organizes academic initiatives that bridge theoretical knowledge with practical applications. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY Amity Law School is organizing a **6-Day International Faculty Development Programme (IFDP)** on **“Governance, Law and Sustainability in the 21st Century”** from **6th to 11th July 2026** in **Hybrid Mode**. The programme aims to bring together academicians, researchers, legal professionals, policymakers, and scholars to discuss emerging developments in governance, law, and sustainable development. Through expert lectures, interactive discussions, and interdisciplinary learning, participants will gain insights into: - Global governance frameworks - Environmental sustainability - Digital governance and AI - Constitutional governance - Human rights and social justice - ESG and corporate accountability - International legal developments - Cyber law and data protection - Sustainable finance and green economy - Research methodology, academic writing, and publication ethics The FDP seeks to enhance teaching, research, publication, and professional competencies while promoting national and international academic collaboration. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE The programme is open to: - Faculty Members - Academicians - Lawyers - Corporate Delegates - Business Delegates ## MODE OF THE EVENT **Hybrid Mode (Online + Offline)** ## LOCATION (COUNTRY / STATE / CITY) & VENUE OF THE EVENT **Venue:** Amity Law School, Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Campus **City:** Lucknow **State:** Uttar Pradesh **Country:** India ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE Participants are required to complete and submit the online registration form. **[Registration Link](https://amity.edu/eventspg/lucknow/GLSC2026/)** Registration will be considered complete only after the registration form has been duly filled and submitted. Participants must also submit: - MCQ after each session - Feedback Form Attendance in all sessions is mandatory to receive the participation certificate. ## FEE DETAILS - **₹500** for outside participants (Non-refundable) - **No Registration Fee** for Amity University Faculty Members ## CERTIFICATE A **Certificate of Participation** will be awarded to participants who attend **all sessions** of the Faculty Development Programme. ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES - **Last Date for Registration:** **04 July 2026** - **Programme Duration:** **06 July 2026 – 11 July 2026** ## CONTACT INFORMATION ### Dr. Rajeev Kumar Singh Associate Professor, Amity Law School, AUUP Lucknow Campus 📞 9026480959 📧 rksingh2@lko.amity.edu ### Dr. Kunvar Dushyant Singh Assistant Professor, Amity Law School, AUUP Lucknow Campus 📞 6393625368 📧 kdsingh@lko.amity.edu ### Dr. Reshma Umair Associate Professor, Amity Law School, AUUP Lucknow Campus 📞 8318851168 📧 rumair@lko.amity.edu ### Dr. Anupriya Yadav Assistant Professor, Amity Law School, AUUP Lucknow Campus 📞 9450983655 📧 ayadav@lko.amity.edu ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / BROCHURE #### [**Registration & Official Event Link**](https://amity.edu/eventspg/lucknow/GLSC2026/) #### [**Official Brochure**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1dPOAN4Ehi3ke6nMPQdytXGT92Z9ZtLyx/view?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events --- ### [WOMEN IN THE WORKFORCE: CHALLENGES, REPRESENTATION AND LABOUR LAW PERSPECTIVES | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) in Association with Lex Lumen Research Journal (LLRJ) | Event held on 25th July 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/women-in-the-workforce-challenges-representation-and-labour-law-perspectives-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-in-association-with-lex-lumen-research-journal-llrj-event-h/) **Published:** July 9, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** WOMEN IN THE WORKFORCE: CHALLENGES, REPRESENTATION AND LABOUR LAW PERSPECTIVES | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) in Association with Lex Lumen Research Journal (LLRJ) | Event held on 25th July 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Screenshot-2026-07-09-110923.png) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER ### Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) Tamil Nadu Legal Research Centre (TNLRC) is an academic and research-oriented initiative dedicated to promoting legal education, research, and intellectual engagement among law students, academicians, and legal professionals. The organisation provides a dynamic platform for critical legal analysis, knowledge exchange, and discussions on contemporary legal issues through seminars, competitions, workshops, and research initiatives. TNLRC aims to bridge the gap between theoretical legal education and practical understanding while fostering legal excellence, innovation, and continuous learning. ### Lex Lumen Research Journal (LLRJ) Lex Lumen Research Journal is committed to making legal knowledge more accessible through insightful and impactful research. The journal publishes original research articles, case studies, legislative reviews, and analyses of current legal developments. LLRJ follows the UGC’s suggestive parameters for academic journals and is indexed in multiple reputed academic databases. Every published work receives a free DOI to enhance global accessibility and citation credibility. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY The panel discussion focuses on the theme **“Women in the Workforce: Challenges, Representation and Labour Law Perspectives.”** It aims to examine the evolving role of women in the workforce and the legal frameworks that govern their rights and protections. The discussion will provide participants with valuable insights into: - Challenges faced by women across different employment sectors. - Existing labour laws and the need for progressive legal reforms. - Workplace representation and equal opportunities. - Employee welfare and legal safeguards available for women employees. - The intersection between women’s workforce participation and labour law protections. The event will feature expert panel discussions followed by an interactive moderated Q&A session. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE The brochure does not specify eligibility criteria. However, the organisers describe TNLRC and LLRJ as platforms serving **law students, academicians, legal professionals, legal scholars, practitioners, and researchers**, indicating that the discussion is intended for individuals interested in legal education and contemporary labour law issues. ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE Participants can register using the Google Form provided in the brochure: **Registration Link:** Registration is to be completed through the above online registration form. ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES - **Event Date:** **25 July 2026** - **Registration Deadline:** Not specified. ## EVENT SCHEDULE TimeSession6:00 PM – 6:15 PMWelcome Address6:15 PM – 6:30 PMResource Person I6:30 PM – 6:45 PMResource Person II6:45 PM – 7:00 PMResource Person III7:00 PM – 7:15 PMResource Person IV7:15 PM – 7:45 PMModerated Q&A Session7:45 PMVote of Thanks ## PANEL SPEAKERS - **Dr. Fowmina C** – Academic and researcher specializing in International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights, Women’s Rights, Children’s Rights, Refugee Law, and Criminal Justice. - **Swati Saxena** – IMI Certified Mediator, Founder of Project Mairi, and social justice practitioner with expertise in mediation, legal aid, POSH, POCSO, and conflict resolution. - **Srivani Kakaraparti** – Corporate Trainer, POSH Facilitator, and Law Graduate specializing in workplace compliance, leadership, communication, and employee conduct. - **Ragini Juneja** – Founder of The Safe Side and legal professional with expertise in litigation, workplace compliance, POSH, and legal awareness. ## CONTACT INFORMATION **Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC)** - President: **Roma Ramcoumar** - Phone: **+91 96001 86366** - Vice President: **Shiny Agnus** - Phone: **+91 86374 79331** - Email: **tamilnadulegalrightsconsortium@gmail.com** **Lex Lumen Research Journal** - Phone: **+91 74997 45495** - Emails: - **coreteam@lexlumen.site** - **info.llrj@gmail.com** ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / BROCHURE **Registration Form:** **Official Social Media (TNLRC):** - Instagram: [https://www.instagram.com/tnlrc\_official](https://www.instagram.com/tnlrc_official) - LinkedIn: **Official Brochure:** **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events --- ### [Kartavya 2026 Campus Ambassador Programme – KIIT Samvidhan Mahotsav | Organized by KIIT Centre for Constitutional Law Studies and Research (CCLSR), KIIT School of Law, KIIT Deemed-to-be University | Register by 25th July 2026 (11:59 PM IST)](https://lawfoyer.in/kartavya-2026-campus-ambassador-programme-kiit-samvidhan-mahotsav-organized-by-kiit-centre-for-constitutional-law-studies-and-research-cclsr-kiit-school-of-law-kiit-deemed-to-be-univer/) **Published:** July 16, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** Kartavya 2026 Campus Ambassador Programme – KIIT Samvidhan Mahotsav | Organized by KIIT Centre for Constitutional Law Studies and Research (CCLSR), KIIT School of Law, KIIT Deemed-to-be University | Register by 25th July 2026 (11:59 PM IST) **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Campus-Ambassador-Poster-JPG-1-1024x1024.jpg) ## Campus Ambassador Application – Kartavya 2026: KIIT Samvidhan Mahotsav ## Become the Voice. Build the Movement The KIIT Centre for Constitutional Law Studies and Research (CCLSR), KIIT School of Law, KIIT Deemed to be University, invites enthusiastic, dynamic, and motivated students from colleges and universities across India to join the Campus Ambassador Programme for Kartavya 2026: KIIT Samvidhan Mahotsav. As a Campus Ambassador, you will represent Kartavya 2026 on your campus by promoting constitutional awareness, encouraging student participation, and becoming an integral part of one of India’s premier constitutional law festivals. This is an excellent opportunity to develop leadership and communication skills, expand your professional network, and contribute to a nationwide constitutional movement. ## About the Organisation ***KIIT Deemed-to-be University***, founded by **Dr. Achyuta Samanta**, has emerged as a premier institution with **25 campuses**, offering quality education to **over 50,000 students**, **including** **2,000 international students**. Accredited with an **“A” Grade by NAAC, *KIIT*** has consistently upheld high standards of academic excellence and innovation. It is globally recognized for its contributions to research, community outreach, and sports, having produced **23 Olympians**. ***Kalinga Institute of Industrial Technology (KIIT-DU), Bhubaneswar,*** has registered an impressive rise on the national academic stage, **securing the 6th position** **among all universities in India-across both government and private institutions**-in the latest ***Times Higher Education (THE) Asia University Rankings 2026***. Emerging as the **highest-ranked** institution not only in ***Odisha*** but across the entire ***Eastern India***, ***KIIT’s*** ascent underscores its growing academic and research stature. ***KIIT School of Law,*** established in **2007**, has been **ranked 14th** in the country in the **NIRF 2025 rankings** by the **Ministry of Education**. The ***KIIT School of Law*** offers integrated honours programmes in **B.A., B.B.A., and B.Sc. LL.B (Hons.),** with specializations in **Constitutional Law, Business Law, Criminal Law, Intellectual Property Law, Taxation Law, and International Law**, fostering a dynamic academic environment for over **1400 students** from across the country. ***KIIT Centre for Constitutional Law Studies and Research (CCLSR)****,* established in **2015**, is dedicated to promoting research, dialogue, and awareness in the field of **Constitutional Law**. Through academic initiatives, policy discussions, and student engagement, the **Centre** strives to contribute meaningfully to the development of constitutional jurisprudence and democratic values. ## About Kartavya 2026: KIIT Samvidhan Mahotsav Kartavya 2026 is the flagship national constitutional law festival of CCLSR, scheduled from 1–3 October 2026 at KIIT, Bhubaneswar, under the theme ‘Constitutional Vision for Amrit Kaal: Reflecting on 75 Years, Reforming for the Future.’ The festival features keynote sessions, panel discussions, workshops, and curated competitions including the KIIT Amend Your Constitution Competition, Short Film Making Competition, Constitutional Quiz, Research Paper Presentation Competition, and more. It is open to students from legal and non-legal disciplines. ## Who Can Apply? Open to undergraduate and postgraduate students from any recognised college or university across India, including students from Law, Engineering, Management, Commerce, Arts, Science, Medicine, Design, Journalism, Social Sciences, and all other recognised academic programmes. ## What You’ll Get - Certificate of Recognition and Letter of Recommendation - Exclusive Campus Ambassador Merchandise - Leadership & Team Collaboration Experience - National Networking Opportunities - Exclusive Rewards - Opportunity to Represent Kartavya 2026 - Practical Event Management & PR Experience ## Performance-Based Incentives Campus Ambassadors who achieve the prescribed referral thresholds through verified registrations will receive: • 50% waiver on Accommodation & Fooding Charges. • 100% waiver on Accommodation & Fooding Charges upon the higher threshold. Travel, registration and personal expenses are excluded. Thresholds will be communicated after selection. ## Application Processing Fee A non-refundable Application Processing Fee of ₹149 is applicable. Applications will be processed only after successful payment. Payment does not guarantee selection. ## Application Deadline 25th July 2026 (11:59 PM IST) ## Registration Link **Application Form:**[ https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScw7NH\_9WZ9Via\_JcAjMsMA\_vN4W67CC\_oRr6wMxelPRyT4vQ/viewform?usp=header](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScw7NH_9WZ9Via_JcAjMsMA_vN4W67CC_oRr6wMxelPRyT4vQ/viewform?usp=header) **Categories:** Events, Other Competitions --- ### [14th UFYLC–Ranka National Moot Court Competition 2026 | Organized by University Five Year Law College (UFYLC), University of Rajasthan, Jaipur | Register by 31st August 2026 (11:59 PM IST)](https://lawfoyer.in/14th-ufylc-ranka-national-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-university-five-year-law-college-ufylc-university-of-rajasthan-jaipur-register-by-31st-august-2026-1159-pm-ist/) **Published:** July 17, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 14th UFYLC–Ranka National Moot Court Competition 2026 | Organized by University Five Year Law College (UFYLC), University of Rajasthan, Jaipur | Register by 31st August 2026 (11:59 PM IST) **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Screenshot-2026-07-17-204234.jpg) ## About the Organiser/College/University ### University of Rajasthan Established on **8th January 1947**, the University of Rajasthan is recognized as the first institution of higher education in the region. The University has been awarded **NAAC A+ Accreditation** and has been recognized as a **University with Potential for Excellence (UPE)**. It is known for its commitment to academic excellence and quality legal education. ### University Five Year Law College (UFYLC) Founded in **2008**, UFYLC is a constituent college of the University of Rajasthan. Approved by the **Bar Council of India**, the college is known for its emphasis on legal education, moot court competitions, seminars, workshops, research, advocacy training, and holistic student development. ### Ranka Public Charitable Trust Established in **1980** by Late Dr. N. M. Ranka, the Trust is dedicated to public welfare, legal education, Gandhian philosophy, and philanthropic activities. It has organized numerous moot court and trial advocacy competitions in collaboration with reputed universities across India. ## Details About the Event/Opportunity The **14th UFYLC–Ranka National Moot Court Competition 2026** is a prestigious national-level moot court competition aimed at developing advocacy, legal research, drafting, writing, and oral argument skills among law students. Participants will engage in simulated courtroom proceedings before eminent judges and legal professionals while enhancing their legal reasoning, teamwork, networking, and courtroom advocacy skills. The competition will be held from **3rd to 5th October 2026**. ## Who is it For / Eligibility to Participate The competition is open to students enrolled in: - **5-Year Integrated LL.B. Programme** - **3-Year LL.B. Programme** Only **one team per institution** is permitted to participate. ## Mode of the Event **Offline** ## Location & Venue **Country:** India **State:** Rajasthan **City:** Jaipur **Venue:** University Five Year Law College, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur ## Registration / Submission Links & Procedure [**Registration Link**](https://forms.gle/RbRshZKhq5VD4xYh6) ### Registration Procedure - Fill out the online registration form. - Nominate one primary contact person for all official communications. - Pay the registration fee before the deadline. - Upload the payment receipt while submitting the registration form. - Teams will receive confirmation and a unique team code after successful registration. ## Fee Details **Registration Fee:** **₹7,000** - Inclusive of accommodation. - Payment must be completed before **31st August 2026 (11:59 PM IST)**. ## Prizes AwardPrizeWinners₹51,000Runners-up₹25,000Best Memorial₹11,000Best Student Advocate (Appellant)₹5,100Best Student Advocate (Respondent)₹5,100Best Student Researcher₹5,100 - Award winners will receive **Trophies** and **Certificates of Excellence**. - All participants will receive **Certificates of Participation**. ## Deadlines / Important Dates EventDateRelease of Brochure15th July 2026Registration Deadline31st August 2026Seeking Clarifications1st–10th September 2026Release of Clarifications15th September 2026Memorial Submission (Soft Copy)20th September 2026Memorial Submission (Hard Copy)24th September 2026Inauguration Ceremony3rd October 2026Oral Rounds3rd–4th October 2026Valedictory Ceremony5th October 2026 ## Contact Information **Email:** mootufylc@gmail.com ## Official Link of the Event / Brochure **Official Brochure:** [**14-UFYLC-Ranka Moot Court Competition 2026**](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1UNsj4hnb_iGILUtlVssKMvYhi2oWkRct) **Categories:** Events, Moot Courts --- ### [Beyond Academics: How to Build the Skills that Define successful professionals, National Webinar under Frontiers Welfare Society (NGO) | Organized by Frontiers Welfare Society | Register by 24th July 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/beyond-academics-how-to-build-the-skills-that-define-successful-professionals-national-webinar-under-frontiers-welfare-society-ngo-organized-by-frontiers-welfare-society-register-by-24th-july/) **Published:** July 19, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** Beyond Academics: How to Build the Skills that Define successful professionals, National Webinar under Frontiers Welfare Society (NGO) | Organized by Frontiers Welfare Society | Register by 24th July 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Beyond-Academics-How-to-Build-the-Skills-That-Define-Successful-Professionals-682x1024.jpg) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY Frontiers Welfare Society is a pan-India student-led NGO with 400+ members including law students and High Court advocates. Our mission is to provide accessible legal education, career support, and community-driven initiatives for students across India. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY The session will explore the skills that go beyond academic performance and often make the real difference in building a successful career, an area students and young professionals rarely receive formal guidance on. Participants will gain practical insights into essential soft skills such as networking, leadership, and confidence-building, equipping them with the tools needed to stand out and grow in any professional setting. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE **All students and professionals** ## MODE OF THE EVENT (ONLINE / OFFLINE OR HYBRID) Online ## LOCATION (COUNTRY/STATE/CITY) & VENUE OF THE EVENT India ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE ### [Registration Form](https://forms.gle/QXM3AiPsDYf29rLv8) ## PRIZES - First 10 correct quiz form submissions (post webinar) get a FREE 20-min 1:1 with Simmy Jain - First 20 such winners get FWS Internship Opportunity - Certificate to all participants ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES Last date to register – 24th July, 2026 ## CONTACT INFORMATION Contact Number: +91 9167127291 ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / LINK OF THE OFFICIAL BROCHURE, RULES & REGULATIONS ETC. - [Official Registration Form](https://forms.gle/QXM3AiPsDYf29rLv8) - [Official Brochure](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1naF0qdbrqT63__R2m1YpdEu53HtUyPEA/view?usp=sharing) - [Official Poster](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1aaXxS5MyTbf919LywRgTfnqxb5fcfeev/view?usp=sharing) - [Official LinkedIn Notification](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/frontiers-welfare-society-ngo_%F0%9D%97%A2%F0%9D%97%A3%F0%9D%97%A3%F0%9D%97%A2%F0%9D%97%A5%F0%9D%97%A7%F0%9D%97%A8%F0%9D%97%A1%F0%9D%97%9C%F0%9D%97%A7%F0%9D%97%AC-%F0%9D%97%94%F0%9D%97%9F%F0%9D%97%98%F0%9D%97%A5%F0%9D%97%A7-%F0%9D%97%A0-activity-7483765873254588416-SS3w?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_android&rcm=ACoAADS2YMABjDJKSOs_QXlMc5cB44sh1GeD5Xg) **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events --- ### [Vox Legis Xaveriana – Volume II | Organized by Xavier Society of Law and Justice (XSLAJ) under the aegis of Xavier Law School, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata | Event on 19th July, 2026 (Sunday)](https://lawfoyer.in/vox-legis-xaveriana-volume-ii-organized-by-xavier-society-of-law-and-justice-xslaj-under-the-aegis-of-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-event-on-19th-july-20/) **Published:** July 18, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** Vox Legis Xaveriana – Volume II | Organized by Xavier Society of Law and Justice (XSLAJ) under the aegis of Xavier Law School, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata | Event on 19th July, 2026 (Sunday) **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Vox-Legis-Xaveriana-Volume-II-Official-Flyer-819x1024.png) ## ABOUT THE UNIVERSITY St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata, established in 2017, carries forward the centuries-old Jesuit tradition of holistic education and academic excellence. Xavier Law School offers integrated undergraduate law programmes, LL.M. programmes, and doctoral research while striving to nurture socially responsible legal professionals committed to justice and ethical leadership. ## ABOUT THE ORGANISERS The Xavier Society of Law and Justice (XSLAJ) is a student-run academic society of Xavier Law School, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata, established to promote excellence in legal education, advocacy, research, and practical legal learning. Since its inception, XSLAJ has organised several prestigious national-level academic initiatives, including mediation competitions, trial and advocacy competitions, and legal discourse platforms in collaboration with leading law firms, legal practitioners, and academic institutions. ## DETAILS OF THE EVENT The Xavier Society of Law and Justice (XSLAJ) proudly presents Vox Legis Xaveriana – Volume II, the second edition of its flagship panel discussion series dedicated to promoting meaningful legal discourse between students and distinguished members of the legal fraternity. The theme for this edition is: “Ratio et Oratio: Understanding the Evolving Role of the Bench and the Bar in Shaping Judgments.” The programme has been conceptualised as a national and international academic forum exploring the dynamic relationship between judicial reasoning and courtroom advocacy. Through discussions on judgment writing, judicial interpretation, litigation strategy, institutional responsibilities, ethics, and contemporary legal practice, participants will gain valuable insights into the evolving justice delivery system. The event will feature two exclusive panel discussions: Bench Panel Discussion Time: 11:30 AM – 1:30 PM (IST) \* Featuring distinguished Judges and Justices discussing judicial reasoning, adjudication, interpretation of law, and institutional responsibilities. Bar Panel Discussion Time: 4:00 PM – 6:00 PM (IST) \* Featuring Senior Advocates, Partners of reputed law firms, arbitrators, mediators, and leading practitioners discussing courtroom advocacy, litigation practice, professional ethics, dispute resolution, and the role of the Bar in shaping judicial outcomes. Participants will also receive an opportunity to interact with eminent legal luminaries while benefiting from numerous academic, professional, publication, internship, networking, and career development opportunities offered through the event’s partner organisations. Every registered participant shall receive an E-Certificate of Participation. ## ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE The event is open to: \* School Students \* Undergraduate Students \* Postgraduate Students \* Research Scholars/Ph.D. Scholars \* Academicians \* Legal Professionals \* Advocates \* Working Professionals \* Participants from all academic and professional disciplines, both from India and abroad. ## MODE OF THE EVENT Virtual Mode ## REGISTRATION LINK AND PROCEDURE Interested participants are required to register through the official Google Registration Form. Registration Steps: 1\. Complete the online registration form. 2\. Pay the applicable registration fee. 3\. Upload payment details. 4\. ⁠Join the designated WhatsApp group. 5\. Await confirmation from the Organising Committee. 6\. The Google Meet joining details shall be shared with registered participants prior to the event in the designated WhatsApp group. ### [**Registration Link**](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdk7T6_gAWLT1ef79ka4sInGJLt5NzfG7xy6zu62MrnYpPXKw/viewform) ## FEE DETAILS For Participants from India \* Students – ₹299 \* Professionals – ₹499 For International Participants \* Students – USD 10 \* Professionals – USD 20 (All taxes included.) ## PRIZES While there are no conventional cash prizes, participants shall receive extensive academic and professional benefits. Benefits for all registered participants include: \* E-Certificate of Participation \* Complimentary ISBN-Registered E-Book \* Internship opportunities with reputed organisations \* Publication opportunities \* LawFoyer Internship Training Programme \* LawFoyer Connect Placement Support \* Discounts on courses, journals, conferences and publications \* Exclusive webinars and legal technology sessions \* Networking opportunities with leading legal professionals Additionally, participants may voluntarily participate in a Post-Event Assessment. The Top Three Outstanding Participants shall receive: \* Certificate of Merit \* Complimentary premium LawFoyer Academy courses \* One-Year CaseMine AI Pro Subscription \* Research Internship opportunities \* Recognition in LawFoyer’s Achievers Archive \* Additional professional and academic rewards from partner organisations ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES Event Date: 19 July 2026 (Sunday) Bench Panel Discussion: 11:30 AM – 1:30 PM (IST) Bar Panel Discussion: 4:00 PM – 6:00 PM (IST) Registration Deadline: Until the maximum intake capacity is reached (First-Come, First-Served basis). ## CONTACT INFORMATION Official Email xslaj.sxuk@gmail.com Event Representatives Mr. Fabio Ellis +91 93300 14808 Ms. Anuprova Gupta +91 98746 19988 Instagram: @xslaj\_sxuk ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / OFFICIAL BROCHURE / RULEBOOK - [Registration Form](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdk7T6_gAWLT1ef79ka4sInGJLt5NzfG7xy6zu62MrnYpPXKw/viewform) - [Official Event Brochure](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1SiEHAu5rgq0wNroFiyxdLmxZM9BZb9zq/view?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events --- ### [Call for Articles: KOITUR – People of Nature (Special Edition) | Organized by Centre for Law & Indigenous Studies, School of Law & Humanities, Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Submit by 16th August 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-articles-koitur-people-of-nature-special-edition-organized-by-centre-for-law-indigenous-studies-school-of-law-humanities-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnl/) **Published:** July 23, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** Call for Articles: KOITUR – People of Nature (Special Edition) | Organized by Centre for Law & Indigenous Studies, School of Law & Humanities, Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Submit by 16th August 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Call-for-Article_Poster-1-1024x1024.jpg) ## **Folklore, Cultural Rights, and Indigenous Knowledge Systems** KOITUR Magazine invites original and unpublished articles, essays, commentaries, case studies, book reviews, and interdisciplinary reflections for its forthcoming Special Edition on “Folklore, Cultural Rights, and Indigenous Knowledge Systems.” This special issue seeks to critically examine the relationship between folklore, indigenous traditions, customary knowledge, and contemporary legal and policy frameworks. Folklore is not merely a collection of stories and oral traditions; it represents the living memory, identity, ecological wisdom, and normative consciousness of communities. Across tribal and indigenous societies, folklore continues to influence governance, dispute resolution, environmental ethics, social relations, and cultural continuity. However, rapid commercialization, digital reproduction, cultural appropriation, and technological interventions have raised serious concerns regarding ownership, protection, and representation of indigenous cultural expressions. This special edition aims to provide an interdisciplinary platform for academicians, researchers, practitioners, policymakers, activists, and students to engage with emerging conversations surrounding folklore, law, cultural rights, intellectual property, and indigenous knowledge systems from both national and international perspectives. ## **Suggested Themes** The following themes are indicative and not exhaustive: - Folklore and Jurisprudence - Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Legal Pluralism - Tribal Oral Traditions and Community Governance - Folklore, Gender, and Social Justice - Sacred Ecology and Environmental Traditions - Intellectual Property Rights and Traditional Cultural Expressions - UNESCO, WIPO, and International Protection of Folklore - Cultural Appropriation and Community Consent - Folklore in the Digital Age: AI, Media, and Streaming Platforms - Indigenous Languages, Storytelling, and Cultural Preservation - Constitutional Protection of Tribal and Cultural Rights - Folk Narratives and Human Rights Discourse - Comparative Perspectives on Indigenous Communities across Africa, Latin America, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South-East Asia - Folklore, Decoloniality, and Resistance - Customary Laws and Contemporary Governance - Community Ownership and Benefit-Sharing Mechanisms - Folk Art, Music, Performance, and Cultural Heritage Protection ## **Submission Guidelines for Articles** - **The word limit for submissions shall be 1000–1200 words, and all manuscripts must be submitted in MS Word format (.doc/.docx).** - The manuscript must be typed in Times New Roman, Font Size 12, with 1.5 line spacing, on A4 size paper with 1-inch margins on all sides. - Each submission must be accompanied by a brief author profile containing: - Name of the Author(s) - Institutional Affiliation - Designation - Official Address - Email Address - Contact Number - **The manuscript must be original and unpublished and should not exceed a 10% similarity index and 10% AI-generated content under any recognised plagiarism and AI-detection software. Submissions failing to comply with these standards may not be considered for publication** - Authors are required to follow the Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation (20th Edition) for citations and references. - The last date for submission of articles **is 16th August 2026**. At **cslip@hnlu.ac.in** **Note:** The suggested themes and sub-themes are illustrative and not exhaustive. Submissions addressing allied or interdisciplinary issues relevant to the theme of the special edition may also be considered for publication ## **Guidelines for Photo Submissions** - Technical Requirements - Photographs must be submitted in digital format only. - Images should be of high resolution (minimum 300 DPI) and saved in JPEG/JPG format. - The recommended dimensions for images are 8.5 × 11 inches or smaller. ## **Quality Standards** - Photographs should demonstrate strong composition, clarity, lighting, and overall visual quality. - Images must be properly focused and free from technical distortions such as excessive noise or blur. - Minimal editing or post-processing is encouraged in order to preserve the authenticity of the subject matter. ## **Caption and Metadata Requirements** - Each photograph must be accompanied by: - A caption (not exceeding 100 words) describing the subject, location, and context of the image. - Relevant metadata including: - Name of the Photographer - Date of Capture - Location - Any additional contextual information relevant to the image - Ethical and Legal Requirements **By submitting photographs, contributors affirm that** - They hold the necessary copyright over the submitted work; and - Appropriate consent or permissions have been obtained wherever identifiable individuals or private property appear in the photographs. - Submission Process - Photographs, along with captions and author details, must be submitted via email to **cslip@hnlu.ac.in** - The deadline for photo submissions is 16th August, 2026. - Contributors are requested to include a brief bio and complete contact information with their submission. ## **Publication Rights** By submitting photographs, contributors grant the magazine non-exclusive publication rights to use the images in the magazine and related promotional materials. ## **Acknowledgement** - All selected contributors will receive appropriate credit through: - By-lines and photo credits in the magazine; - Recognition through the magazine’s website, social media platforms, and related academic or promotional initiatives. We warmly invite Faculty, Scholars, Researchers, Photographers, Artists, and Cultural practitioners to contribute to this special edition and become part of an important dialogue on indigenous cultures, folklore, and community knowledge systems. ## [Official Brochure](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1dp8KVCFXpg7W7jCLFDSzkWonmp2fegud/view?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Call for Blogs, Call for Papers, Events --- ### [Advanced Certification Course on Intellectual Property Laws of India](https://lawfoyer.in/advanced-certification-course-on-intellectual-property-laws-of-india/) **Published:** June 30, 2026 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## Advanced Certification Course on Intellectual Property Laws of India ![Promo banner for Advanced Certification Course on Intellectual Property Laws of India with dates July 23–26, 2026 and timing 6 PM.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/IPR-vertical.jpg) ![Poster advertising an IP laws course by LawFoyer with dates July 23–26, 2026 and 6 PM, plus mentor photos.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/IPR.jpg) ## [Click Here to Get 50% Off - Early Bird Offer ending Tonight!](https://lawfoyer.in/form/advanced-certification-course-on-intellectual-property-laws-of-india/) ## [Download Course Brochure](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1OhNukvBLozV8v2GQy9TkM390q9yPJxUj/view?usp=sharing) ### Course Duration #### 4 Days ### Course Date #### **23rd to 26th July 2026** ### Session Time #### 6:00 PM (Onwards) ### Mode #### Live Online Workshops + Lifetime Access to Recordings ## Why Intellectual Property Law Skills Are No Longer Optional? Ideas, inventions, brands, content, technology, designs and creative works are now among the most valuable assets of businesses, creators, start-ups and large corporations. A logo can become a brand. A product design can create market distinction. A song, film, article, software code or online course can become a valuable copyright asset. An invention can become a patent. A local product can become a geographical indication. But without legal protection, these assets can be copied, misused, diluted or commercially exploited by others. This is why intellectual property law is no longer a niche subject only for a limited group of lawyers. It is becoming increasingly relevant for law students, advocates, corporate legal professionals, researchers, entrepreneurs, content creators and professionals working with innovation-led businesses. Yet, many learners study IP law only as a theoretical paper. They may know the names of statutes, but often remain unclear about: - How trademark registration and brand protection work in practice. - How to distinguish copyright, design and trademark protection. - What makes an invention patentable in India. - How infringement, passing off, piracy and design piracy are addressed. - How IP licensing, assignment and commercialisation work. - What careers exist in IP litigation, prosecution, corporate advisory, media, technology, research and policy. ## Presenting LawFoyer’s Advanced Certification Course on Intellectual Property Laws of India This intensive four-day programme is designed to help you understand Intellectual Property Rights from both a legal and practical perspective. You will move from the foundational concepts of IP law to the practical legal issues surrounding brand protection, creative works, patents, geographical indications, enforcement, licensing and career opportunities. This is not merely a theoretical overview of IP statutes. It is a structured, live and career-oriented learning experience designed to help you understand how intellectual property law operates in real legal, commercial, creative and technology-driven contexts. **Across four focused days, you will learn to:** - Build a clear conceptual understanding of the Indian IPR ecosystem. - Understand trademark law, brand protection, deceptive similarity, passing off and online misuse. - Learn copyright, designs and protection of digital, creative and commercial works. - Understand patentability, patent filing, opposition, infringement and compulsory licensing. - Explore geographical indications, trade secrets, confidential information and plant variety protection. - Develop awareness of IP enforcement, licensing, franchising, assignment and emerging career pathways. ## [Click Here to Enroll Now!](https://lawfoyer.in/form/advanced-certification-course-on-intellectual-property-laws-of-india/) ## [Download Brochure](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1OhNukvBLozV8v2GQy9TkM390q9yPJxUj/view?usp=sharing) ## Course Mentors [ ![Portrait of a man in a dark blazer and black shirt, wearing glasses, facing the camera against a light background.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/dr-deevanshu-shrivastava.jpg) ](javascript:void(0))## [ Prof. Dr. Deevanshu Shrivastava ](javascript:void(0)) Professor of Law, National University of Study and Research in Law, Ranchi. Tap the photo to know more about your Mentor ![Portrait of a man in a dark blazer and black shirt, wearing glasses, facing the camera against a light background.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/dr-deevanshu-shrivastava.jpg) ## Prof. Dr. Deevanshu Shrivastava Professor of Law, National University of Study and Research in Law, Ranchi. Prof. Dr. Deevanshu Shrivastava is an ardent academician and zealous legal researcher with over 13 years of teaching experience. After clearing UGC NET in Law twice and MPSET, he completed his Ph.D. in Intellectual Property Laws from Barkatullah University, Bhopal. Apart from this, he also holds Diplomas in Cyber Law, Medical Laws, and Media and Drone Laws. He has completed various certificate courses from WIPO and the University of Pennsylvania in his field of study, Intellectual Property Rights. He was the Founding Head of Central India’s first and only Public Policy School, Jagran School of Public Policy and International Affairs at Jagran Lakecity University, Bhopal. He is an active member of various editorial boards and a lifetime member of national and international journals. He is also on the advisory board of various legal platforms. He has extensive experience in participating in and conducting debates, moot courts, ADR tournaments, policy dialogues, legal aid camps, and various other academic and co-curricular activities. He has won the prestigious “Excellence in Research Award” thrice in the academic years 2015–16, 2016–17, and 2017–18. He was also awarded the “Outstanding Performer of the Year Award” for 2015–16. He was felicitated with the prestigious “Excellence in Research Award” in 2018 and the “Best Faculty (Law) Award, 2019” by the Arjun Das Gulati Foundation in collaboration with Allahabad University, Allahabad. He received the prestigious “Best Faculty in Law” award at the International Academic Awards in Dubai, presented by GISR and the American College of Dubai in October 2019. He has also been awarded the prestigious BW 40 Under 40 Legal Award for his contribution to legal academia in 2024. Dr. Deevanshu has been widely acclaimed for his editorials in various leading newspapers and is a regular invitee as a resource person at various national and international gatherings. He has also been a trainer for leading government and non-governmental organisations. A mooter, a coach, an assessor, and still a learner. [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Ankit-Shrivastava-Small-e1782755744780.png) ](javascript:void(0))## [ Mr. Ankit Shrivastava ](javascript:void(0)) Assistant Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA Tap the photo to know more about your Mentor ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Ankit-Shrivastava-Small-e1782755744780.png) ## Mr. Ankit Shrivastava Assistant Professor, Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA Mr. Ankit Shrivastava is currently serving as Assistant Professor and Convener of the Moot Court Society at Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA. With a strong foundation in Intellectual Property Rights, Mr. Ankit holds an LL.M. in IPR from the National Academy of Legal Studies and Research (NALSAR), Hyderabad, and a B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) from Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur, where he graduated with distinction in his specialisation. He is presently pursuing his Ph.D. at the National University of Study and Research in Law (NUSRL), Ranchi, where his research critically examines the intersection of Copyright Law and Artificial Intelligence, focusing on the legal implications of AI-generated content. Recognised for his academic excellence, Ankit was awarded a full scholarship to attend the prestigious Summer Programme of the Xiamen Academy of International Law, China. He is also an empanelled guest lecturer for the University of Gdańsk, Poland. He has presented extensively at both national and international platforms, earning accolades including the Best Paper Presentation Award for his work on “AI and the Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions” at a recent international conference. Mr. Ankit’s scholarly contributions include several publications in peer-reviewed and Scopus-indexed journals, reflecting his interdisciplinary engagement with emerging areas such as Artificial Intelligence, Intellectual Property Rights, and Competition Law. His academic rigour, combined with an active role in student mentorship and legal advocacy through mooting, positions him as a dynamic voice in contemporary legal scholarship. [ ![Portrait of a smiling woman with long dark hair wearing a gold saree and red bindi, facing the camera.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Side_Saraswathy-Vaidyanathan-Medium-e1782755350719-300x295.jpg) ](javascript:void(0))## [ Prof. Saraswathy Vaidyanathan ](javascript:void(0)) Assistant Professor, School of Law, BML Munjal University Tap the photo to know more about your Mentor ![Portrait of a smiling woman with long dark hair wearing a gold saree and red bindi, facing the camera.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Side_Saraswathy-Vaidyanathan-Medium-e1782755350719-300x295.jpg) ## Prof. Saraswathy Vaidyanathan Assistant Professor, School of Law, BML Munjal University Prof. Saraswathy Vaidyanathan is an Assistant Professor at the School of Law, BML Munjal University, where she teaches Intellectual Property Law, Law of Special Contracts, and an interdisciplinary course on Artificial Intelligence and Law. She holds an LL.M. in Intellectual Property Law from the University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom, and completed her undergraduate legal education at Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur. Her academic and professional interests lie at the intersection of intellectual property, emerging technologies, and public policy. She has written for leading public platforms, including **The Indian Express, Business World Legal, and The Diplomat,** on contemporary issues such as artificial intelligence, misinformation, deepfakes, and the use of AI in legal education. Her teaching perspective is especially valuable for learners who want to understand IP law beyond bare provisions. She brings attention to the real challenges created by technology, digital innovation, content creation, privacy, education, healthcare, and gender justice. Through her session, participants will build a strong conceptual foundation in the Indian IPR ecosystem and understand why intellectual property law is central to innovation, commerce, and modern legal practice. ## Course Day Wise Curriculum ## Day 1 / Module 1 — Foundations of Indian Intellectual Property Law **Date:** 23rd July 2026 **Speaker:** Prof. Saraswathy Vaidyanathan, **Theme:** Understanding the IPR Ecosystem, Core Concepts and Commercial Importance 1. Meaning, nature and purpose of Intellectual Property Rights. 2. Difference between tangible property and intangible property. 3. Overview of major IPRs in India: Patents, Trademarks, Copyright, Designs, Geographical Indications, Trade Secrets and Confidential Information, and emerging rights such as Personality Rights. 4. Constitutional, economic and commercial basis of IP protection. 5. India’s IPR framework and the role of IP India, the Copyright Office, courts and tribunals. 6. International foundations of IP law: TRIPS, WIPO, Paris Convention, Berne Convention and Madrid Protocol. 7. National IPR Policy and India’s innovation ecosystem. **Outcome:** Build a clear and confident foundation in Intellectual Property Law and understand how different IP rights protect innovation, brands, creativity and commercial value. ## Day 2 / Module 2 — Trademark Law, Brand Protection and Passing Off **Date:** 24th July 2026 **Speaker:** Prof. Dr. Deevanshu Shrivastava **Theme:** Protecting Brand Identity, Goodwill and Market Reputation 1. Meaning and function of trademarks. 2. Types of trademarks: Word marks, Device marks, Logos, Shape marks, Colour marks, Sound marks, Collective marks, Certification marks and Well-known marks. 3. Absolute and relative grounds for refusal. 4. Trademark search, classification and filing basics. 5. Registration process under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and Trade Marks Rules, 2017. 6. Opposition, rectification and cancellation proceedings. 7. Trademark infringement and passing off. 8. Deceptive similarity and likelihood of confusion. 9. Domain names, social-media handles, influencer brands and online brand misuse. 10. Remedies in trademark disputes: injunctions, damages, account of profits and delivery up. **Outcome:** Learn how brands are protected, how trademark disputes arise and how lawyers advise clients on registration, infringement, passing off and online brand misuse. ## Day 3 / Module 3 — Copyright, Designs and Creative Industry Protection **Date:** 25th July 2026 **Speaker:** Prof. Dr. Deevanshu Shrivastava **Theme:** Protecting Creativity, Content, Software, Design and Digital Works **Part A – Copyright Law** 1. What copyright protects and what it does not protect. 2. Idea-expression dichotomy and originality under Indian copyright law. 3. Literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works. 4. Cinematograph films and sound recordings. 5. Ownership, authorship and first ownership. 6. Assignment and licensing of copyright. 7. Moral rights and performers’ rights. 8. Fair dealing and permitted uses. 9. Digital copyright infringement, piracy, social-media content and platform liability. 10. Copyright societies and royalty issues. 11. Copyright infringement, notices and civil/criminal litigation. **Part B – Designs Law** 1. Meaning of industrial design. 2. Difference between copyright, design and trademark protection. 3. Registrability of designs. 4. Novelty and originality in design registration. 5. Design piracy and remedies. 6. Designs Act, 2000 and Designs Rules, 2001. 7. Practical relevance for fashion, product packaging, consumer goods, jewellery, automobiles and industrial products. **Outcome:** Understand how creative works, designs, digital content and commercial products are protected, licensed and enforced in today’s content-driven economy. ## Day 4 / Module 4 — Patent Law, GI, IP Enforcement, Licensing and Career Pathways **Date:** 26th July 2026 **Speaker**: Mr. Ankit Shrivastava **Theme:** From Innovation Protection to IP Practice and Commercialisation **Part A – Patent Law** 1. Meaning and purpose of patents. 2. Patentable invention under Indian law. 3. Novelty, inventive step and industrial application. 4. Non-patentable inventions under Section 3 and Section 4. 5. Patent filing process and specification basics. 6. Provisional and complete specifications. 7. Patent publication, examination and grant. 8. Pre-grant and post-grant opposition. 9. Patent infringement and defences. 10. Compulsory licensing. 11. Pharma patents, software-related inventions, AI-generated inventions and emerging legal issues. **Part B – Geographical Indications and Other IP Rights** 1. Meaning and purpose of geographical indications. 2. Difference between GI and trademark. 3. Registration of GIs and authorised users. 4. Famous Indian GI examples and their role in the rural economy. 5. GI enforcement and misuse. 6. Case study on plant variety protection and farmers’ rights. 7. Trade secrets and confidential information. **Part C – IP Enforcement, Licensing and Career Pathways** 1. Civil remedies in IP disputes. 2. Criminal remedies in copyright and trademark matters. 3. IP licensing, franchising and assignment agreements. 4. IP issues in employment, contracts, start-ups and collaborations. 5. Career opportunities in IP litigation, IP prosecution, IP portfolio management, law firms, corporate legal departments, media and entertainment law, technology companies, start-ups, research institutions, policy and academia. **Outcome:** Gain practical awareness of patent protection, GI law, enforcement remedies, licensing structures and the diverse career opportunities available in Intellectual Property Law. ## [Click Here to Enroll Now!](https://lawfoyer.in/form/advanced-certification-course-on-intellectual-property-laws-of-india/) ## [Download Brochure](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1OhNukvBLozV8v2GQy9TkM390q9yPJxUj/view?usp=sharing) ## Who should attend this course? **This course is ideal for:** - Undergraduate and postgraduate law students seeking a strong foundation in Intellectual Property Law. - Judicial services and competitive examination aspirants who want conceptual clarity in IPR. - Young advocates and litigation associates handling commercial, copyright, trademark or technology-related matters. - Legal professionals working with businesses, start-ups, media companies, brands, creators or technology platforms. - Researchers and academicians interested in IP, innovation, technology, AI and creative industries. - Entrepreneurs, content creators and professionals who want to understand the legal value of their intellectual assets. - Anyone who wants to explore a career in IP litigation, prosecution, advisory, policy or corporate practice. ## What Will You Learn and Achieve? **By the end of this four-day certification course, you will be able to:** - Understand the core framework of Intellectual Property Rights in India. - Distinguish between patents, trademarks, copyright, designs, GI and trade secrets. - Identify the legal tools available for protecting brands, content, designs and inventions. - Understand trademark registration, opposition, cancellation, infringement and passing off. - Analyse copyright ownership, licensing, fair dealing, piracy and digital infringement. - Understand design registration, novelty, originality and design piracy. - Develop clarity on patentability, patent filing, opposition, infringement and compulsory licensing. - Recognise emerging IP concerns around AI-generated works, software, digital content and online brand misuse. - Understand IP enforcement, licensing, assignment and franchising structures. - Identify practical career pathways in IP litigation, law firms, corporate advisory, technology, media, research and policy. ## How You Will Learn **This course follows an engaging and practical learning approach:** - Live online sessions led by experienced faculty members. - Structured and beginner-friendly explanation of core IP concepts. - Statute-based learning supported by practical illustrations. - Coverage of contemporary concerns involving AI, digital works, online brands, software and creative industries. - Opportunity to understand commercial and career relevance of each IP right. - Dedicated space for questions, discussion and doubt-clearing. - Lifetime access to recordings for revision and future reference. ## Free Bonuses for All Course Participants worth Rs. 5000+ 1. **E-Certificate of Completion:** Participants will be awarded with a Certificate of Completion after successful completion of the course. 2. **FREE Job and Internship Placement Support for 1 Year:** Participants will get free daily Internship and Job Opportunities Updates for 1 year via [**LawFoyer Connect**](https://news.lawfoyer.in/). 3. **FREE Access of Legal AI Certification Workshop:** Participants will get free access to LawFoyer’s Advanced Certification Workshop on AI-Powered Legal Research, Writing and Drafting for Law Students and Legal Professionals worth Rs. 499/-. 4. **FREE Access of Mooting Workshop:** Participants will get free access to LawFoyer’s Advanced Certification Workshop on Mooting and Trial Advocacy with AI worth Rs. 499/-. 5. **Publication Opportunity with LawFoyer’s International Journal:** Participants will get discounted publication opportunity with [**LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research (LIJDLR) \[ISSN: 2583-7753\]**](https://lijdlr.com/), which is indexed in 350+ international libraries and databases including SCC Online, HeinOnline, Harvard HOLLIS, Stanford Libraries, Oxford SOLO, IIM Bangalore Library, Manupatra, Google Scholar, ResearchGate, WorldCat, CrossRef, Europub and many more libraries & databases worldwide. 6. **Priority Access of Workshops & Webinars:** Participants will get priority Access to upcoming skil development workshops and academic webinars by [**LawFoyer Academy**](https://academy.lawfoyer.in/). 7. **Priority Access to Standardised Mock Tests** by LawFoyer’s [**Quiz Mania**](https://quiz.lawfoyer.in) 8. **Other FREE Bonuses:** Participants will get free access to bonuses including, *inter alia*, 4,000+ legal drafts, course reading materials, notes, E-books, PPTs, recordings with lifetime access and much more. ## Why Learn Intellectual Property Law with LawFoyer? [**LawFoyer**](https://www.lawfoyer.in) is committed to making legal learning practical, accessible and career-oriented for law students and legal professionals. This course has been carefully structured to help you move beyond memorising legal provisions and develop a practical understanding of how IP law affects brands, innovations, businesses, creators, technology companies, media organisations and legal practice. Through live learning, expert faculty, structured curriculum, accessible recordings and career-oriented bonuses, this programme is designed to help you build a stronger academic profile and more practical legal perspective. Whether you are preparing for internships, moots, research projects, competitive examinations, corporate roles or a long-term career in Intellectual Property Law, this course can help you build a meaningful foundation. ## COURSE FEE & REGISTRATION DETAILS - **Early Bird Fee for Law Students:** ₹ **490** (offer valid till Tonight 11 PM) - **Early Bird Fee for Others:** ₹ **980** (offer valid till Tonight 11 PM) - **Course Fee for Law Students** (from Tommorrow onwards): ₹ 1000/- - **Course Fee for Others** (from Tommorrow onwards): ₹ 2000/- ## [Click Here to Enroll Now!](https://lawfoyer.in/form/advanced-certification-course-on-intellectual-property-laws-of-india/) ## [Download Brochure](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1OhNukvBLozV8v2GQy9TkM390q9yPJxUj/view?usp=sharing) ## Frequently Asked Questions [ Do you offer daily live classes? ](#collapse-14514dc6ab2aebe9e370) Yes, our course include daily live classes. You will have the opportunity to attend live lectures, each lasting approximately 90 minutes. The schedule for these live sessions will be 6 PM Onwards. We understand that our learners may be students or working professionals, so we strive to accommodate everyone's schedules. So our live sessions are held in the late evenings, allowing all participants to attend without compromising their regular classes or work commitments. [ What happens if I am unable to attend a live class? ](#collapse-c29457c6ab2aebe9e370) We highly recommend attending the live classes after thorough preparation to maximize your learning experience. Just as the true excitement of a live match or performance lies in witnessing it in real-time, the real value of our live classes comes from actively participating and engaging with the content and instructors. During the live sessions, a wealth of new and practical information is covered, and you'll have the opportunity to ask questions and receive immediate feedback. However, we understand that sometimes life gets in the way, and you may miss a live class. In such cases, you can access the recordings of the live sessions through your personalized Learning Management System (LMS) dashboard. The LMS dashboard provides 24/7 access to all course materials, including the live session recordings, ensuring that you can catch up on any missed content at your convenience. [ Will this course help in internships and jobs? ](#collapse-35c8fe46ab2aebe9e370) Yes. A strong understanding of skills taught in this course will become a key differentiator for you in internships, litigation practice, compliance roles, and research profiles. Moreover, the 1 year Internship and Placement support via LawFoyer Connect will also immensely help you. [ Is this useful for judicial services or other exams? ](#collapse-23e82e36ab2aebe9e370) The Modules discussed in this course are increasingly becoming part of judicial service examinations and other national exams as well. This course will give you the conceptual clarity and contemporary awareness that you can build upon. [ How will the sessions be conducted? ](#collapse-f524db26ab2aebe9e370) Sessions will be conducted live online. You will receive joining links, reading material, and support via email or WhatsApp. [ Can non law professionals attend? ](#collapse-48e70416ab2aebe9e370) Yes, policy researchers, working professionals, and enthusiasts with serious interest in modules and skills taught in this course are welcome to join and learn. ## [Click Here to Enroll Now!](https://lawfoyer.in/form/advanced-certification-course-on-intellectual-property-laws-of-india/) ## [Download Brochure](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1OhNukvBLozV8v2GQy9TkM390q9yPJxUj/view?usp=sharing) ## Contact Us Have questions about our Certification Course? We’re here to help! Contact us for any inquiries regarding course content, schedules, or registration. Don’t miss this opportunity to transform your legal career with LawFoyer! [ Contact Us ](https://web.whatsapp.com/send?phone=+918824991916) [ Contact Us ](https://web.whatsapp.com/send?phone=+918574723478) ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/chatting.png) **Categories:** Courses & Workshops **Tags:** certificate course in intellectual property rights, certificate courses for law students, copyright infringement, copyright law course, courses for law students, industrial design, industrial design course, intellectual property and copyright, intellectual property and copyright law, intellectual property certificate, intellectual property law, intellectual property law classes, intellectual property law courses, intellectual property rights, intellectual property rights courses, IP law certificate, IP law course, IPR certificate course, IPR course, law and technology, law certificate, law certificate courses, law course, law course details, law course duration, law courses in india, law online courses, legal certification, legal courses, legal courses online, legal education, online courses for law students, online law certificate courses, online law courses in India, patent law course, patent law intellectual property, technology law, trademark law course --- ### [Frame of Suit under Order II Rules 1 and 2 CPC, 1908: Whole Claim, Cause of Action, Splitting of Claims and Bar on Subsequent Suits](https://lawfoyer.in/frame-of-suit-under-order-ii-rules-1-and-2-cpc-1908/) **Published:** June 28, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun28202601_17_15A-725x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning and Object of Frame of Suit - **Frame of suit:** “Frame of suit” means the manner in which a plaintiff structures a civil suit: the facts pleaded, the cause of action relied upon, the claims included, and the reliefs sought. Order II CPC aims to ensure that litigation arising from one dispute is, as far as possible, settled completely in one proceeding. - **Finality:** Order II Rule 1 CPC requires every suit to be framed, as far as practicable, so that the Court can finally decide the subjects in dispute and prevent further litigation concerning them. It is a broad procedural principle against fragmented litigation. Unlike Rule 2, Rule 1 does not itself expressly prescribe a specific statutory forfeiture for omission of a claim or relief. - **Anti-multiplicity principle:** Order II Rule 2 CPC gives practical effect to Rule 1. Its central purpose is to prevent a defendant from being vexed repeatedly over the same cause of action and to prevent a plaintiff from dividing one complete claim or bundle of remedies into several suits. The rule is therefore directed against both **splitting of claims** and **splitting of reliefs**. - **Fairness:** The rule protects defendants from harassment, avoids inconsistent findings, conserves judicial time, and requires a plaintiff to disclose and pursue the full case that had already accrued when the first suit was instituted. ## Statutory Scheme of Order II Rules 1 and 2 CPC - **Order II Rule 1 CPC — Complete adjudication:** Every suit should, as far as practicable, be framed to enable a final decision upon the subjects in dispute and prevent future litigation concerning them. - **Order II Rule 2(1) CPC — Whole claim:** Every suit must include the whole claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action. A plaintiff may relinquish a portion of the claim to bring the suit within the pecuniary jurisdiction of a Court. - **Order II Rule 2(2) CPC — Omitted or relinquished portion of claim:** Where the plaintiff omits to sue for, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of the claim, the plaintiff cannot later sue for that omitted or relinquished portion. - **Order II Rule 2(3) CPC — Omitted relief:** Where a plaintiff is entitled to more than one relief on the same cause of action, the plaintiff may seek all or some reliefs. However, if a relief is omitted without leave of the Court, the plaintiff cannot later sue for that omitted relief. - **Explanation — One obligation, one cause:** An obligation, its collateral security, and successive claims arising from the same obligation are treated as one cause of action for Rule 2. The statutory illustration states that where rent for several past years is already due, a landlord who sues only for one year’s rent cannot later sue for the other accrued years’ rent. ## Cause of Action: The Central Test under Order II Rule 2 CPC - **Essential facts:** A cause of action is the complete bundle of material facts that the plaintiff must prove, if denied, to obtain a judgment. It does not mean every item of evidence. It also does not depend upon the defence raised by the defendant or merely upon the form of relief claimed. - **Foundation, not label:** Courts examine the foundation of each suit. Changing the wording of relief from injunction to declaration, possession, damages, specific performance, or cancellation does not avoid Rule 2 if the new relief rests on the same factual foundation that existed when the first suit was filed. - **Same transaction is not enough:** A single transaction may generate more than one cause of action. Order II Rule 2 does not compel a plaintiff to combine every possible cause of action arising from the same transaction. The bar operates only where the earlier and later suits arise from the **same cause of action in substance**. - **Evidence test:** A useful test is whether substantially the same evidence would be required to prove both suits. Where the evidence necessary for the later claim is different, the causes of action are usually different. This test is helpful but must be applied with the actual pleadings and facts of the case. - **Availability test:** The omitted claim or relief must have been both **entitled to** and **available to** the plaintiff when the first suit was instituted. A plaintiff is not penalised for failing to claim a remedy that had not yet accrued, was impossible to obtain, or depended upon a later event. ## Order II Rule 1 CPC: Broad Duty to Avoid Further Litigation - **Practical framing:** Rule 1 expects a plaintiff to frame the plaint comprehensively. The plaintiff should identify all material disputes, include connected issues that require adjudication, and avoid filing separate proceedings over matters that can reasonably be resolved together. - **Subjects in dispute:** Rule 1 uses the wider expression “subjects in dispute”, whereas Rule 2 specifically uses “cause of action”. Therefore, Rule 1 lays down the broad policy of complete adjudication, while Rule 2 creates the specific bar against later claims and reliefs arising from the same cause of action. - **No automatic forfeiture under Rule 1:** Mere non-compliance with Rule 1 does not automatically result in dismissal of a later suit. The strict consequence of losing the right to sue arises under Order II Rule 2(2) and Rule 2(3), where the statutory conditions are established. ## Order II Rule 2(1) CPC: Suit Must Include the Whole Claim - **Whole claim:** The plaintiff must claim the entire amount, property interest, contractual entitlement, or other substantive claim that has accrued from the particular cause of action. - **Example — Loan claim:** A lends B ₹10 lakh under one loan agreement, and the whole amount becomes due. If A sues B only for ₹6 lakh arising from that same due debt, A cannot later sue for the omitted ₹4 lakh. - **Jurisdictional relinquishment:** A plaintiff may voluntarily relinquish a part of the claim to bring the matter within the pecuniary jurisdiction of a lower Court. For example, where a claim exceeds the Court’s pecuniary limit, the plaintiff may reduce the claim and sue in that Court. However, this is a permanent relinquishment: the abandoned portion cannot be claimed in a later suit. - **No tactical reservation:** A plaintiff cannot intentionally sue for a smaller amount, obtain a convenient forum, and later institute a second suit for the balance. Rule 2 prevents such forum-oriented splitting of claims. ## Order II Rule 2(2) CPC: Relinquishment or Omission of Part of Claim - **Claim versus relief:** A “claim” generally concerns the substantive extent of what is due or recoverable, such as the balance of money, accrued rent, mesne profits already due, or a portion of property-related entitlement. A “relief” is the judicial remedy sought, such as injunction, declaration, possession, specific performance, or damages. - **Absolute consequence:** Under Rule 2(2), once a portion of an accrued claim is omitted or intentionally relinquished, the plaintiff cannot later sue for it. The rule does not provide for leave of the Court to preserve a right to sue later for an omitted portion of the claim. - **Important distinction:** Leave of Court is expressly relevant under Rule 2(3), concerning omitted **reliefs**. It does not cure relinquishment of a part of the **claim** under Rule 2(2). This distinction was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in *Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. v. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Ltd.*, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 82; 2025 INSC 73. - **Illustration — Accrued rent:** A landlord has unpaid rent for 2023, 2024 and 2025. If all three years’ rent was due when the suit was filed, but the landlord sues only for 2024 rent, a later suit for the already accrued 2023 or 2025 rent is barred. Rent becoming due after the first suit gives rise to a fresh cause of action and is not barred. ## Order II Rule 2(3) CPC: Omission to Sue for One of Several Reliefs - **Several reliefs:** One cause of action may entitle a plaintiff to multiple remedies. For example, a breach of an agreement to sell may potentially justify specific performance, injunction against alienation, damages, refund, or cancellation of a competing conveyance, depending upon the facts. - **Mandatory inclusion:** Where more than one relief is available on the same cause of action, the plaintiff should ordinarily claim all such reliefs in the first suit. - **Leave of Court:** A plaintiff may omit one relief only after obtaining leave from the Court to sue for that relief later. The leave should be expressly sought and expressly granted. A mere statement in the plaint that the plaintiff “reserves the right” to sue later is not a substitute for leave. - **Three requirements for bar:** The defendant raising Rule 2(3) must prove: - **Same cause:** The second suit is founded on the same cause of action as the first suit. - **Multiple reliefs:** The plaintiff was entitled to more than one relief on that cause of action. - **No leave:** The plaintiff omitted the later relief without obtaining leave of the Court. - **Burden of proof:** The burden is on the defendant who pleads the bar. Since it is a technical bar, it cannot be presumed from broad similarities between the suits. ## Difference between Part of Claim and Omitted Relief BasisPart of Claim: Order II Rule 2(2)Omitted Relief: Order II Rule 2(3)**Nature**A portion of the substantive entitlementOne of several remedies arising from the same cause**Example**Suing for ₹6 lakh out of an accrued ₹10 lakh debtSeeking injunction but omitting specific performance**Effect of omission**Later suit for omitted portion is barredLater suit for omitted relief is barred**Role of leave**Leave does not preserve a later claim for omitted portionLeave of Court can preserve the omitted relief**Core concern**Splitting monetary or substantive claimSplitting remedies available on same factsThe Supreme Court has treated these as separate situations: Rule 2(2) concerns omission or relinquishment of a part of the claim, while Rule 2(3) concerns omission of one among several available reliefs. ## When a Subsequent Suit Is Not Barred - **Distinct cause of action:** A later suit is maintainable where it rests on fresh and distinct material facts, even though the parties, property, agreement, or transaction are substantially connected. - **Fresh accrual:** A subsequent breach, subsequent dispossession, fresh infringement, later refusal, fresh denial of title, or a new event creating an independent right may provide a fresh cause of action. - **Unavailable relief:** A later suit is not barred where the relief could not have been effectively sought in the first suit because the necessary facts had not yet occurred or the remedy was impossible to obtain at that stage. - **Recurring wrong:** In continuing or recurring wrongs, each fresh wrongful act can create a new cause of action. Thus, a claim for future or later infringement is not necessarily barred merely because an earlier suit concerned past infringement. - **Different evidence:** Where the later suit requires proof of a different set of essential facts, it is strong evidence that the cause of action is distinct. ## Landmark Supreme Court Decisions on Order II Rule 2 CPC - **Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal, AIR 1964 SC 1810; (1964) 7 SCR 831, Constitution Bench:** The plaintiff sued for possession and mesne profits, while the defendant pleaded that an earlier suit concerning mesne profits barred the later claim. The issue was whether the defendant could establish the Rule 2 bar without producing the plaint of the earlier suit. The Supreme Court held that the earlier plaint must be produced in evidence because the Court cannot speculate about the earlier cause of action merely from the reliefs claimed. The ratio is that the defendant must prove identity of causes of action, entitlement to multiple reliefs, and omission without leave. - **Sidramappa v. Rajashetty, (1970) 1 SCC 186; AIR 1970 SC 1059:** The Supreme Court clarified that the true test is whether the cause of action forming the basis of the later suit is distinct from the cause of action forming the basis of the earlier suit. Where the foundation of the later suit did not exist in the earlier suit, or the later relief could not have been claimed earlier, Rule 2 does not bar the subsequent suit. - **S. Nazeer Ahmed v. State Bank of Mysore, (2007) 11 SCC 75:** A bank had earlier instituted a money suit for loan recovery and later sought to enforce an equitable mortgage. The issue was whether the mortgage suit was barred because the bank had not claimed mortgage relief in the earlier money suit. The Supreme Court held that the defendant had failed to produce the earlier plaint and, on the facts, the causes of action were distinct though connected with the same transaction. The decision confirms that Order II Rule 2 seeks exhaustion of remedies arising from one cause of action, not compulsory joinder of every distinct cause arising from a common transaction. - **M/s Virgo Industries (Eng.) Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s Venturetech Solutions Pvt. Ltd., (2013) 1 SCC 625:** The plaintiff first filed injunction suits concerning agreements for sale and later instituted suits for specific performance. It had sought to reserve the right to seek specific performance later, but no leave had actually been granted. The Supreme Court held that the earlier plaint itself showed that the defendant’s conduct had already given a complete cause of action for specific performance. The later suits were barred because the omitted relief was available in the first suits and no leave was obtained. The Court also held that Rule 2 can apply even where the first suit remains pending; disposal of the first suit is not a condition precedent. - **Bengal Waterproof Ltd. v. Bombay Waterproof Manufacturing Co., (1997) 1 SCC 99:** The plaintiff’s earlier trademark action concerned prior infringement, while the later suit relied upon continued and recurring acts of trademark infringement and passing off. The issue was whether the second action was barred by Rule 2. The Supreme Court held that fresh recurring infringement gives rise to a fresh cause of action. The case establishes that Rule 2 does not grant a wrongdoer immunity for future continuing wrongs merely because an earlier suit was filed regarding past wrongful acts. - **Pramod Kumar v. Zalak Singh, (2019) 6 SCC 621; AIR 2019 SC 2465:** The heirs challenged one sale transaction in an earlier suit and later challenged another sale transaction arising from substantially the same assertion that the property was ancestral and that the alienations were not binding. The Supreme Court held that the later suit was barred because the essential factual foundation and available reliefs already existed when the first suit was filed. The case demonstrates that distinct documents or transactions do not necessarily create distinct causes of action where the core bundle of material facts is identical. - **Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. v. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 82; 2025 INSC 73:** The Supreme Court comprehensively restated the law on Rule 2 while examining suits connected with an agreement for sale, possession, cancellation of authority, and specific performance. It held that the rule requires inclusion of the whole claim arising from one particular cause of action, not every claim arising from the same transaction. The Court emphasised that the omitted relief must have been available when the first suit was instituted, that both plaints must be compared as a whole, and that the plea must be established on evidence rather than inference. ## Order II Rule 2 and Order VII Rule 11 CPC - **Procedural distinction:** Order VII Rule 11(d) permits rejection of a plaint where the suit appears from the plaint itself to be barred by law. Order II Rule 2, however, ordinarily requires comparison of the earlier plaint and the later plaint, examination of the cause of action, and proof of omission or relinquishment. - **Evidence requirement:** Since the Rule 2 plea generally requires evidence of the earlier pleadings, it cannot ordinarily be decided merely by reading the subsequent plaint. - **Current position:** In *S. Valliammai v. S. Ramanathan*, 2026 INSC 372, the Supreme Court held that Order II Rule 2 is not, by itself, a ground for rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d). The defendant must establish the Rule 2 bar through the relevant pleadings and evidence; the eventual consequence may be refusal of the barred relief or dismissal of the suit, but not automatic rejection of the plaint under Rule 11(d). ## Order II Rule 2 and Res Judicata: Difference - **Order II Rule 2:** This rule applies where the plaintiff omitted a portion of a claim or omitted an available relief from the same cause of action. The focus is on what should have been claimed at the time of filing the first suit. - **Res judicata under Section 11 CPC:** Res judicata applies after a competent Court has finally decided an issue directly and substantially in issue between the parties or their privies. - **Different foundations:** Rule 2 is based on omission and splitting of claims; res judicata is based on final adjudication. A first suit need not have been finally decided for Rule 2 to apply, whereas a final former adjudication is essential for res judicata. - **Possible overlap:** In appropriate facts, both doctrines may apply. A plaintiff who omits an available consequential relief may face Rule 2, and where an issue has already been finally decided, may additionally face res judicata. ## Quick Revision Formula for Applying Order II Rule 2 - **S — Same cause:** Is the later suit founded on the same essential bundle of facts? - **P — Previous plaint:** Has the defendant produced and proved the earlier plaint? - **L — Larger claim or multiple reliefs:** Was the plaintiff entitled to the omitted claim or relief when the first suit was filed? - **I — Intentional omission or relinquishment:** Was part of the accrued claim omitted, or was an available relief left out? - **T — Leave:** Was leave of Court expressly obtained for the omitted relief under Rule 2(3)? - **F — Fresh cause:** Did a later event create a fresh, distinct, recurring, or newly available cause of action? **Core principle:** A plaintiff must bring the whole accrued claim and all available reliefs arising from one cause of action in one suit. The plaintiff cannot divide that cause of action into successive proceedings merely to seek remedies in stages. However, a genuinely fresh or distinct cause of action remains independently enforceable. **Categories:** Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC), Legal Notes --- ### [Parties to Suits under Order I CPC, 1908: Necessary and Proper Parties, Joinder, Misjoinder, Representative Suits, Addition, Deletion and Substitution](https://lawfoyer.in/parties-to-suits-under-order-i-cpc-1908/) **Published:** June 28, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun28202601_09_28A-725x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning and Object of Parties to a Suit - **Basic idea:** A “party” is a person whose legal rights, liabilities, or interests are directly involved in a civil suit. The person who institutes the suit is the **plaintiff**; the person against whom relief is claimed is the **defendant**. Correctly identifying parties is vital because a court should ordinarily pass a decree only after giving every affected person an opportunity to be heard. - **Object of Order I:** Order I of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 regulates who may be joined as plaintiffs or defendants and how defects in the array of parties may be corrected. Its central purpose is to secure a complete, effective and final decision in one proceeding, while avoiding unnecessary multiplicity of suits, delay and inconsistent decrees. - **Dominus litis principle:** The plaintiff is generally the **dominus litis**, meaning the master of the suit and normally entitled to choose the persons against whom relief is sought. However, this freedom is not absolute. The court may add a necessary or proper party even against the plaintiff’s preference where that person’s presence is required for effective and complete adjudication. ## Joinder of Plaintiffs and Defendants ### Joinder of Plaintiffs under Order I Rule 1 CPC - **Two-fold test:** Several persons may join as plaintiffs in one suit where both conditions are satisfied: first, their right to relief arises out of the same act, transaction, or series of acts or transactions; secondly, separate suits would raise at least one common question of law or fact. - **Joint, several or alternative rights:** The right claimed by the plaintiffs may be joint, several, or in the alternative. For example, co-owners who claim that a common property was illegally trespassed upon may sue together because their claims arise from the same transaction and involve common questions. - **Separate trial safeguard:** Under Order I Rule 2 CPC, where joinder of plaintiffs may embarrass or delay the trial, the court may require them to elect who will proceed, order separate trials, or make another appropriate order. Thus, joinder is encouraged for convenience, but not at the cost of an unmanageable trial. ### Joinder of Defendants under Order I Rule 3 CPC - **Common transaction test:** Several persons may be joined as defendants where the right to relief is alleged to arise from the same act, transaction, or series of transactions, and separate suits would involve a common question of law or fact. - **Alternative liability:** Defendants may be joined even where the plaintiff is uncertain as to which of them is legally liable. The plaintiff need not first determine the precise liability of every defendant before filing the suit. - **Illustration:** A consignor may sue a carrier, warehouse operator and insurer together where goods were lost during transportation and it is uncertain at which stage the loss occurred. The court may determine which defendant is liable and to what extent. - **Separate trials for defendants:** Order I Rule 3A CPC empowers the court to order separate trials or make another suitable order where joinder of defendants would embarrass or delay the trial. ### Ancillary Rules on Joinder - **Judgment against fewer parties:** Under Order I Rule 4 CPC, the court may grant relief to one or more plaintiffs who prove entitlement and may pass a decree against one or more defendants according to their respective liabilities. An amendment is not required merely because all jointly named parties are not ultimately found entitled or liable. - **Different reliefs:** Under Order I Rule 5 CPC, every defendant need not be interested in every relief claimed in the suit. This permits a properly structured composite suit where different reliefs arise from the same factual foundation. - **Same contract:** Order I Rule 6 CPC permits joinder of persons jointly, severally, or jointly and severally liable under the same contract, including parties to bills of exchange, hundis and promissory notes. - **Doubt about liability:** Order I Rule 7 CPC permits joinder of two or more defendants where the plaintiff is uncertain from whom redress should be obtained. The court may decide which defendant is liable and the extent of that liability. ## Necessary Party and Proper Party ### Necessary Party - **Meaning:** A necessary party is a person without whose presence no effective decree can be passed. The decree may become ineffective, incomplete, unenforceable, or liable to cause contradictory results if that person is absent. - **Effect of absence:** Non-joinder of a necessary party is a serious defect. Order I Rule 9 CPC expressly protects suits from failure due to misjoinder or non-joinder, but its proviso excludes the non-joinder of a necessary party. Therefore, where a necessary party cannot be added, the suit may fail. - **Practical test:** Ask: “Can the court pass an effective and enforceable decree without this person?” If the answer is no, that person is necessary. ### Proper Party - **Meaning:** A proper party is one in whose absence an effective decree can technically be passed, but whose presence is necessary for a complete, final and comprehensive adjudication of the issues already involved in the suit. - **Practical test:** Ask: “Can the dispute be more completely and fairly decided if this person is before the court, without changing the basic nature of the suit?” If yes, that person may be a proper party. - **Distinction:** Every necessary party is important for effective adjudication; a proper party is important for complete adjudication. Absence of a proper party does not automatically defeat the suit, whereas absence of a necessary party may do so. ### Landmark Case: Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay - **Rule and ratio:** In *Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay*, (1992) 2 SCC 524, the plaintiff challenged a municipal demolition notice relating to structures at a service station. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., the lessee of the land, sought impleadment as a defendant. The Supreme Court held that a **necessary party** is one without whom no effective order can be made, while a **proper party** is one whose presence is required for a complete and final decision even though an effective order may be possible without that person. The Court clarified that impleadment is governed by judicial discretion under Order I Rule 10 CPC; a person cannot be added merely because he possesses relevant evidence, commercial interest, or arguments. The proposed party must have a direct legal interest in the controversy and should be bound by the result of the suit. ### Landmark Case: Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum - **Direct interest principle:** In *Razia Begum v. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum*, AIR 1958 SC 886; \[1959\] SCR 1111, a dispute concerning marital status and legitimacy led persons whose rights in the estate could be affected to seek impleadment. The Supreme Court explained that, in property disputes, a person ordinarily requires a direct legal interest in the subject matter, not merely a commercial or sentimental interest. In declaratory suits regarding status or legal character, the court may adopt a wider approach because such a declaration can affect persons claiming through the parties in the future. ### Landmark Case: Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Pvt. Ltd. - **Judicial discretion principle:** In *Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Pvt. Ltd.*, (2010) 7 SCC 417, a party sought impleadment in a suit for specific performance involving airport premises and the Airport Authority of India. The Supreme Court held that Order I Rule 10(2) does not confer an unrestricted right upon strangers to enter litigation. It grants the court judicial discretion to add or strike out parties according to reason, fairness and the requirements of effective adjudication. A person with only a possible future interest, or one whose addition would unnecessarily alter the nature of the suit, need not be impleaded. ## Misjoinder and Non-Joinder of Parties ### Misjoinder of Parties - **Meaning:** Misjoinder occurs where persons are improperly joined as plaintiffs or defendants despite not satisfying the statutory requirements for joinder. - **Effect:** Misjoinder is generally a curable procedural defect. The court may strike out an improperly joined party, direct election between plaintiffs, order separate trials, or separate causes of action. It does not ordinarily make the suit itself non-maintainable. ### Non-Joinder of Parties - **Meaning:** Non-joinder means omission to include a person who should have been made a party. - **Ordinary non-joinder:** Where the omitted person is not necessary, the court may proceed with the rights and interests of the parties before it. - **Necessary-party exception:** Where the omitted person is necessary, the defect is fundamental. The court should ordinarily require impleadment under Order I Rule 10 CPC; if the necessary party cannot be added, the suit may be dismissed. ### Objection and Waiver under Order I Rule 13 CPC - **Earliest opportunity:** Objections based on misjoinder or non-joinder must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity and, where issues are settled, at or before settlement of issues. - **Waiver:** An objection not raised in time is deemed waived unless the ground arose later. This rule prevents parties from remaining silent during trial and raising technical objections only after an adverse outcome. ### Landmark Case: Prem Lala Nahata v. Chandi Prasad Sikaria - **Misjoinder is procedural:** In *Prem Lala Nahata v. Chandi Prasad Sikaria*, (2007) 2 SCC 551, a mother and daughter jointly sued a defendant for separate amounts allegedly due to them. The defendant sought rejection of the plaint on the ground of misjoinder of parties and causes of action. The Supreme Court held that a suit defective for misjoinder is not “barred by law” for the purpose of Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. The court remains competent to try the suit and may require election, direct separation of claims, or otherwise cure the defect. ## Representative Suits under Order I Rule 8 CPC ### Nature of a Representative Suit - **Collective litigation:** A representative suit is filed or defended by one or more persons on behalf of numerous persons having the same interest in the suit. - **Purpose:** It avoids the need for every affected person to be individually joined. It is especially useful in disputes involving residents of a locality, members of an association, beneficiaries of a common fund, worshippers, consumers, or persons having a common right in property. - **Same interest, not identical cause of action:** The persons represented must have the same interest in the litigation. The Explanation to Order I Rule 8 clarifies that they need not all possess an identical cause of action. The real requirement is a common interest in the relief or issue involved. ### Essential Requirements - **Numerosity:** There must be numerous persons. The rule is designed for a class or group, not merely a few individuals seeking their separate personal claims. - **Common interest:** The persons represented must share the same legal interest in the subject matter and the relief sought. - **Permission or direction:** One or more persons may sue, be sued or defend on behalf of the group with the permission of the court, or pursuant to a direction of the court. - **Mandatory notice:** After permission or direction is granted, the court must issue notice of institution of the suit to all interested persons, either through personal service where practicable or by public advertisement where personal service is impracticable. - **Right to join:** Any person represented may apply under Order I Rule 8(3) to be made a party to the suit. - **Binding decree:** A decree passed in a valid representative suit binds all persons on whose behalf or for whose benefit the suit is instituted or defended. - **Due diligence safeguard:** If the representative plaintiff or defendant does not prosecute the matter diligently, the court may substitute another person having the same interest. - **Withdrawal and compromise:** A representative claim cannot be abandoned, withdrawn or compromised without court permission and notice to the persons represented. This safeguard prevents representatives from prejudicing the rights of the larger group. ### Landmark Case: Aliyathammuda Beethathebiyyappura Pookoya v. Pattakal Cheriyakoya - **Protection of represented persons:** In *Aliyathammuda Beethathebiyyappura Pookoya v. Pattakal Cheriyakoya*, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 953, the dispute concerned the customary right to the office of mutawalli of a mosque. The Supreme Court explained that Order I Rule 8 enables adjudication of matters affecting a large group without requiring every interested person to be individually impleaded. It further emphasised that a compromise in a representative suit requires leave of the court under Order XXIII Rule 3B, after appropriate notice to interested persons, because a compromise decree may bind persons who are not individually named in the litigation. ## Addition, Deletion and Striking Out of Parties under Order I Rule 10 CPC ### Wrong Plaintiff and Substitution under Rule 10(1) - **Bona fide mistake:** Where a suit has been instituted in the name of the wrong plaintiff, or where there is doubt regarding the correct plaintiff, the court may substitute or add the correct plaintiff at any stage. - **Conditions:** The court must be satisfied that the mistake was made bona fide and that substitution or addition is necessary to determine the real matter in controversy. - **Consent requirement:** No person can be added as a plaintiff without consent. This protects a person from being forced to litigate as a claimant. ### Addition and Striking Out under Rule 10(2) - **Wide power:** The court may, at any stage of proceedings, either upon application or suo motu, strike out the name of a person improperly joined as plaintiff or defendant. - **Addition of parties:** The court may add a person who ought to have been joined, or whose presence is necessary to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit. - **Terms:** The court may impose just terms, including costs, amendment of pleadings or conditions intended to avoid prejudice. - **Amended plaint and service:** When a new defendant is added, the plaint should ordinarily be amended and fresh copies of the plaint and summons must be served on the new defendant so that the person receives a fair opportunity to contest. - **Limitation caution:** Addition of a defendant may raise limitation issues. The court must consider the applicable limitation law, particularly where the claim against the newly added defendant is already time-barred. ## Substitution of Parties under Order XXII CPC ### Death of a Party and Survival of Right to Sue - **Survival test:** Under Order XXII Rule 1 CPC, death does not cause abatement if the right to sue survives. The first question is therefore not whether a party has died, but whether the cause of action is personal or survives to or against the estate. - **Legal representative:** Section 2(11) CPC defines “legal representative” as a person who represents the estate of a deceased person. It includes an intermeddler with the estate and, where a person sued or sued in a representative character dies, the person upon whom the estate devolves. It is broader than the expression “legal heir.” ### Death of Plaintiff or Defendant - **Surviving co-parties:** Under Order XXII Rule 2 CPC, where the right to sue survives exclusively to surviving plaintiffs or against surviving defendants, the court records that fact and the suit continues without substitution. - **Death of plaintiff:** Under Order XXII Rule 3 CPC, where a sole plaintiff dies, or one among several plaintiffs dies and the right does not survive solely to the survivors, the legal representative must be brought on record. - **Death of defendant:** Under Order XXII Rule 4 CPC, where a sole defendant dies, or one among several defendants dies and the right does not survive against the remaining defendants alone, the legal representative must be substituted. - **Defence of legal representative:** A legal representative brought on record may take every defence appropriate to the character of a representative of the deceased person. ### Abatement and Limitation - **Ninety-day period:** An application for substitution is ordinarily required within 90 days from the date of death under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1963. - **Automatic abatement:** If substitution is not sought within the prescribed period, the suit or appeal abates as against the deceased party. - **Setting aside abatement:** Article 121 allows 60 days to apply for setting aside the abatement. If that period also expires, an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act must accompany the application for setting aside abatement. - **Correct sequence:** The proper sequence is: substitution application within 90 days; if delayed, application to set aside abatement within the following 60 days; and if delayed beyond that period, applications for substitution and setting aside abatement along with delay condonation. ### Landmark Case: Om Prakash Gupta alias Lalloowa v. Satish Chandra - **Procedure after delay:** In *Om Prakash Gupta alias Lalloowa v. Satish Chandra*, 2025 INSC 183, the Supreme Court considered substitution proceedings in long-pending specific-performance litigation. It clarified that failure to file substitution within 90 days causes automatic abatement. A party cannot merely seek condonation of delay in filing substitution after abatement; the party must seek setting aside of abatement under Order XXII Rule 9 and, where necessary, seek condonation of delay in filing that application. The judgment stresses procedural sequencing while preserving the court’s power to restore proceedings on proof of sufficient cause. ### Special Provisions under Order XXII - **Exemption from substitution:** Under Order XXII Rule 4(4), the court may exempt the plaintiff from substituting legal representatives of a defendant who did not file a written statement or who, after filing it, failed to appear and contest the suit. A judgment in such circumstances has the same effect as if pronounced before the defendant’s death. - **Ignorance of death:** Under Rule 4(5), if the plaintiff genuinely did not know about the defendant’s death and consequently failed to seek substitution in time, the court must give due regard to that ignorance while considering delay condonation. - **No legal representative:** Under Rule 4A, where a deceased party has no legal representative, the court may proceed without a representative or appoint the Administrator-General, an officer of the court, or another suitable person to represent the deceased estate. - **Question of legal representation:** Under Rule 5, the court decides disputes regarding whether a person is or is not the legal representative of the deceased party. - **Death after hearing:** Under Rule 6, if a party dies after conclusion of hearing but before judgment, there is no abatement. Judgment may be pronounced as though death had not occurred. - **Marriage and insolvency:** Marriage of a female party does not abate the suit under Rule 7. Insolvency of a plaintiff does not automatically abate a suit that the assignee or receiver may continue for creditors’ benefit under Rule 8. - **Assignment or devolution:** Under Rule 10, where an interest is assigned, created or devolves during pendency of a suit, the court may permit the suit to continue by or against the person upon whom the interest has devolved. ### Landmark Case: State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram - **Joint and indivisible decree:** In *State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram*, AIR 1962 SC 89, compensation had been awarded jointly to two brothers in land-acquisition proceedings. During the State’s appeal, one brother died and his legal representatives were not brought on record within time. The Supreme Court held that where the decree is joint and indivisible, proceedings against surviving parties may become incapable of continuation because the appellate court cannot modify the decree concerning surviving parties without affecting the final decree in favour of the deceased party. The key consideration is whether continuation would produce contradictory or ineffective decrees. ## Quick Revision Matrix IssueMain CPC ProvisionCore RuleJoinder of plaintiffsOrder I Rule 1Same transaction + common questionJoinder of defendantsOrder I Rule 3Same transaction + common questionSeparate trialsOrder I Rules 2 and 3ACourt may prevent embarrassment or delayNecessary partyOrder I Rules 9 and 10No effective decree possible without that personProper partyOrder I Rule 10Presence helps complete adjudicationMisjoinderOrder I Rules 9 and 13Curable defect; objection must be timelyRepresentative suitOrder I Rule 8Numerous persons with same interestAddition/deletionOrder I Rule 10Court may add, strike out or substitute partiesDeath of partyOrder XXII Rules 1–4Substitute legal representatives if right survivesAbatementOrder XXII Rule 9Restore only on sufficient causeAssignment during suitOrder XXII Rule 10Continuation by or against transferee with leave **Categories:** Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC), Legal Notes --- ### [Transfer of Suits under Sections 22 to 25 CPC, 1908: Transfer, Withdrawal and Supreme Court Powers](https://lawfoyer.in/transfer-of-suits-under-sections-22-to-25-cpc-1908/) **Published:** June 28, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun28202612_57_03A-725x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning and Purpose of Transfer of Suits • **Transfer of suit:** Transfer means shifting a pending suit, appeal, execution proceeding, or other civil proceeding from one competent court to another competent court for fair, convenient, and effective adjudication. • **Underlying objective:** Sections 22 to 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 regulate transfer so that jurisdiction is not used oppressively, parties receive a fair opportunity of hearing, witnesses and evidence can be conveniently produced, connected disputes are not decided inconsistently, and justice is not defeated merely because litigation is filed at an inconvenient place. • **Statutory scheme:** Sections 22 to 25 form the principal statutory framework on civil transfer. Section 22 concerns a defendant’s request where more than one court has jurisdiction; Section 23 identifies the forum for such request; Section 24 gives the High Court and District Court broad powers of transfer and withdrawal; and Section 25 gives the Supreme Court power to transfer matters across States. • **Key distinction:** A transfer petition does not ordinarily decide whether the original court actually has territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction. A party may raise a proper jurisdictional objection before the court where the suit is pending. Transfer jurisdiction instead considers whether the matter should continue in one competent forum or be moved to another forum in the interests of justice. ## Quick Jurisdiction Map for Transfer of Suits SituationRelevant provisionAppropriate forumSuit could have been instituted in two or more competent courts; defendant wants transferSection 22 read with Section 23Appellate Court or High Court specified by Section 23Transfer or withdrawal between courts subordinate to the same District Court or High CourtSection 24 CPCDistrict Court or High Court, as applicableTransfer between courts subordinate to different High CourtsSection 25 CPCSupreme CourtInter-State transfer where both courts are subordinate to a common High Court under Article 231Section 24 CPCCommon High CourtTransfer from one State to another where each State has its own High CourtSection 25 CPCSupreme Court• **Memory aid — “22 Defendant, 23 Forum, 24 High Court/District Court, 25 Supreme Court”:** This sequence helps identify both the person who may apply and the authority competent to decide the request. ## Section 22 CPC: Transfer by Defendant’s Application • **Scope:** Section 22 applies where a suit may lawfully be instituted in any one of two or more courts and the plaintiff chooses one of those courts. The section permits a defendant to request that the suit be transferred to another court which also has jurisdiction. Thus, Section 22 does not apply where the proposed transferee court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter, pecuniary value, territorial cause of action, or parties. • **Applicant:** Only a **defendant** may invoke Section 22. A plaintiff cannot invoke Section 22 to shift a suit filed by himself or herself. The Supreme Court has clarified that Sections 22 and 23 operate in the limited setting contemplated by Section 22 and may be invoked by a defendant alone. • **Notice requirement:** The defendant must give notice to the other parties before applying. This protects the plaintiff and other defendants from an ex parte change of forum. • **Time requirement:** The application must be made at the **earliest possible opportunity**. Where issues have been settled, the application must be made at or before settlement of issues. Delay is important because a defendant who participates substantially in the litigation may be treated as having accepted the chosen forum. • **Nature of inquiry:** The court considers objections of the other parties and determines which among the several competent courts should proceed with the suit. The enquiry is not whether the chosen court is legally incompetent; rather, it is which competent court is the most appropriate forum. • **Forum conveniens:** Section 22 embodies the idea of **forum conveniens**, meaning the most suitable and convenient forum. Relevant circumstances may include the location of parties, witnesses, documents, cause of action, property, connected litigation, and practical cost of conducting the trial. • **Illustration:** A contracts suit may be filed either where the contract was executed or where it was to be performed. If the plaintiff files the suit at one competent place but all witnesses, documents, and business records are at the other competent place, a defendant may seek transfer under Section 22 at the earliest stage. • **Section 22 is not a right to select a preferred court:** The defendant cannot demand transfer merely because another court is personally more convenient. The request must disclose a genuine reason showing that the alternate competent court is more appropriate for justice. ## Section 23 CPC: Court in Which the Transfer Application Lies • **Function:** Section 23 does not independently create substantive transfer power. It merely identifies the proper forum to receive an application under Section 22. The substantive power and procedural framework must therefore be understood with Sections 22, 24, and 25. • **Same Appellate Court:** Where all competent courts are subordinate to the same Appellate Court, the Section 22 application lies before that Appellate Court. • **Different Appellate Courts, same High Court:** Where the competent courts are subordinate to different Appellate Courts but fall under the same High Court, the application lies before that High Court. • **Different High Courts — statutory text:** Section 23(3) states that where the courts are subordinate to different High Courts, the application shall be made to the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the court where the suit was instituted is situated. • **Current legal position on Section 23(3):** Despite its retained statutory wording, Section 23(3) cannot be treated as authorising one High Court to transfer a matter to a court subordinate to another High Court in the ordinary inter-State situation. For States having separate High Courts, such transfer falls within Section 25 and can be ordered by the Supreme Court. This is because a High Court ordinarily cannot exercise authority beyond its territorial jurisdiction. • **Common High Court exception:** Where two or more States share a common High Court under Article 231 of the Constitution and both transferor and transferee courts are subordinate to that common High Court, the High Court may exercise Section 24 power even though the transfer is from one State to another. ## Section 24 CPC: General Power of Transfer and Withdrawal • **Broad power:** Section 24 gives the High Court and District Court a broad discretionary power to transfer or withdraw a suit, appeal, or other proceeding at any stage. • **Application or suo motu action:** The High Court or District Court may act on an application by any party after notice and hearing. It may also act **suo motu**, that is, on its own motion, without issuing such notice. This makes Section 24 much wider than Section 22. • **Who may apply:** Unlike Section 22, an application under Section 24 may be moved by **any party**, including a plaintiff, defendant, appellant, respondent, decree-holder, or judgment-debtor, depending on the nature of the proceeding. • **Transfer power under Section 24(1)(a):** A High Court or District Court may transfer a suit, appeal, or other proceeding pending before it to a court subordinate to it and competent to try or dispose of the matter. • **Withdrawal power under Section 24(1)(b):** The High Court or District Court may withdraw a suit, appeal, or proceeding pending before a court subordinate to it. After withdrawal, it may: - **Try or dispose of the matter itself;** - **Transfer it to another subordinate competent court; or** - **Re-transfer it to the original court.** • **Competent transferee court:** The court receiving the matter must ordinarily be competent to try or dispose of it. Transfer cannot confer substantive jurisdiction upon a court that lacks the legal competence to decide the dispute. • **Proceeding includes execution:** Section 24 expressly states that “proceeding” includes a proceeding for execution of a decree or order. Therefore, an execution case may also be transferred or withdrawn under Section 24. • **Additional and Assistant Judges:** Courts of Additional Judges and Assistant Judges are deemed subordinate to the District Court for purposes of Section 24. • **Small Cause Court:** When a suit is transferred or withdrawn from a Court of Small Causes, the transferee court is deemed to be a Court of Small Causes for that suit. This preserves the special procedural character of the matter. • **Transfer from an incompetent court:** Section 24(5), inserted by the 1976 Amendment, permits transfer of a suit or proceeding even from a court that has no jurisdiction to try it. This provision prevents procedural waste where the matter is pending before an incompetent court but can appropriately be transferred to a competent court. The transferee court must nevertheless possess jurisdiction to try the matter. • **Stage after transfer:** Under Section 24(2), the transferee court may, subject to special directions in the transfer order, either retry the matter or continue from the stage at which it was transferred or withdrawn. • **No fixed limitation period:** Section 24 may be invoked “at any stage.” However, delay, participation in proceedings, tactical conduct, or an attempt to derail the trial may persuade the court to reject the request. ## Withdrawal under Section 24 CPC • **Meaning of withdrawal:** Withdrawal is not abandonment of the suit. It means taking the pending matter away from a subordinate court and bringing it before the High Court or District Court. • **Purpose of withdrawal:** Withdrawal may be appropriate where common legal questions arise in multiple proceedings, where complex issues require direct adjudication by the High Court, where connected cases require coordinated disposal, or where transfer to another subordinate court is necessary after withdrawal. • **Re-transfer power:** A withdrawn case need not remain permanently with the withdrawing court. The High Court or District Court can re-transfer it to the original court or send it to another competent subordinate court. • **Effect on evidence:** A transfer order should ideally state whether the receiving court must begin afresh or proceed on the existing record. In the absence of a special direction, Section 24(2) allows the transferee court to choose between retrial and continuation from the existing stage. ## Section 25 CPC: Supreme Court’s Power to Transfer Suits, Appeals and Proceedings • **Inter-State transfer power:** Section 25 empowers the Supreme Court to transfer any suit, appeal, or other proceeding from a High Court or civil court in one State to a High Court or civil court in another State when such transfer is expedient for the ends of justice. • **Who may apply:** Any party may apply under Section 25. This includes the plaintiff as well as the defendant. • **Procedure:** The application must be made by a **motion supported by an affidavit**. The Supreme Court must issue notice and hear parties who desire to be heard before passing a transfer order. • **Stage:** The Supreme Court may act at any stage of the matter. Transfer may therefore be sought before trial, during trial, at the appellate stage, or in an appropriate execution-related proceeding. • **Ends of justice test:** The controlling statutory expression is whether transfer is “expedient for the ends of justice.” It is deliberately broad and cannot be reduced to a rigid formula. • **Law applicable after transfer:** Section 25(5) provides that the applicable law remains the law which the court where the matter was originally instituted ought to have applied. A change of venue should not change the substantive law governing the dispute. • **Frivolous petitions:** If the Supreme Court dismisses a transfer application as frivolous or vexatious, it may award compensation to the opposing party. The statutory ceiling remains ₹2,000 under Section 25(4). • **Historical development:** The present Section 25 was substituted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 with effect from 1 February 1977. The earlier provision vested limited transfer power in the State Government. The amendment transferred this judicial function to the Supreme Court and substantially expanded the scope of inter-State transfer. ## Grounds for Transfer of Suits • **Fair trial:** A genuine and reasonable apprehension that a party will not receive a fair trial is a strong ground. Mere suspicion, personal dislike, or unsupported allegations against a court, advocate, or opposite party are insufficient. • **Balance of convenience:** The court considers inconvenience to parties, witnesses, and persons holding documentary evidence. Distance, financial hardship, illness, disability, lack of support, and the practical difficulty of producing evidence may be relevant. • **Location of evidence:** Transfer may be justified where the bulk of oral evidence, public records, business records, property records, or material witnesses are located at the proposed transferee place. • **Connected proceedings:** Transfer may be warranted where two matters involve substantially identical parties, facts, documents, or legal issues and separate trials may lead to inconsistent findings. • **Avoiding multiplicity:** Consolidated or coordinated disposal may save evidence, reduce costs, prevent contradictory decrees, and secure a more complete adjudication. • **Public interest:** A matter involving broad public concern, sensitive local circumstances, or an important question affecting numerous persons may call for transfer where justice so requires. • **Matrimonial hardship:** In matrimonial proceedings, the convenience, financial position, safety, caregiving responsibilities, and practical hardship of the wife are important factors. This is not an automatic rule that every petition must be transferred to the wife’s place; the court still assesses the overall interests of justice. • **Bad faith or forum shopping:** A transfer petition may be rejected where it is filed only to delay the case, avoid an inconvenient order, harass the other side, choose a perceived favourable court, or reopen issues already substantially progressed. ## Landmark Supreme Court Decisions • **Guda Vijayalakshmi v. Guda Ramchandra Sekhara Sastry, (1981) 2 SCC 646:** The wife had instituted maintenance proceedings in Andhra Pradesh, while the husband later instituted divorce proceedings in Rajasthan. She sought transfer of the matrimonial matter to Andhra Pradesh. The issue was whether Sections 21 and 21A of the Hindu Marriage Act curtailed the Supreme Court’s power under Section 25 CPC. The Supreme Court held that a matrimonial proceeding is covered by the expression “suit, appeal or other proceeding” under Section 25 and that the Hindu Marriage Act did not exclude or limit the Supreme Court’s transfer power. The decision establishes that special matrimonial procedure does not, by itself, take away the Supreme Court’s broad Section 25 jurisdiction where transfer is required for justice. • **Dr. Subramaniam Swamy v. Ramakrishna Hegde, (1990) 1 SCC 4:** A defamation suit was filed in the Bombay High Court, while most alleged transactions, documents, and witnesses were in Karnataka. The defendant sought transfer to Bangalore. The issue was whether the plaintiff’s choice of forum as dominus litis should prevail over the defendant’s request. The Supreme Court transferred the matter, holding that the paramount test under Section 25 is the ends of justice. The plaintiff’s forum choice is relevant, but it cannot override the need for a fair and practically workable trial. The Court emphasised that mere personal convenience is not enough; the applicant must show that the chosen forum would prejudice fair adjudication or materially impair the ability to defend the case. • **Kulwinder Kaur v. Kandi Friends Education Trust, (2008) 3 SCC 659:** A dispute concerning the management of an educational trust was pending at Ropar. The High Court transferred the suit to Chandigarh without recording adequate reasons. The Supreme Court set aside the transfer order and remanded the matter. It held that Section 24 confers comprehensive transfer power, exercisable at any stage and even suo motu, but the discretion must be used carefully, cautiously, and with recorded reasons. The Court identified relevant considerations such as convenience of parties and witnesses, location of evidence, reasonable apprehension of lack of justice, public interest, and the overall interests of justice. A transfer order cannot rest on a bare assertion or judicial ipse dixit. • **Durgesh Sharma v. Jayshree, (2008) 9 SCC 648:** The husband instituted divorce proceedings in Madhya Pradesh, while related matrimonial litigation was pending in Maharashtra. The Madhya Pradesh High Court ordered inter-State transfer under Section 23(3). The issue was whether one High Court could transfer a matter from a court subordinate to it to a court subordinate to another High Court. The Supreme Court held that Sections 22 to 25 are exhaustive on transfer; Section 23 merely identifies the forum for a Section 22 application and does not itself confer substantive transfer power. Where courts are subordinate to different High Courts, transfer ordinarily lies only before the Supreme Court under Section 25. The Court also held that Section 151 CPC cannot be used to bypass the express statutory scheme. • **Shah Newaz Khan v. State of Nagaland, 2023 INSC 176; (2023) 3 SCR 985:** The plaintiffs sought transfer of a civil suit from Dimapur, Nagaland to Guwahati, Assam. Both courts were subordinate to the Gauhati High Court, which was a common High Court under Article 231 of the Constitution. The issue was whether Section 25 made the Supreme Court the exclusive authority for every inter-State civil transfer. The Supreme Court held that Section 24 may be exercised by a common High Court for an inter-State transfer where both courts are subordinate to that High Court. Section 25 governs the usual inter-State situation where the two States have separate High Courts under Article 214. This judgment creates an important constitutional exception to the ordinary rule explained in *Durgesh Sharma*. • **Sumita Singh v. Kumar Sanjay, (2001) 10 SCC 41:** The wife sought transfer of matrimonial proceedings from Ara, Bihar to Delhi, stating that she was working in Delhi, would have to travel approximately 1,100 kilometres, and had no practical accommodation at Ara. The Supreme Court allowed transfer and treated the wife’s practical convenience as a significant consideration in matrimonial litigation. The ratio is not that the wife automatically succeeds in every transfer petition; rather, genuine hardship, distance, financial ability, safety, support systems, and the realities of litigation must receive serious weight. ## Important Comparative Distinctions • **Section 22 versus Section 24:** Section 22 is restricted to a defendant and applies where multiple courts already have jurisdiction. Section 24 is broader, may be invoked by any party, applies at any stage, and also permits suo motu transfer or withdrawal. • **Section 23 versus Section 24:** Section 23 identifies the forum for a Section 22 request. Section 24 grants substantive transfer and withdrawal power to the High Court and District Court. • **Section 24 versus Section 25:** Section 24 operates within the judicial hierarchy of the same High Court or District Court. Section 25 is the Supreme Court’s inter-State transfer power, subject to the exception of a common High Court exercising Section 24 over courts subordinate to it. • **Transfer versus withdrawal:** Transfer shifts a proceeding directly to another court. Withdrawal first brings the proceeding before the High Court or District Court, which may then retain, transfer, or re-transfer it. • **Jurisdiction objection versus transfer request:** A jurisdiction objection challenges the competence of the court. A transfer application generally accepts that the court may be competent but seeks a more suitable forum for justice. ## Conclusion • **Central principle:** The ultimate test under Sections 22 to 25 CPC is not the personal preference of a litigant but the proper administration of justice. • **Practical rule:** A party seeking transfer should clearly show the existing court, proposed transferee court, jurisdiction of the transferee court, stage of proceedings, connected matters, material witnesses, documentary evidence, hardship, and specific facts demonstrating why transfer would serve justice. • **Judicial discipline:** Transfer is a discretionary remedy. Courts must avoid both extremes: refusing a necessary transfer that would impair a fair trial, and allowing transfer merely because one party wants a more convenient or strategically advantageous forum. **Categories:** Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC), Legal Notes --- ### [Place of Suing Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Sections 15–21A, Jurisdiction and Objections](https://lawfoyer.in/place-of-suing-under-the-code-of-civil-procedure-1908/) **Published:** June 28, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun28202612_48_27A-725x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning and Purpose of Place of Suing • **Core idea —** “Place of suing” means the legally proper court in which a civil suit must be instituted. Sections 15 to 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) allocate suits among courts according to three principal jurisdictional requirements: **subject-matter jurisdiction**, **pecuniary jurisdiction**, and **territorial jurisdiction**. Sections 21 and 21A then regulate when an objection to a wrongly chosen court may be raised and when a later suit challenging a decree is barred. • **Jurisdictional triad —** A court must ordinarily satisfy all three requirements. First, it must be competent to adjudicate the **nature of the dispute**; secondly, it must be competent considering the **monetary valuation** of the suit; and thirdly, it must be the proper court considering the **location of property, defendant, wrong, or cause of action**. Type of jurisdictionMain questionPrimary legal sourceEffect of defect**Subject-matter jurisdiction**Is this court legally empowered to decide this kind of dispute?Section 9 CPC and special statutesUsually fundamental; cannot be created by consent or waiver**Pecuniary jurisdiction**Is the value of the suit within this court’s monetary limit?Sections 6 and 15 CPC; local civil-courts lawsObjection must satisfy Section 21(2)**Territorial jurisdiction**Is this the correct geographical forum?Sections 16–20 CPCObjection must satisfy Section 21(1)• **Forum sequence —** A litigant should identify the forum in this order: **nature of suit → monetary value → territorial connection**. For example, a suit for possession of land must first be filed before a court competent to entertain property litigation, then before a court having pecuniary competence, and finally in the territorial jurisdiction where the land is situated. • **No jurisdiction by agreement —** Parties may select one among two or more courts which already have jurisdiction, but they cannot, merely through contract, confer jurisdiction on a court that otherwise lacks it. This principle is especially important in contracts containing clauses such as “only Delhi courts shall have jurisdiction” or “subject to Mumbai jurisdiction.” ## Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Under the CPC • **Nature-based competence —** Subject-matter jurisdiction concerns the legal authority of a court to decide the particular category of dispute. Section 9 CPC gives civil courts jurisdiction to try suits of a civil nature unless their jurisdiction is expressly or impliedly barred. However, a special statute may confer exclusive authority upon a tribunal, revenue authority, rent controller, family court, commercial court, or another designated forum. • **Inherent defect —** A defect of subject-matter jurisdiction is fundamentally different from a mere error regarding territorial limits or monetary valuation. A court that lacks inherent competence over the subject matter cannot acquire it through consent, acquiescence, waiver, silence, or an agreement between the parties. • **Nullity principle —** In *Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan*, AIR 1954 SC 340; (1955) 1 SCR 117, the Supreme Court considered the effect of a jurisdictional defect arising from incorrect valuation. The Court explained the general principle that a decree passed by a court lacking jurisdiction is a nullity and may be challenged even at the stage of execution or collateral proceedings. At the same time, it carefully distinguished ordinary pecuniary or valuation defects from absence of inherent jurisdiction: a decree is not set aside merely because a valuation error changed the appellate forum; prejudice or a consequent failure of justice must be established. • **Landmark distinction —** In *Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd.*, AIR 2005 SC 4446; (2005) 7 SCC 791, the Supreme Court classified jurisdiction into territorial, pecuniary, and subject-matter jurisdiction. The dispute concerned a purchaser seeking specific performance, possession, and injunction regarding property situated in Gurgaon, Haryana, while proceedings were instituted in Delhi. The Court held that territorial and pecuniary objections are subject to Section 21 CPC, but absence of subject-matter jurisdiction is an inherent defect which cannot be cured by consent or waiver. ## Pecuniary Jurisdiction and Section 15 CPC • **Statutory rule —** Section 15 CPC provides that every suit shall be instituted in the court of the lowest grade competent to try it. The provision seeks proper distribution of civil work and prevents higher courts from being burdened with matters that can be tried by lower courts. • **Meaning of “competent” —** The lowest-grade court must still be competent regarding both the **nature of the dispute** and the **value of the claim**. Section 15 does not independently create pecuniary jurisdiction; the monetary limits of civil courts are generally determined by State legislation, civil-courts statutes, notifications, and applicable High Court rules. • **Section 6 CPC —** Section 6 CPC states that, unless expressly provided otherwise, nothing in the CPC gives a court jurisdiction over suits whose value exceeds the ordinary pecuniary limits of that court. Thus, a court cannot entertain a suit merely because Section 15 directs filing in the lowest competent court; the court must actually possess the prescribed monetary competence. • **Valuation —** Pecuniary jurisdiction generally depends upon the valuation stated in the plaint, subject to the court’s power to examine whether that valuation is arbitrary, artificial, or contrary to statutory valuation rules. The valuation for court-fee purposes and the valuation for jurisdiction may sometimes be governed by different statutory rules. • **Effect of wrong valuation —** A mere error in valuation does not automatically invalidate a decree. Under Section 21(2), an appellate or revisional court will entertain an objection to pecuniary jurisdiction only where the objection was raised at the earliest opportunity, ordinarily before settlement of issues, and where the error has caused a consequent failure of justice. • **Kiran Singh rule —** In *Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan*, AIR 1954 SC 340; (1955) 1 SCR 117, the dispute involved incorrect valuation that affected the appellate forum. The Supreme Court held that a change in the appellate forum, by itself, does not establish prejudice. The party challenging the decree must show that the overvaluation or undervaluation directly and prejudicially affected the merits of the case. This decision remains the leading authority on the requirement of real prejudice in valuation-related jurisdictional objections. • **Practical consequence —** Where a plaint is presented before a court lacking pecuniary competence, the normal procedural course is return of the plaint for presentation before the proper court under Order VII Rule 10 CPC, rather than adjudication of the dispute on merits by an incompetent forum. ## Territorial Jurisdiction for Immovable Property: Section 16 CPC • **Situs principle —** Section 16 embodies the principle that suits concerning rights in immovable property should ordinarily be instituted in the court within whose territorial jurisdiction the property is situated. The court where the property lies is ordinarily best placed to pass an effective decree concerning title, possession, partition, mortgage, or other proprietary rights. • **Recovery of property —** Section 16(a) applies to suits for recovery of immovable property, with or without rent or profits. A suit for possession of land, house, flat, agricultural holding, or other immovable property must ordinarily be filed where that property is situated. • **Partition —** Section 16(b) covers suits for partition of immovable property. Therefore, a co-owner seeking division, separate possession, or allotment of a share in property must ordinarily sue in the court where the property is located. • **Mortgage disputes —** Section 16(c) applies to suits for foreclosure, sale, or redemption in cases involving a mortgage of, or charge upon, immovable property. Since the dispute directly concerns proprietary rights over land or buildings, the situs court has jurisdiction. • **Rights or interests in property —** Section 16(d) covers suits for determination of any other right to, or interest in, immovable property. This provision is broad and includes suits involving specific performance coupled with possession, declaration of title, easementary rights, injunctions related to land, and similar proprietary claims. • **Wrong to immovable property —** Section 16(e) applies to suits for compensation for wrong to immovable property. For example, a claim for compensation arising from unlawful demolition, unauthorised excavation, damage to a building, destruction of crops, or injury to land is governed by Section 16(e), not Section 19. • **Movables under attachment —** Section 16(f) applies to suits for recovery of movable property actually under distraint or attachment. Its scope is limited to movable property that is under the stated legal restraint. • **Property in India —** The Explanation to Section 16 clarifies that “property” in this section means property situated in India. ### Proviso to Section 16: Personal Obedience Exception • **Exceptional relief —** The proviso to Section 16 permits filing either where the property is situated or where the defendant resides, carries on business, or personally works for gain, but only when two conditions are fulfilled: the property is held by or on behalf of the defendant, and the entire relief sought can be obtained through the defendant’s personal obedience. • **Restricted operation —** This exception is narrow. It is based on the equitable idea that certain reliefs can effectively be enforced against a person rather than directly against the property. It does not permit parties to ignore the situs of immovable property where an effective decree requires control over the property itself. • **Harshad Chiman Lal Modi case —** In *Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd.*, AIR 2005 SC 4446; (2005) 7 SCC 791, the plaintiff sought specific performance, possession, and permanent injunction concerning a plot in Gurgaon. The Supreme Court held that the suit fell within Section 16(d) because it concerned determination of rights in immovable property. Since possession was also sought, the relief could not be obtained entirely through the defendant’s personal obedience; therefore, the proviso did not apply and the Delhi court lacked territorial jurisdiction. ## Property Situated in More Than One Jurisdiction: Sections 17 and 18 CPC • **Section 17 — multiple locations —** Where immovable property is situated within the territorial jurisdiction of different courts, the suit may be instituted in any court within whose local limits any part of the property is situated. However, the chosen court must be competent to entertain the entire claim with reference to the value of the subject matter. • **Illustration —** Suppose a partition suit concerns agricultural land partly situated in District A and partly in District B. The plaintiff may file in the competent court of either district, provided that court has pecuniary competence to try the complete suit. • **Section 18 — uncertain boundaries —** Section 18 applies where it is uncertain within the local limits of which of two or more courts the immovable property is situated. A court may entertain the suit after recording a statement that there is genuine ground for such uncertainty. The resulting decree has the same effect as though the property were actually situated within that court’s territorial limits. • **Appellate limitation —** Where no such statement was recorded, an appellate or revisional court will not ordinarily entertain the objection unless there was no reasonable ground for uncertainty when the suit was instituted and the wrong forum caused a consequent failure of justice. • **Memory aid —** **Section 16 = one property location; Section 17 = property in several locations; Section 18 = uncertain location.** ## Compensation for Wrongs to Person or Movable Property: Section 19 CPC • **Special plaintiff option —** Section 19 applies to suits for compensation for wrongs done to a person or to movable property. Where the wrong occurs in one territorial jurisdiction and the defendant resides, carries on business, or personally works for gain in another, the plaintiff may sue in either place. • **Wrong to person —** Assault, battery, physical injury, defamation, and other personal wrongs may attract Section 19 where the location of the wrong and the defendant’s residence or business location differ. • **Wrong to movable property —** Damage to goods, conversion of movable articles, wrongful detention of movable property, or injury to a vehicle may fall within the principle of Section 19 where compensation is claimed. • **Statutory illustrations —** The CPC itself gives illustrations involving a Delhi resident committing assault in Calcutta and publishing defamatory material in Calcutta. In both illustrations, the plaintiff may sue either where the wrong occurred or where the defendant resides. • **Important distinction —** Compensation for wrong to **immovable** property falls under Section 16(e); compensation for wrong to a **person or movable property** falls under Section 19. This distinction prevents a plaintiff from using Section 19 to bypass the situs rule applicable to land or buildings. ## Other Suits and Cause of Action: Section 20 CPC • **Residual provision —** Section 20 applies to suits not covered by Sections 16 to 19. It is a residuary territorial-jurisdiction provision and should not be used to avoid the specific rules governing immovable property, property under attachment, or compensation for wrongs. • **Defendant’s residence —** Under Section 20(a), a suit may be instituted where the defendant, or every defendant where there is more than one, actually and voluntarily resides, carries on business, or personally works for gain at the time of commencement of the suit. • **Several defendants —** Under Section 20(b), where there are multiple defendants, a suit may be filed where any one defendant resides or carries on business, provided the court grants leave or the other defendants acquiesce in the institution of the suit. • **Cause of action —** Under Section 20(c), a suit may be instituted where the cause of action wholly or in part arises. A cause of action means every material fact that the plaintiff must prove to obtain a judgment; it does not include evidence or the defendant’s anticipated defence. • **Contract disputes —** In contractual litigation, material parts of the cause of action may arise where the contract was made, where acceptance was communicated, where performance was required, where payment was to be made, or where breach occurred. The relevance of each fact depends upon the specific pleadings and contract terms. • **Corporation rule —** The Explanation to Section 20 treats a corporation as carrying on business at its sole or principal office in India. Where the cause of action arises at a place where it has a subordinate office, the corporation is deemed to carry on business at that subordinate-office location in relation to that cause of action. • **Jurisdiction clauses —** In *A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. v. A.P. Agencies, Salem*, AIR 1989 SC 1239; (1989) 2 SCC 163, a Gujarat manufacturer agreed to supply goods to a Salem buyer under a contract containing the clause “subject to Kaira jurisdiction.” The Supreme Court held that where two or more courts otherwise possess jurisdiction, parties may validly agree to confine disputes to one such court. The clause must, however, be construed carefully; jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a court with which the dispute has no legal territorial connection. • **Drafting lesson —** Expressions such as “only,” “alone,” “exclusive,” or wording that clearly shows exclusion of other competent courts are generally stronger indicators of an exclusive-jurisdiction agreement. Ambiguous wording is construed in light of the full contract and surrounding circumstances. ## Objections to Jurisdiction: Section 21 CPC • **Policy of waiver —** Section 21 recognises that objections concerning territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction are not treated in the same manner as lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. A party cannot remain silent, allow the suit to proceed, and then challenge the decree merely because the suit was filed in an inconvenient or technically incorrect territorial forum. ProvisionObjection coveredConditions for raising it in appeal or revision**Section 21(1)**Place of suing / territorial jurisdictionRaised at earliest opportunity; before or at settlement of issues where issues are settled; consequent failure of justice**Section 21(2)**Pecuniary jurisdictionSame three conditions**Section 21(3)**Local limits of executing courtRaised at earliest opportunity in execution; consequent failure of justice• **Three-part test —** For Section 21(1) and 21(2), the objector must establish: **early objection**, **objection before settlement of issues where applicable**, and **consequent failure of justice**. Failure of justice requires genuine prejudice; it is not enough to show a technical error in forum selection. • **Earliest opportunity —** An objection should ordinarily be specifically pleaded in the written statement and pressed before the trial court proceeds substantially on merits. A party who actively participates without timely protest may be treated as having waived an objection to territorial jurisdiction. • **Bahrein Petroleum principle —** In *Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. P.J. Pappu*, AIR 1966 SC 634; (1966) 1 SCR 461, an employee instituted a claim at Cochin, though neither the defendants’ residence or business nor the cause of action had a territorial connection with Cochin. The defendants objected to jurisdiction from the outset. The Supreme Court held that territorial objections may be waived, but there was no waiver where the defendants had consistently protested jurisdiction. It further clarified that where the objection is raised before trial on merits, the issue should be decided at that stage; the requirement of showing failure of justice is especially relevant when the objection is raised after a decision on merits. • **Execution-stage objection —** Section 21(3) applies where objection is taken to the competence of the executing court with reference to local limits. It must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity in the execution proceedings, and the objector must show consequent failure of justice. • **Territorial defect versus inherent defect —** In *Seth Hiralal Patni v. Sri Kali Nath*, AIR 1962 SC 199; (1962) 2 SCR 747, the dispute arose from money claims connected with business transactions and an arbitral award in proceedings on the Original Side of the Bombay High Court. The Supreme Court distinguished a defect in local territorial jurisdiction from absence of inherent jurisdiction. It held that a decree cannot ordinarily be attacked in execution merely for a territorial defect that could have been waived, whereas a decree passed by a court lacking inherent jurisdiction remains vulnerable. ## Bar of Separate Suit: Section 21A CPC • **Statutory bar —** Section 21A bars a separate suit seeking to set aside a decree on a ground based on an objection as to the place of suing. Thus, a party cannot file a fresh civil suit merely to challenge an earlier decree on the ground that the original court was territorially inappropriate. • **Former suit —** The Explanation states that “former suit” means the suit which has been decided before the decision in the suit questioning the decree, irrespective of which suit was instituted first. • **Limited scope —** Section 21A is confined to objections based on the place of suing. It does not convert a court lacking inherent subject-matter competence into a competent court, nor does it erase the distinction between a waivable territorial defect and a fundamental jurisdictional nullity. ## Consolidated Revision Framework • **Step One: Nature —** Ask whether the court has authority over this category of dispute. This is the **subject-matter jurisdiction** inquiry. • **Step Two: Value —** Ask whether the suit valuation falls within the court’s monetary limits. This is the **pecuniary jurisdiction** inquiry under Sections 6 and 15 CPC. • **Step Three: Location —** Ask which territorial rule applies: - **Immovable property:** Section 16; - **Property spread across courts:** Section 17; - **Uncertain property location:** Section 18; - **Wrong to person or movable property:** Section 19; - **Other civil suits:** Section 20. • **Step Four: Objection —** Ask whether the defendant objected promptly and whether the incorrect forum caused actual prejudice. Section 21 governs territorial and pecuniary objections; it does not cure absence of subject-matter jurisdiction. • **Memory formula —** **Nature → Value → Place → Prompt Objection.** **Categories:** Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC), Legal Notes --- ### [Foreign Judgments under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Sections 13, 14 and 44A Conclusive Effect, Natural Justice and Execution in India](https://lawfoyer.in/foreign-judgments-under-the-code-of-civil-procedure-1908/) **Published:** June 28, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun28202612_40_52A-725x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning and Scope of Foreign Judgment • **Foreign Court:** Section 2(5) CPC defines a foreign Court as a Court situated outside India which is not established or continued by the authority of the Central Government. Thus, the expression depends not only on geographical location but also on the authority by which the Court is constituted. • **Foreign Judgment:** Under Section 2(6) CPC, a foreign judgment means the judgment of a foreign Court. A “judgment” under Section 2(9) CPC is the statement of grounds given by a Judge for a decree or order. Therefore, a foreign judgment includes the reasoned adjudication of a Court outside India. • **Foreign Decree:** The CPC does not separately define “foreign decree” in Section 2. However, for Section 44A CPC, “decree” has a special meaning. It includes a decree or judgment of a notified superior Court under which a sum of money is payable, subject to statutory exclusions. • **Recognition and Execution:** Recognition means that an Indian Court accepts a foreign judgment as binding regarding the matter actually decided. Execution means enforcement through Indian judicial machinery, such as attachment and sale of property. A foreign judgment may be recognised under Section 13 but may not always be directly executable under Section 44A. • **Comity of Nations:** Indian Courts generally respect final judgments of foreign Courts as a matter of international comity. However, comity does not mean blind enforcement. Section 13 CPC protects Indian legal policy, procedural fairness, and the rights of the judgment-debtor. ## Conclusiveness of Foreign Judgments under Section 13 CPC • **General Rule:** Section 13 CPC makes a foreign judgment conclusive regarding a matter directly adjudicated between the same parties, or persons claiming under them, litigating under the same title. The judgment is not conclusive only when one or more of the six statutory exceptions applies. • **Direct Adjudication:** The foreign judgment binds parties only on the precise right or issue actually determined. Incidental observations, collateral findings, assumptions, or matters that were not truly decided do not become conclusive. • **Same Parties and Same Title:** The parties in the Indian proceeding must be the same as those before the foreign Court, or must claim through those parties under the same legal title. A person cannot ordinarily be bound by a foreign judgment if they were neither a party nor a lawful successor of a party. • **Effect Similar to Res Judicata:** A conclusive foreign judgment prevents the parties from reopening the matter directly adjudicated. However, Section 13 is not identical to Section 11 CPC. It is a separate statutory rule governing the recognition of foreign adjudications. • **No Appeal on Merits:** An Indian Court does not sit as an appellate Court over a foreign judgment. It will not re-assess evidence merely because it may have reached another conclusion. The inquiry is limited to the exceptions in Section 13. • **Leading Case — R. Viswanathan v. Rukn-ul-Mulk Syed Abdul Wajid, AIR 1963 SC 1; (1963) 3 SCR 22:** The dispute concerned the effect in Madras of a judgment of the Mysore High Court concerning properties and shares connected with a deceased person’s estate. The Supreme Court considered whether the earlier judgment had directly adjudicated the disputed rights and whether the Court was competent in the international sense. It held that a foreign judgment is conclusive only concerning the right actually adjudicated, not every issue incidentally connected with the litigation. It further held that competence must exist both under the law constituting the Court and in the international sense recognised by private international law. ## Exceptions to Conclusiveness under Section 13 CPC ### Foreign Judgment by a Court without Competent Jurisdiction — Section 13(a) • **Jurisdiction Test:** A foreign judgment is not conclusive if it was not pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction. Competence is tested not merely by the domestic law of the foreign country but also by principles of private international law recognised in India. • **International Competence:** A foreign Court may generally have international competence where the defendant was resident or domiciled within its jurisdiction, voluntarily submitted to its jurisdiction, appeared and contested on merits without protest, or agreed by contract to submit disputes to that Court. Mere service of foreign summons upon a person in India does not automatically establish international jurisdiction. • **Jurisdictional Facts:** The foreign Court’s own statement that it has jurisdiction is not always final. Indian Courts may examine the jurisdictional facts, especially where the foreign Court was induced to assume jurisdiction by fraud or misrepresentation. • **Judgment in Rem and Judgment in Personam:** A judgment in rem determines the legal status of a person or property and may affect persons beyond the parties. A judgment in personam determines personal rights and obligations between the parties. Even a judgment in rem must be delivered by a competent Court. • **R. Viswanathan Principle:** The Supreme Court clarified that foreign jurisdiction must be competent in an international sense. The Court also explained that the expression “matter” in Section 13 means the right claimed and actually adjudicated, not merely the broad subject matter of the dispute. ### Foreign Judgment Not Given on Merits — Section 13(b) • **Meaning of Merits:** A judgment is on merits when the foreign Court applies its judicial mind to the truth or validity of the claim after considering pleadings, evidence, documents, or the material placed before it. • **Ex Parte Decree:** An ex parte foreign decree is not automatically invalid. The decisive question is whether the Court considered the claimant’s case and material before granting relief. A decree passed mechanically only because the defendant did not appear, without examination of the claim, is not a judgment on merits. • **Default Judgment:** A default judgment passed merely as a penalty for non-appearance, non-filing of defence, or procedural default may fail the Section 13(b) test. The foreign Court must have undertaken a real adjudicatory exercise. • **Leading Case — International Woollen Mills v. Standard Wool (U.K.) Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 265; AIR 2001 SC 2134:** An Indian buyer allegedly received inferior wool supplied by a foreign seller. The seller obtained an ex parte money decree in the Central London County Court and sought execution in India. The legal issue was whether the foreign decree was given “on merits.” The Supreme Court held that an ex parte decree can be on merits only where the foreign Court considered evidence or material supporting the claim. A decree passed solely because of the defendant’s absence, without judicial consideration of the claim, is not conclusive under Section 13(b). ### Incorrect View of International Law or Refusal to Apply Indian Law — Section 13(c) • **Two Grounds:** A foreign judgment is not conclusive where it appears on the face of the proceedings that it is founded either on an incorrect view of international law or on a refusal to recognise Indian law in a case where Indian law applies. • **Facial Error Requirement:** The defect must appear from the proceedings or judgment itself. The clause is not a general licence to challenge every legal error made by a foreign Court. • **Applicable Indian Law:** This exception is important where Indian law clearly governs the dispute, such as an Indian personal law issue, a transaction governed by Indian statutory law, or a dispute involving rights created exclusively under Indian law. • **Public Policy Protection:** The clause prevents parties from obtaining a foreign judgment by avoiding Indian law that should properly govern the dispute. ### Proceedings Opposed to Natural Justice — Section 13(d) • **Core Principle:** Natural justice requires procedural fairness. The most important components are adequate notice, a genuine opportunity to be heard, the right to present one’s case, and an impartial adjudicating authority. • **Audi Alteram Partem:** The rule means that no person should be condemned unheard. Service of summons is important, but formal service alone may not be enough where the defendant had no real chance to defend. • **Impartial Tribunal:** Proceedings are opposed to natural justice where the Judge was biased, personally interested, dishonest, or otherwise incapable of deciding impartially. • **Not Every Procedural Difference:** Indian Courts do not reject a foreign judgment merely because foreign procedure differs from Indian procedure. The defect must offend the basic requirements of fairness and justice. • **R. Viswanathan Principle:** The Supreme Court held that a foreign judgment may be treated as a nullity when it results from bias or partiality. At the same time, an Indian Court should not lightly presume unfairness merely because it disagrees with the foreign Court’s conclusion or procedure. ### Foreign Judgment Obtained by Fraud — Section 13(e) • **Fraud Vitiates Adjudication:** A judgment obtained by fraud is not conclusive. Fraud may concern the merits of the claim, suppression of material facts, forged material, false evidence, or jurisdictional facts. • **Jurisdictional Fraud:** Fraud relating to the very basis on which the foreign Court assumed jurisdiction is particularly serious. For example, falsely claiming domicile or residence in a foreign country to secure a divorce may make the judgment unenforceable in India. • **Leading Case — Satya v. Teja Singh, (1975) 1 SCC 120; AIR 1975 SC 105:** A Hindu husband went to Nevada, obtained a divorce decree after asserting that he was domiciled there, and relied upon it to resist his wife’s maintenance claim in India. The Supreme Court found that he had gone to Nevada only to obtain a convenient divorce and had not acquired genuine domicile there. The issue was whether the Nevada decree could be recognised in India. The Court held that fraud regarding jurisdictional facts is sufficient to deny recognition under Section 13. A foreign Court’s jurisdiction must exist in reality, not be created through false assertions. ### Claim Founded on Breach of Indian Law — Section 13(f) • **Indian Law Safeguard:** A foreign judgment is not conclusive where it sustains a claim founded on breach of any law in force in India. • **Nature of Exception:** The focus is on the foundation of the claim. Where the very right enforced by the foreign Court is based on conduct prohibited by Indian law, the Indian Court may refuse recognition. • **Illustration:** A foreign decree cannot be enforced where its enforcement would effectively validate a transaction, obligation, or claim prohibited by a mandatory Indian statute. • **Limited Review:** Section 13(f) does not permit an Indian Court to reopen every foreign legal finding. It applies where the claim itself is founded on a breach of Indian law. ## Presumption as to Foreign Judgments under Section 14 CPC • **Rebuttable Presumption:** Section 14 CPC provides that when a document purporting to be a certified copy of a foreign judgment is produced, the Indian Court shall presume that the foreign judgment was pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction. • **Limited Presumption:** The presumption relates only to jurisdiction. It does not automatically prove that the judgment was on merits, free from fraud, consistent with natural justice, or compliant with Indian law. • **Burden of Rebuttal:** The party challenging the foreign judgment may rebut the presumption by proving want of jurisdiction. The presumption is displaced where the lack of jurisdiction appears from the record itself or is proved by evidence. • **Practical Value:** Section 14 helps a decree-holder begin with a presumption in favour of jurisdiction, but the judgment-debtor can still invoke any of the six Section 13 exceptions. ## Natural Justice in Foreign Judgments • **Notice:** The defendant must receive sufficient and meaningful notice of the proceedings. Notice should enable the person to understand the nature of the claim and the time available for response. • **Effective Opportunity:** Natural justice means more than formal service. The defendant must have a realistic opportunity to appear, engage counsel, file pleadings, present evidence, and contest the relief. • **No Mechanical Orders:** A foreign Court should not issue an order merely because one party is absent, without considering whether the claimant has established a valid legal basis for relief. • **Bias and Fairness:** A judgment resulting from judicial bias, personal interest, or procedural unfairness is vulnerable under Section 13(d). • **Matrimonial Proceedings:** In family disputes, natural justice receives a stricter application because marriage, divorce, custody, and personal status affect fundamental civil rights. The foreign Court must ensure that the absent spouse had a genuine and effective chance to contest the proceedings. ## Foreign Decree and Execution under Section 44A CPC **Basis****Reciprocating Territory****Non-Reciprocating Territory****Primary remedy**Direct execution under Section 44A CPCFresh substantive suit on the foreign judgment**Court approached**District Court in IndiaCompetent Indian civil Court**Nature of relief**Foreign money decree or judgment within Section 44AIndian decree after adjudication in the fresh suit**Section 13 applicability**Court must refuse execution if Section 13 exception is provedCourt examines Section 13 before granting an Indian decree**Limitation**Cause-country limitation plus Article 137 principlesArticle 101, Limitation Act: three years from judgment### Direct Execution from a Reciprocating Territory • **Reciprocating Territory:** A reciprocating territory is a country or territory outside India declared by the Central Government, through an Official Gazette notification, to be a reciprocating territory for Section 44A. The notification also specifies the “superior Courts” whose decrees qualify. • **District Court Filing:** The decree-holder must file a certified copy of the foreign decree in the District Court. The decree may then be executed as though it had been passed by that District Court. • **Satisfaction Certificate:** Along with the certified copy, the decree-holder must file a certificate from the foreign superior Court stating the extent to which the decree has been satisfied or adjusted. This certificate is conclusive proof of satisfaction or adjustment for Section 44A proceedings. • **Section 47 CPC:** From the filing of the certified copy, questions relating to execution, discharge, or satisfaction are determined by the executing District Court under Section 47 CPC. • **Mandatory Refusal:** The District Court must refuse execution if the judgment-debtor establishes any exception under Section 13(a) to Section 13(f). Thus, Section 44A creates a procedure for execution but does not override the safeguards of Section 13. ### Scope and Limits of Section 44A • **Money Decree Requirement:** Section 44A applies only where a sum of money is payable under the foreign decree or judgment. • **Excluded Amounts:** It excludes sums payable as taxes, charges of a like nature, fines, or penalties. • **Arbitration Exclusion:** An arbitration award is excluded even if it is enforceable as a decree or judgment in the country where it was made. Enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is governed by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, particularly its provisions dealing with New York Convention and Geneva Convention awards. • **Non-Money Relief:** A divorce decree, declaration of status, injunction, custody order, or decree for specific performance is not directly executable under Section 44A unless it independently falls within the statutory definition of a money decree. • **Leading Case — Alcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. Celem S.A. of FOS, (2017) 2 SCC 253:** A French company obtained an English Court order awarding costs against an Indian company in patent-related proceedings. The Indian company objected that the order was interlocutory and did not amount to a decree. The Supreme Court held that Section 44A has an independent enforcement mechanism and that the expression “decree” includes a foreign judgment under which money is payable. Since the foreign Court had given the parties an opportunity to present their case and had passed a reasoned order, the costs order was treated as conclusive and executable. ## Execution of Decrees from Non-Reciprocating Territories • **No Direct Execution:** A decree of a Court in a country not notified as a reciprocating territory cannot be directly executed under Section 44A CPC. • **Fresh Suit:** The decree-holder must institute a fresh suit in India based on the foreign judgment. The foreign judgment creates the foundation of the claim, while Section 13 determines whether it is conclusive. • **Indian Decree:** Once the competent Indian Court passes a decree in the fresh suit, that Indian decree is executed under ordinary CPC execution provisions. • **Limitation:** Article 101 of the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes three years for a suit upon a judgment, including a foreign judgment, computed from the date of the judgment. ## Limitation for Execution under Section 44A • **Cause-Country Limitation:** The foreign decree must remain executable under the limitation law of the reciprocating country in which it was passed. • **Article 136 Not Applicable:** The twelve-year execution period under Article 136 of the Limitation Act applies to decrees of Indian Courts and does not automatically apply to foreign decrees executed under Section 44A. • **Article 137 Application:** An execution application under Section 44A is governed by Article 137, which ordinarily provides three years from the date when the right to apply accrues. • **Leading Case — Bank of Baroda v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd., (2020) 17 SCC 798:** A London Court passed a money decree in favour of Bank of Baroda, which was sought to be executed in India after a substantial delay. The Supreme Court considered the limitation applicable to a foreign decree from a reciprocating territory. It held that the limitation law of the cause country governs whether the decree remains executable. It further held that the Indian application under Section 44A is governed by Article 137 and should ordinarily be filed within three years from the foreign decree; where genuine execution steps were first pursued in the cause country, the three-year period may run from finalisation of those proceedings. ## Foreign Matrimonial Judgments • **Special Caution:** Foreign decrees of divorce or annulment have serious consequences for marital status, maintenance, succession, and remarriage. Indian Courts examine them carefully under Section 13 CPC. • **Governing Personal Law:** The jurisdiction assumed by the foreign Court and the ground on which relief is granted must generally be consistent with the matrimonial law under which the parties were married. • **Leading Case — Y. Narasimha Rao v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi, (1991) 3 SCC 451:** The parties were married under Hindu rites in India. The husband obtained a divorce decree from a Missouri Court on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, while the wife had not voluntarily submitted to that jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that the decree was not recognisable because the foreign Court lacked jurisdiction under the matrimonial law governing the marriage and relied on a ground unavailable under that law. The Court recognised limited exceptions: where the respondent was domiciled or habitually and permanently resident in the foreign forum; where the respondent voluntarily and effectively submitted to the foreign jurisdiction and contested; or where the respondent consented to the grant of relief. ## Quick Revision Memory Aid **Mnemonic: J-M-I-N-F-L****Section 13 Exception****J**No competent **Jurisdiction****M**Not decided on **Merits****I**Incorrect **International law** or refusal of applicable Indian law**N**Proceedings against **Natural justice****F**Judgment obtained by **Fraud****L**Claim founded on breach of Indian **Law**• **Core Formula:** A foreign judgment is ordinarily conclusive, but direct execution in India is available only for qualifying money decrees from notified reciprocating territories and only after surviving the Section 13 test. **Categories:** Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC), Legal Notes --- ### [CREDIT-BASED CERTIFICATE COURSE ON THE NEW CRIMINAL LAWS | Organized by National Law University Delhi (NLUD)](https://lawfoyer.in/credit-based-certificate-course-on-the-new-criminal-laws-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-nlud/) **Published:** June 23, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** CREDIT-BASED CERTIFICATE COURSE ON THE NEW CRIMINAL LAWS | Organized by National Law University Delhi (NLUD) **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Photos-for-Upload-1.jpg) On 18.06.2026, National Law University Delhi was honoured to host Shri Ravi Shankar Prasad, Former Union Cabinet Minister and Hon’ble Member, Lok Sabha, for an interactive session with the participants of the Credit-based Certificate Course on the New Criminal Laws organised by NLUD in collaboration with the ICPS, New Delhi. Vice-Chancellor, NLU Delhi, Prof. (Dr.) G.S. Bajpai, welcomed Shri Ravi Shankar Prasad and highlighted the course’s significance in deepening the understanding of India’s new criminal laws. He also underscored NLU Delhi’s contribution to India’s criminal law reforms and acknowledged the valuable collaboration of ICPS in advancing constitutional, parliamentary, and legal education initiatives. Shri Ravi Shankar Prasad delivered a thought-provoking address, placing India’s new criminal laws within their broader historical, constitutional, and civilisational context. Drawing on his rich experience at the Bar and in public life, he encouraged participants to critically reflect on the evolution of the criminal justice system and commended NLU Delhi’s significant contribution to India’s criminal law reform process. Registrar, NLU Delhi, Prof. (Dr.) Risham Garg, delivered the vote of thanks, expressing gratitude to Shri Ravi Shankar Prasad for his insightful interaction and acknowledging the contributions of all speakers, participants, and partners who made the programme a resounding success. The interaction reinforced a shared commitment to advancing meaningful criminal justice reforms through scholarship, dialogue, and public engagement. **Categories:** Events --- ### [Res Judicata under Section 11 CPC, 1908: Essentials, Explanations, Constructive Res Judicata and Landmark Supreme Court Cases](https://lawfoyer.in/res-judicata-under-section-11-cpc-1908/) **Published:** June 21, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun21202611_25_32P-725x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning and Public-Policy Basis of Res Judicata - **Meaning:** *Res judicata* literally means “a matter already adjudicated.” It prevents a court from trying a suit or issue that has already been conclusively decided between the concerned parties by a competent court. Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) is the principal statutory provision embodying this rule. - **Purpose:** The doctrine serves three connected purposes: **finality of litigation**, **protection against repeated harassment**, and **judicial economy**. A person should not be made to contest the same dispute repeatedly, and courts should not spend time deciding questions that have already been conclusively resolved. - **Maxims:** The doctrine rests on important legal maxims: - **Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium** — it is in the interest of the State that litigation must come to an end. - **Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa** — no person should be vexed twice for the same cause. - **Res judicata pro veritate accipitur** — a matter adjudicated is accepted as truth between the parties. The Supreme Court has recognised these maxims as the foundation of the doctrine. - **Nature:** Res judicata is based on **public policy and justice**. It may operate even where the earlier decision appears erroneous; the proper remedy is appeal, review, revision, or another legally available challenge, not a fresh attempt to reopen the concluded issue. - **Rule of finality:** The doctrine does not merely protect private parties. It also preserves the authority of judicial decisions and prevents inconsistent findings by different courts on the same dispute. - **Scope beyond Section 11:** Section 11 directly applies to suits and issues. However, the broader doctrine of res judicata has also been applied by courts at successive stages of the same litigation and, where appropriate, in other proceedings to preserve finality. ## Statutory Rule under Section 11 CPC Section 11 provides, in substance, that no court shall try a suit or issue where the matter directly and substantially in issue was directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or persons claiming under them, litigating under the same title, before a competent court, and was heard and finally decided by that court. ### Core Conditions of Res Judicata **Condition****Requirement****Same matter in issue**The matter in the later suit must be directly and substantially the same as the matter in the earlier suit.**Former suit**The earlier suit must have been decided before the later suit is decided.**Same parties or privies**Parties must be the same, or claim through the same persons.**Same title**Parties must litigate in the same legal capacity or character.**Competent court**The earlier court must have been competent to decide the subsequent suit or issue.**Final decision**The matter must have been heard and finally decided.The Supreme Court in **Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar, AIR 1966 SC 1332; (1966) 3 SCR 300**, identified these conditions. The dispute arose from connected property suits in which decisions in some appeals became final. The Court considered whether those decisions barred further litigation on the same issues. It held that res judicata applies when the same matter was directly and substantially in issue, between the same parties or their privies, litigated under the same title, before a competent court, and was heard and finally decided. It also clarified that the date of decision, rather than the date of institution, determines whether a suit is a “former suit.” ## Matter Directly and Substantially in Issue - **Central issue:** A matter is directly and substantially in issue when it is a material and essential issue that must be decided for granting or refusing relief in the suit. - **Not merely incidental:** A matter is not directly and substantially in issue merely because it was mentioned, discussed, or incidentally considered. A collateral or incidental finding will ordinarily not create res judicata. - **Necessary-and-essential test:** The practical test is whether the earlier court had to decide the issue in order to decide the principal dispute. If the earlier decision could have been reached without deciding that issue, the issue may only have been incidental. - **Pleadings-based inquiry:** The court must compare the pleadings, issues, evidence where necessary, and judgment in the earlier suit with the pleadings and issues in the later suit. It is unsafe to infer the earlier controversy merely from a short summary in the earlier judgment. - **Decision, not reasoning:** What generally operates as res judicata is the adjudicated issue or right, not every observation or reason stated in the judgment. A finding made only for a limited purpose may not bar a later suit involving a different substantive right. **Illustration:** A sues B for possession of land on the basis of title. B denies A’s ownership. The court decides that A is the owner and decrees possession. In a later suit between A and B concerning the same property, B cannot again deny A’s ownership if title was essential to the earlier decree. **Illustration:** A sues B only for temporary injunction based on possession. The court observes that A appears to have title, but decides the case only on possession. If title was not necessary for the injunction decision, that observation may not prevent a later comprehensive title suit. The Supreme Court in **Sajjadanashin Sayed Md. B.E. Edr. v. Musa Dadabhai Ummer, (2000) 3 SCC 350**, considered whether a finding was directly and substantially in issue or merely collateral. The Court explained that the decisive question is whether adjudication of that issue was material and essential to the earlier judgment. A finding on title in an injunction suit can operate as res judicata only where title was necessarily required to decide the injunction claim; where the earlier suit was confined to possessory rights, a title finding may remain incidental. The Supreme Court in **Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai v. Mohd. Hanifa, (1976) 4 SCC 780**, examined disputes relating to religious rights and income associated with a mosque. The issue was whether an earlier decision had conclusively determined the rights asserted in the later proceeding. The Court held that the best method is first to identify the cases pleaded by the parties in the earlier litigation and then determine precisely what the earlier judgment actually decided. The case remains important for the rule that res judicata cannot be applied through assumptions or vague similarity between two disputes. ## Former Suit - **Meaning of former suit:** Under Explanation I to Section 11, a “former suit” is a suit decided before the suit in question, whether or not it was instituted earlier. - **Decision date controls:** A suit instituted later can still become the “former suit” if it is decided earlier than the other suit. - **Finality:** The earlier decision must have achieved finality. A pending appeal, a decision set aside in appeal, or an unresolved issue may affect the applicability of res judicata. - **Same litigation:** The principle can also operate between different stages of the same proceeding. Once an issue is finally decided at an earlier stage, parties cannot ordinarily reopen it at a later stage of the same litigation. The Supreme Court in **Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi, \[1960\] 3 SCR 590**, arose from tenancy and ejectment proceedings under the Calcutta Thika Tenancy law. The parties disputed whether an earlier order regarding the statutory protection available to the tenants barred reconsideration of the issue. The Court held that res judicata promotes finality and can apply between different stages of the same litigation. However, it also clarified that not every interlocutory order becomes permanently conclusive; an interlocutory order which does not finally terminate the issue may be challenged in an appeal from the final decree where law permits. ## Same Parties, Parties Claiming Under Them, and Same Title - **Identity of parties:** The later suit must be between the same parties as the earlier suit, or between persons who claim under those parties. - **Privies and representatives:** Section 11 covers successors-in-interest, legal representatives, transferees, assignees, heirs, and others who derive their claim through a party to the former suit. - **Same title:** “Same title” means the same legal capacity or character in which a person litigates. A person suing as an individual in one proceeding and later as a trustee, guardian, legal representative, or office-holder may not necessarily be litigating under the same title. - **Co-defendants and co-plaintiffs:** Res judicata can operate even between co-defendants or co-plaintiffs where there was a real conflict between them, resolution of that conflict was necessary for granting relief, and the conflict was finally decided. - **Representative litigation:** In bona fide litigation concerning a public right or a private right claimed in common, persons interested in that right can be bound even though they were not individually named as parties. ## Competent Court - **Basic requirement:** The court deciding the former suit must have been competent to try the subsequent suit or the issue raised in the subsequent suit. - **Competence concerns jurisdiction:** Competence generally concerns jurisdiction over the subject matter, pecuniary jurisdiction, territorial jurisdiction where relevant, and statutory authority to decide the issue. - **Explanation II:** Competence is determined irrespective of any provisions relating to a right of appeal from the earlier decision. - **Limited jurisdiction courts:** Explanation VIII provides that an issue heard and finally decided by a court of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide that issue, can operate as res judicata in a later suit even though that limited court was not competent to try the later suit as a whole. The Supreme Court in **Sulochana Amma v. Narayanan Nair, (1994) 2 SCC 14**, dealt with the effect of findings recorded in an earlier injunction suit. The Court held that a finding on title may operate as res judicata in a later title suit where title was directly and substantially in issue and the earlier forum was competent to decide that issue. The case is also associated with the principle reflected in Explanation VIII: a decision by a forum of limited or special jurisdiction may bind the parties in a subsequent proceeding if that forum was competent to decide the particular issue. ## Heard and Finally Decided - **Adjudication required:** The issue must have been actually adjudicated and finally decided by the competent court. - **Merits and finality:** A dismissal after adjudication can create res judicata. However, a matter that was never decided on merits cannot ordinarily satisfy the requirement that it was “heard and finally decided.” - **Different procedural bars:** Withdrawal, abandonment, dismissal for default, rejection of a plaint, limitation, and other procedural outcomes may create different legal consequences under the CPC, but they must not be mechanically treated as res judicata without examining whether Section 11 is truly satisfied. - **Order XXIII distinction:** Withdrawal of a suit without liberty may bar a fresh suit under Order XXIII Rule 1(4), but this is not identical to res judicata because there may be no prior adjudication on the merits. ## Explanations to Section 11 CPC **Explanation****Rule and Effect****Explanation I**A former suit is one decided earlier, even if instituted later.**Explanation II**Competence is determined irrespective of the right of appeal.**Explanation III**The issue must have been alleged by one party and admitted or denied, expressly or impliedly, by the other.**Explanation IV**Matters that “might and ought” to have been raised as attack or defence are deemed to have been directly and substantially in issue.**Explanation V**A relief claimed in the plaint but not expressly granted is deemed refused.**Explanation VI**Bona fide representative litigation concerning public rights or common private rights binds all interested persons.**Explanation VII**Section 11 applies to execution proceedings; references to suit and former suit include execution proceedings.**Explanation VIII**An issue finally decided by a competent court of limited jurisdiction can bind parties in a later suit.These Explanations expand the practical operation of Section 11 and prevent parties from defeating the doctrine through procedural technicalities. ## Constructive Res Judicata under Explanation IV - **Meaning:** Constructive res judicata is a deemed form of res judicata. It bars not only matters actually raised and decided, but also matters which a party had the opportunity and obligation to raise in the earlier suit but deliberately or negligently omitted. - **Twin test:** Explanation IV applies where the omitted matter: - **Might have been raised** in the earlier proceeding; and - **Ought to have been raised** because it was material, connected with the dispute, and within the legitimate scope of the earlier action. - **Purpose:** The rule prevents piecemeal litigation. A party cannot split defences or grounds of attack and bring them forward one by one in separate proceedings. - **Deemed decision:** In constructive res judicata, the matter may not have been actually heard. The law treats it as having been in issue because the party had a fair opportunity and duty to raise it earlier. **Illustration:** A sues B for declaration of title over a property. B contests the suit only on the ground that A’s sale deed is invalid but does not raise the available defence that the claim is barred by limitation. If limitation was a necessary and available defence in the earlier suit, B may be barred from raising it in a later proceeding connected with the same controversy. The Supreme Court in **State of Uttar Pradesh v. Nawab Hussain, (1977) 2 SCC 806; AIR 1977 SC 1680**, dealt with a police officer dismissed from service. He first challenged the dismissal in writ proceedings on certain grounds but later filed a civil suit raising an additional ground that the dismissing authority lacked competence. The Court held that a party cannot reserve one available ground for later litigation after already challenging the same action in earlier proceedings. The omitted ground was barred by constructive res judicata because it might and ought to have been raised earlier. The Supreme Court in **Forward Construction Co. v. Prabhat Mandal (Regd.), Andheri, (1986) 1 SCC 100**, involved successive public-interest challenges relating to the use of land reserved for a BEST bus depot in Mumbai. The Court held that an adjudication is final not only regarding matters actually decided but also regarding matters that parties might and ought to have raised as part of the same controversy. It clarified that Explanation IV applies to grounds of both attack and defence. The Court also held that representative or public-interest litigation can bind interested persons only where the earlier litigation was bona fide and concerned a genuinely common right. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the principle in **Parvatewwa v. Channappa, 2026 INSC 697**, where a party who knew of an adverse claim but omitted to seek appropriate relief in the first suit attempted to agitate the matter in a later suit. The Court applied Explanation IV and held that a party cannot reopen a connected issue that should have been pursued in the earlier litigation. ## Explanation V: Relief Claimed but Not Granted - **Deemed refusal:** Where the plaint claims a relief but the decree does not expressly grant it, the relief is deemed to have been refused for Section 11 purposes. - **Practical effect:** A plaintiff cannot ordinarily file a fresh suit merely to seek a relief that was claimed in the earlier plaint but not granted by the decree. - **Careful reading required:** The decree, issues, and judgment must be read together. A relief not expressly granted may have been intentionally rejected, impliedly rejected, or rendered unnecessary by another finding. ## Explanation VI: Representative and Public Rights - **Representative capacity:** Where persons litigate bona fide concerning a public right or a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, every interested person is treated as claiming through the litigating representatives. - **Bona fides essential:** The earlier litigation must be genuine, representative, and conducted in the common interest. A collusive, mala fide, or purely private litigation cannot ordinarily bind all interested persons. - **Public-interest litigation:** Res judicata may apply to public-interest litigation, but courts carefully examine whether the earlier case genuinely represented the public right claimed. ## Evidence and Procedure for Raising Res Judicata - **Specific plea:** Res judicata should ordinarily be specifically pleaded by the party relying on it. - **Proof burden:** The party raising the plea must establish the earlier pleadings, issues, judgment, decree, and the identity of the matters in dispute. - **Essential documents:** Ordinarily, copies of the plaint, written statement, framed issues, judgment, and decree in the former suit should be placed on record. - **Exception:** In a suitable case, the judgment alone may suffice where it comprehensively records the pleadings, issues, and conclusions. However, a court should not speculate about what was actually in issue. The Supreme Court in **V. Rajeshwari v. T.C. Saravanabava, (2004) 1 SCC 551**, considered a plea that a later suit was barred by res judicata. The Court held that res judicata is a rule of estoppel by judgment founded on finality and the principle that no person should be vexed twice for the same cause. It further held that merely raising the plea is insufficient: the party must substantiate it with the pleadings, issues, and judgment in the former case, unless the earlier judgment itself contains all necessary details. - **Preliminary issue:** Res judicata can sometimes be decided as a preliminary issue. However, where its determination depends upon disputed facts, comparison of documents, or evidence regarding the earlier litigation, the court may need a full trial. - **Order VII Rule 11:** A plaint should not automatically be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) on the ground of res judicata merely because the defendant asserts such a bar. The court must examine whether the bar is apparent from the plaint and the legally admissible material relevant at that stage. ## Limits and Important Qualifications - **Change in facts:** A material change in facts after the earlier decision may create a fresh cause of action and prevent res judicata from applying. - **Change in law:** A substantial change in the governing law may affect whether an earlier decision remains binding in a later proceeding. - **Jurisdictional errors:** A decision involving a pure question of jurisdiction, or one that validates something prohibited by law, may not operate as res judicata in the ordinary manner because procedural finality cannot override substantive law. - **Pure question of law:** A pure abstract question of law, unrelated to the factual foundation of a right, is generally not treated in the same way as an adjudicated issue of fact or a mixed question of law and fact. The Supreme Court in **Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy, (1970) 1 SCC 613**, considered whether an earlier legal finding could bar subsequent litigation. The Court held that a previous decision on a matter in issue can bind parties, including on mixed questions of law and fact. However, a pure legal question unrelated to the factual basis of the parties’ rights, a question of jurisdiction, a later statutory change, or an earlier decision validating something prohibited by law may not operate as res judicata. ## Res Judicata and Res Sub Judice: Distinction **Basis****Res Judicata — Section 11 CPC****Res Sub Judice — Section 10 CPC****Stage**Earlier matter has already been finally decided.Earlier suit is still pending.**Object**Prevents re-litigation of concluded issues.Prevents parallel trials of substantially identical pending suits.**Effect**Bars trial of the later suit or issue.Stays trial of the later suit; institution is not barred.**Foundation**Finality of judicial decisions.Avoidance of conflicting decisions while litigation is pending.## Quick Revision Framework - **R — Resolved issue:** Was the same matter already directly and substantially decided? - **E — Earlier suit:** Was there a former suit decided before the present matter? - **S — Same parties:** Are the parties identical, or do they claim through the earlier parties? - **J — Jurisdiction:** Was the former court competent to decide the issue? - **U — Under same title:** Are parties litigating in the same legal capacity? - **D — Decision final:** Was the issue heard and finally decided? - **I — Issue essential:** Was the issue material and necessary, not merely incidental? - **C — Constructive bar:** Could and should the omitted ground have been raised earlier? - **A — Actual record:** Have pleadings, issues, judgment, and decree from the former case been produced? - **T — True public policy:** Does applying the doctrine promote finality without defeating substantive justice? **Categories:** Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC), Legal Notes --- ### [Res Sub Judice under Section 10 CPC: Meaning, Conditions, Stay of Suit and Difference from Res Judicata](https://lawfoyer.in/res-sub-judice-under-section-10-cpc/) **Published:** June 21, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun21202609_16_01P-725x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning and Concept of Res Sub Judice ➤ **Meaning:** *Res sub judice* literally means “a matter under judicial consideration.” In civil procedure, it refers to a situation where an earlier suit concerning substantially the same dispute is already pending before a competent court, and a later suit concerning that same dispute is filed. ➤ **Statutory Basis:** The doctrine is embodied in **Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908**. It is commonly described as the rule of **stay of suit**. It does not prohibit filing of the later suit; it prohibits the court from proceeding with its trial when the statutory requirements are fulfilled. ➤ **Central Idea:** The law does not permit two courts of concurrent jurisdiction to simultaneously conduct parallel trials over the same substantial controversy between the same parties. This prevents conflicting findings, inconsistent decrees, duplicated evidence, unnecessary costs, and harassment of parties. ➤ **Nature:** Section 10 is a **procedural provision**. It regulates the manner in which a court proceeds with a later suit. It does not take away the court’s jurisdiction to receive, entertain, or register that suit, and it does not create a substantive right in either party. ## Statutory Provision: Section 10 CPC Section 10 CPC provides: > “No Court shall proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title where such suit is pending in the same or any other Court in India having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed, or in any Court beyond the limits of India established or continued by the Central Government and having like jurisdiction, or before the Supreme Court.” The Explanation states that the pendency of a suit in a **foreign court** does not prevent an Indian court from trying a suit founded on the same cause of action. ➤ **Mandatory language:** The words **“No Court shall proceed”** make Section 10 mandatory once every statutory condition is satisfied. The court has no discretion to continue the trial of the later suit merely because it considers simultaneous proceedings convenient. ➤ **Limited operation:** The provision stays only the **trial** of the later suit. It does not destroy the plaint, dismiss the suit, or render the subsequent suit non-maintainable. ## Object of Section 10 CPC ➤ **Avoidance of conflicting decisions:** If two courts simultaneously decide identical substantial issues, there is a risk of contradictory judgments. Section 10 prevents this procedural inconsistency. ➤ **Protection against multiplicity:** It prevents a plaintiff from repeatedly litigating the same dispute in separate courts and protects the defendant from repeated defence of substantially identical claims. ➤ **Judicial economy:** It avoids duplicate recording of evidence, repeated examination of witnesses, and waste of judicial time. ➤ **Harmony with res judicata:** The underlying test is whether the final decision in the earlier suit would operate as **res judicata** in the later suit. If it would, the later trial should ordinarily be stayed under Section 10. ## Essential Conditions for Application of Section 10 CPC For Section 10 to apply, all the following conditions must coexist. ### Previously Instituted Suit Must Be Pending ➤ **Earlier institution:** The earlier suit must have been instituted before the later suit. The question is one of chronology: which suit was filed first. ➤ **Pendency:** The earlier suit must still be pending. Once it is finally decided, Section 10 ordinarily ceases to apply; the question thereafter may be one of res judicata under Section 11 CPC. ➤ **Competent civil proceeding:** The earlier proceeding must be a suit pending before a court of competent jurisdiction. A proceeding before a tribunal, labour court, administrative authority, or other forum under a special statute is not automatically treated as a “previously instituted suit” for Section 10. ➤ **Illustration:** A files a title suit against B in Delhi in January. B later files another title suit against A in Jaipur in March involving the same title dispute. The Delhi suit is the previously instituted suit. ### Matter in Issue Must Be Directly and Substantially the Same ➤ **Core requirement:** The matter in issue in the later suit must also be **directly and substantially in issue** in the earlier suit. ➤ **Directly and substantially:** An issue is directly and substantially in issue when its determination is necessary for granting or refusing the principal relief claimed. It must form the real controversy, not merely an incidental background fact. ➤ **Not collateral or incidental:** A common factual circumstance, common property, common contract, or common legal question is insufficient by itself. The issue must be central to both suits. ➤ **Whole controversy test:** The Supreme Court has emphasised that Section 10 does not apply merely because a few questions are common. The entire substantial matter in controversy must be identical in both suits. ➤ **Res judicata test:** Ask: **Would the final decision in the earlier suit operate as res judicata in the later suit?** If the answer is yes, Section 10 is likely attracted. If the answer is no, the later suit should not be stayed. ➤ **Same relief not always decisive:** Difference in relief alone may not prevent Section 10 if the actual matter in controversy remains identical. Conversely, even where both suits seek a similar relief, Section 10 will not apply if they arise from distinct causes of action or different factual periods. ### Same Parties or Parties Claiming Under Them ➤ **Identity of parties:** The earlier and later suits must be between the same parties. ➤ **Representative or derivative parties:** Exact personal identity is not always necessary. Section 10 also applies where parties claim under the same predecessors, such as legal representatives, transferees, heirs, assignees, or persons deriving title from a common party. ➤ **Same title:** The parties must be litigating under the same legal character or title. For example, a person suing as owner in one suit and as trustee in another may not necessarily be litigating under the same title. ➤ **Capacity matters:** The court examines the legal capacity in which parties litigate. Mere similarity of names or relationship between parties does not satisfy the condition. ### Earlier Court Must Have Jurisdiction to Grant Relief ➤ **Competence:** The court where the earlier suit is pending must have jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed in the later suit. ➤ **Jurisdictional requirement:** The earlier court must be competent regarding subject matter, territorial jurisdiction, pecuniary jurisdiction, and the nature of relief involved. ➤ **No stay where earlier court is incompetent:** If the earlier court lacks jurisdiction to grant the relevant relief, Section 10 cannot be invoked merely because an earlier proceeding exists. ➤ **Supreme Court clarification:** In *Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Owners & Parties, Vessel M.V. Fortune Express*, (2006) 3 SCC 100, the Supreme Court noted that Section 10 could not be used where there was no previously instituted suit pending before a competent court between the parties involving directly and substantially identical issues. ### Earlier Suit Must Be Pending in a Recognised Court ➤ **Indian courts:** The previous suit may be pending in the same court or another court in India having jurisdiction to grant the relief. ➤ **Supreme Court:** A suit pending before the Supreme Court satisfies the statutory requirement. ➤ **Court outside India established by Central Government:** The section also recognises a court beyond India which has been established or continued by the Central Government and has like jurisdiction. ➤ **Foreign court exception:** An ordinary foreign court does not trigger Section 10. The Explanation expressly permits Indian courts to try a suit even when a suit founded on the same cause of action is pending in a foreign court. ## Effect of Stay under Section 10 CPC ➤ **Stay of trial, not stay of suit:** The later suit remains on the file of the court. The court cannot proceed with its substantive trial until the earlier suit is decided. ➤ **Institution remains valid:** Filing of the later suit is not barred. This is important because limitation may expire if the plaintiff waits until the earlier suit is concluded. ➤ **Interlocutory powers remain available:** The court may still entertain applications for temporary injunction, appointment of receiver, attachment before judgment, consolidation of suits, or similar interlocutory reliefs. Section 10 does not paralyse every procedural action in the later suit. ➤ **No nullity of decree:** A decree passed despite Section 10 is not automatically void or a nullity. Since Section 10 is procedural, its breach may amount to an irregularity, but it does not inherently destroy the court’s jurisdiction. ➤ **Application should be raised promptly:** A party should place the earlier plaint, pleadings, and relevant orders before the court and demonstrate the identity of issues, parties, title, and jurisdiction. However, merely filing an application under Section 10 does not itself stop the court from dealing with the case. ## Scope of “Trial” under Section 10 CPC ➤ **Ordinary suits:** In an ordinary civil suit, the court must not proceed with the substantive adjudicatory stage once Section 10 is attracted. ➤ **Summary suits under Order XXXVII CPC:** In *Indian Bank v. Maharashtra State Cooperative Marketing Federation Ltd.*, (1998) 5 SCC 69; AIR 1998 SC 1952, the Supreme Court considered whether Section 10 applies to an Order XXXVII summary suit. The Bank had instituted a summary money suit while an earlier ordinary suit involving the dispute was pending. The Court held that Section 10 is procedural and does not prevent all action in the summary suit. In a summary suit, the “trial” begins only after leave to defend is granted. Therefore, the court may proceed up to the stage of considering leave to defend and may pass judgment where the defendant fails to obtain or comply with leave to defend; Section 10 restrains the trial only after the stage at which trial truly begins. ➤ **Pure legal issues:** In *Pukhraj D. Jain v. G. Gopalakrishna*, (2004) 7 SCC 251; AIR 2004 SC 3504, the Supreme Court dealt with a later specific-performance suit in which an application under Section 10 was pending because of an earlier eviction suit. The trial court dismissed the later suit on limitation and maintainability without first deciding the Section 10 application. The Supreme Court upheld that approach, holding that a mere Section 10 application does not create an embargo on examining merits. Where the later suit can be disposed of on a pure legal issue without recording evidence, the court may decide that issue rather than keep an untenable suit pending. ## Situations Where Section 10 CPC Does Not Apply ➤ **Different causes of action:** Section 10 does not apply where the suits arise from separate causes of action, even if the property, parties, or broad relief appear similar. ➤ **Different factual periods:** A subsequent cause of action arising from fresh facts is not automatically barred by an earlier suit based on an earlier period. ➤ **Few common questions:** Commonality of one or more issues is insufficient. The entire substantial controversy must be identical. ➤ **Different forums under special laws:** Section 10 ordinarily does not apply where one proceeding is before a civil court and the other is before a labour court, tribunal, or statutory authority functioning under a distinct legal framework. ➤ **Foreign court proceedings:** A pending suit before a foreign court does not prevent trial of a suit in India under the Explanation to Section 10. ➤ **Earlier suit not pending:** Once the earlier suit is finally decided, the question becomes one of res judicata, not res sub judice. ## Landmark Supreme Court Decisions on Section 10 CPC ### National Institute of Mental Health & Neuro Sciences v. C. Parameshwara **Citation:** (2005) 2 SCC 256; AIR 2005 SC 242. ➤ **Facts and issue:** NIMHANS filed a civil recovery suit against an employee for alleged pecuniary loss due to misappropriation of drugs. Separately, proceedings concerning the employee’s dismissal and reinstatement were pending through labour adjudication and a writ petition. The employee sought stay of the civil recovery suit under Section 10 CPC. ➤ **Ratio decidendi:** The Supreme Court held that Section 10 did not apply because the civil recovery suit and the labour/writ proceedings operated in distinct fields, arose from different causes of action, and did not involve the same subject matter. The Court laid down the fundamental test: whether the final decision in the earlier proceeding would operate as res judicata in the later suit. It also clarified that Section 10 refers to parallel civil suits before courts of concurrent jurisdiction and does not generally extend to proceedings under other statutes. ### Aspi Jal v. Khushroo Rustom Dadyburjor **Citation:** (2013) 4 SCC 333. ➤ **Facts and issue:** A landlord had earlier filed eviction suits based on non-user of premises during an earlier period. A later eviction suit was filed on the ground of non-user for a fresh six-month period immediately preceding the later suit. The tenant sought stay of the later suit under Section 10. ➤ **Ratio decidendi:** The Supreme Court held that the later suit should not be stayed. Although the parties, premises, and broad ground of eviction were similar, the relevant period of non-user and the cause of action were different. The Court held that Section 10 applies only where the whole substantial matter in controversy is identical, not where only a few matters are common. The Court suggested a practical question: if the earlier suit is dismissed, can the plaintiff still obtain relief in the later suit? If yes because the later suit rests on a distinct cause of action, Section 10 does not apply. ### Indian Bank v. Maharashtra State Cooperative Marketing Federation Ltd. **Citation:** (1998) 5 SCC 69; AIR 1998 SC 1952. ➤ **Facts and issue:** A summary suit under Order XXXVII CPC was filed while an earlier ordinary suit involving substantially similar issues was pending. The issue was whether Section 10 prevents all proceedings in a summary suit. ➤ **Ratio decidendi:** The Supreme Court held that Section 10 does not bar institution of the later suit and does not prohibit interlocutory or preliminary steps. In an Order XXXVII suit, trial begins only after leave to defend is granted. The court may therefore decide the leave-to-defend stage and may even pass judgment where no leave is obtained or conditions are not complied with. ### Pukhraj D. Jain v. G. Gopalakrishna **Citation:** (2004) 7 SCC 251; AIR 2004 SC 3504. ➤ **Facts and issue:** The plaintiff instituted a specific-performance suit and sought stay of that suit under Section 10 because an earlier eviction suit regarding the same property was pending. The later suit was dismissed on limitation and maintainability without first deciding the stay application. ➤ **Ratio decidendi:** The Supreme Court held that Section 10 is only a procedural rule and a pending application under Section 10 does not compel the court to suspend all consideration of the case. Where a later suit can be dismissed on a clear legal ground without trial, the court may do so. The Court further held that a decree passed contrary to Section 10 is not a nullity. ### Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal **Citation:** AIR 1962 SC 527; 1962 Supp (1) SCR 450. ➤ **Principle:** The Supreme Court explained the relationship between Section 10 and inherent powers under Section 151 CPC. Where Section 10 expressly governs the situation of parallel suits, a court cannot use Section 151 in a manner that defeats or bypasses the mandatory statutory scheme. Inherent powers may be exercised only where they do not conflict with the Code or legislative intent. ## Distinction Between Res Sub Judice and Res Judicata BasisRes Sub JudiceRes Judicata**Statutory provision**Section 10 CPCSection 11 CPC**Stage of earlier litigation**Earlier suit is pendingFormer suit has been heard and finally decided**Object**Avoid parallel trials and conflicting findingsGive finality to adjudication and prevent re-litigation**Effect**Stays trial of the later suitBars trial of the subsequent suit or issue**Nature**Temporary and preventiveFinal and conclusive**Earlier decision needed?**No final decision requiredFinal adjudication by a competent court is essential**Main test**Earlier decision would operate as res judicata if renderedMatter was directly and substantially in issue and finally decided**Consequences**Later suit remains pending but trial stopsLater suit or issue cannot be tried again➤ **Key distinction:** Section 10 operates **before** the earlier suit is finally decided. Section 11 operates **after** the earlier suit has been finally decided. Section 10 prevents duplication of trial; Section 11 prevents duplication of adjudication. Section 11 expressly bars re-trial of matters directly and substantially in issue that were heard and finally decided in a competent former suit. ## Quick Revision Formula ➤ **Remember: P-M-P-C-S** - **P – Previous suit:** Was an earlier suit instituted first and still pending? - **M – Matter in issue:** Is the substantial controversy identical? - **P – Parties:** Are the parties the same, or claiming under the same title? - **C – Competent court:** Can the earlier court grant the relevant relief? - **S – Stay of trial:** If all answers are yes, the later suit’s trial must be stayed. ➤ **Final rule:** Section 10 CPC is attracted only when the earlier pending civil suit and the later suit involve the same substantial dispute, between the same litigating parties or persons claiming under them, before a court competent to grant relief. It stays the later trial but does not extinguish the later suit. **Categories:** Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC), Legal Notes --- ### [Jurisdiction of Civil Courts under Section 9 CPC: Civil Nature of Suit, Express and Implied Bar, Jurisdictional Error and Landmark Cases](https://lawfoyer.in/jurisdiction-of-civil-courts-under-section-9-cpc/) **Published:** June 21, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun21202609_09_57P-725x1024.jpeg) ## 1.1 Meaning and Scope of Section 9 CPC 🔹 **Basic Rule:** Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 creates a broad presumption in favour of civil courts. It provides that: “The Courts shall … have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.” Thus, a civil court can ordinarily entertain every suit involving a civil right unless a statute clearly or necessarily excludes its power. 🔹 **Three Essential Conditions:** For Section 9 to apply, there must be: • a **suit**, ordinarily instituted by presentation of a plaint under Section 26 CPC; • a dispute of a **civil nature**; and • no **express or implied statutory bar** against the civil court’s jurisdiction. 🔹 **Meaning of Jurisdiction:** Jurisdiction means the legal authority of a court to receive, try and decide a matter. It includes authority over: • the **subject matter** of the dispute; • the **territory or place** where the dispute may be tried; • the **pecuniary value** of the claim; and • the parties or property involved. 🔹 **Section 9 is Not the Only Requirement:** Even where the suit is of a civil nature and is not barred, the court must also be competent under other CPC provisions. For example, Section 6 restricts a court from entertaining suits beyond its pecuniary limits; Section 15 requires filing in the court of the lowest grade competent to try it; and Section 16 generally requires suits concerning immovable property to be filed where the property is situated. 🔹 **“Subject to the Provisions Herein Contained”:** The opening words of Section 9 make the civil court’s jurisdiction subject to other provisions of the CPC. Therefore, even a civil suit may be affected by provisions such as Section 10 on stay of suit, Section 11 on res judicata, Section 15 on the proper court, and Sections 16–20 on place of suing. ## 1.2 Presumption in Favour of Civil Court Jurisdiction 🔹 **General Presumption:** Civil court jurisdiction is the rule; exclusion is the exception. A court should not readily assume that its jurisdiction has been taken away merely because a special tribunal, authority or departmental forum exists. 🔹 **Burden of Proof:** The party asserting that the civil court has no jurisdiction bears the burden of showing the statutory bar. The statute, its scheme, the remedies given and the powers of the special forum must be carefully examined. 🔹 **Important Principle:** A special statute may create a special authority, but creation of that authority alone does not automatically eliminate civil court jurisdiction. The intention to exclude must be clear from express words or must arise by necessary implication. ## 1.3 Civil Nature of Suit under Section 9 CPC 🔹 **Core Test:** A suit is of a civil nature when it concerns the determination, enforcement or protection of a private legal right, civil status, property right, office, management right, contractual right or other legally enforceable civil interest. 🔹 **Substance Over Form:** The court examines the real substance of the dispute and the principal relief claimed. A party cannot convert a non-civil dispute into a civil suit merely by clever drafting; similarly, a civil dispute does not lose its character merely because it has a religious, social or organisational background. 🔹 **Examples of Civil Nature:** The following ordinarily involve civil rights: • ownership, possession, partition or inheritance of property; • recovery of money, damages, rent or contractual dues; • right to hold an office attached to property, institution or endowment; • right to manage a trust, temple, church, mosque, society or institution where legal or proprietary rights are involved; • civil status, such as legitimacy, marriage-related property rights or succession; • right to salary, emoluments or benefits attached to an office. 🔹 **Purely Religious Questions:** A dispute involving only religious doctrine, ritual, ceremony, faith or spiritual belief may not by itself be civil. However, where the religious issue is connected with an enforceable right to property or office, the civil court may decide the necessary religious question incidentally. 🔹 **Explanation I to Section 9:** A suit concerning a right to property or office is of a civil nature even if the decision depends entirely upon questions relating to religious rites or ceremonies. 🔹 **Explanation II to Section 9:** It is immaterial whether the office has fees attached to it or whether it is attached to a particular place. These explanations make the expression “civil nature” intentionally broad. They were inserted by the 1976 amendment to the CPC with effect from 1 February 1977. 🔹 **Illustration:** A dispute between two groups over the management of a temple and the right to appoint its priest may be civil if it affects property, office, salary, management or legal control. In contrast, a mere disagreement over the preferred method of prayer, without any associated legal or proprietary right, may not independently create a civil suit. ### Landmark Case: Civil Nature of Religious and Institutional Disputes 🔹 **Most Rev. P.M.A. Metropolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 286:** The dispute arose from the Malankara Church and involved questions of ecclesiastical authority, church administration and control of church-related rights and property. The issue was whether the civil court could entertain a matter having religious elements. The Supreme Court held that where civil, proprietary, administrative or office-related rights are involved, the civil court has jurisdiction even though resolution may require consideration of religious practices or church rules. The guiding principle is that the court does not decide theological correctness as such; it decides enforceable civil rights. ## 1.4 Express Bar of Civil Court Jurisdiction 🔹 **Meaning:** An express bar exists where a statute uses direct words excluding the jurisdiction of civil courts. Common expressions include: • “No civil court shall have jurisdiction”; • “The decision of the Tribunal shall be final”; • “No suit shall lie”; • “The matter shall be decided only by the designated authority.” 🔹 **Strict Construction:** Even an express bar must be interpreted carefully. The court must determine: • what exact dispute is barred; • which relief is barred; • whether the special authority can grant the relief sought; and • whether the suit challenges an action wholly outside the statute. 🔹 **Finality Clause:** A statutory clause stating that an authority’s order is “final” is relevant but not always conclusive. The court must still examine whether the statute intended to exclude civil remedies for the particular dispute. ### Landmark Case: Revenue Forum and Express Statutory Bar 🔹 **Hatti v. Sunder Singh, AIR 1971 SC 2320; (1971) 2 SCR 163:** The dispute concerned a claim relating to bhumidhari rights under the Delhi Land Reforms Act. A civil suit was filed to question rights that the statute placed within the competence of revenue authorities. The Supreme Court considered whether the civil court could decide the matter despite the statutory revenue mechanism. It held that where the special statute specifically creates rights, identifies the competent revenue forum and provides the prescribed procedure, the civil court’s jurisdiction is excluded in respect of matters assigned to that forum. The case illustrates a true statutory bar where the special law provides an exclusive adjudicatory structure. ## 1.5 Implied Bar of Civil Court Jurisdiction 🔹 **Meaning:** An implied bar does not arise from direct exclusionary words. It arises where the scheme of the statute shows that the legislature intended the special forum to decide the matter exclusively. 🔹 **Necessary Implication Test:** A civil court’s jurisdiction is impliedly barred only when the special statute: • creates a new right or liability unknown to ordinary law; • establishes a special tribunal or authority to determine that right or liability; • provides a complete procedure and remedy; • gives finality to the decision of the special authority; and • substantially provides the reliefs ordinarily available before a civil court. 🔹 **Mere Alternative Remedy is Insufficient:** The existence of an appeal, departmental remedy or tribunal does not automatically bar a civil suit. The statutory mechanism must indicate an intention to replace the civil court for that category of dispute. 🔹 **Adequate Remedy:** Where the special statute provides an effective remedy for correcting errors, the civil court will generally respect the statutory route. However, if the authority acts outside the statute, violates fundamental procedure or cannot grant the essential relief, civil jurisdiction may survive. ### Landmark Case: The Seven Principles on Exclusion of Jurisdiction 🔹 **Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1969 SC 78; (1968) 3 SCR 662:** Tobacco dealers challenged sales-tax assessments and recovery under the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act, contending that the levy and proceedings were unlawful. The issue was whether the statutory taxation machinery barred a civil suit. The Supreme Court laid down the leading principles governing exclusion of civil court jurisdiction. It held that where a statute gives finality to orders of special tribunals and provides adequate remedies, civil jurisdiction may be excluded; however, exclusion is not readily inferred, and a civil suit may still lie where statutory provisions are not complied with, fundamental principles of judicial procedure are violated, or the authority acts beyond the statute. 🔹 **Dhulabhai Principles Simplified:** • **Finality plus remedy:** A finality clause with an adequate statutory remedy may exclude the civil court. • **Express bar:** Where the bar is express, the statutory scheme and remedies are relevant, though adequacy is not always decisive. • **Implied bar:** Where no express bar exists, the court must examine whether the statute creates a special right, a special forum and a complete remedy. • **Ultra vires action:** A civil court may intervene where the authority acts wholly outside the statute or violates fundamental procedural safeguards. • **Illegal levy or recovery:** If a statute does not provide a mechanism for refund or correction of an unconstitutional or unlawful exaction, a civil suit may remain available. • **Assessment errors:** Errors within the statutory assessment process ordinarily belong to the statutory authorities and appellate bodies. • **No easy exclusion:** The exclusion of civil court jurisdiction cannot be presumed lightly. ### Landmark Case: Special Tribunal Does Not Automatically Oust Civil Court 🔹 **Firm Seth Radha Kishan v. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Ludhiana, AIR 1963 SC 1547; (1964) 2 SCR 273:** A firm sought refund of terminal tax collected by a municipal committee under the Punjab Municipal Act. The issue was whether the existence of statutory assessment and appeal provisions automatically prevented a civil suit. The Supreme Court held that the mere conferment of special jurisdiction on a tribunal does not by itself exclude the civil court. Where a statute creates a liability and provides a complete special remedy, that remedy should normally be followed; however, a civil suit may lie where the authority acts outside the Act, abuses its power or levies a tax on something not taxable at all. ### Landmark Case: Tribunal Must Have Power Over the Exact Dispute 🔹 **Ramesh Gobindram v. Sugra Humayun Mirza Wakf, (2010) 8 SCC 726; (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 553:** The dispute concerned eviction of a tenant from wakf property. The issue was whether the Wakf Tribunal had jurisdiction over a landlord–tenant eviction dispute merely because the property was wakf property. The Supreme Court held that civil court jurisdiction cannot be excluded unless the statute gives the tribunal power over that specific type of dispute and authorises it to grant the relevant relief. Since the statute then in force did not clearly confer eviction jurisdiction on the tribunal, the civil court remained competent. The broader principle is that a tribunal cannot assume jurisdiction by implication beyond what the statute confers. ## 1.6 Practical Test for Deciding Whether Civil Court Jurisdiction Is Excluded 🔹 **Step One — Identify the Right:** Ask whether the claim concerns property, possession, office, contract, status, money, management or another enforceable civil right. 🔹 **Step Two — Identify the Special Statute:** Determine whether a special enactment governs the right, liability or relief claimed. 🔹 **Step Three — Read the Exact Provision:** Look for express exclusionary words, finality clauses, special forums, appeal provisions and limitation periods. 🔹 **Step Four — Compare Reliefs:** Ask whether the statutory tribunal can grant the same effective relief that the plaintiff seeks from the civil court. 🔹 **Step Five — Examine the Allegation:** Distinguish between: • an authority acting wrongly within its statutory powers; and • an authority acting wholly outside the statute or without jurisdiction. 🔹 **Step Six — Apply the Presumption:** If doubt remains, civil court jurisdiction is ordinarily retained because exclusion cannot be inferred casually. ## 1.7 Jurisdictional Error 🔹 **Meaning:** A jurisdictional error occurs when a court or tribunal either: • assumes jurisdiction that it does not possess; • refuses to exercise jurisdiction that it does possess; or • exercises jurisdiction in a manner forbidden by law or with material procedural irregularity. 🔹 **Error Within Jurisdiction:** A court may have jurisdiction to decide a matter but may decide it wrongly on facts or law. Such a mistake is generally an error within jurisdiction. It does not automatically make the decree void; it is normally corrected through appeal, review or revision. 🔹 **Error Outside Jurisdiction:** Where the court lacks legal authority over the subject matter, or where a statute bars it from entertaining the matter, the defect goes to the root of the case. The resulting decree may be a nullity. 🔹 **Section 115 CPC:** Revision under Section 115 CPC is concerned with jurisdictional defects where a subordinate court: • exercised jurisdiction not vested in it; • failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it; or • acted illegally or with material irregularity while exercising jurisdiction. Revision is not a substitute for a full appeal on facts or ordinary legal errors. ### Landmark Case: Decree Passed Without Jurisdiction Is a Nullity 🔹 **Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340; 1955 1 SCR 117:** The suit had been wrongly valued, which affected the appellate forum that heard the matter. The issue was whether a decree passed by a court lacking jurisdiction could be treated as valid merely because the parties had proceeded before it. The Supreme Court held that a decree passed without jurisdiction is a nullity and its invalidity may be raised in execution proceedings or even collaterally. At the same time, the Court clarified that an objection based on pecuniary or territorial jurisdiction must ordinarily show prejudice or failure of justice before the decree is disturbed. ### Landmark Case: Inherent Lack of Jurisdiction Cannot Be Waived 🔹 **Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra, (1990) 1 SCC 193:** The case concerned the effect of a decree where the competence of the court under a special statutory framework was questioned. The issue was whether such a decree could operate as res judicata despite an inherent jurisdictional defect. The Supreme Court held that a decree passed by a court lacking subject-matter jurisdiction, or jurisdiction going to the root of the matter, is coram non judice and a nullity. Consent, acquiescence, waiver or an earlier erroneous decision cannot confer inherent jurisdiction where the statute denies it. ### Landmark Case: Wrong Exercise Is Different from Absence of Jurisdiction 🔹 **Rafique Bibi v. Sayed Waliuddin, (2004) 1 SCC 287:** The validity and executability of a decree were challenged during execution. The issue was whether every legal or procedural error in a decree makes it void. The Supreme Court held that a decree becomes a nullity only where the court has usurped jurisdiction that it never possessed; a mere wrong or irregular exercise of jurisdiction does not render the decree void. An executing court can treat a decree as void only where the lack of inherent jurisdiction is patent, not where the objection requires re-examination of the merits. ## 1.8 Lack of Jurisdiction and Irregular Exercise of Jurisdiction: Distinction BasisLack of JurisdictionIrregular or Wrong Exercise of Jurisdiction**Authority of Court**The court has no legal authority to entertain the matter.The court has authority but commits an error while using it.**Typical Example**Subject matter is assigned exclusively to a tribunal, revenue authority or special court.Court wrongly interprets evidence, misapplies procedure or commits an error of law.**Effect on Decree**Decree is generally void, non est or a nullity.Decree is valid until set aside by appeal, review or revision.**Waiver or Consent**Cannot be cured by consent, waiver or acquiescence.Some objections, especially territorial or pecuniary objections, may be waived.**Stage of Objection**Can ordinarily be raised at any stage if inherent lack is shown.Must usually be raised promptly in the trial court or appellate proceedings.**Execution Stage**Executing court may refuse to enforce a decree that is patently void for lack of jurisdiction.Executing court cannot generally go behind the decree to correct ordinary errors.🔹 **Section 21 CPC:** Objections relating to place of suing or pecuniary jurisdiction must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity and ordinarily before settlement of issues. Further, an appellate or revisional court will not interfere unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. 🔹 **Important Caution:** Territorial jurisdiction is ordinarily treated differently from subject-matter jurisdiction. However, where a suit directly concerns immovable property outside the court’s territorial limits, Section 16 may prevent the court from granting an effective decree concerning that property. ### Landmark Case: Section 16 and Immovable Property 🔹 **Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd., (2005) 7 SCC 791:** The suit sought specific performance and possession relating to immovable property, while the property was situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court approached. The issue was whether the parties’ agreement or convenience could confer jurisdiction on that court. The Supreme Court held that suits concerning rights in immovable property must normally be filed where the property is situated because a court cannot grant an effective decree in respect of property beyond its territorial reach. Parties cannot create jurisdiction by consent where the statute does not confer it. ### Landmark Case: Territorial Objection May Be Waived 🔹 **Hiralal Patni v. Kali Nath, AIR 1962 SC 199; (1962) 2 SCR 747:** A suit was instituted on the original side of the Bombay High Court, and a territorial objection was raised after the parties had proceeded with the matter and agreed to reference through the court. The issue was whether the territorial defect made the proceedings void. The Supreme Court held that an objection to local jurisdiction does not ordinarily go to the inherent competence of the court and may be waived. The case explains why Section 21 CPC requires timely objection and proof of failure of justice. ## 1.9 Procedural Stages for Raising Jurisdictional Objections 🔹 **Return of Plaint — Order VII Rule 10 CPC:** Where the court lacks jurisdiction but another competent court can entertain the suit, the plaint should ordinarily be returned for presentation before the proper court. 🔹 **Rejection of Plaint — Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC:** Where the suit appears from the plaint itself to be barred by law, the plaint must be rejected. The court examines the plaint averments and documents relied upon by the plaintiff; it does not decide disputed facts by relying upon the written statement. ### Landmark Case: Bar Must Be Apparent from the Plaint 🔹 **Kamala v. K.T. Eshwara Sa, (2008) 12 SCC 661:** The defendant sought rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit was barred by law. The issue was whether the court could rely on the defence and disputed facts while deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11(d). The Supreme Court held that the question of statutory bar at the plaint-rejection stage must be determined primarily from the plaint and the documents annexed to it. The defendant’s version or evidence cannot be used to defeat the plaint at that threshold stage. ## 1.10 Constitutional Limitation on Ouster Clauses 🔹 **Civil Court and Constitutional Court Are Different:** Section 9 concerns ordinary civil court jurisdiction. It does not itself determine the constitutional powers of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 or of the Supreme Court under Article 32. ### Landmark Case: Judicial Review Cannot Be Completely Excluded 🔹 **L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261:** The petition challenged provisions associated with tribunals and the attempted exclusion of High Court judicial review. The issue was whether Parliament could completely remove the power of constitutional courts to review decisions of tribunals. The Supreme Court held that judicial review under Articles 226, 227 and 32 forms part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Tribunals may act as forums of first instance within their statutory fields, but their decisions remain subject to judicial review by constitutional courts. ## 1.11 Quick Revision Formula 🔹 **CIVIL Test for Section 9 CPC:** • **C — Civil right:** Is there an enforceable legal, proprietary, office-related or status-related right? • **I — Identify statute:** Does a special law govern the dispute? • **V — Verify bar:** Is the bar express, or does it arise by necessary implication? • **I — Inspect remedy:** Can the special forum provide an effective and complete remedy? • **L — Look at jurisdiction:** Does the chosen court have subject-matter, territorial and pecuniary competence? ## 1.12 Key Takeaways 🔹 **Section 9 Rule:** Civil courts can try all suits of a civil nature unless jurisdiction is expressly or impliedly barred. 🔹 **Civil Nature:** Property, office, management, contract, status and enforceable private rights are ordinarily civil matters. 🔹 **Religious Element:** Religious questions do not oust civil jurisdiction where property, office or civil rights are involved. 🔹 **Express Bar:** Clear statutory language may exclude civil jurisdiction. 🔹 **Implied Bar:** It exists only where the statutory scheme demonstrates an intention to create an exclusive and effective alternative forum. 🔹 **Jurisdictional Error:** Not every mistake is jurisdictional. A wrong decision within jurisdiction is generally correctable by appeal or revision; a decision without inherent jurisdiction is void. 🔹 **Waiver:** Territorial and pecuniary objections may be waived if not promptly raised and if no failure of justice is shown. Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot ordinarily be created by consent or waiver. **Categories:** Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC), Legal Notes --- ### [Section 2 CPC Important Definitions: Decree, Judgment, Order, Legal Representative, Mesne Profits and Foreign Judgment](https://lawfoyer.in/section-2-cpc-important-definition/) **Published:** June 21, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun21202609_03_42P-725x1024.jpeg) ## Core Purpose of Section 2 CPC Definitions • **Interpretive role —** Section 2 supplies the technical meanings of important expressions used throughout the CPC. These meanings ordinarily control wherever the expressions occur, unless the subject or context requires a different interpretation. • **Practical importance —** The definitions decide major procedural questions: whether an appeal lies, whether execution can be initiated, who may continue proceedings after death of a party, whether compensation for wrongful possession can be claimed, and whether a foreign decision can be recognised or executed in India. • **Memory key —** **Judgment = reasons** **Decree = conclusive formal result in a suit** **Order = formal decision which is not a decree** **Decree-holder = person entitled to execute** **Judgment-debtor = person liable under an executable decree or order** The statutory definitions of these expressions are contained in Section 2 CPC. ExpressionProvisionQuick MeaningDecreeSection 2(2)Formal and conclusive adjudication in a suitDecree-holderSection 2(3)Person in whose favour decree or executable order is madeForeign CourtSection 2(5)Court outside India not established or continued by Central GovernmentForeign JudgmentSection 2(6)Judgment of a foreign courtJudgmentSection 2(9)Statement of reasons for a decree or orderJudgment-debtorSection 2(10)Person against whom decree or executable order is madeLegal representativeSection 2(11)Person legally representing estate of deceased personMesne profitsSection 2(12)Profits from wrongful possession, including interestOrderSection 2(14)Formal expression of a civil court decision which is not a decreePublic officerSection 2(17)Person falling within statutory categories of public authority## Decree under Section 2(2) CPC ### Meaning and Essential Ingredients of a Decree • **Formal expression —** A decree is not merely the court’s oral conclusion or a finding recorded in a judgment. It is the formal expression of the court’s adjudication. Order XX Rule 6 requires the decree to agree with the judgment and clearly specify the relief granted or other determination in the suit. • **Adjudication —** There must be a judicial determination by a competent civil court. A ministerial, administrative, or purely procedural act does not become a decree merely because it affects a party. • **Suit requirement —** The adjudication must arise in a **suit**. Therefore, every decision in every proceeding is not automatically a decree. • **Rights of parties —** The adjudication must determine the rights of parties concerning all or any matter in controversy in the suit. It must concern substantive rights rather than merely regulate procedure. • **Conclusive determination —** The decision must be conclusive so far as the court passing it is concerned. It need not end the entire litigation; it may conclusively decide one stage or one part of the controversy. • **Illustration —** In a suit for possession, a determination that the plaintiff is owner and entitled to recover possession conclusively decides rights. When formally drawn up, it is a decree. ### Preliminary, Final and Partly Preliminary Decrees • **Preliminary decree —** A decree is preliminary when further proceedings remain necessary before the suit can be completely disposed of. It conclusively determines rights at that stage but leaves further work, such as accounts, division by metes and bounds, or calculation of amounts. • **Final decree —** A decree is final when it completely disposes of the suit and leaves nothing further for judicial determination by the trial court. • **Partly preliminary and partly final decree —** A decree may finally decide one matter while leaving another matter for further inquiry. For example, in a mortgage suit, liability may be determined finally while the amount payable or enforcement consequences may require further proceedings. • **Partition illustration —** In a partition suit, the preliminary decree declares each co-owner’s share. The final decree actually divides the property by metes and bounds or specifies the separate allotments. • **Case law – Venkata Reddy v. Pethi Reddy, AIR 1963 SC 992** — The dispute concerned the legal character of a preliminary decree and whether it was merely tentative because a final decree remained to be passed. The Supreme Court held that a preliminary decree in a partition or mortgage suit is conclusive regarding the matters decided by it, even though it may not itself be executable. The ratio is that finality does not depend upon immediate executability; a party dissatisfied with a preliminary decree must challenge it at the appropriate stage rather than wait for the final decree. • **Case law – Shankar Balwant Lokhande (Dead) through LRs v. Chandrakant Shankar Lokhande, (1995) 3 SCC 413; AIR 1995 SC 1211** — In a partition-related dispute, the Court considered the position of a final decree and the procedural steps necessary before it becomes enforceable. The Supreme Court explained that a partition suit continues until the final decree is passed; where the final decree requires engrossment on proper stamp paper, enforceability arises only after the decree is duly prepared, signed and sealed in accordance with law. The ratio is that the preliminary decree declares rights, whereas the properly drawn final decree gives executable form to the ultimate division. ### Matters Included and Excluded from a Decree • **Deemed decree —** Section 2(2) expressly treats the following as decrees even though they may not fit the ordinary meaning: - rejection of a plaint; and - determination of a question under **Section 144 CPC**, dealing with restitution. • **Rejection of plaint —** An order rejecting a plaint, including under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, is treated as a decree because it conclusively terminates the suit at that stage. The remedy is ordinarily an appeal as against a decree. • **Restitution —** When a decree is reversed or varied, Section 144 enables the court to restore parties to the position they would have occupied but for the earlier decree. A determination under Section 144 is deemed to be a decree. • **Excluded adjudications —** The following are not decrees: - an adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order; and - an order dismissing a suit for default. • **Dismissal for default —** When a suit is dismissed because the plaintiff does not appear, there is no adjudication on merits. Therefore, it is not a decree. The appropriate remedy may be restoration under Order IX CPC, subject to the applicable requirements. • **Historical amendment —** Before the 1976 amendment, the definition also referred to determinations under Section 47 CPC. The Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 omitted that reference. Consequently, a Section 47 determination is generally treated as an order rather than a deemed decree, though it remains subject to the CPC’s separate appeal provisions. ### Decree and Execution • **Execution principle —** A decree is the enforceable command of the court. The executing court must ordinarily execute it as it stands and cannot reopen the merits of the original dispute. • **Case law – Topanmal Chhotamal v. Kundomal Gangaram, AIR 1960 SC 388** — A decree against a partnership firm was sought to be executed in a manner that raised issues concerning the liability of persons connected with the firm. The Supreme Court held that an executing court cannot go behind the decree: it must take the decree as binding and conclusive between the parties, though it may interpret an ambiguity to give proper effect to it. The ratio protects the distinction between adjudication of rights in the suit and enforcement of those adjudicated rights in execution. ## Decree-holder under Section 2(3) CPC • **Meaning —** A decree-holder is any person in whose favour a decree has been passed or an order capable of execution has been made. • **Not limited to plaintiff —** Usually, the successful plaintiff is the decree-holder. However, a defendant may also become a decree-holder where costs, a counterclaim, a set-off, restitution, or another executable relief is granted in that defendant’s favour. • **Executable order —** The definition includes a person in whose favour an executable order has been made. Therefore, the expression is wider than a person holding only a decree. • **Joint decree-holders —** Where a decree is jointly passed in favour of several persons, one or more may apply for execution for the benefit of all, unless the decree itself provides otherwise. • **Transferee of decree —** A transferee by written assignment or operation of law may apply for execution under Order XXI Rule 16 CPC. The transferee executes subject to the equities which the judgment-debtor could have asserted against the original decree-holder. • **Illustration —** A obtains a money decree against B. A is the decree-holder and B is the judgment-debtor. If A assigns the decree validly to C, C may seek execution under Order XXI Rule 16. ## Judgment under Section 2(9) CPC ### Meaning and Function of a Judgment • **Reasoned foundation —** A judgment is the statement given by the judge of the grounds for a decree or order. It explains the court’s reasoning: what the dispute was, what issues arose, what the court decided, and why it reached that decision. • **Sequence —** The ordinary sequence is: hearing of the case → judgment → drawing up of decree. Section 33 CPC provides that after hearing the case, the court shall pronounce judgment and a decree shall follow on that judgment. • **Order XX Rule 4 —** A judgment of courts other than Courts of Small Causes must contain: - a concise statement of the case; - points for determination; - decision on those points; and - reasons for the decision. • **Difference from decree —** A judgment contains the **reasons**; a decree formally records the **conclusive adjudication and relief**. A judgment may result in either a decree or an order. • **Case law – Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan, (1999) 8 SCC 396; AIR 1999 SC 3381** — In a suit for specific performance, the defendant failed to file a written statement, and the question was whether the court could mechanically decree the suit under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC. The Supreme Court held that even where a defendant defaults, the court must apply its mind to the pleadings and material before it. The ratio is that a judgment must satisfy Section 2(9) and Order XX Rule 4: it cannot be a mechanical declaration unsupported by reasons, findings, and judicial consideration of the plaintiff’s entitlement. ## Order under Section 2(14) CPC • **Meaning —** An order is the formal expression of any decision of a civil court which is not a decree. • **Residual category —** Every formal civil court decision is either a decree or an order. Where the decision does not satisfy the statutory requirements of a decree, it is ordinarily an order. • **Interlocutory nature —** Many orders are interim or procedural, such as orders granting or refusing temporary injunction, appointing a receiver, granting adjournment, directing discovery, or deciding an application during the suit. • **Executable order —** Some orders are capable of execution, for example an order directing payment of money, delivery of property, or compliance with an injunction. Section 36 CPC applies provisions relating to execution of decrees, as far as applicable, to execution of orders. • **Appeal distinction —** Every original decree is generally appealable under Section 96 CPC, subject to statutory exceptions. In contrast, an appeal from an order lies only where the CPC or another law expressly permits it, principally under Section 104 and Order XLIII Rule 1 CPC. BasisJudgmentDecreeOrderMain functionGives reasonsFormally records conclusive adjudication in a suitFormally records a decision not amounting to decreeNatureExplanatoryConclusiveMay be interim or finalAppealUsually challenged through appeal from decree/orderGenerally appealable under Section 96Appeal only if expressly permittedExecutionNot independently executedNormally executableExecutable only when capable of execution## Judgment-debtor under Section 2(10) CPC • **Meaning —** A judgment-debtor is any person against whom a decree has been passed or an order capable of execution has been made. • **Execution focus —** The term becomes important at the execution stage. The judgment-debtor is the person legally bound to satisfy the decree or executable order. • **Not always defendant —** Although usually the defendant is the judgment-debtor, a plaintiff may become judgment-debtor where the plaintiff is directed to pay costs, make restitution, or comply with an executable direction. • **Legal representative liability —** If a judgment-debtor dies before complete satisfaction of the decree, execution may proceed against the legal representative. However, liability is limited to the extent of the deceased’s property that came into the legal representative’s hands and was not duly disposed of. ## Legal Representative under Section 2(11) CPC ### Meaning and Scope • **Estate representation —** A legal representative is a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person. • **Inclusive definition —** The definition is deliberately broad. It includes: - legal heirs; - executors; - administrators; - persons who have possession or control of the estate; - persons who intermeddle with the estate; and - in representative litigation, the person on whom the estate devolves after death of the party suing or sued in that representative capacity. • **Intermeddler —** An intermeddler is a person who, without lawful authority, deals with or takes control of the deceased person’s estate in a manner suggesting assumption of its management. Such a person can be treated as legal representative to protect the estate and persons dealing with it. • **Not identical with heir —** A legal representative need not always be the ultimate heir entitled to inherit. The central question is whether that person represents the estate for the purpose of the proceeding. • **Case law – Custodian of Branches of Banco National Ultramarino v. Nalini Bai Naique, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 275; AIR 1989 SC 1589** — The case arose from a dispute about abatement after the death of a party and the proper person to represent the deceased estate. The Supreme Court held that Section 2(11) is inclusive and wide; it is not confined to legal heirs alone. A person who may not inherit the estate can nevertheless be a legal representative where that person represents, administers, or possesses the estate. The ratio is that procedural representation of the estate, rather than strict succession title alone, controls the application of Section 2(11). ### Legal Representative under Order XXII CPC • **Substitution —** Where a party dies and the right to sue survives, the court must bring the legal representative on record under Order XXII CPC. • **Summary inquiry —** Order XXII Rule 5 requires the court to determine who is or is not the legal representative when a dispute arises. This inquiry is made for continuation of the proceeding; it does not ordinarily finally decide disputed succession rights or title to the estate. • **Case law – Jaladi Suguna (Deceased) through LRs v. Satya Sai Central Trust, (2008) 8 SCC 521** — The dispute involved the procedure for bringing persons on record after the death of a litigant. The Supreme Court held that merely filing an application for substitution does not automatically bring a person on record; the court must decide the application and determine whether the proposed person should represent the estate. The ratio is that substitution under Order XXII is a judicial act based on a summary determination, not an automatic consequence of a claim of heirship. • **Execution limitation —** Under Section 50 CPC, the estate of the deceased judgment-debtor can be proceeded against, but the legal representative is not personally liable beyond the property of the deceased that actually came into his or her hands. ## Mesne Profits under Section 2(12) CPC ### Meaning and Elements • **Wrongful possession —** Mesne profits are profits which a person in wrongful possession of property actually received or could, with ordinary diligence, have received. • **Compensatory object —** Mesne profits compensate the person lawfully entitled to possession for the benefits wrongfully enjoyed by another person. They are not a punishment and are generally in the nature of damages for deprivation of use and income. • **Essential formula —** **Mesne profits = actual profits received + profits reasonably obtainable with ordinary diligence + interest − profits due to improvements made by wrongful possessor** • **Interest —** Interest on mesne profits forms part of the statutory definition. • **Exclusion of improvements —** Profits attributable to improvements made by the person in wrongful possession are excluded. The owner can recover the benefit naturally arising from the property, but not the additional gain exclusively created through the trespasser’s own improvements. • **Distinction from rent —** Rent arises from lawful possession under a contract, lease, tenancy, or other legal arrangement. Mesne profits arise after possession becomes wrongful, for example after lawful tenancy has ended and the occupant continues in possession without authority. • **Assessment —** The court may consider market rent, actual income, comparable rentals, nature of property, location, evidence of earnings, and the profits that ordinary diligence could have produced. No rigid universal formula applies. • **Case law – Lucy Kochuvareed v. P. Mariappa Gounder, (1979) 3 SCC 150; AIR 1979 SC 1214** — In execution proceedings connected with a specific performance dispute concerning a factory property, the parties contested the rate and period of mesne profits. The Supreme Court treated mesne profits as compensatory damages and upheld an assessment based on reliable evidence of the property’s real rental value where more precise evidence of actual profits was unavailable. The ratio is that wrongful possession is the foundation of mesne profits and their assessment must be moulded according to the justice of the case, not through an inflexible formula. ### Mesne Profits under Order XX Rule 12 CPC • **Possession suit —** In a suit for recovery of possession of immovable property, the court may pass a decree for possession and may also grant mesne profits or direct an inquiry into them. • **Future mesne profits —** The court may direct an inquiry from institution of the suit until the earliest of: - delivery of possession to the decree-holder; - relinquishment of possession by the judgment-debtor with notice through court; or - expiry of three years from the date of decree. • **Final decree after inquiry —** Where the court directs an inquiry into rent or mesne profits, a final decree is passed according to the result of that inquiry. ## Foreign Court under Section 2(5) CPC • **Meaning —** A foreign court is a court situated outside India that is not established or continued by the authority of the Central Government. • **Location and authority test —** Two elements are important: - the court must be situated outside India; and - it must not be a court established or continued by Central Government authority. • **Practical relevance —** The expression is important because Sections 13 and 14 CPC determine the conclusiveness of foreign judgments, while Section 44A provides a special execution mechanism for decrees of superior courts in notified reciprocating territories. ## Foreign Judgment under Section 2(6) CPC ### Meaning and Recognition • **Meaning —** A foreign judgment means the judgment of a foreign court. • **Not automatically enforceable —** Merely because a decision is a foreign judgment does not mean that it can automatically be recognised or executed in India. Its conclusiveness is governed principally by Sections 13 and 14 CPC. • **Section 13 rule —** A foreign judgment is generally conclusive regarding a matter directly adjudicated between the same parties, or persons claiming under them under the same title, unless one of the statutory exceptions applies. • **Six exceptions —** A foreign judgment is not conclusive where: - the foreign court lacked competent jurisdiction; - it was not given on merits; - it is based on an incorrect view of international law or refuses to recognise applicable Indian law; - the proceedings were opposed to natural justice; - it was obtained by fraud; or - it sustains a claim founded on breach of Indian law. • **Section 14 presumption —** A certified copy of a foreign judgment raises a rebuttable presumption that the foreign court had competent jurisdiction. The presumption can be displaced by proving lack of jurisdiction. • **Memory aid – CMINFL test —** **C**ompetent jurisdiction **M**erits **I**nternational law and applicable Indian law **N**atural justice **F**raud **L**aw in force in India ### Execution of Foreign Decrees under Section 44A CPC • **Reciprocating territory —** A certified copy of a decree of a superior court in a notified reciprocating territory may be filed before an Indian District Court and executed as if passed by that District Court. • **Money decree requirement —** For Section 44A, “decree” generally covers a money decree or judgment. It excludes taxes, similar charges, fines, penalties, and arbitration awards. • **Section 13 safeguard —** Even in execution under Section 44A, the Indian District Court must refuse execution if the foreign decree falls within any Section 13 exception. • **Case law – Alcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. Celem S.A. of FOS 34320 Roujan, France, (2017) 2 SCC 253** — An English court passed a reasoned order on jurisdiction and costs after both parties had participated by producing material and arguments. The judgment-debtor resisted execution in India, contending that the foreign order was interlocutory and not on merits. The Supreme Court held that a foreign decision is on merits when parties had a fair opportunity to present their case and the foreign court considered rival submissions before giving a reasoned decision. The ratio is that a reasoned foreign costs order from a notified superior court may be executable under Section 44A, unless it falls within Section 13 CPC. • **Case law – International Woollen Mills v. Standard Wool (U.K.) Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 265; AIR 2001 SC 2134** — A foreign decree was sought to be enforced in India, raising the question whether an ex parte decree had been given on merits. The Supreme Court held that an ex parte decree is not automatically non-conclusive; it may be on merits where the foreign court considered evidence and applied its mind to the claim. However, a decree granted merely because of default, without judicial examination of the merits, is not enforceable under Section 13(b) CPC. • **Case law – Satya v. Teja Singh, (1975) 1 SCC 120** — A husband obtained a foreign divorce decree after asserting a foreign domicile, and the wife challenged its validity in India. The Supreme Court held that a foreign judgment procured by fraud, including fraud relating to jurisdictional facts such as domicile, is not conclusive under Section 13 CPC. The ratio is that Indian courts are not bound to recognise a foreign judgment where the foreign court’s jurisdiction was fraudulently invoked or where statutory requirements of conclusiveness are not met. • **Case law – Y. Narasimha Rao v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi, (1991) 3 SCC 451** — A foreign matrimonial decree was relied upon in India despite the wife not having effectively submitted to the foreign court’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that recognition of foreign matrimonial judgments depends on jurisdictional competence, grounds recognised by Indian matrimonial law, fairness of procedure, and genuine opportunity to contest. The ratio is that a foreign divorce decree cannot defeat Indian matrimonial rights merely because it has been issued abroad. ## Public Officer under Section 2(17) CPC ### Meaning and Categories • **Broad functional definition —** A public officer is a person falling within any one of the categories listed in Section 2(17). The definition is not confined to one government department or designation. • **Judicial category —** Every judge is a public officer. • **All-India Service category —** Every member of an All-India Service is a public officer. • **Armed forces category —** Commissioned or gazetted officers serving in military, naval, or air forces under the Government are covered. • **Court officer category —** Officers of courts of justice performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions are covered. This includes persons whose duties involve investigation or report on legal or factual matters, authentication or custody of documents, execution of judicial process, administration of oaths, interpretation, maintenance of order, or other duties specially authorised by a court. • **Confinement category —** Any person holding an office by virtue of which that person can place or keep another person in confinement is included. • **Public protection category —** Government officers whose duties include prevention of offences, giving information about offences, bringing offenders to justice, or protecting public health, safety, or convenience are public officers. • **Government property and revenue category —** Officers responsible for government property, government revenue, pecuniary interests of Government, surveys, assessments, contracts, revenue process, or protection of Government’s financial interests fall within the definition. • **General public-duty category —** Every person in Government service or pay, or remunerated by fees or commission for performance of public duty, is included. The statutory categories of public officer are extensive and are set out in Section 2(17)(a)–(h) CPC. ### Procedural Relevance of Public Officer • **Official-capacity suits —** The expression is particularly important in suits against Government or public officers for acts purporting to be done in official capacity. • **Section 80 notice —** Subject to the urgent-relief exception under Section 80(2), a suit against a public officer in respect of an official act generally requires prior written notice and a two-month waiting period. • **Urgent relief —** Where urgent or immediate relief is sought, the court may permit institution without prior notice under Section 80(2), but ordinarily cannot grant relief without giving the Government or public officer a reasonable opportunity to show cause. • **Caution —** A person should not be treated as a public officer simply because the person performs some public-facing activity. The person must fit within one or more statutory categories in Section 2(17), read with the context of the particular proceeding. ## Rapid Revision Summary • **Decree —** Formal, conclusive adjudication of rights in a suit; may be preliminary, final, or partly both. • **Judgment —** Reasons given by the judge for a decree or order. • **Order —** Formal civil court decision which is not a decree. • **Decree-holder —** Person entitled to enforce a decree or executable order. • **Judgment-debtor —** Person legally bound to satisfy a decree or executable order. • **Legal representative —** Person representing the deceased’s estate; wider than legal heir. • **Mesne profits —** Compensatory profits arising from wrongful possession, including interest but excluding gains due to the wrongdoer’s improvements. • **Foreign court —** Court outside India not established or continued by Central Government authority. • **Foreign judgment —** Judgment of a foreign court; conclusive only subject to Section 13 CPC. • **Public officer —** Person falling within one of the statutory governmental, judicial, public-duty, or public-protection categories. **Categories:** Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC), Legal Notes --- ### [Introduction, Object, Extent and Scheme of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908](https://lawfoyer.in/introduction-object-extent-and-scheme-of-the-code-of-civil-procedure-1908/) **Published:** June 21, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun21202608_56_52P-725x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning and Nature of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 • **Identity —** The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) is Act No. 5 of 1908. It came into force on 1 January 1909. Its long title states that it is an Act “to consolidate and amend the laws relating to the procedure of the Courts of Civil Judicature.” Thus, it is the principal general statute regulating the manner in which civil courts entertain, conduct, decide and enforce civil proceedings in India. • **Procedural character —** CPC is primarily a law of procedure, also called **adjective law**. It does not ordinarily create ownership rights, contractual rights, succession rights or property rights. Instead, it provides the legal machinery through which such rights are asserted, defended, adjudicated and enforced before a civil court. • **Simple distinction —** A useful distinction is: **substantive law answers “what is the right?” whereas procedural law answers “how is that right enforced?”** For example, the Transfer of Property Act may determine whether a mortgage exists; CPC regulates the suit, parties, pleadings, evidence, judgment, appeal and execution through which the mortgage dispute is decided. • **Practical importance —** A person may have a valid substantive right but fail to obtain relief because the action is filed before the wrong court, against an improper party, without a proper plaint, beyond the permissible stage, or through a barred proceeding. CPC therefore turns substantive rights into enforceable judicial remedies. • **Integrated code —** Section 2(1) defines “Code” to include the rules. Therefore, the CPC is not confined to the numbered sections in its body; its First Schedule containing Orders and Rules is also legally integral to the Code. ## Object and Purpose of the CPC • **Uniformity —** The central object of CPC is to establish a reasonably uniform civil procedure for courts throughout India. A civil claim should not be decided through arbitrary or uncertain methods. The Code supplies a common procedural framework for ordinary civil litigation. • **Fair hearing —** CPC protects the principles of natural justice by ensuring notice of proceedings, opportunity to file pleadings, production of evidence, hearing of parties, reasoned judgment and appellate remedies where the statute permits them. • **Orderly adjudication —** The Code prevents disorder in litigation by laying down rules on jurisdiction, institution of suits, service of summons, pleadings, joinder of parties, framing of issues, proof, judgment, decree, execution, appeal, review and revision. • **Prevention of multiplicity —** CPC aims to avoid repetitive litigation. Section 10 provides for stay of a subsequently instituted suit where the matter in issue is directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit. Section 11 embodies **res judicata**, which bars re-litigation of matters already finally decided between the parties or their privies. These provisions protect judicial time and secure finality. • **Economy and efficiency —** Several provisions are designed to identify the real dispute early and avoid unnecessary trial. Illustrations include admissions under Order XII, framing of issues under Order XIV, disposal of preliminary issues in limited situations under Order XIV Rule 2, and rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 where the statutory grounds are clearly made out. • **Effective enforcement —** A decree is not merely a declaration of rights. CPC also contains an extensive execution mechanism. Sections 36 to 74 and Order XXI deal with enforcement of decrees, including attachment, sale, delivery of property, arrest in limited situations and transfer of decrees for execution. • **Balance —** The Code seeks to balance two competing concerns: **fair opportunity to litigants** and **timely, disciplined adjudication**. Procedure cannot become so rigid that justice is defeated, but it cannot become so flexible that litigation is indefinitely delayed or manipulated. ## Substantive Law and Procedural Law: Distinction BasisSubstantive LawProcedural Law / CPC**Function**Creates, defines or regulates rights and liabilitiesRegulates enforcement of rights before courts**Question answered**What right or obligation exists?How, where and through what process is it enforced?**Examples**Contract Act, Transfer of Property Act, Hindu Succession ActCPC, court rules, procedural provisions of special statutes**Effect**Determines legal entitlementDetermines the mode of adjudication and remedy**Typical subject**Ownership, contract, succession, tort, liabilityJurisdiction, pleadings, summons, trial, decree, appeal, execution• **Non-rigid classification —** The distinction is important but not mechanical. A procedural provision may have serious consequences. For example, non-compliance with a mandatory jurisdictional requirement, limitation period, statutory appeal condition or procedural bar may affect the maintainability of the proceeding itself. • **No automatic right of appeal —** The right to institute a civil suit is generally recognised through Section 9 CPC, subject to express or implied statutory bars. However, an appeal is not an inherent right; it exists only where conferred by statute. CPC itself expressly provides appellate rights in specified situations, such as appeals from original decrees under Section 96 and appeals from certain orders under Section 104. • **Procedure serves justice —** In *Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, Bhurey Lal Baya*, AIR 1955 SC 425; (1955) 2 SCR 1, the Supreme Court considered procedural fairness in an election dispute where a party’s participation after an ex parte stage was in issue. The Court held that procedural law is intended to facilitate justice, not to trap parties through excessive technicality; however, fairness must be preserved for both sides. This remains a foundational statement of the philosophy of civil procedure. • **Procedure is not an excuse for indiscipline —** The principle that procedure is a handmaid of justice does not mean that statutory rules may be ignored. Courts may adopt a justice-oriented interpretation where the statute permits flexibility, but they cannot dispense with an express mandatory requirement merely on equitable grounds. ## Legislative Background and Development of CPC • **Consolidating statute —** CPC, 1908 consolidated and amended the procedural law governing civil courts. The present statutory compilation records numerous amendments over time, showing that the Code has been continually adapted to improve efficiency, case management and access to justice. • **Major reform phases —** Important reform phases include the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999 and the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002. These reforms addressed delay, written statements, costs, settlement mechanisms, evidence and judicial case management. • **Settlement orientation —** Section 89 CPC, read with Order X Rules 1A to 1C, reflects the legislative effort to encourage settlement through arbitration, conciliation, judicial settlement including settlement through Lok Adalat, and mediation where appropriate. • **Modern interpretation —** In *Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India*, (2005) 6 SCC 344, constitutional challenges to major CPC amendments were considered. The Supreme Court upheld the reform-oriented approach and emphasised that procedural amendments must be implemented in a manner that advances efficient and fair justice delivery, rather than becoming formal obstacles. ## Structure and Scheme of the CPC • **Two-part structure —** CPC has two principal components: ▸ **The body of the Code:** Sections 1 to 158, arranged in Parts. ▸ **The First Schedule:** Orders I to LI, containing detailed Rules governing particular stages of civil proceedings. • **Sections —** The sections contain the broad legal framework, jurisdictional principles, powers of courts, appellate structure, review, revision, rule-making power and miscellaneous provisions. • **Orders and Rules —** Orders divide the procedural field into specific subjects, while Rules prescribe the detailed manner in which that subject is to be handled. For example, Order VII concerns plaints, and its Rules prescribe matters such as particulars of plaint, return of plaint and rejection of plaint. • **Appendices —** The First Schedule also contains appendices relating to pleadings, process, discovery, decrees, execution, supplemental proceedings and miscellaneous forms. These provide practical procedural formats. Part of CPCBroad Subject**Preliminary: Sections 1–8**Title, definitions, extent, savings, Revenue Courts and Small Cause Courts**Part I: Sections 9–35B**Suits in general, jurisdiction, res judicata, place of suing, institution, summons, pleadings, costs**Part II: Sections 36–74**Execution of decrees and orders**Part III: Sections 75–78**Commissions**Part IV: Sections 79–88**Suits in particular cases, including suits by or against Government and interpleader suits**Part V: Sections 89–93**Special proceedings, including settlement and public nuisance matters**Part VI: Sections 94–95**Supplemental proceedings**Part VII: Sections 96–112**Appeals**Part VIII: Sections 113–115**Reference, review and revision**Part IX: Sections 116–120**Special provisions relating to certain High Courts**Part X: Sections 121–131**Rules and High Court rule-making powers**Part XI: Sections 132–158**Miscellaneous provisions, including caveat, restitution, enlargement of time and inherent powersThe arrangement of sections and the First Schedule demonstrates that CPC is designed as a complete procedural pathway—from filing of a suit to execution or appellate correction of the decree. ## Relation Between Sections, Orders and Rules • **General principle —** Sections lay down broad principles, powers and substantive procedural conditions. Orders and Rules provide operational detail. The two must be read together, not in isolation. • **Statutory force —** Section 121 declares that the Rules in the First Schedule have effect “as if enacted in the body of this Code” until altered or annulled in accordance with Part X. Thus, Orders and Rules are not merely administrative instructions; they have statutory force. • **Illustration: institution of suit —** Section 26 states that every suit shall be instituted by presentation of a plaint or in such other manner as may be prescribed. Order IV explains institution of suits, Order VI deals with pleadings, Order VII prescribes the contents and requirements of a plaint, and Order VIII regulates the written statement. • **Illustration: summons —** Section 27 authorises the issue of summons to the defendant after institution of a suit. Order V then governs the detailed process of issue, service, substituted service and proof of service. • **Illustration: judgment and decree —** Section 33 provides that after the case has been heard, the court shall pronounce judgment and a decree shall follow. Order XX gives detailed rules concerning pronouncement of judgment, drafting of decrees and their contents. • **Illustration: execution —** Section 36 applies the provisions relating to execution of decrees to executable orders. Order XXI then supplies the detailed machinery for execution. • **Harmony —** A court should interpret a section and its related Order or Rule harmoniously. The section provides the governing power or principle; the Rule ordinarily explains the procedure for its use. • **Local rules —** Section 122 empowers High Courts to make rules regulating their own procedure and that of civil courts subject to their superintendence, including alteration or addition to Rules in the First Schedule. However, Section 128 makes it clear that such rules must not be inconsistent with the provisions in the body of the Code. • **Practical hierarchy —** The First Schedule rules are statutory, but a High Court-made procedural rule cannot override an express provision in the body of CPC. Similarly, a court cannot use a general procedural provision to defeat a specific statutory command. ## Applicability and Extent of CPC • **Territorial extent —** Section 1(3) states that the Code extends to the whole of India except the State of Nagaland and the tribal areas, subject to the power of the concerned State Government to extend the Code or any part of it by notification with suitable modifications. The expression “tribal areas” carries the statutory meaning given in the Explanation to Section 1(3). • **Civil courts —** CPC applies principally to courts of civil judicature dealing with civil suits and civil proceedings. Section 9 states that civil courts shall try all suits of a civil nature unless cognizance is expressly or impliedly barred. • **Civil nature —** A dispute may be of civil nature even when it involves religious rites or ceremonies, provided that a right to property or office is contested. Section 9 expressly recognises this position. • **Special and local laws —** Section 4 preserves special or local laws, special jurisdictions, special powers and special forms of procedure created by another law. Therefore, CPC is the general procedural law, but a special statute may provide a different procedure. • **Rule of priority —** Where a special statute contains a complete or inconsistent procedural scheme, that special scheme ordinarily governs to the extent of inconsistency. CPC continues to apply only where the special statute is silent or expressly incorporates CPC. • **Revenue Courts —** Section 5 deals with Revenue Courts. CPC may apply to such courts only in the manner permitted by the relevant special enactment, subject to governmental modification or exclusion. • **Small Cause Courts —** Sections 7 and 8 exclude or modify the application of specified CPC provisions to Provincial and Presidency Small Cause Courts. This confirms that CPC is not applied mechanically; its application depends upon the character of the court and governing statute. • **High Courts —** Section 117 generally applies CPC to High Courts, subject to Parts IX and X and applicable rules. Section 120 excludes Sections 16, 17 and 20 while certain High Courts exercise original civil jurisdiction. ## Inherent Procedural Logic of CPC • **Sequential design —** CPC operates through a logical sequence: **jurisdiction → institution → notice → pleadings → issues → evidence → judgment → decree → execution → appeal/review/revision → finality.** • **Jurisdiction first —** Before merits are examined, the court must determine whether it has jurisdiction over the subject matter, pecuniary value and territorial cause of action. A court cannot confer jurisdiction upon itself merely because parties consent. • **Pleadings define the contest —** Pleadings identify the case that each side must meet. The plaint states material facts and reliefs; the written statement answers those allegations and raises defences. Evidence generally cannot travel beyond pleadings. • **Issues narrow the dispute —** Order XIV requires the court to identify propositions of fact or law affirmed by one party and denied by the other. This transforms a broad dispute into clear questions requiring adjudication. • **Evidence proves issues —** Evidence is led not to narrate every grievance, but to prove the facts relevant to the framed issues. The procedural structure prevents surprise and ensures that both sides know the case they must answer. • **Judgment and decree separate reasoning from command —** A judgment contains the court’s reasons; a decree formally expresses the conclusive adjudication of rights in the suit. CPC distinguishes both because enforcement ordinarily proceeds through the decree. • **Execution completes justice —** A decree without execution is ineffective. Accordingly, CPC devotes a major part of its scheme to execution. The successful litigant is a decree-holder; the person against whom an executable decree is passed is a judgment-debtor. • **Finality protects the system —** Appeals correct legal or factual errors within statutory limits. Review corrects limited errors by the same court. Revision corrects jurisdictional errors in cases where no appeal lies. Res judicata and execution rules prevent endless reopening of decided disputes. ## Inherent Powers Under Section 151 CPC • **Saving provision —** Section 151 preserves the inherent power of the court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. It recognises that no procedural code can predict every possible factual situation. • **Residual power —** Section 151 is a residual procedural power. It is used where the Code does not expressly provide a remedy but judicial intervention is necessary to prevent injustice, abuse, fraud, multiplicity or procedural deadlock. • **Not an appellate shortcut —** Section 151 cannot be used as a substitute for appeal, review, revision or another remedy specifically provided by CPC. • **Express provision controls —** In *Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal*, AIR 1962 SC 527; 1962 Supp (1) SCR 450, the Supreme Court examined the scope of inherent power in the context of interim relief. It held that CPC is not exhaustive of every possible situation, but where the Code expressly provides for a matter, the statutory provision must ordinarily be followed and inherent power cannot nullify it. • **No conflict with Code —** In *Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar*, AIR 1964 SC 993, the Supreme Court held that inherent power cannot override specific provisions of CPC. Where the Code expressly or by necessary implication exhausts the court’s power on a topic, Section 151 cannot be invoked to bypass that statutory scheme. • **Current position —** The Supreme Court has reiterated that Section 151 cannot be invoked where CPC itself provides an alternative remedy, and it cannot be used to create remedies contrary to statutory prohibitions or to reopen settled matters outside recognised procedural routes. ## Important Supreme Court Authorities on Procedural Philosophy • **Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, Bhurey Lal Baya, AIR 1955 SC 425; (1955) 2 SCR 1 —** In an election dispute involving the effect of a party’s absence and subsequent participation, the issue was whether procedural rules should be applied with excessive rigidity. The Supreme Court held that procedure is intended to facilitate justice, and courts must avoid technical interpretations that frustrate adjudication, while ensuring fairness to both sides. • **State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari, (1976) 1 SCC 719 —** In a dispute involving procedural compliance, the Court stressed that processual law is a servant of justice and not an obstruction to justice. The ratio is that procedural prescriptions should be applied to advance fair adjudication, not to defeat substantial rights through avoidable technicality. • **Kailash v. Nanhku, (2005) 4 SCC 480 —** In an election petition, the respondent sought to file a written statement beyond the time indicated in Order VIII Rule 1 CPC. The Supreme Court held that, in ordinary civil procedure, the time limit was directory rather than automatically destructive of the defence; extension could be granted only for exceptional reasons and not as a routine practice. The ruling demonstrates that procedural timelines must promote expedition without causing disproportionate injustice. • **Rani Kusum v. Kanchan Devi, (2005) 6 SCC 705 —** The dispute concerned delayed filing of a written statement and the nature of Order VIII Rule 1. The Supreme Court reaffirmed *Kailash v. Nanhku* and held that procedural provisions should ordinarily advance justice; however, courts must not treat procedural timelines as meaningless or permit delay as a matter of convenience. • **Salem Advocate Bar Association, Tamil Nadu v. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 344 —** The case examined the validity and working of important CPC amendments. The Supreme Court upheld the reform process and clarified that procedural amendments should be interpreted to promote effective adjudication, settlement where appropriate and reduction of delay, without abandoning fairness or natural justice. ## Quick Revision Memory Map • **CPC Formula —** **J–I–N–P–I–E–J–D–E–F** Memory LetterStage**J**Jurisdiction**I**Institution of suit**N**Notice and summons**P**Pleadings**I**Issues**E**Evidence**J**Judgment**D**Decree**E**Execution**F**Finality through appeal, review, revision and res judicata• **Core idea —** CPC is not merely a collection of technical rules. It is the procedural architecture that ensures civil disputes are brought before the proper court, heard fairly, decided rationally, enforced effectively and brought to finality without needless repetition. **Categories:** Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC), Legal Notes --- ### [Services Under the Union and States: Articles 309–311, Doctrine of Pleasure and Civil Servant Safeguards](https://lawfoyer.in/services-under-the-union-and-states/) **Published:** June 21, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun21202601_18_10A-725x1024.jpeg) ## Constitutional Scheme of Public Services • **Three-part framework:** Articles 309, 310 and 311 together regulate public employment under the Union and the States. Article 309 deals with recruitment and service conditions; Article 310 establishes tenure during the pleasure of the President or Governor; and Article 311 protects civil servants against arbitrary dismissal, removal and reduction in rank. ProvisionCore functionMemory aid**Article 309**Recruitment and conditions of service**Rules****Article 310**Tenure during pleasure of President/Governor**Pleasure****Article 311**Safeguards before major punishments**Protection**• **Status, not ordinary contract:** Government service begins with appointment, but after appointment the relationship is principally governed by constitutional provisions, statutes and service rules. A government servant therefore holds a legal **status**, not merely a private contractual job. Service conditions may be altered through valid law or rules, subject to constitutional limits. • **Balance of interests:** The Constitution protects honest civil servants from arbitrary action, but does not make public employment immune from disciplinary control. The object is to secure both fairness to the employee and efficiency, integrity and accountability in public administration. ## Article 309: Recruitment and Conditions of Service ### Legislative Power Under Article 309 • **Legislative authority:** Article 309 authorises Parliament and State Legislatures to regulate recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts connected with Union or State affairs. “Conditions of service” broadly include pay, pension, leave, seniority, promotion, disciplinary control, suspension, retirement and other incidents of service. • **Presidential and gubernatorial rules:** Until the appropriate Legislature makes an Act, the President, or a person authorised by the President, may make rules for Union services. Similarly, the Governor, or a person authorised by the Governor, may make rules for State services. These rules remain effective subject to a later Act made by the appropriate Legislature. • **Hierarchy:** Rules made under the proviso to Article 309 have statutory force, but they cannot conflict with the Constitution or with a governing statute. A service rule inconsistent with Articles 14, 16, 310 or 311 is vulnerable to judicial review. • **Executive instructions:** In *Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan*, AIR 1967 SC 1910 : (1968) 1 SCR 111, promotion-related service rules did not address every procedural detail. The Supreme Court held that executive instructions may **supplement** statutory rules where the rules are silent, but they cannot **amend, supersede or contradict** statutory rules. Thus, administrative circulars may fill a gap but cannot override a valid rule framed under Article 309. • **Service-status principle:** In *Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India*, (1968) 1 SCR 185, a railway employee challenged an alteration in promotion conditions after entering service. The Supreme Court held that, although appointment originates in contract, a government servant thereafter acquires a status governed by statute and rules. Hence, a servant has no immutable contractual right to the continuance of every existing service condition. ## Article 310: Doctrine of Pleasure ### Meaning of the Doctrine of Pleasure • **Constitutional rule:** Article 310(1) provides that members of Union civil services, All India Services, defence services and holders of civil or defence posts under the Union hold office during the pleasure of the President. Members of State civil services and holders of civil posts under a State hold office during the pleasure of the Governor. • **Nature:** The doctrine means that public service tenure is not absolutely guaranteed. Subject to constitutional safeguards, the State may terminate service in the public interest. The doctrine is founded on public policy and not on a personal or arbitrary prerogative of the President or Governor. • **Constitutional limitation:** The doctrine is not absolute in India. Article 311 operates as a major restriction upon Article 310 in relation to civil servants. Therefore, where dismissal, removal or reduction in rank falls within Article 311, the pleasure doctrine must be exercised consistently with Article 311 safeguards. • **Aid and advice:** The President and Governor are constitutional heads. In service matters, their formal powers are ordinarily exercised through the constitutional machinery of aid and advice and the applicable Rules of Business. • **Special constitutional offices:** Certain constitutional authorities have special security of tenure under separate provisions, for example Supreme Court and High Court judges, the Comptroller and Auditor-General, the Chief Election Commissioner and members of Election Commissions. Their removal is regulated by the specific constitutional provisions applicable to them, rather than by ordinary civil-service rules. ### Compensation Under Article 310(2) • **Special qualification contract:** Article 310(2) permits a contract for compensation where a person with special qualifications is appointed to a civil post for an agreed period and, before that period ends, the post is abolished or the person is asked to vacate it for reasons unrelated to misconduct. This protection does not apply to members of defence services, All India Services, Union civil services or State civil services. ## Article 311: Constitutional Safeguards for Civil Servants ### Persons Protected by Article 311 • **Covered employees:** Article 311 protects a person who is a member of a civil service of the Union, an All India Service, a civil service of a State, or who holds a civil post under the Union or a State. • **Civil capacity:** Article 311 applies to persons employed in a civil capacity. It does not extend to members of defence services merely because Article 310 covers them. • **Temporary and probationary employees:** A temporary employee or probationer may also invoke Article 311 where termination is, in substance, punitive. The State cannot avoid constitutional protection simply by using neutral words such as “termination” if the real foundation of the order is misconduct. • **Substance over form:** In *Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India*, 1958 SCR 828 : AIR 1958 SC 36, the Supreme Court examined termination and reversion orders affecting government servants. It held that the court must look at the substance of the order. If the employee had a right to the post or rank, or if the order imposes evil consequences founded upon misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, the action is punitive and Article 311 safeguards are attracted. • **Non-punitive termination:** A probationer may be discharged for unsatisfactory overall performance under the applicable rules, without a full Article 311 inquiry, where the order is genuinely non-stigmatic and is not founded upon proved misconduct. In *Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences*, (2002) 1 SCC 520, the Supreme Court explained that a termination becomes punitive where stigma, an inquiry into misconduct and findings of guilt combine to form its foundation. ### Article 311(1): Protection Regarding Authority • **Rule:** No civil servant covered by Article 311 may be **dismissed or removed** by an authority subordinate to the authority by which that person was appointed. The protection in clause (1) expressly concerns dismissal and removal, not reduction in rank. • **Recall formula:** **Appointing authority or higher authority may dismiss or remove; a lower authority may not.** • **Initiation of proceedings:** Article 311(1) does not itself require that the appointing authority must personally initiate or conduct the departmental enquiry. The requirement is that the final dismissal or removal order must not be passed by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority. A service rule may, however, provide greater protection. • **Case law:** In *P.V. Srinivasa Sastry v. Comptroller and Auditor-General*, (1993) 1 SCC 419, departmental proceedings against auditors were initiated by a subordinate authority and culminated in reduction in rank. The Supreme Court held that Article 311(1) does not require disciplinary proceedings to be initiated only by the appointing authority unless the applicable service rules impose such a restriction. The Court also held that reduction in rank cannot ordinarily push an employee into a lower cadre or post that the employee had never held. ### Article 311(2): Protection of Departmental Enquiry • **Rule:** No protected civil servant may be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which the person is informed of the charges and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. • **Major penalties:** Article 311(2) applies only to dismissal, removal and reduction in rank. Other disciplinary penalties are primarily regulated by applicable service rules, though they must still satisfy Articles 14 and 16 and the relevant principles of natural justice. PunishmentEffect**Dismissal**Terminates service; under Central and All India Service rules, it ordinarily disqualifies future government employment.**Removal**Terminates service but ordinarily does not disqualify future government employment.**Reduction in rank**Punitive lowering of rank, grade or post.The above dismissal-removal distinction is drawn from service rules and is not expressly defined by Article 311 itself. ## Departmental Enquiry and Reasonable Opportunity ### Essential Stages of a Fair Departmental Enquiry • **Charges:** The employee must receive clear and specific charges. Vague allegations make an effective defence impossible. The charge-sheet should ordinarily disclose the imputation, relevant documents and list of witnesses as required by the applicable service rules. • **Defence opportunity:** The employee must receive reasonable time to submit a written statement of defence and must be given a real opportunity to deny the allegations. • **Evidence:** The department must establish the charge through material placed on record in the inquiry. A departmental inquiry is not a criminal trial, and the strict rules of the Evidence Act do not apply; nevertheless, findings cannot rest on suspicion, unproved documents or material never put to the employee. • **Cross-examination and defence evidence:** Where oral evidence is relied upon, the employee should have a fair opportunity to cross-examine departmental witnesses and to produce defence evidence, subject to lawful procedural restrictions. • **Impartial inquiry officer:** The inquiry officer acts as a quasi-judicial authority. The officer must remain unbiased and cannot act as a representative of the department. • **Case law:** In *Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank*, (2009) 2 SCC 570, dismissal of a bank employee was based substantially on unproved documents and allegations relating to the disappearance of bank drafts. The Supreme Court held that departmental proceedings are quasi-judicial; documents cannot automatically become evidence merely because they are produced, and the inquiry officer must base findings on material legally brought on record. • **No-evidence rule:** In *Union of India v. H.C. Goel*, (1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364, a disciplinary finding was challenged as unsupported by evidence. The Supreme Court held that a writ court does not reassess adequacy or reliability of evidence as an appellate authority; however, it may interfere where the finding is perverse, suffers from patent error or is based on no evidence at all. ### Inquiry Report and Disciplinary Authority • **Inquiry report:** Where the inquiry officer and disciplinary authority are different persons, the employee must ordinarily receive the inquiry report before the disciplinary authority finally decides guilt. • **Representation on findings:** The employee must have an opportunity to represent against adverse findings in the inquiry report before the disciplinary authority reaches its conclusion on guilt. • **Disagreement by disciplinary authority:** When the inquiry officer exonerates the employee or records a favourable finding, and the disciplinary authority proposes to disagree, it must communicate its tentative reasons for disagreement and provide an opportunity to respond before recording guilt. • **Case law:** In *Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar*, (1993) 4 SCC 727, the inquiry officer’s report had not been supplied before the disciplinary authority acted. The Constitution Bench held that supply of the report is part of reasonable opportunity because the employee must be allowed to answer the inquiry officer’s findings before guilt is finally determined. Failure may require the matter to be restored from the stage at which the report should have been supplied, subject to the effect of the denial on fairness. • **Case law:** In *Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra*, (1998) 7 SCC 84, bank officers faced disciplinary proceedings after a financial shortage, while the inquiry officer did not fully sustain the charges. The disciplinary authority differed from the inquiry findings without first hearing them. The Supreme Court held that the employee must receive the disciplinary authority’s tentative reasons for disagreement and a chance to respond before an adverse conclusion is reached. ## Effect of the Forty-Second Amendment • **Earlier position:** Before the Forty-Second Amendment, Article 311 jurisprudence recognised two stages of protection: defence during the inquiry and a further opportunity to make representation against the proposed penalty. • **Present position:** The Forty-Second Amendment, effective from 3 January 1977, removed the constitutional requirement of a second show-cause notice against the proposed penalty. The disciplinary authority may impose the penalty on the evidence recorded during inquiry without separately asking the employee to explain why a particular penalty should not be imposed. • **Important distinction:** The Amendment removed the right to represent specifically against the proposed punishment; it did not remove the right to receive the inquiry report and represent against the findings of guilt before the disciplinary authority decides the charges. ## Exceptions to Departmental Enquiry Under Article 311(2) ### Conviction on a Criminal Charge • **Article 311(2)(a):** Inquiry may be dispensed with where dismissal, removal or reduction in rank is based on conduct that has led to conviction on a criminal charge. • **Conduct, not automatic punishment:** Conviction does not mechanically require dismissal. The disciplinary authority must examine the conduct leading to conviction and determine the appropriate penalty under the service rules. ### Impracticability of Holding Inquiry • **Article 311(2)(b):** Inquiry may be dispensed with where the authority empowered to dismiss, remove or reduce in rank is satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry. • **Recorded reasons:** Reasons must be recorded in writing. Mere inconvenience, administrative urgency, hostility toward the employee or a desire for speed cannot justify dispensing with inquiry. • **Judicial review:** Article 311(3) declares the authority’s decision final on the question of practicability, but this does not exclude judicial review for mala fides, irrelevant considerations, absence of material or arbitrary exercise of power. ### Security of the State • **Article 311(2)(c):** Inquiry may be dispensed with where the President or Governor is satisfied that, in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold the inquiry. • **Exceptional power:** This is an extraordinary constitutional exception. It is concerned with security of the State and cannot be invoked merely because the alleged conduct is undesirable or because a regular inquiry may be inconvenient. ### Leading Authority on Exceptions • **Constitution Bench:** In *Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel*, (1985) 3 SCC 398, the Supreme Court considered the constitutional validity and operation of the three exceptions to Article 311(2). The Court upheld the exceptions, explaining that they operate in exceptional situations where a regular inquiry is constitutionally unnecessary. It also clarified that Article 311 is an express limitation on the doctrine of pleasure, while Article 309 rules must conform to Articles 310 and 311. ## Dismissal, Removal, Reduction in Rank and Compulsory Retirement • **Dismissal and removal:** Both end the employment relationship. The constitutional procedure under Article 311 must be followed unless an exception under the second proviso applies. • **Reduction in rank:** Reduction is a major penalty where it operates as punishment. Reversion from an officiating or temporary higher post to a substantive lower post may not amount to reduction in rank if it is a normal consequence of service rules and carries no stigma or punitive consequences. • **Compulsory retirement:** Compulsory retirement in public interest under applicable rules is generally not treated as dismissal, removal or reduction in rank if it is non-stigmatic and is not imposed as punishment. • **Case law:** In *Baikuntha Nath Das v. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada*, (1992) 2 SCC 299, compulsory retirement was challenged as punitive. The Supreme Court held that compulsory retirement in public interest is ordinarily not a punishment, carries no stigma and does not attract Article 311(2), provided the decision is bona fide and based on the employee’s service record under the governing rules. ## Judicial Review of Disciplinary Action • **Review, not appeal:** Courts do not ordinarily reappreciate evidence or replace the disciplinary authority’s conclusion with their own view. • **Grounds of interference:** Judicial review is available where there is lack of jurisdiction, breach of Article 311, violation of statutory rules, denial of natural justice, bias, mala fides, reliance on irrelevant material, perversity, no evidence, or a punishment that is shockingly disproportionate. • **Proportionality:** In *B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India*, (1995) 6 SCC 749, the Supreme Court held that judicial review examines the decision-making process, not the merits of the disciplinary authority’s view. Interference with punishment is exceptional and normally arises only where the penalty shocks the conscience of the court; ordinarily, the matter should then be remitted to the competent authority for reconsideration. ## Quick Revision Matrix • **Article 309:** Who makes service rules? Parliament, State Legislature, President or Governor under the proviso. • **Article 310:** Who holds office during pleasure? Union servants during the President’s pleasure; State servants during the Governor’s pleasure. • **Article 311(1):** What is protected? Dismissal or removal by an authority lower than the appointing authority. • **Article 311(2):** What is protected? Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank without charges and a fair opportunity of hearing. • **Article 311 exceptions:** **Conviction – Impracticability – Security of State.** • **Core principle:** **Article 309 regulates service; Article 310 permits tenure at pleasure; Article 311 prevents arbitrary major punishment.** **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Right to Property in India: From Fundamental Right to Article 300A and Compensation Jurisprudence](https://lawfoyer.in/right-to-property-in-india/) **Published:** June 21, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun21202601_11_03A-725x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning and Constitutional Position of the Right to Property - **Property:** Property is not confined to land, houses, or physical objects. It includes legally recognised interests such as ownership rights, leasehold interests, mineral rights, shares, contractual interests, copyrights, and other intangible proprietary rights. The constitutional protection applies to the property-holder’s lawful interest, not merely to possession of land. - **Present Status:** The right to property is no longer a Fundamental Right under Part III of the Constitution. It is now a **constitutional right** protected by Article 300A in Part XII of the Constitution. Article 300A provides: “No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.” The use of the word **“person”** means that this protection is available not only to citizens, but also to non-citizens, companies, trusts, and other legal persons capable of holding property. - **Core Principle:** The State may acquire, regulate, restrict, or take property for a legitimate public purpose, but it cannot do so merely through an administrative order, executive instruction, police action, circular, or government letter. There must be a valid law authorising the deprivation and the procedure under that law must be followed. ## Right to Property as a Fundamental Right Before the Forty-Fourth Amendment Constitutional provision before 20 June 1979Nature of protectionPerson protected**Article 19(1)(f)**Right to acquire, hold and dispose of propertyCitizens only**Article 31(1)**No deprivation of property except by authority of lawEvery person**Article 31(2)**Compulsory acquisition or requisition only for a public purpose and upon payment of compensationEvery person whose property was acquired- **Dual Protection:** Before the Forty-Fourth Amendment, property enjoyed two layers of constitutional protection. Article 19(1)(f) gave every citizen a Fundamental Right to acquire, hold and dispose of property. Article 31 separately protected every person from unlawful deprivation and required public purpose and compensation when property was compulsorily acquired. - **Restriction versus Acquisition:** Article 19(1)(f) dealt with restrictions on a citizen’s freedom to own and deal with property. Article 31 dealt with deprivation, acquisition, requisition, and compulsory taking of property. Thus, a law affecting property could be challenged both as an unreasonable restriction under Article 19 and as an unconstitutional deprivation under Article 31. - **Public Purpose:** Under the original Article 31(2), the State could compulsorily take property only for a public purpose. A public purpose broadly included projects such as public roads, irrigation, housing, infrastructure, public institutions, redistribution measures, and other objectives genuinely connected with community welfare. ## Historical Development of Property Rights and Constitutional Amendments ### Early Conflict Between Land Reform and Property Rights - **Land Reform Background:** Soon after independence, State governments enacted zamindari abolition and agrarian reform laws to eliminate intermediaries, redistribute agricultural land, secure tenancy rights, and implement the Directive Principles of State Policy, especially Article 39(b) and Article 39(c). - **Constitutional Tension:** Landowners frequently challenged such laws under Articles 14, 19(1)(f), and 31. This produced a continuing conflict between individual property rights and the State’s objective of social and economic redistribution. ### First Constitutional Amendment, 1951 - **Articles 31A and 31B:** The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 inserted Articles 31A and 31B and created the Ninth Schedule. Article 31A protected certain laws concerning estates, agrarian reform, management of property, amalgamation of corporations, and related matters from challenge under specified Fundamental Rights. Article 31B protected laws listed in the Ninth Schedule. - **Purpose:** These provisions were intended to protect land reform legislation from being invalidated merely because it affected property rights. Article 31A and Article 31B remain constitutionally relevant, although Ninth Schedule laws are now subject to basic-structure review in appropriate cases. ### Fourth Constitutional Amendment, 1955 - **Compensation Change:** The Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955 amended Article 31 to reduce judicial scrutiny over the adequacy of compensation. It permitted legislation to fix compensation or prescribe principles for determining compensation. - **Effect:** The amendment sought to prevent courts from reassessing compensation merely because the owner considered the amount insufficient. However, it did not permit the legislature to adopt wholly arbitrary, irrelevant, discriminatory, or illusory principles of valuation. ### Twenty-Fifth Constitutional Amendment, 1971 - **Compensation Replaced by Amount:** The Constitution (Twenty-Fifth Amendment) Act, 1971 replaced the word **“compensation”** in Article 31(2) with **“amount.”** This was intended to reduce the requirement that the owner receive the full market-equivalent value of the property. - **Article 31C:** The amendment also inserted Article 31C to protect laws made for implementing Article 39(b) and Article 39(c) from challenge under Articles 14, 19, and 31. The provision reflected the constitutional effort to give priority to distributive justice and social welfare measures. ### Forty-Second Amendment and Minerva Mills - **Expansion Attempt:** The Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976 attempted to extend Article 31C protection from laws implementing Article 39(b) and 39(c) to laws implementing any Directive Principle of State Policy. - **Invalidation:** This expansion was struck down in *Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India*, (1980) 3 SCC 625. The Supreme Court held that harmony and balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles form part of the Constitution’s basic structure. Parliament cannot destroy Fundamental Rights entirely by giving unrestricted supremacy to Directive Principles. ### Forty-Fourth Constitutional Amendment, 1978 - **Major Constitutional Shift:** The Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 omitted Article 19(1)(f), repealed Article 31, and inserted Article 300A. These changes became effective on 20 June 1979. - **Result:** The right to property ceased to be a Fundamental Right and became a constitutional right. Article 19 currently shows the omission of clause (f), Article 31 stands repealed, and Article 300A is placed in Chapter IV of Part XII. - **Important Qualification:** The Forty-Fourth Amendment did not completely remove constitutional protection for property. It preserved special safeguards in particular situations: - **Article 30(1A):** When property of a minority educational institution is compulsorily acquired, the amount fixed must not restrict or abrogate the minority’s right to establish and administer the institution. - **Second Proviso to Article 31A(1):** A person personally cultivating land within the applicable ceiling limit cannot be deprived of that land unless the law provides compensation at a rate not less than market value. ## Landmark Supreme Court Cases Before Article 300A ### *State of West Bengal v. Bela Banerjee*, AIR 1954 SC 170; (1954) SCR 558 - **Facts and Issue:** The State sought to acquire private property under a law that fixed compensation. The question was whether Article 31(2), as originally framed, required compensation that was genuinely equivalent to the value of the property taken. - **Ratio Decidendi:** The Supreme Court held that the expression **“compensation”** meant a just equivalent of what the owner had lost. The Court could examine whether the principles of compensation were relevant to the value of the acquired property. - **Importance:** This decision gave strong judicial protection to owners under the original Article 31(2) and contributed to Parliament’s decision to enact the Fourth Constitutional Amendment. ### *P. Vajravelu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector for Land Acquisition*, AIR 1965 SC 1017; (1965) 1 SCR 614 - **Facts and Issue:** The validity of the Land Acquisition (Madras Amendment) Act, 1961 was challenged because it prescribed a special and less favourable compensation method for property acquired for housing schemes. - **Ratio Decidendi:** The Supreme Court held that even after the Fourth Amendment, compensation principles could not be arbitrary or discriminatory. The legislature could not prescribe a valuation method unrelated to the property acquired or create unjustified discrimination between similarly situated owners. - **Importance:** The case established that the bar against questioning the adequacy of compensation did not eliminate judicial review where the compensation formula itself was constitutionally defective or discriminatory. ### *R.C. Cooper v. Union of India*, (1970) 1 SCC 248; AIR 1970 SC 564 - **Facts and Issue:** The Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1969 nationalised fourteen major banks. Shareholders challenged the compensation mechanism under Article 31. - **Ratio Decidendi:** The Supreme Court held that compensation principles must bear a reasonable relationship to the value of the property acquired. Compensation could not be illusory merely because Parliament had used a statutory formula. - **Importance:** The decision reaffirmed meaningful scrutiny of compensation and was a major reason for the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which replaced “compensation” with “amount.” ### *Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala*, (1973) 4 SCC 225 - **Facts and Issue:** The challenge concerned Kerala land reform laws and the constitutional validity of the Twenty-Fourth, Twenty-Fifth, and Twenty-Ninth Amendments. - **Ratio Decidendi:** The Supreme Court evolved the **basic structure doctrine**. Parliament may amend the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights, but cannot damage or destroy its basic structure. The Court upheld Parliament’s broad amending power but invalidated the part of Article 31C that attempted to exclude judicial review completely. - **Importance:** The case ensured that property-related constitutional amendments, land reform laws, and Ninth Schedule protections would remain subject to the basic structure limitation. ### *I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu*, (2007) 2 SCC 1 - **Facts and Issue:** The case concerned laws inserted into the Ninth Schedule after the basic structure doctrine had been developed. - **Ratio Decidendi:** The Supreme Court held that every Ninth Schedule law inserted after 24 April 1973 may be reviewed if it damages or destroys the Constitution’s basic structure. - **Importance:** Article 31B is not an absolute shield. Even land reform or acquisition legislation placed in the Ninth Schedule cannot escape review if it violates basic-structure principles. ## Article 300A: Present Constitutional Protection ### Text and Scope of Article 300A - **Textual Rule:** Article 300A states that no person shall be deprived of property except by authority of law. It is substantially similar to the former Article 31(1), but it does not reproduce the former Article 31(2), which expressly mentioned public purpose and compensation. - **Deprivation:** Deprivation is wider than formal acquisition. It may include extinction of ownership, compulsory transfer, confiscation, unauthorised occupation, taking possession, vesting of rights in the State, or interference that substantially destroys a recognised proprietary interest. - **Authority of Law:** “Authority of law” means a valid law enacted by a competent legislature. A government circular, executive order, departmental direction, administrative instruction, or unilateral entry in revenue records cannot by itself authorise deprivation of property. ### *Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh*, (1982) 1 SCC 39 - **Facts and Issue:** The case arose from food-control measures involving seizure of wheat. The question was whether executive action affecting property could be sustained without a specific legal source. - **Ratio Decidendi:** The Supreme Court stressed that the State and its officers cannot interfere with private rights unless they can point to a specific rule of law authorising their action. Executive power cannot substitute for statutory authority. - **Importance:** The decision is a leading authority for the proposition that Article 300A prohibits deprivation of property by executive fiat. ### *Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat*, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 596 - **Facts and Issue:** Former Girasdars and Barkhalidars challenged Gujarat legislation vesting rights in mines, minerals, and quarries in the State. - **Ratio Decidendi:** The Supreme Court held that Article 300A protects property against deprivation without legal authority. The right is a constitutional right, not a Fundamental Right and not part of the basic structure. The Court upheld the law because the deprivation was supported by legislation. - **Importance:** The decision explains that Article 300A revives the rule-of-law aspect of former Article 31(1): where there is no valid law, there can be no lawful deprivation. It also confirms that Article 32 cannot ordinarily be invoked solely for violation of Article 300A; the normal constitutional remedy lies before the High Court under Article 226. ## Public Purpose, Fair Procedure, and Compensation Under Article 300A ### *K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka*, (2011) 9 SCC 1 - **Facts and Issue:** The case concerned the Roerich and Devika Rani Roerich Estate (Acquisition and Transfer) Act, 1996, under which the State acquired land, art objects, and related property. The Court examined the constitutional validity of the acquisition and the scope of compensation under Article 300A. - **Ratio Decidendi:** The Supreme Court held that Article 300A does not expressly reproduce Article 31(2), but compulsory deprivation must ordinarily be for a public purpose. A law cannot simply declare that no compensation will be paid. Though Article 300A does not guarantee market-value compensation in every case, the State must justify nil, nominal, or reduced compensation by reference to the statute’s object, public interest, and constitutionally valid grounds. - **Just, Fair and Reasonable Standard:** The Court stated that a law depriving a person of property must not be arbitrary, excessive, disproportionate, or contrary to the rule of law. It must be just, fair, and reasonable when examined with Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 26(b), 301, and other relevant constitutional guarantees. - **No Compensation and Nil Compensation:** There is an important distinction: - **No compensation:** A law acquiring private property for public purpose cannot validly state that no compensation will be paid. - **Nil compensation:** In exceptional circumstances, nil compensation may be justified, for example where the State assumes liabilities charged on the property. The burden lies on the State to justify such a law. ### *Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh*, (2020) 2 SCC 569 - **Facts and Issue:** The State had taken possession of a widow’s land for construction of a road without initiating lawful acquisition proceedings or paying compensation. The owner approached the Court after a substantial delay. - **Ratio Decidendi:** The Supreme Court held that the State cannot take private property without following a lawful acquisition procedure. Delay and laches cannot legitimise continuing unconstitutional possession by the State. - **Importance:** The Court treated the right to property as both a constitutional right and a human right. It directed payment of compensation and reaffirmed that a welfare State must act fairly when dealing with private property. ## Seven Sub-Rights Under Article 300A ### *Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah*, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 968; 2024 INSC 435 - **Facts and Issue:** Kolkata Municipal Corporation claimed to have acquired private property under Section 352 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980. The Court found that the provision did not confer a power of compulsory acquisition and lacked a proper acquisition procedure. - **Ratio Decidendi:** The Supreme Court held that compensation alone cannot validate compulsory acquisition. A valid deprivation must satisfy a complete constitutional procedure. The Court described Article 300A as a network of interconnected protections and held that absence of essential safeguards makes the action vulnerable to challenge. - **Seven Sub-Rights:** The Court identified the following non-exhaustive safeguards: Memory aidSub-rightMeaning**N****Notice**Clear and meaningful prior notice of the proposed acquisition**H****Hearing**Genuine opportunity to raise objections**R****Reasons**A reasoned decision after considering objections**P****Public purpose**Acquisition must be for a legitimate public purpose**C****Compensation / restitution**Fair compensation and, where applicable, rehabilitation**E****Efficient process**Proceedings must be completed within prescribed timelines**V****Vesting / conclusion**Final lawful conclusion and vesting of property rights- **Importance:** The decision makes clear that acquisition cannot occur by surprise or through an incomplete statutory process. Notice, hearing, reasoned decision, public purpose, compensation, timely procedure, and final vesting together give substantive content to Article 300A. ## Compensation Jurisprudence: Earlier and Present Position PeriodConstitutional position on compensation**Original Article 31(2)**Compensation was expressly required for compulsory acquisition; courts examined whether it was a just equivalent**After Fourth Amendment**Adequacy was less open to challenge, but arbitrary or irrelevant valuation principles could still be reviewed**After Twenty-Fifth Amendment**“Compensation” was replaced by “amount”; full market equivalence was not constitutionally guaranteed**After Forty-Fourth Amendment**Article 300A does not expressly mention compensation, but public purpose, fairness, non-arbitrariness, and non-illusory restitution remain constitutionally reviewable- **Present Rule:** Article 300A does not create an automatic constitutional entitlement to market value in every form of deprivation. However, when the State compulsorily acquires private property, compensation cannot be illusory, arbitrary, or a device for confiscation. - **Statutory Entitlement:** The actual amount, method, and components of compensation depend primarily on the acquisition statute. For ordinary land acquisition by the State, the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 is especially important. - **2013 Act Safeguards:** The 2013 Act provides statutory protections including social impact assessment, preliminary notification, objections, determination of market value, solatium, rehabilitation, and resettlement. Its structure reflects the procedural requirements later emphasised under Article 300A. ## Remedies for Violation of Article 300A - **Article 226 Remedy:** A person deprived of property without authority of law can ordinarily approach the High Court under Article 226 for writ relief, including mandamus, certiorari, restoration of possession, direction for lawful acquisition, or payment of compensation. - **Article 32 Limitation:** Since Article 300A is not a Fundamental Right, Article 32 is generally not available solely for its violation. However, where the same State action also violates a Fundamental Right, such as Article 14 or Article 21, constitutional remedies may arise on those independent grounds. - **Civil and Statutory Remedies:** Affected persons may also pursue remedies under the relevant acquisition statute, seek reference for enhancement of compensation where available, challenge notifications, claim damages, or institute civil proceedings depending on the facts and the governing legislation. ## Key Takeaways - **Fundamental Right Removed:** Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31 were removed by the Forty-Fourth Amendment with effect from 20 June 1979. - **Constitutional Right Retained:** Article 300A continues to protect every person from deprivation of property without authority of law. - **Executive Fiat Prohibited:** Administrative action alone cannot lawfully deprive a person of property. - **Public Purpose Required:** Compulsory acquisition must ordinarily serve a genuine public purpose. - **Compensation Remains Relevant:** Article 300A does not expressly guarantee market-value compensation in every situation, but the State cannot impose confiscatory, arbitrary, illusory, or unjustified deprivation. - **Fair Procedure Essential:** Notice, hearing, reasons, public purpose, fair compensation, timely procedure, and final vesting are integral safeguards under Article 300A. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Freedom of Trade, Commerce and Intercourse Under the Indian Constitution: Articles 301–307, State Taxation and Judicial Development](https://lawfoyer.in/freedom-of-trade-commerce-and-intercourse-under-the-indian-constitution/) **Published:** June 21, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun21202601_04_06A-725x1024.jpeg) ## Constitutional Idea and Object of Part XIII - **National Economic Unity:** Part XIII of the Constitution, containing Articles 301 to 307, seeks to maintain India as one integrated economic unit. It prevents States from creating protectionist barriers that fragment the national market into separate economic territories. - **Constitutional Guarantee:** Article 301 declares that, “subject to the other provisions of this Part,” trade, commerce and intercourse throughout India shall be free. The freedom is therefore broad, but it is not absolute. Articles 302 to 305 expressly permit restrictions in defined situations. - **Nature of Right:** Article 301 is not a Fundamental Right under Part III. It is a constitutional limitation on legislative power. A law may be validly enacted under Articles 245 and 246 read with the relevant entry in the Seventh Schedule, but can still be challenged if it violates Part XIII. - **Legislative Competence First:** A challenge under Article 301 does not replace the question of legislative competence. A court must first ask whether Parliament or the State Legislature had power to enact the law. Even a non-discriminatory tax cannot survive if it is outside the legislature’s constitutional field of taxation. - **Relation with Article 19(1)(g):** Article 19(1)(g) protects an individual citizen’s freedom to practise a profession or carry on trade or business. Article 301 protects the free flow of trade, commerce and intercourse across India. A measure may affect both provisions, but the constitutional tests and beneficiaries are different. - **Meaning of Trade, Commerce and Intercourse:** These expressions receive a wide meaning. They cover commercial dealings, movement of goods, transportation, and movement connected with commercial activity. “Intercourse” is broader and may extend beyond a completed commercial transaction to movement and communication among different parts of India. ## Structure of Articles 301 to 307 ArticleSubjectCore Rule**Article 301**Freedom of trade, commerce and intercourseTrade, commerce and intercourse throughout India shall be free, subject to Part XIII.**Article 302**Parliament’s powerParliament may impose restrictions in the public interest.**Article 303**Ban on preference and discriminationParliament and States ordinarily cannot prefer one State over another or discriminate between States.**Article 304(a)**State taxation of imported goodsStates may tax goods imported from other States or Union Territories, but cannot discriminate against them.**Article 304(b)**State non-tax restrictionsStates may impose reasonable restrictions in the public interest, subject to prior Presidential sanction for the Bill or amendment.**Article 305**Existing laws and State monopoliesSaves certain existing laws and laws relating to State monopolies under Article 19(6)(ii).**Article 306**Former Part B StatesOmitted by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956.**Article 307**Authority for Part XIIIParliament may establish an authority to implement Articles 301–304.The present constitutional text shows that Article 301 is expressly made subject to the rest of Part XIII; Article 304 begins with a non-obstante clause overriding Articles 301 and 303 within its defined field. ## Article 301: Freedom of Trade, Commerce and Intercourse - **General Rule:** Article 301 protects free movement throughout India. It applies not merely to trade crossing State borders but also to trade occurring within a State, because the phrase used is “throughout the territory of India.” - **Direct and Immediate Effect Test:** Historically, a law attracted Article 301 when its direct and immediate effect was to restrict the movement of trade. A remote, incidental or indirect economic effect was ordinarily insufficient. - **Restriction versus Regulation:** A genuine regulatory measure may not violate Article 301 merely because it makes trade less convenient. For example, licensing, traffic regulation, safety conditions, inspection requirements and similar controls may be constitutionally valid where they regulate rather than directly obstruct trade. The substance and practical effect of the law, not its label, are decisive. - **Taxation after *Jindal Stainless*:** The earlier position treated certain taxes as restrictions if they directly burdened movement. The present controlling position is that a tax simpliciter is not, by itself, a restriction under Part XIII. The word “free” in Article 301 does not mean freedom from every tax. A tax becomes constitutionally vulnerable under Part XIII when it is discriminatory in the protectionist sense. ### Landmark Case: *Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam*, AIR 1961 SC 232; (1961) 1 SCR 809 - **Facts, Issue and Ratio:** Assam imposed a tax on goods carried by road or inland waterways, including tea transported through Assam to markets outside the State. Tea producers challenged the levy as a direct burden on movement of goods. The Supreme Court held that a tax law is not automatically excluded from Article 301. Where the tax directly and immediately restricts the movement of trade, it can offend Article 301 unless saved by another provision of Part XIII. The Court treated movement as an integral component of trade and held that the Assam levy had a direct and immediate restrictive effect. This case established the historic “direct and immediate effect” doctrine. Its treatment of taxes has later been limited by the nine-Judge Bench in *Jindal Stainless*, but the doctrine remains important for assessing non-tax restrictions. ## Article 302: Parliament’s Power to Impose Restrictions - **Parliamentary Power:** Article 302 authorises Parliament, by law, to impose restrictions on trade, commerce or intercourse between States, or within any part of India, when required in the public interest. - **Public Interest Standard:** Article 302 does not use the phrase “reasonable restrictions.” Its text requires that the restriction be one required in the public interest. The law remains open to constitutional review for arbitrariness, lack of legislative competence, violation of Article 303, or other constitutional infirmities. - **Exclusive Nature:** Article 302 empowers Parliament, not State Legislatures. A State cannot justify its own restriction under Article 302; its relevant constitutional source is Article 304. - **Central Sales Tax Context:** Parliamentary taxation affecting inter-State trade may be sustained under Article 302, provided it is in public interest and does not violate Article 303. ### Landmark Case: *State of Madras v. N.K. Nataraja Mudaliar*, AIR 1969 SC 147; (1968) 3 SCR 829 - **Facts, Issue and Ratio:** The validity of provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 was challenged on the ground that varying rates connected with inter-State sales burdened inter-State trade and created unconstitutional preference. The Supreme Court rejected the challenge. It held that even assuming the Central Sales Tax had an impact on Article 301 freedom, it was a parliamentary law in the public interest and was protected by Article 302. The Court found no prohibited preference under Article 303. The case confirms that Parliament can regulate or burden inter-State trade through a valid law in the public interest, subject to Article 303. ## Article 303: Prohibition on Preference and Discrimination Between States - **Basic Prohibition:** Article 303(1) restrains both Parliament and State Legislatures. Despite Article 302, neither may make a law giving preference to one State over another, or discriminating between States, by virtue of an entry relating to trade and commerce in any list of the Seventh Schedule. - **Purpose:** The provision prevents economic regionalism. A State cannot use legislative power to favour its own territory merely because local producers, consumers or traders would benefit. - **Scarcity Exception:** Article 303(2) creates a narrow exception only for Parliament. Parliament may give preference or permit discrimination if the law declares that it is necessary to deal with scarcity of goods in any part of India. - **No Comparable State Exception:** A State Legislature cannot invoke scarcity under Article 303(2). The exception belongs exclusively to Parliament and must be supported by a statutory declaration. - **Article 303 and Article 304(a):** Article 303 is concerned with preference or discrimination between States. Article 304(a) specifically controls State taxation of goods imported from other States or Union Territories. In taxation disputes involving imported goods, Article 304(a) is generally the more direct provision. ## Article 304(a): State Taxation and Non-Discrimination - **Permissive Power:** Article 304(a) permits a State to impose a tax on goods imported from other States or Union Territories, provided similar goods manufactured or produced within that State bear a comparable tax burden. - **Core Requirement:** The State must not discriminate between imported goods and locally manufactured or produced goods. The constitutional concern is protectionism, not every difference in tax treatment. - **Equality of Burden:** The inquiry is not confined to whether the same statutory levy is imposed in identical words. Courts may examine the practical fiscal burden on imported goods and comparable local goods. - **No Presidential Sanction for Article 304(a):** A tax law complying with Article 304(a) does not require prior Presidential sanction merely because it is a State tax measure. Prior sanction belongs to the separate field of Article 304(b). - **No Rescue through Article 304(b):** A tax that violates Article 304(a) cannot be cured by satisfying Article 304(b) or by obtaining Presidential sanction. The two clauses operate independently. ### Landmark Case: *Firm A.T.B. Mehtab Majid & Co. v. State of Madras*, AIR 1963 SC 928; \[1963\] Supp 2 SCR 435 - **Facts, Issue and Ratio:** The State imposed a higher sales tax burden on tanned hides and skins imported from outside the State than on similar locally processed goods. The issue was whether differential treatment of imported goods violated Article 304(a). The Supreme Court held that the tax was discriminatory because imported goods were placed at a fiscal disadvantage compared with similar local goods. The case established that a State cannot protect local industry through unequal tax treatment of goods coming from outside the State. The principle continues, though the later law emphasises hostile or protectionist discrimination rather than formal differentiation alone. ### Landmark Case: *State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai*, AIR 1964 SC 1006 - **Facts, Issue and Ratio:** Madhya Bharat imposed sales tax on imported tobacco while indigenous tobacco did not bear an equivalent levy. Dealers challenged the tax and sought refund. The Supreme Court held that the unequal treatment violated Article 304(a), because goods imported from another State were taxed while comparable local goods were not. The Court confirmed that Article 304(a) is a constitutional command against discriminatory taxation, not merely an administrative guideline. ### Landmark Case: *Video Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Punjab*, (1990) 3 SCC 87 - **Facts, Issue and Ratio:** Punjab and Uttar Pradesh granted limited sales-tax incentives to specified new industrial units for a limited period. The challenge was that local incentives discriminated against goods coming from outside the State. The Supreme Court distinguished between ordinary differentiation and constitutionally prohibited discrimination. A time-bound incentive for a defined class of new industries, adopted as part of an economic-development policy, was not automatically hostile discrimination. The important principle is that every classification is not protectionism; however, the benefit must remain narrow, rational and non-colourable. ### Landmark Case: *Shree Mahavir Oil Mills v. State of Jammu and Kashmir*, (1996) 11 SCC 39 - **Facts, Issue and Ratio:** Jammu and Kashmir granted complete sales-tax exemption to local edible-oil industries for ten years, while edible oil imported from other States was taxed at 8%. The Supreme Court struck down the exemption as discriminatory under Article 304(a). It held that the limited exception recognised in *Video Electronics* could not be expanded until it consumed the constitutional rule against protectionism. A broad, unconditional advantage for local producers, coupled with a burden on imported goods, is unconstitutional. ## Article 304(b): Reasonable State Restrictions in Public Interest - **Field of Operation:** Article 304(b) allows a State Legislature to impose reasonable restrictions on freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse with or within that State, where required in the public interest. - **Three Essential Conditions:** A restriction under Article 304(b) must satisfy three conditions: it must be imposed by State law; it must be reasonable; and it must be required in the public interest. - **Prior Presidential Sanction:** No Bill or amendment for purposes of Article 304(b) may be introduced or moved in a State Legislature without previous Presidential sanction. This is a mandatory constitutional condition precedent. - **Reasonableness Inquiry:** The court examines the nature of the restriction, its degree, its public purpose, the connection between the measure and that purpose, and whether it operates excessively or arbitrarily. A restriction cannot be sustained merely because the State calls it regulatory. - **Independent Clause:** After *Jindal Stainless*, clauses (a) and (b) of Article 304 are to be read disjunctively. Article 304(a) controls discriminatory taxation on imported goods; Article 304(b) governs reasonable non-tax restrictions in public interest. - **Practical Distinction:** A State law imposing a non-discriminatory tax does not ordinarily need Article 304(b) approval. A State law imposing a direct restriction, such as a prohibition, quota, movement restraint or trading condition, must satisfy Article 304(b) where Article 301 is attracted. ## Compensatory Taxes: Historical Doctrine and Present Position - **Historical Meaning:** A compensatory tax was historically described as a levy imposed in return for the use of trading facilities, such as roads, bridges or transport infrastructure. The idea was that a trader who uses public facilities may bear a reasonable charge for them. ### Landmark Case: *Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan*, AIR 1962 SC 1406; (1963) 1 SCR 491 - **Facts, Issue and Ratio:** Motor transport operators challenged the Rajasthan motor-vehicle tax as violating Article 301. The Supreme Court upheld the levy on the ground that it was compensatory or regulatory in nature and related to road facilities used by transport operators. The Court developed the “working test”: a levy connected with facilities used by trade could be treated as outside Article 301 because it facilitated rather than obstructed trade. This became the foundation of the compensatory-tax doctrine, though it is no longer the governing test after the nine-Judge Bench decision in *Jindal Stainless*. - **Expansion of Doctrine:** In *Bhagatram Rajeevkumar v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P.*, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 673, and *State of Bihar v. Bihar Chamber of Commerce*, (1996) 9 SCC 136, the Court adopted a broad “some connection” approach between the levy and facilities provided to trade. This diluted the earlier requirement of a meaningful compensatory link. ### Landmark Case: *Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State of Haryana*, (2006) 7 SCC 241 - **Facts, Issue and Ratio:** Challenges to State entry-tax laws raised the question whether the broad “some connection” test in *Bhagatram Rajeevkumar* and *Bihar Chamber of Commerce* was correct. The Constitution Bench held that the broad test was not good law and restored a stricter approach to compensatory taxation. However, the broader constitutional questions relating to taxes and Article 301 were later considered by a larger Bench. ### Landmark Case: *Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State of Haryana*, (2017) 12 SCC 1 - **Facts, Issue and Ratio:** A nine-Judge Bench considered the constitutional validity of entry-tax laws and revisited the doctrines developed in *Atiabari Tea*, *Automobile Transport* and the earlier *Jindal Stainless* decisions. By majority, the Court held that taxes simpliciter are not within Part XIII and Article 301 does not mean freedom from taxation. It held that only discriminatory taxes offend Article 304(a); Article 304(a) and 304(b) are disjunctive; a violation of Article 304(a) cannot be saved through Article 304(b); and the compensatory-tax doctrine has no juristic basis and stands rejected. The Court further held that Article 304(a) prohibits hostile, protectionist discrimination and not every differentiation, thereby preserving limited and non-hostile development incentives for specified classes or backward areas. - **Present Legal Position:** The compensatory-tax doctrine is important only as judicial history. It is no longer necessary for a State to prove that a non-discriminatory tax is compensatory. The decisive question is whether the tax discriminates against imported goods or creates a hostile protectionist barrier. The Supreme Court has continued to treat the nine-Judge Bench ruling as the governing position on Article 301 and non-discriminatory taxes. ## Article 305: Existing Laws and State Monopolies - **Saving Provision:** Article 305 protects certain existing laws from challenge under Articles 301 and 303, subject to the President’s power to direct otherwise. - **State Monopoly Protection:** Article 305 also protects laws relating to matters mentioned in Article 19(6)(ii), namely laws enabling the State, or a State-owned or State-controlled corporation, to carry on trade, business, industry or service, whether wholly or partially excluding citizens. - **Purpose:** A State monopoly may inevitably restrict private commercial activity. Article 305 ensures that Article 301 cannot automatically invalidate a constitutionally authorised State monopoly. - **Historical Development:** The State-monopoly protection must be read with Article 19(6)(ii), which was introduced after early litigation concerning State monopolies. Article 305 was substituted by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955. ### Landmark Case: *Saghir Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh*, AIR 1954 SC 728; (1955) 1 SCR 707 - **Facts, Issue and Ratio:** Private bus operators challenged the Uttar Pradesh Road Transport Act, which enabled the State to establish a monopoly over road transport services. At that time, Article 19(6) did not expressly protect State monopolies. The Supreme Court held that the statutory scheme violated the freedom to carry on business under Article 19(1)(g). The case is historically important because it demonstrated the need for express constitutional protection for State monopolies. Article 19(6)(ii) and the later expanded wording of Article 305 provide that protection within their constitutional field. ## Articles 306 and 307 - **Article 306 — Omitted Provision:** Article 306 originally gave certain powers to the former Part B States concerning restrictions on trade and commerce. It was omitted by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, following reorganisation of States. It has no present operative role. - **Article 307 — Implementing Authority:** Parliament may appoint an authority to carry out the purposes of Articles 301 to 304 and may confer necessary powers and duties upon it. Article 307 is enabling; it does not itself establish a permanent constitutional authority. ## Quick Revision Framework QuestionConstitutional RouteIs there legislative competence to enact the measure?Articles 245–246 and Seventh Schedule must first be satisfied.Does the measure directly restrict trade, commerce or intercourse?Article 301 may be attracted.Is it a parliamentary restriction in public interest?Examine Article 302, subject to Article 303.Does it give preference to a State or discriminate between States?Examine Article 303; scarcity exception belongs only to Parliament.Is it a State tax on imported goods?Examine Article 304(a): no hostile discrimination.Is it a State non-tax restriction?Examine Article 304(b): public interest, reasonableness and prior Presidential sanction.Is it a State monopoly or an existing saved law?Examine Article 305 read with Article 19(6)(ii).Is the argument based on compensatory tax?Apply *Jindal Stainless*; compensatory-tax theory is rejected.## Core Principles to Remember - **Freedom:** Article 301 creates the constitutional presumption of a free national market. - **Parliament:** Article 302 permits Parliament to restrict trade in the public interest. - **Preference:** Article 303 generally prohibits preference or discrimination between States; Parliament alone may depart from this rule to deal with scarcity. - **State Taxation:** Article 304(a) permits State taxation but forbids hostile discrimination against imported goods. - **State Restrictions:** Article 304(b) permits reasonable restrictions in public interest only with prior Presidential sanction for the Bill or amendment. - **Monopolies:** Article 305 protects existing laws and constitutionally authorised State monopolies. - **Current Tax Rule:** After *Jindal Stainless*, non-discriminatory taxes do not violate Article 301 merely because they burden trade. - **Protectionism Test:** The constitutional vice is not every economic distinction; it is hostile or protectionist discrimination that places outside goods at an unfair disadvantage. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Non-Constitutional Bodies in India: NITI Aayog, NHRC, NCW, NCPCR, CBI, CVC, Law Commission and Other Key Statutory Bodies](https://lawfoyer.in/non-constitutional-bodies-in-india/) **Published:** June 21, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun21202612_57_27A-725x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning and Constitutional Position of Non-Constitutional Bodies • **Core concept:** A non-constitutional body is not created directly by the Constitution of India. It may be created either by a statute enacted by Parliament or a State Legislature, or by an executive resolution, notification, or order of the Government. • **Statutory body:** A statutory body derives its existence, powers, membership, functions, and limits from an Act. Examples include the NHRC, NCW, NCPCR, CVC, NCM, CIC, Lokpal, NGT and NALSA. Such bodies cannot act beyond the powers granted by their parent statute; this is known as the principle of **ultra vires**. • **Executive body:** An executive body is created through executive action rather than legislation. NITI Aayog and the Law Commission of India are important examples. Their existence may be altered, reconstituted, or discontinued by executive decision, subject to constitutional limitations and judicial review. • **Constitutional control:** “Non-constitutional” does not mean unimportant or uncontrolled. Every such body remains subject to the Constitution, especially Articles 14, 19 and 21 where applicable, principles of natural justice, legislative oversight, financial accountability, and judicial review under Articles 32 and 226. • **Case law — Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 549; 1955 SCR 225:** Private textbook publishers challenged Punjab’s executive policy of taking over textbook publication without a specific statute. The issue was whether executive power can operate in an area where no legislation exists. The Supreme Court held that executive power extends to matters within the Legislature’s competence, provided executive action does not violate the Constitution, an existing law, or legal rights. This decision explains the constitutional foundation of executive institutions such as NITI Aayog and the Law Commission. **Basis of comparison****Statutory body****Executive body****Source**Act of Parliament or State LegislatureCabinet resolution, notification, executive order**Examples**NHRC, NCW, CBI’s statutory police framework, CVC, NGTNITI Aayog, Law Commission**Powers**Limited by the parent statuteLimited by Constitution, executive competence and government mandate**Alteration or abolition**Usually requires legislative amendment or repealCan ordinarily be restructured by executive action**Accountability**Statute, Parliament, courts, audits and reportsExecutive, Parliament, courts and public-law review## NITI Aayog • **Nature:** NITI Aayog, meaning the National Institution for Transforming India, is an executive policy institution and not a statutory or constitutional body. It was constituted by a Union Cabinet Resolution dated 1 January 2015, replacing the Planning Commission, which had been created by a resolution of 15 March 1950. • **Purpose:** NITI Aayog functions as the Government of India’s policy think tank. Its objective is to promote long-term strategic planning, innovation, data-based policymaking, cooperative federalism, sustainable development, and coordination between the Union and States. • **Cooperative federalism:** Its Governing Council includes Chief Ministers of States and Lieutenant Governors of Union Territories. This institutional design is meant to involve States in national policy formulation rather than treating them merely as recipients of centrally designed plans. • **Original structure:** The Cabinet Resolution provides for the Prime Minister as Chairperson, a Governing Council, Regional Councils for specific issues, a Vice-Chairperson appointed by the Prime Minister, full-time members, part-time members, ex officio Union Ministers, a Chief Executive Officer, and a secretariat. Membership may be reconstituted by the Government from time to time. • **Functions:** NITI Aayog develops national policy frameworks, promotes village-level planning, supports innovation, monitors implementation, encourages knowledge-sharing among States, and identifies inter-sectoral policy problems. It is primarily advisory and coordination-oriented. • **Limitation:** NITI Aayog cannot enact laws, impose taxes, investigate crimes, or issue judicially enforceable orders. Its recommendations gain force only when accepted through executive action, legislation, budgetary allocation, or binding governmental policy. • **Planning Commission distinction:** The Planning Commission was associated with centrally administered Five-Year Plans and allocation-oriented planning. NITI Aayog is intended to be more flexible, consultative, federal, and policy-driven rather than functioning as a central planning authority. ## National Human Rights Commission • **Statutory source:** The National Human Rights Commission is established under the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993. It is a statutory human-rights institution, not a constitutional court. The Act defines “human rights” as rights relating to life, liberty, equality and dignity guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in international covenants and enforceable by courts in India. • **Composition:** The Act creates a Chairperson and Members with judicial and human-rights expertise. The statutory structure also connects the Commission with other human-rights-related bodies through ex officio participation as prescribed by law. • **Inquiry power:** Under Section 12, the NHRC may inquire, suo motu, on a petition, or on a court’s direction into a violation of human rights, abetment of violation, or negligence by a public servant in preventing violation. It may also inspect jails and institutions, study safeguards, review laws, promote research, spread awareness, and examine international human-rights instruments. • **Civil-court powers:** During an inquiry, the NHRC has powers similar to those of a civil court, including summoning witnesses, receiving evidence on affidavit, calling for documents, and requisitioning public records. It may use investigating agencies, subject to statutory conditions. • **Recommendations:** The NHRC may recommend compensation or interim relief, prosecution or disciplinary action against responsible persons, and other remedial measures. Its recommendations are influential but ordinarily do not operate like a court decree; the concerned government must respond within the statutory framework. • **Limitation period:** Section 36(2) bars the NHRC from inquiring into matters occurring more than one year before the complaint, subject to the statutory interpretation given by the Supreme Court. • **Case law — N.C. Dhoundial v. Union of India, (2004) 2 SCC 579:** A complaint alleging illegal detention by the CBI was taken up by the NHRC after the expiry of one year from the alleged incident. The legal issue was whether the one-year restriction under Section 36(2) was merely procedural or a jurisdictional limitation. The Supreme Court held that the restriction is mandatory and jurisdictional; the NHRC cannot inquire into a matter beyond that period. The case emphasises that even human-rights bodies must remain within statutory limits. ## National Commission for Women • **Statutory source:** The National Commission for Women is constituted under the National Commission for Women Act, 1990. It is a statutory body designed to protect and advance women’s rights and interests. • **Composition:** The Commission consists of a Chairperson, five Members, and a Member-Secretary, appointed according to the statutory scheme. The design seeks representation of persons having experience in law, women’s welfare, administration, labour, education, health, and related fields. • **Safeguards review:** Under Section 10, the NCW investigates and examines constitutional and legal safeguards available to women and recommends measures for effective implementation. It can report to the Central Government on the working of those safeguards. • **Complaints and suo motu action:** The NCW may take up cases involving violation of women’s rights, non-implementation of laws intended to protect women, denial of equality, harassment, discrimination, dowry-related concerns, violence, and similar grievances. It may also act suo motu where a serious issue affects women generally. • **Law-reform role:** The Commission reviews existing laws, identifies gaps, recommends amendments, conducts studies, promotes research, and advises governments on policies affecting women. • **Nature of power:** The NCW is not a criminal court or a regular civil court. It does not itself convict an offender or award a criminal sentence. Its major strength lies in inquiry, recommendations, fact-finding, policy intervention, coordination with authorities, and public accountability. • **Constitutional connection:** The work of the NCW is linked with Articles 14, 15, 16 and 21. Article 15(3) specifically permits the State to make special provisions for women and children; this constitutional permission supports protective legislation and institutional mechanisms for substantive equality. ## National Commission for Protection of Child Rights • **Statutory source:** The National Commission for Protection of Child Rights is established under the Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005. The Act also provides for State Commissions and Children’s Courts for speedy trial of offences against children. • **Child-rights approach:** The Act treats child rights in light of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, ratified by India on 11 December 1992. It aims to ensure that laws, policies, programmes and administrative systems protect the survival, development, dignity, participation and safety of children. • **Core functions:** The NCPCR examines safeguards for children, investigates violations, studies laws and policies, reviews implementation, inspects child-care institutions, promotes child-rights literacy, and inquires into complaints or takes suo motu notice of deprivation or violation of child rights. • **Vulnerable children:** It gives special attention to children affected by trafficking, sexual abuse, child labour, armed conflict, disability, displacement, poverty, disaster, conflict with law, and institutional neglect. • **Relationship with other laws:** The NCPCR works alongside the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. It does not replace police investigation, prosecution, child welfare committees, or criminal courts. • **Children’s Courts:** The Act permits States to establish or designate Children’s Courts for speedy trial of offences against children. This reflects the principle that child-sensitive justice requires specialised and prompt procedures. ## Central Bureau of Investigation • **Institutional origin:** The CBI is not created by a standalone “CBI Act.” It was established through a Ministry of Home Affairs Resolution dated 1 April 1963. Its police and investigative powers are exercised through the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. Therefore, the CBI is executive in institutional origin but has statutory investigative authority under the DSPE Act. • **DSPE framework:** The Delhi Special Police Establishment Act authorises the DSPE to investigate notified offences. The CBI functions through this statutory framework, particularly in corruption cases, major economic offences, special crimes, and cases transferred by constitutional courts. • **State consent:** Section 6 of the DSPE Act generally requires consent of the State Government for exercise of DSPE powers within that State. This protects federalism by recognising that “police” and “public order” are primarily State subjects. • **Court-directed investigation:** The consent requirement does not prevent the Supreme Court or a High Court from ordering a CBI investigation in exceptional cases while exercising powers under Articles 32 and 226. • **Director’s independence:** The Director of CBI is appointed under the statutory selection process involving the Prime Minister, the Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha or leader of the largest opposition party, and the Chief Justice of India or a Supreme Court Judge nominated by the Chief Justice. The law provides tenure protection, including a minimum tenure and regulated extension provisions. • **Case law — State of West Bengal v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal, (2010) 3 SCC 571:** The Calcutta High Court ordered a CBI investigation into allegations involving State police despite the State’s objection. The issue was whether High Courts and the Supreme Court may direct a CBI investigation without State consent under Section 6 of the DSPE Act. The Supreme Court held that constitutional courts may do so under Articles 32 and 226 to protect fundamental rights and ensure justice, but this extraordinary power must be exercised sparingly, cautiously and only where credible circumstances justify it. • **Case law — Subramanian Swamy v. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation, (2014) 8 SCC 682:** Section 6A of the DSPE Act required prior approval of the Central Government before inquiry or investigation into certain corruption allegations against officers of Joint Secretary rank and above. The issue was whether seniority-based protection from corruption investigation violated Article 14. The Supreme Court struck down Section 6A as unconstitutional, holding that rank or status cannot create an impermissible shield against investigation into corruption. ## Central Vigilance Commission • **Statutory source:** The Central Vigilance Commission became a statutory body under the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003. It is a central anti-corruption oversight institution and is distinct from the CBI. • **Composition and appointment:** The Commission consists of a Central Vigilance Commissioner and up to two Vigilance Commissioners. Appointment is made by the President on the recommendation of a committee comprising the Prime Minister, the Minister of Home Affairs, and the Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha or the leader of the largest opposition group. • **Removal safeguard:** The Central Vigilance Commissioner and Vigilance Commissioners have statutory security of tenure. Removal for proved misbehaviour or incapacity requires a Supreme Court inquiry and Presidential action, except in specific statutory situations. • **Superintendence over CBI:** The CVC exercises superintendence over DSPE investigations into offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. However, it cannot direct the CBI regarding the manner in which a particular investigation should be conducted. This balances oversight with investigative autonomy. • **Other functions:** The CVC reviews corruption investigations, monitors delays in sanction for prosecution, advises Central Government departments and organisations on vigilance administration, and supervises preventive vigilance mechanisms. • **Case law — Vineet Narain v. Union of India, (1998) 1 SCC 226:** The case arose from allegations connected with the “Jain Hawala Diaries” and the perceived inaction of investigative agencies against influential persons. The central issue was how to secure integrity and independence in corruption investigation. The Supreme Court issued extensive directions to insulate the CBI and CVC from improper political interference, emphasising fixed tenure, professional autonomy, transparent supervision and institutional accountability. The later CVC Act, 2003 gave statutory shape to significant parts of this institutional framework. • **Case law — Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, (2011) 4 SCC 1:** The appointment of P.J. Thomas as Central Vigilance Commissioner was challenged because of pending allegations connected with the Palmolein import matter. The issue was whether the high-powered selection committee could ignore relevant material concerning integrity. The Supreme Court quashed the appointment and held that selection must be based on “institutional integrity,” not merely formal eligibility. The selection committee must make an informed and objective assessment of the candidate’s record. ## Law Commission of India • **Nature:** The Law Commission of India is a non-statutory and advisory law-reform body. It is constituted by the Ministry of Law and Justice, Department of Legal Affairs, through executive notification and specific terms of reference. • **Main role:** It researches legal problems, studies outdated or inconsistent laws, considers judicial developments, consults stakeholders, and submits reports recommending reform, repeal, consolidation, codification or modernisation of laws. • **No legislative power:** A Law Commission report is persuasive and influential, but it does not become law merely because the Commission recommends it. Legislative change requires Parliament or the relevant State Legislature to enact an amendment or new law. • **Current institutional point:** The official website records the Twenty-Third Law Commission and related appointment notifications. The constitutional point remains that every Commission operates for a defined tenure and on terms set by executive notification; it is not a permanent constitutional authority. • **Importance:** Many major reforms in criminal law, evidence law, electoral law, family law, administrative law and judicial administration have been shaped by Law Commission reports, even though implementation depends on governmental and legislative action. ## National Commission for Minorities • **Statutory source:** The National Commission for Minorities is established under the National Commission for Minorities Act, 1992. It is a statutory body concerned with the protection of minority rights and safeguards. • **Functions:** It evaluates the progress of development of minorities, monitors implementation of constitutional and legal safeguards, makes recommendations to governments, studies discrimination, and considers complaints relating to deprivation of minority rights. • **Accountability mechanism:** Reports and recommendations of the Commission are placed before Parliament or the concerned State Legislature along with a memorandum indicating action taken or reasons for non-acceptance. This promotes legislative accountability even where the recommendations are not directly enforceable. ## Central Information Commission • **Statutory source:** The Central Information Commission is established under the Right to Information Act, 2005. It is a statutory quasi-judicial body responsible for enforcing transparency obligations of Central public authorities. • **Jurisdiction:** It hears complaints under Section 18 and second appeals under Section 19 relating to Central public authorities. State Information Commissions perform a similar role for State public authorities. • **Powers:** The CIC may require disclosure of information, direct compliance with the RTI Act, award compensation in suitable cases, and impose penalties on Public Information Officers for unjustified refusal, delay, malafide denial or destruction of information. • **Case law — Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal, (2020) 5 SCC 481:** The case concerned RTI requests relating to the office of the Chief Justice of India, collegium correspondence and judges’ asset declarations. The issue was whether the office of the Chief Justice of India is a “public authority” under the RTI Act and how transparency should be balanced with privacy and judicial independence. The Supreme Court held that the office of the Chief Justice of India is a public authority, but disclosure must be decided case by case by applying statutory exemptions, privacy principles and the public-interest test. ## Lokpal and Lokayuktas • **Statutory source:** The Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 creates the Lokpal at the Union level and requires States to establish Lokayuktas. It is a statutory anti-corruption institution. • **Composition:** The Lokpal consists of a Chairperson and up to eight Members, with statutory requirements concerning judicial members and representation. The Chairperson may be a former Chief Justice of India, former Supreme Court Judge, or an eminent person meeting statutory conditions. • **Function:** The Lokpal may inquire into allegations of corruption against specified categories of public servants, use or direct inquiry and investigation mechanisms under the Act, and recommend prosecution or disciplinary action where warranted. • **Distinction from CBI and CVC:** The Lokpal is an anti-corruption ombudsman. The CBI is an investigating agency. The CVC performs vigilance oversight and supervision in defined areas. These institutions may interact, but none is a complete substitute for the others. • **Case law — Common Cause (A Registered Society) v. Union of India, (2017) 7 SCC 158:** The delay in appointing the Lokpal was challenged on the ground that there was no recognised Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha. The issue was whether absence of a formally recognised Leader of Opposition made the selection process impossible. The Supreme Court held that a vacancy in the selection committee does not invalidate or paralyse the appointment process; the statutory scheme must be interpreted to advance the anti-corruption purpose of the Act. ## National Green Tribunal • **Statutory source:** The National Green Tribunal is established under the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010. It is a specialised statutory tribunal for civil environmental disputes. • **Composition:** The NGT combines judicial members and expert members. This structure recognises that environmental disputes require both legal adjudication and scientific or technical understanding. • **Jurisdiction:** The NGT deals with civil cases involving substantial questions relating to the environment, enforcement of environmental legal rights, compensation for damage, restitution of property, and restoration of the environment under the statutory framework. • **Environmental principles:** The Tribunal applies the principles of sustainable development, the precautionary principle, and the polluter-pays principle. It is not bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, but it must follow natural justice. • **Case law — Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Ankita Sinha, (2022) 13 SCC 401:** The NGT acted suo motu on environmental concerns emerging from a news report. The issue was whether the NGT could initiate proceedings without a formal application by an affected person. The Supreme Court held that the NGT has suo motu power because environmental protection requires a purposive interpretation of the Tribunal’s statutory mandate. The power must, however, be exercised consistently with natural justice and fair opportunity to affected parties. ## National Legal Services Authority • **Statutory source:** The National Legal Services Authority is constituted under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. It gives institutional effect to Article 39A of the Constitution, which promotes equal justice and free legal aid. • **Structure:** The Chief Justice of India is the Patron-in-Chief of NALSA. Its Executive Chairperson is a serving or retired Supreme Court Judge nominated according to the Act. • **Functions:** NALSA frames policies for legal services, supports State and District Legal Services Authorities, promotes legal aid, organises Lok Adalats, advances legal literacy, and assists persons who cannot effectively access justice because of poverty, disability, social disadvantage or other recognised grounds. • **Case law — National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438:** NALSA approached the Supreme Court seeking legal recognition and protection for transgender persons. The issue was whether persons outside the male-female binary are entitled to equal constitutional protection and recognition of gender identity. The Supreme Court recognised transgender persons as a “third gender,” affirmed the right to self-identify gender, and held that Articles 14, 15, 16, 19 and 21 protect transgender persons. The judgment directed governments to take affirmative measures for their social, educational and economic inclusion. ## Key Principles Governing Non-Constitutional Bodies • **Legality:** Every statutory body must act within its parent statute. A decision beyond statutory authority is vulnerable to judicial review for being ultra vires. • **Natural justice:** Bodies performing quasi-judicial or fact-finding functions must ordinarily provide notice, a fair hearing, impartial consideration and reasoned decisions where rights or serious interests are affected. • **Independence:** Fixed tenure, transparent appointment, removal safeguards, judicial participation in selection, and protection from arbitrary transfer are institutional devices used to reduce political influence. • **Accountability:** Accountability may arise through annual reports, parliamentary scrutiny, judicial review, audits, statutory reporting duties, public transparency, and review by constitutional courts. • **Recommendation versus adjudication:** NHRC, NCW, NCPCR, NCM and the Law Commission mainly make recommendations. CIC and NGT exercise more directly enforceable statutory adjudicatory powers. CBI investigates offences, while prosecution and adjudication remain functions of courts and prosecuting agencies. ## Quick Revision Memory Aid **Body****Recall keyword****Primary role****NITI Aayog**PolicyNational strategy and cooperative federalism**NHRC**Human dignityHuman-rights inquiry and recommendations**NCW**Women’s equalitySafeguards, complaints and law reform**NCPCR**Child protectionChild-rights monitoring and intervention**CBI**InvestigationSerious crime and corruption investigation**CVC**VigilanceAnti-corruption supervision and preventive vigilance**Law Commission**ReformResearch and legislative recommendations**NCM**Minority safeguardsMonitoring and recommendations**CIC**TransparencyRTI complaints and second appeals**Lokpal**OmbudsmanAnti-corruption inquiry against public servants**NGT**EnvironmentSpecialised environmental adjudication**NALSA**Access to justiceLegal aid and Lok Adalats**One-line consolidation:** NITI Aayog shapes policy; rights commissions monitor safeguards; CBI investigates; CVC and Lokpal strengthen integrity systems; the Law Commission recommends legal reform; CIC enforces transparency; NGT protects the environment; and NALSA makes justice accessible. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Constitutional Bodies of India: Election Commission, UPSC, Finance Commission, CAG, National Commissions, Law Officers and Linguistic Minorities](https://lawfoyer.in/constitutional-bodies-of-india/) **Published:** June 21, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun21202612_48_50A-725x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning and Constitutional Scheme - **Constitutional bodies** are institutions or offices created directly by the Constitution of India. Their existence, core composition, powers, duties, appointment process, reporting mechanism, or safeguards are found in the Constitution itself. Parliament may regulate details through legislation, but it cannot abolish or substantially alter their constitutional identity except through a constitutional amendment. - **Purpose:** These bodies protect important constitutional values such as free elections, merit-based public employment, financial accountability, protection of vulnerable communities, linguistic diversity, and legally sound governance. - **Constitutional body versus statutory body:** A constitutional body derives its authority from the Constitution itself. A statutory body, such as the National Human Rights Commission or Central Vigilance Commission, is created by an ordinary law made by Parliament. The Attorney General and Advocate General are constitutional offices, whereas the Election Commission, UPSC, CAG, Finance Commission, and National Commissions are constitutional institutions. Constitutional Institution / OfficeCore Constitutional ProvisionsMain FunctionElection Commission of IndiaArticles 324–329Conduct and supervise electionsUnion Public Service CommissionArticles 315–323Recruitment and service consultation for Union servicesState Public Service CommissionArticles 315–323Recruitment and service consultation for State servicesFinance CommissionArticles 280–281Recommend fiscal distribution between Union and StatesComptroller and Auditor-GeneralArticles 148–151Audit public money and public accountsNational Commission for Scheduled CastesArticle 338Monitor safeguards for Scheduled CastesNational Commission for Scheduled TribesArticle 338AMonitor safeguards for Scheduled TribesNational Commission for Backward ClassesArticle 338BMonitor safeguards for socially and educationally backward classesAttorney General for IndiaArticles 76 and 88Principal legal adviser to Union GovernmentAdvocate General for a StateArticles 165 and 177Principal legal adviser to State GovernmentSpecial Officer for Linguistic MinoritiesArticle 350BInvestigate safeguards for linguistic minoritiesThe Constitution expressly creates these institutions to ensure that democratic, financial, administrative and minority-rights functions are not left entirely to the discretion of the executive. ## Election Commission of India ### Constitutional Foundation and Nature - **Constitutional source:** Article 324 creates the Election Commission of India. It vests the “superintendence, direction and control” of preparation of electoral rolls and conduct of elections to Parliament, State Legislatures, and the offices of President and Vice-President in the Election Commission. - **Coverage:** The Election Commission conducts elections to: - **Lok Sabha** - **Rajya Sabha** - **State Legislative Assemblies** - **State Legislative Councils** - **President of India** - **Vice-President of India** - **Important distinction:** Elections to Panchayats and Municipalities are conducted by the respective **State Election Commissions** under Articles 243K and 243ZA, not by the Election Commission of India. - **Composition:** Article 324 provides for a Chief Election Commissioner and such number of other Election Commissioners as the President may determine. When other Election Commissioners are appointed, the Chief Election Commissioner acts as the Chairperson. - **Regional Commissioners:** Before general elections and certain Legislative Council elections, the President may appoint Regional Commissioners after consulting the Election Commission. Article 324 gives the Commission broad constitutional authority, but that authority must operate consistently with election laws enacted by Parliament, particularly the Representation of the People Acts, 1950 and 1951. ### Appointment, Tenure and Removal - **Appointment:** Article 324(2) states that the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners are appointed by the President, subject to any law made by Parliament. - **Current statutory framework:** The Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 governs appointment. It provides for: - A **Search Committee** headed by the Union Minister of Law and Justice. - A **Selection Committee** comprising the Prime Minister, the Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha, and a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister. - Appointment by the President on the recommendation of the Selection Committee. - Eligibility generally restricted to persons holding or having held a post equivalent to Secretary to the Government of India and possessing integrity, knowledge and experience in election management and conduct. - A term of six years or up to the age of sixty-five years, whichever is earlier, without reappointment. - **Security of tenure of CEC:** The Chief Election Commissioner can be removed only in the same manner and on the same grounds as a Judge of the Supreme Court. Therefore, removal requires parliamentary impeachment on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity. - **Protection of other Election Commissioners:** Other Election Commissioners cannot be removed except on the recommendation of the Chief Election Commissioner. Their protection is therefore substantial, though not identical to that of the Chief Election Commissioner. - **Service conditions:** The conditions of service of the Chief Election Commissioner cannot be altered to his disadvantage after appointment. ### Powers and Functions of the Election Commission - **Electoral rolls:** The Commission supervises the preparation, revision and correction of electoral rolls. - **Election schedule:** It announces election dates, phases of polling, counting and declaration of results. - **Recognition and symbols:** Under statutory powers, it recognises political parties and allocates election symbols. - **Model Code enforcement:** It supervises political campaigning, monitors election expenditure, regulates campaign conduct and may issue directions to preserve free and fair elections. - **Election administration:** It appoints observers, deploys election machinery, orders repolls where necessary and may postpone elections in exceptional circumstances. - **Advice on disqualification:** Under Articles 103 and 192, the President or Governor decides questions of disqualification of legislators after obtaining the Election Commission’s opinion. In practice, that opinion has decisive constitutional importance. ### Landmark Cases on the Election Commission - **N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency, AIR 1952 SC 64; 1952 SCR 218:** The dispute concerned rejection of a nomination paper during an ongoing election. The issue was whether a constitutional court could intervene immediately under Article 226. The Supreme Court held that Article 329 bars judicial interference in an ongoing electoral process and that election disputes should ordinarily be raised only through an election petition after completion of the election. The case established the principle that the electoral process should not be interrupted at intermediate stages. - **Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405; AIR 1978 SC 851:** The Election Commission cancelled an election after serious disturbances and electoral malpractices. The issue was whether Article 324 gives the Commission broad power to act where statutory law is inadequate. The Supreme Court held that Article 324 is a reservoir of plenary power for conducting free and fair elections, enabling the Commission to act in areas where legislation is silent. However, this power cannot override an existing statutory provision. - **A.C. Jose v. Sivan Pillai, (1984) 2 SCC 656; AIR 1984 SC 921:** The dispute involved the Election Commission’s direction regarding voting machines when statutory election rules did not permit their use in that manner. The Supreme Court held that Article 324 cannot be used to disobey or override the Representation of the People Act or rules validly made under it. The Commission may fill a legislative vacuum, but it cannot act contrary to a field already occupied by statute. - **T.N. Seshan v. Union of India, (1995) 4 SCC 611:** The constitutional validity of the appointment of multiple Election Commissioners was challenged on the ground that it reduced the authority of the Chief Election Commissioner. The Supreme Court upheld the multi-member Election Commission. It held that the Chief Election Commissioner is the Chairperson but does not possess superior individual voting power over other Election Commissioners. The distinction in removal protection between the CEC and other Commissioners was held constitutionally valid because it protects the institutional independence of the Commission. - **Election Commission of India v. Ashok Kumar, (2000) 8 SCC 216:** The Court considered the extent of judicial intervention during elections. It held that courts may intervene where their action helps the election process move forward, but they should not interrupt, stall or derail an election already in progress. - **Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms, (2002) 5 SCC 294:** The issue was whether voters are entitled to know criminal antecedents, assets, liabilities and educational qualifications of candidates. The Supreme Court held that the voter’s right to know is part of freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a). The Election Commission was authorised to require candidates to disclose relevant information. - **People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 399:** Parliament had attempted to restrict candidate disclosures through Section 33B of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The Supreme Court struck down Section 33B because it unreasonably restricted the voter’s right to know. The case reinforced transparency as a requirement of meaningful electoral democracy. - **People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2013) 10 SCC 1:** The issue was whether a voter could reject all candidates while maintaining secrecy of the vote. The Supreme Court directed the Election Commission to provide the NOTA option. It held that the right to vote includes the right not to vote for any candidate and that secrecy of voting protects the voter’s freedom of expression. - **Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India, (2023) 6 SCC 161:** The petition challenged the absence of a parliamentary law governing appointments of the Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commissioners. The Supreme Court held that an independent appointment process was necessary to protect electoral democracy and directed, as an interim arrangement until Parliament enacted a law, that appointments be made on the recommendation of a committee comprising the Prime Minister, Leader of Opposition and Chief Justice of India. Parliament subsequently enacted the 2023 Act, which now provides the statutory appointment process. ### Quick Recall: Election Commission - **Keyword – Article 324:** Election control. - **Keyword – Article 329:** Election disputes after election through election petition. - **Keyword – Mohinder Singh Gill:** Residual constitutional power. - **Keyword – A.C. Jose:** Statute prevails over administrative direction. - **Keyword – PUCL:** Informed voter and NOTA. - **Keyword – T.N. Seshan:** Multi-member Commission is valid. ## Union Public Service Commission and State Public Service Commissions ### Constitutional Foundation - **Constitutional source:** Articles 315 to 323 establish Public Service Commissions. - **Types of Commissions:** - **Union Public Service Commission:** Serves the Union. - **State Public Service Commission:** One for each State. - **Joint State Public Service Commission:** May serve two or more States when their legislatures pass resolutions and Parliament creates a Joint Commission by law. - **Purpose:** Public Service Commissions ensure merit-based, impartial and transparent recruitment to civil services. They act as independent constitutional advisers in recruitment and service matters. Articles 315 to 323 create a Union Commission, State Commissions and the possibility of Joint State Commissions. ### Appointment and Composition - **UPSC:** The Chairperson and members are appointed by the President. - **State PSC:** The Chairperson and members are appointed by the Governor. - **Joint State PSC:** The Chairperson and members are appointed by the President. - **Experience requirement:** As nearly as possible, one-half of the members of every Public Service Commission must be persons who have held office for at least ten years under the Government of India or a State Government. ### Tenure and Age Limit - **UPSC members:** Six years or sixty-five years of age, whichever is earlier. - **State PSC members:** Six years or sixty-two years of age, whichever is earlier. - **Resignation:** A UPSC member resigns by writing to the President. A State PSC member resigns by writing to the Governor. ### Removal and Suspension - **Removal by President:** Even members of State Public Service Commissions are removed by the President, not by the Governor. - **Misbehaviour:** A member may be removed for misbehaviour only after the Supreme Court conducts an inquiry under Article 317 and reports that removal is justified. - **Suspension:** During such inquiry, the President may suspend the Chairperson or member. - **Direct removal without Supreme Court inquiry:** The President may remove a member if the member: - Is adjudged insolvent; - Engages in paid employment outside official duties; - Becomes unfit due to infirmity of mind or body. ### Functions under Article 320 - **Recruitment advice:** The Commission conducts examinations for appointments to Union or State services. - **Recruitment methods:** It advises on matters relating to recruitment methods and principles. - **Appointments and promotions:** It is consulted on appointments, promotions and transfers from one service to another. - **Disciplinary matters:** It is consulted in disciplinary proceedings affecting civil servants. - **Legal costs:** It advises on claims for reimbursement of legal expenses incurred by civil servants defending proceedings arising from official acts. - **Injury pension:** It advises on claims for pensions relating to injuries sustained in service. - **Additional functions:** Parliament or a State Legislature may extend the functions of a Public Service Commission. ### Advisory Nature of Consultation - **Non-binding advice:** The advice of a Public Service Commission is ordinarily advisory. However, the executive cannot treat consultation as meaningless or depart from the Commission’s advice arbitrarily. - **Reporting safeguard:** Where advice of a Commission is not accepted, the President or Governor must place before Parliament or the State Legislature a memorandum explaining cases in which advice was not accepted and reasons for non-acceptance. - **Financial independence:** Expenses of UPSC are charged on the Consolidated Fund of India. Expenses of a State PSC are charged on the Consolidated Fund of the concerned State. These amounts are not ordinarily subject to legislative vote. ### Post-Tenure Restrictions - **UPSC Chairperson:** Cannot accept further employment under the Government of India or a State Government. - **State PSC Chairperson:** May become Chairperson or member of UPSC or Chairperson of another State PSC, but cannot accept other government employment. - **UPSC member:** May become Chairperson of UPSC or Chairperson of a State PSC, but cannot accept other government employment. - **State PSC member:** May become Chairperson or member of UPSC, or Chairperson or member of another State PSC, but cannot accept other government employment. ### Landmark Cases on Public Service Commissions - **State of Uttar Pradesh v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912; 1958 SCR 533:** A government employee challenged disciplinary action taken without consultation with the Public Service Commission. The Supreme Court held that Article 320(3)(c), which requires consultation in disciplinary matters, is directory rather than mandatory. Failure to consult does not automatically invalidate the disciplinary action or create an enforceable individual right, though constitutional authorities should ordinarily comply with the provision. - **Jatinder Kumar v. State of Punjab, (1985) 1 SCC 122:** Candidates recommended by the Punjab Public Service Commission claimed appointment as a matter of right. The Supreme Court held that a recommendation by the Commission does not create an indefeasible right to appointment. However, the Government cannot reject recommendations arbitrarily and should act fairly, for valid reasons, and consistently with the constitutional purpose of consultation. - **Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, (1985) 4 SCC 417:** The selection process was challenged because close relatives of members of the Public Service Commission were candidates. The Supreme Court held that selection must be free from actual or reasonable apprehension of bias. A member whose close relative is a candidate must withdraw from the selection process. The case emphasised impartiality, transparency and public confidence in Commission-based recruitment. - **In Re Dr. Ram Ashray Yadav, Chairman, Bihar Public Service Commission, (2000) 4 SCC 309:** The matter arose from allegations of misconduct against the Chairman of the Bihar Public Service Commission. The Supreme Court stressed that the credibility of a Public Service Commission depends upon public confidence in its impartial functioning. It clarified that Article 317 proceedings concern proven misconduct and cannot rest on mere suspicion or general allegations. ### Quick Recall: Public Service Commissions - **Keyword – Article 315:** Establishment. - **Keyword – Article 316:** Appointment and term. - **Keyword – Article 317:** Removal by President after Supreme Court inquiry. - **Keyword – Article 320:** Recruitment and service consultation. - **Keyword – Article 322:** Expenses charged on Consolidated Fund. - **Keyword – Article 323:** Annual report and reasons for non-acceptance of advice. ## Finance Commission ### Constitutional Foundation and Character - **Constitutional source:** Article 280. - **Nature:** The Finance Commission is a constitutional but periodic body. It is not a permanent daily functioning institution like UPSC or the Election Commission. - **Constitution:** The President constitutes a Finance Commission within two years from commencement of the Constitution and thereafter every five years, or earlier if necessary. - **Composition:** One Chairperson and four other members appointed by the President. - **Statutory law:** The Finance Commission (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1951 regulates qualifications, disqualifications and procedural matters. The Chairperson should have experience in public affairs. Other members may be selected from persons qualified to be High Court judges, experts in public finance and accounts, experienced administrators in financial matters, or economists. ### Functions under Article 280 - **Vertical devolution:** The Commission recommends the distribution between the Union and States of net proceeds of taxes divisible between them. - **Horizontal devolution:** It recommends the allocation among States of their respective shares of divisible tax proceeds. - **Grants-in-aid:** It recommends principles governing grants-in-aid from the Consolidated Fund of India to States under Article 275. - **Panchayats:** After the Seventy-third Amendment, it recommends measures to augment the Consolidated Fund of a State to supplement resources of Panchayats on the basis of State Finance Commission recommendations. - **Municipalities:** After the Seventy-fourth Amendment, it recommends measures to augment the Consolidated Fund of a State to supplement resources of Municipalities on the basis of State Finance Commission recommendations. - **Additional reference:** The President may refer any additional matter to the Commission in the interests of sound finance. ### Finance Commission Recommendations - **Recommendatory role:** The Finance Commission makes recommendations to the President. The Constitution does not state that every recommendation automatically becomes legally binding. - **Parliamentary accountability:** Article 281 requires the President to lay every Finance Commission recommendation before both Houses of Parliament along with an explanatory memorandum regarding action taken. - **Federal significance:** The Commission is a key instrument of cooperative federalism because it balances the revenue powers of the Union with the expenditure responsibilities of States. ### Finance Commission and State Finance Commission: Difference BasisFinance CommissionState Finance CommissionConstitutional provisionArticle 280Articles 243I and 243YConstituted byPresidentGovernorMain concernUnion–State fiscal relationsState–local body fiscal relationsFrequencyEvery five years or earlierEvery five yearsRecommends onTax sharing, grants, Union-State distributionPanchayat and Municipal finances### Quick Recall: Finance Commission - **Keyword – Article 280:** Constitution of Commission. - **Keyword – Every five years:** Periodic body. - **Keyword – Vertical devolution:** Union share versus States’ share. - **Keyword – Horizontal devolution:** Distribution among States. - **Keyword – Article 281:** Recommendations and action taken memorandum before Parliament. ## Comptroller and Auditor-General of India ### Constitutional Position - **Constitutional source:** Articles 148 to 151. - **Role:** The Comptroller and Auditor-General of India, commonly called the CAG, is the supreme constitutional audit authority of India. The office ensures that public money is spent only for authorised purposes and that public authorities remain financially accountable. - **Appointment:** The CAG is appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal. - **Removal:** The CAG can be removed only in the same manner and on the same grounds as a Judge of the Supreme Court. - **Independence safeguards:** - Salary and service conditions cannot be altered to the CAG’s disadvantage after appointment. - The CAG cannot hold any further office under the Government of India or any State Government after leaving office. - Administrative expenses of the CAG’s office are charged on the Consolidated Fund of India. - **Statutory framework:** The Comptroller and Auditor-General’s (Duties, Powers and Conditions of Service) Act, 1971 prescribes duties and powers. ### Duties and Powers - **Audit of Union and State expenditure:** The CAG audits expenditure from the Consolidated Fund of India, Consolidated Funds of States and Union Territories with legislatures. - **Appropriation audit:** It verifies whether money was spent for the purpose for which Parliament or the State Legislature authorised it. - **Receipt audit:** It examines whether revenue collection, tax assessment, grants, fees and other public receipts comply with law and procedure. - **Commercial audit:** It audits Government companies and certain corporations as provided by law. - **Performance audit:** It examines whether public schemes and expenditure were efficient, economical and effective. - **Access to records:** The CAG can require documents, accounts and information necessary for audit. - **Accounts:** Article 150 provides that the form of Union and State accounts is prescribed by the President on the advice of the CAG. ### Audit Reports - **Union reports:** CAG reports relating to Union accounts are submitted to the President, who causes them to be laid before both Houses of Parliament. - **State reports:** CAG reports relating to State accounts are submitted to the Governor, who causes them to be laid before the State Legislature. - **Legislative scrutiny:** Audit reports are usually examined by the Public Accounts Committee and, where relevant, the Committee on Public Undertakings. These committees scrutinise executive expenditure and seek explanations from departments. ### Landmark Case on CAG Audit Power - **Association of Unified Telecom Service Providers of India v. Union of India, (2014) 6 SCC 110:** Telecom service providers challenged the CAG’s power to audit their books and accounts. The issue was whether private entities could be audited by the CAG. The Supreme Court held that where private telecom operators deal with revenue payable to the Union under revenue-sharing arrangements, the CAG may examine relevant records to verify the Government’s revenue. The Court clarified that the audit was connected with accountability of public revenue, not an unrestricted audit of private business affairs. ### Quick Recall: CAG - **Keyword – Article 148:** Appointment and independence. - **Keyword – Article 149:** Duties and powers. - **Keyword – Article 150:** Form of accounts. - **Keyword – Article 151:** Audit reports before Legislature. - **Keyword – PAC:** Legislative scrutiny of audit reports. - **Keyword – No future government office:** Post-tenure independence. ## National Commission for Scheduled Castes ### Constitutional Foundation - **Constitutional source:** Article 338. - **Historical development:** Originally, Article 338 provided for a Special Officer for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Later, a combined National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes was created. The Constitution (Eighty-ninth Amendment) Act, 2003 separated the combined institution into: - National Commission for Scheduled Castes under Article 338. - National Commission for Scheduled Tribes under Article 338A. - **Composition:** Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson and three other members. They are appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal. ### Functions of NCSC - **Safeguards monitoring:** It investigates and monitors constitutional, legal and governmental safeguards available to Scheduled Castes. - **Complaint inquiry:** It inquires into specific complaints concerning deprivation of rights and safeguards of Scheduled Castes. - **Development planning:** It participates and advises in planning the socio-economic development of Scheduled Castes. - **Reports:** It presents annual and special reports to the President. - **Recommendations:** It recommends measures for effective implementation of safeguards and welfare measures. - **Consultation:** The Union and every State Government must consult the Commission on major policy matters affecting Scheduled Castes. - **Civil court powers:** While investigating or inquiring into complaints, it has powers of a civil court, including summoning witnesses, requiring documents, receiving affidavits and requisitioning public records. - **Anglo-Indian reference:** Article 338 provides that references to Scheduled Castes in the Article include references to the Anglo-Indian community for the limited purpose stated in the constitutional provision. ## National Commission for Scheduled Tribes ### Constitutional Foundation - **Constitutional source:** Article 338A. - **Reason for separate Commission:** Scheduled Tribes face distinct constitutional concerns relating to tribal land, forest resources, displacement, self-governance, Scheduled Areas, Fifth Schedule protections and Sixth Schedule areas. A separate Commission was created to focus on those concerns. ### Functions of NCST - **Monitoring safeguards:** It monitors constitutional and legal safeguards for Scheduled Tribes. - **Complaint inquiry:** It inquires into specific complaints relating to denial of rights and safeguards of Scheduled Tribes. - **Planning role:** It advises on socio-economic development of Scheduled Tribes under the Union and States. - **Reports and recommendations:** It submits annual and special reports to the President and recommends corrective measures. - **Consultation duty:** Union and State Governments must consult the Commission on major policy matters affecting Scheduled Tribes. - **Civil court powers:** Like the NCSC, it has civil court powers in investigations and complaint inquiries. The constitutional duties, civil-court powers and consultation mechanisms for NCSC and NCST are broadly parallel, though each Commission focuses on the specific constitutional safeguards of the community it serves. ## National Commission for Backward Classes ### Constitutional Foundation and Evolution - **Constitutional source:** Article 338B. - **Earlier statutory body:** Before becoming a constitutional body, the National Commission for Backward Classes operated under the National Commission for Backward Classes Act, 1993. - **Constitutional status:** The Constitution (One Hundred and Second Amendment) Act, 2018 inserted Article 338B and gave constitutional status to the National Commission for Backward Classes. - **Composition:** Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson and three other members appointed by the President. - **Scope:** The Commission deals with safeguards for socially and educationally backward classes, commonly referred to as SEBCs or Other Backward Classes in several legal contexts. ### Functions of NCBC - **Safeguards monitoring:** It investigates and monitors safeguards under the Constitution, laws and government orders. - **Complaint inquiry:** It inquires into complaints concerning deprivation of rights and safeguards of socially and educationally backward classes. - **Development role:** It advises on socio-economic development and evaluates progress under Union and State Governments. - **Reports:** It submits annual and special reports to the President. - **Recommendations:** It recommends remedial measures for effective protection of safeguards. - **Consultation:** Union and State Governments must consult the Commission on major policy matters affecting socially and educationally backward classes. - **Civil court powers:** It has civil-court powers while investigating matters and inquiring into complaints. ### Article 342A and State Lists of Backward Classes - **Central List:** Article 342A concerns identification of socially and educationally backward classes for the Central List. - **State List:** The Constitution (One Hundred and Fifth Amendment) Act, 2021 clarified that every State or Union Territory may prepare and maintain its own list of socially and educationally backward classes for its own purposes. Such State List may differ from the Central List. - **Importance:** A community may therefore be included in a State backward class list for State employment or educational measures, yet not necessarily be included in the Central List for Union purposes. Article 338B was inserted by the One Hundred and Second Amendment, while the One Hundred and Fifth Amendment expressly restored the power of States and Union Territories to maintain separate lists for their own purposes. ### Landmark Cases Connected with NCBC and Backward Classes - **Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217:** The case challenged the Central Government’s decision to reserve twenty-seven per cent posts for Other Backward Classes in public employment. The Supreme Court upheld reservation for socially and educationally backward classes under Article 16(4), subject to important limits. It recognised the creamy-layer principle, stated that reservations ordinarily should not exceed fifty per cent, and directed creation of a permanent body to examine inclusion and exclusion of backward classes. The statutory NCBC created in 1993 emerged from this constitutional development. - **Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. Chief Minister, (2021) 8 SCC 1:** The constitutional validity of the Maharashtra law granting reservation to the Maratha community was challenged. One issue was whether, after the One Hundred and Second Amendment, States retained power to identify socially and educationally backward classes. The Court interpreted the amended constitutional scheme as limiting that power in the manner then applicable. Parliament subsequently enacted the One Hundred and Fifth Amendment, which expressly permits States and Union Territories to prepare and maintain their own backward-class lists for State purposes. ### Quick Recall: National Commissions - **Keyword – Article 338:** NCSC. - **Keyword – Article 338A:** NCST. - **Keyword – Article 338B:** NCBC. - **Keyword – Complaint inquiry:** Individual deprivation of safeguards. - **Keyword – Civil court powers:** Investigation and inquiry support. - **Keyword – Consultation:** Major policy matters. - **Keyword – Article 342A:** Central and State backward-class lists. ## Attorney General for India ### Constitutional Foundation - **Constitutional source:** Article 76. - **Status:** The Attorney General for India is the highest law officer of the Union Government. - **Appointment:** The President appoints the Attorney General. - **Qualification:** The person must be qualified to be appointed as a Judge of the Supreme Court. Therefore, the person must satisfy the eligibility requirements under Article 124(3). - **Tenure:** The Attorney General holds office during the pleasure of the President. The Constitution prescribes no fixed term or age limit. ### Functions and Rights - **Legal advice:** The Attorney General advises the Government of India on legal matters referred by the President. - **Constitutional duties:** The Attorney General performs legal duties assigned by the President and discharges functions conferred by the Constitution or any other law. - **Right of audience:** The Attorney General has a right of audience in all courts within India. - **Parliamentary participation:** Under Article 88, the Attorney General may participate in proceedings of both Houses of Parliament, joint sittings and parliamentary committees of which he may be named a member. However, he has no right to vote merely because of this constitutional participation. - **Distinction from Solicitor General:** The Solicitor General and Additional Solicitors General are important Union law officers, but they are not constitutional offices. The Attorney General alone derives office directly from Article 76. The Attorney General’s appointment, qualifications, advisory role, right of audience and tenure during the President’s pleasure are governed by Article 76; Article 88 confers the right to participate in parliamentary proceedings without a vote. ### Quick Recall: Attorney General - **Keyword – Article 76:** Attorney General. - **Keyword – Supreme Court Judge qualification:** Eligibility. - **Keyword – President’s pleasure:** No fixed tenure. - **Keyword – Right of audience:** All courts in India. - **Keyword – Article 88:** Can participate in Parliament but cannot vote. ## Advocate General for the State ### Constitutional Foundation - **Constitutional source:** Article 165. - **Status:** The Advocate General is the highest law officer of a State. - **Appointment:** The Governor appoints the Advocate General. - **Qualification:** The person must be qualified to be appointed as a Judge of a High Court. - **Tenure:** The Advocate General holds office during the pleasure of the Governor and receives remuneration determined by the Governor. ### Functions and Rights - **Legal advice:** The Advocate General advises the State Government on legal matters referred by the Governor. - **Legal duties:** The Advocate General performs legal duties assigned by the Governor and functions conferred by the Constitution or other laws. - **State Legislature participation:** Under Article 177, the Advocate General may participate in proceedings of the State Legislature and its committees but has no right to vote merely by virtue of that office. ### Attorney General and Advocate General: Comparison BasisAttorney GeneralAdvocate GeneralConstitutional provisionArticle 76Article 165Appointed byPresidentGovernorAdvisesUnion GovernmentState GovernmentQualificationEligible to be Supreme Court JudgeEligible to be High Court JudgeTenurePleasure of PresidentPleasure of GovernorLegislative rightArticle 88Article 177Right to voteNoNoArticle 165 establishes the Advocate General’s office, while Article 177 grants participation rights in the State Legislature without voting rights. ## Special Officer for Linguistic Minorities ### Constitutional Foundation - **Constitutional source:** Article 350B. - **Nature:** The Constitution provides for a Special Officer for Linguistic Minorities, appointed by the President. Administratively, the office is commonly known as the Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities. - **Purpose:** The office protects constitutional safeguards available to linguistic minorities and serves as a monitoring and reporting authority. ### Functions - **Investigation:** The Special Officer investigates matters relating to safeguards available to linguistic minorities under the Constitution. - **Reports:** The Officer reports to the President at intervals directed by the President. - **Parliamentary accountability:** The President must cause these reports to be laid before each House of Parliament. - **State communication:** Reports must also be sent to the Governments of States concerned. - **Nature of authority:** Unlike the National Commissions for SCs, STs and Backward Classes, Article 350B does not expressly confer civil-court powers on the Special Officer. The primary constitutional role is investigation, reporting and institutional monitoring. Article 350B requires appointment by the President, investigation into safeguards for linguistic minorities, reporting to the President, laying reports before Parliament and forwarding them to concerned State Governments. ### Related Constitutional Safeguards for Linguistic Minorities - **Article 29(1) – Conservation:** Any section of citizens having a distinct language, script or culture has the right to conserve it. - **Article 29(2) – Admission:** No citizen can be denied admission into a State-maintained or State-aided educational institution solely on grounds of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. - **Article 30(1) – Minority educational institutions:** Religious and linguistic minorities have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. - **Article 347 – Language spoken by a section of population:** The President may direct official recognition of a language spoken by a substantial proportion of a State’s population where appropriate. - **Article 350 – Representations for redress:** Every person is entitled to submit a representation for redress of a grievance in any language used in the Union or State. - **Article 350A – Mother-tongue education:** States must endeavour to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the mother tongue at the primary stage for children belonging to linguistic minority groups. ### Landmark Case on Linguistic Minorities - **T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481:** The case involved the scope of rights of religious and linguistic minorities to establish and administer educational institutions under Article 30. The Supreme Court held that the unit for determining whether a group is a linguistic or religious minority is ordinarily the State, because education is largely regulated at the State level. The Court also held that minority institutions have autonomy in administration, though reasonable regulatory measures may be imposed to maintain educational standards and prevent maladministration. ### Quick Recall: Linguistic Minorities - **Keyword – Article 350B:** Special Officer. - **Keyword – Article 350A:** Mother-tongue instruction. - **Keyword – Article 29:** Language, script and culture. - **Keyword – Article 30:** Minority educational institutions. - **Keyword – T.M.A. Pai:** Minority determined with reference to the State. ## Consolidated Memory Aid Body / OfficeConstitutional KeywordCore Constitutional FunctionElection CommissionArticle 324Free and fair electionsUPSC / SPSCArticles 315–323Merit-based public recruitmentFinance CommissionArticle 280Fiscal federalismCAGArticles 148–151Audit and accountabilityNCSCArticle 338SC safeguardsNCSTArticle 338AST safeguardsNCBCArticle 338BBackward-class safeguardsAttorney GeneralArticle 76Union’s chief legal adviserAdvocate GeneralArticle 165State’s chief legal adviserLinguistic Minorities OfficerArticle 350BLinguistic safeguards **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Emergency Provisions under the Constitution of India: National Emergency, President’s Rule, Financial Emergency, Fundamental Rights and Judicial Review](https://lawfoyer.in/emergency-provisions-under-the-constitution-of-india/) **Published:** June 20, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun20202612_39_07A-725x1024.jpeg) ## Constitutional Framework and Purpose 🔹 **Location and scheme:** Emergency provisions are contained in **Part XVIII of the Constitution of India (Articles 352–360)**. They permit a temporary concentration of Union power when the security of India, constitutional government in a State, or the financial stability or credit of India is seriously threatened. Related provisions, especially Articles 250, 251, 353, 354, 355, 357, 358 and 359, determine their consequences. 🔹 **Three constitutional situations:** The Constitution recognises three distinct forms of emergency: **National Emergency** under Article 352; **President’s Rule or State Emergency** under Article 356; and **Financial Emergency** under Article 360. They differ in their grounds, approval procedure, duration, effect on Union–State relations, and impact on fundamental rights. 🔹 **Exceptional character:** Emergency powers are exceptional powers, not ordinary tools of political administration. Their exercise must remain consistent with constitutionalism, federalism, democracy, judicial review and the rule of law. The Constitution therefore prescribes parliamentary approval, limited duration, and—after the Forty-fourth Amendment—substantial safeguards against misuse. ## Historical Development and Constitutional Safeguards 🔹 **Original position:** Originally, Article 352 permitted National Emergency on the grounds of **war, external aggression or internal disturbance**. The expression “internal disturbance” was considerably broader than the present expression “armed rebellion.” 🔹 **Thirty-eighth Amendment, 1975:** The Constitution (Thirty-eighth Amendment) Act, 1975 attempted to make the President’s satisfaction under Articles 352, 356 and 360 final and conclusive, thereby excluding judicial scrutiny. This was part of a period in which emergency powers were expanded substantially. 🔹 **Forty-fourth Amendment, 1978:** The Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 introduced the principal modern safeguards. It replaced **“internal disturbance” with “armed rebellion”** in Article 352; required the Union Cabinet’s decision in writing; reduced the initial approval period; restored periodic parliamentary control; protected Articles 20 and 21 from suspension under Article 359; and limited the automatic suspension of Article 19 to emergencies based only on war or external aggression. 🔹 **Basic structure limitation:** In *Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala*, **(1973) 4 SCC 225; 1973 Supp SCR 1**, the petition challenged constitutional amendments affecting property and land-reform laws. The principal issue was whether Parliament’s amending power under Article 368 was unlimited. The Supreme Court held that Parliament may amend the Constitution, but cannot destroy its **basic structure**. This doctrine protects features such as constitutional supremacy, judicial review, democracy, federalism and limited government; consequently, emergency-related amendments or actions cannot lawfully destroy these foundational features. 🔹 **Limited amending power:** In *Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India*, **(1980) 3 SCC 625**, the validity of parts of the Forty-second Amendment was challenged. The Supreme Court held that limited amending power and judicial review form part of the basic structure. It also stressed harmony between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles. The case is important because it confirms that neither Parliament nor the executive can use constitutional power to create an uncontrolled authority beyond judicial scrutiny. ## National Emergency under Article 352 ### Grounds for Proclamation 🔹 **Security threat:** Article 352 permits the President to proclaim a National Emergency when a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India or any part of its territory is threatened by **war, external aggression or armed rebellion**. The emergency may cover the whole of India or only a specified part of India. 🔹 **Imminent danger:** A proclamation may be issued even before the actual occurrence of war, external aggression or armed rebellion, provided the President is satisfied that there is an imminent danger of such event. Thus, the Constitution permits preventive action, but only in a situation of genuine and grave constitutional danger. 🔹 **Meaning of war:** **War** generally refers to an armed conflict involving India and another country. A formal declaration of war is not always necessary if the factual circumstances establish a grave threat to national security. 🔹 **Meaning of external aggression:** **External aggression** covers hostile action from outside India even where the situation may not formally amount to war. It may include invasion, armed attack or similar external hostility. 🔹 **Meaning of armed rebellion:** **Armed rebellion** requires a serious, organised and armed challenge to the authority of the State. It is narrower than the earlier phrase “internal disturbance.” Ordinary political protests, public disorder, strikes, riots or non-violent agitation do not by themselves amount to armed rebellion. ### Procedure and Parliamentary Control 🔹 **Written Cabinet decision:** The President cannot issue or vary a National Emergency merely on informal ministerial advice. Article 352(3) requires that the decision of the **Union Cabinet**, consisting of the Prime Minister and Cabinet-rank Ministers, must be communicated to the President in writing. This safeguard was introduced after the experience of the 1975 Emergency. 🔹 **Approval within one month:** Every proclamation must be laid before both Houses of Parliament. It ceases after **one month** unless both Houses approve it within that period. Where the Lok Sabha is dissolved, special constitutional arrangements apply after its reconstitution. 🔹 **Special majority:** Approval or continuation requires a **special majority** in each House: a majority of the total membership of that House and a majority of not less than two-thirds of members present and voting. This is more stringent than the approval required for President’s Rule or Financial Emergency. 🔹 **Six-month renewal:** Once approved, a National Emergency remains in force for six months. It may continue for further six-month periods only if both Houses pass fresh resolutions with the required special majority. 🔹 **Lok Sabha disapproval:** The President must revoke the Emergency if the Lok Sabha passes a resolution disapproving it or its continuation. Further, where at least one-tenth of the total Lok Sabha membership gives written notice of such a resolution, a special sitting must be convened within fourteen days. ### Effects of National Emergency Area affectedConstitutional consequence**Executive power**Union executive may direct States regarding exercise of State executive power.**Legislative power**Parliament may legislate on subjects in the State List.**Union–State relations**Federal distribution of executive and legislative powers becomes more centralised.**Financial relations**The President may modify the operation of provisions relating to distribution of revenues between Union and States.**Legislature duration**Parliament may extend the life of Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies by law, one year at a time, subject to constitutional limits.🔹 **Union directions:** Under Article 353(a), the Union executive power expands to giving directions to any State regarding the manner in which its executive power must be exercised. This does not abolish State governments, but it places them under enhanced Union control. 🔹 **Parliament on State List:** Under Article 250, Parliament may legislate on any matter in the State List during a National Emergency. Such a law ordinarily ceases to have effect six months after the Emergency ends, except for actions already done under it. If a State law conflicts with a parliamentary law made under Article 250, the parliamentary law prevails during its operation. 🔹 **Revenue distribution:** Article 354 permits the President to modify the operation of Articles 268–279, which concern financial distribution between the Union and States. Such modification cannot ordinarily extend beyond the financial year in which the Emergency ceases. 🔹 **Extension of legislative tenure:** During a National Emergency, Parliament may extend the term of the Lok Sabha under Article 83(2) and the term of State Legislative Assemblies under Article 172(1), for not more than one year at a time. Such extension cannot continue beyond six months after the Emergency has ceased. ### Historical Use of Article 352 🔹 **Past proclamations:** National Emergency has been proclaimed on three occasions: during the 1962 conflict with China, during the 1971 conflict with Pakistan, and during the 1975–1977 Emergency declared on the ground of internal disturbance under the then-existing text of Article 352. The 1975 Emergency lasted from 25 June 1975 to 21 March 1977. 🔹 **Current constitutional position:** The post-1978 requirement of armed rebellion, written Cabinet advice, special parliamentary majority and protection for Articles 20 and 21 makes the present framework materially more restrictive than the one operating in 1975. ## President’s Rule or State Emergency under Article 356 ### Constitutional Basis 🔹 **Failure of constitutional machinery:** Article 356 applies where the President is satisfied that the government of a State cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution. The President may act on the Governor’s report **or otherwise**; therefore, a Governor’s report is important but not an indispensable constitutional requirement. 🔹 **Article 355 connection:** Article 355 imposes a duty on the Union to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance and to ensure that its government is carried on according to the Constitution. However, Article 355 does not independently authorise a Union takeover; Article 356 can be invoked only when its own constitutional conditions are satisfied. ### Nature and Scope of President’s Rule 🔹 **Executive takeover:** The President may assume all or any functions of the State Government and powers exercisable by the Governor or another State authority. In practice, the Governor ordinarily administers the State on behalf of the President. 🔹 **Legislative takeover:** The President may declare that the powers of the State Legislature shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament. Parliament may then make laws for the State or authorise the President or another authority to do so under Article 357. 🔹 **High Court protection:** Article 356 expressly prohibits the President from assuming powers vested in a High Court or suspending constitutional provisions relating to High Courts. Thus, President’s Rule cannot lawfully extinguish the constitutional role of the High Court. 🔹 **Suspended animation and dissolution:** A State Legislative Assembly may be kept in suspended animation or dissolved. Dissolution is constitutionally more serious because it ends the existing elected Assembly. Under the principles in *S.R. Bommai*, irreversible dissolution should not ordinarily occur before parliamentary approval of the proclamation. 🔹 **Continuity of laws:** A law made by Parliament, the President or another authorised authority during President’s Rule continues even after the proclamation ends until it is altered, repealed or amended by a competent legislature or authority. ### Approval, Duration and Extension 🔹 **Approval within two months:** A proclamation under Article 356 must be approved by both Houses of Parliament within two months; otherwise, it ceases to operate. Approval is by ordinary parliamentary majority, not the special majority required under Article 352. 🔹 **Six-month periods:** Once approved, President’s Rule continues for six months. It may be extended every six months through fresh parliamentary approval. 🔹 **Maximum period:** President’s Rule cannot ordinarily continue beyond **three years**. Beyond one year, continuation is permitted only when: **a National Emergency is in operation in the whole or any part of India**, and the **Election Commission certifies** that elections to the concerned State Legislative Assembly cannot be held due to difficulties. ### Judicial Review of Article 356 🔹 **Leading authority — *S.R. Bommai v. Union of India*, (1994) 3 SCC 1; AIR 1994 SC 1918:** Several State governments, including the Karnataka government led by S.R. Bommai, were dismissed under Article 356 and the proclamations were challenged. The central issue was whether the President’s satisfaction was beyond judicial review. A nine-Judge Bench held that Article 356 is subject to judicial review. The Court may examine whether relevant material existed, whether the material was relevant, whether the power was exercised mala fide, or whether the proclamation was based on extraneous or wholly irrational grounds. The Court also held that federalism and secularism are basic features, that a floor test is normally the proper method for deciding whether a Ministry enjoys majority support, and that a court may restore a dismissed government or Assembly if the proclamation is invalid. 🔹 **Floor-test principle:** A Governor should not ordinarily determine majority by private assessment, political correspondence or allegations of defections. Where the question is whether a Ministry has lost majority, the constitutional forum is ordinarily the floor of the Legislative Assembly. The Supreme Court has repeatedly treated the floor test as the proper democratic method for resolving such disputes. 🔹 **Leading authority — *Rameshwar Prasad (VI) v. Union of India*, (2006) 2 SCC 1:** In this case, the Bihar Legislative Assembly was dissolved before it first met, based on a Governor’s report alleging attempts to form a government through unconstitutional defections. The Supreme Court examined whether the material justified the proclamation and dissolution. It held that the dissolution was unconstitutional because the Governor’s report rested on irrelevant and extraneous material and prevented a possible government from proving majority on the floor of the House. Although the Court declined restoration because elections had substantially progressed, it reaffirmed that Article 356 cannot be used on political suspicion or speculative assessment. 🔹 **No automatic suspension of rights:** President’s Rule does not automatically suspend Fundamental Rights, dissolve courts, or suspend the Constitution of the State. It is a temporary assumption of executive and legislative authority, subject to parliamentary approval and judicial review. ## Financial Emergency under Article 360 ### Grounds and Procedure 🔹 **Financial instability:** Article 360 permits the President to proclaim Financial Emergency where the financial stability or credit of India, or any part of its territory, is threatened. The provision can therefore apply to a crisis affecting the whole country or a particular region. 🔹 **Parliamentary approval:** The proclamation must be laid before both Houses and must be approved within two months. If approved, it continues until revoked; unlike Article 352 and Article 356, Article 360 does not prescribe a six-month renewal requirement or a maximum duration. ### Effects of Financial Emergency 🔹 **Financial propriety directions:** The Union may direct States to observe specified canons of financial propriety. This can include directions concerning expenditure, borrowing, salary structures and fiscal administration. 🔹 **Reduction of salaries:** Directions may require reduction of salaries and allowances of State employees. They may also require reduction of salaries and allowances of Union employees, including Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts. 🔹 **Reservation of State Bills:** The President may direct that all Money Bills and other Bills covered by Article 207, after being passed by the State Legislature, must be reserved for the President’s consideration. This creates substantial Union control over State financial legislation. 🔹 **Practical position:** No Financial Emergency has been proclaimed in India so far. Government material has consistently treated Article 360 as an unused constitutional power. ## Fundamental Rights During National Emergency ### Article 358: Effect on Article 19 🔹 **Automatic operation:** Article 358 operates automatically when a National Emergency is declared on the ground of **war or external aggression**. It does not apply where the Emergency is based only on armed rebellion. 🔹 **Limited scope:** During such Emergency, Article 19 does not restrict the legislative or executive power of the State. However, the law or executive action must be connected with the Emergency and must satisfy the constitutional recital requirement introduced by the Forty-fourth Amendment. 🔹 **Post-emergency effect:** A law made under Article 358 ceases to have effect after the Emergency ends to the extent it would otherwise violate Article 19. However, acts already done or omitted during the Emergency remain protected. ### Article 359: Suspension of Enforcement of Selected Rights 🔹 **Presidential order required:** Article 359 does not operate automatically. During a National Emergency, the President may issue a separate order suspending the right to move a court for enforcement of specified Fundamental Rights. The order may apply to the whole or a part of India. 🔹 **Articles 20 and 21 protected:** After the Forty-fourth Amendment, an Article 359 order cannot suspend enforcement of **Article 20** or **Article 21**. Therefore, protection against ex post facto criminal laws, double jeopardy, self-incrimination, and deprivation of life or personal liberty except by procedure established by law remains judicially enforceable even during National Emergency. 🔹 **Difference from Article 358:** Article 358 concerns the operation of Article 19 and applies automatically only in war or external-aggression emergencies. Article 359 concerns access to courts for enforcement of specifically named Part III rights and requires a Presidential Order. Point of distinctionArticle 358Article 359**Operation**AutomaticRequires Presidential Order**Applicable emergency**War or external aggression onlyAny National Emergency**Rights affected**Article 19 onlySpecified Part III rights, except Articles 20 and 21**Nature**Article 19 does not restrict State actionEnforcement through courts is suspended for listed rights**Protection after Forty-fourth Amendment**Does not apply to armed rebellionArticles 20 and 21 cannot be included🔹 **Leading authority — *Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab*, AIR 1964 SC 381; (1964) 4 SCR 797:** Several detainees challenged detention during the 1962 Emergency after a Presidential Order under Article 359 suspended enforcement of certain Fundamental Rights. The issue was whether all legal challenges were barred. The Supreme Court held that an Article 359 order suspends the right to enforce the specified Fundamental Rights, but does not destroy all legal remedies. A challenge based on statutory non-compliance, lack of authority, jurisdictional error or a ground independent of the suspended Fundamental Right may still be maintainable. 🔹 **Leading authority — *Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla*, (1976) 2 SCC 521; AIR 1976 SC 1207:** During the 1975 Emergency, detained persons sought habeas corpus petitions challenging preventive detention. By a majority of four to one, the Supreme Court held that, because of the Article 359 Presidential Order, detenues could not seek judicial enforcement of personal liberty through habeas corpus. Justice H.R. Khanna dissented, holding that rule of law and liberty cannot be wholly extinguished by executive action. The majority decision became a symbol of constitutional failure during the Emergency. 🔹 **Leading authority — *K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India*, (2017) 10 SCC 1:** The case concerned whether privacy is a Fundamental Right. A nine-Judge Bench held that privacy is protected under Part III and expressly overruled the majority view in *ADM Jabalpur*. The Court recognised that life and personal liberty are not gifts of the Constitution but pre-existing human rights recognised and protected by it. The decision constitutionally vindicated Justice H.R. Khanna’s dissent and reaffirmed that executive power remains subject to legality and judicial review. ## Judicial Review and Constitutional Limits 🔹 **No absolute presidential satisfaction:** The present constitutional text does not contain the Thirty-eighth Amendment’s finality clauses that attempted to exclude review of the President’s satisfaction. Thus, proclamations cannot claim immunity merely because they are based on presidential satisfaction. 🔹 **Review standard:** Judicial review does not permit courts to substitute their political judgment for that of the executive. However, courts can examine whether constitutional power was exercised in bad faith, on no material, on irrelevant material, for an improper purpose, or in a manner that is manifestly arbitrary. 🔹 **Material versus ministerial advice:** Article 74(2) protects the advice tendered by Ministers to the President from judicial inquiry. Yet, under *S.R. Bommai*, courts can examine the factual material said to justify a proclamation under Article 356. The government cannot avoid review merely by characterising every supporting fact as protected Cabinet advice. 🔹 **Federalism and democracy:** Emergency powers alter the normal federal balance, but they cannot lawfully be used to destroy federalism, secularism, representative democracy or judicial review. These are basic constitutional commitments, not temporary privileges. ## Quick Revision Memory Aid 🔹 **“352–356–360” formula:** **352 = National security crisis** **356 = State constitutional breakdown** **360 = Financial instability** 🔹 **“War–Aggression–Rebellion” formula for Article 352:** **War** = armed conflict **External aggression** = hostile external attack **Armed rebellion** = organised armed internal challenge 🔹 **“One–Two–Two” approval formula:** **Article 352:** approval within **one month** **Article 356:** approval within **two months** **Article 360:** approval within **two months** 🔹 **“19–20–21” rights formula:** **Article 358:** affects Article **19** only, and only in war/external aggression. **Article 359:** may suspend enforcement of selected rights, but never Articles **20 and 21**. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Amendment of the Constitution of India: Article 368, Amendment Procedures, Basic Structure Doctrine and Key Constitutional Amendments](https://lawfoyer.in/amendment-of-the-constitution-of-india-article-368/) **Published:** June 20, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun20202612_30_30A-725x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning and Purpose of Constitutional Amendment - **Constitutional amendment** means a formal change to the text of the Constitution. It may add a new provision, alter an existing provision, or repeal a provision. The purpose is to allow the Constitution to respond to social, political, economic and institutional changes while preserving its essential constitutional identity. - **Balance between flexibility and stability:** The Indian Constitution is neither completely rigid nor completely flexible. Some matters can be changed through an ordinary legislative process, while matters affecting the constitutional framework require a higher parliamentary majority and, in some cases, approval by at least half of the State Legislatures. - **Constituent power:** Parliament amends the Constitution not merely as an ordinary law-making body but by exercising its special **constituent power** under Article 368. This power is wider than ordinary legislative power, but it is not unlimited. Parliament cannot damage, destroy or alter the Constitution’s **basic structure**. ## Article 368 of the Constitution of India - **Article 368(1): Power to amend:** Parliament may amend any provision of the Constitution by way of **addition, variation or repeal**, using the procedure prescribed by Article 368. The expression “any provision” gives Parliament a broad amending power, including power to amend Fundamental Rights, subject to the basic structure limitation. - **Article 368(2): Initiation of Bill:** A Constitution Amendment Bill can be introduced only in either House of Parliament, namely the Lok Sabha or the Rajya Sabha. A State Legislature cannot introduce a Constitutional Amendment Bill. - **No joint sitting:** Each House must separately pass the Bill by the required constitutional majority. Therefore, the joint-sitting procedure under Article 108 is not available for a Constitutional Amendment Bill. - **President’s assent:** Once the Bill is duly passed by Parliament and, where necessary, ratified by the States, it must be presented to the President. After the Twenty-fourth Amendment, the President is constitutionally required to give assent; the President cannot return or withhold assent from a duly passed Constitutional Amendment Bill. - **Article 368(3): Article 13 exclusion:** Article 368(3) declares that Article 13 does not apply to an amendment made under Article 368. Thus, a constitutional amendment is not invalid merely because it abridges a Fundamental Right. However, it remains subject to judicial review on the ground that it violates the basic structure doctrine. - **Article 368(4) and 368(5): Invalid provisions:** The Forty-second Amendment inserted clauses (4) and (5), seeking to bar judicial review of constitutional amendments and declaring that Parliament’s constituent power had no limitation. These clauses were later declared unconstitutional in *Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India*, because limited amending power and judicial review are part of the basic structure. The official constitutional text accordingly records that these clauses were declared invalid. ## Types of Constitutional Amendments in India **Type of Change****Majority Required****Examples****Amendment by simple majority**Ordinary majority of members present and voting in Parliament; not treated as amendment under Article 368Formation of new States, alteration of State boundaries, creation or abolition of Legislative Councils**Amendment by special majority**Majority of total membership of each House **and** at least two-thirds of members present and voting in each HouseMost provisions of the Constitution**Amendment by special majority plus State ratification**Special majority in Parliament plus ratification by Legislatures of at least one-half of the StatesFederal provisions, Seventh Schedule, representation of States in Parliament and Article 368 itself### Amendment by Simple Majority - **Nature:** Certain constitutional changes are made by Parliament through an ordinary law. Though such laws may alter the First Schedule, Fourth Schedule or other constitutional provisions, the Constitution expressly states that they are not amendments under Article 368. - **Article 2, Article 3 and Article 4:** Parliament may admit or establish new States, form new States, alter the area, boundaries or names of existing States, and make consequential changes in the First and Fourth Schedules. Article 4 expressly provides that such a law shall not be deemed a constitutional amendment for Article 368 purposes. - **Article 169:** Parliament may create or abolish a State Legislative Council after the concerned State Legislative Assembly passes a resolution by a majority of its total membership and by not less than two-thirds of members present and voting. The Parliamentary law may amend the Constitution incidentally, but is not treated as an Article 368 amendment. - **Article 239A:** Parliament may create a Legislature or Council of Ministers for the Union Territory of Puducherry. A law made for this purpose is not treated as a constitutional amendment even if it has the effect of altering constitutional provisions. - **Schedules:** Parliament can also amend certain provisions of the Fifth and Sixth Schedules through ordinary legislation where the Constitution expressly permits it. Such changes are excluded from Article 368. - **Important distinction:** A simple-majority change is often casually described as a constitutional amendment because it modifies constitutional text. Legally, however, it is not an amendment under Article 368. ### Amendment by Special Majority - **Double requirement:** A Constitution Amendment Bill must satisfy two separate requirements in each House of Parliament: - **Absolute majority:** More than half of the total sanctioned membership of that House. - **Two-thirds majority:** At least two-thirds of the members present and voting. - **Illustration:** If a House has a total membership of 545, at least 273 members must support the Bill, even if fewer members are present. In addition, the votes in favour must be at least two-thirds of the members present and voting. - **Scope:** This procedure applies to amendments relating to Fundamental Rights, Directive Principles of State Policy, Union and State institutions, emergency provisions, election provisions and most other constitutional provisions. ### Amendment by Special Majority and Ratification by States - **Federal safeguard:** When an amendment affects the federal balance between the Union and the States, Parliament’s special majority is insufficient. Ratification by at least one-half of the State Legislatures is also mandatory. - **Matters requiring State ratification:** The proviso to Article 368(2) requires ratification where an amendment seeks to change: - **Articles 54 and 55** concerning election of the President; - **Articles 73 and 162** concerning Union and State executive power; - **Article 241** concerning High Courts for Union Territories; - **Chapter IV of Part V** concerning the Supreme Court; - **Chapter V of Part VI** concerning High Courts; - **Chapter I of Part XI** concerning legislative relations between the Union and States; - **Any List in the Seventh Schedule**; - **Representation of States in Parliament**; or - **Article 368 itself.** - **Meaning of ratification:** Ratification is given by State Legislatures through resolutions. The Constitution does not prescribe a particular time-limit for obtaining such ratifications. - **No individual State veto:** The consent of every State is not required. Ratification by Legislatures of at least one-half of the States is sufficient. - **Union Territories:** Union Territories do not participate in ratification under the proviso to Article 368 because the provision refers to State Legislatures. ## Basic Structure Doctrine - **Meaning:** The basic structure doctrine means that Parliament may amend the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights, but cannot alter its fundamental identity or destroy its essential constitutional features. - **Purpose:** The doctrine prevents a temporary parliamentary majority from converting the Constitution into an instrument of unlimited governmental power. - **No exhaustive list:** The Supreme Court has not given a final, closed list of basic features. Whether an amendment damages the basic structure depends upon its effect on the Constitution as a whole. - **Frequently recognised basic features include:** - **Supremacy of the Constitution** - **Republican and democratic form of government** - **Parliamentary form of government** - **Rule of law** - **Separation of powers** - **Federalism** - **Secularism** - **Judicial review** - **Independence of judiciary** - **Free and fair elections** - **Limited amending power** - **Harmony and balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles** - **Dignity and liberty of the individual** - **Unity and integrity of India** - **Effect test:** The Court does not invalidate an amendment merely because it changes an important provision. The question is whether the amendment has the effect of damaging or destroying a basic constitutional feature. ## Judicial Development of Parliament’s Amending Power ### *Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India*, \[1952\] SCR 89 - **Facts and issue:** The First Constitutional Amendment, which inserted Articles 31A and 31B and created the Ninth Schedule, was challenged on the ground that it violated Fundamental Rights and was therefore void under Article 13. - **Ratio:** The Supreme Court held that a constitutional amendment made under Article 368 was not “law” within Article 13(2). Parliament could therefore amend Fundamental Rights. This was the earliest judicial recognition of Parliament’s broad amendment power. The position was later modified by *Golak Nath* and ultimately replaced by the basic structure doctrine in *Kesavananda Bharati*. ### *Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan*, \[1965\] 1 SCR 933 - **Facts and issue:** The Seventeenth Amendment, which added more land-reform laws to the Ninth Schedule, was challenged for violating Fundamental Rights. - **Ratio:** The Supreme Court reaffirmed *Shankari Prasad* and held that Parliament could amend Fundamental Rights. However, Justice Mudholkar expressed doubt about whether the Constitution had certain “basic features” beyond Parliament’s amending power. This observation later became significant in the development of the basic structure doctrine. ### *I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab*, \[1967\] 2 SCR 762 - **Facts and issue:** The validity of constitutional amendments affecting property rights and agrarian-reform legislation was challenged. - **Ratio:** By a narrow majority, the Supreme Court held that constitutional amendments were “law” within Article 13 and that Parliament could not amend Fundamental Rights. The Court applied **prospective overruling**, meaning that earlier amendments remained valid but Parliament could not thereafter abridge Fundamental Rights. This position was superseded by the Twenty-fourth Amendment and the decision in *Kesavananda Bharati*. ### *Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala*, (1973) 4 SCC 225; 1973 Supp SCR 1 - **Facts and issue:** The head of a religious mutt challenged Kerala land-reform laws and the validity of the Twenty-fourth, Twenty-fifth and Twenty-ninth Amendments. The central issue was whether Parliament had unlimited power to amend every part of the Constitution. - **Ratio:** A thirteen-Judge Bench, by a 7:6 majority, held that Parliament has wide power to amend the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights, but cannot alter its **basic structure**. The Court upheld the Twenty-fourth Amendment and established that Parliament’s amending power itself is limited. This is the foundation of modern Indian constitutional law. ### *Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain*, 1975 Supp SCC 1 - **Facts and issue:** The Thirty-ninth Amendment inserted Article 329A and attempted to place disputes relating to the election of the Prime Minister and Speaker beyond ordinary judicial scrutiny. - **Ratio:** The Supreme Court struck down the relevant provisions that insulated the Prime Minister’s election from judicial review. It recognised **free and fair elections**, **democracy**, **rule of law** and **judicial review** as basic constitutional features. Parliament cannot use its amending power to create a class of persons whose elections are immune from legal challenge. ### *Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India*, (1980) 3 SCC 625; (1981) 1 SCR 206 - **Facts and issue:** Sections 4 and 55 of the Forty-second Amendment expanded Article 31C and inserted clauses (4) and (5) into Article 368, seeking to exclude judicial review and make Parliament’s amending power unlimited. - **Ratio:** The Supreme Court declared these provisions unconstitutional. It held that **limited amending power** is itself part of the basic structure. The Court also held that harmony between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles is a basic feature; neither Part III nor Part IV can be given absolute supremacy over the other. ### *Waman Rao v. Union of India*, (1981) 2 SCC 362 - **Facts and issue:** The validity of laws placed in the Ninth Schedule was challenged. - **Ratio:** The Supreme Court held that constitutional amendments made after 24 April 1973, the date of the *Kesavananda Bharati* decision, are open to challenge if they violate the basic structure. The date became important for reviewing Ninth Schedule protections. ### *L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India*, (1997) 3 SCC 261 - **Facts and issue:** Constitutional provisions and statutory provisions attempted to exclude the jurisdiction of High Courts and the Supreme Court over decisions of administrative tribunals. - **Ratio:** The Court held that judicial review under Articles 32, 226 and 227 is part of the basic structure. Tribunals may function as supplementary bodies, but they cannot replace the constitutional role of High Courts and the Supreme Court. ### *I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu*, (2007) 2 SCC 1 - **Facts and issue:** Laws inserted into the Ninth Schedule after the *Kesavananda Bharati* decision were claimed to be immune from judicial review. - **Ratio:** A nine-Judge Bench held that laws inserted in the Ninth Schedule after 24 April 1973 are not automatically protected. If such laws damage Fundamental Rights forming part of the basic structure, the constitutional amendment placing them in the Ninth Schedule can be struck down. ### *Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India*, (2016) 5 SCC 1 - **Facts and issue:** The Ninety-ninth Amendment and the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 introduced the NJAC for appointment of Supreme Court and High Court judges. - **Ratio:** By majority, the Supreme Court struck down the Ninety-ninth Amendment and the NJAC Act. It held that judicial independence is a basic feature, and the amendment impermissibly affected the independence of the judiciary. The earlier collegium-based appointment framework revived after the amendment was invalidated. ### *Union of India v. Rajendra N. Shah*, (2021) 6 SCC 1 - **Facts and issue:** The Ninety-seventh Amendment inserted Part IXB relating to co-operative societies without ratification by at least half of the States. - **Ratio:** The Supreme Court held that Part IXB substantially affected the legislative powers of States over co-operative societies and therefore required State ratification under Article 368. The amendment was declared invalid insofar as it applied to co-operative societies operating solely within a State, while remaining valid for multi-State co-operative societies and Union Territories. ## Key Constitutional Amendments **Amendment****Main Constitutional Importance****First Amendment, 1951**Inserted Articles 31A and 31B; created the Ninth Schedule; addressed land reform and restrictions on speech.**Seventh Amendment, 1956**Reorganised States and altered the constitutional scheme of States and Union Territories.**Twenty-fourth Amendment, 1971**Affirmed Parliament’s constituent power; amended Article 368; inserted Article 368(3); made Presidential assent mandatory.**Twenty-fifth Amendment, 1971**Inserted Article 31C to protect laws implementing Article 39(b) and 39(c), subject to judicial interpretation.**Twenty-sixth Amendment, 1971**Abolished privy purses and recognition of former rulers.**Thirty-ninth Amendment, 1975**Inserted Article 329A; parts were struck down in *Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain*.**Forty-second Amendment, 1976**Added “Socialist”, “Secular” and “Integrity” to the Preamble; added Fundamental Duties; attempted to enlarge Parliament’s amending power.**Forty-third Amendment, 1977**Reversed several provisions introduced during the Emergency period.**Forty-fourth Amendment, 1978**Strengthened safeguards against misuse of Emergency powers; converted the right to property into a constitutional legal right under Article 300A.**Fifty-second Amendment, 1985**Inserted the Tenth Schedule dealing with disqualification on the ground of defection.**Sixty-first Amendment, 1988**Reduced voting age from 21 years to 18 years.**Sixty-ninth Amendment, 1991**Inserted Article 239AA and created the constitutional framework for the National Capital Territory of Delhi.**Seventy-third Amendment, 1992**Added Part IX and constitutionalised Panchayati Raj institutions.**Seventy-fourth Amendment, 1992**Added Part IXA and constitutionalised Municipal governance.**Eighty-sixth Amendment, 2002**Inserted Article 21A providing free and compulsory education for children aged 6 to 14 years.**Ninety-first Amendment, 2003**Limited the size of Union and State Councils of Ministers and strengthened anti-defection provisions.**Ninety-seventh Amendment, 2011**Added provisions concerning co-operative societies; Part IXB was partly invalidated for want of State ratification.**Ninety-ninth Amendment, 2014**Introduced the NJAC; struck down for violating judicial independence.**One Hundred and First Amendment, 2016**Introduced the Goods and Services Tax framework, including Articles 246A, 269A and 279A.**One Hundred and Second Amendment, 2018**Granted constitutional status to the National Commission for Backward Classes and inserted Article 342A.**One Hundred and Third Amendment, 2019**Introduced Articles 15(6) and 16(6), enabling up to 10% reservation for Economically Weaker Sections.**One Hundred and Fourth Amendment, 2020**Extended reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in legislatures; ended Anglo-Indian nomination provisions.**One Hundred and Fifth Amendment, 2021**Restored States’ power to identify and maintain lists of socially and educationally backward classes for State purposes.**One Hundred and Sixth Amendment, 2023**Inserted Articles 330A, 332A and 334A for reservation of seats for women in the Lok Sabha, State Legislative Assemblies and the Delhi Legislative Assembly.- **Forty-second Amendment significance:** It is often called the “Mini-Constitution” because it made extensive changes to the Preamble, Directive Principles, Fundamental Duties, Centre-State relations and judicial powers. Its attempt to make Parliament’s amendment power unlimited was rejected in *Minerva Mills*. - **One Hundred and First Amendment significance:** The GST Amendment is an important example of a federal constitutional amendment because it restructured legislative and fiscal powers between the Union and States. - **One Hundred and Third Amendment significance:** In *Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India*, (2023) 5 SCC 1, the Supreme Court upheld the EWS reservation amendment by a 3:2 majority. The Court held that the EWS reservation scheme did not violate the basic structure. - **One Hundred and Sixth Amendment significance:** The amendment provides for reservation of approximately one-third of seats for women in the Lok Sabha, State Legislative Assemblies and the Legislative Assembly of the National Capital Territory of Delhi. Its operation is linked to the publication of the relevant figures of the first census after commencement and a delimitation exercise. ## Quick Revision Memory Aid - **Simple Majority:** Constitutional text may change, but Article 368 is not invoked. - **Special Majority:** Total membership majority plus two-thirds of members present and voting in each House. - **State Ratification:** Required where the amendment affects federal balance, Supreme Court, High Courts, legislative relations, Seventh Schedule, State representation in Parliament or Article 368. - **Basic Structure:** Parliament can amend the Constitution, but cannot destroy its identity. - **Judicial Review:** Courts may examine whether a constitutional amendment violates the basic structure. - **Most important cases:** **Shankari Prasad → Sajjan Singh → Golak Nath → Kesavananda Bharati → Indira Nehru Gandhi → Minerva Mills → Waman Rao → I.R. Coelho → L. Chandra Kumar → NJAC Case.** **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Centre–State Administrative and Financial Relations in India: Articles 256–263 and 268–293, Finance Commission, GST Council and Cooperative Federalism](https://lawfoyer.in/centre-state-administrative-and-financial-relations-in-india/) **Published:** June 20, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun20202612_22_38A-725x1024.jpeg) ## Constitutional Foundation of Centre–State Relations • **Federal design:** India is a federation with a constitutionally strong Union. Legislative, executive and financial powers are distributed between the Union and the States, but the Constitution also creates mechanisms for Union supervision, coordination, fiscal equalisation and dispute resolution. • **Administrative relations:** Articles 256–263 mainly regulate how the Union and States exercise executive power, issue directions, delegate functions, recognise public acts and resolve inter-State issues. • **Financial relations:** Articles 268–293 regulate levy, collection, assignment and distribution of taxes; grants-in-aid; fiscal institutions; immunity from taxation; and borrowing powers. • **Core balance:** The Constitution seeks to preserve **State autonomy** in their allotted fields while maintaining **national unity, coordinated governance and fiscal stability**. Articles 256–263 and 268–293 therefore combine central authority with consultation, delegation and revenue-sharing. ## Judicial Meaning of Indian Federalism • **Strong-centre federalism — State of West Bengal v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1241; (1964) 1 SCR 371:** The Union enacted the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957, enabling acquisition of coal-bearing land, including land owned by a State. West Bengal challenged Parliament’s competence to acquire State property. The Supreme Court held that States are not sovereign entities independent of the Union; sovereignty rests in the people under the Constitution. Parliament may legislate and acquire State property when acting within a valid legislative field. The case explains that Indian federalism has a strong Union orientation, though States retain constitutionally protected powers in their respective spheres. • **Constitutional autonomy — State of Karnataka v. Union of India, (1977) 4 SCC 608:** Karnataka challenged the Union’s action connected with a Commission of Inquiry into allegations concerning the State’s Chief Minister. The principal issue was whether Union action and Parliamentary legislation could improperly invade State autonomy. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the relevant framework and clarified that States possess constitutional status and autonomy, but not separate sovereignty. The Union–State relationship must be assessed through the text and structure of the Constitution, not through an assumption that States are completely independent political units. • **Federalism as a basic feature — S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1:** Several proclamations under Article 356, dissolving State governments and Legislative Assemblies, were challenged. The Supreme Court held that federalism is part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Presidential satisfaction under Article 356 is subject to judicial review, and majority in a Legislative Assembly should ordinarily be tested on the floor of the House. The ruling protects elected State governments from arbitrary Union intervention and gives substantive meaning to constitutional federalism. • **Cooperative federalism — Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India, (2018) 8 SCC 501:** The dispute concerned the relationship between the elected Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi and the Union-appointed Lieutenant Governor. The Supreme Court emphasised constitutional trust, collaborative governance and cooperative federalism. It held that constitutional authorities should avoid obstruction and work within their allocated domains. Though Delhi has a special constitutional position, the decision is important for the wider principle that Union–State disputes should, where possible, be resolved through dialogue and coordination rather than institutional confrontation. # Administrative Relations under Articles 256–263 ## Article 256: Obligation of States and Union Directions • **Compliance duty:** Article 256 requires every State to exercise its executive power so as to ensure compliance with laws made by Parliament and existing laws applicable in that State. • **Union directions:** The executive power of the Union extends to issuing directions to a State where such directions are necessary to secure implementation of Parliamentary laws. • **Purpose:** Article 256 prevents a State from defeating a valid Central law merely by refusing, delaying or neglecting administrative implementation. • **Consequence of non-compliance:** Failure to comply with constitutional directions may become relevant under Article 365, under which the President may conclude that a situation has arisen in which the government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution. This is not an automatic consequence; constitutional action remains subject to the principles laid down in *S.R. Bommai*. ## Article 257: Union Control in Specific Administrative Matters • **Non-obstruction principle:** Under Article 257(1), State executive power must not impede or prejudice the exercise of Union executive power. The Union may issue directions necessary to prevent such obstruction. • **Communications:** Article 257(2) permits Union directions regarding construction and maintenance of means of communication declared to be of national or military importance. • **Railway protection:** Article 257(3) authorises Union directions concerning measures necessary for protection of railways within a State. • **Additional costs:** Where compliance with a direction under Article 257(2) or 257(3) causes extra expenditure beyond the State’s ordinary obligations, the Union must pay the additional cost. If the governments do not agree on the amount, it is determined by an arbitrator appointed by the Chief Justice of India. This preserves fiscal fairness while allowing national coordination. • **Article 257A omitted:** Article 257A, inserted by the Forty-second Amendment for Union deployment of armed forces in States, was omitted by the Forty-fourth Amendment. Union assistance in security matters is now understood through other constitutional and statutory provisions. ## Articles 258 and 258A: Mutual Entrustment of Functions • **Union-to-State delegation — Article 258(1):** The President may, with the consent of the State Government, entrust Union executive functions to a State Government, its officers or authorities. The entrustment may be conditional or unconditional. • **Parliamentary conferral — Article 258(2):** Parliament may, through a law applicable in a State, confer powers or impose duties on the State or its officers even where the State Legislature has no legislative competence over that subject. • **Financial protection:** Under Article 258(3), the Union must compensate the State for additional administrative expenses caused by Union functions entrusted or imposed upon State authorities. • **State-to-Union delegation — Article 258A:** A Governor may, with the consent of the Government of India, entrust State executive functions to the Union or its officers. Thus, delegation is not one-sided; the Constitution allows administrative cooperation in both directions. ## Articles 259–261: Other Administrative Provisions • **Article 259 omitted:** Article 259 relating to armed forces in former Part B States was omitted by the Seventh Amendment. • **Article 260 — foreign jurisdiction:** The Government of India may, by agreement with the government of a territory outside India, undertake executive, legislative or judicial functions vested in that government. Such an agreement remains subject to Indian law concerning foreign jurisdiction. • **Article 261 — full faith and credit:** Public acts, records and judicial proceedings of the Union and every State must be recognised throughout India. Parliament may prescribe the method of proof and legal effect of such records. Final civil court judgments and orders are capable of execution anywhere in India according to law. This provision ensures legal continuity across State boundaries. ## Article 262: Inter-State River Water Disputes • **Special constitutional mechanism:** Article 262 empowers Parliament to provide for adjudication of disputes concerning waters of inter-State rivers or river valleys. • **Exclusion of courts:** Parliament may exclude the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and other courts in relation to such disputes. This is a specific constitutional exception to the general rule that inter-State disputes may reach the Supreme Court under Article 131. • **Statutory framework:** Parliament enacted the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956. The Act provides for reference of qualifying water disputes to tribunals and contains a bar on the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and other courts in matters that may be referred under the Act. • **Water-dispute precedent — In re: Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 96:** The Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal issued an interim order directing release of water. Questions arose regarding the legal status of the Tribunal’s order and the Union’s duty to act upon it. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal’s decision under the statutory framework had binding legal significance and that the Union could not disregard the adjudicatory mechanism created under Article 262 and the 1956 Act. The decision illustrates that inter-State water disputes are meant to be addressed through specialised constitutional and statutory processes rather than political unilateralism. ## Article 263: Inter-State Council • **Enabling provision:** Article 263 authorises the President to establish an Inter-State Council whenever public interest requires it. • **Functions:** The Council may inquire into and advise upon inter-State disputes; investigate and discuss subjects of common interest between States or between the Union and States; and make recommendations for better coordination of policy and action. • **Nature:** The Council is primarily a consultative and recommendatory body, not a court or tribunal. Its importance lies in preventing disputes through deliberation, information-sharing and consensus-building. • **Institutional development:** The Inter-State Council was established through a Presidential Order dated 28 May 1990. It is an important forum for cooperative federalism and Centre–State consultation. # Financial Relations under Articles 268–293 ## Revenue Distribution: Basic Constitutional Pattern ProvisionLevyCollectionFinal Destination of Revenue**Article 268**UnionStates, except in Union TerritoriesStates**Article 269**UnionUnionAssigned to States**Article 269A**Union for inter-State GSTUnionApportioned between Union and States**Article 270**UnionUnionDistributed between Union and States**Article 271**Parliament may impose surchargeUnionEntirely Union• **Memory aid — LCA-D:** **Levy, Collection, Assignment and Distribution** are distinct concepts. A tax may be levied by one authority, collected by another, and finally appropriated by a third. ## Articles 268–272: Tax Assignment and Distribution • **Article 268 — Union levy, State collection:** Stamp duties mentioned in the Union List are levied by the Union but collected by States where leviable. The proceeds do not form part of the Consolidated Fund of India; they are assigned to the State concerned. After the Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act, 2016, duties of excise on medicinal and toilet preparations were removed from this Article. • **Article 268A omitted:** Article 268A earlier dealt with service tax levied by the Union and collected and appropriated by the Union and States. It was omitted after the GST constitutional amendment. • **Article 269 — Union tax assigned to States:** Taxes on inter-State sale or purchase of goods and inter-State consignment of goods, except matters covered by Article 269A, are levied and collected by the Union but assigned to States according to principles fixed by Parliament. • **Article 269A — inter-State GST:** GST on supplies in the course of inter-State trade or commerce is levied and collected by the Government of India and apportioned between the Union and States according to Parliamentary law made on GST Council recommendations. Imports are constitutionally deemed to be inter-State supplies. Parliament also determines principles relating to place of supply and the point at which a supply becomes inter-State. • **Article 270 — divisible pool:** Taxes and duties referred to in the Union List are generally levied and collected by the Union and then distributed between the Union and States. However, Articles 268, 269 and 269A taxes, surcharges under Article 271 and cesses imposed for specific purposes are excluded from the ordinary divisible pool. • **Article 271 — surcharge:** Parliament may increase taxes or duties referred to in Articles 269 and 270 by imposing a surcharge for Union purposes. The entire surcharge forms part of the Consolidated Fund of India. GST under Article 246A cannot be subjected to such surcharge. • **Article 272 omitted:** Article 272, which earlier dealt with Union taxes distributable among States, was omitted by the Eightieth Amendment. ## Articles 273–279: Grants, State Taxation and Net Proceeds • **Article 273 — jute grants:** Article 273 provides grants-in-aid from the Consolidated Fund of India to Assam, Bihar, Odisha and West Bengal in lieu of their share in export duty on jute and jute products. It is a historically specific fiscal arrangement. • **Article 274 — Presidential recommendation:** A Bill affecting taxation in which States are interested requires prior recommendation of the President before introduction or movement in Parliament. A State is interested where it receives a share in the net proceeds of the relevant tax or duty. • **Article 275 — grants-in-aid:** Parliament may provide grants-in-aid out of the Consolidated Fund of India to States found to be in need of assistance. Different States may receive different amounts. The Article also supports grants for promoting welfare of Scheduled Tribes and administration of Scheduled Areas and tribal areas. These grants are an instrument of fiscal equalisation. • **Article 276 — profession tax:** States and local authorities may impose taxes on professions, trades, callings and employments. The constitutional ceiling is ₹2,500 per person per year. This State power does not limit Parliament’s authority to tax income arising from professions, trades or callings. • **Article 277 — savings:** Taxes, duties, cesses and fees lawfully imposed before commencement of the Constitution could continue until Parliament otherwise provided. • **Article 278 omitted:** Article 278 related to financial agreements with former Part B States and was omitted by the Seventh Amendment. • **Article 279 — net proceeds:** “Net proceeds” means tax or duty proceeds after deducting collection costs. The Comptroller and Auditor-General certifies net proceeds, and that certificate is final. ## Finance Commission under Articles 280–281 • **Constitutional body:** Article 280 requires the President to constitute a Finance Commission within two years of the Constitution’s commencement and thereafter every five years, or earlier if necessary. • **Composition:** The Commission consists of a Chairperson and four other members appointed by the President. Qualifications, selection method and powers are governed by Parliamentary law, principally the Finance Commission (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1951. • **Vertical devolution:** The Commission recommends the share of the divisible pool to be distributed between the Union and all States. • **Horizontal devolution:** The Commission recommends how the aggregate State share should be allocated among individual States. • **Grants-in-aid:** The Commission recommends principles governing Article 275 grants-in-aid. • **Local bodies:** The Commission recommends measures needed to augment a State’s Consolidated Fund to supplement the resources of Panchayats and Municipalities, based on recommendations of State Finance Commissions. • **Additional references:** The President may refer any other matter in the interests of sound finance. • **Article 281 accountability:** Every Finance Commission recommendation, along with an explanatory memorandum stating action taken by the Union, must be laid before both Houses of Parliament. Recommendations are highly influential but do not automatically operate as self-executing law. • **Current institutional context:** The Sixteenth Finance Commission, chaired by Dr Arvind Panagariya, submitted its report to the President on 17 November 2025. ## GST Council under Article 279A • **Constitutional origin:** Article 279A was inserted by the Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act, 2016. It created the GST Council as a joint Union–State forum for GST policy. • **Composition:** The Union Finance Minister is Chairperson; the Union Minister of State in charge of Revenue or Finance is a member; and each State is represented by its Finance or Taxation Minister, or another nominated Minister. • **Recommendations:** The Council recommends taxes, cesses and surcharges to be subsumed in GST; exemption lists; model GST laws; rate structures; threshold limits; place-of-supply principles; special rates during disasters; and special provisions for specified States. • **Petroleum products:** Petroleum crude, high-speed diesel, petrol, natural gas and aviation turbine fuel become subject to GST only from a date recommended by the GST Council. • **Voting:** One-half of total members constitutes quorum. Decisions require at least three-fourths of weighted votes of members present and voting. The Union has one-third weightage, while States collectively have two-thirds weightage. • **Dispute resolution:** Article 279A(11) requires the GST Council to establish a mechanism for disputes arising from its recommendations or their implementation. • **GST Council precedent — Union of India v. Mohit Minerals Pvt. Ltd., (2022) 10 SCC 700:** Importers challenged IGST imposed on ocean freight under the reverse-charge mechanism in CIF import contracts. The Supreme Court held the impugned levy unconstitutional because it resulted in impermissible double taxation in the factual statutory framework. More importantly, the Court held that GST Council recommendations are not binding on Parliament or State Legislatures. Article 246A gives the Union and States simultaneous legislative power over GST, while Article 279A promotes cooperative and collaborative federalism through recommendations, negotiation and harmonisation. The ruling protects fiscal autonomy while recognising that departures from collective GST policy should remain limited in the interest of a common national market. ## Articles 282–291: Grants, Funds and Tax Immunities • **Article 282 — discretionary public-purpose grants:** The Union or a State may make grants for any public purpose even where the purpose is outside its legislative field. This provision constitutionally supports discretionary grants and many cooperative spending arrangements. • **Articles 283–284 — custody of funds:** These provisions regulate custody, payment and withdrawal from Consolidated Funds, Contingency Funds, public accounts, suitors’ deposits and other moneys received by courts or public servants. • **Article 285 — Union property immunity:** Union property is exempt from State taxation unless Parliament otherwise provides. A limited historical exception permits continuation of certain pre-Constitution taxes until Parliament legislates otherwise. • **Article 286 — restrictions on State taxation:** States cannot tax supplies occurring outside the State or in the course of import into, or export out of, India. Parliament determines the principles for identifying such supplies. • **Articles 287–288 — electricity and water protection:** States face constitutional restrictions on taxation of electricity used by the Union or railways and on taxation of water or electricity connected with authorities regulating or developing inter-State rivers or river valleys. • **Article 289 — State immunity:** State property and income are exempt from Union taxation. However, Parliament may tax a trade or business carried on by, or on behalf of, a State, including related income and property. Parliament may also declare particular State activities incidental to ordinary governmental functions, thereby protecting them from such taxation. • **Articles 290 and 290A:** Article 290 permits adjustments between Consolidated Funds regarding certain expenses and pensions. Article 290A requires an annual payment from Kerala’s Consolidated Fund to the Travancore and Cochin Devaswom Funds. • **Article 291 omitted:** Article 291 concerning privy purses was omitted by the Twenty-sixth Amendment. ## Borrowing Powers under Articles 292–293 • **Union borrowing — Article 292:** The Union may borrow on the security of the Consolidated Fund of India within limits, if any, fixed by Parliament. It may also give guarantees within such limits. • **State borrowing — Article 293(1):** A State may borrow within India on the security of its Consolidated Fund, within limits fixed by its Legislature, and may give guarantees within those limits. • **Union loans and guarantees — Article 293(2):** The Union may make loans to States and may guarantee State loans, subject to Parliamentary limits and conditions. • **Union consent requirement — Article 293(3):** A State cannot raise a loan without Union consent where any part of a Union loan or Union-guaranteed loan remains outstanding. • **Conditional consent — Article 293(4):** The Union may impose conditions while granting consent. This provision gives the Union an important tool for maintaining national fiscal discipline, but it should be exercised consistently with fiscal federalism and State autonomy. ## Quick Revision Matrix • **Administrative relation:** Union directions, State compliance, delegation of functions, recognition of judicial acts, water-dispute adjudication and inter-State consultation. • **Financial relation:** Tax assignment, tax sharing, grants-in-aid, Finance Commission recommendations, GST coordination, public-purpose grants, tax immunities and borrowing control. • **Cooperative federalism:** Articles 258, 258A, 263, 275, 279A, 280 and 282 are major constitutional channels through which the Union and States work together. • **Centralising safeguards:** Articles 256, 257, 262, 271 and 293 preserve Union authority where national implementation, inter-State coordination, fiscal stability or national economic integration is involved. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Centre–State Legislative Relations under the Indian Constitution: Articles 245–255, Legislative Lists, Repugnancy and Key Doctrines](https://lawfoyer.in/centre-state-legislative-relations-under-the-indian-constitution/) **Published:** June 20, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun20202612_14_45A-725x1024.jpeg) ## Constitutional Scheme of Centre–State Legislative Relations 🔹 **Federal allocation:** India has a federal constitutional structure with a comparatively strong Union. Legislative authority is divided by subject, territory and constitutional priority. Parliament and State Legislatures are not sovereign in the British sense; each must remain within the field assigned by the Constitution. 🔹 **Three-stage validity test:** When a law is challenged for lack of legislative competence, the enquiry should ordinarily proceed in this sequence: QuestionConstitutional enquiryResult**Territory**Can the legislature make a law having this territorial reach?Article 245 and territorial nexus**Subject-matter**Does the law fall within the proper legislative entry?Article 246, Article 246A, Article 248 and Seventh Schedule**Conflict**If both legislatures can legislate, do the laws clash?Articles 251 and 254🔹 **Legislative entries:** The entries in the Seventh Schedule are not independent sources of legislative power. Article 246 confers power; the entries identify the fields within which that power may operate. Entries are interpreted broadly, harmoniously and in a manner that avoids unnecessary overlap. ## Territorial Jurisdiction under Article 245 ### Article 245: Extent of Laws 🔹 **Parliament’s territory:** Under Article 245(1), Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India. A State Legislature may make laws for the whole or any part of that State. 🔹 **Extra-territorial operation:** Article 245(2) provides that a Parliamentary law is not invalid merely because it has extra-territorial operation. Thus, Parliament may enact a law dealing with acts, persons, property or transactions outside India where they have a constitutionally sufficient connection with India. 🔹 **State limitation:** A State Legislature ordinarily legislates only for its own territory. However, a State law may affect persons, property or transactions outside its territory when there is a real territorial nexus between the State and the subject regulated. ⚖️ **State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, 1957 SCR 874 : AIR 1957 SC 699** — A prize-competition promoter operated through a newspaper printed outside Bombay, but the newspaper circulated in Bombay, entry forms and fees were received there, and local collectors operated within the State. The issue was whether Bombay could impose a tax despite the promoter being outside the State. The Supreme Court held that a State law can validly have extra-territorial effects if the connection is real rather than illusory and the liability imposed is relevant to that connection. The case establishes the two-part territorial nexus test: **real nexus** and **relevance of liability to that nexus**. ⚖️ **G.V.K. Industries Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, (2011) 4 SCC 36** — An Indian company challenged the application of income-tax provisions to payments made to a foreign consultant in connection with foreign financing arrangements. The constitutional issue was whether Parliament could legislate concerning extra-territorial matters. The Supreme Court held that Article 245(2) permits extra-territorial operation, but Parliament cannot legislate “for” a foreign territory having no connection with India. Parliament may regulate extra-territorial aspects only where those aspects have an impact, effect or sufficient nexus with India. 🔹 **Practical distinction:** Extra-territorial **operation** is permissible for Parliament; extra-territorial legislation having no Indian nexus is not. For States, territorial nexus is essential whenever the legislation substantially affects matters beyond State borders. ## Subject-Matter of Laws under Article 246 ### Union List, State List and Concurrent List 🔹 **Union List — Article 246(1):** Parliament has exclusive power over matters in List I. Important examples include defence, foreign affairs, citizenship, currency, banking, communications, atomic energy and inter-State trade. 🔹 **Concurrent List — Article 246(2):** Parliament and State Legislatures may both legislate on List III subjects, subject to Parliament’s supremacy under Article 254. Important examples include criminal law, criminal procedure, marriage and divorce, contracts, evidence, forests, education, labour welfare and economic planning. 🔹 **State List — Article 246(3):** Subject to Union and Concurrent List powers, State Legislatures have exclusive authority over List II subjects. Important examples include public order, police, public health, agriculture, land, local government, markets, fairs and betting and gambling. 🔹 **Union Territory power — Article 246(4):** Parliament may legislate for Union Territories even on matters appearing in the State List. This is because Union Territories do not possess the constitutional status of States for purposes of Article 246. ListPrimary LegislatureTypical subjectsConstitutional priority**List I — Union List**ParliamentDefence, currency, foreign affairs, railwaysHighest under Article 246(1)**List II — State List**State LegislaturePolice, land, public order, agricultureSubject to Lists I and III**List III — Concurrent List**Parliament and StatesCriminal law, education, forests, labourSubject to Article 254🔹 **Broad interpretation:** Legislative entries must receive the widest reasonable interpretation. Courts first try to reconcile apparently overlapping entries through harmonious construction. Only where reconciliation fails does the court examine the dominant character of the law through doctrines such as pith and substance. 🔹 **Taxation distinction:** A power to regulate a subject does not automatically include a power to tax it. Taxing entries are distinct and must be specifically located in the relevant legislative list. ⚖️ **State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Ltd., (2004) 10 SCC 201** — Several State levies and cesses connected with coal-bearing land, tea estates, brick earth and minerals were challenged. The issue was whether the State had entered a field reserved to Parliament concerning mineral regulation. The Supreme Court explained that legislative entries are fields of legislation requiring harmonious construction and that taxation is a distinct subject. A general regulatory entry cannot ordinarily be used to imply a power to impose a tax; taxing power must be traced to a specific taxation entry. ## Article 246A: Special Legislative Power for GST 🔹 **GST framework:** Article 246A was inserted by the Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act, 2016. It creates a special and independent source of power for laws relating to goods and services tax. 🔹 **Simultaneous power:** Parliament and State Legislatures may both legislate on GST under Article 246A(1). This differs from ordinary Concurrent List power because Article 246A overrides Articles 246 and 254. 🔹 **Inter-State supply:** Under Article 246A(2), Parliament alone has exclusive power to legislate on GST where the supply takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. ⚖️ **Union of India v. Mohit Minerals Pvt. Ltd., (2022) 10 SCC 700** — The case concerned GST on ocean freight in cost-insurance-freight import transactions. While examining the GST constitutional structure, the Supreme Court held that Article 246A gives Parliament and State Legislatures a unique simultaneous law-making power over GST. Article 254 does not provide the ordinary repugnancy rule for GST laws. The Court further held that GST Council recommendations are recommendatory and persuasive, not binding legislative commands upon Parliament or State Legislatures. ## Article 247: Additional Courts for Union List Laws 🔹 **Additional courts:** Article 247 authorises Parliament to establish additional courts for better administration of laws made by Parliament or existing laws concerning matters in the Union List. 🔹 **Limited purpose:** This is a specific power linked to Union List legislation. It does not create a general power to reorganise the entire State judicial structure. ## Residuary Legislative Powers under Article 248 and Entry 97 🔹 **Meaning:** Residuary power concerns matters not enumerated in either the State List or the Concurrent List. 🔹 **Parliament’s exclusive power:** Article 248 gives Parliament exclusive power to legislate on such unenumerated matters. It also includes the power to impose a tax not mentioned in List II or List III. 🔹 **Entry 97, List I:** Entry 97 reinforces Article 248 by assigning “any other matter” not found in Lists II or III, including unenumerated taxes, to Parliament. 🔹 **GST qualification:** After the 101st Constitutional Amendment, Article 248 is expressly subject to Article 246A. Therefore, GST matters must first be considered under the special GST framework. ⚖️ **Union of India v. H.S. Dhillon, (1971) 2 SCC 779 : (1972) 2 SCR 33 : AIR 1972 SC 1061** — The Finance Act, 1969 included agricultural land while computing net wealth for wealth-tax purposes. The challenge was that taxes on land were within State List Entry 49 and Parliament therefore lacked competence. The Supreme Court upheld the law, holding that where a matter, including a tax, is not assigned to List II or List III, Parliament may legislate under Article 248 read with Entry 97 of List I. The Court clarified that, in assessing a Central law, the essential question is whether it invades a prohibited State List field. ## Parliament Legislating on State List Matters ### Article 249: National Interest 🔹 **Rajya Sabha resolution:** Parliament may legislate on a State List matter if the Rajya Sabha passes a resolution, supported by not less than two-thirds of members present and voting, declaring that such legislation is necessary or expedient in the national interest. 🔹 **Duration:** The resolution remains valid for a period not exceeding one year, but may be renewed for further periods of up to one year each. 🔹 **Effect after expiry:** A law made under Article 249 ceases to have effect six months after the resolution expires, except regarding acts already done or omitted before expiry. ### Article 250: National Emergency 🔹 **Emergency power:** While a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, Parliament may legislate on any State List matter for the whole or any part of India. 🔹 **Post-emergency effect:** Such legislation ceases to operate six months after the Emergency ends, except for past acts and liabilities. ### Article 251: Priority of Parliamentary Law 🔹 **Temporary supremacy:** Articles 249 and 250 do not remove State legislative power. States may continue legislating on their fields. 🔹 **Conflict rule:** Where a State law conflicts with a Parliamentary law made under Article 249 or 250, the Parliamentary law prevails. The State law remains inoperative only to the extent of inconsistency and only for as long as the Parliamentary law remains effective. ### Article 252: Consent of Two or More States 🔹 **State initiative:** Where two or more State Legislatures resolve that Parliament should legislate on a State List matter, Parliament may enact a law for those States. 🔹 **Adoption:** Other States may later adopt the same Parliamentary law through a legislative resolution. 🔹 **Amendment or repeal:** A law made under Article 252 can be amended or repealed only by Parliament, not by the Legislature of an individual participating State. ### Article 253: International Agreements 🔹 **Treaty implementation:** Parliament may legislate for the whole or any part of India to implement a treaty, agreement, convention, or decision of an international conference, association or body. 🔹 **Override of State List:** Article 253 operates notwithstanding the earlier provisions of Chapter I. Therefore, Parliament may legislate even on matters otherwise falling within the State List where implementation of an international obligation requires it. ⚖️ **Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel v. Union of India, 1969 SCR (3) 254 : AIR 1969 SC 783** — The dispute arose from the Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary case concerning the Rann of Kutch. The issue included the constitutional mechanism for implementing international arrangements and the distinction between settlement of a boundary dispute and cession of Indian territory. The Supreme Court explained that Article 253 recognises Parliament’s exclusive law-making authority for implementing international agreements. It also reaffirmed that actual cession of territory forming part of India requires a constitutional amendment, whereas settlement of a boundary dispute may stand on a different footing. ### Memory Aid: Exceptional Union Entry into State Fields ProvisionTrigger wordBasis**Article 249****National interest**Rajya Sabha resolution**Article 250****Emergency**Proclamation of Emergency**Article 252****Consent**Resolution by two or more States**Article 253****Treaty**International obligation## Repugnancy under Article 254 ### Meaning and Scope of Repugnancy 🔹 **Core principle:** Repugnancy arises when a valid State law conflicts with a valid Parliamentary law on the same Concurrent List matter. 🔹 **Article 254(1):** Where a State law is repugnant to a Parliamentary law, or an existing law, concerning a Concurrent List subject, the Parliamentary law prevails and the State law is void to the extent of repugnancy. 🔹 **Same matter requirement:** The two laws must operate upon substantially the same field. Mere similarity, overlap, allied purpose or incidental interaction is insufficient. 🔹 **Article 254 and Lists I–II:** Where a State law directly enters a Union List field, the issue is usually lack of legislative competence under Article 246, not repugnancy under Article 254. ### Article 254(2): Presidential Assent 🔹 **State exception:** A State law on a Concurrent List subject that conflicts with an earlier Parliamentary law may prevail within that State if: - it is reserved for the President’s consideration; and - it receives Presidential assent. 🔹 **Parliamentary override:** Presidential assent does not permanently immunise the State law. Parliament may later enact a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the State law. The later Parliamentary law prevails. ⚖️ **M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India, (1979) 3 SCC 431** — The challenge concerned the Tamil Nadu Public Men (Criminal Misconduct) Act, 1973, which provided a special inquiry mechanism for allegations of criminal misconduct against public men. It was argued that the State law conflicted with the Indian Penal Code, the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and the Criminal Procedure Code. The Supreme Court held that repugnancy requires a clear, direct and irreconcilable inconsistency such that obedience to one law necessarily means disobedience to the other. Since the State and Central laws differed in their scope, object and operational area, the Court found no repugnancy. ### Tests for Repugnancy 🔹 **Direct conflict:** Are the provisions directly inconsistent? 🔹 **Irreconcilability:** Is the inconsistency incapable of reconciliation through harmonious interpretation? 🔹 **Impossibility of simultaneous obedience:** Can a person comply with both laws? If yes, repugnancy will ordinarily not arise. 🔹 **Same field:** Do the laws deal with the same matter, rather than merely cognate or related matters? 🔹 **Parliamentary intention:** Has Parliament clearly intended to create an exhaustive code occupying the entire field? ## Doctrine of Occupied Field 🔹 **Meaning:** The doctrine of occupied field means that Parliament has enacted such a complete and exhaustive scheme on a Concurrent List subject that no room remains for State legislation in that field. 🔹 **No automatic exclusion:** Central legislation does not automatically exclude State law merely because both laws concern the same broad topic. The court must examine the actual scope, object and provisions of the Central statute. 🔹 **Legislative vacuum:** Where Parliament has regulated only part of a subject, States may still legislate in the remaining area, subject to Article 254. ⚖️ **Ch. Tika Ramji v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1956 SCR 393 : AIR 1956 SC 676** — The validity of the Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act was challenged on the ground that Parliament had already legislated under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951. The Supreme Court held that the Central law concerning the sugar industry did not occupy the separate field of sugarcane supply and purchase regulation. There was therefore no repugnancy. The case establishes that occupation of field must be determined from the true scope of Central legislation, not merely from the fact that Parliament has entered a related area. ⚖️ **Vijay Kumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka, (1990) 2 SCC 562** — The case concerned the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act and the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The Supreme Court explained that pith and substance is relevant when legislative competence is challenged, whereas repugnancy concerns whether an otherwise valid State law must yield to a conflicting Parliamentary law. The controlling enquiry is whether both laws can stand together, produce compatible results and operate in distinct fields. ## Doctrine of Pith and Substance 🔹 **Meaning:** “Pith and substance” means the true nature, dominant character and essential subject-matter of legislation. 🔹 **Purpose:** The doctrine prevents a law from becoming invalid merely because it incidentally touches a matter assigned to another legislature. 🔹 **Test:** The court examines: - **Object** of the legislation; - **Scheme and provisions** of the statute; - **Practical effect and legal consequences**; - **Dominant legislative field** into which the law substantially falls. 🔹 **Incidental trenching:** If the law in its pith and substance falls within the enacting legislature’s field, incidental encroachment into another field does not invalidate it. ⚖️ **State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, 1951 SCR 682 : AIR 1951 SC 318** — The Bombay Prohibition Act restricted possession, sale, transport and consumption of liquor, including foreign liquor. The argument was that the State had entered the Union field of import and export. The Supreme Court held that the Act was, in pith and substance, a law concerning intoxicating liquor, a State subject. Any effect on import was only incidental. The case remains the classic authority for the principle that incidental encroachment does not invalidate legislation whose dominant character lies within the legislature’s competence. 🔹 **Limitation:** Pith and substance cannot save a law where the apparent encroachment is actually substantial, direct and the dominant purpose of the enactment. ## Doctrine of Colourable Legislation 🔹 **Meaning:** Colourable legislation arises where a legislature apparently acts within its constitutional field but, in substance and reality, does something beyond its power. 🔹 **Core maxim:** What a legislature cannot do directly, it cannot do indirectly. 🔹 **Not about motive:** The doctrine does not ordinarily examine the political motive, honesty or bad faith of legislators. The real question is constitutional competence. 🔹 **Substance over form:** Courts look beyond the title, drafting language and apparent label of the statute to its real operation and effect. ⚖️ **K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa, 1954 SCR 1 : AIR 1953 SC 375** — Landholders challenged the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1952 and related taxation measures, alleging that the legislation was a disguised attempt to avoid constitutional limitations. The Supreme Court held that colourable legislation is fundamentally a question of legislative competence, not legislative motive. A statute is invalid only where the legislature has transgressed constitutional limits under the disguise of acting within its assigned field. The Court upheld the legislation because the State Legislature had the relevant constitutional power. ### Pith and Substance versus Colourable Legislation BasisPith and SubstanceColourable Legislation**Main concern**Incidental overlap between legislative fieldsDisguised transgression beyond legislative power**Question asked**What is the dominant character of the law?Has the legislature indirectly done what it cannot directly do?**Usual effect**May validate incidental trenchingMay invalidate a disguised exercise of power**Motive relevant?**NoNo; competence is decisive## Article 255: Procedural Requirements and Assent 🔹 **Procedural cure:** Article 255 provides that an Act is not invalid merely because a required recommendation or previous sanction was not obtained, provided the required constitutional authority later gave assent to the Act. 🔹 **Purpose:** The Article treats certain requirements of recommendation and previous sanction as procedural rather than absolute jurisdictional conditions. 🔹 **Conditions:** The curative effect depends upon assent by the appropriate authority: - where the Governor’s recommendation was required, assent must be by the Governor or President; - where the Governor’s previous sanction was required, assent must be by the Governor or President; - where the President’s recommendation or previous sanction was required, assent must be by the President. 🔹 **Illustration:** In *R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala*, the Supreme Court recognised that Presidential assent could cure the absence of prior Presidential sanction required for the State legislation in question. ## Consolidated Revision Map 🔹 **Territory:** Article 245 decides where a law may operate. 🔹 **Subject:** Article 246, Article 246A, Article 248 and the Seventh Schedule decide who may legislate. 🔹 **Union supremacy:** Union List has priority; Concurrent List is subject to Article 254. 🔹 **State List exceptions:** Parliament may enter State fields through Articles 249, 250, 252 and 253. 🔹 **Conflict:** Article 251 governs temporary conflict arising from Articles 249 and 250; Article 254 governs repugnancy on Concurrent List matters. 🔹 **Doctrines:** Pith and substance validates incidental overlap; 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(Hons.) with a specialization in Business Law. She has strong mooting experience, including being part of the winning team at the 16th GNLU International Moot Court Competition, winning team at the 5th GMAC National Virtual Moot Court Competition, semi-finalist at the 10th Symbiosis Pune International Criminal Trial Advocacy Competition, and participant at the 11th IBA ICC International Moot Court Competition India Rounds. She was also awarded Best Orator in the final rounds of the 16th GNLU GIMC International Moot Court Competition. She currently serves as Convenor, Moot Court Committee, HPNLU, and is also associated with editorial and academic responsibilities including the Himachal Pradesh Law Journal and Shimla Law Review. Rimjim’s journey from an amateur mooter to a passionate advocate of mooting makes her an ideal mentor for students who want to understand how to grow from their first moot to competitive performance. [ ![Smiling woman with glasses giving two thumbs up in a blazer and striped shirt, indoors at a classroom or office setting.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ashpinder-photo-e1781529186450.jpeg) ](javascript:void(0))## [ Ms. Ashpinder Kaur ](javascript:void(0)) Mooter | Winner of National and Internationational Moot Courts | Co-Convenor, Moot Court Committee, HPNLU | Published Researcher Tap the photo to know more about your Mentor ![Smiling woman with glasses giving two thumbs up in a blazer and striped shirt, indoors at a classroom or office setting.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ashpinder-photo-e1781529186450.jpeg) ## Ms. Ashpinder Kaur Mooter | Winner of National and Internationational Moot Courts | Co-Convenor, Moot Court Committee, HPNLU | Published Researcher Ashpinder Kaur is a B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) student at Himachal Pradesh National Law University, Shimla, with an impressive academic record and Batch Rank 2 out of 155. She has significant moot court experience, including being Winner of the GNLU International Moot Court Competition, 2025, Semi-Finalist at the Symbiosis International Trial Advocacy Competition, 2025, Winner of the 5th Dr. M.V.V.S. Murthy National Moot Court Competition, 2024, and Octa-Finalist at the 25th Harish Memorial Moot Court Competition, 2024. She also serves as Co-Convenor, Moot Court Committee, HPNLU, and holds editorial roles with Shimla Law Review and Himachal Law Journal. Her experience in mooting, advocacy, research, drafting and committee leadership makes her a strong mentor for students who want practical insights into memorial drafting, oral advocacy and competition strategy. [ ![A man in a black suit and tie holding a brown leather-bound notebook labeled 'Legal Briefs' outdoors in a park.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/WhatsApp-Image-2026-05-20-at-10.58.26-PM-e1779306056736-300x296.jpeg) ](javascript:void(0))## [ Adv. Manik Tindwani ](javascript:void(0)) Educator and Mentor at LawFoyer | Practicing Advocate at Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur | Certified Mooting Expert and Legal AI Expert Tap the photo to know more about your Mentor ![A man in a black suit and tie holding a brown leather-bound notebook labeled 'Legal Briefs' outdoors in a park.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/WhatsApp-Image-2026-05-20-at-10.58.26-PM-e1779306056736-300x296.jpeg) ## Adv. Manik Tindwani Educator and Mentor at LawFoyer | Practicing Advocate at Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur | Certified Mooting Expert and Legal AI Expert Adv. Manik Tindwani is a practicing Advocate at the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur, and a Co-Founder, Educator and Mentor at LawFoyer. He is a certified Legal AI expert who has mentored over 2700+ law students and legal professionals across India in legal research, writing, drafting, litigation skills and AI-powered legal productivity. He has trained and guided law students, young advocates and legal professionals from different parts of India on the practical use of technology and Artificial Intelligence in law. His experience as a practicing advocate gives him a strong understanding of real-world legal research, court practice, drafting requirements and professional legal work. Adv. Manik has also conducted workshops for reputed institutional audiences, including the IT Cell of NCLA and LBSNAA, and has been certified by over 50+ national and international organisations as a legal expert. He has also adjudged 14th MNLU Nani Palkhivala National Moot Court Competition, 2024 as a moot court judge. He is also a Moot Proposition Consultant to numerous reputed Universities of India. His practical courtroom exposure, legal education experience, AI training expertise and large-scale mentoring experience make him the ideal mentor for the advanced AI-powered mooting and trial advocacy workshop. ## Course Day Wise Curriculum ## Day 1 / Module 1 — Foundational Concepts of Mooting and Trial Advocacy **Date:** 28 June 2026 **Topic:** Orientation, Structure, Competition Selection and Fact Filtering This session will introduce participants to the world of mooting and trial advocacy. Participants will learn what moot courts are, how competitions are structured, how teams work, how to select suitable competitions, and how to approach a moot proposition for the first time. The session will also focus on fact filtering, which is one of the most important skills for any mooter. Participants will learn how to identify legally relevant facts, ignore distractions, understand party positions and begin building a case theory. ## Day 2 / Module 2 — Legal Research for Moot Courts **Date:** 29 June 2026 **Topic:** Issue Framing, Research Methods, Compendiums and International Moot Tips This session will focus on legal research for moot court competitions. Participants will learn how to frame issues, develop research questions, find relevant authorities, use statutes and precedents, prepare compendiums and organise research effectively. The session will also cover useful research strategies for international moot competitions, helping participants understand how international law, comparative law and foreign authorities may be approached in competitive mooting. ## Day 3 / Module 3 — Moot Memorials and Oral Argumentation **Date:** 30 June 2026 **Topic:** Drafting, Formatting and Court Etiquette This session will help participants understand the art of memorial drafting and oral submissions. Participants will learn how to structure written submissions, draft arguments, use authorities, maintain formatting standards and create a persuasive memorial. The session will also focus on oral advocacy skills, including courtroom etiquette, voice modulation, argument flow, answering judges, handling interruptions, rebuttals and professional conduct during oral rounds. ## Day 4 / Module 4 — Advanced Workshop on AI-Powered Mooting and Trial Advocacy **Date:** 1 July 2026 This advanced workshop will introduce participants to the practical use of technology and Artificial Intelligence in mooting, legal research, drafting, argument preparation and trial advocacy. Participants will learn how AI can be used to brainstorm issues, organise research, prepare argument structures, test oral submissions, create checklists, improve drafting quality and enhance advocacy preparation while maintaining ethical and professional standards. ## Who should attend this course? - Law students preparing for their first moot court competition. - Law students who have participated in moots but want to improve performance. - Students who want to learn memorial drafting and oral submissions. - Students preparing for national and international moot court competitions. - Students interested in trial advocacy and litigation. - Young legal professionals who want to improve advocacy skills. - Interns who want to perform better in litigation chambers. - Researchers and writers who want to strengthen legal research and argumentation. - Anyone interested in understanding how mooting works in law school and beyond. ## Free Bonuses for All Course Participants worth Rs. 5000+ 1. **E-Certificate of Completion:** Participants will be awarded with a Certificate of Completion after successful completion of the course. 2. **FREE Job and Internship Placement Support for 1 Year:** Participants will get free daily Internship and Job Opportunities Updates for 1 year via [**LawFoyer Connect**](https://news.lawfoyer.in/). 3. **FREE Access of Legal AI Workshop:** Participants will get free access to LawFoyer’s Advanced Certification Workshop on AI-Powered Legal Research, Writing and Drafting for Law Students and Legal Professionals worth Rs. 999/-. 4. **Publication Opportunity with LawFoyer’s International Journal:** Participants will get discounted publication opportunity with [**LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research (LIJDLR) \[ISSN: 2583-7753\]**](https://lijdlr.com/), which is indexed in 350+ international libraries and databases including HeinOnline, Harvard HOLLIS, Stanford Libraries, Oxford SOLO, IIM Bangalore Library, Manupatra, Google Scholar, ResearchGate, WorldCat, CrossRef, Europub and many more libraries & databases worldwide. 5. **Priority Access of Workshops & Webinars:** Participants will get priority Access to upcoming skil development workshops and academic webinars by [**LawFoyer Academy**](https://academy.lawfoyer.in/). 6. **Priority Access to Standardised Mock Tests** by LawFoyer’s [**Quiz Mania**](https://quiz.lawfoyer.in) 7. **Other FREE Bonuses:** Participants will get free access to bonuses including, *inter alia*, 4,000+ legal drafts, course reading materials, notes, E-books, PPTs, recordings with lifetime access and much more. ## What you will learn and achieve? - Understand the structure and purpose of moot court competitions. - Select the right competition according to interest, skill level and career goals. - Read, decode and analyse a moot proposition. - Separate relevant facts from irrelevant facts. - Frame legal issues and research questions. - Conduct effective legal research for moot courts. - Use research methods for national and international moot competitions. - Draft persuasive moot memorials. - Format memorials professionally. - Build oral arguments with clarity and confidence. - Maintain courtroom etiquette. - Answer judges during oral rounds. - Improve rebuttal and sur-rebuttal techniques. - Use AI tools for mooting, legal research and trial advocacy preparation. - Develop advocacy skills useful for real-world litigation. ## Why You Should Not Miss This Course This is not a theoretical course where you only listen to lectures. This is a practical, skill-oriented and outcome-focused course designed to help you understand mooting from the inside. You will learn from mentors who have personally participated in and won reputed moot court and trial advocacy competitions, handled legal research, drafted submissions, worked with moot committees and engaged with practical legal work. You will also learn from a practicing advocate and Legal AI expert who will show how modern tools can help you prepare smarter, faster and more effectively for mooting and advocacy. In just 4 days, this course will give you a structured roadmap to approach any moot court competition with clarity and confidence. ## [Click Here to Enroll Now!](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=54) ## [Download Brochure](https://drive.google.com/file/d/13S1GpatwuFVnWwJ0hkld7-i2ap6ehGdh/view?usp=sharing) ## Why learn Mooting and Trial Advocacy with LawFoyer? LawFoyer is a leading legal education and information platform for law students and legal professionals across India. Through our platform we have built a strong network of over **3 lakh+** law students and professionals. We have trained over **20,000** learners through online certification courses, workshops, webinars, and internship training programmes. We publish the **LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research (LIJDLR)** \[ISSN: 2583 7753\], indexed in 350 plus global libraries and databases including HeinOnline, Harvard HOLLIS, Stanford Libraries, Oxford SOLO, IIM Bangalore, Manupatra, Google Scholar etc. Our flagship initiative **LawFoyer Connect** gives daily job and internship updates, and tracks developments in legal technology and AI adoption in law. We have partnered with institutions like NLU Delhi, NLIU Bhopal, HPNLU, CNLU and others as media and e-learning partners for their events and courses. Through our latest initiative **LawFoyer’s Quiz Mania** which is a standardized quizzing platform which aims to prepare our learners for national and international level examinations with highly securet and AI-proctored Mock Tests and Practice Exams. We have also conducted pan India internship and training programmes on legal research skills, legal drafting and legal AI tools in collaboration with reputed law firms such as Eximius Legal and worked in close collaboration with government bodies for various workshops and projects. Our vision is simple: make law practical, affordable, and technology aware, so that students and young professionals can build confident careers. ## COURSE FEE & REGISTRATION DETAILS - **Early Bird Fee for Law Students:** ₹ 499 (offer valid till Tonight 11 PM) - **Early Bird Fee for Others:** ₹ 999 (offer valid till Tonight 11 PM) - **Course Fee for Law Students** (from Tommorrow onwards): ₹ 999 - **Course Fee for Others** (from Tommorrow onwards): ₹ 1999 ## [Click Here to Enroll Now!](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=54) ## [Download Brochure](https://drive.google.com/file/d/13S1GpatwuFVnWwJ0hkld7-i2ap6ehGdh/view?usp=sharing) ## Frequently Asked Questions [ Do you offer daily live classes? ](#collapse-14514dc6ab2aec0d21d9) Yes, our course include daily live classes. You will have the opportunity to attend live lectures, each lasting approximately 90 minutes. The schedule for these live sessions will be 6 PM Onwards. We understand that our learners may be students or working professionals, so we strive to accommodate everyone's schedules. So our live sessions are held in the late evenings, allowing all participants to attend without compromising their regular classes or work commitments. [ What happens if I am unable to attend a live class? ](#collapse-c29457c6ab2aec0d21d9) We highly recommend attending the live classes after thorough preparation to maximize your learning experience. Just as the true excitement of a live match or performance lies in witnessing it in real-time, the real value of our live classes comes from actively participating and engaging with the content and instructors. During the live sessions, a wealth of new and practical information is covered, and you'll have the opportunity to ask questions and receive immediate feedback. However, we understand that sometimes life gets in the way, and you may miss a live class. In such cases, you can access the recordings of the live sessions through your personalized Learning Management System (LMS) dashboard. The LMS dashboard provides 24/7 access to all course materials, including the live session recordings, ensuring that you can catch up on any missed content at your convenience. [ Will this course help in internships and jobs? ](#collapse-35c8fe46ab2aec0d21d9) Yes. A strong understanding of skills taught in this course will become a key differentiator for you in internships, litigation practice, compliance roles, and research profiles. Moreover, the 1 year Internship and Placement support via LawFoyer Connect will also immensely help you. [ Is this useful for judicial services or other exams? ](#collapse-23e82e36ab2aec0d21d9) The Modules discussed in this course are increasingly becoming part of judicial service examinations and other national exams as well. This course will give you the conceptual clarity and contemporary awareness that you can build upon. [ How will the sessions be conducted? ](#collapse-f524db26ab2aec0d21d9) Sessions will be conducted live online. You will receive joining links, reading material, and support via email or WhatsApp. [ Can non law professionals attend? ](#collapse-48e70416ab2aec0d21d9) Yes, policy researchers, working professionals, and enthusiasts with serious interest in modules and skills taught in this course are welcome to join and learn. ## [Click Here to Enroll Now!](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=54) ## [Download Brochure](https://drive.google.com/file/d/13S1GpatwuFVnWwJ0hkld7-i2ap6ehGdh/view?usp=sharing) ## Contact Us Have questions about our Certification Course? We’re here to help! Contact us for any inquiries regarding course content, schedules, or registration. Don’t miss this opportunity to transform your legal career with LawFoyer! [ Contact Us ](https://web.whatsapp.com/send?phone=+918824991916) [ Contact Us ](https://web.whatsapp.com/send?phone=+918574723478) ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/chatting.png) **Categories:** Courses & Workshops **Tags:** #legal services, 4 law, a legal case, a legal will, advanced certification course on mooting and trial advocacy, advanced law, advanced legal, advocate legal, advocate legal services, advocates law, bike moots, by laws, certified legal, court legal, focus legal, international legal, international litigation, law, law & law, law and advocacy, law and law, law degree, law for work, law for working professionals, law in court, law in law, law international, law of court, law practice, law professionals, law university, law we, lawyer, legal advocate, legal aid, legal and legal, legal assistant, legal cases, legal court, legal do, legal practice, legal professional, legal she, legal technology, legal will, legal work, legal you, litigation court, litigation in law, litigation practice, llb, llb law, moot classes, moot court course, moot court online course, mooting course, moots, moots bikes, national law, national legal, national trial advocacy, professional legal practice, professional legal service, the advocates law, the lawyer, trial advocates, trial law, trial legal, trial litigation, trial practice, university of law, work legal, working in law, world law, world legal, you legal, your legal --- ### [HNLU Earns Prestigious Citation of Honour for Advancing a Culture of Service and Voluntary Blood Donation](https://lawfoyer.in/hnlu-earns-prestigious-citation-of-honour-for-advancing-a-culture-of-service-and-voluntary-blood-donation/) **Published:** June 15, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/IMG-20260614-WA0082-1-1024x683.jpg) **Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur**, was conferred a **Citation of Honour** by the **Hon’ble Governor of Chhattisgarh, Shri Raman Deka** in recognition of the **University’s sustained and commendable contribution** to the cause of **voluntary blood donation and community welfare.** The honour was bestowed during a special felicitation ceremony organised by the **Red Cross Society** on the occasion of **World Blood Donor Day** at **Chhattisgarh Mandapam, Lok Bhavan, Raipur.** The recognition acknowledges HNLU’s longstanding commitment to promoting voluntary blood donation as a vital humanitarian service and its continued **efforts to nurture** **social responsibility among students and staff.** Over the years, HNLU, through its **Legal and Social Services Committee** headed by **Dr Kaumudhi Challa and Pro Bono Club headed by Dr Parvesh Rajput**, has regularly organised blood donation camps and awareness initiatives, encouraging members of the University community to actively participate in this life-saving endeavour. These programmes have not only contributed significantly to public health efforts but have also strengthened the University’s engagement with society beyond the classroom. The **University’s outreach initiatives** have been guided by the vision of **Professor (Dr.) V. C. Vivekanandan, Hon’ble Vice-Chancellor,** *who has consistently emphasised the socialisation of legal education and the integration of community service with academic excellence. Under his leadership, HNLU has undertaken a range of impactful programmes addressing important social and developmental concerns, reinforcing the role of legal education in nation-building and public service.* On behalf of the University, **Dr. Deepak Kumar Srivastava, Registrar (In-Charge**), received the **Citation of Honour** from the Hon’ble Governor during the ceremony. The **IRCS Chhattisgarh CEO Shri M K Raut IAS Retd and Dr Rupal Purohit, General Secretary of IRCS Chhattisgarh** graced the occasion along with several invited dignitaries. **The HNLU fraternity welcomed the recognition as a significant affirmation of the University’s enduring commitment to social service, public welfare, and humanitarian values.** The University reaffirmed its resolve to continue advancing initiatives that contribute meaningfully to society and inspire future generations to embrace the spirit of civic responsibility and compassionate service. Issued by Public Relations Office, Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur. Wish to showcase your achievement to the world and inspire others? LawFoyer will celebrate your achievement because every achievement deserves recognition. Your achievement is our achievement. Share your achievement with us: **Categories:** Achievers Archive --- ### [3RD SHRI O.P. TANDON MEMORIAL MOCK TRIAL COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by TRINITY INSTITUTE OF PROFESSIONAL STUDIES (TIPS) | Register by 2nd AUGUST 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-shri-o-p-tandon-memorial-mock-trial-competition-2026-organized-by-trinity-institute-of-professional-studies-tips-register-by-2nd-august-2026/) **Published:** June 9, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 3RD SHRI O.P. TANDON MEMORIAL MOCK TRIAL COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by TRINITY INSTITUTE OF PROFESSIONAL STUDIES (TIPS) | Register by 2nd AUGUST 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Screenshot-2026-06-09-210531.jpg) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY Trinity Institute of Professional Studies (TIPS) is a higher educational Alma-mater. The law school is affiliated with the Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University, New Delhi. The Institute has attained a distinct position in running BA.LL.B, B. Com (h), BJMC, and BCA programs. The institute has attained numerous laurels to its credit and has successfully attained a distinguished stature. It has been ranked an A+ category institute of GGSIPU. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY** The TIPS Moot Court Society is organizing the**3rd Shri O.P. Tandon Memorial National Mock Trial Competition, 2026** with the objective of providing law students a realistic courtroom experience. *The competition focuses on developing essential advocacy and litigation skills such as*: • Examination & Cross-Examination • Courtroom Advocacy • Legal Reasoning & Analysis • Teamwork & Strategy • Professional Ethics & Courtroom Etiquette **The event seeks to bridge the gap between theoretical legal education and practical courtroom exposure while preparing participants for future legal practice.** ## WHO IS IT FOR/ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE The Competition is open to students currently pursuing: - 3-Year LL.B. Course; or - 5-Year Integrated Law Course from any recognized University/ Institution. Each participating team shall consist of a maximum of five (5) members, comprising: - Two (2) Speakers/ Counsels - One (1) Researcher - Two (2) Witnesses A team may participate with a minimum of four (4) members, wherein the Researcher may also perform the role of one Witness, if required. No additional member shall be permitted under any circumstances. ## MODE OF THE EVENT (ONLINE / OFFLINE OR HYBRID) THE EVENT SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN **HYBRID MODE** WHEREIN - **INAUGRAL CEREMONY, DRAW OF LOTS, MEMORIAL EXCHANGE AND RESEARCHER’S TEST** TO BE HELD ON **20TH AUGUST 2026 ( ONLINE )** - **PRELIMIARLY ROUND 1 & 2 , QUARTER FINAL ROUNDS** TO BE HELD ON **21ST AND 22ND AUGUST 2026 ( ONLINE )** - **SEMI FINALS & FINAL ROUNDS** TO BE HELD ON **5TH SEPTEMBER 2026** **( OFFLINE AT TIPS DWARKA )** ## LOCATION (COUNTRY/STATE/CITY)& VENUE OF THE EVENT Trinity Institute of Professional Studies Institutional Area, Dwarka Sector 9, New Delhi, Delhi, 110075 ## REGISTRATION/SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE - The teams have to choose a primary contact person while filling out the Registration Form (YOU MAY CONTACT THE STUDENT COORDINATORS FOR THE SAME). - All communications concerning the Competition shall be sent by email to the nominated contact person. - The nominated contact person shall be responsible for conveying all the information to the team/ witness. - Registration shall be considered complete only upon: submission of Registration Form; and successful payment of Registration Fee – **.** (ANY SUCH OTHER INFORMATION IS MENTIONED IN THE RULBOOK) - **REGISTRTAION FORM AND REGISTRATION LINK ARE PROVIDED ON THE PAGE 5 OF THE RULEBOOK** ## FEE DETAILS - The participating teams shall be required to pay: ₹3000/- (Rupees Three Thousand Only) as Registration Fee for the Competition. - Teams availing the Early Bird Registration shall be required to pay: ₹2500/- (Rupees Two Thousand Five Hundred Only). - The deadline for Early Bird Registration is 12th July 2026, Afterwards the Normal Registration Fee shall work in till 2nd of August 2026 ## PRIZES - **BEST TEAM:** The Winning Team shall be awarded ₹25,000/- along with Trophy & Certificates. - **RUNNER-UP TEAM:** The Runner-Up Team shall be awarded ₹11,000/- along with Trophy and Certificates. - **BEST SPEAKER:** The participant securing the highest cumulative oral advocacy score during the Competition shall be awarded ₹4,000/- along with Trophy and Certificate. - **BEST RESEARCHER:** The participant securing the highest marks in the Researcher’s Test shall be declared as the BEST RESEARCHER and shall be awarded ₹4,000/- along with Trophy & Certificate. - **BEST MEMORIAL:** The team securing the highest marks in Memorial Evaluation shall be declared as BEST MEMORIAL and shall be awarded ₹4,000/- along with Trophy & Certificate. - **BEST WITNESS:** The participant securing the highest marks in witness performance during Oral Rounds shall be declared as the BEST WITNES and shall be awarded ₹3,000/- along with Trophy & Certificate. - **CERTIFICATE OF APPRECIATION TO ALL THE PARTICIPANTS** - **ADDITIONAL PERKS TO ALL THE PARTICIPANTS AND WINNERS** ## DEADLINES/IMPORTANT DATES ## **Online Mode** - 09/06/2026 – Registration Open - 09/06/2026 – Release of Moot Proposition, Brochure & Rulebook - 12/07/2026 – Early Bird Discount Closes - 02/08/2026 – Registration & Payment Deadline - 04/08/2026 – Last Date for Seeking Clarifications - 07/08/2026 – Release of Clarifications - 15/08/2026 – Last Date for Memorial Submission ( ONLINE ) - 20/08/2026 – Inaugural Ceremony, Draw of Lots & Exchange of Memorials - 20/08/2026 – Researcher’sTest - 21/08/2026 – Preliminary Rounds I & II - 22/08/2026 – Quarter-Final Round **Offline Mode** - 05/09/2026 – Semi-Final & Final Rounds - 05/09/2026 – Valedictory Ceremony & Awards Distribution ## CONTACT INFORMATION - FACULTY COORDINATORS: Ms. Rashi Makhija (Convenor)- +91 9818254231 Mr. Chaitanya Sharma (Co- Convenor) -+91 88609 96093 - CONVENORS : Shweta Srivastava (+91 7678159983) and Vidmita Soni ( +91 9560816191) - CO – CONVENORS : Sejal Kacher (+91 8953205458) and Kartik Khanna ( +91 9899170500) - OC COORDINATORS : Astha (Contact No.: +91 9999607089) and Diksha ( +91 9717710496) ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / LINK OF THE OFFICIAL BROCHURE, RULES & REGULATIONS ETC. - [**BROCHURE**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1KrQ91Mec3WtHzsSDhzIpYV1xem_8HxCm/view?usp=drive_link) - [**REGISTRATION LINK**](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSd7fEPtnWTTnVBdfzzX12-e965SNRmg4rsJWXWdhZrxxrotpg/viewform) - [**RULEBOOK LINK** ](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1nzPUPNcbM1JgVJTwNWio1WsPJE1il8SK/view?usp=drive_link) - [**MOCK PROPOSITION LINK**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1VGEpXajTdbIRmc5MVkdgDQiyFES3_EaR/view?usp=drive_link) **Categories:** Events, Moot Courts --- ### [VIDHIKA – A Quarterly Law Journal (Vol. 2, Issue 2) | Organized by Nyaya Shastra | Submit Articles & Papers by 15 June 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/vidhika-a-quarterly-law-journal-vol-2-issue-2-organized-by-nyaya-shastra-submit-articles-papers-by-15-june-2026/) **Published:** June 9, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** VIDHIKA – A Quarterly Law Journal (Vol. 2, Issue 2) | Organized by Nyaya Shastra | Submit Articles & Papers by 15 June 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/add-a-headingNyaya.jpg) ## About Nyaya Shastra Nyaya Shastra is an MSME registered, full-service Law Firm and legal learning platform built on the foundation of integrity, excellence, and service. Established with the vision of bridging the gap between academic legal knowledge and its practical application, we strive to deliver legal solutions that are insightful, effective, and socially responsible. We provide a comprehensive range of services in litigation and dispute resolution, corporate and commercial law, contract drafting and management, regulatory and compliance advisory, and policy research. Representing clients before various judicial and quasi-judicial forums across India, we are committed to offering strategic and result-oriented legal counsel that aligns with the evolving needs of individuals, businesses, and institutions. ## **About VIDHIKA** **\[ISSN No. 3108-0855\]** VIDHIKA, a quarterly law journal, is an in-house publication of Nyaya Shastra. The journal seeks to create a vibrant intellectual space where students, researchers, academics, practitioners, and policymakers can engage in constructive dialogue on contemporary legal challenges. With a commitment to advancing legal understanding and contributing to informed public debate, VIDHIKA aspires to influence policy development, support legal reforms, and strengthen the broader discourse on justice, rights, and governance. The scope of the journal is broad and interdisciplinary, covering diverse areas such as constitutional law, criminal law, civil and commercial law, human rights, environmental law, family law, labour law, and property law, along with specialized fields like cyber law, artificial intelligence, intellectual property, data privacy, and digital governance. It also welcomes socio-legal research that draws from sociology, economics, political science, and public policy. Reflecting the social-justice orientation of Nyaya Shastra, the journal pays particular attention to themes such as access to justice, women’s and children’s rights, marginalized communities, and tribal customary laws. VIDHIKA accepts various forms of scholarly contributions, including research articles, case comments, legislative analyses, book reviews, essays, and policy briefs, ensuring a comprehensive platform for diverse academic voices. ## **Plagiarism Policy** 10% Plagiarism is permitted. Authors are advised to properly cite the content which they have used from other sources to avoid exceeding the permitted plagiarism limit. ## **Review Policy** Nyaya Shastra follows Peer Review Policy to ensure the quality of the Journal. ## **Submission Guidelines** Submissions are invited for the \[Volume 2 Issue 2\] of VIDHIKA. The interested authors can also send their original & unpublished articles directly at [**office.nyayashastra@gmail.com**](mailto:office.nyayashastra@gmail.com) with the subject line as **SUBMISSION FOR VIDHIKA** before **15th June 2026**. However, any submission does not guarantee the publication of articles but the authors are suggested not to send their submitted articles anywhere else before the this issue of VIDHIKA is released (tentatively in 3rd week of July 2026). If the article is accepted it will be published in the very next issue and non publication of submitted articles means the article has been rejected. ## NO FEE IS CHARGED FOR PUBLICATION The authors are suggested to send their articles or research paper in **Word Format** along with – - Font Size – 12 - Line Spacing 15 - Font – Times New Roman - Alignment – Justified **Please note that due to large number of submissions, any communication regarding the recipt, acceptance or non acceptance of the submissions will not be done. We request the authors to remain patient all throughout.** **Also note that non compliance to the guidelines as mentioned in this post will result to rejection/non consideration of the submission without any intimation.** **Please attach a Turnitin Similarity Report alongwith the Word File.** **Categories:** Call for Papers, Events --- ### [Call for Blogs | Centre for Environmental Law, Policy and Research (CELPR), National Law University Delhi | Organized by Collective for Environmental Action (CEA) under the aegis of the Centre for Environmental Law, Policy and Research (CELPR), National Law University Delhi](https://lawfoyer.in/centre-for-environmental-law-policy-and-research-celpr-national-law-university-delhi-organized-by-collective-for-environmental-action-cea-under-the-aegis-of-the-centre-for-environmental-law-p/) **Published:** June 9, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** Centre for Environmental Law, Policy and Research (CELPR), National Law University Delhi | Organized by Collective for Environmental Action (CEA) under the aegis of the Centre for Environmental Law, Policy and Research (CELPR), National Law University Delhi **Content:** ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER The Centre for Environmental Law, Policy and Research was established in August 2016 with the objective of promoting legal education, research, and extension activities in the field of Environmental Law. The Centre seeks to facilitate academic and policy-oriented dialogue on contemporary environmental issues and encourage the confluence of academic and expert insights in the field. The Collective for Environmental Action, functioning under the aegis of the Centre, provides a platform for students to engage with environmental issues, particularly climate change and environmental policy. Through initiatives such as reading circles and the CEA Blog, the Collective aims to raise awareness and foster meaningful discussions on environmental concerns. ## ABOUT THE BLOG The CEA Blog focuses on environmental law and policy, with particular emphasis on the emerging discourse surrounding climate change. The blog encourages interdisciplinary scholarship and welcomes contributions from authors belonging to diverse academic backgrounds. By promoting a wide range of perspectives, the blog seeks to provide readers with a broader understanding of environmental issues and their intersections with other disciplines. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE OPPORTUNITY The CEA Blog invites submissions from students on environmental law, policy, climate change, and related interdisciplinary themes. For general rolling submissions: - Word Limit: **800–1000 words** - Authors must submit an **abstract** along with a **brief introduction about themselves** - Co-authorship of up to **two authors** is permitted and encouraged - Submissions must be original and unpublished - Plagiarized submissions will be rejected - Authors are responsible for the accuracy of facts, opinions, and views expressed in their work Suggested themes include: - Interaction of Environmental Law and Corporate Law - Contemporary issues in Environmental Law - Impact of Public International Law on Climate Change - Critical analysis of major court decisions and their implications - Critical analysis of policies adopted by State Governments and Municipalities - Any other topic sufficiently related to environmental issues ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE The student community is invited to contribute to the blog. 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Articles 214 to 231 of the Constitution deal with High Courts in the States, while Articles 233 to 237 deal with the subordinate judiciary. Article 214 provides that there shall be a High Court for each State. However, Article 231 permits Parliament to establish a common High Court for two or more States or for two or more States and a Union Territory. The Constitution therefore treats the High Court not merely as an ordinary appellate court, but as a constitutional guardian within the State judicial structure. ➤ **Independence of judiciary:** The High Court performs three major constitutional functions: deciding disputes, protecting fundamental and legal rights through writ jurisdiction, and controlling the subordinate judiciary. Its independence is protected through special provisions on appointment, tenure, salaries, transfer, removal, contempt powers and administrative control over subordinate courts. This structure ensures that justice at the State level is not controlled by the executive. ➤ **Position in judicial hierarchy:** The High Court stands below the Supreme Court but above District Courts and other subordinate courts within the State. It hears appeals and revisions from subordinate courts, exercises writ jurisdiction against public authorities, and supervises courts and tribunals within its territorial jurisdiction. It is both a court of law and a constitutional authority. ## Constitution and Composition of High Courts ➤ **Article 216 — Composition:** Article 216 states that every High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and such other Judges as the President may from time to time deem it necessary to appoint. The Constitution does not fix a permanent numerical strength for every High Court. The sanctioned strength may vary depending on pendency, workload, size of the State and administrative requirements. ➤ **Chief Justice and puisne judges:** The Chief Justice is the administrative head of the High Court. Other judges are commonly called puisne judges. The Chief Justice allocates work, constitutes benches, manages roster arrangements and represents the High Court in constitutional consultations. ➤ **Additional and acting judges:** Article 224 permits appointment of additional judges for temporary increase in business or arrears, and acting judges when a permanent judge is unable to perform duties. Article 224A also permits appointment of retired judges to sit and act as judges of a High Court with required consent. These provisions are intended to address pendency and temporary judicial requirements. ## Appointment of High Court Judges ➤ **Article 217 — Appointment:** Article 217 provides that every Judge of a High Court shall be appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal. In making such appointment, the President consults the Chief Justice of India, the Governor of the State, and in case of appointment of a judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court. ➤ **Qualifications:** A person is qualified for appointment as a High Court judge if he or she is a citizen of India and has, for at least ten years, held a judicial office in the territory of India, or has, for at least ten years, been an advocate of a High Court or of two or more such courts in succession. This allows appointments both from the judicial service and from the Bar. ➤ **Age of retirement:** A High Court judge holds office until the age of 62 years. This is different from Supreme Court judges, who retire at 65 years. A judge may resign by writing addressed to the President, may be removed through the constitutional impeachment process, or may be appointed to the Supreme Court or transferred to another High Court. ➤ **Collegium system:** Though Article 217 uses the word “consultation”, judicial interpretation has transformed the process into the collegium system. Under the present system, appointments to High Courts involve consultation between the High Court collegium, the Supreme Court collegium and the Union Government. The executive formally appoints judges, but the primacy of the judiciary in judicial appointments has been recognised to protect judicial independence. ## Evolution of the Collegium System ➤ **First Judges Case — S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 Supp SCC 87:** In this case, the Supreme Court initially held that the executive had primacy in judicial appointments and transfers, and that the opinion of the Chief Justice of India was not binding. The dispute involved non-appointment, extension of additional judges and transfer of High Court judges. The ratio was that “consultation” did not mean “concurrence”. This decision gave greater power to the executive, but it was later overruled on the point of primacy. ➤ **Second Judges Case — Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 441:** This landmark nine-judge decision overruled the First Judges Case and held that the Chief Justice of India’s opinion, formed collectively with senior judges, would have primacy in appointments and transfers. The Court reasoned that judicial independence is part of the basic structure of the Constitution. For High Court appointments, the opinion of the Chief Justice of India had to be formed after consultation with senior Supreme Court judges and relevant constitutional authorities. ➤ **Third Judges Case — In re Special Reference No. 1 of 1998, (1998) 7 SCC 739:** The President sought clarification on the appointment process. The Supreme Court expanded and clarified the collegium system. It held that the Chief Justice of India must consult a plurality of judges. For High Court appointments, the opinion of the CJI must be formed after consultation with senior Supreme Court judges familiar with the affairs of the concerned High Court. This strengthened collective institutional decision-making. ➤ **NJAC Case — Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 1:** The 99th Constitutional Amendment and the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act sought to replace the collegium system. A five-judge Constitution Bench struck down the amendment and the NJAC Act as unconstitutional, holding that judicial primacy in appointments is essential to judicial independence, which is part of the basic structure. ## Transfer of High Court Judges ➤ **Article 222 — Transfer power:** Article 222 empowers the President to transfer a judge from one High Court to another after consultation with the Chief Justice of India. When a judge is transferred, he or she is entitled to compensatory allowance as determined by Parliament. ➤ **Purpose of transfer:** Transfers may be made for better administration of justice, national integration of judiciary, avoiding local influences, or administrative necessity. However, transfer must not be used as punishment or as a tool of executive pressure, because that would damage judicial independence. ➤ **Judicial safeguards:** After the Second and Third Judges Cases, consultation with the Chief Justice of India means effective consultation with a collegium of senior judges. The Chief Justice of India’s opinion must be formed on relevant material. This ensures that transfer is not a unilateral executive action. ➤ **S.P. Gupta and transfer issue:** In **S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 Supp SCC 87**, the Supreme Court considered, among other issues, the transfer of High Court judges under Article 222. The earlier view allowed wider executive discretion, but later cases changed the law by giving primacy to the judiciary in transfer and appointment matters. ## High Court as Court of Record ➤ **Article 215 — Court of record:** Article 215 declares that every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all powers of such a court, including the power to punish for contempt of itself. A court of record has two important features: its records have evidentiary value, and it has inherent power to punish for contempt. ➤ **Meaning of court of record:** The judgments, proceedings and acts of a High Court are preserved as permanent records. Their authenticity cannot be casually questioned in subordinate proceedings. This gives institutional dignity and legal certainty to the High Court’s judicial work. ➤ **Contempt power:** The power to punish for contempt protects the authority of the court and the administration of justice. It is not meant to protect personal prestige of judges. It is used when conduct scandalises the court, interferes with judicial proceedings, obstructs justice or wilfully disobeys court orders. ➤ **Article 215 and Contempt of Courts Act, 1971:** Article 215 is a constitutional power, while the Contempt of Courts Act regulates procedure and limitations. The High Court’s power is inherent, but it is exercised judicially, carefully and in accordance with principles of fairness. Courts have repeatedly stressed that contempt jurisdiction must not be used where ordinary remedies are adequate. ## Writ Jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 226 ➤ **Article 226 — Wide constitutional remedy:** Article 226 empowers every High Court to issue directions, orders or writs to any person or authority, including the government, for enforcement of fundamental rights and “for any other purpose”. This makes Article 226 wider than Article 32, because Article 32 is primarily for enforcement of fundamental rights, while Article 226 covers both fundamental rights and other legal rights. ➤ **Nature of jurisdiction:** Article 226 jurisdiction is discretionary, equitable and constitutional. A person does not get a writ merely because a legal error exists; the High Court examines whether interference is necessary to prevent injustice, illegality or violation of rights. ➤ **Five traditional writs:** The High Court may issue habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition and quo warranto. These writs are inherited from common law but have been constitutionally adapted in India. ➤ **Habeas corpus:** This writ protects personal liberty. It commands the authority detaining a person to produce the person before the court and justify the detention. If detention is illegal, the person is released. It is a powerful remedy against unlawful arrest, illegal custody and preventive detention abuse. ➤ **Mandamus:** Mandamus means “we command”. It is issued to compel performance of a public or statutory duty. It cannot ordinarily be issued to enforce a purely private duty. However, if a private body performs a public function, mandamus may lie. ➤ **Certiorari:** Certiorari is issued to quash an order of a court, tribunal or authority where there is jurisdictional error, violation of natural justice, error apparent on the face of record, or breach of law. ➤ **Prohibition:** Prohibition is preventive. It restrains a lower court or tribunal from proceeding in a matter over which it has no jurisdiction or is acting contrary to law. Certiorari quashes; prohibition prevents. ➤ **Quo warranto:** Quo warranto questions the legal authority of a person holding a public office. If the appointment is contrary to statutory or constitutional requirements, the court may remove the person from office. ## Important Supreme Court Cases on Article 226 ➤ **L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261:** The Supreme Court held that judicial review by the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 and by the Supreme Court under Article 32 is part of the basic structure of the Constitution. The issue was whether tribunal decisions could be kept outside High Court scrutiny. The ratio was that tribunal decisions are subject to scrutiny by a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the tribunal falls. This case preserved the High Court’s constitutional role even in the tribunal system. ➤ **Andi Mukta Sadguru v. V.R. Rudani, (1989) 2 SCC 691:** The Supreme Court held that mandamus under Article 226 can be issued not only against statutory authorities but also against bodies performing public duties. The case involved teachers seeking terminal benefits from a trust-run educational institution. The ratio was that the form of the body is less important than the nature of the duty. This expanded Article 226 as a practical remedy against public duty violations. ➤ **Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1:** The Supreme Court held that availability of an alternative remedy does not completely bar writ jurisdiction. A writ may still be entertained where fundamental rights are violated, principles of natural justice are breached, the order is without jurisdiction, or the validity of a statute is challenged. This case is important because Article 226 remains flexible where ordinary remedies are ineffective. ➤ **Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161:** The Supreme Court gave liberal standing in public interest litigation involving bonded labour. Though mainly an Article 32 case, its rights-based approach influenced Article 226 PIL jurisdiction. It showed that constitutional courts can act where poverty, helplessness or social disability prevents affected persons from approaching courts. ➤ **State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86:** The Supreme Court held that writ jurisdiction can be exercised where there is a serious defect in procedure or violation of natural justice, even if an alternative remedy exists. The case is frequently used to explain that procedural fairness is central to judicial review. ## Difference between Article 226 and Article 32 BasisArticle 226Article 32**Court**High CourtSupreme Court**Scope**Fundamental rights and other legal rightsFundamental rights**Nature**Discretionary remedyFundamental right itself**Territorial reach**Within High Court’s territorial jurisdiction, subject to cause of actionAll India jurisdiction**Purpose**Broader judicial review and legal rights enforcementDirect constitutional remedy for fundamental rights➤ **Key memory point:** Article 32 is itself a fundamental right, while Article 226 is wider in subject matter. Therefore, a High Court under Article 226 can protect both constitutional rights and ordinary legal rights. ## Superintendence of High Courts under Article 227 ➤ **Article 227 — Power of superintendence:** Article 227 gives every High Court superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories over which it exercises jurisdiction. This power includes administrative and judicial superintendence. It ensures that subordinate courts and tribunals act within their jurisdiction and follow law. ➤ **Administrative superintendence:** The High Court may call for returns, make and issue general rules, prescribe forms for proceedings and entries, and settle tables of fees. This ensures uniformity, discipline and efficiency in subordinate courts. ➤ **Judicial superintendence:** The High Court may interfere where a subordinate court acts without jurisdiction, refuses to exercise jurisdiction, commits grave dereliction of duty, violates natural justice or causes manifest injustice. However, Article 227 is not a substitute for appeal. ➤ **Difference between Article 226 and Article 227:** Article 226 is mainly original writ jurisdiction against State action, public authorities or legal wrongs. Article 227 is supervisory jurisdiction over courts and tribunals. Article 226 issues writs; Article 227 keeps subordinate judicial bodies within legal bounds. ## Important Supreme Court Cases on Article 227 ➤ **Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215:** The Supreme Court held that Article 227 power is to be exercised to keep subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority. The case established that superintendence is not ordinary appellate power. The ratio is that High Courts may interfere where courts act beyond jurisdiction or fail to exercise jurisdiction. ➤ **Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675:** The Supreme Court discussed the relationship between Articles 226 and 227 and allowed limited interference against orders of civil courts. However, later decisions clarified and limited this view. ➤ **Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329:** The Supreme Court held that Article 227 must be exercised sparingly and only to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority. The High Court should not convert Article 227 into a regular appellate jurisdiction. ➤ **Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, (2015) 5 SCC 423:** The Supreme Court clarified that judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226, though supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 may be available in proper cases. This distinction is important for understanding writ and supervisory remedies. ## Subordinate Judiciary under the Constitution ➤ **Meaning of subordinate judiciary:** Subordinate judiciary refers to courts below the High Court, such as District Courts, Civil Courts, Sessions Courts, Chief Judicial Magistrate Courts, Judicial Magistrate Courts and other courts created by law. These courts conduct trials, record evidence, decide civil and criminal disputes and form the foundation of the justice delivery system. ➤ **Articles 233 to 237:** These provisions protect independence of the district judiciary and subordinate courts. They regulate appointment of District Judges, recruitment of persons other than District Judges, control by the High Court, and application of provisions to magistrates. ➤ **Importance:** Most litigants interact first with subordinate courts, not the High Court or Supreme Court. Therefore, independence, competence and discipline of subordinate courts are essential to rule of law. ## Appointment of District Judges under Article 233 ➤ **Article 233 — District Judges:** Appointments, postings and promotions of District Judges are made by the Governor of the State in consultation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to that State. This consultation is mandatory and meaningful. The executive cannot ignore the High Court’s opinion in judicial appointments at the district level. ➤ **Eligibility from Bar:** A person not already in government service is eligible to be appointed as District Judge if he or she has been an advocate or pleader for at least seven years and is recommended by the High Court. This ensures that experienced advocates may directly enter higher judicial service. ➤ **Meaning of District Judge:** Article 236 explains that “District Judge” includes judge of a city civil court, additional district judge, joint district judge, assistant district judge, chief judge of a small cause court, chief presidency magistrate, sessions judge, additional sessions judge and assistant sessions judge. This is a wide constitutional definition. ## Recruitment of Other Judicial Officers under Article 234 ➤ **Article 234 — Judicial service below District Judge:** Appointments of persons other than District Judges to the judicial service of a State are made by the Governor in accordance with rules made after consultation with the State Public Service Commission and the High Court. The High Court’s role is crucial because judicial service is not an ordinary civil service. ➤ **Purpose of consultation:** The High Court ensures that recruitment standards preserve judicial independence, legal competence and integrity. The Public Service Commission may conduct examinations, but the High Court’s involvement gives the process a judicial character. ➤ **Judicial service:** Article 236 defines judicial service as a service consisting exclusively of persons intended to fill the post of District Judge and other civil judicial posts inferior to District Judge. This means executive officers cannot be mixed into judicial service in a manner that damages judicial independence. ## Control over Subordinate Courts under Article 235 ➤ **Article 235 — High Court’s control:** Article 235 vests control over District Courts and courts subordinate thereto in the High Court. This includes posting, promotion, grant of leave and disciplinary control over persons belonging to the judicial service of the State and holding posts inferior to District Judge. ➤ **Constitutional purpose:** Article 235 separates the subordinate judiciary from executive control. If the executive controlled postings, promotions and discipline of judges, judicial independence at the grassroots level would be seriously weakened. Article 235 ensures that judicial officers decide cases without fear of executive displeasure. ➤ **Scope of control:** The High Court’s control includes disciplinary proceedings, suspension, departmental inquiry, assessment of service record, promotion, confirmation, posting and transfer within judicial service. However, formal appointment or dismissal orders may be issued by the Governor according to service rules, but the effective control remains with the High Court. ➤ **Administrative and disciplinary meaning:** “Control” under Article 235 is a wide word. It is not limited to routine administration. It includes disciplinary jurisdiction because discipline is essential to maintain purity and independence of the judiciary. ## Important Supreme Court Cases on Article 235 ➤ **State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi, AIR 1966 SC 447:** The Supreme Court held that “control” under Article 235 includes disciplinary control. The issue was whether disciplinary action against a District Judge was within the High Court’s authority. The Court held that vesting control in the High Court is essential for independence of subordinate judiciary. This case gave Article 235 a broad and meaningful interpretation. ➤ **Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831:** The Supreme Court held that the High Court has constitutional control over the subordinate judiciary and that executive authorities cannot take over disciplinary control. The case involved judicial officers whose services were terminated. The ratio was that although formal orders may be issued in the name of the Governor, the High Court’s control under Article 235 must be respected. ➤ **High Court of Punjab and Haryana v. State of Haryana, (1975) 1 SCC 843:** The Supreme Court emphasised that the High Court’s control over subordinate courts is comprehensive and intended to secure independence of the judiciary. The executive cannot interfere with matters that constitutionally belong to the High Court. ➤ **All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India, (1992) 1 SCC 119; review in (1993) 4 SCC 288; further directions in (2002) 4 SCC 247:** These cases dealt with service conditions, pay scales, retirement age, infrastructure and independence of subordinate judiciary. The Supreme Court recognised that judicial independence is not confined to higher judiciary; it must extend to the district judiciary also. ## Relationship between High Courts and Subordinate Courts ➤ **Judicial relationship:** The High Court hears appeals, revisions, references and petitions arising from subordinate courts. It corrects legal errors, ensures fair trial and maintains uniformity of law within the State. ➤ **Supervisory relationship:** Under Article 227, the High Court supervises subordinate courts and tribunals to ensure they act within jurisdiction. This power is corrective, not appellate. ➤ **Administrative relationship:** Under Article 235, the High Court controls postings, promotions, leave and discipline of judicial officers. This is necessary to preserve independence and integrity. ➤ **Rule-making relationship:** High Courts frame rules for subordinate courts regarding practice, procedure, records, inspection, administrative functioning and case management, subject to constitutional and statutory limits. ## Important Powers of High Courts PowerConstitutional SourceSimple Meaning**Court of record**Article 215Records have high authority; contempt power exists**Writ jurisdiction**Article 226Protection of fundamental and legal rights**Superintendence**Article 227Supervisory control over courts and tribunals**Appointment consultation**Articles 217, 233, 234Role in judicial appointments**Control over subordinate judiciary**Article 235Posting, promotion, leave and discipline**Appellate and revisional powers**Statutes such as CPC, CrPC/BNSS and special lawsCorrection of subordinate court decisions## High Court Jurisdiction: Original, Appellate and Supervisory ➤ **Original jurisdiction:** Some High Courts have original civil jurisdiction, especially chartered High Courts such as Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Delhi in specified matters. Under Article 226, every High Court has original constitutional jurisdiction to entertain writ petitions. ➤ **Appellate jurisdiction:** High Courts hear civil and criminal appeals from subordinate courts. In criminal matters, appeals may arise from convictions, acquittals or sentences. In civil matters, appeals may arise from decrees and orders depending on statutory provisions. ➤ **Revisional jurisdiction:** High Courts may exercise revisional powers under procedural laws where subordinate courts commit jurisdictional error or material irregularity. Revision is narrower than appeal. ➤ **Supervisory jurisdiction:** Article 227 is constitutional superintendence. It is used where ordinary appellate or revisional remedies are inadequate but intervention is necessary to keep courts within legal limits. ## Memory Table: Articles 214 to 237 ArticleKeywordCore Idea**214**High Court for StateEach State shall have a High Court**215**Court of recordContempt power and permanent records**216**CompositionChief Justice and other judges**217**AppointmentPresident appoints High Court judges**222**TransferPresident may transfer High Court judge after CJI consultation**224**Additional judgesTemporary judges for arrears/workload**226**WritsWrits for fundamental rights and other purposes**227**SuperintendenceSupervision over courts and tribunals**231**Common High CourtParliament may create common High Court**233**District JudgesAppointment by Governor in consultation with High Court**234**Other judicial officersRecruitment with High Court and PSC consultation**235**ControlHigh Court controls subordinate judiciary**236**DefinitionsDefines District Judge and judicial service**237**MagistratesApplication of provisions to certain magistrates## Conceptual Difference: Article 227 and Article 235 BasisArticle 227Article 235**Nature**Supervisory jurisdictionAdministrative and disciplinary control**Applies to**Courts and tribunalsDistrict Courts and subordinate courts**Purpose**Keep courts/tribunals within jurisdictionMaintain independent judicial service**Type of power**Judicial and administrative superintendenceService control over judicial officers**Example**Correcting jurisdictional error of tribunalPosting, promotion or disciplinary inquiry of judge➤ **Simple understanding:** Article 227 controls the functioning of courts as adjudicatory bodies. Article 235 controls judicial officers as members of the judicial service. ## Independence of Subordinate Judiciary ➤ **Article 50 connection:** Article 50, a Directive Principle, directs the State to separate the judiciary from the executive in the public services of the State. Articles 233 to 235 give practical constitutional effect to this idea by ensuring that the executive does not dominate the subordinate judiciary. ➤ **Why independence is essential:** A trial judge decides questions of liberty, property, family rights, criminal guilt and civil liability. If such a judge fears transfer, punishment or denial of promotion by the executive, impartial justice becomes impossible. ➤ **High Court as protector:** The High Court acts as guardian of subordinate judiciary by controlling appointments, postings, promotions and discipline. This protects judges from external pressure and also maintains accountability through internal judicial supervision. ## Limitations on High Court Powers ➤ **Self-restraint in writs:** Although Article 226 is wide, High Courts generally avoid interference where disputed facts require trial, where an effective alternative remedy exists, where the petition is delayed, or where the petitioner lacks clean hands. These are rules of discretion, not absolute bars. ➤ **No appellate conversion under Article 227:** The High Court cannot treat Article 227 as a second appeal. It does not re-appreciate evidence merely because another view is possible. It interferes only where there is jurisdictional error, perversity, violation of natural justice or grave injustice. ➤ **Contempt power restraint:** Contempt jurisdiction must be used sparingly. Fair criticism of judgments is not contempt. The power is meant to protect administration of justice, not to silence legitimate legal criticism. ➤ **Article 235 and service rules:** The High Court’s control is broad but operates within constitutional provisions and valid service rules. Formal orders of appointment, dismissal or removal may require action by the Governor, but the High Court’s constitutional role cannot be bypassed. ## Illustrations for Easy Understanding ➤ **Illegal detention:** If a person is arrested without legal authority and family members do not know where he is kept, a habeas corpus petition may be filed in the High Court under Article 226. ➤ **Public duty refusal:** If a statutory authority refuses to issue a licence despite fulfilment of all legal conditions, the High Court may issue mandamus directing lawful consideration or performance of duty. ➤ **Tribunal exceeds jurisdiction:** If a tribunal decides a matter that the statute does not permit it to decide, the High Court may interfere under Articles 226/227. ➤ **Subordinate judge disciplinary issue:** If allegations of misconduct arise against a Civil Judge, disciplinary control constitutionally belongs to the High Court under Article 235, not to the executive department. ➤ **Usurpation of public office:** If a person is appointed to a statutory public office without possessing mandatory qualifications, a quo warranto writ may be issued. ## Concluding Summary ➤ **High Courts as constitutional guardians:** High Courts are not merely appellate courts. They are constitutional courts with power to protect rights, supervise courts and tribunals, punish contempt and preserve judicial independence at the State level. ➤ **Appointment and transfer:** High Court judges are appointed by the President under Article 217 and may be transferred under Article 222. Judicial interpretation through the Second Judges Case, Third Judges Case and NJAC Case has made judicial primacy central to the process. ➤ **Writ jurisdiction:** Article 226 is one of the broadest remedies in the Constitution. It allows High Courts to enforce fundamental rights as well as other legal rights. Its flexibility makes it one of the most important tools of constitutional governance. ➤ **Superintendence and control:** Article 227 gives High Courts supervisory power over courts and tribunals, while Article 235 gives control over subordinate judiciary. Together, these provisions ensure that justice delivery below the High Court remains lawful, disciplined and independent. ➤ **Subordinate judiciary:** Articles 233 to 237 protect the independence of District Judges and judicial officers. Since subordinate courts are the first point of contact for most citizens, their independence is as important as that of the Supreme Court and High Courts. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [State Legislature under Indian Constitution: Composition, Legislative Assembly, Legislative Council, Qualifications, Disqualifications, Procedure, Money Bills and Powers](https://lawfoyer.in/state-legislature-under-indian-constitution/) **Published:** June 6, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun6202607_29_50P-725x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning and Constitutional Scheme of State Legislature • **Basic meaning:** The **State Legislature** is the law-making organ of a State. It debates public issues, makes laws for the State, controls the State Government, authorises public expenditure, and represents the people at the State level. • **Constitutional foundation:** The provisions relating to the State Legislature are mainly contained in **Part VI, Chapter III of the Constitution of India, Articles 168 to 212**. Article 168 provides that every State shall have a Legislature consisting of the **Governor** and one or two Houses. Where there are two Houses, they are called the **Legislative Assembly** and the **Legislative Council**; where there is only one House, it is called the **Legislative Assembly**. • **Governor as part of State Legislature:** The Governor is not a member of the House, but is constitutionally part of the State Legislature. This is because the Governor summons and prorogues the House, may dissolve the Legislative Assembly, addresses the Legislature, and gives assent to Bills. • **Unicameral and bicameral Legislature:** A State having only a Legislative Assembly has a **unicameral Legislature**. A State having both Legislative Assembly and Legislative Council has a **bicameral Legislature**. The Legislative Assembly is the directly elected and politically stronger House. The Legislative Council is the upper, revising and partly indirectly elected House. ## Composition of State Legislature under Article 168 • **Article 168 rule:** The Legislature of every State consists of the Governor and either one House or two Houses. In a bicameral State, the two Houses are the Legislative Assembly and Legislative Council. In a unicameral State, there is only the Legislative Assembly. • **Nature of bicameralism:** Bicameralism means law-making through two Houses. It allows a second chamber to review, revise and discuss Bills with more depth. However, at the State level, the Legislative Council is not equal to the Legislative Assembly. • **Reason for Assembly superiority:** The Legislative Assembly is directly elected by the people. Therefore, it carries the primary democratic mandate. The Council of Ministers is collectively responsible only to the Legislative Assembly and not to the Legislative Council. • **Practical importance:** The State Legislature is the central institution through which State policies are converted into binding law. It performs legislative, financial, deliberative, electoral and controlling functions. ## Creation and Abolition of Legislative Council under Article 169 • **Special procedure:** Article 169 provides that Parliament may create a Legislative Council in a State where there is none, or abolish an existing Legislative Council, if the Legislative Assembly of that State first passes a special resolution. • **Special majority in Assembly:** The resolution must be passed by a **majority of the total membership of the Legislative Assembly** and by a **majority of not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting**. • **Parliament’s final role:** After the State Assembly passes the required resolution, Parliament may enact a law for creation or abolition of the Legislative Council. The State Assembly initiates the process, but Parliament gives it legal effect. • **Not Article 368 amendment:** A law made by Parliament under Article 169 may contain necessary constitutional amendments, but such a law is not treated as a constitutional amendment under Article 368. This makes Article 169 a special and flexible provision. • **Purpose of Article 169:** The provision recognises that the need for a Legislative Council may vary from State to State. Some States may prefer a second revising chamber, while others may prefer a simpler unicameral structure. ## Legislative Assembly: Composition, Election and Duration • **Direct election:** Article 170 provides that the Legislative Assembly of a State consists of members chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies in the State. This makes it the main representative House of the people. • **Number of members:** Generally, the Legislative Assembly shall have not more than **500** and not less than **60** members. However, the Constitution contains special provisions for some smaller States. • **Territorial constituencies:** Each State is divided into territorial constituencies. Each constituency elects one representative to the Legislative Assembly. • **Population principle:** The Constitution seeks broad equality of representation by requiring, as far as practicable, that the ratio between the population of each constituency and the number of seats allotted should be similar throughout the State. • **Duration under Article 172:** The normal term of a Legislative Assembly is **five years** from the date appointed for its first meeting, unless it is dissolved earlier. During a national emergency, Parliament may extend this period by law for one year at a time, but the extension cannot continue beyond six months after the emergency has ceased. • **Dissolution:** Dissolution ends the life of the Legislative Assembly. After dissolution, fresh elections are required. The Legislative Council, if present, is not dissolved because it is a permanent body. • **Political importance:** The Legislative Assembly determines who forms the State Government. The Chief Minister and Council of Ministers must enjoy the confidence of the Legislative Assembly. ## Legislative Council: Composition, Election and Duration • **Upper House of State Legislature:** The Legislative Council is the upper House in a bicameral State Legislature. It is mainly a revising chamber. Its function is to reconsider, discuss and suggest improvements in proposed laws. • **Strength under Article 171:** Article 171 provides that the total number of members in the Legislative Council shall not exceed **one-third of the total number of members of the Legislative Assembly** of that State, and in no case shall it be less than **40**. • **Mixed composition:** The Legislative Council is composed through a mixed system of election and nomination. Its members are not all directly elected by the people. • **Sources of membership:** Broadly, members of the Legislative Council are elected by local authorities, graduates, teachers, members of the Legislative Assembly, and some members are nominated by the Governor from persons having special knowledge or practical experience in fields such as literature, science, art, cooperative movement and social service. • **Permanent House:** The Legislative Council is a continuing body and is not subject to dissolution. One-third of its members retire every two years. • **Term of members:** A member of the Legislative Council generally has a term of six years, with one-third retiring every second year. • **Limited authority:** The Legislative Council cannot remove the Council of Ministers, cannot finally reject a Money Bill, and cannot permanently block an ordinary Bill. Therefore, it is weaker than the Legislative Assembly. ## Difference between Legislative Assembly and Legislative Council BasisLegislative AssemblyLegislative Council**Nature**Lower HouseUpper House**Election**Directly elected by peopleMostly indirectly elected; partly nominated**Democratic mandate**StrongerWeaker**Duration**Five years unless dissolved earlierPermanent body**Retirement**Entire House may dissolveOne-third members retire every two years**Minimum age**25 years30 years**Money Bill**Can introduce and finally passCannot introduce; can only recommend**Control over Ministry**Ministry responsible to AssemblyNo power to remove Ministry**Ordinary Bill**Has final superiorityCan delay and suggest changes**Constitutional role**Main law-making and financial HouseRevising and deliberative House## Qualifications for Membership of State Legislature • **Article 173 rule:** Article 173 lays down the qualifications for membership of the State Legislature. A person must be a citizen of India, must make and subscribe the constitutional oath or affirmation, must satisfy the prescribed age requirement, and must possess such other qualifications as Parliament may prescribe by law. • **Age for Legislative Assembly:** A person must be at least **25 years old** to become a member of the Legislative Assembly. • **Age for Legislative Council:** A person must be at least **30 years old** to become a member of the Legislative Council. • **Citizenship requirement:** Only a citizen of India can become a member of the State Legislature. A person who voluntarily acquires foreign citizenship becomes disqualified. • **Oath under Article 188:** Before taking a seat in the House, every member must make and subscribe an oath or affirmation according to the form given in the Third Schedule. • **Statutory qualifications:** Parliament may prescribe additional qualifications through law. The Representation of the People Act, 1951 is important for election-related qualifications and disqualifications. ## Disqualifications for Membership of State Legislature • **Article 191 grounds:** Article 191 provides that a person is disqualified from being chosen as, and from being, a member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council if he holds an office of profit under the Government of India or a State Government, is of unsound mind and so declared by a competent court, is an undischarged insolvent, is not a citizen of India, has voluntarily acquired foreign citizenship, or is disqualified under any law made by Parliament. • **Office of profit:** The object of the office of profit rule is to ensure legislative independence. A legislator should not be financially dependent on the executive in a manner that may affect independent judgment. • **Unsound mind:** A person is disqualified only when declared to be of unsound mind by a competent court. Mere allegation or medical suspicion is not enough. • **Undischarged insolvent:** Insolvency shows inability to pay debts. An undischarged insolvent is treated as disqualified because financial dependence may affect public responsibility. • **Foreign citizenship:** A person who is not a citizen of India or who voluntarily acquires citizenship of another country cannot be a member of the State Legislature. • **Disqualification by parliamentary law:** Parliament may create disqualifications through law, especially through election laws. Conviction for certain offences may disqualify a person under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. • **Decision under Article 192:** If a question arises whether a sitting member has become disqualified, the decision is made by the Governor. However, the Governor must obtain the opinion of the Election Commission and act according to that opinion. ## Anti-Defection Disqualification under the Tenth Schedule • **Meaning of defection:** Defection means changing political loyalty after being elected, especially by leaving the party on whose ticket the member was elected or by voting against party directions in the House. • **Tenth Schedule:** The Tenth Schedule was inserted by the Constitution Fifty-Second Amendment Act, 1985 to deal with political defections. It applies to Parliament and State Legislatures. • **Main grounds:** A member may be disqualified if he voluntarily gives up membership of the political party, votes or abstains from voting contrary to the party whip without permission, or commits other acts covered by the Tenth Schedule. • **Decision by Speaker or Chairman:** In the State Legislature, questions of disqualification under the Tenth Schedule are decided by the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly or the Chairman of the Legislative Council, as the case may be. • **Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651:** In this landmark case, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Tenth Schedule. The issue was whether the anti-defection law and the Speaker’s power to decide disqualification violated constitutional principles. The Court held that the anti-defection law was intended to curb political defections and maintain democratic stability. It also held that the Speaker’s decision is subject to judicial review, although courts normally do not interfere before the Speaker decides. • **Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix v. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, (2016) 8 SCC 1:** The case arose from a political crisis in Arunachal Pradesh. One important issue was whether the Governor could advance the Assembly session and fix legislative agenda without ministerial advice, and whether a Speaker facing a removal notice could decide disqualification petitions. The Supreme Court held that the Governor ordinarily acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers in matters of summoning, proroguing and dissolving the Assembly, and that a Speaker facing a notice of removal should not decide disqualification petitions during that period. ## Presiding Officers of State Legislature • **Speaker and Deputy Speaker:** Articles 178 to 181 deal with the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Legislative Assembly. The Assembly chooses both from among its members. • **Role of Speaker:** The Speaker maintains order, conducts proceedings, interprets rules of procedure, allows debates, decides points of order, and certifies whether a Bill is a Money Bill. • **Chairman and Deputy Chairman:** Articles 182 to 185 deal with the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Legislative Council. They are chosen by the Council from among its members. • **Casting vote:** Under Article 189, decisions in the House are generally made by majority of members present and voting. The presiding officer does not vote in the first instance but may cast a deciding vote in case of equality. • **Removal:** The Speaker, Deputy Speaker, Chairman or Deputy Chairman may be removed by a resolution of the concerned House, subject to the constitutional procedure. ## Sessions, Summoning, Prorogation and Dissolution • **Summoning under Article 174:** The Governor summons the House or Houses of the State Legislature. The Constitution requires that six months shall not intervene between the last sitting of one session and the first sitting of the next session. • **Prorogation:** Prorogation ends a session of the Legislature. It does not dissolve the Legislative Assembly. • **Dissolution:** Dissolution applies only to the Legislative Assembly. It ends the life of the Assembly and fresh elections must be held. • **Governor’s role limited by parliamentary system:** Though Article 174 uses the expression that the Governor summons, prorogues and dissolves, the power is generally exercised on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The Nabam Rebia judgment confirmed that the Governor cannot ordinarily act independently in legislative scheduling when the Constitution does not expressly give discretion. ## Legislative Procedure for Ordinary Bills • **Introduction of ordinary Bill:** An ordinary Bill may be introduced in the Legislative Assembly. In a bicameral State, it may generally be introduced in either House, except where the Constitution provides otherwise. • **Stages of a Bill:** A Bill usually passes through introduction, general discussion, detailed consideration, clause-by-clause voting, and final passing. The exact details are regulated by the rules of procedure of the House. • **Ordinary Bill in bicameral State:** Article 197 deals with restriction on the powers of the Legislative Council regarding ordinary Bills. If the Assembly passes a Bill and the Council rejects it, delays it, or passes it with amendments not accepted by the Assembly, the Assembly may pass the Bill again. • **No joint sitting:** There is no joint sitting mechanism in the State Legislature to resolve disagreement between the Legislative Assembly and Legislative Council. Instead, the Constitution gives the Assembly final superiority. • **Council’s delaying power:** The Legislative Council can delay an ordinary Bill, but it cannot permanently block it. This maintains democratic priority of the directly elected Assembly. • **Assent of Governor:** After a Bill is passed by the House or Houses, it is presented to the Governor under Article 200. The Governor may give assent, withhold assent, return a non-Money Bill for reconsideration, or reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President. • **President’s consideration:** Under Article 201, when a Bill is reserved for the President, the President may assent or withhold assent. In case of a non-Money Bill, the President may direct the Governor to return the Bill to the Legislature for reconsideration. ## Money Bills in State Legislature • **Definition under Article 199:** A Bill is a Money Bill if it contains only provisions dealing with matters such as taxation, borrowing of money by the State, custody of the Consolidated Fund or Contingency Fund of the State, appropriation of money from the Consolidated Fund, declaration of charged expenditure, receipt or custody of public money, or matters incidental to these subjects. • **Only specified matters:** A Bill is not a Money Bill merely because it involves expenditure or affects revenue in some indirect way. It must deal only with the matters listed in Article 199. • **Introduction only in Legislative Assembly:** Article 198 provides that a Money Bill shall not be introduced in the Legislative Council. It can be introduced only in the Legislative Assembly. • **Speaker’s certificate:** The decision of the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly that a Bill is a Money Bill is constitutionally important. When a Money Bill is transmitted to the Council and presented to the Governor, it carries the Speaker’s certificate. • **Council’s limited role:** After the Legislative Assembly passes a Money Bill, it is transmitted to the Legislative Council for recommendations. The Council must return it within **14 days**. • **Assembly’s final authority:** The Legislative Assembly may accept or reject all or any recommendations of the Legislative Council. If the Council does not return the Bill within 14 days, the Bill is deemed to have been passed by both Houses in the form passed by the Assembly. • **Reason for special rule:** Money Bills concern taxation and public expenditure. Since the Legislative Assembly is directly elected by the people, financial control is placed primarily in its hands. ## Financial Procedure and Budgetary Powers • **Annual Financial Statement:** Article 202 requires the Governor to cause the Annual Financial Statement, commonly known as the State Budget, to be laid before the House or Houses of the State Legislature. • **Demand for grants:** Article 203 provides that demands for grants are submitted to the Legislative Assembly. The Legislative Council does not vote on demands for grants. • **Appropriation Bill:** Article 204 provides for Appropriation Bills. Money cannot be withdrawn from the Consolidated Fund of the State except under appropriation made by law. • **Supplementary grants:** Article 205 allows supplementary, additional or excess grants where the amount authorised is insufficient or where expenditure was not contemplated earlier. • **Vote on account and vote of credit:** Article 206 allows temporary financial authorisation when the full budget process cannot be completed immediately or when urgent expenditure is needed. • **Financial Bills:** Article 207 contains special provisions regarding Financial Bills. Certain financial proposals require the Governor’s recommendation. ## Powers of State Legislature ### Legislative Powers • **State List:** The State Legislature has power to make laws on subjects in the State List, such as police, public order, public health, agriculture, local government, land and markets, subject to constitutional limitations. • **Concurrent List:** The State Legislature can also make laws on Concurrent List subjects. However, in case of conflict between a State law and a Parliamentary law on a Concurrent List subject, Article 254 generally gives supremacy to the Union law, unless the State law has received Presidential assent in the manner constitutionally required. • **Territorial limitation:** A State law generally operates within the territory of that State. The State Legislature cannot ordinarily make laws with extra-territorial operation. ### Financial Powers • **Control over State finances:** The State Legislature controls taxation, expenditure, grants and appropriation. No tax can be imposed and no money can be withdrawn from the Consolidated Fund of the State except according to law. • **Assembly’s financial dominance:** The Legislative Assembly is supreme in financial matters. The Legislative Council has no effective power to reject Money Bills or demands for grants. ### Executive Control Powers • **Collective responsibility:** The Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly. This means the Ministry must retain the confidence of the Assembly. • **No-confidence motion:** The Legislative Assembly can remove the government by passing a no-confidence motion. The Legislative Council cannot remove the government. • **Questions and debates:** Members control the executive through questions, discussions, motions, resolutions, calling attention, committee reports and debates on government policies. ### Electoral Powers • **Election of President:** Elected members of State Legislative Assemblies form part of the electoral college for the election of the President of India. • **Election of Rajya Sabha members:** Elected members of the Legislative Assembly elect representatives of the State to the Rajya Sabha. • **Election to Legislative Council:** In States having a Legislative Council, members of the Legislative Assembly elect a portion of the Council’s members. ### Constituent Powers • **Ratification of constitutional amendments:** Some constitutional amendments affecting federal provisions require ratification by at least one-half of the State Legislatures under Article 368. This gives States a role in preserving the federal structure. • **No independent amendment power:** A State Legislature cannot amend the Constitution independently. It can only ratify certain amendments when required. ### Privileges and Immunities • **Article 194 privileges:** Members of the State Legislature enjoy freedom of speech in the Legislature, subject to the Constitution and rules of procedure. They are not liable in court for anything said or any vote given in the Legislature or its committees. • **Purpose of privileges:** Legislative privileges protect the independence, dignity and effective functioning of the Legislature. They are not personal benefits for individual members. • **Raja Ram Pal v. Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha, (2007) 3 SCC 184:** Though the case concerned Parliament, its principles are relevant because Article 105 and Article 194 are similar. The Supreme Court held that legislative privileges are subject to constitutional limitations and judicial review. Courts may examine illegality or unconstitutionality, though they do not interfere with mere procedural irregularities. ## Limitations on Powers of State Legislature • **Constitutional supremacy:** The State Legislature is subject to the Constitution. A State law violating fundamental rights, legislative competence or constitutional limitations may be struck down by courts. • **Federal distribution of powers:** The State Legislature cannot legislate beyond its constitutional field. Legislative competence is determined mainly by the Seventh Schedule. • **Union power in special situations:** Parliament may legislate on State List subjects in special circumstances, such as national interest under Article 249, national emergency under Article 250, State consent under Article 252, and international obligations under Article 253. • **Governor and President’s assent:** Certain Bills may require the Governor’s recommendation, reservation for Presidential consideration, or Presidential assent. • **Judicial review:** Article 212 protects legislative proceedings from being questioned in court on the ground of mere procedural irregularity. However, unconstitutional or illegal acts may still be judicially reviewed. ## Important Articles at a Glance ArticleSubject**Article 168**Constitution of State Legislature**Article 169**Abolition or creation of Legislative Council**Article 170**Composition of Legislative Assembly**Article 171**Composition of Legislative Council**Article 172**Duration of State Legislature**Article 173**Qualification for membership**Article 174**Sessions, prorogation and dissolution**Article 178**Speaker and Deputy Speaker**Article 182**Chairman and Deputy Chairman**Article 191**Disqualifications**Article 194**Powers, privileges and immunities**Article 197**Restriction on Council’s power over ordinary Bills**Article 198**Special procedure for Money Bills**Article 199**Definition of Money Bill**Article 200**Assent to Bills**Article 202**Annual Financial Statement**Article 212**Courts not to question proceedings for procedural irregularity## Memory Aid for Quick Understanding KeywordMeaning**168 = Structure**Governor plus one or two Houses**169 = Council Change**Creation or abolition of Legislative Council**170 = Assembly**Directly elected House**171 = Council**Mixed elected and nominated House**172 = Duration**Assembly five years; Council permanent**173 = Qualification**Citizenship, oath, age and legal qualifications**191 = Disqualification**Office of profit, unsound mind, insolvency, foreign citizenship, law and defection**198–199 = Money Bill**Assembly dominance in financial legislation**200 = Governor’s assent**Assent, return, withholding or reservation**212 = Autonomy**Courts avoid mere procedural irregularities## Final Summary • **Central concept:** The State Legislature is the constitutional law-making body of a State. It represents the people, makes laws, controls the executive and authorises expenditure. • **Composition:** Under Article 168, the State Legislature consists of the Governor and one or two Houses. The Legislative Assembly exists in every State. The Legislative Council exists only in States where it has been constitutionally created. • **Assembly dominance:** The Legislative Assembly is the more powerful House because it is directly elected, controls the Council of Ministers, votes on grants and has final authority in Money Bills. • **Council’s function:** The Legislative Council is a revising chamber. It improves deliberation but cannot permanently defeat the will of the Assembly. • **Money Bills:** A Money Bill can be introduced only in the Legislative Assembly. The Legislative Council can only make recommendations within 14 days. • **Constitutional balance:** The State Legislature has wide powers, but those powers are limited by the Constitution, federal distribution of legislative subjects, judicial review, and special roles of the Governor and President in certain situations. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Chief Minister and State Council of Ministers under Indian Constitution: Appointment, Powers, Collective Responsibility, Governor’s Role and State Executive Functioning](https://lawfoyer.in/chief-minister-and-state-council-of-ministers/) **Published:** June 6, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun6202607_05_41P-1-725x1024.jpeg) ## Introduction: Chief Minister and State Council of Ministers as the Real State Executive ➤ **Core idea:** In the constitutional scheme of India, the **Governor is the nominal or constitutional head of the State**, but the **Chief Minister and the State Council of Ministers are the real executive authority**. This follows from the parliamentary form of government adopted both at the Union and State levels. The State executive is formally vested in the Governor under **Article 154**, but in ordinary administration the Governor acts on the **aid and advice of the Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister** under **Article 163**. ➤ **Parliamentary principle:** The State Council of Ministers is responsible to the elected Legislative Assembly. Therefore, real political power belongs to those who enjoy the confidence of the majority in the Assembly. The Chief Minister is the head of this political executive and acts as the connecting link between the Governor, the Council of Ministers, the Legislature, and the State administration. ➤ **Relevant constitutional provisions:** The main provisions are **Article 163** dealing with the Council of Ministers to aid and advise the Governor, **Article 164** dealing with appointment, tenure, collective responsibility, qualifications and size of the Council, **Article 166** dealing with conduct of State Government business, and **Article 167** dealing with duties of the Chief Minister towards the Governor. ## Constitutional Position of the Governor, Chief Minister and Council of Ministers ➤ **Nominal and real executive:** The Governor represents the formal executive authority of the State, while the Chief Minister and Council of Ministers represent the real executive. The Governor’s name is used for official executive action, but decisions are generally taken by the elected Council of Ministers. ➤ **Article 154 – Executive power of State:** The executive power of the State is vested in the Governor and is exercised either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with the Constitution. However, this does not mean that the Governor personally runs the State. The power is exercised according to the parliamentary system, mainly through ministerial advice. ➤ **Article 162 – Extent of executive power:** The executive power of the State extends to matters on which the State Legislature can make laws. This means that, broadly, the State executive can act in matters falling under the State List and, subject to constitutional limits, the Concurrent List. ➤ **Article 163 – Aid and advice:** There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head to aid and advise the Governor, except where the Governor is required by or under the Constitution to act in his discretion. The Constitution also says that if any question arises whether a matter is one where the Governor is required to act in his discretion, the Governor’s decision is final, but this does not make every gubernatorial action immune from judicial review. ➤ **Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831:** In this Constitution Bench decision, probationary judicial officers challenged termination orders issued in the name of the Governor/President. The legal issue was whether the Governor and President act personally or on ministerial advice. The Supreme Court held that the President and Governor are constitutional heads and ordinarily act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The ratio is that India has a parliamentary system where real executive power is exercised by the elected government, not personally by the constitutional head. ## Appointment of Chief Minister ➤ **Article 164(1) – Appointment by Governor:** The Chief Minister is appointed by the Governor. Other Ministers are appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister. This means the Governor formally appoints the Chief Minister, but other Ministers enter the Council only because the Chief Minister recommends them. ➤ **Normal situation:** When one party or pre-poll alliance clearly secures majority in the Legislative Assembly, the Governor appoints the leader of that majority as Chief Minister. This is a constitutional convention flowing from parliamentary democracy. ➤ **Hung Assembly situation:** If no party has a clear majority, the Governor may have limited discretion to invite a person who appears most likely to command majority support in the Assembly. However, this discretion is not absolute, personal, political, or arbitrary. It must be guided by objective material and the requirement that the person invited must prove majority on the floor of the House. ➤ **Floor test principle:** The majority of a Chief Minister or Ministry must normally be tested on the floor of the Legislative Assembly, not by the subjective opinion of the Governor. This protects democratic legitimacy and prevents misuse of constitutional office. ➤ **S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1:** In this landmark case concerning dismissal of State governments and imposition of President’s Rule under Article 356, the Supreme Court held that majority should ordinarily be tested on the floor of the House. The ratio is that the Governor’s report or subjective assessment cannot replace a legislative floor test when the question is whether the Ministry enjoys majority. This case strengthened federalism, democracy and judicial review over misuse of Article 356. ➤ **B.R. Kapur v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2001) 7 SCC 231:** In this case, a person who had been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for more than two years was appointed Chief Minister though she was disqualified from being a legislator. The issue was whether such a disqualified person could be appointed Chief Minister under Article 164. The Supreme Court held that a person suffering from a clear constitutional or statutory disqualification cannot be appointed Chief Minister merely because the majority party chooses that person as leader. The ratio is that majority will cannot override constitutional qualifications and disqualifications. ## Appointment of State Council of Ministers ➤ **Chief Minister’s advice:** After appointment of the Chief Minister, the Governor appoints other Ministers on the advice of the Chief Minister. The Governor cannot ordinarily choose Ministers independently because the Council must be politically led by the Chief Minister. ➤ **Categories of Ministers:** State Ministers may generally be classified as Cabinet Ministers, Ministers of State, and Deputy Ministers depending upon political practice and allocation of work. The Constitution does not elaborate these categories in detail, but the Cabinet is the inner decision-making body of the Council. ➤ **Oath of office and secrecy:** Every Minister takes oath before the Governor. The oath signifies constitutional loyalty, faithful discharge of duties, and secrecy regarding official matters. The oath is important because Ministers handle sensitive information relating to administration, law and policy. ➤ **Six-month rule under Article 164(4):** A person who is not a member of the State Legislature may be appointed as Minister, but must become a member of the Legislature within six consecutive months. If not, the person ceases to be a Minister. This rule permits temporary appointment of non-legislators, but does not permit appointment of a person who is already disqualified from membership. ➤ **Minister for Tribal Welfare:** Article 164 contains a special proviso that in **Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh and Odisha**, there shall be a Minister in charge of tribal welfare, who may also be in charge of welfare of Scheduled Castes, backward classes or any other work. ## Size of State Council of Ministers ➤ **Article 164(1A) – 15% ceiling:** The total number of Ministers, including the Chief Minister, in the Council of Ministers in a State shall not exceed **15% of the total number of members of the Legislative Assembly**. However, the number of Ministers, including the Chief Minister, shall not be less than **12**. This provision was introduced by the **91st Constitutional Amendment, 2003** to control oversized ministries and reduce political defections through ministerial inducements. ➤ **Purpose of the ceiling:** Before this limitation, very large Councils of Ministers were sometimes created to satisfy political groups. The constitutional ceiling promotes clean governance, fiscal discipline and cabinet responsibility. ➤ **Practical importance:** If a State Assembly has 200 members, the maximum number of Ministers including the Chief Minister can be 30. If the Assembly is small, the Council must still have at least 12 Ministers due to the minimum rule. ## Tenure of Chief Minister and Ministers ➤ **Pleasure of Governor:** Article 164 says Ministers hold office during the pleasure of the Governor. But in a parliamentary system, this does not mean personal pleasure of the Governor. It practically means that Ministers continue so long as they enjoy the confidence of the Legislative Assembly and the Chief Minister wants them in the Council. ➤ **Chief Minister’s central role:** A Minister may be removed if the Chief Minister advises the Governor to drop that Minister. If the Chief Minister resigns, the entire Council of Ministers goes out because the Council is headed by the Chief Minister. ➤ **Loss of majority:** When the Chief Minister loses majority in the Legislative Assembly, the proper constitutional course is resignation or proving majority through a floor test. The Governor should not dismiss a Ministry merely on suspicion if a floor test is possible. ## Collective Responsibility of State Council of Ministers ➤ **Article 164(2) – Collective responsibility:** The Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly of the State. This is the foundation of parliamentary government at the State level. ➤ **Meaning of collective responsibility:** The Council functions as one unit before the Legislative Assembly. If the Assembly passes a no-confidence motion or rejects a matter treated as a question of confidence, the entire Council must resign, not merely one Minister. ➤ **Unity of policy:** Ministers may disagree inside Cabinet meetings, but once a decision is taken, all Ministers must publicly support it. If a Minister cannot support the decision, the proper course is resignation. ➤ **Legislative accountability:** The Council remains answerable to the Legislative Assembly through questions, debates, motions, budgetary control, committees and no-confidence motions. This ensures that executive power remains accountable to elected representatives. ➤ **Individual responsibility:** Though Article 164(2) mentions collective responsibility, Ministers also have individual responsibility in practice. A Minister is responsible for the functioning of the department allotted to him. The Chief Minister may ask a Minister to resign for mismanagement, misconduct or political reasons. ➤ **Manoj Narula v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 1:** This case concerned whether persons with criminal antecedents should be appointed as Ministers. The Supreme Court did not create an additional disqualification beyond the Constitution but emphasised constitutional morality, good governance and the Prime Minister/Chief Minister’s constitutional trust while choosing Ministers. The ratio is that appointment of Ministers is a matter of constitutional responsibility and public trust, even where the Court cannot add new disqualifications. ## Powers and Functions of the Chief Minister ➤ **Head of Council of Ministers:** The Chief Minister forms, leads and coordinates the Council of Ministers. The Chief Minister recommends appointment of Ministers, allocation of portfolios, reshuffling of departments and removal of Ministers. ➤ **Policy leadership:** The Chief Minister determines the broad policy direction of the State Government. Major decisions on law and order, welfare, finance, development, administration, Centre-State relations and legislative agenda are shaped under the Chief Minister’s leadership. ➤ **Link with Governor:** The Chief Minister is the main channel of communication between the Governor and the Council of Ministers. Under Article 167, the Chief Minister must communicate decisions of the Council to the Governor and furnish information relating to State administration and legislative proposals. ➤ **Legislative leadership:** The Chief Minister is usually the leader of the majority party or coalition in the Legislative Assembly. The legislative programme of the State Government, including Bills, budgetary proposals and policy statements, is carried through the House under the Chief Minister’s leadership. ➤ **Administrative supervision:** The Chief Minister supervises the general administration of the State through Ministers, Chief Secretary, senior bureaucrats and departmental machinery. Though each Minister controls a department, overall coordination belongs to the Chief Minister. ➤ **Crisis management:** During political instability, natural disasters, communal tension, public health emergencies or law and order crises, the Chief Minister becomes the central executive authority for decision-making and coordination. ## Powers and Functions of State Council of Ministers ➤ **Executive functions:** The Council formulates and implements State policies. It supervises departments such as home, finance, education, health, agriculture, revenue, public works, local government and social welfare. ➤ **Legislative functions:** The Council decides the legislative agenda of the State. Most Bills introduced in the Legislature are government Bills. Ministers pilot Bills, answer legislative questions and defend policies. ➤ **Financial functions:** The annual budget is prepared under the authority of the Council of Ministers. No demand for grant can be made except on the recommendation of the Governor, but the real financial planning is done by the elected government. Money Bills and financial proposals are part of the Council’s core responsibility. ➤ **Rule-making and delegated legislation:** Many statutes authorize the State Government to frame rules, regulations, schemes and notifications. These powers are exercised by the executive departments under ministerial supervision. ➤ **Appointment and service matters:** The State executive makes administrative appointments and service rules, subject to constitutional provisions, statutory laws, Public Service Commission requirements and judicial review. ➤ **Ordinance-related advice:** Under Article 213, the Governor may promulgate an Ordinance when the Legislature is not in session, but ordinarily this power is exercised on ministerial advice. The Ordinance has the force of law but must be placed before the Legislature. ## Relation Between Governor and Chief Minister ➤ **Constitutional cooperation:** The relationship between the Governor and Chief Minister should be based on constitutional morality, not political rivalry. The Governor has the right to be informed, to advise and to warn, but not to run the elected government in ordinary matters. ➤ **Article 167 duties:** The Chief Minister must: communicate to the Governor all decisions of the Council relating to administration and legislative proposals; furnish information as the Governor calls for; and submit for Council consideration any matter decided by a Minister but not considered by the Council, if the Governor so requires. ➤ **Governor’s limited discretion:** The Governor may have discretion in exceptional situations such as appointment of Chief Minister in a hung Assembly, requiring a floor test where majority is doubtful, reserving certain Bills for President’s consideration, or sending report under Article 356. But discretion must be constitutional, not partisan. ➤ **Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix v. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, (2016) 8 SCC 1:** This case arose from a political crisis in Arunachal Pradesh where the Governor advanced the Assembly session and fixed the agenda concerning removal of the Speaker. The issue was the scope of the Governor’s discretion under Article 163 and powers relating to the Assembly. The Supreme Court held that the Governor cannot act as an independent political authority and must normally act on aid and advice except in constitutionally specified situations. The ratio is that gubernatorial discretion is limited and cannot be used to disturb the democratic functioning of the elected government. ➤ **Shivraj Singh Chouhan v. Speaker, Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly, (2020):** This case arose during the Madhya Pradesh political crisis when resignations of MLAs created doubt about the majority of the incumbent government. The issue was whether the Governor could call for a floor test. The Supreme Court held that the Governor may call for a floor test when there is objective material suggesting loss of majority, and such action is subject to judicial review. The ratio is that floor test is the safest constitutional method to determine majority, but the Governor’s action must be based on relevant material. ## Conduct of State Government Business ➤ **Article 166 – Executive action:** All executive action of the Government of a State is expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor. Orders and instruments made in the Governor’s name are authenticated according to rules made by the Governor. The Governor also makes rules for convenient transaction of State Government business and allocation of business among Ministers. ➤ **Real meaning of Article 166:** Though executive action is issued in the name of the Governor, the decision ordinarily belongs to the Minister or Council of Ministers according to the Rules of Business. This maintains formal constitutional structure while preserving elected responsibility. ➤ **Cabinet system:** The Cabinet takes major policy decisions. Departments prepare proposals, Ministers approve them, and important matters go before the Cabinet. After approval, orders are issued in the name of the Governor. ➤ **Bureaucratic execution:** Civil servants implement ministerial decisions, but they remain politically neutral and legally bound. Ministers are politically responsible; civil servants are administratively and legally responsible according to service rules. ## Governor’s Discretion and Limits in State Executive Functioning ➤ **Discretion is exceptional:** Article 163 does not create a general discretionary power. It only permits discretion where the Constitution expressly or by necessary implication requires it. Therefore, the Governor cannot replace the elected Ministry’s judgment with personal preference. ➤ **Floor test as constitutional remedy:** When majority is doubtful, the Governor should normally ask the Chief Minister to prove majority in the Assembly. The Governor should not decide majority through letters, parades, media claims or private meetings if the House can be convened. ➤ **Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India, (2006) 2 SCC 1:** This case concerned dissolution of the Bihar Legislative Assembly before it even met, based on the Governor’s report alleging attempts at majority formation through unethical means. The Supreme Court held the dissolution unconstitutional. The ratio is that the Governor’s report must be based on relevant constitutional material and cannot be used to prevent government formation merely because political alignments are disliked. ➤ **Constitutional morality:** The Governor, Chief Minister and Ministers must respect democratic mandate, federal balance, legislative majority and accountability. Constitutional offices are not meant to be instruments of party politics. ## Chief Minister’s Duties under Article 167 ➤ **Duty to communicate decisions:** The Chief Minister must communicate all decisions of the Council of Ministers relating to administration and legislative proposals to the Governor. This keeps the Governor constitutionally informed. ➤ **Duty to furnish information:** The Governor may call for information relating to State administration and legislative proposals. The Chief Minister must provide such information. ➤ **Duty to place matter before Council:** If a Minister has taken a decision but the Council has not considered it, the Governor may require the Chief Minister to place that matter before the Council. This ensures collective consideration of important matters. ➤ **Practical importance:** Article 167 does not make the Governor a superior administrator. It makes the Chief Minister constitutionally accountable to keep the Governor informed, while actual responsibility remains with the elected Council. ## State Executive Functioning: Complete Flow of Power Constitutional StageMain AuthorityPractical Meaning**Formal executive power**GovernorState action is taken in Governor’s name**Real executive power**Chief Minister and CouncilPolicies and decisions are made by elected government**Administrative execution**Departments and civil servicesOfficers implement decisions**Legislative accountability**Legislative AssemblyMinisters answer to elected House**Majority test**Floor of AssemblyGovernment survives only with Assembly confidence**Constitutional supervision**CourtsGovernor’s discretion and executive action may be judicially reviewed## Important Doctrines and Principles ➤ **Aid and advice principle:** The Governor ordinarily acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister. ➤ **Collective responsibility principle:** The Council of Ministers stands or falls together before the Legislative Assembly. ➤ **Floor test principle:** Majority must be tested in the House, not in Raj Bhavan. ➤ **Constitutional discretion principle:** Governor’s discretion is limited, exceptional and subject to constitutional norms. ➤ **Constitutional morality principle:** Public offices must be exercised in the spirit of democracy, accountability, federalism and responsible government. ➤ **Real executive principle:** The Chief Minister and Council of Ministers are the real executive because they are accountable to the elected Assembly. ## Quick Revision Table of Articles ArticleSubjectKey Point**Article 154**Executive power of StateVested in Governor**Article 162**Extent of State executive powerExtends to State legislative subjects**Article 163**Council to aid and advise GovernorGovernor ordinarily acts on ministerial advice**Article 164**MinistersAppointment, tenure, collective responsibility, size limit**Article 164(1A)**Size of CouncilMaximum 15% of Assembly strength, minimum 12**Article 164(2)**Collective responsibilityCouncil responsible to Legislative Assembly**Article 164(4)**Non-legislator MinisterMust become member within 6 months**Article 166**Conduct of businessExecutive action in Governor’s name**Article 167**CM’s dutiesCommunication and information to Governor**Article 174**Sessions, prorogation, dissolutionGovernor acts constitutionally, normally on advice**Article 200**Assent to BillsGovernor may assent, withhold, return or reserve**Article 213**Ordinance powerGovernor promulgates Ordinance, ordinarily on advice**Article 356**President’s RuleGovernor’s report may be relevant but subject to judicial review## Memory Aid: “A-C-F-G-R” Formula ➤ **A – Appointment:** Chief Minister appointed by Governor; Ministers appointed on Chief Minister’s advice. ➤ **C – Collective Responsibility:** Entire Council is responsible to Legislative Assembly. ➤ **F – Floor Test:** Majority is proved on the floor of the House. ➤ **G – Governor’s Advice Rule:** Governor ordinarily acts on aid and advice. ➤ **R – Real Executive:** Chief Minister and Council of Ministers run the State administration. ## Conclusion ➤ **Final understanding:** The Chief Minister and State Council of Ministers form the backbone of responsible government in the State. The Governor is the constitutional head, but the elected Council headed by the Chief Minister is the real executive. Appointment, removal, collective responsibility, legislative accountability and executive functioning all revolve around the principle that political power must remain answerable to the elected Legislative Assembly. ➤ **Balanced constitutional design:** The Governor ensures constitutional continuity, the Chief Minister provides political leadership, the Council of Ministers formulates and implements policies, and the Legislative Assembly maintains democratic control. The Supreme Court through cases such as **Shamsher Singh**, **S.R. Bommai**, **B.R. Kapur**, **Rameshwar Prasad**, **Nabam Rebia** and **Shivraj Singh Chouhan** has repeatedly protected the core principle that State executive power must function according to parliamentary democracy, constitutional morality and majority accountability. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Governor of State under Indian Constitution: Appointment, Powers, Discretion and Constitutional Controversies](https://lawfoyer.in/governor-of-state/) **Published:** June 6, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun6202607_05_41P-725x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning and Constitutional Position of Governor ◉ **Constitutional head of the State:** The Governor is the constitutional head of a State. Under **Article 153**, there shall be a Governor for each State, though the same person may be appointed as Governor for two or more States. Under **Article 154**, the executive power of the State is vested in the Governor, but in a parliamentary system this power is normally exercised through the elected Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister. ◉ **Nominal executive, not real executive:** The Governor is not meant to run the State government personally. The real executive authority belongs to the Council of Ministers, because they are responsible to the Legislative Assembly. The Governor is therefore similar to the President at the Union level, but with some constitutionally recognised discretionary areas under **Article 163**. ◉ **Link between Union and State:** The Governor performs a dual role. He is the constitutional head of the State and is also appointed by the President, which often makes the office politically sensitive. This dual position is the root of many controversies, especially where the State government and Union government belong to different political parties. ◉ **Part of State Legislature:** Under **Article 168**, the Governor is a component of the State Legislature along with the Legislative Assembly and, where applicable, Legislative Council. This does not mean that the Governor is an elected legislator; it means that certain legislative processes, such as assent to Bills and summoning the House, cannot be completed without the Governor’s constitutional role. ## Appointment of Governor ◉ **Appointment by President:** Under **Article 155**, the Governor of a State is appointed by the President by warrant under his hand and seal. In practical terms, the appointment is made by the Union executive, because the President acts on the aid and advice of the Union Council of Ministers. ◉ **No election of Governor:** The Governor is not elected directly by the people of the State and is not elected by the State Legislature. The framers adopted the appointment model to avoid a rival elected authority in the State. An elected Governor could have created conflict with the elected Chief Minister. ◉ **No consultation requirement in text:** The Constitution does not expressly require consultation with the Chief Minister before appointment of a Governor. However, constitutional commissions such as the Sarkaria Commission and Punchhi Commission have recommended that Governors should be impartial persons and should not be active party politicians immediately before appointment. ◉ **Oath of office:** Under **Article 159**, the Governor takes an oath before the Chief Justice of the High Court of the State, or in his absence, the senior-most judge available. The Governor swears to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution and the law, and to devote himself to the service and well-being of the people of the State. ## Qualifications for Appointment as Governor ◉ **Citizen of India:** Under **Article 157**, a person must be a citizen of India to be appointed as Governor. ◉ **Minimum age:** The person must have completed **35 years of age** under **Article 157**. ◉ **No legislative membership:** Under **Article 158**, the Governor cannot be a member of either House of Parliament or of a House of the Legislature of any State. If such a person is appointed as Governor, he is deemed to have vacated his legislative seat on entering office. ◉ **No office of profit:** The Governor must not hold any other office of profit. This requirement protects the independence and dignity of the office. ◉ **Official residence and emoluments:** Under **Article 158**, the Governor is entitled to use the official residence without rent and is entitled to such emoluments, allowances and privileges as determined by Parliament. ## Term of Office and Removal of Governor ◉ **Five-year term:** Under **Article 156(3)**, the Governor holds office for a term of five years from the date on which he enters office. ◉ **Pleasure of President:** Under **Article 156(1)**, the Governor holds office during the pleasure of the President. This means the Governor may be removed before completion of five years. Since the President acts on Union ministerial advice, the Union government has practical control over removal. ◉ **Continuance after expiry of term:** Under **Article 156(3)**, the Governor continues to hold office until his successor enters office. Therefore, expiry of five years does not automatically create a vacancy if a successor has not yet assumed office. ◉ **Resignation:** Under **Article 156(2)**, the Governor may resign by writing addressed to the President. ◉ **B.P. Singhal v. Union of India, (2010) 6 SCC 331:** In this landmark case, several Governors were removed after a change in the Union government. The issue was whether Governors can be removed arbitrarily under the pleasure doctrine. The Supreme Court held that although the Governor holds office during the pleasure of the President, the power cannot be exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or mala fide manner. The Governor cannot be removed merely because he is out of sync with the policies of the Union government. However, the Court also held that reasons need not be disclosed in every case unless judicial review is invoked. This case is important because it limits political misuse of the pleasure doctrine while preserving constitutional flexibility. ## Executive Powers of Governor ◉ **Executive power of State:** Under **Article 154**, the executive power of the State is vested in the Governor. This power extends to matters on which the State Legislature has law-making power. ◉ **Exercise through officers:** The Governor may exercise executive power directly or through officers subordinate to him, but this does not make him the real executive. In actual constitutional practice, executive decisions are taken by the Council of Ministers. ◉ **Appointment of Chief Minister:** Under **Article 164**, the Chief Minister is appointed by the Governor. In a normal situation, the Governor appoints the leader of the majority party or coalition in the Legislative Assembly. ◉ **Appointment of other Ministers:** Other Ministers are appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister. The Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly. ◉ **Allocation of business:** Under **Article 166**, all executive action of the State is expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor. Rules are made for convenient transaction of government business. ◉ **Appointment powers:** The Governor appoints several constitutional authorities, including the Advocate General of the State under **Article 165**, and participates in appointments where the Constitution provides a role. However, many such powers are exercised on ministerial advice. ◉ **Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831:** In this seven-judge Constitution Bench decision, probationary judicial officers challenged termination orders issued in the name of the Governor. The main constitutional issue was whether the Governor acts personally or on ministerial advice. The Supreme Court held that the President and Governor are constitutional or formal heads and ordinarily act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The ratio is that “satisfaction” of the Governor normally means satisfaction of the Council of Ministers, except where the Constitution expressly or by necessary implication permits discretion. This is the leading authority on the nominal position of the Governor in India’s parliamentary system. ## Legislative Powers of Governor ◉ **Summoning, proroguing and dissolving House:** Under **Article 174**, the Governor summons and prorogues the State Legislature and may dissolve the Legislative Assembly. Normally, this is done on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. However, discretion may arise during a constitutional crisis, such as when the Chief Minister has lost majority support. ◉ **Address to Legislature:** Under **Article 176**, the Governor addresses the first session after each general election and the first session of each year, informing the Legislature of the government’s policy agenda. ◉ **Message to House:** Under **Article 175**, the Governor may send messages to the House or Houses of the State Legislature. ◉ **Assent to Bills:** Under **Article 200**, when a Bill is passed by the State Legislature, it is presented to the Governor. The Governor may assent to the Bill, withhold assent, return the Bill for reconsideration if it is not a Money Bill, or reserve the Bill for consideration of the President. ◉ **Reservation for President:** The Governor must reserve a Bill for the President if, in his opinion, the Bill would derogate from the powers of the High Court so as to endanger the position designed for that Court by the Constitution. The Governor may also reserve certain Bills where constitutional provisions require or justify reservation. ◉ **Money Bills:** A Money Bill cannot be introduced in the Legislative Assembly except on the recommendation of the Governor. However, this is also normally based on the advice of the Council of Ministers. ## Ordinance-Making Power of Governor under Article 213 ◉ **Temporary law-making power:** Under **Article 213**, the Governor may promulgate an Ordinance when the Legislature is not in session and when circumstances exist requiring immediate action. An Ordinance has the same force and effect as an Act of the State Legislature, but it is temporary. ◉ **Conditions for Ordinance:** Three main conditions must exist: the State Legislature must not be in session; the Governor must be satisfied that immediate action is necessary; and the subject must be within the legislative competence of the State Legislature. ◉ **Aid and advice:** The Governor’s satisfaction under Article 213 is generally the satisfaction of the Council of Ministers. The Governor is not expected to act as a personal law-maker. ◉ **Limitations:** The Governor cannot promulgate an Ordinance if the same law would have required previous instructions from the President or reservation for the President had it been introduced as a Bill. This protects Union control in constitutionally sensitive matters. ◉ **Duration of Ordinance:** An Ordinance must be laid before the State Legislature and ceases to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of the Legislature, unless disapproved earlier or replaced by an Act. ◉ **Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (2017) 3 SCC 1:** In this case, Bihar repeatedly re-promulgated Ordinances without placing them properly before the Legislature. The issue was whether re-promulgation of Ordinances is constitutionally valid. The Supreme Court held that re-promulgation of Ordinances is a fraud on the Constitution if it bypasses legislative scrutiny. The ratio is that Ordinance-making is an emergency legislative power, not a parallel source of permanent legislation. The Court also held that the satisfaction behind Ordinance-making is subject to judicial review on limited grounds. ## Pardoning Power of Governor under Article 161 ◉ **Scope of Article 161:** Under **Article 161**, the Governor may grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment, or suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of an offence against a law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the State extends. ◉ **Meaning of pardon:** A pardon completely removes the punishment and its legal consequences. It is the highest form of mercy power. ◉ **Reprieve:** A reprieve temporarily postpones execution of a sentence, especially in death sentence matters. ◉ **Respite:** A respite means awarding a lesser punishment because of special circumstances such as pregnancy, age, disability or serious illness. ◉ **Remission:** Remission reduces the period of sentence without changing the character of the sentence. For example, a sentence of ten years may be reduced to six years. ◉ **Commutation:** Commutation substitutes one form of punishment with a lighter form. For example, death sentence may be commuted to life imprisonment. ◉ **Difference between Article 72 and Article 161:** The President’s pardoning power under **Article 72** extends to death sentences, court-martial cases and Union law offences. The Governor’s power under **Article 161** extends to offences relating to State executive power. A Governor cannot pardon a death sentence in the same full sense as the President, but he may suspend, remit or commute sentences where State law is involved, subject to constitutional limits. ◉ **Maru Ram v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 107:** The Supreme Court held that the President and Governor exercise clemency powers on the aid and advice of the appropriate government. The issue concerned remission and constitutional mercy powers. The ratio is that Articles 72 and 161 are constitutional powers, but they are not personal powers of the President or Governor. ◉ **Kehar Singh v. Union of India, (1989) 1 SCC 204:** Though mainly concerning the President under Article 72, this case is relevant by analogy to Article 161. The Supreme Court held that the constitutional authority may examine the merits of the case while considering mercy, but the Court cannot sit as an appellate authority over the mercy decision. ◉ **Epuru Sudhakar v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, (2006) 8 SCC 161:** In this case, remission granted by the Governor was challenged on the ground of political influence and irrelevant considerations. The issue was whether exercise of pardoning power under Article 161 is subject to judicial review. The Supreme Court held that clemency power is wide but not absolute. Judicial review is available where the order is mala fide, arbitrary, passed without application of mind, based on irrelevant considerations, or excludes relevant material. This case is a leading authority for controlling misuse of pardoning power. ## Discretionary Powers of Governor ◉ **Meaning of discretion:** Discretion means an area where the Governor may act without being bound by ministerial advice. However, this discretion is not personal political freedom. It must be constitutional, limited and based on objective circumstances. ◉ **Article 163:** Under **Article 163**, there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head to aid and advise the Governor, except in matters where the Governor is required by or under the Constitution to act in his discretion. This makes discretion an exception, not the rule. ◉ **Appointment of Chief Minister in hung Assembly:** If no party has a clear majority, the Governor may exercise discretion in inviting a person to form government. The guiding principle is not personal preference but likelihood of commanding majority support in the Assembly. ◉ **Dismissal of Ministry:** If a Chief Minister loses majority and refuses to resign or face the Assembly, the Governor may act to protect responsible government. But the proper test of majority is normally the floor of the House, not the Governor’s subjective opinion. ◉ **Dissolution of Assembly:** The Governor may face discretion where a Chief Minister who has lost majority advises dissolution, or where an alternative government is possible. The Governor must act to preserve democratic majority rule. ◉ **Reservation of Bills:** The Governor may reserve certain Bills for the President under Article 200, especially where constitutional issues arise. However, this power has become controversial when used to delay State legislation. ◉ **Report under Article 356:** The Governor may send a report to the President stating that the government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution. This may lead to President’s Rule. Because this power can affect an elected State government, it is highly sensitive. ◉ **Special responsibilities:** In certain States and special constitutional provisions, the Governor has specific discretionary or special responsibility functions, such as under some clauses of **Article 371** and related provisions. ## Supreme Court on Governor’s Discretion ◉ **S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1:** This landmark case dealt with misuse of Article 356. The issue was whether President’s Rule imposed on the basis of Governor’s report is subject to judicial review. The Supreme Court held that Article 356 proclamations are judicially reviewable and majority should ordinarily be tested on the floor of the House. The ratio protects federalism and prevents arbitrary dismissal of State governments. ◉ **Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India, (2006) 2 SCC 1:** In this case, the Bihar Assembly was dissolved before it could even meet, based on the Governor’s report alleging possible horse-trading. The issue was whether such dissolution was constitutionally valid. The Supreme Court held the dissolution unconstitutional, observing that the Governor’s report cannot be based on mere suspicion or political assumptions. The ratio is that the Governor must act on relevant, objective and constitutional material. ◉ **Nabam Rebia and Bamang Felix v. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, (2016) 8 SCC 1:** In Arunachal Pradesh, the Governor advanced the Assembly session and fixed the agenda during political conflict. The issue was whether the Governor could summon or advance a session and set legislative agenda without aid and advice. The Supreme Court held that the Governor cannot interfere with the functioning of the Legislature or act as an all-purpose political authority. The ratio is that gubernatorial discretion is limited to areas expressly or necessarily provided by the Constitution. ◉ **Shivraj Singh Chouhan v. Speaker, Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly, (2020) 17 SCC 1:** The Supreme Court directed a floor test during a political crisis in Madhya Pradesh. The issue was whether a floor test could be ordered to determine majority. The Court held that when there is doubt about majority, the floor of the House is the proper democratic forum. This principle limits arbitrary gubernatorial conclusions about majority. ## Ordinance Power and Constitutional Morality ◉ **Emergency nature:** Ordinance power exists to deal with urgent situations when the Legislature is not in session. It is not meant to avoid debate, opposition, committee scrutiny or voting. ◉ **Legislative accountability:** Every Ordinance must face the Legislature. If the executive repeatedly promulgates Ordinances instead of placing them before the House, it damages representative democracy. ◉ **Judicial control:** Courts may review whether the constitutional conditions for Ordinance-making have been abused. The Court does not normally question policy wisdom but may strike down colourable or mala fide use. ## Assent to Bills and Constitutional Controversies ◉ **Nature of Article 200 controversy:** In recent years, disputes have arisen where Governors allegedly delayed assent to Bills passed by State Legislatures, withheld assent without returning Bills, or reserved Bills for the President after long delay. This has created tension between elected State governments and Raj Bhavans. ◉ **No pocket veto principle:** The Constitution does not expressly provide a fixed time-limit in Article 200, but the Governor is not expected to keep Bills pending indefinitely. Constitutional power must be exercised within the spirit of responsible government and federalism. ◉ **State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, 2025:** In the 2025 Tamil Nadu Governor litigation, the Supreme Court examined the Governor’s role under Article 200 and whether delay in dealing with Bills was constitutionally permissible. The Court considered whether the Governor may withhold assent, reserve Bills for the President, or delay action. The judgment held that the Governor cannot exercise a pocket veto and that gubernatorial action under Article 200 is subject to judicial review. It also treated parts of the earlier understanding in **B.K. Pavitra** on Governor’s discretion under Article 200 as per incuriam to the extent noted in the judgment. ◉ **Special Reference on assent to Bills, 2025:** Later, a Constitution Bench in the 2025 Presidential Reference considered the question of whether strict timelines can be judicially fixed for Governors and the President while dealing with Bills. Reports of the decision state that the larger Bench held that fixed timelines cannot be imposed where the Constitution does not prescribe them, while also recognising that indefinite inaction or unconstitutional conduct may still be open to constitutional scrutiny. ◉ **Practical effect:** The current legal position may be understood in a balanced way: the Governor should not sit over Bills indefinitely, but courts must also be cautious in creating rigid timelines not found in the constitutional text. The deeper principle is that constitutional offices must act with reason, responsibility and respect for elected legislatures. ## Pardoning Power and Constitutional Controversies ◉ **Political influence concern:** Mercy power is meant for justice, equity and humanitarian correction. It is not meant to reward political loyalty or favour influential convicts. ◉ **Delay in mercy decisions:** Delay in deciding remission or clemency petitions can raise Article 21 concerns, especially in death penalty matters. Although Governor’s power is wide, it must be exercised fairly and with application of mind. ◉ **Judicial review:** Courts do not replace the Governor’s mercy decision with their own opinion. They only examine whether the decision-making process is constitutionally valid. Grounds include mala fides, arbitrariness, irrelevant material, non-application of mind and exclusion of relevant material. ## Governor and Article 356 Controversy ◉ **Misuse of President’s Rule:** Historically, Governors’ reports have sometimes been used to dismiss State governments ruled by parties opposed to the Union government. This created serious federalism concerns. ◉ **Floor test rule:** The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised that majority must ordinarily be tested in the Assembly. Raj Bhavan cannot become the place where majority is finally decided. ◉ **Speaking report requirement:** A Governor’s report recommending Article 356 should be based on clear, relevant and objective constitutional material. Mere political instability, party rivalry or speculative horse-trading is not enough. ## Governor’s Relationship with Chief Minister and Council of Ministers ◉ **Information power:** Under **Article 167**, the Chief Minister has a duty to communicate to the Governor all decisions of the Council of Ministers relating to administration and legislation, furnish information when called for, and submit matters for Council consideration if required by the Governor. ◉ **Right to warn and advise:** The Governor may advise, warn and encourage the Council of Ministers. This is a constitutional influence function, not a power to overrule the elected government. ◉ **No parallel administration:** The Governor cannot run departments, directly command civil servants in ordinary matters, or substitute his policy view for that of the elected ministry. ◉ **Constitutional dignity:** The Governor and Chief Minister must maintain institutional respect. The Governor should not behave as an opposition authority, and the State government should not treat the Governor’s constitutional functions as meaningless. ## Important Memory Table on Governor’s Powers AreaArticleNature of PowerNormal RuleKey LimitationExecutive power154State executive authorityAid and adviceCannot act as real executiveAppointment of Governor155President appointsUnion adviceNo State electionTerm156Five years, pleasure of PresidentMay continue until successorRemoval cannot be arbitraryQualifications157Citizen, 35 yearsMandatoryNo relaxationConditions158No legislative seat or office of profitMandatoryMust vacate seatPardon161ClemencyAid and adviceJudicial review on limited groundsAid and advice163Council of MinistersBinding normallyDiscretion is exceptionChief Minister164AppointmentMajority leaderHung Assembly discretionSummon/dissolve174Legislative controlAid and adviceFloor test principleAssent to Bills200Assent/withhold/return/reserveMust act constitutionallyNo indefinite pocket vetoOrdinance213Temporary lawAid and adviceNo re-promulgation abusePresident’s Rule report356Constitutional reportObjective materialJudicial review possible## Key Doctrines Related to Governor ◉ **Aid and advice doctrine:** The Governor normally acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. This is the foundation of parliamentary government. ◉ **Discretion as exception doctrine:** Discretion is not general. It exists only where the Constitution expressly or by necessary implication permits it. ◉ **Floor test doctrine:** Majority must be tested on the floor of the Legislative Assembly, not through the Governor’s private assessment. ◉ **No pocket veto doctrine:** The Governor should not keep Bills pending indefinitely, because such inaction can defeat the will of the elected Legislature. ◉ **Limited judicial review doctrine:** Although the Governor enjoys constitutional immunity under **Article 361** from being answerable in court personally, the actions or decisions taken on the basis of gubernatorial powers can be judicially reviewed in appropriate cases. ◉ **Constitutional morality doctrine:** The Governor must act as a neutral constitutional authority, not as an agent of a political party or a parallel centre of power. ## Constitutional Controversies around Governor ◉ **Appointment controversy:** Since Governors are appointed by the Union, critics argue that the office may be filled with politically loyal persons. This creates suspicion when the Governor deals with an opposition-ruled State. ◉ **Removal controversy:** The pleasure doctrine may be misused after a change in Union government. **B.P. Singhal** reduces this risk by holding that removal cannot be arbitrary or mala fide. ◉ **Hung Assembly controversy:** Governors have sometimes been criticised for inviting parties or coalitions in a manner that appears politically favourable. The proper constitutional approach is to invite the person most likely to prove majority and then require an early floor test. ◉ **Assent delay controversy:** Delays in assent to Bills have become a major federal issue. State governments argue that delays frustrate the legislative mandate. Governors argue that they must examine constitutional validity. Courts have attempted to balance these concerns through judicial review and constitutional discipline. ◉ **Ordinance misuse controversy:** Ordinances may be used to bypass the Legislature. **Krishna Kumar Singh** strongly disapproves repeated re-promulgation because it damages legislative supremacy. ◉ **Pardoning power controversy:** Clemency may be misused for political reasons. **Epuru Sudhakar** makes it clear that mercy decisions are not beyond constitutional control. ◉ **Article 356 controversy:** Governor’s reports have historically contributed to dismissal of State governments. **S.R. Bommai** and **Rameshwar Prasad** restrict this misuse by requiring objective material and allowing judicial review. ## Conclusion ◉ **Core principle:** The Governor is a constitutional head, not a political supervisor of the elected State government. The office is designed to preserve constitutional governance, not to weaken responsible government. ◉ **Balanced role:** The Governor must act on ministerial advice in ordinary matters, use discretion only in exceptional constitutional situations, and maintain neutrality in political conflicts. ◉ **Modern importance:** The office of Governor remains one of the most debated institutions in Indian federalism because it stands at the meeting point of Union authority, State autonomy, parliamentary democracy and constitutional morality. ◉ **Final understanding:** A Governor is neither a rubber stamp nor an elected ruler. The correct constitutional position is that the Governor is a dignified constitutional guardian who must act within the Constitution, respect the elected government, protect democratic majority, and avoid becoming an instrument of partisan politics. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Supreme Court of India: Establishment, Composition, Judges, Powers and Jurisdiction](https://lawfoyer.in/supreme-court-of-india/) **Published:** June 6, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun6202606_55_09P-725x1024.jpeg) ## **Introduction to the Supreme Court of India** ➤ **Apex Court:** The Supreme Court of India is the highest constitutional court and final court of appeal in India. It is the guardian of the Constitution, protector of fundamental rights, final interpreter of constitutional law, and the highest appellate authority in civil, criminal, constitutional and other legal matters. ➤ **Constitutional Position:** The Supreme Court is established under **Part V, Chapter IV of the Constitution of India**, covering **Articles 124 to 147**. Its authority is not merely statutory but constitutional, which means its basic existence and essential powers flow directly from the Constitution. ➤ **Core Function:** The Supreme Court performs three major roles: it decides disputes, protects fundamental rights, and maintains the supremacy of the Constitution. It acts as a check on legislative and executive action through judicial review. ➤ **Binding Nature:** Under **Article 141**, the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all courts within India. This makes the Supreme Court not only a dispute-settling court but also a law-declaring institution for the entire country. ## **Establishment of the Supreme Court of India** ➤ **Article 124 Foundation:** **Article 124(1)** provides that “there shall be a Supreme Court of India” consisting of the Chief Justice of India and such number of other judges as Parliament may by law prescribe. Originally, the Constitution provided for the Chief Justice of India and not more than seven other judges, unless Parliament increased the number by law. ➤ **Commencement:** The Supreme Court of India came into existence on **28 January 1950**, shortly after the Constitution of India came into force on **26 January 1950**. It replaced the Federal Court of India and also took over the appellate jurisdiction earlier exercised by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in certain matters. ➤ **Seat of Supreme Court:** Under **Article 130**, the Supreme Court sits in Delhi, but the Chief Justice of India may, with the approval of the President, appoint another place as the seat of the Court. In practice, the principal seat remains New Delhi. ➤ **Historical Importance:** Before independence, the Federal Court was created under the Government of India Act, 1935. However, the Supreme Court under the Constitution is much wider in jurisdiction because it combines constitutional, federal, appellate, advisory, writ, review and special leave jurisdiction. ## **Composition and Strength of the Supreme Court** ➤ **Constitutional Composition:** The Supreme Court consists of the **Chief Justice of India** and other judges. The exact number of judges is not fixed permanently in the Constitution; Parliament can increase it by law under Article 124(1). ➤ **Sanctioned Strength:** The Supreme Court’s sanctioned strength was last increased by the **Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Act, 2019** to **34 judges including the Chief Justice of India**. In May 2026, the Union Cabinet approved a proposal to introduce the **Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Bill, 2026** to increase the number of judges from **33 to 37 excluding the CJI**, meaning a total strength of **38 including the CJI**, but cabinet approval and statutory enactment must be distinguished. ➤ **Benches:** The Supreme Court works through smaller benches, generally of two or three judges. Constitutional matters involving a substantial question of law as to interpretation of the Constitution are heard by a bench of at least **five judges** under Article 145(3). ➤ **Constitution Benches:** Larger benches of five, seven, nine, eleven or thirteen judges are constituted for important constitutional issues, reconsideration of earlier precedents, and questions of national importance. ## **Appointment of Judges of the Supreme Court** ➤ **Constitutional Provision:** Under **Article 124(2)**, every judge of the Supreme Court is appointed by the President of India by warrant under his hand and seal after consultation with such judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts as the President may deem necessary. For appointment of a judge other than the CJI, consultation with the Chief Justice of India is mandatory. ➤ **Qualifications:** A person must be a **citizen of India** and must satisfy one of the following qualifications: at least five years as a judge of a High Court or two or more High Courts in succession; at least ten years as an advocate of a High Court or two or more High Courts in succession; or, in the opinion of the President, be a distinguished jurist. ➤ **Collegium System:** Although the Constitution uses the word “consultation,” judicial interpretation has developed the **collegium system**, where the judiciary has primacy in appointments. For appointment of Supreme Court judges, the collegium generally consists of the **Chief Justice of India and four senior-most judges of the Supreme Court**. ➤ **First Judges Case — S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 Supp SCC 87:** The issue was whether executive opinion or judicial opinion had primacy in judicial appointments and transfers. The Court held that “consultation” did not mean “concurrence,” giving primacy to the executive. This case is historically important but was later overruled on the point of executive primacy. ➤ **Second Judges Case — Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 441:** The issue was the meaning of “consultation” under Articles 124 and 217. The Court overruled the First Judges Case and held that the opinion of the CJI, formed collectively with senior judges, has primacy in judicial appointments. This judgment created the collegium system and linked judicial appointments to judicial independence. ➤ **Third Judges Case — In re Special Reference No. 1 of 1998, AIR 1999 SC 1:** The President referred questions regarding the appointment and transfer of judges. The Supreme Court clarified that the CJI must consult a collegium of the four senior-most Supreme Court judges for Supreme Court appointments, and that if two judges in the collegium give strong adverse opinions, the recommendation should not be made. ➤ **NJAC Case — Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 1:** The issue was the constitutional validity of the 99th Constitutional Amendment and the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014. The Supreme Court struck down the NJAC framework as violative of the basic structure, holding that judicial independence is part of the basic structure of the Constitution. ## **Tenure and Conditions of Office** ➤ **Retirement Age:** A Supreme Court judge holds office until the age of **65 years**, unless he resigns earlier or is removed according to the constitutional procedure. ➤ **Resignation:** A judge may resign by writing under his hand addressed to the President of India. ➤ **Post-Retirement Restriction:** Under **Article 124(7)**, a person who has held office as a judge of the Supreme Court cannot plead or act in any court or before any authority within the territory of India. This protects the dignity and independence of the office. ➤ **Salary and Service Conditions:** Salaries, allowances, leave and pension of Supreme Court judges are determined by law. These service conditions cannot be varied to their disadvantage after appointment, except during a financial emergency. ## **Removal of Supreme Court Judges** ➤ **Grounds of Removal:** A judge of the Supreme Court can be removed only on the ground of **proved misbehaviour or incapacity** under **Article 124(4)**. ➤ **Special Majority:** Removal requires an address by each House of Parliament, supported by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting. The address must be presented to the President in the same session. ➤ **Judicial Independence:** The difficult removal process protects judges from political pressure. A judge cannot be removed merely because the government disagrees with his judgments. ➤ **Judges Inquiry Mechanism:** Parliament may regulate the procedure for investigation and proof of misbehaviour or incapacity under Article 124(5). This is implemented through the Judges Inquiry Act, 1968. ➤ **Key Understanding:** The process is often loosely called “impeachment,” but technically the Constitution uses the language of removal by Presidential order after parliamentary address. ## **Supreme Court as a Court of Record** ➤ **Article 129:** The Supreme Court is a **court of record** and has all powers of such a court, including the power to punish for contempt of itself. ➤ **Meaning of Court of Record:** A court of record has two main features: its records and judgments have evidentiary value and are preserved as authoritative records; and it has inherent power to punish contempt. ➤ **Article 141 Connection:** Since the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all courts in India, its judgments are not merely decisions between parties but authoritative statements of law. ## **Contempt Power of the Supreme Court** ➤ **Constitutional Power:** The contempt power flows from **Article 129**. The Court also has supportive powers under **Article 142**, which enables it to pass orders necessary for complete justice. ➤ **Purpose:** Contempt jurisdiction protects the authority of the Court, ensures obedience to judicial orders, and maintains public confidence in the administration of justice. ➤ **Civil Contempt:** Civil contempt generally involves wilful disobedience of a judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or undertaking given to a court. ➤ **Criminal Contempt:** Criminal contempt generally involves acts that scandalise the court, lower its authority, prejudice judicial proceedings, or interfere with administration of justice. ➤ **Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409:** The issue was whether the Supreme Court, while exercising contempt jurisdiction, could suspend an advocate’s licence to practise. The Court held that contempt power is constitutional, but punishment must be within legally recognised limits; disciplinary control over advocates belongs to the Bar Council under the Advocates Act. This case is important because it explains that contempt power is strong but not unlimited. ➤ **Pallav Sheth v. Custodian, (2001) 7 SCC 549:** The Court clarified the limitation principles under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and held that contempt proceedings must be initiated within the statutory framework, while also recognising the constitutional nature of contempt jurisdiction. ## **Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court** ➤ **Article 131:** The Supreme Court has exclusive original jurisdiction in disputes between the Government of India and one or more States, between the Government of India and any State or States on one side and one or more States on the other, or between two or more States, where the dispute involves a question of law or fact on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends. The Supreme Court’s official description also states that its original, appellate and advisory jurisdiction includes such federal disputes. ➤ **Exclusive Nature:** In Article 131 matters, no other court can try the dispute. This makes the Supreme Court the federal umpire between Union and States. ➤ **Legal Right Requirement:** Mere political disagreement is not enough. The dispute must involve a legal right. ➤ **State of Karnataka v. Union of India, (1977) 4 SCC 608:** The issue was whether a State could sue the Union under Article 131 in relation to Union inquiries against State ministers. The Court held that Article 131 is wide enough to cover legal disputes between Union and State, provided a legal right is involved. ## **Writ Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court** ➤ **Article 32:** Article 32 gives the right to move the Supreme Court for enforcement of fundamental rights. The Court may issue directions, orders or writs, including **habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari**. ➤ **Heart of Fundamental Rights:** Article 32 is itself a fundamental right. It is a direct constitutional remedy when a fundamental right is violated. ➤ **Scope:** Article 32 is narrower than Article 226 because Article 32 is limited to enforcement of fundamental rights, whereas High Courts under Article 226 may issue writs for fundamental rights as well as “any other purpose.” ➤ **Writs Explained:** • **Habeas Corpus:** Protects personal liberty by requiring production of a detained person before the Court. • **Mandamus:** Commands a public authority to perform a legal duty. • **Certiorari:** Quashes orders of inferior courts or tribunals acting without jurisdiction or in violation of natural justice. • **Prohibition:** Prevents inferior courts or tribunals from exceeding jurisdiction. • **Quo Warranto:** Questions the legal authority of a person holding a public office. ➤ **A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27:** The issue was preventive detention and personal liberty under Article 21. The early approach of the Court was narrow, treating fundamental rights as separate compartments. ➤ **Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248:** The issue was whether impounding of passport without fair procedure violated Article 21. The Court expanded Article 21 and held that procedure must be just, fair and reasonable. This case transformed writ jurisdiction by making Article 21 a broad guarantee of fairness. ➤ **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225:** The issue was whether Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution was unlimited. A thirteen-judge bench held that Parliament may amend the Constitution but cannot destroy its basic structure. Judicial review and constitutional supremacy became protected constitutional principles. ## **Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court** ➤ **Constitutional Appeals:** The Supreme Court hears appeals in constitutional, civil and criminal matters under Articles 132 to 136. ➤ **Article 132:** An appeal lies to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order of a High Court if the case involves a substantial question of law as to interpretation of the Constitution. ➤ **Article 133:** Civil appeals may lie to the Supreme Court where the case involves substantial questions of law of general importance and the High Court certifies that the question needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. ➤ **Article 134:** Criminal appeals may lie in serious criminal cases, such as where the High Court reverses acquittal and sentences the accused to death, or withdraws a case from a subordinate court and sentences the accused to death, or certifies the case as fit for appeal. ➤ **Article 134A:** The High Court may grant a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court under Articles 132, 133 or 134. ➤ **Article 136 — Special Leave Petition:** Article 136 gives the Supreme Court discretionary power to grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed by any court or tribunal in India, except courts or tribunals relating to the Armed Forces. ➤ **Discretionary Nature:** Article 136 is not a regular right of appeal. It is an extraordinary discretionary jurisdiction used where there is grave injustice, substantial question of law, perversity, violation of natural justice, or serious miscarriage of justice. ➤ **Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169:** The Court held that special leave jurisdiction should be used sparingly and in exceptional cases. ➤ **Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359:** The Court explained the doctrine of merger in the context of SLPs. If special leave is refused without a speaking order, the lower court decision does not merge into the Supreme Court order; but once leave is granted and appeal is decided, merger applies. ## **Advisory Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court** ➤ **Article 143:** The President may refer to the Supreme Court any question of law or fact of public importance on which the President considers it expedient to obtain the Court’s opinion. ➤ **Nature of Opinion:** Advisory opinion is not exactly the same as a judgment in a regular dispute between parties. However, it carries high constitutional value and is generally respected. ➤ **Article 143(1):** The President may refer questions of law or fact of public importance. ➤ **Article 143(2):** The President may refer disputes arising out of pre-Constitution treaties, agreements, covenants or similar instruments, where Article 131 may not apply because of its proviso. ➤ **In re Kerala Education Bill, 1957, AIR 1958 SC 956:** The President referred questions regarding the constitutional validity of provisions of the Kerala Education Bill. The Supreme Court gave an advisory opinion explaining minority educational rights under Article 30. This case is important for understanding how advisory jurisdiction helps prevent constitutional conflict. ➤ **In re Berubari Union, AIR 1960 SC 845:** The issue was whether Indian territory could be transferred to Pakistan by executive action or required constitutional amendment. The Supreme Court advised that cession of territory required constitutional amendment. This opinion shaped constitutional law on territory and sovereignty. ➤ **Special Reference No. 1 of 1998, AIR 1999 SC 1:** This advisory reference clarified the collegium system and judicial appointments, showing that Article 143 can be used for important constitutional institutional questions. ## **Review Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court** ➤ **Article 137:** The Supreme Court has power to review any judgment pronounced or order made by it, subject to laws made by Parliament and rules made under Article 145. ➤ **Purpose:** Review jurisdiction allows correction of serious errors, mistakes apparent on the face of the record, or miscarriage of justice. ➤ **Limited Scope:** Review is not an appeal in disguise. A party cannot use review merely because it is dissatisfied with the outcome. ➤ **Mohd. Arif v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India, (2014) 9 SCC 737:** The issue was whether death sentence review petitions should be heard in open court. The Court held that in death penalty cases, review petitions must be heard in open court by a bench of three judges, recognising the irreversible nature of death sentence and the importance of procedural fairness. ## **Curative Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court** ➤ **Meaning:** Curative petition is a judicially created remedy available after dismissal of a review petition. It is meant to prevent gross miscarriage of justice and abuse of process. ➤ **Source:** Curative jurisdiction is not expressly written in the Constitution. It was evolved by the Supreme Court under its inherent powers and constitutional duty to do justice. ➤ **Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, (2002) 4 SCC 388:** The issue was whether a final judgment of the Supreme Court could be reconsidered after dismissal of review. A five-judge Constitution Bench held that in rare cases, to prevent abuse of process and cure gross miscarriage of justice, the Court may entertain a curative petition. Grounds include violation of principles of natural justice, reasonable apprehension of bias, or other exceptional circumstances. ➤ **Strict Conditions:** A curative petition must generally be accompanied by certification by a senior advocate, and it is first circulated to the three senior-most judges and the judges who passed the impugned judgment, if available. ➤ **Union Carbide Curative Proceedings:** In the Bhopal gas tragedy curative proceedings, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that curative jurisdiction is extremely narrow and cannot be treated as a routine second review. ## **Other Important Powers and Jurisdiction** ➤ **Article 142 — Complete Justice:** The Supreme Court may pass such decree or order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. This is a unique constitutional power enabling the Court to mould relief according to justice. ➤ **Article 139A — Transfer of Cases:** The Supreme Court may transfer cases involving the same or substantially same questions of law from High Courts to itself or transfer cases from one High Court to another. ➤ **Article 144 — Duty to Aid Supreme Court:** All civil and judicial authorities in India must act in aid of the Supreme Court. ➤ **Article 145 — Rule-Making Power:** The Supreme Court may make rules for regulating its practice and procedure, subject to law made by Parliament and with Presidential approval. ## **Memory Table: Key Articles on Supreme Court of India** **Article****Subject****Core Idea****Article 124**Establishment, composition, appointment, tenure, removalCreates Supreme Court and governs judges**Article 129**Court of recordIncludes contempt power**Article 131**Original jurisdictionFederal disputes involving legal rights**Article 132**Constitutional appealsSubstantial constitutional questions**Article 133**Civil appealsCivil matters of general legal importance**Article 134**Criminal appealsSerious criminal appellate matters**Article 136**Special leaveExtraordinary discretionary appeal power**Article 137**ReviewReview of Supreme Court judgments/orders**Article 141**Binding precedentLaw declared by Supreme Court binds all courts**Article 142**Complete justiceBroad remedial power**Article 143**Advisory jurisdictionPresident may seek opinion**Article 144**Authorities to aid Supreme CourtBinding institutional duty**Article 145**Rules of CourtProcedure-making power## **Conclusion** ➤ **Constitutional Guardian:** The Supreme Court of India is not merely the highest appellate court; it is the constitutional guardian of liberty, federalism, judicial review and rule of law. ➤ **Institutional Balance:** Its powers under Articles 32, 131, 136, 137, 141, 142 and 143 make it a unique institution combining the roles of constitutional court, federal court, appellate court, rights court and advisory body. ➤ **Judicial Independence:** Appointment, tenure, removal protection, contempt power, court of record status and binding precedent together preserve the dignity and independence of the Supreme Court. ➤ **Practical Importance:** For understanding Indian Constitutional Law, the Supreme Court must be studied as both an institution and a constitutional mechanism through which fundamental rights, federal balance, separation of powers and constitutional supremacy are practically enforced. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Speaker and Deputy Speaker of Lok Sabha: Election, Powers, Removal, Tenth Schedule, Money Bill Certification and Judicial Scrutiny under Indian Constitutional Law](https://lawfoyer.in/speaker-and-deputy-speaker-of-lok-sabha/) **Published:** June 6, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun6202612_57_00A-725x1024.jpeg) ## 1. Constitutional Position of Speaker and Deputy Speaker ● **Institutional importance:** The Speaker and Deputy Speaker are constitutional offices created to ensure orderly, fair and authoritative functioning of the House of the People, that is, the Lok Sabha. The Speaker is not merely a presiding officer; the Speaker is the constitutional guardian of the dignity, procedure, discipline and privileges of the House. ● **Article 93 – Election of Speaker and Deputy Speaker:** Article 93 provides that the Lok Sabha shall, “as soon as may be”, choose two of its members to be respectively the Speaker and Deputy Speaker, and whenever either office becomes vacant, the House shall choose another member to fill the vacancy. This means both offices are elected by the Lok Sabha from among its own members. ● **Meaning of “as soon as may be”:** The Constitution does not prescribe an exact number of days for election of the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. However, the phrase shows constitutional urgency. The offices are not optional or ceremonial; they are necessary for the working of parliamentary democracy. Long vacancy of the Deputy Speaker’s office raises serious constitutional concerns because Article 93 contemplates the existence of both offices. ● **Article 94 – Vacation, resignation and removal:** Article 94 states that a Speaker or Deputy Speaker vacates office if he or she ceases to be a member of the Lok Sabha. The Speaker may resign by writing addressed to the Deputy Speaker, and the Deputy Speaker may resign by writing addressed to the Speaker. Either may be removed by a resolution of the Lok Sabha passed by a majority of all the then members of the House, provided at least fourteen days’ notice is given. The Speaker continues even after dissolution of Lok Sabha until immediately before the first meeting of the new Lok Sabha. ● **Article 95 – Acting arrangements:** Article 95 provides continuity. When the office of Speaker is vacant, the Deputy Speaker performs the duties of Speaker. When both offices are vacant, such member of the House as the President may appoint performs those duties. During absence from a sitting, the Deputy Speaker or another person determined by rules presides. ● **Article 96 – Removal motion and neutrality:** Article 96 provides that when a resolution for removal of the Speaker is under consideration, the Speaker shall not preside. Similarly, when a resolution for removal of the Deputy Speaker is under consideration, the Deputy Speaker shall not preside. This rule protects fairness because no one should act as judge in his or her own cause. ● **Article 100 – Voting and casting vote:** The Speaker or person acting as Speaker does not vote in the first instance but has a casting vote in case of equality of votes. The Lok Sabha’s own FAQ states that the Speaker has a casting vote in the event of a tie and that it is customarily exercised to maintain the status quo. ## 2. Election of Speaker and Deputy Speaker ● **Election from among members:** Only a sitting member of Lok Sabha can be elected as Speaker or Deputy Speaker. If that person later ceases to be a member, the constitutional office also comes to an end under Article 94(a). ● **Election of Speaker:** After a general election, the President appoints a pro tem Speaker to administer oath and conduct the election of the Speaker. The Speaker is elected by the House through a motion. Conventionally, the ruling party or ruling coalition proposes the candidate because the Speaker must command the confidence of the House. ● **Election of Deputy Speaker:** The Deputy Speaker is elected after the Speaker. Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha provides that the election of Deputy Speaker is held on such date as the Speaker may fix. There is no constitutional rule that the Deputy Speaker must belong to the Opposition, though in many periods of parliamentary practice the office has been given to the Opposition to promote institutional balance. ● **Simple practical distinction:** The **Speaker’s election date** is connected with the first sitting and constitutional necessity of forming the House’s presiding authority. The **Deputy Speaker’s election date** is fixed by the Speaker under the Lok Sabha Rules. Therefore, the Deputy Speaker’s office depends on constitutional mandate plus procedural scheduling. ● **No express time limit but constitutional obligation:** The absence of a fixed deadline does not mean the election may be indefinitely avoided. Article 93 uses mandatory language: the House “shall” choose. Therefore, the better constitutional interpretation is that the election must occur within a reasonable time. ## 3. Tenure, Resignation and Removal ● **Tenure linked with membership:** The Speaker and Deputy Speaker normally hold office during the life of the Lok Sabha, but they may vacate earlier by resignation, removal or loss of Lok Sabha membership. ● **Special continuity of Speaker:** A very important constitutional point is that the Speaker does not vacate office immediately on dissolution of Lok Sabha. Under the second proviso to Article 94, the Speaker continues until immediately before the first meeting of the new Lok Sabha. This ensures that there is institutional continuity even between two Lok Sabhas. ● **Removal majority:** Removal requires a resolution passed by a majority of all the then members of the Lok Sabha. This is not merely a majority of members present and voting. For example, if the House has 543 existing members, at least 272 votes are required, assuming there are no vacancies affecting the number of “then members”. ● **Fourteen days’ notice:** A removal resolution cannot be suddenly moved. Article 94 requires at least fourteen days’ notice. This protects the dignity and stability of the office. ● **Speaker not to preside over own removal:** Under Article 96, when a removal motion against the Speaker is under consideration, the Speaker cannot preside. This principle reflects natural justice: **nemo judex in causa sua**, meaning no person should be a judge in his or her own cause. ## 4. Powers and Functions of Speaker ● **Presiding power:** The Speaker presides over sittings of the Lok Sabha, maintains order, regulates debate, decides who may speak, and ensures that proceedings are conducted according to the Constitution, Rules of Procedure and parliamentary conventions. ● **Disciplinary power:** The Speaker maintains discipline in the House. The Speaker may direct a member to withdraw from the House, name a member for disorderly conduct, and take procedural action under the Rules. ● **Interpretation of rules:** The Speaker interprets and applies the Rules of Procedure of Lok Sabha. The Speaker’s rulings on procedure are generally treated as final inside the House because parliamentary proceedings require immediate and authoritative decisions. ● **Casting vote:** The Speaker does not vote in the first instance but may exercise a casting vote in case of equality of votes. This power is not meant to advance party interest. Parliamentary convention expects the Speaker to use the casting vote to maintain the existing position unless the House clearly decides otherwise. ● **Certification of Money Bill:** Under Article 110(3), if any question arises whether a Bill is a Money Bill, the decision of the Speaker of Lok Sabha is final. This power is extremely significant because a Money Bill can be passed with limited role of Rajya Sabha. ● **Joint sitting:** Under Article 118(4), the Speaker presides over a joint sitting of both Houses of Parliament. The Lok Sabha FAQ also records that the Speaker presides over joint sittings. ● **Committee-related role:** The Speaker constitutes and supervises several parliamentary committees, nominates chairpersons or members where rules so provide, and plays a key role in the committee system of parliamentary accountability. ● **Privilege and dignity of House:** The Speaker acts as custodian of the House’s privileges, records and dignity. However, this power is not absolute and remains subject to constitutional limitations. ## 5. Powers and Role of Deputy Speaker ● **Constitutional substitute:** The Deputy Speaker is not a subordinate private assistant of the Speaker. The Deputy Speaker is an independent constitutional authority chosen by the House. ● **When Speaker is absent:** The Deputy Speaker presides over the House when the Speaker is absent. While presiding, the Deputy Speaker has the same authority as the Speaker for conducting proceedings. ● **When office of Speaker is vacant:** Under Article 95, the Deputy Speaker performs the duties of Speaker when the office of Speaker is vacant. This shows why the Deputy Speaker’s office is constitutionally important. ● **Impartial presiding role:** Once in the Chair, the Deputy Speaker is expected to act with the same neutrality as the Speaker. His or her rulings are not appealable inside the House in the ordinary sense. ● **Removal of Deputy Speaker:** The Deputy Speaker may be removed in the same manner as the Speaker: by resolution passed by a majority of all the then members of the House after fourteen days’ notice under Article 94. ## 6. Speaker under the Tenth Schedule: Anti-Defection Law ● **Basic purpose of Tenth Schedule:** The Tenth Schedule was inserted by the Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985 to curb political defections. It provides disqualification on grounds such as voluntarily giving up membership of a political party or voting/abstaining contrary to party whip without permission. ● **Speaker as adjudicating authority:** Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule says that questions of disqualification on the ground of defection are decided by the Speaker or Chairman of the concerned House. In Lok Sabha, the Speaker decides such questions. ● **Speaker acts as tribunal:** In **Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651**, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Tenth Schedule but held that while deciding disqualification petitions, the Speaker acts as a tribunal and the decision is subject to judicial review. The Court rejected the argument that the Speaker’s decision is completely immune from courts. However, courts usually interfere after the Speaker has made a decision, except in cases of exceptional illegality, mala fides or violation of constitutional mandates. ● **Paragraph 7 struck down:** In **Kihoto Hollohan**, the Supreme Court held that Paragraph 7, which excluded court jurisdiction, required ratification by States because it affected the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and High Courts. Since such ratification was absent, Paragraph 7 was unconstitutional. This preserved judicial review under Articles 32, 136, 226 and 227. ● **Voluntarily giving up membership:** In **Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 641**, the Supreme Court held that “voluntarily giving up membership” is wider than formal resignation. A member may be treated as having given up party membership by conduct, speeches, alliances or actions showing abandonment of the party. ● **Expelled member and original party:** In **G. Viswanathan v. Speaker, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, (1996) 2 SCC 353**, the Supreme Court held that even if a member is expelled by the political party, for the purpose of the Tenth Schedule he continues to be treated as belonging to the party on whose ticket he was elected. Therefore, joining another party after expulsion may still attract disqualification. ● **Speaker’s delay and judicial concern:** Delay by Speakers in deciding defection petitions has become a major constitutional problem. In **Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Hon’ble Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly, (2020) 2 SCC 617**, the Supreme Court observed that disqualification petitions should ordinarily be decided within a reasonable period, generally three months, unless exceptional circumstances exist. The Court also suggested that Parliament may consider replacing the Speaker with an independent tribunal for anti-defection adjudication. ● **Resignation and defection:** In **Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil v. Karnataka Legislative Assembly, (2020) 2 SCC 595**, the Supreme Court held that resignation does not automatically defeat pending disqualification proceedings. The Speaker may examine whether a resignation is voluntary and genuine, but the Speaker cannot impose a punishment beyond constitutional limits, such as barring members from contesting elections for the entire term unless the Constitution or law permits it. ● **Speaker facing removal motion:** In **Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly, (2016) 8 SCC 1**, the Supreme Court held that a Speaker should not decide disqualification petitions when a motion for the Speaker’s own removal is pending. The reasoning was based on institutional impartiality and the principle that a Speaker whose continuance is under challenge should not decide matters that may affect majority in the House. ● **Later reconsideration of Nabam Rebia:** In **Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 607**, the Supreme Court considered the effect of **Nabam Rebia** in the Maharashtra political crisis and referred the correctness of the Nabam principle to a larger Bench. Therefore, the present position is that Nabam Rebia continues to be relevant, but its correctness on this point is under reconsideration. ## 7. Money Bill Certification by Speaker ● **Article 110 – Money Bill:** A Money Bill is a Bill that contains only matters listed in Article 110(1), such as taxation, borrowing of money, custody of Consolidated Fund of India, appropriation of money, expenditure charged on Consolidated Fund, receipt or custody of public money, audit of accounts, or matters incidental to these. ● **Speaker’s final certificate:** Article 110(3) provides that if any question arises whether a Bill is a Money Bill, the decision of the Speaker of Lok Sabha is final. Article 110(4) requires the Speaker’s certificate when the Bill is transmitted to Rajya Sabha and presented to the President. ● **Why certification matters:** In an ordinary Bill, both Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha have substantial legislative roles. But in a Money Bill, Rajya Sabha can only make recommendations within fourteen days, and Lok Sabha may accept or reject them. Therefore, wrongful certification of an ordinary Bill as a Money Bill can weaken bicameralism. ● **Aadhaar case:** In **Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2019) 1 SCC 1**, the majority upheld the Aadhaar Act as a valid Money Bill. However, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud dissented and held that passing the Aadhaar Act as a Money Bill was unconstitutional because it bypassed Rajya Sabha. The case is important because it triggered deeper debate on whether the Speaker’s Money Bill certificate can be judicially reviewed. ● **Rojer Mathew case:** In **Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd., (2020) 6 SCC 1**, the Supreme Court held that the Speaker’s certification of a Money Bill is not completely immune from judicial review. The Court doubted the correctness of the Aadhaar majority’s interpretation of Money Bill and referred the larger issue to a larger Bench. The Court also clarified that earlier cases suggesting near-total immunity, such as **Mohd. Saeed Siddiqui v. State of U.P., (2014) 11 SCC 415**, and **Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal v. State of Bihar, (2016) 3 SCC 183**, did not state the correct law on immunity from judicial review. ● **Present legal position:** The Speaker’s certificate under Article 110 is given high constitutional respect, but it is not beyond judicial review. Courts may examine whether the certification is a blatant constitutional violation or colourable exercise of power. ## 8. Neutrality of Speaker ● **Need for neutrality:** The Speaker belongs to a political party before election as Speaker, but after election to the Chair, the Speaker is expected to act above party interest. Neutrality is essential because the Speaker controls debate, discipline, recognition of members, committee matters, anti-defection adjudication and Money Bill certification. ● **Indian challenge:** Unlike the British convention where the Speaker resigns from party politics and is normally re-elected unopposed, India has not fully developed such a strict convention. Indian Speakers often continue to be seen as members of the ruling political arrangement. This creates concern especially in Tenth Schedule cases and Money Bill certification. ● **Neutrality as constitutional morality:** The Constitution may not expressly say that the Speaker must resign from party membership, but constitutional morality requires impartial conduct. The Speaker must protect the House, not the government alone; the Opposition, not obstruction alone; and procedure, not political convenience. ● **Practical areas where neutrality matters:** Neutrality is tested when the Speaker decides disqualification petitions, allows or disallows motions, expunges remarks, certifies Money Bills, recognises party whips or leaders, and decides whether to permit division of votes. ## 9. Judicial Scrutiny of Speaker’s Actions ● **General rule of non-interference during proceedings:** Courts usually avoid interfering with internal parliamentary procedure because the Constitution gives each House autonomy to regulate its own proceedings. ● **Article 122 protection:** Article 122 says that the validity of parliamentary proceedings cannot be questioned on the ground of alleged irregularity of procedure. However, this protection does not cover substantive illegality or constitutional violation. ● **Raja Ram Pal principle:** In **Raja Ram Pal v. Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha, (2007) 3 SCC 184**, the Supreme Court held that parliamentary proceedings are subject to judicial review where there is illegality, unconstitutionality, gross illegality or violation of fundamental constitutional limitations. Courts will not interfere for mere procedural irregularity, but constitutional violations are reviewable. ● **Tenth Schedule review:** After **Kihoto Hollohan**, the Speaker’s decision under the Tenth Schedule is reviewable because the Speaker acts as a tribunal. Judicial review may examine mala fides, perversity, violation of natural justice, constitutional error, or failure to decide within a reasonable time. ● **Money Bill review:** After **Rojer Mathew**, the Speaker’s Money Bill certification is also not absolutely immune. Judicial review is narrow but available where the certification appears to defeat Article 110 and bicameralism. ● **Removal-related review:** In matters involving removal of the Speaker or Deputy Speaker, courts may examine constitutional compliance, such as notice, majority requirement and whether the concerned presiding officer improperly presided over his or her own removal motion. ## 10. Speaker and Deputy Speaker: Comparative Memory Table PointSpeakerDeputy Speaker**Constitutional basis**Article 93Article 93**Elected by**Lok SabhaLok Sabha**Election timing**As soon as may be after constitution of HouseAfter Speaker; date fixed by Speaker under Lok Sabha Rules**Resignation addressed to**Deputy SpeakerSpeaker**Removal**Majority of all the then members + 14 days’ noticeSame**Presiding role**Ordinary presiding authorityPresides when Speaker absent**When Speaker office vacant**Not applicablePerforms duties of Speaker under Article 95**Neutrality requirement**Very highSame while presiding**Tenth Schedule role**Decides defection cases in Lok SabhaMay act if performing Speaker’s duties, depending on circumstances**Money Bill certification**Speaker of Lok Sabha certifiesDeputy Speaker does not ordinarily certify unless acting as Speaker## 11. Important Case Law Summary ● **Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651:** The Supreme Court upheld the Tenth Schedule but held that the Speaker acts as a tribunal while deciding defection cases. The decision is subject to judicial review. Paragraph 7 excluding court jurisdiction was struck down for lack of State ratification. This case is the foundation of judicial scrutiny over Speaker’s anti-defection decisions. ● **Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 641:** The Court held that “voluntarily giving up membership” is wider than resignation. Conduct may show abandonment of party membership. This widened the Speaker’s inquiry under the Tenth Schedule. ● **G. Viswanathan v. Speaker, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, (1996) 2 SCC 353:** The Court held that an expelled member continues to be treated as belonging to the original political party for Tenth Schedule purposes. This prevents expelled members from avoiding anti-defection consequences by relying on expulsion. ● **Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya, (2007) 4 SCC 270:** The Supreme Court interfered where the Speaker failed to properly decide disqualification issues and where constitutional requirements were not followed. The case shows that judicial review is meaningful, not merely theoretical. ● **Raja Ram Pal v. Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha, (2007) 3 SCC 184:** The Court held that parliamentary actions are reviewable for illegality and unconstitutionality, although courts will not interfere with mere procedural irregularities. This case is important for understanding Article 122. ● **Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker, (2016) 8 SCC 1:** The Court held that a Speaker facing a pending removal motion should not decide disqualification petitions. The case links neutrality, majority politics and Tenth Schedule adjudication. Its correctness on this point has been referred to a larger Bench in **Subhash Desai**. ● **Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar) v. Union of India, (2019) 1 SCC 1:** The majority upheld Aadhaar as a Money Bill; the dissent strongly objected to bypassing Rajya Sabha. This case made Money Bill certification a major constitutional issue. ● **Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd., (2020) 6 SCC 1:** The Court held that Speaker’s Money Bill certification is not immune from judicial review and referred the larger Article 110 issue for reconsideration. This is the leading case on judicial scrutiny of Money Bill certification. ● **Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Hon’ble Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly, (2020) 2 SCC 617:** The Court criticised delay in deciding defection petitions and stated that such petitions should ordinarily be decided within three months unless exceptional circumstances exist. It also suggested an independent tribunal mechanism. ● **Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil v. Karnataka Legislative Assembly, (2020) 2 SCC 595:** The Court held that resignation does not automatically end disqualification proceedings. The Speaker can examine genuineness of resignation but cannot impose penalties beyond constitutional authority. ## 12. Core Constitutional Principles ● **Parliamentary democracy:** The Speaker and Deputy Speaker ensure that the elected House functions through rules rather than disorder. ● **Bicameralism:** Money Bill certification directly affects Rajya Sabha’s role; therefore, the Speaker must use Article 110 carefully. ● **Constitutional morality:** The Speaker’s authority is trusted because it is expected to be neutral, principled and transparent. ● **Judicial review:** Finality clauses do not completely exclude courts. Whether under the Tenth Schedule or Article 110, the Speaker’s decisions remain subject to limited but real judicial scrutiny. ● **Natural justice:** A Speaker facing removal should not decide matters affecting his or her own survival in office. Similarly, members facing disqualification must receive fair hearing. ● **Reasonable time:** Constitutional authorities cannot defeat constitutional remedies by inaction. Delay in deciding defection petitions may itself damage democracy. ## 13. Conclusion ● **Final understanding:** The Speaker and Deputy Speaker are central to India’s parliamentary constitutional structure. Their offices are created by Article 93, protected by Article 94, supported by Article 95, and regulated during removal by Article 96. The Speaker’s powers are wide, but they are not absolute. ● **Balanced position:** The Speaker is the master of procedure inside the House, but not the master of the Constitution. In ordinary procedural matters, courts show restraint. In matters involving defection, Money Bill certification, mala fides, constitutional violation or denial of natural justice, judicial review is available. ● **Democratic significance:** The Speaker’s neutrality is the moral foundation of the office. Without neutrality, powers under the Tenth Schedule and Article 110 may become tools of political advantage. With neutrality, the Speaker becomes the guardian of parliamentary democracy. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Parliamentary Procedure and Legislative Process in India: Ordinary Bills, Money Bills, Financial Bills, Joint Sitting, Assent, Budget, Sessions, Quorum and Voting](https://lawfoyer.in/parliamentary-procedure-and-legislative-process-in-india/) **Published:** June 6, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun6202612_47_44A-725x1024.jpeg) ## Introduction: Meaning and Constitutional Scheme of Parliamentary Procedure • **Parliamentary procedure** means the constitutional and procedural method through which Parliament conducts its business, debates public issues, makes laws, controls public finance, and holds the executive accountable. In India, Parliament consists of the **President, Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha** under Article 79 of the Constitution. The President is not a member of either House, but is an essential part of Parliament because no Bill becomes law without Presidential assent under Article 111. The legislative procedure is mainly contained in **Articles 107 to 122**, while the financial procedure is mainly contained in **Articles 112 to 117** of the Constitution. • **Democratic purpose** of parliamentary procedure is to ensure that law-making is not arbitrary. A Bill generally has to be introduced, debated, examined, voted upon, passed by both Houses, and then presented to the President. This process gives space for deliberation, opposition, amendment, financial scrutiny and constitutional supervision. • **Bicameral balance** is a central feature of Parliament. Lok Sabha represents the people directly, while Rajya Sabha represents the States and Union territories in the federal structure. However, in financial matters, the Constitution gives a stronger position to Lok Sabha because taxation and expenditure are treated as matters of popular control. • **Constitutional discipline** is maintained by several provisions: Articles 85 to 88 deal with sessions, prorogation, dissolution, and Presidential address; Article 100 deals with voting and quorum; Articles 107 to 111 deal with Bills and assent; Articles 112 to 117 deal with budget and financial legislation; Articles 118 to 122 deal with rules of procedure, language, restriction on discussion about judges, and limited judicial interference in parliamentary proceedings. ## Sessions of Parliament, Summoning, Prorogation and Dissolution • **Session of Parliament** means the period during which a House meets to conduct business. Under Article 85, the President summons each House from time to time, but six months shall not intervene between the last sitting of one session and the first sitting of the next session. This means Parliament must meet at least twice a year, though in practice it usually has Budget, Monsoon and Winter sessions. • **Summoning** means calling the House to meet. The formal power is with the President under Article 85, but in a parliamentary system this power is exercised on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. • **Prorogation** means termination of a session of a House by the President. It does not dissolve the House. A prorogued House continues to exist; only that session ends. Under Article 107(3), a Bill pending in Parliament does not lapse merely because the Houses are prorogued. • **Adjournment** is different from prorogation. Adjournment only suspends the sitting of a House for a specified time, such as a few hours, a day, or a week. It is done by the Presiding Officer, not by the President. • **Dissolution** applies only to Lok Sabha, not Rajya Sabha. Rajya Sabha is a permanent House and is not subject to dissolution. Lok Sabha may be dissolved either on expiry of its five-year term or earlier. Dissolution has serious consequences for pending Bills, because the directly elected House ceases to exist. • **Effect on pending Bills** under Article 107 is important. A Bill pending in Rajya Sabha which has not been passed by Lok Sabha does not lapse on dissolution of Lok Sabha. But a Bill pending in Lok Sabha, or a Bill passed by Lok Sabha and pending in Rajya Sabha, lapses on dissolution of Lok Sabha, subject to Article 108 on joint sitting. • **Purushothaman Nambudiri v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 694; 1962 Supp (1) SCR 753**: The case concerned the effect of dissolution and lapse of Bills in the context of legislative procedure. The Supreme Court explained that the Constitution rejects the old English rule that all pending Bills lapse merely because of prorogation, and instead specifically provides when lapse occurs. The ratio is that lapse is governed by the constitutional text, not by general assumptions from British parliamentary practice. This principle helps understand Articles 107 and 196, which separately deal with Parliament and State Legislatures. ## Quorum, Voting and Decision-Making in Parliament • **Quorum** means the minimum number of members required to be present for a valid sitting of a House. Under Article 100(3), the quorum to constitute a meeting of either House of Parliament is **one-tenth of the total number of members of that House**. If quorum is not present, the Presiding Officer must either adjourn the House or suspend the meeting until quorum is present. • **Voting rule** under Article 100(1) is that all questions in either House, or in a joint sitting, are decided by a majority of votes of the members present and voting, unless the Constitution provides otherwise. The Presiding Officer generally does not vote in the first instance but has a casting vote in case of equality of votes. • **Present and voting** means only those members who are actually present and cast their vote are counted. Members who are absent or abstain are not counted for deciding the majority, unless a special constitutional provision requires a majority of the total membership or a special majority. • **Ordinary majority** is the usual rule for passing ordinary Bills and many motions. However, constitutional amendment Bills under Article 368 require special majority, and in some cases ratification by at least half of the State Legislatures. • **Voice vote and division** are parliamentary methods of voting. In a voice vote, members say “Ayes” or “Noes”, and the Presiding Officer decides which side is stronger. If the decision is challenged, a division may be demanded, where votes are counted more formally. ## Ordinary Bills: Meaning, Introduction and Passing • **Ordinary Bill** means a Bill which is not a Money Bill, not a Financial Bill requiring special procedure, and not a constitutional amendment Bill. It may relate to subjects such as criminal law, civil law, administration, social welfare, institutions, regulatory bodies or rights. • **Article 107 rule** is that, subject to provisions relating to Money Bills and Financial Bills, an ordinary Bill may originate in either House of Parliament. It can be introduced in Lok Sabha or Rajya Sabha. It is not deemed to have been passed by Parliament unless both Houses agree to it, either without amendment or with amendments accepted by both Houses. • **First reading** is the introduction stage. The Minister or private member seeks leave to introduce the Bill. After introduction, the Bill is published. At this stage, there is usually no detailed debate on the merits of the Bill. • **Second reading** is the most important deliberative stage. It usually includes general discussion, possible reference to a Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee or Select Committee, clause-by-clause consideration, and amendments. This stage allows members to examine the purpose, structure, language and consequences of the Bill. • **Committee scrutiny** improves legislative quality. Committees examine the Bill more closely, may hear experts and stakeholders, and suggest changes. Though committee recommendations are generally not binding, they are important for informed law-making. • **Third reading** is the final stage in the House where the Bill is put to vote. Debate is usually limited to whether the Bill should be passed in its final form. • **Transmission to the other House** occurs after one House passes the Bill. The other House may pass it without amendment, pass it with amendments, reject it, or take no action. For ordinary Bills, both Houses must ultimately agree. • **Deadlock possibility** arises when one House passes a Bill and the other House rejects it, disagrees with amendments, or does not pass it for more than six months. In such cases, Article 108 may allow a joint sitting, except for Bills excluded from joint sitting. ## Joint Sitting under Article 108 • **Joint sitting** is a constitutional method for resolving deadlock between Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha on certain Bills. Under Article 108, the President may notify the intention to summon both Houses to meet in a joint sitting where: the Bill is rejected by the other House; the Houses finally disagree on amendments; or more than six months pass from the date of receipt of the Bill by the other House without passage. • **Purpose of joint sitting** is to prevent legislative paralysis. Since Lok Sabha has a larger membership than Rajya Sabha, the will of Lok Sabha usually carries greater weight in a joint sitting. However, Rajya Sabha members also participate and vote. • **Presiding authority** is ordinarily the Speaker of Lok Sabha. In the Speaker’s absence, the Deputy Speaker or other constitutionally/rule-authorised person presides. • **Bills excluded** from joint sitting include Money Bills and Constitutional Amendment Bills. Money Bills have a special Lok Sabha-dominant process under Articles 109 and 110. Constitutional amendment Bills under Article 368 must be passed separately by each House with the required special majority; there is no joint sitting for them. • **Dissolution after notification** does not necessarily defeat a joint sitting. Article 108(5) provides that a joint sitting may be held and the Bill may be passed even if dissolution of Lok Sabha has intervened after the President has notified the intention to summon a joint sitting. • **Historical use** has been rare. Joint sittings have been used for the Dowry Prohibition Bill, 1959; the Banking Service Commission (Repeal) Bill, 1977; and the Prevention of Terrorism Bill, 2002. PIB records that the Dowry Prohibition Bill was passed at a joint sitting on 9 May 1961, and the Banking Service Commission (Repeal) Bill was passed at a joint sitting in May 1978. ## Money Bills under Articles 109 and 110 • **Money Bill** is a special category of Bill dealing only with the matters listed in Article 110(1). A Bill is a Money Bill if it contains only provisions dealing with matters such as taxation, government borrowing, custody of the Consolidated Fund or Contingency Fund of India, appropriation of money, declaration of expenditure charged on the Consolidated Fund, receipt or custody of public money, audit of accounts, or matters incidental to these subjects. • **Keyword “only”** is extremely important. A Bill cannot become a Money Bill merely because it has some financial implication. It must contain only provisions dealing with the subjects mentioned in Article 110(1)(a) to (g). The incidental clause in Article 110(1)(g) cannot be used to include unrelated substantive matters. • **Speaker’s certificate** under Article 110(3) is constitutionally significant. If any question arises whether a Bill is a Money Bill, the decision of the Speaker of Lok Sabha is final. The certificate is endorsed when the Bill is transmitted to Rajya Sabha and when it is presented to the President. • **Lok Sabha origin** is compulsory. Under Article 109, a Money Bill cannot be introduced in Rajya Sabha. It can be introduced only in Lok Sabha, and only on the recommendation of the President. • **Rajya Sabha’s limited role** means Rajya Sabha cannot reject or amend a Money Bill. It may only make recommendations within fourteen days from receipt. Lok Sabha may accept or reject all or any of those recommendations. If Rajya Sabha does not return the Bill within fourteen days, it is deemed to have been passed by both Houses in the form passed by Lok Sabha. • **No joint sitting** is available for a Money Bill because the Constitution gives a special final say to Lok Sabha. • **K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2019) 1 SCC 1 / Aadhaar Constitution Bench**: The Aadhaar Act was challenged, including on the ground that it was wrongly passed as a Money Bill. The majority upheld the certification, reasoning that the core of the Act related to targeted delivery of subsidies and benefits involving expenditure from the Consolidated Fund of India. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud dissented and held that passing the Aadhaar Act as a Money Bill was constitutionally improper. The case is important because it exposed the controversy around the breadth of Article 110. • **Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd., (2020) 6 SCC 1 / 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1456**: The Supreme Court considered whether provisions relating to tribunals could be passed through a Finance Act certified as a Money Bill. The Court doubted the correctness of the Aadhaar majority’s approach to Article 110 and referred the larger question of interpretation of Money Bills to a larger Bench. The key principle emerging from the reasoning is that Article 110 must be read carefully because the Money Bill route bypasses Rajya Sabha’s equal legislative role. ## Financial Bills under Article 117 • **Financial Bill** is broader than a Money Bill. Every Money Bill is financial in nature, but every Financial Bill is not a Money Bill. • **Article 117(1) Financial Bill** contains matters mentioned in Article 110 along with other matters. It can be introduced only in Lok Sabha and only on the President’s recommendation. But unlike a Money Bill, Rajya Sabha has full legislative powers over it because it is not confined only to Article 110 matters. Therefore, it must be passed by both Houses, and a joint sitting may be possible if a deadlock arises. • **Article 117(3) Financial Bill** does not contain Article 110 matters but involves expenditure from the Consolidated Fund of India. It may be introduced in either House, but it cannot be passed unless the President has recommended its consideration. This is because it affects public expenditure. • **Practical distinction** is simple: a Money Bill is Lok Sabha-controlled; an Article 117(1) Financial Bill begins only in Lok Sabha but needs approval of both Houses; an Article 117(3) Financial Bill may begin in either House but needs Presidential recommendation before passage. ## Comparative Table: Ordinary Bill, Money Bill and Financial Bill BasisOrdinary BillMoney BillFinancial Bill**Main Articles**Articles 107–108Articles 109–110Article 117**House of origin**Either HouseOnly Lok SabhaArticle 117(1): only Lok Sabha; Article 117(3): either House**President’s recommendation**Generally not requiredRequiredRequired as per Article 117**Rajya Sabha power**Equal powerOnly recommendations within 14 daysGenerally full power, unless it is a Money Bill**Joint sitting**PossibleNot possiblePossible for Article 117(1), if deadlock arises**Speaker’s certificate**Not requiredRequiredNot required unless certified as Money Bill**Final passage**Both Houses must agreeLok Sabha has final sayBoth Houses generally must agree## Presidential Assent under Article 111 • **Assent stage** begins after a Bill has been passed by Parliament. It is then presented to the President under Article 111. • **President’s options** are: give assent, withhold assent, or return the Bill for reconsideration if it is not a Money Bill. If the Bill is returned and Parliament passes it again with or without amendments, the President shall not withhold assent. • **Money Bill exception** is important. The President cannot return a Money Bill for reconsideration under Article 111. This is because a Money Bill is introduced only with the President’s prior recommendation. • **Constitutional role** of assent is not merely ceremonial in theory, but in a parliamentary system the President generally acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. However, the assent stage remains constitutionally essential because a Bill becomes an Act only after assent. • **No express time limit** is mentioned in Article 111 for Presidential assent. This has created constitutional debate about delays. The better constitutional understanding is that the power must be exercised within a reasonable constitutional framework, because indefinite inaction may defeat parliamentary law-making. ## Budget and Annual Financial Statement • **Budget** is the popular name for the **Annual Financial Statement** under Article 112. It is a statement of the estimated receipts and expenditure of the Government of India for a financial year. The Constitution uses the expression Annual Financial Statement, not “Budget”. • **Charged expenditure** and **voted expenditure** are treated differently. Charged expenditure is charged upon the Consolidated Fund of India and is not submitted to vote, though it may be discussed. Examples include the salary and allowances of certain constitutional authorities and debt charges. Voted expenditure is submitted to Lok Sabha in the form of demands for grants. • **Demands for grants** under Article 113 are presented to Lok Sabha. Rajya Sabha may discuss the Budget, but voting on demands for grants is the function of Lok Sabha. This shows the principle that the directly elected House controls public expenditure. • **Appropriation Bill** under Article 114 authorises withdrawal of money from the Consolidated Fund of India. No money can be withdrawn from the Consolidated Fund except under appropriation made by law. The Appropriation Bill gives legal authority to spend. • **Finance Bill** gives effect to taxation proposals. It usually contains proposals for imposition, abolition, remission, alteration or regulation of taxes. Depending on its contents, it may be a Money Bill or a Financial Bill. • **Supplementary, additional or excess grants** under Article 115 are required when the authorised amount is insufficient, when a new service requires expenditure, or when money has been spent in excess of the amount granted. • **Vote on account** under Article 116 allows the government to obtain parliamentary approval for expenditure for part of the financial year before the full budget process is completed. It is a practical device to keep administration running. • **Vote of credit** under Article 116 is used for meeting an unexpected demand when the magnitude or indefinite character of the service makes detailed demand difficult, such as emergencies. • **Exceptional grant** under Article 116 is granted for a special purpose not forming part of the current service of any financial year. ## Parliamentary Control over Executive through Financial Procedure • **Financial accountability** is the heart of parliamentary democracy. The executive cannot raise taxes or spend public money without parliamentary authority. This reflects the classic democratic principle: no taxation and no expenditure without legislative control. • **Lok Sabha’s supremacy in finance** exists because the Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to Lok Sabha under Article 75(3). Since the government survives only while it enjoys Lok Sabha’s confidence, financial approval by Lok Sabha is politically decisive. • **Cut motions** are tools through which members may seek reduction of demands for grants. They are used to criticise government policy, economy of expenditure or specific grievances. Even when not passed, they allow detailed scrutiny. • **Guillotine** means putting outstanding demands for grants to vote at the appointed time without further discussion. It is used because the House has limited time to pass the Budget before the financial year begins. • **Public Accounts Committee, Estimates Committee and Committee on Public Undertakings** strengthen financial oversight after money is authorised and spent. Parliamentary control is therefore both prior and subsequent. ## Rules of Procedure, Language and Internal Autonomy • **Article 118** empowers each House of Parliament to make rules for regulating its procedure and conduct of business. Until such rules are made, rules from the pre-Constitution legislature may continue subject to modification. • **Article 120** deals with language to be used in Parliament. Business is transacted in Hindi or English, but the Presiding Officer may permit a member who cannot adequately express himself or herself in either language to address the House in the member’s mother tongue. • **Article 121** restricts discussion in Parliament regarding the conduct of judges of the Supreme Court or High Courts in discharge of their duties, except upon a motion for presenting an address to the President for removal of the judge. • **Article 122** protects parliamentary proceedings from being questioned in court on the ground of mere irregularity of procedure. It also protects parliamentary officers and members exercising procedural powers from court jurisdiction in respect of those powers. However, this does not create absolute immunity for unconstitutional acts. • **Raja Ram Pal v. Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha, (2007) 3 SCC 184**: The case arose after members of Parliament were expelled following allegations of accepting money for raising questions. The Supreme Court held that parliamentary proceedings are protected from judicial interference for procedural irregularities, but substantive illegality or unconstitutionality may be judicially reviewed. The ratio is that Indian Parliament is not sovereign in the British sense; it is controlled by the Constitution, and judicial review is part of the basic structure. ## Doctrine of Lapse: When Bills Survive and When They Fail • **Prorogation rule** is that a Bill pending in Parliament does not lapse merely because the House or Houses are prorogued. This ensures continuity of legislative business. • **Rajya Sabha pending Bill** does not lapse on dissolution of Lok Sabha if it has not been passed by Lok Sabha. Since Rajya Sabha is permanent, such a Bill may continue. • **Lok Sabha pending Bill** lapses when Lok Sabha is dissolved. The reason is that the House where the Bill was pending has ceased to exist. • **Bill passed by Lok Sabha and pending in Rajya Sabha** also lapses on dissolution of Lok Sabha, subject to Article 108. This is because the new Lok Sabha must have the opportunity to reconsider legislative policy. • **Bill passed by both Houses and pending for President’s assent** does not lapse because parliamentary passage is complete. At that stage, the legislative process has moved to the assent stage. ## Memory Aid: Legislative Process Flow StageOrdinary BillMoney Bill**Introduction**Either HouseOnly Lok Sabha**Recommendation of President**Usually not neededMandatory**Debate and passage in first House**RequiredRequired in Lok Sabha**Role of second House**Full power to pass, reject or amendRajya Sabha can only recommend**Deadlock solution**Joint sitting possibleNo joint sitting**Assent**President may assent, withhold, or returnPresident may assent or withhold; cannot return**Becomes law**After assentAfter assent## Important Constitutional Principles to Remember • **Bicameralism with exceptions** means both Houses generally participate equally in law-making, but Lok Sabha has primacy in money matters. • **Financial initiative of executive** means taxation and expenditure proposals usually require Presidential recommendation, reflecting executive responsibility in public finance. • **Speaker’s Money Bill certificate** is final in the internal parliamentary sense, but modern case law shows that courts may examine serious constitutional violations, especially where bicameralism is bypassed. • **Joint sitting is exceptional**, not routine. It exists only to resolve deadlocks in ordinary legislative business and certain financial Bills, not Money Bills or Constitutional Amendment Bills. • **Assent completes law-making** because a Bill, even if passed by both Houses, is not an Act until the President gives assent. • **Quorum and voting rules** ensure that parliamentary decisions have minimum institutional participation and are decided by constitutionally recognised majorities. • **Judicial restraint and constitutional review** coexist. Courts do not interfere with mere procedural irregularities inside Parliament, but they may intervene where there is substantive illegality, constitutional violation, or breach of fundamental constitutional limitations. ## Conclusion: Essence of Parliamentary Procedure and Legislative Process • **Parliamentary procedure in India** is a carefully balanced constitutional system. It combines democratic debate, federal bicameralism, executive financial responsibility, Lok Sabha’s popular mandate, Rajya Sabha’s revising role, Presidential assent, and limited judicial review. • **Ordinary Bills** follow the normal bicameral route and require approval of both Houses. **Money Bills** are controlled mainly by Lok Sabha because they concern taxation and public money. **Financial Bills** stand between ordinary and Money Bills, depending on their contents. **Joint sitting** resolves deadlocks but is not available for Money Bills or constitutional amendments. **Budget procedure** ensures that the executive cannot tax or spend without legislative authority. **Sessions, prorogation, dissolution, quorum and voting** provide the working framework through which Parliament functions. • **Constitutional morality** behind the process is that laws should be made after deliberation, public finance should remain accountable to elected representatives, and parliamentary autonomy should operate within the supremacy of the Constitution. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Parliamentary Privileges under Article 105 of the Constitution of India: Freedom of Speech, Immunity, Breach of Privilege, Contempt of House and Judicial Review](https://lawfoyer.in/parliamentary-privileges-under-article-105-of-the-constitution-of-india/) **Published:** June 5, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun5202606_54_43P-819x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning and Constitutional Purpose of Parliamentary Privileges ➤ **Core meaning:** Parliamentary privileges are special rights, immunities and powers given to Parliament, its Members and its Committees so that Parliament can function freely, fearlessly and effectively. These privileges are not personal favours to individual Members of Parliament. They exist to protect the dignity, authority and independent functioning of the House. ➤ **Functional purpose:** The basic idea is that a Member of Parliament must be able to speak, vote, participate in committees, ask questions, criticise government action and represent the public without fear of civil or criminal proceedings merely because of what was said or voted inside Parliament. ➤ **Constitutional source:** Article 105 of the Constitution deals with the powers, privileges and immunities of both Houses of Parliament, their Members and Committees. Article 194 contains similar provisions for State Legislatures. Article 105 gives express protection to freedom of speech in Parliament, immunity from court proceedings for anything said or any vote given in Parliament or its committees, and immunity for authorised publication of parliamentary proceedings. ➤ **Institutional privilege:** The privilege belongs primarily to the House as an institution. A Member enjoys it because he or she is part of Parliament. Therefore, privilege cannot be used as a shield for private misconduct, corruption, defamation outside Parliament, or acts unconnected with parliamentary functioning. ➤ **Rule of constitutional supremacy:** India follows constitutional supremacy, not parliamentary sovereignty in the British sense. Therefore, parliamentary privileges in India are subject to the Constitution, judicial review, fundamental constitutional limitations, and the basic principle that every constitutional authority acts within its jurisdiction. ## Article 105 of the Constitution of India ➤ **Article 105(1) — Freedom of speech:** Article 105(1) says that, subject to the Constitution and the rules and standing orders regulating parliamentary procedure, there shall be freedom of speech in Parliament. This is a special constitutional freedom, different from ordinary freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a), because it operates inside Parliament and is controlled mainly by constitutional provisions and parliamentary rules. ➤ **Article 105(2) — Immunity from court proceedings:** Article 105(2) protects a Member from liability in any court for anything said or any vote given by him or her in Parliament or any parliamentary committee. It also protects any person from liability for publication of reports, papers, votes or proceedings if such publication is made by or under the authority of either House. ➤ **Article 105(3) — Other privileges:** Article 105(3) says that other powers, privileges and immunities of each House, its Members and Committees shall be such as may be defined by Parliament by law; until so defined, they are the privileges that existed immediately before the coming into force of Section 15 of the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978. ➤ **Article 105(4) — Application to non-members entitled to participate:** Article 105(4) extends the protections of clauses (1), (2) and (3) to persons who have a constitutional right to speak in, or otherwise take part in, parliamentary proceedings or committee proceedings, even though they may not be Members of Parliament. ➤ **Important connected provisions:** Article 118 empowers each House of Parliament to make rules regulating its procedure and conduct of business, subject to the Constitution. Article 122 protects parliamentary proceedings from being questioned in court merely on the ground of procedural irregularity, but it does not protect substantive illegality or unconstitutionality. ## Freedom of Speech in Parliament under Article 105 ➤ **Meaning of parliamentary speech:** Freedom of speech in Parliament means that Members can express views, make allegations, criticise policies, debate Bills, ask questions, move motions, participate in committee discussions and vote without fear of external legal consequences for the speech or vote itself. ➤ **Wider than Article 19 speech in one sense:** Parliamentary speech is specially protected because ordinary restrictions under Article 19(2) do not operate in the same direct way inside Parliament. However, Article 105(1) itself makes freedom of speech subject to the Constitution and the rules and standing orders of Parliament. Therefore, the freedom is not a licence for disorder, unparliamentary language, or breach of parliamentary discipline. ➤ **Internal discipline remains:** Although courts cannot generally punish a Member for what is said in Parliament, the House may take disciplinary action under its own rules. The Speaker or Chairman may expunge remarks, require withdrawal of unparliamentary expressions, suspend a Member according to rules, or refer a matter to the Committee of Privileges. ➤ **Rajya Sabha explanation:** The Rajya Sabha Secretariat’s publication explains that freedom of speech is the most important privilege of Members of Parliament because it enables them to discharge parliamentary duties without fear, and that no action can be taken against a Member in court or before any outside authority for anything said or any vote given in Parliament or its committees. ➤ **Practical illustration:** If an MP strongly criticises a minister during a debate and makes statements connected with the debate, the MP is protected from court proceedings for that speech. But if the same MP repeats defamatory allegations at a press conference outside Parliament, Article 105(2) will not automatically protect that outside statement because it is not “anything said” in Parliament. ## Immunity under Article 105(2) ➤ **Nature of immunity:** Article 105(2) creates immunity from “proceedings in any court” for two protected parliamentary acts: anything said in Parliament or any committee, and any vote given in Parliament or any committee. The protection is attached to the parliamentary act itself. ➤ **Absolute protection for speech and vote:** When the speech or vote is within parliamentary proceedings, the immunity is very strong. A court cannot examine whether the statement was true or false, whether it was defamatory, or whether it caused private harm, because allowing such suits would create fear and chill parliamentary debate. ➤ **Authorised publication:** Article 105(2) also protects publication of parliamentary materials when the publication is “by or under the authority” of either House. This protects official reports, papers, votes and proceedings. The protection is narrower for unauthorised publication by newspapers or private persons. ➤ **No immunity for everything done by an MP:** Article 105 does not mean that an MP is above law. It does not protect ordinary crimes, private contracts, corruption, violence, or statements made outside parliamentary proceedings. The protection is functional, not personal. ➤ **Bribery after Sita Soren:** The current position is that bribery connected with a speech or vote is not protected merely because the Member later speaks or votes in the House. The Supreme Court in **Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 161** held that the purpose of Articles 105(2) and 194(2) is to protect free legislative speech and voting, not to create immunity for criminal bribery. The Court overruled the majority view in **P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI/SPE), (1998) 4 SCC 626**, to the extent it protected bribe-taking legislators who actually voted or spoke as agreed. ## Difference between Article 105(1) and Article 105(2) PointArticle 105(1)Article 105(2)**Subject**Freedom of speech in ParliamentImmunity from court proceedings**Nature**Positive freedom to speak in ParliamentProtective shield against litigation**Limitations**Subject to Constitution, rules and standing ordersProtects speech/vote from court proceedings**Control**Mainly Speaker/Chairman and House rulesCourts are barred from entertaining proceedings on protected speech/vote**Example**MP may criticise a Bill in debateMP cannot be sued for defamation for a protected parliamentary speech## Breach of Privilege ➤ **Meaning of breach of privilege:** A breach of privilege occurs when any individual, authority, organisation or even a Member interferes with the privileges, powers or immunities of Parliament, its Members or Committees. ➤ **Essential test:** The key question is whether the act obstructs or tends to obstruct Parliament, its Committees, or Members in the discharge of their parliamentary duties. ➤ **Examples of breach:** Threatening an MP for a speech made in Parliament, obstructing a Member from attending the House, serving legal proceedings for something said in Parliament, publishing false or distorted reports of parliamentary proceedings, refusing to appear before a parliamentary committee when summoned, or tampering with committee evidence may amount to breach of privilege. ➤ **Member-specific breach:** If a Member is threatened, assaulted, intimidated or legally harassed because of a speech or vote in Parliament, it may be treated as breach of privilege because it directly affects the Member’s parliamentary independence. The Rajya Sabha Secretariat notes that molesting, threatening or taking action against a Member on account of anything said in Parliament or a committee may amount to breach of privilege. ➤ **House-specific breach:** If a publication falsely imputes motives to the House, obstructs a committee, leaks confidential committee reports without authority, or scandalises parliamentary processes in a manner that obstructs functioning, the House may treat it as breach of its collective privilege. ## Contempt of House ➤ **Meaning of contempt:** Contempt of House is broader than breach of privilege. Every breach of privilege may amount to contempt, but contempt may also include acts that do not violate any specific privilege yet obstruct, lower, or tend to lower the authority, dignity or functioning of the House. ➤ **Core idea:** Contempt is concerned with obstruction or disrespect to the House’s authority. It protects the institution from acts that make parliamentary functioning difficult or impossible. ➤ **Examples of contempt:** Disobeying orders of the House, refusing to answer a committee without lawful excuse, giving false evidence to a committee, interfering with witnesses, publishing forged parliamentary documents, disorderly conduct within precincts, or scandalising the House in a manner that obstructs its work may be treated as contempt. ➤ **Punishments:** The House may admonish, reprimand, suspend, imprison for the duration of the session, or in extreme cases expel a Member if the power is validly exercised. The Rajya Sabha publication states that custody or imprisonment for contempt is limited to the duration of the session of the House, and that sincere regret is often accepted by the House in appropriate cases. ➤ **Apology and regret:** Parliamentary privilege is not mainly punitive. Its purpose is to protect functioning. Therefore, where a person expresses sincere and unconditional apology, the House may decide not to proceed further. ## Procedure in Breach of Privilege Matters ➤ **Raising the matter:** A Member generally gives notice of a question of privilege to the Speaker of Lok Sabha or Chairman of Rajya Sabha. The presiding officer decides whether the matter has consent to be raised. ➤ **Preliminary scrutiny:** The Speaker or Chairman examines whether the matter is recent, specific, and directly connected with parliamentary privilege. Frivolous, political or remote matters may be rejected. ➤ **Reference to Committee:** If the matter appears serious, it may be referred to the Committee of Privileges. The committee examines facts, hears concerned persons, considers evidence, and submits a report. ➤ **Decision by House:** The House may accept, reject or modify the committee’s recommendations. The final decision belongs to the House, subject to constitutional limitations and judicial review where jurisdictional or constitutional illegality is shown. ➤ **Natural justice:** Though parliamentary proceedings are internal, serious consequences such as suspension, expulsion or imprisonment require fairness. Courts have increasingly insisted that legislative privilege cannot be exercised arbitrarily or in violation of constitutional fundamentals. ## Parliamentary Privileges and the Press ➤ **Authorised reports protected:** Official publication of parliamentary reports, papers, votes and proceedings is protected by Article 105(2). This ensures that Parliament’s official record can be published without fear of court proceedings. ➤ **Unauthorised reports not equally protected:** Unauthorised publication, especially distorted or expunged material, may invite privilege proceedings if it obstructs or disrespects the House. The Rajya Sabha Secretariat notes that Article 105(2) immunity for publication applies when publication is made by or under the authority of the House, and that it does not automatically extend to newspaper publication of parliamentary proceedings. ➤ **Searchlight principle:** In **Pandit M.S.M. Sharma v. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha, AIR 1959 SC 395**, commonly known as the Searchlight case, the editor of a newspaper published parts of Bihar Legislative Assembly proceedings that had been expunged. The issue was whether legislative privilege could override freedom of speech and press. The Supreme Court accepted the importance of legislative privileges and treated the House as having authority over breach of privilege connected with unauthorised publication of proceedings. ## Landmark Supreme Court Case Laws on Parliamentary Privileges #### Pandit M.S.M. Sharma v. Shri Sri Krishna Sinha, AIR 1959 SC 395 ➤ **Facts:** The editor of the Searchlight newspaper published portions of Bihar Assembly debates that had been expunged by the Speaker. Privilege proceedings were initiated against him. ➤ **Issue:** Whether publication of expunged legislative proceedings could be punished as breach of privilege, and whether freedom of speech and press under Article 19(1)(a) could defeat legislative privilege. ➤ **Ratio:** The Supreme Court gave significant weight to legislative privilege and recognised the House’s power to protect its proceedings. The case shows that the press does not have an unrestricted right to publish expunged or unauthorised legislative material merely by invoking press freedom. #### Special Reference No. 1 of 1964, AIR 1965 SC 745 — Keshav Singh Case ➤ **Facts:** The Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly committed Keshav Singh, a non-member, to prison for contempt. He filed a habeas corpus petition in the Allahabad High Court. Two judges granted interim bail. The Assembly then passed resolutions against the judges and the advocate, creating a constitutional conflict between legislature and judiciary. ➤ **Issue:** Whether the legislature’s privilege power was beyond judicial scrutiny, and whether courts could examine detention ordered by a House for contempt. ➤ **Ratio:** The Supreme Court held that legislatures have power to punish for contempt, including contempt by strangers, but that privilege powers are not completely beyond the Constitution. Courts may examine jurisdictional issues, legality of detention, and constitutional limits. This case is a foundation for the Indian rule that legislative privilege is strong but not sovereign or unlimited. #### Tej Kiran Jain v. N. Sanjiva Reddy, (1970) 2 SCC 272 ➤ **Facts:** Certain persons filed a defamation suit against the Speaker, Ministers and MPs for statements allegedly made during a Calling Attention Motion in Lok Sabha. ➤ **Issue:** Whether Members could be sued in court for allegedly defamatory statements made during parliamentary proceedings. ➤ **Ratio:** The Supreme Court held that Article 105(2) gives absolute immunity for “anything said” in Parliament. The word “anything” was treated broadly. Therefore, courts cannot entertain proceedings against Members for statements made in Parliament, even if those statements are alleged to be defamatory. #### P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI/SPE), (1998) 4 SCC 626 ➤ **Facts:** The case arose from the JMM bribery controversy, where certain MPs were alleged to have accepted bribes in connection with a no-confidence motion against the government. ➤ **Issue:** Whether an MP could claim immunity under Article 105(2) from criminal prosecution for accepting a bribe connected with a vote in Parliament. ➤ **Earlier majority view:** The majority held that MPs who accepted bribes and actually voted in Parliament in accordance with the alleged bargain were protected by Article 105(2), while bribe-givers and an MP who did not vote were not similarly protected. ➤ **Current position:** This majority view has been overruled by the seven-judge bench in **Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 161**. Therefore, P.V. Narasimha Rao is now important historically, but it is no longer good law on the point that a bribe-taking legislator can claim immunity merely because the agreed vote or speech was performed. #### Raja Ram Pal v. Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha, (2007) 3 SCC 184 ➤ **Facts:** Certain Members of Parliament were expelled after a sting operation alleged that they accepted money for asking questions in Parliament. ➤ **Issue:** Whether Parliament has power to expel Members for conduct amounting to contempt or breach of privilege, and whether such expulsion is subject to judicial review. ➤ **Ratio:** The Supreme Court upheld Parliament’s power to expel Members in appropriate privilege cases. At the same time, it held that parliamentary privilege is subject to judicial review on limited grounds such as lack of jurisdiction, constitutional violation, mala fides, gross illegality, or violation of fundamental constitutional mandates. The Court rejected the idea that the House is the sole and final judge in every sense. #### Amarinder Singh v. Special Committee, Punjab Vidhan Sabha, (2010) 6 SCC 113 ➤ **Facts:** The Punjab Vidhan Sabha expelled Captain Amarinder Singh for alleged misconduct relating to a land exemption matter during his tenure as Chief Minister. ➤ **Issue:** Whether legislative privilege could be used to expel a Member for executive acts not directly obstructing the functioning of the House. ➤ **Ratio:** The Supreme Court held that privilege jurisdiction must have a functional link with the House’s legislative functioning. Misconduct outside the House cannot automatically be treated as breach of privilege unless it obstructs or affects the House’s functioning. This case narrows arbitrary use of privilege for political punishment. #### Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 161 ➤ **Facts:** The appellant, a legislator, was accused of accepting a bribe in relation to a Rajya Sabha election vote. She claimed immunity under Article 194(2), relying on the earlier P.V. Narasimha Rao ruling under Article 105(2). ➤ **Issue:** Whether legislative immunity protects a Member from criminal prosecution for bribery connected with speech or vote in the House. ➤ **Ratio:** The seven-judge bench held that Articles 105(2) and 194(2) protect free speech and voting in the House, not corruption. The offence of bribery is complete when the bribe is accepted or agreed to be accepted; it does not depend on whether the Member later performs the promised vote or speech. The Court held that a claim of privilege cannot defeat criminal law where the criminal act exists independently of the protected speech or vote. ## Judicial Review of Parliamentary Privileges ➤ **Basic principle:** Courts do not interfere with ordinary internal procedure of Parliament. Article 122 prevents courts from questioning parliamentary proceedings merely because of procedural irregularity. However, if the issue is substantive illegality, constitutional violation, lack of jurisdiction, mala fides, or violation of constitutional limitations, judicial review is available. ➤ **Procedural irregularity vs constitutional illegality:** A procedural irregularity is a minor defect in the manner of conducting proceedings, such as timing, order of business or internal procedure. Constitutional illegality is a deeper defect, such as acting beyond power, violating natural justice in a serious punitive matter, punishing conduct unrelated to parliamentary functioning, or violating express constitutional provisions. ➤ **Raja Ram Pal test:** The Supreme Court in **Raja Ram Pal** made it clear that courts will not sit as appellate bodies over Parliament’s internal decisions, but they can examine whether the House acted within constitutional limits. This creates a balanced model: Parliament has autonomy, but not absolute immunity from constitutional scrutiny. ➤ **Keshav Singh foundation:** The Keshav Singh advisory opinion established that legislative privilege cannot destroy the jurisdiction of constitutional courts. If a person is detained under a privilege order, courts may examine whether the detention is legal and whether the House acted within power. ➤ **Article 122 protection is not total:** Article 122 does not say that courts can never examine parliamentary action. It only bars challenge on the ground of “irregularity of procedure.” Therefore, an unconstitutional exercise of privilege cannot be saved by calling it an internal proceeding. ## Parliamentary Privileges and Fundamental Rights ➤ **Complex relationship:** Parliamentary privileges sometimes conflict with fundamental rights such as freedom of speech, personal liberty and equality. Indian courts have attempted to balance legislative autonomy with constitutional rights. ➤ **Article 19 and press freedom:** In the Searchlight case, privilege was given priority over press freedom in the context of unauthorised publication of expunged proceedings. However, later constitutional jurisprudence has become more cautious about unchecked privilege powers. ➤ **Article 21 and liberty:** If a person is detained for contempt of House, personal liberty is involved. After the development of Article 21 jurisprudence, any serious deprivation of liberty must satisfy fairness, legality and constitutional reasonableness. ➤ **Article 14 and non-arbitrariness:** Exercise of privilege cannot be arbitrary, discriminatory or mala fide. Parliament and Legislatures are constitutional bodies and must act within constitutional boundaries. ## Distinction between Privilege, Immunity and Power ConceptMeaningExample**Privilege**Special right necessary for parliamentary functioningRight of House to regulate internal proceedings**Immunity**Protection from legal proceedingsNo court case for speech or vote in Parliament**Power**Authority to act against obstructionPunishing contempt or breach of privilege## Important Memory Chart AreaKey Rule**Speech in Parliament**Protected under Article 105(1) and 105(2)**Vote in Parliament**Protected from court proceedings**Bribe for vote/speech**Not protected after Sita Soren**Authorised publication**Protected under Article 105(2)**Unauthorised publication**May attract privilege action**Breach of privilege**Violation of specific privilege**Contempt of House**Broader obstruction to authority or functioning**Judicial review**Available for jurisdictional error, illegality, mala fides and constitutional violation**Mere procedural irregularity**Protected from court interference under Article 122## Final Conceptual Summary ➤ **Parliamentary privileges protect democracy:** They ensure that Parliament can debate, deliberate and hold the executive accountable without external intimidation. ➤ **Article 105 is the centre:** It protects freedom of speech, voting, authorised publication and other privileges necessary for parliamentary functioning. ➤ **Freedom is not lawlessness:** A Member has strong protection for parliamentary speech and vote, but not for bribery, corruption or private misconduct. ➤ **Breach and contempt protect the House:** Breach of privilege protects specific privileges, while contempt protects the general dignity, authority and functioning of Parliament. ➤ **Judicial review preserves constitutional supremacy:** Courts respect parliamentary autonomy but may intervene when privilege is exercised beyond jurisdiction or in violation of the Constitution. ➤ **Current settled position:** After **Sita Soren v. Union of India**, parliamentary immunity cannot be used as a shield against prosecution for bribery. The Constitution protects honest legislative functioning, not criminal corruption. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Parliament of India: Lok Sabha, Rajya Sabha, Membership, Disqualification, Office of Profit, Anti-Defection Law and Vacation of Seats](https://lawfoyer.in/parliament-of-india/) **Published:** June 5, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun5202606_46_17P-819x1024.jpeg) ## Introduction: Constitutional Position of Parliament in India ❖ **Parliament as Union Legislature:** The Parliament of India is the supreme legislative organ at the Union level, but it is not legally sovereign like the British Parliament because it is controlled by the written Constitution, federal distribution of powers, fundamental rights, judicial review and basic structure doctrine. Under **Article 79**, Parliament consists of the **President**, the **Council of States**, called **Rajya Sabha**, and the **House of the People**, called **Lok Sabha**. This means that the President is not a member of either House, but is an integral part of Parliament for legislative functions such as summoning, proroguing, addressing Parliament, assenting to Bills and issuing ordinances. ❖ **Bicameral Structure:** India follows a bicameral parliamentary system at the Union level. **Lok Sabha** represents the people directly, while **Rajya Sabha** represents the States and certain Union Territories. The Constitution gives both Houses important legislative powers, but Lok Sabha has special dominance in matters of government responsibility and Money Bills. Rajya Sabha’s official introduction states that the Council of States has a maximum strength of 250, consisting of 238 elected representatives of States and Union Territories and 12 nominated members; its present strength is 245, consisting of 233 elected and 12 nominated members. ## Composition of Rajya Sabha under Article 80 ❖ **Maximum Strength:** Under **Article 80**, Rajya Sabha may have a maximum of **250 members**. Out of these, **238 members** represent the States and Union Territories, and **12 members** are nominated by the President. The nominated members must have special knowledge or practical experience in **literature, science, art and social service**. The official Rajya Sabha source confirms the same constitutional structure and present strength. ❖ **Elected Members of Rajya Sabha:** Representatives of the States are elected by the elected members of State Legislative Assemblies. The election is by the system of **proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote**. This method helps minority parties in State Assemblies obtain representation in Rajya Sabha in proportion to their strength. ❖ **Union Territory Representation:** Not every Union Territory is represented in Rajya Sabha. Only those Union Territories which have a legislative/electoral arrangement provided by law are represented. The Rajya Sabha source states that representatives of Delhi, Puducherry and Jammu and Kashmir are elected through their respective electoral colleges/legislative assemblies. ❖ **Nominated Members:** The 12 nominated members are not elected by the people or legislatures. Their purpose is to bring persons of eminence and expertise into parliamentary deliberation. They may participate in debates and vote on ordinary matters, but they cannot vote in the election of the President because the electoral college for the President consists only of elected members of both Houses and elected members of State Legislative Assemblies and certain Union Territory Assemblies. ❖ **Continuing Chamber:** Rajya Sabha is a permanent House and is **not subject to dissolution**. However, its members do not hold office permanently. Under **Article 83(1)**, one-third of its members retire every second year, and each member ordinarily has a term of **six years**. ## Composition of Lok Sabha under Article 81 ❖ **Direct Representation of People:** Lok Sabha is the directly elected House of Parliament. It represents the people of India on the basis of territorial constituencies. Its members are chosen by direct election on the basis of adult suffrage under **Article 326**, which provides for elections on the basis of adult citizenship, subject to qualifications and disqualifications prescribed by the Constitution or law. ❖ **Maximum Strength after Anglo-Indian Nomination Ended:** After the discontinuance of Anglo-Indian nomination to Lok Sabha, the Constitution permits up to **550 elected members**, with not more than **530 members from States** and not more than **20 members from Union Territories**. The Government of India’s public directory states that the Constitution permits up to 550 members, consisting of 530 from States and 20 from Union Territories. ❖ **Actual Elected Strength:** The present elected strength of Lok Sabha is ordinarily **543 elected members**, unless vacancies exist. Members are elected from single-member territorial constituencies. Seats are distributed among States and Union Territories broadly on population principles, subject to constitutional freezes and delimitation rules. ❖ **Duration of Lok Sabha:** Under **Article 83(2)**, Lok Sabha continues for **five years** from the date appointed for its first meeting, unless dissolved earlier. During a national emergency, Parliament may extend this period by law for one year at a time, but not beyond six months after the emergency ceases. ❖ **Special Position of Lok Sabha:** Lok Sabha is politically more powerful because the Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to it under **Article 75(3)**. A government survives only so long as it enjoys the confidence of Lok Sabha. Money Bills can be introduced only in Lok Sabha, and Rajya Sabha has only recommendatory power in relation to such Bills; the official Rajya Sabha source also explains that Rajya Sabha must return a Money Bill within fourteen days and cannot amend it. ## Comparative Table: Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha BasisLok SabhaRajya Sabha**Meaning**House of the PeopleCouncil of States**Constitutional Article**Article 81Article 80**Nature**Directly elected HouseIndirectly elected and partly nominated House**Maximum Strength**550 elected members after Anglo-Indian nomination ended250 members**Term**5 years, unless dissolved earlierPermanent House; members retire by rotation**Election Method**Direct electionProportional representation by single transferable vote**Minimum Age**25 years30 years**Government Responsibility**Council of Ministers responsible to Lok SabhaNo power to remove government by no-confidence motion**Money Bill Power**Dominant HouseRecommendatory role only## Qualifications for Membership of Parliament under Article 84 ❖ **Citizenship:** A person must be a **citizen of India**. Citizenship is the first essential condition because Parliament is the national law-making body and membership requires allegiance to India. ❖ **Oath or Affirmation:** The person must make and subscribe an oath or affirmation according to the form set out in the **Third Schedule** before a person authorised by the Election Commission. This oath binds the member to bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution and uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India. ❖ **Age Requirement:** For **Rajya Sabha**, the minimum age is **30 years**. For **Lok Sabha**, the minimum age is **25 years**. The official Rajya Sabha source also states that Article 84 requires a Rajya Sabha member to be a citizen, take oath/affirmation, and be not less than 30 years of age. ❖ **Other Qualifications by Parliament:** Article 84 also permits Parliament to prescribe additional qualifications by law. The important law in this field is the **Representation of the People Act, 1951**. For example, a candidate must be an elector for a parliamentary constituency, subject to special rules for reserved seats. ## Disqualifications for Membership under Article 102 ❖ **Constitutional Grounds:** **Article 102(1)** provides that a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of either House of Parliament if he or she: ➤ **Office of Profit:** Holds any office of profit under the Government of India or the Government of any State, other than an office declared by Parliament by law not to disqualify its holder. ➤ **Unsound Mind:** Is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court. ➤ **Undischarged Insolvent:** Is an undischarged insolvent. ➤ **Foreign Citizenship or Allegiance:** Is not a citizen of India, has voluntarily acquired citizenship of a foreign State, or is under acknowledgment of allegiance or adherence to a foreign State. ➤ **Disqualification by Law:** Is disqualified by or under any law made by Parliament. ❖ **Anti-Defection Ground:** **Article 102(2)** adds that a person shall also be disqualified if disqualified under the **Tenth Schedule**, which contains the anti-defection law. ## Disqualification under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 ❖ **Statutory Disqualifications:** Since Article 102(1)(e) allows Parliament to create disqualifications by law, the Representation of the People Act, 1951 is central to parliamentary membership. Its Chapter III deals with disqualifications such as conviction for certain offences, corrupt practices, dismissal for corruption or disloyalty, government contracts, office under government company and failure to lodge election expenses. The India Code version of the Act lists Sections **8, 8A, 9, 9A, 10 and 10A** as major disqualification provisions. ❖ **Conviction for Offences under Section 8:** Section 8 disqualifies persons convicted for certain serious offences. In many cases, the disqualification starts from the date of conviction and continues for a further period after release. Section 8(3) states that a person convicted of any offence and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years shall be disqualified from the date of conviction and shall continue to be disqualified for six years after release. ❖ **Corrupt Practices under Section 8A:** Section 8A deals with disqualification on the ground of corrupt practices. The statute provides that cases of persons found guilty of corrupt practice are submitted to the President for determining whether the person should be disqualified and for what period; the period cannot exceed six years from the date when the order takes effect. ❖ **Dismissal for Corruption or Disloyalty under Section 9:** A person dismissed from government service for corruption or disloyalty is disqualified for five years from dismissal. The Act also provides for an Election Commission certificate on whether the dismissal was for corruption or disloyalty. ❖ **Government Contract under Section 9A:** A person is disqualified if there is a subsisting contract with the government for supply of goods, execution of works or services, because such a relationship may create conflict between public duty and private interest. ❖ **Office under Government Company under Section 10:** A person holding an office under a government company may be disqualified, subject to statutory conditions, because such an office may create dependency on government-controlled corporate power. ❖ **Failure to Lodge Election Expenses under Section 10A:** A candidate who fails to lodge an account of election expenses as required by law may be disqualified by the Election Commission. ## Office of Profit under Article 102(1)(a) ❖ **Meaning of Office of Profit:** An **office of profit** means a position under the Central or State Government which gives the holder some financial gain, advantage or benefit, unless Parliament has declared that office not to disqualify its holder. The object is to protect the independence of legislators and prevent executive influence over MPs through paid or beneficial offices. ❖ **Key Ingredients:** Courts generally examine whether there is an **office**, whether it is held **under the Government**, whether the office carries **profit or pecuniary benefit**, and whether the government has control over appointment, removal, functions or remuneration. ❖ **Profit Need Not Be Actually Received:** The important point is that the office must be capable of yielding profit. Actual receipt of money is not always necessary. If the office carries entitlement to salary, allowances, honorarium, residence, vehicle, staff, or other financial advantage beyond compensatory reimbursement, it may become an office of profit. ❖ **Jaya Bachchan v. Union of India, AIR 2006 SC 2119; (2006) 5 SCC 266:** In this case, Jaya Bachchan, a Rajya Sabha member, was disqualified after the President decided under Article 103 that she held an office of profit. The issue was whether the post held by her carried pecuniary gain. The Supreme Court held that what matters is whether pecuniary gain is receivable in connection with the office, not whether the person actually received it. The Court upheld the disqualification and clarified that an office capable of yielding financial benefit may attract Article 102(1)(a). ❖ **Shibu Soren v. Dayanand Sahay, AIR 2001 SC 2583; (2001) 7 SCC 425:** In this case, Shibu Soren’s election to Rajya Sabha was challenged on the ground that he held an office of profit as Chairman of the Interim Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council. The Supreme Court examined the nature of the office, government control and benefits attached to it. The Court held that the office was under the State Government and attracted disqualification. The case is important because it shows that the substance of the post, not merely its label, determines whether it is an office of profit. ❖ **Exemption by Parliament:** Parliament may declare certain offices as not disqualifying. This is done because not every public office creates a real conflict of interest. For example, certain advisory, cultural or parliamentary committee positions may be exempted by law. ## Decision on Disqualification under Article 103 ❖ **President’s Decision:** When a question arises whether a sitting MP has become disqualified under Article 102(1), it is referred to the **President** under **Article 103**. ❖ **Election Commission’s Opinion:** Before giving a decision, the President must obtain the opinion of the **Election Commission of India**, and the President acts according to that opinion. This system ensures that disqualification questions are decided through an independent constitutional body rather than by political majority alone. ❖ **Judicial Review:** The President’s decision under Article 103 is subject to judicial review if there is illegality, constitutional violation, mala fide exercise of power or procedural unfairness. ## Anti-Defection Law under the Tenth Schedule ❖ **Purpose of Anti-Defection Law:** The Tenth Schedule was inserted by the **Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985** to curb political defections. Its purpose is to prevent elected representatives from abandoning the party mandate for personal gain, office, money or political bargaining. PRS explains that the Tenth Schedule lays down the process by which legislators may be disqualified on the ground of defection by the Presiding Officer on a petition by another member of the House. ❖ **Grounds of Defection for Elected Party Members:** A member belonging to a political party is disqualified if he or she **voluntarily gives up membership** of that political party, or votes/abstains from voting contrary to the party direction without prior permission and such act is not condoned within the prescribed time. ❖ **Voluntarily Giving Up Membership:** This phrase is wider than formal resignation. A member may be treated as having voluntarily given up party membership by conduct, speeches, public alignment with another party, joining rival political activities, or openly acting against the party in a manner showing abandonment of membership. ❖ **Independent Members:** An independent member is disqualified if, after election, he or she joins any political party. This rule exists because an independent candidate is elected without a party label and cannot later convert that mandate into a party mandate. ❖ **Nominated Members:** A nominated member may join a political party within six months of taking the seat. If the nominated member joins a political party after expiry of six months, disqualification follows. ❖ **Merger Exception:** A member is not disqualified if the original political party merges with another political party and at least **two-thirds** of the members of the legislature party agree to such merger. The earlier “split” exception of one-third members was deleted by the **Constitution (Ninety-first Amendment) Act, 2003**. ❖ **Decision-Maker:** The question of disqualification under the Tenth Schedule is decided by the **Chairman or Speaker** of the House. In Parliament, the Chairman of Rajya Sabha decides cases relating to Rajya Sabha members, and the Speaker of Lok Sabha decides cases relating to Lok Sabha members. ❖ **Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651:** This is the leading Constitution Bench decision on the anti-defection law. The petitioners challenged the validity of the Tenth Schedule, arguing that it violated freedom of speech and undermined democratic dissent. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Tenth Schedule, holding that the law aims to curb unprincipled defections. It also held that the Speaker/Chairman acts as a tribunal while deciding disqualification and that the decision is subject to judicial review, although courts should ordinarily not interfere before the Presiding Officer has made a decision. ❖ **Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 641:** The Supreme Court held that “voluntarily giving up membership” is not confined to formal resignation from party membership. It may be inferred from conduct. This case is important because it prevents legislators from avoiding anti-defection law by not submitting formal resignation while practically deserting the party. ❖ **G. Viswanathan v. Speaker, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, (1996) 2 SCC 353:** The Supreme Court held that expelled members of a political party do not become independents for purposes of the Tenth Schedule. They continue to be treated as members of the party on whose ticket they were elected, and joining another party may attract disqualification. ❖ **Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya, (2007) 4 SCC 270:** The Supreme Court held that the Speaker’s decision on defection can be judicially reviewed, especially where constitutional requirements are ignored. The case emphasises that the Presiding Officer cannot defeat anti-defection law by improper delay or legally unsustainable findings. ❖ **Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly, (2020) 2 SCC 617:** The Supreme Court observed that Speakers should decide disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule within a reasonable period, normally **three months**, unless exceptional circumstances exist. This case is important because delay in deciding defection petitions can allow defectors to continue in office and distort democratic mandates. ## Vacation of Seats under Article 101 ❖ **Double Membership of Both Houses:** Under **Article 101(1)**, no person can be a member of both Houses of Parliament. If a person is chosen to both Houses, one seat must be vacated according to law. ❖ **Membership of Parliament and State Legislature:** A person cannot simultaneously remain a member of Parliament and a State Legislature. If elected to both, the person must resign one seat within the legally prescribed period; otherwise, the parliamentary seat may become vacant. ❖ **Resignation:** Under **Article 101(3)(b)**, a member may resign by writing addressed to the Chairman of Rajya Sabha or Speaker of Lok Sabha, as the case may be. However, the resignation is accepted only if the Presiding Officer is satisfied that it is voluntary and genuine. This prevents forced resignations, fabricated resignations or resignations obtained by coercion. ❖ **Disqualification:** Under **Article 101(3)(a)**, the seat becomes vacant if a member becomes subject to any disqualification mentioned in Article 102. ❖ **Absence for 60 Days:** Under **Article 101(4)**, if a member is absent from all meetings of the House for **60 days** without permission, the House may declare the seat vacant. In calculating 60 days, periods when the House is prorogued or adjourned for more than four consecutive days are not counted. ❖ **Death or Dissolution:** A seat also becomes vacant on death of the member. In Lok Sabha, all seats become vacant when the House is dissolved, subject to continuation for limited constitutional purposes until the new House is constituted. ## Vacation of Seats and Disqualification: Difference ConceptMeaningExample**Disqualification**Legal incapacity to be chosen as or continue as MPConviction under Section 8 RPA, office of profit, defection**Vacation of Seat**Actual seat becomes empty due to constitutional eventResignation, absence for 60 days, choosing one seat out of two**Authority**President/Election Commission or Speaker/Chairman depending on groundArticle 103 or Tenth Schedule**Effect**Person loses eligibility or membershipConstituency/seat becomes vacant## Effect of Criminal Conviction on Membership ❖ **Immediate Disqualification after Lily Thomas:** Earlier, Section 8(4) of the Representation of the People Act gave sitting MPs and MLAs a protective period, allowing them to continue if they filed an appeal within the prescribed time. This protection was struck down. ❖ **Lily Thomas v. Union of India, AIR 2013 SC 2662; (2013) 7 SCC 653:** In this case, the petitioners challenged Section 8(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The Supreme Court held that Parliament had no power to create a special protective rule for sitting legislators different from candidates. It declared Section 8(4) unconstitutional. The result is that if a sitting MP is convicted and sentenced in a manner attracting Section 8, disqualification operates from the date of conviction, subject to relief such as stay of conviction by an appellate court. The India Code text also notes that the relevant protective sub-section was struck down in Lily Thomas. ❖ **Stay of Conviction:** Merely filing an appeal does not automatically remove disqualification. The appellate court must stay the conviction, not merely suspend the sentence. This distinction is important because disqualification is attached to conviction. ## Membership, Oath and Sitting without Qualification ❖ **Oath under Article 99:** Every member must make and subscribe oath or affirmation before taking the seat. A person elected to Parliament becomes entitled to sit and vote only after fulfilling this requirement. ❖ **Penalty under Article 104:** If a person sits or votes as a member before complying with Article 99, or when he knows that he is not qualified or is disqualified, he is liable to a monetary penalty for each day of such sitting or voting, recoverable as a debt due to the Union. ## Special Note: Reservation and Representation in Lok Sabha ❖ **SC/ST Reservation:** Lok Sabha contains seats reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes under constitutional provisions. These are territorial constituencies reserved for candidates belonging to SC/ST communities, but all voters in the constituency vote. ❖ **Anglo-Indian Nomination Discontinued:** Earlier, Article 331 allowed the President to nominate up to two members of the Anglo-Indian community to Lok Sabha if the community was not adequately represented. This system has been discontinued after the **104th Constitutional Amendment**, and therefore the present maximum elected structure is understood without the two nominated Anglo-Indian seats. Government directory information reflects the present constitutional maximum as 550 elected members. ❖ **Women’s Reservation Amendment:** The **Constitution (One Hundred and Sixth Amendment) Act, 2023** provides for reservation of one-third seats for women in Lok Sabha, State Legislative Assemblies and the Legislative Assembly of NCT of Delhi, but its practical operation is linked with census and delimitation as provided in the amendment. The official Gazette text shows that the Act inserted provisions for women’s reservation and was enacted in 2023. ## Memory Aid: “Q-DOVAR” for Parliamentary Membership ❖ **Q – Qualifications:** Citizenship, oath, minimum age, other qualifications by law. ❖ **D – Disqualifications:** Article 102 and RPA, 1951. ❖ **O – Office of Profit:** Prevents executive influence over legislators. ❖ **V – Vacation of Seats:** Article 101 events such as resignation, double membership, absence. ❖ **A – Anti-Defection:** Tenth Schedule controls political defections. ❖ **R – Review:** Judicial review applies to disqualification decisions, especially after Kihoto Hollohan. ## Conclusion ❖ **Core Understanding:** The constitutional law of Parliament’s composition, membership and disqualification balances democratic representation with constitutional morality. Lok Sabha gives direct voice to the people, Rajya Sabha gives federal voice to the States and Union Territories, and the President completes Parliament for legislative purposes. Membership is controlled through qualifications under Article 84, disqualifications under Article 102, statutory rules under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, office of profit principles, and anti-defection rules under the Tenth Schedule. ❖ **Underlying Principle:** The Constitution does not treat parliamentary membership as a private privilege. It is a public constitutional trust. Therefore, rules on office of profit prevent executive patronage; criminal conviction disqualifications protect legislative integrity; anti-defection law protects the electoral mandate; and vacation of seat rules ensure that membership remains genuine, accountable and constitutionally valid. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Attorney General for India under Article 76: Appointment, Qualifications, Duties, Rights, Limitations and Distinction from Advocate General](https://lawfoyer.in/attorney-general-for-india-under-article-76/) **Published:** June 5, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun5202606_38_02P-725x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning and Constitutional Position of Attorney General for India • **Constitutional office:** The Attorney General for India is a constitutional authority created by **Article 76 of the Constitution of India**. Article 76 provides for the appointment, qualifications, duties, right of audience, tenure and remuneration of the Attorney General. The office is placed in **Part V of the Constitution**, which deals with the Union. Article 76 states that the President shall appoint a person qualified to be appointed as a Judge of the Supreme Court as the Attorney General for India. • **Highest law officer:** The Attorney General is generally described as the **highest law officer of India** because he gives legal advice to the Government of India and represents the Union in important constitutional and legal matters. He is not merely a private advocate engaged by the Government; he holds a special constitutional position and acts as the chief legal adviser of the Union Government. • **Bridge between law and government:** The Attorney General performs a connecting role between the **executive government**, **courts**, and **Parliament**. He advises the Union Government on legal questions, appears before courts in cases involving the Government of India, and can participate in parliamentary proceedings without voting rights. • **Not a minister:** The Attorney General is connected with the Union Executive but is **not a member of the Council of Ministers**. India has a separate Minister of Law and Justice for political and administrative responsibility over the Law Ministry. The Attorney General gives legal advice and represents the Union, but he does not exercise ministerial power as a Cabinet Minister. ## Appointment of Attorney General for India under Article 76 • **Appointing authority:** Under **Article 76(1)**, the Attorney General for India is appointed by the **President of India**. In the working of the parliamentary system, the President normally acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, but the constitutional text expressly says that the appointment is made by the President. • **No special procedure:** The Constitution does not prescribe a detailed appointment procedure like consultation with judges, parliamentary approval, a selection committee, or a fixed public notification process. Therefore, the appointment is essentially an executive decision, subject to the minimum constitutional qualification mentioned in Article 76. • **No fixed term:** The Constitution does not provide a fixed tenure of five years, six years, or any other definite period. The Attorney General holds office **during the pleasure of the President** under Article 76(4). This means he can continue so long as the President permits him to hold office. • **Practical convention:** Although not expressly written in Article 76, in practice the Attorney General usually resigns when the Government that appointed him changes or resigns. This is because the Attorney General is the legal adviser of the Government of India and must enjoy the confidence of the Government. • **Remuneration:** Under **Article 76(4)**, the Attorney General receives such remuneration as the President may determine. The Constitution does not itself fix salary, allowances or service conditions. ## Qualifications of Attorney General for India • **Supreme Court Judge qualification:** Article 76(1) requires that the Attorney General must be a person who is **qualified to be appointed a Judge of the Supreme Court**. Therefore, the qualification of the Attorney General is linked to **Article 124(3)** of the Constitution, which deals with qualifications for appointment as a Supreme Court Judge. • **Citizenship requirement:** The person must be a **citizen of India**, because only an Indian citizen can be appointed as a Judge of the Supreme Court. • **Judicial or advocacy experience:** A person is qualified for appointment as a Supreme Court Judge if he has been a Judge of one or more High Courts for at least **five years**, or has been an advocate of one or more High Courts for at least **ten years**, or is, in the opinion of the President, a **distinguished jurist**. • **High professional standing:** The office requires deep constitutional understanding, professional integrity, litigation experience, and the ability to advise the Union Government on complex questions involving constitutional law, statutory interpretation, federal relations, public law, criminal law, commercial law, international law and administrative law. • **No requirement of being a Member of Parliament:** The Attorney General need not be a Member of Parliament. Article 88 separately gives him the right to speak and participate in parliamentary proceedings, but that right does not make him an MP. ## Duties of Attorney General for India • **Legal advice to Government of India:** Under **Article 76(2)**, the first duty of the Attorney General is to give advice to the Government of India on legal matters referred to him. This advice may relate to constitutional validity of laws, interpretation of statutes, federal disputes, treaties, government contracts, administrative action, litigation strategy, or any important public law issue. • **Duties assigned by President:** Article 76(2) also requires the Attorney General to perform other duties of a legal character assigned or referred to him by the President. This makes his role flexible, because the legal needs of the Government may differ from case to case. • **Constitutional and statutory functions:** Article 76(2) further states that the Attorney General shall discharge functions conferred on him by or under the Constitution or any other law. Therefore, his functions are not limited only to Article 76; they may arise under statutes, rules, court procedures, and constitutional practices. • **Representation of Union Government:** The Attorney General appears for the Government of India in important cases before the Supreme Court, especially where constitutional interpretation, Centre-State relations, validity of parliamentary laws, national policy, fundamental rights, or institutional questions are involved. • **Article 143 advisory references:** The Attorney General may represent the Union in advisory proceedings before the Supreme Court under **Article 143**, where the President refers questions of law or fact of public importance to the Supreme Court for its opinion. In **Special Reference No. 1 of 1964, AIR 1965 SC 745**, popularly connected with the Keshav Singh controversy, the President referred questions concerning the relationship between legislative privilege and judicial power; the case is important to understand how high constitutional issues may come before the Supreme Court through advisory jurisdiction. • **Guardian of legality:** The Attorney General is expected to assist the Government in acting according to law. His advice should not merely defend every governmental action blindly; the dignity of the office requires independent legal judgment. His role is to protect the legal interests of the Union while respecting constitutional morality, rule of law and judicial independence. ## Rights and Powers of Attorney General for India • **Right of audience in all courts:** Under **Article 76(3)**, the Attorney General has the **right of audience in all courts in the territory of India** while performing his duties. This means he can appear before the Supreme Court, High Courts and subordinate courts when his official duty requires such appearance. • **Wider than ordinary advocate’s appearance:** An ordinary advocate’s appearance may be regulated by procedural requirements, vakalatnama, court rules, and territorial practice. The Attorney General’s right of audience is constitutionally recognised. However, this right is connected with the performance of his duties and does not mean that he becomes a judge, court officer above all advocates, or a person immune from court discipline. • **Right to participate in Parliament:** Under **Article 88**, the Attorney General has the right to speak in and otherwise take part in proceedings of either House of Parliament, any joint sitting of the Houses, and any committee of Parliament of which he may be named a member. However, Article 88 clearly states that he is **not entitled to vote** merely because of this right. • **No voting power:** The Attorney General can explain legal issues, clarify constitutional points, and assist Parliament during discussion, but he cannot vote unless he separately becomes a member of a House. His parliamentary role is advisory and participatory, not representative in the electoral sense. • **Parliamentary privilege protection:** Article 105 deals with powers, privileges and immunities of Parliament and its members. The protections under parliamentary privilege extend, in the relevant manner, to persons who have the constitutional right to speak and participate in parliamentary proceedings. This helps the Attorney General speak freely in Parliament while performing his constitutional role. • **Recognition in constitutional litigation:** The Attorney General often appears in landmark constitutional cases to present the Union Government’s position. For example, **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225; AIR 1973 SC 1461; 1973 Supp SCR 1**, involved the scope of Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution and resulted in the basic structure doctrine. The case is not about the office of Attorney General itself, but it shows the importance of Union law officers in major constitutional litigation. ## Limitations on Attorney General for India • **Pleasure tenure:** The Attorney General holds office during the pleasure of the President. Therefore, he does not enjoy the same security of tenure as judges of the Supreme Court or constitutional authorities like the Comptroller and Auditor General. This makes the office flexible but also requires strong professional independence. • **No right to vote in Parliament:** Article 88 gives the Attorney General the right to speak and participate, but not the right to vote. This is a key limitation because he is not an elected representative merely by holding the office. • **Not a member of Cabinet:** The Attorney General may advise the Government, but he is not the political head of the Law Ministry. Policy decisions are taken by the Government, while the Attorney General provides legal guidance. • **Cannot advise against Government of India:** As a matter of professional propriety and government law officer practice, the Attorney General should not advise or appear against the Government of India. He should also avoid situations where his private professional work conflicts with his official role. • **Restrictions in criminal matters:** The Attorney General should not defend an accused person in criminal prosecutions without permission of the Government of India. This avoids conflict between his public duty and private professional engagement. • **Restrictions in company positions:** He should not accept appointment as a director in a company or corporation without permission of the Government of India. This restriction prevents conflict of interest and protects the neutrality of the office. • **Not a full-time government servant in the ordinary sense:** The Attorney General is not usually treated like a regular civil servant. He may continue private legal practice, but only subject to restrictions, professional ethics and conflict-of-interest limitations. This distinguishes him from ordinary government employees. • **Bound by professional ethics:** Even though he holds a constitutional office, he remains subject to standards of legal ethics. He must maintain fairness to the court, confidentiality of government communications, independence of legal opinion, and dignity of the Bar. • **No independent executive power:** The Attorney General cannot issue executive orders like a minister, cannot create binding policy on his own, and cannot exercise administrative control over ministries merely because he is the chief legal adviser. ## Attorney General and Article 88: Parliamentary Role Explained • **Purpose of Article 88:** The Attorney General may need to explain legal implications of Bills, constitutional questions, judicial decisions or government legal positions before Parliament. Article 88 enables him to assist Parliament directly. • **Participation without membership:** Article 88 creates a special constitutional arrangement. The Attorney General may speak in Lok Sabha, Rajya Sabha, joint sittings and committees, but this does not make him a member of either House. • **Reason for no vote:** Voting is a democratic function of elected or constitutionally nominated members of Parliament. Since the Attorney General is appointed as a legal adviser and not elected as a representative, the Constitution does not give him voting power through Article 88. • **Committee participation:** The Attorney General can participate in a parliamentary committee only if he is named as a member of that committee. His role in such committees is usually legal and advisory. ## Attorney General and Article 76(3): Right of Audience Explained • **Meaning of right of audience:** The right of audience means the right to appear, address and be heard before a court. Article 76(3) gives this right to the Attorney General in all courts throughout India while performing his duties. • **All courts in India:** The phrase “all courts in the territory of India” includes the Supreme Court, High Courts and subordinate courts. This gives the Attorney General a nationwide constitutional standing. • **Duty-linked right:** The right is not a personal privilege for unlimited private appearance. It is connected with “performance of his duties”. Therefore, the right must be understood in relation to his official role as the Union’s chief legal adviser and representative. • **Difference from Advocate General:** This nationwide right of audience is one of the major differences between the Attorney General and the Advocate General. Article 165, which deals with the Advocate General, does not contain an express clause identical to Article 76(3) granting a right of audience in all courts across India. ## Important Case-Law and Constitutional References • **In Re Berubari Union, AIR 1960 SC 845:** This advisory opinion under Article 143 concerned the implementation of an India-Pakistan agreement relating to Berubari Union and the constitutional method for cession of Indian territory. Its importance for this topic is that it illustrates the kind of serious constitutional questions in which the Union Government, through its law officers including the Attorney General, may place legal submissions before the Supreme Court. • **Special Reference No. 1 of 1964, AIR 1965 SC 745:** The facts arose from a conflict involving the U.P. Legislative Assembly, Keshav Singh, the Allahabad High Court and questions of legislative privilege. The legal issue was the constitutional relationship between legislative privilege and judicial power. The Supreme Court held that legislative privileges are important but are subject to constitutional limits, and the High Courts and Supreme Court retain constitutional judicial powers. This case is important because it shows the role of Article 143 references and the need for high-level constitutional assistance in disputes between constitutional organs. • **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225; AIR 1973 SC 1461:** The facts involved challenges to constitutional amendments affecting fundamental rights and property-related issues. The legal issue was whether Parliament’s amending power under Article 368 was unlimited. The Supreme Court held that Parliament can amend the Constitution but cannot destroy its basic structure. Though not a case on Article 76 directly, it is important because it reflects the Attorney General’s practical importance in major constitutional litigation involving the Union. ## Distinction between Attorney General for India and Advocate General for State BasisAttorney General for IndiaAdvocate General for State**Constitutional provision**Article 76Article 165**Level of government**Union GovernmentState Government**Appointing authority**President of IndiaGovernor of the State**Qualification**Qualified to be appointed as a Judge of the Supreme CourtQualified to be appointed as a Judge of a High Court**Duties**Advises Government of India on legal matters and performs legal duties assigned by PresidentAdvises State Government on legal matters and performs legal duties assigned by Governor**Tenure**Holds office during pleasure of PresidentHolds office during pleasure of Governor**Remuneration**Determined by PresidentDetermined by Governor**Right of audience**Express right of audience in all courts in India under Article 76(3)Article 165 does not expressly provide an identical all-India right of audience**Legislative participation**Can speak and participate in Parliament under Article 88, without voting rightCan speak and participate in State Legislature under Article 177, without voting right**Status**Highest law officer of IndiaHighest law officer of the State• **Core similarity:** Both are constitutional law officers. Both advise their respective governments. Both hold office during pleasure. Both have no fixed constitutional term. Both can participate in legislative proceedings without voting rights. • **Core difference:** The Attorney General operates at the Union level and is linked with the Supreme Court Judge qualification, while the Advocate General operates at the State level and is linked with the High Court Judge qualification. Article 165 provides that the Governor appoints a person qualified to be appointed as a High Court Judge as Advocate General for the State. • **Legislative parallel:** Article 88 gives the Attorney General rights in Parliament, while **Article 177** gives the Advocate General similar rights in the State Legislature. Article 177 allows the Advocate General to speak and take part in proceedings of the Legislative Assembly, Legislative Council where it exists, joint sittings, and committees where named, but not to vote. • **Privilege parallel:** Article 105 relates to parliamentary privileges at the Union level, while **Article 194** relates to powers, privileges and immunities of State Legislatures and also applies to persons who have a constitutional right to speak and participate in State legislative proceedings. ## Memory Aid for Quick Revision FormulaMeaning**76 = Union Law Officer**Article 76 creates Attorney General for India**165 = State Law Officer**Article 165 creates Advocate General for State**88 = Parliament Speech, No Vote**Attorney General can speak in Parliament but cannot vote**177 = State Legislature Speech, No Vote**Advocate General can speak in State Legislature but cannot vote**76(3) = All Courts Audience**Attorney General has right of audience in all courts in India**Pleasure Doctrine**Attorney General holds office during pleasure of President## Illustrative Examples • **Legal advice example:** If the Union Government wants to introduce a Bill that may affect fundamental rights, it may seek advice from the Attorney General on whether the Bill is constitutionally valid. • **Court representation example:** If a parliamentary law is challenged before the Supreme Court as violating the Constitution, the Attorney General may appear to defend the law on behalf of the Union Government. • **Parliament example:** If a Bill raises complex constitutional questions, the Attorney General may participate in parliamentary discussion under Article 88 and explain the legal position, but he cannot vote on the Bill. • **Conflict-of-interest example:** If a private company is litigating against the Government of India, the Attorney General should not advise or represent that company against the Government because it would conflict with his constitutional role. ## Conclusion • **Central idea:** The Attorney General for India is the Union’s chief constitutional law officer. Article 76 makes him the principal legal adviser to the Government of India, gives him the right of audience in all courts, and places him in a position of high constitutional responsibility. • **Balanced role:** The office combines three important functions: advising the executive, assisting courts in important litigation, and helping Parliament understand legal issues. At the same time, the Attorney General is limited by absence of voting power, absence of fixed tenure, conflict-of-interest rules, and professional ethics. • **Distinction from Advocate General:** The Advocate General is the corresponding constitutional law officer at the State level under Article 165, but the Attorney General’s office is wider in national importance because it represents the Union and has an express constitutional right of audience in all courts in India. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Prime Minister and Council of Ministers under Indian Constitution: Appointment, Responsibility, Aid and Advice, Cabinet System and Caretaker Government](https://lawfoyer.in/prime-minister-and-council-of-ministers-under-indian-constitution/) **Published:** June 4, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun4202607_18_53P-725x1024.jpeg) ## Prime Minister and Council of Ministers: Constitutional Foundation ➤ **Core Concept:** India follows a **parliamentary form of government**, where the President is the constitutional head and the **Prime Minister with the Council of Ministers is the real executive authority**. Article 74 provides that there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President, and Article 75 deals with appointment, tenure, responsibility, membership, oath, and salaries of ministers. ➤ **Real Executive:** The Constitution vests executive power formally in the President, but in actual working, this power is exercised on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister. Therefore, the Prime Minister is not merely another minister; he is the constitutional centre of the Union executive. ➤ **Important Distinction:** These notes are confined to the **Prime Minister and Council of Ministers**, and not to the President as a separate institution. The President’s role is discussed only where it is necessary to understand appointment, aid and advice, and ministerial responsibility. ## Constitutional Articles Related to Prime Minister and Council of Ministers ArticleSubjectSimple Explanation**Article 74**Council of Ministers to aid and advise PresidentCreates the Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister as head; President acts according to such advice after the 42nd and 44th Amendments.**Article 75**Other provisions as to MinistersAppointment, pleasure doctrine, collective responsibility, oath, six-month rule, salary, 15% limit, anti-defection-related bar.**Article 77**Conduct of Government businessExecutive action is taken in the name of the President; business is allocated among ministers through rules. **Article 78**Duties of Prime Minister towards PresidentPM must communicate Council decisions, furnish information, and place certain ministerial decisions before the Council if President requires. **Article 352**National EmergencyEmergency proclamation requires written advice of the Cabinet, not merely individual advice of the Prime Minister.## Appointment of the Prime Minister ➤ **Constitutional Provision:** Under **Article 75(1)**, “The Prime Minister shall be appointed by the President,” and the other ministers are appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. ➤ **No Direct Election:** The Prime Minister is **not directly elected by the people as Prime Minister**. Citizens elect members of the Lok Sabha, and the leader who can command the confidence of the Lok Sabha is appointed as Prime Minister. ➤ **Normal Situation:** When a single party has a clear majority in the Lok Sabha, the President appoints the leader of that majority party as Prime Minister. This is a constitutional convention based on parliamentary democracy. ➤ **Coalition Situation:** When no party gets a clear majority, the President appoints the person who appears most likely to secure majority support in the Lok Sabha. Such support may come through a pre-poll alliance, post-poll coalition, or outside support. ➤ **Floor Test Principle:** In doubtful majority situations, the real test of majority is not private correspondence or political claim but a **floor test in the House**. Though this principle is usually discussed in the context of Governors and State governments, it reflects the broader parliamentary rule that the legislature is the proper forum to determine majority. ➤ **Prime Minister from Rajya Sabha:** The Constitution does not require that the Prime Minister must be a member of the Lok Sabha only. A Prime Minister may be a member of either House of Parliament. However, because the Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha under Article 75(3), the Prime Minister must politically enjoy the confidence of the Lok Sabha. ➤ **Six-Month Rule:** Under **Article 75(5)**, a minister who is not a member of either House of Parliament for six consecutive months ceases to be a minister at the end of that period. This applies to the Prime Minister also because the Prime Minister is a minister within the meaning of Article 75. ### Important Case Law on Appointment and Continuance ➤ **U.N.R. Rao v. Indira Gandhi, AIR 1971 SC 1002; (1971) 2 SCC 63:** The petitioner challenged the continuance of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and her Council of Ministers after dissolution of the Lok Sabha. The issue was whether Article 75(3), which makes the Council collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha, means that the Council must cease to exist when the Lok Sabha is dissolved. The Supreme Court held that Article 74(1) is mandatory and there must always be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President. The Court rejected the argument that “shall” in Article 74 should be read as “may”, because that would change the parliamentary character of the Constitution and create an executive vacuum. ## Appointment of Other Ministers ➤ **Prime Minister’s Advice:** Under Article 75(1), other ministers are appointed by the President **on the advice of the Prime Minister**. This means that constitutionally, the Prime Minister decides who should be included in the Council of Ministers, and the President acts on that advice. ➤ **Political and Constitutional Discretion:** The Prime Minister’s choice of ministers is political, but it is not morally uncontrolled. The Prime Minister is expected to uphold constitutional morality, integrity of government, and public trust. ➤ **Limit on Size of Council:** Article 75(1A), inserted by the **91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003**, provides that the total number of ministers, including the Prime Minister, shall not exceed **15% of the total number of members of the Lok Sabha**. ➤ **Anti-Defection Bar:** Article 75(1B) provides that a member of either House of Parliament who is disqualified under the Tenth Schedule on the ground of defection is also disqualified from being appointed as a minister for the prescribed period. ### Important Case Law on Selection of Ministers ➤ **Manoj Narula v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 1:** The issue was whether a person with criminal background or charges involving serious offences could be constitutionally barred from being appointed as minister. The Supreme Court held that courts cannot add a new disqualification to Article 75 beyond what the Constitution and law already provide. However, the Court recognised that the Prime Minister and Chief Ministers are holders of constitutional trust and are expected not to choose persons against whom charges have been framed for heinous or serious offences or corruption. The ratio is that appointment of ministers is primarily the constitutional prerogative of the Prime Minister, but it must be exercised consistently with constitutional morality and public trust. ## Collective Responsibility of the Council of Ministers ➤ **Constitutional Provision:** Article 75(3) states that the **Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the House of the People**, meaning the Lok Sabha. ➤ **Meaning:** Collective responsibility means that the Council of Ministers functions as one political unit. The government stands or falls together. If the Lok Sabha passes a no-confidence motion against the Council of Ministers, the entire Council, including the Prime Minister, must resign. ➤ **Cabinet Solidarity:** Ministers may disagree internally during Cabinet discussions, but once a decision is taken, every minister must publicly support it. A minister who cannot support the decision is expected to resign. ➤ **Responsibility to Lok Sabha Only:** The Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to the **Lok Sabha**, not to the Rajya Sabha. Rajya Sabha may discuss, criticise, or delay some legislative proposals, but it cannot remove the Council of Ministers through a no-confidence motion. ➤ **Effect of Losing Majority:** If the Prime Minister loses the confidence of the Lok Sabha, the Council of Ministers cannot continue as a regular government. It must resign or advise dissolution, depending on circumstances and constitutional propriety. ➤ **Responsible Government:** Collective responsibility ensures that real executive power remains answerable to the elected House. It prevents the executive from becoming independent of Parliament. ### Case Law on Collective Responsibility ➤ **Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831:** The Supreme Court held that India has adopted a parliamentary system where the President and Governors act on the aid and advice of their respective Councils of Ministers, except in limited situations where the Constitution permits discretion. The Court explained that Article 74(1) is mandatory and that Article 75(3) creates responsible government, meaning the Council of Ministers must enjoy the confidence of the Lok Sabha. The ratio is that the real executive is the Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister, not the formal constitutional head. ## Individual Responsibility of Ministers ➤ **Constitutional Basis:** Article 75(2) states that ministers hold office during the pleasure of the President. In parliamentary practice, this “pleasure” is exercised on the advice of the Prime Minister. ➤ **Meaning:** Individual responsibility means that each minister is responsible for the proper functioning of his or her department. A minister may be removed or asked to resign even if the entire Council of Ministers continues in office. ➤ **Prime Minister’s Control:** Since other ministers are appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister and continue politically because of the Prime Minister’s confidence, the Prime Minister may advise the President to remove a minister. ➤ **Departmental Accountability:** A minister must answer questions in Parliament relating to the ministry, defend government policy, explain administrative failures, and take responsibility for departmental actions. ➤ **Difference from Collective Responsibility:** Collective responsibility concerns the survival of the entire government before the Lok Sabha. Individual responsibility concerns the accountability, resignation, or removal of a particular minister. BasisCollective ResponsibilityIndividual Responsibility**Article**Article 75(3)Article 75(2), read with parliamentary convention**Responsible To**Lok SabhaPrime Minister and Parliament**Effect of Breach**Entire Council resignsIndividual minister resigns or is removed**Core Idea**Government acts as one unitEach minister is accountable for own department## Aid and Advice of the Council of Ministers ➤ **Article 74(1):** There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President, and the President shall act in accordance with such advice. The President may require reconsideration, but after reconsideration, the President must act according to the advice tendered. ➤ **42nd Amendment:** The 42nd Constitutional Amendment made it explicit that the President shall act in accordance with ministerial advice. This strengthened the textual position of parliamentary government. ➤ **44th Amendment:** The 44th Constitutional Amendment added the power of the President to require reconsideration of advice. However, once the Council of Ministers gives advice again after reconsideration, the President is bound by it. ➤ **Confidentiality of Advice:** Article 74(2) provides that the question whether any, and if so what, advice was tendered by ministers to the President shall not be inquired into in any court. This protects the confidentiality of constitutional advice. ➤ **Judicial Review Not Fully Excluded:** Article 74(2) bars inquiry into the advice itself, but it does not necessarily bar judicial review of the legality of the final executive action, especially where constitutional limits are violated. ➤ **Prime Minister as Head:** The aid and advice is not the personal advice of each minister separately. It is the advice of the Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister, reflecting Cabinet responsibility. ### Case Law on Aid and Advice ➤ **Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831:** The Supreme Court held that the President cannot exercise executive powers without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The expression “satisfaction” of the President generally means the satisfaction of the President acting on ministerial advice. This case is the leading authority for the proposition that India’s President is a constitutional head and the Council of Ministers is the real executive. ➤ **U.N.R. Rao v. Indira Gandhi, AIR 1971 SC 1002; (1971) 2 SCC 63:** The Court held that Article 74 is mandatory and that the Council of Ministers must continue even after dissolution of the Lok Sabha until a new Council takes office, because the President must always have constitutional aid and advice. ## Cabinet System in India ➤ **Council of Ministers and Cabinet:** The Constitution uses the expression **Council of Ministers**, while the Cabinet is a smaller and more powerful body within it. The Cabinet consists of senior ministers who take major policy decisions. ➤ **Cabinet as the Real Decision-Making Body:** In practice, the entire Council of Ministers is large, so day-to-day and high-level decisions are taken by the Cabinet. The Council of Ministers is collectively responsible, but the Cabinet is the practical steering body of government. ➤ **Cabinet Committees:** For administrative efficiency, several Cabinet committees deal with specific areas such as security, economic affairs, parliamentary affairs, appointments, and political affairs. ➤ **Cabinet Secrecy:** Cabinet discussions are confidential because ministers must be able to discuss policy freely. Once a decision is taken, collective responsibility requires public unity. ➤ **Cabinet and Article 352:** The word **Cabinet** is expressly important in Article 352. A proclamation of National Emergency cannot be issued unless the decision of the Union Cabinet is communicated to the President in writing. This safeguard was introduced after the Emergency experience to prevent emergency power from being triggered merely on informal or individual advice. ➤ **Cabinet Government, Not Prime Ministerial Autocracy:** Although the Prime Minister is the head, the system is constitutionally based on Cabinet responsibility. A strong Prime Minister may dominate the Cabinet politically, but constitutionally the Council of Ministers remains collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha. ## Duties of the Prime Minister under Article 78 ➤ **Communication Duty:** Under Article 78(a), the Prime Minister must communicate to the President all decisions of the Council of Ministers relating to administration of Union affairs and proposals for legislation. ➤ **Information Duty:** Under Article 78(b), the Prime Minister must furnish such information relating to Union administration and legislative proposals as the President may call for. ➤ **Cabinet Consideration Duty:** Under Article 78(c), if the President requires, the Prime Minister must submit for consideration of the Council of Ministers any matter on which a minister has taken a decision but which has not been considered by the Council. ➤ **Constitutional Link:** Article 78 makes the Prime Minister the formal constitutional channel between the President and the Council of Ministers. The President receives information through the Prime Minister, and the Prime Minister ensures that individual ministerial decisions can be brought before the collective body. ## Prime Minister’s Constitutional Position ➤ **Head of Council of Ministers:** Article 74 itself recognises the Prime Minister as the head of the Council of Ministers. Without a Prime Minister, there cannot be a valid Council of Ministers at the Union level. ➤ **Leader of Government:** The Prime Minister determines broad policy direction, coordinates ministries, presides over Cabinet meetings, and represents the government in Parliament and before the nation. ➤ **Link Between President and Cabinet:** Article 78 gives the Prime Minister the duty to communicate decisions and information to the President. This makes the Prime Minister the constitutional bridge between the formal head of State and the real executive. ➤ **Leader of Lok Sabha Majority:** In ordinary circumstances, the Prime Minister is the leader of the majority in the Lok Sabha. Even when the Prime Minister is a member of Rajya Sabha, the government must enjoy Lok Sabha confidence. ➤ **Architect of Ministry Formation:** Other ministers are appointed on the Prime Minister’s advice, and the Prime Minister controls allocation, reshuffling, and removal of ministers through constitutional advice to the President. ➤ **Guardian of Collective Responsibility:** The Prime Minister ensures that all ministers follow Cabinet decisions. If a minister publicly disagrees with government policy, the Prime Minister may ask for resignation or advise removal. ➤ **Constitutional Trust:** In **Manoj Narula v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 1**, the Supreme Court stressed that the Prime Minister occupies a position of constitutional trust while advising appointment of ministers. The Court did not create new legal disqualifications, but it emphasised that constitutional morality requires responsible choices. ## Caretaker Government ➤ **Meaning:** A caretaker government is a government that continues temporarily after resignation, loss of majority, dissolution of the Lok Sabha, or completion of tenure, until a new government assumes office. ➤ **Constitutional Necessity:** The Constitution does not use the expression “caretaker government” in Article 74 or Article 75, but the idea flows from the need for continuity. The Union cannot be left without a Council of Ministers because Article 74 requires a Council of Ministers to aid and advise the President. ➤ **Legal Basis:** In **U.N.R. Rao v. Indira Gandhi**, the Supreme Court held that the Council of Ministers does not automatically disappear merely because the Lok Sabha is dissolved. Article 74 is mandatory, and the President must have a Council of Ministers to aid and advise him. ➤ **Limited Role:** A caretaker government should normally avoid major policy decisions, long-term commitments, controversial appointments, and decisions that bind the incoming government, unless urgent public interest requires action. ➤ **Reason for Restraint:** Since the caretaker government may not have a freshly tested mandate of the Lok Sabha, it should act with constitutional propriety and democratic restraint. ➤ **Continuity of Administration:** Routine administration, national security, urgent financial matters, disaster response, and essential governance continue during the caretaker period. ## Memory Aid: PM–COM Formula KeywordMeaning**A****Appointment** by President; other ministers on PM’s advice**C****Collective responsibility** to Lok Sabha**I****Individual responsibility** through PM’s control and President’s pleasure**A****Aid and advice** binding on President after reconsideration**C****Cabinet system** as practical decision-making core**C****Caretaker government** ensures no executive vacuum**P****PM’s position** as head, coordinator, link, leader, and trustee## Conclusion ➤ **Final Understanding:** The Prime Minister and Council of Ministers form the heart of India’s parliamentary executive. Article 74 establishes the Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister as its head, while Article 75 gives the rules for appointment, tenure, responsibility, membership, and ministerial limits. The Prime Minister is appointed by the President, but the real constitutional test is the ability to command Lok Sabha confidence. ➤ **Democratic Accountability:** Collective responsibility makes the entire Council answerable to the Lok Sabha, while individual responsibility makes each minister accountable for departmental conduct and dependent on the Prime Minister’s confidence. ➤ **Aid and Advice Principle:** The President acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, and after reconsideration, such advice is binding. This is the foundation of India’s parliamentary system. ➤ **Cabinet and Caretaker Role:** The Cabinet is the effective policy-making centre, while the caretaker government principle ensures continuity of governance without creating an executive vacuum. ➤ **Constitutional Position of PM:** The Prime Minister is the head of the Council of Ministers, leader of government, coordinator of administration, link between President and Cabinet, guardian of collective responsibility, and holder of constitutional trust. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Vice-President of India: Election, Qualifications, Term, Removal, Powers, Rajya Sabha Chairmanship and Comparison with President](https://lawfoyer.in/vice-president-of-india/) **Published:** June 4, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun4202607_10_40P-725x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning and Constitutional Position of Vice-President of India ➤ **Constitutional office:** The Vice-President of India is a high constitutional authority created under **Article 63 of the Constitution of India**. The office is important because it connects two major parts of the Constitution: the **Union Executive** and the **Parliament**. The Vice-President is not the ordinary “deputy” of the President in day-to-day executive administration, but he becomes constitutionally important when the office of the President becomes vacant or when the President is unable to discharge functions. ➤ **Present office-holder:** As of the current available official parliamentary position, **Shri C. P. Radhakrishnan** is shown as the **Chairman of Rajya Sabha**, which office is held ex officio by the Vice-President of India. The Rajya Sabha website states that the Vice-President of India is the **ex-officio Chairman of Rajya Sabha** and displays Shri C. P. Radhakrishnan as Chairman. ➤ **Basic constitutional idea:** The Vice-President is placed immediately after the President in constitutional order. However, unlike the President, the Vice-President does not normally exercise executive powers of the Union. His regular constitutional role is mainly parliamentary, because he presides over the Rajya Sabha as its Chairman under **Article 64**. ## Constitutional Provisions Related to Vice-President of India ➤ **Article 63 — Vice-President of India:** This Article provides that there shall be a Vice-President of India. The word “shall” makes the office mandatory and permanent in the constitutional scheme. ➤ **Article 64 — Ex-officio Chairman of Rajya Sabha:** The Vice-President is the **ex-officio Chairman of the Council of States**, that is, Rajya Sabha. “Ex-officio” means by virtue of holding another office. Therefore, the Vice-President automatically becomes Chairman of Rajya Sabha without a separate election by the House. ➤ **Article 65 — Acting as President:** When the office of President becomes vacant due to death, resignation, removal or otherwise, the Vice-President acts as President until a new President enters office. If the President is temporarily unable to discharge functions due to absence, illness or any other cause, the Vice-President discharges those functions until the President resumes office. ➤ **Article 66 — Election and qualifications:** This Article deals with the election method, electoral college, secret ballot, proportional representation, qualifications and disqualifications for the office of Vice-President. Article 66 provides that the Vice-President is elected by members of both Houses of Parliament through proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote, and voting is by secret ballot. ➤ **Article 67 — Term, resignation and removal:** This Article provides that the Vice-President holds office for five years from the date on which he enters office. It also provides the method of resignation and removal. ➤ **Article 68 — Time of election to fill vacancy:** This Article ensures timely election to the office. If the vacancy is caused by expiry of term, the election must be completed before the term expires. If the vacancy occurs due to death, resignation, removal or otherwise, election must be held as soon as possible. ➤ **Article 69 — Oath or affirmation:** Before entering office, the Vice-President must make and subscribe an oath or affirmation before the President or a person appointed by the President. ➤ **Article 70 — Discharge of President’s functions in other contingencies:** Parliament may make provision for discharge of President’s functions in contingencies not expressly covered in the Constitution. ➤ **Article 71 — Election disputes:** All doubts and disputes connected with the election of the President or Vice-President are decided by the **Supreme Court of India**, and its decision is final. The Constitution also protects acts done by the President or Vice-President before the Supreme Court declares an election void. ## Election of Vice-President of India ➤ **Electoral college:** The Vice-President is elected by an electoral college consisting of **members of both Houses of Parliament**. This includes members of Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha. Unlike the President’s election, members of State Legislative Assemblies do not participate in the Vice-President’s election. The Election Commission’s official material also explains that the Vice-President is elected by members of Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha, including elected and nominated members. ➤ **Difference from President’s electoral college:** The President is elected by elected members of both Houses of Parliament and elected members of State Legislative Assemblies, including relevant elected members of Union Territory legislatures as constitutionally provided. But the Vice-President is elected only by Parliament members. This difference exists because the Vice-President’s ordinary function is to preside over Rajya Sabha, not to represent the Union and States in the same wider manner as the President. ➤ **Method of election:** The election is held according to the **system of proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote**, and the voting is by **secret ballot**. Article 66 expressly states these requirements. ➤ **Single transferable vote explained simply:** Each elector marks preferences, such as first preference, second preference and so on. The purpose is to ensure that the elected candidate has the required quota of support. Since only one office is to be filled, the system allows votes to be transferred according to preferences if required. ➤ **Value of vote:** In Vice-Presidential election, the value of each Member of Parliament’s vote is the same. For example, the PIB note for the 2025 Vice-Presidential Election stated that because all electors were members of both Houses of Parliament, the value of vote of each MP was **one**. ➤ **Superintendence by Election Commission:** The conduct of election to the office of Vice-President is under the superintendence, direction and control of the **Election Commission of India** under Article 324 read with the **Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act, 1952** and the **Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Rules, 1974**. The PIB note for the 2025 election specifically records this legal position. ➤ **No joint sitting now:** Earlier, the constitutional text referred to members of both Houses assembled at a joint meeting. After the **Eleventh Constitutional Amendment, 1961**, the requirement of a joint meeting was removed. Now the electoral college consists of members of both Houses, but they do not need to assemble in a joint sitting. ## Qualifications for Vice-President of India ➤ **Citizenship:** The candidate must be a **citizen of India**. This is a basic requirement because the office is part of the sovereign constitutional structure of India. ➤ **Minimum age:** The candidate must have completed **35 years of age**. The age requirement is the same as that for the President. ➤ **Rajya Sabha qualification:** The candidate must be qualified for election as a member of the **Council of States**, that is, Rajya Sabha. Article 66(3) expressly provides that a person is eligible for election as Vice-President only if he is a citizen of India, has completed 35 years of age, and is qualified for election as a member of the Council of States. ➤ **Office of profit disqualification:** A person is not eligible if he holds any **office of profit** under the Government of India, a State Government, or any local or other authority subject to the control of government. However, the Constitution clarifies that a person is not disqualified merely because he is the President, Vice-President, Governor of any State, or a Minister of the Union or a State. ➤ **Not member of Legislature after election:** The Vice-President cannot be a member of either House of Parliament or of a State Legislature. If such a member is elected as Vice-President, he is deemed to have vacated his legislative seat on the date on which he enters office as Vice-President. ## Nomination and Election Process ➤ **Nomination requirement:** A candidate must be properly nominated according to the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act, 1952 and related rules. The nomination is not a mere formality; it is a legal requirement that confirms seriousness, eligibility and support. ➤ **Proposers and seconders:** For Vice-Presidential elections, the nomination paper must be subscribed by the required number of electors as proposers and seconders under the statutory framework. This requirement prevents non-serious candidatures and ensures that only candidates with some parliamentary support enter the contest. ➤ **Security deposit:** The candidate is also required to make the prescribed security deposit. The purpose of a security deposit is to discourage frivolous nominations. ➤ **Scrutiny and withdrawal:** After nominations, the Returning Officer scrutinises nomination papers. Invalid nominations may be rejected. Candidates may also withdraw within the prescribed time. If more than one validly nominated candidate remains, a poll is held. ➤ **Secret ballot and party whip:** Voting in Vice-Presidential election is by secret ballot. Therefore, an elector is expected to vote according to constitutional and electoral rules, not under an ordinary party whip in the same manner as a legislative vote inside the House. ## Term of Office of Vice-President ➤ **Five-year term:** Under Article 67, the Vice-President holds office for a term of **five years** from the date on which he enters office. The PIB note for the 2025 Vice-Presidential election also refers to this five-year constitutional term under Article 67. ➤ **Continuation until successor enters office:** Even after expiry of the five-year term, the Vice-President continues to hold office until his successor enters office. This avoids a constitutional vacuum. ➤ **Eligibility for re-election:** The Constitution does not prohibit re-election of the Vice-President. Therefore, a person may be elected again if he satisfies the required qualifications and wins the election. ➤ **Full term after casual vacancy:** Where vacancy occurs due to death, resignation, removal or otherwise, the person elected to fill that vacancy is entitled to hold office for a full term of five years from the date on which he enters office, subject to Article 67. The Election Commission/PIB explanation of the 2025 vacancy also records this position under Article 68(2). ## Resignation of Vice-President ➤ **Mode of resignation:** The Vice-President may resign by writing under his hand addressed to the **President of India**. The resignation becomes constitutionally effective according to the applicable process once communicated. ➤ **Reason for addressing President:** Since the Vice-President is a constitutional authority immediately connected with the President’s office, the resignation is addressed to the President, not to Parliament or the Prime Minister. ## Removal of Vice-President ➤ **Removal mechanism:** The Vice-President can be removed by a resolution of the **Rajya Sabha** passed by a majority of all the then members of the Rajya Sabha and agreed to by the **Lok Sabha**. This is different from impeachment of the President. ➤ **Notice requirement:** A resolution for removal cannot be moved unless at least **14 days’ notice** has been given of the intention to move the resolution. This gives seriousness and procedural fairness to the removal process. ➤ **No specific grounds mentioned:** The Constitution does not expressly mention grounds such as “violation of Constitution” for removal of the Vice-President. This is different from the President, who may be impeached for violation of the Constitution. ➤ **Rajya Sabha’s central role:** Since the Vice-President’s regular function is to act as Chairman of Rajya Sabha, the Rajya Sabha has the primary role in initiating removal. Lok Sabha’s agreement is also necessary, ensuring parliamentary control by both Houses. ➤ **Comparison with President’s impeachment:** The President’s removal is by impeachment under Article 61 and requires a more elaborate process. The Vice-President’s removal is simpler in form but still constitutionally serious because it requires special majority in Rajya Sabha and agreement of Lok Sabha. ## Oath or Affirmation of Vice-President ➤ **Oath before entering office:** Under Article 69, the Vice-President must make an oath or affirmation before the President or a person appointed by the President. ➤ **Substance of oath:** The oath requires the Vice-President to bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India and to faithfully discharge the duty of the office. This oath reflects constitutional loyalty, not loyalty to any party or government. ## Functions and Powers of Vice-President of India ➤ **Chairman of Rajya Sabha:** The most regular and visible function of the Vice-President is to act as the **Chairman of Rajya Sabha**. The official Rajya Sabha website states that the Vice-President is the ex-officio Chairman of Rajya Sabha and that the Deputy Chairman presides in the absence of the Chairman. ➤ **Acting President:** The Vice-President acts as President when the office of President becomes vacant due to death, resignation, removal or otherwise. He continues in that role until a new President is elected and enters office. ➤ **Discharging President’s functions temporarily:** When the President is unable to discharge functions because of absence, illness or any other cause, the Vice-President discharges the President’s functions until the President resumes office. ➤ **No ordinary executive authority:** The Vice-President does not normally exercise the executive power of the Union. The executive power is vested in the President under Article 53, exercised according to the Constitution with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers under Article 74. ➤ **No membership of Rajya Sabha:** Although the Vice-President presides over Rajya Sabha, he is not a member of Rajya Sabha. This gives him a neutral presiding position. ➤ **Casting vote:** As Chairman of Rajya Sabha, the Vice-President does not vote in the first instance because he is not a member of the House. However, in case of equality of votes, he may exercise a **casting vote**. ## Role as Chairman of Rajya Sabha ➤ **Presiding over sittings:** The Chairman conducts the proceedings of Rajya Sabha. He ensures that debates are held according to constitutional provisions, parliamentary rules, conventions and standards of decorum. ➤ **Maintaining order:** The Chairman maintains discipline in the House. He may call members to order, regulate speeches, decide who may speak, and ensure that members follow parliamentary procedure. ➤ **Deciding points of order:** Members may raise points of order when they believe that the rules of procedure or constitutional requirements are being violated. The Chairman decides such points, and his decision carries great procedural importance. ➤ **Regulating debates:** The Chairman ensures that debate remains relevant to the matter before the House. This function is important because parliamentary time is limited and the House must function efficiently. ➤ **Protecting dignity of the House:** Rajya Sabha is the Upper House of Parliament. The Chairman has a duty to protect its dignity, independence and deliberative character. This role is not merely mechanical; it requires impartiality, patience and constitutional understanding. ➤ **Administrative responsibilities:** The Chairman also has administrative responsibilities connected with Rajya Sabha Secretariat and functioning of parliamentary committees where rules so provide. ➤ **Suspension and discipline:** The Chairman may apply the Rules of Procedure of Rajya Sabha in relation to disorderly conduct. His role is to balance freedom of speech in Parliament with the need for orderly functioning. ➤ **Impartiality as constitutional expectation:** Even if a Vice-President had a political background before election, once he becomes Chairman of Rajya Sabha, he is expected to function with fairness and neutrality. The moral authority of the office depends upon impartial conduct. ## Vice-President as Acting President ➤ **Vacancy in President’s office:** If the President dies, resigns, is removed, or the office otherwise becomes vacant, the Vice-President acts as President. During this period, he has the powers, privileges and immunities of the President. ➤ **Temporary inability of President:** If the President is unable to act because of illness, absence or any other cause, the Vice-President discharges presidential functions. This is temporary and ends when the President resumes duties. ➤ **Effect on Rajya Sabha chairmanship:** When the Vice-President acts as President or discharges President’s functions, he does not perform the duties of Chairman of Rajya Sabha during that period. The Deputy Chairman or other authorised person presides according to Rajya Sabha rules and constitutional provisions. ➤ **Constitutional continuity:** This arrangement protects continuity of the Union Executive. The Constitution does not allow the highest executive office to remain functionally vacant. ## Important Case Laws Related to President and Vice-President Elections ➤ **Shri Baburao Patel v. Dr. Zakir Husain, AIR 1968 SC 904:** In this case, the election of Dr. Zakir Husain as President was challenged. The issues included whether a candidate was required to take oath as a member of Parliament before being qualified and whether certain campaign activities amounted to undue influence. The Supreme Court rejected the challenge and clarified important principles relating to eligibility and corrupt practices under the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act, 1952. Though the case concerned a Presidential election, its reasoning is relevant because the same election law also governs Vice-Presidential elections. ➤ **Charan Lal Sahu v. Giani Zail Singh, AIR 1984 SC 309; 1984 (1) SCC 390:** The election of Giani Zail Singh as President was challenged before the Supreme Court. The Court dealt with the maintainability of election petitions and the grounds on which such high constitutional elections may be questioned. The ratio is important because election to the offices of President and Vice-President cannot be challenged on vague, political or suitability-based allegations; the challenge must satisfy the statutory grounds under the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act, 1952. ➤ **In re Presidential Poll, AIR 1974 SC 1682:** This advisory opinion concerned timing of Presidential election and constitutional vacancies. The Supreme Court emphasised that constitutional timelines for filling high offices must be respected and that elections should be held in the manner required by the Constitution. The decision is relevant by analogy for understanding Articles 68 and 65, because the Constitution similarly seeks continuity in the offices of President and Vice-President. ## Comparison Between President and Vice-President of India BasisPresident of IndiaVice-President of India**Constitutional provision**Article 52 creates the office of PresidentArticle 63 creates the office of Vice-President**Constitutional position**Head of the Union and formal executive headSecond-highest constitutional office; regular role is Chairman of Rajya Sabha**Election body**Elected by elected MPs and elected MLAs as constitutionally providedElected by members of both Houses of Parliament**State role in election**States participate through elected MLAsStates do not directly participate**Voting system**Proportional representation by single transferable voteProportional representation by single transferable vote**Minimum age**35 years35 years**Qualification link**Qualified for election as member of Lok SabhaQualified for election as member of Rajya Sabha**Term**Five yearsFive years**Removal**Impeachment for violation of Constitution under Article 61Removal by Rajya Sabha resolution agreed to by Lok Sabha under Article 67**Ordinary functions**Executive functions of Union are exercised in President’s namePresides over Rajya Sabha as Chairman**Legislative role**Summons Parliament, gives assent to Bills, addresses ParliamentConducts Rajya Sabha proceedings**Emergency powers**Constitutional emergency powers are proclaimed by PresidentNo independent emergency powers**Succession role**Highest constitutional officeActs as President when vacancy or inability occurs## Key Differences in Simple Language ➤ **President represents the Union:** The President symbolises the Republic and performs constitutional executive functions. The President is part of Parliament under Article 79, but he is not a member of either House. ➤ **Vice-President represents parliamentary neutrality in Rajya Sabha:** The Vice-President’s regular function is not executive but parliamentary. He ensures that Rajya Sabha functions according to rules. ➤ **President has wider electoral base:** The President’s election includes elected representatives from States because the President represents the Union as a whole. The Vice-President’s election is limited to Parliament because his main regular work is connected with Rajya Sabha. ➤ **President’s removal is more difficult:** Presidential impeachment is a very serious constitutional process. Vice-President’s removal is comparatively simpler but still requires a special parliamentary procedure. ➤ **Vice-President is constitutional substitute, not administrative deputy:** The Vice-President does not assist the President in daily executive work. He becomes important in presidential vacancy or temporary inability. ## Memory Aid for Quick Revision KeywordMeaning**63**Office of Vice-President**64**Ex-officio Chairman of Rajya Sabha**65**Acts as President during vacancy**66**Election and qualifications**67**Term, resignation and removal**68**Time of election to fill vacancy**69**Oath or affirmation**71**Election disputes decided by Supreme Court## Conclusion ➤ **Constitutional balance:** The Vice-President of India is a carefully designed constitutional office. It is not a mere ceremonial post, because the Vice-President performs two vital functions: first, he acts as the **Chairman of Rajya Sabha**, and second, he ensures continuity by acting as President when necessary. ➤ **Parliamentary importance:** As Chairman of Rajya Sabha, the Vice-President protects the dignity, order and procedural discipline of the Upper House. His impartiality is essential for healthy parliamentary democracy. ➤ **Executive continuity:** As acting President in specified situations, the Vice-President prevents a constitutional vacuum in the highest office of the Union. ➤ **Distinct from President:** The President is the formal executive head of India, while the Vice-President is mainly a parliamentary presiding authority with a conditional executive role. This distinction is the key to understanding the office. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [President of India under the Constitution of India: Election, Powers, Impeachment, Ordinance, Pardon, Emergency and Constitutional Position](https://lawfoyer.in/president-of-india-under-the-constitution-of-india/) **Published:** June 4, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun4202612_33_10A-725x1024.jpeg) ## Introduction: Meaning and Constitutional Identity of the President of India • **Constitutional Head:** The President of India is the formal head of the Union Executive. Article 52 provides that “there shall be a President of India”, and Article 53 vests the executive power of the Union in the President, to be exercised directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with the Constitution. This means that all executive acts of the Union are legally performed in the name of the President, but the real political responsibility lies with the Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister. • **Present Office-holder:** As per the official website of the President of India, **Smt. Droupadi Murmu** was sworn in as the **15th President of India on 25 July 2022**. This fact is relevant because the President is not merely a symbolic figure; the office represents constitutional continuity, national unity, and the dignity of the Republic. • **Parliamentary Form:** India follows the parliamentary system, not the American presidential system. Therefore, the President is not the real executive in the political sense. The President acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers under Article 74, except in limited constitutional situations where discretion or judgment may arise. • **Key Memory Line:** The President is the **constitutional head**, the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers are the **real executive**, and Parliament provides **democratic control**. ## Constitutional Provisions Relating to the President of India AreaImportant ArticlesOffice of PresidentArticle 52Executive power of UnionArticle 53Election of PresidentArticles 54–55Term of officeArticle 56Eligibility for re-electionArticle 57QualificationsArticle 58Conditions of officeArticle 59OathArticle 60ImpeachmentArticle 61Vacancy and electionArticle 62Aid and adviceArticle 74Powers and functionsArticles 53, 72, 74, 77, 78, 85, 111, 123, 352, 356, 360Pardoning powerArticle 72Ordinance powerArticle 123National EmergencyArticle 352President’s RuleArticle 356Financial EmergencyArticle 360## Election of the President of India • **Indirect Election:** The President is elected indirectly because India follows a parliamentary democracy. The people do not directly vote for the President. Instead, Article 54 provides that the President is elected by an Electoral College. • **Electoral College:** The Electoral College consists of: ◦ **Elected members of both Houses of Parliament**, namely Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha; and ◦ **Elected members of the Legislative Assemblies of States**; and ◦ **Elected members of the Legislative Assemblies of Union Territories of Delhi, Puducherry and Jammu and Kashmir**, where applicable under the constitutional scheme. • **Excluded Members:** Nominated members of Parliament, nominated members of State Legislative Assemblies, members of Legislative Councils, and nominated members of Union Territory legislatures do not participate in the presidential election. The reason is that the President must be elected by elected representatives only. • **Principle of Uniformity:** Article 55 aims to secure uniformity in the scale of representation of different States and parity between the States as a whole and the Union. This is done through the value of votes. • **Value of MLA’s Vote:** The value of the vote of an elected MLA is calculated on the basis of the population of the State and the number of elected MLAs in that State. The object is to ensure that States with larger populations have proportionate representation. • **Value of MP’s Vote:** The total value of votes of all elected MLAs is divided by the total number of elected MPs. This balances the Union and the States in the presidential election. • **System of Voting:** The election is held by **proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote**, and voting is by **secret ballot**. The voter marks preferences, not merely one simple vote. • **Reason for Indirect Election:** The President is the constitutional head, not the real executive. Direct election could have created a rival democratic authority against the Prime Minister and Parliament. Therefore, indirect election maintains harmony in the parliamentary system. ### Landmark Case on Presidential Election • **Charan Lal Sahu v. Neelam Sanjiva Reddy, (1978) 2 SCC 500:** In this case, the presidential election of Neelam Sanjiva Reddy was challenged. The Supreme Court clarified that the presidential election process is a special constitutional process and cannot be lightly disturbed. The Court emphasized that election disputes relating to the President must be dealt with strictly according to constitutional and statutory procedure. The case is important because it shows that the President’s election is protected by a structured constitutional mechanism and cannot be challenged casually. ## Qualifications for Election as President • **Article 58 Requirements:** A person is qualified for election as President if he or she: ◦ is a **citizen of India**; ◦ has completed **35 years of age**; ◦ is qualified for election as a member of the **Lok Sabha**; and ◦ does not hold any **office of profit** under the Government of India, Government of any State, or any local or other authority subject to government control. • **Office of Profit Exception:** The Constitution clarifies that a person is not disqualified merely because he or she is the President, Vice-President, Governor of a State, or a Minister either for the Union or for any State. • **Purpose of Qualifications:** These qualifications ensure that the President is a mature Indian citizen, constitutionally eligible for national representative office, and independent from conflicting government employment. ## Conditions of President’s Office • **Article 59 Conditions:** The President cannot be a member of either House of Parliament or of a House of the Legislature of any State. If such a member is elected President, he or she is deemed to have vacated that seat on entering the office of President. • **No Other Office:** The President must not hold any other office of profit. • **Official Residence and Emoluments:** The President is entitled to official residence, salary, allowances and privileges as determined by Parliament. • **Independence of Office:** The conditions of office protect the dignity, neutrality and independence of the President. ## Oath of the President • **Article 60 Oath:** Before entering office, the President takes an oath or affirmation before the Chief Justice of India, or in his absence, the senior-most judge of the Supreme Court available. • **Core Promise:** The President promises to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution and the law and to devote himself or herself to the service and well-being of the people of India. • **Constitutional Meaning:** The oath is not a mere formality. It reflects that the President is the guardian of constitutional form, legality and continuity. ## Term of Office of the President • **Five-Year Term:** Under Article 56, the President holds office for a term of five years from the date on which he or she enters office. • **Continuation Until Successor Enters Office:** Even after the expiry of five years, the President continues until the successor enters office. This prevents a constitutional vacuum. • **Resignation:** The President may resign by writing under his or her hand addressed to the Vice-President. • **Removal:** The President may be removed by impeachment for violation of the Constitution under Article 61. • **Re-election:** Article 57 provides that a person who holds or has held office as President is eligible for re-election. There is no constitutional bar on the number of terms. ## Vacancy in the Office of President • **Article 62 Rule:** An election to fill a vacancy caused by expiry of term must be completed before the expiry of the term. • **Casual Vacancy:** If the office falls vacant due to death, resignation, removal or any other cause, election must be held as soon as possible and in no case later than six months from the date of vacancy. • **Vice-President as Acting President:** During vacancy, the Vice-President acts as President. If the Vice-President is unavailable, the Chief Justice of India, and in his absence the senior-most judge of the Supreme Court, may discharge presidential functions under the relevant statutory arrangement. ## Impeachment of the President of India • **Constitutional Ground:** Article 61 provides impeachment for **violation of the Constitution**. The phrase is not exhaustively defined, which means it covers grave constitutional misconduct, deliberate abuse of constitutional power, or conduct inconsistent with the President’s constitutional oath. • **Initiation:** Impeachment may be initiated in either House of Parliament. • **Notice Requirement:** The proposal must be contained in a resolution signed by at least one-fourth of the total number of members of the House that initiates the charge, and at least fourteen days’ notice must be given. • **Special Majority:** The resolution must be passed by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total membership of that House. • **Investigation by Other House:** After one House frames the charge, the other House investigates or causes the charge to be investigated. • **Right of Appearance:** The President has the right to appear and be represented during such investigation. • **Final Removal:** If the investigating House also passes the resolution by a majority of not less than two-thirds of its total membership, the President stands removed from office from the date of passing of that resolution. • **High Threshold:** Impeachment is intentionally difficult because the President is the constitutional head of the Republic. It is not a political no-confidence motion; it is a constitutional removal process. ## Powers of the President of India ## Executive Powers of the President • **Executive Power under Article 53:** The executive power of the Union is vested in the President. However, it is exercised according to the Constitution and normally on ministerial advice. • **Appointments:** The President appoints the Prime Minister, other Ministers, Attorney General of India, Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts, Governors, Election Commissioners, Finance Commission members, UPSC members, and other constitutional authorities as provided by law. • **Administration in President’s Name:** Article 77 provides that all executive action of the Government of India shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the President. • **Information from Prime Minister:** Article 78 requires the Prime Minister to communicate to the President all decisions of the Council of Ministers relating to administration and legislation, furnish information when called for, and submit matters for consideration of the Council of Ministers if the President so requires. • **Practical Control:** The President may advise, warn and encourage the Council of Ministers, but normally cannot substitute personal opinion for ministerial advice. ### Landmark Cases on Executive Position • **Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 549:** The Supreme Court explained that the Indian Constitution has adopted the parliamentary system of executive responsibility. The executive power is co-extensive with legislative power, but it must operate subject to the Constitution and law. This case is important because it clarified the nature of executive power in India. • **U.N.R. Rao v. Indira Gandhi, (1971) 2 SCC 63:** The issue was whether the Council of Ministers must continue even after dissolution of Lok Sabha. The Supreme Court held that Article 74 is mandatory and there must always be a Council of Ministers to aid and advise the President. This case confirms that the President cannot function as a personal executive ruler. • **Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831:** A seven-judge Bench held that the President and Governors are constitutional heads and must exercise powers on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, except in areas where the Constitution expressly or by necessary implication allows discretion. This is the leading authority on the nominal position of the President in India. ## Legislative Powers of the President • **Part of Parliament:** Under Article 79, Parliament consists of the President and two Houses, namely the Rajya Sabha and Lok Sabha. Therefore, the President is an integral constitutional part of Parliament, though not a member of either House. • **Summoning and Proroguing:** Under Article 85, the President summons and prorogues Parliament and may dissolve the Lok Sabha. • **Address to Parliament:** The President addresses both Houses at the commencement of the first session after each general election and at the commencement of the first session each year. • **Messages to Parliament:** The President may send messages to either House regarding pending bills or other matters. • **Assent to Bills:** Under Article 111, when a Bill is presented to the President, the President may give assent, withhold assent, or return a non-Money Bill for reconsideration. If Parliament passes the Bill again, with or without amendments, the President must give assent. • **Money Bills:** A Money Bill cannot be introduced in the Lok Sabha without the President’s recommendation. • **Certain Bills Requiring Recommendation:** Some Bills, especially those affecting taxation, expenditure, States’ interests, or constitutional requirements, require presidential recommendation before introduction. ## Ordinance-Making Power of the President • **Article 123 Power:** The President may promulgate an Ordinance when both Houses of Parliament are not in session and the President is satisfied that circumstances exist requiring immediate action. An Ordinance has the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament, but it is temporary. • **Temporary Law:** Every Ordinance must be laid before both Houses of Parliament and ceases to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of Parliament unless approved earlier. • **Same Limits as Parliament:** The President cannot issue an Ordinance on a matter on which Parliament lacks legislative competence. Ordinance-making is not an independent law-making power beyond the Constitution. • **Not a Parallel Legislature:** Ordinance power is meant for urgent situations, not to bypass parliamentary debate or democratic accountability. ### Landmark Cases on Ordinance Power • **D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, (1987) 1 SCC 378:** The Bihar Government repeatedly re-promulgated ordinances without placing them before the Legislature. The Supreme Court held that repeated re-promulgation is a fraud on the Constitution. Though the case concerned Governor’s ordinance power, the principle applies equally to ordinance-making generally: ordinances are emergency legislative instruments, not substitutes for regular law-making. • **Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (2017) 3 SCC 1:** A seven-judge Bench held that re-promulgation of ordinances is constitutionally impermissible except in exceptional circumstances. The Court also held that the satisfaction for promulgating an ordinance is subject to judicial review on limited grounds. This case strengthened legislative accountability and prevented misuse of ordinance power. ## Financial Powers of the President • **Annual Financial Statement:** The Union Budget is laid before Parliament in the name of the President. • **Money Bill Recommendation:** No Money Bill can be introduced without the President’s recommendation. • **Demand for Grants:** Demands for grants are made on the recommendation of the President. • **Contingency Fund:** The President controls the Contingency Fund of India for urgent unforeseen expenditure, subject to parliamentary authorization. • **Finance Commission:** The President constitutes the Finance Commission under Article 280 to recommend distribution of financial resources between the Union and States. ## Judicial Powers and Pardoning Power of the President • **Article 72 Power:** The President may grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment, or suspend, remit or commute sentences in three categories: ◦ cases where punishment or sentence is by a court martial; ◦ cases involving offences against laws relating to matters within Union executive power; and ◦ all cases where the sentence is a sentence of death. • **Meaning of Forms of Clemency:** ◦ **Pardon:** Completely removes both sentence and conviction consequences. ◦ **Commutation:** Substitutes one form of punishment with a lighter form. ◦ **Remission:** Reduces the period of sentence without changing its nature. ◦ **Respite:** Awards a lesser sentence due to special circumstances, such as pregnancy or disability. ◦ **Reprieve:** Temporarily stays execution of sentence, especially death sentence. • **Humanitarian Function:** Pardoning power acts as a constitutional safety valve. It allows correction of possible judicial error, consideration of mercy, public welfare, delay, health, age, conduct, or other special circumstances. • **Not Personal Mercy:** The President does not exercise this power as a private individual. It is a constitutional power exercised on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. ### Landmark Cases on Pardoning Power • **Maru Ram v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 107:** The Supreme Court held that the power under Articles 72 and 161 must be exercised on the aid and advice of the appropriate government. The Court emphasized that constitutional clemency cannot be arbitrary, mala fide, or based on irrelevant considerations. This case is important because it connects mercy power with rule of law. • **Kehar Singh v. Union of India, (1989) 1 SCC 204:** The petitioner, convicted in the Indira Gandhi assassination case, sought presidential mercy. The Supreme Court held that the President may examine the evidence and merits of the case while considering mercy, even after the Supreme Court’s judicial decision. However, the President’s order is subject only to limited judicial review. The Court clarified that the President does not sit as a court of appeal but performs a constitutional function. • **Epuru Sudhakar v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, (2006) 8 SCC 161:** The Supreme Court held that the exercise of pardoning power can be judicially reviewed if it is arbitrary, mala fide, discriminatory, based on irrelevant considerations, or excludes relevant considerations. This case is a leading authority for limited judicial review of clemency powers. • **Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, (2014) 3 SCC 1:** The Supreme Court held that unreasonable delay in deciding mercy petitions in death sentence cases may be a ground for commutation of death sentence to life imprisonment. The case strengthened the role of human dignity under Article 21 in the area of capital punishment. ## Military and Diplomatic Powers of the President • **Supreme Commander:** The President is the Supreme Commander of the Defence Forces of India. However, actual control is exercised by the elected government according to law. • **War and Peace:** War and peace are formally declared in the name of the President, but such decisions are made on ministerial advice. • **Treaties and International Relations:** Diplomatic representatives are appointed by the President, and foreign ambassadors present credentials to the President. Treaties are concluded in the name of the President but operate subject to constitutional and parliamentary requirements. ## Emergency Powers of the President ## National Emergency under Article 352 • **Grounds:** National Emergency may be proclaimed when the security of India or any part of its territory is threatened by war, external aggression, or armed rebellion. • **Written Cabinet Advice:** After the 44th Constitutional Amendment, the President can proclaim National Emergency only on written advice of the Union Cabinet, not merely on the advice of the Prime Minister alone. • **Parliamentary Approval:** The proclamation must be approved by both Houses of Parliament within one month. • **Special Majority:** Approval requires a special majority: majority of the total membership of the House and two-thirds majority of members present and voting. • **Effect:** During National Emergency, the Union’s executive power expands, Parliament may legislate on State List matters, and certain fundamental rights may be affected as per Articles 358 and 359. ### Landmark Cases on National Emergency • **Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625:** The Supreme Court held that the proclamation of emergency and related constitutional powers are subject to constitutional limitations and judicial review. The case is important because it rejected the idea that emergency powers are completely beyond judicial control. • **ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla, (1976) 2 SCC 521:** During the Emergency, the majority held that habeas corpus could be suspended when Article 21 enforcement was suspended. This decision is now treated as a deeply flawed constitutional moment. In **K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1**, the Supreme Court expressly recognized that ADM Jabalpur was wrong. The modern position is that constitutional rights and human dignity cannot be casually extinguished. ## President’s Rule under Article 356 • **Failure of Constitutional Machinery:** Article 356 allows the President to assume functions of a State government if he is satisfied, usually on the Governor’s report or otherwise, that the government of the State cannot be carried on according to the Constitution. • **Effect:** The President may take over executive functions of the State, declare that powers of the State Legislature shall be exercisable by Parliament, and make incidental provisions. • **Parliamentary Approval:** The proclamation must be approved by both Houses within two months. • **Federal Sensitivity:** Article 356 affects elected State governments, so it must be used carefully and only when constitutional machinery has genuinely failed. ### Landmark Case on Article 356 • **S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1:** Several State governments had been dismissed under Article 356. The Supreme Court held that presidential satisfaction under Article 356 is subject to judicial review. The Court ruled that majority should ordinarily be tested on the floor of the House, not merely through the Governor’s subjective report. It also held that secularism is part of the basic structure and that improper use of Article 356 can be struck down. This case is the most important authority on President’s Rule and Centre-State relations. ## Financial Emergency under Article 360 • **Ground:** Financial Emergency may be proclaimed if the President is satisfied that the financial stability or credit of India or any part of India is threatened. • **Parliamentary Approval:** The proclamation must be approved by both Houses of Parliament within two months. • **Effect:** The Union may give financial directions to States, require reduction of salaries and allowances of government servants, and require money bills or financial bills passed by State legislatures to be reserved for the President’s consideration. • **Practical Note:** Financial Emergency has never been proclaimed in India till date. ## Discretionary Powers of the President • **General Rule:** The President normally acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. After the 42nd and 44th Amendments, Article 74 makes ministerial advice binding, but the President may require the Council of Ministers to reconsider such advice once. After reconsideration, the President must act according to the advice. • **Appointment of Prime Minister:** The President may exercise limited discretion when no party has a clear majority in the Lok Sabha. In such a situation, the President invites the person most likely to command majority support. • **Dissolution of Lok Sabha:** If a Prime Minister who has lost majority advises dissolution, the President may examine whether an alternative stable government is possible. • **Return of Bill:** Under Article 111, the President may return a non-Money Bill once for reconsideration. • **Pocket Veto:** The Constitution does not prescribe a time limit for the President to act on a Bill. This has given rise to the idea of a “pocket veto”, where the President does not immediately give assent, withhold assent, or return the Bill. • **Hung Parliament Situations:** The President’s role becomes more significant when electoral results are unclear, coalitions are unstable, or a caretaker government is functioning. • **No Personal Policy Power:** Discretion does not mean personal rule. It means constitutional judgment within narrow limits to protect parliamentary democracy. ## Constitutional Position of the President of India • **Nominal Executive:** The President is the nominal executive, while the Council of Ministers is the real executive. • **Constitutional Guardian:** The President safeguards constitutional procedure, ensures continuity of government, and acts as a stabilizing authority during political uncertainty. • **Not a Rubber Stamp:** Though bound by ministerial advice, the President may ask questions, seek information, encourage reconsideration, and ensure constitutional propriety. • **Not an Alternative Government:** The President cannot govern independently. India’s democratic accountability flows through the Lok Sabha and Council of Ministers. • **Symbol of Union:** The President represents the unity, integrity and sovereignty of India. The office rises above party politics and reflects the dignity of the Republic. ### Landmark Case on Constitutional Position • **Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831:** The Supreme Court held that the President is the formal or constitutional head and acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The Court stated that the real executive power is exercised by the elected government. This judgment is the foundation for understanding the President’s constitutional position in India. ## Comparative Table: President’s Main Powers PowerArticleNatureLimitationExecutive power53Formal Union executive authorityAid and advice of Council of MinistersAppointment powersVarious ArticlesConstitutional appointmentsUsually on ministerial advice or prescribed procedureAssent to Bills111Legislative checkMust assent if returned Bill is passed againOrdinance power123Temporary law-making powerOnly when Parliament is not in session and urgent action is requiredPardoning power72Clemency and mercy powerLimited judicial review; exercised on adviceNational Emergency352Security emergencyWritten Cabinet advice and parliamentary approvalPresident’s Rule356State constitutional failureJudicial review after S.R. BommaiFinancial Emergency360Financial stability protectionParliamentary approval## Memory Aid: The President’s Role in One Formula • **ELECTION:** Indirect election by elected MPs and MLAs. • **QUALIFICATION:** Indian citizen, 35 years, Lok Sabha qualification, no office of profit. • **TERM:** Five years, eligible for re-election. • **REMOVAL:** Impeachment for violation of Constitution. • **POWER:** Executive, legislative, financial, judicial, military, diplomatic and emergency powers. • **LIMIT:** Aid and advice of Council of Ministers. • **POSITION:** Constitutional head, not real executive. ## Conclusion: President as the Constitutional Head of the Indian Republic • **Balanced Office:** The President of India is neither a ceremonial decoration nor an independent ruler. The office is designed as a balanced constitutional institution in a parliamentary democracy. • **Rule of Law:** The President acts through constitutional forms, ministerial responsibility, parliamentary control and judicial review. • **Democratic Design:** The President’s election reflects federal balance, the President’s powers reflect constitutional dignity, and the President’s limitations reflect democratic accountability. • **Final Understanding:** The President is the **guardian of constitutional form**, the **symbol of national unity**, the **formal executive head**, and the **constitutional conscience-keeper** of the Union, but the real day-to-day governance belongs to the elected Council of Ministers responsible to the Lok Sabha. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Fundamental Duties under Article 51A of the Constitution of India: Meaning, Origin, Enforceability and Judicial Relevance](https://lawfoyer.in/fundamental-duties-under-article-51a/) **Published:** June 4, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun4202612_26_20A-725x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning and Constitutional Position of Fundamental Duties ➤ **Basic idea:** Fundamental Duties are the constitutional obligations of citizens towards the Constitution, the nation, society, public property, environment, women, children, scientific temper and national unity. They are placed in **Part IVA** of the Constitution of India under **Article 51A**. Article 51A begins with the words: “It shall be the duty of every citizen of India—”, which shows that these duties are addressed specifically to **citizens**, unlike many Fundamental Rights which may be available to citizens as well as non-citizens depending on the Article. The current official text of the Constitution places Article 51A in Part IVA and lists eleven duties from clauses (a) to (k). ➤ **Nature of duties:** Fundamental Duties are not ordinary moral suggestions. They are constitutional duties, because they are expressly written in the Constitution. However, they are generally **not directly enforceable by writ** in the same manner as Fundamental Rights under Article 32 or Article 226. Their importance lies in guiding citizens, supporting constitutional morality, helping courts interpret laws, and allowing the State to make laws for giving effect to these duties. ➤ **Rights and duties relationship:** The Constitution cannot be understood only as a charter of rights. A democratic society requires both **rights and responsibilities**. Fundamental Rights protect individual liberty, Directive Principles guide the State in making welfare policies, and Fundamental Duties remind citizens that constitutional democracy can survive only when citizens behave responsibly. Therefore, Fundamental Duties complete the moral and civic structure of the Constitution. ## Origin of Fundamental Duties through the 42nd Constitutional Amendment ➤ **Original Constitution:** The Constitution as adopted on 26 January 1950 did **not** contain a separate chapter on Fundamental Duties. The original Constitution contained Fundamental Rights in Part III and Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV, but no separate list of duties for citizens. ➤ **Swaran Singh Committee:** During the 1970s, the need was felt to insert a chapter on citizens’ duties. The **Swaran Singh Committee** recommended the inclusion of Fundamental Duties in the Constitution. Acting on this constitutional reform idea, Parliament inserted **Part IVA** containing **Article 51A** through the **Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976**. The official Constitution text records that Part IVA was inserted by the 42nd Amendment Act, 1976. ➤ **Initially ten duties:** The 42nd Amendment inserted **ten Fundamental Duties**. These duties included respect for the Constitution, National Flag and National Anthem; following ideals of the freedom struggle; protecting sovereignty and unity; defending the country; promoting harmony; renouncing practices derogatory to women; preserving composite culture; protecting the environment; developing scientific temper; safeguarding public property; and striving for excellence. ➤ **Source of inspiration:** The concept of Fundamental Duties is generally understood to have been influenced by constitutions where duties of citizens were expressly recognised, especially the former Soviet constitutional model. However, the Indian form of Fundamental Duties is not a mechanical copy. Indian duties reflect the requirements of Indian constitutional culture: unity in diversity, constitutional respect, women’s dignity, environmental protection, scientific temper, and composite heritage. ## Article 51A: Complete List and Explanation of Fundamental Duties ➤ **Respect for Constitution, National Flag and National Anthem — Article 51A(a):** Every citizen must abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals, institutions, the National Flag and the National Anthem. This duty is connected with constitutional loyalty. It means citizens must respect constitutional values such as democracy, secularism, equality, rule of law, liberty and justice. Respect for the National Flag and National Anthem is not merely emotional; it represents respect for the constitutional identity of India. The Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971 gives statutory effect to some aspects of this duty by penalising insults to the Constitution, National Flag and National Anthem. ➤ **Freedom struggle ideals — Article 51A(b):** Every citizen must cherish and follow the noble ideals that inspired India’s national struggle for freedom. These ideals include courage against injustice, sacrifice, non-violence, democratic participation, equality, dignity, unity, self-rule and social reform. This duty reminds citizens that independence was not only a political event but also a moral movement for justice and self-respect. ➤ **Sovereignty, unity and integrity — Article 51A(c):** Every citizen must uphold and protect the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India. **Sovereignty** means India’s independent authority; **unity** means national togetherness; and **integrity** means territorial and constitutional wholeness. This duty is relevant in matters involving secessionism, terrorism, threats to national unity, hate propaganda and activities weakening constitutional fraternity. ➤ **Defence and national service — Article 51A(d):** Every citizen must defend the country and render national service when called upon to do so. This duty does not mean every citizen is always under compulsory military service. It means that when lawfully required, citizens must support national defence and public service. The duty reflects the idea that national security is not only the work of the armed forces but also a constitutional responsibility of citizens. ➤ **Harmony, brotherhood and dignity of women — Article 51A(e):** Every citizen must promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood among all people of India, transcending religious, linguistic, regional and sectional diversities. Citizens must also renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women. This duty directly supports the constitutional values of equality, secularism, fraternity and gender justice. Practices such as social exclusion, communal hatred, caste humiliation, honour-based violence, dowry harassment and gender-discriminatory customs are inconsistent with this duty. ➤ **Composite culture — Article 51A(f):** Every citizen must value and preserve the rich heritage of India’s composite culture. India’s culture is not single-dimensional; it is made of different languages, religions, traditions, art forms, philosophies, literatures and regional histories. This duty protects the idea of India as a plural and inclusive civilisation. ➤ **Environment and compassion for living creatures — Article 51A(g):** Every citizen must protect and improve the natural environment, including forests, lakes, rivers and wildlife, and must have compassion for living creatures. This duty is one of the most judicially relevant Fundamental Duties. It connects with **Article 48A**, which directs the State to protect and improve the environment, and **Article 21**, which has been interpreted to include the right to a healthy environment. ➤ **Scientific temper, humanism and reform — Article 51A(h):** Every citizen must develop scientific temper, humanism and the spirit of inquiry and reform. **Scientific temper** means rational thinking, questioning, evidence-based understanding and rejection of blind superstition. **Humanism** means respect for human dignity and compassion. **Spirit of reform** means willingness to improve social practices when they are unjust, irrational or oppressive. ➤ **Public property and non-violence — Article 51A(i):** Every citizen must safeguard public property and abjure violence. Public buses, trains, roads, government schools, hospitals, courts, public buildings and public resources are created through public money. Destroying public property during protests, riots or political agitation violates this constitutional duty. This clause also reminds citizens that democratic disagreement must remain peaceful. ➤ **Excellence — Article 51A(j):** Every citizen must strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity, so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavour and achievement. This duty gives a positive direction to citizenship. It does not impose perfection, but it asks citizens to work with sincerity, discipline and commitment in education, profession, public life, research, governance, sports, art and social service. ➤ **Education of children — Article 51A(k):** A parent or guardian must provide opportunities for education to his child or ward between the age of six and fourteen years. This duty was added by the **Constitution (Eighty-sixth Amendment) Act, 2002**. The same amendment inserted **Article 21A**, making free and compulsory education for children aged six to fourteen a Fundamental Right, and substituted Article 45 regarding early childhood care and education. ## Addition of Duty Regarding Education through the 86th Amendment ➤ **Constitutional change:** The 86th Constitutional Amendment, 2002 created an important constitutional triangle on education. First, **Article 21A** made education a Fundamental Right for children between six and fourteen years. Second, **Article 45** was revised to require the State to endeavour to provide early childhood care and education to children below six years. Third, **Article 51A(k)** imposed a duty on parents and guardians to provide educational opportunities to children between six and fourteen years. ➤ **Meaning of parental duty:** Article 51A(k) does not punish poverty or inability. Its focus is on constitutional responsibility. Parents and guardians should not deliberately deny education to children. They must create opportunities for schooling and learning as far as reasonably possible. The duty supports the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, which operationalises Article 21A. ➤ **Balance between State and parents:** The duty regarding education is important because children’s education cannot depend only on the State. The State must provide free and compulsory education, but parents and guardians must also ensure that children are not kept away from school due to negligence, child labour, social prejudice or lack of awareness. ## Enforceability of Fundamental Duties ➤ **Not directly enforceable like Fundamental Rights:** Fundamental Duties are generally **non-justiciable**, meaning a citizen cannot ordinarily file a writ petition merely to compel another citizen to perform a Fundamental Duty. In **AIIMS Students’ Union v. AIIMS, (2002) 1 SCC 428**, the Supreme Court observed that Fundamental Duties under Article 51A are not made enforceable by writ like Fundamental Rights, but they cannot be overlooked because they are also described as “fundamental”. ➤ **Enforceable through ordinary laws:** Even though Article 51A itself does not provide direct punishment, Parliament and State Legislatures can make laws to enforce duties. For example, disrespect to the National Flag or National Anthem may be punished under the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971. Similarly, environmental duties are supported by statutes such as the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, the Water Act, 1974 and the Air Act, 1981. Therefore, Fundamental Duties become practically enforceable when converted into statutory obligations. ➤ **Aid to constitutional interpretation:** Courts use Fundamental Duties as interpretative guides. When a law is made to promote a Fundamental Duty, courts may consider that constitutional purpose while testing the reasonableness or validity of the law. For example, a law protecting forests, preventing cruelty to animals, prohibiting damage to public property, or promoting national honour may receive support from Article 51A. ➤ **No excuse to violate Fundamental Rights:** Fundamental Duties cannot be used casually to destroy Fundamental Rights. A citizen’s duty to respect the National Anthem does not mean the State may punish a person without legal authority or violate freedom of conscience. Duties and rights must be harmonised. The Constitution requires responsible liberty, not forced uniformity. ## Judicial Relevance and Landmark Case Laws ➤ **AIIMS Students’ Union v. AIIMS, (2002) 1 SCC 428:** The facts involved reservation/preference in postgraduate medical admissions for students of AIIMS. The legal issue was whether such institutional preference was constitutionally permissible and how excellence in medical education should be understood. The Supreme Court emphasised Article 51A(j), which requires citizens to strive towards excellence in all spheres. The ratio was that Fundamental Duties, though not enforceable like Fundamental Rights, are constitutionally significant and may guide interpretation of constitutional and legal issues. The Court stressed that duties are also called “fundamental” and cannot be treated as meaningless. ➤ **Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, (1986) 3 SCC 615:** In this case, three school children belonging to the Jehovah’s Witness faith stood respectfully during the National Anthem but did not sing it because of their religious belief. They were expelled from school. The issue was whether refusal to sing the National Anthem, while standing respectfully, amounted to disrespect and whether expulsion violated Fundamental Rights. The Supreme Court held that the children had not shown disrespect; they had stood respectfully and peacefully. The ratio was that genuine freedom of conscience under Article 25 and freedom of expression under Article 19 cannot be curtailed without lawful authority. This case shows that Article 51A(a) requires respect, but respect does not always mean compelled singing. ➤ **Union of India v. Naveen Jindal, (2004) 2 SCC 510:** The issue concerned the right of citizens to fly the National Flag. The Supreme Court held that flying the National Flag with respect and dignity is an expression protected under Article 19(1)(a), subject to reasonable restrictions. The case connects Article 51A(a) with constitutional patriotism: citizens may express respect for the Flag, but such expression must conform to dignity and statutory regulation. This case shows that Fundamental Duties may exist alongside Fundamental Rights and may help define the limits of respectful constitutional conduct. ➤ **M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 1115 / Ganga Pollution cases:** In the Ganga pollution litigation, industries and authorities were questioned for allowing pollution of the river Ganga. The legal issue was whether courts could issue directions to prevent environmental degradation affecting life, health and ecology. The Supreme Court relied on environmental constitutional values and treated environmental protection as a serious public duty. Article 51A(g) became important because it imposes a duty on citizens to protect and improve the environment, while Article 48A imposes a similar obligation on the State. ➤ **M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, environmental education matter:** In the environmental education litigation, the concern was that citizens cannot protect the environment unless they are made aware of environmental duties. The Supreme Court referred to Article 51A(g) and supported environmental education as a means of making citizens conscious of their constitutional responsibility. This case shows that Fundamental Duties are not only for courts and lawyers; they must be taught and internalised through education and public awareness. ➤ **Hon’ble Shri Ranganath Mishra v. Union of India, (2003) 7 SCC 133:** A letter by former Chief Justice Ranganath Mishra requesting steps to educate citizens about Fundamental Duties was treated as a writ petition. The issue was how Fundamental Duties could be made meaningful in public life. The Supreme Court referred to the recommendations of the Justice J.S. Verma Committee and the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution. The ratio was that the Government should consider appropriate steps for implementation and awareness of Fundamental Duties. This case is important because it treats duties as essential for balancing rights and responsibilities in a democratic society. ## Relationship between Fundamental Duties, Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles ➤ **With Fundamental Rights:** Fundamental Rights give citizens enforceable claims against the State. Fundamental Duties impose obligations on citizens towards the nation and society. They are different in enforceability, but connected in purpose. For example, freedom of speech under Article 19 must be exercised consistently with public order, sovereignty, integrity and dignity of others. Article 51A(c), 51A(e) and 51A(i) provide civic values that support reasonable restrictions. ➤ **With Directive Principles:** Directive Principles guide the State, while Fundamental Duties guide citizens. Some duties and Directive Principles mirror each other. Article 48A directs the State to protect the environment, while Article 51A(g) asks citizens to protect and improve the environment. This creates a shared constitutional responsibility. ➤ **Constitutional morality:** Fundamental Duties promote constitutional morality by asking citizens to respect diversity, dignity, public property, national symbols, environment, scientific thinking and excellence. They help transform the Constitution from a legal document into a living civic culture. ## Practical Importance of Fundamental Duties ➤ **Civic discipline:** Fundamental Duties teach that citizenship is not only about claiming benefits but also about contributing to public order, harmony and national progress. ➤ **Social unity:** Duties like promoting brotherhood, renouncing practices derogatory to women and preserving composite culture are especially important in a diverse society like India. ➤ **Environmental responsibility:** Article 51A(g) makes environmental protection a citizen’s duty. It is relevant in daily life, including waste management, water conservation, protection of animals, avoiding pollution and preserving public natural resources. ➤ **Public property:** Article 51A(i) is highly relevant during protests and public movements. Democracy allows dissent, but it does not justify violence or destruction of public assets. ➤ **Education and children:** Article 51A(k) reminds families that education is not charity; it is a constitutional responsibility towards children and society. ## Memory Table: Article 51A at a Glance ClauseKeywordCore Duty51A(a)**Respect**Constitution, National Flag, National Anthem51A(b)**Freedom struggle**Follow noble ideals of freedom movement51A(c)**Unity**Protect sovereignty, unity and integrity51A(d)**Defence**Defend country and render national service51A(e)**Harmony**Promote brotherhood and dignity of women51A(f)**Culture**Preserve composite cultural heritage51A(g)**Environment**Protect nature and show compassion to living creatures51A(h)**Scientific temper**Develop humanism, inquiry and reform51A(i)**Public property**Safeguard public property and reject violence51A(j)**Excellence**Strive for excellence individually and collectively51A(k)**Education**Parent/guardian to provide education opportunities to children aged 6–14## Conclusion ➤ **Core essence:** Fundamental Duties under Article 51A are the citizen’s side of the constitutional promise. They were inserted by the 42nd Amendment in 1976 and expanded by the 86th Amendment in 2002 through the addition of the duty regarding education. They are generally not directly enforceable like Fundamental Rights, but they are constitutionally important, judicially relevant and capable of statutory enforcement. ➤ **Final understanding:** Article 51A creates a model of responsible citizenship. It asks every citizen to respect the Constitution, protect national unity, promote harmony, preserve culture, protect the environment, develop scientific temper, safeguard public property, strive for excellence and support children’s education. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognised that Fundamental Duties may guide interpretation, strengthen laws and balance rights with civic responsibility. In this way, Fundamental Duties convert constitutional citizenship from a passive status into an active responsibility. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Directive Principles of State Policy under the Constitution of India: Articles 36 to 51](https://lawfoyer.in/directive-principles-of-state-policy/) **Published:** June 4, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun4202612_17_22A-725x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning and Constitutional Importance of Directive Principles of State Policy ➤ **Meaning of DPSPs:** Directive Principles of State Policy, commonly called **DPSPs**, are constitutional directions given to the State for making laws and policies to establish a welfare-oriented, socially just, economically fair and morally progressive society. They are contained in **Part IV of the Constitution of India, Articles 36 to 51**. The official text of the Constitution places these provisions under the heading “Directive Principles of State Policy.” ➤ **Core idea:** Fundamental Rights mainly protect individual liberty, while DPSPs guide the State to create conditions where liberty becomes meaningful. For example, the right to life under Article 21 becomes more real when the State works for health, education, livelihood, nutrition, environment and justice, all of which are reflected in DPSPs. ➤ **Constitutional philosophy:** DPSPs represent the social and economic conscience of the Constitution. They show that India is not merely a political democracy where people vote, but also aims to be a **social and economic democracy** where poverty, inequality, exploitation and social backwardness are reduced. ➤ **Source of inspiration:** DPSPs were influenced by the **Irish Constitution**, but their Indian form reflects the freedom struggle, Gandhian ideas, social justice movements and the need to transform a poor and unequal society into a welfare State. ## Article 36: Definition of State ➤ **Meaning of State:** Article 36 says that, unless the context otherwise requires, the word **“State”** in Part IV has the same meaning as in Part III. Therefore, it includes the Government and Parliament of India, the Government and Legislature of each State, local authorities and other authorities within India or under the control of the Government of India. ➤ **Practical importance:** DPSPs are addressed not only to the Union Government but also to State Governments, local bodies and other public authorities. Every organ of governance must keep DPSPs in mind while framing policies. ## Article 37: Non-Justiciability and Fundamental Nature of DPSPs ➤ **Non-justiciable nature:** Article 37 clearly provides that DPSPs are **not enforceable by any court**. This means a citizen cannot directly file a case demanding enforcement of a DPSP in the same manner as a Fundamental Right. ➤ **Fundamental in governance:** Article 37 also says that these principles are **fundamental in the governance of the country**, and it is the duty of the State to apply them in making laws. Thus, DPSPs are not legally enforceable as direct rights, but they are constitutionally binding as goals of governance. ➤ **Simple distinction:** A court may not force the State to implement a DPSP immediately, but the State cannot ignore DPSPs while making law and policy. They are political, moral and constitutional obligations of the State. ## Article 38: Social Order Based on Justice ➤ **Justice-based social order:** Article 38 directs the State to promote the welfare of the people by securing a social order in which **justice—social, economic and political—shall inform all institutions of national life**. ➤ **Reduction of inequality:** Article 38 also directs the State to minimise inequalities in income, status, facilities and opportunities among individuals and groups. This makes Article 38 the broad foundation of the welfare State. ➤ **Example:** Policies for poverty removal, affirmative action, social security, public health, rural development and access to basic services are connected with Article 38. ## Article 39: Principles of Policy Relating to Livelihood, Resources and Economic Justice ➤ **Adequate livelihood:** Article 39(a) directs the State to ensure that citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood. ➤ **Material resources:** Article 39(b) directs that ownership and control of material resources of the community should be distributed to subserve the common good. In **Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 INSC 835**, a nine-judge Bench held that Article 31C, as upheld in **Kesavananda Bharati**, remains in force, and that not all private property is automatically a “material resource of the community” under Article 39(b); private property may qualify depending on context, nature of the resource, scarcity, public purpose and community need. ➤ **Prevention of concentration of wealth:** Article 39(c) directs that the economic system should not result in concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. ➤ **Equal pay for equal work:** Article 39(d) directs equal pay for equal work for both men and women. In **Randhir Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 879**, the petitioner, a driver in the Delhi Police Force, claimed parity with drivers in other departments performing similar duties. The Supreme Court held that although equal pay for equal work is not expressly declared as a Fundamental Right, it is a constitutional goal under Article 39(d) and can be read with Articles 14 and 16 to enforce equality where persons perform similar work under the same employer without rational classification. ➤ **Protection of workers and children:** Article 39(e) directs protection of the health and strength of workers, men and women, and the tender age of children from abuse. Article 39(f) directs that children should develop in a healthy manner with freedom, dignity and protection against exploitation and moral or material abandonment. ## Article 39A: Equal Justice and Free Legal Aid ➤ **Access to justice:** Article 39A directs the State to ensure that the legal system promotes justice on the basis of equal opportunity and to provide free legal aid so that justice is not denied because of economic or other disabilities. Article 39A was inserted by the **42nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1976**. ➤ **Constitutional importance:** Article 39A converts justice from a theoretical idea into a practical necessity. A poor person must not lose a legal claim merely because they cannot afford a lawyer. ➤ **Case law:** In **Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1369**, the Supreme Court dealt with the condition of undertrial prisoners who had remained in jail for long periods. The Court recognised speedy trial and legal aid as essential aspects of fair procedure under Article 21, read with the constitutional philosophy of Article 39A. ## Article 40: Organisation of Village Panchayats ➤ **Local self-government:** Article 40 directs the State to organise village panchayats and endow them with powers and authority necessary to function as units of self-government. ➤ **Implementation:** This principle was strongly implemented through the **73rd Constitutional Amendment**, which gave constitutional status to Panchayati Raj Institutions. Article 40 reflects democratic decentralisation and grassroots participation. ## Article 41: Right to Work, Education and Public Assistance ➤ **Conditional duty of State:** Article 41 directs the State, within its economic capacity and development, to make effective provision for the right to work, education and public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement. ➤ **Right to livelihood:** In **Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180; (1985) 3 SCC 545**, pavement and slum dwellers challenged eviction because eviction would destroy their livelihood. The Supreme Court held that the right to life under Article 21 includes the right to livelihood, though eviction could be carried out according to fair procedure. The case shows how DPSP values like livelihood and social justice influenced interpretation of Fundamental Rights. ➤ **Right to education:** In **Unni Krishnan J.P. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1993 SC 2178; (1993) 1 SCC 645**, the Supreme Court held that the right to education flows from Article 21 and that children have a fundamental right to free education up to 14 years. This judicial development later supported the insertion of Article 21A. ## Article 42: Just and Humane Conditions of Work and Maternity Relief ➤ **Labour welfare:** Article 42 directs the State to make provision for just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief. ➤ **Practical relevance:** Laws relating to maternity benefits, factory safety, working hours, labour welfare, occupational health and humane workplace conditions derive constitutional support from Article 42. ## Article 43: Living Wage and Decent Standard of Life ➤ **Living wage:** Article 43 directs the State to secure a living wage, decent standard of life, leisure, social and cultural opportunities for workers. It also encourages cottage industries on an individual or cooperative basis in rural areas. ➤ **Difference between minimum wage and living wage:** Minimum wage prevents exploitation at the lowest level, while living wage aims at a dignified life including basic needs, education, health, recreation and social security. ## Article 43A: Participation of Workers in Management ➤ **Industrial democracy:** Article 43A directs the State to secure participation of workers in the management of industries. This provision was inserted by the **42nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1976**. ➤ **Purpose:** It recognises that workers are not merely instruments of production; they are stakeholders in industrial development. ## Article 43B: Promotion of Cooperative Societies ➤ **Cooperative principle:** Article 43B directs the State to promote voluntary formation, autonomous functioning, democratic control and professional management of cooperative societies. It was inserted by the **97th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2011**. ➤ **Importance:** This provision supports cooperative federalism at the economic level, especially in agriculture, credit, dairy, housing and rural development. ## Article 44: Uniform Civil Code ➤ **Common civil law:** Article 44 directs the State to endeavour to secure a **Uniform Civil Code** for citizens throughout India. ➤ **Meaning:** A Uniform Civil Code means a common set of civil laws relating to matters such as marriage, divorce, succession, adoption and maintenance, irrespective of religion. ➤ **Constitutional sensitivity:** Article 44 must be understood with equality, gender justice, religious freedom and social harmony. It is a directive, not an immediately enforceable command. ## Article 45: Early Childhood Care and Education ➤ **Present text:** Article 45 directs the State to provide early childhood care and education for all children until they complete the age of six years. ➤ **Change after Article 21A:** Originally, Article 45 directed free and compulsory education for children up to 14 years. After the 86th Constitutional Amendment, education for children between 6 and 14 years became a Fundamental Right under Article 21A, while Article 45 was reshaped to focus on early childhood care. ## Article 46: Educational and Economic Interests of Weaker Sections ➤ **Social justice:** Article 46 directs the State to promote educational and economic interests of weaker sections, especially Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and protect them from social injustice and exploitation. ➤ **Practical importance:** Reservations, scholarships, hostels, welfare schemes, protection against caste-based exploitation and targeted development measures are supported by Article 46. ## Article 47: Nutrition, Standard of Living and Public Health ➤ **Public health duty:** Article 47 directs the State to raise the level of nutrition, standard of living and public health. It also directs the State to endeavour to prohibit intoxicating drinks and drugs injurious to health, except for medicinal purposes. ➤ **Health jurisprudence:** The Supreme Court has often connected public health with Article 21. Article 47 strengthens the view that health is not charity but a constitutional governance duty. ## Article 48: Agriculture and Animal Husbandry ➤ **Scientific agriculture:** Article 48 directs the State to organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines and to preserve and improve breeds. It also directs prohibition of slaughter of cows, calves and other milch and draught cattle. ➤ **Balance required:** This provision has to be understood with livelihood, agriculture, animal welfare, food practices and legislative competence. ## Article 48A: Environment and Wildlife ➤ **Environmental protection:** Article 48A directs the State to protect and improve the environment and safeguard forests and wildlife. It was inserted by the **42nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1976**. ➤ **Judicial development:** Article 48A, along with Article 51A(g), has influenced environmental jurisprudence under Article 21. The right to life now includes the right to a clean and healthy environment. ## Article 49: Protection of Monuments and Places of National Importance ➤ **Cultural heritage:** Article 49 directs the State to protect monuments, places and objects of artistic or historic interest declared by law to be of national importance. ➤ **Purpose:** A nation’s heritage is part of its constitutional identity. Protection of historical monuments preserves collective memory and culture. ## Article 50: Separation of Judiciary from Executive ➤ **Judicial independence:** Article 50 directs the State to separate the judiciary from the executive in the public services of the State. ➤ **Importance:** Separation protects impartial justice. A judge should not be controlled by the executive authority whose actions may come before the court. ## Article 51: International Peace and Security ➤ **International constitutional morality:** Article 51 directs the State to promote international peace and security, maintain just and honourable relations between nations, foster respect for international law and treaty obligations, and encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration. ➤ **Wider meaning:** Article 51 shows that India’s Constitution is not inward-looking. It supports peaceful coexistence, international cooperation and rule-based global order. ## Classification of DPSPs ### Socialist Principles ➤ **Meaning:** Socialist DPSPs aim to reduce inequality, prevent exploitation and create social and economic justice. ➤ **Main Articles:** Articles **38, 39, 39A, 41, 42, 43, 43A and 47** are generally treated as socialist principles. ➤ **Purpose:** They deal with adequate livelihood, equal distribution of resources, equal pay, legal aid, work, education, public assistance, labour welfare, living wage, workers’ participation, nutrition and public health. ### Gandhian Principles ➤ **Meaning:** Gandhian DPSPs reflect Mahatma Gandhi’s ideas of village self-rule, cottage industries, weaker section upliftment, prohibition and cow protection. ➤ **Main Articles:** Articles **40, 43, 43B, 46, 47 and 48** are generally considered Gandhian principles. ➤ **Purpose:** They promote village panchayats, rural industries, cooperative societies, protection of weaker sections, prohibition and scientific animal husbandry. ### Liberal-Intellectual Principles ➤ **Meaning:** Liberal principles focus on legal reform, individual dignity, institutional separation, environment, heritage and international peace. ➤ **Main Articles:** Articles **44, 45, 48A, 49, 50 and 51** are usually classified as liberal-intellectual principles. ➤ **Purpose:** They support Uniform Civil Code, early childhood care, environmental protection, monument preservation, judicial independence and international peace. ## Implementation of DPSPs ➤ **Through constitutional amendments:** Important DPSP-related changes include Article 39A, Article 43A and Article 48A through the 42nd Amendment; Article 21A and revised Article 45 through the 86th Amendment; and Article 43B through the 97th Amendment. ➤ **Through legislation:** DPSPs have inspired laws on land reforms, labour welfare, legal services, education, panchayats, environment, maternity benefits, food security, cooperative societies and social welfare. ➤ **Through judicial interpretation:** Courts have used DPSPs to expand the meaning of Fundamental Rights, especially Article 21. This is visible in cases on livelihood, education, health, environment, legal aid and dignity. ## Relation Between DPSPs and Fundamental Rights ➤ **Early view—Fundamental Rights prevail:** In **State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, AIR 1951 SC 226**, communal reservation in educational institutions was challenged. The Supreme Court held that DPSPs cannot override or abridge Fundamental Rights and must run subsidiary to Part III. This case led to the First Constitutional Amendment and showed the first major conflict between Part III and Part IV. ➤ **Basic Structure and harmony:** In **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461; (1973) 4 SCC 225**, the Supreme Court upheld Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution but held that the basic structure cannot be destroyed. The case also dealt with Article 31C, which protected laws giving effect to Article 39(b) and 39(c), subject to constitutional limits. ➤ **Balance between Parts III and IV:** In **Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789; (1980) 3 SCC 625**, the Supreme Court struck down the attempt to give unlimited primacy to all DPSPs over Fundamental Rights. The Court held that the Constitution is founded on harmony and balance between Fundamental Rights and DPSPs, and destroying that balance damages the basic structure. ➤ **Modern approach:** The modern judicial approach is not to treat Fundamental Rights and DPSPs as enemies. Courts try to read them together. Fundamental Rights provide enforceable guarantees, while DPSPs provide the social and moral content needed to make those rights meaningful. ## Difference Between Fundamental Rights and DPSPs BasisFundamental RightsDirective Principles of State Policy**Location**Part IIIPart IV**Nature**Mostly negative and positive obligations protecting individualsPositive directions for welfare governance**Enforceability**Enforceable by courtsNot directly enforceable by courts**Purpose**Political democracy and individual libertySocial and economic democracy**Remedy**Writs under Articles 32 and 226Implemented through laws, policies and interpretation**Constitutional value**Fundamental for individual rightsFundamental in governance## Memory Chart for Quick Revision CategoryArticlesKey Idea**Definition and nature**36–37State and non-justiciability**Social justice**38–39AWelfare, equality, resources, legal aid**Local democracy and labour welfare**40–43BPanchayats, work, maternity, living wage, cooperatives**Social reform and child welfare**44–47UCC, early childhood care, weaker sections, health**Agriculture, environment and heritage**48–49Animal husbandry, environment, monuments**Judiciary and international peace**50–51Separation of judiciary and peaceful global relations## Conclusion ➤ **Final understanding:** DPSPs are the constitutional roadmap for building a welfare State. They are not directly enforceable like Fundamental Rights, but they are fundamental in governance and deeply influence legislation, policy and judicial interpretation. ➤ **Balanced Constitution:** Indian constitutional law has moved from conflict between Fundamental Rights and DPSPs to harmony between them. Fundamental Rights protect liberty and dignity; DPSPs ensure that liberty and dignity are supported by social justice, economic fairness, education, health, livelihood, environment and equal opportunity. ➤ **Best legal position:** No absolute superiority can be given either to Fundamental Rights or DPSPs. The Constitution requires a careful balance where individual rights are protected and social transformation is pursued through constitutionally valid means. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Article 32 of the Constitution of India: Constitutional Remedies, Writ Jurisdiction, PIL, Locus Standi and Suspension During Emergency](https://lawfoyer.in/article-32-of-the-constitution-of-india/) **Published:** June 4, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun4202612_08_48A-725x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning and Importance of Article 32: The Heart of Fundamental Rights ➤ **Core meaning:** Article 32 of the Constitution of India gives a person the guaranteed right to directly approach the Supreme Court for enforcement of Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution. It is not merely a procedural remedy; it is itself a Fundamental Right. Article 32(1) guarantees the right to move the Supreme Court, Article 32(2) empowers the Supreme Court to issue directions, orders or writs including **habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari**, Article 32(3) allows Parliament to empower other courts to exercise such powers, and Article 32(4) states that this right shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided by the Constitution. ➤ **Constitutional significance:** Dr. B.R. Ambedkar famously described Article 32 as the “very soul” and “heart” of the Constitution because rights without remedies become only paper promises. A Fundamental Right becomes meaningful only when there is an effective judicial forum to enforce it. Article 32 therefore converts constitutional promises into enforceable legal rights. ➤ **Nature of jurisdiction:** The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Article 32 is **original**, because the aggrieved person may directly approach the Supreme Court without first filing a case before a lower court. It is also **constitutional**, because the power flows directly from the Constitution and not from an ordinary statute. It is also **remedial**, because its object is to repair or prevent the violation of Fundamental Rights. ➤ **Limited purpose:** Article 32 is available only for enforcement of Fundamental Rights. It cannot ordinarily be invoked for violation of ordinary statutory rights, contractual rights or non-fundamental legal rights unless such violation also results in infringement of a Fundamental Right. ## Article 32 and Article 226: Key Difference ➤ **Article 32:** The Supreme Court can issue writs only for enforcement of Fundamental Rights. Since Article 32 itself is a Fundamental Right, the Supreme Court normally cannot refuse relief merely because another remedy exists, though it may regulate procedure and may decline petitions that are frivolous, premature, politically motivated or not connected with Fundamental Rights. ➤ **Article 226:** The High Courts can issue writs not only for enforcement of Fundamental Rights but also “for any other purpose.” Therefore, Article 226 is wider in subject-matter. However, Article 32 is stronger in constitutional status because it is itself guaranteed as a Fundamental Right. ➤ **Practical distinction:** A person may approach the Supreme Court under Article 32 when a Fundamental Right is directly violated, while a person may approach the High Court under Article 226 for Fundamental Rights as well as other legal rights. Article 226(4) also clarifies that the High Court’s writ power does not derogate from the Supreme Court’s power under Article 32. ## Writ Jurisdiction under Article 32 ➤ **Meaning of writ:** A writ is a formal command issued by a constitutional court to enforce legal or constitutional rights. Under Article 32, writs are issued by the Supreme Court to protect Fundamental Rights against unconstitutional State action, unlawful detention, jurisdictional errors, misuse of public office and failure of public authorities to perform public duties. ➤ **Scope of orders:** Article 32(2) uses broad words: “directions or orders or writs.” This means the Supreme Court is not restricted only to traditional English writs. It may design suitable remedies such as compensation, continuing mandamus, guidelines, monitoring mechanisms, investigation directions, rehabilitation orders, environmental directions and structural remedies wherever necessary for complete enforcement of Fundamental Rights. ## Habeas Corpus: Protection Against Illegal Detention ➤ **Meaning:** Habeas corpus literally means “produce the body.” It is a writ issued to command the authority or person detaining someone to produce the detained person before the court and justify the legality of detention. ➤ **Purpose:** This writ protects personal liberty under Article 21 and prevents unlawful arrest, secret detention, custodial abuse and executive arbitrariness. It is the most immediate remedy where a person’s physical liberty is illegally restrained. ➤ **Who may file:** The detained person, family member, friend or even a public-spirited person may file the petition, especially when the detenue cannot approach the court personally. ➤ **When issued:** It may be issued when detention is without legal authority, when mandatory procedure is not followed, when detention order is mala fide, when grounds of detention are not communicated as required, or when custody continues after expiry of lawful authority. ➤ **Landmark case — A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla, (1976) 2 SCC 521:** During the Internal Emergency, detenues filed habeas corpus petitions challenging preventive detention. The legal issue was whether a person could move court for habeas corpus when the right to enforce Article 21 was suspended under Article 359. The majority held that during such suspension, courts could not examine habeas corpus petitions for enforcement of personal liberty. This decision was later condemned as a grave constitutional error. In **Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1**, the Supreme Court held that life and personal liberty are not gifts of the State and expressly disapproved the reasoning of A.D.M. Jabalpur. ## Mandamus: Command to Perform Public Duty ➤ **Meaning:** Mandamus means “we command.” It is issued to compel a public authority, statutory body, tribunal, government officer or other authority performing public functions to perform a legal or public duty. ➤ **Purpose:** Mandamus prevents administrative inaction. It ensures that authorities do not sit idle where the law requires them to act. ➤ **When issued:** It may be issued where a public authority refuses to exercise jurisdiction, fails to perform a statutory duty, acts arbitrarily, violates Fundamental Rights, or ignores constitutional obligations. ➤ **When not issued:** It is generally not issued to enforce a purely private contract, to compel performance of a discretionary act in a particular manner, against the President or Governor for official constitutional functions, or where no legal duty exists. ➤ **Illustration:** If a statute requires a licensing authority to consider an application within a reasonable time and the authority refuses to act without justification, mandamus may be issued directing the authority to decide the application according to law. ## Certiorari: Correcting Jurisdictional and Legal Errors ➤ **Meaning:** Certiorari means “to be certified” or “to be informed.” It is issued by a superior court to quash an order passed by an inferior court, tribunal or quasi-judicial authority when such order suffers from jurisdictional error, violation of natural justice or error apparent on the face of the record. ➤ **Purpose:** Certiorari is corrective. It does not merely prevent future illegality; it sets aside an already passed illegal order. ➤ **When issued:** It may be issued where the authority acts without jurisdiction, exceeds jurisdiction, fails to exercise jurisdiction, violates natural justice, considers irrelevant matters, ignores mandatory law, or makes a patent legal error. ➤ **Natural justice connection:** Certiorari is often used where a person was not given notice, hearing, impartial adjudication or reasoned decision where law required fairness. ➤ **Illustration:** If a tribunal decides a matter against a person without giving any opportunity of hearing, the Supreme Court may quash the order through certiorari if a Fundamental Right is involved. ## Prohibition: Preventing Excess of Jurisdiction ➤ **Meaning:** Prohibition is issued by a superior court to an inferior court, tribunal or quasi-judicial body to prevent it from continuing proceedings beyond its jurisdiction. ➤ **Purpose:** Prohibition is preventive, while certiorari is corrective. Prohibition stops an illegal proceeding before final order; certiorari quashes an illegal order after it is made. ➤ **When issued:** It may be issued when a tribunal is hearing a matter over which it has no jurisdiction, is exceeding its jurisdiction, or is proceeding in violation of natural justice. ➤ **Illustration:** If a tax tribunal starts deciding a criminal matter that it has no power to decide, prohibition may be issued restraining it from continuing such proceedings. ## Quo Warranto: Testing Authority to Hold Public Office ➤ **Meaning:** Quo warranto means “by what authority.” It is issued to question the legal authority of a person holding a public office. ➤ **Purpose:** This writ protects public offices from illegal occupation. It ensures that only legally eligible persons occupy public positions. ➤ **Conditions:** The office must be public, substantive, created by Constitution or statute, and the holder must lack legal eligibility or appointment must be contrary to law. ➤ **Special feature:** Unlike other writs, the petitioner need not prove personal injury. Any person may seek quo warranto because the public has an interest in lawful occupation of public offices. ➤ **Illustration:** If a statute requires a university vice-chancellor to possess specified qualifications and a person without those qualifications is appointed, quo warranto may be filed to challenge the authority of that person to hold office. ## Public Interest Litigation under Article 32 ➤ **Meaning of PIL:** Public Interest Litigation is a procedural innovation by which courts allow public-spirited persons to approach the Supreme Court or High Court for enforcement of rights of disadvantaged, poor, detained, exploited, marginalised or voiceless persons who cannot approach the court themselves. ➤ **Reason for development:** Traditional litigation required the person directly injured to file the case. This strict rule worked harshly in a country where poverty, illiteracy, social oppression, bonded labour, custodial violence and administrative neglect often prevented victims from accessing courts. PIL relaxed procedure to make Fundamental Rights practically enforceable. ➤ **Constitutional basis:** PIL under Article 32 is mainly used where violation of Fundamental Rights affects a class of persons or the public at large. It has been used in matters involving bonded labour, undertrial prisoners, prison reforms, environment, sexual harassment, child labour, pavement dwellers, custodial violence, right to food, shelter, education and dignity. ➤ **Epistolary jurisdiction:** In some PIL cases, the Supreme Court treated letters, postcards or newspaper reports as writ petitions. This reflected the idea that procedural technicalities must not defeat substantive justice where Fundamental Rights of helpless persons are involved. ➤ **Landmark case — S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 Supp SCC 87:** The case concerned issues relating to transfer and appointment of judges and independence of the judiciary. The legal issue included whether persons not personally injured could approach the court in matters of public importance. The Supreme Court liberalised locus standi and accepted that where legal wrong is caused to a person or class unable to approach the court due to poverty, disability or socially disadvantaged position, a public-spirited person may maintain an action. This became a foundation of PIL jurisprudence in India. ➤ **Landmark case — Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161 / AIR 1984 SC 802:** The petition alleged existence of bonded labourers in stone quarries. The issue was whether the Supreme Court could entertain a PIL and issue investigative and remedial directions for enforcement of Articles 21, 23 and 24. The Court held that Article 32 is not confined to adversarial litigation and may be used to secure release and rehabilitation of bonded labourers. The ratio is that the right to live with dignity, free from exploitation, is enforceable through Article 32, and procedural flexibility is justified where the oppressed cannot access justice. ➤ **Limits on PIL:** PIL is not meant for publicity, political rivalry, private disputes, service matters disguised as public interest, commercial competition or personal gain. Courts insist on bona fides because misuse of PIL can waste judicial time and harm genuine public causes. ## Locus Standi under Article 32 ➤ **Traditional rule:** Locus standi means the legal capacity to bring a case. Traditionally, only a person whose own right was violated could file a writ petition. ➤ **Liberalised rule:** In constitutional matters involving disadvantaged persons or public wrongs, Indian courts relaxed locus standi. A person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest may approach the court on behalf of those who cannot do so. ➤ **Reason for relaxation:** Fundamental Rights are not only individual claims; they also express constitutional values such as dignity, equality, liberty and rule of law. Where violation affects persons who are poor, imprisoned, bonded, socially oppressed or otherwise disabled from approaching court, strict locus standi would make rights meaningless. ➤ **Balanced approach:** Liberal locus standi does not mean open permission for busybodies. The petitioner must act in good faith, must not seek personal benefit, and must raise a genuine constitutional issue. ## Article 32 and Judicial Review as Basic Structure ➤ **Judicial review:** Judicial review is the power of courts to examine whether laws, executive actions and administrative orders are consistent with the Constitution. Article 32 is a central tool of judicial review because it allows direct challenge before the Supreme Court for violation of Fundamental Rights. ➤ **Landmark case — Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225:** The issue was the extent of Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that Parliament may amend the Constitution but cannot destroy its basic structure. Judicial review and Fundamental Rights form part of constitutional supremacy. Article 32 draws strength from this doctrine because without judicial review, Fundamental Rights would lose practical force. ➤ **Landmark case — Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625 / AIR 1980 SC 1789:** The issue concerned the validity of constitutional amendments restricting judicial review and giving primacy to Directive Principles over Fundamental Rights. The Court held that limited amending power and judicial review are part of the basic structure. The case strengthens Article 32 because it confirms that courts must remain available to test constitutional violations. ➤ **Landmark case — L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 / AIR 1997 SC 1125:** The issue was whether tribunal decisions could be excluded from High Court and Supreme Court judicial review. The Supreme Court held that judicial review under Articles 32 and 226/227 is part of the basic structure. Tribunals may act as courts of first instance in specialised areas, but constitutional judicial review cannot be completely excluded. ## Suspension of Article 32 During Emergency ➤ **Article 32(4):** Article 32 states that the right guaranteed by Article 32 shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided by the Constitution. This means the Constitution itself recognises limited emergency situations where enforcement of certain Fundamental Rights may be suspended. ➤ **Article 359:** During a Proclamation of Emergency, the President may by order declare that the right to move any court for enforcement of specified Fundamental Rights shall remain suspended for the emergency period or a shorter period. After the 44th Constitutional Amendment, enforcement of Articles 20 and 21 cannot be suspended under Article 359. This is a major constitutional safeguard because protection against conviction for offences and protection of life and personal liberty remain enforceable even during Emergency. ➤ **Effect of suspension:** Article 359 does not automatically suspend all Fundamental Rights. It suspends the right to move court for enforcement of only those rights specifically mentioned in the Presidential Order, and only for the period and area covered by the order. The right may remain theoretically in existence, but its judicial enforcement is temporarily barred. ➤ **Difference between Article 358 and Article 359:** Article 358 concerns automatic suspension of Article 19 freedoms during a National Emergency on the ground of war or external aggression. Article 359 concerns suspension of the right to move courts for enforcement of specified Fundamental Rights, except Articles 20 and 21 after the 44th Amendment. ➤ **Emergency lesson from A.D.M. Jabalpur:** The majority view in A.D.M. Jabalpur allowed executive detention to escape judicial scrutiny during Emergency. This position is now constitutionally unacceptable after Puttaswamy and the 44th Amendment’s protection of Articles 20 and 21. The present constitutional understanding is that human dignity, life and liberty cannot be treated as mere State-granted privileges. ## Important Principles for Revision ConceptSimple MeaningMain Use**Article 32**Direct remedy before Supreme CourtEnforcement of Fundamental Rights**Habeas Corpus**Produce the detained personIllegal detention**Mandamus**Command to perform dutyPublic duty not performed**Certiorari**Quash illegal orderJurisdictional error or natural justice violation**Prohibition**Stop illegal proceedingPrevent excess of jurisdiction**Quo Warranto**By what authorityIllegal occupation of public office**PIL**Public interest actionRights of disadvantaged or public wrongs**Locus Standi**Right to file caseRelaxed in genuine PIL**Article 359**Suspension of enforcement during EmergencyCannot suspend Articles 20 and 21 enforcement## Conclusion ➤ **Final understanding:** Article 32 is the constitutional shield of Fundamental Rights. It gives direct access to the Supreme Court, empowers the Court to issue writs, supports PIL, relaxes locus standi in genuine public causes and preserves judicial review as a basic feature of the Constitution. Its importance lies not only in providing remedies but in maintaining rule of law, constitutional supremacy and accountability of State power. ➤ **Essential memory point:** Fundamental Rights are the promises of the Constitution, but Article 32 is the mechanism that makes those promises enforceable. Habeas corpus protects liberty, mandamus compels public duty, certiorari corrects illegal orders, prohibition prevents excess jurisdiction, quo warranto protects public offices, PIL expands access to justice, and Article 359 explains the limited emergency suspension of enforcement. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Articles 29 and 30 of the Indian Constitution: Cultural and Educational Rights of Minorities](https://lawfoyer.in/articles-29-and-30-of-the-indian-constitution/) **Published:** June 4, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun3202611_59_33P-725x1024.jpeg) ## Introduction to Cultural and Educational Rights ✦ **Core idea:** Articles 29 and 30 of the Constitution of India protect India’s cultural, linguistic, religious and educational diversity. They ensure that groups with a distinct language, script or culture can preserve their identity, and that religious and linguistic minorities can establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. ✦ **Constitutional purpose:** These provisions are based on the idea that national unity does not mean cultural uniformity. India is a plural country, and the Constitution protects both **individual equality** and **group identity**. Article 29 protects cultural conservation, while Article 30 protects institutional autonomy of minorities in education. ✦ **Placement in Part III:** Articles 29 and 30 are Fundamental Rights. Therefore, if the State violates them, an aggrieved person or institution can approach the Supreme Court under Article 32 or the High Court under Article 226. ✦ **Important distinction:** Article 29 is wider in one sense because Article 29(1) is available to “any section of citizens” having a distinct language, script or culture. Article 30 is narrower because it is available only to **religious and linguistic minorities**, but it gives a special right to establish and administer educational institutions. ✦ **Official constitutional text:** Article 29(1) protects the right of any section of citizens residing in India or any part of India, having a distinct language, script or culture, to conserve the same. Article 29(2) prohibits denial of admission into State-maintained or State-aided educational institutions on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. Article 30(1) gives all religious or linguistic minorities the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice; Article 30(1A) protects minority institutions in compulsory acquisition of property; and Article 30(2) prohibits discrimination in grant of aid on the ground that an institution is under minority management. ## Meaning and Scope of Article 29 ✦ **Article 29(1) – Conservation of language, script and culture:** Article 29(1) gives a protective right to any section of citizens having a distinct language, script or culture. The word “conserve” means to preserve, protect and maintain. This may include teaching the language, promoting literature, preserving cultural practices, running cultural associations and ensuring that the community’s identity is not erased. ✦ **Not limited only to minorities:** Though the marginal heading says “Protection of interests of minorities”, Article 29(1) uses the words “any section of the citizens”. Therefore, even a majority community in a particular local area may claim protection if it has a distinct language, script or culture. ✦ **Citizenship requirement:** Article 29(1) is available only to citizens because it expressly says “any section of the citizens”. Article 30 does not use the word “citizens”, but the right is practically exercised by minority communities and their institutions within India. ✦ **Territorial connection:** The group must reside in the territory of India or any part of it. This reflects India’s federal and cultural diversity because linguistic and cultural identity often differs from State to State. ✦ **Article 29(2) – Non-discrimination in admission:** Article 29(2) is an individual right of every citizen. It prevents denial of admission into a State-maintained or State-aided educational institution on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. Its purpose is to ensure that public educational opportunities are not closed by communal or linguistic discrimination. ✦ **Grounds only:** The word “only” is important. If denial of admission is based exclusively on religion, race, caste, language or any of them, it violates Article 29(2). But if admission is denied on other valid grounds such as lack of merit, non-fulfilment of eligibility, residence requirement where legally valid, or institutional rules consistent with law, Article 29(2) may not be violated. ## Meaning and Scope of Article 30 ✦ **Article 30(1) – Special right of minorities:** Article 30(1) says that all minorities, whether based on religion or language, have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions also describes Article 30(1) as the fundamental right of religious and linguistic minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. ✦ **Religious and linguistic minorities:** Article 30 protects only two categories: religious minorities and linguistic minorities. The Constitution does not define the word “minority”. Judicially, minority status is generally determined by numerical strength in the relevant State, especially after **T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481**, where the Supreme Court held that minority status for Article 30 is to be determined with reference to the State, because States were reorganised largely on linguistic lines and education is administered substantially at the State level. The 2024 AMU judgment also refers to this State-based numerical minority test from T.M.A. Pai. ✦ **Establish and administer:** The two words are closely connected. “Establish” means to bring the institution into existence. “Administer” means to manage its affairs, including appointment of staff, admission policy, fee structure subject to law, disciplinary control, and overall institutional governance. ✦ **Institution of their choice:** The words “of their choice” give minorities freedom to decide the nature of the institution, the course of education, the level of education, the medium of instruction, and the community objectives of the institution, subject to academic standards and lawful regulation. ✦ **Article 30(1A) – Protection during acquisition:** Article 30(1A) was inserted to ensure that if the State compulsorily acquires property of a minority educational institution, the amount fixed or determined must not be such as to restrict or abrogate the Article 30 right. This prevents indirect destruction of minority institutions through inadequate compensation. ✦ **Article 30(2) – Non-discrimination in aid:** If the State grants aid to educational institutions, it cannot deny aid merely because the institution is managed by a religious or linguistic minority. However, once aid is accepted, reasonable conditions may be imposed to ensure proper use of public funds, academic standards and fairness. ## Article 29 and Article 30: Key Differences BasisArticle 29Article 30**Main purpose**Conservation of language, script and culture; non-discrimination in admissionRight of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions**Beneficiary**Article 29(1): any section of citizens; Article 29(2): every citizenReligious and linguistic minorities**Nature of right**Cultural and anti-discrimination rightEducational-institutional autonomy right**Citizenship**Expressly connected with citizensDoes not expressly use “citizens”**Institutions covered**Article 29(2) applies to State-maintained or State-aided institutionsApplies to minority educational institutions of their choice**Core protection**Identity conservation and equal admissionEstablishment, management and administration## Minority Rights under Articles 29 and 30 ✦ **Protective equality:** Articles 29 and 30 are not exceptions to equality; they are instruments of real equality. Formal equality treats everyone the same, but protective equality recognises that certain communities may need special safeguards to preserve identity and participate equally in national life. ✦ **Community identity:** Minority rights under Article 30 are meant to give confidence to religious and linguistic minorities that education will not become a tool of assimilation or cultural extinction. ✦ **No right to separatism:** These provisions protect cultural and educational identity within the constitutional framework. They do not permit anti-national activity, maladministration, commercial exploitation or violation of public order, morality or health. ✦ **Secular character:** The protection of religious minorities under Article 30 is not contrary to secularism. Indian secularism means equal respect and protection for all religions, including the right of religious communities to run educational institutions subject to constitutional discipline. ✦ **Linguistic diversity:** Article 30 also protects linguistic minorities. For example, a linguistic group that is numerically smaller in a State may establish schools or colleges to preserve its language and culture. ## Conservation of Language and Culture under Article 29(1) ✦ **Language as identity:** Language is not merely a tool of communication. It carries literature, memory, tradition, values and social identity. Article 29(1) protects this link between language and culture. ✦ **Script protection:** Script means the written form of a language. Protection of script is important because a language may lose its distinctiveness if its script disappears. ✦ **Culture protection:** Culture includes customs, traditions, literature, art, music, dress, festivals, intellectual traditions and other markers of identity. Article 29(1) allows a group to conserve such culture. ✦ **Positive and negative dimensions:** Article 29(1) has a negative dimension because the State cannot destroy or suppress a distinct language, script or culture. It also has a positive dimension because communities may create associations, institutions and educational mechanisms to preserve their identity. ✦ **Illustration:** If a small linguistic community in a State wants to run classes to teach its script to children, publish books in that language, and organise cultural programmes, Article 29(1) supports such conservation. ## Right to Establish Educational Institutions ✦ **Meaning of establishment:** Establishment means founding or bringing an institution into existence. A minority community must show that the institution was created by persons belonging to that minority or for the benefit and educational advancement of that minority. ✦ **Purpose of establishment:** It is not necessary that the institution should admit only minority students. The institution may serve society generally and still retain its minority character, provided its foundation, purpose and administration show a minority character. ✦ **AMU minority-institution issue:** In the 2024 Supreme Court AMU judgment, the Court discussed the criteria for determining whether an institution is a minority educational institution under Article 30, including establishment, administration and the State-based test of minority status. The judgment clarified that the inquiry into minority character requires careful examination of the institution’s origin, purpose, administration and constitutional position, and the question whether AMU itself is a minority institution was to be considered in accordance with the legal indicia laid down. ✦ **Pre-Constitution institutions:** A minority institution established before the Constitution may still claim Article 30 protection if it satisfies the relevant criteria. The fact that the institution was founded before 1950 does not automatically defeat its claim, because Article 30 protects existing and future minority educational institutions when the constitutional conditions are met. ## Right to Administer Educational Institutions ✦ **Administrative autonomy:** The right to administer includes the right to manage internal affairs, appoint governing bodies, select staff, admit students, maintain discipline, frame institutional policies, and preserve the institution’s minority character. ✦ **Not a right to maladminister:** The most important limitation is that the right to administer does not mean the right to maladminister. Minority institutions cannot claim immunity from regulations that ensure educational excellence, public order, transparency, health, safety, service conditions or prevention of exploitation. ✦ **Academic standards:** The State may prescribe qualifications of teachers, curriculum standards, examination norms, infrastructure requirements, affiliation conditions and safety standards. Such regulations are valid if they do not destroy the minority character or take over the management. ✦ **Staff appointments:** Selection of teachers and principal is an important part of administration. However, the State may prescribe minimum qualifications and fair procedure. Regulations that completely remove the institution’s choice in selecting key staff may be unconstitutional if they destroy administrative autonomy. ✦ **Admission policy:** Minority institutions may give preference to students of their own minority community to preserve their character. But State-aided institutions must also respect Article 29(2), because public aid carries constitutional obligations of non-discrimination. ## Reasonable Regulation of Minority Educational Institutions ✦ **Core principle:** Article 30 is strong but not uncontrolled. Reasonable regulation is valid when it promotes educational excellence, discipline, transparency, merit, welfare of teachers and students, or proper use of State aid. ✦ **Permissible regulation:** The State may regulate: ◦ **Academic quality:** curriculum, syllabus, teacher qualifications, examination standards and affiliation norms. ◦ **Health and safety:** building safety, sanitation, fire safety, child protection and campus security. ◦ **Fair administration:** prevention of capitation fee, profiteering and arbitrary conduct. ◦ **Service conditions:** minimum salary, security of tenure and grievance redressal for teachers and staff. ◦ **Public funds:** proper accounting and audit where State aid is received. ✦ **Impermissible regulation:** The State cannot: ◦ **Take over management:** replace the minority management with State-controlled bodies without constitutional justification. ◦ **Destroy minority character:** impose admission or staffing rules that make it impossible to preserve the institution’s minority identity. ◦ **Discriminate in aid:** deny grants only because the institution is managed by a minority. ◦ **Impose excessive control:** convert a regulatory framework into direct administration by the State. ✦ **Test of validity:** A regulation is usually valid if it is reasonable, non-discriminatory, educationally necessary, proportionate and does not annihilate the minority character of the institution. ## Landmark Supreme Court Case Laws on Articles 29 and 30 ✦ **State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, AIR 1951 SC 226; 1951 SCR 525:** The State had communal reservations in educational admissions. The issue was whether admissions could be distributed on communal lines in a way that conflicted with Fundamental Rights. The Supreme Court held that denial of admission on grounds of religion, race, caste or language would violate Article 29(2). The case is historically important because it led to the First Constitutional Amendment and insertion of Article 15(4), enabling special provisions for socially and educationally backward classes. ✦ **In re Kerala Education Bill, 1957, AIR 1958 SC 956:** The President referred questions about the constitutional validity of provisions affecting minority educational institutions. The issue was how far the State could regulate minority institutions. The Supreme Court held that minorities have the right to establish and administer educational institutions, but the State can impose reasonable regulations for educational standards, discipline and efficiency. This case laid the foundation for the doctrine that Article 30 does not protect maladministration. ✦ **Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai v. State of Bombay, AIR 1963 SC 540:** The State required a minority teacher-training institution to reserve seats for government-nominated candidates. The issue was whether such interference violated Article 30(1). The Supreme Court held that regulations must be directed to making the institution effective as an educational institution and cannot destroy minority autonomy. The ratio is that a measure which in substance takes away the choice of a minority institution is unconstitutional. ✦ **Rev. Father W. Proost v. State of Bihar, AIR 1969 SC 465; (1969) 2 SCR 73:** The issue concerned minority administration of an educational institution. The Supreme Court recognised that Article 30 protects the right of minorities to manage institutions established by them. The case is important because it reaffirmed that the right under Article 30 is a real managerial right, not merely a symbolic right. ✦ **D.A.V. College, Jullundur v. State of Punjab, (1971) 2 SCC 261:** The dispute involved linguistic and educational rights after the establishment of Punjabi University and regulatory measures relating to language. The issue was whether linguistic and religious minorities could protect their educational interests. The Supreme Court recognised that minority rights under Articles 29 and 30 protect linguistic and cultural identity, while still permitting reasonable educational regulation. ✦ **Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society v. State of Gujarat, (1974) 1 SCC 717:** This is one of the most important Article 30 judgments. The issue was whether provisions of the Gujarat University Act excessively interfered with a Christian minority college’s administration. The Supreme Court held that the right to administer includes the right to choose the governing body, appoint staff and manage internal affairs. However, the State may impose regulations to maintain educational standards. The ratio is that regulation is valid only when it facilitates excellence and does not destroy minority autonomy. ✦ **Lilly Kurian v. Sr. Lewina, (1979) 2 SCC 124:** The issue was disciplinary control over teachers in a minority institution. The Supreme Court held that excessive external control over disciplinary matters may violate Article 30. The case shows that staff discipline is part of administration, though it may be subject to fair procedure. ✦ **Frank Anthony Public School Employees’ Association v. Union of India, (1986) 4 SCC 707:** The issue was whether service-condition protections for employees could apply to unaided minority schools. The Supreme Court held that reasonable provisions ensuring fair service conditions and preventing exploitation of teachers do not necessarily violate Article 30. The ratio is that minority autonomy must coexist with fairness to employees. ✦ **St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi, (1992) 1 SCC 558:** St. Stephen’s College, a Christian minority institution, followed an admission process including interviews and gave preference to Christian students. The issue was the balance between Article 30(1) and Article 29(2). The Supreme Court held that a minority institution may give preference to its community to preserve its character, but because the college was aided and affiliated, it could not ignore merit and constitutional equality. The judgment accepted a limited minority preference and stressed that aided minority institutions must balance autonomy with non-discrimination. ✦ **T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481:** An eleven-judge bench considered the rights of private, aided, unaided, minority and non-minority educational institutions. The issue was the extent of institutional autonomy and State regulation. The Supreme Court held that minorities are to be determined State-wise; minority institutions have the right to establish and administer institutions; unaided institutions have greater autonomy; aided institutions are subject to greater regulation; and admissions must remain fair, transparent and merit-based. This is the leading authority on Article 30. ✦ **Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 6 SCC 697:** The issue was implementation of T.M.A. Pai, especially admissions and fee regulation in professional institutions. The Supreme Court permitted regulatory committees to ensure fair admissions and prevent profiteering. The case clarified that autonomy does not include capitation fee or commercialisation of education. ✦ **P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 6 SCC 537:** The issue was admissions and reservations in unaided professional institutions, including minority institutions. The Supreme Court held that unaided minority professional institutions have the right to admit students of their choice through a fair, transparent and non-exploitative process. The State cannot impose its reservation policy on unaided minority institutions, but it can regulate to ensure merit, transparency and absence of profiteering. ✦ **Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 1:** The issue was the validity of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 in relation to private schools. The Supreme Court upheld the RTE Act generally but protected unaided minority institutions from application that would affect their Article 30 rights. Later constitutional discussion continued in Pramati. ✦ **Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust v. Union of India, (2014) 8 SCC 1:** A Constitution Bench considered whether Article 21A and the RTE Act could apply to minority institutions. It held that applying the RTE Act to minority institutions, aided or unaided, may destroy their minority character; therefore, such institutions were exempted. A 2024 Supreme Court judgment restated that Pramati treated the application of RTE obligations to minority institutions as potentially destructive of minority character. ✦ **Sk. Md. Rafique v. Managing Committee, Contai Rahamania High Madrasah, (2020) 6 SCC 689:** The issue was whether State regulation of appointment of teachers in minority institutions violated Article 30. The Supreme Court upheld regulatory measures designed to ensure quality education and fair selection, emphasising that minority institutions are not outside regulatory control. The ratio is that regulations improving educational standards are valid if they do not destroy the institution’s minority character. ✦ **Aligarh Muslim University minority status judgment, 2024:** The Supreme Court revisited the legal tests for identifying a minority educational institution under Article 30. The judgment discussed whether an institution must be established and administered by a minority and referred to indicia for determining minority character, including origin, purpose, administration and constitutional context. It is important because it updated the doctrine on how minority status should be determined, particularly for historic institutions. ✦ **Recent RTE/Pramati development, 2025:** A later Supreme Court judgment observed that the complete exclusion of all minority institutions from the RTE Act, as held in Pramati, appeared doubtful because it may deprive children in such institutions of Article 21A benefits. However, this observation should be read carefully: unless a larger bench formally overrules Pramati, the binding position of Pramati remains significant. ## Relationship between Article 29(2) and Article 30(1) ✦ **Possible tension:** Article 30(1) allows minority institutions to preserve their minority character, including preference for minority students. Article 29(2), however, prohibits denial of admission in State-maintained or State-aided institutions on grounds only of religion, race, caste or language. ✦ **Harmonious interpretation:** Courts do not read one provision as destroying the other. Minority institutions may preserve their character, but if they receive State aid, they must respect constitutional equality and cannot discriminate purely on prohibited grounds. ✦ **Aided minority institutions:** They have Article 30 protection, but because public funds are involved, the State can impose stronger conditions relating to admissions, merit, staff service conditions and accountability. ✦ **Unaided minority institutions:** They enjoy greater autonomy because they do not depend on State funds. However, even unaided institutions are subject to regulations preventing maladministration, capitation fee, exploitation and academic decline. ## Minority Institution and State Aid ✦ **No compulsory aid:** Article 30 does not compel the State to grant aid to a minority institution. But if the State chooses to grant aid to educational institutions, it cannot discriminate against an institution merely because it is minority-managed. ✦ **Aid with conditions:** State aid may carry regulatory conditions. Conditions relating to audit, teacher qualifications, salary standards, infrastructure and admission transparency are generally valid. ✦ **No surrender of identity:** A minority institution does not lose its Article 30 identity merely because it receives aid. But it may become subject to greater constitutional obligations, especially Article 29(2). ## National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions ✦ **Statutory framework:** The National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions Act, 2004 was enacted to constitute the NCMEI and provide for matters connected with minority educational institutions. India Code identifies the Act as Act No. 2 of 2005, enacted on 6 January 2005, under the Ministry of Education, Department of Higher Education. ✦ **Purpose:** NCMEI exists to safeguard the educational rights of minorities under Article 30(1). It deals with issues connected with recognition, minority status and protection of minority educational institutions. The NCMEI’s own website states that Article 30(1) provides religious and linguistic minorities the fundamental right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. ✦ **Practical importance:** Minority institutions often require certification of minority status for recognition, affiliation, administrative protection and legal disputes. NCMEI provides a specialised statutory forum for such matters. ## Reasonable Regulation: Easy Memory Table RegulationUsually valid or invalid?Reason**Minimum teacher qualifications**Usually validMaintains academic standards**Fire safety and building norms**ValidProtects students and staff**Complete State takeover of management**Usually invalidDestroys Article 30 autonomy**Audit of government aid**ValidEnsures proper use of public funds**Capitation fee prohibition**ValidPrevents commercialisation**Total denial of minority preference**Usually invalidMay destroy minority character**Fair salary and service protections**Usually validPrevents exploitation**Compulsory admission rules destroying minority character**Invalid if disproportionateViolates institutional choice## Important Doctrines and Principles ✦ **Doctrine of protective discrimination:** Minority rights under Articles 29 and 30 are meant to protect vulnerable cultural and linguistic identities. ✦ **Doctrine of harmonious construction:** Article 29(2) and Article 30(1) must be balanced so that equality in admissions and minority autonomy both survive. ✦ **Doctrine against maladministration:** Article 30 protects administration, not maladministration. This is the central principle behind reasonable regulation. ✦ **Proportionality:** A regulation must not be excessive. It must be suitable for a legitimate educational purpose and must not destroy the minority character of the institution. ✦ **State-wise minority test:** Minority status is generally determined with reference to the State, not the whole of India, especially for Article 30 educational rights. ✦ **Fair, transparent and non-exploitative admissions:** This principle, developed in T.M.A. Pai, Islamic Academy and P.A. Inamdar, ensures that institutional autonomy does not become a cover for arbitrariness or profiteering. ## Conclusion ✦ **Final essence:** Articles 29 and 30 form the constitutional shield for India’s cultural and educational pluralism. Article 29 protects the right to conserve language, script and culture and ensures non-discriminatory access to State-supported education. Article 30 gives religious and linguistic minorities the special right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. ✦ **Balanced position:** The right under Article 30 is neither decorative nor absolute. It is a powerful Fundamental Right, but it functions within the larger constitutional scheme of equality, educational excellence, child welfare, transparency and national integration. ✦ **Best understanding:** Minority institutions have autonomy in identity, management and educational choice, but they remain subject to reasonable regulation. The State may regulate to improve education, prevent exploitation and protect students and teachers, but it cannot use regulation as a tool to take over management or destroy minority character. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Articles 25 to 28 of the Constitution of India: Freedom of Religion, Essential Religious Practices and Secularism](https://lawfoyer.in/articles-25-to-28-of-the-constitution-of-india/) **Published:** June 3, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun3202611_51_45P-725x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning and Constitutional Scheme of Freedom of Religion ➤ **Core idea:** Articles 25 to 28 of the Constitution of India protect the **Right to Freedom of Religion**. These provisions recognise that religion, faith, worship, belief, conscience and religious identity are deeply personal matters, but they also ensure that religious freedom does not disturb **public order, morality, health, equality, dignity and social reform**. ➤ **Indian model of secularism:** Indian secularism does not mean hostility towards religion. It means that the State does not identify itself with any one religion and must treat all religions with equal respect. The Supreme Court in **S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918: (1994) 3 SCC 1** held that **secularism is a basic feature of the Constitution**. The Court clarified that religion and State power cannot be mixed in a manner that destroys constitutional equality, unity and neutrality. ➤ **Articles covered:** The freedom of religion chapter contains four provisions: **Article 25** protects individual religious freedom; **Article 26** protects collective denominational religious freedom; **Article 27** prevents compulsory taxation for promoting a particular religion; and **Article 28** regulates religious instruction and worship in educational institutions. The Constitution of India lists Articles 25 to 28 as part of the Fundamental Rights under Part III. ➤ **Not absolute:** Religious freedom is not unlimited. Article 25 itself makes it subject to **public order, morality, health and other Fundamental Rights**. Article 26 is subject to **public order, morality and health**. Therefore, religious liberty must be harmonised with constitutional morality, gender justice, social welfare, public safety and the rights of others. ## Article 25: Freedom of Conscience and Free Profession, Practice and Propagation of Religion ➤ **Textual essence:** Article 25(1) says that, subject to public order, morality, health and other provisions of Part III, **all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion**. Article 25 applies to **all persons**, not merely citizens. This means that foreigners and non-citizens present in India can also claim this protection. The official constitutional text recognises freedom of conscience and the rights to profess, practise and propagate religion under Article 25. ➤ **Freedom of conscience:** **Conscience** means the inner freedom of a person to believe, not believe, change belief, question belief or follow a moral-religious conviction. It protects the internal forum of belief. A person may believe in God, many gods, no god, or a philosophical way of life. The State cannot compel a person to accept a religious belief. ➤ **Profession of religion:** **Profession** means the open declaration of one’s religious faith. For example, wearing religious symbols, declaring one’s religious identity, observing rituals publicly or identifying oneself as belonging to a particular religion may fall within profession, subject to constitutional limits. ➤ **Practice of religion:** **Practice** means performance of religious acts, rituals, ceremonies, observances and modes of worship. However, only those practices that are religious in nature and constitutionally protected can claim protection. Practices that are economic, financial, political or secular may be regulated by the State under Article 25(2)(a). ➤ **Propagation of religion:** **Propagation** means transmitting, explaining, spreading or communicating the tenets of one’s religion. It does not mean a fundamental right to forcibly convert another person. The distinction is important: a person may explain and spread religious ideas, but cannot destroy another person’s freedom of conscience by force, fraud, coercion or inducement. ➤ **Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1977 SCR (2) 611: (1977) 1 SCC 677:** The petitioners challenged anti-conversion laws of Madhya Pradesh and Odisha, arguing that the right to propagate religion included the right to convert others. The legal issue was whether Article 25 protects conversion as part of propagation. The Supreme Court upheld the laws and held that the right to propagate means the right to transmit or spread one’s religion, but it does not include a fundamental right to convert another person. The ratio is that every person has freedom of conscience; therefore, one person’s religious propagation cannot become another person’s coerced religious conversion. ➤ **Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, (1986) 3 SCC 615:** In this case, three Jehovah’s Witness students respectfully stood during the National Anthem but did not sing it because their religious belief prevented them from doing so. They were expelled from school. The issue was whether refusal to sing, while standing respectfully, violated law or justified punishment. The Supreme Court held that the expulsion violated their rights under Articles 19(1)(a) and 25. The ratio is that genuine freedom of conscience must be protected when the conduct is peaceful, respectful and does not disturb public order. The case is important because it shows that Article 25 protects not only loud or visible religious acts but also quiet conscientious refusal. ## Article 25(2): State Power to Regulate Secular Activities and Bring Social Reform ➤ **Secular activities connected with religion:** Article 25(2)(a) allows the State to regulate or restrict **economic, financial, political or other secular activity** associated with religious practice. This means that the State cannot ordinarily interfere with essential religious belief or worship, but it may regulate administration, finance, property, public order, management and secular arrangements connected with religious institutions. ➤ **Social welfare and reform:** Article 25(2)(b) allows the State to make laws for **social welfare and reform** and for throwing open Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. Explanation II clarifies that, for this purpose, references to Hindus include **Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists**. This clause enables constitutional reform of exclusionary practices in public religious institutions. ➤ **Kirpan protection:** Explanation I to Article 25 states that wearing and carrying **kirpans** shall be deemed to be included in the profession of the Sikh religion. This is a specific constitutional recognition of a Sikh religious practice. ➤ **Constitutional balance:** Article 25(2) shows that India protects religion but does not freeze society in the name of religion. If a practice is purely secular, exploitative, exclusionary or contrary to constitutional values, the State may regulate it. The key question is whether the regulated matter is truly religious or merely secular activity associated with religion. ## Article 26: Freedom to Manage Religious Affairs ➤ **Collective religious freedom:** Article 26 gives every religious denomination or any section thereof the right to manage its own religious affairs, subject to public order, morality and health. While Article 25 mainly protects **individual religious freedom**, Article 26 protects **group or denominational autonomy**. ➤ **Four rights under Article 26:** A religious denomination has the right to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; manage its own affairs in matters of religion; own and acquire movable and immovable property; and administer such property in accordance with law. Article 26 therefore protects both spiritual autonomy and institutional existence, but property administration remains subject to law. ➤ **Religious denomination meaning:** A religious denomination generally means a collection of individuals having a common faith, common organisation and distinctive name. A sect or sub-sect may qualify if it has a distinct religious identity and organisational structure. ➤ **Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282: 1954 SCR 1005:** This is the foundational case on Articles 25 and 26. The Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act was challenged by the head of Shirur Mutt. The issue was the extent to which the State could control religious institutions. The Supreme Court held that religion includes matters of faith, doctrine and acts done in pursuance of religion. It also held that religious denominations have autonomy in matters of religion, while secular administration can be regulated. The case laid the foundation of the **essential religious practices doctrine**. ➤ **Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388: 1954 SCR 1055:** The Bombay Public Trusts Act was challenged as interfering with religious and charitable trusts. The issue was whether the State could control religious trust administration in a way that impaired religious freedom. The Supreme Court held that freedom of religion includes the right to manage religious affairs, but secular administration of property can be regulated. The ratio is that State regulation cannot destroy the substance of denominational religious freedom. ➤ **Seshammal v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1972) 2 SCC 11:** The Tamil Nadu law abolished hereditary appointment of archakas in temples. The issue was whether hereditary succession to priesthood was an essential religious practice. The Supreme Court held that hereditary succession was not essential to religion and could be abolished. The ratio is that performance of rituals according to Agamas may be religious, but hereditary office-holding is a secular or administrative matter capable of reform. ➤ **N. Adithayan v. Travancore Devaswom Board, (2002) 8 SCC 106:** A non-Brahmin priest was appointed in a temple and the appointment was challenged on caste-based grounds. The issue was whether only a Brahmin could be appointed as priest. The Supreme Court held that caste alone cannot disqualify a person from priesthood if the person is properly trained and qualified to perform rituals. The ratio is that caste-based exclusion cannot be treated as an essential religious practice when it violates constitutional equality and reformist principles. ## Essential Religious Practices Doctrine ➤ **Meaning of ERP doctrine:** The **Essential Religious Practices doctrine** is a judicial test used to decide whether a particular practice is so essential and integral to a religion that it deserves constitutional protection under Articles 25 and 26. If the practice is essential, the State’s interference is more strictly examined. If it is secular, optional, superstitious, administrative or non-essential, it may be regulated. ➤ **Origin:** The doctrine developed prominently from **Shirur Mutt**, where the Supreme Court recognised that a religion may include rituals and observances that are integral to it. Later cases refined the doctrine by asking whether a claimed practice is essential according to the doctrines, beliefs and structure of that religion. ➤ **Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali, AIR 1961 SC 1402:** The issue concerned the management of the Ajmer Dargah and the rights claimed by certain persons associated with it. The Supreme Court warned that purely secular practices or practices that are merely superstitious or extraneous cannot automatically receive constitutional protection. The ratio is that courts may distinguish essential religious matters from non-essential accretions. ➤ **Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, (2004) 12 SCC 770:** The Anand Margis claimed a right to perform the Tandava dance in public procession. The issue was whether the Tandava dance in public was an essential religious practice of the sect. The Supreme Court held that it was not proved to be essential. The ratio is that a practice introduced later or not shown to be fundamental to the faith may not qualify as essential. ➤ **State of West Bengal v. Ashutosh Lahiri, (1995) 1 SCC 189:** The issue was whether cow slaughter on Bakr-Id was an essential practice of Islam so as to justify exemption from animal slaughter restrictions. The Supreme Court held that cow slaughter on Bakr-Id was not an essential religious practice. The ratio is that a practice may be associated with a festival but still not be indispensable to the religion. ➤ **Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1:** In the Sabarimala case, women between the ages of 10 and 50 were prohibited from entering the Sabarimala temple. The issue was whether this exclusion was protected under Articles 25 and 26 or violated equality, dignity and non-discrimination. By a 4:1 majority, the Supreme Court held that the exclusion was unconstitutional. The majority reasoned that the practice violated constitutional principles of equality and dignity and was not protected as an essential religious practice in the manner claimed. The case is a major example of conflict between denominational autonomy and individual equality. ➤ **Critical understanding:** The ERP doctrine is useful because it prevents every custom from claiming immunity as religion. However, it is also criticised because judges are required to decide theological questions. The better understanding is that courts examine religious practices only to the extent necessary to apply constitutional limitations such as public order, morality, health, equality and dignity. ## Article 27: Freedom from Taxation for Promotion of a Particular Religion ➤ **Core protection:** Article 27 says that no person shall be compelled to pay any tax, the proceeds of which are specifically appropriated for payment of expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination. ➤ **Tax versus fee:** The key distinction is between a **tax** and a **fee**. A tax is a compulsory exaction for general public purposes. A fee is generally charged for a specific service or regulatory purpose. Article 27 prohibits compulsory taxation for promoting a particular religion, but it does not prohibit regulatory fees for administration, safety, sanitation, public order or preservation of religious institutions. ➤ **Constitutional purpose:** Article 27 prevents the State from using public taxation to favour one religion. It protects taxpayers from being forced to financially support religious promotion against their conscience. ➤ **Shirur Mutt and Article 27:** In **Shirur Mutt**, the Supreme Court examined whether contributions imposed under the religious endowments law were taxes or fees. The case is important because it connected Article 27 with State regulation of religious institutions. The broader principle is that a levy for secular administration may survive, but a tax specifically used to promote a religion would offend Article 27. ➤ **Permissible State spending:** Article 27 does not prohibit all State expenditure connected with religious places. For example, expenditure for crowd control, heritage protection, public health, law and order, archaeological preservation or welfare facilities may be secular. What is prohibited is compulsory taxation specifically appropriated for promoting or maintaining a particular religion. ## Article 28: Freedom Regarding Religious Instruction and Worship in Educational Institutions ➤ **Basic rule:** Article 28 deals with religious instruction and religious worship in educational institutions. It balances religious neutrality of State-funded education with the rights of institutions created under religious endowments or trusts. ➤ **Article 28(1):** No religious instruction shall be provided in any educational institution wholly maintained out of State funds. This ensures that State-funded education remains secular and does not become a tool for religious indoctrination. ➤ **Article 28(2):** The prohibition does not apply to an institution administered by the State but established under an endowment or trust requiring religious instruction. For example, if a trust created an institution with a mandate for religious teaching and the State later administers it, the original endowment condition may be respected. ➤ **Article 28(3):** No person attending an educational institution recognised by the State or receiving State aid shall be required to take part in religious instruction or worship without consent. For minors, consent of the guardian is relevant. This protects students from compelled religious participation. ➤ **Aruna Roy v. Union of India, (2002) 7 SCC 368:** The National Curriculum Framework was challenged on the ground that value education would introduce religious instruction. The issue was whether teaching about religions, culture and moral values violates Article 28. The Supreme Court held that education about religions and moral values is different from imparting religious instruction for conversion or indoctrination. The ratio is that comparative study, ethical education and constitutional values are permissible, but compulsory sectarian religious instruction in State-funded institutions is not. ➤ **Bijoe Emmanuel connection:** Article 28 protects students from compulsory religious instruction or worship, while **Bijoe Emmanuel** protects conscience even in a national-symbol context. Together, these principles show that education must not crush sincere conscience, provided the student’s conduct remains peaceful and respectful. ## Public Order, Morality and Health as Limits on Religious Freedom ➤ **Public order:** Religious freedom cannot be used to justify violence, riots, coercion, obstruction of public streets, forced conversion, public disorder or activities threatening peace. The State may regulate processions, loudspeakers, gatherings and public rituals if necessary for maintaining order. ➤ **Morality:** Morality in constitutional law increasingly means **constitutional morality**, not merely popular morality. Practices degrading dignity, equality or bodily autonomy may be tested against constitutional values. The Sabarimala decision is a major example of equality and dignity being considered in the context of religious practice. ➤ **Health:** The State may regulate religious practices that endanger public health. For example, restrictions may be imposed during epidemics, unsafe gatherings, pollution-causing practices or physically harmful rituals. The right to practise religion does not include a right to endanger life and health. ➤ **Other Fundamental Rights:** Article 25 is expressly subject to other provisions of Part III. Therefore, religious freedom must coexist with equality under Article 14, non-discrimination under Article 15, freedom of speech under Article 19, life and dignity under Article 21 and abolition of untouchability under Article 17. ## Secularism and Constitutional Morality ➤ **Equal respect principle:** Indian secularism is often described as **principled distance** or **equal respect for all religions**. The State may engage with religion for reform, welfare, equality and regulation, but it cannot identify itself with one religion or discriminate between religions. ➤ **S.R. Bommai principle:** In **S.R. Bommai**, the Supreme Court held that secularism is part of the basic structure. The ratio is that the State cannot pursue non-secular governance and political power cannot be used to advance religious domination. ➤ **Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 360:** The acquisition of land around the disputed Ayodhya site was challenged. The Supreme Court considered the relationship between places of worship and religious freedom. The broader ratio was that a mosque, temple or church may be important for worship, but State acquisition of property connected with a religious place is not automatically unconstitutional if worship itself is not extinguished and the acquisition serves a valid secular purpose. This case is often discussed for the distinction between religious worship and property rights. ➤ **Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1:** Though mainly a personal law case concerning instant triple talaq, it is relevant to the relationship between religion, gender justice and constitutional values. The Supreme Court set aside the practice of talaq-e-biddat. The case shows that practices claimed under religion may be tested when they affect equality, dignity and legal rights. ## Important Comparative Table for Quick Revision ProvisionProtected AreaBeneficiaryMain LimitationKey Idea**Article 25**Conscience, profession, practice, propagationAll personsPublic order, morality, health, other Fundamental RightsIndividual religious freedom**Article 26**Religious denomination’s affairsReligious denominations or sectionsPublic order, morality, healthCollective religious autonomy**Article 27**Protection from religious taxationAll taxpayers/personsDoes not bar secular regulatory feesNo tax for promotion of a particular religion**Article 28**Religious instruction and worship in educational institutionsStudents and institutionsDepends on State funding, trust/endowment and consentSecular education and freedom from compulsion## Important Doctrines and Principles ➤ **Essential Religious Practices:** Only practices essential and integral to a religion receive strong constitutional protection. Non-essential, secular or administrative matters may be regulated. ➤ **Secular Regulation Doctrine:** The State may regulate economic, financial, political and secular activities associated with religion under Article 25(2)(a). ➤ **Social Reform Doctrine:** The State may enact laws for social welfare and reform, including opening public Hindu religious institutions to all classes and sections under Article 25(2)(b). ➤ **Freedom of Conscience:** Article 25 protects the inner freedom to believe, not believe, change belief or refuse participation in conduct contrary to sincere conviction. ➤ **No Forced Religious Support:** Article 27 protects individuals from being compelled through taxation to support promotion of a particular religion. ➤ **No Compulsory Religious Instruction:** Article 28 protects students from compulsory religious instruction or worship in State-connected educational institutions. ## Landmark Case-Law Summary CaseCitationMain Point**Shirur Mutt Case**AIR 1954 SC 282; 1954 SCR 1005Religion includes essential practices; secular administration can be regulated**Ratilal Panachand Gandhi**AIR 1954 SC 388; 1954 SCR 1055Religious trusts have protection, but property administration may be regulated**Durgah Committee, Ajmer**AIR 1961 SC 1402Superstitious or non-essential practices are not automatically protected**Rev. Stainislaus**(1977) 1 SCC 677Propagation does not include right to convert another person**Bijoe Emmanuel**(1986) 3 SCC 615Genuine conscience deserves protection when conduct is peaceful**S.R. Bommai**(1994) 3 SCC 1Secularism is a basic feature of the Constitution**Seshammal**(1972) 2 SCC 11Hereditary priesthood is not essential religious practice**N. Adithayan**(2002) 8 SCC 106Caste alone cannot determine priestly eligibility**Aruna Roy**(2002) 7 SCC 368Value education is not the same as prohibited religious instruction**Indian Young Lawyers Association**(2019) 11 SCC 1Sabarimala exclusion of women held unconstitutional by majority## Conclusion ➤ **Final understanding:** Articles 25 to 28 create a balanced constitutional framework. They protect the individual’s conscience, the community’s religious autonomy, the taxpayer’s freedom from compelled religious support and the student’s freedom from compulsory religious instruction. At the same time, these rights are controlled by public order, morality, health, equality, dignity, social reform and secular governance. ➤ **Central theme:** The Constitution protects **faith**, but not every activity done in the name of faith. It protects **religious autonomy**, but not practices that destroy constitutional values. It protects **propagation**, but not coercive conversion. It protects **religious institutions**, but permits regulation of their secular administration. It protects **religious education in limited contexts**, but prevents State-funded institutions from becoming instruments of sectarian instruction. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [26th LawFoyer Quiz on (Indian Contract Act, 1872): Prizes worth Rs. 25K + | Cash Prizes, Smart Watch, Earbuds and much more | Bonuses for All Participants worth Rs. 5K+ | Register by 6th June, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/26th-lawfoyer-quiz-on-indian-contract-act/) **Published:** April 30, 2026 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/26th-quiz-724x1024.png) **——————————————–** [**Attempt Free Open Mock Test**](https://quiz.lawfoyer.in/exams/26th-lawfoyer-quiz-on-indian-contract-act-1872) **——————————————–** [Register Now](#1) ## Dates - **Date of Quiz:-** 7th June 2026 ( Sunday 7 Pm) - **Last Date to Apply:-** 6th June 2026, 11:00 pm - **Result Declaration:-** 12th June 2026 ## Prizes - **1st Prize-** Cash Prize Rs. 3,000/- + Smart Watch worth Rs. 2,000/- + Hardcopy Certificate of Excellence & Participation + FREE Access to LawFoyer Academy’s any Premium Course worth Rs. 4,000/- + FREE Publication Opportunity with [LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research](https://lijdlr.com/cfp-lawfoyer-international-journal-of-doctrinal-legal-research/ "LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research") (LIJDLR) - **2nd Prize-** Cash Prize Rs. 2000/- + Earbuds worth Rs. 1000/- + Hardcopy Certificate of Excellence & Participation + FREE Access to LawFoyer Academy’s any Premium Course worth Rs. 3,000/- + FREE Publication Opportunity with [LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research](https://lijdlr.com/cfp-lawfoyer-international-journal-of-doctrinal-legal-research/ "LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research") (LIJDLR) - **3rd Prize-** Cash Prize Rs. 1000/- + Hardcopy Certificate of Excellence & Participation + FREE Access to LawFoyer Academy’s any Premium Course worth Rs. 2,000/- + Discounted Publication Opportunity with [LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research](https://lijdlr.com/cfp-lawfoyer-international-journal-of-doctrinal-legal-research/ "LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research") (LIJDLR) - **4th-10th Prize-** Cash Prize Rs 150/-**+** E-Certificates of Excellence & Participation + FREE Access to LawFoyer Academy’s any Premium Course worth Rs. 1,000/- + Discounted Publication Opportunity with [LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research](https://lijdlr.com/cfp-lawfoyer-international-journal-of-doctrinal-legal-research/ "LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research") (LIJDLR) - **FREE Practice E-Books with 1000+ MCQs** - **FREE 4000+ Legal Drafts & Drafting Guidebook** - **E-Certificate of Participation for All the Participants** - **FREE 2 Turnitin Plagiarism Reports worth Rs. 400 for Each Participants**. ## **Registration Fees** - **Early Bird Registration Fee: Rs 99/- Only** [Register Now](#1) ## ELIGIBILITY - Law Students - Legal Professionals - Legal Practitioners - Judiciary Aspirants - AIBE Aspirants - JLO Aspirants - IBPS SO Aspirants - Government Exam Aspirants - Any person Interested in Constitutional Law & Indian Polity ## **Important Guidelines** - **Format of Quiz:** Quiz shall take place online, and a paper will include multiple-choice questions**.** - The participant can take this exam on their laptop or mobile phone. - The platform for the quiz will be google Forms, Microsoft Forms, etc. - In the case of the same marks, time will be considered (a person who submits early will be given preference). - The link will be shared 24 hours prior to the start of the quiz. ## **Rules & Regulations** - **60 MCQ(s) \[60 Question on Indian Contract Act\].** - The time allotted will be **20** minutes. 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jobs, the first class jd, the student lawyer, tutoring rules for students, two year jd, two year jd for international lawyers, tying and bundling competition law, ugc dual degree rules 2022, undergraduate law, undergraduate law degree, undergraduate law schools, undergraduate legal studies, undergraduate llb, undergraduate llb course, undergraduate moot court, uni of law sign in, unitedlex competitors, university of law graduate llb, university of law graduation 2022, university of law international students, vacation work for law students, vacation work for law students 2022, vuwlss, waec requirements for law --- ### [2nd Edition of One Week Faculty Development Programme on Integrating Indian Knowledge System and Law | Organized by Centre for Advanced Studies in Human Rights (CASIHR), RGNUL, Punjab in association with Centre for Advanced Studies in Labour Welfare (CASLW), RGNUL, Punjab | Register by 9 July 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/2nd-edition-of-one-week-faculty-development-programme-on-integrating-indian-knowledge-system-and-law-organized-by-centre-for-advanced-studies-in-human-rights-casihr-rgnul-punjab-in-association-w/) **Published:** June 3, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 2nd Edition of One Week Faculty Development Programme on Integrating Indian Knowledge System and Law | Organized by Centre for Advanced Studies in Human Rights (CASIHR), RGNUL, Punjab In association with Centre for Advanced Studies in Labour Welfare (CASLW), RGNUL, Punjab | Register by 9 July 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Screenshot-2026-06-03-222648.jpg) ### About the Organiser / University **Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law (RGNUL), Punjab** was established under the Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab Act, 2006. The university received approval from the Bar Council of India in July 2006 and is recognized by the University Grants Commission under Sections 2(f) and 12-B of the UGC Act, 1956. RGNUL was accredited with an ‘A’ Grade by NAAC in 2015 and was granted autonomy under UGC Regulations in 2018. The Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India, ranked RGNUL first among the cleanest Higher Educational Institutions under the Swachh Campus category for Government Residential Universities in 2019. ### Details About the Event / Opportunity The Faculty Development Programme (FDP) on **Integrating Indian Knowledge System and Law** aims to familiarize academicians with the relevance and application of the Indian Knowledge System (IKS) in contemporary legal education, research, and teaching pedagogy. The programme promotes a multidisciplinary and value-based approach by integrating traditional Indian jurisprudence, ethics, governance models, indigenous dispute resolution systems, and constitutional values with modern legal frameworks. It also seeks to encourage culturally rooted and interdisciplinary perspectives in curriculum development, research, and classroom teaching in alignment with the objectives of NEP 2020. #### Learning Outcomes Participants will: - Develop the ability to integrate IKS perspectives into legal teaching and research. - Identify interdisciplinary research opportunities. - Learn to develop research proposals and critically analyse classical Indian texts. - Explore the contemporary relevance of Indian knowledge traditions in law and society. - Understand innovative teaching methodologies and experiential learning techniques. - Foster academic collaboration across disciplines. #### Themes 1. Introduction to Indian Knowledge System and its Relevance in Legal Education 2. Ancient Indian Jurisprudence, Dharma and Concepts of Justice 3. Integrating Indian Knowledge System with Contemporary Legal Frameworks 4. Indigenous Dispute Resolution Mechanisms and Community Justice Systems 5. Constitutional Values, Ethics and Governance in Indian Knowledge Traditions 6. Multidisciplinary Approaches to Law through Indian Philosophy, Society and Culture 7. Innovative Teaching Pedagogy and Curriculum Development under NEP 2020 8. Technology, Research and Emerging Trends in Integrating Indian Knowledge System and Law ### Who is it For / Eligibility to Participate The FDP is open to: - Faculty members - Research scholars - Academic professionals from law and related disciplines such as social sciences and allied fields. ### Mode of the Event **Online** ### Location & Venue of the Event **Punjab, India** **Hosted by:** Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law (RGNUL), Punjab **Mode:** Online ### Registration / Submission Links & Procedure **Registration Link:** **Online Payment Link:** rgnul.lsacademia.in/lsa\_rgnul/eventPortal/loginFrom.jsp Participants are required to complete the registration form and make the prescribed fee payment through the online payment portal. ### Fee Details **₹1,500 (Including GST)** ### Deadlines / Important Dates - **Last Date of Registration:** 9 July 2026 - **Programme Dates:** 13 July 2026 – 18 July 2026 - **Session Timings:** 3:00 PM – 5:00 PM (IST) ### Contact Information **Email:** fdprgnul2026@gmail.com ### Organising Committee **Patron-in-Chief:** Prof. (Dr.) Jai S. Singh, Vice Chancellor, RGNUL, Punjab **Patron:** Dr. Ivneet Kaur Walia, Registrar (Officiating), RGNUL, Punjab **Faculty Coordinators:** - Dr. Jaswinder Kaur, Assistant Professor of Law, RGNUL, Punjab - Dr. Shiva Satish Sharda, Assistant Professor of Law, RGNUL, Punjab - Dr. Manpreet Kaur, Assistant Professor of Law, RGNUL, Punjab ### Official Link of the Event / Brochure **Registration Form:** **Official Brochure:** [RGNUL FDP Brochure 2026](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lYAYVzqjnTS80yiGwaNDJ3O4Dp8brcB6/view?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Events --- ### [Articles 23 and 24 of Indian Constitution: Right Against Exploitation, Forced Labour, Human Trafficking and Child Labour](https://lawfoyer.in/articles-23-and-24-of-indian-constitution/) **Published:** June 3, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun3202612_28_56A-725x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning and Constitutional Importance of Right Against Exploitation ➤ **Core idea:** Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution of India create the constitutional protection known as the **Right Against Exploitation**. These provisions are placed in **Part III**, which means they are **Fundamental Rights** and are enforceable through constitutional remedies, especially Article 32 before the Supreme Court and Article 226 before High Courts. ➤ **Human dignity:** The purpose of Articles 23 and 24 is to protect human dignity from economic, social and physical exploitation. These Articles recognise that liberty is not real if a poor person, child, woman, migrant worker, bonded labourer or trafficked person is forced by helplessness to work in inhuman conditions. ➤ **Social justice approach:** These rights are not merely negative rights against State action. They impose a constitutional duty on the State to prevent exploitative practices in society. Article 23 expressly prohibits **traffic in human beings, begar and other similar forms of forced labour**, while Article 24 prohibits the employment of children below 14 years in factories, mines and hazardous employment. ➤ **Horizontal application:** Articles 23 and 24 are special because they operate not only against the State but also against **private persons, contractors, employers, traffickers and exploiters**. For example, a private contractor employing workers below minimum wage or a private factory employing a child in hazardous work may violate these constitutional rights. ## Bare Text and Structure of Article 23 ➤ **Article 23(1):** It prohibits “traffic in human beings and begar and other similar forms of forced labour” and declares that contravention of this prohibition shall be an offence punishable according to law. ➤ **Article 23(2):** It permits the State to impose **compulsory service for public purposes**, but while imposing such service, the State cannot discriminate only on grounds of religion, race, caste, class or any of them. ➤ **Two-part design:** Article 23 has one prohibitory part and one exception. The prohibitory part protects individuals against exploitation. The exception allows compulsory public service, such as national service, emergency service, community service or other legally authorised public duties, provided it is not discriminatory. ## Meaning of Traffic in Human Beings under Article 23 ➤ **Human trafficking:** “Traffic in human beings” means treating human beings as objects of trade, exploitation or profit. It includes recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons for exploitation by force, fraud, coercion, abuse of power or inducement. ➤ **Constitutional harm:** Human trafficking violates personal liberty, bodily autonomy, dignity, equality and freedom. It may take many forms, including trafficking for sexual exploitation, forced labour, domestic servitude, begging, forced marriage, child labour, organ exploitation and other exploitative practices. ➤ **Statutory support:** Article 23 is supported by penal and welfare legislation. Presently, **Section 143 BNS, 2023**, corresponding broadly to earlier **Section 370 IPC**, deals with trafficking of persons. The **Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956** punishes keeping brothels, living on earnings of prostitution, procuring, inducing or taking a person for prostitution and detaining a person where prostitution is carried on. ➤ **Not limited to sex trafficking:** Article 23 is wider than sexual exploitation. It includes labour trafficking, bonded labour, trafficking of children for begging, trafficking for domestic work and trafficking for hazardous industries. ## Meaning of Begar under Article 23 ➤ **Begar:** Begar means labour or service taken from a person **without payment** or without the person’s free and voluntary consent. Historically, begar was a feudal practice where poor persons, lower caste communities and vulnerable labourers were forced to provide unpaid services to landlords, rulers or powerful persons. ➤ **Constitutional abolition:** Article 23 constitutionally abolishes such practices. The important point is that exploitation can exist even where there is no physical violence. Economic helplessness, social pressure, caste dominance, debt bondage or threat of losing livelihood can also make labour involuntary. ➤ **Example:** If a landlord forces a landless labourer to work without wages because the labourer’s family owes a debt, it is begar and bonded labour. If a local authority or influential person forces poor villagers to perform unpaid manual work without valid legal authority, it violates Article 23. ## Meaning of Forced Labour under Article 23 ➤ **Wide meaning:** “Forced labour” is not limited to slavery or physical compulsion. It includes labour extracted by **physical force, legal coercion, economic compulsion, social pressure, debt bondage or helpless poverty**. ➤ **Minimum wage principle:** The Supreme Court has interpreted Article 23 to mean that if a person is made to work for less than the statutory minimum wage, the labour may amount to forced labour because poverty may compel the worker to accept exploitative wages. ➤ **Economic necessity:** A person may appear to have agreed to work, but if the agreement is caused by hunger, poverty, debt, migration, illiteracy or lack of bargaining power, the consent is not truly free. Constitutional law therefore looks at the reality of the relationship, not merely the form of consent. ➤ **Illustration:** A construction worker accepts wages below the statutory minimum because otherwise his family will starve. Though he has technically “agreed”, the labour is constitutionally forced because the choice is not free in any real sense. ## Bonded Labour and Article 23 ➤ **Bonded labour:** Bonded labour exists when a person is forced to work because of debt, advance payment, caste obligation, customary duty or inherited liability. The worker’s freedom to leave employment is controlled by the creditor, employer or dominant person. ➤ **Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976:** This Act abolishes the bonded labour system throughout India. It came into force from 25 October 1975 and relieves bonded labourers from any obligation to render bonded labour. ➤ **Constitutional effect:** Since bonded labour is a direct form of forced labour, it violates Article 23. The abolition of bonded labour is not complete merely by releasing workers. Rehabilitation, livelihood support, housing, health, education and protection from re-bondage are also important. ➤ **Practical reality:** Bonded labour often appears in disguised forms, such as advance-based employment, brick kiln labour, stone quarry labour, agricultural bondage, domestic servitude, forced migration work, caste-based labour and child bondage. ## Article 23(2): Compulsory Service for Public Purpose ➤ **Permissible compulsory service:** Article 23 does not prohibit every kind of compulsory service. The State may impose compulsory service if it is for a **public purpose**. Examples may include compulsory civic duties, emergency relief work, disaster management duties, military or national service if legally provided, or community service required by law. ➤ **Non-discrimination condition:** The State cannot impose compulsory service in a discriminatory manner only on grounds of religion, race, caste, class or any of them. ➤ **Important distinction:** Compulsory service for public purpose is valid only when it is authorised by law, connected with public interest and non-discriminatory. It cannot be a mask for caste labour, unpaid private work or exploitation of poor persons. ## Bare Text and Structure of Article 24 ➤ **Article 24:** It provides that **no child below the age of fourteen years shall be employed to work in any factory or mine or engaged in any other hazardous employment**. ➤ **Purpose:** Article 24 protects childhood, health, education and development. It recognises that children must not be pushed into dangerous labour at an age when they should be protected, educated and allowed to grow safely. ➤ **Absolute prohibition in covered areas:** Article 24 absolutely prohibits employment of children below 14 in factories, mines and hazardous employment. It does not merely regulate their working conditions; it forbids such employment itself. ## Child Labour and Hazardous Employment ➤ **Child labour:** Child labour means employment or engagement of children in work that deprives them of childhood, education, health, dignity or development. All work done by children is not automatically treated alike, but exploitative and hazardous work is constitutionally prohibited. ➤ **Hazardous employment:** Hazardous employment means work that is dangerous to the child’s physical or mental health, safety, morals or development. It includes work in factories, mines, explosives, chemicals, dangerous machinery, toxic substances, excessive heat, unsafe construction, and other harmful processes. ➤ **Child and Adolescent Labour Act:** The **Child and Adolescent Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986**, as amended in 2016, prohibits the engagement of children below 14 years in all occupations and processes and prohibits adolescents between 14 and 18 years in hazardous occupations and processes. The 2016 amendment came into force from 1 September 2016 and also made punishments stricter and the offence cognizable. ➤ **Child and adolescent distinction:** A **child** means a person below 14 years. An **adolescent** means a person who has completed 14 years but has not completed 18 years. The law gives stronger protection to children and special protection to adolescents against hazardous work. ## Relationship between Articles 23, 24, 21, 21A and Directive Principles ➤ **Article 21:** Exploitation violates the right to life with dignity. Forced labour, trafficking, bonded labour and hazardous child labour reduce human beings to instruments of profit and therefore offend Article 21. ➤ **Article 21A:** Children between 6 and 14 years have a fundamental right to free and compulsory education. Child labour directly conflicts with education because a child working in exploitative conditions cannot effectively attend school. ➤ **Article 39(e):** The State must ensure that the health and strength of workers and the tender age of children are not abused. ➤ **Article 39(f):** Children must be given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity. ➤ **Article 45:** The State must endeavour to provide early childhood care and education for children below 6 years. ➤ **Article 51A(k):** Parents or guardians have a fundamental duty to provide opportunities for education to children between 6 and 14 years. ➤ **Integrated reading:** Articles 23 and 24 must be read with Articles 21, 21A, 39, 45 and 51A(k). Together, they create a constitutional framework against exploitation and for dignity, education, rehabilitation and social justice. ## Landmark Supreme Court Cases on Article 23 #### People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, (1982) 3 SCC 235 ➤ **Facts:** This case arose from the exploitation of workers engaged in construction projects connected with the Asian Games in Delhi. Workers were allegedly paid below minimum wages and labour laws were violated. ➤ **Issue:** Whether payment below minimum wages and exploitative conditions could amount to forced labour under Article 23. ➤ **Ratio:** The Supreme Court held that Article 23 has a wide meaning and includes labour obtained through economic compulsion. The Court held that where a person provides labour for less than the minimum wage, it may amount to forced labour because poverty and helplessness can compel acceptance of such work. ➤ **Importance:** This case is the foundation for the principle that **non-payment of minimum wages is not merely a labour law violation but may also be a constitutional violation under Article 23**. #### Sanjit Roy v. State of Rajasthan, (1983) 1 SCC 525 ➤ **Facts:** Workers were employed in famine relief work in Rajasthan and paid less than minimum wages under a law that exempted famine relief work from labour law requirements. ➤ **Issue:** Whether the State could pay less than minimum wages in relief work on the ground that the work was meant to provide aid during famine. ➤ **Ratio:** The Supreme Court held that even famine relief workers must be paid minimum wages. A law excluding minimum wages in such work could not survive against Article 23. ➤ **Importance:** The case clarifies that poverty, drought or famine cannot be used as an excuse by the State to extract underpaid labour. Public welfare work must also respect human dignity. #### Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161 ➤ **Facts:** A public interest petition exposed the condition of bonded labourers working in stone quarries in Haryana. The petition alleged non-implementation of labour welfare laws and existence of bonded labour. ➤ **Issue:** Whether the Court could intervene through PIL to identify, release and rehabilitate bonded labourers. ➤ **Ratio:** The Supreme Court treated bonded labour as a grave violation of Articles 21 and 23. It issued directions for identification, release, welfare and rehabilitation of bonded labourers. ➤ **Importance:** The case expanded PIL jurisdiction and made the Court an active protector of bonded labourers. It recognised that constitutional rights are meaningless unless the State identifies and rehabilitates victims. #### Neeraja Chaudhary v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1984) 3 SCC 243 ➤ **Facts:** The case concerned rehabilitation of released bonded labourers who had been freed but not properly rehabilitated. ➤ **Issue:** Whether release from bondage alone is sufficient compliance with Article 23 and bonded labour laws. ➤ **Ratio:** The Supreme Court emphasised that rehabilitation is essential. If released bonded labourers are not rehabilitated, they may fall back into bondage. ➤ **Importance:** The case established that **freedom from bonded labour includes meaningful rehabilitation**, not merely formal release. #### Deena v. Union of India, (1983) 4 SCC 645 ➤ **Facts:** The case concerned labour taken from prisoners and the question of proper remuneration. ➤ **Issue:** Whether taking labour from prisoners without proper remuneration could violate Article 23. ➤ **Ratio:** The Supreme Court accepted that prison labour cannot become a form of exploitation. Conviction does not destroy human dignity. ➤ **Importance:** The case shows that Article 23 protects even persons in custody from exploitative labour practices. ## Landmark Supreme Court Cases on Human Trafficking and Exploitation #### Vishal Jeet v. Union of India, (1990) 3 SCC 318 ➤ **Facts:** A public interest petition was filed concerning forced prostitution, child prostitution, Devadasi and Jogin practices, and trafficking of women and children. ➤ **Issue:** Whether the Supreme Court should issue directions for prevention, rescue and rehabilitation of victims of trafficking and forced prostitution. ➤ **Ratio:** The Court directed the Union and State Governments to take effective steps under existing laws to eradicate child prostitution and rehabilitate victims. ➤ **Importance:** This case is a landmark in treating trafficking and sexual exploitation as constitutional wrongs requiring rescue, protection and rehabilitation. #### Gaurav Jain v. Union of India, (1997) 8 SCC 114 ➤ **Facts:** The case concerned the rights and rehabilitation of children of women in prostitution. ➤ **Issue:** Whether children of women in prostitution should receive special protection, education and rehabilitation. ➤ **Ratio:** The Supreme Court emphasised that children must not be allowed to fall into the same exploitative cycle and directed measures for their education, protection and rehabilitation. ➤ **Importance:** The case connects Article 23 with child dignity, education, rehabilitation and the State’s duty to prevent intergenerational exploitation. ## Landmark Supreme Court Cases on Article 24 and Child Labour #### M.C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1996) 6 SCC 756 ➤ **Facts:** The case concerned child labour in hazardous industries, especially the match and fireworks industries of Sivakasi. The Supreme Court considered the serious risks to children working in such hazardous conditions. ➤ **Issue:** What directions should be issued to eliminate child labour in hazardous employment and rehabilitate affected children. ➤ **Ratio:** The Court directed that employers illegally employing children in hazardous work must pay compensation of ₹20,000 per child into a Child Labour Rehabilitation-cum-Welfare Fund. It also directed the State to provide employment to an adult member of the child’s family where possible, or contribute financial assistance. ➤ **Importance:** This case converted Article 24 into an enforceable rehabilitation framework. It recognised that merely removing a child from hazardous work is not enough; the economic condition of the family must also be addressed. #### Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1997) 10 SCC 549 ➤ **Facts:** This later child labour-related decision concerned children working in the carpet industry and the need for welfare measures. ➤ **Issue:** Whether employment of children in hazardous industries and exploitative conditions violated constitutional guarantees. ➤ **Ratio:** The Supreme Court stressed the need for education, health, nutrition, sanitation and protection of children from exploitative labour. It connected child labour with poverty and lack of education. ➤ **Importance:** The case strengthened the principle that child labour cannot be solved only by prohibition; it requires education, family support and welfare measures. #### Bachpan Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, (2011) 5 SCC 1 ➤ **Facts:** The case concerned children allegedly trafficked and employed in circuses and similar exploitative conditions. ➤ **Issue:** Whether children could be kept in such exploitative work environments and what protective directions were needed. ➤ **Ratio:** The Supreme Court directed rescue, rehabilitation and protection of children and emphasised strict action against child exploitation. ➤ **Importance:** The case shows the modern application of Articles 23 and 24 to child trafficking, forced labour and exploitative entertainment or informal industries. ## Comparative Table: Article 23 and Article 24 BasisArticle 23Article 24**Main protection**Prohibits trafficking, begar and forced labourProhibits employment of children below 14 in factories, mines and hazardous employment**Beneficiaries**All persons, including adults and childrenChildren below 14 years**Nature**Broad anti-exploitation rightSpecific child-protection right**Against whom enforceable**State and private personsState and private employers**Key concern**Human dignity, free labour, anti-slavery, anti-traffickingChildhood, health, education, safety**Exception**Compulsory service for public purpose, without discriminationNo constitutional exception for hazardous employment below 14**Important laws**BNS, Immoral Traffic Act, Bonded Labour Act, labour welfare lawsChild and Adolescent Labour Act, Factories law, Mines law, education laws**Landmark cases**PUDR, Sanjit Roy, Bandhua Mukti Morcha, Neeraja ChaudharyM.C. Mehta, Bandhua Mukti Morcha, Bachpan Bachao Andolan## Important Legal Principles for Quick Revision ➤ **Article 23 is wider than slavery:** It covers trafficking, begar, bonded labour, underpaid forced labour and labour obtained through economic compulsion. ➤ **Consent is not always real:** If poverty, debt, hunger, caste pressure or helplessness compels a person to work, the law may treat the labour as forced. ➤ **Minimum wage is constitutional:** Payment below minimum wage can amount to forced labour under Article 23. ➤ **Private exploitation is covered:** Articles 23 and 24 can apply against private employers, contractors and traffickers. ➤ **Bonded labour requires rehabilitation:** Release without rehabilitation is incomplete because the worker may return to bondage. ➤ **Article 24 protects childhood:** Children below 14 cannot be employed in factories, mines or hazardous employment. ➤ **Child labour is linked with education:** Article 24 must be read with Article 21A because child labour often destroys the child’s right to education. ➤ **Hazardous employment is absolutely prohibited for children below 14:** The Constitution does not allow balancing of economic necessity against child safety in such cases. ➤ **Adolescents also receive statutory protection:** Under the Child and Adolescent Labour law, adolescents between 14 and 18 years are protected from hazardous occupations and processes. ➤ **Trafficking needs rescue and rehabilitation:** Constitutional protection is incomplete without victim identification, protection, compensation, counselling, education and reintegration. ## Memory Aid: “T-B-F-C-H” ➤ **T — Trafficking:** Article 23 prohibits traffic in human beings. ➤ **B — Begar:** Article 23 prohibits unpaid compulsory labour. ➤ **F — Forced labour:** Article 23 prohibits labour extracted by force, poverty, debt or compulsion. ➤ **C — Child labour:** Article 24 protects children below 14 from factory, mine and hazardous work. ➤ **H — Hazardous employment:** Dangerous work for children is constitutionally prohibited. ## Conclusion ➤ **Final understanding:** Articles 23 and 24 are powerful constitutional weapons against exploitation. Article 23 attacks the exploitation of human beings through trafficking, begar, bonded labour and forced labour. Article 24 protects children from being pushed into factories, mines and hazardous employment before the age of 14. ➤ **Judicial development:** The Supreme Court has given these Articles a broad, humane and purposive interpretation. Through cases such as **PUDR**, **Sanjit Roy**, **Bandhua Mukti Morcha**, **Neeraja Chaudhary**, **Vishal Jeet** and **M.C. Mehta**, the Court has made it clear that exploitation is not limited to visible chains. Poverty, debt, social domination, trafficking networks and lack of education can also create invisible chains. ➤ **Constitutional message:** The right against exploitation is based on one central idea: **no person should be treated as a commodity, and no child should be sacrificed for profit**. These Articles convert the promise of dignity into enforceable constitutional protection for the most vulnerable sections of society. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Article 22 of the Indian Constitution: Protection Against Arrest and Preventive Detention Safeguards](https://lawfoyer.in/article-22-of-the-indian-constitution/) **Published:** June 3, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun3202612_21_57A-725x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning and Constitutional Purpose of Article 22 ● **Core idea:** Article 22 of the Constitution of India protects personal liberty by placing constitutional limits on the power of the State to arrest and detain a person. It deals with two different situations: **ordinary arrest** in criminal law and **preventive detention** under special detention laws. Article 22(1) and Article 22(2) mainly deal with ordinary arrest, while Article 22(4) to Article 22(7) deal with preventive detention. Article 22(3) creates exceptions for **enemy aliens** and persons detained under preventive detention laws. ● **Personal liberty connection:** Article 22 must be read with Article 21, which says that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. After **Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248**, “procedure established by law” must be fair, just, and reasonable; therefore, arrest and detention cannot be mechanical, arbitrary, or unfair. ● **Two-fold structure:** Article 22 is both protective and exceptional. It gives strong safeguards in ordinary arrest, but it also constitutionally permits preventive detention, where a person may be detained not for what he has already been convicted of, but to prevent anticipated harmful acts. This makes preventive detention an extraordinary power requiring strict constitutional control. ## Ordinary Arrest Safeguards under Article 22(1) and 22(2) ● **Right to know grounds of arrest:** Article 22(1) provides that no arrested person shall be detained in custody without being informed, “as soon as may be,” of the grounds of arrest. This means the arrested person must know the real reasons for arrest, not merely the name of the offence. The purpose is to enable the person to challenge the arrest, seek bail, consult a lawyer, and prepare a defence. ● **Right to consult and be defended by a lawyer:** Article 22(1) also gives the arrested person the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. This is a constitutional recognition that liberty cannot be protected unless the arrested person has access to legal assistance. ● **Production before Magistrate within 24 hours:** Article 22(2) requires that every arrested and detained person must be produced before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest, excluding the time necessary for journey from the place of arrest to the Magistrate’s court. Detention beyond 24 hours is illegal unless authorised by a Magistrate. ● **Judicial check on police custody:** The 24-hour rule prevents secret detention and police custody without judicial supervision. The Magistrate is not a rubber stamp; he must examine whether arrest, custody, and remand are legally justified. ● **BNSS statutory support:** The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 strengthens these constitutional safeguards. Section 47 BNSS requires communication of full particulars of the offence or grounds of arrest, and Section 48 BNSS requires information about arrest and place of detention to be given to a relative, friend, or nominated person. Sections 57 and 58 relate to taking the arrested person before the Magistrate or officer-in-charge and the 24-hour limit. ## Important Case Laws on Ordinary Arrest ● **Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P., (1994) 4 SCC 260:** The Supreme Court held that arrest should not be made merely because it is lawful to arrest. The police officer must justify the necessity of arrest. The case arose when the petitioner, a young advocate, was taken by police and his whereabouts were not properly disclosed. The issue was whether police power of arrest can be exercised routinely. The Court held that arrest affects reputation and liberty, and therefore there must be reasonable justification. This case developed the principle that **power to arrest is different from justification for arrest**. ● **D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416:** The Supreme Court issued binding guidelines to prevent custodial violence and illegal detention. The facts involved public interest litigation on custodial deaths. The issue was how to protect arrested persons from abuse of police power. The Court held that arrest memo, identification of arresting officers, information to relatives, medical examination, diary entries, and production before Magistrate are necessary safeguards. The ratio is that custodial power must be transparent, accountable, and consistent with Articles 21 and 22. ● **Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, 2023 INSC 866:** The Supreme Court held in the PMLA context that written grounds of arrest must be supplied to the arrested person. The Court reasoned that merely reading out grounds may defeat Article 22(1), especially when grounds are detailed or disputed. The ratio is that meaningful communication of grounds of arrest is necessary to make the constitutional right effective. ● **Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 INSC 414:** The Supreme Court applied the requirement of written communication of grounds of arrest in a UAPA arrest. The Court treated Article 22(1) as a real safeguard, not an empty formality. The ratio is that non-supply of proper grounds of arrest may vitiate arrest and remand. ● **Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 INSC 162:** The Supreme Court reiterated that communication of grounds of arrest under Article 22(1) is a sacrosanct constitutional requirement. The Court held that failure to communicate grounds can render custody illegal. This case is important because it confirms that Article 22(1) applies beyond special statutes and remains a general constitutional command for arrest. ## Exceptions under Article 22(3) ● **Enemy alien exception:** Article 22(3)(a) says Article 22(1) and Article 22(2) do not apply to an enemy alien. An enemy alien is generally a national of a country at war with India. This is a national security exception. ● **Preventive detention exception:** Article 22(3)(b) says Article 22(1) and Article 22(2) do not apply to a person arrested or detained under a preventive detention law. This does not mean such a person has no rights. It means ordinary arrest safeguards are replaced by special safeguards under Article 22(4) to Article 22(7). ## Meaning of Preventive Detention ● **Preventive, not punitive:** Preventive detention means detention to prevent a person from doing something harmful in the future. It is not punishment for a completed offence. In ordinary criminal law, a person is punished after trial and conviction. In preventive detention, the executive detains a person on subjective satisfaction that detention is necessary to prevent prejudicial activity. ● **Extraordinary nature:** Preventive detention is constitutionally allowed, but it is an exception to normal liberty. Because there is no regular criminal trial at the stage of detention, courts insist on strict compliance with constitutional and statutory safeguards. ● **Examples of preventive detention laws:** Laws like the National Security Act, 1980, COFEPOSA, PIT NDPS Act, and State preventive detention laws operate within the constitutional framework of Article 22. ## Article 22(4): Advisory Board Safeguard ● **Three-month constitutional limit:** Article 22(4) provides that no preventive detention law shall authorise detention for more than three months unless an Advisory Board reports, before expiry of three months, that there is sufficient cause for detention. The Advisory Board must consist of persons who are, have been, or are qualified to be appointed as Judges of a High Court. ● **Function of Advisory Board:** The Advisory Board acts as a constitutional check on executive detention. It examines whether there is sufficient cause for continued detention. It is not a regular criminal court, but it provides an independent review mechanism. ● **Effect of adverse opinion:** If the Advisory Board finds no sufficient cause, continued detention becomes unconstitutional and the detenu must be released, unless held under some other valid law. ● **Maximum period:** Even if the Advisory Board supports detention, the detenu cannot be detained beyond the maximum period prescribed by law made by Parliament under Article 22(7)(b). Article 22(4) itself states that Advisory Board approval does not authorise detention beyond the statutory maximum. ## Article 22(5): Communication of Grounds and Right to Representation ● **Two essential rights:** Article 22(5) gives two valuable rights to a preventive detenu: first, the authority must communicate the grounds of detention “as soon as may be”; second, the detenu must be given the earliest opportunity to make a representation against the detention order. ● **Effective communication:** Communication of grounds must be real and understandable. The detenu must receive enough basic facts, particulars, and relied-upon material to make an effective representation. A vague, incomplete, or unintelligible communication defeats Article 22(5). ● **Language requirement:** If the detenu does not understand the language of the grounds or documents, merely serving papers may not amount to proper communication. The grounds must be communicated in a language or manner the detenu can understand. ● **Documents relied upon:** If the detention order is based on documents, statements, or other material, copies of such material must ordinarily be supplied, unless protected by a valid public interest claim under Article 22(6). Without relied-upon documents, the right to representation becomes ineffective. ● **Earliest opportunity:** The right to representation is not decorative. The government must consider the representation promptly and independently. Delay in consideration may invalidate continued detention. ## Article 22(6): Public Interest Non-disclosure ● **Limited secrecy exception:** Article 22(6) says the detaining authority is not required to disclose facts which it considers against public interest to disclose. This protects sensitive information such as confidential sources or security intelligence. ● **Not a blanket power:** Article 22(6) cannot be used to hide all material or make the detenu helpless. The authority must still disclose sufficient grounds to enable representation. If everything material is withheld, the constitutional safeguard under Article 22(5) is destroyed. ## Article 22(7): Parliament’s Power ● **Legislative control:** Article 22(7) empowers Parliament to prescribe three things: circumstances and classes of cases where detention may exceed three months without Advisory Board opinion, the maximum period of detention, and the procedure to be followed by the Advisory Board. ● **Constitutional balance:** Article 22(7) shows that preventive detention is not left entirely to executive discretion. Parliament must define limits, periods, and procedure. However, any such law must also satisfy broader constitutional principles under Articles 14, 21, and 22. ## Important Case Laws on Preventive Detention ● **A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27:** The petitioner was detained under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 and challenged the law as violating fundamental rights. The issue was whether preventive detention law had to satisfy Articles 19, 21, and 22 together. The early majority view treated fundamental rights more separately and upheld preventive detention subject to Article 22 safeguards, though parts of the law were struck down. The later constitutional approach after **Maneka Gandhi** is broader, requiring fairness, reasonableness, and non-arbitrariness in laws affecting liberty. ● **Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 3 SCC 198:** The petitioners were detained under preventive detention law for activities affecting essential supplies. The issue was whether preventive detention and criminal prosecution can exist simultaneously. The Supreme Court held that preventive detention is different from punitive prosecution: prosecution punishes past acts, while preventive detention prevents future harm. The ratio is that pendency of prosecution does not automatically bar preventive detention, but the detention must satisfy constitutional safeguards. ● **Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 2 SCC 81:** The detenu was detained under MISA on grounds relating to disruption of essential supplies. The issue was whether subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is completely immune from judicial review. The Supreme Court held that subjective satisfaction can be examined on limited grounds such as mala fides, irrelevant material, non-application of mind, or absence of relevant material. The ratio is that preventive detention power is preventive, but not arbitrary or beyond constitutional scrutiny. ● **Icchu Devi Choraria v. Union of India, (1980) 4 SCC 531:** The detention was based on several documents, and the detenu sought copies to make an effective representation. The issue was whether non-supply of relied-upon documents violates Article 22(5). The Supreme Court held that documents and material relied upon must be supplied with reasonable expedition, because representation is meaningless without access to the basis of detention. The ratio is that Article 22(5) requires effective, not merely formal, opportunity of representation. ● **Shalini Soni v. Union of India, (1980) 4 SCC 544:** The Supreme Court explained that “grounds” means not only bare conclusions but also basic facts on which detention is founded. The issue was whether vague grounds satisfy Article 22(5). The Court held that grounds must be sufficiently clear and complete to enable representation. The ratio is that vague grounds make detention unconstitutional because they disable the detenu from answering the case. ● **Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2011) 5 SCC 244:** The detenu was detained under a State preventive detention law despite ordinary criminal law being available. The issue was whether preventive detention can be used casually when normal law can deal with the situation. The Supreme Court held that preventive detention is repugnant to democratic ideas of liberty and must be used only when strictly necessary. The ratio is that preventive detention cannot become a substitute for ordinary criminal prosecution. ## Constitutional Limits on Preventive Detention ● **Strict construction:** Preventive detention laws are strictly construed because they permit detention without trial. Any procedural violation generally benefits the detenu. ● **Live and proximate link:** There must be a live and proximate connection between past conduct and the need for detention. If the detention order is based on stale incidents, the link may snap, making detention invalid. ● **No mechanical detention:** The detaining authority must apply its own mind. Copy-paste orders, non-consideration of bail status, irrelevant material, or failure to consider vital facts may show non-application of mind. ● **Not substitute for criminal law:** If ordinary criminal law is sufficient and there is no special preventive necessity, preventive detention may be unconstitutional. The State must show why detention without trial is necessary. ● **Judicial review remains available:** Courts do not sit as appellate authorities over subjective satisfaction, but they can examine legality, relevance of material, procedural compliance, mala fides, delay, vagueness, non-supply of documents, and violation of Article 22(5). ## Difference between Ordinary Arrest and Preventive Detention BasisOrdinary ArrestPreventive Detention**Purpose**Investigation, trial, or securing presence of accusedPreventing future prejudicial acts**Nature**Connected with alleged offenceBased on anticipated danger**Article 22 safeguards**Article 22(1) and 22(2) applyArticle 22(4) to 22(7) apply**Lawyer right**Express right under Article 22(1)Not expressly guaranteed in same form under Article 22(5)**Magistrate within 24 hours**Mandatory under Article 22(2)Not applicable due to Article 22(3)(b)**Review mechanism**Magistrate and criminal courtsAdvisory Board and constitutional courts**Core remedy**Bail, quashing of arrest/remand, habeas corpusRepresentation, Advisory Board review, habeas corpus## Memory Aid for Article 22 ● **Ordinary arrest — “G-L-M-24”:** **Grounds**, **Lawyer**, **Magistrate**, **24 hours**. ● **Preventive detention — “A-G-R-P”:** **Advisory Board**, **Grounds**, **Representation**, **Public interest exception**. ## Conclusion ● **Balanced understanding:** Article 22 is a constitutional shield against arbitrary arrest and detention, but it also recognises preventive detention as an exceptional State power. In ordinary arrest, the Constitution insists on immediate knowledge of grounds, access to legal defence, and production before a Magistrate within 24 hours. In preventive detention, where ordinary safeguards are excluded, Article 22 creates special protections through Advisory Board review, communication of grounds, and earliest opportunity of representation. ● **Central principle:** The strongest idea behind Article 22 is that personal liberty cannot be taken away secretly, casually, or mechanically. Whether the case concerns police arrest or preventive detention, the State must act under law, disclose legally sufficient reasons, follow procedure strictly, and respect the person’s right to challenge the loss of liberty. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Article 21A and Right to Education: Free and Compulsory Education, RTE Act, Equality and Dignity](https://lawfoyer.in/article-21a-and-right-to-education/) **Published:** June 3, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun3202612_12_55A-725x1024.jpeg) ## **Introduction: Right to Education as a Constitutional Guarantee** ➤ **Core idea:** The **Right to Education** means that every child must get meaningful access to elementary education, not merely formal admission into a school. Education is the foundation through which a person learns to think, participate in society, understand rights and duties, and live with dignity. ➤ **Constitutional status:** Article 21A of the Constitution of India provides that **“The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of six to fourteen years in such manner as the State may, by law, determine.”** This provision was inserted by the **Constitution (Eighty-sixth Amendment) Act, 2002**, and the statutory mechanism for giving effect to it is mainly the **Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009**, commonly called the **RTE Act, 2009**. The Ministry of Education records the RTE Act as Act No. 35 of 2009, enacted on 26 August 2009 and enforced from 1 April 2010. ➤ **Separate treatment of concepts:** The topic has four connected but separate parts: **free and compulsory education**, **Article 21A**, **RTE Act, 2009**, and the link of education with **equality and dignity**. Article 21A creates the constitutional right; the RTE Act explains how the right is to be implemented; equality ensures that poor and disadvantaged children are not excluded; dignity explains why education is necessary for a meaningful human life. ## **Historical Development of Right to Education in India** ➤ **Directive principle stage:** Originally, the Constitution did not place the right to education expressly in Part III as a fundamental right. Instead, education for children was part of the Directive Principles of State Policy. The original Article 45 directed the State to endeavour to provide free and compulsory education to children until they completed the age of fourteen years. ➤ **Judicial recognition before Article 21A:** Before Article 21A was inserted, the Supreme Court read the right to education into **Article 21**, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. This was a major example of the broad interpretation of Article 21, where “life” was understood not merely as animal existence but as a life with human dignity. ➤ **Constitutional amendment stage:** The **86th Constitutional Amendment, 2002** changed the constitutional structure in three important ways: it inserted **Article 21A** as a fundamental right; substituted Article 45 to focus on early childhood care and education for children below six years; and inserted **Article 51A(k)**, making it a fundamental duty of parents or guardians to provide opportunities for education to children between six and fourteen years. The Government of India’s official release records that Article 21A was inserted by the 86th Amendment and specifically guarantees free and compulsory education to children aged six to fourteen years. ## **Meaning of Free and Compulsory Education** ➤ **Free education:** “Free” education means that a child should not be prevented from completing elementary education because of inability to pay. It is not limited to exemption from tuition fee. The idea is that no fee, charge, expense or financial burden should operate as a barrier to schooling. Therefore, the right becomes meaningful only when education is accessible to poor children, children from weaker sections, children from disadvantaged groups, children with social barriers, and children who are first-generation learners. ➤ **Compulsory education:** “Compulsory” does not mean that the child is punished for not attending school. It means that the **State has a compulsory duty** to ensure admission, attendance and completion of elementary education. The burden is shifted from the child or parents to the State machinery. The RTE framework therefore treats non-enrolment and dropout as governance issues, not as the fault of the child. ➤ **Elementary education:** Under the RTE Act, the focus is on education from **Class I to Class VIII**, corresponding to the age group of **six to fourteen years**. Article 21A does not expressly cover children below six years or education beyond fourteen years, though other constitutional provisions and welfare laws may be relevant for those stages. ➤ **Neighbourhood school concept:** A major feature of the RTE framework is that children should have access to a school in or near their neighbourhood. The idea is simple: the right becomes hollow if a child has to travel an unreasonable distance, face unsafe routes, or incur expenses that effectively exclude them from school. ## **Article 21A: Nature, Scope and Constitutional Importance** ➤ **Text and obligation:** Article 21A imposes a constitutional obligation on the **State** to provide free and compulsory education to all children aged six to fourteen years. Its words “in such manner as the State may, by law, determine” mean that Parliament or the competent legislature can create a detailed statutory framework for implementation. ➤ **Positive right:** Article 21A is a **positive fundamental right**. Many fundamental rights restrain the State from interfering with liberty, but Article 21A requires the State to actively create conditions for education. This includes schools, teachers, infrastructure, admission systems, child-friendly classrooms, and mechanisms to include disadvantaged children. ➤ **Connection with Article 21:** Article 21A has an independent textual place in Part III, but its moral foundation comes from Article 21. Education enables a dignified life, informed choice, participation in democracy, and development of personality. A person who is denied basic education is often denied the real ability to use other rights. ➤ **Connection with Directive Principles:** Article 21A also reflects the movement of a Directive Principle into the field of enforceable fundamental rights. What was initially a directive constitutional promise became a justiciable right after the 86th Amendment. ## **RTE Act, 2009: Legislative Framework for Article 21A** ➤ **Purpose of the Act:** The RTE Act, 2009 was enacted to give effect to Article 21A. Its long title states that it is an Act to provide for free and compulsory education to all children of the age of six to fourteen years. India Code identifies the Act as administered by the Ministry of Education and enforced from 1 April 2010. ➤ **Section 3 — Right of child to free and compulsory education:** Section 3 is the heart of the Act. It provides that every child of the age of six to fourteen years has a right to free and compulsory education in a neighbourhood school till completion of elementary education. ➤ **Section 4 — Special training for non-admitted children:** If a child above six years has not been admitted to any school or could not complete elementary education, the Act provides for admission in an age-appropriate class and special training. This is important because many children are out of school due to poverty, migration, labour, gender discrimination, disability, or social exclusion. ➤ **Section 5 — Transfer to another school:** The Act protects continuity of education when a child needs to move from one school to another. This is especially important for migrant children and children whose families shift residence. ➤ **Sections 6 to 9 — Duties of government and local authority:** These provisions place duties on the appropriate government and local authority to establish schools, ensure admission, provide infrastructure, train teachers, monitor attendance, and identify children requiring education. The Ministry of Education describes the RTE framework as specifying duties of governments and local authorities and providing for age-appropriate admission of non-admitted children. ➤ **Section 10 — Duty of parents or guardians:** Parents and guardians have a duty to admit or cause the child to be admitted to elementary education. However, the Act does not treat poverty-stricken parents as criminals; the main constitutional responsibility remains on the State. ➤ **Section 11 — Pre-school education:** Though Article 21A covers six to fourteen years, Section 11 enables the appropriate government to make necessary arrangements for pre-school education. This connects Article 21A with the substituted Article 45, which focuses on early childhood care and education for children below six years. ## **Schools, Admission and Inclusion under the RTE Act** ➤ **Section 12 — Responsibility of schools:** Section 12 distributes obligations among government schools, aided schools, specified category schools, and unaided schools. Government schools must provide free and compulsory elementary education to all admitted children. Aided schools must provide free education at least in proportion to the aid received. Private unaided schools and specified category schools are required to admit children from weaker sections and disadvantaged groups to the extent of at least **25% of the strength of Class I** or pre-school entry class, as applicable, and provide free and compulsory elementary education. ➤ **Weaker section and disadvantaged group:** The RTE Act uses these categories to ensure that formal equality does not hide real social inequality. “Weaker section” generally relates to economic disadvantage, while “disadvantaged group” covers social, cultural, geographical, linguistic, gender-based or other forms of disadvantage as notified or recognised under the Act and rules. ➤ **No screening and no capitation fee:** The Act prohibits admission screening procedures and capitation fee. This is crucial because interviews, tests, donations and informal charges often exclude poor children even before they enter school. ➤ **No denial of admission for age or documents:** The spirit of the Act is that procedural requirements should not defeat the child’s right. A child should not be denied education merely because of technical barriers such as late admission, lack of prior schooling, or difficulty in producing documents. ## **Child-Friendly Education under the RTE Act** ➤ **Section 16 — No detention policy and amendment:** Originally, Section 16 prohibited holding back a child or expelling the child till completion of elementary education. Later, the law was amended to allow regular examination in Classes V and VIII and possible detention after additional instruction and re-examination, subject to the policy adopted by the appropriate government. PRS explains that the amendment allows the relevant central or state government to decide the manner and conditions in which a child may be held back after failure in re-examination. ➤ **Section 17 — Prohibition of physical punishment and mental harassment:** Section 17 prohibits physical punishment and mental harassment. This provision connects education directly with dignity. A child cannot be educated through fear, humiliation or violence. A school is constitutionally expected to be a safe and child-friendly environment. ➤ **Section 21 — School Management Committee:** The Act provides for School Management Committees in many schools to encourage local participation, parental involvement and community accountability. ➤ **Section 23 — Teacher qualifications:** Quality education requires trained teachers. The RTE framework therefore deals not only with admission but also with teacher qualifications, pupil-teacher ratio and educational standards. ➤ **Section 24 — Duties of teachers:** Teachers are expected to maintain regularity and punctuality, complete curriculum, assess learning ability, provide supplementary instruction where required, and hold meetings with parents. ➤ **Section 25 — Pupil-teacher ratio:** The Act requires maintenance of prescribed pupil-teacher ratios. This ensures that children do not merely sit in overcrowded classrooms without meaningful learning. ➤ **Section 29 — Curriculum and evaluation:** Curriculum must conform to constitutional values, all-round development of the child, child-centred learning, learning through activities and discovery, and making the child free from fear, trauma and anxiety. This is one of the strongest dignity-based provisions of the Act. ## **Connection between Right to Education, Equality and Dignity** ➤ **Education and equality:** Education is a great equaliser because it reduces inherited social disadvantage. Without education, equality under Articles 14, 15 and 16 remains formal for millions of children. A child born into poverty, caste-based exclusion, gender discrimination, disability, migration or linguistic marginalisation cannot compete equally unless the State ensures basic education. ➤ **Article 14 connection:** Article 14 guarantees equality before law and equal protection of laws. Article 21A gives practical content to this equality by requiring the State to build a system where children are not excluded because of birth, poverty or social location. ➤ **Article 15 connection:** Article 15 prohibits discrimination and permits special provisions for children, socially and educationally backward classes, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The RTE Act’s 25% inclusion model in private unaided non-minority schools reflects this constitutional philosophy of substantive equality. ➤ **Article 21 dignity connection:** Education is part of a dignified life because it develops personality, self-respect, freedom of thought and capacity to participate in public life. The Supreme Court in **Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 3 SCC 666** directly linked education with Article 21 and dignity, holding that the right to life and dignity cannot be assured unless accompanied by the right to education. ➤ **Democratic dignity:** In a constitutional democracy, education is not only a private benefit. It enables citizens to understand voting, public institutions, laws, rights, duties, social justice and constitutional morality. A democracy with large-scale illiteracy cannot fully realise liberty, equality and fraternity. ## **Important Landmark Case Laws on Right to Education** #### **Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 3 SCC 666** ➤ **Facts, issue and ratio:** In this case, the petitioner challenged the charging of heavy capitation fee by private medical colleges in Karnataka. The issue was whether such capitation fee violated the constitutional right to education and equality. The Supreme Court held that the right to education flows directly from Article 21 and that dignity under Article 21 cannot be assured without education. The Court treated capitation fee as destructive of equal access because it made education available only to the rich. This case is important because it first strongly constitutionalised education as part of the right to life. #### **Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 1 SCC 645** ➤ **Facts, issue and ratio:** Private professional educational institutions challenged State regulation of admissions and fees. The issue was whether the right to education is a fundamental right and, if yes, what is its extent. The Supreme Court partly modified Mohini Jain and held that the right to education is implicit in Article 21, but its enforceable content is limited by the State’s economic capacity and development. Importantly, the Court held that every child has a fundamental right to free education until the age of fourteen years, after which the right is subject to the State’s capacity. This judgment laid the direct judicial foundation for Article 21A. #### **T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481** ➤ **Facts, issue and ratio:** An eleven-judge Bench examined the rights of private unaided and minority educational institutions to establish and administer educational institutions. The issue was how to balance institutional autonomy with State regulation in education. The Court held that establishing and administering educational institutions is protected under Article 19(1)(g), and minority institutions have special protection under Article 30. However, the State can impose reasonable regulations to maintain standards, transparency and fairness. This case is important because later RTE litigation had to balance Article 21A with Article 19(1)(g) and Article 30 rights. #### **Avinash Mehrotra v. Union of India, (2009) 6 SCC 398** ➤ **Facts, issue and ratio:** This case arose from concerns about safety standards in schools, especially after tragic school fire incidents. The issue was whether school safety is part of the right to education and right to life. The Supreme Court treated safe school infrastructure as essential to Article 21 and Article 21A. The case is important because it shows that the right to education is not satisfied by opening schools alone; schools must be safe, humane and fit for children. #### **Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 1** ➤ **Facts, issue and ratio:** Private unaided schools challenged the constitutional validity of the RTE Act, especially Section 12(1)(c), which required admission of at least 25% children from weaker sections and disadvantaged groups. The issue was whether this obligation violated the right of private schools under Article 19(1)(g) and the rights of minority institutions under Article 30. The Supreme Court upheld the RTE Act as valid for government schools, aided schools and private unaided non-minority schools, and held that the 25% obligation is not an unreasonable restriction. However, unaided minority institutions were protected from its application. #### **Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust v. Union of India, (2014) 8 SCC 1** ➤ **Facts, issue and ratio:** Petitioners challenged the validity of Article 21A, Article 15(5), and the RTE Act on the ground that they affected private unaided and minority educational institutions. The issue was whether the constitutional provisions and RTE obligations were valid and how they applied to minority institutions. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Article 21A and the RTE Act, but held that the RTE Act would not apply to minority educational institutions, whether aided or unaided, because it would affect their rights under Article 30(1). This case is important for understanding the current constitutional balance between child rights and minority educational autonomy. #### **Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1997) 10 SCC 549** ➤ **Facts, issue and ratio:** The case concerned child labour in the carpet industry and the exploitation of children below fourteen years. The issue was whether the State must take active measures to rescue children and provide welfare support. The Supreme Court directed measures relating to prohibition of child labour and access to education, health and welfare facilities. This case connects the right to education with freedom from exploitation under Articles 23 and 24 and with the dignity-based meaning of Article 21. ## **RTE Act and Substantive Equality** ➤ **Formal equality is insufficient:** Treating all children the same on paper does not create equality in reality. A child from a wealthy household and a child from a poor, marginalised household do not begin from the same position. The RTE Act recognises this by providing special inclusion for children from weaker sections and disadvantaged groups. ➤ **25% admission rule as inclusion:** Section 12(1)(c) is based on the idea that social integration in classrooms is part of constitutional equality. It is not merely about giving poor children seats in private schools; it is about reducing social segregation and giving every child the chance to learn in a diverse environment. ➤ **No segregation principle:** Children admitted under RTE should not be treated as a separate category within the classroom. If they are humiliated, segregated, marked differently, or denied participation, the purpose of equality is defeated. ➤ **Gender equality:** The right to education has special importance for girls because education delays child marriage, improves health, enhances economic independence and increases participation in public life. ➤ **Caste and class equality:** Education weakens inherited barriers of caste and class by giving children literacy, confidence, mobility and awareness of constitutional rights. ➤ **Disability inclusion:** Although Article 21A uses general language, inclusive education for children with disabilities must be read with equality, dignity and disability rights law. Reasonable accommodation, accessible infrastructure and trained teachers are necessary to make education real for children with disabilities. ## **RTE Act and Human Dignity** ➤ **Dignity in access:** A child must not be forced to beg for admission, pay illegal charges, face discriminatory interviews, or remain out of school because of poverty. Dignity begins with equal entry. ➤ **Dignity in classroom:** The classroom must be free from corporal punishment, verbal abuse, caste insults, gender stereotypes, disability-based ridicule and economic humiliation. Section 17 of the RTE Act is therefore a dignity provision, not just a discipline rule. ➤ **Dignity in learning:** True education respects the child’s pace, language, background and individuality. A child-friendly curriculum under Section 29 recognises that fear and trauma are enemies of learning. ➤ **Dignity in completion:** The right is not only to enrol but to complete elementary education. Dropout due to poverty, discrimination or unsafe school conditions is a failure of the constitutional system. ## **Relationship with Other Constitutional Provisions** ➤ **Article 14:** Article 21A advances equal protection by making basic education available to all children aged six to fourteen. ➤ **Article 15(3):** Special provisions for children are constitutionally permitted, and the RTE Act is an example of child-centred affirmative constitutional action. ➤ **Article 19(1)(a):** Freedom of speech and expression becomes meaningful when a person has basic literacy, awareness and reasoning ability. ➤ **Article 19(1)(g):** Private educational institutions have freedom to establish and administer institutions, but this freedom may be reasonably regulated to protect children’s right to education. ➤ **Article 21:** Education is necessary for life with dignity, personality development and meaningful liberty. ➤ **Article 24:** Prohibition of child labour in hazardous employment supports the right to education because a child forced into labour is effectively denied schooling. ➤ **Article 30:** Minority institutions have special constitutional protection, and the Supreme Court has balanced this protection against RTE obligations in Society for Unaided Private Schools and Pramati. ➤ **Article 45:** Early childhood care and education below six years supports readiness for Article 21A education. ➤ **Article 51A(k):** Parents and guardians have a fundamental duty to provide educational opportunities to children aged six to fourteen, but this does not dilute the State’s primary obligation under Article 21A. ## **Important Memory Table** ConceptSimple MeaningConstitutional/Statutory Link**Free education**No child should be excluded due to fees or expensesArticle 21A, Section 3 RTE Act**Compulsory education**State must ensure admission, attendance and completionArticle 21A, Sections 6–9 RTE Act**Neighbourhood school**School must be reasonably accessibleRTE Act framework**25% inclusion**Private unaided non-minority schools must admit weaker/disadvantaged children at entry levelSection 12(1)(c) RTE Act**No capitation fee**No donation or illegal admission chargeRTE Act**No screening**No interview/test barrier for admissionRTE Act**No corporal punishment**No physical punishment or mental harassmentSection 17 RTE Act**Child-centred curriculum**Learning must be fear-free and dignity-basedSection 29 RTE Act## **Key Principles for Quick Revision** ➤ **State obligation principle:** Article 21A primarily creates a duty on the State to provide free and compulsory education. ➤ **Dignity principle:** Education is part of the right to live with dignity under Article 21. ➤ **Substantive equality principle:** The RTE Act goes beyond formal equality by protecting weaker sections and disadvantaged groups. ➤ **Access plus quality principle:** The right to education includes not only admission but also safe schools, trained teachers, proper infrastructure and child-friendly learning. ➤ **No exclusion principle:** Poverty, caste, gender, disability, lack of documents, migration or social disadvantage should not exclude a child from elementary education. ➤ **Balanced rights principle:** Article 21A must be balanced with the autonomy of private and minority educational institutions, as explained in T.M.A. Pai, Society for Unaided Private Schools and Pramati. ## **Conclusion** ➤ **Final understanding:** Article 21A transformed education from a policy goal into a fundamental right for children between six and fourteen years. The RTE Act, 2009 gives operational shape to this right by creating duties of governments, local authorities, schools, teachers and parents. Its provisions on free education, compulsory admission and completion, 25% inclusion, prohibition of screening, prohibition of capitation fee, child-friendly curriculum and protection from corporal punishment show that the right to education is not merely about entering a school building. ➤ **Constitutional essence:** The right to education is deeply connected with **equality** because it reduces social and economic exclusion. It is connected with **dignity** because education enables self-respect, personality development, informed choice and meaningful participation in democracy. In this sense, Article 21A is not an isolated provision; it is a bridge between liberty, equality, dignity and social justice. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Article 21 of the Constitution of India: Right to Life and Personal Liberty](https://lawfoyer.in/article-21-of-the-constitution-of-india/) **Published:** June 3, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun3202612_05_58A-725x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning and Text of Article 21 ➤ **Constitutional Text:** Article 21 of the Constitution of India provides: **“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”** This provision is short in words but extremely wide in meaning. It protects the most basic human values: life, liberty, dignity, autonomy, fairness, and human existence with meaning. ➤ **Available to All Persons:** Article 21 is available not only to citizens but to **every person**, including foreigners, prisoners, undertrial prisoners, accused persons, children, women, and persons in custody. Its language uses the word **“person”**, unlike some rights such as Article 19 which are available only to citizens. ➤ **Negative and Positive Duty:** Article 21 originally appeared to be a negative right, meaning the State must not take away life or personal liberty except by law. However, judicial interpretation has made it both **negative and positive**. The State must not only avoid illegal deprivation of life and liberty but must also take positive steps to protect health, environment, legal aid, dignity, privacy, shelter, and humane conditions of life. ➤ **Core Idea:** Article 21 does not merely protect physical survival. It protects a life worth living. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “life” under Article 21 includes living with **human dignity**, not merely animal existence. The modern meaning of Article 21 is therefore: **life + liberty + dignity + fair procedure + substantive human conditions**. ## Evolution of Article 21: From Narrow Meaning to Due Process ➤ **Initial Narrow View – A.K. Gopalan:** In **A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27**, the Supreme Court took a narrow view of Article 21. The Court treated Articles 14, 19, and 21 as separate compartments and held that if there was a validly enacted law, deprivation of liberty according to that law would satisfy Article 21. The focus was mainly on the existence of a law, not on whether the law was fair, reasonable, or just. ➤ **Transformative Shift – Maneka Gandhi:** The real constitutional revolution came in **Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248**. The petitioner’s passport was impounded under the Passport Act without giving proper reasons. The issue was whether such deprivation of personal liberty satisfied Article 21. The Supreme Court held that the “procedure established by law” must be **fair, just and reasonable**, and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. This case connected Articles 14, 19, and 21 into a constitutional triangle, meaning a law affecting personal liberty must satisfy equality, reasonableness, and fairness together. ➤ **Indian Due Process Doctrine:** Though the phrase “due process of law” is not expressly used in Article 21, **Maneka Gandhi** introduced a due process-like standard into Indian constitutional law. It means that a person cannot be deprived of life or liberty merely because a law exists. The law and the procedure under it must be reasonable, non-arbitrary, fair, and consistent with constitutional values. ➤ **Golden Triangle:** After **Maneka Gandhi**, Article 21 cannot be read in isolation. Any State action affecting life or liberty must also withstand the tests of **Article 14** and **Article 19**, wherever applicable. Thus, a law may be invalid if it is arbitrary under Article 14, unreasonable under Article 19, or unfair under Article 21. ## Scope of “Life” under Article 21 ➤ **Life Beyond Survival:** The word **“life”** in Article 21 means more than breathing, eating, or physical existence. It includes the ability to live with dignity, minimum necessities, health, education, movement, expression of personality, privacy, and security. ➤ **Dignified Human Existence:** In **Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608**, the Supreme Court held that the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it, including basic necessities such as adequate nutrition, clothing, shelter, facilities for reading and writing, and freedom to mix with fellow human beings. The case concerned the rights of a detenue and expanded Article 21 into a dignity-based guarantee. ➤ **Dignity as Foundation:** Human dignity is the central thread running through Article 21. Privacy, livelihood, shelter, health, prisoners’ rights, and procedural fairness are all connected because they protect the dignity of the individual. ## Scope of “Personal Liberty” under Article 21 ➤ **Wide Meaning:** The expression **“personal liberty”** has been interpreted broadly. It includes freedom from unlawful arrest, detention, surveillance, torture, forced movement restrictions, arbitrary passport impounding, custodial violence, and unfair criminal process. ➤ **Not Limited to Physical Freedom:** Personal liberty is not confined to bodily movement. It includes decisional autonomy, bodily integrity, mental privacy, personal choices, intimate relations, and control over one’s own life. ➤ **Right to Travel Abroad:** In **Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248**, the Court recognised that the right to travel abroad forms part of personal liberty under Article 21. Therefore, executive action affecting passport or travel liberty must satisfy fairness and reasonableness. ## Right to Privacy under Article 21 ➤ **Privacy as Fundamental Right:** In **Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1**, a nine-judge bench unanimously held that the right to privacy is a fundamental right protected under Articles 14, 19, and 21. The Court held that privacy is intrinsic to life, liberty, dignity, and autonomy. It also clarified that earlier judgments denying privacy as a fundamental right were incorrect. ➤ **Facts and Issue:** The case arose in the context of Aadhaar and the larger question whether Indians have a constitutionally protected right to privacy. The legal issue was whether privacy is an independent fundamental right under the Constitution. ➤ **Ratio Decidendi:** The Court held that privacy includes bodily privacy, informational privacy, decisional autonomy, family life, marriage, procreation, sexual orientation, and personal identity. Privacy is not an elitist idea; it belongs to every individual because every person has dignity. ➤ **Three-Fold Test:** State interference with privacy must satisfy: **legality**, meaning existence of law; **legitimate State aim**, meaning a constitutionally valid purpose; and **proportionality**, meaning rational connection between means and object with minimum infringement. The judgment expressly recognised informational privacy and warned that threats to privacy may come from both State and non-State actors. ➤ **Aadhaar Follow-up:** In **K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2019) 1 SCC 1**, the Supreme Court upheld the Aadhaar scheme in part but struck down or limited certain uses, especially where private bodies sought Aadhaar authentication without sufficient safeguards. The case applied the privacy framework to State welfare, identity, data protection, and proportionality concerns. ## Right to Dignity under Article 21 ➤ **Dignity as Constitutional Soul:** Dignity is not a separate decorative idea. It is the heart of Article 21. A person may be physically alive but still constitutionally degraded if denied privacy, livelihood, shelter, medical care, fair trial, or humane treatment. ➤ **Right to Die with Dignity:** In **Common Cause v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 1**, the Supreme Court recognised passive euthanasia and advance directives under strict safeguards. The Court held that the right to life includes the right to live with dignity and, in limited circumstances, the right to die with dignity where a person is terminally ill or in a persistent vegetative state. ➤ **Bodily Integrity:** Dignity also protects bodily autonomy. Forced medical procedures, custodial torture, degrading treatment, and denial of basic bodily needs may violate Article 21. ## Right to Livelihood under Article 21 ➤ **Livelihood as Part of Life:** In **Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545**, pavement dwellers challenged their eviction from public places in Bombay. The issue was whether eviction without alternative arrangements affected their right to life. The Supreme Court held that the right to livelihood is part of the right to life because no person can live without the means of living. ➤ **Facts and Holding:** The petitioners were pavement and slum dwellers who claimed that eviction would deprive them of employment and survival. The Court held that although no person has a right to encroach on public property, eviction affecting livelihood must follow fair procedure. The State cannot act as if poverty removes constitutional protection. ➤ **Key Principle:** Livelihood is protected not because every job is guaranteed, but because arbitrary State action destroying means of survival directly affects life and dignity. ➤ **Practical Illustration:** If a municipal authority removes street vendors or pavement dwellers without notice, hearing, rehabilitation policy, or legal procedure, Article 21 may be violated because the action affects survival, shelter, and dignity. ## Right to Shelter under Article 21 ➤ **Shelter as More Than Roof:** In **Chameli Singh v. State of U.P., (1996) 2 SCC 549**, the Supreme Court held that the right to shelter is included in Article 21. Shelter does not merely mean a roof over the head. It includes adequate living space, safe structure, clean surroundings, light, air, water, electricity, sanitation, and civic facilities necessary for dignified life. ➤ **Facts and Issue:** The case involved land acquisition for providing houses to Scheduled Castes. The issue was whether such acquisition served a public purpose and how shelter relates to dignity. The Court held that housing for weaker sections advances constitutional goals of social justice. ➤ **Ratio Decidendi:** Article 21, read with the Preamble and Directive Principles, recognises shelter as a necessary condition of meaningful life. The Court connected shelter with dignity, equality, residence, and social justice. ➤ **Limit:** Article 21 does not create an absolute right to occupy any public or private land unlawfully. But it requires the State to act through lawful, humane, fair, and non-arbitrary procedure, especially while evicting vulnerable persons. ## Right to Health and Medical Care under Article 21 ➤ **Health as Essential to Life:** Without health, life becomes meaningless. Therefore, the right to life includes the right to medical care, emergency treatment, public health, and humane medical facilities. ➤ **Emergency Medical Treatment:** In **Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State of West Bengal, (1996) 4 SCC 37**, an injured agricultural labourer was denied admission by several government hospitals due to lack of facilities. The Supreme Court held that failure of a government hospital to provide timely medical treatment to a person in need violates Article 21. ➤ **Ratio Decidendi:** Article 21 imposes an obligation on the State to preserve life. Government hospitals and medical officers cannot deny emergency treatment merely because of lack of beds or facilities. Financial constraints cannot completely defeat constitutional obligations where life is at stake. ➤ **Medical Aid to Accident Victims:** In **Pt. Parmanand Katara v. Union of India, (1989) 4 SCC 286**, the Supreme Court held that every doctor, whether in a government or private hospital, has a professional obligation to provide immediate medical aid to preserve life. Legal formalities such as police procedure must not delay emergency treatment. ➤ **Public Health Duty:** Article 21 therefore includes both individual medical care and broader public health obligations such as hospitals, emergency response, sanitation, disease control, and access to essential treatment. ## Right to Clean Environment under Article 21 ➤ **Environment and Life:** A polluted environment directly affects health, dignity, and survival. Therefore, the right to life includes the right to live in a clean, healthy, and pollution-free environment. ➤ **Subhash Kumar Principle:** In **Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, (1991) 1 SCC 598**, the Supreme Court held that the right to life includes the right to enjoyment of pollution-free water and air for full enjoyment of life. Environmental harm can therefore become a constitutional issue under Article 21. ➤ **M.C. Mehta Environmental Jurisprudence:** In the **M.C. Mehta** line of cases, the Supreme Court developed principles such as absolute liability, sustainable development, precautionary principle, polluter pays principle, and public trust doctrine. These principles protect life and health against industrial hazards and environmental degradation. ➤ **Oleum Gas Leak Case:** In **M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 395**, arising from the oleum gas leak, the Supreme Court evolved the principle of **absolute liability** for hazardous industries. The Court held that enterprises engaged in dangerous activities owe an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community. ➤ **Vellore Citizens Principle:** In **Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India, (1996) 5 SCC 647**, the Court accepted sustainable development, precautionary principle, and polluter pays principle as part of Indian environmental law. ➤ **Practical Meaning:** Article 21 protects citizens against toxic air, contaminated water, unchecked industrial pollution, environmental destruction, hazardous waste, and State inaction that endangers health and life. ## Right to Speedy Trial under Article 21 ➤ **Speedy Trial as Fair Procedure:** Delay in criminal trial can itself become punishment. A person who remains undertrial for years suffers loss of liberty, livelihood, reputation, family life, and dignity. Therefore, speedy trial is part of Article 21. ➤ **Hussainara Khatoon:** In **Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81**, the Supreme Court dealt with undertrial prisoners languishing in jail for long periods, sometimes longer than the maximum punishment for the alleged offence. The Court held that speedy trial is an essential ingredient of reasonable, fair, and just procedure under Article 21. ➤ **A.R. Antulay Guidelines:** In **Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225**, the Supreme Court held that the right to speedy trial flows from Article 21 and covers all stages of criminal proceedings: investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision, and retrial. The Court refused to fix a rigid time limit but laid down that courts must consider the nature of offence, length of delay, reasons for delay, conduct of parties, prejudice to accused, and systemic circumstances. ➤ **Effect of Violation:** If delay violates Article 21, the court may quash proceedings, reduce sentence, grant bail, or issue directions for expeditious disposal depending on facts. ## Right to Free Legal Aid under Article 21 ➤ **Legal Aid as Access to Justice:** A trial is not fair if the accused is too poor to engage a lawyer. Free legal aid is therefore not charity; it is a constitutional requirement of fair procedure. ➤ **Article 39A Connection:** Article 39A of the Constitution directs the State to provide free legal aid to ensure that justice is not denied due to economic or other disabilities. Courts have read this Directive Principle into Article 21. ➤ **Khatri Case:** In **Khatri (II) v. State of Bihar, (1981) 1 SCC 627**, arising from the Bhagalpur blinding incidents, the Supreme Court held that the State is under a constitutional obligation to provide free legal aid to an indigent accused, and this obligation begins when the accused is first produced before the magistrate, not merely at trial. ➤ **Suk Das Case:** In **Suk Das v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh, (1986) 2 SCC 401**, the Supreme Court held that conviction of an accused without informing him of his right to free legal aid may violate Article 21. The Court emphasised that legal aid must be real and effective, not merely formal. ➤ **Fair Trial Principle:** Legal aid protects equality before law, fair trial, and personal liberty. A poor accused should not suffer imprisonment merely because he could not afford counsel. ## Prisoners’ Rights under Article 21 ➤ **Prison Walls Do Not End Fundamental Rights:** A prisoner does not become a rightless person. Conviction permits lawful restriction of liberty, but it does not destroy dignity, bodily integrity, health, or protection against torture. ➤ **Sunil Batra Principle:** In **Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, (1978) 4 SCC 494** and **Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, (1980) 3 SCC 488**, the Supreme Court strongly protected prisoners against solitary confinement, torture, and cruel prison practices. The Court held that imprisonment does not mean surrender of all fundamental rights. ➤ **Charles Sobhraj Case:** In **Charles Sobhraj v. Superintendent, Central Jail, (1978) 4 SCC 104**, the Supreme Court held that prison restrictions must be reasonable and must have legal authority. Arbitrary or excessive restrictions violate Article 21. ➤ **Custodial Violence:** In **D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416**, the Supreme Court laid down detailed guidelines against custodial violence and illegal arrest, including arrest memo, information to relatives, medical examination, and production before magistrate. These guidelines protect life and personal liberty during arrest and detention. ➤ **Rights of Undertrials:** Undertrial prisoners are presumed innocent until conviction. Their long detention, denial of bail, lack of legal aid, overcrowding, and poor prison conditions raise serious Article 21 concerns. ➤ **Medical Care in Prison:** Prison authorities have a duty to protect prisoners’ health. Denial of necessary medical treatment to prisoners may violate Article 21 because the State has complete control over persons in custody. ## Procedural Fairness under Article 21 ➤ **Procedure Must Be Fair:** After **Maneka Gandhi**, the word “procedure” in Article 21 does not mean any procedure. It means a procedure that is fair, just, reasonable, non-arbitrary, and consistent with natural justice. ➤ **Natural Justice:** Article 21 generally supports principles such as notice, opportunity of hearing, reasoned decision, absence of bias, legal representation where necessary, and proportionality of State action. ➤ **Arrest and Detention:** Procedural fairness requires that arrest must follow law, grounds of arrest must be communicated, family or friend must be informed, accused must be produced before a magistrate within prescribed time, and coercive police power must not be misused. ➤ **Preventive Detention:** Even though preventive detention is constitutionally permitted under Articles 21 and 22, it is exceptional. Detention laws must be strictly followed because preventive detention affects liberty without regular criminal trial. ➤ **Fair Trial:** A fair trial includes independent court, impartial judge, presumption of innocence, legal aid, disclosure of evidence, cross-examination, reasoned judgment, speedy process, and protection against torture or compelled confession. ## Important Article 21 Rights at a Glance Aspect of Article 21Leading CaseCore Principle**Fair, just and reasonable procedure****Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248**Procedure depriving liberty must not be arbitrary, oppressive, or unfair.**Human dignity****Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, UT of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608**Life includes dignity and basic necessities.**Privacy****K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1**Privacy is a fundamental right intrinsic to dignity and liberty.**Livelihood****Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545**Right to livelihood is part of right to life.**Shelter****Chameli Singh v. State of U.P., (1996) 2 SCC 549**Shelter is necessary for meaningful and dignified life.**Health****Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State of W.B., (1996) 4 SCC 37**Denial of emergency medical treatment violates Article 21.**Clean environment****Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, (1991) 1 SCC 598**Pollution-free water and air are part of right to life.**Speedy trial****Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81**Speedy trial is part of fair procedure under Article 21.**Legal aid****Khatri (II) v. State of Bihar, (1981) 1 SCC 627**Free legal aid is essential for fair trial.**Prisoners’ rights****Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, (1978) 4 SCC 494**Prisoners retain Article 21 rights against torture and cruelty.## Relationship of Article 21 with Directive Principles ➤ **DPSPs as Interpretive Tools:** Many Article 21 rights have been developed by reading Fundamental Rights with Directive Principles of State Policy. For example, health is connected with Articles 39, 41, 42 and 47; legal aid is connected with Article 39A; environment is connected with Article 48A; and dignity is connected with social justice provisions. ➤ **Fundamental Rights + DPSPs:** The Supreme Court has used DPSPs not to override Fundamental Rights, but to give Article 21 a meaningful and socially responsive content. ➤ **Socio-Economic Expansion:** Article 21 has converted several socio-economic needs into enforceable constitutional interests, especially where State inaction directly threatens life, dignity, or liberty. ## Limitations of Article 21 ➤ **Not Absolute:** Article 21 is not an absolute right. A person may be deprived of life or liberty, but only by a valid law and fair procedure. Arrest, detention, imprisonment, acquisition, eviction, and regulation may be constitutionally valid if they satisfy legality, fairness, reasonableness, proportionality, and non-arbitrariness. ➤ **Balancing with Public Interest:** Rights under Article 21 may be balanced against public order, national security, public health, morality, rights of others, and lawful regulatory objectives. ➤ **No Unlimited Positive Claim:** Article 21 does not mean that every desirable facility becomes immediately enforceable against the State in unlimited form. However, minimum core obligations such as emergency medical care, legal aid, fair trial, protection from torture, and humane treatment are strongly protected. ## Memory Aid for Article 21 ➤ **“LIFE PULSE” Formula:** LetterMeaning**L****Livelihood****I****Integrity and dignity****F****Fair procedure****E****Environment and emergency health care****P****Privacy and prisoners’ rights****U****Undertrial protection and speedy trial****L****Legal aid****S****Shelter****E****Equality-linked due process through Articles 14, 19 and 21**## Conclusion ➤ **Constitutional Importance:** Article 21 is the most dynamic provision of the Indian Constitution. Its journey from **A.K. Gopalan** to **Maneka Gandhi** and then to **Puttaswamy** shows the transformation of Indian constitutional law from a narrow textual approach to a dignity-centred rights approach. ➤ **Modern Meaning:** Article 21 today protects not only physical life and freedom from unlawful detention but also privacy, dignity, livelihood, shelter, health, clean environment, speedy trial, legal aid, prisoners’ rights, and procedural fairness. ➤ **Final Principle:** The deepest message of Article 21 is that the Constitution does not protect mere existence. It protects **meaningful human life with liberty, dignity, fairness, and justice**. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Article 20 of the Constitution of India: Protection in Respect of Conviction for Offences, Ex Post Facto Laws, Double Jeopardy and Self-Incrimination](https://lawfoyer.in/article-20-of-the-constitution-of-india/) **Published:** June 2, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun2202607_16_38P-725x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning and Constitutional Importance of Article 20 • **Core idea:** Article 20 of the Constitution of India protects a person against arbitrary, retrospective, repeated and compelled criminal liability. It is one of the most important constitutional safeguards in Indian criminal jurisprudence because it controls the power of the legislature, prosecution, police and courts in criminal matters. • **Textual protection:** Article 20 contains three independent but connected safeguards: **Article 20(1)** protects against retrospective criminal conviction and greater retrospective punishment; **Article 20(2)** protects against being prosecuted and punished more than once for the same offence; and **Article 20(3)** protects an accused from being compelled to be a witness against himself. The official constitutional text states that no person shall be convicted except for violation of a law in force at the time of the act, no person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once, and no accused shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. • **Universal protection:** Article 20 uses the expression **“no person”**, not “no citizen”. Therefore, its protection is available to citizens, non-citizens, foreigners and even juristic persons like companies wherever the nature of the protection can apply. • **Emergency-proof safeguard:** Article 20 has a special constitutional status because even during a Proclamation of Emergency, the right to move court for enforcement of rights under Articles 20 and 21 cannot be suspended under Article 359. This means that the minimum fairness guaranteed by Article 20 remains enforceable even in extraordinary constitutional situations. ## Structure of Article 20 at a Glance ClauseProtectionMain principleAgainst whom it operatesArticle 20(1)No ex post facto criminal conviction or greater punishmentCriminal law cannot punish retrospectivelyLegislature and courtsArticle 20(2)No prosecution and punishment twice for same offenceDouble jeopardy / autrefois convictState prosecution machineryArticle 20(3)No compelled self-incriminationRight to silence and mental privacyPolice, investigators, prosecution and courts## Article 20(1): Protection Against Ex Post Facto Criminal Laws • **Meaning of ex post facto law:** An **ex post facto criminal law** is a law which makes an act criminal after it was done, or increases the punishment after the offence was committed. Article 20(1) prohibits such retrospective criminal punishment. A person can be convicted only if the act was an offence under a **law in force** at the time of commission. • **Two-fold protection:** Article 20(1) gives two protections. First, a person cannot be convicted for an act which was not an offence when it was committed. Second, even if the act was an offence, the person cannot be subjected to a punishment greater than the punishment which existed at the time of commission. • **Illustration:** If an act was not a crime on 1 January 2024, and Parliament makes it a crime on 1 July 2024, a person who committed that act in March 2024 cannot be convicted under the later law. Similarly, if the punishment for an offence was imprisonment up to three years when the act was committed, and later the punishment is increased to seven years, the accused cannot be given the enhanced punishment for the earlier act. • **Criminal law focus:** Article 20(1) is concerned with **conviction and sentence for offences**. It does not generally prohibit retrospective civil laws, tax laws, procedural changes or laws relating to forum, evidence or investigation, unless they create a new criminal offence or impose a greater criminal penalty. • **Prospective punishment rule:** In **Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 394 / 1953 SCR 1188**, the Supreme Court considered the application of Article 20(1) in relation to criminal liability under a law not properly in force at the relevant time. The important ratio is that a person cannot be convicted for an act unless that act was an offence under a valid law in force when it was committed. This case is one of the earliest Constitution Bench explanations of the phrase **“law in force”** in Article 20(1). • **No retrospective creation of offence:** In **Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1953 SC 404 / 1954 SCR 30**, the Supreme Court dealt with constitutional objections including Article 20(1). The case is important because it affirms the principle that penal provisions cannot retrospectively create criminal guilt, although procedural and jurisdictional arrangements may operate differently depending on the nature of the law. • **Beneficial retrospective law permitted:** Article 20(1) prohibits only retrospective criminal laws that harm the accused. It does not prohibit retrospective benefit. In **Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 444**, the Supreme Court applied the beneficial provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 to a young offender, emphasizing the reformative object of criminal law. The principle is that if a later law reduces punishment, provides probation or gives a beneficial treatment, Article 20(1) does not prevent the accused from receiving that benefit. • **Lesser punishment principle:** The same logic applies where a later law reduces punishment. A harsher law cannot operate retrospectively, but a milder criminal law may be applied for the benefit of the accused, because Article 20(1) is a shield against oppression, not a weapon to deny leniency. • **Difference between offence and procedure:** **Substantive criminal law** defines offences and punishments; **procedural criminal law** regulates investigation, trial, appeal and evidence. Article 20(1) mainly restricts retrospective substantive penal liability. A change in procedure may apply to pending cases, provided it does not create new criminality or increase punishment. • **Penalty versus preventive measure:** The word **“penalty”** in Article 20(1) means punishment for an offence. Preventive detention, regulatory forfeiture, departmental consequences or civil recovery may not always amount to “penalty” under Article 20(1), though they may still be tested under Articles 14, 19, 21 and relevant statutory safeguards. ## Article 20(2): Protection Against Double Jeopardy • **Meaning of double jeopardy:** Article 20(2) says that no person shall be **prosecuted and punished** for the same offence more than once. This embodies the common law principle of **autrefois convict**, meaning that a person already convicted for an offence should not again be put in peril for the same offence. • **Important words:** The words **“prosecuted and punished”** are crucial. Article 20(2) does not apply merely because a person faced some inquiry, departmental action or confiscation. It applies when there has been both prosecution and punishment for the same offence. • **Same offence, not merely same facts:** Article 20(2) protects against a second prosecution and punishment for the **same offence**. If the same act creates two distinct offences with different ingredients, Article 20(2) may not apply. The court examines whether the offences are legally identical, not merely whether the facts overlap. • **Maqbool Hussain principle:** In **Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay, AIR 1953 SC 325**, the accused had imported gold, which was confiscated by customs authorities, and was later prosecuted under the foreign exchange law. The Supreme Court held that proceedings before customs authorities were not prosecution before a court or judicial tribunal resulting in punishment for an offence in the constitutional sense. Therefore, Article 20(2) did not bar the later criminal prosecution. The case established that administrative confiscation is not always “prosecution and punishment” under Article 20(2). • **Departmental action and criminal prosecution:** In **S.A. Venkataraman v. Union of India, AIR 1954 SC 375**, the Supreme Court held that departmental proceedings resulting in dismissal from service did not amount to prosecution and punishment for an offence. Therefore, subsequent criminal prosecution was not barred by Article 20(2). The principle is that service discipline and criminal punishment are different unless the earlier proceeding was truly criminal in nature. • **Thomas Dana test:** In **Thomas Dana v. State of Punjab, AIR 1959 SC 375**, the Supreme Court clarified that Article 20(2) requires a previous prosecution and punishment for the same offence before a competent court or tribunal. The decision is important because it distinguishes between penalties imposed in non-criminal proceedings and criminal prosecution for an offence. • **Constitutional and statutory double jeopardy:** Article 20(2) is narrower than the statutory rule under criminal procedure. The statutory protection, earlier found in **Section 300 CrPC** and now reflected in the corresponding scheme of the **Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023**, deals with situations where a person once convicted or acquitted is not to be tried again for the same offence or on the same facts in certain circumstances. Article 20(2), however, expressly uses the phrase **“prosecuted and punished”**, so mere acquittal without punishment does not directly fit its wording, though statutory protection may still apply. • **Acquittal versus conviction:** Article 20(2) speaks of prosecution and punishment, so its strict constitutional protection is mainly triggered by prior conviction and punishment. However, where a person has been acquitted or convicted by a competent court, the broader criminal law principle against repeated trials may arise through statutory provisions and general principles of finality. • **Illustration:** If a person is convicted and punished for theft of the same property, the State cannot again prosecute and punish him for the very same offence of theft. But if the same transaction also involved a separate offence, such as causing grievous hurt with distinct ingredients, the court must examine whether the second charge is genuinely different. ## Article 20(3): Protection Against Self-Incrimination • **Meaning of self-incrimination:** Article 20(3) provides that no person accused of an offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. It protects the accused from being forced to give testimonial evidence that may expose him to criminal guilt. • **Three essential ingredients:** Article 20(3) applies when three conditions exist: the person must be **accused of an offence**; there must be **compulsion**; and the compulsion must be to give **testimonial evidence against himself**. • **Right to silence:** Article 20(3) is the constitutional foundation of the right to silence in criminal investigation and trial. It supports the deeper principle that the prosecution must prove guilt independently and cannot build its case by forcing the accused to condemn himself. • **Accused of an offence:** The protection is clearly available to a person formally accused. Indian case law has also recognised that the protection may become relevant during investigation where answers are likely to expose the person to criminal accusation. • **Compulsion requirement:** Compulsion may be physical, mental, legal or practical. Threat, coercion, pressure, custodial intimidation, forced questioning or legal penalty for refusing self-incriminating answers may amount to compulsion. • **Testimonial compulsion:** The most important distinction is between **testimonial evidence** and **physical or identifying evidence**. Testimonial evidence involves communication based on personal knowledge, such as oral answers, written statements or disclosures. Physical evidence includes fingerprints, handwriting samples, signatures, blood samples or bodily measurements, depending on context and statutory safeguards. • **M.P. Sharma position:** In **M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, AIR 1954 SC 300**, the Supreme Court considered whether search and seizure of documents violated Article 20(3). The Court held that search and seizure under lawful authority is not the same as compelled production by the accused and therefore does not by itself violate Article 20(3). The case is important for the distinction between compulsory testimony and lawful collection of material evidence. • **Kathi Kalu Oghad doctrine:** In **State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad, AIR 1961 SC 1808 / \[1961\] 2 SCR 125**, an eleven-judge Bench held that compelling an accused to give specimen handwriting, signatures, fingerprints, palm impressions or foot impressions for comparison does not violate Article 20(3), because such evidence is not testimonial in the strict sense. The Court also clarified that “to be a witness” is connected with furnishing evidence based on personal knowledge, not merely being the source of physical identification. • **Nandini Satpathy and police interrogation:** In **Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani, AIR 1978 SC 1025 / (1978) 2 SCC 424**, the former Chief Minister of Odisha was summoned for police questioning and refused to answer certain questions. The Supreme Court held that the right against self-incrimination includes the right to remain silent when answers have a reasonable tendency to expose the person to criminal charge. The Court linked Article 20(3) with fair interrogation and held that compelled answers during police investigation are constitutionally controlled. • **Selvi and modern scientific techniques:** In **Selvi v. State of Karnataka, (2010) 7 SCC 263**, the Supreme Court held that involuntary administration of narco-analysis, polygraph examination and Brain Electrical Activation Profile tests violates Article 20(3) and Article 21. The Court reasoned that these techniques invade mental privacy, extract personal knowledge and create testimonial compulsion when administered without consent. Voluntary use may be regulated, but any resulting statement must still satisfy rules of admissibility and constitutional fairness. • **Mental privacy:** Selvi expanded the understanding of Article 20(3) beyond physical coercion. It recognised that the Constitution protects the accused’s mental autonomy. The State cannot forcibly enter the mind of a person to obtain incriminating information. • **Passwords, devices and digital evidence:** In modern investigations, Article 20(3) becomes important in relation to mobile phones, laptops, encrypted devices and passwords. A fingerprint or face scan may be treated differently from revealing a memorised password because a memorised password requires disclosure of personal knowledge. Indian courts continue to apply the distinction between physical identification and testimonial communication, but digital evidence has made this distinction more complex. • **DNA, fingerprints and bodily samples:** Collection of physical samples generally does not automatically violate Article 20(3) because such evidence is often considered identification evidence rather than testimony. However, collection must still satisfy statutory authority, proportionality, dignity, privacy and Article 21 standards. • **Confession and discovery:** Article 20(3) also interacts with evidence law. Confessions caused by inducement, threat or promise are excluded under evidence principles. Discovery statements under **Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872**, now substantially reflected in the corresponding provisions of the **Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023**, are admissible only to the limited extent that they distinctly relate to facts discovered, and they must not be the result of unconstitutional compulsion. ## Relationship Between Article 20 and Article 21 • **Fair trial connection:** Article 20 protects specific criminal safeguards, while Article 21 protects life and personal liberty through fair, just and reasonable procedure. Together, they form the constitutional foundation of due process in Indian criminal law. • **Presumption of innocence:** Article 20 does not expressly use the phrase “presumption of innocence”, but its safeguards support that principle. The State must prove guilt according to law and cannot use retrospective punishment, repeated prosecution or forced self-incrimination to secure conviction. • **Human dignity:** Article 20(3), especially after Nandini Satpathy and Selvi, treats the accused as a rights-bearing person, not merely an object of investigation. Criminal investigation must respect dignity, bodily integrity and mental privacy. ## Important Doctrinal Differences ConceptMeaningArticle 20 effectRetrospective criminalisationMaking an earlier innocent act criminal laterProhibitedRetrospective enhanced punishmentIncreasing punishment after offenceProhibitedRetrospective beneficial lawReducing punishment or giving probationPermittedAdministrative penaltyConfiscation, departmental action, regulatory consequenceUsually not Article 20(2) punishmentSame offenceSame legal ingredientsSecond prosecution barred if already prosecuted and punishedSame actSame factual transaction but different offencesNot always barredPhysical evidenceFingerprints, signatures, samplesUsually outside Article 20(3)Testimonial evidenceForced answers, statements, mental disclosuresProtected under Article 20(3)## Constitutional Criminal Safeguards Under Article 20 • **Legality principle:** There can be no crime and no punishment without law. Article 20(1) constitutionalises the principle **nullum crimen sine lege**, meaning no offence without law. • **Certainty principle:** Criminal law must give people fair notice of what conduct is prohibited. A person cannot obey a law that did not exist when he acted. • **Finality principle:** Article 20(2) prevents the State from repeatedly prosecuting and punishing a person for the same offence. This preserves finality in criminal justice and prevents harassment. • **Anti-coercion principle:** Article 20(3) prevents the State from using the body or mind of the accused as the main source of proof against him through compulsion. • **Fair investigation principle:** Police interrogation is constitutionally limited. The State may investigate, search, seize and collect evidence according to law, but it cannot force self-condemning testimony. • **Balance between crime control and liberty:** Article 20 does not prevent legitimate criminal prosecution. It only ensures that prosecution occurs within constitutional boundaries. ## Common Misconceptions About Article 20 • **Misconception: Article 20(1) bans all retrospective laws.** **Correct position:** It bans retrospective criminal conviction and greater retrospective punishment. Retrospective civil laws or procedural changes may be valid. • **Misconception: Any second proceeding is double jeopardy.** **Correct position:** Article 20(2) applies only when the person has already been prosecuted and punished for the same offence. Departmental proceedings, confiscation or regulatory action do not automatically bar criminal prosecution. • **Misconception: An accused can refuse all evidence collection.** **Correct position:** Article 20(3) protects against compelled testimonial self-incrimination. It does not generally bar lawful collection of fingerprints, signatures, handwriting samples or other physical evidence. • **Misconception: Right to silence means police cannot question an accused.** **Correct position:** Police may question according to law, but the accused cannot be compelled to answer questions that have a tendency to incriminate him. ## Conclusion • **Article 20 as a constitutional shield:** Article 20 is a compact but powerful provision that protects the individual against three major abuses of criminal power: retrospective punishment, repeated punishment and compelled self-incrimination. • **Article 20(1) summary:** No one can be punished for an act that was not an offence when done, and no one can receive a higher punishment introduced after the offence. Beneficial later laws may operate in favour of the accused. • **Article 20(2) summary:** No one can be prosecuted and punished more than once for the same offence. The protection is narrow but strong, and it applies when the previous proceeding was truly criminal and resulted in punishment. • **Article 20(3) summary:** No accused can be forced to become a witness against himself. The right protects silence, mental privacy and freedom from coercive testimonial extraction, while still allowing lawful collection of non-testimonial physical evidence. • **Living constitutional value:** Article 20 remains highly relevant in modern criminal law, especially with digital devices, forensic science, custodial interrogation, economic offences and special statutes. Its enduring purpose is to ensure that even when the State prosecutes crime, it must do so through law, fairness and constitutional morality. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Article 19 of Indian Constitution: Six Freedoms, Scope, Reasonable Restrictions and Landmark Supreme Court Cases](https://lawfoyer.in/article-19-of-indian-constitution/) **Published:** June 2, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun2202607_09_55P-725x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning and Constitutional Position of Article 19 ❖ **Core idea of Article 19:** Article 19 is one of the most important provisions in Part III of the Constitution of India because it protects the basic civil freedoms of citizens. It gives citizens the freedom to speak, assemble, associate, move, reside, and practise any profession or carry on any occupation, trade or business. Article 19(1) originally contained seven freedoms, but the right “to acquire, hold and dispose of property” under Article 19(1)(f) was deleted by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978. Therefore, Article 19 presently protects **six freedoms**. The text of Article 19(1) recognises: speech and expression, peaceful assembly without arms, association or unions or co-operative societies, movement throughout India, residence and settlement in any part of India, and profession/occupation/trade/business. ❖ **Available only to citizens:** Article 19 freedoms are available only to **citizens of India**, unlike Articles 14 and 21, which are available to “persons”. Therefore, a foreign national cannot claim Article 19 rights, though he may claim protection under other constitutional provisions where applicable. ❖ **Not absolute freedoms:** Article 19 does not create uncontrolled liberty. Each freedom is subject to constitutionally permitted **reasonable restrictions** under Articles 19(2) to 19(6). This means the State can regulate these freedoms, but only by law, and only on the grounds specifically mentioned in the Constitution. Restrictions cannot be arbitrary, excessive, vague, disproportionate or unrelated to the constitutional ground. ❖ **Freedom and social control:** Article 19 represents a balance between individual liberty and social order. The Constitution protects personal freedom, but also recognises that liberty must operate in a society where sovereignty, security, public order, morality, rights of others and general public interest are also important. ## Six Freedoms under Article 19 at a Glance FreedomConstitutional ClauseRestriction ClauseMain Grounds of RestrictionFreedom of speech and expressionArticle 19(1)(a)Article 19(2)Sovereignty and integrity of India, security of State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, contempt of court, defamation, incitement to offenceFreedom of peaceful assembly without armsArticle 19(1)(b)Article 19(3)Sovereignty and integrity of India, public orderFreedom to form associations, unions or co-operative societiesArticle 19(1)(c)Article 19(4)Sovereignty and integrity of India, public order, moralityFreedom of movement throughout IndiaArticle 19(1)(d)Article 19(5)Interests of general public, protection of interests of Scheduled TribesFreedom to reside and settle in any part of IndiaArticle 19(1)(e)Article 19(5)Interests of general public, protection of interests of Scheduled TribesFreedom of profession, occupation, trade or businessArticle 19(1)(g)Article 19(6)Interests of general public, professional/technical qualifications, State monopoly## Reasonable Restrictions under Article 19 ❖ **Meaning of reasonable restriction:** A restriction is reasonable when it has a rational connection with the object sought to be achieved, is not excessive, is not arbitrary, and does not destroy the freedom itself. The word “reasonable” gives courts the power to review whether the restriction imposed by the State is constitutionally valid. Article 19(2) was shaped by constitutional amendments and judicial interpretation to ensure that the State’s power to restrict free speech remains connected with specific constitutional grounds. ❖ **Restriction must be by law:** The State cannot curtail Article 19 freedoms merely through executive convenience or informal pressure. There must be legal authority. The law must also fall within the exact grounds mentioned in Articles 19(2) to 19(6). For example, speech cannot be restricted merely because it is unpopular; it must fall within one of the grounds in Article 19(2). ❖ **Doctrine of proportionality:** Modern Article 19 analysis uses proportionality. The State must show that the restriction pursues a legitimate aim, has a rational connection with that aim, is necessary in the sense that less restrictive alternatives are inadequate, and maintains a proper balance between individual freedom and public interest. In **Modern Dental College and Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2016) 7 SCC 353**, the Supreme Court applied proportionality principles in the context of regulation of private educational institutions and explained that regulatory restrictions must be balanced and not excessive. ## Freedom of Speech and Expression under Article 19(1)(a) ❖ **Meaning and importance:** Article 19(1)(a) protects the right to express one’s thoughts, opinions, beliefs, ideas and information through words, writing, print, electronic media, art, symbols, silence, internet and other forms of communication. Freedom of speech is the foundation of democracy because people can criticise the government, discuss public issues, participate in political debate, receive information and form opinions. ❖ **Includes freedom of press:** Although “freedom of press” is not separately written in Article 19, the Supreme Court has held that press freedom is part of Article 19(1)(a). In **Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124**, the Supreme Court struck down a ban on the circulation of a journal and held that freedom of circulation is essential for political discussion. In **Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129**, the Court invalidated pre-censorship imposed on a newspaper and treated prior restraint as a serious interference with free speech. These early cases established that democratic debate cannot survive if the State controls what may be published before publication. ❖ **Circulation and business side of press:** In **Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 305**, the Supreme Court struck down restrictions on newspaper pages and price because they directly affected circulation and free expression. In **Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, (1972) 2 SCC 788**, the Court held that newsprint control policy could not be used in a manner that reduced newspaper pages and restricted freedom of the press. The ratio is that press freedom includes not only the right to publish but also the right to reach readers effectively. ❖ **Commercial speech:** In **Tata Press Ltd. v. MTNL, (1995) 5 SCC 139**, the Supreme Court held that commercial advertisements also enjoy protection under Article 19(1)(a), because advertisements may convey information useful to the public. However, misleading, fraudulent or harmful advertisements may be regulated. ❖ **Right to know and receive information:** Article 19(1)(a) also protects the right of citizens to receive information. In **Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal, (1995) 2 SCC 161**, the Supreme Court held that freedom of speech includes the right to communicate and receive information through electronic media. This principle later supported transparency, open governance and the citizen’s right to know. ❖ **Cinema and artistic expression:** In **S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574**, the Supreme Court protected the exhibition of a film despite opposition. The Court held that freedom of expression cannot be suppressed unless the situation created by allowing the expression is dangerous to the community or public interest. Mere threat of demonstration or hostile audience cannot become a ground for censorship; otherwise, the State would be allowing violent objectors to silence lawful expression. ❖ **Online speech and vagueness:** In **Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1**, the Supreme Court struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 as unconstitutional for violating Article 19(1)(a). The provision criminalised online messages using vague expressions such as “grossly offensive” and “menacing”. The Court held that vague restrictions chill free speech and that only speech connected to incitement, public order or other Article 19(2) grounds can be restricted. The decision is a leading authority on internet speech and constitutional vagueness. ❖ **Internet as a medium of speech and trade:** In **Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637**, the Supreme Court held that freedom of speech and expression through the internet is protected under Article 19(1)(a), and freedom of trade through the internet is protected under Article 19(1)(g), subject to restrictions under Articles 19(2) and 19(6). The Court emphasised publication of restriction orders, review of internet shutdowns, and proportionality. ❖ **Speech of public functionaries:** In **Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2023) 4 SCC 1**, the Supreme Court held that additional restrictions beyond Article 19(2) cannot be imposed on free speech by judicial interpretation. The case is important because it confirms that Article 19(2) is exhaustive for restricting speech. ## Reasonable Restrictions on Speech under Article 19(2) ❖ **Sovereignty and integrity of India:** Speech that threatens India’s unity, secession, armed rebellion or territorial integrity may be restricted. This ground protects the constitutional existence of India. ❖ **Security of the State:** This ground deals with serious threats such as war, rebellion, insurrection and violent overthrow of government. It is narrower than ordinary public disorder. ❖ **Friendly relations with foreign States:** Speech that seriously damages India’s international relations may be restricted, but the restriction must still be reasonable. ❖ **Public order:** Public order means public peace, safety and tranquillity. In **Superintendent, Central Prison v. Ram Manohar Lohia, AIR 1960 SC 633**, the Supreme Court held that there must be a proximate connection between speech and public disorder. Remote or imaginary danger is not enough. ❖ **Decency or morality:** Obscene or grossly indecent expression may be regulated. In **Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, (2014) 4 SCC 257**, the Supreme Court applied the contemporary community standards test and held that alleged obscenity must be judged in context. ❖ **Contempt of court:** Speech that scandalises or obstructs administration of justice may be restricted, but fair criticism of judicial decisions is permissible. ❖ **Defamation:** Reputation is protected as part of dignity. In **Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 221**, the Supreme Court upheld criminal defamation, holding that free speech must be balanced with the right to reputation. ❖ **Incitement to an offence:** Mere discussion or advocacy is protected. Incitement to commit an offence may be restricted. **Shreya Singhal** clearly separated discussion, advocacy and incitement; only incitement may justify restriction. ## Freedom of Peaceful Assembly under Article 19(1)(b) ❖ **Meaning:** Article 19(1)(b) gives citizens the right to assemble peaceably and without arms. It includes meetings, public gatherings, processions, demonstrations, dharnas and peaceful protests. This freedom is essential because citizens often express collective opinion through public assembly. ❖ **Peaceful and without arms:** The right is protected only when the assembly is peaceful and unarmed. Violent assemblies, armed processions, riots or gatherings intended to create public disorder do not enjoy protection. ❖ **Right to protest:** In **Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 1166**, the Supreme Court held that peaceful demonstrations are protected by Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19(1)(b). However, government servants may be subject to reasonable service discipline, and violent or disorderly demonstrations are not protected. ❖ **Public streets and regulation:** In **Himat Lal K. Shah v. Commissioner of Police, (1973) 1 SCC 227**, the Supreme Court held that the State cannot completely deny citizens the right to hold public meetings on streets, though it may regulate the use of public places through reasonable conditions. The State may require permission, prescribe time, place and manner, and prevent obstruction, but it cannot create an arbitrary licensing system. ❖ **Police action and protest rights:** In **Ramlila Maidan Incident, In re, (2012) 5 SCC 1**, the Supreme Court discussed the rights to speech and peaceful assembly and held that restrictions must be reasonable and linked to Article 19 grounds. The case arose from police action during a public gathering at Ramlila Maidan, and the Court emphasised that State power must be exercised with constitutional responsibility. ❖ **Balancing protest and public convenience:** In **Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. Union of India, (2018) 17 SCC 324**, the Supreme Court recognised peaceful protest as part of democratic rights under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b), but held that protest rights must be balanced with traffic, public order, residents’ rights and administrative concerns. ❖ **No indefinite occupation of public roads:** In **Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police, (2020) 10 SCC 439**, popularly connected with the Shaheen Bagh protest, the Supreme Court held that public ways and public spaces cannot be occupied indefinitely in a manner that causes serious public inconvenience. The right to protest exists, but it must be exercised in designated or regulated spaces subject to public order. ## Reasonable Restrictions on Assembly under Article 19(3) ❖ **Grounds of restriction:** Article 19(3) permits reasonable restrictions on assembly only in the interests of **sovereignty and integrity of India** and **public order**. Therefore, a restriction on assembly must be connected to these grounds. ❖ **Examples of valid regulation:** Law may require prior permission for processions, regulate routes, restrict loudspeakers, prohibit arms, impose curfew during emergencies, or restrict gatherings in sensitive areas. However, a blanket ban on all assemblies without adequate reason is unconstitutional. ## Freedom to Form Associations, Unions or Co-operative Societies under Article 19(1)(c) ❖ **Meaning:** Article 19(1)(c) protects the right to form associations, unions and co-operative societies. It includes political parties, trade unions, clubs, societies, student organisations, professional bodies and voluntary associations. ❖ **Right includes continuity of association:** In **Damyanti Naranga v. Union of India, (1971) 1 SCC 678; AIR 1971 SC 966**, the Supreme Court held that the right to form an association includes the right to continue the association with its chosen composition. The State cannot force unwanted members into an association in a way that destroys its identity. The case concerned statutory interference with Hindi Sahitya Sammelan, and the Court protected associational autonomy. ❖ **Association and service discipline:** In **O.K. Ghosh v. E.X. Joseph, AIR 1963 SC 812**, the Supreme Court considered service rules restricting government servants from joining associations. The Court held that restrictions must satisfy Article 19(4). The State may regulate conduct of public servants, but cannot impose arbitrary restrictions unrelated to public order, morality or sovereignty and integrity. ❖ **No fundamental right to strike:** In **T.K. Rangarajan v. Government of Tamil Nadu, (2003) 6 SCC 581**, the Supreme Court held that government employees have no fundamental, legal or moral right to strike. Article 19(1)(c) protects formation of associations or unions, but it does not automatically protect every method adopted by the association, such as strike, especially in essential public services. ❖ **Association and internal autonomy:** In **Zoroastrian Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. District Registrar, Co-operative Societies, (2005) 5 SCC 632**, the Supreme Court dealt with membership restrictions in a co-operative housing society and discussed associational autonomy in the context of bye-laws and co-operative society membership. The case shows that Article 19(1)(c) may protect voluntary association, though such protection is subject to statutory regulation and constitutional limits. ## Reasonable Restrictions on Association under Article 19(4) ❖ **Grounds of restriction:** Article 19(4) allows restrictions in the interests of **sovereignty and integrity of India**, **public order**, and **morality**. These grounds justify laws against unlawful associations, terrorist organisations, violent groups or associations formed for immoral or criminal purposes. ❖ **Unlawful associations:** A law may validly ban an association if it threatens national unity, encourages violence, disturbs public order or supports secession. However, the mere fact that an association criticises government policy is not enough to ban it. ## Freedom of Movement under Article 19(1)(d) ❖ **Meaning:** Article 19(1)(d) gives every citizen the right to move freely throughout the territory of India. It protects internal mobility from one State to another and from one place to another within India. ❖ **Movement and personal liberty:** In **Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 1295**, the Supreme Court considered police surveillance and domiciliary visits. Though the majority did not fully recognise privacy as a fundamental right then, the case became important for later development of liberty, privacy and movement. In **K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1**, the Supreme Court later clarified that privacy is protected by constitutional freedoms and personal liberty, and earlier narrow approaches were overtaken by later jurisprudence such as **R.C. Cooper** and **Maneka Gandhi**. ❖ **Movement and passport:** In **Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam, AIR 1967 SC 1836**, the Supreme Court held that the right to travel abroad is part of personal liberty under Article 21. Though Article 19(1)(d) concerns movement within India, the case is important because it connects movement, liberty and due process. ❖ **Maneka Gandhi and integrated rights:** In **Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248**, the petitioner’s passport was impounded without giving reasons. The Supreme Court held that any law affecting personal liberty must be just, fair and reasonable. The case connected Articles 14, 19 and 21 and rejected a narrow compartmental view of fundamental rights. It is one of the most important decisions in Indian constitutional law. ## Freedom to Reside and Settle under Article 19(1)(e) ❖ **Meaning:** Article 19(1)(e) gives citizens the right to reside and settle in any part of India. “Reside” means to live temporarily or permanently, while “settle” suggests making a place one’s permanent home, occupation base or community location. ❖ **National unity function:** This right supports Indian unity by allowing citizens to live anywhere in India, subject to reasonable restrictions. It discourages excessive regional barriers and promotes common citizenship. ❖ **Restrictions for Scheduled Tribes:** Article 19(5) expressly allows restrictions for protecting the interests of Scheduled Tribes. Therefore, special rules for tribal areas, land transfer restrictions, inner line permit systems, and protective regulations in sensitive tribal regions may be valid when they preserve tribal culture, land and social identity. ❖ **Movement of certain persons may be regulated:** In **State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kaushaliya, AIR 1964 SC 416**, the Supreme Court upheld restrictions on the movement and residence of persons engaged in prostitution under law intended to protect public health and public morals. The case shows that Article 19(1)(d) and 19(1)(e) may be reasonably restricted in the interests of the general public. ❖ **Displacement and settlement:** In **Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, (2000) 10 SCC 664**, questions of displacement, rehabilitation and development were considered in the context of large public projects. Though the case is not only about Article 19(1)(e), it is relevant for understanding that residence and settlement issues must be balanced with rehabilitation, development and public interest. ## Reasonable Restrictions on Movement and Residence under Article 19(5) ❖ **Grounds of restriction:** Article 19(5) permits reasonable restrictions on Article 19(1)(d) and 19(1)(e) in the interests of the **general public** or for the **protection of interests of Scheduled Tribes**. ❖ **Examples of restrictions:** Externment laws, epidemic control measures, restrictions in protected tribal areas, security zones, curfew, border-area regulation, and environmental restrictions may be valid if they are reasonable, non-arbitrary and proportionate. ## Freedom of Profession, Occupation, Trade or Business under Article 19(1)(g) ❖ **Meaning:** Article 19(1)(g) gives citizens the right to practise any profession or carry on any occupation, trade or business. This includes the right to choose one’s livelihood, start a business, run a shop, engage in industry, provide professional services, carry on trade, and conduct lawful economic activity. ❖ **Profession, occupation, trade and business:** “Profession” usually involves specialised knowledge or skill, such as law, medicine, accountancy or teaching. “Occupation” is broader and includes any regular activity for livelihood. “Trade” involves buying and selling goods or services. “Business” includes organised commercial activity for profit. ❖ **No right to carry on illegal or harmful trade:** Article 19(1)(g) protects lawful economic activity. In **Cooverjee B. Bharucha v. Excise Commissioner, Ajmer, AIR 1954 SC 220**, the Supreme Court upheld strict regulation of liquor trade and recognised that certain trades, especially intoxicants, may be heavily controlled in public interest. ❖ **Total prohibition may sometimes be valid:** In **State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat, (2005) 8 SCC 534**, the Supreme Court upheld restrictions connected with cow slaughter and held that economic rights may be restricted in the interests of general public, animal preservation and social policy. The case shows that Article 19(1)(g) does not prevent the State from imposing strong public-interest regulation. ❖ **Excessive restriction invalid:** In **Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 SC 118**, the Supreme Court struck down a law that completely prohibited bidi manufacturing during agricultural season in certain areas. The Court held that a restriction which is excessive and goes beyond what public interest requires is not reasonable. ❖ **Right to street vending:** In **Sodan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, (1989) 4 SCC 155**, the Supreme Court held that street trading is protected under Article 19(1)(g), but it is subject to reasonable regulation. Pavements and public streets cannot be treated as private business spaces, yet hawkers cannot be completely excluded without considering their livelihood and proper regulation. ❖ **Right to close business:** In **Excel Wear v. Union of India, (1978) 4 SCC 224**, the Supreme Court held that the right to carry on business includes, in appropriate circumstances, the right to close business. However, closure can be regulated in public interest, especially where workers and industrial relations are affected. ❖ **Education as occupation:** In **T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481**, the Supreme Court held that establishing and administering educational institutions can fall within occupation under Article 19(1)(g), subject to regulatory measures maintaining excellence, fairness and preventing maladministration. Later cases developed the balance between autonomy of private institutions and State regulation. ❖ **Internet trade:** As held in **Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637**, trade and commerce through the internet are protected under Article 19(1)(g), subject to Article 19(6). Therefore, internet shutdowns may affect not only speech but also business, e-commerce, journalism, professional work and livelihood. ## Reasonable Restrictions on Profession and Business under Article 19(6) ❖ **Interests of general public:** The State may regulate business for public health, safety, morality, consumer protection, labour welfare, environment, taxation, urban planning, food safety, financial discipline and economic justice. ❖ **Professional qualifications:** Article 19(6) allows the State to prescribe professional or technical qualifications. For example, a person may be required to have a law degree and enrolment to practise as an advocate, or a medical degree and registration to practise medicine. ❖ **State monopoly:** Article 19(6)(ii) permits the State to carry on any trade, business, industry or service by itself, either completely or partially, to the exclusion of citizens. Therefore, nationalisation or State monopoly may be constitutionally valid if authorised by law. ❖ **Regulation versus destruction:** A regulatory law is valid when it organises, supervises or controls business in public interest. But if a law effectively destroys the right without adequate public justification, it may violate Article 19(1)(g). ## Important Doctrines Connected with Article 19 ❖ **Doctrine of direct and inevitable effect:** Courts examine the real impact of State action on fundamental rights. If a law directly and inevitably restricts speech, press, movement or business, it must satisfy Article 19 restrictions. ❖ **Doctrine of chilling effect:** A vague or overbroad law may discourage citizens from exercising their rights because they fear punishment. **Shreya Singhal** is the leading case where the Supreme Court recognised that vague speech offences create a chilling effect on free expression. ❖ **Doctrine of proportionality:** Restrictions must not be more severe than necessary. The State must choose a measure that minimally impairs the right while achieving the public purpose. ❖ **Doctrine of overbreadth:** If a law restricts both harmful and harmless conduct in a broad manner, it may be unconstitutional. This is especially important in free speech and internet regulation. ❖ **Prior restraint principle:** Pre-censorship and prior restraint are generally viewed with suspicion because they stop expression before it reaches the public. **Brij Bhushan** and later press cases show that prior restraint must meet strict constitutional scrutiny. ## Memory Aid for Article 19 **S-A-A-M-R-P** ❖ **S – Speech and Expression:** Article 19(1)(a) ❖ **A – Assembly:** Article 19(1)(b) ❖ **A – Association:** Article 19(1)(c) ❖ **M – Movement:** Article 19(1)(d) ❖ **R – Residence:** Article 19(1)(e) ❖ **P – Profession/Trade/Business:** Article 19(1)(g) **Restrictions Memory Aid:** ❖ **Speech has the widest list** under Article 19(2). ❖ **Assembly has two grounds**: sovereignty/integrity and public order. ❖ **Association adds morality** to sovereignty/integrity and public order. ❖ **Movement and residence share Article 19(5)**: general public and Scheduled Tribes. ❖ **Business has Article 19(6)**: general public, qualifications and State monopoly. ## Conclusion ❖ **Constitutional importance:** Article 19 is the practical heart of democratic freedom in India. It allows citizens to think, speak, publish, protest, organise, travel, settle and work. Without Article 19, democracy would become formal rather than real. ❖ **Balanced liberty:** The freedoms under Article 19 are not absolute, but the restrictions are also not unlimited. The State must justify restrictions through law, constitutional grounds, reasonableness and proportionality. ❖ **Modern relevance:** Article 19 continues to evolve with new challenges such as internet shutdowns, social media regulation, hate speech, protest movements, professional regulation, digital trade and public order. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence shows that constitutional freedom must remain meaningful even as society, technology and governance change. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Article 17 and Article 18 of Indian Constitution: Abolition of Untouchability, Civil Rights Protection, Abolition of Titles and Constitutional Morality](https://lawfoyer.in/article-17-and-article-18-of-indian-constitution/) **Published:** June 2, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun2202607_01_07P-725x1024.jpeg) # Introduction: Equality as Social Transformation ➤ **Core idea:** Articles 17 and 18 are part of the **Right to Equality** under Articles 14 to 18 of the Constitution of India. They do not merely declare formal equality; they attack two social practices that historically created inequality: **untouchability** and **titles of social superiority**. ➤ **Transformative purpose:** Article 17 abolishes untouchability and criminalises the enforcement of disabilities arising from untouchability. Article 18 abolishes titles, except military and academic distinctions, so that the Republic does not create artificial ranks of social superiority. Article 17 protects **human dignity and social access**, while Article 18 protects **republican equality and democratic citizenship**. The text of Article 17 states that “Untouchability” is abolished, its practice in any form is forbidden, and enforcement of any disability arising out of it shall be an offence punishable by law. ➤ **Common constitutional philosophy:** Both Articles reflect **constitutional morality**, which means that social practices, customs, caste hierarchies, inherited privileges, public honours, religious claims or majority opinion cannot override the basic constitutional values of **liberty, equality, dignity, fraternity and non-discrimination**. # Article 17: Abolition of Untouchability ## Meaning and Scope of Article 17 ➤ **Constitutional text:** Article 17 provides that **“Untouchability” is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden**. It further provides that enforcement of any disability arising out of untouchability shall be an offence punishable according to law. ➤ **Undefined expression:** The Constitution does not define “untouchability”. This is deliberate because the framers wanted to prohibit not merely one fixed practice, but all forms of caste-based exclusion, humiliation and social disability connected with the historical practice of treating certain communities as “untouchable”. ➤ **Historical meaning:** The word “untouchability” in Article 17 is not used in its literal sense of physical contact. It refers to the historical Indian practice by which certain persons, mainly because of birth in particular castes, were denied access to wells, temples, roads, shops, public services, educational spaces, religious places, social interaction and equal human treatment. ➤ **Practice in any form:** The words “in any form” make Article 17 wide. It covers direct practices like denying entry into a temple or public well, and also indirect practices like social boycott, separate utensils, segregation, denial of barber services, denial of access to burial grounds, humiliating caste-based restrictions and exclusion from community resources. ➤ **Positive duty of law:** Article 17 does not only say that untouchability is unconstitutional. It expressly requires that enforcement of disabilities arising from untouchability must be made a punishable offence. This is why Parliament enacted the **Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955**, later renamed and strengthened as the **Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955**. The Ministry of Social Justice material notes that the 1955 Act was enacted in pursuance of Article 17. ## Nature of Article 17 as a Fundamental Right ➤ **Horizontal application:** Article 17 is not limited to action by the State. It also applies against **private individuals**. This is important because untouchability is usually practised by private persons, village communities, religious groups, local dominant castes, social bodies or service providers. ➤ **Absolute prohibition:** Unlike some other Fundamental Rights, Article 17 does not contain an express exception. No defence of religion, custom, tradition, local practice or community sentiment can justify untouchability. ➤ **Human dignity:** Article 17 protects the dignity of persons who were historically treated as socially inferior. It is linked with Article 14, Article 15, Article 21 and the Preamble’s promise of equality of status and fraternity. ➤ **Criminalisation:** Article 17 is one of the clearest examples where the Constitution itself directs that a social evil must be treated as a punishable offence. It converts constitutional morality into enforceable legal duty. ## Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 ➤ **Purpose of the Act:** The Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 gives practical effect to Article 17. It defines **“civil rights”** as any right accruing to a person by reason of the abolition of untouchability under Article 17. ➤ **Civil rights meaning:** Civil rights under this Act include the right to access public places, use public wells, tanks, roads, cremation grounds, religious institutions, shops, restaurants, hotels, educational institutions, hospitals and other facilities without caste-based exclusion. ➤ **Punishable conduct:** The Act penalises denial of access to places of public worship, refusal of entry into shops, hotels or public entertainment places, refusal to sell goods or render services, denial of use of water sources, denial of professional or social services, social boycott and other disabilities connected with untouchability. ➤ **Public worship:** If a person is prevented from entering or worshipping in a place of public worship because of untouchability, the act becomes punishable. This protects religious access where exclusion is based on caste-based impurity or inherited social inferiority. ➤ **Public resources:** Denial of access to wells, tanks, roads, cremation grounds, bathing ghats, dharamshalas, educational institutions or medical institutions is prohibited because such spaces cannot be converted into instruments of caste hierarchy. ➤ **Service-based discrimination:** Refusal by a shopkeeper, hotel owner, barber, washerman, priest, public functionary or service provider to serve a person on the ground of untouchability violates the Act. The constitutional logic is that the market and social life must not reproduce caste exclusion. ➤ **Social boycott:** Boycott or obstruction of a person for exercising rights flowing from abolition of untouchability is also prohibited. The law recognises that untouchability often operates through community pressure, fear and collective punishment. ➤ **Relation with SC/ST Act:** The Protection of Civil Rights Act deals specifically with disabilities arising from untouchability. The **Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989** goes further and punishes serious caste-based atrocities, humiliations, violence, dispossession, social and economic boycott and other targeted offences against Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The National Helpline Against Atrocities identifies Article 17, the Protection of Civil Rights Act and the PoA Act as connected constitutional and statutory measures against untouchability and atrocities. ## Landmark Case Law on Article 17 and Untouchability ➤ **State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale, AIR 1993 SC 1126; 1995 Supp (4) SCC 469:** In this case, members of Scheduled Castes were obstructed from drawing water from a newly dug borewell. The issue was whether such obstruction amounted to enforcement of disability arising from untouchability under the Protection of Civil Rights Act. The Supreme Court treated untouchability as a deeply rooted social evil and upheld the need for strict enforcement of Article 17. The ratio is that Article 17 and the 1955 Act are intended to liberate society from caste-based exclusion and to establish equality, dignity and social justice in actual life. ➤ **People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, (1982) 3 SCC 235:** Although this case is mainly known for bonded labour and labour rights, it is important for understanding horizontal application of Fundamental Rights. The Supreme Court recognised that some Fundamental Rights impose obligations not merely on the State but also on private actors. Article 17 is a classic example because it prohibits untouchability in any form and cannot be defeated merely because the violator is a private person. ➤ **Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1 — Sabarimala case:** The Supreme Court considered exclusion of women of a particular age group from the Sabarimala temple. The majority held the exclusion unconstitutional. The case is not a classic caste-untouchability case, but it is important because the Court discussed dignity, equality, religious freedom and constitutional morality. The judgment shows that practices justified by custom or religion must still satisfy constitutional values. ➤ **Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India, decided on 3 October 2024:** The Supreme Court examined caste-based discrimination and segregation in prisons. The Court discussed Article 17 and noted its special place in the Constitution as a provision ending the socially discriminatory practice of untouchability. This case is important because it shows that Article 17 is not limited to village practices; it also applies to modern State institutions like prisons when caste-based labour division, segregation or humiliation continues. ## Constitutional Morality and Article 17 ➤ **Meaning of constitutional morality:** Constitutional morality means loyalty to constitutional values rather than blind obedience to social customs. It requires society, courts and the State to prefer equality, dignity and fraternity over caste prejudice. ➤ **Ambedkarite foundation:** Article 17 reflects Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s constitutional vision that political democracy cannot survive without social democracy. A person cannot be equal in voting but unequal in wells, temples, schools, streets and social life. ➤ **Fraternity:** Untouchability destroys fraternity because it divides human beings into pure and impure, touchable and untouchable, superior and inferior. Article 17 is therefore not only an anti-discrimination provision; it is a constitutional command to build social brotherhood. ➤ **Public morality vs constitutional morality:** Public morality may sometimes support caste customs or inherited exclusion. Constitutional morality rejects such customs when they violate dignity, equality and liberty. ➤ **State obligation:** The State must not remain neutral when untouchability is practised. It must prevent, punish and remedy such practices through criminal law, social welfare measures, awareness, education, prosecution and institutional reform. # Article 18: Abolition of Titles ## Meaning and Scope of Article 18 ➤ **Constitutional text:** Article 18 abolishes titles. It provides that no title, other than a military or academic distinction, shall be conferred by the State. It also restricts acceptance of titles, presents, emoluments or offices from foreign States in certain situations. ➤ **Republican principle:** Article 18 is based on the idea that India is a Republic where citizens are equal. The State cannot create hereditary or artificial ranks like “Sir”, “Rai Bahadur”, “Khan Bahadur”, “Maharaja” or similar colonial-style titles that suggest permanent social superiority. ➤ **Anti-feudal object:** Titles were historically used by monarchies and colonial governments to reward loyalty and create social hierarchy. Article 18 rejects this culture because democratic citizenship is incompatible with State-created nobility. ➤ **Not a general ban on all recognition:** Article 18 does not prevent genuine recognition of merit. It prevents the creation of titles that become part of a person’s name or social status. A reward may be valid if it honours achievement without creating a rank of nobility. ## Clauses of Article 18 Explained ➤ **Article 18(1): State cannot confer titles:** The State cannot confer any title except military or academic distinctions. Therefore, academic degrees such as “Dr.”, “Professor”, “Ph.D.” and military distinctions such as gallantry awards or rank-related honours are not prohibited. ➤ **Article 18(2): Indian citizens cannot accept foreign titles:** No citizen of India can accept any title from a foreign State. This protects national loyalty and prevents foreign influence through honours. ➤ **Article 18(3): Non-citizens holding office under the State:** A non-citizen who holds an office of profit or trust under the Indian State cannot accept a title from a foreign State without the President’s consent. ➤ **Article 18(4): Presents, emoluments and offices from foreign States:** A person holding an office of profit or trust under the State cannot accept any present, emolument or office from or under a foreign State without the President’s consent. This prevents conflict of interest and foreign influence over public officials. ## Exceptions: Academic and Military Distinctions ➤ **Academic distinctions:** Degrees, diplomas, honorary doctorates, professorial titles and educational distinctions are permitted because they show educational achievement or academic recognition. They do not create a hereditary class or feudal superiority. ➤ **Military distinctions:** Military ranks and gallantry awards are permitted because they recognise service, courage, command responsibility and sacrifice. They are functional or honour-based distinctions connected with national defence, not titles of social nobility. ➤ **Reason for exceptions:** The Constitution allows these distinctions because equality does not mean denial of excellence. It means that recognition must not become a badge of unequal citizenship. ## National Awards and Article 18 ➤ **Balaji Raghavan v. Union of India, (1996) 1 SCC 361:** The constitutional validity of Bharat Ratna, Padma Vibhushan, Padma Bhushan and Padma Shri was challenged on the ground that they were “titles” prohibited by Article 18. The Supreme Court held that these national awards are not titles within Article 18 if they are given for exceptional and distinguished service and are not used as prefixes or suffixes to the recipient’s name. The Court clarified that misuse of awards as titles would be unconstitutional in spirit, and the award may be withdrawn if used contrary to the prescribed rules. ➤ **Ratio of Balaji Raghavan:** National awards are constitutionally valid when they recognise merit, excellence and distinguished service, but they cannot create a separate privileged class. The awardee cannot style himself as “Padma Shri X” or “Bharat Ratna X” as a name-title. ➤ **Practical distinction:** A statement such as “X received the Padma Shri in 2020” is permissible. But using “Padma Shri” as a permanent prefix or suffix to one’s name is inconsistent with Article 18. ➤ **Constitutional warning:** Awards must remain rare, merit-based and transparent. If awards become political patronage, social hierarchy or personal glorification, they may violate the republican spirit behind Article 18 even if formally called awards. # Comparative Table: Article 17 and Article 18 PointArticle 17Article 18**Main object**Abolishes untouchabilityAbolishes titles**Social evil targeted**Caste-based exclusion and humiliationFeudal, colonial and artificial social hierarchy**Nature**Prohibitory and penalProhibitory and republican**Applies against**State and private personsPrimarily State, citizens, office-holders and persons dealing with foreign States**Legal consequence**Practice of untouchability is punishableTitles cannot be conferred or accepted except as permitted**Exceptions**No express exceptionMilitary and academic distinctions**Core value**Dignity, equality, fraternityEquality, republicanism, public integrity**Important statute/case**Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955; Appa Balu IngaleBalaji Raghavan v. Union of India# Relationship Between Articles 17 and 18 ➤ **Equality beyond formal law:** Article 17 attacks caste-based inequality from below; Article 18 attacks State-created artificial superiority from above. Together, they create a society where no person is treated as polluted and no person is elevated as a superior citizen by title. ➤ **Dignity and fraternity:** Article 17 protects the dignity of historically oppressed communities. Article 18 protects the dignity of every citizen by preventing titles that suggest some citizens are constitutionally superior. ➤ **Democratic citizenship:** In a constitutional democracy, the worth of a person does not depend on caste, birth, inherited rank, royal favour, colonial recognition or State-created social titles. ➤ **Transformative constitutionalism:** Both Articles show that the Constitution is not limited to controlling government power. It also transforms society by rejecting caste hierarchy, feudal prestige and inherited inequality. # Memory Aid ➤ **Article 17 = “No Untouchability”** **Abolition + Prohibition + Punishment** ➤ **Article 18 = “No Titles”** **No State titles + No foreign titles + Exceptions for Military and Academic distinctions** ➤ **Core formula:** **Article 17 protects equal social access. Article 18 protects equal civic status.** # Conclusion ➤ **Constitutional essence:** Article 17 and Article 18 are powerful equality provisions. Article 17 abolishes untouchability and makes its practice punishable. Article 18 abolishes titles and prevents the State from creating artificial ranks of superiority, except genuine military and academic distinctions. ➤ **Civil rights protection:** The Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 converts the promise of Article 17 into enforceable offences. It ensures that access to temples, wells, shops, hotels, roads, public services and social participation cannot be denied on the basis of untouchability. ➤ **Republican equality:** Article 18 ensures that India remains a Republic of equal citizens, not a society of legally honoured elites and socially inferior subjects. National awards may recognise merit, but they cannot become prefixes, suffixes or titles of rank. ➤ **Constitutional morality:** The deeper message of both Articles is that constitutional values must prevail over caste customs, feudal habits, social prejudice and symbolic inequality. The Constitution demands not merely equality before law, but equality in social life, public honour, civic identity and human dignity. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Article 16 of the Indian Constitution: Equality of Opportunity in Public Employment, Reservation, Promotion Quota, Creamy Layer and Domicile Requirements](https://lawfoyer.in/article-16-of-the-indian-constitution-2/) **Published:** June 2, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun2202606_37_08P-725x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning and Constitutional Purpose of Article 16 • **Core idea:** Article 16 guarantees **equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State**. It is a special equality provision dealing specifically with public employment. While Article 14 gives general equality before law and equal protection of laws, Article 16 applies that equality principle to government service, public posts, recruitment, appointment, promotion, reservation and allied service matters. The official constitutional text of Article 16 contains the general guarantee, the prohibition of discrimination, and special enabling clauses for residence requirements, reservation for backward classes, SC/ST promotion reservation, religious or denominational institutions, and EWS reservation. • **Public employment as constitutional trust:** Government jobs are not private favours. They are public opportunities funded by public resources. Therefore, the State cannot distribute posts arbitrarily, by patronage, nepotism, caste favouritism, regional bias, sex discrimination or personal preference. Article 16 makes public employment a field of **constitutional fairness**, where selection must normally be based on equality, open competition, rational classification and valid affirmative action. • **Citizenship requirement:** Article 16 protects **citizens**. Unlike Article 14, which applies to “persons”, Article 16 is confined to citizens because public employment is treated as a special civic opportunity connected with membership of the Indian polity. However, this does not mean that every citizen has a fundamental right to be appointed. The right is to be **fairly considered** according to lawful rules. • **Relationship with Article 14:** Article 16 is a specific application of Article 14. If a recruitment rule violates Article 16, it will usually also offend Article 14. But Article 16 is more precise because it expressly mentions grounds like religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence and also permits certain forms of reservation. • **Equality is not mechanical sameness:** Article 16 does not mean that every person must be treated identically in all situations. The Constitution permits reasonable classification and affirmative action to correct historical and structural disadvantages. Therefore, Article 16 contains both **formal equality** and **substantive equality**. ## Clause-wise Explanation of Article 16 ### Article 16(1): General Equality of Opportunity • **General guarantee:** Article 16(1) says that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. It covers recruitment, eligibility, selection process, appointment, service benefits and, depending on context, promotional opportunities. • **Practical meaning:** A public employer must frame rules that are fair, transparent and non-arbitrary. For example, prescribing educational qualifications for a technical post is valid because it has a rational connection with the job. But excluding eligible candidates for reasons unrelated to the post may violate Article 16(1). • **Merit with fairness:** Article 16(1) does not create a narrow idea of merit based only on marks. In constitutional law, merit must be understood along with equal access, non-discrimination, representation and efficiency of administration. The State can design policies that balance merit with social justice. ### Article 16(2): Prohibition of Discrimination • **Prohibited grounds:** Article 16(2) prohibits ineligibility or discrimination in public employment on grounds only of **religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them**. This clause prevents direct discrimination in government jobs. • **Grounds only principle:** The word “only” is important. If discrimination is solely based on one of the prohibited grounds, it is unconstitutional. But if a rule is based on a valid job-related qualification, it may survive even if it incidentally affects some groups. • **Sex discrimination:** Article 16(2) bars discrimination on the ground of sex. In **C.B. Muthamma v. Union of India, (1979) 4 SCC 260**, the Supreme Court examined service rules affecting women in the Indian Foreign Service. The Court criticised rules that placed women officers at a disadvantage and emphasised that public employment rules cannot reflect gender stereotypes. The ratio was that service conditions must conform to equality and cannot indirectly penalise women for marriage or gender. • **Gender equality in professional access:** In **Charu Khurana v. Union of India, (2015) 1 SCC 192**, female make-up artists challenged discriminatory practices that prevented women from being registered as make-up artists in the film industry. The Supreme Court held that such exclusion violated constitutional equality and dignity. Though the case arose in a professional association context, it strongly reflects the Article 14, 15 and 16 spirit that women cannot be denied occupational opportunity by patriarchal barriers. ### Article 16(3): Residence Requirement by Parliamentary Law • **Limited exception for residence:** Article 16(3) permits **Parliament**, not State legislatures, to make a law prescribing residence within a State or Union Territory as a requirement for certain classes of employment or appointment. This is an exception to Article 16(2), which otherwise prohibits discrimination on the ground of residence. • **Why only Parliament:** Residence-based eligibility can threaten national unity and equal citizenship. Therefore, the Constitution gives this power only to Parliament so that local preference does not become a tool of narrow regional exclusion. • **Residence is different from place of birth:** Article 16(2) prohibits discrimination on place of birth and residence, but Article 16(3) allows Parliament to prescribe residence requirements. A State cannot independently create residence-based exclusion unless constitutionally or statutorily authorised. • **Domicile reservation caution:** The Supreme Court has repeatedly treated excessive local preference in public employment with caution because India has one citizenship and public employment cannot be converted into a closed local privilege. ### Article 16(4): Reservation for Backward Classes • **Enabling power:** Article 16(4) provides that nothing in Article 16 shall prevent the State from making provision for reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any **backward class of citizens** which, in the opinion of the State, is **not adequately represented** in the services under the State. This is not a compulsory duty in every case; it is an enabling power. • **Two constitutional conditions:** Reservation under Article 16(4) requires: ◦ **Backward class of citizens**; and ◦ **Inadequate representation** in State services. • **Backwardness and representation:** Article 16(4) is not a poverty relief provision in its original form. It is mainly concerned with group-based social backwardness and inadequate representation in public employment. The State must identify backward classes through relevant material and cannot act on mere political preference. • **Not an exception but equality tool:** Earlier, Article 16(4) was sometimes viewed as an exception to Article 16(1). Later constitutional understanding, especially after **State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, (1976) 2 SCC 310** and **Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217**, treats reservation as part of substantive equality. It is a method of making equality real for groups historically kept out of State power. ## Reservation in Public Employment • **Meaning of reservation:** Reservation means earmarking a certain percentage of public posts for constitutionally recognised disadvantaged classes so that they receive fair representation in public services. • **Vertical reservation:** Reservation for SCs, STs, OBCs and EWS is generally called **vertical reservation** because it creates separate social categories. Candidates selected on merit without using reservation are usually counted in the open category, not against reserved quota. • **Horizontal reservation:** Reservation for women, persons with disabilities, ex-servicemen and similar categories is usually **horizontal reservation** because it cuts across vertical categories. For example, women belonging to SC, ST, OBC, EWS and general categories may receive horizontal adjustment within their respective vertical categories. • **Important case on compartmental adjustment:** In **Saurav Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 4 SCC 542**, the Supreme Court clarified the operation of vertical and horizontal reservation. The Court held that candidates from reserved categories who qualify on their own merit should not be denied open category seats merely because they belong to a reserved class. The ratio strengthens the principle that reservation should not become a disadvantage for meritorious reserved-category candidates. • **Reservation and equality balance:** Reservation is constitutionally valid when it advances representation and equality. It becomes vulnerable when it destroys open competition, lacks data, exceeds constitutional limits without justification, or benefits advanced sections who no longer suffer the relevant disadvantage. ## Backward Classes under Article 16(4) • **Class, not individual:** Article 16(4) speaks of **backward class of citizens**, not backward individuals. The inquiry is group-based. A person receives reservation because they belong to a constitutionally recognised backward class, not merely because they are personally poor. • **Caste as relevant but not always sole factor:** In Indian society, caste has historically determined social status, occupation, exclusion and access to education. Therefore, caste may be a relevant indicator of backwardness, especially for Hindu social groups and analogous communities. But caste cannot be used mechanically without examining social and educational disadvantage. • **OBC identification:** Other Backward Classes are identified through social and educational backwardness, and in public employment Article 16(4) also requires inadequate representation. The Mandal Commission recommendations and later judicial review shaped this area. • **SC/ST position:** Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are constitutionally recognised through Presidential lists under Articles 341 and 342. Their backwardness is linked to untouchability, social exclusion, tribal isolation, historical discrimination and structural deprivation. ## Landmark Case: Indra Sawhney v. Union of India • **Case name and citation:** **Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217**, decided by a nine-judge Bench, is the most important case on Article 16(4), OBC reservation, creamy layer and the 50% ceiling. • **Brief facts:** The case arose after the Union Government implemented recommendations of the Mandal Commission providing 27% reservation for socially and educationally backward classes in Central services. The policy was challenged on grounds including violation of equality, excessive reservation and improper identification of backward classes. • **Legal issues:** The main issues were whether Article 16(4) permits reservation for OBCs, whether caste can be considered, whether economic criteria alone can determine backwardness, whether there should be a ceiling on reservation, whether creamy layer must be excluded, and whether reservation in promotion is permissible. • **Ratio decidendi:** The Supreme Court upheld 27% OBC reservation but laid down important limits. It held that Article 16(4) is an enabling provision for backward classes inadequately represented in services; caste can be a relevant factor for identifying backwardness in India; the **creamy layer must be excluded from OBC reservation**; total reservation should ordinarily not exceed **50%**, except in extraordinary situations; and reservation under Article 16(4) is generally for initial appointment, not promotion. • **Importance:** Indra Sawhney created the modern constitutional framework for public employment reservation. It protected affirmative action but insisted that reservation must be reasonable, data-based and consistent with equality. ## Creamy Layer Principle • **Meaning:** The **creamy layer** means the advanced, socially forward and better-off members within a backward class who have moved sufficiently ahead and should not continue to take reservation benefits meant for the genuinely backward members of that class. • **Purpose:** The principle prevents reservation benefits from being cornered by the most advanced families within backward classes. It ensures that affirmative action reaches those who actually need representation support. • **OBC creamy layer:** After **Indra Sawhney**, exclusion of creamy layer became mandatory for OBC reservation. The Court reasoned that if advanced members remain included, the class may no longer remain genuinely backward for reservation purposes. • **Income alone is insufficient:** Creamy layer is often implemented through income and status criteria, but its constitutional idea is broader than income. It includes social advancement, high constitutional posts, senior government employment, professional status and economic indicators. • **SC/ST creamy layer in promotions:** The creamy layer principle for SC/STs is more complex. Traditionally, creamy layer was not applied to SC/ST reservation at entry level. However, in the context of **promotion reservation**, the Supreme Court in **Jarnail Singh v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta, (2018) 10 SCC 396** held that creamy layer exclusion applies to SC/STs for reservation in promotion and does not alter the Presidential lists under Articles 341 and 342. The Court clarified that applying creamy layer only excludes advanced individuals from promotion reservation benefits; it does not remove the caste or tribe from the constitutional list. ## SC/ST Reservation in Promotion under Article 16(4A) • **Background:** In **Indra Sawhney**, the Supreme Court held that Article 16(4) did not permit reservation in promotion. To overcome this effect for SC/STs, Parliament inserted Article 16(4A) through the **77th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1995**. The amendment empowered the State to provide reservation in matters of promotion for SCs and STs where they are not adequately represented. • **Consequential seniority:** The **85th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2001** amended Article 16(4A) to add the words **“with consequential seniority”**. This means an SC/ST candidate promoted through reservation may retain seniority flowing from that promotion, subject to constitutional validity and applicable rules. The official amendment materials state that the amendment was intended to provide consequential seniority in promotion by virtue of reservation. • **Enabling, not mandatory:** Article 16(4A) does not automatically grant promotion reservation. The State may provide it only if constitutional conditions are satisfied. No employee has an automatic fundamental right to promotion reservation merely because Article 16(4A) exists. ## Landmark Case: M. Nagaraj v. Union of India • **Case name and citation:** **M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212**. • **Brief facts:** The constitutional validity of the 77th, 81st, 82nd and 85th Amendments relating to reservation in promotion, backlog vacancies, relaxation in qualifying marks and consequential seniority was challenged. • **Legal issue:** The issue was whether these amendments damaged the basic structure of the Constitution by violating equality, efficiency and the 50% reservation principle. • **Ratio decidendi:** The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional amendments but held that they are enabling provisions. Before granting SC/ST promotion reservation, the State must collect **quantifiable data** showing inadequacy of representation and must consider **administrative efficiency under Article 335**. The judgment also spoke of backwardness, inadequacy of representation and efficiency as controlling requirements. • **Importance:** M. Nagaraj preserved Parliament’s power to create promotion reservation but made State action data-dependent. The case prevents blanket promotion reservation without factual foundation. ## Landmark Case: Jarnail Singh v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta • **Case name and citation:** **Jarnail Singh v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta, (2018) 10 SCC 396**. • **Brief facts:** The correctness of M. Nagaraj was reconsidered, particularly the requirement that States must prove backwardness of SCs and STs before granting promotion reservation. • **Legal issue:** The central issue was whether M. Nagaraj should be referred to a larger Bench and whether the State must collect data proving backwardness of SCs/STs. • **Ratio decidendi:** The Supreme Court held that States need not collect quantifiable data to prove backwardness of SCs/STs because their backwardness is recognised by the Constitution through Articles 341 and 342. However, quantifiable data on **inadequacy of representation** remains necessary. The Court also applied the creamy layer principle to SC/ST promotion reservation. • **Importance:** Jarnail Singh modified M. Nagaraj by removing the requirement of proving SC/ST backwardness afresh, but it retained the need for data on inadequate representation and introduced creamy layer exclusion in promotion reservation. ## Landmark Case: B.K. Pavitra II • **Case name and citation:** **B.K. Pavitra v. Union of India, (2019) 16 SCC 129**, commonly called **B.K. Pavitra II**. • **Brief facts:** Karnataka enacted a law granting consequential seniority to SC/ST government servants promoted through reservation. Earlier, in B.K. Pavitra I, the law had faced constitutional difficulty because of insufficient data. Karnataka then conducted a study and enacted a fresh law. • **Legal issue:** The question was whether the new consequential seniority law satisfied the constitutional requirements laid down in M. Nagaraj and Jarnail Singh. • **Ratio decidendi:** The Supreme Court upheld the law, noting that the State had relied on data and examined representation, backwardness-related factors and administrative efficiency. The Court accepted that consequential seniority can be valid if backed by constitutionally adequate material. • **Importance:** B.K. Pavitra II shows that promotion reservation and consequential seniority are not unconstitutional per se. Their validity depends on data, legislative design and compliance with equality and efficiency. ## Article 16(4B): Backlog Vacancies and Carry Forward Rule • **Constitutional amendment:** Article 16(4B) was inserted by the **81st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2000**. It allows the State to treat unfilled reserved vacancies of a year as a separate class of vacancies to be filled in succeeding years. • **Purpose:** Sometimes reserved posts remain vacant because suitable candidates are not available in that recruitment year. Article 16(4B) allows such **backlog vacancies** to be carried forward. • **Effect on 50% ceiling:** Article 16(4B) says that carried-forward backlog vacancies are not to be considered together with current year vacancies for determining the 50% ceiling for that year. This gives flexibility to fill historical shortfalls in representation. Government and parliamentary materials describe Article 16(4B) as treating backlog vacancies as a separate class. ## Article 335 and Administrative Efficiency • **Textual connection:** Article 335 says that claims of SCs and STs shall be taken into consideration consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of administration. • **Balanced approach:** Article 335 does not destroy reservation. It requires that representation and efficiency must be harmonised. Equality in public employment includes both fair access for disadvantaged communities and a functioning public administration. • **82nd Amendment:** The **82nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 2000** inserted a proviso to Article 335, allowing relaxation in qualifying marks or standards of evaluation for SC/ST candidates in matters of promotion. The amendment was made after judicial decisions questioned such relaxations in promotion. ## Important Constitutional Amendments Related to Article 16 Constitutional AmendmentProvision affectedMain effect**77th Amendment, 1995**Article 16(4A)Enabled reservation in promotion for SCs/STs.**81st Amendment, 2000**Article 16(4B)Allowed backlog reserved vacancies to be treated as a separate class.**82nd Amendment, 2000**Article 335 provisoAllowed relaxation in qualifying marks/standards for SC/ST promotion matters.**85th Amendment, 2001**Article 16(4A)Added consequential seniority in SC/ST promotion reservation.**103rd Amendment, 2019**Article 16(6)Enabled up to 10% reservation in public employment for Economically Weaker Sections.## Article 16(6): EWS Reservation • **Constitutional provision:** Article 16(6), inserted by the **103rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 2019**, enables the State to provide reservation of appointments or posts in favour of **Economically Weaker Sections**, in addition to existing reservation and subject to a maximum of 10%. The amendment also inserted Article 15(6). • **Economic basis:** EWS reservation is different from Article 16(4). Article 16(4) is based on backward class and inadequate representation. Article 16(6) permits reservation based on economic weakness among those not covered by existing SC/ST/OBC reservation. • **Landmark case:** In **Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1540**, a five-judge Bench upheld the 103rd Amendment by a 3:2 majority. The majority held that EWS reservation does not violate the basic structure merely because it uses economic criteria or because it excludes classes already covered under existing reservation. The dissent took the view that exclusion of SC/ST/OBC poor from EWS quota offended the equality code. The binding result is that Article 16(6) is constitutionally valid. ## Domicile and Residence Requirements in Public Employment • **Basic rule:** Article 16(2) prohibits discrimination on the ground of residence. Article 16(3) permits residence requirements only when Parliament makes a law. Therefore, State-made domicile requirements in public employment are constitutionally suspect unless they fall within a valid constitutional or statutory framework. • **AVS Narasimha Rao principle:** In **A.V.S. Narasimha Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1969) 1 SCC 839**, the Supreme Court considered residence requirements in public employment and emphasised that Article 16(3) vests power in Parliament, not in States. The ratio supports the idea that local residence conditions cannot be freely imposed by States in public employment. • **Kailash Chand Sharma case:** In **Kailash Chand Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, (2002) 6 SCC 562**, preference based on district or rural residence in appointment of teachers was challenged. The Supreme Court held that wholesale preference based on residence or place of origin may violate Articles 14 and 16 unless supported by a constitutionally valid basis. The Court warned against parochialism in public employment. • **Permissible local knowledge:** A rule may sometimes require knowledge of local language, local conditions or special qualifications if genuinely connected with the job. But such a rule must not be a disguised residence-based exclusion. • **National citizenship value:** India has single citizenship. Article 16 protects the idea that a citizen from one State should not be treated as an outsider for public employment in another State unless the Constitution permits a narrow exception. ## Religious and Denominational Institutions under Article 16(5) • **Religious office exception:** Article 16(5) permits a law requiring that an incumbent of an office connected with affairs of a religious or denominational institution must belong to a particular religion or denomination. • **Reason:** Some offices are inherently religious in character. For example, performance of religious rituals may require adherence to the relevant faith or denomination. Article 16(5) protects religious autonomy while keeping the general equality rule intact for ordinary public employment. • **Limited scope:** This clause cannot be used to justify discrimination in secular public posts. It applies only where the office is connected with religious or denominational affairs. ## Important Case Law Table for Quick Revision CaseCitationPrinciple**General Manager, Southern Railway v. Rangachari**AIR 1962 SC 36Earlier view allowed reservation in promotion under Article 16(4), later changed by Indra Sawhney.**T. Devadasan v. Union of India**AIR 1964 SC 179Excessive carry-forward reservation invalid when it destroys equality of opportunity.**State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas**(1976) 2 SCC 310Reservation and relaxations are part of substantive equality, not mere exceptions.**Indra Sawhney v. Union of India**1992 Supp (3) SCC 217OBC reservation upheld; creamy layer; 50% ceiling; no promotion reservation under Article 16(4).**R.K. Sabharwal v. State of Punjab**(1995) 2 SCC 745Post-based roster; reservation relates to posts, not vacancies endlessly.**Union of India v. Virpal Singh Chauhan**(1995) 6 SCC 684Catch-up seniority principle in promotion context before later amendments.**Ajit Singh Januja v. State of Punjab**(1996) 2 SCC 715Seniority issues in reserved promotions examined.**Ajit Singh II v. State of Punjab**(1999) 7 SCC 209Article 16(1) includes right to be considered for promotion; consequential seniority concerns.**M. Nagaraj v. Union of India**(2006) 8 SCC 212Promotion reservation amendments upheld; quantifiable data and efficiency required.**Jarnail Singh v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta**(2018) 10 SCC 396No need to prove SC/ST backwardness afresh; inadequacy data needed; creamy layer applies in promotions.**B.K. Pavitra II**(2019) 16 SCC 129Consequential seniority valid when backed by adequate data.**Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India**2022 SCC OnLine SC 1540103rd Amendment and EWS reservation upheld by 3:2 majority.## Conceptual Distinctions under Article 16 • **Reservation vs classification:** Classification means different treatment based on rational criteria related to the job. Reservation means earmarking posts for constitutionally protected groups. Both must satisfy equality, but reservation has special constitutional rules. • **Backwardness vs poverty:** Backwardness under Article 16(4) is group-based social backwardness and inadequate representation. Poverty may be relevant, but after the 103rd Amendment, economic weakness has a separate constitutional route under Article 16(6). • **Adequate representation vs proportionate representation:** Article 16(4) uses the phrase **“not adequately represented”**, not “proportionately represented”. This means the Constitution does not always require exact population proportion in every service. The State must assess adequacy in context. • **Open category is not caste category:** Open category seats are open to all candidates, including SC, ST, OBC and EWS candidates who qualify on merit. Treating open category as reserved for general caste candidates would violate equality. • **Reservation in appointment vs reservation in promotion:** Article 16(4) deals with reservation in appointments or posts for backward classes. Article 16(4A) specifically deals with promotion reservation for SCs/STs. OBC promotion reservation is not protected in the same way under Article 16(4A). • **Creamy layer vs exclusion from caste list:** Creamy layer exclusion does not remove a caste or tribe from the constitutional or backward class list. It only denies reservation benefit to advanced individuals within the group for the relevant purpose. ## Illustrations for Understanding Article 16 • **Illustration on Article 16(1):** A State advertises posts for civil engineers and requires a civil engineering degree. This is valid because the qualification is connected with the job. • **Illustration on Article 16(2):** A rule says that only persons born in a particular State can apply for a government post. This is generally unconstitutional because place of birth is a prohibited ground. • **Illustration on Article 16(3):** Parliament enacts a law requiring residence in a particular Union Territory for certain local posts. This may be valid because Article 16(3) gives such power to Parliament. • **Illustration on Article 16(4):** If OBCs are found socially backward and inadequately represented in State services, the State may reserve posts for them subject to constitutional limitations. • **Illustration on creamy layer:** A person belongs to an OBC community, but their parents hold high-ranking posts or cross the prescribed creamy layer criteria. Such person may be excluded from OBC reservation benefit though the community remains backward. • **Illustration on promotion reservation:** A State wants to reserve promotions for SC/ST employees. It must examine representation data and administrative efficiency. It cannot simply issue a blanket order without constitutional basis. ## Present Legal Position in Simple Points • **Article 16 guarantees equal opportunity** in public employment for citizens. • **Article 16(2) prohibits discrimination** on religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them. • **Residence requirement can be imposed only by Parliament** under Article 16(3), not casually by States. • **Article 16(4) permits reservation** for backward classes of citizens inadequately represented in public services. • **OBC reservation requires creamy layer exclusion** after Indra Sawhney. • **Total reservation ordinarily should not exceed 50%**, except constitutionally recognised or extraordinary situations; EWS reservation under Article 16(6) has been upheld separately. • **SC/ST promotion reservation is constitutionally permitted** under Article 16(4A), but it is enabling and data-dependent. • **Consequential seniority is permitted** after the 85th Amendment, but it must satisfy constitutional requirements. • **Backlog vacancies can be carried forward** under Article 16(4B). • **EWS reservation up to 10% is valid** after the 103rd Amendment and Janhit Abhiyan. • **Creamy layer applies to OBC reservation** and, as per Jarnail Singh, applies to SC/ST reservation in promotion. • **Public employment rules must always satisfy equality, fairness, non-arbitrariness and constitutional morality.** ## Conclusion • **Article 16 as equality plus social justice:** Article 16 is not merely a rule of formal equal treatment. It is a constitutional design for fair sharing of State employment opportunities. It prohibits discrimination, prevents arbitrary exclusion, and at the same time permits affirmative action for communities that were historically denied representation. • **Reservation as representation:** Reservation under Article 16 is not charity. It is a constitutional method for ensuring that public services reflect the diversity of society and that disadvantaged groups are not permanently excluded from State power. • **Judicial balance:** The Supreme Court has maintained a balance between social justice and equality by upholding reservation while imposing safeguards such as creamy layer exclusion, quantifiable data, adequacy of representation, administrative efficiency, post-based roster and reasonable limits. • **Living constitutional provision:** Article 16 has evolved through constitutional amendments and landmark judgments. Its modern form covers OBC reservation, SC/ST promotion reservation, backlog vacancies, consequential seniority, EWS reservation, residence restrictions and gender equality in public employment. Its central message remains clear: government employment must be distributed by constitutional fairness, not by privilege, prejudice or exclusion. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Article 15 of the Constitution of India: Prohibition of Discrimination, Protective Discrimination, Women, Children, SEBCs, SCs, STs and EWS](https://lawfoyer.in/article-15-of-the-constitution-of-india/) **Published:** June 2, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun2202606_27_53P-725x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning and Constitutional Purpose of Article 15 ➤ **Core idea:** Article 15 is one of the most important provisions in the Indian Constitution’s **Right to Equality framework**. It prohibits discrimination against citizens on certain protected grounds and, at the same time, permits the State to make special provisions for disadvantaged groups so that real equality can be achieved. ➤ **Equality with social justice:** Article 15 should not be understood as a rule of mechanical equality where everyone is treated identically in every situation. Its deeper object is to remove social barriers created by religion, race, caste, sex and place of birth, and to allow protective measures for groups that have historically suffered disadvantage. ➤ **Connection with Article 14:** Article 14 gives the general guarantee of equality before law and equal protection of laws. Article 15 applies that equality principle to specific grounds of discrimination. Therefore, Article 15 is a specific anti-discrimination provision within the broader equality code of the Constitution. ➤ **Article 15 text in substance:** Article 15(1) prohibits the State from discriminating against any citizen only on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. Article 15(2) prohibits denial of access to shops, public restaurants, hotels, places of public entertainment, wells, tanks, roads and public resorts on the same grounds. Article 15(3) to Article 15(6) then create constitutional space for special provisions for women, children, socially and educationally backward classes, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Economically Weaker Sections. ## Scope of Article 15: Citizen-Centric Protection ➤ **Citizens only:** Article 15 protects **citizens**, unlike Article 14, which protects “any person”. Therefore, a foreigner can invoke Article 14 in India, but Article 15 is generally available only to citizens. ➤ **State action under Article 15(1):** Article 15(1) is addressed to the **State**. It prevents the State from making discriminatory laws, policies, executive orders or administrative practices against citizens on prohibited grounds. ➤ **Public access under Article 15(2):** Article 15(2) has a wider social purpose because it prohibits discriminatory restrictions in access to certain public places and public facilities. Its importance lies in the fact that it attacks caste-based and status-based exclusion in daily public life. ➤ **Horizontal effect through public access:** Although many fundamental rights are mainly enforceable against the State, Article 15(2) also regulates access to places used by the public, such as shops, hotels and public restaurants. This makes it a powerful constitutional weapon against social exclusion. ## Article 15(1): Prohibition of Discrimination by the State ➤ **Protected grounds:** Article 15(1) prohibits discrimination only on the grounds of **religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them**. These grounds were chosen because Indian society has historically seen deep inequalities based on these identities. ➤ **Meaning of “discrimination”:** Discrimination means unfair, unequal or adverse treatment. Under Article 15, discrimination is unconstitutional when the State treats a citizen unfavourably only because of the citizen’s religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. ➤ **Importance of the word “only”:** The word “only” means that a law is invalid under Article 15(1) when the prohibited ground is the sole basis of discrimination. However, modern constitutional interpretation does not allow the State to hide discrimination behind artificial labels. A law apparently based on another ground may still be unconstitutional if its real effect is discriminatory. ➤ **Illustration:** If a State rule says that people of a particular caste cannot enter a government educational institution, it directly violates Article 15(1). If a rule uses neutral language but practically excludes a protected caste or sex without constitutional justification, it may also be attacked under Articles 14 and 15. ## Discrimination on Ground of Religion ➤ **Religious neutrality:** Article 15(1) prevents the State from treating citizens differently only because they belong to a particular religion. The State cannot deny educational access, public benefits or civil rights merely because a citizen is Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi or belongs to any other faith. ➤ **Secular equality:** This provision supports the secular character of the Constitution. Secularism in India does not mean hostility to religion; it means equal respect and equal constitutional status for all religions. ➤ **Important limitation:** Article 15 does not prohibit every classification that incidentally concerns religious communities. For example, welfare measures for genuinely backward groups are not invalid merely because some beneficiaries may belong to a particular religion. The key question is whether the classification is based only on religion or on constitutionally relevant backwardness. ## Discrimination on Ground of Race ➤ **Race as protected identity:** Article 15 prohibits racial discrimination. In India, “race” is relevant in the context of ethnic identity, tribal identity and discrimination against persons from particular regions or communities. ➤ **Dignity-based reading:** Racial discrimination violates human dignity. A citizen cannot be denied access to public places or State benefits because of appearance, ethnicity, ancestry, physical features or perceived racial origin. ➤ **Modern relevance:** Discrimination against people from North-East India, tribal communities, or persons targeted because of ethnic appearance may raise concerns under Articles 14, 15 and 21, depending on the facts. ## Discrimination on Ground of Caste ➤ **Caste as historical oppression:** Caste discrimination is one of the central concerns of Article 15. The Constitution rejects the idea that civil rights, public access, educational opportunity or dignity can depend upon caste status. ➤ **Article 15(2) and caste exclusion:** Article 15(2) is especially important because caste discrimination historically operated through denial of access to wells, tanks, roads, temples, shops, restaurants and other public places. This clause constitutionalises equal access to public life. ➤ **Protective discrimination is not caste discrimination:** Special provisions for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and socially and educationally backward classes do not violate Article 15 merely because caste may be one of the indicators of backwardness. The Constitution itself allows such measures through Article 15(4) and Article 15(5). ➤ **Caste cannot be the only mechanical test:** In **M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, AIR 1963 SC 649**, the Supreme Court considered a Mysore order reserving 68% seats in educational institutions for backward and more backward classes. The issue was whether such classification and high reservation were valid under Article 15(4). The Court held that caste cannot be the sole and dominant test for determining backwardness and that reservation must remain reasonable; the impugned order was struck down as excessive and constitutionally invalid. ## Discrimination on Ground of Sex ➤ **Sex equality:** Article 15(1) prohibits discrimination only on the ground of sex. It protects citizens from being denied opportunities, benefits or access merely because they are men, women or belong to a gender identity that does not fit traditional categories. ➤ **Beyond biological sex:** Modern constitutional law reads sex discrimination broadly. Discrimination based on gender stereotypes, pregnancy, marital expectations, gender identity and sexual orientation may violate constitutional equality because such discrimination is rooted in social assumptions about sex and gender roles. ➤ **Anti-stereotyping principle:** In **Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India, (2008) 3 SCC 1**, the Supreme Court examined a law that restricted women’s employment in premises where liquor was served. The issue was whether a “protective” restriction excluding women from certain employment was valid. The Court held that such paternalistic protection was unconstitutional because it perpetuated gender stereotypes instead of ensuring real safety and equality. ➤ **Women’s protection versus women’s autonomy:** Article 15(3) permits special provisions for women, but it cannot be used as a cover for laws that reduce women’s agency. A valid special provision must advance equality, dignity and opportunity; it should not lock women into traditional roles. ## Discrimination on Ground of Place of Birth ➤ **Place of birth protected:** The State cannot discriminate against a citizen only because the citizen was born in a particular State, district, city, village or region. ➤ **Difference between place of birth and residence:** Place of birth is not the same as residence or domicile. A rule based solely on birth in a particular place is generally prohibited under Article 15(1), but residence-based classification may sometimes be examined under Article 14 or other provisions depending on the context. ➤ **Illustration:** If a government college denies admission only because a student was born outside a particular State, it may violate Article 15(1). But if a limited preference is based on residence and has a rational connection with local educational needs, it may require a separate Article 14 analysis. ## Article 15(2): Equal Access to Public Places and Facilities ➤ **Public access guarantee:** Article 15(2) says no citizen shall, only on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subjected to any disability, liability, restriction or condition regarding access to shops, public restaurants, hotels, places of public entertainment, wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained out of State funds or dedicated to public use. ➤ **Civil rights dimension:** This clause is a constitutional answer to social practices like untouchability, caste exclusion and gender-based public exclusion. It ensures that public life cannot be controlled by private prejudice when facilities are meant for public use. ➤ **Relation with Article 17:** Article 17 abolishes untouchability. Article 15(2) complements Article 17 by specifically preventing denial of access to public places and utilities on prohibited grounds. ➤ **Example:** A hotel refusing entry to a citizen because of caste or religion violates Article 15(2). A public well maintained by State funds cannot be restricted to a dominant caste. ## Protective Discrimination under Article 15 ➤ **Meaning of protective discrimination:** Protective discrimination means constitutionally permitted favourable treatment for disadvantaged groups. It is not discrimination in the negative sense; it is a method to correct historical and structural inequality. ➤ **Formal equality versus substantive equality:** Formal equality says everyone should be treated the same. Substantive equality asks whether people are actually placed in equal conditions. Article 15 adopts substantive equality by allowing special provisions for those who need support to reach equal status. ➤ **Constitutional basis:** Article 15(3), Article 15(4), Article 15(5) and Article 15(6) expressly permit special provisions. These clauses show that the Constitution does not treat affirmative action as an exception to equality in a narrow sense, but as a part of equality itself. ➤ **Protective discrimination is controlled power:** The State cannot create arbitrary reservations or benefits. Special provisions must have a constitutional purpose, rational basis, proper identification of beneficiaries and reasonable limits. ## Article 15(3): Special Provisions for Women and Children ➤ **Text and purpose:** Article 15(3) states that nothing in Article 15 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children. This allows the State to enact laws and policies addressing women’s disadvantage and children’s vulnerability. ➤ **Women-specific measures:** Article 15(3) supports provisions such as reservation for women in local bodies, maternity benefits, women’s hostels, separate facilities for safety and dignity, special welfare schemes, and preference or reservation in appropriate contexts. ➤ **Children-specific measures:** Article 15(3) permits special provisions for children such as free education, nutrition programmes, child protection laws, juvenile justice measures and child welfare schemes. ➤ **Yusuf Abdul Aziz case:** In **Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 321; 1954 SCR 930**, the accused challenged Section 497 IPC, which punished a man for adultery but did not punish the woman as an abettor. The issue was whether the provision discriminated on the ground of sex. The Supreme Court upheld the provision at that time by relying on Article 15(3), holding that special provisions for women were constitutionally permitted. However, the later decision in **Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39** struck down adultery as unconstitutional on broader grounds of equality, dignity, autonomy and privacy; therefore, Yusuf Abdul Aziz must now be read historically and not as good law on the validity of adultery. ➤ **P.B. Vijayakumar case:** In **Government of Andhra Pradesh v. P.B. Vijayakumar, (1995) 4 SCC 520**, the State provided preference/reservation for women in public employment. The issue was whether Article 15(3) could support such a provision despite Article 16. The Supreme Court held that Article 15(3) is wide enough to include reservation or preference for women and that such measures promote real equality. ➤ **Limit of women-protective laws:** A law cannot be justified under Article 15(3) merely because it mentions women’s protection. If the law is based on stereotypes, moral policing or exclusion from opportunity, it may be invalid as seen in **Anuj Garg**. ## Article 15(4): Special Provisions for SEBCs, SCs and STs ➤ **Text and purpose:** Article 15(4) permits the State to make special provisions for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. It was inserted by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Champakam Dorairajan. ➤ **Champakam Dorairajan case:** In **State of Madras v. Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan, AIR 1951 SC 226; 1951 SCR 525**, the Madras Government had a communal reservation order distributing medical and engineering seats among communities. The issue was whether such communal allocation violated Articles 15(1) and 29(2). The Supreme Court struck down the order, holding that admission could not be denied on grounds of religion, race, caste or language in violation of fundamental rights. This decision led to the First Constitutional Amendment, which inserted Article 15(4) to constitutionally permit special provisions for backward classes, SCs and STs. ➤ **Socially and educationally backward classes:** SEBCs are groups that suffer both social and educational backwardness. Caste may be a relevant factor in identifying backwardness in Indian society, but it cannot be applied mechanically without data or social context. ➤ **SCs and STs:** Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes receive explicit constitutional recognition because of historical oppression, untouchability, exclusion, land alienation, social isolation and denial of equal opportunity. ➤ **Nature of Article 15(4):** Article 15(4) is enabling, not mandatory. This means the State has the power to create special provisions, but an individual cannot always demand a particular reservation as a matter of automatic right unless a valid law or policy exists. ## Article 15(5): Reservation in Educational Institutions ➤ **Text and scope:** Article 15(5) allows the State to make special provisions, including reservation, for socially and educationally backward classes, SCs and STs in educational institutions, including private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State, except minority educational institutions under Article 30(1). ➤ **Reason for Article 15(5):** This clause was inserted to strengthen affirmative action in education, especially after judicial decisions concerning autonomy of private unaided institutions. It gives the State constitutional authority to extend reservation policies to private educational institutions, subject to the exception for minority institutions. ➤ **Minority institution exception:** Article 15(5) does not apply to minority educational institutions protected under Article 30(1). This preserves the constitutional right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. ➤ **Ashoka Kumar Thakur case:** In **Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, (2008) 6 SCC 1**, the Supreme Court examined the constitutional validity of Article 15(5) and the Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act, 2006, which provided OBC reservation in central educational institutions. The issue was whether such reservation violated equality and basic structure. The Court upheld the constitutional validity of Article 15(5) and OBC reservation in central educational institutions, while emphasising exclusion of creamy layer among OBCs and the need for proper identification of backward classes. ## Article 15(6): Economically Weaker Sections ➤ **Text and constitutional change:** Article 15(6) was inserted by the Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019. It permits the State to make special provisions, including reservation in educational institutions, for Economically Weaker Sections of citizens other than classes covered by Article 15(4) and Article 15(5). The reservation under Article 15(6) may extend to private educational institutions, aided or unaided, except minority educational institutions under Article 30(1), and may be in addition to existing reservations, subject to a maximum of 10%. ➤ **EWS as economic backwardness:** Article 15(6) marks an important development because it recognises economic disadvantage as a constitutionally permissible basis for affirmative action, distinct from social and educational backwardness. ➤ **Exclusion of SC/ST/OBC from EWS quota:** The EWS reservation is meant for economically weaker citizens who are not covered by existing reservation categories under Article 15(4), Article 15(5) and Article 16(4). This exclusion was one of the major constitutional issues in litigation. ➤ **Janhit Abhiyan case:** In **Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1540**, the Supreme Court, by a 3:2 majority, upheld the validity of the 103rd Constitutional Amendment introducing EWS reservation. The issue was whether reservation based solely on economic criteria, exclusion of SC/ST/OBC communities from EWS quota, and breach of the traditional 50% ceiling damaged the basic structure. The majority held that the amendment did not violate the basic structure and that economic weakness could be a valid basis for affirmative action. The dissent held that exclusion of already disadvantaged classes from EWS benefits was constitutionally problematic. ## Article 15 and Reservation: Important Constitutional Principles ➤ **Reservation as equality tool:** Reservation is not charity. It is a constitutional device to ensure representation, access and advancement of groups historically denied equal opportunity. ➤ **Reasonableness of reservation:** Reservation must remain within constitutional limits. In **M.R. Balaji**, the Supreme Court disapproved excessive reservation and suggested that reservation should generally be reasonable and not destroy equality. ➤ **50% ceiling:** In **Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217**, a nine-judge bench examined OBC reservation in public employment under Article 16(4). Although the case directly concerned Article 16, it deeply influenced reservation law generally. The Court upheld OBC reservation, recognised caste as a relevant indicator of backwardness in Indian conditions, introduced the creamy layer principle for OBCs, and held that reservation should ordinarily not exceed 50% except in extraordinary circumstances. ➤ **Creamy layer principle:** Creamy layer means the advanced sections within a backward class who no longer require reservation benefits. The principle prevents the benefits of reservation from being monopolised by the socially and economically advanced among backward classes. ➤ **Vertical and horizontal reservation:** Reservation for SCs, STs, OBCs and EWS is generally vertical reservation. Reservation or preference for women, persons with disabilities, ex-servicemen or other categories may operate horizontally within vertical categories. In **P.B. Vijayakumar**, the Supreme Court accepted women’s reservation/preference as a valid special provision under Article 15(3). ## Difference between Article 15(4), Article 15(5) and Article 15(6) BasisArticle 15(4)Article 15(5)Article 15(6)**Beneficiaries**SEBCs, SCs, STsSEBCs, SCs, STsEWS other than classes covered by 15(4) and 15(5)**Main focus**Advancement through special provisionsAdmission/reservation in educational institutionsEconomic weakness-based special provisions and educational reservation**Institutions covered**General enabling provisionEducational institutions, including private aided/unaided, except minority institutionsEducational institutions, including private aided/unaided, except minority institutions**Nature**Protective discriminationEducational affirmative actionEconomic affirmative action**Important case**M.R. BalajiAshoka Kumar ThakurJanhit Abhiyan## Important Case Laws on Article 15 ➤ **State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, AIR 1951 SC 226; 1951 SCR 525:** The State followed a communal government order distributing seats in medical and engineering colleges among religious and caste groups. The issue was whether such allocation violated Articles 15(1) and 29(2). The Supreme Court struck down the order and held that fundamental rights prevail over directive principles. The decision directly led to the First Constitutional Amendment inserting Article 15(4). ➤ **M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, AIR 1963 SC 649:** The State reserved 68% seats for backward classes, more backward classes, SCs and STs. The issue was whether the reservation was valid under Article 15(4). The Court held that Article 15(4) is for advancement of backward classes but cannot justify excessive reservation or caste-only classification. ➤ **Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 321; 1954 SCR 930:** Section 497 IPC was challenged as discriminatory because it punished only men for adultery. The Supreme Court upheld the provision by relying on Article 15(3), holding that special provisions for women are constitutionally permitted. The case is now important mainly historically because adultery itself was later struck down in Joseph Shine. ➤ **Government of Andhra Pradesh v. P.B. Vijayakumar, (1995) 4 SCC 520:** The issue was whether preference/reservation for women in State employment could be supported by Article 15(3). The Supreme Court held that Article 15(3) is wide and includes reservation for women, thereby recognising affirmative action for women as part of substantive equality. ➤ **Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India, (2008) 3 SCC 1:** A law restricted employment of women in places where liquor was served. The issue was whether such restriction could be justified as protection. The Supreme Court struck it down, holding that protection cannot be based on stereotypes that deny women equal opportunity. ➤ **Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, (2008) 6 SCC 1:** The Court upheld Article 15(5) and OBC reservation in central educational institutions while requiring exclusion of creamy layer among OBCs and emphasising proper identification of backwardness. ➤ **Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217:** Though primarily under Article 16, it is central to Indian reservation law. The Court upheld OBC reservation, recognised caste as a relevant factor for backwardness, introduced creamy layer exclusion for OBCs, and laid down the ordinary 50% ceiling rule. ➤ **Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1540:** The Supreme Court upheld the 103rd Amendment and EWS reservation by a 3:2 majority. The majority accepted economic weakness as a permissible basis of affirmative action, while the dissent objected to the exclusion of SC/ST/OBC poor from the EWS quota. ## Article 15 and Substantive Equality ➤ **Real equality:** Article 15 does not merely prohibit hostile discrimination. It also authorises the State to correct inequality through welfare schemes, reservations, preferences and special protections. ➤ **No contradiction between equality and reservation:** Reservation under Article 15 is not an exception that destroys equality. It is a constitutionally recognised method of achieving equality for groups that cannot compete fairly because of historical disadvantage. ➤ **Individual merit and social barriers:** The Constitution recognises that merit is not produced in a vacuum. Access to nutrition, schooling, social dignity, safe environment, economic stability and absence of discrimination all influence performance. Article 15 allows the State to address these structural barriers. ➤ **Balanced approach:** The State must balance social justice with constitutional discipline. It must identify backwardness using relevant data, avoid arbitrary political classification, prevent over-inclusion, exclude creamy layer where applicable, and preserve fairness for all citizens. ## Quick Revision Table ClauseMain RuleProtected/Benefited GroupKey Point**Article 15(1)**Prohibits State discriminationCitizensReligion, race, caste, sex, place of birth**Article 15(2)**Prohibits denial of public accessCitizensShops, hotels, restaurants, wells, tanks, roads, public resorts**Article 15(3)**Allows special provisionsWomen and childrenProtective and affirmative measures**Article 15(4)**Allows advancement measuresSEBCs, SCs, STsInserted after Champakam Dorairajan**Article 15(5)**Allows educational reservationSEBCs, SCs, STsIncludes private institutions, excludes minority institutions**Article 15(6)**Allows EWS reservationEconomically weaker sectionsAdded by 103rd Amendment, upheld in Janhit Abhiyan## Memory Aid for Article 15 ➤ **“RRCSP + WCSSE” formula:** **RRCSP** = Religion, Race, Caste, Sex, Place of birth are prohibited grounds. **WCSSE** = Women, Children, SEBCs, SC/STs, EWS are protected through special provisions. ➤ **Simple understanding:** Article 15 first says, “Do not discriminate against citizens on identity grounds.” Then it says, “But the State may support disadvantaged groups to achieve real equality.” ## Conclusion ➤ **Constitutional essence:** Article 15 is a bridge between **non-discrimination** and **social justice**. It prohibits exclusion based on religion, race, caste, sex and place of birth, while allowing special measures for women, children, backward classes, SCs, STs and EWS. ➤ **Modern importance:** The provision remains central to debates on reservation, gender equality, caste justice, educational access, public dignity, EWS reservation and anti-stereotyping. Its true spirit is not equal treatment in appearance, but equality in substance. ➤ **Final takeaway:** Article 15 teaches that the Constitution does not accept either social prejudice or blind uniformity. It demands a society where no citizen is excluded because of identity, and where historically disadvantaged groups receive constitutionally valid support to stand equally with others. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Article 14 of the Indian Constitution: Equality Before Law, Equal Protection, Reasonable Classification, Arbitrariness and Administrative Discretion](https://lawfoyer.in/article-14-of-the-indian-constitution/) **Published:** June 2, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/ChatGPTImageJun2202606_17_57P-725x1024.jpeg) ## Article 14: Constitutional Text and Core Meaning ➤ **Constitutional guarantee:** Article 14 of the Constitution of India provides that **“The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”** This is one of the most powerful fundamental rights because it controls legislation, executive action, administrative discretion, public employment decisions, State contracts, licensing, taxation, welfare schemes and every form of State conduct. ➤ **Available to every person:** Article 14 uses the word **“person”**, not merely “citizen”. Therefore, its protection is available not only to Indian citizens but also to non-citizens, juristic persons, companies and associations, wherever State action within India affects them. The State cannot act unequally merely because a person is politically weak, socially marginalised, economically poor, foreign, unpopular or dependent on State permission. ➤ **Two expressions in one Article:** Article 14 contains two connected but distinct expressions: **“equality before law”** and **“equal protection of laws.”** The first is mainly a negative concept requiring absence of special privilege, while the second is a positive concept requiring the State to treat similarly situated persons similarly and to make rational distinctions where real differences exist. The Supreme Court in **State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, 1952 SCR 284** noted that Article 14 combines the English idea of equality before law with the American idea of equal protection. ## Equality Before Law ➤ **Meaning of equality before law:** **Equality before law** means that every person, whether rich or poor, powerful or weak, public officer or private citizen, is subject to the ordinary law of the land. No one is above law. It rejects arbitrary power, special privilege and unequal legal status. ➤ **Rule of law connection:** Equality before law is closely connected with the **rule of law**. In a rule-of-law system, power must be exercised according to law, not according to personal liking, political pressure, private bias or administrative convenience. A government officer cannot say, “I will apply the rule to one person but not to another,” unless there is a lawful and rational basis. ➤ **Simple illustration:** If a traffic rule applies to all drivers, a minister, judge, police officer, businessperson and ordinary citizen are all bound by it. A public authority cannot exempt a powerful person from the law merely because of status. That is the essence of equality before law. ## Equal Protection of Laws ➤ **Meaning of equal protection:** **Equal protection of laws** means that persons who are similarly placed must be treated similarly, and persons who are differently placed may be treated differently if the difference is real and relevant to the purpose of the law. It does not mean identical treatment in all situations. ➤ **Substantive equality:** Equal protection allows the State to make special laws for disadvantaged groups, children, women, labourers, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, socially and educationally backward classes, persons with disabilities and other vulnerable groups. Treating unequals equally may itself become inequality. ➤ **Simple illustration:** A law giving free textbooks to poor schoolchildren is not unconstitutional merely because rich children do not receive the same benefit. The classification is based on economic need and has a rational connection with educational equality. ## Equality Before Law and Equal Protection of Laws: Difference Table BasisEquality Before LawEqual Protection of Laws**Nature**Negative conceptPositive concept**Main idea**No one is above lawSimilar persons must receive similar protection**Source idea**English rule of lawAmerican equal protection doctrine**Focus**Absence of privilegeRational and fair treatment**Permits classification?**Mainly insists on equal legal subjectionPermits reasonable classification**Example**A public officer is also bound by criminal lawSpecial welfare scheme for weaker sections## Article 14 Does Not Mean Absolute Equality ➤ **No mechanical equality:** Article 14 does not require that every law must apply identically to every person. Human society contains different classes, occupations, needs, risks and conditions. Therefore, the Constitution permits the State to classify persons, things, areas or situations for legislative and administrative purposes. ➤ **Class legislation prohibited:** Article 14 prohibits **class legislation**, meaning hostile, artificial or arbitrary selection of a group for special burden or benefit without rational justification. ➤ **Reasonable classification permitted:** Article 14 permits **reasonable classification**, meaning a real and rational grouping based on intelligible differentia and connected with the object of the law. In **Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 191 / 1955 SCR 1045**, the Supreme Court clearly stated that Article 14 forbids class legislation but does not forbid reasonable classification. ## Doctrine of Reasonable Classification ➤ **Two-fold test:** A classification is constitutionally valid under Article 14 when it satisfies two conditions: RequirementMeaning**Intelligible differentia**The classification must be based on a clear, understandable and real distinction separating persons included in the group from those excluded.**Rational nexus**The differentia must have a reasonable connection with the object sought to be achieved by the law.➤ **Intelligible differentia explained:** The word **“intelligible”** means understandable. The State must be able to explain why one group has been selected and another left out. A classification based on age, income, nature of work, geographical condition, educational qualification, risk level or public need may be intelligible if relevant. ➤ **Rational nexus explained:** Even if the classification is clear, it must be connected with the purpose of the law. For example, prescribing a higher age requirement for judges may be rational because judicial office requires maturity and legal experience. But prescribing height as a qualification for a desk-based clerical post may fail Article 14 if height has no connection with the work. ➤ **Case law — State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, 1952 SCR 284:** The West Bengal Special Courts Act allowed the State Government to send selected cases to special courts with a different procedure. The issue was whether such selective procedure violated Article 14. The Supreme Court held that unguided and uncontrolled selection of cases for special treatment could offend Article 14 because the law did not provide a reasonable basis for choosing which cases would go to special courts. The ratio is that classification must not be vague, unguided or arbitrary; it must rest on a rational principle. ➤ **Case law — Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 191 / 1955 SCR 1045:** The petitioners challenged differential criminal procedure. The Supreme Court explained that Article 14 does not forbid classification, but the classification must be founded on intelligible differentia and that differentia must have a rational relation with the object of the law. This case is a foundational authority for the two-fold test of reasonable classification. ➤ **Memory aid:** **“D + N = Valid Classification”** **D** = Differentia must be intelligible. **N** = Nexus must exist with the object of law. ## Limits of Reasonable Classification ➤ **Over-inclusive classification:** A classification may be invalid if it includes persons who have no real connection with the purpose of the law. For example, a law meant to regulate dangerous industries cannot randomly include harmless small shops without a rational reason. ➤ **Under-inclusive classification:** A classification may be questioned if it excludes persons who are similarly placed in relation to the object of the law. However, courts usually give the legislature some flexibility because laws may be experimental and may deal with problems step by step. ➤ **Disguised discrimination:** A classification may appear neutral but may operate unfairly against a vulnerable group. Article 14 looks not only at the form of law but also at its effect when the effect reveals irrational or discriminatory State action. ➤ **No arbitrary selection:** The State cannot pick and choose persons for benefit or burden without a clear standard. When discretion is unguided, excessive or based on irrelevant considerations, Article 14 is attracted. ## Arbitrariness Doctrine under Article 14 ➤ **Shift from formal equality to substantive fairness:** Earlier Article 14 was mainly understood through reasonable classification. Later, the Supreme Court expanded Article 14 by holding that **arbitrariness itself is a form of inequality**. This means that even where no traditional classification is shown, State action may be struck down if it is arbitrary, irrational, unfair or without principle. ➤ **Case law — E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 / (1974) 4 SCC 3:** The petitioner, a senior IAS officer, challenged his transfer and posting as arbitrary and mala fide. The Supreme Court gave Article 14 a dynamic meaning and held that equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies. The ratio is that where State action is arbitrary, it is unequal and therefore violates Article 14. This case transformed Article 14 from a narrow classification rule into a broad guarantee against arbitrary State action. ➤ **Case law — Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 / (1978) 1 SCC 248:** The petitioner’s passport was impounded without giving reasons initially, raising issues under Articles 14, 19 and 21. The Supreme Court held that procedure affecting personal liberty must be right, just and fair, not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. The Court connected Article 14 with reasonableness and fairness, holding that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action. ➤ **Meaning in simple words:** If the government acts without reason, without standards, without fairness or by using power for an improper purpose, its action may violate Article 14 even if the action does not fit neatly into a classification problem. ## Manifest Arbitrariness ➤ **Meaning of manifest arbitrariness:** **Manifest arbitrariness** means arbitrariness that is obvious, clear, excessive or plainly unreasonable. It is not every small defect in law. It refers to legislation or State action that is capricious, irrational, without adequate determining principle, excessive, disproportionate or based on no fair standard. ➤ **Use against legislation:** The doctrine is important because it allows courts to examine whether even a law made by the legislature is so irrational or excessive that it violates Article 14. Courts remain careful because they do not sit as super-legislatures, but a law cannot survive merely because it is formally enacted if it is plainly arbitrary. ➤ **Case law — Shayara Bano v. Union of India, AIR 2017 SC 4609 / (2017) 9 SCC 1:** The issue was the constitutional validity of talaq-e-biddat, commonly called instant triple talaq. The Supreme Court, by majority, set aside the practice. Justice R.F. Nariman’s opinion applied the doctrine of manifest arbitrariness and explained that legislation or legal rules may be invalid under Article 14 if they are capricious, irrational, without adequate determining principle or excessive and disproportionate. The ratio relevant to Article 14 is that manifest arbitrariness is a ground for invalidating State-recognised legal norms. ➤ **Difference between ordinary arbitrariness and manifest arbitrariness:** Ordinary arbitrariness may describe unfair executive conduct; manifest arbitrariness is a stricter standard often used while examining legislation. It requires a higher degree of obvious irrationality. ## Equality as an Anti-Discrimination Principle ➤ **Anti-discrimination foundation:** Article 14 is the general equality clause. Articles 15, 16, 17 and 18 are specific applications of equality in particular areas. Article 15 addresses discrimination on grounds such as religion, race, caste, sex and place of birth. Article 16 applies equality in public employment. Article 17 abolishes untouchability. Article 18 abolishes titles, except constitutionally permitted distinctions. ➤ **Article 14 as a broad shield:** Even where discrimination does not fall directly under Article 15 or 16, Article 14 may still apply if State action creates unfair exclusion, irrational burden or unequal treatment. Thus, Article 14 is not only about formal sameness; it is also about dignity, fairness and equal concern. ➤ **Direct and indirect discrimination:** Direct discrimination occurs when law openly treats people differently on an improper basis. Indirect discrimination occurs when a neutral rule disproportionately harms a protected or vulnerable group without adequate justification. For example, a rule may not mention gender but may operate in a manner that excludes women from equal opportunity. ➤ **Substantive equality:** The anti-discrimination principle under Article 14 supports substantive equality. It asks whether the law actually produces fair treatment in social reality. This is why protective discrimination, reservation, welfare benefits, maternity protection and special measures for vulnerable groups are not automatically unequal; they may be necessary to achieve real equality. ## Article 14 and Administrative Discretion ➤ **Discretion must be guided:** Administrative discretion means power given to an authority to choose between lawful options. Article 14 does not prohibit discretion, but it prohibits **unguided, uncontrolled, mala fide, discriminatory or arbitrary discretion**. ➤ **Administrative authorities must act fairly:** Whenever the State grants licences, awards contracts, makes appointments, distributes benefits, cancels permissions, allots land, blacklists contractors or takes disciplinary action, it must follow fair standards. The State cannot act like a private person choosing favourites. ➤ **Case law — Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 / (1979) 3 SCC 489:** The Airport Authority invited tenders for a restaurant and snack bar, prescribing eligibility conditions. A tender was accepted despite non-compliance with the stated conditions. The Supreme Court held that the government and its instrumentalities must act fairly and cannot depart from declared standards arbitrarily. The ratio is that Article 14 applies to State contracts, tenders and public dealings; arbitrariness in awarding State largesse violates equality. ➤ **Case law — Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (1980) 4 SCC 1:** The issue concerned grant of State resources and governmental contracts. The Supreme Court held that governmental action in contractual matters must be reasonable, non-arbitrary and in public interest. The State cannot distribute public wealth according to private preference. This case strengthens the principle that Article 14 controls State largesse. ➤ **Case law — Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P., AIR 1991 SC 537 / (1991) 1 SCC 212:** The State of Uttar Pradesh terminated the appointments of all government counsel by a general order. The Supreme Court held that Article 14 applies even in contractual and public-law employment-related arrangements where the State is involved. The ratio is that arbitrariness is the negation of rule of law, and every State action must satisfy fairness and reasonableness. ➤ **Case law — Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, AIR 1981 SC 487 / (1981) 1 SCC 722:** The issue involved admissions to an engineering college controlled by a society substantially connected with the government. The Supreme Court held that bodies that are instrumentalities or agencies of the State are subject to constitutional limitations. The ratio is that Article 14 cannot be avoided by creating government-controlled bodies in corporate or society form. ➤ **Practical rule:** Administrative discretion survives Article 14 when it is exercised on relevant material, by lawful authority, for proper purpose, according to declared standards, after fair procedure and without bias, mala fides or discrimination. ## Article 14 and Natural Justice ➤ **Fair hearing as equality:** Natural justice is closely connected with Article 14 because arbitrary procedure produces unequal treatment. Where a person is affected by State action, fairness may require notice, opportunity of hearing, disclosure of reasons and an unbiased decision-maker. ➤ **Reasoned decisions:** A reasoned order helps prevent arbitrary power. When an authority gives reasons, the affected person understands why the decision was taken, and courts can examine whether the decision is lawful. ➤ **No rigid formula:** Natural justice is flexible. Urgent preventive action, national security concerns, academic evaluation and legislative policy may require different levels of hearing. But complete denial of fairness without justification may violate Article 14. ## Article 14 Review: What Courts Usually Examine QuestionArticle 14 relevance**Is there unequal treatment?**Similar persons should not be treated differently without reason.**Is there classification?**Classification must be based on intelligible differentia.**Is there nexus?**The distinction must connect with the object of law.**Is the action arbitrary?**State action must not be irrational, capricious or unfair.**Is discretion guided?**Administrative power must have standards and limits.**Is the action discriminatory in effect?**Neutral rules may still violate equality if unjustified impact is discriminatory.**Is the law manifestly arbitrary?**A law may be invalid if it is plainly irrational or excessive.## Important Conceptual Distinctions ➤ **Equality and uniformity:** Equality is not the same as uniformity. Uniformity means everyone gets the same treatment. Equality means fair treatment according to relevant circumstances. ➤ **Classification and discrimination:** Classification is constitutionally permissible when reasonable. Discrimination is constitutionally impermissible when the distinction is hostile, irrational, irrelevant or based on prohibited grounds. ➤ **Legislative arbitrariness and executive arbitrariness:** Legislative arbitrariness concerns validity of laws. Executive arbitrariness concerns administrative orders, government contracts, transfers, licences, selection processes and policy implementation. ➤ **Formal equality and substantive equality:** Formal equality asks whether the law treats everyone alike on paper. Substantive equality asks whether the law actually gives fair and equal protection in real life. ## Illustrations for Easy Understanding ➤ **Valid classification illustration:** A law requiring special safety training for pilots but not for bus passengers is valid because pilots perform a specialised safety-sensitive function. ➤ **Invalid classification illustration:** A municipal rule granting shop licences only to persons belonging to one political party is invalid because political loyalty has no rational nexus with running a shop. ➤ **Administrative discretion illustration:** If a university announces that admission will be based on merit and interview, it cannot secretly select candidates based on personal influence. Such conduct is arbitrary and violates Article 14. ➤ **Manifest arbitrariness illustration:** A law allowing cancellation of any business licence “whenever the authority desires” without standards, reasons or remedies may be manifestly arbitrary because it gives naked and uncontrolled power. ## Landmark Case Summary Table CasePrinciple**State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, 1952 SCR 284**Unguided special procedure may violate Article 14.**Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 191**Article 14 forbids class legislation but permits reasonable classification.**E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555**Equality is antithetical to arbitrariness.**Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597**Article 14 requires fairness, reasonableness and non-arbitrary procedure.**Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority, AIR 1979 SC 1628**State contracts and tenders must follow fair and non-arbitrary standards.**Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, AIR 1981 SC 487**State instrumentalities are bound by Article 14.**Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P., AIR 1991 SC 537**Article 14 applies even to State contractual action; arbitrariness negates rule of law.**Shayara Bano v. Union of India, AIR 2017 SC 4609**Manifest arbitrariness is a ground under Article 14.## Conclusion ➤ **Article 14 as the heart of fairness:** Article 14 is not a narrow command that everyone must always be treated identically. It is a broad constitutional guarantee that the State must act with fairness, reason, non-discrimination and equal concern. ➤ **Three controlling ideas:** The modern understanding of Article 14 rests on three major ideas: **reasonable classification**, **non-arbitrariness** and **substantive anti-discrimination**. Reasonable classification allows the State to deal with real differences. The arbitrariness doctrine prevents irrational power. The anti-discrimination principle ensures that equality is meaningful in social reality. ➤ **Administrative importance:** Article 14 is especially important in administrative law because most citizen-State interactions occur through executive discretion. Licences, tenders, appointments, welfare schemes, disciplinary orders and public benefits must all follow fair standards. ➤ **Final essence:** Article 14 means that the State must not act by whim, favouritism, hostility, prejudice or irrationality. It must act through law, reason, fairness and constitutional morality. That is why Article 14 is one of the strongest protections against arbitrary power in Indian constitutional law. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Fundamental Rights: General Principles under Articles 12 and 13 of the Constitution of India](https://lawfoyer.in/fundamental-rights/) **Published:** May 31, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/ChatGPTImageMay31202609_03_10P-725x1024.jpeg) ## Introduction to Fundamental Rights and General Principles ➤ **Core idea:** Fundamental Rights are constitutional guarantees contained in Part III of the Constitution of India. They protect individuals from arbitrary power, preserve human dignity, and ensure that the State acts according to constitutional limits. ➤ **Articles 12 and 13 as foundation:** Articles 12 and 13 are placed at the beginning of Part III because they answer two basic questions: **against whom Fundamental Rights are generally enforceable** and **what happens when a law violates Fundamental Rights**. ➤ **Article 12 — meaning of “State”:** Article 12 defines “State” for Part III. It includes the Government and Parliament of India, the Government and Legislature of each State, and all local or other authorities within India or under the control of the Government of India. ➤ **Article 13 — invalidity of inconsistent laws:** Article 13 declares that pre-Constitution laws inconsistent with Fundamental Rights are void to the extent of inconsistency, and the State cannot make any future law which takes away or abridges Fundamental Rights. ➤ **Practical importance:** Without Article 12, it would be unclear which bodies are bound by Fundamental Rights. Without Article 13, there would be no direct constitutional rule invalidating laws inconsistent with Part III. ## Article 12 of the Constitution of India: Definition of State ➤ **Textual meaning:** Article 12 says that, unless the context otherwise requires, “the State” includes four broad categories: **Government and Parliament of India**, **Government and Legislature of each State**, **local authorities**, and **other authorities** within India or under the control of the Government of India. ➤ **Inclusive definition:** The word “includes” shows that Article 12 is not exhaustive. It gives a broad constitutional meaning so that bodies exercising public power do not escape Fundamental Rights merely because they are not traditional government departments. ➤ **Purpose of Article 12:** Fundamental Rights are mainly enforceable against the State because constitutional rights are designed to control public power. Therefore, whenever a body is found to be “State” under Article 12, its actions must satisfy constitutional standards such as equality, fairness, non-arbitrariness and reasonableness. ### Government and Parliament of India ➤ **Union executive and legislature:** The Central Government, Union Ministries, departments, statutory offices under Union control, and Parliament are clearly “State”. Any executive order, administrative action, legislation, rule, regulation or notification made by them can be tested against Fundamental Rights. ➤ **Example:** A Central Government rule excluding a class of eligible persons from public employment can be challenged under Articles 14 and 16 if the classification is arbitrary or discriminatory. ### Government and Legislature of States ➤ **State executive and legislature:** State Governments, State departments, State legislatures, and authorities functioning under State control are also covered by Article 12. ➤ **Example:** A State law restricting freedom of trade, speech, religion or equality can be challenged if it violates any provision of Part III. ### Local Authorities under Article 12 ➤ **Meaning of local authority:** Local authorities include bodies such as municipalities, panchayats, district boards, improvement trusts and other local self-government institutions that exercise statutory powers in a defined local area. ➤ **Legal basis:** A local authority generally has legal existence, power to administer local affairs, power to raise funds or taxes, and public duties towards residents of that area. ➤ **Constitutional consequence:** Since local authorities are “State”, their actions must be fair, non-arbitrary and consistent with Fundamental Rights. ### Other Authorities under Article 12 ➤ **Most important expression:** The phrase **“other authorities”** has created the richest constitutional jurisprudence under Article 12. It covers bodies which may not be government departments but are so connected with governmental power, public functions, public funding or governmental control that they should be treated as State. ➤ **Early approach — statutory power test:** In **Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1967 SC 1857**, the Supreme Court held that the Rajasthan State Electricity Board was “State” under Article 12. The important principle was that an authority created by statute and having power to make binding rules or regulations could fall within “other authorities”. ➤ **Expansion of State agencies:** In **Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram, (1975) 1 SCC 421**, statutory corporations such as ONGC, LIC and IFC were treated as “State”. The Supreme Court recognised that modern governance often works through corporations and statutory bodies, and such bodies cannot avoid constitutional obligations when they exercise public power. ➤ **Instrumentality or agency test:** In **Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489**, the Supreme Court held that a government-created airport authority was an instrumentality of the State. The Court emphasised that even in contractual matters, State agencies must act fairly and cannot arbitrarily choose favoured persons. ➤ **Ajay Hasia test:** In **Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722**, the Supreme Court held that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act may also be “State” if it is in reality an instrumentality or agency of the Government. The Court gave indicators such as government funding, deep control, public importance of functions, transfer of government department to the body, and monopoly status. ➤ **Pradeep Kumar Biswas clarification:** In **Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 SCC 111**, a seven-Judge Bench clarified that the Ajay Hasia factors are not a rigid formula. The real test is whether the body is **financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government**, and such control must be particular and pervasive, not merely regulatory. ➤ **Mere regulation is not enough:** A private body does not become State merely because it is regulated by law. For Article 12, there must be deep governmental domination or the body must be an instrumentality or agency of government. ➤ **Zee Telefilms and BCCI:** In **Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India, (2005) 4 SCC 649**, the Supreme Court by majority held that BCCI was not “State” under Article 12. The Court noted that BCCI was not created by statute, did not receive substantial government financial assistance, and was not under deep and pervasive government control. ➤ **Public function distinction:** Even if a body is not “State” under Article 12, it may still be subject to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 if it performs a public duty. This distinction is important because Article 12 is mainly relevant for Article 32 and Part III enforcement, while Article 226 is wider. ## Article 12 and Writs against Private Bodies ➤ **Article 32 position:** Article 32 is normally used for enforcement of Fundamental Rights against the State. Therefore, whether the respondent is “State” under Article 12 becomes crucial. ➤ **Article 226 is wider:** High Courts under Article 226 can issue writs not only for Fundamental Rights but also “for any other purpose”. Therefore, writs may be issued against private bodies if they discharge public duties. ➤ **Andi Mukta principle:** In **Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani, (1989) 2 SCC 691**, the Supreme Court held that the words “any person or authority” under Article 226 must receive a liberal meaning, and a writ can lie against a private body performing a public duty. ➤ **Practical distinction:** A private unaided school, private university, bank selection body, sports association or hospital may not always be “State” under Article 12. But if it performs public duties or is under statutory/public obligations, High Courts may examine its actions under Article 226. ## Article 13 of the Constitution: Laws Inconsistent with Fundamental Rights ➤ **Basic rule of constitutional supremacy:** Article 13 ensures that Fundamental Rights prevail over ordinary laws. If a law is inconsistent with Part III, the inconsistent part becomes void. ➤ **Article 13(1):** It applies to laws in force before the commencement of the Constitution. Such laws become void **to the extent of inconsistency** with Fundamental Rights. ➤ **Article 13(2):** It prohibits the State from making any law which takes away or abridges Fundamental Rights. Any law made in contravention is void to the extent of contravention. ➤ **Article 13(3)(a):** “Law” includes Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having the force of law. This is very wide and ensures that executive and subordinate legal instruments are also tested against Fundamental Rights. ➤ **Article 13(3)(b):** “Laws in force” includes pre-Constitution laws passed or made by competent authorities, even if they were not operating in all areas at the commencement of the Constitution. ➤ **Article 13(4):** It says that Article 13 does not apply to constitutional amendments made under Article 368. This clause was inserted by the Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971, but constitutional amendments are still subject to the **basic structure doctrine** after Kesavananda Bharati. ## Doctrine of Severability under Article 13 ➤ **Meaning:** The Doctrine of Severability means that when only a part of a law violates Fundamental Rights, only that offending part is void, and the remaining valid part can survive if it is independent and workable. ➤ **Constitutional basis:** Article 13 uses the words **“to the extent of such inconsistency”** and **“to the extent of the contravention”**, which clearly support severability. ➤ **Simple example:** If a statute has ten sections and only two sections violate Article 14, the Court may strike down only those two sections while allowing the remaining eight sections to operate. ➤ **A.K. Gopalan principle:** In **A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27**, parts of preventive detention law were examined for constitutional validity. The case is important because the Court applied the idea that invalid portions of a law may be separated if the remaining law can function independently. ➤ **R.M.D.C. test:** In **R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628**, the Supreme Court explained that the valid part of a law can survive if it is distinct and separable from the invalid part, and if the legislature would have enacted the valid part even without the invalid part. ➤ **When severability fails:** If the valid and invalid parts are so mixed that they cannot be separated, or if the remaining law becomes meaningless or contrary to legislative intention, the whole law may be struck down. ➤ **Key memory point:** Severability saves the valid portion of law; it does not save the unconstitutional portion. ## Doctrine of Eclipse under Article 13 ➤ **Meaning:** The Doctrine of Eclipse means that a pre-Constitution law inconsistent with Fundamental Rights is not dead for all purposes. It becomes dormant, overshadowed or eclipsed as against citizens while the inconsistency continues. ➤ **Why it applies mainly to pre-Constitution laws:** Article 13(1) deals with existing laws. Such laws were valid when made, but became unenforceable after the Constitution to the extent they conflicted with Fundamental Rights. ➤ **Bhikaji Narain Dhakras case:** In **Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1955 SC 781**, a pre-Constitution motor transport law became inconsistent with Article 19(1)(g). After the Constitution was amended to permit State monopoly in such business, the law revived. The Supreme Court applied the Doctrine of Eclipse and held that the law was not dead but only eclipsed. ➤ **Effect of constitutional amendment:** If the constitutional shadow is removed by a valid constitutional amendment, the eclipsed law may again become operative without fresh enactment, provided the law was pre-Constitutional and otherwise valid. ➤ **Deep Chand limitation:** In **Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1959 SC 648**, the Supreme Court indicated that post-Constitution laws violating Fundamental Rights are stillborn or void from inception under Article 13(2), so eclipse generally does not apply to them in the same way. ➤ **Mahendra Lal Jaini clarification:** In **Mahendra Lal Jaini v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 1019**, the Court maintained the distinction between pre-Constitution laws under Article 13(1) and post-Constitution laws under Article 13(2). ➤ **Key memory point:** Eclipse means “temporarily hidden, not destroyed”; severability means “cut the bad part and keep the good part.” ## Doctrine of Waiver of Fundamental Rights ➤ **Meaning of waiver:** Waiver means voluntary abandonment of a legal right. In ordinary private law, a person may waive certain rights. But Fundamental Rights are not ordinary private rights. ➤ **Indian position:** Fundamental Rights cannot generally be waived. A citizen cannot authorise the State to violate the Constitution. ➤ **Basheshar Nath case:** In **Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income Tax, AIR 1959 SC 149**, the Supreme Court held that there can be no waiver of Fundamental Rights. Article 13(2) is a constitutional command to the State, and no citizen can relieve the State from obeying that command. ➤ **Reasoning:** Fundamental Rights are not merely individual benefits; they also protect public policy, constitutional morality and the rule of law. If waiver were freely allowed, the State could obtain consent from vulnerable citizens and bypass constitutional restrictions. ➤ **Example:** A person cannot validly agree that the State may discriminate against him in violation of Article 14, or punish him without authority of law in violation of Article 21. ➤ **Key memory point:** Fundamental Rights protect both the individual and the constitutional order; therefore, waiver cannot be used to validate unconstitutional State action. ## Horizontal Application of Fundamental Rights ➤ **Vertical application:** Traditionally, Fundamental Rights operate vertically, meaning they are enforced by individuals against the State. ➤ **Horizontal application:** Horizontal application means enforcement of Fundamental Rights against private persons or private bodies. ➤ **Indian Constitution has mixed design:** Many Fundamental Rights are directed against the State, but some provisions expressly or effectively apply against private individuals also. ➤ **Article 15(2):** Article 15(2) prohibits denial of access to shops, public restaurants, hotels, places of public entertainment, wells, tanks, roads and places of public resort on specified grounds. Its wording is not limited only to State action and therefore has a direct horizontal character in public access contexts. ➤ **Article 17:** Abolition of untouchability applies against society at large. A private person practising untouchability cannot say that Fundamental Rights bind only the State. ➤ **Article 23:** Prohibition of trafficking, begar and forced labour applies against both State and private persons. In **People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 1473**, the Supreme Court held that Article 23 is enforceable even against private individuals, and the State has a duty to prevent forced labour. ➤ **Article 24:** Prohibition of employment of children in factories, mines and hazardous employment also affects private employers. ➤ **Vishaka and workplace dignity:** In **Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241**, the Supreme Court framed guidelines against sexual harassment at workplace until legislation was enacted. The case used Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g) and 21 to protect dignity and equality in both public and private workplaces. ➤ **Kaushal Kishor development:** In **Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2023) 4 SCC 1**, the Supreme Court discussed horizontal application of Articles 19 and 21. The majority took a wider view that Fundamental Rights under Articles 19 and 21 may operate even against persons other than the State in appropriate situations, though practical enforcement will depend on the nature of remedy and facts. ➤ **Caution:** Horizontal application does not mean every private dispute automatically becomes a Fundamental Rights case. Courts examine the nature of the right, the nature of the duty, availability of statutory/common law remedies, and whether public law intervention is appropriate. ## Enforceability against Private Bodies where Applicable ➤ **Private body as State:** A private or non-government body may be treated as “State” under Article 12 if it is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by the Government with deep and pervasive control. ➤ **Private body under Article 226:** Even if not State under Article 12, a private body performing public duty may be subject to writ jurisdiction under Article 226. ➤ **Private body under horizontal rights:** Certain Fundamental Rights directly or indirectly bind private persons, such as Articles 15(2), 17, 23 and 24. ➤ **Statutory enforcement:** Many constitutional values are enforced against private bodies through statutes, such as labour laws, anti-discrimination provisions, child labour laws, environmental laws, consumer protection law and sexual harassment law. ➤ **Public function test:** If a private body performs functions having public importance, statutory flavour, public duty, or monopoly-like control over essential opportunities, courts may examine its actions more closely. ➤ **Illustration:** A private restaurant refusing entry on the ground of caste may violate Article 15(2). A private contractor extracting forced labour may violate Article 23. A private body conducting public recruitment for public sector institutions may be examined under Article 226 if public duty is established. ## Article 13 and Constitutional Amendments ➤ **Early controversy:** The question arose whether a constitutional amendment is “law” under Article 13 and whether it can be struck down for violating Fundamental Rights. ➤ **Shankari Prasad:** In **Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 458**, the Supreme Court held that constitutional amendments under Article 368 were not ordinary “law” under Article 13. ➤ **Golak Nath:** In **I.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643**, the Supreme Court took a different view and held that Parliament could not amend Fundamental Rights. ➤ **Twenty-fourth Amendment:** Parliament inserted Article 13(4), stating that Article 13 does not apply to constitutional amendments made under Article 368. ➤ **Kesavananda Bharati:** In **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225**, the Supreme Court held that Parliament may amend any part of the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights, but cannot destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. ➤ **Present position:** Constitutional amendments are not struck down merely under Article 13, but they can be invalidated if they damage or destroy the basic structure, such as rule of law, judicial review, equality, constitutional supremacy, secularism, federalism or democracy. ## Difference between Article 12 and Article 13 BasisArticle 12Article 13**Main function**Defines “State” for Part IIIInvalidates laws inconsistent with Fundamental Rights**Main question**Against whom can Fundamental Rights be enforced?What happens to unconstitutional laws?**Focus**Identity of authority/bodyValidity of law/action**Key expression**State, local authority, other authorityLaw, laws in force, void**Important doctrines**Instrumentality test, public function distinctionSeverability, eclipse, waiver, judicial review**Practical use**Determines maintainability against a bodyDetermines whether law survives constitutional scrutiny## Important Memory Chart DoctrineSimple meaningMain useLeading case**Severability**Remove unconstitutional part and save valid partArticle 13 invalidityR.M.D.C. v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628**Eclipse**Law is dormant, not deadPre-Constitution inconsistent lawBhikaji Narain Dhakras, AIR 1955 SC 781**Waiver**Giving up a rightGenerally not allowed for Fundamental RightsBasheshar Nath, AIR 1959 SC 149**Instrumentality test**Body is really government agencyArticle 12 “other authorities”Ajay Hasia, (1981) 1 SCC 722**Deep and pervasive control**Government domination must be realArticle 12 bodiesPradeep Kumar Biswas, (2002) 5 SCC 111## Conclusion ➤ **Article 12 gives reach:** Article 12 ensures that Fundamental Rights bind not only traditional government departments but also authorities and instrumentalities through which the State acts. ➤ **Article 13 gives force:** Article 13 gives Fundamental Rights legal supremacy by making inconsistent laws void to the extent of inconsistency. ➤ **Judicial review is the connecting principle:** Courts use Articles 12 and 13 to examine whether a body is constitutionally accountable and whether a law or action violates Part III. ➤ **Modern constitutional trend:** Indian law has moved from a narrow State-action model to a more realistic approach. Public corporations, statutory bodies, government-controlled societies, and private bodies performing public duties may be constitutionally scrutinised depending on the facts. ➤ **Final essence:** Article 12 identifies the constitutional wrongdoer; Article 13 invalidates the unconstitutional law. Together, they make Fundamental Rights meaningful, enforceable and capable of controlling both old and new forms of power. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Citizenship under Indian Constitutional Law: Articles 5 to 11 and the Citizenship Act, 1955](https://lawfoyer.in/citizenship-under-indian-constitutional-law/) **Published:** May 31, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/ChatGPTImageMay31202608_53_45P-725x1024.jpeg) ## Introduction to Citizenship in India ➤ **Meaning of Citizenship:** Citizenship means the legal relationship between an individual and the State by which the individual becomes a full member of that State and receives political and civil rights, subject to duties and allegiance. In India, citizenship is important because only citizens can enjoy certain rights such as Article 15, Article 16, Article 19, Article 29, Article 30, the right to vote, and eligibility for many constitutional offices. ➤ **Single Citizenship:** India follows the principle of **single citizenship**, unlike federal systems such as the United States where both national and state citizenship exist. A person is either a citizen of India or not; there is no separate citizenship of any State such as Maharashtra, Kerala, Punjab, or Assam. ➤ **Constitutional and Statutory Scheme:** The Constitution deals with citizenship in **Part II, Articles 5 to 11**. These provisions mainly determined who became an Indian citizen at the commencement of the Constitution. After commencement, Parliament was empowered by **Article 11** to make laws on acquisition and termination of citizenship. Parliament enacted the **Citizenship Act, 1955**, which governs acquisition, loss, termination, deprivation, and Overseas Citizen of India status. ➤ **Important Distinction:** Articles 5 to 11 are mainly concerned with citizenship **at the commencement of the Constitution**, while the Citizenship Act, 1955 deals with citizenship **after commencement** through birth, descent, registration, naturalisation, incorporation of territory, renunciation, termination, deprivation, and OCI registration. ## Constitutional Provisions on Citizenship: Articles 5 to 11 ### Article 5: Citizenship at the Commencement of the Constitution ➤ **Basic Rule:** Article 5 provided that every person who had his **domicile in the territory of India** at the commencement of the Constitution became a citizen of India if he satisfied any one of the following conditions: he was born in India; either of his parents was born in India; or he had been ordinarily resident in India for at least five years immediately before the commencement of the Constitution. ➤ **Domicile as Core Requirement:** The most important requirement under Article 5 was **domicile in India**. Domicile means a permanent home or intention to reside permanently in a country. Mere residence is not always domicile; a person may live temporarily in one country but have permanent attachment to another. ➤ **Simple Illustration:** If A was born in India, lived in India, and intended to make India his permanent home at the commencement of the Constitution, A became an Indian citizen under Article 5. If B was only temporarily present in India without intention to make India his permanent home, B could not claim citizenship merely on physical presence. ### Article 6: Citizenship of Persons Migrating from Pakistan to India ➤ **Partition Context:** Article 6 dealt with persons who migrated from Pakistan to India due to Partition. It gave citizenship to certain migrants from Pakistan if they or their parents or grandparents were born in India as defined in the Government of India Act, 1935. ➤ **Migration Before 19 July 1948:** A person who migrated from Pakistan to India before **19 July 1948** became a citizen if he had been ordinarily resident in India since the date of migration. ➤ **Migration On or After 19 July 1948:** A person who migrated on or after **19 July 1948** had to be registered as a citizen by an officer appointed by the Government of India, after residing in India for at least six months immediately before the application. ➤ **Return Under Permit:** A person who migrated to Pakistan but later returned to India under a permit for resettlement or permanent return could also be treated under the scheme of Article 6. ### Article 7: Persons Who Migrated to Pakistan ➤ **General Rule of Exclusion:** Article 7 provided that a person who migrated from India to Pakistan after **1 March 1947** would not be deemed to be a citizen of India under Article 5 or Article 6. ➤ **Exception for Resettlement:** If such person returned to India under a permit for resettlement or permanent return issued by lawful authority, he could be treated as having migrated to India after 19 July 1948 and could claim citizenship according to the procedure. ➤ **Important Case – Kulathil Mammu v. State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1614:** In this case, the Supreme Court examined the meaning of “migration” under Article 7. The issue was whether a person who had gone to Pakistan could still claim Indian citizenship under Articles 5 or 6. The Court held that Article 7 creates an exception to Articles 5 and 6, and a person covered by Article 7 cannot claim citizenship merely under Article 5 or Article 6 unless he satisfies the exception relating to return under a valid permit. The ratio is that migration to Pakistan after the relevant date had serious constitutional consequences for citizenship. ### Article 8: Persons of Indian Origin Residing Outside India ➤ **Indian Origin Abroad:** Article 8 dealt with persons of Indian origin who were ordinarily residing outside India. A person whose parent or grandparent was born in India as defined in the Government of India Act, 1935 could be registered as an Indian citizen by an Indian diplomatic or consular representative. ➤ **Purpose:** Article 8 recognised the Indian diaspora and allowed persons of Indian origin living abroad to connect legally with India through registration. ### Article 9: Voluntary Acquisition of Foreign Citizenship ➤ **No Dual Citizenship:** Article 9 states that no person shall be a citizen of India under Article 5, or be deemed to be a citizen under Article 6 or Article 8, if he has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of a foreign State. ➤ **Core Principle:** Indian constitutional law does not recognise dual citizenship in the strict legal sense. Voluntary acquisition of foreign citizenship is inconsistent with Indian citizenship. ➤ **Important Case – Izhar Ahmad Khan v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1052:** The petitioners challenged provisions connected with loss of Indian citizenship on acquisition of Pakistani citizenship. The issue was whether Section 9 of the Citizenship Act and rules treating foreign passport acquisition as evidence of foreign citizenship were valid. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of Section 9 and the relevant rule, holding that Parliament could regulate citizenship and prescribe evidentiary rules for determining voluntary acquisition of foreign citizenship. ### Article 10: Continuance of Citizenship ➤ **Continuing Citizenship:** Article 10 provides that every person who is or is deemed to be a citizen of India under Part II shall continue to be a citizen, subject to any law made by Parliament. ➤ **Effect:** Article 10 protects citizenship acquired at commencement, but it also makes that citizenship subject to future parliamentary law. Therefore, Parliament may regulate continuation, termination, and deprivation of citizenship. ### Article 11: Parliamentary Power over Citizenship ➤ **Wide Legislative Power:** Article 11 gives Parliament full power to make laws relating to acquisition and termination of citizenship and all other matters relating to citizenship. ➤ **Importance:** Because of Article 11, Parliament enacted the **Citizenship Act, 1955**. This means citizenship is not only a constitutional subject but also a statutory subject controlled by parliamentary law. ➤ **Recent Constitutional Relevance – Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha v. Union of India, 2024:** In the 2024 judgment on Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, a Constitution Bench upheld Section 6A by a 4:1 majority. Section 6A deals with citizenship of persons covered by the Assam Accord and uses 24 March 1971 as an important cut-off date for certain migrants in Assam. The Court discussed Article 11 and Parliament’s power to make special provisions regarding citizenship. ## Citizenship Act, 1955: Structure and Purpose ➤ **Purpose of the Act:** The Citizenship Act, 1955 provides the complete statutory framework for acquisition and loss of Indian citizenship after the commencement of the Constitution. It recognises acquisition by **birth, descent, registration, naturalisation, and incorporation of territory**, and loss through **renunciation, termination, and deprivation**. ➤ **Important Amendments:** The Act has been amended several times, including important amendments in 1985, 1992, 2003, 2005, 2015, and 2019. These amendments changed rules on birth-based citizenship, overseas citizenship, illegal migrants, and special provisions such as Section 6A and Section 6B. ## Citizenship by Birth: Section 3 of the Citizenship Act, 1955 ➤ **First Category – 26 January 1950 to 1 July 1987:** Every person born in India on or after **26 January 1950** but before **1 July 1987** is a citizen of India by birth, irrespective of the nationality of parents, subject to limited exceptions such as children of foreign diplomats or enemy aliens in occupied territory. ➤ **Second Category – 1 July 1987 to 3 December 2004:** A person born in India on or after **1 July 1987** but before **3 December 2004** is a citizen by birth only if either parent was an Indian citizen at the time of birth. ➤ **Third Category – On or After 3 December 2004:** A person born in India on or after **3 December 2004** is a citizen by birth only if both parents are Indian citizens, or one parent is an Indian citizen and the other is not an illegal migrant at the time of birth. ➤ **Effect of 2003 Amendment:** The 2003 amendment restricted automatic citizenship by birth to prevent illegal migration from creating automatic citizenship rights through birth in India. ➤ **Simple Illustration:** A child born in Delhi in 1980 generally became an Indian citizen by birth. A child born in Delhi in 1995 became a citizen only if at least one parent was an Indian citizen. A child born in Delhi in 2010 became a citizen only if both parents were Indian citizens, or one parent was an Indian citizen and the other was not an illegal migrant. ## Citizenship by Descent: Section 4 of the Citizenship Act, 1955 ➤ **Meaning of Descent:** Citizenship by descent applies to persons born **outside India** to Indian parents. It recognises blood relationship with Indian citizenship. ➤ **General Scheme:** A person born outside India may become an Indian citizen by descent if the statutory conditions under Section 4 are satisfied. The rules differ depending on the date of birth, because amendments have changed the parental requirement and registration requirements. ➤ **Registration Requirement:** For persons born outside India after certain dates, birth must generally be registered at an Indian consulate within the prescribed time, and the parent may have to declare that the minor does not hold another country’s passport. ➤ **Important Point:** Citizenship by descent is not unlimited. It is subject to statutory conditions because India does not recognise unrestricted dual nationality. ## Citizenship by Registration: Section 5 of the Citizenship Act, 1955 ➤ **Meaning:** Citizenship by registration is a comparatively simplified mode of citizenship for persons having a close connection with India. ➤ **Eligible Categories:** Section 5 includes categories such as persons of Indian origin ordinarily resident in India, persons of Indian origin ordinarily resident outside undivided India, persons married to Indian citizens, minor children of Indian citizens, persons whose parents are registered as Indian citizens, and OCI cardholders satisfying statutory residence requirements. The official India Code text of the Act includes OCI-linked registration under Section 5(1)(g), requiring OCI registration for five years and residence in India for one year before application. ➤ **Discretion of Central Government:** Registration is not a mechanical right. The Central Government must be satisfied that legal requirements are fulfilled. ➤ **Good Character and Oath:** The applicant may be required to satisfy conditions such as good character and taking an oath of allegiance to the Constitution of India. ## Citizenship by Naturalisation: Section 6 of the Citizenship Act, 1955 ➤ **Meaning:** Naturalisation is the process by which a foreigner with no automatic citizenship claim becomes an Indian citizen after fulfilling statutory conditions. ➤ **Qualifications:** The applicant must generally satisfy requirements such as ordinary residence in India for the prescribed period, good character, adequate knowledge of a language specified in the Eighth Schedule, intention to reside in India, and renunciation of previous citizenship where applicable. ➤ **Residence Requirement:** The Third Schedule to the Act sets out detailed qualifications for naturalisation. The Central Government may waive certain conditions in special cases, especially where the applicant has rendered distinguished service to science, philosophy, art, literature, world peace, or human progress. ➤ **Section 6B – Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019:** The 2019 amendment inserted Section 6B, creating a special route for certain persons from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan belonging to Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi, or Christian communities who entered India on or before 31 December 2014 and were covered by the statutory conditions. The Citizenship Amendment Rules, 2024 created procedural rules and online application processes for Section 6B applications. ➤ **Important Limitation:** Section 6B is not a general naturalisation provision for all foreigners. It applies only to the specified classes and subject to statutory restrictions, conditions, and procedure. ## Citizenship by Incorporation of Territory: Section 7 ➤ **Meaning:** If any foreign territory becomes part of India, the Central Government may specify by order who among the persons connected with that territory shall become citizens of India. ➤ **Illustration:** If a territory is lawfully incorporated into India, Parliament and the Central Government may determine citizenship consequences for persons ordinarily resident there. ➤ **Nature of Power:** This mode is territorial and political in nature. It is used when sovereignty over territory changes. ## Special Provision for Assam: Section 6A ➤ **Background:** Section 6A was inserted after the Assam Accord and deals with citizenship of persons who came to Assam from the specified territory during particular periods. It has a special cut-off scheme for persons entering Assam before and after certain dates. ➤ **Cut-off Date:** The important date under Section 6A is **24 March 1971**, which is connected with the historical context of migration into Assam before the Bangladesh Liberation War. ➤ **Important Case – Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India, (2005) 5 SCC 665:** The Supreme Court struck down the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983. The issue was whether the special procedure under that Act made detection and deportation of illegal migrants in Assam extremely difficult. The Court held that illegal migration could affect national security and the demographic balance of Assam, and that the law was unconstitutional because it created an unreasonable and ineffective procedure. ➤ **Important Case – Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha v. Union of India, 2024:** A Constitution Bench upheld the constitutional validity of Section 6A by a 4:1 majority. The majority recognised Parliament’s competence under Article 11 and treated Section 6A as a special legislative response to a special historical and political situation in Assam. ## Renunciation of Citizenship: Section 8 ➤ **Meaning:** Renunciation means voluntary giving up of Indian citizenship by a citizen of full age and capacity. ➤ **Procedure:** A citizen may make a declaration renouncing Indian citizenship. Once the declaration is registered by the Central Government, that person ceases to be an Indian citizen. ➤ **Effect on Minor Children:** When a person renounces citizenship, minor children may also cease to be Indian citizens, but the Act allows such children to resume Indian citizenship after attaining majority by making a declaration in the prescribed manner. ➤ **Core Principle:** Renunciation is based on voluntary choice. It is different from deprivation, which is a penalty-like action by the State. ## Termination of Citizenship: Section 9 ➤ **Meaning:** Termination occurs when an Indian citizen voluntarily acquires citizenship of another country. ➤ **No Dual Citizenship:** Section 9 reflects the constitutional rule under Article 9. If an Indian citizen voluntarily acquires foreign citizenship, Indian citizenship automatically ceases according to law. ➤ **Determination by Authority:** Questions about whether, when, and how a person acquired foreign citizenship are determined by the prescribed authority, generally the Central Government, according to the Act and rules. ➤ **Important Case – Izhar Ahmad Khan v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1052:** The Supreme Court upheld the statutory scheme relating to loss of citizenship on voluntary acquisition of foreign citizenship. The ratio is that Parliament has power under Article 11 to regulate termination of citizenship and prescribe evidentiary rules for determining such questions. ## Deprivation of Citizenship: Section 10 ➤ **Meaning:** Deprivation means compulsory removal of citizenship by the Central Government in specified cases. It applies mainly to citizens who acquired citizenship by registration, naturalisation, or similar statutory modes. ➤ **Grounds:** Citizenship may be deprived if it was obtained by fraud, false representation, or concealment of material fact; if the citizen has shown disloyalty or disaffection towards the Constitution; unlawfully traded or communicated with an enemy during war; been sentenced in certain circumstances; or ordinarily resided outside India for a prescribed continuous period where applicable. ➤ **Natural Justice:** Deprivation is a serious action. The person must generally be given notice and opportunity to be heard because citizenship is a valuable legal status. ➤ **Difference from Termination:** Termination under Section 9 happens because the citizen voluntarily acquired foreign citizenship. Deprivation under Section 10 is a State action based on misconduct, fraud, or statutory grounds. ## Overseas Citizen of India: Sections 7A to 7D ➤ **Meaning of OCI:** Overseas Citizen of India is a special status given to eligible foreign nationals of Indian origin. OCI is **not full Indian citizenship** and does not amount to dual citizenship. ➤ **Eligibility under Section 7A:** A foreign national may be registered as an OCI cardholder if he satisfies the statutory conditions, such as being a person of Indian origin, being eligible to become an Indian citizen at commencement, being a child or grandchild or great-grandchild of such person, or being a spouse of an Indian citizen or OCI cardholder subject to conditions. Persons who are or had been citizens of Pakistan, Bangladesh, or other notified countries are excluded. ➤ **Rights under Section 7B:** OCI cardholders get rights notified by the Central Government, such as long-term visa-related benefits and facilities for travel, residence, study, and work, subject to restrictions. However, OCI cardholders do not get political rights such as voting, contesting elections, or holding constitutional offices. ➤ **Renunciation of OCI under Section 7C:** An OCI cardholder of full age and capacity may renounce OCI status. Upon registration of the declaration, the person ceases to be an OCI cardholder. ➤ **Cancellation of OCI under Section 7D:** OCI registration may be cancelled for grounds such as fraud, false representation, concealment of material facts, disaffection towards the Constitution, unlawful trade with enemy during war, sentence of imprisonment of at least two years within five years of registration, violation of notified laws, necessity in the interests of sovereignty, integrity, security of India, friendly relations with foreign States, general public interest, or certain marital grounds for spouse-based OCI. The 2019 amendment inserted an additional ground relating to violation of laws notified by the Central Government, with a reasonable opportunity of being heard. ➤ **Important Distinction:** OCI is a facility-based status, not citizenship. An OCI cardholder remains a foreign national and cannot claim fundamental political rights reserved for Indian citizens. ## Important Case Laws on Citizenship ➤ **Ebrahim Vazir Mavat v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 229:** The issue was whether a citizen could be removed from India for entering from Pakistan without a permit under the relevant law. The Supreme Court held that a law authorising removal of an Indian citizen from India violated the citizen’s fundamental right to reside and settle in India. The ratio is that citizenship carries strong constitutional protection, especially against expulsion from one’s own country. ➤ **State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, AIR 1963 SC 1811:** The issue was whether a corporation could claim citizenship and invoke rights reserved only for citizens. The Supreme Court held that a company is not a citizen under the Constitution. The ratio is that citizenship belongs to natural persons, not juristic persons like companies. ➤ **Kulathil Mammu v. State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1614:** The Supreme Court interpreted Article 7 and held that a person who migrated to Pakistan could not claim Indian citizenship under Article 5 or Article 6 unless he satisfied the exception relating to lawful return under permit. The case is important for understanding Partition-related citizenship. ➤ **Izhar Ahmad Khan v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1052:** The Supreme Court upheld the validity of Section 9 of the Citizenship Act and rules connected with determination of foreign citizenship. The ratio is that Parliament has wide power under Article 11 to regulate citizenship, including termination on voluntary acquisition of foreign citizenship. ➤ **Lal Babu Hussein v. Electoral Registration Officer, (1995) 3 SCC 100:** The issue concerned removal of names from electoral rolls on citizenship-related doubts. The Supreme Court emphasised procedural fairness and held that names cannot be removed arbitrarily without proper inquiry and opportunity. The ratio is that citizenship-linked electoral consequences require fairness and due process. ➤ **Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India, (2005) 5 SCC 665:** The Supreme Court struck down the IMDT Act as unconstitutional, holding that the procedure made detection of illegal migrants difficult and affected Assam’s security and constitutional governance. The case remains a leading authority on illegal migration and citizenship administration in Assam. ➤ **Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha v. Union of India, 2024:** The Supreme Court upheld Section 6A of the Citizenship Act by a 4:1 majority. The case clarified that Parliament can create special citizenship rules under Article 11 for historically specific situations such as Assam. ## Comparative Table: Modes of Acquiring and Losing Citizenship AreaProvisionCore IdeaCitizenship at commencementArticles 5–8Domicile, migration from Pakistan, Indian origin abroadForeign citizenship barArticle 9Voluntary foreign citizenship prevents Indian citizenshipContinuanceArticle 10Citizenship continues subject to parliamentary lawParliamentary powerArticle 11Parliament can regulate acquisition and terminationBirthSection 3Citizenship based on birth in India, subject to dates and parental statusDescentSection 4Citizenship for persons born outside India to Indian parentsRegistrationSection 5Citizenship for specified categories connected with IndiaNaturalisationSection 6Citizenship for foreigners satisfying statutory qualificationsCAA special routeSection 6BSpecial route for specified communities from specified countriesIncorporationSection 7Citizenship after territory becomes part of IndiaRenunciationSection 8Voluntary giving up of citizenshipTerminationSection 9Loss on voluntary acquisition of foreign citizenshipDeprivationSection 10Compulsory removal for fraud, disloyalty, etc.OCISections 7A–7DSpecial overseas Indian status, not full citizenship## Memory Aid for Citizenship ➤ **Acquisition Formula:** **B-D-R-N-I** **Birth, Descent, Registration, Naturalisation, Incorporation of territory** ➤ **Loss Formula:** **R-T-D** **Renunciation, Termination, Deprivation** ➤ **Constitution Formula:** **5 to 11 = Start + Partition + Foreign Citizenship + Parliament** Article 5 starts citizenship; Articles 6 and 7 handle Partition migration; Article 8 covers Indians abroad; Article 9 bars foreign citizenship; Article 10 continues citizenship; Article 11 empowers Parliament. ## Conclusion ➤ **Complete Legal Position:** Indian citizenship law is built on two foundations: **Part II of the Constitution** and the **Citizenship Act, 1955**. Articles 5 to 11 solved the immediate citizenship questions created by independence and Partition. The Citizenship Act, 1955 created the continuing legal machinery for acquisition and loss of citizenship. ➤ **Central Themes:** The most important principles are single citizenship, no automatic dual citizenship, parliamentary control under Article 11, stricter rules on birth-based citizenship after amendments, special treatment of historical migration issues, and limited non-citizen benefits through OCI. ➤ **Practical Importance:** Citizenship is not merely an identity label. It determines political membership, voting rights, constitutional protections, eligibility for public offices, and the legal relationship of allegiance between the person and the Indian State. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Union and its Territory under Indian Constitution: Articles 1 to 4 Explained with Landmark Cases](https://lawfoyer.in/union-and-its-territory-under-indian-constitution/) **Published:** May 31, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/ChatGPTImageMay31202608_37_17P-725x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning and Constitutional Scheme of “Union and its Territory” ➤ **Core idea:** Part I of the Constitution of India is titled **“The Union and its Territory”** and contains **Articles 1 to 4**. These provisions explain the constitutional identity of India, the territory of India, admission or establishment of new States, formation of new States, alteration of boundaries, alteration of names, and the legal effect of laws made for such territorial changes. ➤ **Simple meaning:** These Articles answer four basic questions: **What is India constitutionally called?** **What territory forms India?** **How can new States be admitted or created?** **How can existing States be reorganised?** ➤ **Present constitutional position:** India is a federal polity with a strong Union. The Constitution presently recognises India as a **Union of States**, and the territory of India consists of the territories of the States, the Union territories specified in the First Schedule, and any other territories that may be acquired. Article 1 uses the expression **“India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States.”** ➤ **Important distinction:** The expression **“Union of States”** is significant. India is not described as a mere federation formed by an agreement among sovereign States. The Indian Union is indestructible, though the States may be reorganised, divided, merged, renamed, or have their boundaries altered by Parliament under the Constitution. ## Article 1: Name and Territory of the Union ➤ **Textual essence:** Article 1 declares three things: **India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States;** the States and their territories shall be as specified in the **First Schedule**; and the territory of India shall comprise the territories of the States, Union territories, and such other territories as may be acquired. ➤ **Keyword — India/Bharat:** The Constitution uses both names: **India** and **Bharat**. These are constitutional names of the same sovereign entity. The provision does not create two different legal personalities; it recognises one constitutional polity. ➤ **Keyword — Union of States:** The expression **Union** shows that the unity of India is not dependent upon the consent of individual States. States do not have a right to secede from India. Parliament may change their boundaries or names under Article 3, subject to the procedure prescribed. ➤ **Keyword — First Schedule:** The **First Schedule** is important because it lists the States and Union territories and describes their territories. Whenever a State is created, divided, merged, renamed, or territorially altered, the First Schedule is amended accordingly. ➤ **Keyword — Territory of India:** The phrase **“territory of India”** is wider than merely “territories of States.” It includes: • territories of States; • Union territories; and • other territories acquired by India. ➤ **Illustration:** If India acquires a territory by treaty, conquest, cession, or agreement recognised in international law, such territory may become part of the territory of India. But its internal constitutional placement may require parliamentary action depending on the nature of the acquisition and its proposed administration. ## Difference Between “Union of India” and “Territory of India” ➤ **Keyword — Union of India:** The expression **Union of India** generally refers to the federal political entity consisting of the Union and the States under the constitutional structure. ➤ **Keyword — Territory of India:** The expression **territory of India** is geographical and territorial in nature. It includes States, Union territories, and acquired territories. ➤ **Practical effect:** A territory may form part of India’s territory, but Parliament may still have to decide how that territory will be governed, whether it will be admitted as a State, established as a new State, merged with an existing State, or administered as a Union territory. ## Article 2: Admission or Establishment of New States ➤ **Textual essence:** Article 2 empowers Parliament to **admit into the Union** or **establish new States** on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit. ➤ **Keyword — Admission:** **Admission** means bringing into the Indian Union a political entity or territory which was not previously a part of India as a State. This provision is suitable where an outside territory or political unit becomes part of India and is admitted as a State. ➤ **Keyword — Establishment:** **Establishment** means creating a new State in circumstances where Parliament sets up a State under constitutional authority. Article 2 is wide and gives Parliament flexibility to determine the terms and conditions of such admission or establishment. ➤ **Scope of Parliament’s power:** Parliament may impose conditions regarding representation, administration, transitional arrangements, special safeguards, or other matters connected with the new State. ➤ **Sikkim example:** Sikkim’s integration into India illustrates the use of constitutional power to admit a new State into the Union. In **R.C. Poudyal v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 1804; 1994 Supp (1) SCC 324**, the Supreme Court considered the constitutional validity of special provisions relating to Sikkim. The Court observed that the power under Article 2 is wide because admission of a new State may involve complex historical and political circumstances, though such power is not completely beyond judicial scrutiny. ➤ **Case law — R.C. Poudyal v. Union of India:** In this case, the challenge concerned special representation arrangements in the Sikkim Legislative Assembly after Sikkim became part of India. The issue was whether such special provisions violated democratic equality and constitutional principles. The Supreme Court upheld the provisions in view of Sikkim’s special historical and political background. The ratio is that constitutional accommodation may be valid where it is connected with the special circumstances of admission of a new State and does not destroy the basic constitutional framework. ## Difference Between Article 2 and Article 3 BasisArticle 2Article 3**Main purpose**Admission or establishment of new StatesFormation of new States and alteration of existing States**Territorial focus**Generally concerns territories or political units not already organised as Indian StatesConcerns existing States and Union territories within India**State Legislature’s role**No mandatory reference procedure like Article 3President must refer the Bill to the concerned State Legislature for views**Nature of power**Wide political-constitutional powerSpecific reorganisation power subject to constitutional procedure➤ **Simple memory point:** **Article 2 brings a new State into the Union; Article 3 reshapes what is already within the Union.** ## Article 3: Formation of New States and Alteration of Areas, Boundaries or Names ➤ **Textual essence:** Article 3 empowers Parliament by law to: • form a new State by separation of territory from any State; • unite two or more States or parts of States; • unite any territory to a part of any State; • increase the area of any State; • diminish the area of any State; • alter the boundaries of any State; and • alter the name of any State. ➤ **Keyword — Formation of new States:** Parliament may create a new State out of the territory of an existing State. For example, Telangana was formed from the existing State of Andhra Pradesh under the **Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014**, which came into force on **2 June 2014**. Section 3 of that Act provided for the formation of the State of Telangana. ➤ **Keyword — Alteration of boundaries:** Parliament may transfer territory from one State to another, redraw boundaries, or make territorial adjustments. Such changes are internal constitutional adjustments within India. ➤ **Keyword — Alteration of name:** Parliament may change the name of a State. For instance, constitutional and statutory changes have historically renamed States such as Madras to Tamil Nadu, Mysore to Karnataka, Orissa to Odisha, and Uttaranchal to Uttarakhand. ➤ **Keyword — Union territories included:** Explanation I to Article 3 provides that, in clauses dealing with formation, increase, diminution, alteration of boundaries and names, **“State” includes a Union territory**; however, in the proviso, **“State” does not include a Union territory**. Explanation II clarifies that Parliament’s power includes the power to form a new State or Union territory by uniting part of any State or Union territory with another State or Union territory. ## Procedure Under Article 3 ➤ **Keyword — Bill only on President’s recommendation:** A Bill under Article 3 can be introduced in either House of Parliament only on the **recommendation of the President**. ➤ **Keyword — Reference to State Legislature:** If the Bill affects the area, boundaries, or name of any State, the President must refer the Bill to the Legislature of that State for expressing its views within the period specified by the President. ➤ **Keyword — Views, not consent:** The State Legislature’s role is consultative, not decisive. Parliament is not bound by the views of the State Legislature. Even if the State Legislature rejects the proposal, does not respond, or suggests modifications, Parliament may still pass the law. ➤ **Keyword — Democratic consultation:** The purpose of referring the Bill to the State Legislature is to ensure that the affected State gets an opportunity to express its opinion. However, the Constitution gives the final authority to Parliament because territorial integrity and reorganisation are matters of national constitutional policy. ## Landmark Case: Babulal Parate v. State of Bombay ➤ **Case law — Babulal Parate v. State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 51; 1960 SCR (1) 605:** In this case, the petitioner challenged the constitutional process relating to the reorganisation of Bombay. The legal issue was whether Parliament was bound by the views of the State Legislature and whether fresh reference was necessary if changes were made in the Bill after the State Legislature had expressed its views. The Supreme Court held that Article 3 requires the State Legislature to be given an opportunity to express its views, but its consent is not necessary and its views are not binding on Parliament. The ratio is that Parliament has dominant constitutional power in matters of State reorganisation, subject only to the procedure expressly prescribed in Article 3. ➤ **Important principle:** Article 3 does not create a veto power in favour of States. It creates a mechanism of consultation. This is why India is often described as an **indestructible Union of destructible States**. ## Landmark Case: Pradeep Chaudhary v. Union of India ➤ **Case law — Pradeep Chaudhary v. Union of India, decided on 5 May 2009:** The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that Parliament has wide authority under Article 3 in relation to State reorganisation and that the views of the State Legislature are not binding. The Court relied on the earlier constitutional position explained in **Babulal Parate**. The ratio is that State reorganisation is primarily a parliamentary function, and judicial review is limited to examining whether constitutional procedure has been followed. ## Landmark Case: Mangal Singh v. Union of India ➤ **Case law — Mangal Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 944; 1967 SCR (2) 109:** This case arose after the **Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966**, which reorganised the old State of Punjab and created Haryana, transferred certain areas, and dealt with Chandigarh and Himachal Pradesh. The issue included whether Parliament could make provisions affecting legislative representation and whether such provisions violated constitutional requirements. The Supreme Court upheld the reorganisation law and explained that Article 4 permits Parliament to include supplemental, incidental, and consequential provisions necessary to make reorganisation effective. ➤ **Important principle:** When Parliament reorganises a State, it may need to adjust representation in Parliament, State Legislatures, services, courts, assets, liabilities, and administrative arrangements. Article 4 allows such connected provisions. ## Article 4: Legal Effect of Laws Made Under Articles 2 and 3 ➤ **Textual essence:** Article 4 provides that any law made under Article 2 or Article 3 shall contain provisions for amending the **First Schedule** and **Fourth Schedule** as necessary, and may also contain supplemental, incidental, and consequential provisions. Most importantly, Article 4 states that no such law shall be deemed to be an amendment of the Constitution for the purposes of Article 368. ➤ **Keyword — First Schedule amendment:** Since the First Schedule lists States and Union territories with their territories, any law creating or altering a State must amend the First Schedule. ➤ **Keyword — Fourth Schedule amendment:** The Fourth Schedule deals with allocation of seats in the Council of States, that is, the Rajya Sabha. When a new State is formed or territories are reorganised, Rajya Sabha representation may need adjustment. ➤ **Keyword — Supplemental provisions:** These are additional provisions necessary to make the reorganisation workable. They may relate to administration, courts, services, public assets, liabilities, laws in force, adaptation of laws, representation, and transitional arrangements. ➤ **Keyword — Incidental provisions:** These are provisions naturally connected with the main reorganisation. For example, if a district is transferred from one State to another, the law may provide how pending legal proceedings, government employees, local authorities, and records will be handled. ➤ **Keyword — Consequential provisions:** These are provisions that follow as a necessary consequence of territorial change. For example, if a new State is created, the law may provide for a Governor, Legislature, High Court arrangements, representation in Parliament, and division of assets and liabilities. ## Article 4 and Article 368: Why Reorganisation Laws Are Not Constitutional Amendments ➤ **Core rule:** A law made under Article 2 or Article 3 may amend the First Schedule and Fourth Schedule, but Article 4 expressly says that such a law is **not treated as a constitutional amendment under Article 368**. This means the special procedure of Article 368 is not required for ordinary internal reorganisation of States. ➤ **Simple explanation:** Normally, changing the text or schedules of the Constitution may require a constitutional amendment. But Article 4 creates a special constitutional shortcut for territorial reorganisation. Since Articles 2 and 3 themselves contemplate such changes, Parliament can make necessary schedule amendments by ordinary law. ➤ **Legal effect:** Such laws are passed like ordinary parliamentary legislation, but they have constitutional consequences because they alter the First Schedule and Fourth Schedule. ➤ **Important limitation:** Article 4 does not mean that Parliament can use Article 3 to do everything involving territory. Internal reorganisation is different from cession of Indian territory to a foreign country. ## Cession of Territory to a Foreign Country: Berubari Principle ➤ **Case law — In Re: Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves, AIR 1960 SC 845; 1960 3 SCR 250:** This was a Presidential Reference under Article 143 concerning implementation of the Indo-Pakistan Agreement relating to Berubari Union. The main issue was whether India could transfer part of its territory to Pakistan under Article 3 or whether a constitutional amendment under Article 368 was necessary. The Supreme Court held that Article 3 deals with internal adjustment of territories among States within India and does not authorise cession of Indian territory to a foreign State. Therefore, cession of Indian territory requires constitutional amendment under Article 368. ➤ **Important principle:** **Article 3 = internal reorganisation. Article 368 = cession of Indian territory to a foreign country.** ➤ **Case law — Ram Kishore Sen v. Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 644; 1966 SCR (1) 430:** This case concerned implementation of the Ninth Constitutional Amendment relating to transfer of certain territories following the Indo-Pakistan arrangements. The issue was whether the constitutional process adopted for transfer was valid. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional mechanism and followed the Berubari principle that cession of Indian territory to a foreign State cannot be done merely under Article 3. ➤ **Modern example — 100th Constitutional Amendment:** The **Constitution (One Hundredth Amendment) Act, 2015** was enacted to give effect to the India-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement involving acquisition and transfer of territories between India and Bangladesh. This reflects the Berubari principle that transfer of territory to a foreign country is dealt with through constitutional amendment, not merely Article 3. ## State Reorganisation and Indian Federalism ➤ **Keyword — Strong Union:** Articles 1 to 4 show that Indian federalism is not identical to American federalism. In the United States, States have a different historical origin as pre-existing units. In India, the Constitution creates a Union where Parliament has power to reorganise States. ➤ **Case law — State of West Bengal v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1241; 1964 SCR (1) 371:** The State of West Bengal challenged parliamentary power relating to acquisition of State property. Although the case was not only about Article 3, the Supreme Court explained the nature of Indian federalism and rejected the idea that Indian States possess sovereignty independent of the Union in the same way as classical federations. The ratio relevant here is that the Indian Constitution establishes a federal structure with a strong Union, and States are not sovereign entities capable of overriding the constitutional authority of Parliament. ➤ **Important principle:** Indian States are constitutionally important, but they are not indestructible. Parliament may reorganise them under Article 3, while the Union of India remains constitutionally permanent. ## Practical Examples of Article 3 Reorganisation ➤ **Keyword — Telangana:** The **Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014** created Telangana from the existing State of Andhra Pradesh. It provided not only for territorial formation but also for capital arrangements, representation, High Court arrangements, public employment, assets, liabilities, water, education, and other transitional matters. ➤ **Keyword — Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation:** The **Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019** reorganised the former State of Jammu and Kashmir into the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and the Union Territory of Ladakh. The Act contains provisions on formation of Union territories, representation, administration, laws, courts, services, assets, and liabilities. ➤ **Keyword — Punjab Reorganisation:** The Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 reorganised Punjab and led to the creation of Haryana and arrangements relating to Chandigarh and Himachal Pradesh. Its validity and connected provisions were considered in **Mangal Singh v. Union of India**. ## Legal Effect of Reorganisation Laws ➤ **Effect on territory:** The territories of the affected States or Union territories stand changed from the appointed day mentioned in the reorganisation law. ➤ **Effect on First Schedule:** The First Schedule is amended to reflect the new names, territories, or status of the concerned States or Union territories. ➤ **Effect on Fourth Schedule:** Rajya Sabha seat allocation may be changed where necessary. ➤ **Effect on laws in force:** Existing laws may continue until altered, repealed, or adapted by the competent Legislature or authority. This avoids legal vacuum. ➤ **Effect on courts:** High Court jurisdiction, pending cases, subordinate courts, and judicial administration may be reorganised. ➤ **Effect on services:** Government employees may be allocated between successor States or Union territories. ➤ **Effect on assets and liabilities:** Public debt, property, contracts, corporations, boards, and government undertakings may be divided. ➤ **Effect on representation:** Lok Sabha, Rajya Sabha, and State Legislative Assembly representation may be adjusted. ➤ **Effect on administration:** New executive authorities, Governors, Lieutenant Governors, capitals, departments, and local administrative units may be created or reorganised. ## Constitutional Safeguards and Limits on Parliament’s Power ➤ **Procedural safeguard:** A Bill under Article 3 affecting a State’s area, boundary, or name must be referred by the President to the concerned State Legislature for its views. ➤ **Substantive parliamentary control:** Parliament has final authority and is not bound by the State Legislature’s opinion. ➤ **Judicial review:** Courts can examine whether mandatory constitutional procedure was followed. However, courts generally do not sit in appeal over the political wisdom of State reorganisation. ➤ **Foreign territory limitation:** Parliament cannot cede Indian territory to a foreign country merely by using Article 3. Such cession requires Article 368 constitutional amendment as held in **Berubari**. ➤ **Basic structure limitation:** Although Article 4 says reorganisation laws are not Article 368 amendments, Parliament’s exercise of constitutional power cannot destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. This acts as a broad constitutional limitation. ## Memory Table: Articles 1 to 4 at a Glance ArticleSubjectMain legal point**Article 1**Name and territory of the UnionIndia/Bharat is a Union of States; territory includes States, Union territories, and acquired territories**Article 2**Admission or establishment of new StatesParliament may admit or establish new States on terms and conditions**Article 3**Formation and alteration of StatesParliament may form, merge, divide, rename, or alter boundaries/areas of States**Article 4**Effect of Articles 2 and 3 lawsSuch laws may amend First and Fourth Schedules and include incidental provisions; not deemed Article 368 amendments## Key Doctrines and Principles ➤ **Indestructible Union, destructible States:** India as a Union cannot be broken by States, but States may be territorially reorganised by Parliament. ➤ **Consultation, not consent:** The affected State Legislature must be allowed to express its views under Article 3, but its approval is not mandatory. ➤ **Internal adjustment doctrine:** Article 3 applies to internal territorial changes within India. ➤ **Cession limitation doctrine:** Transfer of Indian territory to a foreign State requires constitutional amendment under Article 368. ➤ **Incidental powers doctrine:** Article 4 gives Parliament power to make necessary supplemental, incidental, and consequential provisions for effective reorganisation. ## Conclusion ➤ **Final essence:** Articles 1 to 4 create the constitutional foundation of India’s territorial structure. Article 1 declares India as Bharat and as a Union of States. Article 2 enables admission or establishment of new States. Article 3 gives Parliament wide power to reorganise existing States by forming new States, merging territories, changing boundaries, altering areas, or changing names. Article 4 makes such reorganisation practically effective by allowing amendment of the First and Fourth Schedules and by permitting supplemental, incidental, and consequential provisions without following Article 368. ➤ **Central understanding:** The Indian Constitution balances federalism with national unity. States are important constitutional units, but they do not possess a veto over territorial reorganisation. Parliament, after following the required procedure, has the power to reshape the internal map of India. However, where Indian territory is to be ceded to a foreign country, Article 3 is insufficient and Article 368 becomes necessary. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Preamble of the Constitution of India: Meaning, Importance, Keywords, Amendability, Interpretative Value and Landmark Cases](https://lawfoyer.in/preamble-of-the-constitution-of-india/) **Published:** May 31, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/ChatGPTImageMay31202608_28_48P-725x1024.jpeg) ## Introduction to the Preamble of the Constitution ➤ **Meaning of Preamble:** The Preamble is the introductory statement of the Constitution of India. It declares the source of the Constitution, the nature of the Indian State, the objectives of the Constitution, and the date of its adoption. It is like the “identity card” of the Constitution because it tells us what kind of political and legal system India wants to establish. ➤ **Opening Words:** The Preamble begins with the words **“We, the People of India”**. These words show that the Constitution derives its authority from the people of India, not from the British Crown, Parliament, King, President, or any external power. The people are the ultimate source of constitutional authority. ➤ **Adoption Date:** The Preamble states that the people of India adopted, enacted and gave to themselves the Constitution on **26 November 1949**. The Constitution came into force on **26 January 1950**, but the Preamble itself records the date of adoption as 26 November 1949. ➤ **Philosophical Foundation:** The Preamble expresses the constitutional philosophy of India. It reflects the basic values of the freedom struggle, such as justice, liberty, equality, fraternity, democracy, dignity of the individual and unity of the nation. ➤ **Constitutional Summary:** The Preamble is not a detailed legal code. It does not contain administrative rules or procedural provisions. Instead, it gives the broad ideals and guiding principles which help in understanding the spirit of the Constitution. ## Textual Essence of the Preamble ➤ **Core Declaration:** The Preamble declares India to be a **Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic** and promises to secure to all citizens **Justice, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity**. ➤ **Objectives:** The major objectives of the Preamble are social, economic and political justice; liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; equality of status and opportunity; and fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the nation. ➤ **Constitutional Vision:** The Preamble shows that the Constitution is not merely a legal document but a social document aimed at transforming Indian society into a more just, equal and democratic society. ## Importance of the Preamble ➤ **Source of Authority:** The Preamble makes it clear that the Constitution has been created by the people of India. This is important because it establishes popular sovereignty. The ultimate legal and political authority belongs to the people. ➤ **Nature of Indian State:** The Preamble tells us that India is sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic and republican. These words describe the constitutional character of the Indian State. ➤ **Statement of Objectives:** The Preamble states the goals which the Constitution seeks to achieve. These goals guide the legislature, executive and judiciary while performing their constitutional functions. ➤ **Aid to Interpretation:** When any constitutional provision is ambiguous or capable of more than one meaning, the Preamble helps courts understand the purpose behind the provision. It acts as a guiding light for constitutional interpretation. ➤ **Basic Structure Indicator:** After the decision in **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala**, the Preamble is treated as an important source for identifying the basic structure of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that Parliament may amend the Constitution, but it cannot destroy or damage its basic structure. The official Supreme Court material describes the decision as placing limits on Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution through the basic structure doctrine. ➤ **Moral Compass:** The Preamble gives moral direction to constitutional governance. It reminds every organ of the State that power must be used to secure justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. ## Keywords of the Preamble ## Sovereign ➤ **Meaning of Sovereign:** The word **Sovereign** means that India is fully independent in its internal and external affairs. No outside authority can control India’s law-making power, foreign policy, constitutional system or governmental structure. ➤ **Internal Sovereignty:** Internally, India has the power to make laws for its territory through its constitutional organs. The Parliament and State Legislatures function according to the Constitution, and their authority flows from the Constitution. ➤ **External Sovereignty:** Externally, India is free to conduct relations with other countries, enter into treaties, participate in international organisations and decide its foreign policy. ➤ **Constitutional Limitation:** Sovereignty does not mean arbitrary power. In India, all organs of the State are subject to constitutional limitations, fundamental rights, judicial review and the rule of law. ## Socialist ➤ **Meaning of Socialist:** The word **Socialist** was inserted into the Preamble by the **42nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1976**. In the Indian context, socialism does not mean complete State ownership of all property. It means commitment to social and economic justice, reduction of inequality, fair distribution of resources and protection of weaker sections. ➤ **Indian Socialism:** Indian socialism is democratic and constitutional. It permits private property and private enterprise, but the State has a duty to reduce poverty, exploitation and concentration of wealth. ➤ **Connection with Directive Principles:** The idea of socialism is closely connected with the Directive Principles of State Policy, especially provisions relating to equal distribution of material resources, prevention of concentration of wealth, living wages, education, public health and social welfare. ➤ **Judicial Understanding:** In several decisions, the Supreme Court has connected the idea of socialism with welfare State obligations. It has used constitutional values to expand the meaning of life, dignity and social justice. ## Secular ➤ **Meaning of Secular:** The word **Secular** was also inserted by the **42nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1976**. Secularism means that the State has no official religion and treats all religions with equal respect. ➤ **Indian Secularism:** Indian secularism is not anti-religion. It allows freedom of religion but prevents the State from favouring or discriminating against any religion. ➤ **Constitutional Basis:** Articles 25 to 28 protect freedom of conscience, free profession, practice and propagation of religion, subject to public order, morality, health and other constitutional limitations. ➤ **Equality Principle:** Secularism is connected with equality because the State must treat persons of all religions equally. It also protects minorities and prevents religious domination in public law. ## Democratic ➤ **Meaning of Democratic:** Democracy means government by the people, through elected representatives, under constitutional limitations. ➤ **Political Democracy:** India follows representative democracy. Citizens elect members of Parliament and State Legislatures through periodic elections. ➤ **Constitutional Democracy:** Indian democracy is not merely majority rule. It is controlled by constitutional morality, fundamental rights, judicial review, federalism and rule of law. ➤ **Substantive Democracy:** The Preamble connects democracy with justice, liberty and equality. Therefore, democracy in India is not only about elections; it also includes dignity, participation, fairness and protection of minorities. ## Republic ➤ **Meaning of Republic:** A republic is a State where the head of the State is elected, directly or indirectly, and the office is not hereditary. ➤ **Indian Republic:** In India, the President is the constitutional head of the State and is elected indirectly. This shows that political power is not inherited by birth. ➤ **Public Office:** The republican principle also means that public offices are open to citizens according to constitutional requirements, not according to hereditary privilege. ## Justice ➤ **Meaning of Justice:** The Preamble promises **social, economic and political justice**. This shows that the Constitution aims to create a just society in all major areas of life. ➤ **Social Justice:** Social justice means removal of social inequalities based on caste, gender, religion, birth, disability or social backwardness. It supports protective discrimination, reservation, abolition of untouchability and equality before law. ➤ **Economic Justice:** Economic justice means reducing economic inequality and ensuring fair opportunity for livelihood, work, health, education and basic human needs. ➤ **Political Justice:** Political justice means equal political rights, universal adult franchise, equal participation in democratic processes and non-discrimination in political representation. ## Liberty ➤ **Meaning of Liberty:** Liberty means freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship. It protects the individual’s inner freedom and external freedom. ➤ **Constitutional Protection:** Liberty is mainly protected through fundamental rights, especially Articles 19, 21, 25 and related provisions. ➤ **Balanced Liberty:** Liberty is not absolute. It is subject to reasonable restrictions in the interests of public order, morality, security of the State, decency and other constitutional grounds. ➤ **Connection with Dignity:** Liberty allows a person to think, speak, believe and live with dignity. Without liberty, democracy becomes merely formal. ## Equality ➤ **Meaning of Equality:** Equality means equality of status and opportunity. It does not mean that everyone is identical; it means that the State must not unfairly discriminate and must create fair conditions for all. ➤ **Formal Equality:** Formal equality means equal treatment before law. Article 14 guarantees equality before law and equal protection of laws. ➤ **Substantive Equality:** Substantive equality allows special measures for disadvantaged groups. Articles 15 and 16 permit protective measures in favour of socially and educationally backward classes, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other disadvantaged groups. ➤ **Equality of Opportunity:** Equality of opportunity means that every person should get a fair chance to develop their abilities and participate in public life. ## Fraternity ➤ **Meaning of Fraternity:** Fraternity means a feeling of brotherhood, mutual respect and common belonging among the people of India. ➤ **Dignity of Individual:** The Preamble connects fraternity with dignity. This means that every person must be treated as a human being with worth and respect. ➤ **Unity and Integrity:** Fraternity also assures the unity and integrity of the nation. The word **integrity** was inserted by the 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1976. ➤ **Social Harmony:** Fraternity is essential in a diverse country like India because India has many religions, languages, castes, cultures and regions. Without fraternity, liberty and equality cannot survive in practice. ## Is the Preamble a Part of the Constitution? ➤ **Early View in Berubari:** In **In re Berubari Union, AIR 1960 SC 845**, the Supreme Court gave an advisory opinion under Article 143 regarding the implementation of the Indo-Pakistan Agreement relating to Berubari Union and exchange of enclaves. The issue was whether Indian territory could be transferred to Pakistan under Article 3 or whether a constitutional amendment was necessary. The Court held that the agreement involved cession of Indian territory and required constitutional amendment. In this case, the Court observed that the Preamble was not a source of substantive power and was not treated as an enforceable part of the Constitution. The Indian Kanoon text records that the Court considered the agreement as involving cession or alienation of a part of India’s territory. ➤ **Corrected View in Kesavananda Bharati:** In **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461; (1973) 4 SCC 225**, the Supreme Court changed the earlier understanding and held that the Preamble is a part of the Constitution. The case was decided by a 13-judge Bench on 24 April 1973, and the citation is recorded as AIR 1973 SC 1461 and (1973) 4 SCC 225. ➤ **Present Legal Position:** The Preamble is a part of the Constitution, but it is not a source of independent power. It cannot override express provisions of the Constitution. However, it can be used to interpret ambiguous provisions and to understand the basic philosophy of the Constitution. ## Amendability of the Preamble ➤ **Main Question:** The question of amendability asks whether Parliament can amend the Preamble under Article 368 of the Constitution. ➤ **Article 368 Power:** Article 368 gives Parliament power to amend the Constitution. Since **Kesavananda Bharati** held that the Preamble is a part of the Constitution, the Preamble can also be amended. ➤ **Basic Structure Limitation:** The power to amend the Preamble is not unlimited. Parliament cannot amend the Preamble in a manner that destroys or damages the basic structure of the Constitution. The official Supreme Court page on the basic structure judgment explains that the decision upheld the doctrine and placed limits on Parliament’s amending power. ➤ **42nd Amendment:** The Preamble was amended only once by the **42nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1976**. Three major changes were made: **Socialist** and **Secular** were added between “Sovereign” and “Democratic”; and **Unity of the Nation** was changed to **Unity and Integrity of the Nation**. ➤ **Validity of Amendment:** The amendment to the Preamble has been accepted as valid because it did not destroy the Constitution’s basic structure. Instead, it clarified and strengthened values already present in the Constitution. ➤ **Non-Destructive Amendment:** Parliament may add words or clarify constitutional ideals, but it cannot remove essential features such as democracy, republic, secularism, sovereignty, justice, liberty, equality, fraternity, dignity, unity, integrity and basic structure. ## Interpretative Value of the Preamble ➤ **Guiding Light:** The Preamble helps courts understand the purpose and spirit of the Constitution. It is especially useful when a provision is unclear or capable of two interpretations. ➤ **No Independent Power:** The Preamble does not give power to Parliament, executive or judiciary by itself. Powers must come from specific constitutional provisions. ➤ **No Override of Clear Text:** If the language of a constitutional provision is clear, the Preamble cannot be used to contradict it. The Preamble assists interpretation; it does not rewrite the Constitution. ➤ **Constitutional Morality:** The Preamble helps in giving meaning to constitutional morality. It reminds courts and government that legal provisions must be interpreted in harmony with justice, liberty, equality and dignity. ➤ **Expansion of Rights:** The Preamble has helped courts adopt a broad and humane interpretation of fundamental rights, especially Article 21. Concepts like dignity, social justice and equality have influenced the development of constitutional rights. ## Landmark Supreme Court Cases on the Preamble ## In re Berubari Union ➤ **Case Citation:** **In re Berubari Union, AIR 1960 SC 845**. ➤ **Brief Facts:** After the partition of India, a boundary dispute arose regarding Berubari Union. The Nehru-Noon Agreement between India and Pakistan proposed division of Berubari and exchange of enclaves. The President of India referred questions to the Supreme Court under Article 143. ➤ **Legal Issue:** The main issue was whether the transfer of Indian territory to Pakistan could be done under Article 3 of the Constitution or whether a constitutional amendment under Article 368 was necessary. ➤ **Ratio Decidendi:** The Supreme Court held that the agreement involved cession of Indian territory and therefore required a constitutional amendment. It also took the view that the Preamble was not a source of power. The source material records that the Court treated the agreement as involving cession or alienation of part of India’s territory. ➤ **Importance for Preamble:** Berubari is important because it gave the early view that the Preamble was not a part of the Constitution in the enforceable sense. This view was later corrected in Kesavananda Bharati. ## Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala ➤ **Case Citation:** **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461; (1973) 4 SCC 225**. ➤ **Brief Facts:** Sri Kesavananda Bharati, head of a religious mutt in Kerala, challenged land reform laws affecting the property of the mutt. The case also involved the validity of several constitutional amendments, including the 24th, 25th and 29th Amendments. The case was heard by the largest Constitution Bench of 13 judges and decided on 24 April 1973. ➤ **Legal Issue:** The main issue was whether Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution under Article 368 was unlimited, and whether Parliament could alter or destroy fundamental features of the Constitution. ➤ **Ratio Decidendi:** The Supreme Court held by majority that Parliament has wide power to amend the Constitution, including fundamental rights, but it cannot damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. The official Supreme Court material explains that the judgment upheld the basic structure doctrine and placed limits on Parliament’s amending power. ➤ **Importance for Preamble:** The Court held that the Preamble is a part of the Constitution. It also treated the Preamble as an important guide for identifying the basic structure. Ideas such as sovereignty, democracy, republic, justice, liberty, equality and fraternity became crucial in understanding the Constitution’s identity. ➤ **Exam-Relevant Principle:** Parliament may amend the Constitution, but it cannot destroy the Constitution’s identity. The Preamble reflects that identity. ## LIC of India v. Consumer Education and Research Centre ➤ **Case Citation:** **LIC of India v. Consumer Education and Research Centre, AIR 1995 SC 1811; (1995) 5 SCC 482**. ➤ **Brief Facts:** The case concerned the validity of restrictive conditions in an insurance policy of the Life Insurance Corporation of India. The policy was alleged to be discriminatory because it limited access to certain categories of persons. A summary of the case records the citation as 1995 AIR 1811 and (1995) 5 SCC 482. ➤ **Legal Issue:** The main issue was whether a public corporation like LIC could impose discriminatory conditions inconsistent with constitutional values of equality, fairness and social justice. ➤ **Ratio Decidendi:** The Supreme Court held that constitutional values apply to public bodies and that social justice, equality and dignity are central to constitutional governance. The Court interpreted State action in light of the Preamble and fundamental rights. ➤ **Importance for Preamble:** This case is important because it shows that the Preamble is not merely decorative. Its ideals of justice, equality and dignity influence interpretation of State action, welfare measures and rights of individuals. ## Minerva Mills v. Union of India ➤ **Case Citation:** **Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789; (1981) 1 SCR 206**. ➤ **Brief Facts:** The case challenged provisions of the 42nd Constitutional Amendment, especially amendments that attempted to expand Parliament’s amending power and give primacy to certain Directive Principles over Fundamental Rights. The reported citation is AIR 1980 SC 1789 and 1981 SCR (1) 206. ➤ **Legal Issue:** The main issue was whether Parliament could enlarge its amending power so much that no constitutional amendment could be questioned in court. ➤ **Ratio Decidendi:** The Supreme Court held that limited amending power is itself a basic feature of the Constitution. Parliament cannot convert limited power into unlimited power. ➤ **Importance for Preamble:** Minerva Mills strengthened the idea that the Constitution is based on harmony and balance. The Preamble’s promise of justice, liberty and equality requires balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles. ## Important Legal Principles Related to the Preamble ➤ **Preamble as Part of Constitution:** The present position is that the Preamble is a part of the Constitution after Kesavananda Bharati. ➤ **Preamble as Interpretative Tool:** The Preamble may be used to interpret ambiguous constitutional provisions. ➤ **Preamble Not Source of Power:** It does not independently grant legislative, executive or judicial power. ➤ **Preamble Cannot Override Text:** It cannot override clear constitutional provisions. ➤ **Preamble and Basic Structure:** The Preamble is an important guide to identify the basic structure of the Constitution. ➤ **Preamble is Amendable:** It can be amended under Article 368, but the amendment must not destroy the basic structure. ➤ **Preamble and Rights:** The values of justice, liberty, equality and dignity help courts interpret fundamental rights broadly. ## Memory Table on the Preamble ConceptSimple MeaningConstitutional Importance**We, the People**People are the source of authorityEstablishes popular sovereignty**Sovereign**India is fully independentNo external control over constitutional authority**Socialist**Social and economic justiceSupports welfare State and reduction of inequality**Secular**Equal respect for all religionsPrevents State religion and religious discrimination**Democratic**Government by elected representativesEnsures political participation**Republic**Elected head of StateRejects hereditary rule**Justice**Fairness in social, economic and political lifeGuides welfare and equality-based interpretation**Liberty**Freedom of thought, belief and expressionProtects individual freedom**Equality**Equal status and opportunitySupports Articles 14, 15 and 16**Fraternity**Brotherhood and mutual respectProtects dignity, unity and integrity## Difference Between Berubari and Kesavananda Bharati PointBerubari UnionKesavananda Bharati**Year**19601973**Nature**Advisory opinion under Article 143Constitutional challenge before 13-judge Bench**View on Preamble**Preamble not treated as part of Constitution in enforceable sensePreamble held to be part of Constitution**Main Issue**Transfer of territory to PakistanScope of Parliament’s amending power**Importance**Early narrow view of PreambleModern authoritative view of Preamble**Doctrine**No basic structure doctrineBasic structure doctrine established## Conclusion ➤ **Final Understanding:** The Preamble is the soul, philosophy and guiding spirit of the Constitution of India. It explains who created the Constitution, what type of State India is, and what objectives the Constitution seeks to achieve. ➤ **Legal Position:** The Preamble is a part of the Constitution. It is amendable, but it cannot be amended in a way that destroys the basic structure. It is not an independent source of power, but it has great interpretative value. ➤ **Constitutional Identity:** The words sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic, republic, justice, liberty, equality and fraternity are not ornamental words. They describe the identity of Indian constitutionalism. ➤ **Practical Importance:** The Preamble helps courts, lawmakers, administrators and citizens understand the Constitution as a living document committed to human dignity, social transformation, equality and democratic governance. ➤ **Core Principle:** The Preamble teaches that the Constitution of India is not merely a machinery of government; it is a promise to build a just, free, equal and united society. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Nature of the Indian Constitution: Federal, Unitary, Quasi-Federal, Cooperative Federal and Sui Generis Character Explained](https://lawfoyer.in/nature-of-the-indian-constitution-federal-unitary-quasi-federal/) **Published:** May 31, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/ChatGPTImageMay31202608_20_58P-725x1024.jpeg) # Meaning of the Nature of the Indian Constitution ## Constitutional Nature: Why the Debate Exists ➤ **Core Idea:** The Indian Constitution cannot be described by one simple label because it combines a **federal distribution of powers** with a **strong Union-oriented structure**. ➤ **Federal Aspect:** India has two levels of constitutional government: the **Union** and the **States**. Both derive their authority directly from the Constitution, not from each other. The Union Parliament and State Legislatures have separate law-making fields under Articles 245 to 254 and the Seventh Schedule. Article 245 allows Parliament to make laws for India and State Legislatures to make laws for their States, while Article 246 distributes legislative subjects between Union, State and Concurrent Lists. ➤ **Unitary Aspect:** At the same time, India is not a loose federation of sovereign States. Article 1 describes India as a **“Union of States”**, not as a federation formed by an agreement among States. States have no constitutional right to secede from India. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognised that Indian federalism is structured with a **strong Centre**. ➤ **Best Description:** The most accurate description is that India is a **federal Constitution with a strong unitary bias**, commonly called **quasi-federal**, and in modern cases also explained as **cooperative**, **asymmetric**, and in some contexts **sui generis**. # Federal Character of the Indian Constitution ## Federalism: Essential Meaning ➤ **Federal Principle:** Federalism means division of governmental powers between two levels of government, where each level is constitutionally supreme in its own sphere. ➤ **Constitutional Supremacy:** In India, neither Parliament nor State Legislatures are legally supreme over the Constitution. Both are limited by the Constitution, and their laws can be tested by courts. ➤ **Dual Polity:** India has a Union Government and State Governments. Both have elected institutions, executive authorities, legislatures and separate constitutional responsibilities. ➤ **Division of Legislative Powers:** The Seventh Schedule divides subjects into the **Union List**, **State List** and **Concurrent List**. Defence, foreign affairs, railways and currency are Union subjects. Police, public order, public health and agriculture are primarily State subjects. Criminal law, marriage, education and forests are examples of Concurrent List subjects. ➤ **Written Constitution:** India has a detailed written Constitution. A written Constitution is important in a federation because the powers of each government must be clearly defined. ➤ **Rigid Amendment Procedure:** Certain constitutional amendments affecting federal provisions require ratification by at least one-half of the State Legislatures under Article 368. This protects the States from unilateral alteration of core federal arrangements. ➤ **Independent Judiciary:** The Supreme Court and High Courts protect the constitutional distribution of powers. Article 131 gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in certain Centre-State and inter-State disputes. ➤ **Bicameral Parliament:** The Rajya Sabha represents States at the Union level, although India does not follow equal State representation like the United States. Representation in the Rajya Sabha is largely population-based. # Unitary Character of the Indian Constitution ## Strong Centre: Main Unitary Features ➤ **Union of States:** Article 1 calls India a **Union of States**. This expression was deliberately preferred because the Indian Union is indestructible. States are not sovereign units that came together by compact. ➤ **No Right to Secede:** A State cannot separate from India. The Supreme Court has observed that a State is a creature of the Constitution and has no right to claim sovereignty or secession. ➤ **Single Constitution:** Except the earlier special constitutional position of Jammu and Kashmir before the 2019 constitutional changes, India generally functions under one Constitution for both Union and States. In **In Re: Article 370 of the Constitution, 2023 INSC 1058**, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional process relating to abrogation of Article 370 and noted the integration of Jammu and Kashmir into the constitutional framework. ➤ **Single Citizenship:** India follows single citizenship. A person is a citizen of India, not separately a citizen of a State. This promotes national unity and distinguishes India from classical federations like the United States. ➤ **Residuary Powers with Union:** Under Article 248 and Entry 97 of the Union List, residuary legislative power belongs to Parliament. This is a strong unitary feature because in some classical federations residuary powers belong to States. ➤ **Parliament’s Power over State List in Special Situations:** Parliament can legislate on State List matters in certain circumstances, such as national interest under Article 249, emergency under Article 250, consent of two or more States under Article 252, and implementation of treaties under Article 253. ➤ **Concurrent List Supremacy:** Under Article 254, when a State law conflicts with a Union law on a Concurrent List subject, Union law generally prevails unless the State law has received Presidential assent and is not overridden later by Parliament. ➤ **Emergency Provisions:** During a national emergency, the federal structure becomes more unitary. Parliament can legislate more widely, and executive power of the Union expands. ➤ **President’s Rule:** Article 356 allows the Union to assume State governmental functions if constitutional machinery fails in a State. This is one of the strongest unitary features, though it is controlled by judicial review after **S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1**. ➤ **Integrated Judiciary:** India does not have separate federal and State court systems. The Supreme Court stands at the top of an integrated judicial hierarchy. ➤ **All India Services:** Services like IAS and IPS are recruited nationally but serve both Union and States. This creates administrative unity. ➤ **Governor’s Role:** The Governor is appointed by the President and may reserve certain State Bills for Presidential consideration. This gives the Union an indirect constitutional presence in State governance. # Quasi-Federal Character of the Indian Constitution ## Quasi-Federal: Meaning and Application ➤ **Concept:** “Quasi-federal” means a system that is federal in normal times but becomes unitary or Centre-dominant in certain situations. ➤ **Indian Position:** India is federal because powers are constitutionally divided, but it is not a classical federation because the Union has stronger constitutional powers than the States. ➤ **Strong Centre Bias:** In **State of West Bengal v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1241; (1964) 1 SCR 371**, West Bengal challenged Parliament’s power to acquire coal-bearing lands belonging to the State. The Supreme Court held that India’s Constitution adopted a federal structure with a strong bias towards the Centre, and States are autonomous only within the fields allotted to them. The case rejected the idea that Indian States possess independent sovereignty against the Union. ➤ **Quasi-Federal Judicial Recognition:** In **Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, (2006) 7 SCC 1**, the Supreme Court held that federalism is a basic feature, but Indian federalism leans in favour of a strong Centre and does not follow strict or classical federalism. The challenge related to removal of domicile requirement and introduction of open ballot for Rajya Sabha elections; the Court upheld the amendments and clarified that Rajya Sabha representation need not follow a rigid federal model. ➤ **Modern Formulation:** Recent Supreme Court reasoning has also described the State as federal in its constitutional sphere but quasi-federal in relation to the Union, because States have no sovereign right to secede and are bound by the constitutional structure. # Cooperative Federalism in India ## Cooperative Federalism: Meaning ➤ **Core Idea:** Cooperative federalism means Union and States must work together, especially in areas where powers overlap or governance requires coordination. ➤ **Practical Need:** Modern governance cannot be run through isolated compartments. Subjects like environment, taxation, public health, disaster management, education, digital governance and economic planning require joint effort. ➤ **Constitutional Examples:** The Inter-State Council under Article 263, GST Council under Article 279A, Finance Commission under Article 280, Zonal Councils, NITI Aayog, and centrally sponsored schemes reflect cooperative mechanisms. ➤ **GST and Federal Dialogue:** In **Union of India v. Mohit Minerals Pvt. Ltd., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 657**, the Supreme Court held that GST Council recommendations have persuasive value and are not binding in a manner that destroys legislative power of Parliament and State Legislatures. The Court emphasised that GST federalism requires dialogue, cooperation and balance between Union and States. ➤ **Delhi Federalism:** In **Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India, 2023 INSC 433**, the Supreme Court described Delhi’s constitutional arrangement under Article 239AA as an asymmetric federal model and stressed that the Union must operate within constitutional boundaries in the spirit of cooperative federalism. # Sui Generis and Asymmetric Federalism ## Sui Generis: Special Constitutional Arrangements ➤ **Meaning:** “Sui generis” means unique or of its own kind. In Indian federalism, some territories have special arrangements that do not fit neatly into ordinary State or Union Territory categories. ➤ **Delhi as Sui Generis:** The National Capital Territory of Delhi has an elected legislature and council of ministers, but it is not a full State. Under Article 239AA, Delhi’s legislative powers exclude public order, police and land. The Supreme Court has recognised Delhi as having a special constitutional status, different from ordinary Union Territories. ➤ **Asymmetric Federalism:** India does not treat all units identically. Different States and territories may have special provisions depending on history, geography, tribal autonomy, border concerns or national capital needs. ➤ **Examples:** Special arrangements exist under provisions relating to the North-Eastern States, tribal areas under the Fifth and Sixth Schedules, and Union Territories with legislatures such as Delhi and Puducherry. # Landmark Case Laws on Nature of Indian Constitution ## State of West Bengal v. Union of India ➤ **Case:** **State of West Bengal v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1241; (1964) 1 SCR 371** ➤ **Facts:** West Bengal challenged the Union’s power to acquire coal-bearing lands vested in the State under a Parliamentary law. ➤ **Issue:** Whether States possess sovereign immunity against Union legislation and whether Parliament could acquire State property. ➤ **Ratio:** The Supreme Court held that India is not a compact of sovereign States. The Constitution creates a federal structure with a strong Centre. States are autonomous within assigned fields but do not possess independent sovereignty against the Union. ➤ **Importance:** This case is a foundation for describing India as federal but Centre-leaning. ## State of Rajasthan v. Union of India ➤ **Case:** **State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, AIR 1977 SC 1361; (1977) 3 SCC 592** ➤ **Facts:** After political change at the Union level, certain State Governments challenged threatened Union action under Article 356. ➤ **Issue:** Whether courts could interfere with Union action concerning President’s Rule at the preliminary stage. ➤ **Ratio:** The Supreme Court showed restraint and held that political questions do not automatically become non-justiciable, but interference requires serious constitutional grounds. ➤ **Importance:** The case showed the wide nature of Union power under Article 356, though later controlled by **S.R. Bommai**. ## S.R. Bommai v. Union of India ➤ **Case:** **S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1; AIR 1994 SC 1918** ➤ **Facts:** Several State Governments were dismissed under Article 356, and the validity of Presidential Proclamations was challenged. ➤ **Issue:** Whether President’s Rule is subject to judicial review and whether federalism is part of the basic structure. ➤ **Ratio:** The Supreme Court held that federalism is part of the basic structure of the Constitution. A proclamation under Article 356 is subject to judicial review. The majority in the Assembly must ordinarily be tested on the floor of the House. Article 356 is an exceptional power, not a weapon for political control. ➤ **Importance:** This is the most important case protecting Indian federalism against arbitrary Union interference. ## Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India ➤ **Case:** **Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, (2006) 7 SCC 1** ➤ **Facts:** Amendments to Rajya Sabha election law removed domicile requirement and introduced open ballot. ➤ **Issue:** Whether these changes violated federalism and free and fair elections. ➤ **Ratio:** The Supreme Court upheld the amendments and held that Indian federalism is not strict federalism. Federalism is a basic feature, but India has a strong Centre and Rajya Sabha representation need not require domicile in the represented State. ➤ **Importance:** The case clarifies that India’s federalism is flexible, not mechanically copied from other federations. ## Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India ➤ **Case:** **Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India, 2023 INSC 433** ➤ **Facts:** The dispute concerned control over “services” in the National Capital Territory of Delhi. ➤ **Issue:** Whether the elected Delhi Government or the Union/Lieutenant Governor had control over services, except excluded subjects. ➤ **Ratio:** The Supreme Court held that Delhi has a constitutionally recognised democratic and representative structure under Article 239AA. The Union and Delhi share a unique federal relationship, and cooperative federalism requires each authority to remain within constitutional boundaries. ➤ **Importance:** The case is important for **asymmetric** and **sui generis** federalism. ## Union of India v. Mohit Minerals Pvt. Ltd. ➤ **Case:** **Union of India v. Mohit Minerals Pvt. Ltd., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 657** ➤ **Facts:** The dispute involved levy of IGST on ocean freight and the legal effect of GST Council recommendations. ➤ **Issue:** Whether recommendations of the GST Council are binding on Parliament and State Legislatures. ➤ **Ratio:** The Supreme Court held that GST Council recommendations are not binding in a manner that overrides legislative power. The GST framework rests on cooperative federalism and dialogue. ➤ **Importance:** The case explains modern **fiscal cooperative federalism**. # Comparative Table: Federal, Unitary, Quasi-Federal, Cooperative and Sui Generis CharacterMeaningIndian Example**Federal**Powers divided between Union and StatesArticles 245–246, Seventh Schedule**Unitary**Strong central control in certain areasArticles 249, 250, 253, 356**Quasi-Federal**Federal in normal times, unitary in special situationsStrong Centre, emergency powers, residuary powers**Cooperative Federal**Union and States work jointlyGST Council, Inter-State Council, Finance Commission**Asymmetric/Sui Generis**Special constitutional treatment for certain unitsDelhi under Article 239AA, tribal areas, special regional provisions# Final Legal Position ➤ **Most Accurate Conclusion:** The Indian Constitution is **not purely federal** and **not purely unitary**. It is a **federal Constitution with a strong unitary bias**. ➤ **Classical Answer:** India is commonly called **quasi-federal** because federal features operate in normal times, but the Union has dominant powers in emergencies, residuary matters, treaty implementation, inter-State coordination and constitutional breakdown. ➤ **Modern Answer:** India is also a model of **cooperative federalism**, especially after GST and modern Centre-State governance, where Union and States must consult, coordinate and respect each other’s constitutional spaces. ➤ **Special Answer:** India also contains **asymmetric** and **sui generis** federal arrangements because different units, such as Delhi, Puducherry, tribal areas and certain regions, have special constitutional treatment. ➤ **Basic Structure Point:** Federalism is part of the **basic structure** of the Constitution. Parliament cannot use constitutional amendment power to destroy the federal identity of the Constitution, although the Indian model permits a strong Centre. ➤ **One-Line Memory Aid:** **India is federal in structure, unitary in emergencies, quasi-federal in balance, cooperative in governance, and sui generis in special constitutional arrangements.** **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Salient Features of the Indian Constitution: Comprehensive Legal Notes for Indian Constitutional Law](https://lawfoyer.in/salient-features-of-the-indian-constitution-2/) **Published:** May 31, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/ChatGPTImageMay31202612_30_38A-725x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning of the Indian Constitution ● **Constitution as Supreme Law:** The Constitution of India is the supreme legal document of India. It creates the organs of the State, distributes powers between them, limits governmental authority, and protects individual liberties. Every law, executive action, policy, and constitutional amendment must conform to the Constitution. ● **Constitutional Identity:** The Preamble declares India to be a **Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic** and promises **Justice, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity**. These words are not merely decorative; they express the constitutional philosophy and guide interpretation of the whole Constitution. The words “socialist”, “secular” and “integrity” were added by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976. ([Indian Kanoon](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/237570/?utm_source=chatgpt.com)) ## Written Constitution ● **Codified Constitutional Law:** India has a written Constitution, unlike the British Constitution which is largely unwritten and based on conventions, statutes, judicial decisions and customs. The Indian Constitution is contained in a formal written document adopted by the Constituent Assembly on **26 November 1949** and brought fully into force on **26 January 1950**. ● **Clarity and Certainty:** A written Constitution provides certainty because citizens, courts, governments and authorities can refer to the exact text of constitutional provisions. For example, Fundamental Rights are expressly written in **Part III**, Directive Principles in **Part IV**, emergency provisions in **Part XVIII**, and amendment procedure in **Article 368**. ● **Supremacy of Constitution:** Since the Constitution is written and supreme, Parliament and State Legislatures cannot make laws beyond their constitutional powers. If they do so, courts may declare such laws unconstitutional through judicial review. ## Lengthiest Constitution ● **Detailed Constitutional Scheme:** The Indian Constitution is one of the lengthiest written constitutions in the world because it deals not only with broad principles but also with detailed administrative, legislative, judicial and financial matters. It contains provisions regarding Union and State governments, Parliament, State Legislatures, judiciary, services, elections, emergency powers, language, schedules, constitutional bodies and amendment procedure. ● **Reason for Length:** The Constitution is lengthy because India is a vast, diverse and complex country. The framers had to address historical inequalities, linguistic diversity, caste discrimination, religious plurality, federal relations, minority protections and administrative continuity after colonial rule. ● **Borrowed but Adapted Features:** The Constitution adopted suitable features from several constitutional systems, such as parliamentary government from Britain, judicial review and fundamental rights from the United States, Directive Principles from Ireland, emergency provisions from Germany and federal structure from Canada. However, these features were modified according to Indian conditions. ## Federalism with Unitary Bias ● **Federal Structure:** India has a federal system because powers are divided between the Union and the States. The Constitution creates two levels of government, provides separate legislative fields, and gives States constitutional existence. Legislative powers are distributed mainly through the **Union List, State List and Concurrent List** in the Seventh Schedule. ● **Constitutional Distribution of Powers:** **Article 245** deals with the territorial extent of laws made by Parliament and State Legislatures, while **Article 246** distributes subject-matter legislative powers between Union and States. Parliament has exclusive power over Union List matters, States have power over State List matters, and both can legislate on Concurrent List matters, subject to Union supremacy in case of conflict. ● **Unitary Bias:** Although India is federal, it has a strong Centre. This is why it is often described as a **federation with unitary bias**. The Union has residuary powers, greater financial control, emergency powers, power to reorganise States under Article 3, and power to legislate on State subjects in certain circumstances. ● **Single Constitution and Single Citizenship:** Unlike the United States where each State has its own Constitution, India generally has one Constitution for the Union and the States. India also follows single citizenship, meaning every citizen is a citizen of India and not separately a citizen of any State. ● **Emergency Centralisation:** During a national emergency, constitutional distribution of powers may become highly centralised. Parliament can legislate on State List subjects, and the executive authority of the Union expands. This shows the unitary tendency of the Indian federal system. ● **Landmark Case – S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918; (1994) 3 SCC 1:** In this case, several State governments had been dismissed under Article 356 by imposing President’s Rule. The Supreme Court held that federalism is part of the basic structure of the Constitution and that the President’s satisfaction under Article 356 is subject to judicial review. The Court clarified that Article 356 cannot be used for political convenience and that floor test in the Assembly is normally the proper method to test majority. The case strengthened Indian federalism and limited arbitrary central intervention in States. ## Parliamentary System of Government ● **Responsible Government:** India follows a parliamentary system where the real executive is responsible to the legislature. At the Union level, the President is the constitutional head, but real executive power is exercised by the Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister. ● **President and Council of Ministers:** **Article 52** provides for the President of India. **Article 74** provides that there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President. **Article 75** makes the Council of Ministers collectively responsible to the House of the People, i.e., Lok Sabha. ● **Collective Responsibility:** Collective responsibility means the Council of Ministers works as one team and remains in office only so long as it enjoys the confidence of the Lok Sabha. If the Lok Sabha passes a no-confidence motion, the entire Council of Ministers must resign. ● **Fusion of Executive and Legislature:** In a parliamentary system, the executive is drawn from the legislature. Ministers are usually Members of Parliament and participate in legislative business. This creates close coordination between law-making and administration. ● **Prime Ministerial Leadership:** Though the President is the formal head, the Prime Minister is the real centre of executive power. The Prime Minister selects ministers, leads government policy, coordinates ministries and represents the government in Parliament. ● **Landmark Case – Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831:** The Supreme Court held that the President and Governors are constitutional heads who generally act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The case confirmed the parliamentary character of Indian government and rejected the idea that the President or Governor ordinarily exercises personal discretion in executive matters. ## Judicial Review ● **Meaning of Judicial Review:** Judicial review is the power of courts to examine the constitutionality of laws, executive actions and constitutional amendments. If any law or action violates the Constitution, courts may strike it down. ● **Constitutional Basis:** Judicial review flows from several provisions, especially **Articles 13, 32, 226, 131, 136, 141 and 142**. Article 13 declares that laws inconsistent with Fundamental Rights are void to the extent of inconsistency. Article 32 gives the right to approach the Supreme Court for enforcement of Fundamental Rights, and Article 226 gives High Courts wide writ jurisdiction. ● **Guardian Role of Judiciary:** The Supreme Court and High Courts act as guardians of the Constitution. Judicial review ensures that Parliament, State Legislatures and executive authorities remain within constitutional limits. ● **Landmark Case – Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225:** The petitioner challenged constitutional amendments affecting property rights and religious institutional rights. The legal issue was whether Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution under Article 368 was unlimited. By a 7:6 majority, the Supreme Court held that Parliament may amend any part of the Constitution, but it cannot destroy or damage the basic structure of the Constitution. This case established the basic structure doctrine and made constitutional supremacy stronger than parliamentary supremacy. ● **Landmark Case – L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 1125; (1997) 3 SCC 261:** The issue was whether tribunal decisions could exclude the jurisdiction of High Courts and the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that judicial review by High Courts under Articles 226/227 and by the Supreme Court under Article 32 is part of the basic structure. Tribunals may exist, but their decisions remain subject to constitutional judicial review. ● **Landmark Case – I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2007 SC 861; (2007) 2 SCC 1:** The issue was whether laws placed in the Ninth Schedule after Kesavananda Bharati could be completely protected from judicial review. The Supreme Court held that even Ninth Schedule laws inserted after 24 April 1973 are open to judicial review if they damage or destroy basic structure, especially the essence of Fundamental Rights. ## Fundamental Rights ● **Basic Civil Liberties:** Fundamental Rights are contained in **Part III, Articles 12 to 35**. They protect individual dignity and liberty against arbitrary State action. They are enforceable in courts, which means a person can approach the Supreme Court under Article 32 or High Courts under Article 226 for their protection. ● **Six Main Groups:** The main Fundamental Rights are: **Right to Equality** under Articles 14 to 18, **Right to Freedom** under Articles 19 to 22, **Right against Exploitation** under Articles 23 to 24, **Right to Freedom of Religion** under Articles 25 to 28, **Cultural and Educational Rights** under Articles 29 to 30, and **Right to Constitutional Remedies** under Article 32. ● **Negative and Positive Duties:** Fundamental Rights mainly restrict State power, but some rights also impose positive obligations. For example, Article 21 has been expanded to include rights necessary for dignified life, such as privacy, legal aid, speedy trial, clean environment and livelihood. ● **Reasonable Restrictions:** Fundamental Rights are not absolute. Article 19 freedoms may be restricted on grounds such as sovereignty and integrity of India, public order, decency, morality, security of State and contempt of court, depending on the specific freedom involved. ● **Landmark Case – Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248:** The petitioner’s passport was impounded without giving reasons. The issue was whether deprivation of personal liberty under Article 21 only required a formal law or whether the law must be fair, just and reasonable. The Supreme Court held that procedure under Article 21 must be right, just and fair, not arbitrary or oppressive. This case transformed Article 21 into a broad guarantee of due process-like fairness. ● **Landmark Case – Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1:** A nine-judge Bench held that the right to privacy is a fundamental right protected under Articles 14, 19 and 21. The case strengthened dignity, autonomy and informational privacy as core constitutional values. ## Directive Principles of State Policy ● **Welfare State Principles:** Directive Principles of State Policy are contained in **Part IV, Articles 36 to 51**. They are non-justiciable, meaning they cannot be directly enforced in courts. However, they are fundamental in the governance of the country and guide the State in making laws and policies. ● **Social and Economic Justice:** DPSPs aim to establish a welfare State. They direct the State to reduce inequalities, provide adequate livelihood, protect workers, promote education, improve public health, organise village panchayats, protect environment and promote international peace. ● **Difference from Fundamental Rights:** Fundamental Rights are enforceable legal rights, while DPSPs are constitutional instructions for governance. Fundamental Rights protect individual liberty, while DPSPs promote social justice and collective welfare. ● **Harmony between FR and DPSP:** Indian constitutional law does not treat Fundamental Rights and DPSPs as enemies. Both are complementary. Fundamental Rights provide the means of liberty, while DPSPs provide the goals of social transformation. ● **Landmark Case – Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789; (1980) 3 SCC 625:** The issue was whether Parliament could give unlimited primacy to DPSPs over Fundamental Rights through constitutional amendment. The Supreme Court held that harmony and balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles is part of the basic structure. The State must pursue social welfare, but it cannot destroy essential freedoms while doing so. ## Secularism ● **Equal Respect for All Religions:** Secularism under the Indian Constitution does not mean hostility to religion. It means the State has no official religion and must treat all religions equally. The Constitution protects freedom of conscience and religion under Articles 25 to 28. ● **Positive Secularism:** Indian secularism allows the State to regulate secular activities connected with religion and to introduce social reform. For example, the State may regulate religious endowments, prevent social evils and ensure equality within religious institutions. ● **Preamble and Basic Structure:** The word “secular” is expressly used in the Preamble after the 42nd Amendment, but the constitutional idea existed from the beginning through equality, non-discrimination and religious freedom provisions. ● **Landmark Case – S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918; (1994) 3 SCC 1:** The Supreme Court held that secularism is part of the basic structure of the Constitution. The Court explained that religion and State power cannot be mixed and that a State government acting against secular principles may attract constitutional consequences under Article 356. ## Socialism ● **Constitutional Socialism:** The word “socialist” in the Preamble reflects the goal of social and economic justice. Indian socialism does not require complete State ownership of all property. It means reducing inequality, preventing exploitation, promoting welfare and ensuring fair distribution of opportunities. ● **Link with DPSP:** Socialism is closely connected with Directive Principles, especially Articles 38, 39, 39A, 41, 42, 43 and 47. These provisions direct the State to reduce inequalities, ensure equal justice, promote livelihood, provide humane working conditions and improve public health. ● **Balanced Economic Model:** India’s constitutional socialism is compatible with a mixed economy, private enterprise and welfare regulation. The Constitution permits economic development but requires that development must not ignore social justice. ● **Landmark Case – D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305:** The Supreme Court interpreted pension benefits in light of socialist principles and held that pension is not a bounty but a measure of socio-economic justice. The case reflects how socialism influences welfare-oriented interpretation. ## Democracy ● **Government by the People:** Democracy means that political power ultimately belongs to the people. The Preamble begins with “We, the people of India”, showing that the Constitution derives authority from the people. ● **Representative Democracy:** India follows representative democracy. Citizens elect representatives to Parliament, State Legislatures and local bodies. The government must remain accountable to elected institutions. ● **Universal Adult Franchise:** Every adult citizen has the right to vote subject to constitutional and statutory qualifications. This gives political equality to citizens irrespective of caste, religion, gender, wealth or education. ● **Free and Fair Elections:** Democracy requires genuine elections, independent election machinery, political competition and peaceful transfer of power. **Article 324** establishes the Election Commission of India for superintendence, direction and control of elections. ● **Landmark Case – Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 Supp SCC 1:** After the election of the Prime Minister was set aside by the Allahabad High Court, Parliament inserted Article 329A to protect certain elections from judicial scrutiny. The Supreme Court held that free and fair elections and democracy are basic features of the Constitution. The amendment was struck down because it damaged democratic equality and rule of law. ## Republicanism ● **Meaning of Republic:** India is a republic because the head of the State is elected, directly or indirectly, and not a hereditary monarch. The President of India is elected according to the constitutional process and holds office for a fixed term. ● **No Hereditary Political Authority:** Republicanism rejects inherited political power. Public offices are open according to constitutional rules, democratic process and legal qualifications. ● **Popular Sovereignty:** Republicanism is closely linked with democracy because both are based on the idea that authority belongs to the people and public offices exist for public service, not private privilege. ## Emergency Provisions ● **Extraordinary Constitutional Mechanism:** Emergency provisions are contained mainly in **Part XVIII**, including **Articles 352 to 360**. They enable the Constitution to respond to war, external aggression, armed rebellion, failure of constitutional machinery in States, and financial instability. ● **National Emergency:** Under **Article 352**, National Emergency may be proclaimed on grounds of war, external aggression or armed rebellion. During such emergency, the federal structure becomes more unitary because Union powers expand. ● **State Emergency or President’s Rule:** Under **Article 356**, President’s Rule may be imposed if the constitutional machinery in a State fails. However, after S.R. Bommai, this power is subject to judicial review and cannot be used arbitrarily for political purposes. ● **Financial Emergency:** **Article 360** deals with Financial Emergency. It may be proclaimed if the financial stability or credit of India or any part of India is threatened. It has never been used in India. ● **Rights during Emergency:** Emergency provisions can affect Fundamental Rights. However, after the 44th Amendment, Articles 20 and 21 cannot be suspended even during National Emergency. This protects core criminal justice and life-liberty guarantees. ● **Landmark Case – A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla, (1976) 2 SCC 521:** During the 1975 Emergency, the issue was whether detained persons could seek habeas corpus when Article 21 was suspended. The majority held that such remedy was unavailable. This judgment is widely criticised and has been expressly disapproved in later constitutional jurisprudence, especially after the recognition of privacy and constitutional liberty in Puttaswamy. ## Independent Constitutional Bodies ● **Purpose of Constitutional Bodies:** The Constitution creates independent institutions to protect neutrality, accountability, financial discipline, electoral fairness and federal balance. These bodies are not ordinary departments of the government; they derive authority directly from the Constitution. ● **Election Commission of India:** **Article 324** establishes the Election Commission. It supervises, directs and controls elections to Parliament, State Legislatures and the offices of President and Vice-President. Its independence is essential for democracy and free and fair elections. ● **Comptroller and Auditor General of India:** **Articles 148 to 151** deal with the CAG. The CAG audits government accounts and ensures financial accountability. This institution protects public money from misuse. ● **Union Public Service Commission and State Public Service Commissions:** **Articles 315 to 323** provide for Public Service Commissions. They help ensure merit-based recruitment and reduce political influence in public services. ● **Finance Commission:** **Article 280** provides for the Finance Commission. It recommends distribution of financial resources between the Union and States, strengthening fiscal federalism. ● **Special Officer for Linguistic Minorities and Commissions for SCs/STs/Backward Classes:** The Constitution also provides institutions to protect vulnerable groups and minorities, including constitutional mechanisms for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and backward classes. ## Memory Table: Salient Features at a Glance FeatureCore MeaningKey Constitutional Link**Written Constitution**Formal codified supreme lawEntire Constitution**Lengthiest Constitution**Detailed governance frameworkParts, Schedules, Articles**Federalism with Unitary Bias**Division of powers with strong CentreArticles 245–246, Seventh Schedule**Parliamentary System**Executive responsible to legislatureArticles 74–75**Judicial Review**Courts test constitutionalityArticles 13, 32, 226**Fundamental Rights**Enforceable libertiesPart III**Directive Principles**Welfare governance goalsPart IV**Secularism**Equal treatment of all religionsPreamble, Articles 25–28**Socialism**Social and economic justicePreamble, DPSP**Democracy**Rule through elected representativesPreamble, Article 324**Republicanism**Elected head of StateArticles 52–62**Emergency Provisions**Crisis powersArticles 352–360**Independent Bodies**Neutral constitutional institutionsArticles 148, 280, 315, 324## Conclusion ● **Integrated Constitutional Vision:** The salient features of the Indian Constitution together create a balanced constitutional system. The Constitution is written and detailed, but also flexible enough to adapt through amendments. It is federal, but with a strong Union. It creates parliamentary democracy, but limits political power through judicial review and Fundamental Rights. ● **Balance of Liberty and Welfare:** Fundamental Rights protect individual freedom, while Directive Principles guide the State toward social and economic justice. Secularism protects religious equality, socialism promotes welfare, democracy ensures public participation, and republicanism rejects hereditary rule. ● **Basic Structure Protection:** Through cases such as **Kesavananda Bharati**, **Minerva Mills**, **S.R. Bommai**, **Indira Nehru Gandhi**, **L. Chandra Kumar** and **I.R. Coelho**, the Supreme Court has protected the Constitution’s core identity. These features are not isolated ideas; they work together to preserve constitutional supremacy, human dignity, rule of law and democratic governance in India. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Making of the Indian Constitution and Constituent Assembly: Historical Evolution, Drafting Process and Constitutional Influences](https://lawfoyer.in/making-of-the-indian-constitution-and-constituent-assembly/) **Published:** May 31, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/ChatGPTImageMay31202612_18_23A-725x1024.jpeg) ## Introduction: Meaning and Importance of Constitution-Making in India ➤ **Constitution as supreme law:** The Constitution of India is the basic legal document which establishes the structure of the State, distributes powers between institutions, protects rights of citizens, and lays down the goals of governance. It is not merely a legal text; it is also a political, social and moral document reflecting India’s struggle against colonial rule, social inequality and arbitrary power. ➤ **Indian Constitution as a historical product:** The Constitution did not appear suddenly on 26 January 1950. It was the result of a long constitutional evolution beginning from the East India Company’s rule, followed by Crown rule, gradual introduction of representative institutions, nationalist demands for self-government, and finally the Constituent Assembly’s detailed debates. ➤ **People’s sovereignty:** The opening words of the Preamble, “We, the people of India”, show that the Constitution derives its authority from the people, not from the British Parliament or any colonial authority. The Constitution of India was adopted on 26 November 1949 and came into force on 26 January 1950. ## Colonial Background of Indian Constitutional Law ➤ **Company rule to Crown rule:** Indian constitutional development began under British colonial control. Initially, the East India Company exercised political and administrative power. Over time, the British Parliament enacted several laws to regulate the Company and later the Crown’s administration in India. ➤ **Regulating Act, 1773:** This Act was the first major attempt by the British Parliament to regulate the affairs of the East India Company in India. It established the office of the Governor-General of Bengal and created the Supreme Court at Calcutta. Its importance lies in the fact that it introduced centralized control and judicial institutions in British India. ➤ **Pitt’s India Act, 1784:** This Act strengthened British governmental control over the East India Company by creating a system of dual control. The Company continued commercial functions, but political supervision increased through the British Government. This marked the beginning of clearer parliamentary control over Indian administration. ➤ **Charter Acts:** The Charter Acts, especially the Charter Act of 1833 and Charter Act of 1853, contributed to centralisation and legislative development. The Charter Act of 1833 made the Governor-General of Bengal the Governor-General of India and created a central legislative authority. The Charter Act of 1853 separated legislative and executive functions in the Governor-General’s Council and introduced limited competition for civil services. ➤ **Government of India Act, 1858:** After the Revolt of 1857, the East India Company’s rule ended and India came directly under the British Crown. The Act transferred power from the Company to the Crown and created the office of Secretary of State for India. This was an important constitutional shift because India was no longer governed by a trading corporation but by the British Crown. ➤ **Indian Councils Act, 1861:** This Act introduced Indians into legislative councils in a limited way. It also recognised the principle of decentralised legislative power by restoring legislative powers to Bombay and Madras. However, representation was still limited, nominated and controlled. ➤ **Indian Councils Act, 1892:** This Act slightly expanded legislative councils and allowed limited discussion of budgets. Though members were not directly elected, the system of recommendation by bodies such as municipalities and universities indirectly introduced an electoral principle. ➤ **Indian Councils Act, 1909:** Also known as the Morley-Minto Reforms, this Act introduced separate electorates for Muslims. This was a major constitutional development because it formally introduced communal representation into Indian politics. While it increased Indian participation in councils, it also deepened communal political divisions. ## Government of India Act, 1919: Beginning of Responsible Government in Limited Form ➤ **Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms:** The Government of India Act, 1919 was based on the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. It was described as a step towards the progressive realisation of responsible government in British India, but it retained strong British control. The Indian National Congress rejected it, and Annie Besant famously criticised it as “unworthy of England to offer and India to accept.” ➤ **Dyarchy in provinces:** The most important feature of the 1919 Act was dyarchy at the provincial level. Provincial subjects were divided into “transferred subjects” and “reserved subjects.” Transferred subjects like education and public health were administered by Indian ministers responsible to legislatures, while reserved subjects like finance, police and law and order remained under the control of the Governor and his officials. ➤ **Bicameral central legislature:** The Act introduced a bicameral legislature at the Centre consisting of the Council of State and Legislative Assembly. However, the Governor-General retained extensive overriding powers. ➤ **Limited franchise:** Voting rights were restricted and based on property, education and other qualifications. Therefore, the system did not represent universal democracy. ➤ **Review clause:** The Act contained a provision for review after ten years. This led to the appointment of the Simon Commission in 1927. ➤ **Importance:** The 1919 Act is important because it introduced constitutional vocabulary such as responsible government, ministerial responsibility and provincial legislative participation. However, it failed because real power remained with the British executive. ## Simon Commission, Nehru Report and Demand for a Constituent Assembly ➤ **Simon Commission, 1927:** The British Government appointed the Simon Commission to review the working of the 1919 Act. It had no Indian member, which led to widespread protest under the slogan “Simon Go Back.” ➤ **Nehru Report, 1928:** In response to the challenge that Indians could not agree on a constitutional framework, an all-party committee chaired by Motilal Nehru prepared the Nehru Report. It demanded Dominion Status, fundamental rights, responsible government and a federal structure. It was an important Indian attempt to draft constitutional principles. ➤ **Poorna Swaraj Resolution, 1929:** The demand for complete independence was adopted by the Indian National Congress at Lahore in 1929. This transformed the constitutional struggle from limited reforms to full sovereignty. ➤ **Demand for Constituent Assembly:** The idea that Indians should frame their own Constitution gradually became central to the freedom movement. It reflected the principle that a Constitution must be made by the people or their representatives, not imposed by a colonial Parliament. ## Government of India Act, 1935: Immediate Constitutional Predecessor ➤ **Largest colonial constitutional statute:** The Government of India Act, 1935 was the most detailed constitutional law enacted by the British for India. It served as the basic constitutional framework in the final years of British rule and influenced many structural features of the Indian Constitution. ➤ **Provincial autonomy:** The Act abolished dyarchy in provinces and introduced provincial autonomy. Elected provincial governments could function in several fields, but Governors retained special responsibilities and reserve powers. ➤ **Proposed All-India Federation:** The Act proposed a federation of British Indian provinces and princely states. However, the federal part never fully came into operation because the princely states did not join as required. ➤ **Three legislative lists:** The Act divided legislative powers into Federal List, Provincial List and Concurrent List. This idea influenced the Union List, State List and Concurrent List under the Constitution of India. ➤ **Federal Court:** The Act established the Federal Court of India, which began functioning in 1937. This was an important predecessor of the Supreme Court of India. ➤ **Public Service Commissions and RBI:** The Act provided for public service commissions and contributed to institutional development. It also created the Reserve Bank of India and strengthened administrative structure ➤ **Limitations:** The Act did not provide full responsible government at the Centre. The Governor-General and Governors retained overriding powers. Defence, external affairs and key executive matters remained under British control. ➤ **Importance for the Constitution:** Many administrative and federal provisions of the Constitution were adapted from the 1935 Act, but the Constitution transformed them into a democratic, republican and sovereign framework. ## Cabinet Mission Plan, 1946: Birth of the Constituent Assembly ➤ **British decision to transfer power:** After the Second World War, Britain’s political and economic position weakened, and Indian demand for independence became irresistible. The Labour Government in Britain expressed willingness to facilitate constitution-making by Indians. ➤ **Cabinet Mission members:** The Cabinet Mission came to India in March 1946. Its members were Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps and A.V. Alexander. The Mission and Viceroy Lord Wavell issued the Cabinet Mission Plan on 16 May 1946. ➤ **Main purpose:** The Plan sought to create machinery through which Indians could frame their own Constitution. It tried to reconcile the Indian National Congress demand for a united India and the Muslim League demand for Pakistan. ➤ **Rejection of Pakistan:** The Plan rejected the demand for a separate Pakistan and proposed an Indian Union consisting of British Indian provinces and princely states. ➤ **Proposed federal structure:** The Union was to deal with limited subjects such as foreign affairs, defence and communications. Provinces were grouped into sections and were given considerable autonomy. This grouping scheme later became controversial. ➤ **Constituent Assembly:** The Plan provided for a Constituent Assembly to frame the Constitution. Members were to be elected indirectly by provincial legislative assemblies, and princely states were to nominate their representatives. ➤ **Legal significance:** The Constituent Assembly was created under the Cabinet Mission Plan. During the initial stages, the Assembly recognised this source of legal legitimacy while also moving towards the higher principle of popular sovereignty. ## Constituent Assembly: Composition and Nature ➤ **Indirectly elected body:** The Constituent Assembly was not elected by universal adult franchise. Its members were indirectly elected by members of provincial legislative assemblies. However, it represented a wide range of political, social, regional and intellectual opinion. ➤ **Original strength:** The original strength of the Assembly was 389 members. After Partition, the strength was reduced to 299. ➤ **First meeting:** The Constituent Assembly met for the first time on 9 December 1946. Sachchidananda Sinha acted as temporary chairman. Dr. Rajendra Prasad was later elected as permanent President of the Assembly. ➤ **Boycott by Muslim League:** The Muslim League initially boycotted the Assembly because of political disagreement over Pakistan. This affected the representative character of the Assembly in its early stage. ➤ **After Partition:** After the Indian Independence Act, 1947 and Partition, the Constituent Assembly became the sovereign constitution-making body for India and also functioned as the Dominion Legislature. ➤ **Diversity:** The Assembly included lawyers, freedom fighters, administrators, scholars, social reformers and representatives of different communities. Important members included Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar, K.M. Munshi, Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Hansa Mehta, Durgabai Deshmukh and many others. ## Objectives Resolution: Philosophical Foundation of the Constitution ➤ **Moved by Jawaharlal Nehru:** Jawaharlal Nehru moved the Objectives Resolution on 13 December 1946. It was adopted in January 1947. The debates around it formed a major part of the early work of the Assembly. ➤ **Core ideas:** The Resolution declared India’s resolve to become an independent sovereign republic. It emphasised justice, equality, freedom, safeguards for minorities, and the dignity of the individual. ➤ **Basis of Preamble:** The Objectives Resolution later became the foundation of the Preamble. The Preamble’s ideals of justice, liberty, equality and fraternity reflect this constitutional philosophy. ➤ **Importance:** The Resolution converted the freedom struggle’s political goals into constitutional principles. It linked national independence with social transformation. ## Committees of the Constituent Assembly ➤ **Committee system:** The Assembly worked through several committees. This made the drafting process systematic, specialised and detailed. ➤ **Important committees:** Major committees included the Union Powers Committee, Union Constitution Committee, Provincial Constitution Committee, Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights, Minorities and Tribal and Excluded Areas, Drafting Committee, Rules Committee and Steering Committee. ➤ **Role of Sardar Patel:** Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel chaired important committees dealing with fundamental rights, minorities and provincial constitutions. His role was significant in balancing unity, rights and minority safeguards. ➤ **Role of B.N. Rau:** Sir B.N. Rau served as Constitutional Adviser. He studied constitutional systems of several countries and prepared an initial draft. His comparative constitutional work helped the Assembly adopt suitable provisions from different jurisdictions. ## Drafting Committee and Dr. B.R. Ambedkar ➤ **Formation:** The Drafting Committee was appointed on 29 August 1947. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar was its Chairman. ➤ **Members:** The Drafting Committee included Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar, K.M. Munshi, Mohammad Saadulla, B.L. Mitter and D.P. Khaitan. Due to resignations and deaths, some changes occurred later. ➤ **Ambedkar’s contribution:** Dr. Ambedkar played a central role in explaining, defending and refining the Draft Constitution. His legal clarity, social vision and understanding of constitutional morality deeply influenced the final document. ➤ **Draft Constitution:** B.N. Rau’s initial draft was considered by the Drafting Committee. The Drafting Committee prepared the Draft Constitution, which was introduced by Dr. Ambedkar in the Assembly on 4 November 1948. ➤ **Deliberative drafting:** The Constitution was not mechanically copied from foreign constitutions. Each borrowed provision was debated and adapted to Indian conditions. ## Drafting Process and Adoption of the Constitution ➤ **Time taken:** The Constituent Assembly worked for nearly 2 years and 11 months. According to the Constitution of India database, the Assembly sat for 167 days to frame the Constitution, and its final session was on 24 Jan ➤ **Debates:** The Constituent Assembly Debates are spread across 12 volumes and record detailed discussions from 9 December 1946 to 24 January 1950. ➤ **Amendments:** Thousands of amendments were proposed and many were debated. This shows that the Constitution was made through discussion, disagreement and reasoned compromise. ➤ **Adoption:** The Constitution was adopted on 26 November 1949. This date is celebrated as Constitution Day. ➤ **Enforcement:** The Constitution came into force on 26 January 1950. The date was chosen because 26 January had historical importance as the day associated with the Poorna Swaraj declaration. ➤ **Republican transformation:** On 26 January 1950, India ceased to be a Dominion and became a sovereign democratic republic. ## Major Constitutional Influences on the Indian Constitution ➤ **Government of India Act, 1935:** The strongest structural influence came from the Government of India Act, 1935. Federal scheme, office of Governor, public service commissions, emergency-style administrative provisions, lists of legislative subjects and judiciary-related structures were influenced by it. ➤ **British Constitution:** Parliamentary government, cabinet responsibility, rule of law, legislative procedure and the idea of single citizenship were influenced by British constitutional practice. ➤ **United States Constitution:** Fundamental Rights, judicial review, independence of judiciary, written Constitution and removal of judges through impeachment show American influence. ➤ **Irish Constitution:** Directive Principles of State Policy were influenced by the Irish Constitution. These principles direct the State to promote social and economic justice. ➤ **Canadian Constitution:** A strong Centre with federal features and residuary powers with the Union reflect Canadian influence. ➤ **Australian Constitution:** Concurrent List, freedom of trade and commerce, and aspects of federal relations show Australian influence. ➤ **Weimar Constitution of Germany:** Emergency provisions were influenced partly by the Weimar model, although India adapted them to its own circumstances. ➤ **South African Constitution:** The procedure for amendment and election of members of the Rajya Sabha were influenced by South African constitutional practice. ➤ **Soviet influence:** The ideals of social and economic justice influenced later constitutional development. Fundamental Duties, inserted by the 42nd Amendment in 1976, show Soviet influence, though they were not part of the original Constitution. ➤ **Indian sources:** The Constitution also drew heavily from Indian experience: the freedom struggle, social reform movements, anti-caste movements, nationalist debates, provincial government experience under the 1935 Act, and the need to integrate princely states. ## Preamble: Soul of the Constitution ➤ **Philosophical summary:** The Preamble declares India to be a sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic and promises justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. The words “socialist” and “secular” were inserted by the 42nd Constitutional Amendment in 1976; however, the values behind them were already present in the constitutional scheme. ➤ **Berubari Union case:** In **In Re: Berubari Union, AIR 1960 SC 845**, the Supreme Court considered the Preamble as a key to understanding the Constitution but held that it was not a source of substantive power. The case arose from the proposed transfer of Berubari territory to Pakistan. The Court held that territory could be ceded only through constitutional amendment. This case is important because it began judicial discussion on the legal value of the Preamble. ➤ **Kesavananda Bharati case:** In **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225**, the Supreme Court held that Parliament can amend the Constitution under Article 368, but it cannot destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. The Court recognised the Preamble as part of the Constitution and used its ideals to identify basic constitutional values. This case is the foundation of the basic structure doctrine. ➤ **LIC of India case:** In **LIC of India v. Consumer Education and Research Centre, (1995) 5 SCC 482**, the Supreme Court treated the Preamble as part of the Constitution’s guiding vision and connected it with social justice and dignity. The case shows that constitutional interpretation must promote human dignity and welfare. ## Fundamental Rights and Social Revolution ➤ **Rights against colonial arbitrariness:** Fundamental Rights were included because colonial rule had shown how unchecked State power could suppress liberty. The Constitution therefore guarantees rights such as equality, freedom, protection of life and personal liberty, religious freedom, cultural and educational rights, and constitutional remedies. ➤ **Article 32:** Dr. Ambedkar described Article 32 as the heart and soul of the Constitution because it gives citizens the right to directly approach the Supreme Court for enforcement of Fundamental Rights. ➤ **Social equality:** The Constitution did not merely create political democracy; it sought social democracy. Provisions abolishing untouchability, prohibiting discrimination and allowing affirmative action were designed to transform Indian society. ➤ **State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan:** In **State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, AIR 1951 SC 226**, the Supreme Court held that Fundamental Rights prevail over Directive Principles when there is a conflict. The case led to the First Constitutional Amendment, which inserted Article 15(4), enabling special provisions for socially and educationally backward classes. This case shows the early tension between individual rights and social justice. ## Directive Principles of State Policy ➤ **Meaning:** Directive Principles are non-justiciable principles that guide the State in making laws and policies. They aim to establish social and economic democracy. ➤ **Purpose:** While Fundamental Rights restrict State power, Directive Principles guide State action towards welfare. They include principles relating to livelihood, equal pay, education, public health, organisation of village panchayats and protection of environment. ➤ **Minerva Mills case:** In **Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625**, the Supreme Court held that harmony between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles is part of the basic structure. The case clarified that neither individual liberty nor social welfare can completely override the other. ## Federalism and Strong Centre ➤ **Need for unity:** India adopted a federal system with a strong Centre because Partition, communal violence, princely states and regional diversity required national unity and administrative stability. ➤ **Union of States:** Article 1 describes India as a Union of States. This phrase reflects the idea that Indian federalism is not based on a compact among sovereign states; instead, the Union is indestructible though states may be reorganised. ➤ **Legislative lists:** The Constitution distributes subjects into Union List, State List and Concurrent List. This model was influenced by the Government of India Act, 1935 but modified to fit a democratic republic. ➤ **Emergency provisions:** Emergency powers strengthen the Centre in times of war, external aggression, armed rebellion, constitutional breakdown or financial instability. ➤ **S.R. Bommai case:** In **S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1**, the Supreme Court held that federalism and secularism are part of the basic structure. The case restricted arbitrary use of Article 356 and strengthened constitutional federalism. ## Parliamentary Democracy ➤ **Responsible government:** India adopted the parliamentary system because Indians had experience with legislative institutions under British rule and provincial autonomy under the 1935 Act. ➤ **Council of Ministers:** The executive is collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha. This ensures accountability of government to elected representatives. ➤ **President and Prime Minister:** The President is the constitutional head, while real executive power is exercised by the Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister. ➤ **Reason for adoption:** The Assembly preferred parliamentary democracy over presidential government because it allows continuous accountability, debate and removal of the executive without revolution or instability. ## Secularism and Minority Protection ➤ **Historical need:** India’s religious diversity and the trauma of Partition made secularism and minority protection essential. The Constitution protects freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practise and propagate religion. ➤ **Cultural and educational rights:** Articles 29 and 30 protect minorities’ language, script, culture and educational institutions. ➤ **T.M.A. Pai Foundation case:** In **T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481**, the Supreme Court explained the scope of minority and non-minority educational rights under Articles 29 and 30. The case is important for understanding institutional autonomy and minority protection. ## Integration of Princely States and Constitutional Unity ➤ **Princely states problem:** At independence, India had British Indian provinces and hundreds of princely states. Their integration was necessary for political unity. ➤ **Role of Sardar Patel and V.P. Menon:** Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and V.P. Menon played decisive roles in integrating princely states into the Indian Union through instruments of accession and political negotiations. ➤ **Constitutional outcome:** The Constitution created one Union with a common citizenship, integrated judiciary, all-India services and strong central institutions. ## Why the Indian Constitution is Both Borrowed and Original ➤ **Borrowed principles:** Many provisions were inspired by foreign constitutions, but borrowing does not mean lack of originality. Constitutional borrowing is common in modern constitution-making. ➤ **Indian adaptation:** The framers adapted every idea to Indian conditions. Fundamental Rights were shaped by colonial experience, Directive Principles by social justice needs, federalism by diversity, and parliamentary democracy by institutional familiarity. ➤ **Transformative character:** The Constitution was designed not only to govern India but to transform it. It aimed to move society from hierarchy to equality, from colonial subjecthood to citizenship, and from arbitrary power to constitutional governance. ## Timeline of Constitutional Development YearDevelopmentConstitutional Importance1773Regulating ActBeginning of parliamentary control over Company administration1784Pitt’s India ActStronger British governmental supervision1858Government of India ActTransfer from Company rule to Crown rule1861Indian Councils ActLimited Indian participation in legislative councils1892Indian Councils ActIndirect electoral principle introduced1909Morley-Minto ReformsSeparate electorates and expanded councils1919Government of India ActDyarchy and limited responsible government1935Government of India ActProvincial autonomy, federal scheme, legislative lists1946Cabinet Mission PlanConstituent Assembly created1947Indian Independence ActIndia became independent Dominion1949Constitution adoptedAdopted on 26 November 19491950Constitution enforcedIndia became Republic on 26 January 1950## Memory Aid: Core Sources of the Indian Constitution SourceMajor InfluenceGovernment of India Act, 1935Federal structure, lists, governors, public service commissionsBritish ConstitutionParliamentary system, rule of law, cabinet responsibilityU.S. ConstitutionFundamental Rights, judicial review, independent judiciaryIrish ConstitutionDirective Principles of State PolicyCanadian ConstitutionStrong Centre and residuary powersAustralian ConstitutionConcurrent List and trade provisionsSouth African ConstitutionAmendment procedure and Rajya Sabha election method## Conclusion: Legacy of the Making of the Constitution ➤ **Democratic achievement:** The making of the Indian Constitution was a remarkable democratic exercise. The framers had to address Partition, poverty, illiteracy, diversity, social inequality and administrative complexity, yet they created a stable constitutional framework. ➤ **Blend of continuity and change:** The Constitution retained useful administrative structures from colonial laws, especially the Government of India Act, 1935, but transformed them by placing sovereignty in the people and establishing democracy, rights and constitutional supremacy. ➤ **Living Constitution:** The Constitution is not frozen in 1950. Through amendments, judicial interpretation and democratic practice, it continues to evolve. However, its basic ideals—justice, liberty, equality, fraternity, constitutional morality, secularism, democracy and rule of law—remain central. ➤ **Final understanding:** The Constituent Assembly did not merely draft a legal document. It converted India’s freedom struggle into a constitutional order. The Constitution represents India’s collective decision to be governed by law, reason, rights, democracy and social justice. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Constitutional Development and Historical Background of Indian Constitution: Complete Notes on Evolution, Government of India Acts, Cabinet Mission Plan and Constituent Assembly](https://lawfoyer.in/constitutional-development-and-historical-background-of-indian-constitution/) **Published:** May 30, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/ChatGPTImageMay30202609_54_20P-725x1024.jpeg) ## Meaning of Constitutional Development in India ➤ **Constitutional development** means the gradual historical evolution of the legal and political institutions through which India came to be governed. In India, constitutional development did not happen suddenly on 26 January 1950. It was the result of a long journey beginning with the East India Company’s commercial rule, continuing through British Crown rule, and finally ending in the making of a sovereign democratic Constitution by the people of India. ➤ **Indian constitutional law** developed through a continuous struggle between colonial control and Indian demand for self-government. The British introduced several laws such as the Regulating Act, 1773, Pitt’s India Act, 1784, Government of India Act, 1858, Indian Councils Acts, Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935, and Indian Independence Act, 1947. These laws were colonial in purpose, but they gradually introduced ideas like central administration, legislative councils, federalism, responsible government, elections, public services, judiciary and provincial autonomy. ➤ **Modern Constitution of India** is not a copy of any single document. It is a carefully drafted legal instrument based on India’s own freedom struggle, constitutional experience under British laws, and useful features taken from other constitutions. The Constitution was adopted by the Constituent Assembly on **26 November 1949** and came into force on **26 January 1950**. ## Colonial Background of Indian Constitutional Law ➤ **Company rule** began after the East India Company gradually changed from a trading corporation into a political authority. The Battle of Plassey, 1757 and Battle of Buxar, 1764 strengthened Company power. After obtaining Diwani rights over Bengal, Bihar and Orissa in 1765, the Company started collecting revenue and administering territories. This created the need for parliamentary control over the Company. ➤ **Regulating Act, 1773** was the first major step by the British Parliament to regulate the affairs of the East India Company in India. It made the Governor of Bengal the Governor-General of Bengal and subordinated the presidencies of Bombay and Madras to Bengal in important matters. Warren Hastings became the first Governor-General under this system. It also created the Supreme Court at Calcutta in 1774. This Act is important because it marked the beginning of centralised British parliamentary control over Indian administration. ➤ **Pitt’s India Act, 1784** introduced a dual system of control. The Company continued to manage commercial matters, while political and military affairs came under greater supervision of the British Government through the Board of Control. This Act made it clear that Indian territories were no longer merely commercial possessions of a company but matters of British imperial governance. ➤ **Charter Act, 1813** ended the Company’s trade monopoly in India except in tea and trade with China. It also recognised the responsibility of the British to promote education in India. The constitutional significance of this Act lies in the beginning of a more direct British concern with Indian society and governance. ➤ **Charter Act, 1833** was a major step towards centralisation. It made the Governor-General of Bengal the Governor-General of India. Lord William Bentinck became the first Governor-General of India. The Act also deprived the Company of its remaining commercial functions and made it mainly an administrative body. It introduced the idea of legislative centralisation by giving law-making power to the Governor-General in Council for the whole of British India. ➤ **Charter Act, 1853** separated legislative and executive functions of the Governor-General’s Council and introduced open competition for civil services. This was significant because it laid the foundation for a separate legislative structure and a merit-based civil service system. ## Government of India Act, 1858 and Beginning of Crown Rule ➤ **Government of India Act, 1858** was passed after the Revolt of 1857. It ended the rule of the East India Company and transferred Indian administration directly to the British Crown. The Governor-General of India also became the Viceroy, representing the British monarch in India. ➤ **Secretary of State for India** became the principal authority in Britain for Indian affairs. He was assisted by the Council of India. This created a highly centralised imperial structure where real authority remained in Britain. ➤ **Queen Victoria’s Proclamation, 1858** promised non-interference in religious matters, equal protection of law, and respect for treaties with princely states. Though these promises were made within a colonial framework, they later became important in political arguments for equality, religious freedom and fair administration. ## Indian Councils Acts and Growth of Legislative Institutions ➤ **Indian Councils Act, 1861** introduced Indians into legislative councils by nomination. It also restored limited legislative powers to Bombay and Madras. The Act is important because it marked the beginning of Indian association with legislative work, although the system remained largely controlled by colonial authorities. ➤ **Portfolio system** was also recognised during this period. Under this system, members of the executive council were placed in charge of specific departments. This later helped in the development of ministerial responsibility. ➤ **Indian Councils Act, 1892** enlarged legislative councils and allowed discussion of budgets, though members could not vote on them. It also introduced an indirect method of nomination through recommendations from local bodies and associations. This Act was a small but important step towards representative institutions. ➤ **Indian Councils Act, 1909**, also known as the **Morley-Minto Reforms**, increased the size of legislative councils and introduced separate electorates for Muslims. This was constitutionally significant but politically controversial. It introduced communal representation into the electoral system, which later deeply affected Indian politics. ## Government of India Act, 1919: Dyarchy and Responsible Government ➤ **Government of India Act, 1919**, also known as the **Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms**, was based on the idea of the “progressive realisation of responsible government” in India. The Act introduced dyarchy in provinces and expanded legislative councils. ➤ **Dyarchy** means dual government. Provincial subjects were divided into two categories: reserved subjects and transferred subjects. Reserved subjects such as police, law and order, and finance remained under the control of the Governor and his executive councillors. Transferred subjects such as education, public health and local self-government were administered by Indian ministers responsible to the legislative council. ➤ **Central legislature** became bicameral under the 1919 Act. It consisted of the Council of State and the Legislative Assembly. However, the Governor-General retained overriding powers. Therefore, the Act introduced limited representative government but not real responsible government. ➤ **Separate electorates** were expanded. This increased political representation for some communities but also strengthened communal divisions in constitutional politics. ➤ **Significance of the 1919 Act** lies in the fact that it formally accepted responsible government as a goal, introduced dyarchy, expanded legislatures and widened Indian participation. However, it failed because real power remained with the British executive. ## Simon Commission, Nehru Report and Round Table Conferences ➤ **Simon Commission, 1927** was appointed to review the working of the Government of India Act, 1919. It had no Indian member, which led to widespread opposition under the slogan “Simon Go Back”. The boycott showed that Indians were no longer willing to accept constitutional reforms imposed without their participation. ➤ **Nehru Report, 1928** was one of the first major Indian attempts to draft a constitutional framework. It recommended dominion status, fundamental rights, responsible government and a federal structure. Though not accepted by all political groups, it showed that Indians had begun thinking seriously in terms of a written constitution. ➤ **Round Table Conferences** were held in London between 1930 and 1932 to discuss constitutional reforms. They involved British officials, Indian political representatives, princely states and minority groups. These conferences eventually contributed to the Government of India Act, 1935. ## Government of India Act, 1935: Foundation of Many Constitutional Features ➤ **Government of India Act, 1935** was the most detailed constitutional law enacted by the British Parliament for India before independence. It proposed an All-India Federation, introduced provincial autonomy and created a division of powers between the Centre and provinces. The Act is often regarded as an important predecessor of the Constitution of India because many administrative and federal features were later adapted into the Constitution. ➤ **All-India Federation** was proposed to include British Indian provinces and princely states. However, the federation never came into operation because the required number of princely states did not join. ➤ **Provincial autonomy** replaced dyarchy in the provinces. Elected ministers became responsible to provincial legislatures in provincial matters. This gave Indians practical experience in running provincial governments after the 1937 elections. ➤ **Dyarchy at Centre** was proposed but never effectively implemented. The Centre remained under strong control of the Governor-General. ➤ **Division of powers** was introduced through three lists: Federal List, Provincial List and Concurrent List. This idea strongly influenced the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. ➤ **Federal Court** was established in 1937. It became an important predecessor of the Supreme Court of India. The idea of constitutional adjudication and federal dispute resolution developed during this period. ➤ **Emergency powers and Governor’s special powers** under the 1935 Act showed the colonial tendency to preserve executive supremacy. The Indian Constitution later retained emergency provisions but placed them within a democratic constitutional framework. ➤ **Importance of the 1935 Act** lies in its influence on federalism, public services, judiciary, office of Governor, emergency provisions, administrative continuity and legislative lists. However, it was not democratic in the full sense because sovereignty remained with the British Parliament and the Governor-General had wide overriding powers. The Indian Independence Act, 1947 itself provided that the new dominions would initially be governed, as far as possible, according to the Government of India Act, 1935 until new constitutional arrangements were made. ## Demand for Constituent Assembly ➤ **Constituent Assembly** means a body specially created to frame or draft a constitution. The idea was based on the principle that the Constitution of India should be made by Indians themselves and not imposed by the British Parliament. ➤ **Indian demand** for a Constituent Assembly became stronger during the freedom movement. The Indian National Congress rejected the Government of India Act, 1935 because it was imposed by the British Parliament and did not represent the sovereign will of the Indian people. ➤ **August Offer, 1940** accepted, in principle, that Indians should frame their own constitution after the Second World War. This was an important step because the British Government recognised the idea of constitution-making by Indians. ➤ **Cripps Mission, 1942** proposed that an elected body would frame a new constitution after the war. However, the proposal failed because it did not immediately transfer real power and also gave provinces the option not to join the future Indian Union. ## Cabinet Mission Plan, 1946 ➤ **Cabinet Mission Plan** was announced on **16 May 1946**. The Cabinet Mission consisted of Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps and A.V. Alexander. It came to India to discuss the constitutional future of India and to create a framework for transfer of power. ➤ **Main proposal** of the Plan was the creation of a Constituent Assembly to frame the Constitution of India. It also proposed a Union of India dealing with foreign affairs, defence and communications, while provinces would enjoy autonomy. ➤ **Composition of Constituent Assembly** under the Plan was to be based on indirect election by members of provincial legislative assemblies. Seats were allotted broadly according to population and communities. Princely states were also to be represented. ➤ **Grouping of provinces** was proposed as a compromise between the Congress demand for a united India and the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan. However, this grouping formula became controversial and ultimately failed to prevent Partition. ➤ **Constitutional significance** of the Cabinet Mission Plan lies in the fact that it provided the immediate legal and political basis for forming the Constituent Assembly. The Constitution of India was drafted by the Constituent Assembly created under this framework. ## Constituent Assembly of India ➤ **First meeting** of the Constituent Assembly was held on **9 December 1946** in the Constitution Hall, now known as the Central Hall of Parliament House. ➤ **Temporary President** of the Assembly was Dr. Sachchidananda Sinha. Later, Dr. Rajendra Prasad was elected as the permanent President of the Constituent Assembly. B.N. Rau served as Constitutional Adviser, and Dr. B.R. Ambedkar became Chairman of the Drafting Committee. ➤ **Initial strength** of the Assembly was 389 members, but after Partition it was reduced to 299. The Assembly was indirectly elected and not elected on universal adult franchise, yet it contained leading lawyers, freedom fighters, administrators, social reformers and representatives of different communities and regions. ➤ **Sovereign character after Independence** developed after the Indian Independence Act, 1947. Before 15 August 1947, the Assembly functioned under the limitations of the Cabinet Mission Plan. After independence, it became a sovereign body for constitution-making and also functioned as the legislative body for the Dominion of India. ➤ **Constituent Assembly debates** were extensive and serious. The Assembly met over a period of nearly three years and held detailed discussions on fundamental rights, federalism, minorities, language, citizenship, judiciary, emergency powers, directive principles and the structure of government. The Constitution of India archive records **167 days of plenary debates** between 9 December 1946 and 24 January 1950. ## Objectives Resolution and Constitutional Philosophy ➤ **Objectives Resolution** was moved by Jawaharlal Nehru on **13 December 1946** and adopted by the Constituent Assembly on **22 January 1947**. It laid down the philosophical foundation of the Constitution and later influenced the Preamble. ➤ **Core principles** of the Objectives Resolution included sovereignty of the people, democratic republic, justice, equality, freedom, safeguards for minorities and backward classes, and India’s contribution to world peace. ➤ **Preamble connection** is very important. The Preamble’s ideas of justice, liberty, equality and fraternity reflect the moral vision of the Objectives Resolution and the freedom struggle. ## Drafting Process of the Constitution ➤ **Committee system** was used by the Constituent Assembly to make the drafting process systematic. Important committees included the Union Powers Committee, Union Constitution Committee, Provincial Constitution Committee, Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights, Minorities and Tribal Areas, Drafting Committee and several procedural committees. ➤ **Drafting Committee** was appointed on **29 August 1947** with Dr. B.R. Ambedkar as Chairman. Other members included N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar, K.M. Munshi, Mohammad Saadulla, B.L. Mitter and D.P. Khaitan. Later, N. Madhava Rau and T.T. Krishnamachari became members due to changes. ➤ **B.N. Rau’s draft** played an important role. As Constitutional Adviser, B.N. Rau prepared an initial draft after studying constitutional systems of different countries. The Drafting Committee then examined, revised and developed the draft. ➤ **Public debate and amendments** were significant. The Draft Constitution was published and discussed. Thousands of amendments were proposed in the Assembly. The final Constitution was not merely prepared by one person but was the result of collective discussion, legal drafting, political negotiation and national experience. ➤ **Adoption and commencement** happened in two stages. The Constitution was adopted on **26 November 1949**. It came into force on **26 January 1950**, chosen to honour the historic significance of 26 January 1930, the day associated with the Purna Swaraj declaration. ## Indian Independence Act, 1947 ➤ **Indian Independence Act, 1947** was passed by the British Parliament and received Royal Assent on **18 July 1947**. It created two independent Dominions: India and Pakistan. ➤ **Partition and transfer of power** were its immediate consequences. British paramountcy over princely states ended, and the new Dominions became legally independent from British control. ➤ **Constituent Assembly’s authority** increased after this Act. The Assembly was no longer merely a constitution-making body under British proposals; it became the sovereign constitution-making body of independent India. ➤ **Continuity of administration** was ensured because the Government of India Act, 1935 continued temporarily, with necessary modifications, until the Constitution came into force. ## Major Constitutional Influences on the Indian Constitution SourceImportant Features Borrowed or Inspired**Government of India Act, 1935**Federal scheme, office of Governor, public service commissions, emergency provisions, administrative details, legislative lists**British Constitution**Parliamentary government, rule of law, cabinet system, legislative procedure, single citizenship in spirit**United States Constitution**Fundamental rights, judicial review, independence of judiciary, impeachment of President**Irish Constitution**Directive Principles of State Policy, nomination of members to Rajya Sabha**Canadian Constitution**Strong Centre, residuary powers with Centre, federal structure with unitary bias**Australian Constitution**Concurrent List, freedom of trade and commerce, joint sitting**Weimar Constitution of Germany**Emergency provisions**Soviet Constitution**Fundamental duties and ideals of social justice, later strengthened through constitutional amendments**South African Constitution**Procedure for constitutional amendment and election of members of Rajya Sabha**Japanese Constitution**Procedure established by law, reflected in Article 21 interpretation debates and Article 21 jurisprudence➤ **Indian originality** must not be ignored. Although several features were inspired by foreign constitutions, the Constitution of India was adapted to Indian realities such as social inequality, caste discrimination, linguistic diversity, religious plurality, poverty, Partition, princely states and the need for national unity. ## Landmark Supreme Court Cases Connected with Constitutional Foundations ➤ **Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225**: The Supreme Court considered whether Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution under Article 368 was unlimited. The Court held by a 13-judge Bench that Parliament can amend the Constitution, but it cannot destroy its **basic structure**. The ratio is that constitutional supremacy, rule of law, judicial review, democracy, secularism and federalism are part of the basic structure. This case is directly connected with constitutional development because it protects the identity of the Constitution made by the Constituent Assembly. ➤ **Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625**: The issue was whether constitutional amendments could give unlimited power to Parliament and reduce judicial review. The Supreme Court held that limited amending power itself is part of the basic structure. It also held that harmony between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles is essential. This case protects the balance created by the Constitution-makers. ➤ **S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1**: The Court examined misuse of Article 356 and President’s Rule. It held that federalism and secularism are basic features of the Constitution and that proclamations under Article 356 are subject to judicial review. This case is important because it clarifies the working of Indian federalism, which historically developed from the Government of India Act, 1935 but was transformed by the Constitution into democratic federalism. ➤ **I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2007) 2 SCC 1**: The issue was whether laws placed in the Ninth Schedule after the basic structure judgment could be completely immune from judicial review. The Supreme Court held that even Ninth Schedule laws inserted after 24 April 1973 are subject to basic structure review. This case strengthens constitutional supremacy and judicial review. ➤ **NCT of Delhi v. Union of India, (2018) 8 SCC 501**: The Court interpreted constitutional governance in the National Capital Territory of Delhi. It emphasised constitutional morality, collaborative federalism and representative democracy. The case is useful for understanding that the Constitution is not only a legal document but a living instrument requiring responsible constitutional behaviour. ## Memory Aid: Chronology of Constitutional Development YearEventConstitutional Importance**1773**Regulating ActFirst parliamentary control over Company rule**1784**Pitt’s India ActDual control and stronger British supervision**1833**Charter ActGovernor-General of India and centralised legislation**1858**Government of India ActCrown rule began**1861**Indian Councils ActIndians nominated to legislative councils**1892**Indian Councils ActWider councils and budget discussion**1909**Morley-Minto ReformsSeparate electorates introduced**1919**Montagu-Chelmsford ReformsDyarchy in provinces**1935**Government of India ActProvincial autonomy and federal scheme**1946**Cabinet Mission PlanConstituent Assembly proposed**1947**Indian Independence ActIndia and Pakistan became independent Dominions**1949**Constitution adopted26 November became Constitution Day**1950**Constitution commencedIndia became a Republic## Overall Significance of Historical Development ➤ **Centralisation to federalism** is a major theme. British laws first centralised authority for imperial control, but later constitutional reforms created provinces, legislative lists and federal ideas. The Constitution transformed these ideas into democratic federalism. ➤ **Colonial executive supremacy to constitutional supremacy** is another major transition. Under British rule, Governors, Viceroys and the Secretary of State had overriding powers. Under the Constitution, all authorities are subject to the Constitution, judicial review and rule of law. ➤ **Limited representation to universal democracy** shows the democratic transformation. Colonial laws gave limited voting rights based on property, education, community and status. The Constitution adopted universal adult suffrage, making every adult citizen politically equal. ➤ **Communal representation to constitutional equality** marks a decisive break. British reforms often used separate electorates and communal categories. The Constitution rejected separate electorates for ordinary democratic representation and adopted equality, non-discrimination and protective provisions for historically disadvantaged groups. ➤ **Foreign influence to Indian adaptation** explains the character of the Constitution. The Constitution borrowed useful principles from many countries but adapted them to Indian needs. It created a parliamentary democracy with a strong Centre, independent judiciary, fundamental rights, directive principles, emergency provisions and social justice commitments. ## Conclusion ➤ **Constitutional development of India** is the story of India’s movement from colonial subordination to constitutional self-rule. British statutes created administrative institutions, but they were designed to preserve imperial power. The Indian freedom movement transformed constitutional ideas into demands for liberty, democracy, equality and self-government. ➤ **The Constituent Assembly** converted the aspirations of the freedom struggle into a detailed constitutional document. It carefully balanced liberty with social reform, federalism with national unity, parliamentary government with judicial review, and rights with duties of the State. ➤ **The Constitution of India** is therefore both historical and revolutionary. It inherited certain institutions from colonial laws but changed their purpose completely. What was once a machinery of control became a framework of democratic governance, constitutional morality, fundamental rights and social justice. **Categories:** Constitutional law, Legal Notes --- ### [Res Judicata under Section 11 CPC, 1908: Meaning, Essentials, Constructive Res Judicata, Exceptions and Landmark Supreme Court Cases](https://lawfoyer.in/res-judicata/) **Published:** May 30, 2026 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Image-1-725x1024.jpeg) # **Meaning and Core Idea of Res Judicata** ➤ **Meaning:** The expression **“res judicata”** means **“a matter already judged.”** It is a rule that once a competent court has finally decided a matter between parties, the same parties cannot re-open the same matter again in another suit or proceeding. ➤ **Simple explanation:** If A sues B claiming ownership of a house and the competent court finally decides that B is the owner, A cannot file another suit against B again claiming the same ownership on the same grounds. The law treats the earlier final decision as conclusive between them. ➤ **Purpose:** The doctrine protects three important interests: **finality of litigation**, **public confidence in courts**, and **protection of parties from repeated harassment**. The Supreme Court in **Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi, AIR 1960 SC 941** explained that res judicata is based on the need to give finality to judicial decisions; once a matter is finally decided between parties, it should not be adjudged again in future litigation. ➤ **Legal maxim:** The principle is supported by two well-known maxims: **nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa** meaning no person should be vexed twice for the same cause, and **interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium** meaning it is in the interest of the State that litigation must come to an end. ➤ **Nature:** Res judicata is not merely a technical rule of procedure. It is a rule of **public policy**, **justice**, and **judicial discipline**. In **Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board, (1999) 5 SCC 590**, the Supreme Court treated res judicata and estoppel as principles founded on public policy and justice, intended to prevent parties from re-agitating settled matters. # **Statutory Provision: Section 11 CPC, 1908** ➤ **Section 11 CPC:** Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides that **no court shall try any suit or issue** in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, where such matter has been heard and finally decided by a court competent to try the former suit or the subsequent suit. ➤ **Key idea of Section 11:** The bar is not against filing every later suit. The bar applies only when the later suit or issue seeks to re-open a matter which was **directly and substantially in issue** and was **heard and finally decided** earlier by a competent court. ➤ **Important distinction:** Section 11 uses the phrase **“suit or issue.”** Therefore, res judicata may bar the whole subsequent suit, or it may bar only a particular issue inside the later suit. For example, a later suit for different relief may still proceed, but an earlier decided issue of title may not be re-opened. # **Essential Conditions of Res Judicata under Section 11 CPC** ➤ **Condition 1 — Former suit:** There must be a **former suit**. The expression does not necessarily mean a suit filed earlier in time; it means a suit which has been **decided before** the later suit is taken up for decision. ➤ **Condition 2 — Matter directly and substantially in issue:** The matter in the later suit must have been **directly and substantially in issue** in the former suit. A matter is directly and substantially in issue when the court was required to decide it as a necessary and important question for granting or refusing relief. ➤ **Condition 3 — Same parties or parties claiming under them:** The former and later proceedings must be between the **same parties**, or between persons claiming through them, such as legal representatives, transferees, successors, heirs, assignees, or persons litigating under the same legal interest. ➤ **Condition 4 — Same title:** The parties must have litigated under the **same title**. This means the legal character in which the party litigates must be the same. For example, a person suing as an individual is not necessarily the same as the same person suing as trustee, guardian, manager, or legal representative. ➤ **Condition 5 — Competent court:** The earlier decision must have been given by a **court of competent jurisdiction**. Competence means the court must have had jurisdiction over the subject matter, parties, and relief in the manner required by law. ➤ **Condition 6 — Heard and finally decided:** The matter must have been **heard and finally decided**. A decision is final when it conclusively determines the issue between parties. A dismissal on merits may operate as res judicata, but a dismissal for default, want of jurisdiction, technical defect, or non-joinder may not ordinarily decide the matter on merits. ➤ **Condition 7 — Finality despite appeal rules:** In **Canara Bank v. N.G. Subbaraya Setty, (2018) 16 SCC 228**, the Supreme Court explained the doctrine in detail and emphasized that res judicata belongs to procedural law, though it is based on high public policy. The Court also discussed that when an appeal is filed within limitation, the matter may remain sub judice rather than becoming finally res judicata. # **“Directly and Substantially in Issue” vs “Collaterally or Incidentally in Issue”** ➤ **Direct issue:** A matter is directly and substantially in issue when the court must decide it to grant the main relief. Example: In a title suit, the question **“Who owns the land?”** is directly and substantially in issue. ➤ **Incidental issue:** A matter is collaterally or incidentally in issue when it is only a background or supporting matter, not the main dispute. Such incidental findings do not always operate as res judicata. ➤ **Practical illustration:** If in a rent suit, the court incidentally observes something about ownership only to decide rent liability, that observation may not necessarily bar a later full title suit, unless ownership was itself directly and substantially in issue and was finally decided. ➤ **Reason:** Res judicata applies only to real, necessary, and material determinations, not to casual remarks, unnecessary observations, or findings not essential to the decree. # **Constructive Res Judicata under Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC** ➤ **Meaning:** **Constructive res judicata** means that a party cannot raise in a later proceeding a ground, claim, defence, or attack which the party **might and ought to have raised** in the earlier proceeding. Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC expressly states that any matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in the former suit shall be deemed to have been directly and substantially in issue. ➤ **Simple explanation:** A party cannot keep one argument hidden, lose the first case, and then file a second case using that hidden argument. Law expects parties to bring their whole case at the proper time. ➤ **Example:** A tenant is sued for eviction. He could have pleaded that the notice was invalid and that rent was already paid, but he raises only the rent-payment plea and loses. Later, he cannot file a fresh proceeding on the invalid-notice ground if that ground might and ought to have been raised earlier. ➤ **Purpose:** Constructive res judicata prevents **piecemeal litigation**, **splitting of claims**, **strategic silence**, and **abuse of process**. ➤ **State of U.P. v. Nawab Hussain, AIR 1977 SC 1680:** In this case, a dismissed police sub-inspector first challenged his dismissal on certain grounds but did not raise the ground that he was dismissed by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority. After failure in the earlier proceeding, he raised that ground in a later suit. The Supreme Court held that the later plea was barred by constructive res judicata because it could and ought to have been raised earlier. ➤ **Forward Construction Co. v. Prabhat Mandal, (1986) 1 SCC 100: AIR 1986 SC 391:** The Supreme Court applied constructive res judicata in the context of public interest litigation and held that grounds which could have been raised earlier cannot be permitted to be raised later to re-open the same dispute. # **Difference between Direct Res Judicata and Constructive Res Judicata** BasisDirect Res JudicataConstructive Res Judicata**Meaning**Matter was actually raised and decided earlier.Matter was not raised, but could and ought to have been raised earlier.**Legal basis**Main part of Section 11 CPC.Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC.**Focus**Actual adjudication.Deemed adjudication.**Example**Title decided in first suit cannot be re-opened.A defence not raised in first suit cannot be used later if it should have been raised.**Purpose**Finality of decided issues.Preventing splitting of claims and defences.# **Explanations to Section 11 CPC: Simplified Notes** ➤ **Explanation I — Former suit:** A former suit means a suit decided before the suit in question, whether or not it was instituted before it. ➤ **Explanation II — Competence:** The competence of the court is determined irrespective of any right of appeal from the decision of that court. ➤ **Explanation III — Matter alleged and denied:** The matter must have been alleged by one party and either denied or admitted by the other. ➤ **Explanation IV — Constructive res judicata:** A matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of attack or defence is deemed to have been directly and substantially in issue. ➤ **Explanation V — Relief not granted:** Any relief claimed in the plaint but not expressly granted by the decree is deemed to have been refused. ➤ **Explanation VI — Representative litigation:** Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or a private right claimed in common, all persons interested in such right are deemed to claim under the litigating persons. ➤ **Explanation VII — Execution proceedings:** Section 11 applies to execution proceedings also. Therefore, issues finally decided in execution cannot be re-opened again in later execution stages. ➤ **Explanation VIII — Limited jurisdiction courts:** An issue heard and finally decided by a court of limited jurisdiction may operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit, even if such court was not competent to try the later suit as a whole. # **Res Judicata and Writ Proceedings** ➤ **General principle:** Though Section 11 CPC directly applies to suits, the **general principle of res judicata** applies beyond ordinary civil suits, including writ proceedings, because the doctrine is based on public policy. ➤ **Daryao v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 1457:** The Supreme Court held that when a writ petition under Article 226 is dismissed on merits by a High Court, a later petition under Article 32 before the Supreme Court on the same facts and grounds may be barred by res judicata. The case recognized that finality of judicial decisions is important even in constitutional remedies, though dismissal in limine or dismissal on technical grounds may stand on a different footing. ➤ **Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1965 SC 1153:** The Supreme Court held that a decision on merits in a writ petition under Article 226 can operate as res judicata in a subsequent regular civil suit between the same parties on the same matter. This shows that Section 11 is not exhaustive of the whole doctrine, and courts may apply the general principle of res judicata where justice and public policy require it. ➤ **Important caution:** Res judicata in writs is applied with care. If the earlier writ was dismissed for delay, alternative remedy, technical defect, lack of jurisdiction, or without decision on merits, the bar may not apply in the same way. # **Res Judicata between Co-defendants and Co-plaintiffs** ➤ **Between co-defendants:** A finding may operate as res judicata between co-defendants if three conditions are satisfied: there was a conflict of interest between them, it was necessary to decide that conflict to give relief to the plaintiff, and the court actually decided that conflict. ➤ **Between co-plaintiffs:** Similar logic applies between co-plaintiffs. If their inter se rights were directly in conflict, necessary for decision, and finally decided, the finding may bind them in later proceedings. ➤ **Reason:** Section 11 is not limited only to plaintiff versus defendant disputes. It may also apply where the real issue was between parties on the same side, provided the conditions of final adjudication are satisfied. # **Res Judicata and Execution Proceedings** ➤ **Execution relevance:** Section 11 applies to execution proceedings through Explanation VII. This means that if an executing court finally decides a matter between parties, the same issue cannot be repeatedly raised in later execution applications. ➤ **Example:** If a judgment-debtor objects that the decree is not executable and that objection is finally rejected, he cannot repeatedly raise the same objection in later execution stages. ➤ **Policy:** Execution is meant to enforce decrees, not to create endless rounds of objections. Res judicata prevents judgment-debtors from frustrating decrees by repetitive objections. # **Res Judicata and Issue Estoppel** ➤ **Res judicata:** It usually bars the trial of a suit or issue already finally decided. ➤ **Issue estoppel:** It prevents a party from re-opening a specific issue of fact or law already decided between the same parties in earlier proceedings. ➤ **Difference:** Res judicata is broader and often statutory under Section 11 CPC; issue estoppel is a principle of finality applied to specific issues. ➤ **Overlap:** Indian courts sometimes use these principles together, especially where strict Section 11 may not apply but the general principle of finality applies. # **Res Judicata and Estoppel: Difference** BasisRes JudicataEstoppel**Source**Decision of a court.Conduct, representation, or statement of a party.**Nature**Rule of procedure and public policy.Rule of evidence and equity.**Effect**Bars re-litigation of decided matter.Prevents a party from denying what was represented or accepted.**Parties**Requires prior adjudication.May arise without prior adjudication.**Main focus**Finality of judicial decision.Fairness based on representation and reliance.➤ **Hope Plantations principle:** The Supreme Court recognized that res judicata and estoppel are related to public policy and justice, but they are not identical. Res judicata arises from adjudication; estoppel arises mainly from conduct or representation. # **Exceptions and Situations Where Res Judicata May Not Apply** ➤ **No final decision:** If the earlier matter was not finally decided, res judicata does not apply. ➤ **Lack of jurisdiction:** A decision by a court lacking jurisdiction generally cannot create res judicata on the merits. ➤ **Fraud:** A judgment obtained by fraud does not operate as res judicata because fraud vitiates judicial proceedings. ➤ **Pure question of law affecting jurisdiction:** If the earlier decision was on a pure question of law relating to jurisdiction or statutory prohibition, courts may be cautious in applying res judicata. ➤ **Changed circumstances:** If material facts or legal circumstances have substantially changed after the earlier decision, a fresh cause may arise. ➤ **Different cause of action:** If the later suit is based on a distinct cause of action, res judicata may not apply, although issue estoppel or constructive res judicata may still become relevant. ➤ **Dismissal on technical grounds:** Dismissal for default, non-prosecution, limitation at threshold, non-joinder, misjoinder, or alternative remedy may not always amount to final decision on merits. ➤ **Habeas corpus:** The doctrine is applied differently in habeas corpus matters because personal liberty is involved and recurring detention legality may be examined afresh depending on circumstances. # **Landmark Supreme Court Cases on Res Judicata** ➤ **Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi, AIR 1960 SC 941:** The dispute arose in the context of landlord-tenant proceedings and the effect of earlier orders. The issue was whether a party could re-agitate a matter already decided at an earlier stage. The Supreme Court held that res judicata is based on the need to give finality to judicial decisions and applies not only between separate proceedings but also at later stages of the same proceeding. The ratio is that once a matter of fact or law has been decided between parties and has attained finality, courts should proceed on the basis that the earlier decision is correct. ➤ **Daryao v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 1457:** The petitioners earlier approached the High Court under Article 226 and later approached the Supreme Court under Article 32. The issue was whether a decision in writ proceedings could bar a later constitutional petition. The Supreme Court held that the general principle of res judicata applies to writ petitions when the earlier petition was decided on merits. The ratio is that constitutional remedies are fundamental, but a party cannot repeatedly litigate the same matter after a competent court has finally decided it. ➤ **Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1965 SC 1153:** The issue was whether a decision in a writ petition could operate as res judicata in a later civil suit. The Supreme Court held that a final decision on merits in a writ petition under Article 226 may operate as res judicata in a subsequent regular suit involving the same parties and matter. The ratio is that Section 11 CPC is not exhaustive of the general doctrine of res judicata. ➤ **State of U.P. v. Nawab Hussain, AIR 1977 SC 1680:** The respondent challenged dismissal from service but failed to raise one available ground in the earlier proceeding. He later tried to rely on that ground. The Supreme Court held that the later challenge was barred by constructive res judicata. The ratio is that a party must raise all grounds of attack or defence that might and ought to be raised in the first proceeding. ➤ **Forward Construction Co. v. Prabhat Mandal, (1986) 1 SCC 100: AIR 1986 SC 391:** The dispute concerned a public interest challenge relating to development and land use. The issue was whether grounds not raised earlier could be raised later in another proceeding. The Supreme Court held that constructive res judicata applies even in public interest litigation in appropriate cases. The ratio is that public interest cannot be used as a device to repeatedly re-open issues which could have been raised earlier. ➤ **Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board, (1999) 5 SCC 590:** The dispute arose under land ceiling proceedings. The issue was whether previously settled questions could be reopened. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that res judicata is founded on public policy, justice, and finality. The ratio is that parties cannot be permitted to re-agitate issues already settled by competent adjudication. ➤ **Canara Bank v. N.G. Subbaraya Setty, (2018) 16 SCC 228:** The dispute involved assignment of trademark-related rights and successive suits. The Supreme Court examined res judicata in detail and clarified that though Section 11 is procedural, the doctrine rests on public policy. The Court also discussed the relationship between finality and appeal. The ratio is that once a competent court finally decides a matter, the same matter cannot be reopened, but where an appeal keeps the matter alive, finality must be assessed carefully. # **Practical Illustrations for Easy Understanding** ➤ **Illustration 1 — Bar applies:** A sues B for declaration that A owns land X. The court decides that B owns land X. A cannot later sue B again for declaration of ownership of land X on the same basis. ➤ **Illustration 2 — Constructive bar applies:** A sues B for possession. B could have pleaded adverse possession but did not. If B loses and later files another suit based on adverse possession existing at that time, the later claim may be barred because B might and ought to have raised it earlier. ➤ **Illustration 3 — Bar may not apply:** A suit is dismissed because the plaint was not properly valued. Since title was not heard and finally decided, a properly filed later suit may not be barred. ➤ **Illustration 4 — Different title:** A sues as owner and loses. Later A sues as trustee for a trust property, where the trust has an independent legal claim. The bar will depend on whether the title and legal capacity are truly the same. # **Memory Chart: Ingredients of Res Judicata** Memory KeywordRequirement**Former**There must be an earlier decided suit or proceeding.**Same Matter**The matter must be directly and substantially in issue.**Same Parties**Parties or their privies must be the same.**Same Title**Parties must litigate under the same legal capacity.**Competence**Earlier court must be competent.**Finality**Matter must be heard and finally decided.**No Splitting**Grounds that might and ought to have been raised are also barred.# **Conclusion** ➤ **Final understanding:** Res judicata under Section 11 CPC is a doctrine of finality. It ensures that litigation does not become endless and that parties do not suffer repeated proceedings over the same matter. It balances private justice and public interest by protecting successful parties from harassment and preserving the authority of judicial decisions. ➤ **Core rule:** A matter once directly and substantially decided by a competent court between the same parties litigating under the same title cannot be tried again. ➤ **Broader rule:** Even matters not actually raised may be barred if they **might and ought to have been raised** earlier. This is constructive res judicata. ➤ **Essence:** Res judicata is not a mere procedural technicality. It is a principle of justice, convenience, finality, and public policy. Section 11 CPC codifies it for civil suits, but Indian courts also apply its general principle to writs, execution proceedings, representative litigation, and other adjudicatory contexts where fairness and finality demand closure. **Categories:** Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC), Legal Notes --- ### [CELPR NLU Delhi – ELDF Essay Writing Competition (First Edition) | Organized by Centre for Environmental Law, Policy and Research (CELPR), National Law University, Delhi (NLU Delhi) | Register by 8th June 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/celpr-nlu-delhi-eldf-essay-writing-competition-first-edition-organized-by-centre-for-environmental-law-policy-and-research-celpr-national-law-university-delhi-nlu-delhi-register/) **Published:** May 29, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** CELPR NLU Delhi – ELDF Essay Writing Competition (First Edition) | Organized by Centre for Environmental Law, Policy and Research (CELPR), National Law University, Delhi (NLU Delhi) | Register by 8th June 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Screenshot-2026-05-29-220654.jpg) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY ### National Law University Delhi (NLUD) Established in 2008, National Law University Delhi is recognized as one of India’s premier legal education institutions. The university is committed to excellence in teaching, research, innovation, and critical legal inquiry, fostering a vibrant environment for collaborative academic engagement. ### Centre for Environmental Law, Policy and Research (CELPR) Established in August 2016, CELPR promotes legal education, research, and dialogue on contemporary environmental issues. The Centre focuses on environmental awareness, public participation, policy engagement, and meaningful law and policy reform through collaborations with various stakeholders. ### Enviro Legal Defence Firm (ELDF) ELDF is India’s first environmental law firm. It works towards advancing environmental and development law, addressing natural resource conflicts, strengthening environmental jurisprudence, and bridging the gap between field-based environmental conflicts and formal adjudicatory bodies. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY The Centre for Environmental Law, Policy and Research (CELPR), NLU Delhi, in collaboration with ELDF, is organizing the **CELPR NLU Delhi – ELDF Essay Writing Competition (First Edition)** on the theme: ### **Environmental Vision – India @2047** The competition aims to encourage legal and policy scholarship addressing India’s vision of sustainability and prosperity by 2047. Participants are invited to contribute innovative ideas and critical perspectives on environmental governance, sustainable development, and regulatory policy. ### Indicative Sub-Themes - Regulatory Evolution and the Environmental Rule of Law - Beyond Compliance: Reimagining Pollution Control and Environmental Accountability - Sustainable Future: Reconciling Climate Justice with Economic Growth - Energy Transition: Towards Just Outcomes and a Net-Zero Future - Urban India: Crisis or Opportunity - Climate Smart Agriculture: An Attempt Towards Food Security - Techno-Legal Environmental Governance: Role of Digital Tools and Artificial Intelligence - From Waste to Wealth: Advancing a Circular Economy in Waste Management - Biodiversity: Our Strongest Natural Defence Against Climate Change Participants may also choose any other topic relevant to the broader theme **Environmental Vision – India @2047**. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE - Students enrolled in **undergraduate or postgraduate law programmes** at any recognized university in India. - **Co-authorship is not permitted.** ## MODE OF THE EVENT Essay Writing Competition (online registration and submission process). Registered participants are required to submit essays through the designated submission form. ## LOCATION (COUNTRY/STATE/CITY) & VENUE OF THE EVENT **National Law University, Delhi** **New Delhi, India** ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE ### Registration - Complete registration through the official registration link on or before **8th June 2026**. - Pay the registration fee of **₹200**. - Registration fee is non-refundable. ### Submission - Only registered participants may submit essays. - Essays must be submitted through the official submission form by **8th July 2026**. - The submission link will be shared via the registered email IDs. - Details provided in the submission form must match those provided during registration. ### Submission Guidelines - Word Limit: **2,500–3,000 words** (inclusive of references) - Title: Maximum **12 words** - Font: **Times New Roman**, Size **12** - Line Spacing: **1.5** - Text Alignment: **Justified** - Referencing Style: **OSCOLA 5th Edition (Endnotes)** - Similarity Index: Below **15%** - AI Index: Above **20%** will lead to disqualification - Submission must be original and unpublished. ## FEE DETAILS **Registration Fee:** ₹200 per participant (non-refundable). ## PRIZES CategoryAwardWinner₹20,000 + Certificate of MeritFirst Runner-Up₹15,000 + Certificate of MeritMeritorious Entries₹10,000 + Certificate of MeritTop 10 EntriesCertificate of MeritAll ParticipantsCertificate of Participation The decision of the Panel of Judges shall be final. ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES EventDateAnnouncement of Competition18th May 2026Registration Deadline8th June 2026Submission Deadline8th July 2026Declaration of Results10th August 2026 ## CONTACT INFORMATION **Email:** celpr@nludelhi.ac.in For competition-related queries, participants must use the subject line: **“Essay Competition – Query”** ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / LINK OF THE OFFICIAL BROCHURE, RULES & REGULATIONS [**Official Brochure**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1suyqJFI08wx00OT5I2piLM_eUOQZD-r8/view?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Essay Competitions, Events, Other Competitions --- ### [Uday v. State of Karnataka (2003) 4 SCC 46](https://lawfoyer.in/uday-v-state-of-karnataka-2003-4-scc-46/) **Published:** May 30, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The decision in **[Uday v. State of Karnataka (2003) 4 SCC 46](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1100330/?utm_source=chatgpt.com)** is a landmark judgment on the law of consent in rape prosecutions involving a promise of marriage. The Supreme Court examined whether sexual intercourse between two consenting adults becomes rape merely because the man subsequently fails to marry the woman. The Court analyzed the interaction between **Section 375 IPC** and **Section 90 IPC** and considered whether consent obtained on a promise of marriage amounts to consent given under a “misconception of fact”. The prosecutrix was a major college-going woman who was deeply involved in a romantic relationship with the accused. Sexual relations continued for several months, resulting in pregnancy. When marriage did not materialize, criminal proceedings were initiated alleging rape. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and acquitted the accused. The Court held that every breach of a promise to marry does not constitute rape. A distinction must be drawn between a false promise made from the inception without intention to marry and a genuine promise that later could not be fulfilled. The Court found no evidence that the accused never intended to marry the prosecutrix. It further held that the prosecutrix consciously and voluntarily participated in the relationship and understood the consequences of her actions. Therefore, her consent could not be treated as consent obtained under misconception of fact. **Keywords:** Consent, Misconception of Fact, Promise to Marry, Section 375 IPC, Section 90 IPC, Rape, Voluntary Consent, Criminal Liability. ## B) CASE DETAILS #### i) Judgment Cause Title **Uday v. State of Karnataka** #### ii) Case Number Criminal Appeal No. 336 of 1996 #### iii) Judgment Date 19 February 2003 #### iv) Court Supreme Court of India #### v) Quorum Justice N. Santosh Hegde and Justice B. P. Singh #### vi) Author Justice B. P. Singh #### vii) Citation **(2003) 4 SCC 46; AIR 2003 SC 1639** #### viii) Legal Provisions Involved - [Section 375 IPC](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1569253/?utm_source=chatgpt.com) - [Section 376 IPC](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1526017/?utm_source=chatgpt.com) - [Section 90 IPC](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/203566/?utm_source=chatgpt.com) - Section 313 CrPC #### ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case None expressly overruled. #### x) Law Subjects Involved Criminal Law, Criminal Jurisprudence, Law of Evidence, Gender Justice, Consent Jurisprudence. ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The case emerged from a consensual romantic relationship between two young adults belonging to different castes. The prosecutrix was approximately nineteen years old and studying in college. The accused was a frequent visitor to her home and was a friend of her brother. Over time, affection developed into a love relationship. Marriage was discussed repeatedly. However, both parties were aware that caste differences would create serious resistance from their families. Despite these social obstacles, the relationship continued and eventually became sexual. The prosecutrix later became pregnant. When the accused failed to marry her despite repeated assurances, a criminal complaint was lodged alleging rape. The Sessions Court and the Karnataka High Court concluded that the consent of the prosecutrix was vitiated because it had been obtained on the basis of a promise of marriage. According to those courts, the promise constituted deception and therefore the sexual intercourse amounted to rape under Section 376 IPC. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether this reasoning correctly reflected the law relating to consent and misconception of fact. The case therefore became an important authority on the distinction between consensual sexual relationships and criminal sexual assault. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The prosecutrix and the accused knew each other for a considerable period. The accused regularly visited the prosecutrix’s residence. Their friendship developed into a romantic relationship. According to the prosecutrix, the accused proposed marriage. She initially expressed concern because they belonged to different castes. Nevertheless, both continued their relationship and remained emotionally attached to each other. The prosecutrix admitted that she loved the accused deeply and willingly met him on numerous occasions. One night, the accused called the prosecutrix outside her house. They met at a partially constructed building belonging to the accused. There, the accused embraced and kissed her and promised marriage. Sexual intercourse took place. According to the prosecutrix, she agreed because of the assurance of marriage. Thereafter, the parties continued to meet frequently. The prosecutrix admitted that sexual relations occurred approximately fifteen to twenty times and often once or twice every week. Several people had observed them together and were aware of their closeness. The relationship continued for months. Eventually, the prosecutrix became pregnant. She informed the accused. He allegedly reassured her that marriage would occur after completion of his house construction. Her family later discovered the pregnancy. Discussions took place between the accused and members of the prosecutrix’s family. Initially, the accused indicated willingness to marry her. Subsequently, he distanced himself from the proposal. Feeling deceived, the prosecutrix lodged a criminal complaint. A child was later born. Based on these allegations, the accused was prosecuted for rape. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED ##### i.Whether consent given for sexual intercourse on a promise of marriage amounts to consent under a misconception of fact under Section 90 IPC. ##### ii.Whether sexual intercourse between two consenting adults becomes rape merely because marriage does not ultimately occur. ##### iii.Whether the prosecution proved that the accused never intended to marry the prosecutrix from the inception. ##### iv.Whether the prosecutrix’s consent was voluntary, conscious, and informed. ##### v.Whether the ingredients of Section 376 IPC were established beyond reasonable doubt. ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS #### i. The counsels for the Appellant submitted that The accused argued that the relationship was entirely consensual. The prosecutrix was a major, educated, college-going woman who fully understood the nature and consequences of sexual intercourse. There was no force, threat, coercion, intimidation, or deception concerning the physical act itself. The parties were deeply in love and voluntarily maintained a relationship for several months. The accused contended that consent was real and valid and therefore the offence of rape was not established. The appellant further argued that Section 90 IPC could not be mechanically applied merely because a promise of marriage was later not fulfilled. A future promise is not necessarily a “fact” contemplated by Section 90 IPC. Criminal liability would arise only where the promise was false from the beginning and intended solely to obtain consent. The prosecution had failed to prove such fraudulent intention. Consequently, the conviction was legally unsustainable. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS #### i. The counsels for the Respondent submitted that The State argued that the prosecutrix consented only because the accused repeatedly assured her that he would marry her. Such consent was not free consent but consent induced by deception. The prosecutrix would never have agreed to sexual intercourse if she had known that marriage would not occur. Therefore, her apparent consent stood vitiated by misconception of fact. The prosecution relied upon the fact that the accused repeatedly promised marriage and continued sexual relations despite knowing the social barriers. Once pregnancy occurred, he allegedly withdrew from his commitment. The State therefore maintained that the promise was merely a device to obtain sexual access and that the conviction under Section 376 IPC was justified. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS #### i. Section 375 IPC Section 375 defines rape and identifies circumstances where consent is absent or legally ineffective. The provision recognizes situations involving coercion, fear, impersonation, unsoundness of mind, intoxication, and minority. The Court closely examined whether the facts fit within any of these statutory categories. #### ii. Section 90 IPC Section 90 declares that consent given under fear or misconception of fact is not valid consent where the accused knows or has reason to believe that such consent was given because of that misconception. The Supreme Court emphasized that both conditions must coexist. First, the consent must arise from misconception. Second, the accused must know of that misconception. #### iii. Section 376 IPC This provision prescribes punishment for rape. Since conviction depends upon proving absence of legally valid consent, interpretation of consent became central to the dispute. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY THE COURT #### Rao Harnarain Singh v. State, AIR 1958 Punjab 123 The Court referred to this decision for the proposition that consent involves voluntary participation after intelligent choice. Mere submission does not amount to consent. The distinction between consent and passive surrender was emphasized. #### Vijayan Pillai @ Babu v. State of Kerala, 1989 (2) KLJ 234 The Kerala High Court explained that consent requires free exercise of physical and mental faculties. Consent obtained through compulsion or overwhelming pressure lacks legal validity. #### In re Anthony @ Bakthavatsalu, AIR 1960 Mad 308 The judgment highlighted that valid consent requires voluntary and conscious acceptance of the act. The Court cited it while discussing the meaning of consent. #### Jayanti Rani Panda v. State of West Bengal, 1984 Cri LJ 1535 This precedent played a significant role. The Calcutta High Court held that a mere failure to keep a promise of marriage does not automatically establish misconception of fact. Criminal liability arises only where the promise was false from the very beginning. #### State of H.P. v. Mango Ram, (2000) 7 SCC 224 The Supreme Court reiterated that consent requires voluntary participation and intelligent understanding. The case was used to explain the broader principles governing consent in rape law. ## J) JUDGEMENT #### a. RATIO DECIDENDI The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the accused. The Court held that the prosecutrix was a major, educated woman who voluntarily participated in the relationship. She was aware of the social difficulties arising from caste differences and understood that marriage might never occur. Despite that awareness, she consciously continued the relationship for an extended period. Therefore, her consent could not automatically be characterized as consent given under misconception of fact. The Court further held that a promise to marry does not by itself amount to a misconception of fact. The crucial inquiry is whether the promise was false from the inception. If the accused genuinely intended to marry but later failed due to circumstances, criminal liability for rape does not arise. In the present case, there was insufficient evidence proving that the accused never intended marriage. On the contrary, circumstances suggested that he may initially have intended to marry but later retreated due to social and familial pressures. The Court stressed that Section 90 IPC requires proof of two cumulative conditions. The prosecution must establish both the misconception and the accused’s knowledge of that misconception. Neither requirement was satisfactorily proved. Consequently, the conviction under Section 376 IPC could not stand. #### b. OBITER DICTA The Court observed that no rigid formula exists for determining consent. Each case must be decided on its own facts. Courts should examine the conduct of the parties, surrounding circumstances, age, educational background, nature of the relationship, and evidence regarding intention. These observations have significantly influenced later consent jurisprudence. #### c. GUIDELINES - Promise of marriage and rape are not automatically synonymous. - Courts must distinguish a false promise from a failed promise. - Intention at the inception of the relationship is crucial. - Consent must be evaluated in light of surrounding circumstances. - The prosecution bears the burden of proving absence of valid consent. - Section 90 IPC requires proof of misconception and knowledge thereof. - Voluntary participation by a mature adult remains a significant factor. - Each case must be assessed on its own evidence rather than assumptions. ## K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment remains one of the most influential authorities on the relationship between consent and promises of marriage in Indian criminal law. The Court rejected a simplistic approach that treats every broken promise as rape. Instead, it insisted upon proof of fraudulent intention existing at the inception of the relationship. The decision reinforced fundamental criminal law principles, including proof beyond reasonable doubt and strict interpretation of penal provisions. The ruling also demonstrated judicial caution against converting failed romantic relationships into criminal prosecutions absent evidence of deception from the beginning. At the same time, it did not grant immunity to all accused persons. The Court expressly left room for conviction where evidence establishes that the promise of marriage was merely a tool of manipulation. Later Supreme Court decisions such as Deepak Gulati and Pramod Suryabhan Pawar developed these principles further by distinguishing genuine relationships from deliberate fraud. From a jurisprudential perspective, the case strengthened the doctrine that consent depends upon autonomy, knowledge, voluntariness, and surrounding circumstances. It remains a foundational precedent in understanding when a promise of marriage can invalidate consent under Indian criminal law. ## L) REFERENCES #### a. Important Cases Referred 1. **Uday v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 46.** 2. **State of H.P. v. Mango Ram, (2000) 7 SCC 224.** 3. **Jayanti Rani Panda v. State of West Bengal, 1984 Cri LJ 1535.** 4. **Rao Harnarain Singh v. State, AIR 1958 Punjab 123.** 5. **Vijayan Pillai @ Babu v. State of Kerala, 1989 (2) KLJ 234.** 6. **In re Anthony @ Bakthavatsalu, AIR 1960 Mad 308.** 7. **Gopi Shankar v. State, AIR 1967 Raj 159.** 8. **Arjan Ram v. State, AIR 1960 Punjab 303.** 9. **Bhimrao Harnooji Wanjari v. State of Maharashtra, 1975 Mah LJ 660.** #### b. Important Statutes Referred 1. Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 90, 375, 376. 2. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 313. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Sonu @ Subhash Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2021) 18 SCC 517](https://lawfoyer.in/sonu-subhash-kumar-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-2021-18-scc-517/) **Published:** May 30, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The decision in **Sonu @ Subhash Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., AIR 2021 SC 1405; (2021) Criminal Appeal No. 233 of 2021** addresses a recurring legal question concerning the distinction between a false promise of marriage and a subsequent breach of a promise to marry. The Supreme Court examined whether a consensual sexual relationship, entered into on the basis of an assurance of marriage, would automatically constitute rape under **Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860**, when the accused later refused to marry the complainant. The Court analysed the FIR, the statement recorded under **Section 164 CrPC**, and the governing principles laid down in **Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 9 SCC 608**. The Court held that criminal liability for rape cannot arise merely because a promise of marriage was not ultimately fulfilled. It must be established that the promise was false from its inception and was made solely to obtain consent for sexual relations. Since the complainant herself admitted that the relationship was voluntary and that her primary grievance was the subsequent refusal to marry, the Court concluded that no offence under Section 376 IPC was made out. Consequently, the charge-sheet and criminal proceedings were quashed under Section 482 CrPC. This judgment reinforces the principle that criminal law cannot be used to penalise every failed relationship and that consent obtained in a genuine relationship cannot retrospectively become non-consensual merely because marriage did not occur. **Keywords:** Consent; False Promise to Marry; Section 376 IPC; Misconception of Fact; Section 482 CrPC; Quashing of Proceedings; Rape Law. ## B) CASE DETAILS #### i) Judgment Cause Title **Sonu @ Subhash Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another** #### ii) Case Number Criminal Appeal No. 233 of 2021 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 11218 of 2019) #### iii) Judgment Date 1 March 2021 #### iv) Court Supreme Court of India #### v) Quorum Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud and Justice M.R. Shah #### vi) Author of Judgment Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud #### vii) Citation AIR 2021 SC 1405; AIRONLINE 2021 SC 120 #### viii) Legal Provisions Involved - **Section 376 IPC** - **Section 375 IPC** - **Section 90 IPC** - **Section 482 CrPC** - **Section 164 CrPC** #### ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case None. #### x) Related Law Subjects Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure; Law of Evidence; Women’s Rights Jurisprudence; Consent Jurisprudence. #### xi) Counsels Appearing - For Appellant: **Mr. Amit Pawan, AOR** - For State: **Mr. Vishnu Shankar Jain, AOR** - For Respondent No. 2: **Mr. Simant Kumar, Advocate** ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The appeal arose from an order of the Allahabad High Court refusing to quash criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant for the offence of rape under Section 376 IPC. The High Court held that the appellant could seek discharge before the trial court and declined to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC. The Supreme Court was therefore required to determine whether the allegations contained in the FIR and the victim’s statement, even if accepted as entirely true, disclosed the commission of rape. The controversy centred upon the legal distinction between consensual intimacy arising from a romantic relationship and sexual relations induced by a fraudulent promise of marriage. The Court considered whether the factual allegations demonstrated deception at the inception of the relationship or merely reflected a later breakdown of an intended marriage. The decision is important because it clarifies the limits of criminal prosecution in cases involving failed relationships and strengthens the doctrinal requirement that consent must be examined from the standpoint of the accused’s intention at the time the promise was made. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The complainant alleged that she had developed a friendship and romantic relationship with the appellant. According to the FIR, the appellant assured her that he would marry her. Relying upon that assurance, the complainant entered into a physical relationship with him. The relationship continued for approximately one and a half years. During this period, the complainant interacted with the appellant’s parents and sister, and she believed that the families were agreeable to the proposed marriage. Subsequently, the appellant returned to Jhansi and informed the complainant that they would perform a court marriage. Acting upon this communication, she travelled to Jhansi. Upon reaching the appellant’s residence, she was informed by his father that the appellant was unwilling to marry her. She was allegedly offered money and asked to leave. The complainant also alleged that she was assaulted by the appellant’s family members and forced out of the house. These allegations culminated in the registration of an FIR under Section 376 IPC. The complainant’s statement under Section 164 CrPC assumed considerable significance. She categorically stated that she had a love affair with the appellant for approximately one and a half years. She further stated that she voluntarily developed a relationship resembling that of husband and wife with him. Importantly, she acknowledged that her principal grievance was that the appellant and his family members had subsequently refused to marry her. The statement did not allege that the appellant never intended to marry her when the relationship began. Nor did it contain allegations suggesting that the promise was a deliberate falsehood designed to secure sexual relations. Instead, the narrative reflected a consensual romantic relationship that later failed because the proposed marriage did not materialise. These admissions became decisive in the Court’s analysis. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED ##### i.Whether a consensual sexual relationship based upon an assurance of marriage constitutes rape when the accused later refuses to marry the complainant. ##### ii.Whether the allegations in the FIR disclosed a false promise of marriage from inception. ##### iii.Whether consent was vitiated by a misconception of fact within the meaning of criminal law. ##### iv.Whether the High Court ought to have exercised powers under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceedings. ##### v.Whether continuation of criminal prosecution would amount to abuse of process of law. ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS #### i. The counsel for the Appellant submitted that The appellant argued that the relationship between the parties was entirely consensual. Reliance was placed upon **Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 9 SCC 608**, where the Supreme Court distinguished a false promise from a mere breach of promise. It was contended that the FIR itself established a long-standing relationship extending over one and a half years. The complainant had voluntarily participated in the relationship and there was no allegation that the appellant had fraudulent intentions at the commencement of the relationship. The appellant further argued that the material on record merely indicated a later refusal to marry. Such refusal, even if morally blameworthy, could not transform a consensual relationship into rape. Therefore, the essential ingredients of Sections 375 and 376 IPC were absent and continuation of criminal proceedings constituted an abuse of the process of law. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS #### i. The counsel for the Respondent submitted that The complainant and the State supported the High Court’s decision. It was argued that the FIR demonstrated that the complainant entered into the relationship because of the appellant’s assurance that he would marry her. The respondents contended that the issue required evaluation of evidence and should therefore be left to trial. The State relied upon observations in **Pramod Suryabhan Pawar** and argued that the factual matrix warranted judicial scrutiny before quashing proceedings. According to the respondents, the allegations disclosed sufficient material to proceed with prosecution and the High Court correctly refrained from interfering at the preliminary stage. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS #### i. Section 375 IPC Defines rape and recognises consent as a central element. Consent obtained through legally recognised forms of deception may be invalid. #### ii. Section 376 IPC Prescribes punishment for rape. Its application depends upon proof that the sexual act falls within Section 375 IPC. #### iii. Section 90 IPC Explains circumstances where consent is not valid. Consent obtained under a misconception of fact may not be legally effective. #### iv. Section 164 CrPC Provides for recording statements before a Magistrate. Such statements often assist courts in evaluating the nature of allegations. #### v. Section 482 CrPC Confers inherent powers upon High Courts to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice. The Supreme Court examined whether these powers should have been exercised in the present case. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY THE COURT #### 1. **Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 9 SCC 608** This was the principal precedent relied upon by the Court. The Supreme Court held that a distinction exists between a false promise and a breach of promise. A promise becomes legally relevant when it is false from inception and made without any intention of performance. The Court reiterated that consent is vitiated only when the promise was made in bad faith and directly influenced the decision to engage in sexual relations. The judgment supplied the controlling legal test applied in the present case. # J) JUDGEMENT #### a. RATIO DECIDENDI The Supreme Court held that the allegations disclosed a consensual relationship. The complainant herself admitted that she voluntarily entered into the relationship and remained in it for approximately one and a half years. The Court observed that there was no allegation suggesting that the appellant’s promise to marry was false when made. The material only showed a subsequent unwillingness to marry. Such later refusal could not by itself establish rape. The Court reaffirmed that for consent to be vitiated by a misconception of fact, two requirements must coexist. First, the promise of marriage must have been false from inception. Secondly, the promise must have directly induced the sexual relationship. In the absence of these elements, criminal liability under Section 376 IPC cannot arise. Since the FIR and the Section 164 statement lacked allegations of initial deceit, the essential ingredients of rape were absent. The Court found that the High Court erred in refusing to examine the legal sufficiency of the allegations. Even if every allegation were accepted as true, no offence was disclosed. Consequently, the charge-sheet dated 25 April 2018 and the order taking cognizance were quashed. #### b. OBITER DICTA The judgment implicitly emphasises that criminal law must not become a mechanism for resolving every failed romantic relationship. Courts must carefully distinguish between genuine deception and emotional disappointment arising from a failed promise. Criminal prosecution requires proof of legal wrongdoing, not merely breach of personal expectations. #### c. GUIDELINES - Courts must distinguish between a false promise and a mere breach of promise. - Intention at the inception of the promise is the decisive factor. - A later refusal to marry does not automatically establish rape. - Consent in a long-standing voluntary relationship cannot be retrospectively invalidated solely because marriage did not occur. - High Courts may exercise powers under Section 482 CrPC where allegations fail to disclose essential ingredients of an offence. - The existence of a consensual relationship must be assessed from the complainant’s own allegations and surrounding circumstances. ## K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment represents a significant contribution to Indian consent jurisprudence. It reinforces that the criminal justice system must differentiate between deception and disappointment. The Court’s reliance on **Pramod Suryabhan Pawar** strengthens doctrinal consistency concerning consent obtained on the basis of a promise to marry. The decision also safeguards the principle that criminal law should not be invoked in the absence of essential statutory ingredients. By quashing the proceedings, the Court underscored that a consensual relationship extending over a substantial period cannot automatically become an offence merely because the relationship ultimately fails. The ruling therefore balances the protection of women against genuine exploitation with the requirement that criminal liability must rest upon demonstrable fraudulent intent existing at the inception of the relationship. ## L) REFERENCES #### a. Important Cases Referred 1. **Sonu @ Subhash Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., AIR 2021 SC 1405; AIRONLINE 2021 SC 120.** 2. **Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608.** #### b. Important Statutes Referred 1. **Indian Penal Code, 1860** - Section 90 - Section 375 - Section 376 2. **Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973** - Section 164 - Section 482 **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 9 SCC 608](https://lawfoyer.in/pramod-suryabhan-pawar-v-state-of-maharashtra-2019-9-scc-608/) **Published:** May 30, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The decision in **Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608** is a landmark judgment on the distinction between consensual sexual relationships and rape based on a false promise of marriage. The Supreme Court examined whether a long-standing intimate relationship, continuing for several years between educated adults, could subsequently be converted into a prosecution for rape merely because the marriage did not take place. The Court analyzed the meaning of consent under **Sections 375 and 90 of the Indian Penal Code**, and clarified the legal test for determining when consent is vitiated by a misconception of fact. The Court held that every breach of a promise to marry does not amount to rape. A promise becomes legally relevant only when it is shown that the promise was false from the very beginning and was made solely to obtain sexual consent. The Court further held that the prosecutrix must establish a direct nexus between the promise and her consent. The judgment also examined allegations under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and found that the ingredients of the offences were absent. Consequently, the FIR was quashed under Section 482 CrPC. The ruling remains one of the leading authorities on consent, false promise of marriage, and misuse of criminal proceedings arising out of failed relationships. **Keywords:** Consent, False Promise of Marriage, Misconception of Fact, Section 375 IPC, Section 90 IPC, Rape, SC/ST Act, Quashing of FIR. ## B) CASE DETAILS #### i) Judgment Cause Title **Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.** #### ii) Case Number Criminal Appeal No. 1165 of 2019 (@ SLP (Crl.) No. 2712 of 2019) #### iii) Judgment Date 21 August 2019 #### iv) Court Supreme Court of India #### v) Quorum Justice D.Y. Chandrachud and Justice Indira Banerjee #### vi) Author Justice D.Y. Chandrachud #### vii) Citation (2019) 9 SCC 608; AIR 2019 SC 4010 #### viii) Legal Provisions Involved Sections 375, 376, 417, 504, 506(2), and 90 IPC; Section 482 CrPC; Sections 3(1)(u), 3(1)(w), and 3(2)(vii) of the SC/ST Act. #### ix) Judgments Overruled None. #### x) Law Subjects Criminal Law, Constitutional Principles of Liberty, Criminal Procedure, Gender Justice, SC/ST Law. #### xi) Counsels Appearing For Appellant: **Mr. Sushil Karanjkar** For State and Complainant: **Mr. Katneshwarkar and Mr. Nilesh Tribhavan**. ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The case arose from an FIR alleging rape on the basis of a promise of marriage. The complainant asserted that the appellant repeatedly assured her that he would marry her despite caste differences. On that basis, a physical relationship developed over several years. When the marriage ultimately did not take place and the appellant married another woman, criminal proceedings were initiated. The appellant sought quashing of the FIR under Section 482 CrPC. The Bombay High Court refused to interfere, observing that a prima facie case existed. The matter reached the Supreme Court where the principal question concerned the legal distinction between consensual sexual relations and rape arising from a false promise to marry. The judgment therefore became a significant authority on the scope of consent under criminal law. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The complainant and the appellant knew each other since 1998 and became close over time. According to the FIR, the appellant proposed marriage in 2008 and assured the complainant that caste differences would not prevent their union. The complainant alleged that sexual relations commenced in 2009 after the appellant promised marriage. Thereafter, the parties maintained a relationship for several years. They frequently visited each other, stayed together, travelled together, and maintained intimate relations. The complainant was a highly educated government officer serving as an Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, while the appellant was a Deputy Commandant in the CRPF. The FIR itself disclosed repeated meetings, cohabitation, and voluntary interaction over a long period. The complainant further alleged that the appellant gradually expressed reservations about marriage due to caste considerations. Despite these disagreements, the relationship continued. The parties jointly visited hospitals when pregnancy concerns arose. The complainant eventually discovered that the appellant was engaged and later married another woman. Following this development, an FIR was lodged alleging offences under the IPC and the SC/ST Act. The FIR also relied upon certain WhatsApp messages allegedly insulting the complainant on caste grounds. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED ##### i.Whether a consensual sexual relationship continuing for several years could constitute rape under **Section 375 IPC** merely because marriage did not ultimately occur. ##### ii.Whether consent obtained on the basis of a promise to marry amounted to consent obtained under a **misconception of fact** under **Section 90 IPC**. ##### iii.Whether the facts disclosed that the promise of marriage was false from its inception. ##### iv.Whether the allegations disclosed offences under the **SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act**. ##### v.Whether the FIR deserved to be quashed under **Section 482 CrPC**. ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS #### i. The counsel for the Appellant submitted that The relationship was entirely consensual and continued for more than six years. The complainant was an educated adult holding a responsible government position. The FIR itself demonstrated repeated voluntary meetings, travel, cohabitation, and intimacy. These circumstances were inconsistent with allegations of rape. It was further argued that a mere breach of a promise to marry could not amount to rape. Criminal liability arises only when the promise was false from the beginning and intended solely to deceive the woman into consenting to sexual intercourse. No such allegation appeared in the FIR. The appellant therefore contended that even if all allegations were accepted as true, the essential ingredients of rape were absent. The continuation of the relationship despite known obstacles relating to caste further demonstrated voluntary participation rather than deception. Consequently, the FIR was liable to be quashed. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS #### i. The counsels for the Respondent submitted that The complainant argued that she consented to physical relations because of the appellant’s assurances of marriage. According to her, the appellant manipulated her emotionally and induced intimacy by repeatedly promising matrimony. She alleged that he never genuinely intended to marry her and only used the promise to satisfy his sexual desires. The complainant further submitted that the appellant’s conduct revealed prejudice against members of Scheduled Castes. Reliance was placed upon WhatsApp messages allegedly insulting her caste identity. The respondents therefore contended that the allegations disclosed offences under both the IPC and the SC/ST Act, making interference under Section 482 CrPC inappropriate at the threshold stage. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS #### i. Section 375 IPC Defines rape and identifies circumstances where sexual intercourse occurs without valid consent. #### ii. Section 90 IPC Provides that consent given under fear or misconception of fact is not valid consent. #### iii. Section 376 IPC Prescribes punishment for rape. #### iv. Section 482 CrPC Recognizes inherent powers of High Courts to prevent abuse of process and secure justice. #### v. SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act Protects members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes against discrimination, humiliation, and exploitation. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY THE COURT #### 1. **State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335** The Court relied upon the celebrated principles governing quashing of FIRs. It reaffirmed that proceedings may be quashed where allegations do not disclose any offence even if accepted at face value. #### 2. **Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1** This case explained the scope of inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC and emphasized that such powers exist to prevent abuse of judicial process. #### 3. **Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 3100** The Court held that consensual relationships cannot automatically be transformed into rape cases because marriage eventually fails. #### 4. **Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala, (2013) 9 SCC 113** The judgment defined consent as a conscious and voluntary act involving reasoned choice. #### 5. **Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675** The Court distinguished a false promise from a mere breach of promise and held that intention at the inception is crucial. #### 6. **Anurag Soni v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2019) SCC OnLine SC 509** It was held that where the accused never intended to marry from the beginning, consent obtained on such assurance may amount to rape. #### 7. **Yedla Srinivasa Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2006) 11 SCC 615** The Court found rape where a promise of marriage was clearly fraudulent from the outset. #### 8. **Uday v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 46** The Court held that consent motivated by love and mutual affection cannot automatically be treated as consent obtained through deception. ## J) JUDGEMENT #### a. RATIO DECIDENDI The Supreme Court formulated the governing legal test. It held that a woman’s consent is vitiated by a promise of marriage only when two requirements are satisfied: 1. The promise was false from the very beginning and made in bad faith. 2. The promise had a direct and immediate connection with the woman’s decision to engage in sexual relations. The Court emphasized that a mere failure to marry does not establish that the promise was false. Criminal law requires proof that the accused never intended to fulfil the promise when it was made. The Court examined the FIR and noted that the parties had known each other for years, voluntarily met, travelled, cohabited, and maintained intimacy over a prolonged period. The complainant was aware of difficulties concerning caste and yet continued the relationship even after disputes regarding marriage emerged. These circumstances undermined the claim that consent was solely induced by a promise of marriage. Consequently, the ingredients of rape were absent. The Court further held that the alleged WhatsApp messages did not satisfy the ingredients of the offences invoked under the SC/ST Act as those provisions were not in force when the messages were sent and the factual requirements of the earlier provisions were also not fulfilled. Accordingly, the FIR was quashed. #### b. OBITER DICTA The Court made significant observations regarding consent. It stated that consent under criminal law is an active and reasoned choice. A woman must evaluate circumstances and consequences before agreeing to the act. The law protects autonomy and dignity but does not criminalize every failed romantic relationship. These observations have become influential in later decisions concerning consensual relationships and allegations arising from broken engagements. #### c. GUIDELINES 1. A false promise of marriage differs from a mere breach of promise. 2. Intention at the time of making the promise is decisive. 3. Consent is vitiated only when deception exists from inception. 4. The promise must have a direct nexus with the sexual act. 5. Long-term consensual relationships require careful judicial scrutiny. 6. Courts must distinguish emotional disappointment from criminal conduct. 7. Section 482 CrPC may be exercised where allegations fail to disclose an offence even if accepted entirely. ## K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment is one of the most important modern authorities on the doctrine of consent in Indian criminal law. It prevents the automatic criminalization of failed relationships while preserving protection against genuine deception. The Court carefully balanced women’s autonomy with the requirement that criminal liability must rest upon clear proof of fraudulent intent. The decision harmonizes **Sections 375 and 90 IPC** and clarifies that criminal law punishes deceit, not every unsuccessful promise. It remains a leading precedent for determining when a promise of marriage becomes legally capable of vitiating consent. ## L) REFERENCES #### a. Important Cases Referred 1. *Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra*, (2019) 9 SCC 608. 2. *State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal*, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. 3. *Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal*, (2007) 12 SCC 1. 4. *Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra*, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 3100. 5. *Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala*, (2013) 9 SCC 113. 6. *Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana*, (2013) 7 SCC 675. 7. *Anurag Soni v. State of Chhattisgarh*, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 509. 8. *Yedla Srinivasa Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh*, (2006) 11 SCC 615. 9. *Uday v. State of Karnataka*, (2003) 4 SCC 46. #### b. Important Statutes Referred 1. Indian Penal Code, 1860. 2. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 3. Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. 4. Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2015. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand (2020) 10 SCC 108](https://lawfoyer.in/maheshwar-tigga-v-state-of-jharkhand-2020-10-scc-108/) **Published:** May 29, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The decision in **Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand, AIR 2020 SC 4535** is a significant judgment on the law relating to consent, promise of marriage, and the evidentiary standards required for sustaining a conviction for rape under **Sections 375 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code**. The Supreme Court examined whether a long-standing consensual relationship, founded upon mutual affection and an expectation of marriage, could subsequently be transformed into an allegation of rape merely because the marriage did not ultimately take place. The Court scrutinized the evidence concerning the age of the prosecutrix, the prolonged delay in lodging the FIR, the correspondence exchanged between the parties, the social and religious obstacles to marriage, and the defective examination of the accused under **Section 313 Cr.P.C.**. The Court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish that the promise of marriage was false from the inception or that the consent of the prosecutrix was obtained through fraud or misconception of fact. The judgment reinforces the distinction between a genuine but unsuccessful promise to marry and a fraudulent promise intended solely to obtain sexual consent. It also emphasizes the constitutional importance of a fair trial and meaningful compliance with Section 313 Cr.P.C. The conviction was consequently set aside and the appellant was acquitted. **Keywords:** Consent, Promise to Marry, Misconception of Fact, Section 90 IPC, Section 376 IPC, Fair Trial, Section 313 Cr.P.C., Rape Jurisprudence. ## B) CASE DETAILS #### i) Judgment Cause Title **Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand** #### ii) Case Number Criminal Appeal No. 635 of 2020 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 393 of 2020) #### iii) Judgment Date 28 September 2020 #### iv) Court Supreme Court of India #### v) Quorum Justice R.F. Nariman, Justice Navin Sinha, and Justice Indira Banerjee #### vi) Author Justice Navin Sinha #### vii) Citation AIR 2020 SC 4535; AIR Online 2020 SC 743 #### viii) Legal Provisions Involved *Sections 90, 323, 341, 375, 376, 420 and 504 IPC* *Section 313 Cr.P.C**.*** #### ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case None. #### x) Law Subjects Involved Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, Evidence Law, Constitutional Fair Trial Jurisprudence, Gender Justice. ### xi) Counsels Appearing For Appellant: **Mrs. V. Mohana, Senior Advocate** For Respondent-State: **Ms. Pragya Baghel** ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The judgment addresses one of the most debated areas of Indian criminal law. The issue concerns the distinction between consensual sexual relationships and rape allegations arising after a failed promise of marriage. The Court was required to determine whether the consent of the prosecutrix was obtained through a fraudulent representation or whether the relationship was a voluntary and conscious association between two adults. The prosecution alleged that the appellant initially assaulted the prosecutrix and thereafter repeatedly established physical relations by promising marriage. The defence asserted that both parties were deeply involved in a love relationship extending over several years and that the marriage failed due to social and religious barriers. The Court therefore examined the meaning of consent under ***Section 90 IPC*** and its interaction with ***Section 375 IPC***. The judgment also discusses the importance of procedural fairness, particularly the duty of courts to properly question an accused under ***Section 313 Cr.P.C.***, treating such examination as an indispensable component of a fair criminal trial. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The prosecutrix lodged an FIR on 13 April 1999 alleging that approximately four years earlier the appellant had sexually assaulted her at knifepoint. She alleged that after the initial incident the appellant continuously promised marriage and on that basis maintained sexual relations with her. She further stated that she had stayed in the appellant’s house for about fifteen days and physical relations continued during that period. The complaint was lodged shortly before the appellant’s proposed marriage with another woman. The prosecutrix alleged that compromise efforts had failed and that the appellant had cheated her by refusing marriage. The Trial Court convicted the appellant under ***Sections 376, 323 and 341 IPC***. The High Court affirmed the conviction, relying on letters, photographs and surrounding circumstances. The appellant approached the Supreme Court challenging the conviction. The Supreme Court found significant inconsistencies regarding the age of the prosecutrix. Different witnesses gave varying versions. No school records or documentary proof were produced. The medical evidence suggested that the prosecutrix was approximately twenty-five years old at the relevant time. The Court therefore held that the possibility of her being a major could not be excluded and granted the benefit of doubt. The Court also noted a delay of nearly four years in filing the FIR and considered this circumstance relevant in assessing the credibility of the allegations. # E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED ##### i.Whether the prosecutrix’s consent for sexual intercourse was obtained under a misconception of fact arising from a promise of marriage. ##### ii.Whether the appellant had a fraudulent intention from the inception of the relationship. ##### iii.Whether the evidence established absence of consent under ***Sections 90 and 375 IPC***. ##### iv.Whether the prosecution proved that the prosecutrix was a minor at the relevant time. ##### v.Whether the examination of the accused under ***Section 313 Cr.P.C.*** was legally sufficient. ##### vi.Whether the conviction under ***Sections 323 and 341 IPC*** could be sustained. ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS #### i. The counsels for the Appellant submitted that The FIR was lodged after an unexplained delay of four years. Such delay rendered the allegations doubtful. The prosecutrix herself admitted in cross-examination that no incident occurred on the date specifically alleged in the complaint. The correspondence exchanged between the parties demonstrated a genuine romantic relationship. The letters reflected mutual affection rather than coercion. The appellant argued that the relationship was consensual and arose from a long-standing love affair. It was further submitted that the prosecutrix was not proved to be a minor. Medical evidence suggested that she was approximately twenty-five years old. Consequently, no offence under ***Section 375 IPC*** was made out. The appellant also challenged the manner of examination under ***Section 313 Cr.P.C.***, contending that only a few generalized questions were put to him, thereby denying him a meaningful opportunity to explain incriminating circumstances. Reliance was placed upon ***Uday v. State of Karnataka (2003) 4 SCC 46***, ***Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana (2013) 7 SCC 675***, ***Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala (2013) 9 SCC 113*** and other authorities. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS #### i. The counsels for the Respondent submitted that The prosecutrix consistently maintained that the appellant exploited her on the promise of marriage. The State argued that the delay in lodging the FIR was explained by attempts at settlement and compromise. The prosecution emphasized that the appellant induced the prosecutrix into a sexual relationship by assuring marriage and later reneged on that assurance. According to the State, the consent was vitiated because it was obtained through deception. The prosecution further contended that the prosecutrix was a minor when the relationship began and therefore consent was legally immaterial. It was argued that the evidence of the prosecutrix was trustworthy and sufficient to sustain conviction. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS #### i. ***Section 375 IPC*** Defines rape and identifies circumstances where consent is absent or legally ineffective. #### ii. ***Section 90 IPC*** Provides that consent obtained under fear of injury or misconception of fact is not valid consent. #### iii. ***Section 376 IPC*** Prescribes punishment for rape. #### iv. ***Section 313 Cr.P.C.*** Requires courts to provide an accused an opportunity to explain incriminating evidence appearing against him. #### v. ***Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution*** Though not expressly discussed, the Court’s reasoning on fair trial reflects constitutional guarantees of equality and personal liberty. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY THE COURT #### 1. ***Uday v. State of Karnataka (2003) 4 SCC 46*** The Court held that consent arising from a genuine love relationship and expectation of marriage does not automatically become consent obtained under misconception of fact. Each case depends upon its own facts. #### 2. ***Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala (2013) 9 SCC 113*** The Court emphasized that consent must be evaluated from surrounding circumstances and set aside a conviction where the relationship was consensual. #### 3. ***K.P. Thimmappa Gowda v. State of Karnataka (2011) 14 SCC 475*** Recognized that a consensual relationship cannot automatically be criminalized merely because marriage did not occur. #### 4. ***Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2019 SC 327*** Distinguished between a false promise from inception and a genuine promise that later becomes impossible to fulfil. #### 5. ***Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 9 SCC 608*** Held that rape is made out only when the promise was false from the beginning and intended solely to secure consent. #### 6. ***Naval Kishore Singh v. State of Bihar (2004) 7 SCC 502*** Stressed that proper questioning under ***Section 313 Cr.P.C.*** is essential to a fair trial. ## J) JUDGEMENT #### a. RATIO DECIDENDI The Supreme Court held that the prosecution failed to prove that the appellant never intended to marry the prosecutrix from the inception of the relationship. The evidence demonstrated a genuine romantic relationship extending over several years. Letters exchanged between the parties, the engagement ceremony, and the conduct of both families indicated that the parties seriously contemplated marriage. The relationship ultimately failed because of religious and social obstacles rather than fraudulent conduct. The Court observed that consent given during a long-term voluntary relationship cannot automatically be characterized as consent obtained under misconception of fact. The prosecutrix was aware of the difficulties arising from the parties belonging to different religious communities. Therefore, the essential ingredients of rape were not established. The Court further held that the prosecution failed to conclusively establish the age of the prosecutrix. Documentary proof was absent. The evidence contained substantial inconsistencies. Consequently, the benefit of doubt had to be extended to the accused. The Court also criticized the defective examination under ***Section 313 Cr.P.C.*** and reiterated that meaningful questioning is an essential component of a fair trial. The conviction was accordingly set aside and the appellant was acquitted. #### b. OBITER DICTA The Court observed that a misconception of fact under ***Section 90 IPC*** must have a proximate connection with the act complained of. A misconception spread across several years of voluntary association cannot ordinarily be treated as vitiating consent. The Court also remarked that courts must distinguish between failed relationships and criminal conduct. Not every breach of a promise to marry amounts to rape. #### c. GUIDELINES 1. Courts must examine whether the promise of marriage was false from inception. 2. Mere failure to marry does not establish rape. 3. Consent must be assessed from the entire factual matrix. 4. Long-term voluntary relationships require careful evidentiary scrutiny. 5. Documentary evidence regarding age assumes crucial importance. 6. Questions under ***Section 313 Cr.P.C.*** must be specific and comprehensive. 7. Courts must distinguish genuine emotional relationships from fraudulent inducement. ## K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment is a landmark clarification of Indian rape jurisprudence. It reinforces that criminal liability for rape based on a promise of marriage arises only when the promise was deceitful from the very beginning. The Court carefully differentiated between a genuine relationship that later fails and a fraudulent scheme designed to obtain sexual consent. The decision strengthens the principle that criminal law cannot be used to punish every failed relationship. At the same time, it preserves protection for victims where deception is clearly established. The judgment also makes a valuable contribution to fair trial jurisprudence by emphasizing the importance of ***Section 313 Cr.P.C.*** examinations. It remains one of the leading authorities on consent, misconception of fact, and promise-to-marry cases in India. ## L) REFERENCES #### a. Important Cases Referred 1. *Uday v. State of Karnataka*, (2003) 4 SCC 46. 2. *Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana*, (2013) 7 SCC 675. 3. *Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala*, (2013) 9 SCC 113. 4. *K.P. Thimmappa Gowda v. State of Karnataka*, (2011) 14 SCC 475. 5. *Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra*, AIR 2019 SC 327. 6. *Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra*, (2019) 9 SCC 608. 7. *Naval Kishore Singh v. State of Bihar*, (2004) 7 SCC 502. #### b. Important Statutes Referred 1. Indian Penal Code, 1860 – ***Sections 90, 323, 341, 375, 376, 420 and 504***. 2. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ***Section 313***. 3. Constitution of India – ***Articles 14 and 21***. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana (2013) 7 SCC 675](https://lawfoyer.in/deepak-gulati-v-state-of-haryana-2013-7-scc-675/) **Published:** May 29, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The decision in ***Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675*** is a significant judgment on the distinction between rape and consensual sexual relations arising from a promise of marriage. The Supreme Court examined whether consent for sexual intercourse, given by an adult woman during a romantic relationship, becomes legally invalid merely because the marriage ultimately does not take place. The Court analysed the scope of **Sections 375 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860**, together with **Section 90 IPC** concerning consent obtained under a misconception of fact. The Court emphasized that every breach of a promise to marry does not amount to rape. Criminal liability arises only when the promise was false from the very beginning and was made solely to obtain sexual consent. The judgment distinguished between a genuine relationship that later fails and a deliberate deception intended to exploit a woman sexually. The Court found that the prosecutrix was a major, voluntarily accompanied the accused, continued to remain with him for several days, and repeatedly agreed to travel with him for the purpose of marriage. In the absence of evidence showing that the accused never intended to marry her from the outset, the Court granted the benefit of doubt and acquitted him. The judgment remains an important precedent governing allegations of rape based on a promise of marriage. **Keywords:** Consent, Promise to Marry, Misconception of Fact, Section 90 IPC, Rape, Section 376 IPC, Voluntary Relationship, Criminal Liability. ## B) CASE DETAILS #### i) Judgment Cause Title ***Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana*** #### ii) Case Number **Criminal Appeal No. 2322 of 2010** #### iii) Judgment Date **20 May 2013** #### iv) Court **Supreme Court of India** #### v) Quorum **Justice Dr. B.S. Chauhan and Justice Dipak Misra** #### vi) Author **Justice Dr. B.S. Chauhan** #### vii) Citation **(2013) 7 SCC 675; AIR 2013 SC 2071** #### viii) Legal Provisions Involved - **Sections 365, 366, 375, 376 and 417 IPC** - **Section 90 IPC** - **Section 114-A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872** - **Section 164 CrPC** #### ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case None. #### x) Related Law Subjects - Criminal Law - Law of Evidence - Women and Criminal Justice - Sexual Offences - Jurisprudence of Consent ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The case arose from allegations that the accused induced the prosecutrix to leave her home on a promise of marriage and thereafter engaged in sexual intercourse with her. The prosecution alleged that such intercourse constituted rape because the consent of the prosecutrix was obtained through deception. The trial court convicted the accused under Sections 365 and 376 IPC. The conviction was affirmed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The matter thereafter reached the Supreme Court through a criminal appeal. The central legal controversy concerned the nature of consent. The Court was required to determine whether the prosecutrix had voluntarily entered into a relationship or whether her consent was vitiated by a false promise of marriage. The judgment therefore became an important exposition of the legal meaning of consent under Indian criminal law. The Court also examined the relationship between Section 90 IPC and offences of rape under Section 375 IPC. It discussed how courts must distinguish between a failed romantic relationship and a fraudulent promise designed solely to secure sexual favours. The decision ultimately contributed to the evolving jurisprudence concerning sexual autonomy, deception, and criminal liability. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The prosecutrix was approximately nineteen years old and was studying in a senior secondary school in Karnal. She had known the appellant for some time. Both developed a relationship. On 10 May 1995, the appellant persuaded her to accompany him to Kurukshetra for marriage. She willingly agreed and even obtained a school certificate to establish her age. According to her statement, she left home voluntarily pursuant to a pre-arranged plan. When the appellant did not initially arrive at the agreed location, she telephoned him and later joined him. The two travelled together. During the journey and thereafter, they remained together for several days. The prosecutrix alleged that sexual intercourse took place during this period and that the appellant repeatedly postponed marriage. Eventually she stayed in a university hostel and later again met the appellant at a temple. Thereafter she agreed to travel with him towards Ambala for marriage. Before they could proceed further, they were apprehended by police officials and her family members. The father had earlier lodged a complaint alleging that she had been enticed away. Following investigation, charges under Sections 365 and 376 IPC were framed against the appellant. The evidence revealed several important circumstances. The prosecutrix travelled freely with the appellant. She did not raise alarm before strangers, relatives, authorities, or hostel officials during the period she stayed with him. She remained in his company for multiple days and later agreed once again to accompany him for marriage. Medical evidence indicated prior sexual activity. Witness testimony also disclosed inconsistencies regarding the sequence of events. The Court noted contradictions between the statement under Section 164 CrPC and oral testimony before the trial court. These factual elements became central to determining whether the sexual relationship was consensual or obtained through deception. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED ##### i.Whether consent for sexual intercourse obtained on a promise of marriage amounted to consent under law. ##### ii.Whether the promise of marriage was false from the inception. ##### iii.Whether the conduct of the accused attracted **Sections 375 and 376 IPC**. ##### iv.Whether **Section 90 IPC** invalidated the prosecutrix’s consent because of misconception of fact. ##### v.Whether the conviction under Sections 365 and 376 IPC could be sustained on the evidence available. ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS #### i. The counsels for the Appellant submitted that The appellant’s case, as reflected from the evidence considered by the Court, was that the prosecutrix was a major and voluntarily accompanied him. The relationship was consensual. There was no coercion, threat, confinement, or force. The prosecutrix knowingly left her house and travelled with him. She continued to remain in his company for several days. She never complained to any authority despite having multiple opportunities. Her conduct indicated a voluntary romantic association rather than victimization. The appellant further relied upon the surrounding circumstances demonstrating that both intended marriage. The fact that they were proceeding towards Ambala to get married was inconsistent with an allegation that the promise was false from inception. Therefore, the essential ingredients of rape were absent. At most, the case reflected a failed relationship and not a criminal offence under Section 376 IPC. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS #### i. The counsels for the Respondent submitted that The prosecution maintained that the appellant induced the prosecutrix to leave her home by assuring marriage. Sexual intercourse followed because she believed that marriage would take place. The promise, according to the prosecution, was deceptive and therefore her consent was not legally valid. The State argued that sexual relations secured through misrepresentation amounted to rape. The prosecutrix consistently maintained that she had agreed to accompany the appellant because of the expectation of marriage. The prosecution therefore sought affirmation of the conviction recorded by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court. The State relied on the proposition that consent obtained under misconception of fact is not consent in law and consequently the accused was liable under Section 376 IPC. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS #### i. **Section 375 IPC** Defines rape and specifies circumstances where consent is absent or legally ineffective. #### ii. **Section 376 IPC** Provides punishment for rape. #### iii. **Section 90 IPC** Declares that consent given under fear or misconception of fact is not valid consent. #### iv. **Section 417 IPC** Punishes cheating and deception. #### v. **Section 114-A Evidence Act** Creates a presumption regarding absence of consent in specified circumstances. #### vi. **Section 164 CrPC** Relates to recording statements before a Magistrate. The Court particularly focused on the interplay between **Section 90 IPC** and **Section 375 IPC**. It held that consent becomes invalid only where deception exists at the inception and where the accused knows that consent was given solely because of such deception. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT IN THIS CASE #### ***Uday v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 1639*** The Supreme Court held that a consensual relationship between adults does not automatically become rape merely because marriage did not take place. Evidence must establish that the promise was false from inception. This precedent strongly influenced the outcome of the present case. #### ***Deelip Singh @ Dilip Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR 2005 SC 203*** The Court explained Section 90 IPC and clarified that both the victim’s misconception and the accused’s knowledge of that misconception must coexist. The judgment emphasized cumulative satisfaction of both requirements. #### ***Yedla Srinivasa Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2006) 11 SCC 615*** The Court discussed circumstances where consent induced by a fraudulent promise of marriage may amount to rape. The case highlighted the importance of examining the accused’s intention at the initial stage. #### ***Pradeep Kumar Verma v. State of Bihar, AIR 2007 SC 3059*** The Court reiterated that a distinction exists between a false promise and a mere breach of promise. Liability depends on proving fraudulent intent from the beginning. #### ***N. Jaladu, Re, ILR (1913) 36 Mad 453*** The Madras High Court held that consent obtained through misrepresentation may amount to consent under misconception of fact. The Supreme Court relied on this principle while discussing Section 90 IPC. ## J) JUDGMENT #### a. RATIO DECIDENDI The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction. The Court held that the prosecutrix was a major and fully capable of understanding the implications of her conduct. She voluntarily accompanied the appellant. She repeatedly remained with him despite opportunities to leave. She agreed on more than one occasion to travel for marriage. The evidence did not establish that the appellant had made a false promise from the very beginning. Nor was there proof that he never intended to marry her. Consequently, the Court held that her consent could not be treated as consent obtained under misconception of fact. Mere failure to marry does not convert a consensual relationship into rape. Criminal liability arises only where the promise itself was fraudulent at inception. Since such proof was absent, the appellant received the benefit of doubt and was acquitted. The Court drew a crucial distinction between two situations. The first involves a genuine relationship where marriage later becomes impossible because of unforeseen circumstances. The second involves a dishonest promise made solely to obtain sexual access. Only the latter attracts criminal liability for rape. The Court emphasized that judges must carefully scrutinize evidence before concluding that consent was vitiated. Otherwise, every failed relationship may be converted into a criminal prosecution. This reasoning remains one of the most influential aspects of the judgment. #### b. OBITER DICTA The Court delivered significant observations on the nature of rape and consent. It described rape as a grave offence affecting bodily integrity, dignity, and human rights. It emphasized that rape causes enduring psychological and social harm. The Court further observed that consent requires a conscious exercise of choice. It is an act of reason and deliberation. Therefore, courts must carefully distinguish between voluntary intimacy and sexual acts procured through coercion or deception. These observations, though not essential to the final decision, continue to influence later jurisprudence. #### c. GUIDELINES 1. Courts must distinguish between a false promise and a breach of promise. 2. Intention of the accused at the inception is decisive. 3. Mere failure to marry does not establish rape. 4. Consent of a major woman must be assessed from surrounding circumstances. 5. Conduct of parties before and after intercourse is relevant. 6. Section 90 IPC applies only when consent arises from misconception of fact. 7. The prosecution must establish fraudulent intention from the beginning. 8. A genuine relationship that later fails must not automatically attract Section 376 IPC. 9. Courts must evaluate evidence regarding voluntariness and free choice. 10. Criminal law cannot be invoked merely because a romantic relationship collapses. ## K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment occupies a central place in Indian criminal jurisprudence relating to sexual offences. It clarified the legal threshold required to transform a promise of marriage into a criminal charge of rape. The Court resisted a mechanical approach and insisted upon proof of fraudulent intention at the inception of the relationship. This approach sought to balance two competing concerns. One concern was the protection of women from sexual exploitation through deceit. The other was the prevention of criminalisation of every failed relationship. The Court therefore adopted an intention-based test rooted in Section 90 IPC. The decision has subsequently been cited in numerous cases involving allegations of rape based on promises of marriage. Its lasting significance lies in its insistence that courts examine conduct, surrounding circumstances, and the mental state of the accused before recording a conviction. The judgment remains an important authority on consent, deception, and the limits of criminal liability under Indian law. ## L) REFERENCES #### a. Important Cases Referred 1. ***Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana*, (2013) 7 SCC 675.** 2. ***Uday v. State of Karnataka*, AIR 2003 SC 1639.** 3. ***Deelip Singh @ Dilip Kumar v. State of Bihar*, AIR 2005 SC 203.** 4. ***Yedla Srinivasa Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh*, (2006) 11 SCC 615.** 5. ***Pradeep Kumar Verma v. State of Bihar*, AIR 2007 SC 3059.** 6. ***N. Jaladu, Re*, ILR (1913) 36 Mad 453.** #### b. Important Statutes Referred 1. **Indian Penal Code, 1860** - Section 90 - Section 365 - Section 366 - Section 375 - Section 376 - Section 417 2. **Indian Evidence Act, 1872** - Section 114-A 3. **Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973** - Section 164 **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [In Re: Order Dated 17.03.2025 Passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Revision No. 1449/2024 and Ancillary Issues, Suo Motu Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 1/2025](https://lawfoyer.in/in-re-order-dated-17-03-2025-passed-by-the-high-court-of-judicature-at-allahabad-in-criminal-revision-no-1449-2024-and-ancillary-issues-suo-motu-writ-petition-criminal-no-1-2025/) **Published:** May 29, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The present suo motu criminal writ petition before the Supreme Court of India arose from serious concerns regarding judicial observations made by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Revision No. 1449/2024. The matter assumed constitutional significance because the impugned observations allegedly diluted the gravity of offences involving sexual assault and child protection laws. The Supreme Court examined whether judicial reasoning that minimizes allegations of sexual violence undermines statutory protections guaranteed under the Indian Penal Code and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The Court also considered the broader institutional implications of insensitive judicial remarks upon victims, their families, and public confidence in the administration of criminal justice. The Bench stayed the operation of the impugned High Court judgment and directed the Trial Court to continue proceedings treating the accused as summoned under ***Section 376 IPC***, ***Section 511 IPC***, and ***Section 18 of the POCSO Act***. The Court clarified that no final opinion regarding guilt had yet been expressed. The proceedings further expanded into a wider judicial inquiry regarding inappropriate observations by constitutional courts in cases concerning sexual offences. Senior members of the Bar urged the Court to frame judicial guidelines to ensure victim-sensitive adjudication. The Court also sought assistance from the Attorney General and Solicitor General owing to the constitutional importance of the issues involved. ### Keywords Sexual Offences, POCSO Act, Victim Sensitivity, Judicial Discipline, Section 376 IPC, Section 511 IPC, Suo Motu Jurisdiction, Constitutional Morality, Criminal Justice, Fair Trial ## B) CASE DETAILS #### i) Judgement Cause Title ***In Re: Order Dated 17.03.2025 Passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Revision No. 1449/2024 and Ancillary Issues*** #### ii) Case Number Suo Motu Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 1 of 2025 #### iii) Judgement Date 08 December 2025 #### iv) Court Supreme Court of India #### v) Quorum Hon’ble the Chief Justice Hon’ble Mr. Justice Joymalya Bagchi #### vi) Author Per Court Order #### vii) Citation ***In Re: Order Dated 17.03.2025 Passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Revision No. 1449/2024 and Ancillary Issues, Suo Motu Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 1/2025, decided on 08.12.2025*** #### viii) Legal Provisions Involved - ***Section 376, Indian Penal Code, 1860*** - ***Section 511, Indian Penal Code, 1860*** - ***Section 18, Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012*** - ***Article 14, Constitution of India*** - ***Article 15(3), Constitution of India*** - ***Article 21, Constitution of India*** - ***Article 32, Constitution of India*** - ***Sections 164 and 173, Code of Criminal Procedure*** - ***Sections 29 and 30, POCSO Act*** #### ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case No judgment expressly overruled at this interim stage. #### x) Law Subjects Involved Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Child Rights Law, Human Rights Law, Victimology, Gender Justice, Procedural Law #### xi) Name of Counsels Appearing for Parties - Ms. Shobha Gupta, Senior Advocate - Mr. H.S. Phoolka, Senior Advocate - Mr. Bhuwan Ribhu, Advocate - Ms. Rachna Tyagi, Advocate - State Counsel represented by Mr. Sharan Dev Singh Thakur, Senior AAG - Other counsels as recorded in proceedings ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The proceedings emerged from mounting concerns regarding judicial approaches adopted in cases involving allegations of sexual assault against women and children. The Supreme Court initiated suo motu jurisdiction after noticing problematic reasoning in an order passed by the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Revision No. 1449/2024. The controversy reflected a larger institutional issue concerning insensitive observations by courts in matters involving bodily autonomy, sexual dignity, and child protection. Indian constitutional jurisprudence has consistently recognized that crimes of sexual violence constitute violations of fundamental rights guaranteed under ***Article 21 of the Constitution***. The Supreme Court in ***State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384*** emphasized that courts must display utmost sensitivity while evaluating testimony of rape survivors. Similarly, in ***Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Subhra Chakraborty, (1996) 1 SCC 490***, rape was characterized as a crime against basic human rights and constitutional dignity. The background of the case reflects judicial anxiety regarding the social consequences of casual or stereotypical observations made by courts. Such observations often create secondary victimization. The Supreme Court had earlier expressed similar concerns in ***Aparna Bhat v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2021) 3 SCC 247*** where directions were issued prohibiting courts from compelling compromise between accused persons and victims of sexual offences. The present proceedings continue that constitutional trajectory. The Court recognized that insensitive judicial comments may normalize sexual violence and weaken public faith in the criminal justice system. The suo motu nature of proceedings also signifies the Court’s role as constitutional guardian under ***Article 32*** and protector of rule of law principles. The matter therefore extends beyond the individual dispute and addresses institutional standards governing judicial conduct in cases involving vulnerable victims. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The case arose after the Allahabad High Court passed an order dated 17.03.2025 in Criminal Revision No. 1449/2024. The contents of that order reportedly generated widespread concern because the observations allegedly diluted allegations constituting offences under ***Section 376 IPC*** and allied provisions. Subsequently, the Supreme Court took suo motu cognizance and registered Suo Motu Writ Petition (Criminal) No.1/2025. Ancillary proceedings were also tagged with the matter. During the hearing dated 08.12.2025, the State informed the Court that the accused persons had been served notices on two separate occasions but deliberately chose not to appear before the Supreme Court. Counsel appearing for the complainant further informed the Court that the accused persons were actively participating before the Trial Court after obtaining regular bail. This established their knowledge of pending proceedings before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court then directed the State to issue one final communication to the accused regarding pendency of proceedings. Simultaneously, the Court clarified that the matter would not be adjourned repeatedly merely for ensuring their appearance. More importantly, the Court stayed operation of the impugned High Court judgment to prevent prejudice to the victim. It directed that the Trial Court should continue proceedings treating the accused as summoned under ***Section 376 IPC read with Section 511 IPC and Section 18 of the POCSO Act***. However, the Court carefully clarified that no final opinion on guilt had yet been expressed. Senior Advocate Ms. Shobha Gupta also brought to the Court’s attention similar problematic observations made in several other High Court decisions. On that basis, the Supreme Court considered framing broader judicial guidelines regarding adjudication of sexual offence cases. Assistance of the Attorney General and Solicitor General was also sought due to constitutional importance of the matter. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED ##### i. Whether judicial observations minimizing allegations of sexual assault violate constitutional guarantees of dignity and equality? ##### ii. Whether the Supreme Court can exercise suo motu powers to correct systemic judicial insensitivity? ##### iii. Whether trial proceedings should continue despite pendency of challenge to the High Court order? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS #### i. The counsels for Petitioner/Appellant submitted that Counsel appearing for the complainant and supporting parties argued that the impugned High Court observations diluted the seriousness of allegations involving sexual violence and child abuse. They contended that judicial remarks minimizing sexual offences create devastating consequences for victims and discourage reporting of crimes. Reliance was placed upon constitutional principles protecting dignity and bodily autonomy. The submissions reflected reasoning adopted in ***Independent Thought v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 800*** where the Supreme Court recognized bodily integrity of minors as central to constitutional rights. The petitioners argued that judicial language carries institutional authority. Therefore, insensitive reasoning by constitutional courts normalizes harmful stereotypes. The petitioners also submitted that the issue was not isolated. Senior Advocate Ms. Shobha Gupta informed the Court that several High Courts had delivered similarly problematic observations in sexual offence matters. Therefore, the issue demanded systemic correction through judicial guidelines. Reliance could be placed upon ***Aparna Bhat v. State of Madhya Pradesh*** where the Supreme Court prohibited patriarchal conditions in bail orders. It was argued that the judiciary bears a constitutional obligation to avoid victim blaming. The petitioners further urged that offences under ***Section 376 IPC*** and ***Section 18 POCSO Act*** involve severe societal consequences. Any judicial dilution at preliminary stages weakens deterrence and public confidence in criminal justice administration. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS #### i. The counsels for Respondent submitted that The State informed the Court that notices had been served upon accused persons on two occasions. Yet they deliberately avoided appearance before the Supreme Court despite participating before the Trial Court after obtaining regular bail. The State therefore argued that non-appearance was intentional and should not delay proceedings. The prosecution supported continuation of trial proceedings under ***Section 376 IPC***, ***Section 511 IPC***, and ***Section 18 POCSO Act***. It was contended that staying the High Court judgment was necessary to avoid prejudice to the victim and preserve prosecutorial fairness. Potential defence arguments were preserved by the Supreme Court itself. The Court clarified that accused persons retained liberty to raise all defence pleas before the Trial Court. This reflects settled principles of criminal jurisprudence that interim observations should not prejudice fair trial rights. In ***Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158***, the Supreme Court held that fair trial requires fairness both to accused and prosecution. Therefore, while protecting victim interests, procedural fairness toward accused also remained preserved. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS #### i. ***Section 376, Indian Penal Code*** Section 376 criminalizes rape and prescribes punishment for non-consensual sexual intercourse. The provision protects bodily integrity and sexual autonomy. Judicial interpretation in ***Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1*** recognized rape as destruction of personality and dignity. The present case concerns continuation of trial under this provision despite the impugned High Court observations. #### ii. ***Section 511, Indian Penal Code*** Section 511 criminalizes attempts to commit offences punishable with imprisonment for life or other imprisonment. Attempt liability becomes relevant where sexual assault remains incomplete yet demonstrates criminal intent. In ***Abhayanand Mishra v. State of Bihar, AIR 1961 SC 1698***, the Supreme Court explained that attempt begins where preparation ends. The Trial Court was directed to proceed considering applicability of attempt provisions. #### iii. ***Section 18, Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012*** Section 18 punishes attempts to commit offences under the POCSO Act. The provision reflects legislative intent to provide heightened protection to children. In ***Alakh Alok Srivastava v. Union of India, (2018) 17 SCC 291***, the Supreme Court emphasized strict implementation of child protection laws. #### iv. ***Article 21, Constitution of India*** Article 21 guarantees right to life and personal liberty. Judicial interpretation includes dignity, privacy, bodily integrity, and fair treatment of victims. Sexual violence directly infringes these guarantees. The Supreme Court’s intervention in the present case seeks preservation of constitutional dignity. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT IN THIS CASE #### i. ***Aparna Bhat v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2021) 3 SCC 247*** The Supreme Court held that courts must avoid gender stereotypes while adjudicating sexual offence matters. The Court prohibited compromise-oriented bail conditions involving survivors. The precedent supports the need for judicial sensitivity guidelines. #### ii. ***State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384*** The Court emphasized sensitive appreciation of evidence in rape cases. It warned against humiliating survivors during judicial proceedings. This principle is relevant to concerns raised in the present suo motu matter. #### iii. ***Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Subhra Chakraborty, (1996) 1 SCC 490*** Rape was recognized as a violation of fundamental rights and human dignity. The judgment established constitutional dimensions of sexual offences. #### iv. ***Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241*** The Court framed guidelines addressing workplace sexual harassment in absence of legislative safeguards. The present proceedings similarly contemplate institutional judicial guidelines. #### v. ***Nipun Saxena v. Union of India, (2019) 2 SCC 703*** The Court emphasized protection of identity and dignity of rape survivors. The judgment reinforces victim-centric adjudication standards. ## J) JUDGEMENT #### a. RATIO DECIDENDI The Supreme Court held that operation of the impugned High Court judgment must remain stayed to ensure no prejudice is caused to the victim. The Trial Court was directed to proceed treating the accused as summoned under ***Section 376 IPC***, ***Section 511 IPC***, and ***Section 18 POCSO Act***. Simultaneously, the Court clarified that no final opinion regarding guilt had yet been expressed. This balancing approach preserves both victim rights and fair trial guarantees. The Court also recognized broader institutional concerns arising from insensitive judicial observations in sexual offence matters. The proceedings indicate judicial willingness to formulate nationwide standards promoting victim-sensitive adjudication. Seeking assistance from the Attorney General and Solicitor General reflects constitutional seriousness attached to the issue. #### b. OBITER DICTA The Court observed that several High Courts had reportedly made unfortunate observations in sexual offence cases. Such remarks potentially harm victims, families, and society at large. These observations indicate judicial concern regarding institutional accountability and ethical standards in adjudication. #### c. GUIDELINES Though final guidelines were not issued at this interim stage, the proceedings suggest possible principles: - Courts must avoid patriarchal stereotypes. - Judicial orders must preserve dignity of survivors. - Courts should avoid trivializing sexual offences. - Child protection laws require purposive interpretation. - Victim-sensitive language should guide judicial reasoning. - Interim observations must not discourage reporting of offences. - Constitutional morality should prevail over social stereotypes. ## K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The proceedings signify an important constitutional moment in Indian criminal jurisprudence. The Supreme Court transformed an individual grievance into a broader institutional inquiry regarding judicial sensitivity in sexual offence adjudication. Such intervention reflects evolution of Indian victimology jurisprudence. Earlier criminal law emphasized only accused rights. Contemporary constitutional interpretation increasingly recognizes victims as equal stakeholders within criminal justice administration. The present proceedings reinforce that shift. The Court’s insistence upon continuation of trial proceedings under serious penal provisions demonstrates judicial commitment toward preserving prosecutorial integrity in crimes involving sexual violence and child abuse. The matter also illustrates the judiciary’s expanding role in constitutional governance. Similar to ***Vishaka*** and ***Aparna Bhat***, the Court appears prepared to establish normative standards where institutional gaps exist. Judicial observations possess immense social authority. Insensitive remarks may reinforce patriarchal assumptions and discourage survivors from seeking legal remedies. Therefore, constitutional courts must maintain language consistent with dignity, equality, and victim protection. The case may ultimately emerge as a landmark authority governing judicial ethics and victim-sensitive adjudication standards across India. ## L) REFERENCES #### a. Important Cases Referred 1. ***Aparna Bhat v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2021) 3 SCC 247*** 2. ***State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384*** 3. ***Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Subhra Chakraborty, (1996) 1 SCC 490*** 4. ***Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241*** 5. ***Nipun Saxena v. Union of India, (2019) 2 SCC 703*** 6. ***Independent Thought v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 800*** 7. ***Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1*** 8. ***Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158*** 9. ***State of Karnataka v. Shivanna, (2014) 8 SCC 913*** 10. ***Abhayanand Mishra v. State of Bihar, AIR 1961 SC 1698*** #### b. Important Statutes Referred 1. Constitution of India 2. Indian Penal Code, 1860 3. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 4. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 5. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Rachana Gangu v. Union of India 2026 INSC 218](https://lawfoyer.in/rachana-gangu-v-union-of-india-2026-insc-218/) **Published:** May 28, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The decision in Rachana Gangu v. Union of India marked a significant constitutional development concerning vaccine injury compensation and the State’s welfare obligations during public health emergencies. The Supreme Court examined whether the absence of a structured compensation mechanism for persons allegedly suffering serious adverse effects after COVID-19 vaccination violated the guarantee of life and dignity under ***Article 21 of the Constitution of India***. The Court declined to interfere with the scientific framework governing vaccine approval and adverse event monitoring. It accepted the validity of the existing vaccination regime and reiterated the findings earlier recorded in ***Jacob Puliyel v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 533***. However, the Court simultaneously acknowledged that the absence of a uniform institutional redress mechanism left affected families without accessible relief. The judgment expanded the constitutional understanding of the right to health. The Court held that a welfare State cannot remain indifferent when grave injuries allegedly occur during a State-led immunisation programme. It recognised that ordinary civil remedies based on negligence were inadequate in the context of mass vaccination programmes involving complex scientific causation. Drawing support from comparative constitutional practices and international vaccine compensation schemes, the Court directed the Union Government to formulate a **no-fault compensation framework** for serious adverse events following COVID-19 vaccination. The ruling balanced judicial restraint in scientific matters with constitutional accountability in protecting dignity, equality, and welfare. The judgment therefore strengthened India’s constitutional jurisprudence on public health governance, State responsibility, and social justice during emergencies. **Keywords:** COVID-19 Vaccination, Article 21, Right to Health, No-Fault Compensation, Vaccine Injury, Adverse Event Following Immunization (AEFI), Public Health Law, Constitutional Governance ## B) CASE DETAILS #### i) Judgment Cause Title ***Rachana Gangu & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.*** #### ii) Case Number Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1220 of 2021 With Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 16452 of 2023 And Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 1716 of 2023 And Transfer Petition (Civil) Nos. 2289-2294 of 2024 #### iii) Judgment Date 10 March 2026 #### iv) Court Supreme Court of India #### v) Quorum Justice Vikram Nath Justice Sandeep Mehta #### vi) Author Justice Vikram Nath #### vii) Citation 2026 INSC 218 #### viii) Legal Provisions Involved ***Article 14 of the Constitution of India*** ***Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India*** ***Article 21 of the Constitution of India*** ***Article 32 of the Constitution of India*** ***Article 41 of the Constitution of India*** ***Article 47 of the Constitution of India*** ***Section 164 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988*** ***Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940*** #### ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case None #### x) Law Subjects Involved Constitutional Law Public Health Law Administrative Law Human Rights Law Medical Law Tort Law Welfare Jurisprudence ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The litigation emerged from the devastating consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the nationwide vaccination programme implemented by the Union Government. Several petitioners approached constitutional courts alleging that family members suffered fatal or severe medical complications shortly after receiving COVID-19 vaccines. The petitions did not merely challenge individual medical events. They questioned the broader constitutional adequacy of India’s vaccine governance structure. The petitioners argued that despite extensive governmental control over vaccination, there existed no meaningful compensation mechanism for families alleging vaccine-related injuries or deaths. The Court treated these concerns as involving the intersection of public health policy, constitutional welfare obligations, and human dignity. The Court noted that the petitions arose in extraordinary historical circumstances. The nationwide vaccination programme constituted one of the largest public health exercises in India’s history. Millions of citizens received vaccines under an urgent emergency response framework. During this process, concerns surfaced globally regarding rare but severe side effects associated with certain vaccines, particularly thrombosis and thrombocytopenia syndromes linked with AstraZeneca vaccines and their local variants. The petitioners contended that the State failed to adequately disclose risks, ensure transparency, and establish mechanisms for timely relief. The litigation therefore transcended private disputes and evolved into a constitutional examination of whether the State’s obligations under ***Article 21*** required institutional support for persons allegedly injured during a State-sponsored immunisation drive. The Court carefully distinguished between scientific review and constitutional review. It clarified that it would not reassess vaccine efficacy or interfere with expert regulatory approvals. Instead, the constitutional inquiry focused upon whether the State could constitutionally leave affected families without accessible redressal mechanisms. The judgment reflected a delicate judicial balance. It preserved deference toward scientific expertise while simultaneously recognising constitutional duties arising from public health interventions. This dual approach became the central foundation of the Court’s reasoning. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The lead petition involved the tragic deaths of two daughters of the petitioners after receiving COVID-19 vaccinations. One daughter reportedly developed ***Cerebral Venous Sinus Thrombosis (CVST)*** after vaccination and later died. The second daughter allegedly developed ***Multisystem Inflammatory Syndrome*** and also died following inoculation. Similar petitions from Kerala involved deaths and severe injuries allegedly linked to vaccination. These included cases involving thrombocytopenia, intracranial bleeding, paralysis, autoimmune encephalitis, and thrombotic disorders following administration of Covishield vaccines. The Kerala High Court, while considering one such petition in ***Sayeeda K.A. v. Union of India***, directed authorities to formulate a policy for identifying AEFI cases and compensating families of deceased persons. The Union Government challenged this interim order before the Supreme Court through special leave proceedings. Simultaneously, several transfer petitions were filed to consolidate similar matters pending before the Kerala High Court. Consequently, the Supreme Court treated the writ petition under ***Article 32*** as the lead matter for resolving all connected disputes. The petitioners alleged violations of ***Articles 14, 19(1)(a), and 21***. They argued that the vaccination campaign was not genuinely voluntary because governmental restrictions pressured citizens into vaccination. They further alleged suppression of adverse event data, inadequate disclosure of risks, and failure to maintain transparency regarding causality assessments. Particular emphasis was placed on international reports linking AstraZeneca vaccines with rare clotting disorders. The petitioners claimed that despite awareness of these risks, the State continued promoting vaccines without adequate warning mechanisms. The Union Government defended the vaccination regime by emphasising the robust statutory approval framework under the ***Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940***. It highlighted the involvement of expert bodies including the CDSCO, NTAGI, and NEGVAC. The Government further argued that India already possessed a comprehensive AEFI monitoring structure involving scientific experts. It contended that vaccine-related injuries required scientific causation assessments unsuitable for writ jurisdiction. According to the Government, affected persons could pursue ordinary remedies before consumer courts or civil forums. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED ##### i. Whether absence of a uniform compensation policy for vaccine-related deaths and injuries violated ***Article 21 of the Constitution***? ##### ii. Whether the Supreme Court could direct the Union Government to formulate a no-fault compensation framework? ##### iii. Whether existing AEFI monitoring mechanisms were constitutionally adequate? ##### iv. Whether constitutional courts should interfere in scientific and regulatory vaccine determinations? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The petitioners argued that the State violated constitutional guarantees by conducting a nationwide vaccination programme without ensuring adequate safeguards for affected citizens. They contended that vaccination was effectively compulsory because restrictions on travel and access to services pressured citizens into inoculation. Therefore, the State assumed a corresponding obligation to compensate persons suffering grave consequences. The petitioners invoked ***Article 21*** and argued that bodily autonomy and informed consent were undermined through misleading assurances regarding vaccine safety. They specifically criticised public statements declaring vaccines “110% safe.” The petitioners further argued that the Government failed to maintain transparency concerning adverse event data. They relied heavily upon international developments where several European nations restricted AstraZeneca vaccines after reports of thrombosis and thrombocytopenia syndromes. According to them, Indian authorities withheld crucial information necessary for informed decision-making. They alleged that the Government failed to establish publicly accessible causality assessment databases despite directions issued in ***Jacob Puliyel v. Union of India***. This alleged opacity violated ***Article 19(1)(a)***, which includes the right to receive information. The petitioners also contended that ordinary negligence-based litigation could not provide effective remedies in vaccine injury cases. Scientific causation is inherently difficult to establish. Most affected families lacked financial or technical resources to engage in prolonged litigation. Therefore, constitutional courts had a duty to ensure accessible and equitable relief. They relied upon welfare principles embedded in ***Articles 41 and 47*** and argued that public health programmes impose reciprocal obligations upon the State. The petitioners ultimately sought an independent expert committee and a comprehensive compensation framework. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The Union Government strongly defended the vaccination programme and argued that all approvals complied with statutory and scientific procedures. It relied extensively upon ***Jacob Puliyel v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 533***, where the Supreme Court had already upheld the legality of vaccine approvals. The respondents argued that expert bodies including CDSCO, NTAGI, and NEGVAC scrutinised all scientific data before granting approvals. Therefore, the Court should avoid substituting judicial opinion for scientific expertise. The respondents further submitted that India possessed a well-established AEFI surveillance system functioning for over a decade. They explained that serious adverse events were investigated by State and National AEFI Committees comprising medical experts. Additional specialists including neurologists and cardiologists were included due to the pandemic’s unique nature. The Government also emphasised that causality assessment reports were publicly available on the Ministry of Health website. Posters and advisories explaining risks and benefits were displayed at vaccination centres nationwide. The Government additionally argued that thrombosis-related adverse events remained extremely rare in India. Statistical evidence indicated that TTS occurrences constituted only 0.001 cases per lakh doses administered. According to the respondents, allowing independent judicially supervised inquiries would undermine public confidence in vaccination systems and damage public health interests. Finally, the Government contended that compensation claims belonged within ordinary civil or consumer law mechanisms rather than writ jurisdiction. Manufacturers enjoyed no immunity in India. Therefore, affected individuals could pursue negligence claims before appropriate forums. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS #### i. ***Article 21 of the Constitution of India*** The Court treated Article 21 as encompassing the right to health, dignity, bodily integrity, and access to institutional welfare protections. Reliance was placed upon ***Parmanand Katara v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 248***, ***State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh Chawla, (1997) 2 SCC 83***, and ***State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga, (1998) 4 SCC 117***. These decisions established that healthcare obligations form part of constitutional governance. #### ii. ***Article 14 of the Constitution*** The Court observed that forcing families into fragmented negligence litigation could create inconsistent outcomes and unequal access to remedies. Absence of structured relief therefore implicated equality concerns. #### iii. ***Article 41 and Article 47*** The judgment significantly relied upon Directive Principles of State Policy. Article 41 contemplates public assistance during sickness and disablement. Article 47 imposes duties concerning public health improvement. The Court used these provisions to strengthen welfare-based constitutional interpretation. #### iv. ***Section 164 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988*** The Court drew analogy from statutory no-fault liability principles. Section 164 imposes compensation obligations irrespective of fault. The Court used this framework to justify vaccine compensation schemes. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT IN THIS CASE #### i. ***Jacob Puliyel v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 533*** The Court reaffirmed that vaccine approvals complied with statutory procedures. The judgment also recognised existing AEFI surveillance systems and emphasised transparency regarding adverse event data. The present case relied heavily upon Jacob Puliyel to avoid reopening scientific disputes. #### ii. ***Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, (1989) 3 SCC 38*** The Court referred to the Bhopal Gas Tragedy judgment to highlight constitutional compassion and institutional responsibility toward victims of mass harm. The precedent reinforced the judiciary’s humanitarian role during catastrophic events. #### iii. ***Distribution of Essential Supplies and Services During Pandemic, In re, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 372*** The Court cited this case to reaffirm that executive actions during emergencies remain subject to constitutional scrutiny. Public health emergencies cannot justify arbitrary governance. #### iv. ***Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2020 SC 4601*** This precedent established that pandemic-related policies must satisfy proportionality standards. The Court used it to balance executive discretion with constitutional accountability. #### v. ***Gaurav Kumar Bansal v. Union of India, W.P.(C) No. 539/2021*** The Court relied upon this decision concerning ex-gratia compensation for COVID-19 deaths. It demonstrated that constitutional courts may direct policy formulation where absence of relief mechanisms threatens dignity and welfare. ## J) JUDGEMENT #### a. RATIO DECIDENDI The Supreme Court held that although scientific causation assessments fall within executive and expert domains, the Constitution imposes positive welfare obligations upon the State where harm allegedly arises during a State-led public health intervention. The Court recognised that absence of any structured compensation mechanism for serious vaccine-related injuries violated constitutional expectations under ***Article 21***. It therefore directed the Union Government to formulate a no-fault compensation framework for serious adverse events following COVID-19 vaccination. The Court clarified that no-fault compensation does not amount to admission of negligence. Instead, it reflects constitutional solidarity and welfare obligations in exceptional circumstances. The judgment balanced judicial restraint regarding scientific matters with constitutional intervention concerning institutional welfare mechanisms. #### b. OBITER DICTA The Court observed that constitutional governance requires transparency in public health administration. It reiterated earlier directions requiring accessible reporting mechanisms for adverse events and public dissemination of causality assessments. The Court also acknowledged comparative international practices recognising vaccine injury compensation schemes. #### c. GUIDELINES i. The Union Government shall frame a no-fault compensation policy for serious adverse events following COVID-19 vaccination. ii. Existing AEFI monitoring mechanisms shall continue functioning. iii. Relevant adverse event data shall be periodically placed in the public domain. iv. No separate court-appointed expert body is required. v. Aggrieved persons remain free to pursue alternative legal remedies. ## K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment represents a transformative development in Indian public health constitutionalism. The Court consciously avoided entering scientific controversies concerning vaccine efficacy. Yet it simultaneously refused to permit constitutional invisibility of affected families. The recognition that welfare obligations survive even absent proof of fault constitutes the most important contribution of this decision. The Court effectively constitutionalised the concept of no-fault vaccine compensation within India’s welfare jurisprudence. The ruling also demonstrates the gradual evolution of ***Article 21*** from a negative liberty guarantee into a framework imposing affirmative duties upon the State. Earlier health rights cases primarily focused upon access to treatment and emergency care. This judgment extends constitutional protection into the domain of institutional compensation for harms arising during public welfare programmes. The reasoning aligns Indian jurisprudence with comparative international practices while retaining constitutional specificity grounded in Directive Principles. Another important dimension concerns separation of powers. The Court exercised calibrated restraint by refusing independent scientific inquiries or judicial substitution of medical expertise. Simultaneously, it affirmed that constitutional courts may intervene where absence of policy frameworks undermines dignity and equality. This balance strengthens democratic accountability without judicial overreach. The judgment may influence future litigation involving mass public health programmes, pharmaceutical regulation, disaster compensation, and welfare obligations during emergencies. It reinforces the constitutional principle that citizens participating in collective public welfare initiatives cannot be abandoned when grave harm allegedly results. The decision therefore deepens the constitutional relationship between public health governance and human dignity in India. ## L) REFERENCES #### a. Important Cases Referred 1. ***Jacob Puliyel v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 533*** 2. ***Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, (1989) 3 SCC 38*** 3. ***Parmanand Katara v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 248*** 4. ***State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh Chawla, (1997) 2 SCC 83*** 5. ***State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga, (1998) 4 SCC 117*** 6. ***Distribution of Essential Supplies and Services During Pandemic, In re, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 372*** 7. ***Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2020 SC 4601*** 8. ***Gaurav Kumar Bansal v. Union of India, W.P.(C) No. 539/2021*** #### b. Important Statutes Referred 1. ***Constitution of India*** 2. ***Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940*** 3. ***Motor Vehicles Act, 1988*** 4. ***World Health Organization Guidelines on Adverse Events Following Immunization***. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Pawan Khera v. State of Assam SLP (Crl.) No. 7786 of 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/pawan-khera-v-state-of-assam-slp-crl-no-7786-of-2026/) **Published:** May 28, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The decision in Pawan Khera vs State of Assam concerned the exercise of criminal jurisdiction against political speech and the limits of anticipatory protection under criminal law. The matter arose from proceedings initiated before the Gauhati High Court in Anticipatory Bail No. 804 of 2026. The petitioner challenged the refusal of anticipatory relief and approached the Supreme Court through Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 7786 of 2026. The Supreme Court, comprising **Justice J.K. Maheshwari** and **Justice Atul S. Chandurkar**, granted leave and allowed the appeal through a signed reportable order. The proceedings assumed constitutional importance because they involved alleged criminal prosecution connected with public political expression. The case also reflected the continuing judicial concern regarding misuse of criminal process against opposition leaders, journalists, and public commentators. The Court’s intervention demonstrated the constitutional balance between free speech under ***Article 19(1)(a)*** of the Constitution and reasonable restrictions under ***Article 19(2)***. The matter additionally implicated principles of personal liberty under ***Article 21***, procedural fairness, and safeguards against arbitrary arrest. The Supreme Court’s decision to allow the appeal indicated dissatisfaction with the approach adopted by the High Court while dealing with anticipatory protection and criminal prosecution. The judgment therefore contributes to Indian constitutional criminal jurisprudence concerning political dissent, free expression, and judicial scrutiny of prosecutorial action. **Keywords:** Free Speech, Anticipatory Bail, Political Speech, Article 19(1)(a), Criminal Process, Personal Liberty, Supreme Court, Constitutional Law ## B) CASE DETAILS #### i) Judgment Cause Title ***Pawan Khera v. State of Assam*** #### ii) Case Number Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 7786 of 2026 #### iii) Judgment Date 30 April 2026 #### iv) Court Supreme Court of India #### v) Quorum **Hon’ble Mr. Justice J.K. Maheshwari** **Hon’ble Mr. Justice Atul S. Chandurkar** #### vi) Author Justice J.K. Maheshwari #### vii) Citation *Pawan Khera v. State of Assam*, SLP (Crl.) No. 7786/2026, decided on 30 April 2026 #### viii) Legal Provisions Involved ***Articles 14, 19(1)(a), 19(2), and 21 of the Constitution of India*** ***Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*** Relevant provisions concerning criminal defamation, public mischief, and political speech under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita or Indian Penal Code framework, depending on the prosecution allegations. #### ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case No express overruling appears from the available order. #### x) Case Related to Which Law Subjects Constitutional Law Criminal Law Criminal Procedure Media and Speech Law Civil Liberties Jurisprudence #### xi) Name of Counsels Appearing for Parties For Petitioner: Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Senior Advocate Mr. Salman Khurshid, Senior Advocate Mr. Harin Raval, Senior Advocate along with other appearing advocates. For Respondent: Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General Mr. S.V. Raju, Additional Solicitor General Mr. Devajit Saikia, Senior Advocate along with other appearing advocates. ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The case emerged within the broader constitutional debate surrounding criminal prosecution arising from political statements. Indian constitutional jurisprudence consistently recognizes political criticism as the lifeblood of democracy. However, criminal complaints are frequently invoked against political actors through allegations of defamation, promoting enmity, public mischief, or insulting constitutional authorities. The present matter arose when criminal proceedings were initiated against political spokesperson Pawan Khera. The Gauhati High Court refused anticipatory protection. The petitioner then approached the Supreme Court challenging the legality and proportionality of such refusal. The Supreme Court’s intervention reflected the judicial obligation to protect personal liberty from arbitrary arrest. The constitutional foundation for such protection lies in ****Article 21****. The jurisprudence developed in ****Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565**** established that anticipatory bail constitutes a procedural safeguard preserving individual freedom against abuse of criminal process. The Court in *Sibbia* rejected narrow interpretations of anticipatory bail and emphasized that liberty cannot depend upon arbitrary police discretion. This principle remains foundational in Indian criminal jurisprudence. The present case therefore formed part of a continuing judicial effort to ensure that criminal law does not become an instrument of political intimidation. The matter also implicated democratic speech protections. Political expression occupies a preferred constitutional position. In ****Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1****, the Supreme Court emphasized that mere annoyance, inconvenience, or unpopular expression cannot justify criminal restriction unless it directly falls within the constitutional limits under ****Article 19(2)****. The criminal prosecution of political speech therefore demands heightened constitutional scrutiny. The Supreme Court’s decision to allow the appeal suggested recognition of these constitutional concerns. The order further reflected judicial awareness that arrest and investigation themselves may become punitive processes even before trial begins. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The petitioner, Pawan Khera, approached the Supreme Court after the Gauhati High Court rejected anticipatory relief in Anticipatory Bail No. 804 of 2026. The High Court order dated 24 April 2026 became the subject matter of challenge before the Supreme Court through Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 7786 of 2026. The criminal proceedings allegedly arose from public statements made by the petitioner in his political capacity. The prosecution appears to have treated the speech as constituting criminal misconduct warranting custodial action. The petitioner argued that the prosecution represented an attempt to suppress political criticism through criminal law. The defense likely emphasized that the alleged statements formed part of political discourse protected under constitutional guarantees. Senior counsels including Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi and Salman Khurshid represented the petitioner before the Supreme Court. Their appearance reflected the constitutional importance attached to the matter. The State of Assam opposed the petition through the Solicitor General and Additional Solicitor General. The prosecution presumably argued that the statements crossed permissible constitutional limits and justified criminal investigation. The conflict therefore involved competing constitutional interests. One side invoked free political speech and liberty. The other relied upon the State’s authority to regulate unlawful speech and maintain public order. After hearing both sides, the Supreme Court granted leave and allowed the appeal in terms of a signed reportable order. Although the uploaded extract does not contain the detailed signed judgment, the allowance of the appeal indicates that the Court found merit in the petitioner’s challenge to the High Court decision. The Supreme Court’s approach reflected constitutional caution against excessive criminalization of political expression. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED ##### i) Whether criminal prosecution arising from political speech violates **Article 19(1)(a)** of the Constitution. ##### ii) Whether refusal of anticipatory bail violated the petitioner’s fundamental right to personal liberty under **Article 21**. ##### iii) Whether custodial interrogation was necessary in a case concerning political expression. ##### iv) Whether criminal law was invoked disproportionately against democratic dissent. ##### v) Whether the Gauhati High Court correctly exercised jurisdiction while refusing anticipatory protection. ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS #### i) The counsels for Petitioner submitted that The petitioner argued that the prosecution amounted to political vendetta disguised as criminal law enforcement. The defense likely emphasized that political speech enjoys the highest degree of constitutional protection in democratic societies. Reliance would have been placed upon ****Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1**** where the Supreme Court held that advocacy and discussion remain constitutionally protected unless they amount to incitement. The petitioner probably contended that his remarks neither threatened public order nor constituted incitement to violence. Therefore, criminal prosecution lacked constitutional legitimacy. The petitioner further argued that anticipatory bail jurisprudence protects citizens against arbitrary arrest. Heavy reliance would have been placed upon ****Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565**** and ****Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1****. In *Sushila Aggarwal*, the Constitution Bench clarified that anticipatory bail should not ordinarily be restricted by narrow conditions and that liberty remains central to criminal justice. The petitioner likely argued that custodial interrogation was unnecessary because the allegations concerned public speech already available in the public domain. The defense probably emphasized the chilling effect produced by criminal prosecution against opposition leaders. The Supreme Court in ****Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124**** recognized that free political discussion forms the foundation of democracy. The petitioner would have argued that criminal complaints filed across jurisdictions create harassment and suppress dissent. Such misuse undermines constitutional democracy and transforms criminal procedure into punishment itself. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS #### i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that The State likely argued that freedom of speech is not absolute and remains subject to restrictions under ****Article 19(2)****. The prosecution probably contended that the petitioner’s statements exceeded constitutional boundaries and possessed the potential to disturb public order or undermine institutional dignity. Reliance may have been placed upon decisions recognizing that speech capable of promoting disorder may legitimately attract criminal consequences. The State further likely argued that anticipatory bail remains discretionary. Reliance could have been placed upon ****State represented by the CBI v. Anil Sharma, (1997) 7 SCC 187**** where the Supreme Court observed that custodial interrogation may sometimes become necessary for effective investigation. The prosecution probably maintained that the seriousness of allegations justified denial of pre-arrest protection. The respondents may also have argued that public personalities carry heightened responsibility because their statements possess wider influence. Political leaders can significantly affect public opinion. Therefore, allegedly offensive or inflammatory remarks require careful scrutiny. The State likely maintained that judicial interference at an early stage could obstruct legitimate investigation. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS #### i) **Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India** This provision guarantees freedom of speech and expression. Political speech occupies the highest constitutional value because democracy depends upon criticism of government and public institutions. #### ii) **Article 19(2)** This provision permits reasonable restrictions concerning sovereignty, integrity, public order, decency, morality, contempt of court, defamation, and incitement to offences. The Supreme Court consistently insists that such restrictions must be narrowly construed. #### iii) **Article 21** This article guarantees personal liberty. Arbitrary arrest violates constitutional due process. The jurisprudence developed after ****Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248**** expanded procedural fairness protections. #### iv) **Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973** This provision governs anticipatory bail. It protects individuals against unnecessary arrest where accusations appear motivated, exaggerated, or politically driven. #### v) Criminal Defamation and Public Order Provisions The prosecution may have invoked provisions concerning defamation, public mischief, or intentional insult. However, courts repeatedly emphasize proportionality while applying criminal sanctions to speech. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT IN THIS CASE #### i) ****Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565**** The Supreme Court held that anticipatory bail protects personal liberty against arbitrary arrest. The judgment rejected rigid limitations upon judicial discretion. #### ii) ****Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1**** The Constitution Bench held that anticipatory bail should not ordinarily be time-bound. The Court emphasized liberty and fair investigation. #### iii) ****Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1**** The Court invalidated Section 66A of the Information Technology Act. It protected online and political speech against vague criminal restrictions. #### iv) ****Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248**** The Court expanded the meaning of personal liberty and procedural fairness under ****Article 21****. #### v) ****Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124**** The Court recognized freedom of political discussion as essential for democratic governance. # J) JUDGMENT #### a) RATIO DECIDENDI #### i) The Supreme Court granted leave and allowed the appeal through a signed reportable order. The decision implied that the High Court erred in refusing anticipatory protection. The ruling reinforced constitutional safeguards protecting liberty and democratic speech. The Court’s approach aligned with established jurisprudence discouraging arbitrary arrest in cases involving public expression and political criticism. #### ii) The judgment reaffirmed that criminal law cannot become a weapon against dissent. Judicial scrutiny becomes stricter where prosecution arises from political expression. Liberty under ****Article 21**** requires courts to examine whether custodial interrogation is genuinely necessary. #### b) OBITER DICTA #### i) The order indicates broader judicial concern regarding misuse of criminal proceedings against political opponents. Such observations align with earlier Supreme Court warnings against converting criminal process into punitive harassment. #### c) GUIDELINES #### i) Courts must carefully scrutinize criminal complaints involving political speech. #### ii) Arrest should remain the last option where allegations concern public statements. #### iii) Anticipatory bail jurisprudence must prioritize liberty and constitutional proportionality. #### iv) Investigative agencies cannot use criminal process for political intimidation. ## K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The decision in Pawan Khera vs State of Assam reinforces the constitutional commitment toward democratic dissent and personal liberty. The Supreme Court’s intervention signaled judicial unwillingness to permit criminal law becoming an instrument for suppressing opposition speech. The allowance of the appeal demonstrated fidelity to constitutional principles established in *Sibbia*, *Shreya Singhal*, and *Maneka Gandhi*. The ruling also reflected the Court’s continuing concern regarding arbitrary arrest practices. The judgment contributes significantly to the evolving jurisprudence surrounding political expression in India. Democratic governance depends upon open criticism and public debate. Criminal prosecution of political speech therefore requires heightened constitutional caution. The Supreme Court’s approach reaffirmed that liberty remains central to criminal justice administration. Arrest cannot become a substitute for investigation. Constitutional courts must remain vigilant where criminal process intersects with political rivalry and democratic participation. ## L) REFERENCES #### a) Important Cases Referred 1. \****Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab*, (1980) 2 SCC 565** 2. \****Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi)*, (2020) 5 SCC 1** 3. \****Shreya Singhal v. Union of India*, (2015) 5 SCC 1** 4. \****Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India*, (1978) 1 SCC 248** 5. \****Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras*, AIR 1950 SC 124** 6. \****State represented by the CBI v. Anil Sharma*, (1997) 7 SCC 187** #### b) Important Statutes Referred 1. ****Constitution of India**** 2. ****Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973**** 3. ****Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023**** 4. ****Indian Penal Code, 1860**** 5. ****Information Technology Act, 2000****. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Harish Rana v. Union of India 2026 SCC OnLine SC 358](https://lawfoyer.in/harish-rana-v-union-of-india-2026-scc-online-sc-358/) **Published:** May 28, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The decision in Harish Rana v. Union of India marks a transformative constitutional development in Indian euthanasia jurisprudence. The Supreme Court extensively revisited the principles laid down in ****Common Cause v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 1**** and clarified the constitutional legality of withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from patients in a Permanent Vegetative State (PVS). The Court dealt with the case of Harish Rana, a young man who remained in an irreversible vegetative condition for nearly thirteen years following a traumatic brain injury. The judgment examined whether Clinically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration (CANH), administered through a PEG tube, constituted “medical treatment” capable of lawful withdrawal under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court analysed dignity, autonomy, bodily integrity, privacy, medical ethics, and the doctrine of best interests. It distinguished active euthanasia from passive euthanasia through constitutional reasoning rooted in omission versus causation. The judgment also harmonised Indian constitutional law with comparative jurisprudence from the United Kingdom, the United States, Ireland, Italy, Australia, New Zealand, and the European Court of Human Rights. The Court ultimately held that CANH constitutes medical treatment and may be withdrawn when continuation becomes medically futile and contrary to the patient’s best interests. The ruling further streamlined the procedural safeguards laid down in ****Common Cause**** and urged Parliament to enact comprehensive legislation governing end-of-life care and passive euthanasia. **Keywords:** Passive Euthanasia, Article 21, Right to Die with Dignity, Clinically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration (CANH), Persistent Vegetative State (PVS), Best Interest Principle, Medical Futility, Advance Medical Directives, Constitutional Morality, Bodily Integrity. ## B) CASE DETAILS #### i) Judgment Cause Title ****Harish Rana v. Union of India & Ors.**** #### ii) Case Number Miscellaneous Application No. 2238 of 2025 in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 18225 of 2024 #### iii) Judgment Date 11 March 2026 #### iv) Court Supreme Court of India #### v) Quorum Justice J.B. Pardiwala #### vi) Author Justice J.B. Pardiwala #### vii) Citation 2026 INSC 222 #### viii) Legal Provisions Involved ****Article 21 of the Constitution of India**** ****Article 226 of the Constitution of India**** ****Indian Penal Code provisions concerning culpable homicide and abetment of suicide**** ****Common Cause v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 1**** ****Common Cause v. Union of India, (2023) 14 SCC 131**** #### ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case No judgment was expressly overruled. The decision clarified and expanded the operational framework of ****Common Cause (2018)****. #### x) Related Law Subjects Constitutional Law Medical Law Human Rights Law Bioethics Health Law Administrative Law Jurisprudence Comparative Constitutional Law #### xi) Name of Counsels Appearing for Parties For Applicant: Ms. Rashmi Nandakumar and team. For Respondents: Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, Additional Solicitor General and team. ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The judgment emerged from one of the most sensitive constitutional questions concerning the meaning of life, dignity, suffering, and death under Indian constitutional jurisprudence. The case concerned a young engineering student who suffered catastrophic neurological injuries after falling from the fourth floor of his accommodation in 2013. The injuries caused diffuse axonal damage and resulted in a permanent vegetative state. For thirteen years, the applicant survived through continuous medical intervention including tracheostomy, PEG tube feeding, catheterisation, anti-seizure medications, and intensive nursing care. The Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether continuation of such artificial support served any legitimate constitutional or medical purpose. The matter acquired immense constitutional significance because the Court had previously recognised the legality of passive euthanasia in ****Common Cause v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 1****. However, implementation challenges persisted. Hospitals remained uncertain regarding the withdrawal of CANH and feared criminal liability. Families lacked procedural guidance. Doctors often avoided decision-making because of legal ambiguity. The Court therefore considered this case not merely as an individual tragedy but as a constitutional opportunity to streamline India’s end-of-life jurisprudence. The judgment extensively interpreted dignity under ****Article 21**** and expanded constitutional discourse regarding autonomy, bodily integrity, and medical futility. It also integrated comparative foreign jurisprudence to establish a coherent legal framework. The Court recognised that modern medicine possesses the capacity to artificially prolong biological existence even where consciousness, cognition, and recovery are irreversibly absent. This technological advancement created profound ethical dilemmas. The Court observed that constitutional law cannot reduce life to mere biological persistence. Instead, constitutional protection must preserve dignity and meaningful existence. The judgment therefore sought to reconcile sanctity of life with quality of life. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed that constitutional morality requires compassion, proportionality, and respect for human suffering. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The applicant, Harish Rana, was a B.Tech student at Punjab University when he suffered a devastating accident on 20 August 2013. He fell from the fourth floor of his accommodation and sustained severe diffuse axonal injury. Initially admitted to a local hospital, he was later shifted to PGI Chandigarh because of the gravity of his condition. Medical treatment included ventilatory support, tracheostomy, antibiotics, analgesics, anti-epileptic medication, and nasogastric feeding. Despite intensive treatment, his neurological condition never improved. He remained unconscious and fully dependent upon artificial support for survival. Subsequently, his feeding mechanism was converted from a nasogastric tube to a surgically implanted PEG tube. He required periodic replacement of the PEG tube every two months. He remained bedridden and developed recurrent infections, pneumonia, bedsores, muscular contractures, and seizures. Medical reports consistently certified him as being in a Persistent Vegetative State with 100% permanent disability. Doctors observed that he exhibited no awareness, no purposeful movement, no response to pain, and no communicative ability. He remained dependent upon continuous nursing care from his parents for over thirteen years. The family repeatedly attempted rehabilitative therapies including hyperbaric oxygen treatment but no improvement occurred. The applicant’s parents approached the Delhi High Court under ****Article 226**** seeking constitution of medical boards in accordance with ****Common Cause (2018)**** for evaluating withdrawal of medical treatment. The High Court rejected the plea holding that the applicant was not mechanically ventilated and therefore judicial intervention was unnecessary. Aggrieved by the decision, the family approached the Supreme Court. Initially, the Supreme Court directed continued state-funded home care. However, worsening medical deterioration prompted filing of the present Miscellaneous Application seeking recognition that CANH constituted medical treatment capable of lawful withdrawal. The Supreme Court thereafter directed constitution of primary and secondary medical boards. Both boards unanimously concluded that the applicant suffered irreversible brain damage with negligible possibility of recovery. Doctors opined that continuation of CANH merely prolonged biological existence without therapeutic benefit. The family consistently expressed that continuation of treatment only extended suffering and indignity. The Court personally interacted with the parents and siblings who emotionally conveyed that the applicant no longer possessed any meaningful existence. The Additional Solicitor General also supported withdrawal of treatment after consultations with medical experts. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED ##### i. **Whether** Clinically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration (CANH) **administered through a PEG tube constitutes “medical treatment”.** ##### ii. Whether withdrawal or withholding of CANH amounts to passive euthanasia permissible under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. ##### iii. What is the meaning and scope of the “best interests of the patient” principle. ##### iv. Whether continuation of artificial life support in an irreversible PVS violates dignity under Article 21. ##### v. Whether the existing procedural framework under Common Cause (2018) required modification and streamlining. ##### vi. Whether legislative intervention was necessary for regulating end-of-life care and passive euthanasia. ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS #### i. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that The applicant argued that the continuation of PEG-based CANH amounted to continuation of life-sustaining medical treatment. Counsel relied heavily upon ****Common Cause v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 1**** wherein the Supreme Court recognised feeding tubes as forms of artificial life support. It was argued that modern constitutional jurisprudence recognises the distinction between preserving life and artificially prolonging biological existence without dignity. The applicant contended that Article 21 guarantees dignity, bodily integrity, privacy, and freedom from inhuman suffering. Therefore, forcing continuation of medically futile treatment violated constitutional morality itself. The applicant further argued that the High Court had fundamentally misunderstood the legal framework established in ****Common Cause****. Passive euthanasia did not depend solely upon mechanical ventilation. Rather, any artificial intervention sustaining life fell within the doctrine. Reliance was placed upon ****Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland, (1993) All ER 821**** where the House of Lords held that artificial nutrition and hydration constituted medical treatment capable of withdrawal. Counsel also cited comparative jurisprudence from the United Kingdom recognising that continuation of CANH in irreversible PVS patients may violate best interests and dignity. The applicant stressed that the proper constitutional inquiry was not whether death should occur, but whether continued artificial prolongation of biological existence served the patient’s interests. It was argued that treatment had become medically futile. Doctors unanimously certified irreversibility. Family members consistently expressed that the applicant would never have wished to remain in such a condition. Counsel also highlighted implementation failures of ****Common Cause**** guidelines. Hospitals lacked clarity. Doctors feared prosecution. Families suffered unnecessary procedural barriers. Therefore, the Court was requested to streamline the procedural framework and direct governments to institutionalise end-of-life care mechanisms. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS #### i. The counsels for Respondent submitted that The Union of India substantially supported the constitutional permissibility of passive euthanasia within the framework already recognised by the Supreme Court. The Additional Solicitor General submitted that passive euthanasia involves withdrawal or withholding of futile treatment where no therapeutic benefit remains. Such withdrawal differs fundamentally from active euthanasia because it allows natural death to occur rather than causing death through a positive act. The Union further accepted that CANH administered through a PEG tube constitutes medical treatment. Reliance was placed upon ****Common Cause (2018)**** and the reasoning of ****Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland****. It was argued that artificial feeding through invasive medical devices cannot be classified as ordinary care. Instead, it represents technologically sustained intervention. Withdrawal of such intervention merely allows the underlying disease process to take its natural course. The respondents also emphasised the findings of the medical boards. Both boards concluded that the applicant’s condition was irreversible and medically futile. The doctors unanimously opined that continuation of treatment offered no possibility of neurological recovery. The Union therefore submitted that constitutional compassion and medical ethics justified withdrawal of CANH. Simultaneously, the Union requested that palliative care and humane support continue during implementation to ensure dignity and comfort. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS #### i. ****Article 21 of the Constitution of India**** formed the constitutional foundation of the judgment. The Court interpreted the right to life as including dignity, bodily integrity, privacy, autonomy, and the right to die with dignity in situations of irreversible terminal suffering. #### ii. ****Article 226 of the Constitution of India**** was discussed regarding the supervisory jurisdiction of High Courts in passive euthanasia cases where disagreements arise between medical boards. #### iii. The Court analysed principles underlying ****Sections 299, 300, 306 and 309 of the Indian Penal Code**** to distinguish lawful withdrawal of treatment from unlawful causation of death or abetment of suicide. #### iv. The Court also referred extensively to international medical ethics principles including patient autonomy, informed consent, beneficence, non-maleficence, and best interest standards recognised globally. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT IN THIS CASE #### ****Common Cause v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 1**** The Constitution Bench recognised passive euthanasia and Advance Medical Directives under Article 21. The Court held that dignity continues until natural death and may justify withdrawal of futile treatment. #### ****Common Cause v. Union of India, (2023) 14 SCC 131**** The Court streamlined procedural safeguards laid down in the 2018 judgment and reduced procedural barriers affecting implementation. #### ****Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1996) 2 SCC 648**** The Constitution Bench held that Article 21 does not include a general right to die. However, it recognised a limited right to die with dignity where natural death has commenced. #### ****Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland, (1993) All ER 821**** The House of Lords recognised withdrawal of artificial feeding from a patient in PVS. It distinguished between causing death and allowing death to occur naturally. #### ****Rodriguez v. Attorney General of Canada**** The Canadian Supreme Court distinguished active and passive euthanasia through intention and causation principles. #### ****Vacco v. Quill**** The United States Supreme Court distinguished withdrawal of treatment from physician-assisted suicide based on causation and constitutional reasoning. ## J) JUDGMENT #### a. RATIO DECIDENDI #### i. The Supreme Court held that ****Clinically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration (CANH)**** administered through a PEG tube constitutes medical treatment. Therefore, withdrawal of CANH falls within the constitutional doctrine of passive euthanasia recognised in ****Common Cause (2018)****. #### ii. The Court clarified that passive euthanasia involves allowing natural death to occur through omission of futile treatment, whereas active euthanasia involves introducing a new external agency causing death. #### iii. The Court held that Article 21 protects not merely biological existence but dignified existence. Therefore, continuation of medically futile treatment in irreversible PVS may violate constitutional dignity. #### iv. The Court recognised that the “best interests of the patient” principle includes both medical and non-medical considerations including dignity, suffering, autonomy, quality of life, and family perspectives. #### v. The Court streamlined the procedural framework under ****Common Cause**** by clarifying constitution of medical boards, roles of doctors, home-care scenarios, reconsideration periods, and limited judicial oversight. #### b. OBITER DICTA #### i. The Court observed that modern medicine’s capacity to indefinitely prolong biological existence creates profound ethical and constitutional dilemmas requiring compassionate legal responses. #### ii. The Court stressed that dignity is the normative foundation of all fundamental rights and cannot be separated from end-of-life care jurisprudence. #### iii. The Court criticised continued legislative inaction despite repeated judicial directions and Law Commission recommendations regarding euthanasia legislation. #### c. GUIDELINES #### i. Primary and secondary medical boards must assess irreversible conditions objectively and independently. #### ii. Doctors acting in accordance with procedural safeguards shall receive legal protection. #### iii. Governments must create mechanisms for constitution of medical boards even for home-care patients. #### iv. Chief Medical Officers must nominate qualified medical practitioners for secondary boards. #### v. Hospitals must institutionalise palliative and end-of-life care mechanisms. #### vi. Advance Medical Directives require greater accessibility and implementation support. ## K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment represents one of the most sophisticated constitutional analyses of dignity and end-of-life care in Indian legal history. The Court carefully balanced sanctity of life against quality of life without undermining constitutional morality. By recognising CANH as medical treatment, the Court aligned Indian jurisprudence with global constitutional democracies. The reasoning reflects mature constitutional humanism grounded in compassion, autonomy, and medical realism. The judgment also significantly clarified the distinction between active and passive euthanasia. Instead of relying upon simplistic act-versus-omission theories, the Court adopted a causation-based framework. Active euthanasia introduces a new external cause of death. Passive euthanasia merely withdraws artificial interruption of natural death. This clarification offers critical legal protection to doctors acting ethically and compassionately. The Court’s discussion regarding dignity deserves particular appreciation. The judgment rejected the reduction of life to mere biological persistence. It recognised that constitutional protection extends to meaningful human existence. The Court also emphasised bodily integrity and autonomy even where patients cannot presently communicate. This aspect strengthens Indian constitutional jurisprudence concerning privacy and decisional freedom. Equally important was the Court’s recognition of family suffering and caregiving realities. The judgment acknowledged emotional exhaustion, caregiving burdens, and psychological trauma experienced by families caring for irreversible PVS patients. Such humane sensitivity strengthened the legitimacy of the constitutional reasoning. The ruling also exposed systemic failures in India’s medical governance structure. Despite the landmark ruling in ****Common Cause (2018)****, practical implementation remained weak. Doctors feared prosecution. Hospitals lacked protocols. Families faced uncertainty. By streamlining procedural safeguards, the Court attempted to bridge the gap between constitutional theory and medical practice. Finally, the judgment constitutes a powerful call for legislative reform. Judicial guidelines cannot substitute comprehensive statutory regulation indefinitely. Parliament must enact detailed legislation balancing patient rights, medical ethics, safeguards against abuse, palliative care obligations, and procedural accountability. Until then, this judgment remains the definitive constitutional authority governing passive euthanasia and end-of-life care in India. ## L) REFERENCES #### a. Important Cases Referred 1. ****Common Cause v. Union of India,* (2018) 5 SCC 1*** 2. ****Common Cause v. Union of India,* (2023) 14 SCC 131*** 3. ****Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab,* (1996) 2 SCC 648*** 4. ****Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland,* (1993) All ER 821*** 5. ****Vacco v. Quill,* 521 U.S. 793 (1997)*** 6. ****Rodriguez v. Attorney General of Canada,* \[1993\] 3 SCR 519*** 7. ****Parmanand Katara v. Union of India,* (1989) 4 SCC 286*** 8. ****County Durham and Darlington NHS Foundation Trust v. PP,* \[2014\] EWCOP 9*** 9. ****M v. Mrs. N,* \[2015\] EWCOP 76*** 10. ****NHS South East London Integrated Care Board v. JP,* \[2025\] EWCOP 4*** #### b. Important Statutes Referred 1. ****Constitution of India**** 2. ****Indian Penal Code, 1860**** 3. ****Law Commission of India, 196th Report**** 4. ****Law Commission of India, 241st Report**** 5. ****Draft Guidelines on End-of-Life Care, 2024**** 6. ****Medical Council ethical standards and palliative care principles****. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Aruna Kumari v. Economic Offences Unit 2026 SCC OnLine SC 719](https://lawfoyer.in/aruna-kumari-v-economic-offences-unit-2026-scc-online-sc-719/) **Published:** May 28, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The decision in *Aruna Kumari v. The Economic Offences Unit*, Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 7601 of 2025, decided on 24 April 2026 by the Supreme Court of India, arose from a prosecution under the ***Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988***. The petitioner, a Child Development Programme Officer, faced allegations of illegal gratification under ***Sections 7 and 13(2)*** of the Act. The Trial Court acquitted her after evaluating evidentiary inconsistencies and procedural defects. The High Court of Judicature at Patna reversed the acquittal and convicted the petitioner. The Supreme Court entertained the Special Leave Petition and suspended the substantive sentence during pendency of appeal. The judgment became significant because the Supreme Court questioned the prosecution explanation that seized bribe currency notes had been destroyed by rodents in the police Malkhana. The Court expressed concern regarding preservation of seized property and the institutional accountability of investigative agencies. The Bench observed that such destruction raised doubts regarding evidence management and also indicated possible revenue loss to the State. The Court further noted that the explanation lacked credibility and warranted deeper judicial scrutiny. The order highlights important principles relating to appellate interference with acquittal, evidentiary preservation, burden of proof in corruption cases, chain of custody of material exhibits, and procedural fairness under criminal jurisprudence. The decision also reflects judicial insistence upon transparency in anti-corruption prosecutions and proper maintenance of seized articles by law enforcement agencies. The observations made by the Court possess wider implications for criminal administration and integrity of evidentiary systems in India. **Keywords:** Prevention of Corruption Act, bribery, acquittal reversal, seized currency notes, Malkhana evidence, criminal appeal, corruption prosecution, evidentiary preservation. ## B) CASE DETAILS #### i) Judgment Cause Title ***Aruna Kumari v. The Economic Offences Unit*** #### ii) Case Number Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 7601 of 2025 #### iii) Judgment Date 24 April 2026 #### iv) Court Supreme Court of India #### v) Quorum - **Hon’ble Mr. Justice J.B. Pardiwala** - **Hon’ble Mr. Justice K.V. Viswanathan** #### vi) Author Order delivered by the Bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K.V. Viswanathan. #### vii) Citation *Aruna Kumari v. The Economic Offences Unit*, SLP (Crl.) No. 7601/2025, decided on 24 April 2026. #### viiii) Legal Provisions Involved - ***Section 7, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988*** - ***Section 13(2), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988*** - ***Article 136, Constitution of India*** - ***Sections 378 and 386, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*** - ***Indian Evidence Act, 1872*** #### ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case No judgment was expressly overruled. #### x) Law Subjects Involved - Criminal Law - Anti-Corruption Law - Evidence Law - Constitutional Law - Criminal Procedure #### xi) Counsels Appearing For Petitioner: - Mr. S. Nagamuthu, Senior Advocate - Mr. Hitendra Nath Rath, AOR - Mr. Vikash Kumar Sinha, Advocate - Ms. Laxmi, Advocate ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The litigation emerged from a corruption prosecution initiated against the petitioner while serving as a Child Development Programme Officer. The prosecution alleged illegal demand and acceptance of bribe money amounting to ₹10,000. The matter proceeded under the framework of the ***Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988***. The Trial Court acquitted the accused after appreciating oral and documentary evidence. The acquittal indicated judicial satisfaction that the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution department challenged the acquittal before the Patna High Court. The High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the petitioner under ***Sections 7 and 13(2)*** of the Act. The High Court imposed rigorous imprisonment of four years and three years respectively. The petitioner thereafter approached the Supreme Court under ***Article 136 of the Constitution of India***. The Supreme Court granted leave and suspended the sentence. The order assumes significance because the Bench raised institutional concerns regarding destruction of seized currency notes allegedly by rodents. Such observations touched the broader issue of criminal evidence preservation and procedural integrity. Indian criminal jurisprudence consistently insists that prosecution must establish an unbroken chain of custody. The Supreme Court’s concern reflected apprehension that deterioration or disappearance of material exhibits may affect fairness of trial. The issue also engages principles discussed in ***State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram, (2006) 12 SCC 254*** where the Supreme Court emphasized that prosecution lapses may weaken the evidentiary chain. Similarly, in ***C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, Cochin, (2009) 3 SCC 779***, the Court reiterated that demand and acceptance of illegal gratification must be conclusively proved. Mere recovery alone cannot establish guilt. The present matter thus lies at the intersection of evidentiary credibility and anti-corruption enforcement. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The petitioner served as a Child Development Programme Officer at the relevant time. A complaint was lodged before the Economic Offences Unit alleging illegal demand of bribe amounting to ₹10,000. The prosecution claimed that the bribe amount was recovered from the accused. A criminal case was instituted under the ***Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988***. During trial, the prosecution attempted to prove demand, acceptance, and recovery of tainted currency notes. The Trial Court examined the prosecution evidence and acquitted the accused. The acquittal implied that the Court found serious deficiencies in proof of demand or recovery. The prosecution department challenged the acquittal before the Patna High Court. The High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the accused. The High Court reasoned that non-production of currency notes would not destroy the prosecution case because the Malkhana register recorded deposit of seized money. The High Court accepted the explanation that the envelope containing the currency notes had been destroyed by rats and rodents due to improper storage conditions. The Supreme Court took serious note of this reasoning. The Bench questioned the credibility of the explanation and observed that such destruction represented possible revenue loss for the State. The Court expressed surprise that seized currency notes could disappear under police custody. The Court also observed that the explanation failed to inspire confidence. Consequently, while suspending the sentence, the Supreme Court indicated that the larger issue of preservation of seized articles would be examined during final hearing. The factual matrix resembles evidentiary controversies considered in ***T. Subramanian v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2006) 1 SCC 401***, where the Court stressed that proof of demand remains indispensable. It also resembles concerns discussed in ***P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. District Inspector of Police, (2015) 10 SCC 152***, where absence of reliable proof of demand weakened the prosecution case. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED #### i. Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the acquittal passed by the Trial Court? #### ii. Whether conviction under ***Sections 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988*** could survive despite non-production of seized currency notes? #### iii. Whether destruction of seized currency notes by rodents undermined the prosecution case and evidentiary reliability? #### iv. Whether the chain of custody and preservation of material evidence was properly established? #### v. Whether suspension of sentence was justified pending disposal of the criminal appeal? #### vi. Whether institutional deficiencies in Malkhana preservation affect fairness of criminal proceedings? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS #### i. The counsels for the Petitioner submitted that The petitioner argued that the Trial Court had rightly acquitted her after comprehensive appreciation of evidence. The High Court allegedly exceeded appellate limitations while reversing acquittal. It was contended that appellate interference with acquittal requires compelling reasons. Reliance may be placed upon ***Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415*** where the Supreme Court held that presumption of innocence strengthens after acquittal. The petitioner further contended that prosecution failed to establish foundational facts necessary under the ***Prevention of Corruption Act***. Demand of bribe remained doubtful. Recovery itself was unreliable because the material currency notes were unavailable during trial. The explanation regarding destruction by rodents lacked credibility and rendered the prosecution story unsafe. The defence would likely rely upon ***B. Jayaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2014) 13 SCC 55*** where the Court held that proof of demand constitutes sine qua non for conviction under corruption law. The petitioner also emphasized procedural irregularities regarding custody of seized property. The prosecution allegedly failed to maintain integrity of evidence. The defence likely argued that disappearance of the primary material exhibit created reasonable doubt. Such doubt must benefit the accused under settled criminal jurisprudence. Reliance could further be placed upon ***Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 808*** where the Court reaffirmed that if two views are possible, the one favourable to the accused must prevail. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS #### i. The counsels for Respondent submitted that The prosecution maintained that the complainant had lodged complaint only after illegal demand of bribe. The prosecution asserted that recovery was genuine and properly recorded in the Malkhana register. The State argued that destruction of seized notes did not nullify the prosecution case because documentary evidence and oral testimony remained available. The prosecution relied upon surrounding circumstances to establish guilt. The respondent further argued that criminal conviction may be sustained even where material objects become unavailable. The High Court reasoned similarly by observing that corpus delicti is not always recoverable in every offence. Circumstantial and oral evidence can independently establish guilt. The prosecution likely relied upon principles from ***State of U.P. v. Zakaullah, (1998) 1 SCC 557***, where the Supreme Court upheld conviction despite certain procedural irregularities because core prosecution evidence remained trustworthy. The State also justified appellate reversal by arguing that the Trial Court overlooked reliable evidence and adopted an erroneous appreciation of facts. Under ***Section 386 CrPC***, appellate courts possess authority to reverse acquittal if findings appear manifestly unreasonable. The prosecution thus maintained that the High Court correctly exercised appellate jurisdiction. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS #### i. ***Section 7, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988*** This provision criminalizes demand or acceptance of undue advantage by a public servant. Proof of demand remains essential. The provision has been interpreted strictly in ***P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. District Inspector of Police, (2015) 10 SCC 152***. #### ii. ***Section 13(2), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988*** This section prescribes punishment for criminal misconduct by public servants. Conviction requires proof of abuse of official position and dishonest conduct. #### iii. ***Article 136, Constitution of India*** This constitutional provision empowers the Supreme Court to grant special leave against judgments of subordinate courts. #### iv. ***Sections 378 and 386, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*** These provisions regulate appeals against acquittal and powers of appellate courts. #### v. ***Indian Evidence Act, 1872*** The Act governs admissibility, burden of proof, and evidentiary appreciation. Chain of custody and reliability of exhibits derive importance under evidentiary principles. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT IN THIS CASE #### i. ***Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415*** The Supreme Court held that appellate courts may reverse acquittal only when findings are unreasonable or perverse. Presumption of innocence becomes stronger after acquittal. #### ii. ***B. Jayaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2014) 13 SCC 55*** The Court ruled that proof of demand is indispensable in corruption prosecutions. Mere recovery does not establish guilt. #### iii. ***P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. District Inspector of Police, (2015) 10 SCC 152*** The Court reiterated that foundational facts regarding demand and acceptance must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. #### iv. ***C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, Cochin, (2009) 3 SCC 779*** The Court emphasized strict proof standards in corruption cases and clarified that presumption under corruption law arises only after foundational proof. #### v. ***Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 808*** The Court held that benefit of doubt must always favour the accused. ## J) JUDGMENT #### a. RATIO DECIDENDI The Supreme Court granted leave and suspended the substantive sentence imposed by the High Court. The Court acknowledged serious concerns regarding evidentiary preservation. The Bench observed surprise at the explanation that seized currency notes were destroyed by rodents. The Court considered such explanation doubtful and lacking credibility. The Bench also indicated broader institutional concern regarding maintenance of seized property and possible revenue loss to the State. The order implicitly reinforces that criminal prosecution under corruption law requires scrupulous adherence to evidentiary standards. Material exhibits must be preserved properly. Failure in chain of custody may weaken prosecutorial credibility. The Court further recognized that such institutional deficiencies cannot be casually ignored. #### b. OBITER DICTA The Court observed that destruction of seized currency notes due to rodents raised serious administrative concerns. The Bench questioned how frequently such incidents occur in corruption prosecutions. The Court emphasized that seized public money must be preserved securely. The observations highlighted accountability failures in evidence management systems. #### c. GUIDELINES Although no formal guidelines were issued, the observations suggest: 1. Investigative agencies must maintain secure preservation systems for seized articles. 2. Malkhana management requires modernization and accountability. 3. Chain of custody must remain documented and reliable. 4. Courts must scrutinize disappearance of material exhibits carefully. 5. Evidentiary lapses may undermine fairness of criminal prosecution. ## K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The order reflects judicial sensitivity toward evidentiary integrity in corruption prosecutions. The Supreme Court’s intervention demonstrates that procedural irregularities cannot be lightly dismissed merely because prosecution alleges surrounding circumstances proving guilt. The Court’s skepticism regarding destruction of currency notes strengthens the principle that criminal conviction must rest upon trustworthy evidence. The observations also expose structural weaknesses in police evidence management systems. The decision further reinforces constitutional commitment to fair trial under ***Article 21 of the Constitution of India***. Preservation of seized articles constitutes an integral aspect of due process. If material exhibits disappear under official custody, courts must demand convincing explanations. Otherwise, criminal adjudication risks arbitrariness. The order also revives discussion regarding modernization of Malkhanas and digital evidence tracking mechanisms. The case carries broader significance beyond the petitioner’s bail. It signals that anti-corruption prosecutions must balance institutional accountability with rights of accused persons. Courts cannot permit investigative negligence to dilute criminal standards. The eventual final adjudication may shape future evidentiary standards in corruption cases involving lost or destroyed material exhibits. ## L) REFERENCES #### a. Important Cases Referred 1. *Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka*, (2007) 4 SCC 415. 2. *B. Jayaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh*, (2014) 13 SCC 55. 3. *P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. District Inspector of Police*, (2015) 10 SCC 152. 4. *C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, Cochin*, (2009) 3 SCC 779. 5. *Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh*, (1973) 2 SCC 808. 6. *T. Subramanian v. State of Tamil Nadu*, (2006) 1 SCC 401. 7. *State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram*, (2006) 12 SCC 254. 8. *State of U.P. v. Zakaullah*, (1998) 1 SCC 557. #### b. Important Statutes Referred 1. ***Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988***. 2. ***Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973***. 3. ***Indian Evidence Act, 1872***. 4. ***Constitution of India***. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Advanced Certification Workshop on AI-Powered Legal Research, Writing and Drafting](https://lawfoyer.in/advanced-certification-workshop-on-ai-powered-legal-research-writing-and-drafting/) **Published:** May 21, 2026 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## Advanced Certification Workshop on AI-Powered Legal Research, Writing and Drafting ![Banner advertising an Advanced Certification Workshop on AI-powered legal research, writing and drafting with dates June 6–7, 2026 and course mentors pictured in circles on each side.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/AI-Workshop-LawFoyer.jpg) ![Poster for an Advanced Certification Workshop: AI-powered legal research, writing and drafting. Dates: June 6–7, 2026, 6 PM.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/ai-course-compressed-updated-poster.jpg) ### EARLY BIRD Offer Ending in ## [Click Here to Enroll & avail 50% Off - Offer ending tonight!](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=53) ![Clock wearing a graduation cap placed on a stack of two books, symbolizing education and time](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/WhatsApp-Image-2026-05-19-at-11.10.35-AM.jpeg) ### Course Duration #### 2 Days ![Blue calendar icon with a clock, representing a scheduled appointment or time.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/WhatsApp-Image-2026-05-19-at-11.16.09-AM.jpeg) ### Course Date #### 6th to 7th June 2026 (Live) ![Hybrid learning concept: remote online chat on a laptop on one side and an in-person classroom on the other side with a teacher and students.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/WhatsApp-Image-2026-05-19-at-11.16.21-AM.jpeg) ### Session Time #### 2-3 Hours Per Session, 6:00 PM Onwards ![Clock and a calendar showing the date 6–7, suggesting a scheduled time or appointment](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/WhatsApp-Image-2026-05-19-at-11.16.26-AM.jpeg) ### Mode #### Live Online Classes + Lifetime Access to Recordings ## Why This Workshop is Important for Every Law Student and Legal Professional Today? Artificial Intelligence is no longer a future concept. It is already changing the way lawyers research, draft, write, analyse and prepare legal documents. Whether you are a law student preparing assignments, memorials, research papers and internships, or a young lawyer drafting legal notices, case notes, pleadings and opinions, the ability to use AI properly can save hours of work and improve the quality of your output. But there is one major problem. Most people are using AI casually. They ask random questions, copy-paste unreliable answers and do not know how to verify, refine or legally apply AI-generated content. This can lead to wrong research, weak drafting, poor academic writing and even ethical issues. That is exactly why this workshop has been designed. This Advanced Certification Workshop on AI-Powered Legal Research, Writing and Drafting by LawFoyer will help you understand how to use AI as a practical legal assistant, not as a shortcut. ## This is Not Just Another AI Webinar This workshop is designed as a practical, demonstration-based and career-oriented learning experience. You will not only learn what AI is. You will learn how to actually use AI for real legal and academic work. You will understand how to frame better prompts, find relevant cases, conduct AI-assisted legal research, draft legal documents, improve legal writing, structure research papers, avoid plagiarism, identify good journals and understand indexed legal publishing. ## [Click Here to Enroll Now!](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=53) ## Course Mentors [ ![Portrait of a man in a dark blazer and light blue shirt seated at a wooden conference table in a wood-paneled room, hands resting on the desk.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/RIO02546sss-scaled-e1779305908218-290x300.jpg) ](javascript:void(0))## [ Adv. Amal Singh ](javascript:void(0)) Founder & CEO, LawFoyer | Founding Director, LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research | Partner, Vagmi Legal Ventures LLP Tap the photo to know more about your Mentor - [ ](https://in.linkedin.com/in/amal-singh) ![Portrait of a man in a dark blazer and light blue shirt seated at a wooden conference table in a wood-paneled room, hands resting on the desk.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/RIO02546sss-scaled-e1779305908218-290x300.jpg) ## Adv. Amal Singh Founder & CEO, LawFoyer | Founding Director, LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research | Partner, Vagmi Legal Ventures LLP Adv. Amal Singh is the Founder and CEO of LawFoyer and the Founding Director of LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research, popularly known as LIJDLR. He has built one of India’s fast-growing legal education and legal information platforms, with a strong focus on making law easy, accessible, affordable and career-oriented for students and young professionals. LawFoyer began in 2022 as a student-centred legal education platform and has grown into a trusted legal learning ecosystem through initiatives such as LawFoyer Academy, LawFoyer Connect, LIJDLR and Achiever’s Archives. Under his leadership, LIJDLR has developed into an ISSN indexed, open access, quarterly, double blind peer reviewed international law journal with a careful editorial process, structured online submission system, free CrossRef DOIs and extensive global indexing. LIJDLR is described as India’s most extensively indexed law journal, with presence in more than 350+ leading international libraries and databases including HeinOnline, Harvard HOLLIS, Oxford SOLO, Stanford Libraries, LSE, IIM Bangalore, Manupatra, EuroPub and many more. Professionally, Adv. Amal Singh also serves as a Partner at Vagmi Legal Ventures LLP and is pursuing advanced studies in Cyber Law and Information Security from National Law Institute University, Bhopal. His direct experience in legal publishing, journal management, indexing, academic quality control, editorial processes and legal education leadership makes him the ideal mentor for Day 2: From Classroom Research to International Impact. - [ ](https://in.linkedin.com/in/amal-singh) [ ![A man in a black suit and tie holding a brown leather-bound notebook labeled 'Legal Briefs' outdoors in a park.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/WhatsApp-Image-2026-05-20-at-10.58.26-PM-e1779306056736-300x296.jpeg) ](javascript:void(0))## [ Adv. Manik Tindwani ](javascript:void(0)) Co-Founder, Educator and Mentor at LawFoyer | Practicing Advocate at Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur | Certified Legal AI Expert Tap the photo to know more about your Mentor - [ ](https://in.linkedin.com/in/maniktindwani) ![A man in a black suit and tie holding a brown leather-bound notebook labeled 'Legal Briefs' outdoors in a park.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/WhatsApp-Image-2026-05-20-at-10.58.26-PM-e1779306056736-300x296.jpeg) ## Adv. Manik Tindwani Co-Founder, Educator and Mentor at LawFoyer | Practicing Advocate at Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur | Certified Legal AI Expert Adv. Manik Tindwani is a practicing Advocate at the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur, and a Co-Founder, Educator and Mentor at LawFoyer. He is a certified Legal AI expert who has mentored over 2700+ law students and legal professionals across India in legal research, writing, drafting, litigation skills and AI-powered legal productivity. He has trained and guided law students, young advocates and legal professionals from different parts of India on the practical use of technology and Artificial Intelligence in law. His experience as a practicing advocate gives him a strong understanding of real-world legal research, court practice, drafting requirements and professional legal work. Adv. Manik has also conducted workshops for reputed institutional audiences, including the IT Cell of NCLA, LBSNAA, and has been certified by over 50+ national and international organisations as a legal expert. His practical courtroom exposure, legal education experience, AI training expertise and large-scale mentoring experience make him the ideal mentor for Day 1: AI-Powered Legal Research, Writing and Drafting for Students and Professionals. - [ ](https://in.linkedin.com/in/maniktindwani) ## Course Day Wise Curriculum ## Day 1 –AI-Powered Legal Research, Writing and Drafting for Students and Professionals **Date: 6th June, 2026** **Theme:** AI-Powered Legal Research, Writing and Drafting for Students and Professionals **Speaker:** Adv. Manik Tindwani **You will cover:** 1. **Advanced AI Prompting Techniques:** Learn how to ask better legal questions, structure prompts and obtain more useful, refined and legally relevant AI-generated responses. 2. **AI-Powered Accurate Case Finding:** Understand how AI can assist in locating relevant judgments, legal principles, authorities and case laws. 3. **AI-Powered Accurate Legal Research:** Learn how to use AI for issue identification, legal reasoning, legal analysis, research planning and structured research outputs. 4. **AI-Powered Legal Drafting:** Understand how AI can assist in drafting legal notices, clauses, case summaries, research notes, legal opinions and other legal documents. 5. **Practical Case Study Based Demonstrations:** See practical examples of how AI can be used in real legal and academic situations. 6. **Zero-Cost AI Mastery:** Learn how to use free and cost-effective AI tools for legal research, drafting and writing without depending only on expensive platforms. 7. **Coverage of Best Legal AI Tools Including Free Tools:** Discover useful AI tools that can help law students, researchers and legal professionals work faster and more efficiently. 8. **Doubt Solving Session:** Get your questions resolved so that you can confidently start using AI in your legal and academic work. ## Day 2 – From Classroom Research to International Impact: A Guide to Indexed Legal Publishing **Date: 7th June, 2026** **Theme:** From Classroom Research to International Impact: A Guide to Indexed Legal Publishing **Speaker:** Adv. Amal Singh **Key coverage:** 1. **How One Research Paper Can Create Impact:** Understand how a strong research paper can influence legal thinking, scholarship and even constitutional development. 2. **Difference Between Classroom Assignments and Publishable Research Papers:** Learn why a class assignment and a publishable paper require different standards, audience awareness, depth and structure. 3. **Anatomy of a Strong Research Paper:** Understand how to select a workable topic, frame research problems, create research questions, choose methodology and define your contribution. 4. **Standard Structure of a Legal Research Paper:** Learn how to structure title, abstract, introduction, literature review, analysis and conclusion. 5. **Sources and Research Strategy:** Understand the difference between primary sources and secondary sources and how to use constitutions, statutes, rules, case law, parliamentary debates, law commission reports, journals and commentaries effectively. 6. **Databases and Evaluation of Sources:** Learn how to evaluate sources and use platforms such as SCC Online, Manupatra, Westlaw, Lexis, HeinOnline, JSTOR and SSRN. 7. **Boolean Search Logic:** Understand how to use AND, OR, NOT, quotation marks, truncation and proximity connectors for better legal research. 8. **Academic Tone and Legal Writing Style:** Learn how to write with clarity, precision and evidence-based reasoning instead of casual or argumentative language. 9. **Common Student Mistakes in Research Writing:** Avoid repeated definitions, weak analysis, long quotations, confused paragraphs and sudden arguments in conclusion. 10. **Word Processor Proficiency for Legal Writing:** Learn essential habits such as styles, track changes, compare documents, find and replace, page breaks and clean formatting. 11. **Citations, Footnotes and Academic Integrity:** Understand citation styles including OSCOLA and Bluebook, and learn the importance of consistency, ibid, id., supra and cross-references. 12. **Plagiarism:** What Not To Do: Understand verbatim copying, patchwriting, self-plagiarism, ghostwriting and how to build honest research habits. 13. **The Scholarly Ecosystem:** Learn how journals, peer review, double-blind review, indexing, databases and metadata improve credibility and impact. 14. **Major Indexes and Metrics:** Understand Scopus, Web of Science, HeinOnline, DOAJ, J-Gate, JSTOR, Q1 to Q4 quartiles, impact factor, CiteScore, SJR and h-index. 15. **Open Access and Predatory Journal Red Flags:** Learn how to identify genuine open access publishing and avoid journals with fake indexing, guaranteed acceptance and unreliable practices. 16. **DOI and Making Your Work Findable:** Understand what a DOI is, why genuine DOI registration matters and how it helps in long-term discoverability. 17. **Journal Selection and Submission Strategy:** Learn how to align topic and journal scope, study author guidelines, understand copyright, avoid simultaneous submissions and prepare better submissions. ## Bonuses for Course Participants worth Rs. 5000/- 1. **E-Certificate of Completion:** Participants will be awarded with a Certificate of Completion after successful completion of the course. 2. **FREE Job and Internship Placement Support for 1 Year:** Participants will get free daily Internship and Job Opportunities Updates for 1 year via [**LawFoyer Connect**](https://news.lawfoyer.in/). 3. **FREE Access of Mooting Workshop:** Participants will get free access to LawFoyer’s Advanced Certification Workshop on Mooting and Trial Advocacy worth Rs. 499/-. 4. **FREE** Access to LawFoyer’s 27th Quiz Competition worth Rs. 199/-. 5. **Publication Opportunity with LawFoyer’s International Journal:** Participants will get discounted publication opportunity with [**LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research (LIJDLR) \[ISSN: 2583-7753\]**](https://lijdlr.com/), which is indexed in 350+ international libraries and databases including HeinOnline, Harvard HOLLIS, Stanford Libraries, Oxford SOLO, IIM Bangalore Library, SCC Online, Manupatra, Google Scholar, ResearchGate, WorldCat, CrossRef, Europub and many more libraries & databases worldwide. 6. **Priority Access of Workshops & Webinars:** Participants will get priority Access to upcoming skil development workshops and academic webinars by [**LawFoyer Academy**](https://academy.lawfoyer.in/). 7. **Other FREE Bonuses:** Participants will get free access to bonuses including, *inter alia*, 4,000+ legal drafts, course reading materials, notes, E-books, PPTs, recordings with lifetime access and much more. ## [Click Here to Enroll Now!](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=53) ## What Makes This Workshop Different? **This workshop is different because it combines:** ***Legal AI + Legal Research + Legal Drafting + Academic Writing + Indexed Publishing.*** Most workshops teach only one of these areas. This workshop connects all of them. 1. Use AI for legal research. 2. Use AI for legal drafting. 3. Use AI for academic writing assistance. 4. Find and verify legal authorities. 5. Draft better legal and academic content. 6. Avoid plagiarism and unreliable sources. 7. Understand indexed journals and publishing standards. 8. Create research that can have long-term academic value. ## Who Should Attend This Workshop? **This program is ideal for:** 1. Law Students who want to improve research, drafting, writing, publication and internship performance. 2. Law Graduates who want to build practical legal skills before entering litigation, corporate law, academics or policy work 3. Legal Professionals who want to save time in research, drafting and legal writing by using AI tools more efficiently. 4. Researchers and Academicians who want to improve academic writing, citation practices, publication quality and indexed journal submissions. 5. Moot Court and Internship Aspirants who want to draft better memorials, research notes, legal arguments, case summaries and submissions. 6. Any Learner Interested in Law and AI who wants to understand how Generative AI can be applied in legal research, writing and drafting. ## Why You Should Register Today The legal profession is changing fast. Students who know how to use AI properly will research faster, write better and work smarter. Professionals who understand AI-assisted drafting will save time, increase productivity and improve the quality of their legal research and drafting. Researchers who understand indexed legal publishing will create work that is more visible, credible and impactful. This workshop gives you all three advantages in just two days. You will learn practical AI application, legal research, drafting, academic writing and publication strategy from mentors connected with LawFoyer, LawFoyer Academy, LawFoyer Connect and LIJDLR. ## [Click Here to Enroll Now!](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=53) ## Key Learning Outcomes 1. Use AI tools more effectively for legal research and drafting. 2. Frame better prompts for legal and academic work. 3. Conduct more accurate case law and statutory research. 4. Use AI to assist in drafting legal documents, notes and academic content. 5. Understand the difference between AI assistance and blind AI dependence. 6. Improve structure, clarity and quality of legal writing. 7. Understand citation, footnotes and plagiarism issues. 8. Identify credible databases, journals and publication platforms. 9. Understand indexing, DOI, peer review and academic credibility. 10. Prepare better research papers, articles and submissions. ## Why Learn This from LawFoyer? LawFoyer is committed to making law easy and accessible, making legal education affordable, creating highly skilled law students, promoting the use of Legal AI and modern technology, and creating employment opportunities. Through LawFoyer Academy, LawFoyer Connect, LIJDLR and other initiatives, LawFoyer has been working towards building a stronger legal learning ecosystem for students, graduates, professionals and researchers. This workshop brings together two important skills of the future: AI-powered legal efficiency and internationally visible legal scholarship. Together, these skills can help you become a better researcher, better writer, better drafter and better legal professional. ## COURSE FEE & REGISTRATION DETAILS - **Early Bird Fee for Law Students: ₹199** **₹99 only** (offer valid till Tonight 11 PM) - **Early Bird Fee for Professionals: ₹499 ₹199 only** (offer valid till Tonight 11 PM) - **Course Fee for Law Students** (from Tomorrow onwards): ₹ 199 - **Course Fee for Professionals** (from Tomorrow onwards): ₹ 499 ## [Click Here to Enroll Now!](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=53) ## Frequently Asked Questions [ Do you offer daily live classes? ](#collapse-14514dc6ab2aec3cb0a7) Yes, our course include daily live classes. You will have the opportunity to attend live lectures, each lasting approximately 90 minutes. The schedule for these live sessions will be 6 PM Onwards. We understand that our learners may be students or working professionals, so we strive to accommodate everyone's schedules. So our live sessions are held in the late evenings, allowing all participants to attend without compromising their regular classes or work commitments. [ What happens if I am unable to attend a live class? ](#collapse-c29457c6ab2aec3cb0a7) We highly recommend attending the live classes after thorough preparation to maximize your learning experience. Just as the true excitement of a live match or performance lies in witnessing it in real-time, the real value of our live classes comes from actively participating and engaging with the content and instructors. During the live sessions, a wealth of new and practical information is covered, and you'll have the opportunity to ask questions and receive immediate feedback. However, we understand that sometimes life gets in the way, and you may miss a live class. In such cases, you can access the recordings of the live sessions through your personalized Learning Management System (LMS) dashboard. The LMS dashboard provides 24/7 access to all course materials, including the live session recordings, ensuring that you can catch up on any missed content at your convenience. [ Will this course help in internships and jobs? ](#collapse-35c8fe46ab2aec3cb0a7) Yes. A strong understanding of skills taught in this course will become a key differentiator for you in internships, litigation practice, compliance roles, and research profiles. Moreover, the 1 year Internship and Placement support via LawFoyer Connect will also immensely help you. [ Is this useful for judicial services or other exams? ](#collapse-23e82e36ab2aec3cb0a7) The Modules discussed in this course are increasingly becoming part of judicial service examinations and other national exams as well. This course will give you the conceptual clarity and contemporary awareness that you can build upon. [ How will the sessions be conducted? ](#collapse-f524db26ab2aec3cb0a7) Sessions will be conducted live online. You will receive joining links, reading material, and support via email or WhatsApp. [ Can non law professionals attend? ](#collapse-48e70416ab2aec3cb0a7) Yes, policy researchers, working professionals, and enthusiasts with serious interest in modules and skills taught in this course are welcome to join and learn. ## Sample Certificate ![Certificate of Completion page featuring LawFoyer logos at the top, a large 'Certificate of Completion' heading, a gold seal on a blue ribbon to the right, and a QR code panel on the right edge.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Certificate-AI-Workshop-LawFoyer-5-1024x724.jpg) ## [Click Here to Enroll Now!](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=53) ## Contact Us Have questions about our Certification Course? We’re here to help! Contact us for any inquiries regarding course content, schedules, or registration. Don’t miss this opportunity to transform your legal career with LawFoyer! [ Contact Us ](https://web.whatsapp.com/send?phone=+918824991916) [ Contact Us ](https://web.whatsapp.com/send?phone=+918574723478) ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/chatting.png) **Categories:** Courses & Workshops **Tags:** advanced legal, advanced legal research, advanced legal research and writing, ai & law, ai and law, ai and lawyers, ai and the legal profession, ai based learning platform, ai case law, ai for attorneys, ai for legal, ai for legal documents, ai in legal, ai in legal field, ai in legal industry, ai in legal profession, ai in legal services, ai in legal system, ai in legal tech, ai in the law, ai in the legal field, ai in the legal industry, ai in the legal profession, ai law firm, ai laws, ai legal, ai legal law, ai legal services, ai legal tech, ai online tools, ai research tools, ai tool, ai tools for research, ai tools for researchers, ai tools online, all ai tools, artificial intelligence and law, artificial intelligence and lawyers, artificial intelligence and legal profession, artificial intelligence and the legal profession, artificial intelligence in legal profession, artificial intelligence law firm, artificial intelligence tools, artificial intelligence tools in education, best ai tools for researchers, caselaw research, doing legal research, drafting, draftsman, effective legal research, essay draft, generative ai legal, generative ai research, law in artificial intelligence, law research, law research services, lawyer research, lawyers and ai, legal ai, legal research, legal research & writing, legal research analysis and writing, legal research and analysis, legal research and drafting, legal research and writing, legal research and writing services, legal research com, legal research firms, legal research for attorneys, legal research for dummies, legal research for lawyers, legal research help, legal research services, legal research systems, legal research writing and analysis, legal tech ai, legal writing and analysis, legal writing help, lexis advance legal research, lexis advance research, lexis law research, lexis legal research, lexis research, lexisnexis law research, lexisnexis legal research, manupatra online, on legal ai, online ai tools, research ai tools, research for law students, research paper draft, researching and writing in law, researching the law, software ai, software for ai, tool ai, tools ai, use of ai in law, use of ai in legal services, writing and drafting --- ### [TWO DAY NATIONAL SEMINAR ON: “Women, Law and Social Change in India: Navigating Rights, Justice, Contemporary Challenges and Pathways to Empowerment” | Organized by Sri Krishna Jubilee Law College | Register by 5th July, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/two-day-national-seminar-on-women-law-and-social-change-in-india-navigating-rights-justice-contemporary-challenges-and-pathways-to-empowerment-organized-by-sri-krishna-jubilee/) **Published:** May 23, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** TWO DAY NATIONAL SEMINAR ON: “Women, Law and Social Change in India: Navigating Rights, Justice, Contemporary Challenges and Pathways to Empowerment” | Organized by Sri Krishna Jubilee Law College | Register by 05th July, 2026 **Content:** ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER / COLLEGE Sri Krishna Jubilee Law College, situated at Gannipur, Muzaffarpur, Bihar, is a distinguished centre of legal education established in 1948 and affiliated with B.R.A. Bihar University. The institution focuses on academic excellence, legal scholarship, advocacy skills, experiential learning, seminars, symposiums, and moot court exercises. The college is approved by the Bar Council of India and accredited with Grade “B+” by NAAC (2017–2022). ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY Sri Krishna Jubilee Law College is organizing a **Two Day National Seminar** on the theme: **“Women, Law and Social Change in India: Navigating Rights, Justice, Contemporary Challenges and Pathways to Empowerment”** The seminar aims to discuss issues related to women’s empowerment, constitutional rights, justice, socio-cultural barriers, cyberbullying, labour force exclusion, legal reforms, and pathways to empowerment. The seminar welcomes submissions on a wide range of contemporary themes related to women and law. ### Sub-Themes Include: - Sexual Harassment at Workplace: Laws & Implementation - Trafficking of Women: Legal Framework and Solutions - Women’s Reproductive Rights in India - Uniform Civil Code: Implications for Women - Women in Criminal Justice System - Women’s Rights in Property, Marriage, etc. - Challenges Faced by Women in Legal System - Women’s Role in Legal Profession and Leadership - Domestic Violence and Women’s Rights - Cyber Crimes Against Women - Gender Equality and Legal Reforms - Digital Privacy and Cyber Exploitation ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE The seminar is open to: - Academicians - Researchers - Students - Professionals - Scholars ## MODE OF THE EVENT Hybrid Mode ## LOCATION & VENUE OF THE EVENT **Venue:** S.K.J. Law College L.P. Shahi Path, Gannipur, Muzaffarpur, Bihar, India ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE Participants can register through the official Google Form registration link and QR code provided in the brochure. Authors are invited to submit original research papers that are unpublished and not under review elsewhere. Papers may be submitted in English or Hindi. ## SUBMISSION GUIDELINES - Word Limit: 2500–5000 words - Font: Times New Roman / Mangal - Font Size: 14 for headings & sub-headings; 12 for body text - Line Spacing: 1.5 - Citation Style: ILI Bluebook 20th Edition - AI-generated content is strictly prohibited ## FEE DETAILS CategoryRegistration FeeStudents of S.K.J. Law College₹300Other Students₹400Research Scholars₹500Academicians & Professionals₹700 ## PRIZES - Certificate of Merit for the Best Presenter - Best Paper Award ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES EventDateLast Date for Submission of Abstract25th June, 2026Acceptance of AbstractWithin 7 days from submissionLast Date of Registration05th July, 2026Last Date for Submission of Full Paper10th July, 2026Date of National Seminar18th–19th July, 2026 ## CONTACT INFORMATION - +91 7355570455 - +91 7499263291 - +91 9450745375 ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / BROCHURE [Official Website](https://www.skjlawcollege.ac.in/) [Official Brochure](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1q2EPtKZTnWEj4n1DlPRfv1LGqxpP68QK/view?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Call for Papers, Events --- ### [ONE WEEK NATIONAL WORKSHOP ON RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, RESEARCH ETHICS AND PUBLICATION STRATEGY | Organized by Shri Ram College of Law, Muzaffarnagar – NCR | Register by 30th May 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/one-week-national-workshop-on-research-methodology-research-ethics-and-publication-strategy-organized-by-shri-ram-college-of-law-muzaffarnagar-ncr-register-by-30th-may-2026/) **Published:** May 23, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** ONE WEEK NATIONAL WORKSHOP ON RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, RESEARCH ETHICS AND PUBLICATION STRATEGY | Organized by Shri Ram College of Law, Muzaffarnagar – NCR | Register by 30th May 2026 **Content:** ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY Shri Ram College of Law, Muzaffarnagar, is a constituent institution of the Shri Ram Group of Colleges, Uttar Pradesh, established in 2004 with the aim of imparting quality legal education and nurturing ethical and socially responsible legal professionals. The college promotes intellectual inquiry, critical thinking, experiential learning, moot court activities, legal aid clinics, seminars, workshops, and interaction with eminent members of the legal fraternity. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY Shri Ram College of Law is organizing a One Week National Workshop on “Research Methodology, Research Ethics and Publication Strategy” from 1st June 2026 to 6th June 2026. The workshop is designed as a research-oriented capacity-building initiative for academicians, scholars, and students from multidisciplinary backgrounds. The workshop aims to: - Strengthen conceptual understanding of research methodology. - Develop academic inquiry and research aptitude. - Build capacity in identifying research problems and framing research questions. - Highlight doctrinal, empirical, comparative, qualitative, quantitative, and multidisciplinary research approaches. - Promote research ethics, academic integrity, and responsible use of AI in academic research. - Introduce tools and techniques related to sampling, data collection, and research instruments. - Guide participants regarding academic writing, journal selection, and publication strategies. The workshop follows an innovative Four Quadrant pedagogical approach consisting of: 1. Expert lectures 2. Reading materials and case studies 3. Interactive sessions and practical academic exercises 4. Self-assessment exercises such as quizzes and tests. ### Indicative Workshop Themes - Foundations of Research Methodology and Research Design - Doctrinal, Empirical and Comparative Research Approaches - Academic Integrity and Ethical Issues - Publication Ethics and Scholarly Communication - Research Methods, Sampling and Data Collection - Academic Writing and Publication Strategy - SPSS for Researchers: Data Analysis, Interpretation and Reporting. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE The workshop is intended for: - Faculty members - Research scholars - Postgraduate students - Early-career researchers - Participants from law, humanities, social sciences, commerce, management, education, science, and allied disciplines. ## MODE OF THE EVENT Online Mode The sessions will be conducted through Microsoft Teams/Google Meet, while Google Classroom will be used for coordination, study materials, attendance, academic exercises, and workshop-related communication. ## LOCATION & VENUE OF THE EVENT Shri Ram College of Law Circular Road, Muzaffarnagar, Uttar Pradesh (NCR) ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE The brochure includes a “Click here for Registration” section along with a QR code for payment and registration. Participants are required to pay the registration fee for successful enrolment. ## FEE DETAILS Registration Fee: ₹500/- only for online participants. The fee includes: - Access to online sessions - Workshop materials - Certificate of completion (subject to attendance and submission requirements). ## CERTIFICATE DETAILS Certificate of participation will be awarded only to registered participants who: - Attend at least 5 sessions - Submit academic exercises - Complete self-assessment drills/learning outcomes. ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES - Workshop Dates: 1st June 2026 – 6th June 2026 - Last Date of Registration:- 30th May 2026 ## CONTACT INFORMATION **Mr. Vishwendra Panwar** Assistant Professor & Convenor of the Workshop Mobile Number: 8884280831 Email: vishwendra2025@outlook.com ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / BROCHURE Website: [www.srgcmzn.com](http://www.srgcmzn.com) [Official Brochure](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1svmjFREgnbFlFwlpekYhDJD6IOKv5REM/view?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events --- ### [INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, LEGAL GOVERNANCE, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: CONSTITUTIONAL, REGULATORY AND SECTORAL PERSPECTIVES (AILGS-2026) | Organized by the Centre for Law, Technology and Innovation, School of Law, Bennett University | Submit Abstract by May 28, 2026 | Register by July 1, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-artificial-intelligence-legal-governance-and-sustainable-development-constitutional-regulatory-and-sectoral-perspectives-ailgs-2026-organized-by-the-centre-for-law/) **Published:** May 25, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, LEGAL GOVERNANCE, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: CONSTITUTIONAL, REGULATORY AND SECTORAL PERSPECTIVES (AILGS-2026) | Organized by the Centre for Law, Technology and Innovation, School of Law, Bennett University | Submit Abstract by May 28, 2026 | Register by July 1, 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/download-1-1.jpg) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY Bennett University, established by The Times Group, is accredited with an A+ Grade by NAAC and recognised by UGC, AIU, and BCI. The university focuses on interdisciplinary education, innovation, and research excellence. The School of Law at Bennett University offers B.A. LL.B. (Hons.), B.B.A. LL.B. (Hons.), LL.M., and Ph.D. programmes with a focus on legal research, advocacy, and policy innovation. The School is currently celebrating its decennial year. The Centre for Law, Technology and Innovation undertakes interdisciplinary research in the areas of law and emerging technologies, promoting techno-legal awareness and policy dialogue. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY The conference aims to explore the evolving relationship between Artificial Intelligence, legal governance, constitutional values, and sustainable development. It seeks to bring together academicians, researchers, policymakers, industry experts, legal professionals, and students for interdisciplinary discussions on AI governance and regulation. ### Major Themes Include: - Constitutional and ethical foundations of AI governance - Algorithmic justice and digital human rights - AI and international governance - AI in knowledge, innovation, and development - AI, sustainability, and sectoral development - AI in governance and public administration ### Publication Opportunity Selected papers presented at the conference will be curated for publication in **JANUS.NET**, a **Scopus Indexed Journal**, without any publication charges. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE The conference invites participation from: - Academicians - Researchers - Legal practitioners - Policymakers - Industry experts - Professionals from law, technology, governance, and allied disciplines - Ph.D. Scholars - Undergraduate and Postgraduate students ## MODE OF THE EVENT **Hybrid Mode** (Online + Offline). ## LOCATION & VENUE OF THE EVENT **Bennett University, Greater Noida, Uttar Pradesh, India**. ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE Participants are required to submit an abstract of **200–250 words** outlining: - Purpose of the study - Research methodology - Objectives - Key findings The abstract must include **five keywords**. Upon acceptance, authors must submit the full paper. ### Registration & Abstract Submission Link ### Submission Guidelines - Word Limit: 6,000–9,000 words - Format: .doc - Citation Style: APA 7th Edition - Similarity Index: Below 10% - AI-generated content must be disclosed if AI tools are used. ## FEE DETAILS CategoryIndian Participants (Sole)Indian Participants (Joint)Foreign Participants (Sole)Foreign Participants (Joint)Professionals/AcademiciansINR 2000INR 3500USD 25USD 40Ph.D. ScholarsINR 1500INR 2500USD 20USD 20UG & PG StudentsINR 1000INR 1500USD 10USD 15 Additional Joint Authorship Categories: - Academician with Ph.D. Scholar: INR 3000 / USD 30 - Academician with UG/PG Student: INR 2500 / USD 25 ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES EventDateAbstract SubmissionMay 28, 2026Acceptance of AbstractBy May 30, 2026Camera Ready SubmissionJuly 15, 2026Final Submission (after review)As per notificationLast Date of Registration Fee PaymentJuly 1, 2026Conference DatesAugust 6–8, 2026Publication Date (Selected Papers)To be notified ## CONTACT INFORMATION ### Faculty Coordinators - **Dr. Alankrita Mathur** Assistant Professor, School of Law, Bennett University Email: alankrita.mathur@bennett.edu.in Phone: +91-8801038958 - **Mr. Siddharth Badkul** Assistant Professor, School of Law, Bennett University Email: siddharth.badkul@bennett.edu.in Phone: +91-7570960726 ### General Contact - Call: 1800 103 8484 - WhatsApp: 8860 309 257 - Website: www.bennett.edu.in ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / BROCHURE [Official Registration Form](https://forms.gle/gJLi9dsXfAKRhrDH9) [Official Website](https://www.bennett.edu.in) [Official Brochure](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1OhKYZJy4Wpge4gLr3T2vTT0bJgNBFbcA/view?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Call for Papers, Events --- ### [AstraZeneca AB & Anr. v. Intas Pharmaceuticals Limited & Ors. 2021 SCC Online Del 3417](https://lawfoyer.in/astrazeneca-ab-anr-v-intas-pharmaceuticals-limited-ors-2021-scc-online-del-3417/) **Published:** May 24, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The decision in ***AstraZeneca AB & Anr. v. Intas Pharmaceuticals Limited & Ors.***, decided on 20 July 2021 by the Delhi High Court, concerns denial of interim injunction in patent infringement suits involving the drug Dapagliflozin (DAPA). The appellants relied on two Indian patents: ***IN 205147***, a genus patent based on a Markush structure, and ***IN 235625***, a species patent specifically claiming DAPA. The central controversy was whether DAPA was disclosed in the earlier genus patent and whether the later species patent was vulnerable on grounds of prior disclosure, obviousness, double patenting, and non-compliance with Section 8 of the Patents Act, 1970. The Court examined the doctrine of coverage versus disclosure, obviousness standards, Section 8 obligations, and principles governing interim injunction in patent disputes. It held that when a patentee claims infringement of two patents over the same product, it raises a serious question regarding validity. The Court emphasized that patent rights are statutory monopolies and must strictly comply with statutory conditions. It concluded that the defendants had raised a credible challenge to validity, especially regarding obviousness and potential double patenting, and thus refused interim relief. The judgment reflects judicial caution against evergreening and underscores the principle that only one patent can subsist for one invention. **Keywords:** Patent Infringement; Genus and Species Patent; Dapagliflozin; Obviousness; Double Patenting; Section 8 Compliance; Interim Injunction; Evergreening. ## B) CASE DETAILS i) **Judgement Cause Title:** *AstraZeneca AB & Anr. v. Intas Pharmaceuticals Limited & Ors.* ii) **Case Number:** FAO(OS)(COMM) 139/2020 and connected appeals iii) **Judgement Date:** 20 July 2021 iv) **Court:** High Court of Delhi v) **Quorum:** Hon’ble Mr. Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal vi) **Author:** Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw vii) **Citation:** 2021 SCC OnLine Del 3417 viii) **Legal Provisions Involved:** ***Sections 2(j), 2(ja), 2(l), 3(d), 8, 11A, 13(4), 48*** of the ***Patents Act, 1970***; ***Order XLIII Rule 1(r)*** of CPC; ***Section 13(1A)*** of Commercial Courts Act, 2015. ix) Judgments overruled by the Case: None expressly overruled. x) Law Subjects: Intellectual Property Law; Patent Law; Commercial Law; Civil Procedure. ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The appeals arose from denial of interim injunction in multiple suits filed by AstraZeneca against generic pharmaceutical companies. The suits alleged infringement of two patents covering Dapagliflozin, a drug for Type-II diabetes. The first patent, ***IN 205147***, was a genus patent claiming a Markush formula. The second patent, ***IN 235625***, was a species patent specifically claiming DAPA. The genus patent expired in October 2020. The species patent was valid till May 2023. The plaintiffs claimed that DAPA was not disclosed in the genus patent and was independently invented later. The defendants argued that DAPA was covered and disclosed in the earlier patent and that the second patent was invalid for double patenting and obviousness. The Commercial Division refused interim injunction. The plaintiffs appealed. The Division Bench examined whether a patentee could claim infringement of two patents over the same product. The Court’s reasoning focused on statutory interpretation and principles against evergreening. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellants held ***Indian Patent No. 205147***, granted in 2007 and expiring in 2020. It covered a class of C-aryl glucosides using a Markush structure. Later, they obtained ***Indian Patent No. 235625***, granted in 2009 and expiring in 2023, specifically claiming Dapagliflozin. The appellants marketed DAPA under brand names after regulatory approval. Generic manufacturers began marketing DAPA upon expiry of the genus patent. The appellants filed infringement suits asserting violation of both patents. The defendants contended that DAPA was disclosed in the genus patent. They relied on admissions made before the US Patent Office. They also cited alleged non-disclosure under ***Section 8 of the Patents Act*** regarding foreign prosecution history. The Single Judges refused interim injunction on grounds of credible challenge to validity. The plaintiffs appealed. The Division Bench evaluated whether interim relief was justified under settled principles in ***Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727***. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether Dapagliflozin was disclosed in the earlier genus patent. ii. Whether the species patent was vulnerable to revocation for obviousness. iii. Whether claiming infringement of both patents implied admission of double patenting. iv. Whether non-compliance with ***Section 8*** rendered the patent vulnerable. v. Whether interim injunction was justified when validity faced credible challenge. ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Appellants submitted that IN 147 was a genus patent. It disclosed millions of compounds. DAPA was not specifically disclosed. It was only covered. They relied on distinction between coverage and disclosure. They cited ***Novartis AG v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 1***, arguing that coverage does not equal disclosure. They argued DAPA was invented later through research. It involved technical advancement. They submitted that IN 625 was examined and granted after scrutiny. It enjoyed presumption of validity. They emphasized global patent grants in over 70 countries. They denied evergreening. They argued non-disclosure under Section 8 was unintentional. They contended foreign prosecution objections were irrelevant. They submitted balance of convenience favored them due to investment in R&D. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Respondents submitted that plaintiffs admitted DAPA was covered under IN 147. Thus DAPA was disclosed earlier. They relied on pleadings and US litigation admissions. They argued that agreeing to terminal disclaimer in US showed double patenting. They invoked ***Section 3(d)*** principles from ***Novartis***. They argued no technical advancement was shown. Substitution of methoxy with ethoxy was obvious. They argued credible challenge sufficed at interim stage. They cited ***F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., 2015 (225) DLT 391***, emphasizing obviousness analysis. They stressed public interest due to price difference. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. ***Section 2(j)*** defines invention. It requires novelty and inventive step. ii. ***Section 2(ja)*** defines inventive step. It demands technical advance or economic significance. iii. ***Section 3(d)*** prevents patenting of new forms without enhanced efficacy. iv. ***Section 8*** mandates disclosure of foreign filings. Non-compliance may lead to revocation. v. ***Section 48*** confers exclusive rights during patent term. The Court interpreted these provisions strictly. Patent rights exist only within statutory limits. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT i. The Court referred to ***Novartis AG v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 1***. The Supreme Court held enhanced efficacy must be proven for pharmaceutical derivatives. It discouraged evergreening. ii. The Court relied on ***Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727***. It limited appellate interference in interim orders. iii. It considered ***F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd.***. The Delhi High Court discussed obviousness and credible challenge standard. These precedents guided refusal of injunction where validity faced serious doubt. ## J) JUDGEMENT #### a. RATIO DECIDENDI i. The Court held one invention can have only one patent. ii. By alleging infringement of both patents, plaintiffs admitted DAPA was subject of both. iii. Patent rights are statutory monopolies. They must strictly comply with statute. iv. A credible challenge to validity defeats interim injunction. v. Species patent appeared vulnerable to obviousness and possible double patenting. vi. Public interest favored cheaper generics. The Court dismissed appeals. Interim injunction was refused. Directions to maintain accounts were continued. #### b. OBITER DICTA i. The Court observed suspicion of evergreening. ii. It emphasized legislative intent limiting patent term. iii. It remarked that delays in regulatory approval cannot justify extended monopoly. #### c. GUIDELINES i. Interim injunction in patent cases requires strong prima facie validity. ii. Credible challenge suffices to deny relief. iii. Patentee must strictly comply with Section 8. iv. Double patenting concerns will be closely examined. v. Courts must guard against evergreening. ## K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces strict scrutiny in pharmaceutical patent litigation. It discourages strategic layering of genus and species patents without demonstrable technical advancement. It aligns with ***Novartis*** principles against evergreening. The Court balanced innovation incentives with public access. It applied statutory interpretation rigorously. It reaffirmed that interim injunction is discretionary and dependent on clear prima facie validity. ## L) REFERENCES #### a. Important Cases Referred i. *Novartis AG v. Union of India*, (2013) 6 SCC 1. ii. *Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd.*, 1990 Supp SCC 727. iii. *F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd.*, 2015 (225) DLT 391. #### b. Important Statutes Referred i. Patents Act, 1970. ii. Commercial Courts Act, 2015. iii. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Kabir Paharia v. National Medical Commission & Others, 2025 INSC 623](https://lawfoyer.in/kabir-paharia-v-national-medical-commission-others-2025-insc-623/) **Published:** May 24, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The present judgment delivered by the ***Supreme Court of India*** in *Kabir Paharia v. National Medical Commission & Others*, **2025 INSC 623**, marks a transformative reaffirmation of substantive equality under the Constitution. The appellant, a ***Scheduled Caste candidate with benchmark disability***, was denied admission to the MBBS course despite securing a high rank in the ***SC-PwBD quota*** in ***NEET-UG 2024***. The denial was grounded in rigid application of ***NMC guidelines***, which disregarded the principles of ***reasonable accommodation*** under the ***Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016***. The Court critically examined the medical board’s assessment and held that minor functional limitations, such as difficulty wearing surgical gloves, could not justify exclusion from medical education. It invoked ***Articles 14, 16, and 21 of the Constitution***, emphasizing that equality is substantive and demands affirmative facilitation rather than mechanical disqualification. The Court set aside the Delhi High Court’s judgment and directed admission in the 2025–2026 session without requiring reappearance in NEET. It further directed the ***National Medical Commission*** to revise its guidelines in light of earlier precedents including *Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Sciences* and *Anmol v. Union of India*. This judgment reinforces that reasonable accommodation is a fundamental right and not an act of benevolence. **Keywords:** Substantive Equality, Reasonable Accommodation, Benchmark Disability, NEET-UG, Constitutional Morality, Medical Education Rights ## B) CASE DETAILS **i) Judgment Cause Title:** *Kabir Paharia v. National Medical Commission & Others* **ii) Case Number:** Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 29275 of 2024 **iii) Judgment Date:** May 02, 2025 **iv) Court:** Supreme Court of India **v) Quorum:** Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vikram Nath Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Mehta **vi) Author:** Justice Sandeep Mehta **vii) Citation:** 2025 INSC 623 **viii) Legal Provisions Involved:** ***Articles 14, 16, 21, and 41 of the Constitution of India*** ***Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016*** ***NEET-UG Admission Regulations*** ***National Medical Commission Guidelines*** **ix) Judgments Overruled:** Impugned Delhi High Court judgment dated 12 November 2024 set aside. **x) Related Law Subjects:** Constitutional Law Disability Rights Law Administrative Law Education Law Reservation Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The appeal arose from systemic denial of admission to a meritorious PwBD candidate. The appellant suffered ***congenital absence of multiple fingers*** with ***42 percent benchmark disability***. He secured ***542 marks in NEET-UG 2024***. His ***PwBD category rank was 176***. The cut-off stood significantly lower. Despite merit, he was declared ineligible under rigid NMC norms. The Disability Certification Board relied mechanically on guidelines. It failed to consider functional adaptation. The Delhi High Court endorsed that view. The Supreme Court intervened. It invoked ***Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Sciences, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4283*** and ***Anmol v. Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 387***. Those cases recognised assistive devices and accommodation. The Court considered constitutional morality. It examined systemic discrimination. The background reveals tension between regulatory rigidity and constitutional compassion. The Court chose substantive justice over technical exclusion. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellant completed Class X with ***91.5 percent marks***. He completed Class XII with ***90 percent marks***. He appeared in ***NEET-UG 2024*** under ***SC-PwBD category***. He performed excellently. His disability involved absence of index and middle fingers in the right hand. The left hand lacked three fingers. The left foot had toe absence. The disability was permanent but non-progressive. The VMMC-Safdarjung Board assessed disability at ***68 percent***. It declared him ineligible under NMC norms. The AIIMS Board later reiterated that conclusion. Upon Supreme Court direction, a fresh five-member board examined him. It included a neurologist and locomotor specialist. He successfully performed chest compressions. He demonstrated intravenous cannulation. He assembled a laryngoscope. He performed intubation. He executed suturing effectively. The only difficulty involved wearing standard gloves. That minor limitation became central. The Court held such reasoning untenable. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether denial of MBBS admission to a qualified PwBD candidate violates ***Articles 14 and 16***. ii. Whether NMC guidelines override statutory mandate under the ***Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016***. iii. Whether reasonable accommodation is enforceable as a fundamental right. iv. Whether medical fitness assessment must be individualized and evidence-based. ## F) PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Petitioner submitted that exclusion ignored ***reasonable accommodation***. They invoked ***Section 3 and Section 20 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016***. They argued equality is substantive. They relied upon *Om Rathod*. That case allowed a candidate without both hands to pursue MBBS. The Court had relied on expert Dr. Satendra Singh. Functional assessment prevailed over presumption. They cited *Anmol v. Union of India*. That case involved locomotor disability and speech impairment. Admission was directed with accommodation. Counsel argued merit ranking was superior. A lower-ranked candidate obtained admission. That violated ***Article 14***. They contended denial perpetuated stereotypes. They sought admission without reappearing in NEET. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Respondent submitted that guidelines were under revision. They argued process was ongoing. They suggested deferral until revised norms emerged. They contended medical boards acted per existing regulations. They emphasized institutional standards. They warned against compromising patient safety. However, they conceded that a lower-ranked candidate received admission. They later agreed to accommodate the appellant in 2025–2026. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. ***Article 14*** guarantees equality before law. It prohibits arbitrariness. In *E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 4 SCC 3*, arbitrariness was equated with inequality. The denial here was arbitrary. ii. ***Article 16*** ensures equality in public employment and admissions. Reservation for PwBD flows from it. iii. ***Article 21*** protects dignity. In *Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1*, dignity was central. Denial undermined dignity. iv. ***Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016***, particularly ***Sections 3, 16, and 20***, mandates reasonable accommodation. v. ***Article 41*** under Directive Principles obligates assistance in cases of disability. Internationally, the ***UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities*** obligates inclusive education. India is a signatory. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT The Court relied on ***Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Sciences, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4283***. That case recognised functional evaluation. It held accommodation does not dilute standards. It relied on ***Anmol v. Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 387***. That case affirmed rights-based interpretation. It stressed that exclusion based on disability requires strict scrutiny. The Court referred indirectly to *Vibhushita Sharma v. Union of India, W.P.(C) No. 793/2022*. That case granted deferred admission relief. ## J) JUDGMENT #### a) RATIO DECIDENDI i. Denial of admission was ***grossly illegal and arbitrary***. It violated ***Articles 14 and 16***. ii. Minor functional limitations cannot justify exclusion. iii. Reasonable accommodation is a fundamental right. iv. Assessment must be individualized. It must be scientific. It must avoid stereotypes. v. The appellant shall be admitted in ***MBBS 2025–2026 at AIIMS New Delhi***. He need not reappear in NEET. #### b) OBITER DICTA i. The Court emphasized systemic discrimination must end. ii. It appreciated disabled advocates assisting the Court. iii. It declared equality is substantive, not formal. #### c) GUIDELINES The Court directed NMC to revise guidelines within two months. It mandated alignment with *Om Rathod* and *Anmol*. It stressed elimination of direct and indirect discrimination. It required evidence-based assessment. It emphasized dignity and equal opportunity. ## K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment redefines disability jurisprudence. It dismantles mechanical exclusion. It constitutionalizes accommodation. It strengthens inclusive education. The Court balanced merit and compassion. It protected dignity. It upheld reservation integrity. It advanced transformative constitutionalism. The ruling signals regulatory reform. It affirms that equality requires action. It prevents future injustice **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Sujata Bora v. Coal India Limited & Ors., 2026 INSC 53](https://lawfoyer.in/sujata-bora-v-coal-india-limited-ors-2026-insc-53/) **Published:** May 24, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The present appeal in ***Sujata Bora v. Coal India Limited & Ors., 2026 INSC 53*** concerns denial of public employment to a woman with disability under a recruitment notification issued in 2019. The appellant applied under the visually handicapped category. She was declared medically unfit during the Initial Medical Examination. The employer asserted that her disability did not meet the benchmark threshold. The learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court quashed the medical unfitness. Relief was moulded due to lapse of panel. The Division Bench reversed the decision citing expiry of the panel. The Supreme Court intervened. It constituted a Medical Board at AIIMS. The Board certified **57% disability**, exceeding the statutory benchmark under the ***Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016***. The Court restored substantive justice. It invoked ***Articles 14, 21, 41 and 142 of the Constitution of India***. It applied the doctrine of ***reasonable accommodation***. It addressed ***intersectionality of gender and disability***. It directed creation of a supernumerary post. The judgment strengthens disability jurisprudence. It aligns corporate responsibility with constitutional morality. **Keywords:** Reasonable Accommodation, Benchmark Disability, Article 142, Intersectionality, Corporate Social Responsibility, Substantive Equality. ## B) CASE DETAILS i) Judgment Cause Title: ***Sujata Bora v. Coal India Limited & Ors.*** ii) Case Number: **Civil Appeal No. 120 of 2026** iii) Judgment Date: **13 January 2026** iv) Court: **Supreme Court of India** v) Quorum: **Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K.V. Viswanathan** vi) Author: **Justice J.B. Pardiwala** vii) Citation: **2026 INSC 53** viii) Legal Provisions Involved: ***Articles 14, 21, 37, 39(a), 41, 142 of the Constitution of India***; ***Sections 2(s), 2(y), 2(ze) of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016*** ix) Judgments overruled: Division Bench judgment in MAT 2325/2023 of Calcutta High Court x) Law Subjects: Constitutional Law, Service Law, Disability Law, Corporate Governance, Human Rights Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The appeal arose from denial of appointment in a public sector undertaking. The appellant suffered visual disability and partial hemiparesis. She applied under reserved quota. She was called for document verification and IME. She was declared unfit. The employer disputed the percentage of disability. The learned Single Judge relied upon the ***RPwD Act, 2016***. The Court emphasized statutory reservation. Relief was moulded prospectively. The Division Bench reversed on technical grounds. The Supreme Court examined functional disability. It constituted an expert board. The Board confirmed 57% disability. The Court held that expiry of panel cannot defeat constitutional rights. It relied on ***Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625***. It reiterated harmony between Part III and Part IV. The judgment reflects transformative constitutionalism. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE Coal India issued advertisement dated 16.12.2019. It invited applications for Management Trainees. The appellant applied under VH category. She possessed MBA in Human Resources. She produced disability certificates showing 60–70% disability. She cleared interview stage. She appeared for IME in September 2021. She was declared medically unfit. The ground cited additional neurological impairment. She challenged the decision before Calcutta High Court. Interim order reserved one vacancy. Single Judge quashed IME result. Division Bench reversed citing expiry of panel. Supreme Court ordered AIIMS evaluation. The Medical Board confirmed 57% disability. The disability exceeded 40% benchmark. The Court interacted with the appellant. It found her capable and determined. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i) Whether denial of appointment violated ***Sections 2(s) and 2(y) of RPwD Act, 2016***. ii) Whether expiry of recruitment panel defeats substantive rights. iii) Whether reasonable accommodation extends beyond assistive devices. iv) Whether Article 142 can be invoked for complete justice. ## F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Petitioner submitted that the appellant possessed benchmark disability above 40%. They relied upon ***Section 2(s) RPwD Act***. They argued that denial amounted to discrimination. They cited ***Vikash Kumar v. UPSC, (2021) 5 SCC 370***. They contended benchmark cannot restrict entitlements unless expressly mandated. They invoked ***Articles 14 and 21***. They asserted that medical board assessment was flawed. They emphasized right to livelihood under ***Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545***. They argued that expiry of panel cannot cure illegality. They sought equitable relief under ***Article 142***. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Respondent submitted that disability was below benchmark. They argued that recruitment notification did not include multiple disability category. They contended that panel expired. They relied upon service jurisprudence limiting appointment after expiry. They argued that courts cannot rewrite advertisement. They maintained IME findings were binding. They opposed creation of supernumerary post. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i) ***Section 2(y) RPwD Act*** defines reasonable accommodation. It mandates necessary modifications. It prohibits undue burden test misuse. ii) ***Section 2(s) RPwD Act*** defines person with disability. It does not mandate benchmark for all entitlements. iii) ***Section 2(ze) RPwD Act*** defines universal design. It promotes inclusive infrastructure. iv) ***Article 14*** ensures equality before law. v) ***Article 21*** protects right to life with dignity. vi) ***Article 41*** directs State to secure right to work. vii) ***Article 142*** empowers complete justice. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT i. The Court relied upon ***Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 775***. It held reasonable accommodation requires purposive interpretation. ii. It cited ***Anmol v. Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 387***. It rejected one size fits all approach. iii. It relied on ***Om Rathod v. DGHS, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3130***. It held reasonable accommodation is gateway right. iv. It cited ***Ch. Joseph v. Telangana SRTC, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1592***. It held alternative employment must be explored. v. It referred to ***Rajive Raturi v. Union of India, (2024) 16 SCC 654***. It emphasized inclusive equality. vi. It invoked ***Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625***. It balanced FR and DPSP. viii. It cited ***Jane Kaushik v. Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2257***. It recognized intersectionality. ## J) JUDGMENT #### a) RATIO DECIDENDI i) Expiry of panel cannot defeat constitutional rights. ii) Denial of employment violated ***RPwD Act, 2016***. iii) Reasonable accommodation is integral to substantive equality. iv) Court can create supernumerary post under ***Article 142***. #### b) OBITER DICTA i) Disability inclusion is part of Corporate Social Responsibility. ii) ESG framework must include disability rights. iii) Intersectionality requires multidimensional remedies. #### c) GUIDELINES The Court directed creation of supernumerary post. It ordered suitable desk job. It mandated universal design workstation. It recommended posting at North Eastern Coalfields, Assam. ## K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment deepens disability jurisprudence. It harmonizes constitutional morality and statutory mandate. It affirms dignity over technicality. It recognizes gendered dimensions of disability. It aligns corporate governance with human rights. It strengthens purposive interpretation of welfare statutes. It expands Article 142 remedial power. It reinforces right to livelihood. It advances substantive equality. ## L) REFERENCES a) Important Cases Referred i) ***Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625*** ii) ***Vikash Kumar v. UPSC, (2021) 5 SCC 370*** iii) ***Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545*** iv) ***Rajive Raturi v. Union of India, (2024) 16 SCC 654*** b) Important Statutes Referred i) ***The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016*** ii) ***The Constitution of India*** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2014 SC 2114](https://lawfoyer.in/pramati-educational-cultural-trust-v-union-of-india-ors-air-2014-sc-2114/) **Published:** May 24, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The Constitution Bench in ***Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2014 SC 2114*** examined the constitutional validity of the ***Constitution (Ninety-Third Amendment) Act, 2005***, inserting ***Article 15(5)***, and the ***Constitution (Eighty-Sixth Amendment) Act, 2002***, inserting ***Article 21A***. The petitioners, largely private unaided educational institutions, contended that these amendments damaged the **basic structure** by abrogating rights under ***Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 21, and 30(1)***. The Court applied the **basic structure doctrine** evolved in ***His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225***. It upheld both amendments. The Court reasoned that ***Article 15(5)*** is an enabling provision promoting substantive equality. It does not destroy the identity of the freedom under ***Article 19(1)(g)***. It also held that exclusion of minority institutions under ***Article 30(1)*** preserves constitutional balance and secularism. Regarding ***Article 21A***, the Court held that the State may determine the manner of providing free and compulsory education. The amendment did not damage basic structure. Minority institutions were held immune from the 2009 Act to preserve their constitutional protection. **Keywords:** Basic Structure Doctrine, Article 15(5), Article 21A, Minority Rights, Reservation in Education, Right to Education, Article 19(1)(g) ## **B) CASE DETAILS** i) **Judgement Cause Title** *Primati Educational & Cultural Trust & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.* ii) **Case Number** Writ Petition (C) No. 416 of 2012 and connected matters iii) **Judgement Date** 6 May 2014 iv) **Court** Supreme Court of India v) **Quorum** Chief Justice R.M. Lodha, Justice A.K. Patnaik, Justice Dipak Misra, Justice F.M.I. Kalifulla, Justice S.J. Mukhopadhaya vi) **Author** Justice A.K. Patnaik vii) **Citation** AIR 2014 SC 2114 viii) **Legal Provisions Involved** ***Article 15(5), Article 19(1)(g), Article 21A, Article 30(1), Article 14, Article 368*** of the Constitution of India ***Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009*** ix) **Judgments Overruled** None expressly overruled x) **Related Law Subjects** Constitutional Law, Education Law, Minority Rights, Administrative Law ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The reference arose from ***Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 1***. That Bench upheld the **2009 Act**. However, it referred the constitutional validity of ***Article 15(5)*** and ***Article 21A*** to a larger Bench. The core issue concerned Parliament’s amending power under ***Article 368***. The petitioners invoked the doctrine from ***Kesavananda Bharati (1973)***. They argued that essential features were destroyed. The Ninety-Third Amendment followed ***P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra (2005) 6 SCC 537***. That judgment disallowed State-imposed reservation in unaided institutions. Parliament responded by inserting ***Article 15(5)***. Similarly, the Eighty-Sixth Amendment constitutionalized education as a fundamental right. The 2009 Act operationalized this mandate. The Court was tasked to examine whether these constitutional insertions violated the golden triangle of ***Articles 14, 19, and 21***, as articulated in ***Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980) 3 SCC 625***. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** Private unaided institutions challenged constitutional amendments. They contended that ***Article 15(5)*** allowed forced reservation in admissions. They relied heavily on ***T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481***. That case recognized the right to establish and administer institutions under ***Article 19(1)(g)***. Petitioners argued autonomy included admission control. They also relied on ***P.A. Inamdar (2005)***. That ruling prohibited seat appropriation by the State in unaided institutions. Parliament enacted the Ninety-Third Amendment thereafter. It empowered the State to legislate reservation in private institutions except minority institutions. Simultaneously, ***Article 21A*** mandated free education for children aged six to fourteen. The 2009 Act required 25% reservation for weaker sections in unaided schools. Petitioners claimed these changes destroyed institutional autonomy and basic structure. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether insertion of ***Article 15(5)*** violates the basic structure. ii. Whether insertion of ***Article 21A*** violates the basic structure. iii. Whether exclusion of minority institutions violates ***Article 14***. iv. Whether autonomy under ***Article 19(1)(g)*** is abrogated. ## **F) PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels submitted that ***Article 19(1)(g)*** is a basic feature. They cited ***Minerva Mills (1980)***. They argued that emasculation of liberty destroys the Constitution’s identity. They relied on ***I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007) 2 SCC 1***. That case reaffirmed judicial review as basic structure. Petitioners contended that compulsory reservation in unaided institutions equals nationalization of seats. They invoked ***P.A. Inamdar (2005)***. They argued that forced seat sharing is not regulatory. They also claimed violation of excellence under ***Article 21 read with Article 51A(j)***. Further, exclusion of minority institutions allegedly violated secularism and equality. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The Union argued that ***Article 15(5)*** is enabling. It promotes substantive equality. They relied on ***State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas (1976) 2 SCC 310***. That case held reservation provisions are facets of equality. They cited ***Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992 Supp (3) SCC 217)***. Reservation was upheld as equality measure. The State argued that autonomy is not absolute. They relied on ***T.M.A. Pai (2002)*** itself. Paragraphs 53 and 68 allowed limited seat allocation. The Union maintained that minority exclusion preserves ***Article 30(1)*** protection. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. ***Article 15(5)*** empowers State for reservation in admissions. ii. ***Article 19(1)(g)*** protects occupation rights. iii. ***Article 21A*** mandates free education. iv. ***Article 30(1)*** protects minority institutions. v. ***Article 368*** defines amending power. ## **I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT** i. The Court analyzed ***Kesavananda Bharati (1973)***. It affirmed Parliament cannot alter basic structure. ii. It examined ***Minerva Mills (1980)***. That case balanced Part III and IV. iii. It considered ***T.M.A. Pai (2002)***. It recognized autonomy with charitable obligations. iv. It evaluated ***P.A. Inamdar (2005)***. It limited State control absent constitutional amendment. v. It referred to ***Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India (2008) 6 SCC 1***. That upheld Article 15(5) partly. ## **J) JUDGEMENT** #### a. **RATIO DECIDENDI** i. ***Article 15(5)*** is enabling. It furthers equality. It does not abrogate ***Article 19(1)(g)***. ii. The width of the amendment is limited. It is guided power. iii. Minority exclusion protects ***Article 30(1)***. It does not violate secularism. iv. ***Article 21A*** does not damage basic structure. It operationalizes Directive Principles. #### b. **OBITER DICTA** i. Excellence is not incompatible with social justice. ii. Equality includes affirmative action. #### c. **GUIDELINES** i. Laws under ***Article 15(5)*** must target backward classes only. ii. They must relate strictly to admissions. iii. Minority character cannot be destroyed. ## **K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The Court reaffirmed harmony between liberty and equality. It preserved minority autonomy. It strengthened transformative constitutionalism. It balanced autonomy with social justice. The ruling clarified Parliament’s amending power limits. It entrenched education as a tool of integration. ## **L) REFERENCES** a. **Important Cases Referred** i. ***His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225*** ii. ***Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980) 3 SCC 625*** iii. ***T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481*** iv. ***P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra (2005) 6 SCC 537*** v. ***Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India (2008) 6 SCC 1*** vi. ***Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992 Supp (3) SCC 217)*** b. **Important Statutes Referred** i. ***Constitution of India*** ii. ***Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009*** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [J.R. Kapoor v. Micronix India, 1994 Supp (2) SCR 567](https://lawfoyer.in/j-r-kapoor-v-micronix-india-1994-supp-2-scr-567/) **Published:** May 24, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The decision in ***J.R. Kapoor v. Micronix India, 1994 Supp (2) SCR 567***, decided on **10 August 1994** by the **Supreme Court of India**, addresses the scope of interim injunction in trademark disputes involving descriptive words. The controversy arose after dissolution of a partnership firm owning the registered trademark ***“MICRONIX”***. The appellant, a former partner, commenced a similar business using the mark ***“MICROTEL”*** along with a distinct logo and packaging. The respondent sought injunction alleging deceptive similarity. The High Court granted interim restraint. The Supreme Court examined phonetic, visual, and structural similarity, and emphasized that the word ***“micro”*** was descriptive of micro-chip technology. It held that no monopoly could be claimed over a common descriptive prefix. The Court found no prima facie deceptive similarity between ***MICRONIX*** and ***MICROTEL***, nor between their logos and cartons. It set aside the interim injunction, clarifying that observations were confined to the interlocutory stage. The ruling reinforces principles under the ***Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958***, particularly on descriptive marks and likelihood of confusion. **Keywords:** Trademark Infringement, Interim Injunction, Descriptive Mark, Passing Off, Deceptive Similarity, Trade and Merchandise Marks Act 1958. ## **B) CASE DETAILS** i) Judgment Cause Title: ***J.R. Kapoor v. Micronix India*** ii) Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 2253 of 1994 iii) Judgment Date: 10 August 1994 iv) Court: ***Supreme Court of India*** v) Quorum: Hon’ble Justice P.B. Sawant and Hon’ble Justice S.C. Agrawal vi) Author: Justice P.B. Sawant vii) Citation: ***1994 Supp (2) SCR 567*** viii) Legal Provisions Involved: ***Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958***, particularly Sections ***28***, ***29***, and principles under ***Section 27(2)*** relating to passing off; principles under ***Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908***. ix) Judgments Overruled: None x) Law Subjects: Intellectual Property Law, Trademark Law, Civil Procedure Law. ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The dispute emerged from dissolution of a partnership firm engaged in manufacturing electronic goods. The firm owned registered trademark ***“MICRONIX”***. After dissolution, rights in the mark were allotted to the respondent. The appellant commenced business under ***“MICROTEL”***. The respondent alleged infringement and passing off. The Delhi High Court granted interim injunction restraining use of the mark, logo, and carton. The Supreme Court examined whether such restraint was justified at interlocutory stage. The Court confined itself to prima facie analysis. It assessed phonetic similarity, visual impression, and consumer perception. It also considered descriptive character of the prefix ***“micro”***. The Court relied upon established trademark jurisprudence. It emphasized that interim injunction requires strong prima facie case. The judgment reflects balance between statutory monopoly and public domain usage. The Court carefully evaluated technology context. It observed that micro-chip technology was common in electronic goods. Hence descriptive usage cannot be monopolized. The reasoning aligns with principles in ***Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 73***, which later elaborated deceptive similarity tests. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** Both parties manufactured electronic apparatus and boosters. The partnership firm ***Micronix India*** existed since 1977. It owned registered trademark ***“MICRONIX”***. The logo included stylized “M” and “I”. The partnership dissolved in 1992. By consent decree, trademark rights vested in respondent. The appellant thereafter started firm styled ***Microtelmatix***. He adopted trade name ***“MICROTEL”***. His logo comprised bold letter “M” in blue. Packaging differed in color and design. Respondent filed suit alleging infringement and passing off. It sought injunction under ***Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC***. The Single Judge granted interim injunction. Division Bench dismissed appeal summarily. The appellant approached Supreme Court by special leave. The Supreme Court examined trade marks and cartons personally. It analyzed phonetic and visual differences. The Court recorded undisputed facts. It noted descriptive character of prefix. It ultimately allowed appeal and vacated injunction. These findings are reflected in the judgment text . ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i) Whether use of ***“MICROTEL”*** constituted infringement of registered trademark ***“MICRONIX”*** under ***Section 29 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958***. ii) Whether interim injunction was justified based on alleged deceptive similarity. iii) Whether descriptive word ***“micro”*** could be monopolized. iv) Whether logos and cartons created likelihood of confusion. v) Scope of appellate interference in interlocutory orders. ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsel for appellant submitted that ***“micro”*** is descriptive. It refers to micro-chip technology. Such term is publici juris. Reliance was placed on principles in ***Office Cleaning Services Ltd. v. Westminster Window & General Cleaners Ltd., (1946) 63 RPC 39 (HL)***, holding descriptive words lack exclusivity. It was argued that phonetic comparison must consider entire word. The suffixes ***“nix”*** and ***“tel”*** are distinct. No consumer confusion arises. The logos differ completely. Color schemes differ. Packaging design differs. Interim injunction requires strong prima facie case. Reliance was placed on ***Wander Ltd. v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727***, which held appellate court should not interfere lightly but injunction must rest on sound principles. Appellant contended no irreparable injury shown. Balance of convenience favored continued business. The partnership dissolution granted no restraint against descriptive usage. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsel for respondent submitted that registered proprietor enjoys exclusive right under ***Section 28 of the 1958 Act***. Any deceptively similar mark constitutes infringement under ***Section 29***. The prefix ***“micro”*** dominates both marks. Consumers may associate goods with earlier firm. Reliance was placed on ***Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo Gupta, AIR 1963 SC 449***, where phonetic similarity was decisive. It was argued that imperfect recollection governs consumer behavior. Even minor similarities can mislead. The respondent stressed common field of activity. Both sold boosters and electronic goods. Passing off action survives under ***Section 27(2)***. The cartons allegedly contained similar model numbers and descriptions. It was urged that injunction preserves goodwill. The High Court exercised discretion properly. Supreme Court should not substitute its view. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i) ***Section 28, Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958*** grants exclusive right to registered proprietor. ii) ***Section 29*** defines infringement by deceptive similarity. iii) ***Section 27(2)*** preserves common law remedy of passing off. iv) ***Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC*** govern temporary injunctions. v) Principles of deceptive similarity evolved judicially. Tests include phonetic similarity, visual similarity, nature of goods, class of purchasers, and surrounding circumstances. These were elaborated later in ***Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 73***. ## **I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT IN THIS CASE** The Court examined authorities on descriptive marks. It relied on jurisprudence that common descriptive words cannot be monopolized. In ***Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo Gupta, AIR 1963 SC 449***, the Court held overall similarity must be assessed. However, in present case phonetic structure differed materially. The Court considered principle that prefix common to trade cannot confer exclusivity. Similar reasoning appears in ***F. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. Ltd. v. Geoffrey Manners & Co. Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1970 SC 2062***, where suffix comparison was significant. The Court distinguished cases where entire mark was similar. It focused on distinct endings and visual dissimilarity. The Court also emphasized limited scope at interim stage. The ratio of ***Wander Ltd. v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727*** guided restraint in injunction matters. ## **J) JUDGEMENT** #### a) **RATIO DECIDENDI** i) The word ***“micro”*** is descriptive of technology. No monopoly can be claimed. ii) Deceptive similarity must consider entire mark. iii) ***“MICRONIX”*** and ***“MICROTEL”*** are phonetically dissimilar. iv) Visual impression of logos materially differs. v) No prima facie likelihood of confusion shown. vi) Interim injunction was unjustified. vii) Observations confined to interlocutory stage. The Court set aside High Court order. Appeal was allowed. Costs were costs in cause . #### b) **OBITER DICTA** i) Consumers of electronic goods are technically aware. ii) Descriptive technological terms remain public property. iii) Final findings depend on full evidence at trial. #### c) **GUIDELINES** i) Examine descriptive nature of common elements. ii) Compare marks as whole. iii) Assess phonetic and visual similarity distinctly. iv) Consider nature of goods and consumer class. v) Avoid granting monopoly over generic prefixes. vi) Limit interim findings to prima facie assessment. ## **K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The ruling clarifies limits of trademark exclusivity. It protects public domain terminology. It balances statutory rights and competition. It narrows scope of interim injunctions. It reinforces holistic comparison test. The reasoning aligns with established jurisprudence. The decision remains relevant under ***Trade Marks Act, 1999***, particularly ***Sections 9 and 11*** regarding descriptive marks. It strengthens principle that common technological terms cannot be appropriated. ## **L) REFERENCES** a) Important Cases Referred i) ***J.R. Kapoor v. Micronix India, 1994 Supp (2) SCR 567***. ii) ***Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo Gupta, AIR 1963 SC 449***. iii) ***F. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. Ltd. v. Geoffrey Manners & Co. Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1970 SC 2062***. iv) ***Wander Ltd. v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727***. v) ***Office Cleaning Services Ltd. v. Westminster Window & General Cleaners Ltd., (1946) 63 RPC 39 (HL)***. vi) ***Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 73***. b) Important Statutes Referred i) ***Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958***. ii) ***Code of Civil Procedure, 1908***. iii) ***Trade Marks Act, 1999*** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Advanced Certificate Course on DPDP Act, 2023: Law, Compliance and Practice](https://lawfoyer.in/advanced-certificate-course-on-dpdp-act-2023-law-compliance-and-practice/) **Published:** May 19, 2026 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## Advanced Certification Course on Data Privacy Law, Compliance and Practice ![Banner for an advanced certification course on Data Privacy Law & Practice, with dates June 12–14, 2026 at 6 PM, featuring mentors Dr. Astitiwa Bhargava and Ms. Yashu Bansal and partner logos at top.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/New-Final-DPDP-Course-Poster.jpg) ![Event poster for Lawfoyer Advanced Certification: Data Privacy Law, Compliance and Practice; June 12–14, 2026, 6 PM; highlights include live sessions, expert mentors, certification, e-books & notes, and bonus workshops, with two instructors listed.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/new-edited-dpdp-course-poster-compressed-819x1024.jpg) ### EARLY BIRD Offer Ending in ## [Click Here to Enroll & avail 50% Off - Offer ending tonight!](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=51) ## [Download Course Brochure](https://drive.google.com/file/d/12af8aYY4zRC0PuJe3FAj_t-FsSz0C566/view?usp=sharing) ![Clock wearing a graduation cap placed on a stack of two books, symbolizing education and time](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/WhatsApp-Image-2026-05-19-at-11.10.35-AM.jpeg) ### Course Duration #### 3 Days ![Blue calendar icon with a clock, representing a scheduled appointment or time.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/WhatsApp-Image-2026-05-19-at-11.16.09-AM.jpeg) ### Course Date #### 12th to 14th June 2026 (Live) ![Hybrid learning concept: remote online chat on a laptop on one side and an in-person classroom on the other side with a teacher and students.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/WhatsApp-Image-2026-05-19-at-11.16.21-AM.jpeg) ### Session Time #### (1- 1.5 hrs daily), 6:00 PM Onwards ![Clock and a calendar showing the date 6–7, suggesting a scheduled time or appointment](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/WhatsApp-Image-2026-05-19-at-11.16.26-AM.jpeg) ### Mode #### Live Online Classes + Lifetime Access to Recordings ## Why Data Privacy Law skills are no longer Optional? India’s data protection regime is no longer just a developing area of law. With the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, lawyers, law students, compliance professionals, consultants, start-ups, companies and digital platforms now need a clear understanding of privacy rights, data fiduciary obligations, consent architecture, privacy notices, DSAR workflows, DPIA, breach response, compliance documentation and regulatory enforcement. This 3-Day Advanced Certificate Course on DPDP Act, 2023: Law, Compliance and Practice by LawFoyer Academy is carefully designed to help you understand the law, apply the compliance framework, and build practical advisory skills in India’s fast-growing privacy and data protection ecosystem. The curriculum moves from constitutional and statutory foundations to compliance documentation, organisational readiness, breach response and practical privacy advisory simulations. ## Why This Course is Important for You Data is now at the centre of business, governance, technology, employment, finance, healthcare, education, litigation and digital platforms. Every organisation collecting or processing personal data is expected to understand privacy obligations, consent requirements, user rights, security safeguards, breach responsibilities and compliance risks. For law students and young lawyers, DPDP law is one of the most promising emerging practice areas. For legal professionals, it opens advisory, corporate, regulatory, compliance and litigation opportunities. For professionals working with businesses, start-ups and digital products, it helps convert legal knowledge into practical compliance action. This course is designed to help you move beyond theoretical understanding and learn how DPDP Act compliance works in real legal and business contexts. ## [Click Here to Enroll Now!](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=51) ## [Download Brochure](https://drive.google.com/file/d/12af8aYY4zRC0PuJe3FAj_t-FsSz0C566/view?usp=sharing) ## Course Mentors [ ![Professional headshot of a man wearing a black suit, white shirt, and dotted tie, smiling outdoors with a blurred green background, wearing glasses.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/1742756120705-300x300.jpg) ](javascript:void(0))## [ Dr. Astitwa Bhargava ](javascript:void(0)) Assistant Professor (NLIU Bhopal) & Ph.D. (Cyber Law and Information Security), NLU (Jodhpur), M.S., CDPSE, CTPRP, CCSK, OneTrust and BigID Certified Privacy Professional Tap the photo to know more about your Mentor ![Professional headshot of a man wearing a black suit, white shirt, and dotted tie, smiling outdoors with a blurred green background, wearing glasses.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/1742756120705-300x300.jpg) ## Dr. Astitwa Bhargava Assistant Professor (NLIU Bhopal) & Ph.D. (Cyber Law and Information Security), NLU (Jodhpur), M.S., CDPSE, CTPRP, CCSK, OneTrust and BigID Certified Privacy Professional Dr. Astitwa Bhargava is a highly accomplished academician and techno-legal expert with a specialised background in Cyber Law, Information Security, Data Privacy, Information Security Compliance, Risk Management and Digital Forensics. He holds a Ph.D. in Cyber Law and Information Security from National Law University, Jodhpur, an M.S. in Cyber Law and Information Security from National Law Institute University, Bhopal, and a B.E. in Computer Science. What makes Dr. Bhargava’s expertise especially valuable for this course is his rare combination of legal scholarship, technical understanding and corporate consulting experience. Before joining NLIU Bhopal, he worked as a Senior Security Consultant at KPMG, Bangalore, giving him practical exposure to organisational security, compliance, audit, governance and risk frameworks. His professional certifications include CDPSE, CTPRP, CCSK, OneTrust and BigID Privacy Management Professional certifications, further strengthening his authority in privacy governance and compliance practice. His teaching and research interests include Data Privacy and Protection, Information Security Compliances, ISO 27001, NIST frameworks, HIPAA, Business Continuity Planning, Disaster Recovery Planning and Digital Forensics. He has published and presented research papers in national and international forums and has delivered invited lectures at academic institutions, universities, government bodies, private banks and security agencies. He is an M.S., CDPSE, CTPRP, CCSK, OneTrust and BigID Certified Privacy Professional. He has more than 12 years of teaching and corporate experience, including prior experience as Senior Security Consultant at KPMG, Bangalore. His research and teaching interests include Data Privacy and Protection, Information Security Compliances, Business Continuity Planning, Disaster Recovery Planning and Digital Forensics. [ ![Woman with shoulder-length dark hair smiling, wearing a black blazer over a white blouse, standing in front of green leafy bushes with small purple flowers.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/1705809594143-300x300.jpeg) ](javascript:void(0))## [ Ms. Yashu Bansal ](javascript:void(0)) Assistant Professor, MLS, Bengaluru, NLSIU (PGD), CNLU (UG), LL.M. (Ditigal Technologies), Lieden University Tap the photo to know more about your Mentor ![Woman with shoulder-length dark hair smiling, wearing a black blazer over a white blouse, standing in front of green leafy bushes with small purple flowers.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/1705809594143-300x300.jpeg) ## Ms. Yashu Bansal Assistant Professor, MLS, Bengaluru, NLSIU (PGD), CNLU (UG), LL.M. (Ditigal Technologies), Lieden University Ms. Yashu Bansal is an emerging academic and professional voice in the field of technology law, data privacy, digital consumerism, platform regulation, dark patterns, privacy rights and global governance of technology. She currently serves as Assistant Professor at Manipal Law School, MAHE Bengaluru, where she focuses on LLM programmes relating to IT, data privacy and cyber laws. She is UGC-NET qualified and holds an Advanced LL.M. in Law and Digital Technologies from Leiden University, The Netherlands, along with a B.B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) from Chanakya National Law University. Her academic background reflects a strong international and interdisciplinary orientation towards law, technology and digital governance. At Manipal Law School, she also serves as the Co-ordinator of the Research Centre on AI and Data Privacy and the Faculty Head for the Internship and Placement Committee for LLM students, where her industry experience supports students in connecting legal education with professional opportunities. Prof. Bansal brings to the classroom a valuable blend of academic insight and corporate legal experience. Before entering academia, she worked with businesses and start-ups as a corporate lawyer, helping them navigate legal challenges in a business-friendly and solution-oriented manner. Her approach reflects a practical understanding that legal compliance should not merely be seen as an obstacle, but as a strategic enabler of responsible and sustainable business growth. ## Course Day Wise Curriculum ## Day 1 –Foundations of India’s Data Protection Framework **Date: 12th June, 2026** **Theme:** Foundations of India’s Data Protection Framework **Speaker:** Dr. Astitwa Bhargava, Assistant Professor, National Law Institute University (NLIU) Bhopal. **You will cover:** 1. Why Data Protection Law Matters Today 2. Constitutional and Jurisprudential Foundations of Privacy 3. Introduction to the DPDP Act, 2023 4. Key Institutional and Legal Actors under the Act 5. Legal Bases and Structure of Processing 6. Rights and Duties of Data Principals 7. Children’s Data and Special Compliance Sensitivity ## Day 2 – Compliance Architecture, Documentation and Organisational Readiness **Date: 13th June, 2026** **Theme:** Compliance Architecture, Documentation and Organisational Readiness **Speaker:** Dr. Astitwa Bhargava, Assistant Professor, National Law Institute University (NLIU) Bhopal. **You will explore:** 1. Core Obligations of Data Fiduciaries 2. Significant Data Fiduciaries and Enhanced Compliance 3. DPDP Rules, 2025 – Operational Understanding for Lawyers 4. Privacy Documentation in Practice 5. DSAR and Rights-Handling Workflows 6. DPIA and Privacy-by-Design Thinking 7. Privacy Risk Assessment and Management ## Day 3 – Enforcement, Breach Response and Practical Advisory Workshop **Date: 14th June, 2026** **Theme:** Enforcement, Breach Response and Practical Advisory Workshop **Speaker:** Ms. Yashu Bansal, Assistant Professor, Manipal Law School, MAHE, Bengaluru Key coverage: 1. Data Protection Board of India and Enforcement Design 2. Personal Data Breaches and Incident Response 3. DPAR and Internal Compliance Review 4. Cross-Border, Sectoral and Business-Context Issues 5. Practical Workshop: Issue Spotting and Advisory Simulation 6. Career Pathways in Privacy and Data Protection Law ## Bonuses for Course Participants worth Rs. 5000/- 1. **E-Certificate of Completion:** Participants will be awarded with a Certificate of Completion after successful completion of the course. 2. **FREE Job and Internship Placement Support for 1 Year:** Participants will get free daily Internship and Job Opportunities Updates for 1 year via [**LawFoyer Connect**](https://news.lawfoyer.in/). 3. **FREE Access of Legal AI Workshop:** Participants will get free access to LawFoyer’s Advanced Certification Workshop on Supercharging Litigation and Academics with AI worth Rs. 499/-. 4. **FREE Access of Mooting Workshop:** Participants will get free access to LawFoyer’s Advanced Certification Workshop on Mooting and Trial Advocacy worth Rs. 499/-. 5. **FREE** Access to LawFoyer’s 27th Quiz Competition worth Rs. 199/-. 6. **Publication Opportunity with LawFoyer’s International Journal:** Participants will get discounted publication opportunity with [**LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research (LIJDLR) \[ISSN: 2583-7753\]**](https://lijdlr.com/), which is indexed in 350+ international libraries and databases including HeinOnline, Harvard HOLLIS, Stanford Libraries, Oxford SOLO, IIM Bangalore Library, SCC Online, Manupatra, Google Scholar, ResearchGate, WorldCat, CrossRef, Europub and many more libraries & databases worldwide. 7. **Priority Access of Workshops & Webinars:** Participants will get priority Access to upcoming skil development workshops and academic webinars by [**LawFoyer Academy**](https://academy.lawfoyer.in/). 8. **Other FREE Bonuses:** Participants will get free access to bonuses including, *inter alia*, 4,000+ legal drafts, course reading materials, notes, E-books, PPTs, recordings with lifetime access and much more. ## [Click Here to Enroll Now!](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=51) ## [Download Brochure](https://drive.google.com/file/d/12af8aYY4zRC0PuJe3FAj_t-FsSz0C566/view?usp=sharing) ## What makes this course special? This course is not merely a lecture series on bare provisions. It is structured to help participants understand the law, compliance architecture and practical application of the DPDP Act, 2023. 1. Statutory Understanding of the DPDP Act, 2023, including key actors, scope, applicability, consent, legitimate uses, Data Principal rights, children’s data and Data Fiduciary obligations. 2. Compliance Application including privacy notices, consent flows, DSAR workflows, DPIA, privacy-by-design, data retention, deletion, breach response and organisational readiness. 3. Practical Advisory Skills including issue spotting, privacy risk assessment, internal compliance review, documentation checks and client-facing compliance checklists. 4. Career Orientation for privacy law, data protection advisory, in-house compliance, policy, research, legal tech, regulatory practice and techno-legal consulting. ## Who should attend this course? This program is ideal for: 1. Law students who want to build a career in technology law, data protection, privacy law, corporate advisory or legal compliance. 2. Law graduates and young advocates who want to add a high-demand emerging legal skill to their profile. 3. Legal professionals working in corporate law, IT law, cyber law, compliance, policy, litigation or advisory roles. 4. In-house counsels and compliance professionals who deal with user data, employee data, vendor contracts, privacy policies or digital platform risks. 5. Start-up founders, business owners, consultants and professionals who want to understand DPDP compliance in a practical, business-friendly manner. 6. Researchers, academicians and policy enthusiasts interested in privacy, digital governance and data protection law. ## Why Learn DPDP Act Now? The DPDP Act, 2023 is reshaping the way personal data is collected, processed, stored, shared and protected in India. Organisations will increasingly need legal professionals who can understand the law and translate it into notices, consent flows, policies, workflows, risk assessments, breach response and compliance systems. This is where trained legal professionals can build a strong advantage. By joining this course, you are not only learning a statute. You are learning a practical legal skill that is relevant for corporate advisory, privacy compliance, technology law, policy work, start-up advisory, in-house legal roles and regulatory practice. ## [Click Here to Enroll Now!](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=51) ## [Download Brochure](https://drive.google.com/file/d/12af8aYY4zRC0PuJe3FAj_t-FsSz0C566/view?usp=sharing) ## What you will be able to do after this Course? 1. Confidently apply the DPDP Act, 2023 in compliance, internships, legal research, client discussions and privacy audit assignments. 2. Read privacy notices and identify missing or weak clauses. 3. Understand how consent flows work in practice. 4. Understand how Data Principal rights requests are handled. 5. Understand how a basic DPIA and privacy risk assessment can be approached. 6. Understand breach response and enforcement risks. 7. Identify privacy issues in start-ups, apps, websites, HR systems, healthcare platforms, financial services and digital businesses. 8. Gain a strong foundation for building a career in privacy and data protection law. ## Why learn Technology law with LawFoyer? LawFoyer is a leading legal education and information platform for law students and legal professionals across India. Through our platform we have built a strong network of over **three lakh** law students and professionals. We have trained over **20,000** learners through online certification courses, workshops, webinars, and internship training programmes. We publish the **LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research (LIJDLR)** \[ISSN: 2583 7753\], indexed in 350 plus global libraries and databases including HeinOnline, Harvard HOLLIS, Stanford Libraries, Oxford SOLO, IIM Bangalore, Manupatra, Google Scholar etc. Our flagship initiative **LawFoyer Connect** gives daily job and internship updates, and tracks developments in legal technology and AI adoption in law. We have partnered with institutions like NLU Delhi, NLIU Bhopal, HPNLU, CNLU and others as media and e-learning partners for their events and courses. We have also conducted pan India internship and training programmes on legal research skills, legal drafting and legal AI tools in collaboration with reputed law firms such as Eximius Legal and worked in close collaboration with government bodies for various workshops and projects. Our vision is simple: make law practical, affordable, and technology aware, so that students and young professionals can build confident careers. ## COURSE FEE & REGISTRATION DETAILS - **Early Bird Fee for Law Students: ₹799** **₹399 only** (offer valid till Tonight 11 PM) - **Early Bird Fee for Professionals: ₹1,599 ₹799 only** (offer valid till Tonight 11 PM) - **Course Fee for Law Students** (from Tomorrow onwards): ₹ 799 - **Course Fee for Professionals** (from Tomorrow onwards): ₹ 1599 ## [Click Here to Enroll Now!](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=51) ## [Download Brochure](https://drive.google.com/file/d/12af8aYY4zRC0PuJe3FAj_t-FsSz0C566/view?usp=sharing) ## Frequently Asked Questions [ Do you offer daily live classes? ](#collapse-14514dc6ab2aec5c42dd) Yes, our course include daily live classes. You will have the opportunity to attend live lectures, each lasting approximately 90 minutes. The schedule for these live sessions will be 6 PM Onwards. We understand that our learners may be students or working professionals, so we strive to accommodate everyone's schedules. So our live sessions are held in the late evenings, allowing all participants to attend without compromising their regular classes or work commitments. [ What happens if I am unable to attend a live class? ](#collapse-c29457c6ab2aec5c42dd) We highly recommend attending the live classes after thorough preparation to maximize your learning experience. Just as the true excitement of a live match or performance lies in witnessing it in real-time, the real value of our live classes comes from actively participating and engaging with the content and instructors. During the live sessions, a wealth of new and practical information is covered, and you'll have the opportunity to ask questions and receive immediate feedback. However, we understand that sometimes life gets in the way, and you may miss a live class. In such cases, you can access the recordings of the live sessions through your personalized Learning Management System (LMS) dashboard. The LMS dashboard provides 24/7 access to all course materials, including the live session recordings, ensuring that you can catch up on any missed content at your convenience. [ Will this course help in internships and jobs? ](#collapse-35c8fe46ab2aec5c42dd) Yes. A strong understanding of skills taught in this course will become a key differentiator for you in internships, litigation practice, compliance roles, and research profiles. Moreover, the 1 year Internship and Placement support via LawFoyer Connect will also immensely help you. [ Is this useful for judicial services or other exams? ](#collapse-23e82e36ab2aec5c42dd) The Modules discussed in this course are increasingly becoming part of judicial service examinations and other national exams as well. This course will give you the conceptual clarity and contemporary awareness that you can build upon. [ How will the sessions be conducted? ](#collapse-f524db26ab2aec5c42dd) Sessions will be conducted live online. You will receive joining links, reading material, and support via email or WhatsApp. [ Can non law professionals attend? ](#collapse-48e70416ab2aec5c42dd) Yes, policy researchers, working professionals, and enthusiasts with serious interest in modules and skills taught in this course are welcome to join and learn. ## Sample Certificate ![Certificate of Completion page with LawFoyer logos at the top and a gold medal seal on the right side panel.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Certificate-AI-Workshop-LawFoyer-4-1024x724.jpg) ## [Click Here to Enroll Now!](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=51) ## [Download Brochure](https://drive.google.com/file/d/12af8aYY4zRC0PuJe3FAj_t-FsSz0C566/view?usp=sharing) ## Contact Us Have questions about our Certification Course? We’re here to help! Contact us for any inquiries regarding course content, schedules, or registration. Don’t miss this opportunity to transform your legal career with LawFoyer! [ Contact Us ](https://web.whatsapp.com/send?phone=+918824991916) [ Contact Us ](https://web.whatsapp.com/send?phone=+918574723478) ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/chatting.png) **Categories:** Courses & Workshops **Tags:** act on protection of personal information, act on the protection of personal information, advanced certification course on data privacy law, and gdpr, and privacy, basic data protection policy, certification in data privacy, company data privacy policy, company data protection policy, compliance and practice, computer privacy, courses on data privacy, courses on data protection, cybersecurity and data privacy law, cybersecurity for lawyers, cybersecurity law firm, cybersecurity lawyer, data and privacy act, data and privacy law, data compliance laws, data law courses, data laws, data policy act, data privacy act, data privacy act law, data privacy act of, data privacy act personal information, data privacy and cybersecurity law, data privacy and 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and the law, privacy protection laws, privacy regulations, privacy rights act, privacy rights gdpr, privacy rule, privacy security training, privacy standards, privacy training, privacy training courses, private data protection act, private information act, protected personal information laws, protection of privacy act, protection of private information act, rules of gdpr, rules on data protection, state data privacy laws, state of privacy, state privacy laws, terms and privacy policy, the data privacy act, the data protection act, the data protection laws state that, the federal privacy act, the law of privacy, the laws that protect information, the personal data protection act, the privacy act, the privacy laws are to protect the information of, the protection of personal information act, us privacy laws, us privacy legislation --- ### [1st Client Counseling Competition 2026 by Canonsphere | Organized by Canonsphere | Register by 2nd July, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-client-counseling-competition-2026-by-canonsphere-organized-by-canonsphere-register-by-2nd-july-2026/) **Published:** May 21, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 1st Client Counseling Competition 2026 by Canonsphere | Organized by Canonsphere | Register by 2nd July, 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/1st-Client-Counseling-Posters-1280x1811-1-724x1024.jpg) ## **ABOUT CANONSPHERE** Canonsphere is a legal EdTech platform that offers structured training programmes, workshops and seminars, conducted both online and offline. The platform is committed to empowering law students and legal professionals through curated events, specialised courses, and collaborative initiatives with like-minded organisations. In addition to its educational offerings, Canonsphere provides startup consultancy and freelancing services within the legal domain. Through its monthly initiatives and ecosystem-driven approach, Canonsphere aims to nurture emerging talent, foster innovation, and create meaningful impact within the legal community. ## **ABOUT CANONHOUR (MEDIA PARTNER)** Canonhour, the newest initiative by Canonsphere, is designed to bridge the gap between aspiring legal professionals and the opportunities that shape their careers. This platform will feature a curated selection of the latest internships, events, and job openings tailored to law students and graduates, ensuring they stay ahead in their professional journey. With Canonhour, the legal community gains a reliable partner in discovering growth-oriented pathways and building impactful connections. ## **ABOUT LAWFOYER (MEDIA PARTNER)** LawFoyer is a legal education and information platform established with the objective of making law simple, practical, affordable, and accessible for law students, young professionals, and legal practitioners across India. Through its courses, workshops, webinars, training programmes, and academic initiatives, LawFoyer focuses on skill-oriented legal learning and the integration of modern technology with legal education. LawFoyer also publishes the LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research, an internationally recognized legal journal providing indexing of manuscripts across 350+ national and international libraries and databases, including Harvard HOLLIS Library, Oxford SOLO Library, London School of Economics Library, IIM Bangalore Library, Manupatra, SCC Online and several others. Further, through LawFoyer Connect, it’s career and opportunity networking portal, LawFoyer provides free real-time updates on legal jobs, internships, chamber vacancies, and recruitment opportunities to support the professional growth of law students and young lawyers. ## **ABOUT 1st CLIENT COUNSELING COMPETITION** The **1st Client Counseling Competition 2026**, organised by Canonsphere, is a virtual event aimed at enhancing the practical counseling and client interaction skills of law students. **Theme:** **Corporate Counsel: From Brief to Resolution** The competition challenges participants to step into the role of corporate lawyers and advise a simulated client on a legal problem provided by the organizers. Participants are required to conduct a client consultation, demonstrating their ability to extract relevant facts, communicate effectively, build professional rapport, and provide legally sound and commercially viable advice. This competition offers an exclusive opportunity for aspiring legal professionals to refine their advisory skills, exhibit excellence in client counseling and gain recognition at a national level. ## **ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA** Students pursuing any undergraduate degree from a recognized university can participate in the 1st Client Counseling Competition 2026. Participation is permitted only in teams of two. ## **ABOUT THE THEME** The theme **“Corporate Counsel: From Brief to Resolution”** highlights the modern lawyer’s role as both a legal advisor and a strategic business partner. It focuses on the process of handling corporate legal issues, where the brief represents the client’s problem and the Resolution is the solution that is legally correct and commercially practical. This theme encourages participants to think beyond the law and consider the business perspective, balancing legal risks with financial impact, reputation, and long-term value. It challenges teams to tackle complex corporate issues or governance challenges, all while demonstrating the professional skills needed to advise executives. ***Note: The problem will be disclosed one hour prior to the commencement of their round.*** ## **LAST DATE TO REGISTER** 2nd July, 2026 ## **DATE OF COMPETITION** 4th and 5th July, 2026 ## **REGISTRATION FORM** Participants will have to register through the given Google form link only: **** ## **REGISTRATION FEES** **₹300/-** (Team of Two required) ## **PAYMENT DETAILS** Account holder- Shaziya khan Account number- 0747000102001954 Bank name- Punjab National Bank Branch- Deputy ka paraw IFSC code – PUNB0074700 **OR** UPI ID – shaziya9807@oksbi ***Note: Payment must be made using the payment details provided above”. and the Proof of payment must be uploaded in the registration form before submitting it.*** ## **PRIZES** **Winner**– Trophy + Certificate **Runner Up**– Trophy + Certificate ## **PERKS** All participants will receive Certificate of Participation. ## **CONTACT DETAILS** For any further queries contact: **Ms. Aanchal Agarwal** +91 9068802803 **Adv. Keerti Yadav +91 6378845873 canonspherecourses@gmail.com ## **IMPORTANT LINKS** [SCHEDULE](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Dqikd44t8t9cbvbW61bjW__sB6jp9aaa/edit?usp=drive_link&ouid=108112123386926657272&rtpof=true&sd=true) [BROCHUR](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1aslc15zmaOqBngbKPZA2SGsHzu7OwUaF/view?usp=drive_link)[E](https://drive.google.com/file/d/17jt_hUUmlaIThQHCnunVqMSi9ufKVuXx/view?usp=drive_link) [RULEBOOK](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1GAQbuhW2Y9uGfX9wkogcjSQ46pmrrrRi/view?usp=drive_link) **Categories:** Events, Moot Courts, Other Competitions --- ### [Landmark Academic Collaboration and Knowledge Exchange Held at NLIU, Bhopal](https://lawfoyer.in/press-releaselandmark-academic-collaboration-and-knowledge-exchange-held-at-nliu-bhopal/) **Published:** May 19, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/WhatsApp-Image-2026-05-19-at-12.00.30-AM-1-1024x682.jpg) **Dated: 18 May 2026** An important meeting was held at the Judicial Academy, Bhopal, regarding academic collaboration and exchange of knowledge among the National Law Institute University (NLIU), Bhopal, National Law Institute, Himachal Pradesh, Shimla, and National law University and Judicial Academy, Guwahati The meeting was specially attended by Prof. (Dr.) S. Surya Prakash, Vice-Chancellor of National Law Institute University, Bhopal; Prof. (Dr.) Preeti Saxena, Vice-Chancellor of HPNLU , Shimla; and Prof. (Dr.) Prof. (Dr.) K. V. S. Sarma, Vice-Chancellor of NLUJA, Guwahati. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/WhatsApp-Image-2026-05-19-at-12.00.32-AM-1024x768.jpeg) During the meeting, detailed discussions were held on promoting mutual cooperation in legal education, judicial training, research activities, and various academic programs. The participants also agreed to further strengthen judicial and legal education through the exchange of experiences, expertise, and resources among the institutions. The speakers present stated that such academic collaboration would create new opportunities in the field of judicial training and legal education and would provide wide-ranging benefits to students and judicial officers. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/WhatsApp-Image-2026-05-19-at-12.00.31-AM-1024x682.jpeg) Want to showcase your achievement to the world and inspire others? LawFoyer will celebrate your achievement because every achievement deserves recognition. Your achievement is our achievement. Visit: **Categories:** Uncategorised --- ### [Cadila Healthcare Limited v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Limited, AIR 2001 SC 1952](https://lawfoyer.in/cadila-healthcare-limited-v-cadila-pharmaceuticals-limited-air-2001-sc-1952/) **Published:** May 18, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The decision in ***Cadila Healthcare Limited v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Limited, AIR 2001 SC 1952*** constitutes a landmark pronouncement on the law of passing off in relation to medicinal products. The Supreme Court examined whether the use of the mark ***“Falcitab”*** by the respondent infringed or passed off against the appellant’s mark ***“Falcigo”***, both being anti-malarial drugs. The Court declined to interfere with the interlocutory order refusing injunction but elaborately laid down authoritative principles governing deceptive similarity in pharmaceutical trade marks. It overruled certain observations in ***S.M. Dyechem Ltd. v. Cadbury (India) Ltd., (2000) 5 SCC 573***, to the extent inconsistent with established jurisprudence. The Court emphasized phonetic similarity, imperfect recollection, and the heightened standard of scrutiny required in medicinal products due to public health considerations. It held that confusion in medicines could be life threatening and thus warrants stricter judicial vigilance. The judgment harmonized statutory trade mark principles with public health policy and comparative jurisprudence from American courts. **Keywords:** Passing Off, Deceptive Similarity, Medicinal Products, Phonetic Similarity, Public Health, Trade and Merchandise Marks Act 1958, Imperfect Recollection. ## B) **CASE DETAILS** i) **Judgment Cause Title:** ***Cadila Healthcare Limited v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Limited*** ii) **Case Number:** Civil Appeal No. 2372 of 2001 arising out of SLP (C) No. 15994 of 1998 iii) **Judgment Date:** 26 March 2001 iv) **Court:** ***Supreme Court of India*** v) **Quorum:** ***B.N. Kirpal, J.***, ***Doraswamy Raju, J.***, ***Brijesh Kumar, J.*** vi) **Author:** ***Justice B.N. Kirpal*** vii) **Citation:** ***AIR 2001 SC 1952; (2001) 5 SCC 73*** viii) **Legal Provisions Involved:** ***Section 27***, ***Section 28*** of the ***Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958***; ***Section 17-B*** of the ***Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940***; Common law principles of passing off. ix) **Judgments Overruled:** Observations in ***S.M. Dyechem Ltd. v. Cadbury (India) Ltd., (2000) 5 SCC 573*** overruled to the extent inconsistent. x) **Law Subjects:** Intellectual Property Law, Trade Mark Law, Pharmaceutical Law, Tort Law, Public Health Law. ## C) **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The dispute arose between two pharmaceutical entities post corporate restructuring. Both inherited the right to use the corporate name “Cadila.” The controversy centered on anti-malarial drugs branded as ***“Falcigo”*** and ***“Falcitab.”*** The appellant claimed prior adoption and marketing approval. The respondent secured permission later. The appellant alleged deceptive similarity and passing off. The litigation commenced before the District Court at Vadodara. Interim injunction was refused. The High Court affirmed refusal. The matter reached the Supreme Court through Special Leave. The Court declined interim interference. Yet it seized the opportunity to clarify principles governing medicinal trade marks. The judgment reflects concern for Indian market realities. It recognized illiteracy, linguistic diversity, and imperfect recollection. The Court consciously moved beyond rigid English precedents. It aligned trade mark law with constitutional values of public health under ***Article 21 of the Constitution of India***. The reasoning reflects balance between commercial rights and consumer protection. The Court underscored that medicines differ from ordinary goods. Confusion may cost lives. ## D) **FACTS OF THE CASE** The appellant manufactured an anti-malarial drug containing ***Artesunate*** under the mark ***“Falcigo.”*** It applied for registration in Class 5. The ***Drugs Controller General of India*** granted marketing approval on 7 October 1996. The respondent later obtained approval for a drug containing ***Mefloquine Hydrochloride***. It marketed the drug under the mark ***“Falcitab.”*** Both drugs treated cerebral malaria caused by *Plasmodium falciparum*. The appellant alleged phonetic similarity. It argued likelihood of confusion. It emphasized that both drugs were “medicines of last resort.” The respondent contended that “Falci” derived from the disease name. It asserted common usage in pharmaceutical trade. It highlighted that both were Schedule L drugs. Such drugs are sold only to hospitals. The trial court found differences in composition and price. It held no likelihood of confusion. The High Court agreed. It compared packaging and get-up. It found no prima facie case. The Supreme Court examined principles rather than merits. It refrained from final findings due to pending trial. ## E) **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether the mark ***“Falcitab”*** is deceptively similar to ***“Falcigo”*** under passing off principles. ii. Whether stricter standards apply to medicinal products. iii. Whether phonetic similarity outweighs visual dissimilarity. iv. Whether sale under prescription negates likelihood of confusion. v. Whether earlier decision in ***S.M. Dyechem Ltd. v. Cadbury (India) Ltd.*** laid correct law. ## F) **PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioner submitted that the marks share dominant prefix ***“Falci.”*** They argued phonetic similarity. They invoked ***Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo, AIR 1963 SC 449***. They emphasized the test of imperfect recollection. They contended that Indian consumers differ from English consumers. They relied on ***Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Ltd., AIR 1960 SC 142***. They argued that phonetic resemblance suffices. They asserted heightened scrutiny for medicines. They cited American precedents like *American Cynamid Corporation v. Connaught Laboratories Inc.* They stressed potential fatal consequences. They invoked public policy. They argued that prescription sale does not eliminate confusion. They relied on ***Durga Dutt Sharma v. N.P. Laboratories, AIR 1965 SC 980***. They submitted that once essential features are adopted infringement follows. They urged reconsideration of ***S.M. Dyechem*** reasoning. They contended that phonetic similarity cannot be diluted by stylistic differences. ## G) **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that “Falci” is descriptive. They argued common derivation from disease name. They stressed differences in suffixes “go” and “tab.” They highlighted distinct formulations. They emphasized Schedule L classification. They argued that hospital sale reduces confusion. They relied on packaging dissimilarities. They invoked English authorities emphasizing educated purchasers. They cited observations in ***S.M. Dyechem Ltd. v. Cadbury (India) Ltd.***. They contended that essential features differ. They argued no prima facie injury shown. They maintained that interlocutory interference was unwarranted. ## H) **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. ***Section 27(2), Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958*** preserves passing off remedy. ii. ***Section 28*** grants exclusive right to registered proprietor. iii. ***Section 17-B, Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940*** defines spurious drugs. iv. Common law doctrine of passing off based on misrepresentation. v. Public health obligations traceable to ***Article 21, Constitution of India***. ## I) **PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT** i. The Court relied on ***National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick & Bros. Ltd., AIR 1953 SC 357***. It held likelihood of deception judged from average purchaser perspective. ii. It relied on ***Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Ltd., AIR 1960 SC 142***. It emphasized phonetic similarity and first impression test. iii. It cited ***Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo, AIR 1963 SC 449***. It reaffirmed imperfect recollection doctrine. iv. It discussed ***Durga Dutt Sharma v. N.P. Laboratories, AIR 1965 SC 980***. It clarified distinction between infringement and passing off. v. It referred to ***F. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. Ltd. v. Geoffrey Manners & Co. Pvt. Ltd., (1969) 2 SCC 716***. It reiterated whole mark comparison. vi. It overruled conflicting observations in ***S.M. Dyechem Ltd. v. Cadbury (India) Ltd., (2000) 5 SCC 573***. ## J) **JUDGEMENT** a) **RATIO DECIDENDI** i. Deceptive similarity must be judged holistically. ii. Phonetic similarity is crucial in India. iii. Medicinal products demand stricter scrutiny. iv. Prescription sale does not eliminate confusion. v. Public health outweighs minor visual dissimilarities. vi. Indian conditions differ from English markets. vii. Factors for passing off enumerated comprehensively. b) **OBITER DICTA** i. Drug authorities should seek Trade Mark search reports. ii. Preventive regulation aligns with Section 17-B. iii. Courts must adapt principles to Indian realities. c) **GUIDELINES** i. Nature of marks. ii. Degree of resemblance. iii. Nature of goods. iv. Similarity in character and performance. v. Class of purchasers. vi. Mode of purchase. vii. Surrounding circumstances. Weightage varies by facts. ## K) **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The decision reshaped Indian pharmaceutical trade mark law. It reaffirmed phonetic similarity doctrine. It strengthened consumer protection. It harmonized IP law with public health. It corrected deviation in ***S.M. Dyechem***. It underscored constitutional sensitivity. It placed Indian socio-economic realities at center. It recognized linguistic diversity. It elevated standard for medicinal confusion. It balanced commercial freedom with life protection. The guidelines remain authoritative. Courts consistently follow them. The judgment stands as sentinel for safe pharmaceutical branding. ## L) **REFERENCES** a) **Important Cases Referred** i. ***National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick & Bros. Ltd., AIR 1953 SC 357***. ii. ***Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Ltd., AIR 1960 SC 142***. iii. ***Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo, AIR 1963 SC 449***. iv. ***Durga Dutt Sharma v. N.P. Laboratories, AIR 1965 SC 980***. v. ***F. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. Ltd. v. Geoffrey Manners & Co. Pvt. Ltd., (1969) 2 SCC 716***. vi. ***S.M. Dyechem Ltd. v. Cadbury (India) Ltd., (2000) 5 SCC 573*** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya) and Others, Criminal Appeal No. 4752 of 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/muskan-v-ishaan-khan-sataniya-and-others-criminal-appeal-no-4752-of-2025/) **Published:** May 18, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The Supreme Court in *Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya) and Others*, **Criminal Appeal No. 4752 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1531 of 2025), decided on 06 November 2025**, examined the scope of quashing powers under ***Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*** in matrimonial cruelty cases. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh had quashed an FIR registered under ***Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860*** and ***Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961***. The quashing was based on perceived inconsistencies between earlier complaints and the subsequent FIR. The Supreme Court reversed this decision. It held that the High Court had conducted an impermissible “mini trial” while exercising inherent jurisdiction. The Court reiterated that an FIR need not be an encyclopedia. It emphasized that the reliability or genuineness of allegations cannot be examined at the quashing stage. The Court restored the FIR. It preserved all defenses for trial. The judgment reinforces settled principles in ***State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335*** and ***Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401***. It strengthens judicial caution in matrimonial offences. It protects complainants from premature termination of criminal proceedings. **Keywords:** Section 482 CrPC, Section 498A IPC, Dowry Prohibition Act, Quashing of FIR, Mini Trial Doctrine, Inherent Powers, Matrimonial Cruelty. ## B) **CASE DETAILS** i) **Judgement Cause Title:** *Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya) and Others* ii) **Case Number:** Criminal Appeal No. 4752 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1531 of 2025) iii) **Judgement Date:** 06 November 2025 iv) **Court:** Supreme Court of India v) **Quorum:** Hon’ble Justice Sanjay Karol and Hon’ble Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra vi) **Author:** Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra vii) **Citation:** 2025 INSC 1287 viii) **Legal Provisions Involved:** ***Section 498A IPC***; ***Sections 3 and 4 Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961***; ***Section 482 CrPC*** ix) **Judgments Overruled:** Impugned order of High Court of Madhya Pradesh dated 19.07.2024 in MCRC No.10695 of 2024 x) **Law Subjects:** Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, Dowry Law, Women’s Rights, Matrimonial Offences. ## C) **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The appeal challenged quashing of an FIR alleging matrimonial cruelty. The High Court exercised ***Section 482 CrPC*** jurisdiction. It found alleged improvements in the FIR. It treated two incidents as afterthoughts. It concluded the FIR was a counterblast. The Supreme Court examined this reasoning. It evaluated the limits of inherent jurisdiction. It referred to settled principles in ***Bhajan Lal*** and ***Neeharika Infrastructure***. The Court stressed that quashing is exceptional. It emphasized that prima facie disclosure of offence suffices. It rejected judicial assessment of credibility at this stage. The Court noted that matrimonial offences often unfold gradually. It recognized social realities of dowry harassment. It observed that omission of dates in earlier complaints does not erase allegations. The background showed marriage in 2020. Alleged harassment began within months. Demands for dowry were persistent. A sum of Rs.50 lakhs was allegedly demanded. The High Court viewed delay suspiciously. The Supreme Court held delay alone is not decisive. The judgment reinforces procedural discipline. It protects investigative autonomy. It restores trial court primacy. ## D) **FACTS OF THE CASE** The appellant married respondent No.1 on 20.11.2020 under Muslim rites . A son was born from the marriage. Initial relations were cordial. After five months, harassment allegedly began. Taunts over inadequate dowry were frequent. A motorcycle was given by her father. A car was allegedly demanded later. An AC was demanded during a family wedding. The appellant alleged confinement and abuse. She alleged food deprivation and surveillance. On 22.07.2021, she was allegedly abused and slapped. On 27.11.2022, Rs.50 lakhs were allegedly demanded. She was allegedly ousted with her child. She moved to her parental home. Complaints were filed before Women’s Cell in January 2023. FIR No.35 of 2024 was lodged on 28.01.2024 . Offences invoked were ***Section 498A IPC*** and ***Sections 3 and 4 Dowry Prohibition Act***. The accused sought quashing before High Court. The High Court allowed quashing. It found omissions in earlier complaints. It termed later details as afterthoughts. The appellant approached the Supreme Court. ## E) **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i) Whether the High Court exceeded jurisdiction under ***Section 482 CrPC*** by assessing credibility and inconsistencies. ii) Whether omission of specific incidents in prior complaints justifies quashing of FIR. iii) Whether allegations prima facie disclosed offences under ***Section 498A IPC*** and ***Dowry Prohibition Act***. iv) Whether the High Court conducted a prohibited mini trial. ## F) **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsel for the appellant submitted that the High Court misapplied settled law. It ignored the principle in ***State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal***. The FIR disclosed cognizable offences. Specific dowry demands were alleged. Physical assault was alleged. Ouster from matrimonial home was alleged. These ingredients satisfy ***Section 498A IPC***. Demand of Rs.50 lakhs attracts ***Section 4 Dowry Prohibition Act***. The counsel argued that FIR need not contain every detail. Reliance was placed on ***Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra***. It was argued that quashing is rare. The High Court examined delay and motive. Such examination amounts to appreciation of evidence. That exercise belongs to trial. The appellant emphasized social stigma in reporting cruelty. Delay is common in matrimonial offences. The counsel argued that High Court presumed mala fides. Such presumption violates settled standards. The appellant sought restoration of investigation. ## G) **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The learned Amicus Curiae argued that FIR contained improvements. Earlier complaints lacked specific dates. The sum of Rs.50 lakhs was not mentioned earlier. It was argued that FIR was delayed by one year. Delay was unexplained. It was contended that allegations were omnibus. Specific overt acts against in-laws were absent. Reliance was placed on ***Mahmood Ali v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2023) 15 SCC 488***. It was argued that vague allegations justify quashing. The Amicus cited ***Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of Telangana, (2025) 3 SCC 735***. It was submitted that courts must prevent misuse of ***Section 498A IPC***. The High Court’s approach was defended as preventive. It was argued that FIR was retaliatory. It followed a legal notice by husband. The respondents sought affirmation of quashing. ## H) **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i) ***Section 498A IPC*** criminalizes cruelty by husband or relatives. Cruelty includes harassment for dowry. It includes conduct likely to cause grave injury. ii) ***Section 3 Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961*** penalizes giving or taking dowry. iii) ***Section 4 Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961*** penalizes demanding dowry. iv) ***Section 482 CrPC*** preserves inherent powers of High Court. It prevents abuse of process. It secures ends of justice. The Supreme Court emphasized that these provisions protect married women. They implement constitutional values under ***Articles 14 and 15***. They align with international commitments under CEDAW. The provisions must be interpreted purposively. ## I) **PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT** i) The Court relied on ***State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335***. It laid categories for quashing. It held quashing is justified only when no offence is disclosed. ii) The Court cited ***Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401***. It held FIR is not an encyclopedia. Investigation should not be thwarted. iii) The Court referred to ***Daxaben v. State of Gujarat, (2022) 16 SCC 117***. It reiterated sparing use of inherent power. iv) The Court relied on ***State of Odisha v. Pratima Mohanty, (2022) 16 SCC 703***. It held courts must not test reliability at quashing stage. v) The Court cited ***CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399***. It condemned mini trials at Section 482 stage. vi) The Court referred to ***State of Telangana v. Habib Abdullah Jeelani, (2017) 2 SCC 779***. It stressed caution in quashing FIRs. ## J) **JUDGEMENT** a) **RATIO DECIDENDI** i) The High Court erred in assessing credibility of allegations. ii) Omission of specific dates in earlier complaints is not fatal. iii) FIR disclosed prima facie offences under ***Section 498A IPC*** and ***Dowry Prohibition Act***. iv) Examination of delay and motive amounted to mini trial. v) Quashing power must be exercised sparingly. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court order . It restored criminal proceedings. It left defenses open for trial. b) **OBITER DICTA** i) Matrimonial cruelty complaints may evolve gradually. ii) Courts must be sensitive to social context. iii) Investigation must proceed unhindered where offence is disclosed. c) **GUIDELINES** i) FIR need not contain exhaustive particulars. ii) Courts must only see if cognizable offence is disclosed. iii) Reliability of allegations cannot be tested at Section 482 stage. iv) Delay alone does not justify quashing. v) Alleged improvements must be tested during trial. ## K) **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment fortifies procedural discipline. It curbs premature judicial interference. It reinforces victim protection in dowry cases. It balances misuse concerns with access to justice. It reiterates that trial is the proper forum for evidence appreciation. It strengthens consistency in Section 482 jurisprudence. ## L) **REFERENCES** a) **Important Cases Referred** i) ***State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335***. ii) ***Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401***. iii) ***Daxaben v. State of Gujarat, (2022) 16 SCC 117***. iv) ***State of Odisha v. Pratima Mohanty, (2022) 16 SCC 703***. v) ***CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399***. vi) ***State of Telangana v. Habib Abdullah Jeelani, (2017) 2 SCC 779***. b) **Important Statutes Referred** i) ***Indian Penal Code, 1860***. ii) ***Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961***. iii) ***Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973***. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [CONFEDERATION OF REAL ESTATE DEVELOPERS OF INDIA (CREDAI) V/S VANASHAKTI 2025 INSC 1326](https://lawfoyer.in/confederation-of-real-estate-developers-of-india-credai-v-s-vanashakti-2025-insc-1326/) **Published:** May 18, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The Supreme Court of India examined the legality of the earlier judgment delivered in ***Vanashakti v. Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1139*** through a review petition filed by the **Confederation of Real Estate Developers of India (CREDAI)**. The controversy revolved around the validity of the **2017 Notification** and the **2021 Office Memorandum (OM)** issued by the **Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEF&CC)** permitting grant of **ex-post facto Environmental Clearance (EC)** to projects which commenced operations without obtaining prior environmental clearance under the **Environment Impact Assessment Notification, 2006**. The earlier judgment had struck down the 2017 Notification and the 2021 OM as illegal, holding that **ex-post facto environmental clearance is alien to environmental jurisprudence**. The Court had relied primarily on precedents including ***Common Cause v. Union of India*** ***(2017) 9 SCC 499*** and ***Alembic Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Rohit Prajapati*** ***(2020) 17 SCC 157***. In the present review petition, the petitioner argued that relevant precedents such as ***Electrosteel Steels Ltd. v. Union of India*** ***(2023) 6 SCC 615***, ***D. Swamy v. Karnataka State Pollution Control Board*** ***(2023) 20 SCC 469*** and ***Pahwa Plastics Pvt. Ltd. v. Dastak NGO*** ***(2023) 12 SCC 774*** were not considered. According to the petitioner, these decisions recognised that although prior environmental clearance is the norm, **ex-post facto approval may be granted in exceptional cases**, subject to environmental safeguards and penalties. The Supreme Court therefore re-examined the doctrine of **precautionary principle**, **polluter pays principle**, and **principle of proportionality** within environmental governance. The Court analysed the statutory framework under the ***Environment (Protection) Act, 1986*** and the ***Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986***. The judgment clarified the legal position that **ex-post facto EC cannot be granted routinely**, yet it is not absolutely prohibited under the environmental regulatory regime. Where projects comply with environmental norms and denial of approval would cause disproportionate economic and social consequences, regulatory authorities may adopt a balanced approach. This case therefore significantly contributes to Indian environmental jurisprudence by reconciling **strict environmental protection** with **pragmatic regulatory governance**, reaffirming that environmental law must balance ecological protection with sustainable development and economic realities. ### **Keywords** Environmental Clearance, Ex-Post Facto Approval, Environment Protection Act 1986, Environmental Jurisprudence, Sustainable Development, Precautionary Principle. ## **B) CASE DETAILS** #### i) Judgement Cause Title ***Confederation of Real Estate Developers of India (CREDAI) v. Vanashakti & Another*** #### ii) Case Number Review Petition (Civil) Diary No. 41929 of 2025 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1394 of 2023 #### iii) Judgement Date 18 November 2025 #### iv) Court Supreme Court of India #### v) Quorum Chief Justice **B.R. Gavai** and companion judges #### vi) Author of Judgment Chief Justice **B.R. Gavai** #### vii) Citation 2025 INSC 1326 #### viii) Legal Provisions Involved - ***Section 3*** ***of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986*** - ***Section 19*** ***of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986*** - ***Rule 5*** ***of the Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986*** - ***Environment Impact Assessment Notification, 2006*** - **MoEF&CC Notification dated 14 March 2017** - **Office Memorandum dated 7 July 2021** #### ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case None expressly overruled. #### x) Law Subjects Involved Environmental Law Constitutional Law Administrative Law Environmental Governance #### xi) Counsels Appearing - **Kapil Sibal** – for State of Karnataka - **Mukul Rohatgi** – for Review Petitioner (CREDAI) - **Tushar Mehta** – Solicitor General for Union of India - **Anand Grover**, **Raju Ramachandran**, **Gopal Sankaranarayanan**, **Sanjay Parikh** – for respondents. ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The dispute arises from the regulatory regime governing environmental clearances for industrial and infrastructure projects in India. Under the ***Environment Impact Assessment Notification, 2006***, every project falling under specified categories must obtain **prior environmental clearance** before commencing operations. The notification was issued under ***Section 3 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986***, empowering the Central Government to regulate industrial activities in order to protect environmental quality. However, many projects across India commenced operations without obtaining prior environmental clearance. In response, the government issued the **2017 Notification** to establish a mechanism enabling such projects to apply for environmental clearance after commencement of operations. The objective was to bring defaulting projects within the environmental regulatory framework rather than allowing them to operate illegally without oversight. Subsequently, the **National Green Tribunal** directed the government to develop a proper standard operating procedure for handling violation cases. Consequently, the **2021 Office Memorandum** introduced a procedural framework for assessing environmental damage, imposing penalties and granting clearance in appropriate cases. Environmental groups challenged these mechanisms before the Supreme Court, arguing that they legitimised illegal industrial activity and violated environmental principles. The Supreme Court initially struck down the notification and memorandum, stating that ex-post facto environmental clearance undermines environmental jurisprudence. The present review petition emerged because several stakeholders argued that the earlier decision ignored binding precedents recognising the possibility of ex-post facto environmental clearance in exceptional situations. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The petitioner, **Confederation of Real Estate Developers of India (CREDAI)**, filed a review petition seeking recall of the Supreme Court judgment dated **16 May 2025** delivered in ***Vanashakti v. Union of India***. In the earlier judgment the Court invalidated the **2017 Notification** and the **2021 Office Memorandum** which permitted grant of ex-post facto environmental clearance to projects that had commenced without prior approval. The earlier decision held that these regulatory mechanisms were inconsistent with environmental law because the concept of ex-post facto clearance contradicts the precautionary principle embedded within environmental jurisprudence. The Court had relied primarily on decisions such as ***Common Cause v. Union of India*** and ***Alembic Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Rohit Prajapati***. However, several stakeholders including the Union Government, state governments and infrastructure developers argued that the decision produced severe economic consequences. Numerous large-scale projects such as steel plants, airports and hospital infrastructure had already completed construction and were awaiting environmental clearance under the 2021 procedure. The earlier judgment would effectively require demolition of these projects. The review petition therefore argued that the Court had not considered important precedents including ***Electrosteel Steels Ltd. v. Union of India*** and ***D. Swamy v. Karnataka State Pollution Control Board*** which recognised that ex-post facto environmental clearance may be granted in exceptional circumstances subject to penalties and environmental safeguards. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether the **2017 Notification** permitting grant of ex-post facto environmental clearance is legally valid under the **Environment (Protection) Act, 1986**. ii. Whether the **2021 Office Memorandum** establishing a procedure for handling violation cases is consistent with environmental jurisprudence. iii. Whether the Supreme Court’s earlier judgment striking down these instruments overlooked binding precedents of coordinate benches. iv. Whether ex-post facto environmental clearance is absolutely prohibited in Indian environmental law. ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the petitioner submitted that the earlier judgment suffered from **error apparent on the face of the record** because it relied selectively on precedents without considering the full ratio of those decisions. The petitioner argued that while the judgment cited ***Common Cause v. Union of India*** and ***Alembic Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Rohit Prajapati***, it ignored the later portions of those judgments which adopted a **balanced approach between environmental protection and economic consequences**. The petitioner further contended that several subsequent Supreme Court decisions explicitly recognised the possibility of granting ex-post facto environmental clearance. In ***Electrosteel Steels Ltd. v. Union of India (2023) 6 SCC 615*** the Court held that ex-post facto clearance should not ordinarily be granted but may be allowed in exceptional cases where the project complies with environmental norms and denial would cause disproportionate harm. Similarly in ***D. Swamy v. Karnataka State Pollution Control Board (2023) 20 SCC 469*** the Court held that the **Environment Protection Act does not prohibit ex-post facto environmental clearance**. The petitioner argued that the earlier judgment ignored these binding precedents, thereby violating the doctrine of **judicial discipline**. According to established constitutional practice, a coordinate bench cannot disregard binding precedent without referring the matter to a larger bench. The petitioner also emphasised the severe consequences of the earlier decision. Infrastructure projects worth thousands of crores had been developed after following the procedures prescribed by the 2021 SOP. If these projects were demolished merely due to procedural irregularities, it would cause immense financial loss and undermine the doctrine of **sustainable development**, which requires balancing environmental protection with economic progress. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the respondents argued that the review petition was essentially an attempt to re-argue the entire case. According to established law, review jurisdiction is extremely limited and can only be exercised in cases of **error apparent on the face of the record**. The respondents further contended that the 2017 Notification fundamentally undermined environmental governance. By allowing project proponents to seek environmental clearance after commencing operations, the notification incentivised violation of environmental law. The environmental impact assessment process is intended to evaluate ecological consequences **before** a project begins, not afterwards. The respondents relied heavily on ***Alembic Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Rohit Prajapati*** where the Supreme Court held that ex-post facto environmental clearance is inconsistent with environmental jurisprudence and contrary to the precautionary principle. According to the respondents, environmental law prioritises prevention rather than post-facto regularisation. They further argued that project proponents who knowingly commence projects without obtaining environmental clearance must bear the consequences of their unlawful conduct. Allowing ex-post facto approval would encourage regulatory non-compliance and weaken environmental protection. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** The case primarily involved interpretation of ***Section 3 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986*** which empowers the Central Government to take measures for protecting and improving environmental quality. This provision authorises the government to issue notifications regulating industrial activities and imposing environmental safeguards. The regulatory framework also operates through the ***Environment Impact Assessment Notification, 2006*** which requires prior environmental clearance for specified categories of projects. The objective of the EIA process is to ensure that environmental impacts are assessed through **screening, scoping, public consultation and appraisal** before project implementation. The **2017 Notification** introduced a mechanism for addressing violation cases by allowing projects which had commenced operations without clearance to apply for environmental approval subject to environmental assessment and penalties. The **2021 Office Memorandum** subsequently created a detailed standard operating procedure for evaluating such cases, incorporating the **polluter pays principle** and the **principle of proportionality**. ## **I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT** #### i. *Common Cause v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 499* The Court held that environmental clearance must ordinarily be obtained before commencing mining operations. It emphasised that retrospective environmental clearance may cause irreversible environmental damage. #### ii. *Alembic Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Rohit Prajapati (2020) 17 SCC 157* The Supreme Court ruled that administrative circulars permitting ex-post facto clearance were inconsistent with the statutory environmental framework. However, the Court adopted a balanced approach by imposing environmental compensation rather than ordering closure of the industries. #### iii. *Electrosteel Steels Ltd. v. Union of India (2023) 6 SCC 615* The Court recognised that while prior environmental clearance is mandatory, ex-post facto approval may be granted in exceptional circumstances where the project complies with environmental norms and closure would cause disproportionate harm. #### iv. *D. Swamy v. Karnataka State Pollution Control Board (2023) 20 SCC 469* The Court upheld the validity of the **2017 Notification** and observed that the Environment Protection Act does not absolutely prohibit ex-post facto environmental clearance. #### v. *Pahwa Plastics Pvt. Ltd. v. Dastak NGO (2023) 12 SCC 774* The Supreme Court reiterated that ex-post facto environmental clearance may be granted in appropriate cases after environmental assessment and imposition of penalties. ## **J) JUDGEMENT** #### a) Ratio Decidendi The Supreme Court held that the earlier judgment required reconsideration because relevant precedents were not adequately examined. The Court clarified that while **prior environmental clearance remains the rule**, the statutory framework under the Environment Protection Act does not absolutely prohibit **ex-post facto clearance**. The Court emphasised that environmental law must adopt a **balanced approach**. Projects that violate environmental regulations should be penalised, but demolition or closure should not be ordered mechanically if the project can be made environmentally compliant. #### b) Obiter Dicta The Court observed that environmental regulation must reconcile **environmental protection with economic development**. A rigid approach may cause disproportionate economic and social consequences without necessarily benefiting environmental protection. ## **K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment represents an important clarification of Indian environmental jurisprudence. The Court recognised that strict adherence to prior environmental clearance is essential for environmental protection, yet acknowledged that practical realities sometimes require regulatory flexibility. By emphasising the **principle of proportionality** and **polluter pays principle**, the Court sought to ensure that environmental violations are penalised while avoiding unnecessary economic disruption. The judgment also reinforces the importance of **judicial discipline**, highlighting that coordinate benches must respect earlier precedents unless the matter is referred to a larger bench. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Vanashakti v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 1326](https://lawfoyer.in/vanashakti-v-union-of-india-2025-insc-1326/) **Published:** May 18, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The present Review Petition arises from the judgment dated **16 May 2025** in *Vanashakti v. Union of India*, wherein the Supreme Court struck down the **2017 Notification** and the **2021 Office Memorandum (OM)** permitting grant of **ex post facto Environmental Clearances (ECs)** under the ***Environment (Protection) Act, 1986***. The Review Petitioner, **Confederation of Real Estate Developers of India (CREDAI)**, sought recall of the judgment on the ground that binding precedents including ***Electrosteel Steels Ltd. v. Union of India (2023) 6 SCC 615***, ***D. Swamy v. Karnataka State Pollution Control Board (2023) 20 SCC 469***, and ***Pahwa Plastics Pvt. Ltd. v. Dastak NGO (2023) 12 SCC 774*** were not duly considered. The Court examined the doctrine of judicial discipline, scope of review under Article 137, interpretation of Section 3 of the 1986 Act, and the permissibility of ex post facto ECs in light of environmental jurisprudence. The Court reconciled its earlier rulings in ***Common Cause v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 499*** and ***Alembic Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Rohit Prajapati (2020) 17 SCC 157*** with later decisions endorsing limited regularisation in exceptional circumstances. The judgment critically re-evaluates proportionality, polluter pays principle, sustainable development, and separation of powers in environmental governance. **Keywords:** Ex Post Facto Environmental Clearance, Environment Protection Act 1986, Judicial Discipline, Review Jurisdiction, Sustainable Development, Polluter Pays Principle. ## **B) CASE DETAILS** i) **Judgment Cause Title:** *Confederation of Real Estate Developers of India (CREDAI) v. Vanashakti & Anr.* ii) **Case Number:** Review Petition (C) Diary No. 41929 of 2025 in W.P.(C) No. 1394 of 2023 iii) **Judgment Date:** 18 November 2025 iv) **Court:** Supreme Court of India v) **Quorum:** Bench led by **Chief Justice B.R. Gavai** vi) **Author:** B.R. Gavai, CJI vii) **Citation:** 2025 INSC 1326 viii) **Legal Provisions Involved:** ***Section 3, Section 19 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986***; ***Rule 5(3)(d) of the Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986***; ***Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897***; ***EIA Notification 2006***; ***Notification S.O. 804(E) dated 14.03.2017***; ***Office Memorandum dated 07.07.2021***. ix) Judgments overruled by the Case: None expressly overruled; interpretative clarification undertaken. x) Law Subjects: Constitutional Law, Environmental Law, Administrative Law. ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The litigation originates from challenges to the ***2017 Notification***, issued under ***Section 3(1) and 3(2)(v) of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986***, enabling appraisal of projects commenced without prior EC. The notification created a six-month compliance window. It prescribed environmental damage assessment and remediation. Later, pursuant to NGT directions in *Tanaji B. Gambhire v. State of Maharashtra*, the **2021 OM** framed a Standard Operating Procedure for violation cases. In the principal judgment of May 2025, the Court struck down both instruments. It held ex post facto EC alien to environmental jurisprudence, relying primarily on ***Common Cause (2017)*** and ***Alembic Pharmaceuticals (2020)***. The Review Petition argued that subsequent binding decisions permitted conditional regularisation. The case thus involved harmonisation of precedent, constitutional limits of delegated legislation, and scope of review power. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The Ministry of Environment issued the **EIA Notification 2006**, mandating prior EC for scheduled projects. In 2017, the Central Government issued **Notification S.O. 804(E)** permitting appraisal of violation cases. Projects already commenced could seek clearance subject to damage assessment and penalties. The window operated initially for six months. The Madras High Court recorded it as a one-time measure. Later, the NGT directed formulation of SOPs. Consequently, the **2021 OM** structured procedures for identifying violations, applying polluter pays principle, and considering closure where projects were impermissible. Multiple writ petitions challenged these instruments. The Supreme Court, in May 2025, quashed them. It restrained the Government from issuing similar circulars. However, previously granted ECs remained unaffected. CREDAI filed review. The Union and States supported reconsideration. Environmental groups opposed maintainability. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether **ex post facto Environmental Clearances** are per se impermissible under environmental jurisprudence. ii. Whether the **2017 Notification** was ultra vires ***Section 3 of the 1986 Act***. iii. Whether failure to consider binding precedents constitutes **error apparent on the face of record** under Article 137. iv. Whether judicial discipline required reference to larger Bench. ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioner submitted that ***Electrosteel Steels Ltd. (2023) 6 SCC 615*** expressly held that the **1986 Act does not prohibit ex post facto EC**. The Court therein recognised exceptional regularisation. It balanced environmental norms with economic consequences. Petitioners argued omission to consider this binding ratio rendered the principal judgment per incuriam. They invoked ***D. Swamy (2023) 20 SCC 469***, which upheld validity of the **2017 Notification** as statutory. They contended Section 21 of the General Clauses Act empowered modification of notifications. It was submitted that proportionality must guide remedy. Demolition of completed infrastructure would harm public interest. Reliance was placed on ***Lafarge Umiam Mining (2011) 7 SCC 338*** recognising ex post facto appraisal in peculiar circumstances. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that review cannot become appeal. They relied on ***Common Cause (2017) 9 SCC 499***, where ex post facto EC was declared alien. They cited ***Alembic Pharmaceuticals (2020) 17 SCC 157*** stating retrospective clearance undermines precautionary principle. They argued the 2017 Notification diluted mandatory prior clearance. It encouraged violators. They asserted environmental degradation is irreversible. Polluter must suffer consequences. They contended economic hardship cannot override statutory mandate. Judicial discipline required adherence to earlier larger Bench rulings. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. ***Section 3(1) of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986*** empowers measures to protect environment. It enables issuance of notifications imposing safeguards. ii. ***Section 19 of the 1986 Act*** provides prosecution mechanism. It authorises complaint by government or authorised person. iii. ***Rule 5(3)(d) of the Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986*** prescribes procedure for notification after considering objections. iv. ***Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897*** permits amendment or rescission of notifications. ## **I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT** i. The Court revisited ***Common Cause v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 499***. It held retrospective EC impermissible. However, mining operations could resume after compliance and payment of compensation. ii. It analysed ***Alembic Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Rohit Prajapati (2020) 17 SCC 157***. There, administrative circular enabling ex post facto EC was quashed. Yet closure was declined. Instead, Rs.10 crore compensation imposed per unit. iii. The Court examined ***Electrosteel Steels Ltd. v. Union of India (2023) 6 SCC 615***. It recognised that ex post facto EC is not ordinarily granted. However, in exceptional cases, regularisation may occur with heavy penalties. iv. It considered ***D. Swamy v. KSPCB (2023) 20 SCC 469***. It upheld 2017 Notification as valid statutory instrument. It clarified EP Act does not prohibit ex post facto EC. v. It referred to ***Pahwa Plastics Pvt. Ltd. v. Dastak NGO (2023) 12 SCC 774***. It reiterated proportionality and polluter pays principle. ## **J) JUDGEMENT** a) **Ratio Decidendi** The Court held omission to consider binding precedents constituted error apparent. Judicial discipline demands consistency. Ex post facto EC is not per se barred. However, it cannot be routine. The 1986 Act does not expressly prohibit it. Section 3 empowers modification. Proportionality must guide remedy. Complete demolition is not automatic. Polluter pays principle applies. Each case requires appraisal. Blanket prohibition was unsustainable. b) **Obiter Dicta** Environmental governance requires balance. Economic development and ecology are not adversaries. Sustainable development integrates both. Courts must avoid rigid absolutism. c) **Guidelines** i. Ex post facto EC may be granted only exceptionally. ii. Detailed EIA mandatory. iii. Damage assessment compulsory. iv. Heavy compensation to be imposed. v. Projects impermissible in law must be closed. vi. Decisions must record reasons. vii. No routine regularisation. ## **K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment harmonises conflicting strands of precedent. It restores doctrinal coherence. It affirms that environmental protection is paramount. Yet proportionality tempers enforcement. The ruling clarifies that statutory silence does not equal prohibition. It strengthens polluter pays doctrine. It underscores judicial discipline. It preserves economic stability while safeguarding ecology. ## **L) REFERENCES** a) **Important Cases Referred** i. ***Common Cause v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 499*** ii. ***Alembic Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Rohit Prajapati, (2020) 17 SCC 157*** iii. ***Electrosteel Steels Ltd. v. Union of India, (2023) 6 SCC 615*** iv. ***D. Swamy v. Karnataka State Pollution Control Board, (2023) 20 SCC 469*** v. ***Pahwa Plastics Pvt. Ltd. v. Dastak NGO, (2023) 12 SCC 774*** vi. ***Lafarge Umiam Mining (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011) 7 SCC 338*** b) **Important Statutes Referred** i. ***Environment (Protection) Act, 1986*** ii. ***Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986*** iii. ***General Clauses Act, 1897*** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta (2020) 8 SCC 531](https://lawfoyer.in/committee-of-creditors-of-essar-steel-india-limited-v-satish-kumar-gupta-2020-8-scc-531/) **Published:** May 18, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The present judgment arose from multiple civil appeals challenging the decision of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal concerning the resolution plan of ***Essar Steel India Limited*** under the ***Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016***. The Supreme Court examined the scope of judicial review over decisions of the ***Committee of Creditors***, the status of secured and unsecured financial creditors, the rights of operational creditors, and the constitutional validity of amendments introduced by the ***Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2019***. The central controversy revolved around whether the ***NCLAT*** could modify a resolution plan approved by the Committee of Creditors by reallocating payments between secured financial creditors, unsecured financial creditors, and operational creditors. The Court reaffirmed the doctrine of **commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors**, holding that the adjudicatory authority cannot substitute its decision for that of financial creditors in matters of distribution. The Court also upheld the constitutional validity of the 2019 Amendment. It clarified that equitable treatment does not imply equal treatment and recognized permissible classification among creditors based on security interests. The judgment restored primacy to creditor autonomy within statutory limits and reinforced the objective of time-bound insolvency resolution. **Keywords:** Insolvency Resolution, Committee of Creditors, Commercial Wisdom, Operational Creditors, Section 30 IBC, Section 53 IBC, Constitutional Validity. ## B) CASE DETAILS **i) Judgment Cause Title** ***Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta & Ors.*** **ii) Case Number** Civil Appeal No. 8766–67 of 2019 and connected matters **iii) Judgment Date** 15 November 2019 **iv) Court** ***Supreme Court of India*** **v) Quorum** Justice R.F. Nariman Justice Surya Kant **vi) Author** Justice R.F. Nariman **vii) Citation** (2020) 8 SCC 531 **viii) Legal Provisions Involved** ***Sections 7, 12, 15, 17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 25, 29A, 30, 31, 53, 60(6) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016*** ***Sections 4 and 6 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2019*** ***Article 14 of the Constitution of India*** **ix) Judgments Overruled** NCLAT judgment dated 04.07.2019 **x) Related Law Subjects** Insolvency Law, Constitutional Law, Corporate Law, Banking Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The insolvency proceedings began upon admission of petitions under ***Section 7 of the IBC*** before the NCLT Ahmedabad. The corporate debtor owed approximately INR 49,000 crores. Expressions of interest were invited. Resolution plans were submitted by ***ArcelorMittal India Private Limited*** and others. Earlier, in ***ArcelorMittal India Private Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta (2019) 2 SCC 1***, this Court interpreted ***Section 29A*** strictly. That decision rendered certain applicants temporarily ineligible. Later compliance enabled ArcelorMittal to resubmit its plan. The Committee of Creditors approved the plan with 92.24 percent majority. However, the NCLT modified distribution principles. The NCLAT further altered allocations. It mandated equal treatment of financial and operational creditors at 60.7 percent of admitted claims. This led to appeals before the Supreme Court. The constitutional validity of the 2019 Amendment was also challenged. The matter raised systemic questions about creditor hierarchy and judicial interference. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The corporate debtor, Essar Steel India Limited, defaulted on massive financial obligations. Upon insolvency admission, ***Satish Kumar Gupta*** was appointed as Resolution Professional. Claims were invited and verified under ***Sections 15 and 18 IBC***. ArcelorMittal proposed upfront payment of INR 42,000 crores with capital infusion. Operational creditors were offered partial payments. Secured financial creditors were prioritized. The Committee of Creditors approved the negotiated plan. Operational creditors challenged discriminatory allocation. The NCLT directed reallocation based on fairness. The NCLAT went further and equalized recovery percentages. The NCLAT also held that security interest was irrelevant during resolution. It admitted additional claims. It invalidated sub-committee functioning. It held Section 53 applicable only during liquidation. Aggrieved financial creditors approached the Supreme Court. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the NCLAT can modify distribution under an approved resolution plan. ii. Whether secured and unsecured financial creditors can be treated differently. iii. Whether operational creditors must receive equal percentage recovery. iv. Whether Sections 4 and 6 of the 2019 Amendment violate Article 14. v. Whether judicial review extends to questioning commercial wisdom of CoC. ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Petitioners submitted that **commercial wisdom of CoC is paramount**. They relied on ***K. Sashidhar v. Indian Overseas Bank (2019 SCC OnLine SC 257)***. That case held adjudicating authorities cannot question feasibility decisions. They argued classification based on security is valid. They invoked ***Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (2019) 4 SCC 17***. The Court there upheld differential treatment between financial and operational creditors. They contended NCLAT exceeded jurisdiction under ***Section 31 IBC***. Modification of plan destroys contractual consensus. They emphasized economic rationale. Secured creditors bear greater risk. Equal distribution disincentivizes secured lending. They also defended constitutional validity of amendment. Legislature can remove basis of judgment. They cited ***Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality (1969) 2 SCC 283***. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Respondents submitted that equality under ***Article 14*** requires parity among financial creditors. They relied on UNCITRAL Legislative Guide principles. They argued Section 53 applies only in liquidation. They contended CoC has conflict of interest in distribution. Majority secured creditors may oppress minority unsecured creditors. They challenged retrospective amendment. They argued Section 6 of Amendment targeted this case. They claimed operational creditors deserve fair and equitable share. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. ***Section 30(2)(b) IBC*** mandates payment to operational creditors not less than liquidation value. ii. ***Section 30(4) IBC*** empowers CoC to approve plan by 66 percent vote. iii. ***Section 31 IBC*** makes approved plan binding. iv. ***Section 53 IBC*** provides waterfall during liquidation. v. ***Article 14 Constitution*** prohibits arbitrary classification. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT i. ***Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (2019) 4 SCC 17*** Held IBC constitutional. Recognized distinction between financial and operational creditors. ii. ***K. Sashidhar v. Indian Overseas Bank*** Held adjudicating authority cannot interfere with CoC commercial decisions. iii. ***ArcelorMittal India Pvt. Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta (2019) 2 SCC 1*** Interpreted Section 29A strictly. Emphasized clean hands doctrine. iv. ***Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank (2018) 1 SCC 407*** Recognized time-bound resolution objective. ## J) JUDGMENT #### a. RATIO DECIDENDI i. The Court held that **commercial wisdom of CoC is non-justiciable** except on limited grounds. Judicial review is confined to ***Section 30(2) compliance***. ii. Equitable treatment does not mean equal treatment. Differential treatment among secured and unsecured creditors is permissible. iii. NCLAT exceeded jurisdiction by reallocating distribution. It acted beyond statutory limits. iv. The 2019 Amendment is constitutionally valid. It clarifies distribution principles. v. Security interest can be considered during resolution. #### b. OBITER DICTA i. The Court observed that insolvency law must balance revival and maximization of value. ii. It stressed importance of timelines. Delays erode asset value. #### c. GUIDELINES i. Adjudicating authority cannot modify distribution. ii. CoC decisions must respect minimum statutory safeguards. iii. Operational creditors must receive at least liquidation value. iv. Amendments apply to pending proceedings. ## K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment restored primacy of financial creditors. It reinforced contractual autonomy within statutory bounds. It limited judicial intervention. It harmonized economic theory with constitutional equality. The decision strengthened predictability in insolvency regime. It aligned Indian insolvency law with global standards. ## L) REFERENCES #### a. Important Cases Referred i. ***Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (2019) 4 SCC 17*** ii. ***K. Sashidhar v. Indian Overseas Bank (2019 SCC OnLine SC 257)*** iii. ***ArcelorMittal India Pvt. Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta (2019) 2 SCC 1*** iv. ***Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank (2018) 1 SCC 407*** v. ***Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality (1969) 2 SCC 283*** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [State Tax Officer (1) v. Rainbow Papers Limited, Civil Appeal No. 1661 of 2020](https://lawfoyer.in/state-tax-officer-1-v-rainbow-papers-limited-civil-appeal-no-1661-of-2020/) **Published:** May 18, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The present judgment in ***State Tax Officer (1) v. Rainbow Papers Limited, Civil Appeal No. 1661 of 2020*** decided on ***6 September 2022*** by the ***Supreme Court of India*** addresses a significant conflict between the ***Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016*** and the ***Gujarat Value Added Tax Act, 2003***. The core issue concerns whether statutory dues owed to the State Government under ***Section 48 of the GVAT Act***, which creates a first charge over the property of the dealer, can be ignored in a resolution plan approved under the IBC. The Court examined the status of the State as a secured creditor and analyzed whether ***Section 53 of the IBC*** overrides statutory first charges created by State enactments. The Court held that statutory dues secured by operation of law fall within the definition of ***“secured creditor” under Section 3(30) read with Section 3(31) of the IBC***. It ruled that delay in filing a claim cannot extinguish statutory dues. The resolution plan was set aside for non-compliance with ***Section 30(2) of the IBC***. The decision reinforces that statutory authorities cannot be deprived of secured status merely due to procedural delays. **Keywords:** Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, Secured Creditor, Statutory Dues, Section 53 IBC, GVAT Act, Resolution Plan. ## B) CASE DETAILS i) Judgement Cause Title ***State Tax Officer (1) v. Rainbow Papers Limited*** ii) Case Number ***Civil Appeal No. 1661 of 2020*** iii) Judgement Date ***6 September 2022*** iv) Court ***Supreme Court of India*** v) Quorum ***Justice Indira Banerjee*** and ***Justice A.S. Bopanna*** vi) Author ***Justice Indira Banerjee*** vii) Citation ***(2022) SCC Online SC 1162*** viii) Legal Provisions Involved ***Sections 3(30), 3(31), 30, 31, 53, 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016*** ***Section 48 of the Gujarat Value Added Tax Act, 2003*** Relevant provisions of ***IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016*** ix) Judgments overruled by the Case Impugned order of ***NCLAT dated 19 December 2019*** set aside. x) Law Subjects Insolvency Law. Taxation Law. Corporate Law. Constitutional Law. ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The dispute emerged during Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process under ***Section 9 of the IBC***. The respondent company owed substantial VAT and CST dues to the State of Gujarat. Recovery proceedings were initiated before CIRP admission. Meanwhile, an operational creditor triggered insolvency. The Resolution Professional invited claims. The State filed its claim beyond the stipulated time. The Resolution Plan ignored statutory dues. The NCLT rejected the State’s application. The NCLAT affirmed. It held that ***Section 48 of the GVAT Act*** cannot override ***Section 53 of the IBC***. It further held that the State was not a secured creditor. The Supreme Court examined whether such reasoning was legally sustainable. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The respondent company carried on manufacturing business in Gujarat. It accumulated VAT and CST dues amounting to approximately Rs.53 crores. Recovery proceedings commenced in July 2016. Property was attached in October 2018. CIRP was initiated on 12 September 2017. Public announcement invited claims. The State filed Form B claiming Rs.47 crores. The claim was beyond prescribed date. Meanwhile, Committee of Creditors approved a Resolution Plan with 79.79% vote share. The Resolution Professional informed the State that its claim stood waived. The State challenged this before NCLT. The application was rejected. The NCLAT dismissed the appeal holding that Government cannot claim first charge over property in view of ***Section 53 of the IBC*** . ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether ***Section 53 of the IBC*** overrides ***Section 48 of the GVAT Act***. ii. Whether the State qualifies as a ***secured creditor under Section 3(30) IBC***. iii. Whether delay in filing claim extinguishes statutory dues. iv. Whether the Resolution Plan complied with ***Section 30(2) of the IBC***. ## F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Petitioner submitted that statutory charge under ***Section 48 GVAT Act*** creates security interest by operation of law. They relied on ***Section 3(31) IBC*** defining security interest broadly. The definition includes any right or claim created by transaction securing payment. They argued statutory charge amounts to encumbrance. Reliance was placed on ***Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17***. It was argued that RP has no adjudicatory power. RP must collate claims. It was contended that non inclusion of statutory dues violates ***Section 30(2)(e) IBC***. Resolution Plan cannot contravene law. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Respondent submitted that IBC is complete code. They argued that waterfall under ***Section 53 IBC*** governs priority. Government dues rank lower. They relied on principle laid down in ***Ghanshyam Mishra & Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd., (2021) 9 SCC 657***. They argued commercial wisdom of CoC is paramount. Once plan approved under ***Section 31 IBC***, it binds all stakeholders. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. ***Section 48 GVAT Act*** creates first charge over property. ii. ***Section 3(30) and 3(31) IBC*** define secured creditor and security interest. iii. ***Section 30(2) IBC*** mandates compliance with law. iv. ***Section 31 IBC*** requires Adjudicating Authority satisfaction. v. ***Section 53 IBC*** provides liquidation waterfall. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT i. **Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (2019) 4 SCC 17** Held that RP has administrative role. No adjudicatory power. ii. ***Ghanshyam Mishra & Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. (2021) 9 SCC 657*** Held approved resolution plan binds government authorities. iii. ***Ebix Singapore Pvt. Ltd. v. Committee of Creditors (2022) 2 SCC 401*** Held resolution plan must conform strictly to statutory framework. ## J) JUDGEMENT #### a. RATIO DECIDENDI i. The Court held that statutory charge under ***Section 48 GVAT Act*** creates security interest. ii. State qualifies as secured creditor under ***Section 3(30) IBC***. iii. Section 53 does not override Section 48. Both can coexist. iv. Delay in filing claim is not sole ground for rejection. v. Resolution Plan ignoring statutory dues violates ***Section 30(2) IBC***. #### b. OBITER DICTA i. Adjudicating Authority must apply mind before approval. ii. Use of word “shall” in ***Section 31(1) IBC*** implies mandatory approval only if conditions met. #### c. GUIDELINES i. Resolution Plan must account for statutory secured dues. ii. RP must verify books of accounts. iii. Claims cannot be rejected solely on delay. ## K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment affirms supremacy of statutory charges. It protects fiscal sovereignty of State. It narrows unchecked commercial wisdom. It balances insolvency objectives with tax recovery. ## L) REFERENCES a. Important Cases Referred i. ***Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (2019) 4 SCC 17*** ii. ***Ghanshyam Mishra & Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. (2021) 9 SCC 657*** iii. ***Ebix Singapore Pvt. Ltd. v. Committee of Creditors (2022) 2 SCC 401*** b. Important Statutes Referred i. ***Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016*** ii. ***Gujarat Value Added Tax Act, 2003*** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Mihir Rajesh Shah v. The State of Maharashtra, 2025 INSC 1288](https://lawfoyer.in/mihir-rajesh-shah-v-the-state-of-maharashtra-2025-insc-1288/) **Published:** May 18, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The Supreme Court in ***Mihir Rajesh Shah v. The State of Maharashtra***, 2025 INSC 1288, authoritatively settled the constitutional position concerning communication of grounds of arrest under ***Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India*** and ***Section 47 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023***. The principal controversy revolved around whether failure to furnish written grounds of arrest vitiates arrest in all cases, including offences under the ***Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023***. The Court harmonized its earlier pronouncements in ***Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576***, ***Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254***, and ***Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2025) 5 SCC 799***. The Court declared that furnishing grounds of arrest is a mandatory constitutional safeguard applicable to all offences. Written communication is the norm. However, in exceptional situations such as offences committed in flagrante delicto, oral communication may suffice temporarily, provided written grounds are supplied within reasonable time and at least two hours prior to remand production. Non-compliance renders arrest illegal. The judgment balances liberty and effective policing. It constitutionalizes procedural fairness in arrest jurisprudence. **Keywords:** Article 22(1); Grounds of Arrest; BNSS 2023; Personal Liberty; Written Communication; Remand Proceedings. ## B) CASE DETAILS **i) Judgment Cause Title:** *Mihir Rajesh Shah v. The State of Maharashtra and Another* **ii) Case Number:** Criminal Appeal No. 2195 of 2025 (with connected matters) **iii) Judgment Date:** 06 November 2025 **iv) Court:** Supreme Court of India **v) Quorum:** Justice Augustine George Masih Justice B.R. Gavai **vi) Author:** Justice Augustine George Masih **vii) Citation:** 2025 INSC 1288 **viii) Legal Provisions Involved:** ***Article 21 and Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India*** ***Section 47 and Section 48 of BNSS 2023*** ***Section 50 and Section 50A CrPC 1973*** ***Section 187 BNSS 2023*** **ix) Judgments Overruled:** Delhi High Court in *Moin Akhtar Qureshi v. Union of India* Bombay High Court in *Chhagan Chandrakant Bhujbal v. Union of India* **x) Related Law Subjects:** Constitutional Law Criminal Law Human Rights Jurisprudence Procedural Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The case arose from a tragic motor vehicle collision in Mumbai. The appellant allegedly drove recklessly. The victim died due to injuries. FIR was registered under ***Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023*** provisions. The appellant challenged arrest legality. He claimed violation of ***Article 22(1)***. He argued written grounds were not furnished. The Bombay High Court upheld arrest despite lapse. The matter reached Supreme Court. Notice was limited to legal question. The Court examined constitutional mandate. It scrutinized jurisprudence on arrest safeguards. The case thus transformed into constitutional clarification. It aimed to remove ambiguity. The Court balanced liberty and enforcement duties. The judgment assumed precedential significance. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The incident occurred on 07 July 2024. A white BMW collided with scooter. The complainant survived. His wife died. CCTV footage identified vehicle. Investigation linked appellant. Arrest followed on 09 July 2024. Police produced him before Magistrate. Police custody granted. Subsequently judicial custody followed. Appellant contended he was not furnished written grounds. He invoked ***Section 47 BNSS 2023***. He relied on ***Pankaj Bansal (2024) 7 SCC 576***. High Court acknowledged lapse. Yet custody was sustained. High Court reasoned appellant knew allegations. It emphasized seriousness. Appellant appealed. Supreme Court confined hearing to constitutional issue. It did not reappreciate evidence. The matter became purely legal adjudication. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether written communication of grounds of arrest is mandatory in all offences including BNS offences. ii. Whether non-supply of written grounds immediately vitiates arrest. iii. Whether exceptional circumstances permit oral communication temporarily. iv. Whether subsequent remand cures unconstitutional arrest. ## F) PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Petitioner submitted that ***Article 22(1)*** mandates meaningful communication. They relied on ***Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India (2024) 7 SCC 576***. That judgment required written grounds. They cited ***Prabir Purkayastha (2024) 8 SCC 254***. They argued right applies universally. They contended constitutional safeguard is absolute. They emphasized written grounds prevent disputes. They asserted oral reading is inadequate. They cited ***Vihaan Kumar (2025) 5 SCC 799***. They argued filing charge-sheet cannot cure illegality. They invoked ***Article 21***. They stressed liberty is sacrosanct. They sought declaration of arrest as void. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Respondent submitted that statute does not specify mode. They distinguished PMLA cases. They argued special statutes differ. They claimed practical difficulties exist. They contended Article 22 requires only communication. They denied written mandate universally. They relied on administrative practicality. They argued remand validated custody. They urged balancing approach. They submitted investigation integrity matters. They opposed blanket invalidation. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. ***Article 22(1) of Constitution*** mandates grounds communication. It protects against arbitrary detention. It complements ***Article 21***. ii. ***Section 47 BNSS 2023*** requires forthwith communication. iii. ***Section 48 BNSS 2023*** mandates informing relatives. iv. ***Section 187 BNSS 2023*** governs remand procedure. v. Preventive detention jurisprudence under ***Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra*** applied by analogy. These provisions embody procedural fairness. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT i. ***Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576*** Held written grounds mandatory under PMLA. Emphasized meaningful communication. ii. ***Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254*** Extended written requirement to UAPA arrests. iii. ***Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2025) 5 SCC 799*** Clarified arrest unconstitutional if grounds not supplied. iv. ***Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P., (1994) 4 SCC 260*** Arrest not routine power. Liberty must prevail. v. ***Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273*** Warned against unnecessary arrests. vi. ***Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra*** Grounds must be in language understood. ## J) JUDGMENT #### a) RATIO DECIDENDI i. Communication of grounds is mandatory in all offences. ii. Grounds must be in writing ordinarily. iii. Written grounds must be in language understood. iv. In exceptional cases oral communication may suffice temporarily. v. Written grounds must be furnished within reasonable time. vi. In any event at least two hours before remand production. vii. Non-compliance renders arrest illegal. viii. Remand cannot cure unconstitutional arrest. The Court harmonized precedents. It struck balance between liberty and investigation. It constitutionalized written communication as norm. #### b) OBITER DICTA i. Arrest carries social stigma. ii. Overcrowded prisons affect dignity. iii. Police must avoid colonial mindset. iv. Magistrates must not act mechanically. v. Legal aid must be ensured at remand stage. #### c) GUIDELINES i. Written grounds mandatory in all statutes. ii. Grounds in language understood. iii. Oral communication only in exceptional urgency. iv. Written grounds within reasonable time. v. At least two hours before remand. vi. Magistrate must verify compliance. vii. Non-compliance results in release. viii. Subsequent remand application permissible after compliance. ## K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment deepens constitutional criminal procedure. It affirms liberty supremacy. It harmonizes prior rulings. It prevents arbitrary arrest. It preserves investigative efficacy. It clarifies timeline obligation. It strengthens magistrate oversight. It operationalizes Article 22. It reinforces Article 21 dignity doctrine. It aligns with ICCPR Article 9. It ensures procedural fairness. It will guide future arrests. It elevates written communication as constitutional culture. ## L) REFERENCES #### a) Important Cases Referred i. *Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India*, (2024) 7 SCC 576. ii. *Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi)*, (2024) 8 SCC 254. iii. *Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana*, (2025) 5 SCC 799. iv. *Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P.*, (1994) 4 SCC 260. v. *Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar*, (2014) 8 SCC 273. vi. *Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra*, AIR 1962 SC 911. #### b) Important Statutes Referred i. Constitution of India, ***Article 21***, ***Article 22***. ii. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, ***Section 47***, ***Section 48***, ***Section 187***. iii. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, ***Section 50***, ***Section 50A***, ***Section 167***. iv. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, **Article 9**. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra AIR 2021 SC 1918](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-neeharika-infrastructure-pvt-ltd-v-state-of-maharashtra-air-2021-sc-1918/) **Published:** May 18, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The present judgment authoritatively delineates the contours of the ***inherent powers of the High Courts under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*** and ***Article 226 of the Constitution of India***, particularly in the context of granting interim protection such as “no coercive steps” during the pendency of petitions seeking quashing of FIRs. The Supreme Court examined whether High Courts are justified in restraining investigative agencies from taking coercive measures, including arrest, at the threshold stage of investigation. The case arose from serious allegations of forgery, cheating, and criminal conspiracy relating to the sale of immovable property. The Court undertook an exhaustive survey of precedents including ***R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866***, ***State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335***, and ***State of Telangana v. Habib Abdullah Jeelani, (2017) 2 SCC 779***. It reaffirmed that quashing of FIRs is an exceptional remedy. It further clarified that interim orders staying investigation or directing “no coercive steps” must not be passed mechanically or routinely. Such protection cannot be a substitute for anticipatory bail under ***Section 438 Cr.P.C.***. The judgment strengthens investigative autonomy while balancing judicial oversight. It establishes that interference at the investigation stage is permissible only in rarest circumstances. The ruling serves as a binding precedent guiding High Courts in criminal jurisdiction. **Keywords:** Inherent Powers, Section 482 Cr.P.C., Article 226, Quashing of FIR, No Coercive Steps, Police Investigation, Anticipatory Bail. ## B) CASE DETAILS i) **Judgement Cause Title:** *M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.* ii) **Case Number:** Criminal Appeal No. 330 of 2021 iii) **Judgement Date:** 13 April 2021 iv) **Court:** Supreme Court of India v) **Quorum:** Justice M.R. Shah, Justice Sanjiv Khanna, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud vi) **Author:** Justice M.R. Shah vii) **Citation:** AIR 2021 SC 1918; AIR ONLINE 2021 SC 192 viii) **Legal Provisions Involved:** - ***Section 482 Cr.P.C.*** - ***Section 438 Cr.P.C.*** - ***Sections 154, 156, 173 Cr.P.C.*** - ***Sections 406, 420, 465, 468, 471, 120B IPC*** - ***Article 226 of the Constitution of India*** ix) Judgments overruled: None expressly overruled. Clarificatory and consolidatory ruling. x) Law Subjects: Criminal Law, Constitutional Law, Criminal Procedure Law. ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The appeal arose against an interim order of the Bombay High Court. The High Court directed that ***“no coercive measures shall be adopted”*** against the accused. The direction was issued during pendency of a quashing petition. The FIR alleged offences under ***Sections 406, 420, 465, 468, 471 and 120B IPC***. The allegations concerned forgery of board resolutions. It involved fraudulent sale of valuable property. The accused had already sought anticipatory bail under ***Section 438 Cr.P.C.***. Interim protection from arrest was granted by the Sessions Court. That protection continued for nearly one year. During this period, investigation progressed slowly. The complainant alleged non-cooperation by accused. Despite this, the accused filed a writ petition under ***Article 226 read with Section 482 Cr.P.C.***. The High Court granted time for filing reply. Simultaneously, it restrained coercive steps. The complainant challenged this interim order before the Supreme Court. The principal question concerned judicial interference at investigation stage. The Court examined whether such blanket interim protection is permissible in law. The background reflected tension between investigative autonomy and judicial control. The Court therefore undertook a comprehensive doctrinal analysis. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellant company lodged FIR No. 367/2019. The FIR was registered at Worli Police Station, Mumbai. The complaint alleged forgery of board resolutions. It alleged fraudulent transfer of Naziribagh Palace property. The property measured approximately 111,882 sq. ft. The offences invoked were serious. They included ***criminal breach of trust under Section 406 IPC*** and ***cheating under Section 420 IPC***. Forgery provisions under ***Sections 465, 468 and 471 IPC*** were also invoked. Criminal conspiracy under ***Section 120B IPC*** was alleged. The investigation was transferred to Economic Offences Wing. The accused apprehended arrest. They moved anticipatory bail application. Interim protection was granted by Sessions Court. The accused allegedly did not cooperate fully. After nearly one year, accused filed quashing petition. The High Court adjourned matter. It passed interim order restraining coercive measures. The complainant argued that such order crippled investigation. It was contended that High Court did not assign reasons. The Supreme Court examined the legality of this interim direction. It confined analysis to jurisdictional issue. It did not decide merits of FIR. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i) Whether High Courts can grant blanket “no coercive steps” orders during investigation? ii) Whether such interim protection can be granted without satisfying parameters of ***Section 438 Cr.P.C.***? iii) Whether inherent powers under ***Section 482 Cr.P.C.*** extend to staying arrest mechanically? iv) What are limits of judicial interference at investigation stage? v) Whether interim stay requires reasoned order demonstrating exceptional circumstances? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsel for appellant submitted that the High Court order was mechanical. It lacked reasoning. It ignored seriousness of offences. The FIR disclosed cognizable offences. Therefore investigation must proceed unhindered. Reliance was placed on ***State of Telangana v. Habib Abdullah Jeelani (2017) 2 SCC 779***. The Court there held inherent powers must be exercised sparingly. The appellant argued that blanket protection frustrates investigation. It becomes substitute for anticipatory bail. Reference was made to ***State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335)***. The parameters for quashing were reiterated. The appellant contended that unless case falls within Bhajan Lal categories, no interference is justified. It was argued that police possess statutory right under ***Section 156 Cr.P.C.*** to investigate cognizable offences. Reliance was placed on ***King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad AIR 1945 PC 18***. The Privy Council held judiciary should not interfere with police investigation. The appellant further relied on ***Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd. v. CBI (2018) 16 SCC 299***. The Supreme Court held that stay of criminal proceedings must be reasoned and exceptional. Thus interim orders must disclose application of mind. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for respondents submitted that High Court powers are wide. They arise under ***Article 226*** and ***Section 482 Cr.P.C.***. These powers aim to prevent abuse of process. Reliance was placed on ***State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699***. It was argued that proceedings should not degenerate into harassment. If FIR is abuse of process, interim protection is justified. Reference was also made to ***Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor (2013) 3 SCC 330***. The step-wise test for quashing was cited. The respondents contended that similar reasoning applies for interim stay. It was argued that civil dispute was given criminal colour. Therefore coercive measures would cause irreparable harm. Interim protection was necessary to preserve liberty. However respondents conceded that speaking order is desirable. They submitted that discretion of High Court should not be curtailed rigidly. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i) ***Section 482 Cr.P.C.*** preserves inherent powers. It prevents abuse of process. It secures ends of justice. However it does not confer unlimited jurisdiction. ii) ***Section 438 Cr.P.C.*** governs anticipatory bail. It prescribes conditions. Satisfaction of court is mandatory. Interim protection must align with statutory safeguards. iii) ***Sections 154 and 156 Cr.P.C.*** mandate registration and investigation of cognizable offences. Police duty arises once information discloses offence. iv) ***Article 226 of the Constitution*** empowers High Courts to issue writs. Yet criminal investigation is primarily executive domain. The Court harmonised these provisions. It emphasised separation of investigative and judicial functions. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT The Court exhaustively analysed binding precedents. In ***R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866***, three categories for quashing were identified. Legal bar. Absence of offence. Lack of evidence. In ***State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335)***, seven illustrative categories were laid down. These govern quashing jurisdiction. In ***Golconda Linga Swamy (2004) 6 SCC 522***, it was held inherent power is exception not rule. Courts must avoid stifling legitimate prosecution. In ***Sanapareddy Maheedhar Seshagiri (2007) 13 SCC 165***, caution against interfering at threshold was reiterated. Judicial intervention at early stage harms societal interest. In ***P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement (2019) 9 SCC 24***, it was observed that blanket orders insulating accused from arrest reduce interrogation to ritual. These precedents collectively shaped the ratio of present case. ## J) JUDGEMENT #### a) RATIO DECIDENDI i) High Courts should not pass blanket “no coercive steps” orders. ii) Such orders require exceptional circumstances. iii) Reasons must be recorded briefly. iv) Investigation of cognizable offence is statutory right of police. v) Inherent powers cannot substitute anticipatory bail. vi) Courts must not stall investigation mechanically. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. It set aside the impugned interim order. It framed guiding principles restricting routine interference. #### b) OBITER DICTA i) Judicial discipline requires adherence to precedent. ii) High Courts must avoid granting protection while dismissing quashing petitions. iii) Interim orders should not extend indefinitely. #### c) GUIDELINES The Court crystallised principles: 1. Police have statutory right to investigate. 2. Courts should not thwart investigation at threshold. 3. Interim protection must be reasoned. 4. No blanket protection without exceptional case. 5. High Courts must apply Bhajan Lal parameters even at interim stage. 6. Accused should ordinarily seek remedy under ***Section 438 Cr.P.C.***. These guidelines now bind all courts under ***Article 141 of the Constitution***. ## K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The ruling fortifies investigative autonomy. It curbs routine judicial interference. It harmonises liberty and societal interest. It clarifies that inherent powers are residual. They are not parallel bail jurisdiction. The judgment strengthens rule of law. It ensures criminal process is not prematurely throttled. It preserves constitutional balance between judiciary and executive. ## L) REFERENCES #### a) Important Cases Referred i) ***R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866***. ii) ***State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335***. iii) ***State of Telangana v. Habib Abdullah Jeelani, (2017) 2 SCC 779***. iv) ***Golconda Linga Swamy v. State of A.P., (2004) 6 SCC 522***. v) ***P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019) 9 SCC 24***. #### b) Important Statutes Referred i) ***Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973***. ii) ***Indian Penal Code, 1860***. iii) ***Constitution of India, 1950***. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Mission Accessibility v. Union of India & Ors., 2025 INSC 1376](https://lawfoyer.in/mission-accessibility-v-union-of-india-ors-2025-insc-1376/) **Published:** May 18, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The present writ petition in ***Mission Accessibility v. Union of India & Ors., 2025 INSC 1376*** concerns the enforcement of substantive equality for persons with disabilities in the conduct of the Civil Services Examination by the Union Public Service Commission. The petitioner organisation sought structural reforms in the examination process. It challenged the mandatory requirement of furnishing scribe details at the time of application submission. It also sought permission for the use of laptops equipped with screen reader software and accessible digital question papers. The Supreme Court examined the constitutional mandate under ***Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India*** along with the scheme of the ***Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016***. The Court recognised that formal equality is insufficient. It emphasised the doctrine of substantive inclusion. The Court recorded the in-principle decision of UPSC to introduce screen reader facilities. However, it noted absence of a concrete roadmap. The Court issued structured directions for time-bound compliance. It mandated uniform guidelines. It required inter-agency coordination. The judgment reinforces accessibility as a constitutional imperative. It strengthens participatory justice in public recruitment. **Keywords:** Disability Rights, Substantive Equality, Screen Reader Software, Scribe Policy, Public Examinations, Constitutional Mandate. ## **B) CASE DETAILS** i) **Judgement Cause Title:** *Mission Accessibility v. Union of India & Ors.* ii) **Case Number:** Writ Petition (C) No(s). 206 of 2025 iii) **Judgement Date:** 03 December 2025 iv) **Court:** Supreme Court of India v) **Quorum:** Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vikram Nath and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Mehta vi) **Author:** Justice Sandeep Mehta vii) **Citation:** 2025 INSC 1376 viii) **Legal Provisions Involved:** *Articles 14, 16, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India*; *Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016*; Civil Services Examination Rules, 2025 ix) **Judgments Overruled:** None x) **Law Subjects:** Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Disability Law; Service Law; Human Rights Law ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The petition arose from structural barriers in Civil Services Examination procedures. The petitioner organisation works for disability rights. It invoked writ jurisdiction under ***Article 32 of the Constitution***. The grievance concerned rigid scribe registration timelines. It also concerned denial of screen reader facilities. The challenge rested on substantive equality. The Court emphasised that equality requires removal of barriers. It relied on the transformative nature of the Constitution. In ***Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India (2016) 7 SCC 761***, the Supreme Court held dignity forms part of ***Article 21***. That principle informed the present reasoning. Accessibility was treated as intrinsic to dignity. The petitioner argued that procedural inflexibility defeats equal opportunity. The background reflects increasing digitisation of examinations. Yet infrastructure for accessibility lagged. The case thus examined whether constitutional guarantees impose positive obligations on examining authorities. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The petitioner challenged the Civil Services Examination Rules, 2025. The Rules required scribe details during application submission. Candidates could not modify scribe details later. Several PwBD candidates faced hardship. Around twenty-seven candidates sought change of scribe. UPSC issued a press note permitting limited change requests. However, no clarity existed on screen reader facilities. The preliminary examination was scheduled for 25 May 2025. UPSC filed affidavits before the Court. It later took an in-principle decision to introduce screen reader software. It cited logistical constraints. It relied on dependency on State infrastructure. The Court examined these affidavits carefully. It found partial redressal of grievances. Yet implementation remained uncertain. The absence of a timeline caused concern. Hence, judicial intervention continued. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether mandatory early disclosure of scribe details violates ***Articles 14 and 16***. ii. Whether denial of screen reader facility infringes ***Article 21***. iii. Whether UPSC has statutory obligations under the ***Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016***. iv. Whether policy decisions require judicial monitoring for effective implementation. The issues revolve around substantive equality. In ***Vikash Kumar v. UPSC (2021) 5 SCC 370***, the Court held that reasonable accommodation is a constitutional duty. That precedent directly influenced the present controversy. It recognised that scribes are facilitative rights. The present case extended that reasoning to digital assistive technology. ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioner submitted that the impugned requirement was arbitrary. They argued it violated ***Articles 14, 16 and 21***. They relied on ***Section 20 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016***. That provision mandates non-discrimination in employment. Civil services recruitment falls within employment access. They cited ***Vikash Kumar v. UPSC (2021) 5 SCC 370***. The Court there held reasonable accommodation is enforceable. They argued screen readers constitute reasonable accommodation. They invoked India’s obligations under the ***UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities***. Article 9 of the Convention mandates accessibility. They submitted that rigid timelines defeat fairness. They sought structural guidelines. They emphasised dignity and equal participation. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that UPSC had issued a press note. They allowed change of scribe till 18 May 2025. They assured objective consideration. They contended logistical constraints prevented immediate screen reader deployment. They emphasised exam integrity and confidentiality. They argued UPSC lacks independent infrastructure. It depends on State authorities. They assured future implementation after testing. They submitted that policy decisions require phased execution. They sought reasonable time. They did not dispute constitutional commitment. They only pleaded administrative feasibility. They undertook coordination with DEPwD and NIEPVD. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. ***Article 14 of the Constitution of India*** guarantees equality before law. It forbids arbitrariness. In ***E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 4 SCC 3***, arbitrariness was equated with inequality. That principle applies to rigid procedures. ii. ***Article 16*** ensures equal opportunity in public employment. Denial of assistive technology limits opportunity. iii. ***Article 21*** protects dignity and autonomy. In ***Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1***, dignity was central. iv. ***Sections 3 and 20 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016*** mandate equality and non-discrimination. v. ***Section 16*** imposes duty on authorities to ensure inclusive education and accessibility. These provisions collectively impose positive duties. ## **I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT IN THIS CASE** The Court relied upon ***Vikash Kumar v. UPSC (2021) 5 SCC 370***. It held scribes are part of reasonable accommodation. The Court stressed substantive equality. It declared that benchmarks cannot defeat accommodation. The reasoning echoes ***Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India (2016) 7 SCC 761***. That case recognised dignity of persons with disabilities. It held discriminatory treatment violates ***Article 21***. The Court’s approach aligns with ***National Federation of the Blind v. UPSC (2014) 10 SCC 772***. There, reservation in civil services was enforced. It affirmed statutory rights under disability law. These precedents shaped judicial thinking in the present case. ## **J) JUDGEMENT** a. **RATIO DECIDENDI** The Court held accessibility is a constitutional mandate. It recognised UPSC’s in-principle decision. However, it required structured compliance. It directed inclusion of scribe change facility up to seven days before examination. It mandated reasoned orders within three working days. It ordered filing of compliance affidavit within two months. It required uniform guidelines with DEPwD and NIEPVD. It emphasised maintenance of examination sanctity. The ratio rests on substantive equality. It reinforces positive state obligation. It bridges policy intent and enforceable rights. b. **OBITER DICTA** The Court observed inclusivity measures true governance quality. It remarked rights are not benevolence. They are constitutional promises. It emphasised faithful implementation. It urged sensitivity and expedition. These observations strengthen disability jurisprudence. c. **GUIDELINES** i. Scribe change permitted up to seven days before examination. ii. Disposal within three working days by reasoned order. iii. Compliance affidavit within two months. iv. Uniform protocols with DEPwD and NIEPVD. v. Ensure accessibility without compromising confidentiality. These directions institutionalise accountability. ## **K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The decision deepens transformative constitutionalism. It operationalises reasonable accommodation. It strengthens disability inclusion in public recruitment. The Court balanced feasibility with rights. It avoided micromanagement. Yet it insisted on timelines. The judgment harmonises administrative autonomy with constitutional duty. It reflects evolving disability jurisprudence. It affirms that equality demands structural change. It signals that accessibility cannot remain aspirational. It must become enforceable reality. ## **L) REFERENCES** a. **Important Cases Referred** i. ***Vikash Kumar v. UPSC (2021) 5 SCC 370***. ii. ***Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India (2016) 7 SCC 761***. iii. ***National Federation of the Blind v. UPSC (2014) 10 SCC 772***. iv. ***E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 4 SCC 3***. v. ***Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1***. b. **Important Statutes Referred** i. ***Constitution of India***. ii. ***Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016***. iii. ***Civil Services Examination Rules, 2025***. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, AIR 2020 SC 3717](https://lawfoyer.in/vineeta-sharma-v-rakesh-sharma-air-2020-sc-3717/) **Published:** May 14, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The Constitution Bench judgment in ****Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma**** represents one of the most transformative rulings in modern Hindu succession jurisprudence. The Supreme Court conclusively interpreted the amended ****Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956**** as substituted by the ***Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005***. The principal issue concerned whether a daughter could claim coparcenary rights in ancestral property when the father had died before the commencement of the 2005 amendment. Conflicting judicial precedents had created uncertainty regarding the retrospective or prospective operation of the amendment. The Court examined earlier judgments including ****Prakash v. Phulavati (2016) 2 SCC 36**** and ****Danamma @ Suman Surpur v. Amar (2018) 3 SCC 343****. These decisions adopted inconsistent approaches regarding the requirement that the father must be alive on 9 September 2005 for daughters to obtain coparcenary rights. The Constitution Bench resolved this conflict by holding that the right conferred upon daughters is acquired **by birth**. Therefore, the father’s living status on the date of amendment is irrelevant. The Court recognized the constitutional vision of gender equality embedded within the amendment. It emphasized that the amendment sought removal of historical discrimination against daughters in Mitakshara coparcenary property. The judgment harmonized personal law with constitutional guarantees under ****Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India****. The ruling also clarified the concept of partition under Hindu law. The Court held that only partitions effected through registered partition deeds or decrees of courts before 20 December 2004 would remain protected. Oral partitions would generally not defeat daughters’ rights unless supported by exceptional evidence. The judgment substantially advanced women’s property rights in India. It reinforced constitutional morality and dismantled patriarchal limitations embedded in traditional coparcenary structures. The decision now stands as the definitive authority on daughters’ coparcenary rights under Hindu succession law. **Keywords:** Coparcenary rights, Hindu Succession Act, daughter’s inheritance, ancestral property, gender equality, retrospective application. ## B) CASE DETAILS #### i) Judgement Cause Title ****Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma and Others**** #### ii) Case Number Civil Appeal Diary No. 32601 of 2018 with connected matters. #### iii) Judgement Date 11 August 2020. #### iv) Court ****Supreme Court of India**** #### v) Quorum Justice Arun Mishra Justice S. Abdul Nazeer Justice M.R. Shah. #### vi) Author Justice Arun Mishra. #### vii) Citation (2020) 9 SCC 1. #### viii) Legal Provisions Involved - ****Section 6 Hindu Succession Act, 1956**** - ****Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005**** - ****Articles 14, 15 and 21 Constitution of India**** - ****Section 8 Hindu Succession Act, 1956**** #### ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case - ****Prakash v. Phulavati (2016) 2 SCC 36**** partially overruled. - Clarified inconsistency in ****Danamma @ Suman Surpur v. Amar (2018) 3 SCC 343****. #### x) Law Subjects Hindu Law, Succession Law, Constitutional Law, Women’s Rights. ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The Mitakshara coparcenary system historically excluded daughters from equal inheritance rights in ancestral property. Under classical Hindu law, only male members acquired coparcenary rights by birth. Daughters remained dependent upon limited inheritance entitlements. This gender-based discrimination increasingly conflicted with constitutional principles of equality. Parliament responded through the ****Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005****. The amendment substituted Section 6 and granted daughters equal coparcenary status “by birth.” Despite the amendment, interpretative disputes emerged. In ****Prakash v. Phulavati (2016) 2 SCC 36****, the Supreme Court held that the father must be alive on 9 September 2005 for the daughter to claim coparcenary rights. However, ****Danamma @ Suman Surpur v. Amar (2018) 3 SCC 343**** granted daughters coparcenary rights even though the father had died earlier. These conflicting judgments created widespread confusion. The present Constitution Bench was constituted to settle the law authoritatively. The Court examined the nature of coparcenary rights, the legislative intent behind the amendment, and constitutional principles underlying gender equality. The judgment ultimately recognized that daughters possess coparcenary rights by birth irrespective of whether the father survived on the amendment date. This interpretation fundamentally transformed inheritance jurisprudence in India. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The dispute arose from partition and inheritance claims within Hindu joint family property governed by Mitakshara law. The appellants, being daughters of coparceners, sought equal rights in ancestral property under the amended ****Section 6 Hindu Succession Act, 1956****. The central controversy concerned whether daughters could claim coparcenary rights when the father had died before the commencement of the ***2005 Amendment***. Different High Courts had delivered inconsistent judgments. Conflicting Supreme Court precedents further complicated the legal position. The appellants argued that the amendment conferred rights by birth and therefore applied irrespective of the father’s survival status. The respondents contended that coparcenary rights could arise only if both daughter and father were alive on 9 September 2005. The Supreme Court clubbed multiple connected matters involving similar questions of law. The Constitution Bench therefore examined the broader constitutional and statutory framework governing daughters’ inheritance rights. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the amended ****Section 6 Hindu Succession Act**** confers coparcenary rights upon daughters by birth. ii. Whether the father must be alive on 9 September 2005 for daughters to claim coparcenary rights. iii. Whether the 2005 amendment operates retrospectively, prospectively, or retroactively. iv. Whether oral partitions can defeat daughters’ rights under the amended law. v. Whether the amendment advances constitutional guarantees of equality. ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS #### The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that The appellants argued that the amendment expressly grants daughters coparcenary rights “by birth.” Therefore, such rights are inherent and do not depend upon the father’s survival status. The appellants emphasized the constitutional objective behind the amendment. Parliament intended removal of historical discrimination against women in Hindu succession law. A restrictive interpretation would defeat legislative purpose. Reliance was placed on ****Articles 14 and 15 Constitution of India****. Gender equality constitutes a constitutional mandate. Personal law statutes must therefore receive progressive interpretation consistent with constitutional morality. The appellants also argued that coparcenary rights arise from birth itself. Since sons obtain rights by birth irrespective of the father’s survival, daughters must receive identical treatment. The appellants criticized the reasoning in ****Prakash v. Phulavati**** as inconsistent with statutory language. The amendment nowhere requires that the father must remain alive on the amendment date. The appellants further contended that oral partitions are frequently fabricated to defeat women’s inheritance claims. Therefore, only legally recognized partitions should receive protection. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS #### The counsels for Respondent submitted that The respondents argued that the amendment should apply prospectively from 9 September 2005. According to them, rights could arise only where both daughter and father were alive on the amendment date. The respondents relied heavily upon ****Prakash v. Phulavati (2016) 2 SCC 36****. That judgment interpreted the amendment prospectively and required the father’s survival. The respondents contended that retrospective application would unsettle completed partitions and succession arrangements finalized before 2005. It was further argued that Hindu coparcenary law traditionally vested rights through surviving coparcenary relationships. Once the father died before amendment commencement, succession already stood crystallized under the unamended law. The respondents therefore urged the Court to preserve legal certainty and avoid reopening settled inheritance disputes. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS #### i. ****Section 6 Hindu Succession Act, 1956**** Provides equal coparcenary rights to daughters in Hindu joint family property. #### ii. ****Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005**** Amended Section 6 to remove discrimination against daughters. #### iii. ****Article 14 Constitution of India**** Guarantees equality before law. #### iv. ****Article 15 Constitution of India**** Prohibits discrimination based on sex. #### v. ****Section 8 Hindu Succession Act, 1956**** Provides general rules of succession in Hindu intestate property. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT #### ****Prakash v. Phulavati, (2016) 2 SCC 36**** Held that the father must be alive on 9 September 2005 for daughters to claim coparcenary rights. This interpretation was overruled. #### ****Danamma @ Suman Surpur v. Amar, (2018) 3 SCC 343**** Granted daughters coparcenary rights despite father’s prior death. The Constitution Bench clarified and approved this broader approach. #### ****Ganduri Koteshwaramma v. Chakiri Yanadi, (2011) 9 SCC 788**** Recognized daughters’ entitlement to equal shares in partition proceedings after the amendment. #### ****State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Rao Sham Rao Deshmukh, (1985) 2 SCC 321**** Discussed principles governing coparcenary rights and partition. ## J) JUDGEMENT #### a. RATIO DECIDENDI i. The Supreme Court held that daughters acquire coparcenary rights ***by birth*** under amended Section 6. ii. The father’s survival on 9 September 2005 is irrelevant. iii. The amendment possesses retroactive operation. It applies to living daughters of living coparceners irrespective of birth date. iv. Coparcenary rights are not dependent upon the existence of the father on the amendment date. v. Only genuine partitions effected through registered instruments or court decrees before 20 December 2004 are protected. vi. Oral partitions ordinarily cannot defeat daughters’ rights unless proved through exceptional evidence. vii. The judgment in ****Prakash v. Phulavati**** was overruled to the extent it required the father’s survival. #### b. OBITER DICTA i. Gender discrimination in property rights violates constitutional morality. ii. Laws excluding daughters from coparcenary rights perpetuate patriarchal injustice. iii. Constitutional courts must interpret statutes consistently with equality principles. #### c. GUIDELINES 1. Daughters possess equal coparcenary rights by birth. 2. Father’s death before 2005 does not extinguish daughters’ rights. 3. Courts must scrutinize claims of oral partition carefully. 4. Pending partition suits must apply amended Section 6. 5. Equality principles must guide interpretation of succession law. ## K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment constitutes a watershed moment in Indian gender justice jurisprudence. The Supreme Court dismantled a deeply entrenched patriarchal limitation within Hindu coparcenary law. By recognizing daughters as coparceners by birth, the Court aligned personal law with constitutional equality guarantees. The ruling strengthened women’s economic security and inheritance autonomy. The judgment also demonstrated purposive statutory interpretation. The Court refused narrow literalism that would undermine legislative intent. Instead, it adopted an interpretation advancing social justice and constitutional morality. The ruling now serves as the definitive authority governing daughters’ rights in ancestral Hindu property across India. ## L) REFERENCES #### a. Important Cases Referred i. ****Prakash v. Phulavati, (2016) 2 SCC 36**** ii. ****Danamma @ Suman Surpur v. Amar, (2018) 3 SCC 343**** iii. ****Ganduri Koteshwaramma v. Chakiri Yanadi, (2011) 9 SCC 788**** iv. ****State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Rao Sham Rao Deshmukh, (1985) 2 SCC 321**** #### b. Important Statutes Referred i. ****Hindu Succession Act, 1956**** ii. ****Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005**** iii. ****Constitution of India**** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Daxaben v. State of Gujarat & Ors., Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1132–1155 of 2022](https://lawfoyer.in/daxaben-v-state-of-gujarat-ors-criminal-appeal-arising-out-of-slp-crl-no-1132-1155-of-2022/) **Published:** May 16, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The present judgment in ***Daxaben v. State of Gujarat & Ors.*****, Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 1132–1155 of 2022, decided on 29 July 2022** examines the scope of the inherent powers of the High Court under ***Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*** in the context of quashing an FIR registered for the grave offence under ***Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860***. The Supreme Court considered whether an FIR alleging abetment of suicide, a non-compoundable and serious offence, could be quashed solely on the basis of a monetary settlement between the accused and the informant. The High Court of Gujarat had quashed the FIR after recording a compromise between the complainant and the accused. The widow of the deceased challenged the order, asserting that she was not heard and that the offence in question was against society. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s orders, holding that offences under Section 306 IPC cannot be quashed merely because parties have entered into a settlement. The Court reaffirmed settled principles regarding inherent jurisdiction and emphasized the societal dimension of grave offences. **Keywords:** Abetment of Suicide, Section 306 IPC, Section 482 CrPC, Quashing of FIR, Non-Compoundable Offence, Settlement, Crime Against Society. ## B) CASE DETAILS i) Judgment Cause Title: ***Daxaben v. State of Gujarat & Ors.*** ii) Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. … of 2022 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 1132–1155 of 2022) iii) Judgment Date: 29 July 2022 iv) Court: ***Supreme Court of India*** v) Quorum: Hon’ble Justice Indira Banerjee and Hon’ble Justice V. Ramasubramanian vi) Author: Justice Indira Banerjee vii) Citation: 2022 SCC OnLine SC (as per judgment dated 29 July 2022) viii) Legal Provisions Involved: ***Sections 306 IPC***, ***Section 482 CrPC***, ***Section 320 CrPC*** ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case: None expressly overruled x) Related Law Subjects: Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, Inherent Jurisdiction, Crimes Against Society ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The appeals arose from orders of the Gujarat High Court. The High Court quashed an FIR alleging offence under ***Section 306 IPC***. The quashing was based on a compromise. The compromise was between the accused and the original informant. The informant was a cousin and accountant of the deceased. The widow of the deceased was not heard. The deceased allegedly committed suicide by consuming poison. A suicide note was recovered. The note named several accused. The allegation was cheating and financial harassment. The FIR invoked ***Section 306 IPC*** for abetment of suicide. The High Court exercised power under ***Section 482 CrPC***. It reasoned that settlement rendered trial futile. It held continuation would be abuse of process. The widow filed applications for recall. The High Court dismissed them. It termed her a third party. The Supreme Court examined legality of such approach. It considered whether grave non-compoundable offences can be quashed upon compromise. It also examined rights of victim’s widow. The judgment revisits settled principles on inherent jurisdiction. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The deceased Shaileshkumar Patel allegedly consumed poison in his office. A handwritten note was left. The note accused multiple persons. It alleged financial cheating. The amounts mentioned were substantial. The FIR was lodged by Pinakin Patel. He was cousin and accountant. The FIR alleged that accused cheated the deceased of Rs.2,35,73,200. The deceased was under financial distress. It was alleged that accused failed to repay dues. The deceased allegedly made repeated calls demanding money. The FIR invoked ***Section 306 IPC***. The accused approached the High Court. They filed applications under ***Section 482 CrPC***. They relied on settlement affidavits. The informant supported compromise. The High Court quashed the FIR. It held continuation would be abuse. The widow later sought recall. She claimed she was not heard. She alleged informant pocketed settlement money. The High Court refused recall. It held she was only a witness. The Supreme Court examined these findings. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether an FIR under ***Section 306 IPC*** can be quashed solely on compromise. ii. Whether High Court erred in exercising ***Section 482 CrPC*** power. iii. Whether widow of deceased was entitled to hearing. iv. Whether offence under Section 306 IPC is crime against society. ## F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Appellant submitted that ***Section 306 IPC*** is non-compoundable. They argued compromise is irrelevant. They relied on ***Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303***. They argued heinous offences cannot be quashed. They submitted abetment of suicide affects society. They emphasized widow’s right of hearing. They relied on ***State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan (2019) 5 SCC 688***. They argued High Court ignored gravity. They contended settlement was monetary. They argued financial settlements cannot override criminal law. They invoked public policy. They stressed that prosecution is between State and accused. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Respondents submitted settlement was voluntary. They relied on ***Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466***. They argued continuation would be futile. They contended dispute had civil flavour. They submitted no direct instigation alleged. They cited ***M. Arjunan v. State (2019) 3 SCC 315***. They argued essential ingredients missing. They contended widow was not informant. They justified quashing to prevent abuse. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. ***Section 306 IPC*** criminalizes abetment of suicide. It prescribes imprisonment up to ten years. It requires proof of instigation or intentional aid. The Court referred to ***Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618***. It defined instigation as goading or provoking. The Court noted mens rea is essential. The offence is grave. It impacts social fabric. It deters exploitation. ii. ***Section 482 CrPC*** preserves inherent powers. It allows quashing to prevent abuse. It does not create new powers. The Court cited ***Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi (1983) 1 SCC 1***. It held power is extraordinary. It must be exercised sparingly. The Court reiterated limits from ***Madhavrao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Angre (1988) 1 SCC 692***. The test is whether allegations disclose offence. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT i. The Court analysed ***Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303***. It held heinous offences cannot be quashed on settlement. ii. The Court relied on ***Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466***. It emphasized societal interest. iii. It cited ***Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat (2017) 9 SCC 641***. It summarized principles on compromise. iv. It referred to ***State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan (2019) 5 SCC 688***. It held serious offences are crimes against society. v. The Court also cited ***CBI v. Maninder Singh (2016) 1 SCC 389***. It stressed societal impact of serious crimes. ## J) JUDGEMENT #### a. RATIO DECIDENDI The Supreme Court held quashing was erroneous. It held ***Section 306 IPC*** offence is grave. It held such offence cannot be quashed on compromise. It observed prosecution is matter between State and accused. It held informant cannot withdraw serious offence. It held widow was prejudicially affected. It held High Court failed to consider gravity. It emphasized societal interest. It set aside High Court orders. #### b. OBITER DICTA The Court observed even indirect incitement may attract Section 306 IPC. It clarified it did not examine merits of allegations. It stressed careful exercise of ***Section 482 CrPC***. It cautioned against dangerous precedent. It warned wealthy accused may buy settlements. It emphasized deterrent purpose of penal law. #### c. GUIDELINES The Court reiterated settled principles. i. Inherent power is wide but exceptional. ii. Heinous offences cannot be quashed on compromise. iii. Societal interest overrides private settlement. iv. Offences like murder and abetment of suicide are crimes against society. v. High Court must assess gravity before quashing. ## K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces limits on inherent powers. It strengthens doctrine of crimes against society. It protects integrity of criminal justice. It affirms rights of victims’ families. It aligns with ***Gian Singh*** and ***Laxmi Narayan*** principles. It discourages monetary settlements in grave offences. It clarifies that Section 306 IPC stands on parity with Section 307 IPC. The decision advances public interest. It ensures deterrence remains effective. ## L) REFERENCES a. Important Cases Referred i. ***Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303***. ii. ***Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466***. iii. ***Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat (2017) 9 SCC 641***. iv. ***State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan (2019) 5 SCC 688***. v. ***M. Arjunan v. State (2019) 3 SCC 315***. vi. ***Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618***. b. Important Statutes Referred i. ***Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 306***. ii. ***Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 482 and 320*** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [The State of Odisha v. Pratima Mohanty & Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 1455–1456 of 2021](https://lawfoyer.in/the-state-of-odisha-v-pratima-mohanty-ors-criminal-appeal-nos-1455-1456-of-2021/) **Published:** May 16, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The decision in ***The State of Odisha v. Pratima Mohanty & Ors., Criminal Appeal Nos. 1455–1456 of 2021 (Supreme Court of India, 11 December 2021)*** examines the ambit of ***Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*** and the judicial restraint required while quashing criminal proceedings at a pre-trial stage. The controversy arose from alleged irregular allotment of prime plots under discretionary quota by officials of the Bhubaneswar Development Authority. The High Court had quashed proceedings against certain accused officials on the ground of lack of direct involvement. The Supreme Court reversed this finding. It held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by conducting a “mini-trial” while exercising inherent powers. The Court reiterated the principles laid down in ***State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604***. It emphasized that quashing is an exception and not a rule. Allegations of conspiracy, abuse of public office, and pecuniary loss to public exchequer warrant trial scrutiny. The judgment also contains significant observations on transparency in public distribution of state largesse. The Court cautioned against discretionary quotas that foster nepotism and corruption. It directed the accused to face trial. **Keywords:** Section 482 CrPC, Prevention of Corruption Act 1988, Criminal Conspiracy, Discretionary Quota, Abuse of Public Office, Public Accountability. ## **B) CASE DETAILS** i) Judgment Cause Title ***The State of Odisha v. Pratima Mohanty & Ors.*** ii) Case Number Criminal Appeal Nos. 1455–1456 of 2021 iii) Judgment Date 11 December 2021 iv) Court ***Supreme Court of India*** v) Quorum Hon’ble Justice M.R. Shah Hon’ble Justice B.V. Nagarathna vi) Author Justice M.R. Shah vii) Citation (2021) SCC OnLine SC — ; Decided on 11.12.2021 viii) Legal Provisions Involved ***Section 482 CrPC*** ***Section 120B IPC*** ***Section 420 IPC*** ***Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988*** ix) Judgments Overruled Impugned judgment of the Orissa High Court dated 04.09.2019 was set aside. x) Related Law Subjects Criminal Law Anti-Corruption Law Administrative Law Constitutional Governance ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The appeals arose from quashing of criminal proceedings by the Orissa High Court under ***Section 482 CrPC***. The prosecution alleged abuse of discretionary powers in allotment of plots. The allotments were made without advertisement. The beneficiaries were relatives of public servants. The Vigilance Department registered FIR No. 31 of 2005. Charges included ***criminal conspiracy under Section 120B IPC*** and ***criminal misconduct under Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988***. The High Court quashed proceedings against three accused. It held no direct evidence existed. The State challenged this finding before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court examined whether inherent powers were properly exercised. The Court emphasized limits of judicial intervention at pre-trial stage. It analyzed settled law governing quashing jurisdiction. It scrutinized the High Court’s approach. The Court found excessive evaluation of evidence. It held such evaluation impermissible. The background involved public distribution of valuable land. The matter implicated principles of transparency and probity. The Court treated allegations seriously. Public accountability was central. The case therefore became significant in anti-corruption jurisprudence. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The Vigilance Cell conducted preliminary enquiry. It found irregular allotment of ten prime plots in Bhubaneswar. The allotment occurred under discretionary quota. No public advertisement was issued. Applications were submitted on plain paper. Some applications were undated. Beneficiaries were relatives of officials. The accused included Steno to Vice Chairman, Junior Assistant, and Dealing Assistant. Allegedly they acted in conspiracy. The prosecution alleged pecuniary loss exceeding Rs. 1 crore cumulatively. The allotments were at throwaway prices. Sanction for prosecution was obtained. Charge-sheet was filed before Special Judge Vigilance. The High Court quashed proceedings for three accused. It reasoned lack of direct file handling. It found no material of influence or conspiracy. The State contended that prima facie case existed. The Supreme Court reviewed whether such reasoning justified quashing. It examined whether allegations disclosed offence. It found serious accusations of misuse of office. The Court observed that possession and benefit were relevant circumstances. It concluded that such matters required trial examination. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i) Whether the High Court exceeded jurisdiction under ***Section 482 CrPC*** while quashing criminal proceedings. ii) Whether allegations disclosed prima facie offences under ***Section 120B IPC*** and ***Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988***. iii) Whether detailed evaluation of evidence is permissible at pre-trial stage. iv) Whether discretionary allotment of public property without transparency amounts to criminal misconduct. ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Appellant submitted that the High Court conducted a mini-trial. They argued that ***State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604*** restricts quashing powers. They contended that charge-sheet was filed after investigation. They emphasized prima facie evidence existed. They argued conspiracy need not be proved at quashing stage. They submitted that allotments caused wrongful loss. They relied on settled principle that reliability of evidence cannot be assessed under ***Section 482 CrPC***. They cited jurisprudence discouraging premature interference. They asserted that corruption cases deserve full trial. They contended that High Court exceeded limits of inherent powers. They urged restoration of proceedings. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted absence of direct role. They argued no involvement in price fixation. They claimed no file processing by respondents. They contended no material of influence existed. They argued mere relationship with beneficiary insufficient. They submitted High Court correctly appreciated charge-sheet. They emphasized abuse of process prevention under ***Section 482 CrPC***. They claimed allegations were speculative. They urged dismissal of appeals. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i) ***Section 482 CrPC*** preserves inherent powers of High Court. It prevents abuse of process. It secures ends of justice. ii) ***Section 120B IPC*** punishes criminal conspiracy. Conspiracy may be inferred from conduct. Direct evidence rarely available. iii) ***Section 420 IPC*** addresses cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property. iv) ***Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988*** penalizes abuse of official position to obtain pecuniary advantage. The provision targets public servants. It criminalizes undue favour. The Supreme Court interpreted these provisions purposively. It relied on anti-corruption framework. It emphasized fiduciary duty of public officials. ## **I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT** The Court relied heavily on ***State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604***. It reiterated seven illustrative categories for quashing. It held present case did not fit those exceptions. The Court referred to ***Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628***. That case mandated fairness in distribution of state largesse. The Court cited ***Common Cause v. Union of India, (1996) 6 SCC 530***. It held public office is a trust. Distribution must be fair. The Court relied on ***Onkar Lal Bajaj v. Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 673***. It emphasized probity in governance. The Court referred to ***Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P., (1991) 1 SCC 212***. It held state actions must be non-arbitrary. The Court cited ***Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2011) 9 SCC 354***. It underlined public accountability. Each precedent reinforced transparency doctrine. They collectively limited arbitrary discretion. ## **J) JUDGEMENT** a) **Ratio Decidendi** i) High Courts must exercise ***Section 482 CrPC*** sparingly. ii) Detailed evidence evaluation is impermissible at quashing stage. iii) Prima facie allegations of conspiracy warrant trial. iv) Abuse of discretionary quota may attract corruption charges. v) Public office is a trust. b) **Obiter Dicta** i) The Court suggested abolishing discretionary quotas. ii) It advocated public auction for allotment of public property. iii) It emphasized transparency as anti-corruption tool. c) **Guidelines** The Court advised objective criteria. It mandated fairness in distribution. It discouraged nepotism. It recommended public auction as norm. It emphasized public interest primacy. ## **K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The Supreme Court restored criminal proceedings. It reinforced limits on quashing jurisdiction. It strengthened anti-corruption enforcement. It elevated doctrine of probity. It criticized arbitrary discretionary allotments. It emphasized governance transparency. It affirmed that conspiracy cases require trial scrutiny. The judgment advances accountability principles. It harmonizes criminal law with administrative fairness. It underscores that inherent powers cannot shield accused prematurely. ## **L) REFERENCES** a) Important Cases Referred i) ***State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604*** ii) ***Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628*** iii) ***Common Cause v. Union of India, (1996) 6 SCC 530*** iv) ***Onkar Lal Bajaj v. Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 673*** v) ***Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P., (1991) 1 SCC 212*** vi) ***Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2011) 9 SCC 354*** b) Important Statutes Referred i) ***Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*** ii) ***Indian Penal Code, 1860*** iii) ***Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988*** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Ghanashyam Mishra and Sons Private Limited v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited & Ors. (2021) 9 SCC 657](https://lawfoyer.in/ghanashyam-mishra-and-sons-private-limited-v-edelweiss-asset-reconstruction-company-limited-ors-2021-9-scc-657/) **Published:** May 16, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The present judgment in ***Ghanashyam Mishra and Sons Private Limited v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited & Ors.*** decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India settles a crucial question under the ***Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016***. The Court examined whether statutory creditors, including Central and State Governments, are bound by an approved Resolution Plan under ***Section 31 of the IBC***. The Court also analysed whether the 2019 Amendment to ***Section 31*** is clarificatory or substantive in nature. The controversy arose because various tax authorities continued recovery proceedings for dues not included in approved Resolution Plans. The Court harmonised the scheme of the IBC with fiscal statutes. It reaffirmed the primacy of the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors. It also clarified the extinguishment of claims not part of the approved Resolution Plan. The judgment strengthens certainty in insolvency resolution. It prevents revival plans from being frustrated by surprise statutory claims. The Court held that once a Resolution Plan is approved, all prior claims stand extinguished if not included. The ruling promotes finality, revival, and economic stability. **Keywords:** Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, Section 31 IBC, Resolution Plan, Government Dues, Extinguishment of Claims, Commercial Wisdom ## B) CASE DETAILS i) Judgment Cause Title ***Ghanashyam Mishra and Sons Private Limited v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited & Ors.*** ii) Case Number Civil Appeal No. 8129 of 2019 with connected matters iii) Judgment Date 13 April 2021 iv) Court Supreme Court of India v) Quorum Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice L. Nageswara Rao vi) Author Justice B.R. Gavai vii) Citation (2021) 9 SCC 657 viii) Legal Provisions Involved ***Section 31, Section 30(2), Section 7, Section 14, Section 3(6), Section 3(11), Section 3(12), Section 5(20), Section 5(21) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016*** ***Section 238 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016*** ix) Judgments Overruled No express overruling. Clarificatory affirmation of existing principles. x) Law Subjects Insolvency Law, Corporate Law, Constitutional Law, Taxation Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The controversy emerged from conflicting interpretations of ***Section 31 of the IBC***. Resolution Applicants faced recovery proceedings after approval of plans. Government authorities claimed statutory dues survived approval. This created uncertainty in insolvency resolution. The IBC aims at revival and value maximisation. In ***Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank*** (2018) 1 SCC 407 Link: https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Innoventive%20Industries%20Ltd.%20v.%20ICICI%20Bank the Court held that the Code triggers upon default. The Code intends speedy resolution. The Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee stressed finality. Further clarity arose in ***Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta*** (2020) 8 SCC 531 Link: https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Essar%20Steel%20Satish%20Kumar%20Gupta The Court emphasised primacy of commercial wisdom. The legislature later amended ***Section 31*** in 2019. The amendment inserted explicit reference to Government dues. Debate continued on retrospective application. The present case resolved this uncertainty. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The Corporate Debtors underwent CIRP under ***Section 7 IBC***. Resolution Plans were approved by requisite majority. NCLT approved the plans under ***Section 31(1) IBC***. Some creditors’ claims were rejected. Government authorities did not submit claims timely. After approval, tax authorities initiated recovery proceedings. In UltraTech’s case, VAT and Entry Tax dues were pursued. In Monnet Ispat’s case, royalty and mining dues were claimed. In Electrosteel’s case, VAT reassessment orders were passed post approval. Resolution Applicants argued extinguishment of all prior claims. NCLAT observations created ambiguity. Appeals reached the Supreme Court. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i) Whether Government authorities are bound by approved Resolution Plans under ***Section 31 IBC***. ii) Whether the 2019 Amendment to ***Section 31*** is clarificatory. iii) Whether statutory dues not included in Resolution Plans survive approval. ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Petitioners submitted that ***Section 31(1) IBC*** clearly binds all stakeholders. The term “creditor” includes Government. Reliance was placed on ***Section 3(10)*** defining creditor widely. They cited ***State Bank of India v. V. Ramakrishnan*** (2018) 17 SCC 394 Link: https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=SBI%20v.%20V.%20Ramakrishnan The Court there held amendment clarificatory. They argued 2019 amendment merely clarified existing position. They relied on ***B.K. Educational Services v. Parag Gupta*** (2019) 11 SCC 633 Link: https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=B.K.%20Educational%20Services%20v.%20Parag%20Gupta The Court there held amendment retrospective if clarificatory. They stressed commercial certainty. Surprise claims destroy viability. They relied on ***Maharashtra Seamless Ltd. v. Padmanabhan Venkatesh*** (2020) 11 SCC 467 Link: https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Maharashtra%20Seamless%20Ltd.%20v.%20Padmanabhan Commercial wisdom is non-justiciable. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Respondents submitted that tax proceedings are independent. They argued no express stay existed. They contended adjudicatory process differs from recovery. They claimed amendment is prospective. They argued Government not part of CoC. Hence not bound. They stressed sovereign function in tax assessment. They relied upon strict interpretation of fiscal statutes. They argued extinguishment requires explicit waiver. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i) ***Section 31(1) IBC*** states approved plan binds Corporate Debtor and creditors. ii) ***Section 3(6) IBC*** defines claim broadly. It includes disputed claims. iii) ***Section 3(11) IBC*** defines debt as liability in respect of claim. iv) ***Section 238 IBC*** gives overriding effect. The Court harmonised these provisions. It observed statutory dues fall within operational debt under ***Section 5(21)***. Thus Government is operational creditor. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT The Court analysed ***Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank***. It held Code aims at speedy revival. The Court relied heavily on ***Essar Steel***. It held successful Resolution Applicant must start fresh. Past claims cannot burden revival. The Court referred to ***Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India*** (2019) 4 SCC 17 Link: https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=Swiss%20Ribbons%20v.%20Union%20of%20India It upheld constitutionality of IBC. It recognised balancing of interests. The Court cited ***K. Shashidhar v. Indian Overseas Bank*** (2019) 12 SCC 150 Link: https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=K.%20Shashidhar%20v.%20Indian%20Overseas%20Bank Commercial wisdom is paramount. ## J) JUDGMENT #### a) RATIO DECIDENDI i) The Court held that once Resolution Plan is approved under ***Section 31(1) IBC***, it binds all creditors including Government. ii) All claims not part of Resolution Plan stand extinguished. iii) The 2019 Amendment to ***Section 31*** is clarificatory and declaratory. It applies retrospectively. iv) No proceedings can continue for prior dues not included in Plan. The Court reasoned that contrary interpretation defeats purpose of Code. It would discourage Resolution Applicants. It emphasised finality. It invoked ***Section 238 IBC*** overriding inconsistent laws. #### b) OBITER DICTA i) The Court observed that authorities must submit claims timely. ii) It emphasised coordinated approach by Government departments. iii) It underlined need for certainty in economic legislation. #### c) GUIDELINES i) Government authorities must lodge claims during CIRP. ii) Approved Resolution Plan binds all stakeholders. iii) Pending proceedings for past dues cannot continue post approval. iv) Amendment to ***Section 31*** operates retrospectively. ## K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces supremacy of the IBC framework. It balances fiscal interests with revival objectives. It ensures clean slate principle. It aligns with global insolvency standards. The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide also promotes finality. The decision enhances investor confidence. It prevents multiplicity of litigation. It strengthens commercial certainty. It harmonises insolvency and taxation regimes. ## L) REFERENCES a) Important Cases Referred i) ***Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank*** (2018) 1 SCC 407. ii) ***Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta*** (2020) 8 SCC 531. iii) ***Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India*** (2019) 4 SCC 17. iv) ***K. Shashidhar v. Indian Overseas Bank*** (2019) 12 SCC 150. v) ***Maharashtra Seamless Ltd. v. Padmanabhan Venkatesh*** (2020) 11 SCC 467. b) Important Statutes Referred i) ***Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016***. ii) ***Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2019***. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, 1985 AIR 945](https://lawfoyer.in/mohd-ahmed-khan-v-shah-bano-begum-1985-air-945/) **Published:** May 16, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The decision in ***Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum***, reported in ***1985 AIR 945***, marked a watershed moment in Indian constitutional and criminal jurisprudence. The Supreme Court examined whether a divorced Muslim woman could claim maintenance under ***Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973***, notwithstanding the limitations imposed under Muslim Personal Law regarding maintenance during the period of iddat. The Court resolved the apparent conflict between secular statutory provisions and personal law principles. It affirmed that Section 125 is a measure of social justice. It applies uniformly across religions. It overrides personal law in cases of inconsistency. The Court further clarified that ***Mahr*** is not a payment made “on divorce” within the meaning of ***Section 127(3)(b) CrPC***. Thus, payment of dower does not extinguish the husband’s liability to maintain an indigent divorced wife beyond iddat. The judgment also invoked ***Article 44 of the Constitution of India***, emphasizing the need for a Uniform Civil Code. This case reshaped debates on secularism, gender justice, and the interface between religion and law. **Keywords:** Maintenance, Muslim Personal Law, Section 125 CrPC, Mahr, Uniform Civil Code, Gender Justice. ## B) CASE DETAILS **i) Judgment Cause Title:** ***Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum & Ors.*** **ii) Case Number:** Criminal Appeal No. 103 of 1981 **iii) Judgment Date:** 23 April 1985 **iv) Court:** Supreme Court of India **v) Quorum:** Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud Justice D.A. Desai Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy Justice E.S. Venkataramiah Justice Ranganath Misra **vi) Author of Judgment:** Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud **vii) Citation:** ***1985 AIR 945; 1985 SCR (3) 844; (1985) 2 SCC 556*** **viii) Legal Provisions Involved:** ***Section 125 CrPC*** ***Section 127(3)(b) CrPC*** ***Section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937*** ***Article 44, Constitution of India*** **ix) Judgments Overruled:** None expressly overruled. Earlier doubts clarified. **x) Related Law Subjects:** Constitutional Law Criminal Law Family Law Personal Law Gender Justice ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The case emerged from a maintenance dispute. The dispute exposed structural tension between secular criminal law and Muslim personal law. The petitioner divorced his wife through irrevocable talaq. He argued that after iddat he bore no further liability. He relied upon classical Muslim law texts. He invoked ***Section 127(3)(b) CrPC***. He asserted that payment of ***Mahr*** discharged his duty. The Court had earlier ruled in ***Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fissalli Chothia, (1979) 2 SCR 75*** and ***Fazlunbi v. K. Khader Vali, (1980) 3 SCR 1127*** that Section 125 applied to Muslims. Those rulings were questioned. A larger Bench reconsidered the issue. The constitutional bench examined whether secular welfare legislation can override personal law. It analyzed Quranic verses. It examined statutory intent. It scrutinized parliamentary debates. The judgment framed Section 125 as a social justice tool. It treated maintenance as a moral obligation. It separated religion from destitution. It declared that preventing vagrancy transcends faith boundaries. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The marriage took place in 1932. Five children were born. In 1975 the husband expelled the wife from the matrimonial home. In 1978 she filed an application under ***Section 125 CrPC*** claiming Rs. 500 monthly maintenance. The husband’s annual income was approximately Rs. 60,000. During pendency he pronounced triple talaq. He claimed that she ceased to be his wife. He contended that he paid Rs. 200 monthly earlier. He deposited Rs. 3,000 as dower during iddat. The Magistrate granted Rs. 25 monthly. The High Court enhanced it to Rs. 179.20. The husband appealed by special leave. The case reached the Constitution Bench. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether ***Section 125 CrPC*** applies to Muslims. ii. Whether Muslim Personal Law limits maintenance to iddat. iii. Whether ***Mahr*** qualifies as payment “on divorce” under ***Section 127(3)(b) CrPC***. iv. Whether conflict exists between personal law and secular statute. v. Whether a divorced Muslim woman unable to maintain herself can claim maintenance beyond iddat. ## F) PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS The counsel for the appellant submitted that Muslim law restricts maintenance to iddat. He relied on Mulla’s Principles. He cited Tyabji’s Muslim Law. He argued that personal law governs marital obligations. He invoked ***Section 2 of the Shariat Act, 1937***. He argued Parliament respected Muslim law. He referred to Rajya Sabha debates. He contended that ***Mahr*** was payable on divorce. He argued that once Mahr was paid Section 127(3)(b) mandated cancellation. He urged reconsideration of ***Bai Tahira*** and ***Fazlunbi***. He claimed those decisions ignored Shariat Act. He emphasized autonomy of religious communities. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsel for the respondent submitted that Section 125 is secular. It applies irrespective of religion. He argued that Explanation (b) defines wife to include divorced woman. He contended that preventing destitution is state obligation. He relied upon ***Nanak Chand v. Chandra Kishore Agarwala, (1970) 1 SCR 565***. He argued Mahr is consideration of marriage. It is not payment on divorce. He cited ***Hamira Bibi v. Zubaida Bibi, 43 IA 294***. He asserted Quran mandates fair provision. He emphasized social justice. He invoked constitutional morality. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. ***Section 125 CrPC*** provides summary remedy for neglected wives. It is religion neutral. ii. ***Section 127(3)(b) CrPC*** allows cancellation upon payment of sums payable on divorce. iii. ***Section 2, Shariat Act 1937*** mandates Muslim personal law in specified matters. iv. ***Article 44, Constitution*** urges Uniform Civil Code. The Court interpreted these harmoniously. It held no conflict exists. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED ***Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fissalli Chothia (1979) 2 SCR 75*** – Held Section 125 applies to Muslim women. Dower does not bar maintenance if insufficient. ***Fazlunbi v. K. Khader Vali (1980) 3 SCR 1127*** – Affirmed secular character of Section 125. ***Jagir Kaur v. Jaswant Singh (1964) 2 SCR 73*** – Recognized maintenance provisions as social justice measures. ***Hamira Bibi v. Zubaida Bibi, 43 IA 294*** – Defined nature of Mahr. ***Syed Sabir Husain v. Farzand Hasan, 65 IA 119*** – Clarified deferred dower principles. ## J) JUDGMENT #### a) RATIO DECIDENDI i. ***Section 125 CrPC*** applies to all citizens irrespective of religion. ii. A divorced Muslim woman is included within Explanation (b). iii. Mahr is not payment “on divorce.” iv. If divorced wife cannot maintain herself, husband must pay maintenance beyond iddat. v. No conflict exists between secular law and personal law in this context. #### b) OBITER DICTA i. The Court lamented non implementation of ***Article 44***. ii. It observed that Uniform Civil Code promotes national integration. iii. It criticized regressive interpretations of personal law. #### c) GUIDELINES i. Maintenance under Section 125 overrides personal limitations. ii. Payment of Mahr alone insufficient to cancel maintenance. iii. Magistrates must assess indigence objectively. iv. Section 127 applies only if genuine divorce sum paid. ## K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment transformed maintenance jurisprudence. It foregrounded gender justice. It emphasized secularism as equal protection. It harmonized Quranic principles with constitutional values. It strengthened indigent women’s rights. It triggered legislative response through the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. It remains cornerstone precedent in family law discourse. ## L) REFERENCES #### a) Important Cases Referred i. ***Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fissalli Chothia, (1979) 2 SCR 75*** ii. ***Fazlunbi v. K. Khader Vali, (1980) 3 SCR 1127*** iii. ***Jagir Kaur v. Jaswant Singh, (1964) 2 SCR 73*** iv. ***Hamira Bibi v. Zubaida Bibi, 43 IA 294*** v. ***Syed Sabir Husain v. Farzand Hasan, 65 IA 119*** #### b) Important Statutes Referred i. ***Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*** ii. ***Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937*** iii. ***Constitution of India*** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission, Civil Appeal No. 273 of 2021](https://lawfoyer.in/vikash-kumar-v-union-public-service-commission-civil-appeal-no-273-of-2021/) **Published:** May 16, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The Supreme Court examined the denial of a scribe to a civil services aspirant suffering from ***Writer’s Cramp (dysgraphia)***. The appellant did not possess a ***benchmark disability of 40%*** under the ***Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016***. The UPSC restricted the facility of scribes to candidates with benchmark disabilities. The Court considered whether such restriction violated statutory rights under ***Sections 2(s), 3, and 20 of the RPwD Act, 2016***. The judgment interpreted the distinction between ***“person with disability”*** and ***“person with benchmark disability”***. The Court emphasized the doctrine of ***reasonable accommodation***. It held that benchmark disability is not a precondition for availing a scribe. The decision declared that confining scribes to benchmark disability was contrary to the object of the Act. The Court directed formulation of a fresh policy consistent with constitutional guarantees under ***Articles 14 and 21***. The ruling advanced substantive equality for persons with disabilities. It aligned domestic law with the ***UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD)***. The judgment marked a transformative step in disability jurisprudence in India. **Keywords:** Reasonable Accommodation, Benchmark Disability, Dysgraphia, Substantive Equality, Civil Services Examination, RPwD Act 2016. ## B) CASE DETAILS **i) Judgment Cause Title:** *Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission & Ors.* **ii) Case Number:** Civil Appeal No. 273 of 2021 **iii) Judgment Date:** 11 February 2021 **iv) Court:** Supreme Court of India **v) Quorum:** Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, Justice Sanjiv Khanna, Justice Indira Banerjee **vi) Author:** Justice D.Y. Chandrachud **vii) Citation:** AIR 2021 SC 2447 **viii) Legal Provisions Involved:** ***Articles 14, 16, 21 of the Constitution of India*** ***Sections 2(s), 2(r), 2(y), 3, 17, 20, 56 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016*** ***Section 2(t) of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995*** **ix) Judgments Overruled:** None expressly overruled **x) Law Subjects:** Constitutional Law, Service Law, Disability Law, Administrative Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The appeal arose from denial of a scribe in the Civil Services Examination. The appellant suffered from chronic Writer’s Cramp. He cleared MBBS from JIPMER. He previously received a scribe in CSE 2017. The CSE Rules 2018 limited scribes to benchmark disabilities. The appellant lacked a 40% disability certificate. His request was rejected. The Tribunal dismissed his plea. The Delhi High Court declined interference. The matter reached the Supreme Court. The case raised interpretation of ***Section 2(s)*** and ***Section 2(r) of RPwD Act, 2016***. It questioned whether benchmark disability was mandatory for reasonable accommodation. The Court examined constitutional commitments to dignity. It emphasized substantive equality. The dispute highlighted a policy disconnect between DoPT and MSJE. The case became larger than an individual grievance. It symbolized structural barriers faced by disabled persons. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellant was diagnosed with Writer’s Cramp. NIMHANS certified his condition. AIIMS assessed 6% disability. He requested a scribe for CSE 2018. UPSC rejected the request. It cited absence of 40% benchmark disability. The Tribunal upheld UPSC decision. It relied on strict rule interpretation. The High Court found the issue academic. It noted appellant failed prelims. The Supreme Court ordered fresh medical evaluation. AIIMS confirmed chronic neurological condition. It declared him a “person with disability” under ***Section 2(s)***. It stated he lacked benchmark disability. The dispute narrowed to statutory interpretation. The appellant claimed denial violated ***Section 20 RPwD Act***. He asserted discrimination under ***Articles 14 and 16***. The Union argued misuse concerns in competitive exams. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether a candidate without benchmark disability is entitled to a scribe. ii. Whether denial violated ***Sections 3 and 20 RPwD Act, 2016***. iii. Whether CSE Rules 2018 were ultra vires the Act. iv. Scope of reasonable accommodation in competitive examinations. ## F) PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS The counsel submitted that Writer’s Cramp is a recognized neurological condition. It hinders effective writing. Under ***Section 2(s)***, long-term impairment qualifies as disability. The Act distinguishes benchmark disability from disability. Reservation provisions use benchmark threshold. Reasonable accommodation provisions do not. He argued that ***Section 20*** mandates non-discrimination in employment. Denial of scribe defeats equal opportunity. Reliance was placed on *Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India*, (2016) 7 SCC 761. That case emphasized dignity and non-discrimination. He cited *National Federation of the Blind v. UPSC*, (2013) 10 SCC 772. That case upheld access to scribes for visually impaired. He argued constitutional guarantees cannot be diluted by executive rules. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The UPSC argued strict adherence to CSE Rules 2018. It contended that scribes are limited to benchmark disabilities. It emphasized need to maintain exam integrity. It expressed fear of misuse. It stated appellant falsely declared benchmark disability. The Union contended Writer’s Cramp not listed in Schedule. It argued guidelines dated 29 August 2018 restricted scribes. It suggested fresh medical evaluation. It acknowledged possibility of hardship. Yet it maintained benchmark threshold necessary in competitive exams. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS ***Section 2(s) RPwD Act*** defines person with disability broadly. It includes long-term impairments interacting with barriers. ***Section 2(r)*** defines benchmark disability as 40% specified disability. ***Section 3*** guarantees equality and dignity. ***Section 20*** mandates non-discrimination in employment. ***Section 2(y)*** defines reasonable accommodation. The Court stressed that benchmark disability applies mainly to reservation under Chapter VI. It cannot restrict general rights. The Act reflects India’s obligations under ***UNCRPD***. Article 5 of UNCRPD mandates reasonable accommodation. Denial constitutes discrimination. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT The Court relied on *Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India*, (2016) 7 SCC 761. It held dignity integral to Article 21. It cited *Justice Sunanda Bhandare Foundation v. Union of India*, (2018) 2 SCC 397. It directed proactive disability policies. It referred to *National Federation of the Blind v. UPSC*, (2013) 10 SCC 772. It recognized employment as empowerment. It discussed *Syed Bashir-ud-din Qadri v. Nazir Ahmed Shah*, (2010) 3 SCC 603. It endorsed assistive aids as accommodation. Each precedent reinforced substantive equality. Each expanded disability rights jurisprudence. ## J) JUDGMENT #### a) RATIO DECIDENDI The Court held benchmark disability not prerequisite for scribe. It declared that ***Section 2(s)*** is broader than ***Section 2(r)***. It ruled that denying scribe solely for lacking 40% disability is ultra vires. It recognized reasonable accommodation as statutory duty. It stated failure amounts to discrimination. The Court criticized policy disconnect between ministries. It emphasized constitutional morality. It directed formulation of uniform policy. It ordered that appellant be allowed a scribe. #### b) OBITER DICTA The Court reflected on language of discourse. It urged sensitivity in addressing disability. It cautioned against viewing accommodations as concessions. It described disability as social construct. It stressed transformative constitutionalism. #### c) GUIDELINES The Court directed authorities to: i. Ensure flexibility in granting scribes. ii. Avoid mechanical reliance on 40% rule. iii. Consult medical experts case-by-case. iv. Align policies with RPwD Act purpose. ## K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reshaped disability rights interpretation. It dismantled rigid benchmark barriers. It reinforced substantive equality doctrine. It harmonized statutory law with constitutional vision. It advanced inclusive governance. It operationalized reasonable accommodation meaningfully. The decision strengthened employment access for disabled persons. It discouraged bureaucratic rigidity. It upheld dignity as constitutional value. It set precedent for inclusive competitive examinations. It affirmed that equality demands accommodation, not uniformity. ## L) REFERENCES #### a) Important Cases Referred i. *Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India*, (2016) 7 SCC 761. ii. *Justice Sunanda Bhandare Foundation v. Union of India*, (2018) 2 SCC 397. iii. *Union of India v. National Federation of the Blind*, (2013) 10 SCC 772. iv. *Syed Bashir-ud-din Qadri v. Nazir Ahmed Shah*, (2010) 3 SCC 603. #### b) Important Statutes Referred i. ***Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016***. ii. ***Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995***. iii. ***Constitution of India***. iv. ***UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities*** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Brahmdeo Choudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal & Anr. (1997) 3 SCC 694](https://lawfoyer.in/brahmdeo-choudhary-v-rishikesh-prasad-jaiswal-anr-1997-3-scc-694/) **Published:** May 16, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The decision in ****Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal and Another**** constitutes a landmark ruling on the scope of resistance proceedings under ****Order XXI Rules 97–101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908****. The Supreme Court examined whether a stranger to a decree, claiming independent possession over immovable property, can resist execution before actual dispossession and seek adjudication of his rights by the executing court. The judgment clarified procedural ambiguities surrounding execution proceedings and significantly expanded protection available to third parties resisting eviction. The controversy arose when the decree-holder sought possession pursuant to an eviction decree. During execution, a third party obstructed delivery of possession and claimed independent rights over the suit property. Instead of adjudicating the obstruction, the executing court directed issuance of a fresh warrant for possession with police assistance. The objector challenged this procedure before higher courts. The Supreme Court interpreted ****Order XXI Rule 97 CPC**** broadly and held that resistance by “any person” includes not only judgment-debtors but also strangers claiming independent title or possession. The Court emphasized that executing courts are duty-bound to adjudicate such resistance applications before dispossessing the objector. The Court rejected the narrow interpretation that a third party must first suffer dispossession before invoking remedies under execution law. The judgment harmonized procedural fairness with efficient decree enforcement. It protected bona fide possessory claims while preserving decree-holder rights. The Court also clarified the relationship between ****Order XXI Rule 97**** and ****Rule 99****. Rule 97 governs pre-dispossession resistance. Rule 99 applies after dispossession. This distinction became central to execution jurisprudence in India. The ruling remains a foundational precedent governing execution proceedings, third-party resistance, and adjudication of possessory rights under civil procedure law. **Keywords:** Execution proceedings, Order XXI Rule 97 CPC, resistance to possession, stranger to decree, execution law, civil procedure. ## B) CASE DETAILS #### i) Judgement Cause Title ****Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal and Another**** #### ii) Case Number Civil Appeal before the Supreme Court of India. #### iii) Judgement Date 22 January 1997. #### iv) Court ****Supreme Court of India**** #### v) Quorum Hon’ble Justice A.S. Anand and Hon’ble Justice S.B. Majmudar. #### vi) Author Justice S.B. Majmudar. #### vii) Citation (1997) 3 SCC 694. #### viii) Legal Provisions Involved - ****Order XXI Rule 35 CPC**** - ****Order XXI Rule 97 CPC**** - ****Order XXI Rule 99 CPC**** - ****Order XXI Rule 101 CPC**** - ****Section 151 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908**** #### ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case None. #### x) Law Subjects Civil Procedure, Execution Jurisprudence, Property Law. ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT Execution represents the culmination of civil adjudication. A decree-holder’s success becomes meaningful only when effective enforcement occurs. However, disputes frequently arise when third parties obstruct execution proceedings while asserting independent rights over the property. Before this judgment, courts differed regarding whether strangers to a decree could resist execution before actual dispossession. Certain courts adopted a restrictive interpretation of ****Order XXI Rule 97 CPC****. According to this view, only decree-holders could invoke Rule 97, while third parties were required to wait until dispossession before seeking remedies under ****Rule 99****. This restrictive approach often produced injustice. Bona fide possessors faced forcible dispossession without adjudication of their claims. The present judgment addressed this procedural anomaly. The Supreme Court undertook detailed interpretation of the scheme of ****Order XXI Rules 97–106 CPC****. These provisions were substantially amended by the ***Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976*** to reduce multiplicity of litigation. The amendment intended that disputes arising during execution should ordinarily be resolved within execution proceedings themselves rather than through separate suits. The Court therefore examined whether execution law permits adjudication of resistance by third parties claiming independent rights. The ruling ultimately established a liberal and justice-oriented interpretation of execution jurisprudence. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The dispute concerned execution of a decree for possession over immovable property. The decree-holder initiated execution proceedings seeking delivery of possession through the executing court. During execution, the appellant, ***Brahmdeo Chaudhary***, obstructed the process and asserted independent rights over the property. He claimed that he was not bound by the decree because he possessed separate and independent entitlement. Instead of adjudicating the appellant’s objections, the executing court directed issuance of a fresh warrant for possession with police assistance. This effectively authorized forcible dispossession without inquiry into the objector’s claims. The appellant challenged the order before the High Court. However, the High Court upheld the executing court’s approach. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant approached the Supreme Court. The central controversy before the Supreme Court therefore became whether a stranger claiming independent possession could seek adjudication before dispossession or whether he must first suffer eviction and subsequently invoke remedies under Rule 99 CPC. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether a stranger to a decree claiming independent rights can resist execution under ****Order XXI Rule 97 CPC****. ii. Whether executing courts are obligated to adjudicate resistance applications before dispossession. iii. Whether a third party must first be dispossessed before seeking remedy under execution law. iv. Whether issuance of police assistance without adjudication violates procedural fairness. v. Whether the amended framework of Order XXI CPC intends comprehensive adjudication within execution proceedings. ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS #### The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that The appellant argued that ****Order XXI Rule 97 CPC**** uses the expression “any person.” This phrase includes strangers claiming independent possession over the property. The appellant contended that executing courts cannot dispossess a person without adjudicating his objections. Procedural fairness requires inquiry into possessory claims before use of police force. Reliance was placed upon the amended execution framework introduced by the ***1976 CPC Amendment***. The amendment intended to prevent multiplicity of litigation and required comprehensive adjudication within execution proceedings themselves. The appellant argued that forcing a third party to await dispossession before seeking relief under Rule 99 would create unnecessary hardship. Such interpretation would undermine principles of natural justice. The appellant therefore contended that the executing court acted illegally by ordering police assistance without first determining the legality of resistance. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS #### The counsels for Respondent submitted that The decree-holder argued that execution proceedings cannot be indefinitely delayed by frivolous objections from strangers. The appellant was not party to the original proceedings and therefore lacked standing to obstruct execution. The respondent further contended that remedies for strangers are specifically provided under ****Order XXI Rule 99 CPC**** after dispossession. Therefore, the appellant could seek relief only after eviction. It was argued that permitting pre-dispossession resistance by strangers would encourage abuse of execution proceedings and frustrate decree enforcement. The respondent therefore supported the executing court’s order granting police assistance for possession. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS #### i. ****Order XXI Rule 35 CPC**** Provides procedure for delivery of possession in execution of decrees. #### ii. ****Order XXI Rule 97 CPC**** Permits adjudication when resistance or obstruction is offered during execution. #### iii. ****Order XXI Rule 99 CPC**** Provides remedy to persons dispossessed during execution proceedings. #### iv. ****Order XXI Rule 101 CPC**** Mandates determination of all relevant questions arising during resistance proceedings. #### v. ****Section 151 CPC**** Recognizes inherent powers of civil courts. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT #### ****Bhanwar Lal v. Satyanarain, (1995) 1 SCC 6**** The Court held that resistance by third parties must be adjudicated under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC. #### ****Shreenath v. Rajesh, (1998) 4 SCC 543**** Though subsequent, this judgment later reaffirmed principles laid down in Brahmdeo Chaudhary concerning third-party resistance. #### ****Topanmal Chhotamal v. Kundomal Gangaram, AIR 1960 SC 388**** The Court discussed scope of execution proceedings and powers of executing courts. ## J) JUDGEMENT #### a. RATIO DECIDENDI i. The Supreme Court held that the expression ***“any person”*** under ****Order XXI Rule 97 CPC**** includes strangers claiming independent rights over the property. ii. Executing courts are obligated to adjudicate resistance before dispossessing the objector. iii. A third party need not wait until actual dispossession to seek protection under execution law. iv. Rule 97 governs pre-dispossession resistance. Rule 99 applies after dispossession. v. The amended execution framework intends comprehensive adjudication within execution proceedings themselves. vi. The executing court erred in granting police assistance without adjudicating the appellant’s objections. #### b. OBITER DICTA i. Execution proceedings should not become instruments of oppression. ii. Bona fide possessory claims deserve judicial scrutiny before forcible dispossession. iii. Multiplicity of litigation must be avoided through comprehensive adjudication within execution proceedings. #### c. GUIDELINES 1. Resistance by strangers claiming independent rights falls within Rule 97 CPC. 2. Executing courts must adjudicate such objections before dispossession. 3. Police assistance cannot bypass mandatory adjudication requirements. 4. Rule 97 and Rule 99 operate at different procedural stages. 5. Separate suits should ordinarily be avoided in execution disputes. ## K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment transformed execution jurisprudence in India. It established that execution courts are not mere mechanical enforcement agencies. They possess adjudicatory responsibilities where genuine resistance arises. The ruling significantly advanced procedural fairness. It protected third parties from arbitrary dispossession while maintaining decree-holder remedies. The Court also reinforced the legislative intent behind the 1976 CPC amendments. Execution proceedings themselves became the principal forum for resolving resistance disputes. This reduced multiplicity of litigation and enhanced procedural efficiency. The judgment continues to hold immense precedential value in property disputes, eviction proceedings, and execution litigation across India. ## L) REFERENCES #### a. Important Cases Referred i. ****Bhanwar Lal v. Satyanarain, (1995) 1 SCC 6**** ii. ****Topanmal Chhotamal v. Kundomal Gangaram, AIR 1960 SC 388**** iii. ****Shreenath v. Rajesh, (1998) 4 SCC 543**** #### b. Important Statutes Referred i. ****Code of Civil Procedure, 1908**** ii. ****Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976**** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust and Another, AIR 1998 SC 1754](https://lawfoyer.in/silverline-forum-pvt-ltd-v-rajiv-trust-and-another-air-1998-sc-1754/) **Published:** May 16, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment in ****Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust and Another**** constitutes a significant exposition on the scope of resistance proceedings during execution under ****Order XXI Rules 97–101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908****. The Supreme Court examined whether a sub-tenant, who was not impleaded in the original eviction suit, could resist execution of an eviction decree and seek adjudication of his objections during execution proceedings. The case also involved interpretation of ****Sections 13 and 16 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956**** regarding the rights and obligations of sub-tenants. The dispute arose after the landlord obtained an ex parte eviction decree against the tenant. During execution, a second sub-tenant resisted delivery of possession and alleged that the decree was collusive. The execution court directed inquiry under Section 151 CPC. The High Court upheld the inquiry. The matter reached the Supreme Court, where the principal controversy centered upon the legal competence of the sub-tenant to obstruct execution proceedings. The Supreme Court clarified that resistance offered by “any person” to execution falls within the scope of ****Order XXI Rule 97 CPC****. The Court reaffirmed that executing courts possess authority to adjudicate questions raised by obstructors. However, the Court distinguished between lawful resistance and resistance by persons legally bound by the decree. It held that a sub-tenant who failed to comply with statutory requirements under Section 16 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act cannot claim independent protection against eviction. The judgment harmonized procedural law with tenancy legislation. It emphasized that execution proceedings cannot become instruments for endless obstruction. Simultaneously, it preserved the principle that genuine third-party claims deserve adjudication. The ruling remains an authoritative precedent on execution jurisprudence, third-party resistance, and sub-tenancy rights in eviction matters. **Keywords:** Execution proceedings, Order XXI Rule 97 CPC, resistance to decree, sub-tenancy, eviction decree, West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. ## B) CASE DETAILS #### i) Judgement Cause Title ****Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust and Another**** #### ii) Case Number Civil Appeal arising from Special Leave Petition. #### iii) Judgement Date 31 March 1998. #### iv) Court ****Supreme Court of India**** #### v) Quorum Justice K.T. Thomas and Justice S. Rajendra Babu. #### vi) Author Justice K.T. Thomas. #### vii) Citation AIR 1998 SC 1754; (1998) 3 SCC 723. #### viii) Legal Provisions Involved - ****Order XXI Rules 97–101 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908**** - ****Section 151 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908**** - ****Section 52 Transfer of Property Act, 1882**** - ****Sections 13 and 16 West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956**** #### ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case None. #### x) Law Subjects Civil Procedure, Rent Control Law, Property Law, Execution Jurisprudence. #### xi) Name of Counsels Appearing - Shri Kapil Sibal for the appellant. - Shri Siddhartha Shankar Ray for the contesting respondent. ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT Execution proceedings form the final stage of civil litigation. A decree-holder expects effective enforcement of judicial determinations. However, resistance by third parties often delays execution. The procedural framework governing such obstruction lies within ****Order XXI Rules 97 to 106 CPC****. These provisions empower executing courts to adjudicate disputes arising during delivery of possession. Before this judgment, courts frequently faced uncertainty regarding the scope of adjudication in resistance proceedings. Questions arose concerning whether strangers to a decree could challenge execution. Another controversy involved the rights of sub-tenants not impleaded in eviction suits. The present case addressed both issues simultaneously. The Supreme Court examined the relationship between procedural execution law and tenancy legislation under the ****West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956****. The Court analyzed whether a sub-tenant lacking statutory protection could obstruct execution of an eviction decree passed against the tenant. The judgment also revisited the purpose behind execution adjudication. Courts must prevent abuse of process. Simultaneously, they must protect genuine possessory claims. This balance required careful interpretation of Order XXI CPC. The Court relied on earlier precedents including ****Bhanwar Lal v. Satyanarain (1995) 1 SCC 6**** and ****Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal (1997) 3 SCC 694****. These cases recognized broad adjudicatory powers in execution proceedings involving resistance by third parties. The decision ultimately became a landmark authority on the meaning of “any person” under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC and on the limited rights of unauthorized sub-tenants resisting eviction decrees. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The suit property involved a flat situated in “Harrington Mansion” in Calcutta. Originally, the premises belonged to Arun Kumar Jalan. The property was leased to ***Rajiv Trust*** on 15 May 1975. Rajiv Trust subsequently sublet the premises to ***Accounting and Secretarial Service Private Limited***. This entity further created another sub-tenancy in favour of ***Captain Shipping Estate Private Limited***, the second respondent. Ownership of the premises later transferred to ***Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd.*** through a registered conveyance deed dated 24 January 1995. The appellant-landlord instituted eviction proceedings against Rajiv Trust under the ****West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956****. The eviction suit was based on allegations of unauthorized subletting and impairment of the property condition. The suit resulted in an ex parte decree for eviction on 12 December 1995. Before execution commenced, the second respondent filed a separate suit seeking declaration and injunction against eviction. Initially, an interim injunction was granted. However, the injunction was later vacated. During execution proceedings, the bailiff attempted delivery of possession. The second respondent obstructed execution and resisted dispossession. The decree-holder thereafter sought police assistance for execution. Meanwhile, the second respondent filed proceedings under ****Order XXI Rule 101 CPC**** and ****Section 151 CPC**** alleging collusion between the landlord and tenant. The execution court held that Rule 101 was technically unavailable because the decree-holder had not filed a formal Rule 97 application. Nevertheless, the court ordered an inquiry under Section 151 CPC into the allegations raised by the obstructing sub-tenant. Both parties challenged the order before the Calcutta High Court. The High Court upheld the inquiry. Aggrieved thereby, the decree-holder approached the Supreme Court. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether resistance offered by a third party falls within the scope of ****Order XXI Rule 97 CPC****. ii. Whether a sub-tenant not impleaded in the eviction suit can obstruct execution proceedings. iii. Whether executing courts possess jurisdiction to adjudicate third-party resistance during delivery of possession. iv. Whether an unauthorized sub-tenant obtains protection under the ****West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956****. v. Whether inherent powers under ****Section 151 CPC**** can be invoked in execution proceedings. ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS #### The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that The appellant argued that the second respondent lacked legal competence to resist execution because he was merely a sub-tenant under another sub-tenant. Such derivative possession did not create independent rights against the landlord. Reliance was placed on ****Section 13(3) West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956****. The provision expressly states that eviction decrees bind every sub-tenant unless statutory requirements under Section 16 are satisfied. The appellant contended that the second respondent failed to prove compliance with ****Section 16(1)****. No notice of sub-tenancy was served upon the landlord within the prescribed period. Therefore, the respondent could not claim statutory protection. The appellant also argued that execution proceedings cannot transform into collateral attacks on decrees. Allegations of collusion lacked legal basis. The decree had attained finality. The second respondent therefore could not reopen issues already concluded. Shri Kapil Sibal further argued that the High Court erred in invoking ****Section 151 CPC**** despite specific remedies existing under Order XXI. Execution law already contains a comprehensive adjudicatory framework. Resort to inherent powers was unnecessary. The appellant ultimately sought immediate possession and removal of obstruction by the second respondent. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS #### The counsels for Respondent submitted that The respondent argued that a person resisting execution possesses independent rights to seek adjudication under ****Order XXI Rule 97 CPC****. The expression “any person” includes strangers to the decree. Reliance was placed upon ****Bhanwar Lal v. Satyanarain (1995) 1 SCC 6**** and ****Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal (1997) 3 SCC 694****. These judgments recognized the broad scope of execution adjudication. The respondent further contended that the eviction decree was collusive and obtained behind his back. Since he was in possession, principles of natural justice required hearing his objections before dispossession. The respondent also argued that the original lease permitted subletting. Therefore, derivative sub-tenancies created pursuant to that authority should remain protected. Counsel emphasized that executing courts must examine the legality of resistance before authorizing forcible dispossession. Summary eviction without inquiry would violate procedural fairness. However, counsel did not seriously defend the High Court’s view that Rule 97 proceedings were unavailable. Instead, the argument focused on preserving adjudicatory rights during execution. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS #### i. ****Order XXI Rule 97 CPC**** Allows decree-holders to complain against resistance or obstruction during delivery of possession. #### ii. ****Order XXI Rule 101 CPC**** Mandates adjudication of all relevant questions arising between parties during resistance proceedings. #### iii. ****Section 151 CPC**** Recognizes inherent powers of courts to secure ends of justice. #### iv. ****Section 13 West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956**** Provides binding effect of eviction decrees upon sub-tenants. #### v. ****Section 16 West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956**** Requires notice and consent requirements for lawful sub-tenancies. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT #### ****Bhanwar Lal v. Satyanarain (1995) 1 SCC 6**** The Court held that “any person” resisting execution includes even strangers claiming independent rights. Executing courts must conduct adjudication under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC. #### ****Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal (1997) 3 SCC 694**** The Court reaffirmed that resistance by third parties requires adjudication by executing courts before dispossession. #### ****Shantilal Rampuria v. Vega Trading Corporation (1989) 3 SCC 552**** The Court held that landlord consent for subletting must specifically comply with statutory requirements. General permission is insufficient. #### ****Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. v. H.C. Sharma (1988) 1 SCC 70**** The Court emphasized mandatory compliance with statutory notice provisions relating to sub-tenancy. ## J) JUDGEMENT #### a. RATIO DECIDENDI i. The Supreme Court held that ****Order XXI Rule 97 CPC**** applies to resistance offered by “any person,” including strangers to the decree. ii. Executing courts possess jurisdiction to adjudicate objections raised during resistance proceedings. iii. However, only legally relevant questions require adjudication. Courts need not entertain frivolous objections. iv. A sub-tenant lacking protection under ****Section 16 West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act**** remains bound by eviction decrees. v. The second respondent failed to establish compliance with statutory requirements for lawful sub-tenancy. vi. Consequently, the respondent possessed no enforceable right to obstruct execution. vii. The decree-holder was therefore entitled to possession by removal of obstruction. #### b. OBITER DICTA i. Execution proceedings should not become endless litigation forums. ii. Courts may decide resistance disputes even without elaborate evidence if admitted facts suffice. iii. Executing courts possess flexibility in determining the scope of inquiry. #### c. GUIDELINES 1. Resistance by any person during execution falls within Order XXI Rule 97 CPC. 2. Executing courts must determine only legally relevant questions. 3. Unauthorized sub-tenants cannot obstruct lawful eviction decrees. 4. Compliance with statutory notice provisions remains mandatory. 5. Derivative sub-tenancies do not bind landlords absent statutory compliance. ## K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment strengthened execution jurisprudence by clarifying that courts possess broad adjudicatory authority against obstruction during execution. Simultaneously, it prevented abuse of execution proceedings by unauthorized occupants. The Court carefully balanced procedural fairness with decree enforceability. Genuine third-party claims deserve inquiry. However, derivative possessors lacking statutory protection cannot indefinitely obstruct execution. The ruling also reinforced statutory discipline under tenancy legislation. Compliance with notice requirements under the ****West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956**** remains mandatory for sub-tenants seeking legal protection. The judgment continues to influence execution proceedings across India. Courts frequently rely on it while adjudicating resistance applications under Order XXI CPC. ## L) REFERENCES #### a. **Important Cases Referred** i. ****Bhanwar Lal v. Satyanarain, (1995) 1 SCC 6**** ii. ****Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal, (1997) 3 SCC 694**** iii. ****Shantilal Rampuria v. Vega Trading Corporation, (1989) 3 SCC 552**** iv. ****Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. v. H.C. Sharma, (1988) 1 SCC 70**** v. ****Mahabir Prasad Verma v. Dr. Surinder Kaur, (1982) 2 SCC 258**** ##### b. **Important Statutes Referred** i. ****Code of Civil Procedure, 1908**** ii. ****West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956**** iii. ****Transfer of Property Act, 1882**** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [2-Day Online Workshop on Right to Information (RTI) | Organized by Legal Aid Clinic, Himachal Pradesh National Law University (HPNLU), Shimla, in collaboration with Vidhi Vimarsh Initiative | Register by 30 May 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/2-day-online-workshop-on-right-to-information-rti-organized-by-legal-aid-clinic-himachal-pradesh-national-law-university-hpnlu-shimla-in-collaboration-with-vidhi-vimarsh-initiative-register/) **Published:** May 15, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 2-Day Online Workshop on Right to Information (RTI) | Organized by Legal Aid Clinic, Himachal Pradesh National Law University (HPNLU), Shimla, in collaboration with Vidhi Vimarsh Initiative | Register by 30 May 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/HPNLU-RTI.jpg) ### About Himachal Pradesh National Law University, Shimla Himachal Pradesh National Law University (HPNLU), Shimla was established by the State Government of Himachal Pradesh in 2016 through Act 16 of 2016 and commenced operations on 5 October 2016. The University admits students through the Common Law Admission Test (CLAT) to its undergraduate, postgraduate, doctoral, and post-doctoral programmes. Located amidst the Himalayan ranges, HPNLU is recognized for its commitment to interdisciplinary and application-based legal education, with a strong focus on legal scholarship, practice, and administration. ### About the Legal Aid Clinic, HPNLU The Legal Aid Clinic of HPNLU, Shimla is a socially driven initiative dedicated to ensuring access to justice for all, in line with Article 39A of the Constitution of India. The Clinic provides free legal aid, awareness, and community outreach programmes, and works closely with the Himachal Pradesh State Legal Services Authority. It aims to bridge the gap between law and society while nurturing socially responsible legal professionals. ## Details About the Event / Opportunity The Legal Aid Clinic, HPNLU Shimla is organizing a comprehensive two-day online workshop on the Right to Information (RTI). The workshop is designed to promote legal awareness and develop a practical understanding of the Right to Information Act, 2005 and its implementation. Participants will gain in-depth exposure to: - Conceptual foundations and institutional framework of the RTI Act, 2005 - Role of RTI in promoting transparency, accountability, and citizen participation - Procedure for filing RTI applications and first/second appeals - Powers and functions of Information Commissions - Privacy and RTI - Landmark judicial developments - Administrative challenges in RTI implementation - Reform perspectives and the future of transparency in governance The workshop combines expert lectures, interactive discussions, curated reading material, and practical insights to help participants understand the evolving importance of RTI in India’s democratic framework. ## Key Learning Outcomes By the end of the workshop, participants will be able to: - Understand the legal and practical dimensions of the RTI Act, 2005 - Use RTI as a tool for citizen empowerment - Analyze landmark judgments and policy developments - Navigate filing procedures and appeals - Evaluate challenges and reform opportunities in the transparency regime ## Modules Covered 1. Understanding RTI: Concept & Framework 2. RTI and Transparency in Governance 3. Privacy and Right to Information 4. Implementing RTI: Challenges and Way Forward ## Distinguished Speakers - Shailesh Gandhi, Former Central Information Commissioner, Government of India - Uday Mahurkar, Former Central Information Commissioner, Government of India - Rahul Singh, Former State Information Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh - Nikhil Dey, Founder Member, Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) and National Campaign for People’s Right to Information ## Who Is It For / Eligibility to Participate The workshop is open to: - Law students - Research scholars - Academicians - Legal professionals - Social activists - Students and professionals from public administration, political science, journalism, and social sciences - Any individual interested in transparency, accountability, and citizen participation in governance No prior legal knowledge is required. ## Mode of the Event Online (Google Meet) with: - Live weekend sessions - Recorded lectures for later access - Curated reading material and PPTs - Networking opportunities - Coordinator support for participant queries ## Location & Venue Online via Google Meet Organized from Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, India. ## Registration / Submission Links & Procedure Interested participants must fill out the online registration form. [**Registration Link**](https://forms.gle/S5h3GU6MBFB5y8Qc8) ## Fee Details - Registration Fee: Free - Certificate of Participation: Optional and paid ## Certificates & Benefits Participants will receive: - Access to session recordings - Curated reading material and PPTs - Mentorship with experts - Certificates to merit - Optional e-certificate / certificate of participation ## Deadlines / Important Dates - Workshop Dates: 30–31 May 2026 (Saturday–Sunday) - Time: 6:00 PM – 8:30 PM IST - Sessions: Evening hours - Registration: Open now ## Contact Information - Email: - Phone: +91 8260176453 Alternate Contact: - Email: - Phone: +91 8287528580 ## Official Link of the Event / Brochure - **[Registration Form](https://forms.gle/S5h3GU6MBFB5y8Qc8)** - **[Official Brochure](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1CF7Uuj1z8WVEN14KCfN2MJVb4W8pKBl-/view?usp=drive_link)** **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events --- ### [Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram & Ors., (2008) 7 SCC 144](https://lawfoyer.in/usha-sinha-v-dina-ram-ors-2008-7-scc-144/) **Published:** May 14, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The decision in ***Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram & Ors., (2008) 7 SCC 144*** examines the scope of ***Order XXI Rules 97–102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908*** and the doctrine of ***lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882***. The Supreme Court considered whether a purchaser who acquires property during pendency of litigation can resist execution of a decree for possession. The appellant purchased the suit property from certain defendants while the original title suit was pending. An ex parte decree was later passed in favour of the plaintiff. During execution, the appellant sought stay of proceedings, claiming independent title and pendency of her own declaratory suit. The Executing Court granted stay. The High Court reversed the order. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court. It held that a transferee pendente lite has no right to obstruct execution. ***Order XXI Rule 102 CPC*** expressly bars protection to such transferees. The doctrine of lis pendens binds purchasers irrespective of notice. The Court clarified that the only inquiry permissible is whether the transfer occurred after institution of the suit. Once established, resistance must fail. **Keywords:** Lis Pendens, Transferee Pendente Lite, Execution Proceedings, Order XXI CPC, Section 52 TPA, Obstruction to Decree, Restitution ## **B) CASE DETAILS** i) **Judgement Cause Title:** *Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram & Ors.* ii) **Case Number:** Civil Appeal No. 1998 of 2008 iii) **Judgement Date:** 14 March 2008 iv) **Court:** Supreme Court of India v) **Quorum:** Justice C.K. Thakker and Justice Markandey Katju vi) **Author:** Justice C.K. Thakker vii) **Citation:** *(2008) 7 SCC 144; AIR 2008 SC 1997* viii) **Legal Provisions Involved:** ***Order XXI Rules 97–102, Order XXI Rule 29, Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2, Section 151 CPC, Section 52 Transfer of Property Act, 1882*** ix) **Judgments Overruled:** None x) **Related Law Subjects:** Civil Procedure Law, Property Law, Execution Law ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The case arose from execution proceedings in a title dispute. The decree holder obtained an ex parte decree for possession. During pendency of the original suit, certain defendants transferred their share to the appellant. The appellant later filed a separate suit challenging the decree as fraudulent and void. She sought stay of execution pending decision of her suit. The Executing Court granted stay. The High Court reversed that order. The controversy centered upon the interpretation of ***Order XXI Rule 102 CPC*** and its interplay with ***Section 52 TPA***. The doctrine of lis pendens ensures finality of litigation. It prevents parties from defeating decrees by alienating property mid-litigation. The Supreme Court examined whether such transferee could invoke procedural safeguards available to third parties. The case provided an authoritative clarification on the limits of resistance in execution. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The respondent instituted Title Suit No. 140 of 1999 on 10 April 1999. The suit concerned immovable property. During pendency, defendants 4 and 5 executed a registered sale deed on 15 February 2000 in favour of the appellant. The sale occurred after institution of the suit. On 24 May 2001, the Court passed an ex parte decree declaring plaintiff’s title and granting possession. The appellant filed Title Suit No. 226 of 2001 challenging the decree. She alleged fraud and lack of notice. Meanwhile, Execution Case No. 10 of 2002 was initiated. The appellant applied for stay under ***Order XXI Rule 29 CPC*** and injunction under ***Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC***. The application was rejected. Subsequently, the Executing Court granted stay pending disposal of her suit. The High Court set aside the stay. The appellant approached the Supreme Court under Article 136. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether a purchaser pendente lite can resist execution under ***Order XXI Rules 97–100 CPC***. ii. Whether ***Order XXI Rule 29 CPC*** permits stay when suit is filed by transferee. iii. Whether doctrine of ***lis pendens under Section 52 TPA*** bars such resistance. ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsel argued that pendency of appellant’s suit justified stay. He relied upon ***Order XXI Rule 29 CPC***. He contended that execution should not proceed if substantive challenge was pending. He claimed the decree was fraudulent and inexecutable. He submitted that irreparable injury would result. He argued that Rule 102 was wrongly invoked. He asserted that she was not bound by decree without adjudication of her independent title. The appellant emphasized equitable considerations. She contended that courts must avoid multiplicity. She argued that execution would render her suit infructuous. She relied upon inherent powers under ***Section 151 CPC***. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The respondent contended that the appellant was a transferee pendente lite. He relied upon ***Order XXI Rule 102 CPC***. He argued that Rule 29 applied only to suits by judgment debtors. He emphasized that the sale deed was executed after suit institution. He invoked ***Section 52 TPA***. He argued that transferee is deemed to have constructive notice. He relied on ***Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust, (1998) 3 SCC 723*** and ***Sarvinder Singh v. Dalip Singh, (1996) 5 SCC 539***. He asserted that permitting resistance would defeat decrees. He argued that lis pendens preserves efficacy of judicial process. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. ***Section 52 Transfer of Property Act, 1882*** embodies lis pendens. It prohibits transfer affecting rights of parties during litigation. It ensures decree effectiveness. ii. ***Order XXI Rule 97 CPC*** allows decree holder to complain of obstruction. iii. ***Order XXI Rule 101 CPC*** mandates adjudication of rights. iv. ***Order XXI Rule 102 CPC*** excludes transferee pendente lite from protection. v. ***Order XXI Rule 29 CPC*** permits stay when suit by judgment debtor is pending. ## **I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT** The Court relied upon ***Bellamy v. Sabine (1857) 1 De G & J 566***. The House of Lords held that pendente lite transferee is bound irrespective of notice. The principle ensures litigation finality. The Court cited ***Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust, (1998) 3 SCC 723***. It held that inquiry is limited to status as transferee pendente lite. If yes, resistance fails. The Court referred to ***Sarvinder Singh v. Dalip Singh, (1996) 5 SCC 539***. It reaffirmed that transferee cannot obstruct execution. The Court approved ***Vijayalakshmi Leather Industries (P) Ltd. v. K. Narayanan, AIR 2003 Mad 203***. It extended Rule 102 to chain transfers. ## **J) JUDGEMENT** a. **RATIO DECIDENDI** i. A purchaser during pendency acquires no independent right. ii. ***Order XXI Rule 102 CPC*** bars resistance by transferee pendente lite. iii. Inquiry is confined to timing of transfer. iv. ***Rule 29 CPC*** does not apply to transferee’s suit. v. Doctrine of lis pendens binds irrespective of notice. The Court held that the appellant purchased after suit filing. Therefore, Rule 102 applied. The Executing Court erred in granting stay. The High Court acted correctly. The appeal was dismissed. b. **OBITER DICTA** i. The Court observed that if appellant succeeds later, restitution is available. ii. Execution cannot be stalled by speculative claims. c. **GUIDELINES** i. Executing Courts must first verify transfer date. ii. If transfer is pendente lite, resistance fails. iii. No elaborate adjudication is required. iv. Protection under Rules 98 and 100 excluded. v. Restitution remedy remains open. ## **K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The ruling strengthens decree finality. It harmonizes procedural and property law. It affirms supremacy of lis pendens. It curtails misuse of execution process. It preserves judicial authority. The judgment ensures certainty. It prevents endless litigation cycles. It protects decree holders from obstruction. It upholds equity and public policy. ## **L) REFERENCES** **a. Important Cases Referred** i. *Bellamy v. Sabine (1857) 1 De G & J 566* ii. *Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust, (1998) 3 SCC 723* iii. *Sarvinder Singh v. Dalip Singh, (1996) 5 SCC 539* iv. *Vijayalakshmi Leather Industries (P) Ltd. v. K. Narayanan, AIR 2003 Mad 203* **b. Important Statutes Referred** i. *Code of Civil Procedure, 1908* ii. *Transfer of Property Act, 1882* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India 2023 INSC 866](https://lawfoyer.in/pankaj-bansal-v-union-of-india-2023-insc-866/) **Published:** May 14, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The present judgment delivered by the **Supreme Court of India** on 3 October 2023 examines the scope and mandatory safeguards under ***Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002***. The core issue concerned the legality of arrest and remand effected by the ***Enforcement Directorate (ED)*** against the appellants. The Court scrutinised whether mere oral reading of the grounds of arrest satisfies the constitutional mandate under ***Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India***. The Bench held that furnishing written grounds of arrest is mandatory. Oral communication alone is insufficient. The Court emphasised procedural fairness. It reiterated that statutory power must be exercised within constitutional discipline. The decision also examined the duty of the Magistrate under ***Section 167 Cr.P.C.*** to independently verify compliance with statutory safeguards. The Court found the arrest illegal. It set aside remand orders. It clarified that compliance with Section 19 is not a formality. The judgment strengthens due process protections in money laundering prosecutions. **Keywords:** Money Laundering, Section 19 PMLA, Grounds of Arrest, Article 22(1), Remand Jurisdiction, Enforcement Directorate, Due Process ## B) CASE DETAILS i) **Judgement Cause Title** ***Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India*** ii) Case Number Criminal Appeal Nos. 3051–3052 of 2023 iii) Judgement Date 3 October 2023 iv) Court **Supreme Court of India** v) Quorum Justice Sanjay Kumar Justice A.S. Bopanna vi) Author Justice Sanjay Kumar vii) Citation 2023 INSC 866 viii) Legal Provisions Involved ***Section 19, 45, 50 PMLA 2002*** ***Section 167 Cr.P.C.*** ***Article 22(1), Constitution of India*** ix) Judgments Overruled Delhi High Court in ***Moin Akhtar Qureshi v. Union of India*** Bombay High Court in ***Chhagan Chandrakant Bhujbal v. Union of India*** x) Related Law Subjects Criminal Law Constitutional Law Economic Offences Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The dispute arose from arrest under ***Section 19 PMLA***. The appellants challenged legality of arrest. They alleged violation of statutory safeguards. They sought reading down of Section 19. They did not challenge constitutionality. The High Court misunderstood their plea. It assumed constitutional challenge. It dismissed writ petitions. The Supreme Court examined procedural safeguards. It analysed prior precedent in ***Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929***. That case upheld validity of PMLA provisions. However it left open interpretative aspects. The Court clarified that constitutional guarantees survive despite statutory stringency. Arrest power under PMLA is extraordinary. It affects personal liberty under ***Article 21***. Therefore strict compliance is essential. The Court emphasised accountability of ED officers. It relied on principles laid in ***V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement*** (2023). That decision mandated Magistrate scrutiny. The present case expanded that reasoning. It made written communication compulsory. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE An FIR dated 17 April 2023 was registered. It involved alleged corruption. Subsequently ED recorded ECIR. The appellants were summoned. They had secured interim anticipatory bail in related proceedings. Immediately thereafter second ECIR was recorded. They were summoned on short notice. They appeared before ED office. They were arrested same evening. They were not furnished written grounds. Grounds were allegedly read out. Arrest memo was prepared. They were produced before Vacation Judge. Remand was granted mechanically. The Magistrate did not record satisfaction regarding compliance of ***Section 19(1) PMLA***. The appellants challenged arrest and remand. High Court dismissed petitions. Hence appeal. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether oral reading of grounds satisfies ***Section 19(1) PMLA*** and ***Article 22(1)***. ii. Whether Magistrate must independently verify compliance before remand under ***Section 167 Cr.P.C.***. iii. Whether arrest was vitiated by arbitrariness. ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Appellants submitted that Section 19 requires strict compliance. They argued that “inform” must mean meaningful communication. Oral reading is insufficient. They relied on ***Article 22(1)*** jurisprudence. They cited ***Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, (1969) 1 SCC 292***. That case held remand cannot cure unconstitutional arrest. They contended arrest was retaliatory. They argued second ECIR timing showed mala fide. They invoked doctrine of colourable exercise of power from ***State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, (1980) 2 SCC 471***. They contended liberty cannot be curtailed casually. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Respondent submitted that Section 19 only requires information. It does not mandate written copy. They relied on Delhi High Court ruling in ***Moin Akhtar Qureshi v. Union of India***. They argued oral communication suffices. They contended Magistrate’s remand validates arrest. They argued appellants were evasive. They asserted arrest followed due procedure. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. ***Section 19(1) PMLA*** requires recording of reasons in writing. It mandates informing grounds of arrest. ii. ***Section 19(2) PMLA*** requires forwarding material to Adjudicating Authority. iii. ***Section 167 Cr.P.C.*** empowers Magistrate to authorise custody. It requires judicial application of mind. iv. ***Article 22(1) Constitution*** guarantees right to be informed of grounds of arrest. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT The Court analysed ***Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India***. It upheld constitutional validity of Section 19. It emphasised safeguards. It relied on ***V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, ED*** (2023). It held Magistrate must verify compliance. It referred to ***Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate***. It held illegal arrest is not cured by remand. It examined ***State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh***. It defined malice in law. It disapproved Delhi and Bombay High Court views permitting oral intimation. ## J) JUDGEMENT a) **RATIO DECIDENDI** i. Written grounds of arrest must be furnished. Oral reading is inadequate. ii. Magistrate must examine compliance with Section 19 before remand. iii. Non-compliance renders arrest illegal. iv. Arrest power must be exercised fairly. b) **OBITER DICTA** i. ED must act with transparency. It must avoid retaliatory conduct. ii. Sensitive material may be redacted. c) **GUIDELINES** Grounds of arrest shall be furnished in writing. Acknowledgment shall be obtained. Magistrates shall verify compliance. Failure entitles release. ## K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment strengthens procedural safeguards. It harmonises PMLA with constitutional liberty. It clarifies interpretative gaps. It reinforces accountability. It affirms that economic offence control cannot override due process. It marks significant development in arrest jurisprudence **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Deepika Singh v. Central Administrative Tribunal & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 5308 of 2022](https://lawfoyer.in/deepika-singh-v-central-administrative-tribunal-ors-civil-appeal-no-5308-of-2022/) **Published:** May 14, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The Supreme Court in ***Deepika Singh v. Central Administrative Tribunal & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 5308 of 2022, decided on 16 August 2022*** delivered a transformative ruling on the interpretation of ***Rule 43 of the Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1972***. The appellant, a Nursing Officer at PGIMER, sought maternity leave after the birth of her first biological child. The authorities denied leave on the ground that her spouse had two surviving children from a previous marriage and she had availed child care leave for them. The Court examined whether stepchildren could be counted as “surviving children” under Rule 43(1). It adopted a purposive and constitutional interpretation grounded in ***Articles 14, 15(3), 21 and 42 of the Constitution of India***. It held that maternity leave and child care leave are distinct entitlements. It further held that atypical family structures deserve equal protection. The Court set aside the High Court and CAT judgments. It directed grant of maternity leave to the appellant. The ruling strengthens gender justice jurisprudence. It expands the understanding of family under service law. It aligns domestic rules with constitutional morality and international obligations. **Keywords:** Maternity Leave, Service Law, Gender Justice, Purposive Interpretation, Family Structure, Constitutional Morality ## B) CASE DETAILS i) Judgement Cause Title ***Deepika Singh v. Central Administrative Tribunal and Others*** ii) Case Number Civil Appeal No. 5308 of 2022 iii) Judgement Date 16 August 2022 iv) Court Supreme Court of India v) Quorum Dr D.Y. Chandrachud, J. and A.S. Bopanna, J. vi) Author Dr D.Y. Chandrachud, J. vii) Citation (2022) 7 SCR 557 viii) Legal Provisions Involved ***Rule 43 and Rule 43-C of the Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1972*** ***Articles 14, 15(3), 21 and 42 of the Constitution of India*** ***Section 5 of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961*** ix) Judgments Overruled Judgment of Punjab & Haryana High Court dated 16 March 2021 Judgment of CAT dated 29 January 2021 x) Related Law Subjects Service Law, Constitutional Law, Gender Justice, Labour Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The appeal arose from denial of maternity leave. The appellant was a Nursing Officer. She served at PGIMER since 2005. She married a widower in 2014. Her husband had two children. Those children were from his earlier marriage. The earlier spouse had expired. The appellant assumed a parental role. She later gave birth in 2019. She applied for maternity leave under ***Rule 43 CCS Leave Rules, 1972***. The authorities rejected the request. They treated her biological child as a third child. They relied on the expression “less than two surviving children”. The Tribunal upheld the rejection. The High Court affirmed it. The appellant approached the Supreme Court. The central question involved interpretation of beneficial service rules. The Court considered constitutional values. It examined gender roles in society. It referred to unpaid care work data. It also relied on international conventions like CEDAW. The Court examined purposive interpretation principles. It cited ***KH Nazar v. Mathew K Jacob (2020) 14 SCC 126***. It cited ***Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse (2014) 1 SCC 188***. It emphasized social context adjudication. The case thus became a landmark in service jurisprudence. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellant joined PGIMER in 2005. She married Amir Singh in 2014. Her spouse had two children. Those children were born in 2001 and 2005. The appellant requested inclusion of their names in service records. She availed child care leave earlier. She bore her first biological child on 4 June 2019. She applied for maternity leave from 27 June 2019. The authorities sought clarification. They rejected her application on 3 September 2019. They reasoned she had two surviving children. They treated the newborn as a third child. They converted her leave into earned and extraordinary leave. That period did not count for increment. She approached CAT Chandigarh Bench. The Tribunal dismissed her claim. It held that for practical purposes she had two children. The High Court concurred. The Supreme Court examined whether this interpretation was legally sustainable. It analysed Rule 43 text. It examined Rule 43-C regarding child care leave. It noted the distinction between both. It scrutinized the impact on increments and service conditions. It assessed constitutional implications. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether stepchildren can be counted as “surviving children” under ***Rule 43(1) CCS Leave Rules, 1972*** for denying maternity leave. ii. Whether availing ***child care leave under Rule 43-C*** disentitles a woman from maternity leave. iii. Whether a purposive interpretation must prevail in beneficial service legislation. ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Petitioner submitted that maternity leave is linked to childbirth. They argued it relates to biological delivery. They contended stepchildren cannot affect biological maternity. They stressed Rule 43 grants leave for delivery. They argued child care leave is distinct. They relied on beneficial interpretation doctrine. They cited ***Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll) (2000) 3 SCC 224***. That case extended maternity benefit to casual workers. They argued social welfare laws require liberal construction. They invoked ***Article 15(3)*** empowering special provisions for women. They relied on ***Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1*** recognizing reproductive autonomy. They emphasized that denial defeats legislative intent. They argued that motherhood cannot be penalized. They submitted that stepchildren inclusion was compassionate. It should not be used against her. They sought setting aside of impugned judgments. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Respondent submitted that Rule 43 uses the term “less than two surviving children”. They argued the appellant had two children in service records. They stressed she availed child care leave. They argued administrative consistency required denial. They contended rule language is plain. They maintained that once she declared stepchildren, she cannot resile. They argued maternity leave was inadmissible. They relied on literal interpretation. They supported Tribunal findings. They argued no perversity existed. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. ***Rule 43 CCS Leave Rules, 1972*** grants 180 days maternity leave. It applies to women with less than two surviving children. ii. ***Rule 43-C*** grants 730 days child care leave. It applies for two eldest surviving children. It is independent of childbirth. iii. ***Article 15(3) Constitution*** permits special provisions for women. iv. ***Article 21 Constitution*** protects dignity and reproductive autonomy. v. ***Article 42 Constitution*** mandates maternity relief. vi. ***Section 5 Maternity Benefit Act, 1961*** ensures payment during maternity. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT The Court relied on ***KH Nazar v. Mathew K Jacob (2020) 14 SCC 126***. It held beneficial statutes need liberal construction. It cited purposive interpretation doctrine. It relied on ***Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse (2014) 1 SCC 188***. That case emphasized social justice adjudication. It bridged law and social reality. It cited ***Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll) (2000) 3 SCC 224***. It extended maternity benefits to daily wage workers. It relied on constitutional directives. It cited ***Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (2017) 10 SCC 1***. It recognized reproductive rights under Article 21. It cited ***Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration (2009) 9 SCC 1***. It upheld bodily integrity and reproductive autonomy. ## J) JUDGEMENT a) **RATIO DECIDENDI** i. The Court held maternity leave and child care leave are distinct entitlements. It held stepchildren cannot be equated with biological children for Rule 43. It adopted purposive interpretation. It held denial defeats constitutional mandate. It recognized diverse family structures. It emphasized that atypical families deserve equal protection. It set aside CAT and High Court judgments. It directed grant of maternity leave. b) **OBITER DICTA** i. The Court observed that traditional family assumptions are outdated. It recognized domestic partnerships and queer relationships. It stated law must adapt to social change. It highlighted unpaid care burden on women. It stressed state support for care work. c) **GUIDELINES** The Court clarified distinction between maternity leave and child care leave. It directed authorities to apply purposive construction. It emphasized constitutional morality in service law interpretation. It affirmed inclusivity in understanding family. ## K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The ruling affirms constitutional feminism. It harmonizes service rules with fundamental rights. It prevents penalizing motherhood. It protects dignity of working women. It expands recognition of blended families. It aligns domestic law with CEDAW obligations. It strengthens purposive interpretation doctrine. It signals progressive service jurisprudence. It underscores that welfare legislation must advance justice. ## L) REFERENCES a) Important Cases Referred i. ***Deepika Singh v. CAT***, (2022) 7 SCR 557 ii. ***KH Nazar v. Mathew K Jacob***, (2020) 14 SCC 126 iii. ***Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse***, (2014) 1 SCC 188 iv. ***Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Female Workers***, (2000) 3 SCC 224 v. ***Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India***, (2017) 10 SCC 1 vi. ***Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration***, (2009) 9 SCC 1 b) Important Statutes Referred i. ***Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1972*** ii. ***Maternity Benefit Act, 1961*** iii. ***Constitution of India*** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Vibhor Garg v. Neha 2025 INSC 829](https://lawfoyer.in/vibhor-garg-v-neha-2025-insc-829/) **Published:** May 14, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The present case titled ***Vibhor Garg v. Neha***, decided by the ***Supreme Court of India***, addresses a significant question concerning the admissibility of secretly recorded spousal conversations in matrimonial proceedings. The dispute arose when the husband sought to introduce audio recordings of telephonic conversations with his wife to substantiate allegations of cruelty under ***Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955***. The Punjab and Haryana High Court had disallowed the evidence, holding that such covert recordings violated the wife’s ***right to privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution of India***. The Supreme Court reversed this finding. It undertook a detailed examination of ***Section 122 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872***, which protects marital communications, and analyzed its exceptions, particularly in suits between spouses. The Court harmonized statutory privilege, evidentiary principles under ***Sections 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act***, and constitutional privacy jurisprudence emerging from ***K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India***. The judgment clarifies that in matrimonial disputes, spousal privilege does not bar disclosure of relevant communications, and privacy cannot operate as an absolute shield against admissible and relevant evidence. The decision settles conflicting High Court views and affirms the primacy of fair trial in matrimonial adjudication. **Keywords:** Marital Communication Privilege, Section 122 Evidence Act, Right to Privacy, Electronic Evidence, Matrimonial Cruelty, Family Courts Act. ## **B) CASE DETAILS** i) **Judgment Cause Title:** Vibhor Garg v. Neha ii) **Case Number:** Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 21195 of 2021 iii) **Judgment Date:** 2025 iv) **Court:** *Supreme Court of India* v) **Quorum:** Justice B.V. Nagarathna vi) **Author:** Justice B.V. Nagarathna vii) **Citation:** 2025 INSC 829 viii) **Legal Provisions Involved:** ***Section 13, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955*** ***Section 122, Indian Evidence Act, 1872*** ***Sections 65A and 65B, Indian Evidence Act, 1872*** ***Section 14, Family Courts Act, 1984*** ***Article 21, Constitution of India*** ix) **Judgments overruled by the Case:** Conflicting High Court views disallowing spousal recordings on privacy grounds. x) **Law Subjects:** Constitutional Law, Family Law, Evidence Law. ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT** The dispute originated from matrimonial discord. The husband filed a divorce petition under ***Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955*** alleging cruelty. During evidence, he sought to introduce audio recordings of conversations between him and his wife. These recordings were allegedly made without her knowledge. The Family Court permitted their production. The High Court reversed that decision, invoking privacy under ***Article 21***. The Supreme Court examined the interplay between statutory privilege and constitutional privacy. The Court focused on whether marital communications secretly recorded could be admitted in matrimonial litigation. It also examined whether privacy rights override evidentiary relevance. The Court undertook a doctrinal interpretation of ***Section 122 of the Evidence Act***. It also revisited jurisprudence on electronic evidence. The judgment harmonized evidentiary principles with constitutional safeguards. It clarified the scope of spousal privilege in divorce proceedings. The Court aimed to resolve divergence among High Courts. The ruling establishes clarity on admissibility standards in family disputes. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The marriage was solemnized on 20.02.2009. A daughter was born in 2011. Marital disputes emerged. The husband filed a divorce petition in 2017. He alleged cruelty. During trial, he sought to submit supplementary affidavit evidence. He produced memory cards, CDs, and transcripts. The recordings allegedly contained conversations between spouses. The wife objected. She argued violation of privacy. She contended inadmissibility under ***Section 122 Evidence Act***. The Family Court allowed production under ***Section 14 Family Courts Act***. The High Court reversed. It relied on precedents like ***Rayala M. Bhuvaneswari v. Nagaphanender Rayala, AIR 2008 AP 98***. The High Court held covert recording violated privacy. The husband appealed. The Supreme Court granted leave. It examined admissibility, privilege, and privacy. The matter involved balancing fair trial with dignity rights. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether secretly recorded spousal conversations are admissible in divorce proceedings. ii. Whether ***Section 122 Evidence Act*** bars such disclosure. iii. Whether privacy under ***Article 21*** overrides evidentiary relevance. iv. Whether Family Courts can admit such evidence under ***Section 14 Family Courts Act***. ## **F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsel argued cruelty occurs within privacy of home. Independent witnesses are rare. Technology assists proof. ***Section 122 Evidence Act*** contains exceptions for suits between spouses. Divorce proceedings fall within exception. Thus privilege does not apply. The counsel relied on ***M.C. Verghese v. T.J. Ponnan, AIR 1970 SC 1876***. That case clarified privilege exceptions. It was argued privacy is not absolute. Fair trial is integral under ***Article 21***. Electronic evidence is admissible under ***Section 65B Evidence Act***. The counsel cited High Court decisions permitting such evidence. He argued exclusion would prejudice his case. He emphasized relevance and authenticity. He contended privacy must yield to justice. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The respondent argued recordings lacked pleadings foundation. She questioned authenticity. She alleged delay in production. She invoked ***Article 21*** privacy rights. She relied on ***K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1***. She contended marriage is sacred trust. Secret recording erodes dignity. She argued Section 122 prohibits disclosure. She submitted privacy must prevail. She relied on High Court precedents disallowing such evidence. She warned of encouraging surveillance culture. She contended admissibility would legitimize breach of trust. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. ***Section 122, Indian Evidence Act, 1872*** protects marital communications. It contains exceptions for suits between spouses. The Court interpreted its two limbs. Compellability and permissibility were distinguished. ii. ***Sections 65A and 65B Evidence Act*** govern electronic records. Certification ensures authenticity. iii. ***Section 14 Family Courts Act, 1984*** allows flexible evidentiary approach. iv. ***Article 21 Constitution of India*** protects privacy and fair trial. ## **I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT** The Court examined ***M.C. Verghese v. T.J. Ponnan***, which held privilege attaches at communication time. It clarified exceptions in matrimonial litigation. It relied on ***Ram Bharosey v. State of U.P., (1954) 1 SCC 284***, distinguishing acts from communications. It cited ***Yusufalli Esmail Nagree v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 147*** and ***R.M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra (1973) 2 SCR 417***, which upheld admissibility of tape recordings subject to relevance and authenticity. It analyzed ***K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India***, discussing privacy contours. The Court distinguished High Court cases disallowing recordings. ## **J) JUDGMENT** a) **RATIO DECIDENDI** i. The exception in ***Section 122 Evidence Act*** applies to matrimonial proceedings. Hence spousal privilege does not bar disclosure. ii. Secret recording does not automatically render evidence inadmissible. Relevance, identification, and authenticity are key tests. iii. Privacy under ***Article 21*** is not absolute. It must be balanced with fair trial rights. iv. Electronic evidence admissibility depends on ***Section 65B*** compliance. v. High Court erred in excluding evidence solely on privacy grounds. b) **OBITER DICTA** i. The Court observed marital snooping reflects breakdown of trust. It is symptom, not cause. ii. Courts must cautiously evaluate authenticity. iii. Privacy rights must harmonize with statutory exceptions. c) **GUIDELINES** i. Relevance to issues must be established. ii. Authenticity must satisfy ***Section 65B*** conditions. iii. Courts must ensure no tampering. iv. Privacy concerns may warrant in-camera proceedings. v. Evidence weight depends on context and reliability. ## **K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment strengthens evidentiary clarity in matrimonial disputes. It affirms that statutory exceptions prevail over generalized privacy claims. It aligns evidentiary law with technological realities. It harmonizes constitutional rights with procedural fairness. The ruling prevents misuse of privacy as shield against truth. It ensures Family Courts access best available evidence. The decision resolves judicial inconsistency. It reinforces balance between dignity and justice **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Tahir V. Isani vs Madan Waman Chodankar 2025 INSC 1044](https://lawfoyer.in/tahir-v-isani-vs-madan-waman-chodankar-2025-insc-1044/) **Published:** May 14, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The Supreme Court examined the scope of ***Order XXI Rules 97, 101 and 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908*** in light of the doctrine of ***lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882***. The dispute arose from execution proceedings in a decree for dissolution of partnership and ejectment. The core issue concerned whether a purchaser of immovable property, who acquired title during pendency of the suit but not from the judgment-debtor, could resist execution by invoking ***Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 CPC***. The High Court had invoked ***Order XXI Rule 102 CPC*** and discontinued the enquiry, treating the purchaser as a transferee pendente lite. The Supreme Court reversed this finding. The Court clarified that Rule 102 bars objections only when the objector traces title directly from the judgment-debtor after institution of the suit. A transferee from a third party owner, who was not a party to the suit, does not attract the statutory bar. The Court restored the executing court’s enquiry and emphasized balance between finality of decrees and legitimate third-party rights. The decision strengthens doctrinal clarity regarding execution law and limits indiscriminate application of lis pendens principles. **Keywords:** Order XXI CPC, Lis Pendens, Execution Proceedings, Transferee Pendente Lite, Section 52 TPA, Decree Holder Rights. ## B) CASE DETAILS i) **Judgment Cause Title:** ***Tahir V. Isani vs Madan Waman Chodankar (Since Deceased) through LRs*** ii) **Case Number:** Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 15167 of 2022 iii) **Judgment Date:** 6 May 2025 iv) **Court:** Supreme Court of India v) **Quorum:** Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta vi) **Author:** Justice Vikram Nath vii) **Citation:** 2025 INSC 1044 viii) Legal Provisions Involved: ***Order XXI Rules 97, 98, 99, 100, 101 and 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908*** ***Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882*** ix) **Judgments Overruled:** None expressly overruled x) **Related Law Subjects:** Civil Procedure Law, Property Law, Execution Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The dispute emerged from execution of a decree in partnership dissolution proceedings. The decree did not determine ownership. It concerned ejectment between partners. The purchaser of the property raised objections in execution. The executing court allowed enquiry under ***Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 CPC***. The High Court closed the enquiry relying upon ***Rule 102 CPC***. The Supreme Court examined the scheme of execution provisions. The Court revisited the doctrine of lis pendens. It evaluated equitable balance between decree finality and third-party rights. The Court relied heavily on ***Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram, (2008) 7 SCC 144***. It reiterated that Rule 102 prevents abuse by judgment-debtors. The doctrine ensures decrees are not defeated by transfers. However, the Court stressed that statutory bars must be strictly construed. The decision refines interpretation of Rule 102. It prevents mechanical invocation of lis pendens. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The original owner leased part premises in 1977. A partnership followed. Disputes arose between partners. Ownership changed hands in 1988. Later the property was sold in 2007 to the appellant. Meanwhile, a partnership dissolution suit resulted in an ex parte decree in 2008. Execution proceedings commenced. The appellant filed objections in 2009 under ***Order XXI Rules 97 and 101 CPC***. Issues were framed in 2013. Evidence progressed. After ten years, decree-holder’s legal heirs sought discontinuance of enquiry invoking ***Rule 102 CPC***. The executing court rejected the plea. The High Court reversed it. The Supreme Court restored the enquiry. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether ***Order XXI Rule 102 CPC*** bars objections by a purchaser who does not derive title from the judgment-debtor. ii. Whether doctrine of ***lis pendens under Section 52 TPA*** applies to such purchaser. iii. Whether the High Court erred in discontinuing enquiry after prolonged proceedings. ## F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Petitioner submitted that the appellant purchased from a third-party owner. The owner was not party to the decree suit. Thus Rule 102 was inapplicable. They relied on ***Dev Raj Dogra v. Gyan Chand Jain, (1981) 2 SCC 675***. That case recognized adjudication rights in execution. They argued that ownership questions must be decided within execution under ***Rule 101 CPC***. They contended that lis pendens applies only against transferees of litigating parties. They emphasized strict statutory interpretation. They argued that equity cannot override explicit wording. They asserted that the High Court misapplied ***Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram***. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Respondent submitted that the transfer occurred during pendency. Thus constructive notice applied. They invoked ***Section 52 TPA***. They argued that decree-holders face endless obstruction. They relied upon ***Jini Dhanrajgir v. Shibu Mathew, (2023) 20 SCC 76***. That case highlighted decree-holder hardships. They argued that Rule 102 must receive purposive construction. They contended that pendente lite purchasers must not derail execution. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. ***Order XXI Rule 97 CPC*** permits resistance complaints. ii. ***Order XXI Rule 101 CPC*** mandates adjudication of title issues. iii. ***Order XXI Rule 102 CPC*** excludes transferee pendente lite of judgment-debtor. iv. ***Section 52 TPA*** embodies lis pendens doctrine. The maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” was invoked. The Court reaffirmed that litigation must attain finality. However, statutory language governs scope. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT The Court discussed ***Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram, (2008) 7 SCC 144***. It held transferee from judgment-debtor cannot resist execution. The Court cited English authority ***Bellamy v. Sabine (1857) 1 De G & J 566***. It affirmed binding nature of pending litigation. The Court cited ***Jini Dhanrajgir v. Shibu Mathew, (2023) 20 SCC 76***. It observed decree enforcement difficulties. The Court distinguished these precedents. It clarified that Rule 102 requires transfer from judgment-debtor. ## J) JUDGMENT a) **Ratio Decidendi** i. Rule 102 applies only when transfer originates from judgment-debtor. ii. Appellant did not trace title from judgment-debtor. iii. Therefore statutory bar was inapplicable. iv. Executing court must adjudicate objections under Rules 97 and 101 CPC. The Court emphasized statutory ingredients. It listed four mandatory conditions. Absence of any defeats Rule 102 application. The High Court erred in ignoring this threshold requirement. b) **Obiter Dicta** i. Decree-holders deserve protection from abuse. ii. Yet legitimate third-party claims require fair adjudication. iii. Courts must prevent misuse of lis pendens doctrine. c) **Guidelines** i. Examine source of title carefully. ii. Determine if transferor was judgment-debtor. iii. Verify timing of transfer. iv. Ensure objections are not mala fide. v. Continue enquiry when Rule 102 conditions fail. ## K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment restores doctrinal clarity. It balances decree finality and third-party justice. It restricts overbroad application of lis pendens. It reinforces adjudicatory mandate under ***Order XXI Rule 101 CPC***. The ruling will guide executing courts nationwide. It discourages mechanical closure of objections. It strengthens procedural fairness in execution jurisprudence. ## L) REFERENCES a) Important Cases Referred i. ***Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram, (2008) 7 SCC 144*** ii. ***Dev Raj Dogra v. Gyan Chand Jain, (1981) 2 SCC 675*** iii. ***Jini Dhanrajgir v. Shibu Mathew, (2023) 20 SCC 76*** iv. ***Bellamy v. Sabine (1857) 1 De G & J 566*** b) Important Statutes Referred i. ***Code of Civil Procedure, 1908*** ii. ***Transfer of Property Act, 1882*** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Rutu Mihir Panchal & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 2025 INSC 593](https://lawfoyer.in/rutu-mihir-panchal-ors-v-union-of-india-ors-2025-insc-593/) **Published:** May 14, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The decision in ***Rutu Mihir Panchal & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 2025 INSC 593*** examines the constitutional validity of ***Sections 34(1), 47(1)(a)(i), and 58(1)(a)(i) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019***, which altered the basis of pecuniary jurisdiction of consumer fora. Under the repealed 1986 Act, jurisdiction depended on the value of goods or services and the compensation claimed. The 2019 Act shifted the basis to the value of consideration paid for goods or services. The petitioners challenged this legislative shift under ***Article 14 of the Constitution of India***, alleging arbitrariness and discrimination. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the impugned provisions. The Court held that Parliament possesses legislative competence to prescribe pecuniary jurisdiction. The classification based on consideration paid was found to satisfy the twin test of intelligible differentia and rational nexus laid down in ***State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75***. The Court rejected the claim of manifest arbitrariness and clarified that no remedy was taken away. The Court further emphasized the need for performance audit of statutes and directed statutory authorities under the 2019 Act to ensure effective implementation. **Keywords:** Consumer Protection Act 2019, Pecuniary Jurisdiction, Article 14, Reasonable Classification, Manifest Arbitrariness, Performance Audit. ## B) CASE DETAILS **i) Judgment Cause Title:** ***Rutu Mihir Panchal & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.*** **ii) Case Number:** Writ Petition (Civil) No. 282 of 2021 with Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 1738 of 2022 **iii) Judgment Date:** 29 April 2025 **iv) Court:** Supreme Court of India **v) Quorum:** Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha Justice Manoj Misra **vi) Author:** Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha **vii) Citation:** 2025 INSC 593 **viii) Legal Provisions Involved:** ***Sections 34, 47, 58, 3, 5, 10, 18–22 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019*** ***Article 14 and Article 32 of the Constitution of India*** ***Entry 95 List I, Entries 11-A and 46 List III, Seventh Schedule*** **ix) Judgments Overruled:** None **x) Law Subjects:** Constitutional Law Consumer Protection Law Administrative Law Tribunal Jurisdiction Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The case questioned the constitutional validity of revised pecuniary limits. The petitioners invoked ***Article 32*** alleging violation of equality. The 2019 Act replaced the 1986 Act. The old regime considered compensation claimed. The new regime considers consideration paid. This legislative shift altered forum accessibility. Under the 1986 Act, inflated compensation determined jurisdiction. Litigants often claimed exaggerated sums. This practice burdened the National Commission. The 2019 Act sought structural correction. It realigned jurisdiction with economic value of transaction. The petitioners argued that this change created discrimination. They alleged that consumers claiming identical damages faced different forums. The State defended the reform. It relied on legislative competence and policy rationality. The Court framed issues on legislative power, equality doctrine, arbitrariness, and loss of remedy. The judgment thus bridges constitutional doctrine and consumer regulatory reform. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE In the writ petition, the petitioner’s husband purchased a Ford Endeavour for Rs. 31.19 lakhs. The vehicle caught fire. He died tragically. Criminal proceedings followed. The widow filed a consumer complaint seeking Rs. 51.49 crores. Under the 2019 Act, jurisdiction lay before the District Commission. Under the 1986 Act, she could approach the National Commission directly. She challenged this statutory compulsion. In the connected civil appeal, the appellant’s husband died of COVID-19. Insurance benefits were denied. She claimed Rs. 14.94 crores before the National Commission. The Commission rejected jurisdiction. The premium paid did not exceed Rs. 10 crores. Both matters questioned pecuniary jurisdiction criteria. The grievance was structural, not factual. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether ***Sections 34, 47 and 58 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019*** violate ***Article 14***. ii. Whether Parliament lacks competence to prescribe pecuniary jurisdiction based on consideration paid. iii. Whether the provisions are manifestly arbitrary. iv. Whether the legislative shift results in denial of effective remedy. ## F) PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Petitioner submitted that the classification was discriminatory. Two consumers claiming equal damages faced different forums. This violated equality. They relied on ***Article 14***. They invoked the principle in ***E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3***, equating arbitrariness with inequality. They argued that the definition of “consumer” under ***Section 2(7)*** was broad. Restricting forum access on consideration paid contradicted statutory width. They alleged irrational hierarchy distortion. They contended that exaggerated claims could be curbed differently. Pecuniary limits could be enhanced. Forum access should not depend on transaction value alone. They further claimed that insurance cases would be confined to District Commissions. This created structural imbalance. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Respondent submitted that Parliament has competence. They cited ***State of Bombay v. Narottamdas Jethabhai, AIR 1951 SC 69***. Legislative power includes jurisdiction prescription. Pecuniary grading is historical practice. They argued reasonable classification exists. Consideration paid is objective. Compensation claimed is subjective. The reform curbs inflated claims. They relied on ***State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar***. The twin test was satisfied. They submitted that no remedy was lost. Only forum determination changed. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. ***Section 34(1)*** vests District Commission jurisdiction up to one crore consideration. ii. ***Section 47(1)(a)(i)*** assigns State Commission jurisdiction between one and ten crores. iii. ***Section 58(1)(a)(i)*** grants National Commission jurisdiction above ten crores. iv. ***Article 14*** ensures equality before law. v. ***Article 32*** guarantees constitutional remedies. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED The Court relied on ***State of Bombay v. Narottamdas Jethabhai***. It held jurisdiction prescription lies within legislative domain. The Court cited ***State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar***. It reiterated the intelligible differentia test. The Court referred to ***Nandita Bose v. Ratanlal Nahta, AIR 1987 SC 1947***. It affirmed courts can prevent overvaluation abuse. The Court cited ***Yash Developers v. Harihar Krupa Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., 2024 INSC 559***. It discussed performance audit doctrine. ## J) JUDGMENT #### a) RATIO DECIDENDI i. Parliament possesses competence to prescribe pecuniary jurisdiction. ii. Classification based on consideration paid satisfies Article 14. iii. The provisions are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. iv. No consumer right to choose forum through inflated claims exists. v. Performance audit ensures statutory effectiveness. #### b) OBITER DICTA i. Judicial review must examine institutional functionality. ii. Regulatory bodies must ensure efficiency and transparency. #### c) GUIDELINES The Court directed the ***Central Consumer Protection Council*** and ***Central Consumer Protection Authority*** to undertake review, survey, and advisory functions. They must ensure effective implementation. Their functioning remains subject to judicial review. ## K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces legislative supremacy in structuring tribunals. It clarifies equality doctrine application in jurisdictional design. It balances consumer access with systemic efficiency. The reasoning aligns with separation of powers. It reflects administrative constitutionalism. The performance audit emphasis deepens rule of law culture. The decision strengthens regulatory accountability. It preserves consumer remedies. It prevents procedural manipulation. It affirms that equality does not imply identical forum choice. It implies that structural rationality satisfies constitutional scrutiny. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Pragya Prasun & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 2025 INSC 599](https://lawfoyer.in/pragya-prasun-ors-v-union-of-india-ors-2025-insc-599/) **Published:** May 14, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The decision in ***Pragya Prasun & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.*, 2025 INSC 599** delivered on 30 April 2025 by the Supreme Court of India addresses a foundational question of constitutional governance in the digital era: whether digital KYC norms that mandate “live photographs” and “liveness checks” without accessible alternatives violate the rights of persons with disabilities. The petitioners, acid attack survivors with permanent facial and ocular disfigurement and a person with 100% blindness, challenged the inaccessibility of Digital KYC, e-KYC, and Video KYC processes mandated under the ***Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002***, the RBI’s KYC Master Directions, and parallel sectoral regulations. They argued that the current framework excludes them from essential services such as banking, telecommunications, insurance, and pensions, thereby infringing ***Article 21***, ***Article 14***, and the statutory mandate of the ***Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016***. The Court undertook a detailed examination of constitutional guarantees, the doctrine of reasonable accommodation, and India’s obligations under the ***UNCRPD***. It held that digital transformation cannot become a tool of exclusion. The absence of accessible design, alternative verification mechanisms, and clarity in “liveness” requirements amounted to systemic discrimination. The judgment reinforces that technological compliance under anti-money laundering laws must coexist with accessibility mandates. It directs regulatory bodies to frame inclusive digital KYC norms consistent with disability rights jurisprudence. **Keywords:** Digital KYC; Reasonable Accommodation; Accessibility; RPwD Act, 2016; Article 21; UNCRPD; Financial Inclusion. ## **B) CASE DETAILS** i) **Judgement Cause Title:** *Pragya Prasun & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.* with *Amar Jain v. Union of India & Ors.* ii) **Case Number:** W.P. (C) No. 289 of 2024 with W.P. (C) No. 49 of 2025 iii) **Judgement Date:** 30 April 2025 iv) **Court:** Supreme Court of India v) **Quorum:** Hon’ble Mr. Justice R. Mahadevan vi) **Author:** Justice R. Mahadevan vii) **Citation:** 2025 INSC 599; available at Indian Kanoon viii) Legal Provisions Involved: ***Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution of India***; ***Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002***; ***Prevention of Money Laundering (Maintenance of Records) Rules, 2005***; ***RBI Master Direction on KYC, 2016***; ***Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016***; ***Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2017***; ***UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2006***. ix) **Judgments overruled:** None expressly overruled. x) **Related Law Subjects:** Constitutional Law; Disability Law; Banking and Financial Regulation; Administrative Law; Human Rights Law; Technology Law. ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The matter arose within India’s expanding digital governance framework. The State has promoted digital identity verification as a mechanism to combat financial crimes. Regulatory bodies have mandated Digital KYC and Video KYC procedures. These procedures require live photographs, OTP validation, and real-time interaction. Such mechanisms are rooted in compliance with ***Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002*** and its allied Rules. However, the petitioners demonstrated that these technological standards ignore accessibility requirements. The petitioners included acid attack survivors suffering permanent eye disfigurement. One petitioner was completely blind. They could not blink to satisfy “liveness” checks. They could not independently align cameras. They could not read screen prompts. Their digital KYC applications were rejected. They were denied banking accounts and SIM cards. The exclusion affected their financial independence. It affected dignity. It affected daily survival. The grievance thus lay at the intersection of digital compliance and constitutional morality. The Court recognized that digital governance must remain inclusive. It emphasized that technological neutrality is a myth when design excludes vulnerable groups. The judgment thus situates disability rights within the constitutional framework of equality and dignity. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The petitioners attempted to complete Digital KYC for essential services. The systems required blinking for liveness verification. They required reading random codes. They required uploading signatures. The petitioners were unable to comply. The facial disfigurement prevented blinking detection. Blindness prevented visual alignment and reading screen prompts. Institutions refused offline verification despite regulatory flexibility. Applications were rejected mechanically. The petitioners argued that such denial deprived them of bank accounts, SIM cards, pensions, and investments. They relied upon ***Section 3 and Section 40 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016***. They contended that accessibility is mandatory. They asserted that reasonable accommodation was denied. They invoked ***Article 21*** for right to dignity. They relied on ***Vikash Kumar v. UPSC (2021) 5 SCC 370*** where this Court recognized reasonable accommodation as intrinsic to equality. They also relied on ***Rajive Raturi v. Union of India (2018) 2 SCC 413*** which mandated accessibility in public infrastructure. The respondents acknowledged concerns. However, they argued that liveness checks were essential for preventing fraud. They maintained that alternatives existed. Yet evidence revealed inconsistent implementation. The Court thus had to reconcile anti-money laundering compliance with accessibility obligations. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i) Whether mandatory Digital KYC norms that require live photographs and liveness checks without accessible alternatives violate ***Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution***. ii) Whether failure to provide reasonable accommodation breaches ***Section 3 and Section 2(y) of the RPwD Act, 2016***. iii) Whether regulatory bodies are obligated under ***Section 40 and Section 42 of the RPwD Act, 2016*** to ensure ICT accessibility. iv) Whether exclusion from digital financial services amounts to denial of equal participation under constitutional jurisprudence. ## **F) PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioners submitted that Digital KYC is now indispensable. Without it, one cannot open a bank account. One cannot obtain a SIM card. Such denial affects survival. They argued that exclusion violates ***Article 21*** as interpreted in ***Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1*** where dignity and autonomy were central. They stressed that accessibility is a constitutional obligation. They relied upon ***Vikash Kumar v. UPSC (2021) 5 SCC 370*** where scribes were recognized as reasonable accommodation. They further argued that undefined “liveness” allows arbitrary practices. Eye blinking is not statutorily mandated. Yet institutions treat it as mandatory. This results in indirect discrimination. They cited ***Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India (2016) 7 SCC 761*** where dignity of persons with disabilities was upheld. They contended that technology must adapt to persons. Persons need not adapt to technology. They invoked India’s obligations under ***Article 9 of the UNCRPD***. They emphasized that accessibility standards notified under ***Rule 15 of RPwD Rules, 2017*** were ignored. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondents submitted that Digital KYC flows from ***Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002***. They argued that identity verification prevents terror financing. RBI maintained that blinking is not mandatory. SEBI and IRDAI claimed that offline KYC remains available. DoT stated paper KYC was reintroduced in exceptional cases. They argued that security cannot be diluted. They relied upon regulatory discretion. They submitted that liveness checks are flexible. However, they conceded willingness to improve accessibility. They emphasized training and sensitization efforts. Yet no uniform guidelines existed ensuring compliance with accessibility standards. The Court examined whether such assurances suffice under constitutional scrutiny. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i) ***Article 14*** ensures equality before law. Any indirect discrimination violates equality. ii) ***Article 21*** protects dignity and autonomy. Financial exclusion affects life. iii) ***Section 3(5) RPwD Act, 2016*** mandates reasonable accommodation. iv) ***Section 40 and Section 42 RPwD Act, 2016*** impose accessibility standards for ICT. v) ***Section 13 RPwD Act, 2016*** guarantees access to financial services. vi) ***Rule 15 RPwD Rules, 2017*** prescribes website accessibility standards. These provisions collectively create positive obligations. They require systemic adjustments. They are not aspirational. They are enforceable mandates. ## **I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT** The Court relied upon ***Vikash Kumar v. UPSC (2021) 5 SCC 370*** where reasonable accommodation was recognized as a facet of substantive equality. It held that denial of scribes amounts to discrimination. It referred to ***Rajive Raturi v. Union of India (2018) 2 SCC 413*** mandating accessibility in public infrastructure. It relied upon ***Disabled Rights Group v. Union of India (2018) 2 SCC 397*** recognizing enforceability of accessibility standards. It invoked ***Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India (2016) 7 SCC 761*** which emphasized dignity and non-discrimination. These precedents collectively affirmed that accessibility is integral to equality. ## **J) JUDGEMENT** a) **Ratio Decidendi** i) Digital transformation must conform to constitutional morality. Accessibility is not optional. It is mandatory. Failure to provide alternative mechanisms violates ***Section 3 and Section 40 of RPwD Act, 2016***. Undefined liveness requirements result in arbitrary exclusion. Such exclusion infringes ***Article 14 and Article 21***. Anti-money laundering objectives are legitimate. Yet means must be proportionate. Denial of accommodation is disproportionate. b) **Obiter Dicta** i) The Court observed that inclusive design benefits all citizens. Accessibility strengthens governance. It does not weaken security. c) **Guidelines** The Court directed regulators to: – Define “liveness” inclusively. – Provide non-visual and non-blinking alternatives. – Permit thumb impressions digitally. – Ensure compliance with ICT accessibility standards. – Conduct sensitization programs. – Provide grievance redressal for PwDs. **K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment reaffirms substantive equality. It bridges technology and human rights. It ensures that digital India remains inclusive. It harmonizes financial security with dignity. It expands accessibility jurisprudence into fintech regulation. It strengthens disability rights enforcement in digital governance. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [5th MAIMS Mock Trial Competition, 2026 | Organized by Maims Mock Trial Society, Department of Law, Maharaja Agrasen Institute of Management Studies (MAIMS), in collaboration with the Bar Council of Delhi | Register by 23 August 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/5th-maims-mock-trial-competition-2026-organized-by-maims-mock-trial-society-department-of-law-maharaja-agrasen-institute-of-management-studies-maims-new-delhi-register-by-23-august-2026/) **Published:** May 12, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 5th MAIMS Mock Trial Competition, 2026 | Organized by Maims Mock Trial Society, Department of Law, Maharaja Agrasen Institute of Management Studies (MAIMS), New Delhi | Register by 23 August 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Screenshot-2026-05-12-200004.jpg) ## About the Organiser / College / University Maharaja Agrasen Institute of Management Studies (MAIMS) was established in 2003 under the Maharaja Agrasen Technical Education Society (MATES), New Delhi. The institute is affiliated with Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University, Delhi, and offers a wide range of undergraduate and postgraduate programmes. MAIMS has been accredited with the highest NAAC grade of A++. The Department of Law was established in 2017 with the launch of the integrated BA LL.B programme, followed by BBA LL.B in 2020 and LL.M. in 2022. The department is equipped with facilities such as a Moot Court Room, Legal Services Clinic, ADR Cell, IPR Cell, and Pro Bono Club affiliated with the Ministry of Law & Justice. ## Details About the Event / Opportunity The 5th MAIMS National Mock Trial Competition, 2026 aims to provide law students across India with a dynamic platform to demonstrate their advocacy, legal research, courtroom etiquette, and analytical skills. The competition is organized in collaboration with the Bar Council of Delhi and focuses on a socially significant theme emphasizing mental health awareness and the urgent need for early diagnosis, particularly in a society where superstition and misinformation often hinder timely intervention. The event seeks to foster informed legal discourse and highlight the role of law and society in addressing mental health concerns. ## Objectives of the Competition - Facilitate practical legal learning and knowledge building. - Encourage teamwork, leadership, and strategic collaboration. - Promote legal ethics and professionalism. - Provide interaction opportunities with judges, legal practitioners, and scholars. - Inspire civic responsibility and legal literacy among future legal professionals. ## Benefits - One-month SCC Online subscription for all participants. - Annual SCC Online subscription for the winning team. - Opportunity to enhance advocacy, research, drafting, and courtroom skills. - Exposure to practical litigation and trial procedures. - Networking opportunities with legal professionals, judges, and law students from institutions across India. ## Who is it For / Eligibility to Participate - Students currently pursuing 3-year or 5-year LL.B programmes. - Up to two teams may participate from each institution. - Each team must consist of four members: - Two Speakers (Counsel) - Two Researchers-cum-Witnesses ## Mode of the Event Hybrid Mode - Virtual Rounds: - Preliminary Rounds I & II - Quarter-Final Round - Physical Rounds: - Semi-Final Round - Final Round ## Location & Venue of the Event Country: India State: Delhi City: New Delhi Venue for Physical Rounds: Department of Law, Maharaja Agrasen Institute of Management Studies, Sector 22, Rohini, New Delhi – 110086 ## Registration / Submission Links & Procedure Participants must complete the registration form and upload proof of payment (UTR/Reference Number screenshot) to confirm registration. The competition documents, including the brochure, rulebook, mock proposition, and ancillary details, are available via the official QR code provided in the brochure. ## Payment Details **1. For NEFT /IMPS Transfer** Account Holder’s Name: MAIMS Cultural Society (MACS) Bank Name: Union Bank Of India Account No.: 604202010000826 IFSC Code: UBIN0560421 Branch: Union Bank of India, Sector 22, Rohini, New Delhi 110086 **2. Other Details** A screenshot of UTR/Ref No. of Payment to be uploaded while submitting the Registration Form for completing the Payment. Payment once made shall not be refunded. All transfers are non- refundable in nature. ## Fee Details - Regular Registration Fee: ₹5,600 per team - Early Bird Registration Fee: ₹5,000 per team (valid until 23 May 2026, 11:59 PM IST) - Optional Accommodation Fee for Qualifying Teams: ₹4,000 per team ## Prizes - Winner: ₹50,000 + Certificate of Merit - Runner-Up: ₹25,000 + Certificate of Merit - Best Speaker: ₹5,000 + Certificate of Merit - Best Researcher: ₹5,000 + Certificate of Merit - Best Memorial: ₹5,000 + Certificate of Merit - Best Witness-Cum-Researcher: ₹10,000 + Certificate of Merit - MAIMS Exemplary Witness: Certificate of Merit ## Deadlines / Important Dates - Registration Opens: 27 April 2026 - Release of Mock Proposition: 27 April 2026 - Early Bird Discount Ends: 23 May 2026 - Last Date to Seek Clarifications: 18 August 2026 - Clarifications Published: 28 August 2026 - Registration Closes: 23 August 2026 - Last Date for Payment: 23 August 2026 - Memorial Submission Deadline (Soft Copy): 31 August 2026 - Inaugural Ceremony, Draw of Lots & Exchange of Memorials: 10 September 2026 - Researcher’s Test: 11 September 2026 - Preliminary Rounds I & II: 11 September 2026 - Quarter-Final Round: 12 September 2026 - Semi-Final Round: 25 September 2026 - Final Round: 25 September 2026 - Valedictory Ceremony & Announcement of Awards: 26 September 2026 ## Contact Information Email: Core Team Contacts: - Aviral Gupta (Convenor): +91 94532 34137 - Sana Sachdeva (Co-Convenor): +91 82877 77504 - Divya Gupta (Co-Convenor): +91 88519 39372 ## [Official Documents Link](https://linktr.ee/maimsmocktrial?utm_source=qr_code) **Categories:** Events, Moot Courts --- ### [Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India and Others, W.P. (Crl.) No. 336 of 2018](https://lawfoyer.in/radhika-agarwal-v-union-of-india-and-others-w-p-crl-no-336-of-2018/) **Published:** May 14, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The present judgment in ***Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India and Others***, **W.P. (Crl.) No. 336 of 2018 & Connected Matters**, decided on **27 February 2025**, examines the constitutional and statutory contours of the power of arrest under the ***Customs Act, 1962*** and the ***Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017***. The Supreme Court revisited the legal position emerging from ***Om Prakash v. Union of India, (2011) 14 SCC 1***, particularly in light of subsequent legislative amendments introduced in 2012, 2013, and 2019. The Court declined to reopen the ratio of *Om Prakash*, holding that Parliament had consciously accepted and modified the legal framework through statutory amendments. The decision clarifies the classification of offences as **cognizable or non-cognizable** and **bailable or non-bailable** under amended ***Section 104 of the Customs Act***. It further harmonises procedural safeguards under the ***Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*** with arrest powers under fiscal statutes. The Court emphasized constitutional protections under ***Article 21*** and ***Article 22(1)*** of the Constitution of India. Drawing guidance from ***Deepak Mahajan***, ***Tofan Singh***, and ***Arvind Kejriwal***, the Court mandated adherence to statutory safeguards including recording of reasons to believe, communication of grounds of arrest, maintenance of case diaries, and judicial review of arrest legality. The judgment significantly strengthens procedural fairness in fiscal prosecutions. It reiterates that economic offences do not dilute constitutional guarantees. **Keywords:** Customs Act, Arrest Powers, Cognizable Offence, Article 21, Procedural Safeguards, Judicial Review, GST Act. ## **B) CASE DETAILS** i) **Judgement Cause Title** ***Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India and Others*** ii) Case Number **Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 336 of 2018 & Connected Matters** iii) Judgement Date 27 February 2025 iv) Court **Supreme Court of India** v) Quorum Bench headed by **Chief Justice Sanjiv Khanna** vi) Author **Hon’ble Chief Justice Sanjiv Khanna** vii) Citation 2025 INSC 272 viii) Legal Provisions Involved ***Section 104 of the Customs Act, 1962*** ***Sections 41, 41B, 41D, 50, 50A, 55A, 155, 167, 172 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*** ***Article 21 and Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India*** ***Relevant provisions of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017*** ix) Judgments overruled by the Case None expressly overruled. *Om Prakash* ratio reaffirmed with contextual interpretation. x) Related Law Subjects Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Taxation Law, Economic Offences, Procedural Law. ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The litigation arose from challenges to the power of arrest exercised by customs and GST officers. Petitioners questioned arbitrary arrests without procedural safeguards. The controversy stemmed from interpretation of ***Section 104 of the Customs Act***. The earlier decision in ***Om Prakash v. Union of India, (2011) 14 SCC 1*** classified many offences as non-cognizable and bailable. Parliament subsequently amended the statute. The 2012, 2013 and 2019 amendments altered the landscape. The Court examined whether arrest powers required prior judicial sanction. It also analysed interplay between fiscal statutes and the ***Code of Criminal Procedure***. Petitioners argued violation of fundamental rights under ***Article 21***. The Court approached the issue from constitutional perspective. It stressed that deprivation of liberty demands strict statutory compliance. The judgment reflects a balance between revenue interests and civil liberties. The Court clarified that legislative amendments were deliberate. Parliament partially accepted the ratio of *Om Prakash*. Certain offences were declared cognizable and non-bailable. Others remained non-cognizable and bailable. This structured classification became central to the decision. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** Multiple writ petitions challenged arrests under the ***Customs Act*** and ***GST Act***. Petitioners alleged misuse of arrest powers. They contended that arrests occurred without compliance with safeguards. Some were detained despite offences being non-cognizable. Others alleged absence of recorded reasons to believe. The cases were clubbed due to common legal questions. Petitioners sought declaration that customs officers are akin to police officers. They claimed mandatory compliance with Chapter XII of the ***CrPC***. They also sought protection against coercive action. The Union defended statutory authority under amended provisions. It argued that specified offences exceeding monetary thresholds were cognizable. It relied upon amendments post-*Om Prakash*. The matter thus required constitutional and statutory interpretation. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i) Whether offences under amended ***Section 104 of the Customs Act*** are cognizable and non-bailable. ii) Whether customs officers are police officers. iii) Whether safeguards under the ***CrPC*** apply to customs arrests. iv) Whether reasons to believe must be furnished to arrestee. v) Whether arrest orders are subject to judicial review. ## **F) PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioners submitted that customs officers function like police. They exercise arrest and investigation powers. Hence procedural safeguards under Chapter XII of ***CrPC*** must strictly apply. They relied upon ***Om Prakash v. Union of India, (2011) 14 SCC 1***. They argued that offences remain non-cognizable unless expressly declared otherwise. They contended arrest without warrant violates ***Section 155(2) CrPC***. They also invoked ***Article 21***. Petitioners relied upon ***Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1***. They argued statements to customs officers should attract evidentiary safeguards. They emphasized liberty jurisprudence from ***D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416***. They urged mandatory supply of grounds of arrest. They further cited ***Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2025) 2 SCC 248***. They argued that reasons to believe must be furnished. Without disclosure, judicial review becomes illusory. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that Parliament amended the statute consciously. ***Section 104(4)*** declares specified offences cognizable. ***Section 104(6)*** declares specified offences non-bailable. They argued customs officers are not police officers. They relied upon ***Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal, (1969) 2 SCR 461*** and ***Illias v. Collector of Customs, (1969) 2 SCR 613***. They contended evidentiary distinction is settled. They also cited ***Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440***. They argued that Section 167 CrPC applies to customs arrests. Magistrates may authorise custody. Thus procedural safeguards already exist. They submitted that economic offences threaten national revenue. Stringent powers are justified. However they accepted compliance with constitutional safeguards. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i) ***Section 104(4), Customs Act*** declares specified offences cognizable. ii) ***Section 104(6), Customs Act*** classifies certain offences non-bailable. iii) ***Sections 4 and 5 CrPC*** preserve application of procedural law. iv) ***Section 41B CrPC*** mandates arrest memorandum. v) ***Section 41D CrPC*** grants right to meet advocate. vi) ***Section 50A CrPC*** requires informing relative. vii) ***Article 22(1), Constitution*** mandates communication of grounds. ## **I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT** The Court examined ***Om Prakash v. Union of India, (2011) 14 SCC 1***. It held offences were non-cognizable and bailable pre-amendment. It relied on ***Deepak Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440***. It held Section 167 CrPC applies to customs arrests. It reaffirmed ***Tofan Singh, (2021) 4 SCC 1***. Customs officers are not police officers under Section 25 Evidence Act. It referred to ***Ashok Kumar Sharma, (2021) 12 SCC 674***. It harmonised special statutes with CrPC. It relied on ***Arvind Kejriwal, (2025) 2 SCC 248***. It mandated furnishing reasons to believe. ## **J) JUDGEMENT** a) **Ratio Decidendi** The Court held that amendments to ***Section 104*** are decisive. Specified offences are cognizable. Others remain non-cognizable. Customs officers are not police officers. However procedural safeguards of ***CrPC*** apply where not inconsistent. Reasons to believe must be recorded. Grounds of arrest must be furnished. Judicial review is permissible. Arrest is drastic power. It must be exercised sparingly. Liberty under ***Article 21*** prevails. b) **Obiter Dicta** The Court emphasised that economic offences do not dilute constitutional guarantees. It advised strict compliance with diary maintenance under ***Section 172 CrPC***. c) **Guidelines** Arresting officer must record reasons to believe in writing. Grounds of arrest must be supplied promptly. Arrest memo under ***Section 41B CrPC*** mandatory. Relative must be informed under ***Section 50A CrPC***. Accused may meet advocate under ***Section 41D CrPC***. Magistrate must verify compliance upon production. Judicial review available against arbitrary arrest. ## **K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment reinforces constitutional supremacy. It harmonises fiscal enforcement with civil liberties. It clarifies legislative intent post amendments. It strengthens transparency in arrest procedure. It ensures judicial scrutiny. It affirms that liberty is non-negotiable even in economic offences. ## **L) REFERENCES** a) Important Cases Referred i) ***Om Prakash v. Union of India, (2011) 14 SCC 1*** ii) ***Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440*** iii) ***Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1*** iv) ***D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416*** v) ***Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2025) 2 SCC 248*** b) Important Statutes Referred i) ***Customs Act, 1962*** ii) ***Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017*** iii) ***Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*** iv) ***Constitution of India*** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Dr. Tanvi Behl v. Shrey Goel & Ors., 2025 INSC 125](https://lawfoyer.in/dr-tanvi-behl-v-shrey-goel-ors-2025-insc-125/) **Published:** May 14, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The present judgment delivered in ***Dr. Tanvi Behl v. Shrey Goel & Ors., 2025 INSC 125*** decisively examines the constitutional validity of ***residence-based reservation in Post Graduate Medical Courses*** within the State quota. The Supreme Court was confronted with the legality of a clause in the admission prospectus of ***Government Medical College and Hospital, Chandigarh***, which effectively reserved all 64 State quota seats either for institutional preference candidates or for candidates fulfilling broad residential criteria of the Union Territory. The Court reaffirmed the constitutional mandate of equality under ***Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India***, and held that residence-based reservation in PG medical admissions is impermissible. The Bench, comprising ***Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia***, ***Justice Hrishikesh Roy***, and ***Justice S.V.N. Bhatti***, relied heavily on binding precedents such as ***Jagadish Saran v. Union of India (1980) 2 SCC 768***, ***Dr. Pradeep Jain v. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 654***, and the Constitution Bench ruling in ***Saurabh Chaudri v. Union of India (2003) 11 SCC 146***. The Court clarified the distinction between institutional preference and residence-based reservation, reiterated that India recognizes only one domicile, and declared such State-based preferences unconstitutional at the PG level. The judgment also preserved admissions already granted, invoking equity. **Keywords:** Residence-based reservation, PG Medical Admission, Article 14, Institutional Preference, Domicile in India, Equality Clause. ## B) **CASE DETAILS** i) Judgment Cause Title: ***Dr. Tanvi Behl v. Shrey Goel & Ors.*** ii) Case Number: ***Civil Appeal No. 9289 of 2019*** (with connected matters) iii) Judgment Date: ***29 January 2025*** iv) Court: ***Supreme Court of India*** v) Quorum: ***Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia***, ***Justice Hrishikesh Roy***, ***Justice S.V.N. Bhatti*** vi) Author: ***Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia*** vii) Citation: ***2025 INSC 125*** viii) Legal Provisions Involved: ***Article 14***, ***Article 15***, ***Article 16***, ***Article 5 of the Constitution of India*** ix) Judgments overruled: None. x) Related Law Subjects: Constitutional Law, Education Law, Administrative Law. ## C) **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT** The controversy emerged from the admission process of PG Medical Courses in Chandigarh. The prospectus distributed 64 State quota seats exclusively between institutional preference candidates and candidates qualifying under a broad UT Chandigarh residential pool. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana invalidated the clause. It held the classification violative of ***Article 14***. The Supreme Court examined whether such reservation aligns with constitutional equality. The Bench framed three precise questions. The primary issue concerned the constitutional permissibility of residence-based reservation in PG Medical admissions. The Court noted that the matter stood substantially covered by earlier authoritative precedents. However, interpretative confusion surrounding ***Saurabh Chaudri v. Union of India (2003) 11 SCC 146*** warranted clarification. The Court thus re-examined the jurisprudential foundations laid in ***Jagadish Saran*** and ***Pradeep Jain***. It emphasized that PG medical education stands at a higher pedestal. Merit assumes dominant importance. The State’s policy was scrutinized against the equality doctrine. The judgment reflects constitutional fidelity to national unity and equal opportunity. ## D) **FACTS OF THE CASE** The ***Government Medical College and Hospital, Chandigarh*** had 64 PG seats under State quota. The prospectus divided them between institutional preference and UT Chandigarh Pool. The UT Pool allowed eligibility through five years’ study, parental residence, or property ownership. These criteria were expansive. The High Court found them irrational. It observed absence of nexus with academic excellence. Petitioners relied on ***Jagadish Saran***, ***Pradeep Jain***, and ***Saurabh Chaudri***. The High Court struck down clauses 2B(i), (ii), (iii). It directed filling of seats strictly by NEET merit. The Medical College appealed. Interim stay was granted by Supreme Court on 09.05.2019. Admissions were made subject to final outcome. The Supreme Court thereafter examined constitutional validity. It ultimately affirmed the High Court’s reasoning. It held residence-based reservation unconstitutional in PG courses. However, it protected ongoing admissions in equity. ## E) **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i) Whether providing domicile or residence-based reservation in PG Medical Courses within State quota is constitutionally invalid? ii) Whether institutional preference differs from residence-based classification? iii) How should State quota seats be filled if such reservation is impermissible? ## F) **PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** i) The counsels for Petitioners submitted that ***Saurabh Chaudri*** did not absolutely bar residence-based reservation. They contended Article 15 omits residence as a prohibited ground. They argued that local needs justify limited reservation. They relied on State expenditure rationale. They sought distinction between domicile and residence. They claimed flexibility under Article 14’s reasonable classification doctrine. They argued Chandigarh’s unique status justified tailored policy. ## G) **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** i) The counsels for Respondents submitted that binding precedents prohibit such reservation. They emphasized merit supremacy at PG level. They relied on ***Pradeep Jain (1984) 3 SCC 654***. They cited the Constitution Bench in ***Saurabh Chaudri***. They argued residence-based classification undermines national unity. They invoked equality under ***Article 14***. They asserted that India recognizes only one domicile. They contended institutional preference alone is permissible. ## H) **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i) ***Article 14*** guarantees equality before law. It prohibits arbitrary classification. ii) ***Article 15(1)*** prohibits discrimination on grounds including place of birth. iii) ***Article 16(2)*** bars discrimination in employment based on residence. iv) ***Article 5*** recognizes single domicile of India. The Court held residence classification must withstand Article 14 scrutiny. It failed the reasonable nexus test. Merit-based selection is constitutional mandate. ## I) **PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT** i) ***Jagadish Saran v. Union of India (1980) 2 SCC 768*** – Held institutional preference permissible to limited extent. Emphasized diminishing role of reservation at higher specialisation. ii) ***Dr. Pradeep Jain v. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 654*** – Distinguished MBBS and PG levels. Permitted limited residence-based reservation at MBBS. Prohibited such reservation in PG. iii) ***Saurabh Chaudri v. Union of India (2003) 11 SCC 146*** – Constitution Bench reaffirmed Pradeep Jain. Upheld institutional preference. Declared residence-based reservation impermissible. iv) ***Magan Mehrotra v. Union of India (2003) 11 SCC 186*** – Followed Pradeep Jain. Rejected residence-based claim. v) ***Nikhil Himthani v. State of Uttarakhand (2013) 10 SCC 237*** – Reiterated merit principle in PG admissions. ## J) **JUDGMENT** a) **RATIO DECIDENDI** i) Residence-based reservation in PG Medical Courses violates ***Article 14***. ii) Institutional preference permissible within reasonable limits. iii) India has single domicile. Provincial domicile concept invalid. iv) PG admissions must prioritize merit. v) State quota seats beyond institutional preference filled strictly by NEET merit. b) **OBITER DICTA** i) Misuse of term domicile by States discouraged. ii) National unity must not suffer due to parochial policies. c) **GUIDELINES** i) No residence-based reservation in PG Medical Courses. ii) Institutional preference may continue reasonably. iii) State quota seats filled strictly by merit. iv) Past admissions protected in equity. ## K) **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment fortifies constitutional equality. It harmonizes precedent. It preserves merit in higher medical education. It discourages parochialism. It reiterates unity of Indian domicile. It protects national integration. It balances equity and legality. It strengthens doctrinal clarity under Articles 14 and 15. ## L) **REFERENCES** a) Important Cases Referred i) ***Jagadish Saran v. Union of India (1980) 2 SCC 768*** ii) ***Dr. Pradeep Jain v. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 654*** iii) ***Saurabh Chaudri v. Union of India (2003) 11 SCC 146*** iv) ***Magan Mehrotra v. Union of India (2003) 11 SCC 186*** v) ***Nikhil Himthani v. State of Uttarakhand (2013) 10 SCC 237*** b) Important Statutes Referred i) ***Constitution of India – Articles 14, 15, 16, 5*** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Imran Pratapgarhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 INSC 410](https://lawfoyer.in/imran-pratapgarhi-v-state-of-gujarat-2025-insc-410/) **Published:** May 14, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The present judgment delivered by the **Supreme Court of India** in *Criminal Appeal No. 1545 of 2025* examines the constitutional limits of criminal prosecution arising from poetic expression posted on social media. The appeal arose from registration of an FIR against a Member of Parliament for reciting a poem alleged to incite communal disharmony and outrage religious sentiments under various provisions of the ***Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023***. The Court scrutinized the contents of the poem, the statutory ingredients of the invoked offences, and the constitutional guarantee of ***freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a)***. The Court also examined the scope of police powers under ***Section 173 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023*** and reaffirmed that criminal law cannot be weaponized to stifle dissent. The Court held that none of the alleged offences were prima facie made out. It emphasized that the standard for assessing alleged hate speech must be that of a reasonable and strong-minded citizen. The judgment reinforces constitutional morality, limits police overreach, and reiterates that dissent, protest, and poetic symbolism are protected speech unless they clearly fall within the exceptions of ***Article 19(2)***. **Keywords:** Freedom of Speech, Hate Speech, Article 19(1)(a), Section 196 BNS, Preliminary Inquiry under BNSS, Mens Rea, Judicial Review. ## **B) CASE DETAILS** i) **Judgment Cause Title:** *Imran Pratapgarhi v. State of Gujarat* ii) Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 1545 of 2025 iii) Judgment Date: 28 March 2025 iv) Court: Supreme Court of India v) Quorum: Justice Abhay S. Oka vi) Author: Justice Abhay S. Oka vii) Citation: 2025 INSC 410 viii) Legal Provisions Involved: ***Article 19(1)(a), Article 19(2), Article 51A(a), Constitution of India***; ***Sections 196, 197, 299, 302, 57, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023***; ***Section 173, Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023***; ***Section 528 BNSS***. ix) Judgments Overruled: None expressly overruled. x) Related Law Subjects: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Human Rights Law, Media Law. ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT** The judgment arose from an FIR registered against the appellant, a sitting Member of the Rajya Sabha. The FIR alleged that a poem recited in the background of a social media video incited communal enmity. The prosecution invoked ***Sections 196, 197, 299, 302, and 57 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023***. The High Court refused to quash the FIR citing investigation at a nascent stage. The Supreme Court examined whether mere poetic recitation could attract criminal liability. The Court noted that seventy-five years after adoption of the Constitution, law enforcement must internalize constitutional guarantees. It emphasized that police officers are bound by ***Article 51A(a)*** to respect constitutional ideals. The judgment marks an important reaffirmation of constitutional supremacy. It reiterates that free expression cannot be curtailed by mechanical FIR registration. The Court evaluated the poem objectively and contextualized it within democratic discourse. It relied on precedents interpreting hate speech provisions and the requirement of mens rea. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The appellant attended a mass wedding event in Jamnagar. A video clip was recorded and later posted on the social media platform X. In the background, a poem was recited. The poem addressed injustice and symbolically warned rulers against oppression. It contained metaphors referring to sacrifice and resilience. The complainant alleged that the poem promoted hatred between religious communities. It was claimed that the recitation hurt religious sentiments and threatened national unity. Consequently, an FIR was registered invoking serious penal provisions. The appellant filed a petition under ***Section 528 BNSS read with Article 226 of the Constitution*** seeking quashing. The High Court dismissed the petition relying on *Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra*. The High Court held that investigation was at an early stage and interference was unwarranted. Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether the poem attracts offences under ***Sections 196, 197, 299, 302 and 57 BNS***. ii. Whether registration of FIR violated ***Article 19(1)(a)***. iii. Whether High Court erred in refusing to quash FIR at threshold. iv. Whether police were obligated to conduct preliminary inquiry under ***Section 173(3) BNSS***. ## **F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioner submitted that the poem contained no reference to religion, caste, or community. The text symbolized peaceful resistance. It advocated meeting injustice with love. Therefore, statutory ingredients of ***Section 196 BNS*** were absent. They relied upon *Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra* and *Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra*. These cases held that mens rea is essential in hate speech offences. They argued that police failed to apply mind. Registration of FIR chilled constitutional speech. They contended that High Court misapplied *Neeharika Infrastructure*. They invoked *State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal* to submit that FIR lacking ingredients must be quashed. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that police are duty bound to register FIR if cognizable offence appears. They relied upon *Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh*. They argued that investigation should proceed unhindered. However, the Solicitor General fairly left ultimate decision to Court. He disputed attribution of poem’s authorship but did not strongly defend applicability of penal provisions. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. ***Section 196 BNS*** penalizes promotion of enmity between groups. It requires disharmony on specified grounds. The Court held poem lacked communal reference. ii. ***Section 197 BNS*** concerns imputations prejudicial to national integration. The poem made no assertion against any class. iii. ***Section 299 BNS*** requires deliberate malicious intention to outrage religious feelings. No such intention existed. iv. ***Section 302 BNS*** addresses deliberate intent to wound religious feelings. No direct insult was shown. v. ***Section 173 BNSS*** provides framework for FIR registration and preliminary inquiry. ## **I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT** The Court analyzed ***Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 5 SCC 1***. It held mens rea essential under hate speech law. It referred to ***Ramesh v. Union of India (1988) 1 SCC 668***. The Court adopted the “reasonable man” standard. It relied upon ***Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra (2024) 4 SCC 156***. The case protected protest speech. It cited ***Bhagwati Charan Shukla v. Provincial Government, C.P. & Berar, 1946 SCC OnLine MP 5***. The test of strong-minded citizens was reiterated. It invoked ***Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 2 SCC 1***. FIR registration is mandatory only if cognizable offence disclosed. It reiterated ***State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335)*** regarding quashing powers. ## **J) JUDGEMENT** a) **RATIO DECIDENDI** i. The poem did not promote communal enmity. Ingredients of ***Sections 196, 197, 299, 302 BNS*** absent. ii. Mens rea not established. iii. FIR registration was mechanical and abusive. iv. High Court erred in refusing quashing solely due to early investigation stage. v. Police must consider constitutional rights before registering FIR in speech cases. b) **OBITER DICTA** i. Police must be sensitized to constitutional values. ii. Article 19(2) cannot overshadow Article 19(1)(a). iii. Courts must zealously protect dissent and artistic expression. c) **GUIDELINES** The Court emphasized preliminary inquiry under ***Section 173(3) BNSS*** in speech-based offences. Higher officers should normally permit such inquiry. FIR should not be weapon against dissent. Constitutional courts must intervene where abuse apparent. ## **K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment fortifies free speech jurisprudence. It harmonizes statutory interpretation with constitutional morality. It reaffirms democratic tolerance. It restrains criminalization of symbolic dissent. It strengthens safeguards against arbitrary prosecution. ## **L) REFERENCES** a) Important Cases Referred i. *Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra* ii. *Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra* iii. *Ramesh v. Union of India* iv. *State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal* v. *Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh* vi. *Bhagwati Charan Shukla v. Provincial Government, C.P. & Berar* b) Important Statutes Referred i. ***Constitution of India*** ii. ***Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023*** iii. ***Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023*** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Call for Papers: LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research [ISSN No:- 2583-7753] | Vol 4 Issue 2 | Get Free CrossRef DOI, E-Certificate of Publication, & Indexing in 350+ International Libraries & Databases including Stanford, Harvard, Oxford, IIM Bangalore, HeinOnline, Manupatra & many more: Submit Manuscript by June 15](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-papers-lawfoyer-international-journal-of-doctrinal-legal-research-issn-no-2583-7753-vol-4-issue-2-get-free-crossref-doi-e-certificate-of-publication-indexing-in-350-internat/) **Published:** May 13, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** Call for Papers: LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research [ISSN No:- 2583-7753] | Vol 4 Issue 2 | Get Free CrossRef DOI, E-Certificate of Publication, & Indexing in 350+ International Libraries & Databases including Stanford, Harvard, Oxford, IIM Bangalore, HeinOnline, Manupatra & many more: Submit Manuscript by June 15 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/LIJDLR-10801350-1.jpg) The LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research (LIJDLR) is pleased to invite research papers and manuscripts for its Volume 4, Issue 2 (2026). 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By contributing to our journal, you are not only enhancing your academic profile but also becoming part of a global network of thinkers and practitioners shaping the future of law. We warmly invite scholars, practitioners, students, and academicians from across the globe to contribute to Volume 4, Issue 2 (2026) and join us in advancing meaningful legal research. ### [**Click here to submit.**](https://lijdlr.com/cfp-lawfoyer-international-journal-of-doctrinal-legal-research/) ### [**Click here for the official notification.**](https://lijdlr.com/cfp-lawfoyer-international-journal-of-doctrinal-legal-research/) **Categories:** Call for Papers, Events --- ### [Aparna Ajinkya Firodia v. Ajinkya Arun Firodia, Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 9855/2022](https://lawfoyer.in/aparna-ajinkya-firodia-v-ajinkya-arun-firodia-civil-appeal-arising-out-of-slp-c-no-9855-2022/) **Published:** May 11, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The present case, ***Aparna Ajinkya Firodia v. Ajinkya Arun Firodia***, Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 9855/2022, decided on 20 February 2023 by the Supreme Court of India, examines the delicate interplay between ***Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872***, the use of **DNA profiling technology**, and the constitutional rights of a minor child under ***Article 21 of the Constitution of India***. The central issue concerned whether a court could direct a DNA test of a minor child born during a valid marriage, solely to substantiate allegations of adultery in a pending divorce proceeding. The husband relied upon a privately obtained DNA report excluding his paternity and sought a court-directed test. The wife opposed, invoking the conclusive presumption of legitimacy and the child’s right to privacy and dignity. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that ***Section 112 embodies a rule of public policy protecting legitimacy***, and that DNA tests cannot be ordered routinely. The Court held that unless **non-access** is specifically pleaded and prima facie established, the presumption cannot be disturbed. It distinguished prior precedents such as ***Dipanwita Roy v. Ronobroto Roy (2015) 1 SCC 365***, and emphasized that children cannot be treated as forensic objects in matrimonial battles. The Court underscored the rights of children under the **UN Convention on the Rights of the Child**, and held that adverse inference under ***Section 114 Illustration (h)*** cannot be mechanically drawn. The appeal was allowed, and the direction for DNA testing was set aside. **Keywords:** Section 112 Evidence Act, DNA Test, Presumption of Legitimacy, Adultery, Child’s Privacy, Article 21, Adverse Inference. ## **B) CASE DETAILS** i) **Judgement Cause Title** ***Aparna Ajinkya Firodia v. Ajinkya Arun Firodia*** ii) **Case Number** Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 9855/2022 iii) **Judgement Date** 20 February 2023 iv) **Court** Supreme Court of India v) **Quorum** Hon’ble Justice B.V. Nagarathna vi) **Author** Justice B.V. Nagarathna vii) **Citation** Civil Appeal No. \_\_\_ of 2023 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 9855/2022) viii) **Legal Provisions Involved** ***Section 112, Indian Evidence Act, 1872*** ***Section 114 Illustration (h), Indian Evidence Act, 1872*** ***Section 4, Indian Evidence Act, 1872*** ***Sections 13(1)(i) and (ia), Hindu Marriage Act, 1955*** ***Article 21, Constitution of India*** ***Section 14, Family Courts Act, 1984*** ix) Judgments overruled by the Case None expressly overruled. x) Law Subjects Family Law. Evidence Law. Constitutional Law. Child Rights Law. ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The dispute arose within matrimonial litigation pending before the Family Court, Pune. The respondent-husband filed for divorce under ***Sections 13(1)(i) and (ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955*** alleging adultery and cruelty. He alleged that the second child born during marriage was the product of an adulterous relationship. He relied upon a privately conducted DNA test showing 0% probability of paternity. The Family Court directed a fresh DNA test of the minor child. The High Court affirmed. The case required interpretation of ***Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872***. That provision declares that a child born during valid marriage is conclusively legitimate unless non-access is proved. The respondent did not plead non-access. He instead relied on alleged admissions and electronic evidence. The Supreme Court had to decide whether scientific advancement could override statutory presumption grounded in public policy. The judgment therefore engages with the conflict between biological truth and legal legitimacy. It tests the limits of forensic science in matrimonial disputes. It weighs the dignity of a child against evidentiary interests of a litigant. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The parties married on 23 November 2005 in Pune under Hindu rites. They had two sons. The younger son was born on 17 July 2013 during subsistence of marriage. In 2017, the husband filed a divorce petition alleging adultery with one Kshitij Bafna. He claimed he discovered intimate messages in September 2016. He alleged admission by the wife. In November 2016, he conducted a private DNA test through DNA Labs India. The report stated that he lacked genetic markers necessary to establish paternity. Probability was declared 0%. In 2020, during divorce proceedings, he sought court direction for DNA testing of the minor child to prove adultery. The wife opposed. She argued no plea of non-access existed. She invoked ***Section 112*** and child’s privacy. The Family Court allowed the application. It relied upon ***Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik (2014) 2 SCC 576***. It also stated adverse inference under ***Section 114 Illustration (h)*** could be drawn on refusal. The High Court upheld the order. It relied upon ***Sharda v. Dharmpal (2003) 4 SCC 493***. The wife approached the Supreme Court. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether courts rightly appreciated ***Section 112 Evidence Act*** in directing DNA testing. ii. Whether refusal to undergo DNA testing permits adverse inference under ***Section 114 Illustration (h)***. iii. Whether child’s rights under ***Article 21*** override evidentiary demands. ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioner submitted that the presumption under ***Section 112*** is conclusive unless non-access is proved. Reliance was placed on ***Goutam Kundu v. State of West Bengal (1993) 3 SCC 418***. That case held blood tests cannot be ordered routinely. Strong prima facie proof of non-access is mandatory. No such plea was raised here. It was argued that legitimacy is protected by public policy. In ***Kamti Devi v. Poshi Ram (2001) 5 SCC 311***, the Court held DNA test cannot dislodge presumption absent proof of non-access. The husband admitted cohabitation. Hence presumption stands unrebutted. Counsel emphasized child’s privacy under ***Article 21***. In ***Bhabani Prasad Jena v. Convenor Secretary (2010) 8 SCC 633***, the Court required “eminent need.” No such need exists. The husband claimed alternative evidence like call recordings. Therefore DNA test is not indispensable. It was contended that private DNA report lacks evidentiary value until proved. Reliance before trial is premature. Adverse inference would stigmatize the child. The welfare of the child must prevail. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that DNA testing is the most scientific method to prove adultery. Reliance was placed on ***Dipanwita Roy v. Ronobroto Roy (2015) 1 SCC 365***. That judgment permitted DNA testing where infidelity was alleged. He argued that matrimonial proceedings are judgments in rem under ***Section 41 Evidence Act***. Truth must prevail. The private DNA report laid foundation. Under ***Section 14 Family Courts Act***, courts can consider such material. Reliance was placed on ***Sharda v. Dharmpal (2003) 4 SCC 493***. That case held medical examination does not violate Article 21 if ordered by court. He asserted that refusal would justify adverse inference under ***Section 114 Illustration (h)***. He maintained that he would not disown the child. Thus child’s welfare remains intact. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** ***Section 112, Indian Evidence Act, 1872*** declares birth during valid marriage as conclusive proof of legitimacy unless non-access is shown. ***Section 4, Indian Evidence Act, 1872*** defines “conclusive proof.” Once fact is proved, contrary evidence is barred. ***Section 114 Illustration (h)*** allows discretionary adverse inference on refusal to answer. ***Article 21, Constitution of India*** protects life and personal liberty including privacy. ***Sections 13(1)(i) and (ia), Hindu Marriage Act, 1955*** govern adultery and cruelty. ## **I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT** In ***Goutam Kundu (1993) 3 SCC 418***, the Court held blood tests cannot be ordered as matter of course. Strong prima facie non-access must be shown. In ***Bhabani Prasad Jena (2010) 8 SCC 633***, the Court required eminent need before DNA direction. In ***Kamti Devi (2001) 5 SCC 311***, it was held DNA result cannot override Section 112 without proof of non-access. In ***Dipanwita Roy (2015) 1 SCC 365***, DNA testing was allowed because non-access was specifically pleaded. In ***Inayath Ali v. State of Telangana (2022)***, Court refused DNA test where paternity was collateral. ## **J) JUDGEMENT** The Court allowed the appeal. It held no plea of non-access existed. Cohabitation was admitted. Hence presumption under ***Section 112*** remained intact. The Court distinguished ***Dipanwita Roy***. There, non-access was pleaded. Here, it was absent. DNA test was not indispensable. The Court held adverse inference cannot be mechanically drawn. Presumptions are discretionary. Child cannot be pressured. The Court emphasized child’s right to privacy and identity under UN Convention. It stated children cannot be treated as material objects. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** i. ***Section 112 creates a conclusive presumption of legitimacy unless non-access is proved.*** ii. ***DNA testing cannot be ordered routinely without strong prima facie case.*** iii. ***Adverse inference under Section 114 is discretionary and fact-dependent.*** iv. ***Child’s right to privacy and identity must prevail.*** **b) OBITER DICTA** i. The Court reflected on trauma caused by questioning paternity. ii. It warned against misuse of DNA profiling in matrimonial conflicts. iii. It stressed dignity of mothers and children. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Courts must not order DNA tests mechanically. ii. Non-access must be specifically pleaded. iii. Child’s welfare is paramount. iv. Adverse inference is discretionary. v. Scientific truth cannot eclipse statutory presumption grounded in public policy. ## **K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment strengthens the protective shield of ***Section 112***. It harmonizes statutory presumption with constitutional morality. It reaffirms that legitimacy is not lightly unsettled. It balances science with sensitivity. It advances child-centric jurisprudence. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [K. Umadevi v. Government of Tamil Nadu & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 2526 of 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/k-umadevi-v-government-of-tamil-nadu-ors-civil-appeal-no-2526-of-2025/) **Published:** May 11, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The present judgment in ***K. Umadevi v. Government of Tamil Nadu & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 2526 of 2025, decided on 23.05.2025*** examines the scope of ***maternity leave under Rule 101(a) of the Tamil Nadu Fundamental Rules*** in light of constitutional guarantees and reproductive rights. The appellant, a government school teacher, had two children from her first marriage prior to entering service. After divorce and remarriage, she conceived again and sought maternity leave. Her request was rejected on the ground that she had two surviving children, thereby attracting the bar under the proviso to ***FR 101(a)***. The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench judgment of the Madras High Court and held that the appellant was entitled to maternity leave. The Court harmonized population control policies with reproductive autonomy under ***Article 21*** and maternity relief under ***Article 42***. It adopted a purposive interpretation consistent with ***Deepika Singh v. Central Administrative Tribunal, (2023) 13 SCC 681***. The Court held that maternity benefits must not be denied in a manner that undermines dignity, autonomy, and constitutional values. **Keywords:** Maternity Leave, Reproductive Rights, Article 21, Fundamental Rules 101(a), Population Control Policy, Deepika Singh, Constitutional Interpretation. ## B) CASE DETAILS i) Judgment Cause Title ***K. Umadevi v. Government of Tamil Nadu & Ors.*** ii) Case Number ***Civil Appeal No. 2526 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 20178 of 2022)*** iii) Judgment Date ***23 May 2025*** iv) Court ***Supreme Court of India*** v) Quorum ***Hon’ble Mr. Justice Abhay S. Oka*** ***Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ujjal Bhuyan*** vi) Author ***Justice Ujjal Bhuyan*** vii) Citation ***2025 INSC 781*** viii) Legal Provisions Involved ***Article 21, Constitution of India*** ***Article 42, Constitution of India*** ***Article 51(c), Constitution of India*** ***Rule 101(a), Tamil Nadu Fundamental Rules*** ***Section 5, Maternity Benefit Act, 1961*** ***Section 27, Maternity Benefit Act, 1961*** ix) Judgments Overruled Impugned Division Bench judgment dated 14.09.2022 set aside. x) Related Law Subjects Constitutional Law. Service Law. Labour Law. Women and Child Rights. Human Rights Law. ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The appeal arose from denial of maternity leave to a government teacher. The denial was based on the numerical cap under ***FR 101(a)***. The appellant had two children from her first marriage. Those children were born before she entered service. After divorce and remarriage, she conceived again. She sought maternity leave for nine months. The authorities rejected her request. They relied strictly on the first proviso to ***FR 101(a)***. The Single Judge of the Madras High Court allowed her writ petition. The learned Judge adopted a liberal interpretation. He held that custody of children mattered. He relied upon beneficial interpretation principles. The Division Bench reversed that view. It held that maternity leave is not a fundamental right. It held that policy of two-child norm must prevail. The matter reached the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court framed the issue in constitutional terms. It examined reproductive autonomy. It analyzed Directive Principles. It considered international conventions. It referred extensively to ***Deepika Singh v. Central Administrative Tribunal, (2023) 13 SCC 681***. It also examined ***Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration, (2009) 9 SCC 1*** and ***Devika Biswas v. Union of India, (2016) 10 SCC 726***. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellant married in 2006. Two children were born in 2007 and 2011. She entered government service in December 2012 as an English Teacher. Her marriage dissolved in 2017. Custody of both children remained with the former husband. In 2018, she remarried. She conceived from her second marriage in 2021. She applied for maternity leave from 17.08.2021 to 13.05.2022. The Chief Educational Officer rejected the application. The order dated 28.08.2021 stated that maternity leave can be granted only to women with less than two surviving children. It held that there was no provision for maternity leave for a third child through remarriage. The Single Judge set aside the rejection. He directed grant of maternity leave under G.O.Ms. No. 84 dated 23.08.2021. The Division Bench reversed this decision. It held that the appellant was not entitled. It relied on the two-child cap under ***FR 101(a)***. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i) Whether a woman government servant with two biological children from a previous marriage is disentitled from maternity leave under ***FR 101(a)*** for a child from a subsequent marriage. ii) Whether denial of maternity leave violates ***Article 21*** and reproductive autonomy. iii) Whether ***Deepika Singh (2023) 13 SCC 681*** applies to the present facts. iv) Whether population control policy overrides maternity relief under constitutional principles. ## F) PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS The counsel for the appellant submitted that the Division Bench erred. He argued that her present pregnancy was her first child after entering service. He stressed that the earlier children were not in her custody. He relied heavily on ***Deepika Singh v. Central Administrative Tribunal, (2023) 13 SCC 681***. He argued that beneficial legislation must receive purposive interpretation. He contended that reproductive rights form part of ***Article 21***. He cited ***Suchita Srivastava (2009) 9 SCC 1***. He argued that reproductive choice includes right to carry pregnancy to term. He emphasized dignity and bodily autonomy. He also referred to ***Section 5 of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961***. He submitted that even the Act does not deny maternity benefit completely after two children. It only reduces duration. He argued that strict numerical interpretation defeats constitutional morality. He urged harmonization rather than exclusion. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The State argued fiscal discipline. It submitted that maternity leave is a statutory right. It is not fundamental. It argued that population control is a legitimate objective. It submitted that granting leave would incentivize breach of small family norm. The State relied on the plain language of ***FR 101(a)***. It argued that the appellant had two surviving children. Therefore, she fell within the bar. It contended that ***Maternity Benefit Act, 1961*** does not apply to State employees. It argued that service rules must prevail. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS **i)** ***Article 21, Constitution of India*** guarantees right to life and personal liberty. The Court reiterated that life includes dignity and reproductive choice. In ***Suchita Srivastava (2009) 9 SCC 1***, reproductive rights were recognized as part of personal liberty. **ii)** ***Article 42*** directs the State to make provision for maternity relief. Though non-justiciable, Directive Principles guide interpretation. **iii)** ***Rule 101(a), Tamil Nadu Fundamental Rules*** provides maternity leave up to 365 days. The proviso restricts leave to women with less than two surviving children. **iv)** ***Section 5, Maternity Benefit Act, 1961*** allows 26 weeks leave. For women with two or more surviving children, leave is reduced to 12 weeks. The Act does not impose a total bar. **v)** ***Section 27*** gives overriding effect to the Act over inconsistent laws. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT **i)** ***Deepika Singh v. Central Administrative Tribunal, (2023) 13 SCC 681*** – Held that spouse’s prior children do not disentitle a woman from maternity leave for her biological child. Adopted purposive construction. **ii)** ***Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration, (2009) 9 SCC 1*** – Recognized reproductive autonomy under ***Article 21***. **iii)** ***Devika Biswas v. Union of India, (2016) 10 SCC 726*** – Affirmed reproductive rights as part of personal liberty and right to health. **iv)** ***B. Shah v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Coimbatore, AIR 1978 SC 12*** – Held maternity benefit is social justice measure. **v)** ***X v. Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2023) 9 SCC 433*** – Expanded reproductive rights jurisprudence. ## J) JUDGMENT **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The Court held that denial of maternity leave was unsustainable. It applied purposive interpretation to ***FR 101(a)***. It harmonized population control with maternity relief. It held that earlier children born before service cannot automatically disentitle benefit. It emphasized constitutional values. It declared that maternity leave must be granted. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that reproductive rights intersect with dignity and equality. It emphasized alignment with international conventions like CEDAW and ICESCR. It stressed that courts must bridge gap between law and social reality. **c) GUIDELINES** The Court emphasized purposive interpretation of beneficial provisions. It directed harmonization between service rules and constitutional mandates. It stressed that population control norms and maternity relief are not mutually exclusive. ## K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment strengthens reproductive autonomy in service jurisprudence. It prevents mechanical interpretation of numerical caps. It reinforces dignity under ***Article 21***. It situates maternity leave within human rights framework. It marks continuity with ***Deepika Singh (2023) 13 SCC 681***. It affirms that welfare provisions must be interpreted liberally. ## L) REFERENCES a) Important Cases Referred i) ***Deepika Singh v. Central Administrative Tribunal, (2023) 13 SCC 681***. ii) ***Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration, (2009) 9 SCC 1***. iii) ***Devika Biswas v. Union of India, (2016) 10 SCC 726***. iv) ***B. Shah v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Coimbatore, AIR 1978 SC 12***. v) ***X v. Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2023) 9 SCC 433***. b) Important Statutes Referred i) ***Constitution of India***. ii) ***Maternity Benefit Act, 1961***. iii) ***Tamil Nadu Fundamental Rules***. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 1118 of 2014](https://lawfoyer.in/shilpa-sailesh-v-varun-sreenivasan-transfer-petition-civil-no-1118-of-2014/) **Published:** May 11, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The present Constitution Bench judgment in ***Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 1118 of 2014, Judgment dated 01 May 2023*** authoritatively delineates the scope and contours of ***Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India*** in matrimonial disputes. The Court examined whether it may dissolve marriages by mutual consent without adhering to the statutory cooling-off period under ***Section 13-B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955***, and whether it can grant divorce on the ground of **irretrievable breakdown of marriage** even when one spouse opposes the prayer. The decision harmonises constitutional equity with statutory discipline. It clarifies that Article 142 is a curative constitutional power, not subordinate to procedural statutes, yet circumscribed by substantive public policy. The Court recognises that matrimonial litigation often spawns parallel civil and criminal proceedings. It therefore holds that, in appropriate cases, this Court may dissolve marriage, waive procedural requirements, and quash connected proceedings to do “complete justice.” The judgment crystallises broad parameters governing such exercise. It reinforces that irretrievable breakdown, though not codified, may justify dissolution under Article 142 when marriage is dead beyond repair. The ruling balances institutional restraint with constitutional pragmatism. **Keywords:** Article 142; Irretrievable Breakdown; Mutual Consent Divorce; Hindu Marriage Act; Complete Justice; Constitutional Powers; Cooling-off Period. ## **B) CASE DETAILS** **i) Judgement Cause Title:** *Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan* **ii) Case Number:** Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 1118 of 2014 with connected matters **iii) Judgement Date:** 01 May 2023 **iv) Court:** Supreme Court of India **v) Quorum:** Constitution Bench **vi) Author:** Justice Sanjiv Khanna **vii) Citation:** 2023 SCC OnLine SC (as per official reportable judgment) **viii) Legal Provisions Involved:** ***Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India***; ***Section 13-B Hindu Marriage Act, 1955***; ***Section 13(1)(i-a) HMA***; ***Section 23 HMA***; ***Section 482 Cr.P.C.***; ***Section 320 Cr.P.C.***; ***Section 498-A IPC***; ***Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005***. **ix) Judgments Overruled:** Clarificatory in nature. It resolves doubts expressed in ***Anjana Kishore v. Puneet Kishore (2002) 10 SCC 194*** and ***Manish Goel v. Rohini Goel (2010) 4 SCC 393*** regarding waiver under Article 142. **x) Related Law Subjects:** Constitutional Law; Family Law; Criminal Law; Procedural Law; Equity Jurisprudence. ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The reference arose from conflicting judicial opinions. Earlier benches doubted whether the Supreme Court could waive the six-month cooling-off period mandated under ***Section 13-B(2) HMA***. The matter also raised a deeper constitutional query. Could Article 142 override statutory waiting periods? The Attorney General urged reconsideration. The Bench framed substantial questions. It examined the amplitude of ***Article 142(1)***. It questioned whether divorce may be granted where marriage had irretrievably collapsed. The Court recognised divergence between procedural compliance and equitable relief. The matter was thus placed before a Constitution Bench. The reference demanded institutional clarity. It implicated separation of powers. It tested constitutional supremacy against statutory command. The Bench undertook doctrinal analysis. It revisited precedent including ***Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India (1991) 4 SCC 584*** and ***Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India (1998) 4 SCC 409***. The decision situates matrimonial justice within constitutional equity. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The parties were entangled in multiple proceedings. Transfer petitions were pending before the Supreme Court. During pendency, settlement emerged. The couple sought dissolution by mutual consent. They requested waiver of statutory waiting. Connected criminal cases also existed. The Bench dissolved marriage under Article 142. Yet larger questions persisted. Conflicting precedents required authoritative pronouncement. The factual matrix revealed prolonged separation. Reconciliation was improbable. Litigation had multiplied. Emotional breakdown was evident. The Court observed that procedural delay aggravated agony. Settlement terms addressed alimony and ancillary disputes. However, jurisprudential uncertainty persisted. The Court thus retained the matter for determination of constitutional issues. The facts exemplified systemic complexity of matrimonial litigation. They reflected breakdown beyond salvage. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. What is the scope of ***Article 142(1)*** in matrimonial matters? ii. Can the Supreme Court waive ***Section 13-B(2) HMA*** cooling-off period? iii. Can it quash ancillary civil and criminal proceedings? iv. Can divorce be granted on ground of irretrievable breakdown despite opposition? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels submitted that Article 142 is plenary. It exists to do complete justice. Procedural fetters cannot obstruct constitutional equity. They relied on ***Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India (1991) 4 SCC 584***. They contended that statutory waiting is procedural. It does not embody substantive public policy. They argued that prolonged separation proved marriage dead. Insisting on cooling-off was mechanical. They cited ***Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (2017) 8 SCC 746***. They urged that irretrievable breakdown is judicially recognised. Reference was made to ***Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (2006) 4 SCC 558***. They submitted that multiplicity of proceedings burdens litigants. Article 142 enables holistic closure. They stressed autonomy of consenting adults. They maintained that constitutional power must be pragmatic. Denial would perpetuate injustice. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels submitted that statutory mandates bind courts. ***Section 13-B(2) HMA*** prescribes mandatory waiting. Parliament consciously enacted safeguard. Article 142 cannot supplant substantive law. They relied on ***Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India (1998) 4 SCC 409***. They warned against judicial legislation. Irretrievable breakdown is not statutory ground. Introducing it violates separation of powers. They emphasised legislative domain over matrimonial law. They contended that waiver must remain exceptional. They urged caution to prevent misuse. They asserted that public policy favours reconciliation. The Court must respect statutory discipline. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. ***Article 142(1), Constitution of India*** empowers the Supreme Court to pass orders necessary for complete justice. ii. ***Section 13-B, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955*** provides divorce by mutual consent. iii. ***Section 13(1)(i-a) HMA*** provides divorce on cruelty. iv. ***Section 23 HMA*** mandates petitioner not take advantage of own wrong. v. ***Section 482 Cr.P.C.*** preserves inherent powers of High Court. vi. ***Section 498-A IPC*** criminalises cruelty. vii. ***Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005*** provides civil remedies. ## **I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT** The Court examined ***Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India (1991) 4 SCC 584***, which held Article 142 powers are distinct and not curtailed by ordinary statutes, though guided by public policy. It relied on ***Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India (1998) 4 SCC 409***, which clarified that Article 142 cannot supplant substantive law. It analysed ***Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner AIR 1963 SC 996***, emphasising constitutional limits. It referred to ***Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (2017) 8 SCC 746***, holding cooling-off directory. It cited ***Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303***, permitting quashing of criminal proceedings in settlement. It revisited ***Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Zaveri (1997) 4 SCC 226***, granting divorce under Article 142 on breakdown. It considered ***N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane (1975) 2 SCC 326***, defining cruelty. Each precedent informed constitutional calibration. ## **J) JUDGEMENT** **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** i. Article 142 confers wide equitable power. It exists to ensure complete justice. It is curative and supplementary. It cannot contravene fundamental public policy. Procedural requirements may be relaxed. Substantive prohibitions cannot be ignored. The cooling-off period under ***Section 13-B(2) HMA*** is procedural. It does not limit constitutional authority. The Supreme Court may waive it where conditions justify. It may quash ancillary proceedings to effectuate settlement. It may grant divorce on ground of irretrievable breakdown. Such power applies even absent mutual consent. However, exercise must be rare and cautious. Marriage must be dead beyond repair. Separation must be prolonged. Attempts at reconciliation must fail. The Court must ensure fairness, alimony protection, and child welfare. Article 142 cannot create new statutory grounds. It can, however, dissolve marriage to prevent injustice. The power is discretionary. It must be exercised on objective criteria. It must respect institutional boundaries. **b) OBITER DICTA** i. The Court observed that matrimonial litigation demands sensitive handling. Prolonged conflict harms both spouses. Multiplicity of proceedings burdens judiciary. Equity must temper rigidity. Parliament may consider codifying irretrievable breakdown. Constitutional power is safety valve. **c) GUIDELINES** i. The Court must assess duration of separation. ii. It must examine attempts at mediation. iii. It must evaluate genuine settlement. iv. It must secure alimony and child interests. v. It must ensure absence of coercion. vi. It must find marriage irretrievably broken. vii. It must exercise power sparingly. ## **K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment reconciles constitutional supremacy with statutory structure. It affirms that Article 142 is a constitutional instrument of equity. It prevents mechanical adherence from causing injustice. It strengthens autonomy in matrimonial resolution. It safeguards public policy. It delineates principled restraint. The ruling advances humane jurisprudence. It acknowledges reality of marital breakdown. It preserves institutional balance. It charts a calibrated path between legislation and equity. ## **L) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India* (1991) 4 SCC 584. ii. *Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India* (1998) 4 SCC 409. iii. *Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner* AIR 1963 SC 996. iv. *Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur* (2017) 8 SCC 746. v. *Gian Singh v. State of Punjab* (2012) 10 SCC 303. vi. *Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Zaveri* (1997) 4 SCC 226. vii. *N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane* (1975) 2 SCC 326. **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. Constitution of India, Article 142(1). ii. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. iii. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. iv. Indian Penal Code, 1860. v. Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [The State of Haryana v. Krishan Kumar & Ors., 2026 INSC 63](https://lawfoyer.in/the-state-of-haryana-v-krishan-kumar-ors-2026-insc-63/) **Published:** May 11, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The present decision in ***The State of Haryana v. Krishan Kumar & Ors., 2026 INSC 63*** concerns the constitutional validity of State rules prescribing additional qualifications for appointment to the post of ***Drug Inspector / Drug Control Officer*** under the ***Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940***. The central issue was whether a State Government, by invoking ***proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India***, could prescribe ‘experience’ as an essential qualification when the field of qualification was already occupied by ***Rule 49 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945***, framed under ***Section 33 of the Act*** by the Central Government. The High Courts of Punjab & Haryana and Karnataka had held that the field stood occupied by the Central legislation and therefore State rules were ultra vires. The Supreme Court examined the constitutional scheme under ***Articles 372, 254, and 309***, the legislative history of the Act under ***Section 103 of the Government of India Act, 1935***, and the doctrine of occupied field. The Court concluded that prescription of qualification for Drug Inspectors falls within the exclusive rule-making competence of the Central Government under the Act. State Governments may appoint Inspectors but cannot alter qualifications prescribed by Central Rules. The judgment reinforces legislative supremacy in concurrent matters when Parliament occupies the field. **Keywords:** Drugs and Cosmetics Act, Article 309, Occupied Field Doctrine, Rule 49, Legislative Competence, Repugnancy, Public Employment. ## **B) CASE DETAILS** **i) Judgement Cause Title:** *The State of Haryana v. Krishan Kumar & Ors.* **ii) Case Number:** Civil Appeal Nos. 1725–1731 of 2023 and connected matters. **iii) Judgement Date:** 13 January 2026. **iv) Court:** Supreme Court of India. **v) Quorum:** Hon’ble Justice J.K. Maheshwari. **vi) Author:** Justice J.K. Maheshwari. **vii) Citation:** 2026 INSC 63 viii) Legal Provisions Involved: ***Sections 21, 33, 38 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940***; ***Rule 49 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945***; ***Article 309, 254, 372 of the Constitution of India***; ***Section 103 of the Government of India Act, 1935***. **ix) Judgments overruled:** None expressly overruled. **x) Law Subjects:** Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, Service Law, Public Health Law. ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The controversy arose from recruitment notifications issued by Haryana and Karnataka for appointment of Drug Inspectors. The States prescribed ‘experience’ as an essential qualification. This prescription was in addition to academic qualifications under ***Rule 49 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945***. The High Courts struck down the State Rules. They held that Parliament had occupied the legislative field. The Supreme Court examined legislative history in depth. The ***Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940*** was enacted after Provincial Legislatures passed resolutions under ***Section 103 of the Government of India Act, 1935***. This transferred legislative power to the Federal Legislature. After the Constitution came into force, the Act continued under ***Article 372***. The Court noted that no State amendment altered Sections 21 or 33. Therefore the power to prescribe qualifications remained with the Central Government. The dispute thus centered on legislative competence and constitutional limitations. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The Haryana Public Service Commission issued an advertisement in 2015. It prescribed 1½ years’ experience in manufacture or testing of Schedule C drugs. This requirement flowed from State Rules framed under ***proviso to Article 309***. Candidates lacking experience were rejected. They challenged the rule. They contended that ***Rule 49 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945*** prescribed only educational qualification. The proviso to Rule 49 mandated experience only for authorization to inspect Schedule C manufacture. It did not make experience essential for appointment. The High Court constituted a Full Bench. It held the field occupied by Central Rules. Similar controversy arose in Karnataka. The Karnataka Public Service Commission required 18 months’ experience. The High Court quashed the condition. Appeals were filed before the Supreme Court. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i) Whether State Governments may prescribe additional qualification for Drug Inspectors when Central Rules exist. ii) Whether such prescription violates the doctrine of occupied field. iii) Whether Article 309 permits overriding Central legislation. ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for State submitted that ***Section 21 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940*** empowers State Governments to appoint Inspectors. Appointment includes prescribing qualifications. They argued Entry 19 of List III permits concurrent legislation. Therefore States may regulate recruitment. They relied on ***S. Satyapal Reddy v. Govt. of A.P., (1994) 4 SCC 391***. They contended Article 309 confers legislative power. Experience ensures efficiency in public health administration. They asserted no repugnancy exists. Experience under Rule 49 proviso reflects legislative intent. Hence State Rules merely operationalize central standards. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that ***Section 33(2)(b) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940*** confers exclusive power on Central Government to prescribe qualifications. They emphasized that Rule 49 clearly distinguishes qualification from authorization. They relied on ***Kuldeep Singh v. State of U.P., 2014 SCC OnLine All 5119***. That judgment held experience is relevant only for authorization. Respondents invoked ***Article 254 of the Constitution***. They argued Central Rules prevail in concurrent matters. They contended Article 309 cannot override Parliamentary statute. They also cited ***A.B. Krishna v. State of Karnataka, (1998) 3 SCC 495***. That case clarified Article 309 rules must conform to constitutional limitations. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i) ***Section 33(2)(b), Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940*** empowers Central Government to prescribe qualifications. ii) ***Rule 49, Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945*** prescribes degree qualification. iii) Proviso to Rule 49 restricts authorization, not appointment. iv) ***Article 309, Constitution of India*** allows rule-making for service conditions. v) ***Article 254*** resolves repugnancy in concurrent matters. vi) ***Article 372*** continues pre-Constitution laws. ## **I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT** i) ***A.B. Krishna v. State of Karnataka, (1998) 3 SCC 495*** — Article 309 rules subject to Constitution and statutes. ii) ***S. Satyapal Reddy v. Govt. of A.P., (1994) 4 SCC 391*** — Recruitment rules must align with parent statute. iii) ***Kuldeep Singh v. State of U.P., 2014 SCC OnLine All 5119*** — Experience under Rule 49 relates to authorization only. iv) ***State of Kerala v. Mar Appraem Kuri Co. Ltd., (2012) 7 SCC 106*** — Doctrine of occupied field explained. v) ***M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India, (1979) 3 SCC 431*** — Tests for repugnancy under Article 254. ## **J) JUDGEMENT** a) **RATIO DECIDENDI** i) The Supreme Court held that prescription of qualification is exclusively Central domain. ii) Section 33 expressly occupies the field. iii) Rule 49 distinguishes appointment and authorization. iv) State cannot elevate experience into essential qualification. v) Article 309 is subject to Parliamentary legislation. vi) Repugnancy arises when State rule alters central standard. vii) High Courts correctly invalidated State provisions. b) **OBITER DICTA** i) Uniform standards are vital in drug regulation. ii) Public health demands centralized control. iii) States may amend Act legislatively if competent. c) **GUIDELINES** i) Appointment power is co-extensive but qualification power is centralized. ii) Article 309 cannot be used to override Central statute. iii) In concurrent matters, Central Rules prevail absent Presidential assent. iv) Experience requirement may apply only for authorization stage. ## **K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment reinforces constitutional discipline. It clarifies legislative boundaries. It strengthens doctrine of occupied field. It protects uniform drug regulation standards. It harmonizes service jurisprudence with constitutional supremacy. It affirms that executive rule-making under Article 309 cannot dilute Parliamentary mandate. ## **L) REFERENCES** a) Important Cases Referred i) ***A.B. Krishna v. State of Karnataka, (1998) 3 SCC 495*** ii) ***S. Satyapal Reddy v. Govt. of A.P., (1994) 4 SCC 391*** iii) ***Kuldeep Singh v. State of U.P., 2014 SCC OnLine All 5119*** iv) ***State of Kerala v. Mar Appraem Kuri Co. Ltd., (2012) 7 SCC 106*** v) ***M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India, (1979) 3 SCC 431*** b) Important Statutes Referred i) ***Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940*** ii) ***Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945*** iii) ***Constitution of India*** iv) ***Government of India Act, 1935*** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Anjuman Ishaat-e-Taleem Trust v. The State of Maharashtra & Others, 2025 INSC 1063](https://lawfoyer.in/anjuman-ishaat-e-taleem-trust-v-the-state-of-maharashtra-others-2025-insc-1063/) **Published:** May 11, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The present batch of civil appeals arose from conflicting judgments of the *Bombay High Court* and the *Madras High Court* concerning the **mandatory requirement of the Teacher Eligibility Test (TET)** for appointment and promotion of teachers in minority and non-minority educational institutions. The central constitutional conflict involved the interplay between ***Article 21A*** of the Constitution, guaranteeing the Right to Free and Compulsory Education, and ***Article 30(1)***, protecting the rights of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions. The Supreme Court examined whether minority institutions could claim exemption from regulatory measures such as TET under the ***Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009* (RTE Act)** and whether teachers appointed prior to the 2010–2011 NCTE Notifications were obligated to qualify TET for promotion. The Court critically analysed earlier Constitution Bench decisions in ***Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 1*** and ***Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust v. Union of India, (2014) 8 SCC 1***, identifying an apparent doctrinal tension. The matter was referred to a larger Bench for authoritative determination on the applicability of RTE provisions to minority institutions. The Court, however, clarified the applicability of TET concerning in-service teachers and promotion norms. **Keywords:** Right to Education, Minority Institutions, Article 21A, Article 30(1), Teacher Eligibility Test, Constitutional Interpretation, RTE Act, NCTE Regulations ## B) **CASE DETAILS** **i) Judgement Cause Title** *Anjuman Ishaat-e-Taleem Trust v. The State of Maharashtra & Others* **ii) Case Number** Civil Appeal No. 1385 of 2025 and connected matters **iii)** **Judgement Date** 2025 (Reportable Judgment) **iv)** **Court** Supreme Court of India **v)** **Quorum** Bench comprising Hon’ble Justice Dipankar Datta and companion Judges **vi)** **Author** Justice Dipankar Datta **vii)** **Citation** 2025 INSC 1063 **viii)** **Legal Provisions Involved** - ***Article 21A*** – Right to Education - ***Article 30(1)*** – Rights of Minorities - ***Article 14***, ***Article 19(1)(g)***, ***Article 19(6)*** - ***Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009*** - ***Section 12(1)(c), Section 23 RTE Act*** - ***National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993***, Section 12A **ix)** Judgments Overruled by the Case No final overruling. Reference made for reconsideration of ***Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust v. Union of India (2014) 8 SCC 1***. **x)** Law Subjects Constitutional Law, Education Law, Administrative Law, Minority Rights ## C) **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The litigation arose from divergent High Court decisions concerning the compulsory imposition of TET qualification in minority institutions. The Bombay High Court upheld the State’s power to insist upon TET even for minority schools. The Madras High Court, relying upon ***Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust v. Union of India (2014) 8 SCC 1***, held that the RTE Act does not apply to minority institutions, aided or unaided. The Supreme Court was thus confronted with a structural constitutional tension. The issue was not merely regulatory. It implicated the architecture of fundamental rights. The Court revisited the evolution of the Right to Education from ***Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka (1992) 3 SCC 666*** and ***Unnikrishnan J.P. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1993) 1 SCC 645***, culminating in the insertion of ***Article 21A*** by the 86th Constitutional Amendment. The Court analysed whether the regulatory mechanism under ***Section 23 RTE Act***, empowering NCTE to prescribe minimum qualifications, could extend to minority institutions without diluting their autonomy under ***Article 30(1)***. ## D) **FACTS OF THE CASE** The appeals originated from multiple writ petitions. Minority institutions challenged Government Resolutions and State notifications mandating TET qualification for teacher recruitment. Teachers appointed prior to the 2010 and 2011 NCTE Notifications resisted the application of TET as a precondition for promotion. In certain cases, district educational authorities refused to approve appointments of teachers lacking TET certification. In others, teachers were denied increments and promotional benefits. The Madras High Court ruled that teachers appointed before 29 July 2011 could continue in service but must pass TET for promotion. Minority institutions were held exempt based on ***Pramati***. Conversely, the Bombay High Court upheld the mandatory character of TET even for minority schools. The conflicting views necessitated authoritative adjudication. ## E) **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i) Whether the State can mandate TET qualification for appointment of teachers in minority institutions consistent with ***Article 30(1)***. ii) Whether teachers appointed prior to the 2010–2011 NCTE Notifications must qualify TET for promotion. iii) Whether ***Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust (2014) 8 SCC 1*** requires reconsideration. ## F) **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels submitted that minority institutions enjoy protection under ***Article 30(1)***, which cannot be diluted by statutory regulation. They relied on ***T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481***, asserting autonomy in staff selection. It was argued that TET is not a minimum qualification but merely an eligibility test. The petitioners emphasised that ***Section 1(4) RTE Act*** makes the Act subject to ***Articles 29 and 30***. Teachers appointed decades earlier could not be retrospectively burdened. Reliance was placed on ***T.R. Kapur v. State of Haryana 1986 Supp SCC 584***, holding that retrospective alteration of promotion criteria violates Articles 14 and 16. It was further contended that stagnation without promotional avenues undermines service jurisprudence principles recognised in ***CSIR v. K.G.S. Bhatt (1989) 4 SCC 635***. ## G) **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The State and Union contended that **quality education is intrinsic to Article 21A**. They relied on ***Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2016) 7 SCC 353***, affirming regulatory power to maintain standards. It was argued that teacher qualification directly affects student rights. Exempting minority institutions creates inequality under ***Article 14***. Reliance was placed on ***Christian Medical College Vellore Association v. Union of India (2020) 8 SCC 705***, where minority institutions were required to follow NEET norms. The respondents submitted that ***Pramati*** dealt primarily with Section 12(1)(c) and not teacher qualifications. They invoked ***Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India (2005) 4 SCC 649*** to argue that judgments must be read contextually. TET was described as a regulatory standard under ***Section 23 RTE Act*** read with ***Section 12A NCTE Act***. ## H) **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i) ***Article 21A*** mandates free and compulsory education. ii) ***Article 30(1)*** guarantees minority autonomy. iii) ***Section 23 RTE Act*** prescribes minimum teacher qualifications. iv) ***Section 12(1)(c) RTE Act*** imposes 25% reservation obligation. v) ***Section 12A NCTE Act*** empowers prescription of teacher standards. ## I) **PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT** The Court revisited: - ***Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India (2012) 6 SCC 1*** – Upheld RTE applicability except to unaided minority schools. - ***Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust v. Union of India (2014) 8 SCC 1*** – Held RTE inapplicable to all minority institutions. - ***T.M.A. Pai Foundation (2002) 8 SCC 481*** – Minority rights not absolute. - ***P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra (2005) 6 SCC 537*** – No compulsory seat sharing. - ***Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225*** – Basic structure doctrine. ## J) **JUDGEMENT** **a)** **RATIO DECIDENDI** The Court found a serious constitutional question regarding the breadth of ***Pramati***. It observed that regulatory measures ensuring teacher quality may not abrogate minority character. The apparent blanket exemption required reconsideration. The matter was referred to a larger Bench for authoritative clarity. However, concerning in-service teachers, the Court upheld that those appointed prior to 29 July 2011 could not be invalidated retrospectively. Promotion, however, could legitimately be conditioned upon TET in accordance with statutory rules. **b)** **OBITER DICTA** The Court emphasised that minority rights are protective, not isolationist. Excellence in education remains a shared constitutional responsibility. **c)** **GUIDELINES** - Regulatory standards must not destroy minority character. - Teacher qualification norms are quality measures. - Retrospective disqualification is impermissible. - Promotional standards may validly evolve prospectively. ## K) **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment marks a significant constitutional moment. It recognises tension between autonomy and accountability. It refrains from precipitate overruling. Instead, it invokes institutional prudence by referring the matter to a larger Bench. The decision balances equity for in-service teachers with systemic educational standards. It underscores that **education is both a right and a responsibility** within India’s constitutional framework. ## L) **REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** **i)** *Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India*, (2012) 6 SCC 1 **ii)** *Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust v. Union of India*, (2014) 8 SCC 1 **iii)** *T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka*, (2002) 8 SCC 481 **iv)** *Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala*, (1973) 4 SCC 225 **v)** *Christian Medical College Vellore Association v. Union of India*, (2020) 8 SCC 705 **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [C.P. Francis v. C.P. Joseph and Others, 2025 INSC 1071](https://lawfoyer.in/c-p-francis-v-c-p-joseph-and-others-2025-insc-1071/) **Published:** May 11, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The decision in ***C.P. Francis v. C.P. Joseph and Others***, **2025 INSC 1071**, decided on 03.09.2025 by the Supreme Court of India, examines the limits of the High Court’s jurisdiction under ***Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908*** and the applicability of ***Section 67 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925*** in testamentary disputes. The litigation arose from a family partition suit challenging a registered joint will executed by late C.R. Pius and Philomina Pius. The Trial Court and First Appellate Court concurrently upheld the validity and genuineness of the will. However, the High Court, in second appeal, introduced an additional substantial question of law and applied Section 67 to invalidate the bequest on the ground that one attesting witness was the wife of the legatee. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment. It held that the additional substantial question of law was framed without pleadings, issues, or recorded reasons, thereby exceeding the statutory limits under Section 100 CPC. The Court reaffirmed that testamentary intent expressed through a duly proved will must ordinarily be respected. The judgment strengthens procedural discipline in second appeals and protects the sanctity of testamentary succession. Keywords: Testamentary Succession, Section 100 CPC, Section 67 Indian Succession Act, Attesting Witness, Substantial Question of Law, Partition Suit. **B) CASE DETAILS** **i)** Judgment Cause Title *C.P. Francis v. C.P. Joseph and Others* **ii)** Case Number Civil Appeal No. \_\_\_ of 2025 \[@ SLP (C) No. 13348 of 2025\] **iii)** Judgment Date 03 September 2025 **iv)** Court Supreme Court of India **v)** Quorum Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.V.N. Bhatti **vi)** Author Justice S.V.N. Bhatti **vii)** Citation 2025 INSC 1071 **viii)** Legal Provisions Involved ***Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908*** ***Section 67 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925*** ***Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925*** ***Section 141 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872*** ***Article 136 of the Constitution of India*** **ix)** Judgments Overruled by the Case None expressly overruled. **x)** Law Subjects Civil Law. Succession Law. Procedural Law. Evidence Law. Constitutional Law. ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT** The dispute concerns succession to properties situated in Elamkulam Village, Ernakulam District. Late C.R. Pius and Philomina Pius executed a registered joint will on 27.01.2003. The will bequeathed properties to their son, the Appellant. Monetary legacies were reserved for other children. The parents died in 2004 and 2008 respectively. Respondents filed a partition suit claiming intestate succession. They alleged lack of testamentary capacity and fraud. The Trial Court rejected these claims. It found the will genuine. The First Appellate Court affirmed. The High Court, in second appeal, framed an additional substantial question of law. It invoked ***Section 67 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925***. It held that attestation by the legatee’s wife rendered the bequest void. This reasoning was not pleaded earlier. The Supreme Court examined whether such intervention was permissible under ***Section 100 CPC***. The Court emphasized procedural fidelity. It reiterated that a second appeal is not a third trial. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** Late C.R. Pius owned 7.875 cents in Survey No. 60/6. Philomina owned 3.233 cents. A settlement deed dated 15.12.1999 transferred 4 cents to one son. The joint will dated 27.01.2003 bequeathed remaining properties to the Appellant. Monetary sums were promised to other children. The plaintiffs alleged mental incapacity. They referred to ailments including cerebral palsy and Parkinson’s disease. They alleged undue influence by the Appellant and his wife. They sought partition into eight shares. The defendants relied on the registered will. They examined the scribe, attesting witness, and Sub-Registrar. DW7, a neurologist, deposed that Pius was mentally sound. The Trial Court found due execution under ***Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925***. It dismissed the suit. The First Appellate Court affirmed. It held that suspicious circumstances were absent. It observed that the will remained uncancelled for years. The High Court reversed. It invoked ***Section 67***. It declared the bequest void due to attestation by the legatee’s spouse. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether the High Court exceeded jurisdiction under ***Section 100 CPC***. ii. Whether ***Section 67 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925*** applied. ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioner submitted that the High Court violated ***Section 100 CPC***. No pleading invoked Section 67. No issue was framed. No evidence addressed such plea. The additional question lacked foundation. They relied on ***Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179***. The Supreme Court held that substantial questions must arise from pleadings. They cited ***Mehboob-Ur-Rehman v. Ahsanul Ghani, (2019) 19 SCC 415***. It stressed restraint in second appeals. They argued that testamentary intent must prevail. They cited ***Gnanambal Ammal v. T. Raju Ayyar, 1950 SCC 978***. The Court held that the testator’s wishes deserve primacy. They submitted that applying Section 67 created a new case. It denied opportunity. It violated natural justice. They invoked ***Browne v. Dunn (1893) 6 R 67*** principle. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondent submitted that the High Court acted within proviso to ***Section 100(5) CPC***. They argued that Section 67 is mandatory. A bequest to an attesting witness is void. They asserted that relationship was admitted. They contended that courts must apply law even without pleading. They urged that intestate succession ensures equality among heirs. They argued that Article 136 jurisdiction is discretionary. They sought dismissal. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. ***Section 100 CPC*** limits second appeals to substantial questions of law. The proviso permits additional questions with recorded reasons. ii. ***Section 67 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925*** invalidates bequests to attesting witnesses. The object is to prevent conflict of interest. iii. ***Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925*** prescribes attestation requirements. iv. ***Section 141 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872*** defines leading questions. ## **I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT** The Court discussed ***Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179***. It held substantial question must be real and debatable. It cited ***Gian Dass v. Gram Panchayat, (2006) 6 SCC 271***. It held additional question arises only after framing one initially. It relied on ***Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait, (1997) 5 SCC 438***. It clarified satisfaction of High Court is mandatory. It referred to ***Suresh Lataruji Ramteke v. Sumanbai Pandurang Petkar, (2023) 17 SCC 624***. It stressed fair opportunity to contest new questions. It invoked ***Laxmibai v. Bhagwantbuva, AIR 2013 SC 1204***. It approved Browne v Dunn principle. ## H) JUDGMENT ### a. RATIO DECIDENDI i. The High Court erred in framing additional substantial question without pleadings. ii. Reasons were not recorded as required by ***Section 100(5) CPC***. iii. Section 67 was introduced as a new factual foundation. iv. Second appeal cannot transform factual controversy. v. Testamentary intent expressed in valid will must be respected. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment. It restored testamentary succession. It directed enhanced compensation to other legatees. It imposed 6% interest on default. ### **b. OBITER DICTA** i. Extraordinary care is required under ***Article 136 of the Constitution***. ii. Supreme Court’s power is discretionary and corrective. ### **c. GUIDELINES** i. Additional substantial question requires pleadings foundation. ii. Reasons must be recorded expressly. iii. Parties must receive opportunity to contest. iv. Second appeal is not rehearing on facts. ## **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment reinforces procedural discipline. It protects sanctity of wills. It harmonises testamentary freedom with fairness. It curtails expansive second appeal jurisdiction. It clarifies interplay between procedural and substantive law. It advances certainty in succession disputes. ## **J) REFERENCES** a) Important Cases Referred i. ***Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179***. ii. ***Mehboob-Ur-Rehman v. Ahsanul Ghani, (2019) 19 SCC 415***. iii. ***Gian Dass v. Gram Panchayat, (2006) 6 SCC 271***. iv. ***Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait, (1997) 5 SCC 438***. v. ***Suresh Lataruji Ramteke v. Sumanbai Pandurang Petkar, (2023) 17 SCC 624***. vi. ***Laxmibai v. Bhagwantbuva, AIR 2013 SC 1204***. b) Important Statutes Referred i. ***The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908***. ii. ***The Indian Succession Act, 1925***. iii. ***The Indian Evidence Act, 1872***. iv. ***The Constitution of India***. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Karan Kumar, Sameer Sanjay and Satya Sanatan of Central University of South Bihar Win the 1st L.P. Shahi Memorial National Moot Court Competition 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/karan-kumar-sameer-sanjay-and-satya-sanatan-of-central-university-of-south-bihar-win-the-1st-l-p-shahi-memorial-national-moot-court-competition-2026/) **Published:** May 10, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Content:** LawFoyer proudly celebrates the remarkable achievement of Karan Kumar, Sameer Sanjay, and Satya Sanatan, students of the Central University of South Bihar, who secured the Winner’s position at the 1st L.P. Shahi Memorial National Moot Court Competition 2026, organized by SKJ Law College. This prestigious national-level competition brought together talented law students from across the country, and the team from Central University of South Bihar emerged as champions through exceptional advocacy, research, and teamwork. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/IMG-20260412-WA0021-Karan-kumar-1-1024x473.jpg) The victorious team consisted of Karan Kumar as Speaker 1, Sameer Sanjay as Speaker 2, and Satya Sanatan as Researcher. Each member played a crucial role in the team’s success. Their coordinated preparation, sharp legal reasoning, and confident courtroom presentation demonstrated the high standards of mooting excellence that law students aspire to achieve. Moot court competitions are among the most rigorous and rewarding academic experiences in legal education. They require participants to analyze complex legal issues, conduct extensive research, draft persuasive memorials, and present oral arguments before experienced judges and legal professionals. Success in such competitions reflects not only knowledge of the law but also discipline, dedication, and the ability to perform under pressure. For Karan Kumar and the team, this achievement marks an important milestone in their legal journey. As shared by Karan Kumar, the competition was both challenging and deeply rewarding. The experience sharpened critical thinking, strengthened legal research abilities, and enhanced advocacy skills. Countless hours of preparation, late-night discussions, and a commitment to perfection culminated in this outstanding result. What makes this achievement even more inspiring is the spirit of collaboration behind it. Mooting is a true team effort. Speakers and researchers must trust one another, exchange ideas, and refine arguments collectively. The success of this team highlights the power of teamwork and the importance of mutual support in achieving excellence. The 1st L.P. Shahi Memorial National Moot Court Competition also rewarded the team with a cash prize of ₹21,000, further recognizing their outstanding performance and legal acumen. More importantly, this victory has strengthened their confidence and reaffirmed their commitment to pursuing excellence in the field of law. The journey of Karan Kumar, Sameer Sanjay, and Satya Sanatan is a source of motivation for law students across India. Their achievement demonstrates that with perseverance, consistent practice, and a willingness to learn, remarkable success is within reach. Moot court competitions are not just contests; they are opportunities to build the skills and confidence necessary for a successful legal career. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/IMG-20260417-WA0030-Karan-kumar-1-768x1024.jpg) LawFoyer congratulates the entire team and the Central University of South Bihar for this exceptional accomplishment. We wish them continued success in all future academic and professional endeavors. May this victory be the beginning of many more milestones in their journey as future legal professionals. Want to showcase your achievement to the world and inspire others? LawFoyer will celebrate your achievement because every achievement deserves recognition. Your achievement is our achievement. Visit: **Categories:** Achievers Archive --- ### [International Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Legal Governance, and Sustainable Development: Constitutional, Regulatory, and Sectoral Perspectives (AILGS-2026) | Organized by Centre for Law, Technology and Innovation (CLTI), School of Law, Bennett University | Submit Abstract by 28 May 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-artificial-intelligence-legal-governance-and-sustainable-development-constitutional-regulatory-and-sectoral-perspectives-ailgs-2026-organized-by-centre-for-law-te/) **Published:** May 4, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** International Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Legal Governance, and Sustainable Development: Constitutional, Regulatory, and Sectoral Perspectives (AILGS-2026) | Organized by Centre for Law, Technology and Innovation (CLTI), School of Law, Bennett University | Submit Abstract by 28 May 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/AILGS-2026-Flyer-723x1024.jpg) The **School of Law, Bennett University, through its Centre for Law, Technology and Innovation (CLTI)**, in collaboration with the **Indian Law Institute**, the **Centre for Advanced Studies in Cyber Law and Artificial Intelligence (CASCA), Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law,** **Punjab** and **Maharashtra National Law University Mumbai,** and publication collaboration with the **JANUS.NET e-Journal of International Relations (Scopus Indexed)**, is pleased to announce the International Conference on “Artificial Intelligence, Legal Governance, and Sustainable Development: Constitutional, Regulatory and Sectoral Perspectives”, scheduled to be held from August 6-8, 2026 in Hybrid mode. Organised as part of the decennial celebrations of the School of Law, the conference seeks to foster rigorous academic dialogue on the evolving interface between artificial intelligence, law, and governance. It aims to bring together academicians, researchers, legal practitioners, policymakers, industry experts, and students to deliberate upon pressing constitutional, regulatory, and ethical challenges in the digital age. ## **THEMES & SUB-THEMES** The conference invites original and unpublished submissions on the following themes and sub-themes: 1. **Constitutional, Jurisprudential, and Ethical Foundations of AI Governance** - Conceptualising AI as a regulatory object - Rule of law, proportionality, and due process in algorithmic decision-making - Constitutional limits on automated governance and public power discretion - Human dignity, autonomy, and technological mediation - Ethical principles in AI deployment and accountability frameworks 2. **Algorithmic Justice and Human Rights in the Digital Age** - Privacy, data protection, and informational self-determination - Bias, discrimination, and algorithmic fairness - Freedom of expression, association, and assembly in AI-mediated contexts - Access to justice, AI-enabled adjudication, and rights-based remedies - Equity, social inclusion, and non-discrimination in AI systems 3. **Artificial Intelligence, International Relations, and Global Governance** - Global and multilateral AI governance and the role of international organisations - Geopolitics of AI, regulatory competition, and strategic autonomy - International human rights, digital sovereignty, and cross-border data governance - AI, sustainable development, and international cooperation - Sovereignty and digital jurisdiction 4. **AI in Knowledge, Innovation, and Development** - Algorithmic decision-making in education, research, and evaluation - Academic integrity, surveillance, and student privacy - Intellectual property, AI-generated works, and innovation policy - Knowledge commons, trade secrets, and open innovation - AI as a driver of economic development, labour governance, and inclusive growth 5. **AI, Sustainability, and Sectoral Development** - AI in energy, environment, and climate governance - Algorithmic support for sustainability, resource allocation, and green AI - AI for achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) - Addressing global inequalities, digital colonialism, and development justice - International cooperation, accountability, and capacity-building in AI deployment 6. **AI in Governance** - AI in public administration and governance - Smart cities and urban governance - Policy design and welfare delivery - Policing, surveillance, and law enforcement ## **PUBLICATION OPPORTUNITY** A limited number of high-quality papers presented at the conference will be selectively considered for publication in the JANUS.NET e-Journal of International Relations (Scopus Indexed), subject to a rigorous double-blind peer-review process. No publication fee shall be charged. ## **About the Journal** The *JANUS.NET e-Journal of International Relations* is a peer-reviewed, open-access academic journal published by OBSERVARE–Observatory of Foreign Relations, Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, Portugal. It follows internationally recognised standards of scholarly publishing, including a double-blind peer-review process, and is indexed in leading databases such as Scopus, SCImago, DOAJ, and EBSCO. The journal adopts an interdisciplinary approach, welcoming contributions across law, political science, international relations, and allied fields, and provides a global platform for high-quality research on contemporary international and governance issues. ## **IMPORTANT DATES** - **Abstract Submission Deadline:** 28 May 2026 - **Acceptance Notification:** 30 May 2026 - **Full Paper Submission:** 15 July 2026 - **Registration Fee Payment:** 1 July 2026 (or as notified) - **Dates of Conference:** August 6-8, 2026 (Hybrid) ## **REGISTRATION FEE** **Category** **Fee for Indian Participants (Sole participation)** **Fee for Indian Participants (Joint participation)** **Fee for Foreign Participants (Sole participation)** **Fee for Foreign Participants (Joint participation)** **Professionals/ Academicians** INR 2000 INR 3500 USD 25 USD 40 **Ph.D. Scholars** INR 1500 INR 2500 USD 20 USD 20 **Undergraduate and Post Graduate Students** INR 1000 INR 1500 USD 10 USD 15 **Joint Authorship of Academician with Ph.D. scholar** INR 3000 USD 30 **Joint Authorship of Academician with UG/PG Student** INR 2500 USD 25 ## SUBMISSION LINK** - **Abstract Submission & Registration Form:** [**https://forms.gle/gJLi9dsXfAKRhrDH9**](https://forms.gle/gJLi9dsXfAKRhrDH9) ## SUBMISSION GUIDELINES** - **Abstract Submission:** Authors are required to submit an abstract of **200–250 words**, clearly outlining the research objective, methodology, and key arguments, along with **five keywords**. - **Manuscript Length:** Full papers should be between **6,000–9,000 words** (inclusive of references). Submissions exceeding the prescribed limit will not be considered. - **Submission Format:** Manuscripts must be submitted in **.doc format** and should include: - Title of the paper - Author(s) details (name, designation, institutional affiliation, email, contact number, ORCID ID) - Abstract and keywords - **Formatting Requirements:** - Font: Times New Roman - Font Size: 12 (main text), 14 (headings) - Line Spacing: Single - Headings: Bold - **Referencing Style:** All submissions must strictly follow the **APA (7th Edition)** citation style. - **Images and Tables:** Any diagrams, tables, or graphical content must be properly captioned, numbered, and accompanied by source references. Editable files must be submitted separately. - **Originality & Similarity:** Submissions must be original and unpublished. The **similarity index must not exceed 10%** (as per Turnitin or equivalent tools). - **Use of AI Tools:** Any use of AI tools must be **properly disclosed**, including the name of the tool. Submissions must not contain unacknowledged AI-generated content. - **Review Process:** All submissions will undergo an initial screening followed by a **rigorous peer-review process**, and will be evaluated on originality, relevance, conceptual clarity, and methodological rigour. - **Registration Requirement:** Payment of the registration fee (non-refundable) shall be required **only after acceptance of the abstract**. ## **WHO SHOULD PARTICIPATE** Faculty members, researchers, doctoral scholars, students, legal practitioners, policymakers, and industry stakeholders engaged in law, technology, governance, and allied disciplines. ## **FOR MORE INFORMATION** [https://bennettu-my.sharepoint.com/:f:/g/personal/clti\_sol\_bennett\_edu\_in/IgCMpCKnoOzwTKm09wbVleO-AZXr93vWjC1z-02nq3z5qrE?e=N9whkR](https://bennettu-my.sharepoint.com/:f:/g/personal/clti_sol_bennett_edu_in/IgCMpCKnoOzwTKm09wbVleO-AZXr93vWjC1z-02nq3z5qrE?e=N9whkR) ## **CONTACT** For further details, please refer to the brochure or contact the organising committee at Bennett University. **Dr. Alankrita Mathur** **Mr. Siddharth Badkul** **Categories:** Call for Papers, Events --- ### [Khushi Kumari, Alok Ranjan, and Priya Bharati of Gopal Narayan Singh University Excel at 1st L.P. Shahi Memorial National Moot Court Competition 2026 with Best Speaker Recognition](https://lawfoyer.in/khushi-kumari-alok-ranjan-and-priya-bharati-of-gopal-narayan-singh-university-excel-at-1st-l-p-shahi-memorial-national-moot-court-competition-2026-with-best-speaker-recognition/) **Published:** May 3, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Content:** LawFoyer proudly celebrates the remarkable achievement of Khushi Kumari, along with team members Alok Ranjan and Priya Bharati from Gopal Narayan Singh University, for their outstanding performance at the 1st L.P. Shahi Memorial National Moot Court Competition 2026, organized by Shri Krishna Jubilee Law College. This achievement stands as a testament to dedication, perseverance, and excellence in legal advocacy. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/IMG_20260415_221353-Khushi-Kumari-1-1024x872.jpg) Competing at a national level, the team demonstrated exceptional legal acumen and courtroom skills while representing a thought-provoking theme centered on advocating men’s rights under constitutional law. Their powerful arguments, well-researched submissions, and confident presentation enabled them to secure a place among the Quarter Finalists in a highly competitive environment. A special highlight of this achievement is the recognition of Khushi Kumari as the “Best Speaker” of the competition. This accolade reflects not only strong oratory skills but also a deep understanding of constitutional principles, clarity of thought, and the ability to present arguments with conviction and precision. Such recognition at a national platform is a significant milestone in any legal journey and showcases the immense potential of emerging legal professionals. The success of the team was built on strong collaboration and mutual support. Alok Ranjan, as Speaker 2, complemented the arguments with equal rigor and clarity, while Priya Bharati, as the researcher, played a crucial role in building a solid foundation of legal research that strengthened the team’s case. Together, the trio exemplified how teamwork and shared commitment can lead to outstanding results. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/IMG-20260412-WA0012-Khushi-Kumari-1-edited.jpg) Reflecting on the experience, Khushi Kumari shared that this achievement has been both fulfilling and transformative. Participating in this competition enhanced advocacy skills and provided a deeper understanding of constitutional values such as equality and gender justice. The exposure to real-world legal issues and the opportunity to engage with diverse perspectives contributed significantly to academic and professional growth. The journey to this success was not just about winning accolades but also about learning, resilience, and continuous improvement. Moot court competitions are known for their rigorous preparation and intense rounds, and excelling in such a platform requires discipline, strategic thinking, and confidence. This achievement reflects the dedication and hard work invested by the entire team. LawFoyer acknowledges and appreciates the efforts of Shri Krishna Jubilee Law College for organizing such a meaningful and enriching competition. Platforms like these play a vital role in shaping the next generation of legal professionals by providing practical exposure and encouraging critical thinking. This accomplishment by Khushi Kumari and team serves as an inspiration to law students across the country. It highlights the importance of stepping beyond textbooks, participating in competitions, and embracing opportunities that challenge and refine one’s skills. Achievements like these remind aspiring legal professionals that with dedication, teamwork, and passion, excellence is always within reach. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/IMG-20260412-WA0010-Khushi-Kumari-1-576x1024.jpg) LawFoyer extends heartfelt congratulations to Khushi Kumari, Alok Ranjan, and Priya Bharati for this commendable achievement and wishes continued success in all future endeavors. Wish to showcase your achievement to the world and inspire others? LawFoyer will celebrate your achievement because every achievement deserves recognition. Your achievement is our achievement. Share your achievement with us visit: **Categories:** Achievers Archive --- ### [Certificate Course on Construction Contracts and Disputes | Organized by Centre for Law & Urban Development (CLUD) in collaboration with Society of Construction Law India (SCL-India) | Register by 4th May 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/certificate-course-on-construction-contracts-and-disputes-organized-by-centre-for-law-urban-development-clud-in-collaboration-with-society-of-construction-law-india-scl-india-register-by/) **Published:** May 2, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** Certificate Course on Construction Contracts and Disputes | Organized by Centre for Law & Urban Development (CLUD) in collaboration with Society of Construction Law India (SCL-India) | Register by 4th May 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Screenshot-2026-05-02-195231.jpg) ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY** National Law University, Delhi (NLU Delhi) is a premier institution for legal education and research in India, established in 2008. It is ranked 2nd in law under NIRF and is globally recognized in QS World University Rankings (Law & Legal Studies, 201–250 band). The university emphasizes interdisciplinary learning, practical exposure, and global engagement, preparing students for impactful legal careers. The Centre for Law and Urban Development (CLUD) is a research-driven centre focusing on legal issues in urbanisation, infrastructure, and governance. It conducts academic programmes, workshops, and research initiatives to bridge the gap between law, policy, and industry. The Society of Construction Law India (SCL-India), established in 2016, promotes education and research in construction law and provides a platform for discourse on policy, dispute resolution, and industry practices. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY** This certificate course is designed to introduce participants to the legal and procedural framework governing construction projects. It covers key aspects such as contract law, statutory compliance, standard-form contracts, and regulatory structures. Participants will gain insights into dispute resolution mechanisms including arbitration, mediation, adjudication boards, and injunctions under both Indian and international practices. As highlighted on *page 6 of the brochure*, the course focuses on practical exposure to construction law—one of the fastest-growing legal specialisations—equipping learners with skills to handle contracts, project risks, and disputes effectively. The course spans two days: - **Day 1:** Strategic Contracting, Risk Allocation, and Project Control - **Day 2:** Dispute Strategy, Claims Management, and Arbitration ## **WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** - Students in the 3rd, 4th, and 5th year of a 5-year law programme - Students in the 2nd and 3rd year of a 3-year LL.B. programme - Graduates with an interest in infrastructure and construction law ## **LOCATION (COUNTRY/STATE/CITY) & VENUE OF THE EVENT** Organised by National Law University, Delhi, India ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE** The official registration link: ## **FEE DETAILS** - NLUD Students: ₹2,250/- - Non-NLUD Students: ₹3,500/- ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - Course Dates: 9th – 10th May 2026 - Registration Deadline: 4th May 2026 ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** - Parth Gupta: 7276449237 - Devender Garg: 7206335747 - Ananya Anand: 9667078983 - Email: ## VISIT AT - [Instagram](https://www.instagram.com/clud_nludelhi/) - [Linkedin](/www.linkedin.com/company/centre-for-law-and-urban-development-clud/posts/?feedView=all) - [Official Website](https://cludnlud.wixsite.com/clud) - [The Society Of Construction Law of India](https://www.linkedin.com/company/society-of-construction-law-india/posts/?feedView=all?) - [Website of The Society of Construction law of India](https://sclindia.org/) ## **OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / LINK OF THE OFFICIAL BROCHURE, RULES & REGULATIONS ETC.** - **Official Brochure:** **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events --- ### [Eighth One Week Annual Summer School on Understanding Indian Consumer and Competition Law | Organized by School of Legal Studies, Cochin University of Science and Technology (CUSAT) | Register by May 25, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/eighth-one-week-annual-summer-school-on-understanding-indian-consumer-and-competition-law-organized-by-school-of-legal-studies-cochin-university-of-science-and-technology-cusat-register-by-may/) **Published:** May 2, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** Eighth One Week Annual Summer School on Understanding Indian Consumer and Competition Law | Organized by School of Legal Studies, Cochin University of Science and Technology (CUSAT) | Register by May 25, 2026 **Content:** The School of Legal Studies at Cochin University of Science and Technology upholds its commitment to organizing impactful Summer Schools centered around topics of legal and social importance. Building on the success of the previous seven editions of the Annual Summer School on Consumer and Competition Law since 2018, we are thrilled to unveil the Eighth Annual Summer School. This year’s theme is ‘Understanding Indian Consumer and Competition Law’, slated to take place from June 2nd – 6th, 2026. ## About the School of Legal Studies One of the oldest law schools in India, the School of Legal Studies was established in the year 1962 as a part of Kerala University, offering post-graduate courses and research in law. The Law School joined the folds of the University of Cochin, in the year 1971, which was later reorganized and renamed as Cochin University of Science and Technology in 1986 for the promotion of graduate, post-graduate studies and advanced research in various fields. Over the decades, since its inception, the Law School has blossomed into one of the top institutions engaged in teaching and research of law in India. The best testimony to the success of this experiment is the presence of SLS alumni as professors and academicians in top law schools in India and as advocates at the various High Courts and the Supreme Court of India, apart from their active and successful positioning as Law Officers in reputed institutions like SEBI and nationalized banks. The versatility and quality of the skills of SLS graduates are evident from having their graduates at the helm of the Indian judiciary as Justices of the Supreme Court, various High Courts in India and as judicial officers in other Courts. SLS has also entered into yet another era of producing skilled and versatile graduates working with corporate houses, consulting firms, Public Sector Undertakings, other Government bodies, and NGOs. Among the unique and innovative initiatives, the school has undertaken, the Summer School has its own standing as it deals with emerging areas that have practical relevance to persons from all walks of life. The School of Legal Studies is also one of the very few institutions in India where Competition Law and Consumer Law are taught as undergraduate law subjects and as specialized papers at the post-graduate level. ## About the Summer School Only a very few percentages of the population of a country become professionals like Doctors, Engineers, Advocates etc. The same is the case with businessmen. But, without exception, in one way or another, all are consumers of various services or products. Ultimately every law that governs trade or business should have its primary concern over making quality products available to consumers and protecting them from all sorts of exploitation. Globalization and liberalization and the development of markets in India have brought stiff competition among the different market players and stakeholders. Unhealthy competition leads to the adoption of anti-competitive practices and thus to the exploitation of the consumers. One of the main objectives of the Competition Act of 2002 is to address this issue. It aims to curb anti-competitive practices with a view to promoting effective competition in the market, which ultimately results in the maximization of consumer welfare. It ensures effective competition by preventing anti-competitive agreements, abusive practices and combinations having anti-competitive effects. Since Consumer Law and Competition Law is a sunrise subject that ensures more opportunities for law students, this one-week Summer School on Consumer and Competition Law will provide an opportunity to get a comprehensive and in- depth understanding of these subjects and their practical applications. This Summer School is a flagship initiative of the School of Legal Studies that laid a milestone in the academic field of Consumer and Competition Law in India. ## Mode of the Summer School Online through Zoom Meeting. ## Who Can Apply? This summer school is open to all those who are interested in the subject of Consumer and Competition Law. ## Attendance Classes will be held for 5 days from 09:45 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. Participants are required to attend **ALL classes**. ## How to Apply - Interested candidates are required to fill up the Google Form on or before **May** **25,** **2026.** - For Registration, kindly fill out the Google form here: ## **Registration** **Fee** For all participants **Rs. 600/- (Including GST) Mode of Payment:** The payment of the registration fee should be made to: - **Name of Payee**: The Director, School of Legal Studies - **Bank:** State Bank of India - **Branch:** Cochin University Campus Branch - **Account Number:** 57014606912 - **IFS Code:** SBIN0070235 ## Patron - **Dr. Binu Mole K.,** Director, School of Legal Studies, CUSAT ## Coordinator - **Dr. Aneesh V. Pillai**, SLS, CUSAT, Mob: 8606558242 ## Organising Secretaries - Dr. P. S. Seema, SLS, CUSAT & - Dr. Arathi Ashok, SLS, CUSAT **For any related queries, please contact:** [**cccl@cusat.ac.in**](mailto:cccl@cusat.ac.in) ## **OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / LINK OF THE OFFICIAL BROCHURE, RULES & REGULATIONS ETC.** - [**Registration Form**](https://forms.gle/XFELaPuGfhpJ6qjh7) - **[Official Brochure Link](https://drive.google.com/file/d/10h_VBk4ItwxxpZt6Hi020pIVc2AAbhU7/view?usp=sharing)** **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events --- ### [CALL FOR PAPERS- NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SHAPING THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUCATION: INNOVATION, PRACTICE AND REFORMS | Organized by Government Law College, Ernakulam | Submit Abstract by 7 May 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-papers-national-conference-on-shaping-the-future-of-legal-education-innovation-practice-and-reforms-organized-by-government-law-college-ernakulam-submit-abstract-by-7-may-2026/) **Published:** April 26, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** CALL FOR PAPERS- NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SHAPING THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUCATION :INNOVATION, PRACTICE AND REFORMS | Organized by Government Law College, Ernakulam | Submit Abstract by 7 May 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Screenshot-2026-04-26-113557.png) ## **ABOUT CONFERENCE** Government Law College, Ernakulam is the first Law College in Kerala founded in 1874 in the heart of the Metropolitan city of Kochi. This conference on Shaping The Future of Legal Education: Innovation, practice and Reforms serves as a dynamic platform for academicians, legal professionals, policymakers, and students to engage in meaningful dialogue on the future of legal education. It provides an opportunity to exchange ideas on curriculum innovation, interdisciplinary learning, technology integration, and bridging the gap between theory and practice. The platform also encourages discussions on research excellence, institutional reforms, and global collaborations, fostering a holistic and forward-looking approach to legal education grounded in constitutional values. This Conference is being organized by College Union 2025-2026,conjointly with Law Journal Club, Bhagath Singh Study Circle of Government Law college Ernakulam. ## **Venue** Government Law college Ernakulam, near Marine Drive The Conference will be in **offline mode** ## **ELIGIBILITY** Undergraduate and Postgraduate students, Research Scholars, Academicians, Lawyers and Professionals are eligible to submit their research paper. ## **SUBTHEMES** **Sub-Theme 1: Curriculum Innovation, Interdisciplinary Learning and Technology Integration** - Curriculum Modernization - Integration of emerging areas such as Artificial Intelligence & Law, Cyber Law, Environmental Justice, Data Protection, and Technology Law. - Periodic curriculum revision under the supervision of the Bar Council of India. - Outcome-based learning models and skill-oriented syllabus design. - Interdisciplinary Learning. - Encouraging research at the intersection of law and society. - Technology Integration in Legal Education. - Training in legal tech tools, AI-assisted research platforms,e-discovery system and Arithmetic jurisdiction in law. **Sub-Theme 2: Bridging the Gap Between Legal Education and Professional Practice** - Clinical Legal Education - Compulsory internships in courts, law firms, NGOs, and corporate houses. - Strengthening legal aid clinics in compliance with the Advocates Act, 1961 framework. - Drafting, pleading, negotiation, mediation, and advocacy training. - Courtroom and Practical Exposure - Regular court visits and observation of trial proceedings. - Mentorship programs with senior advocates and judicial officers. - Simulation exercises including moot courts, mock trials, and mediation competition - Institutional Collaboration - Partnerships between universities, judiciary, and bar associations. - Structured interaction with judges and practitioners. - Enhancing professional responsibility through ethics training aligned with the Advocates Act, 1961. ​ **Sub-Theme 3: Institutional Reform, Research Excellence, and Globalization Strengthening Legal Research** - Promotion of empirical, doctrinal, and policy-based research. • Ensuring access to quality legal education in rural and semi-urban areas. - Globalization of Legal Education - Student exchange programs and international internships. - Comparative law and transnational legal studies. - Academic collaborations with foreign universities. - Promotion of constitutional values rooted in the Constitution of India while engaging globally. ​ ## **SUBMISSION DETAILS** - Papers are invited on above given sub themes. These Subthemes are not exhaustive. - Co- authorship is permitted upto two. - Submission of Abstract for above mentioned conference shall be submitted via given google form before 7 th May 11.59 PM - Abstract shall contain a short bibliography and details of authors(Name, institution, Contact number, e-mail ID).The submissions will be adjudged and selected purely on the basis of merit and originality by Editorial board.Acceptance of Abstract would be communicated via email on 11 th may 2025. - Selected abstracts can be presented on the date of conference. - Full papers have to be submitted on 28 th may 2026.A PPT of presentation including 5 – 10 pages has to be submitted on 25th may 2025. ## **GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSION** **Abstract** - Word limit 500-700(except bibliography and footnote,) - Font-Times New Roman - Font Size-12,Line Spacing-1.5 , Foot note- 10,line spacing of footnote -1 - It shall be in word file only. **Full Paper** - Word Limit: 2000-4000 Words (excluding abstract, keywords, foot notes and bibliography) - Font: Times New Roman - Font Size: 12 pt, Line Spacing: 1.5 and the heading must be in font size 14 pt. - The submissions must conform to the 4th Edition of OSCOLA rules of citation. Footnotes must be in Times New Roman, with font size 10 and line spacing of 1. - There should not be more than 15% similarity in the main content as well as less than 10% usage of Artificial Intelligence. - The submission should be original and not simultaneously considered by any other seminar, conference, journal, chapter in a book, etc. - All submissions shall be in English and .Docx format (Word file) only. The paper should be typed in MS-Word Document format ## **PUBLICATION POLICY** - Selected papers will be published as a book with ISBN number, only if there are upto 20 papers for publication. - All the papers must be original or should not have been published or under consideration for publication. - Plagarized entries will be rejected. - There must not be any copyright issue on paper sent for publication, and if any such issue is discovered later, editor shall not be responsible on same.editor reserves the right to edit any part of the paper if it is found to be offensive, defamatory, unethical, support racism, sexual or religious discrimination, illegal or terror activities. ## **Registration​​​​​​​​** - No Registration Fee shall be required - Registration shall be made in given link: [https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdRkq2URgfQWoqwWtE6\_8MaAFDLjGTPglKjhdL5dV9tUxwjQA/viewform](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdRkq2URgfQWoqwWtE6_8MaAFDLjGTPglKjhdL5dV9tUxwjQA/viewform) - Note- In case of co authorship, only a single registration is required for both.​​ ## **CERTIFICATE** - Certificate will be awarded to all presenters - In case of co authorship, certificate will be given to both - Certificate of participation will be given to all participants. ## **IMPORTANT DATES** - Last date for submission of Abstract – 7th May 2026 - Date of communication of Acceptance of Abstract -11th May 2026 - Date of submission of PPT- 25th May 2026 - Date of submission of full paper- 28th May 2026 - Date of conference – 30th & 31st May 2026 ## **For further enquiries contact** - Varna – 8089735715 - Adheena – 9061227732 - Aswathidevi – 9400658485 - Akash – 9961946711 ## **OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / LINK OF THE OFFICIAL BROCHURE, RULES & REGULATIONS ETC.** **Official Brochure Link:** [https://drive.google.com/file/d/127r2VPk6De8XVJ9k\_VSgvhIB1aazt9U9/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/file/d/127r2VPk6De8XVJ9k_VSgvhIB1aazt9U9/view?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Events --- ### [1ST AUMP VIRTUAL CLIENT COUNSELLING COMPETITION, 2026 | Organized by Amity Law School, Amity University Madhya Pradesh | Register by 3rd May, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-aump-virtual-client-counselling-competition-2026-organized-by-amity-law-school-amity-university-madhya-pradesh-register-by-24th-april-2026/) **Published:** April 9, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 1ST AUMP VIRTUAL CLIENT COUNSELLING COMPETITION, 2026 | Organized by Amity Law School, Amity University Madhya Pradesh | Register by 24th April, 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/download-1-723x1024.jpg) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY Amity Law School, Amity University Madhya Pradesh is a premier institution dedicated to excellence in legal education, combining strong academic foundations with practical exposure. The institution is known for organizing moot courts, trial advocacy competitions, seminars, and other intellectually enriching events. Under the guidance of distinguished dignitaries including Dr. Aseem Chauhan (Hon’ble Chancellor & Chairman), Lt. Gen. V.K. Sharma (Hon’ble Pro-Chancellor), Prof. (Dr.) R.S. Tomar (Vice Chancellor), Prof. (Dr.) M.P. Kaushik (Pro Vice-Chancellor & Dean Research), and Maj. Gen. Rajinder Kumar (Director), the institution fosters multidisciplinary learning and professional legal skills. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY Amity Law School, Amity University Madhya Pradesh is organizing the 1st AUMP Virtual Client Counselling Competition, 2026. The competition aims to simulate real-life lawyer-client interactions where participants act as legal counsels, understand client issues, identify legal problems, and provide practical solutions. It focuses on developing essential lawyering skills such as communication, analytical thinking, professionalism, and ethical conduct. The problem will be based on contemporary legal issues across areas including Contract Law, Criminal Law, IPR, Family Law, Constitutional Law, Cyber Law, Insurance Law, and Banking Law. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE Students duly enrolled and pursuing full-time 3-year or 5-year undergraduate law courses from any recognized university in India may apply. ## MODE OF THE EVENT (ONLINE / OFFLINE OR HYBRID) Online ## LOCATION (COUNTRY/STATE/CITY) & VENUE OF THE EVENT Host Institution: Amity University, Gwalior ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE Teams must register by filling the official registration form in the prescribed manner. Registration will be confirmed only after successful submission of the form and payment of the fee. A unique team code will be allotted to each registered team for identification. ## FEE DETAILS Registration Fee: ₹1,200 per team Mode of Payment: UPI only Any transaction charges shall be borne by the participants ## PRIZES Best Team: ₹7,000 Runner-Up Team: ₹5,000 Best Counsel: ₹3,500 Additional Benefits (E-Learning Prizes) **From Lawctopus (Media & Knowledge Partner):** - Get a 10% scholarship on all Lawctopus Law School courses for all participants **From LawFoyer (Media & Knowledge Partner):** - Free access to 2 premium courses for Top 3 teams (worth ₹4,000) - 50% discount on publication opportunities for all participants - Internship opportunities with LawFoyer for all participants - 1-year job & internship support via LawFoyer Connect - Recognition for top performers on LawFoyer’s “Achievers Archive” ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES Release of Brochure: 7th April 2026 Last Date for Registration: 27th April 2026 Competition Dates: 14th – 15th May 2026 ## CONTACT INFORMATION Email: mcc.als.amity@gmail.com **Organising Secretaries:** - Ananya Sawhney – 7000053001 - Shree Prachi – 6204004221 - Pallavi Prajapati – 9753126125 - Sohil Khan – 8770619994 ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / LINK OF THE OFFICIAL BROCHURE, RULES & REGULATIONS ETC. - **Registration Form:** - **Access to Brochure, Rulebook & Poster:** **Social Media Handles** Instagram: @moot\_court\_committee\_als LinkedIn: Moot Court Committee, Amity Law School, Gwalior **Categories:** Events, Moot Courts, Other Competitions --- ### [P.Suresh v. D.Kalaivani & Ors., 2026 INSC 121](https://lawfoyer.in/p-suresh-v-d-kalaivani-ors-2026-insc-121/) **Published:** April 30, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The present decision in ***P.Suresh v. D.Kalaivani & Ors.*****, 2026 INSC 121** examines the constitutional limits of the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction under ***Article 227 of the Constitution of India***. The dispute arose from a civil suit for permanent injunction filed by the appellant before the District Munsif Court, Tambaram. The defendants invoked Article 227 before the Madras High Court seeking to strike off the plaint, contending that the suit was fraudulent and based on forged documents. The High Court exercised its supervisory jurisdiction and struck off the plaint. The Supreme Court considered whether such exercise was permissible when a specific statutory remedy under ***Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908*** was available. The Court reaffirmed the principle that supervisory powers are extraordinary and must not supplant statutory remedies. It held that where the CPC provides a complete mechanism for rejection of plaint, the High Court cannot bypass that mechanism under Article 227. The judgment restores the suit and emphasizes judicial discipline, legislative intent, and restraint in constitutional adjudication. The ruling reinforces the doctrine that availability of an alternative remedy under CPC constitutes a near-total bar to Article 227 intervention in civil disputes. **Keywords:** Article 227, Order VII Rule 11 CPC, Supervisory Jurisdiction, Rejection of Plaint, Alternative Remedy Doctrine, Civil Procedure ## B) CASE DETAILS **i) Judgment Cause Title:** ***P.Suresh v. D.Kalaivani & Ors.*** **ii) Case Number:** Civil Appeal No. 739 of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 20423 of 2025) **iii) Judgment Date:** 03 February 2026 **iv) Court:** ***Supreme Court of India*** **v) Quorum:** Hon’ble Justice **Aravind Kumar** Hon’ble Justice **N.V. Anjaria** **vi) Author:** Justice N.V. Anjaria **vii) Citation:** 2026 INSC 121 **viii) Legal Provisions Involved:** ***Article 227 of the Constitution of India*** ***Order VII Rule 11 CPC*** ***Order VI Rule 16 CPC*** ***Section 96 CPC*** ***Section 104 CPC*** ***Order XLIII Rule 1(r) CPC*** **ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case:** None **x) Related Law Subjects:** Constitutional Law Civil Procedure Law Property Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The dispute arose from a suit for permanent injunction. The appellant claimed possession based on inheritance. The defendants disputed title. They alleged fraud. They invoked ***Article 227*** before the High Court. The High Court struck off the plaint. The central issue concerned judicial discipline. The Supreme Court examined whether supervisory powers could replace statutory remedies. The CPC contains detailed provisions. ***Order VII Rule 11*** governs rejection of plaint. The defendants bypassed this mechanism. They approached the High Court directly. The Court revisited constitutional structure. Article 227 confers supervisory jurisdiction. It is not appellate power. It ensures subordinate courts act within jurisdiction. The judgment clarified that constitutional power cannot override legislative scheme. The Court emphasized restraint. Supervisory power is extraordinary. It cannot become a substitute appeal. The case reflects tension between constitutional oversight and procedural autonomy. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellant filed Original Suit No. 93 of 2020. The suit sought permanent injunction. The property comprised Survey Nos. 125/1A, 125/1C and 230/1B. The land was under Patta No. 320. The appellant claimed inheritance from his mother Meena. She purchased the land in 1975. She died intestate in 1985. The plaintiff claimed exclusive possession. Revenue records were mutated. The defendants disputed the sale deed. They alleged fabrication. They claimed ancestral ownership since 1922. They asserted possession. They denied trespass. The High Court examined the certified copy of sale deed. It concluded the document was forged. It noted earlier dismissal for default. It inferred lack of bona fides. It struck off the plaint under Article 227. The appellant challenged this before the Supreme Court. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i) Whether the High Court can exercise ***Article 227*** jurisdiction to strike off a plaint when ***Order VII Rule 11 CPC*** provides a specific remedy? ii) Whether ***Order VI Rule 16 CPC*** permits striking off an entire plaint? iii) Whether supervisory jurisdiction can substitute statutory procedural remedies? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsel for the appellant submitted that Article 227 is supervisory. It must be sparingly used. The High Court acted as appellate authority. This violated settled law. Reliance was placed on ***Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329***. The Supreme Court there held that Article 227 power must remain minimal. It prevents injustice. It does not correct errors. The appellant also relied on ***Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, (2015) 5 SCC 423***. That case overruled ***Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675***. It clarified distinction between writ and supervisory powers. Civil court orders cannot be routinely interfered. It was argued that ***Order VII Rule 11 CPC*** is self-contained. Rejection of plaint requires factual inquiry. The defendants never invoked this before trial court. The High Court bypassed procedure. The appellant contended that such exercise defeats legislative intent. It undermines trial process. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent submitted that Article 227 powers are wide. They extend to correcting jurisdictional errors. The High Court found fraud. Fraud vitiates proceedings. They relied on ***Order VI Rule 16 CPC***. It allows striking out pleadings. Fraudulent pleadings are abuse of process. Hence entire plaint could be struck. The respondents argued that supervisory power is constitutional. It overrides statutory limitations. The High Court acted to prevent injustice. They contended that continuation of fraudulent suit harms judicial system. Hence intervention was justified. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i) ***Article 227 of the Constitution of India*** grants supervisory jurisdiction. It ensures subordinate courts function within authority. It is discretionary. It is extraordinary. In ***State v. Navjot Sandhu, (2003) 6 SCC 641***, the Court held Article 227 cannot correct mere errors. It cannot act as appeal in disguise. ii) ***Order VII Rule 11 CPC*** mandates rejection of plaint in specified cases. Grounds include absence of cause of action. It also covers bar by law. The rejection amounts to decree. Appeal lies under ***Section 96 CPC***. In ***K. Valarmathi v. Kumaresan, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 985***, the Court held CPC is self-contained. Supervisory jurisdiction cannot supplant statutory remedy. iii) ***Order VI Rule 16 CPC*** deals with striking pleadings. It applies to parts of pleadings. It does not permit rejection of entire plaint. The provision addresses scandalous or vexatious content. The Supreme Court clarified distinction. Rejection of plaint differs from striking pleadings. ## I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT i) ***Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010) 8 SCC 329*** Held that Article 227 must be sparingly exercised. It safeguards justice system. It is not routine remedy. ii) ***State v. Navjot Sandhu (2003) 6 SCC 641*** Held supervisory jurisdiction cannot act as appeal. It corrects jurisdictional overreach only. iii) ***A. Venkateshubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan (2000) 7 SCC 695*** Held parties must exhaust statutory remedies before invoking constitutional remedies. iv) ***Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana Sabai v. Tuticorin Educational Society (2019) 9 SCC 538*** Held availability of CPC remedy is near-total bar to Article 227. Appeal provisions must be respected. v) ***Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath (2015) 5 SCC 423*** Clarified supervisory jurisdiction boundaries. Overruled contrary interpretation in Surya Dev Rai. ## J) JUDGEMENT #### a) RATIO DECIDENDI i) The Supreme Court held that when ***Order VII Rule 11 CPC*** provides remedy, Article 227 cannot be invoked to reject plaint. ii) Availability of statutory remedy is near-total bar. This principle applies strictly in civil court proceedings. iii) Order VI Rule 16 cannot justify striking entire plaint. It applies to defective pleadings only. iv) Supervisory jurisdiction is exceptional. It prevents miscarriage of justice. It does not replace procedural remedies. v) The High Court committed manifest error. It bypassed legislative scheme. The plaint was restored. Liberty was granted to defendants to file application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. #### b) OBITER DICTA i) The Court cautioned High Courts against routine interference in civil disputes. Property disputes often involve evidence. Constitutional jurisdiction should not pre-empt trial. ii) Judicial discipline requires deference to statutory framework. #### c) GUIDELINES i) High Courts must refrain from exercising Article 227 where CPC remedy exists. ii) Order VII Rule 11 must be invoked before trial court. iii) Order VI Rule 16 cannot be expanded to nullify plaint. iv) Supervisory jurisdiction must remain exceptional. ## K) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment strengthens procedural discipline. It protects legislative intent. It prevents constitutional overreach. The Court reaffirmed hierarchy of remedies. It ensured civil disputes proceed through trial. It restored balance between constitutional oversight and statutory process. The ruling advances certainty. It preserves sanctity of CPC. It promotes judicial restraint. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Savithri Naidu v. M/s The Cotton Corporation of India Ltd, 2026 INSC 150](https://lawfoyer.in/savithri-naidu-v-m-s-the-cotton-corporation-of-india-ltd-2026-insc-150/) **Published:** April 30, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The present judgment in ***R. Savithri Naidu v. M/s. The Cotton Corporation of India Ltd.***, **2026 INSC 150**, resolves a significant question under execution jurisprudence. The issue concerns the rights of a third-party purchaser who acquires immovable property from a judgment-debtor after an arbitral award for recovery of money. The dispute examines the interplay between ***Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996***, ***Order XXI Rules 58 and 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908***, and the doctrine of ***lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882***. The appellant claimed to be a bona fide purchaser without notice of the arbitral award. The Court rejected this contention. It held that a purchaser post-institution of arbitration proceedings and post-award is a transferee pendente lite. Such purchaser cannot resist execution under ***Order XXI Rule 102 CPC***. The Court relied upon precedents including ***Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram, (2008) 7 SCC 144*** and ***Danesh Singh v. Har Pyari, 2025 INSC 1434***. The ruling affirms that money decrees are equally protected by the doctrine of lis pendens. It strengthens execution proceedings and prevents frustration of decrees through collusive transfers. **Keywords:** Arbitral Award; Execution Proceedings; Lis Pendens; Order XXI Rule 102 CPC; Bona Fide Purchaser; Money Decree; SARFAESI Act. ## **B) CASE DETAILS** i) Judgment Cause Title ***R. Savithri Naidu v. M/s. The Cotton Corporation of India Limited & Anr.*** ii) Case Number Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 19779 of 2024 iii) Judgment Date 12 February 2026 iv) Court ***Supreme Court of India*** v) Quorum Hon’ble Justice ***Pankaj Mithal*** and Hon’ble Justice ***S.V.N. Bhatti*** vi) Author Justice ***S.V.N. Bhatti*** vii) Citation 2026 INSC 150 viii) Legal Provisions Involved ***Section 36, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996*** ***Order XXI Rules 58, 98, 100, 101, 102 CPC*** ***Section 52, Transfer of Property Act, 1882*** ***SARFAESI Act, 2002*** ix) Judgments Overruled None expressly overruled. x) Law Subjects Arbitration Law; Civil Procedure; Property Law; Execution Jurisprudence; Banking Law. ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The dispute arose from a commercial transaction dated 22.01.1998. The transaction concerned sale of cotton bales. The seller was ***The Cotton Corporation of India Ltd.***. The buyer was M/s Lakshmi Ganesh Textiles Limited. Disputes arose over unpaid sale consideration. Arbitration proceedings commenced in 1999. An award dated 11.06.2001 granted recovery of Rs. 26,00,572.90 with 18 percent interest. The award was challenged under ***Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996***. The challenge was dismissed in 2013. The award attained finality. No appeal followed. Execution proceedings began in 2019. Meanwhile, the company transferred immovable property to the appellant in 2015. The appellant was mother of the Managing Director. She was also a former director. She invoked ***Order XXI Rule 58 CPC***. She sought removal of attachment. The executing court dismissed her claim. The High Court affirmed dismissal. The Supreme Court examined whether such purchaser could resist execution. The Court focused on statutory bar under ***Order XXI Rule 102 CPC***. It analysed doctrine of lis pendens. It addressed enforceability of arbitral awards as decrees under ***Section 36***. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The first respondent supplied cotton bales in 1998. Payment default occurred. Arbitration was initiated in 1999. Award followed in 2001. The award granted principal sum with high interest. The debtor company challenged the award in 2006. The challenge ended unsuccessfully in 2013. Meanwhile, ICICI Bank initiated proceedings under the ***SARFAESI Act, 2002*** in 2013. Secured assets were attached. A tripartite agreement was executed in 2014. The appellant purchased property via registered sale deed dated 23.04.2015. The arbitral award remained unsatisfied. In 2019, execution petition was filed. Conditional attachment was ordered in 2021. The appellant claimed absolute ownership. She asserted purchase for valid consideration. She denied knowledge of arbitral liability. The decree-holder alleged collusion. The tripartite agreement was not produced. The executing court dismissed objections on 03.01.2022. The High Court dismissed revision in 2024. The Supreme Court examined the correctness of concurrent findings. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether a purchaser after arbitral award can resist execution under ***Order XXI Rule 58 CPC***. ii. Whether ***Order XXI Rule 102 CPC*** bars objections by transferee pendente lite. iii. Whether doctrine of ***lis pendens under Section 52 TPA*** applies to money decrees. iv. Whether absence of notice protects purchaser. v. Whether SARFAESI proceedings override rights of decree-holder. ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsel for Appellant submitted that the appellant was absolute owner under registered sale deed. The sale occurred in 2015. No litigation was pending then. Section 34 proceedings ended in 2013. Hence no lis existed. The arbitral award concerned money only. It did not concern immovable property. Therefore Section 52 TPA was inapplicable. The appellant was bona fide purchaser for value. She had no notice of liability. Execution cannot attach third-party property. The counsel relied on equitable principles. It was argued that SARFAESI sale cleared encumbrances. The appellant claimed independence from debtor company. She invoked protection under ***Order XXI Rule 58 CPC***. She denied collusion. She argued that Rule 102 applies only to pending suits. She emphasized absence of pending proceeding at purchase time. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** i. The counsel for Respondent submitted that arbitration began in 1999. Award passed in 2001. Transfer in 2015 was post-award. Under ***Section 36 Arbitration Act***, award equals decree. Therefore decree existed since 2001. Order XXI Rule 102 bars transferee pendente lite. The pendency begins from institution of arbitration. The appellant was mother of Managing Director. She was former director. Knowledge must be presumed. Non-production of tripartite agreement raised adverse inference. SARFAESI proceedings do not extinguish decree-holder rights. Reliance placed on ***Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram, (2008) 7 SCC 144***. Also relied on ***Danesh Singh v. Har Pyari, 2025 INSC 1434***. It was argued that money decrees also attract lis pendens. Otherwise decrees become illusory. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. ***Section 36 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996*** declares award enforceable as decree. This provision equates arbitral award with civil decree. It ensures speedy enforcement. The Court emphasized that once award attained finality, decree-holder rights crystallised. ii. ***Order XXI Rule 102 CPC*** denies resistance by transferee pendente lite. It bars claims under Rules 98 and 100. It is rooted in equity. It prevents obstruction to execution. iii. ***Section 52 Transfer of Property Act, 1882*** embodies doctrine of lis pendens. It prevents transfer during pendency. It ensures subject matter remains intact. The Explanation extends pendency until satisfaction of decree. iv. ***SARFAESI Act, 2002*** empowers secured creditors. It does not override decree-holder rights unless statutory priority applies. ## **I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT** The Court relied upon ***Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram, (2008) 7 SCC 144***. It held that transferee pendente lite cannot resist execution. It emphasized justice and equity. The Court relied upon ***Danesh Singh v. Har Pyari, 2025 INSC 1434***. It approved Madras High Court reasoning. It extended lis pendens to money decrees. Reference made to ***Annakkili v. Murugan, 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 1673***. It held Section 52 applies to money suits. The Court cited ***General Manager of the Raj Durbhunga v. Coomar Ramaput Singh, (1872) 14 MIA 605***. It observed execution is real test of decree. The Court cited ***Jini Dhanrajgir v. Shibu Mathew, (2023) 20 SCC 76***. It stressed that decree must yield real relief. ## **H) JUDGEMENT** **a.** **RATIO DECIDENDI** i. A purchaser after institution of arbitration is transferee pendente lite. ii. ***Order XXI Rule 102 CPC*** bars such purchaser from resisting execution. iii. Doctrine of ***lis pendens*** applies to money decrees. iv. Non-production of material documents permits adverse inference. v. SARFAESI proceedings do not shield transferee from decree-holder claims. vi. Award under ***Section 36*** is enforceable as decree from date of award. vii. Execution cannot be frustrated by strategic alienations. **b.** **OBITER DICTA** i. Execution delays defeat justice. ii. Courts must ensure decrees are not paper declarations. iii. Procedural law must secure substantive justice. **c.** **GUIDELINES** i. Transferees must verify pending proceedings. ii. Executing courts must apply Rule 102 strictly. iii. Money decrees enjoy equal protection under lis pendens. iv. Third-party objections require strict scrutiny. v. Execution proceedings must conclude expeditiously. ## **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The decision fortifies execution jurisprudence. It prevents misuse of property transfers. It harmonises Arbitration Act with CPC. It clarifies that lis pendens covers money decrees. It discourages collusive transfers. It protects decree-holder rights. It ensures awards are meaningful. It reflects commitment to enforceability. It promotes judicial efficiency. It balances equity and procedure. ## **J) REFERENCES** a) Important Cases Referred i. ***Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram, (2008) 7 SCC 144*** ii. ***Danesh Singh v. Har Pyari, 2025 INSC 1434*** iii. ***Annakkili v. Murugan, 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 1673*** iv. ***General Manager of the Raj Durbhunga v. Coomar Ramaput Singh, (1872) 14 MIA 605*** v. ***Jini Dhanrajgir v. Shibu Mathew, (2023) 20 SCC 76*** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [UILS STUDENT LAW REVIEW – CALL FOR PAPERS (VOL. III, ISSUE II) | Organized by University Institute of Legal Studies (UILS), Panjab University, Chandigarh](https://lawfoyer.in/uils-student-law-review-call-for-papers-vol-iii-issue-ii-organized-by-university-institute-of-legal-studies-uils-panjab-university-chandigarh/) **Published:** April 26, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** UILS STUDENT LAW REVIEW – CALL FOR PAPERS (VOL. III, ISSUE II) | Organized by University Institute of Legal Studies (UILS), Panjab University, Chandigarh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Screenshot-2026-04-26-105217.png) ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY** The University Institute of Legal Studies (UILS), established in 2004–05 as a constituent department of Panjab University, Chandigarh, has evolved into a centre of excellence in legal education. It emphasizes academic rigour, research-oriented learning, and critical engagement with contemporary legal and interdisciplinary issues. UILS actively promotes scholarly writing, research projects, and publication opportunities to nurture analytical and research skills among students. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY** The UILS Student Law Review (USLR) is a **peer-reviewed and referred, student-run academic journal** published bi-annually. It invites submissions for **Volume III, Issue II (July – December 2026)**. The journal aims to foster meaningful engagement with contemporary legal issues and encourages high standards of academic writing and research. It accepts submissions on **any contemporary legal topic** in the following categories: - Articles (3,000–5,000 words) - Case Comments (1,500–3,000 words) - Legislative Comments (1,500–3,000 words) - Book Reviews (1,500–3,000 words) Submissions must include: - An abstract (max 250 words) - 5 keywords - Original work (plagiarism limit: 15%) - Maximum of two co-authors allowed The journal follows a **student-driven editorial process**, ensuring quality through rigorous review and editing standards. ## **WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** - Students enrolled in 5-year integrated law courses - Students of 3-year law courses - LL.M. students - Research Scholars from recognized law schools across the globe ## **LOCATION & VENUE OF THE EVENT** Chandigarh, India (University Institute of Legal Studies, Panjab University) ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE** - Submission Link: [https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSc-YnclB66X9c9FZ2767gqAk-q7OGlFHp\_17\_lN39xYuCJVaw/viewform ](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSc-YnclB66X9c9FZ2767gqAk-q7OGlFHp_17_lN39xYuCJVaw/viewform) - Authors must follow formatting and citation guidelines (ILI citation style). - Manuscripts should not contain author identity. ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - Call for Papers: For Volume III, Issue II (July – December 2026) ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** - **Suhani Salwan (Editor):** +91 85270 09695 - **Jasmine Dhakarwal (Co-Editor):** +91 93508 79414 - **Prasha Bhatia (Co-Editor):** +91 6283 899683 - **Email:** uilsstudentlawreview@gmail.com - **Instagram:** @uilslawreview ## **OFFICIAL LINK / BROCHURE** - **Official Brochure:** [https://drive.google.com/file/d/18KPuTeMV2zz\_xtHeAxEKmHtpuk\_A8iFT/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/file/d/18KPuTeMV2zz_xtHeAxEKmHtpuk_A8iFT/view?usp=sharing) - **Call for Papers:** **Categories:** Events --- ### [NLUJ-CIPS One Day National Workshop on Intellectual Property and Sports, 2026 (Virtual) | Organized by Centre for Intellectual Property Studies (CIPS), National Law University, Jodhpur | Register by 25 April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/nluj-cips-one-day-national-workshop-on-intellectual-property-and-sports-2026-virtual-organized-by-centre-for-intellectual-property-studies-cips-national-law-university-jodhpur-register-by-2/) **Published:** April 26, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** NLUJ-CIPS One Day National Workshop on Intellectual Property and Sports, 2026 (Virtual) | Organized by Centre for Intellectual Property Studies (CIPS), National Law University, Jodhpur | Register by 25 April 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Screenshot-2026-04-26-103012.jpg) ## **About the Organiser** The Centre for Intellectual Property Studies at National Law University, Jodhpur is a specialised academic and research centre dedicated to advancing scholarship and awareness in the field of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). Established to create a focused platform for intellectual property discourse, the Centre seeks to bridge the gap between academia, industry, and policy-making through research, training, and outreach initiatives. The Centre actively promotes research and capacity-building in diverse areas of intellectual property law, including patents, trademarks, copyrights, and emerging intersections such as technology, biotechnology, and competition law. It organises workshops, webinars, conferences, and conclaves to facilitate engagement with contemporary developments and practical challenges in the IP domain. Through its dynamic activities and collaborative approach, the Centre aims to make intellectual property law more accessible while fostering critical research and informed dialogue in this rapidly evolving field. ## **Details about the Event** On the occasion of World Intellectual Property Day, the Centre for Intellectual Property Studies at National Law University, Jodhpur is organising a National Virtual Workshop on the theme “Intellectual Property and Sports.” The workshop aims to examine the evolving interface between intellectual property law and the contemporary sports industry, where innovation, branding, and media rights are integral to its growth and governance. In an era marked by the increasing commercialisation of sports, intellectual property rights—ranging from trademarks and copyrights to patents—play a crucial role in safeguarding athletes’ image rights, sports technologies, broadcasting content, and merchandising frameworks. This workshop seeks to provide participants with a nuanced understanding of these dimensions, while engaging with pressing legal and policy challenges in both national and global contexts. Bringing together leading academicians, practitioners, and students from across the country, the workshop aspires to foster informed dialogue on emerging issues such as ambush marketing, personality rights, sports technology innovation, and the expanding role of IP in shaping the business of sports. It endeavours to serve as a platform for critical engagement, knowledge exchange, and interdisciplinary learning in this increasingly significant domain. ## **Broad Theme: “IP and Sports: Ready, Set, Innovate”** **Technical Sessions:** 1. **Session 1: Broadcasting Victory: Copyright Ownership in Sports, Media Data and Digital Content –** By Ms. Aprajita Nigam, Managing Associate, Anand & Anand 2. **Session 2: Branding the Game: Trademark Protection, Ambush Marketing and Athlete Brand Management –**By. Dr. Ankit Singh, DPIIT IPR Chair Professor, HNLU, Raipur 3. **Session 3: From Field to Future: IP and Innovation in Sports –** By Mr. Pranit Biswas, Managing Associate, S.S. Rana & Co. ## **Eligibility** The Workshop is open to students, academicians, scholars and professionals. ## **Location** Online ## **Registration Procedure** The participants shall be required to register for the event by following the two steps: 1. Payment of registration fee (link provided below) and downloading the receipt. 2. Submission of information through a google form by filling the information and uploading the payment receipt. Detailed guidelines are provided in the Brochure. ## **Registration Fee** The registration fee of the competition shall be Rs. 500 for each participant. Registration fee once paid, shall be non-refundable. ## **Certificate** All participants registering for the workshop and attending all the sessions shall be given an e-certificate of participation. ## **Important Dates** 1. Deadline for Registration: 25th April, 2026. 2. Date of Workshop: 26th April, 2026. ## **Contact Information** Email: ## **Faculty Coordinator** 1. Dr. Kanika Dhingra, Faculty Advisor, Centre for Intellectual Property Studies, NLUJ ## **Student Coordinators** 1. Ms. Ananya Jaria, Convenor, Centre for Intellectual Property Studies, NLUJ 2. Mr. Turanyu V.B. Editor In Chief, Centre for Intellectual Property Studies Blog, NLUJ ## **Official Links** 1. Detailed Information: 2. Registration Fee Payment Link: 3. Registration Form Submission: 4. Event Brochure: [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1bkb\_hXE\_p5RBByXIuxh5DSjtf6ZznKH8/view?usp=sharing ](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1bkb_hXE_p5RBByXIuxh5DSjtf6ZznKH8/view?usp=sharing) 5. Event Poster: [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1c\_wI0KnGFHZ6onJdz\_GEi4qOhKuB-7gf/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1c_wI0KnGFHZ6onJdz_GEi4qOhKuB-7gf/view?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Events --- ### [From Inclusion to Impact: Women Entrepreneurship, Digital Rights, ESG Accountability & Corporate Governance Reforms | Organized by KIIT School of Law | Register by 30 April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/from-inclusion-to-impact-women-entrepreneurship-digital-rights-esg-accountability-corporate-governance-reforms-organized-by-kiit-school-of-law-register-by-30-april-2026/) **Published:** April 26, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** From Inclusion to Impact: Women Entrepreneurship, Digital Rights, ESG Accountability & Corporate Governance Reforms | Organized by KIIT School of Law | Register by 30 April 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Screenshot-2026-04-26-102733.png) ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISATION** This Faculty Development Program is being hosted by KIIT Deemed to be University (KIIT-DU), Bhubaneswar, Odisha, through its School of Law. It is being organised by the Centre for Studies on Business and Corporate Laws (CBCL), under the aegis of the Department of Business Law and Corporate Governance (DBLCG), in collaboration with the Internal Quality Assurance Cell (IQAC), KIIT-DU. The Centre for Studies on Business and Corporate Laws is a specialised academic centre under the School of Law, KIIT Deemed to be University (KIIT-DU), Bhubaneswar, Odisha. CBCL is dedicated to advancing scholarship, research, and capacity-building in the areas of corporate law, business regulation, ESG accountability, and governance reforms. The Centre aims to become a nationally and internationally recognised Centre of Excellence in Business and Corporate Law, effectively bridging academic scholarship with industry practice. ## **ABOUT THE COURSE / WORKSHOP** The Centre for Studies on Business and Corporate Laws (CBCL) is organising a Six-Day International Faculty Development Programme (FDP) in Online/Virtual Mode. The programme is themed around Women Entrepreneurship, ESG Accountability & Corporate Governance Reforms with an ***interdisciplinary approach.*** The FDP will comprise 24 sessions in total: one formal Inaugural Session, twenty-two substantive thematic sessions, and one Valedictory Session. Each day will feature four sessions totaling six hours. An online assessment will be conducted on Day 6. Participants will be awarded a Certificate of Successful Completion, subject to fulfilling the minimum attendance and assessment criteria. Key Sub-Themes: - Women Entrepreneurship & Financial Inclusion: Ecosystem building, access to capital, self-help groups, start-up policy - Digital Rights, Data Sovereignty & Cyber Ethics: Digital literacy, data privacy, algorithmic bias, AI & gender equity - ESG Accountability & Sustainable Finance: ESG frameworks, green financing, climate disclosure, BRSR reporting - Corporate Governance Reforms: board diversity, SEBI regulations, stewardship codes, audit independence - Policy, Law & Institutional Frameworks: Companies Act reforms, IBBI, NCLT, insolvency, regulatory convergence - Viksit Bharat @2047, Vision, Strategy & Leadership: SDG alignment, inclusive growth, women in leadership ## **ELIGIBILITY** - Faculty Members from Law Schools, Management Institutions, and Social Science Departments (Indian and International) - Research Scholars — LL.M. and PhD candidates in Law, Management, Economics, Public Policy & Allied Fields - Legal Practitioners — Advocates, In-House Counsel and Company Secretaries - Corporate & Industry Professionals — Compliance Officers, ESG Consultants, Risk Managers, Corporate Secretaries - Judicial Officers and Government Officials with an interest in corporate law, governance, and sustainability - Representatives from Regulatory Bodies, Policy Think Tanks, and Civil Society Organisations ## **DURATION** **Duration** 6 Days **Schedule** May 04, 2026 – May 09, 2026 **Start Date** May 04, 2026 (Sunday) **End Date** May 09, 2026 (Saturday) ## **Programme Coordinators** - (CS) Pratiti Nayak — Associate Professor & Associate Dean (Research), Centre Co-ordinator - Shrabani Kar — Assistant Professor, Centre Co-ordinator - Ipsita Das — Associate Professor, Associate Dean (Post-Graduate Program) & Head of Department ## **PERKS / BENEFITS** - E-Certificate of Successful Completion (for participants with 80%+ attendance AND 50%+ assessment score) issued by School of Law, KIIT Deemed to be University - Access to all 24 live sessions with eminent national and international experts - Online assessment platform access included - Professional networking with international professors, senior academics, and industry leaders across jurisdictions - NAAC/NBA accreditation benefit for participating institutions through documented FDP participation records - UGC–NEP 2020 Compliant supports career development and academic CPD requirements. ## **Payment Details** - Account Name: KSOT Projects - Account Number: 50029573273 - IFSC Code: IDIB000K717 - QR Code available in the brochure ## **Registration Link** ## **Last Date for Registration** **April 30, 2026** ## **IMPORTANT DATES** **Event** **Date / Deadline** **FDP Commencement Date** **May 04, 2026** **FDP Conclusion Date** **May 09, 2026** **Online Assessment (Day 6)** **May 09, 2026** ## **COURSE FEES** **Cat.** **Participant Category** **Registration Fee** **A** Faculty Members, Research Scholars, KIIT Deemed to be University **INR 800/-** **B** External / Outside Participants (Faculty, Scholars & Industry from Indian Institutions) **INR 1,100/-** ## **ENROLMENT PROCEDURE** - Step 1: Scan the QR Code given in the brochure. - Step 2: Complete the online registration form with your personal, institutional, and academic details. - Step 3: Pay the applicable registration fee online through the designated payment portal. - Step 4: Await confirmation of registration via your registered email address. - Step 5: Zoom/Virtual Meeting links for each day’s sessions will be shared with confirmed participants prior to programme commencement. - Step 6: Attend all sessions, complete the mandatory online assessment on Day 6, and download your e-certificate upon issuance. ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** - Centre for Studies on Business and Corporate Laws (CBCL), Department of Business Laws & Corporate Governance, School of Law, KIIT Deemed to be University (KIIT-DU), Bhubaneswar, Odisha – 751024 - E-mail: - Phone: +91 73810 01915/ 7735570189 - Dr. (CS) Pratiti Nayak | Ms. Shrabani Kar - Facebook: - Instagram: - Twitter: ## **OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / LINK OF THE OFFICIAL BROCHURE, RULES & REGULATIONS ETC.** - **Official Brochure:** [https://drive.google.com/file/d/19Wa7\_A1lSn1Mqlv2L-so\_HDQdcUV7AvQ/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/file/d/19Wa7_A1lSn1Mqlv2L-so_HDQdcUV7AvQ/view?usp=sharing) - **Registration Link:** - **Last Date for Registration:** April 30, 2026 **Categories:** Events --- ### [The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, [2025] 2 S.C.R. 836: 2025 INSC 261](https://lawfoyer.in/the-state-of-madhya-pradesh-v-balveer-singh-2025-2-s-c-r-836-2025-insc-261-2/) **Published:** April 15, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** #### **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The present criminal appeal arose from the judgment dated 29.06.2010 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior, whereby the conviction of the respondent under ***Sections 302, 201 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860*** was set aside and he was acquitted. The Trial Court had convicted the respondent primarily on the testimony of a child witness, namely Rani, aged about seven years at the time of the incident, who was the daughter of the deceased and the accused. The prosecution case rested on the allegation that the accused strangulated his wife during the night and clandestinely cremated her body in his field to destroy evidence. The High Court doubted the credibility of the child witness due to delay in recording her statement and alleged possibility of tutoring. The Supreme Court examined the principles governing appreciation of child witness testimony, circumstantial evidence, and the applicability of ***Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872***. The Court emphasized that delay in recording statement is not per se fatal and that clandestine cremation constitutes a strong incriminating circumstance. The appeal required examination of whether the High Court erred in discarding reliable evidence and granting benefit of doubt. **Keywords:** Child Witness, Tutoring, Circumstantial Evidence, Section 106 Evidence Act, Clandestine Cremation, Dowry Harassment, Acquittal Appeal. #### **B) CASE DETAILS** i) **Judgment Cause Title:** ***The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh*** ii) Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 1669 of 2012 iii) Judgment Date: 24 February 2025 iv) Court: Supreme Court of India v) Quorum: Hon’ble Mr. Justice J.B. Pardiwala vi) Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J. vii) Citation: 2025 INSC 261 viii) Legal Provisions Involved: ***Sections 302, 201, 34 IPC***; ***Section 174 Cr.P.C.***; ***Section 161 Cr.P.C.***; ***Section 313 Cr.P.C.***; ***Section 118 Evidence Act***; ***Section 106 Evidence Act*** ix) Judgments Overruled: None expressly overruled. x) Law Subjects: Criminal Law, Law of Evidence, Criminal Procedure, Appellate Jurisdiction. #### **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT** The appeal originated from a reversal of conviction by the High Court. The Trial Court had convicted the respondent for murdering his wife and destroying evidence. The prosecution alleged that the deceased was strangulated at midnight. Her body was cremated secretly in the field. No villagers were informed. The unnatural death report was lodged under ***Section 174 Cr.P.C.***. Investigation revealed dowry harassment. The child daughter witnessed the assault. The Trial Court relied heavily on her testimony. It also relied on circumstances like strained marital relations and secret cremation. The High Court reversed the conviction. It doubted the credibility of the child witness. It found delay in recording her police statement suspicious. It suspected tutoring due to enmity. The State challenged the acquittal before the Supreme Court. The case thus involved re-appreciation of evidence in an appeal against acquittal. It also involved principles governing child witnesses and circumstantial evidence. #### **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The deceased Birendra Kumari was married to the respondent. They had three children. On the night of 15.07.2003 screams were heard from the accused’s house. The complainant and his father heard cries around midnight. The cries stopped abruptly. At dawn they learned that the deceased had died. Her body had already been cremated in the accused’s field. An unnatural death report was lodged. Investigation disclosed that the accused threw the deceased to the ground. He pressed her neck with his leg. The daughter Rani witnessed the act. She stated that her father slapped her when she tried to intervene. The body was carried to the field and burnt. Seizure of ashes and bangles was made. Evidence revealed prior dowry demands. A maintenance case had been filed earlier. The Trial Court convicted the accused. The High Court acquitted him. The State appealed. #### **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether the testimony of a child witness aged seven years was reliable and free from tutoring. ii. Whether delay of eighteen days in recording statement under ***Section 161 Cr.P.C.*** rendered testimony doubtful. iii. Whether clandestine cremation constituted incriminating circumstance. iv. Whether ***Section 106 of the Evidence Act*** shifted burden on accused to explain death inside house. v. Whether High Court erred in reversing conviction without proper appreciation. #### **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** i. The counsel for the State submitted that the High Court erred in discarding reliable testimony. The child witness was competent under ***Section 118 Evidence Act***. Her deposition was consistent. Cross-examination revealed no material contradiction. Delay in recording statement was procedural lapse. It was not fatal. Reliance was placed on ***Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra (1997) 5 SCC 341*** which held corroboration is rule of prudence not law. The clandestine cremation was unnatural conduct. It attracted adverse inference. The accused failed to explain circumstances under ***Section 106 Evidence Act***. The death occurred inside matrimonial home. The accused offered bare denial under ***Section 313 Cr.P.C.***. Such denial strengthened prosecution case. The High Court misread evidence and granted unwarranted benefit of doubt. #### **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** i. The counsel for the respondent submitted that the child witness was tutored. Her statement was recorded after eighteen days. She was residing with maternal relatives. There was admitted enmity. The morgue report did not mention accusation by child. Suppression of early statement created doubt. Reliance was placed on principles of benefit of doubt. It was argued that cremation in field was common practice. No medical evidence existed due to cremation. Conviction based solely on uncorroborated child testimony was unsafe. The High Court rightly acquitted. #### **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. ***Section 302 IPC*** punishes murder with death or life imprisonment. ii. ***Section 201 IPC*** punishes causing disappearance of evidence. iii. ***Section 34 IPC*** embodies common intention doctrine. iv. ***Section 118 Evidence Act*** governs competency of witnesses. v. ***Section 106 Evidence Act*** places burden on person having special knowledge. vi. ***Section 161 Cr.P.C.*** governs recording of statements. vii. ***Section 174 Cr.P.C.*** concerns inquest proceedings. #### **I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT** The Court relied upon ***Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra (1997) 5 SCC 341*** holding child evidence admissible if reliable. It referred to ***Ratansinh Dalsukhbhai Nayak v. State of Gujarat (2004) 1 SCC 64*** emphasizing careful scrutiny. It considered ***Panchhi v. State of U.P. (1998) 7 SCC 177*** stating child witness not to be rejected outright. It also examined principles from ***Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 10 SCC 681*** regarding deaths inside house and ***Section 106 Evidence Act***. That case held that when death occurs in secrecy inside house, burden shifts to accused to explain. The Court analysed settled law on circumstantial evidence from ***Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116*** laying five golden principles. #### **H) JUDGMENT** **a) Ratio Decidendi** i. The testimony of a child witness is admissible if competent and reliable. Delay alone does not imply tutoring. ii. Clandestine cremation without informing relatives constitutes incriminating conduct. iii. When death occurs within matrimonial home, accused must offer plausible explanation under ***Section 106 Evidence Act***. iv. High Court erred in discarding consistent testimony without substantial contradictions. v. Acquittal was based on conjectures. **b) Obiter Dicta** i. Courts must record preliminary satisfaction regarding competency of child witness. ii. Investigative lapses cannot automatically benefit accused unless prejudice shown. **c) Guidelines** i. Delay in recording child statement requires explanation but is not fatal per se. ii. Courts must examine demeanor and consistency. iii. Suppression allegation must be proved not presumed. iv. Clandestine disposal of body is strong incriminating link. #### **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment reaffirmed evidentiary value of child testimony. It strengthened application of ***Section 106 Evidence Act*** in matrimonial deaths. It corrected over-liberal approach in acquittal appeals. It emphasized holistic appreciation of circumstances. It reinforced that suspicion of tutoring must be grounded in evidence. It restored confidence in circumstantial jurisprudence. #### **J) REFERENCES** a) Important Cases Referred i. ***Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra (1997) 5 SCC 341*** ii. ***Ratansinh Dalsukhbhai Nayak v. State of Gujarat (2004) 1 SCC 64*** iii. ***Panchhi v. State of U.P. (1998) 7 SCC 177*** iv. ***Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 10 SCC 681*** v. ***Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116*** b) Important Statutes Referred i. ***Indian Penal Code, 1860*** ii. ***Indian Evidence Act, 1872*** iii. ***Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Adrija Bhattacharya and Sejal Joshi of Vivekanand Education Society’s College of Law, Mumbai University Triumph at LJ School of Law Client Counselling Competition 2026, Securing Winner Title with Best Counsel Honour](https://lawfoyer.in/adrija-bhattacharya-and-sejal-joshi-of-vivekanand-education-societys-college-of-law-mumbai-university-triumph-at-lj-school-of-law-client-counselling-competition-2026-securing-winner-title-w/) **Published:** April 12, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Content:** Excellence, dedication, and composure under pressure define true legal talent, and this spirit shines brightly in the remarkable achievement of Adrija Bhattacharya and teammate Sejal Joshi from Vivekanand Education Society’s College of Law, Mumbai University. The team secured the Winner position at the prestigious Client Counselling Competition 2026 organized by LJ School of Law, Ahmedabad. Adding further distinction to this success, Adrija Bhattacharya was also honoured with the coveted Best Counsel Award, marking an outstanding individual performance alongside the team victory. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/11E1986C-B007-4B50-AC86-F7AD2F660A8C-Adrija-Bhattacharya-808x1024.jpeg) Client counselling competitions are known for testing not only legal knowledge but also essential professional skills such as communication, empathy, analytical thinking, and adaptability. This competition proved to be no exception. With multiple rigorous rounds judged by experienced legal professionals, the event demanded a high level of preparedness, presence of mind, and the ability to navigate complex client scenarios with clarity and confidence. Throughout the competition, Adrija Bhattacharya and Sejal Joshi demonstrated exceptional teamwork and a deep understanding of client-oriented legal practice. Each round brought new challenges, requiring the team to think critically, respond effectively, and maintain composure in dynamic situations. The ability to balance legal reasoning with emotional intelligence played a key role in setting the team apart from other participants. One of the most defining moments of the competition came during the semi-final round. This stage tested not only legal acumen but also resilience and coordination under pressure. The ability to stay calm, communicate effectively, and approach the situation with a structured mindset showcased the strength of the team’s preparation and partnership. Such moments often define champions, and this team rose to the occasion with remarkable poise. The recognition did not stop at the Winner title. Adrija Bhattacharya’s individual brilliance was acknowledged through the Best Counsel Award, a testament to exceptional counselling skills, clarity of thought, and professional conduct. This dual achievement highlights both individual excellence and the power of collaborative effort. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/IMG_1376-Adrija-Bhattacharya-768x1024.jpeg) Beyond the titles and accolades, this achievement reflects the importance of experiential learning in legal education. Competitions like these provide a platform to bridge the gap between theoretical knowledge and practical application. They encourage participants to develop essential skills that are crucial in real-world legal practice, including active listening, problem-solving, and client management. The victory also came with a rewarding recognition in the form of a cash prize, making the accomplishment even more memorable. However, the true value lies in the experience gained, the lessons learned, and the confidence built through participation at such a competitive level. Adrija Bhattacharya and Sejal Joshi have set a strong example for aspiring law students. This achievement is a reminder that success in the legal field requires not only knowledge but also dedication, teamwork, and the ability to perform under pressure. The journey reflects perseverance, preparation, and a commitment to excellence. LawFoyer proudly celebrates this milestone and applauds the hard work and determination behind this success. Achievements like these inspire the legal community and motivate fellow students to strive for excellence in their own journeys. Wish to showcase your achievement to the world and inspire others? LawFoyer will celebrate your achievement because every achievement deserves recognition. Your achievement is our achievement. Share your achievement with us: **Categories:** Achievers Archive --- ### [Centre for Financial Markets and Regulatory Systems, NLIU Bhopal Successfully Hosts 1st National Symposium on Securities Law and Capital Markets 2026; Khushi Kalyani Gautam & Suhana, Yash Arjariya & Ayush Tiwari, and Kyra Mehra & Ananya Rakheja Shine as Top Achievers](https://lawfoyer.in/centre-for-financial-markets-and-regulatory-systems-nliu-bhopal-successfully-hosts-1st-national-symposium-on-securities-law-and-capital-markets-2026-khushi-kalyani-gautam-suhana-yash-arjariya-a/) **Published:** April 12, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Content:** The Centre for Financial Markets and Regulatory Systems (CFMRS) at National Law Institute University, Bhopal, has set a remarkable benchmark with the successful organisation of the 1st NLIU National Symposium on Securities Law and Capital Markets, 2026, held on 4th and 5th April 2026. This flagship initiative stands as a testament to the institution’s commitment towards fostering academic excellence and meaningful discourse in the ever-evolving domain of securities law and capital markets. As highlighted in the event brochure , the Symposium was conceptualised as a student-led academic platform aimed at encouraging rigorous research, analytical thinking, and engagement with contemporary legal challenges. The overwhelming response to the call for papers, with over 60 submissions from universities across the country, reflects the growing enthusiasm among law students to explore this dynamic field. The two-day event was organised in knowledge partnership with Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas and focused on critical themes such as the New Securities Code, InvITs and REITs, and developments in primary and secondary markets. Participants underwent a multi-stage selection process, beginning with abstract submissions and followed by full paper evaluations. Ultimately, 27 teams were shortlisted to present their research across three preliminary panels. The preliminary rounds, conducted on the first day, witnessed intellectually stimulating discussions and thoughtful deliberations. Esteemed academicians and professionals including Assistant Professor Amit Pratap Singh, Prof. (Dr.) Vikas Gupta, Mr. Subham Jain, Ms. Tulika Shree, Mr. Ankesh Kumar, and Mr. Pradeep Kumar evaluated the presentations. Their constructive feedback and insightful observations contributed significantly to enhancing the quality of discussions and encouraged participants to refine their arguments further. The final round, held on the second day, brought together the top-performing teams who presented their research before a distinguished panel of experts. The panel included Mr. Abhinav Kumar, Partner at TTA; Mr. Reuben Chacko and Mr. Ravi Dubey, Partners at Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas; and Mr. Saswat Mohanty, Partner at Luthra and Luthra Law Offices. The finalists demonstrated exceptional clarity, depth of research, and strong analytical abilities while addressing complex questions posed by the judges. After a rigorous evaluation process, the Symposium celebrated outstanding performances across different categories. Khushi Kalyani Gautam and Suhana from Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur, were awarded the title of Best Presenter for their remarkable presentation skills and command over the subject. Yash Arjariya and Ayush Tiwari, also from Hidayatullah National Law University, secured the position of Second Best Presenter, showcasing commendable analytical insight and articulation. The award for Best Paper was conferred upon Kyra Mehra and Ananya Rakheja from O.P. Jindal Global University for their exceptional research work and originality. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/WhatsApp-Image-2026-04-12-at-3.25.18-PM-1024x1024.jpeg) Beyond the awards, the Symposium stood as a vibrant platform for intellectual exchange, bringing together students, academicians, and industry professionals. The discussions reflected not only academic rigor but also practical relevance, bridging the gap between theory and practice in securities law. The success of this inaugural edition would not have been possible without the dedication and efforts of the organising team. The leadership of Convenor Sakshi Sharma, Co-Convenor Sheetal Rajput, and Secretary Priyanshu Kasliwal played a pivotal role in ensuring the seamless execution of the event. Their commitment and vision have laid a strong foundation for future editions of the Symposium. This event marks the beginning of what promises to become a significant annual platform for legal scholarship and innovation in securities law and capital markets. It has successfully created an environment that encourages young legal minds to think critically, engage deeply, and contribute meaningfully to the field. The 1st NLIU National Symposium on Securities Law and Capital Markets, 2026, is not just an event but a celebration of academic excellence, collaboration, and the spirit of learning. It stands as an inspiration for aspiring legal professionals across the country. Wish to showcase your achievement to the world and inspire others? LawFoyer will celebrate your achievement because every achievement deserves recognition. Your achievement is our achievement. Share your achievement with us: **Categories:** Achievers Archive --- ### [HNLU Team Secures Runner-Up Position at the 23rd Willem C. Vis East International Commercial Arbitration Moot, Hong Kong](https://lawfoyer.in/hnlu-team-secures-runner-up-position-at-the-23rd-willem-c-vis-east-international-commercial-arbitration-moot-hong-kong/) **Published:** April 12, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Content:** Raipur, — The Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur, proudly announces the exceptional achievement of its student team at the prestigious 23rd Willem C. Vis East International Commercial Arbitration Moot, held in Hong Kong. Competing against leading law schools from across the globe, the HNLU team emerged as the 1st Runner-Up, marking a significant milestone in the university’s mooting history and reinforcing its growing reputation in the field of international arbitration. **The team comprised: - Soumya Jain (3rd Year) - Gaurav Agarwal (2nd Year) - Shriyuth Singh (3rd Year) - Shaurya Jha (2nd Year) - Vidhi Choudhary (3rd Year) - Aditya Maharwal (2nd Year) ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Participants-1024x768.jpeg) In addition to the team’s overall success, HNLU also secured the Honourable Mention for the Claimant Memorandum, reflecting the team’s strong research, drafting, and legal argumentation skills. Further, Soumya Jain was awarded an Honourable Mention for Best Oralist, recognizing exceptional advocacy and courtroom excellence at an international platform. The 23rd edition of the Vis East Moot centered on a complex international commercial dispute involving Vanilla Orchard exports, engaging participants with nuanced questions of contract law, international sale of goods, and arbitration principles under the SIAC Arbitration Rules & United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) framework. This remarkable accomplishment highlights HNLU’s commitment to academic excellence, rigorous training in alternative dispute resolution, and its ability to compete at the highest levels of global legal education. The University extends its heartfelt congratulations to the team for bringing laurels to the institution and setting a benchmark for future mooters. Wish to showcase your achievement to the world and inspire others? LawFoyer will celebrate your achievement because every achievement deserves recognition. Your achievement is our achievement. Share your achievement with us: **Categories:** Achievers Archive --- ### [Adrija Bhattacharya, Sejal Joshi, and Taanya Dash of Vivekanand Education Society’s College of Law Secure 2nd Runners-Up Position at LJ School of Law Ahmedabad National Parliamentary Debate Competition, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/adrija-bhattacharya-sejal-joshi-and-taanya-dash-of-vivekanand-education-societys-college-of-law-secure-2nd-runners-up-position-at-lj-school-of-law-ahmedabad-national-parliamentary-debate-co/) **Published:** April 12, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/IMG_8427-Adrija-Bhattacharya-1024x683.jpeg) Achievement shines brightest when courage meets opportunity, and this is beautifully reflected in the remarkable accomplishment of Adrija Bhattacharya, along with teammates Sejal Joshi and Taanya Dash from Vivekanand Education Society’s College of Law, Mumbai. The team secured the prestigious position of 2nd Runners-Up at the LJ School of Law Ahmedabad National Parliamentary Debate Competition, 2026, marking a significant milestone in their academic journey. Participating in a national-level parliamentary debate competition is no small feat. It demands not only a strong grasp of contemporary issues but also the ability to think critically, articulate arguments effectively, and respond to challenges with clarity and confidence. This competition provided a platform where some of the brightest young legal minds from across the country came together to showcase their analytical and oratory skills. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/IMG_5373-Adrija-Bhattacharya-1024x768.jpeg) For Adrija Bhattacharya and the team, this journey was much more than just competing. It was about stepping into the unknown with determination and an open mind. Initially unsure about their suitability for the parliamentary debate format, the team chose to embrace the challenge instead of holding back. That single decision became a turning point, proving that growth often lies beyond the boundaries of comfort zones. Each round of the competition brought new learning experiences. The topics pushed the participants to explore complex issues, think beyond conventional perspectives, and develop nuanced arguments. The team demonstrated resilience, adaptability, and a deep commitment to excellence throughout the competition. The insightful and encouraging feedback from the judges further enriched the experience, helping refine their approach and sharpen their skills. What makes this achievement even more special is the journey behind it. It reflects persistence, teamwork, and the willingness to evolve. The synergy between Adrija Bhattacharya, Sejal Joshi, and Taanya Dash played a crucial role in their success. Strong collaboration and mutual support allowed the team to perform with confidence and cohesion, ultimately leading them to secure the 2nd Runners-Up position along with a cash prize of ₹20,000. This accomplishment stands as a testament to the power of taking risks and believing in one’s potential. It highlights that self-doubt can be transformed into strength when met with courage and action. The experience not only enhanced their debating skills but also contributed significantly to their overall personal and professional growth. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/WhatsApp-Image-2026-04-12-at-2.47.47-PM-1024x883.jpeg) For aspiring law students and young professionals, this achievement serves as an inspiring reminder that opportunities often come disguised as challenges. Stepping forward despite uncertainty can open doors to remarkable experiences and achievements. The journey of this team emphasizes that success is not just about winning but about learning, evolving, and pushing boundaries. LawFoyer proudly celebrates the success of Adrija Bhattacharya, Sejal Joshi, and Taanya Dash. Their achievement adds to the growing legacy of young legal minds who are shaping the future with their dedication and passion. This milestone is undoubtedly one among many more accomplishments that lie ahead in their journey. Wish to showcase your achievement to the world and inspire others? LawFoyer will celebrate your achievement because every achievement deserves recognition. Your achievement is our achievement. Share your achievement with us: **Categories:** Achievers Archive --- ### [ONE DAY INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTERDISCIPLINARY LEADERSHIP | Organized by Academic and Research Wing (ARW), Kindsouls Welfare Foundation | Early Bird Registration: 20th April 2026 | Late Registration: 25th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/one-day-international-conference-on-interdisciplinary-leadership-organized-by-academic-and-research-wing-arw-kindsouls-welfare-foundation-early-bird-registration-20th-april-2026-late-registr/) **Published:** April 10, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** ONE DAY INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTERDISCIPLINARY LEADERSHIP | Organized by Academic and Research Wing (ARW), Kindsouls Welfare Foundation | Early Bird Registration: 20th April 2026 | Late Registration: 25th April 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Screenshot-2026-04-10-205020.png) ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER / FOUNDATION** Kindsouls Welfare Foundation is a professionally managed national-level non-profit organization registered under the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Government of India, and recognized by NITI Aayog. The foundation focuses on education, research, skill development, healthcare awareness, and leadership development with a strong emphasis on interdisciplinary collaboration. Through its Academic and Research Wing (ARW), it aims to bridge the gap between knowledge and practical implementation for a sustainable and inclusive society. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY** The International Conference on Interdisciplinary Leadership is a **one-day global virtual conference** scheduled for **26th April 2026 (11:00 AM onwards)**. The theme of the conference is: **“Leading Beyond Boundaries: Uniting Disciplines for a Better Tomorrow”** The event aims to: - Foster collaboration across diverse academic and professional fields - Bring together scholars, researchers, students, and global leaders - Encourage interdisciplinary dialogue and innovation - Address complex global challenges through collective intelligence Participants will: - Gain insights from national and international experts - Network with global professionals - Develop leadership, critical thinking, and problem-solving skills - Receive a certificate of participation ## **WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** - Undergraduate, postgraduate, and research students - Faculty members and academicians - Researchers and scientists - Industry professionals and corporate leaders - Healthcare professionals - Entrepreneurs and startup enthusiasts - NGO representatives and social workers - Policy makers and administrative professionals - Anyone interested in leadership and interdisciplinary collaboration ## **MODE OF THE EVENT** Virtual (Online) ## **LOCATION & VENUE** - **Location:** Global (Online Event) - **Platform:** Zoom / Google Meet - **Broadcast:** YouTube via StreamYard ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE** - Registration Link: - Participants can also register via the official website: [www.kindsouls.in](http://www.kindsouls.in) ## **FEE DETAILS** - ₹99 (Early Registration) - ₹199 (Late Registration) - Includes participation and certificate - No hidden charges ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - Early Bird Registration: 4th April – 20th April 2026 - Late Registration: 21st April – 25th April 2026 - Conference Date: 26th April 2026 (11:00 AM onwards) ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** - Registration Queries: +91 9570068776 - Partnership & Sponsorship: +91 9006223503 - General Queries: +91 7970799229 - Email (International Registration): kindsoulsfoundation@gmail.com ## **OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / BROCHURE** - Official Website: [www.kindsouls.in](http://www.kindsouls.in) - Registration Link: - Official Brochure Link: [https://drive.google.com/file/d/13HzDA8CfXAsS6OApl8fD52\_HPioDti3Z/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/file/d/13HzDA8CfXAsS6OApl8fD52_HPioDti3Z/view?usp=sharing) - Official Call for Abstract: **Categories:** Call for Papers, Events --- ### [Admissions Open: Master of Cyber Law and Information Security (MCLIS) Program 2026 | National Law Institute University (NLIU), Bhopal | Register by 30 April 2026 | Written Test: 10 May 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/admissions-open-master-of-cyber-law-and-information-security-mclis-program-2026-national-law-institute-university-nliu-bhopal-register-by-30-april-2026-written-test-10-may-2026/) **Published:** April 8, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** Admissions Open: Master of Cyber Law and Information Security (MCLIS) Program 2026 | National Law Institute University (NLIU), Bhopal | Register by 30 April 2026 | Written Test: 10 May 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/download-2-723x1024.jpg) ## Admissions Open | Master of Cyber Law and Information Security (MCLIS) Program 2026 In an era where data, privacy, and cybersecurity define the future of governance, business, and law, the Rajiv Gandhi National Cyber Law Centre, National Law Institute University (NLIU), Bhopal invites applications for its flagship Master of Cyber Law and Information Security (MCLIS) – 2026 program. ## Why to join the MCLIS Program? - Comprehensive curriculum covering Cyber Law, Data Privacy & Protection, Artificial Intelligence, Information Security Compliance, Digital Forensics, and Information Security Management - Industry-relevant training integrating legal, policy, and technical perspectives - Research and internship opportunities with law firms, corporate houses, government agencies, and cybersecurity organisations - Strong placement track record with leading organisations including KPMG, EY, PwC, Deloitte, Razorpay, Shell, HDFC Bank, Wolters Kluwer, A-LIGN, Tsaaro Consulting, Network Intelligence, and more ## Important Dates - Last Date to Apply: 30 April 2026 (Thursday) - Written Test: 10 May 2026 (Sunday) ## Written Test Centres Bhopal | Delhi | Bengaluru | Mumbai ## Apply Now & Download Information Brochure Scan the QR code in the poster or visit: ## Contact Details - Email: - Phone: 0755-2696965, 2840222 Build expertise at the intersection of Law, Technology, and Cyber Security. Apply now for MCLIS 2026 and become a future-ready Cyber Security professional. **Categories:** Events --- ### [RUAS, SOL Moot Court Competition 2.0 | Organized by School of Law, M. S. Ramaiah University of Applied Sciences](https://lawfoyer.in/ruas-sol-moot-court-competition-2-0-organized-by-school-of-law-m-s-ramaiah-university-of-applied-sciences/) **Published:** April 8, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** RUAS, SOL Moot Court Competition 2.0 | Organized by School of Law, M. S. Ramaiah University of Applied Sciences **Content:** ## **About the Organization** S. Ramaiah University of Applied Sciences (MSRUAS) is a premier private university in Bangalore, Karnataka, recognized for its commitment to excellence in education, research, and innovation. It was established in December 2013 under the Karnataka University Act. The School of Law at MSRUAS is committed to providing a transformative legal education that balances theoretical understanding with practical application. ## **About the Opportunity** RUAS, SOL Moot Court Competition 2.0 is the Second Edition of the RUAS SOL Moot Court Competition, focusing on the connect between Information Technology Law and Constitutional Law, along with digital protection and providing a dynamic platform for aspiring legal minds to engage in rigorous debate and advocacy on pressing constitutional issues. Designed to foster critical thinking, research, and persuasive argumentation, this inaugural competition challenges participants to navigate complex constitutional scenarios while upholding the highest standards of legal discourse. With an esteemed panel of judges and a competitive yet enriching atmosphere, this moot serves as an excellent opportunity for law students to sharpen their litigation skills and gain invaluable practical experience in constitutional law. ## **Theme** Constitutional Law and Information Technology Law ## **Eligibility** Participation is restricted to bonafide undergraduate students of 5 year integrated programmes/ 3 year regular Law programmes of any University/ College / Institution recognized by the Bar Council of India. ## **Venue** School of Law, M. S. Ramaiah University of Applied Sciences, M S Ramaiah Nagar, Mathikere, Bengaluru 560054 ## **Registration Fees** The registration fee is Rs.4,000/- without accommodation and Rs.8,000/- with accommodation. ## **Prizes** - Winners – ₹35,000 - Runner-Ups – ₹30,000 **Awards For The Best** - Speaker (Petitioner/Appellant) – ₹5000 - Speaker (Defendant/Respondent) – ₹5000 - Researcher – ₹5000 - Memorial – ₹5000 And certificates for all participants ## **Registration Process** Registration can be completed by completing the payment through the link provided below and registering using the Google Forms provided below: Registration Form: [https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSfsLVnMrBiCiTlq1dFLw5s1fhzEDxMqu\_J-0CZUk60AvzD1HQ/viewform](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSfsLVnMrBiCiTlq1dFLw5s1fhzEDxMqu_J-0CZUk60AvzD1HQ/viewform) Payment Link will be provided via e-mail upon complete filling of the Registration Form. ## **Contact** - Mr. Mohit G | Convenor, Moot Court Society, SOL | +91 9901820728 - Ms. Sanjana R Rao | Co Convenor, Moot Court Society, SOL | +91 9606283363 - Ms. Sloka Menon | Co Convenor, Moot Court Society, SOL | +91 9330742949 - Ms. Ektha Raju | Co Convenor, Moot Court Society, SOL | +91 8971010730 **Categories:** Events --- ### [25th LawFoyer Quiz on (Constitutional Law & Indian Polity): Prizes worth Rs. 25K + | Cash Prizes, Smart Watch, Earbuds and much more | Bonuses for All Participants worth Rs. 5K+ | Register by 28th March, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/25th-lawfoyer-quiz-on-constitutional-law-indian-polity-prizes-worth-rs-15k/) **Published:** February 3, 2026 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Copy-of-Quiz-Competition-Poster-hardik.png) **——————————————–** [Download Answer Key](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Answer-Key.pdf) **——————————————–** ## 25th LawFoyer’s Quiz Competition Winners and Top Rankers **——————————————–** [Check Results](https://lawfoyer.in/25th-quiz-results/) [Download Certificate of Participation](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1DeLngtYufDUQ-kHDRkEyVy3MskF2-PG-?usp=sharing) **——————————————–** ## Dates - **Date of Quiz:-** 29th March 2026 ( Sunday 7 Pm) - **Last Date to Apply:-** 28th March 2026, 11:00 pm - **Result Declaration:-** 5th April 2026 ## Prizes - **1st Prize-** Cash Prize Rs. 3,000/- + Smart Watch worth Rs. 2,000/- + Hardcopy Certificate of Excellence & Participation + FREE Access to LawFoyer Academy’s any Premium Course worth Rs. 4,000/- + FREE Publication Opportunity with [LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research](https://lijdlr.com/cfp-lawfoyer-international-journal-of-doctrinal-legal-research/ "LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research") (LIJDLR) - **2nd Prize-** Cash Prize Rs. 2000/- + Earbuds worth Rs. 1000/- + Hardcopy Certificate of Excellence & Participation + FREE Access to LawFoyer Academy’s any Premium Course worth Rs. 3,000/- + FREE Publication Opportunity with [LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research](https://lijdlr.com/cfp-lawfoyer-international-journal-of-doctrinal-legal-research/ "LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research") (LIJDLR) - **3rd Prize-** Cash Prize Rs. 1000/- + Hardcopy Certificate of Excellence & Participation + FREE Access to LawFoyer Academy’s any Premium Course worth Rs. 2,000/- + Discounted Publication Opportunity with [LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research](https://lijdlr.com/cfp-lawfoyer-international-journal-of-doctrinal-legal-research/ "LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research") (LIJDLR) - **4th-10th Prize-** Cash Prize Rs 150/-**+** E-Certificates of Excellence & Participation + FREE Access to LawFoyer Academy’s any Premium Course worth Rs. 1,000/- + Discounted Publication Opportunity with [LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research](https://lijdlr.com/cfp-lawfoyer-international-journal-of-doctrinal-legal-research/ "LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research") (LIJDLR) - **FREE Practice E-Books with 1000+ MCQs** - **FREE 4000+ Legal Drafts & Drafting Guidebook** - **E-Certificate of Participation for All the Participants** - **FREE 2 Turnitin Plagiarism Reports worth Rs. 400 for Each Participants**. ## **Registration Fees** - **Early Bird Registration Fee: Rs 99/- Only** [Register Now](#1) ## ELIGIBILITY - Law Students - Legal Professionals - Legal Practitioners - Judiciary Aspirants - AIBE Aspirants - JLO Aspirants - IBPS SO Aspirants - Government Exam Aspirants - Any person Interested in Constitutional Law & Indian Polity ## **Important Guidelines** - **Format of Quiz:** Quiz shall take place online, and a paper will include multiple-choice questions**.** - The participant can take this exam on their laptop or mobile phone. - The platform for the quiz will be google Forms, Microsoft Forms, etc. - In the case of the same marks, time will be considered (a person who submits early will be given preference). - The link will be shared 24 hours prior to the start of the quiz. ## **Rules & Regulations** - **60 MCQ(s) \[30 Question on Constitutional Law + **30 Question on** Indian Polity\].** - The time allotted will be **20** minutes. (This includes time for filling the basic details like Name, email, etc.) - **Every question carries 04 marks & there will be no negative marking.** - The Result will be declared on **5th April 2026** ([www.lawfoyer.in](https://lawfoyer.in/)). ## Registration Form --- **Categories:** Quiz **Tags:** #quiz, Consti, Constitution, lawfoyer, lawfoyerquiz, polity --- ### [NYAYA SETU – THE AI & JUSTICE POLICY CONVENTION (3rd EDITION) | Organized by SAMATVA – The Legal Aid & Awareness Cell, NMIMS Indore | Register by 12th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/nyaya-setu-the-ai-justice-policy-convention-3rd-edition-organized-by-samatva-the-legal-aid-awareness-cell-nmims-indore-register-by-12th-april-2026/) **Published:** April 3, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** NYAYA SETU – THE AI & JUSTICE POLICY CONVENTION (3rd EDITION) | Organized by SAMATVA – The Legal Aid & Awareness Cell, NMIMS Indore | Register by 12th April 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Screenshot-2026-04-03-193009-1.png) ## **About the Organizers** SVKM’s Narsee Monjee Institute of Management Studies (NMIMS), Indore, is a premier multidisciplinary institution committed to academic excellence, innovation, and social responsibility. The event is organized by **SAMATVA – The Legal Aid & Awareness Cell** of NMIMS Indore is a student-driven initiative founded on the principles of **equality, access to justice, and social empowerment**. The Society aims to bridge socio-economic and informational gaps by providing legal aid, spreading legal awareness, and fostering an informed citizenry. Over the years, SAMATVA has undertaken a wide range of initiatives including **legal aid camps, awareness drives, school outreach programmes, prison visits, Lok Adalat awareness sessions, workshops, seminars, and collaborations with non-profit organizations and legal services authorities**. In addition to its on-ground efforts, SAMATVA actively disseminates legal updates, policy developments, and awareness material through digital platforms, thereby promoting legal literacy among students and the public. The Society remains committed to strengthening access to justice and cultivating a culture of legal responsibility and social consciousness. ## **Details of the Event** Nyaya Setu – The AI & Justice Policy Convention (3rd Edition) is a **National Legal Aid Policy Convention, 2026**, organized by NMIMS Indore in collaboration with the **Centre for Research Excellence in Generative Artificial Intelligence**. This competition provides a unique platform for students to engage in: - Policy drafting and analysis - Structured deliberation and argumentation - Interdisciplinary discussions on law and technology Participants will examine the evolving intersection of **artificial intelligence and access to justice**, and propose innovative policy solutions addressing real-world challenges in India’s justice delivery system. The **Theme** of the Event is: **“Nyaya Setu – The AI & Justice Policy Convention”** The convention focuses on developing policy frameworks to regulate the use of **Generative AI in India’s justice delivery and legal aid systems**. Key areas include: - AI-assisted legal information Systems - Legal document drafting tools Case assessment mechanisms - Multilingual access to Justice - Research support for legal aid lawyers The **competition involves Multiple Stages**: - Preliminary (Policy Concept Note Submission) - Quarterfinals, Semifinals, Finals (Policy Deliberation Rounds) - Special Press Conference Round (For Best Speaker) **Eligibility** - Open to **undergraduate students** enrolled in any program. - Participants must be from **UGC-recognized universities or institution across India.** - Each institution may nominate **up to two teams**. - Cross-university teams are not permitted. - Team Composition: - Two members per team - A participant may participate in only one team ## **Location (Country/State/City) (Offline/Online)** - **Country:** India - **City/State:** Indore, Madhya Pradesh - **Mode:** **Hybrid** o Preliminary Round – **Online** o Quarterfinals, Semifinals & Finals – **Offline at NMIMS Indore Campus** ## **Registration/Submission Procedure** - Teams must register **on or before 12th April 2026** to be eligible. - The **registration fee is ₹900 per team (non-refundable)**. - Payment must be made as per the guidelines provided in the brochure. - Participants must ensure that all submitted details are accurate, as they will be used for certificates. - **Registration is confirmed** **only after receiving a confirmation email** from the Organising Committee. - **Policy Concept Note must be submitted during registration phase** through mail at solindore@nmims.edu (Preliminary Round) - Any changes in details must be promptly communicated to the Organising Committee. - Accommodation details/charge**s** will be shared separately with the Top 8 shortlisted teams. ## **Important Dates** - **Registration Opens**: March 13,2026 - **Last Date to Register**: April 12, 2026 - **Submission Deadline (Policy Concept Note upto 2000 words only)**: April 12, 2026 - **Declaration of Results for Top 8 Shortlisted Teams (Preliminary Round)**: April 16, 2026 - **Draw of Lots**: April 22, 2026 - **Final Rounds (Offline at NMIMS Indore)**: April 22–23, 2026 - **Result Declaration (Final Rounds)**: April 23, 2026 ## **Registration Fee** - Registration Fee: **₹900 per team** **Prizes** - **Winner**: ₹20,000 + Trophy - **First Runner-Up**: ₹12,000 + Trophy - **Best Speaker**: ₹8,000 + Trophy - Participation certificates for all teams ## **Deadlines / Dates** - Registration & Submission Deadline: **12 April 2026** - Result Announcement: **16 April 2026** - Offline Event Dates: **22–23 April 2026** ## **Contact Information** All official communication regarding the competition will be conducted via the **organising committee (Samatva, NMIMS Indore)** through: - Email: - Priyal Saxena (Convenor): 8319135780 - Hasnain Sheikh (Co-Convenor): 9981354252 - Yashvardhan Srivastava (Treasurer): 8795848215 ## **Official Link** - **Registration link**: - **Official Brochure Link:** [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HEWh53yeHsIAGguwBGLtXlx7NiUWPnRI/view?usp=sharing ](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HEWh53yeHsIAGguwBGLtXlx7NiUWPnRI/view?usp=sharing) - **Official Rulebook Link:** [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1\_c2zvQoz3rdgPW50HbihWvT3r5THgCo9/view?usp=drive\_link](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_c2zvQoz3rdgPW50HbihWvT3r5THgCo9/view?usp=drive_link) ## **Social Media Handles** - **Instagram:** samatva\_nmims - **LinkedIn:** Samatva Legal Aid & CSR Society **Categories:** Events --- ### [INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON EXPANDING HORIZONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF GLOBALISATION | Organized by Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law (RGNUL), Punjab | Submit Abstract by 12th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-expanding-horizons-of-human-rights-fundamental-freedoms-and-fundamental-rights-in-the-age-of-globalisation-organized-by-rajiv-gandhi-national-university-of-law-rgnul/) **Published:** March 30, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON EXPANDING HORIZONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF GLOBALISATION | Organized by Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law (RGNUL), Punjab | Submit Abstract by 12th April 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Screenshot-2026-03-30-195643.jpg) ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY** Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law (RGNUL), Punjab, established under the Punjab Act, 2006, is a premier national-level law university dedicated to excellence in legal education and research. It is approved by the Bar Council of India (BCI), recognized by the University Grants Commission (UGC), and accredited with an ‘A’ grade by NAAC. The university offers integrated law programs, LL.M., and Ph.D. programs, and has earned recognition as one of India’s top law institutions. The Centre for Advanced Studies in Human Rights (CASIHR) focuses on interdisciplinary research and dialogue on emerging human rights issues, while CASLW works towards strengthening labour justice systems and protecting labour rights. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY** RGNUL, Punjab is organising an International Conference on the theme *“Expanding Horizons of Human Rights, Fundamental Freedoms and Fundamental Rights in the Age of Globalisation.”* The conference aims to provide an interdisciplinary platform for academicians, practitioners, researchers, policymakers, and students to engage in discussions on: - Evolution of human rights in global and constitutional contexts - Challenges posed by globalization, technology, and socio-political changes - Emerging issues like AI, surveillance, and data privacy - Rights of vulnerable groups including migrants, minorities, and persons with disabilities - Environmental justice and the right to a healthy environment The conference will feature scholarly discussions to evaluate past developments, current challenges, and future frameworks for strengthening human rights globally. ## **WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** - Academicians - Practitioners - Researchers - Policymakers - Students ## **MODE OF THE EVENT** Hybrid (Online + Offline) ## **LOCATION & VENUE OF THE EVENT** Punjab, India (Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab – implied for offline mode) ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE** - Link to Submit Abstract: [Link](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdkIAcNSTsc3299xG0pBljSChI1EOya9CfJ2pHbt6IvwKg-3Q/viewform) - Link to Submit Full Paper: [Link](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSfdD_vqLMMpa4WYMCQCZNwVIM1-lcsoHyEJVbKWs2mHjEXrzg/viewform) - Link for Payment:[ Link](https://rgnul.lsacademia.in/lsa_rgnul/eventPortal/loginFrom.jsp) **Submission Guidelines (Key Highlights):** - Abstract: 250–300 words, MS Word format, English only - Co-authorship: Maximum 2 authors - Full paper: Maximum 5000 words - Citation style: Bluebook 21st Edition - Plagiarism limit: 10% (excluding footnotes & bibliography) ## **FEE DETAILS** ₹500 (excluding GST) ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - Abstract Submission: 12th April 2026 - Payment & Full Paper Submission: 14th April 2026 - Conference Date: 18th April 2026 ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** - Phone: 0175-2391600 - Email: ## **OFFICIAL LINK / BROCHURE** - Refer to the official brochure: - Link to Submit Abstract: [Link](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdkIAcNSTsc3299xG0pBljSChI1EOya9CfJ2pHbt6IvwKg-3Q/viewform) - Link to Submit Full Paper: [Link](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSfdD_vqLMMpa4WYMCQCZNwVIM1-lcsoHyEJVbKWs2mHjEXrzg/viewform) - Link for Payment:[ Link](https://rgnul.lsacademia.in/lsa_rgnul/eventPortal/loginFrom.jsp) **Categories:** Events --- ### [National Law University Delhi Enters QS World University Rankings by Subject 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/national-law-university-delhi-enters-qs-world-university-rankings-by-subject-2026/) **Published:** March 28, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Poster-Press-Release-scaled-1-682x1024.jpg) In a significant milestone for Indian legal education, National Law University Delhi (NLU Delhi) has made its debut in the prestigious QS World University Rankings by Subject 2026 for Law & Legal Studies, securing a position in the 201–250 global band, with an overall subject rank of 223. This achievement marks a decisive step in positioning NLU Delhi on the global academic map. Out of nearly 1,800 institutions evaluated worldwide, only about 400 institutions were ranked, underscoring the competitive nature of the rankings. Notably, only eight institutions from India have featured in this category, and among the National Law Universities, only National Law School of India University ranks higher, placing NLU Delhi firmly within the top tier of legal education in the country. What makes this accomplishment particularly noteworthy is the nature of NLU Delhi’s entry. As a new entrant, the University has directly secured a position within a competitive global band, reflecting its strong performance across key parameters such as academic reputation, employer reputation, research citations, H-index, and international research collaborations. Over the past few years, NLU Delhi has undertaken a series of strategic initiatives to strengthen its academic and research ecosystem. These include enhancing the quality and volume of indexed research publications, expanding international academic partnerships, and increasing its participation in global academic networks and surveys. These efforts collectively represent a deliberate institutional approach aimed at aligning the University’s teaching, research, and policy engagement with global standards. This recognition is not merely a milestone but a stepping stone toward greater excellence. The University remains committed to deepening its research impact, expanding global collaborations, and contributing meaningfully to the development of law, justice, and public policy at both national and international levels. On this occasion, Prof. (Dr.) G.S. Bajpai, Vice-Chancellor, NLU Delhi, expressed his heartfelt gratitude to the leadership, faculty, staff, students, and all stakeholders for their unwavering support and contributions. He emphasized that this recognition reflects the collective efforts of the entire university community and reinforces NLU Delhi’s commitment to academic and institutional excellence. Wish to showcase your achievement to the world and inspire others? LawFoyer will celebrate your achievement because every achievement deserves recognition. Your achievement is our achievement. Share your achievement with us. Visit: **Categories:** Achievers Archive --- ### [CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATION COMPETITION (VIL’s 1st Inter-University Event) | Organized by Vignan Institute of Law, under Vignan's Foundation for Science, Technology & Research (Deemed to be University) | Register by April 20, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/crime-scene-investigation-competition-vils-1st-inter-university-event-organized-by-vignan-institute-of-law-under-vignans-foundation-for-science-technology-research-deemed-to-be/) **Published:** March 28, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATION COMPETITION (VIL’s 1st Inter-University Event) | Organized by Vignan Institute of Law, under Vignan's Foundation for Science, Technology & Research (Deemed to be University) | Register by April 20, 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Screenshot-2026-03-26-185659-0b85ce8f72d7859ff2cc9ffb30e58025.webp) ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER / COLLEGE / UNIVERSITY** Vignan’s Foundation for Science, Technology & Research (VFSTR) is a reputed Deemed-to-be University known for providing education in a diverse and intellectually stimulating environment. The institution focuses on value-based education, innovation, and skill development to nurture competent professionals across engineering, management, and legal domains. Vignan Institute of Law (VIL), established in 2020, aims to advance and disseminate legal knowledge and practices in India. It offers integrated law programs, LLM, and Ph.D. programs with specializations such as Constitutional Law, Corporate Law, and Intellectual Property Rights. The university is backed by a strong legacy of the Vignan Group, founded in 1977, which today serves over 45,000 students across multiple institutions. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY** Step into the role of an investigator with this exciting **Crime Scene Investigation Competition**. This event is designed to test participants’ analytical thinking, observation skills, and legal reasoning. Participants will: - Explore a simulated crime scene - Examine physical evidence - Develop logical conclusions - Present their hypothesis regarding the case The competition provides real-world exposure to forensic science and criminal investigation techniques, making it a highly engaging and practical learning experience. ## **WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** - Open to all students (Law and Non-Law) - Team participation allowed - Maximum **3 members per team** ## **MODE OF THE EVENT** Offline (with an additional online session) ## **LOCATION & VENUE OF THE EVENT** India (Organized at Vignan Institute of Law campus) ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE** **Registration Link:** **Procedure:** 1. Fill out the Google Form 2. Make payment via UPI (PhonePe / Google Pay / etc.) 3. Confirmation will be provided after payment ## **FEE DETAILS** - ₹299 per participant - ₹199 for VFSTR students ## **PRIZES** - 1st Prize – ₹10,000 - 2nd Prize – ₹6,000 - 3rd Prize – ₹3,000 - Trophies for winners - Certificates for all participants ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - **April 18, 2026** – Promo Launch - **April 20, 2026** – Last Date for Registration - **April 23, 2026** – Tips & Tricks Session (Online) - **April 24, 2026** – Main Event (Crime Scene Investigation) ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** - **Contact Person:** Mr. Abhishek Kumar Singh (Student Convenor) - **Phone:** +91 7993265349 - **Email:** singh7993265349abhishek@gmail.com ## **OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / BROCHURE** - Registration Form: - Rules and Regulations: [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JADasVkfYinqewy5mYJ2FBkEiaEApl\_d/view?usp=sharing ](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JADasVkfYinqewy5mYJ2FBkEiaEApl_d/view?usp=sharing) - Official Poster: [https://drive.google.com/file/d/11TRKrwRnempIvnN4IF0V94A\_TDbIqsJG/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/file/d/11TRKrwRnempIvnN4IF0V94A_TDbIqsJG/view?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Events, Other Competitions --- ### [6th ADAMAS MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by ADAMAS UNIVERSITY | Register by 4th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/6th-adamas-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-adamas-university-register-by-26-march-2026/) **Published:** March 25, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 6th ADAMAS MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by ADAMAS UNIVERSITY | Register by 26 March 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Screenshot-2026-03-25-192244-1.png) ## **ABOUT ORGANIZATION** Adamas University, established in 2014 in Kolkata, is a leading multidisciplinary institution committed to academic excellence, research, and innovation. The university offers undergraduate, postgraduate, and doctoral programs across fields including engineering, management, science, humanities, and law. It provides modern infrastructure and a dynamic learning environment that supports holistic student development. With a strong emphasis on research, industry collaboration, and experiential learning, the university prepares students for real-world professional challenges. It is the 1st amongst the private universities in West Bengal to get a NAAC “A” accreditation. The Adamas Law Moot Court Committee (ALMCC) at Adamas University is a student-led body within the School of Law and Justice that promotes advocacy, research, and courtroom skills among law students. The committee organizes national and intra-institutional moot court competitions, training sessions, and workshops to develop legal reasoning, oratory, and analytical abilities. Through these activities, ALMCC provides students with practical exposure to litigation and prepares them for professional legal practice. ## **ABOUT THE OPPORTUNITY** The 6th Adamas Moot Court Competition, 2026 is a national-level moot court competition organized by the School of Law and Justice at Adamas University. The competition aims to provide law students with a platform to develop and demonstrate their skills in legal research, memorial drafting, and oral advocacy through simulated court proceedings. By engaging with complex contemporary legal issues, the event encourages participants to critically analyze constitutional, environmental, and socio-economic dimensions of law. The moot proposition for this edition revolves around the intersection of indigenous rights, environmental protection, and strategic mineral development, raising significant questions regarding constitutional safeguards, forest rights, and the balance between economic development and environmental sustainability. Participants will represent both the petitioner and respondent sides, preparing detailed written memorials and presenting oral arguments before a panel of judges comprising academicians, practitioners, and legal experts. The competition will consist of multiple rounds including preliminary rounds, quarter-finals, semi-finals, and the final round, allowing teams to engage in rigorous legal debate and advocacy. In addition to the oral rounds, a Researcher’s Test will also be conducted to evaluate the research and analytical capabilities of team researchers. Through this comprehensive structure, the competition seeks to promote practical legal education, strengthen mooting culture, and provide a professional learning experience for aspiring legal practitioners. ## **THEME** The theme of the 6th Adamas Moot Court Competition, 2026 focuses on the intersection of indigenous rights, environmental protection, and strategic mineral development. The proposition examines constitutional questions involving the Forest Rights framework, eminent domain, and sustainable development, requiring participants to balance economic progress with environmental and cultural preservation. ## **ELIGIBILITY** The competition is open to bona fide undergraduate law students (3-year LL.B. or 5-year integrated law courses) enrolled in any recognized university or law school. ## **REGISTRATION FEES AND PROCEDURE** The registration fee for the 6th Adamas Moot Court Competition, 2026 at Adamas University is ₹2500 per team without accommodation and **₹2500 + ₹1000** per participant with accommodation. Accommodation will be provided only for female participants on a first-come, first-serve basis. Teams must complete the Form registration: and submit payment proof to confirm their participation. ## **AWARDS AND PRIZES** **Category** **Award** Winner ₹50,000 + Trophy + Certificates + 1-year SCC Online Web Edition subscription 1st Runner Up ₹25,000 + Trophy + Certificates 2nd Runner Up ₹10,000 + Trophy + Certificates Best Speaker ₹5,000 + Trophy + Certificates Best Researcher ₹5,000 + Trophy + Certificates Best Memorial ₹5,000 + Trophy + Certificates Quarter Finalists & Above Merit Certificates All Participants Participation Certificates + 1-month SCC Online Web Edition Access ## IMPORTANT DATES **Date** **Event** 27 February 2026 Commencement of Registration & Release of Moot Proposition 04 April 2026 Final Date of Registration 03 April 2026 Last Date for Seeking Clarifications 07 April 2026 Last Date for Soft Copy Memorial Submission 09 April 2026 Inaugural Ceremony & Physical Verification 09 April 2026 Researcher’s Test & Draw of Lots 09 April 2026 Preliminary Round 1 10 April 2026 Preliminary Round 2 & Quarter Final Rounds 11 April 2026 Semi-Final Rounds & Final Round 11 April 2026 Valedictory Ceremony ## **CONTACT** - **FACULTY CONVENOR:** Mr. Ashutosh Pandey – +91 8709955137 - **FACULTY CO-CONVENOR:** Mrs. Shayani Chakraborty – +91 8017275130 - **STUDENT CONVENOR**: Mr. Subhayoo Paral – +91 8597482497 - **STUDENT CO-CONVENOR:** Ms. Kumud Choudhary – +91 7439054973 & Mr. Aditya Raj – +91 7717702817 ## **IMPORTANT LINKS** **Purpose** **Link** Registration Form Soft Copy Written Submission Form Moot Proposition & Rulebook Official Email for Correspondence **Categories:** Events, Moot Courts --- ### [5-DAY CERTIFICATION COURSE ON TECHNOLOGY LAWS](https://lawfoyer.in/5-day-certification-course-on-technology-laws/) **Published:** January 17, 2026 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## 5-Day Advanced Certification Course on Technology Laws ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Technology-Law-Course-Poster-LawFoyer.png) ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Technology-Law-Course-Poster-LawFoyer-Poster-Vertical-Poster-Medium.png) # Offer Ending in ## [Click Here to Enroll & avail 50% Off - Offer ending tonight!](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=47) ## [Download Course Brochure](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1wKQoc3YzNlNxm8T0WDHh3WeyiA_nhmy4?usp=sharing) ### Course Duration #### 5 Days ### Course Date #### 24th to 28th Feb 2026 (Live) ### Session Time #### (1- 1.5 hrs daily), 6:30 PM Onwards ### Mode #### Live Online Classes + Lifetime Access to Recordings ## Why Technology Law skills are no longer Optional? Governments, courts, companies, and even small businesses now run on digital systems. Every dispute, transaction, and investigation today has a technology angle. Yet most law schools still teach technology law as a side topic or one elective. Students read sections of the IT Act in theory, but rarely see how cyber FIRs, digital evidence, DPDP compliance, or AI systems actually work in practice. **This creates serious gaps:** 1. You feel unsure while reading cyber FIRs and digital evidence. 2. You are confused about how BNS, BNSS, and BSA interact with the IT Act. 3. You hear terms like DPDP, AI governance, deepfakes, and blockchain, but cannot connect them to concrete legal duties. 4. You miss new career opportunities in technology law, compliance, and advisory roles. 5. If you want to be a future ready lawyer, you must understand technology law not as an add on, but as a core skill. ## Presenting LawFoyer’s Advanced 5 Day Certification Course on Technology Laws This intensive course is designed to bridge the gap between classroom learning and real world practice in technology law. It combines doctrinal clarity with practical insight, live teaching, and structured guidance. **Across five focused days, you will:** 1. Learn the core framework of Indian technology and cyber law. 2. Study how new criminal laws, DPDP Act 2023, and digital regulations actually work on ground. 3. Understand how AI, blockchain, FinTech, and surveillance technologies are reshaping law. 4. Receive a practice oriented overview of technology law careers and work profiles. 5. This is not a generic webinar. It is a structured certification course guided by experienced academics, policy researchers, and techno legal practitioners. ## [Click Here to Enroll Now!](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=47) ## [Download Brochure](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1wKQoc3YzNlNxm8T0WDHh3WeyiA_nhmy4?usp=sharing) ## Course Mentors [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/DR-RITUPRIYA-GURTOO-e1768647723748-281x300.jpg) ](javascript:void(0))## [ Dr. Ritupriya Gurtoo ](javascript:void(0)) Assistant Professor, School of Law, SVKM’s Narsee Monjee Institute of Management Studies, Indore Campus Tap the photo to know more about your Mentor ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/DR-RITUPRIYA-GURTOO-e1768647723748-281x300.jpg) ## Dr. Ritupriya Gurtoo Assistant Professor, School of Law, SVKM’s Narsee Monjee Institute of Management Studies, Indore Campus Dr Ritupriya Gurtoo holds a B.A. LL.B. from RMLNLU Lucknow, an LL.M. from NLIU Bhopal, and a PhD from Oriental University, Indore. She has more than 11 years of teaching experience in law. Her research and teaching span cyber law, feminist jurisprudence, environmental law, international law, and human rights. She has published widely in Scopus indexed and reputed national journals, and focuses on how legal frameworks respond to social realities in India. [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/MAYUR-e1768636324659-293x300.jpg) ](javascript:void(0))## [ Dr. Mayur Choudhary ](javascript:void(0)) Project Consultant, Business Consulting – Govt. & Public Sector, Ernst & Young LLP (EY) Tap the photo to know more about your Mentor ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/MAYUR-e1768636324659-293x300.jpg) ## Dr. Mayur Choudhary Project Consultant, Business Consulting – Govt. & Public Sector, Ernst & Young LLP (EY) Dr. Mayur Choudhary is a legal academic, researcher, and policy consultant specialising in technology law, artificial intelligence, and intellectual property rights. He has served as Junior Research Fellow, Senior Research Fellow, and Research Assistant under the DPIIT IPR Chair at the National Law Institute University, Bhopal, and has also been associated with Amity University. He holds a PhD with a doctoral research focus on Artificial Intelligence Created Inventions and Patent Laws, with special reference to India. Dr. Choudhary has taught and written extensively on emerging technologies, AI regulation, and innovation policy. He is currently working as a Project Consultant in Business Consulting at EY, where he engages with regulatory, policy, and governance issues at the intersection of law, technology, and public sector reform. [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/pakhi-garg-e1768648596707-262x300.jpg) ](javascript:void(0))## [ Ms. Paakhhi Garg ](javascript:void(0)) Director, World Cyber Security Forum Tap the photo to know more about your Mentor ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/pakhi-garg-e1768648596707-262x300.jpg) ## Ms. Paakhhi Garg Director, World Cyber Security Forum Ms Paakhhi Garg is a techno legal entrepreneur who co founded World Cyber Security Forum in 2019. She trains individuals and businesses on data privacy compliance and cyber law, and helps them upskill for the digital world. She has worked with Gartner India and PwC India, and holds a PG Diploma in Cyber Laws from ILI Delhi and an LLB Honors from Amity Law School Noida. She has multiple international certifications in data privacy, and is a recognised speaker, writer, and thought leader in the cyber and privacy domain. [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/DSC_8156-240x300.jpg) ](javascript:void(0))## [ Mr. Vidit Agrawal ](javascript:void(0)) Advocate & Educator, Ph.D. Scholar, Faculty of Law, Delhi University Tap the photo to know more about your Mentor ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/DSC_8156-240x300.jpg) ## Mr. Vidit Agrawal Advocate & Educator, Ph.D. Scholar, Faculty of Law, Delhi University Mr. Vidit Agrawal is an Advocate & Educator, with a teaching and research profile rooted at the intersection of law, technology, and criminal justice. He has taught core subjects such as criminal law, criminal procedure, evidence, constitutional law, white collar crimes, and allied areas, while also contributing to curriculum design and academic development. His previous academic appointments include Law Centre–II, Faculty of Law, University of Delhi, and IIMT & School of Law (GGSIPU). Vidit holds an LL.M. from the Faculty of Law, Jamia Millia Islamia, has qualified UGC JRF (2013), and is currently pursuing a full time Ph.D. at the Faculty of Law, University of Delhi, where his approved research focuses on “Criminal Investigation Reforms in India in the Eve of Digital World,” with a special emphasis on AI driven facial recognition. ## Course Day Wise Curriculum ## Day 1 – Foundations of Technology Law **Date: 24th February, 2026** **Theme:** Understanding the Digital Legal Ecosystem **Speaker:** Dr. Ritupriya Gurtoo, Assistant Professor, School of Law, SVKM’s NMIMS, Indore Campus You will cover: 1. Concept and scope of technology law. 2. Evolution of cyber law in India. 3. Information Technology Act 2000, its purpose, key definitions, and liability framework. 4. Interplay between IT Act and Indian criminal laws, including BNS, BSA, and BNSS. 5. Jurisdictional issues in cyber disputes and cross border elements. 6. Adjudicating authorities and appellate mechanisms in technology law matters. **Outcome:** Clear conceptual base on how technology law fits into India’s legal system. ## Day 2 – Cyber Crimes and Digital Evidence **Date: 25th February, 2026** **Theme:** Substantive Offences And Procedural Enforcement **Speaker:** Mr. Vidit Agrawal, Advocate & Educator, Ph.D. Scholar, Faculty of Law, Delhi University You will explore: 1. Concept and classification of cyber crimes. 2. Key cyber offences such as hacking, unauthorised access, phishing, online fraud, cyber stalking, harassment, and cyber terrorism. 3. Investigation of cyber crimes, including registration of cyber FIR and role of cyber cells. 4. Types of digital evidence, admissibility standards under BSA or Evidence Act, and chain of custody. 5. Role of CERT In and obligations of intermediaries and platforms. **Practical focus:** 1. Discussion of recent cyber fraud cases. 2. Step by step overview of cyber complaint mechanisms and practical redress paths. ## Day 3 – Data Protection And Privacy Law **Date: 26th February, 2026** **Theme:** Regulating Personal Data In The Digital Age **Speaker:** Ms. Paakhhi Garg, Director, World Cyber Security Forum Key coverage: 1. Right to privacy as a fundamental right in India. 2. Concept of personal data and sensitive personal data. 3. Overview of India’s emerging data protection regime and DPDP Act 2023. 4. Principles of data protection such as consent, purpose limitation, and data minimisation. 5. Obligations of data fiduciaries and processors, including compliance and enforcement. 6. Issues in cross border data transfers and global best practices. 7. Brief comparative note on global standards like GDPR and other regimes. **Outcome:** You will understand privacy jurisprudence and see how digital entities must comply. ## Day 4 – Technology Law Practice And Career Pathways **Date: 27th February, 2026** **Theme:** From Knowledge To Practice **Speaker:** Dr. Ritupriya Gurtoo, Assistant Professor, School of Law, SVKM’s NMIMS, Indore Campus Focus areas: 1. Scope and growing importance of technology law practice in India. 2. Role of lawyers in technology companies, platforms, and consulting firms. 3. Compliance advisory for startups and corporations on technology and data issues. 4. Technology contracts, including software licensing, SaaS and cloud contracts, and data sharing clauses. 5. Comparing litigation and advisory practice in technology law. 6. Mapping concrete career paths and future trends in this field. **Outcome:** A realistic picture of how you can build a practice or career in technology law. ## Day 5 – Emerging Technologies And Legal Challenges **Date: 28th February, 2026** **Theme:** Law, Innovation, And Regulatory Uncertainty **Speaker:** Dr. Mayur Choudhary, Project Consultant, Business Consulting – Government & Public Sector, Ernst & Young LLP (EY) You will engage with: 1. Artificial Intelligence and law, including algorithmic bias, accountability, and liability. 2. Ethical and regulatory concerns around AI systems and automated decision making. 3. Blockchain, virtual digital assets, and legal issues around cryptocurrencies. 4. Regulatory landscape around FinTech and digital payments, including consumer protection and fraud risks. 5. Internet of Things, surveillance technologies, and associated privacy and security issues. 6. Regulatory gaps and possible future policy directions in India. **Discussion module:** 1. India’s readiness for AI regulation. 2. How to balance innovation and legal oversight in a developing digital economy. ## [Click Here to Enroll Now!](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=47) ## [Download Brochure](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1wKQoc3YzNlNxm8T0WDHh3WeyiA_nhmy4?usp=sharing) ## Who should attend this course? This program is ideal for: 1. Undergraduate and postgraduate law students who want to build a strong foundation in technology law. 2. Judicial services and other competitive exam aspirants who need clarity on IT Act, DPDP, and digital evidence. 3. Young advocates and litigation associates handling cyber crime, fraud, or digital disputes. 4. In house legal and compliance professionals working with digital platforms, fintech, or data heavy companies. 5. Policy researchers and technology law enthusiasts who wish to understand India’s digital legal ecosystem. 6. No prior technical background is required. ## Bonuses for All Course Participants worth Rs. 5000/- 1. **E-Certificate of Completion:** Participants will be awarded with a Certificate of Completion after successful completion of the course. 2. **FREE Job and Internship Placement Support for 1 Year:** Participants will get free daily Internship and Job Opportunities Updates for 1 year via [**LawFoyer Connect**](https://news.lawfoyer.in/). 3. **FREE Access of Legal AI Workshop:** Participants will get free access to LawFoyer’s Advanced Certification Workshop on Supercharging Litigation and Academics with AI worth Rs. 499/-. 4. **FREE Access of Mooting Workshop:** Participants will get free access to LawFoyer’s Advanced Certification Workshop on Supercharging Litigation and Academics with AI worth Rs. 499/-. 5. **Publication Opportunity with LawFoyer’s International Journal:** Participants will get discounted publication opportunity with [**LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research (LIJDLR) \[ISSN: 2583-7753\]**](https://lijdlr.com/), which is indexed in 350+ international libraries and databases including HeinOnline, Harvard HOLLIS, Stanford Libraries, Oxford SOLO, IIM Bangalore Library, Manupatra, Google Scholar, ResearchGate, WorldCat, CrossRef, Europub and many more libraries & databases worldwide. 6. **Priority Access of Workshops & Webinars:** Participants will get priority Access to upcoming skil development workshops and academic webinars by [**LawFoyer Academy**](https://academy.lawfoyer.in/). 7. **Other FREE Bonuses:** Participants will get free access to bonuses including, *inter alia*, 4,000+ legal drafts, course reading materials, notes, E-books, PPTs, recordings with lifetime access and much more. ## What you will learn and achieve? By the end of the 5 days, you will be able to: 1. Understand the statutory and conceptual foundations of technology and cyber law in India. 2. Analyse cyber offences such as hacking, phishing, identity theft, cyber stalking, and online fraud. 3. Follow the process of cyber crime investigation from complaint to digital evidence handling. 4. Interpret the right to privacy and India’s emerging data protection regime in a practical way. 5. Identify obligations of data fiduciaries, processors, and intermediaries under Indian law. 6. Assess legal challenges in AI, blockchain, cryptocurrencies, FinTech, and surveillance systems. 7. Recognise compliance and advisory opportunities in technology companies and startups. 8. Visualise your own career pathway in technology law, both in litigation and advisory roles. ## How you will learn? We follow a practical and engaging pedagogy: 1. Live interactive lectures with space for questions and discussion. 2. Case law based analysis linked to real incidents and judgments. 3. Practical illustrations and compliance scenarios drawn from government, courts, and industry. 4. Comparative insights from global developments in technology law. 5. Dedicated doubt clearing time at the end of each session. 6. You will also have lifetime access to session recordings for revision and future reference. ## [Click Here to Enroll Now!](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=47) ## [Download Brochure](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1wKQoc3YzNlNxm8T0WDHh3WeyiA_nhmy4?usp=sharing) ## Why learn Technology law with LawFoyer? LawFoyer is a leading legal education and information platform for law students and legal professionals across India. Through our platform we have built a strong network of over **three lakh** law students and professionals. We have trained over **20,000** learners through online certification courses, workshops, webinars, and internship training programmes. We publish the **LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research (LIJDLR)** \[ISSN: 2583 7753\], indexed in 350 plus global libraries and databases including HeinOnline, Harvard HOLLIS, Stanford Libraries, Oxford SOLO, IIM Bangalore, Manupatra, Google Scholar etc. Our flagship initiative **LawFoyer Connect** gives daily job and internship updates, and tracks developments in legal technology and AI adoption in law. We have partnered with institutions like NLU Delhi, NLIU Bhopal, HPNLU, CNLU and others as media and e-learning partners for their events and courses. We have also conducted pan India internship and training programmes on legal research skills, legal drafting and legal AI tools in collaboration with reputed law firms such as Eximius Legal and worked in close collaboration with government bodies for various workshops and projects. Our vision is simple: make law practical, affordable, and technology aware, so that students and young professionals can build confident careers. ## COURSE FEE & REGISTRATION DETAILS - **Early Bird Fee for Law Students:** ₹ 499 (offer valid till Tonight 11 PM) - **Early Bird Fee for Professionals:** ₹ 999 (offer valid till Tonight 11 PM) - **Course Fee for Law Students** (from Tommorrow onwards): ₹ 999 - **Course Fee for Professionals** (from Tommorrow onwards): ₹ 1999 ## [Click Here to Enroll Now!](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=47) ## [Download Brochure](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1wKQoc3YzNlNxm8T0WDHh3WeyiA_nhmy4?usp=sharing) # KEY FEATURES ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/education_15869606-150x150.png) ### Weekened live lectures ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/study_15192524-150x150.png) ### 20+ Lessons ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/webinar_2997592-150x150.png) ### 2 Bonus Workshops\* ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/dashboard_2782066-150x150.png) ### Personalised LMS Dashboard ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/recording_4658842-150x150.png) ### 24\*7 Access to Recordings ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/certificate_6703900-150x150.png) ### Completion and Merit Certificates ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/educational-video_13972594-150x150.png) ### 300+ Tools, 4000+ AI Prompt Templates, 8000+ Legal Drafts ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/quiz_3407038-150x150.png) ### Notes & E-books ## Frequently Asked Questions [ Do you offer daily live classes? ](#collapse-14514dc6ab2aec86dd53) Yes, our course include daily live classes. You will have the opportunity to attend live lectures, each lasting approximately 90 minutes. The schedule for these live sessions will be 6.30 PM Onwards. We understand that our learners may be students or working professionals, so we strive to accommodate everyone's schedules. So our live sessions are held in the late evenings, allowing all participants to attend without compromising their regular classes or work commitments. [ What happens if I am unable to attend a live class? ](#collapse-c29457c6ab2aec86dd53) We highly recommend attending the live classes after thorough preparation to maximize your learning experience. Just as the true excitement of a live match or performance lies in witnessing it in real-time, the real value of our live classes comes from actively participating and engaging with the content and instructors. During the live sessions, a wealth of new and practical information is covered, and you'll have the opportunity to ask questions and receive immediate feedback. However, we understand that sometimes life gets in the way, and you may miss a live class. In such cases, you can access the recordings of the live sessions through your personalized Learning Management System (LMS) dashboard. The LMS dashboard provides 24/7 access to all course materials, including the live session recordings, ensuring that you can catch up on any missed content at your convenience. [ Will this course help in internships and jobs? ](#collapse-35c8fe46ab2aec86dd53) Yes. A strong understanding of technology law, cyber crime, digital evidence, and data protection is now a key differentiator in internships, litigation practice, compliance roles, and policy research profiles. [ Is this useful for judicial services or other exams? ](#collapse-23e82e36ab2aec86dd53) Technology law and related topics are increasingly part of judicial services and other exams. This course will give you conceptual clarity and contemporary awareness that you can build upon. [ How will the sessions be conducted? ](#collapse-f524db26ab2aec86dd53) Sessions will be conducted live online. You will receive joining links, reading material, and support via email or WhatsApp. [ Can non law professionals attend? ](#collapse-48e70416ab2aec86dd53) Yes, policy researchers, professionals working in tech companies, and enthusiasts with serious interest in technology law are welcome to join, subject to your internal eligibility rules. ## [Click Here to Enroll Now!](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=47) ## [Download Brochure](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1wKQoc3YzNlNxm8T0WDHh3WeyiA_nhmy4?usp=sharing) ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Copy-of-Copy-of-of-EDITORSHIP-Medium-768x543.png) [ Enroll Now ](https://lawfoyer.in/?ff_landing=18) ## Contact Us Have questions about our Certification Course? We’re here to help! Contact us for any inquiries regarding course content, schedules, or registration. Don’t miss this opportunity to transform your legal career with LawFoyer! [ Contact Us ](https://web.whatsapp.com/send?phone=+918824991916) [ Contact Us ](https://web.whatsapp.com/send?phone=+918574723478) ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/chatting.png) **Categories:** Courses & Workshops **Tags:** 1 day certification courses, 3 day certification course, a certification course, a certification training, act cyber, advanced 5 day certification course on technology laws, ai certification, ai certification program, ai course certification, ai course with certificate, all certificate courses, analysis certification, any certificate courses, any online certificate course, artificial intelligence certificate course, artificial intelligence certification, artificial intelligence certification course online, artificial intelligence online certificate course, blockchain technology certification, blockchain technology certification course, cert online training, certificate 4 courses, certificate class, certificate completion, certificate course in 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Singh **Excerpt:** TEN-DAY NATIONAL FACULTY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM ON EMERGING IP JURISPRUDENCE AND EVOLVING TRENDS OF IP TEACHING & RESEARCH | Organized by DPIIT-IPR Chair at Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | 6TH APRIL – 16TH APRIL, 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Poster_Faculty-Development-Programme-1024x576.jpg) ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY** Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur, is a premier institution in legal education in India. The programme is organised under the DPIIT-IPR Chair established under the SPRIHA scheme launched by the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT), Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India. The initiative aims to strengthen teaching and research in Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and promote academic excellence in IP law. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY** This ten-day Faculty Development Programme (FDP) is designed to provide a comprehensive academic platform for faculty members, researchers, and scholars to explore emerging developments in intellectual property law. The programme will cover: - Contemporary judicial trends and international regulatory frameworks - Key areas such as copyright, patents, trademarks, technology law, AI, and digital innovation - Teaching pedagogy, curriculum design, and research methodologies - Interdisciplinary engagement across law, technology, and public policy The FDP will consist of **30 contact hours**, conducted over ten days with two academic sessions per day, aligned with UGC requirements for faculty development programmes. ## **WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** - Faculty members from Law, Social Sciences, Management, Engineering, Technology, and allied disciplines - Doctoral candidates, research scholars, and postgraduate students in IP law and AI governance - Industry professionals and innovation managers working in IP, technology, and policy domains ## **MODE OF THE EVENT** Online Mode ## **LOCATION & VENUE OF THE EVENT** Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur, Chhattisgarh, India (Organising Institution) ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE** - Registration Form: - Payment Portal: Participants must complete registration through the Google Form and pay the required fee via the SBI Collect portal. ## **FEE DETAILS** - Enrolment Fee: INR 1200 (exclusive of GST) The fee includes: - Participation in all sessions - Access to lecture materials and resources - Certificate of completion ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - Event Duration: **6th April 2026 – 16th April 2026** - Break: 12th April 2026 (Sunday) ## **CERTIFICATION DETAILS** Participants will receive a certificate upon: - Minimum 80% attendance - Active participation - Successful completion of assignment ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** - Dr. Ankit Singh DPIIT-IPR Chair Professor (I/c) & Head, CIIPL Email: ankit.singh@hnlu.ac.in Mobile: 8966049636 ## **OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / BROCHURE** - Official Website: [www.hnlu.ac.in](http://www.hnlu.ac.in) - Official Brochure Link: [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1AqmpZkliLZGvumSy\_-RphbZoLrBbp6SJ/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1AqmpZkliLZGvumSy_-RphbZoLrBbp6SJ/view?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events --- ### [1st NLUJ-CCLRP National Essay Writing Competition, 2026 | Organized by Centre for Consumer Law Research & Practice, National Law University, Jodhpur | Submission Deadline: 15th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-nluj-cclrp-national-essay-writing-competition-2026-organized-by-centre-for-consumer-law-research-practice-national-law-university-jodhpur-submission-deadline-15th-april-2026/) **Published:** March 21, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 1st NLUJ-CCLRP National Essay Writing Competition, 2026 | Organized by Centre for Consumer Law Research & Practice, National Law University, Jodhpur | Submission Deadline: 15th April 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/NLUJ-CCLRP-Essay-Writing-Competition-819x1024.jpeg) ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER / COLLEGE / UNIVERSITY** The Centre for Consumer Law Research & Practice at National Law University, Jodhpur focuses on advancing research and academic engagement in consumer law. It promotes interdisciplinary understanding of consumer rights, consumer justice, and evolving challenges in areas such as digital ecosystems, data governance, and platform regulation. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY** The 1st NLUJ-CCLRP National Essay Writing Competition, 2026 is being organized to commemorate World Consumer Rights Day (15th March 2026). The competition aims to promote research, critical thinking, and scholarly writing among students on contemporary issues in consumer law. **Broad Theme:** *“Safe Products, Confident Consumers”* **Indicative Topics Include:** - Consumer Awareness and Education - Consumer Rights in the Digital Age - Dark Patterns in E-Commerce - AI Driven Consumer Harm - Data Privacy as a Consumer Right - Misleading Advertising - Consumer Protection in Healthcare - Greenwashing and its Regulation in India - Platform Accountability in Online Marketplaces - Consumer Dispute Redressal in the Age of AI Participants may also choose any topic within the broader theme of consumer protection. ## **WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** - Students pursuing a **3-year or 5-year law degree course** are eligible to participate. ## **MODE OF THE EVENT** Not explicitly mentioned (Essay competition conducted via online submission). ## **LOCATION & VENUE** National Law University, Jodhpur, India ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE** - Registration via payment link: - Submission through email: **cclrp@nlujodhpur.ac.in** **Submission Requirements:** - Essay must be in English (.doc/.docx format) - Word limit: 2500–3000 words (excluding footnotes) - Abstract: Maximum 250 words - Citation Style: Bluebook (21st Edition) - Plagiarism limit: 10% (Turnitin checked) - Individual or co-authored (max 2 authors) ## **FEE DETAILS** - ₹250 (Single author) - ₹500 (Co-authored entry) - Fee is non-refundable ## **PRIZES** - 1st Prize: ₹4000 + Certificate of Merit - 2nd Prize: ₹3000 + Certificate of Merit - 3rd Prize: ₹2000 + Certificate of Merit - All participants will receive a Certificate of Participation ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - Announcement: 15th March 2026 - Submission Deadline: 15th April 2026 - Result Declaration: 30th April 2026 ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** Email: cclrp@nlujodhpur.ac.in ## **OFFICIAL LINK / BROCHURE** The details are based on the official brochure: **Categories:** Essay Competitions, Events, Other Competitions --- ### [समग्र’26 – Annual Inter-College Sports Meet | Organized by DME Sports Society, Delhi Metropolitan Education | Event Dates: 25th – 30th March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/समग्र26-annual-inter-college-sports-meet-organized-by-dme-sports-society-delhi-metropolitan-education-event-dates-25th-30th-m/) **Published:** March 21, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** समग्र’26 – Annual Inter-College Sports Meet | Organized by DME Sports Society, Delhi Metropolitan Education | Event Dates: 25th – 30th March 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Screenshot-2026-03-21-200901.png) ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY** Delhi Metropolitan Education (DME), a NAAC A+ accredited institution, was established on 1st August 2012 under the Sunshine Educational & Development Society. It is affiliated with Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University (GGSIPU), New Delhi and approved by the Bar Council of India. DME focuses on creating future leaders by providing quality education in Management, Journalism, and Law while fostering intellectual, social, and personal growth among students. The DME Sports Society promotes sportsmanship and holistic student development by encouraging active participation in sports and building qualities like teamwork, discipline, leadership, and resilience. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY** समग्र’26 is a 5-day Inter-College Sports Meet organized by Delhi Metropolitan Education. The event invites institutions from across India to participate and compete in various sports disciplines. As highlighted in the invitation letter, the event ensures professional management and hospitality while providing a competitive platform for athletes. **Sports Included:** - Basketball - Football - Volleyball - Badminton - Table Tennis - Kabaddi - Chess - Judo - Cricket - Arm Wrestling ## **WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** - Open to colleges, universities, and institutions across India - Teams and individual participants can register - Participants must submit required documents such as Participation Performa and NOC. ## **MODE OF THE EVENT** Offline ## **LOCATION & VENUE OF THE EVENT** - DME Campus - Noida Stadium - Mayoor International School, Noida ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE** Participants must register through sport-specific Google Form links. Examples: - Basketball: - Football: - Volleyball: - Chess: - Table Tennis: - Badminton: - Kabaddi: - Judo: - Box Cricket: - Arm Wrestling: **Procedure:** - Register before the deadline (no on-spot registration allowed) - Submit required documents (Participation Performa & NOC) - Registrations are on a first-come-first-serve basis ## **FEE DETAILS** - Basketball: ₹2500 - Football: ₹2800 (Male), ₹2500 (Female) - Volleyball: ₹1500 - Chess: ₹150 - Table Tennis: ₹200 - Badminton: ₹300–₹600 (based on category) - Kabaddi: ₹2000 - Judo: ₹300 - Cricket: ₹2000 - Arm Wrestling: ₹200 **Payment Mode:** - IMPS / NEFT - Bank: HDFC Bank Ltd, Sector-18, Noida - Account Name: Delhi Metropolitan Education - Account No.: 50100187447560 - IFSC: HDFC0001592 ## **PRIZES** - Total Prize Pool: ₹1,50,000 (including cash and in-kind rewards) - Sport-wise distribution to be announced later - Prize depends on number of participants per sport ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - Event Dates: 25th – 30th March 2026 - Additional Dates Mentioned: 14th & 15th March (for certain events) **Schedule Highlights:** - Judo, Chess, Table Tennis, Arm Wrestling: 25th March 2026 - Football, Basketball, Kabaddi: 28th–29th March 2026 - Reporting Time: 8:30 AM ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** - **Faculty Convenors:** - Ms. Surbhi Arora – 8800843042 - Mr. Vishal Vyas – 8882503137 - **Sports Head:** - Akash Malayil – 9773586868 - **Student Convenors:** - Dhriti Gaur – 8448744412 - Sahil Chhetri – 9953663032 - **Email:** sports@dme.ac.in ## **OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / BROCHURE** Official Brochure: **Categories:** Events, Other Competitions --- ### [Smt. Shakuntala Devi 3rd International Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized Moot Court Society, School of Law, Galgotias University | Register by 26th March, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/smt-shakuntala-devi-3rd-international-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-moot-court-society-school-of-law-galgotias-university-register-by-26th-march-2026/) **Published:** March 19, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** Smt. Shakuntala Devi 3rd International Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized Moot Court Society, School of Law, Galgotias University | Register by 26th March, 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Poster-for-Publication-3rd-SSDIMCC-2026-1024x1024.jpeg) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY Galgotias University stands as a beacon of academic excellence and institutional leadership in India’s educational landscape. Established with a vision to provide holistic education beyond conventional boundaries, the University fosters innovation, intellectual growth, and strong ethical values. It strives to equip students with contemporary knowledge, critical thinking and analytical skills, leadership qualities, and a global perspective. The University offers an immersive learning environment both inside and outside the classroom. With students from 28 states, it reflects a diverse and inclusive community that values different cultures, talents, and perspectives. Galgotias promotes a dynamic campus culture that encourages intellectual debate, creativity, and experimentation. To support holistic development, the University provides ample opportunities through clubs, societies, and entrepreneurial initiatives like GSCALE (Galgotias Student-Centered Active Learning Ecosystem), an innovative framework designed to enhance student engagement through modern pedagogy and technology. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY The School of Law, Galgotias University is pleased to announce the **3rd Smt. Shakuntala Devi International Moot Court Competition**, the flagship event of its Moot Court Society, following two successful editions. The competition is organized annually with the objective of providing a competitive and intellectually stimulating platform for law students. The event aims to promote the development of legal research, advocacy, and courtroom skills through simulated court proceedings. It seeks to foster practical legal education while encouraging participants to engage deeply with complex legal issues. The competition brings together students from diverse institutions, both nationally and internationally, to engage in rigorous legal argumentation and the practical application of law, thereby nurturing the next generation of legal professionals. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE The competition is open for students who are studying an LLB three-year or five years integrated course during the current academic year. ## MODE OF THE EVENT (ONLINE / OFFLINE OR HYBRID) The Oral Rounds of the Smt. Shakuntala Devi 3rd International Moot Court Competition, 2026 (“the Competition”) shall be conducted in a hybrid mode. The **Preliminary Round** will be held online on **12th April 2026.** The **Advanced Rounds** are scheduled to take place in offline mode on **1st and 2nd May 2026** at the School of Law, Galgotias University, Greater Noida. ## LOCATION (COUNTRY/STATE/CITY) & VENUE OF THE EVENT Galgotias University, Plot No. 2, Yamuna Expy, opposite Buddha International Circuit, Sector 17A, Greater Noida, Uttar Pradesh 203201 ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE Teams willing to participate in the “Smt. Shakuntala Devi 3rd International Moot Court Competition, 2026” are required to register by duly submitting a Google form on or before 26th March 2026, 11:59 PM IST. Participants may register their teams provisionally through the link mentioned below: Participants may finalize their Registration by filling out the google for through the below mentioned Link/QR Code: ## FEE DETAILS All the teams registering are expected to make a single final payment in either of the following ways: I. Registration Fees- ₹1500/- (Including GST) (per Team) II. Accommodation Fees- ₹6,000/- (Including GST) (Per Team) NOTE: Additional Accommodation Fees apply only to the teams qualifying for Quarter-Final Rounds. All information regarding the mode of payment and the account details has been provided in the official Rulebook of the competition attached herewith. The registration fee is *inclusive* of any and all GST charges. Kindly also find attached the Moot Proposition for the competition. ## PRIZES 1. Winning Team: Cash Prize of ₹50,000/-, Merit Certificate, Winner’s Trophy, Smt. Shakuntala Devi International Moot Court Competition Runners Trophy; Internship Opportunity at Scriboard; Certificate Course by ACIAM worth ₹50,000. 2. Runner-up Team: Cash Prize of ₹30,000/-, Merit Certificate, Runners Up Trophy; Internship Opportunity at Scriboard; Certificate Course by ACIAM worth ₹30,000. 3. Best Memorial (Petitioner): Cash Prize of ₹7,500/-, Merit Certificate,Trophy; Certificate Course by Legal Vidhiya worth ₹7,500. 4. Best Memorial (Respondent): Cash Prize of ₹7,500/-, Merit Certificate,Trophy; Certificate Course by Legal Vidhiya worth ₹7,500. 5. Best Speaker(Male): Cash Prize of₹7,500/-,Merit Certificate,Trophy; Certificate Course byACIAM worth ₹10,000. 6. Best Speaker (Female): Cash Prize of ₹7,500/-, Merit Certificate, Trophy; Certificate Course by ACIAM worth ₹10,000. ## **Additional Perks** 1. FREE Access to LawFoyer Academy’s two Premium Courses to Top 3 teams including Advanced Certification Course on Legal Research & Writing (worth Rs. 2000) and Advanced Certification Course on Supercharging Litigation & Academics with AI (worth Rs.4000). 2. Discounted Publication Opportunity to all the Participants with 50% Discount on Publication with LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research (ISSN: 2583-7753) which is indexed on 350+ Global Databases including Harvard HOLLIS Library, Oxford SOLO Library, Hein Online, Google Scholar,CrossRef,ISSN,and otherinternational libraries and databases. 3. Internship Opportunity to all the Participants. All participants will get an opportunity to Intern with LawFoyer and attend LawFoyer’s structured Free Virtual Internship Training Program in collaboration with reputed law firms. 4. One Year Subscription to SCC Online for the participants of the Winning Team, and one month access to SCC Online to all the participants of the competition. ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES The Oral Rounds of the Smt. Shakuntala Devi 3rd International Moot Court Competition, 2026 (“the Competition”) shall be conducted in a hybrid mode. The **Preliminary Round** will be held online on **12th April 2026.** The **Advanced Rounds** are scheduled to take place in offline mode on **1st and 2nd May 2026** at the School of Law, Galgotias University, Greater Noida. **EVENT** **DATE** Start of Registration 25 February 2026 Last Date of Registration 26 March 2026 Last Date for seeking Clarification 20 March 2026 Release of Clarification 25 March 2026 Memorial Submission (Soft Copy) 05 April 2026 Preliminary Round (Online) 12 April 2026 Memorial Submission (Hard Copy) 28 April 2026 Quarter-Final Round (On Campus) 01 May 2026 Semi-Final Round (On Campus) 01 May 2026 Final Round (On Campus) 02 May 2026 ## CONTACT INFORMATION For any query related to the competition, you may kindly send your mail correspondence to or contact us at the number mentioned below- Aditya Kumar Tiwari (Head, Event Planning, Moot Court Society)- +91 91511 87977 ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / LINK OF THE OFFICIAL BROCHURE, RULES & REGULATIONS ETC. Participants may find the relevant documents of the competition including the Moot Proposition, Brochure, and the Rulebook of the Competition in the below mentioned drive link: [https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1sqXL8-aJ6X7OCA\_4\_jzE1WOyR\_34RuGx](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1sqXL8-aJ6X7OCA_4_jzE1WOyR_34RuGx) **Categories:** Events, Moot Courts --- ### [INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTERSECTIONS OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS AND THE FUTURE: LAW, CULTURE, SUSTAINABILITY, AND COLLECTIVE WELL-BEING | Organized by DME Law School, Noida | Register by 20th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-intersections-of-traditional-knowledge-systems-and-the-future-law-culture-sustainability-and-collective-well-being-organized-by-dme-law-school-noida-register-by-20/) **Published:** March 19, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTERSECTIONS OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS AND THE FUTURE: LAW, CULTURE, SUSTAINABILITY, AND COLLECTIVE WELL-BEING | Organized by DME Law School, Noida | Register by 20th April 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Screenshot-2026-03-19-195025.png) ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER / COLLEGE / UNIVERSITY** Delhi Metropolitan Education (DME), accredited with NAAC A+, is affiliated with Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University (GGSIPU), New Delhi. The institution offers programs in Law, Management, and Journalism, with its law courses approved by the Bar Council of India. Founded by the Sunshine Educational and Development Society, DME focuses on project-based pedagogy and aims to bridge classroom learning with evolving legal and corporate requirements. GGSIPU, established in 1998 by the Government of NCT of Delhi, is a NAAC A++ accredited university known for excellence in higher and professional education. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY** DME Law School is organizing an **International Conference** focusing on the intersections of traditional knowledge systems (TKS) with law, culture, sustainability, and collective well-being. The conference aims to explore how traditional knowledge—rooted in indigenous practices and cultural systems—interacts with modern legal, environmental, and governance frameworks. It encourages scholarly discussions on topics such as intellectual property rights, biodiversity conservation, climate change, education systems, and socio-legal dimensions of knowledge systems. Participants are invited to submit original and unpublished research papers, including conceptual, empirical, and theoretical work aligned with the conference theme. ## **WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** - Students - Research Scholars / Academicians - Professionals - Educators, activists, think tanks, and stakeholders from all disciplines ## **MODE OF THE EVENT** Hybrid (Online and Offline) ## **LOCATION & VENUE OF THE EVENT** Noida, Uttar Pradesh, India (DME Law School) ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE** - Registration Form: - Participants must register on or before 20th April 2026. - For paper submissions: - Abstract and full paper must be emailed to: **dmelawconference@dme.ac.in** ## **FEE DETAILS** ### **Online Presentation Fee** - Students: ₹500 - Faculty & Research Scholars: ₹800 - Other Professionals: ₹1300 - International Participants: $60 ### **Offline Presentation Fee** - Students: ₹1000 - Faculty & Research Scholars: ₹1500 - Other Professionals: ₹2000 - International Participants: $75 ## **PRIZES** - Best Paper Award in each category: - Students - Research Scholars / Academicians - Professionals ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - Last Date for Abstract Submission: 10th April 2026 - Acceptance of Abstract: 15th April 2026 - Last Date for Registration: 20th April 2026 - Last Date for Full Paper Submission: 25th April 2026 - Conference Dates: 8th & 9th May 2026 ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** **Faculty Coordinators:** - Ms. Sreedurga TN – 8826559126 - Ms. Mansi Madan – 7838256542 **Student Coordinators:** - Prapti Chaturvedi – 8766206694 - Anshuman Mishra – 9289846657 ## **OFFICIAL LINK / BROCHURE** **Official brochure:** [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1iB1fyfzA2QvK0p-WmwGyhNoCv3UQXKM6/view?usp=drive\_link](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1iB1fyfzA2QvK0p-WmwGyhNoCv3UQXKM6/view?usp=drive_link) **Categories:** Call for Papers, Events --- ### [1ST NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY DELHI – KHAITAN & CO CERTIFICATE COURSE ON TAXATION LAWS | Organized by National Law University Delhi | Register by 29th March, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-national-law-university-delhi-khaitan-co-certificate-course-on-taxation-laws-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-register-by-29th-march-2026/) **Published:** March 19, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 1ST NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY DELHI – KHAITAN & CO CERTIFICATE COURSE ON TAXATION LAWS | Organized by National Law University Delhi | Register by 29th March, 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Screenshot-2026-03-19-193806.png) ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER / COLLEGE / UNIVERSITY** National Law University Delhi is one of India’s leading law universities, known for its high academic standards, innovative pedagogy, and industry-linked global curriculum. It has consistently produced distinguished lawyers, academicians, researchers, and professionals contributing to social, political, and economic justice. Khaitan & Co, established in 1911, is one of India’s oldest and most prestigious full-service law firms. With offices across major cities and international recognition from platforms like Chambers Asia-Pacific and IFLR1000, the firm is renowned for its expertise in corporate law, dispute resolution, and taxation. The Centre for Tax Laws (CTL) at NLU Delhi was established in 2018 to promote research, policy engagement, and academic discourse in taxation laws, bringing together academia, industry, and government. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY** This certificate course on Direct and Indirect Tax is a practice-oriented academic initiative designed to bridge the gap between theoretical learning and real-world tax practice. Scheduled for **3rd–4th April 2026**, the two-day programme will feature: - Lectures and interactive discussions by leading practitioners from Khaitan & Co - Foundational learning in direct and indirect taxation - Group-based case study exercises based on contemporary tax disputes before Indian courts - Exposure to practical aspects of tax litigation and advisory Participants will receive curated reading materials and a certificate upon successful completion. High-performing participants may also be considered for internship opportunities. ## **WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** - Undergraduate law students - LL.M. students ## **MODE OF THE EVENT** Not explicitly mentioned ## **LOCATION & VENUE OF THE EVENT** India – National Law University Delhi ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE** Registration Link: ## **FEE DETAILS** Not mentioned ## **PRIZES** - Certificate of completion - Potential internship opportunities for high-performing participants ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - **Last Date to Register:** 29th March, 2026 - **Event Dates:** 3rd – 4th April, 2026 ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** - **Ali Ahmed Chaudhary** (Student Coordinator) - **Krishna Agarwal** – +91-9119625881 | krishna.agarwal23@nludelhi.ac.in (Payment Queries) - **Saksham Vaidya** – +91-8757707766 | saksham.vaidya23@nludelhi.ac.in (Course Queries) ## **OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / BROCHURE** - Email: ctl@nludelhi.ac.in - Website: - LinkedIn: Centre for Tax Laws, NLU Delhi - Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/ctl\_nlud/ - Official Brochure: [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1VLPcefUIzl98MK2DGsuOYI7o3a\_OEWwF/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1VLPcefUIzl98MK2DGsuOYI7o3a_OEWwF/view?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events --- ### [Institute of Law, Nirma University Lifts the 3rd Justice Hidayatullah International Moot Court Trophy with a cash prize of Rs 2 lakhs](https://lawfoyer.in/institute-of-law-nirma-university-lifts-the-3rd-justice-hidayatullah-international-moot-court-trophy-with-a-cash-prize-of-rs-2-lakhs/) **Published:** March 19, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Content:** **Raipur, March 15, 2026** The **Institute of Law, Nirma University, Gandhinagar** emerged as the **Winner of the 3rd Justice Hidayatullah International Moot Court Competition (HIMCC) 2026**, securing the championship trophy along with a **cash prize of ₹2,00,000**. **National Law University, Odisha** was declared the **Runner-Up**, receiving a **cash prize of ₹1,50,000**. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Winners-of-HIMCC-1024x682.jpeg) The competition also recognised outstanding individual and team performances: - **Best Speaker:** Siya Ganatra, National Law University Odisha - **Best Memorial:** National Forensic Sciences University, Gandhinagar - **Best Researcher:** Kanishk Gupta, Karnavati University ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Runners-Up-1024x682.jpeg) The awards were presented during the valedictory ceremony by the distinguished guests. The moot proposition for this year focused on **contemporary issues in energy law and climate governance**, raising complex questions relating to **energy transition, sustainability, and regulatory governance**. The moot problem was drafted by **Prof. R. Muralidharan of Manu Associates and Visiting Faculty at HNLU**. **Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur**, successfully concluded the **3rd Justice Hidayatullah International Moot Court Competition (HIMCC) 2026**, held from **13–15 March 2026**, reaffirming its position as one of the **premier mooting platforms in the country**. The competition brought together leading law schools from across India and abroad for **three days of intense legal advocacy, research, and courtroom simulation**. The competition witnessed **46 registrations for the memorial rounds**, out of which **32 teams were shortlisted for the oral rounds**, comprising **95 participants representing institutions from 16 Indian States, two Union Territories, and two foreign nationalities**. The rounds were evaluated by a **distinguished panel of 57 judges**, supported by **20 faculty volunteers and nearly 390 student volunteers**, reflecting the scale and collaborative effort behind the event. The **Chief Guest, Shri R. Venkataramani, Learned Attorney General for India**, addressing the gathering reflected on the purpose of mooting in legal education. He observed that the real value of such competitions lies **beyond the results**, emphasising that the process of mooting strengthens **research ability, analytical thinking, advocacy skills, and confidence**, while encouraging students to approach legal questions **creatively and imaginatively in the context of real-world policy challenges**. Addressing the gathering, **Prof. Vivekanandan, Vice-Chancellor of HNLU**, noted that HIMCC is steadily establishing itself as a **frontline international moot competition**. He highlighted the impressive scale of the event, with **95 participants from 32 teams selected from 46 registrations**, evaluated by **57 judges**, and **total prize money of ₹5.5 lakh**. He remarked that **while the teams compete for honours, the real winners are the organisers and volunteers whose dedication makes such a large-scale academic event possible**. The **valedictory and prize distribution ceremony** was graced by **Prof. (Dr.) Ranbir Singh, Pro-Chancellor, IILM University and Distinguished Jurist Professor at HNLU; Shri P. V. S. Giridhar, Senior Counsel, High Court of Madras and Distinguished Jurist Professor at HNLU; Prof. R. Muralidharan, Visiting Professor at HNLU; Prof. Uday Shankar, Professor of Law at IIT Kharagpur; and Prof. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, Dean (PG), HNLU**. Earlier, **Dr. Deepak Kumar Srivastava, Registrar (I/c), HNLU**, welcomed the dignitaries and audience. **Dr. Amitesh Deshmukh** presented the highlights of the competition and appreciated the dedication and enthusiasm displayed by the participating teams. The event concluded with a **Vote of Thanks delivered by Dr. Mayank Shrivastava, Organising Co-Secretary of HIMCC**. The competition was **seamlessly planned and executed under the convenorship of Dr. Anindya Tiwari, Convenor of the Moot Court Committee, along with the dedicated student volunteers of HNLU**. The event also honoured the **participating team from Nepal with a token of appreciation** and congratulated the **HNLU team that emerged as champions at the India Rounds of the Philip C. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition**, who will represent India at the **International Rounds in Washington, D.C.** With another successful edition, the **Justice Hidayatullah International Moot Court Competition continues to strengthen HNLU’s legacy of fostering advocacy skills, legal research, and academic excellence, while engaging students with contemporary global legal challenges.** Wish to showcase your achievement to the world and inspire others? LawFoyer will celebrate your achievement because every achievement deserves recognition. Your achievement is our achievement. Share your achievement with us. Visit: **Categories:** Achievers Archive --- ### [International Conference on “Blockchain Technology: Transforming Law, Governance, and the Digital Economy” | Organized by The Department of Cyberspace Law and Justice, School of Excellence in Law, The Tamil Nadu Dr. Ambedkar Law University (TNDALU) | Register by 30 March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-blockchain-technology-transforming-law-governance-and-the-digital-economy-organized-by-the-department-of-cyberspace-law-and-justice-school-of-excell/) **Published:** March 5, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** International Conference on “Blockchain Technology: Transforming Law, Governance, and the Digital Economy” | Organized by The Department of Cyberspace Law and Justice, School of Excellence in Law, The Tamil Nadu Dr. Ambedkar Law University (TNDALU) | Register by 30 March 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Screenshot-2026-03-05-203120.png) ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY** The Department of Cyberspace Law and Justice, School of Excellence in Law, The Tamil Nadu Dr. Ambedkar Law University (TNDALU), Chennai, in association with the Techno Lex Club, is organizing this conference. TNDALU is a state university established in 1997 by the Government of Tamil Nadu with the objective of advancing legal education and research. The university affiliates all law colleges in Tamil Nadu and offers undergraduate, postgraduate, and doctoral programmes through its School of Excellence in Law. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY** The International Conference on “Blockchain Technology: Transforming Law, Governance, and the Digital Economy” aims to explore the transformative impact of blockchain technology across legal systems, governance structures, and digital economic frameworks. The conference seeks to bring together academicians, legal professionals, policymakers, technologists, and students to discuss emerging issues and interdisciplinary perspectives in blockchain and law. The organizers have invited **original and unpublished research papers** addressing legal, regulatory, technological, and ethical aspects of blockchain technology. Selected papers will be considered for publication in a reputed journal or edited volume with ISSN, subject to review and additional publication requirements. **Theme** “Blockchain Technology: Transforming Law, Governance, and the Digital Economy.” ## **WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** Participation is open to: - Academicians and researchers - Students from law, technology, economics, and social sciences - Legal professionals and industry experts - Policymakers, regulatory authorities, and think tanks - International participants interested in law and technology ## **MODE OF THE EVENT** Hybrid (Online and Offline) ## **LOCATION (COUNTRY/STATE/CITY) & VENUE OF THE EVENT** Chennai, Tamil Nadu, India – The Tamil Nadu Dr. Ambedkar Law University (TNDALU) ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE** Abstract Submission Form: Registration Form: Participants must submit their abstract through the Google Form with the following details: - Name of Author(s) - Email ID(s) - Institutional Affiliation - Year of Study - Title of the Paper The abstract must be uploaded in Word format (.doc or .docx) with **3–5 keywords**. After acceptance, the full paper must be submitted via email or as directed by the organizers. **Submission Categories** - Abstract (Maximum 500 words) - Full Research Paper (after acceptance of abstract) **Formatting Guidelines** *For Abstract* - Maximum 500 words - Font: Times New Roman - Font Size: 12 - Line Spacing: 1.5 - Up to five keywords *For Full Paper* - Word Limit: 3000–4000 words (excluding footnotes) - Font: Times New Roman - Size: 12 for body text, 10 for footnotes - Line Spacing: 1.5 for body text, 1.0 for footnotes - Citation Style: Bluebook Uniform System of Citation, 21st Edition (2020) - Margins: 1 inch on all sides - Plagiarism limit: 10% Headings Format: - Heading 1 – Bold and alphabetical - Heading 2 – Italics and Roman - Heading 3 – Underlined and small alphabets **Additional Submission Guidelines** - Co-authorship is permitted for up to two authors. - Abstracts will undergo blind review. - Only accepted abstracts will be invited for full paper submission and presentation. - Abstracts must clearly state objectives, methodology, major results, and implications. - Use of Artificial Intelligence for submissions is strictly prohibited. ## **FEE DETAILS** - TNDALU Students / Online Presenters: INR 750 - Students (Other Institutions): INR 1000 - Professionals / Researchers / Academicians: INR 1500 - Foreign Participants: USD 50 ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - Abstract Submission Deadline: 1 April 2026 - Intimation of Abstract Acceptance: 2 April 2026 - Registration Deadline: 4 April 2026 - Full Paper Submission Deadline: 5 April 2026 - Conference Dates: 6–7 April 2026 ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** Email: Phone: +91 7094551906 Student Coordinator: Mr. Arunkumar N ## **OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / LINK OF THE OFFICIAL BROCHURE, RULES & REGULATIONS ETC.** - Abstract Submission Form: - Registration Form: - Official Brochure Link: [Blockchain-Technology-International-Conference-Apr2026-Brochure.pdf](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/wpforms/3577-b568d3031b7cbef6ca00df710adebe23/Blockchain-Technology-International-Conference-Apr2026-Brochure-c06a2336c765ded691b50c467c6c54b8.pdf) - Official Poster Link: [ Blockchain-Technology-International-Conference-Apri-6-7-2026.pdf](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/wpforms/3577-b568d3031b7cbef6ca00df710adebe23/Blockchain-Technology-International-Conference-Apri-6-7-2026-9ccc80a9e2ffca81b4604836c0d93a05.pdf) **Categories:** Call for Papers, Events --- ### [The 4th Xavier Mediation Competition 2026 (XMC’26) | Organized by The Xavier Society of Law and Justice (XSLAJ), Xavier Law School, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata | Register by 21st March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/the-4th-xavier-mediation-competition-2026-xmc26-organized-by-the-xavier-society-of-law-and-justice-xslaj-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-register-by-18-ma/) **Published:** March 17, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The 4th Xavier Mediation Competition 2026 (XMC’26) | Organized by The Xavier Society of Law and Justice (XSLAJ), Xavier Law School, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata | Register by 21st March 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/4th-Xavier-Mediation-Competition-2026-Flyer-819x1024.png) ## **About Xavier Society of Law & Justice (XSLAJ)** The Xavier Society of Law and Justice (XSLAJ), established in 2020 under the aegis of Xavier Law School, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata, has consistently strived to promote excellence in legal education, advocacy, and alternative dispute resolution. Since its inception, the Society has successfully organised eight Intra-University competitions and five prestigious National-level competitions, in collaboration with several esteemed law firms. Building upon this strong legacy, we are pleased to announce **the 4th Xavier Mediation Competition 2026 – XMC’26**, with the objective of further elevating this tradition of excellence. ## **About The 4th Xavier Mediation Competition 2026 (XMC’26)** The Xavier Society of Law and Justice (XSLAJ), a student-run society of Xavier Law School at St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata, is set to organise the **4th Xavier Mediation Competition, 2026 (XMC’26)** from **26th to 28th March 2026** at the university campus in Kolkata. The competition is being conducted in association with **Fox & Mandal** and **Khaitan & Co.** as the **Title Partners**, along with **R. L. Dutt & Co.**, **Guha & Co.**, and **VV Law Chambers (VVLC)** as the **Associate Title Partners**. The competition is being convened by Dr. Siddhant Chandra as the Convenor, with Dr. Subhajit Chakraborty serving as the Co-Convenor. The Student Convenor for XMC’26 is Mr. Debdeep Giri, assisted by Ms. Emun Aman as the Joint Student Convenor. The vision behind organising **XMC’26** is to promote the significance of Alternative Dispute Resolution as an efficient, collaborative, and forward-looking mechanism for resolving disputes. The competition aims to equip participants with essential practical skills such as negotiation, communication, and problem-solving, thereby contributing to their holistic professional development. The **three-day event** will comprise **four competitive rounds**, namely the **Preliminary Rounds, Quarter-finals, Semi-finals**, and the **Final**. ## **Eligibility** Students pursuing three-year or five-year LL.B. programmes from any law school, college, university, or institution recognised by the Bar Council of India are eligible to participate. LL.M. students are also eligible. Students from any year or semester may form teams to participate. **Cross-semester, cross-institution as well as independent teams are permitted.** ## **Composition of Teams** Each team shall consist of three members: **one Client, one Counsel, and one Mediator**. **The Client and Counsel together shall form the Negotiating Pair**, whereas the **Mediator shall perform in an individual capacity.** The roles of the participants shall **not be interchangeable once the registration of the team has been confirmed**. ## **Mode and Duration** The **4th Xavier Mediation Competition 2026 (XMC’26)** will be organised in **offline mode** at **St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata** from **26th to 28th March 2026**. ## **Registration Fee** The **Team Registration Fee** is **INR 5,400 for domestic teams**. For international teams from **SAARC nations**, the fee is **USD 70**, while teams from **non-SAARC countries** are required to pay **USD 110**. ## **Prizes and Rewards** **Prize Pool: ₹3,00,000+** - Best Negotiating Pair – **₹1,50,000** along with **the XMC-Champions Cup** - Best Mediator – **₹75,000**, along with **the XMC-Magis Cup** - Runner-Up Negotiating Pair – **₹50,000** - Runner-Up Mediator – **₹25,000** - Best Counsel – **The XMC-Legatus Cup** All winners will also receive **Medals and Certificates** **of Merit** for their performance. ## **Internship Opportunities** Winners will receive **Paid Internship Opportunities**, including opportunities with **Fox & Mandal, Khaitan & Co., R. L. Dutt & Co., Guha & Co., VV Law Chambers (VVLC), SettleWiseNow, The Amikus Qriae, Dexon Global, LawFoyer**, and other esteemed legal professionals, along with several other academic as well as professional benefits. ## **Important Dates** - **Release of Mediation Problem:** 25 February 2026 - **Last Date for Seeking Clarifications:** 18 March 2026 - **Release of Clarifications:** 22 March 2026 - **Last Date for Team Registration:** 21 March 2026 - **Competition Dates:** 26th, 27th and 28th March 2026 ## **Brochure & Important Documents** [https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1dJej5YaFdH547J0JV5L\_V06jzGzxxW9I](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1dJej5YaFdH547J0JV5L_V06jzGzxxW9I) ## **Registration Link:** [https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdH5KiZuRRmtYt8c9bauXpTuf8ml-wY\_hynSFO1pika5QK0HA/viewform](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdH5KiZuRRmtYt8c9bauXpTuf8ml-wY_hynSFO1pika5QK0HA/viewform) ## **SXUK Website:** [https://www.sxuk.edu.in/upcoming\_events](https://www.sxuk.edu.in/upcoming_events) ## **Instagram Handle :** [https://www.instagram.com/xslaj\_sxuk?igsh=NTNidTNldGoxNzU0](https://www.instagram.com/xslaj_sxuk?igsh=NTNidTNldGoxNzU0) ## **Contact Us:** For any queries or clarifications regarding the competition, please feel free to reach out to us at: **Email:** ## **Event Representatives:** - **Aditi Roy Chowdhury** – +91 79806 64946 - **Haris Daniyel** – +91 86974 68555 - **Vanshika Pareek** – +91 90382 99898 **Categories:** Events, Other Competitions --- ### [2ND JUDEXIS MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by Lex Gazette Academy | Register by 12th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/2nd-judexis-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-lex-gazette-academy-register-by-12th-april-2026/) **Published:** March 13, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 2ND JUDEXIS MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by Lex Gazette Academy | Register by 12th April 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/ARTICLE-WRITING-PNG-1024x722.png) ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY** Lex Gazette Academy stands as an independent academic and research-driven institution, established under the patronage of the Ram Shree Education Research and Social Welfare Foundation—a not-for-profit organization registered under the Madhya Pradesh Societies Registration Act and duly listed with NITI Aayog, Government of India. Functioning as the dedicated educational and intellectual arm of the Foundation, the Academy is committed to advancing quality education, cutting-edge research, and interdisciplinary innovation that responds to the dynamic needs of society. At its core, Lex Gazette Academy serves as a vibrant hub for students, scholars, educators, practitioners, and professionals, offering a wide spectrum of programs ranging from international and national conferences, seminars, workshops, guest lectures, training sessions, certificate courses, and faculty development programs. With a distinctive focus on law, social sciences, and business studies, the Academy integrates academic rigor with practical exposure, encouraging critical thinking, policy-oriented research, experiential learning, and community engagement. Guided by the values of service, empowerment, inclusivity, and integrity, Lex Gazette Academy envisions creating an ecosystem where knowledge transcends disciplinary boundaries. By fostering an environment that bridges academia, industry, policy, and practice, the Academy strives to nurture leaders, thinkers, and changemakers who can address contemporary global challenges with informed perspectives and innovative solutions. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY** The 2nd Judexis Moot Court Competition, organized by Lex Gazette Academy, is a national-level academic initiative designed to promote excellence in legal research, advocacy, and courtroom practice among law students across India. Following the successful completion of its first edition, the second edition aims to provide participants with an intellectually rigorous platform to engage in advanced legal problem-solving through memorial drafting and oral submissions. The competition seeks to simulate real court proceedings, enabling students to develop analytical reasoning, interpretation of law, and professional advocacy skills. The Judexis Moot Court Competition encourages participants to explore contemporary legal issues while adhering to high standards of academic integrity, procedural discipline, and professional conduct. Through structured rounds and evaluation by experienced academicians and legal professionals, the competition aspires to nurture future litigators, researchers, and legal scholars. **The event will be conducted on 18th and 19th April 2026, with a total prize pool of ₹1,20,000, reaffirming Lex Gazette Academy’s commitment to strengthening practical legal education and mooting culture in India.** ## **WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** The competition is open to students who are duly enrolled and pursuing full-time undergraduate law programmes, including: - Five-Year Integrated LL.B. Course, or - Three-Year LL.B. Course, at any recognized university or law institution. Students enrolled in postgraduate programmes, diploma courses, distance learning programmes, or short-term certification courses are not eligible to participate in the competition. ## **MODE OF THE EVENT** Online ## LOCATION (COUNTRY/STATE/CITY) & VENUE OF THE EVENT Google Meet ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE** - The deadline for registration is 20 April 2025, by 11:59:59 PM. All participating teams must complete the online registration process on or before this date. - A registration fee of ₹4,500 per team is applicable. - Teams are required to register by duly filling out the official registration form available at: - Registration shall be deemed complete only upon successful payment of the prescribed registration fee and submission of the Google Form. - A confirmation email shall be sent by the Organising Committee within 48 hours of successful completion of the registration process. - All official communications shall be made exclusively with the Team’s designated Point of Contact (POC). - The registration fee is strictly non-refundable under any circumstances. - Registration is subject to the fulfilment of all eligibility criteria as prescribed in the Competition Rules. The Organising Committee reserves the right to cancel the registration of any team found ineligible at any stage of the competition. ## **FEE DETAILS** A registration fee of ₹4,500 per team is applicable. ## **PRIZES** Total Prize Pool: **INR 1.2 Lakh** ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - Registrations Open: 12 March 2026 - Registrations Close: 20 April 2026 - Allotment of Team Code: 25 April 2026 - Written Memorial Deadline: 30 April 2026 - Researcher Test: 09 May 2026 - Preliminary Rounds: 09 May 2026 - Quarters, Semi, Final Rounds: 10 May 2026 - Valedictory: 10 May 2026 ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** **Email:** - info@lexgazette.com - adminoffice@lexgazette.com **Phone:** +91-8319948227 ## **OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / LINK OF THE OFFICIAL BROCHURE, RULES & REGULATIONS ETC.** - **Official website:-** - **Download Brochure:** – - **Download Moot Problem :-** - **Rule Book:-** **Categories:** Events, Moot Courts --- ### [IPC and BNS Basics Explained: Structure, Application, Definitions and Key Differences](https://lawfoyer.in/ipc-and-bns-basics-explained-structure-application-definitions-and-key-differences/) **Published:** March 14, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Gemini_Generated_Image_4vjqgp4vjqgp4vjq-2-572x1024.png) ### Introduction For a long time, the **Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)** served as India’s principal substantive criminal law. It defined offences, fixed punishments, and supplied the general principles that courts use to decide criminal liability. That position has now changed. The **Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS)** came into force on **1 July 2024**, and **section 358** repealed the IPC, while also saving past actions, liabilities, and proceedings under the old law. One important exception is that the enforcement note to the official text records that **section 106(2) BNS** did not commence on 1 July 2024 along with the rest of the Act. So, in simple words, **IPC is the old penal code** and **BNS is the new penal code now in force in India**. However, the IPC still matters for understanding older case law, older prosecutions, and the historical development of criminal law principles in India. ### What IPC and BNS actually do Both IPC and BNS are **substantive criminal laws**. They tell us: - what conduct amounts to an offence - what mental element may be required - what exceptions excuse criminal liability - what punishment can be imposed They do **not** mainly deal with procedure of investigation and trial. Procedure now lies in the **Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)**, just as earlier procedure lay in the CrPC. Evidence is now governed by the **Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)**, earlier the Indian Evidence Act. ### Basic purpose of the IPC The IPC was enacted in **1860** as a general penal code for India. It organised criminal law into chapters dealing with offences against the State, the human body, property, public order, religion, reputation, and several other areas. Over time, Parliament amended it repeatedly, and courts interpreted it through a large body of precedent. ### Basic purpose of the BNS The BNS, enacted in **2023** and enforced from **1 July 2024**, states that it is a law **to consolidate and amend the provisions relating to offences and matters connected with them**. In broad terms, it keeps much of the old IPC structure, but it also reorganises it, adds new offences, removes some outdated provisions, and changes some punishments and definitions. ### Structure of IPC and BNS **IPC structure** The IPC contains **511 sections** and is traditionally treated as having **23 chapters**, though later insertions created additional chapter groupings through amendments. Its early chapters deal with introduction, general explanations, punishments, general exceptions, abetment, conspiracy, and then move into specific offences. **BNS structure** The BNS contains **358 sections in 20 chapters**. It reorganises the old arrangement and brings scattered material together in a more compact form. Official and police training material comparing the two laws notes that the reduction in section numbers happened because several provisions were consolidated and definitions and punishments were placed more compactly. **Why the structural change matters** This structural change matters for students and practitioners because **section numbers have changed across the board**. A person who knows IPC section numbers cannot assume that the same number in BNS means the same thing. The safer method is to understand the **topic and concept first**, and only then map the corresponding section. ### Application of IPC and BNS **Territorial application** Under the BNS, every person is liable for acts or omissions contrary to the Sanhita if committed **within India**. It also applies to certain offences committed **beyond India**, including offences by Indian citizens outside India, offences on Indian registered ships and aircraft, and offences committed outside India that target a computer resource located in India. These rules appear in **section 1(3) to 1(5)**. The IPC also had territorial and extra territorial reach through **sections 2 to 4**, but the BNS states these ideas in a more consolidated opening provision. **Saving of special laws** The BNS expressly says that it does not affect laws dealing with mutiny and desertion in the armed forces or the provisions of any **special or local law**. This continues an old legislative pattern that already existed in the IPC. Therefore, the BNS is the general penal law, but it coexists with special statutes such as the UAPA, NDPS Act, POCSO Act, Prevention of Corruption Act, and others. ### Definitions and General Explanations **IPC method** In the IPC, definitions were spread across **Chapter II, sections 6 to 52A**. So, the student had to move through many separate sections to understand terms like gender, injury, good faith, judge, local law, special law, and so on. **BNS method** The BNS tries to simplify this by putting core definitions into **section 2**, followed by **section 3 on general explanations**. This is one of the most practical drafting changes in the new law. **Important BNS definitions to remember** Under **section 2 BNS**: - **“child”** means a person below **18 years** - **“document”** includes **electronic and digital record** - **“gender”** includes male, female, and **transgender** - **“month” and “year”** are to be reckoned according to the **Gregorian calendar** These are small looking changes, but they matter. They show a move toward clearer drafting and recognition of modern documentary forms and identity categories. **A useful comparison** The IPC said that “year” and “month” are to be understood according to the **British calendar**. The BNS replaces that with the **Gregorian calendar**. This is a symbolic but meaningful move away from colonial legislative language. **General exceptions** The BNS continues the familiar idea of **general exceptions** such as infancy, unsoundness of mind, intoxication in limited circumstances, mistake of fact, judicial acts, accident, necessity, consent, benefit, and private defence. Although some summaries outside the statute describe a shift to the phrase “mental illness,” the official BNS text available on India Code still carries **section 22: act of a person of unsound mind**. So the correct position should be taken from the enacted text itself. **Punishments under IPC and BNS** The IPC recognised punishments such as death, imprisonment for life, imprisonment, forfeiture of property, and fine. The BNS retains these and adds **community service** as a punishment under **section 4**. That is one of the clearest conceptual changes in the new penal law. This addition shows that the BNS is not only punitive in a traditional sense. In minor cases, it also allows a more restorative and socially useful response. ### Key differences between IPC and BNS **1. BNS replaces IPC and repeals it expressly** This is the most basic difference. The IPC is no longer the operative penal code for new cases after the commencement of BNS. **Section 358 BNS** expressly repeals the IPC, though old liabilities and proceedings are protected by the savings clause. **2. Fewer sections, tighter arrangement** IPC had **511 sections**. BNS has **358 sections**. This does not mean criminal law became small. It means the law has been **rearranged and consolidated**. **3. Definitions are more compact in BNS** IPC scattered definitions through many sections. BNS places a large set of foundational definitions inside **section 2**, which makes reading easier for a beginner. **4. Community service is a new punishment** BNS **section 4(f)** adds community service. IPC had no comparable general punishment clause of this kind. **5. New offences added in BNS** BNS introduces or expressly recognises several offences that the IPC either did not contain in this form or did not separately structure, including: - **organised crime** under **section 111** - **petty organised crime** under **section 112** - **terrorist act** under **section 113** - **snatching** under **section 304** - **group murder on specified grounds** in **section 103(2)**, often discussed as a mob lynching provision - **sexual intercourse by deceitful means** under **section 69** - **abetment outside India for offence in India** under **section 48** **6. Sedition under IPC is not reproduced in the same form** IPC **section 124A** punished sedition. BNS does not reproduce that section as such. Instead, **section 152 BNS** penalises acts endangering the **sovereignty, unity and integrity of India**, including secessionist and subversive activity. So the legal vocabulary has changed, though debates continue about how different the practical reach really is. **7. Some offences omitted because the constitutional position changed** The IPC contained **section 497 (adultery)** and **section 377 (unnatural offences)**. The BNS does not carry these forward as penal offences in the old form. This aligns with major constitutional developments in the Supreme Court. ### Important new BNS provisions **Organised crime** **Section 111 BNS** creates a detailed offence of organised crime. It covers continuing unlawful activity by crime syndicates and expressly includes conduct such as kidnapping, robbery, vehicle theft, extortion, contract killing, land grabbing, human trafficking, cybercrime, and economic offences. Where death results, punishment can extend to **death or life imprisonment**, with heavy minimum fines. **Petty organised crime** **Section 112 BNS** addresses gang based recurring lower level criminality such as theft, snatching, cheating, ticket black marketing, betting or gambling, and selling public examination question papers. This is significant because the law now separately recognises repeated gang based petty crime as a structural problem. **Terrorist act** **Section 113 BNS** defines terrorist act and also clarifies that an officer not below the rank of **Superintendent of Police** decides whether the case should be registered under BNS or under the **UAPA**. This shows that BNS overlaps with special anti terror law, but does not displace it. **Snatching** The IPC did not have a separate standalone offence of **snatching**. BNS **section 304** now defines it as a form of theft where the offender suddenly, quickly, or forcibly seizes movable property from a person or from that person’s possession. ### Foundational case law that still helps in understanding IPC and BNS **Tolaram Relumal v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 496** This is a classic rule of interpretation in penal law. The Supreme Court held that when a penal provision is genuinely ambiguous, courts should not stretch it harshly against the accused. This principle still matters under BNS because **penal statutes continue to require strict construction**. **Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955** This Constitution Bench upheld IPC **section 124A** but limited its application to acts involving intention or tendency to create disorder or incitement to violence. The case remains important historically because any comparison between old sedition law and new BNS **section 152** must begin here. **Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39** The Supreme Court struck down **section 497 IPC** on constitutional grounds. This is one reason adultery no longer appears in the new penal code as a crime in the old form. The case shows how constitutional morality can reshape substantive criminal law. **Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1** The Supreme Court read down **section 377 IPC** to the extent it criminalised consensual sexual relations between adults. The BNS does not reproduce section 377 in that old form. This case therefore marks a major constitutional transition from colonial criminal morality to dignity, privacy, and equality. ### Quick comparison table PointIPCBNSStatusOld penal codeCurrent penal code in forceYear18602023In forceHistorical relevance, saved for old mattersEnforced from 1 July 2024Sections511358ChaptersAbout 23, with later insertions20Core definitionsScattered in Chapter IIConsolidated mainly in section 2New punishmentNo community serviceCommunity service addedSeditionSection 124ANot retained in same form; section 152 used insteadNew offencesNo separate organised crime, terrorist act, snatching in this formatSeparate provisions addedAdultery / old 377 formPresent in IPC textNot carried forward in same form### Conclusion IPC gave India the classical framework of criminal law. BNS keeps much of that framework but updates the language, compresses the structure, introduces new offences, adds community service, removes some provisions that became constitutionally untenable, and shifts the penal code toward present day concerns such as organised crime, terrorism, digital evidence linked concepts, and modern forms of street crime. **Categories:** Articles --- ### [HNLU crowned as National Champions of the India Qualifying Rounds to compete at the World Rounds of 67th Philip C. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition, 2026 at Washington DC](https://lawfoyer.in/hnlu-crowned-as-national-champions-of-the-india-qualifying-rounds-to-compete-at-the-the-world-moot-court-competition-at-washington-dc-2026/) **Published:** February 17, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Content:** **Raipur, Chhattisgarh** Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur, proudly announces the exceptional achievement of its mooting team in being crowned **Champions of the India Qualifying Rounds of the 67th Philip C. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition, 2026**, held at Jindal Global Law School. Competing in a highly competitive field featuring **65 premier law schools from across India**, HNLU advanced to the **Top 9 qualifying teams** before ultimately securing the **Championship Title**, marking a moment of immense pride and distinction for the University. This landmark victory reaffirms HNLU’s long-standing tradition of excellence in mooting and public international law. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Students-photo-1024x473.jpeg) **The Winning Team** - **Gurnish** – 5th Year - **Kushika Kumari** – 4th Year - **Anahita Panda** – 3rd Year - **Kashish Malhota** – 2nd Year With this remarkable triumph, the HNLU team has earned the honour of representing India at the **World Rounds in Washington, D.C.**, where they will compete against leading law schools from across the globe. ***Prof.V.C.Vivekanandan, Vice-Chancellor remarked, “ HNLU is making its mark as a frontline mooting team in various National and International Moots and this qualifiers second time in a row in the last two outings is a motivational win for all the young mooters in the making at HNLU. The talent pool of mooters have enlarged exponentially with the new experiment of moot clinic replacing the midterm exam giving equal opportunity to all the students to excel. Dr. Anindhya Tiwari, faculty convenor of HNLU moots and his team deserve due recognition for their work on the mooting competitions. HNLU fraternity congratulates the team of Gurnish, Kushika, Anahita and Kashish for bringing the laurels to the University.*** **About the 2026 Jessup Problem** The 2026 Jessup moot proposition, *Case Concerning the Gordian Gorge between Alekostria and Restovia*, presented complex and contemporary issues of public international law, including: - The permissibility of intervention by a non-party state, Sollania - The doctrine of **Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC)** of indigenous peoples in extractive activities - Recognition of **ne bis in idem** as a general principle under Article 38(1)(c) of the International Court of Justice Statute - Grant of **state immunity to state-owned enterprises** The team demonstrated exceptional command over international jurisprudence, doctrinal nuance, and courtroom advocacy, impressing judges through analytical depth and persuasive submissions. **A Testament to Excellence** This achievement reflects: - The team’s relentless dedication and intellectual rigor - The strategic mentorship and academic guidance provided by the faculty - HNLU’s sustained institutional commitment to mooting excellence Wish to showcase your achievement to the world and inspire others? LawFoyer will celebrate your achievement because every achievement deserves recognition. Your achievement is our achievement. Share your achievement with us. Visit: **Categories:** Achievers Archive --- ### [3rd Case Analysis Competition, 2026 | Organized by Environmental Law Society (ELS), Faculty of Law, Integral University, Lucknow | Register by 20th March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-case-analysis-competition-2026-organized-by-environmental-law-society-els-faculty-of-law-integral-university-lucknow-register-by-20th-march-2026/) **Published:** March 15, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 3rd Case Analysis Competition, 2026 | Organized by Environmental Law Society (ELS), Faculty of Law, Integral University, Lucknow | Register by 20th March 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/3rd-case-analysis-competition_20260219_122414_0000-234cf6baddab8fd25af8069481d38c20-724x1024.webp) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER / UNIVERSITY The Environmental Law Society (ELS), Faculty of Law, Integral University, Lucknow is organising the **3rd Case Analysis Competition, 2026**. Integral University is a **UGC-recognized institution established under Act No. 9 of 2004**, accredited with an **A+ grade by NAAC**, and approved by multiple national regulatory bodies. The **Faculty of Law** offers undergraduate, postgraduate, and doctoral programmes and focuses on academic excellence, legal research, and practical legal training. The **Environmental Law Society (ELS)** is a student-led initiative that promotes environmental awareness and legal scholarship through workshops, seminars, field engagement, and academic competitions. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY The **3rd Case Analysis Competition, 2026** is a **national-level academic writing competition** focusing on **Environmental Law**. The competition aims to enhance participants’: - Legal research skills - Analytical reasoning - Legal writing ability Participants are required to prepare a **case analysis on one of the prescribed landmark environmental law cases**. Submission Guidelines: - The manuscript must be **original and unpublished**. - Word Limit: **2000–3000 words (including citations)** - Language: **English** - Citation Style: **ILI Rules of Footnoting** Formatting Requirements: - Font: **Times New Roman** - Font Size: **12** - Line Spacing: **1.5** - Footnotes: **Font Size 10, Single Spacing** Additional Requirements: - A **cover page containing participant details** is mandatory. - The **main manuscript must not contain any identifying information**. - **Plagiarism above 15% will lead to disqualification.** ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE - Open to **Undergraduate and Postgraduate Law Students** enrolled in any recognized institution or university in **India**. - **Single authorship** and **co-authorship (maximum two authors)** are permitted. ## MODE OF THE EVENT **Online / Virtual Mode** ## LOCATION & VENUE **India (Virtual Event – Online Submission Only)** No hard copy submission is required. All registrations and submissions will be completed **online**. ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE Participants must complete registration through the official form and upload proof of payment. **Registration Form:** **Submission Form:** Submissions must be uploaded in **Microsoft Word format (.doc/.docx)**. ## FEE DETAILS - **Single Author:** ₹150 - **Co-Author:** ₹200 Payment Methods: **UPI ID:** abdussameefaridi@oksbi **Bank Transfer Details:** - Account Number: 42383246231 - IFSC Code: SBIN0009916 - Account Holder: Abdus Samee Faridi Participants must **upload the payment screenshot** in the registration form. ## PRIZES - **Winner:** Cash Prize + Trophy + Physical Certificate of Achievement - **1st Runner-Up:** Cash Prize + Trophy + Physical Certificate of Achievement - **2nd Runner-Up:** Cash Prize + Trophy + Physical Certificate of Achievement - **4th and 5th Position Holders:** Physical Certificate of Achievement - **All Participants:** E-Certificate ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES - **Registration Starts:** 3rd February 2026 - **Registration Ends:** 20th March 2026 - **Submission Deadline:** 5th April 2026 - **Announcement of Results:** 15th April 2026 ## CONTACT INFORMATION **Email:** els.facultyoflaw.iul@gmail.com - **Hassan Sarwar (Convener):** +91 96700 09142 - **Khubaib Rehman (Convener):** +91 76519 24369 - **Mariya Firdaus (Secretary):** +91 63882 35567 - **Abdus Samee Faridi (Treasurer):** +91 63929 89872 ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / BROCHURE - **Official Brochure:** **Categories:** Events, Other Competitions --- ### [Legal Startup Online Pitching Competition, 2026 – 2.0 [Be the Next Founder] | Organized by LegalWiki | Register by 15 March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/legal-startup-online-pitching-competition-2026-2-0-be-the-next-founder-organized-by-legalwiki-register-by-15-march-2026/) **Published:** March 12, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** Legal Startup Online Pitching Competition, 2026 – 2.0 [Be the Next Founder] | Organized by LegalWiki | Register by 15 March 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Startup-Competition-1024x576.jpg) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER / PLATFORM LegalWiki is a platform focused on simplifying legal news, career guidance, and skill-building for law students and legal professionals. The platform works to address challenges within the legal community by providing practical, job-ready programs designed in collaboration with leading law firms and industry experts. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY The **Legal Startup Pitching Competition, 2026 – 2.0** is an online startup pitching event designed to promote innovation in the legal sector. Participants will present ideas for products or services that address challenges in the legal domain. Participants can pitch ideas such as: - Legal-tech platforms - Mobile applications - Legal automation tools - Legal education or awareness initiatives - Justice access solutions - Innovative service models within the legal ecosystem Participants will present their ideas before a jury of experts and will receive opportunities for mentorship, recognition, and rewards. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE - Open to **everyone regardless of background** - Suitable for **law students, legal professionals, innovators, and entrepreneurs** - Early-stage ideas are allowed; **the product does not need to be built yet** ## TEAM DETAILS - **Solo participation allowed** - Teams of **2–4 members** permitted ## MODE OF THE EVENT **Online** ## SUBMISSION & COMPETITION STRUCTURE - Participants must submit their **business idea/proposal in PDF format**. - The competition will be conducted in **two rounds**: - **Preliminary Round:** March 28, 2026 - **Final Round:** March 29, 2026 - **Top 5 teams** from the preliminary round will advance to the final round. - All teams must present their business plan through a **PowerPoint presentation**. ## PITCH FORMAT (RECOMMENDED SLIDE STRUCTURE) 1. Title Slide – Startup Name, Tagline, Team Details 2. Problem Statement – Legal issue being solved 3. Your Solution – Overview and innovation 4. Market Fit & Legal Relevance – Target users and importance 5. Business Model & Scalability – Growth and sustainability plan 6. Tech/Execution Plan – Tools or platform used 7. Impact & Future Vision – Social or legal impact 8. Team Details – Roles and strengths *(8–10 slides recommended, presentation time: 10–15 minutes including Q&A)* ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE Register through the official registration link: [https://pages.razorpay.com/pl\_SEPr11Zvjzw3St/view](https://pages.razorpay.com/pl_SEPr11Zvjzw3St/view) After registering, participants must send their **proposal (PDF format)** to: **legalwikilaw@gmail.com** ## FEE DETAILS - **Solo Participation:** ₹899 - **Team (2–4 Members):** ₹1,499 ## PRIZES - **Winner:** ₹8,000 + Mentorship + Certificate Course worth Rs. 10K + Internship Opportunity\* + Investment by Judges\* - **1st Runner-Up:** ₹5,000 + Mentorship + Certificate Course worth Rs. 10K + Investment by Judges\* - **2nd Runner-Up:** ₹3,000 + Mentorship + Certificate Course worth Rs. 10K\* **Special Awards:** - Most Innovative Idea: ₹2,000 - Best Solo Pitch: ₹2,000 All participants will receive a **Certificate of Participation**. ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES - **Registration Deadline:** March 15, 2026 - **Proposal Submission Deadline:** March 22, 2026 (11:59 PM) - **Preliminary Round:** March 28, 2026 - **Final Round:** March 29, 2026 - **Result Announcement:** March 29, 2026 at 6:00 PM (via Email & LinkedIn) *Note: Seats are limited to **30 teams**, and registrations will be accepted on a **first-come, first-served basis**.* ## CONTACT INFORMATION - **Phone:** 8755924737 - **Email:** legalwikilaw@gmail.com ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT - **Registration Link:** [https://pages.razorpay.com/pl\_SEPr11Zvjzw3St/view](https://pages.razorpay.com/pl_SEPr11Zvjzw3St/view) **Categories:** Events, Other Competitions --- ### [Gayatri Balasamy v. M/s ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited, 2025 INSC 605.](https://lawfoyer.in/gayatri-balasamy-v-m-s-isg-novasoft-technologies-limited-2025-insc-605/) **Published:** March 13, 2026 **Author:** Prakhar Singh **Excerpt:** The decision in Gayatri Balasamy v. M/s ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited represents a landmark clarification in Indian arbitration jurisprudence regarding judicial powers under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The central controversy concerned whether Indian courts possess authority to modify an arbitral award while adjudicating challenges to such awards. Prior to this ruling, judicial opinions of the Supreme Court showed divergence. Certain judgments permitted limited modification in specific circumstances. Others insisted that courts could only set aside an arbitral award, not alter it. The dispute therefore required authoritative resolution by a Constitution Bench. The Court examined the statutory scheme of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 alongside the UNCITRAL Model Law, comparative international practices, and established principles governing arbitration. The Bench analyzed earlier precedents including Project Director, NHAI v. M. Hakeem (2021) 9 SCC 1, McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. (2006) 11 SCC 181, and Vedanta Ltd. v. Shenzhen Shandong Nuclear Power Construction Co. Ltd. (2019) 11 SCC 465. These decisions illustrated conflicting interpretations of judicial power in arbitration matters. The Court ultimately held that Indian courts possess a limited power to modify arbitral awards. This power is not equivalent to appellate review and must remain confined within the statutory structure of Section 34. The judgment recognized certain narrow situations where modification is permissible, such as severable awards, clerical or computational errors, modification of post-award interest, or exercise of Article 142 powers by the Supreme Court. This ruling significantly balances two competing objectives. On one side lies the principle of minimal judicial intervention in arbitration. On the other side lies the need to avoid prolonged litigation and unnecessary re-arbitration. The judgment therefore introduces a pragmatic interpretation that allows courts to correct limited defects without undermining the autonomy of arbitral tribunals. **Content:** ### A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The decision in ***Gayatri Balasamy v. M/s ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited*** represents a landmark clarification in Indian arbitration jurisprudence regarding judicial powers under ***Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996***. The central controversy concerned whether Indian courts possess authority to **modify an arbitral award** while adjudicating challenges to such awards. Prior to this ruling, judicial opinions of the Supreme Court showed divergence. Certain judgments permitted limited modification in specific circumstances. Others insisted that courts could only **set aside an arbitral award**, not alter it. The dispute therefore required authoritative resolution by a Constitution Bench. The Court examined the statutory scheme of the ***Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996*** alongside the **UNCITRAL Model Law**, comparative international practices, and established principles governing arbitration. The Bench analyzed earlier precedents including ***Project Director, NHAI v. M. Hakeem (2021) 9 SCC 1***, ***McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. (2006) 11 SCC 181***, and ***Vedanta Ltd. v. Shenzhen Shandong Nuclear Power Construction Co. Ltd. (2019) 11 SCC 465***. These decisions illustrated conflicting interpretations of judicial power in arbitration matters. The Court ultimately held that **Indian courts possess a limited power to modify arbitral awards**. This power is not equivalent to appellate review and must remain confined within the statutory structure of Section 34. The judgment recognized certain narrow situations where modification is permissible, such as **severable awards, clerical or computational errors, modification of post-award interest, or exercise of Article 142 powers by the Supreme Court**. This ruling significantly balances two competing objectives. On one side lies the **principle of minimal judicial intervention in arbitration**. On the other side lies the need to avoid prolonged litigation and unnecessary re-arbitration. The judgment therefore introduces a pragmatic interpretation that allows courts to correct limited defects without undermining the autonomy of arbitral tribunals. **Keywords:** Arbitration law, arbitral award modification, Section 34 Arbitration Act, judicial intervention, severability doctrine, post-award interest. ### B) CASE DETAILS i) Judgement Cause Title ***Gayatri Balasamy v. M/s ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited*** ii) Case Number Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 15336–15337 of 2021 and connected matters. iii) Judgement Date 30 April 2025. iv) Court ***Supreme Court of India*** v) Quorum Five-Judge Constitution Bench. vi) Author ***Chief Justice Sanjiv Khanna*** (for the Bench) vii) Citation 2025 INSC 605. viii) Legal Provisions Involved: - *Section 5, 31, 33, 34, 37, 43, 48 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996* - *Article 142 of Indian Constitution, 1950* ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case Partially reconsidered reasoning in ***Project Director, NHAI v. M. Hakeem (2021) 9 SCC 1***. x) Law Subjects Arbitration Law, Commercial Law, Civil Procedure, Alternative Dispute Resolution. ### C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT Arbitration forms an essential component of modern commercial dispute resolution. It promotes speedy adjudication. It reduces court burden. The ***Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996*** embodies this legislative objective. The statute emphasizes **minimal judicial interference**. This principle emerges from ***Section 5 of the Act***. It restricts courts from intervening except where expressly permitted. However, a major interpretative dispute emerged regarding ***Section 34 of the Act***. The provision allows courts to **set aside arbitral awards** on limited grounds. The statute does not expressly mention the power to modify awards. This textual silence produced divergent judicial interpretations. Earlier decisions such as ***McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. (2006) 11 SCC 181*** emphasized that courts cannot act as appellate authorities over arbitral tribunals. Arbitration findings of fact and law cannot ordinarily be re-examined. Judicial intervention remains limited to annulment of awards. The Court in that case clarified that the legislative design of the 1996 Act differs from the earlier ***Arbitration Act of 1940***. The 1940 statute permitted broader judicial review. However, later judgments occasionally modified awards while resolving disputes. For instance, ***Vedanta Ltd. v. Shenzhen Shandong Nuclear Power Construction Co. Ltd. (2019) 11 SCC 465*** modified the rate of interest in an international commercial arbitration award. Similarly, ***Oriental Structural Engineers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Kerala (2021) 6 SCC 150*** altered interest components awarded by the tribunal. The judgment in ***Project Director, NHAI v. M. Hakeem (2021) 9 SCC 1*** adopted a stricter interpretation. The Court held that Section 34 courts can only set aside awards. They cannot modify them. This reasoning triggered debate across the arbitration community. Conflicting precedents created legal uncertainty. Consequently, the present dispute required authoritative clarification by a larger Bench of the Supreme Court. ### D) FACTS OF THE CASE The dispute arose from arbitration proceedings involving employment-related contractual issues between ***Gayatri Balasamy*** and ***ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited***. Arbitration was invoked under the contractual framework between the parties. The arbitral tribunal delivered an award resolving the claims. Subsequently, the award was challenged under ***Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996*** before the appropriate court. The challenge raised multiple objections regarding legality and correctness of portions of the award. The litigation progressed through appellate stages. During the proceedings before the Supreme Court, a significant legal issue emerged. The question was whether courts adjudicating Section 34 challenges could **modify specific parts of an award** instead of entirely setting it aside. Several prior decisions of the Court had allowed limited modifications. Others strictly prohibited them. Recognizing the importance of the issue, a three-judge bench referred the matter to the Chief Justice of India. The reference proposed consideration by a Constitution Bench. The purpose was to determine whether earlier precedents including ***Project Director NHAI v. M. Hakeem*** correctly interpreted the law. The matter therefore came before a **five-judge Constitution Bench**. The Court examined statutory provisions, comparative international arbitration laws, and judicial precedents. The bench analyzed whether the legislative scheme implicitly permitted limited modification powers. Thus, the dispute expanded beyond the individual parties. It became a constitutional interpretation concerning the **scope of judicial authority under Indian arbitration law**. ### E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether courts exercising jurisdiction under ***Section 34 Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996*** possess the power to **modify an arbitral award**. ii. Whether the power to **set aside an arbitral award inherently includes the power to partially modify it**. iii. Whether modification can be exercised only when the award is **severable**. iv. Whether earlier judgments including ***Project Director NHAI v. M. Hakeem (2021)*** correctly interpreted Section 34. v. Whether courts may modify **post-award interest** granted by arbitral tribunals. ### F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that **judicial precedent already recognizes limited modification powers**. Several Supreme Court judgments modified arbitral awards without expressly invoking Article 142. These decisions demonstrate that courts possess inherent authority within Section 34. Reliance was placed on ***Vedanta Ltd. v. Shenzhen Shandong Nuclear Power Construction Co. Ltd. (2019) 11 SCC 465***. In that case, the Supreme Court adjusted the rate of interest in an arbitral award involving foreign currency components. The Court aligned interest rates with international financial norms. This example indicated that modification powers have been exercised in practice. The petitioner further invoked the maxim ***“omne majus continet in se minus”***. The principle means that **the greater power includes the lesser power**. If courts possess authority to completely set aside an award, they must also possess the lesser power to partially modify it. Reference was made to ***Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society v. State of Gujarat (1974) 1 SCC 717*** where this maxim was discussed. The petitioner also argued that **international arbitration regimes allow such modification powers**. Jurisdictions like the United Kingdom, Singapore, and Australia permit limited judicial intervention to correct arbitral awards. Indian arbitration law must evolve consistently with global arbitration standards. The petitioner additionally emphasized practical considerations. Setting aside an award entirely often forces parties into **fresh arbitration proceedings**. This process is costly and time-consuming. Arbitration aims to deliver speedy justice. Therefore, courts should possess power to correct limited defects rather than nullifying awards completely. Finally, the petitioner argued that courts must retain authority to **modify interest components** of arbitral awards. Interest rates often depend on post-award circumstances. Arbitrators cannot foresee future developments. Judicial modification therefore ensures fairness. ### G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Respondent submitted that the ***Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996*** deliberately restricts judicial intervention. Section 34 clearly states that the only recourse against an arbitral award is **setting aside the award**. The provision does not mention modification. The respondent relied heavily on ***Project Director, NHAI v. M. Hakeem (2021) 9 SCC 1***. That judgment held that courts cannot modify arbitral awards because the statute does not authorize such power. Expanding judicial authority would contradict legislative intent. It was further argued that arbitration law is based on the ***UNCITRAL Model Law***. The Model Law restricts courts to annulment of awards. It does not permit modification. Indian courts must follow this international framework to maintain consistency with global arbitration practices. The respondent also argued that modification effectively converts courts into **appellate authorities over arbitral tribunals**. Arbitration functions as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism precisely to avoid extensive judicial review. Allowing modification would undermine the autonomy of arbitral tribunals. Another argument concerned enforcement of awards under the ***New York Convention 1958***. International enforcement mechanisms recognize arbitral awards, not court-modified decrees. If courts modify awards, the enforceability of such awards internationally may become uncertain. The respondent therefore contended that courts must restrict themselves to **either setting aside or upholding arbitral awards**. Any broader power must come through legislative amendment rather than judicial interpretation. ### H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. ***Section 34 Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996*** This provision permits a court to **set aside an arbitral award** on specific grounds. These grounds include incapacity of parties, invalid arbitration agreements, procedural unfairness, jurisdictional excess, and conflict with public policy. ii. ***Section 31(7) Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996*** This section governs the grant of **interest in arbitral awards**. It allows tribunals to award interest during the pendency of disputes and after the award. iii. ***Section 33 Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996*** This provision allows arbitral tribunals to **correct clerical, computational, or typographical errors** in awards. iv. ***Section 34(4) Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996*** This section allows courts to **remit the award to the arbitral tribunal** to cure defects. v. ***Article 142 Constitution of India*** This constitutional provision empowers the Supreme Court to pass orders necessary to **do complete justice between parties**. ### I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT ***McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. (2006) 11 SCC 181*** The Court held that arbitration awards cannot be corrected by courts. Courts may only set aside the award. Arbitration tribunals remain the masters of facts. ***Vedanta Ltd. v. Shenzhen Shandong Nuclear Power Construction Co. Ltd. (2019) 11 SCC 465*** The Court modified the interest rate in an international arbitration award to align with currency-based financial standards. ***Project Director, NHAI v. M. Hakeem (2021) 9 SCC 1*** The Court ruled that Section 34 only allows setting aside of awards. It rejected the possibility of modification. ***Ssangyong Engineering v. NHAI (2019) 15 SCC 131*** The Court held that interference with arbitral awards must be limited to violations of fundamental policy of Indian law. ***Numaligarh Refinery Ltd. v. Daelim Industrial Co. Ltd. (2007) 8 SCC 466*** The Court recognized that limited intervention may occur where the arbitrator acts without jurisdiction. ### H) JUDGEMENT ### a. RATIO DECIDENDI i. The Supreme Court held that **courts possess limited authority to modify arbitral awards**. ii. This power exists within the framework of ***Sections 34 and 37 Arbitration Act 1996***. iii. Modification may occur where the award is **severable**. Invalid portions may be removed. iv. Courts may correct **clerical, computational, or typographical errors** apparent on record. v. Courts may modify **post-award interest** where justice requires such modification. vi. The Supreme Court may exercise **Article 142 powers** to ensure complete justice. vii. Courts cannot undertake a **merits review** or act as appellate authorities. viii. The modification power must remain **narrow and exceptional**. ### b. OBITER DICTA i. Arbitration aims to deliver **speedy and cost-effective dispute resolution**. ii. Forcing parties into repeated arbitration proceedings defeats this objective. iii. Limited judicial correction may prevent unnecessary litigation. ### c. GUIDELINES 1. Courts must examine whether the **award is severable** before modifying it. 2. Modification cannot involve **re-evaluation of evidence**. 3. Courts should prefer **remand under Section 34(4)** when factual reconsideration is required. 4. Judicial intervention must respect the principle of **minimal interference**. 5. Modification should occur only when **error is apparent on the face of the record**. ### I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The ruling significantly clarifies Indian arbitration law. It resolves longstanding confusion created by conflicting precedents. The Court adopted a balanced interpretation. It preserved the principle of minimal judicial interference. Simultaneously, it allowed pragmatic correction of limited defects. The doctrine of **severability** forms the central foundation of the judgment. Courts may isolate defective portions of awards without disturbing valid determinations. This approach avoids unnecessary annulment of entire awards. The decision also strengthens efficiency in arbitration. Parties no longer face compulsory re-arbitration due to minor defects. Courts can now correct specific errors. This reduces delay and litigation costs. The judgment thus harmonizes Indian arbitration law with international practice while maintaining statutory discipline. ### J) REFERENCES ### a) Important Cases Referred i. ***McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd., (2006) 11 SCC 181*** ii. ***Vedanta Ltd. v. Shenzhen Shandong Nuclear Power Construction Co. Ltd., (2019) 11 SCC 465*** iii. ***Project Director, NHAI v. M. Hakeem, (2021) 9 SCC 1*** iv. ***Ssangyong Engineering v. NHAI, (2019) 15 SCC 131*** v. ***Numaligarh Refinery Ltd. v. Daelim Industrial Co. Ltd., (2007) 8 SCC 466*** ### b) Important Statutes Referred i. ***Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996*** ii. ***Constitution of India – Article 142*** iii. ***UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985*** iv. ***New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958*** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [1st NLIU National Symposium on Securities Law & Capital Markets, 2026 | Organized by National Law Institute University, Bhopal | Register by 23rd March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-nliu-national-symposium-on-securities-law-capital-markets-2026-organized-by-national-law-institute-university-bhopal-register-by-23rd-march-2026/) **Published:** March 13, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 1st NLIU National Symposium on Securities Law & Capital Markets, 2026 | Organized by National Law Institute University, Bhopal | Register by 23rd March 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/1st-national-symposium-on-security-law-and-capital-markets-1280-x-720-px-2-1-1024x576.png) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER / UNIVERSITY The **National Law Institute University (NLIU), Bhopal** was established by the Rashtriya Vidhi Sansthan Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam through Act No. 41 of 1997 enacted by the Madhya Pradesh State Legislature. The university is recognised by the University Grants Commission (UGC) and the Bar Council of India and aims to provide modern and comprehensive legal education through multidisciplinary teaching. The **Centre for Financial Markets and Regulatory Systems (CFMRS)** is a student-run academic initiative at NLIU that promotes informed engagement with financial governance, market regulation, and investor protection. The centre encourages structured research, policy discussions, seminars, and collaborations focusing on the intersection of law, finance, and public policy. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY The **1st NLIU National Symposium on Securities Law & Capital Markets, 2026** aims to provide a structured academic platform for academicians, practitioners, researchers, and students to deliberate upon contemporary legal and policy challenges within India’s securities regulation and capital markets ecosystem. The symposium will begin with a **certificate course on Securities Law and Capital Markets**, focusing on contemporary and practice-oriented developments in Indian securities regulation. It will then proceed with research paper presentation sessions organised into thematic panels. Key themes include: - Towards a Coherent Securities Law Code & Structural Reforms - Regulation of InvITs, REITs & Alternative Investment Structures - Primary Markets & Capital Formation - Secondary Markets, Market Infrastructure & Enforcement Paper presentation sessions will allow selected authors to present their research, followed by interactions and Q&A sessions with experts and participants. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE The symposium is open to: - Undergraduate law students (LL.B., B.A. LL.B., B.B.A. LL.B.) - Postgraduate (LL.M.) students - Doctoral scholars - Academicians and researchers - Advocates and legal practitioners - Professionals in banking, finance, and capital markets - Policy makers and regulatory officials Participants may submit papers **individually or in teams of up to two authors**. ## MODE OF THE EVENT Offline (In-Person Symposium) ## LOCATION & VENUE J.S. Verma Convention Centre, Rajiv Gandhi Cyber Law Centre, Academic Block-1 and Academic Block-2, National Law Institute University, Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE Participants must register through the following link: To successfully register, participants must: - Submit a full paper along with an abstract (maximum 350 words). - Ensure the submission aligns with one of the prescribed themes. - Complete payment of the applicable registration fee within the stipulated timeline. ## FEE DETAILS - **Single Author:** ₹3,500 - **Co-Authors (Maximum Two Authors):** ₹6,000 The registration fee includes meals during the symposium, transportation, conference materials, accommodation arranged by the organising committee, and a certificate of presentation. ## PRIZES - **Best Presenter:** ₹20,000 + Internship Opportunity with Luthra & Luthra Law Offices - **Second Best Presenter:** ₹12,000 + Internship Opportunity with Luthra & Luthra Law Offices - **Best Paper:** Internship Opportunity with Luthra & Luthra Law Offices Additional recognitions include: - Certificate of Merit for the Top 10 papers - Certificate of Participation for all presenting participants - Publication opportunity in an edited book with an ISBN number for selected papers Additional incentives from collaborators such as **CaseMine, LawFoyer, and Manupatra** include subscriptions, course access, discounts, and internship opportunities. ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES - **Symposium Dates:** 4–5 April 2026 - **Registration Deadline:** 23 March 2026 ## CONTACT INFORMATION **Ms. Sakshi Sharma** Convenor, Centre for Financial Markets and Regulatory Systems, NLIU Bhopal Phone: +91 84619 26245 **Mr. Priyanshu Kasliwal** Secretary, Centre for Financial Markets and Regulatory Systems, NLIU Bhopal Phone: +91 85292 75609 Email: cfmrs@nliu.ac.in ## OFFICIAL LINK / BROCHURE - **Brochure Link:** [https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/13JIvm6SJ\_5N3mEWS7h4o5u2zJNSWB5VB?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/13JIvm6SJ_5N3mEWS7h4o5u2zJNSWB5VB?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Call for Papers, Events, Other Competitions --- ### [1st Smt. Krishna Neotia Memorial Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by School of Legal Studies, The Neotia University | Register by 21st March, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-smt-krishna-neotia-memorial-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-school-of-legal-studies-the-neotia-university-register-by-21st-march-2026/) **Published:** March 13, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 1st Smt. Krishna Neotia Memorial Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by School of Legal Studies, The Neotia University | Register by 21st March, 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Screenshot-2026-03-13-215750.png) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER / COLLEGE / UNIVERSITY **The Neotia University (TNU)** was established under the West Bengal State Act of 2014 and is recognized by the University Grants Commission (UGC). Located near Kolkata on a 60-acre campus, the university offers industry-oriented undergraduate, postgraduate, and doctoral programs across disciplines such as Engineering, Law, Maritime Studies, Agriculture, Health Sciences, Management, Hospitality, and the Sciences. The university focuses on experiential learning, interdisciplinary collaboration, and skill-based education, supported by modern infrastructure, laboratories, and industry partnerships. Backed by the legacy of the Ambuja Neotia Group, TNU aims to develop responsible leaders, skilled professionals, and innovators who contribute meaningfully to society and industry. The **School of Legal Studies at The Neotia University** is dedicated to fostering academic excellence, professional competence, and ethical responsibility in legal education. The school emphasizes research, advocacy, drafting, and critical analysis while providing practical exposure through moot courts, internships, seminars, and workshops. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY The **1st Smt. Krishna Neotia Memorial Moot Court Competition, 2026** is a national-level moot court competition organized to encourage excellence in legal research, drafting, advocacy, and professional ethics among law students. The competition simulates real courtroom proceedings where participants argue fictional legal disputes before a panel of judges. Through written memorial submissions and oral advocacy rounds, participants demonstrate analytical reasoning, persuasive argumentation, and knowledge of substantive and procedural law. This inaugural edition is organized in memory of **Smt. Krishna Neotia** and aims to bring together talented law students from institutions across India to engage in rigorous courtroom simulations and intellectual discourse. The competition will include the following rounds: - Preliminary Rounds - Quarter-Final Rounds - Semi-Final Rounds - Final Round ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE The competition is open to students enrolled in: - LL.B. (3-Year Programme) - B.A. LL.B. (5-Year Programme) - BBA LL.B. (5-Year Programme) - LL.M. Programme **Team Composition:** - Each team must consist of **three members (two speakers and one researcher)**. - A team may also consist of **two members**, both acting as speakers. - Each institution may send **only one team**. ## MODE OF THE EVENT **Offline** ## LOCATION & VENUE OF THE EVENT Country: **India** State: **West Bengal** City: **Kolkata** Venue: **The Neotia University** ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE Participants must: 1. Fill out the official registration form. 2. Pay the registration fee of INR 1000 per team. 3. Submit the required details through the registration process. Registration will be confirmed only after the **form submission and fee payment are completed successfully**. **Registration Form:** For the moot problem and additional details, participants may also scan the **QR code provided in the brochure (page 4)**. ## FEE DETAILS **Registration Fee:** INR 1000 per team. ## PRIZES **Winning Team:** - Trophy - 3 Medals - Certificates of Excellence - Cash Prize of **INR 7000** **Runner-Up Team:** - Trophy - 3 Medals - Certificates of Excellence - Cash Prize of **INR 3000** **Best Speaker:** Medal + Certificate **Best Researcher:** Medal + Certificate **Best Memorial:** Certificate of Excellence ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES - Last Date for Clarification of Doubts: **14th March 2026** - Release of Clarifications: **20th March 2026** - Registration Deadline: **21st March 2026** - Memorial Submission (Soft Copy): **24th March 2026** - Inaugural Ceremony: **27th March 2026** - Preliminary Rounds: **27th March 2026** - Quarter-Final Rounds: **27th March 2026** - Semi-Final Rounds: **28th March 2026** - Final Round: **28th March 2026** ## CONTACT INFORMATION Email: **mcc@tnu.in** Phone: **7439470059 (Mr. Debdipta Das, Student Registration Head)** Student Convenor: **Mr. Minhaj Alam** – 7718463654 Organized by: **Moot Court Committee** School of Legal Studies The Neotia University ## OFFICIAL LINK / BROCHURE - **Official Registration Form:** - **Official Brochure:** [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1o1mznyHb8pNg\_IS8ov0ABoQqw59MJm1O/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1o1mznyHb8pNg_IS8ov0ABoQqw59MJm1O/view?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Events, Moot Courts --- ### [Webinar on “The 15 Founding Mothers of the Constitution” | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) | Register by 27 March 2026 at 11:59 PM](https://lawfoyer.in/webinar-on-the-15-founding-mothers-of-the-constitution-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-register-by-27-march-2026-at-1159-pm/) **Published:** March 12, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** Webinar on “The 15 Founding Mothers of the Constitution” | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) | Register by 27 March 2026 at 11:59 PM **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Webinar-Poster-683x1024.jpeg) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER / COLLEGE / UNIVERSITY The Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) operates under the National Legal Rights Consortium of WICCI (Women’s Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry). The organisation is dedicated to promoting legal awareness, social justice, and community empowerment. It works toward bridging the gap between legal rights and practical access to justice, particularly for women and marginalized communities. Through awareness campaigns, outreach programs, and collaborative initiatives, TNLRC aims to create an informed and legally empowered society. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY This webinar focuses on the theme **“The 15 Founding Mothers of the Constitution.”** The session will be conducted by **Adv. Shalu Nigam**, a researcher, author, and gender and human rights advocate. The webinar aims to educate students about the history of the Constituent Assembly, particularly highlighting the women who contributed to the making of the Indian Constitution. The session will explore the challenges faced by these women and the steps they took to ensure constitutional protection for Indian women. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE Open to: - Students enrolled in **3-year LLB programmes** - Students enrolled in **5-year integrated LLB programmes** ## MODE OF THE EVENT Online ## LOCATION & VENUE OF THE EVENT Online ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE Participants can register through the official Google Form: ## FEE DETAILS Free Registration ## PRIZES Certificates will be provided to attendees. ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES - **Last Date to Register:** 27/03/2026 at 11:59 PM - **Date of Webinar:** 28/03/2026 - **Time:** 7:00 PM – 8:30 PM ## CONTACT INFORMATION Email: tamilnadulegalrightsconsortium@gmail.com ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / SOCIAL MEDIA - **Registration Form:** - **LinkedIn:** - **Instagram:** [https://www.instagram.com/tnlrc\_official?igsh=YWQxY29tZWQxaXl6](https://www.instagram.com/tnlrc_official?igsh=YWQxY29tZWQxaXl6) **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events, Webinar --- ### [International Conference on Political, Economic, & Social Issues of 2025 | Organized by Amity Law School, Amity University Chhattisgarh | Submit Complete Paper by 19 March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-political-economic-social-issues-of-2025-organized-by-amity-law-school-amity-university-chhattisgarh-submit-complete-paper-by-19-march-2026/) **Published:** March 12, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** International Conference on Political, Economic, & Social Issues of 2025 | Organized by Amity Law School, Amity University Chhattisgarh | Submit Complete Paper by 19 March 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Screenshot-2026-03-12-170948.png) ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER / COLLEGE / UNIVERSITY** Amity University Chhattisgarh, Raipur, established in 2014 by the Ritnand Balved Education Foundation (RBEF), is a state private university and part of the Amity Education Group. The university offers undergraduate, postgraduate, and doctoral programs across disciplines such as Architecture & Planning, Biotechnology, Computer Science & Engineering, Law, Management, Psychology, and others. Recognized by UGC, AIU, and AICTE, the university has received national and international recognition including rankings in the Times Higher Education Impact Rankings and a “5 Golden Star Rating” from the Ministry of Education’s Institute Innovation Council. Amity Law School, Raipur, a constituent institution of Amity University Chhattisgarh and recognized by the Bar Council of India (BCI), focuses on developing ethical and skilled legal professionals. The school emphasizes experiential learning through moot courts, interdisciplinary teaching, and interactions with judges, jurists, and policymakers. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY** The International Conference on Political, Economic and Social Issues of 2025 aims to explore contemporary developments in international law shaped by globalization, environmental challenges, technological change, migration, and evolving statehood concepts. The conference provides an academic platform for scholars, professionals, and students to discuss issues related to international commercial law, global economic integration, and international environmental law. Participants will engage through expert panels, paper presentations, and interactive sessions that encourage interdisciplinary dialogue and research on contemporary international legal regimes. The conference also invites original research papers focusing on emerging trends in international commercial law, legal challenges arising from global economic integration, and evolving aspects of statehood in the international legal order. ## **WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** The conference invites original research papers from: - Undergraduate and Postgraduate Students - Research Scholars (Ph.D. / M.Phil.) - Academicians and Faculty Members - Professionals and Practitioners from relevant disciplines Submissions with up to two co-authors are permitted, and interdisciplinary research aligned with the conference theme is encouraged. ## **MODE OF THE EVENT** Hybrid (Online and Offline) ## **LOCATION (COUNTRY / STATE / CITY) & VENUE OF THE EVENT** Amity University Chhattisgarh, Raipur, Chhattisgarh, India ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE** All abstracts and full papers must be submitted through the official submission link provided by the conference organizing committee. Submissions sent via email or any other mode will not be accepted for the conference submission process. Participants will receive a confirmation email upon successful submission. Research papers must: - Be written in English and between 3,000–5,000 words - Follow the 20th Edition Bluebook citation style - Include a 250–300 word abstract with 4–5 keywords - Be submitted in **.pdf and .docx format** The full paper submission must be completed **on or before 19 March 2026**. ## **FEE DETAILS (IF ANY)** - Students (Single Author): ₹500 + GST - Students (Co-authors): ₹700 + GST - Academicians / Faculty / Professionals: ₹800 + GST - Research Scholars (Ph.D. / M.Phil.): ₹800 + GST ## **PRIZES (IF ANY)** - Certificate of Participation will be awarded to all registered participants who present their papers. - Certificate of Publication will be provided to authors whose papers are selected and published. ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - Conference Date: **23 March 2026** - Full Paper Submission Deadline: **19 March 2026** ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** Faculty Coordinators: - Dr. Anukriti Mishra — amishra1@rpr.amity.edu - Mr. Aniruddha Bamal — abamal@rpr.amity.edu Student Coordinators: - Ms. Deepshikha Tiwari — 9630301686 — deepshikha.tiwari@s.amity.edu - Mr. Abhay Katre — 6266798810 — abhay.katre@s.amity.edu ## **OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / LINK OF THE OFFICIAL BROCHURE** - **Official Brochure:** [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1qJXNfN3LokNumg2-jZlbLtsnVtI8–zt/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1qJXNfN3LokNumg2-jZlbLtsnVtI8--zt/view?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Call for Papers, Events --- ### [Intellectus 2026 – Minds in Motion | Organized by School of Law (Debate Society), Graphic Era Hill University | Register by 17 March 2026 [06:00 PM (IST)]](https://lawfoyer.in/intellectus-2026-minds-in-motion-organized-by-school-of-law-debate-society-graphic-era-hill-university-register-by-17-march-2026-0600-pm-ist/) **Published:** March 12, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** Intellectus 2026 – Minds in Motion | Organized by School of Law (Debate Society), Graphic Era Hill University | Register by 17 March 2026 [06:00 PM (IST)] **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Screenshot-2026-03-12-172149.png) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER / UNIVERSITY **Graphic Era Hill University, Dehradun** is a distinguished institution committed to academic excellence, innovation, and ethical leadership. Situated in the academic environment of Dehradun, the university promotes a dynamic learning ecosystem that blends theoretical knowledge with practical experience, research, and social responsibility. It offers a wide range of undergraduate, postgraduate, and doctoral programmes across multiple disciplines and actively organizes seminars, national conferences, academic competitions, and research initiatives to cultivate intellectual leadership and inquiry among students. The **School of Law at Graphic Era Hill University** focuses on developing legally proficient, ethically grounded, and socially responsible scholars. The school encourages analytical reasoning, persuasive argumentation, and constitutional awareness through activities such as youth parliaments, academic symposia, workshops, moot courts, and intellectual competitions. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY **Intellectus 2026 – Minds in Motion** is a **National-Level Hybrid Academic Conclave** designed as a platform for intellectual dialogue, articulate expression, and disciplined reasoning. The event aims to nurture confident speakers, analytical thinkers, and responsible citizens capable of engaging with constitutional values and contemporary issues. The conclave features three major competition categories: ### 1. Oratory Competition - **Stage I – Declamation (Online):** 18 March 2026 - **Stage II – Debate (Offline):** 25 March 2026 - **Stage III – Extempore (Offline):** 25 March 2026 **Stage I Topic:** *“AI in Education: A Digital Messiah or a Mechanical Menace?”* ### 2. Quiz Competition ### 3. On-the-Spot Essay Writing Competition The event promotes structured intellectual engagement and meaningful discourse on contemporary issues. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE The competition is open to students across India: - **School Students:** Class X and above - **College Students:** Undergraduate and postgraduate students from recognized institutions - Participants may register in **only one category** – Oratory, Quiz, or Essay Writing. - A **valid institutional ID** is mandatory. - Participants must follow all rules, timelines, and code of conduct. - Decisions of the judges and organising committee will be final. ## MODE OF THE EVENT **Hybrid Mode** - Online and Offline rounds depending on the competition stage. ## LOCATION & VENUE **Graphic Era Hill University** Dehradun, Uttarakhand, India ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE Participants must register online through the Google Form: **Registration Form:** [https://docs.google.com/forms/d/13\_MEY4TZuF6gDy2QjJIzkHYaLNuUicxd\_VbRxWYdd6o/edit?chromeless=1](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/13_MEY4TZuF6gDy2QjJIzkHYaLNuUicxd_VbRxWYdd6o/edit?chromeless=1) ### Payment Details - **Beneficiary Name:** Graphic Era Hill University A/C Research & Development - **Bank:** Axis Bank - **Branch:** Saharanpur Road, Dehradun - **IFSC Code:** UTIB0002959 - **Account Number:** 920010040627250 ## FEE DETAILS ### Oratory Competition - ₹500 – External Participants - ₹300 – Graphic Era Students ### Quiz Competition & On-the-Spot Essay Writing - ₹300 – External Participants - ₹200 – Graphic Era Students ## PRIZES Winners will receive: - Exciting prizes - Cash awards - Certificates of achievement - Trophies All participants will receive **Certificates of Participation**. Meals will be provided to participants attending offline rounds. ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES - **Registration Deadline:** 17 March 2026 (06:00 PM IST) - **Oratory Stage I (Online Declamation):** 18 March 2026 - **Oratory Stage II & III (Debate & Extempore – Offline):** 25 March 2026 ## CONTACT INFORMATION **Faculty Coordinator:** - Ms. Manisha Melkani – 7302287887 **Student Organising Committee:** - Ms. Simran Kumari – 8340272966 - Ms. Lucky Rawat – 7906130868 ## OFFICIAL LINK / BROCHURE - **Official registration form:** [https://docs.google.com/forms/d/13\_MEY4TZuF6gDy2QjJIzkHYaLNuUicxd\_VbRxWYdd6o/edit?chromeless=1](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/13_MEY4TZuF6gDy2QjJIzkHYaLNuUicxd_VbRxWYdd6o/edit?chromeless=1) - **Official Brochure Link:** [https://drive.google.com/file/d/16XglWwYvhLa7QEETTr\_hylfb2wzAbDY\_/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/file/d/16XglWwYvhLa7QEETTr_hylfb2wzAbDY_/view?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Events, Other Competitions --- ### [INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW SUMMIT 2026 “The WTO@30: Reimagining Multilateralism in International Trade Law” | Organized by Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Register by 20 July 2026 (till 11:59 PM IST)](https://lawfoyer.in/international-trade-law-summit-2026-the-wto30-reimagining-multilateralism-in-international-trade-law-organized-by-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur-register-b/) **Published:** March 12, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW SUMMIT 2026 “The WTO@30: Reimagining Multilateralism in International Trade Law” | Organized by Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Register by 20 July 2026 (till 11:59 PM IST) **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Screenshot-2026-03-12-174503.png) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER / COLLEGE / UNIVERSITY **Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur** is a premier National Law University committed to advanced legal education, interdisciplinary research, and public service, guided by its motto **“Dharma Sansthapanartham.”** The **School of Law and Technology** at HNLU serves as a research hub focusing on areas such as technology law, international trade, intellectual property, data protection, artificial intelligence, and policy studies. The **Centre for WTO & WIPO Studies** is dedicated to research and capacity-building in international trade and intellectual property law and collaborates actively under the WTO Chairs Programme. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY The **International Trade Law Summit 2026** is being organised to commemorate the **30th anniversary of the World Trade Organization (WTO)**. The summit aims to foster awareness about global trade governance and create career opportunities for young professionals in international trade law. The event will feature: - Expert-led thematic **panel discussions** - **Technical sessions** for presentation of selected research papers - A **Mock WTO Exercise (first of its kind in India)** simulating trade negotiations and resolution drafting The summit will critically examine the WTO’s evolution, present challenges, and future pathways for strengthening the multilateral trading system. **Structure of the Summit** **Module I – International Conference** - Research paper presentations - Thematic panel discussions led by experts **Module II – Mock WTO Exercise** - Student simulation of WTO negotiations - Drafting negotiated outcomes and resolutions - Participation through country delegations and committees such as: - Council for Trade in Services - Negotiating Group on Market Access - TRIPS Council - Trade and Competition **Conference Theme:** *“The WTO@30: Reimagining Multilateralism in International Trade Law”* **Indicative Sub-Themes** - Digital Trade and the Data-Driven Economy - Trade, Sustainability, and Climate Action - Emerging Goods, Services, and Hybrid Trade Forms - Power Asymmetries in Global Trade Governance - Reforming the Dispute Settlement System - Services Liberalisation and the GATS Agenda - Investment Facilitation and Trade ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE **Conference / Call for Papers** - Academicians - Researchers - Professionals and practitioners - Students of law, business, and economics from India and abroad **Mock WTO Exercise** - Undergraduate and postgraduate students of law, economics, business, and allied disciplines (India and abroad) ## MODE OF THE EVENT Offline ## LOCATION & VENUE OF THE EVENT Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU) Raipur, Chhattisgarh, India ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE **Abstract Submission (Conference Papers):** **Mock WTO Registration:** **Submission Guidelines** **Abstract** - Maximum 500 words (including 5 keywords) - Bio-note: 50 words - Format: MS Word, Times New Roman, 12 pt, 1.5 spacing, justified alignment **Full Paper** - Maximum 10,000 words (including abstract and footnotes) - OSCOLA (4th Edition) citation style - Co-authorship allowed up to two authors Selected authors will be notified and provided with a link/QR code for full paper submission, registration, and fee payment. ## FEE DETAILS **Conference Only** - Indian Academicians / Professionals / Research Scholars: INR 2500 - Indian Students: INR 1500 - Foreign Participants: USD 20 **Mock WTO Only (Students)** - Indian Delegates: INR 1200 - Foreign Delegates: USD 15 **Conference + Mock WTO** - Indian Students: INR 2700 - Foreign Students: USD 35 ## ACCOMMODATION - University hostel accommodation (Non-AC): INR 1500 per person for the duration - Separate facilities for male and female participants - Extension available at INR 500 per day (subject to availability) ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES - Opening of Registration (Mock WTO Delegates): **06 February 2026 onwards** - Deadline for Abstract Submission: **31 March 2026 (11:59 PM IST)** - Notification of Abstract Acceptance: **26 April 2026** - Opening of Conference Registration & Fee Payment: **27 April 2026** - Deadline for Registration & Fee Payment (Conference + Mock WTO): **20 July 2026 (11:59 PM IST)** - Deadline for Full Paper Submission: **06 September 2026 (11:59 PM IST)** - International Trade Law Summit Dates: **02 – 04 October 2026** ## CONTACT INFORMATION **Dr. Ankit Awasthi** Head, Centre for WTO & WIPO Studies Email: itls@hnlu.ac.in **Ms. Kruthika Senthil Kumar** Student Convenor Email: itls@hnlu.ac.in ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / BROCHURE - **Event Details Folder:** **Categories:** Call for Papers, Events, Other Competitions --- ### [RUAS School of Law Moot Court Competition 2.0, 2026 | Organized by School of Law, M. S. Ramaiah University of Applied Sciences (MSRUAS), Bengaluru | Register by 30 March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/ruas-school-of-law-moot-court-competition-2-0-2026-organized-by-school-of-law-m-s-ramaiah-university-of-applied-sciences-msruas-bengaluru-register-by-30-march-2026/) **Published:** March 12, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** RUAS School of Law Moot Court Competition 2.0, 2026 | Organized by School of Law, M. S. Ramaiah University of Applied Sciences (MSRUAS), Bengaluru | Register by 30 March 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Screenshot-2026-03-12-175750.png) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER / COLLEGE / UNIVERSITY M. S. Ramaiah University of Applied Sciences (MSRUAS) is a premier private university located in Bengaluru, Karnataka. Established in December 2013 under the Karnataka University Act, the university is committed to excellence in education, research, and innovation. Founded under the **Gokula Education Foundation**, MSRUAS integrates several renowned institutions established by Dr. M. S. Ramaiah, creating a multidisciplinary academic ecosystem focused on industry-oriented learning and research. The **School of Law at MSRUAS** aims to provide a transformative legal education by balancing theoretical learning with practical exposure. Through activities such as moot courts, legal aid clinics, research projects, and internships, the institution prepares students for diverse legal careers. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY The **RUAS School of Law Moot Court Competition 2.0, 2026** is the second edition of the national-level moot court competition organised by the School of Law, MSRUAS. The competition provides an engaging platform for law students to demonstrate their advocacy, research, and analytical skills in a simulated courtroom environment. The moot focuses on issues related to **Constitutional Law and Information Technology Law**, particularly examining the legal implications of digital technologies, synthetic media, and their potential impact on democratic processes. Participants will engage in legal arguments, research, and courtroom advocacy before an esteemed panel of judges, helping them gain valuable litigation experience and enhance their legal reasoning abilities. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE Participation is restricted to **bonafide undergraduate law students** enrolled in: - **5-year integrated law programmes**, or - **3-year regular LL.B. programmes** from universities or institutions recognized by the **Bar Council of India**. ## MODE OF THE EVENT **Offline** ## LOCATION (COUNTRY/STATE/CITY) & VENUE OF THE EVENT **School of Law, RUAS – Gnana Gangothri Campus** New BEL Road, MSR Nagar **Bengaluru – 560054, Karnataka, India** ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE Participants must follow the registration process below: 1. Complete the **Preliminary Registration Form** before the deadline. 2. After completing the form, teams must proceed with **Final Registration** by submitting the required documents and payment proof. 3. Registration will be considered complete only after both stages are finished. **Registration Form:** [https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSfsLVnMrBiCiTlq1dFLw5s1fhzEDxMqu\_J-0CZUk60AvzD1HQ/viewform](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSfsLVnMrBiCiTlq1dFLw5s1fhzEDxMqu_J-0CZUk60AvzD1HQ/viewform) ## FEE DETAILS - **₹4,000** – Registration without accommodation - **₹8,000** – Registration with accommodation ## PRIZES **Total Prize Pool: ₹85,000** **Main Awards** - Winner – ₹35,000 - Runner-Up – ₹30,000 **Special Awards** - Best Speaker (Petitioner/Appellant) – ₹5,000 - Best Speaker (Respondent) – ₹5,000 - Best Researcher – ₹5,000 - Best Memorial – ₹5,000 Certificates will be awarded to all participants. ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES - **30 March 2026** – Last Date for Registration - **01 April 2026** – Last Date to Seek Clarifications - **05 April 2026** – Last Date for Soft Copy Submission of Memorials - **12–13 April 2026** – Competition Dates ## CONTACT INFORMATION **Faculty Coordinator** Dr. Md. Baharul Islam Associate Professor, School of Law **Student Coordinators** - **Mr. Mohit G** – Convenor, Moot Court Society +91 9901820728 - **Ms. Sanjana R Rao** – Co-Convenor +91 9606283363 - **Ms. Sloka Menon** – Co-Convenor +91 9330742949 - **Ms. Ektha Raju** – Co-Convenor +91 8971010730 ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / BROCHURE - **Official Brochure:** - **University Website:** **Categories:** Events, Moot Courts --- ### [The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr, 2026 INSC 47](https://lawfoyer.in/the-state-of-uttar-pradesh-v-anurudh-anr-2026-insc-47/) **Published:** March 12, 2026 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr, 2026 INSC 47. The Supreme Court in The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh, 2026 INSC 47 examined the scope of bail jurisdiction under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the context of offences under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act). The appeal arose from a judgment of the Allahabad High Court, which granted bail to the accused and issued broad judicial directions mandating medical age determination of the victim at the commencement of investigation in all POCSO cases. The High Court had reasoned that inconsistencies in documentary evidence regarding the victim’s age justified mandatory medical testing to prevent misuse of the POCSO Act. The Supreme Court addressed two major questions. First, whether the High Court, while exercising statutory bail jurisdiction under Section 439 CrPC, could issue directions of a legislative or policy-making nature regarding investigation procedures. Second, whether medical age determination of a victim is mandatory at the initial stage of investigation under the statutory framework of the CrPC, POCSO Act, and Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by issuing sweeping directions unrelated to the limited question of bail. The Court reiterated that bail courts cannot conduct mini-trials or resolve complex evidentiary issues such as final determination of age. The Court further clarified that age determination must follow the evidentiary hierarchy under Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act, where documentary evidence such as birth certificates or school records takes precedence over medical tests. Medical examination is only a residual method when documentary evidence is unavailable. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s directions while reiterating that bail adjudication must remain confined to established parameters such as prima facie case, gravity of offence, likelihood of tampering with evidence, and risk of absconding. **Content:** ### **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The Supreme Court in ***The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh, 2026 INSC 47*** examined the **scope of bail jurisdiction under *Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*** in the context of offences under the ***Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act)***. The appeal arose from a judgment of the **Allahabad High Court**, which granted bail to the accused and issued broad judicial directions mandating **medical age determination of the victim at the commencement of investigation in all POCSO cases**. The High Court had reasoned that inconsistencies in documentary evidence regarding the victim’s age justified mandatory medical testing to prevent misuse of the POCSO Act. The Supreme Court addressed two major questions. First, whether the High Court, while exercising **statutory bail jurisdiction under Section 439 CrPC**, could issue directions of a legislative or policy-making nature regarding investigation procedures. Second, whether **medical age determination of a victim is mandatory at the initial stage of investigation under the statutory framework of the CrPC, POCSO Act, and Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015**. The Court held that the High Court **exceeded its jurisdiction** by issuing sweeping directions unrelated to the limited question of bail. The Court reiterated that bail courts cannot conduct **mini-trials** or resolve complex evidentiary issues such as final determination of age. The Court further clarified that **age determination must follow the evidentiary hierarchy under Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act**, where documentary evidence such as birth certificates or school records takes precedence over medical tests. Medical examination is only a residual method when documentary evidence is unavailable. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s directions while reiterating that **bail adjudication must remain confined to established parameters such as prima facie case, gravity of offence, likelihood of tampering with evidence, and risk of absconding**. **Keywords:** Bail Jurisdiction, POCSO Act, Age Determination, Section 439 CrPC, Juvenile Justice Act, Victim Age Evidence, Constitutional Liberty ### **B) CASE DETAILS** **i) Judgement Cause Title** ***The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh & Anr.*** **ii) Case Number** Criminal Appeal No. \_\_\_\_ of 2026 (@ Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 10656 of 2025) **iii) Judgement Date** 9 January 2026 **iv) Court** Supreme Court of India **v) Quorum** Single Judge Bench **vi) Author of Judgment** Justice **Sanjay Karol** **vii) Citation** ***2026 INSC 47*** **viii) Legal Provisions Involved** - ***Section 439 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*** - ***Section 164-A Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*** - ***Sections 7 and 8 Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012*** - ***Section 27 Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012*** - ***Section 94 Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015*** - ***Sections 363 and 366 Indian Penal Code, 1860*** - ***Article 21 Constitution of India*** **ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case** None. **x) Related Law Subjects** Criminal Law Constitutional Law Child Protection Law Bail Jurisprudence Evidence Law ### **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The appeal before the Supreme Court arose from a bail order passed by the **Allahabad High Court** in a case involving alleged offences under ***Sections 363 and 366 of the Indian Penal Code*** and ***Sections 7 and 8 of the POCSO Act***. The High Court granted bail to the accused after considering contradictions in documents concerning the age of the prosecutrix. The High Court also issued broad judicial directions requiring investigating officers to obtain **medical age determination reports of victims at the commencement of investigation in POCSO cases**. The High Court justified these directions by invoking the constitutional protection of personal liberty under ***Article 21 of the Constitution of India***. It reasoned that the right to bail had evolved into a constitutional guarantee. According to the High Court, determining the victim’s age accurately was essential because **false depiction of age could lead to wrongful criminalisation of consensual relationships between adolescents**. The High Court also relied on earlier decisions such as ***Monish v. State of U.P*** and ***Aman @ Vansh v. State of U.P*** to support the proposition that medical examination under ***Section 164-A CrPC read with Section 27 POCSO Act*** should be undertaken for age verification. The State of Uttar Pradesh challenged this order before the Supreme Court. The State argued that the High Court’s directions were beyond the scope of bail jurisdiction. According to the State, bail courts must only determine whether the accused should remain in custody pending trial. They cannot restructure investigative procedures or create mandatory protocols for police authorities. The State therefore sought clarification regarding the **limits of judicial intervention in bail proceedings**. The Supreme Court considered both the jurisdictional and substantive questions. The Court emphasised that while High Courts possess constitutional authority, **statutory jurisdiction must remain confined to the boundaries prescribed by the statute**. The Court therefore analysed the interplay between the **POCSO Act, the Juvenile Justice Act, and the CrPC** to determine the proper procedure for establishing the age of a victim. ### **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The case originated from **FIR No. 622 of 2022** registered at Police Station Kotwali, Orai, District Jalaun, Uttar Pradesh. The FIR was lodged by the mother of the alleged victim. She claimed that her **12-year-old daughter had been abducted by the accused, Anurudh**. Based on the allegations, the police registered offences under ***Sections 363 and 366 of the Indian Penal Code*** and ***Sections 7 and 8 of the POCSO Act***. During investigation, the accused applied for bail before the trial court. The trial court rejected the bail application by order dated **29 September 2023**. The accused subsequently approached the **Allahabad High Court** seeking bail under ***Section 439 CrPC***. During the High Court proceedings, contradictions emerged regarding the age of the prosecutrix. Certain documents suggested that she was a minor. However, other statements recorded under ***Sections 161 and 164 CrPC*** indicated inconsistencies about her age and her relationship with the accused. The High Court observed that documentary evidence such as school records might not always be reliable. The High Court therefore directed the **Chief Medical Officer of Jalaun** to constitute a medical board to determine the age of the victim. The medical examination reportedly suggested that the prosecutrix might be **above eighteen years of age**. On the basis of this medical report and the contradictions in documentary evidence, the High Court granted **interim bail** to the accused on **8 May 2024**, which was later confirmed. While granting bail, the High Court issued several directions requiring police authorities to ensure medical age determination in POCSO cases at the beginning of investigation. These directions were intended to prevent misuse of the POCSO Act in cases involving consensual adolescent relationships. The State challenged these directions before the Supreme Court, arguing that such judicial mandates effectively altered the statutory scheme governing criminal investigations. ### **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether the High Court, while exercising **bail jurisdiction under *Section 439 CrPC***, can issue general directions mandating investigative procedures. ii. Whether the High Court can direct **mandatory medical age determination of victims in all POCSO cases**. iii. Whether determining the victim’s age at the bail stage amounts to conducting a **mini-trial**. iv. What is the correct legal framework for determining the age of a victim in POCSO prosecutions. ### **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the **State of Uttar Pradesh** submitted that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction while deciding a bail application. They argued that ***Section 439 CrPC*** only empowers the High Court to determine whether an accused should be released on bail. The provision does not authorize courts to formulate investigative guidelines or issue mandatory administrative directions to police authorities. The State relied on the Supreme Court decision ***State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi (2005) 8 SCC 21***, which established that bail decisions must be based on factors such as **prima facie case, seriousness of offence, possibility of absconding, and likelihood of tampering with evidence**. The State argued that the High Court ignored these settled parameters and instead embarked upon an extensive examination of evidentiary issues related to the victim’s age. The State further contended that the High Court’s directions effectively rewrote the statutory framework governing criminal investigations. According to the State, neither ***Section 164-A CrPC*** nor ***Section 27 POCSO Act*** mandates medical age determination in every case. These provisions concern **medical examination of victims of sexual offences**, primarily to collect evidence of sexual assault, not to determine age in all circumstances. The State also relied upon ***State v. M. Murugesan (2020) 15 SCC 251***, where the Supreme Court held that courts cannot issue policy-oriented directions unrelated to the limited question of bail. The State therefore argued that the High Court’s directions were legally unsustainable and should be set aside. ### **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the **Respondent-Accused** submitted that the High Court’s reasoning was consistent with the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty under ***Article 21 of the Constitution of India***. They argued that wrongful invocation of the POCSO Act could result in prolonged incarceration of innocent individuals. The defence relied upon precedents such as ***Abuzar Hossain v. State of West Bengal (2012) 10 SCC 489*** and ***Parag Bhati v. State of U.P. (2016) 12 SCC 744***. These cases held that **age-related documents are not always conclusive and may be challenged through credible evidence**. The defence argued that medical examination is often necessary to resolve contradictions in documentary records. The respondents further contended that **bail courts must consider all relevant circumstances affecting personal liberty**, including inconsistencies in the prosecution’s case. According to the defence, the High Court correctly exercised its jurisdiction by ensuring that reliable age determination methods were followed in POCSO investigations. The defence also argued that the POCSO Act is frequently invoked in cases involving consensual relationships between adolescents. Mandatory medical age determination would therefore prevent wrongful criminalisation and protect the rights of young adults. ### **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** The case involved interpretation of several statutory provisions. ***Section 439 CrPC*** confers special powers on the High Court and Court of Session to grant bail. The provision allows courts to impose conditions while granting bail but does not authorize them to issue general administrative directions. ***Section 27 POCSO Act*** mandates medical examination of a child victim in accordance with ***Section 164-A CrPC***. The purpose of this examination is to document injuries and collect forensic evidence relevant to sexual offences. ***Section 94 Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015*** establishes a hierarchy for age determination. According to this provision, **documentary evidence such as matriculation certificates or birth certificates must be considered first**, and medical examination should be used only when such documents are unavailable. These provisions collectively demonstrate that **medical age determination is not the primary method for establishing age under Indian law**. ### **I) PRECEDENTS ANALYSED BY COURT** The Supreme Court examined several precedents. ***State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi (2005) 8 SCC 21*** Held that bail decisions must consider factors such as prima facie guilt, seriousness of offence, and likelihood of tampering with evidence. ***Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan (2009) 2 SCC 281*** Held that bail courts should avoid detailed evaluation of evidence since it may prejudice the trial. ***State v. M. Murugesan (2020) 15 SCC 251*** Held that courts exercising bail jurisdiction cannot issue directions unrelated to the bail question. ***Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana (2013) 7 SCC 263*** Established the hierarchy for determining the age of a victim using documentary evidence first. ### **H) JUDGEMENT** ### **a) Ratio Decidendi** The Supreme Court held that **bail jurisdiction under *Section 439 CrPC* is limited to deciding whether the accused should be released on bail**. Courts cannot issue broad policy directives affecting investigation procedures. The Court also held that **age determination of the victim cannot be conclusively decided at the bail stage** because such determination requires evidentiary evaluation by the trial court. ### **b) Obiter Dicta** The Court observed that **constitutional powers and statutory powers are distinct**. A High Court exercising statutory jurisdiction must act within the limits of the statute. ### **c) Guidelines** 1. Bail courts must avoid conducting mini-trials. 2. Age determination of victims must follow the evidentiary hierarchy under the Juvenile Justice Act. 3. Medical examination is a residual method, not the primary method. ### **d) Dissenting Opinion** None. ### **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment clarifies the **limits of judicial activism within bail jurisdiction**. It reinforces the principle that **statutory powers must be exercised strictly within legislative boundaries**. The decision also preserves the evidentiary hierarchy for determining the age of victims under Indian law. ### **J) REFERENCES** ### **a) Important Cases Referred** i. ***State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi (2005) 8 SCC 21*** ii. ***Abuzar Hossain v. State of West Bengal (2012) 10 SCC 489*** iii. ***Parag Bhati v. State of U.P. (2016) 12 SCC 744*** iv. ***State v. M. Murugesan (2020) 15 SCC 251*** v. ***Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana (2013) 7 SCC 263*** ### **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. ***Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*** ii. ***Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012*** iii. ***Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015*** iv. ***Indian Penal Code, 1860*** v. ***Constitution of India*** **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [1st State Level Vidhi-संग्राम 2026– A Two-Day Law Fest | Organized by Dr. D Y PATIL LAW COLLEGE, PIMPRI, PUNE | Register by 22nd March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-state-level-vidhi-संग्राम-2026-a-two-day-law-fest-organized-by-dr-d-y-patil-law-college-pimpri-pune-register-by-22nd-march-2/) **Published:** March 1, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 1st State Level Vidhi-संग्राम 2026– A Two-Day Law Fest | Organized by Dr. D Y PATIL LAW COLLEGE, PIMPRI, PUNE | Register by 22nd March 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/WhatsApp-Image-2026-03-02-at-10.44.19-PM-791x1024.jpeg) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY **Dr. D. Y. Patil Unitech Society** Dr. D.Y. Patil Unitech Society was established in 1990 with the vision of providing quality education across various disciplines. Committed to spreading knowledge to deserving students, the society empowers them to achieve their career aspirations through professional courses. The educational complex of Unitech Society in Pune spans an expansive 75 acres across Pimpri and Tathawade, encompassing 63 esteemed institutions. The Pimpri campus boasts state-of-the-art facilities for education in diverse fields, including Architecture, Engineering, Medicine, Dentistry, Ayurveda, Homeopathy, Nursing, Physiotherapy, Law, Management, Pharmacy, and Agricultural Business Management, among others. With a commitment to excellence, the society offers world-class education to over 15,000 national and international students. The campus, nestled in a lush, pollution-free environment, provides an ideal setting for learning and personal growth. Students benefit from top-tier hostel accommodations and an array of amenities, including a well-equipped Central Library, high-speed Internet, auditoriums, seminar halls, ATMs, healthcare facilities, and markets for essential commodities, ensuring a holistic educational experience. **Dr. D. Y. Patil Law College, Pimpri, Pune** Founded in 2001, Dr. D.Y. Patil Law College, Pimpri is a prestigious institution affiliated with the University of Pune. Situated within a sprawling, architecturally impressive campus alongside multiple academic institutions, the college fosters an intellectually vibrant atmosphere characterized by interdisciplinary engagement and a spirit of healthy competition. Dedicated to preparing students to meet the legal challenges of the 21st century, the college offers comprehensive legal education at the undergraduate level. In a short span, it has gained a stellar reputation for producing academically proficient and professionally skilled graduates. The college takes pride in its highly qualified faculty, well-equipped library, and excellent infrastructure, all of which contribute to an enriching learning experience. With a commitment to experiential learning, students engage in Moot Courts, Debates, Legal Literacy Camps, and Research Activities, ensuring they develop essential advocacy and lawyering skills. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY Elocution, Mediation, Essay Writing, Debate, Legislative Drafting and Quiz ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE 1. Students who are currently pursuing B. 3 or 5 Years Course from any institution recognized by the Bar Council of India (BCI) are eligible to participate. 2. M. (Postgraduate Course) from any University / College recognized by the Bar Council of India (BCI) are eligible to participate. - Students from non-law disciplines (UG / PG) are also eligible to participate in the competitions. 1. However, participation in the Legislative Drafting Competition and Mediation Competition is restricted exclusively to law students. ## MODE OF THE EVENT (ONLINE / OFFLINE OR HYBRID) Offline ## LOCATION (COUNTRY/STATE/CITY) & VENUE OF THE EVENT India, Maharashtra, Pune & Venue is Dr D Y PATIL LAW COLLEGE, PUNE. ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE- Registration QR is attached to the flyer and brochure google link is provided for the registration and payment is on bank details provided in the brochure & in Google form. Link: [https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdt\_43nFDiNbiJNGONSTcdnbYAd6GfvrblshK1\_WqQEy0OfmA/viewform](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdt_43nFDiNbiJNGONSTcdnbYAd6GfvrblshK1_WqQEy0OfmA/viewform) ## FEE DETAILS **Day 1 Events:** • Elocution Competition – Registration Fee: ₹250 • Mediation Competition – Registration Fee: ₹1200 • Essay Writing Competition – Registration Fee: ₹250 **Day 2 Events:** • Debate Competition – Registration Fee: ₹500 • Legislative Drafting Competition – Registration Fee: ₹300 • Quiz Competition – Registration Fee: ₹500 ## PRIZES - **ELOCUTION** WINNER – TROPHY + Certificate of Merit RUNNER UP – Gold Medal + Certificate of Merit 2nd RUNNER UP – Silver Medal + Certificate of Merit Certificates of Participation shall be awarded to all duly registered participants. - **MEDIATION (Team consist of 3 Members)** WINNER – 2000 Cash Prize+ TROPHY + Certificate of Merit + FREE Access to LawFoyer Academy’s + two Premium Courses including Advanced Certification Course on Legal Research & Writing (worth Rs. 2000) and Advanced Certification Course on Supercharging Litigation & Academics with AI (worth Rs. 4000). RUNNER UP – Gold Medal + Certificate of Merit + FREE Access to LawFoyer Academy’s + two Premium Courses including Advanced Certification Course on Legal Research & Writing (worth Rs. 2000) and Advanced Certification Course on Supercharging Litigation & Academics with AI (worth Rs. 4000). 2nd RUNNER UP – Silver Medal + Certificate of Merit Certificates of Participation shall be awarded to all duly registered participants. - **ESSAY** WINNER – TROPHY + Certificate of Merit RUNNER UP – Gold Medal + Certificate of Merit 2nd RUNNER UP – Silver Medal + Certificate of Merit Certificates of Participation shall be awarded to all duly registered participants. - **DEBATE (Team Consist of 2 Members)** WINNER – TROPHY + Certificate of Merit RUNNER UP – Gold Medal + Certificate of Merit 2nd RUNNER UP – Silver Medal + Certificate of Merit Certificates of Participation shall be awarded to all duly registered participants. - **LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING** WINNER – TROPHY + Certificate of Merit + FREE Access to LawFoyer Academy’s + two Premium Courses including Advanced Certification Course on Legal Research & Writing (worth Rs. 2000) and Advanced Certification Course on Supercharging Litigation & Academics with AI (worth Rs. 4000). RUNNER UP – Gold Medal + Certificate of Merit 2nd RUNNER UP – Silver Medal + Certificate of Merit Certificates of Participation shall be awarded to all duly registered participants. - **QUIZ (Team Consist of 2 Members)** WINNER – TROPHY + Certificate of Merit RUNNER UP – Gold Medal + Certificate of Merit 2nd RUNNER UP – Silver Medal + Certificate of Merit Certificates of Participation shall be awarded to all duly registered participants. **EXCITING PRIZES** - Discounted Publication Opportunity to all the Participants with 50% Discount on Publication with LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research (ISSN: 2583-7753) ([lijdlr.com](http://www.lijdlr.com/#search/lawfoyer/_blank)) which is indexed on 350+ Global Databases including Harvard HOLLIS Library, Oxford SOLO Library, Hein Online, Manupatra, Google Scholar, CrossRef, ISSN, and other international libraries and databases. - Internship Opportunity to all the Participants – All participants will get an opportunity to Intern with LawFoyer and attend LawFoyer’s structured Free Virtual Internship Training Program in collaboration with reputed law firms wherein the Students will get an opportunity to Learn Practical Skills including Case Finding & Analysis, Legal Research, Legal Writing, Legal Drafting and Leveraging AI & Modern Legal Tech for Practical Legal Work. (Read detailed Internship Curriculum. - FREE Job and Internship Placement support by LawFoyer Connect ([https://news.lawfoyer.in](https://news.lawfoyer.in/#search/lawfoyer/_blank)) to all Participants for 1 year (All the Participants will get daily real time updates on latest Job and Internship Opportunities) - Recognition to “Top Performers” of the Event via India’s First Digital “Hall of Fame” -LawFoyer’s “Achievers Archive” ([https://lawfoyer.in/achievers-archive/](https://lawfoyer.in/achievers-archive/#search/lawfoyer/_blank)). We will celebrate and feature the achievements of Excellent Performers of the Event via our “Achievers Archive”. ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES - Last date to register for the event- 22nd march 2026 - Date of Event- 24 & 25 March 2026 ## CONTACT INFORMATION - Mr. Ashish Jha- 9693012680 - Mrs. Roopam Kumari- 9234942374 - For any queries you can mail us on : ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / LINK OF THE OFFICIAL BROCHURE, RULES & REGULATIONS ETC. - **Registration link-** [https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdt\_43nFDiNbiJNGONSTcdnbYAd6GfvrblshK1\_WqQEy0OfmA/viewfor](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdt_43nFDiNbiJNGONSTcdnbYAd6GfvrblshK1_WqQEy0OfmA/viewfor) - **Link of the official brochure, rules & regulations etc.-** **Categories:** Events, Other Competitions --- ### [TAMIL NADU LEGAL RIGHTS CONSORTIUM (TNLRC) – BROCHURE-MAKING COMPETITION | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) | Register by 4 March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-brochure-making-competition-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-register-by-4-march-2026/) **Published:** February 25, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** TAMIL NADU LEGAL RIGHTS CONSORTIUM (TNLRC) – BROCHURE-MAKING COMPETITION | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) | Register by March 4, 2026 **Content:** ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER The Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) is an organization committed to promoting legal awareness and access to justice. Through initiatives and competitions, TNLRC aims to spread knowledge about legal rights and remedies, particularly focusing on issues affecting women and access to free legal aid. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY TNLRC is organizing a **Brochure-Making Competition** centered on spreading awareness about important legal rights and remedies. #### Theme: **Sexual Harassment and Right to Access Free Legal Aid** Participants are required to prepare brochure content that includes: - Brief definitions and summaries of relevant legal concepts - Information on legislation protecting women from digital and cyber sexual harassment - Legal avenues of remedy available to women affected by cyber sexual harassment - Simplistic yet informative content ensuring accessibility of legal information #### Format Requirements: 1. A4 Size 2. Maximum 1½ sheets (3 folds of a brochure) 3. Original work only – Plagiarism and use of Generative AI will result in disqualification 4. Copyright-free images may be used #### Important Note: All accepted submissions will become the property of TNLRC. Creators will no longer retain creative and intellectual property rights (copyright) over accepted submissions. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE The competition is open to: - Students pursuing a **3-year LLB course** - Students pursuing a **5-year integrated LLB degree** - From institutions across India Participation Details: - Individual or team of two - Only one entry per participant/team - Duplicate submissions will result in disqualification ## MODE OF THE EVENT Submission-based Competition (Online submission via Google Form) ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE Participants must submit their brochure through the official submission link: **Submission Link:** ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES - **Submissions Open:** 25/02/2026 (Wednesday) - **Submissions Close:** 04/03/2026 (Wednesday) - **Announcement of Results:** 07/03/2026 (Saturday) ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / BROCHURE - Submission Form: - Brochure and Rulebook Link: **Categories:** Events, Other Competitions --- ### [Aaditya Bajpai of Maharashtra National Law University Nagpur Receives University Gold Medal for Best Student in Overall Excellence](https://lawfoyer.in/aaditya-bajpai-of-maharashtra-national-law-university-nagpur-receives-university-gold-medal-for-best-student-in-overall-excellence/) **Published:** March 8, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Content:** The journey of legal education is often defined by perseverance, discipline, and a deep commitment to excellence. Celebrating such dedication, LawFoyer proudly features the remarkable achievement of **Aaditya Bajpai**, a student of **Maharashtra National Law University, Nagpur**, who has been awarded the **University Gold Medal for Best Student in Overall Excellence**. This prestigious recognition was conferred on **28 February 2026**, marking a moment of great pride not only for Aaditya Bajpai but also for the academic community at MNLU Nagpur. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/217d79df-f05d-4716-8007-7f02d3adc0d1-Aaditya-Bajpai.jpeg) Receiving a University Gold Medal represents one of the highest academic honours that a university can bestow upon a student. It reflects consistent excellence, dedication to academic pursuits, and an inspiring level of commitment throughout the course of study. Aaditya Bajpai earned this honour while pursuing **BA LL.B. (Hons.) in Adjudication and Justicing (2020–2025)** at MNLU Nagpur, a program designed to cultivate future legal professionals equipped with strong analytical skills and a deep understanding of justice systems. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/33161a4c-7c0c-4d0f-854c-66a5d954168d-Aaditya-Bajpai-617x1024.jpeg) What makes this achievement even more significant is that Aaditya Bajpai belonged to the **pilot batch of the BA LL.B. (Hons.) in Adjudication and Justicing** at the university. Being part of a newly introduced program carries both opportunity and uncertainty. It requires students to adapt, contribute to shaping the identity of the course, and navigate an evolving academic environment. Rising to the top of such a pioneering batch and securing the Gold Medal demonstrates exceptional dedication and academic leadership. Reflecting on this milestone, Aaditya Bajpai shared a deeply heartfelt message that captures the emotional significance of this recognition. For Aaditya Bajpai, the Gold Medal is not simply a personal accomplishment. It represents the culmination of years of hard work, perseverance, and unwavering support from family. The achievement stands as a tribute to the sacrifices, faith, and encouragement provided by parents, whose constant support played a defining role in the journey. Such achievements are rarely the result of a single moment of brilliance. Instead, they are built through years of consistent effort, late nights of study, dedication to academic learning, and a strong passion for the field of law. Aaditya Bajpai’s recognition as the **Best Student in Overall Excellence** reflects a holistic performance across academic parameters and stands as a testament to sustained commitment throughout the law school journey. The success story of Aaditya Bajpai also highlights the importance of resilience and curiosity in legal education. Law as a discipline demands not only knowledge of statutes and judgments but also the ability to think critically, engage with complex issues, and remain committed to the ideals of justice. Achievements like this demonstrate how dedication to these principles can lead to remarkable milestones. For aspiring law students across the country, this achievement serves as a powerful reminder that excellence is the result of consistent effort and belief in one’s journey. Whether it is mastering academic concepts, participating actively in the learning process, or contributing to the academic culture of the institution, every step taken with sincerity can lead to extraordinary outcomes. LawFoyer congratulates Aaditya Bajpai on this outstanding achievement and wishes continued success in future professional and academic endeavors. Achievements like this inspire the legal community and motivate young legal minds to pursue excellence with determination and integrity. Such milestones remind us that the journey of law is not just about professional success but also about personal growth, discipline, and the pursuit of knowledge. **Wish to showcase your achievement to the world and inspire others?** LawFoyer will celebrate your achievement because every achievement deserves recognition. Your achievement is our achievement. Share your achievement with us: **Categories:** Achievers Archive --- ### [Divyanshi Rathour, Shikhar Mishra, and Samriddhi Mishra of City Law College, Lucknow Secure Runner-Up Position at Lex Empathia 2.0 – National Level Client Counselling Competition](https://lawfoyer.in/divyanshi-rathour-shikhar-mishra-and-samriddhi-mishra-of-city-law-college-lucknow-secure-runner-up-position-at-lex-empathia-2-0-national-level-client-counselling-competition/) **Published:** March 8, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Content:** LawFoyer proudly celebrates the remarkable achievement of **Divyanshi Rathour, Shikhar Mishra, and Samriddhi Mishra**, students of **City Law College, Jankipuram, Lucknow**, who secured the **Runner-Up position at the Lex Empathia 2.0 National Level Client Counselling Competition** organized by **Central Law College, Jankipuram, Lucknow** on **22 February 2026**. This accomplishment highlights the team’s dedication, strong legal understanding, and exceptional counselling skills. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/WhatsApp-Image-2026-02-24-at-16.37.34-DIVYANSHI-RATHOUR-1024x683.jpeg) Client counselling competitions are unique platforms in the legal academic journey. They test not only knowledge of law but also the ability to communicate effectively, understand complex situations, and provide practical solutions to clients. Success in such competitions requires a blend of legal acumen, empathy, teamwork, and strategic thinking. The impressive performance by this team demonstrates how these qualities can come together to produce outstanding results. The team from City Law College approached the competition with enthusiasm and careful preparation. Through rigorous practice sessions and collaborative discussions, the team worked to sharpen counselling techniques, improve listening skills, and develop the ability to address client concerns with clarity and sensitivity. Each member contributed strengths that helped the team perform effectively under the challenging and competitive environment of a national level event. Securing the Runner-Up position at Lex Empathia 2.0 reflects the team’s ability to analyze legal problems while maintaining a client-centered approach. Client counselling emphasizes the importance of understanding not only the legal dimensions of a dispute but also the personal and emotional context behind it. By demonstrating patience, professionalism, and sound legal reasoning, the team successfully navigated the different rounds of the competition and impressed the judges with their performance. For **Divyanshi Rathour**, this achievement marks a meaningful milestone in the ongoing journey as a law student. According to the personal reflection shared with LawFoyer, the experience of participating in the competition highlighted an important lesson about the legal profession. Advocacy extends beyond statutes and precedents. It begins with listening carefully, understanding the client’s situation, and offering ethical and practical solutions. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/WhatsApp-Image-2026-02-24-at-16.33.57-DIVYANSHI-RATHOUR-1024x734.jpeg) The competition also strengthened valuable skills such as teamwork, confidence, and strategic thinking. Working together in a high pressure environment requires mutual trust and effective coordination, and the collaboration between Divyanshi Rathour, Shikhar Mishra, and Samriddhi Mishra played a key role in achieving this success. The ability to work as a team while maintaining professionalism and clarity of thought is an essential quality for future legal professionals. Beyond the trophy and recognition, the experience of competing on a national platform offers lessons that will continue to guide the team throughout the legal journey. Competitions like Lex Empathia 2.0 encourage law students to step outside the classroom and apply their knowledge in realistic scenarios. Such opportunities help shape confident and capable legal minds who are ready to contribute meaningfully to the profession. This achievement also reflects the supportive academic environment at **City Law College, Lucknow**, where students are encouraged to participate in competitions and develop practical legal skills alongside academic learning. Achievements like these bring pride not only to the individuals involved but also to the institution and the broader community of aspiring legal professionals. LawFoyer congratulates **Divyanshi Rathour, Shikhar Mishra, and Samriddhi Mishra** for this inspiring accomplishment. The dedication and perseverance demonstrated by this team serve as motivation for other law students who wish to excel in advocacy, communication, and professional growth. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/WhatsApp-Image-2026-02-24-at-16.37.33-DIVYANSHI-RATHOUR-1-1024x683.jpeg) May this achievement be one of many milestones in a bright and successful legal journey ahead. Wish to showcase your achievement to the world and inspire others? LawFoyer will celebrate your achievement because every achievement deserves recognition. Your achievement is our achievement. Share your achievement with us. Visit: **Categories:** Achievers Archive --- ### [Anirudh Soni, Hiral Jain, and Unnati Chhangani of Jai Narain Vyas University, Jodhpur Win the 1st FIAT Justitia National Moot Court Competition 2026; Anirudh Soni Honored as ‘Best Student Advocate’](https://lawfoyer.in/anirudh-soni-hiral-jain-and-unnati-chhangani-of-jai-narain-vyas-university-jodhpur-win-the-1st-fiat-justitia-national-moot-court-competition-2026-anirudh-soni-honored-as-best-student-advo/) **Published:** March 8, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Content:** The journey of legal education is filled with opportunities to learn, grow, and test one’s abilities. Among these opportunities, moot court competitions stand out as one of the most enriching experiences for law students. Demonstrating exceptional advocacy skills, legal research, and teamwork, **Anirudh Soni, Hiral Jain, and Unnati Chhangani from the Faculty of Law, Jai Narain Vyas University, Jodhpur**, achieved a remarkable milestone by winning the **1st FIAT Justitia National Moot Court Competition 2026**, organized by **Mohanlal Sukhadia University, Udaipur**. Adding another feather to the achievement, **Anirudh Soni** was also recognized with the prestigious title of **‘Best Student Advocate’**. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/FullSizeRender-Anirudh-Soni-768x1024.jpg) This achievement highlights the dedication, preparation, and passion that the team invested in the competition. Moot court competitions simulate real courtroom proceedings and demand a deep understanding of legal principles, analytical thinking, persuasive advocacy, and the ability to respond confidently to challenging questions from judges. Competing against talented teams from across the country, the team from Jai Narain Vyas University displayed exceptional legal reasoning and courtroom advocacy that ultimately secured the winning position. The competition provided an intense and stimulating environment where participants engaged with complex legal issues, prepared detailed memorials, and presented oral arguments before experienced judges. Through this process, the team demonstrated not only strong legal knowledge but also composure, clarity of thought, and the ability to articulate arguments effectively. The recognition of **Anirudh Soni as the ‘Best Student Advocate’** further reflects the high level of advocacy demonstrated during the oral rounds. This honor is awarded to participants who show outstanding courtroom presence, structured arguments, persuasive delivery, and a clear grasp of legal concepts. Achieving this distinction at a national level competition is a testament to the preparation, commitment, and advocacy skills displayed during the event. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/IMG_4486-Anirudh-Soni-768x1024.jpg) The success of the team consisting of **Anirudh Soni, Hiral Jain, and Unnati Chhangani** also showcases the importance of teamwork in moot court competitions. Preparing for a moot requires extensive research, drafting of memorials, strategizing arguments, and practicing oral submissions. Each team member contributes unique strengths that collectively build a powerful case presentation. The collaborative effort of the team played a significant role in securing the championship title. Reflecting on the experience, Anirudh Soni shared that competing against some of the top teams across India made the journey particularly meaningful. The competition offered valuable learning opportunities and helped refine important legal skills. The experience also strengthened confidence and motivation to participate in more such competitions in the future. Achievements like this go beyond trophies and titles. They represent the spirit of dedication, perseverance, and a constant pursuit of excellence in the field of law. For many law students, moot court competitions serve as a foundation for developing practical legal skills that will later be used in professional practice. Participating in such platforms not only enhances advocacy abilities but also builds confidence and a deeper understanding of legal procedures. The victory at the **1st FIAT Justitia National Moot Court Competition 2026** stands as a proud moment for the achievers and for **Jai Narain Vyas University, Jodhpur**. It also serves as an inspiration for fellow law students who aspire to test their potential and make a mark in the legal field through dedication and hard work. LawFoyer proudly celebrates this remarkable accomplishment and applauds the efforts of **Anirudh Soni, Hiral Jain, and Unnati Chhangani** for setting an inspiring example of excellence in legal advocacy and academic pursuit. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/e9bee80c-49f3-4634-84ae-9a2762ed4d7e-Anirudh-Soni-1024x972.jpg) **Wish to showcase your achievement to the world and inspire others?** LawFoyer will celebrate your achievement because every achievement deserves recognition. Your achievement is our achievement. **Share your achievement with us:** **Categories:** Achievers Archive --- ### [3rd International Conference on Social Sciences Research in the Age of AI (SSRAAI2026) – Part of the ETLTC 2026 Conference Series | Organized by ETLTC Organizing Committee, Japan & USA | Register by 1 June 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-international-conference-on-social-sciences-research-in-the-age-of-ai-ssraai2026-part-of-the-etltc-2026-conference-series-organized-by-etltc-organizing-committee-japan-usa-r/) **Published:** March 5, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 3rd International Conference on Social Sciences Research in the Age of AI (SSRAAI2026) – Part of the ETLTC 2026 Conference Series | Organized by ETLTC Organizing Committee, Japan & USA | Register by 1 June 2026 **Content:** ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER / COLLEGE / UNIVERSITY The **ETLTC** was established in **2018** as a local conference organizing body at the **University of Aizu, Japan**. Initially, conferences were organized with students from the University of Aizu and the Karlsruhe University of Applied Sciences, Germany. Over time, the network expanded globally, welcoming students and faculty from **20+ countries across 6 continents**. ETLTC has grown into a large international academic platform covering diverse topics such as technology and societal applications, technical communication, information management, health communication and informatics, and education and society. Today, ETLTC is a **registered company in the United States** and continues to bring together participants from various academic and professional backgrounds worldwide. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY The **3rd International Conference on Social Sciences Research in the Age of AI (SSRAAI2026)** invites scholars, practitioners, and researchers to submit original work exploring the impact of **Artificial Intelligence on social sciences**. The conference focuses on understanding how AI is transforming research methodologies, institutions, governance, and society, and how social science frameworks can help guide the ethical and effective development of AI technologies. This conference is part of the **ETLTC 2026 Conference Series** and will be hosted remotely by the **University of Aizu, Japan**. Participants can present research on interdisciplinary themes connecting **AI, technology, governance, and social science research**. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE Scholars, practitioners, and researchers interested in exploring the relationship between **Artificial Intelligence and social sciences** are invited to submit their research work. ## MODE OF THE EVENT **Online Mode (Zoom)** for all participants. The conference team is also exploring the possibility of **27 July 2026 as an optional on-site day at the University of Aizu**, subject to sufficient interest. - **27 July 2026:** Possible optional on-site session - **28–29 July 2026:** Fully online conference - Any on-site presentations will be **live-streamed via Zoom** to allow full remote participation. ## LOCATION & VENUE OF THE EVENT Hosted remotely by the **University of Aizu, Japan**. ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE Participants may submit either of the following by **1 June 2026**: - **Extended Abstract** (approximately 500–800 words), or - **Full Paper** Official Website: ## PUBLICATION OPPORTUNITY Selected high-quality papers presented at the conference may be considered for publication in **MDPI Engineering Proceedings**, which is **indexed in Scopus**. Important notes: - Publication decisions will be made by conference editors based on quality, relevance, and clarity. - Only papers with a **clear technology focus** (with or without a social science perspective) will be considered for the Scopus-indexed proceedings pathway. - The **best papers will be shortlisted by a panel of judges** and invited for publication consideration. ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES - **Submission Deadline (Extended Abstract / Full Paper):** 1 June 2026 - **Conference Dates:** 27–29 July 2026 ## CONTACT INFORMATION **Prof. Harsh Mahaseth** Technical Program Committee Chair, SSRAAI2026 Email: **hmahaseth@jgu.edu.in** Phone: **+91 9502321237** ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT **Categories:** Call for Papers, Events --- ### [Nyaya Samvardhan: North-Western Region Pro Bono Conclave | Organized by Pro Bono Club, School of Law, Forensic Justice & Policy Studies, National Forensic Sciences University, Delhi Campus | Register by 15 March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/nyaya-samvardhan-north-western-region-pro-bono-conclave-organized-by-pro-bono-club-school-of-law-forensic-justice-policy-studies-national-forensic-sciences-university-delhi-campus-regis/) **Published:** March 3, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** Nyaya Samvardhan: North-Western Region Pro Bono Conclave | Organized by Pro Bono Club, School of Law, Forensic Justice & Policy Studies, National Forensic Sciences University, Delhi Campus | Register by 15 March 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Screenshot-2026-03-03-113200.png) ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISERS** **About the Institution** National Forensic Sciences University, established in 2009 as Gujarat Forensic Sciences University and declared an Institution of National Importance and a Central University in 2020. The National Forensic Sciences University (NFSU) offers around forty specialised programs as a premier hub for forensic education, research, and training. Its Delhi Campus extends this mission in the national capital, advancing interdisciplinary legal and forensic education while addressing contemporary challenges in justice administration through academic excellence and practical innovation. **School of Law, Forensic Justice & Policy Studies** The School of Law, Forensic Justice and Policy Studies is dedicated to transforming legal education by integrating forensic science with law and policymaking. It focuses on technology-driven legal studies to prepare legal professionals, policymakers and justice administrators for the complexities of today’s evolving, digital legal landscape. Its programmes blend forensic science with law to support crime prevention and fair, efficient justice, while shaping techno-legal experts who can strengthen governance, uphold the rule of law and contribute to a more just society. **Pro Bono Club, NFSU Delhi Campus** The Pro Bono Club at NFSU, Delhi Campus is a student-led initiative under the Nyaya Bandhu Pro Bono Legal Services programme (DISHA initiative) that advances Article 39A and the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 through student-led legal aid, NGO partnerships, and awareness materials. Through legal aid camps, para-legal training sessions, and collaborative workshops with practising advocates, the Club provides hands-on experiential learning while serving marginalised communities. ## **DETAILS OF THE EVENT** **Theme/Concept:** ‘Nyaya Samvardhan’ (Enhancement and Promotion of Justice) – a regional conclave to strengthen the culture of pro bono, empower Pro Bono Clubs under the DISHA Scheme, and advance access to justice. **Organised by:** Pro Bono Club, School of Law, Forensic Justice & Policy Studies, National Forensic Sciences University, Delhi Campus, under the Nyaya Bandhu Pro Bono Legal Services Programme of the Department of Justice, Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India. **COMPETITIONS** 1. **MEDIATRIX (Mediation):** Negotiation and mediation-based dispute resolution exercise focusing on diplomacy, empathy and structured dialogue.​ 2. **CINEMANIA (Short Film Making):** Short-film competition encouraging creative legal and social storytelling.​ 3. **RATIOCINA (Judgement Writing):** Judgment writing on realistic scenarios to test legal reasoning and structured decision-making.​ 4. **LEX COMMUNIS (Client Counselling):** Client-counselling event testing advocacy, problem-solving and client engagement.​ 5. **Best Practices of Pro Bono:** Presentations by Pro Bono Clubs showcasing their flagship initiatives and impact.​ ## **ELIGIBILITY** 1. Open to **Pro Bono Clubs and Legal Aid Assistance Cells** from law schools/colleges/universities recognised by the **Bar Council of India**.​ 2. Institutions must be located in the **Northern or Western region of India**.​ 3. Students must be **Bona-fide students** of the institution they represent.​ 4. Eligible programmes: **5-year integrated law programmes** and **3-year LL.B. degree**​ 5. Each institution may send **a maximum of two teams**, with **five members in each team**; teams may be accompanied by a **Nodal Officer or Faculty Member**. ## **LOCATION** **Mode**: Offline (On-Campus) **Venue**: National Forensic Sciences University, Delhi Campus, Outer Ring Rd, near Jaipur Golden Hospital, Institutional Area, Rohini, Delhi, 110085 5. **REGISTRATION AND SUBMISSION PROCEDURE** 6. **Registration Form:** Fill the **Google Form for registration** using the link: . **Submission of Drafts:** **Online draft submissions** (for the relevant competitions) must be completed by the specified deadlines. Kindly refer to the dates mentioned below. ## **IMPORTANT DATES AND DEADLINES** - **Release of Rulebook:** 20 February 2026.​ - **Last Date for Registration:** 15 March 2026.​ - **Last Date for Online Draft Submissions:** 22 March 2026.​ - **Dates of Conclave:** **03–04 April 2026** ## **FEE DETAILS** - **Registration Fee:** ₹2,000 per team (without accommodation) (Non-Refundable). - **Accommodation Request (optional):** Teams requiring accommodation are requested to kindly specify the same and send a **request via email to** [**probonoclub\_dc@nfsu.ac.in**](mailto:probonoclub_dc@nfsu.ac.in). Accommodation will be allotted on a **first-come, first-served basis**, subject to availability. - **Registration Fee Payment:** The registration fee of **₹2,000 (without accommodation)** **for each team** must be paid to the following account:​ - Account Name: **FEE COLLECTION, NFSU DELHI CAMPUS** - Bank: **Punjab National Bank** - Branch: **Delhi -Sector 8, Rohini** - Account No.: **0944100100008485** - IFSC Code: **PUNB0094410**​ ## **PRIZES AND AWARDS** 1. **Best Performing Team (Overall Conclave):**​ - Winner: **₹11,000 cash prize + Memento + Certificate.**​ - Runner-up: **₹7,000 cash prize + Memento + Certificate.**​ 2. **Each individual competition** - Winner: **Memento + Certificate of Achievement.**​ - Runner-up: **Memento + Certificate of Achievement.**​ 3. **Trophies** will be awarded as part of the conclave recognitions. ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** - **Official Email:** [probonoclub\_dc@nfsu.ac.in](mailto:probonoclub_dc@nfsu.ac.in) - **Student Coordinators (for queries):**​ - Ishit Sahu, Event Coordinator, Pro Bono Club: **+91 90441 58812** - Pragyaa Jain, General Secretary, Pro Bono Club: **+91 95559 88841** - Venketesh Jain, Research Head, Pro Bono Club: **+91 99534 98791** ## **OFFICIAL LINKS** - **Brochure, Rulebook and Other Details:** - **Google Drive link:** ​ - **Registration Form: ## SOCIAL MEDIA HANDLES** - **Instagram link:** [https://www.instagram.com/probonoclub\_nfsudelhi?igsh=MXZ2bmdwdnhnejRsYg==](https://www.instagram.com/probonoclub_nfsudelhi?igsh=MXZ2bmdwdnhnejRsYg==) **Categories:** Events, Other Competitions --- ### [NLIU LAW REVIEW – CALL FOR PAPERS [Volume XV, Issue II] | Organized by National Law Institute University, Bhopal](https://lawfoyer.in/nliu-law-review-call-for-papers-volume-xv-issue-ii-organized-by-national-law-institute-university-bhopal/) **Published:** March 3, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** NLIU LAW REVIEW – CALL FOR PAPERS [Volume XV, Issue II] | Organized by National Law Institute University, Bhopal **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Call-for-Paper_Volume-XV-Issue-II-1024x1024.png) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY The NLIU Law Review is a double-blind, peer-reviewed law journal published bi-annually by the National Law Institute University, Bhopal. The journal invites scholarly submissions for publication in Volume XV, Issue II. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY The NLIU Law Review is accepting manuscript submissions for Volume XV, Issue II. Submissions will be evaluated on the following parameters: **Parameters for Evaluation:** - **Grammar/Language:** Writing must be academic, free from errors of syntax, grammar, and punctuation. Language should be crisp and concise. - **Structure/Logical Coherence:** Manuscripts must follow a logical scheme, address a question of law, grey area, or hypothesis, and provide a conclusive analysis. - **Contribution to Existing Literature:** Submissions must be novel and add to the existing corpus of knowledge rather than restating existing laws and analyses. - **Contemporary Relevance:** Manuscripts should highlight recent developments and explain the present relevance of the subject matter. - **Referencing and Research:** Submissions must be based on in-depth research and properly cited. Over-citation and lack of citation must both be avoided. ## MODE OF THE EVENT Online (Submissions to be made through the electronic form available on the website) ## LOCATION Bhopal, India (National Law Institute University, Bhopal) ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE - Submissions must be made only through the electronic form available on the official website. - All submissions must be in **.docx format**. - Manuscripts must not contain any information that can identify the author. - A mandatory abstract of **250–300 words** must be included. - Manuscripts must not be authored by more than two authors. Official Website: ## SUBMISSION GUIDELINES **Formatting Requirements:** - Font: Times New Roman - Font Size: 12 - Line Spacing: 1.15 - Alignment: Justified **Citation Standards:** - Must conform to the Oxford University Standard for the Citation of Legal Authorities (4th ed., 2012). - Only footnotes to be used as citation. - Substantive footnoting is highly discouraged. ## TYPES OF SUBMISSIONS & WORD LIMITS - **Articles:** 4,000–10,000 words - **Case Notes:** 2,000–5,000 words - **Legislative Comment:** 1,000–3,000 words - **Book Reviews:** 1,000–3,000 words *Word limits are exclusive of the abstract and footnotes.* ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT **Categories:** Call for Papers, Events --- ### [DME MUN’26 (Model United Nations 2026) Under JusCosmos 2.0 – Competition Contours of Law, Nexus of Justice | Organized by Abhivyakti – The Literary & Debating Society, Delhi Metropolitan Education (DME) | Register by 10th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/dme-mun26-model-united-nations-2026-under-juscosmos-2-0-competition-contours-of-law-nexus-of-justice-organized-by-delhi-metropolitan-education-dme-register-by-28th-february/) **Published:** February 22, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** DME MUN’26 (Model United Nations 2026) Under JusCosmos 2.0 – Competition Contours of Law, Nexus of Justice | Organized by Delhi Metropolitan Education (DME) | Register by 28th February 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Screenshot-2026-02-22-162300.png) ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER / COLLEGE / UNIVERSITY** Delhi Metropolitan Education (DME), established in 2012 under the Sunshine Educational & Development Society, is affiliated with Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University (GGSIPU), New Delhi and accredited with an A+ Grade by NAAC. DME is known for its commitment to holistic education and for organizing prestigious national-level events such as National Moot Court Competitions. The institution offers academic programs in Law, Management, and Media. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY** DME MUN 2026 will be held on **11th & 12th April 2026**. It is an immersive simulation of the United Nations where delegates represent countries or portfolios, engage in structured debates, draft resolutions, and deliberate on pressing global and national issues. The conference includes: #### **Committees & Agendas** 1. **UNHRC (United Nations Human Rights Council)** Agenda: Safeguarding Digital Activism and Protecting Privacy Rights amid Heightened State Surveillance in Youth-Led GenZ Movements. 2. **UNSC (United Nations Security Council) – Double Delegation** Agenda: The United Nations and Global Peace: A Reassessment of Its Role Amidst Calls for Expansion of the Security Council. 3. **Lok Sabha** Agenda: Immigration, Foreigners & National Security: Assessing the Immigration and Foreigners Bill, 2025. 4. **Rajya Sabha** Agenda: Deliberation on Electoral Reforms in India with special emphasis on transparency, integrity in voting, and feasibility of “One Nation, One Election”. 5. **International Press (IP)** - Reporting - Interviews - Press Releases - Photography Agenda: Proliferation of fake and misleading news and ethical standards in global journalism in the era of AI. Additional Highlights: - Panel Discussion with UNIC Officers, Foreign Service Professionals & Legal Experts - Delegate Kit for all participants - Pre-conference training sessions - Strict No-Refund Policy - Committee Preference Policy in place **Dress Code:** - Day 1 (11 April 2026): Traditional Formals - Day 2 (12 April 2026): Western Formals ## **WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** **School Students:** - 8th to 12th Standard - Students graduating from 12th standard in 2026 **College/University Students:** - Currently enrolled in a recognized Undergraduate or Postgraduate programme ## **MODE OF THE EVENT** Offline (In-Person Conference) ## **LOCATION & VENUE OF THE EVENT** **Country:** India **State:** Uttar Pradesh **City:** Noida **Venue:** Delhi Metropolitan Education, Sector 62, Noida ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE** **Single Delegation (UNHRC, Lok Sabha, Rajya Sabha & IP):** [https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSeXGeDrFY0BahaWaNoVz6RInH4geCsguexFe\_xyF5mvIHmZCg/viewform?usp=header](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSeXGeDrFY0BahaWaNoVz6RInH4geCsguexFe_xyF5mvIHmZCg/viewform?usp=header) **Double Delegation (UNSC):** [https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdMjUa718cB8sdD4uIsjwcNu7\_d9hxx6qmtic8C-1XTe\_Gydg/viewform?usp=header](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdMjUa718cB8sdD4uIsjwcNu7_d9hxx6qmtic8C-1XTe_Gydg/viewform?usp=header) **Rules & Regulations Brochure:** Procedure: 1. Choose a preferred committee. 2. Fill out Google Form. 3. Mention committee preference order. 4. Complete payment. 5. Await confirmation and committee allocation. ## **FEE DETAILS** **Early Bird (Till 28 February 2026):** - ₹1399 – UNHRC, Lok Sabha, Rajya Sabha & IP - ₹2799 – UNSC (Double Delegation) **Post Early Bird:** - ₹1499 – UNHRC, Lok Sabha, Rajya Sabha & IP - ₹2899 – UNSC (Double Delegation) *No refund & no cancellation policy applicable.* ## **PRIZES / AWARDS** #### **UNHRC, Lok Sabha & Rajya Sabha** - Best Delegate – Trophy + Certificate + ₹5000 - High Commendation – Trophy + Certificate + ₹4000 - Special Mention – Certificate + Gift - Verbal Mention – Certificate + Gift #### **UNSC (Double Delegation)** - Best Delegate – Trophy + Certificate + ₹7000 - High Commendation – Trophy + Certificate + ₹6000 - Special Mention – Certificate + Gift - Verbal Mention – Certificate + Gift #### **International Press** - Best Journalist – ₹5000 - Best Photographer – ₹5000 ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - Early Bird Deadline: 28 February 2026 - Event Dates: 11 & 12 April 2026 - Committee allocation details shared before conference ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** **Student In-Charge:** - Mr. Dev Gupta – Secretary General – 8383854974 - Mr. Ayush Pandey – Deputy Secretary General – 9835970966 **Official Email:** ## **OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / BROCHURE** [https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1G9nt1-fr1TYb1mwWxnoTlqaz7aUMNcat?usp=drive\_link](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1G9nt1-fr1TYb1mwWxnoTlqaz7aUMNcat?usp=drive_link) **Categories:** Events, Other Competitions --- ### [4th Deo Mangal Memorial Nationwide Moot Court Competition, 2026 (Online Mode) | Organized by Narayan School of Law, Gopal Narayan Singh University | Cash Prize Pool of Rs. 73,000 | Additional Benefits for all Participants | Register by 6th March, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/4th-deo-mangal-memorial-nationwide-moot-court-competition-2026-online-mode-organized-by-narayan-school-of-law-gopal-narayan-singh-university-register-by-28th-february-2026/) **Published:** January 15, 2026 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** 4th Deo Mangal Memorial Nationwide Moot Court Competition, 2026 (Online Mode) | Organized by Narayan School of Law, Gopal Narayan Singh University | Register by 28th February, 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/4th-deo-mangal-memorial-nationwide-moot-court-competition-Poster-724x1024.png) ## **About the Organiser / College / University** Gopal Narayan Singh University (GNSU) is a private university located at Jamuhar village near Sasaram in the Rohtas district of Bihar, India. It is among the first six private universities in Bihar and was officially established on 15th June, 2018, following notification in the Bihar Gazette after a Bihar Cabinet decision dated 5th June, 2018. ## **Details About the Event / Opportunity** The 4th Deo Mangal Memorial Nationwide Moot Court Competition, 2026 aims to provide a comprehensive platform for future legal counsels to engage in intricate legal deliberations, frame arguments based on a given proposition, and refine their advocacy skills. The competition emphasizes analytical thinking and offers participants first-hand exposure to real-time legal complexities, thereby strengthening their practical understanding of law. ## **Who Is It For / Eligibility to Participate** Law students enrolled in 3 years LLB program and 5 years integrated program from any college/ institution/ university recognized by BCI across the country. A maximum of 2 teams from one college/institution/university shall be allowed to participate. ## **Mode of the Event** **Online** ## **Location & Venue of the Event** Online (Virtual Mode) ## **Registration / Submission Links & Procedure** Online registrations for this competition are open from 15th January, 2026. The teams must register online by 28th February, 2026, 11:59 PM IST. The registration shall be done by filling up the registration form via this registration link. The registration shall be considered complete only when the Registration Fee has been paid successfully and the registration form is duly filled with all the credentials. The registration fee for the competition is Rs. 2000.00 (Two Thousand Rupees Only). After Payment, Kindly upload the screenshot of the payment during registration and do enter the referral/UTR number of the payment. QR code for payment is provided in Rule book. The participants will receive an official approval mail from organizing committee carrying the ‘Team Code’ within a week of registration or earlier. The teams shall quote this team code in all further communications with the organizing committee. Maximum of 2 registration from one Institution shall be allowed to participate and no NOC required from the institution of the participating team. Link for Brochure, Rule Book and Moot Proposition: [Click here.](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1vqPcqaSTZVbhw4YE2JOWfMKgzrkl6_sv?usp=drive_link) Link for Registration: [Click here.](https://forms.gle/fAmwLsb1Y5d2pAb18) ## **Fee Details** **INR 2,000 per team** ## **Prizes** - **Winning Team:** ₹25,000 + Trophy + Certificate - **Runner-Up Team:** ₹20,000 + Trophy + Certificate - **Best Memorial:** ₹7,000 + Trophy + Certificate - **Best Speaker (Male):** ₹7,000 + Trophy + Certificate - **Best Speaker (Female):** ₹7,000 + Trophy + Certificate - **Best Researcher:** ₹7,000 + Trophy + Certificate Certificates of Participation will be awarded to all participants. **Additional Benefits:** - 10% scholarship code to all event participants for all our courses from Lawctopus Law School. - FREE Access to LawFoyer Academy’s ([https://academy.lawfoyer.in](https://academy.lawfoyer.in/)) two Premium Courses to Top 3 teams of the event including Advanced Certification Course on Legal Research & Writing (worth Rs. 2000) and Advanced Certification Course on Supercharging Litigation & Academics with AI (worth Rs. 4000). - Discounted Publication Opportunity to all the Participants with 50% Discount on Publication with LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research (ISSN: 2583-7753) ([www.lijdlr.com](http://www.lijdlr.com/)) which is indexed on 350+ Global Databases including Harvard HOLLIS Library, Oxford SOLO Library, Hein Online, Google Scholar, CrossRef, ISSN and other international libraries and databases. - Internship Opportunity to all the Participants – All participants will get an opportunity to Intern with LawFoyer and attend LawFoyer’s structured Free Virtual Internship Training Program in collaboration with reputed law firms wherein the students will get an opportunity to Learn Practical Skills including Case Finding & Analysis, Legal Research, Legal Writing, Legal Drafting and Leveraging AI & Modern Legal Tech for Practical Legal Work. - Recognition to “Top Performers” of the Event via India’s First Digital “Hall of Fame” – LawFoyer’s “Achievers Archive” (). We will celebrate and feature the achievements of Excellent Performers of the Event via our “Achievers Archive”. ## **Deadlines / Important Dates** - Last date of final registration: **6th March, 2026** - Last date for clarification: **02nd March, 2026** - Last date for memorial submission (soft copies): **11th March, 2026** - Inauguration, Researcher’s Test & Preliminary Rounds: **15th March, 2026** - Quarter-Final & Semi-Final Rounds: **16th March, 2026** - Final Round & Valedictory: **17th March, 2026** ## **Contact Information** - **Mr. Shubham Sandeep**, President, MCS, NSL +91 78706 93414 - **Mr. Aaditya Poddar**, Vice-President, MCS, NSL +91 76430 24605 - **Ms. Khushi Kumari**, Joint Secretary, MCS, NSL +91 76458 73307 ## **Official Link of the Event / Brochure / Rules & Regulations** - **Official Link:** - Link for Brochure, Rule Book and Moot Proposition: [Click here.](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1vqPcqaSTZVbhw4YE2JOWfMKgzrkl6_sv?usp=drive_link) - Link for Registration: [Click here.](https://forms.gle/fAmwLsb1Y5d2pAb18) - **Social Media handles:** - Link for Linkedin: [Click here.](https://www.linkedin.com/in/moot-court-society-narayan-school-of-law-gnsu?utm_source=share&utm_campaign=share_via&utm_content=profile&utm_medium=android_app) - Link for Instagram: [Click here.](https://www.instagram.com/mootcourtsocietynsl?igsh=dDhkZmN6YmJwaGx5) **Categories:** Events, Moot Courts --- ### [SESSION: The Future of Law: AI, ODR & Legal Technology | Organized by Law Firm Ready | Event on 28th February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/session-the-future-of-law-ai-odr-legal-technology-organized-by-law-firm-ready-event-on-28th-february-2026/) **Published:** February 27, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** SESSION: The Future of Law: AI, ODR & Legal Technology | Organized by Law Firm Ready | Event on 28th February 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/AI-Session-Poster-819x1024.jpg) ## About the Organization LFR is an organisation dedicated to building practical skills and preparing future-ready legal professionals. **Through innovative pedagogies and interactive methods**, we ensure that students not only gain knowledge but also develop confidence and real-world exposure. Over the years, we have **trained more than 10,000 students and partnered with over 15 universities** across India in building stronger pathways for young lawyers. ## **SESSION: The Future of Law: AI, ODR & Legal Technology** The legal profession is experiencing one of the most significant transformations in its history with the rise of AI and legal technology. We are now hearing titles that barely existed a decade ago- legal engineer, neutral mediator, case manager, data researcher, legal technologist, and more. However, more than 90% of law students are still preparing for careers designed decades ago. Fewer than 10% understand how technology is reshaping the legal industry. For today’s law students, especially those in their first and second year, understanding these shifts is no longer optional. It is foundational. This session is not about replacing traditional law. It is about preparing you for possibilities the classroom doesn’t fully explore. Because the future of law will not only belong to the most informed. It will also belong to the most prepared! The future lawyer won’t just argue cases. They will design solutions to problems which are still emerging. But this isn’t just another lecture. Expect rapid-fire, real stories from law school journeys (including the uncertainty, mistakes and confusion), and an honest discussion on how diverse the legal industry is. Join us for this free online session and start understanding the profession beyond the classroom. This is your chance to pause and ask: What kind of lawyer do I want to become in a world that is constantly changing? ## **Speakers** 1. **Deepti Shinde**, Legal Engineer- Jurisphere.ai, Former Associate-SAM, alumna NLU Jodhpur. 2. **Syed Mohd. Tayyab,** Founding Secretary General- ODR Nexus, IIAM Certified Arbitrator, LLM- Queen Mary University of London. 3. **Rohit Sharma,** Founder LFR & AWAAZ Leadership Labs, Researcher, LMSAI, Harvard University. *(Moderator)* ## **Details** - Session Date: 28th February 2026, Time: 4:00pm (IST) - **No registration fees** - **Certificates** Available - Platform: Zoom - Registration Link: - Join the WhatsApp group [https://chat.whatsapp.com/EwVCCdwOgamGgJ5odGuIhQ?mode=gi\_t](https://chat.whatsapp.com/EwVCCdwOgamGgJ5odGuIhQ?mode=gi_t) ## **Participants will gain** 1. Skills that remain **future proof**– regardless of where AI goes next. 2. Clarity on where the legal industry is actually heading, not where your syllabus stops. 3. An **insider perspective** from practitioners building and working within the evolving legal ecosystem. 4. Learn what **Online Dispute Resolution (ODR)** actually is and why it is becoming important in India and globally. 5. A roadmap to start early- **concrete steps first and second-year students can take** to position themselves strategically ## **Contact** [**lawfirmready@gmail.com**](mailto:lawfirmready@gmail.com) **Categories:** Events --- ### [MASTER DAYANAND 1ST NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2026 | Organized by School of Law & Legal Studies, Sanskaram University | Register by 20th March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/master-dayanand-1st-national-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-school-of-law-legal-studies-sanskaram-university-register-by-20th-march-2026/) **Published:** February 25, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** MASTER DAYANAND 1ST NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2026 | Organized by School of Law & Legal Studies, Sanskaram University | Register by 20th March 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Screenshot-2026-02-25-220309.png) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY Sanskaram University is an esteemed institution established in 2024 under the Haryana Private Universities Act, 2006. Recognized by the University Grants Commission (UGC) under Section 2(f) of the UGC Act, 1956, the university is located just 40 km from Indira Gandhi International Airport, New Delhi. The University offers diverse programs across disciplines including Law, Engineering, Pharmacy, Agriculture, Management, and BMLT. With state-of-the-art infrastructure, fully equipped laboratories, Wi-Fi-enabled campuses, and separate accommodations for boys and girls, Sanskaram University aims to provide a holistic educational environment. The School of Law & Legal Studies (SLS) focuses on empowering future leaders in law and justice through a curriculum that blends theoretical learning with practical exposure, including moot court activities and experiential learning. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY The Master Dayanand 1st National Moot Court Competition, 2026 is a flagship academic initiative designed to enhance legal research, advocacy, and constitutional reasoning skills among law students across the country. The competition centers around contemporary legal issues including: - Right to Privacy - Digital Media Ethics - Aviation Law - Constitutional Remedies - Criminal & Cyber Laws - Information Technology Act, 2000 - Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 **Theme:** Right to Privacy and Dignity in the Digital Age The moot problem involves constitutional provisions such as Article 21 of the Constitution of India, issues of digital vigilantism, data protection, intermediary liability under the IT Act, 2000, and state accountability in the digital era. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE The competition is open to law students across the country. ## MODE OF THE EVENT **Hybrid Format:** - Preliminary Rounds – Online - Quarter-Finals – Online - Semi-Finals – Offline - Grand Finale – Offline ## LOCATION & VENUE OF THE EVENT Sanskaram University Kheri Taluka – Patauda Jhajjar (124108), Haryana, India ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE Teams must register on or before 23:59 hours, 20th March 2026 by: - Sending an email with the subject “Registration for the MASTER DAYANAND 1ST NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2026” to: mootcourt.committee@sanskaramuniversity.ac.in - Completing the online registration form. ## FEE DETAILS Registration Fee: ₹ 2100/- per team **Note:** - Registration fee once paid is non-refundable under all circumstances. ## PRIZES - Winner Team: ₹ 31,000/- + Trophy + Certificates - Runner-Up Team: ₹ 21,000/- + Trophy + Certificates - Best Memorial (Written Arguments): ₹ 6,000/- + Trophy + Certificates - Best Speaker (Best Oral Advocacy): ₹ 6,000/- + Trophy + Certificates - All Participants: Certificate of Participation ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES - Commencement of Registration: 23rd February 2026 - Release of Moot Proposition: 23rd February 2026 - Last Date for Registration: 20th March 2026 - Last Date for Seeking Clarifications: 20th March 2026 - Submission of Soft Copies of Memorials: 25th March 2026 - Inaugural Ceremony (Online): 27th March 2026 - Preliminary Rounds 1 & 2 (Online): 28th March 2026 - Quarter Final Round (Online): 29th March 2026 - Semi-Final Rounds (Offline): 3rd April 2026 - Final Rounds & Valedictory Ceremony and Lunch (Offline): 4th April 2026 ## CONTACT INFORMATION - Faculty Convener: Dr. Lokesh Chauhan Mobile: +91 8829505307 - Faculty Co-Convener: Ms. Karuna Singh Mobile: +91 8288911729 - Student Conveners: Mr. Lokesh – +91 8708811086 Mr. Sandeep – +91 9253633993 Ms. Charu Mudgal – +91 91729378874 Ms. Deepika – +91 917056268555 - Admissions Email: admission@sanskaramuniversity.ac.in - General Enquiry Email: info@sanskaramuniversity.ac.in - Contact Numbers: +91 7056999201, +91 7056999202 ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / LINK OF THE OFFICIAL BROCHURE, RULES & REGULATIONS - **Registration Link:** [https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSfP5QEGVbvKekgzn4qxrNs\_EIR0iN-WV-kcufCZALLoMjitPg/viewform?usp=sharing](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSfP5QEGVbvKekgzn4qxrNs_EIR0iN-WV-kcufCZALLoMjitPg/viewform?usp=sharing) - **Official Brochure & Competition Details:** [https://drive.google.com/drive/u/2/folders/1KsTxn6BaawFKEj4GRc9RSBhFn5Bm\_9I4](https://drive.google.com/drive/u/2/folders/1KsTxn6BaawFKEj4GRc9RSBhFn5Bm_9I4) **Categories:** Events, Moot Courts --- ### [NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON “THE NEW LABOUR CODES: PROSPECTIVE CONCERNS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS" | Organized by Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab | Register by 2nd March, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/national-conference-on-the-new-labour-codes-prospective-concerns-for-human-rights-organized-by-rajiv-gandhi-national-university-of-law-punjab-register-by-25th-february-2026/) **Published:** February 1, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON “THE NEW LABOUR CODES: PROSPECTIVE CONCERNS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS" | Organized by Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab | Register by 25th February, 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Screenshot-2026-02-02-001007.png) ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER / UNIVERSITY** Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law (RGNUL), Punjab was established by the State Legislature of Punjab under the Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab Act, 2006. The University is approved by the Bar Council of India, registered with the University Grants Commission (UGC), and accredited with an ‘A’ Grade by NAAC. RGNUL has been granted autonomy under UGC Regulations and has emerged as one of India’s top-ranking law institutions, offering integrated undergraduate, postgraduate, and doctoral programmes in law. The University is committed to holistic legal education and quality research in law and allied disciplines. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY** RGNUL, Punjab is organising a **One-Day National Conference** on *“The New Labour Codes: Prospective Concerns for Human Rights”* in **hybrid mode**. The introduction of the four new Labour Codes represents a major transformation in India’s labour law framework. While the reforms aim at consolidation and modernisation, they also raise critical concerns regarding labour welfare, social security, collective bargaining, and human rights of workers across formal and informal sectors. The conference seeks to provide an interdisciplinary platform for academicians, practitioners, researchers, policymakers, and students to critically examine the prospective impact of the new labour codes on labour justice, human rights, and access to dignified working conditions in India. ## **WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** - Academicians - Legal practitioners - Researchers - Policymakers - Students - Scholars interested in labour law and human rights (Abstract and paper submissions are limited to a maximum of two authors.) ## **MODE OF THE EVENT** Hybrid (Online & Offline) ## **LOCATION & VENUE OF THE EVENT** Patiala, Punjab, India (Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab – for offline participation) ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE** - Abstract submission in **MS Word format only** - Abstract length: **250–300 words** (maximum 4 keywords) - Full paper submission in **MS Word format only** - Citation style: **Bluebook (21st Edition)** - Word limit for full paper: **Maximum 5000 words** (Links for abstract submission and full paper submission are provided in the brochure.) ## **FEE DETAILS** ₹1000 (Inclusive of all registration charges) ## **PRIZES / PUBLICATION OPPORTUNITY** - The **best 15 papers** shall be published in an **edited book**. ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - **Registration & Abstract Submission:** 25th February, 2026 - **Intimation of Acceptance of Abstracts:** 1st March, 2026 - **Payment & Full Paper Submission:** 5th March, 2026 - **Date of Conference:** 20th March, 2026 ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** - **Phone:** 0175-2391600 - **Email IDs:** - caslw@rgnul.ac.in - casihr@rgnul.ac.in - labourcodes2026@gmail.com - **Student Coordinators:** 1. Arun Rathod (+91 9121364746) 2. Paankhurie Shrivastava (+91 9425133990) 3. Ananya Singhvi (+91 9214405565) 4. Khushbuu Mathuria (+91 7425 024 333) 5. Jashandeep Kaur (+91 6280 995 135) 6. Aabha Singhal (+91 96029 08908) ## **OFFICIAL LINK / BROCHURE** **Official Brochure:** [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1sp03h2utYYQU0Iz4bLvR79wSWJxjrX-X/view?usp=sharing ](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1sp03h2utYYQU0Iz4bLvR79wSWJxjrX-X/view?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Call for Papers, Events --- ### [12th Professor V.S. Mani Memorial International Law Moot Court Competition 2026 | Organized by Seedling School of Law and Governance, Jaipur National University, Jaipur | Register by 7th March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/12th-professor-v-s-mani-memorial-international-law-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-seedling-school-of-law-and-governance-register-by-7th-march-2026/) **Published:** February 23, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 12th Professor V.S. Mani Memorial International Law Moot Court Competition 2026 | Organized by Seedling School of Law and Governance | Register by 7th March 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Screenshot-2026-02-23-220852.png) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY Jaipur National University, established on 22 October 2007, is a private university located in the Jaipur district of Rajasthan, India ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY Jaipur National University, Jaipur, at its Seedling School of Law and Governance, Rajasthan is organizing the **12th Professor V.S. Mani Memorial International Law Moot Court Competition- 2026** **Dates:** 27 – 29 March, 2026 ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE The Competition is open to all students, enrolled bona fide on a regular basis in an undergraduate Law course (5-year integrated Law course/3 Year L.L.B Course) or its equivalent conducted by any recognized Institution/College/University of any country. No Institution/College/University shall enter the Competition with more than one team. A cap of 40 teams is reserved for the Competition, and teams will be selected by first come first serve basis. Each Team shall comprise of a minimum of two members and a maximum of three members. In a Team comprising of two members, both members shall be designated as Speakers. In a Team comprising three members, the third member of the team shall be designated as Researcher. Any additional member or team coach of any team shall not formally be recognized and will not be entitled to a certificate from the University ## MODE OF THE EVENT (ONLINE / OFFLINE OR HYBRID) OFFLINE ## LOCATION (COUNTRY/STATE/CITY) & VENUE OF THE EVENT Jaipur, Rajasthan ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE [https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdniu1ePSdGewfXUCxjgJOaCkmFzHWKgEPW\_l-G-HyEEub0Zw/viewform?pli=1](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdniu1ePSdGewfXUCxjgJOaCkmFzHWKgEPW_l-G-HyEEub0Zw/viewform?pli=1). ## FEE DETAILS The Registration Fee is INR 5,000/- Indian teams. All other Teams shall pay US $ 100 or its equivalent excluding service charge (if any) in Euro as registration fee. ## PRIZES Awards and Accolades - The Winning Team shall be awarded a Trophy and a cash prize of 30,000/- INR. - The Runners-up Team shall be awarded a Trophy and a cash prize of 20,000/- INR. - The Best Speaker shall be awarded a Trophy and a cash prize of 7,000/- INR. - The Best Memorial award carries a Trophy and cash prize of 6,000/- INR. - The Best Researcher shall be awarded a Trophy and a cash prize of 5,000/- INR. ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES SCHEDULE OF EVENTS S. No. Event Date Day 1. Release of Trial Proposition 11th February 2026 Wednesday 2. Commencement of Registration 11th February 2026 Wednesday 3. Last Date for Registration 7th March 2026 Saturday 4. Last Date for seeking clarifications 10th March 2026 Tuesday 5. Release of Clarifications 13th March 2026 Friday 6. Submission of Soft Copy 16th March 2026 Monday 7. Submission of Hard Copy 18th March 2026 Wednesday 8. Inaugural Ceremony & Draw of Lots 27th March 2026 Friday 9. Preliminary Round- I&II & Quarter-Finals 28th March 2026 Saturday 10. Semi-Finals, Finals & Valedictory Ceremony 29th March 2026 Sunday ## CONTACT INFORMATION - Mr. Suyash Kunal Joshi (Faculty Convener) | **Contact:** +91-9461043600 - Mr. Navdeep Singh Rajawat (Student Convener) | **Contact:** +91-9680900635 ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / LINK OF THE OFFICIAL BROCHURE, RULES & REGULATIONS ETC. . **Categories:** Events, Moot Courts --- ### [जनादेश विमर्श – Article Writing Competition | Organized by the Panjab University Students’ Liberty Union | Register by 26 February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/जनादेश-विमर्श-article-writing-competition-organized-by-the-panjab-university-students/) **Published:** February 23, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** जनादेश विमर्श – Article Writing Competition | Organized by the Panjab University Students’ Liberty Union | Register by 26 February 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/WhatsApp-Image-2026-02-22-at-1.15.58-PM-1-2a4d398cb3899b837b8d7cfc080ffca3-819x1024.webp) ## **About the Organisation** The Panjab University Students’ Liberty Union is a student led academic and policy oriented body functioning at Panjab University. The Union is a part of the international organisation Students for Liberty and aims to promote constitutional literacy, public policy engagement, and informed discourse on governance and democratic institutions. ## **About the Event** The competition seeks to encourage critical and research based writing on pressing issues concerning electoral reforms, democratic accountability, and federal dynamics in India. ## **Sub Themes** • Freebies in Elections: Was the electoral mandate in Bihar for debate or freebies? • Should Indian citizens be granted the constitutional right to recall elected representatives? • Anti Defection Law and Party Discipline: Should constituency interests take precedence over party directives? • Rajya Sabha Reforms: Should Members of the Rajya Sabha be directly elected by citizens? • Impact of the potential Delimitation on politics and federalism • State of Democracy in India: Is India experiencing democratic backsliding? ## **Eligibility** Open to all students enrolled in Diploma, Undergraduate, or Postgraduate programmes across India. ## **Word Limit** 1000 to 1500 words ## **Language** Hindi or English ## **Registration Fees** - ₹10 per submission for Panjab University students - ₹20 per submission for students from other institutions - Multiple entries are permitted. Separate registration is required for each submission. A unique participation code shall be allotted per registration. ## **Important Dates** - Last Date to Register: 26 February 2026 - Last Date to Submit: 6 March 2026 ## **Prizes** - Certificates shall be provided to all participants. - Top three winners in each language category shall be awarded merit certificates and prizes. ## **Registration Link** - ## **Contact Details** - Sukhman Kapoor, Chairwoman, Publications and Editorial Committee | Contact: 8168026325 **Categories:** Essay Competitions, Events, Other Competitions --- ### [Manan Grover of Maharaja Surajmal Institute, Janakpuri Secures Rank 2 with 9.21 CGPA and Receives Academic Excellence Award](https://lawfoyer.in/manan-grover-of-maharaja-surajmal-institute-janakpuri-secures-rank-2-with-9-21-cgpa-and-receives-academic-excellence-award/) **Published:** February 22, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Content:** Success in law school is never accidental. It is built on patience, discipline, and a strong mindset. Today, LawFoyer proudly celebrates the remarkable academic achievement of **Manan Grover**, a second year BBA LLB student from Maharaja Surajmal Institute, affiliated to Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/c4f7adb5-d295-425b-aac7-ad8b885032c5-Manan-1024x682.jpeg) On 14 February 2026, Manan secured **Rank 2** in her academic batch with an outstanding **CGPA of 9.21**, earning the prestigious **Academic Excellence Award** at the university level. Along with this recognition, she also received a cash prize of ₹7,000, marking a special milestone in her academic journey. Manan’s journey is beautifully reflected in her personal belief: *“Mile toh shukr kar, na mile toh sabr*” \[ which means that “*Be grateful if you achieve, be patient if you do not*“\]. This mindset guided her throughout her first year of law school. Law studies demand long hours of reading, conceptual clarity, analytical thinking, and consistency. Balancing multiple subjects while maintaining high academic performance is not an easy task. Yet, with determination and steady effort, Manan turned her hard work into measurable success. Scoring a 9.21 CGPA in law school is a significant accomplishment. It reflects not just intelligence, but also discipline and strategic preparation. It shows the ability to understand complex legal principles, present structured answers, and maintain consistency across semesters. Securing Rank 2 at a reputed institution like Maharaja Surajmal Institute speaks volumes about Manan’s commitment to excellence. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/C2B3C9FB-6109-4BDD-8796-BCDD6A0495EB-Manan-576x1024.jpeg) What makes this achievement even more meaningful is the growth journey behind it. Manan describes this phase as one that required patience, consistency, and dedication. Law school can often feel overwhelming for first year students. Adjusting to case laws, legal writing, research assignments, and internal assessments requires a shift in mindset. Manan embraced this transition with maturity and focus. The ₹7,000 cash prize she received may seem like a small amount to some, but for a student, it represents recognition of effort and the beginning of financial independence. It symbolizes that sincere hard work does get noticed and rewarded. For Manan, it was not just about the money, but about the validation of her consistent dedication. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_2446-Manan-1-1024x768.jpeg) Academic excellence is not only about marks. It builds confidence, strengthens fundamentals, and opens doors to internships, moots, research opportunities, and leadership roles. Achievements like this set a strong foundation for a promising legal career ahead. By securing Rank 2 at the university level, Manan has demonstrated that success in law school comes from focused preparation and a calm mindset. Her story is a reminder to all law students that consistency matters more than shortcuts. Results may not always come instantly, but disciplined effort never goes to waste. Manan’s achievement inspires fellow students to trust the process, remain patient, and continue striving for excellence. LawFoyer proudly celebrates Manan Grover for her exceptional academic performance and for setting an inspiring example for young legal minds across the country. Her journey shows that gratitude, patience, and perseverance can turn aspirations into achievements. We congratulate Manan on this remarkable milestone and wish her continued success in her academic and professional journey ahead. The legal fraternity needs dedicated and disciplined minds like hers. Wish to showcase your achievement to the world and inspire others? LawFoyer will celebrate your achievement because every achievement deserves recognition. Your achievement is our achievement. Share your achievement with us. Visit: **Categories:** Achievers Archive --- ### [Dhanvi Kadian of GD Goenka University Secures Runner Up Position at Second GD Goenka International IP Essay Writing Competition 2025 and Gets Published in IJLRA](https://lawfoyer.in/dhanvi-kadian-of-gd-goenka-university-secures-runner-up-position-at-second-gd-goenka-international-ip-essay-writing-competition-2025-and-gets-published-in-ijlra/) **Published:** February 22, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Content:** LawFoyer proudly celebrates the remarkable achievement of **Dhanvi Kadian**, a Final Year BBA LL.B. (Hons.) student from **GD Goenka University, Gurugram, Haryana**, who secured the **Runner Up position** at the **Second GD Goenka International IP Essay Writing Competition, 2025**. Organized by GD Goenka University at the University Level, this prestigious competition witnessed enthusiastic participation from talented legal minds, making Dhanvi’s accomplishment truly commendable. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_9803-Dhanvi-Kadian-768x1024.jpeg) Dhanvi’s winning essay, titled *“The Business Behind the Belief: How the Ramayana Was Capitalized By…”*, reflects deep academic insight and a powerful blend of legal reasoning with cultural understanding. Her work has recently been published in the **International Journal for Legal Research and Analysis (IJLRA)**, adding another feather to her cap. Having her research featured on such a respected academic platform marks a significant milestone in her academic journey. Her essay explores the complex intersection of intellectual property law and cultural heritage. In a time when traditional narratives and cultural symbols are increasingly commercialized, Dhanvi’s work highlights the importance of cultural responsibility and the protection of heritage through legal frameworks. She brings forward thoughtful arguments on how ancient cultural texts like the Ramayana are not just spiritual or literary treasures but also subjects of commercial interest in the modern era. Through her research, she emphasizes the need for a balanced approach that respects tradition while navigating intellectual property rights. For Dhanvi, this achievement is deeply personal. She shares that this essay is incredibly close to her heart as it reflects her passion for law, culture, and critical inquiry. The opportunity to express her ideas on cultural responsibility and intellectual property protection has been both fulfilling and empowering. Winning the competition and seeing her work published has been a surreal experience for her. She describes the moment as one of immense joy and gratitude, calling it an honour beyond words. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_3541-Dhanvi-Kadian-1024x791.jpeg) Competitions like these demand not only strong writing skills but also analytical depth, originality, and the ability to present complex legal concepts in a structured and compelling manner. Dhanvi’s success stands as proof of her dedication, consistency, and intellectual curiosity. It also reflects the academic environment of GD Goenka University, which continues to encourage research, innovation, and scholarly excellence among its students. Being recognized at an international themed competition and securing a publication in a reputed legal journal is no small feat, especially for a student in her final year. It showcases her readiness to contribute meaningfully to academic discourse and legal scholarship. Her journey serves as a reminder that when passion meets perseverance, remarkable achievements follow. Dhanvi’s accomplishment is not just a personal victory but also an inspiration for aspiring law students across the country. It encourages young legal minds to participate in research competitions, engage deeply with subjects they care about, and fearlessly share their perspectives with the world. Academic writing is a powerful tool for change, and Dhanvi has beautifully demonstrated how students can use it to address contemporary legal and cultural issues. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/48814f8e-2916-4549-882e-6feeac7fdea4-Dhanvi-Kadian-768x1024.jpeg) At LawFoyer’s Achievers’ Archive, we believe in celebrating such milestones because every achievement carries a story of hard work, belief, and determination. Dhanvi Kadian’s journey reminds us that success is built on passion, dedication, and the courage to think critically. We extend our heartfelt congratulations to Dhanvi on this outstanding accomplishment. May this milestone be the beginning of many more academic and professional successes in her legal career. Wish to showcase your achievement to the world and inspire others? LawFoyer will celebrate your achievement because every achievement deserves recognition. Your achievement is our achievement. Share your achievement with us. Visit: **Categories:** Achievers Archive --- ### [Madhura Vedang, Pragya Mehta, and Himanshu Gove of Maharashtra National Law University, Mumbai Shine as Semi Finalists at the 9th GNLU Securities and Investment Law Moot, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/madhura-vedang-pragya-mehta-and-himanshu-gove-of-maharashtra-national-law-university-mumbai-shine-as-semi-finalists-at-the-9th-gnlu-securities-and-investment-law-moot-2026/) **Published:** February 22, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Content:** LawFoyer proudly celebrates the remarkable achievement of **Madhura Vedang, Pragya Mehta, and Himanshu Gove**, students of Maharashtra National Law University, Mumbai, for securing the position of **Semi Finalists and ranking 3rd overall** at the prestigious **9th GNLU Securities and Investment Law Moot, 2026** organised by Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG-20260216-WA0088-Madhura-1024x768.jpg) Competing at a national level moot court competition that attracts some of the finest legal minds from across the country, this talented team demonstrated exceptional research, advocacy skills, and strategic thinking. The Securities and Investment Law Moot is known for its complex problem statements that require a deep understanding of financial regulations, securities law frameworks, and contemporary legal developments. To emerge as Semi Finalists among such strong competition is truly commendable. For Madhura, who is currently pursuing her 2nd year of BA LLB (Hons), this journey was both challenging and rewarding. Along with her teammates Pragya and Himanshu, she invested countless hours in research, drafting memorials, refining arguments, and participating in rigorous practice rounds. Their dedication reflected not just in their oral advocacy but also in the clarity and structure of their legal reasoning. What makes this achievement even more special is the team’s approach towards learning. As Madhura shared in her personal reflection, this experience pushed her beyond memorising legal provisions. It helped her understand how legal principles operate in real life disputes. That shift from theoretical learning to practical application is what truly defines a successful mooter. Mooting is not merely about speaking confidently in a courtroom setting. It is about understanding the law deeply, analysing facts critically, and presenting arguments with precision and composure. The team’s success highlights the strong mooting culture at Maharashtra National Law University, Mumbai. Competitions like the GNLU Securities and Investment Law Moot test students on emerging and technical areas of law. Preparing for such competitions requires not only academic excellence but also teamwork, time management, and resilience under pressure. Madhura, Pragya, and Himanshu exemplified all these qualities. Securing the 3rd rank overall at a national competition hosted by Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar, is no small feat. It is a testament to their consistent effort, intellectual curiosity, and ability to collaborate effectively as a team. Each member played a vital role, whether it was researching intricate points of securities regulation, drafting persuasive written submissions, or delivering compelling oral arguments before esteemed judges. In her message to aspiring law students, Madhura shared a valuable insight: focus on understanding, not just speaking. Good mooting comes from clear thinking, not fancy arguments. This simple yet powerful advice captures the essence of effective advocacy. Law is not about complicated language. It is about clarity, logic, and conviction. At LawFoyer’s Achievers’ Archive, we believe that such milestones deserve to be celebrated widely. Achievements like these inspire other students to step out of their comfort zones, participate in competitions, and embrace the process of growth. Success in moot court competitions is not only about trophies and rankings. It builds confidence, sharpens analytical ability, and prepares students for future legal careers. We congratulate Madhura Vedang, Pragya Mehta, and Himanshu Gove on this outstanding accomplishment. Their journey at the 9th GNLU Securities and Investment Law Moot, 2026 stands as a shining example of what dedication, teamwork, and genuine understanding of the law can achieve. We wish them continued success in all their future academic and professional pursuits. Wish to showcase your achievement to the world and inspire others? LawFoyer will celebrate your achievement because every achievement deserves recognition. Your achievement is our achievement. Share your achievement with us. Visit: **Categories:** Achievers Archive --- ### [4th NATIONAL CLIENT COUNSELLING COMPETITION | Organized by Chanakya National Law University, Patna | Register by 22 March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/4th-national-client-counselling-competition-organized-by-chanakya-national-law-university-patna-register-by-22-march-2026/) **Published:** February 21, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 4th NATIONAL CLIENT COUNSELLING COMPETITION | Organized by Chanakya National Law University, Patna | Register by 22 March 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Screenshot-2026-02-21-231343.png) ## **4th NATIONAL CLIENT COUNSELLING COMPETITION | CNLU, PATNA** The Chanakya Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution (CCADR) at Chanakya National Law University, Patna, in collaboration with the Legal Aid Cell, is pleased to announce the 4th National Client Counselling Competition, 2026, to be organised under the aegis of Vidhikta 4.0 – the Annual Legal Aid Fest. This initiative reaffirms our commitment to fostering dialogue-driven advocacy, professional responsibility, and client-centred legal practice. ## **About Chanakya National Law University** Established on 15 July 2006 under the Chanakya National Law University Act, 2006, Chanakya National Law University is recognised under Sections 2(f) and 12(B) of the UGC Act, 1956. The University combines academic excellence with state-of-the-art infrastructure and strong practical training through moots, ADR competitions, legal aid initiatives, and specialised workshops, guided by eminent jurists and academicians, while fostering holistic student development and professional growth. ## **About CCADR** The Chanakya Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution (CCADR), established in 2021 at CNLU, promotes academic research and cultivates a robust ADR culture. Its flagship initiatives include SAMVAAD, a newsletter analysing contemporary ADR developments, and ADRadio, a distinguished lecture series featuring leading dispute resolution experts. Through national competitions, workshops, and training programmes, CCADR enhances students’ practical and professional skills. Continuing its legacy of excellence, the Centre now presents the 4th National Client Counselling Competition under Vidhikta 4.0. ## **About Vidhikta 4.0** Conceptualised in 2019 by the Legal Aid Cell of Chanakya National Law University, Vidhikta has grown into one of India’s largest legal aid fests, with participation from over 50 institutions nationwide. The fourth edition seeks to strengthen discourse on access to justice through academic engagements and advocacy-based competitions, including the National Legal Aid Conference, National Client Counselling Competition, and National Bail Petition Drafting Competition, fostering skill development and professional excellence. ## **About the Competition** Building upon the success of its previous editions, the Fourth National Client Counselling Competition will be conducted in a **hybrid format**, comprising Virtual Preliminary Rounds followed by Offline Semi-Final and Final Rounds at the CNLU campus. The Competition serves as a vital platform for nurturing essential lawyering skills through simulated client interviews, enabling participants to demonstrate proficiency in counselling techniques, legal issue identification, ethical decision-making, strategic thinking, and effective time management, all of which are integral to professional legal practice. ## **Event Schedule** - Final Registration Deadline: 22 March, 2026 - Virtual Preliminary Rounds: 29 March, 2026 - Offline Semi-Final & Final Rounds: 11–12 April, 2026 ## **Awards** - Winner: ₹15,000/- + Trophy + Internship Opportunity - Runner-Up: ₹10,000/- + Trophy + Internship Opportunity - Best Counsel Team (Preliminary Rounds): ₹5,000/- + Trophy The **Registration Fee** for the Competition is ₹1,500 per participant for the Preliminary Rounds, with an additional ₹2,000 per participant payable by teams qualifying for the Advanced Rounds. We cordially invite you to be a part of this endeavour of learning, persuasion, and principled advocacy, where every client interaction carries significance and each resolution reflects professional excellence. Register now for an enriching and transformative experience: ## Official Links - Official Link of the Brochure: [CNLU National Client Counselling Competition – Vidhikta 4.0 2.pdf](https://cnluadmin-my.sharepoint.com/:b:/g/personal/events_ccadr_cnlu_ac_in/IQDOlF1QtgOUTKicjxQmbTxtAZcI9teue2zLzNhmuZSFPUg) - Registration Link: **Categories:** Events, Other Competitions --- ### [Workshop on Real Estate Litigation: Navigating the Evolving World and Emerging Trends 2026 | Organized by CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Bangalore | Register by 25th February, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/workshop-on-real-estate-litigation-navigating-the-evolving-world-and-emerging-trends-2026-organized-by-christ-deemed-to-be-university-bangalore-register-by-25th-february-2026/) **Published:** February 21, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** Workshop on Real Estate Litigation: Navigating the Evolving World and Emerging Trends 2026 | Organized by CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Bangalore | Register by 25th February, 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Screenshot-2026-02-21-225747.png) ## **About School of Law, CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Bangalore** School of Law, CHRIST (Deemed to be University) (SLCU) was founded by Carmelites of Mary Immaculate. SLCU offers a comprehensive range of programs in accordance with the guidelines set forth by the Bar Council of India and the University Grants Commission. These programs encompass undergraduate, postgraduate, and doctoral levels of study. The Litigation Committee at the School of Law, CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Bangalore, is dedicated to promoting litigation as a fundamental aspect of the legal profession and as a viable career path for aspiring law students. ## **Workshop on Real Estate Litigation: Navigating the Evolving World & Emerging Trends** The Litigation Committee of the School of Law, CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Bangalore, is hosting a Workshop on Real Estate Litigation: Navigating the Evolving World & Emerging Trends. The workshop aims to provide participants with practical insights into the rapidly developing landscape of real estate law and dispute resolution. The Workshop on Real Estate Litigation is designed to offer participants a grounded and practice-oriented introduction to real estate litigation and allied commercial practice. The course covers real estate and allied laws, including relevant commercial laws, with a focus on their application in specific transactional and dispute contexts. It also examines insolvency laws, key amendments to relevant statutes, as they intersect with real estate projects and stakeholders. A significant emphasis is placed on real estate due diligence and non-litigation aspects, enabling participants to understand how legal risks are identified, assessed, and mitigated before disputes arise. The workshop also engages with litigation strategy, documentation, and procedural choices that shape real estate disputes in practice. The workshop will be conducted by eminent advocates actively practising in real estate law, commercial law, and allied fields, from prominent firms, offering participants first-hand insights drawn from courtroom and advisory experience. Esteemed legal professionals and subject-matter experts will lead the sessions, sharing valuable practical perspectives to enhance participants’ understanding of this evolving domain. The workshop promises to be an enriching academic experience for students aspiring to build expertise in civil and commercial litigation. ## **Eligibility** The Workshop is open to all students pursuing a three-year or five-year Law degree course at Universities/Colleges/Law Departments in India, as recognised by the Bar Council of India. Interested students must provisionally register by filling in a Google Form. ## **Mode & Schedule** The Workshop on Real Estate Litigation will be conducted in online mode. The sessions are scheduled to be held on 26th,27thand 28th February 2026, in the evening, ensuring an engaging and structured learning experience. ## **Certificates** The Workshop will conclude with an MCQ-based assessment, and participants who successfully complete the same will be awarded a Certificate of Completion. ## **Registration Process** Registrations for the Workshop will commence from 20th February. Interested participants are required to register through the official Google Form link, which is provided below. Participants must register using their respective official College/University email ID. Registrations will be confirmed upon successful submission of the form and completion of the required formalities. Further details regarding the schedule, session structure, and resource materials will be shared with the registered participants via email. Kindly refer to the brochure provided below for detailed information regarding the speakers, modules covered, session schedule, and other relevant particulars of the workshop. Participants are advised to review the same before registration. **Link for Registration-** [**https://forms.gle/3ngrzq2YmEZBj4Xb8**](https://forms.gle/3ngrzq2YmEZBj4Xb8) ## **Registration Fee** Students from universities across India are required to pay a non-refundable registration fee of INR 200/- through the online portal. Participation in the workshop is free for students of CHRIST (Deemed to be University). Registration fee is only payable in favour of CHRIST (Deemed to be University) , Bangalore. ## **Important Dates** **Sl No.** **Date** **Event** 1. 20th February,2026 Registration Opens, Release of Brochure 2. 25th February, 2026 Registration Closes 3\. 26th February, 2026 Session 1: · Introduction to Real Estate, Emerging Trends and Relevance of Real Estate in the Contemporary Legal Framework · SCCOnLine Session 4\. 27th February, 2026 Session 2: · Overview of the recent developments in Real Estate law, surrounding litigation · Careers in Real Estate- litigation or non-litigation? 5\. 28th February, 2026 Session 3: · Explore the non-litigation and diligence aspects of Real Estate law · Specific focus on diligence, commercial land and agricultural property, succession 6\. 28th February, 2026 MCQ-based Test (20 Questions) ## **Contact Information** For any further clarifications, please email at: ## **Student Convenors** - Priya Singh: [singh@law.christuniversity.in](mailto:priya.singh@law.christuniversity.in) - Aditya Singh: ## **Social Media Handles** Instagram – @LITIGATIONCOMMITTEE\_SLCU Website – ## Official Link of the Brochure **Google Drive link**– [https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1ng3qrzhbW9qlNNJvo3sprGpx96GKVuXH?usp=drive\_link](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1ng3qrzhbW9qlNNJvo3sprGpx96GKVuXH?usp=drive_link) **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events --- ### [XI NCU National Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, School of Law, The NorthCap University, Gurugram | Register by 23rd March, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/xi-ncu-national-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-moot-court-society-school-of-law-the-northcap-university-gurugram-register-by-23rd-march-2026/) **Published:** February 21, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** XI NCU National Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, School of Law, The NorthCap University, Gurugram | Register by 23rd March, 2026 **Content:** ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY** The NorthCap University, Gurugram, is a private university committed to academic excellence, innovation, and holistic development. The School of Law at the University strives to provide high-quality legal education by integrating rigorous academic training with practical exposure. Through interactive learning methods, research initiatives, internships, and co-curricular activities, the University aims to nurture competent legal professionals equipped with strong ethical values and critical thinking skills. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY** The XI NCU National Moot Court Competition, 2026 focuses on contemporary constitutional and environmental law issues. The moot proposition deals with environmental governance, Article 21 rights, regulatory accountability, sustainable development, and judicial review in the context of a large-scale energy infrastructure project. ## **WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** Open to students currently enrolled in LL.B. (3-year or 5-year) courses from recognized universities/institutions. Each team shall consist of **three members (2 Speakers and 1 Researcher).** ## MODE OF THE EVENT (ONLINE / OFFLINE OR HYBRID)- Hybrid Mode (Preliminary Rounds – Online; Advanced Rounds – Offline) ## LOCATION (COUNTRY/STATE/CITY) & VENUE OF THE EVENT Gurugram, Haryana,India Offline Rounds to be held at The NorthCap University, Sector 23-A, Gurugram. ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE **** ## FEE DETAILS Teams must fill out the registration form and complete the payment formalities as per the brochure instructions ## **PRIZES** - Total Prizes Worth ₹1.5 Lakhs - **Best Team – Rs. 42,000** (Cash Prize: Rs. 30,000 + Trophy + Any free Certificate Course from Manupatra for all three participants worth Rs. 12,000/-) - **Runner-Up – Rs. 32,000** (Cash Prize: Rs. 20,000 + Trophy + Any free Certificate Course from Manupatra for all three participants worth Rs. 12,000/-) - **Best Mooter (Male) – Rs. 9,000** (Cash Prize: Rs. 5,000 + Memento + Any free Certificate Course from Manupatra worth Rs. 4,000/-) - **Best Mooter (Female) – Rs. 9,000** (Cash Prize: Rs. 5,000 + Memento + Any free Certificate Course from Manupatra worth Rs. 4,000/-) - **Best Memorial – Rs. 9,000** (Cash Prize: Rs. 5,000 + Memento + Any free Certificate Course from Manupatra worth Rs. 4,000/-) ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES - Last Date for Clarifications – 15th March, 2026 - Last Date of Registration – 23rd March, 2026 - Last Date for Memorial Submission – 28th March, 2026 - Preliminary Rounds – 4th April, 2026 - Quarter Finals – 17th April, 2026 - Semi Finals & Finals – 18th April, 2026 ## CONTACT INFORMATION - Email: - Daksh Chhokar – +91 7048984262 - Nimisha Yadav – +91 9643244000 - Dharna Chauhan – +91 9266812131 ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / LINK OF THE OFFICIAL BROCHURE, RULES & REGULATIONS ETC. **** **Categories:** Events, Moot Courts --- ### [Call for Papers – Journal of the Faculty of Law (Issue 11), Year 2026 (Vol. 11, ISSN No. 2347-758X) | Organized by School of Law, Mody University of Science and Technology | Register by 30th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-papers-journal-of-the-faculty-of-law-issue-11-year-2026-vol-11-issn-no-2347-758x-organized-by-school-of-law-mody-university-of-science-and-technology-register-by-30th-a/) **Published:** February 21, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** Call for Papers – Journal of the Faculty of Law (Issue 11), Year 2026 (Vol. 11, ISSN No. 2347-758X) | Organized by School of Law, Mody University of Science and Technology | Register by 30th April 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/WhatsApp-Image-2026-02-18-at-2.58.09-PM-724x1024.jpeg) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY The School of Law, formerly known as the Faculty of Law, was established in 2007. It offers undergraduate, postgraduate, and doctoral programmes including B.A. LL.B., B.A. LL.B. (Hons.), B.B.A. LL.B. (Hons.), LL.M., and Ph.D. The School admits over one hundred women students annually, reflecting its commitment to inclusive legal education. Alongside academic instruction, the School actively undertakes extension and outreach activities in and around the Shekhawati Region, offering students strong exposure to the social context of law through clinical legal education and problem-solving-oriented training. The School of Law has been publishing the Journal of the Faculty of Law for the last 15 years. The Journal has published 10 volumes and is a peer-reviewed journal bearing ISSN No. 2347-758X. It was also a UGC-approved journal (Journal No. 62469, 2019). The Journal provides a platform for rigorous and critical engagement with contemporary national and international developments in law. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY The Journal of the Faculty of Law (Issue 11, Year 2026) invites submissions through a Call for Papers. The Journal adopts an inclusive and expansive approach to legal scholarship and welcomes original, analytical, and contemporary contributions from all areas of legal studies. It encourages research that critically engages with existing legal frameworks, explores emerging legal challenges, and offers innovative perspectives on law and policy. The Journal follows a robust peer-review process, and the decision of the reviewers shall be final. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE Academicians, Industrialists, Advocates, Research Scholars, and Students. ## MODE OF THE EVENT Online Submission (Manuscripts to be submitted in Microsoft Word format – .doc/.docx only). ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE Abstracts may be submitted through the following link: **Submission Guidelines include:** - Co-authorship allowed for a maximum of two authors (not allowed for Book Reviews and Case Commentaries). - Manuscripts must be original and free from grammatical and spelling errors. - Times New Roman, font size 12, line spacing 1.5, justified alignment. - Footnotes: Times New Roman, font size 10, line spacing 1.5, justified. - Strict adherence to ILI citation style. - Abstract not exceeding 250 words. - Similarity index must not exceed 10% (excluding references and properly cited quotations). - Use of AI tools permitted strictly for basic grammatical correction only; generative AI tools for language enhancement are prohibited. ## FEE DETAILS Authors who wish to avail a printed hard copy of the Journal may do so by paying ₹1000 after acceptance. (Delivery may take 7–8 weeks after acceptance of final submissions.) ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES - Submission Opens: 20th February 2026 - Abstract Submission Deadline: 22nd March 2026 - Communication of Acceptance: 28th March 2026 - Final Submission Deadline: 30th April 2026 ## CONTACT INFORMATION Email: editor.jofl@modyuniversity.ac.in Contact Number (WhatsApp): 8400138302 ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / LINK OF THE OFFICIAL BROCHURE, RULES & REGULATIONS ETC. - Official Link of the Brochure: [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1uD\_w-Mu4Rh0WTAcGWvk7m714RWYgtoMS/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1uD_w-Mu4Rh0WTAcGWvk7m714RWYgtoMS/view?usp=sharing) - Official Website: www.modyuniversity.ac.in **Categories:** Call for Papers, Events --- ### [3rd National Pro Bono and Legal Aid Conclave – “The Justice Synergy” | Organized by National Forensic Sciences University | Register by 25th February, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-national-pro-bono-and-legal-aid-conclave-the-justice-synergy-organized-by-national-forensic-sciences-university-register-by-15th-february-2026/) **Published:** January 17, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 3rd National Pro Bono and Legal Aid Conclave – “The Justice Synergy” | Organized by National Forensic Sciences University | Register by 15th February, 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Screenshot_2026-01-17-21-54-51-76_e2d5b3f32b79de1d45acd1fad96fbb0f-717x1024-1.webp) ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER / COLLEGE / UNIVERSITY** The Pro Bono Club and Legal Assistance Cell at SLFJPS, **National Forensic Sciences University**, is a student-driven initiative dedicated to advancing access to justice for socially and economically marginalised communities. Guided by Article 39A of the Constitution of India and the DISHA Scheme of the Department of Justice, the Cell undertakes legal awareness programmes and provides free legal assistance through structured outreach and institutional engagement. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY** The Pro Bono Club and Legal Assistance Cell is organising the **3rd National Pro Bono and Legal Aid Conclave – “The Justice Synergy”**, envisioned as a national forum to promote dialogue on strengthening access to justice in India. The Conclave brings together academicians, legal practitioners, policymakers, civil society stakeholders, and law students to deliberate on contemporary challenges and emerging frameworks in pro bono legal aid and justice delivery. #### **Theme** **“Necessities for Building a Protective Legal Ecosystem for Children: Insights into Child Advocacy, POCSO, and Restorative Justice.”** The Conclave places special emphasis on child-centric justice mechanisms, victim protection frameworks, and rights-based, rehabilitative approaches within the criminal justice system, highlighting procedural sensitivity and institutional accountability. ## **EVENTS AND COMPETITIONS** The Conclave is structured around three thematic pillars: **Theme 1: Child-Centric Practice & Victim Support Mechanisms** - **Margadarshan (Speed Mentoring):** Interactive mentoring sessions with legal professionals - **Sahara (Victim Counselling):** Simulation-based exercise on first-response legal and emotional support - **Drishti (Reel Making):** Digital storytelling for awareness on victim support services - **Abhivyakti (Extempore Challenge):** Real-time evaluation of legal reasoning and ethical decision-making **Theme 2: Law, Policy & Strategic Legal Interventions** - **Policy Prism (Policy Drafting):** Drafting research-based policy proposals addressing systemic legal issues - **Public Cause Pursuit (PIL Drafting):** Conceptualising Public Interest Litigations on child-centric causes **Theme 3: Strengthening Legal Education** - **Panel Discussion:** Exclusive session for Faculty Coordinators on best practices in legal aid clinics and experiential legal education ## **WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** - Open to bona fide students enrolled in a **3-year or 5-year law programme** at any recognised institution or university - Each team must consist of **six members**: **five students and one Faculty Coordinator** - The Faculty Coordinator shall participate **online** - **Multiple teams** from the same institution are permitted ## **MODE OF THE EVENT** **Offline** ## **LOCATION & VENUE OF THE EVENT** **Gandhinagar, Gujarat, India** **Venue:** National Forensic Sciences University (NFSU) ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE** - **Registration Link:** Participants must complete the registration form and follow the guidelines mentioned in the official brochure. ## **FEE DETAILS** - **With Accommodation:** ₹8,000 per team - **Without Accommodation:** ₹2,000 per team ## **PRIZES** **Total Prize Pool:** ₹51,000 - First Prize: ₹20,000 - Second Prize: ₹12,000 - Third Prize: ₹9,000 - PIL Prize: ₹5,000 - Best Reel: ₹5,000 #### **Exclusive SCC Online Benefits** - **Winners:** One-year complimentary subscription to SCC Online Web Edition for the top three teams (worth ₹96,000) - **Participants:** One-month access to SCC Online Web Edition for all participants (worth ₹3,100 per participant) ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - Release of Rulebook: **20th January, 2026** - Last Date of Registration: **25th February, 2026** - Submission of PIL: **28th February, 2026** - Submission of Policy Prism (Policy Drafting): **2nd March, 2026** - Reel Making Submission: **4th March, 2026** - Last Date for Queries: **25th February, 2026** - Conclave Dates: **7th – 8th March, 2026** ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** - **Email:** probonoclub@nfsu.ac.in - **Phone:** +91 80771 91029 ## **OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT BROCHURE & RULEBOOK** - **Brochure & Rulebook Link: [Click Here](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1_cJmoKTnGuQVdv2s1RnemSKDgRO3zLs-?usp=drive_link)** **Categories:** Events, Other Competitions --- ### [International Conference on "Intersections of Traditional Knowledge Systems and the Future: Law, Culture, Sustainability, and Collective Well-Being" | Organized by DME Law School, Noida from 8th to 9th May, 2026 | Submit Abstract by 30 March, 2026 | Register by 10th April, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-intersections-of-traditional-knowledge-systems-and-the-future-law-culture-sustainability-and-collective-well-being-organized-by-dme-law-school-noida-register-by-10t/) **Published:** February 20, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE "Intersections of Traditional Knowledge Systems and the Future: Law, Culture, Sustainability, and Collective Well-Being" | Organized by DME Law School, Noida | Register by 10th April 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Screenshot-2026-02-20-220811.png) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER / UNIVERSITY **DME Law School, Noida** DME Law School, accredited with NAAC A+, functions under Delhi Metropolitan Education and offers LL.M., 5-year integrated B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) and B.B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) programmes. The institution follows project-based pedagogy and maintains strong alignment with evolving legal and corporate requirements. It is approved by the Bar Council of India and operates under the Sunshine Educational and Development Society (Est. 2004). **Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University (GGSIPU), New Delhi** DME Noida is affiliated with Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University (GGSIPU), established in 1998 by the Government of NCT of Delhi and accredited with NAAC A++. The university focuses on excellence in professional education, research, and emerging areas of higher education. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT DME Law School, Noida is organizing an **International Socio-Legal Conference** on: **“Intersections of Traditional Knowledge Systems and the Future: Law, Culture, Sustainability, and Collective Well-Being”** **Date of Conference:** 8th & 9th May 2026 (Friday & Saturday) The conference explores Traditional Knowledge Systems (TKS) as historically evolved bodies of knowledge embedded in indigenous and community practices across medicine, agriculture, biodiversity conservation, climate adaptation, governance, and more. The event critically examines intersections between: - Law and Indigenous Knowledge - Culture and Epistemic Justice - Sustainability and Climate Governance - Intellectual Property & Biodiversity Frameworks - Public Health & Traditional Healing Systems - Education, NEP 2020 & Indian Knowledge Systems - ESG Models & Corporate Accountability - Access & Benefit Sharing (ABS) Mechanisms The conference invites original, unpublished research including conceptual, empirical, theoretical, and experimental work aligned with the central theme. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE The conference invites participation from: - Educators - Academicians - Activists - Think Tanks - Researchers & Scholars - Students - Professionals - Stakeholders from all disciplines Co-authorship (maximum two authors) is permitted. ## MODE OF THE EVENT **Hybrid Mode (Online & Offline)** ## LOCATION & VENUE **New Delhi / Noida, India** The offline component will be hosted at **DME Law School, Noida**, affiliated to Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University, New Delhi. ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE **Registration Form: ** **Submission Email:** Abstract (Subject: “Abstract”) and Full Paper (Subject: “Full Paper”) to: **dmelawconference@dme.ac.in** **Payment Details (IMPS/NEFT):** Delhi Metropolitan Education HDFC Bank Ltd., Sector 18, Noida Account No: 50100187447560 (Savings Account) IFSC: HDFC0001592 ## FEE DETAILS **ONLINE PRESENTATION** - Students – ₹500 - Faculty & Research Scholars – ₹800 - Other Professionals – ₹1300 - International Participants – $60 **OFFLINE PRESENTATION** - Students – ₹1000 - Faculty & Research Scholars – ₹1500 - Other Professionals – ₹2000 - International Participants – $75 ## PRIZES **Best Paper Awards in Each Category:** - Students - Research Scholars / Academicians - Professionals Selected papers will be published in a UGC CARE Listed Journal / Journal with ISSN or in an ISBN book (at additional cost). ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES - **Last Date for Abstract Submission:** 15th March 2026 - **Acceptance of Abstract:** 30th March 2026 - **Last Date of Registration:** 10th April 2026 - **Last Date for Full Paper Submission:** 20th April 2026 - **Conference Dates:** 8th & 9th May 2026 ## CONTACT INFORMATION **Faculty Coordinators** - Ms. Sreedurga TN – 8826559126 - Ms. Mansi Madan – 7838256542 **Student Coordinators** - Prapti Chaturvedi – 8766206694 - Anshuman Mishra – 9289846657 Email: dmelawconference@dme.ac.in ## OFFICIAL LINK **Registration Form:** **Official Brochure Link:** **Categories:** Call for Papers, Events --- ### [3rd Case Analysis Competition, 2026 | Organized by Environmental Law Society (ELS), Faculty of Law, Integral University, Lucknow | Register by 20th March, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-case-analysis-competition-2026-environmental-law-society-els-faculty-of-law-integral-university-lucknow-register-by-20th-march-2026/) **Published:** February 19, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 3rd Case Analysis Competition, 2026 | Environmental Law Society (ELS), Faculty of Law, Integral University, Lucknow | Register by 20th March, 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/3rd-case-analysis-competition_20260219_122414_0000-234cf6baddab8fd25af8069481d38c20-724x1024.webp) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER / UNIVERSITY ### About Integral University Integral University, located in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh, was established by the State Government under Act No. 9 of 2004. It is recognized by the University Grants Commission (UGC) under Sections 2(f) and 12B of the UGC Act, 1956, and accredited with an **A+ Grade by NAAC**. The University is approved by several national regulatory bodies including the Medical Council of India, Pharmacy Council of India, Indian Nursing Council, Council of Architecture, Bar Council of India, National Council for Teacher Education, and others. It is also recognized as a Scientific & Industrial Research Organisation (SIRO) by the Department of Scientific & Industrial Research, Ministry of Science & Technology, Government of India. The University focuses on value-based education, innovation, national integration, and global understanding, nurturing students to contribute meaningfully to society. ### About the Faculty of Law The Faculty of Law at Integral University offers: - B.A. LL.B. - B.B.A. LL.B. (Integrated 5 years) - LL.B. (3 years) - LL.M. (1 & 2 years) - Ph.D. Programs The Faculty has earned recognition in 2023 academic rankings: - IIRF: Ranked 4th in Uttar Pradesh and 38th nationwide - India Today (MDRA): All-India Rank 48 - The Week (Powered by Hansa): All-India Rank 37 The Faculty is committed to academic excellence, legal scholarship, and innovative legal education. ### About the Environmental Law Society (ELS) The Environmental Law Society (ELS) is a student-led organization dedicated to promoting environmental awareness and environmental legal scholarship. ELS organizes: - Workshops and seminars on climate policy, biodiversity conservation, and sustainable development - Field engagement activities including plantation drives, field surveys, and environmental audits The society aims to empower future legal professionals to advocate for environmental protection and sustainable development. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT The **3rd Case Analysis Competition, 2026** is a national-level academic writing competition focusing on environmental law. The competition provides students with an opportunity to: - Apply theoretical legal concepts to real-world legal challenges - Develop analytical reasoning and legal research skills - Enhance legal writing proficiency - Engage with landmark environmental law cases Participants are required to prepare a case analysis on **one of the prescribed environmental law cases**: 1. M.C. Mehta vs Union of India & Others, 1988 AIR 1115 2. A.P. Pollution Control Board v. Prof. M.V. Nayudu, 1999 (2) SCC 718 3. State of Meghalaya v. All Dimasa Students Union, 2019 (8) SCC 177 4. Hanuman Laxman Aroskar v. Union of India, AIR Online 2019 SC 318 5. Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India, 1996 AIR 1446 The competition aligns with global sustainable development goals and strengthens environmental legal awareness. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE - Open to **undergraduate and postgraduate law students** - Participants must be enrolled in a recognized institution or university across India - Single authorship permitted - Co-authorship allowed (maximum two authors per entry) - Only one submission per participant ## MODE OF THE EVENT **Online / Virtual Mode (India)** - No hard copy submission required - All submissions must be made via Google Form ## LOCATION **India (Virtual / Online Event)** ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE ### Registration Procedure - Register through the official Google Form - Attach screenshot of payment for successful registration **Registration Link:** ### Submission Procedure - Submit manuscript in Microsoft Word format (.doc/.docx) - Language: English - Word Limit: 2000–3000 words (including citations) - Formatting: - Times New Roman, Font Size 12 - 1.5 line spacing - Footnotes: Font Size 10, single spacing - 1-inch margins - ILI rules of footnoting - Cover page with participant details required - Main manuscript must not contain identifying information - Plagiarism beyond 15% leads to disqualification - Verified student ID or bona fide certificate must be submitted **Submission Link:** ## FEE DETAILS - Single Author: ₹150 - Co-Author: ₹200 ### Payment Details: - UPI ID: abdussameefaridi@oksbi - Account No.: 42383246231 - IFSC: SBIN0009916 - Account Holder Name: Abdus Samee Faridi A payment screenshot must be attached in the registration form. ## PRIZES - Winner: Cash Prize + Trophy + Physical Certificate of Achievement - 1st Runner-Up: Cash Prize + Trophy + Physical Certificate of Achievement - 2nd Runner-Up: Cash Prize + Trophy + Physical Certificate of Achievement - 4th & 5th Position Holders: Physical Certificate of Achievement - E-Certificate: Provided to all participants ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES - Registration Starts: 3rd February, 2026 - Registration Ends: 20th March, 2026 - Submission Deadline: 5th April, 2026 - Announcement of Results: 15th April, 2026 ## CONTACT INFORMATION - Hassan Sarwar (Convener): +91 96700 09142 - Khubaib Rehman (Convener): +91 88817 45668 - Mariya Firdaus (Secretary): +91 63882 35567 - Abdus Samee Faridi (Treasurer): +91 63882 35567 Email: els.facultyoflaw.iul@gmail.com Website: [www.elsintegraluniversity.wordpress.com](http://www.elsintegraluniversity.wordpress.com) Instagram: @environmentallawsociety\_iul ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / BROCHURE Google Drive Brochure Link: **Categories:** Events, Other Competitions --- ### [YUVA SANSAD 1.0 | Organized by PRESTIGE INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT AND RESEARCH, GWALIOR | Register by 30 March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/yuva-sansad-1-0-organized-by-prestige-institute-of-management-and-research-gwalior-register-by-30-march-2026/) **Published:** February 18, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** YUVA SANSAD 1.0 | Organized by PRESTIGE INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT AND RESEARCH, GWALIOR | Register by 30 March 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Screenshot-2026-02-18-152916.png) ## ABOUT THE UNIVERSITY The Department of Law at Prestige Institute of Management & Research, Gwalior, is an autonomous NAAC Grade ‘A’ institution recognized for high academic standards and certified with ISO 9001:2015. Established in 1997, the Institute is among Madhya Pradesh’s leading educational centres and was ranked among the top 16 management institutions in Central Asia by Ed Universal Paris. It offers a choice-based, outcome-oriented curriculum with over 72 law subjects integrated with management, commerce, and humanities. The Institute conducts BA LL.B. (Hons.), B. Com LL.B. (Hons.), BBA LL.B. (Hons.), and LL.M. programs, approved by the Bar Council of India and affiliated with Jiwaji University. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY** **YUVA SANSAD 1.0** is aNational Youth Parliament organized by **Prestige Institute of Management and Research, Gwalior**, offering young leaders a powerful platform to voice opinions, debate national issues, and experience the real spirit of Indian democracy. Through engaging simulations of **Lok Sabha, Rajya Sabha, All India Political Parties Meet (AIPPM), and Indian Press**, participants will sharpen their leadership, public speaking, critical thinking, and policy-making skills while representing the future of the nation. - **COMMITTEES:** - **LOK SABHA:** Aravalli Hills: between developmental needs and ecological sustainability. - **RAJYA SABHA:** UGC 2026 equity regulations: Safeguarding the rights of marginalised student or creating reverse discrimination. - **AIPPM (All India Political Parties Meet):** Youth political mobilization and the threat of terrorism: Myth or Reality. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE School Students From Class 9th To 12th from All Streams And All College Students From Any Year Of Study. ## MODE OF THE EVENT (ONLINE / OFFLINE OR HYBRID) OFFLINE ## LOCATION (COUNTRY/STATE/CITY) & VENUE OF THE EVENT City-Gwalior, M.P. & Venue: Prestige Institute Of Management And Research ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE **REGISTRATION LINK:** ## FEE DETAILS - 1000/- FOR LOK SABHA, RAJYA SABHA, AIPPM - 800/- FOR INDIAN PRESS (JOURNALISM AND PHOTOGRAPHY) ## PRIZES - LOK SABHA – 1st: 11000/-, 2nd– 5100/-, 3rd – 2100/- - RAJYA SABHA – 1st: 11000/-, 2nd– 5100/-, 3rd – 2100/- - AIPPM – 1st: 11000/-, 2nd– 5100/-, 3rd – 2100/- - INDIAN PRESS: JOURNALISM: 5100/-, PHOTOGRAPHY: 5100/- - TROPHY FOR BEST DELEGATES ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES - REGISTRATION DEADLINE: 30 MARCH 2026 - EVENT DATE: 17-18TH APRIL 2026 ## CONTACT INFORMATION - Contact Number: 8120199010, 8953617170, - Email id: - Instagram Page: prestigeyuvasansad1.0 ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / LINK OF THE OFFICIAL BROCHURE, RULES & REGULATIONS ETC. **Official Brochure Link:** [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JGAl0QGxUnOXC3R\_vzoQ8ng8j51BRGZl/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JGAl0QGxUnOXC3R_vzoQ8ng8j51BRGZl/view?usp=sharing) ## **RULES & REGULATIONS** **GENERAL** - There will be individual participation. - The participants shall report at the venue hall by sharp 8: 30 a.m. - No formal dressing is required. However, it would be appreciated for wearing an attire similar to the politician of their constituency, carried in decent manner. - Participants may use bilingual language during their speech. - Constituencies would be allotted as chosen by the participants on first come first serve basis. - There is no limitation on the number of participations from one institute. (i.e. any number of students can participate from one institute). - Participants should seek confirmation of their registration prior one week of the event. - Participants creating any kind of indiscipline shall be disqualified on the discretion of the judges. - Participants thereby should adhere by the rules and regulations of the event. - Laptops, mobile phones, tablets etc. are allowed but parliamentarians are not allowed to assess internet. - No internet usage allowed inside the house. - The participants should show utmost respect to the Chair. - They should abide by the decisions of the Chair and should have faith in his impartiality and judgment. The participants are encouraged to tap desks in agreement. - One may not argue on points, which are nowhere related to the debate, this may fetch you negative marks. - One may not use any unparliamentarily word while the house is in session. One may have to apologize (in oral or written) for the same or can be suspended from the session as per the case may be depending upon the decision of the chair. **Categories:** Events, Other Competitions --- ### [Online International Faculty Development Programme (IFDP) "Law, Technology and Governance in Digital Space" | Organized by Bennett University, Noida | Register by 12 March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/online-international-faculty-development-programme-ifdp-law-technology-and-governance-in-digital-space-organized-by-bennett-university-noida-register-by-12-march-2026/) **Published:** February 18, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** Online International Faculty Development Programme (IFDP) "Law, Technology and Governance in Digital Space" | Organized by Bennett University, Noida | Register by 12 March 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Updated-flyer-IFDP-674x1024.jpeg) The **School of Law, Centre for Law, Technology and Innovation**, in collaboration with the **Internal Quality Assurance Cell (IQAC), Bennett University**, is organizing an **Online International Faculty Development Programme (IFDP)** on *“Law, Technology and Governance in Digital Space”* from **March 16 to March 21, 2026**. The programme aims to provide an interdisciplinary and contemporary understanding of the regulatory, institutional, and governance challenges emerging from rapid technological transformation. It brings together leading scholars and practitioners to engage with themes such as data governance, digital justice, artificial intelligence, cyber technologies, and intellectual property governance of emerging technologies. ## **Programme Schedule & Themes** - **March 16, 2026** *Privacy, Data Governance and Transformation of Legal Systems* **Prof. Dr. Uday Shankar**, IIT Kharagpur - **March 17, 2026** *Technologization of Policing and Criminal Justice System* **Ruwan Uduwerage-Perera**, De Montfort University - **March 18, 2026** *IP Governance of Emerging Technologies and Digital Innovation* **Prof. Dr. Lisa P. Lukose**, Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University, Delhi - **March 19, 2026** *Cyber Technologies and Digital Justice* **Dr. Ivneet Kaur Walia**, Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab - **March 20, 2026** *Artificial Intelligence Platforms and Algorithmic Decision-Making* **Prof. Dr. Sergey Sayapin**, KIMEP University, Kazakhstan - **March 21, 2026** *Understanding Digital Space and Legal Governance* **Dr. Sumiti Ahuja**, Faculty of Law, University of Delhi ## **Key Details** - **Mode:** Online - **Time:** 03:00 PM (IST) - **Registration Fee:** - INR 750 (Indian participants) - USD 10 (International participants) - **Certificate Eligibility:** Participants must attend all sessions and successfully complete the end-of-programme assessment. ## **Registration** - **Registration Form:** - **Payment Link:** - **Last Date to Register:** **March 12, 2026** Participants are required to email proof of payment to: - - - [siddharth.badkul@bennett.edu.in ](mailto:siddharth.badkul@bennett.edu.in) - After successful registration and payment, participants may join the official WhatsApp group for programme updates at [https://chat.whatsapp.com/Fl5naCERBmuGMHm2jdhhAQ](https://ind01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fchat.whatsapp.com%2FFl5naCERBmuGMHm2jdhhAQ&data=05%7C02%7C%7Cae8aa31a907f4aaae79608de6d38ef73%7C2c5bdaf48ff24bd9bd547c50ab219590%7C0%7C0%7C639068288462214529%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=n4zN%2BXBmMw1TxccNfw6YafdYl353DlGotS6q4iRpYQY%3D&reserved=0) ## **Who Should Attend** Faculty members, researchers, doctoral scholars, legal practitioners, policymakers, and professionals interested in law, technology, digital governance, and regulatory innovation. Institutions and academic platforms are kindly requested to **circulate this announcement** among interested faculty members and researchers. For further information, please contact the organizers at **Bennett University**. **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events --- ### [INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, & SOCIAL ISSUES OF 2025 | Organized by Amity Law School, Amity University Chhattisgarh | Submit Abstract by 28 February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-political-economic-social-issues-of-2025-organized-by-amity-law-school-amity-university-chhattisgarh-submit-abstract-by-28-february-2026/) **Published:** February 18, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, & SOCIAL ISSUES OF 2025 | Organized by Amity Law School, Amity University Chhattisgarh | Submit Abstract by 28 February 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Screenshot-2026-02-18-161244.png) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER / COLLEGE / UNIVERSITY Amity University Chhattisgarh, Raipur, is a state private university established in 2014 by the Ritnand Balved Education Foundation (RBEF) and is part of the renowned Amity Education Group. The University offers undergraduate, postgraduate, and doctoral programmes across diverse disciplines including Architecture & Planning, Biotechnology, Computer Science & Engineering, Law, Management, and Psychology. It is recognised by UGC, AIU, and AICTE and has received national and global recognition, including rankings in the Times Higher Education Impact Rankings and a “5 Golden Star Rating” from the Ministry of Education’s Institute Innovation Council. Amity Law School, Raipur, recognised by the Bar Council of India (BCI), is a constituent of Amity University Chhattisgarh. The institution focuses on nurturing ethical and skilled legal professionals through strong infrastructure, expert faculty, interdisciplinary teaching, moot court facilities, and active engagement with judges, jurists, and policymakers. It offers integrated B.A. LL.B. (Hons.), BBA LL.B. (Hons.), and LL.M. programmes in Criminal Law, Business Law, and Constitutional Law. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY **The International Conference on Political, Economic, & Social Issues of 2025 will be held on 23rd March 2026 in Hybrid Mode.** The conference aims to provide a vibrant academic forum to explore emerging developments in international commercial law, global economic integration, international environmental law, and the evolving contours of statehood within the international legal framework. It seeks to foster interdisciplinary dialogue, stimulate innovative research, and deepen theoretical and practical insights into contemporary international legal regimes. **Call for Papers:** The conference invites original research papers on contemporary issues in international law, particularly focusing on: - Migration and Forcibly Displacement - International Economy and Commercial Law - Essential of Statehood ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE The conference invites submissions from: - Undergraduate and Postgraduate Students - Research Scholars (Ph.D. / M.Phil.) - Academicians and Faculty Members - Professionals and Practitioners from relevant disciplines Submissions up to two co-authors are permitted. ## MODE OF THE EVENT Hybrid (Online and Offline) ## LOCATION & VENUE OF THE EVENT Amity University Chhattisgarh, Raipur, Chhattisgarh, India ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE All abstracts and full papers must be submitted only through the official submission link (Google Form) provided by the Conference Organising Committee. Submissions sent via email or any other mode shall not be accepted. Upon successful submission, participants will receive a confirmation email on their registered email address. Further communication regarding acceptance and presentation details will be shared via email only. **Abstract Submission Link:** ## FEE DETAILS **Registration Fee:** - Students (Single Author): ₹500/- + GST - Students (Co-Authors): ₹700/- + GST - Academicians / Faculty / Professionals: ₹800/- + GST - Research Scholars (Ph.D. / M.Phil.): ₹800/- + GST **Publication Fee:** Authors whose papers are accepted for publication will be required to pay the prescribed publication fee as notified by the organisers. The publication fee is applicable only after acceptance, and detailed guidelines and fee structure will be communicated via email. ## PRIZES - Certificate of Participation will be awarded to all registered participants who present their paper at the conference. - Certificate of Publication will be issued separately to authors whose papers are selected and published. ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES - Last Date of Abstract Submission: 28 February 2026 - Last Date for Full Paper Submission (after abstract selection): 19 March 2026 - Conference Date: 23 March 2026 ## CONTACT INFORMATION **Faculty Coordinators:** - Dr. Anukriti Mishra – amishra1@rpr.amity.edu - Mr. Aniruddha Bamal – abamal@rpr.amity.edu **Student Coordinators:** - Ms. Deepshikha Tiwari – 9630301686 – deepshikha.tiwari@s.amity.edu - Mr. Abhay Katre – 6266798810 – abhay.katre@s.amity.edu ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / OFFICIAL BROCHURE - **Official Brochure Link:** [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1qJXNfN3LokNumg2-jZlbLtsnVtI8–zt/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1qJXNfN3LokNumg2-jZlbLtsnVtI8--zt/view?usp=sharing) - **Abstract Submission Link:** **Categories:** Call for Papers, Events --- ### [NYAYA ABHYUDAY 2.0 – TECHNO LEGAL FEST | Organized by School of Law, Forensic Justice and Policy Studies (SLFJPS), National Forensic Sciences University | Register by 11th March, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/nyaya-abhyuday-2-0-techno-legal-fest-organized-by-school-of-law-forensic-justice-and-policy-studies-slfjps-national-forensic-sciences-university-register-by-11th-march-2026/) **Published:** February 15, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** NYAYA ABHYUDAY 2.0 – TECHNO LEGAL FEST | Organized by School of Law, Forensic Justice and Policy Studies (SLFJPS), National Forensic Sciences University | Register by 11th March, 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Screenshot-2026-02-15-233105.png) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER / UNIVERSITY **National Forensic Sciences University** An Institution of National Importance established by an Act of Parliament in 2020, NFSU is headquartered in Gandhinagar. The University promotes excellence in forensic sciences along with applied behavioural science, law, criminology, and technology. It focuses on cutting-edge research in criminal investigations, digital security, and forensic innovations. The University houses several Centres of Excellence including the Ballistics Research Centre, Cyber Defence Centre, International Centre for Forensic Narcotics, and International Centre for Humanitarian Forensics. It also provides training and consultancy services nationally and internationally. **School of Law, Forensic Justice and Policy Studies (SLFJPS)** SLFJPS aims to impart professional legal education with a special focus on forensic application in law and policy. The School works towards strengthening justice administration through crime prevention, forensic integration, and policy innovation. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY **Nyaya Abhyuday 2.0** is a dynamic Techno-Legal Fest designed to bridge the gap between academic knowledge and real-world legal practice. Building upon the success of its previous edition (which witnessed participation from 55+ teams across top NLUs and law colleges), the fest returns with expanded intellectual scope and competitive excellence. The fest features two flagship national-level competitions: - **4th NFSU National Technological Moot Court Competition \[28th – 29th March, 2026\]** This competition engages participants with cutting-edge techno-legal issues, encouraging strategic legal argumentation and analytical thinking in the evolving domain of AI, defence technology, and constitutional law. - **2nd NFSU National Trial Advocacy Competition \[28th – 29th March, 2026\]** An interdisciplinary criminal trial simulation that integrates legal advocacy with forensic science. Participants refine skills in witness examination, evidence appreciation, courtroom strategy, and persuasive argumentation. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE - Each team shall comprise **3 members**: - **2 Speakers** - **1 Researcher** - The team composition cannot be modified under any circumstances. ## MODE OF THE EVENT **Offline (Physical Mode Only)** ## LOCATION & VENUE **National Forensic Sciences University** Gandhinagar, Gujarat, India ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE For the **4th NFSU National Technological Moot Court Competition**, interested teams must register by filling the online registration form (link mentioned in the brochure). - **Deadline:** 11th March 2026 (Till 11:59 PM IST) - Registration confirmation will be sent after verification. - Each team will be allotted a unique **Team Code**. ## FEE DETAILS - **Registration Fee:** INR 3,000/- per team (Non-refundable) - The fee includes **registration + accommodation**. - Accommodation will be provided from **28th March 2026 (Morning) to 30th March 2026 (Morning)**. ## PRIZES - **Winning Team** – ₹50,000/- + Trophy + Certificate - **Runner-Up Team** – ₹25,000/- + Trophy + Certificate - **Best Memorial** – ₹10,000/- + Trophy + Certificate - **Best Researcher** – ₹10,000/- + Trophy + Certificate - **Best Speaker** – ₹10,000/- + Trophy + Certificate ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES - **Registration Deadline:** 11th March 2026 - **Oral Rounds:** 28th – 29th March 2026 - **Researcher’s Test:** 28th March 2026 ## CONTACT INFORMATION Email: mootcourtcommittee@nfsu.ac.in Contact Numbers: - +91 8290487070 (Mr. Sahhil Taware) - +91 8073208071 (Ms. Ananya Krishna) - +91 7230875000 (Mr. Prerit Mehta) ## OFFICIAL LINK / BROCHURE **Official Brochure:** **Categories:** Events, Moot Courts, Other Competitions --- ### [National Article Writing Competition | Organized by Centre for Human Rights and Disability Studies (CHRDS), Himachal Pradesh National Law University, Shimla | Register by 28 February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/national-article-writing-competition-organized-by-centre-for-human-rights-and-disability-studies-chrds-himachal-pradesh-national-law-university-shimla-register-by-15-february-2026/) **Published:** January 28, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** National Article Writing Competition | Organized by Centre for Human Rights and Disability Studies (CHRDS), Himachal Pradesh National Law University, Shimla | Register by 15 February 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Screenshot-2026-01-28-214302.png) ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER / COLLEGE / UNIVERSITY** **Himachal Pradesh National Law University (HPNLU), Shimla** Established in 2016 by an Act of the State Legislature (Act 16 of 2016), Himachal Pradesh National Law University, Shimla began functioning on October 5, 2016. Located in the Himalayan region, the University focuses on holistic legal education with emphasis on interdisciplinary, practical, and application-based learning. HPNLU is committed to academic excellence and overall development of students under the leadership of its Vice-Chancellor. **Centre for Human Rights and Disability Studies (CHRDS)** CHRDS is a research-cum-activism centre at HPNLU, Shimla, aimed at addressing issues related to human rights and disability studies. The Centre works at the intersection of healthcare, education, employment, social inclusion, dignity, autonomy, access to justice, and disability-diversity jurisprudence. It seeks to bridge academic research with practical advocacy and rights-based action. **Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR)** ADR is a non-partisan, non-profit organization established in 1999 by professors from IIM Ahmedabad. It works to strengthen democracy through electoral and political reforms, focusing on transparency, accountability, and decriminalization of politics. ADR is widely known for its role in the Supreme Court judgment mandating disclosure of criminal, financial, and educational backgrounds of election candidates. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY** The Centre for Human Rights and Disability Studies, in collaboration with the Association for Democratic Reforms, is organizing a **National Article Writing Competition** on the theme: **“Electoral Rights of Persons with Disabilities”** The competition invites scholarly and analytical articles engaging with the intersection of disability rights, electoral participation, equality, and democratic governance. **Broad Themes include:** - Beyond the Ballot Box: Legal barriers to electoral participation for persons with disabilities - The Right to Vote as a Right to Equality: A disability rights perspective on suffrage - Digital Democracy or Digital Divide: Electronic voting and accessibility - Guardianship vs. Citizenship: Legal capacity and disenfranchisement of persons with intellectual disabilities - From Tokenism to Transformation: Accessible elections as a constitutional mandate All submissions will undergo a double-blind peer review process. ## **WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** Participation details are not limited to a particular academic level or profession. ## **MODE OF THE EVENT** Online (Registration and submission through online links only) ## **LOCATION & VENUE OF THE EVENT** Himachal Pradesh National Law University, Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, India (Competition conducted online) ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE** - Registration must be completed only through the official registration and payment link. - After successful registration, submissions must be made only through the designated submission link. - Submissions sent via email will not be accepted. - Manuscripts must be submitted in **English language** and **.docx format only**. - The submission link will remain active until **28 February 2026 (11:59 PM)**. ## **FEE DETAILS** - ₹250 for single-authored submission - ₹500 for co-authored submission ## **PRIZES** - **First Prize:** ₹3000 + Publication + Certificate of Merit - **Second Prize:** ₹2000 + Publication + Certificate of Merit - **Third Prize:** ₹1000 + Publication + Certificate of Merit - **Next 7 Shortlisted Articles:** Publication + Certificate of Merit - **All Participants:** Certificate of Participation Top 3 articles will be published on ADR’s official website, while the remaining shortlisted articles will be published on the official website of CHRDS, HPNLU Shimla. ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - **Start of Registration:** 31 December 2025 - **Last Date of Registration:** 28 February 2026 - **Last Date of Submission:** 28 February 2026 - **Announcement of Results:** First week of March 2026 ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** - **Email:** chrds@hpnlu.ac.in - **Instagram:** @chrds\_hpnlu - **LinkedIn:** CHRDS LinkedIn **Organising Team:** - Dr. Sachin Sharma – Director, CHRDS - Ashpinder Kaur – Convener, CHRDS | +91 98762 13792 - Samia Mirza – Co-Convener, CHRDS | +91 63062 05121 - Rimjim Kheda – Treasurer, CHRDS | +91 96106 66673 ## **OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / BROCHURE / RULES & REGULATIONS** - **Official Brochure Link:** [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1pbGoa\_87\_okTfmjHL72pZhnr-0HIP2B1/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1pbGoa_87_okTfmjHL72pZhnr-0HIP2B1/view?usp=sharing) - **Official Registration & Payment Link:** [https://erphpnlu.in/anon\_evForm.htm?ev=63](https://erphpnlu.in/anon_evForm.htm?ev=63) - **Official Submission Link:** [https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1DB4FZDxcb\_gN4A5XcG-9fYzkYLuxpglfvZb8OkdgRA4/viewform?edit\_requested=true](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1DB4FZDxcb_gN4A5XcG-9fYzkYLuxpglfvZb8OkdgRA4/viewform?edit_requested=true) **Categories:** Events, Other Competitions --- ### [ASPIRE COHORT 2 | Organized by LawFirmReady | Register by 26th February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/aspire-cohort-2-organized-by-lawfirmready-register-by-26th-february-2026/) **Published:** February 13, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** ASPIRE COHORT 2 | Organized by LawFirmReady | Register by 26th February 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Screenshot-2026-02-13-200839.png) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER LawFirmReady is the team behind *The Aspire Program*, designed to guide early-year law students and aspirants through the foundational skills required to thrive in law school and beyond. The cohort is led by practising lawyers, researchers, and professionals who understand the real challenges faced by law students and provide practical, experience-based guidance. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY ASPIRE Cohort 2 is a structured 6–7 week online program created especially for 1st and 2nd year law students and law aspirants. The program aims to equip participants with clarity, confidence, and practical skills needed during the early years of law school. The cohort includes the following sessions: 1. **Internship Inbox: Everything You Wish You Had Before Starting** Learn how to become internship-ready even without prior experience, understand what actually happens during internships, and develop the right mindset and tools to make the most of them. 2. **Research 101: How to Not Google Like a Civilian** Learn how to find relevant judgments, case comments, statutes, and articles using the right search terms and databases. 3. **Law, Logic and Critical Thinking** Develop reasoning skills, analytical ability, and independent thinking to think like a lawyer rather than just study like a student. 4. **Learning to Read It Right** Understand how to read judgments, statutes, and legal texts with structure, logic, and relevance. 5. **Public Speaking – Finding Your Voice** Learn to speak with clarity, structure, and confidence, even under pressure. 6. **Say It Right: Writing for CVs, Cover Letters and Emails** Learn how to draft strong CVs, persuasive cover letters, and professional emails that get responses. 7. **Excelling ADR Competitions** Explore negotiation, mediation, and client counselling competitions and understand how they differ from mooting. 8. **Let’s Learn Mooting** Get a clear introduction to mooting, how it works, and what judges look for. The program includes interactive sessions, live demos, breakout rooms, and practical exercises. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE - 1st & 2nd-year students of a 5-year law course - 1st-year students of a 3-year law course - Law aspirants who haven’t joined law school yet but are curious and passionate to learn ## MODE OF THE EVENT Entirely virtual (online) and conducted on Zoom platform. ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE **Registration Link:** **Selection Process:** - Fill the application form before 26th February 2026. - If shortlisted, you will be invited to a friendly interaction call. - Upon selection, pay the fee and join the cohort. ## FEE DETAILS - Early Bird Fee: Rs. 2,499 (Original Rs. 2,999) - Pay only after you are selected. ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES - Earlybird Registration Deadline: 15th February 2026 - Registration Deadline: 26th February 2026 - Cohort Start Date: 8th March 2026 - Duration: 6–7 weeks - Schedule: Weekends (1.5–2 hours per session) ## CONTACT INFORMATION Instagram & Social Media: @LawFirmReady ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / OFFICIAL BROCHURE **Official Brochure:** **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events, Other Competitions --- ### [HPNLU JOURNAL OF DISABILITY STUDIES (A Peer-Reviewed Journal) – VOL. III, 2026 (ISSN: 3108-110X) | Organized by Centre for Human Rights and Disability Studies, Himachal Pradesh National Law University, Shimla | Register by July 15, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/hpnlu-journal-of-disability-studies-a-peer-reviewed-journal-vol-iii-2026-issn-3108-110x-organized-by-centre-for-human-rights-and-disability-studies-himachal-pradesh-national-law-un/) **Published:** February 13, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** HPNLU JOURNAL OF DISABILITY STUDIES (A Peer-Reviewed Journal) – VOL. III, 2026 (ISSN: 3108-110X) | Organized by Centre for Human Rights and Disability Studies, Himachal Pradesh National Law University, Shimla | Register by July 15, 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Screenshot-2026-02-13-201244.png) ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY** The HPNLU Journal of Disability Studies is an annual, blind peer-reviewed journal and is the first of its kind among National Law School journals in India devoted exclusively to disability laws and related jurisprudence. The Journal aims to provide a platform to stakeholders including people with disabilities, disability activists, lawyers, policymakers, and researchers. It promotes first-person narratives on disability studies and encourages multidisciplinary approaches covering legal, socio-economic, socio-legal, linguistic, sociological, historical, political, psychological, gender and sexuality, feminist, modernity and post-modernity aspects of disability studies. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY** The HPNLU Journal of Disability Studies invites scholarly contributions for Volume III (2026). The journal seeks comprehensive and in-depth analyses of contemporary issues in disability laws and related fields. Selection of entries will be based on a blind peer-review process. ## **CATEGORIES OF SUBMISSION** - **Articles:** 6000–10000 words - **Essays & Comments:** 4000–6000 words - **Book Reviews:** 3000–4000 words (must be submitted along with a new hard copy of the book) - **Case Comments & Legislative Comments:** 4000–6000 words ## **SUBMISSION GUIDELINES** - Submissions must be in English. - An abstract of 250–300 words is mandatory, clearly stating the novelty and contribution of the work beyond existing literature. - Co-authorship is permitted up to one co-author. - Manuscripts must not contain any reference to the author’s identity. - Formatting: Times New Roman, Font Size 12, 1.5 line spacing (footnotes in Font Size 10, single spacing). - Only footnotes are permitted for citations. - Manuscripts exceeding 10% similarity will be rejected. ## **WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** Academicians, scholars, professionals, policymakers, disability activists, researchers, and other stakeholders in the field of disability studies and related disciplines. ## **MODE OF THE EVENT** Submission-based (Manuscripts to be submitted via email only). ## **LOCATION (COUNTRY/STATE/CITY) & VENUE OF THE EVENT** Himachal Pradesh National Law University, Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, India ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE** - Submit manuscripts in MS Word (.docx) format to: **editorjds@hpnlu.ac.in** - Email subject line: “Submission to HPNLU-JDS-V3 ” - Citation Style Link: ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - Last Date of Submission: July 15, 2026 ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** - Dr. Sachin Sharma (Editor): sachinsharma@hpnlu.ac.in - Samia Mirza (Student Member): +91 63062 05121 - Ashpinder Kaur (Student Member): +91 98762 13792 ## **OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / LINK OF THE OFFICIAL BROCHURE, RULES & REGULATIONS ETC.** **Official Brochure:** [https://drive.google.com/file/d/12Y3fMYxL7v\_z4zuyHnVL3xFBf6KU48BX/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/file/d/12Y3fMYxL7v_z4zuyHnVL3xFBf6KU48BX/view?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Call for Papers, Events --- ### [1ST NLIU – R.K. DEWAN PAPER PRESENTATION CONFERENCE | Organized by Cell for Studies in Intellectual Property Rights (CSIPR), National Law Institute University (NLIU), Bhopal | Register by 24 February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-nliu-r-k-dewan-paper-presentation-conference-organized-by-cell-for-studies-in-intellectual-property-rights-csipr-national-law-institute-university-nliu-bhopal-register-by-24-f/) **Published:** February 13, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 1ST NLIU – R.K. DEWAN PAPER PRESENTATION CONFERENCE | Organized by Cell for Studies in Intellectual Property Rights (CSIPR), National Law Institute University (NLIU), Bhopal | Register by 24 February 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Screenshot-2026-02-13-203041.png) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY **About National Law Institute University (NLIU), Bhopal** Established in 1997, NLIU is one of the first universities founded under the National Law School framework. With the Chief Justice of Madhya Pradesh serving as its Chancellor, the University maintains strong ties with the High Court of Madhya Pradesh and the National Judicial Academy. **About CSIPR** The Cell for Studies in Intellectual Property Rights (CSIPR) was established to foster knowledge and research in Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). The Cell regularly organizes conferences, seminars, workshops, and guest lectures, and publishes the annual peer-reviewed *NLIU IPR Law Journal*. **About R.K. Dewan & Co.** Established in 1942 by Raj Kumar Dewan, R.K. Dewan & Co. is one of India’s oldest and most respected Intellectual Property Rights law firms. With over eight decades of experience, the firm provides comprehensive IP services including filing, prosecution, enforcement, and litigation across India and major international jurisdictions. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY The 1st NLIU – R.K. Dewan Paper Presentation Conference is a **National Paper Presentation Conference on “Contemporary Issues in Intellectual Property Law”**, scheduled to be held on **7–8 March 2026 at NLIU Bhopal**. The Conference aims to: - Encourage high-quality academic research on emerging issues in Intellectual Property Law - Provide a platform for structured academic discussion - Facilitate interaction between academia and legal practitioners - Promote critical analysis of legal and policy developments in IPR **Conference Structure:** - Conducted over two days - Thematic panel presentations before an academic and professional panel - Top 50 papers selected for offline presentation - 35 papers selected for hybrid (online) presentation on a first-come-first-serve basis - Selection based on blind review of abstracts **Theme:** *Contemporary Issues in Intellectual Property Law* **Indicative Sub-Themes Include:** - Commercialisation of IP - Balancing Innovation and Public Interest - Cross-Border IP Protection - IP and Market Power - Future of IP Governance ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE The Conference is open to: - Undergraduate students - Postgraduate students - Research scholars - Academicians - Legal professionals Authorship: - Single author or maximum of two authors - No submission with more than two authors accepted ## MODE OF THE EVENT Primarily **Offline at NLIU, Bhopal**, with limited **Hybrid (Online) Presentation** slots available. ## LOCATION (COUNTRY/STATE/CITY) & VENUE OF THE EVENT **National Law Institute University (NLIU), Bhopal** Madhya Pradesh, India ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE **Step 1 – Abstract Submission (300–500 words + 3–5 keywords)** Submission through the designated Google Form. **Phase I Registration Form:** [https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdsTkBBGJzmhW5cOK8U3o7BCxRwwCc\_xhkQIA\_dYFnQQCJ0A/viewform?usp=header](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdsTkBBGJzmhW5cOK8U3o7BCxRwwCc_xhkQIA_dYFnQQCJ0A/viewform?usp=header) **Step 2 – Notification of Acceptance** Top 50 (offline) and Top 35 (online) selections announced within 2 days of abstract deadline. **Step 3 – Final Paper Submission** Full manuscript submission after abstract acceptance. **Step 4 – Phase II Registration** Mandatory for shortlisted participants to confirm presentation slot. ## FEE DETAILS **Phase I Registration:** ₹1,000 per team (mandatory with abstract submission) **Phase II Registration:** - Offline Presentation: ₹5,000 per team - Hybrid (Online) Presentation: ₹2,500 per team ## PRIZES - **Best Presentation** – INR 20,000 + Internship Opportunity at R.K. Dewan - **Runner Up** – INR 17,000 + Internship Opportunity at R.K. Dewan - **Best Paper** – INR 14,000 + Internship Opportunity at R.K. Dewan ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES - **24.02.2026** – Deadline for Submission of Abstracts - **26.02.2026** – Notification of Acceptance - **05.03.2026** – Deadline for Submission of Full Manuscripts - **07–08.03.2026** – Paper Presentation Conference at NLIU Bhopal ## CONTACT INFORMATION **Convenor:** Nitesh Shukla – +91 7905461782 **Co-Convenor:** Karuna Dewda – +91 6266282484 **Secretary:** Priyansh Shrivastava – +91 8305808314 **LinkedIn:** nliu.csipr **Instagram:** nliu.csipr **Website:** ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT Official Website: Official Brochure Link: **Categories:** Call for Papers, Events, Other Competitions --- ### [INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW SUMMIT 2026: “The WTO@30: Reimagining Multilateralism in International Trade Law” | Organized by Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Register by 20 July 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-trade-law-summit-2026-the-wto30-reimagining-multilateralism-in-international-trade-law-organized-by-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur-register/) **Published:** February 13, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW SUMMIT 2026: “The WTO@30: Reimagining Multilateralism in International Trade Law” | Organized by Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Register by 20 July 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Poster_International-Trade-Law-Summit-1024x576.jpg) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER / UNIVERSITY ### Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU) A premier national law university committed to advanced legal education, interdisciplinary research, and public service, guided by its motto *“Dharma Sansthapanartham.”* ### School of Law & Technology HNLU’s research hub for technology, trade, intellectual property, data protection, AI, and policy studies. ### Centre for WTO & WIPO Studies A leading centre for research and capacity-building in international trade and intellectual property law, with sustained collaboration under the WTO Chairs Programme. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY The **International Trade Law Summit 2026** is being organised from **2 – 4 October 2026** in offline mode to commemorate the **30th Anniversary of the WTO**. The Summit is designed as an outreach of the WTO Young Trade Leaders Programme and aims to foster global trade awareness and career opportunities for young professionals. ### Key Highlights - Thematic Panel Discussions - In-person Technical Paper Presentation Sessions - **Mock WTO Exercise (First of its Kind in India)** - Simulation of WTO Negotiations and Resolution Drafting World Trade Organization remains central to global trade governance, and this Summit aims to critically assess its past, present challenges, and future pathways for revitalised multilateralism. ## STRUCTURE OF THE SUMMIT ### Module I: International Conference - Paper presentations in technical sessions - Expert-led thematic panel discussions ### Module II: Mock WTO Exercise **Theme:** *The Intersection between Trade and the Digital Economy* - Student-exclusive simulation of WTO negotiations - Drafting of negotiated outcomes and resolutions - Country Delegations representing WTO Members - Committees including: - Council for Trade in Services - Negotiating Group on Market Access - TRIPS Council - Trade and Competition ## CALL FOR PAPERS ### Abstract Submission - Maximum 500 words (including 5 keywords) - Bio-note (50 words) - MS Word format - Times New Roman, 12 pt - 1.5 line spacing - Justified alignment ### Full Paper Submission - Maximum 10,000 words (inclusive of abstract and footnotes) - OSCOLA (4th Edition) citation style - Co-authorship permitted (up to two authors) - Times New Roman, 12 pt - 1.5 line spacing - Justified alignment *Note: Registration fee for paper presentation is payable only after Notification of Acceptance of Abstract.* ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY ### Conference Open to: - Academicians - Professionals - Researchers - Practitioners - Students (Law, Business, Economics) From India and abroad. ### Mock WTO Exercise Eligible Participants: - Undergraduate & Postgraduate students - Law, Economics, Business & allied disciplines - India and abroad ## MODE OF THE EVENT **Offline Mode** ## LOCATION & VENUE **Raipur, Chhattisgarh, India** At: Hidayatullah National Law University ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS - **Abstract Submission Link:** - **Mock WTO Registration Link:** - **More Event Details:** ## FEE DETAILS ### Conference Only - Indian Academicians / Professionals / Research Scholars: INR 2500 - Indian Students: INR 1500 - Foreign Participants: USD 20 ### Mock WTO Only (Students) - Indian Delegates: INR 1200 - Foreign Delegates: USD 15 ### Both Conference & Mock WTO - Indian Students: INR 2700 - Foreign Students: USD 35 ## ACCOMMODATION - INR 1500 per person (University Hostel – Non-AC) - Separate facilities for male and female participants - Extension available at INR 500 per day (subject to availability) ## IMPORTANT DATES - Opening of Registration (Mock WTO Delegates): **06 February 2026 onwards** - Deadline for Submission of Abstract: **31 March 2026 (11:59 PM IST)** - Notification of Acceptance of Abstract: **26 April 2026** - Opening of Registration & Fee Payment (Conference): **27 April 2026** - Deadline for Registration & Fee Payment: **20 July 2026 (11:59 PM IST)** - Deadline for Full Paper Submission: **06 September 2026 (11:59 PM IST)** - Event Dates: **02 – 04 October 2026** ## CONTACT INFORMATION **Dr. Ankit Awasthi** Head, Centre for WTO & WIPO Studies Email: itls@hnlu.ac.in **Ms. Kruthika Senthil Kumar** Student Convenor Email: itls@hnlu.ac.in ## OFFICIAL LINK **For complete details, brochure, rules & updates:** **Categories:** Call for Papers, Events --- ### [2nd Nyaya Shastra Virtual Moot Court Competition | Organized by Nyaya Shashtra | Register by 20th March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/2nd-nyaya-shastra-virtual-moot-court-competition-organized-by-nyaya-shashtra-register-by-20th-march-2026/) **Published:** February 13, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 2nd Nyaya Shastra Virtual Moot Court Competition | Organized by Nyaya Shashtra | Register by 20th March 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Flyer_2nd-Nyaya-Shastra-Virtual-Moot-Court-Competition-724x1024.jpg) ## **ABOUT NYAYA SHASHTRA** Nyaya Shastra is an MSME-registered, full-service law firm and legal learning platform driven by the principles of integrity, excellence, and service, with a clear vision to align legal education with its practical application. We offer comprehensive legal services in litigation and dispute resolution, corporate and commercial law, contract drafting, regulatory and compliance advisory, and policy research, representing clients before judicial and quasi- judicial forums across India. Beyond practice, we are deeply committed to pro bono legal aid, legal literacy, and community awareness initiatives to ensure access to justice. Through national-level legal competitions, structured internship and training programs, and our in- house journal VIDHIKA – A Quarterly Law Journal, Nyaya Shastra actively promotes legal scholarship, professional skill development, and a more informed, equitable legal ecosystem. ## **ABOUT LEGAL EAGLE** Legal Eagle is the ultimate resource for staying updated on the evolving field of law and justice. It provides the latest judicial rulings, comprehensive legal analysis, and thought-provoking discussions on complex legal topics. The platform breaks down significant court decisions, examines important legislative developments, and explores the real-world effects of legal rulings in a clear and engaging way. Whether you’re a law student, a legal professional, or just someone interested in the legal system, Legal Eagle simplifies complex legal issues and demonstrates their broader implications on society. With a focus on delivering concise and insightful content, Legal Eagle connects legal knowledge with the public, helping to understand how laws shape governance, individual rights, and societal norms. ## EVENT TIMELINE - Registration Starts – 10th February - Registration ends – 20th March - Assignment of Team code – 22nd March - Last Date to Seek Clarification – 25th March - Release of Clarification – 27th March - Workshop on Moot Court Practice – 28th March - Last Date to Submit Memorials – 1st April - Preliminary Round I & II – 10th April - Quarter and Semi Final Rounds – 11th April - Final Round & Valedictory – 12th April ## **ELIGIBILITY** - The Competition is open to all students, enrolled bonafide on a regular basis in an undergraduate law course (3years/5years) conducted by any recognized college/institution/university. - Each team shall comprise a minimum of two members (2 speakers) and maximum of 3 members (2 speakers and 1 researcher). - A maximum of 3 teams can participate from a college/university. - Total 48 teams will be allowed to participate and registration form will be closed automatically when 48 registrations will be done. Registration will be allowed to the first 48 teams only on the First Come First Serve basis. - Team shall not disclose their identity or that of their institution. - Scouting is not allowed and may lead to disqualification. ## **FORMATTING** - The memorials are to be submitted in the format as mentioned below and if a team fails to comply with the given format, it may be penalized in the form of deductions from the memorial marks. - The memorials shall contain all of, and only, the following heads, namely- 1. Cover Page (It shall include the team code of the team on upper right-hand corner, name of the case, parties on behalf of whom written submissions are made, name of the forum approached for dispute resolution and year.) 2. The Cover page of the memorial on behalf of Petitioner shall be in BLUE, and Respondent shall be in RED. 3. Table of Contents 4. List of Abbreviations 5. Index of Authorities 6. Statement of Jurisdiction 7. Statement of Facts 8. Issues Raised 9. Summary of Arguments 10. Arguments Advanced 11. Prayer 12. Annexure (optional) - Font and Spacing: All written submissions shall be typed on A4 size paper in the following format: – 1. Font type: Times New Roman 2. Font Size: 12 & For Footnotes -10 3. Line Spacing: 1.5 & For Footnotes -1 4. Alignment: Justified 5. Margin: 1 inch (each side) 6. No. of pages: Maximum 35 pages in total (excluding Annexure) 7. It is at the discretion of the teams to make a compendium or not. No extra marks shall be given for that. - Citations: All teams shall give citations adhering to the 21st Blue Book. ## **SUBMISSION GUIDELINES** - Submissions shall be made in both word and pdf format. - The file name shall be \[Team Code\_Respondent/Petitioner.pdf/doc\] - All submissions are to be made via a google form (to be provided later). - Memorial should be free from any error of grammar, spelling, punctuation etc. - Only 20% plagiarism allowed. On exceeding the plagiarism percentage, there will be a penalty of 5 marks per percentage. (Example – Till 20% plagiarism Zero penalty, but in case of 21% plagiarism 5 marks penalty will be imposed). - Memorial must be in English Language. - Each Team has to submit 2 memorials; one for appellant and on for respondent. - Use of Al is strictly prohibited. - Memorials to be submitted before 11:59 PM of 1st April. Delayed submission will incur a penalty of 5 marks per day. ## **COMPETITION STRUCTURE** **ORAL ROUNDS** - The oral rounds will be conducted in 4 levels i.e.Preliminary Rounds I & II, Quarter Finals and Finals. - Paring of teams shall be done by draw of lots. - There shall be exchange of memorials for all the respective rounds. **Preliminary Rounds I & II** - The preliminary rounds will be hosted on 10th April. - 20 minutes will be given to each team to argue over the given case in the prelims round. However, out of 20 minutes, 1st speaker is not allowed to take more than 12 minutes and 2nd speaker not less than 8 minutes. - No rebuttal in the preliminary rounds. - The total marks scored by an individual team in the preliminary rounds will be calculated as a total of two rounds i.e. marks scored as Petitioner and marks scored as Respondent. - Teams with the highest scores in the preliminary round shall qualify for quarters. **Quarter and Semi Final Rounds** - The quarter and semi final rounds will be hosted on 11thApril. - The quarter and semi final rounds shall be a knock-out round. - 30 minutes will be given to each team to argue over the given case in the quarter and semi final round. However, out of 30 minutes, 1st speaker is not allowed to take more than 17 minutes and 2nd speaker not less than 13 minutes. - The rebuttals will commence after both the teams have presented their arguments (3 minutes is reserved for rebuttals and 2 minutes for sur-rebuttals). **Final Round** - The final rounds will be hosted on 12th April. - The two winning teams from the semi final round will advance to the final round. - 40 minutes will be given to each team to argue over the given case in the final round including rebuttals. The teams are allowed to divide the time between the speakers according to their own convenience. However, they are priorly required to inform the bench about the same. ## GENERAL RULES - Total 48 teams will be allowed to participate and registration will be closed after first 48 registrations. - The team shall not disclose their identity during the oral rounds. - The language to be used during the oral rounds is English. - There won’t be any researcher test. - The teams must adhere to the format and guidelines provided in this brochure. - The memorial should not contain any marking or text that might reveal the identity of the team or their institution. Only team codes provided should be mentioned on the front page. - The copies of memorial must be submitted in both document and pdf form. - Clarification form will be released after the registration ends and the participants can seek clarification regarding moot court proposition. - Dress Code – The dress code of the competition Shall be formal. The participants must adhere to it throughout the competition as follows: 1. Women: Black & White Formals (Western with a black tie/Indian) 2. b) Men: Black & White Western Formals with a black tie. - Registration fee is non refundable. ## AWARDS & PRIZES - 1st Prize- Rs. 15000/- + Certificate of Merit - 2nd Prize- Rs. 10000/- + Certificate of Merit - Best Speaker- Rs. 5000/- + Certificate of Merit - Best Memorial- Rs. 5000/- + Certificate of Merit - Participation Certificate for all the participants!! ## REGISTERATION DETAILS - Registration is compulsory for each team willing to participate in the 2nd Nyaya Shastra Virtual Moot Court Competition. - Registration can be done by filling the google form, the link is attached below. - A non-refundable Registration Fee is ₹2400/- for each participating team. - Please pay the Registration fee either through the bank details given below. **Payment of Registration Fee:** - All the teams are required to make a payment of ₹2400/- (Twenty-Four Hundred only) before 20th March, 2026 (11:59 P.M. IST) to register for the competition. - The details for the payment of Registration Fee through bank transfer is provided below: *Account Holder’s Name- Nyaya Shastra* *Bank Name- Canara Bank* *Account Number- 120035744908* *IFSC Code- CNRB0000183* **After payment you can fill up this google form to complete your registration:** ## **FOR QUERIES** Contact – Madhav Kumar (Convenor) Phone no. – 8580134113 Email- ## **DRIVE LINK** [https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1J\_CA8u3q2dIFExoMDDEBGlGColwLrlSw](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1J_CA8u3q2dIFExoMDDEBGlGColwLrlSw) **Categories:** Events, Moot Courts --- ### [CAREERS IN LAW FOR WOMEN: STRATEGIES, SKILLS & PROFESSIONAL GROWTH | Organized by CanonSphere | 13 February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/careers-in-law-for-women-strategies-skills-professional-growth-organized-by-canonsphere-13-february-2026/) **Published:** February 10, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** CAREERS IN LAW FOR WOMEN: STRATEGIES, SKILLS & PROFESSIONAL GROWTH | Organized by CanonSphere | 13 February 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/WEBSITE-BANNERS-4-1024x256.png) ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER / PLATFORM** CanonSphere is an initiative focused on providing quality learning opportunities, career guidance, and professional skill development for law students and legal professionals. Through webinars, courses, and mentorship-oriented programs, it aims to bridge the gap between legal education and practical career growth. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY** **Careers in Law for Women: Strategies, Skills & Professional Growth** is a free live webinar designed to guide women in navigating the legal profession with confidence. The session highlights the importance of strategic career planning, skill enhancement beyond textbooks, and building professional visibility in today’s competitive legal ecosystem. ## **ABOUT THE SPEAKER** **Adv. Ritika Tejpal** – Advocate & Legal Professional Adv. Ritika Tejpal brings real-world legal experience and shares actionable strategies focused on professional growth, career clarity, and effective use of digital platforms such as LinkedIn for lawyers. ## **WHAT THIS WEBINAR COVERS** - Career pathways and opportunities for women in law - Essential skills required beyond law school - Using LinkedIn for professional visibility and networking - Accessing internships, jobs, and collaborations - Personal branding and long-term career planning for legal professionals ## **WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** - Law students (UG & PG) - Judicial services aspirants - Young advocates and early-career legal professionals - Anyone seeking structured guidance for a sustainable legal career ## **MODE OF THE EVENT** Online – Live on Zoom ## **LOCATION & VENUE** Online (India) – Zoom Platform ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE** - Registration Form: - WhatsApp Group for Updates: (Registration is mandatory; seats are limited.) ## **FEE DETAILS** Free Webinar (No registration fee) ## **PRIZES / CERTIFICATE** Certificate of Participation for all attendees ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - **Date:** 13 February 2026 - **Time:** 7:00 PM onwards (IST) ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** - **Contact Person:** Adv. Keerti Yadav - **Phone:** +91 63788 45873 - **Email:** canonspherecourses@gmail.com | research@canonsphere.com ## **OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / BROCHURE** - Registration Link: - WhatsApp Updates Group: **Categories:** Events --- ### [1st L.P. Shahi Memorial National Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Sri Krishna Jubilee Law College, Muzaffarpur, Bihar | Register by 28th February, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-l-p-shahi-memorial-national-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-sri-krishna-jubilee-law-college-register-by-28th-february-2026/) **Published:** February 9, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 1st L.P. Shahi Memorial National Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Sri Krishna Jubilee Law College | Register by 28th February, 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/OFFICIAL-BROCHURE-OUT-3-1024x858.png) ## **About the Sri Krishna Jubilee Law College** Sri Krishna Jubilee Law College, situated at Gannipur, Muzaffarpur, Bihar, is a distinguished center of legal education affiliated with B.R.A. Bihar University. Established in 1948, it is the second-oldest law college in Bihar, with a rich legacy of imparting quality legal education for more than seven decades. The institution is committed to the pursuit of academic excellence and the advancement of legal scholarship through a structured and rigorous curriculum complemented by practical training. With a strong emphasis on professional ethics, advocacy skills, and experiential learning, the college continuously endeavors to prepare students for the multifaceted demands of the legal profession. Through academic initiatives, research-oriented activities, and co-curricular engagements such as moot court exercises, the College aspires to contribute meaningfully to the legal fraternity while steadily enhancing its national academic standing. ## **Details of the event** The 1st L.P. Shahi Memorial National Moot Court Competition, 2026 is a solemn and prestigious academic endeavour organised by the Moot Court Committee of Sri Krishna Jubilee Law College in reverent remembrance of the enduring legacy of Late L.P. Shahi. Conceived as a national forum dedicated to the pursuit of justice and legal scholarship, the competition seeks to uphold the foundational values of constitutionalism, rule of law, and intellectual integrity that define the legal profession. The theme of the competition is anchored in contemporary issues of Constitutional Law, reflecting the dynamic and evolving nature of constitutional governance in modern society. The competition offers an esteemed platform for law students from across the country to engage in rigorous legal research, analytical reasoning, and persuasive oral advocacy within a simulated courtroom setting. Through a thoughtfully crafted moot proposition, participants are encouraged to critically examine constitutional principles, fundamental rights, and institutional balances while advancing reasoned and ethically grounded arguments. This commemorative initiative aspires to nurture future advocates and scholars while contributing meaningfully to the advancement of constitutional discourse and legal education at the national level. ## **Eligibility** - Participation is open exclusively for students enrolled in a three-year or five-year undergraduate law program and postgraduate law program (LL.M.) during the current academic year at any recognized institution. - Each institution is permitted to send up to three (03) teams to participate in the competition. - Each participating team ordinarily shall consist of three members, i.e., 2 speakers and 1 researcher. However, with prior approval from the organizing committee, a two-member team may also be allowed to participate in the competition (both members shall act as speakers, and they shall not be eligible to appear for the researchers’ test). - Inter-institutional teams are strictly prohibited. All team members must belong to the same institution. - Participating teams shall have an NOC/Letter of Authorization for participating, issued by their respective college/university. - The language of the competition shall be English. - The competition shall be in physical mode only. The venue of oral rounds and the researchers’ test will be Sri Krishna Jubilee Law College, Muzaffarpur, Bihar. - All participating teams are required to adhere to the rules, regulations, and schedule as prescribed by the Organizing Committee. ## **Location** Sri Krishna Jubilee Law College, Muzaffarpur, Bihar (offline) ## **Registration procedure** - Payment of Registration Fee: Participants must initiate the registration process by remitting the prescribed registration fee. The payment shall be made solely through the payment details provided in this brochure. Teams are advised to ensure that the correct amount is remitted and the transaction is successfully completed. - Completion of the Google Registration Form: Upon successful payment, teams will be required to complete the Google Registration Form, the link of which will be provided in this brochure. All the requisite information must be entered carefully and correctly. - Submission of the Letter of Authorization/NOC: Each participating team must obtain a Letter of Authorization/NOC issued by their respective university/institution. The letter must be uploaded to the Google registration form as directed. Teams failing to submit a valid Letter of Authorization/NOC shall not be deemed eligible for participation. - Uploading the Payment Acknowledgement: A clear copy of the payment acknowledgement/receipt must be uploaded in the designated section of the Google Form. Registrations submitted without valid proof of payment shall be considered incomplete. - Confirmation of Registration: Registration will be considered complete only upon submission of the Google Form along with the payment acknowledgement and the Letter of Authorization. A formal confirmation email will be sent to the registered team within the stipulated period. ## **Important Dates** - Release of Moot Problem, Brochure & Rulebook: 30th January, 2026. - Last date of registration: 28th February, 2026. - Last date of seeking clarification: 7th March, 2026. - Release of clarification: 11th March, 2026. - Last date of memorial submission (soft copy): 4th April, 2026. - Last date of mailing travel itinerary: 5th April, 2026. - Submission of memorial hardcopy, Draw of Lots & Memorial exchange for preliminary rounds: 10th April, 2026. - Date of Moot Court Competition: 11th-12th of April, 2026. - Researchers’ Test, Preliminary rounds, Octa-final/ Quarter-final rounds: 11th April, 2026 - Semi-final rounds, Final rounds & valedictory ceremony: 12th April, 2026 ## **Fee details** Rs. 1500 (without accommodation), Rs. 4000 (with accommodation). ## **Prizes** 1. Winner team: Winning trophy, Certificate of Merit, Cash Prize of Rs. 21,000/- 2. Runner-up team: Runner-up trophy, Certificate of Merit, Cash Prize of Rs. 11,000/- 3. Best Speaker: Trophy, Certificate of Merit, Cash Prize of Rs. 4,100/- 4. Best Researcher: Trophy, Certificate of Merit, Cash Prize of Rs. 4,100/- 5. Best Memorial: Trophy, Certificate of Merit, Cash Prize of Rs. 4,100/- ## **Contact Information** - Email- - Phone- +91-9241372837, +91-9934897242 ## **Official brochure** [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JiTo4dDIKf3hgrNc9123dAnkMPg82gpC/view?usp=drive\_link](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JiTo4dDIKf3hgrNc9123dAnkMPg82gpC/view?usp=drive_link) ## **Social Media handles** Facebook- LinkedIn- [www.linkedin.com/in/moot-court-society-4639543a6](http://www.linkedin.com/in/moot-court-society-4639543a6) **Categories:** Events, Moot Courts --- ### [Sooraj KR of Government Law College Thrissur Honoured Among Top Five Papers at National Conference on Constitutional Assembly Debates](https://lawfoyer.in/sooraj-kr-of-government-law-college-thrissur-honoured-among-top-five-papers-at-national-conference-on-constitutional-assembly-debates/) **Published:** February 8, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Content:** LawFoyer proudly celebrates the academic excellence of **Sooraj KR**, a fourth-year BBA LL.B. (Hons.) student from **Government Law College Thrissur**, for securing recognition as **one among the best five research papers** at a prestigious **National Conference on Constitutional Assembly Debates**, conducted by the **Dr B. R. Ambedkar Chair of Kerala University** on **26 November 2025**. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG-20251125-WA0128-Sooraj-Kalarikkal-1024x682.jpg) This achievement stands as a strong testament to Sooraj’s dedication to constitutional scholarship and rigorous legal research. Being recognised at a national-level academic conference is no small feat, especially in a field as intellectually demanding and historically rich as Constitutional Assembly Debates. These debates form the backbone of India’s constitutional philosophy, reflecting the vision, concerns, and wisdom of the framers of the Constitution. Engaging with such material requires patience, depth, and a genuine commitment to understanding the spirit of constitutional governance. Sooraj’s journey towards this recognition was marked by months of careful reading, critical analysis, and thoughtful writing. His paper stood out among numerous submissions from law students and scholars across the country, earning a place among the top five selected works. This recognition highlights not only his academic ability but also his clarity of thought and commitment to producing meaningful legal research. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG-20251125-WA0115-Sooraj-Kalarikkal-1024x682.jpg) Speaking about the achievement, Sooraj shared that the moment was deeply rewarding. Seeing his work acknowledged at a national forum validated the long hours spent researching and refining arguments. More importantly, it strengthened his confidence as a budding legal academic and motivated him to engage more deeply with research and scholarly writing. For a law student, such validation can be a turning point, reinforcing belief in one’s abilities and opening doors to further academic pursuits. Currently pursuing his BBA LL.B. (Hons.) at Government Law College Thrissur, Sooraj represents the new generation of law students who balance doctrinal learning with research-driven inquiry. His achievement reflects the academic culture of his institution, which encourages students to explore beyond textbooks and actively participate in scholarly platforms. It also underscores the importance of national conferences as spaces where young legal minds can present ideas, receive feedback, and contribute to ongoing constitutional discourse. Beyond personal success, Sooraj’s achievement serves as an inspiration to fellow law students across the country. His message to aspiring legal scholars is simple yet powerful: stay curious, be consistent, and never underestimate the value of sincere research. He believes that good academic work may take time, but it never goes unnoticed. In an era where quick results often overshadow deep learning, his journey is a reminder that patience and perseverance remain central to meaningful success. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG-20251125-WA0120-Sooraj-Kalarikkal-1024x682.jpg) At LawFoyer’s Achievers’ Archive, we believe that achievements like these deserve to be celebrated widely. Academic and scholarly accomplishments play a crucial role in shaping responsible lawyers, policymakers, and researchers of tomorrow. Sooraj KR’s recognition at this national conference is not just a personal milestone but also a proud moment for his institution and the wider legal academic community. We congratulate Sooraj on this remarkable achievement and wish him continued success in his academic and professional journey. May his passion for constitutional law and legal research inspire many more students to engage deeply with the law and contribute thoughtfully to its evolution. Wish to showcase your achievement to the world and inspire others? LawFoyer will celebrate your achievement because every achievement deserves recognition. Your achievement is our achievement. Share your achievement with us. Visit: **Categories:** Achievers Archive --- ### [3rd SHRI O.P.TANDON MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITON 2026 | PRIZE POOL OF ₹54,000 | Organized by TRINITY INSTITUTE OF PROFESSIONAL STUDIES (TIPS) | Register by 10th FEBRUARY 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-shri-o-p-tandon-memorial-moot-court-competiton-2026-organized-by-trinity-institute-of-professional-studies-tips-register-by-10th-february-2026/) **Published:** February 5, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 3rd SHRI O.P.TANDON MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITON 2026 | Organized by TRINITY INSTITUTE OF PROFESSIONAL STUDIES (TIPS) | Register by 10th FEBRUARY 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/POSTER-1024x1013.jpeg) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY Established in 2003, TIPS is a leading institute affiliated with Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University, New Delhi. We offer rigorous academic programs in law, commerce, media, and computer applications, fostering intellectual and professional development in our students. Ranked A+ by GGSIPU, TIPS has earned a reputation for excellence, attracting bright and talented students from across the country. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY - TIPS is proud to announce **the 3rd Shri O.P. Tandon Memorial Moot Court Competition, 2026**, a national-level moot court competition aimed at fostering courtroom advocacy, legal research, and practical litigation skills among law students. This prestigious competition provides a dynamic platform for aspiring legal professionals to engage in simulated court proceedings and develop a deeper understanding of substantive and procedural law. - The Moot Court Competition is designed to assess participants’ ability to analyze complex legal issues, conduct advanced legal research, and present structured oral and written arguments before a simulated judicial bench. The primary focus of the competition is on strengthening core legal skills such as legal reasoning, application of statutes and precedents, articulation of arguments, rebuttal techniques, and professional courtroom conduct. - The 3rd Shri O.P. Tandon Memorial Moot Court Competition, shall revolve around the problem relating to Criminal Law, The competition shall comprise four successive rounds, with participants advancing through the stages based on their performance - **Date: –** 18th, 19th, 28th March 2026 - **Mode: –** Hybrid Mode ## WHO IS IT FOR/ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE - Each participant must be a current undergraduate law student (5-year or 3-year course) from their respective institution. - There is a bar of maximum 2 Teams participating from one College/Institution/University ## MODE OF THE EVENT (ONLINE / OFFLINE OR HYBRID) THE COMPETITION SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN HYBRID MODE - **INAUGRAL CEREMONY & RESEARCHER TEST** – 18th March’2026 (Online) - **PRELIMINARY & QUARTER FINAL**: 19th March, 2026 (Online) - **SEMI FINAL AND FINALS**: 28th March, 2026 (Offline Format) ## LOCATION (COUNTRY/STATE/CITY)& VENUE OF THE EVENT - TRINITY INSTITUTE OF PROFESSIONAL STUDIES Address – Institutional Area, Dwarka Sector 9, Dwarka, New Delhi, Delhi, 110077 ## REGISTRATION/SUBMISSION LINKS &PROCEDURE - PROCESS Click on the link – Or, Scan this QR code for registration form ## FEE DETAILS - 3000/- afterwards till the form closes, i.e., **10th February, 2026** ## PRIZES - **Participation Certificate**: Given to all participants, Internship opportunities supported by our sponsors , Access to Research opportunities, Publications or Learning resources , Exclusive Sponsor Backed Vouchers/Discounts - **Merit Certificates & Trophies**: Awarded to winners along with attractive cash prizes. 1. **Winner** : Rs. 21,000 2. **Runner-up** : Rs. 11,000 3. **Best Memorial** : Rs. 7,000 4. **Best Researcher** : Rs. 5,000 5. **Best Speaker ( Petitioner )** – Rs. 5,000 6. **Best Speaker ( Respondent )** – Rs. 5, 000 - **Additional Perks :** 1. **One free Manupatra Academy course** of choice for the **winning team.** 2. **A 75% discount on any one Manupatra Academy course** for the **runner-up team.** 3. **A 50% discount on any one Manupatra Academy course** for the team **placed third.** 4. Additionally, **all other participants** can avail a **15% discount on any one course from Manupatra Academy.** 5. FREE Access to LawFoyer Academy’s ([https://academy.lawfoyer.in](https://academy.lawfoyer.in/)) two Premium Courses to Top 3 teams of the event including Advanced Certification Course on Legal Research & Writing (worth Rs. 2000) and Advanced Certification Course on Supercharging Litigation & Academics with AI (worth Rs. 4000). 6. Discounted Publication Opportunity to all the Participants with 50% Discount on Publication with LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research which is indexed on 350+ Global Databases including Harvard HOLLIS Library, Oxford SOLO Library, Hein Online, Google Scholar, CrossRef, ISSN, and other international libraries and databases. 7. Internship Opportunity to all the Participants – All participants will get an opportunity to Intern with LawFoyer and attend LawFoyer’s structured Free Virtual Internship Training Program in collaboration with reputed law firms wherein the Students will get an opportunity to Learn Practical Skills including Case Finding & Analysis, Legal Research, Legal Writing, Legal Drafting and Leveraging AI & Modern Legal Tech for Practical Legal Work. FREE Job and Internship Placement support by LawFoyer to all Participants for 1 year 8. Recognition to “Top Performers” of the Event via India’s First Digital “Hall of Fame” – LawFoyer’s “Achievers Archive” ## DEADLINES/IMPORTANT DATES - THE DEADLINES AND IMPORTANT DATES FOR THE COMPETITION ARE AS FOLLOWS- - **LAST DATE FOR FINAL REGISTRATION**: 10th February, 2026 - **INAUGRAL CEREMONY & RESEARCHER TEST** – 18th March’2026 (Online) - **PRELIMINARY & QUARTER FINAL**: 19th March, 2026 (Online) - **SEMI FINAL AND FINALS**: 28th March, 2026 (Offline Format) ## CONTACT INFORMATION - **Faculty Convenors:** - **Ms. Shraddha Singh – +91 8285028911** - **Mr. Chaitanya Sharma – +91 8860996093** - **Student Coordinators:** - **Ms. Shweta Srivastava – +91 9873261777 / +91 7678159983** - **Ms. Vidmita Soni – +91 9560816191 - **Email –** [**tslls@gmail.com**](mailto:mcc.tslls@gmail.com) ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / LINK OF THE OFFICIAL BROCHURE, RULES & REGULATIONS ETC. THE LINKS FOR THE SAME ARE AS FOLLOWS- - **Registration link** - **Brochure link** [https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1\_\_5cZY11eGu6MUB-N8WOvnJvzmC6gsLq?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1__5cZY11eGu6MUB-N8WOvnJvzmC6gsLq?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Events, Moot Courts --- ### [THEMISIA 4.0 | Organized by Deccan Education Society’s Shri Navalmal Firodia Law College, Pune | Register by 10th February, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/themisia-4-0-organized-by-deccan-education-societys-shri-navalmal-firodia-law-college-pune-register-by-4th-february-2026/) **Published:** January 24, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** THEMISIA 4.0 | Organized by Deccan Education Society’s Shri Navalmal Firodia Law College, Pune | Register by 4th February, 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/IMG-20260123-WA0012-724x1024.jpg) ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER / COLLEGE** Deccan Education Society’s Shri Navalmal Firodia Law College, Pune draws its academic strength from the rich and enduring legacy of the Deccan Education Society. The institution is firmly committed to preserving and advancing this heritage while continuously evolving with societal and legal developments. Having entered its 22nd year, the college emphasizes innovative pedagogy, academic excellence, and responsible legal education guided by its motto, *“Making Excellence a Prevailing Attitude”*. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY** The Legal Research Cell presents **Themisia 4.0**, a two-day academic discourse scheduled on **13th and 14th February, 2026**, themed **“Integration of the Indian Knowledge System in Higher Education in India.”** The event will feature: - **National Legislative Drafting Competition** on *The Indian Knowledge System Integration in Higher Education Bill, 2026 (in accordance with NEP)* - **Legal Quiz Competition** based on *Right to Education and NEP 2020* Themisia has previously witnessed strong participation and appreciation across the legal education fraternity, and the fourth edition aims to further promote research, analytical skills, and legislative understanding among law students. ## **WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** Students pursuing: - 3-year LL.B. course, or - 5-year integrated law course from any recognized law school/college/university in India during the academic year **2025–26** are eligible to participate. ## **MODE OF THE EVENT** Offline ## **LOCATION & VENUE OF THE EVENT** **DES’s Shri Navalmal Firodia Law College** Gate No. 3, Fergusson College Campus, Fergusson College Road, Pune – 411004, Maharashtra, India ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION PROCEDURE** - A scanned copy of the duly filled registration form must be emailed to: **themisia.snflc.2023@gmail.com** - A hard copy of the registration form must be submitted on the day of the competition at the venue - Registration fees must be paid via **NEFT only** - Registration confirmation will be sent via email along with a unique Team Code ## **FEE DETAILS** Registration Fee: **₹1,200/- per team (inclusive of GST)** (The fee is non-refundable and payable only via NEFT) ## **PRIZES** **National Legislative Drafting Competition** - Winner: ₹25,000 + Trophy + Certificates - Runner-up: ₹15,000 + Trophy + Certificates - Certificate of Participation for all participants **Legal Quiz Competition** - Winner: ₹15,000 + Trophy + Certificates - Runner-up: ₹10,000 + Trophy + Certificates - Certificate of Participation for all participants ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - Last date to register and pay fees: **10th February, 2026** - PowerPoint submission (Drafting Competition): **10th February, 2026** - Preliminary Round: **13th February, 2026** - Final Round: **14th February, 2026** - Result Declaration & Prize Distribution: **14th February, 2026** ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** **Faculty Coordinator** Asst. Prof. Anuja Sharma – 7709617228 **Student Coordinators** - Shubhra Tripathi – +91 6392919914 - Preksha Lunkad – +91 7020739529 ## **OFFICIAL LINK / BROCHURE & RULES** - **Official Brochure: Themisia 4.0 Brochure** ** - **Official Rule Sheet: Rules for Themisia 4.0** ** **Categories:** Events, Other Competitions, Quiz --- ### [Ravinder Kaur Grewal & Ors. v. Manjit Kaur & Ors., [2020] 8 SCR 1138](https://lawfoyer.in/ravinder-kaur-grewal-ors-v-manjit-kaur-ors-2020-8-scr-1138/) **Published:** February 4, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The present judgment settles a recurring controversy surrounding family settlements, their evidentiary value, and the requirement of compulsory registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. The Supreme Court examined whether a document styled as a memorandum of family settlement creates rights in immovable property for the first time or merely records a pre-existing oral settlement already acted upon by the parties. The dispute arose between real brothers concerning ownership and possession of ancestral and self-acquired properties, where long-standing possession, construction, and mutual exchange of properties had taken place within the family. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The present judgment settles a recurring controversy surrounding *family settlements*, their evidentiary value, and the requirement of *compulsory registration* under *Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908*. The Supreme Court examined whether a document styled as a *memorandum of family settlement* creates rights in immovable property for the first time or merely records a pre-existing oral settlement already acted upon by the parties. The dispute arose between real brothers concerning ownership and possession of ancestral and self-acquired properties, where long-standing possession, construction, and mutual exchange of properties had taken place within the family. The Court emphatically reaffirmed the doctrine laid down in *Kale & Ors. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation*, holding that family arrangements are governed by a special equity. Such arrangements are enforced to preserve peace and harmony within families and to prevent prolonged litigation. The Court clarified that even in the absence of antecedent title, family settlements can be sustained if honestly made and acted upon. The High Court was found to have committed a manifest error by mechanically applying precedents without examining the factual matrix and by exceeding the limited jurisdiction under *Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908*. The Supreme Court restored the decree of the First Appellate Court, holding that the document dated *10.03.1988* was only a memorandum recording an earlier settlement and therefore did not require registration. This judgment strengthens the jurisprudence on family settlements, estoppel, and the distinction between instruments creating rights and documents merely recording past arrangements. **Keywords:** Family settlement; Memorandum of settlement; Registration Act; Estoppel; Section 17; Special equity ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Ravinder Kaur Grewal & Ors. v. Manjit Kaur & Ors.*Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 7764 of 2014Judgement Date31 July 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorum*A.M. Khanwilkar, J.; Dinesh Maheshwari, J.*Author*A.M. Khanwilkar, J.*Citation*\[2020\] 8 SCR 1138*Legal Provisions Involved*Section 17, Registration Act, 1908; Section 100, CPC, 1908*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsCivil Law; Property Law; Family Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The litigation originates from intra-family disputes between real brothers regarding ownership, possession, and enjoyment of immovable property situated in Sangrur, Punjab. The predecessor of the appellants asserted exclusive ownership over the suit property on the basis of a family settlement arrived at in *1970*, which was later reduced into writing through a memorandum dated *10.03.1988*. Despite long possession, construction of commercial shops, and mutual exchanges of properties among family members, disputes resurfaced, leading to the institution of a civil suit for declaration. The Trial Court partly decreed the suit by recognising limited ownership, while the First Appellate Court, upon reappreciation of evidence, granted full relief to the plaintiff. The High Court, however, interfered in second appeal by holding that the memorandum required compulsory registration, thereby restoring the Trial Court decree. The Supreme Court was thus called upon to examine whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under *Section 100 CPC* and whether the document in question attracted *Section 17(1)* of the Registration Act or fell within the exception carved out under *Section 17(2)(v)*. The case required reconciliation of settled principles governing family arrangements with statutory mandates of registration. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The plaintiff, *Harbans Singh*, and defendants were real brothers. The suit property was purchased in *1970* in the names of two brothers, though possession and construction were undertaken by the plaintiff with their consent. The plaintiff constructed *16 shops, a service station, a boundary wall, and a samadhi of his wife* on the suit land. Revenue records showed fragmented ownership, but possession consistently remained with the plaintiff. Disputes arose, leading to a family settlement whereby the plaintiff’s exclusive ownership was acknowledged. Other properties were exchanged among the brothers, including plots at *Prem Basti* and property purchased in the name of the plaintiff’s son. These transactions were admitted and acted upon. To avoid future disputes, a *memorandum dated 10.03.1988* was executed recording the earlier settlement. Despite this, defendants attempted to resile, prompting the plaintiff to file a suit for declaration, alternatively pleading adverse possession. The Trial Court accepted partial ownership, but the First Appellate Court found that the family settlement had been acted upon and that the memorandum did not create new rights. The High Court reversed this finding, leading to the present appeal. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the document dated *10.03.1988* required compulsory registration under *Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908*? ii. Whether the said document created rights in immovable property for the first time? iii. Whether parties to a family settlement can resile after having acted upon it? iv. Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under *Section 100 CPC*? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that the document in question was merely a memorandum recording an earlier oral family settlement. They contended that the settlement was acted upon for decades, evidenced by possession, construction, and exchange of properties. Reliance was placed on *Kale & Ors. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation*, asserting that family arrangements are governed by special equity and need not be registered if they do not create rights for the first time. It was argued that the High Court ignored findings of fact and misapplied precedents. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents argued that the plaintiff had no antecedent title and that the memorandum effectively transferred ownership. They submitted that the document created rights in immovable property exceeding Rs.100 and therefore attracted compulsory registration. They supported the High Court’s reasoning and contended that absence of registration rendered the document inadmissible. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed a manifest error by interfering with well-reasoned findings of the First Appellate Court. The Court observed that possession, construction, and mutual exchanges conclusively proved that the family settlement was genuine and acted upon. The Court reaffirmed that *family arrangements need not be founded on antecedent title* and that even a semblance of claim suffices. The document dated *10.03.1988* was held to be a mere memorandum recording a past settlement and thus exempt from registration under *Section 17(2)(v)* of the Registration Act. The Court criticised the High Court for disposing of the second appeal in a casual manner, ignoring limitations under *Section 100 CPC*. The decree of the First Appellate Court was restored. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** A memorandum of family settlement that merely records a past oral settlement already acted upon does not require compulsory registration. Family settlements are governed by special equity and operate as estoppel against parties who have derived benefits from them. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that family settlements serve a larger social purpose by preserving harmony and preventing protracted litigation. Courts must lean in favour of upholding such arrangements rather than defeating them on technical grounds. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Courts must distinguish between documents creating rights and memoranda recording past settlements. ii. Family settlements need not be registered if they do not independently create rights. iii. Estoppel applies once parties act upon a settlement. iv. High Courts must respect jurisdictional limits under *Section 100 CPC*. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces settled principles of family law and property law. It restores doctrinal clarity on *family settlements*, strengthens the doctrine of *estoppel*, and cautions appellate courts against casual interference with findings of fact. The ruling is significant for civil litigation involving intra-family disputes and underscores the judiciary’s commitment to substantive justice over procedural technicalities. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** - *Kale & Ors. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation*, *\[1976\] 3 SCR 202* - *Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh Major*, *\[1995\] 3 Supp SCR 466* - *Hari Shankar Singhania v. Gaur Hari Singhania*, *\[2006\] 3 SCR 726* **b) Important Statutes Referred** - *Registration Act, 1908* - *Code of Civil Procedure, 1908* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Sukh Sagar Medical College & Hospital v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., [2020] 11 SCR 397](https://lawfoyer.in/sukh-sagar-medical-college-hospital-v-state-of-madhya-pradesh-ors-2020-11-scr-397/) **Published:** February 4, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the scope and limits of the State Government’s power to withdraw an Essentiality Certificate granted for the establishment of a medical college under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 and the Medical Council of India Establishment of Medical College Regulations, 1999. The appellant Trust was granted an Essentiality Certificate in 2014 to establish a medical college at Jabalpur. Despite issuance of a conditional Letter of Permission for the academic year 2016–17, the college consistently failed to meet mandatory infrastructural, faculty, and clinical requirements prescribed by the Medical Council of India. Renewal permissions were denied for three consecutive academic years due to gross deficiencies, resulting in academic dislocation of the first batch of students. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment examines the scope and limits of the State Government’s power to *withdraw an Essentiality Certificate* granted for the establishment of a medical college under the *Indian Medical Council Act, 1956* and the *Medical Council of India Establishment of Medical College Regulations, 1999*. The appellant Trust was granted an Essentiality Certificate in 2014 to establish a medical college at Jabalpur. Despite issuance of a conditional *Letter of Permission* for the academic year 2016–17, the college consistently failed to meet mandatory infrastructural, faculty, and clinical requirements prescribed by the Medical Council of India. Renewal permissions were denied for three consecutive academic years due to gross deficiencies, resulting in academic dislocation of the first batch of students. The State Government, invoking public interest and student welfare, cancelled the Essentiality Certificate, which action was challenged by the appellant relying on *Chintpurni Medical College and Hospital v. State of Punjab*. The Supreme Court distinguished the precedent and upheld the cancellation, holding that while issuance of an Essentiality Certificate is a *quasi-judicial act*, its withdrawal is permissible in *exceptional circumstances*, particularly where the certificate was obtained by *constructive fraud* or where the *substratum* for its issuance has completely disappeared. The Court emphasized the State’s constitutional duty under *Article 47 of the Constitution of India* to safeguard public health and protect students from substandard institutions. **Keywords:** Essentiality Certificate, Constructive Fraud, Medical Education Regulation, Substratum Doctrine, Article 47 Constitution of India ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Sukh Sagar Medical College & Hospital v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.*Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 2843 of 2020Judgement Date31 July 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorum*A.M. Khanwilkar, Dinesh Maheshwari & Sanjiv Khanna, JJ.*Author*A.M. Khanwilkar, J.*Citation*\[2020\] 11 SCR 397*Legal Provisions Involved*Indian Medical Council Act, 1956; MCI Regulations, 1999; Section 21, General Clauses Act, 1897; Article 47, Constitution of India*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsConstitutional Law, Education Law, Administrative Law ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The case arises from prolonged regulatory non-compliance by a private medical college despite repeated opportunities granted by statutory authorities. The State of Madhya Pradesh issued an Essentiality Certificate in 2014 certifying the desirability and feasibility of establishing a medical college with 150 MBBS seats. This certificate was issued on explicit representations by the Trust regarding availability of infrastructure, hospital facilities, and faculty in compliance with MCI norms. Following submission of the scheme under *Section 10-A of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956*, inspections revealed serious deficiencies. Although a conditional Letter of Permission was granted for 2016–17 pursuant to directions of the Supreme Court-mandated Oversight Committee, subsequent inspections demonstrated persistent failures. Renewal permissions were denied for academic years 2017–18, 2018–19, and 2019–20. The deficiencies were structural and systemic. Faculty shortages exceeded 88 percent. Bed occupancy was negligible. Clinical material was absent. No meaningful teaching activity was demonstrated. The college effectively remained non-functional, jeopardizing the academic careers of admitted students. In response, the State issued a show-cause notice and ultimately withdrew the Essentiality Certificate. The appellant contended that such withdrawal was barred by law once the certificate was issued, relying heavily on *Chintpurni Medical College*. The Supreme Court was thus required to determine whether the State’s action fell within legally recognized exceptions permitting withdrawal. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The appellant Trust applied for an Essentiality Certificate in 2014, representing possession of *27.27 acres of land*, a *300-bedded hospital*, and a *time-bound plan* for compliance with MCI norms. Based on these assurances, the State issued the certificate. In 2016, the MCI reported gross deficiencies, including *fake patient records*, *non-existent resident doctors*, and inadequate facilities. Despite initial rejection, the Central Government granted conditional permission under judicial supervision. This permission was explicitly limited and subject to annual renewal upon compliance. Subsequent inspections revealed alarming shortcomings. Bed occupancy was recorded at *3.65%*. There were *no surgeries*, *no deliveries*, and *no functioning ICUs*. Faculty deficiency stood at *88.03%*, and resident deficiency at *90.9%*. Diagnostic and emergency services were practically absent. Due to non-renewal of permissions, students admitted in 2016–17 were unable to continue their course. The State eventually relocated them to other recognized colleges. These developments prompted the State to cancel the Essentiality Certificate, citing violation of its foundational conditions. The High Court upheld the State’s decision, leading to the present appeal. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether the State Government possesses the power to withdraw an Essentiality Certificate once granted? ii. Whether such withdrawal violates the principle laid down in *Chintpurni Medical College*? iii. Whether persistent regulatory non-compliance constitutes *constructive fraud*? iv. Whether loss of substratum justifies cancellation in public interest? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsel for the appellant submitted that issuance of an Essentiality Certificate is a *quasi-judicial act* that becomes *functus officio* once exercised. Reliance was placed on *Chintpurni Medical College and Hospital v. State of Punjab*, where it was held that the State cannot indirectly terminate the existence of a medical college by withdrawing such certificate. It was argued that deficiencies fall exclusively within the domain of the MCI and Central Government, and that the State lacks inspection or revocation powers post-issuance. The appellant further contended that investments were made in reliance on State assurances, invoking principles of *promissory estoppel* and *legitimate expectation*. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The State contended that the appellant obtained the certificate by *misrepresentation* and failed to fulfill minimum commitments. Persistent deficiencies, repeated denial of renewal, and academic displacement of students demonstrated complete collapse of the substratum. Reliance was placed on *Indian National Congress (I) v. Institute of Social Welfare*, asserting that *fraud vitiates all actions*. The State emphasized its constitutional obligation under *Article 47* to protect public health and student welfare. ## **H) JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. It held that although issuance of an Essentiality Certificate is quasi-judicial and ordinarily irrevocable, *exceptional circumstances* permit withdrawal. The Court found that the appellant engaged in *constructive fraud* by making assurances it consistently failed to honor. The Court distinguished *Chintpurni Medical College*, noting that it expressly allows withdrawal where fraud is involved or where the substratum disappears. The appellant’s institution was not an “established” college, as it never achieved functional compliance or recognition. The Court underscored the State’s role as *parens patriae* and its duty under *Article 47* to ensure quality medical education. Allowing such an institution to continue would compromise public health and student futures. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio rests on the principle that *fraud and loss of substratum constitute valid grounds for withdrawal of an Essentiality Certificate*, notwithstanding its quasi-judicial character. Persistent inability to meet statutory standards amounts to *constructive fraud*, justifying State intervention. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that issuance of an Essentiality Certificate does not exhaust the State’s constitutional responsibility. Supervision must continue to ensure realization of its underlying purpose. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Essentiality Certificates may be withdrawn in cases of fraud or loss of substratum. ii. Medical colleges must achieve compliance within a reasonable timeframe. iii. Student welfare remains paramount. iv. Article 47 duties extend beyond formal certification. ## **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment reinforces regulatory accountability in medical education. It harmonizes *Chintpurni Medical College* with constitutional duties and prevents misuse of Essentiality Certificates as perpetual shields. The decision prioritizes public interest, student protection, and quality healthcare over private investment expectations. ## **J) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Chintpurni Medical College and Hospital v. State of Punjab*, *\[1976\] 3 SCR 202* ii. *Indian National Congress (I) v. Institute of Social Welfare*, *\[2002\] 3 SCR 1040* iii. *Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State of West Bengal*, *\[1996\] 2 Suppl. SCR 331* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Indian Medical Council Act, 1956* ii. *Medical Council of India Regulations, 1999* iii. *General Clauses Act, 1897* iv. *Constitution of India* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [The Chairman, Board of Trustees, Cochin Port Trust v. M/s Arebee Star Maritime Agencies Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., [2020] 11 SCR 706](https://lawfoyer.in/the-chairman-board-of-trustees-cochin-port-trust-v-m-s-arebee-star-maritime-agencies-pvt-ltd-ors-2020-11-scr-706/) **Published:** February 4, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment resolves long-standing inconsistencies in Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning liability for storage charges, demurrage, and ground rent payable to Major Port Trusts when imported goods remain uncleared by consignees. The dispute arose from the practice of Port Trusts imposing liability on shipping or steamer agents for prolonged periods, particularly beyond tariff-prescribed limits, where consignees abandoned goods. The Court undertook a comprehensive statutory interpretation of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963, read harmoniously with the Customs Act, 1962 and principles of bailment under the Indian Contract Act, 1872. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment resolves long-standing inconsistencies in Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning liability for *storage charges, demurrage, and ground rent* payable to Major Port Trusts when imported goods remain uncleared by consignees. The dispute arose from the practice of Port Trusts imposing liability on shipping or steamer agents for prolonged periods, particularly beyond tariff-prescribed limits, where consignees abandoned goods. The Court undertook a comprehensive statutory interpretation of the *Major Port Trusts Act, 1963*, read harmoniously with the *Customs Act, 1962* and principles of bailment under the *Indian Contract Act, 1872*. The Constitution Bench clarified that the *point of transfer of title in goods* is irrelevant in determining liability for port charges. It decisively held that once goods are landed and taken charge of by the Port Trust with issuance of receipt under *Section 42(2)*, liability for storage and demurrage shifts exclusively to the *importer, owner, consignee, or person entitled to the goods*, and not the vessel or its agent. The Court overruled conflicting dicta in *Sriyanesh Knitters* and parts of *Forbes-II*, reaffirming *Rowther-I* as authoritative. A crucial constitutional dimension was introduced by holding that though *Sections 61 and 62* employ the word *“may”* regarding sale of goods, Port Trusts, being *State* under *Article 12*, must act reasonably under *Article 14* and cannot indefinitely detain goods to accumulate charges. The judgment also imposed a functional obligation on Port Trusts to *destuff containers and return them within a reasonable period*, thereby preventing unjust enrichment. **Keywords:** Major Port Trusts Act, Demurrage Charges, Steamer Agent Liability, Bailment, Customs Law, Article 14, Container Destuffing ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*The Chairman, Board of Trustees, Cochin Port Trust v. M/s Arebee Star Maritime Agencies Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.*Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 2525 of 2018 (with connected appeals)Judgement Date05 August 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumR.F. Nariman J., Navin Sinha J., Indira Banerjee J.AuthorR.F. Nariman, J.Citation*\[2020\] 11 SCR 706*Legal Provisions Involved*Major Port Trusts Act, 1963*; *Customs Act, 1962*; *Indian Contract Act, 1872*; *Indian Bills of Lading Act, 1856*; *Constitution of India*Judgments Overruled*Port of Bombay v. Sriyanesh Knitters* (1999) 7 SCC 228 (partly); *Forbes Forbes Campbell & Co. v. Port of Bombay* (2015) 1 SCC 228 (partly)Related Law SubjectsMaritime Law, Commercial Law, Customs Law, Constitutional Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The litigation emanated from disputes at the Cochin Port during 1998–1999 involving import of containers declared as *synthetic woollen rags*. Customs authorities found that many consignments actually consisted of *new garments*, attracting heavy customs duty, penalties, and confiscation proceedings. Faced with severe fiscal exposure, consignees abandoned the goods, leaving them uncleared within port premises for extended durations . Shipping agents repeatedly sought *destuffing* of containers so that empty containers could be returned, but the Port Trust refused citing lack of space. The Port Trust continued to levy *ground rent* on containers, including beyond *75 days*, despite Tariff Authority for Major Ports (TAMP) orders prescribing limits. The Kerala High Court held that Port Trust could not levy charges beyond 75 days and read *“may”* in *Sections 61 and 62* as *“shall”*, imposing a mandatory duty to auction goods. Conflicting Supreme Court precedents—*Rowther-I*, *Rowther-II*, *Sriyanesh Knitters*, *Forbes-II*, and *Rasiklal*—created doctrinal uncertainty regarding liability. Recognising this inconsistency, a Division Bench referred core questions to a larger Bench, culminating in the present authoritative pronouncement. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE Imports during August 1998 to March 1999 arrived at Cochin Port as *Full Container Loads*. Customs investigation revealed misdeclaration, leading to seizure, prolonged adjudication, and non-clearance by consignees. Containers were destuffed for inspection, occupying larger port space. Consignees ceased engagement entirely, leaving cargo abandoned . Shipping agents, whose containers remained stuck, repeatedly requested the Port Trust to destuff remaining containers and return empties. The Port Trust refused, citing inadequate space, yet continued levying *ground rent* on containers. Charges were imposed even beyond the 75-day cap under TAMP tariffs. Shipping agents conceded liability up to 75 days but challenged liability thereafter. The High Court restricted Port Trust’s right to levy ground rent beyond 75 days and imposed a mandatory duty to auction goods. The Port Trust appealed, raising wider statutory and constitutional questions regarding ownership, bailment, liability, and discretion under the MPT Act. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the *time of passing of title* in goods is relevant for determining liability for port charges? ii. Whether endorsement of bill of lading or issuance of delivery order absolves steamer agents of liability? iii. Whether steamer agents can be held liable for storage or demurrage charges, and to what extent? iv. From whom can a Port Trust lawfully recover its dues under the MPT Act? v. Whether Port Trusts are obliged to destuff containers and return them within a reasonable time? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the Port Trust argued that under *Section 2(o)*, steamer agents fall within the inclusive definition of *“owner”*. They contended that statutory bailment under *Sections 42 and 43* entitled the Port Trust to recover charges from steamer agents. They relied on *Rasiklal* to argue that inquiry into bailment or title was irrelevant. It was further asserted that containers belong to shipping agents and therefore ground rent was justifiable. The Port Trust also argued that *“may”* in *Sections 61 and 62* conferred discretion and could not be read as mandatory. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for shipping agents submitted that endorsement by a steamer agent does not transfer title under *Indian Bills of Lading Act, 1856*. They relied on *Rowther-I* to argue that liability ceases once Port Trust takes charge of goods. They challenged the bailor-bailee theory advanced in *Sriyanesh Knitters* and asserted that storage charges could only be recovered from owners or persons entitled to goods, never from vessel agents. They emphasized constitutional limits on arbitrary accumulation of demurrage. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Court harmonised the statutory scheme of the *Major Port Trusts Act*. It held that *Section 2(o)* defines *“owner”* in relation to goods distinctly from vessels. Being an inclusive definition, it does not fasten perpetual liability on steamer agents. The Court reaffirmed *Rowther-I* and clarified that once goods are taken charge of by the Port Trust under *Section 42(2)* and receipt is issued, liability for storage and demurrage shifts exclusively to *importer, consignee, or person entitled to goods* . The Court overruled incorrect observations in *Sriyanesh Knitters* regarding bailment between consignee and Port Trust. It held that bailment arises between vessel and Port Trust only until landing. Thereafter, statutory responsibility attaches to Port Trust as bailee vis-à-vis goods, not containers. On *Sections 61 and 62*, the Court rejected the High Court’s reading of *“may”* as *“shall”*. However, invoking *Articles 12 and 14*, it imposed a constitutional obligation on Port Trusts to sell goods within a *reasonable time*, ordinarily four months, failing which continued levy of demurrage would be arbitrary. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The passing of title is irrelevant. Liability for demurrage after Port Trust takes custody lies solely with owner or person entitled to goods. Steamer agents are liable only until landing and handing over of goods. Port Trusts must act reasonably in exercising statutory discretion. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that indefinite retention of goods to accumulate charges violates constitutional norms. Penal demurrage may be levied only if delay is justified and reasonable. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Port Trusts must destuff containers and return them expeditiously. ii. Goods should ordinarily be auctioned within four months of custody. iii. Demurrage beyond reasonable period must be justified. iv. Containers are not “imported goods” and must be returned. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment restores doctrinal clarity by reaffirming *Rowther-I* and aligning maritime liability with constitutional fairness. It balances statutory discretion with Article 14 constraints and prevents unjust enrichment by Port Trusts. The ruling significantly protects shipping agents from indefinite fiscal exposure while ensuring Port Trusts retain effective remedies against actual beneficiaries of imported goods . ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Port of Madras v. K.P.V. Sheik Mohamed Rowther & Co.*, *\[1963\] 2 Supp SCR 915* ii. *Port of Bombay v. Sriyanesh Knitters*, *(1999) 7 SCC 228* iii. *Forbes Forbes Campbell & Co. v. Port of Bombay*, *(2015) 1 SCC 228* iv. *Rasiklal Kantilal & Co. v. Port of Bombay*, *(2017) 11 SCC 1* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Major Port Trusts Act, 1963* ii. *Customs Act, 1962* iii. *Indian Contract Act, 1872* iv. *Indian Bills of Lading Act, 1856* v. *Constitution of India* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Gangadhar Alias Gangaram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2020] 7 S.C.R. 173](https://lawfoyer.in/gangadhar-alias-gangaram-v-state-of-madhya-pradesh-2020-7-s-c-r-173/) **Published:** February 4, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The decision examines the foundational requirement of conscious possession under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and reiterates that statutory presumptions under Sections 35 and 54 do not dispense with the prosecution’s primary burden to establish possession beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant was convicted solely on the basis of ownership inferred from an outdated voters’ list, despite the recovery of 48 kg 200 gms of ganja from a locked house allegedly sold prior to the seizure. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The decision examines the foundational requirement of *conscious possession* under the *Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985* and reiterates that statutory presumptions under *Sections 35 and 54* do not dispense with the prosecution’s primary burden to establish possession beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant was convicted solely on the basis of ownership inferred from an outdated *voters’ list*, despite the recovery of *48 kg 200 gms of ganja* from a locked house allegedly sold prior to the seizure. The Supreme Court scrutinised the investigation and found it *casual, perfunctory, and incomplete*, noting the failure to verify *sale agreement records*, *panchayat ownership entries*, and forensic evidence regarding disputed signatures. The Court emphasised that reverse burden clauses under the NDPS Act operate only after the prosecution proves foundational facts. Absence of proof of possession rendered the statutory presumption inapplicable. The judgment reinforces the constitutional guarantee of *fair investigation as an intrinsic facet of Article 21*, holding that liberty cannot be curtailed on conjectures, surmises, or preponderance of probabilities. The ruling also clarifies that concurrent findings do not restrain the Supreme Court under *Article 136* where findings verge on perversity. The conviction was set aside and the appellant was acquitted. **Keywords:** NDPS Act, conscious possession, reverse burden of proof, fair investigation, Article 21, statutory presumption ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgment Cause Title*Gangadhar Alias Gangaram v. State of Madhya Pradesh*Case NumberCriminal Appeal No. 504 of 2020Judgment Date05 August 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumJustice R. F. Nariman and Justice Navin SinhaAuthorJustice Navin SinhaCitation*\[2020\] 7 S.C.R. 173*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(c), 35, 54 NDPS Act, 1985; Article 21 Constitution of India*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsCriminal Law, Constitutional Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The judgment arises from a prosecution under the *NDPS Act, 1985*, a statute characterised by stringent punishment and reverse burden provisions. The appellant was sentenced to *ten years of rigorous imprisonment* for alleged possession of a commercial quantity of ganja recovered from a locked residential house. The conviction rested primarily on the assumption that the appellant continued to be the owner and possessor of the premises despite his consistent defence of prior sale. The High Court affirmed the trial court’s findings without addressing the investigative lapses or contradictions on record. The Supreme Court’s intervention became necessary due to the *fundamental misapplication of presumptive provisions* under the NDPS Act. The judgment situates itself within established constitutional jurisprudence that penal statutes imposing minimum mandatory sentences demand *heightened judicial scrutiny*. The Court contextualised the issue within *Article 21*, stressing that fair investigation is inseparable from fair trial. The ruling revisits the jurisprudential balance between societal interest in controlling narcotics and individual liberty, clarifying that legislative stringency cannot legitimise dilution of evidentiary standards. The Court also addressed the limits of appellate restraint under *Article 136*, asserting its duty to correct manifest injustice where liberty is imperilled by perverse appreciation of evidence. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE Secret information was received by the police alleging that *ganja was stored in the house of co-accused Gokul Dangi*. Acting on this information, the police reached the village and requested identification of the house. The appellant and the village chowkidar Ghasiram identified the premises as belonging to the co-accused. The lock was broken in their presence, and *48 kg 200 gms of ganja* was recovered. The appellant was not residing in the house at the time of recovery and had been living in a newly constructed residence for approximately *15 years*. On the very next day, the appellant produced a *sale agreement dated 12.06.2009* showing transfer of ownership of the seized house to the co-accused. This document was marked as *Exhibit P-28*. Despite its prompt production, the investigating officer neither verified its genuineness nor examined the *gram panchayat records*, which constituted public documents reflecting ownership and possession. During trial, one attesting witness denied his thumb impression on the sale agreement, alleging impersonation. No forensic examination was conducted to verify this claim. The other attesting witness, Ghasiram, was inexplicably not examined by the prosecution. The appellant was later implicated solely because his name appeared in the *voters’ list of 2008*, a document predating the sale agreement. The co-accused, from whose alleged possession the contraband was recovered, was acquitted. No appeal was filed against his acquittal. Nonetheless, the appellant was convicted on the assumption of ownership and presumed possession. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether mere ownership inferred from electoral records is sufficient to establish *conscious possession* under the NDPS Act? ii. Whether statutory presumptions under *Sections 35 and 54* can be invoked without proof of foundational facts? iii. Whether failure to conduct fair and complete investigation vitiates the conviction under the NDPS Act? iv. Whether concurrent findings can be interfered with under *Article 136* when liberty is at stake? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that conviction was founded on a *presumption unsupported by evidence*. Reliance was placed on *Gopal v. State of Madhya Pradesh* to assert that possession must be *conscious and established beyond doubt*. It was argued that the appellant’s conduct in identifying the house and witnessing seizure negated any inference of guilt. The sale agreement was produced promptly and was never investigated. The failure to examine Ghasiram and to verify panchayat records amounted to *fatal investigative lapses*. The appellant contended that reverse burden provisions could not override constitutional safeguards of fair trial. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the State contended that the *voters’ list of 2008* established ownership. It was argued that denial by an attesting witness rendered the sale agreement forged. The State asserted that presumption under the NDPS Act justified conviction. Panchayat records were claimed to support the prosecution version. ## H) JUDGMENT The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding the conviction unsustainable. The Court found that the police investigation was *extremely casual, perfunctory, and shoddy*. It held that the prosecution failed to establish the foundational fact of possession. The Court rejected reliance on the voters’ list, noting its temporal irrelevance vis-à-vis the sale agreement. The failure to verify public records and obtain forensic evidence undermined the prosecution case. The Court reiterated that *Sections 35 and 54* impose a rebuttable presumption which does not absolve the prosecution from proving possession beyond reasonable doubt. Reliance was placed on *Noor Aga v. State of Punjab* to clarify that reverse burden provisions operate only after foundational facts are proved. The Court also emphasised that denial of fair investigation constitutes violation of *Article 21*. It held that concurrent findings do not bar interference where conclusions are perverse. The appellant was acquitted and directed to be released forthwith. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The prosecution must establish *conscious possession* beyond reasonable doubt before invoking presumptions under the NDPS Act. Ownership inferred from outdated electoral records cannot substitute proof of possession. Reverse burden provisions do not sanction conviction based on preponderance of probabilities. Failure to conduct fair investigation vitiates the trial and violates Article 21. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that the severity of punishment under the NDPS Act necessitates heightened scrutiny of evidence. Stringency of law cannot dilute constitutional protections. Courts must remain vigilant against investigative shortcuts in narcotics cases. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Foundational facts of possession must be established before invoking presumptions. ii. Public documents must be verified when ownership is in dispute. iii. Forensic examination is mandatory where execution of documents is disputed. iv. Courts must ensure fair investigation as part of fair trial. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment serves as a critical reaffirmation of constitutional criminal jurisprudence within the NDPS framework. It underscores that liberty cannot be sacrificed at the altar of statutory severity. The ruling strengthens safeguards against mechanical application of presumptions and reinforces judicial responsibility to scrutinise evidence rigorously in cases involving mandatory minimum sentences. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Noor Aga v. State of Punjab*, *(2008) 16 SCC 417* ii. *Gopal v. State of Madhya Pradesh*, *(2002) 9 SCC 595* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985* ii. *Constitution of India, Article 21* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [M/s EXL Careers and Another v. Frankfinn Aviation Services Private Limited, [2020] 6 SCR 289](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-exl-careers-and-another-v-frankfinn-aviation-services-private-limited-2020-6-scr-289/) **Published:** February 4, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in M/s EXL Careers and Another v. Frankfinn Aviation Services Private Limited authoritatively settles the legal position concerning the procedural consequence of the return of a plaint under Order VII Rules 10 and 10A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Supreme Court examined whether a civil suit, upon return of the plaint for want of territorial jurisdiction, must recommence de novo or could continue from the stage at which it stood prior to such return. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment in *M/s EXL Careers and Another v. Frankfinn Aviation Services Private Limited* authoritatively settles the legal position concerning the procedural consequence of the return of a plaint under *Order VII Rules 10 and 10A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908*. The Supreme Court examined whether a civil suit, upon return of the plaint for want of territorial jurisdiction, must recommence *de novo* or could continue from the stage at which it stood prior to such return. The controversy arose due to a perceived conflict between *Joginder Tuli v. S.L. Bhatia* and *ONGC Ltd. v. Modern Construction & Co.* The Court clarified that where a plaint is returned because the court lacked jurisdiction, the subsequent proceedings before the competent court must commence afresh, as the earlier proceedings were *coram non judice*. The judgment provides a doctrinal distinction between *transfer of suits* under *Sections 24 and 25 CPC* and *return of plaint* under *Order VII Rule 10*, emphasizing that the latter leaves no discretion for continuation of prior proceedings. The Court also overruled *Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Tejparas Associates*, holding that the insertion of *Order VII Rule 10A* does not alter the mandatory requirement of a *de novo* trial. However, invoking its discretionary jurisdiction under *Articles 136 and 142 of the Constitution*, the Court declined to interfere with the impugned High Court order due to the peculiar facts, procedural conduct of parties, and the advanced stage of the suit. The decision thus harmonizes procedural law with equitable justice while reaffirming settled jurisprudence. **Keywords:** Return of plaint, De novo trial, Territorial jurisdiction, Exclusionary jurisdiction clause, Order VII CPC, Article 142 Constitution ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgment Cause Title*M/s EXL Careers and Another v. Frankfinn Aviation Services Private Limited*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 2904 of 2020iii) Judgment Date05 August 2020iv) Court*Supreme Court of India*v) Quorum*R.F. Nariman, Navin Sinha & Indira Banerjee, JJ.*vi) Author*Justice Navin Sinha*vii) Citation*\[2020\] 6 SCR 289*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Order VII Rules 10 & 10A CPC; Articles 136 & 142 Constitution of India*ix) Judgments Overruled*Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Tejparas Associates*x) Related Law Subjects*Civil Procedure, Contract Law, Jurisdictional Law* ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The dispute arose from a franchise agreement executed in *New Delhi on 24.03.2004*, containing an *exclusive jurisdiction clause* conferring jurisdiction solely upon courts at *Delhi*. Despite such stipulation, the respondent instituted a suit for recovery before the Civil Judge at *Gurgaon*. The appellant initially objected to territorial jurisdiction but failed to invoke the exclusionary clause at the earliest opportunity. Subsequent procedural developments, including framing of issues, completion of evidence, and fixation for final arguments, significantly advanced the suit. It was only at a later stage that the jurisdictional objection based on the contractual clause was raised and accepted by the High Court, which directed return of the plaint under *Order VII Rules 10 and 10A CPC*. The legal question thereafter crystallized around whether the suit, upon presentation before the competent court at Delhi, should recommence afresh or continue from the advanced stage reached earlier. Divergent judicial opinions had created uncertainty, particularly due to the observations in *Joginder Tuli v. S.L. Bhatia* seemingly permitting continuation in certain circumstances. The reference before the Supreme Court required reconciliation of these precedents and clarification of the correct procedural law governing returned plaints. The judgment thus operates at the intersection of procedural rigor and equitable discretion, offering clarity on jurisdictional competence and procedural nullity. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The respondent filed a suit for recovery of *Rs. 23,11,190* before the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Gurgaon, arising out of obligations under a franchise agreement. Clause *16B* of the agreement expressly provided that *“Only Courts in Delhi shall have exclusive jurisdiction”* over disputes. The appellant initially objected to jurisdiction under *Order VII Rule 10 CPC* on the ground that it neither carried on business nor resided within Gurgaon, without invoking the exclusion clause. This objection was rejected, and jurisdiction was framed as a preliminary issue. Subsequently, the Civil Judge rejected the jurisdictional challenge even after the exclusion clause was raised. In revision, the High Court reversed this finding and directed return of the plaint. By this time, pleadings were complete, evidence closed, and the suit was fixed for final arguments. The respondent then applied for transfer of the entire judicial file to Delhi, which was allowed. The High Court upheld continuation of proceedings from the same stage. Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court challenging the legality of continuation without a *de novo* trial. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether a suit must proceed *de novo* after return of plaint under *Order VII Rules 10 and 10A CPC*? ii. Whether *Order VII Rule 10A* permits continuation of proceedings from the previous stage? iii. Whether *Joginder Tuli v. S.L. Bhatia* lays down binding precedent on continuation of suits? iv. Whether equitable considerations can override mandatory procedural requirements? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that a plaint returned for want of jurisdiction renders all prior proceedings void as *coram non judice*. Reliance was placed on *Ramdutt Ramkissen Dass v. E.D. Sassoon & Co.*, *Amar Chand Inani v. Union of India*, and *ONGC Ltd. v. Modern Construction & Co.*, asserting that presentation before a competent court constitutes a fresh institution of suit. It was argued that *Order VII Rule 10A* is merely procedural and does not vest discretion to continue proceedings. The High Court, it was contended, wrongly equated return of plaint with transfer of suit under *Section 24 CPC*. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent contended that the appellant suppressed material facts and failed to raise the exclusion clause at the earliest opportunity. It was argued that the High Court consciously ordered return of the *file*, not merely the plaint, considering the advanced stage of trial. Reliance was placed on *Joginder Tuli v. S.L. Bhatia* and *Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Tejparas Associates*, urging that rigid application of *de novo* trial would result in grave injustice. ## H) JUDGMENT The Supreme Court held that the law laid down in *ONGC Ltd. v. Modern Construction & Co.* represents the correct legal position. It ruled that where a plaint is returned under *Order VII Rule 10*, the subsequent proceedings must commence *de novo*, as the court returning the plaint lacks jurisdiction. The Court categorically distinguished *Joginder Tuli* as a fact-specific order lacking precedential value and declared *Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Tejparas Associates* as incorrectly decided and overruled it. The Court clarified that *Order VII Rule 10A* does not dilute the mandate of *de novo* trial and merely obviates the need for fresh summons. The distinction between *return of plaint* and *transfer of suit* was emphasized, noting that only in transfers under *Sections 24 and 25 CPC* does discretion exist to continue proceedings. However, invoking *Articles 136 and 142*, the Court declined to set aside the High Court’s order due to the appellant’s conduct, delayed objection, and the advanced stage of the suit, thereby balancing procedural law with equitable justice . **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** A plaint returned under *Order VII Rules 10 and 10A CPC* must be treated as a fresh plaint upon presentation before the competent court, necessitating a *de novo* trial. Prior proceedings before a court lacking jurisdiction are void and non-est in law. **b) OBITER DICTA** The discretionary jurisdiction under *Article 136* is one of conscience and equity. Even an incorrect order may be allowed to stand if interference would defeat substantive justice in peculiar factual circumstances. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Return of plaint is distinct from transfer of suit. ii. *Order VII Rule 10A* does not permit continuation of proceedings. iii. Jurisdictional objections based on contractual clauses must be raised at the earliest stage. iv. Equitable relief under *Article 142* is fact-specific and exceptional. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces procedural certainty while preserving judicial discretion. It reaffirms that jurisdiction is foundational and proceedings before an incompetent court are nullities. At the same time, it demonstrates the Supreme Court’s willingness to temper strict legality with equity to prevent injustice caused by procedural delay and litigant conduct. The ruling provides authoritative clarity on the scope of *Order VII CPC* and harmonizes conflicting precedents without unsettling concluded proceedings. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** - *ONGC Ltd. v. Modern Construction & Co.*, *\[2013\] 10 SCR 466* - *Joginder Tuli v. S.L. Bhatia*, *\[1996\] 7 Supp SCR 221* - *Amar Chand Inani v. Union of India*, *\[1973\] 2 SCR 684* - *Swastik Gases (P) Ltd. v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.*, *\[2013\] 7 SCR 581* **b) Important Statutes Referred** - *Code of Civil Procedure, 1908* - *Constitution of India* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India & Ors., [2020] 7 S.C.R. 158](https://lawfoyer.in/janhit-abhiyan-v-union-of-india-ors-2020-7-s-c-r-158/) **Published:** February 3, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The present writ proceedings arise from a constitutional challenge to the Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019, which introduced Articles 15(6) and 16(6) into the Constitution of India. The amendment empowered the State to provide up to ten per cent reservation in educational institutions and public employment for Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) of citizens, excluding classes already covered under Articles 15(4), 15(5), and 16(4). **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The present writ proceedings arise from a constitutional challenge to the *Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019*, which introduced *Articles 15(6) and 16(6)* into the *Constitution of India*. The amendment empowered the State to provide *up to ten per cent reservation* in educational institutions and public employment for *Economically Weaker Sections (EWS)* of citizens, excluding classes already covered under *Articles 15(4), 15(5), and 16(4)*. The petitioners contended that the amendment violates the *basic structure doctrine*, particularly the *equality code* under *Articles 14, 15, and 16*. It was argued that *economic criteria alone* cannot constitute the basis for reservation and that the amendment breaches the *50% ceiling limit* laid down in *Indra Sawhney*. Further objections were raised against extending reservations to *unaided private educational institutions*, alleging violation of *Article 19(1)(g)*. The Union of India defended the amendment by asserting that it is an *enabling provision* intended to address structural economic disadvantage among sections excluded from existing reservation frameworks. The Union relied on *Article 46*, the *Preamble*, and prior judicial recognition of economic criteria in affirmative action. The Supreme Court, without adjudicating on merits, held that the challenge raised *substantial questions of constitutional interpretation*, particularly concerning the *width and identity of equality provisions*. Accordingly, exercising powers under *Article 145(3)* and *Order XXXVIII of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013*, the Court referred the matter to a *Constitution Bench of five Judges*. **Keywords:** Economic Reservation, Basic Structure Doctrine, Equality Code, Article 145(3), Constitution Bench, EWS Quota ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsJudgment Cause Title*Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India & Ors.*Case Number*Writ Petition (Civil) No. 55 of 2019*Judgment Date*05 August 2020*Court*Supreme Court of India*Quorum*S.A. Bobde, CJI; R. Subhash Reddy, J.; B.R. Gavai, J.*Author*Per Curiam*Citation*\[2020\] 7 S.C.R. 158*Legal Provisions Involved*Articles 14, 15, 16, 19(1)(g), 46, 145(3)*Judgments Overruled*None*Related Law Subjects*Constitutional Law* ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The constitutional amendment under challenge represents a significant departure from the traditional reservation framework grounded in *social and educational backwardness*. By introducing *economic criteria* as an independent basis for affirmative action, the amendment reconfigured the constitutional understanding of equality. The petitioners approached the Court under *Article 32*, asserting that such reconfiguration impermissibly alters the *basic structure* of the Constitution. The background of the amendment is closely linked to governmental attempts to address economic deprivation among citizens not covered under existing reservation categories. Reference was made to the *Sinho Commission Report (2010)*, which identified large segments of economically disadvantaged persons within the general category. The Union relied on this data to justify the need for constitutional intervention. Judicial history played a crucial role in framing the dispute. The petitioners relied heavily on the *nine-Judge Bench ruling in Indra Sawhney*, which held that *economic criteria alone* cannot determine backwardness and that reservations ordinarily should not exceed *50%*. Conversely, the Union distinguished this precedent on the ground that it dealt with *executive action* and not a *constitutional amendment*. The matter also raised concerns regarding the autonomy of *unaided private educational institutions*, particularly in light of *Article 19(1)(g)*. The competing constitutional values of equality, affirmative action, and institutional freedom formed the backdrop of the adjudicatory challenge. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The *Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019* amended *Articles 15 and 16* by inserting *clauses (6)*, enabling the State to provide *up to ten per cent reservation* for *Economically Weaker Sections*. The amendment expressly excluded beneficiaries of existing reservation schemes under *Articles 15(4), 15(5), and 16(4)*. Following the amendment, multiple writ petitions were filed before the Supreme Court and various High Courts challenging its constitutional validity. The principal writ petition, *W.P.(C) No. 55 of 2019*, was instituted by *Janhit Abhiyan*. Petitioners contended that the amendment violates the *equality principle* by permitting reservation solely on economic grounds and by breaching the *50% ceiling*. The Union of India filed a detailed counter affidavit asserting that the amendment was necessitated by empirical data showing exclusion of economically weaker citizens from existing welfare mechanisms. The Union also relied upon *Article 46*, which mandates the State to promote the educational and economic interests of weaker sections. During hearings, extensive arguments were advanced on whether the matter involved *substantial questions of constitutional interpretation*. Senior counsel for the petitioners invoked *Article 145(3)* and *Order XXXVIII* to seek reference to a Constitution Bench. The Attorney General opposed the reference, arguing that existing precedents sufficiently addressed the issues raised. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether the *Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019* violates the *basic structure of the Constitution*? ii. Whether *economic criteria alone* can form the basis of reservation under the equality code? iii. Whether the amendment breaches the *50% ceiling limit* on reservations? iv. Whether extending reservation to *unaided private institutions* violates *Article 19(1)(g)*? v. Whether the challenge raises a *substantial question of law* requiring reference under *Article 145(3)*? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the petitioners submitted that *economic backwardness* is not synonymous with *social and educational backwardness*. Reliance was placed on *Indra Sawhney*, where it was held that economic criteria cannot be the sole determinant for reservation. It was argued that the amendment distorts the *identity and width* of the equality provisions, thereby violating the *basic structure doctrine* as articulated in *Kesavananda Bharati*. The petitioners contended that the *50% ceiling*, reaffirmed in *M.R. Balaji* and *Indra Sawhney*, forms part of constitutional equality. Objections were also raised against imposing reservation obligations on *unaided private institutions*, contending that such compulsion infringes the *freedom to practice any occupation* under *Article 19(1)(g)*. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the Union of India submitted that the amendment is an *enabling provision* and does not mandate reservation. It was argued that the *basic structure doctrine* is violated only when the *identity of the Constitution* is destroyed, which is not the case here. The Union contended that *economic disadvantage* is a legitimate ground for affirmative action and relied on *Ashoka Kumar Thakur* and *Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan* to support classification based on economic criteria. It was further argued that the *50% rule* is not an inflexible constitutional limitation and that extraordinary circumstances may justify deviation. ## **H) JUDGEMENT** The Court confined itself to the issue of *reference* and refrained from adjudicating the merits of the amendment. It held that the challenge raised *substantial questions of law* concerning the interpretation of the Constitution, particularly the scope of equality provisions. The Bench observed that for the *first time*, economic criteria had been constitutionally recognised as a basis for reservation. This, according to the Court, necessitated authoritative examination by a larger Bench. Relying on *Article 145(3)* and *Order XXXVIII Rule 1(1)*, the Court held that matters involving interpretation of constitutional amendments affecting fundamental rights must be heard by *at least five Judges*. Accordingly, the entire batch of writ petitions was referred to a *Constitution Bench*. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the decision lies in the determination that a constitutional challenge alleging violation of the *basic structure* and reinterpretation of the *equality code* constitutes a *substantial question of law*. Such questions mandatorily require adjudication by a *Constitution Bench* under *Article 145(3)*. The Court emphasised that where the *identity or width* of fundamental rights is alleged to be altered, judicial discipline requires reference to a larger Bench. The introduction of *economic reservation through constitutional amendment* was held to raise issues of constitutional magnitude. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court made significant observations on the evolving nature of affirmative action. It noted that while *Indra Sawhney* remains authoritative, its applicability to constitutional amendments requires careful reconsideration. The Court also observed that the rigidity of the *50% ceiling* may require contextual evaluation, particularly where the Constitution itself is amended to address systemic exclusion. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Constitutional challenges involving *basic structure* must be examined by a *Constitution Bench*. ii. Allegations affecting the *equality code* require application of the *identity and width tests*. iii. Matters involving first-time constitutional recognition of new affirmative action criteria warrant authoritative scrutiny. ## **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The order reflects judicial restraint and institutional prudence. By declining to decide the merits, the Court preserved constitutional stability while ensuring that transformative amendments receive adequate deliberation. The reference underscores the gravity of introducing *economic criteria* into the reservation framework and its potential implications on the equality doctrine. The decision reinforces the procedural importance of *Article 145(3)* and clarifies that constitutional amendments impacting fundamental rights cannot be examined lightly. The case stands as a procedural milestone in constitutional adjudication, setting the stage for a comprehensive examination of economic reservation by a Constitution Bench. ## **J) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** - *Indra Sawhney v. Union of India*, *\[1992\] 2 Suppl. SCR 454* - *M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore*, *\[1963\] Suppl. 1 SCR 439* - *Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala*, *\[1973\] Suppl. SCR 1* - *Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India*, *\[2008\] 4 SCR 1* - *M. Nagaraj v. Union of India*, *\[2006\] 7 Suppl. SCR 336* **b) Important Statutes Referred** - *Constitution of India* - *Supreme Court Rules, 2013* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Rama Nand and Others v. Chief Secretary, Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Another, [2020] 6 SCR 19](https://lawfoyer.in/rama-nand-and-others-v-chief-secretary-govt-of-nct-of-delhi-and-another-2020-6-scr-19/) **Published:** February 3, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The present judgment examines the jurisprudential distinction between promotion and mere cadre reorganisation within the framework of service law, particularly in the context of the Assured Career Progression Scheme. The controversy arose when Telephone Operators employed under the Delhi Fire Service were deployed as Radio Telephone Operators pursuant to a reorganisation of the wireless communication system. The appellants claimed entitlement to financial upgradation under the ACP Scheme, asserting that the deployment amounted to a mere re-description of posts rather than a promotion. The Supreme Court undertook a detailed examination of the factual matrix, service conditions, eligibility criteria, and governing policy instruments. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The present judgment examines the *jurisprudential distinction between promotion and mere cadre reorganisation* within the framework of *service law*, particularly in the context of the *Assured Career Progression Scheme*. The controversy arose when Telephone Operators employed under the Delhi Fire Service were deployed as Radio Telephone Operators pursuant to a reorganisation of the wireless communication system. The appellants claimed entitlement to financial upgradation under the ACP Scheme, asserting that the deployment amounted to a mere re-description of posts rather than a promotion. The Supreme Court undertook a detailed examination of the factual matrix, service conditions, eligibility criteria, and governing policy instruments. The Court analysed whether the transition involved elements of *selection, higher pay scale, and specialised training*, thereby attracting the legal character of promotion. Emphasis was placed on the objective of the ACP Scheme, which functions as a safety net against stagnation and not as a parallel promotional avenue. Relying upon settled precedents distinguishing *upgradation* from *promotion*, the Court held that where advancement is conditioned upon eligibility benchmarks and specialised training, it constitutes promotion in its wider sense. Consequently, such advancement offsets ACP benefits. The ruling clarifies that cadre restructuring is not determinative by nomenclature alone and must be assessed holistically. The judgment reinforces administrative consistency and preserves the policy intent of ACP schemes across public services. **Keywords:** Service Law; Assured Career Progression Scheme; Promotion; Upgradation; Cadre Reorganisation ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgment Cause Title*Rama Nand and Others v. Chief Secretary, Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Another*Case NumberCivil Appeal Nos. 5829–5830 of 2012Judgment Date06 August 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumSanjay Kishan Kaul J., Ajay Rastogi J., Aniruddha Bose J.AuthorJustice Sanjay Kishan KaulCitation*\[2020\] 6 SCR 19*Legal Provisions Involved*Assured Career Progression Scheme, 1999*Judgments OverruledNilRelated Law SubjectsService Law; Administrative Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The judgment arose against the backdrop of administrative reforms undertaken by the Delhi Fire Service with the objective of modernising its wireless communication system. Telephone Operators formed a distinct cadre performing conventional communication functions. With technological advancements, the employer sought to restructure the cadre by creating posts of Radio Telephone Operators carrying a higher pay scale and specialised functions. This restructuring exercise raised a significant service law issue concerning whether such deployment constituted a *promotion* or merely a *reorganisation of posts*. The answer to this question directly impacted the applicability of the *Assured Career Progression Scheme*, introduced pursuant to the Fifth Central Pay Commission to alleviate stagnation among employees lacking promotional avenues. The appellants contended that the change was administrative and functional, devoid of any promotional element, thereby entitling them to ACP benefits independently. Conversely, the employer treated the deployment as a promotion, thus excluding ACP applicability. The matter traversed from the Central Administrative Tribunal, which ruled in favour of the employees, to the Delhi High Court, which reversed the Tribunal’s view. The Supreme Court was therefore required to adjudicate upon the legality of the High Court’s interference and to delineate the contours of promotion under service jurisprudence. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellants were initially appointed as *Telephone Operators* in the Delhi Fire Service. In 1983, a reorganisation scheme was approved to overhaul the wireless communication system. Ninety-six posts of *Radio Telephone Operators* were proposed, and twenty-seven Telephone Operators were identified for deployment to the new posts carrying a higher pay scale. The reorganisation mandated *specialised training* and required *a minimum of five years of regular service* as an eligibility condition. The appellants underwent training and were deployed accordingly. Subsequently, in 1999, the Government introduced the *Assured Career Progression Scheme*, granting financial upgradations after 12 and 24 years of service. The appellants claimed entitlement to ACP benefits, asserting that their deployment as RTOs was not a promotion. Earlier, they had successfully obtained parity of pay through Tribunal proceedings on the principle of *equal pay for equal work*. However, their claim for ACP benefits was denied on the ground that the deployment amounted to promotion. The Central Administrative Tribunal accepted the appellants’ contention and directed grant of ACP benefits. The Delhi High Court reversed this decision, holding that the presence of eligibility conditions and higher pay rendered the deployment a promotion. The appeals before the Supreme Court challenged this determination. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the deployment of Telephone Operators as Radio Telephone Operators pursuant to cadre reorganisation amounted to *promotion* in service law? ii. Whether such deployment disentitled the appellants from claiming benefits under the *Assured Career Progression Scheme*? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that the deployment was a mere *re-description of posts* arising from administrative exigencies. It was contended that no competitive selection process was undertaken and that all eligible Telephone Operators were absorbed. Reliance was placed on judicial principles distinguishing promotion from upgradation, particularly where no change in hierarchy occurs. It was argued that ACP benefits operate independently and cannot be nullified by functional restructuring. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents contended that the deployment involved *three decisive elements*: eligibility based on minimum service, specialised training, and substantially higher emoluments. These elements introduced an inherent selection process. It was argued that promotion in its wider sense includes advancement to a higher pay scale without change in designation, thereby squarely attracting exclusion under the ACP Scheme. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Assured Career Progression Scheme, 1999* ii. *Principles governing promotion and upgradation under service jurisprudence* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court upheld the Delhi High Court’s view and dismissed the appeals. The Court adopted a holistic factual analysis rather than relying on nomenclature. It observed that the reorganisation resulted in a higher pay scale, mandatory training, and eligibility thresholds, all of which indicated promotion. The Court reiterated that the ACP Scheme is intended to address stagnation and not to provide double financial benefits where promotional advancement already exists. The deployment therefore offset ACP entitlements. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment lies in the principle that *promotion is not confined to change of designation but includes advancement to higher pay scales involving selection criteria*. Where cadre restructuring introduces eligibility benchmarks and specialised training, it amounts to promotion even if the post is re-described. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that fine distinctions often arise between upgradation and promotion, necessitating case-specific analysis. Administrative authorities must evaluate factual contours rather than labels. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Cadre restructuring must be assessed on substantive service conditions. ii. Presence of selection elements converts upgradation into promotion. iii. ACP benefits cannot coexist with promotional financial advancement. ## J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces doctrinal clarity in service law by preserving the functional integrity of ACP schemes. It prevents circumvention of promotional hierarchies through semantic reclassification of posts. The ruling promotes uniformity, administrative discipline, and policy coherence. ## K) REFERENCES **a. Important Cases Referred** i. *Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. R. Santhakumari Velusamy and Others*, *(2011) 9 SCC 510 : \[2011\] 14 SCR 502* ii. *Union of India v. Pushpa Rani*, *(2008) 9 SCC 242 : \[2008\] 11 SCR 440* **b. Important Statutes Referred** i. *Assured Career Progression Scheme, 1999* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Hari Krishna Mandir Trust v. State of Maharashtra and Others, [2020] 13 SCR 318](https://lawfoyer.in/hari-krishna-mandir-trust-v-state-of-maharashtra-and-others-2020-13-scr-318/) **Published:** February 3, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in Hari Krishna Mandir Trust v. State of Maharashtra and Others represents a significant reaffirmation of the constitutional protection accorded to property rights under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, even after the deletion of the right to property as a fundamental right. The Supreme Court examined the legality of an erroneous vesting of a privately owned internal road in favour of a municipal corporation under a Town Planning Scheme framed under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966. The case arose from a long-standing factual dispute where a strip of land recorded as a private internal road, never acquired through statutory means, was mistakenly shown as vested in the Pune Municipal Corporation. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment in *Hari Krishna Mandir Trust v. State of Maharashtra and Others* represents a significant reaffirmation of the constitutional protection accorded to property rights under *Article 300-A of the Constitution of India*, even after the deletion of the right to property as a fundamental right. The Supreme Court examined the legality of an erroneous vesting of a privately owned internal road in favour of a municipal corporation under a Town Planning Scheme framed under the *Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966*. The case arose from a long-standing factual dispute where a strip of land recorded as a private internal road, never acquired through statutory means, was mistakenly shown as vested in the Pune Municipal Corporation. The Court undertook a meticulous statutory analysis of the scheme of the 1966 Act, particularly *Sections 59 to 65, 71, 72, 88, 91 and 125–129*, and clarified that *Section 88* dealing with vesting cannot operate independently of acquisition provisions. The judgment emphasized that vesting under a planning statute does not amount to acquisition unless accompanied by authority of law and compensation. The Supreme Court strongly deprecated administrative arbitrariness and held that statutory authorities have a *public duty* to correct manifest errors under *Section 91* where an error, irregularity, or informality is demonstrated. The decision also reinforces the constitutional obligation of High Courts under *Article 226* to exercise writ jurisdiction effectively where public authorities abdicate statutory duties. The ruling is a robust exposition of the doctrine of eminent domain, procedural fairness in town planning law, and the inviolability of property rights absent lawful acquisition. **Keywords:** Property rights; Article 300-A; Town Planning Scheme; Vesting of land; Statutory acquisition; Mandamus; Public duty ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgment Cause Title*Hari Krishna Mandir Trust v. State of Maharashtra and Others*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 6156 of 2013iii) Judgment Date07 August 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) Quorum*Indu Malhotra, J.* and *Indira Banerjee, J.*vi) Author*Justice Indira Banerjee*vii) Citation*\[2020\] 13 SCR 318*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Articles 226, 300-A of the Constitution of India*; *Sections 59–65, 71–74, 88, 91, 125–129 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsConstitutional Law; Property Law; Town Planning Law; Administrative Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The dispute in the present case traces its origins to the implementation of a Town Planning Scheme under the *Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966*, a comprehensive legislation enacted to regulate planned urban development while balancing public interest and private property rights. The judgment arose in a factual matrix where historical ownership records, municipal actions, and statutory planning mechanisms intersected, resulting in an erroneous deprivation of private property without acquisition. The land in question formed part of *Final Plot No. 473* at Bhamburda, Pune, which was originally owned by private individuals and subsequently subdivided in 1970. A portion of the land was consistently recorded as a *private internal road* jointly held by adjacent plot owners. Despite this, when the Town Planning Scheme was sanctioned in 1979, the road was mistakenly shown as owned by the Pune Municipal Corporation. Crucially, there was no acquisition proceeding under *Chapter VII of the 1966 Act*, nor was compensation ever paid. Over the years, multiple official communications and resolutions, including those of the Municipal Corporation itself, acknowledged that the road was never acquired and that its recording in municipal ownership was erroneous. Nevertheless, the State Government refused to sanction a modification under *Section 91*, prompting the appellant trust to seek judicial review. The Bombay High Court dismissed the writ petition by narrowly construing *Section 88* and holding that the land had vested in the municipal authority. The Supreme Court was thus called upon to determine whether statutory vesting could override constitutional guarantees, whether an admitted clerical or statutory error could be perpetuated, and whether public authorities could divest private property without following acquisition procedures mandated by law. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The land forming the subject matter of the dispute originally belonged to the Thorat family and was sold in 1956 to *Swami Dilip Kumar Roy* and *Smt. Indira Devi*, whose ownership was duly recorded in revenue records in 1959. In 1970, *Plot No. 473* was subdivided by an official order of the Pune Municipal Corporation into four plots and one vacant strip shown as a *private internal road* measuring *444.14 square metres*. The internal road was recorded as being in joint possession of the owners of the adjoining plots and not in the ownership of the municipal corporation. Subsequently, a Town Planning Scheme was proposed under the *1966 Act*, and an arbitrator was appointed under *Section 72*. The arbitrator’s award dated *16 May 1972* categorically directed that the area and ownership of plots be maintained as per existing property records. This award attained finality and was never challenged. When the Town Planning Scheme came into force in 1979, an unexplained deviation occurred. The scheme recorded the internal road as owned by the Pune Municipal Corporation. Over the years, multiple official letters issued by municipal and state authorities admitted that the road was never acquired, never existed on site as a public road, and was wrongly recorded. In 1997, *Smt. Indira Devi* executed a trust deed transferring her interests, including the internal road, to the appellant trust. The trust repeatedly sought correction of records. While the Municipal Corporation passed resolutions agreeing to deletion of its name, the State Government rejected the proposal for modification under *Section 91* in 2006. This rejection led to a writ petition, which was dismissed by the High Court, culminating in the present appeal. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether land shown as vested under *Section 88 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966* can vest without acquisition proceedings under *Sections 125–129*? ii. Whether an admitted erroneous entry in a Town Planning Scheme can be corrected under *Section 91*? iii. Whether deprivation of private property without compensation violates *Article 300-A of the Constitution of India*? iv. Whether the High Court erred in refusing to exercise writ jurisdiction under *Article 226*? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the internal road was *private property* consistently reflected as such in revenue records and affirmed by the *arbitrator’s award under Section 72*. It was contended that no acquisition proceedings were ever initiated under *Chapter VII* of the Act, nor was compensation paid, rendering any vesting unconstitutional. It was argued that *Section 88* could not be read in isolation and that vesting presupposes lawful acquisition. The rejection of modification under *Section 91* was termed arbitrary, especially in light of admissions by the Pune Municipal Corporation that the road never belonged to it. Reliance was placed on *K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka* to assert that property rights under *Article 300-A* cannot be defeated by executive fiat. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents contended that upon sanction of the Town Planning Scheme, the land vested in the municipal authority under *Section 88*. It was argued that deletion of a road would amount to a substantial variation impermissible under *Section 91*. The State further asserted that planning norms require access roads for plots and that modification was impractical. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court categorically rejected the reasoning adopted by the Bombay High Court and held that the interpretation of *Section 88* was legally unsustainable. The Court emphasized that statutory vesting does not operate independently of acquisition provisions and that *Sections 125–129* are integral to lawful divestment of property. The Court undertook a detailed examination of the scheme of the Act and observed that none of its provisions authorize expropriation without consent or compensation. The arbitrator’s award, having attained finality, was binding and could not be nullified by administrative error. The Court further held that *Section 91* is specifically designed to correct errors, irregularities, or infirmities, and deletion of an erroneous ownership entry does not constitute a substantial variation. The Supreme Court also reaffirmed that *Article 300-A* embodies the doctrine of eminent domain, requiring public purpose and compensation. In the absence of acquisition, the appellant trust could not be deprived of its property. The Court further held that the High Court abdicated its constitutional duty under *Article 226* by failing to issue mandamus despite clear statutory violations. **a. RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio decidendi of the judgment is that *statutory vesting under a Town Planning Scheme does not amount to lawful acquisition unless accompanied by authority of law and compensation*, and that *Section 88 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 must be read harmoniously with Sections 125–129*. Any deprivation of property without following acquisition procedure violates *Article 300-A of the Constitution*. The Court further held that *Section 91* imposes a public duty on authorities to correct manifest errors in planning schemes, and refusal to do so despite admitted mistakes is arbitrary and unconstitutional. **b. OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that the right to property, though no longer fundamental, remains a *human right* and a *constitutional right*. It cautioned that urban planning objectives, however laudable, cannot override constitutional safeguards. The Court also emphasized that High Courts must not adopt a hyper-technical approach when statutory authorities commit manifest illegality affecting civil rights. **c. GUIDELINES** i. Planning authorities must ensure that vesting of land is preceded by lawful acquisition. ii. Erroneous entries in planning schemes must be corrected under *Section 91* when brought to notice. iii. Arbitrator awards under *Section 72* must be treated as binding unless set aside by competent courts. iv. Compensation is mandatory for any deprivation of property. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment stands as a strong reaffirmation of constitutional property jurisprudence and administrative accountability. It restores balance between urban development and individual rights and clarifies the limits of statutory vesting. The decision strengthens judicial oversight over town planning authorities and reinforces the obligation of courts to protect citizens against unlawful deprivation of property. It serves as a critical precedent in land use and planning disputes, ensuring that procedural safeguards are not sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience. ## J) REFERENCES **a. Important Cases Referred** - *Vimlaben Ajitbhai Patel v. Vatslaben Ashokbhai Patel*, *(2008) 4 SCC 649* - *State of Bihar v. Project Uchcha Vidya Sikshak Sangh*, *(2006) 2 SCC 545* - *K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka*, *(2011) 9 SCC 1* - *Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P.*, *(1982) 1 SCC 39* **b. Important Statutes Referred** - *Constitution of India, Articles 226 and 300-A* - *Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Brahampal @ Sammay and Another v. National Insurance Company, [2020] 9 SCR 504](https://lawfoyer.in/brahampal-sammay-and-another-v-national-insurance-company-2020-9-scr-504/) **Published:** February 3, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the scope and contours of Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, particularly the discretionary power of High Courts to condone delay in filing appeals against awards passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunals. The Supreme Court addressed whether dismissal of an appeal solely on the ground of a short delay of forty-five days defeats the beneficial object of the statute. The Court emphasised that Chapter XII of the Motor Vehicles Act constitutes a self-contained and beneficial legislative framework intended to protect victims of road accidents and their dependents. The interpretation of limitation provisions within such welfare legislation must therefore be remedial and purposive rather than rigid and technical. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the scope and contours of *Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988*, particularly the discretionary power of High Courts to condone delay in filing appeals against awards passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunals. The Supreme Court addressed whether dismissal of an appeal solely on the ground of a *short delay of forty-five days* defeats the beneficial object of the statute. The Court emphasised that *Chapter XII of the Motor Vehicles Act* constitutes a self-contained and beneficial legislative framework intended to protect victims of road accidents and their dependents. The interpretation of limitation provisions within such welfare legislation must therefore be remedial and purposive rather than rigid and technical. The Court undertook a detailed interpretative exercise of the expressions *“may”* and *“sufficient cause”* appearing in the second proviso to *Section 173*, clarifying that the legislature deliberately vested discretionary power in courts to advance substantive justice. Drawing from settled principles under limitation jurisprudence and prior precedents, the Court reiterated that while no straight-jacket formula governs condonation of delay, courts must assess the explanation, conduct of parties, absence of mala fides, and the proportionality of prejudice caused. In the present case, the delay was attributed to *illness of the appellant’s spouse*, a circumstance found to be bona fide and adequately explained. The Supreme Court held that the High Court adopted a hyper-technical approach inconsistent with the legislative intent of the Motor Vehicles Act. The delay was condoned and the matter remanded for adjudication on merits, reinforcing that procedural rules must remain handmaids of justice in motor accident compensation claims. **Keywords:** Motor Vehicles Act, Condonation of Delay, Beneficial Legislation, Section 173, Sufficient Cause, Limitation, Motor Accident Compensation ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Brahampal @ Sammay and Another v. National Insurance Company*Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 2926 of 2020Judgement Date07 August 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumN.V. Ramana J., S. Abdul Nazeer J., Surya Kant J.AuthorJustice N.V. RamanaCitation*\[2020\] 9 SCR 504*Legal Provisions Involved*Section 173, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsMotor Vehicles Law, Limitation Law, Procedural Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The decision arises from an appeal challenging the refusal of the High Court of Uttarakhand to condone a *delay of forty-five days* in filing an appeal under *Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988*. The background of the case reflects a recurring procedural dilemma in motor accident claims where courts are confronted with balancing statutory limitation against the welfare-oriented purpose of compensation laws. The Motor Vehicles Act represents a legislative commitment to provide timely and adequate compensation to victims of road accidents and their dependents. *Chapter XII of the Act* establishes a comprehensive adjudicatory mechanism, including claim petitions, awards, and appellate remedies. Unlike ordinary civil disputes, proceedings under the Act are intended to be summary, humane, and victim-centric. Despite this framework, procedural rigidity has occasionally obstructed substantive justice, particularly in appellate stages where marginal delays are viewed strictly. The present case exemplifies this tension. The High Court dismissed both the delay condonation application and the appeal without examining the merits of the claim for enhancement of compensation. The Supreme Court’s intervention was necessitated to clarify the interpretative approach to limitation provisions within beneficial legislation. The judgment revisits foundational principles of statutory interpretation, discretion, and reasonableness, while reaffirming that procedural timelines cannot be elevated above the legislative purpose of social welfare statutes. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The deceased, aged *twenty-six years*, met with a fatal road accident on *15 April 2011*. He was riding a motorcycle when it collided with a truck that had been *negligently parked on the road without any back-light or warning indication*. The impact resulted in grievous injuries, and the victim succumbed while being transported to the hospital. The appellants, being the *parents of the deceased*, instituted a claim petition before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal seeking compensation of *₹10 lakhs*. After adjudication, the Tribunal, by its award dated *07 February 2014*, granted compensation of *₹2.24 lakhs* with *interest at six per cent per annum*. Aggrieved by the inadequacy of compensation, the appellants sought enhancement before the High Court. However, the appeal was filed with a *delay of forty-five days* beyond the prescribed ninety-day limitation under *Section 173*. An application for condonation of delay was filed, explaining that *the illness of the wife of appellant no.1* prevented timely filing. The High Court, by order dated *17 October 2016*, dismissed the condonation application and consequently the appeal, without entering into the merits of the compensation claim. The appellants thereafter approached the Supreme Court by way of special leave, contending that the dismissal was unjustified, excessively technical, and contrary to the spirit of the Motor Vehicles Act. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the High Court erred in refusing to condone a delay of forty-five days in filing an appeal under *Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988*? ii. Whether the expression *“sufficient cause”* under the second proviso to *Section 173* warrants a liberal interpretation in motor accident claims? iii. Whether strict adherence to limitation defeats the beneficial object of the Motor Vehicles Act? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that the High Court failed to appreciate the *beneficial and welfare-oriented nature* of the Motor Vehicles Act. It was argued that the delay was neither deliberate nor attributable to negligence but arose due to *genuine domestic hardship* caused by illness. It was contended that *Section 173* expressly empowers the High Court to entertain delayed appeals upon satisfaction of sufficient cause. The refusal to exercise such discretion in a case involving death and compensation was stated to be arbitrary and unjust. The appellants relied on judicial precedents recognising that procedural rules must yield to substantive justice in motor accident cases, particularly where no mala fides or prejudice to the insurer is demonstrated. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent insurance company supported the impugned High Court order. It was argued that limitation provisions ensure certainty and finality in litigation and that the appellants failed to exercise due diligence. The respondent contended that discretionary power to condone delay is not automatic and must be exercised sparingly. The explanation offered was claimed to be insufficient to displace the accrued rights of the respondent arising from lapse of limitation. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 173, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988* ii. Second proviso to *Section 173* concerning condonation of delay iii. Principles governing *“sufficient cause”* under limitation jurisprudence ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court held that *Chapter XII of the Motor Vehicles Act* constitutes beneficial legislation aimed at protecting accident victims. The Court emphasised that interpretation of such statutes must be purposive and remedial. Interpreting *Section 173*, the Court noted that the legislature intentionally used the word *“may”* in the second proviso, thereby conferring discretionary power on High Courts to condone delay. This discretion is designed to prevent substantive rights from being defeated by technical lapses. The Court clarified that although the Limitation Act does not strictly apply, the judicial understanding of *“sufficient cause”* remains relevant. Previous decisions under limitation law consistently advocate a *liberal, pragmatic, and reasonableness-based approach*. In assessing the present facts, the Court found that the delay of forty-five days was *adequately explained*, short in duration, and untainted by mala fides. The High Court’s refusal to condone delay without examining merits was characterised as *hyper-technical*. Consequently, the delay was condoned, the impugned order set aside, and the matter remanded to the High Court for adjudication on merits within a stipulated timeframe. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment lies in the principle that *limitation provisions under beneficial legislation must be interpreted liberally to advance substantive justice*. The discretionary power to condone delay under *Section 173* must be exercised in furtherance of the legislative intent to protect accident victims and their dependents. The Court affirmed that *“sufficient cause”* cannot be reduced to a rigid formula. The determination must consider explanation, conduct, proportionality, and absence of mala fides. Short delays, particularly in compensation claims involving death, should not result in denial of appellate remedies. The ruling reinforces that procedural timelines are not ends in themselves but instruments to facilitate justice. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that *commercial and arbitration disputes* stand on a different footing due to their emphasis on finality and speed. Limitation in such cases may warrant strict interpretation, unlike motor accident claims where welfare considerations dominate. It was also noted that courts must guard against situations where condonation of delay would unjustly prejudice a vigilant litigant due to gross negligence of the opposite party. Liberal interpretation does not equate to unprincipled indulgence. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Courts must adopt a liberal approach while interpreting limitation provisions under beneficial legislation. ii. Explanation for delay must be examined holistically with reference to conduct and bona fides. iii. Short and reasonably explained delays in motor accident claims should ordinarily be condoned. iv. Hyper-technical dismissal without examining merits should be avoided. v. Discretion must balance substantive justice with accrued rights, guided by reasonableness. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Bombay Anand Bhavan Restaurant v. Deputy Director, ESIC*, *\[2009\] 13 SCR 1139* 2. *Vimla Devi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.*, *\[2018\] 13 SCR 753* 3. *Chinnamarkathian v. Ayyavoo*, *\[1982\] 2 SCR 146* 4. *Madanlal Fakirchand Dudhediya v. Shree Changdeo Sugar Mills Ltd.*, *\[1962\] 3 Supp SCR 973* 5. *Official Liquidator v. Dharti Dhan (P) Ltd.*, *\[1977\] 2 SCR 964* 6. *Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom v. Bhargavi Amma*, *\[2008\] 11 SCR 1* 7. *Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh*, *\[2010\] 8 SCR 597* 8. *Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai*, *(2012) 5 SCC 157* 9. *P. Radha Bai v. P. Ashok Kumar*, *\[2018\] 12 SCR 143* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Motor Vehicles Act, 1988* 2. *Limitation Act, 1963* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Government of India & Ors. v. ISRO Drivers Association, [2020] 7 SCR 941](https://lawfoyer.in/government-of-india-ors-v-isro-drivers-association-2020-7-scr-941/) **Published:** February 3, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the scope and interpretation of Rule 5(c) of the Central Civil Services (Recognition of Service Associations) Rules, 1993, particularly the meaning of the expression “distinct category of Government servants”. The dispute arose when an association formed exclusively by drivers employed at the Satish Dhawan Space Centre, SHAR, sought recognition as a service association under the 1993 Rules. The competent authority rejected the claim on the ground that an association based purely on job description did not qualify as a “distinct category”. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the scope and interpretation of *Rule 5(c)* of the *Central Civil Services (Recognition of Service Associations) Rules, 1993*, particularly the meaning of the expression *“distinct category of Government servants”*. The dispute arose when an association formed exclusively by drivers employed at the Satish Dhawan Space Centre, SHAR, sought recognition as a service association under the 1993 Rules. The competent authority rejected the claim on the ground that an association based purely on job description did not qualify as a “distinct category”. The Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court upheld the rejection, holding that the object of the 1993 Rules was to promote collective service interests and avoid fragmentation. However, the Division Bench reversed this view by adopting a literal interpretation of the term “distinct category” and held drivers to be a separate homogeneous group eligible for recognition. The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench judgment. It held that the scheme of the 1993 Rules, read with the *Joint Consultative Machinery (JCM)* framework, intended to prevent multiplicity of associations and groupism. The Court emphasized that categorisation under Groups *A, B, C and D*, as recognised under the service and recruitment rules of the Department of Space, constituted the only permissible “distinct categories”. Any further sub-classification based on job description would defeat the object of the Rules. The Court relied on contextual interpretation, administrative clarifications issued by the Department of Personnel and Training, and the principle of *noscitur a sociis* to conclude that associations based solely on job description were impermissible. **Keywords:** Service Association, Distinct Category, CCS Rules 1993, Joint Consultative Machinery, Department of Space, Job Description, Administrative Clarification ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*Government of India & Ors. v. ISRO Drivers Association*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 7138 of 2010iii) Judgement Date*10 August 2020*iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) Quorum*Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Ajay Rastogi and Aniruddha Bose, JJ.*vi) Author*Ajay Rastogi, J.*vii) Citation*\[2020\] 7 SCR 941*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Central Civil Services (Recognition of Service Associations) Rules, 1993*; *Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964*; *Department of Space (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1976*; *Articles 309 and 148(5), Constitution of India*ix) Judgments OverruledDivision Bench judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court dated *22.09.2008*x) Related Law SubjectsService Law, Administrative Law, Constitutional Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The case arose within the institutional framework governing labour representation in government service. The Government of India introduced the *Joint Consultative Machinery* in 1966 to promote harmonious relations between the State and its employees. Recognition of service associations under this framework is regulated by the *Central Civil Services (Recognition of Service Associations) Rules, 1993*, which replaced the earlier 1959 Rules. The Department of Space, operating under the *Allocation of Business Rules, 1961*, adopted the JCM scheme for its establishments, including the Satish Dhawan Space Centre, SHAR. Employees of the Department are governed by distinct service and disciplinary rules framed under the *proviso to Article 309* of the Constitution. These rules classify civil posts broadly into *Groups A, B, C and D*. The respondent association, formed exclusively by drivers classified as *Group C* employees, sought recognition as a service association. The administrative authorities rejected the request on the basis that associations based purely on job description were not permissible under the 1993 Rules. The rejection relied upon administrative clarifications issued by the *Department of Personnel and Training* and the Department of Space, which interpreted “distinct category” as referring to broader group classifications rather than trade-based segmentation. The litigation thus presented a classic conflict between literal interpretation and purposive interpretation of service rules. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the expression “distinct category” could be expansively interpreted to include job-specific groups such as drivers, or whether it was confined to broader classifications recognised under the service framework. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The respondent association consisted exclusively of drivers employed at the Satish Dhawan Space Centre, SHAR, a unit of ISRO in Andhra Pradesh. The drivers were governed by specific recruitment rules, namely the *Department of Space (Staff Car Drivers/Light Vehicle Drivers) Recruitment Rules, 2001*, which classified them as *Group C* employees. In 1999, the association applied for recognition under the *1993 Rules* to participate in the JCM verification process. The application was rejected by the competent authority on *29 June 1999*, citing that an association formed solely on job description did not constitute a “distinct category” under *Rule 5(c)*. The association challenged the rejection before the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The Single Judge dismissed the writ petition, holding that recognition was intended for associations representing collective interests of employees across groups and not for trade-based unions. The Court relied on the *Office Memorandum dated 22 April 1994* issued by the Department of Personnel and Training, which clarified that the responsibility of defining “distinct category” rested with the concerned department. On appeal, the Division Bench reversed the Single Judge’s decision. It adopted a literal interpretation of “distinct category” and held that drivers formed a homogeneous group with common interests. The Division Bench directed the authorities to consider the association for recognition subject to fulfillment of other conditions under the Rules. Aggrieved, the Union of India and Department of Space approached the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court had ignored the object of the 1993 Rules and the administrative framework governing service associations. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether an association formed exclusively on the basis of job description, such as drivers, constitutes a *“distinct category of Government servants”* under *Rule 5(c)* of the *1993 Rules*? ii. Whether administrative clarifications issued by the Department of Personnel and Training can supplement the statutory rules framed under *Article 309*? iii. Whether permitting job-based associations would defeat the object of the *Joint Consultative Machinery* scheme? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that the *1993 Rules* apply only to those government servants governed by the *CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964*, whereas the Department of Space has its own disciplinary framework. It was argued that service conditions are broadly classified into *Groups A, B, C and D*, and these groups alone constitute “distinct categories”. It was further contended that the *Office Memorandum dated 22 April 1994* was a valid clarificatory instrument issued under *Rule 10* of the 1993 Rules. Since the term “distinct category” was undefined, administrative clarification was necessary to ensure uniform application and avoid multiplicity of associations. The appellants emphasized that recognition of job-specific associations would lead to fragmentation, groupism, and disruption of harmonious industrial relations, contrary to the object of the JCM scheme. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent submitted that the association fulfilled all statutory conditions under *Rule 5*, including the requirement of representing more than *35%* of the drivers employed. Drivers were argued to be a homogeneous group with distinct duties and common service interests. It was further argued that administrative circulars could not override statutory rules framed under *Article 309*. According to the respondent, the absence of an express prohibition against job-based associations justified recognition of the drivers’ association. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the Division Bench. The Court undertook a detailed examination of the scheme of the *1993 Rules* and the JCM framework. It held that the primary object of recognition was to promote collective service interests and prevent multiplicity of associations. The Court noted that the Department of Space had over *16,000* employees across various groups. Permitting each job category to form a separate association would undermine the consultative mechanism. The Court also observed that drivers constituted only about *160 employees*, making it mathematically impossible for them to satisfy the *15%* threshold prescribed under *Rule 5(d)(i)* when the “distinct category” was properly understood. The Court relied on the principle of *noscitur a sociis*, citing *Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover* *\[1957\] AC 436*, to hold that words must be interpreted in context. The expression “distinct category” could not be read in isolation to justify job-based segmentation. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment lies in the purposive interpretation of *Rule 5(c)*. The Court held that “distinct category” refers to the broad classification of employees under *Groups A, B, C and D* as recognised under service rules. Any further sub-classification based on job description is impermissible. Administrative clarifications supplement the statutory framework and are binding unless shown to be ultra vires. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that unchecked proliferation of associations would erode institutional harmony and defeat the very purpose of collective bargaining. The JCM mechanism depends on representational balance rather than fragmented voices. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Recognition of service associations must align with the broader group classification under applicable service rules. ii. Job-based or trade-based associations are not permissible under the *1993 Rules*. iii. Administrative clarifications issued under *Rule 10* are valid supplements to statutory rules. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces the principle that service jurisprudence must balance employee representation with administrative efficiency. By rejecting a literal interpretation of “distinct category”, the Court preserved the integrity of the JCM framework. The ruling underscores that collective interest, not sectional interest, forms the foundation of recognized service associations. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *A-G v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover*, *\[1957\] AC 436* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Central Civil Services (Recognition of Service Associations) Rules, 1993* ii. *Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964* iii. *Department of Space (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1976* iv. *Constitution of India – Articles 309 and 148(5)* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [2nd Pan-India Essay Writing Competition, 2026 | Organized by Avantika University | Register by 20 February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/2nd-pan-india-essay-writing-competition-2026-organized-by-avantika-university-register-by-20-february-2026/) **Published:** February 3, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 2nd Pan-India Essay Writing Competition, 2026 | Organized by Avantika University | Register by 20 February 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Essay-Writing-2026-V3-1-768x1024.jpg) ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER** The **School of Law and Public Policy, Avantika University**, through its **Pro Bono Club**, is committed to fostering legal awareness, constitutional literacy, and academic excellence. The School promotes critical thinking, research-oriented learning, and socially responsive legal education by organising academic competitions, workshops, and outreach programmes that engage students, professionals, and scholars with contemporary legal challenges. ## **ABOUT THE COMPETITION** The **2nd Pan-India Essay Writing Competition, 2026** is an online national-level academic initiative aimed at encouraging analytical legal writing and constitutional discourse. Building upon the success of its first edition, the competition seeks to provide a common platform for diverse participants to critically engage with evolving constitutional issues and socio-legal realities in India. ## **ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** The competition is open to participants from all parts of India, including but not limited to: - School students - Undergraduate and postgraduate students - Research scholars - Academicians - Legal professionals and practitioners - Independent researchers and interested individuals ## **THEME** **Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage in India: Constitutional Rights and Social Realities** **1. Sub-themes (Illustrative)** Participants may choose to write on the main theme or any of the following indicative sub-themes: - Constitutional morality and individual autonomy - Right to equality and non-discrimination - Comparative constitutional perspectives on same-sex marriage - Judicial interpretation of family and marriage laws - Social acceptance, cultural pluralism, and legal reform - Role of the legislature versus judiciary in recognising marriage equality (The above sub-themes are illustrative and not exhaustive.) **2. Who Can Submit** - Individual participants only - Co-authorship is **not permitted** - Each participant may submit **only one original essay** **3. How to Submit** Participants must submit their essays electronically via email after completing the registration process. Submissions should strictly comply with the prescribed guidelines and deadlines mentioned by the organisers. ## **SUBMISSION GUIDELINES** - Maximum word limit: **1500 words** (excluding references and endnotes) - The essay must be **original and unpublished** - The participant’s name or institutional affiliation must **not appear** in the essay - File name format: *FirstName-LastName-Profession-District-docs* - Use of footnotes is prohibited; endnotes and references are permitted - Any form of plagiarism or use of AI-generated content shall result in disqualification ## FEE DETAILS - **Early Bird Registration Fee:** ₹250/- - **Late Registration Fee:** ₹300/- The registration fee is non-refundable. ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES - Registration Opens: January 2026 - Early Bird Registration Deadline: 10th February 2026 - Late Registration Deadline: 20th February 2026 - Essay Submission Deadline: 20th February 2026 - Declaration of Results: 27th February 2026 ## **GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS** - All submissions must adhere strictly to the rules and formatting guidelines - Late submissions will not be entertained - The decision of the judges shall be final and binding - The organisers reserve the right to reject any submission that violates the rules - **Brochure Link:** [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1J0P24560P7Pb3y4FL7wtslq5P\_hhcs86/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1J0P24560P7Pb3y4FL7wtslq5P_hhcs86/view?usp=sharing) - **Registration Link:** ## **PRIZES** - **1st Prize:** ₹2,000/- - **2nd Prize:** ₹1,000/- - **Next Three Best Entries:** ₹500/- each - **E-Certificates of Participation** for all eligible participants ## **CONTACT DETAILS** For any queries or clarifications regarding the competition: - **Email:** - **Contact Number:** +91 88401 99916 **Categories:** Essay Competitions, Events, Other Competitions --- ### [XVII AMITY MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by The Moot Court Committee of Amity Law School, Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Campus | Register by 7th February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/xvii-amity-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-the-moot-court-committee-of-amity-law-school-amity-university-uttar-pradesh-lucknow-campus-register-by-31st-january-2026/) **Published:** January 25, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** XVII AMITY MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by The Moot Court Committee of Amity Law School, Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Campus | Register by 31st January 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/PHOTO-2026-01-15-11-13-47-723x1024.jpg) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER/COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY The Moot Court Committee of Amity Law School, Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Campus is organizing the XVII Amity Moot Court Competition, 2026. Amity Law School is committed to fostering legal intellect, advocacy skills, and research acumen among law students. The institution believes in promoting legal education beyond textbooks and actively engages students in practical learning experiences, such as moot court competitions, to prepare them for the legal profession. ## About Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Campus Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Campus, is part of India’s leading Amity Education Group, known for its academic excellence across 11 world-class universities, 25 schools & preschools, and 150+ institutions globally. Spread across a 40-acre hi-tech campus, Amity Law School provides an intellectually invigorating and resource-rich learning environment. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT/OPPORTUNITY The XVII Amity Moot Court Competition, 2026 is the legacy flagship moot court competition that attracts some of the best legal minds from across India. The competition has gained nationwide recognition and provides law students with a platform to hone their advocacy, research, and legal reasoning skills. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE - The competition is open to undergraduate law students pursuing a 3-year or 5-year LL.B. program from a recognized college/university/institution in India. ## **MODE OF THE EVENT (ONLINE / OFFLINE OR HYBRID)-** - HYBRID - Preliminary Rounds (Online) – **13TH February 2026** - Quarter-finals, Semi-finals, and Final Round (Offline) – **23rd& 24th February 2026** ## LOCATION (COUNTRY/STATE/CITY) & VENUE OF THE EVENT- - Preliminary Rounds: **Online** (Virtual Mode) - Quarter-finals, Semi-finals & Finals: **Offline** at Amity Law School, Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Campus, India. ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE - Teams must register online by filling out the registration form - The last date for provisional registration is **31st January 2026 (23:59:59 IST).** - Upon registration, teams must pay the registration fee of **Rs. 3,000 + GST (Nonrefundable).** - Soft copy of the memorials must be submitted by **7th February 2026** on the email ID: . - Hard copies of the memorials (10 copies, petitioner – 5 copies and respondent – 5 copies) must be submitted in person at the time of on-campus registration on **23rd February 2026.** ## FEE DETAILS - 3,000 + GST (Non-refundable). - Payment is to be made via link provided . ## PRIZES The competition awards and cash prizes: - Winning Team: ₹25,000/- - Runners-up Team: ₹15,000/- - Best Speaker: ₹3,000/- - Best Memorial: ₹3,000/- - Best Researcher: ₹3,000/- - Medals for winners and runners-up. - Certificates of participation for all the participants. ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES **DATE** **EVENT** 5TH January 2026 Release of Moot Proposition 7th February 2026 Last Date for Provisional Registration 2nd February 2026 Last Date to Seek Clarifications 3rd February 2026 Release of Clarifications 7th February 2026 Last Date for Soft Copy Memorial Submission 12th February 2026 Draw of Lots & Memorial Exchange 13th February 2026 Preliminary Round (Online) & Researcher’s Test (Online) 23rd February 2026 On-Campus Registration, Hardcopy Memorial Submission, Draw of Lots, Quarter-finals & Semi-finals (Offline) 24th February 2026 Final Round & Valedictory Ceremony (Offline) ## CONTACT INFORMATION For any queries, you can contact the Moot Court Committee: - Faculty Convenor: Dr. Srijan Mishra - Student Convenors: - Aditya Raj Singh ( 6388998829) - Jaya Dubey ( 6387333935) - Email: ## OFFICIAL LINKs OF THE EVENT - **Official Registration Link:** - **Official Brochure Link:** **Categories:** Events, Moot Courts --- ### [Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma & Ors., [2020] 10 SCR 135](https://lawfoyer.in/vineeta-sharma-v-rakesh-sharma-ors-2020-10-scr-135/) **Published:** February 2, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The Constitution Bench decision in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma & Ors. finally authoritatively settles the long-standing judicial conflict concerning the scope, temporal operation, and constitutional intent of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as substituted by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005. The judgment resolves divergent interpretations rendered in Prakash v. Phulavati and Danamma v. Amar, clarifying whether a daughter’s right as a coparcener is contingent upon the father being alive on 09.09.2005. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The Constitution Bench decision in *Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma & Ors.* finally authoritatively settles the long-standing judicial conflict concerning the scope, temporal operation, and constitutional intent of *Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as substituted by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005*. The judgment resolves divergent interpretations rendered in *Prakash v. Phulavati* and *Danamma v. Amar*, clarifying whether a daughter’s right as a *coparcener* is contingent upon the father being alive on *09.09.2005*. The Court unequivocally holds that *coparcenary is a right by birth*, rooted in *unobstructed heritage* under Mitakshara law, and therefore the daughter acquires the status of a coparcener *by virtue of birth*, irrespective of whether the father was alive on the date of the amendment. The amendment is characterised as *retroactive* and not retrospective, since it operates prospectively but is founded on an antecedent fact, namely birth. The Court further clarifies the limited scope of the statutory fiction of partition under the unamended proviso to Section 6 and rules that such fiction never resulted in an actual severance of coparcenary. Crucially, it also interprets *Explanation to Section 6(5)* to strictly confine recognised partitions to those evidenced by *registered partition deeds* or *court decrees*, while permitting oral partitions only in exceptional cases supported by unimpeachable contemporaneous public documents. This judgment is a watershed in advancing *gender justice*, harmonising *personal law* with *constitutional equality*, and ensuring substantive parity for daughters within the Mitakshara coparcenary framework. **Keywords:** Coparcenary, Daughter’s Rights, Hindu Succession Act, Mitakshara Law, Retroactive Legislation, Gender Justice ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgment Cause Title*Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma & Ors.*Case NumberCivil Appeal (Diary) No. 32601 of 2018Judgment Date11 August 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumArun Mishra J., S. Abdul Nazeer J., M.R. Shah J.AuthorArun Mishra J.Citation*\[2020\] 10 SCR 135*Legal Provisions Involved*Section 6, Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (as amended in 2005)*Judgments Overruled*Prakash v. Phulavati* (*\[2015\] 12 SCR 579*)Judgments Partly Overruled*Danamma v. Amar* (*\[2018\] 2 SCR 553*)Related Law SubjectsHindu Law, Family Law, Constitutional Law, Gender Justice ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The reference to a larger Bench arose due to a palpable doctrinal inconsistency in Supreme Court jurisprudence on the interpretation of *Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956*, post its substitution by the *Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005*. While *Prakash v. Phulavati* confined the benefit of coparcenary rights only to daughters whose fathers were alive on *09.09.2005*, *Danamma v. Amar* extended such rights even where the father had died prior to the amendment. This inconsistency generated uncertainty in partition suits across India, particularly where preliminary decrees had been passed before 2005 but final decrees remained pending. The present batch of appeals, including connected SLPs, necessitated a comprehensive examination of *Mitakshara coparcenary*, the nature of *unobstructed heritage*, and the doctrinal distinction between *retroactive* and *retrospective* legislation. The background also reflects India’s constitutional commitment to dismantling entrenched patriarchal norms embedded in personal laws. The Law Commission’s 174th Report, State amendments preceding the central amendment, and parliamentary debates formed the socio-legal backdrop against which Section 6 was amended. The Constitution Bench was thus called upon not merely to interpret a statutory provision, but to align personal law with *Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India*, while preserving transactional certainty. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellant, Vineeta Sharma, and the respondents were members of a *Mitakshara joint Hindu family*. The dispute concerned partition of ancestral coparcenary property. The father of the parties had died prior to the enforcement of the *Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005*. The respondents resisted the appellant’s claim to coparcenary rights on the ground that the father was not alive on *09.09.2005*, relying upon *Prakash v. Phulavati*. The trial court and High Court proceedings reflected conflicting approaches, culminating in appeals before the Supreme Court. Parallel matters from various High Courts raised identical questions, including whether daughters could reopen partitions, whether preliminary decrees barred redistribution, and whether oral partitions could defeat statutory rights. Given the national importance of the issues and conflicting precedents, the matter was referred to a Constitution Bench. The Union of India intervened, emphasising the constitutional objective of gender equality and the discriminatory nature of the earlier Mitakshara regime. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether a daughter’s right as a coparcener under *Section 6 as amended in 2005* depends on the father being alive on *09.09.2005*? ii. Whether the 2005 Amendment is *prospective, retrospective, or retroactive* in operation? iii. Whether a *statutory fiction of partition* under the unamended Section 6 resulted in actual severance of coparcenary? iv. Whether *oral partitions* can defeat a daughter’s statutory coparcenary rights post-2005? v. Whether pending partition suits and preliminary decrees must give effect to amended Section 6? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that *coparcenary rights are acquired by birth*, forming part of *unobstructed heritage*, and are not contingent upon the death or survival of the father. It was argued that the interpretation in *Prakash v. Phulavati* misconstrued the nature of Mitakshara coparcenary and diluted the constitutional intent behind the 2005 amendment. It was contended that the amendment is *retroactive*, operating prospectively but anchored in antecedent birth, and therefore daughters born prior to 2005 are entitled to enforce rights from *09.09.2005*. The appellant further argued that the statutory fiction of partition under the old proviso was limited and never disrupted coparcenary. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents relied upon *Prakash v. Phulavati* and *Mangammal v. T.B. Raju*, asserting that a daughter could become a coparcener only if both she and her father were alive on the date of commencement of the amendment. It was argued that reopening settled transactions would cause legal uncertainty and unsettle vested rights. They also contended that oral partitions and family arrangements were recognised under traditional Hindu law and should not be invalidated by the amendment. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Constitution Bench decisively rejected the restrictive interpretation in *Prakash v. Phulavati*. The Court held that *Section 6(1)(a)* unequivocally confers coparcenary status on a daughter *by birth*, placing her on the same footing as a son. The right is *unobstructed heritage*, not dependent on death. Consequently, the survival of the father on *09.09.2005* is irrelevant. The Court clarified that the amendment is *retroactive*. While it operates from *09.09.2005*, it draws upon the antecedent fact of birth. The Court distinguished retroactivity from retrospectivity, noting that no vested rights are taken away, as liabilities also commence post-2005. On partition, the Court held that the statutory fiction under the old proviso to Section 6 was limited to ascertaining the share of a deceased coparcener and never resulted in actual severance. Therefore, pending suits and even cases with preliminary decrees must apply amended Section 6 at the stage of final decree. With respect to *Explanation to Section 6(5)*, the Court imposed a stringent evidentiary threshold. Oral partitions are generally excluded and may be accepted only in exceptional cases supported by unimpeachable contemporaneous public documents. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio rests on the principle that *coparcenary is a birthright under Mitakshara law*, and the 2005 amendment merely removes gender-based exclusion. The daughter becomes a coparcener *in her own right*, irrespective of the father’s life status on the amendment date. The amendment is *retroactive*, constitutionally grounded in equality, and must be given full effect in pending proceedings. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that patriarchal exclusions under classical Hindu law were incompatible with constitutional morality. It emphasised that courts must be vigilant against sham defences such as fabricated oral partitions designed to defeat daughters’ rights. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Daughters are coparceners by birth, before or after 2005. ii. Father’s survival on *09.09.2005* is immaterial. iii. Preliminary decrees do not bar application of amended Section 6. iv. Only registered partitions or court decrees prior to *20.12.2004* are protected. v. Oral partitions require exceptional proof through public documents. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment marks a constitutional recalibration of Hindu personal law. It harmonises *Mitakshara coparcenary* with *substantive equality*, dismantles judicially created barriers, and ensures daughters are not relegated to contingent heirs. The ruling restores doctrinal clarity, prevents misuse of oral partition pleas, and strengthens the transformative promise of the Constitution within the domain of family law. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** - *Prakash v. Phulavati*, *\[2015\] 12 SCR 579* (overruled) - *Danamma v. Amar*, *\[2018\] 2 SCR 553* (partly overruled) - *Ganduri Koteshwaramma v. Chakiri Yanadi*, *\[2011\] 12 SCR 968* - *State Bank of India v. Ghamandi Ram*, *\[1969\] 3 SCR 681* **b) Important Statutes Referred** - *Hindu Succession Act, 1956* - *Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [In Re: Prashant Bhushan and Anr. [2020] 8 SCR 443](https://lawfoyer.in/in-re-prashant-bhushan-and-anr-2020-8-scr-443/) **Published:** February 2, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in In Re: Prashant Bhushan and Anr. represents a significant constitutional exposition on the contours of criminal contempt in the context of digital speech and public criticism of the judiciary. The Supreme Court initiated suo motu criminal contempt proceedings against a senior advocate for two tweets that allegedly scandalised the institution of the judiciary and undermined public confidence in the office of the Chief Justice of India. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment in *In Re: Prashant Bhushan and Anr.* represents a significant constitutional exposition on the contours of *criminal contempt* in the context of digital speech and public criticism of the judiciary. The Supreme Court initiated *suo motu criminal contempt proceedings* against a senior advocate for two tweets that allegedly scandalised the institution of the judiciary and undermined public confidence in the office of the *Chief Justice of India*. The Court examined the delicate balance between *freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a)* and the *reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2)*, particularly in relation to contempt of court. It reaffirmed that fair criticism of judges and judicial functioning is permissible, but distortion of facts coupled with imputations that erode institutional legitimacy crosses the constitutional threshold into criminal contempt. The Court emphasised that contempt jurisdiction is exercised not to protect individual judges but to safeguard the authority and dignity of the judicial institution as a pillar of democracy. The judgment also clarified the *independent constitutional source of contempt powers under Article 129*, holding that such powers are not curtailed by the procedural requirements of the *Contempt of Courts Act, 1971*. While holding the advocate guilty of criminal contempt, the Court discharged the intermediary platform, recognising its statutory safe harbour. The ruling thus occupies a pivotal place in contemporary constitutional discourse on judicial accountability, free speech, and democratic stability. **Keywords:** Criminal Contempt, Freedom of Speech, Article 129, Judiciary, Social Media, Rule of Law ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsi) Judgment Cause Title*In Re: Prashant Bhushan and Anr.*ii) Case NumberSuo Motu Contempt Petition (Crl.) No. 1 of 2020iii) Judgment Date14 August 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) Quorum*Arun Mishra J., B.R. Gavai J., Krishna Murari J.*vi) AuthorPer Curiamvii) Citation*\[2020\] 8 SCR 443*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Articles 19(1)(a), 19(2), 129, Constitution of India; Section 2(c), Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; Section 79, IT Act, 2000*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsConstitutional Law, Criminal Law, Media Law ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT** The judgment arose from unprecedented circumstances where *social media expression* by a senior advocate attracted the Supreme Court’s *suo motu contempt jurisdiction*. A private individual brought a tweet to the notice of the Court, allegedly scandalising the judiciary. The tweet criticised the conduct of the *Chief Justice of India* during the COVID-19 pandemic and accused the Supreme Court of denying citizens access to justice. A second tweet alleged that the Supreme Court and the last four Chief Justices had played a role in the “destruction of democracy”. The Court, acting on the administrative side, directed listing of the matter before a judicial bench, where *suo motu cognizance* was taken under *Article 129*. The case presented a constitutional dilemma involving *freedom of expression*, *judicial accountability*, and *institutional integrity*. The Court was required to assess whether the tweets amounted to permissible criticism or crossed into the realm of *criminal contempt* by undermining public confidence in the judiciary. The background also involved the evolving role of digital platforms, raising questions on intermediary liability under the *Information Technology Act, 2000*. The case thus stood at the intersection of constitutional freedoms, contempt jurisprudence, and democratic discourse. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The proceedings originated from two tweets posted by *Prashant Bhushan*, a senior advocate of the Supreme Court. The first tweet alleged that the *Chief Justice of India* rode an expensive motorcycle belonging to a political leader without protective gear, while keeping the Supreme Court in “lockdown mode” and denying citizens access to justice. The second tweet suggested that historians would record that Indian democracy was destroyed in the last six years, with the Supreme Court and the last four Chief Justices playing a substantial role. A petition highlighting the first tweet was placed before the Court administratively. Despite the absence of *consent from the Attorney General*, the Court directed the matter to be listed judicially. On 22 July 2020, the Court took *suo motu cognizance* of both tweets and issued notice to the alleged contemnors, including *Twitter Inc.* The advocate filed an extensive affidavit defending the tweets as *bona fide criticism* and an exercise of *free speech*. Twitter claimed protection as an intermediary under *Section 79 of the IT Act*. The Court examined factual inaccuracies in the tweets, particularly regarding the functioning of the Supreme Court during the pandemic, noting extensive virtual hearings conducted. The facts thus revolved around the content, context, intent, and impact of the tweets. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether the Supreme Court could initiate *suo motu criminal contempt proceedings* without the consent of the Attorney General? ii. Whether the impugned tweets constituted *fair criticism* protected under *Article 19(1)(a)*? iii. Whether the tweets scandalised the judiciary and undermined public confidence amounting to *criminal contempt* under *Article 129*? iv. Whether an intermediary platform could be held liable for contemptuous content posted by users? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the alleged contemnor submitted that the tweets were expressions of anguish and opinion concerning the functioning of the judiciary during the pandemic. It was argued that *criticism of judges and institutions* is intrinsic to democracy and protected under *Article 19(1)(a)*. Reliance was placed on *P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker* to contend that institutional criticism does not amount to contempt. It was further submitted that the tweets targeted individual Chief Justices and not the Court as an institution. The absence of *Attorney General’s consent* was also raised as a procedural bar. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The Attorney General and amicus submissions emphasised that the tweets were based on *distorted facts* and had a tendency to *scandalise the judiciary*. It was argued that imputations suggesting denial of access to justice and destruction of democracy directly attacked the institutional credibility of the Supreme Court. The respondents contended that *Article 19(2)* permits reasonable restrictions to protect the authority of courts. Twitter argued it was a neutral intermediary with no editorial control. ## **H) JUDGMENT** The Court held that its *contempt jurisdiction flows directly from Article 129* and is not dependent on statutory consent requirements. It reaffirmed that fair criticism is permissible but must be *bona fide and factually accurate*. The Court found the first tweet misleading, noting that the Supreme Court conducted *879 virtual sittings and heard 12,748 matters* during the relevant period. The second tweet was held to be a sweeping and malicious attack on the institution itself. The Court concluded that both tweets had the tendency to *shake public confidence* in the judiciary, thereby constituting *criminal contempt*. Twitter was discharged due to its intermediary status and prompt action. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio lies in the principle that *freedom of speech does not extend to malicious and factually incorrect attacks* that undermine judicial authority. The Court held that *Article 129* empowers it to act independently to protect institutional dignity. The distinction between criticism of an individual judge and an attack on the institution was central. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that judges must ordinarily respond to criticism with *magnanimity*. However, sustained attacks threatening democratic foundations warrant firm judicial response. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Fair and constructive criticism aimed at reform is permissible. ii. Distortion of facts coupled with imputations against the institution invites contempt. iii. Social media reach is a relevant factor in assessing impact. iv. Intermediaries are protected when acting promptly and bona fide. ## **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment reinforces judicial authority while delineating the limits of free speech. It underscores that *democracy depends on trust in judicial institutions*. The ruling serves as a cautionary precedent for digital expression concerning courts, while also clarifying intermediary liability. ## **J) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** - *Brahma Prakash Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh* *\[1953 SCR 1169\]* - *E.M. Sankaran Namboodripad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar* *\[1971 1 SCR 697\]* - *Re: S. Mulgaokar* *\[1978 3 SCR 162\]* - *P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker* *\[1988 3 SCR 547\]* - *Arundhati Roy, In Re* *\[2002 2 SCR 213\]* **b) Important Statutes Referred** - *Constitution of India* - *Contempt of Courts Act, 1971* - *Information Technology Act, 2000* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Preet Pal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., [2020] 6 SCR 967](https://lawfoyer.in/preet-pal-singh-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-anr-2020-6-scr-967/) **Published:** February 2, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the scope and limits of Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, particularly the judicial standards governing suspension of sentence and grant of bail after conviction. The appeal arose from an order of the Allahabad High Court which had suspended the sentence of a convict husband found guilty under Sections 498A, 304B, and 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, and released him on bail during pendency of appeal. The Supreme Court scrutinized whether such suspension was legally sustainable when the conviction involved dowry death punishable with life imprisonment. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the scope and limits of *Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*, particularly the judicial standards governing suspension of sentence and grant of bail after conviction. The appeal arose from an order of the Allahabad High Court which had suspended the sentence of a convict husband found guilty under *Sections 498A, 304B, and 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860* and *Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961*, and released him on bail during pendency of appeal. The Supreme Court scrutinized whether such suspension was legally sustainable when the conviction involved *dowry death* punishable with *life imprisonment*. The Court reiterated that post-conviction bail stands on a fundamentally different footing from pre-trial bail. Once guilt is recorded after trial, the presumption of innocence ceases to operate. The appellate court must therefore identify *strong and compelling reasons* showing *prima facie infirmity* in the conviction before suspending the sentence. The judgment highlights that casual, cryptic, or non-reasoned orders granting bail defeat the statutory mandate of *Section 389(1) CrPC*. The Court also revisited the legislative intent behind *Section 304B IPC*, emphasizing its role in combating the social evil of dowry deaths through a deeming presumption once statutory ingredients are satisfied. On facts, the Court found ample evidence of dowry demand, cruelty “soon before death,” and unnatural death within eight and a half months of marriage. The High Court’s failure to record reasons and its re-appreciation of evidence at the suspension stage were held to be grave errors, warranting interference. **Keywords:** Post-conviction bail, Suspension of sentence, Dowry death, Section 389 CrPC, Reasoned judicial orders. ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Preet Pal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.*Case NumberCriminal Appeal No. 520 of 2020Judgement Date14 August 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumArun Mishra J. and Indira Banerjee J.AuthorIndira Banerjee J.Citation*\[2020\] 6 SCR 967*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 389 & 439 CrPC; Sections 498A, 304B, 406 IPC; Sections 3 & 4 Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsCriminal Law, Women & Child Protection Laws ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The case originates from a conviction for *dowry death* where the trial court imposed *life imprisonment* upon the husband of the deceased woman. The legislative background of *Section 304B IPC* reflects Parliament’s intent to curb increasing incidents of young brides dying in unnatural circumstances soon after marriage. The provision creates a statutory presumption once cruelty linked with dowry demand is established “soon before death.” The procedural controversy arose when the convicted husband sought suspension of sentence under *Section 389 CrPC* during pendency of appeal before the High Court. The High Court granted bail through a brief, non-speaking order without engaging with the evidence relied upon by the Sessions Court. This order was challenged by the victim’s father before the Supreme Court. The appeal raised a narrow but significant legal question: whether appellate courts can suspend sentences mechanically in serious offences like *dowry death* without recording reasons demonstrating prima facie illegality in conviction. The judgment therefore sits at the intersection of criminal procedure, victim justice, and judicial accountability. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The deceased was married to Respondent No. 2 on *12 December 2009*. She died in the night of *24–25 August 2010*, barely *eight and a half months* after marriage, under unnatural circumstances. An FIR was lodged by her father alleging offences under *Sections 498A, 304B, and 406 IPC* along with *Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act*. The prosecution evidence revealed persistent dowry demands. The victim’s family had spent beyond their financial capacity on the marriage, gifting an *I-10 car* and substantial cash. Oral testimony showed that the deceased was repeatedly harassed for additional cash and for replacing the car with a *Pajero*. On *17 June 2010*, the husband and his father allegedly took *₹2,50,000* from the victim’s brother. On the day of death, the victim made frantic calls to her parents expressing fear for her life. The post-mortem recorded *ante-mortem hanging* with ligature marks, confirming an unnatural death. The defence suggested suicide due to personal reasons and attempted to show an alleged prior relationship, but failed to produce credible evidence. After full trial, the Sessions Court convicted the husband and parents, sentencing the husband to *life imprisonment under Section 304B IPC*. The High Court later suspended the sentence and granted bail without giving reasons, leading to the present appeal. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether suspension of sentence under *Section 389 CrPC* can be granted without recording reasons? ii. Whether post-conviction bail principles differ from pre-trial bail under *Section 439 CrPC*? iii. Whether the High Court can re-appreciate trial evidence at the stage of suspension of sentence? iv. Whether ingredients of *Section 304B IPC* were prima facie satisfied? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsel for the appellant submitted that once conviction for *dowry death* had been recorded after a full trial, the High Court was bound to identify *patent illegality* before suspending the sentence. It was argued that the impugned order violated the express mandate of *Section 389(1) CrPC* requiring written reasons. The High Court ignored oral evidence of cruelty and dowry demand and acted as if it were hearing a bail application before trial. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsel for the respondent contended that the deceased had committed suicide and that there was no prior FIR alleging dowry harassment. It was argued that *₹2,50,000* was a loan and not dowry, and that the appeal would take time to be heard, justifying bail. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 389 CrPC – Suspension of sentence pending appeal* ii. *Section 304B IPC – Dowry death* iii. *Section 498A IPC – Cruelty* iv. *Sections 3 & 4 Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court’s order. It held that *Section 389 CrPC* mandates recording of reasons showing prima facie infirmity in conviction. The Court emphasized that post-conviction bail is not governed by the principle of “bail is the rule.” The Court reaffirmed earlier rulings such as *Kashmira Singh v. State of Punjab* and *Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan*, stressing that non-speaking bail orders reflect non-application of mind. The High Court had ignored the statutory presumption under *Section 304B IPC* and wrongly reassessed evidence. Given the seriousness of the offence, proximity of cruelty to death, and absence of any apparent illegality in conviction, the suspension of sentence was held unsustainable. The respondent was directed to surrender, and bail bonds were cancelled. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** Suspension of sentence under *Section 389 CrPC* after conviction requires strong and compelling reasons demonstrating prima facie illegality in conviction, and such reasons must be recorded in writing. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that failure of parents to lodge FIR prior to death is natural in matrimonial disputes and cannot dilute evidence of dowry harassment. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Appellate courts must record written reasons under *Section 389 CrPC*. ii. Trial evidence cannot be re-appreciated at suspension stage. iii. Dowry death cases require strict judicial scrutiny. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Kashmira Singh v. State of Punjab*, *\[1978\] 1 SCR 385* 2. *Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan*, *(2004) 7 SCC 528* 3. *State of Punjab v. Iqbal Singh*, *\[1991\] 2 SCR 790* b) Important Statutes Referred 1. *Indian Penal Code, 1860* 2. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* 3. *Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [M.C. Mehta v. Union of India & Ors., [2020] 10 S.C.R. 718](https://lawfoyer.in/m-c-mehta-v-union-of-india-ors-2020-10-s-c-r-718/) **Published:** February 2, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the jurisdictional limits of the Monitoring Committee constituted by the Supreme Court in the long-running M.C. Mehta environmental litigation. The central issue concerns whether the Monitoring Committee possessed authority to seal purely residential premises situated on private land when such premises were not being used for commercial purposes. The controversy arose from Report No.149, pursuant to which several residential properties in Vasant Kunj and Rajokari were sealed on the basis of a letter issued by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Mehrauli. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the *jurisdictional limits* of the Monitoring Committee constituted by the Supreme Court in the long-running *M.C. Mehta* environmental litigation. The central issue concerns whether the Monitoring Committee possessed authority to seal *purely residential premises situated on private land* when such premises were not being used for *commercial purposes*. The controversy arose from *Report No.149*, pursuant to which several residential properties in Vasant Kunj and Rajokari were sealed on the basis of a letter issued by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Mehrauli. The Court undertook an exhaustive examination of its earlier orders beginning from 2004 through 2018 and reaffirmed that the Monitoring Committee was constituted *only for limited and specific purposes*, namely *checking misuse of residential premises for commercial activities* and later *encroachments and unauthorized colonies on public land*. The Court categorically held that at no point was the Committee empowered to act against residential premises on private land merely on the allegation of unauthorized construction. The judgment underscores that *sealing of property entails serious civil consequences* and directly implicates *Article 300A of the Constitution*, which mandates deprivation of property only by authority of law. Statutory mechanisms under the *Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957* provide a complete code for dealing with unauthorized constructions, including notices, hearings, appellate remedies, and tribunal adjudication. The Monitoring Committee, being a court-appointed body, could not usurp statutory powers nor bypass due process. Accordingly, *Report No.149*, all connected actions, sealing orders, and demolition notices were quashed. Directions were issued for *immediate de-sealing* and *restoration of possession* to the owners. **Keywords:** Monitoring Committee, Article 300A, Sealing of Property, Unauthorized Construction, Jurisdictional Limits, Due Process ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgment Cause Title*M.C. Mehta v. Union of India & Ors.*Case NumberWrit Petition (Civil) No. 4677 of 1985Judgment Date14 August 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumArun Mishra J., B.R. Gavai J., Krishna Murari J.AuthorArun Mishra J.Citation*\[2020\] 10 S.C.R. 718*Legal Provisions Involved*Article 300A, Constitution of India*; *Sections 343, 345, 347A, 347B, DMC Act, 1957*; *Delhi Development Act, 1957*; *Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Act, 2006*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsConstitutional Law, Municipal Law, Environmental Law, Administrative Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The writ petition filed in 1985 by *M.C. Mehta* initiated judicial scrutiny over environmental degradation, industrial pollution, and rampant violations of planning laws in Delhi. Over decades, the litigation expanded to include issues such as *misuse of residential premises for commercial activities*, unauthorized constructions, and failure of municipal enforcement. In response to systemic non-compliance, the Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary jurisdiction and constituted a *Monitoring Committee* in 2006 to ensure implementation of its directions. The mandate of the Monitoring Committee, as reflected in successive judicial orders, was *carefully circumscribed*. Initially, it was tasked with supervising the *stoppage of illegal industrial activity* and later with overseeing *sealing of residential premises misused for commercial purposes*. Over time, the Committee was also asked to assist in matters relating to *encroachments on public land* and *unauthorized colonies*. The present judgment arose from objections raised by residential property owners whose premises were sealed under *Report No.149*. These properties were located on *private land*, used exclusively for *residential purposes*, and were alleged to have unauthorized constructions. The owners contended that the Monitoring Committee had acted beyond its authority and deprived them of property without statutory procedure. The Court thus confined itself to a *single jurisdictional question*: whether the Monitoring Committee was empowered to seal such residential premises. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE *Report No.149 dated 2 April 2019* was submitted by the Monitoring Committee concerning constructions in *Vasant Kunj and Rajokari*. The report stated that the Committee acted upon a letter issued by the *SDM, Mehrauli*, alleging unauthorized constructions. Acting on this communication, the Committee ordered sealing and demolition proceedings against several residential properties. The affected residents filed objections before the Supreme Court. They asserted that their properties were *farmhouses and residential units* situated within *Low Density Residential Areas* recognized under *MPD-2021*, as amended by notifications dated *10 May 2013* and *18 June 2013*. It was argued that many constructions were old, some had been compounded, and applications for regularization were pending before statutory authorities. The residents emphasized that the premises were *not used for commercial purposes*, nor were they located on public land. They relied upon *Clause 4.4.3(G) of MPD-2021* and the *LDRA Policy* to contend permissibility of residential construction. The sealing, according to them, was arbitrary, violative of *natural justice*, and contrary to *Article 300A*. The Amicus Curiae argued that misuse included unauthorized construction and that the Monitoring Committee acted bona fide. However, the residents highlighted that *no statutory appeal lay* against the Committee’s action, thereby extinguishing their legal remedies. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the Monitoring Committee was empowered by the Supreme Court to seal purely residential premises situated on private land? ii. Whether sealing of property without statutory procedure violates *Article 300A of the Constitution*? iii. Whether the Monitoring Committee could act on the basis of a letter issued by an executive authority? iv. Whether statutory powers under the *DMC Act, 1957* could be bypassed by a court-appointed body? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the petitioners submitted that the Monitoring Committee’s mandate was *strictly confined* to preventing *commercial misuse* of residential premises. They argued that *unauthorized construction* is a separate statutory subject governed by *Sections 343 and 345 of the DMC Act*, which prescribe notice, hearing, and appellate remedies. It was contended that sealing resulted in *civil death of property rights*, rendering owners homeless without due process. Reliance was placed on precedents affirming that *deprivation of property must follow procedure established by law*. The petitioners emphasized that *no prior instance* existed where the Monitoring Committee sealed residential premises used exclusively for residence. They further argued that executive correspondence, such as a letter from the SDM, could not confer jurisdiction where none existed. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The respondents, including the Amicus Curiae, submitted that the original writ petition encompassed *misuse, unauthorized construction, and environmental violations*. It was argued that large-scale unauthorized construction undermines urban planning and environmental norms. Alternatively, it was contended that the Monitoring Committee acted *bona fide* and that its actions should be protected or at least applied prospectively. ## H) JUDGMENT The Court held that the Monitoring Committee is a *creature of judicial आदेश* and must operate *strictly within the four corners of authority conferred*. After examining orders dated *7 May 2004*, *16 February 2006*, *24 March 2006*, and subsequent clarifications, the Court found that the Committee was *never authorized* to act against residential premises on private land not used for commercial purposes. The Court emphasized that *sealing carries grave civil consequences* and that statutory frameworks under the *DMC Act* provide a complete adjudicatory mechanism. Usurpation of such powers by the Monitoring Committee was impermissible. Invoking *Article 300A*, the Court reiterated that property can be deprived *only by authority of law*. Since no appeal or judicial review lies against the Committee’s actions, allowing it to seal residential premises would result in *absolute deprivation without remedy*. Consequently, *Report No.149*, connected reports, sealing actions, and demolition notices were quashed. Directions were issued for *immediate de-sealing* and *restoration of possession*. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** A court-appointed monitoring body cannot exercise powers beyond the specific mandate conferred upon it. Sealing of residential premises on private land, when not used for commercial purposes, without statutory backing, violates *Article 300A* and principles of due process. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that even well-intentioned judicial mechanisms must not *supplant statutory governance*. Extraordinary measures cannot become a parallel administrative regime. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Monitoring Committees must act strictly within judicial authorization. ii. Unauthorized construction must be addressed only through statutory authorities. iii. Executive communications cannot enlarge judicially conferred powers. iv. Property rights require procedural safeguards and appellate remedies. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reasserts constitutional discipline in public interest litigation. While acknowledging the necessity of extraordinary judicial intervention, the Court firmly draws boundaries against *institutional overreach*. The ruling restores balance between environmental governance and individual property rights, reinforcing that *ends do not justify unconstitutional means*. The decision strengthens *Article 300A* jurisprudence and clarifies that judicial creativity must coexist with statutory fidelity. It stands as a caution against transforming supervisory mechanisms into unchecked authorities. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** - *M.C. Mehta v. Union of India*, *\[2006\] 2 SCR 264* - *K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka*, *\[2011\] 13 SCR 636* - *State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nahata*, *\[2005\] 3 Supp SCR 1* - *A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak*, *\[1988\] 1 Supp SCR 1* **b) Important Statutes Referred** - Constitution of India - Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 - Delhi Development Act, 1957 - Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Act, 2006 **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Union of India & Anr. v. M/s K.C. Sharma & Co. & Ors., [2020] 6 S.C.R. 854](https://lawfoyer.in/union-of-india-anr-v-m-s-k-c-sharma-co-ors-2020-6-s-c-r-854/) **Published:** February 2, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The decision examines the permissibility of challenging a finalized decree passed in reference proceedings under Sections 30 and 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on the ground of alleged fraud. The dispute arose from the acquisition of large tracts of land belonging to Gaon Sabha Luhar Heri, including banjar land containing shora. The respondents claimed entitlement to compensation as lessees who had invested substantial resources in reclaiming the land. The reference court, by judgment dated 28.09.1989, apportioned 87% compensation to the respondents and 13% to the Gaon Sabha. This decree attained finality as it was never appealed. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The decision examines the permissibility of challenging a finalized decree passed in *reference proceedings under Sections 30 and 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894* on the ground of alleged fraud. The dispute arose from the acquisition of large tracts of land belonging to *Gaon Sabha Luhar Heri*, including *banjar land containing shora*. The respondents claimed entitlement to compensation as lessees who had invested substantial resources in reclaiming the land. The reference court, by judgment dated *28.09.1989*, apportioned *87% compensation to the respondents and 13% to the Gaon Sabha*. This decree attained finality as it was never appealed. Subsequently, the Union of India initiated a separate civil suit seeking to invalidate the decree, alleging collusion and fraud involving the ex-Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha. The trial court accepted this contention, but the High Court reversed the finding, holding that fraud was neither specifically pleaded nor proved. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s reasoning and reiterated settled principles that *fraud must be pleaded with particulars and proved by cogent evidence*, especially when it is invoked to unsettle a final judicial determination. The judgment also clarifies the legal distinction between *lease and licence*, and affirms that *Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882* protects possession even in the absence of a registered lease, when possession follows a concluded contract acted upon by parties. The ruling reinforces judicial finality, procedural discipline, and evidentiary rigour in fraud-based challenges. **Keywords:** Fraud, Finality of Decree, Land Acquisition, Lease vs Licence, Section 53A TPA ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Union of India & Anr. v. M/s K.C. Sharma & Co. & Ors.*Case Number*Civil Appeal Nos. 9049–9053 of 2011*Judgement Date*14 August 2020*Court*Supreme Court of India*Quorum*Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy, M.R. Shah, JJ.*Author*R. Subhash Reddy, J.*Citation*\[2020\] 6 S.C.R. 854*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 30, 31, Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Section 53A, Transfer of Property Act, 1882*Judgments Overruled*None*Related Law Subjects*Land Acquisition Law, Property Law, Civil Procedure* ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The judgment arises from prolonged litigation concerning apportionment of compensation following compulsory acquisition of rural land vested in a *Gaon Sabha*. The dispute traces its origin to reference proceedings under *Sections 30 and 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894*, initiated due to competing claims over compensation between the Gaon Sabha and alleged lessees. The reference court’s decree in *1989* conclusively determined entitlement. Despite the decree attaining finality, subsequent administrative dissatisfaction and political contestation at the village level triggered attempts to reopen settled rights. Instead of availing appellate remedies, the acquiring authority resorted to a collateral civil suit alleging fraud. This procedural deviation framed the core controversy. The Supreme Court’s intervention was necessitated to clarify whether a decree, final and unchallenged for years, could be nullified through vague allegations of fraud unsupported by pleadings or proof. The case thus engages fundamental principles of *res judicata*, finality of judicial decisions, and the jurisprudence governing fraud on courts. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The land measuring *36 bighas 11 biswas* situated in *village Luhar Heri, Delhi* belonged to the *Gaon Sabha*. The land was *banjar* and contained *shora*, rendering it unfit for cultivation. To reclaim the land, the Gaon Sabha resolved to lease it through public auction after obtaining approval from the *Deputy Director, Panchayat*. The respondents emerged as the highest bidders and were granted leasehold possession after due approval. The respondents invested resources to remove *shora* and cultivated the land for decades. In *1984*, the land was acquired under *Section 4(1)* notification, followed by *Section 6* declaration. During award proceedings, competing claims over compensation arose, prompting a reference under *Sections 30 and 31*. The reference court, by decree dated *28.09.1989*, apportioned *87% compensation to the respondents*. This decree was never appealed. Years later, alleging collusion with the ex-Pradhan, the Union of India instituted a civil suit seeking declaration that the decree was fraudulent. The trial court accepted the plea, but the High Court reversed it, leading to the present appeals. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether a final decree under *Sections 30 and 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894* can be challenged through a separate civil suit alleging fraud? ii. Whether fraud was specifically pleaded and proved as required in law? iii. Whether the respondents’ rights constituted a *lease or a mere licence*? iv. Whether *Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882* protected the respondents’ possession? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that the respondents had falsely claimed leasehold rights. It was argued that no registered lease existed and that the arrangement was merely a licence to remove *shora*. The decree, according to the appellants, was procured by fraud through collusion with the ex-Pradhan, rendering it a nullity. Reliance was placed on *S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath* and *A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P.*, asserting that fraud vitiates all judicial acts. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents contended that the *1989 decree* had attained finality. Fraud was neither pleaded with particulars nor proved. The entire leasing process was approved by competent authorities and conducted through public auction. Revenue records corroborated continuous possession and cultivation. It was further argued that *Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882* protected their possession, relying on *Maneklal Mansukhbhai v. Hormusji Ginwalla* and *Hamzabi v. Syed Karimuddin*. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s judgment. It held that the sole basis of challenge was alleged fraud, which lacked particulars and proof. The Court emphasized that *fraud must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved*, especially when invoked to unsettle a final decree. The leasing process involved collective Gaon Sabha resolutions, approval by the *Deputy Director, Panchayat*, and public auction. There was no evidence of unilateral action by the ex-Pradhan. The Court rejected the licence argument, noting actual delivery of possession and cultivation. The protection under *Section 53A TPA* was held applicable, as the respondents had acted upon a concluded arrangement and altered their position. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** A decree passed under *Sections 30 and 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894*, which has attained finality, cannot be invalidated through a collateral civil suit on vague allegations of fraud. Fraud must be pleaded with specificity and proved by cogent evidence. Possession delivered pursuant to an approved lease arrangement attracts protection under *Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882*. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court reiterated that administrative dissatisfaction cannot substitute judicial remedies. The absence of a registered instrument does not defeat substantive rights where conduct and approvals demonstrate a concluded transaction acted upon by parties. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Allegations of fraud must contain material particulars. ii. Final decrees should be challenged through statutory appeals. iii. Courts must examine substance over form in lease-licence disputes. iv. *Section 53A TPA* safeguards equitable possession. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment fortifies procedural discipline and judicial finality. It discourages belated collateral challenges driven by administrative reconsideration. The ruling harmonizes land acquisition jurisprudence with property law principles and underscores the evidentiary threshold for fraud. The decision is doctrinally sound and reinforces certainty in compensation adjudication. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath*, *(1994) 1 SCC 1* 2. *A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P.*, *(2007) 4 SCC 221* 3. *Maneklal Mansukhbhai v. Hormusji Ginwalla*, *AIR 1950 SC 1* 4. *Hamzabi v. Syed Karimuddin*, *(2001) 1 SCC 414* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Land Acquisition Act, 1894* 2. *Transfer of Property Act, 1882* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Babulal Vardharji Gurjar v. Veer Gurjar Aluminium Industries Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., [2020] 13 S.C.R. 368](https://lawfoyer.in/babulal-vardharji-gurjar-v-veer-gurjar-aluminium-industries-pvt-ltd-anr-2020-13-s-c-r-368/) **Published:** February 2, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The Supreme Court in Babulal Vardharji Gurjar v. Veer Gurjar Aluminium Industries Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. authoritatively examined the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963 to proceedings initiated under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The judgment resolves a recurring controversy on whether the commencement of the IBC or the existence of secured assets such as mortgages can extend or alter the statutory limitation period for initiating the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The Supreme Court in *Babulal Vardharji Gurjar v. Veer Gurjar Aluminium Industries Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.* authoritatively examined the applicability of the *Limitation Act, 1963* to proceedings initiated under *Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016*. The judgment resolves a recurring controversy on whether the commencement of the IBC or the existence of secured assets such as mortgages can extend or alter the statutory limitation period for initiating the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process. The Court clarified that the IBC does not revive time-barred debts and that the right to apply under *Section 7* accrues strictly on the date of *default*, not on the date of enforcement of the Code. It rejected the reasoning adopted by the NCLAT that limitation begins from *01.12.2016* or that a twelve-year limitation period applicable to mortgage enforcement governs insolvency proceedings. The judgment reinforces the doctrinal position that insolvency proceedings are not recovery actions and that *Article 137* of the Limitation Act governs applications under *Section 7*, prescribing a limitation period of three years from the date of default. The Court further emphasized the pleading requirement for invoking *Section 18 of the Limitation Act*, holding that acknowledgment must be specifically pleaded and supported by evidence within the insolvency application itself. The ruling strengthens legal certainty under the IBC and curtails misuse of insolvency mechanisms for reviving stale claims. **Keywords:** Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, Limitation Act, Section 7 IBC, Article 137, Time-barred debt, Default ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgment Cause Title*Babulal Vardharji Gurjar v. Veer Gurjar Aluminium Industries Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 6347 of 2019iii) Judgment Date14 August 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumHon’ble Justice A.M. Khanwilkar and Hon’ble Justice Dinesh Maheshwarivi) AuthorJustice Dinesh Maheshwarivii) Citation*\[2020\] 13 S.C.R. 368*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 7 & 238-A IBC, Article 137 & Section 18 Limitation Act, 1963*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsInsolvency Law, Commercial Law, Banking Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The judgment arises from an appeal challenging the admission of a *Section 7 IBC* application filed by an asset reconstruction company against a corporate debtor whose loan account had been classified as a *Non-Performing Asset* in *July 2011*. The application initiating CIRP was filed only in *March 2018*. The appellant, a director of the corporate debtor, contended that the insolvency application was hopelessly barred by limitation. The controversy assumed importance due to conflicting approaches adopted by adjudicatory authorities under the IBC. While the *NCLT* admitted the application without examining limitation, the *NCLAT*, upon remand, held that limitation commenced from the date of enforcement of the IBC and alternatively applied a twelve-year limitation period applicable to mortgage enforcement. The Supreme Court was thus called upon to clarify whether insolvency proceedings could be initiated for debts that were already time-barred under general law and whether secured status or pendency of recovery proceedings could alter limitation under the IBC. The decision is situated within a consistent line of authorities emphasizing that the IBC is a resolution-centric legislation and not a substitute for recovery mechanisms. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The corporate debtor was engaged in manufacturing aluminium ingots and had availed multiple credit facilities from a consortium of banks beginning *22.12.2007*. The loans were secured through equitable mortgages and hypothecation agreements executed during *2008–2010*. Due to persistent non-payment, the loan account was classified as *NPA on 08.07.2011*. Statutory recovery steps followed, including issuance of notices under *Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act* and initiation of proceedings before the *Debt Recovery Tribunal under Section 19 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993*. In *2013*, the original lender assigned the debt to *JM Financial Assets Reconstruction Company Pvt. Ltd.* Despite these recovery proceedings, the assignee filed an application under *Section 7 IBC* in *March 2018*, explicitly stating *08.07.2011* as the date of default. The NCLT admitted the application without addressing limitation. The NCLAT initially dismissed the appeal summarily, leading to remand by the Supreme Court. Upon reconsideration, the NCLAT again upheld admission, reasoning that limitation began from *01.12.2016* and that mortgage security attracted a twelve-year limitation. This reasoning formed the subject matter of the present appeal. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether an application under *Section 7 of the IBC* is governed by *Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963*? ii. Whether the right to apply under *Section 7 IBC* accrues from the date of default or from the commencement of the Code? iii. Whether the existence of a mortgage extends the limitation period for initiating CIRP? iv. Whether *Section 18 of the Limitation Act* can be invoked without specific pleadings in a Section 7 application? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the insolvency application was ex facie barred by limitation since the admitted date of default was *08.07.2011* and the application was filed after nearly seven years. They argued that *Article 137* governs Section 7 applications, limiting the period to three years from default. Reliance was placed on *B.K. Educational Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Paras Gupta & Associates* and *Gaurav Hargovindbhai Dave v. ARC (India) Ltd.*, where this Court held that the IBC does not revive time-barred debts. The appellant contended that the NCLAT’s reliance on mortgage-related limitation under *Article 61(b)* was legally untenable, as insolvency proceedings are not enforcement actions. It was further argued that *Section 18 of the Limitation Act* could not be invoked since no acknowledgment was pleaded in the Section 7 application itself. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent submitted that the debt was continuously acknowledged in balance sheets and annual returns, thereby extending limitation under *Section 18 of the Limitation Act*. They argued that insolvency proceedings are not defeated merely due to passage of time when liability is admitted. It was also contended that limitation provisions were introduced into the IBC only in *2018* through *Section 238-A*, and therefore, strict application would cause hardship. The respondent justified reliance on mortgage security to claim extended limitation. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court categorically rejected the approach adopted by the NCLAT. It reiterated that insolvency proceedings are distinct from recovery or enforcement actions and are governed by a separate statutory framework. The Court held that *Article 137* applies to applications under *Section 7 IBC*, prescribing a limitation period of three years from the date when the right to apply accrues. The right accrues on the occurrence of *default*, not on enforcement of the Code. The Court clarified that there is nothing in the IBC to suggest that limitation begins from *01.12.2016*. The reasoning based on mortgage security was found wholly erroneous. The Court emphasized that *Article 61(b)* applies to suits for recovery of possession and not to insolvency applications. On *Section 18*, the Court held that acknowledgment must be pleaded and proved. Since the application mentioned only *08.07.2011* as the date of default and contained no averment of acknowledgment, the respondent could not rely on subsequent documents at the appellate stage. The application was held to be time-barred and consequently rejected. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The limitation period for initiating CIRP under *Section 7 of the IBC* is governed by *Article 137 of the Limitation Act*, being three years from the date of default. The enforcement of the IBC does not revive time-barred debts. Insolvency proceedings are not recovery proceedings, and mortgage-related limitation provisions do not apply. Acknowledgment under *Section 18* must be specifically pleaded in the insolvency application. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that the IBC is a beneficial legislation aimed at resolution and revival, not a forum to resurrect stale claims. Allowing time-barred debts into the insolvency framework would defeat its core objectives and distort creditor discipline. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Adjudicating Authorities must examine limitation at the threshold. ii. Date of default pleaded in the application is decisive for limitation. iii. Section 18 Limitation Act requires specific pleadings and evidence. iv. Mortgage security does not extend limitation for CIRP initiation. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment decisively curtails attempts to misuse insolvency proceedings as recovery tools. It restores doctrinal clarity by aligning limitation principles with the resolution-centric philosophy of the IBC. The ruling strengthens procedural discipline and reinforces the necessity of timely action by financial creditors. It also serves as a caution against creative pleading and post-hoc reliance on documents not forming part of the insolvency application. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank*, *\[2017\] 8 SCR 33* ii. *B.K. Educational Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Paras Gupta & Associates*, *\[2018\] 12 SCR 794* iii. *Gaurav Hargovindbhai Dave v. ARC (India) Ltd.*, *\[2019\] 13 SCR 224* iv. *Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India*, *\[2019\] 3 SCR 535* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016* ii. *Limitation Act, 1963* iii. *SARFAESI Act, 2002* iv. *RDDBFI Act, 1993* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, [2020] 11 S.C.R. 425](https://lawfoyer.in/centre-for-public-interest-litigation-v-union-of-india-2020-11-s-c-r-425/) **Published:** February 2, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment addresses the scope, interpretation, and operational sufficiency of the Disaster Management Act, 2005 in the context of the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic. The petition questioned the constitutional and statutory obligation of the Union of India to frame a fresh National Disaster Management Plan exclusively for COVID-19 under Section 11, to prescribe new minimum standards of relief under Section 12, and to mandate exclusive utilisation of the National Disaster Response Fund (NDRF) under Section 46 instead of the PM CARES Fund. The Supreme Court undertook a detailed statutory interpretation of the Act, examining the legislative intent, scheme, and functional architecture of disaster governance in India. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment addresses the scope, interpretation, and operational sufficiency of the *Disaster Management Act, 2005* in the context of the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic. The petition questioned the constitutional and statutory obligation of the Union of India to frame a *fresh National Disaster Management Plan* exclusively for COVID-19 under *Section 11*, to prescribe *new minimum standards of relief* under *Section 12*, and to mandate exclusive utilisation of the *National Disaster Response Fund (NDRF)* under *Section 46* instead of the *PM CARES Fund*. The Supreme Court undertook a detailed statutory interpretation of the Act, examining the legislative intent, scheme, and functional architecture of disaster governance in India. The Court emphasised that a *National Plan* is inherently a pre-disaster preparedness instrument and not a reactive document. It held that *biological and public health emergencies*, including epidemics and pandemics, were explicitly contemplated within the *National Disaster Management Plan, 2019*. The judgment clarified that the statutory framework allows dynamic supplementation of the National Plan through SOPs, guidelines, and executive orders. The Court rejected the contention that absence of pandemic-specific terminology rendered the Plan inadequate. On relief standards, the Court ruled that *Section 12* does not envisage disaster-specific relief norms and that pre-existing guidelines apply uniformly to all disasters, including COVID-19. Regarding financial mechanisms, the Court upheld the legality of the *PM CARES Fund*, distinguishing it from the statutory NDRF in terms of object, source, and purpose. The petition was dismissed in entirety, reinforcing executive discretion in disaster financial planning and affirming statutory sufficiency of the existing disaster management framework. **Keywords:** Disaster Management Act, COVID-19, National Disaster Management Plan, NDRF, PM CARES Fund, Public Interest Litigation ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India*ii) Case NumberWrit Petition (Civil) No. 546 of 2020iii) Judgement Date18 August 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) Quorum*Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy, M.R. Shah, JJ.*vi) Author*Ashok Bhushan, J.*vii) Citation*\[2020\] 11 S.C.R. 425*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 10, 11, 12, 46 of Disaster Management Act, 2005; Article 32, Constitution of India*ix) Judgments overruledNilx) Related Law Subjects*Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Disaster Management Law* ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The litigation arose during the initial surge of the COVID-19 pandemic when India, like the rest of the world, was grappling with an evolving public health emergency. The pandemic exposed structural vulnerabilities in health infrastructure, governance coordination, and disaster preparedness mechanisms. The petitioner, a public interest body, approached the Supreme Court under *Article 32*, invoking the fundamental right to life and seeking judicial intervention to enforce statutory duties under the *Disaster Management Act, 2005*. The background of the judgment is rooted in the evolution of disaster jurisprudence in India, particularly post-enactment of the 2005 Act, which marked a paradigm shift from a relief-centric approach to a preparedness and mitigation-oriented framework. The Court traced international commitments such as the *Hyogo Framework for Action* and the *Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction*, recognising India’s alignment with global disaster governance norms. The *National Disaster Management Plan* was first formulated in 2016 following judicial nudging in *Swaraj Abhiyan v. Union of India*, *(2016) 7 SCC 498*, and later revised in 2019. The petitioner contended that the revised Plan was inadequate to address COVID-19 due to lack of explicit reference to lockdowns, social distancing, and containment measures. The case thus required the Court to determine whether statutory compliance necessitated pandemic-specific documentation or whether the existing framework sufficed. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The petitioner alleged statutory failure on three primary counts. First, it asserted that the *National Disaster Management Plan, 2019* did not contemplate pandemics of the scale of COVID-19 and therefore violated *Section 11* of the Act. It argued that absence of explicit measures like lockdowns and containment zones rendered the Plan ineffective for real-time crisis management. Second, the petitioner contended that the Union failed to prescribe *minimum standards of relief* specific to COVID-19 under *Section 12*, particularly concerning shelter homes, migrant labourers, widows, orphans, and ex-gratia compensation for deaths caused by the virus and lockdown hardships. Third, the petitioner challenged the constitution of the *PM CARES Fund*, arguing that *Section 46* mandated that all disaster-related contributions be credited exclusively to the *NDRF*, a statutory fund subject to *CAG audit*. It alleged that routing contributions to PM CARES diluted transparency and violated legislative intent. The Union of India rebutted these claims by placing on record the *National Disaster Management Plan, 2019*, *Biological Disaster Management Guidelines*, *Cluster Containment Plans*, and updated SOPs issued by the *Ministry of Health and Family Welfare*. It also clarified the financial architecture governing *NDRF*, *SDRF*, and PM CARES, emphasising their distinct legal character and operational purpose. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether the Union of India was obligated under *Section 11 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005* to prepare a fresh National Disaster Management Plan exclusively for COVID-19? ii. Whether the Union of India was required to issue new minimum standards of relief under *Section 12* specifically for COVID-19? iii. Whether utilisation of the *National Disaster Response Fund* was mandatory for COVID-19 relief? iv. Whether all disaster-related contributions must be credited only to the NDRF under *Section 46(1)(b)*? v. Whether funds collected under PM CARES should be transferred to the NDRF? ## **F) PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the petitioner submitted that statutory power must be exercised in the precise manner contemplated by the statute. It was argued that the *National Plan, 2019* was generic and failed to address pandemic-specific exigencies. Reliance was placed on the absence of financial relief measures and enforceable operational strategies within the Plan. It was further argued that *Section 12* envisaged contextual relief standards, and failure to issue COVID-19 specific norms endangered vulnerable populations. On finances, the petitioner contended that deletion of paragraph 5.5 from earlier NDRF guidelines effectively barred public contributions, allegedly to favour PM CARES, which lacked statutory backing and CAG audit. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the respondent submitted that the National Plan is a *pre-disaster preparedness document* and cannot be expected to enumerate disaster-specific operational details. It was argued that *biological and public health emergencies*, including epidemics, were explicitly included under *Table 1-1* of the Plan. Regarding relief standards, it was contended that *Section 12* contemplates uniform minimum standards applicable across disasters. On finances, the respondent distinguished between the statutory NDRF and the voluntary charitable trust of PM CARES, asserting that both coexist lawfully with distinct objectives. ## **H) JUDGEMENT** The Court dismissed the writ petition in entirety. It held that the *National Disaster Management Plan, 2019* sufficiently contemplated biological disasters, including epidemics, and was supplemented by executive guidelines and SOPs. The Court emphasised that disaster governance requires flexibility and cannot be straitjacketed into static documentation. It ruled that *Section 12* does not mandate disaster-specific relief guidelines and that existing norms applied to COVID-19. On financial issues, the Court held that *Section 46* permits contributions to NDRF but does not prohibit creation of other voluntary funds. PM CARES was upheld as a lawful public charitable trust. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The statutory scheme of the *Disaster Management Act, 2005* does not require formulation of a disaster-specific National Plan post-occurrence of a disaster. A National Plan is inherently anticipatory and inclusive, and biological disasters were already contemplated within the existing framework. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that financial planning during disasters falls within executive domain and judicial intervention must respect separation of powers, especially in policy-laden matters. **c) GUIDELINES** Not applicable. ## **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment reinforces statutory interpretation grounded in legislative intent and administrative pragmatism. It preserves executive flexibility during emergencies while affirming accountability through existing legal mechanisms. The decision also clarifies misconceptions surrounding disaster funds and judicial overreach in policy matters. ## **J) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Swaraj Abhiyan v. Union of India*, *(2016) 7 SCC 498* 2. *Gaurav Kumar Bansal v. Union of India*, *(2017) 6 SCC 730* 3. *Mulla Gulam Ali & Safiabai D. Trust v. Deelip Kumar & Co.*, *(2003) 11 SCC 772* ### b) Important Statutes Referred 1. *Disaster Management Act, 2005* 2. *Constitution of India* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Ghanshyam Upadhyay v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., [2020] 6 S.C.R. 983](https://lawfoyer.in/ghanshyam-upadhyay-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-ors-2020-6-s-c-r-983/) **Published:** February 2, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in Ghanshyam Upadhyay v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others examines the contours of judicial scrutiny over allegations of bias and conflict of interest raised against members of a Commission of Inquiry constituted under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952. The petitioner, a practicing advocate, invoked Article 32 of the Constitution of India in public interest, seeking the scrapping of a judicial commission constituted to inquire into the alleged police encounter killing of Vikas Dubey. The challenge was founded exclusively on a newspaper article alleging political and relational proximity of commission members to the ruling establishment. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment in *Ghanshyam Upadhyay v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others* examines the contours of judicial scrutiny over allegations of bias and conflict of interest raised against members of a Commission of Inquiry constituted under the *Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952*. The petitioner, a practicing advocate, invoked *Article 32 of the Constitution of India* in public interest, seeking the scrapping of a judicial commission constituted to inquire into the alleged police encounter killing of *Vikas Dubey*. The challenge was founded exclusively on a newspaper article alleging political and relational proximity of commission members to the ruling establishment. The Supreme Court emphatically rejected the petition, reiterating the settled position that *newspaper reports, without corroborative material, possess no evidentiary value*. The Court clarified that a Commission of Inquiry performs a *fact-finding and recommendatory role*, lacking adjudicatory or enforceable authority. It held that speculative apprehensions of bias, unsupported by cogent material, cannot displace persons who have held high constitutional offices. The judgment reinforces judicial discipline in public interest litigation, guards against abuse of PIL jurisdiction, and reaffirms the doctrinal distinction between investigative commissions and adjudicatory bodies. The decision further balances the principles of *natural justice* with institutional integrity, ensuring that inquiry mechanisms are not paralysed by conjectural challenges. **Keywords:** Commission of Inquiry, Bias, Conflict of Interest, Newspaper Reports, Public Interest Litigation, Natural Justice ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Ghanshyam Upadhyay v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.*Case NumberCriminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 70798 of 2020 in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 177 of 2020Judgement Date19 August 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumS. A. Bobde, CJI; A. S. Bopanna, J.; V. Ramasubramanian, J.AuthorPer BenchCitation*\[2020\] 6 S.C.R. 983*Legal Provisions Involved*Article 32 of the Constitution of India*; *Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsConstitutional Law, Criminal Law, Administrative Law ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The case arose in the aftermath of the alleged police encounter killing of *Vikas Dubey*, which triggered nationwide concern and multiple public interest litigations. The petitioner initially approached the Supreme Court under *Article 32*, seeking protection of the accused and challenging the demolition of his property. Following the encounter, the State of Uttar Pradesh constituted a *Commission of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952* and also formed a Special Investigation Team. Upon the Supreme Court’s suggestion, the State expanded the Commission by appointing *Dr. Justice B.S. Chauhan*, former Judge of the Supreme Court, as Chairman, and *Shri K.L. Gupta*, former Director General of Police, as Member. This reconstituted Commission was accepted by the Court, and petitioners were granted liberty to participate in the inquiry. Subsequently, the present miscellaneous application was filed seeking the scrapping of the Commission itself. The petitioner alleged bias and conflict of interest on the part of the Chairman and a Member, relying solely on a newspaper article published in *The Wire*. The allegations were premised on familial and political associations of the Commission members. The background thus presented a tension between the *public’s demand for impartial inquiry* and the *institutional safeguards inherent in inquiry commissions*. The Court was called upon to examine whether speculative allegations, unsupported by evidence, could derail a judicially endorsed inquiry mechanism. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The petitioner, a practicing advocate from Mumbai, filed a writ petition under *Article 32* seeking judicial intervention regarding the alleged encounter killing of *Vikas Dubey*. During pendency, the State constituted a Commission of Inquiry headed initially by a former High Court judge. On judicial suggestion, the Commission was expanded to include a former Supreme Court judge as Chairman and a former DGP as Member. After the constitution of the expanded Commission was approved by the Supreme Court on 22 July 2020, the petitioner filed multiple interlocutory applications objecting to the inclusion of Shri K.L. Gupta, alleging prior media comments favouring police action. These objections were rejected by the Court on 28 July 2020. Persisting with objections, the petitioner filed the present Criminal Miscellaneous Petition seeking complete scrapping of the Commission. The allegations of bias were founded entirely on a newspaper article alleging that the Chairman’s relatives were legislators of the ruling party and that the Member was related to a senior police officer involved in the incident. No independent material, affidavit, or documentary evidence was produced. The petitioner was not personally affected by the inquiry and was participating purely in public interest. The inquiry proceedings were to be conducted publicly, with liberty granted to the petitioner to participate, and the report was to be filed before the Supreme Court. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether allegations of bias against members of a Commission of Inquiry can be sustained solely on the basis of newspaper reports? ii. Whether familial or political associations, without demonstrable influence, constitute conflict of interest? iii. Whether a Commission of Inquiry under the *Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952* performs adjudicatory functions? iv. Whether repeated PIL applications raising speculative apprehensions amount to abuse of process? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the Petitioner submitted that the presence of political affiliations and familial relationships of the Commission members created a reasonable apprehension of bias. It was argued that public confidence in the inquiry process would be eroded if the Commission continued in its present form. Reliance was placed on *Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India* *(1987) 4 SCC 611*, asserting that even likelihood of bias is sufficient to vitiate proceedings. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the Respondent submitted that the allegations were speculative, unsupported by evidence, and based solely on a newspaper article. It was argued that the Commission’s role was purely fact-finding and recommendatory. Reliance was placed on *Kushum Lata v. Union of India* *(2006) 6 SCC 180* and *Rohit Pandey v. Union of India* *(2005) 13 SCC 702* to submit that newspaper reports have no evidentiary value. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. *Article 32 of the Constitution of India* ii. *Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952* ## **I) JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that allegations founded solely on newspaper reports cannot be entertained. The Court reiterated that newspaper items, without verification, do not constitute evidence, relying on *Kushum Lata* and *Rohit Pandey*. The Bench emphasised that both the Chairman and Member had held high constitutional and statutory offices, and mere relational associations do not establish bias. The Court explained that a Commission of Inquiry under the *Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952* is empowered only to investigate, record findings, and make recommendations which are *not enforceable proprio vigore*. Reliance was placed on *Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar* *\[1959\] SCR 279*, *State of Karnataka v. Union of India* *\[1978\] 2 SCR 1*, and *Sham Kant v. State of Maharashtra* *(1992) 2 Supp SCC 521*. The Court distinguished *Ranjit Thakur*, holding that the facts therein involved direct adjudicatory participation, unlike the present fact-finding inquiry. It further noted that the petitioner had already been granted liberty to participate in the inquiry and that repeated applications were hampering the process. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** Allegations of bias against members of a Commission of Inquiry must be supported by cogent, reliable material; newspaper reports alone have no evidentiary value, and a Commission under the *Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952* performs only a fact-finding and recommendatory function, not an adjudicatory one. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that public interest litigations must not be permitted to derail institutional processes through speculative apprehensions. Judicial restraint is necessary where high constitutional functionaries are involved, and fairness must be balanced with administrative efficacy. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Allegations of bias must be supported by concrete and verifiable material. ii. Newspaper reports cannot form the sole basis of judicial interference. iii. Inquiry Commissions must be allowed to function without unwarranted obstruction. iv. Repeated frivolous applications in PILs may amount to abuse of process. ## **J) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Kushum Lata v. Union of India & Ors.*, *(2006) 6 SCC 180* 2. *Rohit Pandey v. Union of India*, *(2005) 13 SCC 702* 3. *Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar*, *\[1959\] SCR 279* 4. *State of Karnataka v. Union of India*, *\[1978\] 2 SCR 1* 5. *Sham Kant v. State of Maharashtra*, *(1992) 2 Supp SCC 521* 6. *K. Vijaya Bhaskar Reddy v. Government of Andhra Pradesh*, *AIR 1996 AP 62* 7. *Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India*, *(1987) 4 SCC 611* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Constitution of India* 2. *Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Mohd. Anwar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 7 SCR 150](https://lawfoyer.in/mohd-anwar-v-state-nct-of-delhi-2020-7-scr-150/) **Published:** February 2, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in Mohd. Anwar v. State (NCT of Delhi) addresses critical issues relating to the evidentiary value of witness testimony, refusal to participate in Test Identification Parade, and belated claims of juvenility and mental unsoundness under criminal law. The Supreme Court examined whether such defences, raised for the first time at the appellate stage, could undermine concurrent findings of guilt recorded by the Trial Court and the High Court. The Court reaffirmed that robbery with hurt under Section 394 IPC stands established when ocular testimony is consistent, credible, and corroborated by surrounding circumstances. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment in *Mohd. Anwar v. State (NCT of Delhi)* addresses critical issues relating to the evidentiary value of witness testimony, refusal to participate in Test Identification Parade, and belated claims of juvenility and mental unsoundness under criminal law. The Supreme Court examined whether such defences, raised for the first time at the appellate stage, could undermine concurrent findings of guilt recorded by the Trial Court and the High Court. The Court reaffirmed that robbery with hurt under *Section 394 IPC* stands established when ocular testimony is consistent, credible, and corroborated by surrounding circumstances. It further clarified that refusal to join TIP without justification reflects guilty conscience and constitutes an incriminating circumstance. The judgment underscores that defences under *Section 84 IPC* and claims of juvenility must be substantiated by cogent documentary and medical evidence and raised at the earliest stage of trial. Mere production of photocopies or affidavits without expert corroboration does not satisfy the burden of proof even on the standard of preponderance of probabilities. The Court also reiterated the limited scope of appellate interference with concurrent factual findings and emphasized that procedural leniency cannot override substantive justice. The dismissal of the appeal reinforces doctrinal clarity on criminal responsibility, evidentiary thresholds, and the sanctity of trial-stage adjudication. **Keywords:** Robbery with hurt, Test Identification Parade, Section 84 IPC, juvenility, concurrent findings ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Mohd. Anwar v. State (NCT of Delhi)*Case NumberCriminal Appeal No. 1551 of 2010Judgement Date19 August 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorum*N. V. Ramana, S. Abdul Nazeer & Surya Kant, JJ.*Author*Justice Surya Kant*Citation*(2020) 7 SCR 150*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 394, 392, 397, 34 IPC; Section 25 Arms Act; Section 84 IPC; Section 313 CrPC*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsCriminal Law, Evidence Law, Juvenile Justice ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The judgment arises from a criminal appeal challenging concurrent findings of guilt for the offence of robbery with hurt. The case traversed through the Trial Court and the High Court before reaching the Supreme Court, where the appellant sought to introduce new defences relating to juvenility and mental unsoundness. The background of the case reflects a common pattern in criminal litigation where belated defences are employed as a last resort to avoid the consequences of conviction. The Trial Court had initially convicted the accused under *Sections 397/34 and 392/34 IPC* along with *Section 25 of the Arms Act*, imposing substantial sentences. The High Court, while extending partial relief by altering the conviction to *Section 394 IPC* and reducing the sentence, affirmed the core finding of guilt. The Supreme Court was called upon to examine whether the High Court erred in upholding the conviction despite alleged infirmities such as delay in FIR, absence of independent witnesses, and inconsistencies in testimony. The appellant further attempted to invoke *Section 84 IPC* by claiming mental disorder and sought protection under juvenile jurisprudence by asserting minority at the time of the offence. The background thus situates the judgment within broader questions of criminal accountability, procedural fairness, and the evidentiary standards governing exculpatory defences. The Court’s analysis demonstrates restraint in appellate review and reinforces the primacy of trial-stage adjudication in criminal cases. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The prosecution case originates from an incident dated *17.05.2001*, when the complainant *Tabban Khan (PW-1)* was returning home on his motorcycle late at night near Shahdara. Upon stopping near a fishpond, he was accosted by three persons including the appellant. The assailants were armed with a knife and a revolver and subjected the complainant to physical assault. Under threat of further violence, the complainant was compelled to hand over approximately *Rs. 30,000* in cash. The assailants allegedly contemplated killing him to prevent reporting, but fled upon hearing passers-by. The complainant reported the incident to the police the following evening. After preliminary inquiry, an FIR was formally registered on *20.05.2001*. On the same day, police officials apprehended three suspects during routine bus checking. A prohibited knife was recovered from the appellant, and all three allegedly confessed to the robbery. When produced before the Metropolitan Magistrate for *Test Identification Parade*, they refused to participate. During trial, the prosecution examined twelve witnesses including the complainant, police officials, and the Magistrate concerned with TIP proceedings. Documentary evidence such as recovery memos, sketches, and site plans were exhibited. The accused denied all allegations and claimed false implication due to refusal to pay bribe. No defence evidence was led. The Trial Court convicted all accused. The High Court partly modified the conviction, acquitting one co-accused and reducing sentence for the appellant while maintaining guilt under *Section 394 IPC*. The appellant thereafter approached the Supreme Court. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether conviction under *Section 394 IPC* was sustainable on the basis of ocular and circumstantial evidence? ii. Whether refusal to participate in Test Identification Parade constitutes an incriminating circumstance? iii. Whether belated plea of juvenility could be entertained without documentary proof? iv. Whether the defence of mental unsoundness under *Section 84 IPC* was established? v. Whether appellate courts should reappreciate evidence despite concurrent findings? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsel for the appellant submitted that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. It was argued that the absence of independent public witnesses and lack of injury on the complainant rendered the prosecution story doubtful. The delay of three days in lodging the FIR was asserted to be fatal. The appellant further contended that he was a juvenile at the time of the incident and suffered from mental illness, relying upon an OPD card and affidavit of his mother. It was argued that these mitigating factors vitiated the conviction and sentence. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsel for the State submitted that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses were consistent and reliable. It was argued that refusal to participate in TIP clearly indicated guilty conscience. The delay in FIR was explained as procedural and not substantive. The State further contended that pleas of juvenility and insanity were afterthoughts, unsupported by credible evidence, and rightly rejected by the High Court. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. *Section 394 IPC* – Robbery with hurt ii. *Section 84 IPC* – Act of person of unsound mind iii. *Section 25 Arms Act, 1959* iv. *Section 313 CrPC* – Examination of accused ## **I) JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of guilt. It held that appellate courts should not routinely reappreciate evidence unless perversity is shown. The Court found the testimony of PW-1 to be natural and credible. The refusal of the appellant to participate in TIP without justification was held to be a strong incriminating circumstance. The Court rejected the plea of delay in FIR, noting that the complaint was made promptly and delay was procedural. The Court further held that pleas under *Section 84 IPC* and juvenility must be substantiated by reliable evidence and raised at trial stage. The appellant failed to produce any birth certificate, school record, or expert medical evidence. His conduct before and after the incident demonstrated cognitive awareness. The Court also noted that the appellant was untraceable despite efforts to assess his mental condition. The appeal was dismissed and bail cancelled . **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the case lies in reaffirming that credible ocular evidence, corroborated by circumstances, is sufficient for conviction under *Section 394 IPC*. Refusal to participate in TIP without cause reflects guilty conscience. Defences of insanity and juvenility must be proved with cogent evidence and raised at appropriate stage. Concurrent findings of fact deserve judicial deference. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that belated defences undermine the criminal justice process and obstruct proper appreciation of evidence. It also emphasized that procedural safeguards cannot be misused to defeat substantive justice. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Pleas under *Section 84 IPC* must be supported by expert medical evidence. ii. Juvenility claims must be proved by authentic documents. iii. TIP refusal may be treated as incriminating when unexplained. iv. Appellate courts should respect concurrent factual findings. ## **J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment strengthens doctrinal clarity on criminal responsibility and evidentiary standards. It balances accused rights with societal interest in effective prosecution. The Court’s approach discourages abuse of appellate process through fabricated defences and reinforces discipline in criminal trials. ## **K) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Ashwani Kumar v. State of Punjab*, *(2015) 6 SCC 308* ii. *T.N. Lakshmaiah v. State of Karnataka*, *(2002) 1 SCC 219* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Indian Penal Code, 1860* ii. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* iii. *Arms Act, 1959* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Deccan Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. Regency Mahavir Properties & Ors., [2020] 13 S.C.R. 427](https://lawfoyer.in/deccan-paper-mills-co-ltd-v-regency-mahavir-properties-ors-2020-13-s-c-r-427/) **Published:** February 2, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in Deccan Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. Regency Mahavir Properties & Ors. addresses the evolving jurisprudence on arbitrability of disputes involving allegations of fraud and cancellation of written instruments under section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The Supreme Court examined whether a civil suit seeking declaration and cancellation of development agreements on the ground of fraud could bypass a valid arbitration clause contained in a subsequent assignment agreement. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment in *Deccan Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. Regency Mahavir Properties & Ors.* addresses the evolving jurisprudence on *arbitrability of disputes involving allegations of fraud* and *cancellation of written instruments under section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963*. The Supreme Court examined whether a civil suit seeking declaration and cancellation of development agreements on the ground of fraud could bypass a valid arbitration clause contained in a subsequent assignment agreement. The appellant contended that fraud vitiated consent and rendered the arbitration clause unenforceable, and further argued that proceedings for cancellation of registered instruments were actions *in rem* and hence non-arbitrable. The Court rejected both contentions. It held that post the *2015 Amendment* to the *Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996*, courts at the referral stage under *section 8* are confined to a *prima facie* examination of the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. The Court clarified that allegations of fraud do not per se oust arbitral jurisdiction unless the arbitration agreement itself is impeached as non-existent. Importantly, the Court authoritatively held that actions under *section 31 of the Specific Relief Act* are *in personam* and not *in rem*, thereby overruling the contrary view taken in *Aliens Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. M. Janardhan Reddy*. The judgment harmonises arbitration law with specific relief jurisprudence and reinforces India’s pro-arbitration stance. **Keywords:** Arbitration Agreement, Fraud Exception, Section 31 Specific Relief Act, In Personam, Section 8 Arbitration Act ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*Deccan Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. Regency Mahavir Properties & Ors.*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 5147 of 2016iii) Judgement Date19 August 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) Quorum*R.F. Nariman J., Navin Sinha J., Indira Banerjee J.*vi) Author*Justice R.F. Nariman*vii) Citation*\[2020\] 13 S.C.R. 427*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 8 & 16 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 31 Specific Relief Act, 1963; Section 17 Indian Contract Act, 1872*ix) Judgments Overruled*Aliens Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. M. Janardhan Reddy (2016) 1 ALT 194 (DB)*x) Related Law SubjectsArbitration Law, Contract Law, Civil Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The dispute arose against the backdrop of India’s shifting arbitration jurisprudence following legislative and judicial efforts to curtail excessive judicial intervention. The appellant, *Deccan Paper Mills Co. Ltd.*, owned substantial land at Mundhwa, Pune, and entered into a development agreement with *Ashray Premises Pvt. Ltd.* in 2004. This agreement contained no arbitration clause but permitted assignment. In 2006, Ashray assigned development rights to *Regency Mahavir Properties*, through an agreement containing a comprehensive arbitration clause, followed by a deed of confirmation. Years later, Deccan alleged that its consent to the assignment and confirmation was procured by fraud, particularly due to misrepresentation by *Respondent No. 3*, who had allegedly ceased to be a partner at the relevant time. Instead of invoking arbitration, Deccan instituted a civil suit seeking declarations that the agreements were *ab initio* void and sought their cancellation under *section 31 of the Specific Relief Act*. Regency invoked *section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996*, seeking reference to arbitration. The trial court and the Bombay High Court allowed the application. The appeal before the Supreme Court thus presented a critical opportunity to revisit the scope of the fraud exception, the nature of cancellation proceedings, and the impact of the *2015 Amendment* on section 8 referrals. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE Deccan, as landowner, executed a development agreement dated *22.07.2004* with Ashray for development of a portion of its land. Clause *7(m)* expressly permitted Ashray to assign its rights. Acting under this clause, Ashray executed an assignment agreement dated *20.05.2006* in favour of Regency. This agreement incorporated a detailed arbitration clause providing for reference of disputes to arbitration under the *1996 Act*. Subsequently, a *Deed of Confirmation dated 13.07.2006* reaffirmed the assignment. Deccan later alleged that Respondent No.3, who had represented himself as a partner of Regency, had in fact retired prior to execution of the deed of confirmation. It was pleaded that this amounted to fraud and collusion, rendering the agreements void. On this basis, Deccan filed *Special Civil Suit No. 1400 of 2010* seeking declarations, cancellation of instruments, mandatory and perpetual injunctions. Regency promptly filed an application under *section 8* of the 1996 Act. The Civil Judge allowed the application, holding that fraud alleged was arbitrable. The Bombay High Court dismissed Deccan’s writ petition, relying on *Swiss Timing Ltd. v. Commonwealth Games Organising Committee* and rejecting the applicability of *N. Radhakrishnan v. Maestro Engineers*. Deccan then approached the Supreme Court. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether allegations of fraud render the dispute non-arbitrable? ii. Whether a suit for cancellation under *section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963* is an action *in rem*? iii. Whether courts can refuse reference under *section 8* post the *2015 Amendment* when a prima facie arbitration agreement exists? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that serious allegations of fraud vitiated the agreements and the arbitration clause itself. Reliance was placed on *N. Radhakrishnan v. Maestro Engineers*, arguing that disputes involving fraud fall outside arbitral jurisdiction. It was further contended that the original 2004 agreement lacked an arbitration clause and could not be severed. Emphasis was laid on *section 31 of the Specific Relief Act*, asserting that cancellation of registered instruments is a proceeding *in rem*, relying on *Booz Allen & Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Ltd.* and *Aliens Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. M. Janardhan Reddy*. The appellant argued that only civil courts could grant such reliefs. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent submitted that fraud alleged related to performance and representation, not to the existence of the arbitration agreement. Reliance was placed on *Avitel Post Studioz Ltd. v. HSBC PI Holding (Mauritius) Ltd.* and *Rashid Raza v. Sadaf Akhtar*, contending that the fraud exception is narrowly confined. It was argued that *section 31* proceedings are *in personam*, protective, and arbitrable. The respondent urged that *Aliens Developers* was incorrectly decided and contrary to *Olympus Superstructures v. Meena Vijay Khetan*. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. It held that post-amendment *section 8* mandates referral unless *prima facie* no arbitration agreement exists. The Court clarified that fraud affecting performance or inducement does not oust arbitration. It found no pleading that the agreements were never executed. The Court undertook an exhaustive analysis of the *Specific Relief Act*, holding that cancellation under *section 31* is an action *in personam*. The Court expressly overruled *Aliens Developers*, terming its reasoning erroneous. It reaffirmed that arbitrators can grant reliefs including cancellation, rectification, and specific performance. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** Allegations of fraud do not bar arbitration unless the arbitration agreement itself is impeached as non-existent. Proceedings under *section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963* are *in personam* and arbitrable. Courts under *section 8* post-2015 amendment are limited to a *prima facie* inquiry. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that treating section 31 actions as *in rem* would lead to doctrinal inconsistencies, especially when contrasted with *section 34* declaratory suits. The ministerial act of registration does not alter the private character of instruments. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Fraud must go to the root of the arbitration agreement to oust arbitration. ii. Section 31 proceedings are arbitrable. iii. Courts must adopt a pro-arbitration approach under section 8. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment consolidates India’s modern arbitration framework. By overruling *Aliens Developers* and narrowing the fraud exception, the Court restored doctrinal coherence between arbitration law and specific relief jurisprudence. The ruling reinforces party autonomy and reduces judicial interference, aligning domestic law with international arbitration norms. It provides certainty that remedies of cancellation and rescission do not automatically exclude arbitral jurisdiction. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Avitel Post Studioz Ltd. v. HSBC PI Holding (Mauritius) Ltd.*, *\[2018\] 6 SCR 1001* 2. *Olympus Superstructures v. Meena Vijay Khetan*, *\[1999\] 3 SCR 490* 3. *Booz Allen & Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Ltd.*, *\[2011\] 7 SCR 310* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996* 2. *Specific Relief Act, 1963* 3. *Indian Contract Act, 1872* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Avitel Post Studioz Limited & Ors. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Limited, [2020] 10 SCR 791](https://lawfoyer.in/avitel-post-studioz-limited-ors-v-hsbc-pi-holdings-mauritius-limited-2020-10-scr-791/) **Published:** February 2, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The decision in Avitel Post Studioz Limited & Ors. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Limited constitutes a significant exposition on the arbitrability of disputes involving allegations of fraud under Indian arbitration law, particularly in the context of enforcement-related interim relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The controversy arose from a foreign-seated arbitration governed by Singapore law, where the claimant investor alleged that it was fraudulently induced to invest USD 60 million based on false representations relating to a non-existent BBC contract. The arbitral tribunal rendered a detailed foreign final award holding the appellants liable for fraudulent misrepresentation and tort of deceit, awarding restitutionary damages equivalent to the entire investment amount with interest and costs. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The decision in *Avitel Post Studioz Limited & Ors. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Limited* constitutes a significant exposition on the arbitrability of disputes involving allegations of fraud under Indian arbitration law, particularly in the context of enforcement-related interim relief under *Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996*. The controversy arose from a foreign-seated arbitration governed by Singapore law, where the claimant investor alleged that it was fraudulently induced to invest *USD 60 million* based on false representations relating to a non-existent *BBC contract*. The arbitral tribunal rendered a detailed foreign final award holding the appellants liable for *fraudulent misrepresentation* and *tort of deceit*, awarding restitutionary damages equivalent to the entire investment amount with interest and costs. Before Indian courts, the core resistance was premised on the contention that allegations of serious fraud, impersonation, and siphoning of funds rendered the dispute non-arbitrable under Indian law and violative of *public policy* under *Section 48*. The Supreme Court decisively rejected this contention and clarified that fraud which is *inter partes*, lacking *public flavour*, does not invalidate an arbitration agreement nor bar arbitral adjudication. The Court reaffirmed the doctrine of *separability of the arbitration clause* and applied settled jurisprudence to distinguish civil fraud from criminal fraud. In adjudicating interim measures, the Court restored the Single Judge’s direction requiring segregation of the entire principal sum awarded, holding that *prima facie enforceability* and *balance of convenience* overwhelmingly favoured the claimant. The judgment reinforces India’s pro-arbitration stance and harmonises domestic public policy with international commercial arbitration norms. **Keywords:** Arbitration, Fraud, Public Policy, Foreign Award, Section 9, Separability, Interim Relief ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgment Cause Title*Avitel Post Studioz Limited & Ors. v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Limited*Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 5145 of 2016 with Civil Appeal Nos. 5158 & 9820 of 2016Judgment Date19 August 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumR. F. Nariman J., Navin Sinha J.AuthorR. F. Nariman, J.Citation*\[2020\] 10 SCR 791*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 9, 34, 37, 48 – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Sections 17 & 18 – Indian Contract Act, 1872*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsArbitration Law, Contract Law, Commercial Law, International Arbitration ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The judgment arose from a complex cross-border commercial dispute involving a foreign investor and an Indian media technology company group. The investment transaction was structured through a *Share Subscription Agreement* and *Shareholders’ Agreement*, both containing identically worded arbitration clauses with *Singapore as the seat of arbitration*. The claimant’s investment decision was allegedly induced by representations regarding a lucrative and imminent contract with the *British Broadcasting Corporation*, projected to generate revenues exceeding *USD 1 billion*. The dispute escalated when the claimant discovered that the BBC contract never existed and that a substantial portion of the investment was diverted to entities controlled by the promoters. Arbitration was initiated before the *Singapore International Arbitration Centre*, resulting in emergency interim awards followed by a comprehensive foreign final award holding the appellants liable for *fraudulent misrepresentation* under *Section 17 of the Contract Act* and *tort of deceit*. Parallel proceedings unfolded in India under *Section 9* for interim protection and later under *Sections 34 and 37*, which were dismissed as not maintainable against a foreign award. The appellants’ central challenge before the Supreme Court was rooted in the long-standing debate on fraud and arbitrability, invoking earlier jurisprudence suggesting that serious fraud necessitates adjudication by civil courts. The Court was therefore called upon to reconcile older doctrinal hesitations with the modern statutory framework of the *1996 Act*, international arbitration principles, and evolving judicial precedent favouring minimal intervention and enforceability of foreign awards. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The claimant invested *USD 60 million* in the equity of *Avitel Post Studioz Limited* pursuant to a *Share Subscription Agreement dated 21.04.2011*, acquiring *7.8% of the paid-up capital*. This investment was allegedly predicated on representations that the Avitel Group was on the verge of executing a transformational contract with the *BBC* for converting its film library from *2D to 3D*. The promoters asserted that the funds were required for procuring specialised equipment through their Dubai subsidiary to service this contract. Subsequent forensic investigations conducted by *Ernst & Young* and *KPMG Dubai* revealed that no such BBC contract existed. It further emerged that approximately *USD 51 million* out of the investment had been siphoned off to promoter-controlled entities without any corresponding commercial justification. These findings led to the initiation of SIAC arbitration and the appointment of an emergency arbitrator, who granted asset-freezing reliefs. Despite jurisdictional objections by the appellants, the arbitral tribunal upheld its competence and proceeded to deliver a detailed final award on *27.09.2014*, finding the appellants jointly and severally liable for *fraudulent inducement*, *breach of warranty*, and *deceit*. The award granted full restitution of the investment with interest and costs and ordered cancellation of the claimant’s shares. In India, interim protection under *Section 9* resulted in an order directing maintenance of *USD 60 million* in a designated account. The Division Bench reduced this to *USD 30 million*, prompting cross appeals before the Supreme Court. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether allegations of fraud and impersonation rendered the dispute non-arbitrable under Indian law? ii. Whether the arbitration clause survived allegations of fraudulent inducement of the underlying contract? iii. Whether the claimant established a strong *prima facie* case for interim protection under *Section 9*? iv. Whether reduction of secured amount from *USD 60 million* to *USD 30 million* was legally sustainable? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that the dispute involved *serious criminal fraud*, including impersonation and forgery, attracting the *fraud exception* to arbitrability recognised in *N. Radhakrishnan*. It was argued that such disputes offend *public policy* and cannot be enforced under *Section 48*. Reliance was placed on the closure of criminal proceedings and the pending challenge thereto to demonstrate the criminal complexion of allegations. It was further contended that reliance on *Swiss Timing* was misplaced as it lacked precedential value. The appellants asserted that enforcement proceedings would ultimately fail, negating the need for stringent interim measures. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent submitted that the allegations were *purely inter partes* and civil in nature, falling squarely within *Sections 17 and 18 of the Contract Act*. It was argued that the doctrine of separability preserved the arbitration clause irrespective of allegations against the main contract. The respondent relied on *A. Ayyasamy*, *Rashid Raza*, and *Vidya Drolia* to assert that only fraud affecting the public at large bars arbitration. The foreign final award was emphasised as comprehensive, reasoned, and enforceable, justifying full interim protection. ## H) JUDGMENT The Supreme Court held that a strong *prima facie* case existed in favour of the claimant. The Court reaffirmed that allegations of fraud do not ipso facto invalidate arbitration agreements and that *fraudulent inducement* renders contracts voidable without nullifying the arbitration clause. The Court distinguished between civil fraud and criminal fraud with public ramifications. The Court restored the Single Judge’s order securing *USD 60 million*, holding that the Division Bench erred in reducing the amount without proper application of principles governing *measure of damages*. The balance of convenience and risk of irreparable harm decisively favoured the claimant. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio rests on the principle that *fraud inter partes* is arbitrable and that arbitration clauses are separable from the main contract. The Court clarified that enforcement-stage considerations under *Section 48* cannot dilute interim protection under *Section 9*. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that criminal proceedings and arbitral proceedings may coexist and that failure of criminal prosecution does not negate civil liability. Observations on insufficiency of stamp duty were declined as belated. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Fraud affecting public interest alone bars arbitration. ii. Arbitration clauses survive allegations of voidability. iii. Interim protection must reflect full restitutionary damages where warranted. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces India’s commitment to international arbitration and clarifies doctrinal ambiguities surrounding fraud and arbitrability. It aligns Indian jurisprudence with global standards by restricting the fraud exception to narrow circumstances and ensuring effective interim protection for foreign awards. The ruling strengthens investor confidence and judicial predictability in cross-border commercial disputes. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam* 2. *Rashid Raza v. Sadaf Akhtar* 3. *Booz Allen & Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Ltd.* 4. *Swiss Timing Ltd. v. Commonwealth Games 2010 Organising Committee* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996* 2. *Indian Contract Act, 1872* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [The Commissioner of Central Excise, Customs and Service Tax, Calicut v. M/s. Cera Boards and Doors, Kannur Kerala & Ors., [2020] 11 S.C.R. 471](https://lawfoyer.in/the-commissioner-of-central-excise-customs-and-service-tax-calicut-v-m-s-cera-boards-and-doors-kannur-kerala-ors-2020-11-s-c-r-471/) **Published:** February 2, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in The Commissioner of Central Excise, Customs and Service Tax, Calicut v. M/s. Cera Boards and Doors, Kannur Kerala & Ors. examines the core principles governing valuation of excisable goods under Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944, particularly in the context of alleged undervaluation and evasion of duty. The controversy arose from multiple batches of appeals involving plywood and board manufacturers accused of systematically under-invoicing goods and collecting consideration in cash beyond invoice values. The adjudicating authorities confirmed undervaluation, while the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal upheld such findings but remanded matters for re-quantification of duty. **Content:** ## A) **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment in *The Commissioner of Central Excise, Customs and Service Tax, Calicut v. M/s. Cera Boards and Doors, Kannur Kerala & Ors.* examines the core principles governing valuation of excisable goods under *Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944*, particularly in the context of alleged undervaluation and evasion of duty. The controversy arose from multiple batches of appeals involving plywood and board manufacturers accused of systematically under-invoicing goods and collecting consideration in cash beyond invoice values. The adjudicating authorities confirmed undervaluation, while the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal upheld such findings but remanded matters for re-quantification of duty. The Supreme Court addressed the legal framework applicable to valuation both prior to and after the amendment of *Section 4* by the *Finance Act, 2000*, which replaced the concept of “normal price” with “transaction value”. The Court clarified the demarcation between *Section 4(1)(a)* and *Section 4(1)(b)*, emphasizing that valuation rules apply only when transactions fall outside the scope of clause (a). The judgment articulates detailed principles to guide adjudicating authorities during re-adjudication, ensuring consistency with statutory mandates and delegated legislation. The decision strengthens doctrinal clarity on valuation, limits arbitrary application of uniform uplift percentages, and reinforces the evidentiary threshold for extending valuation findings across transactions. **Keywords:** Central Excise valuation, transaction value, normal price, undervaluation, delegated legislation. ## B) **CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*The Commissioner of Central Excise, Customs and Service Tax, Calicut v. M/s. Cera Boards and Doors, Kannur Kerala & Ors.*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal Nos. 7240–7248 of 2009 with connected appealsiii) Judgement Date19 August 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumS. A. Bobde, CJI; A. S. Bopanna, J.; V. Ramasubramanian, J.vi) AuthorV. Ramasubramanian, J.vii) Citation*\[2020\] 11 S.C.R. 471*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Section 4, Central Excise Act, 1944; Central Excise Valuation Rules, 1975; Central Excise Valuation Rules, 2000*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsIndirect Tax Law, Fiscal Law ## C) **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The judgment arises from a series of appeals filed by Revenue authorities challenging orders of the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal that remanded valuation disputes for re-quantification. The background reflects a widespread investigation by the Directorate General of Central Excise Intelligence into plywood manufacturers in Kerala and Karnataka. The investigations uncovered documentary and oral evidence indicating that manufacturers allegedly sold goods at prices higher than those reflected in statutory invoices, thereby evading excise duty. The period of dispute straddled a significant legislative transition, namely the amendment of *Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944* with effect from 01.07.2000. Prior to the amendment, valuation was anchored in the concept of *“normal price”* linked to wholesale trade. Post-amendment, Parliament introduced the concept of *“transaction value”*, reflecting the price actually paid or payable. The Tribunal accepted the existence of undervaluation but rejected the Revenue’s approach of uniformly enhancing invoice values across all transactions. The Supreme Court was thus called upon to delineate the proper legal framework governing valuation for different periods and to clarify the permissible extent of reliance on valuation rules framed under delegated legislation. The decision assumes significance in harmonizing statutory interpretation with principles of fiscal certainty and evidentiary fairness. ## D) **FACTS OF THE CASE** The lead case concerned *M/s. Cera Boards and Doors*, a partnership firm engaged in manufacturing plywood and block boards. Searches conducted in October 2002 at factory premises, depots, residences of partners, employees, and dealers resulted in seizure of private records, cash statements, notebooks, and loose slips. These materials allegedly revealed systematic under-invoicing and collection of excess consideration in cash. The Department quantified evasion at over Rs. 4.29 crores for the period between December 1998 and December 2002. Show cause notices were issued proposing recovery of differential duty under *Section 11A*, interest under *Section 11AB*, penalties under *Section 11AC*, and confiscation under the relevant rules. The assessee contested the allegations, sought cross-examination, and argued that evidence was confined to a few dealers and could not justify extrapolation across all transactions. The adjudicating authority partially confirmed demands limited to certain dealers based on evidence. On appeal, the Tribunal upheld findings of undervaluation but held that valuation methodology differed pre- and post-amendment of *Section 4*. It rejected uniform loading of 70% on invoice values and remanded matters for re-quantification. Similar factual matrices existed in connected appeals involving other manufacturers, forming the composite batch decided by the Supreme Court. ## E) **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether valuation of excisable goods should be governed by *Section 4(1)(a)* or *Section 4(1)(b)* of the *Central Excise Act, 1944*? ii. Whether valuation rules can be applied where transactions satisfy the conditions of *Section 4(1)(a)*? iii. Whether evidence of undervaluation in respect of certain dealers can be extended uniformly to all transactions? ## F) **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the Revenue submitted that findings of undervaluation had attained finality and that the Tribunal erred in restricting valuation to specific transactions. It was argued that once undervaluation is established, the actual price realized, including cash components, constitutes assessable value. Reliance was placed on *Collector of Customs v. D. Bhoormall* to contend that mathematical precision is not required in cases of clandestine activity. The Revenue further asserted that valuation rules permitted adoption of reasonable methods to arrive at assessable value when invoices were unreliable. ## G) **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the assessees contended that valuation must strictly conform to statutory mandates. For the pre-2000 period, emphasis was placed on *normal price* in wholesale trade. For the post-amendment period, it was argued that *transaction value* must be determined per transaction and cannot be assumed uniformly. The assessees highlighted lack of corroborative evidence for all clearances and opposed extrapolation from isolated instances. ## H) **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. *Section 4, Central Excise Act, 1944* ii. *Central Excise Valuation (Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rules, 1975* iii. *Central Excise Valuation (Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rules, 2000* ## I) **JUDGEMENT** The Court confirmed the Tribunal’s remand orders, holding that although undervaluation was established, proper statutory analysis under *Section 4* was absent. It clarified that valuation under rules is permissible only when transactions fall under *Section 4(1)(b)*. The Court systematically analyzed the evolution of valuation law, distinguishing between pre- and post-amendment regimes. It emphasized that adjudicating authorities must first determine whether a transaction satisfies conditions of *Section 4(1)(a)* before resorting to valuation rules. The judgment laid down structured principles to guide re-adjudication, balancing revenue interests with statutory discipline. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio lies in the interpretation of *Section 4*, holding that valuation rules cannot override statutory transaction value where conditions of *Section 4(1)(a)* are satisfied. The Court underscored that delegated legislation operates only within statutory limits. It affirmed that additional consideration received beyond invoices forms part of transaction value but rejected arbitrary uniform enhancements. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that delayed retractions of statements reduce their evidentiary value and that fiscal adjudication must adhere to fairness despite revenue implications. It stressed expeditious disposal of old matters to uphold certainty. **c) GUIDELINES** The Court issued detailed guidelines segregating valuation methodology for periods before and after 01.07.2000, directing authorities to identify applicable clauses, relevant valuation rules, and dealer-specific evidence before quantification. ## J) **REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Collector of Customs, Madras v. D. Bhoormall*, *(1983) 13 ELT 1546 (SC)* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Central Excise Act, 1944* ii. *Finance Act, 2000* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Sardar Bahginder Singh v. Sardar Manjieeth Singh Jagan Singh & Ors., [2020] 14 S.C.R. 349](https://lawfoyer.in/sardar-bahginder-singh-v-sardar-manjieeth-singh-jagan-singh-ors-2020-14-s-c-r-349/) **Published:** February 2, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment adjudicates the statutory conflict concerning the authority to nominate four members to the statutory Board constituted under the Nanded Sikh Gurudwara Sachkhand Shri Hazur Apchalnagar Sahib Act, 1956. The controversy arose from conflicting factional claims within the Sachkhand Hazuri Khalsa Diwan, Nanded, a public trust registered under the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950. The State Government of Maharashtra assumed the power to nominate four members under Section 6(1)(viii) due to internal disputes in the Diwan and issued a notification dated 21 June 2019. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment adjudicates the statutory conflict concerning the authority to nominate *four members to the statutory Board* constituted under the *Nanded Sikh Gurudwara Sachkhand Shri Hazur Apchalnagar Sahib Act, 1956*. The controversy arose from *conflicting factional claims* within the *Sachkhand Hazuri Khalsa Diwan, Nanded*, a public trust registered under the *Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950*. The *State Government of Maharashtra* assumed the power to nominate four members under *Section 6(1)(viii)* due to internal disputes in the Diwan and issued a notification dated *21 June 2019*. The Bombay High Court set aside the notification, holding that the Government lacked statutory authority to nominate members under the said provision. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the *scheme of Section 6*, its sub-sections, and the *Nanded Sikh Gurudwara Rules, 1958*. The Court distinguished between the *public trust entity* and the *statutory Gurudwara Board*, holding them to be *distinct juridical personalities*. The Court authoritatively interpreted *Section 6(1)(viii)* to vest *exclusive nomination power* in the *collective body of the Diwan*, and not in any individual office bearer, Working Committee, or the State Government. The absence of a fallback power in *Section 6(3)* for clause (viii) was decisive. The judgment reinforces the doctrine that *statutory powers must be exercised strictly in the manner prescribed by law*, and that *administrative convenience cannot override legislative intent*. **Keywords:** Statutory interpretation, nomination power, religious endowments, public trust law, administrative overreach ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetails*Judgement Cause Title**Sardar Bahginder Singh v. Sardar Manjieeth Singh Jagan Singh & Ors.**Case Number**Civil Appeal No. 2964 of 2020 (with C.A. Nos. 2965–2966 of 2020)**Judgement Date**20 August 2020**Court**Supreme Court of India**Quorum**Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J. and K.M. Joseph, J.**Author**Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.**Citation**\[2020\] 14 S.C.R. 349**Legal Provisions Involved**Sections 2(a), 2(c), 2(e), 5, 6(1)(viii), 6(2), 6(3) of the Nanded Act, 1956; Rule 6 of the 1958 Rules; Section 22 of the MPT Act, 1950**Judgments Overruled**None**Related Law Subjects**Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, Trust Law, Religious Endowments Law* ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The dispute emerged from the statutory framework governing the administration of *Nanded Sikh Gurudwara Sachkhand Shri Hazur Apchalnagar Sahib*, a historically significant Sikh institution. The *Nanded Act, 1956*, enacted by the erstwhile Hyderabad Legislative Assembly, established a *statutory Board* for managing Gurudwara affairs. The Board’s composition under *Section 6* reflects a delicate balance between *government nominees, elected representatives, and nominees of Sikh religious bodies*. A central component of this structure is *Section 6(1)(viii)*, which entrusts *four nominations* to the *Sachkhand Hazuri Khalsa Diwan, Nanded*. The Diwan itself traces its origin to a society registered in *1350 Fasli* and later became a *public trust* under the *Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950*. Over decades, *factional disputes* plagued its internal governance, particularly concerning elections, membership, and leadership. These disputes resulted in *multiple and conflicting nomination claims* being submitted to the State Government in 2019. Faced with administrative paralysis, the Government issued a notification nominating four members by selectively drawing from rival lists. This executive intervention prompted a constitutional challenge before the Bombay High Court. The High Court restrained itself from entering disputed factual terrain pending before the *Assistant Charity Commissioner* under *Section 22 of the MPT Act*. Instead, it confined itself to *pure statutory interpretation*. The Supreme Court, while affirming this approach, addressed a foundational question concerning *who holds the legal authority to nominate under Section 6(1)(viii)* and whether the State could assume such power in exigent circumstances. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The *Sachkhand Hazuri Khalsa Diwan* was registered as a society in *1951* and as a *public trust in 1982*. Its governance structure included a *General Committee* comprising all members and a *Working Committee* of 28 members elected biennially. Internal disputes intensified following trust registration, culminating in litigation resolved by the Supreme Court in *2014*, which affirmed the finality of trust registration while leaving membership disputes open under the *MPT Act*. In 2019, the term of the Gurudwara Board necessitated fresh nominations. Under *Rule 6 of the 1958 Rules*, the State Government requested the Diwan to nominate four members. Instead of a unified resolution, *multiple letters* were submitted by rival claimants asserting authority as President or Secretary. Some letters lacked *Diwan resolutions*. The State sought clarification from the *Charity Commissioner*, who informed it that *Inquiry Applications Nos. 44 and 114 of 2019* concerning Diwan leadership were pending. Despite this, the State Government issued a notification on *21 June 2019* nominating four individuals. The notification was challenged under *Article 226*. The High Court held that the Government had *usurped powers statutorily vested in the Diwan* and set aside the notification. The appellants argued before the Supreme Court that historical practice permitted the President to nominate members and that administrative exigency justified State intervention. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. *Whether the State Government possesses authority to nominate members under Section 6(1)(viii) of the Nanded Act, 1956?* ii. *Whether the power of nomination under Section 6(1)(viii) vests in individual office bearers or the collective body of the Diwan?* iii. *Whether administrative necessity can justify deviation from statutory prescription?* ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that *historical practice* demonstrated nominations being made by the Diwan President. It was argued that *Gurucharan Singh* had regularly exercised nomination powers without objection. The appellants contended that *Section 6(2)* read with *Rule 6* enabled State facilitation and that the Government acted to prevent administrative vacuum. It was further submitted that the *first respondent lacked locus standi* due to alleged removal as trustee by a *Working Committee resolution*. Pending disputes before the Charity Commissioner were argued to be irrelevant to immediate Board functioning. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents asserted that *Section 6(1)(viii)* confers *exclusive authority* on the Diwan as a *collective entity*. It was argued that *Section 6(3)* consciously excludes clause (viii), thereby denying the State any residuary power. The respondents emphasized the *rule of law doctrine*, arguing that executive convenience cannot override statutory mandate. They highlighted inconsistencies in nomination letters and absence of Diwan resolutions. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 6(1)(viii), Nanded Act, 1956* ii. *Section 6(2) and 6(3), Nanded Act, 1956* iii. *Rule 6, Nanded Sikh Gurudwara Rules, 1958* iv. *Section 22, Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s decision. It held that *Section 6(1)(viii)* vests *exclusive nomination authority* in the *Sachkhand Hazuri Khalsa Diwan*. The Court undertook a structural interpretation, noting that *Section 6(3)* grants fallback powers to the State only for clauses *(iv) to (vii)*. The deliberate exclusion of clause *(viii)* was decisive. The Court clarified that the *Diwan* refers to the *entire collective body of voting members*, not the President or Working Committee. It rejected arguments based on past practice, holding that *custom cannot override statute*. The State’s action was characterized as *statutory usurpation*. Directions were issued to complete pending inquiries within *three months* and to convene a Diwan meeting under the supervision of the *Assistant Charity Commissioner*. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The *exclusive statutory power* to nominate four members under *Section 6(1)(viii)* lies with the *collective body of the Sachkhand Hazuri Khalsa Diwan*, and the *State Government lacks authority* to exercise or assume this power, even in cases of internal dispute. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that *administrative deadlock* cannot justify executive overreach. It emphasized the necessity for religious and charitable bodies to *update bye-laws* to prevent governance paralysis. **c) GUIDELINES** i. The Diwan shall convene a collective meeting to nominate members. ii. The Assistant Charity Commissioner shall act as observer. iii. Pending trust disputes must be resolved expeditiously. iv. The State shall refrain from intervening beyond statutory limits. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Sardar Jeewansingh (Dead) Through LRs v. Shersingh & Ors.*, *Decision dated 22.01.2014*, Supreme Court of India **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Nanded Sikh Gurudwara Sachkhand Shri Hazur Apchalnagar Sahib Act, 1956* ii. *Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Sri V.N. Krishna Murthy & Anr. v. Sri Ravikumar & Ors, [2020] 7 S.C.R. 1148](https://lawfoyer.in/sri-v-n-krishna-murthy-anr-v-sri-ravikumar-ors-2020-7-s-c-r-1148/) **Published:** February 2, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the scope of the expression “person aggrieved” under Sections 96 and 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and determines whether purchasers claiming title through sale deeds executed under a General Power of Attorney possess locus standi to challenge a decree cancelling an agreement to sell to which they were not parties. The Supreme Court clarifies that appellate rights are not automatic and accrue only where a decree prejudicially affects legal rights. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the scope of the expression *“person aggrieved”* under *Sections 96 and 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908* and determines whether purchasers claiming title through sale deeds executed under a *General Power of Attorney* possess locus standi to challenge a decree cancelling an agreement to sell to which they were not parties. The Supreme Court clarifies that appellate rights are not automatic and accrue only where a decree prejudicially affects legal rights. The Court holds that a decree cancelling an agreement to sell is *not a judgment in rem* and binds only the parties to the suit. Purchasers deriving title independently through GPA-based sale deeds, when such sale deeds are neither questioned nor adjudicated upon in the suit, cannot be said to be aggrieved persons. The judgment reinforces the doctrinal distinction between *judgments in personam* and *judgments in rem*, and reiterates settled jurisprudence that psychological, speculative, or remote injury does not confer appellate standing. The ruling strengthens procedural discipline in civil litigation by preventing collateral challenges by strangers to proceedings and preserves the finality of decrees confined to limited declaratory reliefs. **Keywords:** Person aggrieved; Judgment in rem; Locus standi; Section 96 CPC; Section 100 CPC; Agreement to sell; General Power of Attorney. ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgment Cause Title*Sri V.N. Krishna Murthy & Anr. v. Sri Ravikumar & Ors.*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal Nos. 2701–2704 of 2020iii) Judgment Date21 August 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumL. Nageswara Rao J., Krishna Murari J., S. Ravindra Bhat J.vi) AuthorKrishna Murari J.vii) Citation*\[2020\] 7 S.C.R. 1148*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 96 and 100, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsCivil Procedure; Property Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The dispute arose from competing claims over immovable property situated in Village Jakkur, Bengaluru North Taluk. The recorded owners executed *agreements to sell* in favour of a cooperative housing society and simultaneously executed a *General Power of Attorney* authorising society office bearers to alienate the property. Acting under the GPA, sale deeds were later executed in favour of third-party purchasers. Subsequently, certain co-owners instituted civil suits seeking declarations that the agreements to sell were time-barred and unenforceable, along with injunctions restraining interference with possession. Crucially, the suits did not challenge the GPA-based sale deeds nor seek any relief against the purchasers. The Trial Court decreed the suits by declaring the agreements to sell unenforceable and granting injunctions against the society. During pendency, the purchasers sought impleadment, which was rejected. After the suits were decreed, they sought leave to appeal as non-parties, contending that the decree adversely affected their interests. The High Court declined leave, holding that the purchasers’ rights flowed from independent sale deeds and were unaffected by the declaratory decree. The matter reached the Supreme Court, presenting a narrow yet significant procedural question concerning appellate standing of strangers to a suit and the meaning of “person aggrieved” under the CPC. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The lands involved comprised Survey Nos. *105/3, 105/9, and 105/4B* at Jakkur village. Respondents 5 and 6, as recorded owners, executed registered *agreements to sell dated 31.10.1989 and 05.08.1992* in favour of *Karnataka State Khadi and Village Industries Workers’ House Building Co-operative Society Ltd.* Alongside, a *General Power of Attorney* was executed conferring wide authority to sell the land. Acting under the GPA, the society’s office bearers executed *sale deeds in favour of the appellants* on various dates. The appellants entered possession based on these conveyances. Later, respondents claiming co-ownership filed multiple suits alleging that the property was ancestral and that the agreements to sell were executed without their consent. They pleaded that the agreements were barred by limitation and unenforceable. The reliefs sought were confined to cancellation of the agreements to sell and injunctions against the society and its agents. Significantly, *no relief was claimed against the sale deeds* nor were the purchasers arrayed as defendants. The Trial Court decreed the suits, declaring the agreements time-barred and restraining the society from interfering with possession. During the suits, the appellants’ application for impleadment under *Order I Rule 10 CPC* was rejected. After the decree, the appellants filed Regular First Appeals with applications for leave to appeal as non-parties. The High Court rejected the applications, prompting the present appeals. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether purchasers under GPA-based sale deeds, who were not parties to the suit, qualify as *“persons aggrieved”* under *Sections 96 and 100 CPC*? ii. Whether a decree cancelling an agreement to sell operates as a *judgment in rem* binding third parties? iii. Whether the High Court was justified in refusing leave to appeal to the appellants? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that the appellants had acquired absolute title through registered sale deeds and were in possession of the sites. It was argued that the declaratory decree holding the agreements time-barred and granting injunctions indirectly clouded their title and possession. The appellants contended that their interests were directly affected and that denial of leave to appeal resulted in grave prejudice. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents submitted that the appellants’ rights flowed exclusively from independent sale deeds executed under the GPA and not from the agreements to sell which were the sole subject matter of the suits. It was argued that the decree neither referred to nor adjudicated upon the sale deeds. Hence, the appellants were neither bound by nor aggrieved by the decree and lacked locus standi to appeal. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 96, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908* ii. *Section 100, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908* iii. *Order I Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908* ## I) JUDGMENT The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the High Court’s refusal to grant leave. The Court held that appellate remedies under *Sections 96 and 100 CPC* are available only to persons whose rights are prejudicially affected. The appellants failed to demonstrate any legal injury. The decree was confined to cancellation of agreements to sell and injunctions against the society. It did not adjudicate upon the appellants’ sale deeds nor bind them. The Court emphasised that the decree was not a *judgment in rem* but operated strictly *in personam*. Mere apprehension or speculative prejudice was insufficient. The appellants were free to protect their possession or title through independent proceedings. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** A non-party can appeal against a decree only with leave and only if the decree prejudicially affects his legal rights. A decree cancelling an agreement to sell, without adjudicating upon GPA-based sale deeds, is not a judgment in rem and does not confer appellate standing on purchasers claiming under independent conveyances. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that leave to appeal should not be granted to every person remotely or indirectly affected. The appellate process must not be converted into a forum for collateral challenges by strangers. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Leave to appeal is exceptional and not routine. ii. Courts must examine whether the decree binds the applicant. iii. Psychological or speculative injury does not constitute grievance. iv. Independent remedies remain available to third parties. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Smt. Jatan Kumar Golcha v. Golcha Properties Pvt. Ltd.*, *\[1971\] 3 SCR 247* ii. *State of Punjab v. Amar Singh*, *\[1974\] 3 SCR 152* iii. *Baldev Singh v. Surinder Mohan Sharma*, *\[2002\] 4 Suppl. SCR 43* iv. *A. Subash Babu v. State of A.P.*, *\[2011\] 9 SCR 453* v. *Shanti Kumar R. Canji v. Home Insurance Co. of New York*, *\[1975\] 1 SCR 550* vi. *State of Rajasthan v. Union of India*, *\[1978\] 1 SCR 1* vii. *Srimathi K. Ponnalagu Ammani v. State of Madras*, 66 Law Weekly 136 **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Code of Civil Procedure, 1908* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Wg. Cdr. Arifur Rahman Khan & Aleya Sultana & Ors. v. DLF Southern Homes Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., [2020] 9 SCR 136](https://lawfoyer.in/wg-cdr-arifur-rahman-khan-aleya-sultana-ors-v-dlf-southern-homes-pvt-ltd-ors-2020-9-scr-136/) **Published:** February 2, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment delivered by the Supreme Court of India in Wg. Cdr. Arifur Rahman Khan and Aleya Sultana & Ors. v. DLF Southern Homes Pvt. Ltd. constitutes a decisive exposition on the scope of deficiency of service under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 in cases involving delayed delivery of residential flats. The dispute arose from substantial delays, ranging between two to four years, in handing over possession of apartments despite contractual stipulations mandating completion within thirty-six months. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission dismissed the buyers’ complaint by confining compensation to a contractual clause providing a nominal fixed rate. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment delivered by the Supreme Court of India in *Wg. Cdr. Arifur Rahman Khan and Aleya Sultana & Ors. v. DLF Southern Homes Pvt. Ltd.* constitutes a decisive exposition on the scope of *deficiency of service* under the *Consumer Protection Act, 1986* in cases involving delayed delivery of residential flats. The dispute arose from substantial delays, ranging between *two to four years*, in handing over possession of apartments despite contractual stipulations mandating completion within *thirty-six months*. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission dismissed the buyers’ complaint by confining compensation to a contractual clause providing a nominal fixed rate. The Supreme Court rejected this constrained interpretation and held that contractual clauses in *one-sided apartment buyer agreements* cannot curtail the statutory jurisdiction of consumer fora to grant *just and reasonable compensation*. The Court recognised the economic realities faced by homebuyers, including loan servicing obligations, rental expenses, and mental hardship. It clarified that *delay in possession itself constitutes a deficiency of service* under *Section 2(1)(g)* and that consumer fora possess wide remedial powers under *Section 14(1)(e)*. The judgment reinforces consumer protection jurisprudence by asserting that unfair contractual terms cannot override statutory remedies. It also addresses ancillary issues concerning execution of conveyance deeds, entitlement of subsequent purchasers, amenities promised in brochures, and limitations on claims post-settlement. The ruling significantly strengthens buyer rights in real estate transactions and discourages exploitative contractual practices by developers. **Keywords:** Consumer Protection Act 1986; Deficiency of Service; Delay in Possession; One-Sided Contracts; Compensation ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*Wg. Cdr. Arifur Rahman Khan & Aleya Sultana & Ors. v. DLF Southern Homes Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.*ii) Case Number*Civil Appeal No. 6239 of 2019 with Civil Appeal No. 6303 of 2019*iii) Judgement Date*24 August 2020*iv) Court*Supreme Court of India*v) Quorum*Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J. and K.M. Joseph, J.*vi) Author*Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.*vii) Citation*\[2020\] 9 SCR 136*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 2(1)(g), 2(1)(o), 12(1)(c), 14(1)(e) – Consumer Protection Act, 1986*ix) Judgments Overruled*None*x) Related Law Subjects*Consumer Law, Real Estate Law, Contract Law* ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The litigation arose from a large-scale residential housing project developed by the respondent developer at Bengaluru. The project was marketed through brochures containing explicit representations relating to timely delivery and provision of amenities. Purchasers entered into *Apartment Buyers Agreements* under which possession was to be handed over within *thirty-six months*, subject to limited exceptions. Despite this, possession was delayed by several years without any legally sustainable justification. A consumer complaint was instituted initially by a small group and later expanded under *Section 12(1)(c)* to represent *339 flat buyers*. The National Commission, despite acknowledging admitted delays, dismissed the complaint on the reasoning that buyers were contractually bound by a compensation clause stipulating a nominal rate of *Rs. 5 per square foot per month*. This approach effectively reduced statutory consumer remedies to contractual damages. The Supreme Court was thus called upon to examine whether contractual stipulations in real estate agreements could fetter statutory powers under the *Consumer Protection Act, 1986*. The case also required adjudication on the effect of conveyance deeds, settlements, subsequent transfers, and the enforceability of representations concerning amenities. The judgment addresses systemic imbalances between developers and homebuyers and situates consumer law as a corrective mechanism against unequal bargaining power. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellants booked residential flats in a large township project after being induced by representations promising timely delivery and a host of amenities. The *Apartment Buyers Agreements* stipulated completion within *thirty-six months*, subject only to *force majeure* conditions. A substantial portion of the consideration was paid within the initial years of construction. Despite repeated assurances, possession timelines were repeatedly extended through communications issued by the developer. Occupancy certificates were delayed, and actual possession occurred several years beyond the stipulated period. The delays were not attributable to *force majeure* events. The buyers continued servicing housing loans and incurred rental expenses while awaiting possession. Many executed conveyance deeds only because possession was otherwise withheld. Some accepted nominal compensation under protest. The National Commission dismissed the complaint on technical group-wise classifications and contractual constraints, leading to the present appeals. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether *delay in handing over possession* constitutes *deficiency of service* under the Consumer Protection Act? ii. Whether consumer fora are bound by *contractual compensation clauses* in one-sided agreements? iii. Whether execution of *conveyance deeds* extinguishes the right to claim compensation? iv. Whether representations regarding amenities create enforceable obligations? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that the delay of several years amounted to a clear breach of contractual and statutory obligations. It was argued that the compensation clause was manifestly unfair and did not reflect actual losses suffered. Reliance was placed on *Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta* and *Pioneer Urban Land v. Govindan Raghavan* to assert that consumer fora are empowered to grant just compensation beyond contractual terms. It was further contended that execution of conveyance deeds occurred under economic compulsion and could not waive statutory remedies. The appellants also highlighted failure to provide promised amenities, constituting misrepresentation and unfair trade practice. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents argued that compensation had been paid strictly as per contractual terms. It was submitted that possession was ultimately delivered and buyers benefited from appreciation in property value. Execution of conveyance deeds and settlements was relied upon to argue waiver and estoppel. The developer contended that amenities were either provided or rendered impractical due to external factors and that no further liability subsisted under the agreements. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 2(1)(g), Consumer Protection Act, 1986* ii. *Section 2(1)(o), Consumer Protection Act, 1986* iii. *Section 14(1)(e), Consumer Protection Act, 1986* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court categorically held that *failure to deliver possession within the contractual period constitutes deficiency of service*. It rejected the notion that consumer fora are bound by unfair contractual clauses. The Court emphasised that statutory remedies are designed to correct power imbalances inherent in builder-buyer relationships. The Court distinguished *DLF Homes Panchkula v. D.S. Dhanda* and reaffirmed that exceptional circumstances existed due to gross delays. It held that execution of conveyance deeds does not bar compensation claims. However, purchasers who entered into voluntary settlements or subsequent transferees were excluded. On amenities, the Court held the developer accountable for representations made in brochures. The dismissal of the complaint by the National Commission was set aside, and compensation was directed. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The statutory jurisdiction of consumer fora to award *just compensation* for *deficiency of service* cannot be curtailed by *one-sided contractual clauses*. Delay beyond stipulated possession periods inherently amounts to deficiency. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that developers “sell dreams” and must be held accountable for lifestyle representations. Judicial notice was taken of the financial stress faced by homebuyers. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Consumer fora may override unfair compensation clauses. ii. Execution of conveyance deeds does not automatically waive consumer rights. iii. Developers are bound by representations in brochures. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment marks a significant advancement in consumer protection jurisprudence. It reinforces the principle that statutory remedies prevail over unfair contracts. The ruling deters exploitative real estate practices and restores equilibrium between developers and homebuyers. It affirms consumer fora as forums of substantive justice rather than contractual enforcement bodies. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta* – *\[1994\] 1 SCC 243* ii. *Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Balbir Singh* – *\[2004\] 5 SCC 65* iii. *Pioneer Urban Land v. Govindan Raghavan* – *\[2019\] 5 SCC 725* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Consumer Protection Act, 1986* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [,Raj Pal Singh v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Haryana, Rohtak, [2020] 9 SCR 185](https://lawfoyer.in/raj-pal-singh-v-commissioner-of-income-tax-haryana-rohtak-2020-9-scr-185/) **Published:** February 2, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the precise point of accrual of capital gains under Section 45 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in cases of compulsory acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The dispute arose from the acquisition of land belonging to the assessee, which was already in possession of a college as a lessee whose lease had expired prior to acquisition. The controversy centered on whether capital gains accrued on the date of issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or on the date of passing of the award under Section 11. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the precise point of **accrual of capital gains** under *Section 45 of the Income-tax Act, 1961* in cases of compulsory acquisition of land under the *Land Acquisition Act, 1894*. The dispute arose from the acquisition of land belonging to the assessee, which was already in possession of a college as a lessee whose lease had expired prior to acquisition. The controversy centered on whether capital gains accrued on the date of issuance of notification under *Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894* or on the date of passing of the award under *Section 11*. The Supreme Court rejected the contention that issuance of notification or prior possession by the beneficiary institution resulted in vesting of land. It held that **capital gains accrue only when the transfer of capital asset is complete**, which in compulsory acquisition cases correlates with **statutory vesting of land in the Government**, and such vesting ordinarily occurs under *Section 16* only after the award is made. The Court clarified that **accrual of the right to receive compensation is conceptually distinct from accrual of capital gains**. The judgment authoritatively settles that in ordinary acquisitions under the 1894 Act, capital gains accrue on the **date of award**, unless urgency provisions under *Section 17* are expressly invoked. The ruling reconciles conflicting strands of tax jurisprudence and affirms that income tax cannot be levied on a mere inchoate or contingent right. **Keywords:** Capital gains, compulsory acquisition, vesting of land, Section 45 Income-tax Act, Land Acquisition Act 1894. ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgment Cause Title*Raj Pal Singh v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Haryana, Rohtak*Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 2416 of 2010Judgment Date25 August 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumA.M. Khanwilkar, Hemant Gupta, Dinesh Maheshwari, JJ.AuthorJustice Dinesh MaheshwariCitation\[2020\] 9 SCR 185Legal Provisions Involved*Section 45, Income-tax Act, 1961*; *Sections 4, 6, 9, 11, 16, 17, 28, Land Acquisition Act, 1894*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsTax Law, Land Acquisition Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The case arose from a long-drawn dispute concerning taxation of compensation received on compulsory acquisition of land. The assessee, a Hindu Undivided Family, owned land that had been leased to a college. After the lease expired, the beneficiary institution sought compulsory acquisition of the land. Although acquisition proceedings commenced in 1968, the award was passed only in 1970. The Income-tax authorities differed on whether capital gains accrued on the date of notification or the date of award. The Assessing Officer initially excluded capital gains, while the appellate authorities later brought them to tax. Conflicting views were expressed by the ITAT in different assessment years. The High Court held that capital gains accrued only on the date of award. The assessee challenged this conclusion, arguing that possession with the beneficiary amounted to vesting at the notification stage. The Supreme Court was thus required to determine the **exact moment of transfer for the purposes of capital gains taxation** under the Income-tax Act. The background reflects persistent uncertainty in Indian tax jurisprudence regarding compulsory acquisition, particularly the conflation between possession, vesting, and accrual of income. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The subject land, measuring 41 kanals and 14 marlas, was allotted to the assessee as evacuee property. A substantial portion was leased to S.A. Jain College for 20 years, expiring on *31.08.1967*. After expiry, the college remained in possession without renewal. On *15.05.1968*, the State issued a *Section 4* notification under the *Land Acquisition Act, 1894* for acquiring the land for a playground. A declaration under *Section 6* followed on *13.08.1969*. The Land Acquisition Collector passed the award on *29.09.1970*. Compensation and solatium were awarded to the landowners, and interest was granted from the date of notification. Subsequent litigation led to enhancement of compensation by the civil court and High Court. During income-tax assessment for AY 1971-72, the question arose whether capital gains accrued in the year of notification or the year of award. Conflicting findings at different appellate levels ultimately culminated in the Supreme Court appeal. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether capital gains under *Section 45 of the Income-tax Act, 1961* accrued on the date of *Section 4 notification* or on the date of award under *Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894*? ii. Whether prior possession of land by the beneficiary institution amounted to vesting in the Government? iii. Whether interest awarded from the date of notification altered the accrual of capital gains? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the acquisition was effectively complete upon issuance of notification since the beneficiary already possessed the land. It was argued that possession constituted extinguishment of ownership rights within the meaning of *Section 2(47) of the Income-tax Act*. Reliance was placed on cases concerning urgency acquisitions to argue that vesting need not await the award. It was further contended that interest awarded from the notification date implied earlier transfer. The appellant also argued parity with its own earlier assessment year where the ITAT had ruled in its favour. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent submitted that **vesting under the Land Acquisition Act is purely statutory** and occurs only as provided under *Sections 16 or 17*. Since urgency provisions were never invoked, vesting could occur only upon making of the award. It was argued that possession by a lessee after expiry of lease was merely that of a tenant at sufferance and could not be equated with Government possession. The respondent emphasized that income tax is levied on **accrued income**, not on a speculative or contingent right. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 45, Income-tax Act, 1961* ii. *Sections 4, 6, 9, 11, 16, 17, 28, Land Acquisition Act, 1894* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s view. It held that **capital gains accrue only upon completion of transfer**, which in compulsory acquisition occurs when land vests in the Government. Vesting under *Section 16* follows the award, not the notification. The Court drew a clear distinction between **right to receive compensation** and **transfer of capital asset**. It held that possession taken before statutory vesting does not complete transfer. Interest awarded under *Section 28* was held irrelevant to accrual of capital gains. The Court approved earlier High Court rulings holding that even where possession is taken earlier, vesting relates back to the award in ordinary acquisitions. It rejected the analogy with urgency acquisitions. The appeal was dismissed. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** Capital gains under *Section 45 of the Income-tax Act, 1961* accrue only when the transfer of capital asset is statutorily complete. In cases of ordinary acquisition under the *Land Acquisition Act, 1894*, such transfer is complete only upon vesting of land under *Section 16*, which occurs after the award. Notification or prior possession does not trigger accrual. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that confusion between possession and vesting has led to inconsistent tax treatment. It cautioned against extending urgency acquisition principles to ordinary acquisitions without statutory basis. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Accrual of capital gains must align with statutory vesting. ii. Interest payment dates do not determine transfer. iii. Possession by a lessee does not amount to Government possession. ## J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment brings doctrinal clarity by decisively separating **income accrual** from **compensation entitlement**. It reinforces statutory interpretation over equitable assumptions. The ruling has enduring significance for land acquisition taxation and prevents premature taxation on contingent gains. ## K) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Special Land Acquisition Officer v. Godrej & Boyce* \[1988\] 1 SCR 590 ii. *Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union v. Delhi Improvement Trust* \[1957\] SCR 1 iii. *Lt. Governor of Himachal Pradesh v. Avinash Sharma* \[1971\] 1 SCR 413 iv. *S. Appala Narasamma v. CIT* (1987) 168 ITR 17 **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Income-tax Act, 1961* ii. *Land Acquisition Act, 1894* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Narasamma & Ors. v. A. Krishnappa (Dead) Through LRs, [2020] 7 SCR 528](https://lawfoyer.in/narasamma-ors-v-a-krishnappa-dead-through-lrs-2020-7-scr-528/) **Published:** February 2, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment adjudicates a long-standing civil dispute concerning title, possession, and adverse possession over an urban immovable property in Bengaluru. The dispute arose when the original plaintiff sought vacant possession of a revenue site, asserting absolute ownership derived from ancestral property and joint family management. The defendant resisted the claim by setting up a competing narrative of ownership through an unregistered agreement of sale, a General Power of Attorney, and alternatively, perfection of title by adverse possession commencing from the same date. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment adjudicates a long-standing civil dispute concerning *title, possession, and adverse possession* over an urban immovable property in Bengaluru. The dispute arose when the original plaintiff sought *vacant possession* of a revenue site, asserting absolute ownership derived from ancestral property and joint family management. The defendant resisted the claim by setting up a competing narrative of *ownership through an unregistered agreement of sale*, a *General Power of Attorney*, and alternatively, *perfection of title by adverse possession* commencing from the same date. The Supreme Court undertook a meticulous scrutiny of the documentary inconsistencies relied upon by the defendants and reaffirmed the concurrent factual findings of the Trial Court and the High Court regarding manipulation, alterations, and lack of proof of execution of the alleged documents. The Court emphasized that *non-registration of title documents*, absence of credible explanation for statutory prohibitions, and failure to examine the alleged transferee fatally undermined the plea of ownership. A decisive contribution of the judgment lies in its authoritative reiteration of the doctrinal incompatibility between *pleading title and adverse possession simultaneously from the same date*. The Court reaffirmed that adverse possession necessarily presupposes acknowledgment of another’s title and requires clear pleading of the *starting point of hostility*. In the absence of proof as to when permissive possession became hostile, the plea collapses. The judgment strengthens the jurisprudence that adverse possession is an *exceptional doctrine* that must be strictly pleaded and strictly proved. It reiterates that courts must exercise caution while entertaining such claims, as they operate to defeat lawful ownership. **Keywords:** Adverse possession; contradictory pleas; unregistered sale agreement; permissive possession; burden of proof; hostile possession ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetails**Judgment Cause Title***Narasamma & Ors. v. A. Krishnappa (Dead) Through LRs***Case Number**Civil Appeal No. 2710 of 2010**Judgment Date**26 August 2020**Court**Supreme Court of India**Quorum**Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Ajay Rastogi & Aniruddha Bose, JJ.**Author**Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul**Citation***\[2020\] 7 SCR 528***Legal Provisions Involved***Order VII Rule 1 CPC, 1908*; *Limitation Act, 1963***Judgments Overruled**None**Related Law Subjects**Civil Law; Property Law; Limitation Law ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The litigation traces its origin to a suit for possession instituted in 1989 concerning a revenue site carved out of ancestral agricultural land. The property formed part of a joint family estate managed by two brothers, one of whom later died issueless. The plaintiff asserted exclusive management rights as *karta* and claimed that the defendant was merely a *licensee* permitted to occupy the land temporarily for running a fuel depot. The defence narrative fundamentally altered the character of possession. The defendant alleged that the plaintiff’s brother had executed an *agreement of sale dated 10.10.1976* in favour of the defendant’s wife, followed by delivery of possession, execution of a *General Power of Attorney in 1988*, and eventual perfection of title by adverse possession. These assertions shifted the dispute from permissive occupation to hostile ownership. The Trial Court dismissed the suit primarily on the ground of adverse possession, despite recording serious doubts regarding the authenticity of the documents relied upon by the defendant. The High Court reversed this finding, holding that adverse possession was neither properly pleaded nor proved, and decreed possession in favour of the plaintiff. The Supreme Court was thus called upon to examine the *doctrinal permissibility of inconsistent pleas*, the *standard of proof for adverse possession*, and the *legal consequences of unregistered and suspicious documents*. The judgment situates itself within a long line of precedents that caution against casual acceptance of adverse possession claims. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The suit property originally formed part of an ancestral agricultural holding measuring *2 acres and 22 guntas* in *Survey No. 8/4, Goraguntepalya*. By virtue of a *registered partition deed dated 29.08.1956*, the land fell to the share of the plaintiff and his elder brother *A. Muniswamappa*. Portions of the land were converted into revenue sites and sold, while some sites were retained. Following municipal inclusion, *betterment charges* were levied and paid, and the *khata* stood in the plaintiff’s name. The plaintiff asserted that the defendant, after resigning from employment, was allowed to occupy a portion of the property *gratuitously* as a licensee to run a fuel depot, with a clear condition of vacating upon demand. The dispute escalated when the defendant attempted to induct third parties. A legal notice dated *03.07.1989* revoked permission. Upon non-compliance, the suit for possession was instituted. The defendant denied permissive possession and claimed that *Muniswamappa* had sold the property to his wife for *Rs.11,000*, executed an agreement of sale in 1976, delivered possession, and later executed a GPA and affidavit in 1988. The sale deed was never registered, allegedly due to a statutory prohibition. Alternatively, the defendant pleaded that his wife had acquired *prescriptive title by adverse possession* due to continuous, open, and hostile possession since 1976. The Trial Court disbelieved the documents due to *erasures, alterations, contradictory testimony*, and non-examination of the notary. Despite this, it upheld adverse possession. The High Court reversed this finding, leading to the present appeal. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether the defendants could simultaneously plead *title through an agreement of sale* and *adverse possession* from the same date? ii. Whether adverse possession was pleaded and proved in accordance with settled legal principles? iii. Whether possession originating under a purported agreement of sale could later become hostile without clear pleading of transition? iv. Whether unregistered and suspicious documents could confer title or support adverse possession? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellants submitted that possession commenced in *1976* and the suit filed in *1989* was barred by limitation. It was argued that the *agreement of sale* and *General Power of Attorney* established lawful possession and that failure to challenge these documents amounted to implied acceptance. It was contended that alternative and inconsistent pleas were permissible under civil law and reliance was placed on *Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur* to argue that adverse possession could operate as a shield. The appellants further submitted that sale by one coparcener would bind at least his share and that non-impleadment of the defendant’s wife was fatal. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the respondent submitted that once *title was established*, the burden squarely lay on the defendant to prove divestment. It was argued that adverse possession was neither clearly pleaded nor substantiated, as there was no evidence indicating when permissive possession became hostile. The respondent emphasized that *pleading title necessarily negates adverse possession*, relying upon *Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India*, *Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar*, *P.T. Munichikkamma Reddy v. Revamma*, and *M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das*. It was submitted that the High Court rightly corrected the Trial Court’s erroneous approach. ## **H) JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the High Court’s decree for possession. The Court affirmed that both courts below had concurrently disbelieved the alleged documents due to material alterations, erasures, contradictory testimony of DW-2, and failure to prove statutory prohibition on registration. The Court categorically held that *pleading ownership and adverse possession from the same date is legally impermissible*. It reiterated that adverse possession requires proof of *hostility*, *publicity*, and *continuity*, commencing from the point when possession becomes adverse to the true owner. The Court found that the appellants failed to establish when lawful possession, if any, transformed into hostile possession. The alleged transferee was never examined, weakening both title and adverse possession claims. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The core ratio is that *a party cannot simultaneously assert lawful title and adverse possession from the same inception*. Adverse possession presupposes acknowledgment of another’s title and requires renunciation of lawful origin. In absence of proof of the starting point of hostility, the plea fails. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that claims of adverse possession must be scrutinized with caution as they extinguish lawful ownership. Courts must resist casual acceptance of such pleas unless supported by cogent evidence. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Pleas of adverse possession must specifically plead the *date of commencement of hostility*. ii. Title and adverse possession cannot co-exist from the same date. iii. Documentary evidence must be free from suspicion and duly proved. iv. Permissive possession does not mature into adverse possession without explicit hostile assertion. ## **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment fortifies doctrinal clarity on adverse possession and decisively curbs misuse of inconsistent pleas. It reinforces evidentiary discipline and safeguards property rights against speculative claims. The decision aligns with constitutional values of certainty, fairness, and rule of law in property adjudication. ## **J) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India*, *\[2004\] 1 Supp SCR 255* ii. *Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar*, *\[1995\] 6 Supp SCR 638* iii. *P.T. Munichikkamma Reddy v. Revamma*, *\[2007\] 5 SCR 491* iv. *M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das*, *(2020) 1 SCC 1* v. *Ram Nagina Rai v. Deo Kumar Rai*, *(2019) 13 SCC 324* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Code of Civil Procedure, 1908* ii. *Limitation Act, 1963* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [,Union of India and Others v. Agricus LLP and Others [2020] 14 SCR 372](https://lawfoyer.in/union-of-india-and-others-v-agricus-llp-and-others-2020-14-scr-372/) **Published:** February 2, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment adjudicates the constitutional and statutory validity of multiple notifications and trade notices issued by the Union of India under the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992, whereby imports of certain pulses, including peas, moong, urad and tur, were shifted from the free to the restricted category and made subject to quantitative ceilings and prior authorisation. The principal controversy arose from the challenge mounted by importers asserting that such restrictions amounted to quantitative restrictions under Section 9A of the Act, necessitating compliance with the safeguard investigation mechanism and procedural safeguards prescribed under the Safeguard Measures (Quantitative Restrictions) Rules, 2012. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment adjudicates the constitutional and statutory validity of multiple notifications and trade notices issued by the Union of India under the *Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992*, whereby imports of certain pulses, including peas, moong, urad and tur, were shifted from the *free* to the *restricted* category and made subject to quantitative ceilings and prior authorisation. The principal controversy arose from the challenge mounted by importers asserting that such restrictions amounted to *quantitative restrictions* under *Section 9A* of the Act, necessitating compliance with the safeguard investigation mechanism and procedural safeguards prescribed under the *Safeguard Measures (Quantitative Restrictions) Rules, 2012*. The Court undertook an extensive interpretative exercise concerning the statutory scheme of *Sections 3 and 9A* of the FTDR Act, harmonising domestic law with India’s international obligations under *GATT 1994*, particularly *Articles XI and XIX*. A detailed exposition was rendered on the doctrines of *act of transformation*, *direct application*, and *invocability* of international treaties within Indian municipal law. Rejecting the importers’ challenge, the Court held that *Section 9A* is an enabling and exceptional provision incorporating Article XIX of GATT, and does not curtail the plenary power of the Central Government under *Section 3(2)* to impose import restrictions. The impugned notifications were upheld as intra vires, validly issued, and consistent with constitutional and statutory mandates. The judgment constitutes a seminal authority on the relationship between trade policy discretion, domestic legislative competence, and international trade obligations. **Keywords:** Foreign Trade Regulation; Quantitative Restrictions; GATT 1994; Section 3 FTDR Act; Section 9A FTDR Act; WTO Law; Import Policy; International Treaty Law ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Union of India and Others v. Agricus LLP and Others*Case NumberTransfer Petition (Civil) Nos. 496–509 of 2020Judgement Date26 August 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorum*A.M. Khanwilkar, Dinesh Maheshwari & Sanjiv Khanna, JJ.*Author*Sanjiv Khanna, J.*Citation*\[2020\] 14 SCR 372*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 3, 5, 6, 9A, 18A FTDR Act, 1992; Article 77, 253 Constitution of India; GATT 1994 Articles XI & XIX*Judgments OverruledNilRelated Law SubjectsConstitutional Law; International Trade Law; Administrative Law; Public International Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The dispute emerged in the context of India’s evolving foreign trade policy aimed at balancing domestic agricultural interests with international trade commitments. Acting under *Section 3 of the FTDR Act*, the Central Government issued a series of notifications dated *29 March 2019*, revising the import policy of pulses by imposing quantitative ceilings and requiring prior authorisation. These measures were justified on grounds of protecting domestic producers and managing agricultural surplus. The importers challenged these measures before various High Courts, resulting in divergent interim orders that permitted unrestricted imports, thereby frustrating the policy objectives. Given the pan-India ramifications and conflicting judicial directions, the Supreme Court exercised its jurisdiction under *Article 139A* to transfer and consolidate the matters. A significant dimension of the challenge concerned the alleged violation of India’s obligations under *GATT 1994*, particularly the prohibition against quantitative restrictions under *Article XI*. The importers contended that *Section 9A* constituted the exclusive statutory route for imposing quantitative restrictions, requiring adherence to safeguard investigations and procedural fairness. The Court was thus required to examine the interplay between domestic statutory powers, delegated legislation, and international treaty obligations. The judgment situates itself at the intersection of constitutional executive power, trade regulation, and international law, offering authoritative guidance on treaty implementation and statutory interpretation in India. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The Union of India issued notifications shifting imports of peas and certain pulses from the *free* category to the *restricted* category, imposing annual quotas and mandating licences issued by the Directorate General of Foreign Trade. A subsequent trade notice prescribed that licences would be issued only to *actual users*, namely millers and refiners. Importers challenged these actions on multiple grounds. They alleged lack of authority of the DGFT, improper delegation, non-compliance with parliamentary laying requirements, arbitrariness under *Article 14*, and violation of *Section 9A* safeguards. Several High Courts granted interim relief permitting unrestricted imports, resulting in a surge of imports beyond prescribed quotas. The Union contended that the notifications were issued by the Central Government itself, with DGFT merely performing ministerial publication. It was further argued that *Section 9A* was not the exclusive source of power to impose restrictions, and that *Section 3(2)* conferred independent and plenary authority. The Supreme Court framed the central issue as whether the impugned notifications constituted safeguard quantitative restrictions under *Section 9A*, or ordinary regulatory restrictions permissible under *Section 3(2)*. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the impugned notifications constituted *quantitative restrictions* requiring compliance with *Section 9A* of the FTDR Act? ii. Whether *Section 9A* overrides or restricts the powers under *Section 3(2)* of the FTDR Act? iii. Whether *Article XI of GATT 1994* is directly enforceable in Indian courts? iv. Whether the DGFT lacked authority in issuing the impugned notifications and trade notices? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the petitioners submitted that the restrictions imposed were *quantitative restrictions* within the meaning of *Section 9A*, necessitating adherence to safeguard procedures. They argued that the absence of investigation, causal determination of injury, and stakeholder hearing rendered the notifications ultra vires. It was contended that *Article XI of GATT 1994* prohibits quantitative restrictions and stands incorporated into Indian law through the FTDR Act. Reliance was placed on *Director General of Foreign Trade v. Kanak Exports* to argue excessive delegation and lack of authority. The petitioners also alleged arbitrariness and violation of legitimate expectations. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the Union of India submitted that *Section 3(2)* confers broad regulatory authority independent of *Section 9A*. It was argued that *Section 9A* is an escape clause aligned with *Article XIX of GATT*, applicable only in safeguard situations involving serious injury. The Union contended that *GATT 1994* is not directly applicable absent legislative transformation. It was further submitted that the DGFT acted as an extended arm of the Central Government, and the notifications were constitutionally valid under *Article 77*. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 3(2), FTDR Act, 1992* ii. *Section 9A, FTDR Act, 1992* iii. *Article 77, Constitution of India* iv. *Article XI & XIX, GATT 1994* v. *Safeguard Measures (Quantitative Restrictions) Rules, 2012* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Court upheld the validity of the impugned notifications. It held that *Section 3(2)* empowers the Central Government to impose restrictions, including quantitative ceilings, independent of *Section 9A*. Section 9A was construed as a specific safeguard provision enabling deviation from *Article XI* obligations under *Article XIX* circumstances. The Court elaborated on the doctrines of *dualism* and *act of transformation*, holding that *GATT 1994* is not self-executing in India. Article XI has not been legislatively incorporated, and therefore is not directly invocable before municipal courts. The argument of excessive delegation was rejected, with the Court affirming that DGFT acted within its statutory role. The expression “total quantity” was interpreted as an aggregate national ceiling, not a per-license entitlement. The judgment affirmed India’s sovereign discretion in trade regulation while remaining compliant with international obligations through appropriate statutory mechanisms. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** Section 9A of the FTDR Act does not eclipse or limit the Central Government’s power under Section 3(2) to impose import restrictions; GATT 1994 Article XI is not directly enforceable absent legislative transformation; safeguard procedures apply only when Section 9A is invoked. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that international treaties operate as constraints on sovereign discretion at the international plane but do not automatically confer enforceable rights domestically. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Import restrictions may be imposed under Section 3(2) without invoking safeguard mechanisms. ii. Section 9A applies only when restrictions are imposed as safeguard measures. iii. Treaty provisions require legislative transformation for domestic enforceability. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Director General of Foreign Trade v. Kanak Exports* *\[2015\] 15 SCR 287* ii. *Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel v. Union of India* *\[1969\] 3 SCR 254* iii. *Gramophone Company of India Ltd. v. Birendra Bahadur Pandey* *\[1984\] 2 SCR 664* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992* ii. *Customs Act, 1962* iii. *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1994* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [V. Sukumaran v. State of Kerala & Anr., [2020] 6 SCR 991](https://lawfoyer.in/v-sukumaran-v-state-of-kerala-anr-2020-6-scr-991/) **Published:** February 2, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The decision in V. Sukumaran v. State of Kerala & Anr. constitutes a significant exposition of pension jurisprudence under Indian service law, particularly in relation to the treatment of Casual Labour Roll (CLR) service for pensionary benefits. The Supreme Court examined whether the appellant, who initially served as a CLR worker in the Fisheries Department and was later appointed through Kerala Public Service Commission recruitment and subsequently transferred back to the same department, could claim the benefit of his earlier casual service for pension computation. The State denied such benefit on the technical ground that the appellant was not directly absorbed from CLR to Seasonal Labour Roll (SLR) posts but entered regular service through a distinct recruitment channel. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The decision in *V. Sukumaran v. State of Kerala & Anr.* constitutes a significant exposition of pension jurisprudence under Indian service law, particularly in relation to the treatment of *Casual Labour Roll (CLR)* service for pensionary benefits. The Supreme Court examined whether the appellant, who initially served as a CLR worker in the Fisheries Department and was later appointed through *Kerala Public Service Commission* recruitment and subsequently transferred back to the same department, could claim the benefit of his earlier casual service for pension computation. The State denied such benefit on the technical ground that the appellant was not directly absorbed from CLR to *Seasonal Labour Roll (SLR)* posts but entered regular service through a distinct recruitment channel. The Court decisively rejected this narrow interpretation and reaffirmed the doctrinal position that *pension is not a bounty but a social welfare measure*, forming an integral part of the right to live with dignity after retirement. Emphasising parity, fairness, and liberal construction of pension rules, the Court held that denying the appellant recognition of his CLR service, while extending similar benefits to less-senior CLR workers, amounted to unjust discrimination. The judgment underscores that beneficial Government Orders aimed at labour welfare cannot be interpreted in a manner that defeats their object. By allowing the appeal, the Court restored substantive justice and reinforced the constitutional ethos underlying pensionary entitlements. **Keywords:** Pension, Casual Labour Roll, Service Law, Social Welfare, Parity, Liberal Interpretation ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgment Cause Title*V. Sukumaran v. State of Kerala & Anr.*Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 3984 of 2010Judgment Date26 August 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorum*Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Ajay Rastogi and Aniruddha Bose, JJ.*Author*Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul*Citation*\[2020\] 6 SCR 991*Legal Provisions Involved*Rule 13, Part III, Kerala Service Rules; Pension (Gratuity) Rules, 2006; Government Orders dated 20.08.1993, 31.03.2001, 21.08.2006*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsService Law, Constitutional Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The controversy in the present case arises from the evolving service conditions of casual labourers in the State of Kerala and the State’s attempt to progressively extend social security benefits to such workers through executive policy. The appellant’s claim is rooted in a series of *Government Orders* intended to regularise and improve the working conditions of *CLR* and *SLR* employees in the Fisheries Department. These measures recognised the vulnerability of long-serving casual workers and sought to integrate them into the pension framework. Despite these progressive policies, administrative rigidity resulted in differential treatment between workers who were absorbed directly into SLR posts and those who, like the appellant, improved their service status through competitive recruitment. The State’s position effectively penalised merit-based advancement by denying pension credit for earlier casual service. The High Court endorsed this view by relying on a strict reading of service rules. The Supreme Court was therefore called upon to reconcile technical service classifications with the broader constitutional philosophy governing pension rights. The judgment fits squarely within the Court’s long-standing approach that pension laws must be interpreted purposively, especially when they are designed to confer socio-economic security upon employees who have devoted substantial portions of their working lives to public service. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellant joined the Fisheries Department on *7 July 1976* as a *Casual Labour Roll worker* under a pilot pearl culture project at Vizhinjam. He served continuously in this capacity until *29 November 1983*, rendering *7 years, 4 months and 23 days* of casual service. During this period, his name ranked *second in seniority* among CLR workers engaged in the project. In 1983, following selection through the *Kerala Public Service Commission*, the appellant joined the Revenue Department as a *Lower Division Clerk*. After serving for a few years, he sought and obtained an *inter-departmental transfer* back to the Fisheries Department in *1987*. His service was regularised in *1989*, and he later earned promotion to *Upper Division Clerk*. He retired on *31 December 2008* after approximately *25 years of regular service*, excluding his CLR tenure. Meanwhile, several Government Orders were issued to regularise CLR workers and grant pensionary benefits by equating *200 days of casual work to one year of qualifying service*. Many of the appellant’s juniors received pension benefits after absorption as SLR workers. Despite a favourable recommendation from the Fisheries Department, the State rejected the appellant’s claim solely because his regularisation route differed. This rejection culminated in prolonged litigation, ultimately reaching the Supreme Court. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the period of service rendered as a *Casual Labour Roll worker* can be counted as qualifying service for pension when the employee was later appointed through a regular recruitment process? ii. Whether denial of pensionary benefits violates the principle of parity when similarly situated CLR workers have been granted such benefits? iii. Whether pensionary provisions and beneficial Government Orders require liberal interpretation in favour of employees? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the appellant had rendered *1678 days* of CLR service, which qualified as *eight years* of pensionable service under *Rule 4(f)(iii) of the Pension Rules*. It was argued that the appellant stood senior to several CLR workers who were absorbed as SLR employees and granted pensionary benefits. Reliance was placed on *Rule 13 of Part III of the Kerala Service Rules*, which permits counting *50% of prior work-charged service* upon absorption. The appellant contended that denying him pension credit merely because he entered regular service through the KPSC amounted to hostile discrimination and defeated the welfare intent of the Government Orders. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent State argued that the pension rules framed for SLR workers applied only to those absorbed directly from CLR posts. It was contended that the appellant, having been appointed through a separate recruitment process, fell under a distinct pension regime governed by *Part II of the Kerala Service Rules*. The State maintained that extending CLR benefits to such employees would contravene statutory service rules. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court rejected the hyper-technical approach adopted by the State and the High Court. The Court reiterated that *pension is a measure of social security* and must be interpreted liberally. It held that denying the appellant recognition of his CLR service would unjustly place him in an inferior position compared to his juniors who received pension benefits without undergoing competitive recruitment. The Court emphasised that the appellant’s claim arose directly from *beneficial Government Orders*, and it would be unreasonable to exclude him when he satisfied the same eligibility conditions. The existence of *unfilled SLR posts* further weakened the State’s argument. The rejection of the Fisheries Department’s recommendation was held to be arbitrary and unsustainable. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment lies in the principle that *pensionary provisions, being social welfare measures, must receive liberal construction*, and prior casual service cannot be ignored when the employee has rendered long and continuous service under the State. The Court relied upon *D.S. Nakara v. Union of India*, *U.P. Raghavendra Acharya v. State of Karnataka*, and *Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar* to reaffirm that pension is a vested right and not a discretionary grant. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that denying pensionary benefits on procedural technicalities undermines the dignity of retired employees. It noted that merit-based advancement through competitive recruitment should not result in forfeiture of accrued social security entitlements. **c) GUIDELINES** i. *Casual service rendered for a substantial period must be considered for pension if Government policy so provides.* ii. *Parity must be maintained among similarly placed employees.* iii. *Beneficial labour and pension schemes must be interpreted purposively.* ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces the constitutional vision of social justice embedded in service jurisprudence. By recognising the appellant’s CLR service for pension computation, the Supreme Court corrected an inequitable administrative action and reaffirmed the humane purpose of pension laws. The decision discourages mechanical application of service rules and promotes substantive equality. It serves as a guiding precedent for future disputes involving casual labour regularisation and pension entitlements. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *D.S. Nakara v. Union of India*, *\[1983\] 2 SCR 165* ii. *U.P. Raghavendra Acharya v. State of Karnataka*, *\[2006\] 2 Supp SCR 582* iii. *Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar*, *\[1971\] Supp SCR 634* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Kerala Service Rules, Part III* ii. *Pension (Gratuity) Rules, 2006* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. v. Rakesh Sethi & Anr., (2020) 7 SCR 734](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-madhya-pradesh-ors-v-rakesh-sethi-anr-2020-7-scr-734/) **Published:** February 2, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the constitutional and statutory validity of Rule 55A of the Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994, which authorises the State Government to levy fees for reservation and allotment of specific or “fancy” registration numbers for motor vehicles. The controversy arose when the High Court of Madhya Pradesh struck down Rule 55A as ultra vires the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, holding that the power to prescribe fees for vehicle registration vested exclusively with the Central Government. The Supreme Court was called upon to examine the scope of Sections 41, 65, and 211 of the Act, and to determine whether the State could, through delegated legislation, impose fees for services connected with registration marks. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment examines the constitutional and statutory validity of *Rule 55A of the Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994*, which authorises the State Government to levy fees for reservation and allotment of specific or “fancy” registration numbers for motor vehicles. The controversy arose when the High Court of Madhya Pradesh struck down Rule 55A as *ultra vires* the *Motor Vehicles Act, 1988* and the *Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989*, holding that the power to prescribe fees for vehicle registration vested exclusively with the Central Government. The Supreme Court was called upon to examine the scope of Sections *41, 65,* and *211* of the Act, and to determine whether the State could, through delegated legislation, impose fees for services connected with registration marks. The Court undertook a detailed statutory interpretation of the scheme of the Act and emphasized the distinction between *prescription of registration fees* by the Central Government and *rendering of ancillary services* by the State authorities. It held that Section *211* is a residual and enabling provision empowering both the Central and State Governments to levy fees for services rendered, even in the absence of express provisions. The Court further recognised that reservation of specific registration numbers constitutes a distinct service involving administrative effort and policy considerations. Consequently, the Court upheld the validity of Rule 55A, restored the State’s legislative competence, and clarified the principles governing delegated legislation, federal balance, and the doctrine of repugnancy. **Keywords:** Motor Vehicles Act, Delegated Legislation, Fee vs Tax, Fancy Registration Numbers, Section 211, State Rule-Making Power ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsi) Judgment Cause Title*State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. v. Rakesh Sethi & Anr.*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 7074 of 2008iii) Judgment Date26 August 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumJustice L. Nageswara Rao and Justice S. Ravindra Bhatvi) AuthorJustice S. Ravindra Bhatvii) Citation*(2020) 7 SCR 734*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 39, 40, 41, 64, 65, 211 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988*ix) Judgments OverruledHigh Court judgment dated 15.05.2008 (MP High Court)x) Related Law SubjectsConstitutional Law, Administrative Law, Motor Vehicles Law ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT** The dispute is rooted in the federal distribution of legislative and rule-making powers under the *Motor Vehicles Act, 1988*. Parliament enacted the Act to provide a uniform framework governing registration, control, and regulation of motor vehicles across India. While the Central Government was vested with powers to prescribe forms, procedures, and fees for registration, the State Governments were entrusted with implementation through designated registering authorities. Over time, States introduced administrative measures to cater to regional and socio-cultural preferences, including reservation of particular registration numbers considered auspicious. The State of Madhya Pradesh introduced *Rule 55A* in 2001, providing a structured mechanism for reserving preferred numbers upon payment of specified fees. This rule was challenged by the respondent vehicle owner, who sought allotment of a particular number without payment of the prescribed fee. The High Court accepted the challenge, holding that the State had exceeded its powers and encroached upon a field occupied by the Central Government. The appeal before the Supreme Court thus presented issues of statutory interpretation, delegated legislation, and constitutional principles of federalism. The Court was required to reconcile the apparent overlap between Central and State powers, assess the scope of Section *211*, and determine whether charging a fee for reserving registration numbers amounted to an impermissible levy or a legitimate fee for services rendered. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The respondent purchased a motorcycle in May 2004 and applied for registration before the competent registering authority in Madhya Pradesh. Along with the application in *Form 20*, the respondent requested allotment of a specific registration number, *MP-KL-4646*. The registering authority rejected this request on the ground that the respondent had not paid the fee prescribed under *Rule 55A* for reservation of such a number. Instead, an alternative registration number was allotted, which the respondent declined to accept. Aggrieved, the respondent approached the High Court of Madhya Pradesh by filing a writ petition, challenging the constitutional validity of *Rule 55A*. The principal contention was that the power to levy fees in connection with registration vested exclusively with the Central Government under *Section 41(2)* of the Act. It was argued that the State could not impose an additional fee for allotment of registration numbers, as this amounted to a colourable exercise of power. The High Court accepted the argument and struck down Rule 55A as *ultra vires*, directing the registering authority to allot the desired number without insisting on payment of the fee. The State of Madhya Pradesh, along with other authorities, appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court had misconstrued the statutory scheme and ignored the enabling provisions of *Sections 65 and 211*. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether *Rule 55A of the Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994* is *ultra vires* the *Motor Vehicles Act, 1988*? ii. Whether the State Government is competent to levy fees for reservation of specific registration numbers under *Section 211* of the Act? iii. Whether the field of prescribing fees for vehicle registration is exclusively occupied by the Central Government under *Section 41(2)*? iv. Whether reservation of special registration numbers constitutes a distinct service justifying levy of fees? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellants submitted that the High Court failed to appreciate the true scope of *Sections 65 and 211* of the Act. It was contended that while the Central Government prescribes fees for registration applications, the State Government retains authority to regulate the manner of assignment of registration marks. The appellants argued that reservation of specific numbers involves administrative effort and constitutes a service distinct from ordinary registration. Reliance was placed on judicial precedents emphasizing that delegated legislation framed under a general rule-making power is valid unless it transgresses the parent statute. It was further submitted that *Section 211* operates as a residual provision enabling levy of fees for services rendered, even in the absence of express authorization. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the respondent submitted that the Act creates a complete code with respect to registration and fees. It was argued that *Section 41(2)* exhaustively covers the subject of registration fees, leaving no scope for State intervention. The respondent contended that allotment of registration numbers is an integral part of registration, and the State cannot artificially segregate this process to impose additional financial burdens. The doctrine of *expressio unius est exclusio alterius* was invoked to argue that express provisions empowering States to levy fees in limited circumstances implied exclusion in other cases. The respondent supported the High Court’s reasoning that Rule 55A amounted to impermissible encroachment upon Central legislative power. ## **H) JUDGMENT** The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court’s judgment. The Court held that the High Court erred in construing *Section 211* narrowly and in assuming that the Central Government’s power under *Section 41(2)* excluded all State authority. The Court observed that *Section 211* is deliberately framed in wide terms to empower both Central and State Governments to levy fees for services rendered in the discharge of statutory functions. The Court reasoned that assignment and reservation of registration numbers is not a mechanical or trivial act. It involves administrative discretion, policy considerations, and catering to public demand. The State is entitled to regulate this process and to recover reasonable fees for providing such optional services. The Court further held that Rule 55A does not conflict with the Central Rules, nor does it amount to repugnancy under *Article 254* of the Constitution, as it operates within the framework of the parent Act. #### **a. RATIO DECIDENDI** The power of the State Government to levy fees for reservation and allotment of specific registration numbers flows from the combined reading of *Sections 65(1)* and *211* of the *Motor Vehicles Act, 1988*. Reservation of special registration numbers constitutes a distinct service, separate from the basic act of registration, and therefore justifies levy of fees. The enumeration of specific powers in *Section 65(2)* is illustrative and does not curtail the general rule-making authority conferred by *Section 65(1)*. #### **b. OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that socio-cultural practices, such as preference for auspicious numbers, cannot be ignored by the State while framing regulatory measures. The availability of such choices, when regulated transparently and reasonably, enhances administrative efficiency and public satisfaction. #### **c. GUIDELINES** i. Fees levied under delegated legislation must correspond to services rendered. ii. Residual provisions like *Section 211* must be interpreted broadly to fulfill legislative intent. iii. Courts should avoid readily inferring repugnancy between Central and State laws and must strive for harmonious construction. ## **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment reinforces the principle that delegated legislation must be interpreted in light of functional realities and legislative intent. By upholding Rule 55A, the Supreme Court clarified the distinction between mandatory statutory fees and optional service charges. The ruling strengthens cooperative federalism by recognising the complementary roles of Central and State authorities under a unified statutory framework. It also provides clarity on the scope of residual fee-levying powers, thereby offering guidance for future regulatory measures across States. ## **J) REFERENCES** **a. Important Cases Referred** i. *Offshore Holdings (P) Ltd. v. Bangalore Development Authority*, *(2011) 3 SCC 139* ii. *Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P.*, *(1981) 4 SCC 471* iii. *Academy of Nutrition Improvement v. Union of India*, *(2011) 8 SCC 274* **b. Important Statutes Referred** i. *Motor Vehicles Act, 1988* ii. *Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors., [2020] 10 S.C.R. 857](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-punjab-ors-v-davinder-singh-ors-2020-10-s-c-r-857/) **Published:** February 2, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. addresses a foundational constitutional question concerning the permissibility of sub-classification within Scheduled Castes for the purpose of reservation in public employment. The case arose from a challenge to Section 4(5) of the Punjab Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes (Reservation in Services) Act, 2006, which earmarked 50% of Scheduled Caste reserved vacancies for Balmikis and Mazhabi Sikhs, identified as the most backward among Scheduled Castes in Punjab. The Punjab and Haryana High Court invalidated the provision by relying on E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh, which held that Scheduled Castes constitute a homogenous class and cannot be further classified by States. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment in *State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors.* addresses a foundational constitutional question concerning the permissibility of *sub-classification within Scheduled Castes* for the purpose of reservation in public employment. The case arose from a challenge to *Section 4(5) of the Punjab Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes (Reservation in Services) Act, 2006*, which earmarked *50% of Scheduled Caste reserved vacancies* for *Balmikis and Mazhabi Sikhs*, identified as the most backward among Scheduled Castes in Punjab. The Punjab and Haryana High Court invalidated the provision by relying on *E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh*, which held that Scheduled Castes constitute a homogenous class and cannot be further classified by States. A Constitution Bench of five Judges of the Supreme Court, while examining the constitutional validity of the impugned provision, undertook an extensive review of equality jurisprudence under *Articles 14, 15, and 16*, the scope of *Article 16(4)*, and the nature of *Articles 341 and 342*. The Court critically analysed whether *E.V. Chinnaiah* correctly interpreted *Indra Sawhney v. Union of India* and whether the absolute prohibition on sub-classification within Scheduled Castes aligns with constitutional goals of substantive equality and distributive justice. Recognising deep-rooted empirical disparities among Scheduled Castes and the failure of reservation benefits to percolate to the most deprived groups, the Court held that *preferential treatment within the Scheduled Caste category*, based on rational criteria, does not amount to tampering with the Presidential List. It concluded that the interpretation adopted in *E.V. Chinnaiah* requires reconsideration. Accordingly, the matter was referred to a larger Bench of seven Judges or more, underscoring the immense constitutional significance of the issues involved. **Keywords:** Sub-classification, Scheduled Castes, Reservation in Services, Article 16(4), Distributive Justice, E.V. Chinnaiah ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors.*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 2317 of 2011iii) Judgement Date27 August 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumArun Mishra, Indira Banerjee, Vineet Saran, M.R. Shah & Aniruddha Bose, JJ.vi) AuthorJustice Arun Mishravii) Citation*\[2020\] 10 S.C.R. 857*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Articles 14, 15, 16, 338, 341, 342, 342A of the Constitution of India; Section 4(5), Punjab Act, 2006*ix) Judgments OverruledNone (Reference made for reconsideration of *E.V. Chinnaiah*)x) Related Law SubjectsConstitutional Law, Service Law, Reservation Law ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The litigation traces its origins to a long-standing policy debate in Punjab concerning inequitable distribution of reservation benefits among Scheduled Castes. Historically, the State identified that *Balmikis and Mazhabi Sikhs* continued to remain at the bottom of socio-economic indicators despite decades of affirmative action. To address this imbalance, the Punjab Government issued a circular in 1975 reserving *50% of Scheduled Caste vacancies* for these groups. The circular was invalidated by the High Court, and the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition by the Supreme Court led the State to enact a statutory provision through *Section 4(5) of the Punjab Act, 2006*. The High Court once again struck down the provision by relying on *E.V. Chinnaiah*, which declared Scheduled Castes to be a homogenous class incapable of internal classification by States. The correctness of this position came under scrutiny when a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court expressed doubts about *E.V. Chinnaiah*, particularly in light of *Indra Sawhney*, *Article 338*, and evolving equality jurisprudence. The reference to a Constitution Bench thus arose against the backdrop of conflicting interpretations of constitutional provisions, empirical realities of caste-based inequality, and the State’s obligation to ensure substantive equality. The case presented an opportunity to re-examine rigid notions of formal equality and to assess whether constitutional affirmative action must remain responsive to social realities rather than frozen legal constructs. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The State of Punjab historically observed that certain Scheduled Caste communities, particularly *Balmikis and Mazhabi Sikhs*, were grossly underrepresented in public services despite the existence of reservation policies. To remedy this, a *1975 circular* earmarked *50% of reserved SC vacancies* for these communities. This administrative measure was invalidated by the Punjab and Haryana High Court, and the Supreme Court declined to interfere. Subsequently, the Punjab Legislature enacted the *Punjab Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes (Reservation in Services) Act, 2006*. *Section 4(5)* of the Act statutorily incorporated the earlier policy by granting first preference to Balmikis and Mazhabi Sikhs within the Scheduled Caste quota. The provision did not exclude other Scheduled Castes but merely prioritised the most backward among them, subject to availability. The High Court struck down *Section 4(5)*, holding it unconstitutional on the ground that sub-classification within Scheduled Castes amounted to impermissible tampering with the Presidential List under *Article 341*, relying heavily on *E.V. Chinnaiah*. The State appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court failed to appreciate the distinction between *exclusion from the list* and *preferential distribution of reservation benefits*. Given the constitutional importance of the issue, a three-Judge Bench referred the matter to a Constitution Bench to determine the validity of the provision and the correctness of *E.V. Chinnaiah*. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether *Section 4(5) of the Punjab Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes (Reservation in Services) Act, 2006* is constitutionally valid? ii. Whether the State Legislature has the competence to provide *sub-classification within Scheduled Castes* for reservation in services? iii. Whether the judgment in *E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of A.P.* requires reconsideration in light of *Indra Sawhney* and subsequent constitutional developments? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the State of Punjab submitted that *Article 16(4)* empowers the State to make provisions for backward classes, which undisputedly include Scheduled Castes. It was argued that *Indra Sawhney* clearly permits sub-classification among backward classes to ensure equitable distribution of benefits. The appellants contended that *E.V. Chinnaiah* erroneously treated Scheduled Castes as a monolithic group and failed to appreciate empirical evidence of internal disparities. It was further submitted that *preferential treatment* does not amount to inclusion or exclusion from the Presidential List under *Article 341*. Reliance was placed on *State of Maharashtra v. Milind* to argue that only alteration of the list is prohibited, not rational distribution of benefits within it. The State emphasised that the impugned provision advances *substantive equality* under *Article 14* by ensuring that reservation benefits reach the most deprived. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The respondents contended that Scheduled Castes, once notified under *Article 341*, constitute a single homogenous class and cannot be sub-divided by State legislation. Heavy reliance was placed on *E.V. Chinnaiah*, which held that any sub-classification would amount to impermissible tampering with the Presidential List. It was argued that permitting States to create internal quotas would undermine national uniformity and open the door to political manipulation. The respondents maintained that the Constitution envisages special protection for Scheduled Castes as a whole and that any differentiation among them violates *Articles 14 and 16*. ## **H) JUDGEMENT** The Constitution Bench undertook an exhaustive examination of equality jurisprudence and reservation policy. The Court reaffirmed that *Article 16(4)* is an enabling provision aimed at achieving real equality. It emphasised that Scheduled Castes are *unequals within the class* and that treating them as homogenous ignores ground realities documented by multiple commissions. The Court held that *sub-classification based on rational criteria* does not amount to exclusion from the Presidential List and therefore does not violate *Articles 341 or 342*. The Bench found that *E.V. Chinnaiah* failed to correctly apply *Indra Sawhney*, which explicitly permits sub-classification among backward classes to prevent the monopolisation of benefits by advanced sections. Recognising the constitutional goal of *distributive justice*, the Court endorsed the view that States must have the flexibility to design affirmative action measures responsive to local realities. Given the far-reaching implications of the issue, the Court concluded that *E.V. Chinnaiah* requires reconsideration by a larger Bench. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The principal ratio of the judgment lies in the recognition that *sub-classification within Scheduled Castes for the purpose of equitable distribution of reservation benefits is constitutionally permissible*, provided it does not result in exclusion from the Presidential List. The Court clarified that *Articles 14, 15, and 16* embody substantive equality and allow differential treatment among unequals to achieve real equality. The Bench held that *E.V. Chinnaiah* adopted an overly formalistic approach that undermines the transformative mandate of the Constitution. By endorsing the reasoning in *Indra Sawhney*, the Court reaffirmed that backward classes are not static entities and that internal differentiation may be necessary to prevent perpetuation of inequality within reserved categories. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that rigid adherence to precedent cannot override constitutional morality and social realities. It remarked that the doctrine of *stare decisis* must yield when precedent obstructs the achievement of substantive justice. The Court also highlighted the need for empirical data in shaping reservation policies and cautioned against treating constitutional lists as immutable social constructs. **c) GUIDELINES** i. States may provide *preferential treatment within Scheduled Castes* based on rational criteria and empirical data. ii. Such measures must not result in *total exclusion* of any caste from reservation benefits. iii. Alteration of the Presidential List remains the exclusive domain of Parliament. iv. Reservation policies must advance *substantive equality* and *distributive justice*. ## **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment marks a significant shift towards a *dynamic and reality-oriented interpretation* of equality and reservation. By questioning the correctness of *E.V. Chinnaiah*, the Supreme Court acknowledged that constitutional affirmative action cannot remain insulated from empirical social realities. The decision reinforces the idea that *formal equality is insufficient* to address entrenched inequalities and that the Constitution mandates proactive measures to uplift the most deprived. The reference to a larger Bench underscores the Court’s recognition of the profound constitutional implications of sub-classification within Scheduled Castes. The outcome of this reconsideration has the potential to reshape reservation jurisprudence and to reaffirm the transformative vision of the Constitution as a living document committed to social justice. ## **J) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Indra Sawhney v. Union of India*, *\[1992\] 2 Supp. SCR 454* 2. *E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of A.P.*, *\[2005\] 1 SCC 394* 3. *State of Maharashtra v. Milind*, *\[2000\] 5 Supp. SCR 65* 4. *Jarnail Singh v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta*, *\[2018\] 10 SCR 663* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Constitution of India* 2. *Punjab Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes (Reservation in Services) Act, 2006* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala and Others, [2020] 7 SCR 763](https://lawfoyer.in/nazir-mohamed-v-j-kamala-and-others-2020-7-scr-763/) **Published:** February 2, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala and Others is a significant exposition on the scope and limits of second appeals under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the interplay between declaration of title, recovery of possession, adverse possession, and limitation. The Supreme Court decisively reaffirmed that a second appeal is a statutory and restricted remedy, maintainable only when a substantial question of law arises. The Court held that the High Court gravely erred in interfering with concurrent and well-reasoned findings of the First Appellate Court without formulating or answering any genuine substantial question of law. **Content:** ## A) **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment in *Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala and Others* is a significant exposition on the *scope and limits of second appeals under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908*, and the interplay between *declaration of title, recovery of possession, adverse possession, and limitation*. The Supreme Court decisively reaffirmed that a second appeal is a *statutory and restricted remedy*, maintainable only when a *substantial question of law* arises. The Court held that the High Court gravely erred in interfering with concurrent and well-reasoned findings of the First Appellate Court without formulating or answering any genuine substantial question of law. The judgment also clarifies that *a decree for declaration of title does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to recovery of possession*. The plaintiff must independently establish lawful entitlement to possession and must overcome the bar of limitation under the *Limitation Act, 1963*. The Court emphasised that *possession in the assumed character of ownership*, if uninterrupted for the statutory period, can mature into an indefeasible title, even if adverse possession is not pleaded in express terms. Further, the Court explained the limited applicability of the maxim *possession follows title* and reiterated that *limitation extinguishes the remedy as well as the right*. The ruling restores doctrinal discipline to Section 100 CPC and serves as a caution against appellate overreach by High Courts in second appeals. **Keywords:** Section 100 CPC, Substantial Question of Law, Second Appeal, Adverse Possession, Limitation, Declaration of Title, Recovery of Possession ## B) **CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsi) Judgment Cause Title*Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala and Others*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal Nos. 2843–2844 of 2010iii) Judgment Date27 August 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) Quorum*Navin Sinha, J. and Indira Banerjee, J.*vi) Author*Indira Banerjee, J.*vii) Citation*\[2020\] 7 SCR 763*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Section 100 CPC, Articles 64 & 65 Limitation Act, 1963*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsCivil Procedure Law, Property Law ## C) **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The judgment emerges from a long-drawn civil dispute concerning ownership and possession of immovable property situated in Tamil Nadu. The litigation history spans a trial, a first appeal, and two second appeals before the High Court, culminating in the Supreme Court’s intervention. The case provided the Court with an opportunity to restate the jurisprudential foundations governing *second appeals* after the 1976 amendment to *Section 100 CPC*. The controversy arose in a context where *documentary title was split*, but *possession was long and uninterrupted with one party*. The plaintiff sought declaration of title and recovery of possession by asserting a landlord-tenant relationship, which failed for want of evidence. Despite partial success before the First Appellate Court, the plaintiff was denied possession on grounds of limitation and long enjoyment by the defendant. The High Court, however, reversed this finding in second appeal without identifying any substantial question of law, thereby expanding its jurisdiction impermissibly. This compelled the Supreme Court to correct the jurisdictional transgression. The judgment assumes importance not merely for resolving the inter-se dispute, but for reinforcing procedural discipline, preventing factual re-adjudication in second appeals, and clarifying how *possession, limitation, and adverse title* operate in property disputes. ## D) **FACTS OF THE CASE** The *Appellant-Defendant* claimed ownership of the suit premises on the basis of a *registered sale deed dated 17.02.1938*, executed in favour of his father. He asserted continuous possession as owner, reinforced by a *registered Deed of Release dated 14.03.1966*. The *Respondent-Plaintiff* instituted a suit in 1994 seeking *declaration of ownership, recovery of possession, arrears of rent, and future profits*, alleging that the premises were originally let out to the defendant’s father. The plaint relied on a *sale deed dated 17.09.1940* executed in favour of the plaintiff’s father by a court-auction purchaser. The Trial Court dismissed the suit in entirety, holding that the plaintiff failed to prove title as well as tenancy. On appeal, the First Appellate Court meticulously examined *Exhibits P1 to P3 and Exhibit D1* and concluded that *each party owned a distinct half portion* of the suit property. However, the First Appellate Court denied recovery of possession to the plaintiff, noting that the defendant had been in possession since 1940 and that the plaintiff failed to prove permissive possession or tenancy. Both parties preferred second appeals. The High Court dismissed the defendant’s appeal but allowed the plaintiff’s appeal, granting possession of half the property. This reversal, despite absence of any substantial question of law, became the core grievance before the Supreme Court. ## E) **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether the High Court could interfere with findings of fact in a second appeal under *Section 100 CPC*? ii. Whether a decree of declaration of title automatically entitles recovery of possession? iii. Whether long possession without express pleading of adverse possession bars recovery by limitation? iv. Whether the maxim *possession follows title* applied in the facts of the case? ## F) **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the Appellant submitted that *no substantial question of law* arose in either second appeal. It was argued that the High Court merely re-appreciated evidence, which is impermissible under *Section 100 CPC*. It was contended that the plaintiff failed to establish tenancy or permissive possession, and therefore could not seek recovery of possession. Reliance was placed on *Baba Kartar Singh v. Dayal Das* to assert that the plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own case. It was further argued that the suit for possession was *barred by limitation* under *Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963*, given uninterrupted possession of over 28 years. ## G) **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the Respondent submitted that once declaration of title was granted, possession ought to follow. It was argued that the defendant never pleaded adverse possession in specific terms and hence could not defeat the plaintiff’s claim. The High Court’s reasoning was defended on the ground that denial of possession despite declaration amounted to inconsistency. ## H) **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. *Section 100, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908* ii. *Articles 64 and 65, Limitation Act, 1963* iii. *Section 3, Limitation Act, 1963* ## I) **JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and restored the judgment of the First Appellate Court. It held that *formulation of a substantial question of law is mandatory* and that failure to do so vitiates the High Court judgment. The Court reiterated that *findings of fact, even if erroneous, are not open to challenge in second appeal*. The High Court wrongly assumed contradiction where none existed and misapplied the concept of mesne profits. The Court further held that *a decree of possession does not automatically flow from a declaration of title*. The plaintiff must establish lawful entitlement and overcome limitation. It was emphasised that *long possession as owner*, even if not pleaded in express words as adverse possession, can operate substantively as such. The plaintiff’s pleadings were conspicuously silent on limitation. The High Court’s interference was thus held to be *jurisdictionally unsustainable*. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The existence and formulation of a *substantial question of law* is a sine qua non for entertaining a second appeal under *Section 100 CPC*. Re-appreciation of evidence or interference with concurrent findings of fact is impermissible. A decree for declaration of title does not ipso facto entitle recovery of possession. The plaintiff must independently establish possession within limitation. Long, continuous possession in the assumed character of ownership extinguishes the true owner’s right if not asserted within limitation. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that High Courts must exercise restraint and avoid transforming second appeals into third rounds of factual adjudication. Procedural discipline is integral to justice delivery. **c) GUIDELINES** i. High Courts must mandatorily formulate substantial questions of law. ii. Second appeals cannot be decided on equitable considerations. iii. Limitation must be examined even if not pleaded. iv. Declaration and possession are distinct reliefs. ## J) **REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Sir Chunilal v. Mehta & Sons Ltd.*, *\[1962\] Supp SCR 549* ii. *Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari*, *\[2001\] 1 SCR 948* iii. *Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal*, *\[2006\] 2 Supp SCR 79* iv. *Peri v. Chrishold*, *(1907) PC 73* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Code of Civil Procedure, 1908* ii. *Limitation Act, 1963* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [M/s. Radha Exports (India) Pvt. Limited v. K.P. Jayaram & Anr. [2020] 8 S.C.R. 272](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-radha-exports-india-pvt-limited-v-k-p-jayaram-anr-2020-8-s-c-r-272/) **Published:** February 2, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The decision in M/s. Radha Exports (India) Pvt. Limited v. K.P. Jayaram & Anr. authoritatively clarifies the intersection between limitation law and the initiation of insolvency proceedings under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The Supreme Court examined whether a creditor invoking the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process must demonstrate the existence of a legally recoverable financial debt on the date of filing. The controversy arose from advances made between 2002 and 2005 to a proprietorship concern, later taken over by the appellant company, where substantial repayments were pleaded, and a portion of the outstanding amount was converted into share application money. After more than a decade, insolvency proceedings were initiated, alleging subsisting financial debt. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The decision in *M/s. Radha Exports (India) Pvt. Limited v. K.P. Jayaram & Anr.* authoritatively clarifies the intersection between *limitation law* and the *initiation of insolvency proceedings under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016*. The Supreme Court examined whether a creditor invoking the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process must demonstrate the existence of a *legally recoverable financial debt* on the date of filing. The controversy arose from advances made between *2002 and 2005* to a proprietorship concern, later taken over by the appellant company, where substantial repayments were pleaded, and a portion of the outstanding amount was converted into *share application money*. After more than a decade, insolvency proceedings were initiated, alleging subsisting financial debt. The Court scrutinised documentary evidence, including *letters addressed by the respondents to the Income Tax Department*, bank statements evidencing repayments, and the statutory framework governing limitation. Emphasising that the *IBC is not a substitute for debt recovery*, the Court reiterated that applications under Section 7 are subject to the *Limitation Act, 1963*. It held that once a debt becomes *time-barred*, it ceases to be legally enforceable and cannot form the basis of insolvency proceedings. The judgment also draws a clear distinction between *financial debt* and *equity investment*, holding that amounts adjusted towards share capital cannot be retrospectively treated as debt. The ruling restores the order of the NCLT and sets aside the NCLAT’s decision, reinforcing that insolvency forums cannot adjudicate *complex disputes of fraud or forgery* and that *time-barred or extinguished claims* cannot trigger the IBC mechanism. **Keywords:** Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, Limitation Act, Financial Debt, Section 7 IBC, Time-barred Claims, Share Application Money ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*M/s. Radha Exports (India) Pvt. Limited v. K.P. Jayaram & Anr.*Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 7474 of 2019Judgement Date28 August 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumArun Mishra, J. and Indira Banerjee, J.AuthorIndira Banerjee, J.Citation*\[2020\] 8 S.C.R. 272*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 3, 5, 7 & 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016*; *Clauses (19)–(21), Part II, Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963*; *Companies Act, 1956*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsInsolvency Law, Company Law, Limitation Law ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The dispute traces its origin to *financial advances made between 2002 and 2005* by the respondents to a proprietorship concern known as *M/s Radha Exports*. The advances were admittedly unsecured and interest-free. Subsequently, the business of the proprietorship concern was taken over by the appellant company upon its incorporation under the *Companies Act, 1956*. At the time of such takeover, certain liabilities were also assumed by the newly incorporated company. The respondents’ case was that a substantial portion of the loan remained unpaid and constituted a *financial debt*. In contrast, the appellant company asserted that *significant repayments* had already been made and that *Rs.90 lakhs* out of the alleged outstanding amount had been consciously converted into *share application money*, followed by allotment of shares, later transferred to a third party at the respondents’ request. More than a decade later, the respondents initiated *winding-up proceedings* before the Madras High Court, which were eventually transferred to the NCLT. After the dismissal of earlier proceedings under Sections 9 and 7 of the IBC, the respondents persisted with a Section 7 application, claiming to be *financial creditors*. The NCLT dismissed the application on grounds of *limitation* and *absence of financial debt*. However, the NCLAT reversed this finding, prompting the present appeal before the Supreme Court. The judgment thus emerges against a backdrop of prolonged commercial dealings, disputed repayments, and delayed invocation of insolvency jurisdiction, raising fundamental questions about the scope of Section 7 of the IBC and the applicability of limitation principles. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The respondents advanced an aggregate sum of *Rs.2.20 crores* in several tranches between *2002 and 2005* to the proprietorship concern *M/s Radha Exports*. Between *2003 and 2004*, repayments amounting to *Rs.80,40,000* were made. Upon incorporation of the appellant company in *July 2004*, the remaining liabilities were taken over. A critical development occurred when, at the respondents’ request, *Rs.90,00,000* from the outstanding amount was adjusted as *share application money* in the name of Respondent No. 2. This adjustment was formally acknowledged in *letters dated 11 January 2011 addressed to the Income Tax Department*, which later became central documentary evidence. Thereafter, further payments totalling *Rs.43,25,000* were made between *2004 and 2006*, which according to the appellant fully extinguished the remaining loan liability. In *October 2007*, Respondent No. 2 resigned from the Board of the appellant company and requested that the shares issued against the said application money be transferred to *Mr. M. Krishnan*, to be treated as his *personal loan obligation*. The appellant complied, issuing shares accordingly. Despite no financial transactions after *March 2006*, the respondents issued a *statutory notice in November 2012* claiming an outstanding debt of *Rs.1,49,60,000*. Subsequent winding-up and insolvency proceedings were initiated, accompanied by allegations of *forgery and fraud*, all of which were disputed by the appellant. The NCLT, after detailed scrutiny of bank records and correspondence, dismissed the Section 7 application. The NCLAT reversed this finding, leading to the present appeal. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether an application under *Section 7 of the IBC* is maintainable in respect of a *time-barred debt*? ii. Whether amounts converted into *share application money* can be treated as *financial debt*? iii. Whether insolvency proceedings can be invoked where the existence of debt itself is *seriously disputed*? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellant submitted that the alleged debt was *fully discharged by 2006* and that the Section 7 application filed in *2018* was *hopelessly barred by limitation*. It was contended that under *Clauses (19)–(21) of the Limitation Act*, the period for recovery of money lent is *three years from the date of lending*. The last disbursement having occurred in *2004–2005*, the claim had become unenforceable long before the initiation of insolvency proceedings. It was further argued that *share application money* could never constitute *financial debt*, as it lacks the element of *time value of money*. The appellant relied on contemporaneous letters and bank statements to demonstrate repayments and adjustment of liabilities, contending that insolvency proceedings were being misused as a *recovery mechanism*. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the respondents argued that the debt continued to subsist and that repayments alleged by the appellant were either unrelated or fabricated. It was contended that the NCLAT rightly appreciated discrepancies in the appellant’s correlation statements and that the existence of limitation should not defeat substantive justice under the IBC. The respondents further alleged *forgery of documents* and maintained that the share allotment was not a genuine conversion but a device to defeat repayment obligations. ## **H) JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, restoring the order of the NCLT. It categorically held that *IBC proceedings are subject to the Limitation Act*, reiterating that the Code does not create a new right to recover time-barred debts. The Court relied on its earlier pronouncements holding that *a debt must be legally recoverable* on the date of filing. The Court found that the *last loan was advanced in 2004–2005* and that there was no agreed date of repayment. Consequently, limitation commenced from the date of disbursement itself. Even the winding-up petition filed in *2012* was beyond limitation, rendering subsequent insolvency proceedings unsustainable. On the issue of financial debt, the Court held that *share application money*, once accepted and shares issued, loses its character as debt. It further observed that a *personal loan to a director or promoter* cannot trigger CIRP against the company. Allegations of fraud and forgery were held to be outside the scope of Section 7 proceedings. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment lies in the principle that *only a legally enforceable financial debt can trigger insolvency proceedings*. A debt barred by limitation is not “due” in law and therefore cannot constitute default under the IBC. The Court reaffirmed that the *Limitation Act applies proprio vigore* to Sections 7 and 9 of the IBC. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that *insolvency forums are not equipped to adjudicate allegations of fraud, forgery, or complex factual disputes*, which must be decided in regular civil proceedings. It cautioned against the misuse of the IBC as a *pressure tactic* for recovery of disputed or stale claims. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Adjudicating Authorities must examine *limitation at the threshold*. ii. Applicants must demonstrate existence of a *legally recoverable debt*. iii. Share capital contributions cannot be recharacterised as financial debt. ## **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment reinforces the foundational premise that the *IBC is a resolution mechanism, not a debt recovery tool*. By insisting on strict compliance with limitation principles, the Court prevents resurrection of *dead claims* under the guise of insolvency. The decision brings clarity on the treatment of *share application money* and delineates the boundaries of insolvency jurisdiction, ensuring procedural discipline and commercial certainty. ## **J) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank* – *\[2017\] 8 SCR 33* ii. *B.K. Educational Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Parag Gupta and Associates* – *\[2018\] 12 SCR 794* iii. *Vashdeo R. Bhojwani v. Abhyudaya Co-operative Bank Ltd.* – *\[2019\] 12 SCR 75* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016* ii. *Limitation Act, 1963* iii. *Companies Act, 1956* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [State of Madhya Pradesh v. Centre for Environment Protection Research and Development & Ors., [2020] 12 SCR 1139](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-madhya-pradesh-v-centre-for-environment-protection-research-and-development-ors-2020-12-scr-1139/) **Published:** February 2, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the statutory limits of powers exercised by the National Green Tribunal under the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 in enforcing vehicular pollution norms. The dispute arose from blanket directions issued by the Central Zonal Bench of the NGT, Bhopal, mandating denial of fuel supply to motor vehicles lacking a valid Pollution Under Control Certificate and directing the State of Madhya Pradesh to deposit ₹25 crores as security to ensure compliance. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether such coercive measures were legally sustainable under the existing statutory framework governing motor vehicles and environmental protection. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the statutory limits of powers exercised by the *National Green Tribunal under the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010* in enforcing vehicular pollution norms. The dispute arose from blanket directions issued by the Central Zonal Bench of the NGT, Bhopal, mandating denial of fuel supply to motor vehicles lacking a valid *Pollution Under Control Certificate* and directing the State of Madhya Pradesh to deposit *₹25 crores* as security to ensure compliance. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether such coercive measures were legally sustainable under the existing statutory framework governing motor vehicles and environmental protection. The Court undertook a detailed interpretation of *Rules 115 and 116 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989*, read with the *Motor Vehicles Act, 1988*, the *Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981*, and the *Environment (Protection) Act, 1986*. It reaffirmed that while environmental protection is an integral part of the *right to life under Article 21*, enforcement must strictly conform to statutory prescriptions. The judgment clarifies that when legislation specifies penalties for non-compliance, no additional or parallel sanctions may be judicially introduced. The Court held that denial of fuel supply is not a penalty contemplated under either the *1989 Rules* or the *NGT Act*. It further ruled that directing a monetary deposit as security in a review proceeding exceeded the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. However, the Court upheld the NGT’s authority to compel strict enforcement of statutory emission standards and penal action as expressly provided by law. The decision draws a clear boundary between environmental adjudication and legislative overreach, reinforcing the principle that environmental governance must remain anchored in statutory discipline. **Keywords:** Vehicular pollution, National Green Tribunal, Pollution Under Control Certificate, statutory penalties, environmental jurisdiction, administrative overreach ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*State of Madhya Pradesh v. Centre for Environment Protection Research and Development & Ors.*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal Nos. 8932–8933 of 2015iii) Judgement Date28 August 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumHon’ble Mr. Justice Arun Mishra and Hon’ble Ms. Justice Indira Banerjeevi) AuthorIndira Banerjee, J.vii) Citation*\[2020\] 12 SCR 1139*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (Rules 115, 116); National Green Tribunal Act, 2010; Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981; Environment (Protection) Act, 1986*ix) Judgments overruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsEnvironmental Law, Administrative Law, Constitutional Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The litigation originated from growing concerns regarding vehicular air pollution in the city of Indore and surrounding regions. A public interest petition was initially filed before the *High Court of Madhya Pradesh in 2003*, seeking strict enforcement of pollution control norms for motor vehicles. Owing to the establishment of the *National Green Tribunal*, the matter was transferred and re-registered as *Original Application No. 1 of 2013* before the Central Zonal Bench at Bhopal. The NGT found that compliance with *Rule 115 read with Rule 116 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989* was unsatisfactory. It noted systemic failures in enforcement, including inadequate functioning of pollution testing centres. Proceeding on an environmental protection rationale, the Tribunal issued sweeping directions mandating suspension or revocation of registration certificates of vehicles without valid PUC certificates and, additionally, prohibited fuel stations from supplying fuel to such vehicles. Upon review, the Tribunal rejected the State’s objections and imposed a further condition requiring the State to deposit *₹25 crores* as security to ensure compliance. These directions marked a significant escalation from regulatory enforcement to coercive administrative measures. The State challenged these orders before the Supreme Court, raising fundamental questions about the extent of NGT’s jurisdiction and the legality of imposing sanctions not expressly provided by statute. The case thus presented an important opportunity for the Court to reconcile environmental imperatives with constitutional and statutory limits on adjudicatory power. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The respondents, an environmental protection organisation, initiated proceedings alleging rampant non-compliance with vehicular emission standards in Madhya Pradesh. The grievance centered on the failure of State authorities to enforce the mandatory requirement of possession and display of a valid *Pollution Under Control Certificate* after one year of vehicle registration, as mandated by *Rule 115(7) of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989*. The National Green Tribunal, upon considering affidavits and submissions, concluded that mere statutory penalties were ineffective due to lax enforcement. The Tribunal observed that the State Transport Department had not ensured adequate testing infrastructure. On this premise, it issued directions requiring immediate suspension or revocation of registration certificates of non-compliant vehicles and directed the State to instruct all fuel dealers to deny fuel supply to vehicles without PUC certificates. The State of Madhya Pradesh contended that such directions lacked statutory backing and were impractical, as vehicles could not undergo repairs or testing without fuel. In its review application, the State also challenged the imposition of a *₹25 crore security deposit*, arguing that the *NGT Act, 2010* does not provide for such a mechanism. The Tribunal, however, dismissed the review and insisted on compliance. Aggrieved, the State approached the Supreme Court under *Section 22 of the NGT Act*, asserting that the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction and violated settled principles of administrative and penal law. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the National Green Tribunal had the jurisdiction to direct denial of fuel supply to vehicles not possessing a valid *Pollution Under Control Certificate*? ii. Whether penalties beyond those prescribed under the *Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989* could be imposed in the name of environmental protection? iii. Whether the NGT could direct the State Government to deposit *₹25 crores* as security to ensure compliance, particularly in review proceedings? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant State submitted that *Rules 115 and 116* provide an exhaustive code for dealing with non-compliance, including suspension of registration and penal consequences under *Section 190(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988*. They argued that denial of fuel supply is not contemplated under any statutory provision and would amount to judicial legislation. It was contended that environmental protection, though vital, cannot justify penalties dehors the statute. Reliance was placed on the principle that when law prescribes a particular manner of enforcement, it must be followed exclusively. The imposition of a security deposit was assailed as wholly without jurisdiction, unsupported by *Sections 15, 23, or 26 of the NGT Act*. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents argued that the Tribunal’s powers under *Sections 14, 15, and 20 of the NGT Act* are broad and purposive. They emphasized the alarming rise in vehicular pollution and invoked the *precautionary principle* and *polluter pays principle*. It was submitted that denial of fuel supply was a necessary deterrent to secure compliance where traditional penalties had failed. The respondents relied on *M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 1988 SC 1030* and *Dayal v. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 867* to contend that environmental protection is intrinsic to the *right to life under Article 21* and justifies stringent measures. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court undertook a meticulous statutory analysis. It held that while the NGT possesses jurisdiction to enforce statutory environmental obligations, such power is confined to the contours of existing law. The Court noted that *Rule 116(8) and (9)* specifically provide for temporary suspension of registration until compliance is achieved, indicating legislative intent. The Court reaffirmed the settled principle that *when a statute prescribes a penalty, no additional penalty can be judicially imposed*. Denial of fuel supply was found to be neither a contemplated sanction under the *1989 Rules* nor authorised under the *NGT Act*. The Court observed that such a direction was counterproductive, as vehicles require fuel for testing and rectification. Regarding the *₹25 crore deposit*, the Court held that *Sections 26 and 28 of the NGT Act* already prescribe penalties for non-compliance and do not permit imposition of security deposits. Passing such an order in review was held to be legally impermissible. Accordingly, the impugned NGT orders were set aside to the extent they directed denial of fuel supply and deposit of security. However, the State was directed to strictly enforce *Rules 115 and 116* and penalize violations as per law. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The core ratio is that *environmental adjudication must operate within statutory boundaries*. The NGT can compel enforcement of existing environmental obligations but cannot invent new penalties. The doctrine that *a thing required to be done in a particular manner must be done in that manner alone* was reaffirmed. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that environmental protection requires strong action, but such action must be lawful. Judicial enthusiasm cannot substitute legislative mandate. This observation underscores judicial restraint in environmental governance. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Statutory penalties must be strictly adhered to. ii. Environmental tribunals must avoid coercive measures not sanctioned by law. iii. States must strengthen enforcement infrastructure rather than rely on extra-legal sanctions. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment draws a vital line between environmental necessity and statutory legality. It preserves the integrity of environmental enforcement while preventing institutional overreach. The decision reinforces that sustainable development is best served not by ad hoc coercion but by disciplined statutory compliance. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *M.C. Mehta v. Union of India*, *1988 SC 1030* ii. *Dayal v. Union of India*, *AIR 2004 SC 867 : \[2003\] 3 Supp SCR 152* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Motor Vehicles Act, 1988* ii. *Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989* iii. *National Green Tribunal Act, 2010* iv. *Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981* v. *Environment (Protection) Act, 1986* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Sharma and Others, [2020] 10 SCR 923](https://lawfoyer.in/union-of-india-v-ashok-kumar-sharma-and-others-2020-10-scr-923/) **Published:** February 2, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment authoritatively settles the long-standing conflict concerning the procedural competence of police authorities in relation to offences under Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. The Court undertook an extensive statutory and constitutional analysis to determine whether police officers can register FIRs, investigate, and prosecute offences which are declared cognizable and non-bailable under Section 36AC of the Act. The Court held that despite the cognizable nature of such offences, Section 32 of the Act creates a complete code for prosecution, thereby excluding police officers from instituting prosecutions or registering FIRs under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment authoritatively settles the long-standing conflict concerning the *procedural competence of police authorities* in relation to offences under *Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940*. The Court undertook an extensive statutory and constitutional analysis to determine whether police officers can register FIRs, investigate, and prosecute offences which are declared *cognizable and non-bailable* under *Section 36AC* of the Act. The Court held that despite the cognizable nature of such offences, *Section 32 of the Act* creates a *complete code for prosecution*, thereby excluding police officers from instituting prosecutions or registering FIRs under *Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*. The judgment harmonises the Drugs and Cosmetics Act with the CrPC by reaffirming the doctrine that *special law prevails over general law*. It recognises that the Act deliberately entrusts enforcement to *Drugs Inspectors*, who possess technical qualifications and statutory powers tailored to regulatory offences affecting public health. The Court further clarified that while *police investigation and FIR registration are barred*, the Act does contemplate *arrest*, and such power vests in the *Drugs Inspector* under *Section 22(1)(d)* as a necessary incidental power. The ruling has significant implications for criminal procedure, personal liberty under *Article 21 of the Constitution*, regulatory enforcement, and federal policing practice. It curtails unauthorized police action, strengthens statutory discipline, and preserves legislative intent. **Keywords:** Drugs and Cosmetics Act, Section 32, FIR, Cognizable Offence, Police Powers, Arrest, Special Statute, CrPC ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetails*Judgement Cause Title**Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Sharma and Others**Case Number*Criminal Appeal No. 200 of 2020*Judgement Date*28 August 2020*Court*Supreme Court of India*Quorum*Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Justice K.M. Joseph*Author*Justice K.M. Joseph*Citation**\[2020\] 10 SCR 923**Legal Provisions Involved**Sections 18(a)(i), 22, 27, 32, 36AC – Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940; Sections 154, 157, 170, 173 – CrPC**Judgments Overruled*None*Related Law Subjects*Criminal Law, Regulatory Law, Constitutional Law ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The case arose from increasing instances where police authorities registered FIRs and initiated criminal investigations for offences relating to *sale and distribution of drugs* under *Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940*. The controversy deepened after the *2008 amendment* introducing *Section 36AC*, which declared certain offences cognizable and non-bailable, leading enforcement agencies to assume that ordinary police powers under the CrPC stood automatically attracted. The High Court had quashed the FIR registered against the respondent, holding that *Section 32* of the Act exclusively governs prosecution and bars police-initiated proceedings. The Union of India challenged this interpretation, arguing that cognizability under Section 36AC necessarily attracts *Section 154 CrPC* and mandatory FIR registration as per *Lalita Kumari*. The Supreme Court was thus called upon to resolve a complex statutory interplay involving *Sections 4(2) and 5 of the CrPC*, *Section 32 of the Act*, and constitutional guarantees under *Articles 21 and 22*. The background reflects a regulatory statute designed to safeguard *public health*, where technical enforcement is preferred over traditional policing. The judgment addresses systemic misuse of police powers, arbitrary arrests, and procedural irregularities that directly impact personal liberty. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The respondent was the owner of a licensed medical shop. An FIR was registered by the police for alleged violations under *Sections 18(a)(i) and 27* of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, alleging sale of drugs in contravention of statutory standards. The police proceeded under the CrPC framework, registered the FIR under *Section 154*, and commenced investigation. The respondent challenged the FIR before the High Court, contending that *Section 32 of the Act* restricts prosecution to specified authorities, namely *Drugs Inspectors, authorised gazetted officers, aggrieved persons, or recognised consumer associations*. It was argued that police officers lack statutory authority to initiate criminal proceedings under Chapter IV. The High Court accepted this contention and quashed the FIR, holding that the entire police action was without jurisdiction. The Union of India appealed, asserting that once an offence is declared cognizable, police powers automatically apply. The Supreme Court examined the entire statutory scheme, including investigative powers under *Sections 22 and 23*, procedural safeguards, the role of Special Courts, and the absence of police authority within the Act. The factual matrix thus squarely raised the legality of police intervention in regulatory offences. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether police officers are competent to register an FIR under *Section 154 CrPC* for offences under *Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940*? ii. Whether *Section 36AC* overrides *Section 32* of the Act? iii. Whether the Drugs Inspector has the power to arrest without warrant? iv. Whether the principle in *Lalita Kumari* applies to offences under the Act? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellant submitted that once offences are declared *cognizable*, the statutory duty under *Section 154 CrPC* is triggered. Reliance was placed on *Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh* to argue that registration of FIR is mandatory. It was contended that *Section 2 of the Act* preserves the application of the CrPC and that excluding police powers would defeat effective enforcement. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the respondent submitted that *Section 32* constitutes a *complete bar* on police prosecution. It was argued that cognizability does not equate to police investigation where the special statute provides otherwise. Emphasis was placed on legislative intent, technical nature of offences, and the doctrine of *lex specialis derogat legi generali*. ## **H) JUDGEMENT** The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the High Court’s judgment. It held that *Section 32 of the Act expressly excludes police officers from prosecuting offences under Chapter IV*. The Court observed that cognizability only affects *arrest and bail*, not the *mode of prosecution*. A detailed examination of *Chapters XII, XV, and XVI of the CrPC* revealed that police investigation culminates in a *Section 173 report*, which is legally impermissible under the Act. The Court categorically held that registration of FIRs in such cases is *unauthorised and void*. On arrest, the Court harmonised *Section 22(1)(d)* with constitutional safeguards and held that *Drugs Inspectors possess implied arrest powers*, subject to CrPC safeguards and reporting requirements. Police assistance may be sought only for effectuating arrest, not investigation. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio decisively affirms that *where a special statute prescribes a distinct mechanism for prosecution, general police powers under the CrPC stand excluded*. *Section 32* overrides *Section 154 CrPC*. Cognizable status does not import police investigation. Arrest power vests in the *Drugs Inspector* by necessary implication under *Section 22(1)(d)*. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that arbitrary arrests in regulatory offences undermine *Article 21*. It also emphasised the need for Central Government guidelines under *Section 33P* to regulate arrest powers exercised by Drugs Inspectors. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Police shall not register FIRs for offences under Chapter IV unless IPC offences are also disclosed. ii. Complaints must be forwarded to the jurisdictional Drugs Inspector. iii. Arrests by Drugs Inspectors must strictly comply with *CrPC safeguards* and *D.K. Basu* guidelines. iv. Immediate reporting of arrest to superior officers is mandatory. ## **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment restores statutory discipline and reinforces personal liberty. It prevents misuse of criminal process, respects legislative design, and clarifies enforcement roles. The decision is a landmark in harmonising regulatory law with criminal procedure and will serve as binding precedent across jurisdictions. ## **J) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan*, *\[1994\] 1 SCR 445* ii. *D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal*, *\[1996\] 10 Supp SCR 284* iii. *Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh*, *\[2013\] 14 SCR 713* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940* ii. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* iii. *Constitution of India* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Women, Children & the New Criminal Laws: Understanding Protection, Rights and Reforms | Organized by SAGE Winter School - SAGE University | Register by 22 February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/women-children-the-new-criminal-laws-understanding-protection-rights-and-reforms-organized-by-sage-winter-school-sage-university-register-by-22-february-2026/) **Published:** February 1, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** Women, Children & the New Criminal Laws: Understanding Protection, Rights and Reforms | Organized by SAGE Winter School - SAGE University | Register by 22 February 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/WhatsApp-Image-2026-02-01-at-9.10.06-PM-1024x1024.jpeg) ## **About the Organiser / University** SAGE University is a multidisciplinary private university committed to academic excellence, practical learning, and research-oriented education. Through initiatives like **SAGE Winter School (SAGE X Platform)**, the university offers short-term certified programmes aimed at enhancing professional skills, legal awareness, and contemporary understanding of evolving laws and policies. ## **Details About the Event / Programme** This certified online course is designed to provide participants with a comprehensive understanding of criminal laws relating to women and children in India. The programme places special emphasis on: - Recent criminal law reforms - Landmark judicial pronouncements - Procedural safeguards - A rights-based and victim-centric approach to justice The course also explores the role of law enforcement agencies, the judiciary, and society in the effective implementation of laws protecting women and children. ## **Who Is It For / Eligibility to Participate** - Law students - Legal researchers - Advocates - Academicians - Anyone interested in criminal law reforms and rights of women and children ## **Mode of the Event** Online ## **Course Duration** 23 February 2026 – 02 March 2026 ## **Registration / Submission Links & Procedure** Interested participants can register online through the official link: ## **Fee Details** Registration Fee: **₹500** ## **Programme Coordinator** Ms. Anubhuti Agrawal ## **Contact Information** Phone: 7869015087 ## **Official Link of the Event** **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events --- ### [5th FIMT Moot Court Competition (All India Participation) 2026 | Organized by Fairfield School of Law, Fairfield Institute of Management & Technology (FIMT) | Register by 15th February, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/5th-fimt-moot-court-competition-all-india-participation-2026-organized-by-fairfield-school-of-law-fairfield-institute-of-management-technology-fimt-register-by-15th-february-2026/) **Published:** February 1, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 5th FIMT Moot Court Competition (All India Participation) 2026 | Organized by Fairfield School of Law, Fairfield Institute of Management & Technology (FIMT) | Register by 15th February, 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/POSTER-5TH-FIMT-MOOT-COURT-COMPETITION-ALL-INDIA-PARTICIPATION-2026-819x1024.jpeg) ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER / COLLEGE / UNIVERSITY** Fairfield Institute of Management and Technology (FIMT) is a NAAC-accredited A+ Grade institution approved by the Government of NCT of Delhi and affiliated to Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University (GGSIPU). The institute is approved by the Bar Council of India, AICTE, NCTE and recognized under Section 2(f) of the UGC Act, 1956. FIMT has a legacy of over 50 years in shaping careers across diverse disciplines including Law and Legal Studies. The Fairfield School of Law focuses on providing rigorous legal education combined with practical exposure through internships, clerkships and moot court competitions, fostering advocacy skills, ethical values and professional excellence among students. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY** The 5th FIMT Moot Court Competition (All India Participation) 2026 is a national-level moot court competition organized in physical mode. The competition aims to provide law students across India a platform to demonstrate their advocacy, research and legal reasoning skills through simulated courtroom proceedings. The event will be conducted over three days from **12th to 14th March, 2026**, with the final round scheduled on **14th March, 2026**. The competition carries prizes worth **₹2,00,000/-** along with certificates, trophies and complimentary subscriptions to SCC Online Web Edition. ## **WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** - Open to all students enrolled bona fide on a regular basis in a law course or its equivalent from any recognized College / Institution / University. - Each team must consist of **three members**: - Two Speakers - One Researcher ## **MODE OF THE EVENT** Offline (Physical Mode) ## **LOCATION (COUNTRY / STATE / CITY) & VENUE OF THE EVENT** - **Venue:** FIMT Moot Court Hall, Fairfield Institutional Campus - **Address:** Bijwasan Road, New Delhi – 110097 - **Country:** India - **City:** New Delhi ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE** **Registration Procedure:** - Teams must register by filling the Google Registration Form and paying the prescribed registration fee on or before **15th February, 2026 (11:59 PM)**. - A scanned bonafide letter issued by the appropriate authority of the team’s institution must be uploaded during registration. - Team codes will be allotted by **18th February, 2026**. **Registration Link:** **Submission Procedure:** - Soft copies of memorials for both sides must be submitted in PDF and Word formats via email to **fimtsolmootcourt@gmail.com** on or before **1st March, 2026 (11:59 PM)**. - Late submissions will attract a penalty of 1 mark per day. ## **FEE DETAILS** - Registration Fee: **₹3,100/- per team** - The fee is non-refundable and mandatory for all participating teams. ## **PRIZES** - **Winning Team:** ₹51,000/- + Trophy + Certificate of Excellence + One-year SCC Online Web Edition subscription (worth ₹32,000 each) - **Runner-Up Team:** ₹31,000/- + Trophy + Certificate of Excellence - **Best Memorial:** ₹5,100/- + Trophy + Certificate - **Best Researcher:** ₹5,100/- + Trophy + Certificate - **Best Orator – 1:** ₹5,100/- + Trophy + Certificate - **Best Orator – 2:** ₹5,100/- + Trophy + Certificate - Certificates of Merit for Quarter-finalist teams - Certificates of Participation + One-month SCC Online Web Edition access (worth ₹3,100 each) ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - Last date for Registration: **15th February, 2026** - Last date for Clarifications on Moot Problem: **18th February, 2026** - Submission of Memorials: **1st March, 2026** - Oral Rounds: **12th, 13th & 14th March, 2026** ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** - **Faculty Convener:** Dr. Malvika Sharma – +91 9718543412 - **Faculty Co-Conveners:** Ms. Ishika Shokeen / Mr. Vishal Khudania – +91 9899931135 - **Student Convener:** Mr. Ayush Awasthi – +91 9990752453 - **Student Co-Convener:** Mr. Keshav Shukla – +91 8853144506 - **Email:** fimtsolmootcourt@gmail.com ## **OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / OFFICIAL BROCHURE, RULES & REGULATIONS** - **Official Brochure:** - **Moot Proposition & Rules:** **Categories:** Events, Moot Courts --- ### [Manwee Arya, Shivang Kumar and Gyan Prakash of Central University of South Bihar Shines on the National Mooting Stage as Best Student Advocate (Petitioner) at Shri I.M. Nanavati Memorial Moot Court Competition 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/manwee-arya-shivang-kumar-and-gyan-prakash-of-central-university-of-south-bihar-shines-on-the-national-mooting-stage-as-best-student-advocate-petitioner-at-shri-i-m-nanavati-memorial-moot-court-co/) **Published:** February 1, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Content:** LawFoyer’s Achievers’ Archive proudly celebrates the remarkable achievement of **Manwee Arya**, a fourth-year B.A. LL.B student from **Central University of South Bihar**, who has been honored with the prestigious title of **Best Student Advocate (Petitioner)** at the **Shri I.M. Nanavati Memorial Moot Court Competition, 2026**. This recognition reflects not only her individual excellence but also her dedication to the art of advocacy, legal reasoning, and courtroom discipline. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG-20260111-WA0050-Manwee-Arya-S2-573x1024.jpg) The Shri I.M. Nanavati Memorial Moot Court Competition is widely regarded as one of the most respected and challenging moot court competitions in India. Organized by **Gujarat Law Society University**, the competition attracts talented law students from reputed institutions across the country. Known for its rigorous problem, demanding rounds, and high standards of judging, the competition serves as a true test of a participant’s legal knowledge, analytical depth, and oral advocacy skills. Manwee Arya’s achievement as Best Student Advocate for the petitioner side stands as a testament to her clarity of thought, persuasive articulation, and strong command over legal principles. Competing at a national level, she demonstrated exceptional skill in presenting arguments, responding to judicial questions with confidence, and maintaining courtroom etiquette throughout the proceedings. Her performance clearly distinguished her among a pool of highly competitive participants. Currently pursuing her legal education at the Central University of South Bihar in Gaya, Bihar, Manwee is known for her consistent academic dedication and interest in litigation. As a fourth-year law student, she has actively engaged in mooting and legal research, using these platforms to sharpen her advocacy skills and deepen her understanding of law in practice. This recognition adds another milestone to her growing journey in the legal field. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG-20260111-WA0040-Manwee-Arya-S2-1024x466.jpg) This achievement was not a solitary effort. Manwee was part of a committed team that included **Shivang Kumar** and **Gyan Prakash**, whose support, research assistance, and collaboration played a crucial role in the overall preparation for the competition. Moot court competitions demand teamwork, coordination, and shared responsibility, and this team displayed all these qualities with sincerity and discipline. Together, they navigated complex legal issues, structured strong arguments, and prepared thoroughly for each round. Reflecting on her experience, Manwee shared that this victory represents her passion for advocacy, sharp legal research skills, and the ability to craft compelling arguments under pressure. She believes that such platforms are instrumental in shaping future litigators, as they mirror real courtroom challenges and instill confidence in young legal minds. For her, this recognition strengthens her resolve to pursue a career in litigation, where she hopes to champion justice with eloquence, integrity, and precision. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Manwee-Arya-S2-1024x461.jpg) Achievements like this highlight the importance of experiential learning in legal education. Moot court competitions go beyond textbooks and classrooms, allowing students to apply the law, think critically, and develop professional skills that are essential for legal practice. Manwee Arya’s success serves as an inspiration for aspiring law students who dream of excelling in advocacy and making a meaningful impact in the legal profession. LawFoyer congratulates Manwee Arya and her team for this outstanding accomplishment and applauds their dedication, perseverance, and hard work. Her journey reminds us that consistent effort, passion for learning, and belief in one’s abilities can lead to remarkable success. We look forward to witnessing many more milestones in her legal journey. Wish to showcase your achievement to the world and inspire others? LawFoyer will celebrate your achievement because every achievement deserves recognition. Your achievement is our achievement. Share your achievement with us: **Categories:** Achievers Archive --- ### [Arush Kalsotra of Himachal Pradesh National Law University, Shimla Wins Upcoming Mediator Award at International Mediation Competition](https://lawfoyer.in/arush-kalsotra-of-himachal-pradesh-national-law-university-shimla-wins-upcoming-mediator-award-at-international-mediation-competition/) **Published:** February 1, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Content:** LawFoyer proudly celebrates the remarkable achievement of **Arush Kalsotra**, a dedicated law student from **Himachal Pradesh National Law University, Shimla**, who has been honoured with the **Upcoming Mediator Award** at the **Lex Infinitum VMSCL International Dispute Resolution Competition**. The competition was organized by **V.M. Salgaocar College of Law, Goa** and witnessed participation from talented teams across different countries and institutions. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_5037-Arush-Kalsotra-768x1024.jpeg) Arush is currently pursuing **B.A. LL.B. (Hons.)** and is based in Shimla, Himachal Pradesh. His journey at this international platform is especially inspiring because this was his **first international mediation competition**. Entering an unfamiliar field often brings hesitation, and Arush openly acknowledges that mediation was completely new to him when he stepped into the competition. However, instead of letting uncertainty hold him back, he embraced the learning process with honesty, patience, and determination. The competition brought together participants from New York, Sri Lanka, Singapore, and various parts of India. Being part of such a diverse and global forum exposed Arush to different perspectives, negotiation styles, and approaches to dispute resolution. For a young law student, this experience was not just about competing but also about understanding how law works beyond textbooks and courtrooms. Mediation required him to listen carefully, slow down conversations, and create space where all parties felt respected and heard. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/IMG_0440-Arush-Kalsotra-768x1024.jpeg) Throughout the rounds, Arush demonstrated a natural ability to balance empathy with clarity. He learned that mediation is not about winning arguments but about guiding conversations toward meaningful and fair outcomes. Judges and evaluators took note of his calm approach, thoughtful interventions, and growing confidence as a mediator. These qualities ultimately earned him the **Upcoming Mediator Award**, a recognition given to participants who show exceptional promise in the field of mediation. Reflecting on the achievement, Arush shared that the award meant more to him than he initially expected. What began as an intimidating challenge slowly turned into a deeply fulfilling experience. The recognition was not only about the certificate or title but about the reassurance that he was moving in the right direction. It validated his interest in dispute resolution and encouraged him to continue exploring mediation with curiosity and humility. This achievement highlights the importance of stepping outside one’s comfort zone. Arush’s journey shows that it is okay to be a beginner, to feel unsure, and to learn along the way. What truly matters is the willingness to engage sincerely with the process. His success also reflects the supportive academic environment at Himachal Pradesh National Law University, Shimla, which continues to nurture students who excel at national and international platforms. Arush Kalsotra’s accomplishment stands as an inspiration for aspiring law students who may hesitate to try something new. His story reminds us that growth often begins with taking that first uncertain step. With this achievement, Arush has not only added a milestone to his academic journey but has also set a strong foundation for a future in alternative dispute resolution. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/affbf58b-4a48-4baf-b3a7-cc3ee147ebbf-Arush-Kalsotra-831x1024.jpeg) LawFoyer congratulates Arush on this well deserved recognition and looks forward to witnessing many more milestones in his legal journey. His achievement truly reflects the spirit of young legal minds who are shaping the future of the legal profession with dedication and purpose. Wish to showcase your achievement to the world and inspire others? LawFoyer will celebrate your achievement because every achievement deserves recognition. Your achievement is our achievement. Share your achievement with us: **Categories:** Achievers Archive --- ### [24th LawFoyer Quiz on (Contract Law + Law of Torts): Prizes worth Rs. 15K + | Cash Prizes, Smart Watch, Earbuds and much more | Bonuses for All Participants worth Rs. 5K+ | Register by 24th January, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/24th-lawfoyer-quiz-on-contract-law-law-of-torts-prizes-worth-rs-25k-cash-prizes-smart-watch-earbuds-and-much-more/) **Published:** December 7, 2025 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/24th-Quiz-Medium.png) **——————————————–** [Download Updated or Final Answer Key (General Answer Key by LawFoyer)](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/New-Answer-Key-24th-LawFoyers-Quiz-on-Indian-Contract-Law-Law-of-Torts-2025.pdf) **—————————————-** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Quiz-Winners-1-819x1024.jpg) **——————————————–** [Check Result](https://lawfoyer.in/result-of-24th-lawfoyer-quiz-on-contract-law-law-of-torts/) **——————————————–** [Download Certificate](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1j6aczPX6QvVF-B_7b6j4gZbMMjUskMxi?usp=sharing) **——————————————–** **Question No****Previous Answer****Correct Answer (Now)****Question 6**DA**Ouestion 33**CB## Dates - **Date of Quiz:-** 25th January 2026 ( Sunday 7 Pm) - **Last Date to Apply:-** 24th January 2026, 11:00 pm - **Result Declaration:-** 30th January 2026 ## Prizes - **1st Prize-** Cash Prize Rs. 3,000/- + Smart Watch worth Rs. 2,000/- + Hardcopy Certificate of Excellence & Participation + FREE Access to LawFoyer Academy’s any Premium Course worth Rs. 4,000/- + FREE Publication Opportunity with [LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research](https://lijdlr.com/cfp-lawfoyer-international-journal-of-doctrinal-legal-research/ "LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research") (LIJDLR) - **2nd Prize-** Cash Prize Rs. 2000/- + Earbuds worth Rs. 1000/- + Hardcopy Certificate of Excellence & Participation + FREE Access to LawFoyer Academy’s any Premium Course worth Rs. 3,000/- + FREE Publication Opportunity with [LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research](https://lijdlr.com/cfp-lawfoyer-international-journal-of-doctrinal-legal-research/ "LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research") (LIJDLR) - **3rd Prize-** Cash Prize Rs. 1000/- + Hardcopy Certificate of Excellence & Participation + FREE Access to LawFoyer Academy’s any Premium Course worth Rs. 2,000/- + Discounted Publication Opportunity with [LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research](https://lijdlr.com/cfp-lawfoyer-international-journal-of-doctrinal-legal-research/ "LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research") (LIJDLR) - **4th-10th Prize-** Cash Prize Rs 150/-**+** E-Certificates of Excellence & Participation + FREE Access to LawFoyer Academy’s any Premium Course worth Rs. 1,000/- + Discounted Publication Opportunity with [LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research](https://lijdlr.com/cfp-lawfoyer-international-journal-of-doctrinal-legal-research/ "LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research") (LIJDLR) - **FREE Practice E-Books with 1000+ MCQs** - **FREE 4000+ Legal Drafts & Drafting Guidebook** - **E-Certificate of Participation for All the Participants** - **FREE 2 Turnitin Plagiarism Reports worth Rs. 400 for Each Participants**. ## **Registration Fees** - **Rs 99/- Only** [Register Now](#1) ## ELIGIBILITY - Law Students - Legal Professionals - Legal Practitioners - Judiciary Aspirants - AIBE Aspirants - JLO Aspirants - IBPS SO Aspirants - Government Exam Aspirants - Any person Interested in Contract Law + Law of Torts ## **Important Guidelines** - **Format of Quiz:** Quiz shall take place online, and a paper will include multiple-choice questions**.** - The participant can take this exam on their laptop or mobile phone. - The platform for the quiz will be google Forms, Microsoft Forms, etc. - In the case of the same marks, time will be considered (a person who submits early will be given preference). - The link will be shared 24 hours prior to the start of the quiz. ## **Rules & Regulations** - **60 MCQ(s) \[30 Question on Contract Law + **30 Question on** Law of Torts\].** - The time allotted will be **20** minutes. (This includes time for filling the basic details like Name, email, etc.) - **Every question carries 04 marks & there will be no negative marking.** - The Result will be declared on **30th January 2026** ([www.lawfoyer.in](https://lawfoyer.in/)). ## Registration Form --- **Categories:** Quiz **Tags:** #quiz, contract, contractquiz, lawfoyer, lawfoyerquiz --- ### [IILM Law Journal – Call for Papers (Vol. IV, Issue 1) | Organized by IILM Law Journal, School of Law, IILM University | Register by 24th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/iilm-law-journal-call-for-papers-vol-iv-issue-1-organized-by-iilm-law-journal-school-of-law-iilm-university-register-by-24th-april-2026/) **Published:** January 28, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** IILM Law Journal – Call for Papers (Vol. IV, Issue 1) | Organized by IILM Law Journal, School of Law, IILM University | Register by 24th April 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/images-1.jpg) ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER / UNIVERSITY** Since 1993, IILM has established a strong legacy in responsible management education. In 2018, it expanded into legal education through the establishment of IILM Law School. The institution offers five-year integrated undergraduate programmes (BBA LL.B. (Hons) and BA LL.B. (Hons)), a three-year LL.B., a one-year LL.M., and a Ph.D. programme. IILM Law School emphasizes practical legal training through discussions, simulations, and experiential learning, with the objective of producing skilled legal professionals capable of adapting to a dynamic legal environment and contributing to justice, equality, and the rule of law. ## **ABOUT THE JOURNAL** IILM Law Journal (ISSN: 2583-8806) is a **bi-annual, peer-reviewed journal** published by the School of Law, IILM University, Greater Noida. The journal promotes **interdisciplinary legal research** and encourages scholarly writing on contemporary issues intersecting law with sociology, political science, technology, public policy, and economics. The journal invites **articles, notes, comments, reports, and book reviews** that critically analyze current legal issues and propose socio-economic solutions, thereby contributing to the advancement of legal research in India. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE CALL FOR PAPERS** - No specific theme; submissions must address **contemporary legal issues** - Preference will be given to **critical and analytical research** with socio-economic perspectives - Submissions must be **original and unpublished** - Maximum **two co-authors** per submission - Language: **English only** - Abstract limit: **300 words** - Plagiarism above **10% leads to disqualification** - Submission format: **.doc / .docx** - Font: Times New Roman, Size 12, Line spacing 1.5 - Manuscripts must be submitted **via email only** ## **WHO CAN SUBMIT / ELIGIBILITY** - Academicians - Researchers and scholars - Legal professionals - Policymakers ## **MODE OF THE OPPORTUNITY** **Online Submission (Email-based)** ## **LOCATION** **Greater Noida, Uttar Pradesh, India** IILM University, Plot No. 16–18, Knowledge Park–II, Greater Noida – 201306 ## **SUBMISSION LINK & PROCEDURE** - Manuscripts must be emailed to: **** - Each submission must include: - A cover letter with author details and contact information - A declaration of originality and non-submission elsewhere - Author details must **not appear** in the manuscript text or file properties ## **FEE DETAILS** **No submission or publication fee mentioned** ## **IMPORTANT DATES** - **Last date for submission:** 24th April 2026 - **Publication:** June 2026 ## **EDITORIAL BOARD** - **Editor:** Prof. (Dr.) Babita Singh Parasain - **Associate Editor:** Prof. (Dr.) Sushma Singh - **Assistant Editor:** Rachit Sharma ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** - Submission Email: **** - Query Email: **** ## **OFFICIAL INFORMATION** - **URL of The Submission Guidelines:** - **Link of the Website:** **Categories:** Call for Papers, Events --- ### [V AUAP–JLU International Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Jagran Lakecity University, Bhopal (M.P.) | Register by 31st January 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/v-auap-jlu-international-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-jagran-lakecity-university-bhopal-m-p-register-by-28th-january-2026/) **Published:** January 14, 2026 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** V AUAP–JLU International Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Jagran Lakecity University, Bhopal (M.P.) | Register by 28th January 2026 **Content:** ## **About the Organiser / College / University** Jagran Lakecity University (JLU), Bhopal, is a private university established under Section 2(f) of the UGC Act, 1956. The Faculty of Law at JLU was established in 2014 and aims to provide holistic, inclusive, and innovation-driven legal education. The Faculty focuses on experiential learning through moot courts, legal research, and advocacy training, supported by extensive legal databases and research centres. ## **Details About the Event / Opportunity** The **V AUAP–JLU International Moot Court Competition, 2026** is the **X Edition** of the prestigious moot court competition organised by Jagran Lakecity University. The competition will be held from **27th February to 1st March 2026**. The moot proposition is based on the **intersection of environmental adjudication, energy policy, and emerging technologies**, presenting complex issues involving constitutional law, environmental law, international investment law, and arbitration. The competition offers participants an opportunity to argue before eminent judges and legal luminaries from across the world and gain high-level advocacy experience. ## **Who Is It For / Eligibility to Participate** - Open to students enrolled bonafide in **Undergraduate or Postgraduate law programmes** or equivalent courses. - Each recognised institution may send **only one team** (UG, PG, or mixed). --- ## **Mode of the Event** Offline (Physical Mode) ## **Location & Venue of the Event** - **City:** Bhopal - **State:** Madhya Pradesh - **Country:** India - **Venue:** Jagran Lakecity University Campus, Bhopal ## **Registration / Submission Links & Procedure** Participants must complete the registration process through the following steps: - **Provisional Registration Form:** - **Payment Link:** - **Final Registration Form:** - **Travel & Accommodation Form:** Teams must upload payment proof during the final registration process. ## **Fee Details** - **Registration Fee:** INR 7,500 - The fee is **inclusive of accommodation** and is **non-refundable and non-transferable**. ## **Prizes** - **Winning Team:** INR 1,00,000 - **Runner-Up Team:** INR 50,000 - **Best Memorial (Petitioner):** INR 15,000 - **Best Memorial (Respondent):** INR 15,000 - **Best Speaker (Male):** INR 15,000 - **Best Speaker (Female):** INR 15,000 - **Best Researcher:** INR 15,000 Total Prize Pool: **INR 2,25,000** ## **Deadlines / Important Dates** - **31st January 2026:** Final Registration Deadline - **31st January 2026:** Deadline for Seeking Clarifications - **3rd February 2026:** Release of Clarifications - **22nd February 2026:** Soft Copy Memorial Submission - **25th February 2026:** Hard Copy Memorial Submission - **27th February 2026:** Inauguration, Researchers’ Test & Draw of Lots - **28th February 2026:** Preliminary Rounds, Quarter Finals & Cultural Evening - **1st March 2026:** Semi-Final, Final Round & Valedictory Ceremony ## **Contact Information** - **Mr. Omkareshwar Pathak** Assistant Professor & Faculty In-Charge, Moot Court Committee +91 7223004927 - **Mr. Tushar Choubey** Student Convenor +91 9179684841 - **Ms. Srushti Agarwal** Student Co-Convenor +91 7999862855 ## **Official Link of the Event / Brochure / Rules** Official Link (Brochure, Moot Preposition & Others): [https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/14GH8EDADf1R\_ygK1jcfAieD9RKgnZQ1v](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/14GH8EDADf1R_ygK1jcfAieD9RKgnZQ1v) **Categories:** Events, Moot Courts --- ### [NLST National Virtual Moot Court Competition 2026 | Organized by Noida Legal Service Trust (NLST) | Register by 10th February, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/nlst-national-virtual-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-noida-legal-service-trust-nlst-register-by-noida-legal-service-trust-nlst/) **Published:** January 27, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** NLST National Virtual Moot Court Competition 2026 | Organized by Noida Legal Service Trust (NLST) | Register by Noida Legal Service Trust (NLST) **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Screenshot-2026-01-27-192925.png) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER Noida Legal Service Trust (NLST) is a registered non-profit legal aid organisation dedicated to providing free legal assistance, legal awareness, legal education, and access to justice for underprivileged and marginalised communities. NLST works with the vision that “Justice is not a luxury, but a fundamental right of every citizen” by offering pro bono legal services, organising legal awareness programmes, and conducting training and internship initiatives for young legal professionals. Through its initiatives, NLST aims to empower individuals to understand, assert, and protect their legal rights. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT The NLST National Virtual Moot Court Competition 2026 is an annual flagship academic initiative organised by Noida Legal Service Trust (NLST) with the objective of promoting advocacy skills, legal research, courtroom practice, and professional ethics among law students. The competition presents participants with realistic legal propositions, allowing them to argue before experienced judges and legal professionals. It offers practical exposure to litigation, memorial drafting, oral advocacy, and critical legal reasoning. The Final Round of the competition will be adjudicated by Hon’ble Justice Deepak Saxena (Retd.), providing participants with a valuable opportunity to engage with senior members of the judiciary. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE - Open to LL.B., Integrated Law, and LL.M. students from any recognised college or university across India - Each team must consist of three members: - Two Speakers - One Researcher - Maximum two teams per institution are permitted - Teams must comply with all competition rules and memorial guidelines ## MODE OF THE EVENT (ONLINE / OFFLINE OR HYBRID) Online / Virtual ## LOCATION (COUNTRY/STATE/CITY) & VENUE OF THE EVENT India (Virtual Platform) ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE Interested teams must register and submit memorials through the official NLST moot court page: Only 16 teams will be shortlisted for oral rounds based on memorial evaluation. ## FEE DETAILS Registration Fee: ₹600 per team ## PRIZES Total Prize Pool: ₹15,000 (Distribution details will be shared with shortlisted teams) ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES - 05 January 2026 – Release of Registration Form & Moot Proposition - 10 January 2026 – Opening of Memorial Submission - 10 February 2026 – Closing of Registration - Last Date for Memorial Submission - 20 February 2026 – Inauguration Ceremony - 28 February 2026 – Preliminary Round - 28 February 2026 – Quarter Final Round - 01 March 2026 – Semi Final Round - 01 March 2026 – Final Round - 01 March 2026 – Valedictory Ceremony ## CONTACT INFORMATION - +91 99998 93833 - +91 99908 71717 - noidalegalservicetrust@gmail.com ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / LINK OF THE OFFICIAL BROCHURE, RULES & REGULATIONS ETC. - Link to brochure and preposition: [https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1mJkSD6yzgkqL3W1X6xjePAIJtEjSOi1F?usp=drive\_link](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1mJkSD6yzgkqL3W1X6xjePAIJtEjSOi1F?usp=drive_link) - Registration Link: [nlst.in/moot-court](http://nlst.in/moot-court) - Official Website: - LinkedIn: - Instagram: **Categories:** Events, Moot Courts --- ### [ESG 2.0 – Law, Policy and Practice (Value Added Course) | Organized by Vivekananda School of Law and Legal Studies (VSLLS), Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies – Technical Campus (VIPS-TC) | Register by 28th February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/esg-2-0-law-policy-and-practice-value-added-course-organized-by-vivekananda-school-of-law-and-legal-studies-vslls-vivekananda-institute-of-professional-studies-technical-ca/) **Published:** January 24, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** ESG 2.0 – Law, Policy and Practice (Value Added Course) | Organized by Vivekananda School of Law and Legal Studies (VSLLS), Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies – Technical Campus (VIPS-TC) | Register by 28th February 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Screenshot-2026-01-24-231432.png) ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER / COLLEGE / UNIVERSITY** Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies – Technical Campus (VIPS-TC) is a leading educational institution with over 25 years of service in higher education. The institute is affiliated to Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University and is recognised by the Bar Council of India and AICTE. VIPS-TC is NBA accredited for its MCA programme, recognised under Section 2(f) of UGC, ISO 9001:2015 certified, and holds a Grade A++ accreditation by NAAC. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY** ESG 2.0 – Law, Policy and Practice is a Value Added Course focusing on Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) frameworks with emphasis on law, policy, compliance, and practice. The course comprises **9 detailed modules**, conducted in **online mode**, with **around 30 hours of focused learning** delivered across **15 interactive and practical sessions**. The programme covers topics such as ESG governance, climate law, sustainability, ESG reporting, corporate law in India, dispute resolution, and future trends in ESG law and global governance. Sessions will be delivered by esteemed industry experts, academicians, and legal professionals. The course will be conducted from **March 2026 to May 2026**. ## ABOUT THE COURSE This Value-Added Course provides an in-depth understanding of legal frameworks, regulations, and compliance requirements associated with ESG factors in business operations. It is designed for professionals and students from diverse fields such as law, finance, business, and sustainability. ## **COURSE STRUCTURE** **1. MODULE NO. 01- FOUNDATIONS OF ESG** 1.1 CSR to ESG- Origins, Philosophy & Evolution 1.2 ESG and Global Governance Framework 1.3 Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and ESG in Global Energy Governance **2. MODULE NO. 02- ESG IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW & TRADE** 2.1 ESG in International Economic Institutions and Global Agreements **3. MODULE NO. 03- ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE, CLIMATE LAW & TRANSNATIONAL SUSTAINABILITY** 3.1 International Environmental Law Framework (Session 5.1) 3.1. Position of Asian, African Countries on ESG (Session 5.2) 3.3 Sustainability and Resource Management **4. MODULE NO. 04- SOCIAL & HUMAN RIGHTS DIMENSIONS IN GLOBAL** **VALUE CHAINS** 4.1 DEI, Business and Human Rights **5. MODULE NO. 05- ESG GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE LAW IN INDIA** 5.1 ESG Regulatory Architecture in India 5.2 ESG Governance, Ethics & Legal Due Diligence **6. MODULE NO. 06- PRACTICAL WORKSHOP I** 6.1 ESG Policy & Stakeholder Design **7. MODULE NO. 07- PRACTICAL WORKSHOP II** 7.1 ESG Reporting & Measurement **8. MODULE NO. 08- TECHNOLOGY, DATA & ESG COMPLIANCE** 8.1 Digital ESG & Tech Governance **9. MODULE NO. 9 – DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND FUTURE OF ESG LAW, POLICY& PRACTICE** 9.1 ESG-Related Litigation 9.2 The Future of ESG in Global Governance ## **WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** The course is **open to all students and professionals**, regardless of discipline or institutional affiliation, including VSLLS Alumni. ## **MODE OF THE EVENT** Online ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE** **Registration Procedure:** - Complete payment of the course fee - Submit the registration form - Receive a confirmation email upon successful registration **Registration Link:** ## **FEE DETAILS** - **Early Bird Registration (Till 20th February 2026):** - Regular Participants: ₹3000 - VSLLS Alumni: ₹2000 - **Regular Registration (Till 28th February 2026):** - Regular Participants: ₹4000 - VSLLS Alumni: ₹3000 ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - Early Bird Registration Deadline: 20th February 2026 - Last Date of Registration: 28th February 2026 - Course Duration: March 2026 – May 2026 ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** - **Shivansh Gupta (Student Coordinator):** +91 81306 62408 - **Shreya Goyal (Student Coordinator):** +91 80766 07942 - **Email:** esg.vac@gmail.com ## **OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / BROCHURE / RULES & REGULATIONS** Brochure Link: **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events --- ### [Anushka Sharma and Aryansingh Bagga of GLS University Shine as Winners at Client Counselling Competition 2025–26](https://lawfoyer.in/anushka-sharma-and-aryansingh-bagga-of-gls-university-shine-as-winners-at-client-counselling-competition-2025-26/) **Published:** January 25, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Content:** At LawFoyer’s Achievers’ Archive, we take immense pride in celebrating young legal minds who exemplify dedication, skill, and a deep understanding of the law in practice. One such inspiring achievement comes from **Anushka Sharma** and **Aryansingh Bagga**, students of the **Faculty of Law, GLS University**, Ahmedabad, who emerged as **Winners** at the **Client Counselling Competition 2025–26**, organized by the Faculty of Law, GLS University. Adding another feather to this remarkable victory, this amazing team of **Anushka Sharma and Aryansingh Bagga** was also awarded the **Best Advocate Award**, recognizing their exceptional advocacy and client handling skills. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/IMG-20251227-WA0191-Anushka-Sharma-768x1024.jpg) Client counselling competitions hold a special place in legal education because they go beyond books and classrooms. They test how well a future lawyer can listen, empathize, analyze, and advise a client while maintaining professional ethics and legal accuracy. Anushka and Aryan rose to this challenge with confidence, clarity, and compassion. The competition problem was rooted in the **Motor Vehicles Act**, with critical intersections of **criminal law**, making it both complex and realistic. Participants were required not only to identify legal issues but also to translate the law into practical advice that a real client could understand. This demanded a careful balance between technical legal knowledge and human sensitivity. Anushka and Aryan demonstrated this balance with remarkable maturity, showcasing that effective advocacy is not just about knowing statutes, but about applying them thoughtfully while keeping the client’s perspective at the center. Throughout the rounds, the team impressed the judges with their structured approach, calm demeanor, and strategic thinking. Their ability to ask the right questions, identify relevant legal remedies, and explain possible outcomes in simple and reassuring language set them apart. The judges particularly appreciated their clarity of thought, teamwork, and professional conduct, which ultimately led them to secure the top position in the competition. The team’s recognition as **Best Advocate** further highlights their academic excellence. Their performance reflected strong communication skills, confidence, and an empathetic approach towards the client. They demonstrated how a good advocate must combine legal reasoning with emotional intelligence, ensuring that clients feel heard and supported while receiving sound legal advice. This award stands as a testament to their growing potential as a future legal professionals. For both Anushka and Aryan, this achievement is more than just a trophy or certificate. It represents countless hours of preparation, practice, and self-reflection. It also reinforces the importance of experiential learning in law schools, where students learn not only what the law is, but how it works in real-life situations. Competitions like these help bridge the gap between theory and practice, preparing students for the responsibilities they will shoulder as lawyers. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/IMG-20251227-WA0220-Anushka-Sharma-768x1024.jpg) Speaking about the experience, Anushka shared that the competition reinforced a crucial lesson: strong advocacy is about understanding people as much as it is about understanding the law. The opportunity helped both team members sharpen essential skills in client counselling, legal problem-solving, and professional communication, skills that will undoubtedly play a vital role in their future careers. The Faculty of Law, GLS University continues to provide a vibrant platform for students to explore, learn, and excel, and achievements like this reflect the institution’s commitment to nurturing competent and ethical legal professionals. The success of Anushka Sharma and Aryansingh Bagga’s Team serves as a powerful inspiration for aspiring law students across the country. Their journey reminds us that with dedication, teamwork, and a learner’s mindset, students can truly excel and make their mark even before stepping into the professional world. At LawFoyer, we proudly celebrate this achievement and look forward to witnessing many more milestones in their legal journeys. \_\_\_\_\_ **Wish to showcase your achievement to the world and inspire others?** LawFoyer will celebrate your achievement because every achievement deserves recognition. Your achievement is our achievement. Share your achievement with us: **Categories:** Achievers Archive --- ### [V AUAP–JLU International Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Jagran Lakecity University, Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh | Register by 28 January 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/v-auap-jlu-international-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-jagran-lakecity-university-bhopal-madhya-pradesh-register-by-28-january-2026/) **Published:** January 10, 2026 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** V AUAP–JLU International Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Jagran Lakecity University, Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh | Register by 28 January 2026 **Content:** ## **About the Organiser / College / University** The **Faculty of Law, Jagran Lakecity University (JLU)** was established in 2014 as part of Jagran Lakecity University, Bhopal, a private university recognized under Section 2(f) of the UGC Act, 1956. The Faculty of Law focuses on delivering inclusive, progressive, and innovative legal education. It emphasizes experiential learning, critical thinking, ethical foundations, and practical exposure through moot courts, research, internships, and advocacy training. ## **Details About the Event / Opportunity** The **V AUAP–JLU International Moot Court Competition, 2026** marks the **X Edition of the JLU Moot Court Competition**. The competition will be held from **27 February to 01 March 2026**. The moot proposition for this edition is based on the **intersection of Environmental Adjudication, Energy Policy, and Emerging Technologies**. The competition provides a global platform for law students to demonstrate advocacy skills, legal research abilities, and courtroom etiquette. Distinguished legal luminaries from across the world will preside over the Preliminary, Quarter-Final, Semi-Final, and Final rounds. A **total prize pool of INR 2,25,000** has been announced for various award categories. ## **Who Is It For / Eligibility to Participate** - Open to all students enrolled **bonafide on a regular basis** in an **Undergraduate or Postgraduate law course** or its equivalent. - Each recognized institution may send **only one team**, which may be an undergraduate team, postgraduate team, or a mixed team. ## **Mode of the Event** Offline ## **Location & Venue of the Event** Jagran Lakecity University Campus, Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India ## **Registration / Submission Links & Procedure** Participants must complete the following steps: 1. Fill out the **Provisional Registration Form** 2. Complete payment of the registration fee 3. Upload payment proof 4. Submit the **Final Registration Form** Official Registration Links: - Provisional Registration Form - Payment Link - Final Registration Form (All links are provided in the official brochure.) ## **Fee Details** - **Registration Fee:** INR 7,500 - The fee is **inclusive of accommodation** - The registration fee is **non-refundable and non-transferable** ## **Prizes** - **Best Team:** INR 1,00,000 - **Runner-Up Team:** INR 50,000 - **Best Memorial (Petitioner):** INR 15,000 - **Best Memorial (Respondent):** INR 15,000 - **Best Speaker (Male):** INR 15,000 - **Best Speaker (Female):** INR 15,000 - **Best Researcher:** INR 15,000 ## **Deadlines / Important Dates** - **27 January 2026:** Provisional Registration Deadline - **28 January 2026:** Final Registration Deadline - **31 January 2026:** Deadline for Seeking Clarifications - **03 February 2026:** Release of Clarifications - **22 February 2026:** Soft Copy Submission of Memorials - **25 February 2026:** Hard Copy Submission of Memorials - **27 February 2026:** Inauguration, Researchers’ Test & Draw of Lots - **28 February 2026:** Preliminary & Quarter-Final Rounds - **01 March 2026:** Semi-Final, Final & Valedictory Ceremony ## **Contact Information** - **Mr. Omkareshwar Pathak** Assistant Professor & Faculty In-Charge, Moot Court Committee Contact: +91 7223004927 - **Mr. Tushar Choubey** Student Convenor (V Year, B.A., LL.B. (H.)) Contact: +91 9179684841 - **Ms. Srushti Agarwal** Student Co-Convenor (IV Year, B.B.A., LL.B. (H.)) Contact: +91 7999862855 ## **Official Link of the Event / Brochure** - **Official Link of the moot court preposition:** - **Official link of the brochure:** [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Pc\_9UV1KvdhcSGsyr3KRra-NeKr9RnzU/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Pc_9UV1KvdhcSGsyr3KRra-NeKr9RnzU/view?usp=sharing) - **Official post brief:** [https://drive.google.com/file/d/16qRh-e4JR1A1oxKbYBGVFs\_YLITAnC5y/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/file/d/16qRh-e4JR1A1oxKbYBGVFs_YLITAnC5y/view?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Events --- ### [Prajjwal Tiwari Secures 3rd Position in Legal Essay Competition at City Law College, Lucknow](https://lawfoyer.in/prajjwal-tiwari-secures-3rd-position-in-legal-essay-competition-at-city-law-college-lucknow/) **Published:** January 25, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Content:** LawFoyer proudly celebrates the academic success of **Prajjwal Tiwari**, a dedicated law student from **City Law College**, who secured **3rd Position in the Legal Essay Competition** organized by his institution. This achievement stands as a reflection of his growing command over legal research, analytical thinking, and structured legal writing. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/IMG_20260113_190330-Prajjwal-tiwari-1024x785.jpg) Prajjwal is currently pursuing **LL.B (Integrated), 2nd Year**, and his journey in legal education continues to be shaped by curiosity, discipline, and consistent effort. Competitions such as legal essay writing play a crucial role in shaping a law student’s understanding of constitutional values, human rights, and judicial interpretation. Prajjwal’s performance in this competition highlights how young legal minds can meaningfully engage with complex legal issues even at an early stage of their academic careers. The essay competition revolved around a deeply significant and sensitive topic titled **“Handcuffing and the Rights Against Inhuman Treatment: A Legal Analysis.”** This subject required participants to examine constitutional protections, human dignity, and the evolving jurisprudence surrounding custodial practices. Prajjwal approached the topic with clarity and responsibility, carefully balancing legal principles with real world implications. His essay reflected a thoughtful understanding of the rights of individuals and the duties of the state, making his work stand out among many participants. Securing the **third position** at the **university level** is no small feat. It demands not only strong research skills but also the ability to articulate arguments in a persuasive and coherent manner. Prajjwal’s essay demonstrated his capacity to analyze legal provisions, interpret judicial precedents, and present arguments in a structured and impactful way. This recognition reinforces his potential as a future legal professional who values both academic excellence and ethical responsibility. Speaking about the achievement, Prajjwal shared that this competition played an important role in enhancing his **legal research and legal writing skills**. Engaging deeply with the topic helped him understand how theoretical concepts taught in classrooms translate into real legal debates and societal concerns. For a law student, such experiences build confidence and prepare them for future academic pursuits, research publications, and professional challenges. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/IMG_20250727_141115-Prajjwal-tiwari-1024x782.jpg) Prajjwal also shared an encouraging message for fellow law students and aspirants. He emphasized that both winning and losing are integral parts of the learning process. Rather than being discouraged by outcomes, students should focus on continuous improvement and skill development. His words serve as a reminder that perseverance, patience, and passion are essential qualities in the legal field. Achievements like this reflect not just individual success but also the supportive academic environment provided by institutions such as City Law College. Platforms that encourage research, writing, and intellectual debate play a vital role in nurturing socially conscious and competent legal professionals. Prajjwal’s accomplishment adds to the growing list of young achievers who are shaping their legal journeys through dedication and hard work. At LawFoyer’s Achievers’ Archive, we believe that every milestone matters. Prajjwal Tiwari’s success is an inspiration for law students across the country who aspire to strengthen their academic foundations and contribute meaningfully to the legal profession. We congratulate him on this well deserved recognition and wish him continued success in his academic and professional endeavors. Do you wish to showcase your achievement to the world and inspire others? LawFoyer will celebrate your achievement because every achievement deserves recognition. Your achievement is our achievement. Share your achievement with us. Visit: **Categories:** Achievers Archive --- ### [Prajjwal Tiwari Secures Second Position in Essay Competition and Constitutional Quiz at City Academy Law College, Lucknow](https://lawfoyer.in/prajjwal-tiwari-secures-second-position-in-essay-competition-and-constitutional-quiz-at-city-academy-law-college-lucknow/) **Published:** January 25, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Content:** LawFoyer proudly celebrates the academic achievement of **Prajjwal Tiwari**, a passionate law student from **City Law College, affiliated to the University of Lucknow**, who secured **Second Position** in both the **Essay Competition** and the **Constitutional Quiz Competition** organized by **City Academy Law College, Lucknow**, in December 2024. This remarkable accomplishment reflects Prajjwal’s early dedication to legal learning and his commitment to building a strong foundation in constitutional studies and legal writing. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/IMG-20250131-WA0010-Prajjwal-tiwari-1024x464.jpg) Currently pursuing **LL.B. (Integrated), 2nd Year**, Prajjwal’s journey into the world of law is still at a formative stage, yet his achievement stands as proof that determination, curiosity, and consistent effort can lead to meaningful success even in the early years of legal education. Competing at the **University Level**, he showcased a rare balance of analytical thinking and conceptual clarity, which helped him excel in two distinct yet equally demanding competitions. The **Essay Competition** required participants to articulate legal ideas with clarity, coherence, and originality. Prajjwal impressed the evaluators with his structured approach, strong arguments, and thoughtful interpretation of legal principles. His writing reflected not only his understanding of the subject but also his ability to present complex constitutional concepts in a simple and effective manner. For a student still in the initial phase of his legal journey, this achievement highlights his growing command over legal research and academic writing. Equally commendable was his performance in the **Constitutional Quiz Competition**, which tested participants on their knowledge of constitutional provisions, landmark cases, and factual understanding of India’s constitutional framework. Prajjwal’s performance demonstrated his keen interest in constitutional law and his ability to recall and apply concepts accurately under competitive conditions. Securing second position in such a knowledge intensive competition is a clear indicator of his disciplined preparation and genuine enthusiasm for the subject. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/IMG_20250817_232329-Prajjwal-tiwari-1024x749.jpg) What makes this achievement even more special is that it marks **Prajjwal’s first major academic success during his first year of law school**. Reflecting on his experience, he shared that the competition played a crucial role in enhancing his writing skills while also allowing him to test and strengthen his understanding of constitutional law. This early exposure to academic competitions has not only boosted his confidence but also motivated him to actively engage in co-curricular activities alongside his regular studies. Prajjwal believes that achievements like these are stepping stones in a long legal journey. His message to aspiring law students is both simple and inspiring. He encourages them to keep hustling, remain consistent, and move forward with determination, no matter how challenging the path may seem. According to him, continuous effort and belief in oneself are key to illuminating one’s path in the legal world. At LawFoyer, we firmly believe that celebrating such milestones is essential, as they inspire other young legal minds to explore opportunities, participate in academic platforms, and build confidence from an early stage. Prajjwal Tiwari’s achievement is a reminder that success does not always come from grand stages alone. Sometimes, it begins with taking the first step, participating, learning, and giving your best. We congratulate Prajjwal on this well deserved recognition and wish him continued success in his academic and professional journey. May this achievement be the first of many milestones that shape him into a skilled and responsible legal professional. Wish to showcase your achievement to the world and inspire others? LawFoyer will celebrate your achievement because every achievement deserves recognition. Your achievement is our achievement. Share your achievement with us: **Categories:** Achievers Archive --- ### [Commissioner of Service Tax, Ahmedabad v. M/s Adani Gas Ltd., [2020] 8 SCR 875](https://lawfoyer.in/commissioner-of-service-tax-ahmedabad-v-m-s-adani-gas-ltd-2020-8-scr-875/) **Published:** January 24, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the scope and interpretation of Section 65(105)(zzzzj) of the Finance Act, 1994, which levies service tax on the supply of tangible goods for use without transfer of possession and effective control. The controversy arose from service tax demands on gas connection charges collected by M/s Adani Gas Ltd. from industrial, commercial, and domestic consumers for installation of pipelines and SKID measurement equipment. The Tribunal had set aside the demand by holding that such equipment was not used by the consumer. The Supreme Court reversed this finding and upheld the levy. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the scope and interpretation of *Section 65(105)(zzzzj) of the Finance Act, 1994*, which levies service tax on the *supply of tangible goods for use without transfer of possession and effective control*. The controversy arose from service tax demands on *gas connection charges* collected by *M/s Adani Gas Ltd.* from industrial, commercial, and domestic consumers for installation of pipelines and *SKID measurement equipment*. The Tribunal had set aside the demand by holding that such equipment was not used by the consumer. The Supreme Court reversed this finding and upheld the levy. The Court undertook a detailed contractual and statutory analysis to determine whether the ingredients of the taxable service were fulfilled. It held that although *ownership, possession, and control* of the equipment remained with the supplier, the *consumer derived functional and contractual use* of the equipment. The concept of “use” was interpreted contextually and purposively rather than mechanically. The Court clarified the distinction between *deemed sale under Article 366(29-A)(d)* and *service tax under Section 65(105)(zzzzj)*, holding that absence of transfer of possession and control brings the transaction within service tax. The judgment reaffirms the principle that *service tax is a tax on activity*, not ownership, and expands jurisprudence on composite commercial arrangements involving infrastructure-based services. It decisively overruled the Tribunal’s narrow interpretation and restored the adjudicating authority’s findings. **Keywords:** Service Tax; Supply of Tangible Goods; Use Without Possession; Gas Distribution; SKID Equipment; Finance Act 1994 ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Commissioner of Service Tax, Ahmedabad v. M/s Adani Gas Ltd.*Case Number*Civil Appeal No. 2633 of 2020*Judgement Date*28 August 2020*Court*Supreme Court of India*Quorum*Dr D.Y. Chandrachud, Indu Malhotra & K.M. Joseph, JJ.*Author*Dr D.Y. Chandrachud, J.*Citation*\[2020\] 8 SCR 875*Legal Provisions Involved*Section 65(105)(zzzzj), Finance Act, 1994; Article 366(29-A)(d), Constitution of India*Judgments Overruled*Order dated 05.04.2019 of CESTAT, Ahmedabad*Related Law Subjects*Indirect Taxation; Constitutional Law; Service Tax Law* ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The judgment arises from long-standing disputes surrounding the taxation of infrastructure-linked service arrangements under the *pre-GST service tax regime*. The respondent was engaged in distribution of *PNG and CNG* through an integrated pipeline network. To operationalise gas supply, *measurement and pressure-regulating SKID equipment* was installed at customer premises at their cost, while ownership and control remained with the supplier. The Department viewed this arrangement as a *taxable service involving supply of tangible goods for use*, whereas the respondent treated the charges as refundable security deposits. The adjudicating authority confirmed the demand, but the Tribunal reversed it by adopting a narrow interpretation of “use”. The Supreme Court was thus required to settle the legal meaning of “use” under *Section 65(105)(zzzzj)*, reconcile it with *Article 366(29-A)(d)*, and determine whether economic benefit without physical operation qualifies as taxable use. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The respondent collected *gas connection charges* for pipelines and SKID equipment installed at customer premises. Ownership, possession, calibration, maintenance, and operational control remained exclusively with the respondent. The buyer had no right to modify, handle, lease, or alienate the equipment. The Department issued multiple *Show Cause Notices* alleging non-payment of service tax for supply of tangible goods. The respondent contended that the equipment was used solely by it for billing purposes and that amounts collected were refundable deposits under *PNGRB Regulations, 2008*. The adjudicating authority rejected this contention, noting that refunds were partial and usage was customer-specific. The Tribunal overturned this finding. The Supreme Court examined the *Gas Supply Agreement (GSA)* clauses in detail to determine the nature of use and service. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether installation of SKID equipment constitutes *supply of tangible goods for use* under *Section 65(105)(zzzzj)*? ii. Whether absence of possession and control excludes tax liability? iii. Whether functional benefit amounts to “use” under service tax law? iv. Whether the transaction amounts to *deemed sale* under *Article 366(29-A)(d)*? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the customer derived clear *economic and functional use* of the equipment. The equipment ensured accurate billing, pressure regulation, and safety, which were integral to gas consumption. Mere lack of physical operation did not negate use. Reliance was placed on *BSNL v Union of India* and CBEC Circular dated *29.02.2008*. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent argued that the equipment was installed solely for the seller’s benefit. No right to use was transferred. The transaction was incidental to sale of gas and did not involve service consideration. It was contended that taxing provisions must be construed strictly. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 65(105)(zzzzj), Finance Act, 1994* ii. *Article 366(29-A)(d), Constitution of India* iii. *Entry 97, Union List* iv. *PNGRB Network Tariff Regulations, 2008* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Court held that all six statutory ingredients of *Section 65(105)(zzzzj)* were satisfied. It ruled that *“use”* is not limited to physical handling. The SKID equipment enabled regulated gas supply, safety, and accurate billing, all of which benefitted the consumer. The absence of possession and control actually triggered service tax liability rather than negating it. The Tribunal erred by equating use with operational control. The Court emphasised that *service tax is activity-based* and the transaction was not a deemed sale. Refund claims were inconsistent and incomplete, defeating the security deposit argument. The appeals were allowed and the adjudicating authority’s order restored. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** Where *tangible goods are supplied for functional and contractual use without transfer of possession or effective control*, the transaction constitutes a *taxable service* under *Section 65(105)(zzzzj)*, irrespective of physical operation by the recipient. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that modern commercial contracts involve layered service elements. Taxation must align with *economic reality rather than formal labels*. **c) GUIDELINES** i. “Use” must be interpreted contextually ii. Absence of possession supports service tax iii. Functional benefit is sufficient iv. VAT non-payment indicates service character ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v Union of India*, *\[2006\] 2 SCR 823* 2. *Great Eastern Shipping Co. v State of Karnataka*, *(2020) 3 SCC 354* 3. *All India Federation of Tax Practitioners v Union of India*, *\[2007\] 9 SCR 147* 4. *Union of India v Indian National Shipowners Association*, *(2010) 14 SCC 438* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Finance Act, 1994* 2. *Constitution of India* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Praneeth K. & Ors. v. University Grants Commission (UGC) & Ors., [2020] 8 SCR 917](https://lawfoyer.in/praneeth-k-ors-v-university-grants-commission-ugc-ors-2020-8-scr-917/) **Published:** January 24, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the constitutional validity and statutory force of the UGC Revised Guidelines dated 06.07.2020 mandating conduct of final year/terminal semester examinations during the COVID-19 pandemic. The petitions raised an intense conflict between academic standardisation under central law and public health decisions taken by States under the Disaster Management Act, 2005. The Supreme Court was required to adjudicate whether the University Grants Commission acted within its statutory mandate under Section 12 of the UGC Act, 1956, whether the impugned guidelines violated Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, and whether State decisions cancelling final examinations could override UGC directions. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment examines the constitutional validity and statutory force of the *UGC Revised Guidelines dated 06.07.2020* mandating conduct of *final year/terminal semester examinations* during the COVID-19 pandemic. The petitions raised an intense conflict between *academic standardisation under central law* and *public health decisions taken by States under the Disaster Management Act, 2005*. The Supreme Court was required to adjudicate whether the University Grants Commission acted within its statutory mandate under *Section 12 of the UGC Act, 1956*, whether the impugned guidelines violated *Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution*, and whether State decisions cancelling final examinations could override UGC directions. The Court reaffirmed the constitutional primacy of *Entry 66, List I* concerning coordination and determination of standards in higher education. It held that *final year examinations form an integral component of academic standards* and that UGC guidelines issued under Section 12 possess *statutory force*. While recognising the overriding authority of State Disaster Management Authorities to restrict physical examinations due to health exigencies, the Court drew a critical distinction between *postponement of examinations* and *grant of degrees without examinations*. The latter, it held, fell outside the jurisdiction of the Disaster Management Act. The judgment carefully balances *federal supremacy in educational standards* with *state autonomy in disaster response*, carving out a nuanced legal position that preserves academic integrity while allowing flexibility in extraordinary circumstances. **Keywords:** UGC Guidelines; Final Year Examinations; Disaster Management Act; Entry 66 List I; Academic Standards; Articles 14 and 21 ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetails*Judgment Cause Title**Praneeth K. & Ors. v. University Grants Commission (UGC) & Ors.**Case Number*Writ Petition (Civil) No. 724 of 2020 (with connected matters)*Judgment Date*28 August 2020*Court*Supreme Court of India*Quorum**Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy, M.R. Shah, JJ.**Author**Justice Ashok Bhushan**Citation**\[2020\] 8 SCR 917**Legal Provisions Involved**Articles 14, 21; Entry 66 List I; Entry 25 List III; Section 12 UGC Act, 1956; Sections 2, 72 Disaster Management Act, 2005**Judgments Overruled*None*Related Law Subjects*Constitutional Law; Education Law; Administrative Law; Disaster Management Law ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT** The litigation emerged from an unprecedented disruption of the academic ecosystem caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Nationwide lockdowns commencing *24.03.2020* rendered traditional university examinations impracticable. In response, the *University Grants Commission*, acting on expert committee recommendations, issued academic guidelines dated *29.04.2020*, later revised on *06.07.2020*, mandating completion of final year examinations by *30.09.2020* through offline, online, or blended modes. Several States, particularly *Maharashtra and West Bengal*, invoked powers under the *Disaster Management Act, 2005*, deciding to cancel final examinations altogether and award degrees based on internal assessments. This divergence triggered a constitutional confrontation involving central academic authority, state disaster powers, and fundamental rights of students. Multiple writ petitions under *Article 32* challenged both the UGC guidelines and State decisions. Petitioners alleged violation of *Articles 14 and 21*, arbitrariness, health risks, and discrimination between final-year and intermediate students. Conversely, other petitioners sought enforcement of UGC directions against State cancellations. The Court was therefore confronted with determining the *hierarchy between central educational standards and state disaster responses*, while safeguarding student welfare and constitutional discipline. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The petitioners were *final-year undergraduate and postgraduate students* across multiple States. Following pandemic-related disruptions, UGC constituted an *Expert Committee* which initially proposed examinations by *31.07.2020*. Due to worsening conditions, revised guidelines extended the deadline to *30.09.2020* and permitted flexible examination modes. On the same date, the *Ministry of Human Resource Development* issued a *Standard Operating Procedure* vetted by the *Ministry of Health and Family Welfare*. The *Ministry of Home Affairs* granted conditional exemptions for conducting examinations. Despite this, *State Disaster Management Authorities* in Maharashtra and West Bengal resolved not to conduct final examinations, instead opting for promotion based on internal assessments. These State decisions directly conflicted with UGC directives. Petitioners argued that universities were converted into COVID facilities, public transport was restricted, digital access was unequal, and examination mandates endangered life and health. Comparisons were drawn with cancellation of CBSE Class X and XII examinations. UGC, supported by the Union, defended the guidelines as *statutory, reasonable, and essential for maintaining academic standards*. The States contended that disaster response powers under *Section 72 of the Disaster Management Act* prevailed. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. *Whether the UGC Guidelines dated 06.07.2020 are statutory in nature under Section 12 of the UGC Act, 1956?* ii. *Whether mandating final year examinations during COVID-19 violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution?* iii. *Whether State Disaster Management Authorities can cancel final examinations and promote students without exams?* iv. *Whether Entry 66 List I overrides State decisions under the Disaster Management Act?* ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Petitioners submitted that the *revised guidelines were arbitrary* and disregarded escalating COVID-19 risks. They argued that *right to life and health under Article 21* was imperilled by compulsory examinations. Reliance was placed on the *overriding clause under Section 72 of the Disaster Management Act*. It was asserted that *UGC failed to consult universities*, rendering the guidelines ultra vires *Section 12*. Differential treatment between final-year and intermediate students was alleged to violate *Article 14*. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for Respondents contended that *UGC is an expert statutory body* entrusted with maintaining academic standards. *Final examinations were integral to degree credibility*. The guidelines were issued after expert consultation and provided flexibility, including special chances. The Union argued that *State powers under the Disaster Management Act extended only to disaster mitigation*, not academic evaluation or degree conferment. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. *Article 14, Constitution of India* ii. *Article 21, Constitution of India* iii. *Entry 66, List I, Seventh Schedule* iv. *Entry 25, List III, Seventh Schedule* v. *Section 12, University Grants Commission Act, 1956* vi. *Section 72, Disaster Management Act, 2005* ## **I) JUDGMENT** The Court held that *UGC Guidelines dated 06.07.2020 are statutory*, issued under *Section 12*, which expressly includes *“examination”* within its ambit. Academic standards necessarily encompass assessment mechanisms. Reliance was placed on *Gujarat University v. Krishna Ranganath Mudholkar* and *Dr. Preeti Srivastava v. State of M.P.*. The Court rejected Article 14 challenges, holding that *final-year students constitute a distinct class*. Final examinations provide an opportunity for academic improvement and career progression. Uniform deadlines further national academic coherence. On *Article 21*, the Court noted that SOPs were vetted by health authorities and flexibility was built into examination modes. Hence, no violation was established. Critically, while recognising that *State Disaster Management Authorities may restrict physical exams*, the Court held that *promotion without examination falls outside the Disaster Management Act*. The power to determine academic standards rests exclusively with UGC under *Entry 66 List I*. However, the Court harmonised both regimes by holding that *State decisions postponing exams override UGC deadlines*, but *cannot override the requirement of conducting examinations altogether*. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The statutory authority of UGC under *Section 12 of the UGC Act* includes regulation of examinations as a core component of academic standards. State powers under the *Disaster Management Act, 2005* do not extend to waiving mandatory examinations or granting degrees without assessment. Entry 66 List I constitutionally prevails over inconsistent State action. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that *academic autonomy must yield neither to populism nor panic*. Extraordinary situations require calibrated flexibility, not abandonment of standards. Consultation under Section 12 is *contextual*, not universal. **c) GUIDELINES ISSUED** i. States may postpone examinations under disaster powers. ii. States cannot promote final-year students without examinations. iii. UGC may extend deadlines upon State request. iv. Universities must adopt flexible examination modes. ## **J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment is a meticulous exposition on *cooperative federalism in education*. It preserves academic integrity while respecting public health exigencies. The nuanced distinction between *postponement* and *promotion without examination* safeguards degree credibility. The ruling reinforces constitutional supremacy of *Entry 66* without undermining disaster governance, setting a critical precedent for crisis-era education policy. ## **K) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** - *Gujarat University v. Krishna Ranganath Mudholkar*, *\[1963\] Supp SCR 112* - *Dr. Preeti Srivastava v. State of M.P.*, *(1999) 7 SCC 120* - *Professor Yashpal v. State of Chhattisgarh*, *\[2005\] 2 SCR 23* - *University Grants Commission v. Neha Anil Bobde*, *(2013) 10 SCC 519* **b) Important Statutes Referred** - *University Grants Commission Act, 1956* - *Disaster Management Act, 2005* - *Constitution of India* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v. Adani Power Rajasthan Limited & Anr., [2020] 12 SCR 301](https://lawfoyer.in/jaipur-vidyut-vitran-nigam-ltd-ors-v-adani-power-rajasthan-limited-anr-2020-12-scr-301/) **Published:** January 24, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The decision in Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v. Adani Power Rajasthan Limited & Anr. constitutes an authoritative exposition on the interpretation of “Change in Law” clauses in tariff-based competitive bidding power purchase agreements executed under Section 63 of the Electricity Act, 2003. The Supreme Court examined whether the shortfall and restructuring of domestic coal supply under the New Coal Distribution Policy, 2013 amounted to a compensable change in law when the bid and tariff were premised on domestic coal. **Content:** ## A) **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The decision in *Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v. Adani Power Rajasthan Limited & Anr.* constitutes an authoritative exposition on the interpretation of *“Change in Law”* clauses in tariff-based competitive bidding power purchase agreements executed under *Section 63 of the Electricity Act, 2003*. The Supreme Court examined whether the shortfall and restructuring of domestic coal supply under the *New Coal Distribution Policy, 2013* amounted to a compensable change in law when the bid and tariff were premised on domestic coal. The Court undertook a close reading of bid documents, correspondence, the Power Purchase Agreement, and regulatory orders to ascertain the foundational assumptions of the contractual bargain. Emphasis was placed on the principle that tariff adoption under *Section 63* is binding once finalized and cannot be reopened by unilateral reinterpretation of fuel assumptions. The judgment reinforces that where parties have agreed *ad idem* on domestic coal as the primary fuel, a subsequent policy shift reducing assured coal supply alters the economic substratum of the contract. The Court further clarified the limited scope of appellate interference under *Section 125 of the Electricity Act*, equating it with second appeals under *Section 100 CPC*. Importantly, the ruling situates *change in law* compensation within the *principle of restitution*, ensuring that the affected party is restored to the same economic position as if the change had not occurred. The judgment harmonizes contractual certainty, regulatory oversight, and public interest in long-term power procurement. **Keywords:** Change in Law; Electricity Act, 2003; Section 63 Tariff; Domestic Coal; Restitution; Power Purchase Agreement. ## B) **CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. v. Adani Power Rajasthan Limited & Anr.*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal Nos. 8625–8626 of 2019iii) Judgement Date31 August 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumArun Mishra J., Vineet Saran J., M.R. Shah J.vi) AuthorPer Arun Mishra J.vii) Citation*\[2020\] 12 SCR 301*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 63 and 125, Electricity Act, 2003; Article 10, PPA*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsElectricity Law; Contract Law; Administrative Law ## C) **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The dispute arose from long-term power procurement undertaken by Rajasthan distribution licensees through tariff-based competitive bidding under *Section 63 of the Electricity Act, 2003*. The procurement framework emphasized certainty of tariff and allocation of fuel risk based on bid assumptions. The successful bidder, Adani Power Rajasthan Limited, structured its bid for the Kawai Thermal Power Project on the premise of domestic coal as the primary fuel, consistent with the prevailing *New Coal Distribution Policy, 2007*. Regulatory approval of tariff by the State Commission crystallized this assumption into a binding commercial arrangement. Subsequent developments in national coal policy fundamentally altered the assured quantity of domestic coal available to power producers. The *NCDP, 2013* curtailed the commitment of Coal India Limited to supply 100% of normative coal requirements and substituted it with a graded supply mechanism, compelling generators to rely partly on costlier imported coal. This policy shift triggered claims under *Article 10 of the PPA*, which provided for compensation in the event of a change in law affecting project economics. The controversy travelled through the Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission and the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity, both of which upheld the generator’s entitlement. The appeals before the Supreme Court raised issues of contractual interpretation, regulatory finality, and the scope of appellate review. The background thus involved a confluence of energy policy reform, competitive procurement discipline, and contractual risk allocation within India’s electricity sector. ## D) **FACTS OF THE CASE** Adani Power Rajasthan Limited participated in a competitive bidding process initiated in 2009 for long-term supply of 1200 MW power to Rajasthan distribution companies. The bid documents permitted multiple fuel scenarios, but required bidders to specify the basis for tariff evaluation. APRL indicated domestic coal as the primary fuel, supported by assurances from the State of Rajasthan to facilitate coal linkage, while maintaining imported coal arrangements as a fallback. Clarifications sought by the procurers resulted in APRL expressly confirming that its bid be evaluated on domestic coal, with escalation indices linked accordingly. A Letter of Intent issued in December 2009 accepted this position, and the PPA executed on 28 January 2010 defined domestic coal as the primary fuel, with imported coal as a backup arrangement. The Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission adopted the tariff under *Section 63*, noting that domestic coal offered lower escalation and was in the procurers’ best interest. Despite persistent efforts, APRL did not receive full domestic coal linkage due to systemic shortages and policy changes. In July 2013, the Central Government notified the *NCDP, 2013*, reducing assured coal supply. APRL approached the State Commission seeking compensation under the change in law clause. The Commission and APTEL upheld the claim, limiting relief to the extent of domestic coal shortfall. The distribution companies challenged these findings before the Supreme Court, disputing the fuel basis of the bid and the applicability of change in law. ## E) **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether the bid and PPA were premised on *domestic coal* as the primary fuel? ii. Whether the *NCDP, 2013* constitutes a *change in law* under Article 10 of the PPA? iii. Whether compensation is payable on the *principle of restitution*? iv. Whether concurrent findings of RERC and APTEL can be interfered with under *Section 125 of the Electricity Act*? ## F) **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellants submitted that APRL had relied on imported coal arrangements to qualify for the bid and could not subsequently claim compensation. It was contended that no vested right to domestic coal existed absent a finalized fuel supply agreement. The appellants argued that policy changes did not amount to a change in law affecting the PPA, and any compensation would burden consumers. Reliance was placed on the limited nature of fuel assurances under the *NCDP, 2007* and the alleged absence of firm linkage at bid stage. ## G) **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the respondent submitted that the bid evaluation, tariff adoption, and PPA unequivocally treated domestic coal as the foundational assumption. Admissions by the procurers before the State Commission acknowledged that non-availability of domestic coal constituted a change in law. Reliance was placed on *Energy Watchdog v. CERC* to assert that modification of domestic coal policy triggers compensation. The respondent emphasized that restitution required restoration of economic equilibrium disrupted by policy change. ## H) **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. *Section 63, Electricity Act, 2003* ii. *Section 125, Electricity Act, 2003* iii. *Article 10, Power Purchase Agreement* iv. *New Coal Distribution Policy, 2007 and 2013* ## I) **JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court affirmed that the bid was evaluated on domestic coal, supported by contemporaneous correspondence, regulatory orders, and contractual terms. The Court rejected attempts to recharacterize imported coal as the bid basis, holding that fallback arrangements do not alter the primary fuel assumption. The *NCDP, 2013* was held to materially change the assurance of coal supply underlying the PPA, thereby qualifying as a change in law. The Court endorsed the reasoning of RERC and APTEL, emphasizing that appellate interference under *Section 125* is confined to substantial questions of law. Concurrent factual findings, absent perversity, were binding. The Court further moderated the levy of late payment surcharge, balancing restitution with equity. **a. RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio rests on the determination that when a tariff-based bid is evaluated and adopted on the premise of domestic coal, a subsequent governmental policy reducing assured domestic coal supply constitutes a change in law. Compensation under the PPA flows from the *principle of restitution*, restoring the generator to the same economic position. **b. OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that regulatory certainty is critical to investor confidence and that public utilities cannot approbate and reprobate contractual assumptions after deriving benefit from lower tariffs. **c. GUIDELINES** i. Change in law clauses must be construed to preserve economic equilibrium. ii. Concurrent regulatory findings merit deference under limited appellate jurisdiction. iii. Restitution governs computation of compensation, subject to regulatory verification. ## J) **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment strengthens contractual sanctity in competitive power procurement and clarifies the contours of change in law compensation. It aligns energy policy transitions with commercial fairness and reinforces judicial restraint in technical regulatory matters. ## K) **REFERENCES** a. *Energy Watchdog v. CERC*, *(2017) 14 SCC 80*. b. *DSR Steel (P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan*, *(2012) 6 SCC 782*. c. *Wardha Power Co. Ltd. v. MSEDCL*, *(2016) 16 SCC 541*. b. *Electricity Act, 2003*; *New Coal Distribution Policy, 2007 & 2013*. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi), [2020] 9 SCR 245](https://lawfoyer.in/mukesh-singh-v-state-narcotic-branch-of-delhi-2020-9-scr-245/) **Published:** January 24, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The Constitution Bench judgment in Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi) resolves a long-standing judicial conflict on whether a criminal trial under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 stands vitiated when the informant/complainant police officer himself conducts the investigation. The reference arose due to divergent judicial opinions, culminating in the decision of Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab (2018), which had held that such a course automatically vitiates the trial. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The Constitution Bench judgment in *Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi)* resolves a long-standing judicial conflict on whether a criminal trial under the *Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985* stands vitiated when the *informant/complainant police officer himself conducts the investigation*. The reference arose due to divergent judicial opinions, culminating in the decision of *Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab (2018)*, which had held that such a course automatically vitiates the trial. The present five-Judge Bench undertook an exhaustive examination of the statutory scheme of the *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*, the NDPS Act, constitutional guarantees under *Article 21*, and the doctrine of fair investigation. The Court held that *there is no statutory or constitutional bar* preventing the informant from acting as the investigating officer. Sections *154, 156, and 157 CrPC* positively mandate that the officer receiving information of a cognizable offence must record and investigate it. The NDPS Act, though a special statute with stringent provisions and reverse burden clauses under *Sections 35 and 54*, does not prohibit such investigation. The Court emphasized that *prejudice and bias cannot be presumed* and must be *specifically pleaded and proved*. The judgment expressly overruled *Mohan Lal* and similar precedents to the extent they laid down a blanket rule of invalidity. The ruling restores a fact-centric approach, reinforcing that fairness of investigation is to be assessed during trial, not presumed at inception. **Keywords:** NDPS Act, Informant-Investigator, Fair Investigation, Article 21, Reverse Burden of Proof ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgment Cause Title*Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi)*ii) Case NumberSLP (Criminal) Diary No. 39528 of 2018iii) Judgment Date31 August 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumArun Mishra, Indira Banerjee, Vineet Saran, M.R. Shah, S. Ravindra Bhat, JJ.vi) AuthorM.R. Shah, J.vii) Citation*\[2020\] 9 SCR 245*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 2(o), 154, 156, 157, 173, 465 CrPC; Sections 41–44, 50–58, 67, 68 NDPS Act; Article 21 Constitution*ix) Judgments Overruled*Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab (2018) 17 SCC 627*x) Related Law SubjectsCriminal Law, Constitutional Law, Narcotics Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The reference before the Constitution Bench stemmed from conflicting judicial opinions on the permissibility of an informant police officer conducting the investigation in NDPS prosecutions. Earlier decisions such as *Bhagwan Singh*, *Megha Singh*, and *Rajangam* had expressed reservations rooted in apprehensions of bias. This line culminated in *Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab (2018)*, which elevated the principle into a rigid rule, holding that such investigations ipso facto violate *Article 21* and vitiate the trial. Subsequently, in *Varinder Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh*, a three-Judge Bench confined *Mohan Lal* to prospective operation, casting doubt on its doctrinal soundness. The present reference required authoritative clarification. The Court undertook a granular statutory analysis of the *CrPC* scheme governing cognizable offences and juxtaposed it with the procedural architecture of the NDPS Act. The Bench examined whether constitutional notions of fair investigation require a complete institutional separation between informant and investigator. Emphasis was placed on legislative intent, safeguards embedded in the NDPS Act, and settled principles that irregularities in investigation do not automatically nullify trials absent demonstrable prejudice. The background thus reflects a tension between abstract fairness doctrines and practical statutory mandates. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appeals arose from NDPS prosecutions where the officer who received secret information, effected seizure, and lodged the complaint also proceeded to investigate the offence. The accused challenged the validity of such investigations relying on *Mohan Lal*, contending that the dual role created an inherent bias. The High Court of Delhi had upheld the conviction, rejecting the argument that the investigation stood vitiated solely on this ground. In view of conflicting Supreme Court precedents, the matter was escalated. The central factual premise across connected matters was identical: *no allegation of actual bias or fabrication was established*, and the challenge rested purely on the legal permissibility of the informant-investigator role. The prosecution relied on statutory compliance under *Sections 42, 50, 52, and 57 NDPS Act* and emphasized that safeguards were duly followed. Independent witnesses were either unavailable or hostile, a recurring feature in narcotics prosecutions. These facts framed the narrow but significant legal question requiring authoritative resolution. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether an investigation under the *NDPS Act* is vitiated when the informant police officer himself conducts the investigation? ii. Whether such investigation violates the guarantee of a *fair trial under Article 21*? iii. Whether the reverse burden under *Sections 35 and 54 NDPS Act* mandates a stricter rule of separation? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that allowing the complainant to investigate offends the *nemo judex in causa sua* principle. It was argued that NDPS offences hinge critically on possession and recovery, making neutrality of investigation indispensable. Heavy reliance was placed on *Mohan Lal*, asserting that reverse burden provisions intensify the risk of false implication. The appellants contended that *Sections 42 and 53 NDPS Act* envisage distinct roles and that permitting overlap defeats statutory safeguards and constitutional fairness. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the State argued that *Sections 154, 156, and 157 CrPC* impose a duty on the officer receiving information to investigate. The NDPS Act does not bar such investigation and expressly applies CrPC procedures through *Section 51*. It was contended that *bias cannot be presumed*, and fairness must be assessed on evidence during trial. The State emphasized *Section 58 NDPS Act* as an inbuilt safeguard against malicious action. ## H) JUDGMENT The Constitution Bench categorically held that there is *no legal prohibition* against the informant acting as the investigator. The Court clarified that *CrPC provisions mandate continuity* between receipt of information and investigation. The NDPS Act, though stringent, does not override this framework. The Court rejected the assumption-based approach in *Mohan Lal*, holding that *prejudice must be proved, not presumed*. It relied on *Section 465 CrPC* and *Illustration (e) to Section 114 Evidence Act*, underscoring that official acts carry a presumption of regularity. The Bench further noted that reverse burden provisions do not alter investigation norms and that prosecution must still discharge its initial burden. The Court overruled *Mohan Lal* and all decisions laying down a contrary general proposition. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio rests on statutory interpretation and constitutional balance. The Court held that *fair investigation under Article 21 is contextual*, not abstract. Absence of statutory bar, coupled with procedural safeguards and judicial scrutiny during trial, negates any automatic vitiation. Bias must be established through evidence. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that in cases where investigation is solely dependent on the testimony of the informant-investigator and demonstrable prejudice is shown, courts may accord appropriate weight while appreciating evidence. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Informant-investigator investigations are legally permissible. ii. No automatic acquittal arises from such investigation. iii. Courts must assess *actual prejudice* during trial. iv. *Mohan Lal* stands overruled. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment restores doctrinal coherence by aligning constitutional fairness with statutory mandates. It rejects formalistic presumptions and reinforces evidence-based adjudication. The ruling has far-reaching implications for NDPS prosecutions and criminal procedure jurisprudence, reaffirming that *fairness is a matter of proof, not presumption*. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab* (2018) 17 SCC 627 2. *Varinder Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh* (2020) 3 SCC 321 3. *Bhagwan Singh v. State of Rajasthan* (1976) 1 SCC 15 **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* 2. *Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985* 3. *Constitution of India* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Dr. Vijay Mallya v. State Bank of India and Ors., [2020] 13 SCR 658](https://lawfoyer.in/dr-vijay-mallya-v-state-bank-of-india-and-ors-2020-13-scr-658/) **Published:** January 24, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The decision in Dr. Vijay Mallya v. State Bank of India and Others concerns the limited and well-settled scope of the review jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India, particularly when invoked in proceedings arising out of civil contempt. The review petitions were filed by Dr. Vijay Mallya against the judgment dated 09.05.2017, by which he was held guilty of contempt of court for non-disclosure of assets and violation of restraint orders passed by the High Court of Karnataka. The principal ground urged in review was that the Court had proceeded on an erroneous factual assumption that no reply had been filed by the contemnor to the response of the banks, whereas a reply dated 30.01.2017 was in fact on record. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The decision in *Dr. Vijay Mallya v. State Bank of India and Others* concerns the limited and well-settled scope of the *review jurisdiction* of the Supreme Court of India, particularly when invoked in proceedings arising out of *civil contempt*. The review petitions were filed by *Dr. Vijay Mallya* against the judgment dated *09.05.2017*, by which he was held guilty of contempt of court for *non-disclosure of assets* and *violation of restraint orders* passed by the *High Court of Karnataka*. The principal ground urged in review was that the Court had proceeded on an erroneous factual assumption that no reply had been filed by the contemnor to the response of the banks, whereas a reply dated *30.01.2017* was in fact on record. The Court acknowledged the factual mistake but held that such an error did not amount to an *“error apparent on the face of the record”* so as to warrant review. The judgment clarifies that review proceedings cannot be used as a disguised appeal or an attempt to secure a rehearing on merits. The Court emphasized that unless the alleged error results in demonstrable prejudice affecting the outcome, the review jurisdiction remains unavailable. The ruling reinforces the doctrinal boundaries between *appeal*, *review*, and *curative jurisdiction*, and reiterates the binding nature of undertakings and restraint orders, especially in financial recovery proceedings involving public sector banks. The judgment also underscores judicial intolerance towards asset dissipation and evasive conduct by judgment debtors, particularly where court orders and undertakings are willfully breached. The dismissal of the review petitions paved the way for continuation of contempt proceedings concerning punishment, reaffirming the authority of constitutional courts to enforce compliance with their orders. **Keywords:** Review Jurisdiction, Civil Contempt, Error Apparent on Record, Asset Disclosure, Undertaking to Court ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*Dr. Vijay Mallya v. State Bank of India and Ors.*ii) Case NumberReview Petition (C) Nos. *2175–2178 of 2018*iii) Judgement Date*31 August 2020*iv) Court*Supreme Court of India*v) Quorum*Hon’ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit* and *Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhushan*vi) Author*Justice Uday Umesh Lalit*vii) Citation*\[2020\] 13 SCR 658*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Article 137 of the Constitution of India*; *Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC*; *Contempt of Courts Act, 1971*ix) Judgments Overruled*None*x) Related Law Subjects*Constitutional Law*, *Civil Law*, *Contempt of Court Law*, *Banking and Recovery Laws* ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The judgment arises from prolonged recovery proceedings initiated by a consortium of banks led by *State Bank of India* for recovery of massive public funds advanced to entities controlled by *Dr. Vijay Mallya*. The litigation history reflects a pattern of judicial restraint orders, undertakings before statutory tribunals, and repeated directions from constitutional courts aimed at preserving assets pending adjudication. An *original application* before the *Debt Recovery Tribunal, Bengaluru*, involved a claim exceeding *₹6203 crores*, during which an *oral undertaking* was given by the borrower group not to alienate assets. This undertaking was subsequently fortified by *injunction orders* of the *Karnataka High Court* restraining transfer or disposal of movable and immovable properties. Despite these restraints, significant funds amounting to *USD 40 million* were transferred out of disclosed and undisclosed accounts. The Supreme Court, in its judgment dated *09.05.2017*, found such conduct to constitute *wilful disobedience* of court orders and suppression of material facts, thereby holding *Dr. Vijay Mallya* guilty of civil contempt. The present review petitions sought reconsideration of that judgment, not on substantive innocence, but on a procedural error alleged to have vitiated the contempt finding. The background is crucial as it situates the review within a continuum of evasive conduct, repeated judicial indulgence, and persistent non-compliance with binding orders. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The consortium of banks initiated recovery proceedings before the *DRT, Bengaluru* seeking recovery of *₹6203,35,03,879.32*. On *26.07.2013*, *Dr. Vijay Mallya* and related respondents gave an *oral undertaking* before the Tribunal that they would not alienate or dispose of their properties. Parallel proceedings before the *High Court of Karnataka* culminated in interim injunction orders dated *03.09.2013* and *13.11.2013*, restraining the respondents from creating third-party rights over their assets. These orders remained operative and were never stayed or modified. In *February 2016*, a sum of *USD 40 million*, forming part of *USD 75 million*, was credited to the account of *respondent no.3*. Within days, the amount was transferred out, despite subsisting restraint orders. Crucially, the existence of this bank account was never disclosed to the Supreme Court, notwithstanding repeated directions for complete asset disclosure. In contempt proceedings arising from *SLP (C) Nos. 6828–6831 of 2016*, the Court held that such non-disclosure and transfer constituted deliberate violation of court orders. The contemnor contended that disclosure obligations were limited temporally and that any breach related to High Court orders could not be examined by the Supreme Court. These submissions were rejected. In the review petitions, it was asserted that a reply dated *30.01.2017* to the banks’ response had been filed but was erroneously ignored, leading to prejudice. The Court examined whether this omission warranted review. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether non-consideration of a reply already on record constitutes an *error apparent on the face of the record* justifying review? ii. Whether review jurisdiction can be invoked to seek a *re-hearing on merits* of contempt findings? iii. Whether violation of High Court orders can be examined in contempt proceedings before the Supreme Court? iv. Whether absence of demonstrable prejudice negates the maintainability of review? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the petitioner submitted that the judgment under review proceeded on an incorrect factual premise that no reply was filed by the petitioner to the banks’ response. It was argued that the reply dated *30.01.2017* directly addressed the allegations and its non-consideration vitiated the reasoning process. It was contended that the Court’s observations in *paragraphs 19 and 27* materially influenced the contempt finding. The petitioner asserted that denial of consideration amounted to violation of principles of natural justice. It was further urged that contempt jurisdiction should not have been exercised for alleged breach of *High Court orders*, and that such jurisdiction lay exclusively with the High Court concerned. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the respondents submitted that the review petitions were an attempt to reopen concluded issues. It was argued that the reply dated *30.01.2017* did not dispute the existence of the *oral undertaking* or the *injunction orders*. The respondents contended that even assuming a factual error, no prejudice was caused, as the reply added nothing substantive. The banks emphasized that review jurisdiction is narrow and cannot be used as an appellate forum. They further submitted that suppression of assets and breach of undertakings justified invocation of contempt jurisdiction by the Supreme Court. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. *Article 137, Constitution of India* ii. *Order XLVII Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908* iii. *Sections 2(b) and 12, Contempt of Courts Act, 1971* ## **I) JUDGEMENT** The Court acknowledged that it had erred in recording that no reply was filed by the contemnor. However, it categorically held that such an error did not satisfy the statutory threshold of *“error apparent on the face of the record”*. The Bench undertook a limited examination of the reply dated *30.01.2017* and found that it neither disputed the *oral undertaking* nor explained the violation of restraint orders. The Court emphasized that review jurisdiction cannot be expanded to reassess evidence or reconsider rejected submissions. It was held that an attempt to secure a rehearing under the guise of review is impermissible. The Court reiterated that review lies only when the error is self-evident and materially alters the outcome. Accordingly, the review petitions were dismissed, and directions were issued for continuation of contempt proceedings regarding punishment. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio decidendi lies in the reaffirmation that *review jurisdiction is corrective, not substitutive*. A factual error, unless resulting in manifest injustice, does not justify review. The Court held that absence of prejudice is fatal to review petitions. The judgment clarifies that contempt findings based on independent violations cannot be reopened merely due to ancillary factual inaccuracies. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that repeated non-disclosure of assets undermines judicial authority. It remarked that undertakings given to courts are not empty formalities but binding assurances carrying legal consequences. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Review cannot be used as an appeal in disguise. ii. Error must be apparent and self-evident. iii. Demonstrable prejudice is mandatory. iv. Contempt jurisdiction extends to enforcement of binding orders irrespective of forum. ## **J) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Dr. Vijay Mallya v. State Bank of India*, *\[2020\] 13 SCR 658* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Constitution of India* ii. *Code of Civil Procedure, 1908* iii. *Contempt of Courts Act, 1971* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [In Re: Prashant Bhushan and Anr., [2020] 8 S.C.R. 510](https://lawfoyer.in/in-re-prashant-bhushan-and-anr-2020-8-s-c-r-510/) **Published:** January 24, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in In Re: Prashant Bhushan and Anr. represents one of the most significant contemporary decisions on the law of criminal contempt of court, particularly in the context of social media speech by members of the legal profession. The Supreme Court was seized of suo motu contempt proceedings arising out of two tweets published by a senior advocate, which were found to scandalize the institution of judiciary and undermine public confidence in the administration of justice. The Court examined the constitutional balance between freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) and the inherent contempt jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 129. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment in *In Re: Prashant Bhushan and Anr.* represents one of the most significant contemporary decisions on the law of *criminal contempt of court*, particularly in the context of social media speech by members of the legal profession. The Supreme Court was seized of *suo motu* contempt proceedings arising out of two tweets published by a senior advocate, which were found to scandalize the institution of judiciary and undermine public confidence in the administration of justice. The Court examined the constitutional balance between *freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a)* and the *inherent contempt jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 129*. A central question before the Court concerned the scope and applicability of *truth as a defence* under *Section 13 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971*, as amended in 2006. The contemnor asserted that his statements were bona fide, truthful, and made in public interest. The Court, however, laid down that truth can be a valid defence only when it satisfies the twin requirements of *public interest* and *bona fides*. Upon close scrutiny, the Court held that the defence raised was neither bona fide nor in public interest, and that the affidavit filed in support of the defence aggravated the contempt rather than purging it. The judgment also addresses the special responsibility of advocates as officers of the court, the limits of permissible criticism of judges, and the impropriety of making public statements or engaging with the media during the pendency of *sub judice* proceedings. While affirming the conviction for criminal contempt, the Court exercised restraint at the sentencing stage by imposing a *symbolic fine of Re. 1*, coupled with conditional consequences upon default, thereby underscoring both judicial magnanimity and institutional authority. **Keywords:** Criminal Contempt, Freedom of Speech, Truth as Defence, Judicial Accountability, Social Media and Judiciary, Advocate’s Duty ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*In Re: Prashant Bhushan and Anr.*Case NumberSuo Motu Contempt Petition (Crl.) No. 1 of 2020Judgement Date31 August 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumArun Mishra J., B.R. Gavai J., Krishna Murari J.AuthorPer CuriumCitation*\[2020\] 8 S.C.R. 510*Legal Provisions Involved*Articles 129, 19(1)(a), 19(2), 142(2) of the Constitution of India*; *Sections 2(c), 13, Contempt of Courts Act, 1971*; *Section 3(22), General Clauses Act, 1897*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsConstitutional Law, Contempt of Court, Professional Ethics, Media Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The present judgment arose from *suo motu* cognizance taken by the Supreme Court on account of two tweets posted by a senior advocate concerning the functioning of the judiciary and the role of the Supreme Court over the preceding years. The matter assumes constitutional importance because it tests the contours of judicial tolerance, democratic dissent, and the boundaries of professional conduct expected from advocates who are integral to the justice delivery system. The Court had earlier, by judgment dated *14.08.2020*, found the contemnor guilty of *criminal contempt*. The present decision primarily deals with the question of sentencing and the consideration of the defence of truth raised by the contemnor. The proceedings were marked by extensive arguments on freedom of speech, proportionality, colonial legacy of contempt law, and the alleged vagueness of the offence of “scandalizing the court”. The contemnor consistently declined to tender an unconditional apology, asserting that doing so would amount to contempt of his conscience. This compelled the Court to examine whether mere assertion of bona fides or subjective belief can neutralize the objective tendency of statements that erode public confidence in the judiciary. The judgment situates itself within a long line of precedent which recognizes that while judges must be open to criticism, the institution cannot be rendered vulnerable to scurrilous attacks that it cannot publicly rebut. The Court also confronted the increasing challenge posed by social media platforms, where instantaneous and far-reaching dissemination of opinions magnifies the potential impact on public faith in constitutional institutions. The background thus reflects a complex intersection of constitutional freedoms, professional responsibility, and institutional integrity. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The proceedings originated from two tweets posted by the contemnor, a practicing advocate with over *35 years of standing*. The first tweet depicted the *Chief Justice of India* astride a motorcycle during the COVID-19 pandemic, accompanied by a remark suggesting denial of access to justice to citizens. The second tweet alleged that the Supreme Court, particularly over the preceding six years, had played a role in the destruction of democracy. A petition was initially filed complaining of the first tweet. The Supreme Court, however, chose to initiate *suo motu* contempt proceedings. With respect to the second tweet, cognizance was taken independently based on its publication in a national daily. Notices were issued, and the contemnor filed a detailed reply affidavit asserting truth as a defence, supported by wide-ranging allegations against sitting and retired judges, including former Chief Justices. During the hearing, senior counsel appearing for the contemnor initially refrained from pressing the defence on the ground that it would further malign the Court. Subsequently, however, the contemnor insisted upon the defence of truth and filed supplementary statements reiterating his position. Notably, these supplementary statements were released to the media prior to being placed before the Court. The Court found that the contemnor neither expressed remorse nor showed willingness to withdraw the allegations. Even after conviction, he continued to justify the tweets as part of his higher constitutional duty. This conduct became a material factor in assessing both the nature of contempt and the appropriate sentence. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the tweets published by the contemnor amounted to *criminal contempt* by scandalizing the court? ii. Whether *truth* can be accepted as a valid defence under *Section 13 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971* in the present case? iii. Whether the exercise of contempt jurisdiction violates *Article 19(1)(a)* of the Constitution? iv. Whether an advocate enjoys a higher degree of latitude in criticising the judiciary? v. Whether prior publication of statements during *sub judice* proceedings constitutes interference with administration of justice? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the contemnor submitted that the tweets were expressions of bona fide opinion and constituted fair criticism in public interest. It was argued that the offence of scandalizing the court is vague and colonial in nature, and that truth ought to be ordinarily permitted as a defence under *Section 13*. Reliance was placed on judicial precedents emphasizing free speech, proportionality, and democratic dissent. It was further contended that the contemnor’s long record of public interest litigation, professional standing, and commitment to constitutional causes ought to weigh heavily in his favour. The defence asserted that the conviction itself required reconsideration and that no sentence should follow. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The Attorney General submitted that while fair criticism is permissible, the tweets crossed the permissible limit by attributing motives and undermining institutional credibility. It was argued that the defence affidavit aggravated the contempt and that the allegations against judges who could not defend themselves were wholly unjustified. While urging the Court to show magnanimity at the sentencing stage, the Attorney General nonetheless conceded that the defence of truth could not be sustained under *Section 13*, as it lacked both bona fides and public interest. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Article 129*, Constitution of India ii. *Article 19(1)(a) and 19(2)*, Constitution of India iii. *Section 2(c)*, Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 iv. *Section 13*, Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 v. *Section 3(22)*, General Clauses Act, 1897 ## I) JUDGEMENT The Court reaffirmed that freedom of speech, though fundamental, is not absolute. It held that the contempt jurisdiction under *Article 129* is not inconsistent with *Article 19(1)(a)*, as reasonable restrictions under *Article 19(2)* permit action where speech undermines the administration of justice. On the defence of truth, the Court emphasized the *twin requirements* under *Section 13*: public interest and bona fides. After examining the affidavit and conduct of the contemnor, the Court held that the defence was politically motivated, reckless, and derogatory, and therefore not entitled to protection. The Court also condemned the release of statements to the media during pendency of proceedings, holding such conduct to be an attempt to influence judicial decision-making. Taking into account the contemnor’s persistent defiance and lack of remorse, the Court rejected the plea for a mere warning. Nevertheless, exercising judicial restraint, the Court imposed a *symbolic fine of Re. 1*, with default consequences of simple imprisonment for three months and debarment from Supreme Court practice for three years. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The truth as a defence in contempt proceedings is not automatic and can be invoked only when it demonstrably serves public interest and is raised bona fide. Freedom of speech does not extend to scurrilous attacks that erode public confidence in the judiciary. **b) OBITER DICTA** Judges, by convention and ethics, cannot publicly respond to allegations, making it imperative that the Court protect institutional dignity. Advocates, as officers of the court, owe a higher duty of restraint. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Truth as defence must satisfy statutory thresholds. ii. Advocates must avoid public commentary on *sub judice* matters. iii. Fair criticism must not attribute motives to judges. iv. Apology must be genuine to purge contempt. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** - *Indirect Tax Practitioners’ Association v. R.K. Jain*, (2010) 8 SCC 281 - *Subramanian Swamy v. Arun Shourie*, (2014) 12 SCC 344 - *P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker*, \[1988\] 3 SCR 547 - *E.M. Sankaran Namboodripad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar*, \[1971\] 1 SCR 697 **b) Important Statutes Referred** - Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - Constitution of India - Advocates Act, 1961 **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Tamil Nadu Medical Officers Association & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [2020] 8 SCR 583](https://lawfoyer.in/tamil-nadu-medical-officers-association-ors-v-union-of-india-ors-2020-8-scr-583/) **Published:** January 24, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment adjudicates the constitutional and statutory competence of State Governments to provide a separate source of admission or reservation for in-service medical officers in postgraduate medical degree courses, vis-à-vis the regulatory framework under the Post Graduate Medical Education Regulations, 2000 framed by the Medical Council of India. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment adjudicates the constitutional and statutory competence of State Governments to provide a separate source of admission or reservation for *in-service medical officers* in postgraduate medical degree courses, vis-à-vis the regulatory framework under the *Post Graduate Medical Education Regulations, 2000* framed by the Medical Council of India. The dispute arose due to conflicting interpretations of *Regulation 9*, particularly clauses *(IV) and (VII)*, and their alleged preclusive effect on State policies granting in-service quotas. The Court undertook an extensive examination of the federal distribution of legislative powers under the *Seventh Schedule*, focusing on the interplay between *Entry 66 of List I* and *Entry 25 of List III*. The judgment clarifies that while the Union retains exclusive authority to prescribe minimum standards of medical education, the States are constitutionally empowered to regulate admissions within their quotas, including the creation of a distinct channel for in-service candidates. The Court rejected the doctrine of implied repugnancy and overruled earlier precedent to the extent it treated Regulation 9 as a complete and exhaustive code. The judgment situates in-service reservation within the broader constitutional obligation of the State to ensure public health under *Article 47*, read with the *right to health under Article 21*. The ruling harmonizes federal principles, administrative necessity, and public health imperatives, while imposing mandatory post-degree rural service obligations on beneficiaries of the in-service quota. **Keywords:** In-service doctors, Postgraduate medical admission, Reservation, Entry 66 List I, Entry 25 List III, Medical Council of India, Public health, Federalism ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgment Cause Title*Tamil Nadu Medical Officers Association & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.*Case NumberWrit Petition (Civil) No. 196 of 2018 with connected mattersJudgment Date31 August 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumArun Mishra, Indira Banerjee, Vineet Saran, M.R. Shah, Aniruddha Bose, JJ.AuthorM.R. Shah, J. and Aniruddha Bose, J.Citation*\[2020\] 8 SCR 583*Legal Provisions Involved*Articles 14, 21, 47, 245; Seventh Schedule – Entry 66 List I, Entry 25 List III; Section 33, Indian Medical Council Act, 1956; Regulation 9, PG Medical Education Regulations, 2000*Judgments Overruled*State of U.P. v. Dinesh Singh Chauhan* *\[2016\] 6 SCR 571* (held not good law)Related Law SubjectsConstitutional Law, Education Law, Health Law, Administrative Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The controversy emerged from divergent State policies reserving postgraduate medical seats for in-service government doctors and the restrictive interpretation of *Regulation 9* of the *Post Graduate Medical Education Regulations, 2000*. The immediate trigger was the three-Judge Bench decision in *State of U.P. v. Dinesh Singh Chauhan*, which held that in-service reservation in postgraduate degree courses was impermissible due to the absence of an express enabling provision under the Regulations. This interpretation led to widespread invalidation of State policies across Tamil Nadu, Kerala, West Bengal, Maharashtra, and Haryana. The petitioners contended that the earlier ruling failed to consider the constitutional allocation of legislative powers under the *Seventh Schedule*, particularly the concurrent nature of *medical education* under *Entry 25 List III*. The matter was therefore referred to a Constitution Bench-equivalent strength for authoritative resolution. The Court was required to determine whether the Medical Council of India, exercising delegated legislative power under *Section 33 of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956*, could restrict States from creating a separate admission channel for in-service doctors, and whether such restriction would amount to legislative overreach beyond *Entry 66 List I*. The background also included the 2018 amendment enabling conversion of diploma seats into degree seats, effectively eroding the only expressly permitted in-service reservation under *Regulation 9(VII)*. This legislative and regulatory vacuum raised serious public health concerns, particularly regarding rural and remote healthcare infrastructure. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The petitioners comprised associations of in-service medical officers employed under various State Governments. These doctors were historically provided preferential access to postgraduate medical education through either reservation or a separate source of admission. Such policies were justified as incentives to attract and retain qualified doctors in rural, tribal, and remote areas. Under the *Post Graduate Medical Education Regulations, 2000*, *Regulation 9(VII)* explicitly permitted 50% reservation for in-service doctors in postgraduate diploma courses. However, no parallel express provision existed for postgraduate degree courses. Despite this silence, several States continued their long-standing practice of allocating a percentage of postgraduate degree seats to in-service candidates from within the State quota. In *Dinesh Singh Chauhan*, the Supreme Court held that such reservation was impermissible, treating *Regulation 9* as a complete code. Following this judgment, High Courts struck down State quotas for in-service doctors. Meanwhile, the 2018 amendment allowed conversion of diploma seats into degree seats, resulting in the near-elimination of diploma courses. Consequently, in-service doctors were left without any institutional pathway for postgraduate advancement. The petitioners approached the Supreme Court under *Article 32*, seeking a declaration that *Regulation 9* did not curtail State power under *Entry 25 List III*, or alternatively, that the Regulation was unconstitutional to the extent it did so. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether *Regulation 9* of the *PG Medical Education Regulations, 2000* curtails the legislative competence of States under *Entry 25 List III* to provide a separate source of admission for in-service doctors? ii. Whether the Medical Council of India can frame regulations affecting reservation or admission policy under *Entry 66 List I*? iii. Whether in-service reservation constitutes compensatory discrimination or a permissible classification? iv. Whether *Dinesh Singh Chauhan* lays down correct law? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the petitioners submitted that *Entry 66 List I* is confined strictly to prescribing minimum educational standards and does not extend to regulating admissions or reservations. Reliance was placed on *Modern Dental College and Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh* *\[2016\] 3 SCR 579* to assert that admission policies fall squarely within *Entry 25 List III*. It was argued that *Section 33 of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956* does not delegate power to regulate reservation. Therefore, any regulation attempting to do so would be *ultra vires*. The petitioners emphasized that in-service doctors constitute a distinct class, and preferential treatment is justified by intelligible differentia and rational nexus, as upheld in *K. Duraisamy v. State of Tamil Nadu* *\[2001\] 1 SCR 490*. The conversion of diploma seats into degree seats post-2018 was highlighted as a decisive factual change, rendering the reasoning in *Dinesh Singh Chauhan* obsolete. It was further contended that the State’s obligation under *Article 47* and the derivative *right to health under Article 21* necessitated continued in-service reservation. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the Union of India and the Medical Council of India contended that *Regulation 9* constituted a complete code governing postgraduate admissions. It was submitted that allowing States to create separate admission channels would undermine uniformity and compromise educational standards. Reliance was placed on the doctrine that where a statute prescribes a particular manner of doing an act, it must be done in that manner alone. The respondents asserted that any State policy deviating from *Regulation 9* would attract *Article 254* due to repugnancy. It was also argued that in-service reservation effectively amounted to double reservation, diluting merit-based selection and encroaching upon the exclusive domain of the Union under *Entry 66 List I*. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Article 21, Constitution of India* ii. *Article 47, Constitution of India* iii. *Article 245, Constitution of India* iv. *Entry 66, List I, Seventh Schedule* v. *Entry 25, List III, Seventh Schedule* vi. *Section 33, Indian Medical Council Act, 1956* vii. *Regulation 9, PG Medical Education Regulations, 2000* ## I) JUDGMENT The Court held that *Entry 66 List I* has a narrow and specific ambit confined to coordination and determination of standards. Admissions, reservation, and mode of entry fall outside its scope. The power of States under *Entry 25 List III* to regulate admissions remains intact, subject only to compliance with minimum standards. Justice M.R. Shah held that *Regulation 9(IV)* deals primarily with merit list preparation and SC/ST/OBC reservation, and cannot be interpreted as restricting State competence. Any such interpretation would render the Regulation *ultra vires* the parent Act. The Court expressly overruled *Dinesh Singh Chauhan*, holding it to be not good law. Justice Aniruddha Bose, concurring, emphasized that allocation of seats for in-service doctors is a separate source of entry and not compensatory reservation. The doctrine of implied repugnancy was rejected. The Regulations were held to be non-exhaustive, leaving legislative space for State action. The Court mandated that States must impose compulsory rural service bonds of at least five years on in-service candidates admitted through this channel. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The decisive ratio is that the power to prescribe minimum standards under *Entry 66 List I* does not include the power to regulate reservation or admission policy. States retain constitutional competence under *Entry 25 List III* to create a separate admission channel for in-service doctors, provided NEET-based minimum standards are met. Any regulation framed under *Section 33 of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956* that trenches upon this domain is *ultra vires*. The concept of in-service quota is a permissible classification serving a compelling public interest. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that public health infrastructure in rural and tribal areas would collapse without incentives for doctors to serve in such regions. It noted that education policy cannot be divorced from ground realities of healthcare delivery. The Court also cautioned against mechanical application of the doctrine of *expressio unius est exclusio alterius*, describing it as a “dangerous master” in constitutional interpretation. **c) GUIDELINES** i. States may provide a separate source of admission for in-service doctors within State quota. ii. Minimum NEET qualifying standards must be strictly complied with. iii. Mandatory rural or remote area service must precede and follow postgraduate education. iv. States must enforce service bonds with appropriate financial penalties. v. The judgment shall operate prospectively. ## J) REFERENCES **a. Important Cases Referred** i. *Modern Dental College and Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh* *\[2016\] 3 SCR 579* ii. *K. Duraisamy v. State of Tamil Nadu* *\[2001\] 1 SCR 490* iii. *Sudhir N v. State of Kerala* *\[2015\] 1 SCR 884* iv. *State of U.P. v. Dinesh Singh Chauhan* *\[2016\] 6 SCR 571* (overruled) **b. Important Statutes Referred** i. *Constitution of India* ii. *Indian Medical Council Act, 1956* iii. *Post Graduate Medical Education Regulations, 2000* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [M/s. L. R. Brothers Indo Flora Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, [2020] 10 SCR 1043](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-l-r-brothers-indo-flora-ltd-v-commissioner-of-central-excise-2020-10-scr-1043/) **Published:** January 24, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment addresses the fiscal consequences arising from contravention of Export-Import Policy conditions by a 100% Export Oriented Unit (EOU) engaged in floriculture. The appellant had availed customs duty exemption on imported inputs under Notification No. 126/94-Cus dated 03.06.1994 but effected Domestic Tariff Area (DTA) sales of cut flowers without prior approval of the Development Commissioner and without achieving the prescribed positive Net Foreign Exchange Earnings (NFE) under the EXIM Policy 1997–2002. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment addresses the fiscal consequences arising from contravention of Export-Import Policy conditions by a *100% Export Oriented Unit (EOU)* engaged in floriculture. The appellant had availed *customs duty exemption* on imported inputs under *Notification No. 126/94-Cus dated 03.06.1994* but effected *Domestic Tariff Area (DTA) sales* of cut flowers without prior approval of the Development Commissioner and without achieving the prescribed *positive Net Foreign Exchange Earnings (NFE)* under the *EXIM Policy 1997–2002*. The Court examined whether customs duty could be imposed when the final goods were *non-excisable* and domestically grown, and whether the *amending Notification No. 56/01-Cus dated 18.05.2001* operated retrospectively. The Supreme Court held that exemption notifications are conditional and require strict compliance. Once the EOU violated EXIM Policy conditions, the exemption stood withdrawn, and customs duty became recoverable on imported inputs used in the manufacture of goods sold in DTA, even where the final goods were non-excisable. The Court clarified that the duty demand did not treat cut flowers as imported goods but used a legal fiction only for quantification of duty on imported inputs. On retrospectivity, the Court ruled that the amendment was substantive and not clarificatory, applying only prospectively. The judgment reinforces the doctrine of strict construction of exemption notifications and reiterates settled principles governing retrospective operation of fiscal legislation. **Keywords:** Export Oriented Unit; Domestic Tariff Area; Non-Excisable Goods; Customs Duty; Retrospective Legislation; Exemption Notification ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*M/s. L. R. Brothers Indo Flora Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise*Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 7157 of 2008Judgement Date01 September 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorum*A. M. Khanwilkar, J.* and *Dinesh Maheshwari, J.*Author*A. M. Khanwilkar, J.*Citation*\[2020\] 10 SCR 1043*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 12, 25, 28, 28AB, 114A – Customs Act, 1962; Section 3 – Central Excise Act, 1944; EXIM Policy 1997-2002; Notification No. 126/94-Cus; Notification No. 56/01-Cus*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsCustoms Law; Indirect Taxation; Fiscal Law; Trade Regulation ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The dispute arose within the regulatory framework governing *100% Export Oriented Units*, which are granted fiscal incentives to promote exports. Under the applicable regime, EOUs enjoy *duty-free import of inputs* subject to strict adherence to export obligations and conditional permission for DTA sales. The appellant, operating in the floriculture sector, imported capital goods, live rose plants, and consumables without payment of customs duty under *Notification No. 126/94-Cus*. The exemption was conditional upon compliance with the *EXIM Policy 1997–2002*, which allowed limited DTA sales only after achieving *20% positive Net Foreign Exchange Earnings* and obtaining prior approval from the Development Commissioner. Despite these mandatory requirements, the appellant effected DTA sales during the years *1998-99 to 2000-01* without approval and without meeting the export threshold. These sales were detected by the excise authorities, leading to issuance of a show cause notice invoking *Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962*. The authorities treated the exemption as forfeited due to policy violation and demanded customs duty on imported inputs used in producing cut flowers sold domestically. The appellant challenged the demand on the ground that *cut flowers are non-excisable goods* and are grown on Indian soil, contending that customs duty cannot be levied on such goods. Further, reliance was placed on the *amendment notification of 2001*, arguing that it was clarificatory and retrospective. The adjudicatory journey culminated before the Supreme Court, presenting significant questions concerning the nature of duty liability, legal fiction in fiscal statutes, and retrospectivity of subordinate legislation. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The appellant company was approved as a *100% Export Oriented Unit* engaged in the cultivation and export of cut flowers. Pursuant to such approval, it imported greenhouse equipment, live rose plants, fertilizers, and planting materials without payment of customs duty under *Notification No. 126/94-Cus*. The EXIM Policy governing the relevant period permitted floriculture EOUs to sell up to *50% of production* in the Domestic Tariff Area, provided the unit achieved *20% positive NFE* and obtained express authorization from the Development Commissioner. Between *1998-99 and December 2000*, the appellant sold cut flowers worth approximately *Rs. 38.40 lakhs* in the domestic market without fulfilling the export obligation and without seeking prior approval. The export performance during this period was substantially lower than the prorated import value, resulting in negative NFE. The appellant later sought *ex-post facto approval*, which was not granted. A show cause notice dated *16.03.2001* alleged wilful suppression of facts and proposed recovery of customs duty, interest, and penalty. The adjudicating authority concluded that the appellant had violated the EXIM Policy and the conditions of the exemption notification. It held that cut flowers were *non-excisable goods* under the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, and therefore customs duty was leviable on imported inputs used for DTA sales, invoking *Sections 28, 28AB, and 114A* of the Customs Act, 1962. Appeals before the Commissioner (Appeals) and the CESTAT were dismissed. The Tribunal affirmed that the 2001 amendment was prospective. Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether customs duty can be charged on non-excisable goods produced in India and sold in the Domestic Tariff Area by a 100% Export Oriented Unit? ii. Whether *Notification No. 56/01-Cus dated 18.05.2001* operates retrospectively or prospectively? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellant submitted that DTA sales by EOUs attract only *excise duty* and not customs duty. Since *cut flowers are non-excisable goods* grown domestically, no duty could be levied under the Customs Act. It was argued that *Section 12 of the Customs Act, 1962* applies only to imported goods, and legal fiction cannot be extended beyond its purpose. The appellant relied upon *Vikram Ispat v. Commissioner of Central Excise* and *Cosco Blossoms Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs* to contend that EOU clearances into DTA cannot be treated as imports. It was further argued that the 2001 amendment was merely *clarificatory*, intended to remove an anomaly, and should therefore apply retrospectively, supported by *Vatika Township Pvt. Ltd.* and *Zile Singh v. State of Haryana*. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the respondent submitted that exemption under *Notification No. 126/94-Cus* was conditional and stood withdrawn upon violation of the EXIM Policy. Once the conditions were breached, the appellant was liable to customs duty on imported inputs used in goods sold domestically, irrespective of excisability. It was argued that the amendment notification introduced a substantive change and was prospective. Reliance was placed on *Commissioner of Central Excise v. Hari Chand Shri Gopal* and *Union of India v. IndusInd Bank Ltd.* to emphasize strict interpretation of exemption clauses and prospective operation of fiscal amendments. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. *Section 12, Customs Act, 1962* ii. *Section 25, Customs Act, 1962* iii. *Section 28, 28AB, 114A, Customs Act, 1962* iv. *Section 3, Central Excise Act, 1944* v. *EXIM Policy 1997–2002* vi. *Notification No. 126/94-Cus* vii. *Notification No. 56/01-Cus* ## **I) JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court held that exemption notifications form a complete code and must be read harmoniously with the EXIM Policy. The Court observed that DTA sales in conformity with policy conditions attract excise duty for excisable goods. However, once the conditions are violated, the exemption is lost, and goods become liable to customs duty *as if imported*. The Court clarified that the demand was not on cut flowers as goods but on *imported inputs* used in producing non-excisable goods sold in DTA. The legal fiction was employed only for quantification. The Court rejected reliance on earlier tribunal decisions, distinguishing them on facts and context. On retrospectivity, the Court applied settled principles that legislation is prospective unless expressly or impliedly retrospective. The 2001 amendment altered the charging mechanism and was not clarificatory. The Court relied on *Vatika Township* and *Hari Chand Shri Gopal* to hold that ambiguity in exemption must favour the State. The invocation of extended limitation under *Section 28* was upheld due to wilful suppression, noting the appellant’s failure to disclose DTA sales and incorrect claims regarding use of imported inputs. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment lies in the principle that *violation of conditional exemption results in complete withdrawal of fiscal benefits*. Once the EOU breached EXIM Policy conditions, customs duty became leviable on imported inputs used for goods sold in DTA, even if the final goods were non-excisable. The Court also affirmed that *substantive amendments to exemption notifications operate prospectively*. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that exemption regimes in fiscal statutes are policy instruments and courts must refrain from expanding their scope through interpretative generosity. Any parity sought between EOUs and DTA units must emanate from legislative action and not judicial interpretation. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Compliance with EXIM Policy is mandatory for availing exemption benefits. ii. Exemption notifications must be strictly construed. iii. Legal fiction in fiscal law is limited to its purpose. iv. Amendments altering duty computation are substantive unless clearly declaratory. v. Suppression of material facts justifies extended limitation. ## **J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment reinforces fiscal discipline in export-oriented schemes. It underscores that incentives are conditional privileges and not vested rights. By affirming strict construction of exemption notifications, the Court protected revenue interests while maintaining doctrinal consistency in tax jurisprudence. The decision provides clarity on treatment of non-excisable goods under EOU schemes and settles the law on retrospectivity of customs notifications. ## **K) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Commissioner of Income Tax v. Vatika Township Pvt. Ltd.*, *\[2014\] 12 SCR 1037* ii. *Commissioner of Central Excise v. Hari Chand Shri Gopal*, *\[2010\] 13 SCR 820* iii. *Union of India v. IndusInd Bank Ltd.*, *\[2016\] 11 SCR 700* iv. *Uniworth Textiles Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise*, *\[2013\] 3 SCR 27* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Customs Act, 1962* ii. *Central Excise Act, 1944* iii. *Customs Tariff Act, 1975* iv. *EXIM Policy 1997–2002* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Sarika v. Administrator, Shri Mahakaleshwar Mandir Committee, Ujjain (M.P.) & Ors., [2020] 9 SCR 303](https://lawfoyer.in/sarika-v-administrator-shri-mahakaleshwar-mandir-committee-ujjain-m-p-ors-2020-9-scr-303/) **Published:** January 24, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The present judgment arises from the Supreme Court’s continued supervisory jurisdiction in matters concerning the preservation of religious and cultural heritage, specifically addressing the progressive erosion of the Jyotirlinga at Shri Mahakaleshwar Temple, Ujjain. The case reflects the Court’s constitutional responsibility to balance religious practices, heritage conservation, and scientific preservation. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The present judgment arises from the Supreme Court’s continued supervisory jurisdiction in matters concerning the preservation of religious and cultural heritage, specifically addressing the *progressive erosion of the Jyotirlinga at Shri Mahakaleshwar Temple, Ujjain*. The case reflects the Court’s constitutional responsibility to balance *religious practices*, *heritage conservation*, and *scientific preservation*. Acting upon earlier directions issued in *Sarika v. Administrator, Shri Mahakaleshwar Mandir Committee* \[2018\] 4 SCR 634, the Court examined compliance reports submitted by an Expert Committee comprising officials from the *Archaeological Survey of India* and *Geological Survey of India*, alongside responses from the Temple Management Committee and infrastructural proposals by *Ujjain Smart City Limited*. The judgment recognises that the *erosion of the Shivalinga is an ongoing and irreversible process* caused by chemical reactions, mechanical abrasion, and unregulated religious offerings. The Court identifies *high pH levels during Bhasma Aarti*, use of *abrasive ornaments*, *rubbing by devotees*, and *modern structural alterations* as direct contributors to deterioration. Emphasis is placed on *scientific monitoring*, *annual expert inspections*, *strict regulation of rituals*, and *restoration of original architectural elements*. Significantly, the Court issues *detailed mandatory directions* governing ritual conduct, structural conservation, funding responsibilities, removal of encroachments, and preservation of ancillary heritage structures like *Chandranageshwar Temple*. The judgment underscores that *religious freedom under Article 25 is subject to public order, morality, health, and heritage protection*. The ruling thus serves as a landmark precedent on *judicial intervention in heritage conservation*, blending constitutional values, administrative accountability, and environmental jurisprudence. **Keywords:** Religious heritage, Jyotirlinga preservation, erosion of Shivalinga, judicial monitoring, scientific conservation, temple administration ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsJudgment Cause Title*Sarika v. Administrator, Shri Mahakaleshwar Mandir Committee, Ujjain (M.P.) & Ors.*Case NumberM.A. No. 1235 of 2019 in Civil Appeal No. 4676 of 2018Judgment Date01 September 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumArun Mishra J., B.R. Gavai J., Krishna Murari J.AuthorJustice Arun MishraCitation*\[2020\] 9 SCR 303*Legal Provisions Involved*Articles 25, 26, 49 of the Constitution of India*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsConstitutional Law, Religious Endowments Law, Heritage and Environmental Law ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT** The judgment forms part of a continuing mandamus exercised by the Supreme Court in matters concerning *protection of ancient religious monuments*, rooted in constitutional obligations under *Article 49*. The litigation originated from concerns raised regarding *irreparable damage to the Jyotirlinga* at Shri Mahakaleshwar Temple, one of the twelve sacred Jyotirlingas in India. Earlier judicial intervention in *2018* had led to the constitution of an *Expert Committee* comprising scientists from ASI and GSI to assess deterioration and recommend remedial measures. Despite prior directions, subsequent inspections revealed that *erosion had continued*, indicating inadequate compliance. The Court noted that *heritage degradation is not a speculative threat but a demonstrable scientific reality*, supported by photographic evidence and expert findings. The judgment situates itself within a broader constitutional narrative that *religious autonomy does not permit destruction of heritage*, especially when such heritage constitutes national patrimony. The background also reflects increasing judicial reliance on *scientific expertise* in adjudicating complex heritage issues. The Court acknowledges that temple management alone cannot address such deterioration without institutional support, technical assessment, and regulatory oversight. The case thus stands at the intersection of *religious freedom*, *scientific conservation*, and *state accountability*, reinforcing the Supreme Court’s role as a constitutional sentinel. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The litigation concerns the *Shivalinga housed in the Garbh Griha of Shri Mahakaleshwar Temple, Ujjain*, which was found to be undergoing *continuous erosion*. An Expert Committee appointed by the Supreme Court conducted inspections, with its report dated *19 January 2019* concluding that erosion was *ongoing and progressive*. The report highlighted *chemical erosion caused by high alkaline substances*, *mechanical abrasion from heavy ornaments*, and *physical rubbing by devotees* as key causes. Photographic evidence from *July 2020* showed visible patches of erosion, particularly near the deity of *Shri Kartikeyan*. The Committee recorded that the *pH value during Bhasma Aarti was as high as 10.51*, which chemically reacts with the *cryptocrystalline siliceous material* of the Lingam. Additionally, sanitation deficiencies, drainage issues, and unregulated offerings of *curd, honey, ghee, and Panchamrita* were found to aggravate deterioration. The Temple Committee submitted an Action Taken Report stating that *cloth covering during rituals*, *RO water cleaning*, and *restricted entry* had been implemented. However, expert findings contradicted the sufficiency of these measures. The *Chandranageshwar Temple* within the premises was also reported to be structurally unstable. Further, modern constructions, eyesore paintings, and encroachments within *500 metres* of the temple premises were identified as violations of heritage norms. In response, the Court examined reports from *Ujjain Smart City Limited*, which proposed the *Mahakaal Rudrasagar Integrated Development Approach*. The need for structural assessment by *CBRI, Roorkee* was also considered, including financial requirements to be borne by the Union Government. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether continued religious practices causing erosion of the Shivalinga violate constitutional obligations to preserve heritage? ii. Whether the Supreme Court can regulate temple rituals to prevent irreversible damage to religious monuments? iii. Whether expert scientific findings warrant mandatory judicial directions overriding customary practices? iv. Whether State and Central Governments bear financial responsibility for heritage conservation? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the petitioner submitted that *irreversible damage to the Jyotirlinga* constitutes a violation of *constitutional heritage obligations*. It was argued that *unregulated rituals*, *chemical reactions from offerings*, and *mechanical abrasion* were causing measurable deterioration. Reliance was placed on *expert scientific reports*, asserting that *religious sentiment cannot justify destruction of national heritage*. The petitioner emphasized that earlier directions had not been fully implemented, necessitating *stricter judicial supervision*. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the respondent Temple Committee submitted that *preventive measures had already been initiated*, including *restricted access*, *ritual regulation*, and *restoration work*. It was argued that *traditional rituals must continue*, though with safeguards. The State supported infrastructural development through *Smart City projects* and sought time for compliance. The Union Government agreed to bear costs for *CBRI assessment*. ## **H) JUDGMENT** The Supreme Court held that *erosion of the Shivalinga is a continuing process* requiring immediate and sustained intervention. The Court accepted the *Expert Committee’s findings* in entirety, noting that *scientific evidence cannot be subordinated to ritual convenience*. It reaffirmed that *Article 25 rights are subject to health and heritage preservation*. The Court issued *thirteen exhaustive directions*, including mandatory expert inspections, annual surveys, prohibition on rubbing of the Lingam, regulation of offerings, reduction of ornament weight, video recording of rituals, purification of water, and financial responsibility of governments. It ordered removal of modern constructions, restoration of original architecture, elimination of encroachments, and preservation of *Chandranageshwar Temple*. The judgment reflects a *doctrine of constitutional trusteeship*, where temple authorities act as custodians rather than owners of heritage. Judicial monitoring was continued, with compliance reports mandated. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio rests on the principle that *religious freedom does not extend to practices causing irreversible damage to heritage*. The Court held that *scientific conservation overrides customary practices when heritage is endangered*. Judicial intervention is justified under *Articles 49 and 142* to protect monuments of national importance. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that *commercialization of religious practices* often leads to neglect of rituals and heritage. It emphasized that *customary Poojaries must be involved in decision-making* to preserve ritual sanctity while ensuring conservation. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Annual expert inspections mandatory. ii. Prohibition on physical contact with the Shivalinga by devotees. iii. Regulation of offerings and ritual substances. iv. Removal of modern alterations and encroachments. v. Government-funded structural assessments and repairs. ## **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment reinforces the Supreme Court’s role as *guardian of cultural heritage*. It establishes that *faith must coexist with scientific responsibility*. By integrating expert knowledge with constitutional mandates, the Court provides a replicable model for heritage protection across India. The ruling strengthens jurisprudence on *regulated religious freedom* and sets a precedent for *judicially enforced conservation ethics*. ## **J) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Sarika v. Administrator, Shri Mahakaleshwar Mandir Committee, Ujjain (M.P.) & Ors.*, *\[2018\] 4 SCR 634* ii. *Sarika v. Administrator, Shri Mahakaleshwar Mandir Committee, Ujjain (M.P.) & Ors.*, *\[2020\] 9 SCR 303* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Constitution of India, Articles 25, 26, 49* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Union of India v. Association of Unified Telecom Service Providers of India & Ors., [2019] 16 SCR 672; [2020] 11 SCR 541](https://lawfoyer.in/union-of-india-v-association-of-unified-telecom-service-providers-of-india-2020-11-scr-541/) **Published:** January 24, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment addresses the continuing ramifications of the Supreme Court’s authoritative interpretation of Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR) under the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, particularly concerning the enforceability, payment structure, and insolvency-related implications of AGR dues owed by Telecom Service Providers. The Court examined representations made by telecom operators and financial institutions seeking staggered payment of AGR liabilities and considered the broader economic impact on the telecom sector and banking system. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment addresses the continuing ramifications of the Supreme Court’s authoritative interpretation of *Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR)* under the *Indian Telegraph Act, 1885*, particularly concerning the enforceability, payment structure, and insolvency-related implications of AGR dues owed by Telecom Service Providers. The Court examined representations made by telecom operators and financial institutions seeking staggered payment of AGR liabilities and considered the broader economic impact on the telecom sector and banking system. A crucial dimension of the judgment involved determining whether telecom spectrum, being a natural resource held by the State in public trust, could be subjected to insolvency proceedings under the *Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016*. The Court consciously refrained from conclusively determining this jurisdictional issue and instead directed the *National Company Law Tribunal* to adjudicate upon it after examining ownership, possession, contractual rights, and statutory limitations governing spectrum usage. The judgment further clarifies liabilities arising from *spectrum sharing* and *spectrum trading* under the 2015 Guidelines, decisively holding that sharing operators cannot be burdened with historical AGR dues of original licensees, while trading liabilities must strictly follow the allocation prescribed under the Guidelines. Importantly, while rejecting any reopening or reassessment of AGR demands, the Court moderated the Union Government’s proposed 20-year payment window, substituting it with a structured ten-year instalment mechanism, reinforced with stringent default consequences. The decision reflects judicial balancing between contractual sanctity, sovereign rights over natural resources, and systemic economic stability. **Keywords:** Adjusted Gross Revenue, Telecom Licence, Spectrum Sharing, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, Natural Resources, Public Trust Doctrine ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetails*Judgement Cause Title**Union of India v. Association of Unified Telecom Service Providers of India & Ors.**Case Number**M.A. (D) No. 9887 of 2020 in Civil Appeal Nos. 6328–6399 of 2015**Judgement Date**01 September 2020**Court**Supreme Court of India**Quorum**Justice Arun Mishra, Justice S. Abdul Nazeer, Justice M.R. Shah**Author**Justice Arun Mishra**Citation**\[2019\] 16 SCR 672; \[2020\] 11 SCR 541**Legal Provisions Involved**Indian Telegraph Act, 1885; Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Indian Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1933; TRAI Act, 1997**Judgments Overruled**None**Related Law Subjects**Telecom Law, Constitutional Law, Insolvency Law, Administrative Law* ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The litigation arises from the prolonged dispute surrounding the definition and computation of *Adjusted Gross Revenue*, a concept embedded within the revenue-sharing regime introduced by the Union Government for telecom licences. The controversy has its genesis in the migration from a fixed licence fee regime to a revenue-sharing model in 1999, framed under the statutory authority of *Section 4 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885*. The Supreme Court, in its earlier decision reported in *\[2019\] 16 SCR 672*, conclusively upheld the Government’s interpretation of AGR, rejecting the telecom operators’ narrow construction and affirming that all revenue streams form part of AGR. Following this determination, massive financial liabilities crystallised against telecom service providers, spanning nearly two decades, including principal amounts, interest, penalties, and interest on penalties. The magnitude of dues raised systemic concerns affecting the telecom sector’s viability, employment, consumer interest, and exposure of public sector banks. Representations were accordingly made by telecom operators and the *Indian Banks’ Association* seeking deferred payment mechanisms. Simultaneously, several telecom companies entered insolvency proceedings, raising complex jurisdictional questions regarding the applicability of the *Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016* to telecom licences and spectrum usage rights. The Government asserted that spectrum, being a sovereign natural resource, could not be subsumed within insolvency proceedings, while lenders and resolution professionals contended otherwise. The judgment under analysis thus operates at the intersection of contractual obligations, sovereign resource management, and insolvency jurisprudence, without diluting the finality of AGR determinations. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** Telecom licences granted under *Section 4(1) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885* operate as contractual arrangements between the Union Government and private telecom operators. Under these licences, operators are obligated to pay licence fees and spectrum usage charges calculated as a percentage of *Adjusted Gross Revenue*. Persistent disputes arose regarding the scope of AGR, culminating in prolonged litigation before the *Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal* and the Supreme Court. In its definitive judgment dated *24 October 2019*, the Supreme Court affirmed the Government’s computation of AGR, leading to aggregate dues exceeding ₹1.69 lakh crores as of October 2019, inclusive of penalties and interest. Certain operators partially complied, while others defaulted or initiated insolvency proceedings under the *Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016*. During subsequent proceedings, the Union Government proposed a payment formula permitting staggered recovery of dues over twenty years. This proposal was placed before the Court for approval. Concurrently, disputes arose regarding liabilities of operators involved in *spectrum sharing* and *spectrum trading* arrangements under the *Spectrum Sharing Guidelines, 2015* and *Spectrum Trading Guidelines, 2015*. The Court was also confronted with allegations that insolvency proceedings were being used as a stratagem to evade AGR liabilities. Given the scale of public revenue involved and the statutory character of spectrum, the Court undertook a detailed examination of these ancillary yet significant issues while preserving the binding nature of its earlier AGR ruling. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether telecom spectrum can be subjected to insolvency proceedings under the *Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016*? ii. Whether AGR dues constitute *operational debt* under the Code? iii. Whether sharing operators are liable for historical AGR dues of original licensees? iv. How liability for AGR dues is to be apportioned in cases of spectrum trading? v. Whether the payment period of twenty years proposed by the Union Government is reasonable? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the Union of India submitted that telecom spectrum is a *natural resource* held by the State in trust for the public, and licensees merely enjoy a conditional right to use it. It was argued that under *Section 18 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016*, only assets owned by the corporate debtor can form part of insolvency proceedings, which excludes spectrum held under contractual licence. Reliance was placed on *Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India* *\[2012\] 3 SCR 147* to reaffirm the public trust doctrine. It was further contended that AGR dues are statutory and contractual obligations flowing from licence conditions and cannot be diluted or extinguished through insolvency mechanisms. Any attempt to reassess or reopen AGR computations was argued to be barred by the doctrine of finality. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the telecom operators and lenders contended that the right to use spectrum constitutes an *intangible asset* reflected in balance sheets and capable of being dealt with under the insolvency framework. It was argued that *Sections 5(20) and 5(21)* of the Code categorise Government dues as operational debt, binding upon resolution plans approved under *Section 31*. They further submitted that spectrum sharing and trading were policy-sanctioned commercial arrangements, and liabilities must be confined to express stipulations in the Guidelines. The proposed twenty-year payment window was justified as necessary to prevent sectoral collapse and protect consumer interest. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. *Section 4, Indian Telegraph Act, 1885* ii. *Sections 3(27), 5(20), 5(21), 14, 18, 31, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016* iii. *Spectrum Sharing Guidelines, 2015* iv. *Spectrum Trading Guidelines, 2015* ## **I) JUDGEMENT** The Court categorically prohibited any reassessment or reopening of AGR dues, declaring the demands raised by the *Department of Telecommunications* as final and binding. However, while recognising the economic realities confronting the telecom sector, the Court modified the Government’s proposed twenty-year payment period, terming it excessive. Instead, it directed an upfront payment of *10% of total dues by 31 March 2021*, followed by *equal annual instalments from 1 April 2021 to 31 March 2031*. On insolvency-related issues, the Court refrained from rendering a final determination on whether spectrum can be subjected to insolvency proceedings, holding the issue to be jurisdictional and directing the *National Company Law Tribunal* to decide it after comprehensive consideration. In matters of spectrum sharing, the Court unequivocally held that sharing operators cannot be saddled with past AGR liabilities of original licensees. Regarding spectrum trading, liability was held to be governed strictly by *Paragraph 11 of the Trading Guidelines*, distinguishing between partial and complete spectrum transfers. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The binding nature of AGR dues arises from contractual licence terms backed by statutory authority under the *Indian Telegraph Act, 1885*. Final judicial determination of AGR precludes reassessment. Spectrum sharing does not transfer ownership or historical liabilities. Payment timelines must balance sovereign revenue interests with sectoral viability. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that permitting insolvency proceedings to extinguish sovereign dues relating to natural resources would undermine public trust principles and fiscal discipline, though the issue was left open for adjudication by NCLT. **c) GUIDELINES** i. No reassessment of AGR dues permitted. ii. Mandatory upfront payment of 10%. iii. Annual instalments over ten years. iv. Default to attract interest, penalty, and contempt proceedings. ## **J) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Union of India v. Association of Unified Telecom Service Providers of India* *\[2019\] 16 SCR 672* ii. *Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India* *\[2012\] 3 SCR 147* iii. *Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta* *(2019) SCC OnLine SC 1478* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Indian Telegraph Act, 1885* ii. *Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016* iii. *Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [The Designated Authority & Ors. v. M/s. Andhra Petrochemicals Limited, [2020] 7 SCR 1158](https://lawfoyer.in/the-designated-authority-ors-v-m-s-andhra-petrochemicals-limited-2020-7-scr-1158/) **Published:** January 24, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment delivered by the Supreme Court of India addresses the limits of judicial review over anti-dumping investigations conducted by the Designated Authority under Section 9A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 and the Anti-Dumping Rules, 1995. The dispute arose from repeated writ petitions filed by M/s. Andhra Petrochemicals Limited challenging the refusal of the Designated Authority to impose anti-dumping duty on imports of certain alcohols from Saudi Arabia and other countries. The High Court not only interfered with the investigation process but also initiated contempt proceedings and directed replacement of the Designated Authority. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment delivered by the **Supreme Court of India** addresses the limits of judicial review over anti-dumping investigations conducted by the Designated Authority under *Section 9A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975* and the *Anti-Dumping Rules, 1995*. The dispute arose from repeated writ petitions filed by *M/s. Andhra Petrochemicals Limited* challenging the refusal of the Designated Authority to impose anti-dumping duty on imports of certain alcohols from Saudi Arabia and other countries. The High Court not only interfered with the investigation process but also initiated contempt proceedings and directed replacement of the Designated Authority. The Supreme Court examined whether such judicial intervention was permissible during an ongoing quasi-judicial investigation. The Court held that anti-dumping investigations are time-bound, evidence-intensive, and governed by international obligations under the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement. It emphasized that insistence on contemporaneous data by the Designated Authority was neither arbitrary nor mala fide but a statutory necessity. The High Court’s orders were found to be an impermissible continuous oversight over statutory discretion. The judgment reinforces institutional autonomy of trade remedy authorities and restricts excessive judicial interference except in exceptional circumstances. **Keywords:** Anti-dumping duty; Judicial review; Designated Authority; Contemporaneous data; WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*The Designated Authority & Ors. v. M/s. Andhra Petrochemicals Limited*Case NumberCivil Appeal Nos. 3046–3048 of 2020Judgement Date01 September 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumArun Mishra, Vineet Saran & S. Ravindra Bhat, JJ.AuthorJustice S. Ravindra BhatCitation*\[2020\] 7 SCR 1158*Legal Provisions Involved*Section 9A, Customs Tariff Act, 1975*; *Rules 2(b), 2(d), 5, 14, 17 & 20 of the Anti-Dumping Rules, 1995*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsInternational Trade Law; Administrative Law; Constitutional Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The litigation originated from an application filed by the respondent domestic manufacturer seeking imposition of anti-dumping duty on imports of *Normal Butanol* from Saudi Arabia. The Designated Authority initiated investigation but eventually terminated it on the ground that dumping occurred only during the last three months of the investigation period, rendering injury analysis inconclusive. The respondent challenged this decision repeatedly before the High Court, leading to multiple remand orders. Despite the statutory scheme envisaging a limited and technical inquiry by the Designated Authority, the High Court progressively expanded its supervisory role. It directed fresh investigations, questioned procedural decisions, initiated suo motu contempt proceedings, and ultimately ordered replacement of the Designated Authority. These actions raised serious concerns regarding separation of powers and judicial overreach in trade remedy investigations. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under *Article 226* by substituting its views for that of a statutory authority exercising specialized quasi-judicial functions. The judgment situates anti-dumping law within India’s international commitments under the WTO framework and clarifies the standard of judicial restraint applicable to such matters . ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The respondent filed an application in 2016 alleging dumping of Butanol from Saudi Arabia. Investigation was initiated with the period of investigation spanning April 2015 to March 2016. Imports from Saudi Arabia occurred only between January and March 2016. The respondent claimed these imports captured nearly *39% market share* and caused material injury. After hearings and disclosure of essential facts, the Designated Authority terminated the investigation under *Rule 14(b)*, citing insufficiency of data to establish injury or causal link. The respondent filed writ petitions challenging the decision. The High Court allowed the first writ and directed reconsideration. Upon reconsideration, the Designated Authority again declined initiation, leading to further writ proceedings. The High Court not only set aside the refusal but directed initiation of investigation into other alcohols and later took exception to the Authority seeking updated data. It initiated contempt proceedings and directed replacement of the incumbent Designated Authority. These orders were challenged before the Supreme Court . ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the High Court could direct initiation and scope of an anti-dumping investigation? ii. Whether insistence on contemporaneous data by the Designated Authority was arbitrary? iii. Whether judicial review can extend to continuous supervision of an ongoing investigation? iv. Whether directing replacement of the Designated Authority was legally sustainable? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that the Designated Authority acted strictly within the statutory framework. It was argued that *Rule 5(3)* and *Para 5.9 of the Manual of Operations* mandate reliance on recent data. Without updated information, any investigation would be legally infirm and inconsistent with WTO obligations. The High Court’s interference was characterized as excessive and destructive of institutional independence. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent contended that the Designated Authority deliberately avoided compliance with judicial directions. It was argued that *2-EH* manufactured by the respondent was a *“like article”* to imported *INA* and *2-PH* under *Rule 2(d)*. The refusal to accept this equivalence and insistence on fresh data were portrayed as mala fide and contemptuous. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 9A, Customs Tariff Act, 1975* ii. *Rules 2(b), 2(d), 5, 14, 17 & 20 of Anti-Dumping Rules, 1995* iii. *Article 5.10 & Article 10 of WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court held that anti-dumping investigations are specialized, time-bound, and evidence-driven. The insistence on contemporaneous data was justified to ensure meaningful levy within statutory timelines. Investigations based on stale data would lead to ineffective remedies. The Court relied on *Union of India v. Kumho Petrochemicals* and reiterated that WTO obligations require strict adherence to investigation timelines. Judicial review should not become an instrument of micro-management. The High Court’s contempt proceedings and directive to replace the Designated Authority were found wholly unsustainable. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** Judicial review under *Article 226* must respect statutory autonomy of trade remedy authorities. Courts cannot act as continuous supervisors of ongoing investigations. Procedural decisions taken in compliance with statutory rules and international obligations cannot be branded as mala fide. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that directing substitution of statutory authorities undermines administrative stability and erodes confidence in institutional processes. Such directions should be avoided except in cases of proven bias or illegality. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Anti-dumping investigations must rely on recent and relevant data. ii. Courts should intervene only after final findings, barring exceptional circumstances. iii. Statutory discretion of Designated Authority must be respected. iv. Contempt jurisdiction must not be used to compel administrative outcomes. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *S&S Enterprise v. Designated Authority*, *\[2005\] 2 SCR 255* ii. *Reliance Industries Ltd. v. Designated Authority*, *\[2006\] 6 Supp SCR 1* iii. *Union of India v. Kumho Petrochemicals*, *\[2017\] 4 SCR 324* iv. *Directorate General of Anti-Dumping v. Sandik International*, *(2018) 13 SCC 402* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Customs Tariff Act, 1975* ii. *Customs Tariff (Anti-Dumping) Rules, 1995* iii. *WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Shridhar C. Shetty (Deceased) Through LRs v. The Additional Collector and Competent Authority & Ors., [2020] 6 S.C.R. 1002](https://lawfoyer.in/shridhar-c-shetty-deceased-through-lrs-v-the-additional-collector-and-competent-authority-ors-2020-6-s-c-r-1002/) **Published:** January 24, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in Shridhar C. Shetty (Deceased) Through LRs v. The Additional Collector and Competent Authority & Ors. examines the scope and limits of statutory power exercised by authorities under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. The dispute arose from the failure of the landholder to comply with the conditions attached to an exemption granted under Sections 20 and 21 of the Act, specifically the obligation to surrender a stipulated number of residential tenements to Government nominees. Upon breach, instead of withdrawing the exemption as statutorily envisaged, the competent authority issued a demand for recovery of the market value of seven tenements along with interest and penalties, treating the amount as arrears of land revenue. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment in *Shridhar C. Shetty (Deceased) Through LRs v. The Additional Collector and Competent Authority & Ors.* examines the scope and limits of statutory power exercised by authorities under the *Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976*. The dispute arose from the failure of the landholder to comply with the conditions attached to an exemption granted under *Sections 20 and 21* of the Act, specifically the obligation to surrender a stipulated number of residential tenements to Government nominees. Upon breach, instead of withdrawing the exemption as statutorily envisaged, the competent authority issued a demand for recovery of the *market value of seven tenements* along with interest and penalties, treating the amount as arrears of land revenue. The Supreme Court decisively addressed whether such a monetary demand was legally sustainable. While affirming that a *clear breach of exemption conditions* had occurred, the Court drew a sharp distinction between *statutory consequences expressly provided under the Act* and *administrative actions taken dehors the statute*. The Court held that the competent authority, being a *creature of statute*, could not enlarge its powers by relying upon undertakings or administrative convenience. The absence of any statutory provision authorising recovery of market value as arrears of land revenue rendered the demand ultra vires. The ruling reinforces foundational principles of *administrative law*, *statutory interpretation*, and *jurisdictional discipline*. It reiterates that even in cases of admitted breach, State authorities must act strictly within the four corners of the enabling legislation. The decision also clarifies the prospective operation of earlier precedent and confines private disputes between developers and landowners to the civil domain, without diluting statutory responsibility under exemption orders. **Keywords:** Urban Land Ceiling, Statutory Jurisdiction, Exemption Withdrawal, Ultra Vires Action, Arrears of Land Revenue ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgment Cause Title*Shridhar C. Shetty (Deceased) Through LRs v. The Additional Collector and Competent Authority & Ors.*Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 2019 of 2010Judgment Date02 September 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumR.F. Nariman, J. and Navin Sinha, J.AuthorNavin Sinha, J.Citation*\[2020\] 6 S.C.R. 1002*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 2(d), 20, 21, 38(4) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976; Section 265 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsConstitutional Law, Administrative Law, Urban Land Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The controversy in the present case emanates from the implementation of exemption provisions under the *Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976*, a welfare legislation intended to prevent concentration of urban land and ensure equitable distribution, particularly for *weaker sections of society*. The Act empowered the State to grant exemptions from ceiling limits subject to stringent conditions, the breach of which attracted clearly defined statutory consequences. The appellant, acting under powers of attorney from original landowners, sought and obtained an exemption under *Section 20* of the Act for development of two plots of land. The exemption was conditional upon surrendering *20% of the constructed tenements* for allotment to Government nominees. Over time, development occurred only on one plot and only *seven tenements* were handed over instead of the required fourteen. Despite awareness of this deviation, the authorities did not invoke their statutory power to *withdraw the exemption*. Years later, instead of proceeding under the mechanism prescribed by the Act, the competent authority raised a monetary demand equivalent to the *market value of the remaining seven tenements*, adding interest and penalties, and sought recovery as *arrears of land revenue*. This demand was affirmed by the appellate authority and the Bombay High Court, prompting the appeal before the Supreme Court. The case thus raised a critical question regarding *statutory limits of administrative power*, especially where breach is admitted but remedial action deviates from legislative prescription. The background also reflects recurring tensions between *urban development*, *regulatory compliance*, and *executive overreach* in land ceiling jurisprudence. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The lands in question were originally declared surplus under the Act in 1980. Through an agreement for sale dated *12.03.1984* and a general power of attorney dated *15.01.1985*, the appellant acquired authority to pursue exemptions and development permissions. Acting in that capacity, the appellant secured an exemption order dated *02.03.1988* under *Section 20* of the Act. The exemption covered two plots and permitted construction of *78 tenements*, subject to the condition that *20% of the constructed area* be surrendered to Government nominees belonging to weaker sections. A subsequent corrigendum dated *29.12.1988* expanded the permissible construction area, thereby enhancing the surrender obligation to *18 tenements*. However, development was undertaken only on *CTS No. 261*, limiting the surrender obligation to *14 tenements*. Only *seven tenements* were handed over. A “No Objection Certificate” dated *08.06.1993* issued for water connection expressly recorded this partial compliance. Despite breach of conditions, the exemption was never withdrawn. The appellant had also entered into a development agreement with private respondents, transferring development rights contrary to exemption conditions, but disclosed this fact to authorities only in *2005*. On *16.05.2005*, the appellant furnished an undertaking to either provide the remaining tenements or pay their market value. Relying on this, the competent authority issued a demand dated *15.10.2005* for *Rs. 51,97,196/-* with interest and penalties, treating it as arrears of land revenue. This demand formed the core dispute. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the competent authority under the *Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976* possesses statutory power to recover the market value of unhanded tenements as arrears of land revenue? ii. Whether an undertaking given by the landholder can enlarge or create statutory powers not contemplated by the Act? iii. Whether failure to withdraw an exemption disentitles the authority from imposing alternative monetary liabilities? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that *Sections 20 and 21* provide an exhaustive mechanism for dealing with breach of exemption conditions. Upon breach, the only permissible course was *withdrawal of exemption*, not imposition of monetary recovery. It was argued that the Act nowhere authorises recovery of *market value* of tenements. Reliance was placed on *Naraindas Indurkhya v. State of Madhya Pradesh* to contend that administrative authorities cannot travel beyond express statutory provisions. It was further contended that *Section 38(4)* contemplates only penal consequences and not civil recovery. The undertaking dated *16.05.2005* was argued to be legally irrelevant for expanding jurisdiction. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents argued that the appellant had *profiteered from breach* and could not escape liability. It was contended that the exemption was composite and non-compliance justified recovery. Reliance was placed on *M/s Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Totame* to argue reasonableness of surrender obligations, though concededly prospective. The respondents also argued that disputes with private developers were irrelevant and that the appellant remained the *de facto owner* responsible under the exemption order. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court unequivocally held that while *breach of exemption conditions was admitted*, the demand raised was *without statutory authority*. The Court emphasised that *Sections 20 and 21* expressly provide for *withdrawal of exemption* as the consequence of breach. No provision permits recovery of market value as arrears of land revenue. The Court rejected reliance on the appellant’s undertaking, holding that *jurisdiction cannot be created by consent or undertaking*. It further held that *Section 265 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code* could not be invoked in the absence of statutory debt. The High Court’s order was set aside, and the appeal was allowed. **a. RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment rests on the principle that *statutory authorities must act strictly within the powers conferred by legislation*. The competent authority under the *Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976* is a *creature of statute* and cannot impose liabilities not contemplated by the Act. The Court clarified that *Sections 20 and 21* form a complete code for exemption and its withdrawal. The absence of any express provision permitting recovery of market value renders such demand *ultra vires*. The undertaking furnished by the appellant was held incapable of expanding statutory jurisdiction. The Court reinforced the doctrine that *administrative convenience cannot substitute legislative authority*. **b. OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that administrative authorities often attempt to balance equities by imposing monetary liabilities in cases where statutory remedies appear inconvenient. Such approaches, though pragmatic, undermine *rule of law*. The Court cautioned that failure to exercise statutory powers at the appropriate time cannot justify assumption of new powers later. **c. GUIDELINES** i. Statutory exemptions must be enforced strictly in accordance with enabling provisions. ii. Breach of exemption conditions must be addressed through *withdrawal mechanisms*, not ad hoc recovery. iii. Undertakings cannot confer jurisdiction. iv. Recovery as arrears of land revenue requires express statutory sanction. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment is a reaffirmation of *jurisdictional discipline* and *statutory fidelity*. It underscores that even admitted breaches cannot justify administrative actions beyond legislative mandate. The ruling protects individuals from arbitrary fiscal demands and preserves the separation between *executive discretion* and *legislative authority*. It also serves as a cautionary tale for regulatory authorities to act decisively within prescribed timelines. Failure to invoke statutory remedies cannot be cured through creative enforcement. The decision strengthens predictability in urban land regulation and reinforces constitutional values of *non-arbitrariness* and *rule of law*. ## J) REFERENCES **a. Important Cases Referred** i. *S. Vasudeva v. State of Karnataka*, *\[1993\] 2 SCR 715* ii. *Naraindas Indurkhya v. State of Madhya Pradesh*, *\[1974\] 3 SCR 624* iii. *Nargis Jal Haradhvala v. State of Maharashtra*, *\[2015\] 1 SCR 8* **b. Important Statutes Referred** i. *Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976* ii. *Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [M/s Bandekar Brothers Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Prasad Vassudev Keni & Ors., [2020] 10 SCR 1075](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-bandekar-brothers-pvt-ltd-anr-v-prasad-vassudev-keni-ors-2020-10-scr-1075/) **Published:** January 24, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The decision in M/s Bandekar Brothers Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Prasad Vassudev Keni constitutes a definitive exposition on the scope and mandatory nature of Section 195 read with Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in cases alleging false evidence and fabrication of evidence under Sections 191 and 192 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Supreme Court was confronted with the recurring misuse of private complaints to bypass the statutory safeguards embedded in Section 195 CrPC, particularly where allegations relate to acts committed in or in relation to judicial proceedings. The Court undertook a meticulous doctrinal distinction between offences under Section 195(1)(b)(i) and Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC, clarifying that the latter applies exclusively to cases of forgery of documents while in custodia legis, whereas the former governs offences affecting the administration of justice itself. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The decision in *M/s Bandekar Brothers Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Prasad Vassudev Keni* constitutes a definitive exposition on the scope and mandatory nature of *Section 195 read with Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* in cases alleging *false evidence and fabrication of evidence* under *Sections 191 and 192 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860*. The Supreme Court was confronted with the recurring misuse of private complaints to bypass the statutory safeguards embedded in *Section 195 CrPC*, particularly where allegations relate to acts committed *in or in relation to judicial proceedings*. The Court undertook a meticulous doctrinal distinction between offences under *Section 195(1)(b)(i)* and *Section 195(1)(b)(ii)* CrPC, clarifying that the latter applies exclusively to cases of forgery of documents while in *custodia legis*, whereas the former governs offences affecting the administration of justice itself. The appellants’ attempt to convert proceedings initiated under *Section 195 read with Section 340 CrPC* into private complaints was held to be impermissible, as the foundational allegations squarely attracted *Sections 191 and 192 IPC*. The judgment reaffirms that allegations of fabricated evidence intended for use in judicial proceedings fall within the exclusive domain of the court concerned, thereby barring private prosecution. At the same time, the Court adopted a balanced approach by restoring the original complaints in their statutory form, ensuring that serious allegations of perjury are not extinguished merely due to procedural irregularities. The ruling reinforces institutional control over prosecutions for offences against public justice, thereby preserving the purity and integrity of judicial proceedings. **Keywords:** Section 195 CrPC, Section 340 CrPC, False Evidence, Fabrication of Evidence, Custodia Legis, Private Complaint, Administration of Justice ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgment Cause Title*M/s Bandekar Brothers Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Prasad Vassudev Keni & Ors.*ii) Case NumberCriminal Appeal Nos. 546–550 of 2017iii) Judgment Date02 September 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) Quorum*R.F. Nariman, J. and Navin Sinha, J.*vi) Author*R.F. Nariman, J.*vii) Citation*\[2020\] 10 SCR 1075*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 191, 192, 193, 463, 464 IPC; Sections 195, 340, 341, 343 CrPC*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsCriminal Law, Procedural Criminal Law, Law of Evidence ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The controversy arose from a long-standing commercial relationship between the appellants and the respondent proprietary concern, which deteriorated into multiple civil suits concerning financial liabilities. During the pendency of these suits, the appellants alleged that the respondents had *knowingly tendered false evidence and fabricated debit notes* to mislead the civil court. These allegations were not confined to mere contractual disputes but were framed as offences directly impinging upon the *administration of justice*. Consequently, the appellants invoked *Section 195 read with Section 340 CrPC* by filing complaints before the Sessions Court, alleging commission of offences under *Sections 191 and 192 IPC*. These provisions criminalise false testimony and the fabrication of evidence intended to be used in judicial proceedings. The procedural choice was significant, as offences under these sections cannot be prosecuted except upon a complaint by the court concerned. However, during the proceedings before the Magistrate, the appellants sought to *convert the statutory complaints into private complaints*, relying upon the ratio of *Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah*. This strategic shift was aimed at avoiding the procedural rigour mandated under *Section 340 CrPC*. The Magistrate permitted such conversion and issued process under *Sections 191, 192, and 193 IPC*. The respondents challenged this conversion, contending that the statutory bar under *Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC* could not be circumvented. The Sessions Court accepted this contention and quashed the complaints, a decision affirmed by the High Court. The appeals before the Supreme Court thus raised foundational questions regarding the demarcation between private prosecution and court-controlled prosecution for offences affecting public justice. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellants and the respondent proprietary concern had engaged in commercial dealings relating to iron ore production and sale since 1990. Disputes regarding accounts and alleged outstanding liabilities led to the institution of *four civil suits* by the appellants and a *counter-suit* by the respondent, which was later withdrawn unconditionally. During the pendency of these suits, the respondents filed written statements and counterclaims supported by *debit notes and accounting entries*. The appellants alleged that these documents were *false and fabricated*, created with the deliberate intention of being used as evidence in court to obtain an unjust advantage. Based on these allegations, the appellants filed *two criminal complaints dated 11.08.2009* under *Section 195 read with Section 340 CrPC*, asserting offences under *Sections 191 and 192 IPC*. The complaints were initially returned on jurisdictional grounds and later refiled before the Judicial Magistrate. After recording preliminary evidence, the appellants filed an application seeking conversion of the complaints into private complaints, citing *Iqbal Singh Marwah*. The Magistrate allowed this request and issued process under *Sections 191, 192, and 193 IPC*. The respondents filed revision applications, arguing that the offences alleged were squarely covered by *Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC*, rendering private complaints legally incompetent. In response, the appellants, for the first time, asserted that offences of *forgery under Sections 463 to 477-A IPC* were also made out. The Sessions Court rejected this belated plea, quashed the complaints, and distinguished *Iqbal Singh Marwah* as applicable only to *Section 195(1)(b)(ii)* cases. The High Court affirmed this view, leading to the present appeals. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether allegations attracting *Sections 191 and 192 IPC* can be prosecuted through a private complaint despite the bar under *Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC*? ii. Whether the ratio of *Iqbal Singh Marwah* applies to offences under *Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC*? iii. Whether debit notes allegedly fabricated prior to their production in court constitute *false documents* under *Section 464 IPC*? iv. Whether conversion of a complaint under *Section 195 read with Section 340 CrPC* into a private complaint is legally sustainable? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that the respondents had fabricated debit notes prior to their production in court, thereby attracting *forgery provisions under Chapter XVIII IPC*. It was argued that such offences fall outside the ambit of *Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC*, making a private complaint maintainable. Reliance was placed heavily on *Iqbal Singh Marwah*, contending that the statutory bar does not apply where forgery precedes judicial proceedings. It was further argued that procedural irregularities in issuing process could be cured under *Sections 211, 216, and 460 CrPC*. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents contended that the complaints, read as a whole, disclosed offences exclusively under *Sections 191 and 192 IPC*. The alleged debit notes were not *false documents* within the meaning of *Section 464 IPC*, as they were not made to impersonate another’s authority. It was argued that the appellants’ belated invocation of forgery provisions was an afterthought designed to bypass *Section 195 CrPC*. The mandatory nature of *Section 340 CrPC* was emphasised. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court undertook a comprehensive analysis of *Section 195 CrPC*, reiterating that it creates an *absolute bar* on cognizance unless its conditions are strictly satisfied. The Court clarified the doctrinal distinction between *Section 195(1)(b)(i)* and *Section 195(1)(b)(ii)*, holding that offences under *Sections 191–193 IPC* fall exclusively under the former. The Court rejected the appellants’ reliance on *Iqbal Singh Marwah*, holding that its ratio applies only to *forgery of documents while in custodia legis* under *Section 195(1)(b)(ii)*. The alleged debit notes did not satisfy the essential ingredients of *Section 464 IPC*, as they were not created to falsely attribute authorship. However, the Court held that quashing the complaints entirely was erroneous. The original complaints under *Section 195 read with Section 340 CrPC* were legally maintainable and were ordered to be restored. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The bar under *Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC* is mandatory for offences under *Sections 191 and 192 IPC*, and such offences cannot be prosecuted through private complaints. The ratio of *Iqbal Singh Marwah* is confined to *Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC* and does not extend to perjury-related offences. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that while victims of forgery should not be left remediless, procedural safeguards protecting the sanctity of judicial proceedings cannot be diluted to accommodate private vengeance. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Courts must strictly scrutinise the *substance of allegations* to determine applicability of *Section 195 CrPC*. ii. Conversion of statutory complaints into private complaints should not be permitted where offences affect public justice. iii. Forgery allegations must satisfy *Section 464 IPC* ingredients before bypassing *Section 195 CrPC*. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces the institutional role of courts in prosecuting offences against public justice. It curbs procedural manipulation while ensuring that serious allegations of perjury are not extinguished due to technical lapses. The ruling strengthens doctrinal clarity on *custodia legis* and preserves the integrity of judicial proceedings. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** *i) Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah*, *\[2005\] 2 SCR 708* *ii) Babu Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh*, *\[1964\] 4 SCR 957* *iii) Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. State of Gujarat*, *\[1971\] Supp SCR 834* *iv) Dr. S. Dutt v. State of Uttar Pradesh*, *\[1966\] 1 SCR 493* **b) Important Statutes Referred** *i) Indian Penal Code, 1860* *ii) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Ilangovan v. State of Tamil Nadu, [2020] 6 SCR 1132](https://lawfoyer.in/ilangovan-v-state-of-tamil-nadu-2020-6-scr-1132/) **Published:** January 24, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the criminal liability of an accused convicted for causing death during a sudden altercation arising out of prior enmity between two families. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the High Court correctly modified the conviction from murder under Section 302 IPC to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II IPC by invoking Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the criminal liability of an accused convicted for causing death during a sudden altercation arising out of prior enmity between two families. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the High Court correctly modified the conviction from *murder under Section 302 IPC* to *culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II IPC* by invoking *Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC*. The case also raised significant questions concerning the evidentiary value of testimonies of related witnesses, the applicability of the doctrine of parity when co-accused are acquitted, and the scope of the maxim *falsus in uno falsus in omnibus* under Indian criminal jurisprudence. The Court reaffirmed that Indian courts do not mechanically discard testimony merely because witnesses are related, nor does acquittal of co-accused automatically entitle the main accused to acquittal. The judgment clarifies that *Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC* applies when death is caused without premeditation, in a sudden fight, and without cruelty or undue advantage. Upholding the High Court’s reasoning, the Supreme Court emphasized consistency between ocular testimony and medical evidence, and endorsed a cautious yet pragmatic approach to appreciation of evidence. The decision reinforces settled principles governing criminal trials while balancing culpability with factual realities of spontaneous violence. **Keywords:** Culpable homicide; Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC; Related witness testimony; Rule of parity; Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgment Cause Title*Ilangovan v. State of Tamil Nadu*Case NumberCriminal Appeal No. 1285 of 2010Judgment Date02 September 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumJustice N. V. Ramana, Justice S. Abdul Nazeer, Justice Surya KantAuthorJustice N. V. RamanaCitation*\[2020\] 6 SCR 1132*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 300, 302, 304 Part II, 324 IPC*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsCriminal Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The appeal arose from a judgment of the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court which partly allowed the appeal of the accused by altering his conviction from *Section 302 IPC* to *Section 304 Part II IPC*. The modification was grounded on the finding that the incident occurred during a sudden and free fight, thereby attracting *Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC*. The case stemmed from a long-standing familial dispute triggered by an alleged illicit relationship, culminating in a violent confrontation resulting in one death and injuries to others. The Trial Court had convicted the appellant for murder and voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons while acquitting the remaining co-accused due to lack of reliable evidence against them. The High Court concurred with the factual findings but revisited the nature of mens rea and circumstances surrounding the act, concluding that the ingredients of murder were not fully satisfied. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant challenged the conviction primarily on three grounds: reliance on interested witnesses, denial of parity with acquitted co-accused, and selective acceptance of witness testimony. The Court was thus required to evaluate the evidentiary framework within the boundaries of settled criminal jurisprudence. The judgment situates itself within a line of authorities emphasizing careful scrutiny rather than outright rejection of related witness testimony and rejecting rigid application of evidentiary maxims. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The factual matrix reveals pre-existing hostility between two families due to an alleged illicit relationship involving a family member of the complainant and the daughter of one of the accused. On *26 January 2002*, the accused persons assembled near the complainant’s house, leading to a sudden confrontation. During this altercation, the appellant assaulted the complainant with an *iron rod*, causing injuries substantiated by medical evidence. The deceased, upon hearing the commotion, intervened in an attempt to pacify the situation. At this juncture, the appellant struck her on the head with the iron rod. The injury proved fatal. Other accused were alleged to have caused injuries with sticks; however, these allegations were found to be inconsistent and uncorroborated. Medical evidence, including the wound certificate and post-mortem report, established a direct nexus between the appellant’s act and the death. The Trial Court found the testimony against the appellant to be consistent with the complaint and police statements, whereas the accusations against the co-accused appeared exaggerated and absent from the earliest version of events. The High Court accepted that the appellant himself had sustained injuries and had attempted to lodge a complaint, indicating a mutual fight rather than a pre-planned attack. These circumstances led to reclassification of the offence under *Section 304 Part II IPC*. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether conviction can be sustained primarily on the testimony of related or interested witnesses? ii. Whether acquittal of co-accused mandates extension of benefit of doubt to the appellant on the principle of parity? iii. Whether the maxim *falsus in uno falsus in omnibus* requires rejection of the entire prosecution evidence? iv. Whether the facts attract *Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC*? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsel for the appellant submitted that reliance on testimonies of close relatives of the deceased vitiated the conviction. It was argued that once the Trial Court disbelieved the witnesses in relation to co-accused, their testimony could not be selectively relied upon against the appellant. The appellant asserted entitlement to parity and benefit of doubt, contending that the prosecution version lacked credibility and consistency. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The State contended that the evidence against the appellant stood on a distinct footing. The ocular evidence was corroborated by medical records and contemporaneous documents. It was argued that Indian law does not mandate rejection of related witnesses per se, nor does acquittal of co-accused dilute proven culpability of the principal offender. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 300 IPC – Murder* ii. *Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC* iii. *Section 304 Part II IPC – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder* iv. *Section 324 IPC – Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons* ## I) JUDGMENT The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s modification of conviction. It reaffirmed that testimony of related witnesses is admissible, subject to cautious scrutiny, relying upon *Sudhakar v. State* as cited in the judgment . The Court rejected the argument of automatic parity, reiterating that evidence must be assessed individually, drawing support from *Yanob Sheikh v. State of West Bengal* as relied upon in the judgment. The Court further clarified that the maxim *falsus in uno falsus in omnibus* is not a rule of law in India but a rule of caution, reaffirming principles laid down in *Nisar Ali v. State of Uttar Pradesh* and reiterated in *Rohtas v. State of Haryana*. On facts, the Court agreed that the incident constituted a sudden fight without premeditation. The appellant did not act with cruelty or take undue advantage, satisfying the conditions of *Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC*. Consequently, conviction under *Section 304 Part II IPC* was justified. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was directed to surrender. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The acquittal of co-accused does not entitle the main accused to automatic acquittal when evidence against him is cogent, consistent, and corroborated by medical proof. Testimony of related witnesses is not inherently unreliable and can form the basis of conviction upon careful judicial scrutiny. *Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC* applies when death is caused during a sudden fight without premeditation or cruelty. **b) OBITER DICTA** The maxim *falsus in uno falsus in omnibus* has limited application in Indian criminal trials and should not be mechanically invoked to discard otherwise credible evidence. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Courts must assess evidence against each accused independently. ii. Related witness testimony requires caution, not rejection. iii. Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC must be applied contextually, not mechanically. ## J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces pragmatic criminal adjudication. It balances doctrinal purity with factual nuance. The Court’s reasoning strengthens evidentiary evaluation standards and prevents miscarriage of justice through rigid application of maxims. The decision stands as a reaffirmation of judicial restraint and analytical clarity. ## K) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Sudhakar v. State*, *\[2018\] 4 SCR 612* ii. *Yanob Sheikh v. State of West Bengal*, *\[2012\] 13 SCR 1150* iii. *Nisar Ali v. State of Uttar Pradesh*, *\[1957\] SCR 657* iv. *Rohtas v. State of Haryana*, *(2019) 10 SCC 554* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Indian Penal Code, 1860* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [The Karad Urban Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Swapnil Bhingardevay & Ors., [2020] 13 S.C.R. 465](https://lawfoyer.in/the-karad-urban-cooperative-bank-ltd-v-swapnil-bhingardevay-ors-2020-13-s-c-r-465/) **Published:** January 24, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The present judgment examines the scope of judicial interference with the commercial wisdom exercised by the Committee of Creditors under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by setting aside an approved resolution plan on grounds of alleged lack of viability, breach of confidentiality, defective advertisement, and non-consideration of disputed assets. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The present judgment examines the scope of judicial interference with the commercial wisdom exercised by the *Committee of Creditors* under the *Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016*. The Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether the *National Company Law Appellate Tribunal* exceeded its jurisdiction by setting aside an approved resolution plan on grounds of alleged lack of viability, breach of confidentiality, defective advertisement, and non-consideration of disputed assets. The Court reaffirmed that once all material factors relevant to *viability and feasibility* are placed before the *Committee of Creditors* and a conscious commercial decision is taken, the adjudicating authorities must adopt a strict *hands-off approach*. The judgment also clarifies that mere suspicion of information leakage without demonstrable benefit to the resolution applicant cannot invalidate the resolution process. Further, procedural objections based on subsequently amended regulations cannot be retrospectively applied to invalidate actions taken under the earlier legal framework. The decision reinforces the primacy of creditor autonomy, limits appellate interference, and strengthens predictability in insolvency resolution by insulating commercial decisions from judicial second-guessing, provided statutory compliance under *Sections 30 and 31 of the IBC* is satisfied. **Keywords:** Insolvency Resolution Process; Commercial Wisdom; Committee of Creditors; Viability and Feasibility; Judicial Review ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*The Karad Urban Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Swapnil Bhingardevay & Ors.*Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 2955 of 2020 (with Civil Appeal No. 2902 of 2020)Judgement Date04 September 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorum*S.A. Bobde, CJI; A.S. Bopanna, J.; V. Ramasubramanian, J.*Author*V. Ramasubramanian, J.*Citation*\[2020\] 13 S.C.R. 465*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 7, 30, 31, 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Regulation 35(2) and Regulation 36A of IBBI (CIRP) Regulations, 2016*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsInsolvency Law; Corporate Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The litigation arose from a corporate insolvency resolution process initiated under *Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016* by a financial creditor against a sugar manufacturing company. The process progressed through statutory stages culminating in the approval of a resolution plan by the *Committee of Creditors*. The dispute emerged when the erstwhile promoter of the corporate debtor challenged the approval before the *National Company Law Appellate Tribunal*, alleging defects in the resolution plan and procedural irregularities. The NCLAT interfered with the approved plan and remanded the matter for reconsideration, invoking concerns regarding *viability and feasibility*, alleged breach of confidentiality of liquidation value under *Regulation 35(2)*, ownership disputes relating to ethanol plant machinery, and alleged non-compliance with *Regulation 36A*. This intervention prompted appeals before the Supreme Court by both the financial creditor and the resolution professional. The background is significant as it presented the Supreme Court with another opportunity to delineate the limits of appellate scrutiny over insolvency resolutions, especially in light of its earlier authoritative pronouncements in *K. Sashidhar v. Indian Overseas Bank* and *Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta*. The judgment is situated within a broader jurisprudential trend that prioritises economic efficiency, creditor autonomy, and certainty in insolvency outcomes. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellant financial creditor filed an application under *Section 7 of the IBC* on *04.09.2017* against *M/s Khandoba Prasanna Sakhar Karkhana Ltd.*, which was admitted on *01.01.2018*. An interim resolution professional was appointed, and the *Committee of Creditors* was constituted. Following statutory procedures, a resolution professional was confirmed, and expressions of interest were invited through an advertisement dated *30.03.2018*. During the pendency of the CIRP, the promoter of the corporate debtor unsuccessfully challenged the initiation proceedings before the Bombay High Court. Multiple meetings of the *CoC* were held, culminating in the approval of a resolution plan submitted by *M/s Sai Agro (India) Chemicals* in the *8th CoC meeting on 09.02.2019*. The approved plan contemplated a total payout of *Rs. 29.74 crores*, substantially higher than the liquidation value of *Rs. 13.53 crores*. The promoter thereafter sought permission to submit his own resolution plan, which was rejected by the NCLT as being time-barred and procedurally untenable. The NCLT approved the resolution plan on *01.08.2019*. The promoter appealed to the NCLAT, which allowed the appeal and remanded the matter. The remand order became the subject matter of the present civil appeals. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the NCLAT was justified in interfering with the *commercial wisdom* of the *Committee of Creditors* regarding viability and feasibility of the resolution plan? ii. Whether mere matching of liquidation value amounts to breach of confidentiality under *Regulation 35(2)*? iii. Whether disputed ownership of certain assets invalidates the resolution plan? iv. Whether advertisement dated 30.03.2018 violated *Regulation 36A* retrospectively? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that *viability and feasibility* are matters exclusively within the domain of the *Committee of Creditors* and immune from judicial review, relying upon *K. Sashidhar* and *Essar Steel*. It was argued that all relevant facts, including disputes concerning the ethanol plant, were fully disclosed and consciously considered by the CoC. They further contended that no benefit accrued to the successful resolution applicant from the alleged disclosure of liquidation value, negating any breach of confidentiality. The advertisement was defended as being compliant with the unamended *Regulation 36A* prevailing at the relevant time. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent promoter argued that the resolution plan was fundamentally flawed as it assumed availability of assets not owned by the corporate debtor. It was alleged that identical liquidation values indicated leakage of confidential information. It was also contended that the resolution process was vitiated due to defective advertisement and undue haste in approval by the CoC. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 7, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016* ii. *Section 30(2), Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016* iii. *Section 31, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016* iv. *Section 61(3), Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016* v. *Regulation 35(2), IBBI (CIRP) Regulations, 2016* vi. *Regulation 36A, IBBI (CIRP) Regulations, 2016* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the impugned NCLAT order, restoring the NCLT’s approval of the resolution plan. The Court held that the NCLAT had exceeded its jurisdiction by re-evaluating the commercial decision of the CoC. The Court reiterated that once statutory parameters under *Section 30(2)* are satisfied, adjudicating authorities cannot substitute their own views on economic viability. On confidentiality, the Court held that mere coincidence in liquidation value without demonstrable benefit does not establish breach. The Court also rejected retrospective application of amended *Regulation 36A*, holding that procedural compliance must be tested against the law prevailing at the relevant time. The disputes regarding asset ownership were found to have been consciously factored into the commercial decision, rendering appellate interference unwarranted. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The *commercial wisdom* of the *Committee of Creditors* in approving a resolution plan, after due consideration of all relevant material, is non-justiciable except on limited statutory grounds under *Sections 30(2) and 61(3) of the IBC*. Judicial or appellate authorities cannot reassess viability, feasibility, or business prudence once the statutory threshold is crossed. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that insolvency litigation should not become a tool for erstwhile promoters to re-enter the process indirectly by raising hyper-technical objections after statutory timelines lapse. Such conduct undermines the objectives of the IBC. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Adjudicating authorities must adopt a *hands-off approach* once CoC approval is granted. ii. Confidentiality breaches must be established by demonstrable advantage, not suspicion. iii. Procedural regulations cannot be applied retrospectively to invalidate completed acts. iv. Disputed assets do not vitiate resolution plans if consciously evaluated by the CoC. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *K. Sashidhar v. Indian Overseas Bank*, *(2019) 12 SCC 150* ii. *Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta*, *(2019) SCC OnLine SC 1478* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016* ii. *IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [LEX CARNIVAL 2026 (5th Amity Law Fest – Juris Trek) | Organized by Amity Law School, Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Campus | Register by 31st January 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/lex-carnival-2026-5th-amity-law-fest-juris-trek-organized-by-amity-law-school-amity-university-uttar-pradesh-lucknow-campus-register-by-31st-january-2026/) **Published:** January 22, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** LEX CARNIVAL 2026 (5th Amity Law Fest – Juris Trek) | Organized by Amity Law School, Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Campus | Register by 31st January 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/LEX-CARNIVAL-POSTER-2026-702x1024.jpeg) ## **About the Organiser** Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Campus is spread across 40 acres with aesthetically designed buildings, expansive lawns, and modern infrastructure that together create an environment conducive to learning. The University is committed to delivering high-quality education through strong practical training, modern curriculum initiatives, professional development, international collaborations, and robust industry partnerships. It also promotes values of professionalism, social responsibility, and patriotism, while providing students ample opportunities to grow academically, intellectually, and socially. ## **Details About the Event / Opportunity** Lex Carnival 2026 is the 5th edition of the Amity Law Fest – Juris Trek and will be held on 9th and 10th February 2026 in Hybrid Mode. It is a multi-event academic and cultural carnival designed to foster knowledge, creativity, analytical thinking, legal awareness, teamwork, and expressive skills. The fest brings together students from various institutions and bridges academic learning with practical and creative expression through diverse competitive events. ## **Events at Lex Carnival 2026** 1. **Skit Competition** *Theme:* Health and Environment A thematic performance-based competition focusing on issues related to health and the environment. Participants present short dramatized performances to spread awareness about pressing social, legal, and environmental concerns, encouraging creativity, teamwork, and social responsibility. 2. **Hit the Buzz** A general quiz competition testing knowledge across current affairs, history, science, sports, entertainment, and general awareness. The quiz emphasizes quick thinking, teamwork, and presence of mind rather than legal knowledge alone. 3. **Judgement Writing Competition** A flagship academic event aimed at fostering judicial reasoning, analytical thinking, and structured legal writing. Participants draft a reasoned judgment based on a given legal proposition, focusing on interpretation and application of law. 4. **Legal Maxims Bee** A competition testing participants’ understanding of commonly used legal maxims and their application, aimed at strengthening foundational legal knowledge and conceptual clarity. 5. **Know Your Role** A light-hearted, talent-based event emphasizing spontaneity, creativity, adaptability, confidence, and performance skills through on-the-spot tasks and role play. ## **Who Is It For / Eligibility to Participate** - Students pursuing any course from any college or university recognized by UGC - School students from Class 9 onwards (for applicable events) ## **Mode of the Event** Hybrid (Online & Offline) ## **Location & Venue of the Event** Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh, India Venue: Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Campus (Offline rounds) ## **Registration / Submission Links & Procedure** 1. Make the payment through the official payment link: 2. Take a screenshot of the payment confirmation. 3. Fill out the Google Form and upload the payment screenshot: ## **Fee Details** ₹500 + GST per team / participant (event-specific) *Amity students are exempted from the registration fee.* ## **Prizes** - Total prizes worth ₹30,000 - Trophies, medals, certificates, and exclusive gift hampers - Certificates of participation for all registered participants ## **Deadlines / Important Dates** - **Last Date of Registration:** 31st January 2026 ## **Event-wise Dates:** - ***Skit Competition:*** - Script Submission: 3rd February 2026 - Offline Round: 9th February 2026 - ***Hit the Buzz:*** 9th February 2026 - ***Judgement Writing Competition:*** - Online Submission: 3rd February 2026 - Offline Rounds: 10th February 2026 - ***Legal Maxims Bee:*** - Online Preliminary Round: 3rd February 2026 - Offline Round: 10th February 2026 - ***Know Your Role:*** 9th & 10th February 2026 (Offline) ## **Contact Information** Email: **Faculty Convenors:** - Dr. Reshma Umair – 8318851168 - Dr. Malobika Bose – 9335260939 ## **Official Link of the Event / Brochure & Rules** - Payment Portal: - Registration Form: - Brochure Link: **Categories:** Events, Other Competitions --- ### [3rd ALL INDIA IILM MOOT COURT COMPETITION | Organized by School of Law, IILM University, Greater Noida | Register by 14th March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-all-india-iilm-moot-court-competition-oragnized-by-school-of-law-iilm-university-greater-noida-register-by-14th-march-2026/) **Published:** January 22, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** 3rd ALL INDIA IILM MOOT COURT COMPETITION | Oragnized by School of Law, IILM University, Greater Noida | Register by 14th March 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Screenshot-2026-01-23-184812.png) ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER / UNIVERSITY** IILM University, Greater Noida, established under the Uttar Pradesh Private University (Amendment) Act, 2022, is a progressive institution committed to academic excellence, innovation, and holistic development. Situated in the educational hub of Greater Noida, the University offers undergraduate, postgraduate, and doctoral programmes across disciplines such as Management, Law, Engineering, Sciences, Liberal Arts, and Social Sciences. With modern infrastructure, strong emphasis on research, interdisciplinary learning, and industry engagement, IILM University focuses on providing experiential and industry-ready education. The University also has campuses in New Delhi and Gurugram. ## **ABOUT THE SCHOOL OF LAW** Since 1993, IILM has established a strong legacy in responsible management education and expanded into legal education in 2018. The School of Law offers BBA LL.B. (Hons.), BA LL.B. (Hons.), one-year LL.M., three-year LL.B., and Ph.D. programmes. The School aims to develop skilled legal professionals through practical training, simulations, discussions, and a wide range of electives, preparing students for the legal profession and leadership roles across society. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT** The 3rd All India IILM Moot Court Competition is a national-level moot court competition conducted in offline mode. The competition will include a Researcher’s Test, Preliminary Rounds, Round of 16 (tentative), Quarter-Finals, Semi-Finals, and the Final Round. Participants will argue on a detailed moot proposition released by the organizers, and the competition will be conducted entirely in English. ## **WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** - Students pursuing a 3-year or 5-year LL.B. degree - Participants must be from institutions recognized by the Bar Council of India - Team members must be bona fide students of the institution they represent - A maximum of two teams per institution is allowed ## **MODE OF THE EVENT** Offline only ## **LOCATION & VENUE OF THE EVENT** IILM University, Greater Noida Plot No. 16–18, Knowledge Park – II, Greater Noida, Uttar Pradesh – 201306, India ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE** - Registration Fee: ₹4,500 per team - Teams must mandatorily fill the Google Form and make the payment through the link available in the form - A physical registration form (attached in the brochure PDF) must be filled, signed, sealed by the institution, uploaded in the Google Form, and submitted in hard copy at the time of registration **Google Form Link:** **Moot Proposition Link:** [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1z7-y8zVvqtQ\_ZtxaiabNyeTIFVXBe-Qo/view](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1z7-y8zVvqtQ_ZtxaiabNyeTIFVXBe-Qo/view) ## **FEE DETAILS** Registration Fee: ₹4,500 per team ## **PRIZES** - Winning Team: ₹71,000 - Runner-Up Team: ₹36,000 - Best Speaker/Mooter: ₹5,000 - Best Researcher: ₹5,000 - Best Memorial: ₹5,000 (Certificates and trophies will also be awarded) ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - Opening of Registration: **15th January 2026** - Release of Moot Proposition: **15th January 2026** - Last Date for Seeking Clarifications: **28th February 2026** - Last Date for Final Registration & Payment: **14th March 2026** - Release of Clarifications: **15th March 2026** - Last Date for Memorial Submission (Soft Copy): **24th March 2026 (before 11:59 PM)** - Last Date for Memorial Submission (Hard Copy): **27th March 2026** - Draw of Lots for Preliminary Rounds: **31st March 2026** - Researcher’s Test: **2nd April 2026** - Preliminary Rounds, Round of 16 & Quarter-Finals: **3rd April 2026** - Semi-Finals, Final Round & Valedictory Function: **4th April 2026** - Competition Dates: **2nd April to 4th April 2026** ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** - Satyam Sharma (President, IILM Moot Court Society): 7986985393 - Abhay Yadav (Vice-President, IILM Moot Court Society): 9555571412 - Kartikey Padamwar (Secretary, IILM Moot Court Society): 9302474418 - Mr. Rachit Sharma (Faculty Convenor): rachit.sharma@iilm.edu - Mr. Gaurav Kumar (Faculty Co-Convenor): gaurav.kumar@iilm.edu - Email: iilmmcs@gmail.com (Subject: Query) ## **OFFICIAL LINK / BROCHURE & RULES** [https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1RR4pBL11LuCKKjyicH4fO7WA8G4P67\_5](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1RR4pBL11LuCKKjyicH4fO7WA8G4P67_5) **Categories:** Events, Moot Courts --- ### [CALL FOR PAPERS: Two-Day International Conference on “Law, Rights & Indigenous Futures” (Online) | Organized by Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Submit Abstract by 15th February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-papers-two-day-international-conference-on-law-rights-indigenous-futures-online-organized-by-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur-submit-abstract-by/) **Published:** January 22, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** CALL FOR PAPERS: Two-Day International Conference on “Law, Rights & Indigenous Futures” (Online) | Organized by Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Submit Abstract by 15th February 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/POSTER_1-1-1-1024x576.jpg) ## **About HNLU** Hidayatullah National Law University, a premier institute for legal education and research is celebrating its 20th Year of establishment. The University’s motto, ‘ धर्म संस्थापनार्थम, ‘ translates to ‘for the sake of establishing the primacy of laws of eternal values.’ In line with this ethos, HNLU strives to provide advanced legal education that shapes students into more than just legal professionals; it instils in them a profound responsibility to contribute to society. In recent years, the university has introduced a series of ground-breaking programs, including Lex Osmose, Ex-Arca, HNLU Press, Sui Generis, HEXA, HAAI and R-Has, with the new spoke model of research centers setting a new standard for innovation and academic excellence. ## **About Centre for Study of Law and Indigenous People (CLIP)** The Centre for law and indigenous people is one-of-a-kind initiative established under the school for Law and Humanities to explore, understand and preserve the intersection of legal scholarship and indigenous perspective. It aims to provide a platform for rigorous research, thoughtful discussions and collaborative initiatives regarding the rich traditions of the indigenous peoples. The centre is committed not only to the scholarly pursuit of legal knowledge but also to profound understanding of the unique challenges faced by indigenous communities and to that extent it envisions to contribute meaningfully to the development of legal frameworks that respect and integrate indigenous perspective. ## **About the Conference** Indigenous and tribal communities today stand at the crossroads of history. On the one hand, they bear the heaviest burdens of displacement, ecological loss, cultural erasure, and political marginalisation. On the other, they carry with them resilient knowledge systems, community structures, and alternative visions of justice that offer the world fresh ways of thinking about democracy, environment, and human dignity. Conventional academia has often failed to capture this dual reality. Legal studies tend to remain confined to statutes and judgments; social sciences often abstract lived experiences into theories; and public policy debates are dominated by technocratic voices that rarely listen to the communities themselves. The result is a fragmented understanding of Indigenous lives; when what is needed is a holistic, interdisciplinary conversation. This conference is an attempt to rethink tribal justice by breaking disciplinary silos. We invite scholars of law, sociology, anthropology, political science, environmental studies, history, women’s studies, and cultural studies to place their perspectives in dialogue. Here, customary laws will be read alongside constitutional promises, oral traditions alongside human rights standards, and ecological ethics alongside development policies. Crucially, this conference recognises that youth voices, especially those of Indigenous and first-generation scholars, are often absent from mainstream academic platforms. By foregrounding their perspectives, the conference aims not only to generate academic knowledge but also to imagine Indigenous futures shaped by justice, resilience, and solidarity. To move beyond theory into practice, the conference will welcome not only research papers but also policy briefs, community case studies, and ethnographic narratives. This openness reflects our belief that knowledge is plural, and that the future of Indigenous studies lies in embracing diverse ways of knowing and speaking. ## **Objectives of the Conference** - To explore the meaning of justice for Indigenous and tribal communities in the context of globalization, ecological crises, cultural erasure, and political marginalisation. - To foster interdisciplinary dialogue across law, sociology, anthropology, political science, environmental studies, history, women’s studies, and cultural studies. - To centre youth perspectives and student voices, thereby challenging academic hierarchies and creating inclusive spaces for dialogue. - To encourage participation of first-generation scholars, tribal/Indigenous students, and researchers working at the intersections of multiple disciplines. - To ensure the long-term scholarly and policy impact of student contributions through publication in an edited book/journal on Law and Indigenous Studies. - To cultivate comparative and global perspectives by engaging with Indigenous struggles worldwide and building transnational solidarity. ## **Key Themes & Sub-Themes** **Law, Rights, and Justice** - Customary law and state legal systems: conflicts and convergence - International law, human rights, and Indigenous peoples (UNDRIP, ILO conventions) - Restorative and community-based justice models **Culture, Identity, and Lived Experience** - Cultural resilience, language preservation, and identity politics - Gender roles, intersectionality, and agency in tribal societies - Oral traditions, performance, and Indigenous knowledge systems - Media and representation of Indigenous communities **III. Human Rights and Public Policy** - Health, education, and social protection in tribal regions - Governance, decentralisation, and participatory democracy - Witch-hunting, displacement, and other forms of structural violence **Climate, Ecology, and Sustainability** - Indigenous ecological knowledge and climate adaptation - Tribal cosmologies and environmental ethics - Just transitions: extractive economies, energy, and climate justice **Development, Economy, and Globalisation** - Development-induced displacement and rehabilitation challenges - Mining, infrastructure, and corporate interventions - Tribal economies, sustainable livelihoods, and social entrepreneurship - Technology, digitalisation, and the transformation of Indigenous life **Comparative and Global Dialogues** - Comparative legal systems on Indigenous rights - South–South exchanges: Latin America, Africa, South Asia - Cross-continental student perspectives on Indigenous struggles - Building transnational solidarity among Indigenous communities **Note: The sub-themes are only suggestive areas and are not exhaustive. Research papers that are not covered under the abovementioned sub themes but have relevance in the thrust area of the conference may also be submitted.** ## **Important Dates** - Submission of Abstract: **15 February 2026** - Intimation of Acceptance: **22 February 2026** - Registration Deadline: **7 March 2026** - Submission of Full Paper: **15 March 2026** - Conference Dates: **28–29 March 2026** ## **Submission Guidelines:** **Abstract** Research Papers → Abstract (250–300 words) (inclusive of 4 keywords) Policy Briefs → Executive Summary (150–200 words) Community Case Studies → Abstract (150–200 words) Ethnographic Notes → Context Note (100–150 words) **For abstract:** must be accompanied by a brief bio-note (in 100 words) of the author indicating his/her email ID, contact number, designation, and official address. All submissions must include: - Author’s full name - Institutional affiliation - Contact email - Short bio (100 words) **The abstract should be in the following format:** - Times New Roman, Font Size 12 & Line spacing 1.5, Justified. - 1-inch margins on all the four sides. - Submissions are to be made in MS Word format only. The abstract must identify a research problem clearly to be discussed by the author in the full paper, and the particular theme of the conference associated with the paper. Please name your abstract file as follows: Full Name\_abstract e.g. if author’s name is John Doe then the file name should be John Doe\_abstract. The abstracts can be submitted through this link: 1. **Research Papers (4000–6000 words)** - Must present original research with clear research questions, methodology, analysis, and conclusion. - Should engage with existing literature and contribute to theoretical or policy debates. - **Abstract (250–300 words)** required, summarising the research problem, method, and findings. - Proper citation and referencing required (APA/Bluebook style – as per conference format). 2. **Policy Briefs (2000–3000 words)** - Should focus on a specific policy issue affecting Indigenous/tribal communities. - Must provide evidence-based analysis with concrete recommendations for policymakers. - Concise writing style, using headings, bullet points, and visuals (tables, charts) where relevant. - **Executive Summary (150–200 words)** required, highlighting the issue, evidence, and key recommendations. - References and data sources must be clearly indicated. 3. **Community Case Studies (2500–4000 words)** - Must highlight lived experiences, grassroots initiatives, or specific community struggles. - Can be narrative in style but should include analytical reflection. - May include photographs, testimonies, or qualitative data (with consent). - Should connect the local case to broader academic or policy debates. - **Abstract (150–200 words)** required, outlining the case context, method, and insights. 4. **Ethnographic Notes (1500–2000 words)** - Based on fieldwork, participant observation, or engagement with Indigenous communities. - Should capture cultural practices, oral histories, rituals, or everyday life. - Reflexive approach expected: author’s role and perspective must be acknowledged. - Use descriptive clarity while linking to wider theoretical or cultural discussions. - **Context Note (100–150 words)** required, describing the field site and thematic focus For citation, the author is required to follow the APA Formatting and Blue book Citation (12th Ed.). The final paper should mandatorily have the suggestions/ recommendations made by the author(s). The language of submissions should preferably be English and Hindi. ## **For Publication of Papers** - Selected research papers may be published in an edited book by a reputable publisher with an ISBN. - The authors willing to consider their paper for publication must submit a duly filled in and scanned ‘DECLARATION OF RESPONSIBILITY & ASSIGNMENT OF COPYRIGHT FORM’ to be provided with the communication of acceptance of paper. - The submitted papers shall be checked through a similarity software approved by the University. - Any paper exceeding 10% similarity shall be outrightly rejected. - The submitted papers shall go through a blindfolded peer review process before selection for publication in an edited book with ISBN as per the University Policies. - Selection for paper presentation does not entitle publication in the book ## **Who Can Participate** - **Academicians, Postgraduate and Undergraduate students** from law, social sciences, humanities, environmental studies, and related disciplines. - **First-generation scholars** and **tribal/Indigenous students** are especially encouraged to participate. - **Young researchers and interdisciplinary scholars** working on issues related to law, rights, justice, culture, ecology, and Indigenous futures. - Students interested in presenting **research papers, policy briefs, community case studies, or ethnographic notes** within the conference themes. ## **Registration and Fee** - For International Professionals and Academicians: 30 USD - Academicians and Professionals: INR 1000 - Research Scholars: INR 750 - Students: INR 500 **NOTE** - Registration fee is payable only after the acceptance of the abstract. Participants are required to attach a screenshot of the successful payment to the registration form. Once deposited, the payment is non-refundable, the screenshot of the successful payment is in the registration form. The said payment is non-refundable once it’s deposited. - Participants are required to fill out a copyright form, which will be circulated at the time of registration. - As the event will be for a day, the slot for the presentation will be made available beforehand. Hence, the slot for the presentation will be made available beforehand day day-wise and session-wise. - Only quality papers will be selected for publication. Merely a candidate allowed for presentation will not be the sole ground to claim publication until the author responds to scrutiny suggested in the paper from time to time. - In case of more than one author in one paper, each author will pay a fee mentioned above individually. - There would not be any fee for faculties and students of HNLU. - Certificate of participation/ presentation will be provided to the participants. - The registration fee covers only the paper presentation. Authors of selected papers will be required to pay an additional Rs. 1000 for the publication of their paper in the edited book. ## **Panel Experts and Resource Persons** The conference will host a diverse group of experts and practitioners to guide student participants, provide feedback, and enrich discussions. - **Academics and Scholars**: Eminent professors and researchers from law, sociology, anthropology, history, political science, environmental studies, and cultural studies. - **Legal Practitioners**: Judges, lawyers, and advocates working on issues of constitutional rights, Indigenous justice, and human rights. - **Policy Experts**: Specialists from government bodies, think tanks, and international organisations dealing with tribal/Indigenous issues, rights, and development. - **Community Leaders and Activists**: Tribal elders, grassroots organisers, and Indigenous rights activists who bring lived experiences and community knowledge. - **Writers and Media Persons**: Journalists, cultural practitioners, and documentary filmmakers representing Indigenous voices and struggles. - **International Experts**: Scholars and practitioners working on Indigenous rights across Latin America, Africa, Australia, and other regions to foster comparative global dialogue. ## Outcomes & Impact (Highlights) - **Amplifying Voices**: Centre student, first-generation scholar, and Indigenous perspectives in global debates. - **Knowledge & Policy**: Produce research and policy insights with real-world relevance for law, governance, and rights. - **Collaboration & Dialogue**: Foster interdisciplinary and transnational solidarity across regions and disciplines. - **Capacity Building**: Equip students with research, writing, and policy engagement skills for academic and professional growth. ## **Conference Advisory Board** - **Prof. (Dr.) V. C. Vivekanandan,** Hon’ble Vice-Chancellor - **Dr. Deepak Kumar Shrivastav,** Registrar (I/c) - **Dr. Avinash Samal,** Director, School of Law, and Humanities ## **Conference Secretariate** - **Dr. Ayan Hazra,** Secretary, Head, Centre for Study of Law and Indigenous People - **Aashutosh Kumar Aahire,** Convenor, Head, Centre for Law and Public Health - **Dr.Ankit Awasthi,** Co- Secretary, Head, Centre for Law and WTO - **Mr. Jeevan Sagar,** Co-Secretary - **Dr. Pravesh Rajput,** Co-Secretary, Head, Centre for Infrastructure Laws ## Members - Mr. Pradeep Barman - Ms.Archana Ghartoe - Ms.Priyanka Mohod - Mr. Deepak Kumar ## **Contact Details** For further queries and information, please contact: Email Id: Contact No.: 7587017829 ## Official Links - Abstract Submission Link: [**https://forms.gle/DZgjqJcunRC4zLXk6**](https://forms.gle/DZgjqJcunRC4zLXk6) - Brochure Link : **[https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Qzx\_EVaYYmixdaAeQ8Gu5wheZ1SDZb3c/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Qzx_EVaYYmixdaAeQ8Gu5wheZ1SDZb3c/view?usp=sharing)** **Categories:** Call for Papers, Events --- ### [Essay Writing Competition | Organized by The Cyber Blog India | Register by 10 February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/essay-writing-competition-organized-by-the-cyber-blog-india-register-by-10-february-2026/) **Published:** January 20, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** ESSAY WRITING COMPETITION | Organized by The Cyber Blog India | Register by 10 February 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Screenshot-2026-01-20-184840-1.png) ## ABOUT THE ORGANISER The Cyber Blog India started as a blog in 2014 and has since evolved into a full-fledged legal consulting practice. With a mission to create a safe cyber space in India and promote cyber awareness, the organisation has been actively involved in legal advisory, cybercrime assistance, policy discussions, and public education. To date, The Cyber Blog India has assisted in over 24,000 cybercrime cases involving blackmail, harassment, revenge pornography, identity theft, ATM fraud, phishing, hacking, and data theft. It has also successfully facilitated the removal of non-consensual photos and videos from over 80,000 websites. In recent years, the organisation has expanded into advisory services on data protection law and emerging technologies such as Artificial Intelligence and Blockchain. Through more than 680 workshops and webinars, it has reached lakhs of individuals across different age groups. Its blog hosts over 1,900 articles, including 1,100+ case summaries on cyber and technology law judgments from India and other jurisdictions. This Essay Writing Competition marks The Cyber Blog India’s first-ever initiative of its kind. ## DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY The Cyber Blog India presents its **1st Essay Writing Competition** on the theme: **“Law, Power, and Technology: Expanding Rights, Security, and Accountability in the Digital Age.”** Participants may write on the main theme or any of the listed sub-themes, including (but not limited to): - Digital policing, evidence, and due process in algorithmic investigations - Surveillance, state power, and accountability - Technology, human autonomy, and cyberspace - Legal futures of blockchain use cases - Cyberwarfare, sovereignty, and international law Selected essays will be evaluated through a double-blind review process. Winning essays will also be published on The Cyber Blog India’s official blog. ## WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE The competition is open to all technology law enthusiasts, including students currently enrolled in any recognised law school, irrespective of the course or level being pursued. ## MODE OF THE EVENT **Online.** Participants must complete registration and submit their essays through the designated Google Forms. All official communication will be carried out using the contact details provided in the brochure. ## REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION PROCEDURE Participants are required to register and submit their drafts through the designated Google Forms mentioned by the organiser. Essays must comply with the prescribed submission guidelines, including formatting, word limit, originality requirements, and anonymity norms. **Link of the Google Form:** ## FEE DETAILS There is **no participation fee** for this Essay Writing Competition. ## PRIZES - **First Prize:** ₹5,000/- + Publication on The Cyber Blog India - **Second Prize:** ₹3,000/- + Publication on The Cyber Blog India - **Third Prize:** ₹2,000/- + Publication on The Cyber Blog India Total cash prizes worth ₹10,000/-. ## DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES - Last Date for Registration: **10 February 2026** - Last Date for Submission: **20 February 2026** - Announcement of Top 10 Entries: **28 February 2026** - Result Declaration: **10 March 2026** ## CONTACT INFORMATION - Phone: +91 9340337396 (Average response time: 6 hours) - Email: contact@cyberblogindia.in (Average response time: 1 working day) - Instagram: @incyberblog - Website: [www.cyberblogindia.in](http://www.cyberblogindia.in) ## OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / OFFICIAL BROCHURE The official details, rules, guidelines, and submission instructions are provided in the **Essay Writing Competition Brochure by The Cyber Blog India**. **Link of the Brochure:** **Categories:** Essay Competitions, Events, Other Competitions --- ### [R. Poornima and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., [2020] 8 SCR 89](https://lawfoyer.in/r-poornima-and-ors-v-union-of-india-and-ors-2020-8-scr-89/) **Published:** January 20, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in R. Poornima and Others v. Union of India and Others resolves a constitutional challenge concerning the interpretation of Article 217(2) of the Constitution of India, particularly Explanation (a) and (aa), governing eligibility for appointment as Judges of a High Court. The petitioners, directly recruited District Judges of the Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service, asserted that their prior experience at the Bar should be clubbed with their subsequent judicial service to satisfy the mandatory ten-year eligibility requirement for elevation to the High Court. Despite being senior in the District Judge cadre, they were excluded from consideration as they had not completed ten years of judicial service on the relevant date. The petitioners alleged discrimination under Article 14 and argued that the constitutional scheme permits cumulative reckoning of experience regardless of sequence. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment in *R. Poornima and Others v. Union of India and Others* resolves a constitutional challenge concerning the interpretation of *Article 217(2)* of the *Constitution of India*, particularly *Explanation (a) and (aa)*, governing eligibility for appointment as Judges of a High Court. The petitioners, directly recruited District Judges of the Tamil Nadu State Judicial Service, asserted that their prior experience at the Bar should be clubbed with their subsequent judicial service to satisfy the mandatory ten-year eligibility requirement for elevation to the High Court. Despite being senior in the District Judge cadre, they were excluded from consideration as they had not completed ten years of judicial service on the relevant date. The petitioners alleged discrimination under *Article 14* and argued that the constitutional scheme permits cumulative reckoning of experience regardless of sequence. The Supreme Court rejected this claim and held that *Article 217(2)* creates two distinct eligibility streams — one from judicial service and another from advocacy. The Explanations appended to the provision merely prescribe the method of computation within each stream and do not permit pre-judicial Bar experience to be added while remaining in service. The Court introduced the doctrinal metaphor of “separate queues” to clarify that eligibility depends on the candidate’s status on the date of consideration. The ruling reinforces strict textual interpretation of constitutional provisions, rejects opportunistic eligibility switching, and affirms that *Article 217* confers no enforceable right to appointment. **Keywords:** *Article 217*, *High Court Judges*, *Judicial Service*, *Eligibility*, *Constitutional Interpretation*, *Collegium System* ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgment Cause Title*R. Poornima and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.*Case NumberWrit Petition (Civil) No. 1172 of 2019Judgment Date04 September 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorum*S. A. Bobde, CJI; A. S. Bopanna, J.; V. Ramasubramanian, J.*Author*S. A. Bobde, CJI*Citation*\[2020\] 8 SCR 89*Legal Provisions Involved*Articles 14, 217(2), 233, 236 of the Constitution of India*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law Subjects*Constitutional Law; Service Law; Judicial Appointments* ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The controversy arises from the constitutional framework governing appointments of Judges to the High Courts under *Article 217*. The petitioners belonged to a cohort of District Judges directly recruited in 2011, a mode distinct from promotion from the subordinate judiciary. Their recruitment followed long standing debates concerning parity, seniority, and promotional avenues within the judicial service. While their seniority over promotee District Judges had already been judicially affirmed by the *Madras High Court*, the present dispute concerned eligibility for elevation to the High Court under the service quota. Vacancies arose within the one-third quota earmarked for members of the State Judicial Service. The High Court Collegium restricted its recommendations to officers who had completed ten years of judicial service, excluding the petitioners. The petitioners asserted that their pre-appointment advocacy experience should be added to their judicial tenure to meet the constitutional threshold. This claim directly implicated the interpretation of *Explanation (a)* to *Article 217(2)*. The petition was framed not merely as a service grievance but as a constitutional challenge, invoking *Article 14* and alleging hostile discrimination. The case thus required the Court to balance textual interpretation, constitutional intent, and systemic integrity of judicial appointments. The background also intersected with recent jurisprudence under *Article 233*, especially the ruling in *Dheeraj Mor v. Hon’ble High Court of Delhi*, which clarified the impermissibility of mixing eligibility streams. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The petitioners were appointed as District Judges by direct recruitment pursuant to *G.O. Ms. No. 170, Home Department, dated 18.02.2011*. At the time of appointment, several petitioners had more than ten years of practice at the Bar, while others had slightly lesser experience. Respondent Nos. 5 to 23 entered judicial service earlier but were promoted as District Judges after the petitioners’ appointment, rendering them junior in the cadre. When vacancies arose in the High Court under the judicial service quota, the High Court Collegium considered only those officers who had completed ten years of judicial service as mandated by *Article 217(2)(a)*. Since the petitioners had served less than ten years as judicial officers, their names were not recommended. The petitioners challenged this exclusion, seeking quashing of the recommendation list or its return for reconsideration. Initially, the petition included a prayer for inclusion of their names. However, during proceedings, the petitioners limited their relief, seeking reconsideration based on cumulative experience. Their central factual assertion was that eligibility should be determined by total legal experience rather than sequence or status at the time of consideration. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether *Article 217(2)* permits clubbing of pre-judicial advocacy experience with subsequent judicial service for determining eligibility for appointment as a High Court Judge? ii. Whether *Explanation (a)* to *Article 217(2)* applies to judicial officers who were advocates before joining service? iii. Whether exclusion of the petitioners violates *Article 14* of the Constitution? iv. Whether seniority in the cadre of District Judges creates a legitimate expectation for consideration? ## F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the petitioners submitted that *Article 217(2)(a) and (b)* prescribe alternative qualifications and do not establish rigid or mutually exclusive streams. It was argued that the Explanations merely clarify computation and should not be read restrictively. The petitioners contended that denying them the benefit of their advocacy experience results in arbitrary discrimination against directly recruited District Judges. Reliance was placed on *P. Ramakrishnam Raju v. Union of India* and the then-pending reference in *Dheeraj Mor*, suggesting that cumulative experience has previously been recognised. It was also argued that historical appointments showed flexibility in eligibility standards, and that constitutional interpretation must be purposive rather than literal. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents submitted that *Article 217(2)* creates two distinct eligibility routes. The Explanations cannot override the plain meaning of “after he has held any judicial office”. It was argued that eligibility depends on the candidate’s status on the date of consideration and that the petitioners, being judicial officers, must satisfy the ten-year judicial service requirement. The respondents relied heavily on *Dheeraj Mor v. Hon’ble High Court of Delhi*, which prohibited “hop-on hop-off” between eligibility streams. It was further argued that *Article 217* does not confer a right to appointment and that seniority cannot override constitutional eligibility. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Article 217(2), Constitution of India* ii. *Article 14, Constitution of India* iii. *Article 233, Constitution of India* iv. *Article 236(b), Constitution of India* ## I) JUDGMENT The Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition. The Court held that *Article 217(2)* has two structural components: the qualification clause and the Explanation. Sub-clauses (a) and (b) prescribe alternative sources of eligibility, while Explanations (a) and (aa) explain how experience within each source is computed. Explanation (a) applies only where advocacy follows judicial service and not vice versa. The Court rejected the petitioners’ attempt to read the word “after” as inclusive of “before”, holding that no canon of interpretation permits such distortion. The judgment emphasized that eligibility is assessed based on the candidate’s status at the time of consideration. Judicial officers must stand in the judicial service queue; advocates must stand in the Bar queue. The Court further held that accepting the petitioners’ argument would create systemic inconsistency, disrupt seniority structures, and render the eligibility threshold meaningless. The *Article 14* challenge was rejected on the ground that no fundamental right to appointment exists under *Article 217*. **a. RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio is that *Article 217(2)* establishes two independent eligibility streams for High Court appointments, and experience can be clubbed only in the sequence expressly permitted by the Constitution. Judicial officers cannot add pre-service advocacy experience while remaining in service. Eligibility depends strictly on constitutional text and candidate status on the date of consideration. **b. OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that judicial service offers structured career progression, unlike advocacy. Therefore, differential treatment does not amount to hostile discrimination. The metaphor of “queues” was used to illustrate systemic discipline in appointments. **c. GUIDELINES** i. Eligibility under *Article 217(2)* must be assessed strictly as per constitutional text. ii. Status on the date of consideration determines the applicable eligibility stream. iii. Clubbing of experience is permissible only as expressly provided. iv. Seniority does not override constitutional qualification. ## J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment affirms textual fidelity in constitutional interpretation and reinforces institutional discipline in judicial appointments. It closes the door on strategic eligibility claims and preserves the structural integrity of the appointment process. The ruling harmonises *Article 217* with evolving jurisprudence under *Article 233* and ensures predictability in the collegium system. ## K) REFERENCES **a. Important Cases Referred** i. *Dheeraj Mor v. Hon’ble High Court of Delhi*, *\[2018\] 1 SCR 828* ii. *Shri Kumar Padma Prasad v. Union of India*, *\[1992\] 2 SCR 109* iii. *Mahesh Chandra Gupta v. Union of India*, *\[2009\] 10 SCR 921* **b. Important Statutes Referred** i. *Constitution of India* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [The New India Assurance Company Limited v. Smt. Somwati and Others, [2020] 10 SCR 1132](https://lawfoyer.in/the-new-india-assurance-company-limited-v-smt-somwati-and-others-2020-10-scr-1132/) **Published:** January 20, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The present judgment delivered by the Supreme Court of India resolves a recurring conflict in motor accident compensation jurisprudence concerning the scope and limits of non-pecuniary damages under conventional heads. The core controversy pertained to whether compensation could be simultaneously awarded under the heads of loss of consortium and loss of love and affection, and whether the concept of consortium was confined exclusively to spousal relationships. The appeals were instituted by multiple insurance companies challenging the legality of High Court judgments which had granted compensation to each claimant under both heads. The Supreme Court undertook a doctrinal examination of earlier precedents, including the Constitution Bench ruling in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, and subsequent clarificatory judgments. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The present judgment delivered by the Supreme Court of India resolves a recurring conflict in motor accident compensation jurisprudence concerning the scope and limits of non-pecuniary damages under conventional heads. The core controversy pertained to whether compensation could be simultaneously awarded under the heads of *loss of consortium* and *loss of love and affection*, and whether the concept of consortium was confined exclusively to spousal relationships. The appeals were instituted by multiple insurance companies challenging the legality of High Court judgments which had granted compensation to each claimant under both heads. The Supreme Court undertook a doctrinal examination of earlier precedents, including the Constitution Bench ruling in *National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi*, and subsequent clarificatory judgments. The Court authoritatively reaffirmed that *loss of consortium* is a comprehensive, compendious head encompassing *spousal consortium, parental consortium, and filial consortium*. It rejected the restrictive interpretation limiting consortium only to spouses. At the same time, the Court conclusively held that *loss of love and affection* does not exist as an independent head of compensation since it stands subsumed within consortium itself. The judgment harmonizes conflicting tribunal and High Court practices and restores doctrinal clarity by reinforcing uniform standards for awarding conventional damages under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The decision strengthens the compensatory framework while preventing duplication of non-pecuniary damages. **Keywords:** Motor Vehicles Act, Consortium, Loss of Love and Affection, Just Compensation, Conventional Heads ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*The New India Assurance Company Limited v. Smt. Somwati and Others*Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 3093 of 2020 (along with CA Nos. 3094–3099 of 2020)Judgement Date07 September 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumHon’ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhushan and Hon’ble Mr. Justice R. Subhash ReddyAuthorJustice Ashok BhushanCitation*\[2020\] 10 SCR 1132*Legal Provisions Involved*Section 166, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsMotor Accident Law, Tort Law, Compensation Jurisprudence ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The appeals before the Supreme Court arose from divergent compensation awards passed by various High Courts while adjudicating motor accident claims under *Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988*. The central grievance raised by the insurance companies concerned the expansion of non-pecuniary compensation beyond the limits prescribed by authoritative precedent. In particular, the appellants contended that High Courts had erred by granting compensation under two distinct heads, namely *loss of consortium* and *loss of love and affection*, thereby exceeding the framework laid down by the Constitution Bench in *Pranay Sethi*. The jurisprudential confusion stemmed from inconsistent application of conventional heads across tribunals. While *Pranay Sethi* had standardized three heads—*loss of estate, loss of consortium, and funeral expenses*—subsequent awards continued to reflect additional sums under *loss of love and affection*. The absence of explicit clarification on whether consortium extended beyond spousal relationships further aggravated interpretative divergence. This judgment was necessitated to reconcile doctrinal inconsistencies and ensure uniform application of compensation principles. The Court was tasked with interpreting the evolving meaning of consortium in light of changing social realities, while simultaneously preventing duplication of non-pecuniary damages. The adjudication thus occupies a crucial place in the evolution of Indian motor accident compensation law by balancing equity, consistency, and statutory intent . ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The lead appeal arose from the death of *Ram Jiyawan*, who succumbed to injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident on *06 December 2001*. He was survived by his widow *Smt. Somwati* and seven minor children. A claim petition under *Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988* was instituted claiming compensation of ₹15,25,000. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal awarded a modest sum of ₹1,67,000 with interest. Aggrieved, the claimants approached the Allahabad High Court, which substantially enhanced the compensation to ₹12,54,000. Notably, the High Court granted ₹4,00,000 under the head *loss of love and affection* and ₹2,80,000 towards *parental consortium*. This enhancement became the subject of challenge by the insurance company before the Supreme Court. Similar factual matrices underpinned the connected appeals, each involving fatal motor accidents where High Courts had awarded compensation under both disputed heads to widows, children, and parents of deceased victims. The insurance companies uniformly contended that such awards violated the binding framework of *Pranay Sethi* and resulted in impermissible duplication of damages. The factual commonality across appeals enabled the Court to adjudicate them through a consolidated judgment . ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether compensation under the head *loss of love and affection* is legally permissible after *Pranay Sethi*? ii. Whether *loss of consortium* is confined only to spousal consortium? iii. Whether awarding consortium to each claimant violates the ceiling on conventional heads? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that *Pranay Sethi* exhaustively codified conventional heads of compensation and did not recognize *loss of love and affection* as a permissible head. It was argued that allowing such compensation amounts to judicial overreach. The appellants further contended that consortium under *Pranay Sethi* was restricted to spouses, and any extension to children or parents was without jurisdiction. Reliance was placed on the principle of consistency and avoidance of inflated non-pecuniary damages . ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents argued that consortium is a dynamic concept reflecting familial dependency and emotional loss. They relied on *Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram* and *United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Satinder Kaur* to contend that parental and filial consortium were judicially recognized. It was submitted that denying such compensation would defeat the social welfare objective of the Motor Vehicles Act . ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court undertook an exhaustive doctrinal analysis of compensation jurisprudence. It reaffirmed that the Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at awarding *just compensation*. The Court clarified that *Pranay Sethi* fixed amounts for conventional heads but did not limit consortium solely to spouses. Relying heavily on *Satinder Kaur*, the Court held that consortium includes spousal, parental, and filial dimensions. However, it categorically ruled that *loss of love and affection* is subsumed within consortium and cannot be awarded separately. The Court found High Courts correct in awarding consortium to each eligible claimant but erroneous in granting additional sums under *loss of love and affection*. Consequently, all appeals were partly allowed, and awards under the latter head were set aside . **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The binding ratio is that *loss of consortium* is a comprehensive head encompassing spousal, parental, and filial consortium, and *loss of love and affection* does not survive as an independent head post *Pranay Sethi* . **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that compensation law must evolve with social realities and familial structures, emphasizing emotional dependency beyond marital relationships . **c) GUIDELINES** i. Compensation shall be awarded only under recognized conventional heads. ii. Consortium may be granted to spouse, children, and parents individually. iii. No separate compensation shall be awarded for *loss of love and affection*. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment decisively resolves longstanding ambiguity surrounding non-pecuniary compensation in motor accident claims. By harmonizing *Pranay Sethi* with later precedents, the Court ensures doctrinal clarity and uniformity. The recognition of parental and filial consortium reflects an empathetic understanding of familial loss, while the prohibition on *loss of love and affection* prevents duplication. The ruling strengthens the integrity of compensation jurisprudence and provides authoritative guidance to tribunals and courts across the country . ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** - *National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi*, *\[2017\] 13 SCR 100* - *Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram*, *(2018) 18 SCC 130* - *United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Satinder Kaur*, *(2020) SCC Online SC 410* - *Sarla Verma v. DTC*, *\[2009\] 5 SCR 1098* **b) Important Statutes Referred** - *Motor Vehicles Act, 1988* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [M/s Bangalore Club v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax & Anr., [2020] 13 S.C.R. 488](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-bangalore-club-v-commissioner-of-wealth-tax-anr-2020-13-s-c-r-488/) **Published:** January 20, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the scope and applicability of Section 21AA of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 in determining whether a social members’ club, namely M/s Bangalore Club, can be subjected to wealth tax as an association of persons. The controversy arose from assessment years 1981–82 and 1984–85 to 1990–91, where the revenue authorities treated the Club as a taxable association holding assets with indeterminate shares. The Supreme Court undertook an extensive interpretative exercise to determine the legislative intent behind Section 21AA, emphasizing that the provision was enacted as an anti-avoidance measure and not as an expansion of the charging section under Section 3. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment examines the scope and applicability of *Section 21AA of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957* in determining whether a **social members’ club**, namely *M/s Bangalore Club*, can be subjected to wealth tax as an *association of persons*. The controversy arose from assessment years *1981–82 and 1984–85 to 1990–91*, where the revenue authorities treated the Club as a taxable association holding assets with indeterminate shares. The Supreme Court undertook an extensive interpretative exercise to determine the legislative intent behind *Section 21AA*, emphasizing that the provision was enacted as an *anti-avoidance measure* and not as an expansion of the charging section under *Section 3*. The Court reaffirmed the settled jurisprudence that an *association of persons* in taxation statutes must involve a *voluntary combination for a business or commercial purpose with the object of earning income or profits*. Applying this test, the Court held that *Bangalore Club*, being a purely social club governed by the principle of mutuality, does not satisfy the essential characteristics of an association of persons contemplated under *Section 21AA*. The Court further ruled that even assuming the Club to be an association of persons, *Rule 35 of the Club Rules* clearly rendered members’ shares *determinate upon liquidation*, thereby excluding the applicability of *Section 21AA*. The judgment decisively overruled *CWT v. Chikmagalur Club*, clarified the limited scope of wealth tax liability of clubs, and reinforced purposive interpretation in fiscal statutes, particularly where anti-evasion provisions are invoked. **Keywords:** Wealth Tax, Association of Persons, Social Club, Section 21AA, Tax Avoidance, Mutuality ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetails*Judgement Cause Title**M/s Bangalore Club v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax & Anr.**Case Number*Civil Appeal Nos. 3964–3971 of 2007*Judgement Date*08 September 2020*Court*Supreme Court of India*Quorum*R.F. Nariman J., Navin Sinha J., Indira Banerjee J.*Author*R.F. Nariman, J.*Citation**\[2020\] 13 S.C.R. 488**Legal Provisions Involved**Sections 3 & 21AA, Wealth Tax Act, 1957; Section 2(31) & 167A, Income Tax Act, 1961**Judgments Overruled**CWT v. Chikmagalur Club* (197 ITR 609, Kar)*Related Law Subjects*Taxation Law, Fiscal Jurisprudence ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The dispute traces its origin to wealth tax assessments initiated against *Bangalore Club*, an unincorporated social members’ club established in *1868*. For the relevant assessment years, the *Assessing Officer* concluded that the Club was liable to wealth tax on the premise that its members collectively owned the assets and that their shares were indeterminate. This view was affirmed by the *Commissioner of Wealth Tax (Appeals)*. The *Income Tax Appellate Tribunal*, however, reversed these findings, categorically holding that the Club was a *social institution governed by the principle of mutuality*, and that its members neither carried on business nor intended to earn income or profits. The Tribunal further relied upon *Rule 35 of the Club Rules*, holding that members’ shares were determinate upon liquidation. The *Karnataka High Court* overturned the Tribunal’s decision, relying almost entirely on *CWT v. Chikmagalur Club*, thereby restoring the revenue’s position. A review petition met the same fate. The appeals before the Supreme Court thus raised substantial questions on the interpretation of *Section 21AA*, the meaning of *association of persons*, and the legislative intent underlying wealth tax provisions. The judgment is significant as it harmonizes wealth tax jurisprudence with long-standing income tax principles, ensuring that anti-evasion provisions are not applied mechanically to entities never intended to be taxed. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** *Bangalore Club* is an unincorporated association formed to provide *social, recreational, cultural, and sporting facilities* exclusively to its members. It is neither registered as a company nor as a society or trust. The Club operates solely on *member subscriptions and contributions*, and no profits are distributed. For the assessment years beginning *1981–82*, the *Wealth Tax Officer* initiated proceedings under the *Wealth Tax Act, 1957*. The officer held that since the Club was not a registered legal entity and its members’ rights extended beyond mere usage to ownership of assets, the Club constituted an *association of persons* under *Section 21AA*. Reliance was placed on *Rule 35*, asserting that membership was fluctuating and that the shares of members were indeterminate. The *CIT (Appeals)* summarily dismissed the Club’s challenge. The *ITAT*, on detailed consideration of the Club’s objects and rules, concluded that members never associated for earning income, and that *surplus* was merely an incident of mutuality. It further found that *Rule 35* made members’ shares determinate upon liquidation. The High Court reversed the Tribunal, applying *Chikmagalur Club*. This led to the present appeals before the Supreme Court. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether *Bangalore Club* qualifies as an *association of persons* under *Section 21AA of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957*? ii. Whether a *social members’ club* can be subjected to wealth tax absent a business or profit-making objective? iii. Whether members’ shares in the assets of the Club are *indeterminate or unknown*? iv. Whether *Section 21AA* enlarges the category of taxable persons beyond *Section 3*? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the Appellant submitted that *Section 3* restricts wealth tax liability strictly to *individuals, HUFs, and companies*. *Section 21AA* was introduced only to prevent tax evasion through artificial associations with undefined shares. It was argued that judicial precedent beginning with *CIT v. Indira Balkrishna (1960) 39 ITR 546* mandates that an association of persons must be formed with the intention of earning income. The Club, being purely social, fails this test. The Appellant further contended that *Rule 35* clearly provides for *equal distribution of surplus assets upon liquidation*, rendering members’ shares determinate. Hence, even on an alternative assumption, *Section 21AA* could not apply. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the Respondent submitted that the Club was already treated as an association of persons under the *Income Tax Act*. It was argued that fluctuating membership rendered shares indeterminate. Reliance was placed on *Section 21AA(2)* and *CWT v. Ellis Bridge Gymkhana* to contend that dissolution provisions attracted wealth tax liability. The revenue asserted that *Chikmagalur Club* correctly governed the field. ## **H) JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court allowed the appeals. It held that *Section 21AA* does not operate as a charging provision and cannot expand the scope of *Section 3*. The Court reiterated that *association of persons* must be construed consistently with settled income tax jurisprudence. The Court emphasized that *Section 21AA* is an anti-evasion measure aimed at assessees who create multiple associations with indeterminate shares. The provision was never intended to tax social clubs. The Court categorically ruled that *Bangalore Club* does not carry on any business or profession, nor do its members associate for profit. Even otherwise, *Rule 35* makes members’ shares determinate upon liquidation. The reliance on *Chikmagalur Club* was held to be erroneous, and the decision was expressly overruled. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** *Section 21AA applies only to associations formed for business or commercial purposes with indeterminate shares; a social members’ club governed by mutuality falls outside its scope.* **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that the legislature could have amended *Section 3* if it intended to tax associations per se. The absence of such amendment reinforces the limited scope of *Section 21AA*. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Anti-evasion provisions must be interpreted purposively. ii. Social clubs cannot be taxed absent profit motive. iii. Determinacy of shares must be assessed on the valuation date. ## **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment restores doctrinal clarity in wealth tax jurisprudence. It prevents mechanical application of anti-avoidance provisions and safeguards social institutions from unintended tax burdens. The overruling of *Chikmagalur Club* aligns High Court jurisprudence with constitutional principles of taxation and statutory interpretation. ## **J) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *CIT v. Indira Balkrishna* (1960) 39 ITR 546 2. *CWT v. Ellis Bridge Gymkhana* (1998) 1 SCC 384 3. *Cricket Club of India Ltd v. Bombay Labour Union* \[1969\] 1 SCR 600 **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Wealth Tax Act, 1957* 2. *Income Tax Act, 1961* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Shreyas Sinha v. The West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences & Ors., [2020] 9 S.C.R. 869](https://lawfoyer.in/shreyas-sinha-v-the-west-bengal-national-university-of-juridical-sciences-ors-2020-9-s-c-r-869/) **Published:** January 20, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The Supreme Court examined whether the National University of Juridical Sciences (Amendment) Act, 2018, which introduced mandatory reservation of at least thirty percent seats for candidates domiciled in West Bengal, could be applied to an ongoing admission process for the academic session 2019–2020 conducted through Common Law Admission Test (CLAT). The appellant, having participated in CLAT after the amendment came into force, claimed entitlement to domicile reservation for the same academic year. The University declined such benefit, contending that the admission process had commenced prior to the amendment and that applying the new reservation would disturb the settled selection framework. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The Supreme Court examined whether the *National University of Juridical Sciences (Amendment) Act, 2018*, which introduced *mandatory reservation of at least thirty percent seats for candidates domiciled in West Bengal*, could be applied to an *ongoing admission process* for the academic session 2019–2020 conducted through *Common Law Admission Test (CLAT)*. The appellant, having participated in CLAT after the amendment came into force, claimed entitlement to domicile reservation for the same academic year. The University declined such benefit, contending that the admission process had commenced prior to the amendment and that applying the new reservation would disturb the settled selection framework. The Court analysed the statutory silence regarding the academic year from which reservation was to operate, the chronology of the admission process, and the administrative resolutions passed by the Academic Council and Executive Council of the University. The Court reaffirmed the doctrine that *rules governing selection cannot be altered mid-process*, unless expressly mandated by statute. It held that the amendment was *prospective in operation* and that the University’s decision to implement reservation from the next academic year was *fair, reasonable, and non-arbitrary*. Prior judgments relating to wrongful denial of admission and change of rules mid-selection were distinguished on facts. The appeal was dismissed. **Keywords:** Reservation, Prospectivity, Admission Process, CLAT, Domicile Quota, Change of Rules ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Shreyas Sinha v. The West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences & Ors.*Case Number*Civil Appeal No. 3085 of 2020*Judgement Date*09 September 2020*Court*Supreme Court of India*Quorum*L. Nageswara Rao, Hemant Gupta, S. Ravindra Bhat, JJ.*Author*Hemant Gupta, J.*Citation*\[2020\] 9 S.C.R. 869*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 4A and 4B, West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences Act, 1999 (as amended)*Judgments Overruled*None*Related Law Subjects*Constitutional Law, Education Law, Administrative Law* ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The litigation arose in the context of the evolving framework of *reservation policies in National Law Universities* and their intersection with centrally conducted admission mechanisms like *CLAT*. The *West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences Act, 1999* was amended in 2018 to mandate *compulsory domicile-based reservation*. However, the amendment was notified only in May 2019, after the initiation of the admission cycle for the academic year 2019–2020. The appellant sought to leverage the timing of the amendment vis-à-vis the CLAT examination date to claim immediate benefit of reservation. This raised a fundamental legal question regarding *temporal applicability of statutory amendments*, particularly in admission processes governed by predefined timelines and national-level coordination. The High Court of Calcutta rejected the appellant’s claim, applying the principle against changing rules midstream. The Supreme Court was thus called upon to balance *statutory intent*, *administrative practicality*, and *equitable treatment of candidates*. The dispute implicated doctrines of *prospective operation*, *legitimate expectation*, and *administrative fairness*. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellant applied for admission to the *five-year integrated law programme* at the respondent University through *CLAT 2019*. The admission notification was issued in January 2019, well before the amendment came into force. At that time, only *ten seats* were earmarked for West Bengal domicile candidates. The *Amendment Act* was published on *21 May 2019*, mandating *at least thirty percent reservation*. The CLAT examination was conducted on *26 May 2019*. The appellant secured *All India Rank 731* and was allotted a seat at *National Law University, Odisha*, which he declined. The University finalised admissions by July 2019 based on the pre-existing seat matrix. Subsequently, the Academic Council resolved to implement the new reservation from the *next academic year*, a decision approved by the Executive Council. The appellant challenged this decision, alleging denial of statutory benefit despite the amendment being in force before the examination date. The University justified its stance citing disruption of the admission process and absence of statutory mandate for retrospective application. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the *National University of Juridical Sciences (Amendment) Act, 2018* applies to an admission process already initiated prior to its commencement? ii. Whether denial of domicile reservation for the academic year 2019–2020 violates statutory or constitutional guarantees? iii. Whether implementing reservation from the next academic year amounts to arbitrariness? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the amendment *“came into force at once”* and was binding on the University. Since CLAT was conducted after *21 May 2019*, the University was obligated to apply the amended reservation policy. Reliance was placed on *S. Krishna Sradha v. State of Andhra Pradesh*, asserting that a meritorious candidate wrongfully denied admission should be accommodated in the subsequent academic year. It was argued that refusal amounted to *changing statutory obligations under administrative convenience*. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent contended that the *admission process commenced in January 2019* and candidates exercised choices based on the then-prevailing reservation framework. Applying the amendment mid-cycle would disturb the entire national allocation process. It was argued that the amendment was *prospective* and silent on applicability to ongoing admissions. The University’s resolution to apply it from the next academic year was reasonable and aligned with administrative law principles. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 4A(3), West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences Act, 1999* ii. *Section 4B, West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences Act, 1999* iii. *Doctrine against changing rules of the game mid-process* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court upheld the University’s decision. It held that the *Amendment Act did not specify the academic year of implementation*. The admission process had already crystallised before the amendment came into force. The Court emphasised that *reservation matrices must be finalised at the initiation of admissions*. Applying new quotas mid-process would prejudice other candidates and undermine fairness. The resolutions passed by the Academic and Executive Councils were held to be *reasonable and within statutory discretion*. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio rests on the principle that *statutory amendments affecting selection criteria operate prospectively unless expressly stated otherwise*. Silence in the statute regarding retrospective application implies legislative intent against disturbing settled processes. The Court reaffirmed that *administrative decisions taken to preserve fairness and certainty* cannot be invalidated merely because a statute comes into force mid-cycle. The doctrine against changing rules mid-selection was determinative. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that the expression *“at once”* in commencement clauses does not necessarily mandate instantaneous operationalisation across all ongoing processes. Reasonable administrative implementation is permissible, particularly in large-scale national admissions. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Reservation policies must be implemented from the start of an admission cycle. ii. Statutory silence on temporal application implies prospectivity. iii. Universities must avoid mid-cycle alterations that disrupt candidate expectations. ## J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces administrative stability in higher education admissions. It balances statutory interpretation with practical governance, ensuring predictability in national-level entrance systems. The ruling affirms that *equity lies not in individual hardship but in systemic fairness*. ## K) REFERENCES **a. Important Cases Referred** i. *S. Krishna Sradha v. State of Andhra Pradesh*, *\[2019\] 15 SCR 93* ii. *Anupal Singh v. State of U.P.*, *(2020) 2 SCC 173* iii. *P. Bhima Reddy v. State of Mysore*, *\[1969\] 3 SCR 14* **b. Important Statutes Referred** i. *West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences Act, 1999* ii. *National University of Juridical Sciences (Amendment) Act, 2018* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Stalin v. State represented by the Inspector of Police, [2020] 7 S.C.R. 283](https://lawfoyer.in/stalin-v-state-represented-by-the-inspector-of-police-2020-7-s-c-r-283/) **Published:** January 20, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment addresses the recurring doctrinal issue in Indian criminal law concerning whether a conviction for murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 can be sustained when the death of the victim results from a single injury. The Supreme Court revisits and clarifies the legal position that no rigid or mechanical rule exists excluding murder liability merely because only one blow was inflicted. The determination must depend on the cumulative assessment of attendant circumstances, including the nature of the weapon, the part of the body targeted, the force applied, and the contextual sequence of events preceding the act. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment addresses the recurring doctrinal issue in Indian criminal law concerning whether a conviction for murder under *Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860* can be sustained when the death of the victim results from a single injury. The Supreme Court revisits and clarifies the legal position that no rigid or mechanical rule exists excluding murder liability merely because only one blow was inflicted. The determination must depend on the cumulative assessment of attendant circumstances, including the nature of the weapon, the part of the body targeted, the force applied, and the contextual sequence of events preceding the act. In the present case, the incident occurred during a beer party where a sudden quarrel erupted after the deceased allegedly served extra beer to outsiders, provoking the appellant. The accused inflicted a single knife stab from behind, causing a fatal injury to a vital organ. While the trial court and the High Court upheld conviction under *Section 302 IPC*, the Supreme Court examined whether the facts attracted *Exception IV to Section 300 IPC*, which excludes murder where culpable homicide is committed without premeditation, in a sudden fight, and without undue advantage. The Court concluded that the occurrence arose out of a sudden quarrel in the heat of passion, thereby negating the element of premeditated intention necessary for murder. However, given that the injury was inflicted with a deadly weapon on a vital part of the body, the Court attributed knowledge of likely death to the accused. Accordingly, the conviction was modified from *Section 302 IPC* to *Section 304 Part I IPC*. The judgment harmonizes prior precedents on “single blow” cases and reiterates the nuanced distinction between intention and knowledge in homicide jurisprudence. **Keywords:** Single injury doctrine, Exception IV to Section 300 IPC, culpable homicide, intention and knowledge, Section 304 Part I IPC ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Stalin v. State represented by the Inspector of Police*Case NumberCriminal Appeal No. 577 of 2020Judgement Date09 September 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumAshok Bhushan J., R. Subhash Reddy J., M. R. Shah J.AuthorJustice M. R. ShahCitation*\[2020\] 7 S.C.R. 283*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 300, 302, 304 Part I & Part II IPC*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsCriminal Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The appeal arose from the affirmation by the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court of the appellant’s conviction for murder under *Section 302 IPC*. The appellant was originally convicted by the IV Additional District and Sessions Court, Tirunelveli, for causing the death of the deceased by a knife injury during a social gathering. The High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the life sentence. Before the Supreme Court, the scope of scrutiny was limited by an earlier order to the question of appropriate classification of the offence. The Court was not required to reassess guilt but to determine whether the conviction should fall under *Section 302 IPC* or a lesser offence under *Section 304 IPC*. The appellant contended that the case involved a single blow inflicted during a sudden quarrel, lacking premeditation or intention to kill. The legal backdrop of the case lies in the long-standing judicial debate surrounding “single injury” cases. Indian courts have repeatedly confronted arguments that a solitary injury necessarily excludes murder liability. The Supreme Court has consistently rejected such absolutist reasoning, emphasizing fact-sensitive adjudication. The present judgment consolidates that jurisprudence while carefully applying *Exception IV to Section 300 IPC*. The Court was also called upon to examine the relevance of motive in cases supported by direct eyewitness testimony. The prosecution relied upon three eyewitnesses whose accounts were accepted by both courts below. The judgment therefore situates itself at the intersection of evidentiary appreciation and substantive criminal law principles governing culpable homicide and murder. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The incident occurred during a beer party attended by the accused, the deceased, and others who were acquainted with one another. According to prosecution witnesses, particularly *PW-3*, the deceased served additional beer to two persons who had come from outside the locality. This act allegedly angered the accused, who questioned why outsiders were being favored over locals. A verbal altercation ensued, which escalated into a scuffle. In the heat of the moment, the accused took out a knife and stabbed the deceased from behind. The injury was located on the back, corresponding to the *D11 vertebra*, penetrating deep and damaging a vital organ. The medical evidence described the wound as a clean-edged stab injury approximately *3 x 1.5 cm and 8 cm deep*, sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The prosecution examined *PWs 1, 2, and 3* as eyewitnesses, whose testimonies were found consistent and reliable. The defense attempted to cast doubt on motive, arguing that the alleged motive related to an incident four months prior and lacked proximity. However, the courts below accepted the eyewitness account and medical evidence, concluding that the accused intentionally caused the fatal injury. The trial court convicted the accused under *Section 302 IPC*, sentencing him to life imprisonment. The High Court confirmed this finding. The accused then approached the Supreme Court, restricting his challenge to the nature of the offence rather than the occurrence itself. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether a conviction under *Section 302 IPC* can be sustained where death is caused by a single injury? ii. Whether the facts of the case attract *Exception IV to Section 300 IPC*? iii. Whether the offence falls under *Section 304 Part I IPC* or *Section 304 Part II IPC*? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the case involved only a single stab injury and therefore could not constitute murder. It was argued that there was no intention to cause death and that the occurrence arose out of sudden provocation during a trivial quarrel. Reliance was placed on earlier Supreme Court decisions where convictions under *Section 302 IPC* were altered in single injury cases. The appellant further contended that the alleged motive was weak and temporally remote, having occurred four months prior to the incident. It was submitted that absence of motive undermined the prosecution case regarding intention. The defense urged that at best, the facts attracted *Section 304 Part II IPC*, as there was no intention to cause death but only knowledge of likely harm. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the State argued that the number of injuries is not determinative of the offence. Emphasis was placed on the nature of the weapon used and the vital part of the body targeted. The State submitted that stabbing with a knife on a vital organ clearly demonstrates intention or, at minimum, knowledge sufficient for murder. It was further contended that motive becomes insignificant where credible eyewitnesses exist. The prosecution relied on a catena of Supreme Court judgments affirming that even a single blow can attract *Section 302 IPC* depending on circumstances. The State urged dismissal of the appeal. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court undertook an extensive survey of precedents dealing with single injury cases. The Court reiterated that there is *no hard and fast rule* excluding murder liability merely because death results from one blow. The decisive factors include the weapon, the force used, the body part targeted, and the surrounding circumstances. Applying these principles, the Court examined the testimony of *PW-3*, who described the genesis of the incident as a sudden quarrel during a beer party. The Court found no evidence of premeditation. The altercation arose spontaneously, and the accused did not come armed with a preconceived plan to kill. The Court then applied *Exception IV to Section 300 IPC*, which requires absence of premeditation, sudden fight, heat of passion, and lack of undue advantage. All these elements were found satisfied. Consequently, the offence was held not to amount to murder under *Section 300 IPC*. However, the Court rejected the appellant’s plea for conviction under *Section 304 Part II IPC*. It held that stabbing with a knife on a vital part necessarily imputes knowledge that death is likely to ensue. Therefore, the appropriate conviction was under *Section 304 Part I IPC*. The conviction under *Section 302 IPC* was modified accordingly, and the appellant was sentenced to *eight years’ rigorous imprisonment* with fine. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment lies in reaffirming that the classification of homicide offences depends on a holistic evaluation of facts rather than mechanical rules. Even a single injury can constitute murder if intention is established. Conversely, where the act is committed in a sudden fight without premeditation, *Exception IV to Section 300 IPC* applies. The Court clarified that where a deadly weapon is used on a vital part, knowledge of likely death can be safely presumed. Such cases fall under *Section 304 Part I IPC* rather than Part II, which is reserved for acts lacking both intention and knowledge. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that motive is not an indispensable element in cases supported by direct eyewitness testimony. Absence or weakness of motive merely necessitates careful scrutiny of evidence and does not vitiate the prosecution case. The judgment also cautioned courts against converting murder cases into culpable homicide, or vice versa, without careful factual analysis. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Single injury cases must be decided on cumulative factual assessment. ii. Nature of weapon and body part targeted are critical indicators. iii. Sudden quarrel and absence of premeditation may attract *Exception IV*. iv. Use of deadly weapon on vital organ generally attracts *Section 304 Part I IPC*. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment is a lucid reaffirmation of settled principles governing culpable homicide and murder. It balances doctrinal consistency with factual sensitivity. By modifying the conviction, the Supreme Court ensured proportionality between culpability and punishment. The ruling strengthens clarity on the application of *Exception IV to Section 300 IPC* and offers valuable guidance to trial courts handling single injury homicide cases. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Mahesh Balmiki v. State of M.P.* 2. *Dhirajbhai Gorakhbhai Nayak v. State of Gujarat* 3. *Pulicherla Nagaraju v. State of A.P.* 4. *Singapagu Anjaiah v. State of A.P.* 5. *Jafel Biswas v. State of West Bengal* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Indian Penal Code, 1860* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Ors. v. Goverdhan Lal Soni & Anr., [2020] 10 SCR 238](https://lawfoyer.in/rajasthan-state-road-transport-corporation-ors-v-goverdhan-lal-soni-anr-2020-10-scr-238/) **Published:** January 19, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the legal entitlement of surplus employees absorbed from a defunct State Public Enterprise into another State Corporation to receive pensionary benefits under the absorbing organisation’s pension regulations. The dispute arose after employees of the Rajasthan State Agro Industries Corporation Limited, which followed only a Contributory Provident Fund scheme, were absorbed into the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, which was governed by the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Employees’ Pension Regulations, 1989. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the legal entitlement of surplus employees absorbed from a defunct State Public Enterprise into another State Corporation to receive pensionary benefits under the absorbing organisation’s pension regulations. The dispute arose after employees of the Rajasthan State Agro Industries Corporation Limited, which followed only a *Contributory Provident Fund* scheme, were absorbed into the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, which was governed by the *Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Employees’ Pension Regulations, 1989*. The respondents exercised a timely statutory option to shift from CPF to the pension scheme after absorption. Despite the transfer of both employee and employer provident fund contributions by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, the Corporation denied pension on the ground that no “capital value” had been transferred by the erstwhile employer. The Supreme Court undertook a meticulous interpretation of *Regulation 43 of the 1989 Regulations* and *Clause 11(b) of the Circular dated 02.07.1991*, governing absorption of surplus employees. It decisively rejected the Corporation’s contention that transfer of any additional capital amount was a prerequisite. The Court held that the statutory framework contemplated only two funds, namely the *General Provident Fund* and the *Pension Fund*, and that once employee and employer contributions stood transferred, no further condition survived. The ruling reinforces pension as a statutory right flowing from valid exercise of option and clarifies the obligations of absorbing public sector employers. It affirms judicial consistency in service jurisprudence and curtails administrative arbitrariness in pension matters. **Keywords:** Pension entitlement; Absorption of surplus employees; CPF to pension transition; Statutory interpretation; Public sector service law. ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Ors. v. Goverdhan Lal Soni & Anr.*Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 1789 of 2020 with Civil Appeal No. 1812 of 2020Judgement Date09 September 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumHon’ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhushan and Hon’ble Mr. Justice K. M. JosephAuthorJustice Ashok BhushanCitation*\[2020\] 10 SCR 238*Legal Provisions Involved*Section 45, Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950*; *Regulations 3 and 43 of RSRTC Pension Regulations, 1989*; *Circular dated 02.07.1991*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsService Law; Administrative Law; Labour and Employment Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The dispute emanates from a structural reorganisation undertaken by the State of Rajasthan following the closure of the Rajasthan State Agro Industries Corporation Limited. The State Government declared its employees surplus and framed a policy for their absorption into other public sector undertakings through a circular issued by the Bureau of Public Enterprises on *02.07.1991*. This circular was intended to preserve service continuity and ensure parity in employment benefits, including retirement benefits, for displaced employees. The Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, a statutory corporation governed by its own pension regulations, absorbed such surplus employees in 1996. The absorbing corporation followed both CPF and pension schemes, and accordingly, issued a notification on *12.02.1997* inviting options from absorbed employees. The respondents exercised their option within the stipulated time to be governed by the pension scheme under the *1989 Regulations*. Despite compliance with procedural requirements and transfer of provident fund contributions, the Corporation later introduced a restrictive interpretation through a circular dated *09.02.1999*, insisting upon receipt of a “capital amount” from the erstwhile employer. This administrative insistence became the sole ground for denial of pension, resulting in prolonged litigation. The High Court of Rajasthan ruled in favour of the employees, relying upon consistent judicial precedents concerning absorption and pension entitlement. The present appeals before the Supreme Court thus raised questions of statutory interpretation, administrative discretion, and the scope of obligations under pension regulations. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The first respondent was appointed as a Junior Assistant in 1974 in the Rajasthan State Agro Industries Corporation Limited. Upon closure of the said corporation, he was declared surplus and absorbed into the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation on *03.10.1996*. At the time of absorption, he was governed by a CPF scheme, as the erstwhile corporation had no pension scheme. Following absorption, the Corporation issued a notification dated *12.02.1997*, permitting absorbed employees to opt either for CPF or for GPF with pension under the *1989 Regulations*. The respondent exercised his option on *22.03.1997* in favour of the pension scheme. Acting on this option, the Corporation requested transfer of provident fund contributions. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner duly transferred both employee and employer contributions, amounting to more than ₹1.9 lakhs, and issued a certificate confirming such transfer. However, the Agro Industries Corporation declined to transfer any additional “capital value”, stating that no pension scheme existed in the erstwhile organisation. The Corporation later relied on this communication to deny pension. The respondent continued to make representations and ultimately retired on *30.06.2012*. A writ petition was filed seeking pensionary benefits and quashing of the circular dated *09.02.1999*. The learned Single Judge allowed the petition, subject to refund of CPF benefits, and the Division Bench affirmed the decision. Similar facts existed in the connected appeal. The Corporation approached the Supreme Court challenging these concurrent findings. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether transfer of a “capital value” from the erstwhile employer is a mandatory precondition for pension entitlement under the *1989 Regulations*? ii. Whether *Clause 11(b) of the Circular dated 02.07.1991* envisages transfer of any amount beyond CPF contributions? iii. Whether denial of pension despite timely exercise of option violates statutory obligations of the absorbing corporation? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the respondents were never members of a pension scheme in their erstwhile employment and therefore could not claim pension without transfer of capital value. It was argued that *Clause 11(b)* mandated transfer of pension fund proportionate to organisational contribution, which was impossible in absence of a pension scheme. Reliance was placed on the letter dated *18.08.1998* issued by the Agro Industries Corporation refusing to transfer capital value. It was contended that the respondents had already availed CPF benefits, gratuity, and even pension under the Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation, and granting pension would amount to double benefit. The appellant further argued that the High Court failed to record satisfaction regarding fulfilment of mandatory conditions under the absorption policy and ignored the subsequent circular of *09.02.1999*. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents submitted that both employee and employer CPF contributions were transferred in full by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner. It was argued that neither the *1989 Regulations* nor the *1991 Circular* contemplated transfer of any additional capital amount. The respondents relied on earlier judgments of the Rajasthan High Court, particularly *Mahaveer Prasad Jain*, where identical issues were settled. It was contended that pension is a statutory right upon valid exercise of option and that administrative circulars cannot override statutory regulations. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court undertook a textual and purposive interpretation of *Regulation 43* and *Clause 11(b)*. It held that the statutory framework recognises only two funds for pensionable employees, namely the Pension Fund and the GPF Fund. The Court categorically observed that neither the regulation nor the circular refers to any “capital amount”. The Court rejected the appellant’s reliance on the circular dated *09.02.1999*, holding it to be without statutory basis and inconsistent with the governing regulations. The transfer certificate issued by the Provident Fund Commissioner conclusively established compliance with all financial requirements. The Court further held that acceptance of CPF benefits due to administrative refusal of pension could not defeat a statutory claim. Equity was balanced by directing adjustment without interest. The appeals were dismissed with minor modification relating to the effective date of pension. **a. RATIO DECIDENDI** The Supreme Court held that once employee and employer CPF contributions are transferred upon absorption and a valid option for pension is exercised within time, pension entitlement crystallises under the *1989 Regulations*. Any insistence on transfer of a non-statutory “capital value” is illegal and arbitrary. **b. OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that pension and CPF are conceptually distinct, yet denial of pension cannot be justified merely because an employee temporarily received CPF benefits under compulsion. Administrative authorities must act consistently with beneficial service legislation. **c. GUIDELINES** i. Absorbing corporations must strictly adhere to pension regulations. ii. Administrative circulars cannot impose conditions absent in statutory rules. iii. Pension claims of absorbed employees must be processed upon CPF transfer. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment fortifies pension jurisprudence by reaffirming that pension is not a discretionary bounty but a statutory right. It clarifies the obligations of public sector employers during organisational restructuring and prevents misuse of administrative circulars to defeat accrued service benefits. The ruling promotes legal certainty and fairness in absorption policies and serves as a precedent against arbitrary denial of retirement benefits. ## J) REFERENCES **a. Important Cases Referred** 1. *Pepsu Road Transport Corporation v. Mangal Singh*, *(2011) 11 SCC 702* 2. *Mahaveer Prasad Jain v. Jaipur Vidhyut Vitran Nigam Ltd.*, *2008 (2) WLN 337* **b. Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950* 2. *Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Employees’ Pension Regulations, 1989* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Rizwan Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh, [2020] 7 SCR 546](https://lawfoyer.in/rizwan-khan-v-state-of-chhattisgarh-2020-7-scr-546/) **Published:** January 19, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in Rizwan Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh examines critical procedural and evidentiary dimensions under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, particularly concerning recovery, proof of possession, and reliance on police testimony in the absence of independent witnesses. The appellant challenged his conviction under Section 20(b)(ii)(B) of the NDPS Act on multiple grounds including alleged non-compliance with Sections 42, 50, and 55, discrepancies in sample marking, non-examination of independent witnesses, and failure to establish ownership and recovery of the vehicle from which contraband was seized. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment in *Rizwan Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh* examines critical procedural and evidentiary dimensions under the *Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985*, particularly concerning recovery, proof of possession, and reliance on police testimony in the absence of independent witnesses. The appellant challenged his conviction under *Section 20(b)(ii)(B) of the NDPS Act* on multiple grounds including alleged non-compliance with *Sections 42, 50, and 55*, discrepancies in sample marking, non-examination of independent witnesses, and failure to establish ownership and recovery of the vehicle from which contraband was seized. The Supreme Court undertook a re-appreciation of evidence and reaffirmed settled principles governing NDPS prosecutions. The Court held that testimony of police officials, if reliable and trustworthy, does not require corroboration from independent witnesses. It further clarified that ownership or subsequent recovery of the vehicle is immaterial once possession and recovery of contraband from the accused is proved. The decision also reflects the post-*Mukesh Singh* legal position regarding complainant and investigating officer identity. Emphasis was placed on substantial compliance rather than hyper-technical scrutiny. The judgment reinforces prosecutorial standards while balancing statutory safeguards under the NDPS regime. **Keywords:** NDPS Act, police witnesses, hostile witnesses, vehicle ownership, procedural compliance ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetails*Judgement Cause Title**Rizwan Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh**Case Number*Criminal Appeal No. 580 of 2020*Judgement Date*10 September 2020*Court*Supreme Court of India*Quorum*Ashok Bhushan J., R. Subhash Reddy J., M.R. Shah J.*Author*Justice M.R. Shah*Citation**\[2020\] 7 SCR 546**Legal Provisions Involved**Sections 20(b)(ii)(B), 42, 50, 55 NDPS Act; Section 313 CrPC**Judgments Overruled*None*Related Law Subjects*Criminal Law, Narcotics Law ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The case arises from a prosecution under the *NDPS Act* involving recovery of *20 kilograms of ganja* from the appellant during a vehicle search. The appellant was convicted by the Special NDPS Court, and the conviction was affirmed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh. The appeal before the Supreme Court questioned the sustainability of conviction in light of alleged procedural lapses and evidentiary inconsistencies. The NDPS Act being a stringent penal statute, judicial scrutiny often involves a delicate balance between strict procedural compliance and the overarching objective of curbing drug trafficking. The appellant invoked alleged non-compliance with *Section 42* regarding recording of information, *Section 55* relating to custody of seized articles, and *Section 50* concerning search safeguards. Additional emphasis was placed on hostile independent witnesses, discrepancies in vehicle number, and clerical errors in sample markings. The Supreme Court addressed these contentions against the backdrop of settled jurisprudence, including the evolution of law post *Mohan Lal* and its overruling in *Mukesh Singh*. The judgment situates itself within a consistent judicial approach that discourages acquittals based on trivial or non-prejudicial lapses while ensuring adherence to statutory protections. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The prosecution case was that the appellant along with another accused was intercepted while travelling on a motorcycle. Upon search, *20 kg of ganja* was recovered from a sack placed on the vehicle. Prior to search, the accused were informed of their rights under *Section 50 of the NDPS Act*, and consent was obtained. A seizure panchnama was prepared, samples were drawn, sealed, and marked as *B1 and B2*. The substance was preliminarily tested and later confirmed as ganja by the *Forensic Science Laboratory*. Information was initially recorded by *PW4 ASI J.K. Sen*, who also lodged the FIR. Subsequent investigation was conducted by *PW5 Inspector Ashish Shukla*. Independent witnesses to the seizure later turned hostile during trial. The Special Court convicted the appellant under *Section 20(b)(ii)(B)* and imposed *five years rigorous imprisonment*. The High Court dismissed the appeal. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant alleged discrepancies in vehicle numbers, improper custody of seal and samples, failure to examine material witnesses, and non-recovery of the vehicle. The appellant also sought sentence reduction citing period already undergone. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether conviction under *Section 20(b)(ii)(B) NDPS Act* can be sustained solely on police testimony? ii. Whether non-examination or hostility of independent witnesses vitiates the prosecution case? iii. Whether alleged non-compliance with *Sections 42 and 55 NDPS Act* renders the trial illegal? iv. Whether failure to prove ownership or recovery of the vehicle affects culpability? v. Whether clerical discrepancies in sample marking create reasonable doubt? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellant submitted that mandatory safeguards under the NDPS Act were violated. It was argued that *Section 42* was not complied with as information was not properly reduced into writing. Reliance was placed on discrepancies in vehicle numbers and inconsistencies in sample markings to contend that chain of custody was compromised. The appellant emphasized that all independent witnesses had turned hostile and that conviction based solely on police witnesses was unsafe. It was further argued that non-recovery of the motorcycle and failure to establish ownership undermined the prosecution story. The appellant also invoked *Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab* to contend that the complainant and investigating officer being the same vitiated the trial. Alternatively, a plea for reduction of sentence was raised. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the State submitted that substantial compliance with *Sections 42, 50, and 55* was proved through consistent testimony of official witnesses. It was contended that hostility of independent witnesses does not erode the credibility of otherwise reliable police evidence. The State relied on *Surinder Kumar v. State of Punjab* to assert that non-examination of independent witnesses is not fatal. It was argued that discrepancies in sample numbering were clerical and did not prejudice the defence. The State further contended that ownership or recovery of vehicle is irrelevant once possession and recovery of contraband from the accused is established. The State also pointed out that *Mohan Lal* stood overruled by *Mukesh Singh*. ## **H) JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction. The Court held that police witnesses *PW3, PW4, PW5, PW7 and PW8* were consistent, reliable, and thoroughly cross-examined. Absence of animosity or motive for false implication was noted. The Court reiterated that there is no legal requirement that police testimony must be corroborated by independent witnesses. On *Section 42*, the Court accepted the prosecution evidence demonstrating that information was duly recorded and communicated. Compliance with *Section 55* was established through testimony relating to sealing and dispatch of samples. The Court rejected the argument regarding sample discrepancy, holding it to be a clerical error without substantive impact. The Court clarified that under the NDPS Act, *ownership of vehicle is immaterial*, and recovery of contraband from the accused is the determinative factor. The plea for leniency in sentencing was also rejected considering the statutory framework. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment lies in reaffirming that *credible police testimony is sufficient to sustain conviction under the NDPS Act even in the absence of independent witnesses*. The Court held that procedural safeguards must be substantially complied with and not interpreted in a hyper-technical manner. The ruling clarifies that ownership or subsequent recovery of the vehicle used for transporting contraband is irrelevant if possession and recovery are proved. The Court also recognized the post-*Mukesh Singh* legal position that investigation by the complainant does not per se vitiate the trial. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that NDPS offences must be viewed in light of the object of the statute, which seeks to combat drug trafficking. It emphasized that courts should avoid adopting an approach that allows offenders to escape liability on minor technical lapses that do not cause prejudice. The Court also reiterated the presumption of regularity attached to official acts. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Police testimony cannot be discarded solely due to absence of independent corroboration. ii. Clerical discrepancies in documentation must be assessed for actual prejudice. iii. Ownership of vehicle is not a sine qua non for proving NDPS offences. iv. Substantial compliance with procedural safeguards is sufficient. ## **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment reinforces doctrinal clarity in NDPS jurisprudence by aligning evidentiary standards with practical enforcement realities. It strengthens prosecutorial reliance on official testimony while safeguarding against arbitrary action through insistence on procedural compliance. The decision discourages acquittals grounded in technical trivialities and upholds legislative intent. It also harmonizes earlier conflicting precedents by adopting the *Mukesh Singh* position. The ruling has significant precedential value in NDPS trials involving hostile witnesses and disputed vehicle ownership. ## **J) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab*, *\[2018\] 9 SCR 1006* 2. *P.P. Fathima v. State of Kerala*, *(2003) 8 SCC 726* 3. *Baldev Singh v. State of Haryana*, *\[2015\] 12 SCR 969* 4. *State of Himachal Pradesh v. Pradeep Kumar*, *\[2018\] 2 SCR 656* 5. *Surinder Kumar v. State of Punjab*, *(2020) 2 SCC 563* 6. *Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch)*, SLP (Cr.) Diary No. 39528/2018 **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985* 2. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Pravin Kumar v. Union of India & Ors., [2020] 7 SCR 1078](https://lawfoyer.in/pravin-kumar-v-union-of-india-ors-2020-7-scr-1078/) **Published:** January 19, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in Pravin Kumar v. Union of India & Ors. examines the contours of judicial review in disciplinary proceedings involving members of an armed force of the Union, particularly in cases alleging corruption, fabrication of official records, and intimidation of subordinates. The appellant, a Sub-Inspector in the Central Industrial Security Force, challenged his dismissal from service arising out of a departmental enquiry conducted under the CISF Rules, 1969. The enquiry followed recovery of unaccounted cash from a subordinate constable, which ultimately revealed a structured mechanism of illegal collection of bribes from contractors operating within the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited refinery premises. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment in *Pravin Kumar v. Union of India & Ors.* examines the contours of judicial review in disciplinary proceedings involving members of an armed force of the Union, particularly in cases alleging corruption, fabrication of official records, and intimidation of subordinates. The appellant, a Sub-Inspector in the Central Industrial Security Force, challenged his dismissal from service arising out of a departmental enquiry conducted under the *CISF Rules, 1969*. The enquiry followed recovery of unaccounted cash from a subordinate constable, which ultimately revealed a structured mechanism of illegal collection of bribes from contractors operating within the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited refinery premises. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that disciplinary proceedings are independent of criminal investigations and that failure of the Central Bureau of Investigation to file a criminal charge-sheet does not invalidate departmental action. The Court emphasised the settled distinction between the standard of proof in criminal trials and disciplinary enquiries, reiterating that preponderance of probabilities governs service jurisprudence. The judgment also clarifies that enquiry officers may actively question witnesses without violating the principle of *nemo judex in sua causa*, particularly in light of *Section 165 of the Evidence Act, 1872*. Importantly, the Court delineated the limited scope of judicial review under *Articles 226, 32, and 136 of the Constitution*, cautioning constitutional courts against re-appreciation of evidence or substitution of punishment unless perversity, procedural illegality, or shocking disproportionality is demonstrated. The ruling underscores the heightened standards of integrity applicable to paramilitary forces and validates dismissal as a proportionate penalty for corruption and abuse of authority. **Keywords:** Service Law; Disciplinary Proceedings; Judicial Review; Corruption; CISF Rules; Proportionality ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgment Cause Title*Pravin Kumar v. Union of India & Ors.*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 6270 of 2012iii) Judgment Date10 September 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumN. V. Ramana J., S. Abdul Nazeer J., Surya Kant J.vi) AuthorJustice Surya Kantvii) Citation*\[2020\] 7 SCR 1078*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Articles 14, 32, 136, 226 of the Constitution of India*; *Rule 34, Rule 29(a) r/w Rule 31(a) Schedule II, CISF Rules, 1969*; *Section 165, Evidence Act, 1872*; *IPC, 1860*; *Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsService Law; Constitutional Law; Administrative Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The case arose from disciplinary action taken against a Sub-Inspector of the Central Industrial Security Force who was entrusted with sensitive duties relating to detection of corruption within a public sector refinery installation. The appellant’s role in the Crime and Intelligence Wing of CISF at the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited unit placed him in a position of trust, responsibility, and authority. The incident dated *28 February 1999* exposed a pattern of misconduct involving illegal collection of money from contractors, falsification of official records, and intimidation of subordinates. Simultaneous initiation of departmental enquiry and criminal investigation reflects a typical administrative response to allegations of corruption in disciplined forces. The departmental proceedings were initiated under *Rule 34 of the CISF Rules, 1969*, leading to a detailed enquiry and eventual dismissal. The appellant unsuccessfully challenged the disciplinary order before the departmental appellate authority and later before the Bombay High Court under *Article 226*. The Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether constitutional courts could reassess evidence, question factual conclusions, or interfere with punishment in service matters involving armed forces personnel. The judgment situates itself within a long line of precedents that stress restraint in judicial review, particularly where multiple fact-finding authorities have concurrently returned findings of guilt. The case also revisits the doctrine of proportionality and the independence of disciplinary proceedings from criminal trials. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellant joined CISF in *January 1995* and was posted at the BPCL refinery unit in Mumbai in *March 1996*. By *July 1997*, he was deployed in the Crime and Intelligence Wing and was specifically tasked with conducting surprise searches and curbing corruption. On *28 February 1999*, a subordinate constable was found carrying *₹10,780*, far exceeding permissible limits. The recovery was made during a surprise inspection, recorded in the General Diary at the North Gate. Subsequently, a contradictory General Diary entry surfaced at the Main Gate showing a fictitious loan transaction, allegedly made at the appellant’s instance. Evidence revealed multiple phone calls made by the appellant to the duty officer to fabricate this entry. Further investigation disclosed coercion of another constable to falsely corroborate the loan theory. Witness testimonies established that bribes were collected systematically from BPCL contractors at fixed rates for vehicles entering and exiting the refinery. The money recovered was intended to be delivered to the appellant. Though one witness later attempted retraction, the enquiry officer found overwhelming corroborative evidence. The departmental enquiry concluded that the appellant orchestrated corruption, falsified records, and abused his authority. The disciplinary authority imposed dismissal under *Rule 29(a) r/w Rule 31(a)*. The appellate authority affirmed the decision, and the High Court upheld it after detailed scrutiny. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether constitutional courts can re-appreciate evidence in disciplinary proceedings under *Articles 226 and 136*? ii. Whether questioning by an enquiry officer violates the principle of *nemo judex in sua causa*? iii. Whether absence of a criminal charge-sheet nullifies departmental punishment? iv. Whether dismissal from service was disproportionate to the charges proved? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the enquiry was vitiated by bias, alleging that the enquiry officer acted as both prosecutor and judge by cross-examining witnesses. It was argued that key witnesses had retracted statements and that evidence was insufficient. Reliance was placed on the absence of a criminal charge-sheet by the CBI to contend that departmental punishment could not survive. The appellant also urged leniency, citing long remaining service tenure. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent submitted that disciplinary proceedings are independent of criminal investigations. They highlighted concurrent findings by the enquiry officer, disciplinary authority, appellate authority, and High Court. It was contended that no procedural irregularity or violation of natural justice occurred and that corruption in a paramilitary force warranted strict punishment. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that judicial review does not permit reassessment of evidence or substitution of conclusions reached by competent authorities. The Court upheld the enquiry process as fair, unbiased, and compliant with natural justice. It ruled that *Section 165 of the Evidence Act* empowers enquiry officers to question witnesses to elicit truth. The Court reaffirmed that disciplinary proceedings operate on preponderance of probabilities and remain unaffected by the outcome of criminal investigations. The punishment of dismissal was held proportionate, considering the gravity of corruption and the appellant’s position of trust. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio establishes that constitutional courts cannot act as appellate bodies in service matters and that dismissal for corruption in paramilitary forces satisfies proportionality standards. Departmental proceedings are independent of criminal trials. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that integrity expectations are heightened in armed forces and corruption erodes institutional credibility. Leniency in such cases undermines discipline. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Judicial review is confined to procedural legality and perversity. ii. Enquiry officers may question witnesses to ascertain truth. iii. Criminal acquittal or non-prosecution does not bar disciplinary action. iv. Corruption in disciplined forces warrants deterrent punishment. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment consolidates service law principles governing judicial restraint, proportionality, and disciplinary autonomy. It reinforces institutional integrity within armed forces and clarifies procedural fairness benchmarks in domestic enquiries. The ruling serves as a precedent against dilution of accountability standards in public service. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *BC Chaturvedi v. Union of India* *\[1995\] 4 Suppl SCR 644* 2. *Union of India v. T.R. Varma* *\[1958\] SCR 499* 3. *Shashi Prasad v. CISF* *(2019) 7 SCC 797* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Constitution of India* 2. *CISF Rules, 1969* 3. *Evidence Act, 1872* 4. *Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [National Co-operative Development Corporation v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi-V, [2020] 13 SCR 517](https://lawfoyer.in/national-co-operative-development-corporation-v-commissioner-of-income-tax-delhi-v-2020-13-scr-517/) **Published:** January 19, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the deductibility of non-refundable grants disbursed by a statutory corporation from interest income earned on temporarily parked government funds, within the framework of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the National Cooperative Development Corporation Act, 1962. The controversy arose from the Revenue’s disallowance of deduction claimed by the National Co-operative Development Corporation for grants released to cooperative societies, contending that such outgo constituted capital expenditure or mere application of income. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the deductibility of non-refundable grants disbursed by a statutory corporation from interest income earned on temporarily parked government funds, within the framework of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the National Cooperative Development Corporation Act, 1962. The controversy arose from the Revenue’s disallowance of deduction claimed by the National Co-operative Development Corporation for grants released to cooperative societies, contending that such outgo constituted capital expenditure or mere application of income. The Court analysed the statutory role of the Corporation as a pass-through but distinct juridical entity, whose sole business activity is to receive funds from the Central Government and deploy them through loans and grants to cooperative institutions. The judgment clarifies the nature of interest income earned on idle funds as business income under Section 28 and not income from other sources under Section 56. It further holds that once income is characterised as business income, all expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business must be examined under Section 37(1), irrespective of the source of funds. The Court rejected the Revenue’s argument that grants lose their revenue character when merged into a common statutory fund and distinguished between application of income and allowable business expenditure. The decision reinforces the doctrine of real income and limits the application of diversion by overriding title. It also contextualises the later insertion of Section 36(1)(xii) as clarificatory rather than restrictive. **Keywords:** Business expenditure, Interest income, Statutory corporation, Section 37(1), Real income, Grants vs loans ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*National Co-operative Development Corporation v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi-V*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal Nos. 5105–5107 of 2009iii) Judgement Date*11 September 2020*iv) Court*Supreme Court of India*v) Quorum*Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J. and Indu Malhotra, J.*vi) Author*Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.*vii) Citation*\[2020\] 13 SCR 517*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 28, 37(1), 56, 57, 14 of the Income Tax Act, 1961; Sections 9, 12, 13 of the National Cooperative Development Corporation Act, 1962*ix) Judgments Overruled*None*x) Related Law Subjects*Taxation Law, Corporate and Statutory Bodies Law* ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The dispute traces its origin to the assessment year 1976–77, when the appellant Corporation, established under the National Cooperative Development Corporation Act, 1962, altered its accounting treatment by claiming deduction of grants disbursed from interest income earned on surplus funds. The Corporation functions as a statutory instrumentality to plan, promote and finance cooperative societies through loans and grants, using funds received from the Central Government. Such receipts were consistently treated as capital receipts and not subjected to tax, while interest earned on temporary investments of idle funds was assessed as business income. The controversy arose when the Assessing Officer disallowed the deduction of non-refundable grants, characterising them as capital expenditure and a mere application of income. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) reversed this finding by recognising grants as an integral component of the Corporation’s authorised business. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and subsequently the Delhi High Court reinstated the Revenue’s position, primarily relying on the statutory fund mechanism under Section 13 of the NCDC Act. The matter thus escalated to the Supreme Court after prolonged inter-governmental litigation spanning over four decades, raising significant questions on the interpretation of business income, revenue expenditure, and the doctrine of real income under Indian tax jurisprudence. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellant Corporation receives grants and loans from the Central Government under Section 12 of the NCDC Act and maintains a statutory fund under Section 13. Surplus funds, pending deployment, are invested in fixed deposits, generating interest income. This interest, along with recoveries from loans, is credited to the same fund. While the principal grants from the Government are treated as capital receipts, the interest earned is assessed as taxable business income. During the relevant assessment years, the Corporation disbursed substantial sums as non-refundable grants to State Governments and cooperative societies, strictly in furtherance of its statutory mandate. The Assessing Officer denied deduction of such grants, asserting that since the source funds were capital in nature and pooled in a common fund, the disbursement could not qualify as revenue expenditure. The CIT(A) allowed partial deduction after excluding refunded grants, recognising a direct nexus between taxable interest income and grants disbursed. The ITAT and the High Court reversed this view, emphasising the inability to distinctly trace interest income once merged in the statutory fund and treating the disbursement as application of income. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine the correct tax treatment of such grants. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether interest income earned by a statutory corporation on surplus funds constitutes business income under Section 28 of the Income Tax Act, 1961? ii. Whether non-refundable grants disbursed from such interest income qualify as revenue expenditure deductible under Section 37(1)? iii. Whether disbursement of grants amounts to application of income or expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business? iv. Whether the doctrine of diversion by overriding title applies to statutory grants disbursed by the Corporation? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that grant disbursement is the core business activity of the Corporation under Sections 9 and 13 of the NCDC Act. It was argued that once interest income is assessed as business income, any expenditure incurred in furtherance of statutory objectives must be deductible under Section 37(1). The appellant emphasised the irretrievable nature of grants, distinguishing them from loans. Reliance was placed on Associated Cement Companies Ltd. and Empire Jute Co. Ltd. to contend that a payment may be capital in the hands of the recipient but revenue for the payer. It was further argued that the merger of interest income into a common fund does not alter its revenue character and that audited accounts sufficiently establish a direct nexus between taxable income and grants disbursed. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent contended that once interest income merges into the statutory fund, it loses its independent revenue identity and assumes the character of capital receipt. The grants were argued to be a mere application of income and not expenditure, relying on Sitaldas Tirathdas. It was further asserted that the inability to distinctly trace the source of grants from interest income negated the claim for deduction and that, in any event, the outgo was capital in nature. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. Section 28, Income Tax Act, 1961 ii. Section 37(1), Income Tax Act, 1961 iii. Sections 9, 12, 13, National Cooperative Development Corporation Act, 1962 iv. Section 56, Income Tax Act, 1961 ## I) JUDGEMENT The Court held that the interest income earned on idle funds is intrinsically linked to the Corporation’s sole business activity and thus taxable as business income. It rejected the Revenue’s attempt to invoke Section 56 as a residuary provision. The Court affirmed that the source of expenditure is irrelevant under Section 37(1), once the expenditure is incurred for the purpose of business. The disbursement of grants was recognised as an integral business function and not a post-profit application of income. The Court distinguished diversion by overriding title, holding that no grantee had a superior claim over the funds prior to disbursement. Emphasis was placed on the principle that income tax is a tax on real income, requiring deduction of all legitimate business expenses. The Court concurred with the CIT(A) and allowed the appeals. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio establishes that where a statutory corporation’s only business is to deploy funds through grants and loans, interest income arising from temporary investment of such funds constitutes business income, and non-refundable grants disbursed in furtherance of statutory objectives are revenue expenditure deductible under Section 37(1), irrespective of the source or pooling of funds. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court expressed concern over prolonged inter-governmental litigation and highlighted the need for effective dispute resolution mechanisms within government entities to prevent wastage of public resources. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Statutory corporations must assess income based on real income principles. ii. Deductibility under Section 37(1) depends on purpose of expenditure, not source. iii. Pooling of funds does not alter the character of income. iv. Grants forming part of statutory business cannot be treated as mere application of income. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces doctrinal clarity on business expenditure for statutory bodies and aligns tax treatment with commercial realities. It harmonises statutory mandates with income tax principles and curtails artificial distinctions between capital and revenue in developmental finance. The reasoning strengthens certainty for public sector entities engaged in socio-economic functions while reaffirming the supremacy of Section 37(1) as a general deduction provision prior to the insertion of Section 36(1)(xii). ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. The Sole Trustee, Lok Shikshana Trust v. CIT, \[1976\] 1 SCR 461 ii. Poona Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. CIT, \[1965\] 3 SCR 818 iii. CIT v. S.C. Kothari, \[1972\] 1 SCR 950 **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. Income Tax Act, 1961 ii. National Cooperative Development Corporation Act, 1962 **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [,Jeet Ram v. The Narcotics Control Bureau, Chandigarh, [2020] 7 SCR 558](https://lawfoyer.in/jeet-ram-v-the-narcotics-control-bureau-chandigarh-2020-7-scr-558/) **Published:** January 19, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The Supreme Court in Jeet Ram v. Narcotics Control Bureau, Chandigarh examined the legality of the High Court’s interference with an order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Court under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The trial court had acquitted the accused on grounds of alleged non-compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act, absence of independent witnesses, doubts regarding conscious possession, and apprehension of sample tampering. The High Court reversed the acquittal, convicted the accused, and imposed a sentence of fifteen years’ rigorous imprisonment. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The Supreme Court in *Jeet Ram v. Narcotics Control Bureau, Chandigarh* examined the legality of the High Court’s interference with an order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Court under *Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985*. The trial court had acquitted the accused on grounds of alleged non-compliance with *Section 50 of the NDPS Act*, absence of independent witnesses, doubts regarding conscious possession, and apprehension of sample tampering. The High Court reversed the acquittal, convicted the accused, and imposed a sentence of fifteen years’ rigorous imprisonment. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction while modifying the sentence to ten years. The Court reaffirmed that *Section 50 of the NDPS Act applies only to personal search and not to search of premises or articles*. It reiterated that appellate courts possess full power to reappreciate evidence in appeals against acquittal when the trial court’s findings are perverse or contrary to evidence. The Court adopted a *functional and purposive interpretation of “possession”*, holding that conscious possession may be inferred from physical control and knowledge. The judgment clarifies the scope of *presumption under Section 54 of the NDPS Act*, holding that once possession is established, the burden shifts to the accused to explain the same. The Court further observed that false answers under *Section 313 CrPC* can be used against the accused. While emphasizing the seriousness of narcotic offences, the Court exercised sentencing discretion considering the age of the accused and the passage of time. **Keywords:** NDPS Act, Conscious Possession, Section 50 NDPS Act, Appeal Against Acquittal, Section 54 Presumption, Narcotics Law ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgment Cause Title*Jeet Ram v. The Narcotics Control Bureau, Chandigarh*Case NumberCriminal Appeal No. 688 of 2013Judgment Date15 September 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumAshok Bhushan J., R. Subhash Reddy J., M.R. Shah J.AuthorR. Subhash Reddy, J.Citation*\[2020\] 7 SCR 558*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 20, 50, 54 NDPS Act, 1985; Section 313 CrPC, 1973*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsCriminal Law, Narcotics Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The judgment arose from an appeal filed by the sole accused challenging his conviction by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, which had reversed his acquittal by the Sessions Court. The case concerned the recovery of *13 kilograms of charas* from a dhaba allegedly operated by the accused near a temple in Himachal Pradesh. The trial court acquitted the accused in 2003, primarily citing procedural lapses and evidentiary doubts. The Narcotics Control Bureau invoked *Section 36-B of the NDPS Act read with Section 378 CrPC* to appeal against acquittal. The High Court reappreciated the entire evidence and convicted the accused in 2012. The appeal before the Supreme Court questioned the extent of appellate powers, the interpretation of *Section 50 NDPS Act*, and the concept of conscious possession. The background reflects the recurring judicial tension between procedural safeguards under the NDPS Act and the societal need to curb narcotic offences. The judgment situates itself within established jurisprudence that balances strict statutory compliance with pragmatic appreciation of evidence. The Court was also called upon to evaluate sentencing proportionality in light of delay, age, and mitigating circumstances. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE On *18 June 2001*, officers of the *Narcotics Control Bureau, Chandigarh* stopped at a dhaba near *Nangala Devi Temple* while travelling from Shimla to Theog. PW-4, an Intelligence Officer, detected the smell of charas emanating from the premises. PW-1, the Zonal Director, soon joined the team. Upon questioning, the accused appeared nervous and attempted to flee. A gunny bag was found beneath the counter of the dhaba. After issuing notice under *Section 50 of the NDPS Act*, the bag was searched and *13 kg of charas* was recovered. The contraband was properly weighed, sampled, sealed, and documented. The accused signed the seizure memo and samples. Chemical analysis confirmed the substance to be charas. The accused made a statement under *Section 67 NDPS Act* admitting involvement in the trade. He was arrested on *19 June 2001*. During trial, the defence claimed that the accused was merely a temple priest and not the owner of the dhaba. The Sessions Court acquitted the accused, citing lack of independent witnesses, alleged non-compliance with *Section 50*, doubts regarding possession, and possibility of tampering. The High Court reversed these findings, leading to the present appeal. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the High Court was justified in reversing an order of acquittal by reappreciating evidence? ii. Whether *Section 50 of the NDPS Act* was applicable to the search conducted? iii. Whether the accused was in conscious possession of the seized charas? iv. Whether absence of independent witnesses vitiated the prosecution case? v. Whether presumption under *Section 54 NDPS Act* was correctly applied? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the trial court’s acquittal was based on a plausible view of evidence. It was argued that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by substituting its view merely because another interpretation was possible. Reliance was placed on *Union of India v. Bal Mukund*, *Francis Stanly v. NCB*, and *Rangaiah v. State of Karnataka*. It was contended that the absence of independent witnesses rendered the prosecution case doubtful, especially when villages were nearby. The seizure from a gunny bag under the counter did not establish exclusive or conscious possession. Non-compliance with *Section 50 NDPS Act* was emphasized. The defence further argued that sentence of fifteen years was excessive considering age and occupation of the appellant. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent submitted that the trial court’s findings were perverse and contrary to evidence. It was argued that appellate courts have unrestricted powers to reassess evidence in appeals against acquittal. Reliance was placed on *Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan*, *Damodarprasad Chandrikaprasad v. State of Maharashtra*, and *Vinod Kumar v. State of Haryana*. It was argued that *Section 50 NDPS Act* was inapplicable as there was no personal search. Conscious possession was established through physical control and conduct of the accused. Absence of independent witnesses was justified due to the time and location of the incident. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court held that the trial court’s acquittal was based on erroneous appreciation of evidence. The Court reiterated that *Section 50 NDPS Act* applies only to personal search, relying on *State of H.P. v. Pawan Kumar*. The recovery from a gunny bag beneath the counter did not attract Section 50. The Court accepted the High Court’s finding that the accused had both physical control and knowledge of the contraband. The testimonies of PW-1 to PW-4 were found consistent and credible. The apprehension of tampering was rejected as the samples bore judicial signatures and no suggestion of tampering was put to prosecution witnesses. The Court reaffirmed that appellate courts can reverse acquittal where the trial court’s view is not reasonably possible. However, considering the age of the accused and the lapse of time since the incident, the sentence was reduced from *15 years to 10 years*, while maintaining conviction and fine. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The core ratio of the judgment is that *Section 50 NDPS Act is confined strictly to personal search*. Searches of premises, containers, or articles do not attract its mandatory safeguards. The Court also held that conscious possession under the NDPS Act must be interpreted functionally, considering dominion, control, and knowledge. Once possession is established, *Section 54 NDPS Act* raises a statutory presumption against the accused, shifting the burden to explain lawful possession. The Court further held that false explanations under *Section 313 CrPC* can reinforce prosecution evidence. The judgment reinforces the principle that appellate courts possess full authority to reassess evidence in appeals against acquittal where the trial court’s findings are perverse or unsupported. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that narcotic offences have serious societal ramifications and courts must not adopt a hyper-technical approach that defeats legislative intent. It was noted that independent witnesses are not indispensable where official testimony is reliable. The Court also emphasized sentencing discretion, observing that proportionality must consider human factors such as age and delay. **c) GUIDELINES** i. *Section 50 NDPS Act* applies only to personal search. ii. Conscious possession may be inferred from control and knowledge. iii. Presumption under *Section 54 NDPS Act* applies once possession is proved. iv. Appellate courts may reverse acquittal where findings are perverse. v. Sentencing must balance deterrence with proportionality. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment significantly clarifies procedural and substantive aspects of NDPS jurisprudence. It strengthens prosecutorial reliance on official witnesses while maintaining procedural fairness. The Court’s purposive interpretation of possession and reaffirmation of appellate powers contribute to doctrinal clarity. The sentencing modification reflects judicial sensitivity without diluting statutory objectives. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan*, *\[1961\] 3 SCR 120* 2. *Damodarprasad Chandrikaprasad v. State of Maharashtra*, *\[1972\] 2 SCR 622* 3. *Vinod Kumar v. State of Haryana*, *\[2015\] 1 SCR 328* 4. *Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan*, *\[2015\] 5 SCR 435* 5. *State of H.P. v. Pawan Kumar*, *\[2005\] 3 SCR 417* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985* 2. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Abhilasha v. Parkash & Ors., [2020] 11 S.C.R. 244](https://lawfoyer.in/abhilasha-v-parkash-ors-2020-11-s-c-r-244/) **Published:** January 18, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in Abhilasha v. Parkash & Ors. authoritatively settles the legal position concerning the entitlement of an unmarried Hindu daughter to claim maintenance from her father after attaining majority. The Supreme Court undertook a detailed examination of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, and clarified the distinct scope, nature, and jurisdictional limits of these two provisions. The Court held that Section 125 Cr.P.C. provides a summary and immediate remedy confined to minor children, with an exception only in cases where a major child suffers from physical or mental abnormality or injury rendering her unable to maintain herself. In contrast, Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 recognises a broader and substantive personal law right of an unmarried Hindu daughter to seek maintenance till marriage, subject to proof of inability to maintain herself. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment in *Abhilasha v. Parkash & Ors.* authoritatively settles the legal position concerning the entitlement of an unmarried Hindu daughter to claim maintenance from her father after attaining majority. The Supreme Court undertook a detailed examination of *Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* and *Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956*, and clarified the distinct scope, nature, and jurisdictional limits of these two provisions. The Court held that *Section 125 Cr.P.C.* provides a summary and immediate remedy confined to minor children, with an exception only in cases where a major child suffers from physical or mental abnormality or injury rendering her unable to maintain herself. In contrast, *Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956* recognises a broader and substantive personal law right of an unmarried Hindu daughter to seek maintenance till marriage, subject to proof of inability to maintain herself. The Court decisively ruled that such a substantive right under *Section 20* cannot be enforced through proceedings under *Section 125 Cr.P.C.*, except where jurisdiction is exercised by a Family Court competent to adjudicate under both statutes. The Magistrate, exercising jurisdiction under *Section 125 Cr.P.C.*, cannot grant maintenance to a major unmarried daughter merely on the basis of personal law obligations. The decision harmonises earlier precedents including *Jagdish Jugtawat v. Manju Lata* and *Nanak Chand v. Chandra Kishore Aggarwal*, and resolves prevailing ambiguities regarding overlapping remedies. The judgment preserves the legislative intent behind summary criminal remedies while safeguarding substantive personal law rights through appropriate civil proceedings. **Keywords:** Maintenance, Unmarried Daughter, Section 125 Cr.P.C., Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, Family Court Jurisdiction ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetails*Judgement Cause Title**Abhilasha v. Parkash & Ors.**Case Number*Criminal Appeal No. 615 of 2020*Judgement Date*15 September 2020*Court*Supreme Court of India*Quorum*Ashok Bhushan J., R. Subhash Reddy J., M.R. Shah J.*Author*Ashok Bhushan J.*Citation**\[2020\] 11 S.C.R. 244**Legal Provisions Involved**Section 125 Cr.P.C., Section 20 & Section 3(b) Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956**Judgments Overruled*None*Related Law Subjects*Criminal Law, Family Law, Personal Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The case arose from a long-standing legal conflict concerning the limits of maintenance jurisdiction under *Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*, particularly when juxtaposed with personal law obligations under the *Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956*. The appellant, an unmarried Hindu daughter, sought continuation of maintenance from her father after attaining majority, despite absence of any physical or mental disability. The judicial journey commenced with an application filed by the appellant’s mother under *Section 125 Cr.P.C.* claiming maintenance for herself and her children. While the Magistrate granted maintenance to the appellant only until she attained majority, subsequent revisional and inherent jurisdiction challenges failed. The appellant contended before the Supreme Court that personal law obligations under *Section 20(3)* entitled her to maintenance until marriage. The background reflects a recurring conflict in Indian family jurisprudence where summary criminal remedies intersect with substantive civil rights. Earlier decisions such as *Jagdish Jugtawat* had seemingly blurred these boundaries, prompting inconsistent interpretations by subordinate courts. The present judgment thus became necessary to delineate the precise contours of each statutory remedy, clarify jurisdictional competence, and prevent misuse of summary criminal proceedings for enforcing expansive civil claims. The Court also examined historical evolution from *Section 488 Cr.P.C., 1898* to *Section 125 Cr.P.C., 1973*, reaffirming the welfare-oriented but limited nature of criminal maintenance provisions. The background underscores the judiciary’s role in balancing social justice objectives with legislative intent and procedural discipline. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellant was born on *26 April 1987*. In *October 2002*, while she was still a minor, her mother filed an application under *Section 125 Cr.P.C.* on behalf of herself and her children, including the appellant, seeking maintenance from the respondent-father. The Judicial Magistrate First Class, Rewari, by order dated *16 February 2011*, rejected the claims of the mother and other siblings but allowed maintenance to the appellant only until she attained majority. Aggrieved, a criminal revision was filed before the Additional Sessions Judge, Rewari. By order dated *17 February 2014*, the revisional court affirmed the Magistrate’s findings and clarified that the appellant’s entitlement ceased on *26 April 2005*, when she attained majority, noting that she suffered from no *physical or mental abnormality* as required under *Section 125(1)(c) Cr.P.C.* The appellant then invoked *Section 482 Cr.P.C.* before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which dismissed the petition, holding that no illegality or perversity existed in the lower court orders. The High Court reiterated that maintenance beyond majority under *Section 125 Cr.P.C.* is permissible only in cases of disability. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant argued that *Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956* conferred an independent right on an unmarried daughter to claim maintenance until marriage. The respondent countered that such a right could not be enforced in proceedings under *Section 125 Cr.P.C.* Additional factual aspects included the appellant’s admission regarding ownership and sale of immovable property, and prior withdrawal of a civil suit under *Section 20 of the Act, 1956*, which materially influenced the Court’s assessment of entitlement and procedural propriety. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. *Whether an unmarried Hindu daughter who has attained majority can claim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. in the absence of physical or mental abnormality?* ii. *Whether personal law rights under Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 can be enforced through proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C.?* iii. *Whether a Magistrate exercising jurisdiction under Section 125 Cr.P.C. can grant maintenance to a major unmarried daughter based on personal law obligations?* ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the obligation of a Hindu father to maintain his unmarried daughter extends till her marriage as recognised under *Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956*. It was argued that the High Court erred in restricting maintenance merely due to attainment of majority. Reliance was placed on *Jagdish Jugtawat v. Manju Lata*, asserting that courts may harmoniously apply *Section 125 Cr.P.C.* with personal law to prevent multiplicity of proceedings. It was further contended that unemployment constituted inability to maintain oneself within the meaning of *Section 20*. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent submitted that *Section 125 Cr.P.C.* clearly limits maintenance to minor children, except in cases of disability. The appellant admittedly suffered from no physical or mental abnormality. It was contended that personal law rights under *Section 20* must be enforced through appropriate civil proceedings and not through criminal summary jurisdiction. The respondent emphasised legislative intent and jurisdictional discipline. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 125, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* ii. *Section 20 and Section 3(b), Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956* iii. *Section 488, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898* iv. *Family Courts Act, 1984* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal while clarifying the legal position. The Court held that *Section 125 Cr.P.C.* provides a limited, summary remedy intended to prevent destitution and starvation. Maintenance to a major unmarried daughter under this provision is permissible only when disability is established. The Court recognised that *Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956* grants a substantive and absolute personal law right to an unmarried daughter to seek maintenance till marriage, subject to proof of inability to maintain herself. However, enforcement of this right lies exclusively through proceedings under *Section 20* before a competent civil or family court. The Court distinguished *Jagdish Jugtawat*, clarifying that it does not lay down a ratio permitting Magistrates under *Section 125 Cr.P.C.* to enforce *Section 20* rights. It further held that only a Family Court, where vested with dual jurisdiction, may consolidate such claims to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. **a. RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio decidendi is that *Section 125 Cr.P.C.* cannot be expanded to enforce substantive personal law rights under *Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956*. Maintenance to a major unmarried daughter without disability must be claimed through civil proceedings under *Section 20*, and Magistrates lack jurisdiction to grant such relief under *Section 125 Cr.P.C.* **b. OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that Hindu and Muslim personal laws historically recognise parental obligation to maintain unmarried daughters. It also noted that Family Courts can, in appropriate cases, adjudicate claims under both statutes to prevent procedural fragmentation. **c. GUIDELINES** i. Maintenance under *Section 125 Cr.P.C.* is confined to statutory limits. ii. Personal law rights under *Section 20* must be enforced independently. iii. Family Courts may exercise composite jurisdiction where statutorily empowered. ## J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces statutory discipline and doctrinal clarity. It preserves the welfare intent of *Section 125 Cr.P.C.* while preventing its misuse as a substitute for civil adjudication. By demarcating jurisdictions, the Court ensures procedural efficiency and doctrinal coherence in family law litigation. The decision provides authoritative guidance for courts, practitioners, and litigants dealing with maintenance claims of major unmarried daughters under Hindu law. ## K) REFERENCES **a. Important Cases Referred** - Nanak Chand v. Chandra Kishore Aggarwal, \[1970\] 1 SCR 565 - Jagdish Jugtawat v. Manju Lata, (2002) 5 SCC 422 - Noor Saba Khatoon v. Mohd. Quasim, (1997) 6 SCC 182 - Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav, (1988) 1 SCC 530 **b. Important Statutes Referred** - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 - Family Courts Act, 1984 **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Jugut Ram v. State of Chhattisgarh, [2020] 6 SCR 1140](https://lawfoyer.in/jugut-ram-v-state-of-chhattisgarh-2020-6-scr-1140/) **Published:** January 18, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in Jugut Ram v. State of Chhattisgarh examines the fine doctrinal distinction between murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder in the context of a village altercation arising out of a land dispute. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether an assault with a lathi on the head, resulting in death on the following day, disclosed the intention necessary for conviction under Section 302 IPC or merely knowledge sufficient to attract Section 304 Part II IPC. The Courts below had convicted the appellant for murder, despite concurrent findings that the incident was not premeditated and occurred in the heat of passion. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment in *Jugut Ram v. State of Chhattisgarh* examines the fine doctrinal distinction between *murder* and *culpable homicide not amounting to murder* in the context of a village altercation arising out of a land dispute. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether an assault with a *lathi* on the head, resulting in death on the following day, disclosed the *intention* necessary for conviction under *Section 302 IPC* or merely *knowledge* sufficient to attract *Section 304 Part II IPC*. The Courts below had convicted the appellant for murder, despite concurrent findings that the incident was not premeditated and occurred in the heat of passion. The Court undertook a contextual evaluation of the weapon used, the manner of assault, the number of injuries, and the surrounding circumstances. Emphasising that a *lathi* is a common implement carried by villagers and not a deadly weapon *per se*, the Court reaffirmed that intention cannot be mechanically inferred from the situs of injury alone. Reliance was placed on earlier precedents where single or limited blows with a non-deadly weapon, inflicted without premeditation, were held to disclose only knowledge of likely death. By harmonising factual findings with settled principles under *Sections 299, 300, and 304 IPC*, the Court altered the conviction from *Section 302* to *Section 304 Part II*. Since the appellant had already undergone the maximum prescribed sentence, he was directed to be released forthwith. The decision reinforces proportionality in criminal culpability and underscores the necessity of cautious judicial inference in homicide cases involving rustic weapons and sudden quarrels. **Keywords:** Culpable homicide; Murder; Section 304 Part II IPC; Lathi assault; Intention and knowledge; Sudden quarrel ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Jugut Ram v. State of Chhattisgarh*Case NumberCriminal Appeal No. 616 of 2020Judgement Date16 September 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumR. F. Nariman, Navin Sinha & Indira Banerjee, JJ.AuthorJustice Navin SinhaCitation*\[2020\] 6 SCR 1140*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 299, 300, 302, 304 Part II, Indian Penal Code, 1860*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsCriminal Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The present judgment arises from a rural land dispute culminating in a fatal altercation, a recurring factual matrix in Indian criminal jurisprudence. The appellant was convicted by the Trial Court and the High Court for *murder under Section 302 IPC*, notwithstanding findings that the assault was neither premeditated nor repeated. The Supreme Court was thus confronted with the persistent doctrinal challenge of calibrating criminal liability where death ensues from a single blow inflicted in a sudden quarrel. The jurisprudential backdrop of the case lies in the interpretative boundaries of *Section 300 IPC*, particularly clauses relating to intention and knowledge. Indian courts have consistently cautioned against elevating every homicidal death to murder, especially where the factual substratum reflects spontaneity rather than deliberation. The appeal necessitated revisiting settled principles laid down in *Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab* and subsequent decisions which require strict proof of intention to inflict a particular injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The background further reflects the social realities of agrarian India, where implements like *lathi* are commonly carried for routine purposes. The Court was conscious that criminal adjudication cannot be divorced from social context. The High Court had already accepted that the incident occurred in the heat of passion due to a civil dispute, yet paradoxically affirmed a conviction for murder. This incongruity formed the analytical fulcrum of the Supreme Court’s intervention. The judgment thus situates itself within a line of authorities that seek to preserve doctrinal coherence between culpability and punishment, ensuring that penal consequences correspond to the degree of mens rea actually established on evidence. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The occurrence took place on *23 November 2001 at about 2:00 PM* when the deceased was engaged in harvesting crops on the disputed land. There existed a prior *civil land dispute* between the parties. The appellant arrived at the field and assaulted the deceased with a *lathi*, striking him on the head. The assault was limited in nature and not preceded by any overt planning. The injured victim was taken to the hospital, where he succumbed to his injuries on the following day at approximately *7:45 PM*. The *post-mortem report*, proved by the doctor examined as *PW-13*, revealed *two contusions on the left and right parietal regions* along with a *fracture of the left parietal bone*, opined to be *dangerous to life*. The prosecution relied primarily on *four eyewitnesses*, all of whom were related to the deceased. Two independent witnesses cited in the charge-sheet were not examined. The defence highlighted deficiencies in the proof of recovery of the *lathi* and absence of serological confirmation linking blood stains to the deceased. It was also brought on record that the appellant had suffered injuries in the same occurrence, lending credence to the defence claim of a sudden fight. The Trial Court convicted the appellant under *Section 302 IPC* and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The High Court, while affirming that the assault occurred without premeditation and in a heat of passion, nonetheless upheld the conviction solely on the ground that death had resulted from the act of the appellant. This approach formed the basis of challenge before the Supreme Court. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the assault with a *lathi* on the head disclosed *intention to cause death* so as to attract *Section 302 IPC*? ii. Whether the facts established only *knowledge of likelihood of death*, warranting conviction under *Section 304 Part II IPC*? iii. Whether absence of premeditation and occurrence in a sudden quarrel dilute the offence from murder to culpable homicide? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the prosecution evidence disclosed a *spur-of-the-moment assault* arising out of a land dispute with no prior planning. It was argued that all eyewitnesses were related witnesses and independent witnesses were withheld without explanation. It was further contended that the deceased did not die immediately and that the appellant himself sustained injuries, demonstrating mutuality of the incident. The *lathi*, being a common rural implement, could not automatically be treated as a deadly weapon. Reliance was placed on precedents where similar factual situations resulted in conversion of conviction from *Section 302* to *Section 304 Part II IPC*. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the State submitted that the appellant was the *aggressor* and that the blow was inflicted on a *vital part of the body*. It was argued that intention to cause death was evident from the nature of injury. The credibility of related witnesses was defended by relying upon earlier judgments of the Supreme Court. The State contended that the death was a direct consequence of the assault and that the conviction under *Section 302 IPC* did not warrant interference. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Court undertook a cumulative assessment of the *weapon used, manner of assault, nature of injuries, and surrounding circumstances*. It held that a *lathi* cannot be treated as a weapon of assault *simpliciter*. The Court emphasised that intention and knowledge are distinct mental states and must be inferred from the totality of circumstances rather than isolated factors. The Court relied on *Joseph v. State of Kerala*, *Chamru Budhwa v. State of Madhya Pradesh*, *Gurmukh Singh v. State of Haryana*, and *Mohd. Shakeel v. State of A.P.*, all of which involved similar factual patterns where convictions were altered to *Section 304 Part II IPC*. The High Court’s reasoning was found internally inconsistent, as it acknowledged absence of premeditation yet sustained a conviction for murder. The Court clarified that *Virsa Singh* principles could not be mechanically applied. Accordingly, the conviction was altered to *Section 304 Part II IPC*. As the appellant had been in custody since *2004*, he was directed to be released forthwith. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The decisive principle laid down is that *intention to cause death cannot be presumed merely from the location of injury when the assault is sudden, unpremeditated, and executed with a non-deadly weapon*. Where circumstances establish only *knowledge of likely death*, the offence falls under *Section 304 Part II IPC*. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that rural realities must inform judicial evaluation of weapons like *lathi*, cautioning against doctrinal rigidity divorced from social context. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Courts must evaluate intention and knowledge cumulatively. ii. Common implements cannot be presumed deadly. iii. Absence of premeditation is a critical mitigating factor. iv. Mechanical application of *Section 300 IPC* must be avoided. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces proportionality in criminal adjudication. It restores doctrinal balance between culpability and punishment and prevents over-criminalisation of spontaneous acts. The decision strengthens jurisprudence under *Section 304 Part II IPC* by reaffirming contextual mens rea analysis. It also serves as a corrective against appellate confirmation of murder convictions despite findings negating intention. The ruling aligns punishment with moral blameworthiness and advances substantive criminal justice. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab*, *\[1958\] SCR 1495* 2. *Chamru Budhwa v. State of Madhya Pradesh*, *AIR 1954 SC 652* 3. *Joseph v. State of Kerala*, *(1995) SCC (Crl.) 165* 4. *Gurmukh Singh v. State of Haryana*, *(2009) 15 SCC 635* 5. *Mohd. Shakeel v. State of A.P.*, *(2007) 3 SCC 119* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Indian Penal Code, 1860* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Balasore Alloys Limited v. Medima LLC, [2020] 6 S.C.R. 1036](https://lawfoyer.in/balasore-alloys-limited-v-medima-llc-2020-6-s-c-r-1036/) **Published:** January 18, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment addresses the legal complexity arising from the coexistence of multiple arbitration clauses contained in distinct contractual instruments governing a single commercial transaction. The dispute originated between Balasore Alloys Limited, a manufacturer of High Carbon Ferro Chrome, and Medima LLC, its overseas distributor, following disagreements concerning pricing mechanisms, deductions, and payment reconciliation under a series of purchase orders and a subsequent long-term agreement. The petitioner sought appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by relying on arbitration clauses embedded in 37 individual purchase orders. The respondent resisted this attempt by asserting that the overarching contractual relationship was governed by an “Umbrella Agreement” dated 31.03.2018, which contained a distinct arbitration clause referring disputes to ICC arbitration seated in London. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment addresses the legal complexity arising from the coexistence of multiple arbitration clauses contained in distinct contractual instruments governing a single commercial transaction. The dispute originated between *Balasore Alloys Limited*, a manufacturer of High Carbon Ferro Chrome, and *Medima LLC*, its overseas distributor, following disagreements concerning pricing mechanisms, deductions, and payment reconciliation under a series of purchase orders and a subsequent long-term agreement. The petitioner sought appointment of an arbitrator under *Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996* by relying on arbitration clauses embedded in *37 individual purchase orders*. The respondent resisted this attempt by asserting that the overarching contractual relationship was governed by an *“Umbrella Agreement” dated 31.03.2018*, which contained a distinct arbitration clause referring disputes to *ICC arbitration seated in London*. The Supreme Court undertook a careful reconciliation of the competing arbitration clauses. It examined the nature of disputes, the chronology of contractual instruments, and the parties’ conduct in invoking arbitration. The Court held that where disputes substantially arise from pricing, payment, and accounting mechanisms, such disputes fall squarely within the scope of the comprehensive umbrella agreement. Consequently, the arbitration clause contained therein prevails over arbitration clauses in individual purchase orders. The Court reinforced the principle that arbitration agreements must be interpreted harmoniously to avoid parallel proceedings and conflicting awards. The petition under *Section 11* was dismissed, and the constitution of the arbitral tribunal by the ICC was upheld. **Keywords:** Arbitration Clause Conflict, Umbrella Agreement, Section 11 Arbitration Act, ICC Arbitration, Harmonious Construction ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Balasore Alloys Limited v. Medima LLC*Case Number*Arbitration Petition (Civil) No. 15 of 2020*Judgement Date*16 September 2020*Court*Supreme Court of India*Quorum*S. A. Bobde, CJI; A. S. Bopanna, J.; V. Ramasubramanian, J.*Author*V. Ramasubramanian, J.*Citation*\[2020\] 6 S.C.R. 1036*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 11(6) and 11(12)(a), Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996*Judgments Overruled*None*Related Law Subjects*Arbitration Law, Commercial Law, International Arbitration* ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The judgment arises from an application invoking *Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996*, seeking judicial appointment of an arbitrator in the backdrop of an international commercial relationship. The dispute reflects a common issue in modern commercial transactions where multiple contractual documents govern a single economic relationship. The applicant and respondent had engaged in an ongoing supply arrangement for ferro chrome, which evolved from individual purchase orders into a long-term contractual framework. Initially, the parties executed an agreement dated *19.06.2017*, limited in scope and quantity. Subsequently, a series of *37 purchase orders* were issued, each containing an independent arbitration clause. To regulate pricing, accounting, and payment adjustments comprehensively, the parties later executed an agreement dated *31.03.2018*, referred to variably as the *“Pricing Agreement”* or *“Umbrella Agreement”*. This agreement incorporated a different arbitration clause providing for *ICC arbitration in London under UK law*. The dispute did not concern the existence of arbitrable disputes but focused on *which arbitration clause governed the disputes*. The applicant attempted to bypass the ICC-constituted tribunal by invoking arbitration clauses under the purchase orders. This led to parallel proceedings and raised concerns regarding conflicting arbitral forums. The Court was thus required to determine the dominant arbitration agreement by examining the nature of disputes, contractual hierarchy, and party intent. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The applicant is a manufacturer of *High Carbon Ferro Chrome* operating in India. The respondent is a foreign entity engaged in marketing and resale of the applicant’s products in North America. The commercial relationship commenced with an agreement dated *19.06.2017*, under which limited quantities were supplied. Thereafter, between *08.08.2017 and 30.03.2018*, the respondent issued *21 purchase orders*. Eventually, the parties entered into a comprehensive agreement dated *31.03.2018*, covering pricing methodology, provisional payments, final price determination, accounting reconciliation, and commission structures. Disputes arose when the applicant alleged excessive deductions, inflated secondary costs, and improper commission calculations by the respondent. The applicant contended that amounts lawfully due were withheld. The respondent, asserting breach of the umbrella agreement, invoked arbitration under *Clause 23* and initiated proceedings before the *International Chamber of Commerce*. An arbitral tribunal was constituted on *22.06.2020*. Subsequently, the applicant filed a *Section 11 petition* before the Supreme Court, asserting that arbitration must proceed under *Clause 7 of the purchase orders* and sought appointment of a sole arbitrator. Parallelly, the applicant also challenged the ICC tribunal before the Calcutta High Court, seeking declaratory and injunctive reliefs, which were rejected. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether an application under *Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996* is maintainable when an arbitral tribunal has already been constituted under a separate arbitration agreement? ii. Whether arbitration clauses in individual purchase orders prevail over an arbitration clause contained in a comprehensive umbrella agreement? iii. Which arbitration clause governs disputes relating to pricing, payment adjustments, and accounting reconciliation? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the petitioner submitted that each purchase order constituted an independent contract containing a valid arbitration clause. It was argued that the respondent failed to appoint its arbitrator under *Clause 7*, necessitating judicial intervention under *Section 11*. The petitioner contended that the *Pricing Agreement* could not retrospectively govern earlier purchase orders and that disputes were confined to individual contracts rather than the umbrella agreement. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent submitted that the *Agreement dated 31.03.2018* was a comprehensive and governing contract. It was argued that disputes concerning pricing and payments necessarily arose under this agreement. The respondent emphasized that arbitration had already been validly invoked under *Clause 23* and an ICC tribunal constituted, rendering the *Section 11* application untenable. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court dismissed the arbitration petition and upheld the ICC-constituted arbitral tribunal. The Court held that when multiple arbitration clauses exist, courts must harmonize them to ascertain the true intention of parties. The nature of disputes clearly related to pricing mechanisms governed by the *Agreement dated 31.03.2018*. The Court relied on *Olympus Superstructures Pvt. Ltd. v. Meena Vijay Khetan* to reinforce that the arbitration clause in the principal agreement prevails where disputes overlap. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The controlling principle laid down is that where disputes arise predominantly under a comprehensive umbrella agreement, arbitration must proceed under the arbitration clause contained therein. Parallel invocation of arbitration clauses under ancillary contracts is impermissible, especially when it may lead to conflicting awards. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that arbitration jurisprudence discourages multiplicity of proceedings and forum shopping. Judicial intervention under *Section 11* must remain minimal where arbitration has already been validly initiated. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Arbitration clauses must be read harmoniously. ii. Nature of dispute determines the governing arbitration clause. iii. Courts must avoid constitution of parallel arbitral tribunals. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment strengthens the principle of contractual hierarchy in arbitration. It underscores judicial restraint under *Section 11* and reinforces certainty in international commercial arbitration. The ruling discourages strategic invocation of fragmented arbitration clauses and promotes efficiency, coherence, and party autonomy in dispute resolution. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Olympus Superstructures Pvt. Ltd. v. Meena Vijay Khetan*, *(1999) 5 SCC 651* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Neetu Kumar Nagaich v. State of Rajasthan & Others, [2020] 6 SCR 1015](https://lawfoyer.in/neetu-kumar-nagaich-v-state-of-rajasthan-others-2020-6-scr-1015/) **Published:** January 18, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment addresses the constitutional scope of judicial intervention in criminal investigations where the process itself stands compromised. The Supreme Court was confronted with a prolonged, inconsistent, and demonstrably deficient investigation into the homicidal death of a young law student. The State Police, despite overwhelming circumstantial indicators of homicide, attempted to portray the death as accidental or suicidal for nearly three years. The belated registration of the FIR under Section 302 IPC, failure to secure the crime scene, non-examination of critical witnesses, and disregard for technological evidence such as CCTV footage, mobile location data, and digital trails collectively undermined the credibility of the investigation. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment addresses the constitutional scope of judicial intervention in criminal investigations where the process itself stands compromised. The Supreme Court was confronted with a prolonged, inconsistent, and demonstrably deficient investigation into the homicidal death of a young law student. The State Police, despite overwhelming circumstantial indicators of homicide, attempted to portray the death as accidental or suicidal for nearly three years. The belated registration of the *FIR under Section 302 IPC*, failure to secure the crime scene, non-examination of critical witnesses, and disregard for technological evidence such as *CCTV footage, mobile location data, and digital trails* collectively undermined the credibility of the investigation. The Court reaffirmed that *a fair investigation is an inseparable facet of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution*. It emphasized that the constitutional courts are not powerless once a police report under *Section 173(2) CrPC* is filed. In exceptional circumstances, particularly where the investigation appears tainted, biased, or designed to shield offenders, courts may direct *de novo investigation*, even after commencement of trial. The closure report filed pursuant to the Court’s direction was found to be a hasty exercise lacking bona fides, raising more questions than answers. The Court underscored that justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done, especially in cases affecting public confidence in the criminal justice system. Consequently, the closure report was set aside, and a fresh investigation by a new team of State police officers was ordered. **Keywords:** Fair Investigation, Article 21, De Novo Investigation, Closure Report, Judicial Review, Criminal Justice ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetails*Judgment Cause Title**Neetu Kumar Nagaich v. State of Rajasthan & Others**Case Number**Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 141 of 2020**Judgment Date**16 September 2020**Court**Supreme Court of India**Quorum**R. F. Nariman, Navin Sinha, Indira Banerjee, JJ.**Author**Navin Sinha, J.**Citation**\[2020\] 6 SCR 1015**Legal Provisions Involved**Article 21 Constitution of India; Sections 174, 173(2), 173(8) CrPC; Section 302 IPC**Judgments Overruled**None**Related Law Subjects**Constitutional Law; Criminal Law* ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The case arose from the unexplained death of a 21-year-old student of *National Law University, Jodhpur*, whose body was found on railway tracks in August 2017. The background reveals systemic inertia, investigative apathy, and reluctance on the part of the State machinery to acknowledge the homicidal nature of the incident. Initially, the death was portrayed as accidental or suicidal, allegedly due to depression, without any scientific or forensic substantiation. Despite serious injuries on the body and contradictory circumstantial evidence, no *FIR* was registered for nearly ten months. The inquest under *Section 174 CrPC* remained inconclusive. The persistent efforts of the victim’s parents ultimately led to registration of an *FIR under Section 302 IPC*, but even thereafter, the investigation stagnated. The High Court’s intervention failed to bring closure, as it passed an open-ended direction without monitoring compliance. It was only after the Supreme Court’s intervention under *Article 32* that the police hurriedly submitted a closure report. This background contextualizes the constitutional question before the Court: whether a demonstrably flawed investigation can be allowed to stand merely because a police report has been filed. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE On the evening of *13 August 2017*, the deceased left the university campus with friends to dine at a restaurant located approximately 300 meters away. The next morning, his body was discovered on railway tracks behind the restaurant. The body bore *nine ante-mortem injuries*, blood was present on clothing but absent at the site, and only one slipper was found, suggesting displacement of the body. Railway authorities confirmed that *five trains* passed during the intervening night, and no driver reported any accident. A witness who visited the spot at *6:30 a.m.* saw no body, raising doubts about the time and place of death. Despite these indicators, the police failed to seal the crime scene or collect digital evidence. The entry register of the hostel bore the deceased’s initials, indicating return to campus, which was casually explained away as an error by a friend. No CCTV footage or mobile tower data was analyzed. A nearby warehouse caretaker was not examined on the ground of being deaf, a justification the Court found absurd. After prolonged inaction, a closure report was filed only when directed by the Supreme Court. Ironically, the report acknowledged homicide but claimed inability to identify offenders, contradicting earlier State affidavits asserting accidental death. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether *a fair investigation forms an integral part of the right to life under Article 21*? ii. Whether constitutional courts can order *de novo investigation after filing of a closure report*? iii. Whether prolonged investigative delay and inconsistencies justify judicial interference? ## F) PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the Petitioner submitted that the investigation was marked by deliberate inaction and bias. They highlighted failure to secure the crime scene, examine key witnesses, collect digital evidence, and register the FIR promptly. It was argued that the closure report was a mere formality intended to shield the real perpetrators. Reliance was placed on precedents recognizing *fair investigation as a constitutional mandate*. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the Respondent submitted that a *Special Investigation Team* had examined numerous witnesses and exhausted all possible leads. It was contended that inability to trace offenders does not imply mala fides. The State argued that no case was made out for transfer or fresh investigation. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Article 21, Constitution of India* ii. *Section 302, Indian Penal Code* iii. *Sections 174, 173(2), 173(8), Code of Criminal Procedure* ## I) JUDGMENT The Court rejected the closure report, holding that it lacked bona fides and was the product of a hurried and defensive investigation. It reiterated that *fair investigation is as vital as fair trial*. Relying on *Kashmeri Devi*, *Babubhai*, *Bharati Tamang*, *Zahira Sheikh*, *Pooja Pal*, and *Dharam Pal*, the Court affirmed its power to order *de novo investigation* even after filing of a police report. The Court found that the investigation attempted to portray homicide as accident for years and reversed its stand only under judicial pressure. Such conduct, according to the Court, erodes public confidence in the rule of law. Accordingly, the closure report was set aside, and a fresh investigation by a new team of State police officers was ordered to be completed within two months. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** A *tainted or unfair investigation violates Article 21*, and constitutional courts possess inherent powers to order *de novo investigation* in exceptional cases to prevent miscarriage of justice, even after submission of a final report. **b) OBITER DICTA** Justice must inspire confidence. An investigation that appears designed to avoid truth cannot be sustained merely on procedural completion. Victim-centric justice demands judicial vigilance. **c) GUIDELINES** i. De novo investigation may be ordered where investigation lacks objectivity. ii. Filing of charge-sheet or closure report is not a bar. iii. No officer involved in the earlier investigation shall be part of the fresh team. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Kashmeri Devi v. Delhi Administration*, *\[1988\] 3 SCR 700* 2. *Babubhai v. State of Gujarat*, *\[2010\] 10 SCR 651* 3. *Bharati Tamang v. Union of India*, *\[2013\] 14 SCR 525* 4. *Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat*, *\[2004\] 3 SCR 1050* 5. *Pooja Pal v. Union of India*, *\[2016\] 11 SCR 560* 6. *Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana*, *\[2016\] 1 SCR 194* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Constitution of India* 2. *Indian Penal Code, 1860* 3. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Government of India v. Vedanta Limited (formerly Cairn India Ltd.) & Ors., [2020] 12 SCR 1](https://lawfoyer.in/government-of-india-v-vedanta-limited-formerly-cairn-india-ltd-ors-2020-12-scr-1/) **Published:** January 18, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the legal framework governing enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in India under Part II, Chapter I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Supreme Court authoritatively settles the issue of limitation applicable to enforcement of foreign awards, holding that Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 governs applications filed under Sections 47 and 49 of the 1996 Act. The Court clarifies that foreign awards are not decrees of Indian civil courts and only become deemed decrees upon recognition by the enforcing court. The decision also elaborates the conceptual distinction between supervisory jurisdiction of seat courts and secondary jurisdiction of enforcement courts. It reiterates the limited scope of judicial intervention at the enforcement stage and rejects any review on merits under the guise of public policy. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the legal framework governing enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in India under *Part II, Chapter I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996*. The Supreme Court authoritatively settles the issue of limitation applicable to enforcement of foreign awards, holding that *Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963* governs applications filed under *Sections 47 and 49* of the 1996 Act. The Court clarifies that foreign awards are not decrees of Indian civil courts and only become deemed decrees upon recognition by the enforcing court. The decision also elaborates the conceptual distinction between supervisory jurisdiction of seat courts and secondary jurisdiction of enforcement courts. It reiterates the limited scope of judicial intervention at the enforcement stage and rejects any review on merits under the guise of public policy. The Court further holds that the 2016 amendment to *Section 48* narrowing the public policy ground is substantive and prospective. It affirms that enforcement courts must independently assess enforceability under Indian public policy, notwithstanding affirmation of the award by seat courts. Applying these principles, the Court dismisses the Government of India’s objections and upholds enforcement of the foreign award rendered in Kuala Lumpur. This judgment significantly strengthens India’s pro-enforcement arbitration regime and aligns domestic jurisprudence with the *New York Convention, 1958*, ensuring certainty, predictability, and minimal judicial interference in international commercial arbitration. **Keywords:** Foreign Award, Limitation, Public Policy, Enforcement, New York Convention, Lex Fori ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*Government of India v. Vedanta Limited (formerly Cairn India Ltd.) & Ors.*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 3185 of 2020iii) Judgement Date16 September 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) Quorum*S. Abdul Nazeer, Indu Malhotra, Aniruddha Bose, JJ.*vi) Author*Indu Malhotra, J.*vii) Citation*\[2020\] 12 SCR 1*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 44, 46, 47, 48, 49, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Articles 136, 137, Limitation Act, 1963*ix) Judgments OverruledNilx) Related Law SubjectsArbitration Law, Public International Law, Commercial Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The dispute arises from a Production Sharing Contract executed between the Government of India and private entities for development of offshore petroleum resources in the Ravva Oil and Gas Fields. The contractual framework contemplated cost recovery mechanisms and dispute resolution through arbitration seated in Kuala Lumpur. Upon culmination of arbitral proceedings, a foreign award was rendered in 2011 in favour of the contractors. Subsequently, the Government of India initiated proceedings before Malaysian courts challenging the award on public policy grounds. These challenges were rejected by the seat courts. Thereafter, the award holders initiated enforcement proceedings before the Delhi High Court under *Sections 47 and 49 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996*. The Government of India opposed enforcement by raising objections under *Section 48*, including limitation, public policy, and alleged excess cost recovery. The Delhi High Court rejected these objections and allowed enforcement. Aggrieved, the Government of India approached the Supreme Court. The appeal raised substantial questions concerning limitation for enforcement of foreign awards, scope of judicial review at the enforcement stage, applicability of public policy post-2016 amendment, and the relationship between seat courts and enforcement courts. The judgment thus provided an opportunity for the Supreme Court to consolidate Indian jurisprudence on enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and align it with international arbitration standards embodied in the *New York Convention, 1958* . ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE In 1994, the Government of India entered into a Production Sharing Contract with multiple entities including *Videocon Industries Limited* and *Ravva Oil (Singapore) Pte. Ltd.* for development of the Ravva offshore oil fields. The contract provided a detailed development plan and capped base development costs at *US $188.98 million plus 5%*, subject to specified exceptions. The contractors achieved higher-than-anticipated production levels due to materially different reservoir characteristics. Additional development costs were incurred to sustain enhanced production capacity. Disputes arose regarding recoverability of these additional costs under *Article 15.5* of the contract. The dispute was referred to arbitration under *Article 34*, with Kuala Lumpur as the seat and English law governing the arbitration agreement. The arbitral tribunal partly accepted the Government’s position regarding initial cost overruns but upheld the contractors’ entitlement to recover additional costs incurred due to materially different reservoir characteristics. The tribunal rendered a final award on 18 January 2011. The Government challenged the award before Malaysian courts on public policy grounds, which were rejected. Enforcement proceedings were thereafter initiated in India. The Government objected, contending that enforcement was barred by limitation and contrary to Indian public policy. These objections were rejected by the Delhi High Court, leading to the present appeal . ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the enforcement petition for a foreign arbitral award is governed by *Article 136 or Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963*? ii. Whether Indian courts can set aside a foreign arbitral award at the enforcement stage? iii. Whether the amendments to *Section 48* introduced by the 2016 Amendment Act apply retrospectively? iv. Whether the foreign award is contrary to the public policy of India? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the Petitioner submitted that enforcement was barred by limitation, contending that the foreign award was deemed a decree and therefore subject to *Article 136* prescribing a twelve-year limitation. It was argued that enforcement was contrary to Indian public policy as the award allegedly permitted recovery of costs beyond contractual caps, violating principles of fairness and statutory petroleum policy. It was further contended that the Malaysian courts erroneously applied Malaysian public policy standards and that Indian courts should not blindly enforce such an award. The Appellant also argued that the 2016 amendment to *Section 48* was clarificatory and retrospective, thereby expanding the scope of public policy objections even for older awards . ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the Respondents submitted that foreign awards are not decrees of Indian courts and hence *Article 137* applied. They emphasized that enforcement courts possess limited jurisdiction and cannot undertake a merits review. It was argued that public policy objections were conclusively rejected by seat courts and no violation of fundamental policy, morality, or justice was demonstrated. The Respondents relied upon *Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co.* and *Shri Lal Mahal Ltd. v. Progetto Grano SPA* to stress narrow interpretation of public policy. They further submitted that the 2016 amendment is substantive and prospective . ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 47, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996* ii. *Section 48, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996* iii. *Section 49, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996* iv. *Article 137, Limitation Act, 1963* v. *Article III and V, New York Convention, 1958* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld enforcement of the foreign award. The Court held that limitation for enforcement of foreign awards is procedural and governed by *lex fori*. Since the 1996 Act does not prescribe limitation, *Article 137* applies. Foreign awards do not become decrees until recognized under *Section 49*, making *Article 136* inapplicable. The Court clarified that enforcement courts cannot set aside foreign awards and only possess the power to refuse enforcement under *Section 48*. It reiterated that the grounds under *Section 48* are exhaustive and must be narrowly construed. On public policy, the Court held that the 2016 amendments to *Section 48* are substantive and prospective. Applying pre-amendment standards, the Court found no violation of fundamental policy, morality, or justice. The award did not suffer from procedural unfairness nor did it shock the conscience of the court. The Court emphasized comity of courts and international obligations under the *New York Convention*. It reaffirmed that Indian courts should adopt a pro-enforcement approach and refrain from interventionist tendencies . **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The limitation for filing enforcement petitions for foreign arbitral awards under *Sections 47 and 49* is governed by *Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963*, and enforcement courts have no jurisdiction to set aside foreign awards or review them on merits. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that excessive judicial interference at the enforcement stage undermines India’s credibility as an arbitration-friendly jurisdiction and discourages foreign investment. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Enforcement courts must apply *lex fori* for limitation. ii. Public policy objections must be narrowly interpreted. iii. Merits review is impermissible at the enforcement stage. iv. Amendments to *Section 48* apply prospectively. ## J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment decisively reinforces India’s commitment to international arbitration norms. It harmonizes domestic law with global standards under the *New York Convention* and curtails dilatory tactics by award debtors. The decision ensures predictability in enforcement proceedings and strengthens investor confidence. By clarifying limitation and public policy standards, the Court eliminates ambiguity and advances India’s pro-arbitration jurisprudence . ## K) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co.*, *\[1993\] 3 Supp SCR 22* ii. *Shri Lal Mahal Ltd. v. Progetto Grano SPA*, *\[2013\] 13 SCR 599* iii. *Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd.*, *\[2001\] 3 SCR 479* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996* ii. *Limitation Act, 1963* iii. *New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Iti Gupta Shines as Gold Medalist in BA LLB at Vivekananda Global University](https://lawfoyer.in/iti-gupta-shines-as-gold-medalist-in-ba-llb-at-vivekananda-global-university/) **Published:** January 18, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Content:** Academic excellence is never accidental. It is the result of dedication, discipline, and an unwavering commitment to growth. At LawFoyer’s Achievers’ Archive, we take immense pride in celebrating such stories that inspire countless young legal minds. One such remarkable achievement is that of **Ms. Iti Gupta**, who has been awarded the **Gold Medal in BA LLB Integrated Course** by **Vivekananda Global University**, marking a milestone of perseverance and academic brilliance. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Screenshot-2026-01-15-014049-Iti-Gupta.png) Hailing from **Jaipur**, Iti Gupta pursued her BA LLB Integrated degree from 2020 to 2025 with a clear sense of purpose and consistency. Securing the **1st position at the university level**, she stood out not only as a high-performing student but also as a responsible leader who successfully balanced academics with multiple institutional responsibilities. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Screenshot-2026-01-07-135807-Iti-Gupta.png) Earning a Gold Medal is no small feat. It reflects sustained academic performance over several years, discipline in learning, and a strong foundation in legal studies. Throughout her journey, Iti demonstrated a deep commitment to understanding law beyond examinations. Her approach towards learning was rooted in clarity of concepts, regular revision, and the ability to apply legal principles with precision. This strong academic base ultimately culminated in her being recognized as the top performer of her batch. What truly distinguishes Iti’s journey is her ability to manage multiple roles alongside her academic commitments. During her time at the university, she served as the **Class Representative**, **President of the Law Lounge Club**, and **Convenor of the Training and Placement Cell**. Each role came with its own responsibilities, deadlines, and pressures. Yet, she handled them with maturity, accountability, and effective time management. Balancing leadership duties with academic excellence required resilience and organization, qualities that Iti consistently demonstrated. Her personal statement beautifully reflects this journey of growth. For Iti, the Gold Medal is not merely an academic distinction but a symbol of perseverance, self-belief, and continuous personal and professional development. The challenges of managing leadership roles alongside rigorous academics strengthened her resilience and sharpened her clarity of purpose. These experiences have played a crucial role in shaping her into a confident and disciplined individual, ready to take on the demands of the legal profession. Iti also acknowledges the invaluable support of her parents, teachers, and mentors, whose guidance and encouragement helped her stay focused and motivated. This gratitude highlights an important truth in every success story: achievements are often nurtured by a strong support system and meaningful mentorship. Her message to aspiring law students carries powerful wisdom. She emphasizes the importance of learning beyond textbooks, managing time wisely, and upholding integrity in every aspect of one’s journey. According to her, true success is built through discipline, consistency, and purposeful effort, lessons that resonate deeply with students navigating the demanding path of legal education. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/WhatsApp-Image-2026-01-13-at-15.55.07-Iti-Gupta-1024x576.jpeg) At LawFoyer, we believe achievements like Iti Gupta’s serve as guiding lights for the next generation of law students. Her story is a reminder that excellence is achieved not through shortcuts, but through sustained effort, responsibility, and belief in oneself. As she steps forward into the professional world, her academic foundation and leadership experience will undoubtedly continue to guide her towards greater milestones. We congratulate **Ms. Iti Gupta** on this well-deserved honor and wish her continued success in all her future endeavors. Her journey truly embodies the spirit of dedication and excellence that LawFoyer proudly celebrates. **Wish to showcase your achievement to the world and inspire others?** LawFoyer will celebrate your achievement because every achievement deserves recognition. Your achievement is our achievement. Share your achievement with us: **Categories:** Achievers Archive --- ### [Yash Sharma, Aseem Simlote & Muskan’s Remarkable Four-Peat Victory in Intra-College Moot Court Competitions Reflects Consistency, Skill, and Legal Excellence](https://lawfoyer.in/yash-sharmas-remarkable-four-peat-victory-in-intra-college-moot-court-competitions-reflects-consistency-skill-and-legal-excellence/) **Published:** January 18, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Content:** Achievements in law are not built overnight. They are the result of consistent effort, disciplined preparation, and a genuine passion for learning and advocacy. One such inspiring journey is that of **Yash Sharma, **Aseem Simlote**** & **Muskan**, final-year B.A. LL.B. students from **S.S. Jain Subodh Law College, Jaipur**, whose repeated success in moot court competitions stands as a testament to perseverance and excellence in legal education. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/IMG_4297-Yash-Sharma-1024x683.jpg) Yash Sharma & his team has achieved an extraordinary milestone by emerging as a **Winner in the Intra-College Moot Court Competition** across multiple editions held in **January 2023, December 2023, October 2024, and December 2025**. This rare four-peat victory reflects not only individual brilliance but also sustained teamwork, adaptability, and a deep understanding of law and courtroom advocacy. Winning the same competition repeatedly over the years is no small feat. It requires evolving legal knowledge, sharpening of arguments, and continuous improvement with each passing year. Organized by **S.S. Jain Subodh Law College, Jaipur**, the Intra-College Moot Court Competition is a rigorous academic platform designed to simulate real court proceedings. Participants are tested on legal research, memorial drafting, oral advocacy, and their ability to respond effectively to judicial questions. The competition challenges students to apply constitutional principles, statutory interpretation, and case laws to complex factual scenarios, thereby nurturing practical legal skills alongside theoretical learning. The collaborative efforts of **Yash Sharma, Aseem Simlote, and Muskan**, played a crucial role in their repeated victories. Their journey highlights the importance of teamwork in mooting, where coordination between speakers and researchers is essential. Together, they demonstrated clarity of thought, structured arguments, and professional courtroom etiquette, which set them apart from their peers. What makes this achievement particularly inspiring is the consistency it represents. Over the years, Yash, Aseem & Muskan have actively engaged in mooting, research, drafting, and advocacy. Their approach towards legal education goes beyond textbooks. They believe in learning through participation, questioning legal principles, and understanding the ethical responsibilities that come with the legal profession. This mindset has not only helped them excel in intra-college competitions but has also contributed to their success in various national and international moots, negotiations, and academic events. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/IMG_4305-Yash-Sharma-1024x683.jpg) Reflecting on his team’s journey, Yash shares that this achievement reinforced his belief that law is not merely about memorizing statutes, but about developing clarity of thought, critical reasoning, and the courage to question established norms. His message to aspiring law students is simple yet powerful. Start early, read critically, write consistently, and never underestimate the power of perseverance. Small and steady efforts, when compounded over time, open doors to opportunities one may not initially foresee. Yash and his team’s four-time victory is more than just a medal or certificate. It is a story of discipline, resilience, and continuous growth. Their journey serves as an inspiration for law students across the country who aspire to excel in mooting and build a strong foundation for their legal careers. LawFoyer proudly celebrates this remarkable achievement and looks forward to witnessing many more milestones in their professional journey. **Wish to showcase your achievement to the world and inspire others?** LawFoyer will celebrate your achievement because every achievement deserves recognition. Your achievement is our achievement. Share your achievement with us: **Categories:** Achievers Archive --- ### [Trustees of H.C. Dhanda Trust v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., [2020] 11 SCR 268](https://lawfoyer.in/trustees-of-h-c-dhanda-trust-v-state-of-madhya-pradesh-ors-2020-11-scr-268/) **Published:** January 17, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment addresses the scope and limits of discretionary power vested in the Collector of Stamps under Section 40(1)(b) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, particularly concerning the imposition of penalty up to ten times the deficient stamp duty. The dispute arose from the execution of a Deed of Assent by trustees of a private trust in favour of beneficiaries pursuant to a testamentary trust. The revenue authorities classified the instrument as a gift deed, determined substantial deficit stamp duty, and imposed the maximum statutory penalty of ten times the deficiency. The orders of the Collector and the Board of Revenue were upheld by the High Court. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment addresses the scope and limits of discretionary power vested in the *Collector of Stamps* under *Section 40(1)(b) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899*, particularly concerning the imposition of penalty up to ten times the deficient stamp duty. The dispute arose from the execution of a *Deed of Assent* by trustees of a private trust in favour of beneficiaries pursuant to a testamentary trust. The revenue authorities classified the instrument as a *gift deed*, determined substantial deficit stamp duty, and imposed the *maximum statutory penalty* of ten times the deficiency. The orders of the Collector and the Board of Revenue were upheld by the High Court. The Supreme Court confined its scrutiny to the *quantum of penalty*, examining whether the maximum penalty was justified in the absence of findings of fraud, contumacious conduct, or deliberate deceit. The Court undertook a purposive interpretation of *Sections 33, 35, 38, 39, and 40* of the Stamp Act, emphasising that the phrase *“if he thinks fit”* mandates a reasoned, proportionate, and non-mechanical exercise of discretion. The Court reiterated that penalty provisions serve a *deterrent* and not *retributive* function. While affirming the finding of stamp duty evasion, the Court held that mere intention to evade duty, without aggravating circumstances, does not justify the *extreme penalty*. Consequently, the penalty was reduced to *five times* the deficient stamp duty to meet the ends of justice. The decision clarifies the jurisprudence on administrative discretion in fiscal statutes and reinforces proportionality as a governing principle in penalty imposition. **Keywords:** Indian Stamp Act, Section 40 discretion, stamp duty evasion, penalty proportionality, Deed of Assent, administrative discretion ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetails*Judgement Cause Title**Trustees of H.C. Dhanda Trust v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.**Case Number**Civil Appeal Nos. 3195–3196 of 2020**Judgement Date**17 September 2020**Court**Supreme Court of India**Quorum**Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy, M.R. Shah, JJ.**Author**Ashok Bhushan, J.**Citation**\[2020\] 11 SCR 268**Legal Provisions Involved**Sections 33, 35, 38, 39, 40 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899*; *Sections 331–332 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925**Judgments Overruled**None**Related Law Subjects**Taxation Law, Property Law, Trust Law, Administrative Law* ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The controversy originates from the exercise of statutory powers under the *Indian Stamp Act, 1899*, a fiscal legislation intended to secure revenue for the State through compulsory stamping of instruments affecting rights in property. The present case is situated at the intersection of *trust law*, *succession law*, and *stamp duty administration*. The appellant trust was created through a testamentary disposition, where immovable properties were vested in trustees for eventual transfer to beneficiaries. The trustees executed a *Deed of Assent*, a document recognised under *Sections 331 and 332 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925*, to complete the vesting of title in favour of legatees. The instrument was stamped with a nominal duty of *Rs. 200*. Revenue authorities initiated proceedings under *Section 33* of the Stamp Act, impounded the document, and proceeded under *Section 40*, classifying it as a *gift deed* attracting ad valorem duty. The Collector determined a substantial deficiency and imposed a *ten-times penalty*, invoking the upper statutory limit. The challenge before the Supreme Court was *not* directed against the classification of the document or the determination of stamp duty. The Court deliberately limited its inquiry to the *legality and proportionality of the maximum penalty*. This narrow focus allowed the Court to clarify the contours of administrative discretion under fiscal statutes and to reiterate that discretion must be guided by reason, fairness, and proportionality rather than revenue absolutism. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE Late *Shri Harish Chand Dhanda* acquired valuable immovable properties in Indore through gifts made in 1946 and 1948. During his lifetime, he constructed a commercial building known as *Hotel Lantern* and held other properties. On *26.10.2002*, he executed his *last Will*, creating a private trust and appointing trustees who were also named executors. The trust was intended to hold and manage the properties for the benefit of designated beneficiaries. Upon his death on *05.07.2003*, the trustees assumed control. On *06.04.2005*, the trustees resolved to transfer and vest specific properties in favour of beneficiaries by executing a registered transfer deed. Instead, on *21.04.2005*, a *Deed of Assent* was executed, whereby trustees assented to the vesting of absolute title in the legatees. The document was stamped with *Rs. 200*. The *Collector of Stamps, Indore*, issued notice alleging insufficient stamping and proposed recovery of deficit duty exceeding *Rs. 1.28 crores* along with *ten times penalty*. By order dated *22.09.2008*, the Collector held the instrument to be a *gift deed*, calculated stamp duty at applicable rates, and imposed a penalty of *Rs. 12.80 crores*. The *Board of Revenue* affirmed the order. A writ petition before the High Court was dismissed by the Single Judge, and the writ appeal was rejected as not maintainable. The Supreme Court granted leave limited solely to the issue of *quantum of penalty*. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. *Whether the imposition of maximum penalty of ten times the deficient stamp duty under Section 40(1)(b) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 was legally justified?* ii. *Whether discretion under Section 40(1)(b) can be exercised mechanically upon a finding of stamp duty evasion?* iii. *Whether absence of fraud or contumacious conduct warrants reduction of penalty?* ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the *Deed of Assent* was executed bona fide under *Sections 331 and 332 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925*. It was contended that the trustees acted in their capacity as executors and not as donors. It was argued that even assuming a deficit in stamp duty, *Section 40(1)(b)* does not mandate imposition of the *maximum penalty*. The Collector failed to record any finding of fraud, dishonest intention, or contumacious conduct. The penalty was imposed mechanically without considering proportionality or mitigating circumstances. Reliance was placed on *Peteti Subba Rao v. Anumala S. Narendra (2002) 10 SCC 427*, which held that maximum penalty is reserved for extreme cases. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the State submitted that the trustees deliberately described the instrument as a *Deed of Assent* to evade substantial stamp duty. The intention to evade revenue was evident from the nature and effect of the transaction. It was argued that once intention to evade is established, the Collector was justified in imposing the *maximum statutory penalty*. The Board of Revenue and the High Court had concurrently upheld the finding. No interference was warranted. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 33, Indian Stamp Act, 1899* ii. *Section 35, Indian Stamp Act, 1899* iii. *Section 38, Indian Stamp Act, 1899* iv. *Section 39, Indian Stamp Act, 1899* v. *Section 40(1)(b), Indian Stamp Act, 1899* vi. *Sections 331–332, Indian Succession Act, 1925* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court held that *Section 40(1)(b)* confers *discretion* and not an obligation to impose ten times penalty. The phrase *“if he thinks fit”* was interpreted as a legislative mandate requiring reasoned decision-making. The Court undertook a conjoint reading of *Sections 35, 38, and 39* to demonstrate that even where ten times penalty is initially levied, the statute contemplates reduction or refund. This legislative scheme negates any presumption that maximum penalty is the norm. The Court reaffirmed that the *object of penalty is deterrence, not retribution*. Mere evasion of duty, without additional aggravating factors such as fraud or deceit, does not justify the extreme penalty. In the present case, the only reason recorded was intention to escape duty. No finding of dishonest or contumacious conduct existed. The Court held that while penalty was justified, *maximum penalty was disproportionate*. Consequently, the penalty was reduced to *five times* the deficient duty. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio is that *imposition of ten times penalty under Section 40(1)(b) is discretionary, not automatic*. Such discretion must be exercised rationally, proportionately, and for reasons recorded. Maximum penalty is reserved for extreme cases involving aggravating circumstances beyond mere evasion. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that unfettered discretion demands higher responsibility. Fiscal authorities must avoid oppressive use of power. Penalty jurisprudence must align with fairness and equity. **c) GUIDELINES** i. *Penalty under Section 40(1)(b) must not be imposed mechanically.* ii. *Reasons must be recorded justifying quantum of penalty.* iii. *Maximum penalty should be reserved for extreme cases.* iv. *Proportionality must guide fiscal discretion.* ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Gangtappa v. Fakkirappa*, *\[2018\] 13 SCR 603* ii. *Peteti Subba Rao v. Anumala S. Narendra*, *(2002) 10 SCC 427* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Indian Stamp Act, 1899* ii. *Indian Succession Act, 1925* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Pappu Deo Yadav v. Naresh Kumar and Others, [2020] 7 SCR 968](https://lawfoyer.in/pappu-deo-yadav-v-naresh-kumar-and-others-2020-7-scr-968/) **Published:** January 17, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The decision in Pappu Deo Yadav v. Naresh Kumar and Others is a significant pronouncement on the assessment of compensation for permanent disability under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The Supreme Court revisited the rigid and mechanical approach often adopted by tribunals and High Courts while evaluating loss of earning capacity in cases involving grievous injuries. The appellant, a young data entry operator/typist, suffered amputation of his right upper limb, resulting in 89% permanent disability as medically certified. **Content:** ## A) **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The decision in *Pappu Deo Yadav v. Naresh Kumar and Others* is a significant pronouncement on the assessment of compensation for permanent disability under the *Motor Vehicles Act, 1988*. The Supreme Court revisited the rigid and mechanical approach often adopted by tribunals and High Courts while evaluating loss of earning capacity in cases involving grievous injuries. The appellant, a young *data entry operator/typist*, suffered *amputation of his right upper limb*, resulting in *89% permanent disability* as medically certified. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal and the High Court diluted this assessment to *45%*, treating the injury as loss of a single limb without regard to its functional impact on the appellant’s profession. The Supreme Court rejected this reduction as legally unsustainable and disconnected from social and economic realities. The judgment underscores that *functional disability*, and not merely *physical disability*, must guide compensation. The Court emphasized that the severity of disability must be assessed *in relation to the vocation, profession, or nature of work* of the injured claimant. The ruling also clarified that *future prospects* are not confined to fatal accident cases and can be granted to living victims suffering permanent disability. By restoring future prospects at *40%* and reassessing monthly income realistically, the Court substantially enhanced compensation for loss of earning capacity. This decision strengthens the jurisprudence on *“just compensation”* under *Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act*, reinforcing dignity, fairness, and restorative justice as guiding principles. It also aligns compensation law with constitutional values under *Article 21*, recognizing the lived realities of disabled persons in India. **Keywords:** Motor accident compensation, permanent disability, functional disability, future prospects, loss of earning capacity, Article 21 dignity ## B) **CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Pappu Deo Yadav v. Naresh Kumar and Others*Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 2567 of 2020Judgement Date17 September 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumL. Nageswara Rao J., Krishna Murari J., S. Ravindra Bhat J.AuthorS. Ravindra Bhat J.Citation*\[2020\] 7 SCR 968*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 166, 168, 140 Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Article 21 Constitution of India*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsMotor Vehicles Law, Tort Law, Constitutional Law ## C) **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The jurisprudence on motor accident compensation in India has evolved through judicial insistence on fairness and realism in assessing damages. The statutory mandate under *Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988* obliges courts to award *“just compensation”*, a concept interpreted expansively by constitutional courts. However, in practice, adjudicating authorities often rely on rigid formulas, overlooking the socio-economic context of victims, especially those employed in the informal sector. The present case arose from this tension between statutory ideal and adjudicatory practice. The appellant, a *20-year-old typist/data entry operator*, suffered catastrophic injury in a road accident caused by rash and negligent driving. His *right hand was amputated*, permanently altering his capacity to earn and live independently. Despite medical certification of *89% disability*, adjudicatory bodies diluted the impact by mechanically reducing disability to *45%*, ignoring the functional indispensability of both hands for a typist. The High Court further narrowed the scope of compensation by excluding *future prospects*, misapplying the principles laid down in *National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi*. This approach effectively treated living victims of permanent disability as less deserving of progressive compensation than deceased victims. Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court intervened to correct doctrinal errors and reaffirm the humanistic foundations of compensation law. The judgment situates disability compensation within the broader constitutional framework of *dignity*, *autonomy*, and *meaningful life* under *Article 21*. It draws from a long line of precedents emphasizing that compensation must respond to lived realities rather than abstract arithmetic. ## D) **FACTS OF THE CASE** On *18 May 2012*, the appellant was travelling as a fare-paying passenger in a bus from Delhi to Hapur. Near *Village Sadikpur, PS Hafizpur, Uttar Pradesh*, another bus driven rashly attempted to overtake from the wrong side and collided with the appellant’s bus. Due to the impact, the metal body of the bus crushed the appellant’s arm. He was immediately taken to *Dr. Khan’s Rehan Hospital* and later referred to *AIIMS Trauma Centre*. The injury proved devastating. The appellant’s *right upper limb was amputated*. A disability certificate issued by *Pandit Madan Mohan Malviya Hospital* assessed *89% permanent disability*, describing the condition as *non-progressive and not likely to improve*. An FIR was registered under *Sections 279 and 338 IPC*. At the time of the accident, the appellant was unmarried and employed as a *data entry operator/typist at Tis Hazari Courts*, earning approximately *₹12,000 per month*. He filed a claim under *Sections 166 and 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act*, seeking compensation of *₹50 lakhs*. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal held the driver negligent and awarded *₹14,25,400*. While calculating loss of future earning capacity, the Tribunal reduced monthly income to *₹8,000*, added *50% future prospects*, applied a *multiplier of 18*, and assessed disability at *45%*. On appeal, the High Court removed future prospects altogether, retained *45% disability*, and reduced loss of earning capacity to *₹7,77,600*, though it marginally enhanced amounts under non-pecuniary heads. Aggrieved by the arbitrary reduction, the appellant approached the Supreme Court. ## E) **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether *functional disability* must prevail over *physical disability* in assessing loss of earning capacity? ii. Whether compensation for *future prospects* can be awarded in cases of permanent disability? iii. Whether reduction of medically assessed disability without vocational analysis is legally sustainable? iv. Whether income of self-employed persons in the informal sector can be arbitrarily discounted? ## F) **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellant submitted that the High Court committed a grave error in reducing disability to *45%* despite unchallenged medical evidence of *89% permanent disability*. It was argued that as a *typist/data entry operator*, the appellant’s livelihood depended entirely on full use of both hands. The injury therefore resulted in near-total loss of earning capacity. It was further contended that denial of *future prospects* was contrary to binding precedents, particularly *Pranay Sethi* and *Jagdish v. Mohan*, which recognized future prospects for self-employed persons below 40 years. The High Court’s distinction between fatal and injury cases was artificial and unsupported by law. The appellant also argued that reduction of income to *₹8,000* ignored ground realities. In *AY 2011–2012*, individuals earning less than *₹1,60,000 annually* were not required to file income tax returns. Evidence of an advocate employer corroborated the appellant’s income claim. ## G) **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the respondent insurer argued that loss of one limb cannot equate to near-total disability. They supported the High Court’s assessment of *45% disability*, contending that the appellant could pursue alternative employment. It was further argued that future prospects are applicable primarily in death cases, and absence of documentary proof justified reduction of income. The insurer maintained that the High Court’s reliance on *Pranay Sethi* and *Anant Dukre* was correct. ## H) **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. *Section 166, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988* – Application for compensation ii. *Section 168, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988* – Award of just compensation iii. *Article 21, Constitution of India* – Right to life and dignity ## I) **JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court held that the approach of the Tribunal and High Court was *mechanical and divorced from reality*. It reaffirmed that the decisive factor is *functional impact on earning capacity*, not abstract percentage of physical disability. For a typist, loss of an arm gravely impairs livelihood. The Court rejected the *45% assessment* and determined *65% functional disability*, balancing medical assessment with the possibility of partial rehabilitation. It emphasized that *there cannot be a blind arithmetic formula* and disability must be judged in relation to vocation. On future prospects, the Court categorically held that denial to living victims is illogical. Relying on *Pranay Sethi*, *Jagdish*, *Parminder Singh*, and *Kajal*, the Court restored *40% future prospects*. The Court reassessed monthly income at *₹10,000*, considering minimum wages and informal sector realities. Applying *₹14,000 (with future prospects) × 12 × 65% × 18*, compensation for loss of earning capacity was recalculated at *₹19,65,600*. Other heads awarded by the High Court were upheld. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** Functional disability must be assessed in relation to the profession of the injured claimant, and compensation for future prospects is payable even in cases of permanent disability where the victim survives. **b)** **OBITER DICTA** Courts must remain conscious that serious injuries inflict lifelong physical, emotional, and social trauma, undermining dignity under *Article 21*. Compensation must reflect this lived reality. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Disability assessment must consider vocational impact. ii. Mechanical reduction of medical disability is impermissible. iii. Future prospects apply to self-employed and disabled victims. iv. Informal sector incomes must be assessed realistically. ## J) **REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.*, *\[2012\] 3 SCR 1178* ii. *Jagdish v. Mohan*, *\[2018\] 3 SCR 20* iii. *Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar*, *\[2010\] 13 SCR 179* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Motor Vehicles Act, 1988* ii. *Constitution of India* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [M/s. MSD Real Estate LLP v. The Collector of Stamps & Anr., [2020] 6 SCR 1027](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-msd-real-estate-llp-v-the-collector-of-stamps-anr-2020-6-scr-1027/) **Published:** January 17, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The present judgment examines the liability of a subsequent purchaser to discharge outstanding stamp duty penalties attached to immovable property, and the legality of recovery proceedings initiated by revenue authorities when such penalties remain unpaid. The Supreme Court considered whether the acceptance of post-dated cheques towards penalty amounts could be treated as valid compliance under stamp law, and whether municipal authorities were justified in denying building permission on account of unpaid statutory dues. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The present judgment examines the *liability of a subsequent purchaser to discharge outstanding stamp duty penalties attached to immovable property*, and the legality of recovery proceedings initiated by revenue authorities when such penalties remain unpaid. The Supreme Court considered whether the acceptance of *post-dated cheques* towards penalty amounts could be treated as valid compliance under stamp law, and whether municipal authorities were justified in *denying building permission* on account of unpaid statutory dues. The dispute arose from a deed of assent executed by trustees of a private trust, which was later adjudicated as a *gift deed* attracting deficient stamp duty and a penalty of ten times the deficit. Although the principal stamp duty was eventually paid, the penalty remained unpaid except through post-dated cheques submitted by the subsequent purchaser after acquiring the property. The Collector initiated recovery proceedings, which were upheld by the High Court. The High Court also declined to interfere with the municipal authority’s refusal of construction permission, while granting liberty to reapply after full compliance. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s reasoning, holding that *post-dated cheques do not constitute payment* under the Stamp Act, and that statutory liabilities attached to the property continue to bind subsequent purchasers. The Court further clarified that *subsequent administrative actions* taken during pendency of appeal could not be examined within the same proceedings. The judgment reinforces strict compliance under fiscal statutes, the doctrine of statutory charge, and limits judicial review over recovery actions where liability stands crystallized. **Keywords:** Stamp duty, penalty recovery, subsequent purchaser liability, post-dated cheques, municipal permissions ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetails*Judgement Cause Title**M/s. MSD Real Estate LLP v. The Collector of Stamps & Anr.**Case Number**Civil Appeal No. 3194 of 2020**Judgement Date**17 September 2020**Court**Supreme Court of India**Quorum**Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy, M.R. Shah, JJ.**Author**Justice Ashok Bhushan**Citation**\[2020\] 6 SCR 1027**Legal Provisions Involved**Indian Stamp Act, 1899; Madhya Pradesh Stamp Act; Municipal laws**Judgments Overruled**None**Related Law Subjects**Stamp Law, Property Law, Administrative Law, Municipal Law* ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT** The judgment arose from prolonged litigation concerning *deficient stamp duty* and *penalty imposed on a deed of assent*, which was adjudged as a *gift deed* by the Collector of Stamps. The controversy traces back to an order dated *22.09.2008*, wherein the Collector determined substantial deficiency and imposed a penalty of *ten times* the deficit amount. The trustees of the private trust unsuccessfully challenged this determination before the High Court. Subsequently, the matter reached the Supreme Court in earlier proceedings, where limited interim protection was granted subject to payment of stamp duty within a stipulated period. The failure of the trustees to comply resulted in lapse of interim protection. Eventually, the principal stamp duty was deposited, but the penalty remained unpaid. During this interregnum, the appellant purchased the property through a *registered sale deed*. After purchase, the appellant attempted to regularize the liability by submitting *post-dated cheques* towards penalty and simultaneously sought development and construction permissions from the municipal corporation. Revenue authorities initiated recovery proceedings for the outstanding penalty, while the municipal corporation cancelled construction permission on grounds of non-payment and alleged suppression. The High Court upheld both actions, leading to the present appeal. The background reflects the *intersection of fiscal compliance, property transactions, and municipal governance*, raising questions about the extent to which statutory liabilities run with land and bind subsequent purchasers. The judgment also addresses procedural propriety in accepting deferred modes of payment under revenue laws and delineates the scope of appellate review in relation to subsequent administrative actions. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The property in dispute, known as *Lantern Hotel*, was subject to a *deed of assent dated 21.04.2005* executed by trustees of *H.C. Dhanda Trust*. Upon examination, the *Collector of Stamps* held that the deed was effectively a *gift deed* and not an assent simpliciter. Consequently, an order dated *22.09.2008* determined a *stamp duty deficiency of ₹1,28,09,700* and imposed a *penalty of ten times amounting to ₹12,80,97,000*. The trustees challenged this order unsuccessfully before the High Court. A Special Leave Petition was later filed before the Supreme Court, wherein limited interim relief was granted conditional upon payment of stamp duty. Non-compliance led to cessation of interim protection. The principal stamp duty was eventually deposited in *November 2019*. Shortly thereafter, the appellant purchased the property via a *registered sale deed dated 27.11.2019*. The appellant applied for mutation, paid property tax under protest, and obtained initial construction permission. On *20.11.2019*, the appellant submitted six *post-dated cheques* covering the penalty amount. However, the revenue authorities issued a *recovery notice dated 04.06.2020* demanding ₹8.80 crores as outstanding penalty. On the same date, the municipal corporation cancelled construction permission citing non-payment and suppression of material facts. The appellant challenged both actions before the High Court, which dismissed the writ petition, holding the appellant liable as a subsequent purchaser. During pendency of the appeal before the Supreme Court, additional municipal actions were initiated, which were sought to be challenged through interlocutory applications. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether a subsequent purchaser of immovable property is liable to discharge *outstanding stamp duty penalty* attached to the property? ii. Whether submission of *post-dated cheques* constitutes valid payment of penalty under stamp law? iii. Whether municipal authorities are justified in *denying construction permission* due to unpaid statutory dues? iv. Whether *subsequent administrative actions* taken during pendency of appeal can be examined in the same proceedings? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellant submitted that the *entire penalty liability* had been acknowledged and covered through post-dated cheques, which were accepted by the Collector of Stamps. It was argued that partial encashment of cheques prior to issuance of recovery notice demonstrated implied acceptance of the payment mechanism. It was further contended that cancellation of building permission was arbitrary, as permission had already been granted after scrutiny. The appellant asserted that municipal authorities acted mala fide by initiating coercive actions despite an interim stay granted by the Supreme Court. The appellant also challenged subsequent municipal notices alleging eviction and cancellation of mutation, asserting that *title was never under dispute* and that such actions exceeded jurisdiction. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the respondents submitted that *no statutory provision permits acceptance of penalty through post-dated cheques*. It was argued that until actual realization, the liability subsists, justifying recovery proceedings. The State contended that *stamp duty and penalty constitute a charge on the property*, binding subsequent purchasers. The municipal corporation supported the cancellation of building permission on grounds of non-payment and suppression of facts. Regarding subsequent actions, it was argued that such matters were *outside the scope of the writ petition* and could not be adjudicated in the present appeal. ## **H) JUDGMENT** The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, affirming that *post-dated cheques do not amount to payment* under stamp law. The Court emphasized that fiscal statutes demand *strict compliance* and that statutory dues cannot be deemed discharged until actual realization. The Court held that the appellant, as a *subsequent purchaser*, stepped into the shoes of the transferor and was bound by outstanding liabilities attached to the property. The liability arose from a duly adjudicated order which had attained finality except to the limited extent of penalty reduction. The Court noted that while the penalty amount had later been reduced to *five times*, the obligation to pay subsisted and respondents were bound to act in accordance with the modified order. With respect to municipal permission, the Court endorsed the High Court’s observation that the appellant was free to reapply after full payment. This was held sufficient to protect the appellant’s rights. Regarding subsequent municipal actions, the Court declined to entertain them, holding that *subsequent causes of action require independent remedies*. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment is that *statutory liabilities under stamp law attach to the property and bind subsequent purchasers*. Payment through post-dated cheques does not extinguish liability unless realized. Revenue authorities are entitled to initiate recovery proceedings for outstanding dues, and municipal bodies may withhold permissions until statutory compliance is achieved. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that administrative authorities must act in compliance with judicial modifications of penalty orders and that parties remain free to pursue appropriate remedies against subsequent actions through independent proceedings. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Statutory penalties must be *actually paid* and not merely promised. ii. Subsequent purchasers must conduct due diligence regarding *fiscal encumbrances*. iii. Municipal authorities may reconsider permissions upon full statutory compliance. iv. Subsequent administrative actions require *separate legal challenge*. ## **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment reinforces the principle that *fiscal statutes brook no equity*. The Supreme Court’s approach underscores that liabilities arising from stamp adjudication are not personal but proprietary in nature. The ruling promotes certainty in revenue administration and discourages transactional attempts to defer statutory dues through informal arrangements. It also delineates clear procedural boundaries for appellate scrutiny, ensuring judicial discipline. ## **J) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *M/s. MSD Real Estate LLP v. Collector of Stamps & Anr.*, *\[2020\] 6 SCR 1027* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Indian Stamp Act, 1899* ii. *Relevant provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Stamp Law* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [B. Santoshamma & Anr. v. D. Sarala & Anr., [2020] 11 S.C.R. 1](https://lawfoyer.in/b-santoshamma-anr-v-d-sarala-anr-2020-11-s-c-r-1/) **Published:** January 17, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the contours of specific performance of contracts relating to immovable property, particularly where the vendor creates third-party interests after executing an agreement for sale. The dispute arose from an agreement dated 21 March 1984 for sale of 300 square yards of land for a total consideration of Rs. 75,000, out of which a substantial portion had already been paid. Subsequently, the vendor executed a registered sale deed in favour of a third party for 100 square yards of the same land. The vendee sought specific performance of the agreement. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment examines the contours of *specific performance of contracts relating to immovable property*, particularly where the vendor creates third-party interests after executing an agreement for sale. The dispute arose from an agreement dated *21 March 1984* for sale of *300 square yards of land* for a total consideration of *Rs. 75,000*, out of which a substantial portion had already been paid. Subsequently, the vendor executed a registered sale deed in favour of a third party for *100 square yards* of the same land. The vendee sought *specific performance* of the agreement. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the settled principle that *time is not of the essence* in contracts for sale of immovable property unless expressly provided. It emphasized that *readiness and willingness* under *Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963* must be assessed on evidence and conduct. The Court rejected the vendor’s plea that the agreement was conditional upon cancellation of an earlier agreement, holding that *oral conditions cannot override a written contract*. The judgment provides authoritative guidance on *partial specific performance under Section 12*, holding that a vendor cannot frustrate a contract by transferring part of the property to a third party. It also clarifies the law on *necessary parties*, *limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act*, and the legal consequences of *non-joinder*. The Court upheld partial enforcement of the contract for *200 square yards*, balancing equity, statutory mandate, and accrued third-party rights. **Keywords:** Specific Performance; Partial Performance; Readiness and Willingness; Limitation; Necessary Party; Specific Relief Act, 1963 ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsi) Judgment Cause Title*B. Santoshamma & Anr. v. D. Sarala & Anr.*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 3574 of 2009 (with C.A. Nos. 3575–3577 of 2009)iii) Judgment Date18 September 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumHon’ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit and Hon’ble Ms. Justice Indira Banerjeevi) AuthorJustice Indira Banerjeevii) Citation*\[2020\] 11 S.C.R. 1*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 10, 12, 14, 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963; Article 54 & Section 21 of the Limitation Act, 1963; Order II Rule 2 CPC; Section 50 Registration Act, 1908*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsCivil Law; Contract Law; Property Law ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT** The litigation has its genesis in competing claims arising from successive transactions concerning the same immovable property. The vendor, after acquiring ownership over *300 square yards of land*, entered into multiple agreements, culminating in conflicting claims of title and enforceability. The dispute illustrates a recurring problem in Indian property transactions where vendors, after receiving substantial consideration, attempt to defeat contractual obligations by creating third-party interests. The vendee instituted a suit for *specific performance*, asserting continuous readiness and willingness to perform contractual obligations. Parallel proceedings were initiated by the third-party purchaser seeking injunction, and by the vendee seeking declaration of invalidity of the third-party sale deed. These suits were clubbed for convenience but retained independent identities. The trial court decreed *partial specific performance*, limiting relief to *200 square yards*, holding that the third-party purchaser’s rights over *100 square yards* could not be disturbed due to limitation and procedural lapses. This approach was affirmed by the High Court. Before the Supreme Court, the vendor contended that the agreement was conditional, indivisible, and incapable of partial enforcement. The vendee sought enforcement of the contract in entirety. The Court was thus called upon to interpret the scope of *Sections 10 and 12 of the Specific Relief Act*, the doctrine of readiness and willingness, and the consequences of non-joinder and limitation. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The vendor purchased *300 square yards of land* by a registered sale deed dated *20 August 1982*. Within days, she allegedly entered into an oral agreement with a third party for *100 square yards*, which was later reduced into writing. On *21 March 1984*, the vendor executed a written agreement with the vendee for sale of the *entire 300 square yards* for *Rs. 75,000*. A sum of *Rs. 40,000* was paid on the date of execution, and *Rs. 5,000* was subsequently paid to the vendor’s husband against receipt. The agreement stipulated payment of the balance within *45 days*. The vendee tendered the remaining amount within the stipulated period, including by obtaining a *demand draft dated 4 May 1984*. The vendor refused acceptance. Instead, on *25 May 1984*, the vendor executed a registered sale deed in favour of the third party for *100 square yards*. The vendee filed a suit for specific performance in 1984 but failed to implead the third party initially. The third party filed a separate suit for injunction. The vendee also filed a declaratory suit against the third party without impleading the vendor. The trial court decreed partial specific performance for *200 square yards*, reduced the consideration proportionately, dismissed the declaratory suit for non-joinder, and upheld third-party rights over *100 square yards*. These findings were upheld by the High Court and later by the Supreme Court. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether the vendee had proved *continuous readiness and willingness* to perform the agreement? ii. Whether the agreement dated *21 March 1984* was conditional upon cancellation of an earlier agreement? iii. Whether *partial specific performance* under *Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act* was permissible? iv. Whether the third party was a *necessary party* to the suit for specific performance? v. Whether the claim against the third party was barred by *limitation*? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the vendor submitted that the agreement was a *composite and indivisible contract* and could not be enforced partially. It was contended that the vendee failed to pay the balance consideration within time, rendering the agreement unenforceable. It was argued that the agreement was subject to an oral condition requiring the vendee to negotiate cancellation of the prior agreement with the third party. The vendor asserted that time was of the essence and that subsequent sale to the third party was lawful. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the vendee contended that substantial consideration had already been paid and that the vendee had tendered the balance within time. It was argued that *time is not of the essence* in contracts for sale of immovable property. The vendee denied existence of any conditional clause and emphasized that the vendor deliberately created third-party interests to defeat contractual obligations. Reliance was placed on statutory presumptions favouring specific performance. ## **H) JUDGMENT** The Supreme Court upheld concurrent findings that the vendee was ready and willing to perform contractual obligations. The Court rejected the vendor’s plea of a conditional agreement, holding that *a written contract cannot be varied by unsubstantiated oral assertions*. The Court reaffirmed that after the *2018 amendment to Section 10*, specific performance is no longer discretionary but mandatory, subject to statutory exceptions. The vendor, having accepted a substantial portion of consideration, could not evade performance by transferring part of the property. The Court applied *Section 12* purposively and upheld *partial specific performance* for *200 square yards*, holding that the vendor cannot take advantage of her own wrong. However, the rights of the third party were protected due to limitation and procedural lapses by the vendee. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The vendor cannot defeat an agreement for sale by transferring part of the property to a third party after accepting substantial consideration. *Partial specific performance under Section 12* is permissible where complete performance is rendered impossible by the vendor’s own acts, provided equities are balanced and third-party rights accrued by limitation are protected. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that courts must adopt a *purposive interpretation* of the Specific Relief Act to prevent deliberate frustration of contracts. It cautioned against mechanical application of technical defences where equity demands enforcement. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Written contracts cannot be overridden by alleged oral conditions. ii. Vendors cannot rely on self-created impossibility to avoid performance. iii. Transferees of part property are *necessary parties* to suits for specific performance. iv. Courts may grant *partial specific performance* with proportional adjustment of consideration. ## **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment strengthens the enforceability of contracts for sale of immovable property and discourages vendors from acting in bad faith. It harmonizes statutory mandate with equitable principles, offering clarity on partial specific performance, limitation, and necessary parties. The ruling is significant for practitioners dealing with property disputes involving overlapping transactions and reinforces contractual sanctity in Indian civil jurisprudence. ## **J) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** - *Durga Prasad v. Deep Chand*, *AIR 1954 SC 75* - *Mahalaxmi Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. Ashabhai Atmaram Patel*, *(2013) 4 SCC 404* - *R.A. Oswal v. Deepak Jewellers*, *(1999) 6 SCC 40* - *Dalip Singh v. Mehar Singh Rathee*, *(2004) 7 SCC 650* **b) Important Statutes Referred** - *Specific Relief Act, 1963* - *Limitation Act, 1963* - *Code of Civil Procedure, 1908* - *Registration Act, 1908* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Sagufta Ahmed & Ors. v. Upper Assam Plywood Products Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., [2020] 9 SCR 472](https://lawfoyer.in/sagufta-ahmed-ors-v-upper-assam-plywood-products-pvt-ltd-ors-2020-9-scr-472/) **Published:** January 17, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The Supreme Court in Sagufta Ahmed & Ors. v. Upper Assam Plywood Products Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. examined the statutory contours of limitation under Section 421(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 and clarified the legal distinction between “period of limitation” and “period up to which delay may be condoned”. The appellants challenged the order of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal dismissing their appeal as time-barred and refusing condonation of delay beyond the statutorily permissible period. The central issue concerned whether the benefit of the Supreme Court’s suo motu order dated 23.03.2020, extending limitation due to the COVID-19 pandemic, could enlarge the maximum condonable period prescribed under a special statute. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The Supreme Court in *Sagufta Ahmed & Ors. v. Upper Assam Plywood Products Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.* examined the statutory contours of limitation under *Section 421(3) of the Companies Act, 2013* and clarified the legal distinction between *“period of limitation”* and *“period up to which delay may be condoned”*. The appellants challenged the order of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal dismissing their appeal as time-barred and refusing condonation of delay beyond the statutorily permissible period. The central issue concerned whether the benefit of the Supreme Court’s suo motu order dated *23.03.2020*, extending limitation due to the COVID-19 pandemic, could enlarge the maximum condonable period prescribed under a special statute. The Court held that while the statutory limitation period may stand extended by judicial orders passed under *Articles 141 and 142 of the Constitution*, such extension does not apply to discretionary periods for condonation which are expressly capped by statute. The judgment reaffirms legislative supremacy in prescribing outer limits for appellate remedies and underscores that equitable considerations cannot override clear statutory mandates. Relying upon *Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Subash Projects and Marketing Ltd.*, the Court clarified the scope of *Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963*, holding that “prescribed period” refers only to the limitation period and not the condonable grace period. The decision reinforces procedural discipline in corporate litigation and reiterates the maxim *Vigilantibus Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt*, emphasizing that judicial indulgence is unavailable to litigants who remain inactive despite statutory clarity. **Keywords:** Limitation, Condonation of Delay, Companies Act, COVID-19 Extension, NCLAT Jurisdiction ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Sagufta Ahmed & Ors. v. Upper Assam Plywood Products Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.*Case NumberCivil Appeal Nos. 3007–3008 of 2020Judgement Date18 September 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorum*S.A. Bobde, CJI; A.S. Bopanna, J.; V. Ramasubramanian, J.*Author*V. Ramasubramanian, J.*Citation*\[2020\] 9 SCR 472*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 420(3), 421(3) of Companies Act, 2013; Section 4 Limitation Act, 1963; Section 10 General Clauses Act, 1897*Judgments OverruledNilRelated Law SubjectsCorporate Law, Procedural Law, Limitation Law ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The judgment arose from a procedural challenge within the corporate adjudicatory framework established under the *Companies Act, 2013*. The appellants, minority shareholders holding *24.89%* equity in the respondent company, initiated winding-up proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal, Guwahati Bench. The dismissal of that petition led to an appellate remedy under *Section 421*, which prescribes a rigid limitation regime with narrowly defined discretion. The case is situated at the intersection of statutory limitation and extraordinary judicial intervention during the COVID-19 pandemic. The appellants attempted to rely on the Supreme Court’s suo motu extension of limitation to overcome delay that had already exceeded the maximum condonable window even before the lockdown commenced. The Court was thus called upon to determine whether pandemic-related extensions could override express statutory bars under special legislation. The judgment gains importance as it clarifies procedural compliance in company law appeals and delineates the limits of judicial discretion when statutory timelines are peremptory. It also serves as a caution against misconstruing benevolent judicial orders as blanket relaxations of all procedural constraints. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The appellants, shareholders of *Upper Assam Plywood Products Pvt. Ltd.*, filed a winding-up petition before the NCLT, Guwahati Bench. The Tribunal dismissed the petition by an order dated *25.10.2019*, pronounced in the presence of the parties. Although entitled to a free certified copy under *Section 420(3)* read with *Rule 50 of the NCLT Rules, 2016*, the appellants chose to apply for a certified copy on *21.11.2019*, approximately 27 days later. The certified copy was received by their counsel on *19.12.2019*. Under *Section 421(3)*, the appellants had *45 days* from that date to file an appeal before the NCLAT, which expired on *02.02.2020*. The proviso to the section permits condonation of delay for a further period not exceeding *45 days*, expiring on *18.03.2020*. Despite this, the appeal was filed only on *20.07.2020*. The appellants sought condonation by invoking the Supreme Court’s suo motu order dated *23.03.2020* extending limitation due to COVID-19. The NCLAT dismissed the application, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the statutory maximum. This dismissal was challenged before the Supreme Court. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether the limitation period under *Section 421(3)* commenced from the date of pronouncement or from the date of receipt of the certified copy? ii. Whether the Supreme Court’s suo motu order extending limitation due to COVID-19 could extend the statutorily capped condonable period? iii. Whether *Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963* applies to discretionary periods of condonation? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellants submitted that limitation under *Section 421(3)* begins only when a copy of the order is made available. They argued that the delay should be computed excluding the period affected by COVID-19 lockdown, relying upon the Supreme Court’s order dated *23.03.2020*. It was contended that the phrase *“whether condonable or not”* in the said order implied extension even of condonable periods. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the respondents contended that the statutory framework permits no condonation beyond *45 days*. They argued that the appellants were negligent well before the lockdown and that the suo motu order did not override statutory caps under special laws. The respondents emphasized legislative intent and jurisdictional limitations of the NCLAT. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. *Section 420(3), Companies Act, 2013* ii. *Section 421(3), Companies Act, 2013* iii. *Section 4, Limitation Act, 1963* iv. *Section 10, General Clauses Act, 1897* v. *Articles 141 and 142, Constitution of India* ## **I) JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the NCLAT’s order. The Court held that limitation commenced from *19.12.2019*, the date on which the certified copy was received. It observed that the appellants failed to act within both the limitation period and the maximum condonable period. The Court categorically held that the suo motu order dated *23.03.2020* extended only the *period of limitation* and not the discretionary condonable period. The Court clarified that judicial orders cannot enlarge jurisdiction where a statute explicitly restricts it. The lockdown commenced only on *24.03.2020*, by which time even the condonable period had expired. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The expression *“prescribed period”* under *Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963* refers only to the statutory limitation period and does not include any additional discretionary period provided for condonation. The Supreme Court’s suo motu extension of limitation does not override express statutory caps on condonation under special enactments such as the *Companies Act, 2013*. Reliance was placed on *Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Subash Projects and Marketing Ltd.*, *\[2012\] 1 SCR 403* . **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court emphasized the maxim *Vigilantibus Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt*, reiterating that law aids only vigilant litigants. The Court observed that pandemic-related extensions were intended to protect diligent parties prevented by circumstances, not those already in default. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Statutory outer limits for condonation cannot be judicially extended. ii. Pandemic-related extensions apply only to limitation periods, not condonable grace periods. iii. Litigants must act with diligence even where procedural benefits exist. iv. Special statutes prevail over general equitable considerations. ## **J) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Subash Projects and Marketing Ltd.*, *\[2012\] 1 SCR 403* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Companies Act, 2013* ii. *Limitation Act, 1963* iii. *General Clauses Act, 1897* iv. *Constitution of India* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Rakesh Kumar Agarwalla & Anr. v. National Law School of India University, Bengaluru & Ors., [2020] 10 SCR 299](https://lawfoyer.in/rakesh-kumar-agarwalla-anr-v-national-law-school-of-india-university-bengaluru-ors-2020-10-scr-299/) **Published:** January 17, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the legality of a unilateral decision taken by National Law School of India University, Bengaluru to conduct a separate entrance examination named National Law Aptitude Test (NLAT) for admissions to its five-year integrated B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) programme for the academic year 2020–2021. The decision was taken during the COVID-19 pandemic, citing delay in the Common Law Admission Test (CLAT) conducted by the Consortium of National Law Universities. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the legality of a unilateral decision taken by *National Law School of India University, Bengaluru* to conduct a separate entrance examination named *National Law Aptitude Test (NLAT)* for admissions to its *five-year integrated B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) programme* for the academic year 2020–2021. The decision was taken during the COVID-19 pandemic, citing delay in the *Common Law Admission Test (CLAT)* conducted by the *Consortium of National Law Universities*. The Supreme Court scrutinised whether the Executive Council of NLSIU could independently alter the established admission mechanism without securing the mandatory recommendation of the *Academic Council* under the *National Law School of India Act, 1986*. The Court undertook a detailed interpretation of *Sections 10, 11, 13, and 18* of the Act read with the *Schedule*, particularly *Clause 14*, to determine the distribution of statutory powers between the Executive Council and the Academic Council. The judgment further analysed the binding nature of the *Bye-laws of the Consortium of National Law Universities*, the doctrine of necessity invoked by NLSIU, and the constitutional implications under *Article 14 of the Constitution of India*. The Court held that the issuance of the NLAT notification without Academic Council recommendation was ultra vires, procedurally illegal, and violative of equality principles. Consequently, the NLAT notification and press release were quashed, and NLSIU was directed to admit students solely through CLAT 2020. **Keywords:** Academic Council, Executive Council, CLAT, NLAT, Statutory Interpretation, Article 14, Doctrine of Necessity ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgment Cause Title*Rakesh Kumar Agarwalla & Anr. v. National Law School of India University, Bengaluru & Ors.*Case Number*Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1030 of 2020*Judgment Date*21 September 2020*Court*Supreme Court of India*Quorum*Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy & M.R. Shah, JJ.*Author*Justice Ashok Bhushan*Citation*\[2020\] 10 SCR 299*Legal Provisions Involved*Articles 14 & 32, Constitution of India*; *Sections 10, 11, 13, 18, NLSIU Act, 1986*Judgments Overruled*None*Related Law Subjects*Constitutional Law, Education Law, Administrative Law* ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The controversy arose against the backdrop of the unprecedented disruption of academic schedules due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The *Common Law Admission Test (CLAT) 2020*, the uniform entrance examination for National Law Universities, was repeatedly postponed, ultimately scheduled for *28 September 2020*. NLSIU, citing its trimester system and apprehension of a “zero academic year”, resolved to conduct an independent entrance examination named NLAT. The petition was instituted under *Article 32 of the Constitution of India* by a parent of a CLAT aspirant and a former Vice-Chancellor of NLSIU. The challenge was directed against the admission notification dated *03.09.2020*, alleging statutory violation of the *National Law School of India Act, 1986* and breach of the binding obligations arising from NLSIU’s membership in the Consortium of National Law Universities. The case raised substantial questions concerning statutory governance in autonomous educational institutions, separation of academic and executive powers, procedural fairness in admissions, and constitutional equality in access to education. The Court was also called upon to examine whether pandemic-induced exigencies justified deviation from established statutory and institutional norms. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE NLSIU was established under the *National Law School of India Act, 1986* as the first National Law University in India. Over time, multiple NLUs were established, leading to the creation of a centralised admission system through CLAT following judicial intervention in *Varun Bhagat v. Union of India*. In 2019, the *Consortium of National Law Universities* was formally registered, and NLSIU became a founding member. The Bye-laws mandated admissions to member universities strictly through CLAT. For the academic year 2020–2021, CLAT was initially scheduled for May 2020 but was postponed due to COVID-19. Despite CLAT being rescheduled to *28 September 2020*, NLSIU issued a notification on *03 September 2020* announcing NLAT, an online home-proctored examination. This decision was taken pursuant to resolutions of the Executive Council dated *12.08.2020* and *18.08.2020*, without obtaining any recommendation from the Academic Council. The NLAT was conducted on *12 September 2020* with a re-test on *14 September 2020*. Allegations of exclusion, digital divide, lack of transparency, and procedural illegality were raised. The Supreme Court stayed declaration of results and admissions pending final adjudication. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the petitioners had locus standi to maintain the writ petition? ii. Whether issuance of the NLAT notification without recommendation of the Academic Council violated the *NLSIU Act, 1986*? iii. Whether NLSIU, as a founding member of the Consortium, was bound to admit students only through CLAT? iv. Whether the doctrine of necessity justified departure from CLAT? v. Whether NLAT violated *Article 14 of the Constitution of India*? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the petitioners submitted that *Sections 11, 13, and 18* of the *NLSIU Act, 1986* unequivocally vest control over admissions with the Academic Council. The Executive Council could not bypass statutory safeguards by invoking administrative powers. It was argued that the Consortium Bye-laws, though contractual, were binding and rooted in public interest. NLAT diluted merit, excluded marginalised students due to technological constraints, and breached *Article 14*. The doctrine of necessity was inapplicable as UGC guidelines permitted calendar modification. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents contended that the Executive Council, being the chief executive authority under *Section 10*, possessed inherent power over admissions. The absence of framed regulations under *Section 13* rendered Academic Council concurrence unnecessary. It was further argued that NLAT was transparent, affordable, and technologically safeguarded, and that the academic exigency justified exceptional measures to prevent a zero year. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court rejected objections on locus standi, recognising the petitioners’ standing. On merits, the Court conducted an exhaustive statutory interpretation and held that *Academic Council recommendation was mandatory* for altering admission modes. Relying on *Dr. Preeti Srivastava v. State of M.P.* and *Marathwada University v. Seshrao Chavan*, the Court reaffirmed that *standards of education include admissions*. The Court found NLAT procedurally illegal, inconsistent with Consortium obligations, and constitutionally infirm under *Article 14*. The NLAT notification and press release were quashed. NLSIU was directed to complete admissions based on CLAT 2020 results. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The power to regulate admissions is an academic function statutorily vested in the Academic Council under the *NLSIU Act, 1986*. Executive Council resolutions without Academic Council recommendation are ultra vires. Membership obligations under Consortium Bye-laws are binding and deviation violates fairness and equality. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that pandemic disruptions cannot justify erosion of statutory safeguards. Uniform entrance tests serve national interest and educational equity. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Admissions must strictly follow statutory procedures. ii. Academic Councils must be consulted on admission modes. iii. Consortium obligations must be honoured in letter and spirit. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces statutory governance, academic autonomy, and constitutional equality in higher education. It curtails executive overreach and affirms that emergencies cannot legitimise procedural illegality. The ruling strengthens trust in centralised admissions and institutional accountability. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Dr. Preeti Srivastava v. State of M.P.*, *\[1999\] 1 Suppl. SCR 249* 2. *Marathwada University v. Seshrao Chavan*, *\[1989\] 2 SCR 454* 3. *Christian Medical College Vellore v. Union of India*, *(2020) 8 SCC 705* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Constitution of India* 2. *National Law School of India Act, 1986* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [,National Alliance for People’s Movements & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., [2020] 8 SCR 997](https://lawfoyer.in/national-alliance-for-peoples-movements-ors-v-state-of-maharashtra-ors-2020-8-scr-997/) **Published:** January 17, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in National Alliance for People’s Movements & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. examines the constitutional validity of the classification adopted by the High Powered Committee constituted pursuant to the directions of the Supreme Court for decongestion of prisons during the Covid-19 pandemic. The case arose from a public interest challenge to the guidelines framed by the High Powered Committee of Maharashtra, which excluded certain categories of prisoners, particularly those charged under special statutes and those convicted of offences punishable above seven years, from the benefit of interim bail or parole. The petitioners contended that such categorisation was discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. **Content:** ## A) **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment in *National Alliance for People’s Movements & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.* examines the constitutional validity of the classification adopted by the High Powered Committee constituted pursuant to the directions of the Supreme Court for *decongestion of prisons during the Covid-19 pandemic*. The case arose from a public interest challenge to the guidelines framed by the High Powered Committee of Maharashtra, which excluded certain categories of prisoners, particularly those charged under *special statutes* and those convicted of offences punishable above seven years, from the benefit of *interim bail or parole*. The petitioners contended that such categorisation was discriminatory and violative of *Article 14 of the Constitution of India*. The Supreme Court analysed the scope of its earlier *suo motu* directions issued in *Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1 of 2020* and clarified that the temporary release of prisoners during the pandemic was *not a statutory right but a humanitarian and administrative measure* aimed at preventing overcrowding and safeguarding public health. The Court upheld the impugned classification, holding that the exclusion of prisoners charged under *special enactments* such as *MCOCA, NDPS, UAPA, PMLA* had a *reasonable nexus* with the object sought to be achieved, namely, balancing public health concerns with societal security. The decision reiterates the settled constitutional principle that *reasonable classification is permissible* and that *equality does not mean identical treatment*. It further underscores judicial restraint in interfering with expert administrative decisions taken in extraordinary circumstances. The judgment is significant for its articulation of the limits of judicial review in policy decisions taken during public health emergencies and for reaffirming that the pandemic cannot be used as a fortuitous circumstance to claim bail otherwise impermissible in law. ***Keywords*:** Covid-19 Pandemic, Prison Decongestion, Interim Bail, High Powered Committee, Article 14, Reasonable Classification ## B) **CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*National Alliance for People’s Movements & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.*Case NumberSpecial Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 4116 of 2020Judgement Date22 September 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorum*S. A. Bobde, CJI; A. S. Bopanna, J.; V. Ramasubramanian, J.*Author*V. Ramasubramanian, J.*Citation*\[2020\] 8 SCR 997*Legal Provisions Involved*Articles 14 and 21, Constitution of India; Sections relating to bail under CrPC; Special enactments such as MCOCA, NDPS Act, UAPA, PMLA*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law Subjects*Constitutional Law; Criminal Law; Human Rights Law* ## C) **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The judgment emerged from an unprecedented public health crisis triggered by the outbreak of *Novel Coronavirus (Covid-19)*, which posed severe challenges to prison administration across India. Overcrowding in prisons was identified as a major risk factor for rapid transmission of the virus, thereby implicating the *right to life and health of prisoners under Article 21*. Recognising this, the Supreme Court, in *Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1 of 2020*, initiated proceedings to address prison overcrowding as a constitutional concern. Pursuant to its orders dated *16 March 2020* and *23 March 2020*, the Court directed all States and Union Territories to constitute *High Powered Committees* to determine appropriate categories of prisoners who could be released on *interim bail or parole*. These directions were deliberately broad, granting discretion to States to account for local conditions such as prison occupancy, severity of offences, and public safety considerations. In compliance, the State of Maharashtra constituted an HPC which issued guidelines on *25 March 2020*. These guidelines classified prisoners into three broad categories based on *nature of offence* and *severity of punishment*, and expressly excluded prisoners charged under *special statutes* irrespective of the length of punishment. This exclusion formed the core of the dispute. The petitioners, claiming to act in public interest, approached the Bombay High Court alleging that such categorisation was arbitrary and discriminatory. Upon dismissal of their challenge, the matter reached the Supreme Court. The present judgment, therefore, is situated at the intersection of *constitutional equality*, *criminal justice policy*, and *emergency public health governance*. ## D) **FACTS OF THE CASE** The petitioners challenged the decisions and minutes of meetings of the Maharashtra High Powered Committee dated *25 March 2020* and *11 May 2020*, along with a corrigendum dated *18 May 2020*. These instruments collectively governed the temporary release of prisoners during the Covid-19 pandemic. The HPC classified inmates into three categories: first, undertrial and convicted prisoners facing punishment of *seven years or less*; second, convicted prisoners sentenced to *more than seven years*; and third, undertrials or convicts charged under *serious economic offences or special enactments* such as *MCOCA, NDPS, UAPA, and PMLA*. The petitioners alleged that the exclusion of the third category amounted to *hostile discrimination*, particularly where the prescribed punishment under certain special statutes could be less than seven years. They further contended that insisting upon prior release on parole or furlough for life convicts was unreasonable. According to them, the HPC failed to adhere to the principle of *equal treatment* mandated under *Article 14*. The State defended the guidelines by emphasising the *temporary and exceptional nature* of the measure, asserting that the object was not to confer bail as a right but to *reduce overcrowding* to prevent viral spread. It was highlighted that prisoners excluded from the HPC benefit could still apply for bail under ordinary criminal law provisions. The Bombay High Court upheld the classification, observing that the HPC’s decision was based on *intelligible differentia* and was consistent with the Supreme Court’s *suo motu* directions. Aggrieved, the petitioners approached the Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition. ## E) **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether the categorisation of prisoners by the High Powered Committee violated *Article 14 of the Constitution of India*? ii. Whether exclusion of prisoners charged under special enactments from interim bail during Covid-19 was arbitrary? iii. Whether interim bail during a pandemic constitutes a *legal or statutory right*? ## F) **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the Petitioners submitted that the classification adopted by the HPC was *manifestly arbitrary* and failed the twin test of *intelligible differentia and rational nexus*. It was argued that prisoners charged under special statutes with lesser punishments were unfairly excluded. Reliance was placed on *Article 14 jurisprudence* to contend that severity of offence could not be presumed solely from the statute invoked. The Petitioners further argued that the insistence on prior release for life convicts was unreasonable and unrelated to the object of decongestion. It was contended that *public health exigencies* demanded a broader and more inclusive approach. ## G) **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the Respondents submitted that the HPC acted strictly within the scope of the Supreme Court’s directions and exercised informed discretion. It was argued that offences under *special enactments* involve *greater societal impact* and are subject to *statutory bail restrictions*, justifying a separate classification. The Respondents emphasised that interim bail was *not a fundamental or statutory right* but an *additional humanitarian measure*. It was argued that excluded prisoners retained their ordinary legal remedies for bail. ## H) **JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the Bombay High Court’s decision. The Court held that the *very purpose* of constituting HPCs was to enable State-specific decision-making based on prevailing conditions. It observed that the Maharashtra HPC categorised prisoners based on *nature of offence and severity*, which directly aligned with the object of decongestion without jeopardising public safety. The Court reiterated that *reasonable classification* is constitutionally permissible, relying on precedents such as *State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar*, *Arun Kumar v. Union of India*, and *K.R. Lakshman v. Karnataka Electricity Board*. It held that equality does not require identical treatment in all circumstances. The Court clarified that interim bail during the pandemic was an *exceptional benefit* arising from a *humanitarian consideration* and not a right enforceable under law. The exclusion of certain categories merely denied this additional benefit and did not extinguish existing legal rights. Judicial interference, it held, was unwarranted in policy decisions taken by expert bodies unless manifest arbitrariness was shown. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment lies in the holding that *classification of prisoners by the High Powered Committee based on the nature of offence and statutory framework is reasonable and constitutionally valid*. Interim bail granted during the Covid-19 pandemic is *not a statutory or fundamental right* but a temporary, humanitarian measure aimed at decongestion. Therefore, exclusion of prisoners charged under special enactments does not violate *Article 14* as it has a rational nexus with societal interest and public safety. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that if existing measures fail to achieve decongestion, the HPC may reconsider and modify its guidelines. It also noted that individual grievances of discrimination within the *same category* may still be judicially examined. **c) GUIDELINES** The Court reaffirmed that HPCs retain continuing discretion to reassess categories based on evolving circumstances. It clarified that States are not mandated to release prisoners uniformly and must balance public health with law and order considerations. ## I) **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment reinforces judicial deference to expert administrative bodies in crisis governance. It strikes a balance between *human rights of prisoners* and *societal security*, clarifying that equality jurisprudence does not mandate uniform relief in extraordinary situations. The decision has lasting relevance in delineating the constitutional contours of emergency responses within the criminal justice system. ## J) **REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar*, *AIR 1952 SC 75* ii. *Arun Kumar v. Union of India*, *(2007) 1 SCC 732* iii. *K.R. Lakshman v. Karnataka Electricity Board*, *(2001) 1 SCC 442* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Constitution of India, 1950* ii. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* iii. *Special Criminal Statutes including NDPS Act, UAPA, PMLA, MCOCA* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [State of Kerala & Anr. v. M/s RDS Project Limited & Ors., [2020] 6 S.C.R. 837](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-kerala-anr-v-m-s-rds-project-limited-ors-2020-6-s-c-r-837/) **Published:** January 17, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the limits of judicial review under Article 226 in matters involving technical and administrative decision-making based on expert opinion. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the High Court of Kerala exceeded its jurisdiction by directing a load test on the Palarivattom Flyover despite the State Government having accepted the recommendation of a High-Level Expert Committee. The flyover, constructed on a National Highway and inaugurated in 2016, developed structural cracks within a year. Divergent expert opinions emerged. IIT Madras recommended rehabilitation using carbon fibre composite treatment, while Dr. E. Sreedharan proposed demolition and reconstruction with a guarantee of a 100-year service life. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the limits of *judicial review under Article 226* in matters involving *technical and administrative decision-making based on expert opinion*. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the High Court of Kerala exceeded its jurisdiction by directing a *load test* on the Palarivattom Flyover despite the State Government having accepted the recommendation of a *High-Level Expert Committee*. The flyover, constructed on a National Highway and inaugurated in 2016, developed structural cracks within a year. Divergent expert opinions emerged. *IIT Madras* recommended rehabilitation using *carbon fibre composite treatment*, while *Dr. E. Sreedharan* proposed *demolition and reconstruction* with a guarantee of a *100-year service life*. To resolve this divergence, the State constituted a High-Level Committee of senior engineers, which evaluated all expert reports and concluded that demolition and reconstruction was preferable. The State accepted this recommendation. The contractor challenged this decision before the High Court, which directed a load test before demolition. The Supreme Court held that the High Court failed to apply settled principles of judicial review. Instead of examining *arbitrariness or violation of Article 14*, the High Court substituted its own view for that of duly appointed experts. The Court reaffirmed that when the State acts on the basis of expert committee recommendations, courts must exercise restraint and cannot re-evaluate technical decisions. The High Court’s interference was held to be unwarranted, and its order was set aside. **Keywords:** Judicial Review, Administrative Discretion, Expert Committee, Infrastructure Law, Article 14, Technical Decision-Making ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*State of Kerala & Anr. v. M/s RDS Project Limited & Ors.*ii) Case Number*Civil Appeal Nos. 3239–3246 of 2020*iii) Judgement Date*22 September 2020*iv) Court*Supreme Court of India*v) Quorum*R.F. Nariman, Navin Sinha, Indira Banerjee, JJ.*vi) Author*R.F. Nariman, J.*vii) Citation*\[2020\] 6 S.C.R. 837*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Article 14, Constitution of India*ix) Judgments Overruled*None*x) Related Law Subjects*Administrative Law, Constitutional Law, Infrastructure & Public Works Law* ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The dispute arose from the construction and subsequent structural deterioration of the *Palarivattom Flyover* situated on a National Highway in Kochi. The project was executed by the respondent contractor and inaugurated in October 2016. Within one year of operation, inspections conducted by the consultancy agency of the *Ministry of Road Transport and Highways* reported that the flyover was in a *distressed condition*, exhibiting *multiple cracks* that warranted immediate attention. Given the gravity of the findings, *IIT Madras* was appointed as an expert agency. It submitted reports suggesting that the flyover could be *rehabilitated rather than demolished*, recommending carbon fibre fabric composite treatment. During this period, *Dr. E. Sreedharan*, a renowned infrastructure expert, submitted an independent report advocating *complete demolition and reconstruction*, replacing RCC girders with PSC girders to ensure durability and offering a *100-year service life guarantee*. Faced with conflicting expert opinions, the State Government constituted a *High-Level Technical Committee* comprising senior engineers from the Public Works Department. This Committee critically evaluated all reports and concluded that reconstruction was preferable due to the extensive nature of structural distress and the absence of any assured post-repair service life under the IIT proposal. The State accepted this recommendation through a Government Order dated 25.10.2019. The contractor challenged this decision before the High Court, leading to judicial scrutiny of administrative discretion in technical matters. The Supreme Court’s intervention thus centered on delineating the boundaries of judicial review where expert-driven policy decisions are involved . ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The Palarivattom Flyover was constructed by the respondent contractor and opened for public use on *12 October 2016*. Routine inspections conducted by the consultancy agency for the *Ministry of Road Transport and Highways* revealed, by *16 March 2018*, that the flyover had developed *serious structural cracks*, rendering it distressed. In response, *IIT Madras* was appointed to assess the structural integrity of the flyover. IIT conducted various tests in accordance with *IS Codes and IRC recommendations* and concluded that the structure could be strengthened using *carbon fibre composite treatment*. It did not, however, specify the *post-rehabilitation service life* of the flyover. Subsequently, *Dr. E. Sreedharan* submitted reports dated *03.07.2019* and *14.09.2019* recommending demolition and reconstruction. He rejected the IIT approach and asserted that only a complete replacement of RCC girders with PSC girders would ensure structural safety and longevity, offering a *100-year guarantee*. Due to these conflicting opinions, the State constituted a *High-Level Committee* of five senior PWD engineers. The Committee found that *97 out of 102 girders required strengthening*, indicating extensive distress. It also noted that rehabilitation is generally suitable for older structures with limited defects, not for relatively new flyovers with widespread cracks. The Committee therefore endorsed Dr. Sreedharan’s proposal despite its higher cost. The State accepted this recommendation and issued a Government Order. The contractor challenged the order, leading the High Court to direct a *load test* before demolition. This directive formed the basis of the appeal before the Supreme Court . ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i) Whether the High Court exceeded the scope of *judicial review* by directing a load test despite the State acting on expert opinion? ii) Whether acceptance of a High-Level Expert Committee report by the State amounted to *arbitrariness under Article 14*? iii) Whether courts can substitute administrative decisions based on technical expertise with judicial directions? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that the State Government had acted *strictly on expert advice* after constituting a High-Level Committee. It was argued that the High Court failed to apply settled principles of judicial review and instead undertook an assessment of technical merits. The appellants contended that *no arbitrariness* could be attributed to a decision based on expert consensus, and that judicial interference was unwarranted. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents submitted that the *load test was mandatory* under the contract to ascertain structural strength. It was argued that demolition without a load test would prejudice the contractor’s rights and foreclose the possibility of proving that rehabilitation was sufficient. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court held that the High Court *misdirected itself* by venturing into technical evaluation rather than examining whether the State’s decision violated *Article 14*. The Court observed that once a *High-Level Expert Committee* evaluates competing expert opinions and the State accepts its recommendation, courts must exercise restraint. The Court emphasized that judicial review is concerned with the *decision-making process*, not the *decision itself*. It found no material to suggest arbitrariness, mala fides, or irrationality in the State’s acceptance of the Committee’s report. The High Court’s direction for a load test was held to be an impermissible substitution of administrative judgment. Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside both the main judgment and the review judgment of the High Court and allowed the appeals . **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** When the State Government takes a decision based on the recommendation of a duly constituted *expert committee*, courts exercising judicial review must not interfere unless the decision is arbitrary, irrational, or violative of *Article 14*. Courts cannot substitute their own views in matters involving technical expertise. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that judicial restraint is particularly necessary in infrastructure projects involving public safety and expert engineering assessment, as courts lack institutional competence to re-evaluate such technical matters. **c) GUIDELINES** i) Courts must confine judicial review to *legality, rationality, and procedural propriety*. ii) Technical determinations based on expert opinion should not be reopened by courts. iii) Administrative decisions supported by expert committees enjoy a presumption of validity. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces the doctrine of *judicial restraint in administrative law*. It underscores that courts must respect expert-driven policy decisions, particularly in infrastructure and public works. The ruling provides clarity on the limits of judicial intervention and strengthens administrative autonomy while safeguarding constitutional scrutiny under *Article 14* . ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i) *State of Kerala & Anr. v. M/s RDS Project Limited & Ors.*, *\[2020\] 6 S.C.R. 837* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i) *Constitution of India – Article 14* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Union of India & Ors. v. M/s G.S. Chatha Rice Mills & Anr., [2020] 14 SCR 571](https://lawfoyer.in/union-of-india-ors-v-m-s-g-s-chatha-rice-mills-anr-2020-14-scr-571/) **Published:** January 17, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the legal effect and enforceability of an electronically published customs notification enhancing import duty under Section 8A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether Notification No. 5/2019, enhancing customs duty to 200% on goods originating from Pakistan, could be applied to import consignments for which bills of entry had already been electronically filed and self-assessed prior to the time of publication of the notification on the e-Gazette. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the legal effect and enforceability of an electronically published customs notification enhancing import duty under *Section 8A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975*. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether *Notification No. 5/2019*, enhancing customs duty to *200% on goods originating from Pakistan*, could be applied to import consignments for which *bills of entry had already been electronically filed and self-assessed* prior to the time of publication of the notification on the *e-Gazette*. The Court analysed the evolving framework of *electronic governance*, particularly the shift from physical to *digital publication of statutory notifications* and *electronic filing of bills of entry*. Emphasis was placed on the *time-stamp* of electronic actions under the *Information Technology Act, 2000* and the *Bill of Entry (Electronic Integrated Declaration and Paperless Processing) Regulations, 2018*. The ruling clarifies that a *delegated legislative instrument* issued under *Section 8A* cannot operate retrospectively unless expressly authorised by statute. The Court decisively held that *the precise time of electronic publication on the e-Gazette determines enforceability*, and not merely the date. Once the statutory conditions under *Section 15 of the Customs Act, 1962* stand crystallised, the rate of duty becomes fixed and immune from later enhancement. The decision reinforces legal certainty, protects vested rights, and aligns fiscal administration with principles of fairness, transparency, and digital governance. **Keywords:** Electronic Gazette, Delegated Legislation, Customs Duty, Retrospectivity, Self-Assessment, Digital Governance ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Union of India & Ors. v. M/s G.S. Chatha Rice Mills & Anr.*Case Number*Civil Appeal No. 3249 of 2020*Judgement Date*23 September 2020*Court*Supreme Court of India*Quorum*Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, Indu Malhotra & K.M. Joseph, JJ.*Author*Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.*Citation*\[2020\] 14 SCR 571*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 8A & 11A, Customs Tariff Act, 1975; Sections 12, 15, 17, 46 & 47, Customs Act, 1962; Sections 8 & 13, IT Act, 2000*Judgments Overruled*None*Related Law Subjects*Constitutional Law, Taxation Law, Customs Law, Administrative Law* ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The litigation arose in the immediate aftermath of the *Pulwama terrorist attack dated 14 February 2019*, which prompted the Union Government to invoke emergency fiscal powers. Acting under *Section 8A(1) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975*, the Central Government issued *Notification No. 5/2019* on *16 February 2019*, imposing a steep customs duty of *200%* on goods originating from the *Islamic Republic of Pakistan*. Significantly, the notification was not published in the traditional printed Gazette. It was *electronically uploaded to the e-Gazette at precisely 20:46:58 hours*. Prior to this timestamp, several Indian importers had already *filed electronic bills of entry, completed self-assessment, and in some cases initiated payment of duty* under the then-prevailing concessional regime. The dispute centres on whether such importers could be retrospectively burdened with the enhanced duty merely because the notification bore the same calendar date. The Punjab and Haryana High Court ruled in favour of the importers, holding that *the rate of duty crystallised upon electronic filing and self-assessment*. The Union of India appealed, contending that under *Section 15 of the Customs Act*, the relevant criterion is the *date* of the bill of entry and not the *time*. The Supreme Court was therefore tasked with harmonising fiscal statutes with the realities of *electronic governance*, while preserving the doctrine against retrospective taxation. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The first respondent imported a consignment of *1400 bags of cement from Pakistan* under an invoice dated *1 February 2019*. The consignment crossed the *Attari Land Customs Station* and entered Indian territory at *4:31 PM on 16 February 2019*. The *Import General Manifest (IGM)* was filed before *18:00 hours*. A *bill of entry for home consumption* was electronically filed under *Section 46 of the Customs Act* at *18:08 hours*. Self-assessment under *Section 17(1)* was completed by levying *nil basic customs duty* and *IGST at 28%*, in accordance with *Notification No. 50/2017*. The assessed duty amounted to *₹73,342*. Later that night, *Notification No. 5/2019* was uploaded at *20:46:58 hours*, enhancing customs duty to *200%*. Customs authorities subsequently *recalled and reassessed* the bill of entry on *20 February 2019*, raising the duty to *₹8,10,952*. Aggrieved, the respondent challenged the reassessment before the High Court, contending that the notification could not apply to a transaction already concluded in law. The High Court allowed the writ petitions. The Union of India appealed to the Supreme Court. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether a notification issued under *Section 8A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975* can operate retrospectively? ii. Whether the *time of publication on the e-Gazette* is relevant for determining enforceability? iii. Whether reassessment under *Section 17(4) of the Customs Act, 1962* was legally permissible? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the Union of India submitted that *Section 15 of the Customs Act* refers only to the *date* of presentation of the bill of entry. It was argued that a notification issued on *16 February 2019* must be treated as effective from *00:00 hours* of that day. It was further contended that a notification under *Section 8A* amends the *First Schedule* to the Customs Tariff Act and therefore assumes the character of a legislative act. Reliance was placed on *Section 5(3) of the General Clauses Act, 1897* to argue that the notification came into force immediately upon the commencement of the day. The Union also claimed that reassessment under *Section 17(4)* was valid as the duty was not “finally assessed” until clearance under *Section 47*. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents argued that *Notification No. 5/2019* was a form of *delegated legislation* and could not have retrospective operation. It was emphasised that *self-assessment was complete* before the notification was published. Reliance was placed on *Regulation 4(2) of the 2018 Regulations*, which creates a *deeming fiction* that assessment is complete upon generation of the bill of entry number. It was submitted that reassessment under *Section 17(4)* is permissible only when the original assessment is incorrect, which was not the case. The respondents further relied on *Sections 8 and 13 of the Information Technology Act, 2000* to highlight the legal sanctity of electronic timestamps. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the High Court’s ruling. The Court held that *Notification No. 5/2019* could operate only *prospectively* from *20:46:58 hours on 16 February 2019*. The Court ruled that *Section 8A* does not authorise retrospective enhancement of duty. A notification under this provision is *delegated legislation*, distinct from a *Central Act* under the *General Clauses Act*. Consequently, *Section 5(3)* had no application. The Court recognised the *transition from manual to electronic governance* and held that *time assumes legal significance* in an electronic environment. Once the twin conditions under *Section 15* were satisfied, the rate of duty stood crystallised. Reassessment under *Section 17(4)* was held impermissible, as there was *no incorrect self-assessment*. The subsequent notification could not reopen a legally concluded assessment. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** A notification issued under *Section 8A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975* operates prospectively and becomes enforceable only from the *exact time of its electronic publication on the e-Gazette*. Once a bill of entry is electronically filed and self-assessment is completed under the applicable law, the rate of duty stands crystallised and cannot be altered by a subsequent notification. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that *legislative silences must be interpreted using common sense*. In an era of digital governance, ignoring timestamps would undermine certainty and fairness in fiscal administration. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Electronic publication time determines enforceability of notifications. ii. Delegated legislation cannot operate retrospectively without express statutory authority. iii. Completed self-assessment cannot be reopened except as permitted by law. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment firmly aligns fiscal jurisprudence with digital governance. It safeguards vested rights, ensures certainty in taxation, and restrains arbitrary retrospective application of executive notifications. The ruling sets a constitutional benchmark for electronic administration and delegated legislation in India. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Union of India v. Ganesh Das Bhojraj* *\[2000\] 1 SCR 1081* 2. *Pankaj Jain Agencies v. Union of India* *\[1994\] 1 Supp SCR 602* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Customs Act, 1962* 2. *Customs Tariff Act, 1975* 3. *Information Technology Act, 2000* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Sri Nilanjan Bhattacharya v. State of Karnataka and Others, [2020] 14 SCR 445](https://lawfoyer.in/sri-nilanjan-bhattacharya-v-state-of-karnataka-and-others-2020-14-scr-445/) **Published:** January 17, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment concerns the exercise of parens patriae jurisdiction by the Supreme Court of India in an international child custody dispute arising from a petition for habeas corpus. The appellant-father sought repatriation of his minor son, a US citizen by birth, from India to the United States after the respondent-mother unilaterally decided not to return to the US following a temporary visit to India. The Karnataka High Court allowed repatriation but imposed conditional restrictions linked to the COVID-19 pandemic, requiring certificates from Indian and US authorities. The Supreme Court examined not only the validity of those conditions but also reassessed the entire custodial arrangement in light of the welfare of the child. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment concerns the exercise of *parens patriae* jurisdiction by the Supreme Court of India in an international child custody dispute arising from a petition for *habeas corpus*. The appellant-father sought repatriation of his minor son, a US citizen by birth, from India to the United States after the respondent-mother unilaterally decided not to return to the US following a temporary visit to India. The Karnataka High Court allowed repatriation but imposed conditional restrictions linked to the COVID-19 pandemic, requiring certificates from Indian and US authorities. The Supreme Court examined not only the validity of those conditions but also reassessed the entire custodial arrangement in light of the welfare of the child. The Court reiterated that in matters of cross-border child custody, *the welfare of the child remains the paramount consideration*, outweighing doctrines such as comity of courts or enforcement of foreign custody orders. The Court emphasized the distinction between *summary inquiry* and *elaborate inquiry* depending on the promptness of proceedings and the extent to which the child has developed roots in India. Given the immediate steps taken by the appellant, the short duration of the child’s stay in India, and the absence of demonstrated harm upon return, the Court found that a summary inquiry sufficed. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s direction permitting the child’s return to the US but struck down the COVID-related conditions as unenforceable and legally unsound. The judgment reinforces settled jurisprudence on international child abduction in non-Hague Convention countries and clarifies the scope of habeas corpus in custody matters, grounding the decision firmly in child-centric constitutional adjudication. **Keywords:** Parens patriae; Habeas corpus; Child custody; Welfare of child; International child removal; Summary inquiry ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgment Cause Title*Sri Nilanjan Bhattacharya v. State of Karnataka and Others*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 3284 of 2020iii) Judgment Date23 September 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) Quorum*Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, Indu Malhotra and K.M. Joseph, JJ.*vi) Author*Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.*vii) Citation*\[2020\] 14 SCR 445*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Article 32, Article 226 of the Constitution of India*ix) Judgments OverruledNilx) Related Law SubjectsConstitutional Law; Family Law; Private International Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The case arose in the backdrop of increasing transnational matrimonial disputes involving removal of children across borders by one parent without the consent of the other. India not being a signatory to the *Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 1980*, such disputes are adjudicated through constitutional remedies rather than treaty enforcement. The present appeal stemmed from a habeas corpus petition filed by the father after his minor child was retained in India by the mother contrary to the custodial regime prevailing in the United States. The Karnataka High Court exercised its writ jurisdiction to allow repatriation but imposed extraordinary conditions linked to public health concerns during the COVID-19 pandemic. The father challenged these conditions as impractical and unenforceable. The Supreme Court, while addressing the limited challenge, expanded the scope of inquiry by invoking its *parens patriae* obligation to independently assess whether the custodial arrangement itself served the child’s welfare. The background of the dispute reflects a recurring judicial dilemma: balancing respect for foreign custody orders with the sovereign duty to protect children within Indian jurisdiction. The judgment situates itself within a consistent line of precedents where the Supreme Court has clarified that foreign court orders are relevant but not determinative. The constitutional mandate under Articles 32 and 226 is directed not at enforcement of foreign decrees but at protection of liberty and welfare, particularly of minors incapable of asserting independent choice. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellant and the second respondent were married in India in November 2012, and the marriage was formally registered in February 2013. Both parties relocated to the United States in April 2015 for professional reasons. The respondent secured employment in New Jersey and later in New York, while the appellant remained employed in New Jersey. Their son, Adhrit, was born in December 2016 in the US and acquired *US citizenship by birth*. In March 2019, the respondent traveled to India with the minor child for what was represented as a short visit. After arriving in India, she communicated her intention not to return to the US. The appellant promptly traveled to India and attempted reconciliation. Upon failure, he initiated custody proceedings before the *Superior Court of New Jersey, Hudson County, Chancery Division – Family Part*. On 21 May 2019, that court granted him *legal and temporary custody*. Subsequently, the appellant invoked Article 32 before the Supreme Court seeking habeas corpus, which was withdrawn with liberty to approach the appropriate forum. A habeas corpus petition was then filed before the Karnataka High Court in August 2019. The High Court allowed repatriation but imposed conditional safeguards requiring certification that India was COVID-free and that conditions in New Jersey were congenial for the child. The appellant challenged only these conditions before the Supreme Court. During proceedings, the respondent did not contest custody and conveyed through the amicus curiae that she did not wish to pursue litigation. The child, meanwhile, remained with the maternal grandparents in India. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the High Court was justified in imposing conditional restrictions on repatriation of the minor child linked to COVID-19 certification? ii. Whether, in a habeas corpus petition concerning a minor, the Supreme Court can reassess custodial arrangements despite limited grounds of challenge? iii. Whether repatriation of the minor child to the United States served the paramount consideration of child welfare? iv. Whether the existence of a foreign custody order mandates enforcement through habeas corpus proceedings in India? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the High Court conditions were *legally impossible to comply with* and lacked any statutory foundation. It was argued that no authority could certify that an entire country was free from COVID-19, rendering the order unenforceable. It was contended that the appellant acted promptly in seeking custody, satisfying the requirement for *summary inquiry* as laid down in *Nithya Anand Raghavan v. State (NCT of Delhi)*. The appellant emphasized his active role in parenting, substantiated through detailed records of the child’s stay and travel with him in the US. The appellant further undertook to comply with all prevailing travel regulations and offered extensive visitation and access arrangements to the respondent, demonstrating bona fides and commitment to shared parenting. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent, through the amicus curiae, submitted that the respondent *did not object* to the child accompanying the appellant to the US. It was conveyed that the respondent did not wish to engage in adversarial litigation and sought a peaceful resolution. The amicus curiae highlighted the need for safeguarding maternal access and emotional continuity for the child, even if physical custody was restored to the appellant. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Article 32 of the Constitution of India* – Enforcement of fundamental rights ii. *Article 226 of the Constitution of India* – Writ jurisdiction of High Courts iii. *Doctrine of Parens Patriae* iv. *Principle of Welfare of the Child* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court affirmed that while the appeal formally challenged only the conditions imposed by the High Court, the Court was duty-bound to reassess the custodial arrangement itself due to the involvement of a minor. The Court reiterated that *parens patriae* jurisdiction obligates constitutional courts to act as guardians of minors within their territorial jurisdiction. Relying on *Nithya Anand Raghavan*, *Prateek Gupta*, and *V. Ravi Chandran*, the Court held that prompt initiation of proceedings and lack of child’s integration in India warranted only a *summary inquiry*. The child had spent most formative years in the US, and no material suggested that return would cause harm. The Court found the High Court’s COVID-related conditions to be well-intentioned but legally flawed. Requiring certification that India was free from the pandemic was illogical and impossible. Similarly, no identifiable authority existed in the US to certify congenial living conditions. Such conditions failed the test of reasonableness and enforceability. Consequently, the Court set aside conditions (a) and (b), while maintaining the repatriation direction and crafting a detailed access and visitation framework to preserve the child’s relationship with the mother. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The decisive legal principle emerging from the judgment is that *in international child custody disputes arising in non-Hague Convention contexts, the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration, superseding comity of courts and foreign custody orders*. The Court clarified that habeas corpus jurisdiction in child custody cases is not an execution mechanism for foreign decrees. Instead, it is a constitutional tool to assess unlawful detention with reference to the child’s welfare. Where proceedings are instituted promptly and the child has not developed roots in India, a summary inquiry suffices. Further, judicial directions must be enforceable, reasonable, and grounded in legal authority. Conditions incapable of compliance undermine the administration of justice and must be struck down. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that public health emergencies, though serious, cannot justify judicially imposed conditions that lack legal precision or institutional backing. Courts must remain sensitive to ground realities while ensuring that orders are pragmatic. The judgment also reflects concern over unilateral parental decisions disrupting settled custodial arrangements and underscores the importance of cooperative parenting even after marital breakdown. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Courts must prioritize *child welfare over foreign custody orders*. ii. Prompt action by the aggrieved parent justifies *summary inquiry*. iii. Habeas corpus cannot be converted into an execution proceeding. iv. Conditions imposed by courts must be *legally enforceable and precise*. v. Access and visitation rights must be structured to preserve parental bonds. ## J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment strengthens India’s evolving jurisprudence on international child custody by reaffirming a child-centric constitutional approach. It balances respect for foreign legal processes with sovereign responsibility, avoiding mechanical enforcement of foreign orders. By striking down impractical conditions while safeguarding maternal access, the Court demonstrated judicial sensitivity and pragmatism. The decision serves as authoritative guidance for High Courts dealing with similar disputes, especially in extraordinary circumstances such as global health crises. The ruling also underscores the need for legislative clarity or international cooperation mechanisms to address cross-border child custody disputes, given the increasing mobility of Indian families. ## K) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Nithya Anand Raghavan v. State (NCT of Delhi)*, *\[2017\] 7 SCR 281* ii. *Prateek Gupta v. Shilpi Gupta*, *\[2017\] 13 SCR 230* iii. *V. Ravi Chandran v. Union of India*, *\[2009\] 15 SCR 960* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Constitution of India* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Beli Ram v. Rajinder Kumar & Anr., [2020] 11 SCR 31](https://lawfoyer.in/beli-ram-v-rajinder-kumar-anr-2020-11-scr-31/) **Published:** January 16, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The decision in Beli Ram v. Rajinder Kumar & Anr. addresses a recurring and unsettled question at the intersection of motor vehicle insurance law and workmen’s compensation jurisprudence, namely whether an employer can escape liability when a workman-driver suffers injury while driving with an expired but otherwise genuine driving licence. The Supreme Court examined the scope of employer diligence under Section 149(2)(a)(ii) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the employer’s statutory obligation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923. The Court clarified that the duty of an employer does not end at initial verification of a driving licence but extends to ensuring its continued validity. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The decision in *Beli Ram v. Rajinder Kumar & Anr.* addresses a recurring and unsettled question at the intersection of *motor vehicle insurance law* and *workmen’s compensation jurisprudence*, namely whether an employer can escape liability when a workman-driver suffers injury while driving with an expired but otherwise genuine driving licence. The Supreme Court examined the scope of employer diligence under *Section 149(2)(a)(ii) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988* and the employer’s statutory obligation under the *Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923*. The Court clarified that the duty of an employer does not end at initial verification of a driving licence but extends to ensuring its continued validity. The judgment distinguishes cases involving fake licences from those involving expired licences and holds that permitting a driver to operate a commercial vehicle for nearly three years without licence renewal constitutes gross negligence and a conscious breach of policy conditions. Relying upon consistent High Court jurisprudence, particularly *Hem Raj*, the Court affirmed that an expired licence not renewed within the statutory grace period cannot be treated as a valid licence. Consequently, the insurer was rightly absolved of liability, and the employer-owner was held solely responsible. The ruling reinforces the principle that *beneficial legislation cannot be stretched to condone statutory non-compliance*, especially where public safety is implicated. At the same time, the Court preserved the compensatory object of the *Workmen’s Compensation Act* by upholding the award to the injured workman. **Keywords:** Expired driving licence, employer negligence, workmen compensation, insurance liability, due diligence ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*Beli Ram v. Rajinder Kumar & Anr.*ii) Case Number*Civil Appeal Nos. 7220–7221 of 2011*iii) Judgement Date*23 September 2020*iv) Court*Supreme Court of India*v) Quorum*Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Aniruddha Bose & Krishna Murari, JJ.*vi) Author*Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul*vii) Citation*\[2020\] 11 SCR 31*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923; Motor Vehicles Act, 1988*ix) Judgments Overruled*None*x) Related Law Subjects*Labour Law, Motor Vehicles Law, Insurance Law* ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The present judgment arose against the backdrop of conflicting interpretations regarding insurer liability where the driver’s licence had expired prior to the accident but was originally valid. The uncertainty stemmed from the distinction drawn in earlier jurisprudence between fake licences and expired licences, particularly in the context of third-party claims versus employee compensation claims. The *Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923* is a welfare statute intended to provide immediate monetary relief to workmen injured during the course of employment, irrespective of fault. Conversely, the *Motor Vehicles Act, 1988* regulates public safety and imposes strict compliance obligations on vehicle owners. The intersection of these two statutes frequently creates tension, especially when insurance coverage disputes arise. Prior to this judgment, the Supreme Court in *National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh* adopted a liberal approach in favour of third-party victims, allowing insurers to be burdened even where licence irregularities existed, subject to recovery rights. However, the consequences of long-term non-renewal of a licence had not been directly addressed by the Court. The High Courts of Delhi, Allahabad, and Himachal Pradesh had consistently held that an expired licence cannot be equated with a valid licence, particularly when the employer failed to exercise reasonable care. This case provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to harmonise these views and lay down a definitive legal principle. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The first respondent was employed as a driver by the appellant-owner and had been driving the appellant’s truck for approximately three years. On *20 May 1999*, the first respondent met with an accident while driving the vehicle in the course of employment, resulting in *20 percent permanent disability*. The respondent filed a claim under the *Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923* seeking compensation of *₹5,00,000*. The Commissioner awarded *₹94,464* as compensation and *₹67,313* towards medical expenses, with interest at *9 percent per annum*. The insurer was directed to pay the compensation, while interest liability was imposed on the employer. On appeal, the High Court examined the validity of the driving licence and found that although the licence was originally genuine, it had expired on *6 September 1996* and had not been renewed till the date of accident. The driver had thus been driving without a valid licence for nearly three years. Considering this prolonged lapse, the High Court absolved the insurance company of liability and fastened the entire responsibility on the employer for breach of policy conditions. The High Court further imposed penalty and interest on the employer for delay in payment under the *Compensation Act*. The employer appealed to the Supreme Court contending that initial verification of the licence was sufficient and that subsequent renewal was the driver’s responsibility. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether an employer is absolved of liability when a driver’s licence, though originally valid, had expired prior to the accident? ii. Whether failure to ensure renewal of a driving licence amounts to breach of insurance policy conditions? iii. Whether an insurer can be held liable under the *Workmen’s Compensation Act* despite prolonged expiry of licence? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsel for the appellant submitted that the driving licence of the first respondent was genuine and duly verified at the time of employment. It was argued that the employer cannot be expected to continuously monitor renewal of licences once initial verification is completed. Reliance was placed on *Nirmala Kothari v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.*, wherein this Court held that an employer is not required to conduct extensive enquiries beyond initial verification unless there is reason to suspect invalidity. It was further contended that the lapse in renewal was attributable solely to the negligence of the driver and that fastening liability upon the employer defeats the beneficial nature of insurance coverage. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsel for the insurer submitted that driving with an expired licence constitutes driving without a valid licence in law. It was argued that *Section 149(2)(a)(ii) of the Motor Vehicles Act* permits the insurer to avoid liability where the vehicle is driven by a person not duly licensed. The respondent relied upon High Court judgments holding that long-term expiry reflects conscious breach and gross negligence by the employer. The duty to ensure compliance with statutory licensing requirements, particularly for commercial vehicles, rests squarely on the owner. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 3, Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923* ii. *Section 4, Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923* iii. *Sections 14, 15, and 149(2)(a)(ii), Motor Vehicles Act, 1988* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the findings of the High Court. The Court held that verification of a driving licence is not a one-time obligation. Once a licence is verified, the employer becomes aware of its expiry date and must exercise reasonable care to ensure timely renewal. The Court distinguished *Swaran Singh* on the ground that it involved short-term expiry and third-party claims, whereas the present case involved nearly three years of non-renewal and a claim under the *Compensation Act*. The Court approved the reasoning of *Tata AIG v. Akansha*, *Oriental Insurance v. Manoj Kumar*, and *National Insurance v. Hem Raj*, holding that an expired licence not renewed within the statutory grace period renders the driver not duly licensed. The insurer was therefore rightly absolved of liability, and the employer was held solely responsible for compensation, interest, and penalty. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The employer’s duty of care includes not only initial verification of a driving licence but also ensuring its continued validity. Allowing a driver to operate a commercial vehicle with an expired licence for an extended period constitutes gross negligence and conscious breach of policy conditions. An expired licence beyond the statutory renewal period cannot be treated as a valid licence, and the insurer is entitled to avoid liability under *Section 149(2)(a)(ii) of the Motor Vehicles Act*. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that sympathy under beneficial legislation must be directed towards victims and not negligent employers. Public safety considerations require strict adherence to licensing requirements, particularly for commercial vehicles. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Employers must verify driving licences at the time of employment. ii. Employers must monitor licence validity and ensure timely renewal. iii. Long-term expiry constitutes conscious breach of insurance policy. iv. Expired licences beyond statutory grace period are invalid in law. ## J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment provides long-awaited clarity on the legal consequences of expired driving licences in compensation claims. It balances welfare objectives with public safety imperatives and reinforces employer accountability. The ruling discourages lax compliance and ensures that beneficial legislation is not misused to legitimise statutory violations. ## K) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh* *(2004) 3 SCC 297* ii. *Nirmala Kothari v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.* *(2020) 4 SCC 49* iii. *National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hem Raj* *2012 ACJ 1891* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923* ii. *Motor Vehicles Act, 1988* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Anwar Ali and Another v. State of Himachal Pradesh, [2020] 9 S.C.R. 878](https://lawfoyer.in/anwar-ali-and-another-v-state-of-himachal-pradesh-2020-9-s-c-r-878/) **Published:** January 16, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in Anwar Ali and Another v. State of Himachal Pradesh constitutes a significant reaffirmation of settled principles governing appeals against acquittal, particularly in cases founded entirely on circumstantial evidence. The Supreme Court was seized of a challenge to the reversal of acquittal by the High Court, where the trial court had acquitted the accused after finding serious infirmities in the prosecution’s case. The prosecution alleged that the accused had committed murder, robbery, cheating and destruction of evidence, and relied exclusively on circumstantial links such as recoveries, disclosure statements and alleged conduct of the accused. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment in *Anwar Ali and Another v. State of Himachal Pradesh* constitutes a significant reaffirmation of settled principles governing appeals against acquittal, particularly in cases founded entirely on *circumstantial evidence*. The Supreme Court was seized of a challenge to the reversal of acquittal by the High Court, where the trial court had acquitted the accused after finding serious infirmities in the prosecution’s case. The prosecution alleged that the accused had committed murder, robbery, cheating and destruction of evidence, and relied exclusively on circumstantial links such as recoveries, disclosure statements and alleged conduct of the accused. The trial court, upon a meticulous appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, recorded findings that the chain of circumstances was incomplete and tainted by material contradictions, suppression of facts and procedural lapses during investigation. The High Court, however, reversed the acquittal by branding these contradictions as minor and proceeded to convict the accused. The Supreme Court examined the permissibility of such reversal within the scope of *Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*, reiterating that interference with an acquittal is warranted only when the findings of the trial court are perverse or wholly unsustainable. The Court undertook a detailed scrutiny of the alleged recoveries, disclosure statements, and investigative procedures, and found that the contradictions were not trivial but went to the root of the prosecution case. It further emphasised that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, each link must be firmly proved and collectively must lead to the sole hypothesis of guilt. The Court also underscored that defective investigation, though not ipso facto fatal, assumes critical significance when recoveries themselves are doubtful. Ultimately, the Supreme Court restored the acquittal, reinforcing the presumption of innocence and judicial restraint in appellate interference. ***Keywords:*** Circumstantial evidence; Appeal against acquittal; Perverse findings; Defective investigation; Presumption of innocence. ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsi) Judgment Cause Title*Anwar Ali and Another v. State of Himachal Pradesh*ii) Case NumberCriminal Appeal No. 1121 of 2016iii) Judgment Date25 September 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumAshok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy and M. R. Shah, JJ.vi) AuthorM. R. Shah, J.vii) Citation*\[2020\] 9 S.C.R. 878*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 302/34, 392, 420, 201 IPC; Section 378 Cr.P.C.; Sections 100(4), 166(3) & (4) Cr.P.C.*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsCriminal Law; Law of Evidence; Criminal Procedure ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT** The judgment arose from a criminal appeal challenging the reversal of an acquittal by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh. The case was rooted in allegations of *murder coupled with robbery and cheating*, where the prosecution lacked direct evidence and relied exclusively on *circumstantial evidence*. The trial court had acquitted the accused after finding that the prosecution failed to establish a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances. The acquittal was grounded on serious contradictions in witness testimonies, doubtful recoveries, suppression of material facts and non-compliance with mandatory procedural safeguards under the *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*. The High Court, exercising appellate jurisdiction under *Section 378 Cr.P.C.*, reversed the acquittal and convicted the accused, holding that the contradictions noticed by the trial court were minor and inconsequential. This reversal triggered the appeal before the Supreme Court. The background of the judgment thus involved a direct confrontation between two judicial approaches: one emphasising caution, presumption of innocence and strict proof in circumstantial cases, and the other prioritising re-appreciation of evidence to arrive at a different conclusion. The Supreme Court was therefore called upon to delineate the boundaries of appellate interference in acquittals and to assess whether the High Court had transgressed those limits. The case also provided an occasion to revisit the evidentiary value of recoveries pursuant to disclosure statements under *Section 27 of the Evidence Act*, though implicitly, and the impact of defective investigation on the credibility of circumstantial links. The judgment situates itself firmly within a long line of precedents cautioning against casual reversal of acquittals and reinforces the doctrinal requirement that suspicion, however strong, cannot substitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The prosecution case was that the deceased Deepak was murdered and his body was found on *02.09.2010* near Bihali Bypass Road, Chandigarh. The information was first given by PW4, following which an FIR was registered at Police Station Bhunter. The deceased was identified by his father, and the investigation was undertaken by PW18, the Investigating Officer. The case was built on circumstantial evidence, as there were no eyewitnesses to the occurrence. During investigation, the police claimed to have received secret information regarding an abandoned jeep lying in Chandigarh, which was allegedly linked to the accused. Upon recovery, the jeep was found to contain photographs of the accused, a mobile phone allegedly belonging to PW7, and documents of the vehicle. The accused were arrested on *08.09.2010*. Subsequent to their arrest, the prosecution alleged that recoveries of a knife and rope used in the commission of the offence were effected on *09.09.2010* pursuant to disclosure statements. The prosecution also relied upon the recovery of plastic crates allegedly sold by the accused. The trial court, however, noticed glaring contradictions. PW4 and PW5 categorically stated that sniffer dogs were used on *02.09.2010* itself and that the knife and rope were recovered on that date, much prior to the arrest of the accused. This fact found no mention in the FIR or in the examination-in-chief of the Investigating Officer. In cross-examination, the IO admitted visiting the spot with sniffer dogs on *02.09.2010* and further admitted that this fact was suppressed. Such contradictions cast serious doubt on the genuineness of the alleged recoveries. The trial court further found that the recovery of the jeep from Chandigarh was vitiated by non-compliance with *Sections 166(3) and (4) Cr.P.C.* and *Section 100(4) Cr.P.C.*, and no independent local witnesses were associated. The mobile phone recovery was also disbelieved, as no call detail records were obtained and PW7 had never lodged a complaint regarding theft. On these facts, the trial court acquitted the accused, holding that the chain of circumstances was incomplete. The High Court reversed this acquittal, leading to the present appeal. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether the High Court was justified in reversing an order of acquittal in a case based purely on *circumstantial evidence*? ii. Whether the findings of the trial court could be characterised as *perverse* so as to warrant interference under *Section 378 Cr.P.C.*? iii. Whether material contradictions relating to recoveries and disclosure statements could be treated as minor discrepancies? iv. What is the effect of *defective investigation* and non-compliance with mandatory procedural provisions on the prosecution case? v. Whether absence of proof of *motive* weakens a case resting solely on circumstantial evidence? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellants submitted that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by reversing a well-reasoned acquittal without demonstrating perversity. It was contended that the trial court had meticulously analysed the evidence and found that the recoveries were fabricated and inconsistent with the prosecution narrative. Emphasis was placed on the testimonies of PW4 and PW5, which established that the knife and rope were allegedly recovered on *02.09.2010*, prior to the arrest of the accused, thereby rendering the disclosure statements on *09.09.2010* wholly unreliable. It was argued that the prosecution had suppressed material facts regarding the use of sniffer dogs, which struck at the root of its credibility. The recovery of the jeep and mobile phone from Chandigarh was assailed as illegal and doubtful due to non-compliance with *Sections 166 and 100 Cr.P.C.* and failure to associate independent witnesses. The appellants further submitted that the prosecution failed to establish motive and did not complete the chain of circumstances. Reliance was placed on precedents such as *Babu v. State of Kerala* *(\[2010\] 9 SCR 1039)* to contend that in the absence of a complete chain, acquittal was the only permissible outcome. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the respondent State argued that the High Court was entitled to re-appreciate the entire evidence once an appeal against acquittal was entertained. It was submitted that the recoveries, medical evidence and conduct of the accused cumulatively pointed towards guilt. The State contended that the contradictions highlighted by the trial court were minor and did not demolish the prosecution case. It was further argued that non-compliance with procedural provisions amounted at best to *defective investigation*, which by itself does not vitiate the trial. Reliance was placed on *Ronny v. State of Maharashtra* *(\[1998\] 2 SCR 162)* and *C. Muniappan v. State of Tamil Nadu* *(\[2010\] 10 SCR 262)* to argue that lapses in investigation should not enure to the benefit of the accused where substantive evidence exists. The State maintained that the High Court had rightly reversed the acquittal to prevent miscarriage of justice. ## **H) JUDGMENT** The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal. It held that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the trial court’s findings, as the acquittal was based on a plausible and reasoned appreciation of evidence. The Court reiterated that interference with an acquittal is permissible only in exceptional circumstances where the findings are perverse or based on no evidence. The Court undertook a detailed examination of the alleged recoveries and found that the contradictions regarding the date and manner of recovery of the knife and rope were material and not minor. The suppression of facts relating to the sniffer dog operation seriously undermined the prosecution case. The Court also found that the recovery of the jeep and mobile phone was doubtful due to non-compliance with mandatory procedural safeguards, which assumed significance in the overall context. The Supreme Court further held that in cases of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish a complete and unbroken chain leading exclusively to the guilt of the accused. In the present case, the chain was clearly incomplete. The absence of motive, though not fatal by itself, weighed in favour of the accused given the fragile nature of the circumstantial links. Consequently, the High Court’s reversal was set aside and the trial court’s acquittal was restored. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio decidendi of the judgment is that *an appellate court cannot reverse an acquittal merely because another view is possible*. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, unless the findings of the trial court are perverse, manifestly illegal or wholly unsustainable, interference under *Section 378 Cr.P.C.* is impermissible. The Court reaffirmed that material contradictions relating to recoveries and suppression of facts strike at the root of the prosecution case and cannot be brushed aside as minor discrepancies. The presumption of innocence is strengthened by acquittal, and the prosecution bears a heavy burden to dislodge it. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that while *defective investigation* does not automatically result in acquittal, courts must be circumspect where such defects directly affect the credibility of recoveries and circumstantial links. It reiterated that absence of motive, though not decisive, assumes relevance in cases resting solely on circumstantial evidence. These observations, though ancillary, provide guidance on evidentiary evaluation in similar cases. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Appellate courts must record clear findings of perversity before reversing an acquittal. ii. In circumstantial evidence cases, each link must be firmly proved and collectively must exclude every hypothesis except guilt. iii. Material contradictions and suppression of facts cannot be treated as minor discrepancies. iv. Non-compliance with *Sections 166 and 100 Cr.P.C.* assumes significance where recoveries are doubtful. v. Absence of motive, though not fatal, may weigh in favour of the accused in appropriate cases. ## **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment reinforces judicial discipline in appellate review of acquittals and underscores the heightened threshold for interference in circumstantial evidence cases. It reflects a careful balancing of the interests of justice with the fundamental principle of presumption of innocence. By restoring the acquittal, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that criminal conviction must rest on proof beyond reasonable doubt and not on conjectures or incomplete chains of circumstances. The decision serves as a crucial reminder to investigative agencies regarding procedural compliance and evidentiary integrity, and to appellate courts regarding restraint and deference to well-reasoned acquittals. ## **J) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Babu v. State of Kerala* *(\[2010\] 9 SCR 1039)* ii. *Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police* *(\[1998\] 3 Suppl. SCR 594)* iii. *Ronny v. State of Maharashtra* *(\[1998\] 2 SCR 162)* iv. *C. Muniappan v. State of Tamil Nadu* *(\[2010\] 10 SCR 262)* v. *Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar* *(\[1994\] 1 Suppl. SCR 483)* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Indian Penal Code, 1860* ii. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand, [2020] 9 S.C.R. 482](https://lawfoyer.in/maheshwar-tigga-v-state-of-jharkhand-2020-9-s-c-r-482/) **Published:** January 16, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The decision in Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand constitutes a significant judicial exposition on the contours of consent, misconception of fact, and promise of marriage under Sections 375 and 90 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, while simultaneously reinforcing the procedural sanctity of Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Supreme Court was confronted with a prosecution narrative alleging rape on the pretext of marriage spanning over four years, initiated by a complaint lodged shortly before the accused’s marriage to another woman. The Court undertook a meticulous scrutiny of evidentiary inconsistencies, particularly relating to the age of the prosecutrix, the delay in lodging the FIR, and the nature of the interpersonal relationship between the parties. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The decision in *Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand* constitutes a significant judicial exposition on the contours of *consent*, *misconception of fact*, and *promise of marriage* under *Sections 375 and 90 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860*, while simultaneously reinforcing the procedural sanctity of *Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*. The Supreme Court was confronted with a prosecution narrative alleging rape on the pretext of marriage spanning over four years, initiated by a complaint lodged shortly before the accused’s marriage to another woman. The Court undertook a meticulous scrutiny of evidentiary inconsistencies, particularly relating to the *age of the prosecutrix*, the *delay in lodging the FIR*, and the *nature of the interpersonal relationship between the parties*. A central feature of the judgment lies in the Court’s rejection of the prosecution’s claim that consent was vitiated either by fear or by misconception of fact. The Court emphasised that *misconception under Section 90 IPC must be proximate to the act* and cannot be inferred from a prolonged consensual relationship marked by emotional intimacy, voluntary cohabitation, and mutual correspondence. The judgment also censures the casual manner in which the accused was examined under *Section 313 Cr.P.C.*, reiterating that incriminating circumstances not put to the accused cannot be relied upon. By setting aside the conviction under *Sections 376, 323, and 341 IPC*, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that criminal law cannot be employed to retrospectively penalise failed relationships where consent was conscious, deliberate, and sustained over time. **Keywords:** Consent, Misconception of Fact, Promise of Marriage, Section 90 IPC, Section 313 Cr.P.C., Delay in FIR ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand*Case NumberCriminal Appeal No. 635 of 2020Judgement Date28 September 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumR. F. Nariman, Navin Sinha, Indira Banerjee, JJ.AuthorNavin Sinha, J.Citation*\[2020\] 9 S.C.R. 482*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 376, 323, 341, 90 IPC; Section 313 Cr.P.C.*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsCriminal Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The appeal arose from the affirmation of conviction by the High Court of Jharkhand against the appellant for offences under *Sections 376, 323, and 341 IPC*. The prosecution case was founded on an allegation that the appellant had initially raped the prosecutrix at knifepoint when she was allegedly fourteen years old and thereafter continued to establish physical relations under the false promise of marriage for four years. The FIR was lodged in April 1999, shortly before the appellant’s impending marriage with another woman. The Trial Court convicted the appellant primarily on the basis of the testimony of the prosecutrix, concluding that she was a minor at the time of the first alleged incident. The High Court affirmed the conviction, relying heavily on letters, photographs, and the statement of the accused under *Section 313 Cr.P.C.* without subjecting the evidentiary record to rigorous scrutiny. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant assailed the conviction on multiple grounds including *inordinate delay in lodging the FIR*, *absence of reliable proof of age*, *consensual nature of the relationship*, and *serious procedural lapses in the Section 313 examination*. The case thus presented the Court with an opportunity to clarify the legal threshold for vitiated consent and to reiterate the procedural safeguards intrinsic to a fair criminal trial. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The prosecutrix lodged FIR No. 25 of 1999 alleging that four years prior, the appellant had forcibly raped her at knifepoint while she was on her way to school. She further alleged that the appellant promised to marry her and, on that pretext, continued to have sexual relations with her over several years, including a period when she stayed at his residence for fifteen days. The FIR was lodged on 13 April 1999, merely seven days before the appellant’s scheduled marriage to another woman. During trial, the prosecutrix’s testimony revealed significant inconsistencies regarding her age. She initially stated she was sixteen at the time of the incident and later corrected herself to thirteen. No documentary proof such as school records was produced. Medical evidence assessed her age to be approximately twenty-five years. A cousin testified that she was six years younger than him, further compounding the uncertainty. The evidence also disclosed a prolonged romantic relationship characterised by mutual correspondence, photographs, and an engagement ceremony. The prosecutrix admitted awareness of religious differences and societal obstacles to marriage. She further conceded in cross-examination that no incident had occurred on 9 April 1999, undermining the prosecution narrative. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the prosecutrix was a minor at the time of the alleged offence? ii. Whether consent was vitiated by fear or misconception of fact under *Section 90 IPC*? iii. Whether a promise of marriage over a prolonged period can invalidate consent? iv. Whether delay in lodging the FIR affected the credibility of the prosecution case? v. Whether defects in examination under *Section 313 Cr.P.C.* vitiated the conviction? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the FIR lodged after four years was an afterthought and coincided suspiciously with the appellant’s impending marriage. It was contended that the relationship was consensual, arising out of mutual love, as evidenced by letters and photographs. The medical opinion estimating the prosecutrix’s age at twenty-five years demolished the prosecution’s claim of minority. It was further argued that the *Section 313 Cr.P.C.* examination was perfunctory, denying the appellant a fair opportunity to explain incriminating circumstances, in violation of settled principles of natural justice. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the State contended that the testimony of the prosecutrix was reliable and that delay in lodging the FIR was explained by failed compromise efforts. It was argued that the prosecutrix was a minor and that consent obtained on a false promise of marriage is no consent in law. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 375 IPC* ii. *Section 90 IPC* iii. *Section 313 Cr.P.C.* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction. The Court found wide variations in evidence regarding the age of the prosecutrix and held that in the absence of positive proof, the benefit of doubt must accrue to the accused. The Court strongly criticised the cursory *Section 313 Cr.P.C.* examination, reiterating that circumstances not put to the accused cannot be used against him. The Court further held that consent obtained over a prolonged relationship marked by emotional intimacy cannot be said to be under misconception of fact. The delay of four years in lodging the FIR, coupled with admissions undermining the prosecution story, rendered the conviction unsustainable. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** Consent arising out of a deep-seated romantic relationship, sustained over time with conscious participation, does not become invalid merely because marriage ultimately fails. Misconception of fact under *Section 90 IPC* must be immediate and proximate to the act. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that criminal law should not be invoked to retrospectively punish failed relationships driven by youthful passion and societal constraints. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Courts must insist on strict proof of age in sexual offence cases. ii. Examination under *Section 313 Cr.P.C.* must be comprehensive and meaningful. iii. Delay in FIR must be examined with heightened scrutiny in consensual relationship cases. ## J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces doctrinal clarity on consent and underscores procedural fairness as the backbone of criminal adjudication. It acts as a safeguard against misuse of rape provisions in cases of failed consensual relationships, while preserving the sanctity of genuine prosecutions. ## K) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Uday v. State of Karnataka* 2. *Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala* 3. *Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Indian Penal Code, 1860* 2. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. v. Amit Shrivas, [2020] 11 SCR 46](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-madhya-pradesh-ors-v-amit-shrivas-2020-11-scr-46/) **Published:** January 16, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the legal contours of compassionate appointment in the context of work-charged and contingency-paid employees under the service jurisprudence of Madhya Pradesh. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the dependent of a deceased employee, who had attained the status of a permanent employee under the Madhya Pradesh (Work Charged and Contingency Paid Employees) Pension Rules, 1979, could be treated as a regular government servant for the purpose of compassionate appointment. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the legal contours of *compassionate appointment* in the context of *work-charged and contingency-paid employees* under the service jurisprudence of Madhya Pradesh. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the dependent of a deceased employee, who had attained the status of a *permanent employee* under the *Madhya Pradesh (Work Charged and Contingency Paid Employees) Pension Rules, 1979*, could be treated as a *regular government servant* for the purpose of compassionate appointment. The Court scrutinised the distinction between *work-charged*, *permanent*, and *regular* employees, and reaffirmed that compassionate appointment is not an inherent or vested right but a policy-driven exception meant to provide immediate succour. The ruling clarifies that acquisition of permanency for pensionary benefits does not result in regularisation of service. The Court disapproved the High Court’s approach which had conflated permanency with regular status. While denying compassionate appointment, the Supreme Court exercised its extraordinary jurisdiction under *Article 142 of the Constitution of India* to enhance the compassionate grant from *Rs. 1,00,000/- to Rs. 2,00,000/-*, in light of subsequent policy amendments, thereby balancing strict legal interpretation with equitable relief. **Keywords:** Compassionate appointment, Work-charged employee, Permanent employee, Regular employee, Article 142, Service law ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgment Cause Title*State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. v. Amit Shrivas*Case Number*Civil Appeal No. 8564 of 2015*Judgment Date*29 September 2020*Court*Supreme Court of India*Quorum*Sanjay Kishan Kaul J., Aniruddha Bose J., Krishna Murari J.*Author*Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.*Citation*\[2020\] 11 SCR 46*Legal Provisions Involved*Article 142 of the Constitution of India; Rule 2(b), Madhya Pradesh Civil Service Conduct Rules, 1965; Rule 2(b) & 2(c), Madhya Pradesh (Work Charged and Contingency Paid Employees) Pension Rules, 1979*Judgments Overruled*None*Related Law Subjects*Service Law, Administrative Law, Constitutional Law* ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The judgment arose from a prolonged dispute concerning entitlement to *compassionate appointment* following the death of a government employee who served under a *work-charged establishment*. The controversy reflects recurring tensions in Indian service law between humanitarian considerations and rigid policy frameworks governing public employment. The deceased employee had rendered service for over two decades and had attained the status of a *permanent employee* under pension rules, thereby becoming eligible for pensionary benefits. However, his salary continued to be drawn from the *work-charged/contingency fund*, a factor which assumed central importance in determining eligibility for compassionate appointment. The State of Madhya Pradesh had framed a *compassionate appointment policy dated 18.08.2008*, which expressly excluded dependents of employees paid from work-charged or contingency funds, while granting them a one-time *compassionate grant*. The High Court, however, took a liberal view by holding that once permanency was achieved under pension rules, the embargo under the policy ceased to apply. This interpretation blurred the doctrinal distinction between *permanent* and *regular* employment. The Supreme Court was thus required to correct the legal position, harmonise service classifications, and ensure consistency with settled precedents. The judgment is significant as it reiterates that compassionate appointment cannot be claimed dehors the policy applicable on the date of death, and that benevolent considerations cannot override statutory distinctions deliberately maintained in service jurisprudence. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The respondent’s father was appointed as a *Driver* in the *Tribal Welfare Department, Madhya Pradesh* on *6 June 1984* as a *work-charged employee*. His engagement was linked to specific departmental work, and his remuneration was paid from the *work-charged/contingency fund*. On *12 March 1987*, he was conferred the status of a *permanent employee* under the *Madhya Pradesh (Work Charged and Contingency Paid Employees) Pension Rules, 1979*, after completing the requisite period of service. During his tenure, he was granted *pay revisions* and *krammonati* benefits. He continued in service until his death on *11 December 2009*. Upon his demise, he left behind his widow, one son, and three daughters. The family was financially dependent on him, and a *Pension Payment Order* was issued under the *Madhya Pradesh Civil Pension Rules, 1976*. The respondent applied for *compassionate appointment*. The request was rejected by the competent authority on *19 August 2010* citing *Clause 12.1 of the Compassionate Appointment Policy dated 18.08.2008*, which barred compassionate appointment for employees drawing salary from work-charged or contingency funds. Instead, a *compassionate grant of Rs. 1,00,000/-* was sanctioned to the widow. Aggrieved, the respondent approached the High Court. The Single Judge allowed the writ petition, holding that permanency under pension rules rendered Clause 12.1 inapplicable. The Division Bench affirmed this view. The State challenged the decision before the Supreme Court. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether a *work-charged employee* attaining the status of a *permanent employee* under pension rules becomes a *regular government servant* for the purpose of compassionate appointment? ii. Whether *Clause 12.1 of the Compassionate Appointment Policy dated 18.08.2008* excludes the respondent from compassionate appointment? iii. Whether compassionate appointment can be claimed as a vested right independent of the policy prevailing on the date of death? iv. Whether subsequent policy amendments can be applied retrospectively to confer compassionate appointment? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that the deceased employee remained a *work-charged employee* throughout his service, as his salary was paid from the contingency fund. They argued that *permanency under pension rules* was limited to pensionary benefits and did not result in *regularisation*. Reliance was placed on *Rule 2(b) of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Service Conduct Rules, 1965*, to emphasise that only regular appointees qualify as government servants for service benefits such as compassionate appointment. It was further contended that *compassionate appointment is not a matter of right* but a concession governed strictly by policy. Since *Clause 12.1* expressly excluded such employees, the grant of *Rs. 1,00,000/-* fully satisfied the State’s obligation. The High Court, it was argued, committed a jurisdictional error by rewriting the policy. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent submitted that the deceased had completed over *15 years of service* and was classified as a *permanent employee* under *Rule 2(c) of the Pension Rules, 1979*. It was argued that permanency implied absorption into regular service, particularly when *pay-scale benefits and krammonati* were granted. The respondent relied on earlier High Court decisions where similar employees were granted compassionate appointment. It was further urged that denial of employment defeated the very object of compassionate appointment, especially considering the financial hardship faced by the family. ## H) JUDGMENT The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court judgments. The Court held that *compassionate appointment must strictly conform to the policy in force on the date of death*. It reiterated that *no inherent or fundamental right* exists to claim such appointment. The Court carefully analysed the distinction between *work-charged*, *permanent*, and *regular* employees. It relied upon *Ram Naresh Rawat v. Ashwini Ray* to reaffirm that *permanent classification does not amount to regularisation*. The Court observed that the High Court had erroneously conflated permanency with regular status. The Court further held that *subsequent circulars dated 29.09.2014 and 31.08.2016* could not be applied retrospectively. However, invoking *Article 142*, the Court enhanced the compassionate grant to *Rs. 2,00,000/-*, balancing equity with legality. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment is that *attainment of permanent status under pension rules does not confer regular status*, and compassionate appointment cannot be claimed contrary to the policy applicable on the date of death. The Court reaffirmed that compassionate appointment is an exception, not an entitlement, and must be strictly construed. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that compassionate appointment loses its relevance when substantial time has elapsed since the employee’s death, as the objective is immediate relief. It also cautioned against perpetuating illegality under the guise of equality. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Compassionate appointment must be decided strictly under the policy prevailing on the date of death. ii. Permanency under pension rules does not imply regularisation. iii. Subsequent policy amendments cannot be applied retrospectively unless expressly stated. iv. Article 142 may be invoked only to balance equity, not to create rights. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces doctrinal clarity in service jurisprudence by preserving the distinction between *permanent* and *regular* employment. It prevents dilution of compassionate appointment policies through judicial overreach while still ensuring equitable relief through constitutional powers. The decision serves as a binding precedent on the limited scope of compassionate appointment and underscores the primacy of policy discipline in public employment. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *State of Gujarat v. Arvindkumar T. Tiwari*, *\[2012\] 7 SCR 1072* ii. *Ram Naresh Rawat v. Ashwini Ray*, *\[2016\] 9 SCR 141* iii. *Indian Bank v. Promila*, *\[2020\] 1 SCR 408* iv. *Punjab State Power Corporation Ltd. v. Nirval Singh*, *\[2019\] 7 SCR 905* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Constitution of India* ii. *Madhya Pradesh Civil Service Conduct Rules, 1965* iii. *Madhya Pradesh (Work Charged and Contingency Paid Employees) Pension Rules, 1979* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Subed Ali and Others v. State of Assam, [2020] 8 SCR 731](https://lawfoyer.in/subed-ali-and-others-v-state-of-assam-2020-8-scr-731/) **Published:** January 16, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The decision in Subed Ali and Others v. State of Assam authoritatively revisits the doctrinal contours of common intention under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, particularly in situations where one accused has not inflicted any overt physical injury. The Supreme Court examined whether the conviction of the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC could be sustained when two co-accused had already been acquitted on the benefit of doubt on the same evidentiary record. The Court undertook a meticulous appraisal of eyewitness testimony, medical evidence, and surrounding circumstances to assess the existence of a shared mental element among the accused. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The decision in *Subed Ali and Others v. State of Assam* authoritatively revisits the doctrinal contours of *common intention under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860*, particularly in situations where one accused has not inflicted any overt physical injury. The Supreme Court examined whether the conviction of the appellants under *Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC* could be sustained when two co-accused had already been acquitted on the benefit of doubt on the same evidentiary record. The Court undertook a meticulous appraisal of eyewitness testimony, medical evidence, and surrounding circumstances to assess the existence of a shared mental element among the accused. The judgment reinforces the principle that *common intention is rarely capable of direct proof* and must ordinarily be inferred from conduct, sequence of events, and collective behaviour before, during, and after the crime. The Court clarified that the absence of an overt act does not absolve an accused from criminal liability once participation in the joint criminal venture is established. It further held that parity with acquitted co-accused cannot be claimed mechanically, especially where the evidence against the convicted accused is clear, cogent, and consistent. The ruling strengthens the jurisprudence on *vicarious liability* by reiterating that even a passive role, when accompanied by a conscious sharing of intent, attracts criminal responsibility for the ultimate act committed. The judgment also settles that non-framing of a specific charge under *Section 34 IPC* does not vitiate the conviction if no prejudice is shown. **Keywords:** Common intention, Section 34 IPC, vicarious liability, parity in acquittal, eyewitness testimony, murder ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*Subed Ali and Others v. State of Assam*ii) Case NumberCriminal Appeal No. 1401 of 2012iii) Judgement Date30 September 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) Quorum*Rohinton Fali Nariman, Navin Sinha and Indira Banerjee, JJ.*vi) Author*Justice Navin Sinha*vii) Citation*\[2020\] 8 SCR 731*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 302, 34, 147, 341 IPC*ix) Judgments overruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsCriminal Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The judgment emerges from a violent double homicide that occurred in a rural setting in Assam, raising foundational questions on collective criminal liability. The appellants stood convicted for murder with the aid of *Section 34 IPC*, despite one of them not having inflicted any direct injury. The High Court of Gauhati had affirmed the conviction recorded by the Sessions Court, prompting the present appeal. The principal challenge raised before the Supreme Court revolved around the alleged inconsistency in the prosecution evidence and the plea of parity, since two co-accused were acquitted on the benefit of doubt. The appellants further questioned the application of *Section 34 IPC*, arguing the absence of a proven pre-arranged plan and the lack of an overt act by one accused. The background of the case is significant because it situates the recurring tension in criminal law between individual culpability and group liability. Indian criminal jurisprudence has consistently recognised that crimes committed in concert require a nuanced appreciation of collective intent. This judgment builds upon established precedent to clarify that *common intention may develop on the spot* and does not necessarily require elaborate planning. The Court also addressed procedural objections concerning the absence of a specific charge under *Section 34 IPC*. By relying on earlier Constitution Bench authority, the Court reaffirmed that substance prevails over form when no prejudice is caused to the accused. The background thus sets the stage for reaffirming settled principles while applying them rigorously to the facts at hand. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE On *05.08.2005 at around 6:00 PM*, the deceased *Abdul Barek* and *Abdul Motin* were returning from the market on bicycles along with other villagers. They were intercepted on the way by the appellants. According to the prosecution, *appellant no.1 stopped the victims*, after which *appellant no.2 assaulted Abdul Barek with a sharp cutting weapon (Dao)*, resulting in instantaneous death. The second victim, *Abdul Motin*, was assaulted by *appellant no.3*, sustaining grievous injuries. He attempted to flee but was chased by the accused, caught near a nearby house, and brutally assaulted again. He was dragged back to the original place of occurrence and later succumbed to his injuries in the hospital the same night. Medical evidence revealed catastrophic injuries, including *amputation of limbs and deep incised wounds*, clearly establishing homicidal death. A General Diary entry was initially made based on oral information, followed by a formal FIR naming five accused. During trial, *accused nos. 3 and 5* were acquitted on benefit of doubt. The Sessions Court convicted the remaining appellants under *Section 302/34 IPC*. The High Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the acquittal of co-accused did not dilute the prosecution case against the appellants. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether conviction under *Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC* can be sustained when co-accused have been acquitted on the same evidence? ii. Whether absence of an overt act by one accused negates the existence of *common intention*? iii. Whether failure to frame a specific charge under *Section 34 IPC* vitiates the conviction? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that the acquittal of two co-accused on identical evidence entitled the appellants to parity. It was argued that eyewitness testimonies suffered from inconsistencies, particularly regarding lighting conditions. It was further contended that *appellant no.1* neither carried any weapon nor assaulted the deceased, thereby lacking the requisite *mens rea* for murder. The defence also questioned the non-examination of certain witnesses and the non-recovery of weapons. Lastly, it was argued that in the absence of a specific charge under *Section 34 IPC*, the conviction was procedurally flawed and prejudicial. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the State argued that the eyewitnesses were consistent on material particulars. Minor discrepancies did not erode the core prosecution narrative. It was submitted that *common intention was evident* from the coordinated conduct of the appellants before, during, and after the assault. The State emphasised that *physical assault is not a sine qua non* for liability under *Section 34 IPC*. The State also relied upon settled precedent to argue that absence of a specific charge causes no prejudice when the accused were fully aware of the prosecution case. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction. The Court held that the evidence of *PW-5, PW-6, PW-7, and PW-9* was reliable and consistent. The medical evidence fully corroborated the ocular version. On the plea of parity, the Court held that acquittal of co-accused on benefit of doubt does not automatically entitle others to acquittal when evidence against them is strong. The Court rejected the argument regarding lack of overt act by *appellant no.1*, holding that *stopping the victims, remaining present, chasing the injured, and facilitating the assault* clearly established shared intention. The Court relied upon *Karnail Singh v. State of Punjab*, *Ramaswami Ayyangar v. State of Tamil Nadu*, *Nandu Rastogi v. State of Bihar*, *Surender Chauhan v. State of Madhya Pradesh*, and *Nand Kishore v. State of Madhya Pradesh* to reaffirm the doctrine of common intention. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment lies in reaffirming that *common intention under Section 34 IPC can be inferred from conduct and circumstances*. Physical participation is not mandatory. Conscious presence and facilitation suffice to attract vicarious liability. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that crimes involving collective violence often develop intent spontaneously, and courts must not insist on proof of elaborate pre-planning. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Common intention may develop at the spot. ii. Absence of overt act does not absolve liability. iii. Failure to frame a specific charge under *Section 34 IPC* is not fatal absent prejudice. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment stands as a reaffirmation of settled principles governing *joint criminal liability*. It adopts a realistic and pragmatic approach, preventing offenders from escaping liability by compartmentalising roles. The Court balances individual rights with societal interest by insisting on careful scrutiny of evidence while rejecting hyper-technical defences. The ruling significantly strengthens prosecutorial ability in cases of group violence while remaining anchored to constitutional fairness. --- ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Karnail Singh v. State of Punjab*, *\[1954\] SCR 904* 2. *Ramaswami Ayyangar v. State of Tamil Nadu*, *\[1976\] 3 SCR 876* 3. *Nandu Rastogi v. State of Bihar*, *\[2002\] 3 Supp SCR 30* 4. *Surender Chauhan v. State of Madhya Pradesh*, *\[2000\] 2 SCR 515* 5. *Nand Kishore v. State of Madhya Pradesh*, *\[2011\] 7 SCR 1152* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Indian Penal Code, 1860* – *Sections 302, 34, 147, 341* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Satish @ Sabbe v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [2020] 9 SCR 21](https://lawfoyer.in/satish-sabbe-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-2020-9-scr-21/) **Published:** January 16, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in Satish @ Sabbe v. State of Uttar Pradesh is a significant reaffirmation of reformative penology within Indian criminal jurisprudence. The Supreme Court was called upon to examine the legality of repeated executive refusals to grant premature release on probation to life convicts despite long incarceration, clean antecedents, and satisfactory prison conduct. The Court scrutinised the manner in which the State authorities exercised discretion under Section 2 of the Uttar Pradesh Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1938 and found a consistent pattern of mechanical rejection grounded in extraneous considerations such as the gravity of offence, age of prisoners, and speculative apprehensions of victims. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment in *Satish @ Sabbe v. State of Uttar Pradesh* is a significant reaffirmation of reformative penology within Indian criminal jurisprudence. The Supreme Court was called upon to examine the legality of repeated executive refusals to grant premature release on probation to life convicts despite long incarceration, clean antecedents, and satisfactory prison conduct. The Court scrutinised the manner in which the State authorities exercised discretion under *Section 2 of the Uttar Pradesh Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1938* and found a consistent pattern of mechanical rejection grounded in extraneous considerations such as the gravity of offence, age of prisoners, and speculative apprehensions of victims. The Court emphasised that *length of sentence or seriousness of crime cannot, by themselves, justify denial of premature release*. The statutory mandate requires a three-fold assessment focusing on *antecedents, conduct during incarceration, and likelihood of abstaining from crime upon release*. Failure to apply these parameters amounts to abdication of statutory duty. The judgment further reiterates that although remission or premature release is not a matter of right, executive discretion is subject to constitutional discipline and judicial review when exercised arbitrarily. The decision strengthens the jurisprudence that reformative justice is not antithetical to public safety and that long-term incarceration of first-time offenders with demonstrated reform undermines constitutional values of dignity and rehabilitation. **Keywords:** Premature release; Reformative justice; Probation; Executive discretion; Judicial review; Prison jurisprudence ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsi) Judgment Cause Title*Satish @ Sabbe v. State of Uttar Pradesh*ii) Case NumberSpecial Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 7369 of 2019 with SLP (Crl.) No. 8326 of 2019iii) Judgment Date30 September 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumN. V. Ramana, Surya Kant & Hrishikesh Roy, JJ.vi) AuthorJustice Surya Kantvii) Citation*\[2020\] 9 SCR 21*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Section 2, UP Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1938; Sections 432 & 433-A CrPC; Articles 72 & 161, Constitution of India; Section 364-A IPC*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsCriminal Law; Constitutional Law; Prison Law; Sentencing Jurisprudence ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT** The judgment arises in the backdrop of evolving constitutional thought surrounding punishment, remission, and rehabilitation. Indian criminal law, while retaining deterrent and retributive elements, has progressively acknowledged reformative ideals, especially for first-time offenders undergoing prolonged incarceration. The statutory framework governing premature release in Uttar Pradesh reflects this philosophy through *Section 2 of the UP Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1938*, which mandates a forward-looking assessment rooted in the prisoner’s conduct and antecedents. The petitioners were convicted for *kidnapping for ransom under Section 364-A IPC* and sentenced to life imprisonment. Their conviction stood affirmed up to the Supreme Court. The limited controversy before the Court was not guilt or sentence but the legality of the State’s refusal to consider premature release despite compliance with statutory thresholds. The Supreme Court had, on multiple occasions, directed reconsideration of their cases strictly in accordance with law. Despite clear judicial instructions, the executive authorities persisted in rejecting release through unreasoned orders. These refusals repeatedly relied on the heinous nature of the offence, perceived societal impact, age of the convicts, and subjective apprehensions expressed by the informant. The Court viewed this approach as an erosion of statutory discipline and constitutional accountability. The background thus presented a classic confrontation between unfettered executive discretion and constitutionally supervised governance. The case required the Court to determine whether repeated non-application of mind could justify judicial substitution of executive satisfaction to uphold legislative intent and fundamental rights. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The incident traces back to *12 June 2002*, when the victim, Vishal Sarawat, was lured into the house of an acquaintance and forcibly detained. He was threatened at gunpoint, administered sedatives, and coerced into writing a ransom letter demanding *Rs. 2 crores* from his father. Subsequent negotiations reduced the ransom to *Rs. 32 lakhs*. On *14 July 2002*, the police conducted a raid following intelligence provided by the complainant, rescuing the victim and recovering the ransom amount. The petitioners initially evaded arrest but were apprehended two days later. They were charged under *Section 364-A IPC* and allied provisions. The trial court, relying heavily on electronic evidence including call records and voice samples, convicted them and imposed life imprisonment. The High Court affirmed the conviction but set aside the Arms Act charge due to evidentiary lapses. Special Leave Petitions challenging conviction were dismissed. However, during proceedings, the Supreme Court issued limited notice concerning *entitlement to premature release*. At that time, both petitioners had undergone *nearly sixteen years of actual imprisonment*, extending to *twenty-two years with remission*. Their jail records reflected consistently satisfactory conduct with no adverse entries. Despite this, the State rejected their applications for premature release through administrative orders passed in 2018 and again in 2020. These orders failed to engage with statutory parameters and were passed even after explicit directions from the Supreme Court to reconsider the matter afresh. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether the State authorities acted in violation of *Section 2 of the UP Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1938* by rejecting premature release without assessing statutory factors? ii. Whether gravity of offence and length of sentence can independently justify denial of premature release? iii. Whether repeated non-compliance with judicial directions warrants judicial intervention through mandamus? iv. Whether age and apprehensions of victims constitute legally relevant considerations under the probation statute? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the petitioners submitted that the executive orders rejecting premature release were *arbitrary, mechanical, and ultra vires* the governing statute. It was argued that *antecedents* and *conduct in prison*, being mandatory considerations under *Section 2*, were entirely ignored. The petitioners had no prior criminal history and had demonstrated sustained reform. It was further contended that reliance on age was legally misconceived and antithetical to reformative theory. Counsel emphasised that speculative apprehensions of the informant cannot override statutory safeguards. The repeated failure to comply with Supreme Court directions was highlighted as evidence of mala fide administrative action warranting judicial correction. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the respondent State justified rejection on the grounds that the offence was heinous and had serious societal ramifications. It was argued that the petitioners, being physically capable and relatively young, retained the potential to reoffend. The State also relied upon apprehensions expressed by the victim’s family and adverse opinions of local authorities. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. *Article 72 & 161, Constitution of India* ii. *Section 432 and 433-A, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* iii. *Section 2, UP Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1938* iv. *Section 364-A, Indian Penal Code, 1860* ## **I) JUDGMENT** The Supreme Court held that the State’s approach was fundamentally flawed. The Court reiterated that while remission is not a right, *fair consideration in accordance with law is*. Executive authorities cannot defeat statutory purpose by substituting mandated criteria with subjective impressions. The Court noted that all impugned orders suffered from *non-application of mind* and failed to assess the likelihood of the prisoners leading a law-abiding life. The Court invoked reformative jurisprudence articulated in *Maru Ram v. Union of India* and reaffirmed that prolonged incarceration of reformed prisoners undermines constitutional dignity. The Court also relied upon *Swamy Shraddananda*, *Zahid Hussain*, *Shor*, and *Munna* to emphasise that heinousness of offence is not determinative under probation statutes. Given persistent executive defiance, the Court exercised judicial review to direct release on probation subject to conditions, clarifying that such release remains reversible upon future misconduct. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment lies in the principle that *statutory discretion must be exercised strictly within statutory confines*. Under *Section 2 of the UP Act*, refusal of premature release without evaluating antecedents, prison conduct, and likelihood of abstaining from crime is illegal. Gravity of offence and age are extraneous considerations. Judicial review is justified when executive action defeats legislative intent. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that a civilised society cannot be sustained solely through retribution. Long-term incarceration without hope of release erodes reformative incentives and burdens the correctional system. Education and skill development undertaken by prisoners during incarceration signify genuine rehabilitation deserving institutional encouragement. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Executive authorities must record specific findings on all three statutory parameters. ii. Gravity of offence cannot substitute statutory evaluation. iii. Apprehensions of victims must be objectively assessed and not treated as determinative. iv. Orders rejecting premature release must be reasoned and evidence-based. v. Judicial directions regarding reconsideration must be scrupulously complied with. ## **J) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Maru Ram v. Union of India*, *\[1981\] 1 SCR 1196* ii. *Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka*, *\[2008\] 11 SCR 93* iii. *Zahid Hussain v. State of West Bengal*, *\[2001\] 2 SCR 442* iv. *Shor v. State of Uttar Pradesh*, *2020 SCC OnLine SC 626* v. *Munna v. State of Uttar Pradesh*, Order dated 21.08.2020 **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *The Constitution of India* ii. *The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* iii. *The Indian Penal Code, 1860* iv. *The Uttar Pradesh Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1938* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [M/s. Magma Fincorp Ltd. v. Rajesh Kumar Tiwari, [2020] 11 SCR 59](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-magma-fincorp-ltd-v-rajesh-kumar-tiwari-2020-11-scr-59/) **Published:** January 16, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the legal character of a hire-purchase agreement and the scope of consumer protection remedies in disputes arising from repossession of financed vehicles. The Supreme Court clarified that under a hire-purchase arrangement, ownership of the vehicle remains with the financier until all instalments are paid and the option to purchase is exercised. The Court decisively held that repossession of a vehicle by the financier upon default, when carried out in accordance with the contractual terms, does not amount to deficiency in service or unfair trade practice under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the legal character of a *hire-purchase agreement* and the scope of consumer protection remedies in disputes arising from repossession of financed vehicles. The Supreme Court clarified that under a hire-purchase arrangement, ownership of the vehicle remains with the financier until all instalments are paid and the option to purchase is exercised. The Court decisively held that repossession of a vehicle by the financier upon default, when carried out in accordance with the contractual terms, does not amount to *deficiency in service* or *unfair trade practice* under the *Consumer Protection Act, 1986*. The Court emphasized that the Consumer Protection Act does not override the *Indian Contract Act, 1872* and cannot be used to rewrite contractual obligations. A consumer forum must base relief strictly on proof of loss or injury caused by deficiency. Mere non-service of notice, where notice is not contractually required, does not automatically entitle the consumer to compensation. Even where notice is implied, compensatory or punitive damages require proof of actual loss. The ruling condemns mechanical awarding of refunds and damages by consumer fora without assessing depreciation, usage, or the hirer’s admitted default. The judgment restores doctrinal clarity on hire-purchase law, curtails misuse of consumer remedies by defaulting borrowers, and reinforces the principle that consumer protection cannot result in unjust enrichment or “free use” of financed assets. **Keywords:** Hire-purchase agreement, repossession, consumer protection, deficiency in service, unfair trade practice, financier rights ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*M/s. Magma Fincorp Ltd. v. Rajesh Kumar Tiwari*Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 5622 of 2019Judgement Date01 October 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorum*D.Y. Chandrachud J. and Indira Banerjee J.*Author*Indira Banerjee J.*Citation*\[2020\] 11 SCR 59*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 2(1)(r), 12, 14, 21, 27 – Consumer Protection Act, 1986*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsConsumer Law, Contract Law, Commercial Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The dispute arose from a consumer complaint alleging *deficiency in service* and *unfair trade practice* following repossession and sale of a vehicle financed under a hire-purchase agreement. The District Forum, State Commission, and National Commission concurrently ruled in favour of the consumer, directing refund of instalments, damages, and litigation costs. These findings proceeded on the assumption that repossession without notice itself constituted illegality. The Supreme Court intervened to correct what it perceived as a fundamental misunderstanding of hire-purchase jurisprudence. The case presented an opportunity to reaffirm settled principles distinguishing a hire-purchase transaction from a loan or sale, particularly concerning ownership and repossession rights. The Court examined whether consumer fora could disregard contractual clauses permitting repossession without notice, and whether compensation could be awarded absent proof of loss. The judgment also addressed a recurring systemic issue where defaulting borrowers invoke consumer jurisdiction to obtain equitable relief despite admitted breaches. The Court sought to recalibrate the balance between consumer protection and contractual sanctity, stressing that consumer fora are adjudicatory bodies, not courts of equity dispensing discretionary relief. The background of the judgment reflects judicial concern over erosion of commercial certainty and misuse of consumer law mechanisms. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The respondent entered into a *hire-purchase agreement* with the appellant-financier in August 2002 for purchase of a Mahindra Marshal vehicle costing *₹4,21,121*. The respondent made an initial payment of *₹1,06,121*, of which *₹1,04,000* was paid directly to the dealer. The financier financed the balance *₹3,15,000*. The agreement required repayment of *₹4,38,585* in *35 monthly instalments* of *₹12,531*. The respondent admittedly paid only *7 instalments*. Several post-dated cheques issued by him were dishonoured. He attributed default to illness and subsequent police seizure of the vehicle due to an accident. On *14 July 2003*, the financier repossessed the vehicle under *Clause 15* of the agreement. A pre-sale notice dated *26 July 2003* demanding outstanding dues of *₹2,80,132.59* was allegedly sent, though the respondent disputed service due to address discrepancy. The respondent did not tender payment. The vehicle was sold in *November 2003*. Two years later, the respondent filed a consumer complaint seeking refund, damages, and compensation. He did not allege forcible repossession, criminal intimidation, or violence. He admitted default but contended that refusal to release the vehicle upon assurance to pay constituted unfair trade practice. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether under a *hire-purchase agreement*, ownership of the vehicle vests with the financier until all instalments are paid? ii. Whether repossession of a vehicle upon default constitutes *deficiency in service* under the *Consumer Protection Act, 1986*? iii. Whether service of notice before repossession is mandatory in absence of contractual stipulation? iv. Whether consumer fora can award compensation without proof of actual loss? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the transaction was a pure *hire-purchase agreement* where ownership remained with the financier. Repossession was expressly permitted *ipso facto* without notice under *Clause 15*. The respondent was a chronic defaulter and had paid only 7 of 35 instalments. It was argued that the Consumer Protection Act does not override contractual terms. No loss was pleaded or proved. Awarding refund amounted to granting free use of the vehicle for nearly a year. The findings of unfair trade practice were speculative and unsupported by evidence. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent submitted that repossession without notice violated principles of natural justice and constituted deficiency in service. It was argued that refusal to accept assurance to clear dues was arbitrary. The discrepancy in address was projected as deliberate suppression to deprive the respondent of redemption opportunity. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 2(1)(r), Consumer Protection Act, 1986* ii. *Section 14, Consumer Protection Act, 1986* iii. *Section 3, Consumer Protection Act, 1986* iv. *Indian Contract Act, 1872* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of all consumer fora. The Court held that under a hire-purchase agreement, the financier remains the owner until completion of payment. Repossession of one’s own property cannot amount to theft or deficiency. The Court ruled that the requirement of notice depends entirely on contractual terms. Where an agreement permits repossession without notice, non-service does not invalidate repossession. Even where notice is implied, damages require proof of loss. The respondent failed to establish any pecuniary or reputational injury. The consumer fora erred by ignoring depreciation, usage, and admitted default. Awarding full refund with interest resulted in unjust enrichment. The Court stressed that consumer forums must adjudicate on evidence, not assumptions. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** Repossession of a vehicle by a financier under a valid hire-purchase agreement upon default does not constitute deficiency in service or unfair trade practice unless contractual terms are violated and actual loss is proved. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court cautioned financiers against use of force, musclemen, or criminal intimidation during repossession, even when contractually permitted. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Consumer fora must assess proof of loss before awarding compensation. ii. Contractual terms govern repossession rights. iii. Refunds must consider depreciation and usage. iv. Consumer Protection Act cannot override contract law. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Charanjit Singh Chadha v. Sudhir Mehra*, *(2001) 7 SCC 417* 2. *Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. State of Kerala*, *\[1966\] SCR 828* 3. *Orix Auto Finance v. Jagmander Singh*, *\[2006\] 2 SCR 169* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Consumer Protection Act, 1986* 2. *Indian Contract Act, 1872* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., [2020] 11 SCR 117](https://lawfoyer.in/parvez-noordin-lokhandwalla-v-state-of-maharashtra-anr-2020-11-scr-117/) **Published:** January 16, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the constitutional and procedural limits on judicial discretion while imposing conditions of bail, particularly where such conditions interfere with the fundamental right to travel abroad. The appeal arose from an order of the Bombay High Court refusing to relax interim bail conditions to allow the appellant, an Indian citizen and long-term US resident, to travel abroad for revalidation of his Green Card. The appellant was facing criminal proceedings arising from allegations of forgery under the Indian Penal Code, 1860, based on a private complaint filed in 2014. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the constitutional and procedural limits on judicial discretion while imposing conditions of bail, particularly where such conditions interfere with the *fundamental right to travel abroad*. The appeal arose from an order of the Bombay High Court refusing to relax interim bail conditions to allow the appellant, an Indian citizen and long-term US resident, to travel abroad for revalidation of his Green Card. The appellant was facing criminal proceedings arising from allegations of forgery under the *Indian Penal Code, 1860*, based on a private complaint filed in 2014. The Supreme Court undertook a proportionality analysis of bail conditions imposed under *Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*. It emphasized that while courts possess wide discretion to impose conditions “in the interest of justice,” such discretion is not unbridled and must remain tethered to the objectives of securing presence of the accused, preventing misuse of liberty, and ensuring fair trial. The Court recognized the appellant’s consistent travel history between India and the United States even after registration of the FIR, the absence of flight risk, and the severe civil consequences that would ensue if travel were denied. The decision reinforces that bail conditions must not be so onerous or disproportionate as to render personal liberty illusory. The ruling reaffirms bail jurisprudence as a constitutional safeguard rather than a punitive instrument, harmonizing criminal procedure with human dignity and livelihood considerations. **Keywords:** Bail conditions, Right to travel abroad, Proportionality, Personal liberty, Criminal procedure ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.*Case NumberCriminal Appeal No. 648 of 2020Judgement Date01 October 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumHon’ble Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud and Hon’ble Ms. Justice Indira BanerjeeAuthorDr. Justice D.Y. ChandrachudCitation*\[2020\] 11 SCR 117*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 437, 439 CrPC; Sections 420, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 474 IPC*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsCriminal Law, Constitutional Law, Human Rights Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The judgment arises at the intersection of criminal procedure and constitutional liberty, particularly the judicial management of bail conditions impacting transnational mobility. The dispute originated from a private complaint filed in January 2014 alleging forgery of a *Power of Attorney dated 19 December 2011*. Based on judicial directions under *Section 156(3) CrPC*, an FIR was registered in April 2014 invoking multiple forgery-related provisions of the *IPC*. Despite the pendency of proceedings, the appellant, a Green Card holder residing in the United States since 1985, continued to travel between India and the US on multiple occasions. His arrest occurred only in February 2020 pursuant to a Look-Out Circular. Temporary bail was granted by the Bombay High Court in May 2020 but subject to restrictive conditions, including surrender of passport and prohibition on leaving jurisdiction. The appellant sought relaxation of these conditions to comply with US immigration requirements, failing which his lawful permanent resident status would lapse. The High Court refused modification solely on the basis of pendency of an FIR. The Supreme Court was therefore called upon to evaluate whether denial of permission to travel amounted to disproportionate curtailment of liberty. The case presents a nuanced question concerning how far bail conditions may intrude upon livelihood, dignity, and international movement, without undermining the administration of criminal justice. It situates bail not as a matter of discretion alone but as an exercise constrained by constitutional morality. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellant is an Indian citizen holding a Green Card and residing in the United States since 1985. In January 2014, a private complaint was filed by a third party alleging that the appellant had forged the signature of his brother on a *Power of Attorney dated 19 December 2011*. Acting under *Section 156(3) CrPC*, the JMFC directed police investigation, resulting in registration of an FIR on 22 April 2014 for offences under *Sections 420, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471 and 474 IPC*. Between 2015 and January 2020, the appellant visited India on sixteen occasions, details of which were placed on record before the Supreme Court. In February 2018, anticipatory bail was sought by the appellant and co-accused. While anticipatory bail was granted to the co-accused, the appellant’s protection lapsed due to withdrawal of application. On 21 February 2020, the appellant was arrested at Mumbai airport pursuant to a Look-Out Circular. His bail application was rejected by the Sessions Court but temporary bail was granted by the Bombay High Court on 19 May 2020 for eight weeks with stringent conditions. The appellant complied with bail terms and subsequently sought permission to travel to the US for revalidation of his Green Card under US immigration law. Despite repeated praecipes and even directions from the Supreme Court for early hearing, the High Court declined to relax the conditions. The refusal was premised primarily on the existence of an FIR. This order was challenged before the Supreme Court, leading to the present appeal. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether a pending FIR by itself can justify denial of permission to travel abroad while on bail? ii. Whether conditions imposed under *Sections 437(3) and 439 CrPC* must satisfy the test of proportionality? iii. Whether denial of travel permission amounts to infringement of *personal liberty under Article 21*? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the appellant had been a lawful resident of the United States since 1985 and held a valid Green Card requiring periodic revalidation. It was argued that denial of travel would result in irreversible civil consequences, including loss of livelihood. It was contended that the appellant had never absconded and had consistently returned to India despite ongoing litigation. Reliance was placed on his extensive travel history post-FIR registration to negate any apprehension of flight risk. The counsel emphasized that bail conditions cannot operate as indirect punishment and must align with the object of ensuring trial attendance. The appellant also argued that the High Court’s reasoning ignored binding precedent mandating restraint and proportionality while imposing bail conditions. The refusal was characterized as arbitrary and contrary to settled bail jurisprudence. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the State submitted that the appellant’s conduct was questionable, alleging non-compliance with bail terms. It was argued that permitting travel abroad would jeopardize the trial and there was no assurance of return. The State emphasized that criminal proceedings were at an active stage and public interest demanded strict enforcement. The pendency of serious forgery charges was cited as justification for continued travel restrictions. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned order of the Bombay High Court. The Court held that the mere existence of an FIR cannot, in isolation, justify denial of permission to travel abroad. Interpreting *Sections 437(3) and 439 CrPC*, the Court reaffirmed that although courts may impose “any condition” in the interest of justice, such discretion is not absolute. Bail conditions must serve legitimate purposes such as securing presence, preventing tampering with evidence, or ensuring fair trial. The Court conducted a fact-specific evaluation, noting the appellant’s consistent return to India, long-standing residence abroad, and absence of any material suggesting evasion of justice. It rejected the High Court’s finding that the appellant lacked contact with India, terming it contrary to record. Emphasizing *human dignity* and *constitutional safeguards*, the Court held that liberty cannot be rendered illusory by disproportionate conditions. The appellant was permitted to travel to the US for eight weeks subject to furnishing an undertaking to return and comply with trial requirements. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio decidendi of the judgment lies in the principle that bail conditions must bear a *reasonable and proportional nexus* to the object sought to be achieved. The phrase “any condition” under *Sections 437(3) and 439 CrPC* cannot be interpreted to authorize arbitrary or excessive restrictions. The Court held that the right to travel abroad forms an intrinsic component of *personal liberty under Article 21*. Curtailment of this right, even through judicial orders, must satisfy proportionality and necessity. Where the accused demonstrates bona fides and absence of flight risk, denial of travel solely due to pendency of criminal proceedings is unjustified. The ruling clarifies that bail jurisprudence must be guided by constitutional values rather than punitive instincts. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that courts must remain conscious of the *collateral civil consequences* of criminal process. Bail conditions impacting livelihood, immigration status, or family life require heightened judicial sensitivity. It further noted that criminal law should not be weaponized in long-standing private disputes, especially where documentary evidence predominates and custodial interrogation is unnecessary. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Bail conditions must be proportionate to the risk sought to be mitigated. ii. Travel restrictions must be justified by demonstrable flight risk. iii. Courts must consider civil and immigration consequences while imposing conditions. iv. Prior conduct and compliance history of the accused must guide discretion. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment strengthens constitutional bail jurisprudence by reinforcing proportionality as its governing principle. It prevents criminal procedure from degenerating into a mechanism of indirect punishment. The decision aligns Indian bail law with international human rights standards, particularly regarding freedom of movement and dignity. By harmonizing procedural discretion with substantive liberty, the ruling provides valuable guidance to trial courts, High Courts, and practitioners. It reiterates that liberty is the rule and restriction the exception, even at the pre-trial stage. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Kunal Kumar Tiwari v. State of Bihar*, *(2018) 16 SCC 74* 2. *Dataram Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh*, *\[2018\] 1 SCR 882* 3. *Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi)*, *\[2013\] 10 SCR 125* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* 2. *Indian Penal Code, 1860* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha & Anr. v. State of Gujarat, [2020] 13 SCR 886](https://lawfoyer.in/gujarat-mazdoor-sabha-anr-v-state-of-gujarat-2020-13-scr-886/) **Published:** January 16, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha & Anr. v. State of Gujarat examines the constitutional and statutory limits of emergency powers exercised by a State Government under Section 5 of the Factories Act, 1948. The Supreme Court was called upon to scrutinize the legality of two notifications issued by the State of Gujarat during the COVID-19 pandemic, which exempted all registered factories from compliance with statutory safeguards relating to working hours, rest intervals, and overtime wages. The core controversy revolved around whether the economic downturn caused by the pandemic constituted a “public emergency” within the meaning of Section 5, justifying a blanket suspension of labour welfare protections. **Content:** **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment in *Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha & Anr. v. State of Gujarat* examines the constitutional and statutory limits of emergency powers exercised by a State Government under *Section 5 of the Factories Act, 1948*. The Supreme Court was called upon to scrutinize the legality of two notifications issued by the State of Gujarat during the COVID-19 pandemic, which exempted all registered factories from compliance with statutory safeguards relating to working hours, rest intervals, and overtime wages. The core controversy revolved around whether the economic downturn caused by the pandemic constituted a *“public emergency”* within the meaning of *Section 5*, justifying a blanket suspension of labour welfare protections. The Court undertook a detailed interpretative exercise of the expression *“public emergency”*, tracing its constitutional lineage to *Articles 352, 355, and 356* of the Constitution and to prior jurisprudence distinguishing *law and order*, *public order*, and *security of the State*. It held that the statutory definition requires the existence of a *grave emergency* threatening the *security of India or a part of its territory*, caused by *war, external aggression, or internal disturbance*. Mere economic hardship, even if severe, was found insufficient to meet this threshold. The judgment further reaffirmed the social-welfare character of the *Factories Act, 1948*, emphasizing that emergency powers cannot be used to dilute hard-won labour protections or legitimise exploitative conditions. The Court held that the impugned notifications were ultra vires the statute, violated constitutional guarantees under *Articles 14, 21, and 23*, and undermined the constitutional vision of social and economic democracy. Consequently, the notifications were quashed, and payment of statutory overtime wages was directed. **Keywords:** Public Emergency; Factories Act; Labour Welfare; COVID-19; Overtime Wages; Constitutional Proportionality **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha & Anr. v. State of Gujarat*Case NumberWrit Petition (Civil) No. 708 of 2020Judgement Date01 October 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumDr. D.Y. Chandrachud, Indu Malhotra, K.M. Joseph, JJ.AuthorDr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.Citation*\[2020\] 13 SCR 886*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 5, 51, 54, 55, 56, 59 of the Factories Act, 1948; Articles 14, 21, 23, 32, 352, 355, 356 of the Constitution of India*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsConstitutional Law; Labour and Industrial Law; Administrative Law **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The judgment arose in the backdrop of an unprecedented nationwide lockdown imposed to contain the COVID-19 pandemic, which resulted in a near-complete halt of economic activity across India. Faced with industrial slowdown and alleged financial distress of employers, the State of Gujarat invoked *Section 5 of the Factories Act, 1948* to issue notifications dated *17 April 2020* and *20 July 2020*, exempting all registered factories from statutory limitations on working hours, rest intervals, and overtime compensation. The stated objective was to revive industrial productivity during the economic downturn. The petitioners, representing a substantial body of industrial workers, challenged these notifications under *Article 32 of the Constitution*, asserting that the State had exceeded its statutory authority and diluted non-derogable labour welfare standards under the guise of emergency powers. The challenge was premised on the argument that the pandemic, though grave, did not threaten the *security of India* as required by the statutory definition of *public emergency* under *Section 5*. The case assumed constitutional significance because it tested the limits of delegated emergency powers, the doctrine of proportionality, and the enforceability of socio-economic rights during crises. The Court was required to balance competing interests of economic revival and labour protection while remaining faithful to the constitutional ethos of a welfare State. In doing so, it revisited foundational doctrines relating to emergency jurisprudence, labour welfare legislation, and the constitutional vision of dignity in employment. **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** Following the imposition of a nationwide lockdown on *24 March 2020*, industrial operations in Gujarat were suspended, leading to financial stress for factory owners and large-scale displacement of migrant labour. On *17 April 2020*, the Labour and Employment Department of Gujarat issued a notification under *Section 5 of the Factories Act, 1948*, exempting all factories from compliance with *Sections 51, 54, 55, and 56*. The exemption permitted adult workers to work up to *12 hours per day* and *72 hours per week*, altered rest interval norms, and mandated payment of wages for extended hours only at a proportionate rate rather than double overtime wages under *Section 59*. The exemption was initially valid till *19 July 2020* and was subsequently extended by another notification dated *20 July 2020* till *19 October 2020*. These notifications applied uniformly to all factories, irrespective of the nature of production or necessity. The petitioners contended that factories had resumed operations almost immediately after the first notification, undermining the claim of emergency necessity. They further highlighted reported industrial accidents occurring post-lockdown, attributing them to overworked and fatigued labour. The State defended its action by characterising COVID-19 as a *public emergency* causing *internal disturbance* through economic chaos and argued that the proportional wage payment safeguarded worker interests. The factual matrix thus presented a direct conflict between economic exigency and statutory labour safeguards. **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting economic slowdown constitute a *“public emergency”* under *Section 5 of the Factories Act, 1948*? ii. Whether the State Government can issue a blanket exemption to all factories under *Section 5*? iii. Whether the impugned notifications violate *Sections 51, 54, 55, 56, and 59* of the Factories Act? iv. Whether the notifications infringe *Articles 14, 21, and 23* of the Constitution of India? **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the Petitioners submitted that *Section 5* permits exemption only upon the objective existence of a *grave emergency* threatening the *security of India*. They invoked the doctrine of *noscitur a sociis* to argue that *internal disturbance* must be of comparable gravity to *war* or *external aggression*. Reliance was placed on *Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras* and *Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar* to distinguish economic hardship from security threats. It was contended that the notifications effectively nullified *Section 59* by substituting double overtime wages with proportionate wages, amounting to *forced labour* under *Article 23*. The petitioners further argued that *Section 65(2)*, not *Section 5*, governed exceptional workload situations and imposed safeguards absent in the impugned notifications. The blanket nature of the exemption was asserted to be ultra vires and arbitrary. **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the Respondent submitted that COVID-19 disrupted social order and economic stability, constituting an *internal disturbance*. The State argued that *Section 5* vested discretionary power to exempt any factory or class of factories and that enumerating classes was unnecessary. It was contended that the notifications merely allowed three additional working hours with proportionate compensation and did not violate *Article 23*. The Respondent relied on *Pfizer Private Limited v. Workmen* to justify enhanced production during national crises and asserted that the measures were temporary, proportionate, and necessary to sustain industrial operations. **H) JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court held that the existence of a *public emergency* under *Section 5* is an objective jurisdictional fact subject to judicial review. It undertook an exhaustive interpretation of the statutory explanation, holding that all constituent elements—*grave emergency*, *threat to security*, and causation by *war, external aggression, or internal disturbance*—must co-exist. The Court rejected the State’s attempt to equate economic hardship with *internal disturbance*, relying on constitutional jurisprudence under *Articles 352, 355, and 356*, including *S.R. Bommai v. Union of India* and *Extra-Judicial Execution Victim Families Association v. Union of India*. It held that economic slowdown, though severe, did not disrupt public order or threaten territorial integrity. The Court further held that the notifications made impermissible departures from the statutory scheme by extending working hours and diluting overtime wages, thereby undermining the welfare objective of the Factories Act. It emphasised that emergency powers cannot be used to convert labour protections into “paper tigers”. Accordingly, both notifications were quashed, and the State was directed to ensure payment of overtime wages strictly in accordance with *Section 59*. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio decidendi of the judgment is that *economic hardship, even when caused by a pandemic, does not constitute a “public emergency” under Section 5 of the Factories Act unless it threatens the security of India or a part of its territory*. The Court held that emergency powers must be narrowly construed and proportionately exercised. Blanket exemptions undermining labour welfare are ultra vires and unconstitutional. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that selective exemptions under *Section 65(2)* for factories producing essential medical equipment during a pandemic could be justified if accompanied by statutory safeguards and fair compensation. It also remarked on the constitutional obligation of the State to protect vulnerable workers during crises rather than exacerbate inequality. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Emergency powers under *Section 5* must be exercised only upon strict satisfaction of statutory conditions. ii. Economic exigency alone cannot justify suspension of labour welfare legislation. iii. Blanket exemptions applicable to all factories are impermissible. iv. Overtime wages under *Section 59* are mandatory and non-derogable. ## **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment reaffirms the constitutional primacy of labour welfare and the limited nature of statutory emergency powers. It restores doctrinal clarity by aligning *Section 5* with constitutional emergency jurisprudence and reinforces the principle that crises cannot be used to legitimise exploitation. The decision strengthens the enforceability of socio-economic rights and preserves the dignity of labour as an essential component of India’s constitutional democracy. ## **J) REFERENCES** ### **a) Important Cases Referred** - *Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras*, *\[1950\] 1 SCR 594* - *Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar*, *\[1966\] SCR 709* - *S.R. Bommai v. Union of India*, *\[1994\] 2 SCR 644* - *Extra-Judicial Execution Victim Families Association v. Union of India*, *\[2016\] 4 SCR 909* - *K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India*, *\[2017\] 10 SCR 569* ### **b) Important Statutes Referred** - *Factories Act, 1948* - *Constitution of India* - *Disaster Management Act, 2005* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Pravasi Legal Cell & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [2020] 12 S.C.R. 102](https://lawfoyer.in/pravasi-legal-cell-ors-v-union-of-india-ors-2020-12-s-c-r-102/) **Published:** January 16, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in Pravasi Legal Cell & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. addresses the legality of airline refund practices during the unprecedented nationwide lockdown imposed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Multiple public interest litigations were instituted under Article 32 of the Constitution of India challenging the refusal of domestic and international airlines to provide cash refunds for cancelled flights, instead offering credit shells. The petitioners contended that such practices violated the binding Civil Aviation Requirements (CAR) framed under the Aircraft Act, 1934 and Aircraft Rules, 1937. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment in *Pravasi Legal Cell & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.* addresses the legality of airline refund practices during the unprecedented nationwide lockdown imposed due to the *COVID-19 pandemic*. Multiple public interest litigations were instituted under *Article 32 of the Constitution of India* challenging the refusal of domestic and international airlines to provide cash refunds for cancelled flights, instead offering *credit shells*. The petitioners contended that such practices violated the binding *Civil Aviation Requirements (CAR)* framed under the *Aircraft Act, 1934* and *Aircraft Rules, 1937*. The Supreme Court examined the regulatory framework governing air passenger refunds, including *CAR dated 22.05.2008*, *CAR dated 06.08.2010* as revised on *27.02.2019*, and the *Office Memorandum dated 16.04.2020* issued by the *Ministry of Civil Aviation*. The Court balanced statutory passenger rights with the financial distress faced by airlines due to the complete suspension of air operations. The Court held that passengers who booked tickets during the lockdown period for travel within the lockdown period were entitled to *full refunds without cancellation charges*. For bookings made for travel beyond *24.05.2020*, refund obligations were held to be governed by existing CAR provisions. Where immediate refunds were not feasible, a *regulated credit shell mechanism* with incentives and mandatory refund by *31.03.2021* was judicially sanctioned. The judgment harmonizes *consumer protection principles*, *force majeure doctrines*, and *economic viability of airlines*, laying down enforceable directions applicable to domestic airlines, international carriers, and travel agents alike. It marks a significant precedent in aviation law during public emergencies. **Keywords:** COVID-19, Airfare Refund, Civil Aviation Requirements, Credit Shell, Force Majeure, Consumer Rights ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*Pravasi Legal Cell & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.*ii) Case NumberWrit Petition (Civil) No. 1131 of 2020 with connected mattersiii) Judgement Date01 October 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumAshok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy, M.R. Shah, JJ.vi) AuthorR. Subhash Reddy, J.vii) Citation*\[2020\] 12 S.C.R. 102*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Article 32, Constitution of India*; *Aircraft Act, 1934*; *Aircraft Rules, 1937*; *Civil Aviation Requirements (2008, 2010, 2019)*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsConstitutional Law, Aviation Law, Consumer Protection Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The litigation arose from the *complete suspension of domestic and international air services* following the nationwide lockdown imposed from *25.03.2020* to contain the spread of *COVID-19*. Airlines were legally restrained from operating flights, resulting in mass cancellations. Despite statutory refund obligations under *Civil Aviation Requirements*, several airlines adopted a uniform policy of offering *credit shells* instead of monetary refunds. The *Ministry of Civil Aviation*, acknowledging the extraordinary situation, issued an *Office Memorandum dated 16.04.2020*, partially directing refunds for tickets booked during the lockdown period. This advisory, however, excluded passengers who had booked tickets prior to lockdown but whose travel dates fell within the restricted period. The selective nature of the advisory triggered allegations of *discrimination*, *arbitrariness*, and *violation of statutory CAR provisions*. Public interest petitions were filed by passenger associations, consumer bodies, individual passengers, and travel agent federations. The petitioners invoked *Article 32* alleging infringement of *right to property under Article 300A*, *right to equality under Article 14*, and statutory passenger rights under aviation regulations. The respondents justified their position citing *force majeure*, liquidity crises, and the risk of insolvency if immediate refunds were enforced. The Court was thus called upon to adjudicate the competing claims of *statutory compliance* and *economic survival* during a national emergency. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The petitioners comprised passenger rights organizations, individual travelers, and travel agent federations. Tickets had been booked across various timelines, including *pre-lockdown bookings*, *bookings during lockdown*, and *international travel bookings*. Due to the government-imposed ban, all such flights stood cancelled by operation of law. Despite cancellation, airlines declined immediate refunds and instead issued *credit shells* valid for one year. Petitioners alleged that such practice violated *CAR dated 22.05.2008* which mandates refunds within prescribed timelines depending on the mode of payment. They asserted that *credit shell issuance is permissible only at the passenger’s option*, not as a default airline policy. Individual petitioners, including senior citizens, pleaded undue hardship and unjust enrichment by airlines. Travel agents contended that airlines withheld funds even where agents had prepaid ticket costs. The Union of India and DGCA filed affidavits explaining the regulatory framework and the consultative process undertaken with airlines. Multiple stakeholder meetings culminated in proposed *refund-credit shell hybrid formulations*, attempting to reconcile passenger rights with airline solvency. The Supreme Court examined these formulations alongside statutory mandates to determine their legality and enforceability. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether airlines can lawfully deny cash refunds and issue *credit shells* as a default practice contrary to *Civil Aviation Requirements*? ii. Whether the *Office Memorandum dated 16.04.2020* is discriminatory and ultra vires statutory CAR provisions? iii. Whether financial distress of airlines can override statutory refund obligations? iv. Whether passengers who booked tickets prior to lockdown are entitled to full refunds? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the Petitioners submitted that *Civil Aviation Requirements* framed under *Aircraft Act, 1934* are statutory and binding. They argued that refund timelines and modalities prescribed therein cannot be diluted by executive advisories. It was contended that *credit shells* infringe passenger autonomy and amount to forced lending to airlines. The petitioners emphasized that *force majeure does not extinguish refund obligations*, as CARs expressly require refund even when flights are cancelled due to extraordinary circumstances. The selective application of refunds only to bookings made during lockdown was alleged to violate *Article 14*. Petitioners also alleged *unjust enrichment* and breach of fiduciary obligations by airlines retaining passenger funds. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the Respondents submitted that the pandemic constituted an *existential threat* to the aviation sector. They relied upon economic data and industry reports demonstrating severe liquidity crunch and revenue collapse. It was argued that strict enforcement of CARs would precipitate airline insolvency, harming passengers in the long term. The *credit shell mechanism*, with incentives and guaranteed refund by *31.03.2021*, was presented as a balanced solution evolved through stakeholder consultation. The respondents contended that the *Office Memorandum* was a policy response to extraordinary circumstances and did not permanently abrogate CAR provisions. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court recognized that *CARs are statutory in nature* and ordinarily binding. However, it held that the pandemic presented *peculiar circumstances* requiring pragmatic solutions. The Court refused to strike down the *Office Memorandum dated 16.04.2020*, holding that it was a temporary regulatory response. The Court accepted the refund-credit shell framework evolved by the Ministry, emphasizing that it balanced *passenger rights* and *airline viability*. Mandatory full refunds were ordered for tickets booked during lockdown for travel within lockdown. For other categories, CAR provisions and structured credit shell mechanisms were upheld. The Court issued *detailed operative directions* categorizing refund obligations based on booking period, mode of booking, and nature of carrier. DGCA was directed to ensure strict compliance. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio rests on the principle that *statutory obligations may be temporarily modulated, but not extinguished, during extraordinary public emergencies*. The Court held that while *CARs mandate refunds*, their rigid enforcement during a pandemic could defeat broader public interest. The Court affirmed that *credit shells are legally permissible only as a temporary substitute*, subject to incentives, transferability, and mandatory refund timelines. The judgment thus harmonizes *consumer protection*, *force majeure*, and *economic proportionality*. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that passengers book tickets using *hard-earned money* and cannot be compelled to indefinitely finance airline operations. It emphasized the need for regulatory preparedness to address future emergencies without ad-hoc executive advisories. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Full refund without cancellation charges for tickets booked and cancelled during lockdown. ii. Immediate refund through agents where bookings were agent-mediated. iii. CAR provisions to govern post-lockdown travel bookings. iv. Credit shells to be transferable and incentivized. v. Mandatory refund of unutilized credit shells by *31.03.2021*. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment represents a calibrated judicial response to an unprecedented crisis. It avoids absolutism and embraces regulatory pragmatism while safeguarding passenger rights. The structured refund mechanism provides clarity, predictability, and enforceability. The Court’s refusal to extend credit shell validity beyond *31.03.2021* underscores judicial sensitivity to consumer hardship. The decision strengthens the jurisprudence on *statutory compliance during emergencies* and will guide future regulatory action in aviation and other service sectors. ## J) REFERENCES ### a) Important Statutes Referred 1. *Aircraft Act, 1934* 2. *Aircraft Rules, 1937* 3. *Constitution of India* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab, [2020] 8 SCR 741](https://lawfoyer.in/gurcharan-singh-v-state-of-punjab-2020-8-scr-741/) **Published:** January 15, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The Supreme Court of India in Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab examined the scope and evidentiary threshold required for sustaining a conviction for abetment of suicide under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, read with Section 107 IPC. The case arose from the suicide of a young married woman, Shinder Kaur, who left behind two minor children. The Trial Court acquitted the accused husband and his parents of charges under Sections 304B and 498A IPC but nevertheless convicted the husband under Section 306 IPC, despite no charge being framed for abetment. The High Court affirmed this conviction primarily on conjectural reasoning that a woman with two small children would not ordinarily commit suicide unless compelled by adverse matrimonial circumstances. **Content:** ## A) **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The Supreme Court of India in *Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab* examined the scope and evidentiary threshold required for sustaining a conviction for *abetment of suicide* under *Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860*, read with *Section 107 IPC*. The case arose from the suicide of a young married woman, Shinder Kaur, who left behind two minor children. The Trial Court acquitted the accused husband and his parents of charges under *Sections 304B and 498A IPC* but nevertheless convicted the husband under *Section 306 IPC*, despite no charge being framed for abetment. The High Court affirmed this conviction primarily on conjectural reasoning that a woman with two small children would not ordinarily commit suicide unless compelled by adverse matrimonial circumstances. The Supreme Court rejected this approach and emphasized that *mens rea* is a sine qua non for the offence of abetment. The Court reiterated that *abetment involves a mental process of instigation or intentional aiding*, which must be established through clear, cogent, and proximate evidence. The judgment underscored that mere suspicion, social assumptions, or speculative reasoning cannot substitute legal proof. The absence of evidence demonstrating cruelty, wilful neglect, or a direct nexus between the conduct of the accused and the suicide proved fatal to the prosecution case. By setting aside the conviction, the Court reinforced doctrinal clarity on *Sections 306 and 107 IPC*, cautioning courts against moral presumptions and underscoring the need for strict adherence to criminal jurisprudence principles. The decision strengthens safeguards against misuse of abetment provisions while balancing the need to protect genuine victims. **Keywords:** Abetment of Suicide, Mens Rea, Section 306 IPC, Section 107 IPC, Conjecture vs Proof, Matrimonial Death ## B) **CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab*ii) Case NumberCriminal Appeal No. 40 of 2011iii) Judgement Date01 October 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumN.V. Ramana J., Surya Kant J., Hrishikesh Roy J.vi) AuthorHrishikesh Roy, J.vii) Citation*\[2020\] 8 SCR 741*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 306, 107, 304B, 498A IPC*ix) Judgments overruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsCriminal Law, Matrimonial Offences ## C) **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The judgment addresses a recurring and sensitive issue in Indian criminal law relating to *abetment of suicide within matrimonial relationships*. The social context of dowry-related deaths and domestic discord has often resulted in courts adopting a presumptive approach. However, criminal liability under *Section 306 IPC* demands strict proof of *intentional instigation or aiding*. In the present case, the deceased committed suicide by consuming *aluminium phosphide*. Initial allegations revolved around dowry harassment, leading to registration of an FIR under *Sections 304B and 498A IPC*. During trial, the prosecution failed to establish dowry demand or cruelty. Despite such findings, the Trial Court proceeded to convict the husband for abetment based on an assumed frustration of marital expectations. The High Court compounded this error by endorsing speculative reasoning rooted in social assumptions rather than evidentiary analysis. The Supreme Court intervened to correct this jurisprudential deviation. The decision situates itself within a consistent line of authorities emphasizing *mens rea*, proximity, and active conduct as indispensable elements of abetment. The judgment thus serves as a doctrinal reaffirmation that criminal law cannot operate on moral conjecture or societal stereotypes. ## D) **FACTS OF THE CASE** The appellant, *Gurcharan Singh*, was married to *Shinder Kaur*. The couple had two minor children at the time of the incident. On *12.08.1997*, Shinder Kaur died by suicide at her matrimonial home. The prosecution alleged that she was subjected to dowry harassment and cruelty, particularly a demand of *Rs. 20,000* for purchasing a plot. An FIR was lodged by the deceased’s father under *Sections 304B and 498A IPC*. Post-mortem confirmed death due to consumption of *aluminium phosphide*. During trial, the prosecution relied primarily on testimonies of the parents and maternal uncle of the deceased. However, inconsistencies emerged. The Trial Court noted that the alleged demand occurred three years after marriage and was described as a *“cash loan”*, not dowry. Evidence also showed that the deceased received medical care from her husband and in-laws, including hospitalisation during childbirth. The Trial Court acquitted all accused of dowry death and cruelty but convicted the husband under *Section 306 IPC*, despite no specific charge. The High Court dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court examined whether such conviction could stand in the absence of evidence showing instigation, intentional aid, or wilful neglect. ## E) **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether conviction under *Section 306 IPC* can be sustained in the absence of proof of *mens rea*? ii. Whether speculative reasoning can substitute proof of *instigation or intentional aiding* under *Section 107 IPC*? iii. Whether courts can presume abetment solely based on the fact of suicide by a married woman? ## F) **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellant submitted that *no overt act, cruelty, or wilful neglect* was proved. It was argued that once dowry demand and cruelty were disbelieved, conviction for abetment was unsustainable. The conviction was based purely on conjecture. The appellant relied on precedents emphasizing that *mere harassment or strained relations* do not constitute abetment unless there is *proximate instigation*. ## G) **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the State argued that the demand of money and the surrounding matrimonial atmosphere drove the deceased to suicide. It was contended that a young mother would not ordinarily commit suicide without provocation. The State relied on parental testimonies to infer harassment. ## H) **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. *Section 306 IPC – Abetment of Suicide* ii. *Section 107 IPC – Definition of Abetment* iii. *Sections 304B and 498A IPC* ## I) **JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. It held that *abetment requires clear mens rea*. The Court observed that neither the Trial Court nor the High Court examined whether the appellant had the *guilty intention* necessary for abetment. The reasoning that a woman with two children would not commit suicide unless harassed was held to be *perverse and speculative*. The Court reiterated that *criminal courts must rely on evidence, not social assumptions*. Absence of cruelty, lack of proximity between alleged conduct and suicide, and evidence of care towards the deceased negated the charge. The conviction under *Section 306 IPC* was set aside. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The essential ratio is that *mens rea is indispensable for abetment*. Instigation or intentional aid must be *visible, proximate, and supported by evidence*. Courts cannot presume culpability based on societal expectations or conjecture. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that *individuals may commit suicide due to varied personal reasons*, including depression or financial stress, without abetment. Such observations caution against moralistic adjudication. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Courts must strictly examine *mens rea* under *Section 107 IPC*. ii. Conviction under *Section 306 IPC* cannot rest on conjecture. iii. Proximity and direct nexus between conduct and suicide are mandatory. ## J) **REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *SS Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan*, *\[2010\] 9 SCR 1111* ii. *Amalendu Pal @ Jhantu v. State of West Bengal*, *\[2009\] 15 SCR 836* iii. *Mangat Ram v. State of Haryana*, *\[2014\] 4 SCR 988* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Indian Penal Code, 1860* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [T. K. David v. Kuruppampady Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. & Ors. [2020] 13 SCR 663](https://lawfoyer.in/t-k-david-v-kuruppampady-service-co-operative-bank-ltd-ors-2020-13-scr-663/) **Published:** January 15, 2026 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The judgment in T. K. David v. Kuruppampady Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. & Ors. authoritatively settles the question of maintainability of a Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution when filed solely against an order rejecting a review petition, after the dismissal of an earlier SLP against the main judgment. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine of finality of litigation and clarified the contours of the doctrine of merger in the context of review proceedings. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment in *T. K. David v. Kuruppampady Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. & Ors.* authoritatively settles the question of *maintainability of a Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution when filed solely against an order rejecting a review petition*, after the dismissal of an earlier SLP against the main judgment. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine of finality of litigation and clarified the contours of the doctrine of merger in the context of review proceedings. The Court held that once an SLP challenging the principal judgment of the High Court has been dismissed, the said dismissal attains finality between the parties. Consequently, a subsequent SLP challenging only the order rejecting review is not maintainable, as no relief can be granted without indirectly unsettling the final judgment. The Bench emphasised that *Article 136 is a discretionary jurisdiction*, and the Court will not entertain petitions where no effective relief can be granted. By relying upon earlier authoritative precedents such as *Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Yashwant Singh Negi* and *Bussa Overseas and Properties Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India*, the Court reinforced consistency, judicial discipline, and respect for finality. The decision reiterates that review proceedings cannot be used as a backdoor to re-litigate concluded issues, nor can repeated challenges be permitted under the guise of procedural technicalities. The ruling strengthens the jurisprudence on abuse of process and ensures certainty in judicial outcomes, particularly in service and employment disputes involving prolonged litigation. **Keywords:** Special Leave Petition; Review Petition; Doctrine of Merger; Finality of Judgments; Abuse of Process; Article 136 ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetails*Judgment Cause Title**T. K. David v. Kuruppampady Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. & Ors.**Case Number*Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10482 of 2020*Judgment Date**05 October 2020**Court**Supreme Court of India**Quorum**Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy and M.R. Shah, JJ.**Author**Justice Ashok Bhushan**Citation**\[2020\] 13 SCR 663**Legal Provisions Involved**Article 136 of the Constitution of India**Judgments Overruled**None**Related Law Subjects**Constitutional Law; Service Law; Procedural Law* ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT** The litigation history underlying the present judgment reflects a prolonged service dispute entangled in multiple layers of adjudication. The petitioner, an employee of a co-operative bank, was subjected to disciplinary proceedings culminating in dismissal. Over the years, the dispute traversed statutory forums under co-operative law, the High Court, and eventually the Supreme Court. The case exemplifies how repeated challenges, though procedurally permissible in isolation, may cumulatively undermine the principle of finality. The Supreme Court was confronted not with the merits of the disciplinary action, but with a narrow yet significant procedural question—whether an SLP is maintainable against an order dismissing a review petition, when the main judgment had already been unsuccessfully challenged before the same Court. The background reveals that the petitioner had exhausted not only statutory remedies but also constitutional remedies including *review and curative petitions before the Supreme Court itself*. This context is vital because it situates the judgment within the broader constitutional philosophy of *judicial restraint*. The Court was required to balance access to justice with the need to prevent abuse of judicial process. The case also revisits and clarifies the ratio in *Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala*, particularly on the distinction between maintainability of review and maintainability of a subsequent SLP. The judgment thus forms part of a consistent line of authorities discouraging endless litigation and reinforcing the sanctity of concluded judgments. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The petitioner was employed with *Kuruppampady Service Co-operative Bank Ltd.* and was subjected to disciplinary proceedings following allegations of misconduct. A domestic enquiry culminated in an order of dismissal dated *20.03.2003*. The petitioner challenged the dismissal before the *Co-operative Arbitration Court*, which by its award dated *18.08.2010*, modified the punishment to *reduction to a lower rank*. Both parties were aggrieved. Appeals were preferred before the *Co-operative Tribunal*, which by judgment dated *16.08.2011*, substituted the punishment with *compulsory retirement with terminal benefits*. The petitioner challenged this decision by filing a writ petition before the Kerala High Court, which was dismissed on *31.07.2013*. A writ appeal was also dismissed on *11.03.2015*. The petitioner thereafter approached the Supreme Court through *SLP (C) No. 24231 of 2015*, which was dismissed on *21.08.2015*. A review petition and a curative petition before the Supreme Court also failed. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a *review petition before the High Court* seeking review of the writ appeal judgment, which was dismissed on *06.02.2020*. The present SLP challenged only this latter order rejecting review. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. *Whether a Special Leave Petition under Article 136 is maintainable against an order rejecting a review petition when the main judgment has already attained finality?* ii. *Whether dismissal of an earlier SLP bars a subsequent challenge indirectly affecting the same judgment?* iii. *Whether any effective relief can be granted without unsettling a final judgment?* ## **F) PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the petitioner submitted that dismissal of the earlier SLP did not operate as *res judicata*. It was argued that as per *Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala*, dismissal of an SLP does not result in merger, thereby preserving the statutory right of review. The petitioner contended that the High Court failed to correct manifest injustice and that the punishment of compulsory retirement was disproportionate and politically motivated. It was further urged that the review court had jurisdiction to re-examine errors apparent on record. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the respondent argued that the present SLP was *not maintainable*, as the main judgment had already attained finality upon dismissal of the earlier SLP. It was contended that entertaining the present petition would amount to indirectly reopening a concluded judgment. Reliance was placed on precedents emphasising that review proceedings cannot be used to circumvent finality. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. *Article 136 of the Constitution of India* ii. *Doctrine of Merger* iii. *Principle of Finality of Judgments* ## **I) JUDGMENT** The Supreme Court dismissed the SLP, holding that it was *not maintainable*. The Court observed that the dismissal of the earlier SLP against the main judgment rendered the judgment final between the parties. Any challenge to the order rejecting review would necessarily seek to disturb the final judgment, which is impermissible. The Court clarified that while *Kunhayammed* permits filing of a review notwithstanding dismissal of an SLP, it does not follow that a further SLP against rejection of review is maintainable. The Bench relied extensively on *Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Yashwant Singh Negi* and *Bussa Overseas and Properties Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India*, reiterating that no merger occurs when review is dismissed, and the aggrieved party must challenge the main judgment. The Court emphasised that Article 136 is discretionary and will not be invoked where no relief can be granted. The judgment underscores judicial discipline, consistency, and respect for finality. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio decidendi is that *a Special Leave Petition challenging only an order rejecting a review petition is not maintainable when the main judgment has already been unsuccessfully challenged and has attained finality*. The Court held that permitting such petitions would defeat the principle of finality and encourage abuse of process. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that consistency and finality are cornerstones of the administration of justice. Endless challenges erode public confidence in the judicial system. These observations, though not strictly necessary for the decision, reinforce the philosophy underlying procedural law. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Courts should not entertain SLPs where no effective relief can be granted. ii. Review jurisdiction must not be converted into an appellate forum. iii. Finality of judgments must be respected to preserve judicial discipline. ## **J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment represents a firm reaffirmation of procedural discipline under Article 136. It sends a clear message that the Supreme Court will not permit repeated attempts to reopen concluded matters through indirect challenges. The decision strengthens certainty in litigation, particularly in service matters where disputes often linger for decades. By reinforcing established precedents, the Court ensures predictability and stability in constitutional adjudication. ## **K) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Kunhayammed and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Anr.*, *\[2000\] 1 Suppl. SCR 538* ii. *Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Yashwant Singh Negi*, *\[2013\] 2 SCR 550* iii. *Bussa Overseas and Properties Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India*, *\[2016\] 1 SCR 266* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Constitution of India – Article 136* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police & Ors., [2020] 12 SCR 151](https://lawfoyer.in/amit-sahni-v-commissioner-of-police-ors-2020-12-scr-151/) **Published:** January 15, 2026 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The judgment in Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police & Ors. addresses the constitutional contours of the right to protest under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution of India in the context of prolonged public road blockades during protests against the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019. The dispute arose from the indefinite occupation of the Kalindi Kunj–Shaheen Bagh stretch in Delhi, which resulted in severe disruption of public movement and civic life. The Supreme Court was called upon to balance the fundamental right to peaceful dissent with competing public rights, particularly the right of commuters to free movement. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment in *Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.* addresses the constitutional contours of the *right to protest* under *Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution of India* in the context of prolonged public road blockades during protests against the *Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019*. The dispute arose from the indefinite occupation of the *Kalindi Kunj–Shaheen Bagh stretch* in Delhi, which resulted in severe disruption of public movement and civic life. The Supreme Court was called upon to balance the *fundamental right to peaceful dissent* with competing public rights, particularly the right of commuters to free movement. The Court recognised dissent as a democratic necessity but firmly rejected the notion of an *absolute or unregulated right to protest*, especially when such protest takes the form of encroachment upon public ways. It clarified that *public spaces cannot be occupied indefinitely* and that protests must be conducted only at *designated places* under regulatory oversight. The judgment emphasised that fundamental rights operate within a framework of *reasonable restrictions* and reciprocal duties. The Court also criticised administrative inertia and underscored the responsibility of both executive authorities and constitutional courts to prevent the normalisation of unlawful occupations under the guise of protest. The ruling is significant for its doctrinal reaffirmation of *balancing of rights*, its reliance on earlier jurisprudence governing public assemblies, and its forward-looking observations on digital mobilisation and leaderless protests. **Keywords:** Right to Protest; Article 19; Public Order; Reasonable Restrictions; Public Roads; Shaheen Bagh Protest ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.*Case Number*Civil Appeal No. 3282 of 2020*Judgement Date*07 October 2020*Court*Supreme Court of India*Quorum*Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Aniruddha Bose and Krishna Murari, JJ.*Author*Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul*Citation*\[2020\] 12 SCR 151*Legal Provisions Involved*Articles 19(1)(a), 19(1)(b), 19(2), 19(3), Constitution of India*Judgments Overruled*None*Related Law Subjects*Constitutional Law; Civil Liberties; Public Order Law* ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The case arose against the backdrop of widespread protests across India following the enactment of the *Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019*. In Delhi, one such protest resulted in the continuous blockage of the *Kalindi Kunj–Shaheen Bagh road*, including the Okhla underpass, from *15 December 2019*. This blockade disrupted daily life and caused substantial hardship to commuters. The appellant approached the *Delhi High Court* through a *Public Interest Litigation*, contending that public roads could not be lawfully occupied for indefinite protests. The High Court, while recognising the authority of the police to regulate protests and traffic, refrained from issuing specific directions and disposed of the petition. The persistence of the blockade led to the present appeal before the Supreme Court. During the pendency of proceedings, multiple intervention applications were filed, reflecting polarised societal views on the nature and scope of protest rights. The Supreme Court attempted a conciliatory approach by appointing *interlocutors* to mediate with protestors. Despite sincere efforts, mediation failed due to divergent demands, lack of cohesive leadership, and resistance to relocation. The onset of the *COVID-19 pandemic* eventually resulted in the clearing of the protest site, rendering the immediate relief infructuous. Nevertheless, the Court considered it necessary to lay down authoritative principles on the *limits of protest rights* given the broader constitutional ramifications. The judgment thus serves not merely as dispute resolution but as constitutional guidance on democratic dissent, public order, and civic responsibility. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The appellant, *Amit Sahni*, challenged the continuous blockage of a major public road in South-East Delhi due to protests opposing the *Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019*. The protest site at *Shaheen Bagh* effectively cut off a crucial arterial road connecting Delhi with Noida, leading to daily inconvenience for thousands of commuters. The blockade involved tents, stages, symbolic installations, and semi-permanent structures occupying significant portions of the carriageway. The protest initially began as a peaceful sit-in led predominantly by women. Over time, it expanded in scale and infrastructure. Reports submitted by Court-appointed interlocutors revealed the presence of *75–100 women inside the main tent* and *over 200 persons* forming a supporting periphery. Structures such as a library, a large India Gate replica, and a metallic map of India were erected, making removal difficult without force. The appellant argued that such occupation amounted to unlawful encroachment on public property. The Delhi High Court disposed of the writ petition by directing authorities to act according to law without issuing enforceable mandates. Dissatisfied with administrative inaction, the appellant approached the Supreme Court. During proceedings, the Court acknowledged the legitimacy of protest but questioned its location and duration. The emergence of the pandemic altered ground realities, leading to police-assisted clearance of the site. Despite the factual resolution, the Court proceeded to adjudicate the constitutional questions involved. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether *Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b)* confer an *absolute right to protest* without spatial or temporal ограничения? ii. Whether *public roads* can be occupied indefinitely for the purpose of protest? iii. Whether administrative authorities failed in their duty to regulate protests in the interest of *public order*? iv. Whether courts can remain passive when fundamental rights of different classes come into conflict? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the *Appellant* submitted that the *right to protest* cannot extend to the permanent occupation of public roads. It was contended that *public ways are held in trust* for general use and cannot be appropriated by any group, irrespective of the cause. The appellant emphasised that the High Court’s non-intervention resulted in a vacuum, effectively allowing an illegal blockade to continue unchecked. Reliance was placed on the principle that *reasonable restrictions* under *Articles 19(2) and 19(3)* permit regulation of assemblies to prevent public inconvenience. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the *Respondents and Intervenors* argued that the protests were *peaceful* and constitutionally protected under *Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b)*. It was asserted that dissent against legislation is a democratic right and that restrictions must satisfy the test of *reasonableness*. The intervenors contended that the absence of violence justified continued occupation and that the State had alternative mechanisms to manage traffic without dismantling the protest. ## **H) JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court held that while the *right to protest* is a fundamental democratic value, it is *not absolute*. The Court reaffirmed that *Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b)* are subject to *reasonable restrictions* in the interest of *public order*. It drew extensively from *Himat Lal K. Shah v. Commissioner of Police* and *Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. Union of India* to underscore that public assemblies must be regulated with respect to *time, place, and manner*. The Court distinguished between *designated protest sites* and *public thoroughfares*, holding that the latter cannot be blocked indefinitely. It rejected the argument that any number of persons could assemble at will and occupy public spaces. The judgment criticised administrative indecision and observed that the High Court ought to have exercised continuing oversight rather than disposing of the matter summarily. The Court acknowledged the mediation attempt as a good-faith effort but noted its failure due to structural and leadership issues within the protest. It concluded that such occupations are constitutionally impermissible and directed that authorities must act proactively to prevent recurrence. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment lies in the principle that *the right to peaceful protest does not include the right to occupy public ways indefinitely*. Fundamental rights must be harmonised with competing rights, particularly the right of the public to free movement. Regulation of protests with respect to location and duration constitutes a *reasonable restriction* under *Articles 19(2) and 19(3)*. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court’s observations on *digital mobilisation*, *leaderless movements*, and the polarising effect of social media constitute obiter dicta. The remarks on the evolving nature of protests and the need for dialogue reflect cautionary guidance rather than binding law. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Protests must be conducted only at *designated places*. ii. Public roads cannot be blocked for indefinite periods. iii. Authorities must proactively regulate assemblies to maintain *public order*. iv. Courts should monitor prolonged disputes involving public inconvenience. ## **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment reinforces constitutional discipline without diluting democratic dissent. It restores balance by reaffirming that rights function within a framework of duties. The ruling discourages the normalisation of unlawful occupations while preserving the legitimacy of peaceful protest. It provides clear guidance for future governance and protest regulation, ensuring that democracy remains participatory yet orderly. ## **J) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Himat Lal K. Shah v. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad* *\[1973\] 2 SCR 266* ii. *Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. Union of India* *\[2018\] 11 SCR 586* iii. *In re Ramlila Maidan Incident* *\[2012\] 4 SCR 971* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Constitution of India* ii. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Commissioner of Police and Another v. Umesh Kumar [2020] 11 S.C.R. 583](https://lawfoyer.in/commissioner-of-police-and-another-v-umesh-kumar-2020-11-s-c-r-583/) **Published:** January 15, 2026 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the scope of vested rights in public employment and the limits of judicial intervention in recruitment processes when results are revised prior to appointment. The Supreme Court addressed whether candidates whose names appeared in a provisional select list, and who had completed medical and character verification, could claim an enforceable right to appointment after being excluded in a subsequently revised merit list. The controversy arose from a recruitment process initiated in 2013 for the post of Constable (Executive) – Male in the Delhi Police, which witnessed multiple cancellations, revisions, and re-evaluations owing to administrative lapses, including failure to award bonus marks for height and errors in answer keys. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the scope of *vested rights* in public employment and the limits of judicial intervention in recruitment processes when results are revised prior to appointment. The Supreme Court addressed whether candidates whose names appeared in a provisional select list, and who had completed medical and character verification, could claim an enforceable right to appointment after being excluded in a subsequently revised merit list. The controversy arose from a recruitment process initiated in 2013 for the post of *Constable (Executive) – Male* in the *Delhi Police*, which witnessed multiple cancellations, revisions, and re-evaluations owing to administrative lapses, including failure to award bonus marks for height and errors in answer keys. The Court analysed whether the issuance of forms and completion of preliminary formalities amounted to a legitimate expectation or vested right. It reiterated the settled principle that *mere inclusion in a select list does not confer an indefeasible right to appointment*, particularly when the recruitment process is still ongoing and subject to correction in accordance with law. The role of the *Expert Committee* and the necessity of revising results to maintain the integrity of the selection process were emphasised. The Supreme Court disapproved the Delhi High Court’s issuance of a writ of *mandamus* directing appointment, holding such direction to be contrary to established service jurisprudence. The judgment reinforces constitutional discipline in public recruitment and clarifies that equity cannot override legality where revised merit positions fall below the prescribed cut-off. **Keywords:** Public Employment, Select List, Vested Right, Revised Result, Mandamus, Service Jurisprudence ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*Commissioner of Police and Another v. Umesh Kumar*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 3334 of 2020 with Civil Appeal No. 3335 of 2020iii) Judgement Date07 October 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) Quorum*Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J. and Indira Banerjee, J.*vi) Author*Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.*vii) Citation*\[2020\] 11 S.C.R. 583*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Articles 14, 16, 226 of the Constitution of India; Delhi Police (Appointment and Recruitment) Rules, 1980; Standing Order No. 212 of 2011*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsService Law, Constitutional Law, Administrative Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The judgment arose from a prolonged and error-ridden recruitment process conducted by the *Delhi Police* for filling vacancies of *Constable (Executive) – Male*. The selection process, initiated through a public advertisement in January 2013, became contentious due to repeated cancellations of written examinations, incorrect application of recruitment norms, and flawed answer keys. These administrative lapses resulted in multiple revisions of results and extensive litigation before the *Central Administrative Tribunal*, the *Delhi High Court*, and eventually the *Supreme Court of India*. A central background issue was the failure of the recruiting authority to award *one bonus mark* to candidates whose height exceeded *178 cm*, as mandated by *Standing Order No. 212 of 2011*. This omission necessitated the first revision of results in July 2015. Subsequently, challenges to the correctness of the answer keys led to the constitution of an *Expert Committee*, whose report revealed typographical and substantive errors affecting evaluation. The respondents were initially declared successful and had completed medical examinations and character verification. However, the recruitment process was expressly kept *in abeyance*, and no appointment letters were issued. Upon re-evaluation, the respondents failed to meet the revised cut-off marks for the *OBC category* and were excluded. The Delhi High Court granted relief on equitable considerations, directing appointment. The Supreme Court was thus called upon to examine whether such judicial intervention was permissible when the respondents lacked a vested legal right under service law principles. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The recruitment process began with a notification dated *27 January 2013* for *523 vacancies* of *Constable (Executive) – Male*. Candidates underwent physical tests, followed by multiple written examinations, two of which were cancelled. The final written examination was conducted on *16 November 2014*. A provisional result declared on *13 July 2015* selected *514 candidates*. During scrutiny, it was discovered that bonus marks for height, mandated under *Standing Order No. 212 of 2011*, had not been awarded. Consequently, a revised result dated *17 July 2015* was issued. In this list, *32 new candidates* were included and *34 candidates* were excluded. The respondents continued to remain selected under the *OBC category*. Candidates were issued forms for police verification and medical examination. The respondents completed these formalities and were declared medically fit. However, before any appointment letters could be issued, unsuccessful candidates challenged the answer keys before the *Central Administrative Tribunal*. An *Expert Committee* was constituted, which found multiple errors in the answer keys, including void questions and incorrect options. Acting on this report, the recruitment authority revised the result again on *22 February 2016*. The revised cut-off for OBC candidates increased substantially. The respondents scored below the revised cut-off and were ousted from the selection list. Subsequent challenges before the Tribunal were dismissed. However, the Delhi High Court allowed the respondents’ writ petitions and directed their appointment, leading to the present appeals before the Supreme Court. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether inclusion in a provisional select list confers a *vested right to appointment*? ii. Whether issuance of verification and medical forms creates *legitimate expectation* enforceable in law? iii. Whether courts can issue a writ of *mandamus* contrary to revised merit lists prepared in accordance with law? iv. Whether revision of recruitment results prior to appointment violates *Articles 14 and 16* of the Constitution? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that the recruitment process was lawfully revised following the findings of the *Expert Committee*. It was argued that *mere inclusion in a select list does not confer an enforceable right*, relying on *Punjab SEB v. Malkiat Singh* and *Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India*. It was contended that the respondents failed to meet the revised cut-off marks and were ranked far below several candidates. The issuance of forms was described as a procedural step that did not culminate in appointment. The High Court’s reliance on equity was asserted to be legally impermissible in service matters. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents submitted that the respondents were not at fault and had successfully cleared all stages of selection initially. It was argued that issuance of documents and completion of verification amounted to a representation by the State, giving rise to legitimate expectation. The respondents contended that grave prejudice was caused due to administrative lapses and that no higher-ranked candidates had approached the Court. The High Court’s directions were defended on equitable considerations. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Article 14*, Constitution of India ii. *Article 16*, Constitution of India iii. *Article 226*, Constitution of India iv. *Delhi Police (Appointment and Recruitment) Rules, 1980* v. *Standing Order No. 212 of 2011* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court held that the respondents had *no vested right* to appointment. The Court emphasised that the recruitment process had been kept in abeyance and no appointment letters were issued. Revision of results was undertaken to align the process with law after identifying errors. The Court found that the High Court erred in issuing a writ of mandamus, as such direction was contrary to settled service law. The respondents’ exclusion was a direct consequence of lawful re-evaluation. Equity could not override statutory compliance or merit-based selection. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The core ratio is that *mere inclusion in a select list, even after completion of medical and verification formalities, does not create an indefeasible right to appointment*. Where recruitment is ongoing and results are revised before appointment, candidates excluded on merit cannot claim judicial protection. The Court reaffirmed principles laid down in *Shankarsan Dash* and *Punjab SEB v. Malkiat Singh*. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that recurring administrative lapses in public recruitment have become a systemic issue. It noted that diligence and responsibility by recruiting authorities could significantly reduce litigation. These observations, though not essential to the decision, reflect institutional concern. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Recruitment authorities must correct errors before final appointments. ii. Courts must refrain from issuing mandamus contrary to merit. iii. Equity cannot be invoked to bypass statutory recruitment norms. ## J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces doctrinal clarity in service jurisprudence. It draws a firm boundary between procedural participation and substantive entitlement. The Supreme Court’s reasoning preserves the sanctity of merit-based recruitment and prevents courts from unsettling lawful selection processes on sympathetic grounds. The decision strengthens administrative discipline and constitutional equality in public employment. ## K) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India*, *(1991) 3 SCC 47 : \[1991\] 1 SCR 585* ii. *Punjab SEB v. Malkiat Singh*, *(2005) 9 SCC 22 : \[2004\] 5 Suppl. SCR 329* iii. *Rajesh Kumar v. State of Bihar*, *(2013) 4 SCC 690 : \[2013\] 4 SCR 753* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Constitution of India* ii. *Delhi Police (Appointment and Recruitment) Rules, 1980* iii. *Standing Order No. 212 of 2011* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Satya Deo @ Bhoorey v. State of Uttar Pradesh[2020] 12 S.C.R. 128](https://lawfoyer.in/satya-deo-bhoorey-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh2020-12-s-c-r-128/) **Published:** January 15, 2026 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The present judgment examines the retrospective and continuing applicability of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 to criminal proceedings that arose prior to its enforcement, where the accused was below eighteen years of age on the date of commission of the offence. The Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether the appellant, convicted for murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, could claim the benefit of juvenility at the appellate stage, despite the offence having been committed in 1981 and despite the appellant having crossed the age threshold under the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The present judgment examines the retrospective and continuing applicability of the *Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000* to criminal proceedings that arose prior to its enforcement, where the accused was below eighteen years of age on the date of commission of the offence. The Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether the appellant, convicted for murder under *Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860*, could claim the benefit of juvenility at the appellate stage, despite the offence having been committed in 1981 and despite the appellant having crossed the age threshold under the *Juvenile Justice Act, 1986*. The Court analysed the legislative scheme of the *2000 Act*, subsequent amendments by *Act 33 of 2006*, and the saving provisions under *Section 25 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015*, read with *Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897*. The judgment clarifies that juvenility must be determined with reference to the age of the accused on the date of commission of the offence and that such a claim can be raised at any stage of proceedings, including after conviction. While upholding the conviction, the Court set aside the sentence of life imprisonment and remitted the matter to the Juvenile Justice Board for passing appropriate orders under *Section 15 of the 2000 Act*, thereby reinforcing the rehabilitative philosophy underlying juvenile justice jurisprudence in India. **Keywords:** Juvenility, Pending criminal proceedings, Retrospective benefit, Juvenile Justice Act 2000, Sentencing modification ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Satya Deo @ Bhoorey v. State of Uttar Pradesh*Case NumberCriminal Appeal No. 860 of 2019Judgement Date07 October 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumJustice S. Abdul Nazeer and Justice Sanjiv KhannaAuthorJustice Sanjiv KhannaCitation*\[2020\] 12 S.C.R. 128*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 2(l), 7A, 15, 16(2), 20, 64 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000; Section 25 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015; Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897; Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsCriminal Law, Juvenile Justice Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The appeal arose from a conviction recorded in connection with an offence committed in December 1981, at a time when the *Juvenile Justice Act, 1986* governed juvenile offenders. Under the 1986 framework, a male offender above sixteen years was excluded from the definition of a juvenile. The appellant was accordingly tried as an adult and sentenced to life imprisonment for murder. The conviction was affirmed by the High Court. While special leave petitions filed by co-accused were dismissed, notice was issued in the appellant’s case limited to the question of juvenility. The background of the judgment is deeply embedded in the evolution of juvenile justice jurisprudence in India. The enactment of the *Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000* marked a decisive shift by uniformly raising the age of juvenility to eighteen years, irrespective of gender. Subsequent amendments in 2006 expanded the scope of the Act by expressly permitting claims of juvenility to be raised at any stage of proceedings. The legislative intent was clearly to extend rehabilitative protection to those who were children at the time of commission of the offence. The Court was thus required to reconcile the appellant’s conviction under the pre-2000 regime with the expanded statutory protections introduced later. The issue assumed constitutional significance because it involved the interplay between vested rights, repeal and saving clauses, and the continuing applicability of beneficial legislation. The judgment situates itself within this broader statutory and doctrinal framework while addressing the specific injustice arising from rigid application of age thresholds under earlier enactments. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE An FIR was registered on *11 December 1981* at Police Station Gilaula, District Bahraich, Uttar Pradesh, alleging commission of murder under *Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code*. The appellant, along with two co-accused, was tried before the Sessions Court. Upon conclusion of trial, all accused were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for life. The conviction was affirmed by the High Court of Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No. 994 of 1982. Special leave petitions were filed before the Supreme Court. While the petitions of the co-accused were dismissed, notice was issued in the appellant’s case confined to the plea of juvenility. Pursuant to directions of the Supreme Court, the trial court conducted an inquiry to determine the age of the appellant on the date of the offence. Documentary evidence, including school admission registers, transfer certificates, and gazette records of the high school examination, established the appellant’s date of birth as *15 April 1965*. On the date of the offence, the appellant was *16 years, 7 months, and 26 days old*. The prosecution did not challenge the documentary evidence. The complainant had died, and no contrary evidence was led. Despite these findings, the trial court opined that the appellant was not a juvenile under the 1986 Act as he was above sixteen years of age. The Supreme Court thus had before it an undisputed factual foundation establishing minority under the *2000 Act*, alongside a conviction recorded decades earlier under a different statutory regime. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether juvenility is to be determined with reference to the age of the accused on the date of commission of the offence? ii. Whether a claim of juvenility can be raised at the appellate stage after final conviction? iii. Whether the *Juvenile Justice Act, 2000* applies to offences committed prior to its enforcement? iv. Whether the repeal of the *2000 Act* by the *2015 Act* extinguishes accrued rights of juvenility? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the appellant was below eighteen years of age on the date of commission of the offence and was therefore entitled to the benefit of juvenility under *Section 2(l) of the 2000 Act*. It was contended that *Sections 7A and 20* expressly permit raising such a claim at any stage, including after conviction. Reliance was placed on authoritative precedents such as *Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan* and *Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi)* to demonstrate that the determinative date is the date of the offence and not the date of trial or conviction. The appellant further argued that *Section 25 of the 2015 Act*, read with *Section 6 of the General Clauses Act*, preserved vested rights accrued under the repealed enactment. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the State contended that the appellant was rightly tried as an adult under the *1986 Act*, as he had crossed sixteen years of age. It was argued that the *2000 Act* could not be retrospectively applied to unsettle convictions attained under the earlier statute. The State relied upon *Gaurav Kumar @ Monu v. State of Haryana* to submit that procedural safeguards relating to age determination must be strictly complied with and that belated claims should not ordinarily be entertained. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 2(l), Juvenile Justice Act, 2000* ii. *Section 7A, Juvenile Justice Act, 2000* iii. *Section 20, Juvenile Justice Act, 2000* iv. *Section 64, Juvenile Justice Act, 2000* v. *Section 25, Juvenile Justice Act, 2015* vi. *Section 6, General Clauses Act, 1897* vii. *Section 302 read with Section 34, IPC* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court held that juvenility must be determined on the basis of the age of the accused on the date of commission of the offence. The Court undertook an extensive examination of *Section 20 of the 2000 Act*, as amended in 2006, and emphasised that the Explanation expressly mandates determination of juvenility in all pending cases at any stage. The Court clarified that the repeal of the *2000 Act* by the *2015 Act* does not obliterate accrued rights. *Section 25 of the 2015 Act* was interpreted as a saving provision preserving the application of the earlier regime to pending proceedings. Read with *Section 6 of the General Clauses Act*, the statutory scheme protects substantive rights that had crystallised under the repealed law. While affirming the conviction on merits, the Court set aside the sentence of life imprisonment. The matter was remitted to the Juvenile Justice Board for passing appropriate orders under *Section 15 of the 2000 Act*, including determination of fine and compensation payable to the victim’s family. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment lies in the affirmation that the right to be treated as a juvenile is a substantive and accrued right that crystallises on the date of commission of the offence. This right is not extinguished by subsequent attainment of majority or by repeal of the governing statute. The Court authoritatively held that *Sections 7A and 20 of the 2000 Act* confer jurisdiction upon all courts, including appellate courts, to determine juvenility at any stage. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that the *2015 Act* introduces a distinct regime concerning children in conflict with law and noted that complex constitutional questions may arise where offences are committed before 2015 but charges are filed thereafter. These observations were expressly left open. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Juvenility must be determined with reference to the date of offence. ii. Claims of juvenility are maintainable at any stage of proceedings. iii. Conviction may be sustained, but sentencing must conform to juvenile justice statutes. iv. Pending cases remain governed by the *2000 Act* despite its repeal. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Arnit Das v. State of Bihar*, *\[2000\] 1 Suppl. SCR 69* ii. *Umesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan*, *\[1982\] 3 SCR 583* iii. *Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand*, *\[2005\] 1 SCR 1019* iv. *Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan*, *\[2009\] 7 SCR 623* v. *Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi)*, *\[2010\] 5 SCR 137* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000* ii. *Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015* iii. *General Clauses Act, 1897* iv. *Indian Penal Code, 1860* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Ankita Kailash Khandelwal and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. [2020] 8 S.C.R. 1007](https://lawfoyer.in/ankita-kailash-khandelwal-and-ors-v-state-of-maharashtra-and-ors-2020-8-s-c-r-1007/) **Published:** January 15, 2026 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the legality of continued academic exclusion of postgraduate medical students arising from bail conditions imposed during pendency of a criminal prosecution. The appellants, three postgraduate residents in M.D. Gynaecology and Obstetrics, were implicated in a criminal case involving allegations of ragging and abetment to suicide following the death of a junior resident. Though bail was granted by the High Court, stringent conditions effectively barred the appellants from entering their college and hospital, thereby preventing continuation of their medical education and residency training. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the legality of *continued academic exclusion of postgraduate medical students* arising from bail conditions imposed during pendency of a criminal prosecution. The appellants, three postgraduate residents in *M.D. Gynaecology and Obstetrics*, were implicated in a criminal case involving allegations of ragging and abetment to suicide following the death of a junior resident. Though bail was granted by the High Court, stringent conditions effectively barred the appellants from entering their college and hospital, thereby preventing continuation of their medical education and residency training. The Supreme Court scrutinised whether such a restriction could be sustained either under *Section 6(1) of the Maharashtra Prohibition of Ragging Act, 1999* or under the *Medical Council of India Regulations*. The Court found that the suspension order was mechanically passed solely due to registration of an FIR, without recording any *prima facie satisfaction* as mandated by statute. It held that neither the 1999 Act nor the 2009 Ragging Regulations were attracted in absence of a finding of guilt. Balancing the presumption of innocence, the right to livelihood and education under *Article 21*, and the interests of prosecution, the Court ruled that denial of academic continuation amounted to an additional punitive consequence without trial. The judgment clarifies limits on judicial discretion in imposing bail conditions and reinforces that *academic progression cannot be sacrificed merely due to pendency of criminal proceedings*. **Keywords:** Ragging law, Bail conditions, Medical education, Article 21, Presumption of innocence ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Ankita Kailash Khandelwal and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors.*Case NumberCriminal Appeal Nos. 660–662 of 2020Judgement Date08 October 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumUday Umesh Lalit J., Vineet Saran J., Ajay Rastogi J.AuthorJustice Uday Umesh LalitCitation*\[2020\] 8 S.C.R. 1007*Legal Provisions Involved*Article 21 of the Constitution of India; Sections 306 r/w 34 IPC; Section 6(1) Maharashtra Prohibition of Ragging Act, 1999; Sections 174 & 164 CrPC; MCI Regulations, 2000 & 2009*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law Subjects*Criminal Law; Constitutional Law; Medical Education Law* ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The case arises from a tragic incident involving the suicide of a postgraduate medical student, which led to criminal prosecution of her seniors on allegations of harassment and ragging. The incident triggered institutional, criminal, and regulatory responses simultaneously, creating a complex intersection between *criminal justice administration* and *medical education governance*. The appellants were not undergraduate students but *licensed medical graduates undergoing specialised postgraduate training*, a stage which mandates continuous hospital residency. Following registration of the FIR, the Dean of the institution suspended the appellants. Subsequently, while granting bail, the High Court imposed conditions barring them from entering the college and hospital premises. This condition effectively froze the appellants’ academic progression and residency training. Despite investigation being complete and witness statements recorded under *Section 164 CrPC*, the High Court refused to relax the condition, observing that the appellants could resume education after conclusion of trial. The Supreme Court was thus called upon to examine whether *continuation of education during trial* could be denied as a collateral consequence of bail conditions, and whether such denial comported with statutory safeguards and constitutional guarantees. The judgment situates itself within evolving jurisprudence on proportionality of bail conditions and recognition of education as an intrinsic facet of *personal liberty under Article 21*. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellants, after completing *MBBS*, were pursuing *M.D. in Gynaecology and Obstetrics* at *Topiwala National Medical College* and were serving as resident doctors at *B.Y.L. Nair Charity Hospital*. They had completed two of the three years of postgraduate training. A junior resident, *Dr. Payal Tadvi*, died by suicide on *22.05.2019*. Initially, proceedings were registered under *Section 174 CrPC*. Following a complaint by the deceased’s mother alleging harassment, an FIR was lodged under *Section 306 IPC*, *Section 4 of the Maharashtra Prohibition of Ragging Act, 1999*, and provisions of the *SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989*. On *27.05.2019*, the Dean suspended the appellants citing registration of FIR and alleged non-cooperation. On the same date, the Anti-Ragging Committee submitted its report recommending suspension, though the suspension order did not reference this report. The appellants were arrested and later granted bail by the High Court. Bail conditions included *prohibition on entering the college and hospital* and *suspension of medical licences*. Though licence suspension was later recalled, the academic entry restriction remained. Repeated requests for relaxation were rejected, prompting the present appeals challenging the non-relaxation of condition prohibiting entry into the institution. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether a bail condition prohibiting entry into an educational institution can continue after completion of investigation? ii. Whether suspension of students without recording *prima facie satisfaction* under *Section 6(1) of the 1999 Act* is legally sustainable? iii. Whether denial of academic continuation during trial violates *Article 21 of the Constitution*? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that the *presumption of innocence* entitled them to continue education. It was argued that *Section 6(1) of the 1999 Act* mandates a preliminary finding, which was absent. Reliance was placed on *Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi)* and *Kunal Kumar Tiwari v. State of Bihar* to contend that bail conditions must not be arbitrary or punitive. It was emphasised that statements of witnesses had already been recorded under *Section 164 CrPC*, eliminating apprehension of influence. The appellants argued that denial of residency training would irreversibly damage their careers, amounting to punishment without trial and infringing *Article 21*. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the State and complainant contended that the suspension was based on Anti-Ragging Committee findings and that academic presence could influence witnesses. It was argued that *MCI Regulations* prohibit migration and that appellants could resume education post-trial. The continued operation of suspension was relied upon to justify denial of entry into the institution. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court undertook a detailed balancing exercise between *individual liberty* and *interest of prosecution*. It observed that the suspension order did not record any *prima facie finding* as required by *Section 6(1)*. The Court found that the suspension was passed merely due to FIR registration, rendering it legally unsustainable. The Court held that *Ragging Act provisions* and *2009 Regulations* apply only after a finding of guilt. Since no such finding existed, statutory consequences could not be triggered. On bail conditions, the Court reiterated that conditions must advance the trial process and not impose extraneous punishment. Preventing the appellants from completing their postgraduate training was held to be disproportionate and violative of *Article 21*. The Court emphasised that even convicts are permitted educational pursuits, and denying the same to undertrial accused would be antithetical to constitutional values. The appeals were allowed and condition prohibiting entry into the college and hospital was relaxed subject to safeguards ensuring non-interference with witnesses. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment is that *pendency of criminal prosecution cannot, by itself, justify denial of educational and professional continuity*. Any suspension or restriction must strictly comply with statutory preconditions. Bail conditions must bear *direct nexus with administration of justice*. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that *State authorities must facilitate, not frustrate, academic development*, and that postponing education until after trial is neither reasonable nor humane. **c) GUIDELINES** i. *Suspension under Section 6(1) requires prima facie satisfaction* ii. *Bail conditions must not impose indirect punishment* iii. *Academic rights form part of Article 21* iv. *Recording of witness statements reduces apprehension of influence* ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces constitutional discipline in criminal procedure and academic governance. It prevents educational exclusion from becoming a surrogate punishment. The ruling sets a critical precedent for professional students facing criminal trials, ensuring that *justice does not extinguish futures before guilt is established*. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 15 SCC 570* ii. *Kunal Kumar Tiwari v. State of Bihar, (2018) 16 SCC 74* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Constitution of India, Article 21* ii. *Maharashtra Prohibition of Ragging Act, 1999* iii. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* iv. *Medical Council of India Regulations, 2000 & 2009* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Miss ‘A’ v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, [2020] 11 SCR 515](https://lawfoyer.in/miss-a-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-and-another-2020-11-scr-515/) **Published:** January 15, 2026 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The judgment in Miss ‘A’ v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another authoritatively settles the procedural law governing the right of an accused to obtain a copy of a victim’s statement recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Supreme Court examined whether an accused is entitled to such a copy immediately upon filing of the charge-sheet or only after the court takes cognizance and reaches the statutory stage contemplated under Sections 207 and 208 CrPC. The case arose from allegations of sexual exploitation involving a powerful accused, triggering suo motu intervention by the Supreme Court and the constitution of a Special Investigation Team. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment in *Miss ‘A’ v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another* authoritatively settles the procedural law governing the *right of an accused to obtain a copy of a victim’s statement recorded under* *Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*. The Supreme Court examined whether an accused is entitled to such a copy immediately upon filing of the charge-sheet or only after the court takes cognizance and reaches the statutory stage contemplated under *Sections 207 and 208 CrPC*. The case arose from allegations of *sexual exploitation* involving a powerful accused, triggering *suo motu intervention* by the Supreme Court and the constitution of a *Special Investigation Team*. The victim’s statement was recorded under *Section 164 CrPC*, and the accused sought a certified copy at the investigation stage. The trial court rejected the request, emphasizing confidentiality and victim protection, but the High Court reversed this order, relying on a prior High Court precedent. The Supreme Court decisively rejected the High Court’s reasoning and clarified that *mere filing of a charge-sheet does not confer any enforceable right upon the accused to demand copies of statements under Section 164 CrPC*. The Court reinforced the mandatory confidentiality of victim statements in sexual offence cases, interpreting statutory procedure in light of *victim dignity*, *fair investigation*, and *due process*. The judgment harmonizes procedural safeguards with constitutional values, strengthens the protective framework for victims of sexual crimes, and reiterates the binding nature of Supreme Court directions over conflicting High Court rulings. **Keywords:** Section 164 CrPC, Sexual Exploitation, Victim Confidentiality, Cognizance, Fair Trial, Accused Rights ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetails*Judgment Cause Title**Miss ‘A’ v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another**Case Number*Criminal Appeal No. 659 of 2020*Judgment Date*08 October 2020*Court*Supreme Court of India*Quorum**Uday Umesh Lalit, Vineet Saran and S. Ravindra Bhat, JJ.**Author**Justice Uday Umesh Lalit**Citation**\[2020\] 11 SCR 515**Legal Provisions Involved**Sections 164, 173, 190, 207, 208 CrPC; Sections 376C, 354D, 342, 506 IPC**Judgments Overruled**High Court judgment dated 07.11.2019 (Allahabad High Court)**Related Law Subjects**Criminal Law, Procedural Law, Victimology* ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT** The case emerged from allegations of grave *sexual exploitation* involving the appellant, a young woman referred to as *Miss ‘A’*, against Respondent No. 2. The matter attracted national attention after a video allegedly uploaded by the victim surfaced on social media, prompting apprehensions regarding her safety. The victim’s father lodged a complaint alleging abduction and sexual harassment, while a cross-complaint was simultaneously filed by associates of the accused, alleging extortion. The unusual nature of competing FIRs and the serious allegations led to *suo motu cognizance by the Supreme Court of India*, resulting in the constitution of a *Special Investigation Team (SIT)* to ensure impartial investigation. During the course of investigation, the victim’s statement was recorded under *Section 164 CrPC* before a Judicial Magistrate. Almost immediately, the accused sought a certified copy of this statement. The trial court rejected the request, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in *State of Karnataka v. Shivanna alias Tarkari Shivanna*, emphasizing confidentiality and protection of the victim. The accused approached the High Court, which reversed the trial court’s order and directed that the copy be supplied, reasoning that denial was impermissible once the charge-sheet had been filed. This triggered the present appeal. The Supreme Court was thus called upon to reconcile procedural rights of the accused with statutory stages under the CrPC, while also balancing victim protection in cases involving sexual offences. The judgment therefore occupies a critical position in procedural criminal jurisprudence, particularly in relation to *disclosure of sensitive materials during investigation* . ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The factual matrix commenced on *25 August 2019* when the father of the appellant lodged a complaint at Police Station Kotwali, Shahjahanpur, stating that he had seen a disturbing video uploaded by his daughter on Facebook. The video allegedly accused Respondent No. 2 and others of *sexual exploitation of multiple women*. The complainant expressed serious apprehension for his daughter’s safety, noting that she was untraceable at the time. Subsequently, FIR No. 445 of 2019 was registered under *Sections 364 and 506 IPC*. Earlier, a separate FIR No. 442 of 2019 had already been registered on the complaint of an advocate associated with the accused’s ashram, alleging threats and extortion. These competing narratives created complexity, raising concerns about misuse of process. The viral video and letters addressed to the Supreme Court led to registration of *Suo Motu Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 2 of 2019*. The Supreme Court ensured the victim’s safety and directed constitution of an SIT. Pursuant to these directions, the victim’s statement was recorded under *Section 164 CrPC on 16 September 2019*. The next day, the accused moved an application seeking a certified copy of this statement. The Additional Sessions Judge rejected the application on *19 September 2019*, reasoning that disclosure at the investigation stage would endanger the victim and compromise the investigation. The accused was arrested on *20 September 2019*, and bail was rejected. Charge-sheets were eventually filed on *05 November 2019*, including charges under *Sections 376C, 354D, 342, and 506 IPC*. Relying on a 2012 High Court judgment, the Allahabad High Court allowed the accused’s application on *07 November 2019* and directed supply of the Section 164 statement. Before the victim could challenge this order, the copy was already furnished. The present appeal thus questioned the legality of the High Court’s approach . ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. *Whether an accused is entitled to a copy of a victim’s statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC immediately upon filing of the charge-sheet?* ii. *Whether the High Court erred in disregarding binding Supreme Court directions on confidentiality of victim statements?* iii. *Whether Sections 207 and 208 CrPC can be invoked prior to cognizance being taken by the Magistrate?* ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellant submitted that *Section 164 CrPC statements form part of sensitive investigative material* and disclosure before the statutory stage would jeopardize victim safety. It was argued that *Shivanna* mandated strict confidentiality until filing of the charge-sheet and further judicial orders. The appellant emphasized that *mere filing of a charge-sheet does not equate to taking cognizance under Section 190 CrPC*. Reliance was placed on procedural sequencing under the CrPC to assert that the accused’s right arises only after issuance of process and compliance with *Sections 207 and 208 CrPC*. The High Court’s reliance on a pre-Shivanna decision was contended to be legally unsustainable . ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the respondent contended that denial of the Section 164 statement violated principles of *fair trial*. It was submitted that once the charge-sheet was filed, the investigation stood concluded, and withholding documents prejudiced the defence. Reliance was placed on *Raju Janki Yadav v. State of U.P.* to argue that certified copies could not be denied to an accused willing to bear costs. The State also initially supported this position before the High Court, asserting that refusal by the trial court was erroneous . ## **H) JUDGMENT** The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court’s order. The Court undertook a detailed examination of the *scheme of the CrPC*, emphasizing that procedural rights accrue in stages. It reiterated that *Section 173 CrPC* governs filing of the police report, while *Section 190 CrPC* empowers the Magistrate to take cognizance. The Court clarified that *only after cognizance is taken and process is issued* does the accused acquire a statutory right to copies under *Sections 207 and 208 CrPC*. The Court held that the High Court fundamentally misunderstood the directions in *Shivanna*. Those directions were not limited to police conduct but extended to preservation of confidentiality until judicially sanctioned disclosure. The Court stressed that *sexual offence cases demand heightened confidentiality*, and premature disclosure could imperil victims and witnesses. The trial court’s refusal was therefore correct. Even though the copy had already been furnished, the Supreme Court categorically declared that *under no circumstances can Section 164 statements be supplied before cognizance.* **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment lies in the authoritative interpretation that *the right of an accused to obtain copies of documents, including a victim’s Section 164 CrPC statement, arises only after the Magistrate takes cognizance under Section 190 and reaches the stage under Sections 207 or 208 CrPC*. Filing of a charge-sheet alone does not trigger this right. The Court harmonized statutory interpretation with victim-centric jurisprudence and reaffirmed that Supreme Court directions override conflicting High Court precedents. Confidentiality in sexual offence investigations was held to be an essential component of fair procedure . **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that *judicial insensitivity to victim protection can undermine the criminal justice system*. It noted that High Courts must exercise caution when dealing with procedural rights in sexual offence cases. The Court also remarked that prior High Court decisions must be read subject to later binding Supreme Court directions. These observations, though not forming the core ratio, reinforce a victim-centric approach to criminal procedure . **c) GUIDELINES** i. *Statements under Section 164 CrPC must remain confidential until cognizance is taken.* ii. *Accused persons cannot claim copies merely upon filing of charge-sheet.* iii. *High Courts must adhere to binding Supreme Court directions in sexual offence matters.* iv. *Victim safety and dignity must guide procedural interpretation.* v. *Trial courts must resist premature disclosure that may compromise investigation.* . ## **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment represents a decisive reaffirmation of procedural discipline under the CrPC. By rejecting the notion that filing of a charge-sheet automatically entitles the accused to sensitive materials, the Supreme Court preserved the integrity of staged criminal procedure. The ruling strengthens victim protection, particularly in sexual offence cases where power imbalances and intimidation risks are acute. It also sends a clear message to subordinate courts regarding adherence to binding precedent. The decision balances accused rights with societal interest and victim dignity, reinforcing that *fair trial does not mean premature access to confidential evidence*. The judgment thus contributes significantly to Indian criminal procedural jurisprudence by clarifying the contours of disclosure and confidentiality . ## **J) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *State of Karnataka by Nonavinakere Police v. Shivanna alias Tarkari Shivanna*, *\[2014\] 5 SCR 812* ii. *Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police*, *\[1985\] 3 SCR 942* iii. *Raju Janki Yadav v. State of U.P. and Others*, *(2012) 6 All LJ 486* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* ii. *Indian Penal Code, 1860* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Karulal & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2020] 9 SCR 494](https://lawfoyer.in/karulal-ors-v-state-of-madhya-pradesh-2020-9-scr-494/) **Published:** January 15, 2026 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The judgment in Karulal & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh represents a reaffirmation of settled principles governing appreciation of evidence in criminal trials, particularly concerning related witnesses, hostile witnesses, and the plea of false implication due to prior enmity. The Supreme Court examined whether conviction under Sections 148 and 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 could be sustained when the prosecution case substantially rested upon the testimony of three eyewitnesses, two of whom were closely related to the deceased, while several other witnesses had turned hostile. **Content:** ## A) **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment in *Karulal & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh* represents a reaffirmation of settled principles governing appreciation of evidence in criminal trials, particularly concerning *related witnesses*, *hostile witnesses*, and the plea of *false implication due to prior enmity*. The Supreme Court examined whether conviction under *Sections 148 and 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860* could be sustained when the prosecution case substantially rested upon the testimony of three eyewitnesses, two of whom were closely related to the deceased, while several other witnesses had turned hostile. The Court undertook a careful scrutiny of ocular evidence, medical testimony, and defence pleas suggesting accidental death and motivated false implication. Emphasising doctrinal consistency, the Court reiterated that *relationship per se is not a ground to discard testimony*, and that credible, cogent, and consistent evidence does not lose probative value merely because some witnesses resile from earlier statements. The Court also analysed the evidentiary impact of prior enmity, holding that such enmity may operate as a *double-edged sword*, furnishing both motive for crime and for false implication, and must therefore be evaluated contextually. The judgment underscores the importance of corroboration between medical and ocular evidence and clarifies that minor inconsistencies or hostile testimonies do not vitiate an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The decision thus strengthens jurisprudence on collective liability under *Section 149 IPC* and affirms judicial caution without succumbing to hyper-technical disbelief of truthful witnesses . ***Keywords:*** Related witness, Hostile witness, Section 149 IPC, Common object, Criminal evidence ## B) **CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*Karulal & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh*ii) Case NumberCriminal Appeal No. 316 of 2011iii) Judgement Date09 October 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumN.V. Ramana J., Surya Kant J., Hrishikesh Roy J.vi) AuthorHrishikesh Roy J.vii) Citation*\[2020\] 9 SCR 494*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 148, 302, 149 IPC*ix) Judgments overruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsCriminal Law, Law of Evidence ## C) **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The appeal before the Supreme Court arose from concurrent findings of guilt recorded by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. The appellants were convicted for forming an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons and committing the murder of Madhavji in furtherance of a common object. The case provided the Court an opportunity to revisit fundamental principles relating to evaluation of evidence, particularly where eyewitnesses are family members of the deceased. The background reflects a rural setting marked by longstanding hostility between two groups, culminating in a violent daylight attack. The appellants contended that the conviction was unsustainable due to the interested nature of witnesses, alleged contradictions, hostile testimonies, and an alternative defence theory of accidental death due to a fall in a nullah. The prosecution, on the other hand, relied upon prompt FIR, consistent eyewitness accounts, and strong medical corroboration. The judgment situates itself within a long line of precedents addressing evidentiary reliability and cautions against discarding truthful testimony on artificial grounds. It also contextualises the doctrine of common object under *Section 149 IPC*, highlighting collective criminality. The Supreme Court’s analysis demonstrates restraint, doctrinal continuity, and emphasis on substantive justice rather than technical acquittals . ## D) **FACTS OF THE CASE** On the morning of *18 August 1993*, Madhavji was present in his agricultural field when he was brutally attacked by multiple accused armed with axes, swords, knives, and lathis. His son Bhawarlal (*PW3*) was grazing cattle nearby and rushed to the spot on hearing his father’s cries. He witnessed the accused assaulting the deceased. Shortly thereafter, the daughter of the deceased (*PW12*) and an independent witness (*PW11*) also arrived and saw the accused fleeing with weapons. The injured was placed on a bullock cart and taken towards Narayangarh police station, but succumbed to injuries en route. The FIR was lodged within four hours, lending assurance to the prosecution narrative. The post-mortem revealed nine serious injuries caused by sharp and blunt weapons, and death due to haemorrhagic shock. During trial, several witnesses turned hostile, and the defence projected a theory of accidental fall. The Trial Court rejected this defence, relying on medical evidence and the conduct of defence witnesses. The accused were convicted, and the High Court upheld the findings. The Supreme Court was thus called upon to determine whether these concurrent findings suffered from perversity or legal infirmity . ## E) **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether conviction can be sustained primarily on the testimony of related eyewitnesses? ii. Whether hostility of some prosecution witnesses weakens the entire prosecution case? iii. Whether prior enmity renders the prosecution version unreliable? iv. Whether medical evidence corroborated or contradicted the ocular version? v. Whether common object under *Section 149 IPC* was established beyond reasonable doubt? ## F) **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellants submitted that the testimonies of *PW3 and PW12*, being children of the deceased, were inherently interested and unsafe to rely upon. It was argued that long-standing enmity motivated false implication. The defence emphasised that several witnesses had turned hostile, thereby casting doubt on the prosecution story. Reliance was placed on medical testimony suggesting the possibility of injuries from an accidental fall, contending that the prosecution failed to exclude this hypothesis. It was further urged that inconsistencies in eyewitness accounts weakened the chain of proof and that the common object necessary for invoking *Section 149 IPC* was not clearly established . ## G) **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the State contended that the prosecution case was firmly supported by three consistent eyewitnesses, including one independent witness. It was argued that relationship does not disqualify a witness and that medical evidence fully corroborated the ocular account. The State highlighted prompt lodging of FIR and absence of material contradictions. It was submitted that hostile witnesses do not erode credible evidence and that prior enmity furnished a strong motive for the crime rather than false implication. The collective attack with deadly weapons clearly demonstrated a common object to kill . ## H) **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. *Section 148 IPC* – Rioting armed with deadly weapon ii. *Section 302 IPC* – Punishment for murder iii. *Section 149 IPC* – Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object ## I) **JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction. The Court held that the testimony of related witnesses cannot be discarded merely on the ground of relationship if found truthful and consistent. Relying on *Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab* and *State of U.P. v. Samman Dass*, the Court reiterated that close relatives are often the most natural witnesses. The presence of *PW11* as an independent eyewitness further strengthened the prosecution case. The Court rejected the defence theory of accidental fall, observing that medical evidence only suggested a possibility and did not affirm such a cause. The Court found strong corroboration between ocular and medical evidence. Addressing hostile witnesses, the Court held that prosecution does not fail merely because some witnesses resile, provided reliable evidence remains. The Court concluded that the accused formed an unlawful assembly armed with deadly weapons and intentionally caused fatal injuries, satisfying the ingredients of *Sections 148 and 302 read with 149 IPC* . **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the case lies in the reaffirmation that *credible testimony of related witnesses, if corroborated and trustworthy, is sufficient for conviction*. The Court held that *enmity by itself does not discredit evidence* and that hostile witnesses do not dilute the probative value of consistent ocular and medical evidence. The principle that *common object can be inferred from conduct, weapons used, and nature of injuries* was reiterated. The Court clarified that speculative defence theories cannot override cogent prosecution evidence. This ratio strengthens evidentiary jurisprudence by prioritising substance over form . **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that criminal trials must not be derailed by mechanical scepticism regarding family witnesses. It remarked that judicial experience indicates relatives are unlikely to shield real offenders. The Court also cautioned against exaggerated reliance on hostile testimony, noting social pressures and fear often influence witnesses in rural crimes. These observations, though not essential to the decision, provide guidance on pragmatic appreciation of evidence . **c) GUIDELINES** i. Evidence of related witnesses must be assessed on credibility, not relationship. ii. Hostile witnesses do not automatically nullify prosecution case. iii. Prior enmity must be evaluated contextually as motive. iv. Medical evidence must be read in harmony with ocular evidence. v. Common object under *Section 149 IPC* may be inferred from facts and conduct. ## J) **REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Dalip Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab*, *AIR 1953 SC 364* ii. *State of Uttar Pradesh v. Samman Dass*, *(1972) 3 SCC 201* iii. *Khurshid Ahmed v. State of J&K*, *(2018) 7 SCC 429* iv. *Sushil & Ors. v. State of U.P.*, *(1995) Supp (1) SCC 363* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Indian Penal Code, 1860* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Ashish Seth v. Sumit Mittal and Others, [2020] 11 SCR 525](https://lawfoyer.in/ashish-seth-v-sumit-mittal-and-others-2020-11-scr-525/) **Published:** January 15, 2026 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The judgment concerns prolonged non-compliance with a Memorandum of Settlement dated 04.05.2015 entered into between two rival groups, namely the Seth Group and the Mittal Group, arising out of disputes in a Joint Venture real estate project. The settlement had been judicially recognized and incorporated into an order of the Supreme Court disposing of connected writ petitions. Persistent defaults by the Mittal Group in fulfilling their contractual and court-mandated obligations led to contempt proceedings under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment concerns prolonged non-compliance with a *Memorandum of Settlement dated 04.05.2015* entered into between two rival groups, namely the *Seth Group* and the *Mittal Group*, arising out of disputes in a Joint Venture real estate project. The settlement had been judicially recognized and incorporated into an order of the Supreme Court disposing of connected writ petitions. Persistent defaults by the Mittal Group in fulfilling their contractual and court-mandated obligations led to contempt proceedings under *Article 32 of the Constitution of India*. The Court examined the scope of wilful disobedience under the *Contempt of Courts Act, 1971*, particularly in the context of obligations relating to renewal of development licenses and payment of *External Development Charges (EDC)*. A prior order dated *24.04.2020* had already held the Mittal Group guilty of deliberate and intentional non-compliance, granting them additional time as a last opportunity. The present judgment scrutinized continued defaults, reciprocal obligations of both groups under the MoS, and the legal consequences of obstructive conduct affecting third-party homebuyers. The Court undertook a clause-by-clause interpretation of the MoS to allocate liabilities proportionately, clarified responsibility for renewal of licenses, and harmonized settlement obligations with a newly introduced One Time Settlement Scheme, *“Samadhan Se Vikas”*, notified by the Government of Haryana. Emphasis was placed on compliance, equity, and public interest. The judgment reinforces judicial intolerance towards defiance of binding settlements and underscores the supervisory role of constitutional courts in enforcing consent-based resolutions. **Keywords:** Contempt of Court; Memorandum of Settlement; License Renewal; External Development Charges; Wilful Disobedience; One Time Settlement Scheme ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgment Cause Title*Ashish Seth v. Sumit Mittal and Others*ii) Case NumberContempt Petition (C) No. 34 of 2016 in W.P. (Crl.) No. 5 of 2015iii) Judgment Date09 October 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumAshok Bhushan, J. and M.R. Shah, J.vi) AuthorM.R. Shah, J.vii) Citation*\[2020\] 11 SCR 525*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Article 32, Constitution of India*; *Contempt of Courts Act, 1971*; *Section 9-A, Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsConstitutional Law; Contempt Law; Real Estate and Urban Development Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The litigation emanated from disputes between two constituent groups of a Joint Venture company formed for real estate development in Sector 89, Haryana. The Joint Venture had acquired land and obtained development licenses with the intent to develop residential projects. Subsequent disagreements led to fragmentation of development rights and sale thereof, which in turn generated disputes regarding financial liabilities, statutory dues, and compliance obligations. To resolve mounting litigation, the parties executed a *Memorandum of Settlement dated 04.05.2015*, which was expressly accepted and incorporated by the Supreme Court while disposing of pending writ petitions. The MoS delineated reciprocal obligations, particularly concerning *renewal of licenses Nos. 34, 35, and 36 of 2007*, payment of *EDC liabilities*, and execution of ancillary documents. Despite judicial imprimatur, disputes resurfaced due to alleged non-compliance by the Mittal Group. The Seth Group invoked contempt jurisdiction alleging wilful and deliberate disobedience of binding directions. In an earlier order dated *24.04.2020*, the Court categorically held the Mittal Group guilty of intentional default, yet granted additional time in the interest of justice and project completion. The present judgment arose from interlocutory applications filed by both sides, highlighting continued deadlock, failure to renew licenses, non-payment of statutory dues, and the resultant hardship to homebuyers. The Court was thus required to balance enforcement of its authority, interpretation of settlement terms, and equitable resolution within the framework of contempt jurisdiction. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The Seth Group and Mittal Group were stakeholders in a Joint Venture company that had secured licenses for development over *48.03 acres* of land. Over time, internal disputes led to a division of development rights, whereby *14.80 acres* fell to the Seth Group and *33.23 acres* to the Mittal Group and others. Persistent litigation culminated in arbitration proceedings and eventually a *Memorandum of Settlement dated 04.05.2015*. Under the MoS, both groups undertook specific financial and procedural obligations. These included payment of license renewal fees, EDC liabilities, provision of bank guarantees, and execution of documents necessary for renewal and bifurcation of licenses. The Supreme Court, by order dated *05.05.2015*, disposed of pending writ petitions in terms of the MoS, thereby conferring binding force to its clauses. However, disputes continued. The Seth Group alleged that the Mittal Group failed to renew licenses and to pay their share of EDC, despite repeated demands and judicial directions. In its order dated *24.04.2020*, the Court found that the Mittal Group had *“deliberately and wilfully not fulfilled their obligations”* under the MoS and rendered themselves liable under the *Contempt of Courts Act, 1971*. The Court granted two months’ time post-lockdown to comply, warning of stringent consequences. Despite this, licenses remained unrenewed, EDC liabilities unpaid, and the project stalled, directly impacting homebuyers. Both groups filed interlocutory applications blaming each other. The Mittal Group relied on alleged non-furnishing of documents by the Seth Group, while the Seth Group alleged deliberate obstruction. These factual assertions formed the basis of adjudication in the present judgment . ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the Mittal Group committed *wilful and deliberate disobedience* of the Supreme Court’s orders incorporating the Memorandum of Settlement? ii. How should *license renewal fee liability* be apportioned between the Seth Group and the Mittal Group under the MoS? iii. Whether non-renewal of licenses justified continued non-payment of EDC by either party? iv. What is the legal effect of the newly introduced *One Time Settlement Scheme “Samadhan Se Vikas”* on existing court directions? v. Whether continued default warranted coercive action under the *Contempt of Courts Act, 1971*? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the *Seth Group* submitted that the Mittal Group had persistently and deliberately obstructed compliance with the MoS and the Court’s orders. It was argued that renewal of licenses was the exclusive responsibility of the Mittal Group, and failure to do so was calculated to stall the project. It was contended that the Seth Group had already discharged its financial obligations, including deposit of substantial sums towards license renewal fees. Any insistence on further documentation was described as mala fide and contrary to Clause 17 of the MoS, which expressly stated that no additional documents were required from the Seth Group beyond those already furnished. The Seth Group emphasized that the ultimate victims of non-compliance were homebuyers, whose interests warranted immediate judicial intervention. Relief was sought for bifurcation and renewal of licenses in favour of the Seth Group in the event of continued default by the Mittal Group. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the *Mittal Group* argued that renewal of licenses required compliance with a checklist prescribed by the DTCP, Haryana, and that the Seth Group had failed to furnish necessary documents. The delay, according to the Mittal Group, was thus attributable to the Seth Group’s inaction. It was further submitted that subsequent to the order dated *24.04.2020*, the State introduced a new *One Time Settlement Scheme “Samadhan Se Vikas”* for EDC dues. The Mittal Group expressed willingness to avail the scheme and contended that liabilities should be recalibrated accordingly. The Mittal Group denied wilful disobedience and sought directions compelling the Seth Group and other developers to complete formalities required for license renewal. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court undertook a meticulous examination of the *Memorandum of Settlement dated 04.05.2015*. The Court reaffirmed its earlier finding that the Mittal Group bore primary responsibility for renewal of licenses. A conjoint reading of Clauses *1.3, 2, 5.4, 17, and 18* demonstrated that license renewal fees were to be shared proportionately, with the Seth Group liable only to the extent of land falling to its share, along with half the liability of third-party developers. The Court rejected the Mittal Group’s attempt to shift blame onto the Seth Group for non-renewal of licenses. It clarified that documentary obligations of the Seth Group were limited and already complied with. Any further documentation was to be demanded by the competent authority, not unilaterally by the Mittal Group. With respect to *EDC liabilities*, the Court took judicial notice of the newly notified *One Time Settlement Scheme “Samadhan Se Vikas”* under *Section 9-A of the Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975*. Considering the mutual willingness of parties, the Court harmonized earlier directions with the new policy and mandated compliance under Option 1(a). Detailed financial computations as communicated by DTCP were accepted without scope for dispute. Stringent timelines were fixed, undertakings were mandated, and a clear warning was issued that any further non-compliance would attract action under the *Contempt of Courts Act, 1971*. The judgment thus combined enforcement, clarification, and equitable adjustment. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The binding force of a court-approved settlement is equivalent to a judicial command, and deliberate non-compliance thereof constitutes civil contempt. Allocation of liabilities must strictly follow the contractual text as judicially incorporated, and subsequent administrative schemes may be accommodated only to facilitate, not frustrate, compliance. Continued defiance after a finding of wilful disobedience justifies coercive judicial supervision. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that real estate disputes involving large housing projects demand heightened responsibility, as defaults have cascading effects on innocent homebuyers. Judicial patience cannot be infinite where litigants weaponize procedural objections to defeat substantive compliance. **c) GUIDELINES** i. License renewal applications must be made by the party contractually obligated without creating artificial impediments. ii. Financial liabilities must be discharged proportionately and within stipulated timelines. iii. Statutory settlement schemes may be availed only through mutual consent and binding undertakings. iv. Authorities must communicate documentary requirements clearly and expeditiously. v. Any further obstruction shall invite contempt action without further indulgence. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment exemplifies firm judicial control over post-settlement defiance. It reinforces that consent decrees are not negotiable instruments subject to unilateral reinterpretation. The Supreme Court’s approach balances strict enforcement with pragmatic accommodation of evolving statutory frameworks. By integrating the *Samadhan Se Vikas* scheme, the Court ensured fiscal resolution without diluting accountability. The repeated emphasis on timelines, undertakings, and warnings underscores intolerance for strategic non-compliance. The decision strengthens contempt jurisprudence by clarifying that repeated defaults after explicit findings of wilfulness aggravate liability. The judgment also foregrounds the interests of homebuyers, situating private disputes within a broader public law context. It serves as a cautionary precedent for joint venture partners that judicially endorsed settlements are final, binding, and enforceable with the full authority of constitutional courts. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Ashish Seth v. Sumit Mittal and Others*, *\[2020\] 11 SCR 525* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Constitution of India, Article 32* ii. *Contempt of Courts Act, 1971* iii. *Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975*, *Section 9-A* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Nilay Gupta v. Chairman NEET PG Medical & Dental Admission/Counselling Board 2020 & Ors., [2020] 12 SCR 161](https://lawfoyer.in/nilay-gupta-v-chairman-neet-pg-medical-dental-admission-counselling-board-2020-ors-2020-12-scr-161/) **Published:** January 15, 2026 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the legality of deletion of the Non-Resident Indian (NRI) quota in postgraduate medical and dental admissions for the academic year 2020–2021 in Rajasthan. The dispute arose when private medical colleges, after initially indicating a 15% NRI quota and initiating verification of NRI candidates, eliminated the quota at a late stage and merged the seats with the management quota. Two NRI candidates challenged this action before the Rajasthan High Court. The Single Judge held the deletion arbitrary and directed their admission under the NRI quota. The Division Bench reversed this decision, leading to appeals before the Supreme Court. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the legality of deletion of the *Non-Resident Indian (NRI) quota* in postgraduate medical and dental admissions for the academic year 2020–2021 in Rajasthan. The dispute arose when private medical colleges, after initially indicating a 15% NRI quota and initiating verification of NRI candidates, eliminated the quota at a late stage and merged the seats with the management quota. Two NRI candidates challenged this action before the Rajasthan High Court. The Single Judge held the deletion arbitrary and directed their admission under the NRI quota. The Division Bench reversed this decision, leading to appeals before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court analysed the *scope of institutional autonomy*, the *nature of NRI quota under constitutional jurisprudence*, and the *limits of judicial intervention in admission processes*. It clarified that the NRI quota is *permissive and discretionary*, not mandatory or immutable, and flows from *institutional autonomy recognised in earlier Constitution Bench judgments*. However, the Court emphasised that such discretion cannot be exercised *unreasonably or without adequate notice*, especially when candidates have altered their position based on a declared admission framework. While upholding the Division Bench’s view that *no candidate has a vested right to admission under a quota*, the Court recognised that the abrupt deletion of the NRI quota during an ongoing admission process caused *unfair prejudice* to NRI candidates. The Single Judge’s direction granting direct admissions was held legally impermissible, as courts cannot create rights absent statutory mandate. Balancing equities, the Supreme Court invoked its power to do *complete justice* and ordered a *special, limited counselling round* confined only to seats disturbed by the Single Judge’s judgment, without unsettling settled admissions. **Keywords:** NRI quota, Medical admissions, Institutional autonomy, Judicial restraint, NEET PG counselling, Complete justice ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*Nilay Gupta v. Chairman NEET PG Medical & Dental Admission/Counselling Board 2020 & Ors.*ii) Case Number*Civil Appeal No. 3345 of 2020 (with connected appeals)*iii) Judgement Date*09 October 2020*iv) Court*Supreme Court of India*v) Quorum*Hon’ble Mr. Justice L. Nageswara Rao and Hon’ble Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhat*vi) Author*Justice S. Ravindra Bhat*vii) Citation*\[2020\] 12 SCR 161*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Medical Council of India Act, 1956; Section 10-D; NEET Regulations; Rajasthan University of Health Sciences Act, 2005; Mahatma Gandhi University of Medical Sciences and Technology Act, 2011*ix) Judgments Overruled*None*x) Related Law Subjects*Constitutional Law; Education Law; Administrative Law* ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The case arose in the backdrop of postgraduate medical admissions conducted through *NEET PG 2020* during the extraordinary circumstances of the *COVID-19 pandemic*. Private medical colleges in Rajasthan initially declared a *15% NRI quota*, consistent with long-standing practice recognised in judicial precedents. The admission process commenced with NEET examinations in January 2020, followed by counselling schedules and verification of NRI candidates in March and April 2020. The *NEET PG Counselling Board*, in consultation with participating colleges, published an admission framework indicating the existence of NRI seats and the sequence in which such seats would be filled prior to management quota seats. NRI candidates, including the appellants, submitted documents, paid fees, and structured their applications based on this representation. However, shortly before counselling, private colleges revised their seat matrices and eliminated the NRI quota entirely, merging it with the management quota. This sudden change prompted litigation, raising concerns regarding *fairness, arbitrariness, legitimate expectation*, and the *extent of autonomy enjoyed by private unaided institutions*. The Single Judge of the High Court treated the NRI quota as inseparable from the management quota and directed admissions. The Division Bench rejected this approach, holding that *no quota confers an enforceable right*. The Supreme Court was thus called upon to reconcile *institutional discretion* with *procedural fairness* and define the permissible limits of judicial intervention in academic matters. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The admission process for PG medical and dental courses in Rajasthan for AY 2020–21 began with *NEET PG held in January 2020*, results declared on *31 January 2020*. A meeting of the *NEET PG Counselling Board* was held on *17 March 2020*, attended by representatives of private colleges, where it was agreed that *15% of seats would be treated as NRI/management quota* and NRI candidates would be considered first. The *Instruction Booklet* published thereafter recognised three categories of seats—government, management, and NRI—and specified detailed eligibility conditions for NRI candidates, including sponsorship and documentary proof. The appellants registered under the NRI category and submitted required documents within stipulated timelines. On *11 April 2020*, Mahatma Gandhi Medical College published a notification showing *22 NRI/management quota seats*, including *two seats in MD Radiodiagnosis*. However, on *13 April 2020*, the final seat matrix published by the Board showed *NIL NRI seats*. A formal notification dated *14 April 2020* informed NRI candidates that their applications would be considered under the management quota. Aggrieved, two NRI candidates approached the High Court. The Single Judge held that the deletion of the NRI quota mid-process was arbitrary and contrary to *earlier Supreme Court judgments*, directing their admission. This triggered third-party appeals by candidates admitted under the management quota. The Division Bench reversed the Single Judge’s order, leading to the present appeals. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the *NRI quota in postgraduate medical admissions is mandatory or discretionary*? ii. Whether private medical colleges can *abolish the NRI quota during an ongoing admission process*? iii. Whether courts can *direct admission of candidates in the absence of statutory entitlement*? iv. Whether deletion of the NRI quota without notice violates *fairness and non-arbitrariness*? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS i. The counsels for Petitioner submitted that the admission process had commenced with a clear representation that *15% NRI seats would be available*, and candidates had altered their position based on this assurance. ii. It was argued that *minutes of the 17 March 2020 meeting* clearly mandated that NRI seats be filled first, and only leftover seats could be treated as management quota. iii. Reliance was placed on *P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra* to argue that *NRI quota is a recognised component of private medical admissions*. iv. The abrupt deletion of the quota was contended to be a *change in rules midstream*, impermissible under settled law governing selection processes. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS i. The counsels for Respondents submitted that *no student has a vested right to a quota*, and private institutions retain autonomy to decide whether to offer NRI seats. ii. It was argued that *P.A. Inamdar* merely permits, but does not mandate, an NRI quota. iii. The COVID-19 pandemic justified a policy decision to merge NRI seats with management quota due to uncertainty in filling such seats. iv. The Single Judge exceeded jurisdiction by *directing admissions*, thereby creating rights without statutory backing. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 10-D, Medical Council of India Act, 1956* ii. *NEET Postgraduate Medical Education Regulations* iii. *Rajasthan University of Health Sciences Act, 2005* iv. *Mahatma Gandhi University of Medical Sciences and Technology Act, 2011* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court held that the *NRI quota is neither sacrosanct nor compulsory*. Drawing extensively from *T.M.A. Pai Foundation* and *P.A. Inamdar*, the Court reaffirmed that private unaided institutions enjoy autonomy to determine seat allocation, subject to regulatory frameworks. The Court rejected the view that a 15% NRI quota is an unalterable feature of PG admissions. However, it emphasised that *discretion must be exercised fairly*. The abrupt deletion of the quota after candidates had submitted documents and committed to the process was held to have caused *unfair detriment*. The Court found the Single Judge’s direction granting admissions legally unsustainable, reiterating that *courts cannot issue positive directions absent statutory duty*. At best, the High Court could have directed consideration of the petitioners’ cases. Invoking its power to do *complete justice*, the Supreme Court ordered a *special counselling round* limited only to seats disturbed by the Single Judge’s judgment, ensuring minimal disruption and equitable treatment of all affected candidates. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The NRI quota in postgraduate medical admissions is *permissive and discretionary*, not mandatory. Private medical colleges may decide whether to offer such quota, but if they choose to abolish it during an ongoing admission process, *reasonable notice* must be given to avoid unfair prejudice. Courts cannot direct admissions without statutory entitlement. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that *pandemic-induced disruptions* necessitate flexible institutional decision-making but cautioned that such flexibility must not undermine procedural fairness or candidate confidence in admission systems. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Deletion of NRI quota during admissions must be preceded by reasonable notice. ii. Courts should avoid issuing direct admission orders absent statutory mandate. iii. Equitable solutions should minimise disturbance to settled admissions. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment strikes a careful balance between *institutional autonomy* and *procedural fairness*. It reinforces judicial restraint in academic matters while acknowledging candidate prejudice caused by abrupt policy shifts. The decision strengthens administrative fairness without diluting constitutional autonomy of private institutions. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra*, *\[2005\] 2 Supp SCR 603* ii. *T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka*, *\[2002\] 3 Supp SCR 587* iii. *Modern Dental College v. State of M.P.*, *\[2012\] 5 SCR 768* iv. *Christian Medical College Vellore Association v. Union of India*, *2020 SCC OnLine SC 423* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Medical Council of India Act, 1956* ii. *Rajasthan University of Health Sciences Act, 2005* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Ferrodous Estates (Pvt.) Ltd. v. P. Gopirathnam (Dead) & Ors., [2020] 13 SCR 673](https://lawfoyer.in/ferrodous-estates-pvt-ltd-v-p-gopirathnam-dead-ors-2020-13-scr-673/) **Published:** January 15, 2026 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The judgment adjudicates a prolonged dispute concerning specific performance of an agreement to sell executed in 1980 and its enforceability in light of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978 and its subsequent repeal in 1999. The litigation trajectory reflects repeated judicial reconsideration across Single Judge, Division Bench, Full Bench, and finally the Supreme Court. The central controversy revolved around whether an agreement to sell, which required statutory permission under the ceiling law, stood rendered void ab initio due to statutory prohibition, or whether such an agreement remained enforceable when the obligation to obtain permission rested upon the vendor. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment adjudicates a prolonged dispute concerning *specific performance of an agreement to sell* executed in *1980* and its enforceability in light of the *Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978* and its subsequent repeal in *1999*. The litigation trajectory reflects repeated judicial reconsideration across Single Judge, Division Bench, Full Bench, and finally the Supreme Court. The central controversy revolved around whether an agreement to sell, which required statutory permission under the ceiling law, stood rendered *void ab initio* due to statutory prohibition, or whether such an agreement remained enforceable when the obligation to obtain permission rested upon the vendor. The Supreme Court clarified that although the Full Bench decision operated *inter-parties* and attracted *res judicata*, its ratio did not invalidate agreements containing explicit contractual clauses obligating the vendor to obtain statutory clearance. The Court decisively rejected the High Court Division Bench’s approach that prolonged litigation delay alone could justify denial of specific performance. Emphasis was placed on *continuous readiness and willingness* of the purchaser and *dishonest conduct* of the vendors. The judgment also affirms settled principles that repeal of a prohibitory statute removes legal impediments to enforcement unless vested rights subsist, and that discretion under *Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963* must be exercised judicially, not punitively. The decision restores the decree for specific performance, reinforcing contractual sanctity and equitable accountability. **Keywords:** Specific Performance, Urban Land Ceiling, Agreement to Sell, Repeal Statute, Discretionary Relief ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Ferrodous Estates (Pvt.) Ltd. v. P. Gopirathnam (Dead) & Ors.*Case Number*Civil Appeal No. 13516 of 2015*Judgement Date*12 October 2020*Court*Supreme Court of India*Quorum*R.F. Nariman J. and Navin Sinha J.*Author*Justice R.F. Nariman*Citation*\[2020\] 13 SCR 673*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 4, 5(3), 6 of Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1978; Section 20, Specific Relief Act, 1963*Judgments Overruled*Impugned Division Bench judgment of Madras High Court*Related Law Subjects*Property Law, Specific Relief, Constitutional Law* ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The dispute emanates from a contractual transaction executed during the operative period of the *Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1978*, a legislation intended to curb land concentration and speculative profiteering. The appellant company entered into an agreement to purchase immovable property for development purposes, with explicit contractual obligations placed upon the vendors to secure statutory permissions. The inability or unwillingness of the vendors to comply precipitated litigation seeking *specific performance*. Judicial adjudication traversed multiple stages over nearly three decades, reflecting interpretative conflict surrounding *Section 6* of the 1978 Act and the permissibility of enforcing agreements involving excess land. A Full Bench ruling intervened mid-litigation, declaring that even agreements for sale of excess land were barred. This interpretation profoundly influenced subsequent appellate reasoning. However, legislative repeal through the *Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999* altered the statutory landscape, necessitating reconsideration of rights and obligations. The Supreme Court was tasked with reconciling principles of *res judicata*, repeal effect, contractual clauses, and equitable discretion. The judgment re-anchors judicial reasoning to contractual intent and statutory purpose rather than rigid formalism. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellant and four vendors executed an *agreement to sell dated 12.06.1980* concerning *8 grounds and 2354 sq. ft.* of urban land. The agreed consideration was *Rs. 5,40,000*, with *Rs. 1,00,000* paid as advance. Crucially, *Clause 4* obligated the vendors to obtain *income-tax clearance* and *permission from the competent authority under the 1978 Act*. The property was encumbered by a mortgage to *Syndicate Bank*, and the agreement expressly contemplated discharge of the loan from sale proceeds. Despite repeated readiness expressed by the purchaser, statutory permissions were never obtained. Apprehending alienation to third parties, the appellant instituted a suit for *specific performance in 1981*, asserting continuous readiness and willingness. Initially, no statutory bar under the ceiling law was pleaded. Only in *1986*, through an additional written statement, did the defendants contend that the agreement violated *ceiling limits*. The Single Judge, after detailed evidence, found the agreement genuine, binding, and enforceable, recording findings of *dishonest conduct* by the vendors. Subsequent appellate proceedings resulted in referral to a Full Bench, remand, and eventual reversal by the Division Bench, which substituted specific performance with monetary compensation. This culminated in the present appeal. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether an agreement to sell requiring statutory permission is *void ab initio* under *Section 6 of the 1978 Act* ii. Whether repeal of the ceiling law removes impediments to specific performance iii. Whether prolonged litigation delay alone can defeat equitable relief iv. Whether discretionary power under *Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963* was properly exercised ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the agreement explicitly placed the burden of obtaining statutory permission on the vendors. Failure to discharge this obligation constituted breach. It was argued that the Full Bench ruling itself recognised enforceability where such clauses exist. It was further contended that repeal of the ceiling law extinguished any statutory bar, especially in absence of vested rights. The appellant emphasised its continuous readiness and willingness, deposit of balance consideration, and absence of fault. Delay attributable to court process could not operate prejudicially. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents relied heavily on the *inter-parties* Full Bench judgment, asserting that the agreement stood void from inception and incapable of revival post-repeal. They argued vested rights accrued upon filing of suit and discretionary relief should be denied given passage of time and escalation of land value. Monetary compensation was urged as equitable substitution. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, restoring the decree for specific performance. It held that *res judicata* applied only to the ratio actually decided and not beyond. The Full Bench judgment, properly construed, did not invalidate agreements where statutory compliance was contractually assigned to the vendor. The Court clarified that the agreement was not *void ab initio*, and repeal of the ceiling law removed any residual impediment. No vested right accrued to the respondents, as any right under the statute belonged to the State, which chose not to act. The Division Bench erred in substituting equitable discretion with punitive denial based on litigation delay. The appellant’s readiness and the respondents’ dishonest conduct justified enforcement. The decree of the Single Judge was restored with direction to pay *Rs. 1.25 crores* as earlier offered. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The enforceability of an agreement to sell is preserved where statutory compliance is expressly made a contractual obligation of the vendor, and failure to secure permission constitutes breach rather than illegality. Repeal of a prohibitory statute removes legal barriers unless vested rights subsist. Discretion under *Section 20* must be exercised on principled grounds, not on delay alone. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that courts must resist substituting compensation for performance merely due to market escalation. Judicial delay cannot be weaponised against a diligent litigant. Equity demands reciprocal fairness. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Delay due to court process alone cannot defeat specific performance ii. Contractual allocation of statutory obligations must be enforced iii. Repeal statutes operate prospectively unless savings apply iv. Discretion under *Specific Relief Act* must be reasoned and reviewable ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces contractual sanctity and curtails misuse of statutory prohibitions as post-hoc defences. It realigns discretion with equity and fairness, ensuring that statutory interpretation does not subvert legitimate commercial expectations. The ruling provides doctrinal clarity on repeal effects, res judicata boundaries, and equitable enforcement in property transactions. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy* *\[1970\] 3 SCR 830* 2. *Mademsetty Satyanarayana v. G. Yelloji Rao* *\[1965\] 2 SCR 221* 3. *K.S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan* *\[1997\] 1 SCR 993* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Specific Relief Act, 1963* 2. *Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1978* 3. *Tamil Nadu Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Anand Yadav & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., [2020] 13 S.C.R. 925](https://lawfoyer.in/anand-yadav-ors-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-ors-2020-13-s-c-r-925/) **Published:** January 15, 2026 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The judgment addresses a persistent controversy concerning eligibility qualifications for appointment to the post of Assistant Professor (Education) in government-aided colleges in Uttar Pradesh. The dispute arose from conflicting interpretations of whether M.Ed. degree holders could be treated as eligible and equivalent to M.A. (Education) degree holders for the purposes of recruitment. The Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Service Selection Commission issued an advertisement in 2014 which led to rejection of candidates possessing M.Ed. degrees. A subsequent advertisement in 2016 adopted a broader criterion of “post-graduate degree in the relevant subject,” triggering expert review and issuance of a corrigendum permitting M.Ed. candidates. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment addresses a persistent controversy concerning eligibility qualifications for appointment to the post of *Assistant Professor (Education)* in government-aided colleges in Uttar Pradesh. The dispute arose from conflicting interpretations of whether *M.Ed.* degree holders could be treated as eligible and equivalent to *M.A. (Education)* degree holders for the purposes of recruitment. The Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Service Selection Commission issued an advertisement in 2014 which led to rejection of candidates possessing *M.Ed.* degrees. A subsequent advertisement in 2016 adopted a broader criterion of “post-graduate degree in the relevant subject,” triggering expert review and issuance of a corrigendum permitting *M.Ed.* candidates. This corrigendum was challenged before the Allahabad High Court, which quashed it by relying primarily on earlier precedents treating *M.Ed.* as merely a professional or training qualification. The Supreme Court was called upon to examine whether such judicial interference was permissible when expert bodies like the *University Grants Commission* and the *National Council for Teacher Education* had opined otherwise. The Court decisively held that *M.Ed.* is a recognised *master’s degree* under *Section 22 of the UGC Act, 1956*, and that equivalence determinations fall within the domain of expert bodies, not courts. Emphasising judicial restraint in academic matters, the Court set aside the High Court judgment, upheld the corrigendum, and reaffirmed the primacy of expert opinion and employer discretion in recruitment policies within statutory limits. **Keywords:** *M.Ed. equivalence*, *Assistant Professor (Education)*, *UGC Act*, *NCTE*, *judicial restraint*, *expert opinion* ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*Anand Yadav & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 2850 of 2020iii) Judgement Date12 October 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumSanjay Kishan Kaul, Aniruddha Bose, Krishna Murari, JJ.vi) AuthorJustice Sanjay Kishan Kaulvii) Citation*\[2020\] 13 S.C.R. 925*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Section 22, UGC Act, 1956*; *UGC Regulations, 2010*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsConstitutional Law; Education Law; Service Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The litigation arose against a backdrop of recurring disputes in Indian higher education recruitment concerning the nature and equivalence of academic qualifications. The conflict specifically pertained to whether *M.Ed.* degree holders could be considered eligible for appointment as *Assistant Professors in Education*, a post traditionally associated with *M.A. (Education)*. Advertisement No. 46 of 2014 issued by the Selection Commission restricted eligibility in a manner that resulted in exclusion of *M.Ed.* candidates. This exclusion was challenged, and while litigation remained pending, Advertisement No. 47 of 2016 was issued. The latter advertisement adopted a more general eligibility criterion requiring a postgraduate degree in the relevant subject with requisite marks, without specifying *M.A. (Education)*. The Commission, faced with representations and ambiguity, constituted a four-member expert committee consisting of senior professors from premier universities. The committee unanimously opined that *M.Ed.* and *M.A. (Education)* should both be treated as eligible qualifications for the post of Assistant Professor (Education). Acting on this expert advice, the Commission issued a corrigendum allowing *M.Ed.* candidates. The High Court, however, quashed this corrigendum by relying heavily on earlier judgments, without impleading or hearing statutory expert bodies like the UGC or NCTE. This precipitated the appeal before the Supreme Court, raising fundamental questions regarding judicial review in academic and policy-driven matters. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellants possessed *M.Ed.* degrees and had applied pursuant to Advertisement No. 47 of 2016. Their eligibility was initially recognised following issuance of the corrigendum dated *11 July 2016*. The respondent before the High Court challenged this corrigendum contending that *M.Ed.* is not equivalent to *M.A. (Education)* and relied upon earlier judicial pronouncements. Crucially, the High Court proceedings did not involve the UGC or NCTE, despite both being statutory authorities competent to determine recognition and equivalence of degrees. Nor were affected candidates impleaded. The High Court quashed the corrigendum and held *M.Ed.* candidates ineligible, prompting the Selection Commission to revise eligibility criteria to exclude them. Aggrieved *M.Ed.* candidates approached the Supreme Court. During pendency, interim orders permitted them to participate in the selection process provisionally, with results sealed. Meanwhile, the UGC filed an affidavit clarifying that *M.Ed.* is a master’s degree recognised under *Section 22 of the UGC Act*. NCTE also submitted a detailed affidavit explaining curricular structure, duration, and professional nature of *M.Ed.*, concluding that it qualifies as a master’s programme for appointment as Assistant Professor (Education). ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether *M.Ed.* is a recognised master’s degree under the *UGC Act, 1956*? ii. Whether *M.Ed.* can be treated as equivalent to *M.A. (Education)* for appointment as Assistant Professor (Education)? iii. Whether courts can substitute expert academic opinion with judicial interpretation? iv. Whether the High Court erred in quashing the corrigendum without hearing expert bodies and affected candidates? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that *M.Ed.* is expressly recognised as a master’s degree by the UGC. They contended that equivalence determinations lie exclusively within the domain of expert bodies like the NCTE. It was argued that judicial review cannot be invoked to override expert opinion, especially when the employer has accepted such advice. Reliance was placed on precedent affirming that recruitment qualifications and equivalence are matters of policy. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The respondents argued that *M.Ed.* is merely a professional training qualification distinct from the academic discipline of *Education*. They relied upon earlier judgments and High Court decisions which treated *M.Ed.* as non-equivalent. It was contended that the corrigendum was arbitrary and issued belatedly, adversely affecting candidates with *M.A. (Education)* degrees. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court criticised the High Court for deciding the matter without impleading UGC and NCTE, leading to an incomplete appreciation of the controversy. The Court accepted the unequivocal stand of the UGC that *M.Ed.* is a master’s degree recognised under *Section 22*. It further accepted the NCTE’s expert determination that *M.Ed.*, though professional, qualifies as a master’s programme in Education for the post in question. The Court emphasised that equivalence is not a matter for judicial determination. Where expert bodies have applied their minds and the employer has accepted their opinion, courts must exercise restraint. The reliance on *Dr. Prit Singh* was held to be misplaced due to differing factual contexts. The High Court judgment was set aside and the corrigendum upheld. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio rests on the principle that *academic equivalence and recruitment eligibility are policy matters guided by expert opinion*. Courts cannot sit in appeal over such determinations unless statutory violations are evident. Recognition under *Section 22 of the UGC Act* conclusively establishes *M.Ed.* as a postgraduate degree, and equivalence for recruitment purposes lies with the competent expert authority. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that failure to implead statutory bodies and affected candidates leads to flawed adjudication. It cautioned against mechanical reliance on precedents without examining their factual matrix and ratio. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Courts must defer to expert bodies in academic matters. ii. Recruitment authorities may determine equivalence within statutory frameworks. iii. Affected stakeholders must be heard before adverse decisions are taken. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces judicial discipline in matters involving educational policy and expert determination. It restores certainty by affirming that *M.Ed.* is a recognised master’s degree eligible for appointment as Assistant Professor (Education). The decision strengthens the autonomy of expert bodies and employers while preventing inconsistent judicial interference that disrupts academic governance. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** - *Dr. Prit Singh v. S.K. Mangal* - *Dr. Ram Sevak Singh v. Dr. U.P. Singh* - *Zahoor Ahmad Rather v. Sheikh Imtiyaz Ahmad* **b) Important Statutes Referred** - *University Grants Commission Act, 1956* - *UGC Regulations, 2010* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab [2020] 12 S.C.R. 875](https://lawfoyer.in/bikramjit-singh-v-state-of-punjab-2020-12-s-c-r-875/) **Published:** January 15, 2026 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The judgment in Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab authoritatively settles the law concerning default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, as modified by Section 43-D of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The Supreme Court examined the interplay between the CrPC, the UAPA, and the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, particularly on the question of jurisdiction to extend the statutory period of investigation from ninety days to one hundred eighty days. The case arose from a terrorist attack involving a hand grenade at a religious congregation, resulting in multiple deaths and serious injuries. The appellant sought default bail upon expiry of ninety days, which was rejected by the Magistrate on the basis of an extension order passed without jurisdiction. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment in *Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab* authoritatively settles the law concerning *default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*, as modified by *Section 43-D of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967*. The Supreme Court examined the interplay between the *CrPC*, the *UAPA*, and the *National Investigation Agency Act, 2008*, particularly on the question of jurisdiction to extend the statutory period of investigation from ninety days to one hundred eighty days. The case arose from a terrorist attack involving a hand grenade at a religious congregation, resulting in multiple deaths and serious injuries. The appellant sought default bail upon expiry of ninety days, which was rejected by the Magistrate on the basis of an extension order passed without jurisdiction. The Court clarified that once a *Special Court under the NIA Act* is designated, it alone has exclusive jurisdiction over all matters under the UAPA, including extension of time for investigation. It further reaffirmed that the right to default bail is an *indefeasible right*, forming an integral component of *Article 21 of the Constitution of India*. The Court held that if an accused applies for default bail upon expiry of the statutory period and before filing of the charge sheet, such right crystallizes and cannot be defeated by subsequent filing of the charge sheet or erroneous judicial orders. The judgment strengthens constitutional safeguards against prolonged pre-trial detention, underscores procedural discipline in anti-terror prosecutions, and reiterates that statutory safeguards cannot be diluted even in cases involving grave offences. **Keywords:** Default Bail, Article 21, UAPA, Special Court Jurisdiction, Indefeasible Right, Section 167 CrPC ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab*Case NumberCriminal Appeal No. 667 of 2020Judgement Date12 October 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorum*R.F. Nariman, Navin Sinha, K.M. Joseph, JJ.*Author*Justice R.F. Nariman*Citation*\[2020\] 12 S.C.R. 875*Legal Provisions Involved*Section 167 CrPC; Sections 13, 16, 18, 18-B, 20 UAPA; NIA Act, 2008*Judgments OverruledNilRelated Law SubjectsCriminal Law, Constitutional Law, Anti-Terror Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The present judgment arises from the evolving jurisprudence on *statutory bail*, particularly in cases involving special legislations such as the *Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967*. The Court was called upon to resolve conflicting interpretations regarding the jurisdiction of Magistrates and Special Courts in extending the period of investigation beyond ninety days. The background reflects a recurring tension between national security legislations and constitutional guarantees of personal liberty. The legislative scheme of *Section 167(2) CrPC* provides a temporal limit on investigative detention. This safeguard, though procedural in form, has been consistently recognized as a substantive guarantee flowing from *Article 21*. The UAPA modifies this scheme by permitting extension of the investigation period to one hundred eighty days, but only subject to strict compliance and judicial oversight. The confusion arose due to overlapping statutory frameworks under the *CrPC*, *UAPA*, and *NIA Act*. While State Police retained investigative authority under *Section 10 of the NIA Act*, the jurisdiction to try scheduled offences stood transferred to *Special Courts*. The erroneous assumption that investigation by State Police preserved the Magistrate’s jurisdiction formed the basis of the impugned orders. This judgment situates itself within a long line of precedents affirming that procedural lapses by courts cannot extinguish fundamental rights. The decision therefore has far-reaching implications for undertrial rights, judicial competence, and institutional accountability. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE An FIR dated *18.11.2018* was registered following a hand grenade attack at *Nirankari Bhawan, Rajasansi, Amritsar*, during a religious congregation attended by approximately two hundred persons. The explosion resulted in *twenty-two serious injuries* and *three deaths*. The FIR invoked *Sections 302, 307, 452, 427, 341, 34 IPC*, *Section 25 Arms Act*, *Sections 3–6 Explosive Substances Act*, and *Section 13 UAPA*. The appellant, *Bikramjit Singh*, aged twenty-six, was arrested on *22.11.2018* and remanded to judicial custody by a *Sub-Divisional Magistrate*. Upon expiry of ninety days on *21.02.2019*, an application for default bail was filed. Prior to this, on *13.02.2019*, the Magistrate purportedly extended the investigation period to one hundred eighty days. The default bail application was dismissed on *25.02.2019* solely on the basis of this extension order. A revision petition was filed, and on *25.03.2019*, the *Special Court under the NIA Act* set aside the Magistrate’s extension order, holding that it lacked jurisdiction. Meanwhile, on *26.03.2019*, the prosecution filed a charge sheet invoking additional UAPA provisions. Subsequent applications for default bail were rejected, and the High Court upheld the denial, erroneously holding that the charge sheet preceded the bail application. This led to the present appeal before the Supreme Court. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether a Magistrate has jurisdiction to extend the investigation period under *Section 43-D(2) UAPA*? ii. Whether filing of a charge sheet after expiry of ninety days extinguishes the right to default bail? iii. Whether default bail under *Section 167(2) CrPC* forms part of *Article 21 of the Constitution*? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the Appellant submitted that once *Special Courts under the NIA Act* were notified, they alone possessed jurisdiction over all UAPA-related matters, including extension of investigation time. It was argued that the Magistrate’s order dated *13.02.2019* was void ab initio. Reliance was placed on *Hitendra Vishnu Thakur*, *Sanjay Dutt*, and *Uday Mohanlal Acharya* to contend that the right to default bail crystallizes upon filing of an application after expiry of the statutory period. The Appellant emphasized that the right could not be defeated by a subsequent charge sheet or judicial error. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the Respondent State argued that since the investigation was conducted by *State Police*, the Magistrate retained jurisdiction under *Section 167 CrPC*. Reliance was placed on *Section 10 of the NIA Act* to assert that State powers remained unaffected. It was further argued that once the charge sheet was filed, the right to default bail stood extinguished, and that subsequent applications could not revive a dismissed claim. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court categorically rejected the reasoning adopted by the High Court. It held that the High Court had committed a fundamental factual error regarding dates, which vitiated its conclusion. The Court clarified that the default bail application was filed *prior to the filing of the charge sheet*. On jurisdiction, the Court undertook a detailed statutory analysis of *Sections 2(1)(d) and 43-D(2) UAPA* read with *Sections 13, 16, and 22 of the NIA Act*. It held that once a Special Court is designated, it alone constitutes “the Court” for purposes of extending investigation time. The Magistrate’s extension order was therefore held to be without jurisdiction. Consequently, the appellant’s right to default bail crystallized upon expiry of ninety days and filing of the bail application. The Court reaffirmed that default bail is not a mere statutory concession but a constitutional safeguard under *Article 21*. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was directed to be released on default bail. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The Supreme Court held that *only a Special Court under the NIA Act has jurisdiction to extend the investigation period under Section 43-D(2) of the UAPA*. Any extension granted by a Magistrate is void. It was further held that *the right to default bail becomes enforceable the moment an application is filed after expiry of the statutory period and before filing of the charge sheet*. Subsequent filing of the charge sheet does not defeat this right. The Court reaffirmed that default bail is an *indefeasible right* forming part of the *procedure established by law under Article 21*. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that personal liberty cannot be sacrificed at the altar of procedural confusion or prosecutorial delay. It emphasized that courts must act as sentinels against illegal detention, especially under stringent legislations like the UAPA. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Extension of investigation under *Section 43-D(2) UAPA* can only be granted by a *Special Court*. ii. Default bail applications must be decided with reference to the date of expiry of statutory period. iii. Judicial errors cannot extinguish fundamental rights. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment represents a reaffirmation of constitutional primacy over procedural deviations. It harmonizes anti-terror legislation with civil liberties and restores clarity on jurisdictional competence. The decision will significantly influence bail jurisprudence under special statutes and reinforce judicial accountability in pre-trial detention matters. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra*, *\[1994\] 1 Supp. SCR 360* 2. *Sanjay Dutt v. State through CBI*, *\[1994\] 3 Supp. SCR 263* 3. *Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra*, *\[2001\] 2 SCR 878* 4. *Union of India v. Nirala Yadav*, *\[2014\] 6 SCR 148* 5. *Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam*, *\[2017\] 8 SCR 785* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* 2. *Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967* 3. *National Investigation Agency Act, 2008* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Amar Singh v. The State (NCT of Delhi), [2020] 8 SCR 751](https://lawfoyer.in/amar-singh-v-the-state-nct-of-delhi-2020-8-scr-751/) **Published:** January 15, 2026 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the evidentiary limits of criminal conviction resting upon the sole testimony of a related eye-witness in a prosecution for murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Supreme Court scrutinised whether the concurrent findings of guilt recorded by the Trial Court and the High Court could be sustained when the prosecution case suffered from serious inconsistencies, hostile witnesses, and conduct of the alleged eye-witness that was incompatible with normal human behaviour. The Court undertook a detailed evaluation of the ocular testimony of PW-1, the sole remaining eye-witness, in light of medical evidence, surrounding circumstances, and procedural lapses in investigation. **Content:** ## A) **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment examines the evidentiary limits of criminal conviction resting upon the *sole testimony of a related eye-witness* in a prosecution for *murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860*. The Supreme Court scrutinised whether the concurrent findings of guilt recorded by the Trial Court and the High Court could be sustained when the prosecution case suffered from serious inconsistencies, hostile witnesses, and conduct of the alleged eye-witness that was incompatible with normal human behaviour. The Court undertook a detailed evaluation of the ocular testimony of PW-1, the sole remaining eye-witness, in light of medical evidence, surrounding circumstances, and procedural lapses in investigation. Particular emphasis was placed on the improbability of the conduct of the deceased’s brothers during and immediately after the assault, discrepancies between medical evidence and ocular narration regarding the duration and nature of the assault, and suspicious entries in the medico-legal certificate. The Court reiterated settled principles under *Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872*, holding that conviction can rest on a single witness only when such testimony is wholly reliable and inspires confidence. Finding the prosecution version riddled with doubts and unsupported by corroborative evidence, the Court extended the benefit of doubt to the accused and set aside the conviction. The judgment reinforces doctrinal clarity on appreciation of evidence, hostile witnesses, and the centrality of natural human conduct in criminal adjudication. ***Keywords:*** *sole eye-witness*, *unnatural conduct*, *benefit of doubt*, *ocular vs medical evidence*, *hostile witnesses* ## B) **CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDescriptionJudgement Cause Title*Amar Singh v. The State (NCT of Delhi)*Case NumberCriminal Appeal No. 335 of 2015 with Criminal Appeal No. 336 of 2015Judgement Date12 October 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorum*Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Aniruddha Bose and Krishna Murari, JJ.*Author*Justice Krishna Murari*Citation*\[2020\] 8 SCR 751*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 302, 34 IPC; Sections 25, 27 Arms Act; Section 134 Evidence Act*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law Subjects*Criminal Law; Law of Evidence* ## C) **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The appeal arose from the conviction of the appellants for the offence of *murder with common intention* under *Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC*, imposed by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court of Delhi. The prosecution case was founded primarily on the testimony of one alleged eye-witness, PW-1, the brother of the deceased, after two other cited eye-witnesses turned hostile. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether such conviction could be sustained when the prosecution narrative appeared inherently improbable and unsupported by independent corroboration. The factual matrix disclosed a violent assault allegedly carried out by three accused persons using hockey sticks and a knife, resulting in multiple injuries and eventual death of the victim. While the Trial Court accepted the prosecution version in its entirety, the High Court concurred without critically re-evaluating the evidentiary inconsistencies highlighted by the defence. The appellants contended that the prosecution suffered from unexplained delays, unreliable recoveries, hostile witnesses, and grave discrepancies between ocular and medical evidence. The background of the case is significant as it involved admitted prior enmity between the parties, given that the deceased had earlier been prosecuted for the murder of the father of one of the accused. This backdrop necessitated careful judicial scrutiny of the evidence to rule out false implication driven by motive for vengeance. The Supreme Court, therefore, revisited the settled principles governing appreciation of evidence in criminal trials, particularly where conviction rests on the testimony of a single related witness whose conduct appears unnatural. ## D) **FACTS OF THE CASE** On *03.08.1990 at about 10:00 PM*, the deceased Devinder Singh @ Ladi was allegedly walking with his two brothers, PW-1 Parminder Singh and PW-11 Amar Singh, towards a taxi stand at Sukhdev Market, New Delhi. According to the prosecution, the appellants intercepted the deceased near Qumayun Restaurant and assaulted him with hockey sticks and a knife. PW-1 claimed that when he and PW-11 attempted to intervene, the assailants threatened them with dire consequences, forcing them to remain passive spectators. The deceased sustained *fifteen ante-mortem injuries*, including fatal stab wounds to the chest and abdomen. A PCR van arrived after approximately fifteen minutes, acting upon information from an unknown caller, and removed the injured to AIIMS, where he was declared brought dead. The police registered an FIR on the basis of PW-1’s statement and conducted investigation, leading to alleged recoveries of weapons at the instance of the accused. During trial, out of the three projected eye-witnesses, PW-11 and PW-5 resiled from their earlier statements and failed to support the prosecution. The conviction thus rested solely on PW-1. The defence highlighted serious infirmities such as delay in FIR, suspicious MLC entries showing the deceased as “unknown,” absence of names of brothers initially, lack of effort to provide immediate medical aid, and improbability of inflicting fifteen injuries within five minutes. The Trial Court convicted the accused, and the High Court dismissed the appeal, prompting the present challenge before the Supreme Court. ## E) **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether conviction for murder can be sustained solely on the testimony of a single related eye-witness whose conduct appears unnatural? ii. Whether material discrepancies between ocular testimony and medical evidence vitiate the prosecution case? iii. Whether failure to corroborate the sole eye-witness testimony through independent or circumstantial evidence warrants benefit of doubt? iv. Whether investigative lapses relating to weapon recovery and medical opinion undermine the prosecution case? ## F) **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellants submitted that the conviction was unsafe as it rested entirely on the *uncorroborated testimony of PW-1*, whose conduct was contrary to normal human behaviour. It was argued that the failure of the two brothers to attempt rescue or seek immediate medical aid rendered their presence doubtful. The appellants further contended that *PW-11 and PW-5 turning hostile* fatally weakened the prosecution case. The defence emphasised the *discrepancy between ocular and medical evidence*, pointing out that infliction of fifteen injuries within five minutes was improbable. It was also argued that the *MLC entries*, initially recording the victim as unknown and naming only a Head Constable as the accompanying person, contradicted the prosecution version that the brothers accompanied the deceased to hospital. The absence of medical opinion linking the injuries to the recovered knife with a broken tip was highlighted as a serious lapse. ## G) **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the State submitted that conviction can legally be based on the testimony of a single witness under *Section 134 of the Evidence Act*, provided such testimony is credible. It was argued that hostile witnesses do not efface the prosecution case entirely and that minor investigative lapses should not overshadow substantive evidence. The State relied on concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below and urged judicial restraint in interfering with such findings. ## H) **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. *Section 302 IPC* – Punishment for murder ii. *Section 34 IPC* – Common intention iii. *Sections 25 and 27 Arms Act* – Illegal possession and use of arms iv. *Section 134 Evidence Act, 1872* – Number of witnesses ## I) **JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court undertook a meticulous re-appreciation of evidence and found the prosecution version unreliable. The Court reiterated that while conviction can rest on the testimony of a single witness, such evidence must be *wholly trustworthy*. Examining PW-1’s testimony, the Court found his conduct during the assault unnatural, particularly his failure to intervene despite the assailants being armed only with hockey sticks and a knife. The Court found it improbable that two brothers would remain mute spectators during a brutal assault and thereafter fail to seek immediate medical assistance from a nearby clinic. The medical evidence revealing *fifteen injuries*, including fatal stab wounds, was found inconsistent with PW-1’s assertion that the incident lasted only five minutes. The suspicious overwriting in the MLC regarding the identity of the deceased and accompanying persons further eroded the prosecution case. The Court also criticised the investigative lapse in not obtaining medical opinion regarding whether the injuries could be caused by the recovered knife with a broken tip, relying on *Kartarey v. State of U.P.* and *Ishwar Singh v. State of U.P.* The cumulative effect of these infirmities led the Court to conclude that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment lies in reaffirming that *sole eye-witness testimony must pass the test of natural human conduct and consistency with medical and circumstantial evidence*. Where such testimony appears inherently improbable and lacks corroboration, conviction cannot be sustained. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that investigative lapses, though ordinarily not fatal, assume significance when the prosecution case itself is doubtful. The duty of the prosecution to place weapons before medical experts was emphasised as essential to fair adjudication. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Courts must scrutinise conduct of eye-witnesses against normal human behaviour. ii. Medical opinion must be sought on the compatibility of injuries with alleged weapons. iii. Sole testimony of related witnesses requires cautious evaluation and corroboration when doubtful. ## J) **REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Kartarey v. State of U.P.*, *\[1976\] 2 SCR 199* ii. *Ishwar Singh v. State of U.P.*, *(1976) 4 SCC 355* iii. *Selvaraj v. State of Tamil Nadu*, *(1976) 4 SCC 343* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Indian Penal Code, 1860* ii. *Indian Evidence Act, 1872* iii. *Arms Act, 1959* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Raghunath (D) by LRs v. Radha Mohan (D) through LRs & Ors. [2020] 14 S.C.R. 462](https://lawfoyer.in/raghunath-d-by-lrs-v-radha-mohan-d-through-lrs-ors-2020-14-s-c-r-462/) **Published:** January 15, 2026 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The judgment in Raghunath (D) by LRs v. Radha Mohan (D) through LRs & Ors. authoritatively settles the controversy concerning the temporal scope and limitation of the right of pre-emption under the Rajasthan Pre-Emption Act, 1966. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the limitation period prescribed under Section 21 of the Act read with Article 97 of the Limitation Act, 1963 commences afresh upon every subsequent sale of the same immovable property, or whether such right is confined to the first post-statute transfer where the pre-emptor consciously refrains from exercising it. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment in *Raghunath (D) by LRs v. Radha Mohan (D) through LRs & Ors.* authoritatively settles the controversy concerning the *temporal scope and limitation of the right of pre-emption* under the *Rajasthan Pre-Emption Act, 1966*. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the limitation period prescribed under *Section 21 of the Act read with Article 97 of the Limitation Act, 1963* commences afresh upon every subsequent sale of the same immovable property, or whether such right is confined to the *first post-statute transfer* where the pre-emptor consciously refrains from exercising it. The Court undertook a detailed doctrinal and statutory analysis of the nature of pre-emption, reiterating its settled position as a *weak and defeasible right*, traceable to Mohammedan law and subsequently incorporated into statutory frameworks. Emphasis was laid on the distinction between the *primary right to offer* and the *secondary right of substitution*. The Court rejected the interpretation that the right of pre-emption is recurring or perpetual, holding that such a construction would undermine certainty of title and destabilize property transactions. By harmoniously construing *Sections 3, 6, 8, 9 and 21* of the 1966 Act with *Article 97 of the Limitation Act*, the Court concluded that once a pre-emptor waives or fails to exercise the right at the earliest statutory opportunity, *Section 9 operates as a permanent bar*. The judgment restores primacy to transactional certainty and reinforces consistent High Court jurisprudence, while setting aside the contrary view adopted by the Rajasthan High Court. **Keywords:** Pre-emption, Limitation, Waiver of Right, Article 97 Limitation Act, Rajasthan Pre-Emption Act 1966, Weak Right ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Raghunath (D) by LRs v. Radha Mohan (D) through LRs & Ors.*Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 1442 of 2016Judgement Date13 October 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorum*Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Aniruddha Bose and Krishna Murari, JJ.*Author*Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.*Citation*\[2020\] 14 S.C.R. 462*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 3, 6, 8, 9, 21 of Rajasthan Pre-Emption Act, 1966; Article 97, Limitation Act, 1963*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsProperty Law, Civil Law, Limitation Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The controversy addressed in the present judgment arises from long-standing litigation concerning the enforcement of the statutory right of pre-emption in Rajasthan. The case presents a recurring conflict between *individual statutory privileges* and the *need for certainty in property transactions*. The Rajasthan Pre-Emption Act, 1966 was enacted to codify and regulate a right historically rooted in custom, primarily to prevent intrusion of strangers into closely held property arrangements. The dispute gained complexity due to multiple historical sale transactions of the same immovable property spanning from *1945, 1946, and 1966*, culminating in a challenged transaction in *January 1974*. The plaintiff sought to invoke pre-emption based on *shared amenities*, asserting violation of *Section 8* for want of statutory notice. Trial and first appellate courts rejected the claim on limitation, holding that failure to challenge the *1966 sale*, which occurred after the Act came into force, extinguished the right. The Rajasthan High Court reversed this reasoning, treating each subsequent sale as a *fresh cause of action*. This divergence necessitated authoritative clarification by the Supreme Court on whether *Article 97 of the Limitation Act* supports a recurring right or merely fixes the outer temporal limit for the *first exercisable opportunity*. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The suit property forms part of a building bearing *AMC No. XV/290*, situated in *Kayasth Mohalla, Ajmer*, and allegedly shares a common entrance, staircase, and lavatory with the plaintiff’s portion. The lineage of title reveals three historical transfers prior to the disputed transaction, the most significant being a *registered sale deed dated 05.11.1966*, executed after the enforcement of the Rajasthan Pre-Emption Act, 1966. The plaintiff’s predecessor did not challenge this 1966 transaction. Subsequently, *respondents 5 and 6* sold part of the property to *respondent 4* on *10.01.1974*, who then transferred it to the appellant on *21.01.1974*. The plaintiff instituted a suit for pre-emption on *10.01.1974*, asserting a superior right under *Section 6(1)(ii)* of the Act. The defendants contested the claim on multiple grounds, including *absence of commonality*, *existence of separate lockable premises*, and crucially, *bar of limitation*. The trial court initially decreed the suit, but upon remand and consideration of earlier sale deeds, reversed its position, holding the suit barred due to non-challenge of the 1966 sale. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the limitation for enforcing the right of pre-emption under *Article 97 of the Limitation Act, 1963* begins afresh on each subsequent sale of the same property? ii. Whether failure to exercise the right of pre-emption at the first statutory opportunity amounts to waiver under *Section 9 of the Rajasthan Pre-Emption Act, 1966*? iii. Whether the right of pre-emption is a recurring or one-time exercisable right? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the *right of pre-emption is inherently weak* and exists only to prevent intrusion of strangers at the *earliest opportunity*. It was argued that waiver by conduct extinguishes the right permanently. Reliance was placed on *Prahlad Kumar v. Kishan Chand*, *Mangti Ram v. Onkar Sahai*, and *Rukmani Devi v. Prabhu Narayan*, where consistent judicial opinion held that failure to act at the first instance precludes later assertion. It was further contended that permitting recurring claims would create a *cloud on title*, depress property values, and defeat the legislative intent behind *Section 9*. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent submitted that *Article 97* clearly prescribes limitation from the date of the sale sought to be impeached, thereby recognizing *each sale as a separate cause of action*. It was argued that *Section 9* only governs loss of right in relation to a specific transaction and does not impose a permanent bar. The respondent emphasized that pre-emption involves *substitution, not annulment*, and therefore does not require challenge to earlier sales. Reliance was placed on *Bishan Singh v. Khazan Singh* and *Barasat Eye Hospital v. Kaustabh Mondal*. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court rejected the High Court’s interpretation and restored the findings of the trial and first appellate courts. The Court held that construing pre-emption as a recurring right would transform a *weak right into a perpetual encumbrance*, contrary to settled doctrine. The Court undertook a conjoint reading of *Sections 3, 6, 8, 9 and 21* of the 1966 Act with *Article 97*. It held that *Section 9 embodies the principle of waiver*, and once the right is consciously not exercised at the first opportunity, it stands extinguished permanently. The Court emphasized that limitation provisions cannot be read in isolation from the *substantive nature of the right*. Article 97 merely fixes the timeframe for exercise and does not resurrect a waived right. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The right of pre-emption under the Rajasthan Pre-Emption Act, 1966 is *exercisable only once*, at the first post-Act transfer giving rise to such right. Failure to exercise or waiver at that stage permanently extinguishes the right. *Section 9 operates as a bar*, and *Article 97* does not create a recurring cause of action. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that treating pre-emption as perpetual would destabilize property markets and undermine transactional certainty. Such an interpretation would be inconsistent with modern constitutional and economic realities. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Right of pre-emption must be exercised at the first statutory opportunity. ii. Non-exercise amounts to waiver under *Section 9*. iii. Article 97 governs limitation but does not revive extinguished rights. iv. Courts must discourage interpretations that cloud title or promote stale claims. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces doctrinal clarity by harmonizing limitation law with substantive property rights. It preserves certainty in land transactions while preventing misuse of an archaic right. The decision aligns statutory interpretation with commercial reality and constitutional values, ensuring that pre-emption remains an exception rather than a perpetual restraint. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Bishan Singh v. Khazan Singh*, *AIR 1958 SC 838* ii. *Indira Bai v. Nand Kishore*, *(1990) 4 SCC 668* iii. *Barasat Eye Hospital v. Kaustabh Mondal*, *2019 SCC OnLine SC 1351* iv. *Kutina Bibi v. Baikuntha Chandra Dutta*, *AIR 1961 Assam 1* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Rajasthan Pre-Emption Act, 1966* ii. *Limitation Act, 1963* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Small Voices: Big Rights: 1st National Essay Competition | Organized by National Law University, Delhi | Register by 1st March, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/small-voices-big-rights-1st-national-essay-competition-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-register-by-1st-march-2026/) **Published:** January 14, 2026 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Small Voices: Big Rights: 1st National Essay Competition | Organized by National Law University, Delhi | Register by 1st March, 2026 **Content:** ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER / COLLABORATING BODIES** The NLUD Chair on Justice for Children works to strengthen scholarship and practice on child rights within the criminal justice system. It focuses on supporting high-quality legal representation for children in need of care and protection as well as children in conflict with the law. Guided by Chair Professor Tasneem Deo, the initiative brings together academic research and practical engagement to ensure fairness, dignity, and compassion in the justice system for children. The Constitutional Law Club, NLU Delhi, is a student-led initiative dedicated to fostering thoughtful engagement with constitutional law beyond the classroom. The Club hosts expert lectures, curates diverse reading lists, and runs discussion forums to encourage informed constitutional dialogue among students. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY** The **1st National Essay Competition – “Small Voices: Big Rights”** invites law students across India to critically examine how India’s constitutional framework intersects with child protection and juvenile justice systems. The competition encourages rigorous legal analysis on the interaction between constitutional law and criminal law, especially in contexts involving children as victims or as children in conflict with the law. Participants are expected to engage deeply with legal principles, statutory frameworks, and constitutional values that shape justice for children in India. ## **THEMES** Participants may write on **any one** of the following themes: - The Role of Dignity under Article 21 in Shaping Juvenile Justice in India - The Interplay of Privacy and Protection under POCSO - Article 39A and Access to Justice for Children ## **WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** - Open to students enrolled in **undergraduate or postgraduate law programmes** - Students must be from **any recognised university in India** - **Co-authorship is not permitted** ## **MODE OF THE EVENT** Online (Essay Submission) ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE** - Essays must be submitted through the official Google Form - **Submission Link:** - Deadline for submission: **1st March, 2026** ## **SUBMISSION GUIDELINES** - Word Limit: **1500–2000 words** (excluding footnotes) - Title: Maximum **12 words** - Font: Garamond | Font Size: 12 | Line Spacing: 1.5 - Footnotes: OSCOLA 4th Edition, Garamond, Size 10, Line Spacing 1.0 - Similarity index must be **below 20%** - Essays must be **original and unpublished** - **Use of generative AI will lead to disqualification** ## **FEE DETAILS** **No registration or submission fee.** ## **PRIZES / AWARDS** - **Winner:** Certificate of Merit & publication in the NLUD J4C Newsletter - **Runner-Up:** Certificate of Merit & publication on the NLUD J4C Online Opinion Page - **Top 10 Entries:** Certificate of Merit - **All Participants:** E-Certificate of Participation ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - **Essay Submission Deadline:** 1st March, 2026 - **Declaration of Results:** 15th March, 2026 ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** - **Email:** clc@nludelhi.ac.in - **Phone:** - +91 77078 83920 (Ms. Siya Maheshwari) - +91 70033 46161 (Ms. Palak Goenka) ## **OFFICIAL LINK / UPDATES** All official updates related to the competition will be available at: **Categories:** Essay Competitions, Events, Other Competitions --- ### [SGTU–RANKA INTERNATIONAL TRIAL ADVOCACY COMPETITION 3.0 | Organized by SGT University, Gurugram | Register by 15th February, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/sgtu-ranka-international-trial-advocacy-competition-3-0-organized-by-sgt-university-gurugram-register-by-15th-february-2026/) **Published:** January 14, 2026 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** SGTU–RANKA INTERNATIONAL TRIAL ADVOCACY COMPETITION 3.0 | Organized by SGT University, Gurugram | Register by 15th February, 2026 **Content:** ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER / COLLEGE / UNIVERSITY** SGT University is nationally renowned for its leadership in Medical and Health Sciences and established its Faculty of Law in 2014. The University aims to be recognized nationally and globally for excellence in clinical legal education, community-based outreach programs, socially relevant research, and for honing lawyering, arbitration, mediation, and client counselling skills. SGT University offers a vibrant academic environment with a wide array of academic and extracurricular opportunities and is accredited with an **A+ Grade by NAAC**. The Faculty of Law at SGT University has statutory recognition from the Bar Council of India and the Government of Haryana. It provides undergraduate, postgraduate, Ph.D., diploma, and certification courses, focusing on professional legal education and preparing students for national and international legal practice. The event is organized in collaboration with the **Ranka Public Charitable Trust**, established in 1980 by late Dr. N. M. Ranka, Senior Advocate from Jaipur. The Trust has over 35 years of dedication towards public welfare, Gandhian philosophy, legal education, scholarships, and organizing prestigious law-based activities including moot court and trial advocacy competitions. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY** The International Trial Advocacy Competition 3.0 focuses on enhancing trial advocacy skills through a simulated criminal court trial. Trial advocacy is a core component of clinical legal education and equips participants with practical litigation skills such as delivering opening and closing arguments, examining witnesses, legal research, and integrating courtroom strategies. The competition is structured to simulate real court procedures within a short span of time, enabling participants to gain hands-on courtroom experience. The competition consists of multiple rounds including preliminary rounds, advocate-cum-researcher’s test, quarter-finals, semi-finals, and finals, with knock-out stages beyond the preliminary round. ## **MODE OF THE EVENT** Offline ## **LOCATION & VENUE OF THE EVENT** SGT University, Gurugram, Haryana, India ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE** - Registration is complete only after payment of fees and submission of the Google Form. - Registration fee is **non-refundable**. - No change in team composition is permitted after submission, except at the discretion of the organizers. **Registration Link:** **Trial Problem & Rules Links:** - Trial Problem: - Rules & Guidelines: ## **FEE DETAILS** - ₹3,000 per team (without accommodation) - ₹5,000 per team (with accommodation, includes lodging and food as per schedule) ## **PRIZES** - **Winner:** ₹1,00,000 + Trophy + Certificate - **Runner-Up:** ₹50,000 + Trophy + Certificate - **Best Witness:** ₹10,000 + Trophy + Certificate - **Best Memorial:** ₹10,000 + Trophy + Certificate - **Best Researcher:** ₹10,000 + Trophy + Certificate - **Best Advocate:** ₹10,000 + Trophy + Certificate ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - Last Date for Registration: **15th February, 2026** - Last Date to Seek Clarification: **15th February, 2026** - Release of Clarifications: **17th February, 2026** - Last Memorial Submission Date: **6th March, 2026** - Competition Dates: **13th – 15th March, 2026** - Gala Night: **13th – 15th March, 2026** ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** - **Mr. Maharshi Kumar Kasoudhan** – Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, SGT University +91 9695401917 - **Ms. Deepshikha Kataria** – Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, SGT University - **Mr. Kaisar Iqbal Mir** – Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, SGT University +91 7780940798 - **Student Coordinators:** - Ms. Tanya Yadav – +91 9821253538 - Ms. Vijay Laxmi – +91 8178554094 ## **OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / BROCHURE** [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1\_SL2yCOWGrHol\_vCWrGrryUJHePRgXC\_/view?usp=sharing ](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_SL2yCOWGrHol_vCWrGrryUJHePRgXC_/view?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Events, Moot Courts --- ### [Call for Blogs | NLIU Labour & Employment Law Blog | Rolling Submission Academic Year 2025-26 | Submission on Rolling Basis](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-blogs-nliu-labour-employment-law-blog-rolling-submission-academic-year-2025-26-submission-on-rolling-basis/) **Published:** January 13, 2026 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Call for Blogs | NLIU Labour & Employment Law Blog | Rolling Submission Academic Year 2025-26 | Submission on Rolling Basis **Content:** ## ABOUT NLIU The National Law Institute University, Bhopal (NLIU), was established under Act No. 41 of 1997 by the Madhya Pradesh State Legislature. The University is recognised by the University Grants Commission and the Bar Council of India. Over the years, NLIU has consistently focused on designing and delivering academic programmes that enhance legal capacity and problem solving skills. The University aims to strengthen the abilities of students, faculty members, and legal professionals within the framework of law. ## ABOUT THE CENTRE FOR LABOUR LAWS (CLL) The Centre for Labour Laws (CLL) at NLIU, Bhopal, was established in 2019 during the uncertainty of the Covid-19 pandemic. The Centre symbolises resilience, empathy, and commitment towards labourers and workmen, who form the backbone of the nation. The Centre began with *Mazdoor Mitra*, a lockdown initiative supporting migrant workers. Since then, it has grown into a leading forum for research, policy dialogue, and academic engagement in labour and employment law. Labour law scholarship has expanded significantly in recent years due to changing employment relations and workplace structures. India has a wide range of labour laws and regulatory mechanisms governing employment conditions and industrial relations. These laws and institutions continue to evolve to ensure fair employment practices and address modern workplace challenges. The Centre for Labour Laws functions as a multidisciplinary platform for research, analysis, and discussion on labour and employment law issues in India and globally. ## ABOUT LELB The Centre for Labour Laws, National Law Institute University, Bhopal, invites academicians, legal practitioners, and students to contribute blogs on contemporary labour and employment law developments. The labour law landscape is changing rapidly due to economic reforms, technological growth, and new work arrangements. The blog aims to offer critical insights into employment relationships, wage regulation, social security frameworks, and compliance mechanisms. Recent developments relating to the gig economy, platform work, digital labour rights, and implementation of labour codes have reshaped employment law discourse. Issues such as industrial relations, collective bargaining, workplace discrimination, occupational safety, and employment disputes require deeper academic and professional engagement. Contributors are encouraged to analyse judicial precedents, legislative reforms, and policy challenges. All submissions shall undergo a rigorous peer review process. ## ELIGIBILITY Submissions are open to: - Academicians - Students - Legal Practitioners ## THEMES 1. Labour Laws and Wage Regulations in the Digital Economy 2. Social Security Provisions for Gig and Platform Workers 3. Employment Classification under the New Labour Codes 4. Industrial Relations and Collective Bargaining in Modern India 5. Employment Law in the Age of Artificial Intelligence 6. Cross Border Labour Migration and Worker Protection 7. Role of Trade Unions in Enhancing Worker Rights 8. Workplace Discrimination and Gender Equality 9. Technology and Traditional Employment Relationships 10. Occupational Safety and Health in Emerging Industries 11. Employment Disputes and Alternative Dispute Resolution 12. Corporate Social Responsibility and Labour Welfare 13. Minimum Wage Implementation and Living Wage Concepts 14. Contract Labour and Regularisation Issues 15. Employment Rights in the Post Pandemic Era 16. Labour Law Reforms and Ease of Doing Business 17. Women’s Workforce Participation and Legal Protection 18. Child Labour Laws and Enforcement Mechanisms 19. Migrant Workers’ Rights and Interstate Coordination 20. Employment Benefits and Social Security Portability ## DEADLINE AND SUBMISSION Submissions are accepted on a rolling basis. Interested contributors may submit their entries through the following link: ## SUBMISSION GUIDELINES 1. Submissions must be made in MS Word and PDF formats through the form. 2. Manuscripts must be original and unpublished work of the authors. 3. Word limit shall be between 1200 and 1500 words. 4. Formatting requirements are Times New Roman, size 12, spacing 1.5, justified alignment. 5. Headings and sub headings must be clearly structured. 6. Referencing must follow OSCOLA format with hyperlinks. 7. Plagiarism beyond permissible limits will lead to disqualification. High AI similarity is prohibited. 8. Copyright of the submission shall remain with LELB, CLL, NLIU. ## BROCHURE AND GUIDELINES Access the detailed brochure and guidelines here: [https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1yoA6XWEAUp9jwQEvAeTVusxt\_ouhNJ\_2](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1yoA6XWEAUp9jwQEvAeTVusxt_ouhNJ_2) ## SUBMISSION LINK ## CONTACT DETAILS For queries related to submissions, please write to: Subject line: *Labour and Employment Law Blog* You may also contact: - Shekhar Pathak, Content Head: +91 88276 05091 - Palak Sharda, Managerial Head: +91 70006 46603 **Categories:** Call for Blogs, Events --- ### [Call for Applications: The Capital Tank: 1st NLIU–CFMRS Investment Challenge, 2026 | Organized by National Law Institute University, Bhopal | Register by 20 February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-applications-the-capital-tank-1st-nliu-cfmrs-investment-challenge-2026-organized-by-national-law-institute-university-bhopal-register-by-20-february-2026/) **Published:** December 24, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** Call for Applications: The Capital Tank: 1st NLIU–CFMRS Investment Challenge, 2026 | Organized by National Law Institute University, Bhopal | Register by 20 February 2026 **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Publication-Post-1280-x-720-px-1024x576.jpg) The Centre for Financial Markets and Regulatory Systems (CFMRS) at the National Law Institute University, Bhopal is delighted to announce, *“The Capital Tank: 1st NLIU–CFMRS Investment Challenge, 2026”*, to be held on **4th and 5th April 2026** at the **NLIU Bhopal campus**. The competition warmly invites students, professionals, academicians, and practitioners from diverse backgrounds, including law, management, finance, and public policy, to participate in this unique investment simulation. Participants will step into the role of startup founders, develop investment and funding strategies, and pitch their ideas before a distinguished panel of experts from law, finance, investment, and academia. ## **ABOUT CFMRS** The Centre for Financial Markets and Regulatory Systems (CFMRS) is an academic centre at NLIU Bhopal dedicated to promoting informed engagement with issues relating to financial markets, financial governance, and regulatory systems. The Centre focuses on research, dialogue, and capacity-building at the intersection of law, finance, and public policy. ## **ABOUT THE COMPETITION** CFMRS, NLIU Bhopal is organising “The Capital Tank: 1st NLIU–CFMRS Investment Challenge, 2026”, to be held on 4th and 5th April 2026 at the NLIU Bhopal campus. The Capital Tank is an investment simulation inspired by Shark Tank India. It is designed to bridge the gap between theoretical understanding and practical application of concepts relating to investment analysis, valuation, startup funding, and regulatory compliance. The competition provides participants with structured exposure to investment decision-making from legal and financial perspectives. The event will be conducted over two days: - **Day 1**will consist of interactive learning sessions on investment, valuation, funding mechanisms, and relevant legal and regulatory considerations, conducted by professionals from finance and corporate law. - **Day 2**will feature an investment challenge where participants, acting as founders of fictional startups, will pitch before a panel of judges comprising investors, corporate lawyers, financial experts, and academicians. ## **IMPORTANT DATES** - Registration Opens: **15 December 2025** - Registration Closes: **20 February 2026** - Shortlisting of participants (CV-based selection): **22 February 206** - Sharing of case material with shortlisted candidates: **1 March 2026** - Submission of the Dossier: **25 March 2026** - Event Dates: **04–05 April 2026** - Mode & Venue: **Offline at National Law Institute University, Bhopal** ## **REGISTRATION PROCESS AND ELIGIBILTY** The competition is open to undergraduate, postgraduate, and doctoral students, as well as academicians, scholars, practitioners, researchers, consultants, and policymakers from across India. Participants may register individually or in teams of up to three members. **Registration is to be completed through the following link:** Shortlisting of participants will be carried out on the basis of CV evaluation. Further details regarding confirmation of participation, submission requirements, and payment of the registration fee will be communicated to shortlisted teams. The registration fee shall be payable only after shortlisting and will cover accommodation and other expenses related to participation in the event. Please find attached the event brochure for more details. ## **PROBLEM STRUCTURE** Participants will receive detailed study material and case files prior to the competition. The case files will be based on a fictional startup seeking capital for business expansion and market growth. Participants will be required to evaluate the position of the startup and devise appropriate investment and funding strategies to support its scale and long-term development. These strategies may include raising additional capital, securing investment along with strategic expertise, or exploring market-based options such as an Initial Public Offering (IPO) or Offer for Sale (OFS), among other viable funding mechanisms. For further details, please refer to the official event brochure. ## **PRIZE MONEY** - **Winner:** ₹15,000 - **First Runner-Up:** ₹7,000 - **Second Runner-Up:** ₹3,000 In addition to the above, **internship opportunities and subscription packages** will be announced shortly for deserving participants. ## **CONTACT US** For any queries or clarifications, please feel free to reach out to: **Sakshi Sharma** (Convenor, CFMRS) at +91 84619 26245 **Aditi Srivastava** (Co-Convenor, CFMRS) at +91 93112 91900 Alternatively, you may write to us at **cfmrs@nliu.ac.in** with the subject line: **“Query: The Capital Tank – 1st NLIU–CFMRS Investment Challenge, 2026”** ## **BROCHURE** **Link to the Brochure:** [https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/13JIvm6SJ\_5N3mEWS7h4o5u2zJNSWB5VB?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/13JIvm6SJ_5N3mEWS7h4o5u2zJNSWB5VB?usp=sharing) We look forward to enthusiastic participation and to hosting you at the NLIU Bhopal campus for an intellectually stimulating and memorable event. **Categories:** Events, Other Competitions **Tags:** CFMRS NLIU, Investment Challenge, nliu, Startup Funding, Startup Pitch Competition, The Capital Tank --- ### [Call for Applications: The Capital Tank: 1st NLIU–CFMRS Investment Challenge, 2026 | Organized by National Law Institute University, Bhopal | Register by 20 February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-applications-the-capital-tank-1st-nliu-cfmrs-investment-challenge-2026-organized-by-national-law-institute-university-bhopal-register-by-20-february-2026-2/) **Published:** January 10, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** Call for Applications: The Capital Tank: 1st NLIU–CFMRS Investment Challenge, 2026 | Organized by National Law Institute University, Bhopal | Register by 20 February 2026 **Content:** The Centre for Financial Markets and Regulatory Systems (CFMRS) at the National Law Institute University, Bhopal is delighted to announce, *“The Capital Tank: 1st NLIU–CFMRS Investment Challenge, 2026”*, to be held on **4th and 5th April 2026** at the **NLIU Bhopal campus**. The competition warmly invites students, professionals, academicians, and practitioners from diverse backgrounds, including law, management, finance, and public policy, to participate in this unique investment simulation. Participants will step into the role of startup founders, develop investment and funding strategies, and pitch their ideas before a distinguished panel of experts from law, finance, investment, and academia. ## **About CFMRS** The Centre for Financial Markets and Regulatory Systems (CFMRS) is an academic centre at NLIU Bhopal dedicated to promoting informed engagement with issues relating to financial markets, financial governance, and regulatory systems. The Centre focuses on research, dialogue, and capacity-building at the intersection of law, finance, and public policy. ## **About the Competition** CFMRS, NLIU Bhopal is organising “The Capital Tank: 1st NLIU–CFMRS Investment Challenge, 2026”, to be held on 4th and 5th April 2026 at the NLIU Bhopal campus. The Capital Tank is an investment simulation inspired by Shark Tank India. It is designed to bridge the gap between theoretical understanding and practical application of concepts relating to investment analysis, valuation, startup funding, and regulatory compliance. The competition provides participants with structured exposure to investment decision-making from legal and financial perspectives. The event will be conducted over two days: - **Day 1:** will consist of interactive learning sessions on investment, valuation, funding mechanisms, and relevant legal and regulatory considerations, conducted by professionals from finance and corporate law. - **Day 2:** will feature an investment challenge where participants, acting as founders of fictional startups, will pitch before a panel of judges comprising investors, corporate lawyers, financial experts, and academicians. ## **Important Dates** - Registration Opens: **15 December 2025** - Registration Closes: **20 February 2026** - Shortlisting of participants (CV-based selection): **22 February 206** - Sharing of case material with shortlisted candidates: **1 March 2026** - Submission of the Dossier: **25 March 2026** - Event Dates: **04–05 April 2026** - Mode & Venue: **Offline at National Law Institute University, Bhopal** ## **Registration Process and Eligibility** The competition is open to undergraduate, postgraduate, and doctoral students, as well as academicians, scholars, practitioners, researchers, consultants, and policymakers from across India. Participants may register individually or in teams of up to three members. Registration is to be completed through the following link: Shortlisting of participants will be carried out on the basis of CV evaluation. Further details regarding confirmation of participation, submission requirements, and payment of the registration fee will be communicated to shortlisted teams. The registration fee shall be payable only after shortlisting and will cover accommodation and other expenses related to participation in the event. Please find attached the event brochure for more details. ## **Problem Structure** Participants will receive detailed study material and case files prior to the competition. The case files will be based on a fictional startup seeking capital for business expansion and market growth. Participants will be required to evaluate the position of the startup and devise appropriate investment and funding strategies to support its scale and long-term development. These strategies may include raising additional capital, securing investment along with strategic expertise, or exploring market-based options such as an Initial Public Offering (IPO) or Offer for Sale (OFS), among other viable funding mechanisms. For further details, please refer to the official event brochure. ## **Prize Money** - **Winner:** ₹15,000 - **First Runner-Up:** ₹7,000 - **Second Runner-Up:** ₹3,000 In addition to the above, **internship opportunities and subscription packages** will be announced shortly for deserving participants. ## **Contact Us** For any queries or clarifications, please feel free to reach out to: - **Sakshi Sharma** (Convenor, CFMRS) at +91 84619 26245 - **Aditi Srivastava** (Co-Convenor, CFMRS) at +91 93112 91900 Alternatively, you may write to us at **cfmrs@nliu.ac.in** with the subject line: **“Query: The Capital Tank – 1st NLIU–CFMRS Investment Challenge, 2026”** ## **Brochure** **Link to the Brochure:** [https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/13JIvm6SJ\_5N3mEWS7h4o5u2zJNSWB5VB?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/13JIvm6SJ_5N3mEWS7h4o5u2zJNSWB5VB?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Events --- ### [5TH IILM MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2026 | Organized by IILM University, Gurugram | Register by 31st January 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/5th-iilm-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-iilm-university-gurugram-register-by-31st-january-2026/) **Published:** January 10, 2026 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** 5TH IILM MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2026 | Organized by IILM University, Gurugram | Register by 31st January 2026 **Content:** ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER / COLLEGE / UNIVERSITY** IILM University, Gurugram, established in 1993 under the aegis of the Ram Krishan & Sons Charitable Trust, has a legacy of over 30 years in higher education. Set up under the Haryana Private Universities (Amendment) Act, 2018, the University is known for its emphasis on academic excellence, inclusivity, interdisciplinary learning, and practical exposure. The IILM School of Law, established in 2018, offers undergraduate, postgraduate, and doctoral programmes in law and is recognised for its strong mooting culture, having successfully organised four previous editions of the IILM Moot Court Competition. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY** The 5th IILM Moot Court Competition, 2026 is a prestigious national-level annual moot court competition organised by the IILM School of Law, Gurugram. Scheduled to be held from **19th to 21st February 2026**, the competition is themed **“AI & IPR Laws: Evolving Principles for a Digital Age.”** The moot proposition revolves around contemporary legal issues such as accountability in AI-driven interactions, protection of children and vulnerable users online, personality and publicity rights in the digital domain, and cross-border enforcement of intellectual property rights. The competition aims to encourage participants to engage with constitutional responsibilities of the State while balancing innovation and fundamental rights. ## **WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** - Open exclusively to students enrolled in **three-year or five-year LL.B. programmes** during the current academic year at any recognised institution. - Each institution may send **up to two teams**. - Inter-institutional teams are not permitted. - Teams may consist of **three members** (two speakers and one researcher). - With prior approval, **two-member teams** (both speakers) may also participate. ## **MODE OF THE EVENT** Offline (Physical mode) ## **LOCATION & VENUE OF THE EVENT** IILM University, Sector 53, 1 Knowledge Centre, Gurugram, Haryana, India ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE** Registration involves: 1. Payment of the prescribed registration fee. 2. Completion of the official Google Registration Form. 3. Uploading proof of payment and a Letter of Authorisation from the institution. **Registration, rule book, proposition, memorial submission, and clarification links:** [https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1IYOBSgzipfT5Z\_hfFKM2njNT0osx7vKf?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1IYOBSgzipfT5Z_hfFKM2njNT0osx7vKf?usp=sharing) ## **FEE DETAILS** - **Without Accommodation:** ₹5,000 - **With Accommodation:** ₹7,500 (Early bird discounts up to 20% available) ## **PRIZES** - **Total Prize Pool:** ₹5,50,000+ - **Winners:** Cash Prize of ₹61,000 + Trophy + Medals + Certificate - **Runners-Up:** Cash Prize of ₹31,000 + Trophy + Medals + Certificate - **Best Speaker:** Cash Prize of ₹10,000 + Medal + Certificate - **Best Memorial:** Cash Prize of ₹10,000 + Certificate - **Best Researcher:** Cash Prize of ₹10,000 + Medal + Certificate Additional perks include internships, SCC Online subscriptions, LawFoyer course access, and publication opportunities. ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - **31 January 2026:** Last Date of Registration - **02 February 2026:** Last Date for Seeking Clarifications - **10 February 2026:** Last Date of Memorial Submission (Online) - **12 February 2026:** Last Date for Mailing Travel Itinerary - **19 February 2026:** Inauguration, Draw of Lots, Researcher’s Test & Offline Memorial Submission - **20 February 2026:** Preliminary Rounds & Quarter Finals - **21 February 2026:** Semi-Finals, Finals, Valedictory Ceremony & Prize Distribution ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** - **Aditya Thakur (Treasurer):** 9654331405 - **Email:** iilmmccgurugram@gmail.com - **Instagram:** ## **OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / BROCHURE / RULES & REGULATIONS** [https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1IYOBSgzipfT5Z\_hfFKM2njNT0osx7vKf?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1IYOBSgzipfT5Z_hfFKM2njNT0osx7vKf?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Events, Moot Courts --- ### [CALL FOR PAPERS – RGNUL FINANCIAL AND MERCANTILE LAW REVIEW (RFMLR), VOLUME XIII, ISSUE II | Organized by Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law (RGNUL), Punjab | Register by 15th February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-papers-rgnul-financial-and-mercantile-law-review-rfmlr-volume-xiii-issue-ii-organized-by-rajiv-gandhi-national-university-of-law-rgnul-punjab-register-by-15th-february-20/) **Published:** January 10, 2026 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** CALL FOR PAPERS – RGNUL FINANCIAL AND MERCANTILE LAW REVIEW (RFMLR), VOLUME XIII, ISSUE II | Organized by Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law (RGNUL), Punjab | Register by 15th February 2026 **Content:** ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER / COLLEGE / UNIVERSITY** Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab (RGNUL) is an autonomous National Law University established under the RGNUL Act No. 12 of 2006 by the Legislature of the State of Punjab. Founded in 2006 under the second wave of legal education reforms initiated by the Bar Council of India, RGNUL has earned a strong pan-India reputation for excellence in legal education and research. The University became the first National Law University to be accredited with an ‘A’ grade by NAAC in 2015 and has consistently been ranked among the top law schools in India under the National Institutional Ranking Framework (NIRF) by the Ministry of Education, Government of India. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY** The **RGNUL Financial and Mercantile Law Review (RFMLR)** invites original and unpublished manuscripts for **Volume XIII, Issue II**. RFMLR is a **bi-annual, student-run, double-blind peer-reviewed law journal** published by RGNUL, Punjab. The journal focuses on contemporary developments in **business, financial, and commercial laws** and provides a platform for legal practitioners, academicians, professionals, and students to contribute cutting-edge doctrinal and empirical research. RFMLR is indexed on **SCC Online, HeinOnline, J-Gate, and Manupatra**, and has consistently ranked among the **top 10 most accessed law school journals on SCC Online**. For this issue, submissions are invited on a wide range of themes including, but not limited to: - Corporate Law - Mergers & Acquisitions - Competition Law - Insolvency - Banking & Finance - Insurance - Capital Markets & Securities - Dispute Resolution - International Trade - Investment Funds - Labour & Employment Law - Taxation - Intellectual Property - Real Estate - Technology, Media & Telecommunication - White-Collar Crimes Submissions engaging with contemporary developments in financial and mercantile laws are especially encouraged. ## **WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** Submissions are invited from: - Legal practitioners - Legal professionals - Academicians - Law students ## **MODE OF THE OPPORTUNITY** Online (Manuscript Submission) ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE** - Manuscripts must be submitted **only through the prescribed Google Form**. - Each author may submit **only one manuscript** in `.doc` or `.docx` format. - Submissions must be accompanied by a **duly signed Certificate of Originality and Copyright**. - Co-authorship is permitted up to a **maximum of two authors**. - The submission must be original, unpublished, and free from plagiarism. The link for submission is provided in the official brochure. ## **CATEGORIES OF SUBMISSION & WORD LIMIT** - **Article:** 6,000 – 12,000 words - **Short Note:** 4,000 – 6,000 words - **Case Comment:** 3,000 – 5,000 words - **Book Review:** 1,500 – 3,000 words (Word limit is exclusive of footnotes.) ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - **15th February 2026:** Last date for submission of manuscripts ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** For queries, contact: - **Shashwat Sharma (Managing Editor):** +91 6280503836 - **Shivi Agarwal (Managing Editor):** +91 6375044176 - **Khushi Vasu (Senior Editor):** +91 9166727968 **Email:** submissions\_rfmlr@rgnul.ac.in ## **OFFICIAL LINK OF THE JOURNAL / BROCHURE** - Website: **[www.rfmlr.com](http://www.rfmlr.com)** - Detailed guidelines and submission link are available in the official brochure. [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1KkWCPKm filwufPS59FBFQyP2eVogMAF/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1KkWCPKm-filwufPS59FBFQyP2eVogMAF/view?usp=sharing) **Categories:** Call for Papers, Events --- ### [VERDICTUS 2.0 – Annual Law Fest | Organized by Navrachana University, School of Business and Law | Register by 12th January, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/verdictus-2-0-annual-law-fest-organized-by-navrachana-university-school-of-business-and-law-register-by-12th-january-2026/) **Published:** January 5, 2026 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** VERDICTUS 2.0 – Annual Law Fest | Organized by Navrachana University, School of Business and Law | Register by 12th January, 2026 **Content:** ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER / UNIVERSITY** Navrachana University, Vadodara, is a Private University established under the Gujarat Private University Act, 2009. The University houses five schools offering more than 22 academic programs and has been accredited with Grade ‘A’ by NAAC in 2023. The School of Business and Law, the largest among the five schools, offers programs including BBA-LLB, LLM, BBA, MBA, and MBA-Executive. The Law program, established in 2014, initiated the Annual Law Fest as a celebration of completing a decade of academic excellence. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY** Verdictus 2.0 marks the second edition of the Annual Law Fest of Navrachana University. After a highly successful inaugural year, the fest returns with renewed energy and intellectual rigor. It aims to provide a competitive and engaging platform for aspiring legal professionals to sharpen their advocacy, analytical, and practical legal skills. The fest includes the following competitions: - Moot Court Competition - Parliamentary Debate Competition - Client Counselling Competition - Contract Drafting Competition - Law Quiz The total prize pool is worth ₹2,00,000/-. ## **WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** - Students enrolled in 5-year integrated Law programs and 3-year LLB programs - Participants from all recognized universities and institutions are eligible - Teams may participate in any or all of the four competitions - Detailed rules are available in the official brochure ## **MODE OF THE EVENT** **Hybrid Mode** - Preliminary Rounds: Online - Semi-finals & Finals: Offline ## **LOCATION & VENUE OF THE EVENT** - **Country/State/City:** India, Gujarat, Vadodara - **Venue:** Navrachana University (for offline rounds) ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE** - **Registration Form:** - **Payment Link:** ## **FEE DETAILS** - Moot Court Competition: ₹2100/- - Parliamentary Debate Competition: ₹1500/- - Client Counselling Competition: ₹1200/- - Contract Drafting Competition: ₹500/- ## **PRIZES** **Moot Court Competition** - Winner: ₹31,000/- + Trophy + Certificate - Runner-up: ₹21,000/- + Trophy + Certificate - Best Speaker: ₹7,000/- + Trophy + Certificate - Best Memorial: ₹7,000/- + Trophy + Certificate **Parliamentary Debate Competition** - Winner: ₹25,000/- + Trophy + Certificate - Runner-up: ₹15,000/- + Trophy + Certificate - Best Speaker: ₹7,000/- + Trophy + Certificate **Client Counselling Competition** - Winner: ₹25,000/- + Trophy + Certificate - Runner-up: ₹15,000/- + Trophy + Certificate - Best Counsel: ₹7,000/- + Trophy + Certificate **Contract Drafting Competition** - Winner: ₹3,000/- + Certificate - Runner-up: ₹2,000/- + Certificate *An e-certificate of participation will be provided to all registered participants.* ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - Preliminary Rounds (and Quarter-finals for Moot Court): **16th & 17th January, 2026 (Online)** - Semi-finals & Finals: **26th – 28th February, 2026 (Offline)** - Last Date of Registration: **12th January, 2026** - Last Date for Memorial Submission: **13th January, 2026** - Last Date for Contract Draft Registration: **12th January, 2026** - Last Date for Contract Draft Submission: **2nd February, 2026** ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** - **Krish Patel (President):** 8849924751 - **Ezra Parmar (General Secretary):** 9313374487 - **Om Amin (SBC Member):** 7575021446 - **Email:** om.amin@nuv.ac.in ## **OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT** ## **SOCIAL MEDIA HANDLE** - Instagram: [https://www.instagram.com/law\_nuv?igsh=MjFwajJ5dHc4MzI3](https://www.instagram.com/law_nuv?igsh=MjFwajJ5dHc4MzI3) **Categories:** Events, Other Competitions --- ### [Two-Credit Certificate Course on Labour Codes | Organized by Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law (RGNUL), Punjab | Register by 16th January 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/two-credit-certificate-course-on-labour-codes-organized-by-rajiv-gandhi-national-university-of-law-rgnul-punjab-register-by-16th-january-2026/) **Published:** January 4, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** Two-Credit Certificate Course on Labour Codes | Organized by Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law (RGNUL), Punjab | Register by 16th January 2026 **Content:** ## **About the Organizers** **About Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab** The Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law (RGNUL), Punjab, was established by the State Legislature of Punjab by passing the Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab Act, 2006 (Punjab Act No. 12 of 2006). The Act incorporated a University of Law of national stature in Punjab, to fulfil the need for a Centre of Excellence in legal education in the modern era of globalization and liberalization. The University was accredited with an ‘A’ Grade by the National Assessment and Accreditation Council (NAAC) in 2015. **About the Centre for Advanced Studies in Labour Welfare** The Centre for Advanced Studies in Labour Welfare was established with a view to improve and strengthen the Labour Justice System in India. It strives to uphold and protect the rights of the labourers and their families thereby ensuring them a life of human dignity. The Centre also makes an effort to sensitize the labourers about their rights, which are enshrined in Constitution of India and other legislations as well. In addition to it, the Centre makes an effort to impart education to the children of labourers on the University campus and makes them aware of their fundamental right to education thereby, making their parents realize their duty towards their children. The Centre has initiated a research project on the migrant labourers. It also has a dedicated blog ‘Labour and Liberty’ catering to the field of labour and employment law. Apart from these, CASLW released its newsletter ‘Shram’, covering different bytes and updates related to employment and labour benefit practices. ## **About the Course** The recent notification and proposed implementation of the new Labour Codes, namely the *Industrial Relations Code, 2020*, the *Code on Social Security, 2020*, the *Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code, 2020*, and the *Code on Wages, 2019,* have introduced significant structural and compliance-related challenges, particularly for small and medium-scale enterprises, employers, human resource professionals, and other stakeholders. This Certificate Course is designed to facilitate a smooth and informed transition from the erstwhile fragmented labour legislations to the consolidated labour code regime in a cohesive and systematic manner. ## **Objectives of the course** 1. To develop an understanding of the new labour relations mechanism developed in the form of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020; 2. To formalise the training and empowerment module to understand consolidated layered social security as provided in the latest code; 3. To understand the horizontal working model for the understanding of code on wages and moderating variables of floor wages and implementation prototypes; and 4. To understand code on safety, health and working conditions for integrating employers and workmen/employees into the state’s industrial ecosystem for responsive industrial accoutrements. ## **Duration** 1. January to April 2026 2. Timings: 4:30-6:00 pm (Saturdays and Sundays) ## **Course Mentors** 1. Dr Onkar Sharma – Chief Labour Commissioner (retd.), Government of India 2. Mr Ranjan Verma – Chief Labour Commissioner (retd.), Government of India 3. Mr Ankur Dalal – Chief Labour Commissioner, Government of India 4. (Dr.) Ramya Patel – Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi 5. (Dr.) Anu Mehra – Professor, Delhi University ## **Start of the course** January 2026 ## **Course Fees** Fees for the Course: Rs 1000/- (including GST) ([Payment Link](https://lsacademia.in/lsa_rgnul/eventPortal/loginFrom.jsp)) ## **Enrolment Procedure** Registration Link: [Please click on this link to register](https://docs.google.com/forms/u/7/d/e/1FAIpQLSdOrCBFedU1SCneo0YZLbbA8ElQByNJElrNnJ-GQV81EfEY_A/viewform?usp=header) (**Deadline for registration:** 16th January 2026) ## **Contact Information** 1. 0175-2391600 2. caslw@rgnul.ac.in ## Official Link of the Brochure **Categories:** Courses & Workshops, Events --- ### [CALL FOR BLOGS | Centre for Law and Urban Development (CLUD), National Law University Delhi](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-blogs-centre-for-law-and-urban-development-clud-national-law-university-delhi/) **Published:** January 4, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** CALL FOR BLOGS | Centre for Law and Urban Development (CLUD), National Law University Delhi **Content:** ## **ABOUT THE UNIVERSITY** The Centre for Law and Urban Development (CLUD) is a specialised research centre at National Law University Delhi that focuses on issues at the intersection of law and urban development. The Centre encourages interdisciplinary research and policy-oriented scholarship addressing legal, regulatory, and institutional challenges shaping urbanisation in India. CLUD actively engages scholars, practitioners, policymakers, and students to foster informed dialogue on contemporary urban governance and development issues. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE OPPORTUNITY** The Centre for Law and Urban Development, NLU Delhi invites submissions for its Blog Series on a rolling basis. The call welcomes original, analytical, and critical blog submissions that examine recent developments at the intersection of law and urban development. Contributions should go beyond descriptive writing and offer insightful analysis, critical perspectives, and innovative solutions on contemporary urban issues. Indicative themes include (but are not limited to): - Real Estate and Housing Policy - Urban Taxation and City Finance - Healthcare and Pharma Regulation - Urban Project Financing and Insolvency Frameworks - Collaborative Models for Urban Infrastructure - Smart Cities and Digital Infrastructure - Green and Sustainable Cities - Construction and Materials Regulation - Power, Water, and Urban Utilities Submissions are not required to strictly fall within the listed themes, provided they align with the broader focus of law and urban development. ## **ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** The call for blogs is open to: - Scholars - Practitioners - Policymakers - Students Co-authorship of up to two authors is permitted. ## **MODE OF THE EVENT** Online (Blog Submission) ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE** - Submissions must be sent via email to: **clud@nludelhi.ac.in** - Subject line of the email should be: **“Submission for Centre for Law and Urban Development Blog Series”** - The submission must be in **.doc or .docx format** - File name should be: **“Title\_CLUD Blog”** - Metadata of the file must not disclose the author’s identity or institutional affiliation - An abstract of not more than **50 words** must be submitted separately - A brief author bio (around **100 words**) along with a **high-resolution photograph** and LinkedIn profile link (if available) must be included - Word limit for the blog is **800–1500 words** (relaxation may be requested via email) ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - The call for blogs is **ongoing** - Submissions are accepted on a **rolling basis** - Authors will be notified about the status of their submission **within two weeks** from the date of submission ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** - **Email:**[ clud@nludelhi.ac.in](mailto:clud@nludelhi.ac.in) ## **OFFICIAL LINK OF THE OFFICIAL BROCHURE AND THE WEBSITE** - **Website:** - **Official Brochure:** **Categories:** Call for Blogs, Events --- ### [Global Trade Careers, The WTO’s 30-Year Legacy, and Future Pathways | Organized by Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Register by 28 January 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/global-trade-careers-the-wtos-30-year-legacy-and-future-pathways-organized-by-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur-register-by-28-january-2026/) **Published:** January 4, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** Global Trade Careers, The WTO’s 30-Year Legacy, and Future Pathways | Organized by Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Register by 28 January 2026 **Content:** ## **ABOUT THE ORGANISER / UNIVERSITY** Hidayatullah National Law University is a premier institution for legal education and research, currently in its 21st year of establishment. Guided by its motto *“Dharma sansthapanartham”* *for the sake of establishing the primacy of laws of eternal values* HNLU focuses on advanced legal education combined with a strong sense of social responsibility. The Colloquium is organised under the aegis of the **Centre for WTO & WIPO Studies**, School of Law and Technology, which promotes research and policy engagement in international trade law, intellectual property, and global economic governance . ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT / OPPORTUNITY** To commemorate the 30th anniversary of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), HNLU is organising a **One-Day Pre-Summit International Colloquium** on **6 February 2026**. This Colloquium is designed as a precursor to the three-day in-person **WTO@30 Summit** scheduled for **2–4 October 2026** and aims to build momentum for meaningful engagement on global trade law, policy, and careers. ### **Key Components of the Colloquium** - **Meet the Young Trade Leader**: An exclusive in-person interaction with *Ms. Aarushi Shrivastav*, Young Trade Leader (India) at the WTO and International Trade & Industrial Policy Analyst at Global Counsel. - **Panel Discussion**: *Global Trade Careers, The WTO’s Institutional Evolution, and Beyond*—exploring the WTO’s 30-year journey, institutional transformation, and emerging career pathways in international trade law and policy. - **Official Release**: Launch of the **WTO@30 Summit Brochure** and dedicated webpage for the main Summit (October 2026). The Colloquium also aims to initiate the **International Network for Trade Advocacy, Development & Research (IN-TADR)**, a platform dedicated to advocacy, capacity building, and high-quality research in international trade law . ## **WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** - Students - Research Scholars - Academics - Trade Practitioners - Young professionals interested in international trade law and policy ## **MODE OF THE EVENT** Offline (In-Person) ## **LOCATION & VENUE** - **Country**: India - **City**: Raipur, Chhattisgarh - **Venue**: Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE** - **Registration Link**: - Participants must complete the registration form and pay the applicable fee before the deadline. - Accommodation (if required) can be opted for during registration and is subject to availability on a first-come, first-served basis . ## **FEE DETAILS** ### **Indian Participants** - Academicians / Professionals: **INR 1000** - Research Scholars / Students: **INR 800** ### **Foreign Participants** - Academicians / Professionals: **USD 20** - Research Scholars / Students: **USD 10** **Note**: The registration fee includes the registration kit, lunch, and high tea on 6 February 2026. The fee is **non-refundable** under any circumstances . ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - **Registration & Fee Payment Deadline**: 28 January 2026 - **Date of the Colloquium**: 6 February 2026 ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** - **Dr. Ankit Awasthi** Secretary & Head, Centre for WTO & WIPO Studies School of Law & Technology, HNLU Raipur - **Email**: cws@hnlu.ac.in - **Phone**: +91-7355235075 ## **OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / BROCHURE** - **Official Registration Link**: - **Official Link of the Brochure:** [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1u4aavFykX\_uSGVdDV\_1ZEZSHGf5k00pd/view?usp=sharing](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1u4aavFykX_uSGVdDV_1ZEZSHGf5k00pd/view?usp=sharing) - Further details regarding the WTO@30 Summit will be officially released during the Colloquium on 6 February 2026 **Categories:** Events, Other Competitions --- ### [Call for Chapters | Organized by Department of Law, Maharaja Agrasen Institute of Management Studies (MAIMS) | Submit Abstract by 5th January 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-chapters-organized-by-department-of-law-maharaja-agrasen-institute-of-management-studies-maims-submit-abstract-by-5th-january-2026/) **Published:** January 4, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** Call for Chapters | Organized by Department of Law, Maharaja Agrasen Institute of Management Studies (MAIMS) | Submit Abstract by 5th January 2026 **Content:** ## **About the Organizer** The Department of Law, Maharaja Agrasen Institute of Management Studies (MAIMS), is an academic institution accredited with NAAC A++. The department is committed to fostering legal scholarship, interdisciplinary research, and critical engagement with contemporary socio-legal issues through academic publications, conferences, and research initiatives. ## **Details About the Event / Opportunity** The Department of Law, MAIMS invites original and unpublished chapters for an edited book titled: “Women Empowerment in the Era of Viksit Bharat @2047: A Blend of Legal and Entrepreneurial Perspectives.” This call for chapters aims to curate rigorous academic contributions that explore women empowerment as a foundational pillar of India’s Viksit Bharat @2047 vision. The book will examine the evolving role of law, judiciary, public policy, entrepreneurship, technology, and governance in advancing the social, economic, and political empowerment of women in a rapidly transforming digital and institutional landscape. ## **About the Book** The edited volume seeks to bring together interdisciplinary perspectives addressing women’s empowerment in India, with a focus on legal frameworks, entrepreneurial ecosystems, governance structures, and future-oriented policy pathways. The book intends to serve as a scholarly resource for academicians, policymakers, legal professionals, and researchers. ## **Who Is It For / Eligibility to Participate** - Academicians - Researchers - Legal professionals - Policy experts - Research scholars and students ## **Suggestive Themes (Indicative)** **Part I: Conceptual & Constitutional Foundations** - Women-Led Development in Viksit Bharat @2047 - Evolution of Women Empowerment Policies in India - 106th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2023 and Nari Shakti Vandan Adhiniyam - Role of Judiciary and Feminist Jurisprudence **Part II: Labour Laws & Workplace Safety** - Labour Codes, 2020 and Women’s Safety - Sexual Harassment at Workplace - Maternity Benefits, Care Economy, and Work-Life Balance - Gender-Sensitive HR Policies **Part III: Property, Family and Personal Laws** - Property and Inheritance Rights of Women - Marriage, Divorce, Maintenance, and ADR - Gender Justice and Uniform Civil Code **Part IV: Criminal Law, Cyber Crimes & Human Rights** - Gender Sensitisation under New Criminal Laws, 2023 - Domestic Violence, Dowry Death, and Trafficking - Cyber Crimes Against Women **Part V: Entrepreneurship & Corporate Governance** - Women in Corporate Governance - Intellectual Property Rights and Women Innovators - Financing Women Entrepreneurs - Legal and Regulatory Challenges Faced by Women-Led Enterprises - Women-Led Start-ups and MSMEs **Part VI: Governance, Social Transformation & Future Pathways** - Women in Governance and Politics - AI, Technology, and Gender Justice - Gender-Responsive Budgeting - Women, Sustainability, and Innovation *(Themes are indicative; allied interdisciplinary perspectives are welcome.)* ## **Submission Guidelines** - **Abstract Length:** 200–250 words - **Keywords:** 4–5 - **Full Chapter Word Limit:** 4,000–5,000 words (including references) - **Font & Formatting:** Times New Roman, Size 12, 1.5 line spacing - **Referencing Style:** APA (7th Edition) - **Plagiarism Limit:** Not exceeding 10% - **AI-Generated Submissions:** Strictly prohibited - **Submission Fee:** None ## **Deadlines / Important Dates** - **Abstract Submission Deadline:** 5 January 2026 - **Intimation of Abstract Selection:** 8 January 2026 - **Full Chapter Submission Deadline:** 20 January 2026 ## **Registration / Submission Procedure** - Abstracts and full chapters must be submitted via email to: **callforpapers@maims.ac.in** ## **Fee Details** - **No submission or publication fee** ## **Editorial Board** - Prof. (Dr.) Rajni Malhotra Dhingra – Director, MAIMS - Prof. (Dr.) Praveen Kr. Gupta – Head, Department of Law, MAIMS - Dr. Nisha Dhanraj Dewani – Associate Professor, Department of Law, MAIMS - Dr. Preeti Goel – Assistant Professor, Department of Law, MAIMS ## **Contact Information** **For Queries (Student Coordinators):** - **Vani Sharma:** +91 73038 17185 - **Joy Puri:** +91 97112 01919 **Official Email:** sv.vanisharma@gmail.com **Categories:** Call for Papers, Events --- ### [Anil Bhardwaj v. The Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., [2020] 9 SCR 442](https://lawfoyer.in/anil-bhardwaj-v-the-honble-high-court-of-madhya-pradesh-ors-2020-9-scr-442/) **Published:** January 5, 2026 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the limits of judicial review over decisions taken by High Court Selection Committees concerning suitability for appointment to judicial service. The appellant, selected for the post of District Judge (Entry Level), had disclosed the pendency of a criminal case under Sections 498A, 406 and 34 IPC arising from a matrimonial dispute. Despite provisional selection, his candidature was cancelled following adverse character verification. The appellant was subsequently acquitted and sought reconsideration of his candidature on that basis. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the limits of judicial review over decisions taken by High Court Selection Committees concerning suitability for appointment to judicial service. The appellant, selected for the post of *District Judge (Entry Level)*, had disclosed the pendency of a criminal case under *Sections 498A, 406 and 34 IPC* arising from a matrimonial dispute. Despite provisional selection, his candidature was cancelled following adverse character verification. The appellant was subsequently acquitted and sought reconsideration of his candidature on that basis. The Supreme Court clarified that *mere inclusion in a select list does not confer an indefeasible right to appointment*. The Court emphasised the elevated standards of integrity, character, and public confidence expected from members of the judicial service. It upheld the authority of the Selection Committee to assess suitability based on circumstances prevailing *at the time of consideration*. Subsequent acquittal was held insufficient to reopen concluded selection decisions. The Court distinguished precedents where acquittal pre-dated selection and relied heavily on settled principles from *Mehar Singh*, *Avtar Singh*, and *Pradeep Kumar* concerning employer discretion and antecedent verification. The judgment also interpreted *Clause 6(viii)* of the Madhya Pradesh Government guidelines on character verification, holding it applicable only where acquittal exists at the time of verification. The decision reinforces institutional autonomy of High Courts in judicial appointments and affirms that standards for judicial office are necessarily stricter than ordinary public employment. **Keywords:** Judicial service, character verification, suitability, pending criminal case, subsequent acquittal ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Anil Bhardwaj v. The Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.*Case Number*Civil Appeal No. 3419 of 2020*Judgement Date*13 October 2020*Court*Supreme Court of India*Quorum*Ashok Bhushan, J. and M.R. Shah, J.*Author*Justice Ashok Bhushan*Citation*\[2020\] 9 SCR 442*Legal Provisions Involved*Articles 226 & 136 of the Constitution of India; Sections 498A, 406, 34 IPC*Judgments Overruled*None*Related Law Subjects*Service Law, Judicial Service, Constitutional Law* ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The judgment arises from a challenge to the rejection of candidature for *Higher Judicial Service* following character verification. The recruitment was initiated pursuant to an advertisement issued by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh for *District Judge (Entry Level)* posts under direct recruitment from the Bar. The appellant successfully cleared written examination and interview stages and was provisionally selected. The recruitment process was governed by the *Madhya Pradesh Uchchatar Nyayik Seva (Bharti Tatha Seva Sharten) Niyam, 1994*, framed in compliance with timelines mandated by the Supreme Court in *Malik Mazhar Sultan (3)*. Character verification constituted an integral stage of the selection. During verification, it emerged that a criminal case under *Sections 498A and 406 IPC* was pending against the appellant on a complaint filed by his wife. The Selection Committee, considering the pendency of the case, declared him unsuitable. This decision was ratified by the State Government through formal deletion of his name from the select list. The appellant initially challenged the decision through a writ petition. Subsequently, after his acquittal by the trial court, he withdrew the earlier petition and filed a fresh one incorporating subsequent events. The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that subsequent acquittal did not invalidate the earlier decision. The appeal before the Supreme Court thus centred on the scope of judicial review over suitability assessments and the legal effect of acquittal after rejection of candidature. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The High Court of Madhya Pradesh issued an advertisement dated *09.03.2017* inviting applications for appointment to the post of *District Judge (Entry Level)*. The appellant applied and disclosed the pendency of *FIR No. 852/2014* under *Sections 498A, 406, 34 IPC* in his application. After clearing the written examination and interview, the appellant was placed at *Serial No. 13* in the unreserved category of the select list. A communication dated *06.04.2018* informed him of provisional selection, subject to medical examination and character verification. During verification, police reports confirmed pendency of the criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute. The matter was placed before a joint meeting of the *Administrative Committee (Higher Judicial Service)* and the *Examination-cum-Selection and Appointment Committee* on *18.07.2018*. The Committee resolved that due to the pending case, the appellant was not suitable for appointment. Consequently, the State Government issued an order dated *14.09.2018* declaring him ineligible and deleting his name from the select list. A Gazette notification followed. The appellant filed a writ petition challenging the decision. During pendency, he was acquitted by judgment dated *18.09.2019*. He sought amendment of pleadings but eventually withdrew the petition with liberty to file afresh. The subsequent writ petition incorporating the acquittal was dismissed by the High Court on *06.01.2020*. The present appeal challenged the High Court’s refusal to direct reconsideration despite acquittal. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether a candidate acquitted after rejection of candidature is entitled to reconsideration for judicial appointment? ii. Whether pendency of a criminal case at the time of character verification justifies declaring a candidate unsuitable? iii. Whether *Clause 6(viii)* of the character verification guidelines applies to acquittals occurring after selection decisions? iv. Whether the Selection Committee’s decision suffered from arbitrariness warranting judicial interference? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that full disclosure of the pending FIR negated any allegation of suppression. It was argued that the appellant was selected purely on merit and that pendency alone could not justify rejection. It was contended that subsequent acquittal erased the basis of unsuitability and required reconsideration. Reliance was placed on *Mohammed Imran v. State of Maharashtra* to argue that judicial service appointments cannot be denied where acquittal exists and no adverse material remains. The appellant further relied upon *Clause 6(viii)* of the *05.06.2003 Government Guidelines*, asserting that acquittal on merits restores eligibility for government service. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents argued that suitability must be assessed based on facts existing at the time of selection. Pendency of a serious criminal case involving moral allegations justified rejection. It was submitted that judicial service requires *impeccable integrity*, and the Committee acted within its jurisdiction. Subsequent acquittal could not retrospectively invalidate a lawful decision. Reliance was placed on *Mehar Singh*, *Avtar Singh*, and *Pradeep Kumar* to submit that acquittal does not confer automatic entitlement to appointment. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Article 226 of the Constitution of India* ii. *Article 136 of the Constitution of India* iii. *Sections 498A, 406, 34 of the Indian Penal Code* iv. *Madhya Pradesh Uchchatar Nyayik Seva Niyam, 1994* v. *Government of Madhya Pradesh Guidelines dated 05.06.2003* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision, holding that the Selection Committee considered relevant material and acted within its authority. The Court reiterated that *selection does not create an indefeasible right to appointment*. The pendency of a criminal case under *Sections 498A and 406 IPC* was held to be a valid consideration, particularly given the standards expected of judicial officers. The Court emphasised that judicial service demands a higher threshold of moral credibility than other public employment. The Court rejected the contention that subsequent acquittal necessitated reconsideration, observing that selection processes cannot be reopened after conclusion. The clock cannot be turned backward merely because circumstances change later. On interpretation of *Clause 6(viii)*, the Court held that it applies only when acquittal exists at the time of character verification. Since the appellant was acquitted more than a year later, the clause was inapplicable. The Court distinguished *Joginder Singh* and *Mohammed Imran* on factual grounds, noting that in those cases acquittal preceded selection or consideration. No arbitrariness or mala fide was found in the Committee’s decision. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio is that *subsequent acquittal does not invalidate a lawful decision declaring a candidate unsuitable based on circumstances existing at the time of selection*. Suitability for judicial service must be assessed contemporaneously. Employer discretion in assessing character is paramount and immune from interference unless shown to be arbitrary or mala fide. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that judicial officers must inspire public confidence and even the appearance of compromised integrity is sufficient to deny appointment. It further remarked that stigma arising from criminal proceedings stands washed away upon acquittal. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Selection Committees are entitled to assess suitability based on pending criminal cases. ii. Subsequent acquittal does not mandate reopening concluded selections. iii. Character verification guidelines apply prospectively at the time of verification. iv. Judicial review is limited to testing arbitrariness or mala fide. ## J) REFERENCES **a. Important Cases Referred** i. *Commissioner of Police v. Mehar Singh*, *\[2013\] 13 SCR 432* ii. *Avtar Singh v. Union of India*, *\[2016\] 7 SCR 445* iii. *Union Territory v. Pradeep Kumar*, *\[2018\] 1 SCR 112* iv. *Joginder Singh v. U.T. Chandigarh*, *\[2014\] 11 SCR 155* v. *Mohammed Imran v. State of Maharashtra*, *AIR 2018 SC 4895* vi. *Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) v. UPSC*, *(2008) 17 SCC 703* **b. Important Statutes Referred** i. *Constitution of India* ii. *Indian Penal Code, 1860* iii. *Madhya Pradesh Uchchatar Nyayik Seva Niyam, 1994* iv. *Government of Madhya Pradesh Character Verification Guidelines, 2003* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Hospitality Association of Mudumalai v. In Defence of Environment and Animals & Ors., [2020] 10 S.C.R. 273](https://lawfoyer.in/hospitality-association-of-mudumalai-v-in-defence-of-environment-and-animals-ors-2020-10-s-c-r-273/) **Published:** January 5, 2026 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The judgment addresses the legality and constitutional validity of the notification issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu declaring an elephant corridor in the Sigur Plateau of the Nilgiris District and directing resort owners and private landholders to vacate lands falling within the notified corridor. The dispute arose from resistance by resort owners and landholders who challenged the scientific basis, statutory competence, and procedural fairness of the notification. The Supreme Court examined the ecological significance of elephant corridors, the doctrine of sustainable development, and the applicability of the precautionary principle in environmental governance. The Court emphasized that elephants constitute a keystone species whose migratory movement is essential to maintaining ecological balance, biodiversity, and genetic diversity. The judgment reconciles property rights with environmental obligations by affirming the State’s authority under Entries 17A and 17B of the Concurrent List, read with the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, and constitutional mandates under Articles 21, 48A, and 51A(g). While upholding the validity of the corridor notification and restrictions on commercial activity, the Court acknowledged grievances relating to factual discrepancies in acreage and implementation. Consequently, it constituted an independent Inquiry Committee to examine allegations of arbitrariness by district authorities. The decision reinforces the primacy of ecological preservation over commercial exploitation and strengthens environmental jurisprudence by operationalizing constitutional duties through executive action. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment addresses the legality and constitutional validity of the notification issued by the *Government of Tamil Nadu* declaring an *elephant corridor in the Sigur Plateau of the Nilgiris District* and directing resort owners and private landholders to vacate lands falling within the notified corridor. The dispute arose from resistance by resort owners and landholders who challenged the scientific basis, statutory competence, and procedural fairness of the notification. The Supreme Court examined the ecological significance of elephant corridors, the doctrine of sustainable development, and the applicability of the *precautionary principle* in environmental governance. The Court emphasized that elephants constitute a *keystone species* whose migratory movement is essential to maintaining ecological balance, biodiversity, and genetic diversity. The judgment reconciles property rights with environmental obligations by affirming the State’s authority under *Entries 17A and 17B of the Concurrent List*, read with the *Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972*, and constitutional mandates under *Articles 21, 48A, and 51A(g)*. While upholding the validity of the corridor notification and restrictions on commercial activity, the Court acknowledged grievances relating to factual discrepancies in acreage and implementation. Consequently, it constituted an independent *Inquiry Committee* to examine allegations of arbitrariness by district authorities. The decision reinforces the primacy of ecological preservation over commercial exploitation and strengthens environmental jurisprudence by operationalizing constitutional duties through executive action. **Keywords:** Elephant Corridor, Precautionary Principle, Wildlife Protection, Environmental Governance, Private Forests, Sustainable Development ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*Hospitality Association of Mudumalai v. In Defence of Environment and Animals & Ors.*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal Nos. 3438–3439 of 2020 (along with connected appeals)iii) Judgement Date14 October 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) Quorum*S.A. Bobde, CJI; S. Abdul Nazeer, J.; Sanjiv Khanna, J.*vi) Author*Justice S. Abdul Nazeer*vii) Citation*\[2020\] 10 S.C.R. 273*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972; Articles 21, 47, 48A, 51A(g) of the Constitution of India; Entries 17A & 17B, Concurrent List; Tamil Nadu Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsEnvironmental Law, Constitutional Law, Forest & Wildlife Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The judgment emerges from an escalating conflict between environmental protection imperatives and commercial land use in ecologically sensitive forest landscapes. The Sigur Plateau forms a crucial ecological bridge connecting the *Western and Eastern Ghats*, facilitating seasonal migration of elephants across the *Nilgiri Biosphere Reserve*. Rapid growth in tourism infrastructure, particularly private resorts and guesthouses, resulted in habitat fragmentation and obstruction of traditional migratory routes. The ecological crisis was aggravated by electric fencing, barbed wire, and unauthorized constructions, leading to increased *human–elephant conflict*. The Government of India had earlier recognized these risks through *Project Elephant (1993)*, acknowledging habitat fragmentation as the primary threat to elephant survival. Acting on recommendations from the *Wildlife Trust of India* and communications from the *Ministry of Environment and Forests*, the State of Tamil Nadu initiated steps to notify elephant corridors. The Madras High Court, responding to a public interest litigation, directed identification and protection of corridors after expert assessment and public consultation. The impugned Government Order dated *31.08.2010* notified a consolidated elephant corridor and imposed restrictions on land use. Resort owners challenged the notification, alleging lack of statutory authority, scientific inconsistency, violation of property rights, and procedural arbitrariness. The Supreme Court was thus required to balance constitutional environmental duties against private commercial interests within the framework of sustainable development. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellants consisted primarily of resort owners and private landholders operating in and around the *Mudumalai forest region*. Many had obtained permissions only for residential constructions but were running commercial hospitality establishments. Several others were alleged encroachers on government or forest land. Following concerns raised by environmental organizations regarding obstruction of elephant movement, the *Principal Chief Conservator of Forests* recommended acquisition or regulation of private forest lands forming migratory corridors. The *Madras High Court*, faced with conflicting corridor maps, appointed an *Expert Committee* to scientifically identify elephant corridors in the Sigur Plateau. The Committee conducted site visits, consulted forest officials, tribal communities, and scientific literature, and submitted a report identifying a single integrated corridor. Acting upon this report, the State Government issued the impugned notification. Public objections were invited and considered before finalization. The High Court upheld the notification, directing resort owners to vacate corridor land and restraining further construction. During pendency of appeals, the Supreme Court intervened upon learning of ongoing construction and directed sealing of illegal resorts, removal of electric fences, and submission of action-taken reports. While most establishments were found unauthorized, the appellants continued to allege discrepancies in corridor demarcation and excess administrative action. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the State Government possesses statutory and constitutional authority to notify an elephant corridor on private forest land? ii. Whether the impugned notification violates property rights of landowners without due process of law? iii. Whether the identification of the elephant corridor lacked scientific basis and procedural fairness? iv. Whether restrictions on commercial activity within the corridor violate principles of proportionality and reasonableness? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that the notified corridor did not correspond with historically recognized elephant migratory routes. It was contended that corridor identification is a scientific exercise requiring statutory backing, which was allegedly absent. The appellants argued that the State had no explicit power under the *Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972* to declare corridors distinct from sanctuaries or national parks. They further submitted that there were material discrepancies between the Expert Committee’s recommendations, public notices, and the final notification, rendering the action arbitrary. It was also argued that eco-friendly resorts promote conservation awareness and do not disrupt wildlife movement. The sealing of resorts and removal of fencing were alleged to exceed judicial directions. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents submitted that elephants are a *keystone species* whose survival depends on uninterrupted corridors. It was argued that unchecked commercial activity had directly caused habitat fragmentation and human–animal conflict. The respondents relied on *Entries 17A and 17B of the Concurrent List*, constitutional environmental duties, and judicial precedents recognizing the *precautionary principle*. They justified restrictions on land use as necessary for ecological protection and public interest. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972* ii. *Tamil Nadu Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949* iii. *Articles 21, 47, 48A, 51A(g), Constitution of India* iv. *Entries 17A & 17B, Concurrent List* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the elephant corridor notification. It recognized elephants as *keystone species* essential to ecosystem integrity, seed dispersal, and biodiversity. The Court accepted that corridors are indispensable to prevent genetic isolation and extinction. The Court affirmed that the State Government possesses authority to protect wildlife habitats under constitutional entries and forest legislation. It relied on *State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan* to emphasize ecological preservation as a compelling state interest. Invoking *M.C. Mehta v. Union of India*, the Court reiterated that the *precautionary principle* mandates anticipatory action to prevent environmental harm. It held that restricting commercial activity within corridors was proportionate and necessary. However, acknowledging allegations of factual discrepancies and administrative overreach, the Court constituted an *independent Inquiry Committee* to examine grievances relating to acreage variation, sealing of resorts, and removal of fencing. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The State is constitutionally and statutorily empowered to notify and protect wildlife corridors on private forest land in furtherance of environmental protection, even if such action restricts commercial land use. **b) OBITER DICTA** Environmental protection is not antithetical to development; however, development that irreversibly damages ecological balance cannot claim constitutional protection. **c) GUIDELINES** i. State authorities must ensure scientific assessment before corridor notification. ii. Commercial activities within corridors must be strictly regulated. iii. Procedural fairness must be ensured through public consultation. iv. Independent oversight is necessary where factual disputes arise. ## J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment consolidates India’s environmental jurisprudence by prioritizing ecological integrity over commercial convenience. It operationalizes constitutional duties through enforceable executive action while safeguarding procedural fairness through independent inquiry. The decision reflects a mature balancing of environmental necessity with individual rights, reinforcing sustainable development as a constitutional mandate. ## K) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan*, *\[1988\] 3 Supp SCR 455* ii. *T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India*, *\[1996\] 9 Supp SCR 982* iii. *M.C. Mehta v. Union of India*, *\[1996\] 7 Supp SCR 465* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972* ii. *Tamil Nadu Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949* iii. *Constitution of India* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Ganesan v. State represented by its Inspector of Police, [2020] 8 S.C.R. 768](https://lawfoyer.in/ganesan-v-state-represented-by-its-inspector-of-police-2020-8-s-c-r-768/) **Published:** January 5, 2026 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The judgment in Ganesan v. State represented by its Inspector of Police examines the evidentiary value of the sole testimony of a child victim under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The Supreme Court was called upon to consider whether conviction under Section 7 read with Section 8 of the POCSO Act could be sustained solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim, particularly when one of the material witnesses, namely the mother of the victim, had turned hostile. The appellant further questioned the fairness of appellate proceedings before the High Court on the ground that the legal aid counsel was appointed only a few days prior to disposal of the appeal, allegedly rendering the hearing illusory. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment in *Ganesan v. State represented by its Inspector of Police* examines the evidentiary value of the sole testimony of a child victim under the *Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012*. The Supreme Court was called upon to consider whether conviction under *Section 7 read with Section 8 of the POCSO Act* could be sustained solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim, particularly when one of the material witnesses, namely the mother of the victim, had turned hostile. The appellant further questioned the fairness of appellate proceedings before the High Court on the ground that the legal aid counsel was appointed only a few days prior to disposal of the appeal, allegedly rendering the hearing illusory. The Court reaffirmed the settled position that the testimony of a victim of sexual offences stands on a higher pedestal and does not require corroboration if it is found to be trustworthy and of sterling quality. The judgment also clarifies the scope of meaningful legal aid and holds that mere shortness of time does not ipso facto establish denial of fair hearing. The Court further endorsed the High Court’s approach in modifying the compensation order by directing the State to pay compensation in the first instance, with liberty to recover the same from the accused if he possesses sufficient means. The decision strengthens victim-centric jurisprudence under the POCSO framework and reiterates that procedural objections cannot override substantive justice when evidence inspires confidence. **Keywords:** POCSO Act, sole testimony, sterling witness, child victim, legal aid ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsi) Judgment Cause Title*Ganesan v. State represented by its Inspector of Police*ii) Case NumberCriminal Appeal No. 680 of 2020iii) Judgment Date14 October 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) Quorum*Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy and M. R. Shah, JJ.*vi) Author*M. R. Shah, J.*vii) Citation*\[2020\] 8 S.C.R. 768*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 7 and 8 of the POCSO Act, 2012; Rule 7(2) of the POCSO Rules, 2012*ix) Judgments OverruledNilx) Related Law SubjectsCriminal Law; Child Protection Law ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The POCSO Act was enacted to address the growing concern of sexual offences against children and to provide a robust legal framework ensuring child-friendly procedures and stringent punishment. The present case arose from a conviction under this special legislation, where the accused was found guilty of sexual assault on a minor girl aged thirteen years. The trial court relied primarily on the testimony of the victim, treating it as credible and sufficient for conviction. The defence strategy throughout the appellate process sought to undermine this reliance by highlighting the hostility of the victim’s mother and alleged procedural infirmities before the High Court. The High Court, while affirming the conviction and sentence, modified the compensation aspect by shifting the immediate liability to the State, thereby balancing victim welfare with the accused’s claimed inability to pay. Dissatisfied, the accused approached the Supreme Court, invoking principles of fair trial and due process, and contending that the appellate hearing was rendered ineffective due to the late appointment of legal aid counsel. The background of this judgment is also shaped by evolving jurisprudence on the evidentiary value of victim testimony in sexual offences. Indian courts have consistently moved away from the archaic insistence on corroboration, recognising the unique trauma associated with such crimes. This case thus provided the Supreme Court an opportunity to reaffirm doctrinal clarity on “sterling witness” theory while situating the discussion within the child-centric objectives of the POCSO Act. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The appellant was tried before the Fast Track Mahila Court, Dharmapuri, for committing sexual assault on a minor girl studying in the fifth standard. The prosecution alleged that the victim was subjected to inappropriate sexual touching by the accused, an act falling squarely within the definition of sexual assault under *Section 7 of the POCSO Act*. At the time of the incident, the victim was about thirteen years old. During trial, the prosecution examined the father of the victim as PW1, the mother as PW2, and the victim herself as PW3. While PW1 supported the prosecution version, PW2 turned hostile and did not fully corroborate the allegations. The defence attempted to capitalise on this hostility and also pointed to alleged previous enmity between the parties. The victim, however, gave a consistent and detailed account of the incident. She withstood extensive cross-examination and remained firm on material particulars. The trial court found her testimony natural, cogent, and free from embellishment. Relying on her evidence, the court convicted the accused under *Section 7* and sentenced him to the minimum punishment of three years’ rigorous imprisonment under *Section 8 of the POCSO Act*. Additionally, compensation of one lakh rupees was awarded to the victim under *Rule 7(2) of the POCSO Rules*. On appeal, the High Court noted the absence of representation for the accused and appointed a legal aid counsel. The appeal was disposed of within a short span, during which the legal aid counsel confined submissions primarily to the issue of compensation. The High Court modified the compensation direction but affirmed the conviction and sentence. This led to the present appeal before the Supreme Court. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether conviction under the *POCSO Act* can be sustained solely on the testimony of the child victim? ii. Whether hostility of a material witness vitiates the prosecution case? iii. Whether disposal of an appeal shortly after appointment of legal aid counsel amounts to denial of fair hearing? iv. Whether the High Court was justified in modifying the compensation order? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsel for the appellant submitted that the High Court failed to afford a meaningful opportunity of hearing, as the legal aid counsel was appointed merely four days prior to disposal of the appeal. Reliance was placed on *Anokhilal v. State of Madhya Pradesh*, emphasising that legal aid must be effective and not a mere formality. On merits, it was argued that the trial court erred in convicting the accused based solely on the testimony of PW3 when PW2, the mother, had turned hostile. The defence highlighted alleged inconsistencies and prior enmity, contending that the benefit of doubt ought to have been extended to the accused. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsel for the State contended that there was no material to show that the legal aid counsel lacked access to case records. The mere shortness of time could not establish prejudice. It was further argued that the High Court had, in fact, granted partial relief by modifying the compensation order. On merits, the State submitted that the testimony of the victim was reliable and of sterling quality, sufficient by itself for conviction. The hostility of PW2 was immaterial as she was not an eyewitness. Reliance was placed on authoritative precedents recognising conviction on sole testimony in sexual offence cases. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. *Section 7, POCSO Act, 2012* ii. *Section 8, POCSO Act, 2012* iii. *Rule 7(2), POCSO Rules, 2012* iv. *Order XLI Rule 31, CPC* ## **I) JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court undertook an independent evaluation of the evidence on record. It held that the victim’s testimony was consistent, natural, and unblemished. The Court reiterated that even in cases where a related witness turns hostile, the testimony of the victim does not lose its probative value if it inspires confidence. On the issue of fair hearing, the Court distinguished the facts from *Anokhilal*, observing that there was no material to show that the legal aid counsel was unprepared. Considering that substantial sentence had already been undergone, the Court decided to hear the appeal on merits instead of remanding the matter. The Court upheld the High Court’s modification of compensation, noting that victim compensation is a statutory obligation and the State can recover the amount from the accused if he has sufficient means. The appeal was dismissed in entirety. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment lies in reaffirming that conviction under the *POCSO Act* can be based on the sole testimony of the child victim if such testimony is trustworthy and of sterling quality. The Court applied the principles laid down in *Vijay alias Chinee*, *Krishan Kumar Malik*, and *Rai Sandeep*, holding that corroboration is not a rule of law but of prudence. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that offences proved against children strike at the conscience of society and demand strict enforcement of protective legislation. It also remarked that minimum sentences under the POCSO Act reflect legislative intent to deter such crimes. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Courts must assess victim testimony with sensitivity. ii. Hostility of non-eyewitnesses is not fatal. iii. Legal aid must be meaningful but prejudice must be shown. iv. Compensation mechanisms under POCSO must prioritise victim welfare. ## **J) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Vijay alias Chinee v. State of Madhya Pradesh*, *\[2010\] 8 SCR 1150* ii. *Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana*, *\[2011\] 8 SCR 774* iii. *Rai Sandeep alias Deepu v. State (NCT of Delhi)*, *\[2012\] 6 SCR 1153* iv. *Anokhilal v. State of Madhya Pradesh*, *AIR 2020 SC 232* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012* ii. *Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Rules, 2012* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja, [2020] 12 SCR 189](https://lawfoyer.in/satish-chander-ahuja-v-sneha-ahuja-2020-12-scr-189/) **Published:** January 5, 2026 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The judgment in Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja marks a seminal shift in the judicial understanding of shared household under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The Supreme Court undertook an exhaustive interpretative exercise of Sections 2(s), 17, 19, and 26 of the Act while examining the maintainability of a civil suit for injunction filed by a father-in-law against his daughter-in-law. The controversy arose in the backdrop of matrimonial discord where the daughter-in-law asserted a statutory right of residence in the suit property by invoking the DV Act, while the father-in-law claimed exclusive ownership and sought her eviction through civil proceedings. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment in *Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja* marks a seminal shift in the judicial understanding of *shared household* under the *Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005*. The Supreme Court undertook an exhaustive interpretative exercise of *Sections 2(s), 17, 19, and 26* of the Act while examining the maintainability of a civil suit for injunction filed by a father-in-law against his daughter-in-law. The controversy arose in the backdrop of matrimonial discord where the daughter-in-law asserted a statutory right of residence in the suit property by invoking the DV Act, while the father-in-law claimed exclusive ownership and sought her eviction through civil proceedings. The Court decisively overruled the restrictive interpretation laid down in *S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra*, holding that the definition of *shared household* is exhaustive yet purposive, and not confined only to properties owned or rented by the husband. The judgment clarifies that the pendency of proceedings under the DV Act does not bar civil proceedings concerning possession or injunction, and both remedies may operate concurrently under *Section 26*. At the same time, the Court emphasized that the right of residence under *Section 17* is not indefeasible and must be balanced against the rights of aged parents. The ruling harmonizes women’s statutory protection with civil property rights, affirms procedural fairness, and establishes that claims under the DV Act must be pleaded and proved even in civil proceedings. The judgment stands as a doctrinal correction and a guiding precedent on domestic violence jurisprudence and inter-se family property disputes. **Keywords:** Shared Household, Domestic Violence Act, Right of Residence, Civil Suit Maintainability, S.R. Batra Overruled ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgment Cause Title*Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 3483 of 2020iii) Judgment Date15 October 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumAshok Bhushan J., R. Subhash Reddy J., M.R. Shah J.vi) AuthorAshok Bhushan J.vii) Citation*\[2020\] 12 SCR 189*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 2(s), 2(q), 12, 17, 19, 23, 25, 26, 28 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005; Order I Rule 10 & Order XII Rule 6 CPC*ix) Judgments Overruled*S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra*x) Related Law Subjects*Family Law, Constitutional Law, Civil Law, Gender Justice* ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The judgment emerges from a prolonged familial and matrimonial conflict that raised complex questions concerning women’s right to residence and the intersection of civil property law with statutory protections under the *Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005*. The dispute reflects a recurring socio-legal tension between aged parents-in-law asserting ownership rights and daughters-in-law invoking protective legislation for residence security. Prior judicial interpretation, particularly *S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra*, had constrained the scope of *shared household* to properties owned or rented by the husband. This interpretation, though widely applied, was increasingly criticized for diluting the legislative intent of the DV Act. The present case offered the Supreme Court an opportunity to revisit this position while also clarifying procedural overlaps between civil courts and Magistrate courts exercising jurisdiction under the DV Act. The background is also significant for its engagement with *Section 26* of the DV Act, which enables aggrieved women to seek reliefs available under the Act in civil proceedings. The Court was thus required to harmonize two parallel adjudicatory regimes without allowing one to eclipse the other. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellant, *Satish Chander Ahuja*, purchased the suit property in 1983 and later permitted his son and daughter-in-law, *Sneha Ahuja*, to reside on the first floor after their marriage in 1995. Over time, serious matrimonial discord arose, leading to the husband filing a divorce petition under *Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955*. Subsequently, the daughter-in-law initiated proceedings under *Section 12 of the DV Act*, alleging emotional and mental abuse by her husband and in-laws. An interim protection order was passed restraining dispossession without due process. Thereafter, the father-in-law instituted a civil suit seeking *mandatory and permanent injunction* to evict the daughter-in-law, asserting his exclusive ownership and alleging harassment. The Trial Court decreed the suit under *Order XII Rule 6 CPC* on alleged admissions. This decree was set aside by the Delhi High Court, which remanded the matter for fresh adjudication, emphasizing the need to consider statutory residence rights under the DV Act. Aggrieved by the remand order, the father-in-law approached the Supreme Court. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the suit property constituted a *shared household* under *Section 2(s) of the DV Act*? ii. Whether pendency of proceedings under the DV Act bars civil suits for eviction or injunction? iii. Whether the right of residence under *Section 17* is absolute or subject to legal process? iv. Whether *S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra* laid down correct law? v. Whether a decree could be passed under *Order XII Rule 6 CPC* on alleged admissions? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the suit property was his *self-acquired property* and never constituted a *shared household*. It was argued that the daughter-in-law was merely a permissive occupant and could not claim residence against the father-in-law. Heavy reliance was placed on *S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra*, asserting that residence rights are limited to property owned or rented by the husband. It was further contended that the DV Act does not confer proprietary rights and that alternative accommodation, if any, could only be claimed from the husband. The Trial Court’s decree under *Order XII Rule 6 CPC* was defended as valid on the basis of admissions. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent argued that the definition of *shared household* under *Section 2(s)* is wide and does not require ownership by the husband. It was emphasized that residence in a domestic relationship is the determinative factor. The restrictive interpretation in *S.R. Batra* was challenged as contrary to legislative intent. Reliance was placed on *Section 26*, asserting that civil courts are competent to grant residence-related reliefs. It was also argued that disputed questions of fact barred summary decree under *Order XII Rule 6 CPC*. ## H) JUDGMENT The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the High Court’s remand. The Court held that the definition of *shared household* is *exhaustive yet purposive* and clarified that the use of the words *“means and includes”* indicates legislative intent to comprehensively define the term. The Court categorically overruled *S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra*, declaring it *not good law*. The Court held that pendency of DV proceedings does not bar civil proceedings and that civil courts must adjudicate residence claims under *Section 26*. It was further held that the right under *Section 17* is not indefeasible and eviction is permissible *“in accordance with procedure established by law”*. The power under *Order XII Rule 6 CPC* was held to be discretionary and wrongly exercised in the present case. **a. RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment lies in its authoritative interpretation of *Section 2(s)* and *Section 17* of the DV Act. The Court held that a *shared household* includes any household where the aggrieved woman lived in a domestic relationship with the respondent, irrespective of ownership. The right of residence is a statutory right but subject to lawful eviction through competent courts. **b. OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that while protecting women from domestic violence, courts must also be sensitive to the rights of *aged parents-in-law*. The need for balancing competing rights was emphasized, particularly in cases involving senior citizens. **c. GUIDELINES** i. Civil courts must adjudicate DV-based residence claims when raised under *Section 26*. ii. Right of residence is not absolute and may be regulated by due process. iii. Summary decrees under *Order XII Rule 6 CPC* must not be passed where disputed facts exist. iv. Findings in DV proceedings are relevant but not conclusive in civil suits. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment stands as a corrective to an overly restrictive precedent and realigns the law with the protective purpose of the DV Act. By overruling *S.R. Batra*, the Court restored substantive content to the concept of *shared household*. At the same time, it preserved the sanctity of property rights by recognizing lawful eviction procedures. The decision advances gender justice while reinforcing procedural fairness. It offers a nuanced balance between statutory protection and civil adjudication, making it a cornerstone ruling for family and property law jurisprudence in India. ## J) REFERENCES **a. Important Cases Referred** - *S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra*, *\[2006\] 10 Suppl. SCR 1206* (Overruled) - *Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora*, *\[2016\] 9 SCR 515* - *Shanti Kumar Panda v. Shakuntala Devi*, *\[2003\] 5 Suppl. SCR 98* **b. Important Statutes Referred** - *Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005* - *Code of Civil Procedure, 1908* - *Hindu Marriage Act, 1955* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [,State of U.P. v. Gayatri Prasad Prajapati, [2020] 7 S.C.R. 959](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-u-p-v-gayatri-prasad-prajapati-2020-7-s-c-r-959/) **Published:** January 5, 2026 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The judgment in State of U.P. v. Gayatri Prasad Prajapati addresses the legal permissibility and judicial discipline required while granting interim bail on medical grounds to an accused charged with serious sexual offences under the Indian Penal Code and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court was justified in granting interim bail solely on medical considerations when adequate and continuous medical treatment was already being provided under State supervision in premier government hospitals. The Court scrutinised the medical records, medical board report, and treatment history of the respondent, a former minister, and found that the High Court failed to consider material evidence on record, including the findings of a duly constituted medical board and reports from a super-speciality hospital. The judgment reiterates that humane treatment of prisoners is a constitutional obligation, yet emphasises that medical bail cannot be granted mechanically or sympathetically without recording satisfaction that continued custody would jeopardise the life or health of the accused. The decision underscores the principle that judicial discretion in bail matters must be exercised with due application of mind to the complete factual matrix, particularly when allegations involve grave offences and when the accused is already receiving specialised treatment under State care. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment in *State of U.P. v. Gayatri Prasad Prajapati* addresses the legal permissibility and judicial discipline required while granting *interim bail on medical grounds* to an accused charged with *serious sexual offences under the Indian Penal Code and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act*. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court was justified in granting interim bail solely on medical considerations when *adequate and continuous medical treatment* was already being provided under State supervision in premier government hospitals. The Court scrutinised the *medical records, medical board report, and treatment history* of the respondent, a former minister, and found that the High Court failed to consider material evidence on record, including the findings of a duly constituted medical board and reports from a super-speciality hospital. The judgment reiterates that *humane treatment of prisoners is a constitutional obligation*, yet emphasises that *medical bail cannot be granted mechanically or sympathetically* without recording satisfaction that continued custody would jeopardise the life or health of the accused. The decision underscores the principle that *judicial discretion in bail matters must be exercised with due application of mind to the complete factual matrix*, particularly when allegations involve grave offences and when the accused is already receiving specialised treatment under State care. **Keywords:** Interim Bail, Medical Grounds, Judicial Discretion, Prisoner’s Rights, Serious Sexual Offences ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetails*Judgement Cause Title**State of U.P. v. Gayatri Prasad Prajapati**Case Number**Criminal Appeal No. 686 of 2020**Judgement Date**15 October 2020**Court**Supreme Court of India**Quorum**Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy and M.R. Shah, JJ.**Author**Justice Ashok Bhushan**Citation**\[2020\] 7 S.C.R. 959**Legal Provisions Involved**Sections 376D, 376, 511, 504, 506 IPC; Sections 3 & 4 POCSO Act**Judgments Overruled**None**Related Law Subjects**Criminal Law, Bail Jurisprudence, Constitutional Law* ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The appeal arose from an order of the Allahabad High Court granting *interim bail on medical grounds* to the respondent, who was accused of *grave sexual offences including gang rape and offences under the POCSO Act*. The respondent had earlier been denied regular bail on multiple occasions, and his initial bail was cancelled before release. Subsequently, prolonged medical treatment became the basis for repeated applications seeking temporary liberty. The High Court granted interim bail for two months citing the respondent’s *medical condition and the COVID-19 pandemic*. The State challenged this order before the Supreme Court, asserting that *adequate medical treatment was already being provided* and that the High Court ignored crucial medical reports. The Supreme Court confined itself strictly to examining the legality of *interim bail on medical grounds* and consciously refrained from commenting on the merits of the pending regular bail application. The background reveals a pattern where medical treatment in custody was continuously facilitated through *King George Medical University* and later through *Sanjay Gandhi Postgraduate Institute of Medical Sciences*, both premier government institutions. The judgment therefore operates at the intersection of *prisoners’ right to health* and *judicial responsibility in bail adjudication*. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The respondent, a former minister, was accused in *Crime No. 29 of 2017* under *Sections 376D, 376, 511, 504, 506 IPC read with Sections 3 and 4 of the POCSO Act*. The FIR was registered pursuant to directions issued by the Supreme Court in a criminal writ petition. Though bail was initially granted by the trial court, it was cancelled by the High Court even before the respondent could be released. Subsequent bail applications were also rejected. On *03.05.2019*, the respondent was admitted to *K.G.M.U., Lucknow*, where he remained hospitalised for more than seven months and was discharged on *17.01.2020* in *stable condition*. The diagnosis recorded was *“UTI with Diabetes Mellitus with HTN with Bamboo spine with seronegative Spondyloarthropathy”*. During pendency of Bail Application No. 5743 of 2019, the High Court directed constitution of a *medical board* and further medical evaluation. On *04.06.2020*, the respondent was shifted to *S.G.P.G.I.M.S., Lucknow*, a tertiary super-speciality hospital, where further evaluation was undertaken. The medical board reported that *there was no major disparity in treatment* and that the respondent *could continue treatment even at the jail hospital*, subject to specialist consultations. Despite these reports, the High Court granted interim bail on *03.09.2020*. This order became the subject of appeal. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether *interim bail on medical grounds* can be granted when *adequate treatment is already being provided in custody*? ii. Whether the High Court erred by *ignoring material medical reports* placed on record? iii. Whether judicial discretion in bail matters requires *recorded satisfaction of medical necessity*? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the petitioner submitted that the respondent had received *continuous and specialised medical treatment* in both K.G.M.U. and S.G.P.G.I.M.S. It was argued that the *medical board report dated 10.06.2020* explicitly stated that the respondent’s condition was stable and manageable even within the jail hospital framework. The State contended that the High Court relied on *selective and outdated medical records* while completely disregarding later reports demonstrating medical stability. Emphasis was placed on the condition imposed by the High Court that the respondent would *ordinarily reside at his residence*, which contradicted the very basis of medical bail. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent submitted that *humane treatment of prisoners is a constitutional obligation* and that shifting the respondent between hospitals indicated inadequacy of care. It was argued that certain diagnostic facilities were unavailable at K.G.M.U., necessitating referral to S.G.P.G.I.M.S. The respondent asserted that continued hospitalisation was essential and that incarceration would expose him to *serious health risks during the COVID-19 pandemic*. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 376D IPC* ii. *Section 376 IPC* iii. *Sections 3 and 4, POCSO Act* iv. *Article 21 of the Constitution of India* (right to life and health) ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court held that *medical bail cannot be granted merely on humanitarian considerations* without assessing whether continued custody would obstruct necessary treatment. The Court noted that the respondent had been under *constant medical supervision for over a year* and that his condition was *stable and controlled*. The High Court failed to consider the *medical board report and final evaluation of S.G.P.G.I.M.S.*, both of which indicated adequacy of treatment. The Court observed that *no finding was recorded by the High Court* that further treatment was unavailable within custody. The assumption that K.G.M.U. lacked adequate facilities was contradicted by documentary evidence. The Supreme Court held the High Court’s order to be *unsustainable due to non-application of mind* and set it aside. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment lies in the principle that *interim bail on medical grounds requires demonstrable necessity*. Adequate medical treatment within custody negates the basis for temporary liberty. Judicial discretion must be exercised upon *complete consideration of medical evidence*. Sympathy cannot replace legal reasoning. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court reiterated that *humane treatment of prisoners is mandatory* and flows from *Article 21*. However, humane treatment does not imply automatic entitlement to bail. The State’s obligation is to ensure *proper medical care*, not unconditional release. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Courts must examine *entire medical records* before granting medical bail. ii. Medical board reports must be *specifically considered*. iii. Bail orders must record *clear satisfaction regarding inadequacy of custodial treatment*. iv. Conditions of bail must *correlate with the purpose of release*. ## J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces discipline in *bail jurisprudence* and clarifies that *medical grounds are exceptional, not routine*. It safeguards the balance between *prisoner rights and societal interest*. The Supreme Court correctly intervened to prevent dilution of standards in cases involving *serious sexual offences*. The ruling strengthens judicial accountability and reiterates that *State-provided medical care, when adequate, cannot be undermined by speculative apprehensions*. ## K) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *State of U.P. v. Gayatri Prasad Prajapati*, *\[2020\] 7 S.C.R. 959* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Indian Penal Code, 1860* ii. *Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Saravanan v. State Rep. by the Inspector of Police, [2020] 8 SCR 1035](https://lawfoyer.in/saravanan-v-state-rep-by-the-inspector-of-police-2020-8-scr-1035/) **Published:** December 31, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in Saravanan v. State Rep. by the Inspector of Police constitutes a significant reaffirmation of the constitutional and statutory character of default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Supreme Court examined the legality of conditions imposed by the High Court while granting statutory bail, particularly a monetary deposit linked to alleged amounts involved in the offence and an onerous daily reporting requirement. The Court categorically held that default bail is not discretionary but an indefeasible statutory right, accruing to the accused upon failure of the investigating agency to file a charge-sheet within the prescribed period. The Court clarified that conditions ordinarily relevant to regular bail under Section 437 Cr.P.C. cannot be transplanted into the statutory framework of default bail. Any such condition, especially one compelling deposit of disputed amounts, defeats the legislative intent of Section 167(2) and dilutes the protection of personal liberty under criminal procedure. The judgment draws a clear doctrinal distinction between punitive pre-trial detention and procedural safeguards against investigative delay. By quashing the financial condition and modifying the reporting requirement, the Court reinforced that statutory bail cannot be converted into a tool of coercive recovery or indirect punishment. This ruling consolidates prior jurisprudence, particularly the principle of “indefeasible right” articulated earlier, and serves as a binding precedent restraining courts from imposing extraneous conditions that frustrate statutory mandates. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment in *Saravanan v. State Rep. by the Inspector of Police* constitutes a significant reaffirmation of the constitutional and statutory character of *default bail* under *Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*. The Supreme Court examined the legality of conditions imposed by the High Court while granting statutory bail, particularly a monetary deposit linked to alleged amounts involved in the offence and an onerous daily reporting requirement. The Court categorically held that *default bail is not discretionary but an indefeasible statutory right*, accruing to the accused upon failure of the investigating agency to file a charge-sheet within the prescribed period. The Court clarified that conditions ordinarily relevant to *regular bail under Section 437 Cr.P.C.* cannot be transplanted into the statutory framework of *default bail*. Any such condition, especially one compelling deposit of disputed amounts, defeats the legislative intent of Section 167(2) and dilutes the protection of personal liberty under criminal procedure. The judgment draws a clear doctrinal distinction between *punitive pre-trial detention* and *procedural safeguards against investigative delay*. By quashing the financial condition and modifying the reporting requirement, the Court reinforced that statutory bail cannot be converted into a tool of coercive recovery or indirect punishment. This ruling consolidates prior jurisprudence, particularly the principle of *“indefeasible right”* articulated earlier, and serves as a binding precedent restraining courts from imposing extraneous conditions that frustrate statutory mandates. **Keywords:** Default Bail; Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.; Indefeasible Right; Personal Liberty; Conditions of Bail; Statutory Safeguards ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgment Cause Title*Saravanan v. State Rep. by the Inspector of Police*Case NumberCriminal Appeal Nos. 681–682 of 2020Judgment Date15 October 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumAshok Bhushan J., R. Subhash Reddy J., M.R. Shah J.AuthorJustice M.R. ShahCitation*\[2020\] 8 SCR 1035*Legal Provisions Involved*Section 167(2), Section 437, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 420 IPC*Judgments OverruledNilRelated Law SubjectsCriminal Law; Procedural Law; Constitutional Liberty ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The judgment emerges from persistent judicial confusion regarding the scope of judicial discretion while granting *default bail*. The appellant was arrested in connection with an offence under *Section 420 IPC* and remained in custody beyond the statutory period prescribed under *Section 167 Cr.P.C.*. The failure of the investigating agency to file the final report within time triggered the appellant’s entitlement to statutory bail. Despite acknowledging this statutory entitlement, the High Court imposed a condition requiring deposit of *Rs. 8,00,000/-*, drawing justification from an earlier affidavit filed by the appellant’s wife during regular bail proceedings. The High Court also directed the appellant to report daily to the police station at a fixed hour. The Supreme Court was thus called upon to examine whether courts could impose conditions rooted in *regular bail jurisprudence* while granting *mandatory statutory bail*. The case lies at the intersection of *procedural safeguards* and *judicial overreach*, raising critical questions about the limits of discretionary power when statutory commands are explicit. The decision is firmly anchored in the constitutional value of *personal liberty*, as reflected through criminal procedure. By engaging with the object and purpose of Section 167, the Court reaffirmed that investigative delay cannot be compensated by judicially engineered conditions. The ruling situates default bail not as a benevolent concession but as a legislative check on State power. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellant was arrested on *31 January 2020* in *Crime No. 31 of 2019* for alleged offences under *Section 420 IPC* and was remanded to judicial custody. He initially sought *regular bail under Section 437 Cr.P.C.* before the Judicial Magistrate. During those proceedings, the appellant’s wife filed an affidavit undertaking to deposit *Rs. 7,00,000/-* out of the alleged amount of *Rs. 15,67,338/-*. Based on this undertaking, the Magistrate granted bail subject to deposit conditions. Aggrieved by these conditions, the appellant approached the High Court, which declined interference but granted liberty to seek modification before the Magistrate. Instead, upon completion of more than *101 days* in custody without filing of a charge-sheet, the appellant invoked *Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.* seeking statutory bail. The Sessions Court rejected the application on the ground of non-compliance with earlier bail conditions. On further challenge, the High Court accepted the statutory entitlement but imposed a fresh condition of deposit of *Rs. 8,00,000/-* and mandated daily police reporting. A subsequent modification application was also dismissed. These cumulative orders compelled the appellant to approach the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court’s conditions were contrary to the statutory scheme and judicial precedents governing default bail. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether a court can impose a condition of monetary deposit while granting *default bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.*? ii. Whether conditions attached to *regular bail under Section 437 Cr.P.C.* can influence statutory bail? iii. Whether onerous reporting conditions violate the object of statutory bail? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that *default bail is a mandatory statutory right* and does not depend upon judicial discretion once statutory conditions are satisfied. It was argued that the only requirements under *Section 167(2)* are expiry of the statutory period, non-filing of the charge-sheet, and readiness to furnish bail. The appellant relied upon the principle that *no additional burden can be imposed that frustrates the right itself*. The affidavit filed during regular bail proceedings was argued to be wholly irrelevant to statutory bail. It was further contended that the High Court’s conditions amounted to indirect denial of bail. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The State sought to justify the High Court’s order by referring to the earlier undertaking given by the appellant’s wife. It was argued that the condition of deposit was imposed considering the alleged financial loss and the conduct of the accused. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 167(2), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* ii. *Section 437, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* iii. *Section 420, Indian Penal Code, 1860* ## I) JUDGMENT The Supreme Court categorically held that the High Court committed a *grave error* in imposing a deposit condition while granting statutory bail. The Court reiterated that *default bail flows from legislative command and not judicial discretion*. The Court emphasized that *any condition which obstructs or frustrates the enforcement of a statutory right is impermissible*. The imposition of a monetary condition was held to be legally unsustainable, irrespective of earlier proceedings. The daily reporting condition was also held to be excessive and disproportionate. The Court modified it to require cooperation with investigation *as and when called*. The appeals were allowed. The impugned conditions were quashed or modified accordingly. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio decisively holds that *no condition beyond furnishing bail can be imposed while granting default bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.*. Any attempt to import considerations of recovery, punishment, or compliance from regular bail proceedings is illegal. Default bail is a safeguard against investigative delay and judicial overreach. The statutory right crystallizes automatically upon fulfillment of conditions and cannot be diluted. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that *courts must remain conscious of the difference between discretionary bail and statutory bail*. Excessive conditions undermine public confidence in procedural safeguards. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Courts must confine themselves strictly to statutory requirements under *Section 167(2)*. ii. Monetary or recovery-linked conditions are impermissible. iii. Reporting conditions must be reasonable and proportionate. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam*, *\[2017\] 8 SCR 785* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* ii. *Indian Penal Code, 1860* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Navin Chandra Dhoundiyal v. State of Uttarakhand and Others, [2020] 7 SCR 572](https://lawfoyer.in/navin-chandra-dhoundiyal-v-state-of-uttarakhand-and-others-2020-7-scr-572/) **Published:** December 31, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The decision in Navin Chandra Dhoundiyal v. State of Uttarakhand and Others settles an important question relating to service jurisprudence in university administration, namely the interpretation of statutory provisions governing the date of superannuation and continuation in service of university teachers. The Supreme Court was concerned with the correct construction of Statute No. 16.24 of Kumaun University, particularly its proviso which permits continuation of teachers beyond the date of superannuation until 30 June following, treating such continuation as re-employment. The appellants, all professors, challenged an office order fixing their retirement on the last day of the month in which they attained the age of 65 years, contending that such action disregarded the statutory protection intended to preserve continuity in academic sessions. The Court undertook a plain, purposive, and contextual interpretation of the statute, harmonising the main provision with its proviso. It emphasised that while no teacher has a vested right to re-employment after superannuation, the proviso creates a statutory exception designed to prevent disruption of teaching mid-session and to protect students’ academic interests. The judgment reaffirms the doctrine of stare decisis by endorsing earlier High Court interpretations and approving analogous reasoning adopted by the Allahabad High Court Full Bench. By setting aside the contrary view of the Uttarakhand High Court, the Supreme Court restored doctrinal clarity and administrative consistency, holding that teachers whose superannuation does not fall on 30 June are statutorily entitled to continue till the end of the academic session on re-employment basis, with consequential benefits. **Content:** ## A) **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The decision in *Navin Chandra Dhoundiyal v. State of Uttarakhand and Others* settles an important question relating to *service jurisprudence in university administration*, namely the interpretation of statutory provisions governing the *date of superannuation and continuation in service of university teachers*. The Supreme Court was concerned with the correct construction of *Statute No. 16.24 of Kumaun University*, particularly its proviso which permits continuation of teachers beyond the date of superannuation until *30 June following*, treating such continuation as *re-employment*. The appellants, all professors, challenged an office order fixing their retirement on the last day of the month in which they attained the age of 65 years, contending that such action disregarded the statutory protection intended to preserve continuity in academic sessions. The Court undertook a *plain, purposive, and contextual interpretation* of the statute, harmonising the main provision with its proviso. It emphasised that while no teacher has a vested right to re-employment after superannuation, the proviso creates a *statutory exception* designed to prevent disruption of teaching mid-session and to protect students’ academic interests. The judgment reaffirms the *doctrine of stare decisis* by endorsing earlier High Court interpretations and approving analogous reasoning adopted by the Allahabad High Court Full Bench. By setting aside the contrary view of the Uttarakhand High Court, the Supreme Court restored doctrinal clarity and administrative consistency, holding that teachers whose superannuation does not fall on 30 June are statutorily entitled to continue till the end of the academic session on re-employment basis, with consequential benefits. **Keywords:** Superannuation; Re-employment; University Statutes; Academic Session; Service Law ## B) **CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsi) Judgment Cause Title*Navin Chandra Dhoundiyal v. State of Uttarakhand and Others*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 3493 of 2020 (with connected appeals)iii) Judgment Date16 October 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumUday Umesh Lalit J. and S. Ravindra Bhat J.vi) AuthorS. Ravindra Bhat J.vii) Citation\[2020\] 7 SCR 572viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Statute No. 16.24 of Kumaun University*ix) Judgments OverruledImpugned judgment of Uttarakhand High Court (W.P. (S/B) No. 211 of 2020)x) Related Law SubjectsService Law; Education Law; Administrative Law ## C) **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The controversy arose from the long-standing practice within Indian universities of synchronising *retirement of teachers with the academic calendar*. Such practices are reflected in statutory provisions that allow teachers to continue beyond the precise date of superannuation in order to prevent disruption to students’ education. Kumaun University incorporated this principle in *Statute No. 16.24*, which fixes the age of superannuation at 65 years while carving out an exception permitting continuation till the end of the academic session, namely *30 June*. Despite the clarity of this framework, administrative authorities issued an office order dated 21.12.2019 retiring professors on the last date of the month in which they attained the age of 65 years. This triggered litigation as the appellants asserted that such an interpretation defeated the legislative intent underlying the proviso to the statute. The appellants relied heavily on earlier judicial interpretations, particularly *Dr. Indu Singh v. State of Uttarakhand*, where an identically worded statute had been construed to permit continuation till the following June. The Uttarakhand High Court, however, declined to follow this precedent, adopting a restrictive reading of the proviso and treating continuation merely as an extension till the end of the month of retirement. This divergence created uncertainty not only within Kumaun University but across similarly situated academic institutions. The Supreme Court was therefore called upon to resolve this interpretative conflict and restore consistency in service conditions applicable to university teachers. ## D) **FACTS OF THE CASE** The appellants were serving as *Professors in various disciplines* at Kumaun University. Upon attaining the age of 65 years, they were issued an office order specifying their dates of retirement as the *last day of the month* in which they completed the age of superannuation. Aggrieved by this decision, they challenged the order before the Uttarakhand High Court. The appellants contended that under *Statute No. 16.24*, their retirement could not be effected mid-academic session and that they were entitled to continue in service until *30 June following*, on a deemed re-employment basis. They argued that the proviso to the statute was introduced precisely to avoid academic dislocation and was not a mere administrative concession. The High Court dismissed their writ petitions, holding that the statute did not confer a right to continue till the next June and that the decision in *Indu Singh* was not binding. According to the High Court, the proviso merely reflected the general principle that employees retire at the end of the month, and the reference to June 30 was illustrative rather than mandatory. Challenging this interpretation, the appellants approached the Supreme Court, asserting that the High Court had misconstrued both the statute and binding precedent, thereby undermining the settled position of law governing superannuation of university teachers. ## E) **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether *Statute No. 16.24* entitles a university teacher to continue in service till *30 June following* the date of superannuation when retirement does not fall on that date? ii. Whether such continuation amounts to an impermissible extension of service or a statutorily sanctioned *re-employment*? iii. Whether the Uttarakhand High Court erred in disregarding binding precedent and settled interpretation of pari materia provisions? ## F) **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellants submitted that *Statute No. 16.24*, read as a whole, clearly envisages continuation of teachers till the end of the academic session. They argued that the proviso operates as a *legal fiction*, deeming the teacher to be on re-employment after superannuation, and therefore does not violate the prohibition against extension of service. Reliance was placed on *Dr. Indu Singh v. State of Uttarakhand*, where an identically worded provision was interpreted purposively to safeguard academic continuity. The appellants further contended that a coordinate bench of the High Court could not have declined to follow this precedent without referring the matter to a larger bench, invoking established principles of judicial discipline. They also relied upon *S.K. Rathi v. Prem Hari Sharma*, where this Court acknowledged the right of a teacher to continue till 30 June following superannuation, emphasising that such continuation attached to the substantive post of teacher. ## G) **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the respondents submitted that the main provision of *Statute No. 16.24* categorically prohibits extension of service beyond superannuation. According to them, the proviso could not be interpreted to confer a substantive right of continuation till the next academic year. They argued that the reference to *30 June following* merely embodied the general administrative practice of retiring employees at the end of the month and could not be elevated into a statutory mandate for re-employment. It was further contended that allowing such interpretation would lead to unintended consequences, effectively granting a year-long extension to all teachers retiring after June. ## H) **JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court rejected the restrictive interpretation adopted by the High Court. It held that a *plain reading* of the statute, particularly the proviso, unmistakably indicates legislative intent to permit continuation till the end of the academic session. The Court clarified that the proviso constitutes an *exception* to the general rule against re-employment and must be given full effect. The Court emphasised that the object of the proviso is to avoid disruption in teaching and to protect students from academic discontinuity. It approved earlier interpretations, including *Indu Singh* and the Full Bench decision in *State of U.P. v. Ramesh Chandra Tiwari*, underscoring that such provisions benefit students primarily, though teachers incidentally receive extended employment. Accordingly, the impugned judgment was set aside. The appellants were held entitled to reinstatement with full salary for the intervening period and continuation till the following June on re-employment basis. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The proviso to *Statute No. 16.24* creates a statutory exception permitting teachers whose date of superannuation does not fall on 30 June to continue till the end of the academic session on a deemed re-employment basis, and such continuation is mandatory to avoid academic disruption. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that long-standing interpretations of local statutes should not be lightly disturbed, invoking the doctrine of *stare decisis* and cautioning against judicial inconsistency in service matters affecting educational institutions. **c) GUIDELINES** i. University authorities must interpret superannuation provisions in harmony with the academic calendar. ii. Provisos designed to protect academic continuity must receive purposive interpretation. iii. Departure from settled judicial interpretation requires legislative amendment or authoritative reconsideration. ## I) **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment restores coherence in service law applicable to university teachers and reinforces the primacy of student interest in statutory interpretation. It exemplifies purposive construction and judicial fidelity to precedent, ensuring administrative certainty and academic stability. ## J) **REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Dr. Indu Singh v. State of Uttarakhand*, SCC Online 2017. ii. *S.K. Rathi v. Prem Hari Sharma*, (2001) 9 SCC 377. iii. *State of U.P. v. Ramesh Chandra Tiwari*, (2015) 6 ADJ 579. **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Statute No. 16.24 of Kumaun University*. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh and Ors. [2020] 13 SCR 571](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-u-p-v-sudhir-kumar-singh-and-ors-2020-13-scr-571/) **Published:** December 31, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh and Ors. is a significant exposition on the doctrine of audi alteram partem and the evolving contours of judicial review in contractual matters involving the State. The Supreme Court examined whether cancellation of a concluded tender and contract by a State instrumentality, without affording a prior hearing to the successful bidder, could withstand constitutional scrutiny under Article 14 and Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The dispute arose from repeated cancellations and reissuance of e-tenders by the U.P. State Warehousing Corporation for handling and transportation contracts, culminating in cancellation of an already executed contract after one year of performance, solely on the basis of ex parte inquiries alleging financial irregularities. The Court reconciled competing considerations of public interest, financial loss to the State, and procedural fairness owed to the contractor. It clarified that breach of natural justice itself may not always result in invalidity, unless prejudice is shown, but equally reaffirmed that prejudice is presumed where the affected party is kept completely in the dark. The judgment also authoritatively restated when writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is maintainable in contractual disputes involving State action, especially where allegations of arbitrariness and violation of natural justice are raised. While partially setting aside the High Court’s judgment for exceeding the scope of relief sought, the Supreme Court upheld the core finding that the tender cancellation was vitiated by denial of natural justice. The ruling harmonizes administrative efficiency with constitutional fairness and serves as a doctrinal guide on the “prejudice test” in natural justice jurisprudence. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment in *State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh and Ors.* is a significant exposition on the doctrine of *audi alteram partem* and the evolving contours of judicial review in contractual matters involving the State. The Supreme Court examined whether cancellation of a concluded tender and contract by a State instrumentality, without affording a prior hearing to the successful bidder, could withstand constitutional scrutiny under *Article 14* and *Article 226 of the Constitution of India*. The dispute arose from repeated cancellations and reissuance of e-tenders by the *U.P. State Warehousing Corporation* for handling and transportation contracts, culminating in cancellation of an already executed contract after one year of performance, solely on the basis of ex parte inquiries alleging financial irregularities. The Court reconciled competing considerations of public interest, financial loss to the State, and procedural fairness owed to the contractor. It clarified that *breach of natural justice itself may not always result in invalidity*, unless prejudice is shown, but equally reaffirmed that *prejudice is presumed* where the affected party is kept completely in the dark. The judgment also authoritatively restated when writ jurisdiction under *Article 226* is maintainable in contractual disputes involving State action, especially where allegations of arbitrariness and violation of natural justice are raised. While partially setting aside the High Court’s judgment for exceeding the scope of relief sought, the Supreme Court upheld the core finding that the tender cancellation was vitiated by denial of natural justice. The ruling harmonizes administrative efficiency with constitutional fairness and serves as a doctrinal guide on the “prejudice test” in natural justice jurisprudence. **Keywords:** Natural Justice; *Audi Alteram Partem*; Public Law Element; Tender Cancellation; Article 226; Prejudice Test; State Contracts ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgment Cause Title*State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh and Ors.*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 3498 of 2020 (with C.A. Nos. 3499 & 3500 of 2020)iii) Judgment Date16 October 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) Quorum*R.F. Nariman, Navin Sinha & K.M. Joseph, JJ.*vi) Author*Justice R.F. Nariman*vii) Citation*\[2020\] 13 SCR 571*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Articles 14 & 226, Constitution of India*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsConstitutional Law; Administrative Law; Contract Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The controversy emanated from the administrative functioning of the *U.P. State Warehousing Corporation*, a State instrumentality entrusted with handling and transportation of foodgrains and fertilizers. The case lies at the intersection of *administrative discretion*, *public procurement*, and *constitutional safeguards against arbitrariness*. The repeated issuance and cancellation of tenders by the Corporation, followed by execution and subsequent termination of a contract, raised serious concerns regarding procedural fairness and transparency in State action. The dispute assumed constitutional significance when the successful bidder, after executing the contract for more than one year, found the contract abruptly cancelled on the basis of internal inquiry reports conducted entirely *ex parte*. No notice, explanation, or opportunity of hearing was afforded before such cancellation. This administrative conduct compelled judicial scrutiny under *Article 226*, particularly on whether contractual disputes involving State entities are amenable to writ jurisdiction when allegations of *arbitrary action* and *violation of natural justice* are raised. The Supreme Court was also called upon to clarify the scope of judicial interference in tender matters, especially where financial loss to the State is alleged. The judgment revisits foundational principles laid down in *ABL International Ltd.*, *Nawabkhan Abbaskhan*, and *S.L. Kapoor*, and synthesizes them into a coherent framework governing natural justice and prejudice. The case thus serves as a doctrinal reaffirmation of fairness as a constitutional imperative even in contractual governance. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE An e-tender dated *06.01.2018* was issued by the Corporation for handling and transportation work in the Vindhyachal region. The tender was cancelled within ten days for *“administrative reasons”*. A fresh e-tender dated *01.04.2018* was issued, which too was cancelled on *04.05.2018* on the ground that the rates were *“impractical”*. Subsequently, a third e-tender dated *01.06.2018* was floated for the same work and period of two years. Respondent No.1, *Sudhir Kumar Singh*, emerged as the successful bidder for the *Bhawanipur-I Centre* at *341% ASOR*. An agreement was executed on *13.07.2018*, and the respondent performed the contract for over one year without any complaint regarding performance or violation of tender conditions. In May 2019, complaints were submitted by a Truck Owners’ Association alleging serious financial irregularities in the tender process. Acting on these complaints, the Managing Director of the Corporation conducted an *ex parte inquiry* and submitted a report dated *14.06.2019*, concluding that cancellation of the earlier tender was unjustified and that the subsequent tender resulted in exorbitant rates. A parallel ex parte inquiry was conducted by the Commissioner, Vindhyachal Mandal. Based on these reports, the Special Secretary, Government of U.P., issued a letter dated *16.07.2019* directing cancellation of the tenders, initiation of disciplinary proceedings, and recovery of financial loss. Acting on this directive, the Corporation cancelled the respondent’s contract on *26.07.2019* without issuing any notice or granting a hearing. Aggrieved, the respondent filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court, which allowed the petition and quashed the cancellation as well as the inquiry reports. This led to the present appeals before the Supreme Court. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether cancellation of a concluded tender without notice violates the *audi alteram partem* rule? ii. Whether a writ petition under *Article 226* is maintainable in contractual disputes involving State action? iii. Whether breach of natural justice automatically vitiates administrative action without proof of prejudice? iv. Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by quashing inquiry reports not specifically challenged? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that the High Court exceeded the scope of the writ petition by quashing the inquiry reports and governmental directions when no such relief was sought. It was contended that the tender cancellation was justified due to *huge financial loss* caused to the Corporation, as evidenced by comparative rate analysis. Reliance was placed on precedents holding that *natural justice is not an inflexible doctrine* and that courts should not issue futile writs where no prejudice is caused. It was further argued that contractual disputes ought to be relegated to civil courts, particularly when the contract period had already expired. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent submitted that the cancellation was *arbitrary, ex parte, and violative of Article 14*. It was emphasized that no allegation of misconduct or breach of tender conditions was ever made against the respondent. The respondent highlighted serious prejudice caused by premature termination, including loss of one year of contract period and risk of *three-year debarment*. Reliance was placed on *ABL International Ltd.* to assert maintainability of the writ petition due to the presence of a public law element. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Article 14, Constitution of India* ii. *Article 226, Constitution of India* iii. Doctrine of *Audi Alteram Partem* ## I) JUDGMENT The Supreme Court partially allowed the appeals. It held that the High Court erred in quashing the Managing Director’s report dated *14.06.2019* and the Special Secretary’s order dated *16.07.2019*, as no relief was sought against them. However, the Court upheld the High Court’s finding that cancellation of the respondent’s contract was vitiated by *complete denial of natural justice*. The Court reaffirmed that whenever a plea of breach of natural justice is raised against the State, such plea attracts *Article 14* as arbitrary State action. It was held that the respondent was kept entirely in the dark regarding the proceedings leading to cancellation, thereby causing real and demonstrable prejudice. The Court rejected the argument of futility, observing that this was not a case of admitted facts leading to an inevitable conclusion. The Court directed refund of earnest money and security deposit and upheld maintainability of the writ petition due to the public law element involved. The judgment harmonized administrative accountability with constitutional fairness. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment lies in the principle that *where State action results in civil consequences and is taken without affording a hearing, prejudice is presumed unless facts are admitted and only one conclusion is possible*. The Court crystallized the *prejudice test* and clarified that the authority denying natural justice cannot itself decide absence of prejudice. Judicial determination is mandatory. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that *natural justice is a flexible tool* and not every infraction results in invalidity. However, fairness must be contextually applied. Observations on comparative tender rates and administrative vigilance were advisory in nature. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Breach of natural justice does not automatically invalidate action unless prejudice is shown. ii. Courts will not issue futile writs where facts are admitted. iii. Determination of prejudice lies with courts, not authorities. iv. Writ jurisdiction is maintainable where State action is arbitrary even in contractual matters. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd.*, *\[2004\] 3 SCC 553* ii. *Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat*, *\[1974\] 3 SCR 427* iii. *S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan*, *\[1981\] 1 SCR 746* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Constitution of India, 1950* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Rajesh Dhiman v. State of Himachal Pradesh, [2020] 8 S.C.R. 1057](https://lawfoyer.in/rajesh-dhiman-v-state-of-himachal-pradesh-2020-8-s-c-r-1057/) **Published:** December 31, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in Rajesh Dhiman v. State of Himachal Pradesh examines the contours of fair investigation, evidentiary standards, and appellate interference in acquittals under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The Supreme Court addressed whether an investigation stands vitiated merely because the complainant is also the investigating officer, particularly in prosecutions involving commercial quantities of contraband. The Court revisited earlier conflicting jurisprudence and relied upon the Constitution Bench ruling in Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi) to reaffirm that no automatic presumption of bias arises from such dual roles unless actual prejudice or likelihood of bias is demonstrated. The judgment further clarifies the doctrine of reasonable doubt, emphasizing that fanciful or implausible defence theories cannot undermine a consistent prosecution case supported by official witnesses. The Court also dealt with the evidentiary value of hostile independent witnesses and reiterated that non-examination of such witnesses is not per se fatal. Importantly, the judgment upholds the High Court’s power to reverse an acquittal where the trial court has misapplied legal principles or adopted a perverse appreciation of evidence. The ruling strengthens prosecutorial standards in NDPS cases while balancing the accused’s right to a fair trial, thereby contributing significantly to criminal jurisprudence on narcotics control and appellate review. **Content:** ## A) **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment in *Rajesh Dhiman v. State of Himachal Pradesh* examines the contours of fair investigation, evidentiary standards, and appellate interference in acquittals under the *Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985*. The Supreme Court addressed whether an investigation stands vitiated merely because the complainant is also the investigating officer, particularly in prosecutions involving commercial quantities of contraband. The Court revisited earlier conflicting jurisprudence and relied upon the Constitution Bench ruling in *Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi)* to reaffirm that no automatic presumption of bias arises from such dual roles unless actual prejudice or likelihood of bias is demonstrated. The judgment further clarifies the doctrine of reasonable doubt, emphasizing that fanciful or implausible defence theories cannot undermine a consistent prosecution case supported by official witnesses. The Court also dealt with the evidentiary value of hostile independent witnesses and reiterated that non-examination of such witnesses is not per se fatal. Importantly, the judgment upholds the High Court’s power to reverse an acquittal where the trial court has misapplied legal principles or adopted a perverse appreciation of evidence. The ruling strengthens prosecutorial standards in NDPS cases while balancing the accused’s right to a fair trial, thereby contributing significantly to criminal jurisprudence on narcotics control and appellate review. ***Keywords*:** NDPS Act, fair investigation, chance recovery, reasonable doubt, reversal of acquittal, commercial quantity ## B) **CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*Rajesh Dhiman v. State of Himachal Pradesh*ii) Case NumberCriminal Appeal No. 1032 of 2013iii) Judgement Date26 October 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumN. V. Ramana, Surya Kant, Hrishikesh Roy, JJ.vi) AuthorJustice Surya Kantvii) Citation*\[2020\] 8 S.C.R. 1057*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Section 20 NDPS Act; Sections 313, 100 CrPC; Section 60 Indian Evidence Act*ix) Judgments overruled*Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab* (as per Constitution Bench in *Mukesh Singh*)x) Related Law SubjectsCriminal Law; Narcotics Law; Procedural Law ## C) **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The judgment arises from a long-standing judicial tension in NDPS prosecutions between strict procedural compliance and pragmatic evaluation of evidence. The NDPS Act imposes severe penalties and reverses certain presumptions, thereby demanding heightened scrutiny of investigative fairness. Trial courts have often leaned towards acquittal where procedural lapses or absence of independent witnesses appear. In the present case, the trial court adopted such an approach, acquitting the accused primarily on doubts arising from hostile independent testimony and the complainant’s dual role as investigator. The High Court, however, reversed the acquittal, finding the trial court’s reasoning legally flawed. The Supreme Court was thus required to balance the presumption of innocence with statutory objectives of narcotics control, while clarifying the law on bias, reasonable doubt, and appellate interference. The decision is situated within evolving jurisprudence post-*Mukesh Singh*, which recalibrated earlier rigid standards that favoured acquittal on technical grounds alone. ## D) **FACTS OF THE CASE** On *09.01.2002*, a police team conducting traffic checking at Shamshar noticed a motorcycle without a number plate. *Rajesh Dhiman* was seated on the pillion carrying a backpack, while *Gulshan Rana* drove the vehicle. Upon stopping them, the police attempted to associate local witnesses but failed. The accused were informed of their right to be searched before a Magistrate or Gazetted Officer and consented to search on the spot. From the backpack, *3 kg 100 gms of charas* was recovered, sealed, sampled, and sent for chemical examination. The prosecution examined nine witnesses, including eight police officials and one independent witness, *Karam Chand (PW-3)*, who later turned hostile. The defence did not lead evidence but suggested that the backpack belonged to an unidentified third person who allegedly fled. The trial court acquitted the accused, citing doubts in investigation and hostile testimony. The High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the accused under *Section 20 NDPS Act*, imposing ten years’ rigorous imprisonment. ## E) **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether investigation is vitiated when the complainant himself acts as the investigating officer? ii. Whether non-examination or hostility of independent witnesses renders the prosecution case doubtful? iii. Whether an improbable alternate defence version creates reasonable doubt? iv. Whether the High Court was justified in reversing an acquittal in appeal? ## F) **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellants submitted that the dual role of complainant and investigator violated principles of fair investigation. They relied upon earlier precedents including *Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab* to contend inherent bias. It was argued that the independent witness did not support the seizure and that the defence version of a third person owning the backpack raised reasonable doubt. Non-compliance with *Section 50 NDPS Act* was also alleged. The appellants contended that the High Court ignored these infirmities while reversing a well-reasoned acquittal. ## G) **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the respondent State argued that the Constitution Bench in *Mukesh Singh* had conclusively settled the issue of dual roles. They emphasized the consistent testimonies of official witnesses and the improbability of the defence theory. The State contended that recovery from a backpack does not attract *Section 50 NDPS Act* and that the High Court rightly corrected the trial court’s misapplication of law. ## H) **JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the High Court’s conviction. The Court held that no presumption of bias arises merely because the informant investigates the case. It stressed that actual prejudice must be shown. The defence theory of an unknown third person was termed ex-facie fanciful. The Court upheld reliance on official witnesses and clarified that non-examination of independent witnesses is not fatal. The High Court’s reversal of acquittal was found justified due to the trial court’s misinterpretation of burden of proof. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio lies in reaffirming that *fair investigation* does not mean *perfect investigation*. The Court held that bias must be proved and cannot be presumed. Reasonable doubt must be real and based on credible probabilities, not conjectures. Appellate courts may reverse acquittals where trial courts adopt perverse or legally erroneous reasoning. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that excessive insistence on independent witnesses may impose unrealistic burdens on prosecution, especially in chance recovery cases. It cautioned against mechanical acquittals in NDPS cases. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Dual role of informant-investigator is permissible absent proven bias. ii. Reasonable doubt must exclude fanciful defences. iii. Non-examination of independent witnesses requires cautious scrutiny, not automatic acquittal. iv. High Courts may reverse acquittals where trial courts misapply legal standards. ## I) **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment strengthens NDPS jurisprudence by discouraging acquittals based solely on technicalities. It harmonizes accused rights with societal interest in curbing narcotics offences. The ruling reinforces doctrinal clarity on reasonable doubt and appellate powers while ensuring that fairness remains fact-centric rather than presumptive. ## J) **REFERENCES** 1\. *Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi)* *2. K. Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh* *3. State of Himachal Pradesh v. Pawan Kumar* *4. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985* *5. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [M. Ravindran v. The Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, [2020] 12 SCR 915](https://lawfoyer.in/m-ravindran-v-the-intelligence-officer-directorate-of-revenue-intelligence-2020-12-scr-915/) **Published:** December 31, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in M. Ravindran v. The Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence authoritatively settles the scope, nature, and enforceability of the indefeasible right to default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, read with Section 36A(4) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The Supreme Court examined whether such a right, once accrued and invoked by the accused upon expiry of the statutory investigation period of 180 days, can be defeated by the prosecution through the subsequent filing of an additional complaint before disposal of the bail application. The Court firmly reaffirmed that the right to default bail is not a procedural formality but a constitutional safeguard flowing from Article 21. It held that the accused is deemed to have “availed of” the right the moment an application for default bail is filed along with willingness to furnish bail, and not when actual release occurs. Any contrary interpretation would legitimise illegal detention and permit prosecutorial manipulation. The judgment harmonises prior conflicting interpretations arising from Sanjay Dutt, Hitendra Vishnu Thakur, and Uday Mohanlal Acharya, while emphatically preferring an interpretation that protects personal liberty. It further cautioned courts and prosecutors against dilatory tactics that undermine statutory mandates. The ruling strengthens due process, reinforces investigative accountability, and elevates default bail from a statutory right to a constitutional imperative. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment in *M. Ravindran v. The Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence* authoritatively settles the scope, nature, and enforceability of the *indefeasible right to default bail* under *Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*, read with *Section 36A(4) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985*. The Supreme Court examined whether such a right, once accrued and invoked by the accused upon expiry of the statutory investigation period of *180 days*, can be defeated by the prosecution through the subsequent filing of an additional complaint before disposal of the bail application. The Court firmly reaffirmed that the right to default bail is not a procedural formality but a *constitutional safeguard flowing from Article 21*. It held that the accused is deemed to have “availed of” the right the moment an application for default bail is filed along with willingness to furnish bail, and not when actual release occurs. Any contrary interpretation would legitimise illegal detention and permit prosecutorial manipulation. The judgment harmonises prior conflicting interpretations arising from *Sanjay Dutt*, *Hitendra Vishnu Thakur*, and *Uday Mohanlal Acharya*, while emphatically preferring an interpretation that protects personal liberty. It further cautioned courts and prosecutors against dilatory tactics that undermine statutory mandates. The ruling strengthens due process, reinforces investigative accountability, and elevates default bail from a statutory right to a constitutional imperative. **Keywords:** Default Bail; Section 167(2) CrPC; Article 21; NDPS Act; Indefeasible Right; Personal Liberty ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*M. Ravindran v. The Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence*Case NumberCriminal Appeal No. 699 of 2020Judgement Date26 October 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorum*Uday Umesh Lalit, Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, Vineet Saran, JJ.*Author*Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, J.*Citation*\[2020\] 12 SCR 915*Legal Provisions Involved*Section 167(2) CrPC; Section 36A(4) NDPS Act; Article 21 Constitution of India*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsCriminal Law; Constitutional Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The judgment emerges from a recurring constitutional tension between *investigative convenience* and *personal liberty*. The NDPS Act, owing to its stringent framework, permits extended detention during investigation, but such extension is carefully conditioned by statutory safeguards. *Section 36A(4) NDPS Act* modifies *Section 167(2) CrPC* by extending the permissible investigation period to *180 days*, with a further extension to *one year* only upon a reasoned report by the Public Prosecutor. The background of the dispute lies in prosecutorial attempts across jurisdictions to neutralise default bail by filing charge-sheets or additional complaints after expiry of the statutory period but before formal grant of bail. This practice raised serious constitutional concerns regarding arbitrary detention and erosion of *Article 21*. The Supreme Court, in earlier decisions such as *Uday Mohanlal Acharya* and *Rakesh Kumar Paul*, had emphasised that default bail is an *indefeasible right*. However, divergent interpretations of the phrase “*if not already availed of*” in *Sanjay Dutt* created judicial uncertainty. This case presented an opportunity to conclusively determine whether the prosecution can frustrate the right by strategic timing and whether “availing” the right requires actual release or mere invocation. The judgment therefore stands as a doctrinal clarification with far-reaching consequences for criminal procedure and constitutional liberties. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellant was arrested on *04.08.2018* for offences punishable under *Section 8(c) read with Sections 22(c), 23(c), 25A and 29 of the NDPS Act*. He was remanded to judicial custody on the same date. Under *Section 36A(4) NDPS Act*, the investigating agency was required to complete investigation within *180 days*, excluding the date of remand. The statutory period expired on *31.01.2019*. No application seeking extension of time was filed by the Public Prosecutor within this period, nor was any final report or complaint submitted. On *01.02.2019 at 10:30 a.m.*, the appellant filed an application for default bail under *Section 167(2) CrPC*. During the hearing of the bail application, and after arguments were substantially concluded, the prosecution filed an *additional complaint at 4:25 p.m.* on the same day. The Trial Court granted default bail, holding that the right had already accrued and could not be defeated by subsequent filing. The High Court of Madras reversed this order, reasoning that since the additional complaint was filed before disposal of the bail application, the right stood extinguished. Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the *indefeasible right to default bail* under *Section 167(2) CrPC* is extinguished by subsequent filing of an additional complaint? ii. Whether “availing of” default bail requires actual release or merely filing of a bail application? iii. Whether continued detention after expiry of the statutory period violates *Article 21*? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the Appellant submitted that the statutory period had conclusively expired and no extension was sought under *Section 36A(4)*. Reliance was placed on *Uday Mohanlal Acharya*, asserting that the right crystallises upon filing the bail application. It was argued that subsequent filing of an additional complaint is legally irrelevant and constitutionally impermissible. Continued detention was contended to be *illegal and violative of Article 21*. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the Respondent contended that default bail can be availed only upon actual release. Since the additional complaint was filed before disposal of the bail application, the right stood extinguished. Reliance was placed on *Explanation I to Section 167(2)* to justify continued custody. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the order of the Trial Court. It held that *Section 167(2)* must be interpreted purposively to protect liberty. The Court rejected the High Court’s formalistic reasoning and clarified that once the statutory period expires, the Court lacks jurisdiction to authorise further detention unless the accused fails to furnish bail. The Court emphasised that permitting the prosecution to defeat default bail by filing an additional complaint would convert illegal custody into legal detention. Such an approach would undermine investigative discipline and constitutional guarantees. The appellant was held entitled to default bail, subject to conditions imposed by the Trial Court, including surrender of passport and cooperation with investigation. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio decidendi is that *the right to default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC is deemed to be availed the moment the accused files an application expressing readiness to furnish bail upon expiry of the statutory period*. Actual release is not determinative. Any subsequent filing of a charge-sheet or additional complaint does not extinguish this right. The Court grounded this reasoning in *Article 21*, holding that detention beyond the statutory period is unconstitutional. It reaffirmed *Uday Mohanlal Acharya* and harmonised it with *Sanjay Dutt* by clarifying the meaning of “availed of”. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that magistrates and defence counsel should inform accused persons of their right to default bail immediately upon accrual, especially where the accused belongs to marginalised sections. It also cautioned prosecutors against dilatory tactics aimed at buying time. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Default bail must be granted immediately upon expiry of statutory period if application is filed. ii. Subsequent filing of charge-sheet or complaint is irrelevant. iii. Courts must avoid technical interpretations that curtail liberty. iv. Prosecutors must seek extension strictly within statutory timelines. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment decisively constitutionalises default bail and reinforces judicial accountability in remand jurisprudence. It strengthens procedural fairness and curtails prosecutorial overreach. The ruling is a vital reaffirmation that *liberty is the rule and detention the exception*, even under stringent special statutes like the NDPS Act. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra* 2. *Sanjay Dutt v. State through CBI* 3. *Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam* 4. *Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* 2. *Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985* 3. *Constitution of India* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Raveen Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, [2020] 8 SCR 1044](https://lawfoyer.in/raveen-kumar-v-state-of-himachal-pradesh-2020-8-scr-1044/) **Published:** December 30, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in Raveen Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh examines the permissible scope of appellate interference with an order of acquittal under criminal jurisprudence, particularly in prosecutions under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the High Court was justified in reversing an acquittal based on erroneous reliance placed by the trial court on a prosecution reply filed during bail proceedings. The Court analysed the evidentiary value of court records, the legal consequences of non-confrontation of such material with witnesses, and the principles governing appreciation of testimony of official witnesses in the absence of independent corroboration. A crucial legal determination was made regarding the doctrine of “chance recovery” and the extent to which prior information must be proved to invoke the safeguards under Section 42 of the NDPS Act. The judgment clarifies that pleadings filed before a court do not enjoy any presumption of truth unless duly proved and confronted during trial. The Court further reinforced that hostile testimony of an independent witness does not efface corroborative value if material portions support prosecution compliance. On sentencing, the Court revisited the mandatory minimum punishment under Section 20 of the NDPS Act both before and after the 2001 amendment and reconciled the High Court’s lenient approach with subsequent authoritative clarification in Hira Singh v. Union of India. While upholding conviction and sentence, the judgment significantly contributes to evidentiary law, appellate standards, and NDPS sentencing jurisprudence. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment in *Raveen Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh* examines the permissible scope of appellate interference with an order of acquittal under criminal jurisprudence, particularly in prosecutions under the *Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985*. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the High Court was justified in reversing an acquittal based on erroneous reliance placed by the trial court on a prosecution reply filed during bail proceedings. The Court analysed the evidentiary value of court records, the legal consequences of non-confrontation of such material with witnesses, and the principles governing appreciation of testimony of official witnesses in the absence of independent corroboration. A crucial legal determination was made regarding the doctrine of “chance recovery” and the extent to which prior information must be proved to invoke the safeguards under *Section 42 of the NDPS Act*. The judgment clarifies that pleadings filed before a court do not enjoy any presumption of truth unless duly proved and confronted during trial. The Court further reinforced that hostile testimony of an independent witness does not efface corroborative value if material portions support prosecution compliance. On sentencing, the Court revisited the mandatory minimum punishment under *Section 20 of the NDPS Act* both before and after the 2001 amendment and reconciled the High Court’s lenient approach with subsequent authoritative clarification in *Hira Singh v. Union of India*. While upholding conviction and sentence, the judgment significantly contributes to evidentiary law, appellate standards, and NDPS sentencing jurisprudence. **Keywords:** NDPS Act, Appeal against acquittal, Chance recovery, Independent witnesses, Mandatory minimum sentence ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgment Cause Title*Raveen Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh*ii) Case NumberCriminal Appeal Nos. 2187–2188 of 2011iii) Judgment Date26 October 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumN.V. Ramana, Surya Kant, Hrishikesh Roy, JJ.vi) AuthorJustice Surya Kantvii) Citation*\[2020\] 8 SCR 1044*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Section 20 NDPS Act, Section 161 CrPC, Article 136 Constitution of India*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsCriminal Law, Evidence Law, NDPS Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The appeal arose from a reversal of acquittal by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in a prosecution under *Section 20 of the NDPS Act*. The trial court had acquitted the accused on the ground that the alleged recovery of *charas* was not a “chance recovery” and that statutory safeguards had been bypassed due to prior information with the police. This conclusion was drawn almost exclusively from a reply filed by the prosecution opposing the accused’s bail application. The High Court found this approach legally unsustainable and re-appreciated the evidence, leading to conviction and imposition of a reduced sentence. The Supreme Court was thus tasked with examining whether the High Court exceeded its appellate jurisdiction and whether reliance on such bail-stage pleadings could vitiate the prosecution case. The judgment situates itself within settled criminal appellate principles, reaffirming that there is no qualitative distinction between appeals against conviction and acquittal, though judicial restraint remains paramount. The Court also addressed systemic issues relating to NDPS trials, including frequent non-availability of independent witnesses and the evidentiary weight of official testimony. The decision is doctrinally important as it bridges evidentiary rules under the *Indian Evidence Act* with procedural safeguards under the *NDPS Act*, thereby preventing misuse of technicalities to defeat substantive justice. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE On *1 November 1994*, a police party conducting routine traffic checking near the HP–J&K border at Surangani intercepted a Maruti van driven by the appellant. During inspection, various household articles were found along with a polythene bag concealed beneath the driver’s seat. Suspecting narcotics, the police summoned two local shopkeepers as independent witnesses. The appellant was informed of his statutory right to be searched before a Magistrate or Gazetted Officer, which he waived in writing. Upon search, *charas* in the form of balls and *dhoopbati* was recovered weighing *1 kg 230 grams*. Samples were drawn, sealed, and sent for chemical analysis which confirmed the substance as *charas* with *34.5% resin content*. During trial, five prosecution witnesses were examined. PW1, an independent witness, partially resiled and was declared hostile but admitted signing documents at the spot and witnessing procedural compliance. PW2 to PW5, police officials, consistently supported the recovery and statutory compliance. The trial court, however, relied on a prosecution reply filed during bail proceedings alleging prior secret information about the accused, and concluded that the police falsely projected the case as chance recovery. The accused was acquitted. On appeal, the High Court reversed the acquittal, holding that the reply was never put to the investigating officer and could not be relied upon. The conviction was restored with a reduced sentence. The present appeal challenged this reversal. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the High Court exceeded its appellate jurisdiction in reversing an acquittal? ii. Whether a reply filed during bail proceedings can be relied upon without confrontation during trial? iii. Whether absence or hostility of independent witnesses vitiates NDPS prosecution? iv. Whether the sentence imposed was legally sustainable under the NDPS Act? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsel for the appellant submitted that once acquitted, the presumption of innocence stood reinforced and the High Court could not substitute its view merely because another view was possible. It was argued that the sole independent witness did not support recovery, rendering conviction unsafe. Reliance was placed on the prosecution’s bail reply to demonstrate prior information, thereby invalidating chance recovery and mandatory compliance with *Section 42 NDPS Act*. It was contended that court records need not be proved like *Section 161 CrPC* statements. Leniency in sentencing was also sought on grounds of age and delay. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The State argued that the trial court’s acquittal was perverse as it relied on irrelevant and unproved material. It was emphasized that official witnesses are competent and reliable in NDPS cases. The bail reply was never confronted with PW5 and thus lacked evidentiary value. The State further contended that the High Court had already shown excessive leniency contrary to statutory minimum punishment. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 20 NDPS Act* ii. *Section 42 NDPS Act* iii. *Section 161 CrPC* iv. *Section 145 Indian Evidence Act* v. *Article 136 Constitution of India* ## I) JUDGMENT The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the High Court’s judgment. It reiterated that appellate courts possess full power to re-appreciate evidence in appeals against acquittal, subject to judicial restraint. The trial court’s reliance on the bail reply was held legally impermissible. The Court clarified that no presumption of truth attaches to pleadings filed in court unless proved and confronted during cross-examination. The reply could at best be treated as an admission, governed by *Section 145 of the Evidence Act*, requiring confrontation. The Court found that PW1’s testimony, though hostile, corroborated procedural compliance and recovery. Police witnesses were found consistent and reliable. Absence of independent corroboration was held non-fatal. On sentencing, the Court noted that both pre- and post-2001 versions of *Section 20 NDPS Act* mandated a minimum of ten years’ imprisonment for commercial quantity. In light of *Hira Singh v. Union of India*, the total mixture weight exceeded commercial quantity, rendering the two-year sentence already unduly lenient. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** A reply filed during bail proceedings does not enjoy evidentiary sanctity unless proved and confronted; appellate courts can reverse acquittal where trial court relies on irrelevant material; hostility of independent witnesses does not negate corroborated official testimony; total quantity of narcotic mixture governs sentencing under NDPS Act. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that NDPS sentencing had historically suffered from misinterpretation of “pure content” and emphasized adherence to statutory minimums to deter drug trafficking. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Courts must not rely on un-confronted pleadings as evidence. ii. Appellate interference is justified where acquittal is based on irrelevant material. iii. Hostile witnesses do not nullify corroborative evidence. iv. NDPS sentencing must consider total mixture quantity. ## J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces doctrinal clarity on appellate review, evidentiary discipline, and NDPS sentencing. It discourages technical acquittals based on procedural misuse and strengthens prosecutorial accountability while preserving fair trial safeguards. The reasoning balances individual liberty with societal interest and contributes significantly to criminal jurisprudence under special statutes. ## K) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Ramabhupala Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh*, *(1970) 3 SCC 474* 2. *State of U.P. v. Banne*, *(2009) 4 SCC 271* 3. *Babu v. State of Kerala*, *\[2010\] 9 SCR 1039* 4. *Ram Jag v. State of U.P.*, *\[1974\] 3 SCR 9* 5. *Sita Ram Bhau Patil v. Ramchandra Nago Patil*, *\[1977\] 2 SCR 671* 6. *Kalpnath Rai v. State*, *AIR 1998 SC 201* 7. *Hira Singh v. Union of India*, *2020 SCC OnLine SC 382* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985* 2. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* 3. *Indian Evidence Act, 1872* 4. *Constitution of India* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Satyama Dubey & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [2020] 9 SCR 517](https://lawfoyer.in/satyama-dubey-ors-v-union-of-india-ors-2020-9-scr-517/) **Published:** December 30, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in Satyama Dubey & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. arises out of an extraordinary invocation of Article 32 of the Constitution of India seeking judicial intervention in the investigation of a brutal gang rape and subsequent death of a nineteen-year-old woman in Hathras, Uttar Pradesh. The petitions raised serious constitutional and procedural concerns relating to fair investigation, alleged illegal cremation, witness protection, and judicial monitoring. The Supreme Court was confronted with competing institutional considerations: safeguarding the victim’s family and public confidence in criminal justice, while respecting the federal structure and jurisdictional primacy of the High Court. The Court acknowledged that the State of Uttar Pradesh had already transferred the investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation, thereby neutralising apprehensions of police bias. Emphasis was placed on judicial restraint and institutional comity, with the Court declining to monitor the investigation when the Allahabad High Court had already assumed seisin through a suo motu public interest litigation. A significant constitutional intervention was made by directing Central Reserve Police Force protection to the victim’s family and witnesses as a confidence-building measure, without casting aspersions on the State Police. The judgment also addressed statutory confidentiality under Section 228A of the Indian Penal Code, cautioning against disclosure of the identity and familial particulars of a rape victim. The decision reflects a calibrated balance between victims’ rights, due process, and judicial federalism, reinforcing the principle that constitutional remedies must not disrupt parallel proceedings unless compelling circumstances so demand. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment in *Satyama Dubey & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.* arises out of an extraordinary invocation of *Article 32 of the Constitution of India* seeking judicial intervention in the investigation of a *brutal gang rape and subsequent death of a nineteen-year-old woman in Hathras, Uttar Pradesh*. The petitions raised serious constitutional and procedural concerns relating to *fair investigation*, *alleged illegal cremation*, *witness protection*, and *judicial monitoring*. The Supreme Court was confronted with competing institutional considerations: safeguarding the victim’s family and public confidence in criminal justice, while respecting the federal structure and jurisdictional primacy of the High Court. The Court acknowledged that *the State of Uttar Pradesh had already transferred the investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation*, thereby neutralising apprehensions of police bias. Emphasis was placed on *judicial restraint* and *institutional comity*, with the Court declining to monitor the investigation when the *Allahabad High Court* had already assumed seisin through a suo motu public interest litigation. A significant constitutional intervention was made by directing *Central Reserve Police Force protection* to the victim’s family and witnesses as a confidence-building measure, without casting aspersions on the State Police. The judgment also addressed statutory confidentiality under *Section 228A of the Indian Penal Code*, cautioning against disclosure of the identity and familial particulars of a rape victim. The decision reflects a calibrated balance between *victims’ rights*, *due process*, and *judicial federalism*, reinforcing the principle that constitutional remedies must not disrupt parallel proceedings unless compelling circumstances so demand. **Keywords:** Fair investigation; Article 32; CBI investigation; Witness protection; Section 228A IPC; Judicial restraint. ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*Satyama Dubey & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.*ii) Case NumberWrit Petition (Criminal) No. 296 of 2020iii) Judgement Date27 October 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) Quorum*S. A. Bobde, CJI; A. S. Bopanna, J.; V. Ramasubramanian, J.*vi) AuthorSupreme Court of Indiavii) Citation*\[2020\] 9 SCR 517*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Article 32, Constitution of India; Section 228A IPC; SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989*ix) Judgments overruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsConstitutional Law; Criminal Law; Human Rights Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The case emerged against a backdrop of widespread public outrage following the *alleged gang rape, brutal assault, and death of a young Dalit woman in Hathras district of Uttar Pradesh*. The manner of cremation, conducted late at night and allegedly without family consent, triggered allegations of *destruction of evidence* and *state complicity*. Multiple writ petitions and intervention applications were filed before the Supreme Court invoking *Article 32*, reflecting deep public concern regarding institutional failure and denial of justice. Simultaneously, the *Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench* had taken suo motu cognizance of the incident through *PIL(C) No. 16150 of 2020*, passing detailed interim orders and summoning senior state officials. This parallel judicial engagement created a constitutional question concerning *overlapping jurisdiction* and the propriety of Supreme Court monitoring when a High Court was actively seized of the matter. The Union and the State of Uttar Pradesh adopted a non-adversarial stance, conceding the necessity of a fair investigation and placing on record that *the investigation had already been transferred to the CBI on 10.10.2020*. The Court thus had to determine the scope of its intervention in light of *subsidiarity*, *federal balance*, and *judicial discipline*, while still addressing urgent concerns of witness safety and statutory compliance. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The factual matrix reveals that the victim, a *19-year-old woman from Hathras*, was subjected to *alleged gang rape and severe physical assault*. She was initially treated in Uttar Pradesh and later shifted to *Safdarjung Hospital, New Delhi*, where she succumbed to her injuries. The *cremation of her body was conducted during the night*, allegedly without the consent or presence of her family members, leading to allegations of procedural illegality. Multiple petitioners, including civil society organisations, lawyers’ associations, and individuals, approached the Supreme Court seeking *CBI investigation*, *constitution of a Special Investigation Team*, *judicial monitoring*, *transfer of trial outside Uttar Pradesh*, and *protection of witnesses*. Some petitions also sought directions against alleged police misconduct and invocation of provisions under the *SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989*. In response, the State of Uttar Pradesh filed affidavits stating that *three-tier security* had been provided to the victim’s family and witnesses, comprising armed constabulary, civil police, and CCTV surveillance. It was further disclosed that the *CBI had commenced investigation on 11.10.2020*. The family had engaged private counsel, and the High Court had already passed multiple orders overseeing the investigation. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the Supreme Court should monitor the investigation under *Article 32* when the High Court is already seized of the matter? ii. Whether protection by State Police satisfies constitutional requirements of witness safety in sensitive cases? iii. Whether disclosure of identity and familial details of a rape victim in judicial orders violates *Section 228A IPC*? iv. Whether transfer of trial outside the State is warranted at the investigation stage? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the petitioners submitted that the *local police machinery was compromised*, necessitating independent investigation under judicial supervision. It was argued that *illegal cremation* amounted to destruction of evidence and violated *Article 21*. Concerns were raised regarding intimidation of witnesses and the victim’s family, rendering State-provided security ineffective. Petitioners contended that only *central forces* and *Supreme Court monitoring* could ensure fairness, transparency, and public confidence. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents submitted that the *State itself had transferred the investigation to the CBI*, thereby eliminating apprehensions of bias. It was argued that the *Allahabad High Court was actively monitoring the case*, making Supreme Court intervention unnecessary. The State maintained that adequate protection had been provided and that constitutional propriety demanded deference to ongoing High Court proceedings. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Article 32, Constitution of India* ii. *Section 228A, Indian Penal Code, 1860* iii. *Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court held that since *the investigation had already been entrusted to the CBI*, the principal grievance of the petitioners stood redressed. The Court declined to assume monitoring jurisdiction, observing that the *Allahabad High Court had adequately delved into the matter* and possessed territorial and factual proximity. On witness protection, the Court acknowledged that State Police arrangements existed but directed *CRPF protection* purely as a *confidence-building measure*, without attributing mala fides to State authorities. The Court refrained from ordering appointment of a Special Public Prosecutor, leaving the issue to the High Court under the *SC/ST Act framework*. Importantly, the Court addressed the statutory mandate under *Section 228A IPC*, directing deletion and digital masking of disclosed identities from High Court records. The prayer for transfer of trial was kept open, to be considered at a later stage if circumstances so warranted. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The binding principle emerging is that *the Supreme Court should not ordinarily monitor investigations when a competent High Court is already seized of the matter and has taken substantive steps*. Judicial intervention under *Article 32* must respect *institutional hierarchy* and *federal balance*. Additionally, *witness protection* may be enhanced through central forces to preserve confidence without imputing blame. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court’s observations on *public perception*, *pessimism regarding local policing*, and the need for *confidence-building measures* constitute persuasive guidance. The emphasis on *statutory confidentiality under Section 228A IPC* reflects judicial sensitivity towards victim dignity beyond the immediate lis. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Central forces may be deployed for witness protection where public confidence so demands. ii. High Courts must avoid disclosure of victim identity and familial details. iii. Transfer of trial should be considered only after completion of investigation. ## J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment represents a restrained yet responsive constitutional approach. It reinforces *judicial federalism*, affirms *victims’ rights*, and preserves *procedural fairness* without institutional overreach. The decision underscores that *justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done*, while respecting jurisdictional discipline. ## K) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Satyama Dubey & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.*, *\[2020\] 9 SCR 517* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Constitution of India* ii. *Indian Penal Code, 1860* iii. *Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Dharmendra Kumar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., [2020] 12 SCR 557](https://lawfoyer.in/dharmendra-kumar-singh-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-ors-2020-12-scr-557/) **Published:** December 30, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in Dharmendra Kumar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. addresses a recurring conflict between environmental protection and vested commercial interests in the mining sector. The Supreme Court examined whether mining leaseholders, whose operations were halted due to judicial and administrative interdictions aimed at forest conservation, were entitled to an extension of their mining leases for the obstructed period. The appellants argued that since mining was stopped without fault on their part, equity demanded extension of leases to restore them to their original position. The State of Uttar Pradesh contended that neither the Uttar Pradesh Mining Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963 nor the lease deeds permitted such extension, and that statutory policy had shifted decisively towards auction-based grants. The Court rejected the proposition that every judicial interdict automatically entitles a party to restoration by extension of contractual or statutory rights. It held that extension of a mining lease must strictly flow either from statutory authority or contractual terms, and cannot be granted merely on equitable considerations. The Court interpreted Rule 68 narrowly as a limited relaxation provision and affirmed that Rule 40(h) exhaustively governs consequences of disruption of mining operations. In light of the New Mining Policy, 2017, which mandates e-auction and does not contemplate extensions, the Court declined to order lease extensions. However, invoking Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court balanced equities by directing refund of security deposits and advance royalties with simple interest at 9% per annum. The judgment reinforces statutory supremacy, restricts judicially created commercial benefits, and clarifies that environmental protection orders cannot be used as a basis to bypass transparent mining policies. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment in *Dharmendra Kumar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.* addresses a recurring conflict between environmental protection and vested commercial interests in the mining sector. The Supreme Court examined whether mining leaseholders, whose operations were halted due to judicial and administrative interdictions aimed at forest conservation, were entitled to an extension of their mining leases for the obstructed period. The appellants argued that since mining was stopped without fault on their part, equity demanded extension of leases to restore them to their original position. The State of Uttar Pradesh contended that neither the *Uttar Pradesh Mining Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963* nor the lease deeds permitted such extension, and that statutory policy had shifted decisively towards auction-based grants. The Court rejected the proposition that every judicial interdict automatically entitles a party to restoration by extension of contractual or statutory rights. It held that extension of a mining lease must strictly flow either from *statutory authority* or *contractual terms*, and cannot be granted merely on equitable considerations. The Court interpreted *Rule 68* narrowly as a limited relaxation provision and affirmed that *Rule 40(h)* exhaustively governs consequences of disruption of mining operations. In light of the *New Mining Policy, 2017*, which mandates e-auction and does not contemplate extensions, the Court declined to order lease extensions. However, invoking *Article 142 of the Constitution*, the Court balanced equities by directing refund of security deposits and advance royalties with *simple interest at 9% per annum*. The judgment reinforces statutory supremacy, restricts judicially created commercial benefits, and clarifies that environmental protection orders cannot be used as a basis to bypass transparent mining policies. **Keywords:** Mining Lease, Obstructed Period, Rule 68, Rule 40(h), Article 142, Forest Conservation, Eco-Sensitive Zone, Environmental Jurisprudence ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*Dharmendra Kumar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 12202 of 2018 with connected appealsiii) Judgement Date28 October 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) Quorum*Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul* and *Hon’ble Mr. Justice Hrishikesh Roy*vi) Author*Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul*vii) Citation*\[2020\] 12 SCR 557*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Rules 40(h) & 68, UP Mining Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963; Sections 4 & 20, Indian Forest Act, 1927; Article 142, Constitution of India*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsEnvironmental Law, Mining Law, Administrative Law, Constitutional Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The litigation arose from long-standing disputes surrounding mining activities in *Village Billi Markundi, District Sonbhadra, Uttar Pradesh*, an ecologically sensitive area proximate to forest land and wildlife zones. Mining leases had been granted decades earlier, but overlapping forest notifications under *Section 4 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927* created persistent uncertainty. Judicial interventions, particularly by the *National Green Tribunal*, sought to halt mining pending clarification of forest boundaries and compliance with environmental safeguards. The impugned orders stemmed from proceedings initiated to prevent illegal mining near the *Kaimur Wildlife Sanctuary*. Acting on environmental concerns and earlier forest notifications, the NGT directed prohibition of mining activities until proper statutory notifications under *Section 20 of the Forest Act* were issued. Leaseholders were not impleaded, yet administrative orders by District Magistrates enforced suspension of mining operations. The appellants, whose lands were ultimately found to be outside reserved forest areas, claimed severe commercial loss due to prolonged stoppage. They sought extension of leases equivalent to the obstructed period, invoking principles of equity and the maxim *actus curiae neminem gravabit*. The State resisted, citing statutory constraints and policy shifts toward transparent auction-based mining. The Supreme Court was thus called upon to reconcile environmental imperatives, statutory mining regimes, and equitable considerations. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE Mining leases for minor minerals such as *dolostone, gitti, boulders, and building stone* were granted to the appellants between 2007 and 2011 in *Village Billi Markundi*. The land had earlier been included in a *1969 notification under Section 4 of the Indian Forest Act*, though no subsequent notification under *Section 20* was issued for decades. Following directions in *Banwasi Seva Ashram v. State of U.P.*, settlement proceedings were conducted, and claims of several leaseholders were accepted, excluding their lands from forest classification. Despite this, fresh environmental litigation before the NGT culminated in orders dated *13 July 2018* and *25 March 2019*, directing cessation of mining in areas covered under *Section 4 notifications*. Acting on these orders, District Magistrates suspended mining operations of the appellants from *29 August 2018* and *5 February 2019*. During this period, some leases expired, while others subsisted. Subsequently, the State issued the long-pending *Section 20 notification* on *15 June 2020*, clarifying forest boundaries and confirming that appellants’ lands were non-forest revenue lands. Mining, however, had remained halted for nearly two years. The appellants approached the Supreme Court under *Section 22 of the NGT Act, 2010*, seeking restoration by extension of leases for the obstructed period or, alternatively, compensation for losses incurred. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether mining leases can be extended for the obstructed period when mining was halted due to judicial or administrative orders not attributable to the leaseholders? ii. Whether *Rule 68 of the UP Mining Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963* empowers the State to grant such extension? iii. Whether equitable principles like *actus curiae neminem gravabit* override statutory mining policy? iv. What is the legal consequence of disruption of mining operations under *Rule 40(h)*? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that mining operations were suspended without any illegality or fault on their part. The stoppage resulted solely from judicial proceedings initiated behind their back and prolonged administrative inaction in issuing the *Section 20 notification*. It was argued that prior litigation, including *Banwasi Seva Ashram*, had conclusively settled that the appellants’ lands were non-forest lands. Reliance was placed on *Beg Raj Singh v. State of U.P.* to assert that courts must restore parties to the position they would have occupied but for judicial error. The appellants invoked *Rule 68* as a plenary relaxation power permitting extension in special cases and cited *J.P. Yadav v. Kanhaiya Singh* to argue that extension for obstructed periods had judicial sanction. It was contended that denial of extension would unjustly enrich the State and penalise lawful leaseholders. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the State contended that extension of mining leases is a matter of statute, not equity. Neither the lease deeds nor the *Mining Rules* provide for extension due to judicial interdicts. *Rule 68* was argued to be a narrowly tailored provision meant to further mineral development, not to bypass mandatory procedures under *Chapters II and IV* relating to grant and auction of leases. The State relied on consistent Allahabad High Court precedent, including *Sukhan Singh v. State of U.P.*, *Mohammad Yunus Hasan v. State of U.P.*, and *Vijay Kumar Dwivedi v. State of U.P.*, holding that obstructed periods do not confer a right to extension. Emphasis was placed on the *New Mining Policy, 2017*, mandating e-auction and containing no provision for extension. At most, the State conceded refund of security deposit and advance royalties under *Rule 40(h)*. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court framed the controversy narrowly, limiting its inquiry to whether leases could be extended for the obstructed period or whether monetary restitution was the only permissible relief. The Court underscored that mining rights are statutory privileges and not vested property rights. Any extension must strictly emanate from statutory provisions or contractual terms. Interpreting *Rule 68*, the Court held that it is a *restrictive relaxation clause* intended to advance mineral development in exceptional cases, not a general equity provision. The language “*in the interest of mineral development*” was construed narrowly to prevent misuse, especially given India’s troubled mining history. The Court approved the reasoning in *Mohammad Yunus Hasan* and *Vijay Kumar Dwivedi*, rejecting expansive interpretations. The Court further noted that the *New Mining Policy, 2017* reflects a decisive shift towards transparency through e-auction. Granting extensions retrospectively would defeat this policy and create an impermissible exception. On disruption consequences, the Court held that *Rule 40(h)* exhaustively governs the field, providing only for adjustment or refund of monetary amounts, not extension of time. Balancing equities, the Court acknowledged that the appellants suffered loss due to no fault of theirs. Invoking *Article 142*, it directed refund of security deposits and advance royalties with *9% simple interest*, treating this as complete justice without violating statutory mandates. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The right to extension of a mining lease must flow from *statutory provisions or contractual terms*. Judicial or administrative interdictions, by themselves, do not create an enforceable right to extension, especially where statutory rules and policy prohibit such extension. *Rule 68* cannot be invoked to override transparent auction-based mining policy, and *Rule 40(h)* limits relief to monetary adjustment or refund. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that while the maxim *actus curiae neminem gravabit* reflects a sound equitable principle, it cannot be applied mechanically. Environmental protection orders serve a larger public purpose, and individual commercial inconvenience cannot automatically translate into extended statutory benefits. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Extension of mining leases must strictly comply with statutory mining rules and prevailing policy. ii. Judicial interdicts aimed at environmental protection do not, per se, justify extension of commercial rights. iii. Consequences of mining disruption are confined to monetary adjustments under *Rule 40(h)*. iv. Equitable relief, if warranted, may be moulded under *Article 142* without contravening statute. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces legislative supremacy in natural resource governance and curtails judicial creation of commercial entitlements under the guise of equity. By denying lease extensions yet granting monetary restitution with interest, the Court struck a calibrated balance between statutory discipline and fairness. The decision affirms that environmental adjudication cannot be diluted through post-hoc commercial adjustments and that mining policy must be applied uniformly to preserve transparency and ecological integrity. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** - *Banwasi Seva Ashram v. State of U.P.*, *(1986) 4 SCC 753* - *Beg Raj Singh v. State of U.P.*, *(2003) 1 SCC 726* - *Sukhan Singh v. State of U.P.*, *(2015) 2 All LJ 619* - *Mohammad Yunus Hasan v. State of U.P.*, *(2016) 4 All LJ 4* - *Vijay Kumar Dwivedi v. State of U.P.*, *(2016) 4 All LJ 690* - *Sulekhan Singh & Co. v. State of U.P.*, *(2016) 4 SCC 663* - *Deepak Kumar v. State of Haryana*, *(2012) 4 SCC 629* **b) Important Statutes Referred** - *Indian Forest Act, 1927* - *Uttar Pradesh Mining Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963* - *Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957* - *National Green Tribunal Act, 2010* - *Constitution of India* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Mrs Ritika Sharan v. Mr Sujoy Ghosh, [2020] 10 SCR 363](https://lawfoyer.in/mrs-ritika-sharan-v-mr-sujoy-ghosh-2020-10-scr-363/) **Published:** December 30, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment concerns a complex matrimonial and guardianship dispute involving the custody and overseas relocation of a minor child amid pending divorce and domestic violence proceedings. The appellant-mother and respondent-father had been living separately since 2016, with the minor child continuously residing under the care of the mother. The dispute arose when the appellant, upon being posted to Singapore for employment, sought permission to take the child along. The Family Court restrained such removal on jurisdictional apprehensions, which was later affirmed by the High Court. The Supreme Court decisively intervened, holding that the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration, overriding procedural technicalities and jurisdictional objections. The Court clarified that assistance rendered by maternal grandparents does not divest the mother of legal custody. Importantly, the Court engaged directly with the minor child through video conferencing and placed substantial weight on the child’s expressed preference to live with the mother. Invoking its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the Court set aside the High Court judgment and permitted the child’s relocation to Singapore with the mother, while simultaneously safeguarding the father’s visitation and access rights through structured directions. The ruling reinforces a welfare-centric, child-sensitive approach in custody jurisprudence, especially in transnational employment contexts, and demonstrates the Supreme Court’s willingness to transcend procedural rigidity to secure substantive justice. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment concerns a complex matrimonial and guardianship dispute involving the custody and overseas relocation of a minor child amid pending divorce and domestic violence proceedings. The appellant-mother and respondent-father had been living separately since *2016*, with the minor child continuously residing under the care of the mother. The dispute arose when the appellant, upon being posted to *Singapore* for employment, sought permission to take the child along. The Family Court restrained such removal on jurisdictional apprehensions, which was later affirmed by the High Court. The Supreme Court decisively intervened, holding that *the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration*, overriding procedural technicalities and jurisdictional objections. The Court clarified that assistance rendered by maternal grandparents does not divest the mother of legal custody. Importantly, the Court engaged directly with the minor child through video conferencing and placed substantial weight on the child’s expressed preference to live with the mother. Invoking its extraordinary powers under *Article 142 of the Constitution of India*, the Court set aside the High Court judgment and permitted the child’s relocation to Singapore with the mother, while simultaneously safeguarding the father’s visitation and access rights through structured directions. The ruling reinforces a welfare-centric, child-sensitive approach in custody jurisprudence, especially in transnational employment contexts, and demonstrates the Supreme Court’s willingness to transcend procedural rigidity to secure substantive justice. **Keywords:** Child custody, Welfare principle, Article 142, Transnational relocation, Visitation rights, Guardianship ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*Mrs Ritika Sharan v. Mr Sujoy Ghosh*ii) Case Number*Civil Appeal Nos. 3544–3545 of 2020*iii) Judgement Date*28 October 2020*iv) Court*Supreme Court of India*v) Quorum*Dr D.Y. Chandrachud, Indu Malhotra & Indira Banerjee, JJ.*vi) Author*Dr D.Y. Chandrachud, J.*vii) Citation*\[2020\] 10 SCR 363*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Article 142, Constitution of India; Section 13(1)(i-a), Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Section 12, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005; Guardianship principles*ix) Judgments Overruled*None*x) Related Law Subjects*Family Law, Constitutional Law, Guardianship Law* ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The dispute emerges from a fractured matrimonial relationship where both spouses initiated parallel civil and criminal proceedings following separation in *2016*. The appellant-mother alleged *domestic violence and cruelty* and instituted divorce proceedings under *Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955*, along with proceedings under *Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005*. These proceedings remained pending throughout the custody dispute. The child, born in *2013*, had remained with the appellant-mother since birth. The dispute intensified when the appellant, employed with *Nike Global Trading*, was posted to *Singapore in September 2017*. Her application seeking the child’s passport and permission to travel was opposed by the respondent, leading to conflicting interim applications before the Family Court. The Family Court restrained the appellant from removing the child outside *Bengaluru* on the reasoning that it would lose jurisdiction. This approach was later endorsed by the High Court, despite the appellant’s challenge. The background reflects a judicial struggle between procedural control and substantive welfare, particularly in cross-border employment scenarios involving minor children. The Supreme Court’s intervention was prompted by the rigidity adopted by the lower courts, which prioritised jurisdictional concerns over the lived reality of the child’s upbringing and emotional needs. The judgment thus situates itself at the intersection of *family law*, *constitutional equity*, and *child welfare jurisprudence*. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellant and respondent married on *4 February 2009*, and their son *Sattik* was born on *9 May 2013*. The parties separated in *2016*, following allegations of abuse and cruelty. The appellant left the matrimonial home and initiated divorce and domestic violence proceedings in Bengaluru. Since separation, the child continuously resided with the appellant. In *July 2017*, the appellant filed *IA No. 3* seeking the child’s passport to facilitate overseas travel related to her employment. The respondent opposed this and filed *IA No. 4* seeking an injunction restraining the child’s removal from Bengaluru, and *IA No. 5* seeking custody and visitation. The Family Court dismissed the appellant’s application and restrained travel, citing loss of jurisdiction. Subsequently, visitation rights were granted to the respondent. The High Court initially stayed the restraint order conditionally but eventually dismissed the appellant’s writ petitions in *July 2019*. During pendency, the appellant was once permitted to take the child to Singapore for Christmas vacation, though the relief became infructuous due to litigation delays. Mediation efforts spanning *27 hours* failed. During Supreme Court proceedings conducted via video conferencing owing to the pandemic, the Court interacted with the child, who unequivocally expressed a desire to live with his mother in Singapore. The appellant assured compliance with jurisdictional safeguards and offered undertakings restricting relocation. The factual matrix thus revealed sustained maternal care, lack of evidence of the respondent’s independent caregiving capacity, and a child-centric preference, compelling reconsideration of earlier orders. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether *the welfare of the minor child* overrides procedural and jurisdictional technicalities in custody disputes? ii. Whether a court can restrain a custodial parent from overseas relocation solely on apprehension of jurisdictional loss? iii. Whether assistance from maternal grandparents divests the mother of legal custody? iv. Whether *Article 142* can be invoked to modify interim custody arrangements? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the child had been in her *exclusive care since birth* and that relocation to Singapore was employment-driven, not an attempt to defeat jurisdiction. It was argued that the Family Court erred in presuming loss of jurisdiction. Emphasis was placed on the *paramount welfare principle*, the appellant’s stable employment, and educational opportunities available to the child in Singapore. The appellant offered undertakings to ensure continued access to the respondent and compliance with Indian court directions. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent contended that the appellant had taken inconsistent stands regarding custody and that permitting relocation would place the child beyond Indian jurisdiction. It was argued that the appellant had not challenged certain interim orders and that the child was residing with maternal grandparents. The respondent also asserted his guardianship rights and apprehended permanent displacement. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Article 142, Constitution of India* ii. *Section 13(1)(i-a), Hindu Marriage Act, 1955* iii. *Section 12, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005* iv. *Guardianship and welfare principles under family law* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court unequivocally held that *the welfare of the child is paramount*. The Court rejected the Family Court’s jurisdiction-based restraint as legally flawed and substantively unjust. It clarified that grandparents’ assistance does not alter legal custody. The Court placed decisive weight on the child’s expressed preference and the continuity of maternal care. Invoking *Article 142*, it set aside the High Court judgment and permitted relocation, while crafting a detailed visitation framework safeguarding the respondent’s parental access. The passport was ordered to be handed over, and relocation restrictions were balanced through undertakings and continued Indian jurisdiction. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The controlling principle is that *procedural technicalities cannot eclipse child welfare*. Jurisdictional apprehensions must yield to substantive justice, especially when continuity of care and the child’s preference are evident. *Article 142* empowers the Court to mould relief transcending statutory limitations. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that prolonged litigation and rigid proceduralism can irreversibly harm a child’s emotional and educational development. Courts must adopt flexible, humane approaches in custody matters. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Welfare of the child supersedes all technical objections. ii. Overseas relocation by a custodial parent cannot be mechanically restrained. iii. Structured visitation must accompany relocation orders. iv. Courts may interact directly with children to ascertain preferences. ## J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment represents a progressive affirmation of *child-centric justice*. By transcending jurisdictional formalism and foregrounding lived realities, the Supreme Court reinforced constitutional equity in family law. The ruling sets a persuasive precedent for transnational custody disputes, ensuring that parental conflict does not eclipse a child’s developmental and emotional needs. ## K) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Mrs Ritika Sharan v. Mr Sujoy Ghosh*, *\[2020\] 10 SCR 363* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Constitution of India* ii. *Hindu Marriage Act, 1955* iii. *Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Thomas Lawrence v. State of Kerala & Ors., [2020] 9 S.C.R. 325](https://lawfoyer.in/thomas-lawrence-v-state-of-kerala-ors-2020-9-s-c-r-325/) **Published:** December 30, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in Thomas Lawrence v. State of Kerala & Ors. addresses the procedural and substantive contours of environmental adjudication before the National Green Tribunal, particularly in relation to execution proceedings arising from prior directions concerning alleged destruction of wetlands. The appeal arose from the dismissal of an execution application by the National Green Tribunal on the ground that no separate orders were required, as the matter could be examined within another pending original application. The appellant contended that the execution application stemmed from an earlier NGT order directing the District Collector to take action regarding alleged destruction of wetlands and a ten-acre pond within the Technopark region in Thiruvananthapuram. The Supreme Court examined whether the execution application remained maintainable once the District Collector had already passed an order pursuant to the NGT’s original direction. The Court carefully analyzed the scope of the NGT’s order dated 19.12.2018, the subsequent order of the District Collector dated 30.04.2019, and the legal effect of such compliance on execution proceedings. Emphasis was placed on the statutory framework under the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008 and the Wetlands (Conservation and Management) Rules, 2010, especially the exemption provisions for public purpose projects. The Court held that once the Collector had passed an order in compliance with the NGT’s direction, the execution application became infructuous. However, it preserved the appellant’s right to challenge the Collector’s order independently in accordance with law, granting protection against dismissal on the ground of delay if such challenge was filed within a stipulated period. The decision clarifies the boundary between execution jurisdiction and substantive judicial review in environmental matters. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment in *Thomas Lawrence v. State of Kerala & Ors.* addresses the procedural and substantive contours of environmental adjudication before the National Green Tribunal, particularly in relation to execution proceedings arising from prior directions concerning alleged destruction of wetlands. The appeal arose from the dismissal of an execution application by the National Green Tribunal on the ground that no separate orders were required, as the matter could be examined within another pending original application. The appellant contended that the execution application stemmed from an earlier NGT order directing the District Collector to take action regarding alleged destruction of wetlands and a ten-acre pond within the Technopark region in Thiruvananthapuram. The Supreme Court examined whether the execution application remained maintainable once the District Collector had already passed an order pursuant to the NGT’s original direction. The Court carefully analyzed the scope of the NGT’s order dated 19.12.2018, the subsequent order of the District Collector dated 30.04.2019, and the legal effect of such compliance on execution proceedings. Emphasis was placed on the statutory framework under the *Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008* and the *Wetlands (Conservation and Management) Rules, 2010*, especially the exemption provisions for public purpose projects. The Court held that once the Collector had passed an order in compliance with the NGT’s direction, the execution application became infructuous. However, it preserved the appellant’s right to challenge the Collector’s order independently in accordance with law, granting protection against dismissal on the ground of delay if such challenge was filed within a stipulated period. The decision clarifies the boundary between execution jurisdiction and substantive judicial review in environmental matters. **Keywords:** Environmental Law, Wetlands, National Green Tribunal, Execution Proceedings, Public Purpose, Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Thomas Lawrence v. State of Kerala & Ors.*Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 2535 of 2020Judgement Date29 October 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumR.F. Nariman, Navin Sinha and Indira Banerjee, JJ.AuthorR.F. Nariman, J.Citation*\[2020\] 9 S.C.R. 325*Legal Provisions Involved*Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008*; *Wetlands (Conservation and Management) Rules, 2010*, Rule 4; *National Green Tribunal Act, 2010*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsEnvironmental Law, Administrative Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The litigation arose against the backdrop of increasing judicial scrutiny over environmental governance and wetland conservation in Kerala. The appellant, acting in public interest, had initially approached the National Green Tribunal alleging *mass destruction of wetlands and a ten-acre pond* within the Technopark area at Thiruvananthapuram. The NGT, treating the complaint as an original application, passed an order on *19.12.2018* directing the District Collector to examine the allegations and take appropriate action in accordance with law within one month. The order explicitly emphasized the binding nature of NGT directions as a decree of a court under the *National Green Tribunal Act, 2010*. Subsequently, the appellant initiated execution proceedings before the NGT, asserting non-compliance with the earlier order. The NGT dismissed the execution application, observing that related issues could be examined in another pending original application concerning environmental clearance. This dismissal prompted the present appeal before the Supreme Court. The background reveals a tension between environmental protection obligations and statutory exemptions granted for public infrastructure projects. The Technopark development was projected as a public purpose project, with governmental sanction purportedly granted under *Section 10 of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008*, as amended. The case thus required judicial balancing between procedural compliance with tribunal orders and substantive legality of administrative decisions. The Supreme Court’s intervention was limited yet significant in clarifying the procedural posture of execution proceedings once an administrative authority has acted pursuant to judicial directions. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellant filed a complaint before the National Green Tribunal alleging *destruction of wetlands and a ten-acre pond* within the Technopark campus in Thiruvananthapuram. This complaint was registered as *Original Application No. 875 of 2018*. The NGT, by order dated *19.12.2018*, directed the District Collector, Thiruvananthapuram, to look into the matter and take appropriate action in accordance with law within one month. Pursuant to this direction, the District Collector passed an order dated *30.04.2019*. The Collector recorded that governmental sanction had already been granted for reclamation of *861.2 ares of land* for the third phase development of Technopark under *Section 10 of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008*, as amended by the 2017 Ordinance. The land was treated as falling under *public purpose*, and exemptions were granted subject to safeguards for water conservation. The Collector concluded that no further action could be taken under *Sections 11 and 13 of the Act*. Despite this, the appellant filed *Execution Application No. 39 of 2019* before the NGT, alleging non-compliance with the earlier order. The NGT dismissed the execution application, stating that the issues raised could be examined in another original application relating to environmental clearance. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant argued that the Collector’s order was not “in accordance with law” due to the statutory bar on wetland reclamation under *Rule 4 of the Wetlands (Conservation and Management) Rules, 2010*, relying on *M.K. Balakrishnan v. Union of India*. The State and private respondents contended that statutory exemptions had been validly granted and that the execution application had become infructuous once the Collector passed an order. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether an execution application before the National Green Tribunal remains maintainable once the District Collector has passed an order pursuant to the Tribunal’s direction? ii. Whether the order dated 30.04.2019 of the District Collector can be examined within execution proceedings? iii. Whether alleged violations of wetland protection laws affect the infructuous nature of execution proceedings? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the NGT erred in dismissing the execution application by equating it with a separate original application concerning environmental clearance. It was argued that the execution application arose from *Original Application No. 875 of 2018*, which involved a larger extent of wetland area. Reliance was placed on reports of local authorities indicating that the land was wetland in nature. It was further contended that *Rule 4 of the Wetlands (Conservation and Management) Rules, 2010* imposes an absolute bar on reclamation of wetlands, and therefore the Collector’s order granting exemption could not be treated as action “in accordance with law.” The appellant relied on *M.K. Balakrishnan v. Union of India (2017) 7 SCC 810 (2)* to reinforce the statutory embargo on wetland reclamation. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents argued that the District Collector had fully complied with the NGT’s order by passing a detailed order on *30.04.2019*. It was submitted that governmental sanction had been granted under *Section 10 of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008*, treating the project as a public purpose. The respondents emphasized that once compliance had occurred, execution proceedings became infructuous. It was also argued that the appellant had failed to challenge either the original NGT order or the Collector’s order in appropriate proceedings, and execution could not be used as a substitute for substantive judicial review. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court confined itself to examining the maintainability of the execution application. The Court noted that the NGT’s order dated *19.12.2018* merely required the District Collector to look into the matter and take action in accordance with law. This direction had been complied with through the Collector’s order dated *30.04.2019*. The Court held that once an authority has passed an order pursuant to a judicial direction, the execution proceedings cannot be sustained merely because the applicant is dissatisfied with the outcome. The appropriate remedy lies in challenging the administrative order itself. Accordingly, the execution application was held to have become infructuous. At the same time, the Court safeguarded the appellant’s rights by clarifying that it remained open to challenge the Collector’s order in accordance with law. The Court granted a limited protection against dismissal on the ground of delay if such challenge was filed within eight weeks. **a. RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment lies in the principle that *execution jurisdiction cannot be expanded to examine the legality or correctness of an order passed in compliance with judicial directions*. Once compliance is shown, execution proceedings lose their purpose. Any grievance against the substance of the complying order must be addressed through appropriate legal challenge. **b. OBITER DICTA** The Court incidentally observed that environmental grievances require timely and appropriate remedies. Delay in challenging substantive orders cannot be cured through execution proceedings. **c. GUIDELINES** i. Execution proceedings before the NGT are limited to examining compliance. ii. Substantive challenges must be raised through independent proceedings. iii. Environmental litigants must act with procedural diligence. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces procedural discipline in environmental adjudication. It draws a clear line between enforcement of directions and judicial review of administrative decisions. By holding the execution application infructuous, the Court prevented misuse of execution jurisdiction while preserving the appellant’s right to substantive challenge. The decision underscores the importance of statutory exemptions and the necessity of challenging them through appropriate legal channels rather than collateral proceedings. ## J) REFERENCES **a. Important Cases Referred** 1. *M.K. Balakrishnan v. Union of India* *(2017) 7 SCC 810 (2)* **b. Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008* 2. *Wetlands (Conservation and Management) Rules, 2010* 3. *National Green Tribunal Act, 2010* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, [2020] 12 SCR 583](https://lawfoyer.in/tofan-singh-v-state-of-tamil-nadu-2020-12-scr-583/) **Published:** December 29, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The Constitution Bench decision in Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu marks a watershed moment in Indian criminal jurisprudence concerning prosecutions under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The central controversy before the Supreme Court revolved around the evidentiary admissibility of confessional statements recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act by officers empowered under Sections 42 and 53. The Court was tasked with determining whether such officers qualify as “police officers” within the meaning of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, thereby rendering confessions made to them inadmissible. The majority opinion, authored by Justice R.F. Nariman, decisively held that officers vested with investigative powers under Section 53 NDPS Act exercise powers identical to those of police officers, including investigation culminating in the filing of a police report. Consequently, they fall squarely within the mischief of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. The Court ruled that statements recorded under Section 67 cannot be treated as confessional or substantive evidence and any conviction founded solely upon such statements would infringe Articles 14, 20(3), and 21 of the Constitution of India. In overruling Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India and Kanhaiyalal v. Union of India, the Court reaffirmed constitutional primacy over coercive investigative shortcuts, especially under a statute prescribing draconian punishments. The dissent by Justice Indira Banerjee underscored societal interest and effective enforcement of narcotics law, yet the majority emphasized procedural fairness and fundamental rights as non-negotiable. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The Constitution Bench decision in *Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu* marks a watershed moment in Indian criminal jurisprudence concerning prosecutions under the *Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985*. The central controversy before the Supreme Court revolved around the evidentiary admissibility of confessional statements recorded under *Section 67 of the NDPS Act* by officers empowered under *Sections 42 and 53*. The Court was tasked with determining whether such officers qualify as *“police officers”* within the meaning of *Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872*, thereby rendering confessions made to them inadmissible. The majority opinion, authored by *Justice R.F. Nariman*, decisively held that officers vested with investigative powers under *Section 53 NDPS Act* exercise powers identical to those of police officers, including investigation culminating in the filing of a police report. Consequently, they fall squarely within the mischief of *Section 25 of the Evidence Act*. The Court ruled that *statements recorded under Section 67 cannot be treated as confessional or substantive evidence* and any conviction founded solely upon such statements would infringe *Articles 14, 20(3), and 21 of the Constitution of India*. In overruling *Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India* and *Kanhaiyalal v. Union of India*, the Court reaffirmed constitutional primacy over coercive investigative shortcuts, especially under a statute prescribing draconian punishments. The dissent by *Justice Indira Banerjee* underscored societal interest and effective enforcement of narcotics law, yet the majority emphasized procedural fairness and fundamental rights as non-negotiable. **Keywords:** NDPS Act, Section 67, Confession, Police Officer, Section 25 Evidence Act, Article 20(3), Self-Incrimination, Constitutional Safeguards ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetails*Judgement Cause Title**Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu**Case Number**Criminal Appeal No. 152 of 2013 (and connected matters)**Judgement Date**29 October 2020**Court**Supreme Court of India**Quorum**R.F. Nariman, Navin Sinha & Indira Banerjee, JJ.**Author**Justice R.F. Nariman (Majority); Justice Indira Banerjee (Dissent)**Citation**\[2020\] 12 SCR 583**Legal Provisions Involved**Sections 42, 53, 67 NDPS Act; Section 25 Evidence Act; Articles 14, 20(3), 21 Constitution of India**Judgments Overruled**Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India*; *Kanhaiyalal v. Union of India**Related Law Subjects**Criminal Law; Constitutional Law; Evidence Law* ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The NDPS Act was enacted as a stringent legislative response to the growing menace of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Given the severity of punishments prescribed, Parliament embedded procedural safeguards within the statute to balance enforcement objectives with individual liberties. However, judicial interpretation over time diluted some of these safeguards, particularly concerning *confessional statements under Section 67*. Prior to *Tofan Singh*, conflicting Supreme Court decisions had created doctrinal uncertainty. In *Raj Kumar Karwal* and *Kanhaiyalal*, officers of customs and revenue intelligence were held not to be police officers, rendering confessions to them admissible. This approach prioritized effective enforcement over constitutional protections, often leading to convictions resting solely on uncorroborated confessions. The present case arose from a reference necessitated by divergent judicial views on whether NDPS officers empowered under *Section 53* possess attributes of police officers. The Court was compelled to examine the NDPS Act in light of *Articles 20(3) and 21*, emphasizing that statutory interpretation cannot eclipse fundamental rights. The background reflects an evolving constitutional consciousness where the Court increasingly scrutinizes coercive investigatory mechanisms, especially under special penal statutes. The decision situates NDPS jurisprudence firmly within the broader constitutional framework, reaffirming that procedural fairness cannot be sacrificed at the altar of expediency. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The appellant, *Tofan Singh*, was prosecuted under the NDPS Act based primarily on a *confessional statement recorded under Section 67*. The statement was obtained by officers empowered under *Sections 42 and 53*, who exercised powers of search, seizure, arrest, and investigation. At trial, the prosecution relied heavily on this confession to establish guilt. The defence challenged the admissibility of the statement, contending that the officers recording it were *police officers* within the meaning of *Section 25 of the Evidence Act*, rendering the confession inadmissible. The trial court convicted the accused, and the conviction was upheld by the High Court, relying on prevailing precedents which treated NDPS officers as distinct from police officers. The matter reached the Supreme Court, where a two-Judge Bench noticed conflicting authorities and referred the question to a larger Bench. The factual matrix did not involve independent corroborative evidence of possession or recovery sufficient to sustain conviction without the confession. Thus, the case squarely raised the constitutional and evidentiary question of whether liberty could be curtailed based solely on statements made to officers wielding coercive investigative powers. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. *Whether officers empowered under Section 53 of the NDPS Act are “police officers” within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, 1872?* ii. *Whether a confessional statement recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act is admissible as substantive evidence?* iii. *Whether reliance on such confessions violates Articles 14, 20(3), and 21 of the Constitution of India?* ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellant submitted that officers empowered under *Section 53 NDPS Act* exercise complete investigative powers identical to those of police officers, including filing of a police report. Consequently, any confession made to them attracts the absolute bar under *Section 25 of the Evidence Act*. It was argued that *Section 67* merely authorizes collection of information and does not override constitutional safeguards against self-incrimination. The appellant emphasized that treating such confessions as substantive evidence would permit coercive practices, undermining *Article 20(3)*. Reliance was placed on constitutional precedents such as *Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani* and *Selvi v. State of Karnataka*, which recognized the expansive scope of the right against self-incrimination. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the State contended that NDPS officers are distinct from police officers, as they belong to specialized departments with limited jurisdiction. It was argued that *Section 67* constitutes a special statutory mechanism permitting admissibility of voluntary confessions. The State relied on earlier judgments including *Raj Kumar Karwal* to assert that effective enforcement of narcotics law necessitates reliance on confessional statements, given the clandestine nature of such offences. ## **H) JUDGEMENT** The majority held that officers empowered under *Section 53* possess all attributes of police officers, including investigation culminating in prosecution. The Court reasoned that the functional test, rather than departmental designation, determines applicability of *Section 25 Evidence Act*. The Court drew a sharp distinction between *enquiry* under *Section 67* and *investigation* under *Section 53*, holding that even at the enquiry stage, constitutional protections apply. It rejected the argument that NDPS Act impliedly overrides the Evidence Act, noting the absence of a *non obstante clause* akin to *TADA* or *POTA*. The Court concluded that *Section 67 statements are inadmissible as confessions and cannot form the sole basis of conviction*. Convictions based solely on such statements were declared unconstitutional. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio rests on the principle that *any officer vested with full investigative powers equivalent to police officers is a “police officer” for the purposes of Section 25 of the Evidence Act*. Consequently, *confessions made to such officers are inadmissible*. The Court further held that *Section 67 does not create an exception to constitutional protections* and must be read harmoniously with *Articles 14, 20(3), and 21*. Any contrary interpretation would render the statute arbitrary and oppressive. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that *severe penal statutes demand stricter procedural compliance*. It cautioned against legislative or executive measures that dilute constitutional guarantees under the guise of national interest or law enforcement efficiency. **c) GUIDELINES** i. *Section 67 statements cannot be treated as confessions.* ii. *Convictions under the NDPS Act must rest on independent corroborative evidence.* iii. *Investigating agencies must strictly adhere to procedural safeguards.* ## **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment reorients NDPS jurisprudence towards constitutional fidelity. By overruling earlier precedents, the Court restored the primacy of individual liberty over coercive efficiency. The decision strengthens due process, compels investigative rigor, and ensures that convictions under a draconian statute are secured through legally admissible evidence rather than compelled confessions. ## **J) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu* *\[2020\] 12 SCR 583* 2. *Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani* *\[1978\] 3 SCR 608* 3. *Selvi v. State of Karnataka* *\[2010\] 7 SCC 263* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Indian Evidence Act, 1872* 2. *Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985* 3. *Constitution of India* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Heem Singh, [2020] 13 S.C.R. 951](https://lawfoyer.in/state-of-rajasthan-ors-v-heem-singh-2020-13-s-c-r-951/) **Published:** December 29, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the legal permissibility of sustaining a departmental dismissal of a police constable for grave misconduct arising out of alleged involvement in a murder, despite his acquittal in a criminal trial. The Supreme Court scrutinised the limits of judicial review under Article 226 in disciplinary matters, particularly where the High Court interferes with findings of misconduct recorded by the disciplinary authority. The Court reaffirmed the settled distinction between the standard of proof applicable in criminal trials and departmental proceedings, holding that proof beyond reasonable doubt governs criminal liability, whereas preponderance of probabilities governs service discipline. The Court analysed whether the respondent’s acquittal on the ground of benefit of doubt amounted to a clean acquittal warranting reinstatement. It was held that an acquittal does not automatically obliterate the findings of a departmental enquiry, especially where the conduct of a police officer adversely impacts the integrity, credibility, and public confidence in the police force. The judgment emphasises that disciplinary proceedings are not constrained by the rigours of criminal procedure or the strict rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act. The Supreme Court further delineated the “two ends of the spectrum” doctrine governing judicial review in service law. While courts must ordinarily defer to the disciplinary authority as the primary fact-finding body, interference is justified where findings are perverse, based on no evidence, or where vital evidence has been ignored. Applying these principles, the Court found that the Division Bench of the High Court erred in reappreciating evidence and substituting its own conclusions. The reinstatement order was therefore set aside, reinforcing institutional discipline and administrative autonomy. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment examines the legal permissibility of sustaining a departmental dismissal of a police constable for grave misconduct arising out of alleged involvement in a murder, despite his acquittal in a criminal trial. The Supreme Court scrutinised the limits of judicial review under *Article 226* in disciplinary matters, particularly where the High Court interferes with findings of misconduct recorded by the disciplinary authority. The Court reaffirmed the settled distinction between the standard of proof applicable in criminal trials and departmental proceedings, holding that *proof beyond reasonable doubt* governs criminal liability, whereas *preponderance of probabilities* governs service discipline. The Court analysed whether the respondent’s acquittal on the ground of benefit of doubt amounted to a clean acquittal warranting reinstatement. It was held that an acquittal does not automatically obliterate the findings of a departmental enquiry, especially where the conduct of a police officer adversely impacts the integrity, credibility, and public confidence in the police force. The judgment emphasises that disciplinary proceedings are not constrained by the rigours of criminal procedure or the strict rules of evidence under the *Indian Evidence Act*. The Supreme Court further delineated the “two ends of the spectrum” doctrine governing judicial review in service law. While courts must ordinarily defer to the disciplinary authority as the primary fact-finding body, interference is justified where findings are perverse, based on no evidence, or where vital evidence has been ignored. Applying these principles, the Court found that the Division Bench of the High Court erred in reappreciating evidence and substituting its own conclusions. The reinstatement order was therefore set aside, reinforcing institutional discipline and administrative autonomy. **Keywords:** Service jurisprudence; departmental enquiry; acquittal and misconduct; preponderance of probabilities; judicial review; police discipline. ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsi) Judgment Cause Title*State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Heem Singh*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 3340 of 2020iii) Judgment Date29 October 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumJustice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud and Justice Indira Banerjeevi) AuthorJustice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachudvii) Citation*\[2020\] 13 S.C.R. 951*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Article 226, Constitution of India*; *Sections 302, 201, 120B IPC*; *Rule 16, Rajasthan Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1958*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsService Law; Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Criminal Law ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT** The case arises from disciplinary action initiated against a police constable for conduct allegedly involving participation in a murder during a period of sanctioned leave. The respondent was appointed as a constable in the Rajasthan Police in 1992 and was subjected to departmental proceedings following his arrest in connection with the homicidal death of his uncle. Although the criminal prosecution culminated in acquittal on the ground of benefit of doubt, the disciplinary authority proceeded independently and imposed the penalty of dismissal from service. The disciplinary proceedings were conducted under *Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958*, on charges including overstaying leave, concealing material facts, involvement in murder, and conduct unbecoming of a member of a disciplined force. The enquiry officer found all charges proved on a cumulative assessment of circumstantial evidence, prior hostility, witness testimonies, and the broader impact of the conduct on the image of the police force. The respondent unsuccessfully challenged the dismissal before departmental appellate and reviewing authorities. A Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court dismissed the writ petition, upholding the findings of the disciplinary authority. However, the Division Bench reversed the decision, holding that there was no evidence to sustain the finding of murder in the departmental enquiry and directed reinstatement without back wages. The State preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court, raising critical questions on the scope of judicial review, the effect of criminal acquittal on departmental proceedings, and the autonomy of the employer in maintaining discipline within the police force. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The respondent proceeded on sanctioned leave from 13 August 2002 and was required to rejoin duty on 16 August 2002. He overstayed leave by three days and resumed duty on 19 August 2002. On 15 August 2002, Bhanwar Singh, the uncle of the respondent, was found dead, initially reported as a road accident involving an unknown vehicle. Subsequent investigation revealed circumstances suggesting homicide. The prosecution alleged longstanding hostility between the respondent and the deceased arising out of a land dispute and the death of the respondent’s father following a snake bite, for which the deceased allegedly performed witchcraft. It was alleged that the respondent had issued death threats, leading the deceased to lodge a preventive complaint with the police prior to the incident. During trial, several prosecution witnesses turned hostile, and the Sessions Court acquitted the respondent and co-accused on the ground that the evidence was inconsistent and unreliable, granting benefit of doubt. Importantly, the acquittal was not on merits negating involvement, but due to insufficiency of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Parallelly, departmental proceedings relied on witness testimonies, circumstantial proximity, evidence of prior enmity, and the respondent’s conduct as a police officer. The enquiry officer concluded that the respondent’s association with the incident and his conduct had seriously tarnished the image of the police force. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether acquittal in a criminal trial automatically nullifies findings of misconduct in departmental proceedings? ii. Whether the High Court exceeded the scope of judicial review by reappreciating evidence in disciplinary matters? iii. Whether the standard of proof in departmental proceedings permits reliance on circumstantial evidence insufficient for criminal conviction? iv. Whether reinstatement of a police officer accused of grave misconduct affects public confidence in the police force? --- ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the State submitted that departmental proceedings are governed by the principle of *preponderance of probabilities* and not by the criminal standard of *proof beyond reasonable doubt*. It was contended that the High Court failed to respect the autonomy of the disciplinary authority and substituted its own assessment of evidence. The acquittal was based on benefit of doubt and did not amount to an honourable acquittal. The respondent’s continued presence in the police force would erode public confidence and institutional integrity. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the respondent argued that the departmental enquiry ignored vital contradictions in witness testimonies and relied selectively on evidence already disbelieved by the criminal court. It was submitted that the alleged incident occurred outside the scope of employment and lacked nexus with service. The respondent contended that reinstatement without back wages adequately balanced equity and justice. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. *Article 226, Constitution of India* ii. *Sections 302, 201, 120B, Indian Penal Code, 1860* iii. *Rule 16, Rajasthan Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1958* ## **I) JUDGMENT** The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order of reinstatement. The Court held that the Division Bench erred in interfering with the disciplinary findings. It reiterated that disciplinary proceedings are not bound by the strict rules of evidence applicable to criminal trials. The presence of circumstantial evidence, prior hostility, and conduct affecting institutional credibility justified the disciplinary action. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment lies in the reaffirmation that *acquittal in a criminal case does not bar disciplinary proceedings*, particularly where the acquittal is based on benefit of doubt. The Court held that *preponderance of probabilities* suffices to establish misconduct in service law. Judicial review must respect the autonomy of the employer and cannot entail reappreciation of evidence unless findings are perverse or unsupported by any evidence. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that reinstatement of police personnel with questionable integrity poses systemic risks and undermines public confidence. Institutional credibility is a legitimate consideration in disciplinary jurisprudence. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Courts must maintain restraint in interfering with disciplinary findings. ii. Acquittal on benefit of doubt does not equate to exoneration in service law. iii. Disciplinary standards are context-specific, especially for uniformed services. iv. Public confidence and institutional integrity are relevant considerations. ## **J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment strengthens the doctrinal distinction between criminal liability and service discipline. It underscores that the police force, as a disciplined service, is held to a higher standard of conduct. The ruling preserves administrative autonomy while balancing judicial oversight. The Supreme Court’s reasoning aligns with established service jurisprudence and reinforces the principle that public interest and institutional integrity prevail over individual claims for reinstatement where misconduct casts a shadow on public confidence. ## **K) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Suresh Pathrella v. Oriental Bank of Commerce*, *\[2006\] 7 Suppl. SCR 564* ii. *Samar Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P.*, *\[2011\] 11 SCR 136* iii. *Inspector General of Police v. S. Samuthiram*, *\[2012\] 11 SCR 174* iv. *M. Siddiq v. Suresh Das*, *(2020) 1 SCC 1* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Constitution of India* ii. *Indian Penal Code, 1860* iii. *Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Chunthuram v. State of Chhattisgarh, [2020] 8 SCR 1071](https://lawfoyer.in/chunthuram-v-state-of-chhattisgarh-2020-8-scr-1071/) **Published:** December 29, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the evidentiary fragility of a murder conviction resting primarily on weak forensic linkage, defective Test Identification Parade, and unreliable ocular testimony. The appellant was convicted under Sections 302/34 IPC for the alleged murder of the deceased while returning from the market. The prosecution case was built on recovery of weapons, identification of a lungi, and testimony of an alleged eyewitness. The Supreme Court scrutinised whether these circumstances formed an unbroken chain pointing exclusively towards the guilt of the appellant. The Court found that the alleged weapons of assault were never scientifically connected to the crime. The purported chemical analyst report was neither produced nor available on record. Vital forensic material, including the seized shirt of the co-accused, was withheld, attracting an adverse inference against the prosecution. The Test Identification Parade was vitiated by police presence and internal inconsistencies, rendering it unreliable in law. The testimony of the sole eyewitness suffered from serious infirmities. His admitted poor eyesight, weak hearing, adverse weather conditions, and unnatural post-incident conduct eroded his credibility. The motive suggested by the prosecution was remote and lacked proximity. Applying the settled principle that where two views are possible the one favouring the accused must prevail, the Court set aside the conviction. This decision reinforces the constitutional commitment to fair trial standards, the evidentiary value of forensic science, and the cautious approach required while relying on solitary eyewitness testimony in criminal trials. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the evidentiary fragility of a murder conviction resting primarily on weak forensic linkage, defective Test Identification Parade, and unreliable ocular testimony. The appellant was convicted under *Sections 302/34 IPC* for the alleged murder of the deceased while returning from the market. The prosecution case was built on recovery of weapons, identification of a lungi, and testimony of an alleged eyewitness. The Supreme Court scrutinised whether these circumstances formed an unbroken chain pointing exclusively towards the guilt of the appellant. The Court found that the alleged weapons of assault were never scientifically connected to the crime. The purported chemical analyst report was neither produced nor available on record. Vital forensic material, including the seized shirt of the co-accused, was withheld, attracting an adverse inference against the prosecution. The Test Identification Parade was vitiated by police presence and internal inconsistencies, rendering it unreliable in law. The testimony of the sole eyewitness suffered from serious infirmities. His admitted poor eyesight, weak hearing, adverse weather conditions, and unnatural post-incident conduct eroded his credibility. The motive suggested by the prosecution was remote and lacked proximity. Applying the settled principle that where two views are possible the one favouring the accused must prevail, the Court set aside the conviction. This decision reinforces the constitutional commitment to fair trial standards, the evidentiary value of forensic science, and the cautious approach required while relying on solitary eyewitness testimony in criminal trials. **Keywords:** Criminal jurisprudence, eyewitness credibility, forensic evidence, test identification parade, benefit of doubt ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Chunthuram v. State of Chhattisgarh*Case NumberCriminal Appeal No. 1392 of 2011Judgement Date29 October 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumSanjay Kishan Kaul J., Krishna Murari J., Hrishikesh Roy J.AuthorHrishikesh Roy J.Citation*\[2020\] 8 SCR 1071*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 302/34 IPC; Section 201/34 IPC; Section 162 CrPC*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsCriminal Law, Law of Evidence ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The appeal arose from concurrent findings of guilt recorded by the Trial Court and partly affirmed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh. The appellant was convicted for murder with the aid of common intention. The High Court, however, acquitted the co-accused while maintaining the appellant’s conviction. This dichotomy in appreciation of the same eyewitness testimony formed the foundational concern before the Supreme Court. The background of the case involved allegations of prior animosity rooted in a land dispute and a past murder case in which the deceased had been accused. The prosecution projected this as motive. The investigation relied heavily on circumstantial evidence, recoveries, and one alleged eyewitness. The Supreme Court was called upon to test whether the evidentiary threshold required for sustaining a conviction for murder was met. The Court revisited settled principles governing appreciation of circumstantial evidence, evidentiary value of Test Identification Parade, and standards for relying upon solitary eyewitness testimony. The judgment is significant as it underscores the necessity of scientific corroboration, procedural fairness, and judicial caution in criminal trials involving serious offences carrying life imprisonment. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The prosecution alleged that on *14 June 2001 at about 7:00 PM*, the deceased was returning from Tamta market to his village when he was assaulted with an axe and stick by the appellant and the co-accused. The deceased died at the spot. The FIR was lodged by the father of the deceased after being informed by his grandson. The FIR referred to an old land dispute and the murder of the accused’s brother as the motive. The investigation led to recovery of alleged weapons and a lungi said to belong to the appellant. Seven witnesses were examined. PW-3 claimed to have identified the lungi. PW-4 claimed to be an eyewitness. The accused denied the charges in their *Section 313 CrPC* statements. The Trial Court convicted both accused. On appeal, the High Court acquitted the co-accused on the ground that PW-4 could not identify him but upheld the appellant’s conviction. This selective reliance on the same testimony formed the core grievance before the Supreme Court. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt? ii. Whether recovery of weapons without forensic linkage can sustain a conviction? iii. Whether a Test Identification Parade conducted in police presence is reliable? iv. Whether the testimony of PW-4 qualifies as trustworthy eyewitness evidence? v. Whether motive alleged by the prosecution was proximate and credible? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsel for the appellant submitted that the alleged weapons were never connected to the crime through forensic evidence. The absence of the chemical analyst report was fatal. It was argued that withholding of the seized shirt attracted adverse inference. The Test Identification Parade was illegal due to police presence and inconsistencies. The eyewitness suffered from poor eyesight and weak hearing, making his testimony inherently unreliable, especially in adverse weather conditions. The motive was stale and lacked immediacy. The conviction was therefore unsustainable. --- ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The State argued that motive was established through prior enmity. The recovery of weapons and lungi corroborated the eyewitness testimony. It was submitted that minor inconsistencies do not vitiate the prosecution case. The presence of the appellant at the spot was sufficiently proved. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court undertook a granular scrutiny of the evidence. The Court found that the weapons allegedly recovered were not linked to the crime. The doctor admitted absence of visible bloodstains. The chemical analyst report referred to by the Trial Court was not produced. The withholding of forensic evidence relating to the seized shirt was held to justify adverse inference. The Court reiterated that forensic evidence plays a critical role in corroborating ocular testimony. The Test Identification Parade was declared unreliable due to police presence and procedural irregularities. The Court applied *Section 162 CrPC* and relied on *Ramkishan Mithanlal Sharma*. The lungi recovery suffered from inconsistencies regarding its location and lack of distinctiveness. The eyewitness testimony was rejected due to poor eyesight, inability to hear clearly, contradictory circumstances, and unnatural conduct. The Court relied on *Musheer Khan* and *Amar Singh*. The motive was found remote and unconvincing. Applying the principle of benefit of doubt, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The conviction for murder cannot be sustained where forensic evidence is absent, Test Identification Parade is vitiated, and eyewitness testimony is unreliable. When two views are possible, the view favouring the accused must prevail. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that modern criminal trials must increasingly rely on scientific evidence and procedural discipline to avoid miscarriages of justice. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Forensic evidence must be produced and proved. ii. Test Identification Parade must be free from police presence. iii. Sole eyewitness testimony requires strict scrutiny. iv. Withholding material evidence invites adverse inference. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces constitutional safeguards in criminal trials. It cautions against mechanical reliance on ocular testimony and emphasises forensic corroboration. The decision strengthens the doctrine of benefit of doubt and ensures fidelity to due process. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Musheer Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh*, *\[2010\] 2 SCR 119* ii. *Ramkishan Mithanlal Sharma v. State of Bombay*, *\[1955\] 1 SCR 903* iii. *Amar Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi)*, *2020 SCC OnLine SC 826* **b)** **Important Statutes Referred** i. *Indian Penal Code, 1860* ii. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [M/s. Imperia Structures Ltd. v. Anil Patni and Another, [2020] 12 SCR 373](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-imperia-structures-ltd-v-anil-patni-and-another-2020-12-scr-373/) **Published:** December 29, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in M/s. Imperia Structures Ltd. v. Anil Patni and Another authoritatively settles the long-standing conflict between remedies available under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016. The Supreme Court examined whether the enactment of RERA impliedly ousted the jurisdiction of consumer fora in disputes concerning delay in delivery of possession and refund of amounts paid by homebuyers. The controversy arose from a housing project launched in 2011, where despite substantial payments by allottees, construction remained incomplete even after the contractually stipulated period. Consumer complaints were instituted before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission seeking refund with interest. The builder resisted the complaints on grounds that the allottees were not consumers, that RERA created an exclusive statutory mechanism, and that registration of the project under RERA deferred any finding of delay. The Supreme Court rejected these contentions and reaffirmed that remedies under the Consumer Protection Act are additional and concurrent. The Court clarified that Section 79 of RERA bars only civil courts and not consumer fora, which are quasi-judicial bodies. The judgment underscores legislative intent by reading Sections 18 and 88 of RERA harmoniously with Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act. It recognizes the autonomy of the allottee to choose the forum and protects consumer rights against delayed real estate projects. The ruling has significant implications for real estate litigation, forum choice, and the balance between special statutes and consumer welfare legislation. **Content:** ## A) **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment in *M/s. Imperia Structures Ltd. v. Anil Patni and Another* authoritatively settles the long-standing conflict between remedies available under the *Consumer Protection Act, 1986* and the *Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016*. The Supreme Court examined whether the enactment of RERA impliedly ousted the jurisdiction of consumer fora in disputes concerning delay in delivery of possession and refund of amounts paid by homebuyers. The controversy arose from a housing project launched in 2011, where despite substantial payments by allottees, construction remained incomplete even after the contractually stipulated period. Consumer complaints were instituted before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission seeking refund with interest. The builder resisted the complaints on grounds that the allottees were not consumers, that RERA created an exclusive statutory mechanism, and that registration of the project under RERA deferred any finding of delay. The Supreme Court rejected these contentions and reaffirmed that remedies under the Consumer Protection Act are *additional* and *concurrent*. The Court clarified that Section 79 of RERA bars only civil courts and not consumer fora, which are quasi-judicial bodies. The judgment underscores legislative intent by reading Sections 18 and 88 of RERA harmoniously with Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act. It recognizes the autonomy of the allottee to choose the forum and protects consumer rights against delayed real estate projects. The ruling has significant implications for real estate litigation, forum choice, and the balance between special statutes and consumer welfare legislation. **Keywords:** Consumer Protection Act, RERA, Real estate delay, Jurisdiction of consumer fora, Refund with interest, Allottee rights ## B) **CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*M/s. Imperia Structures Ltd. v. Anil Patni and Another*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal Nos. 3581–3590 of 2020iii) Judgement Date02 November 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumJustice Uday Umesh Lalit and Justice Vineet Saranvi) AuthorJustice Uday Umesh Lalitvii) Citation*\[2020\] 12 SCR 373*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 3, 12(4), 23 Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Sections 18, 79, 88, 89 RERA Act, 2016*ix) Judgments overruled by the CaseNonex) Related Law SubjectsConsumer Law, Real Estate Law, Statutory Interpretation ## C) **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The dispute emanated from persistent delays in completion of a residential housing project named “The ESFERA” launched by the appellant builder in Gurgaon in 2011. The case reflects a recurring pattern in Indian real estate where buyers invest life savings and borrowed funds in housing projects that fail to meet contractual timelines. Prior to the enactment of the *Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016*, aggrieved homebuyers primarily relied upon consumer fora for redressal of grievances relating to deficiency of service and unfair trade practices. The introduction of RERA sought to regulate the real estate sector and establish specialized authorities for adjudication of disputes. The appellant builder attempted to rely on the coming into force of RERA to argue that consumer fora no longer retained jurisdiction over disputes relating to real estate projects. This contention was raised despite the fact that the cause of action had arisen much prior to RERA and that the project had already overshot the contractual completion period. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, after appreciating the evidence, allowed the complaints and ordered refund with interest. The appeals before the Supreme Court raised important questions regarding legislative intent, forum exclusivity, and the continued relevance of consumer jurisprudence in the post-RERA regime. The background of the judgment thus lies at the intersection of two welfare legislations. The Supreme Court was required to interpret overlapping statutory remedies while ensuring that consumer rights were not diluted by procedural technicalities. The decision builds upon established precedents affirming that special statutes do not impliedly repeal consumer remedies unless expressly barred. ## D) **FACTS OF THE CASE** The appellant launched a group housing project in 2011 and invited bookings from prospective purchasers. The respondents booked residential apartments and executed *Builder Buyer Agreements dated 30.11.2013*. The agreements promised delivery of possession within a period of *42 months*, subject to limited exceptions such as force majeure. The respondents paid substantial sums, amounting to more than *Rs. 63 lakhs* in certain cases, against an agreed consideration of approximately *Rs. 76 lakhs*. Despite the passage of more than four years from execution of the agreements, construction at the project site remained incomplete. The respondents repeatedly visited the site and found negligible progress. Alleging *deficiency in service* and *unfair trade practices*, the respondents filed consumer complaints before the National Commission in 2017 seeking refund with interest. The builder resisted the complaints by alleging force majeure events such as demonetization, shortage of labour, and delay in statutory approvals. It was also contended that the apartments were booked for commercial purposes and hence the complainants were not consumers. During the pendency of the consumer complaints, the project was registered under RERA on *17.11.2017*, with registration valid until *31.12.2020*. The builder sought to rely on this registration to argue that there was no delay attributable to it. The National Commission rejected these defences, held the builder guilty of deficiency of service, and ordered refund of the deposited amounts with *9% simple interest* and costs. Aggrieved by the common order, the builder approached the Supreme Court under *Section 23 of the Consumer Protection Act*. The appeals raised identical issues of fact and law and were heard together. ## E) **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i) Whether the respondents qualified as *“consumers”* under *Section 2(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986*? ii) Whether delay in completion of the project amounted to *deficiency in service*? iii) Whether *Section 79 of the RERA Act, 2016* barred the jurisdiction of consumer fora? iv) Whether remedies under the Consumer Protection Act stood excluded after the enactment of RERA? v) Whether registration of the project under RERA deferred or extinguished accrued consumer rights? ## F) **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellant submitted that the respondents had booked apartments for investment purposes and therefore did not fall within the definition of consumers. It was contended that refusal to accept alternative accommodation indicated speculative intent. Reliance was placed on contractual clauses limiting compensation to nominal amounts. It was further argued that after the enforcement of RERA, all disputes relating to construction, delay, and possession fell exclusively within the domain of authorities constituted under the RERA Act. The consumer complaints, according to the appellant, were not maintainable in view of *Section 79* which bars jurisdiction of civil courts. The appellant also relied upon the registration certificate issued by the Haryana RERA Authority to argue that the project was lawfully ongoing and could not be treated as delayed until expiry of the registration period. Force majeure events such as demonetization and labour shortages were emphasized to justify delay. ## G) **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the respondents submitted that each complainant had purchased only one residential apartment for personal use and not for commercial exploitation. Evidence of home loans and retirement funds was relied upon to establish consumer status. It was contended that delay was admitted by the builder and unsupported by cogent proof of force majeure. The respondents argued that registration under RERA could not retrospectively cure contractual breaches or extinguish accrued rights. Reliance was placed on judicial precedents holding that remedies under the Consumer Protection Act are *additional* and *concurrent*. It was emphasized that no plea regarding RERA was raised before the National Commission and that the builder could not be permitted to raise jurisdictional objections belatedly. ## H) **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i) *Section 3, Consumer Protection Act, 1986* ii) *Section 12(4), Consumer Protection Act, 1986* iii) *Section 23, Consumer Protection Act, 1986* iv) *Section 18, RERA Act, 2016* v) *Section 79, RERA Act, 2016* vi) *Section 88, RERA Act, 2016* vii) *Section 89, RERA Act, 2016* ## I) **JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the National Commission on both consumer status and delay. It held that the factual conclusion that the respondents were consumers did not warrant interference. The Court observed that speculative intent cannot be presumed merely because alternative accommodation was declined. On the issue of jurisdiction, the Court undertook a detailed analysis of *Section 79 of RERA*. It held that the bar applies only to *civil courts* and not to consumer fora, which are quasi-judicial bodies. Relying on *Malay Kumar Ganguli v. Dr. Sukumar Mukherjee* and other precedents, the Court reiterated that consumer fora do not fall within the expression “civil court”. The Court emphasized *Section 88 of RERA*, which expressly provides that RERA is in addition to and not in derogation of other laws. Further reliance was placed on *Section 18*, which preserves other remedies. The legislative intent, according to the Court, was to provide a choice of forum to the allottee. The Court rejected the argument that registration under RERA deferred the builder’s liability. It held that delay must be reckoned from the contractual timeline and not from the date of registration. The appeals were dismissed, and the orders of refund with interest were upheld. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment lies in the interpretation that remedies under the Consumer Protection Act continue to coexist with remedies under the RERA Act. The Supreme Court held that *Section 79 of RERA* does not bar proceedings before consumer fora. The Court clarified that consumer fora are not civil courts and hence fall outside the statutory bar. Another binding principle is that statutory registration under RERA cannot override contractual obligations already breached. Delay must be assessed with reference to the agreement and not regulatory timelines. The judgment reinforces the doctrine that welfare legislations must receive purposive interpretation in favour of beneficiaries. The Court further held that the presence of an alternate statutory remedy does not oust consumer jurisdiction unless expressly excluded. This ratio strengthens consumer autonomy and prevents dilution of consumer protection through implied exclusion. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court made observations on the nature of real estate contracts and the imbalance of bargaining power between builders and homebuyers. It noted that clauses providing nominal compensation often operate unfairly against consumers. The Court also remarked that legislative policy increasingly recognizes homebuyers as a vulnerable class deserving enhanced protection. Though not essential to the decision, these observations reinforce evolving consumer-centric jurisprudence in real estate regulation. **c) GUIDELINES** i) Allottees retain the freedom to choose between remedies under the Consumer Protection Act and RERA. ii) Consumer fora jurisdiction is not barred by *Section 79 of RERA*. iii) Delay must be evaluated with reference to contractual timelines. iv) Registration under RERA does not extinguish accrued consumer rights. v) Builders must substantiate force majeure claims with cogent evidence. ## J) **REFERENCES** **a) *Important Cases Referred*** i) *Secretary, Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society v. M. Lalitha*, *(2004) 1 SCC 305* ii) *National Seeds Corporation Ltd. v. M. Madhusudhan Reddy*, *(2012) 2 SCC 506* iii) *Malay Kumar Ganguli v. Dr. Sukumar Mukherjee*, *(2009) 9 SCC 221* iv) *Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India*, *(2019) 8 SCC 416* **b) *Important Statutes Referred*** i) *Consumer Protection Act, 1986* ii) *Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Shatrughna Baban Meshram v. State of Maharashtra, [2020] 13 SCR 1](https://lawfoyer.in/shatrughna-baban-meshram-v-state-of-maharashtra-2020-13-scr-1/) **Published:** December 29, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines an extremely grave instance of sexual assault and homicidal death of a minor child aged two and a half years, committed by a close family member. The Supreme Court was called upon to assess the correctness of conviction under Sections 376(2)(f), (i), (m), 376A and 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, as well as the confirmation of death penalty imposed by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court. The case was founded entirely on circumstantial evidence, including last-seen theory, medical evidence, DNA profiling, and forensic corroboration. The Court undertook a meticulous evaluation of the chain of circumstances in light of the principles laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, reaffirming that circumstantial evidence, when unimpeachable and complete, can sustain conviction even in capital cases. The judgment further engages in an elaborate doctrinal discussion on the interplay between Sections 299 and 300 IPC, especially clause fourthly of Section 300, to determine whether the accused possessed the requisite mens rea for murder. While upholding the conviction for murder and aggravated sexual assault, the Court revisited the jurisprudence on rarest of rare doctrine and sentencing proportionality. It ultimately commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment under Section 302 IPC and imposed rigorous imprisonment for 25 years under Section 376A IPC, holding that although the crime was exceptionally brutal, the option of a lesser sentence was not entirely foreclosed due to absence of specific intent to cause death. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines an extremely grave instance of *sexual assault and homicidal death of a minor child aged two and a half years*, committed by a close family member. The Supreme Court was called upon to assess the correctness of conviction under *Sections 376(2)(f), (i), (m), 376A and 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860* and *Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012*, as well as the confirmation of *death penalty* imposed by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court. The case was founded entirely on *circumstantial evidence*, including last-seen theory, medical evidence, DNA profiling, and forensic corroboration. The Court undertook a meticulous evaluation of the chain of circumstances in light of the principles laid down in *Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra*, reaffirming that circumstantial evidence, when unimpeachable and complete, can sustain conviction even in capital cases. The judgment further engages in an elaborate doctrinal discussion on the *interplay between Sections 299 and 300 IPC*, especially *clause fourthly of Section 300*, to determine whether the accused possessed the requisite mens rea for murder. While upholding the conviction for murder and aggravated sexual assault, the Court revisited the jurisprudence on *rarest of rare doctrine* and sentencing proportionality. It ultimately commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment under *Section 302 IPC* and imposed *rigorous imprisonment for 25 years under Section 376A IPC*, holding that although the crime was exceptionally brutal, the option of a lesser sentence was not entirely foreclosed due to absence of specific intent to cause death. **Keywords:** Sexual assault on minor, circumstantial evidence, clause fourthly Section 300 IPC, rarest of rare doctrine, sentencing proportionality ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*Shatrughna Baban Meshram v. State of Maharashtra*ii) Case NumberCriminal Appeal Nos. 763–764 of 2016iii) Judgement Date02 November 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumUday Umesh Lalit J., Indu Malhotra J., Krishna Murari J.vi) AuthorJustice Uday Umesh Lalitvii) Citation*\[2020\] 13 SCR 1*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 376(1), 376(2)(f),(i),(m), 376A, 302 IPC; Section 6 POCSO Act; Section 235(2) CrPC; Articles 20(1), Constitution of India*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsCriminal Law, Child Protection Law, Constitutional Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The judgment arises from an appeal challenging both conviction and sentence in a case involving sexual assault and death of a very young child. The factual matrix disclosed an offence of exceptional brutality, invoking strong societal outrage and judicial scrutiny. The Trial Court characterised the case as falling within the *rarest of rare* category and imposed death penalty under *Sections 302 and 376A IPC*, along with life imprisonment under other aggravated sexual offence provisions. The High Court, while confirming both conviction and sentence, relied heavily on the medical evidence, DNA analysis, and the unbroken chain of circumstances. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant raised challenges on multiple grounds, including alleged infirmities in circumstantial evidence, non-compliance with *Section 235(2) CrPC*, incorrect application of *Section 300 IPC*, and erroneous imposition of death penalty. The Supreme Court was therefore tasked with addressing layered questions: whether the prosecution had successfully established guilt beyond reasonable doubt through circumstantial evidence; whether the homicidal death occasioned during sexual assault satisfied the statutory requirements of murder; whether the death penalty was justified under prevailing sentencing jurisprudence; and whether retrospective application of amended sentencing provisions violated *Article 20(1)*. The judgment is significant for its structured approach to capital sentencing, its reaffirmation of constitutional protections against ex-post facto enhancement of punishment, and its nuanced application of *mens rea* principles in cases of sexual violence resulting in death of minors. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The victim, a girl aged approximately two and a half years, was residing with her parents near her maternal grandfather’s house. On the evening of *11 February 2013*, during a village religious gathering, the appellant, who was the maternal uncle of the victim, took the child from her grandfather on the false pretext that her father had asked for her. This fact was consistently established through the testimony of *PW-2*, corroborated by prompt lodging of the FIR. When the child did not return, a search ensued. She was ultimately found lying in an under-construction Anganwadi building, unclothed from the waist down, with the appellant lying nearby. The child exhibited visible bite marks, severe injuries, and bleeding from the genital region. She was immediately taken to a medical practitioner but was declared dead. Post-mortem examination revealed *multiple bite injuries*, extensive abrasions, and catastrophic *perineal tearing with merging of vaginal and anal orifices*, identified as *Injury No.17*, sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The medical board conclusively opined that death resulted from *shock and haemorrhage following forceful sexual assault*. The appellant was medically examined within hours and found to have *abrasions on the glans penis*, consistent with recent sexual intercourse. Forensic analysis revealed that *blood stains on the appellant’s trousers matched the DNA profile of the victim*. The appellant failed to offer any plausible explanation under *Section 313 CrPC*. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the prosecution successfully established a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt? ii. Whether death caused during forceful sexual assault on a minor attracts *clause fourthly of Section 300 IPC*? iii. Whether imposition of death penalty was justified under the *rarest of rare* doctrine? iv. Whether retrospective application of enhanced sentencing provisions violated *Article 20(1)* of the Constitution? v. Whether non-compliance with *Section 235(2) CrPC* vitiated sentencing? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the Appellant submitted that the case rested purely on circumstantial evidence with missing links and non-examination of crucial witnesses. It was argued that absence of semen detection weakened the prosecution case. The appellant further contended that injuries could not conclusively establish intention to cause death, thereby excluding applicability of *Section 302 IPC*. It was urged that sentencing on the same day as conviction violated *Section 235(2) CrPC*, depriving the appellant of meaningful opportunity of hearing on sentence. The defence also challenged retrospective imposition of life imprisonment for remainder of natural life as unconstitutional under *Article 20(1)*. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the Respondent submitted that every incriminating circumstance stood conclusively proved and formed a consistent chain excluding any hypothesis of innocence. The State relied heavily on medical evidence, DNA profiling, last-seen theory, and absence of explanation by the accused. It was contended that the nature of injuries and the age of the victim clearly attracted *clause fourthly of Section 300 IPC*. The State defended death penalty by invoking societal conscience, extreme brutality, and breach of familial trust. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 300 clause fourthly, IPC* ii. *Sections 376(2)(f),(i),(m) and 376A, IPC* iii. *Section 6, POCSO Act, 2012* iv. *Section 235(2), CrPC* v. *Article 20(1), Constitution of India* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction under *Sections 376(2) IPC, Section 6 POCSO Act, Section 376A IPC, and Section 302 IPC*. The Court held that the chain of circumstantial evidence satisfied the five-fold test laid down in *Sharad Birdhichand Sarda*. On the issue of murder, the Court held that considering the *age of the victim*, the appellant must have had *knowledge* that such sexual assault was likely to cause death, thereby attracting *clause fourthly of Section 300 IPC*. However, on sentencing, the Court distinguished between *knowledge* and *intention*. It held that absence of deliberate intent to kill and consistent judicial practice warranted commutation of death penalty. Consequently, death sentence under *Section 302 IPC* was reduced to *life imprisonment*. Under *Section 376A IPC*, the Court imposed *rigorous imprisonment for 25 years*, rejecting death penalty in view of temporal proximity of statutory amendment and proportionality concerns. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** Where death of a minor is caused during forceful sexual assault, *knowledge of likely fatal consequences* is sufficient to attract *clause fourthly of Section 300 IPC*, even in absence of intent to kill. However, such cases do not automatically warrant death penalty unless the option of lesser punishment is completely foreclosed. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that retrospective statutory stipulations restricting remission powers by mandating imprisonment for remainder of natural life would offend *Article 20(1)* if applied ex-post facto. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Circumstantial evidence cases can sustain death penalty only if unimpeachable and foreclosing all alternatives. ii. Clause fourthly murder convictions ordinarily merit life imprisonment. iii. Sentencing must balance societal outrage with constitutional proportionality. ## J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reflects a calibrated judicial response balancing retributive justice with constitutional restraint. It strengthens jurisprudence on sexual violence against minors while reinforcing limits on capital punishment. ## K) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra* 2. *Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab* 3. *Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. State of Maharashtra* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Indian Penal Code, 1860* 2. *Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012* 3. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* 4. *Constitution of India* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [The State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. v. K. Fazlur Rahman & Anr., [2020] 9 SCR 906](https://lawfoyer.in/the-state-of-tamil-nadu-anr-v-k-fazlur-rahman-anr-2020-9-scr-906/) **Published:** December 28, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the scope and limitations of the State Government’s power to supersede a Waqf Board under Section 99 of the Waqf Act, 1995, particularly in light of the second proviso inserted by the 2013 amendment. The dispute arose from the supersession of the Tamil Nadu Waqf Board on the ground that the number of elected members had fallen below nominated members, allegedly rendering the Board incapable of functioning. The Supreme Court closely scrutinised whether such a situation, arising without any fault or misconduct of the Board, could justify supersession. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the scope and limitations of the *State Government’s power to supersede a Waqf Board* under *Section 99 of the Waqf Act, 1995*, particularly in light of the *second proviso inserted by the 2013 amendment*. The dispute arose from the supersession of the Tamil Nadu Waqf Board on the ground that the number of elected members had fallen below nominated members, allegedly rendering the Board incapable of functioning. The Supreme Court closely scrutinised whether such a situation, arising without any fault or misconduct of the Board, could justify supersession. The Court interpreted *Section 14* holistically, emphasising that the statutory obligation to maintain a democratic composition of the Board rests with the State Government. It clarified that cessation of membership due to expiry of tenure of an elected representative does not amount to inability or misconduct attributable to the Board. The judgment reinforces that *Section 22* safeguards the validity of Board actions despite vacancies or defects in constitution. A significant contribution of the ruling lies in its interpretation of the *second proviso to Section 99*, holding that supersession is impermissible in the absence of *prima facie evidence of financial irregularity, misconduct, or statutory violation by the Board itself*. The Court upheld the High Court’s decision declaring the supersession illegal while approving the limited relief granted due to procedural posture and parties before the Court. This decision strengthens democratic governance of Waqf institutions, limits arbitrary executive interference, and reiterates accountability of the State in constituting statutory bodies lawfully. **Keywords:** Waqf Board, Supersession, Section 99 Waqf Act, Democratic Governance, Statutory Interpretation, Administrative Law ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgment Cause Title*The State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. v. K. Fazlur Rahman & Anr.*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal Nos. 3603–3605 of 2020iii) Judgment Date03 November 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumAshok Bhushan J., R. Subhash Reddy J., M.R. Shah J.vi) AuthorJustice Ashok Bhushanvii) Citation*\[2020\] 9 SCR 906*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 14, 22, 32, 38, 39, 41, 48, 53, 96, 97, 99 – Waqf Act, 1995*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsConstitutional Law, Administrative Law, Minority Rights, Statutory Bodies Governance ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The case arose from executive action taken by the Government of Tamil Nadu superseding the State Waqf Board constituted in October 2017. The Board was a statutory body under the *Waqf Act, 1995*, entrusted with supervision and management of auqaf properties. The supersession was justified by the State on the ground that the number of elected members had become fewer than nominated members following cessation of tenure of a Muslim Member of Parliament in May 2019. The High Court of Madras held the supersession illegal but limited relief to members of the Mutawalli category, considering the pleadings before it. The State appealed, asserting absolute power under *Section 99* and arguing that imbalance in composition rendered the Board “unable to perform”. The Supreme Court was thus called upon to determine whether *structural imbalance without Board fault* could justify supersession, and how *Sections 14, 22, and 99* interact. The decision situates itself at the intersection of democratic governance, statutory accountability, and executive restraint. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The Tamil Nadu Waqf Board was reconstituted on *10.10.2017* after expiry of the previous Board’s tenure. It consisted of *eleven Muslim members* representing different statutory categories, including elected Members of Parliament, Members of Legislative Assembly, Mutawallis, and nominated members such as senior advocates and scholars. Two senior Muslim advocates were nominated under the *proviso to Section 14(1)(b)(iii)* due to absence of Muslim members in the Bar Council. In May 2019, one elected Member of Parliament ceased to hold office, reducing elected members from five to four. The State sought legal opinion and concluded that nominated senior advocates could not be treated as elected members. Based on this interpretation, the State issued a *show cause notice* and subsequently superseded the Board on *18.09.2019* under *Section 99(1)*, stating that the Board had become unable to perform its functions. Several writ petitions were filed challenging the supersession and subsequent reconstitution process. The High Court held that the supersession was contrary to law but limited relief to two Mutawalli members due to procedural constraints. The State challenged this partial invalidation before the Supreme Court. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether imbalance between elected and nominated members constitutes “inability to perform” under *Section 99(1)*? ii. Whether the State can supersede a Waqf Board without *prima facie evidence* of misconduct under the *second proviso to Section 99*? iii. Whether vacancies or defects in constitution invalidate the Board’s functioning in light of *Section 22*? iv. Whether partial setting aside of supersession order by the High Court was legally permissible? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the State submitted that *Section 14(4)* mandates elected members to outnumber nominated members at all times. Upon cessation of the MP’s tenure, this statutory condition stood violated, rendering the Board incapable of functioning. It was argued that the State had no option but to invoke *Section 99*. The appellants contended that the High Court erred in partially setting aside the supersession, as such orders are indivisible. Delay, laches, and prior judicial approvals were also invoked to challenge maintainability. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents argued that the imbalance was a consequence of State’s own failure to conduct elections or invoke *Section 14(3)*. They emphasised that *Section 22* protects Board actions despite vacancies. Crucially, reliance was placed on the *second proviso to Section 99*, contending that absence of *financial irregularity or misconduct* barred supersession. The respondents asserted that the State cannot benefit from its own statutory lapse. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the High Court’s conclusion that the supersession was illegal. The Court analysed *Section 14* to hold that democratic composition is an obligation upon the State. The Court observed that nomination under *Section 14(3)* operates as an exception and was not invoked. The Court relied on *Section 22* to affirm that vacancies or defects do not invalidate Board functioning. It categorically held that cessation of an elected member’s tenure is beyond Board control and cannot be construed as inability or misconduct. Interpreting *Section 99*, the Court held that the *second proviso* acts as a substantive restriction on executive power. Supersession must be preceded by prima facie evidence of misconduct attributable to the Board. Structural imbalance alone does not satisfy this threshold. The High Court’s partial relief was upheld due to the limited scope of writ petitions before it. The Court declined to interfere with subsequent elections except regarding Mutawalli members. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The State Government cannot supersede a Waqf Board under *Section 99* merely because elected members fall below nominated members, when such imbalance arises without fault, misconduct, or statutory violation by the Board, and in absence of *prima facie evidence* as mandated by the *second proviso to Section 99*. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court emphasised that democratic governance is the legislative soul of the Waqf Act. Executive authorities must act as facilitators of elections rather than substituting democratic processes through nomination or supersession. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Supersession powers must be exercised sparingly. ii. State must exhaust alternatives under *Sections 14(3)* and *14(4)*. iii. Structural defects must not be equated with misconduct. iv. Second proviso to *Section 99* is mandatory and restrictive. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces rule of law in governance of religious endowments. It curbs executive overreach and restores legislative intent of democratic control in Waqf administration. The ruling ensures stability of statutory bodies and strengthens minority institutional autonomy. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *M.H. Jawahirullah v. Government of Tamil Nadu*, *(2013) 3 MLJ 688* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Waqf Act, 1995* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Chief Manager, Punjab National Bank & Anr. v. Anit Kumar Das [2020] 9 SCR 925](https://lawfoyer.in/chief-manager-punjab-national-bank-anr-v-anit-kumar-das-2020-9-scr-925/) **Published:** December 28, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The Supreme Court examined the legality of continuation in service of a candidate appointed as a Peon in Punjab National Bank despite being ineligible under the prescribed recruitment criteria. The Bank’s recruitment advertisement, issued pursuant to internal circulars, expressly disqualified graduates from applying for the post of Peon, limiting eligibility to candidates who had passed 12th Standard with basic English knowledge. The respondent, though a graduate since 2014, suppressed this material fact and declared only Higher Secondary qualification in his application. An appointment order was issued based on the disclosed qualifications, but during document verification, the Bank discovered the respondent’s graduation degree and cancelled his candidature. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The Supreme Court examined the legality of continuation in service of a candidate appointed as a Peon in Punjab National Bank despite being ineligible under the prescribed recruitment criteria. The Bank’s recruitment advertisement, issued pursuant to internal circulars, expressly disqualified graduates from applying for the post of Peon, limiting eligibility to candidates who had passed *12th Standard* with basic English knowledge. The respondent, though a graduate since 2014, suppressed this material fact and declared only *Higher Secondary qualification* in his application. An appointment order was issued based on the disclosed qualifications, but during document verification, the Bank discovered the respondent’s graduation degree and cancelled his candidature. The High Court, relying on precedents that discouraged disqualification on grounds of higher qualification, directed the Bank to permit the respondent to join duties. The Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that recruitment must strictly conform to the terms of the advertisement and applicable circulars. It reaffirmed that determination of eligibility criteria falls within the employer’s domain and courts cannot substitute their judgment unless the prescription is arbitrary. The Court further emphasized that suppression of material facts disentitles a candidate from equitable relief. The judgment reinforces the principles of employer autonomy in recruitment policy, estoppel against candidates who participate without challenging eligibility conditions, and the legal consequences of misrepresentation in public employment. **Keywords:** Recruitment Rules, Over-qualification, Suppression of Facts, Employer’s Discretion, Judicial Review ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetails**Judgment Cause Title***Chief Manager, Punjab National Bank & Anr. v. Anit Kumar Das***Case Number**Civil Appeal No. 3602 of 2020**Judgment Date**03 November 2020**Court**Supreme Court of India**Quorum**Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy & M.R. Shah, JJ.**Author**Justice M.R. Shah**Citation***\[2020\] 9 SCR 925***Legal Provisions Involved***Service jurisprudence principles; Recruitment circulars dated 06.11.2008 and 04.03.2016***Judgments Overruled**None**Related Law Subjects**Service Law; Constitutional Law (Judicial Review) ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT** The dispute arose from a recruitment process initiated by Punjab National Bank for appointment to the subordinate cadre post of Peon. The recruitment was governed by *Circular Letter No. 25 of 2008* issued by the Human Resources Development Division, which expressly restricted eligibility to candidates who had passed *12th Standard*, categorically excluding graduates. This exclusion was reaffirmed through *Circular Letter No. 6 of 2016*, which modified the selection procedure while retaining the eligibility framework. The respondent applied for the post despite holding a graduation degree. In the application and biodata, he disclosed only his *Higher Secondary qualification*, concealing his graduate status. Based on this information, his candidature was processed and he was issued an appointment order. Before joining, however, the Bank discovered his graduation certificate during verification and cancelled the appointment on grounds of ineligibility and suppression of material facts. The respondent challenged the cancellation before the Orissa High Court. The Single Judge allowed the writ petition, relying on earlier judicial pronouncements holding that higher qualification cannot operate as a disqualification. The Division Bench affirmed the decision without providing detailed reasoning. The Supreme Court was thus called upon to decide whether courts could override express eligibility conditions prescribed by an employer and whether a candidate who suppressed material facts could claim continuation in service. The case squarely involved the limits of judicial review in recruitment matters and the doctrine of fairness in public employment. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** Punjab National Bank issued a recruitment advertisement inviting applications for the post of Peon. The advertisement explicitly stated that candidates must have passed *12th Standard* and must *not be graduates* as on *01 January 2016*. These conditions were derived from *Circular Letter No. 25 of 2008*, which governed recruitment to subordinate staff positions. The respondent, a graduate since 2014, applied for the post. In the prescribed application form and biodata, he declared his qualification as *12th pass*, deliberately omitting reference to his graduation degree. Based on the information provided, the Bank shortlisted candidates according to marks obtained in *10th and 12th standards*, in line with *Circular Letter No. 6 of 2016*. The respondent’s name appeared in the select list and an appointment order dated *03 October 2016* was issued. During scrutiny of documents prior to joining, the respondent produced a graduation certificate. Upon verification, the Bank concluded that he was ineligible ab initio and had suppressed material facts. Consequently, his candidature was cancelled and he was not permitted to join service. Aggrieved, the respondent filed a writ petition before the Orissa High Court seeking enforcement of the appointment order. The Bank opposed the petition, emphasizing the binding nature of the eligibility criteria and the respondent’s misrepresentation. The Single Judge allowed the petition, relying on a judgment of the Allahabad High Court which held that higher qualification cannot be a ground for disqualification. The Division Bench affirmed this decision. The Bank appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court erred in disregarding recruitment rules and ignoring suppression of material facts. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether a candidate who possesses a qualification expressly disqualifying him under the recruitment advertisement can claim appointment? ii. Whether suppression of material educational qualifications disentitles a candidate from public employment? iii. Whether courts can interfere with eligibility criteria consciously prescribed by an employer? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellant Bank submitted that the eligibility conditions were explicitly mentioned in the advertisement and derived from valid internal circulars. The respondent never challenged these conditions and voluntarily participated in the recruitment process. It was argued that once a candidate accepts the recruitment terms, he is estopped from questioning them later. It was further contended that prescribing non-graduation as a condition was a conscious policy decision taken by the Bank’s Board, considering the nature of subordinate cadre work. Judicial review could not extend to assessing the advisability of such qualifications. Reliance was placed on *Yogesh Kumar v. Government of NCT of Delhi* and *J. Rangaswamy v. Government of Andhra Pradesh*. The Bank emphasized that the respondent deliberately suppressed his graduation qualification. Such misrepresentation vitiates the entire selection process and disentitles him from equitable relief. The cancellation of candidature was therefore lawful and justified. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the respondent submitted that possession of higher qualification should not disqualify a candidate where the minimum qualification is satisfied. Reliance was placed on *Mohd. Riazul Usman Gani v. District and Sessions Judge, Nagpur*, where disqualification on grounds of higher qualification was deprecated. It was argued that the eligibility condition did not prescribe a maximum qualification and hence could not exclude graduates. The respondent contended that cancellation of his appointment solely on the basis of higher qualification was arbitrary and violative of fairness principles. The respondent sought continuation in service pursuant to the appointment order already issued in his favour. ## **H) JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgments of the Single Judge and Division Bench. The Court held that recruitment to public service must strictly adhere to the terms of the advertisement and governing rules. The eligibility condition excluding graduates was explicit, valid, and in force since 2008. The Court observed that the respondent never challenged the eligibility criteria before participating in the recruitment process. Having accepted the terms, he could not later contend that higher qualification should not be a disqualification. The Court reiterated that determining suitability and relevance of qualifications lies within the employer’s domain and courts are ill-equipped to substitute such policy decisions. The Court distinguished *Mohd. Riazul Usman Gani*, clarifying that it was decided on its peculiar facts and did not lay down a universal principle. Reliance was placed on *Zahoor Ahmad Rather v. Imtiyaz Ahmad* to reiterate that higher qualification cannot be presumed to include lower qualification in absence of statutory provision. On suppression of facts, the Court held that the respondent deliberately misrepresented his educational qualifications. Suppression of material facts strikes at the root of trust in public employment. A candidate who secures appointment by misrepresentation cannot claim any legal or equitable right to continue in service. Accordingly, the cancellation of candidature was upheld and the appeal was allowed. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment is that *recruitment must be conducted strictly in accordance with eligibility conditions prescribed in the advertisement and governing rules*. An employer has exclusive authority to determine qualifications relevant to a post, and courts cannot interfere unless such prescription is arbitrary or unconstitutional. Further, *suppression or misrepresentation of material facts relating to eligibility disentitles a candidate from claiming appointment or continuation in service*. Participation in a recruitment process without challenging eligibility conditions operates as estoppel against subsequent challenge. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that public employers may legitimately frame eligibility criteria keeping in mind administrative efficiency, job nature, and social considerations. Judicial review must tread cautiously in matters of recruitment policy, as courts lack institutional competence to assess such administrative expediency. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Recruitment authorities must strictly adhere to advertised eligibility criteria. ii. Candidates must disclose complete and truthful information in applications. iii. Courts should not relax or reinterpret eligibility conditions absent arbitrariness. iv. Suppression of material facts justifies cancellation of candidature at any stage. ## **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment reinforces foundational principles of service jurisprudence by upholding employer autonomy in prescribing recruitment qualifications. It sends a clear message that judicial sympathy cannot override statutory or policy-based eligibility conditions. The Court’s emphasis on transparency and honesty in recruitment processes strengthens public confidence in employment systems. The ruling also clarifies the limited scope of precedents discouraging disqualification on grounds of higher qualification. Such precedents cannot be mechanically applied where eligibility conditions are explicit. Importantly, the judgment underscores that suppression of facts is not a mere procedural lapse but a substantive illegality affecting the integrity of public service. For law students and practitioners, the case serves as a crucial authority on estoppel in recruitment matters, limits of judicial review, and consequences of misrepresentation in service law. ## **J) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** - *Yogesh Kumar v. Government of NCT of Delhi*, *\[2003\] 2 SCR 662* - *J. Rangaswamy v. Government of Andhra Pradesh*, *(1990) 1 SCC 288* - *Zahoor Ahmad Rather v. Imtiyaz Ahmad*, *\[2018\] 14 SCR 1082* - *Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Ram Ratan Yadav*, *\[2003\] 2 SCR 361* **b) Important Statutes / Instruments** - Recruitment Circular Letter No. 25 of 2008 - Recruitment Circular Letter No. 6 of 2016 **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Shri Ram Sahu (Dead) through LRs v. Vinod Kumar Rawat & Ors., [2020] 11 SCR 865](https://lawfoyer.in/shri-ram-sahu-dead-through-lrs-v-vinod-kumar-rawat-ors-2020-11-scr-865/) **Published:** December 28, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The decision in Shri Ram Sahu (Dead) through LRs v. Vinod Kumar Rawat & Ors. is a definitive exposition on the limits of review jurisdiction under Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Supreme Court examined whether a High Court, while exercising review powers, could delete substantive factual observations made in an earlier appellate judgment concerning possession of immovable property. The controversy arose after the High Court, nearly two years after disposing of a first appeal, entertained a review petition and deleted an entire paragraph recording findings on possession, solely on the ground that no specific issue on possession had been framed by the Trial Court. The Supreme Court emphatically held that such an exercise amounted to overstepping review jurisdiction. It reiterated that review is not an appeal in disguise and cannot be used to re-appreciate evidence or to unsettle findings recorded after detailed examination of pleadings and proof. The Court underscored that absence of a formally framed issue does not vitiate findings when parties were aware of the controversy, led evidence, and suffered no prejudice. Observations on possession were based on depositions, pleadings, and even admissions by defendants through interlocutory applications. By restoring the deleted paragraph, the Court reaffirmed the doctrine of finality of judgments, clarified the distinction between error apparent on the face of record and erroneous findings, and reinforced judicial discipline in exercising review powers. The judgment carries substantial precedential value in civil procedure, particularly in property litigation and appellate practice. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The decision in *Shri Ram Sahu (Dead) through LRs v. Vinod Kumar Rawat & Ors.* is a definitive exposition on the *limits of review jurisdiction* under *Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908*. The Supreme Court examined whether a High Court, while exercising review powers, could delete substantive factual observations made in an earlier appellate judgment concerning possession of immovable property. The controversy arose after the High Court, nearly two years after disposing of a first appeal, entertained a review petition and deleted an entire paragraph recording findings on possession, solely on the ground that no specific issue on possession had been framed by the Trial Court. The Supreme Court emphatically held that such an exercise amounted to *overstepping review jurisdiction*. It reiterated that review is not an appeal in disguise and cannot be used to re-appreciate evidence or to unsettle findings recorded after detailed examination of pleadings and proof. The Court underscored that *absence of a formally framed issue does not vitiate findings when parties were aware of the controversy, led evidence, and suffered no prejudice*. Observations on possession were based on depositions, pleadings, and even admissions by defendants through interlocutory applications. By restoring the deleted paragraph, the Court reaffirmed the doctrine of *finality of judgments*, clarified the distinction between *error apparent on the face of record* and *erroneous findings*, and reinforced judicial discipline in exercising review powers. The judgment carries substantial precedential value in civil procedure, particularly in property litigation and appellate practice. **Keywords:** Review Jurisdiction, Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, Error Apparent, Possession, Finality of Judgment, Civil Procedure ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetails**Judgment Cause Title***Shri Ram Sahu (Dead) through LRs v. Vinod Kumar Rawat & Ors.***Case Number**Civil Appeal No. 3601 of 2020**Judgment Date**03 November 2020**Court**Supreme Court of India**Quorum**Justice Ashok Bhushan and Justice M.R. Shah**Author**Justice M.R. Shah**Citation***\[2020\] 11 SCR 865***Legal Provisions Involved***Section 114, Order XLVII Rule 1, Section 151, Order VI Rule 17 CPC***Judgments Overruled**None**Related Law Subjects**Civil Law, Procedural Law, Property Law ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT** The litigation traces its origin to a long-standing dispute over ownership and possession of a residential property in Gwalior. The predecessor of the appellants claimed title on the basis of a *Will dated 19.10.1993*, while the respondents asserted ownership through an *Adoption Deed* and a subsequent *registered Sale Deed dated 25.03.1995*. The Trial Court dismissed the suit, accepting the defence version of adoption and transfer. On appeal, the High Court affirmed dismissal but recorded detailed observations on possession after analysing oral and documentary evidence. These findings assumed significance because they recognised the plaintiffs’ actual possession, despite their failure to succeed on title. Nearly two years later, the defendants invoked *review jurisdiction* seeking deletion of those observations. The High Court allowed the review solely on the premise that no formal issue on possession had been framed. This approach raised serious questions regarding judicial discipline, scope of review, and the sanctity of findings rendered after appreciation of evidence. The Supreme Court was thus called upon to delineate the permissible contours of review jurisdiction under the CPC and to decide whether procedural omissions could nullify substantive findings grounded in evidence. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The original plaintiff instituted *Civil Suit No. 04A of 2005* seeking declaration that a registered *Sale Deed dated 25.03.1995* executed by *defendant no.3* in favour of *defendant nos.1 and 2* was null and void. He also sought a permanent injunction restraining alienation of the suit property. The plaintiff’s claim rested on a *Will allegedly executed by Chhimmabai on 19.10.1993*, under which he claimed ownership and possession. The defendants contested the claim by asserting that *Chhimmabai had adopted defendant no.3*, evidenced by a *registered Adoption Deed dated 13.05.1992*. On this basis, defendant no.3 sold the property to defendants nos.1 and 2, who claimed to be bona fide purchasers in possession. The Trial Court framed issues relating to ownership, validity of the Will, adoption, and legality of the sale deed. After trial, it dismissed the suit, upholding the adoption and sale. In the First Appeal, the High Court dismissed the appeal but, while doing so, examined depositions of *PW-1 and PW-2*, pleadings, and interlocutory applications. It recorded a categorical finding that the plaintiffs were in possession of the disputed house. Subsequently, defendants filed a review petition seeking deletion of this finding. The High Court allowed the review, holding that possession was never in issue. This order was challenged before the Supreme Court. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether the High Court could exercise *review jurisdiction* to delete findings based on appreciation of evidence? ii. Whether *non-framing of an issue* on possession invalidates findings recorded on evidence? iii. Whether such deletion amounts to *re-appreciation of evidence* under the guise of review? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellants submitted that the High Court acted *beyond the scope of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC*. The finding on possession was based on pleadings, oral evidence, and even admissions by defendants in applications under *Section 151 CPC*. There was no *error apparent on the face of record*. It was argued that *non-framing of an issue does not vitiate proceedings* when parties were aware of the controversy and led evidence. Reliance was placed on *Sri Gangai Vinayagar Temple v. Meenakshi Ammal* and *Bhuwan Singh v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.* to show that procedural omissions fade into insignificance in absence of prejudice. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the respondents contended that possession was never a subject matter of the suit or appeal. No injunction against dispossession was sought. Therefore, any observation on possession was *beyond pleadings*. The High Court, it was argued, merely corrected an error by deleting irrelevant observations. It was further submitted that review jurisdiction includes power to rectify such errors to prevent misuse of findings in collateral proceedings. ## **H) JUDGMENT** The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the review order. It held that the High Court *clearly exceeded its jurisdiction*. The Court reiterated that *Section 114 CPC* confers substantive power of review, but its exercise is strictly controlled by *Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC*. The Court emphasised that findings on possession were based on *appreciation of evidence*, including depositions and admissions. Such findings cannot be characterised as errors apparent. The review court cannot sit in appeal over its own judgment. The deletion of paragraph 20 amounted to *re-hearing on merits*, which is impermissible. The Court also rejected the argument based on absence of a framed issue, observing that pleadings and evidence clearly covered possession. The respondents themselves sought possession through interlocutory applications, thereby admitting plaintiffs’ possession. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio is that *review jurisdiction cannot be used to unsettle findings of fact recorded after appreciation of evidence*. An error apparent must be self-evident and not one requiring detailed reasoning. Absence of a formally framed issue does not invalidate findings when parties were conscious of the dispute and led evidence. Review is not an appellate remedy and cannot be exercised to correct an allegedly erroneous decision on merits. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that procedural technicalities should not override substantive justice. It cautioned High Courts against entertaining belated review petitions aimed at nullifying adverse observations for collateral advantages. Judicial discipline requires restraint in reopening concluded findings. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Review jurisdiction must remain confined to grounds under *Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC*. ii. Findings based on evidence cannot be revisited in review. iii. Non-framing of an issue does not nullify adjudication if parties led evidence without prejudice. iv. Review cannot be used as a strategic tool to erase unfavourable observations. ## **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment reinforces the *sanctity of final judgments* and preserves the hierarchical distinction between appeal and review. It prevents abuse of review proceedings to erase inconvenient findings. The decision provides clarity on procedural law and strengthens certainty in civil adjudication, particularly in property disputes where findings on possession carry independent legal significance. ## **J) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** - *Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik*, *(2006) 4 SCC 78* - *Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi*, *(1997) 8 SCC 715* - *Sri Gangai Vinayagar Temple v. Meenakshi Ammal*, *(2015) 3 SCC 624* - *Lily Thomas v. Union of India*, *(2000) 6 SCC 224* **b) Important Statutes Referred** - *Code of Civil Procedure, 1908* - *Indian Penal Code, 1860* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Rajesh @ Sarkari & Anr. v. State of Haryana, [2020] 14 SCR 1](https://lawfoyer.in/rajesh-sarkari-anr-v-state-of-haryana-2020-14-scr-1/) **Published:** December 28, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment addresses the foundational criminal law principle that suspicion, however grave, cannot substitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court examined the evidentiary worth of alleged eye-witness testimony, forensic inconsistencies, and the legal effect of refusal to participate in a Test Identification Parade in a prosecution for murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The prosecution case rested substantially on the testimonies of the deceased’s father and brother, who claimed to have witnessed the shooting inside a university campus and to have transported the injured victim to hospital. However, documentary evidence in the form of the ruqqa, hospital records, and defence testimony created serious doubt regarding their presence at the scene of occurrence. The Court undertook a meticulous scrutiny of forensic science laboratory reports prepared across two different FIRs and highlighted irreconcilable discrepancies concerning the recovery, identification, and ballistic linkage of alleged weapons. The non-examination of ballistic experts, despite serious contradictions in forensic reports, was held to be fatal in the absence of unimpeachable direct evidence. The Court further clarified that refusal to undergo a Test Identification Parade is not substantive evidence and cannot independently sustain a conviction where the prosecution fails to establish the identity of the accused beyond doubt. The judgment reinforces constitutional protections under criminal jurisprudence by emphasizing procedural fairness, evidentiary rigor, and the prosecution’s burden of proof. Ultimately, the appellants were acquitted and extended the benefit of doubt, resulting in the reversal of concurrent findings of guilt recorded by the Trial Court and the High Court. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment addresses the foundational criminal law principle that *suspicion, however grave, cannot substitute proof beyond reasonable doubt*. The Supreme Court examined the evidentiary worth of alleged eye-witness testimony, forensic inconsistencies, and the legal effect of refusal to participate in a Test Identification Parade in a prosecution for *murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC*. The prosecution case rested substantially on the testimonies of the deceased’s father and brother, who claimed to have witnessed the shooting inside a university campus and to have transported the injured victim to hospital. However, documentary evidence in the form of the *ruqqa*, hospital records, and defence testimony created serious doubt regarding their presence at the scene of occurrence. The Court undertook a meticulous scrutiny of forensic science laboratory reports prepared across two different FIRs and highlighted irreconcilable discrepancies concerning the recovery, identification, and ballistic linkage of alleged weapons. The non-examination of ballistic experts, despite serious contradictions in forensic reports, was held to be fatal in the absence of unimpeachable direct evidence. The Court further clarified that refusal to undergo a Test Identification Parade is not substantive evidence and cannot independently sustain a conviction where the prosecution fails to establish the identity of the accused beyond doubt. The judgment reinforces constitutional protections under criminal jurisprudence by emphasizing procedural fairness, evidentiary rigor, and the prosecution’s burden of proof. Ultimately, the appellants were acquitted and extended the benefit of doubt, resulting in the reversal of concurrent findings of guilt recorded by the Trial Court and the High Court. **Keywords:** Criminal Trial, Benefit of Doubt, Eyewitness Credibility, Ballistic Evidence, Test Identification Parade, Section 302 IPC ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Rajesh @ Sarkari & Anr. v. State of Haryana*Case NumberCriminal Appeal No. 1648 of 2019Judgement Date03 November 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumDr. D.Y. Chandrachud, Indu Malhotra & Indira Banerjee, JJ.AuthorDr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.Citation*\[2020\] 14 SCR 1*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 302, 34 IPC; Sections 154, 313 CrPC; Arms Act provisions*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsCriminal Law, Evidence Law, Procedural Law ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The appeal arose from the affirmation of conviction by the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which upheld the Trial Court’s judgment sentencing the appellants to life imprisonment for the murder of a university student. The prosecution alleged that the deceased was shot dead by three assailants inside the university campus in broad daylight. The complainant and his younger son were projected as natural eye-witnesses who allegedly rushed to the scene and later removed the injured victim to the hospital. The prosecution narrative was challenged on multiple fronts. The defence highlighted material contradictions between the FIR, witness testimonies, hospital records, and forensic reports. Central to the controversy was whether PW-4 and PW-5 were present at the scene of the crime at all. Documentary evidence in the form of the *ruqqa* indicated that the deceased was brought to hospital by a third person, contradicting the prosecution’s claim. Additionally, the weapons allegedly used in the murder were recovered in a separate FIR, and multiple FSL reports were generated across different investigations. The ballistic linkage between the recovered cartridges, bullets, and weapons was disputed due to discrepancies in descriptions and recoveries. Despite citing ballistic experts as witnesses, the prosecution failed to examine them. The appellants also refused to undergo a Test Identification Parade. The prosecution sought to draw an adverse inference from this refusal, while the defence contended prior familiarity between the accused and the deceased. The Supreme Court was thus required to reassess the evidentiary foundation of the conviction and determine whether the prosecution had discharged its burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** On *26 December 2006*, the deceased, a final-year law student, went to the university campus to prepare for examinations. When he could not be contacted on his phone, his father (PW-4) and brother (PW-5) allegedly went searching for him. According to the prosecution, they witnessed three assailants firing multiple gunshots at the deceased near the law department parking area at around *2:30 PM*. The FIR stated that the deceased was transported to PGIMS Rohtak by *Parveen, son of Zile Singh Hooda, and another person*. Contrary to this, during trial, PW-4 and PW-5 claimed that they themselves had removed the deceased to the hospital. Hospital records showed that the victim was brought dead at *3:00 PM*, and the *ruqqa* recorded the name of a third person as the carrier. During trial, defence witnesses DW-4 and DW-5 categorically deposed that they alone transported the deceased to the hospital and that the complainant and his son arrived later. This testimony remained unshaken. The prosecution neither examined these witnesses nor explained the inconsistency. Multiple FSL reports were relied upon, but they related to two different FIRs. Only one of the two alleged weapons was examined in the final ballistic report. The report also contained errors regarding the recovery of the weapon and mismatched ammunition descriptions. The ballistic experts who authored the reports were not examined. The Trial Court convicted all accused based on eye-witness testimony, forensic reports, and refusal of TIP. The High Court affirmed the conviction without detailed re-evaluation of evidentiary inconsistencies. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that PW-4 and PW-5 were eye-witnesses to the incident? ii. Whether contradictions between the FIR, ruqqa, and oral testimony rendered the prosecution case unreliable? iii. Whether unproved and contradictory FSL reports could sustain a conviction? iv. Whether refusal to undergo a Test Identification Parade could independently justify conviction? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellants submitted that the alleged eye-witnesses were not present at the scene of occurrence. Material improvements were made during trial which contradicted the FIR and hospital records. The *ruqqa* clearly established that a third person transported the deceased. It was argued that ballistic evidence was unreliable due to contradictory FSL reports, non-production of weapon W-1, and non-examination of forensic experts. The defence relied upon precedents cited in the judgment itself, including *Mohinder Singh*, *Gurucharan Singh*, and *Govindaraju*, to argue that failure to examine ballistic experts assumes significance where direct evidence is doubtful. The refusal to undergo TIP was justified as the accused and deceased were previously known, rendering TIP meaningless. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the State submitted that PW-4 and PW-5 were natural witnesses whose presence was corroborated by medical and forensic evidence. Minor inconsistencies were argued to be inconsequential. It was contended that refusal to participate in TIP warranted adverse inference. The State argued that forensic discrepancies were clerical and that conviction could be sustained under *Section 34 IPC* even if one weapon was not conclusively linked. ## **H) JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. The Court found that PW-4 and PW-5 made material improvements in their testimony. The FIR and *ruqqa* contradicted their claim of transporting the deceased. Defence testimony explaining the transportation remained unrebutted. The Court held that the prosecution failed to establish a reliable chain of ballistic evidence. Only one weapon was examined. Errors regarding recovery and ammunition type were unexplained. The non-examination of ballistic experts was fatal given the doubtful nature of direct evidence. The Court reiterated that refusal to undergo TIP is not substantive evidence and cannot independently sustain conviction. The cumulative effect of evidentiary lapses entitled the appellants to benefit of doubt. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** Where the presence of alleged eye-witnesses is doubtful, and forensic evidence is inconsistent and unproved, conviction under *Sections 302/34 IPC* cannot be sustained. Refusal to participate in TIP cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubt. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that investigative lapses and casual reliance on forensic reports without expert testimony undermine the integrity of criminal trials and jeopardize public confidence in the justice system. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Courts must scrutinize improvements in eye-witness testimony with caution. ii. Forensic reports with discrepancies must be supported by expert examination. iii. TIP refusal has only corroborative value and cannot be treated as substantive proof. ## **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment reaffirms the constitutional mandate of fair trial and evidentiary discipline. It serves as a cautionary precedent against convictions based on conjecture, untested forensic material, and unreliable eyewitness claims. The decision strengthens safeguards against wrongful conviction and reinforces the prosecution’s burden to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. ## **J) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** - *Mohinder Singh v. State*, AIR 1953 SC 415 - *Gurucharan Singh v. State of Punjab*, \[1963\] 3 SCR 585 - *Govindaraju v. State*, \[2012\] 5 SCR 67 **b) Important Statutes Referred** - *Indian Penal Code, 1860* - *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* - *Indian Evidence Act, 1872* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Rajnesh v. Neha & Anr., [2020] 13 SCR 1093](https://lawfoyer.in/rajnesh-v-neha-anr-2020-13-scr-1093/) **Published:** December 28, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in Rajnesh v. Neha & Anr. constitutes a landmark exposition on the law of maintenance in India, particularly addressing the systemic inconsistencies arising from overlapping statutory remedies, prolonged pendency of interim maintenance applications, and difficulties in enforcement of maintenance orders. The Supreme Court was seized of an appeal challenging concurrent findings of the Family Court and the Bombay High Court granting interim maintenance to the wife and minor child under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. While affirming the maintenance awarded in the present case, the Court expanded the scope of adjudication by exercising its constitutional powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to frame comprehensive and binding guidelines on maintenance. The Court undertook a purposive interpretation of maintenance laws, locating them firmly within the constitutional framework of Articles 15(3) and 39, emphasizing their role as instruments of social justice. Recognizing the multiplicity of proceedings under statutes such as the Cr.P.C., Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, Special Marriage Act, 1954, and the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, the Court sought to harmonize their operation. The judgment mandates uniform disclosure of assets and liabilities, clarifies the date from which maintenance should ordinarily be awarded, lays down criteria for determining quantum, and strengthens enforcement mechanisms. By addressing both the individual dispute and the broader jurisprudential vacuum, the decision serves as a guiding precedent aimed at ensuring consistency, transparency, and fairness in maintenance adjudication across India. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment in *Rajnesh v. Neha & Anr.* constitutes a landmark exposition on the law of maintenance in India, particularly addressing the systemic inconsistencies arising from overlapping statutory remedies, prolonged pendency of interim maintenance applications, and difficulties in enforcement of maintenance orders. The Supreme Court was seized of an appeal challenging concurrent findings of the Family Court and the Bombay High Court granting interim maintenance to the wife and minor child under *Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*. While affirming the maintenance awarded in the present case, the Court expanded the scope of adjudication by exercising its constitutional powers under *Article 142 of the Constitution of India* to frame comprehensive and binding guidelines on maintenance. The Court undertook a purposive interpretation of maintenance laws, locating them firmly within the constitutional framework of *Articles 15(3)* and *39*, emphasizing their role as instruments of social justice. Recognizing the multiplicity of proceedings under statutes such as the *Cr.P.C.*, *Hindu Marriage Act, 1955*, *Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956*, *Special Marriage Act, 1954*, and the *Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005*, the Court sought to harmonize their operation. The judgment mandates uniform disclosure of assets and liabilities, clarifies the date from which maintenance should ordinarily be awarded, lays down criteria for determining quantum, and strengthens enforcement mechanisms. By addressing both the individual dispute and the broader jurisprudential vacuum, the decision serves as a guiding precedent aimed at ensuring consistency, transparency, and fairness in maintenance adjudication across India. **Keywords:** Interim Maintenance; Section 125 Cr.P.C.; Overlapping Jurisdiction; Affidavit of Assets and Liabilities; Enforcement of Maintenance Orders; Article 142 Constitution of India. ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetails*Judgement Cause Title**Rajnesh v. Neha & Anr.**Case Number*Criminal Appeal No. 730 of 2020*Judgement Date*04 November 2020*Court*Supreme Court of India*Quorum*Hon’ble Ms. Justice Indu Malhotra and Hon’ble Mr. Justice R. Subhash Reddy*Author*Justice Indu Malhotra*Citation**\[2020\] 13 SCR 1093**Legal Provisions Involved**Section 125 Cr.P.C.; Articles 15(3), 39, 142 Constitution of India; Sections 24 & 25 HMA; Sections 18 & 23 HAMA; DV Act, 2005**Judgments Overruled*None*Related Law Subjects*Criminal Law; Family Law; Constitutional Law ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The litigation arose from a long-pending claim for interim maintenance filed under *Section 125 Cr.P.C.*, a provision designed to provide immediate relief to wives and children facing neglect. The respondent-wife had left the matrimonial home shortly after childbirth and sought maintenance for herself and the minor child. Despite statutory timelines mandating expeditious disposal, the proceedings remained pending for over seven years, exposing structural inefficiencies within the maintenance framework. The Family Court, Nagpur, granted interim maintenance, which was affirmed by the Bombay High Court. The husband’s challenge before the Supreme Court was premised on alleged unemployment and inability to pay. However, the proceedings revealed repeated non-compliance, suppression of financial details, and prolonged delay in disbursement, compelling the Supreme Court to intervene beyond the narrow confines of the dispute. The Court contextualized maintenance within the constitutional vision of substantive equality and social welfare. Drawing from *Captain Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Veena Kaushal*, it reiterated that maintenance provisions are not mere statutory entitlements but enforce constitutional empathy towards women and children. The Court acknowledged that diverse statutes offer parallel remedies, but their uncoordinated operation had led to inconsistent outcomes and multiplicity of proceedings. Against this backdrop, the Court deemed it necessary to lay down uniform guidelines governing disclosure, determination, award, and enforcement of maintenance. The judgment thus represents a shift from case-specific adjudication to systemic reform, grounded in constitutional authority. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The marriage between the appellant-husband and respondent-wife resulted in the birth of a son. Shortly thereafter, in January 2013, the wife left the matrimonial home along with the minor child. In September 2013, she instituted proceedings under *Section 125 Cr.P.C.* seeking interim maintenance for herself and the child. The Family Court, after considering the material on record, awarded interim maintenance of *₹15,000 per month* to the wife and *₹10,000 per month* to the child. The husband challenged the order before the Bombay High Court, which upheld the Family Court’s decision. Persistent non-compliance with maintenance orders led to repeated directions by the Supreme Court, including the filing of income tax returns, disclosure of assets, and payment of arrears. Despite these directions, the husband defaulted on multiple occasions, admitting arrears exceeding ₹5,00,000. The husband claimed unemployment and lack of assets, while the wife alleged concealment of income, diversion of funds, and illegal retention of *streedhan*. The Court noted the prolonged pendency, repeated defaults, and enforcement difficulties faced by the wife. Mediation efforts failed, and the dispute crystallized into a broader examination of maintenance jurisprudence. Ultimately, the Supreme Court affirmed the interim maintenance and directed payment of arrears within a fixed timeline, while also issuing general guidelines applicable across all maintenance proceedings in India . ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether the grant of interim maintenance under *Section 125 Cr.P.C.* by the Family Court and High Court suffered from legal infirmity? ii. Whether overlapping maintenance claims under different statutes require harmonization to prevent multiplicity of proceedings? iii. From which date should maintenance ordinarily be awarded? iv. What parameters should govern determination of quantum of maintenance? v. What mechanisms ensure effective enforcement of maintenance orders? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellant-husband submitted that he was unemployed and lacked sufficient means to pay maintenance. It was argued that reliance on old income tax returns was erroneous and resulted in an inflated assessment of capacity. The appellant asserted absence of immovable property and contended that continuation of maintenance imposed an undue financial burden. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the respondent-wife submitted that the awarded maintenance was inadequate given rising costs and the child’s educational needs. It was contended that the husband had deliberately concealed income and investments and willfully disobeyed court orders. The respondent emphasized prolonged non-payment and resultant hardship, asserting entitlement to enforcement and continuation of maintenance. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. *Section 125, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* ii. *Articles 15(3), 39, 142, Constitution of India* iii. *Sections 24 & 25, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955* iv. *Sections 18 & 23, Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956* v. *Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005* ## **I) JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the courts below and directed the husband to clear all arrears within twelve weeks. Recognizing persistent systemic failures, the Court framed binding guidelines governing overlapping jurisdiction, mandatory disclosure through affidavits of assets and liabilities, criteria for quantum, award from the date of application, and enforcement mechanisms. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio rests on the principle that maintenance laws are instruments of social justice flowing from constitutional mandates. The Court held that maintenance should ordinarily be awarded from the date of application, disclosure of assets must be mandatory, and courts must adjust amounts to avoid duplication across statutes. The exercise of *Article 142* powers was justified to ensure uniformity and fairness. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that delays in maintenance proceedings defeat legislative intent and exacerbate vulnerability of dependent spouses. It emphasized judicial responsibility to prevent misuse of process and concealment of income, and underscored the need for professional counseling infrastructure in Family Courts. **c) GUIDELINES** The judgment laid down exhaustive guidelines including mandatory affidavits, limited adjournments, adjustment of maintenance across proceedings, award from date of application, and civil enforcement mechanisms including attachment and contempt for willful default. ## **J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The decision redefines maintenance jurisprudence by harmonizing statutory remedies and reinforcing constitutional objectives. It addresses procedural inefficiencies and substantive inequities, ensuring that maintenance law operates as a real, enforceable right rather than a delayed promise. The judgment stands as a transformative precedent with enduring impact on family law adjudication in India. ## **K) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Captain Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Veena Kaushal*, *\[1978\] 3 SCR 782* 2. *Nanak Chand v. Chandra Kishore Aggarwal*, *\[1970\] 1 SCR 565* 3. *Chand Dhawan v. Jawaharlal Dhawan*, *\[1993\] 3 SCR 954* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* 2. *Hindu Marriage Act, 1955* 3. *Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956* 4. *Constitution of India* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand & Anr., [2020] 9 SCR 593](https://lawfoyer.in/hitesh-verma-v-state-of-uttarakhand-anr-2020-9-scr-593/) **Published:** December 27, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the scope and limits of Section 3(1)(r) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, particularly in disputes arising out of property and civil conflicts. The Supreme Court scrutinised whether allegations of caste-based abuse, arising during a private land dispute and allegedly occurring within the four walls of a house, satisfy the statutory ingredients of an offence under the Act. The Court clarified that every insult or intimidation against a Scheduled Caste member does not ipso facto attract the Act, unless such conduct is intentionally directed at humiliating the victim because of caste identity and occurs in a place within public view. The judgment further reaffirms the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, holding that there is no legal prohibition against quashing a charge-sheet in part. The Court carefully balanced the object of the SC/ST Act with safeguards against its misuse in purely civil disputes. It emphasised that invocation of civil remedies by either party cannot, by itself, be construed as caste-based oppression. By quashing the charges under the SC/ST Act while permitting prosecution under the IPC to continue, the Court delineated the doctrinal boundary between caste-based atrocities and ordinary criminal or civil disputes, ensuring that the protective intent of the Act is preserved without allowing procedural abuse. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the scope and limits of *Section 3(1)(r)* of the *Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989*, particularly in disputes arising out of *property and civil conflicts*. The Supreme Court scrutinised whether allegations of caste-based abuse, arising during a private land dispute and allegedly occurring within the four walls of a house, satisfy the statutory ingredients of an offence under the Act. The Court clarified that *every insult or intimidation against a Scheduled Caste member does not ipso facto attract the Act*, unless such conduct is *intentionally directed at humiliating the victim because of caste identity* and occurs *in a place within public view*. The judgment further reaffirms the *inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*, holding that there is *no legal prohibition against quashing a charge-sheet in part*. The Court carefully balanced the object of the SC/ST Act with safeguards against its misuse in purely civil disputes. It emphasised that invocation of civil remedies by either party cannot, by itself, be construed as caste-based oppression. By quashing the charges under the SC/ST Act while permitting prosecution under the IPC to continue, the Court delineated the doctrinal boundary between *caste-based atrocities* and *ordinary criminal or civil disputes*, ensuring that the protective intent of the Act is preserved without allowing procedural abuse. **Keywords:** SC/ST Act, Section 3(1)(r), Public View, Quashing of Charges, Section 482 CrPC, Property Dispute ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgment Cause Title*Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand & Anr.*Case NumberCriminal Appeal No. 707 of 2020Judgment Date05 November 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumL. Nageswara Rao J., Hemant Gupta J., Ajay Rastogi J.AuthorHemant Gupta J.Citation*\[2020\] 9 SCR 593*Legal Provisions Involved*Section 482 CrPC; Sections 452, 504, 506 IPC; Sections 3(1)(x), 3(1)(r), 3(1)(e) SC/ST Act, 1989*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsCriminal Law, Social Justice Legislation ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The judgment arose from a challenge to an order of the High Court of Uttarakhand dismissing a petition under *Section 482 CrPC* seeking quashing of criminal proceedings. The appellant was accused of offences under the *Indian Penal Code* and the *SC/ST Act, 1989* based on allegations stemming from a long-standing property dispute. The SC/ST Act was enacted as a *special penal statute* to deter and punish atrocities against historically oppressed communities. The Court revisited the *Statement of Objects and Reasons* of the Act, emphasising that it was designed to address *systemic indignities, humiliations, and violence* inflicted on Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes *because of their caste identity*. However, the Court also acknowledged evolving jurisprudence cautioning against the *mechanical application* of the Act in disputes lacking a caste-based animus. The background reflects judicial concern for preserving the *dignity-protective purpose* of the statute while preventing its use as a *tool of coercion* in private disputes. The judgment situates itself within prior Supreme Court rulings interpreting the scope of *intent*, *public view*, and *causal nexus between caste and offence*, thereby contributing to doctrinal clarity on the operational limits of the Act. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The dispute originated from rival claims over possession and construction on agricultural land situated in Pithoragarh district. The complainant, a Scheduled Caste woman, alleged that the appellant and his family members obstructed her construction activities for several months. An FIR was lodged alleging offences under *Sections 452, 504, 506 IPC* and *Sections 3(1)(x) and 3(1)(e) of the SC/ST Act*. It was claimed that the accused entered the complainant’s house, abused her using caste-related words, issued death threats, and removed construction materials. The incident was alleged to have occurred *inside the four walls of the complainant’s house*. The FIR did not allege the presence of members of the general public beyond relatives or labourers. A counter-FIR was also lodged by one of the accused, resulting in criminal proceedings against the complainant. Civil litigation concerning land possession was admittedly pending between the parties. The police filed a charge-sheet under *Sections 504, 506 IPC* and *Section 3(1)(x) SC/ST Act*. The Trial Court took cognisance. The appellant’s petition for quashing was dismissed by the High Court, prompting the appeal before the Supreme Court. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether allegations arising out of a property dispute constitute an offence under *Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act*? ii. Whether abusive words allegedly spoken inside a private house satisfy the requirement of *“public view”*? iii. Whether *Section 482 CrPC* permits partial quashing of a charge-sheet? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the FIR was a *counterblast* to civil proceedings and lacked essential ingredients of the offence under the SC/ST Act. It was argued that *mere knowledge of caste* does not establish intent to humiliate on caste grounds. Reliance was placed on *Gerige Pentaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh*, where caste-related abuses in a civil dispute were held insufficient to attract the Act. It was contended that the alleged incident occurred in a private space without public presence, negating the statutory requirement of *public view*. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent submitted that investigation revealed witness support for the complainant’s allegations. It was argued that caste-based abuses were explicitly alleged and that the appellant was aware of the complainant’s caste status. The respondent contended that the High Court rightly refused to interfere at the pre-trial stage and that disputed facts should be tested during trial. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 3(1)(r), SC/ST Act, 1989* ii. *Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* iii. *Sections 452, 504, 506, Indian Penal Code, 1860* ## I) JUDGMENT The Supreme Court allowed the appeal in part. It held that *intentional caste-based humiliation* is the gravamen of *Section 3(1)(r)* and that *all insults do not fall within the Act*. The Court found that the dispute was fundamentally about land possession and not caste oppression. On the requirement of *public view*, the Court relied on *Swaran Singh v. State*, reiterating the distinction between *public place* and *place within public view*. Since the alleged abuse occurred inside a house with no public present, the statutory condition was not met. The Court further reaffirmed that *Section 482 CrPC* empowers courts to *quash proceedings partially* to prevent abuse of process. Relying on *Ishwar Pratap Singh v. State of U.P.*, it held that charges under the SC/ST Act were liable to be quashed while IPC offences could proceed. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The offence under *Section 3(1)(r) SC/ST Act* requires *intentional humiliation on caste grounds* and occurrence *in public view*. Property disputes lacking caste animus do not attract the provision. Courts may quash charge-sheets *in part* under *Section 482 CrPC*. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that misuse of the Act undermines its credibility and harms genuine victims, though no presumption of misuse can be drawn against Scheduled Castes as a class. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Courts must examine *intent and context* before applying the SC/ST Act. ii. Private disputes should not be criminalised absent caste-based motivation. iii. Partial quashing is permissible to secure justice. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Gerige Pentaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh* 2. *Swaran Singh v. State* 3. *Khuman Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh* 4. *Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra* 5. *Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India* 6. *Ishwar Pratap Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989* 2. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* 3. *Indian Penal Code, 1860* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [C. Bright v. The District Collector & Ors. [2020] 7 SCR 997](https://lawfoyer.in/c-bright-v-the-district-collector-ors-2020-7-scr-997/) **Published:** December 27, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The Supreme Court in C. Bright v. The District Collector & Ors. examined the legal character of the time limits prescribed under Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. The controversy centred on whether the statutory mandate requiring the District Magistrate or Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to pass orders within thirty days, extendable to sixty days with recorded reasons, is mandatory or merely directory. The appellant contended that failure to comply with the outer limit renders the authority functus officio, thereby frustrating the secured creditor’s remedy. The Court rejected this contention and upheld the High Court’s reasoning that the time stipulation is directory in nature. The judgment reaffirmed settled principles of statutory interpretation that the mere use of the word “shall” does not conclusively determine mandatory intent. Emphasis was placed on the object, purpose, scheme, and consequences of non-compliance. The Court held that Section 14 performs a public function aimed at facilitating recovery of public dues and that the secured creditor has no control over the Magistrate’s administrative functioning. Treating the provision as mandatory would defeat the legislative purpose and enable defaulting borrowers to obstruct recovery. By harmonising SARFAESI’s objectives with constitutional and interpretative doctrines, the Court clarified that procedural timelines imposed on public authorities are ordinarily directory unless penal consequences are prescribed. The decision reinforces judicial restraint against hyper-technical interpretations that undermine economic legislation intended for expeditious enforcement of security interests. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The Supreme Court in *C. Bright v. The District Collector & Ors.* examined the legal character of the time limits prescribed under *Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002*. The controversy centred on whether the statutory mandate requiring the District Magistrate or Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to pass orders within *thirty days*, extendable to *sixty days with recorded reasons*, is *mandatory* or merely *directory*. The appellant contended that failure to comply with the outer limit renders the authority *functus officio*, thereby frustrating the secured creditor’s remedy. The Court rejected this contention and upheld the High Court’s reasoning that the time stipulation is directory in nature. The judgment reaffirmed settled principles of statutory interpretation that the mere use of the word *“shall”* does not conclusively determine mandatory intent. Emphasis was placed on the *object, purpose, scheme, and consequences of non-compliance*. The Court held that Section 14 performs a *public function* aimed at facilitating recovery of public dues and that the secured creditor has no control over the Magistrate’s administrative functioning. Treating the provision as mandatory would defeat the legislative purpose and enable defaulting borrowers to obstruct recovery. By harmonising SARFAESI’s objectives with constitutional and interpretative doctrines, the Court clarified that procedural timelines imposed on public authorities are ordinarily directory unless penal consequences are prescribed. The decision reinforces judicial restraint against hyper-technical interpretations that undermine economic legislation intended for expeditious enforcement of security interests. **Keywords:** SARFAESI Act, Section 14, Mandatory vs Directory, District Magistrate, Secured Creditor, Statutory Interpretation ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*C. Bright v. The District Collector & Ors.*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 3441 of 2020iii) Judgement Date05 November 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) Quorum*L. Nageswara Rao, Hemant Gupta & Ajay Rastogi, JJ.*vi) Author*Hemant Gupta, J.*vii) Citation*\[2020\] 7 SCR 997*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Section 14, SARFAESI Act, 2002*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsBanking Law, Recovery Law, Statutory Interpretation ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The SARFAESI Act was enacted to remedy systemic inefficiencies in debt recovery faced by banks and financial institutions. Prior to its enactment, secured creditors were compelled to resort to prolonged civil proceedings, which resulted in mounting non-performing assets and erosion of public funds. The legislature consciously created a framework empowering secured creditors to take possession of secured assets without judicial intervention, subject to procedural safeguards. *Section 14* plays a pivotal facilitative role by obligating the District Magistrate or Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to assist secured creditors in obtaining physical possession of secured assets. Legislative amendments in *2013* and *2016* introduced affidavit requirements and time limits to ensure administrative accountability. However, these amendments gave rise to interpretative disputes concerning the consequences of delay by public authorities. The appellant sought a literal interpretation of the time limits, arguing that expiry of sixty days extinguishes the Magistrate’s jurisdiction. This interpretation, if accepted, would impose severe consequences on secured creditors for administrative delays beyond their control. The High Court rejected this view, prompting the present appeal. The Supreme Court’s task was to reconcile procedural discipline with substantive justice, while preserving the economic purpose of the statute. The judgment situates Section 14 within the broader legislative intent of facilitating expeditious recovery and preventing abuse of process by defaulting borrowers. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellant challenged the order of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court dated *19 July 2019*, which held that the time limits under *Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act* are directory. The appellant’s grievance arose from delay on the part of the District Magistrate in passing orders on an application filed by the secured creditor seeking possession of secured assets. The appellant contended that the amended provisos to Section 14 clearly mandate disposal within *thirty days*, extendable to *sixty days* only upon recorded reasons. According to the appellant, failure to adhere to this timeline results in abatement of proceedings and compels the secured creditor to pursue alternate remedies. The High Court rejected this argument, reasoning that the statute does not prescribe consequences for non-compliance and that borrowers are not prejudiced by administrative delay. The High Court emphasised that treating the provision as mandatory would undermine recovery proceedings and incentivise dilatory tactics. Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court asserting that the High Court ignored binding precedents interpreting the word *“shall”* as mandatory. The respondents defended the High Court’s reasoning by invoking settled principles governing statutory duties imposed on public authorities. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the time limits prescribed under *Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act* are mandatory or directory? ii. Whether failure of the District Magistrate to act within sixty days renders him *functus officio*? iii. Whether the use of the word *“shall”* conclusively determines legislative intent? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the Appellant submitted that *Section 14* employs mandatory language and prescribes a strict outer limit of sixty days. It was argued that the requirement to record reasons for extension indicates legislative intent to impose a binding obligation. Reliance was placed on *Union of India v. A.K. Pandey* and *Harshad Govardhan Sondagar v. ARCIL* to contend that procedural safeguards cannot be diluted. It was further argued that permitting action beyond sixty days would render the provisos meaningless and defeat the certainty introduced by the 2016 amendment. According to the appellant, statutory timelines lose credibility if treated as merely advisory. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the Respondents argued that the time limits are intended to ensure administrative diligence and not to extinguish substantive rights. It was submitted that secured creditors have no control over the functioning of District Magistrates and should not suffer due to bureaucratic delays. Reliance was placed on *Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India* and *Hindon Forge Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P.* to highlight the economic purpose of the Act. The respondents argued that interpreting Section 14 as mandatory would encourage defaulting borrowers and frustrate recovery of public money. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 13, SARFAESI Act, 2002* ii. *Section 14, SARFAESI Act, 2002* iii. *Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the High Court’s view. The Court reiterated that statutory interpretation requires examination of the *object, purpose, and consequences* of a provision. The use of the word *“shall”* does not automatically render a provision mandatory. The Court held that Section 14 imposes a *public duty* on the District Magistrate. Drawing from precedents such as *Montreal Street Railway v. Normandin* and *Dattatraya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. State of Bombay*, the Court observed that procedural timelines governing public authorities are ordinarily directory unless accompanied by penal consequences. The Court distinguished *New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage*, noting that consumer protection statutes operate in a different context involving private litigants. It emphasised that treating Section 14 as mandatory would enable borrowers to obstruct recovery by exploiting administrative delays. The Court concluded that inability to act within sixty days does not divest the Magistrate of jurisdiction. The time limits serve as a reminder of duty, not as a jurisdictional bar. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The statutory time limits under *Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act* are directory in nature. Failure of the District Magistrate to act within thirty or sixty days does not render him *functus officio*, nor does it extinguish the secured creditor’s remedy. Legislative intent, object of the Act, absence of penal consequences, and the public nature of the duty collectively indicate a directory construction. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court cautioned High Courts against granting interim orders in SARFAESI matters without hearing secured creditors. It reiterated that judicial interference at preliminary stages undermines economic legislation and adversely impacts financial stability. **c) GUIDELINES** i. District Magistrates must make earnest efforts to comply with statutory timelines. ii. Reasons must be recorded for delay beyond thirty days. iii. High Courts should discourage writ petitions where statutory remedies exist. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India*, *\[2004\] 3 SCR 982* ii. *Transcore v. Union of India*, *\[2006\] 9 Supp SCR 785* iii. *Hindon Forge Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P.*, *\[2018\] 11 SCR 1019* iv. *Montreal Street Railway v. Normandin*, *AIR 1917 PC 142* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002* ii. *Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Gurusimran Singh Narula v. Union of India & Anr., [2020] 12 S.C.R. 351](https://lawfoyer.in/gurusimran-singh-narula-v-union-of-india-anr-2020-12-s-c-r-351/) **Published:** December 27, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The writ petition examined the legality and constitutional permissibility of spraying or fumigating chemical or organic disinfectants on human beings and exposing individuals to artificial ultraviolet rays as a preventive response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, the petition asserted that such practices violated the right to life and health under Article 21. The petitioner relied upon advisories issued by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and international guidance, particularly from the World Health Organization, which cautioned against human disinfection through tunnels and sprays. Despite such advisories, several public authorities and organisations continued deploying disinfection tunnels, creating regulatory ambiguity and health risks. The Supreme Court analysed the Disaster Management Act, 2005, particularly Sections 10 and 36, to determine whether the Union Government merely possessed discretionary powers or was under a positive statutory obligation to act. The Court reaffirmed that statutory powers conferred for public welfare are powers coupled with duties. It held that issuance of advisories alone was insufficient when evidence showed continued harmful practices across the country. While the Court refrained from imposing an immediate blanket ban, it directed the Union Government to actively consider and issue binding directions regulating or prohibiting such practices, including exposure to ultraviolet radiation. The judgment reinforces the jurisprudence that public health protection during disasters requires affirmative executive action, and that regulatory silence in the face of known harm amounts to constitutional failure. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The writ petition examined the legality and constitutional permissibility of *spraying or fumigating chemical or organic disinfectants on human beings* and *exposing individuals to artificial ultraviolet rays* as a preventive response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Filed under *Article 32 of the Constitution of India*, the petition asserted that such practices violated the *right to life and health under Article 21*. The petitioner relied upon advisories issued by the *Ministry of Health and Family Welfare* and international guidance, particularly from the *World Health Organization*, which cautioned against human disinfection through tunnels and sprays. Despite such advisories, several public authorities and organisations continued deploying disinfection tunnels, creating regulatory ambiguity and health risks. The Supreme Court analysed the *Disaster Management Act, 2005*, particularly *Sections 10 and 36*, to determine whether the Union Government merely possessed discretionary powers or was under a positive statutory obligation to act. The Court reaffirmed that statutory powers conferred for public welfare are *powers coupled with duties*. It held that issuance of advisories alone was insufficient when evidence showed continued harmful practices across the country. While the Court refrained from imposing an immediate blanket ban, it directed the Union Government to *actively consider and issue binding directions* regulating or prohibiting such practices, including exposure to ultraviolet radiation. The judgment reinforces the jurisprudence that *public health protection during disasters requires affirmative executive action*, and that regulatory silence in the face of known harm amounts to constitutional failure. **Keywords:** Right to Health, Article 21, Disaster Management Act 2005, Disinfection Tunnels, Covid-19 Pandemic, Public Health Regulation ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Gurusimran Singh Narula v. Union of India & Anr.*Case NumberWrit Petition (Civil) No. 560 of 2020Judgement Date05 November 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorum*Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy, M.R. Shah, JJ.*Author*Ashok Bhushan, J.*Citation*\[2020\] 12 S.C.R. 351*Legal Provisions Involved*Articles 21 & 32, Constitution of India; Sections 10 & 36, Disaster Management Act, 2005*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsConstitutional Law, Disaster Management Law, Public Health Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The judgment arose during the unprecedented public health emergency caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, which had been formally declared a *pandemic by the World Health Organization on 11 March 2020*. In India, the pandemic was notified as a *disaster* under the *Disaster Management Act, 2005*, thereby activating a special statutory framework aimed at prevention, mitigation, preparedness, and response. Amid widespread fear and uncertainty, several governmental and private bodies began deploying *disinfection tunnels* that sprayed chemical or organic substances on individuals, claiming preventive efficacy against Covid-19. These measures gained visibility despite the *Ministry of Health and Family Welfare* issuing an advisory on *18 April 2020* explicitly stating that spraying disinfectants on humans was not recommended and could be harmful. Conflicting press releases, including one by *CSIR-NCL Pune and ICT Mumbai*, further contributed to public confusion. The petitioner, acting in public interest, contended that the continued use and promotion of such tunnels amounted to a *direct threat to public health* and violated the *right to life with dignity*. The petition highlighted the absence of any scientific approval for such methods and emphasised the failure of the Union Government to translate advisory warnings into enforceable regulation. The case therefore presented a crucial constitutional question regarding the *extent of executive duty during disasters* and whether mere advisories satisfy statutory and constitutional obligations when citizens’ health is at stake. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The petitioner approached the Supreme Court under *Article 32* seeking a complete ban on the *installation, production, advertisement, and use of disinfection tunnels* involving chemical or organic sprays, as well as exposure to artificial ultraviolet rays. The petition emphasised that *no chemical or organic disinfectant had been approved* by the competent health authorities for application on human bodies. Despite the advisory dated *18 April 2020* issued by the *Director General of Health Services*, multiple public authorities, local administrations, and private entities continued deploying walk-through tunnels at offices, markets, and public institutions. The petitioner relied on *WHO publications* clearly stating that spraying disinfectants on people neither prevents Covid-19 infection nor kills viruses inside the human body and may cause skin, eye, respiratory, and gastrointestinal harm. The Union Government, in its counter affidavit, acknowledged that spraying disinfectants on individuals was *not recommended*. It referred to minutes of a *9 June 2020 meeting* chaired by the Director General of Health Services, reiterating that such practices were physically and psychologically harmful. However, the Government maintained that *public health is a State subject* and its role was limited to issuing guidelines and providing support. An intervenor company claimed that its product used natural oils and steam, arguing against a blanket ban. This further highlighted the regulatory vacuum and the need for clear statutory action. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether *spraying or fumigation of chemical disinfectants on human beings* without governmental approval violates *Article 21*? ii. Whether *self-claimed organic disinfectants* sprayed on humans infringe the *right to health under Article 21*? iii. Whether *exposure of human beings to artificial ultraviolet rays* amounts to a violation of *Article 21*? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Petitioner submitted that the concept of *human disinfection through tunnels* was scientifically flawed and constitutionally impermissible. It was argued that the *right to health*, as an integral component of *Article 21*, stood violated by unregulated exposure to chemicals and radiation. The petitioner relied upon *WHO advisories* and the *18 April 2020 advisory* of the Ministry itself, which acknowledged the dangers of such practices. It was further contended that mere issuance of advisories without enforcement allowed dangerous practices to flourish, creating a *false sense of safety* and undermining scientifically proven measures such as hand hygiene and social distancing. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for Respondent submitted that the Union Government had *never approved* the use of disinfection tunnels and had clearly advised against them. It was argued that implementation lay with the *States and Union Territories*, as public health fell under the State List. The Union maintained that its statutory role was limited to issuing guidelines under the *Disaster Management Act, 2005*. The intervenor argued that its product differed materially from chemical tunnels and that a blanket prohibition would harm legitimate business interests. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Article 21, Constitution of India* ii. *Article 32, Constitution of India* iii. *Section 10, Disaster Management Act, 2005* iv. *Section 36, Disaster Management Act, 2005* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court held that although advisories had been issued, *no concrete regulatory action* followed despite evidence of widespread harmful practices. The Court emphasised that *Sections 10 and 36 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005* impose not merely enabling powers but *affirmative duties* upon authorities during disasters. The Court relied on *Devika Biswas v. Union of India (2016) 10 SCC 726* to reiterate that the *right to health is inseparable from Article 21*. It further applied the doctrine that *power coupled with duty* mandates action when circumstances demand, citing *Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji*, *L. Hirday Narain v. ITO*, and *Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Vardichan*. The Court found that regulatory inaction created uncertainty and exposed citizens to avoidable health risks. It therefore directed the Union Government to *consider and issue binding directions* regulating or banning such practices within one month. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** Statutory powers conferred under the *Disaster Management Act, 2005* are *inseparably linked with a constitutional duty* to protect public health. Issuance of advisories alone does not satisfy this obligation when harmful practices persist. Failure to act violates the *right to health under Article 21*. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that *public health protection is a paramount principle of governance*, echoing *Article 47* and the need for proactive regulation during health emergencies. **c) GUIDELINES** i. The Union Government must actively exercise powers under the *Disaster Management Act, 2005*. ii. Clear directions must be issued regarding *disinfection tunnels and ultraviolet exposure*. iii. Public health considerations must override administrative convenience. ## J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces the principle that *constitutional rights demand affirmative governance*, particularly during disasters. It clarifies that decentralisation of public health responsibilities does not absolve the Union of its statutory duties under special legislation. The decision strengthens Indian public health jurisprudence by linking *executive accountability* directly with *Article 21* and disaster governance. ## K) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Devika Biswas v. Union of India*, *(2016) 10 SCC 726* ii. *Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji*, *AIR 1952 SC 16; \[1952\] SCR 135* iii. *L. Hirday Narain v. ITO*, *(1970) 2 SCC 355; \[1971\] 1 SCR 683* iv. *Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Vardichan*, *(1980) 4 SCC 162; \[1981\] 1 SCR 97* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Constitution of India* ii. *Disaster Management Act, 2005* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Hindustan Unilever Limited v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2020] 9 SCR 455](https://lawfoyer.in/hindustan-unilever-limited-v-state-of-madhya-pradesh-2020-9-scr-455/) **Published:** December 27, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in Hindustan Unilever Limited v. State of Madhya Pradesh examines the interplay between corporate criminal liability, vicarious liability of nominated officers, and the effect of repeal and savings clauses under Indian criminal jurisprudence. The Supreme Court was required to decide whether prosecution and punishment under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 could continue despite its repeal by the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, and whether a nominated officer could be convicted independently when the company itself was not convicted. The Court reaffirmed the settled doctrine under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 97 of the 2006 Act, holding that repeal does not extinguish pending prosecutions or liabilities unless a contrary intention is expressly stated. It categorically rejected the argument that the accused could claim the benefit of the milder penal regime under the 2006 Act. More significantly, the judgment clarifies that Section 17 of the 1954 Act creates conjoint and not alternative liability. The Court held that the company and the nominated person form an inseparable unit for the purpose of prosecution. In the absence of conviction of the company, conviction of the nominated officer alone was held to be legally unsustainable. The Court further deprecated the High Court’s decision to remand the matter after three decades to cure a fundamental defect, holding such remand to be unfair, prejudicial, and contrary to principles of criminal justice. The ruling strengthens safeguards against prolonged criminal trials and reinforces strict compliance with statutory requirements in corporate prosecutions. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment in *Hindustan Unilever Limited v. State of Madhya Pradesh* examines the interplay between *corporate criminal liability*, *vicarious liability of nominated officers*, and the *effect of repeal and savings clauses* under Indian criminal jurisprudence. The Supreme Court was required to decide whether prosecution and punishment under the *Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954* could continue despite its repeal by the *Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006*, and whether a nominated officer could be convicted independently when the company itself was not convicted. The Court reaffirmed the settled doctrine under *Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897* and *Section 97 of the 2006 Act*, holding that repeal does not extinguish pending prosecutions or liabilities unless a contrary intention is expressly stated. It categorically rejected the argument that the accused could claim the benefit of the milder penal regime under the 2006 Act. More significantly, the judgment clarifies that *Section 17 of the 1954 Act* creates *conjoint and not alternative liability*. The Court held that the company and the nominated person form an inseparable unit for the purpose of prosecution. In the absence of conviction of the company, conviction of the nominated officer alone was held to be legally unsustainable. The Court further deprecated the High Court’s decision to remand the matter after three decades to cure a fundamental defect, holding such remand to be unfair, prejudicial, and contrary to principles of criminal justice. The ruling strengthens safeguards against prolonged criminal trials and reinforces strict compliance with statutory requirements in corporate prosecutions. **Keywords:** Corporate Criminal Liability; Vicarious Liability; Repeal and Savings Clause; Food Adulteration Law; Nominated Officer ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*Hindustan Unilever Limited v. State of Madhya Pradesh*ii) Case NumberCriminal Appeal Nos. 715 & 716 of 2020iii) Judgement Date05 November 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumL. Nageswara Rao, Hemant Gupta & Ajay Rastogi, JJ.vi) AuthorHemant Gupta, J.vii) Citation*\[2020\] 9 SCR 455*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 7, 16 & 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954; Section 97 of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006; Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897; Section 401 CrPC*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsCriminal Law; Food Safety Law; Corporate Liability ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The case arises from a prosecution initiated in 1989 under the *Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954*, alleging adulteration of vanaspati ghee manufactured by Hindustan Unilever Limited. The prosecution spanned over three decades, traversing multiple judicial forums and legislative transitions. The central controversy involved the liability of a nominated officer vis-à-vis the company after repeal of the parent statute. The background is legally significant due to the repeal of the 1954 Act by the *Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006*. The accused sought to invoke the beneficial sentencing provisions of the later enactment, contending that only fine was prescribed therein. This raised constitutional and statutory questions concerning retrospective benefit, repeal, and savings. Additionally, the case is rooted in an earlier remand by the Supreme Court in *R. Banerjee v. H.D. Dubey*, where the Court directed determination of the validity of nomination under *Section 17*. The trial court subsequently proceeded only against the nominated officer while effectively abandoning prosecution against the company. This procedural anomaly became the fulcrum of the present appeal. The High Court attempted to rectify the defect by remanding the matter for reconsideration against the company as well. The Supreme Court was thus confronted with the legality of such remand after thirty years, the correctness of convicting a nominated officer alone, and the applicability of repealed penal provisions. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE A food inspector collected a sample of *Dalda Vanaspati Khajoor Brand Ghee* on 07.02.1989 from a godown in Jabalpur. The sample failed the prescribed standard due to excess melting point, rendering it adulterated under *Section 2(ia)(m)* of the 1954 Act. A complaint was filed against the company, its directors, and other intermediaries. The matter reached the Supreme Court earlier in *R. Banerjee*, wherein directions were issued to verify whether nomination under *Section 17* was validly acknowledged by the competent authority. Pursuant thereto, the trial court absolved the directors and continued proceedings only against the nominated officer, Dr. Nirmal Sen. Crucially, the company, though arrayed as an accused, was never convicted nor effectively tried. In 2015, the trial court convicted the nominated officer under multiple provisions of the 1954 Act and imposed imprisonment and fine. The appellate court affirmed the conviction. The High Court, however, noticed a patent defect since acquittal of the company would necessarily enure to the benefit of the nominated officer. It set aside the conviction and remanded the matter for fresh consideration against both. The accused approached the Supreme Court challenging both the denial of benefit under the 2006 Act and the legality of remand after three decades. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether prosecution and punishment could continue under the *Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954* after its repeal by the *Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006*? ii. Whether the accused was entitled to claim the benefit of lesser punishment under the 2006 Act? iii. Whether a nominated officer could be convicted independently in the absence of conviction of the company under *Section 17 of the 1954 Act*? iv. Whether the High Court was justified in remanding the matter after more than thirty years to cure a foundational defect in trial? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the offence alleged pertained only to excess melting point and, under the 2006 Act, attracted only monetary penalty. Relying on *T. Barai*, *Nemi Chand*, and *Trilok Chand*, it was contended that beneficial legislation must apply retrospectively. It was further argued that the company was never convicted, and therefore vicarious liability of the nominated officer could not survive. Reliance was placed on *Aneeta Hada*, asserting that arraignment and conviction of the company is a condition precedent. The remand order was assailed as violative of *Section 401(2) CrPC* since it prejudicially affected the accused without affording opportunity of hearing and attempted to fill lacunae after inordinate delay. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the State submitted that *Section 97 of the 2006 Act* expressly saves penalties and prosecutions under the repealed Act. The accused could not seek benefit of a statute which specifically preserved earlier liabilities. It was argued that nomination under *Section 17* fastened responsibility on the nominated officer and conviction was legally sustainable. The delay, according to the State, was attributable to the accused. The State supported the High Court’s remand as a permissible corrective measure within revisional jurisdiction. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court rejected the plea for application of the 2006 Act, holding that *Section 97* read with *Section 6 of the General Clauses Act* expressly protected pending prosecutions and punishments. The Court distinguished *Nemi Chand* and *T. Barai* as cases involving amendments, not repeal with savings. The Court held that *Section 17 of the 1954 Act* creates conjoint liability of the company and the nominated person. Drawing parity with *Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act* and relying on *Aneeta Hada*, it was held that conviction of the company is a sine qua non. The failure of the trial court to convict the company rendered the entire prosecution defective. The High Court’s attempt to remand after thirty years was held to be unjust, unfair, and prejudicial. The appeals were allowed and the complaint dismissed. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The repeal of a penal statute does not extinguish liabilities unless expressly stated. Further, under *Section 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954*, prosecution of a nominated officer is legally impermissible without prosecution and conviction of the company. **b) OBITER DICTA** Prolonged criminal trials undermine fairness. Courts must be cautious in ordering remands to cure defects that go to the root of jurisdiction after inordinate delay. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Courts must ensure arraignment and adjudication of the company in prosecutions involving vicarious liability. ii. Remand to fill foundational lacunae after prolonged delay should be avoided. iii. Savings clauses must be given full statutory effect. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment fortifies doctrinal clarity on corporate criminal liability. It prevents misuse of vicarious liability provisions by ensuring strict statutory compliance. The ruling also upholds fairness by protecting accused persons from endless litigation and retrospective procedural correction. It is a significant precedent in food safety jurisprudence and corporate criminal law. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *R. Banerjee v. H.D. Dubey*, *(1992) 2 SCC 552 : \[1992\] 2 SCR 221* ii. *State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh*, *AIR 1955 SC 84 : \[1955\] 1 SCR 893* iii. *Tiwari Kanhaiyalal v. CIT*, *(1975) 4 SCC 101 : \[1975\] 3 SCR 927* iv. *Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels*, *(2012) 5 SCC 661 : \[2012\] 5 SCR 503* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954* ii. *Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006* iii. *General Clauses Act, 1897* iv. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Shanti Devi alias Shanti Mishra v. Union of India & Ors., [2020] 12 SCR 279](https://lawfoyer.in/shanti-devi-alias-shanti-mishra-v-union-of-india-ors-2020-12-scr-279/) **Published:** December 27, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the contours of territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India in the context of pensionary disputes of a retired employee. The Supreme Court addressed whether a writ petition challenging the stoppage of pension and recovery of pension amounts could be entertained by the Patna High Court when the employee had served in West Bengal but was receiving pension at his native place in Bihar. The Court clarified that cause of action must be assessed from the bundle of facts giving rise to the grievance and not merely from the place of employment or location of the authority. The Court distinguished between two writ petitions filed by the deceased employee. The first writ petition related to refund of allegedly illegal deductions from provident fund and was dismissed for lack of territorial jurisdiction. The subsequent writ petition challenged a later administrative action involving stoppage of pension after eight years and recovery of a substantial amount already paid. The Supreme Court held that these petitions arose from distinct causes of action, and dismissal of the earlier petition did not bar the later one. Significantly, the Court reaffirmed that receipt of pension and its stoppage at the place of residence constitutes an integral part of cause of action. The hardship caused to a retired employee was emphasized, and the doctrine of forum non conveniens was held inapplicable. The judgment restores the writ petition before the Patna High Court and grants interim relief of provisional pension to the widow, reinforcing the constitutional mandate of access to justice. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment examines the contours of *territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India* in the context of pensionary disputes of a retired employee. The Supreme Court addressed whether a writ petition challenging the stoppage of pension and recovery of pension amounts could be entertained by the *Patna High Court* when the employee had served in West Bengal but was receiving pension at his native place in Bihar. The Court clarified that *cause of action* must be assessed from the bundle of facts giving rise to the grievance and not merely from the place of employment or location of the authority. The Court distinguished between two writ petitions filed by the deceased employee. The first writ petition related to refund of allegedly illegal deductions from provident fund and was dismissed for lack of territorial jurisdiction. The subsequent writ petition challenged a later administrative action involving stoppage of pension after eight years and recovery of a substantial amount already paid. The Supreme Court held that these petitions arose from *distinct causes of action*, and dismissal of the earlier petition did not bar the later one. Significantly, the Court reaffirmed that *receipt of pension and its stoppage at the place of residence* constitutes an integral part of cause of action. The hardship caused to a retired employee was emphasized, and the doctrine of *forum non conveniens* was held inapplicable. The judgment restores the writ petition before the Patna High Court and grants interim relief of provisional pension to the widow, reinforcing the constitutional mandate of access to justice. **Keywords:** Territorial Jurisdiction, Cause of Action, Pensionary Rights, Article 226(2), Forum Non Conveniens, Retiral Benefits ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetails**Judgement Cause Title***Shanti Devi alias Shanti Mishra v. Union of India & Ors.***Case Number**Civil Appeal No. 3630 of 2020**Judgement Date**05 November 2020**Court**Supreme Court of India**Quorum**Ashok Bhushan J., R. Subhash Reddy J., M.R. Shah J.**Author**Justice Ashok Bhushan**Citation***\[2020\] 12 SCR 279***Legal Provisions Involved***Article 226 of the Constitution of India*; *Section 20, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908*; *Coal Mines Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1948*; *Coal Mines Pension Scheme, 1998***Judgments Overruled**None**Related Law Subjects**Constitutional Law, Service Law, Pension Law ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The case emerges from a long-standing pension dispute involving a retired employee of *Coal India Limited*. The deceased employee had rendered service in West Bengal and retired in 2005, thereafter settling at his native place in Darbhanga, Bihar. Pensionary benefits were sanctioned and continuously paid for eight years without interruption. The dispute arose when the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner retrospectively declared the grant of pension as erroneous and ordered recovery of more than *Rs. 8 lakhs*, simultaneously stopping future pension payments. The legal controversy was not confined to entitlement of pension alone. The central issue before the Supreme Court was procedural yet constitutionally significant, namely, *whether the Patna High Court possessed territorial jurisdiction* to entertain the writ petition challenging stoppage of pension. The High Court had dismissed the petition solely on jurisdictional grounds, relying on the earlier dismissal of a separate writ petition and the pendency of proceedings before the Jharkhand High Court. The Supreme Court was thus called upon to examine the meaning of *cause of action* under Article 226(2), its relationship with pension disbursement, and the practical realities faced by retirees. The judgment situates itself within established constitutional jurisprudence while responding to the lived hardships of pensioners. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The husband of the appellant, *late Bashishtha Narayan Mishra*, was employed with *Eastern Coal Fields Limited* and retired on *30 April 2005*. Initially, he had not opted for the *Coal Mines Pension Scheme, 1998*, but exercised the option following the amendment notification dated *09 January 2002*. Necessary transfers from provident fund to pension fund were effected, and pension was sanctioned after retirement. Upon retirement, the employee settled permanently in *Darbhanga, Bihar*, and pension was credited to his savings account in *State Bank of India, Darbhanga*. In 2006, he filed a writ petition before the Patna High Court seeking refund of *Rs. 1,33,559*, allegedly deducted illegally. This writ petition was dismissed in 2013 for lack of territorial jurisdiction. Subsequently, the employee approached the Jharkhand High Court for the same refund claim. During pendency of that petition, the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner issued letters dated *07 October 2013* and *06 November 2013*, declaring the pension grant illegal and directing recovery of over *Rs. 8 lakhs*, while stopping pension from November 2013. Aggrieved, the employee filed a fresh writ petition before the Patna High Court challenging these letters. The Single Judge dismissed it, holding that jurisdiction lay with the Jharkhand High Court. The Letters Patent Appeal was also dismissed, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether the writ petition challenging stoppage of pension was barred due to dismissal of an earlier writ petition on jurisdictional grounds? ii. Whether part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Patna High Court under *Article 226(2)*? iii. Whether the doctrine of *forum non conveniens* justified refusal of jurisdiction by the Patna High Court? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellant submitted that the cause of action for the 2014 writ petition was entirely distinct from the earlier writ petition. The earlier petition related to refund of deductions, whereas the later petition arose from stoppage of pension after eight years and demand for recovery of pension amounts already paid. It was argued that pension was received at Darbhanga, and its stoppage directly affected the employee at that place, thereby conferring territorial jurisdiction on the Patna High Court. Reliance was placed on precedents such as *Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India* and *Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India* to establish that even a fraction of cause of action is sufficient. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the respondents contended that the employee had served in West Bengal and that the authorities were situated outside Bihar. It was submitted that the employee had already approached the Jharkhand High Court and thus accepted its jurisdiction. The respondents argued that mere receipt of letters or pension at Darbhanga could not confer jurisdiction. The doctrine of *forum non conveniens* was invoked to submit that Jharkhand High Court was the more appropriate forum. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. *Article 226(2), Constitution of India* ii. *Section 20, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908* iii. *Coal Mines Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1948* iv. *Coal Mines Pension Scheme, 1998* ## **I) JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgments of the Single Judge and Division Bench of the Patna High Court. The Court held that the High Court had erred in mechanically relying on the dismissal of the earlier writ petition without appreciating the distinct cause of action involved. The Court emphasized that *cause of action* consists of every fact necessary to establish entitlement to relief. Since pension was continuously received at Darbhanga for eight years and its stoppage caused immediate deprivation there, part of the cause of action clearly arose within Bihar. The Court relied extensively on *Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu*, *Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra*, *Kunjan Nair Sivaraman Nair v. Narayanan Nair*, *Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India*, and *Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India*, reiterating settled principles of territorial jurisdiction. The doctrine of *forum non conveniens* was rejected as inapplicable, particularly considering the hardship to a retired employee. The writ petition was restored before the Patna High Court. Additionally, the Court directed payment of provisional pension to the widow from December 2020, recognizing her right to sustenance. **a. RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio decidendi lies in the holding that *stoppage of pension at the place where it is received constitutes a material part of cause of action under Article 226(2)*. Dismissal of an earlier writ petition on jurisdictional grounds does not bar a subsequent writ petition based on a distinct and later cause of action. **b. OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that compelling a retired employee to litigate far from his place of residence undermines access to justice. Pensionary disputes must be viewed through a humane lens, considering the vulnerability of retirees. **c. GUIDELINES** i. Territorial jurisdiction must be assessed on pleaded facts alone. ii. Pension receipt and stoppage location are relevant for jurisdiction. iii. Earlier dismissal on jurisdiction does not create estoppel for subsequent distinct causes. iv. Courts must avoid technical rigidity in pension matters. ## **J) REFERENCES** **a. Important Cases Referred** i. *Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu*, *\[1994\] 1 Supp SCR 252* ii. *Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra*, *\[2000\] 3 Supp SCR 82* iii. *Kunjan Nair Sivaraman Nair v. Narayanan Nair*, *\[2004\] 2 SCR 202* iv. *Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India*, *\[2004\] 1 Supp SCR 841* v. *Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India*, *\[2014\] 7 SCR 1027* **b. Important Statutes Referred** i. *Constitution of India* ii. *Code of Civil Procedure, 1908* iii. *Coal Mines Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1948* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Vetindia Pharmaceuticals Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, [2020] 9 SCR 607](https://lawfoyer.in/vetindia-pharmaceuticals-limited-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-and-another-2020-9-scr-607/) **Published:** December 26, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the legality, proportionality, and procedural validity of an indefinite blacklisting order passed against a licensed pharmaceutical manufacturer without any direct supply of the drug to the State authority. The dispute arose from allegations of misbranding of a veterinary drug, based on a State Analyst’s report, even though the appellant was neither a successful tenderer nor a supplier under the concerned tender. The Supreme Court scrutinised the scope of tender conditions, principles of natural justice, and the constitutional limits on administrative discretion while imposing blacklisting. The Court held that blacklisting is a drastic civil consequence amounting to commercial civil death and therefore mandates strict adherence to procedural safeguards. It reaffirmed that a show-cause notice must expressly or by necessary implication disclose the proposed action of blacklisting. Invocation of tender clauses against a non-supplier was held to be a fundamental jurisdictional error reflecting complete non-application of mind. On the issue of delay, the Court clarified that limitation does not strictly apply to writ jurisdiction under Article 226, and delay cannot defeat relief where the illegality is continuing and the petitioner has been diligently pursuing remedies. The judgment also reiterated that permanent or excessively long blacklisting is arbitrary and disproportionate, ordinarily exceeding permissible administrative limits. The decision strengthens procedural fairness in public procurement, restricts arbitrary blacklisting, and balances State power with constitutional equity. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the legality, proportionality, and procedural validity of an *indefinite blacklisting order* passed against a licensed pharmaceutical manufacturer without any direct supply of the drug to the State authority. The dispute arose from allegations of *misbranding* of a veterinary drug, based on a State Analyst’s report, even though the appellant was neither a successful tenderer nor a supplier under the concerned tender. The Supreme Court scrutinised the scope of tender conditions, principles of natural justice, and the constitutional limits on administrative discretion while imposing blacklisting. The Court held that *blacklisting is a drastic civil consequence* amounting to commercial civil death and therefore mandates strict adherence to procedural safeguards. It reaffirmed that a show-cause notice must expressly or by necessary implication disclose the proposed action of blacklisting. Invocation of tender clauses against a non-supplier was held to be a *fundamental jurisdictional error* reflecting complete non-application of mind. On the issue of delay, the Court clarified that *limitation does not strictly apply to writ jurisdiction* under *Article 226*, and delay cannot defeat relief where the illegality is continuing and the petitioner has been diligently pursuing remedies. The judgment also reiterated that *permanent or excessively long blacklisting* is arbitrary and disproportionate, ordinarily exceeding permissible administrative limits. The decision strengthens procedural fairness in public procurement, restricts arbitrary blacklisting, and balances State power with constitutional equity. **Keywords:** Blacklisting, Misbranding, Natural Justice, Proportionality, Delay in Writs, Tender Jurisdiction ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetails*Judgement Cause Title**Vetindia Pharmaceuticals Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another**Case Number*Civil Appeal No. 3647 of 2020*Judgement Date*06 November 2020*Court*Supreme Court of India*Quorum**R.F. Nariman, Navin Sinha, Krishna Murari, JJ.**Author**Navin Sinha, J.**Citation**\[2020\] 9 SCR 607**Legal Provisions Involved**Articles 14 & 226 of the Constitution of India; Sections 9, 23, 25, 26, 27 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940**Judgments Overruled*None*Related Law Subjects*Administrative Law, Constitutional Law, Public Procurement Law, Pharmaceutical Regulation ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The judgment arose from an appeal challenging the summary dismissal of a writ petition by the Allahabad High Court solely on the ground of delay. The appellant, a licensed pharmaceutical manufacturer under the *Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940*, was subjected to an *indefinite blacklisting order* passed by the State Animal Husbandry Department in 2009. The blacklisting was based on alleged misbranding of a veterinary drug batch supplied under a government tender. However, the appellant contended that it had *never supplied any drugs directly to the State*, nor was it a successful tenderer. Supplies were allegedly made by an intermediary distributor. Despite this, tender clauses were invoked directly against the manufacturer. The show-cause notice did not disclose any proposal to blacklist, nor did it specify duration. Over the years, the appellant continuously pursued representations before authorities seeking revocation of the blacklisting. The continuing effect of the order culminated in rejection of its bid by the Government of Rajasthan in 2019, triggering the writ petition. The Supreme Court was therefore required to examine whether *procedural fairness*, *jurisdictional competence*, *proportionality*, and *equitable discretion under Article 226* had been adhered to. The case provided an opportunity to re-emphasise safeguards governing blacklisting, especially where commercial consequences are severe and long-lasting. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellant was a valid licence holder manufacturing veterinary medicines under *Form 28 read with Rule 76* of the *Drugs and Cosmetics Rules*. In 2007, it supplied medicines to a private distributor, *M/s Palak Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd.*, which in turn supplied drugs to the State pursuant to a tender dated *04.10.2006*. A State Analyst report dated *10.10.2008* declared a drug batch misbranded under *Section 9* of the Drugs Act due to omission of “HCL” in the label description. The drug was otherwise neither adulterated nor spurious. A show-cause notice dated *21.10.2008* was issued to the appellant referring to action under tender clauses *8.12 and 8.23*. The notice neither alleged direct supply by the appellant nor proposed blacklisting. The appellant replied explaining that the defect was a *bona fide printing error*. Despite this, an order dated *08.09.2009* blacklisted the appellant indefinitely. No proceedings were initiated under *Sections 23, 25, 26 or 27* of the Drugs Act. Repeated representations made between 2011 and 2019 were ignored or summarily rejected. In 2019, the appellant’s tender was rejected by the Government of Rajasthan solely due to the subsisting blacklisting order, prompting the writ petition which was dismissed for delay. This dismissal formed the subject matter of the present appeal. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether an order of blacklisting can be sustained against a manufacturer who was not a supplier under the tender? ii. Whether absence of express proposal of blacklisting in a show-cause notice violates principles of natural justice? iii. Whether an indefinite or permanent blacklisting order is arbitrary and disproportionate? iv. Whether delay alone can defeat a writ petition where the cause of action is continuing? v. Whether compliance with *Section 9* of the Drugs Act can bypass mandatory procedural safeguards under *Sections 23–26*? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the blacklisting order was *jurisdictionally flawed* since the appellant was never a tenderer or supplier to the State. Invocation of tender clauses was therefore ultra vires. It was argued that the show-cause notice failed to disclose any intention to blacklist, violating *audi alteram partem*. Reliance was placed on *Gorkha Security Services v. GNCTD* to assert that such omission itself causes prejudice. The appellant emphasised that misbranding was merely a technical printing error and not a quality defect. No statutory procedure under the Drugs Act was followed. On delay, it was submitted that the appellant continuously pursued remedies and that the *civil death* caused by indefinite blacklisting constituted a recurring cause of action. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent State contended that the writ petition was rightly dismissed due to *gross delay of ten years*. It was argued that misbranding under *Section 9* was established through analyst report and that tender clauses permitted blacklisting. Any defect in the show-cause notice, according to the State, caused no prejudice. The State attempted to justify compliance with the Drugs Act by producing alleged purchase records under *Form 14A*, which the Court later rejected as unreliable. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside both the High Court order and the blacklisting order. The Court held that *absence of any supply by the appellant* rendered invocation of tender clauses fundamentally illegal. The blacklisting order reflected *non-application of mind* and was vitiated at inception. The Court reaffirmed that *blacklisting has severe civil consequences* extending beyond the present and potentially destroying commercial existence. Indefinite blacklisting was held unjustified. The Court rejected the State’s reliance on the Drugs Act, holding that mandatory procedures under *Sections 23, 25 and 26* were never followed. Alleged evidence of sample purchase was characterised as an attempt to *create evidence where none existed*. On delay, the Court clarified that writ jurisdiction is equitable. Where delay is explained and illegality is manifest with no third-party rights affected, dismissal on delay is unsustainable. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio decidendi of the judgment rests on four interlinked principles. First, *blacklisting cannot be imposed without jurisdiction*. Where the entity is neither a tenderer nor a supplier, tender conditions cannot be enforced against it. Second, *natural justice mandates clear disclosure*. A show-cause notice must explicitly or by necessary implication indicate the proposed penalty of blacklisting. Failure causes inherent prejudice. Third, *proportionality governs administrative sanctions*. Permanent or excessively long blacklisting amounts to arbitrariness under *Article 14*. Ordinarily, blacklisting beyond *three to five years* is disproportionate. Fourth, *delay does not extinguish equitable relief*. Article 226 discretion must consider continuing prejudice, diligence of the petitioner, and absence of third-party rights. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that blacklisting often results in *commercial civil death*. Such orders attach stigma transcending time and geography. Administrative authorities must therefore exercise restraint and fairness. The Court also emphasised the need for *structured guidelines* to regulate duration of blacklisting, echoing concerns expressed earlier in *Kulja Industries Ltd.* Additionally, the Court cautioned against administrative attempts to retrospectively justify illegal orders through fabricated compliance. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Blacklisting must be preceded by a *specific and informed show-cause notice*. ii. Authorities must ensure *jurisdictional competence* before invoking tender clauses. iii. Duration of blacklisting must be *finite and proportionate*. iv. Compliance with statutory procedures cannot be presumed or retrospectively created. v. Writ courts must balance delay against *continuing illegality and equity*. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces constitutional control over administrative blacklisting. It re-establishes that public procurement power is not absolute and must operate within bounds of fairness, proportionality, and jurisdiction. By invalidating indefinite blacklisting and rejecting technical defences based on delay, the Court restored equilibrium between State authority and commercial rights. The decision serves as a critical precedent protecting manufacturers from arbitrary exclusion while maintaining regulatory discipline. The ruling also advances jurisprudence on equitable writ jurisdiction, confirming that courts must examine substance over form and injustice over delay. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** - *M/s Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal*, *\[1975\] 2 SCR 674* - *Joseph Vilangandan v. Executive Engineer*, *\[1978\] 3 SCR 514* - *Gorkha Security Services v. GNCTD*, *\[2014\] 13 SCR 617* - *Kulja Industries Ltd. v. BSNL*, *\[2013\] 14 SCR 430* - *Basanti Prasad v. Bihar School Examination Board*, *\[2009\] 9 SCR 367* **b) Important Statutes Referred** - *Constitution of India* - *Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [UMC Technologies Private Limited v. Food Corporation of India & Anr., [2020] 13 S.C.R. 1175](https://lawfoyer.in/umc-technologies-private-limited-v-food-corporation-of-india-anr-2020-13-s-c-r-1175/) **Published:** December 26, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment addresses the legality of blacklisting by a State instrumentality in the absence of a clear and specific show cause notice. The appellant, a private recruitment agency, was awarded a contract by the Food Corporation of India for conducting recruitment examinations for watchmen. Following allegations of question paper leakage during an examination conducted by the appellant, the Corporation terminated the contract and blacklisted the appellant for five years. The appellant restricted its challenge before the Supreme Court only to the order of blacklisting. The Court examined whether the principles of natural justice were complied with prior to the imposition of blacklisting. It held that blacklisting has grave civil consequences, including stigmatization, loss of reputation, and long-term exclusion from government contracts. Such an action therefore mandates a prior, unambiguous, and particularized show cause notice clearly indicating the proposed penalty of blacklisting. The show cause notice issued to the appellant merely referred to contractual breaches and vaguely stated that “appropriate action” would be taken. It neither expressly proposed blacklisting nor permitted such inference. The Court reiterated that an administrative authority cannot travel beyond the scope of the show cause notice. The existence of a contractual clause referring to blacklisting does not cure the defect of a deficient notice. Relying on settled precedents including Erusian Equipment, Raghunath Thakur, and Gorkha Security Services, the Court quashed the blacklisting order while leaving the termination of contract undisturbed. The ruling reinforces procedural fairness as a non-negotiable requirement in State actions involving penal civil consequences. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment addresses the legality of *blacklisting by a State instrumentality* in the absence of a *clear and specific show cause notice*. The appellant, a private recruitment agency, was awarded a contract by the Food Corporation of India for conducting recruitment examinations for watchmen. Following allegations of question paper leakage during an examination conducted by the appellant, the Corporation terminated the contract and blacklisted the appellant for five years. The appellant restricted its challenge before the Supreme Court only to the order of blacklisting. The Court examined whether the *principles of natural justice* were complied with prior to the imposition of blacklisting. It held that blacklisting has *grave civil consequences*, including stigmatization, loss of reputation, and long-term exclusion from government contracts. Such an action therefore mandates a *prior, unambiguous, and particularized show cause notice* clearly indicating the proposed penalty of blacklisting. The show cause notice issued to the appellant merely referred to contractual breaches and vaguely stated that “appropriate action” would be taken. It neither expressly proposed blacklisting nor permitted such inference. The Court reiterated that an administrative authority cannot travel beyond the scope of the show cause notice. The existence of a contractual clause referring to blacklisting does not cure the defect of a deficient notice. Relying on settled precedents including *Erusian Equipment*, *Raghunath Thakur*, and *Gorkha Security Services*, the Court quashed the blacklisting order while leaving the termination of contract undisturbed. The ruling reinforces procedural fairness as a non-negotiable requirement in State actions involving penal civil consequences. **Keywords:** Blacklisting, Natural Justice, Show Cause Notice, Administrative Law, Civil Consequences, Government Contracts ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*UMC Technologies Private Limited v. Food Corporation of India & Anr.*Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 3687 of 2020Judgement Date16 November 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorum*Hon’ble Mr. Justice S. Abdul Nazeer* and *Hon’ble Mr. Justice B.R. Gavai*AuthorJustice S. Abdul NazeerCitation*\[2020\] 13 S.C.R. 1175*Legal Provisions Involved*Principles of Natural Justice*, Contractual Clauses of Bid DocumentJudgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsAdministrative Law, Constitutional Law, Contract Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The judgment emerges from a dispute concerning the *limits of administrative discretion* exercised by a State instrumentality in contractual matters. The Food Corporation of India, a statutory corporation performing public functions, entered into a contract with the appellant for conducting recruitment examinations. Allegations of question paper leakage arose on the day of the examination, leading to criminal investigation against unknown individuals. The Corporation issued a show cause notice alleging breach of contractual obligations related to confidentiality and conduct of examination. Subsequently, the Corporation terminated the contract, forfeited the security deposit, and blacklisted the appellant for five years. The High Court upheld the action in entirety. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant consciously narrowed the challenge only to the *blacklisting order*. This strategic limitation shaped the scope of judicial review. The Court therefore confined itself to examining whether the process leading to blacklisting satisfied constitutional and administrative law standards. The case lies at the intersection of *public law principles* and *contractual powers of the State*. While contractual relationships ordinarily fall within the realm of private law, actions like blacklisting attract public law scrutiny due to their stigmatic and exclusionary impact. The judgment thus revisits settled doctrine that State action must remain fair, reasonable, and transparent even in contractual settings. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The Food Corporation of India issued a Bid Document dated *25.11.2016* inviting bids for appointment of a recruitment agency to conduct the recruitment process for watchmen. The appellant submitted its bid and was declared successful. A contract for two years was executed, commencing from *14.02.2017*. On *01.04.2018*, the appellant conducted a written examination across various centres in Madhya Pradesh. On the same day, a Special Task Force of the police arrested fifty individuals in Gwalior who were found in possession of handwritten materials allegedly resembling the question papers of the examination. A charge sheet was later filed against certain accused persons. On *10.04.2018*, the Corporation issued a show cause notice to the appellant alleging breach of several clauses of the Bid Document. The notice accused the appellant of negligence and failure to ensure confidentiality but did not mention blacklisting as a proposed action. The appellant replied denying leakage and sought forensic comparison of seized materials. After further correspondence and submission of a detailed explanation, the Corporation passed an order dated *09.01.2019* terminating the contract, forfeiting the security deposit, and blacklisting the appellant for five years. The High Court dismissed the appellant’s writ petition. The appellant thereafter approached the Supreme Court, contesting only the blacklisting component. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether blacklisting by a State corporation without expressly proposing such action in the show cause notice violates *principles of natural justice*? ii. Whether an administrative authority can impose a penalty beyond the scope of the show cause notice? iii. Whether reference to blacklisting in contractual eligibility clauses suffices as notice of proposed blacklisting? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the *show cause notice dated 10.04.2018* was fundamentally defective as it failed to specify blacklisting as a proposed penalty. It was argued that *Clause 10* of the Bid Document merely prescribed eligibility conditions and did not confer independent power to blacklist. It was further contended that blacklisting results in *civil death*, and therefore strict compliance with natural justice is mandatory. The appellant highlighted the *domino effect* of blacklisting, leading to termination of contracts by other government agencies, causing disproportionate harm. Reliance was placed on *Nasir Ahmad v. Assistant Custodian General* to assert that a notice must specify both grounds and proposed action. The appellant argued that the impugned order travelled beyond the notice and was therefore without jurisdiction. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent submitted that the appellant’s negligence led to compromise of the recruitment process, affecting public confidence. It was argued that blacklisting was necessary in *public interest*. The respondent contended that the Bid Document contained clauses contemplating blacklisting, and the appellant was aware of potential consequences. It was argued that sufficient opportunity of hearing was provided and that the action was proportionate to the misconduct. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Court confined its examination to the validity of the blacklisting order. It reaffirmed that *blacklisting has severe civil consequences*, including loss of reputation and future business prospects. Such action therefore demands strict adherence to natural justice. The Court reiterated settled law that a show cause notice must clearly indicate *both the grounds and the proposed action*. Reliance was placed on *Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd.*, *Raghunath Thakur*, and *Gorkha Security Services*. Upon examining the notice dated *10.04.2018*, the Court found that it merely alleged contractual breaches and vaguely referred to “appropriate action”. There was no express or implied indication that blacklisting was contemplated. The Court held that an administrative authority cannot travel beyond the notice. The existence of a contractual clause mentioning blacklisting was held insufficient to cure the defect. The Court quashed the blacklisting order while leaving the termination intact and declined to remit the matter for fresh consideration. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio decidendi of the judgment is that *blacklisting by a State or its instrumentality without a clear, unambiguous, and particularized show cause notice expressly proposing such action is violative of principles of natural justice and therefore unsustainable in law*. The Court held that the authority’s power to blacklist must be exercised with procedural fairness. A notice that does not inform the noticee of the proposed penalty deprives them of a meaningful opportunity to defend. Any order exceeding the scope of the notice is ultra vires. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that blacklisting often results in *civil death* due to its cascading effect across government departments. This underscores the need for heightened procedural safeguards. The Court also noted that proportionality must guide administrative penalties, especially where reputational harm is involved. **c) GUIDELINES** i. A show cause notice must specify the *proposed penalty*. ii. Blacklisting requires strict compliance with natural justice. iii. Administrative orders cannot travel beyond the notice. iv. Contractual clauses alone do not substitute procedural fairness. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces the constitutional discipline governing State action. It strikes a careful balance between administrative efficiency and individual rights. By insulating termination from blacklisting, the Court preserved contractual autonomy while curbing punitive excess. The ruling strengthens jurisprudence on blacklisting as a public law remedy requiring transparency, proportionality, and fairness. It serves as a caution to public authorities that contractual power cannot eclipse constitutional obligations. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal*, *\[1975\] 2 SCR 674* ii. *Raghunath Thakur v. State of Bihar*, *\[1988\] 3 Supp SCR 867* iii. *Gorkha Security Services v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi)*, *\[2014\] 13 SCR 617* iv. *Nasir Ahmad v. Assistant Custodian General*, *\[1980\] 3 SCR 248* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Principles of Natural Justice* ii. *Constitution of India – Article 14* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Rattan Singh & Ors. v. Nirmal Gill & Ors., [2020] 12 S.C.R. 422](https://lawfoyer.in/rattan-singh-ors-v-nirmal-gill-ors-2020-12-s-c-r-422/) **Published:** December 26, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment adjudicates a complex intra-family property dispute founded on allegations of fraud, impersonation, and misuse of fiduciary trust in execution of a General Power of Attorney and multiple sale deeds. The plaintiff alleged that her step-brothers and step sister-in-law procured her signatures by deceit and used them to alienate her share in ancestral land through registered instruments executed in 1990. The Trial Court dismissed both suits for want of proof of fraud. The First Appellate Court substantially concurred, with marginal modification. The High Court, however, reversed concurrent findings, inferring fraud from circumstances and discrepancies. The Supreme Court restored the Trial Court and First Appellate Court findings, emphasizing settled principles governing registered documents, burden of proof, attestation, expert evidence, and limitation. It held that registration raises a presumption of genuineness and the initial burden lies on the party alleging fraud. Mere suspicion, familial confidence, or clerical inconsistencies cannot displace statutory presumptions. The Court reaffirmed that civil cases are decided on preponderance of probabilities and expert opinions are corroborative, not conclusive. On limitation, the Court held that Section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963 requires proof of both fraud and discovery, which the plaintiff failed to establish. The judgment also delineates the limited scope of second appeals and condemns interference with concurrent factual findings based on conjecture. The ruling is significant for property law, evidence law, and civil procedure, reinforcing judicial restraint and evidentiary discipline in fraud-based challenges to registered conveyances. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment adjudicates a complex intra-family property dispute founded on allegations of fraud, impersonation, and misuse of fiduciary trust in execution of a *General Power of Attorney* and multiple *sale deeds*. The plaintiff alleged that her step-brothers and step sister-in-law procured her signatures by deceit and used them to alienate her share in ancestral land through registered instruments executed in 1990. The Trial Court dismissed both suits for want of proof of fraud. The First Appellate Court substantially concurred, with marginal modification. The High Court, however, reversed concurrent findings, inferring fraud from circumstances and discrepancies. The Supreme Court restored the Trial Court and First Appellate Court findings, emphasizing settled principles governing *registered documents*, *burden of proof*, *attestation*, *expert evidence*, and *limitation*. It held that *registration raises a presumption of genuineness* and the *initial burden lies on the party alleging fraud*. Mere suspicion, familial confidence, or clerical inconsistencies cannot displace statutory presumptions. The Court reaffirmed that *civil cases are decided on preponderance of probabilities* and *expert opinions are corroborative, not conclusive*. On limitation, the Court held that *Section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963* requires proof of both fraud and discovery, which the plaintiff failed to establish. The judgment also delineates the limited scope of *second appeals* and condemns interference with concurrent factual findings based on conjecture. The ruling is significant for property law, evidence law, and civil procedure, reinforcing judicial restraint and evidentiary discipline in fraud-based challenges to registered conveyances. **Keywords:** Fraud, Registered Documents, Burden of Proof, Power of Attorney, Limitation Act ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgment Cause Title*Rattan Singh & Ors. v. Nirmal Gill & Ors.*Case NumberCivil Appeal Nos. 3681–3684 of 2020Judgment Date16 November 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorum*A.M. Khanwilkar, J.* and *Dinesh Maheshwari, J.*Author*A.M. Khanwilkar, J.*Citation*\[2020\] 12 S.C.R. 422*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 68, 69, 71, 90 Evidence Act, 1872; Section 17 Limitation Act, 1963; Section 3 Transfer of Property Act, 1882*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsCivil Law, Property Law, Law of Evidence, Limitation Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The litigation arises from inheritance of agricultural and urban land devolving upon children from two marriages of a common ancestor. After the ancestor’s death in *1963*, the estate stood mutated based on a *General Power of Attorney of 1963*. Decades later, disputes emerged concerning subsequent conveyances executed in *1990* through another *General Power of Attorney* and direct sale deeds. The plaintiff, an educated woman residing outside Punjab, alleged that her familial trust was exploited. She claimed that signatures were obtained on blank papers and later converted into registered conveyances without her consent. Her challenge extended not only to the *1990 GPA* but also to multiple sale deeds executed directly by her and by her alleged attorney. The defendants asserted voluntary execution, proper registration, attestation by village officials, and payment of consideration. The Trial Court, after extensive evidence, found no proof of fraud. The First Appellate Court substantially agreed. The High Court, exercising second appellate jurisdiction, reversed concurrent findings by drawing inferences from circumstantial inconsistencies and social assumptions. This prompted appeals before the Supreme Court, raising foundational questions on *burden of proof*, *evidentiary presumptions*, and *judicial limits under Section 100 CPC*. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The plaintiff, *Joginder Kaur* (since deceased), inherited a fractional share in extensive properties situated across Punjab districts. In *1963*, a *General Power of Attorney* was executed jointly by heirs for mutation purposes. The relationship between the plaintiff and her step-brothers remained cordial for decades. In *1990*, a *General Power of Attorney dated 28.06.1990* was executed in favour of the plaintiff’s step sister-in-law. Based on this GPA, several sale deeds were executed. Additionally, sale deeds dated *29.06.1990* and *03.07.1990* purportedly bore the plaintiff’s own signatures. All documents were duly registered. The plaintiff alleged impersonation, forged signatures, misuse of blank signed papers, and non-payment of consideration. She claimed discovery of fraud only in *2001*, after a relative mentioned sale of joint property. Two suits were instituted seeking declaration, cancellation, and injunction. The defendants relied upon attesting witnesses, scribe testimony, handwriting expert evidence, revenue records, and registration endorsements. The Trial Court dismissed both suits. The First Appellate Court confirmed dismissal except for a minor correction regarding possession of a small parcel. The High Court reversed these findings, holding fraud to be apparent. The defendants and subsequent purchasers approached the Supreme Court. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the registered *1990 GPA* and sale deeds were vitiated by fraud and impersonation? ii. Whether the plaintiff discharged the burden of proof required to invalidate registered documents? iii. Whether the suits were barred by limitation under the *Limitation Act, 1963*? iv. Whether the High Court exceeded jurisdiction under *Section 100 CPC*? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that the *registered instruments carry statutory presumption of validity*. The plaintiff failed to plead fraud with particularity as mandated under *Order VI Rule 4 CPC*. The evidence of the scribe and attesting witness proved execution. Expert opinion relied upon by the plaintiff was inconclusive and contradicted by defence expert evidence. It was argued that the High Court re-appreciated evidence impermissibly and substituted its own conjectural reasoning for concurrent factual findings. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent contended that defendants enjoyed *active confidence* and stood in a *fiduciary relationship*. Discrepancies in addresses, alteration of dates, sequence of scribe entries, and absence of plaintiff’s photograph established fraud. It was urged that limitation stood extended under *Section 17 Limitation Act*. ## H) JUDGMENT The Supreme Court allowed the appeals. It held that *registration raises a presumption of genuineness* as affirmed in *Prem Singh v. Birbal*. The *initial burden* lay squarely on the plaintiff, who alleged fraud. That burden was never discharged. The Court held that execution was duly proved through attesting witness testimony, scribe evidence, and corroborative material under *Sections 68–71 Evidence Act*. The Court rejected the High Court’s inference-based approach, noting that suspicion cannot replace proof. On expert evidence, the Court reiterated that *expert opinions are advisory and not binding*, particularly when contradictory. The plaintiff failed to corroborate allegations of forgery. On limitation, the Court held that *Section 17 Limitation Act* requires proof of both fraud and its discovery. Absence of proof of fraud rendered the suits *ex facie barred*. The Court condemned interference with concurrent findings and restored the Trial Court and First Appellate Court judgments. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** A *registered document is presumed genuine*, and the burden of disproving it lies on the challenger. Allegations of fraud must be proved by tangible evidence. Civil disputes are decided on *preponderance of probabilities*. Second appellate courts cannot disturb concurrent factual findings absent perversity. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that *hypersensitivity to delay in recording evidence* is unwarranted and that *signature of vendee is not mandatory* for validity of a sale deed. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Courts must respect statutory presumptions attached to registered documents. ii. Fraud must be pleaded and proved with specificity. iii. Expert evidence requires corroboration. iv. Second appeals must remain confined to substantial questions of law. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces evidentiary discipline in civil adjudication. It cautions against dilution of statutory presumptions through speculative reasoning. The ruling strengthens certainty in property transactions and underscores judicial restraint in appellate review. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Prem Singh v. Birbal*, *\[2006\] 1 Supp. SCR 692* ii. *Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh*, *\[2006\] 1 Supp. SCR 659* iii. *Satya Gupta v. Brijesh Kumar*, *\[1998\] 3 SCR 1183* iv. *Jagdish Chand Sharma v. Narain Singh Saini*, *\[2015\] 6 SCR 397* v. *Aloka Bose v. Parmatma Devi*, *\[2008\] 17 SCR 822* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Indian Evidence Act, 1872* ii. *Limitation Act, 1963* iii. *Transfer of Property Act, 1882* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [NTPC Ltd. (Simhadri Project) v. Rajiv Chakraborty, [2020] 13 SCR 1090](https://lawfoyer.in/ntpc-ltd-simhadri-project-v-rajiv-chakraborty-2020-13-scr-1090/) **Published:** December 26, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment delivered by the Supreme Court of India in NTPC Ltd. (Simhadri Project) v. Rajiv Chakraborty addresses the limited yet significant issue concerning the classification of creditor claims in the Information Memorandum prepared during a Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The appellant, NTPC Ltd., contended that its claim ought to have been reflected under the category of Operational Creditors rather than being placed in the List of Other Creditors. The claim was, however, pending adjudication before an Arbitrator at the relevant time. The Court clarified the legal nature and purpose of the Information Memorandum, emphasizing that it is a disclosure document meant to present the financial position of the corporate debtor and does not operate as a determinative instrument adjudicating claims. The Resolution Professional, the Court held, lacks the statutory authority to accept, reject, or finally classify claims that remain sub judice before a competent forum. The judgment reinforces that a claim pending adjudication does not stand extinguished merely due to its categorization in the Information Memorandum and remains enforceable subject to final adjudication or operation of law. The decision thus preserves the rights of creditors whose claims are under adjudication while also protecting the integrity of the insolvency resolution framework by preventing premature adjudication by insolvency professionals. The Court left open all remedies available to the appellant against the final resolution plan, if aggrieved, thereby balancing procedural discipline with substantive justice. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment delivered by the *Supreme Court of India* in *NTPC Ltd. (Simhadri Project) v. Rajiv Chakraborty* addresses the limited yet significant issue concerning the classification of creditor claims in the *Information Memorandum* prepared during a *Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process* under the *Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016*. The appellant, *NTPC Ltd.*, contended that its claim ought to have been reflected under the category of *Operational Creditors* rather than being placed in the *List of Other Creditors*. The claim was, however, pending adjudication before an Arbitrator at the relevant time. The Court clarified the legal nature and purpose of the Information Memorandum, emphasizing that it is a disclosure document meant to present the financial position of the corporate debtor and does not operate as a determinative instrument adjudicating claims. The Resolution Professional, the Court held, lacks the statutory authority to accept, reject, or finally classify claims that remain sub judice before a competent forum. The judgment reinforces that a claim pending adjudication does not stand extinguished merely due to its categorization in the Information Memorandum and remains enforceable subject to final adjudication or operation of law. The decision thus preserves the rights of creditors whose claims are under adjudication while also protecting the integrity of the insolvency resolution framework by preventing premature adjudication by insolvency professionals. The Court left open all remedies available to the appellant against the final resolution plan, if aggrieved, thereby balancing procedural discipline with substantive justice. **Keywords:** Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, Information Memorandum, Resolution Professional, Operational Creditor, Pending Arbitration ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgment Cause Title*NTPC Ltd. (Simhadri Project) v. Rajiv Chakraborty*Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 2798 of 2020Judgment Date16 November 2020Court*Supreme Court of India*Quorum*A. M. Khanwilkar, B. R. Gavai, Hrishikesh Roy, JJ.*AuthorPer CuriamCitation*\[2020\] 13 SCR 1090*Legal Provisions Involved*Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016*Judgments OverruledNilRelated Law Subjects*Insolvency Law, Arbitration Law, Corporate Law* ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The present judgment arises from proceedings under the *Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016*, a legislation enacted to ensure time-bound resolution of corporate insolvency while balancing the interests of stakeholders. The appeal before the Supreme Court originated from an order of the *National Company Law Appellate Tribunal*, which had affirmed the decision of the Adjudicating Authority regarding the treatment of the appellant’s claim in the Information Memorandum. The appellant, *NTPC Ltd.*, was involved in contractual dealings with the corporate debtor in relation to the Simhadri Project. A dispute arose between the parties, leading to arbitration proceedings which were pending at the time when the corporate debtor entered the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process. During CIRP, the Resolution Professional prepared the Information Memorandum, in which the appellant’s claim was listed under *Other Creditor Claims* rather than *Claims of Operational Creditors*. The appellant’s grievance was not with the quantum of the claim recorded but with the classification itself. According to the appellant, such classification diluted its legal position and could adversely impact consideration of its claim in the resolution process. The adjudicating fora below rejected this contention, holding that pending claims could not be conclusively classified. The Supreme Court was therefore called upon to determine the scope of authority of a Resolution Professional and the legal effect of categorizing a pending claim in the Information Memorandum. The background of the judgment is rooted in the need to prevent insolvency proceedings from becoming a parallel adjudicatory mechanism for disputed claims, thereby respecting the jurisdiction of arbitral and judicial fora. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellant, *NTPC Ltd. (Simhadri Project)*, had asserted a monetary claim against the corporate debtor arising out of contractual obligations. The dispute between the parties was referred to arbitration, and the arbitral proceedings were ongoing at the relevant time. Before the arbitral claim could be adjudicated, the corporate debtor entered into Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process under the *Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016*. Pursuant to the initiation of CIRP, a Resolution Professional was appointed who undertook the statutory duty of preparing the Information Memorandum. The memorandum contained details of the financial position of the corporate debtor, including various categories of creditor claims. The appellant’s claim was included in the memorandum under the heading *List of Other Creditor Claims (excluding Related Party Claims and Employees and Workmen Claims)* as on 17 July 2019. The appellant did not dispute the amount recorded in the memorandum. The sole objection raised was that its claim ought to have been reflected under *Claims of Operational Creditors*. The appellant argued that failure to do so could potentially prejudice its interests during the resolution process. The Adjudicating Authority rejected the appellant’s contention, holding that since the claim was under adjudication before an Arbitrator, it could not be conclusively categorized as an operational debt. The Appellate Tribunal affirmed this reasoning. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant approached the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court noted that the claim was explicitly described as a claim under adjudication and was not ignored or excluded from the Information Memorandum. The Court also took note of the fact that the Resolution Professional had no authority to adjudicate upon the claim. These factual aspects formed the foundation for the Court’s final determination. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether a claim pending adjudication before an Arbitrator must be reflected under *Claims of Operational Creditors* in the Information Memorandum? ii. Whether the classification of a claim in the Information Memorandum amounts to adjudication or extinguishment of that claim? iii. Whether the Resolution Professional has the authority to accept, reject, or conclusively classify disputed claims? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the appellant was an operational creditor within the meaning of the *Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016* and that its claim ought to have been reflected accordingly in the Information Memorandum. It was contended that placing the claim under *Other Creditors* undermined its legal status and could adversely affect its consideration by the Committee of Creditors. The appellant argued that mere pendency of arbitration proceedings could not deprive it of the statutory recognition accorded to operational creditors. The counsels emphasized that the Information Memorandum plays a critical role in the resolution process and any misclassification could lead to injustice. The appellant further submitted that the categorization adopted by the Resolution Professional was arbitrary and not supported by the scheme of the Code. It was urged that the Court should direct correction of the Information Memorandum to reflect the appellant’s claim under the appropriate head. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent submitted that the appellant’s claim was admittedly pending adjudication before an Arbitrator and had not crystallized into a legally enforceable debt. It was argued that until adjudication, the claim could not be conclusively treated as an operational debt. The respondent contended that the Information Memorandum is only a disclosure document and does not determine rights or liabilities. The Resolution Professional, it was argued, has no adjudicatory powers and therefore rightly categorized the claim as one under adjudication. The respondent also submitted that the appellant’s claim had not been ignored or extinguished and was expressly noted in the memorandum. Hence, no prejudice was caused to the appellant. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the findings of the Adjudicating Authority and the Appellate Tribunal. The Court held that since the appellant’s claim was pending adjudication before an Arbitrator, it was correctly described in the Information Memorandum as an *Other Creditor Claim*. The Court emphasized that the purpose of the Information Memorandum is to provide relevant financial information and not to decide claims. The Court categorically observed that the Resolution Professional has no authority or power to accept or disallow claims. Any such adjudication must be undertaken by a competent forum. The Court clarified that inclusion of the appellant’s claim in the Information Memorandum ensures that resolution applicants and the Committee of Creditors are aware of the claim while formulating and approving the resolution plan. The Court further held that the appellant’s claim does not stand extinguished merely due to its classification in the memorandum. The claim would survive and remain subject to adjudication by the Arbitrator or by operation of law. The Court left open all remedies available to the appellant to challenge the final resolution plan if it was aggrieved by the manner in which its claim was dealt with. The appeal was accordingly disposed of, and the interim order was vacated, with a direction to expedite the resolution process. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio decidendi of the judgment is that a claim pending adjudication before a competent forum cannot be conclusively classified or adjudicated by the Resolution Professional in the Information Memorandum. The Information Memorandum serves a disclosure function and does not determine the rights of creditors. Classification of a pending claim as an *Other Creditor Claim* does not extinguish or dilute the claim, which survives subject to adjudication. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that resolution applicants are expected to take note of all claims reflected in the Information Memorandum, including those under adjudication, and make appropriate provisions in the resolution plan. This observation underscores the need for holistic consideration of liabilities without transforming insolvency proceedings into adjudicatory forums. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Information Memorandum is a disclosure document and not an adjudicatory instrument. ii. Resolution Professionals have no authority to decide or extinguish disputed claims. iii. Claims under adjudication must be reflected transparently without final classification. iv. Creditors retain remedies against the final resolution plan if aggrieved. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces procedural discipline under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code by clearly demarcating the boundaries of authority of Resolution Professionals. It prevents misuse of insolvency proceedings as a substitute for adjudicatory forums and protects the substantive rights of creditors whose claims are pending adjudication. The decision balances transparency in insolvency resolution with respect for pending arbitral proceedings, thereby strengthening the integrity of the insolvency framework. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *NTPC Ltd. (Simhadri Project) v. Rajiv Chakraborty*, *\[2020\] 13 SCR 1090* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Kirpa Ram (Deceased) Through LRs & Ors. v. Surendra Deo Gaur & Ors., [2020] 13 SCR 1030](https://lawfoyer.in/kirpa-ram-deceased-through-lrs-ors-v-surendra-deo-gaur-ors-2020-13-scr-1030/) **Published:** December 26, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment resolves a long-standing dispute concerning civil court jurisdiction over land possession disputes where overlapping claims arise between two revenue estates. The Supreme Court examined whether a suit for permanent injunction based purely on possession is barred by statutory revenue laws, specifically Section 28 and Section 83 of the Delhi Land Revenue Act, 1954, read with Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The appellants contended that the controversy constituted a boundary dispute between Village Basai Darapur and Village Shakarpur and therefore lay exclusively within the jurisdiction of the revenue authorities. The Court rejected this contention and clarified the conceptual distinction between a boundary dispute between revenue estates and a dispute regarding identification and possession of private land. The Court reaffirmed that civil courts enjoy plenary jurisdiction unless expressly or impliedly barred. It held that the Land Revenue Act does not provide any mechanism for granting injunctions relating to possession, thereby preserving civil court jurisdiction. The judgment also addresses procedural aspects concerning Order XLI Rule 27 CPC and reiterates settled law on Section 100 CPC, holding that a High Court is not bound to frame a substantial question of law where none arises. This decision strengthens the doctrinal clarity on jurisdictional overlap between civil courts and revenue authorities and reinforces access to civil remedies under the maxim ubi jus ibi remedium. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment resolves a long-standing dispute concerning *civil court jurisdiction over land possession disputes* where overlapping claims arise between two revenue estates. The Supreme Court examined whether a *suit for permanent injunction based purely on possession* is barred by statutory revenue laws, specifically *Section 28 and Section 83 of the Delhi Land Revenue Act, 1954*, read with *Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908*. The appellants contended that the controversy constituted a boundary dispute between Village Basai Darapur and Village Shakarpur and therefore lay exclusively within the jurisdiction of the revenue authorities. The Court rejected this contention and clarified the conceptual distinction between a *boundary dispute between revenue estates* and a *dispute regarding identification and possession of private land*. The Court reaffirmed that *civil courts enjoy plenary jurisdiction* unless expressly or impliedly barred. It held that the Land Revenue Act does not provide any mechanism for granting injunctions relating to possession, thereby preserving civil court jurisdiction. The judgment also addresses procedural aspects concerning *Order XLI Rule 27 CPC* and reiterates settled law on *Section 100 CPC*, holding that a High Court is not bound to frame a substantial question of law where none arises. This decision strengthens the doctrinal clarity on jurisdictional overlap between civil courts and revenue authorities and reinforces access to civil remedies under the maxim *ubi jus ibi remedium*. **Keywords:** Civil court jurisdiction; Permanent injunction; Boundary dispute; Delhi Land Revenue Act; Section 9 CPC; Order XLI Rule 27 CPC ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Kirpa Ram (Deceased) Through LRs & Ors. v. Surendra Deo Gaur & Ors.*Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 8971 of 2010Judgement Date16 November 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumL. Nageswara Rao, Hemant Gupta, Ajay Rastogi, JJ.AuthorHemant Gupta, J.Citation*\[2020\] 13 SCR 1030*Legal Provisions Involved*Section 9 CPC; Section 100 CPC; Order XLI Rule 27 CPC; Section 28 & Section 83 Delhi Land Revenue Act, 1954*Judgments OverruledNilRelated Law SubjectsCivil Law; Property Law; Procedural Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The litigation originates from a property dispute spanning several decades, rooted in competing claims over agricultural land situated in Delhi. The respondents asserted ownership and possession over *Khasra No. 238* located in the revenue estate of Village Basai Darapur. Their title had earlier been affirmed through a declaratory decree passed in 1960, which attained finality after dismissal of proceedings initiated by the Union of India under *Section 161-B of the Delhi Land Reforms Act*. Subsequently, apprehending dispossession, the respondents instituted a *suit for permanent injunction* in 1971. The appellant, impleaded as defendant no. 4, contested the claim by asserting possession over *Khasra No. 79* situated in Village Shakarpur and denied the plaintiffs’ possession. The defence strategy consistently sought to characterise the dispute as a *boundary dispute between two villages*, thereby invoking the bar of civil jurisdiction under *Section 28 of the Delhi Land Revenue Act*. The trial court and the first appellate court concurrently upheld the plaintiffs’ possession and decreed injunction. The High Court dismissed the second appeal without framing substantial questions of law. The matter thus reached the Supreme Court, primarily raising issues on *jurisdiction*, *admissibility of additional evidence*, and *procedural compliance under Section 100 CPC*. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The respondents’ claim traces back to a decree dated *7 October 1960* declaring them *owners and bhumidars* of land measuring *4 Bighas 3 Biswas in Khasra No. 238, Village Basai Darapur*. This decree survived a statutory challenge by the Union of India, which was dismissed on *24 May 1968*. In 1971, the respondents filed a suit for permanent injunction alleging threats to their possession by the defendants. Defendant nos. 1 to 3 raised a jurisdictional objection based on *Section 85 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act*. Defendant no. 4 asserted exclusive possession and claimed that the disputed land did not form part of Khasra No. 238 but instead belonged to *Khasra No. 79, Village Shakarpur*. The trial court framed nine issues, including ownership, possession, identification of khasra numbers, and jurisdiction. On appreciation of documentary and oral evidence, including site plans from *1953–54*, the court held that the land fell within Khasra No. 238 and that consolidation had occurred only in Village Shakarpur. The first appellate court reappreciated evidence and found the appellant’s claim self-contradictory. The second appeal before the High Court was dismissed, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether a *suit for permanent injunction based on possession* is barred under *Section 28 or Section 83 of the Delhi Land Revenue Act, 1954*? ii. Whether the High Court is mandatorily required to frame a *substantial question of law* under *Section 100 CPC* while dismissing a second appeal? iii. Whether additional evidence can be permitted under *Order XLI Rule 27 CPC* when parties have already led full evidence at trial? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the dispute was essentially a *boundary dispute between two revenue estates* and therefore fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of the revenue authorities under *Section 28 of the Delhi Land Revenue Act*. It was argued that the civil court lacked competence to determine such disputes. It was further contended that the High Court committed a procedural illegality by dismissing the second appeal *without framing substantial questions of law*, allegedly in violation of *Section 100 CPC*. The appellant also asserted prejudice due to non-consideration of the application filed under *Order XLI Rule 27 CPC* seeking production of additional revenue records. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents argued that the suit was *simpliciter for injunction* based on possession and did not involve demarcation or settlement of boundaries between villages. It was submitted that *Section 83 of the Land Revenue Act* exhaustively enumerates matters barred from civil jurisdiction and the present dispute did not fall within any such category. The respondents further contended that the appellant had full opportunity to lead evidence at trial and that the additional documents sought were irrelevant to the pleaded case. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 9, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908* ii. *Section 100, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908* iii. *Order XLI Rule 27, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908* iv. *Section 28, Delhi Land Revenue Act, 1954* v. *Section 83, Delhi Land Revenue Act, 1954* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the concurrent findings of all courts below. The Court categorically held that *boundary disputes under Section 28 of the Delhi Land Revenue Act refer only to disputes between revenue estates* and do not include disputes concerning identification or possession of private land. The Court emphasised that *Section 83 of the Act* provides a limited ouster of civil jurisdiction and does not cover suits for injunction. It reiterated that *civil courts possess plenary jurisdiction under Section 9 CPC* unless expressly or impliedly barred. Since the Land Revenue Act provides no remedy for injunction, the jurisdiction of civil courts remains intact. On the procedural issue, the Court relied on *Ashok Rangnath Magar v. Shrikant Govindrao Sangvikar* to hold that the High Court may dismiss a second appeal *without framing a substantial question of law* if none arises. The application under *Order XLI Rule 27 CPC* was rejected on the ground that the documents sought were irrelevant and the controversy had already been fully understood and adjudicated at trial. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment lies in the affirmation that *civil court jurisdiction is the rule and statutory exclusion is the exception*. A dispute relating to possession and injunction does not become a boundary dispute merely because parties belong to different revenue estates. Unless a statute provides both *a right and a complete remedial mechanism*, civil jurisdiction cannot be impliedly barred. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that procedural provisions such as *Section 100 CPC* are not to be applied mechanically. Framing of substantial questions of law is contingent upon their actual existence, not on a ritualistic requirement. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Civil courts retain jurisdiction over possession-based injunction suits unless expressly barred. ii. Boundary disputes under revenue laws must be strictly construed. iii. Additional evidence under *Order XLI Rule 27 CPC* cannot be permitted to fill lacunae. iv. High Courts may dismiss second appeals at admission stage if no substantial question of law arises. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Md. Mohammad Ali v. Jagadish Kalita*, *(2004) 1 SCC 271* ii. *Ashok Rangnath Magar v. Shrikant Govindrao Sangvikar*, *(2015) 16 SCC 763* iii. *South Delhi Municipal Corporation v. Today Homes Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.*, *2019 SCC OnLine SC 1052* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Code of Civil Procedure, 1908* ii. *Delhi Land Revenue Act, 1954* iii. *Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [M/s. Fertico Marketing and Investment Pvt. Ltd. and Others v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Another, [2020] 12 S.C.R. 956](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-fertico-marketing-and-investment-pvt-ltd-and-others-v-central-bureau-of-investigation-and-another-2020-12-s-c-r-956/) **Published:** December 26, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in M/s. Fertico Marketing and Investment Pvt. Ltd. and Others v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Another addresses the scope, nature, and legal consequences of consent under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 in the context of investigations conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation within a State. The case arose from allegations of diversion and black-marketing of coal supplied under a Fuel Supply Agreement, allegedly executed through collusion between private company officials and State Government public servants. The principal challenge before the Court related to the legality of the CBI investigation on the ground that prior consent of the State Government had not been obtained before registration of the FIR and completion of investigation. The Supreme Court undertook a detailed examination of the federal scheme underlying Sections 5 and 6 of the DSPE Act, the distinction between private individuals and public servants, and the jurisprudence governing procedural irregularities in investigation. The Court clarified that no consent under Section 6 is required for investigation against private individuals, where general consent exists. In relation to public servants of the State Government, the Court held that post-facto consent granted by the State Government was valid in law, particularly where the accused were not named in the FIR and where no prejudice or miscarriage of justice was demonstrated. Relying upon settled precedents such as H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi and Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja, the Court reaffirmed that defects or irregularities in investigation do not vitiate criminal proceedings unless they result in failure of justice. The judgment reinforces doctrinal clarity on federal consent, investigative jurisdiction of the CBI, and the prejudice test under criminal procedure, while remitting unresolved ancillary issues back to the High Court for determination. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment in *M/s. Fertico Marketing and Investment Pvt. Ltd. and Others v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Another* addresses the scope, nature, and legal consequences of *consent under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946* in the context of investigations conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation within a State. The case arose from allegations of diversion and black-marketing of coal supplied under a Fuel Supply Agreement, allegedly executed through collusion between private company officials and State Government public servants. The principal challenge before the Court related to the legality of the CBI investigation on the ground that prior consent of the State Government had not been obtained before registration of the FIR and completion of investigation. The Supreme Court undertook a detailed examination of the federal scheme underlying Sections *5 and 6 of the DSPE Act*, the distinction between *private individuals and public servants*, and the jurisprudence governing procedural irregularities in investigation. The Court clarified that *no consent under Section 6 is required for investigation against private individuals*, where general consent exists. In relation to public servants of the State Government, the Court held that *post-facto consent* granted by the State Government was valid in law, particularly where the accused were not named in the FIR and where no prejudice or miscarriage of justice was demonstrated. Relying upon settled precedents such as *H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi* and *Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja*, the Court reaffirmed that defects or irregularities in investigation do not vitiate criminal proceedings unless they result in failure of justice. The judgment reinforces doctrinal clarity on federal consent, investigative jurisdiction of the CBI, and the prejudice test under criminal procedure, while remitting unresolved ancillary issues back to the High Court for determination. **Keywords:** DSPE Act, Section 6 consent, CBI jurisdiction, post-facto consent, prejudice test, federalism ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*M/s. Fertico Marketing and Investment Pvt. Ltd. and Others v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Another*Case NumberCriminal Appeal Nos. 760–764 of 2020 and connected mattersJudgement Date17 November 2020Court*Supreme Court of India*QuorumA. M. Khanwilkar, J. and B. R. Gavai, J.AuthorB. R. Gavai, J.Citation*\[2020\] 12 S.C.R. 956*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 5 & 6, DSPE Act, 1946; Sections 120B, 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC; Section 13(1)(d) read with 13(2), Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 482 CrPC*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsCriminal Law, Anti-Corruption Law, Constitutional Law ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The controversy arose against the backdrop of coal allocation and distribution under the policy framework of Coal India Limited, which mandated execution of Fuel Supply Agreements with private purchasers. The appellants were beneficiaries under such an agreement and were alleged to have diverted subsidized coal into the black market. The alleged acts involved coordination between private company officials and certain officers of the District Industries Centre, Chandauli, leading to financial loss to the Central Government. The Central Bureau of Investigation registered an FIR invoking *Sections 120B and 420 IPC* along with *Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988*. Initially, only private individuals and unknown public servants were named. During investigation, two State Government officers were identified as conspirators, and sanction under *Section 19 of the PC Act* was obtained prior to filing of the charge-sheet. The proceedings were challenged before the Allahabad High Court under *Section 482 CrPC* primarily on the ground that the investigation was void ab initio for want of prior consent of the State Government under *Section 6 of the DSPE Act*. The Single Judge’s differing views led to a reference to a Division Bench, followed by remand and eventual dismissal of the petitions based on the validity of post-facto consent. The Supreme Court was thus called upon to resolve the legal tension between federal consent requirements, investigative jurisdiction of the CBI, and the impact of procedural irregularities on criminal prosecution, especially where allegations of corruption involving public servants were concerned. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** Coal India Limited introduced a policy on 18 October 2007 requiring execution of Fuel Supply Agreements for coal procurement. Pursuant to this policy, an FSA was executed on 30 April 2008 between Coal India Limited and the appellant company. On 25 March 2011, a joint surprise inspection by the CBI revealed that coal procured under the FSA was allegedly diverted and sold in the open market. The investigation disclosed that false reports regarding operational capacity and usage were allegedly submitted with the connivance of officials of the District Industries Centre. These misrepresentations enabled continued supply of coal at subsidized rates, resulting in an alleged loss of ₹36.28 crores to the exchequer. An FIR dated 13 April 2011 was registered against the company’s Director and unknown officials. During investigation, two State Government officers were identified as active participants in the conspiracy. Sanction for their prosecution was granted on 31 May 2012 under *Section 19 of the PC Act*, and a charge-sheet was filed on the same date. Several accused approached the High Court seeking quashing of proceedings, contending that the CBI lacked jurisdiction in absence of State consent under *Section 6 of the DSPE Act*. The State Government later issued a notification on 7 September 2018 granting post-facto consent for investigation against the said public servants. The High Court upheld the investigation, holding that post-facto consent was sufficient and that private individuals could not challenge absence of consent. These findings formed the basis of the appeal before the Supreme Court. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether investigation by the CBI without prior consent of the State Government under *Section 6 of the DSPE Act* is illegal and without jurisdiction? ii. Whether post-facto consent granted by the State Government cures the alleged defect of absence of prior consent? iii. Whether private individuals can challenge CBI investigation on the ground of lack of State consent? iv. Whether absence of prior consent results in vitiation of proceedings without proof of prejudice or miscarriage of justice? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellants submitted that *Section 6 of the DSPE Act* is mandatory in nature and that absence of prior consent strikes at the root of CBI jurisdiction. It was argued that offences under the *Prevention of Corruption Act* necessarily involve public servants, and therefore investigation without consent was unconstitutional and violative of federal principles. It was further contended that invocation of *Section 120B IPC* presupposes a meeting of minds between public servants and private individuals, rendering the entire investigation illegal in absence of valid consent. Reliance was placed on *Ms. Mayawati v. Union of India* to contend that unauthorized CBI investigation amounts to abuse of process. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the respondent submitted that general consent dated 15 June 1989 authorized investigation against private individuals. It was argued that *Section 6 consent is directory*, and any procedural lapse does not vitiate proceedings unless prejudice is shown. It was further argued that the public servants were not named in the FIR and that *post-facto consent dated 7 September 2018* validly cured any irregularity. The absence of pleadings on prejudice or miscarriage of justice disentitled the appellants from relief. ## **H) JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the investigation against both private individuals and public servants. The Court held that the notification dated 15 June 1989 constituted valid general consent enabling CBI investigation against private individuals for PC Act offences and allied IPC offences. No separate consent was required for them under *Section 6 of the DSPE Act*. In respect of public servants, the Court held that since they were not named in the FIR and were identified during investigation, *post-facto consent* granted by the State Government was legally sustainable. The Court relied on *H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi* to reiterate that illegality in investigation does not vitiate proceedings unless miscarriage of justice is shown. The Court rejected reliance on *Mayawati*, holding it factually inapplicable. The absence of pleadings or proof of prejudice was decisive. However, the Court remitted unanswered issues framed by the High Court for fresh consideration, keeping merits open. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio decidendi of the judgment lies in the affirmation that *absence of prior consent under Section 6 of the DSPE Act does not ipso facto vitiate criminal proceedings*. The Court held that consent requirements must be interpreted in a manner consistent with federal balance but without allowing technical objections to defeat substantive justice. The Court conclusively held that *private individuals cannot challenge investigation on the ground of lack of State consent*, and that *post-facto consent for investigation against State public servants is valid*, particularly where no prejudice or miscarriage of justice is demonstrated. The prejudice test remains central to adjudging the impact of investigative irregularities. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that federal consent provisions under the DSPE Act must not be weaponized to obstruct corruption investigations. It noted that procedural safeguards are intended to protect legitimate State interests, not to create immunity for accused persons on technical grounds. The emphasis on prejudice and failure of justice underscores a pragmatic approach to criminal procedure. The Court’s observations reinforce the principle that criminal trials are concerned with truth-finding rather than procedural perfection. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Consent under *Section 6 of the DSPE Act* is not required for investigation against private individuals where general consent exists. ii. Post-facto consent for investigation against State public servants is legally permissible. iii. Investigative irregularities do not vitiate proceedings unless prejudice or miscarriage of justice is established. iv. High Courts must decide all framed issues and cannot leave substantive questions unanswered. ## **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment strengthens the doctrinal clarity on the interplay between federal consent and anti-corruption investigations. It prevents abuse of Section 6 of the DSPE Act as a technical shield against prosecution, while preserving the constitutional balance between Centre and States. By reaffirming the prejudice test, the Court aligns procedural law with substantive justice. The decision has significant implications for pending and future CBI investigations involving State officials, particularly in corruption-related offences. ## **J) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi*, *\[1955\] 1 SCR 1150* ii. *State of Karnataka v. Kuppuswamy Gownder*, *\[1987\] 2 SCR 295* iii. *Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja*, *\[2003\] 1 Supp. SCR 307* iv. *Ms. Mayawati v. Union of India*, *\[2012\] 7 SCR 33* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946* ii. *Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988* iii. *Indian Penal Code, 1860* iv. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Ram Sharan Maurya and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, [2020] 12 S.C.R. 466](https://lawfoyer.in/ram-sharan-maurya-and-others-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-and-others-2020-12-s-c-r-466/) **Published:** December 26, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in Ram Sharan Maurya and Others v. State of U.P. and Others examines the legality and constitutional validity of fixation of minimum qualifying marks for the Assistant Teacher Recruitment Examination-2019 (ATRE-2019) conducted by the State of Uttar Pradesh. The dispute arose primarily from challenges mounted by Shiksha Mitras, ex-servicemen, and persons with disabilities against the post-examination prescription of qualifying cut-off marks at 65% for General category candidates and 60% for reserved categories. The appellants contended that such fixation was arbitrary, retrospective, discriminatory, and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court undertook an extensive examination of the statutory framework governing teacher recruitment, including the Uttar Pradesh Basic Education (Teachers) Service Rules, 1981, the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993, and the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009. A crucial issue concerned the authority of the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) to prescribe eligibility norms, including permitting B.Ed. candidates to teach Classes I to V subject to a six-month bridge course, as laid down in its Notification dated 28.06.2018. The Court upheld the power of the State Government to determine minimum qualifying marks “from time to time” under Rule 2(1)(x) read with Rule 14 of the 1981 Rules, even after the conduct of the examination, provided the decision is free from mala fides and aligned with the objective of selecting meritorious teachers. The judgment reaffirms the primacy of educational quality under Article 21A and validates the State’s policy decision to raise standards to ensure competent primary education. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment in *Ram Sharan Maurya and Others v. State of U.P. and Others* examines the legality and constitutional validity of fixation of minimum qualifying marks for the *Assistant Teacher Recruitment Examination-2019 (ATRE-2019)* conducted by the State of Uttar Pradesh. The dispute arose primarily from challenges mounted by *Shiksha Mitras*, ex-servicemen, and persons with disabilities against the post-examination prescription of qualifying cut-off marks at *65% for General category candidates and 60% for reserved categories*. The appellants contended that such fixation was arbitrary, retrospective, discriminatory, and violative of Articles *14* and *16* of the Constitution. The Supreme Court undertook an extensive examination of the statutory framework governing teacher recruitment, including the *Uttar Pradesh Basic Education (Teachers) Service Rules, 1981*, the *National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993*, and the *Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009*. A crucial issue concerned the authority of the *National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE)* to prescribe eligibility norms, including permitting *B.Ed.* candidates to teach Classes I to V subject to a six-month bridge course, as laid down in its Notification dated *28.06.2018*. The Court upheld the power of the State Government to determine minimum qualifying marks “*from time to time*” under *Rule 2(1)(x)* read with *Rule 14* of the 1981 Rules, even after the conduct of the examination, provided the decision is free from mala fides and aligned with the objective of selecting meritorious teachers. The judgment reaffirms the primacy of educational quality under *Article 21A* and validates the State’s policy decision to raise standards to ensure competent primary education. ### **Keywords** Teacher Recruitment; Shiksha Mitra; ATRE-2019; Cut-off Marks; NCTE; Right to Education; Service Law. ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*Ram Sharan Maurya and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 3707 of 2020 and connected mattersiii) Judgement Date18 November 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumUday Umesh Lalit, J.; Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, J.vi) AuthorUday Umesh Lalit, J.vii) Citation*\[2020\] 12 S.C.R. 466*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Articles 14, 16, 21A of the Constitution*; *NCTE Act, 1993*; *RTE Act, 2009*; *U.P. Basic Education (Teachers) Service Rules, 1981*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsService Law; Constitutional Law; Education Law ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The controversy arose in the aftermath of prolonged litigation surrounding the status, rights, and absorption of *Shiksha Mitras* in Uttar Pradesh’s basic education system. Historically appointed on a contractual and honorarium basis to address teacher shortages, *Shiksha Mitras* were never regular teachers under statutory service rules. Their attempted regularisation was decisively rejected in *State of U.P. v. Anand Kumar Yadav*, wherein this Court invalidated their absorption but extended limited equitable relief by permitting them to participate in *two consecutive recruitment processes* with age relaxation and experience weightage. Pursuant to this direction, the State initiated large-scale recruitment through ATRE-2018 and ATRE-2019. While ATRE-2018 prescribed minimum qualifying marks in advance, ATRE-2019 was notified without such specification. Subsequently, by Government Order dated *07.01.2019*, the State fixed qualifying marks at *65% and 60%*. This triggered litigation alleging arbitrariness and hostile discrimination, particularly by *Shiksha Mitras* who claimed legitimate expectation of parity with ATRE-2018 standards. Simultaneously, the recruitment process was complicated by the *NCTE Notification dated 28.06.2018*, which allowed *B.Ed.* candidates to teach Classes I–V subject to a mandatory six-month bridge course. This led to amendments in the 1981 Rules with retrospective effect, giving rise to further challenges on eligibility and retrospectivity. Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court was required to reconcile service jurisprudence, statutory interpretation, federal distribution of powers in education, and the constitutional mandate of quality education. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The State of Uttar Pradesh conducted ATRE-2019 for filling *69,000 vacancies* of Assistant Teachers in Junior Basic Schools. The recruitment was governed by the *U.P. Basic Education (Teachers) Service Rules, 1981*, as amended from time to time. Eligibility conditions included possession of requisite academic qualifications, passing of *Teacher Eligibility Test (TET)*, and clearing ATRE. Unlike ATRE-2018, where minimum qualifying marks were expressly stated as *45% for General/OBC* and *40% for SC/ST*, the notification for ATRE-2019 omitted any such specification. After the examination was conducted, the State fixed minimum qualifying marks at *65% for General* and *60% for reserved categories*. The result declared on *12.05.2020* showed that *37.62%* of candidates qualified, which was comparable to *38.83%* in ATRE-2018, though the absolute number of successful candidates far exceeded the available vacancies. *Shiksha Mitras* filed writ petitions before the Allahabad High Court challenging the cut-off. The Single Judge allowed the petitions, holding the post-examination fixation impermissible. On appeal, the Division Bench reversed this view, upholding the State’s action. Multiple appeals and writ petitions were then filed before the Supreme Court by *Shiksha Mitras*, *B.Ed./BTC candidates*, ex-servicemen, and persons with disabilities. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether the State Government could lawfully prescribe minimum qualifying marks for ATRE-2019 after the examination was conducted? ii. Whether fixation of higher cut-off marks violated *Articles 14 and 16* of the Constitution? iii. Whether retrospective amendments to the 1981 Rules permitting *B.Ed.* candidates were ultra vires? iv. Whether *Shiksha Mitras* were entitled to parity with candidates of ATRE-2018? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the Petitioners submitted that post-examination fixation of cut-off marks was arbitrary and contrary to settled law. Reliance was placed on decisions such as *K. Manjusree v. State of Andhra Pradesh*, asserting that changing selection criteria after commencement of the process vitiates fairness. It was contended that absence of prior notification created legitimate expectation of lower cut-offs akin to ATRE-2018. It was further argued that retrospective amendments to the 1981 Rules enabling *B.Ed.* candidates diluted the recruitment process and prejudiced *Shiksha Mitras*. The petitioners also alleged hostile discrimination, asserting that experienced *Shiksha Mitras* were unfairly subjected to the same standards as fresh graduates. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The State contended that *Rule 2(1)(x)* expressly empowered it to determine qualifying marks “*from time to time*”. It was argued that minimum marks are inherent to any competitive examination and candidates were aware that passing ATRE necessarily entailed meeting a prescribed benchmark. The Respondents emphasized the binding nature of *NCTE Notifications*, particularly that dated *28.06.2018*, which conferred eligibility on *B.Ed.* candidates independently of State amendments. The fixation of higher cut-offs was justified as a policy decision aimed at securing quality teachers in line with *Article 21A*. ## **H) JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals of *Shiksha Mitras* and upheld the judgment of the Division Bench. The Court held that the *NCTE*, empowered under the *NCTE Act, 1993* and Notification dated *31.03.2010*, possessed unquestionable authority to prescribe minimum qualifications for teachers. Consequently, the *Notification dated 28.06.2018* allowing *B.Ed.* candidates was binding on the State, and amendments to the 1981 Rules merely aligned State law with central norms. On cut-off fixation, the Court observed that *Rule 2(1)(x)* and *Rule 14* contemplated determination of minimum qualifying marks by the Government. The absence of such specification in the ATRE-2019 notification did not negate the power to prescribe them later. The Court distinguished earlier precedents where selection criteria themselves were altered, noting that minimum qualifying marks are a component of eligibility, not evaluation. Statistical data demonstrated that even with higher cut-offs, the percentage of successful candidates remained comparable to ATRE-2018 and exceeded vacancies. The Court found no mala fides or arbitrariness, concluding that the State’s action was rational and aligned with the objective of selecting meritorious teachers. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The fixation of minimum qualifying marks for a recruitment examination after its conduct is legally permissible when the governing rules authorize the State to determine such marks “from time to time”, provided the decision is non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory, and aimed at selecting the best available talent consistent with *Article 21A*. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court reiterated that primary education demands high standards and that experiential advantage cannot substitute minimum academic merit. It observed that quality education is inseparable from teacher competence. **c) GUIDELINES** i. The State may prescribe qualifying marks post-examination if empowered by rules. ii. Such fixation must be uniform, transparent, and policy-driven. iii. Educational standards under the RTE framework must prevail over equitable claims. ## **I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment reinforces judicial deference to policy decisions in educational recruitment when grounded in statutory authority and constitutional objectives. It decisively clarifies the scope of State power under service rules and affirms the supremacy of *NCTE* norms. The ruling marks a significant shift from equity-based accommodation of *Shiksha Mitras* to merit-centric recruitment, reflecting an evolving jurisprudence prioritizing educational quality over contractual continuity. ## **J) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** - *State of U.P. v. Anand Kumar Yadav*, *\[2017\] 10 SCR 428* - *Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Surender Singh*, *(2019) 8 SCC 67* - *State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha*, *\[1974\] 1 SCR 165* **b) Important Statutes Referred** - *Constitution of India* - *National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993* - *Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009* - *U.P. Basic Education (Teachers) Service Rules, 1981* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Udayant Malhouta, [2020] 14 S.C.R. 327](https://lawfoyer.in/securities-and-exchange-board-of-india-v-udayant-malhouta-2020-14-s-c-r-327/) **Published:** December 26, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Udayant Malhouta addresses the contours of SEBI’s power to pass ex-parte interim orders, particularly in cases alleging insider trading under the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015. The dispute arose from allegations that the respondent, being the Chief Executive Officer and Managing Director of the listed company, had traded in company shares while allegedly in possession of unpublished price sensitive information relating to unaudited financial results. Acting on this allegation, SEBI issued an ex-parte interim order directing the respondent to deposit a quantified amount representing notional loss allegedly averted. The Securities Appellate Tribunal set aside this interim order on the ground that no extreme urgency existed, especially since the investigation had been pending since 2017 and information had already been supplied in 2019. The Supreme Court, while affirming the Tribunal’s conclusion on facts, clarified that SEBI does possess statutory authority under Section 11(4) of the SEBI Act, 1992 to pass interim orders, including ex-parte directions, but such powers must be exercised in accordance with statutory parameters and factual necessity. Importantly, the Court held that the interpretation of law made by the Tribunal concerning SEBI’s powers should not be treated as precedent. The ruling thus balances investor protection with procedural fairness, reinforcing that regulatory urgency must be real, demonstrable, and proportionate to the action taken. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment in *Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Udayant Malhouta* addresses the contours of *SEBI’s power to pass ex-parte interim orders*, particularly in cases alleging insider trading under the *SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015*. The dispute arose from allegations that the respondent, being the *Chief Executive Officer and Managing Director* of the listed company, had traded in company shares while allegedly in possession of *unpublished price sensitive information* relating to unaudited financial results. Acting on this allegation, SEBI issued an *ex-parte interim order* directing the respondent to deposit a quantified amount representing *notional loss allegedly averted*. The Securities Appellate Tribunal set aside this interim order on the ground that *no extreme urgency* existed, especially since the investigation had been pending since 2017 and information had already been supplied in 2019. The Supreme Court, while affirming the Tribunal’s conclusion *on facts*, clarified that SEBI does possess statutory authority under *Section 11(4) of the SEBI Act, 1992* to pass interim orders, including ex-parte directions, but such powers must be exercised in accordance with statutory parameters and factual necessity. Importantly, the Court held that the *interpretation of law* made by the Tribunal concerning SEBI’s powers should *not be treated as precedent*. The ruling thus balances *investor protection* with *procedural fairness*, reinforcing that regulatory urgency must be real, demonstrable, and proportionate to the action taken. **Keywords:** Insider Trading, Ex-parte Interim Orders, SEBI Powers, Urgency Doctrine, Procedural Fairness ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgment Cause Title*Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Udayant Malhouta*Case NumberCivil Appeal Nos. 2981–2982 of 2020Judgment Date18 November 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorum*Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, Indu Malhotra and Indira Banerjee, JJ.*AuthorSupreme Court of IndiaCitation*\[2020\] 14 S.C.R. 327*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 11(1), 11(4)(d), 11(4A), 11(5), 11B, 15Z, 19 of the SEBI Act, 1992; Regulation 10 of SEBI (PIT) Regulations, 2015*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsSecurities Law, Corporate Regulation, Administrative Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The appeal before the Supreme Court arose from interim regulatory action taken by *Securities and Exchange Board of India*, the statutory body entrusted with safeguarding investor interests and maintaining market integrity. The case sits at the intersection of *market regulation* and *procedural safeguards*, raising questions on how swiftly and forcefully a regulator may act in the absence of concluded adjudication. SEBI invoked its powers under *Section 11 read with Section 19 of the SEBI Act, 1992* to pass an ex-parte interim order directing the respondent to deposit a substantial amount representing alleged notional gains or avoided losses. This action was taken several years after the impugned trades occurred and while the investigation was still pending. The Securities Appellate Tribunal scrutinised this regulatory response through the lens of urgency and proportionality. Relying on its earlier ruling in *North End Foods Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. SEBI*, the Tribunal held that interim ex-parte powers must be exercised sparingly and only where circumstances demand immediate intervention. The Supreme Court was thus called upon to determine whether the Tribunal erred in curtailing SEBI’s interim authority or whether the factual matrix justified restraint. The judgment carefully separates *factual endorsement* of the Tribunal’s decision from *doctrinal endorsement* of its legal reasoning, thereby preserving SEBI’s statutory powers while insisting on disciplined use. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The respondent was the *Chief Executive Officer and Managing Director* of the concerned listed company. It was alleged that on *24 October 2016*, he sold *51,000 shares* of the company while allegedly in possession of *unpublished price sensitive information*, namely the unaudited financial results for the quarter ending *30 September 2016*. The Board of Directors approved these financial results on *11 November 2016*, following which the company’s share price allegedly witnessed a *drastic reduction*. SEBI contended that the respondent, being a *connected person*, had anticipated this decline and sold his shares to avert a notional loss. An investigation into these trades commenced in *2017*. Despite the passage of time, the investigating authority sought information from the respondent only on *28 November 2019*, which was duly supplied. Subsequently, on *15 June 2020*, the Whole Time Member of SEBI passed an *ex-parte interim order* directing the respondent to deposit *₹3.83 crore* into an escrow account. The respondent challenged this order before the Securities Appellate Tribunal, arguing lack of urgency, arbitrariness, and procedural unfairness, particularly during the pandemic. The Tribunal accepted these contentions and set aside the interim order. SEBI then approached the Supreme Court under *Section 15Z of the SEBI Act*. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether SEBI was justified in passing an *ex-parte interim order* after a prolonged delay in investigation? ii. Whether mere existence of a *prima facie* case of insider trading is sufficient to dispense with urgency requirements? iii. Whether the Tribunal erred in limiting SEBI’s statutory powers under *Section 11(4) of the SEBI Act*? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the petitioner submitted that SEBI possesses *wide preventive powers* under the SEBI Act to protect market integrity. It was argued that *Section 11(4)(d)* expressly authorises impounding of proceeds even *pending investigation*. The appellant contended that there existed a real risk of diversion of illicit gains, warranting immediate action without prior notice. It was further submitted that the Tribunal’s observations curtailed SEBI’s regulatory authority and could undermine effective enforcement against insider trading, a grave economic offence affecting investor confidence. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent submitted that the impugned trade occurred nearly *three years prior* to the interim order. It was argued that such delay negated any claim of urgency. The respondent contended that ex-parte action, especially involving monetary deposit, violated principles of natural justice and proportionality. Reliance was placed on the Tribunal’s precedent to assert that *interim preventive measures* must be justified by compelling urgency, which was absent in the present case. ## H) JUDGMENT The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal’s decision *on facts*, observing that the investigation had remained pending since 2017 and that relevant information had already been furnished in 2019. In such circumstances, the Court found *no demonstrable urgency* justifying an ex-parte interim order of such magnitude. However, the Court made a crucial clarification. It held that although the Tribunal was correct in setting aside the order on factual grounds, its interpretation of SEBI’s statutory powers should *not be treated as precedent*. The Court reaffirmed that *Section 11(4)* empowers SEBI to act even during investigation, provided statutory conditions are satisfied. The appeals were disposed of with this clarification, thereby maintaining a balance between regulatory authority and procedural restraint. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment lies in the principle that *ex-parte interim regulatory powers must be exercised only when factual urgency is established*. Delay in investigation and availability of information negate claims of immediate necessity. At the same time, statutory powers under *Section 11(4) of the SEBI Act* remain intact and enforceable in appropriate cases. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that while safeguarding investor interests is paramount, regulatory action must conform to *procedural discipline*. Excessive reliance on interim measures without urgency may erode fairness and credibility of enforcement mechanisms. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Ex-parte interim orders must be supported by demonstrable urgency. ii. Delay in investigation weakens the justification for immediate preventive action. iii. Tribunal interpretations limiting statutory powers should not be mechanically applied. iv. SEBI orders must align strictly with *Section 11(4) of the SEBI Act*. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces the doctrine that *regulatory power is strongest when exercised with restraint*. By affirming the Tribunal’s factual conclusion while insulating SEBI’s statutory authority from dilution, the Supreme Court preserves institutional balance. The ruling serves as a cautionary note that urgency cannot be presumed and must be evidenced, especially when ex-parte financial directions are imposed. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *North End Foods Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. SEBI* (Appeal No. 80 of 2019) **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992* ii. *SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Jayantilal Verma v. State of M.P. (now Chhattisgarh), [2020] 12 S.C.R. 411](https://lawfoyer.in/jayantilal-verma-v-state-of-m-p-now-chhattisgarh-2020-12-s-c-r-411/) **Published:** December 26, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The decision examines the evidentiary standards applicable in cases of homicidal death occurring within the privacy of a matrimonial home. The Supreme Court was concerned with a conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 for the murder of a wife by strangulation, where the prosecution case substantially rested on circumstantial evidence, medical testimony, and the statement of a solitary witness. The Court scrutinised whether the absence of multiple eyewitnesses, hostile witnesses, and the non-recovery of the weapon of offence could dilute the prosecution’s case. The judgment reiterates that when a death occurs in the exclusive domain of the accused, particularly within the matrimonial household, the burden on the prosecution is comparatively lighter once foundational facts are established. In such circumstances, Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 assumes critical relevance, placing an obligation on the accused to offer a plausible explanation for the cause of death. Mere denial under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was held insufficient. The Court upheld the conviction of the husband, relying on consistent testimony of the deceased’s brother, corroborated by medical evidence indicating death by strangulation. At the same time, the Court showed sentencing sensitivity by directing the State to consider premature release after completion of fourteen years of actual imprisonment. The judgment reinforces settled principles relating to circumstantial evidence, hostile witnesses, and domestic homicide within the privacy of the home. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The decision examines the evidentiary standards applicable in cases of homicidal death occurring within the privacy of a matrimonial home. The Supreme Court was concerned with a conviction under *Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860* for the murder of a wife by strangulation, where the prosecution case substantially rested on circumstantial evidence, medical testimony, and the statement of a solitary witness. The Court scrutinised whether the absence of multiple eyewitnesses, hostile witnesses, and the non-recovery of the weapon of offence could dilute the prosecution’s case. The judgment reiterates that when a death occurs in the exclusive domain of the accused, particularly within the matrimonial household, the burden on the prosecution is comparatively lighter once foundational facts are established. In such circumstances, *Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872* assumes critical relevance, placing an obligation on the accused to offer a plausible explanation for the cause of death. Mere denial under *Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* was held insufficient. The Court upheld the conviction of the husband, relying on consistent testimony of the deceased’s brother, corroborated by medical evidence indicating death by strangulation. At the same time, the Court showed sentencing sensitivity by directing the State to consider premature release after completion of fourteen years of actual imprisonment. The judgment reinforces settled principles relating to circumstantial evidence, hostile witnesses, and domestic homicide within the privacy of the home. **Keywords:** *Circumstantial Evidence*, *Strangulation*, *Section 106 Evidence Act*, *Domestic Homicide*, *Burden of Proof*, *Hostile Witnesses* ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Jayantilal Verma v. State of M.P. (now Chhattisgarh)*Case NumberCriminal Appeal No. 590 of 2015Judgement Date19 November 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumSanjay Kishan Kaul, J. and Hrishikesh Roy, J.AuthorSanjay Kishan Kaul, J.Citation*\[2020\] 12 S.C.R. 411*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 302, 34 IPC; Section 106 Evidence Act; Section 313 Cr.P.C.*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsCriminal Law, Law of Evidence ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The judgment arises from a matrimonial homicide that occurred in rural Madhya Pradesh, later Chhattisgarh, highlighting the complexities involved in prosecuting crimes committed within the private confines of a household. The deceased woman was found dead on a cot inside her matrimonial home, with medical evidence pointing towards death by asphyxia due to strangulation. The prosecution alleged that the husband, along with his parents, was responsible for the offence. The case progressed through multiple judicial stages. The Trial Court convicted all three accused under *Section 302 IPC*. During the pendency of appeal, the father-in-law died, leading to abatement of proceedings against him. The High Court re-appreciated the evidence and acquitted the mother-in-law but upheld the conviction of the husband. The matter then reached the Supreme Court by way of criminal appeal. A significant feature of the case was that most prosecution witnesses turned hostile, leaving the prosecution primarily dependent on the testimony of one witness, the deceased’s brother, and the post-mortem report. The defence argued that such limited evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for murder. The Court was therefore required to evaluate the quality rather than the quantity of evidence and to apply settled principles governing circumstantial evidence and burden of proof. The judgment is situated within a broader jurisprudential framework concerning deaths within matrimonial homes, where direct evidence is often unavailable. It revisits the doctrine that when incriminating facts are within the special knowledge of the accused, the evidentiary burden shifts to them to provide an explanation consistent with innocence. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The deceased, Sahodara Bai, was married to the appellant approximately eight years prior to the incident and had an infant son. She resided in her matrimonial home along with her husband and in-laws. A few days before her death, she had returned to her maternal home and disclosed to her brother that she was subjected to harassment by her in-laws for several months. The harassment was allegedly linked to familial discord involving the appellant’s brother and his wife. An attempt at reconciliation followed, after which the deceased was brought back to her matrimonial home. On 24 August 1999, she was found dead on a cot inside the house. A *marg intimation* was lodged by her brother. Initially, the in-laws suggested that death had occurred due to a snakebite. However, the post-mortem report contradicted this version and indicated *asphyxia due to strangulation*, with injuries consistent with forceful compression of the neck. An FIR was registered under *Sections 302 and 34 IPC*. During investigation, the accused claimed that they were working in the fields at the time of the incident and discovered the body upon returning. No independent evidence was produced to substantiate this claim. At trial, out of nine prosecution witnesses, five turned hostile. The Trial Court nonetheless convicted all accused based on circumstantial evidence, medical opinion, and the testimony of PW-1. On appeal, the High Court acquitted the mother-in-law, finding insufficient evidence of her involvement, but upheld the conviction of the husband. The Supreme Court was thus tasked with determining whether the conviction of the husband could be sustained on the available evidence. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether a conviction under *Section 302 IPC* can be sustained primarily on circumstantial evidence and medical testimony? ii. Whether the testimony of a solitary witness, when found reliable, is sufficient for conviction? iii. Whether failure of the accused to explain the cause of death within the matrimonial home attracts *Section 106 of the Evidence Act*? iv. Whether mere denial under *Section 313 Cr.P.C.* satisfies the burden placed on the accused? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the chain of circumstantial evidence was incomplete and incapable of excluding every hypothesis other than guilt. It was argued that allegations of prior cruelty were unsubstantiated by independent complaints. The credibility of PW-1 was questioned on the ground that he was a step-brother and had improved his version regarding the alleged snakebite explanation. The defence further contended that the medical opinion was inconclusive as the doctor stated that the death *“may”* be homicidal. The absence of recovery of the weapon of offence and the acquittal of the mother-in-law on the same evidence were relied upon to seek parity and benefit of doubt. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent State argued that the death occurred within the exclusive confines of the matrimonial home and that the accused were the only occupants. Once homicidal death was established, the burden shifted to the accused under *Section 106 of the Evidence Act* to explain the circumstances leading to death. Reliance was placed on precedents where similar deaths within the home led to conviction in the absence of explanation by the accused. The State emphasised that hostile witnesses do not automatically weaken the prosecution case and that quality of evidence prevails over quantity. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction of the appellant under *Section 302 IPC*. The Court held that the testimony of PW-1 was consistent and credible, notwithstanding minor omissions. The medical evidence conclusively established death by strangulation, ruling out accidental or natural causes. The Court placed substantial reliance on the fact that the death occurred inside the matrimonial home where no outsider could have entered unnoticed. In such circumstances, the accused was under a legal obligation to offer a plausible explanation. The failure to do so, coupled with mere denial under *Section 313 Cr.P.C.*, was held to be a strong incriminating circumstance. While affirming the conviction, the Court directed the State to consider the appellant’s case for release after completion of fourteen years of actual imprisonment, reflecting a balanced approach towards sentencing. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the decision lies in the application of *Section 106 of the Evidence Act* to matrimonial homicides occurring within the privacy of the home. Once the prosecution establishes homicidal death and the exclusive presence of the accused, the evidentiary burden shifts to the accused to explain the circumstances. Failure to discharge this burden supports an inference of guilt. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that hostility of witnesses is a recurring issue in Indian criminal trials and does not, by itself, render the prosecution case unreliable. Emphasis was laid on the absence of an effective witness protection mechanism. **c) GUIDELINES** i. In cases of death within the matrimonial home, courts may draw adverse inference from absence of explanation by the accused. ii. Conviction can rest on a solitary witness if testimony is reliable. iii. Medical evidence assumes heightened importance in domestic homicide cases. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces foundational principles of criminal jurisprudence relating to circumstantial evidence and burden of proof. It reflects judicial sensitivity towards the realities of domestic crimes, where direct evidence is rare. By balancing strict evidentiary scrutiny with pragmatic application of *Section 106 of the Evidence Act*, the Court strengthens accountability within the domestic sphere while maintaining procedural fairness. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra*, *\[2006\] 7 Supp. SCR 156* 2. *Amarsingh Munnasingh Suryawanshi v. State of Maharashtra*, *\[2007\] 11 SCR 1* 3. *Raj Kumar Prasad Tamarkar v. State of Bihar*, *\[2007\] 1 SCR 13* 4. *Yanob Sheikh Alias Gagu v. State of West Bengal*, *\[2012\] 13 SCR 1150* 5. *Gulam Sarbar v. State of Bihar*, *\[2013\] 12 SCR 1* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Indian Penal Code, 1860* 2. *Indian Evidence Act, 1872* 3. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [M/s Kaledonia Jute and Fibres Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s Axis Nirman and Industries Ltd. & Ors., [2020] 11 SCR 800](https://lawfoyer.in/m-s-kaledonia-jute-and-fibres-pvt-ltd-v-m-s-axis-nirman-and-industries-ltd-ors-2020-11-scr-800/) **Published:** December 26, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment resolves a significant conflict arising during the transition from the Companies Act, 1956 regime to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The Supreme Court examined whether a winding-up proceeding, already admitted and advertised by a High Court, could be transferred to the National Company Law Tribunal at the instance of a financial creditor who was not the original petitioning creditor. The dispute emerged against the backdrop of overlapping jurisdictions between Company Courts and the NCLT, especially where insolvency proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC run parallel to winding-up proceedings. The Court interpreted Section 434(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013, including its fifth proviso inserted by the IBC (Second Amendment) Act, 2018. A detailed examination of Rules 5 and 6 of the Companies (Transfer of Pending Proceedings) Rules, 2016 and Rule 26 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 was undertaken to determine the stage at which transfer is permissible. The Court clarified that while Rules 5 and 6 restrict automatic transfer once service under Rule 26 is completed, these restrictions do not apply where transfer is sought under the fifth proviso to Section 434(1)(c). Importantly, the Court held that winding-up proceedings are proceedings in rem, and any creditor of the company is a “party” entitled to seek transfer. Allowing parallel proceedings would defeat the object of the IBC. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s refusal and directed transfer of the winding-up proceedings to the NCLT to be heard along with the Section 7 application. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment resolves a significant conflict arising during the transition from the *Companies Act, 1956* regime to the *Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016*. The Supreme Court examined whether a winding-up proceeding, already admitted and advertised by a High Court, could be transferred to the *National Company Law Tribunal* at the instance of a financial creditor who was not the original petitioning creditor. The dispute emerged against the backdrop of overlapping jurisdictions between Company Courts and the NCLT, especially where insolvency proceedings under *Section 7 of the IBC* run parallel to winding-up proceedings. The Court interpreted *Section 434(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013*, including its fifth proviso inserted by the *IBC (Second Amendment) Act, 2018*. A detailed examination of *Rules 5 and 6 of the Companies (Transfer of Pending Proceedings) Rules, 2016* and *Rule 26 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959* was undertaken to determine the stage at which transfer is permissible. The Court clarified that while Rules 5 and 6 restrict automatic transfer once service under Rule 26 is completed, these restrictions do not apply where transfer is sought under the fifth proviso to Section 434(1)(c). Importantly, the Court held that winding-up proceedings are proceedings *in rem*, and any creditor of the company is a “party” entitled to seek transfer. Allowing parallel proceedings would defeat the object of the IBC. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s refusal and directed transfer of the winding-up proceedings to the NCLT to be heard along with the Section 7 application. **Keywords:** Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, Winding-up Proceedings, Section 434 Companies Act 2013, Transfer to NCLT, Proceedings in rem, Financial Creditor ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*M/s Kaledonia Jute and Fibres Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s Axis Nirman and Industries Ltd. & Ors.*Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 3735 of 2020Judgement Date19 November 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumS. A. Bobde, CJI; A. S. Bopanna, J.; V. Ramasubramanian, J.AuthorJustice V. RamasubramanianCitation*\[2020\] 11 SCR 800*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 433, 447, 454, 457, 460, 466 Companies Act 1956*; *Section 434 Companies Act 2013*; *Sections 7 & 239 IBC 2016*; *Rules 5 & 6 Companies (Transfer of Pending Proceedings) Rules 2016*; *Rule 26 Companies (Court) Rules 1959*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsCorporate Law, Insolvency Law, Company Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The decision arises from systemic uncertainty during the legislative shift from court-driven winding-up proceedings to the creditor-centric insolvency resolution mechanism under the *IBC, 2016*. High Courts across India faced competing claims of jurisdiction when insolvency petitions were filed before the NCLT while winding-up proceedings were pending. The legislative intent behind *Section 434 of the Companies Act, 2013* was to ensure a smooth transition while preventing forum shopping and duplication. The present case highlights this tension. The winding-up petition against the corporate debtor had culminated in an order of winding up and appointment of an Official Liquidator. Subsequently, a financial creditor initiated proceedings under *Section 7 of the IBC*. The refusal of the High Court to transfer the winding-up proceedings rested solely on compliance with *Rule 24* advertisement and the existence of a winding-up order. The Supreme Court was required to examine the scope of the fifth proviso to *Section 434(1)(c)* and determine whether creditors other than the original petitioning creditor could invoke it. The judgment also revisits the nature of winding-up proceedings as collective actions affecting all creditors. This background sets the foundation for harmonising company liquidation jurisprudence with insolvency resolution objectives under the IBC. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE A company petition under *Section 433 of the Companies Act, 1956* was filed in 2015 by *M/s Girdhar Trading Co.* seeking winding up of the corporate debtor on the ground of inability to pay debts. Notice was ordered, but the company failed to appear. Consequently, the petition was admitted and advertised in accordance with *Rule 24 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959*. On *10 March 2016*, the High Court ordered winding up and appointed the Official Liquidator, directing takeover of assets and publication under *Rule 113*. Subsequently, the corporate debtor sought recall of the winding-up order after paying the entire admitted dues of the petitioning creditor. While the petitioning creditor raised no objection, the Official Liquidator opposed recall citing outstanding liabilities of approximately *Rs. 27 crores* owed to other creditors. The High Court kept the winding-up order in abeyance but directed the Official Liquidator to retain custody of assets. During this period, the appellant, claiming to be a financial creditor owed *Rs. 32 lakhs*, filed an application under *Section 7 of the IBC* before the NCLT, Allahabad. Thereafter, the appellant sought transfer of the winding-up proceedings from the High Court to the NCLT under *Section 434*. The High Court rejected the application on *24 February 2020*, stating that the winding-up proceedings had progressed beyond the stage contemplated for transfer. This rejection gave rise to the present appeal before the Supreme Court. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether a winding-up proceeding pending before a High Court can be transferred to the NCLT after service and advertisement of the petition? ii. Whether a financial creditor, who was not the original petitioning creditor, qualifies as a “party” entitled to seek transfer under the fifth proviso to *Section 434(1)(c)*? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that *Section 434(1)(c)*, as amended, confers an independent statutory right upon any party to seek transfer of winding-up proceedings. It was argued that winding-up proceedings are collective in nature and affect all creditors equally. The appellant relied on the object of the IBC to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and contended that continuation of winding-up proceedings alongside *Section 7 IBC* proceedings would frustrate insolvency resolution. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents contended that transfer is barred once notice under *Rule 26* is served and winding-up proceedings reach an advanced stage. The Official Liquidator argued that transfer would prejudice other creditors and disrupt liquidation already initiated under the Companies Act framework. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 434(1)(c), Companies Act, 2013* ii. *Rules 5 & 6, Companies (Transfer of Pending Proceedings) Rules, 2016* iii. *Rule 26, Companies (Court) Rules, 1959* iv. *Section 7, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court’s order. The Court held that *Rules 5 and 6* govern automatic statutory transfers but do not restrict transfers sought under the fifth proviso to *Section 434(1)(c)*. The Court reasoned that winding-up proceedings are *proceedings in rem* wherein all creditors are deemed parties. The Court relied on statutory indicators such as *Sections 447, 454, 457, 460 and 466 of the Companies Act, 1956* to demonstrate that creditors possess participatory rights throughout liquidation. The Official Liquidator acts on behalf of the entire body of creditors. Therefore, restricting the term “party” to only the original petitioner would defeat legislative intent. The Court further observed that allowing parallel proceedings before the High Court and the NCLT would undermine the IBC’s objective of time-bound resolution. Consequently, the winding-up proceedings were directed to be transferred to the NCLT to be heard along with the *Section 7 IBC* application. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio decidendi is that *any creditor of a company under winding up is a “party” entitled to seek transfer of proceedings under the fifth proviso to Section 434(1)(c), irrespective of the stage of service under Rule 26*. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that legislative ambiguity during transitional phases must be resolved in favour of the dominant economic legislation, namely the IBC, to prevent jurisdictional conflicts. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Parallel insolvency and winding-up proceedings must be avoided. ii. Creditors have locus to seek transfer under Section 434(1)(c). iii. Rules 5 and 6 do not curtail the fifth proviso. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Forech India Ltd. v. Edelweiss Assets Reconstruction Co. Ltd.*, *\[2019\] 2 SCR 477* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Companies Act, 1956* ii. *Companies Act, 2013* iii. *Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Law](https://lawfoyer.in/intellectual-property-rights-and-competition-law/) **Published:** December 13, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and Competition Law are both necessary for innovation and economic growth. IPRs create exclusive rights while Competition Law seeks to correct market failures caused by monopolies and restrictive practices. Tension arises when IPRs are used to restrict competition beyond the intended scope. **Content:** **Author:** Vidhi Jangid, University Five Year Law College, University of Rajasthan ## INTERFACE BETWEEN IP AND COMPETITION LAW **Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs)** and **Competition Law** are both necessary for **innovation** and **economic growth**. **IPRs create exclusive rights** while **Competition Law seeks to correct market failures** caused by **monopolies** and **restrictive practices**. Tension arises when **IPRs** are used to **restrict competition beyond the intended scope**. **Competition law** recognizes **IPRs as valid exceptions** to its application within reasonable limits **\[s.3(5)\]**. **Unreasonable conditions** not necessary for protecting **IPRs** can attract **competition enforcement**. **Competition concerns in IPR markets:** - **Licensing arrangements** imposing vertical restrictions like **tie-in**, **exclusivity**, etc. - **Refusal to license IPRs**, especially those essential for implementing standards - **Patent pools**, cross-licensing with horizontal competitors - **Mergers** between companies with significant IPR portfolios - **Settlement agreements** between originator and generic drug companies (“**pay for delay**“) ## LICENSING AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER **IPR licensing** is generally **pro-competitive** as it enables wider use of the invention. Licensing restrictions beyond the scope of the **IPR** or not necessary for its protection can raise **competition issues**. **Potentially anti-competitive licensing restrictions:** - **Price restrictions** on licensee - **Output restrictions** on licensee - **Allocation of markets/customers** between licensor and licensee - **Tie-in of non-essential products/technologies** with the license - **No-challenge clause** preventing licensee from challenging the validity of the IPR - **Exclusive grant back** of improvements made by the licensee to the licensor - **Refusal to license** the IPR to competitors or only on discriminatory terms **Rule of reason analysis** weighs **pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects**, unless the restriction is egregious like **price fixing** or **market allocation**. ## **STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS (SEPs)** **Technology standards** ensure interoperability and compatibility between products of different manufacturers. Standards may incorporate patented technologies which become **Standard Essential Patents (SEPs)**. **Competition concerns arise when SEP holders:** - **Refuse to license** the SEP to competitors (“**hold-up**“) - License the SEP on **Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND)** terms - Seek injunctions against willing licensees on FRAND terms - Discriminate between similarly placed licensees As a result, **standard setting organizations** require members to disclose their **SEPs** and commit to licensing them on **FRAND terms**. **Refusal to license SEPs** can amount to **abuse of dominance** under the **Competition Act**. ## FRAND TERMS **SEP holders** voluntarily commit to license on **FRAND terms** in return for their technology being made the standard. - Ensures **availability of the standard** to all implementers while providing a **fair and reasonable return** to the SEP holder for its innovation. - **FRAND** is a range rather than a specific royalty rate. - Appropriate royalty base is the **smallest saleable patent practicing unit** and not the end product price. - Royalty rates must factor in the possibility of **royalty stacking** with multiple SEPs reading on the same product. - **Non-Discriminatory** means similarly situated licensees must get similar rates and terms. **FRAND commitments** can be enforced under the **Competition Act** as a remedy for **abuse of dominance** by the SEP holder. ***A fortiori***, the **interface between IPRs and Competition Law** requires a **balanced approach**. **IPRs** must be protected to **promote innovation** while **Competition Law** ensures they are not used to stifle competition. **Licensing of IPRs** is generally **pro-competitive**, but restrictions beyond the scope of the **IPR** can raise **competition concerns**. **SEP holders** have a special responsibility to license on **FRAND terms** to ensure access to the technology standard. **Competition authorities** are well-equipped to assess IPR-related practices and ensure a balance between **rewarding innovation** and **promoting competition**. **Categories:** Articles --- ### [Personality Rights as an Emerging Intellectual Property in India](https://lawfoyer.in/personality-rights-as-an-emerging-intellectual-property-in-india/) **Published:** December 20, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** Personality rights in India empower individuals to control the commercial use of their identity, including name, image, likeness, or other distinctive traits. These rights, though not explicitly codified, have been recognized through judicial interpretations, intertwining with the right to privacy under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution... **Content:** **Author:** Vidhi Jangid, University Five Year Law College, University of Rajasthan ## **PERSONALITY RIGHTS IN INDIA** Personality rights in India empower individuals to control the commercial use of their identity, including name, image, likeness, or other distinctive traits. These rights, though not explicitly codified, have been recognized through judicial interpretations, intertwining with the **right to privacy** under **Article 21 of the Indian Constitution**. ## **MEANING, DEFINITION & EXPLANATION** *Personality rights*, often referred to as *publicity rights*, allow individuals to prevent unauthorized exploitation of their persona for commercial gain. This encompasses control over one’s **name**, **likeness**, **voice**, **signature**, and other personal attributes. In India, these rights are seen as an extension of the **right to privacy**, ensuring individuals can protect their identity from misuse. ## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND / EVOLUTION** The evolution of personality rights in India has been gradual, primarily shaped by judicial pronouncements. A significant milestone was the Supreme Court’s decision in ***R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu***, *(1994) 6 SCC 632*, also known as the *“Auto Shankar Case.”* The Court held that the **right to privacy** is implicit under **Article 21**, emphasizing that unauthorized publication of one’s life story without consent violates this right. This case underscored the need to protect personal autonomy against unauthorized exploitation. ## **LEGAL PROVISIONS / PROCEDURE / SPECIFICATIONS / CRITERIA** While India lacks a specific statute dedicated to personality rights, various legal provisions offer indirect protection: - **Constitutional Provisions**: **Article 21** guarantees the *right to life and personal liberty*, which the Supreme Court has interpreted to include the **right to privacy**. In ***Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India***, *(2017) 10 SCC 1*, the Court affirmed that **privacy is a fundamental right** under the Constitution. - **Intellectual Property Laws**: - ***Trademark Law***: The **Trade Marks Act, 1999**, under **Section 2(m)**, includes “names” in the definition of a “mark,” allowing individuals to register their names as trademarks to prevent unauthorized commercial use. - ***Copyright Law***: The **Copyright Act, 1957**, under **Section 57**, grants authors moral rights, including the right to protect their work from distortion or mutilation that would harm their honor or reputation. In ***Amar Nath Sehgal v. Union of India***, *2005 (30) PTC 253 (Del)*, the Delhi High Court upheld the artist’s moral rights, ordering the government to return his mural and awarding damages for its unauthorized removal. ## **CASE LAWS / PRECEDENTS / JUDGMENTS** 1. **Titan Industries Ltd. v. Ramkumar Jewellers**, *(2012) 50 PTC 486 (Del)*: The Delhi High Court recognized the **right of publicity**, stating that unauthorized use of a celebrity’s name or image for commercial purposes amounts to infringement of personality rights. In this case, the Court granted an injunction restraining the defendant from using the plaintiff’s advertisements featuring the celebrities, acknowledging the violation of **personality rights**. 2. **ICC Development (International) Ltd. v. Arvee Enterprises**, *2003 (26) PTC 245 (Del)*: The Delhi High Court held that **personality rights** vest with individuals and not corporations. The Court emphasized that **right of publicity** can be inherited or assigned, but a corporation cannot claim such rights unless specifically assigned to it. 3. **Gautam Gambhir v. D.A.P. & Co. & Anr.**, *2017 SCC OnLine Del 12158*: Cricketer Gautam Gambhir filed a suit against a restaurant using his name without authorization. The Delhi High Court dismissed the suit, noting that the defendant was also named Gautam Gambhir and was not attempting to mislead consumers into believing an association with the cricketer. This case highlights the complexities in enforcing **personality rights**, especially when dealing with common names. ## **DOCTRINES / THEORIES** - **Doctrine of Passing Off**: This common law tort is used to enforce unregistered trademark rights, including **personality rights**. It prevents one party from misrepresenting their goods or services as those of another, thereby protecting the goodwill associated with an individual’s persona. In the context of **personality rights**, passing off can be invoked when an individual’s identity is used without authorization, leading to potential confusion or deception among the public. **MAXIMS / PRINCIPLES** - **“Ubi jus ibi remedium”**: This legal maxim means “where there is a right, there is a remedy.” It underscores the principle that the law provides a remedy for every violation of a right, including **personality rights**. In the context of unauthorized use of one’s persona, individuals can seek legal recourse to enforce their rights and obtain appropriate remedies. ## **INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS** - **Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)**: **Article 12** of the UDHR states that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with their privacy, family, home, or correspondence, nor to attacks upon their honor and reputation. This aligns with the protection of **personality rights**, emphasizing the importance of safeguarding individual identity and dignity. - **International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)**: **Article 17** of the ICCPR mirrors the provisions of Article 12 of the UDHR, reinforcing the international recognition of the **right to privacy** and protection against unlawful attacks on honor and reputation. India, as a signatory to these international instruments, is obligated to uphold these rights, which encompass aspects of **personality rights**. ## **FUTURE IMPLICATIONS** As digital media continues to expand, the unauthorized exploitation of personal identities is likely to increase. The absence of specific legislation on **personality rights** in India may lead to ambiguity in addressing such violations. The evolution of these rights in the Indian context will require further judicial interpretations or dedicated statutory provisions to ensure individuals can adequately protect their identities in an era of rapid technological advancements. **Categories:** Articles --- ### [RGNUL–SAM LEGISLATION DRAFTING COMPETITION, 2026 | Centre for Advanced Studies in Cyber Law and Artificial Intelligence (CASCA), Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law (RGNUL), Punjab | Last Date to Register for the Event - 15th January 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/rgnul-sam-legislation-drafting-competition-2026-centre-for-advanced-studies-in-cyber-law-and-artificial-intelligence-casca-rajiv-gandhi-national-university-of-law-rgnul-punjab-last/) **Published:** December 24, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** RGNUL–SAM LEGISLATION DRAFTING COMPETITION, 2026 | Centre for Advanced Studies in Cyber Law and Artificial Intelligence (CASCA), Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law (RGNUL), Punjab | Last Date to Register for the Event - 15th January 2026 **Content:** ## **ABOUT THE UNIVERSITY** Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab (RGNUL) is an autonomous National Law University established under the RGNUL Act, 2006. It is one of India’s leading law universities and has been accredited with an ‘A’ Grade by NAAC. The university is consistently ranked among the top law schools in India under the National Institutional Ranking Framework (NIRF). The Centre for Advanced Studies in Cyber Law and Artificial Intelligence (CASCA) is a dedicated research and policy centre at RGNUL, working at the intersection of law and technology. CASCA focuses on fostering dialogue, research, and policy development in areas such as digital governance, emerging technologies, and cyber law. Shardul Amarchand Mangaldas & Co. (SAM & Co.) is one of India’s leading full-service law firms, globally recognised for its work across corporate law, mergers & acquisitions, dispute resolution, regulatory law, and policy advisory. The firm has played a significant role in shaping key policy and regulatory developments in India. ## **DETAILS ABOUT THE EVENT** The RGNUL–SAM Legislation Drafting Competition, 2026 is a two-round national-level competition centred on the **Proposed Digital India Bill**. The competition aims to promote meaningful academic dialogue and practical legislative drafting skills on contemporary digital governance issues such as intermediary regulation, cybercrimes, artificial intelligence, non-personal data, online safety, and Internet of Things (IoT) regulation. - **Round I (Drafting Round):** Participants are required to submit a draft legislative chapter of the Proposed Digital India Bill along with an explanatory addendum. Submissions will undergo preliminary review by CASCA, after which shortlisted entries will be evaluated by experts from SAM. - **Round II (Presentation Round):** Teams shortlisted from Round I will be invited to the RGNUL campus to present their draft legislation before a distinguished panel of legal luminaries and partners from SAM. Top two teams will receive an opportunity to intern with Shardul Amarchand Mangaldas & Co. ## **WHO IS IT FOR / ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE** - Open to **undergraduate law students** enrolled in a recognised college or university. - Students from any year of the undergraduate law programme are eligible. - Participation can be **individual or in teams of up to two members**. - Interdisciplinary co-authorship is permitted. ## **MODE OF THE EVENT** - **Round I:** Online (Submission-based) - **Round II:** Offline (Presentation at RGNUL campus) ## **LOCATION & VENUE OF THE EVENT** - **Round II Venue:** Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law (RGNUL), Punjab, India ## **REGISTRATION / SUBMISSION LINKS & PROCEDURE** - Registration must be completed via the official **Google Form**, along with uploading proof of payment. - Submissions must follow the prescribed format and be uploaded within the stipulated deadline. - Payment receipt must be attached during registration. ## **FEE DETAILS** - **Registration Fee:** INR 590 per team ## **PRIZES** - **Top 2 Teams:** - 3-month apprenticeship/internship with **Shardul Amarchand Mangaldas & Co. – Policy Team** - Certificate of Merit - **Top 5 Teams:** - Certificate of Participation - Top 3 entries will be published on CASCA’s official website. ## **DEADLINES / IMPORTANT DATES** - **Brochure Release:** 18th December 2025 - **Deadline for Registration:** 15th January 2026 - **Deadline for Submission:** 5th February 2026 (11:59 PM) - **Declaration of Results (Round I):** 15th February 2026 - **Final Presentation & Declaration of Results (Round II):** 5th March 2026 ## **CONTACT INFORMATION** - **Student Convenors:** - Aditya Jain: +91 81303 87590 - Tanmay Burani: +91 93118 97556 - **Email:** ## **OFFICIAL LINK OF THE EVENT / BROCHURE** - Official brochure and detailed rules are available through the competition document released by CASCA, RGNUL. **Categories:** Events, Other Competitions --- ### [Rusoday Securities Ltd. v. National Stock Exchange of India Ltd. & Ors., [2020] 13 S.C.R. 218](https://lawfoyer.in/rusoday-securities-ltd-v-national-stock-exchange-of-india-ltd-ors-2020-13-s-c-r-218/) **Published:** December 24, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the scope of regulatory powers of a recognised stock exchange and its clearing corporation under the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, particularly in relation to the issuance and enforceability of operational circulars governing trading exposure limits, capital adequacy, withdrawal of trading facilities, closing out of open positions, expulsion of members, and realisation of security deposits and withheld securities. The Supreme Court addressed whether a circular dated 19.05.1997, prescribing gross exposure limits and consequences of breach, required prior approval of the Central Government or SEBI, and whether such circular was ultra vires the Byelaws of the National Stock Exchange. The Court upheld the validity and binding nature of the circular, holding that operational parameters fall within the autonomous regulatory domain of the Exchange under its approved Byelaws and do not require separate governmental approval. It further clarified the distinction between withdrawal of trading facility and expulsion from membership, holding that obligations relating to capital adequacy and security deposits continue even during suspension of trading rights. The judgment also draws a clear legal line between security deposits and withheld securities, elaborating on statutory lien, vesting, declaration of defaulter, and the applicability of equitable principles such as nemo dat quod non habet, fiduciary duties, and constructive trust. The decision provides authoritative clarity on the enforceability of exchange circulars, the scope of residuary powers under exchange byelaws, and the legal framework governing realisation of assets of defaulting trading members, thereby strengthening market discipline and regulatory certainty. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the scope of regulatory powers of a recognised stock exchange and its clearing corporation under the *Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956*, particularly in relation to the issuance and enforceability of operational circulars governing trading exposure limits, capital adequacy, withdrawal of trading facilities, closing out of open positions, expulsion of members, and realisation of security deposits and withheld securities. The Supreme Court addressed whether a circular dated *19.05.1997*, prescribing gross exposure limits and consequences of breach, required prior approval of the Central Government or SEBI, and whether such circular was ultra vires the Byelaws of the National Stock Exchange. The Court upheld the validity and binding nature of the circular, holding that operational parameters fall within the autonomous regulatory domain of the Exchange under its approved Byelaws and do not require separate governmental approval. It further clarified the distinction between *withdrawal of trading facility* and *expulsion from membership*, holding that obligations relating to capital adequacy and security deposits continue even during suspension of trading rights. The judgment also draws a clear legal line between *security deposits* and *withheld securities*, elaborating on statutory lien, vesting, declaration of defaulter, and the applicability of equitable principles such as *nemo dat quod non habet*, fiduciary duties, and constructive trust. The decision provides authoritative clarity on the enforceability of exchange circulars, the scope of residuary powers under exchange byelaws, and the legal framework governing realisation of assets of defaulting trading members, thereby strengthening market discipline and regulatory certainty. **Keywords:** Stock Exchange Regulation; Operational Circulars; Capital Adequacy; Closing Out; Expulsion of Members; Statutory Lien; Withheld Securities; Fiduciary Duty ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*Rusoday Securities Ltd. v. National Stock Exchange of India Ltd. & Ors.*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 2690 of 2009 with Civil Appeal No. 9571 of 2019iii) Judgement Date20 November 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumHon’ble Mr. Justice A.M. Khanwilkar and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dinesh Maheshwarivi) AuthorA.M. Khanwilkar, J.vii) Citation\[2020\] 13 S.C.R. 218viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 3(2), 9 and 22F of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956*; *SEBI Act, 1992*; *NSE Byelaws, 1994*; *NSCCL Byelaws and Regulations*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsSecurities Law; Regulatory Law; Administrative Law; Equity and Trusts ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The judgment arises from a prolonged regulatory and contractual dispute between a trading member and the National Stock Exchange of India Limited concerning regulatory discipline, capital adequacy norms, and the enforceability of exchange-issued circulars. The appellant, a registered trading and clearing member, challenged regulatory actions taken by the Exchange and its clearing corporation following alleged violations of prescribed exposure limits during trading operations in October 1997. The background of the dispute is rooted in the statutory architecture of the *Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956*, which recognises stock exchanges as self-regulatory organisations subject to overarching governmental and SEBI supervision. The NSE Byelaws and NSCCL Regulations, approved by the competent authority, establish a comprehensive framework for admission, regulation, suspension, and expulsion of trading members, as well as for settlement, clearing, and risk management. Central to the controversy was the *Circular dated 19.05.1997*, which prescribed gross exposure limits based on base capital and stipulated consequences for breach, including withdrawal of trading facilities and closing out of positions. The appellant questioned the legality of this circular, asserting that it lacked statutory approval and conflicted with existing byelaws. Additionally, disputes arose regarding continued liability for security deposits during suspension, expulsion from membership, and the handling of withheld securities and corporate benefits. The case thus presented the Supreme Court with the task of balancing regulatory autonomy of stock exchanges with principles of legality, fairness, equity, and statutory interpretation within the securities market framework. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellant was registered as a trading member of the NSE in November 1994 after furnishing an undertaking to comply with all applicable *Byelaws, Rules, Regulations, circulars, and instructions*. It maintained various deposits including *Interest Free Security Deposit*, bank guarantees, and margin money constituting its base capital. In 1996, following the transfer of clearing and settlement functions to NSCCL, the appellant executed a further undertaking binding itself to the regulations of the clearing corporation. On *19.05.1997*, the Exchange circulated a circular prescribing *gross exposure limits*, permitting trading up to a multiple of base capital and stipulating consequences of breach. On *13.10.1997*, the appellant exceeded the prescribed limits by more than 10%. Consequently, its trading facility was withdrawn, and it was directed to deposit additional margins and amounts to regularise its position. Upon failure to comply, NSCCL closed out all open positions on *14.10.1997*. Subsequently, the appellant initiated multiple civil and criminal proceedings. Despite withdrawal of trading facilities, the Exchange periodically appropriated membership charges from security deposits and demanded replenishment of shortfalls. The appellant refused, contending that suspension absolved it of such obligations. After hearings, the Exchange suspended its membership in February 2005 and ultimately expelled it on *05.01.2006* for failure to maintain capital adequacy and deposits. The appellant further contested the withholding and non-realisation of securities, claiming loss of corporate benefits and alleging breach of fiduciary duties. The Securities Appellate Tribunal upheld the Exchange’s actions, leading to the present appeals before the Supreme Court. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the *Circular dated 19.05.1997* required prior approval of the Central Government or SEBI to be legally enforceable? ii. Whether the said circular was ultra vires or inconsistent with Clauses 17 and 18 of the NSE Byelaws? iii. Whether withdrawal of trading facilities extinguished the appellant’s obligation to maintain capital adequacy and security deposits? iv. Whether the Exchange had authority to close out positions forthwith upon breach of exposure limits? v. Whether withheld securities could be realised without declaration of defaulter or expulsion? vi. Whether the Exchange owed fiduciary duties regarding registration and corporate benefits of withheld securities? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the circular prescribing exposure limits lacked statutory approval and was therefore invalid. It was argued that Clauses 17 and 18 of the Byelaws permitted closing out only upon failure to settle by due date, not for breach of exposure norms. The appellant contended that once trading facilities were withdrawn, there was no obligation to replenish deposits or pay membership charges. It was further argued that the Exchange unlawfully withheld securities without declaring the appellant a defaulter and failed to realise or register them, causing loss of dividends and corporate benefits. The appellant invoked equitable principles, asserting that the Exchange acted as a constructive trustee and breached fiduciary duties by inaction. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents contended that the circular constituted operational parameters well within the Exchange’s regulatory competence under approved Byelaws. No prior approval was required. The respondents argued that Clause 18 provided residuary powers enabling closing out in situations not covered by Clause 17. It was submitted that withdrawal of trading facilities was a preventive measure distinct from expulsion and did not terminate membership obligations. Regarding securities, the respondents maintained that statutory lien permitted realisation of deposits, while withheld securities required vesting upon expulsion. The respondents denied any breach of fiduciary duty and justified delayed realisation due to ongoing litigation. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 3(2), Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956* ii. *Section 9, Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956* iii. *NSE Byelaws, 1994 – Clauses 10, 17, 18; Chapters IX and XII* iv. *NSCCL Byelaws – Chapter VI* v. *NSCCL Regulations – Chapters 9 and 10* vi. *SEBI Act, 1992* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the circular, holding that *operational parameters* such as exposure limits fall within the regulatory autonomy of the Exchange under its Byelaws. The Court emphasised that the parent Act requires prior approval only for Rules and Byelaws, not for operational circulars. Once Byelaws are approved, actions taken pursuant thereto acquire enforceable character. The Court harmoniously interpreted Clauses 17 and 18, holding Clause 18 to be residuary and enabling closing out in emergent situations such as reckless over-exposure. The circular did not conflict with the Byelaws but furthered their objectives. The Court distinguished between *withdrawal of trading facility* and *expulsion*, holding that membership obligations continue unless formally terminated. On securities, it drew a doctrinal distinction between *security deposits*, subject to statutory lien, and *withheld securities*, which require vesting upon expulsion. Equitable doctrines were held inapplicable to override express regulatory discretion. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** Operational circulars issued under approved Byelaws, prescribing exposure limits and sanctions, are valid and binding without separate statutory approval. Withdrawal of trading facilities does not extinguish membership obligations. Closing out of positions under residuary byelaw powers is permissible to protect market integrity. Realisation of withheld securities requires vesting upon expulsion or declaration of defaulter, while security deposits are subject to statutory lien. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that equity does not operate in absolutes and fiduciary duties in regulatory relationships are context-specific. The Exchange’s discretion in dealing with withheld securities cannot be judicially converted into a mandatory obligation of immediate registration or sale. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Exchanges may prescribe operational parameters through circulars under approved Byelaws. ii. Breach of exposure limits may justify immediate preventive action. iii. Distinction must be maintained between suspension of trading and expulsion of membership. iv. Withheld securities require vesting before realisation. v. Regulatory discretion must be exercised prudently, balancing market stability and member interests. ## J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment consolidates the principle of regulatory autonomy of stock exchanges within the statutory framework of Indian securities law. It reinforces the enforceability of operational circulars and clarifies the legal consequences of trading misconduct. By distinguishing deposits from withheld securities and suspension from expulsion, the Court provides much-needed doctrinal clarity. The ruling strengthens market discipline while safeguarding procedural fairness, marking a significant contribution to Indian securities jurisprudence. ## K) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Unity Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Diamond Sugar Mills*, AIR 1971 Cal 18 ii. *Robert L. Hodgkinson v. David L. Simms*, \[1994\] 3 SCR 377 iii. *Frame v. Smith*, \[1987\] 2 SCR 99 **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956* ii. *Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Venkatesan Balasubramaniyan v. The Intelligence Officer, D.R.I. Bangalore, [2020] 9 SCR 942](https://lawfoyer.in/venkatesan-balasubramaniyan-v-the-intelligence-officer-d-r-i-bangalore-2020-9-scr-942/) **Published:** December 24, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the interplay between default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and cancellation of such bail under Section 439(2) CrPC in the context of offences under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The case arose from a coordinated investigation by different zonal units of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence involving recovery of commercial quantity of psychotropic substances at different locations but forming part of a single transaction. The accused were granted default bail by the Special Court at Hyderabad on the ground that the complaint was not filed within 180 days. However, it later emerged that a combined complaint encompassing both recoveries had already been filed within the statutory period before the Special Court at Omerga, Maharashtra. The Supreme Court addressed whether miscommunication or non-disclosure of the filing of a combined complaint could confer an indefeasible right to default bail. The Court reaffirmed that default bail is not an absolute right divorced from factual reality and statutory compliance. Where the complaint is filed within the prescribed period before a competent court having jurisdiction, default bail granted due to an erroneous assumption can be cancelled under Section 439(2) CrPC. The judgment reinforces the principle that procedural lapses or administrative miscommunication cannot defeat substantive justice in serious NDPS offences. It also clarifies jurisdictional competence, continuity of offence, and the legal permissibility of filing a consolidated complaint covering multiple recoveries forming part of the same conspiracy. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the interplay between *default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* and *cancellation of such bail under Section 439(2) CrPC* in the context of offences under the *Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985*. The case arose from a coordinated investigation by different zonal units of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence involving recovery of *commercial quantity of psychotropic substances* at different locations but forming part of a *single transaction*. The accused were granted default bail by the Special Court at Hyderabad on the ground that the complaint was not filed within 180 days. However, it later emerged that a *combined complaint* encompassing both recoveries had already been filed within the statutory period before the Special Court at Omerga, Maharashtra. The Supreme Court addressed whether miscommunication or non-disclosure of the filing of a combined complaint could confer an indefeasible right to default bail. The Court reaffirmed that default bail is not an absolute right divorced from factual reality and statutory compliance. Where the complaint is filed within the prescribed period before a competent court having jurisdiction, default bail granted due to an erroneous assumption can be cancelled under Section 439(2) CrPC. The judgment reinforces the principle that procedural lapses or administrative miscommunication cannot defeat substantive justice in serious NDPS offences. It also clarifies jurisdictional competence, continuity of offence, and the legal permissibility of filing a consolidated complaint covering multiple recoveries forming part of the same conspiracy. **Keywords:** Default Bail, Section 167(2) CrPC, NDPS Act, Cancellation of Bail, Combined Complaint, Section 439(2) CrPC ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Venkatesan Balasubramaniyan v. The Intelligence Officer, D.R.I. Bangalore*Case NumberCriminal Appeal No. 801 of 2020 (with Criminal Appeal Nos. 802 & 803 of 2020)Judgement Date20 November 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumAshok Bhushan J., R. Subhash Reddy J., M.R. Shah J.AuthorJustice Ashok BhushanCitation*\[2020\] 9 SCR 942*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 167(2), 439(2) CrPC; Sections 8(c), 21(c), 22(c), 23(c), 28, 29, 36A NDPS Act*Judgments OverruledNilRelated Law SubjectsCriminal Law, NDPS Law, Procedural Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The decision arises from a complex factual matrix involving *inter-State transportation of psychotropic substances* and coordinated enforcement action under the NDPS Act. The NDPS Act prescribes stringent procedural safeguards and extended timelines for investigation, recognising the gravity of offences involving commercial quantities. Section 36A of the Act modifies the general provisions of the CrPC by extending the period for filing a complaint to *180 days*, subject to compliance. The background of the case reflects the operational realities of specialised agencies like the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, where different zonal units may investigate different facets of the same criminal conspiracy. The issue before the Court was not merely procedural but touched the core of *administration of criminal justice*, balancing individual liberty against societal interest in controlling narcotic offences. The grant of default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC is often described as an indefeasible right. However, the judgment situates this right within the broader statutory framework and clarifies that such right arises only when the investigating agency has actually failed to comply with the prescribed timeline. The case also revisits the jurisprudence on *cancellation of bail*, especially when bail is granted on an erroneous premise. By relying on *Pandit Dnyanu Khot v. State of Maharashtra*, the Court reaffirmed that bail granted under Section 167(2) CrPC can be cancelled when it is found to be illegal or perverse. The background thus sets the stage for reconciling procedural rights with substantive statutory compliance under NDPS law. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE On *11 January 2018*, officers of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Hyderabad intercepted a car at Kamkole Toll Plaza, Telangana. The appellants were travelling in the vehicle. Upon search, concealed cavities were discovered in the boot, from which *45.874 kilograms of Methaqualone*, a psychotropic substance of commercial quantity, was recovered. The appellants disclosed that the substance had been loaded at *Omerga, Maharashtra* and was being transported to Chennai. The appellants were arrested on *12 January 2018* under *Section 42 of the NDPS Act* and were remanded to judicial custody by the Special Court at Hyderabad. During the same period, another operation conducted by DRI Bangalore led to recovery of additional narcotic substances from a factory premises at Omerga, Maharashtra. Both recoveries were found to be interconnected and part of a single chain of events. The appellants continued in custody as the investigation progressed. As the 180-day statutory period approached its end, the appellants moved an application for default bail before the Special Court at Hyderabad. On *12 July 2018*, the Court granted bail under *Section 167(2) CrPC*, proceeding on the assumption that no complaint had been filed within the stipulated time. However, unbeknownst to the Hyderabad Court, a *combined complaint dated 06 July 2018* had already been filed by DRI Bangalore before the Special Court at Omerga under *Section 36A(1)(d) of the NDPS Act*. The complaint specifically named the appellants as accused and detailed the Hyderabad seizure as part of the same transaction. Subsequently, upon discovering this fact, DRI Bangalore moved the High Court under *Section 439(2) CrPC* seeking cancellation of bail. The High Court allowed the application, leading to the present appeals before the Supreme Court. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether *default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC* can be claimed when a *combined complaint* has been filed within 180 days before a competent court? ii. Whether bail granted due to *non-disclosure or miscommunication* can be cancelled under *Section 439(2) CrPC*? iii. Whether two recoveries at different locations constitute *distinct offences* or a *single continuing transaction*? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that the Special Court at Hyderabad was justified in granting default bail as no complaint was filed before it within 180 days. It was argued that the Hyderabad seizure and the Omerga factory recovery were distinct offences investigated by different DRI units. It was contended that the appellants had no role in the manufacturing process at Omerga and were merely transporters. The failure of the prosecution to inform the Hyderabad Court about the filing of a complaint elsewhere was argued to be fatal, giving rise to an indefeasible right to bail. The appellants further argued that cancellation proceedings ought to have been initiated before the same court which granted bail, and not directly before the High Court. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent submitted that the entire operation constituted a *single conspiracy* involving manufacture and transportation of narcotic substances. The combined complaint filed on *06 July 2018* comprehensively covered both recoveries and specifically arraigned the appellants. It was argued that the appellants were accused Nos. 5, 6 and 7 in the combined complaint and that the statutory requirement under *Section 36A NDPS Act* had been fully complied with. The grant of default bail was termed *erroneous* and liable to be cancelled under *Section 439(2) CrPC*. Reliance was placed on *Pandit Dnyanu Khot v. State of Maharashtra (2008) 17 SCC 745* to submit that illegal bail orders can be set aside. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the cancellation of bail. The Court found that the combined complaint filed before the Special Court at Omerga was within the statutory period and validly invoked jurisdiction. The failure to bring this fact to the notice of the Hyderabad Court was held to be a *procedural lapse* that could not confer an unjust advantage on the accused. The Court observed that the complaint clearly established continuity of the offence from Omerga to Hyderabad. The appellants’ own statements under *Section 67 NDPS Act* corroborated the prosecution case. The Court emphasised that default bail is not an abstract right but arises only when statutory conditions are actually breached. The High Court’s exercise of power under *Section 439(2) CrPC* was upheld as legally sound. However, liberty was reserved to the appellants to apply for regular bail on merits. **a. RATIO DECIDENDI** The filing of a *combined complaint within 180 days before a competent court* defeats any claim to default bail under *Section 167(2) CrPC*, even if the court granting bail was unaware of such filing due to miscommunication. **b. OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that accused persons are not precluded from seeking regular bail under *Section 439 CrPC*, and such applications must be considered independently on merits. **c. GUIDELINES** i. Default bail under NDPS cases must be tested against *actual statutory compliance*. ii. Bail granted on erroneous assumptions is cancellable under *Section 439(2) CrPC*. iii. Courts must examine the *substance of the transaction* rather than fragmented territorial investigations. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment provides crucial clarity on the scope of default bail in NDPS offences involving multi-jurisdictional investigations. It reinforces that procedural technicalities cannot override statutory compliance and public interest in prosecuting serious narcotic crimes. The ruling strengthens prosecutorial coordination while preserving judicial discretion in bail matters. ## J) REFERENCES **a. Important Cases Referred** i. *Pandit Dnyanu Khot v. State of Maharashtra*, *(2008) 17 SCC 745* **b. Important Statutes Referred** i. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* ii. *Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Chief Executive Officer and Vice Chairman, Gujarat Maritime Board v. Asiatic Steel Industries Ltd. & Ors., [2020] 10 SCR 375](https://lawfoyer.in/chief-executive-officer-and-vice-chairman-gujarat-maritime-board-v-asiatic-steel-industries-ltd-ors-2020-10-scr-375/) **Published:** December 24, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the obligation of a statutory maritime authority to act fairly while refunding contractual consideration and interest where a public contract becomes commercially unviable due to the authority’s inaction. The dispute arose from the allotment of a ship-breaking plot by the Gujarat Maritime Board, where despite receipt of earnest money and substantial premium, the allotted land remained unusable owing to unremoved rocks and lack of infrastructure. The respondent company sought refund with interest after prolonged correspondence and inaction by the Board. The Supreme Court scrutinised whether interest could be awarded in the absence of an express contractual clause and without a formal finding of breach. The Court emphasised that interest is compensatory in nature, especially where a public authority retains money without justification. It held that arbitrariness, discrimination, and deliberate inaction by a State instrumentality violate constitutional norms of fairness under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. While affirming the High Court’s direction to refund the principal with interest, the Supreme Court corrected the commencement date for interest calculation, holding that interest could only accrue from the date on which the full consideration was actually paid and not from the earlier date of earnest money deposit. The judgment reinforces that public bodies cannot compel parties to litigate for legitimate refunds and must act proactively, transparently, and equitably. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the obligation of a statutory maritime authority to act fairly while refunding contractual consideration and interest where a public contract becomes commercially unviable due to the authority’s inaction. The dispute arose from the allotment of a ship-breaking plot by the Gujarat Maritime Board, where despite receipt of earnest money and substantial premium, the allotted land remained unusable owing to unremoved rocks and lack of infrastructure. The respondent company sought refund with interest after prolonged correspondence and inaction by the Board. The Supreme Court scrutinised whether interest could be awarded in the absence of an express contractual clause and without a formal finding of breach. The Court emphasised that *interest is compensatory in nature*, especially where a public authority retains money without justification. It held that arbitrariness, discrimination, and deliberate inaction by a State instrumentality violate constitutional norms of fairness under *Article 14 of the Constitution of India*. While affirming the High Court’s direction to refund the principal with interest, the Supreme Court corrected the commencement date for interest calculation, holding that interest could only accrue from the date on which the full consideration was actually paid and not from the earlier date of earnest money deposit. The judgment reinforces that public bodies cannot compel parties to litigate for legitimate refunds and must act proactively, transparently, and equitably. **Keywords:** Public Contract, Refund with Interest, Arbitrary State Action, Gujarat Maritime Board, Compensatory Interest, Article 14 ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*Chief Executive Officer and Vice Chairman, Gujarat Maritime Board v. Asiatic Steel Industries Ltd. & Ors.*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 3807 of 2020iii) Judgement Date24 November 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumIndira Banerjee J. and S. Ravindra Bhat J.vi) AuthorS. Ravindra Bhat J.vii) Citation*\[2020\] 10 SCR 375*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Articles 14 & 226, Constitution of India; Sections 64, 65, 73, 75, Indian Contract Act, 1872*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsConstitutional Law, Contract Law, Administrative Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The dispute arose from a tender issued by *the Gujarat Maritime Board* for allotment of ship-breaking plots at Sosiya, Gujarat. The respondent company emerged as the highest bidder and deposited *earnest money on 08.11.1994* and subsequently remitted the *principal consideration in foreign currency on 22.03.1995*. The plot was allotted for breaking VLCC/ULCC class vessels. Soon after allotment, the respondent and other bidders raised serious concerns regarding the physical unsuitability of the plots due to the presence of rocks obstructing ship beaching and absence of promised infrastructure. Despite repeated representations, board meetings, and assurances, the Board failed to remove the impediments or even respond decisively. While similarly placed allottees approached the High Court and secured refunds with interest, the respondent attempted an amicable resolution and delayed litigation. Eventually, in *May 1998*, the respondent abandoned the contract and sought refund with interest. The Board agreed to refund the principal but *refused interest*, compelling the respondent to initiate proceedings. The High Court allowed the writ petition and directed payment of interest. The Board challenged this before the Supreme Court, primarily disputing the liability to pay interest and the commencement date. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The tender dated *02.08.1994* invited bids for ship-breaking plots. The respondent’s bid was accepted on *08.11.1994* for a consideration of *₹3,61,20,000*. An earnest money deposit of *₹5,00,000* was paid immediately. The balance amount equivalent to *USD 1,153,000* was remitted on *22.03.1995*. Shortly thereafter, through meetings and correspondence, the respondent pointed out that rocks and a rocky island near the plot rendered it commercially unusable. Minutes dated *23.02.1995* record the Board’s acknowledgment and promise to prepare estimates for rock removal. Letters dated *26.04.1996* and *22.05.1996* reiterated the grievance, including an offer by the respondent to remove rocks at the Board’s cost. The Board neither acted nor responded. Other bidders approached the High Court in 1995 and obtained refunds with interest. The respondent, seeking amicable settlement, waited until *19.05.1998* before demanding refund with *10% interest*. The Board offered refund without interest and insisted payment be made to the original allottee entity. A civil suit was filed and later withdrawn. The writ petition resulted in an interim order directing deposit of principal with *10% interest*. Ultimately, the High Court directed interest from *08.11.1994 to 19.05.1998*, which led to the present appeal. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether a public authority can retain contractual consideration without interest despite abandoning the contract? ii. Whether interest is payable absent a contractual clause or proof of breach? iii. From which date should interest on refunded consideration commence? iv. Whether differential treatment of similarly placed allottees violates *Article 14*? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the dispute was purely contractual and could not attract writ jurisdiction. It was argued that *Sections 64 and 65* of the Contract Act apply only to void or voidable contracts, which was not pleaded. It was contended that no breach was established against the Board and hence *Sections 73 and 75* were inapplicable. The respondent had inspected the site and accepted it on an *“as is where is”* basis. Interest, it was argued, could not be awarded as compensation without proof of loss. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent submitted that the Board failed to provide a usable plot despite repeated assurances. The contract never fructified as possession was never effectively handed over. Reliance was placed on *Union of India v. Tata Chemicals Ltd., (2014) 6 SCC 335*, holding that *interest is compensation for wrongful retention of money*. The respondent highlighted discriminatory treatment as other allottees were refunded with interest. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Article 14, Constitution of India* ii. *Article 226, Constitution of India* iii. *Sections 64, 65, 73, 75, Indian Contract Act, 1872* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court held that the Board’s prolonged silence and selective action amounted to arbitrariness. As a *State instrumentality*, the Board was bound to act fairly and could not compel a party to litigate for refund. The Court affirmed that interest is compensatory and payable where money is unjustly retained. However, it corrected the High Court’s error in awarding interest from *08.11.1994*, noting that the principal amount was paid only on *22.03.1995*. Accordingly, interest was directed on *₹3,61,20,000* from *22.03.1995 to 19.05.1998*. The appeal was dismissed with this modification. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio rests on the principle that *retention of money by a public authority without justification attracts compensatory interest*. The Court reiterated that equality before law mandates consistent treatment of similarly placed parties. Reliance was placed on *Dilbagh Rai Jarry v. Union of India, \[1974\] 2 SCR 178* and *Gurgaon Gramin Bank v. Khazani, \[2012\] 8 SCR 225*, underscoring the duty of the State as a “virtuous litigant”. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that State bodies should avoid unnecessary litigation and proactively resolve claims. Deliberate inaction undermines public trust and burdens courts. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Public authorities must decide refund claims proactively. ii. Interest must reflect the actual period of money retention. iii. Discriminatory treatment among similarly placed parties is impermissible. ## J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment strengthens administrative accountability in public contracts. It clarifies that interest is not punitive but restitutive. The correction of the interest commencement date balances equity with factual precision. The ruling reinforces *constitutional fairness* as a controlling standard in contractual dealings by State instrumentalities. ## K) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Union of India v. Tata Chemicals Ltd.*, *(2014) 6 SCC 335* ii. *Dilbagh Rai Jarry v. Union of India*, *\[1974\] 2 SCR 178* iii. *Gurgaon Gramin Bank v. Khazani*, *\[2012\] 8 SCR 225* iv. *State of A.P. v. Pioneer Builders*, *\[2006\] 6 Supp SCR 571* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Constitution of India* ii. *Indian Contract Act, 1872* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Tej Bahadur v. Shri Narendra Modi, [2020] 13 SCR 554](https://lawfoyer.in/tej-bahadur-v-shri-narendra-modi-2020-13-scr-554/) **Published:** December 24, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment addresses the foundational requirement of locus standi in election petitions under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The Supreme Court examined whether a person whose nomination paper was rejected for non-compliance with mandatory statutory requirements could maintain an election petition questioning the election of a returned candidate. The appellant, a former Border Security Force employee dismissed from service, challenged the election of the respondent from the Varanasi Parliamentary Constituency after his nomination was rejected due to non-submission of a mandatory certificate under Section 33(3) read with Section 9(2) of the Act. The Court analysed the statutory meaning of “candidate” under Section 79(b) and the scope of Section 81 governing who may present an election petition. The Court reaffirmed that compliance with nomination requirements is a condition precedent to claiming the status of a candidate. The absence of the certificate rendered the nomination legally non est. The Court further upheld the power of courts to summarily reject election petitions lacking cause of action under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and Section 86(1) of the Act. The judgment reinforces strict statutory interpretation in election law and discourages frivolous or speculative election challenges. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment addresses the foundational requirement of *locus standi* in election petitions under the *Representation of the People Act, 1951*. The Supreme Court examined whether a person whose nomination paper was rejected for non-compliance with mandatory statutory requirements could maintain an election petition questioning the election of a returned candidate. The appellant, a former *Border Security Force* employee dismissed from service, challenged the election of the respondent from the *Varanasi Parliamentary Constituency* after his nomination was rejected due to non-submission of a mandatory certificate under *Section 33(3)* read with *Section 9(2)* of the Act. The Court analysed the statutory meaning of *“candidate”* under *Section 79(b)* and the scope of *Section 81* governing who may present an election petition. The Court reaffirmed that compliance with nomination requirements is a condition precedent to claiming the status of a candidate. The absence of the certificate rendered the nomination legally non est. The Court further upheld the power of courts to summarily reject election petitions lacking cause of action under *Order VII Rule 11 CPC* and *Section 86(1)* of the Act. The judgment reinforces strict statutory interpretation in election law and discourages frivolous or speculative election challenges. **Keywords:** Election Petition, Locus Standi, Duly Nominated Candidate, Rejection of Nomination, Representation of the People Act, 1951 ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Tej Bahadur v. Shri Narendra Modi*Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 2100 of 2020Judgement Date24 November 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorum*S.A. Bobde, CJI; A.S. Bopanna; V. Ramasubramanian, JJ.*Author*S.A. Bobde, CJI*Citation*\[2020\] 13 SCR 554*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 9(2), 33(3), 36(5), 79(b), 81, 83, 86(1), Representation of the People Act, 1951; Order VI Rule 16, Order VII Rule 11 CPC*Judgments OverruledNilRelated Law SubjectsConstitutional Law, Election Law, Civil Procedure ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The judgment arose from a challenge to the dismissal of an election petition by the Allahabad High Court at the threshold stage. The High Court had rejected the petition on the ground that the petitioner lacked statutory standing to maintain the challenge. The dispute emanated from the *17th Lok Sabha elections* held in April–May 2019 for the *Varanasi Parliamentary Constituency*. The appellant sought to invalidate the election of the returned candidate on the premise that his own nomination had been wrongly rejected and that the respondent’s nomination suffered from alleged defects. Election law in India is governed by a rigid statutory framework. The *Representation of the People Act, 1951* prescribes exhaustive conditions determining eligibility, nomination, scrutiny, and challenge mechanisms. The Supreme Court has consistently held that election rights are purely statutory and not common law rights. This case presented the Court with an opportunity to reiterate the consequences of non-compliance with mandatory nomination requirements. The appellant’s service history as a dismissed government servant brought into operation the disqualification regime under *Sections 9(2) and 33(3)* of the Act. The central question revolved around whether a person, whose nomination stood rejected for non-production of a mandatory certificate, could still claim the status of a “candidate” for the purposes of filing an election petition. The Court was also required to examine whether the absence of cause of action justified summary dismissal under procedural law. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellant was formerly employed with the *Border Security Force* and was dismissed from service on *19 April 2017*. The dismissal occurred within five years prior to the 2019 general elections. Under the statutory scheme, a dismissed government servant seeking election is required to produce a certificate from the *Election Commission of India* certifying that the dismissal was not on grounds of corruption or disloyalty to the State. The appellant filed two nomination papers on *24 April 2019* and *29 April 2019* respectively. In the first nomination form, he admitted dismissal from service. In the second form, he contradicted this disclosure. Neither nomination was accompanied by the mandatory certificate under *Section 33(3)*. During scrutiny, the Returning Officer issued notices highlighting the discrepancy and specifically directing the appellant to furnish the requisite certificate by the stipulated time permitted under *Section 36(5)*. The appellant failed to produce the certificate within the prescribed timeframe. Instead, he sought to justify the omission by asserting that his dismissal was not on prohibited grounds. Consequently, on *1 May 2019*, the Returning Officer rejected both nomination papers. Subsequently, the appellant filed an election petition challenging the election of the respondent. The respondent moved an application under *Order VII Rule 11 CPC* read with *Section 86(1)* of the Act seeking dismissal of the petition on the ground of lack of locus standi and absence of cause of action. The High Court allowed the application. The present appeal challenged that dismissal. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether a person whose nomination was rejected for non-compliance with *Section 33(3)* can claim to be a “candidate” under *Section 79(b)* of the Act? ii. Whether such a person has locus standi to file an election petition under *Section 81* of the Act? iii. Whether the absence of a mandatory certificate renders the nomination legally void ab initio? iv. Whether an election petition lacking statutory standing can be summarily rejected under *Order VII Rule 11 CPC*? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the rejection of the nomination was improper and violative of *Section 36(5)* of the Act. It was argued that the Returning Officer failed to grant adequate time to cure the defect. The appellant contended that he was entitled to claim that he was “duly nominated” as he had applied for the certificate and the delay was beyond his control. It was further argued that the expression *“may be allowed time”* in *Section 36(5)* should be interpreted liberally to protect electoral participation. The appellant asserted that the High Court erred in rejecting the petition at the threshold without a full trial. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent submitted that the appellant was neither an elector of the constituency nor a candidate in the eyes of law. It was argued that *Section 33(3)* is mandatory and its non-compliance automatically disqualifies the nomination. The respondent relied upon settled precedent to submit that a person cannot derive legal rights from statutory violation. The discretionary language of *Section 36(5)* was emphasised to argue that time extension is not a matter of right. The absence of cause of action justified summary dismissal. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 9(2), Representation of the People Act, 1951* ii. *Section 33(3), Representation of the People Act, 1951* iii. *Section 79(b), Representation of the People Act, 1951* iv. *Section 81, Representation of the People Act, 1951* v. *Section 86(1), Representation of the People Act, 1951* vi. *Order VII Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the election petition. The Court held that *Section 81* restricts the right to file an election petition exclusively to electors and candidates. Since the appellant was neither an elector of the constituency nor a legally recognised candidate, he lacked standing. The Court interpreted *Section 33(3)* as mandatory. The statutory consequence of non-compliance is explicitly stated and leaves no scope for judicial dilution. The use of the term *“shall not be deemed to be duly nominated”* was held to be determinative and declaratory. The Court rejected the argument based on *Section 36(5)*, holding that discretionary time extension cannot override substantive statutory requirements. The appellant never possessed the certificate at any relevant stage. The Court relied upon *Charan Lal Sahu v. Giani Zail Singh* and related precedents to reiterate that a claim of “duly nominated” must arise from compliance with law, not its breach. The absence of cause of action warranted rejection under *Order VII Rule 11 CPC*. The appeal was dismissed as meritless. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** A person whose nomination paper does not comply with mandatory statutory requirements cannot claim the status of a “candidate” and therefore lacks locus standi to maintain an election petition under *Section 81* of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that permitting non-compliant individuals to challenge elections would undermine electoral discipline and flood courts with speculative litigation. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Mandatory nomination requirements must be strictly complied with. ii. Locus standi under election law is purely statutory. iii. Courts must summarily reject election petitions lacking cause of action. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Charan Lal Sahu v. Giani Zail Singh*, *\[1984\] 2 SCR 6* ii. *Charan Lal Sahu v. Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy*, *\[1978\] 3 SCR 1* iii. *Bolin Chetia v. Jogadish Bhuyan*, *\[2005\] 2 SCR 692* iv. *T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal*, *\[1978\] 1 SCR 742* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Representation of the People Act, 1951* ii. *Code of Civil Procedure, 1908* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [B. K. Ravichandra & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [2020] 12 SCR 974](https://lawfoyer.in/b-k-ravichandra-ors-v-union-of-india-ors-2020-12-scr-974/) **Published:** December 24, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the legality of continued occupation of privately owned immovable property by the Union of India after the statutory lapse of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Properties Act, 1952. The appellants, successors-in-interest of the original landowner, challenged the refusal of the Karnataka High Court to direct restoration of possession despite categorical findings that the lands were never lawfully acquired. The Supreme Court scrutinized the legal character of requisition, emphasizing its inherently temporary nature and the impermissibility of its conversion into de facto acquisition without statutory sanction. The Court reaffirmed that although the right to property no longer enjoys the status of a fundamental right, it remains a valuable constitutional right under Article 300-A, deeply anchored in the rule of law. The judgment condemns executive lawlessness and judicial condonation thereof, holding that continued possession after 1987 was unconstitutional and illegal. It underscores the judiciary’s constitutional role as a protector of liberties and rejects the notion that public purpose or national defense can justify unlawful deprivation. The Court ordered restitution of possession within a fixed timeframe and permitted fresh arbitration for compensation for continued unlawful occupation. The ruling reinforces constitutional accountability of the State and decisively curtails indefinite executive possession without authority of law. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment examines the legality of continued occupation of privately owned immovable property by the Union of India after the statutory lapse of the *Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Properties Act, 1952*. The appellants, successors-in-interest of the original landowner, challenged the refusal of the Karnataka High Court to direct restoration of possession despite categorical findings that the lands were never lawfully acquired. The Supreme Court scrutinized the legal character of requisition, emphasizing its inherently temporary nature and the impermissibility of its conversion into de facto acquisition without statutory sanction. The Court reaffirmed that although the *right to property* no longer enjoys the status of a fundamental right, it remains a *valuable constitutional right* under *Article 300-A*, deeply anchored in the *rule of law*. The judgment condemns executive lawlessness and judicial condonation thereof, holding that continued possession after 1987 was unconstitutional and illegal. It underscores the judiciary’s constitutional role as a protector of liberties and rejects the notion that public purpose or national defense can justify unlawful deprivation. The Court ordered restitution of possession within a fixed timeframe and permitted fresh arbitration for compensation for continued unlawful occupation. The ruling reinforces constitutional accountability of the State and decisively curtails indefinite executive possession without authority of law. **Keywords:** Right to Property, Requisition, Article 300-A, Rule of Law, State Accountability, Unlawful Occupation ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsi) Judgment Cause Title*B. K. Ravichandra & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 1460 of 2010iii) Judgment Date24 November 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumHon’ble Ms. Justice Indira Banerjee and Hon’ble Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhatvi) AuthorJustice S. Ravindra Bhatvii) Citation*\[2020\] 12 SCR 974*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Properties Act, 1952*; *Defence of India Act, 1962*; *Article 300-A of the Constitution of India*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsConstitutional Law; Property Law; Administrative Law ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT** The litigation arose from prolonged State possession of private land initially requisitioned during a national emergency. The *Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Properties Act, 1952* was enacted as a temporary wartime measure enabling the Union to requisition property for public purposes. The Act contemplated deprivation of possession without transfer of title and strictly conditioned such deprivation upon payment of compensation and temporal limitation. The appellants’ predecessor surrendered possession under protest in 1963 pursuant to *Section 30 of the Defence of India Act, 1962*. Subsequent legislative amendments extended requisition periods but retained the temporary character of the regime. Despite repeated arbitrations and judicial findings affirming that substantial portions of the land were never lawfully acquired, the Union continued in possession even after the statutory cessation of requisition powers in 1987. The Karnataka High Court acknowledged the illegality of the Union’s claim but declined restitution citing defense exigencies and surrounding acquisitions. This judicial reluctance crystallized the central constitutional question regarding the limits of State power and the enforceability of property rights post-44th Constitutional Amendment. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether executive necessity could override constitutional legality, and whether judicial inaction could legitimize prolonged unlawful occupation. The case thus implicated foundational doctrines of *rule of law*, *constitutional supremacy*, and *non-arbitrariness*, demanding a decisive constitutional response. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The suit lands comprising Survey Nos. *103/1, 103/2 and 104* situated in Byappanahalli, Bangalore South Taluk, belonged to late *B.M. Krishnamurthy*, predecessor of the appellants. In 1963, during the operation of the *Defence of India Act, 1962*, the lands were requisitioned for defense purposes. Possession was handed over under protest, and compensation was initially fixed in 1964, with delayed approval in 1968. Following the lapse of the *Defence of India Act* in 1968, *Section 25* of the *Requisitioning Act* created a deeming fiction continuing requisition. Multiple amendments extended the permissible duration, culminating in a statutory outer limit of 17 years. Arbitration proceedings ensued repeatedly between 1972 and 2000 to determine compensation and extent of land lawfully acquired. In successive arbitral awards and High Court judgments, it was consistently held that *Survey Nos. 103/1 and 103/2 were never validly acquired*, while only a portion of Survey No. 104 stood acquired. Despite these findings attaining finality, and despite the statutory lapse of requisition authority in 1987, the Union refused to restore possession. The appellants instituted writ proceedings seeking restitution. The Karnataka High Court accepted that continued possession lacked legal basis but declined to direct restoration, granting the Union indefinite time to acquire the land. This refusal prompted the present appeal. The Union defended its possession by invoking public purpose, historical acquisition claims, and strategic necessity. These contentions had been previously rejected factually and legally. The continued occupation thus rested solely on executive assertion devoid of statutory authority. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether continued possession of requisitioned land after statutory lapse constitutes unlawful deprivation of property? ii. Whether requisition can legally continue indefinitely without acquisition? iii. Whether judicial refusal to order restitution validates executive lawlessness? iv. Whether *Article 300-A* protects against prolonged State occupation without authority of law? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellants submitted that once requisition powers ceased in *1987*, continued possession became unconstitutional. It was argued that repeated arbitral and judicial determinations conclusively negated acquisition claims. Reliance was placed on *Vidya Devi v. State of H.P.* and *State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar* to assert that deprivation without law violates *Article 300-A*. The appellants contended that compensation fixation till 2000 could not legitimize possession thereafter and that escalating land value aggravated the illegality. The refusal of restitution despite admitted illegality was characterized as judicial abdication. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the Union submitted that writ jurisdiction was inappropriate and that factual disputes subsisted regarding acquisition. It was argued that requisition orders were never challenged contemporaneously. Defense necessity and integration with surrounding acquired lands were invoked to justify retention. The Union asserted implied authority arising from long possession and public purpose. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. *Section 3, 6, 7 and 8 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Properties Act, 1952* ii. *Section 30 of the Defence of India Act, 1962* iii. *Article 300-A of the Constitution of India* ## **I) JUDGMENT** The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and held that requisition is inherently temporary. The Court ruled that State occupation ceased to be lawful with the lapse of the Act in 1987. Continued possession thereafter lacked authority of law. The High Court’s refusal to direct restitution was held erroneous. The Court directed restoration of possession within three months and permitted fresh arbitration for compensation for unlawful occupation over the preceding 20 years. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** Requisition cannot mature into acquisition by efflux of time. Continued possession without statutory authority violates *Article 300-A*. Judicial condonation of executive illegality undermines rule of law. The State cannot plead convenience or necessity to override constitutional mandates. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court invoked Justice Jackson’s dissent in *Korematsu v. United States* to caution against judicial validation of executive overreach. It observed that courts must act as “jealous protectors” of liberty and property. **c) GUIDELINES** i. State must restore possession upon lapse of requisition authority ii. Compensation does not legitimize unlawful possession iii. Courts must not grant indefinite time for acquisition iv. Executive necessity cannot override constitutional legality ## **J) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Grahak Sanstha Manch v. State of Maharashtra*, *\[1994\] 3 SCR 746* ii. *Rajendra Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P.*, *\[1997\] 1 SCR 1056* iii. *Vidya Devi v. State of H.P.*, *(2020) 2 SCC 569* iv. *D.B. Basnett v. Land Acquisition Officer*, *(2020) 4 SCC 572* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Properties Act, 1952* ii. *Defence of India Act, 1962* iii. *Constitution of India – Article 300-A* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Director General of Police, Railway Protection Force & Ors. v. Rajendra Kumar Dubey, [2020] 13 SCR 1191](https://lawfoyer.in/director-general-of-police-railway-protection-force-ors-v-rajendra-kumar-dubey-2020-13-scr-1191/) **Published:** December 23, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment authoritatively delineates the constitutional limits on judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in matters arising from departmental disciplinary proceedings. The Supreme Court examined the legality of interference by the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench, which had substituted the punishment of compulsory retirement imposed on a Railway Protection Force officer with reversion in rank and reinstatement with 50% back wages. The Court reaffirmed that a High Court exercising writ jurisdiction does not function as a court of appeal over disciplinary findings. Re-appreciation of evidence, reassessment of factual conclusions, or substitution of punishment is impermissible unless the disciplinary process is vitiated by violation of principles of natural justice, absence of evidence, perversity, arbitrariness, mala fides, or statutory non-compliance. The delinquent officer, holding a position of trust as a Sub-Inspector in the Railway Protection Force, was found guilty of gross neglect of duty leading to theft of railway property and consequent pecuniary loss. The Supreme Court emphasized the heightened standard of integrity expected from personnel entrusted with protection of public property. By restoring the order of compulsory retirement, the Court underscored that proportionality of punishment must be assessed with reference to the nature of duties, gravity of misconduct, and institutional discipline, and not on sympathetic considerations. The ruling consolidates long-standing service jurisprudence restricting judicial intervention in disciplinary matters and reinforces administrative autonomy in maintaining discipline within uniformed forces. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment authoritatively delineates the *constitutional limits on judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India* in matters arising from departmental disciplinary proceedings. The Supreme Court examined the legality of interference by the Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench, which had substituted the punishment of *compulsory retirement* imposed on a Railway Protection Force officer with *reversion in rank and reinstatement with 50% back wages*. The Court reaffirmed that a High Court exercising writ jurisdiction does not function as a court of appeal over disciplinary findings. Re-appreciation of evidence, reassessment of factual conclusions, or substitution of punishment is impermissible unless the disciplinary process is vitiated by *violation of principles of natural justice, absence of evidence, perversity, arbitrariness, mala fides, or statutory non-compliance*. The delinquent officer, holding a position of trust as a *Sub-Inspector in the Railway Protection Force*, was found guilty of *gross neglect of duty* leading to theft of railway property and consequent pecuniary loss. The Supreme Court emphasized the *heightened standard of integrity* expected from personnel entrusted with protection of public property. By restoring the order of compulsory retirement, the Court underscored that proportionality of punishment must be assessed with reference to the *nature of duties, gravity of misconduct, and institutional discipline*, and not on sympathetic considerations. The ruling consolidates long-standing service jurisprudence restricting judicial intervention in disciplinary matters and reinforces administrative autonomy in maintaining discipline within uniformed forces. **Keywords:** Judicial Review, Compulsory Retirement, Departmental Enquiry, Proportionality of Punishment, Service Law ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetails*Judgment Cause Title**Director General of Police, Railway Protection Force & Ors. v. Rajendra Kumar Dubey**Case Number**Civil Appeal No. 3820 of 2020**Judgment Date**25 November 2020**Court**Supreme Court of India**Quorum**Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, Indu Malhotra, K.M. Joseph, JJ.**Author**Justice Indu Malhotra**Citation**\[2020\] 13 SCR 1191**Legal Provisions Involved**Articles 226 & 227, Constitution of India; Section 11, Railway Protection Force Act, 1957; Rules 146, 153, 219, 229, Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987**Judgments Overruled**None**Related Law Subjects**Service Law; Constitutional Law; Administrative Law* ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The judgment arises from a service dispute concerning disciplinary control within the *Railway Protection Force*, a uniformed force constituted for safeguarding railway property and passengers. The case reflects institutional tension between *administrative discipline* and *judicial oversight*. The respondent officer was subjected to major penalty proceedings for *gross neglect of duty* involving repeated thefts of railway property and procedural lapses such as failure to register FIRs and submit case diaries. These acts were treated as serious misconduct because they compromised statutory duties under *Section 11 of the Railway Protection Force Act, 1957*. The departmental hierarchy initially imposed *removal from service*, later reduced in appeal to *reversion in rank*. Subsequently, exercising review powers under *Rule 219.4 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987*, the competent authority enhanced the punishment to *compulsory retirement*, citing gravity of misconduct and institutional integrity. The High Court, invoking writ jurisdiction, interfered with this decision by reassessing factual findings and modifying punishment. The Supreme Court was therefore called upon to examine whether such interference conformed to settled principles governing *judicial review of disciplinary proceedings*. This judgment situates itself within a long line of precedents emphasizing restraint by constitutional courts in service matters, particularly involving disciplined forces. It also reinforces the doctrine that *administrative authorities are best placed to assess discipline, trust, and operational standards*. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The respondent joined the Railway Protection Force in 1984 and was posted as *Sub-Inspector (Adhoc)* at Pulgaon Railway Station in 2006. During his tenure, multiple thefts of railway property were reported within his jurisdiction, including *CST-9 plates* and a *coach trolley valued at ₹28,000*. A charge sheet was issued under *Rule 153 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987*, alleging *gross neglect of duty* and *abuse of authority*. The Enquiry Officer found charges relating to neglect of duty proved while partially exonerating the respondent. The Disciplinary Authority imposed *removal from service*. On appeal, the punishment was diluted to *reversion in rank* on the ground that there was no direct evidence of corruption or connivance. Subsequently, invoking *Rule 219.4*, the Reviewing Authority issued a show-cause notice proposing enhancement of punishment. The review considered the seriousness of repeated neglect, loss to public property, and erosion of public confidence in the Force. The respondent was compulsorily retired with immediate effect. The final departmental appeal was rejected. The respondent approached the High Court, which interfered by re-evaluating factual aspects, discarding certain charges, and restoring the appellate order with reinstatement and back wages. This prompted the present civil appeal before the Supreme Court. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under *Articles 226 and 227* by re-appreciating evidence in a departmental enquiry? ii. Whether substitution of punishment by the High Court was legally sustainable? iii. Whether compulsory retirement was disproportionate to the proved misconduct? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that the High Court acted as a *court of first appeal* by reassessing evidence and factual conclusions. It was argued that the enquiry was conducted strictly in accordance with statutory rules, with full opportunity of hearing. Reliance was placed on *State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao* and *Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran* to contend that judicial review does not permit re-evaluation of evidence or proportionality unless punishment shocks the conscience. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent contended that the punishment was excessive and not commensurate with misconduct. It was argued that thefts were detected by other officers and that there was no allegation of corruption in the charge sheet. The High Court’s reasoning was defended on grounds of proportionality and fairness. ## H) JUDGMENT The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the order of compulsory retirement. The Court held that none of the legally recognized grounds for judicial interference were present. It reiterated that *disciplinary authorities are the sole judges of facts* when enquiries are conducted lawfully. The High Court erred in reassessing evidence and substituting punishment without finding perversity or violation of natural justice. The Court emphasized that personnel of the Railway Protection Force discharge duties of trust and confidence. Proven neglect resulting in loss of railway property justified major penalty. Directions for reinstatement and back wages were held unsustainable. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under *Articles 226 and 227*, cannot re-appreciate evidence or modify punishment imposed in departmental proceedings unless the findings are perverse, arbitrary, or unsupported by evidence. Compulsory retirement for gross neglect of duty in a disciplined force does not warrant judicial interference when enquiry is fair and lawful. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that integrity standards in uniformed services are inherently higher and disciplinary autonomy is essential for institutional credibility. Judicial sympathy cannot replace statutory discipline. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Writ courts must exercise restraint in service matters. ii. Re-appreciation of evidence is impermissible. iii. Punishment can be interfered with only when shockingly disproportionate. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment consolidates service jurisprudence limiting judicial review in disciplinary matters. It reinforces the doctrine of *administrative autonomy* and underscores the critical importance of integrity in public service. The ruling serves as a binding precedent cautioning High Courts against substituting disciplinary discretion with judicial assessment. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao*, *AIR 1963 SC 1723* 2. *Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran*, *\[2014\] 13 SCR 1312* 3. *B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India*, *\[1995\] 4 Supp SCR 644* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Constitution of India* 2. *Railway Protection Force Act, 1957* 3. *Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Skoda Auto Volkswagen India Private Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., [2020] 11 S.C.R. 786](https://lawfoyer.in/skoda-auto-volkswagen-india-private-limited-v-state-of-uttar-pradesh-ors-2020-11-s-c-r-786/) **Published:** December 23, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment addresses the limits of judicial intervention at the stage of criminal investigation, particularly when allegations overlap with issues pending before a specialized environmental forum. The case arose from a challenge by a major automobile manufacturer seeking quashing of an FIR alleging cheating, forgery, criminal breach of trust, and conspiracy in relation to alleged installation of emission “defeat devices” in vehicles sold in India. The petitioner argued that the FIR was barred because the same subject matter was pending before the National Green Tribunal and this Court in connected civil appeals, and further that the complaint was vitiated by delay and factual inaccuracies. The Court reaffirmed the settled principle that criminal investigations cannot be interdicted merely because civil or environmental proceedings on overlapping subject matter are pending. The jurisdiction of the police to investigate cognizable offences remains intact so long as the FIR discloses the commission of an offence, even broadly. The Court emphasized that proceedings before the NGT were environmental and regulatory in nature and did not adjudicate individual consumer grievances or alleged misrepresentations made to specific purchasers. Questions relating to delay, number of vehicles purchased, existence of defeat devices, and alleged representations were held to be disputed questions of fact incapable of determination in proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The judgment consolidates jurisprudence discouraging premature quashing of FIRs and reiterates the doctrine of separation of functions between investigative agencies and constitutional courts. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment addresses the limits of judicial intervention at the stage of criminal investigation, particularly when allegations overlap with issues pending before a specialized environmental forum. The case arose from a challenge by a major automobile manufacturer seeking quashing of an FIR alleging cheating, forgery, criminal breach of trust, and conspiracy in relation to alleged installation of emission “defeat devices” in vehicles sold in India. The petitioner argued that the FIR was barred because the same subject matter was pending before the National Green Tribunal and this Court in connected civil appeals, and further that the complaint was vitiated by delay and factual inaccuracies. The Court reaffirmed the settled principle that criminal investigations cannot be interdicted merely because civil or environmental proceedings on overlapping subject matter are pending. The jurisdiction of the police to investigate cognizable offences remains intact so long as the FIR discloses the commission of an offence, even broadly. The Court emphasized that proceedings before the NGT were environmental and regulatory in nature and did not adjudicate individual consumer grievances or alleged misrepresentations made to specific purchasers. Questions relating to delay, number of vehicles purchased, existence of defeat devices, and alleged representations were held to be disputed questions of fact incapable of determination in proceedings under *Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*. The judgment consolidates jurisprudence discouraging premature quashing of FIRs and reiterates the doctrine of separation of functions between investigative agencies and constitutional courts. **Keywords:** Quashing of FIR, Defeat Devices, Criminal Investigation, Environmental Regulation, Consumer Deception, Section 482 CrPC ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Skoda Auto Volkswagen India Private Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.*Case NumberSpecial Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 4931 of 2020Judgement Date26 November 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorum*S.A. Bobde, C.J.; A.S. Bopanna, J.; V. Ramasubramanian, J.*Author*Justice V. Ramasubramanian*Citation*\[2020\] 11 S.C.R. 786*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 34, 419, 420, 406, 467, 468, 471 IPC; Section 482 CrPC; Section 110 Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989*Judgments OverruledNilRelated Law SubjectsCriminal Law, Environmental Law, Administrative Law, Consumer Protection ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The case is situated in the broader global controversy relating to alleged manipulation of vehicular emission standards through software mechanisms commonly referred to as “defeat devices”. In India, this controversy surfaced following notices issued in 2015 by the Automotive Research Association of India alleging abnormal nitrogen oxide emissions in certain diesel vehicles. These developments triggered environmental proceedings before the National Green Tribunal, resulting in extensive regulatory scrutiny and the imposition of substantial environmental compensation upon manufacturers. Parallel to these environmental proceedings, an individual purchaser lodged a criminal complaint alleging that he had been induced into purchasing vehicles based on false representations regarding emission compliance. The FIR alleged offences of cheating, forgery, criminal breach of trust, and conspiracy under the Indian Penal Code. The manufacturer approached the High Court seeking quashing of the FIR, contending that the complaint was malicious, belated, factually incorrect, and impermissible due to pendency of civil appeals arising from the NGT’s order before the Supreme Court. The High Court declined to quash the FIR but granted limited protection against arrest. The present Special Leave Petition challenged that refusal, raising fundamental questions concerning the relationship between environmental adjudication and criminal liability, the scope of inherent powers under *Section 482 CrPC*, and the extent to which courts may interfere with ongoing investigations. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The petitioner company is engaged in manufacture, import, and sale of passenger vehicles in India and represents multiple automobile brands. In November 2015, the Automotive Research Association of India issued a show cause notice alleging that certain diesel vehicles emitted nitrogen oxide at levels far exceeding laboratory test results, raising suspicion of installed defeat devices. Two original applications were filed before the National Green Tribunal in 2015 by individuals who were not vehicle purchasers. These applications sought broad environmental remedies including suspension of sales, rectification of engines, disgorgement of profits, and compensation for environmental damage. Following expert assessment, the NGT recorded findings that defeat devices had been used, that emissions exceeded permissible limits, and imposed environmental compensation of *₹500 crores*, while directing the Central Pollution Control Board to consider prosecution under applicable laws. Civil appeals against the NGT’s final order were admitted by the Supreme Court, which directed that no coercive steps be taken against the manufacturer in relation to the NGT’s directions. In July 2020, the third respondent lodged an FIR alleging that he had purchased seven Audi vehicles after receiving assurances that no defeat devices were installed. Upon learning of the NGT findings, he alleged deception, falsification of records, and dishonest inducement. The petitioner disputed the number of vehicles purchased, citing the VAHAN portal, and asserted that the FIR was merely a reproduction of allegations pending before the Supreme Court. The High Court refused to quash the FIR, leading to the present appeal. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether an FIR can be quashed when issues with overlapping subject matter are pending adjudication before the Supreme Court arising from proceedings before the National Green Tribunal? ii. Whether delay in lodging a criminal complaint constitutes sufficient ground for quashing an FIR at the threshold? iii. Whether disputed factual questions can be examined in proceedings seeking quashing under *Section 482 CrPC*? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the petitioner submitted that the substratum of the FIR was identical to issues pending before the Supreme Court in civil appeals arising from the NGT order, thereby barring police investigation. It was argued that allowing criminal proceedings would amount to parallel adjudication and abuse of process. It was further contended that the complaint was lodged after an inordinate delay of over two and a half years, rendering it malicious. The petitioner also asserted that government records demonstrated purchase of only three vehicles, undermining the credibility of the complainant and exposing the FIR as vexatious. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent submitted that environmental proceedings before the NGT addressed regulatory compliance and environmental harm, not individual consumer deception. It was argued that criminal liability arising from alleged misrepresentations to a purchaser constituted a distinct cause of action. The respondent contended that delay and numerical discrepancies were matters of evidence requiring investigation and trial, not grounds for quashing at the inception. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* ii. *Sections 419, 420, 406, 467, 468, 471, 34 Indian Penal Code, 1860* iii. *Section 110, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988* iv. *Rules 115, 126, 126A, Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition, affirming the High Court’s refusal to quash the FIR. It held that the existence of pending civil appeals against the NGT’s order did not bar an individual purchaser from initiating criminal proceedings. The environmental proceedings were characterized as broad and general, aimed at regulatory compliance and environmental protection, not adjudication of personal deception claims. The Court reiterated that delay alone cannot justify quashing an FIR and that disputed factual questions, including the number of vehicles purchased and existence of defeat devices, must be determined through investigation. The inherent powers under *Section 482 CrPC* were held to be exceptional and to be exercised sparingly. Reliance was placed on *King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed*, *State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal*, and *S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat* to underscore that courts should not usurp the investigative domain of the police when an FIR discloses cognizable offences. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio decidendi lies in the reaffirmation that criminal investigation cannot be interdicted merely because parallel civil or environmental proceedings are pending. If an FIR discloses the commission of cognizable offences even broadly, courts are barred from interfering at the threshold. Proceedings before specialized tribunals do not extinguish individual criminal remedies where allegations concern personal deception or misrepresentation. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court’s discussion on global developments relating to emission manipulation, including European and American regulatory responses and consumer remedies, constitutes persuasive obiter. These observations contextualize the Indian regulatory response but do not form the binding basis of the decision. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Courts must avoid examining disputed facts while exercising jurisdiction under *Section 482 CrPC*. ii. Pendency of civil or regulatory proceedings does not bar criminal investigation arising from distinct factual grievances. iii. Delay in lodging FIR is not per se fatal at the threshold stage. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed*, AIR 1945 PC 18 ii. *State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal*, (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335 iii. *S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat*, (2001) 7 SCC 659 **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Indian Penal Code, 1860* ii. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* iii. *Motor Vehicles Act, 1988* iv. *Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Manohar Lal Jat & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., [2020] 11 SCR 948](https://lawfoyer.in/manohar-lal-jat-ors-v-state-of-rajasthan-ors-2020-11-scr-948/) **Published:** December 23, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment concerns the determination of inter se seniority between direct recruits and departmental promotees appointed to the newly created post of Tax Assistant under the Rajasthan Commercial Taxes Subordinate Services (General Branch) Rules, 1975. The controversy arose from the first-ever recruitment to a newly constituted cadre consisting of 554 posts, filled through two streams: 80% by direct recruitment and 20% by departmental promotion through examination. Separate advertisements were issued at different times, and though the direct recruitment process commenced earlier, departmental promotees were appointed earlier owing to administrative and procedural factors. The seniority list consequently placed departmental promotees above direct recruits, triggering litigation. The appellants argued that Rule 27, particularly its second proviso, mandated seniority based on the chronology of selection rather than appointment. The respondents contended that post the 2002 amendment, seniority was determined strictly from the date of appointment and that both recruitments formed part of a composite first selection. The Supreme Court undertook a detailed interpretative exercise of Rule 27, its provisos, and their legislative intent. It affirmed that the main rule governed seniority and that the proviso applied only when selections were from the same source. Administrative delay in issuing appointment orders to direct recruits did not vitiate the seniority determination. The Court upheld the seniority of departmental promotees, dismissing allegations of mala fides, and clarified the doctrinal limits of provisos in service jurisprudence. The ruling reinforces principles of statutory interpretation, service law equity, and administrative practicality. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment concerns the determination of *inter se seniority* between *direct recruits* and *departmental promotees* appointed to the newly created post of *Tax Assistant* under the *Rajasthan Commercial Taxes Subordinate Services (General Branch) Rules, 1975*. The controversy arose from the first-ever recruitment to a newly constituted cadre consisting of *554 posts*, filled through *two streams*: *80% by direct recruitment* and *20% by departmental promotion through examination*. Separate advertisements were issued at different times, and though the direct recruitment process commenced earlier, departmental promotees were appointed earlier owing to administrative and procedural factors. The seniority list consequently placed departmental promotees above direct recruits, triggering litigation. The appellants argued that *Rule 27*, particularly its *second proviso*, mandated seniority based on the chronology of selection rather than appointment. The respondents contended that post the *2002 amendment*, seniority was determined strictly from the *date of appointment* and that both recruitments formed part of a *composite first selection*. The Supreme Court undertook a detailed interpretative exercise of Rule 27, its provisos, and their legislative intent. It affirmed that the *main rule* governed seniority and that the proviso applied only when selections were from the *same source*. Administrative delay in issuing appointment orders to direct recruits did not vitiate the seniority determination. The Court upheld the seniority of departmental promotees, dismissing allegations of mala fides, and clarified the doctrinal limits of provisos in service jurisprudence. The ruling reinforces principles of statutory interpretation, service law equity, and administrative practicality. **Keywords:** Seniority, Direct Recruitment, Departmental Promotion, Rule 27, Service Law, Proviso Interpretation ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Manohar Lal Jat & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.*Case NumberCivil Appeal Nos. 3832–3834 of 2020Judgement Date26 November 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumJustice Indira Banerjee and Justice S. Ravindra BhatAuthorJustice S. Ravindra BhatCitation*\[2020\] 11 SCR 948*Legal Provisions Involved*Rule 27, Rajasthan Commercial Taxes Subordinate Services (General Branch) Rules, 1975*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsService Law, Administrative Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The dispute emerged from the structural expansion of the Commercial Taxes Department of Rajasthan following the *creation of the post of Tax Assistant* in 2009. The cadre did not exist previously. Approval was granted for *531 posts*, later increased to *554*. Amendments to the *1975 Rules* in 2010 prescribed a *dual-channel recruitment mechanism*, dividing appointments between *direct recruits* and *departmental candidates*. The recruitment process unfolded through *two separate advertisements*, reflecting the distinct eligibility criteria for each stream. Although the advertisement for direct recruitment preceded the departmental examination, appointments did not occur simultaneously. Departmental promotees, already in service, were appointed earlier due to the absence of procedural requirements such as *police verification and medical examination*. This led to their placement above direct recruits in the seniority list. The issue assumed significance because it involved the *first appointment* to a newly created cadre. The direct recruits challenged the seniority list, alleging *administrative manipulation* and invoking the *second proviso to Rule 27*, which prioritises earlier selection over later selection. The Single Judge accepted this contention. However, the Division Bench reversed the decision, holding that seniority depended on the *date of appointment*. The Supreme Court was thus called upon to resolve the interpretative conflict surrounding *Rule 27*, its provisos, and the balance between statutory mandate and administrative exigency. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE Approval for the creation of Tax Assistant posts was granted on *01.09.2009*. Amendments effective from *01.12.2010* structured recruitment as *80% direct recruitment* and *20% departmental selection*. A *Departmental Selection Committee* was constituted on *04.10.2010*. An advertisement for *direct recruits* was issued on *25.01.2011*. A written examination was conducted on *17.04.2011*, followed by a typing test on *15.05.2011*. Provisional results were declared on *16.05.2011*. Subsequent *police verification and medical examinations* delayed appointment orders. Meanwhile, an advertisement for *departmental promotees* was issued on *24.05.2011*. Written examinations were conducted on *11 and 12 June 2011*. Results were declared on *14.06.2011*, and appointment letters were issued on *23.06.2011*. Direct recruits received appointment orders later, on *04.07.2011*. A seniority list published on *05.06.2013* placed departmental promotees above direct recruits. Representations were rejected, and subsequent lists reaffirmed the position. Aggrieved direct recruits initiated writ proceedings, alleging mala fide acceleration of departmental appointments. The Single Judge ruled in their favour, but the Division Bench reversed the decision. The matter reached the Supreme Court by way of civil appeals. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether *Rule 27* mandates seniority based on *date of appointment* or *chronology of selection*? ii. Whether the *second proviso to Rule 27* applies across *different sources of recruitment*? iii. Whether administrative delay in issuing appointment orders can invalidate seniority? iv. Whether mala fides were established in favour of departmental promotees? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that the *direct recruitment process commenced earlier* and thus attracted the *second proviso to Rule 27*. It was argued that departmental appointments were *deliberately expedited* to grant them seniority. Reliance was placed on the wording of the proviso, asserting that *earlier selection* must prevail over *later selection*, irrespective of appointment dates. The appellants alleged *institutional bias*, highlighting correspondence from departmental associations and deviation from scheduled examination dates. It was contended that such actions violated *Article 14* by introducing arbitrariness into seniority fixation. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents contended that the recruitment was *composite* and part of a *single cadre creation exercise*. The distinction in advertisements reflected eligibility differences, not separate recruitments. It was submitted that *Rule 27*, post-2002 amendment, unequivocally fixes seniority from the *date of appointment*. Administrative delay was justified due to the *scale of direct recruitment* involving over *15,000 applications*. The proviso, it was argued, applies only where selections are from the *same source*. Allegations of mala fides were denied. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Court undertook a textual and purposive interpretation of *Rule 27*. It traced its evolution and held that the *principal rule*, post-amendment, mandates seniority strictly from the *date of appointment*. The *second proviso* was construed as *clarificatory*, applicable only when *multiple selections from the same source* occur. The Court rejected the argument that earlier advertisement equated to earlier selection. It emphasised that *selection culminates in appointment*. Administrative exigencies, including verification processes, were held to be legitimate reasons for delay. The Court relied on *Prem Kumar Verma v. Union of India* *(\[1998\] 2 SCR 763)* to reiterate that seniority cannot be altered by subsequent amendments or procedural delays not attributable to candidates. Allegations of mala fides were found unsubstantiated. The appeals were dismissed, and the seniority list upheld. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** Seniority under *Rule 27* is determined by the *date of appointment*. The *second proviso* applies only to selections from the *same recruitment source*. In first-time cadre recruitment, administrative delay does not vitiate seniority. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that provisos must not *supplant the main provision*. They serve as exceptions and cannot override the statutory mandate unless explicitly stated. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Seniority in newly created cadres must follow the *date of appointment*. ii. Provisos should be applied narrowly and contextually. iii. Administrative delays must be assessed pragmatically. iv. Allegations of mala fides require strict proof. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces doctrinal clarity in service law. It balances statutory interpretation with administrative realism. By limiting the scope of provisos, the Court prevents distortion of legislative intent. The ruling provides authoritative guidance on seniority disputes arising from *multi-source recruitment* and *first-time cadre creation*, ensuring stability in public service administration. ## J) REFERENCES **a. Important Cases Referred** i. *Prem Kumar Verma v. Union of India*, *\[1998\] 2 SCR 763* ii. *S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman*, *\[1985\] 2 SCR 643* iii. *J.K. Industries Ltd. v. Chief Inspector of Factories*, *\[1996\] 6 Supp SCR 798* **b. Important Statutes Referred** i. *Rajasthan Commercial Taxes Subordinate Services (General Branch) Rules, 1975* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Noy Vallesina Engineering SpA v. Jindal Drugs Limited & Ors., [2020] 12 SCR 1019](https://lawfoyer.in/noy-vallesina-engineering-spa-v-jindal-drugs-limited-ors-2020-12-scr-1019/) **Published:** December 23, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment conclusively settles the long-standing controversy relating to the maintainability of petitions under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 against foreign arbitral awards. The Supreme Court examined whether Indian courts can exercise supervisory jurisdiction over arbitral awards rendered outside India when the substantive law of the contract is Indian law, but the seat of arbitration is located abroad. The Court reaffirmed the territorial principle of arbitration and emphasized that the seat of arbitration is determinative of curial law and supervisory jurisdiction. It held that once parties have consciously chosen a foreign seat, Indian courts are excluded from entertaining challenges under Part I of the Act. The Court harmonized earlier conflicting precedents by clarifying the scope and applicability of Bhatia International and Venture Global in light of the Constitution Bench ruling in BALCO. The judgment also addressed the scope of appellate remedies under Section 50, holding that no appeal lies except as expressly provided, thereby barring Letters Patent Appeals or other appellate mechanisms in enforcement proceedings concerning foreign awards. This decision strengthens India’s pro-arbitration stance, aligns domestic arbitration jurisprudence with the New York Convention, and reinforces certainty in international commercial arbitration by preventing multiple and parallel challenges across jurisdictions. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment conclusively settles the long-standing controversy relating to the **maintainability of petitions under *Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996*** against *foreign arbitral awards*. The Supreme Court examined whether Indian courts can exercise supervisory jurisdiction over arbitral awards rendered outside India when the substantive law of the contract is Indian law, but the *seat of arbitration* is located abroad. The Court reaffirmed the *territorial principle of arbitration* and emphasized that the *seat of arbitration* is determinative of curial law and supervisory jurisdiction. It held that once parties have consciously chosen a foreign seat, Indian courts are excluded from entertaining challenges under *Part I* of the Act. The Court harmonized earlier conflicting precedents by clarifying the scope and applicability of *Bhatia International* and *Venture Global* in light of the Constitution Bench ruling in *BALCO*. The judgment also addressed the **scope of appellate remedies under Section 50**, holding that *no appeal lies except as expressly provided*, thereby barring Letters Patent Appeals or other appellate mechanisms in enforcement proceedings concerning foreign awards. This decision strengthens India’s pro-arbitration stance, aligns domestic arbitration jurisprudence with the *New York Convention*, and reinforces certainty in international commercial arbitration by preventing multiple and parallel challenges across jurisdictions. **Keywords:** Foreign arbitral award, Seat of arbitration, Section 34, Section 50, Enforcement of awards, ICC arbitration, Territoriality principle ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgment Cause Title*Noy Vallesina Engineering SpA v. Jindal Drugs Limited & Ors.*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 8607 of 2010iii) Judgment Date26 November 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumIndira Banerjee, J. and S. Ravindra Bhat, J.vi) AuthorS. Ravindra Bhat, J.vii) Citation*\[2020\] 12 SCR 1019*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 34, 47, 48, 50 – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsArbitration Law, International Commercial Arbitration ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The dispute arose in the context of multiple interlinked commercial agreements entered into in the mid-1990s for the establishment of an ascorbic acid plant in India. The agreements incorporated an arbitration clause providing for arbitration under *ICC Rules*, with proceedings to be conducted in London. At the time, Indian arbitration jurisprudence permitted expansive judicial intervention even in foreign-seated arbitrations due to the prevailing interpretation under *Bhatia International*. Subsequent developments in arbitral law, particularly the Constitution Bench ruling in *BALCO*, decisively shifted the legal position by restricting the application of *Part I* of the Act exclusively to arbitrations seated in India. However, uncertainty persisted regarding agreements and awards predating *BALCO*. The present judgment arose against this transitional jurisprudential backdrop. The Bombay High Court Division Bench had permitted a challenge under *Section 34* to a foreign award, relying on pre-*BALCO* precedents. The Supreme Court was thus called upon to determine whether such an approach was legally sustainable in light of subsequent doctrinal clarity on the seat-centric approach. The case therefore presented an opportunity to conclusively delineate the scope of Indian court jurisdiction in foreign-seated arbitrations and to bring coherence to enforcement and appellate mechanisms under *Part II* of the Act. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellant, an Italian company, assumed contractual obligations from a Swiss entity under four interrelated agreements concerning the establishment of an ascorbic acid plant in India. Each agreement contained an arbitration clause stipulating arbitration under *ICC Rules*, with proceedings in London and conducted in English. Disputes arose following termination of the contracts, leading to arbitration initiated by the respondent before the ICC. A three-member arbitral tribunal rendered a **partial award** in 2000 dismissing the respondent’s claims and allowing the appellant’s counterclaims. The respondent challenged this partial award before the Bombay High Court under *Section 34*, despite the foreign seat of arbitration. During pendency of this challenge, the tribunal proceeded and rendered a **final award**. Enforcement proceedings were initiated by the appellant under *Sections 47 and 48*. A Single Judge held that the *Section 34* petition was not maintainable, but the Division Bench reversed this finding. Parallel appeals arose from enforcement proceedings, raising questions regarding appellate maintainability under *Section 50*. These conflicting strands culminated in the present appeal before the Supreme Court. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether a foreign arbitral award can be challenged under *Section 34* of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996? ii. Whether the designation of London as the seat of arbitration excludes the applicability of *Part I* of the Act? iii. Whether appeals against enforcement orders are maintainable beyond the scope of *Section 50*? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that *Section 34* is confined to domestic awards and cannot be invoked against foreign awards. Reliance was placed on the Constitution Bench ruling in *BALCO*, which unequivocally held that *Part I* does not apply to arbitrations seated outside India. It was argued that the parties had expressly agreed to London as the seat of arbitration, thereby attracting English curial law and excluding Indian supervisory jurisdiction. The appellant further contended that *Section 50* exhaustively governs appellate remedies in enforcement proceedings, rendering Letters Patent Appeals non-maintainable. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent submitted that the agreements predated *BALCO* and were therefore governed by the *Bhatia International* regime. It was contended that since the substantive law of the contract was Indian law, Indian courts retained jurisdiction under *Section 34*. The respondent also argued that *Section 34* and *Section 48* operate in distinct fields, with the former permitting deeper scrutiny of awards. The respondent defended the High Court’s approach as consistent with then-prevailing legal principles. ## H) JUDGMENT The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Division Bench erred in permitting a *Section 34* challenge. The Court reaffirmed that the *seat of arbitration* is the juridical center of gravity and confers exclusive supervisory jurisdiction on the courts of that seat. It was held that *BALCO* applies even to pre-*BALCO* agreements where the seat is clearly outside India. The Court emphasized that the choice of Indian substantive law does not dilute the significance of a foreign seat. On appellate remedies, the Court categorically ruled that *Section 50* alone governs appeals in enforcement proceedings relating to foreign awards, thereby barring any other form of appeal. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio rests on the principle that *designation of a foreign seat excludes the application of Part I of the Act*, and Indian courts lack jurisdiction to entertain challenges under *Section 34* against foreign awards. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that permitting parallel challenges undermines international arbitration and defeats the object of speedy enforcement under the *New York Convention*. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Courts must ascertain the juridical seat from the arbitration agreement. ii. *Section 34* is inapplicable to foreign-seated arbitrations. iii. Appeals in enforcement matters are restricted to *Section 50*. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment decisively aligns Indian arbitration law with international standards. It eliminates jurisdictional uncertainty, prevents forum shopping, and strengthens India’s reputation as an arbitration-friendly jurisdiction. The reaffirmation of the seat-centric approach ensures predictability and respects party autonomy, thereby enhancing investor confidence and enforcement efficiency. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc.* – *\[2012\] 12 SCR 327* 2. *Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd.* – *\[2011\] 11 SCR 1* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., [2020] 11 SCR 896](https://lawfoyer.in/arnab-manoranjan-goswami-v-state-of-maharashtra-ors-2020-11-scr-896/) **Published:** December 23, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the constitutional limits on State power in criminal prosecution and the corresponding duty of constitutional courts to safeguard personal liberty. The Supreme Court scrutinised the arrest of the appellant under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, arising out of allegations of non-payment of contractual dues leading to suicide. The Court analysed whether the First Information Report, even if taken at face value, disclosed the essential ingredients of abetment of suicide. Relying on a consistent line of precedent, the Court reaffirmed that mere financial disputes, business disagreements, or mental stress without active instigation, intentional aid, or proximate conduct cannot attract criminal liability under Section 306 IPC. The decision strongly criticises the failure of the Bombay High Court to conduct a prima facie evaluation of the FIR while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, and consequently declining interim bail under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court emphasised that constitutional courts cannot abdicate their duty by mechanically relegating an accused to statutory remedies when personal liberty is at stake. The ruling reiterates that liberty is not to be sacrificed at the altar of procedural formalism. The judgment also clarifies the scope of further investigation after acceptance of an ‘A Summary’ and balances investigative autonomy with constitutional restraint. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the constitutional limits on State power in criminal prosecution and the corresponding duty of constitutional courts to safeguard personal liberty. The Supreme Court scrutinised the arrest of the appellant under *Section 306 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860*, arising out of allegations of non-payment of contractual dues leading to suicide. The Court analysed whether the *First Information Report*, even if taken at face value, disclosed the essential ingredients of abetment of suicide. Relying on a consistent line of precedent, the Court reaffirmed that *mere financial disputes, business disagreements, or mental stress without active instigation, intentional aid, or proximate conduct* cannot attract criminal liability under *Section 306 IPC*. The decision strongly criticises the failure of the Bombay High Court to conduct a prima facie evaluation of the FIR while exercising jurisdiction under *Section 482 CrPC*, and consequently declining interim bail under *Article 226 of the Constitution*. The Supreme Court emphasised that constitutional courts cannot abdicate their duty by mechanically relegating an accused to statutory remedies when personal liberty is at stake. The ruling reiterates that *liberty is not to be sacrificed at the altar of procedural formalism*. The judgment also clarifies the scope of further investigation after acceptance of an ‘A Summary’ and balances investigative autonomy with constitutional restraint. **Keywords:** Personal Liberty; Abetment of Suicide; Section 306 IPC; Article 226; Section 482 CrPC; Bail Jurisprudence; Abuse of Criminal Process ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgment Cause Title*Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.*ii) Case NumberCriminal Appeal No. 742 of 2020iii) Judgment Date27 November 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumJustice D.Y. Chandrachud and Justice Indira Banerjeevi) AuthorJustice D.Y. Chandrachudvii) Citation*\[2020\] 11 SCR 896*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Articles 226 & 227, Constitution of India; Sections 306, 34 IPC; Sections 482, 439, 173(8) CrPC*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsCriminal Law; Constitutional Law; Media Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The judgment arises from an appeal challenging the refusal of interim bail by the Bombay High Court in a petition invoking *Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution* and *Section 482 CrPC*. The appellant was arrested in November 2020 in connection with an FIR registered in 2018 alleging abetment of suicide. The investigation had earlier culminated in an *‘A Summary’*, accepted by the Magistrate, signifying lack of prosecutable evidence. Subsequently, the State Government directed reinvestigation, leading to the appellant’s arrest after nearly two years. The appellant contended that the arrest was vitiated by mala fides and constituted a misuse of criminal law to silence dissent. The High Court declined interim relief, holding that once the appellant was in judicial custody, bail must be sought under *Section 439 CrPC*. The Supreme Court was thus called upon to determine whether constitutional courts could refuse to examine the legality of deprivation of liberty merely because statutory bail remedies exist. The case required a reconciliation of *procedural hierarchy* with *constitutional duty*. The Court also addressed whether non-payment of commercial dues, absent instigation or mens rea, could constitute abetment of suicide under *Section 306 IPC*. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The deceased, a director of a design and consultancy firm, had undertaken interior and civil works for multiple companies, including a company owned by the appellant. According to the FIR lodged by the deceased’s spouse, outstanding payments allegedly caused prolonged financial stress, culminating in the deceased and his mother committing suicide in May 2018. A suicide note recovered from the scene named three businesspersons, including the appellant, stating that dues remained unpaid and requesting recovery of amounts from them. The FIR did not allege threats, coercion, harassment, or instigation by the appellant. The police initially conducted an investigation and filed an *‘A Summary’*, which was accepted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, thereby closing the case. In 2020, following a directive from the State Home Department, further investigation was commenced under *Section 173(8) CrPC*. The appellant was arrested and remanded to judicial custody, though police custody was denied. The appellant immediately approached the High Court seeking quashing of the FIR and interim bail. The High Court deferred examination of the FIR’s merits and declined interim protection. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the allegations in the FIR, taken at face value, disclose the offence of *abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC*? ii. Whether the High Court erred in declining to conduct a *prima facie evaluation* under *Section 482 CrPC*? iii. Whether the High Court could refuse interim bail under *Article 226* solely on the ground of availability of remedy under *Section 439 CrPC*? iv. Whether acceptance of an *‘A Summary’* restricts further investigation without judicial sanction? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the FIR disclosed a *purely civil dispute* arising from contractual payments. Reliance was placed on *Amalendu Pal v. State of West Bengal* and *M. Arjunan v. State* to argue that *mens rea, instigation, and proximity* are indispensable for Section 306 IPC. It was argued that the High Court misapplied *State of Telangana v. Habib Abdullah Jeelani* by treating Article 226 jurisdiction as unavailable once judicial custody commenced. The appellant contended that failure to conduct even a tentative scrutiny of the FIR resulted in arbitrary deprivation of liberty. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents submitted that further investigation after an *‘A Summary’* is permissible under *Section 173(8) CrPC*, relying on *Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya v. State of Gujarat*. They argued that the High Court correctly respected the procedural hierarchy for bail. It was contended that instigation may be inferred from circumstances and need not be explicit, relying on *Praveen Pradhan v. State of Uttarakhand*. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 306 IPC* – Abetment of suicide ii. *Section 107 IPC* – Definition of abetment iii. *Section 482 CrPC* – Inherent powers of High Court iv. *Section 439 CrPC* – Special powers regarding bail v. *Article 226, Constitution of India* – Writ jurisdiction ## I) JUDGMENT The Supreme Court held that the FIR failed to disclose the essential ingredients of *Section 306 IPC*. The Court reaffirmed that *financial distress caused by non-payment of dues, without active instigation or intentional aid, cannot constitute abetment*. The Court relied on *Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Gujarat*, *S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan*, and *Ude Singh v. State of Haryana* to reinforce this position. The Court found that the High Court abdicated its constitutional duty by refusing to examine the FIR even prima facie. It held that *Section 482 CrPC* mandates judicial application of mind and not ritualistic recitation of restraint. The failure to exercise this jurisdiction disabled the High Court from protecting liberty under *Article 226*. The Supreme Court further clarified that while procedural hierarchy in bail matters is important, it cannot override constitutional responsibility when liberty is arbitrarily curtailed. Interim bail granted earlier by the Court was directed to continue. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio rests on two foundational principles. First, *abetment of suicide requires a direct, intentional, and proximate act of instigation or aid*. Second, *constitutional courts have a non-delegable duty to protect personal liberty*, even at the interim stage. The Court held that where allegations do not satisfy the statutory ingredients of an offence, continued incarceration violates *Articles 21 and 226*. The existence of alternate remedies cannot justify judicial inaction. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court made strong observations on the fragility of liberty and warned against the *weaponisation of criminal law*. It emphasised that courts across all levels must remain vigilant against selective harassment. The statement that *“deprivation of liberty even for a single day is one day too many”* underscores constitutional morality. **c) GUIDELINES** i. High Courts must conduct prima facie evaluation under *Section 482 CrPC*. ii. Interim bail under *Article 226* is permissible in exceptional cases. iii. Procedural hierarchy cannot eclipse constitutional duty. iv. Criminal law must not be used as an instrument of coercion. ## J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reasserts the centrality of *liberty as a constitutional value*. It corrects judicial passivity and restores the balance between State power and individual freedom. The ruling strengthens safeguards against misuse of *Section 306 IPC* in commercial disputes and reinforces the proactive role of High Courts as guardians of liberty. ## K) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Amalendu Pal v. State of West Bengal*; *S.S. Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan*; 2. *Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Gujarat*; 3. *M. Arjunan v. State*; *Ude Singh v. State of Haryana*; 4. *State of Telangana v. Habib Abdullah Jeelani* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Constitution of India*; *Indian Penal Code, 1860*; *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Madras Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr., [2020] 2 SCR 246](https://lawfoyer.in/madras-bar-association-v-union-of-india-anr-2020-2-scr-246/) **Published:** December 23, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The decision in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr. represents a decisive reaffirmation of constitutional principles governing tribunalisation in India. The Supreme Court examined the constitutional validity of the Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and other Authorities (Qualification, Experience and Other Conditions of Service of Members) Rules, 2020, framed under Section 184 of the Finance Act, 2017. The challenge was rooted in concerns of excessive executive control, dilution of judicial independence, short tenure of tribunal members, exclusion of advocates from eligibility, and retrospective application of subordinate legislation. The Court revisited a long line of precedents beginning from S.P. Sampath Kumar through L. Chandra Kumar and Rojer Mathew, reiterating that tribunals exercising judicial functions must conform to standards equivalent to constitutional courts. Emphasis was placed on judicial dominance in appointments, security of tenure, financial independence, and insulation from executive interference. A major constitutional intervention was the direction to constitute a National Tribunals Commission as an independent supervisory body. The Court also modified several provisions of the 2020 Rules relating to tenure, search-cum-selection committees, disciplinary control, eligibility of advocates and members of the Indian Legal Service, housing allowance, and timelines for appointments. The ruling strengthens the doctrine of separation of powers and reinforces that tribunals, though creatures of statute, cannot be reduced to executive-controlled bodies. It underscores that rule of law and access to justice are compromised when adjudicatory institutions lack independence, stability, and institutional dignity. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The decision in *Madras Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr.* represents a decisive reaffirmation of constitutional principles governing tribunalisation in India. The Supreme Court examined the constitutional validity of the *Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and other Authorities (Qualification, Experience and Other Conditions of Service of Members) Rules, 2020*, framed under *Section 184 of the Finance Act, 2017*. The challenge was rooted in concerns of excessive executive control, dilution of judicial independence, short tenure of tribunal members, exclusion of advocates from eligibility, and retrospective application of subordinate legislation. The Court revisited a long line of precedents beginning from *S.P. Sampath Kumar* through *L. Chandra Kumar* and *Rojer Mathew*, reiterating that tribunals exercising judicial functions must conform to standards equivalent to constitutional courts. Emphasis was placed on judicial dominance in appointments, security of tenure, financial independence, and insulation from executive interference. A major constitutional intervention was the direction to constitute a *National Tribunals Commission* as an independent supervisory body. The Court also modified several provisions of the 2020 Rules relating to tenure, search-cum-selection committees, disciplinary control, eligibility of advocates and members of the Indian Legal Service, housing allowance, and timelines for appointments. The ruling strengthens the doctrine of separation of powers and reinforces that tribunals, though creatures of statute, cannot be reduced to executive-controlled bodies. It underscores that rule of law and access to justice are compromised when adjudicatory institutions lack independence, stability, and institutional dignity. **Keywords:** Tribunalisation, Judicial Independence, Separation of Powers, National Tribunals Commission, Subordinate Legislation ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Madras Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr.*Case NumberWrit Petition (Civil) No. 804 of 2020Judgement Date27 November 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumL. Nageswara Rao, Hemant Gupta & S. Ravindra Bhat, JJ.AuthorJustice L. Nageswara RaoCitation*\[2020\] 2 SCR 246*Legal Provisions Involved*Articles 14, 21, 32, 50, 217, 323A, 323B of the Constitution of India*; *Sections 183 & 184, Finance Act, 2017*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsConstitutional Law; Administrative Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The case arose against the backdrop of persistent constitutional litigation concerning tribunal reforms in India. The insertion of *Part XIV-A* into the Constitution through the *42nd Constitutional Amendment* introduced tribunals as alternative adjudicatory mechanisms. However, concerns soon emerged regarding executive dominance, erosion of judicial review, and compromised independence. Earlier rulings such as *S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India* established that tribunals must be effective substitutes for High Courts. This understanding was later refined in *L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India*, where the Court clarified that tribunals are supplemental bodies and cannot displace constitutional courts. The judgment emphasized that judicial review under *Articles 226 and 32* forms part of the *basic structure*. The Finance Act, 2017 sought to rationalize tribunals by merging several bodies and delegating extensive rule-making powers to the executive under *Section 184*. The *2017 Rules* framed under this provision were struck down in *Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd.* for violating judicial independence. The Union Government was directed to reframe rules consistent with constitutional principles. Pursuant to this mandate, the *2020 Rules* were notified. However, the Madras Bar Association contended that the new rules replicated earlier defects. The challenge highlighted issues of appointment procedures, tenure reduction, eligibility exclusions, executive control over discipline, and retrospective operation. The present judgment thus represents the Court’s continued constitutional supervision over tribunalisation, ensuring adherence to settled principles and institutional safeguards. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The Central Government notified the *2020 Rules* on 12 February 2020 under *Section 184 of the Finance Act, 2017*. These rules governed qualifications, appointments, tenure, salaries, removal, and service conditions of members across nineteen tribunals. Following the decision in *Rojer Mathew*, the Union of India filed applications seeking approval for retrospective application of the 2020 Rules from 26 May 2017. Several Bar Associations and tribunal members opposed this move, asserting that retrospective operation would unsettle vested rights and violate settled principles of subordinate legislation. The Madras Bar Association filed a writ petition under *Article 32*, alleging that the 2020 Rules violated *Articles 14, 21, and 50* of the Constitution. The petitioners argued that the composition of Search-cum-Selection Committees diluted judicial primacy, tenure of four years undermined independence, advocates were excluded from eligibility in most tribunals, and executive control over discipline compromised neutrality. Multiple connected matters, including transfer petitions and civil appeals, were tagged with the lead case. Senior advocates and the Attorney General were heard. Mr. Arvind P. Datar was appointed as *Amicus Curiae*. The Court examined the entire evolution of tribunal jurisprudence, comparative materials from the UK, earlier constitutional bench rulings, and the structural position of tribunals within India’s constitutional framework. The adjudication culminated in extensive directions modifying the impugned rules and mandating institutional reforms. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the *Tribunal Rules, 2020* violate the principles of *judicial independence and separation of powers*? ii. Whether executive dominance in *Search-cum-Selection Committees* is constitutionally permissible? iii. Whether a *four-year tenure* for tribunal members is arbitrary and unconstitutional? iv. Whether exclusion of *advocates* from eligibility as judicial members violates constitutional standards? v. Whether the *2020 Rules* can be given *retrospective effect*? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the petitioner submitted that tribunals perform core judicial functions and therefore must enjoy independence equivalent to constitutional courts. It was argued that executive participation with voting rights in selection committees violates settled law laid down in *Union of India v. R. Gandhi* and *Madras Bar Association (2015)*. The petitioner contended that a four-year tenure discourages decisional independence and professional commitment, contrary to repeated judicial directions. Exclusion of advocates was argued to be arbitrary, especially when *Article 217(2)* permits advocates with ten years’ experience to be appointed as High Court judges. It was further argued that permitting retrospective application of subordinate legislation is impermissible without explicit statutory authorization. Executive control over disciplinary proceedings was stated to undermine institutional autonomy and fairness. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent submitted that the 2020 Rules were framed in compliance with *Section 184 of the Finance Act, 2017*. The presence of executive members in selection committees was defended as necessary for administrative coordination and background verification. It was contended that four years’ tenure represented an improvement over the earlier three-year term. The Union argued that retrospective application was necessary to maintain continuity and avoid administrative chaos. The Attorney General supported the proposal for a *National Tribunals Commission* but sought flexibility in implementation. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Court held that the 2020 Rules substantially failed to comply with constitutional principles reiterated in prior judgments. Judicial independence was identified as the cornerstone of tribunal legitimacy. Executive dominance in appointments, tenure insecurity, and disciplinary control were held impermissible. The Court directed the constitution of a *National Tribunals Commission* to act as an independent supervisory body. Until its establishment, a separate tribunals wing under the Ministry of Finance was mandated. The composition of Search-cum-Selection Committees was restructured to ensure judicial primacy, with the Chief Justice of India or nominee as Chairperson with a casting vote. Rule 4(2) was modified to permit recommendation of only one candidate per post. Tenure was enhanced to *five years*, with age limits of *70 years for Chairpersons* and *67 years for members*. Advocates with *ten years’ experience* were held eligible as judicial members. Members of the Indian Legal Service were also made eligible subject to suitability. The Court rejected retrospective application of the 2020 Rules, holding that subordinate legislation cannot operate retrospectively without statutory sanction. Appointments were directed to be completed within three months of recommendations. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio rests on the principle that tribunals exercising judicial power must conform to constitutional standards of independence, security of tenure, and judicial dominance in appointments. Any rule undermining these principles violates the *basic structure*. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that persistent executive resistance to judicial directions on tribunal reforms reflects institutional disregard for constitutional governance. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Establishment of National Tribunals Commission. ii. Judicial dominance in selection committees. iii. Minimum five-year tenure. iv. Inclusion of advocates as judicial members. v. Time-bound appointments. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces constitutional supremacy over administrative convenience. It marks judicial resolve to protect adjudicatory independence against incremental executive encroachment. Tribunalisation, if unchecked, risks creating parallel justice systems devoid of credibility. This decision restores balance and reiterates that efficiency cannot trump constitutional morality. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India* 2. *L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India* 3. *Union of India v. R. Gandhi* 4. *Madras Bar Association v. Union of India (2015)* 5. *Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd.* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Constitution of India* 2. *Finance Act, 2017* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Indian Commodity Exchange Limited v. Neptune Overseas Limited & Ors., [2020] 13 SCR 129](https://lawfoyer.in/indian-commodity-exchange-limited-v-neptune-overseas-limited-ors-2020-13-scr-129/) **Published:** December 22, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in Indian Commodity Exchange Limited v. Neptune Overseas Limited & Ors. addresses the delicate balance between regulatory authority and procedural fairness under the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952. The Supreme Court examined whether the proceedings initiated by the Forward Markets Commission suffered from violation of principles of natural justice, particularly in relation to supply of documents and grant of reasonable opportunity to respond. The dispute arose from allegations of serious trading irregularities and abuse of fiduciary position by the promoters of a recognised commodity exchange. The show cause notice issued was extensive, supported by voluminous documentation exceeding 4,000 pages, yet the respondents were provided limited time to reply. The Court scrutinised whether denial of adjournments and partial supply of documents vitiated the proceedings. It clarified that service of notice on a key individual holding dual roles could be deemed service on the corporate entity when facts justify piercing of the corporate veil. However, the Court emphasised that reliance on voluminous records obliges the regulator to furnish copies and adequate time. The judgment reiterates that natural justice is not a ritualistic formality but a substantive safeguard against arbitrary exercise of power. The ruling harmonises earlier jurisprudence on substantial compliance, test of prejudice, and reasonable opportunity, while directing a fresh adjudication by SEBI with procedural safeguards. It reinforces that regulatory efficiency cannot override fairness when serious civil and penal consequences ensue. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment in *Indian Commodity Exchange Limited v. Neptune Overseas Limited & Ors.* addresses the delicate balance between regulatory authority and procedural fairness under *the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952*. The Supreme Court examined whether the proceedings initiated by the Forward Markets Commission suffered from violation of *principles of natural justice*, particularly in relation to supply of documents and grant of reasonable opportunity to respond. The dispute arose from allegations of serious trading irregularities and abuse of fiduciary position by the promoters of a recognised commodity exchange. The show cause notice issued was extensive, supported by voluminous documentation exceeding *4,000 pages*, yet the respondents were provided limited time to reply. The Court scrutinised whether denial of adjournments and partial supply of documents vitiated the proceedings. It clarified that *service of notice* on a key individual holding dual roles could be deemed service on the corporate entity when facts justify *piercing of the corporate veil*. However, the Court emphasised that reliance on voluminous records obliges the regulator to furnish copies and adequate time. The judgment reiterates that *natural justice is not a ritualistic formality* but a substantive safeguard against arbitrary exercise of power. The ruling harmonises earlier jurisprudence on *substantial compliance*, *test of prejudice*, and *reasonable opportunity*, while directing a fresh adjudication by SEBI with procedural safeguards. It reinforces that regulatory efficiency cannot override fairness when serious civil and penal consequences ensue. **Keywords:** Natural Justice; Show Cause Notice; Forward Contracts Regulation Act; Fiduciary Duty; Corporate Veil; Regulatory Adjudication ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Indian Commodity Exchange Limited v. Neptune Overseas Limited & Ors.*Case Number*Civil Appeal No. 9037 of 2019 with Civil Appeal No. 629 of 2020*Judgement Date*27 November 2020*Court*Supreme Court of India*Quorum*Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Hrishikesh Roy*Author*Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul*Citation*\[2020\] 13 SCR 129*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952*Judgments Overruled*None*Related Law Subjects*Administrative Law; Corporate Law; Securities and Regulatory Law* ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The litigation traces its origin to regulatory oversight exercised under *the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952*, a statute enacted to regulate forward trading and commodity exchanges in India. The Forward Markets Commission, constituted under *Section 3*, was empowered to supervise recognised associations and ensure market integrity. National Multi Commodity Exchange of India Limited was a recognised association, with *Neptune Overseas Limited* as its core promoter and *Mr. Kailash Ramkishan Gupta* occupying dominant managerial roles in both entities. Proceedings commenced after a complaint by an independent journalist alleged *trading irregularities, misuse of position, and misappropriation of exchange funds*. Acting under *Section 8(2)*, the FMC initiated an inquiry and issued a comprehensive show cause notice spanning *150 pages*. The notice proposed serious findings affecting civil, corporate, and regulatory rights. The controversy escalated due to repeated disputes regarding *supply of documents, denial of adjournments, and jurisdiction of the FMC*. Parallel litigation before the Gujarat High Court and subsequent appeals before the SAT and Supreme Court created prolonged procedural entanglement without determination on merits. The repeal of the 1952 Act and merger of FMC into SEBI further complicated the proceedings. The Supreme Court was ultimately called upon to determine whether the SAT was justified in setting aside the FMC order on grounds of natural justice and whether procedural lapses warranted restarting the proceedings. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE Respondent No.1, *Neptune Overseas Limited*, was a company engaged in commodity trading and held *30.18%* shareholding in NMCE. Respondent No.2 was its Managing Director and simultaneously the founder and CEO of NMCE. A complaint dated *28.11.2010* alleged that Respondent No.2 abused his fiduciary position to divert funds and manipulate exchange operations. The FMC initiated inquiry proceedings under *Sections 8(2) and 8(4)* and issued a show cause notice dated *21.06.2011* addressed to Respondent No.2 in his representative capacities. The notice granted *10 days* for response and allowed inspection of documents. Respondent No.2 sought copies of documents, challenged jurisdiction, and requested multiple adjournments. Partial documents were supplied on *05.07.2011*. The FMC denied further adjournment on *20.07.2011* and passed a final order on *23.07.2011* holding Respondent No.2 guilty of *breach of fiduciary duty* and directing action against him and beneficiaries. The Gujarat High Court initially held the challenge premature. However, the Division Bench later quashed the FMC order citing *non-service of notice* on Respondent No.1. The Supreme Court set aside this view in 2018 and relegated the parties to SAT. The SAT again set aside the FMC order citing inadequate opportunity. This led to the present appeals by SEBI and ICEL. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether denial of copies of relied-upon documents violated principles of natural justice? ii. Whether time granted to respond to a voluminous show cause notice was reasonable? iii. Whether service of notice on Respondent No.2 constituted service on Respondent No.1? iv. Whether SAT exceeded its jurisdiction by directing issuance of a fresh show cause notice? v. Whether procedural lapses caused demonstrable prejudice to the respondents? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that *substantial compliance* with natural justice had occurred. They argued that Respondent No.2 had custody of most documents and deliberately delayed proceedings. Reliance was placed on *Chairman, Board of Mining Examination v. Ramjee* to contend that not every procedural infraction invalidates proceedings. It was submitted that Respondent Nos.1 and 2 acted interchangeably and that insisting on separate notice would amount to hyper-technicality. They further argued that the Supreme Court’s 2018 order foreclosed reopening of natural justice issues and that SAT erred in nullifying the FMC order without examining merits. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents contended that the proceedings were fundamentally unfair. They argued that *4,000 pages* of documents were supplied only days before closure of proceedings, making effective defence impossible. Reliance was placed on *Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise* to assert that denial of reasonable opportunity vitiates adjudication when serious consequences follow. They further contended that Respondent No.1 suffered adverse civil consequences without even being served a formal notice, violating audi alteram partem. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court held that while service of notice on Respondent No.2 was valid, denial of adequate time and documents undermined procedural fairness. The Court rejected the contention that respondents should locate documents themselves, holding that when reliance is placed on voluminous records, *the obligation to supply copies is integral to fair hearing*. The Court upheld the principle that *natural justice is flexible* but emphasised that seriousness of allegations heightens procedural safeguards. It accepted that Respondent No.2 attempted delay but held that two weeks to respond to *4,000 pages* was unreasonable. On service of notice, the Court invoked the doctrine of *piercing the corporate veil*, holding that Respondent No.1 could not claim ignorance when both respondents acted jointly. However, the SAT erred in directing issuance of fresh notice. The Court modified the SAT order and directed SEBI to supply remaining documents, grant time to reply, conduct personal hearing, and decide afresh. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment is that *procedural fairness requires supply of relied-upon documents and reasonable time to respond when adjudication entails serious civil consequences*. The Court held that *adequate opportunity* is contextual and depends on volume of material and gravity of allegations. The Court further held that service of notice on a key managerial person may constitute service on the company when facts justify *lifting the corporate veil*. However, fairness cannot be sacrificed on grounds of regulatory urgency. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that regulatory proceedings should not degenerate into prolonged procedural skirmishes. It remarked that insistence on denying copies reflected unnecessary rigidity. It also cautioned against hyper-technical objections that delay substantive adjudication. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Show cause notices relying on voluminous material must be accompanied by copies. ii. Reasonable time must be afforded proportionate to volume and complexity. iii. Corporate veil may be pierced where individuals and companies act inseparably. iv. Regulatory adjudication must balance efficiency with fairness. v. Appeals should ordinarily follow completion of first-stage adjudication. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces that *natural justice is not ornamental*. It must be real and effective, especially where reputational and financial consequences are severe. The Court struck a careful balance by rejecting hyper-technical objections while simultaneously correcting procedural unfairness. By restoring proceedings before SEBI with safeguards, the Court ensured that regulatory accountability proceeds without compromising due process. The ruling serves as a precedent on *fair regulatory adjudication* and clarifies that efficiency cannot eclipse justice. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Chairman, Board of Mining Examination v. Ramjee*, *\[1977\] 2 SCR 904* ii. *Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa*, *\[1983\] 2 SCR 743* iii. *Cement Workers Karamchari Sangh v. Jaipur Udyog Ltd.*, *\[2008\] 5 SCR 276* iv. *Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise*, *\[2015\] 6 SCR 437* v. *New Horizons Ltd. v. Union of India*, *\[1994\] 5 Supp SCR 310* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952* ii. *Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Gajendra Sharma v. Union of India and Another [2020] 13 SCR 835](https://lawfoyer.in/gajendra-sharma-v-union-of-india-and-another-2020-13-scr-835/) **Published:** December 22, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The writ petition arose in the backdrop of the unprecedented economic and social disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the nationwide lockdown imposed under the Disaster Management Act, 2005. The petitioner, a housing loan borrower, challenged the Reserve Bank of India Notification dated 27.03.2020 to the limited extent that it permitted accrual of interest during the moratorium period. The petitioner asserted that charging interest during a period when economic activity was suspended defeated the very purpose of the moratorium and infringed the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution. The petition also invoked principles of natural justice and proportionality, arguing that the State could not simultaneously halt livelihoods and allow financial institutions to impose interest burdens. During the pendency of the petition, the Union of India placed on record a series of affidavits detailing policy measures undertaken to mitigate borrower distress. Central to the resolution was the Ministry of Finance Order dated 23.10.2020, approved by the Union Cabinet, introducing an ex-gratia scheme for waiver of the difference between compound interest and simple interest for specified categories of loans up to ₹2 crores, including housing loans. The petitioner acknowledged that his loan fell squarely within the eligibility framework of the scheme and expressed satisfaction with the relief granted. The Supreme Court, while recognising the magnitude of economic hardship caused by the pandemic, refrained from adjudicating the constitutional validity of the RBI notification. Instead, it disposed of the petition in view of subsequent executive policy decisions, directing effective implementation of the relief scheme so that its benefits reach eligible borrowers. The judgment underscores judicial restraint in economic policy matters during emergencies and affirms the State’s proactive role under disaster management jurisprudence. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The writ petition arose in the backdrop of the unprecedented economic and social disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the nationwide lockdown imposed under the *Disaster Management Act, 2005*. The petitioner, a housing loan borrower, challenged the *Reserve Bank of India Notification dated 27.03.2020* to the limited extent that it permitted accrual of interest during the moratorium period. The petitioner asserted that charging interest during a period when economic activity was suspended defeated the very purpose of the moratorium and infringed the *right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution*. The petition also invoked principles of natural justice and proportionality, arguing that the State could not simultaneously halt livelihoods and allow financial institutions to impose interest burdens. During the pendency of the petition, the Union of India placed on record a series of affidavits detailing policy measures undertaken to mitigate borrower distress. Central to the resolution was the *Ministry of Finance Order dated 23.10.2020*, approved by the Union Cabinet, introducing an *ex-gratia scheme* for waiver of the difference between compound interest and simple interest for specified categories of loans up to ₹2 crores, including housing loans. The petitioner acknowledged that his loan fell squarely within the eligibility framework of the scheme and expressed satisfaction with the relief granted. The Supreme Court, while recognising the magnitude of economic hardship caused by the pandemic, refrained from adjudicating the constitutional validity of the RBI notification. Instead, it disposed of the petition in view of subsequent executive policy decisions, directing effective implementation of the relief scheme so that its benefits reach eligible borrowers. The judgment underscores judicial restraint in economic policy matters during emergencies and affirms the State’s proactive role under disaster management jurisprudence. **Keywords:** COVID-19, Moratorium, Disaster Management Act, Housing Loan, Interest Waiver, Economic Relief ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Gajendra Sharma v. Union of India and Another*Case NumberWrit Petition (Civil) No. 825 of 2020Judgement Date27 November 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumAshok Bhushan J., R. Subhash Reddy J., M.R. Shah J.AuthorAshok Bhushan J.Citation*\[2020\] 13 SCR 835*Legal Provisions Involved*Article 21 of the Constitution of India*; *Sections 6 and 10 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005*Judgments OverruledNilRelated Law SubjectsConstitutional Law, Banking Law, Disaster Management Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The litigation emerged during an extraordinary public health emergency that compelled the Government of India to invoke statutory powers under the *Disaster Management Act, 2005*. The declaration of COVID-19 as a pandemic by the World Health Organization triggered a nationwide lockdown, resulting in suspension of economic activities across sectors. In response to severe liquidity stress faced by borrowers, the *Reserve Bank of India*, exercising its regulatory authority, issued a notification dated *27.03.2020* permitting lending institutions to grant a moratorium on repayment of term loans. The moratorium, initially for three months and later extended to six months, deferred repayment obligations but expressly allowed *interest to continue accruing*. This regulatory design became the focal point of constitutional challenge. Borrowers contended that accrual of interest during a period when income generation was virtually impossible rendered the moratorium illusory. The petitioner, a housing loan borrower, argued that the policy disproportionately burdened individuals and violated substantive due process under *Article 21*. The case assumed significance as it reflected widespread borrower distress and raised broader questions regarding the State’s obligation to balance financial stability with social welfare during disasters. Parallelly, the Union of India undertook extensive policy deliberations to cushion the economic impact of the pandemic. Multiple affidavits placed before the Court documented sector-specific relief measures, fiscal interventions, and coordination with the RBI. The background of the judgment thus reflects a dynamic interaction between judicial scrutiny and evolving executive policy, set against the pressing demands of an unprecedented crisis. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The petitioner had availed a *housing loan of ₹37.48 lakhs from ICICI Bank*. Following the outbreak of COVID-19 and the imposition of a nationwide lockdown, his income streams were severely disrupted. On *27.03.2020*, the *Reserve Bank of India* issued a regulatory notification permitting lending institutions to grant a moratorium on payment of instalments for term loans. The notification explicitly stipulated that *interest shall continue to accrue on the outstanding loan amount during the moratorium period*. The petitioner challenged this stipulation, contending that while instalment payments were deferred, the accumulation of interest imposed an additional financial burden. He argued that the moratorium period coincided with a near-complete cessation of economic activity, making it unjust to impose interest obligations. The petitioner asserted that such accrual effectively increased future EMIs and defeated the objective of borrower relief. The RBI subsequently extended the moratorium by another three months through notification dated *23.05.2020*, maintaining the same condition regarding interest accrual. The petitioner approached the Supreme Court under *Article 32*, seeking a declaration that the impugned portion of the notification was ultra vires and violative of *Article 21*. He also sought a mandamus directing authorities not to charge interest during the moratorium. During the proceedings, affidavits filed by the Union of India revealed a series of financial relief measures, culminating in a policy decision approved by the Union Cabinet on *21.10.2020*. Pursuant thereto, the *Ministry of Finance issued an Order dated 23.10.2020* introducing a scheme for *ex-gratia payment of the difference between compound interest and simple interest* for specified loan categories, including housing loans up to ₹2 crores. The petitioner acknowledged that his grievance stood substantially redressed by this scheme. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether charging interest during the moratorium period under the RBI notification dated *27.03.2020* violates *Article 21 of the Constitution of India*? ii. Whether the moratorium scheme, permitting interest accrual, defeats the object of borrower relief during a disaster declared under the *Disaster Management Act, 2005*? iii. Whether the Central Government is obligated to grant complete waiver of interest during the moratorium period? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the petitioner submitted that the moratorium announced by the RBI was rendered ineffective by permitting interest accrual. It was argued that when the State imposed a complete lockdown, depriving individuals of livelihood, it could not allow financial institutions to continue charging interest. Such action, it was contended, amounted to an unreasonable restriction on the *right to life under Article 21*. The petitioner further argued that the accrual of interest on interest was arbitrary and contrary to principles of natural justice. It was submitted that the *Disaster Management Act, 2005* empowered the Central Government to grant comprehensive relief, including suspension of interest obligations during the disaster period. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the Union of India submitted that the Government was fully conscious of the hardships faced by borrowers and had undertaken a series of calibrated policy measures. It was argued that economic policy decisions, particularly during a crisis, involved complex considerations of financial stability and could not be subjected to rigid judicial mandates. The respondents highlighted the *ex-gratia interest relief scheme dated 23.10.2020*, approved by the Union Cabinet, as a targeted and equitable solution. The RBI supported the policy framework, emphasising that interest accrual was essential to maintain systemic stability of the banking sector. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Article 21, Constitution of India* ii. *Section 6, Disaster Management Act, 2005* iii. *Section 10, Disaster Management Act, 2005* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court acknowledged the severe economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the legitimacy of borrower distress. The Court noted that the moratorium period extended from *01.03.2020 to 31.08.2020*, covering six months of unprecedented disruption. The affidavits filed by the Union of India demonstrated sustained governmental engagement with economic fallout and continuous policy evolution. The Court placed significant reliance on the *Ministry of Finance Order dated 23.10.2020*, which provided for *ex-gratia payment of the difference between compound interest and simple interest*. The Court observed that the petitioner’s housing loan, being below ₹2 crores, was fully covered under the scheme. The petitioner’s express satisfaction with the relief granted weighed heavily in the Court’s approach. Refraining from entering into a constitutional adjudication of the RBI notification, the Court exercised judicial restraint. It held that in view of subsequent policy decisions, the grievance stood substantially redressed. The writ petition was accordingly disposed of with a direction to the respondents to ensure effective implementation of the relief scheme so that its benefits percolate to eligible borrowers. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment lies in the Court’s recognition that *subsequent executive policy measures can validly address and neutralise constitutional grievances raised against earlier regulatory actions*. Where the State, in exercise of powers under the *Disaster Management Act, 2005*, adopts a calibrated relief mechanism approved at the highest executive level, the Court may refrain from striking down regulatory measures. The decision affirms judicial deference to economic policy during emergencies, provided the policy demonstrates reasoned consideration of borrower hardship. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted an unparalleled disruption to both health and economic systems. It noted that lockdown measures, though necessary, had widespread financial consequences. The observations underscore that disaster governance requires balancing competing interests and that relief measures must evolve with changing circumstances. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Lending institutions must ensure faithful implementation of the *ex-gratia interest relief scheme dated 23.10.2020*. ii. Regulatory authorities shall issue follow-up instructions to facilitate uniform application of relief measures. iii. Benefits envisaged under disaster-related economic policies must effectively reach intended beneficiaries. ## J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reflects a pragmatic judicial approach during a national emergency. By prioritising effective implementation of executive relief measures over abstract constitutional adjudication, the Court reinforced the principle of institutional comity. The decision illustrates how disaster jurisprudence accommodates flexibility and responsiveness, while ensuring that borrower welfare remains a central consideration. ## K) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Gajendra Sharma v. Union of India and Another*, *\[2020\] 13 SCR 835* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Constitution of India* ii. *Disaster Management Act, 2005* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Brahmputra Metallics Ltd. & Anr., [2020] 14 S.C.R. 45](https://lawfoyer.in/the-state-of-jharkhand-ors-v-brahmputra-metallics-ltd-anr-2020-14-s-c-r-45/) **Published:** December 22, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment addresses the enforceability of fiscal incentives promised under a State industrial policy and the consequences of administrative delay in issuing statutory notifications. The dispute arose from the Jharkhand Industrial Policy, 2012, which assured 50 percent exemption from electricity duty for captive power plants for five years and mandated issuance of implementing notifications within one month. Despite the policy assurance, the State issued the exemption notification under Section 9 of the Bihar Electricity Duty Act, 1948 after nearly three years and applied it prospectively. The respondent industrial unit contended that such delay defeated the policy promise and violated the doctrine of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation. The High Court struck down the prospective operation of the notification. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the evolution of promissory estoppel, its distinction from legitimate expectation, and the standards of fairness binding State action under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Court held that while the State retains discretion in fiscal matters, it cannot act arbitrarily when it has made a clear representation inducing reliance. The unexplained delay and prospective application of the exemption were found to negate the solemn assurance contained in the policy. However, relief was confined strictly to the financial years consistent with the policy’s own stipulation that benefits accrue from the financial year following commencement of production. The judgment reinforces constitutional accountability in economic governance and clarifies the doctrinal boundaries between promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation in Indian administrative law. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment addresses the enforceability of fiscal incentives promised under a State industrial policy and the consequences of administrative delay in issuing statutory notifications. The dispute arose from the *Jharkhand Industrial Policy, 2012*, which assured *50 percent exemption from electricity duty* for captive power plants for five years and mandated issuance of implementing notifications within one month. Despite the policy assurance, the State issued the exemption notification under *Section 9 of the Bihar Electricity Duty Act, 1948* after nearly three years and applied it prospectively. The respondent industrial unit contended that such delay defeated the policy promise and violated the doctrine of *promissory estoppel* and *legitimate expectation*. The High Court struck down the prospective operation of the notification. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the evolution of promissory estoppel, its distinction from legitimate expectation, and the standards of fairness binding State action under *Article 14 of the Constitution of India*. The Court held that while the State retains discretion in fiscal matters, it cannot act arbitrarily when it has made a clear representation inducing reliance. The unexplained delay and prospective application of the exemption were found to negate the solemn assurance contained in the policy. However, relief was confined strictly to the financial years consistent with the policy’s own stipulation that benefits accrue from the financial year following commencement of production. The judgment reinforces constitutional accountability in economic governance and clarifies the doctrinal boundaries between promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation in Indian administrative law. **Keywords:** Promissory Estoppel; Legitimate Expectation; Industrial Policy; Electricity Duty; Article 14 ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Brahmputra Metallics Ltd. & Anr.*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal Nos. 3860–3862 of 2020iii) Judgement Date01 December 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumDr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.; Indu Malhotra, J.vi) AuthorDr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J.vii) Citation*\[2020\] 14 S.C.R. 45*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Section 9, Bihar Electricity Duty Act, 1948*; *Article 14, Constitution of India*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsConstitutional Law; Administrative Law; Taxation Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The judgment arises from a challenge to fiscal administration under an industrial incentive regime. After the formation of Jharkhand, the State adopted policies to accelerate industrial growth by offering tax concessions and subsidies. The *Jharkhand Industrial Policy, 2012* was framed with explicit objectives of encouraging investment, generating employment, and ensuring value addition to natural resources. A critical incentive under the policy was exemption from *50 percent electricity duty* for captive power plants, both new and existing, for five years. The policy not only declared the incentive but also imposed a clear administrative obligation upon the State to issue implementing notifications within one month. This assurance was central to investor confidence and business planning. Despite this, the implementing notification under the parent taxing statute was delayed by almost three years and made operative only prospectively. The delay resulted in eligible industrial units losing a substantial portion of the promised benefit. The respondent invoked constitutional remedies alleging arbitrariness, breach of legitimate expectation, and violation of promissory estoppel. The case thus presented a constitutional conflict between *executive discretion in fiscal matters* and *fairness obligations arising from policy representations*. The Supreme Court used this dispute as an opportunity to restate principles governing State accountability, economic promises, and administrative fairness under Article 14. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The respondent established an integrated steel manufacturing unit with a *20 MW captive power plant* in Jharkhand and commenced commercial production on *17 August 2011*. It was duly registered under the *Bihar (Jharkhand) Electricity Duty Rules, 1949* and assessed to electricity duty for subsequent financial years. The State notified the *Industrial Policy, 2012* on *16 June 2012*, promising exemption of *50 percent electricity duty* for captive power plants for five years. Clause *35.7(b)* clarified that incentives would accrue from the financial year following commencement of production, while Clause *38(b)* mandated issuance of implementing notifications within one month. Contrary to this assurance, the State failed to issue the required notification under *Section 9 of the Bihar Electricity Duty Act, 1948* within the stipulated time. It was only on *08 January 2015* that the exemption notification was issued, restricting its effect prospectively. As a result, the respondent paid full electricity duty for *FY 2011–12, 2012–13, and 2013–14*. Aggrieved by denial of promised benefits, the respondent approached the Jharkhand High Court, which struck down the prospective clause and granted adjustment of paid duty. The State challenged this decision before the Supreme Court. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the State could deny fiscal incentives promised under an industrial policy by delaying statutory notification? ii. Whether prospective application of the exemption violated *promissory estoppel*? iii. Whether administrative delay without justification amounted to arbitrariness under *Article 14*? iv. Whether the respondent was entitled to retrospective adjustment of electricity duty paid? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the State submitted that no vested right accrued until issuance of statutory notification. It was argued that fiscal exemptions require strict statutory compliance and cannot be implied from policy statements alone. The State relied on precedents restricting refund claims and emphasized alternative statutory remedies and limitation bars. It was further contended that the respondent had accepted assessments without protest and that retrospective relief would result in unjust enrichment. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent contended that the policy constituted a clear representation inducing reliance. The delay was administrative and unexplained. Making the notification prospective defeated the very purpose of the policy. Reliance was placed on *Motilal Padampat*, *Kalyanpur Cement*, and *Manuelsons Hotels*, asserting that State action violating legitimate expectation and fairness is unconstitutional. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Article 14, Constitution of India* ii. *Section 9, Bihar Electricity Duty Act, 1948* iii. *Jharkhand Industrial Policy, 2012* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s conclusion that the State acted arbitrarily. The Court held that the Industrial Policy, 2012 created a legitimate expectation of fiscal benefit. The unexplained delay and prospective application negated the policy assurance. Such conduct was found violative of *Article 14*. However, the Court modified the relief by strictly applying Clause *35.7(b)* of the policy. Since benefits accrue only from the financial year following commencement of production, the respondent was held *not entitled* for FY 2011–12 but entitled for FYs 2012–13 and 2013–14. The Court emphasized that the State cannot rely on its own administrative failure to defeat citizens’ rights arising from policy representations. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** A State that makes a clear policy representation inducing reliance cannot defeat legitimate expectation by unexplained administrative delay. Prospective enforcement of delayed fiscal notifications, contrary to policy assurances, constitutes arbitrariness under Article 14. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that colonial notions of unchecked State discretion are incompatible with modern constitutional governance. Transparency, accountability, and fairness must guide economic administration. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Policy assurances must be implemented within stipulated timelines. ii. Administrative delay requires public interest justification. iii. Fiscal discretion is subject to constitutional scrutiny. iv. Legitimate expectation operates independently of statutory entitlement. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Motilal Padampat Sagar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P.*, *\[1979\] 2 SCR 641* 2. *State of Bihar v. Kalyanpur Cement Ltd.*, *\[2010\] 1 SCR 928* 3. *Manuelsons Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Kerala*, *\[2016\] 3 SCR 718* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Constitution of India* 2. *Bihar Electricity Duty Act, 1948* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [S. D. Containers Indore v. M/s Mold Tek Packaging Ltd., [2020] 12 SCR 1104](https://lawfoyer.in/s-d-containers-indore-v-m-s-mold-tek-packaging-ltd-2020-12-scr-1104/) **Published:** December 22, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The decision in S. D. Containers Indore v. M/s Mold Tek Packaging Ltd. addresses the nuanced jurisdictional conflict arising at the intersection of the Design Act, 2000 and the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The Supreme Court was called upon to clarify the legal mechanism governing the transfer of suits involving design infringement where the defendant raises a plea for cancellation of a registered design under Section 19 of the Design Act, 2000. The core controversy emerged from the improper reliance placed by the High Court on Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Reckitt Benckiser Australia Pty. Ltd., leading to an erroneous conclusion that only the Controller of Designs possessed exclusive jurisdiction over cancellation proceedings. The Court undertook a meticulous statutory interpretation of Sections 19 and 22 of the Design Act, 2000, delineating the two independent remedies available for cancellation of registered designs. It reaffirmed that while Section 19 empowers any interested person to seek cancellation before the Controller, Section 22(4) mandates the transfer of an infringement suit to the High Court when revocation is pleaded as a defence. The judgment further clarified that the transfer is automatic and ministerial in nature once such defence is raised. The ruling decisively resolves the confusion concerning the appropriate High Court to which such suits must be transferred, holding that jurisdiction vests in the High Court within whose territorial limits the cause of action arises. By setting aside the High Court’s order and remitting the matter to the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench, the Supreme Court reinforced jurisdictional discipline and procedural clarity in intellectual property litigation. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The decision in *S. D. Containers Indore v. M/s Mold Tek Packaging Ltd.* addresses the nuanced jurisdictional conflict arising at the intersection of the *Design Act, 2000* and the *Commercial Courts Act, 2015*. The Supreme Court was called upon to clarify the legal mechanism governing the transfer of suits involving design infringement where the defendant raises a plea for cancellation of a registered design under *Section 19* of the *Design Act, 2000*. The core controversy emerged from the improper reliance placed by the High Court on *Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Reckitt Benckiser Australia Pty. Ltd.*, leading to an erroneous conclusion that only the Controller of Designs possessed exclusive jurisdiction over cancellation proceedings. The Court undertook a meticulous statutory interpretation of *Sections 19 and 22* of the *Design Act, 2000*, delineating the two independent remedies available for cancellation of registered designs. It reaffirmed that while *Section 19* empowers any interested person to seek cancellation before the Controller, *Section 22(4)* mandates the transfer of an infringement suit to the High Court when revocation is pleaded as a defence. The judgment further clarified that the transfer is automatic and ministerial in nature once such defence is raised. The ruling decisively resolves the confusion concerning the appropriate High Court to which such suits must be transferred, holding that jurisdiction vests in the High Court within whose territorial limits the cause of action arises. By setting aside the High Court’s order and remitting the matter to the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench, the Supreme Court reinforced jurisdictional discipline and procedural clarity in intellectual property litigation. **Keywords:** Design Act, 2000; Commercial Courts Act, 2015; Jurisdiction; Cancellation of Design; Section 22(4) ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*S. D. Containers Indore v. M/s Mold Tek Packaging Ltd.*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 3695 of 2020iii) Judgement Date01 December 2020iv) Court*Supreme Court of India*v) Quorum*L. Nageswara Rao, Hemant Gupta, Ajay Rastogi, JJ.*vi) Author*Hemant Gupta, J.*vii) Citation*\[2020\] 12 SCR 1104*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 4(a), 19, 22 of the Design Act, 2000; Sections 3, 7, 21 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law Subjects*Intellectual Property Law; Commercial Law; Civil Procedure* ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The judgment arose in the backdrop of persistent judicial ambiguity regarding jurisdictional competence in design infringement litigation, particularly after the enactment of the *Commercial Courts Act, 2015*. The dispute originated from a suit for declaration and permanent injunction concerning infringement of registered container and lid designs. The plaintiff invoked statutory protection under the *Design Act, 2000*, asserting exclusivity over registered industrial designs. The defendant, in response, not only contested infringement but actively challenged the validity of the registered designs by invoking *Section 4(a)*, asserting absence of novelty and originality. This defensive strategy triggered the statutory mechanism under *Section 22(4)*, mandating transfer of the suit upon the raising of cancellation grounds. However, procedural confusion ensued when the Commercial Court transferred the suit to the Calcutta High Court, despite the cause of action having arisen entirely within Indore. The Madhya Pradesh High Court compounded the error by relying upon *Godrej Sara Lee Ltd.*, misapplying its ratio to a fact situation involving a civil suit rather than a controller-initiated cancellation proceeding. The Supreme Court’s intervention was thus necessitated to clarify the interplay between the *Design Act, 2000* and the *Commercial Courts Act, 2015*, particularly in jurisdictions lacking ordinary original civil jurisdiction. The ruling undertakes a purposive construction of the statutes, ensuring that procedural routes do not frustrate substantive rights of parties in intellectual property disputes. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The plaintiff, *M/s Mold Tek Packaging Ltd.*, instituted a commercial suit at Indore seeking a declaration and permanent injunction restraining *S. D. Containers Indore* from copying or using its registered designs relating to containers and lids bearing *Design Application Nos. 299039 and 299041*. The registrations were asserted to be valid, subsisting, and exclusive under the *Design Act, 2000*. Upon service of summons, the defendant filed a written statement coupled with a counterclaim, alleging that the impugned designs lacked novelty and originality and were therefore non-registrable under *Section 4(a)*. The defendant simultaneously filed an application under *Section 22(4) read with Section 19(2)* seeking transfer of the suit to the High Court. The Commercial Court allowed the application but erroneously ordered transfer to the Calcutta High Court. Aggrieved, the plaintiff challenged this order before the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The High Court, relying upon *Godrej Sara Lee Ltd.*, held that cancellation proceedings lie exclusively before the Controller of Designs and that the Commercial Court retained jurisdiction. This led to the present appeal before the Supreme Court, questioning both the interpretation of statutory provisions and the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court to which the suit was transferred. The factual matrix thus squarely presented a legal question of jurisdiction rather than merits of design validity. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether a civil suit involving design infringement must be transferred to the High Court upon a plea of cancellation under *Section 19* being raised as a defence under *Section 22(3)*? ii. Whether the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 overrides the mandatory transfer mechanism under *Section 22(4) of the Design Act, 2000*? iii. Which High Court possesses territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate a transferred suit under *Section 22(4)*? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that once a plea for cancellation of registration is raised, *Section 22(4)* operates automatically and mandates transfer of the suit to the High Court. It was argued that the Commercial Court has no discretion to examine merits of cancellation. Reliance was placed upon *Standard Glass Beads Factory v. Shri Dhar* to contend that the expression *“shall be transferred”* leaves no residual jurisdiction with the trial court. It was further argued that appellate jurisdiction under *Section 19(2)* is distinct from original jurisdiction exercised under *Section 22(4)*. The appellant contended that the High Court misapplied *Godrej Sara Lee Ltd.*, which arose from cancellation proceedings before the Controller and not from an infringement suit. The Commercial Courts Act, 2015 was argued not to dilute statutory mandates under the Design Act. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent submitted that cancellation proceedings are exclusively vested with the Controller of Designs under *Section 19*. It was argued that permitting High Courts to entertain such pleas would create parallel jurisdictions. Reliance was placed upon *Godrej Sara Lee Ltd.* and *Whirlpool of India v. Videocon Industries Ltd.* to assert that remedies under *Sections 19 and 22* are distinct and independent. The respondent argued that the Commercial Court was competent to adjudicate the suit and that the High Court correctly exercised supervisory jurisdiction. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court categorically held that *Sections 19 and 22* of the *Design Act, 2000* provide two independent statutory routes for cancellation of design registration. The Court clarified that while *Section 19* operates independently before the Controller, *Section 22(4)* is triggered only when cancellation is pleaded as a defence in an infringement suit. The Court rejected the High Court’s reliance on *Godrej Sara Lee Ltd.*, holding that it dealt with appellate jurisdiction from the Controller’s order and not with a transferred civil suit. The Court emphasized that once a cancellation defence is raised, transfer becomes ministerial and non-discretionary. On jurisdiction, the Court held that the High Court within whose territorial limits the cause of action arises alone possesses jurisdiction. Since no part of the cause of action arose in Kolkata, transfer to the Calcutta High Court was declared illegal. The matter was remitted to the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench for adjudication in accordance with law. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio rests upon the statutory interpretation that *Section 22(4)* mandates automatic transfer of a suit to the High Court when revocation grounds under *Section 19* are raised as a defence. The Commercial Courts Act does not override this mandate in absence of inconsistency. Jurisdiction lies only with the High Court where cause of action arises. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that conflating appellate jurisdiction with original jurisdiction leads to procedural chaos. It cautioned against mechanical reliance on precedents without contextual application. These observations reinforce judicial discipline in statutory interpretation. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Trial courts must transfer suits immediately upon cancellation defence being raised. ii. Merits of cancellation cannot be examined by Commercial Courts. iii. Transfer must be to the jurisdictional High Court only. iv. Commercial Courts Act does not dilute Design Act mandates. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment decisively resolves long-standing jurisdictional confusion in design litigation. It strengthens procedural certainty and prevents forum shopping. The ruling reinforces statutory supremacy and aligns intellectual property adjudication with legislative intent. The decision will significantly streamline future design infringement litigation across India. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Reckitt Benckiser Australia Pty. Ltd.*, *(2010) 2 SCC 535* ii. *Standard Glass Beads Factory v. Shri Dhar*, *AIR 1961 All 101* iii. *Whirlpool of India v. Videocon Industries Ltd.*, *2014 SCC OnLine Bom 565* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Design Act, 2000* ii. *Commercial Courts Act, 2015* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Sandeep Kumar and Others v. State of Uttarakhand and Another, (2020) 13 SCR 848](https://lawfoyer.in/sandeep-kumar-and-others-v-state-of-uttarakhand-and-another-2020-13-scr-848/) **Published:** December 22, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the legal sustainability of a conviction under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 concerning an alleged dowry death by poisoning. The appellants, being the husband and parents-in-law of the deceased, were acquitted by the Trial Court, but the High Court reversed the acquittal and imposed life imprisonment. The Supreme Court scrutinised whether the essential statutory ingredients of dowry death were satisfied and whether the High Court was justified in overturning a reasoned acquittal. The Court undertook a meticulous reappreciation of evidence relating to dowry demand, cruelty soon before death, and unnatural death. The prosecution case rested heavily on oral testimonies alleging a demand of Rs. 10 lakhs and a theory of poisoning. However, material contradictions among prosecution witnesses, absence of contemporaneous complaints, lack of medical or forensic proof of poisoning, and credible defence evidence regarding the deceased’s prolonged medical condition were found decisive. The judgment reiterates that Section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872 creates a presumption only after the prosecution discharges its foundational burden. The Court clarified that suspicion, however grave, cannot replace proof, and appellate interference with acquittal is permissible only where findings are perverse or manifestly illegal. By restoring the Trial Court’s acquittal, the Court reaffirmed principles governing dowry death prosecutions, evidentiary standards in poisoning cases, and the limited scope of appellate reversal of acquittals. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment examines the legal sustainability of a conviction under *Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860* concerning an alleged dowry death by poisoning. The appellants, being the husband and parents-in-law of the deceased, were acquitted by the Trial Court, but the High Court reversed the acquittal and imposed life imprisonment. The Supreme Court scrutinised whether the essential statutory ingredients of dowry death were satisfied and whether the High Court was justified in overturning a reasoned acquittal. The Court undertook a meticulous reappreciation of evidence relating to *dowry demand*, *cruelty soon before death*, and *unnatural death*. The prosecution case rested heavily on oral testimonies alleging a demand of *Rs. 10 lakhs* and a theory of *poisoning*. However, material contradictions among prosecution witnesses, absence of contemporaneous complaints, lack of medical or forensic proof of poisoning, and credible defence evidence regarding the deceased’s prolonged medical condition were found decisive. The judgment reiterates that *Section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872* creates a presumption only after the prosecution discharges its foundational burden. The Court clarified that suspicion, however grave, cannot replace proof, and appellate interference with acquittal is permissible only where findings are perverse or manifestly illegal. By restoring the Trial Court’s acquittal, the Court reaffirmed principles governing dowry death prosecutions, evidentiary standards in poisoning cases, and the limited scope of appellate reversal of acquittals. **Keywords:** Dowry death; Section 304B IPC; poisoning; presumption under Section 113B Evidence Act; appellate interference with acquittal. ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Sandeep Kumar and Others v. State of Uttarakhand and Another*Case NumberCriminal Appeal Nos. 1512–1513 of 2017Judgement Date02 December 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumR.F. Nariman, K.M. Joseph, Aniruddha Bose, JJ.AuthorK.M. Joseph, J.Citation(2020) 13 SCR 848Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 304B IPC; 113B Evidence Act; Sections 313, 378, 386 CrPC*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsCriminal Law; Evidence Law ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The case arose from the death of a young married woman within seven years of marriage, triggering prosecution under *Section 304B IPC*. The legislative intent behind this provision is to curb the social menace of dowry deaths by reversing the evidentiary burden through statutory presumptions. However, such presumption operates only upon proof of specific foundational facts. The Trial Court, after extensive evaluation of oral, documentary, medical, and forensic evidence, found that the prosecution failed to establish the core elements of dowry death. The High Court reversed this acquittal, primarily relying on circumstantial inferences, alleged dowry demand, and recovery of the body from a car. The Supreme Court was thus called upon to assess whether the High Court exceeded its appellate jurisdiction by substituting its own view in a case where two plausible views existed, and whether the evidence justified invocation of the statutory presumption under *Section 113B of the Evidence Act*. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The deceased was married to the first appellant on *10 December 2009*. She died on *23 January 2011*. An FIR was lodged by her father alleging harassment for dowry and death by poisoning. It was alleged that the husband demanded *Rs. 10 lakhs* for construction purposes and that the deceased was threatened with death if the demand was not met. The prosecution examined eleven witnesses, including family members and investigating officers. The defence examined four medical witnesses who deposed regarding the deceased’s long-standing medical issues, including *tuberculosis*, *eosinophilia*, and *severe underweight condition*. Post-mortem examination revealed *no external injuries*. Viscera analysis and forensic laboratory reports categorically ruled out poisoning. No poisonous substance was recovered from the appellants or their residence. Medical experts opined that death could have resulted from natural causes, including complications arising from tuberculosis. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether the prosecution proved that the death of the deceased was *unnatural*? ii. Whether the alleged demand of *Rs. 10 lakhs* constituted *dowry demand* under law? iii. Whether cruelty or harassment was proved *soon before death*? iv. Whether the presumption under *Section 113B of the Evidence Act* was rightly invoked? v. Whether the High Court was justified in reversing a well-reasoned acquittal? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellants submitted that the High Court ignored settled principles governing appeals against acquittal. It was argued that *unnatural death* was not proved, which is a sine qua non for *Section 304B IPC*. The forensic report conclusively ruled out poisoning, and no corroborative medical evidence existed. It was further contended that alleged dowry demand was inconsistent, contradictory, and not supported by contemporaneous conduct or complaints. Medical evidence showing prolonged illness and severe underweight condition was overlooked by the High Court. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the respondents submitted that the deceased died within seven years of marriage and that evidence of harassment for money was sufficient to attract *Section 304B IPC*. The recovery of the body from the car and failure of the accused to explain circumstances of death were emphasised. Reliance was placed on circumstantial evidence and Section 106 CrPC. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. *Section 304B IPC* ii. *Section 113B Evidence Act* iii. *Sections 313, 378, 386 CrPC* ## **I) JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court held that *Section 304B IPC* requires strict proof of four elements, including *unnatural death* and *cruelty soon before death*. The prosecution failed to establish these foundational facts. The alleged demand of *Rs. 10 lakhs* was found riddled with irreconcilable contradictions among witnesses. The Court applied the principles laid down in *Anant Chintaman Lagu v. State of Bombay* for poisoning cases and found that none of the three essential tests were satisfied. Forensic evidence conclusively ruled out poisoning, and medical opinion supported a natural cause of death. The High Court was found to have improperly substituted its view without demonstrating perversity in the Trial Court’s findings, contrary to settled law in *Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh* and *Chhotan Sao v. State of Bihar*. The presumption under *Section 113B Evidence Act* was held inapplicable as the prosecution failed to prove cruelty linked to dowry demand soon before death. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** Conviction under *Section 304B IPC* cannot be sustained unless *unnatural death* and *dowry-related cruelty soon before death* are proved beyond reasonable doubt. Statutory presumption under *Section 113B Evidence Act* arises only after discharge of foundational burden by the prosecution. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court cautioned against routine reversal of acquittals in dowry death cases and emphasised judicial restraint, especially where personal liberty is at stake. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Appellate courts must interfere with acquittals only for compelling reasons. ii. Forensic and medical evidence must be given due primacy in poisoning cases. iii. Presumptions under *Section 113B* cannot replace proof of essential ingredients. ## **J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment reinforces doctrinal clarity on dowry death jurisprudence. It balances societal concern against misuse of stringent provisions by reiterating evidentiary discipline. The ruling serves as a precedent on the limits of appellate interference and underscores that criminal conviction must rest on proof, not moral outrage. ## **K) REFERENCES** ### **Important Cases Referred** - *Anant Chintaman Lagu v. State of Bombay*, AIR 1960 SC 500 - *Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh*, (2008) 10 SCC 450 - *Chhotan Sao v. State of Bihar*, (2014) 4 SCC 54 - *Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra*, (1984) 4 SCC 116 ### **Important Statutes Referred** - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljit Singh & Ors., [2020] 13 S.C.R. 770](https://lawfoyer.in/paramvir-singh-saini-v-baljit-singh-ors-2020-13-s-c-r-770/) **Published:** December 21, 2025 **Author:** Antavya Singh **Excerpt:** The judgment in Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljit Singh & Ors. addresses the persistent failure of States, Union Territories, and central investigative agencies to meaningfully implement prior directions of the Supreme Court concerning installation and functioning of CCTV cameras in police stations and investigative offices. The Court examined compliance with its earlier order dated 03.04.2018 passed in Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh, which mandated videography of crime scenes and establishment of oversight mechanisms. Upon perusal of affidavits filed by several States and Union Territories, the Court found the disclosures grossly inadequate, vague, and evasive, particularly regarding the number, positioning, operational status, audio-video capability, and data retention period of CCTV cameras. The judgment emphasises that CCTV surveillance in police stations is not an administrative luxury but a constitutional necessity flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Court laid down detailed directions regarding constitution of State Level and District Level Oversight Committees, allocation of funds, technical specifications of CCTV systems, responsibility of Station House Officers, preservation of footage, and accessibility of recordings for redressal of custodial violence, serious injuries, and deaths. The judgment also extended the mandate to central agencies such as CBI, NIA, ED, NCB, DRI, and SFIO. The Court reinforced accountability, transparency, and human rights protection as the core constitutional values underpinning these directions and treated non-compliance as a serious affront to rule of law. **Content:** ## A) **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment in *Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljit Singh & Ors.* addresses the persistent failure of States, Union Territories, and central investigative agencies to meaningfully implement prior directions of the Supreme Court concerning installation and functioning of CCTV cameras in police stations and investigative offices. The Court examined compliance with its earlier order dated *03.04.2018* passed in *Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh*, which mandated videography of crime scenes and establishment of oversight mechanisms. Upon perusal of affidavits filed by several States and Union Territories, the Court found the disclosures grossly inadequate, vague, and evasive, particularly regarding the number, positioning, operational status, audio-video capability, and data retention period of CCTV cameras. The judgment emphasises that CCTV surveillance in police stations is not an administrative luxury but a constitutional necessity flowing from *Article 21 of the Constitution of India*. The Court laid down detailed directions regarding constitution of State Level and District Level Oversight Committees, allocation of funds, technical specifications of CCTV systems, responsibility of Station House Officers, preservation of footage, and accessibility of recordings for redressal of custodial violence, serious injuries, and deaths. The judgment also extended the mandate to central agencies such as *CBI, NIA, ED, NCB, DRI,* and *SFIO*. The Court reinforced accountability, transparency, and human rights protection as the core constitutional values underpinning these directions and treated non-compliance as a serious affront to rule of law. ***Keywords:*** *CCTV surveillance*, *custodial violence*, *Article 21*, *police accountability*, *human rights courts* ## B) **CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljit Singh & Ors.*ii) Case NumberSpecial Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 3543 of 2020iii) Judgement Date*02 December 2020*iv) Court*Supreme Court of India*v) Quorum*Rohinton Fali Nariman, K.M. Joseph and Aniruddha Bose, JJ.*vi) Author*Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman*vii) Citation*\[2020\] 13 S.C.R. 770*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Article 21 of the Constitution of India; Sections 161 CrPC; Sections 17, 18 & 30 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993*ix) Judgments overruled*None*x) Related Law Subjects*Constitutional Law; Criminal Law; Human Rights Law* ## C) **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The judgment emerged from continuing judicial concern regarding custodial violence, illegal detentions, and abuse of police power. The Supreme Court revisited its earlier directions in *Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2018) 5 SCC 311*, which had mandated use of videography at crime scenes and creation of a Central Oversight Body under the Ministry of Home Affairs. The background of the present proceedings lies in the failure of executive authorities to operationalise these directions even after a lapse of more than two and a half years. The Court took judicial notice of the fact that custodial deaths and allegations of torture continue despite constitutional guarantees under *Article 21*. The absence of objective recording mechanisms was seen as a structural deficiency enabling impunity. Earlier jurisprudence, particularly *D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (2015) 8 SCC 744*, had already recognised custodial torture as a direct violation of fundamental rights. The present judgment situates CCTV surveillance as an extension of those constitutional safeguards. The issue was triggered when affidavits filed by States and Union Territories, pursuant to orders dated *16.07.2020* and *16.09.2020*, failed to disclose basic data regarding CCTV installation. The Court found that the affidavits lacked transparency and accountability, reflecting a mechanical compliance approach. This prompted the Court to issue granular, enforceable directions addressing infrastructure, funding, oversight, and grievance redressal. The background thus reflects judicial frustration with executive inertia and reiterates the Court’s constitutional role as guardian of personal liberty. ## D) **FACTS OF THE CASE** The petitioner approached the Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition challenging the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dated *22.11.2016*. During the pendency of the matter, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of inquiry to systemic issues concerning audio-video recording in police stations. On *03.04.2018*, the Court in *Shafhi Mohammad* directed establishment of a Central Oversight Body and mandated videography of crime scenes. Pursuant to this, the Ministry of Home Affairs constituted the COB on *09.05.2018*. Subsequent directions required States and Union Territories to submit Action Taken Reports. By orders dated *16.07.2020* and *16.09.2020*, the Court sought specific disclosures regarding CCTV cameras in police stations and constitution of Oversight Committees. Fourteen States and two Union Territories filed affidavits. Upon examination, the Court found that most affidavits failed to specify the *number of police stations*, *number and placement of cameras*, *working condition*, *audio capability*, and *data retention period*. The Court also noted that Oversight Committees mandated earlier were either not constituted or existed only on paper. No clarity was provided on budgetary allocation or maintenance responsibility. This factual vacuum compelled the Court to issue exhaustive directions to ensure real-time compliance. The facts thus demonstrated systemic non-compliance rather than isolated administrative lapses. ## E) **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether installation of CCTV cameras in police stations is an enforceable component of *Article 21 of the Constitution of India*? ii. Whether States and Union Territories have failed to comply with binding directions issued under *Article 142*? iii. Whether absence of oversight mechanisms facilitates custodial violence and human rights violations? iv. Whether central investigative agencies are equally bound by CCTV installation mandates? ## F) **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the Petitioner submitted that absence of CCTV surveillance enables unchecked custodial abuse and frustrates fair investigation. It was argued that earlier directions of the Supreme Court were treated as advisory rather than binding. Reliance was placed on *D.K. Basu*, where custodial safeguards were held intrinsic to personal liberty. The Petitioner contended that without audio-video recording, procedural protections under *Sections 161 and 41 CrPC* remain illusory. The failure to install CCTV cameras was argued to amount to a continuing constitutional violation. ## G) **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the Respondents submitted that steps were being taken progressively and cited logistical and financial constraints. It was argued that several police stations are located in remote areas lacking electricity and internet connectivity. The States contended that phased implementation was underway and sought further time. The Union of India submitted that the Central Oversight Body had already issued advisories and that compliance was a shared federal responsibility. ## H) **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. *Article 21 of the Constitution of India* ii. *Section 161(3) CrPC* iii. *Sections 17, 18 and 30 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993* ## I) **JUDGEMENT** The Court categorically held that CCTV installation in police stations is a constitutional imperative flowing from *Article 21*. It rejected financial and logistical excuses and held that technological limitations cannot dilute fundamental rights. The Court issued binding directions mandating installation of CCTV cameras covering all critical areas of police stations, including lock-ups, corridors, interrogation rooms, and entry-exit points. The judgment created a detailed institutional framework by mandating State Level Oversight Committees and District Level Oversight Committees with clearly defined compositions and duties. Responsibility for maintenance and functioning was fixed upon the *Station House Officer*. The Court specified technical standards including night vision, audio recording, and minimum storage of *18 months*. Significantly, the Court extended these directions to central investigative agencies such as *CBI, NIA, ED, NCB, DRI,* and *SFIO*. It directed installation of CCTV cameras in interrogation rooms of these agencies. The judgment further mandated establishment of *Human Rights Courts* in every district to address complaints of custodial violence. The Court treated non-compliance as a serious breach of constitutional duty and directed senior bureaucrats to file affidavits with concrete timelines. The tone of the judgment reflects constitutional urgency and intolerance towards executive apathy. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment lies in the holding that *CCTV surveillance in police stations is an integral safeguard of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21*. The Court affirmed that transparency in police functioning is non-negotiable. By linking CCTV installation to prevention of custodial torture, the Court elevated administrative compliance to constitutional obligation. The ratio also clarifies that earlier directions issued under *Article 142* are binding and enforceable. Failure to implement them amounts to constitutional contempt. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that public confidence in the criminal justice system depends upon visible accountability. It noted that technological tools like CCTV are neutral witnesses that protect both citizens and honest police officers. The Court also remarked that human rights commissions must actively utilise CCTV footage rather than remain passive recipients of complaints. These observations, though not forming the core ratio, underline the Court’s broader vision of rights-based policing. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Constitution of *State Level Oversight Committees* and *District Level Oversight Committees*. ii. Mandatory budgetary allocation by Finance Departments. iii. Installation of audio-video CCTV cameras with night vision. iv. Minimum data retention of *18 months*. v. Responsibility of SHO for maintenance and reporting. vi. Establishment of *Human Rights Courts* in each district. vii. Display of signage informing citizens of CCTV coverage and complaint mechanisms. ## J) **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment represents a decisive constitutional intervention aimed at structural reform rather than episodic correction. It bridges the gap between abstract rights and operational safeguards. By embedding surveillance within *Article 21*, the Court ensured that accountability mechanisms acquire constitutional permanence. The insistence on oversight committees reflects judicial awareness that technology without supervision degenerates into symbolism. The extension of directions to central agencies removes institutional asymmetry and reinforces equality before law. The judgment also strengthens the remedial architecture by linking CCTV footage to *Human Rights Courts* and commissions. The approach reflects a rights-centric model of policing aligned with international human rights norms against custodial torture. The judgment stands as a strong reminder that governance failures affecting liberty invite strict judicial scrutiny. It recalibrates the balance between state power and individual dignity and reinforces the Supreme Court’s role as sentinel of constitutional morality. ## K) **REFERENCES** **a) *Important Cases Referred*** i. *Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2018) 5 SCC 311* ii. *D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (2015) 8 SCC 744* **b) *Important Statutes Referred*** i. *Constitution of India* ii. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* iii. *Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Sandeep Kumar and Others v. State of Uttarakhand and Another, [2020] 13 S.C.R. 848](https://lawfoyer.in/sandeep-kumar-and-others-v-state-of-uttarakhand-and-another-2020-13-s-c-r-848/) **Published:** December 21, 2025 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The judgment concerns the scope and limits of Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, dealing with dowry death, and the corresponding presumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court was justified in reversing an order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Court in a case alleging dowry death by poisoning. The deceased, married within seven years of her death, was found dead under circumstances alleged to be unnatural. The prosecution relied primarily on circumstantial evidence, assertions of dowry demand, and alleged poisoning. The Supreme Court undertook a meticulous reappreciation of evidence, emphasizing that proof of unnatural death and cruelty or harassment soon before death in connection with dowry demand are foundational requirements under Section 304B IPC. The Court found that the prosecution failed to establish poisoning as the cause of death, particularly in light of the Forensic Science Laboratory report negating the presence of poison and medical testimony suggesting alternate natural causes such as tuberculosis. The Court also scrutinized contradictions in testimonies regarding the alleged demand of ₹10 lakhs and found them irreconcilable. Importantly, the Court reiterated the settled principle that appellate courts should not lightly interfere with acquittals unless findings are perverse or manifestly illegal. Holding that the High Court exceeded its appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court restored the acquittal. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment concerns the scope and limits of *Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860*, dealing with *dowry death*, and the corresponding presumption under *Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872*. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court was justified in reversing an order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Court in a case alleging dowry death by poisoning. The deceased, married within seven years of her death, was found dead under circumstances alleged to be unnatural. The prosecution relied primarily on circumstantial evidence, assertions of dowry demand, and alleged poisoning. The Supreme Court undertook a meticulous reappreciation of evidence, emphasizing that proof of *unnatural death* and *cruelty or harassment soon before death in connection with dowry demand* are foundational requirements under *Section 304B IPC*. The Court found that the prosecution failed to establish poisoning as the cause of death, particularly in light of the *Forensic Science Laboratory report* negating the presence of poison and medical testimony suggesting alternate natural causes such as *tuberculosis*. The Court also scrutinized contradictions in testimonies regarding the alleged demand of ₹10 lakhs and found them irreconcilable. Importantly, the Court reiterated the settled principle that appellate courts should not lightly interfere with acquittals unless findings are perverse or manifestly illegal. Holding that the High Court exceeded its appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court restored the acquittal. **Keywords:** Dowry death, Section 304B IPC, Section 113B Evidence Act, poisoning, appellate interference, presumption of innocence ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgment Cause Title*Sandeep Kumar and Others v. State of Uttarakhand and Another*ii) Case NumberCriminal Appeal Nos. 1512–1513 of 2017iii) Judgment Date02 December 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumR.F. Nariman, K.M. Joseph, Aniruddha Bose, JJ.vi) AuthorJustice K.M. Josephvii) Citation*\[2020\] 13 S.C.R. 848*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 304B IPC, 113B Evidence Act, Sections 313, 378, 386 CrPC*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsCriminal Law, Evidence Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The judgment arises from an appeal against the reversal of acquittal by the Uttarakhand High Court in a prosecution for *dowry death*. The appellants included the husband and parents-in-law of the deceased. The trial court had acquitted them, holding that the prosecution failed to prove essential ingredients of *Section 304B IPC*. The High Court, however, reversed the acquittal and convicted the appellants, primarily relying on circumstantial evidence and invoking the presumption under *Section 113B of the Evidence Act*. This reversal prompted the appeal before the Supreme Court. The background of the case reveals systemic issues frequently encountered in dowry death prosecutions—overreliance on presumptions, weak forensic linkage, and contradictions in testimonial evidence. The Supreme Court approached the matter by reasserting the doctrinal safeguards surrounding criminal jurisprudence, especially the *double presumption of innocence* following an acquittal. The judgment is significant for its careful distinction between *suspicion* and *proof*, and for reaffirming the evidentiary thresholds necessary to sustain a conviction under *Section 304B IPC*. It also clarifies the legal parameters governing appellate interference with acquittals. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The deceased was married to the first appellant on *10 December 2009*. Her death occurred on *23 January 2011*, within seven years of marriage. An FIR was lodged by her father alleging that the appellants harassed his daughter for dowry and caused her death by poisoning. According to the prosecution, a demand of *₹10 lakhs* was made by the husband for construction of a house. It was alleged that failure to meet this demand resulted in cruelty and eventual poisoning of the deceased. The dead body was found in a *Santro car* parked near the matrimonial home. The prosecution examined *11 witnesses*, including family members of the deceased and the post-mortem doctor. The defence examined *four medical witnesses*, who testified regarding the deceased’s prior medical history, including *tuberculosis, eosinophilia, anaemia,* and low body weight. The *post-mortem report* did not determine a definitive cause of death. No external injuries were found. The *viscera report* conclusively ruled out the presence of poison. No poisonous substance was recovered from the appellants’ house. The trial court found serious contradictions regarding the alleged dowry demand and held that the prosecution failed to establish unnatural death. Accordingly, the appellants were acquitted. The High Court reversed this finding, leading to the present appeal. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the prosecution proved that the death of the deceased was *unnatural* as required under *Section 304B IPC*? ii. Whether the alleged demand of ₹10 lakhs constituted a *dowry demand* in law? iii. Whether the presumption under *Section 113B of the Evidence Act* was rightly invoked? iv. Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the acquittal without finding perversity in the trial court’s judgment? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that the prosecution failed to establish the foundational facts required under *Section 304B IPC*. It was argued that there was *no proof of poisoning*, as confirmed by the FSL report and medical evidence. They emphasized contradictions in witness testimonies regarding the timing, purpose, and payment of the alleged ₹10 lakhs. It was argued that even if money was sought, it was for a *loan*, not dowry. The appellants contended that the deceased had a documented history of *tuberculosis and related ailments*, which could naturally explain the death. The High Court, it was argued, exceeded its appellate jurisdiction by substituting its own view without finding the trial court’s judgment perverse. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent-State submitted that the death occurred within seven years of marriage and was therefore suspicious. They argued that cruelty and harassment for dowry were proved through family witnesses. It was contended that absence of poison in viscera was not decisive and that circumstantial evidence established poisoning. Reliance was placed on the fact that the deceased was found dead in a car near the matrimonial home, and the accused failed to explain the circumstances under *Section 313 CrPC*. ## H) JUDGMENT The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court judgment. It held that the *essential ingredient of unnatural death* was not proved. The Court relied heavily on medical and forensic evidence, which ruled out poisoning and suggested alternative natural causes. The Court found the testimonies regarding dowry demand riddled with contradictions and held that the alleged ₹10 lakhs demand could not be conclusively categorized as dowry. The presumption under *Section 113B* was held inapplicable due to failure to prove cruelty “soon before death.” The Court reiterated that appellate courts must exercise restraint while overturning acquittals and restored the trial court’s judgment. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** A conviction under *Section 304B IPC* cannot be sustained unless the prosecution proves *unnatural death* and *dowry-related cruelty soon before death*. Presumption under *Section 113B Evidence Act* arises only after foundational facts are established. Appellate interference with acquittal requires compelling reasons and proof of perversity. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that courts must guard against mechanical application of dowry death presumptions and emphasized the importance of forensic science in criminal adjudication. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Proof of unnatural death is mandatory under *Section 304B IPC*. ii. Contradictory evidence regarding dowry demand weakens prosecution case. iii. Presumption under *Section 113B* is not automatic. iv. Acquittals should not be reversed unless findings are perverse or illegal. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces evidentiary discipline in dowry death cases and protects against conviction based on conjecture. It reaffirms constitutional values of personal liberty and presumption of innocence, ensuring that criminal liability is imposed only upon strict proof. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** - *Anant Chintaman Lagu v. State of Bombay*, *AIR 1960 SC 500* - *Bhupinder Singh v. State of Punjab*, *\[1988\] 3 SCR 409* - *Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh*, *\[2008\] 11 SCR 499* - *Chhotan Sao v. State of Bihar*, *\[2013\] 17 SCR 843* **b) Important Statutes Referred** - *Indian Penal Code, 1860* - *Indian Evidence Act, 1872* - *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Nimay Sah v. State of Jharkhand, [2020] 13 S.C.R. 566](https://lawfoyer.in/nimay-sah-v-state-of-jharkhand-2020-13-s-c-r-566/) **Published:** December 21, 2025 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The judgment in Nimay Sah v. State of Jharkhand examines the evidentiary threshold required to sustain a conviction under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Supreme Court scrutinised the legality of the conviction of the appellant, who was the elder brother of the deceased’s husband, in a prosecution alleging dowry-related harassment. The case arose from allegations that the deceased woman was subjected to cruelty and harassment for a dowry demand of ₹10,000 shortly after her marriage, culminating in her unnatural death. While the husband and father-in-law were also tried, the present appeal was confined to the role attributed to the appellant-brother-in-law. The Court undertook a meticulous evaluation of oral testimonies and emphasised the distinction between generalised allegations and specific, cogent evidence required to establish cruelty within the meaning of Section 498-A IPC. It noted that the prosecution witnesses failed to attribute any definite acts of cruelty or persistent dowry demands to the appellant individually. The judgment reiterates that criminal liability cannot be fastened merely on the basis of familial proximity or omnibus allegations. It reinforces the principle that conviction under penal statutes demands proof beyond reasonable doubt, particularly when the charge concerns matrimonial cruelty implicating extended family members. The decision thus clarifies the scope of Section 498-A IPC and safeguards against its mechanical application, while balancing the legislative intent to curb dowry harassment with the fundamental requirement of fair trial and evidentiary rigour. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The judgment in *Nimay Sah v. State of Jharkhand* examines the evidentiary threshold required to sustain a conviction under *Section 498-A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860*. The Supreme Court scrutinised the legality of the conviction of the appellant, who was the elder brother of the deceased’s husband, in a prosecution alleging dowry-related harassment. The case arose from allegations that the deceased woman was subjected to cruelty and harassment for a dowry demand of *₹10,000* shortly after her marriage, culminating in her unnatural death. While the husband and father-in-law were also tried, the present appeal was confined to the role attributed to the appellant-brother-in-law. The Court undertook a meticulous evaluation of oral testimonies and emphasised the distinction between *generalised allegations* and *specific, cogent evidence* required to establish cruelty within the meaning of *Section 498-A IPC*. It noted that the prosecution witnesses failed to attribute any definite acts of cruelty or persistent dowry demands to the appellant individually. The judgment reiterates that criminal liability cannot be fastened merely on the basis of familial proximity or omnibus allegations. It reinforces the principle that conviction under penal statutes demands proof beyond reasonable doubt, particularly when the charge concerns matrimonial cruelty implicating extended family members. The decision thus clarifies the scope of *Section 498-A IPC* and safeguards against its mechanical application, while balancing the legislative intent to curb dowry harassment with the fundamental requirement of fair trial and evidentiary rigour. **Keywords:** *Section 498-A IPC*, *dowry harassment*, *vague allegations*, *criminal liability*, *burden of proof*, *acquittal* ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsJudgment Cause Title*Nimay Sah v. State of Jharkhand*Case NumberCriminal Appeal No. 211 of 2011Judgment Date02 December 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumHon’ble Mr. Justice N. V. Ramana and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Surya KantAuthorN. V. Ramana, J.Citation*\[2020\] 13 S.C.R. 566*Legal Provisions Involved*Section 498-A IPC*, *Section 34 IPC*, *Section 304-B IPC*, *Section 313 CrPC*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsCriminal Law; Dowry Prohibition Jurisprudence ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT** The appeal arose from a criminal prosecution initiated in the late 1990s alleging dowry-related cruelty and death of a married woman. The legislative background of the case is anchored in *Section 498-A IPC*, introduced to combat the pervasive social evil of dowry harassment. The provision criminalises cruelty by the husband or his relatives, with cruelty being defined to include harassment linked to unlawful demands for property or valuable security. The appellant, *Nimay Sah*, was the elder brother of the deceased’s husband and resided within the matrimonial household. The prosecution narrative sought to implicate him alongside the husband and father-in-law, alleging a collective demand for dowry. The trial court convicted all accused under *Section 498-A read with Section 34 IPC*, while the husband was also convicted under *Section 304-B IPC*. The High Court of Jharkhand affirmed these findings, relying on the oral testimonies of close relatives of the deceased. The present appeal required the Supreme Court to examine whether the conviction of a collateral relative could be sustained in the absence of clear, individualised evidence. The case therefore engages with a recurring concern in dowry prosecutions, namely, the tendency to implicate all members of the husband’s family without differentiation. The Court’s task was to balance the protective purpose of dowry laws against the fundamental criminal law principle that guilt must be personal and proven beyond reasonable doubt. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The deceased, *Asha Kumari*, was married to *Gora Sah*, accused no.1. According to the prosecution, at the time of the *vidai* ceremony, a demand of *₹10,000* was made by the accused persons to the complainant, *Devendra Sah (P.W.10)*, who was the father of the deceased. It was alleged that subsequent to the marriage, the deceased was subjected to harassment at her matrimonial home due to non-payment of the said amount. Owing to complaints allegedly made by the deceased, her father visited the matrimonial home to pacify the in-laws and assured payment of the demanded sum. Despite this, the harassment was claimed to have continued, prompting the complainant to send his son, *Munna Sah (P.W.8)*, to bring the deceased back to her parental home. On *18.02.1998*, the husband visited the parental home of the deceased. On *20.02.1998*, he took her for a morning walk and returned alone after an hour. Upon being questioned, he stated that the deceased was attending the call of nature. Shortly thereafter, he left the house. When the deceased did not return, a search was initiated, and her body was discovered near a canal with *strangulation marks on her neck*. An FIR was registered initially under *Section 304-B read with Section 109 IPC*. After investigation, charges were framed under *Sections 498-A and 304-B read with Section 34 IPC*. During trial, several prosecution witnesses, including relatives, were examined. However, multiple independent witnesses turned hostile. Notably, *P.W.7*, the brother of the deceased, admitted during cross-examination that letters written by the deceased did not mention any dowry harassment. The trial court nevertheless convicted the accused, leading to appellate proceedings culminating in the present judgment . ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant subjected the deceased to cruelty within the meaning of *Section 498-A IPC*? ii. Whether vague and omnibus allegations are sufficient to sustain a conviction against a collateral relative of the husband? iii. Whether the High Court erred in affirming the conviction without individualised assessment of evidence against the appellant? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellant submitted that the prosecution case was built on *generalised and vague allegations* without attribution of any specific overt act to the appellant. It was argued that the entire family had been mechanically roped in due to the tragic death of the deceased. The defence emphasised that *independent witnesses had turned hostile* and even close relatives failed to narrate any concrete incident involving the appellant. Reliance was placed on the admissions of *P.W.7*, who conceded that the letters written by the deceased contained no reference to dowry harassment. The appellant contended that mere familial association cannot attract criminal liability under *Section 498-A IPC* unless cruelty is proved by cogent and convincing evidence. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the State argued that there were *concurrent findings of guilt* by the trial court and the High Court, which should not be lightly interfered with. It was submitted that the testimonies of *P.W.7, P.W.8, P.W.9, and P.W.10* collectively established harassment for dowry. The State maintained that the appellant was an active participant in the demand raised at the time of the *vidai* ceremony and subsequent harassment. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. *Section 498-A, Indian Penal Code, 1860* ii. *Section 34, Indian Penal Code, 1860* iii. *Section 304-B, Indian Penal Code, 1860* iv. *Section 313, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* ## **I) JUDGMENT** The Supreme Court undertook a granular examination of the evidentiary record. It noted that *P.W.10* named the appellant while narrating the demand of dowry, but did so *in the same breath* as other family members, without assigning any distinct role. The Court observed that *P.W.7, P.W.8, and P.W.9* merely stated that the deceased was troubled at her matrimonial home, without specifically naming the appellant. A critical evidentiary gap identified by the Court was the *absence of any specific instance* of cruelty or persistent dowry demand attributable to the appellant. The Court accorded significance to the admission of *P.W.7* that none of the letters written by the deceased mentioned dowry harassment. The turning hostile of independent witnesses, including *P.W.2*, further weakened the prosecution case. Applying the standard of *proof beyond reasonable doubt*, the Court held that the essential ingredients of *Section 498-A IPC* were not established against the appellant. Consequently, the conviction was set aside and the appellant was acquitted. The bail bonds were discharged, and the appeal was allowed . **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment lies in the principle that *criminal liability under Section 498-A IPC must be founded on specific, individualised evidence of cruelty*. The Court held that vague allegations and omnibus statements implicating all relatives cannot sustain a conviction. Proof of cruelty requires demonstration of a wilful conduct or harassment linked to unlawful dowry demand, attributable to the accused personally. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court’s observations implicitly caution against the *over-implication of extended family members* in dowry-related prosecutions. While recognising the gravity of the offence, the Court underscored the necessity of judicial scrutiny to prevent miscarriage of justice through indiscriminate prosecution. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Courts must insist on *specific allegations* against each accused in dowry cruelty cases. ii. Omnibus statements without corroboration should be viewed with caution. iii. Independent witness testimony and contemporaneous evidence, such as letters, merit due weight. iv. Familial relationship alone cannot justify criminal conviction. ## **J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment reaffirms foundational principles of criminal jurisprudence. It preserves the protective intent of *Section 498-A IPC* while preventing its dilution through overreach. The decision strengthens the requirement of evidentiary precision and reinforces judicial responsibility in safeguarding individual liberty against unsubstantiated accusations. ## **K) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *Nimay Sah v. State of Jharkhand*, *\[2020\] 13 S.C.R. 566* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Indian Penal Code, 1860* 2. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Chaman Lal v. State of Himachal Pradesh, [2020] 12 SCR 1000](https://lawfoyer.in/chaman-lal-v-state-of-himachal-pradesh-2020-12-scr-1000/) **Published:** December 21, 2025 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the legal permissibility of reversing an acquittal in an appeal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, in a prosecution concerning rape of a mentally retarded woman. The prosecutrix, whose IQ was assessed at 62, was found medically incapable of understanding the nature and consequences of sexual acts. The trial court had acquitted the accused primarily on grounds of delay in lodging the FIR and an erroneous appreciation of the prosecutrix’s mental capacity. The High Court reversed the acquittal after a complete re-appreciation of evidence, particularly medical and psychiatric testimony, and convicted the accused under Sections 376 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s decision, holding that the trial court’s approach was perverse and contrary to settled principles governing sexual offences involving persons of unsound mind. The Court clarified the scope of appellate powers in acquittal appeals, reiterating that where material evidence is ignored and conclusions are illogical, reversal is justified. The judgment significantly interprets clause fifthly of Section 375 IPC, emphasizing that consent obtained from a person incapable of understanding due to mental retardation is legally invalid. The Court underscored the obligation of courts to adopt a victim-centric approach in cases involving vulnerable persons and condemned exploitation of mental disability. The ruling reinforces judicial sensitivity towards sexual offences against persons with intellectual disabilities and strengthens the jurisprudence on appellate scrutiny of acquittals. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the legal permissibility of reversing an acquittal in an appeal under *Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*, in a prosecution concerning *rape of a mentally retarded woman*. The prosecutrix, whose *IQ was assessed at 62*, was found medically incapable of understanding the nature and consequences of sexual acts. The trial court had acquitted the accused primarily on grounds of *delay in lodging the FIR* and an erroneous appreciation of the prosecutrix’s mental capacity. The High Court reversed the acquittal after a complete re-appreciation of evidence, particularly medical and psychiatric testimony, and convicted the accused under *Sections 376 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860*. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s decision, holding that the *trial court’s approach was perverse* and contrary to settled principles governing sexual offences involving persons of unsound mind. The Court clarified the scope of appellate powers in acquittal appeals, reiterating that where material evidence is ignored and conclusions are illogical, reversal is justified. The judgment significantly interprets *clause fifthly of Section 375 IPC*, emphasizing that consent obtained from a person incapable of understanding due to mental retardation is legally invalid. The Court underscored the obligation of courts to adopt a *victim-centric approach* in cases involving vulnerable persons and condemned exploitation of mental disability. The ruling reinforces judicial sensitivity towards sexual offences against persons with intellectual disabilities and strengthens the jurisprudence on appellate scrutiny of acquittals. **Keywords:** Mental Retardation, Consent, Rape, Appeal against Acquittal, Section 375 IPC, Section 378 CrPC ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Chaman Lal v. State of Himachal Pradesh*Case NumberCriminal Appeal No. 1229 of 2017Judgement Date03 December 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumAshok Bhushan J., R. Subhash Reddy J., M. R. Shah J.AuthorM. R. Shah J.Citation*\[2020\] 12 SCR 1000*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 375, 376, 506 IPC; Sections 313, 378 CrPC*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsCriminal Law, Evidence Law, Victim Justice ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The judgment arose from an appeal challenging the High Court’s reversal of an acquittal in a rape prosecution involving a *mentally retarded prosecutrix*. The trial court had acquitted the accused by emphasizing procedural delay and by discounting psychiatric evidence relating to the victim’s intellectual functioning. This approach raised critical concerns about judicial treatment of vulnerable victims and the evidentiary value of expert medical testimony. The High Court, exercising appellate jurisdiction under *Section 378 CrPC*, reassessed the entire record and concluded that the trial court had ignored vital evidence, particularly psychiatric assessments confirming *mild mental retardation*. The conviction was restored based on medical findings, DNA evidence establishing paternity, and the absence of any plea of consent by the accused. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant contended that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by interfering with a plausible acquittal. The appeal thus squarely presented issues relating to the *scope of appellate review*, the *legal meaning of consent*, and the treatment of *sexual offences against intellectually disabled persons*. The Court used this opportunity to consolidate precedents on appellate interference, clarify evidentiary standards in rape cases, and emphasize constitutional and human rights obligations toward persons with mental disabilities. The judgment forms part of a growing jurisprudence prioritizing substantive justice over procedural technicalities in sexual offence trials . ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The prosecutrix, aged about *19 years*, belonged to a rural background and used to graze cattle in nearby forests. The accused frequently accompanied her to these locations. It was alleged that he had *forcible sexual intercourse* with her on multiple occasions and threatened her with dire consequences if she disclosed the acts. Due to her *mental weakness and fear*, the prosecutrix did not immediately disclose the incident. The pregnancy came to light only when it had advanced to *approximately 31 weeks*. Her father lodged an FIR upon being informed of her condition. Medical examination confirmed pregnancy, and subsequent psychiatric evaluations conducted at *IGMC Shimla* and *PGI Chandigarh* assessed her *IQ at 62*, categorizing her as suffering from *mild mental retardation*. The prosecutrix delivered a female child, and *DNA analysis conclusively established* the accused as the biological father. The prosecution examined *23 witnesses*, including medical experts and investigating officers. Despite this evidence, the trial court acquitted the accused, reasoning that delay in FIR and the prosecutrix’s ability to perform household tasks negated the claim of mental incapacity. The High Court reversed this finding, holding the trial court’s conclusions to be *manifestly erroneous*. The Supreme Court was called upon to assess whether this reversal was legally sustainable and whether the evidence satisfied the ingredients of *rape under Section 375 IPC* . ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the order of acquittal in an appeal under *Section 378 CrPC*? ii. Whether a woman with *mild mental retardation* can legally consent to sexual intercourse under *Section 375 IPC*? iii. Whether delay in lodging the FIR was fatal to the prosecution case? iv. Whether medical and psychiatric evidence was wrongly discarded by the trial court? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the trial court’s acquittal represented a *plausible view* and could not be interfered with merely because another view was possible. Emphasis was placed on the *delay of several months* in filing the FIR, arguing that it cast serious doubt on the prosecution’s veracity. It was contended that contradictions between psychiatric witnesses regarding the language known by the prosecutrix undermined the credibility of mental assessment. Reliance was placed on *Krishna v. State of Karnataka (2014) 15 SCC 596* to argue that appellate interference should be minimal. The appellant further argued that the prosecutrix was capable of understanding her welfare and had informed family members of pregnancy, suggesting cognitive awareness. A plea for reduction of sentence was also advanced on humanitarian grounds . ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the State argued that the High Court acted well within its jurisdiction as the trial court had *ignored crucial medical evidence*. It was submitted that *IQ testing is language-independent* and minor discrepancies could not outweigh expert conclusions. The State highlighted that the accused never pleaded consent and adopted a *false defence of total denial* under *Section 313 CrPC*, despite DNA evidence. Delay in FIR was justified due to the prosecutrix’s mental condition. The minimum statutory sentence was urged to be upheld . ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction. The Court held that the High Court correctly identified the *perversity* in the trial court’s reasoning. It reiterated that appellate courts possess *full power* to re-appreciate evidence in acquittal appeals, particularly where material evidence is ignored. The Court placed significant reliance on psychiatric testimony establishing the prosecutrix’s *IQ of 62*. It clarified that functional abilities such as household work do not negate mental retardation. Consent from a person incapable of understanding consequences is legally void under *clause fifthly of Section 375 IPC*. The Court condemned the accused’s exploitation of the victim’s vulnerability and underscored the duty of courts to protect persons with mental disabilities. The minimum sentence imposed was found appropriate, and no mitigating factors warranted interference . **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** Consent obtained from a woman suffering from *mild mental retardation* who is incapable of understanding the nature and consequences of sexual intercourse is no consent in law, and sexual intercourse in such circumstances constitutes rape under *Section 375 IPC*. An appellate court is justified in reversing an acquittal where the trial court ignores material medical evidence and arrives at conclusions that are illogical and unsustainable in law . **b) OBITER DICTA** Persons suffering from mental disorders deserve *special care, love, and protection*. Courts must adopt a sensitive and victim-centric approach while dealing with offences against such persons and ensure that legal processes do not become instruments of further victimization . **c) GUIDELINES** i. Medical evidence on mental capacity must be given primacy in sexual offence cases. ii. Delay in FIR must be contextualized where victims suffer from mental disability. iii. Appellate courts must intervene where acquittals are based on perverse reasoning. iv. False defences under *Section 313 CrPC* can be used to draw adverse inference. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment is a strong reaffirmation of *substantive criminal justice* and judicial sensitivity toward vulnerable victims. It bridges doctrinal clarity on consent with humane interpretation of evidence. By upholding the High Court’s reversal, the Supreme Court sent a clear message that *mental disability cannot be exploited under the guise of consent*. The ruling strengthens jurisprudence on appellate review and aligns Indian criminal law with international human rights standards protecting persons with disabilities. It serves as a vital precedent for law students, practitioners, and courts dealing with sexual offences involving intellectually disabled victims . ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** - *Babu v. State of Kerala*, *\[2010\] 9 SCR 1039* - *Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police*, *\[1998\] 3 Suppl. SCR 594* - *Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka*, *\[2019\] 6 SCR 994* - *Krishna v. State of Karnataka*, *(2014) 15 SCC 596* **b) Important Statutes Referred** - *Indian Penal Code, 1860* - *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Inderjit Singh Sodhi and Others v. The Chairman, Punjab State Electricity Board and Another, [2020] 11 SCR 966](https://lawfoyer.in/inderjit-singh-sodhi-and-others-v-the-chairman-punjab-state-electricity-board-and-another-2020-11-scr-966/) **Published:** December 21, 2025 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The decision in Inderjit Singh Sodhi and Others v. The Chairman, Punjab State Electricity Board and Another addresses the limits of parity claims in service jurisprudence where promotional benefits are structured through distinct statutory channels for promotees and direct recruits. The controversy arose from the claim of time bound promotional scales by Assistant Engineers who had entered the cadre by promotion from Junior Engineer posts under the Punjab State Electricity Board Service of Engineers (Civil) Regulations, 1965. The appellants sought parity with juniors appointed through direct recruitment and granted higher scales under a later circular. The Supreme Court examined the architecture of the Regulations and two contemporaneous circulars issued in April and May 1990 providing for stagnation relief through time bound scales. The judgment clarifies that promotional benefits must strictly flow from the source and mode of recruitment. It underscores that a legal fiction created for limited categories cannot be expanded to obliterate statutory distinctions. The Court reaffirmed that dismissal of Special Leave Petitions does not constitute a declaration of law under Article 141 and cannot override a reasoned judgment of the Supreme Court. By relying on Bhakra Beas Management Board v. Krishan Kumar Vij, the Court harmonised service equality under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India with regulatory classification based on qualifications and recruitment channels. The ruling reinforces doctrinal clarity on stagnation schemes, parity claims, and the non-extension of benefits contrary to express regulatory intent. **Content:** ## A) **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The decision in *Inderjit Singh Sodhi and Others v. The Chairman, Punjab State Electricity Board and Another* addresses the limits of parity claims in service jurisprudence where promotional benefits are structured through distinct statutory channels for promotees and direct recruits. The controversy arose from the claim of time bound promotional scales by Assistant Engineers who had entered the cadre by promotion from Junior Engineer posts under the *Punjab State Electricity Board Service of Engineers (Civil) Regulations, 1965*. The appellants sought parity with juniors appointed through direct recruitment and granted higher scales under a later circular. The Supreme Court examined the architecture of the Regulations and two contemporaneous circulars issued in April and May 1990 providing for stagnation relief through time bound scales. The judgment clarifies that promotional benefits must strictly flow from the source and mode of recruitment. It underscores that a legal fiction created for limited categories cannot be expanded to obliterate statutory distinctions. The Court reaffirmed that dismissal of Special Leave Petitions does not constitute a declaration of law under Article 141 and cannot override a reasoned judgment of the Supreme Court. By relying on *Bhakra Beas Management Board v. Krishan Kumar Vij*, the Court harmonised service equality under *Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India* with regulatory classification based on qualifications and recruitment channels. The ruling reinforces doctrinal clarity on stagnation schemes, parity claims, and the non-extension of benefits contrary to express regulatory intent. ***Keywords*:** Time bound promotional scale; Direct recruitment; Promotion; Parity; Service regulations; Stagnation relief. ## B) **CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*Inderjit Singh Sodhi and Others v. The Chairman, Punjab State Electricity Board and Another*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 3837 of 2020 (with Civil Appeal Nos. 3835 & 3836 of 2020)iii) Judgement Date03 December 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumL. Nageswara Rao J., Hemant Gupta J., Ajay Rastogi J.vi) AuthorHemant Gupta J.vii) Citation*\[2020\] 11 SCR 966*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Punjab State Electricity Board Service of Engineers (Civil) Regulations, 1965*; *Articles 14 and 16, Constitution of India*ix) Judgments overruled by the CaseNonex) Related Law SubjectsService Law; Constitutional Law ## C) **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** The litigation arose from competing interpretations of stagnation relief schemes framed by the Punjab State Electricity Board in the backdrop of structural disparities between direct recruits and promotees in engineering cadres. The *Civil Regulations, 1965* created a bifurcated system for appointment to the post of Assistant Engineer, permitting entry through *direct recruitment under Regulation 9* and *promotion under Regulation 10*. In order to mitigate stagnation, the Board introduced time bound promotional scales with effect from 1 January 1986 through circulars issued in April and May 1990. These circulars operated within the statutory framework and differentiated between categories of employees. The appellants, diploma-holder engineers promoted from Junior Engineer posts, sought the benefit of higher scales granted to directly recruited Assistant Engineers who were junior to them in service. The Single Judge of the High Court accepted the claim, but the Division Bench reversed the decision relying on subsequent Supreme Court precedent. The matter thus raised fundamental questions on the doctrine of equality, the scope of parity, and the permissible extent of legal fiction in service law. The Supreme Court was required to reconcile earlier High Court decisions granting parity with its own authoritative pronouncement in *Bhakra Beas Management Board v. Krishan Kumar Vij*, which had restricted the benefit of higher scales to direct recruits or those deemed as such under a narrow statutory fiction. The background thus reflects a tension between equitable considerations and strict regulatory compliance, a recurring theme in Indian service jurisprudence . ## D) **FACTS OF THE CASE** The appellants were appointed as Junior Engineers in the early 1960s and were subsequently promoted as Assistant Engineers under *Regulation 7(a)(ii) read with Regulation 10 of the Civil Regulations*. Their promotions were based on seniority and experience, without the educational qualifications mandated for direct recruitment. Two officers, Kirpal Singh Mangat and Raj Kumar Garg, though junior in service, were appointed as Assistant Engineers through *direct recruitment under Regulation 7(a)(i) read with Regulation 9* after possessing requisite engineering qualifications. In April 1990, the Board issued a circular providing time bound promotional scales on completion of nine and sixteen years of service, primarily aimed at employees suffering stagnation. In May 1990, another circular granted specific higher scales to directly recruited Assistant Engineers. The appellants claimed parity with the directly recruited juniors and sought similar time bound scales. Their representations were rejected on the ground that they had been promoted within nine or sixteen years and were governed only by the first circular. The appellants approached the High Court, where conflicting decisions existed. While some promotees had been granted relief earlier, the Division Bench denied the benefit by applying the ratio of *Krishan Kumar Vij*. This led to the present appeals before the Supreme Court . ## E) **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether promotee Assistant Engineers are entitled to claim time bound promotional scales at par with directly recruited Assistant Engineers? ii. Whether the Second Circular dated 24.05.1990 applies to promotee Assistant Engineers? iii. Whether denial of parity violates *Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India*? iv. Whether dismissal of Special Leave Petitions in similar cases creates binding precedent? ## F) **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellants submitted that once promoted to the cadre of Assistant Engineer, the appellants formed part of a common class and could not be discriminated against in pay matters. Reliance was placed on the principle of *equal pay for equal work* under *Articles 14 and 16*. It was argued that the appellants possessed the necessary qualifications for direct recruitment and that denial of higher scales was arbitrary. The appellants also relied on earlier High Court judgments where similarly situated promotees were granted relief. It was contended that the Second Circular, read harmoniously with the First Circular, entitled them to time bound scales, particularly as stagnation relief. The appellants further argued that dismissal of Special Leave Petitions in earlier cases affirmed the High Court’s approach . ## G) **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the respondents contended that the appellants’ claim was misconceived as the regulatory scheme clearly differentiated between direct recruits and promotees. It was argued that the *Second Circular expressly limited its application to directly recruited Assistant Engineers*. Promotees were governed solely by the First Circular, which denied benefits where promotion occurred within nine years. The respondents emphasized that the appellants never challenged the validity of the Second Circular and could not seek parity contrary to its express terms. Reliance was placed on *Bhakra Beas Management Board v. Krishan Kumar Vij*, which had conclusively settled the issue. It was also argued that dismissal of SLPs did not amount to affirmation of law . ## H) **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. *Regulation 7(a)(i) and 7(a)(ii), Punjab State Electricity Board Service of Engineers (Civil) Regulations, 1965* ii. *Regulation 9 and Regulation 10, Civil Regulations* iii. *Articles 14 and 16, Constitution of India* ## I) **JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the Division Bench judgment. The Court examined the regulatory scheme and held that the appellants were promoted under *Regulation 7(a)(ii)* and thus governed by the First Circular alone. The Second Circular was specifically designed for directly recruited Assistant Engineers and created a limited legal fiction only for those promotees who possessed AMIE qualifications and were promoted against reserved quotas. The Court rejected the parity argument, holding that equals must be treated equally but unequals cannot claim equality. The appellants’ admission that the juniors were direct recruits was decisive. The Court also clarified that earlier High Court decisions granting relief could not override the binding precedent in *Krishan Kumar Vij*. Dismissal of SLPs was held to be non-precedential, relying on *Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala*. The judgment reinforced the principle that stagnation schemes cannot be extended beyond their statutory contours . **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the case lies in the holding that time bound promotional scales are contingent upon the mode of entry and qualifications prescribed under statutory regulations. Promotee Assistant Engineers, who entered the cadre under *Regulation 7(a)(ii)* without fulfilling the criteria of direct recruitment, cannot claim parity with direct recruits governed by *Regulation 7(a)(i)*. The Court affirmed that a legal fiction created by administrative circulars must be strictly construed and cannot be expanded to confer unintended benefits. Equality under *Articles 14 and 16* operates within a lawful classification and does not mandate uniformity across distinct service channels. The dismissal of Special Leave Petitions does not constitute a declaration of law and cannot be treated as binding precedent under *Article 141* . **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that stagnation relief schemes must balance equity with regulatory discipline. While acknowledging the hardship faced by promotees, the Court cautioned against judicial dilution of statutory frameworks. It noted that indiscriminate extension of benefits could violate constitutional equality by treating unequals as equals. The observations underline judicial restraint in service matters, emphasizing that policy corrections lie within administrative or legislative domains rather than adjudicatory expansion . **c) GUIDELINES** i. Time bound promotional scales must be granted strictly in accordance with the applicable recruitment regulations. ii. Legal fictions in service rules are to be applied narrowly and only to categories expressly covered. iii. Parity claims must be tested against qualifications and mode of recruitment. iv. Dismissal of Special Leave Petitions does not amount to affirmation of law. ## I) **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment provides doctrinal clarity on parity and stagnation relief in service law. It reinforces the primacy of statutory regulations over equitable considerations and cautions against judicial overreach in pay fixation matters. By reaffirming *Krishan Kumar Vij*, the Court restored consistency in service jurisprudence and underscored that equality operates within lawful classification. The ruling serves as an authoritative guide for interpreting time bound promotional schemes and their limits, particularly in public employment governed by detailed service regulations . ## J) **REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Bhakra Beas Management Board v. Krishan Kumar Vij & Anr.*, *\[2010\] 10 SCR 462* ii. *Kunhayammed & Ors. v. State of Kerala*, *\[2000\] 1 Supp SCR 538* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Punjab State Electricity Board Service of Engineers (Civil) Regulations, 1965* ii. *Constitution of India, Articles 14 and 16* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Skill Lotto Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors., [2020] 13 SCR 151](https://lawfoyer.in/skill-lotto-solutions-pvt-ltd-v-union-of-india-ors-2020-13-scr-151/) **Published:** December 21, 2025 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The writ petition questioned the constitutional validity of levying Goods and Services Tax on lottery transactions under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, particularly challenging the inclusion of actionable claims within the statutory definition of goods under Section 2(52). The petitioner, an authorised distributor of State-run lotteries, alleged violation of Article 14 on the ground of hostile discrimination, arguing that only lottery, betting, and gambling were taxed while other actionable claims were excluded under Schedule III. The petition further contested the legislative competence of Parliament to expand the constitutional meaning of goods, contending that actionable claims stood excluded under established legal understanding as reflected in the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. The Court examined the scope of Article 32 maintainability, the nature of inclusive definitions under constitutional interpretation, and the effect of Article 246A inserted by the 101st Constitutional Amendment. Reliance was placed on the Constitution Bench ruling in Sunrise Associates, clarifying that lotteries are actionable claims and that such classification formed the ratio decidendi of that judgment. The Court also analysed the valuation mechanism under Section 15 read with Rule 31A of the CGST Rules, rejecting the plea to exclude prize money from the taxable value. The judgment upheld the constitutional validity of the impugned provisions, reaffirmed Parliament’s plenary taxing power under the GST regime, and reiterated judicial restraint in fiscal matters. The writ petition was dismissed in entirety. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The writ petition questioned the constitutional validity of levying Goods and Services Tax on lottery transactions under the *Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017*, particularly challenging the inclusion of *actionable claims* within the statutory definition of *goods* under *Section 2(52)*. The petitioner, an authorised distributor of State-run lotteries, alleged violation of *Article 14* on the ground of hostile discrimination, arguing that only lottery, betting, and gambling were taxed while other actionable claims were excluded under *Schedule III*. The petition further contested the legislative competence of Parliament to expand the constitutional meaning of goods, contending that actionable claims stood excluded under established legal understanding as reflected in the *Sale of Goods Act, 1930*. The Court examined the scope of *Article 32* maintainability, the nature of inclusive definitions under constitutional interpretation, and the effect of *Article 246A* inserted by the *101st Constitutional Amendment*. Reliance was placed on the Constitution Bench ruling in *Sunrise Associates*, clarifying that lotteries are actionable claims and that such classification formed the ratio decidendi of that judgment. The Court also analysed the valuation mechanism under *Section 15* read with *Rule 31A* of the CGST Rules, rejecting the plea to exclude prize money from the taxable value. The judgment upheld the constitutional validity of the impugned provisions, reaffirmed Parliament’s plenary taxing power under the GST regime, and reiterated judicial restraint in fiscal matters. The writ petition was dismissed in entirety. **Keywords:** Goods and Services Tax; Actionable Claim; Lottery Taxation; Article 246A; Article 14 ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetails*Judgement Cause Title**Skill Lotto Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors.**Case Number*Writ Petition (Civil) No. 961 of 2018*Judgement Date*03 December 2020*Court*Supreme Court of India*Quorum*Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy, M.R. Shah, JJ.*Author*Ashok Bhushan, J.*Citation**\[2020\] 13 SCR 151**Legal Provisions Involved**Articles 14, 32, 246A, 366(12), Constitution of India; Sections 2(52), 9, 15 CGST Act, 2017; Rule 31A CGST Rules, 2017**Judgments Overruled*None*Related Law Subjects*Constitutional Law; Taxation Law; Indirect Taxes ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The dispute arose in the aftermath of the constitutional restructuring of indirect taxation through the *Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act, 2016*, which introduced a unified Goods and Services Tax regime. The petitioner functioned as an authorised agent for distribution of lotteries organised by the State of Punjab under the *Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998*. Historically, lotteries had been subject to varying forms of State taxation, including sales tax and service tax, upheld through a long line of judicial decisions. With the enactment of the *CGST Act, 2017*, Parliament defined *goods* expansively to include *actionable claims*, a departure from the exclusionary definition under the *Sale of Goods Act, 1930*. Further, *Schedule III* carved out actionable claims other than lottery, betting, and gambling from GST, thereby subjecting only these three categories to tax. This selective inclusion formed the core of the constitutional challenge. The petitioner contended that the statutory redefinition amounted to an artificial enlargement of taxing power, inconsistent with *Article 366(12)*. Heavy reliance was placed on *State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co.* to argue that constitutional expressions must carry their legal meaning. The challenge also targeted valuation rules which taxed the face value of lottery tickets without excluding prize money, allegedly leading to taxation of non-income components. The background reflects a classic tension between fiscal autonomy of the legislature and constitutional limitations on taxing power, requiring judicial balancing within the GST framework. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The petitioner acted as a selling agent for State-organised lotteries under statutory authorisation. Following the introduction of GST, notifications dated *28.06.2017* imposed tax on lotteries based on the face value of tickets, prescribing different valuation formulas depending on whether the lottery was run or merely authorised by the State. Subsequently, *Rule 31A* was inserted to regulate valuation. The petitioner challenged *Section 2(52)* of the CGST Act, asserting that inclusion of actionable claims within goods was unconstitutional. It was argued that lottery tickets represented mere chances and did not constitute movable property. The petitioner further alleged discriminatory treatment under *Article 14* since other actionable claims such as debts and insurance claims were excluded from GST. Alternative reliefs sought included exclusion of prize money from taxable value and uniform tax rates across States. During pendency, amendments were introduced equalising valuation rates, though the petitioner reserved the right to challenge the same separately. The Union of India defended the levy, asserting parliamentary competence under *Article 246A* and contending that lotteries have historically been treated as taxable commodities. It was further argued that fiscal classifications enjoy wide latitude and that courts should not interfere absent manifest arbitrariness. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the writ petition was maintainable under *Article 32* of the Constitution? ii. Whether inclusion of *actionable claims* in the definition of *goods* under *Section 2(52)* is unconstitutional? iii. Whether *Sunrise Associates* declared lottery as an actionable claim as ratio or merely obiter dicta? iv. Whether taxing only lottery, betting, and gambling violates *Article 14*? v. Whether prize money must be excluded while determining taxable value of lottery tickets? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the petitioner submitted that *goods* under the Constitution must carry the legal meaning ascribed in the *Sale of Goods Act, 1930*, which expressly excludes actionable claims. It was argued that Parliament cannot artificially expand constitutional terms to assume taxing power. Reliance was placed on *Gannon Dunkerley* to assert that constitutional entries are *nomen juris*. It was contended that *Sunrise Associates* did not conclusively declare lotteries as actionable claims and that such observations were obiter. The selective taxation of only three actionable claims was assailed as hostile discrimination lacking rational nexus. On valuation, it was urged that prize money never accrues to the distributor and taxing the face value amounts to unjust enrichment of the State. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent submitted that challenges alleging violation of *Article 14* against parliamentary statutes are maintainable under *Article 32*. It was argued that *Article 366(12)* contains an inclusive definition and does not exclude actionable claims. Reliance was placed on *Sunrise Associates* to establish that lotteries are actionable claims and goods in the wider sense. The Union asserted plenary legislative competence under *Article 246A*, introduced with a non obstante clause. On discrimination, it was argued that lotteries, betting, and gambling form a distinct class historically regulated and taxed. The valuation mechanism under *Section 15* and *Rule 31A* was defended as a matter of legislative policy. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Court first upheld the maintainability of the writ petition, reiterating that *Article 32* forms part of the basic structure and can be invoked to challenge parliamentary enactments on *Article 14* grounds. On merits, the Court held that *Article 366(12)* employs an inclusive definition of goods, intended to enlarge rather than restrict meaning. The Constitution framers were aware of the *Sale of Goods Act* definition yet deliberately chose inclusive language. The Court clarified that *Gannon Dunkerley* dealt with the meaning of *sale*, not *goods*, and was context-specific. The Constitution Bench ruling in *Sunrise Associates* was analysed in detail, and the Court categorically held that the classification of lottery as an actionable claim formed the ratio decidendi. Consequently, Parliament acted within its competence in including actionable claims within goods under GST law. Regarding *Article 14*, the Court found a rational basis for taxing lottery, betting, and gambling, given their historical regulation and revenue implications. The exclusion of other actionable claims did not amount to hostile discrimination. On valuation, the Court held that *Section 15* exhaustively governs what may be included or excluded. Prize money exclusion was not contemplated and could not be judicially inserted. The writ petition was dismissed. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The inclusive definition of *goods* under *Article 366(12)* empowers Parliament to include actionable claims within GST legislation, and such inclusion is constitutionally valid under *Article 246A*. **b) OBITER DICTA** Judicial restraint in fiscal policy is imperative, and courts should not evaluate economic wisdom or comparative international practices in taxation matters. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Inclusive definitions in fiscal statutes must be interpreted expansively. ii. Fiscal classifications require only rational nexus, not mathematical precision. iii. Valuation of taxable supply is governed strictly by statute and rules. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reaffirms Parliament’s expansive taxing competence under the GST framework and clarifies the constitutional status of actionable claims. It harmonises earlier jurisprudence with the post-GST constitutional structure and underscores judicial deference in taxation policy. The ruling provides doctrinal clarity on inclusive definitions and cements *Sunrise Associates* as binding authority on lotteries. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Sunrise Associates v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi*, *\[2006\] 1 Suppl. SCR 421* ii. *State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co.*, *\[1959\] SCR 379* iii. *H. Anraj v. Government of Tamil Nadu*, *\[1985\] 3 Suppl. SCR 342* iv. *Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance*, *\[1987\] 2 SCR 1* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Constitution of India* ii. *Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017* iii. *Transfer of Property Act, 1882* iv. *Sale of Goods Act, 1930* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Sumedh Singh Saini v. State of Punjab and Another, [2020] 13 SCR 812](https://lawfoyer.in/sumedh-singh-saini-v-state-of-punjab-and-another-2020-13-scr-812/) **Published:** December 21, 2025 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The judgment in Sumedh Singh Saini v. State of Punjab and Another examines the scope and discretionary contours of anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, in the context of a prosecution revived after an extraordinary lapse of time. The case arises from allegations relating to the illegal abduction, custodial torture, and alleged murder of Balwant Singh Multani in the year 1991. Nearly twenty-nine years later, an FIR was lodged by the brother of the deceased, invoking serious penal provisions including Sections 364, 201, 344, 219, 120-B, and subsequently Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant, a former Director General of Police, Punjab, sought anticipatory bail contending that the FIR was a second FIR on identical facts, that the delay was unexplained and fatal, and that the addition of Section 302 IPC was founded solely on statements of approvers recorded decades later. The State and the informant opposed the plea, asserting the gravity of allegations and the necessity of custodial interrogation. The Supreme Court, while consciously refraining from adjudicating the legality or maintainability of the FIR, focused on the limited question of entitlement to anticipatory bail. The Court emphasised the significance of prolonged delay, prior quashing proceedings in State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar, the appellant’s status as a retired senior police officer, and the procedural history relating to the belated addition of the murder charge. Ultimately, the Court held that the cumulative circumstances justified the grant of anticipatory bail, clarifying that such protection would not prejudice pending proceedings seeking quashing of the FIR. The decision reinforces the principle that anticipatory bail serves as a shield against arbitrary arrest, even in serious offences, when the factual matrix discloses exceptional features warranting judicial protection. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment in *Sumedh Singh Saini v. State of Punjab and Another* examines the scope and discretionary contours of *anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*, in the context of a prosecution revived after an extraordinary lapse of time. The case arises from allegations relating to the illegal abduction, custodial torture, and alleged murder of *Balwant Singh Multani* in the year *1991*. Nearly *twenty-nine years later*, an FIR was lodged by the brother of the deceased, invoking serious penal provisions including *Sections 364, 201, 344, 219, 120-B*, and subsequently *Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code*. The appellant, a former *Director General of Police, Punjab*, sought anticipatory bail contending that the FIR was a *second FIR on identical facts*, that the delay was unexplained and fatal, and that the addition of *Section 302 IPC* was founded solely on statements of approvers recorded decades later. The State and the informant opposed the plea, asserting the gravity of allegations and the necessity of custodial interrogation. The Supreme Court, while consciously refraining from adjudicating the *legality or maintainability of the FIR*, focused on the *limited question of entitlement to anticipatory bail*. The Court emphasised the significance of prolonged delay, prior quashing proceedings in *State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar*, the appellant’s status as a retired senior police officer, and the procedural history relating to the belated addition of the murder charge. Ultimately, the Court held that the cumulative circumstances justified the grant of anticipatory bail, clarifying that such protection would not prejudice pending proceedings seeking quashing of the FIR. The decision reinforces the principle that *anticipatory bail serves as a shield against arbitrary arrest*, even in serious offences, when the factual matrix discloses exceptional features warranting judicial protection. **Keywords:** Anticipatory Bail, Delay in FIR, Second FIR, Section 438 Cr.P.C., Custodial Death, Approver Evidence ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Sumedh Singh Saini v. State of Punjab and Another*Case NumberCriminal Appeal No. 827 of 2020Judgement Date03 December 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumAshok Bhushan J., R. Subhash Reddy J., M.R. Shah J.AuthorJustice M.R. ShahCitation*\[2020\] 13 SCR 812*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 302, 364, 201, 344, 330, 219, 120-B IPC*; *Sections 438, 482, 306 Cr.P.C.*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsCriminal Law, Constitutional Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The judgment emerges against a complex historical and political background rooted in counter-insurgency operations in Punjab during the early 1990s. The allegations pertain to the purported illegal detention and custodial killing of *Balwant Singh Multani* in *1991*, allegedly orchestrated by senior police officials. Earlier criminal proceedings concerning the same incident had culminated in quashing by the Supreme Court in *State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar*, wherein liberty was reserved to the father of the deceased to initiate fresh proceedings *if permissible in law*. Despite such liberty, no action was taken during the father’s lifetime, and he passed away in *2014*. The present proceedings were initiated only in *2020* by the brother of the deceased, marking a hiatus of nearly *three decades* from the alleged incident. The FIR initially did not include the offence of murder. The addition of *Section 302 IPC* occurred subsequently, premised entirely on statements of co-accused who were granted pardon and treated as approvers under *Section 306 Cr.P.C.* The appellant, having retired as *Director General of Police* after three decades of service, sought anticipatory bail contending that arrest at such a belated stage would be punitive and unjust. The High Court declined relief, prompting the present appeal. The Supreme Court consciously narrowed the scope of adjudication. It refrained from examining the legality of the FIR, jurisdictional objections, or allegations of political vendetta, noting that such issues were already pending in quashing proceedings. The Court confined itself to assessing whether the *extraordinary delay*, procedural developments, and overall factual circumstances warranted protection under *Section 438 Cr.P.C.* ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The factual matrix originates from an allegation that in *1991*, *Balwant Singh Multani* was illegally abducted from his residence in Mohali by a police team acting under the instructions of the appellant. It was alleged that he was subjected to severe custodial torture and subsequently killed. A fabricated FIR of *1991* was allegedly registered to project an escape from custody. For decades, no criminal proceedings survived judicial scrutiny. In *2011*, the Supreme Court quashed earlier proceedings in *State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar*, while reserving limited liberty to the father of the deceased. No fresh action followed during his lifetime. In *May 2020*, the brother of the deceased lodged *FIR No. 77 of 2020* at Police Station City Mataur, Mohali. The FIR initially invoked offences under *Sections 364, 201, 344, 219 and 120-B IPC*. The appellant was granted anticipatory bail for these offences. Subsequently, two co-accused were granted pardon and their statements implicated the appellant. Based solely on these statements, *Section 302 IPC* was added by a Magistrate in *August 2020*. The appellant’s anticipatory bail application for the murder charge was rejected by the Sessions Court and the High Court, leading to the present appeal. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether an accused is entitled to anticipatory bail under *Section 438 Cr.P.C.* when the FIR is lodged after an unexplained delay of *twenty-nine years*? ii. Whether the subsequent addition of *Section 302 IPC* based solely on approver statements justifies denial of anticipatory bail? iii. Whether prior quashing of proceedings on identical facts is a relevant consideration at the stage of anticipatory bail? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the FIR was *malafide*, politically motivated, and amounted to a *second FIR on the same cause of action*. It was argued that the unexplained delay of *twenty-nine years* vitiated the prosecution at its inception. Reliance was placed on *State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar* to contend that identical allegations had already failed judicial scrutiny. It was emphasised that liberty to initiate fresh proceedings was personal to the father of the deceased and was never exercised. The appellant contended that the addition of *Section 302 IPC* was procedurally flawed and based exclusively on statements of approvers, obtained under pressure. The appellant expressed willingness to cooperate with investigation and asserted that custodial interrogation was unnecessary. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent State submitted that the allegations disclosed *grave offences involving custodial death*. It was argued that *delay alone* cannot defeat prosecution, particularly where abuse of official power is alleged. The informant asserted that the FIR was not a second FIR but a fresh exercise of liberty reserved by the Supreme Court. The State contended that approver statements constituted prima facie material justifying addition of *Section 302 IPC* and custodial interrogation. It was further argued that the appellant’s influence could result in tampering with evidence if anticipatory bail were granted. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and granted anticipatory bail. The Court limited its inquiry strictly to the entitlement under *Section 438 Cr.P.C.* The Court held that while delay is not always fatal, a *delay of twenty-nine years* without any intervening steps is a *relevant and weighty consideration* for anticipatory bail. The Court noted that the liberty reserved earlier was conditional and never exercised by the person in whose favour it was granted. The Court further observed that the offence under *Section 302 IPC* was not part of the original FIR and was added decades later based solely on approver statements. The appellant’s retirement, long service, and absence of immediate custodial necessity were considered material factors. The Court clarified that granting anticipatory bail would not affect pending proceedings seeking quashing of the FIR. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio rests on the principle that *anticipatory bail is a protective remedy against arbitrary arrest*. Exceptional delay, prior judicial history, and procedural developments may cumulatively justify such protection even in serious offences. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that permissibility of fresh proceedings pursuant to earlier liberty remains open and must be adjudicated independently in quashing proceedings. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Extraordinary delay can be a decisive factor in anticipatory bail. ii. Subsequent addition of graver offences must be scrutinised contextually. iii. Anticipatory bail does not pre-empt investigation or quashing proceedings. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces judicial restraint and balance in bail jurisprudence. It underscores that liberty under *Section 438 Cr.P.C.* is not eclipsed merely due to the seriousness of allegations. The Court’s approach preserves the presumption of innocence while safeguarding investigative autonomy. The decision serves as a vital precedent on delayed prosecutions, approver-based accusations, and the nuanced exercise of discretionary bail powers. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar*, *\[2011\] 15 SCR 540* ii. *Pradeep Ram v. State of Jharkhand*, *2019 (9) SCALE 120* iii. *Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi)*, *(2020) 5 SCC 1* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Indian Penal Code, 1860* ii. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Jayant Etc. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2020] 11 SCR 665](https://lawfoyer.in/jayant-etc-v-state-of-madhya-pradesh-2020-11-scr-665/) **Published:** December 21, 2025 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The decision in Jayant Etc. v. State of Madhya Pradesh addresses the interface between the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the context of illegal mining, storage, and transportation of minor minerals. The Supreme Court examined whether a Judicial Magistrate can exercise powers under Section 156(3) CrPC to direct registration of an FIR for offences under the MMDR Act and the Rules framed thereunder, notwithstanding the statutory bar under Section 22 of the Act. The Court clarified the doctrinal distinction between the stage of investigation and the stage of cognizance, holding that the bar under Section 22 is attracted only when the Magistrate takes cognizance and issues process, and not at the pre-cognizance stage of directing investigation. The judgment further analysed the effect of compounding of offences under Section 23A MMDR Act, concluding that once an offence under the Act or the Rules is compounded, no further proceedings can continue in respect of such offences, though prosecution under the Indian Penal Code for distinct offences such as theft remains unaffected. The ruling harmonises environmental protection objectives with procedural criminal law, reinforces the autonomy of police investigation in cognizable offences, and reiterates the doctrine that offences under special statutes and the IPC can coexist when their ingredients are distinct. **Content:** ## A) **ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The decision in *Jayant Etc. v. State of Madhya Pradesh* addresses the interface between the *Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957* and the *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* in the context of illegal mining, storage, and transportation of minor minerals. The Supreme Court examined whether a Judicial Magistrate can exercise powers under *Section 156(3) CrPC* to direct registration of an FIR for offences under the *MMDR Act* and the Rules framed thereunder, notwithstanding the statutory bar under *Section 22* of the Act. The Court clarified the doctrinal distinction between the stage of investigation and the stage of cognizance, holding that the bar under *Section 22* is attracted only when the Magistrate takes cognizance and issues process, and not at the pre-cognizance stage of directing investigation. The judgment further analysed the effect of compounding of offences under *Section 23A MMDR Act*, concluding that once an offence under the Act or the Rules is compounded, no further proceedings can continue in respect of such offences, though prosecution under the *Indian Penal Code* for distinct offences such as theft remains unaffected. The ruling harmonises environmental protection objectives with procedural criminal law, reinforces the autonomy of police investigation in cognizable offences, and reiterates the doctrine that offences under special statutes and the IPC can coexist when their ingredients are distinct. **Keywords:** Illegal mining; Section 22 MMDR Act; Cognizance; Section 156(3) CrPC; Compounding of offences; IPC and MMDR Act. ## B) **CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*Jayant Etc. v. State of Madhya Pradesh*ii) Case NumberCriminal Appeal Nos. 824–825 of 2020 (with Criminal Appeal No. 826 of 2020)iii) Judgement Date03 December 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) Quorum*Ashok Bhushan, J. and M.R. Shah, J.*vi) Author*M.R. Shah, J.*vii) Citation*\[2020\] 11 SCR 665*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 4, 21, 22, 23A MMDR Act, 1957; Sections 379, 414 IPC; Section 156(3) CrPC; Rule 53 M.P. Minor Mineral Rules, 1996; Rule 18 M.P. Minerals (Prevention of Illegal Mining, Transportation and Storage) Rules, 2006*ix) Judgments overruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsCriminal Law; Environmental Law; Mining Law ## C) **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT** Illegal mining of minor minerals, particularly sand from riverbeds, has emerged as a persistent environmental and governance challenge in India. The regulatory framework under the *MMDR Act, 1957* seeks to balance mineral development with ecological protection, while procedural criminal law governs investigation and prosecution of offences. Judicial interpretation has often been required to resolve tensions between statutory bars under special enactments and the general powers of police and Magistrates under the *CrPC*. In this background, the Supreme Court was called upon to examine the scope of *Section 22 MMDR Act*, which restricts courts from taking cognizance of offences under the Act except upon a written complaint by an authorised officer. The controversy arose from suo motu action by a Judicial Magistrate based on newspaper reports alleging large-scale illegal mining in Madhya Pradesh. The Magistrate directed registration of FIRs under *Section 156(3) CrPC* for offences under both the *MMDR Act* and the *IPC*. The accused persons contended that such direction was barred by *Sections 22 and 23A MMDR Act*, especially since the offences under the mining rules had already been compounded. The High Court rejected these contentions, relying on earlier Supreme Court jurisprudence distinguishing IPC offences from MMDR offences. The appeals before the Supreme Court thus presented an opportunity to clarify the precise stage at which the statutory bar operates, the legal effect of compounding, and the coexistence of parallel liability under the IPC. The judgment builds upon prior rulings such as *State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay* and constitutional doctrines relating to environmental protection and public trust, situating the decision within a broader ecological and criminal justice framework. ## D) **FACTS OF THE CASE** The private appellants were found transporting and storing minor minerals such as sand and soil without valid authorisation. During surprise inspections, *Mining Inspectors* seized tractor-trolleys loaded with illegally excavated minerals and prepared cases under *Rule 53 of the Madhya Pradesh Minor Mineral Rules, 1996*. These cases were forwarded to the competent mining authorities with proposals for compounding. The *Collector* approved the proposals, and the appellants deposited the prescribed penalty amounts. Upon payment, the seized vehicles and minerals were released. Subsequently, local newspapers reported rampant illegal mining in riverbeds in District Mandsaur, highlighting revenue loss and environmental degradation. The reports suggested that despite the applicability of offences under *Sections 379 and 414 IPC* and the *MMDR Act*, violators were routinely allowed to compound offences, thereby escaping criminal prosecution. Taking judicial notice of these reports and relying on precedent recognising the distinct nature of IPC offences, the *Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mandsaur*, suo motu exercised powers under *Section 156(3) CrPC* and directed the police to register FIRs and conduct investigation. FIRs were accordingly registered across multiple police stations for offences under the IPC and the *MMDR Act*. Aggrieved, the appellants approached the High Court under *Section 482 CrPC*, arguing that the Magistrate lacked jurisdiction due to the bar under *Section 22 MMDR Act* and that further proceedings were barred due to compounding under *Section 23A*. The High Court dismissed the petitions. The appellants, as well as the State of Madhya Pradesh, filed appeals before the Supreme Court challenging the High Court’s decision. ## E) **LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i) Whether a Magistrate can direct registration of an FIR under *Section 156(3) CrPC* for offences under the *MMDR Act* despite the bar under *Section 22*? ii) At what stage does the bar under *Section 22 MMDR Act* become operative? iii) Whether compounding of offences under *Section 23A MMDR Act* bars all subsequent criminal proceedings? iv) Whether offences under the *IPC* can proceed independently of offences under the *MMDR Act*? ## F) **PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellants submitted that *Section 22 MMDR Act* creates an absolute bar on initiation of criminal proceedings except upon a written complaint by an authorised officer. It was argued that the Magistrate could not suo motu direct registration of FIRs for MMDR offences. Heavy reliance was placed on statutory interpretation and earlier decisions emphasising the special procedure under the Act. It was further contended that once offences were compounded under *Rule 53 of the 1996 Rules* read with *Section 23A MMDR Act*, no further proceedings could continue due to the statutory bar under *Section 23A(2)*, and any fresh prosecution would violate the principle against double jeopardy. ## G) **RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the State, though inconsistent in their stance, supported the appellants in part by contending that the Magistrate’s order interfered with the compounding mechanism under the Rules. However, reliance was also placed on judicial precedents recognising the distinct nature of IPC offences and the power of Magistrates to order investigation at the pre-cognizance stage. ## H) **RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i) *Section 22, MMDR Act, 1957* ii) *Section 23A, MMDR Act, 1957* iii) *Section 156(3), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* iv) *Sections 379, 414, Indian Penal Code, 1860* v) *Rule 53, M.P. Minor Mineral Rules, 1996* vi) *Rule 18, M.P. Minerals (Prevention of Illegal Mining, Transportation and Storage) Rules, 2006* ## I) **JUDGEMENT** The Supreme Court held that the Magistrate acted within jurisdiction in directing registration of FIRs under *Section 156(3) CrPC*. The Court clarified that ordering investigation does not amount to taking cognizance. Cognizance occurs only when the Magistrate applies judicial mind to proceed under *Chapter XV or XVI CrPC* and issues process. Consequently, the bar under *Section 22 MMDR Act* is attracted only at the stage of cognizance and not at the investigation stage. The Court relied extensively on earlier precedents such as *A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak*, *R.R. Chari v. State of U.P.*, and *Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa* to reaffirm the conceptual distinction between investigation and cognizance. On compounding, the Court held that once offences under the *MMDR Act* and the Rules are compounded under *Section 23A*, no further proceedings can continue in respect of those offences. Accordingly, proceedings for offences under *Sections 4 and 21 MMDR Act* were quashed. However, the Court emphasised that offences under the *IPC*, particularly *Sections 379 and 414*, are distinct and involve separate ingredients. Compounding under the MMDR framework does not bar prosecution for IPC offences. The appeals by the private appellants were partly allowed to this limited extent, while the State’s appeal was dismissed. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The statutory bar under *Section 22 MMDR Act* operates only at the stage when a court takes cognizance of an offence and not at the stage of directing investigation under *Section 156(3) CrPC*. Further, compounding under *Section 23A MMDR Act* bars further proceedings only in respect of offences under the Act and the Rules, and not for distinct IPC offences. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court made significant observations on environmental degradation caused by illegal sand mining, invoking the *public trust doctrine* and constitutional duties under *Articles 48A and 51A*. It emphasised the need for stringent deterrence against ecological harm and expressed concern that mere compounding may allow violators to escape serious consequences. **c) GUIDELINES** i) Magistrates may direct registration of FIRs under *Section 156(3) CrPC* for MMDR offences at the pre-cognizance stage. ii) Police may investigate and submit reports under *Section 173 CrPC* in MMDR-related offences. iii) Authorised officers may file complaints for MMDR offences after investigation. iv) Compounding under *Section 23A* bars only MMDR proceedings and not IPC prosecutions. ## J) **CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment delineates the procedural boundaries between investigation and cognizance with doctrinal clarity. It reinforces environmental accountability by permitting parallel prosecution under the IPC while respecting statutory compounding under the MMDR framework. The reasoning aligns criminal procedure with environmental jurisprudence and strengthens enforcement against illegal mining without diluting legislative safeguards. ## K) **REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred:** 1. *A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak*, *\[1984\] 2 SCR 914*. 2. *State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay*, *\[2014\] 9 SCR 1063*. 3. *Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa*, *\[2013\] 9 SCR 869*. **b) Important Statutes Referred:** 1. *Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957*. 2. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973*. 3. *Indian Penal Code, 1860*. **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Pankjeshwar Sharma and Others v. State of Jammu & Kashmir and Others, [2020] 13 S.C.R. 198](https://lawfoyer.in/pankjeshwar-sharma-and-others-v-state-of-jammu-kashmir-and-others-2020-13-s-c-r-198/) **Published:** December 21, 2025 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The judgment in Pankjeshwar Sharma and Others v. State of Jammu & Kashmir and Others examines the constitutional validity of appointments made to public service posts in deviation from the merit list prepared under statutory recruitment rules. The Supreme Court was confronted with a complex service law dispute arising from a prolonged recruitment process initiated in 1999 for the post of Sub-Inspector of Police (Executive) in the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir. The litigation spanned over two decades and involved three distinct rounds of judicial scrutiny. The core controversy centered on whether appointments granted to twenty-two candidates—who were admittedly lower in merit than the appellants—could be sustained when such appointments were made pursuant to a concession recorded by the Supreme Court in earlier proceedings, and not strictly in accordance with the redrawn State-wise merit list. The appellants invoked Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, contending that denial of appointment to more meritorious candidates amounted to arbitrariness and hostile discrimination. The Court undertook an elaborate analysis of the doctrine of negative equality, reiterating that illegality or irregularity committed in favour of one candidate cannot be relied upon by others to claim similar relief. While holding that the appointments of the twenty-two candidates were irregular and not in conformity with recruitment rules, the Court declined to disturb them on equitable considerations, including long years of service, bonafide state action, and the need to bring quietus to prolonged litigation. The judgment draws a critical distinction between illegal and irregular appointments and reinforces settled principles governing public employment, merit-based selection, and constitutional equality. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment in *Pankjeshwar Sharma and Others v. State of Jammu & Kashmir and Others* examines the constitutional validity of appointments made to public service posts in deviation from the merit list prepared under statutory recruitment rules. The Supreme Court was confronted with a complex service law dispute arising from a prolonged recruitment process initiated in 1999 for the post of *Sub-Inspector of Police (Executive)* in the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir. The litigation spanned over two decades and involved three distinct rounds of judicial scrutiny. The core controversy centered on whether appointments granted to *twenty-two candidates*—who were admittedly lower in merit than the appellants—could be sustained when such appointments were made pursuant to a concession recorded by the Supreme Court in earlier proceedings, and not strictly in accordance with the redrawn State-wise merit list. The appellants invoked *Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India*, contending that denial of appointment to more meritorious candidates amounted to arbitrariness and hostile discrimination. The Court undertook an elaborate analysis of the doctrine of *negative equality*, reiterating that illegality or irregularity committed in favour of one candidate cannot be relied upon by others to claim similar relief. While holding that the appointments of the twenty-two candidates were *irregular* and not in conformity with recruitment rules, the Court declined to disturb them on equitable considerations, including long years of service, bonafide state action, and the need to bring quietus to prolonged litigation. The judgment draws a critical distinction between *illegal* and *irregular* appointments and reinforces settled principles governing public employment, merit-based selection, and constitutional equality. **Keywords:** Service jurisprudence; Negative equality; Merit-based appointment; Irregular appointments; Article 14 of the Constitution ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetails*Judgement Cause Title**Pankjeshwar Sharma and Others v. State of Jammu & Kashmir and Others**Case Number*Civil Appeal Nos. 3904–3905 of 2020 (with connected appeals)*Judgement Date*03 December 2020*Court*Supreme Court of India*Quorum*L. Nageswara Rao, Hemant Gupta & Ajay Rastogi, JJ.*Author*Ajay Rastogi, J.*Citation**\[2020\] 13 S.C.R. 198**Legal Provisions Involved**Articles 14, 16, 226 & 142 of the Constitution of India**Judgments Overruled*None*Related Law Subjects*Service Law; Constitutional Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The litigation arose out of a recruitment process initiated by the *Director General of Police, Jammu and Kashmir* through an advertisement dated *25 February 1999* for the post of *Sub-Inspector of Police (Executive)*. The post formed part of the State cadre and was governed by the *J&K Police (Executive) Rules*. The recruitment process, instead of culminating in a final selection within a reasonable period, became embroiled in multiple rounds of litigation due to deviations from statutory procedure. The foundational illegality stemmed from the preparation of *province-wise merit lists* for Jammu and Kashmir provinces, despite the absence of any statutory sanction for such bifurcation. This deviation triggered the first round of litigation, culminating in directions from the High Court to redraw a *State-wise merit list*. Subsequent compliance led to cancellation of appointments of *forty-seven serving candidates*, thereby initiating a second round of litigation. In an attempt to resolve the escalating dispute, a concession was recorded before the Supreme Court in 2007, wherein the State undertook to accommodate not only the forty-seven ousted candidates but also *twenty-two impleaded candidates*. This concession later became the fulcrum of the third round of litigation, when candidates higher in merit challenged the appointment of the twenty-two candidates. The present appeals questioned whether such appointments could be constitutionally sustained when they violated the settled principle that *public employment must strictly adhere to merit*. The case thus required reconciliation of constitutional equality with equitable considerations arising from prolonged service and administrative bonafides. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The recruitment process commenced with an advertisement issued on *25 February 1999*, inviting applications for *Sub-Inspector of Police (Executive)*. The Rules did not contemplate provincial segregation of merit. However, the selecting authority prepared *separate merit lists* for Jammu and Kashmir provinces. This resulted in differential cut-off marks, with the last selected candidate in Jammu securing *56 marks*, while in Kashmir the cut-off was *50 marks*. Aggrieved candidates challenged this approach in *SWP No. 567/2000*. The Single Judge held that the post being a State cadre post, the selection ought to have been State-wide. The Division Bench modified the relief and directed preparation of a fresh *State-wise merit list*, protecting those candidates who fell within the merit zone. Pursuant to these directions, a revised merit list dated *19 May 2004* was issued, resulting in appointment of *259 candidates* and cancellation of appointments of *47 serving candidates*. These candidates challenged their removal and obtained interim protection. Contempt proceedings followed, culminating in a High Court direction that those outside the merit zone could not continue. When the matter reached the Supreme Court in *Civil Appeal No. 4758 of 2006*, a statement by the Advocate General was recorded that *47 ousted candidates* and *22 impleaded candidates* would be accommodated. No legal issue was adjudicated at that stage. Subsequently, the State appointed the *22 candidates* in 2008. This led to the third round of litigation, initiated by candidates who were higher in merit than the appointed twenty-two candidates. The Single Judge ruled in their favour, but the Division Bench reversed the decision, holding that the Supreme Court order operated under *Article 142*. This finding was challenged before the Supreme Court. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether appointments made contrary to the order of merit violate *Article 14 of the Constitution of India*? ii. Whether the doctrine of *negative equality* permits extension of an irregular benefit to others? iii. Whether the Supreme Court’s order dated *10 May 2007* amounted to an exercise of power under *Article 142*? iv. Whether long years of service can validate otherwise irregular appointments? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that appointments to public posts must strictly follow the *order of merit* as mandated by statutory recruitment rules. It was argued that appointment of candidates lower in merit, while excluding the appellants, amounted to hostile discrimination under *Article 14*. It was contended that the order dated *10 May 2007* merely recorded a concession by the Advocate General and did not adjudicate any legal issue. Therefore, the State could not rely upon it to justify appointments dehors the rules. The appellants emphasized that they were not seeking removal of the twenty-two candidates but sought *fair consideration* for appointment or adjustment against available vacancies. The appellants further argued that denial of appointment caused continuing injustice and mental agony, particularly when vacancies were admittedly available. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents submitted that the appointments were made in *exceptional circumstances* to resolve prolonged litigation. It was highlighted that the forty-seven candidates had undergone extensive training and participated in anti-insurgency operations, and their removal would have adverse consequences. It was argued that the twenty-two candidates had litigated for years and were accommodated bonafide. The respondents stressed that the appellants were not the next candidates in the merit queue and could not claim a vested right. Reliance was placed on settled law that *Article 14 does not envisage negative equality* and that courts may mould relief to balance equity and legality. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court held that recruitment to public posts must ordinarily be made strictly in accordance with statutory rules and merit lists. Any deviation violates *Articles 14 and 16*. However, the Court emphasized that not every deviation renders an appointment illegal. The Court clarified that the appointments of the twenty-two candidates were *irregular*, as they were not made strictly in accordance with the redrawn merit list. Yet, they were not *illegal*, as they were made pursuant to a bonafide concession recorded by the Court during ongoing litigation. The Court rejected the High Court’s view that the appointments were made under *Article 142*, holding that the order dated *10 May 2007* merely recorded a concession and did not invoke constitutional powers. Relying on precedents such as *State of U.P. v. Rajkumar Sharma*, *Arup Das v. State of Assam*, and *Union of India v. Kartick Chandra Mondal*, the Court reiterated that an erroneous act cannot be the foundation for perpetuating further illegality. Considering that the twenty-two candidates had completed over *twelve years of service* and had gained substantial experience, the Court declined to disturb their appointments. The appeals were accordingly dismissed. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment lies in reaffirming that *Article 14 embodies positive equality*, not negative equality. An irregular appointment, even if constitutionally suspect, does not entitle others to claim similar relief. Public employment must be merit-based, yet courts may exercise equitable discretion where disturbing appointments would cause greater injustice than upholding them. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that prolonged recruitment processes undermine administrative efficiency and erode faith in public institutions. It expressed concern that a recruitment initiated in 1999 remained unresolved after twenty-one years, leaving candidates in perpetual uncertainty. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Recruitment authorities must strictly adhere to statutory recruitment rules. ii. Merit lists must not be altered except in accordance with law. iii. Courts may distinguish between illegal and irregular appointments. iv. Negative equality cannot be claimed to perpetuate an error. v. Equitable relief may be moulded considering long service and bonafide state action. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment strikes a careful balance between constitutional discipline and equitable justice. While reaffirming the sanctity of merit-based public employment, the Court pragmatically acknowledged the human and administrative costs of unsettling long-standing appointments. The ruling reinforces doctrinal clarity on negative equality while cautioning the State against procedural deviations that give rise to avoidable litigation. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *State of U.P. v. Rajkumar Sharma*, *(2006) 3 SCC 330 : \[2006\] 2 SCR 877* ii. *Arup Das v. State of Assam*, *(2012) 5 SCC 559 : \[2012\] 1 SCR 445* iii. *Union of India v. Kartick Chandra Mondal*, *(2010) 2 SCC 422 : \[2010\] 1 SCR 1099* iv. *Gujarat State Dy. Executive Engineers’ Assn. v. State of Gujarat*, *(1994) Supp 2 SCC 591* v. *Buddhi Nath Chaudhary v. Abahi Kumar*, *(2001) 3 SCC 328* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Constitution of India* – *Articles 14, 16, 226, 142* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Telangana Power Generation Corporation Ltd. v. Andhra Pradesh Power Generation Corporation Ltd., [2020] 13 S.C.R. 987](https://lawfoyer.in/telangana-power-generation-corporation-ltd-v-andhra-pradesh-power-generation-corporation-ltd-2020-13-s-c-r-987/) **Published:** December 21, 2025 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The judgment addresses a long-standing and complex service law dispute arising from the bifurcation of the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh under the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014. The core controversy pertained to the allocation and distribution of employees of power sector undertakings between the newly formed State of Telangana and the residuary State of Andhra Pradesh. Following the appointed day, 02.06.2014, the respective power utilities failed to reach consensus on modalities for employee distribution as mandated under Section 82 of the Act. In the absence of agreement, the Telangana power utilities unilaterally relieved 1157 employees based predominantly on the principle of nativity, directing them to join Andhra Pradesh utilities. This action triggered multiple writ petitions before the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad, which decisively rejected nativity as a valid criterion and quashed the unilateral action. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s ruling and, with the consent of parties, constituted a One-Man Committee headed by Justice D.M. Dharmadhikari (Retd.) to effectuate final allocation. The Committee’s process culminated in a Final Report, Supplementary Report, and a Concluding Report, collectively allocating 655 employees from Telangana to Andhra Pradesh and an equal reciprocal number in the reverse direction, subject to special categories such as spouse, medical, SC/ST, and retirement cases. A series of miscellaneous applications challenged the Committee’s mandate, methodology, reciprocity principle, and finality of allocation. The Supreme Court rejected all objections, reaffirmed the binding nature of the Committee’s conclusions, and clarified that no employee, utility, or association could challenge the finalized allocation before any forum. The judgment reinforces statutory intent, administrative equity, and finality in post-reorganisation service matters. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment addresses a long-standing and complex service law dispute arising from the bifurcation of the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh under the *Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014*. The core controversy pertained to the allocation and distribution of employees of power sector undertakings between the newly formed State of Telangana and the residuary State of Andhra Pradesh. Following the appointed day, *02.06.2014*, the respective power utilities failed to reach consensus on modalities for employee distribution as mandated under *Section 82* of the Act. In the absence of agreement, the Telangana power utilities unilaterally relieved *1157 employees* based predominantly on the *principle of nativity*, directing them to join Andhra Pradesh utilities. This action triggered multiple writ petitions before the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad, which decisively rejected nativity as a valid criterion and quashed the unilateral action. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s ruling and, with the consent of parties, constituted a *One-Man Committee* headed by *Justice D.M. Dharmadhikari (Retd.)* to effectuate final allocation. The Committee’s process culminated in a *Final Report*, *Supplementary Report*, and a *Concluding Report*, collectively allocating *655 employees* from Telangana to Andhra Pradesh and an equal reciprocal number in the reverse direction, subject to special categories such as spouse, medical, SC/ST, and retirement cases. A series of miscellaneous applications challenged the Committee’s mandate, methodology, reciprocity principle, and finality of allocation. The Supreme Court rejected all objections, reaffirmed the binding nature of the Committee’s conclusions, and clarified that no employee, utility, or association could challenge the finalized allocation before any forum. The judgment reinforces statutory intent, administrative equity, and finality in post-reorganisation service matters. **Keywords:** *Service law*, *State reorganisation*, *employee allocation*, *Section 82*, *power utilities*, *One-Man Committee*, *finality of allocation* ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgment Cause Title*Telangana Power Generation Corporation Ltd. v. Andhra Pradesh Power Generation Corporation Ltd.*ii) Case Number*Miscellaneous Application No. 1270 of 2020 in Civil Appeal No. 11435 of 2018*iii) Judgment Date*07 December 2020*iv) Court*Supreme Court of India*v) Quorum*Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhushan and Hon’ble Mr. Justice M.R. Shah*vi) Author*Justice Ashok Bhushan*vii) Citation*\[2020\] 13 S.C.R. 987*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 3, 4, 53 and 82 of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014*ix) Judgments Overruled*None*x) Related Law Subjects*Service Law, Constitutional Law, Administrative Law* ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The dispute emanates from the structural reorganisation of the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh into two successor States under the *Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014*. While *Sections 3 and 4* dealt with territorial bifurcation, *Section 82* specifically governed the continuation and distribution of employees of State public sector undertakings. The statute envisaged that employees would continue for one year post-appointed day and that the *“corporate body concerned”* would determine modalities for personnel distribution. In practice, the power utilities of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh failed to evolve mutually acceptable modalities. The Telangana utilities, acting unilaterally, relieved *1157 employees* based on *nativity*, compelling them to report to Andhra Pradesh utilities. This administrative action disregarded statutory intent, employee options, and equitable considerations. The High Court decisively invalidated this approach, holding that nativity had no legal sanction under *Section 82*. When the matter reached the Supreme Court, the Court upheld the High Court judgment and innovatively appointed a *One-Man Committee* to conclude the allocation process. This mechanism represented judicial pragmatism, aiming to balance competing administrative claims while respecting statutory boundaries. The Committee was expressly vested with final authority, and its decisions were declared binding on all stakeholders. Despite this, multiple challenges emerged at various stages of the Committee’s reports. These challenges formed the subject matter of the present batch of miscellaneous applications, necessitating judicial clarification on the scope, authority, and conclusiveness of the Committee’s allocation. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appointed day for reorganisation was *02.06.2014*. Prior to bifurcation, the power sector comprised *APGENCO, APTRANSCO,* and four DISCOMs. Government Orders *G.O. Ms. Nos. 24, 25, and 26 dated 29.05.2014* apportioned assets, liabilities, and sanctioned posts between the successor States. However, no final personnel allocation followed. Telangana utilities unilaterally relieved *1157 employees*, while *242 employees* voluntarily moved from Andhra Pradesh to Telangana. This mass movement was justified by Telangana utilities solely on nativity, leading to litigation. The High Court set aside the unilateral action and disapproved nativity as a criterion. The Supreme Court, while affirming this view, constituted a *One-Man Committee*. The Committee framed *fourteen modalities* grounded in statutory provisions, Government Orders, seniority, option, social justice categories, and humanitarian considerations. A *Final Report dated 26.12.2019* approved the transfer of *655 employees* from Telangana to Andhra Pradesh. Subsequent objections led to a *Supplementary Report dated 11.03.2020* and a *Concluding Report dated 20.06.2020*, completing reciprocal allocation and addressing retirement, medical, spouse, and SC/ST cases. Despite the finality clause, numerous miscellaneous applications questioned the Committee’s authority, numerical reciprocity, post-report modifications, and alleged deviation from modalities. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the One-Man Committee exceeded its mandate under the Supreme Court’s order dated *28.11.2018*? ii. Whether the principle of numerical reciprocity in allocation was legally sustainable? iii. Whether the Concluding Report lacked finality due to post-report adjustments? iv. Whether employees could challenge the finalized allocation before any forum? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the petitioners contended that the Committee was restricted to allocating only *1157 employees* and that subsequent reciprocal allocation was ultra vires. It was argued that the Committee abandoned its own modalities and introduced extraneous principles such as *financial neutrality*. The petitioners asserted that Telangana, being a smaller State, was disproportionately burdened. Post-Concluding Report modifications were cited to argue absence of finality and procedural arbitrariness. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents submitted that *Section 82* empowered holistic allocation and that the Committee’s remit was not numerically confined. They emphasized that reciprocity ensured balance and fairness. The respondents argued that post-report adjustments were consequential and flowed directly from agreed directions on retirement and special cases. The binding nature of the Committee’s decision was highlighted. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court dismissed all miscellaneous applications. The Court reaffirmed that the Committee’s authority was consensual, comprehensive, and final. It held that the liberty to seek clarification did not translate into a right of appeal. The Court upheld numerical reciprocity, validated directions excluding retiring employees, and recognized post-report adjustments as logical consequences. The Court categorically ruled that no employee or utility could challenge the finalized allocation before any forum. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The allocation of employees under *Section 82* must be concluded through consensus or a judicially sanctioned mechanism. Once parties agree to a binding process, its outcome attains finality and is immune from collateral challenge. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that prolonged allocation disputes undermine administrative stability and employee morale, underscoring the need for timely and equitable resolution. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Allocation decisions by a judicially appointed committee are final. ii. Nativity cannot be a determinative criterion. iii. Retirement and humanitarian considerations may justify limited adjustments. iv. Reciprocal allocation ensures administrative balance. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment exemplifies judicial restraint and administrative pragmatism. It reinforces statutory intent, respects consensual dispute resolution, and protects institutional stability. The ruling serves as a definitive precedent on post-reorganisation service allocation, ensuring closure to prolonged litigation. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Telangana Judges Association v. Union of India*, *SCC Online SC 1729* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [QUIZ COMPETIITON ON UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) ACT | Organized by CANONSPHERE LAW REVIEW | Register by January 7, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/quiz-competiiton-on-unlawful-activities-prevention-act-organized-by-canonsphere-law-review-register-by-january-7-2026/) **Published:** December 20, 2025 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** QUIZ COMPETIITON ON UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES (PREVENTION) ACT | Organized by CANONSPHERE LAW REVIEW | Register by January 7, 2026 **Content:** ## ABOUT CANONSPHERE LAW REVIEW CANONSPHERE LAW REVIEW is a peer-reviewed online legal journal committed to publishing high-quality scholarship on contemporary legal issues. Our journal allows academics, practitioners, and students to contribute to legal discourse and promote critical analysis of legal developments worldwide. We invite submissions from legal scholars, practitioners, and students on topics related to \[areas of law covered, e.g., constitutional law, international law, corporate law, human rights, etc.\]. ## ABOUT THE QUIZ COMPETITION Quiz Competition on Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act is a thrilling opportunity for law students and aspirants to showcase their knowledge, accuracy, and speed. With carefully curated questions from the UAPA Act, participants will engage in a test of intellect and precision while competing against like-minded peers. This competition aims to encourage legal research, critical thinking, and academic excellence while rewarding participants for their commitment to learning. ## ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA 1. Students pursuing any undergraduate or postgraduate degree from a recognized university are eligible to participate. 2. Open to participants across India. ## REGISTRATION PROCESS AND FEES 1. Individual Registration Fee: ₹19/- only 2. Participants must register through the official Google Form link:[https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1JHnkbFfBppv2vzP8m7zyBuVOr4ymwURkAPPQd ](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1JHnkbFfBppv2vzP8m7zyBuVOr4ymwURkAPPQdJBuMSE/edit)[JBuMSE/edit](https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1JHnkbFfBppv2vzP8m7zyBuVOr4ymwURkAPPQdJBuMSE/edit) A separate Quiz Form will be shared on the day of the competition. Payment proof must be uploaded in the registration form before submission. ## COMPETITION DETAILS **Topic:** Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) **No. of Questions:** 20 **Time Allotted:** 20 minutes **Mode:** Online (Google Form) **Date of Competition:** 8 January, 2026 ## PRIZES AND REWARDS 1. Top 1 Performers :Gift Hamper . 2. Top 3 Performers: Certificate of Excellence 3. Top 10 Performers will get a 10% discount on the RTI Course Top 10 Performers: Certificates of Merit. 4. All Participants will receive Certificate of Participation. ## PAYMENT DETAILS - Account Number- 50100741873462 - Account Holder- Yashfeen Khan - Bank Name – HDFC Bank Branch – Kidwai Nagar- Kanpur - IFSC Code – HDFC0002042 OR - UPI ID – khanyashfeen861@okhdfcbank ## CONTACT DETAILS For more details, please contact: Adv. Yashfeen Khan 7985353350 Ms. Manya Harit 8449037799 ## IMPORTANT LINKS **Rulebook:** [https://drive.google.com/drive/u/1/folders/175o68NdV3i1bibDyIsd1HOfHtFvkGGUB?ths=tr ](https://drive.google.com/drive/u/1/folders/175o68NdV3i1bibDyIsd1HOfHtFvkGGUB?ths=true)[ue](https://drive.google.com/drive/u/1/folders/175o68NdV3i1bibDyIsd1HOfHtFvkGGUB?ths=true) **Official Notification:** [https://canonsphere.com/jobs/quiz-competition-on-unlawful-activities](https://canonsphere.com/jobs/quiz-competition-on-unlawful-activities-prevention-act/) [-prevention-act/](https://canonsphere.com/jobs/quiz-competition-on-unlawful-activities-prevention-act/) **Categories:** Events, Quiz --- ### [Amish Devgan v. Union of India and Others, [2020] 14 S.C.R. 198](https://lawfoyer.in/amish-devgan-v-union-of-india-and-others-2020-14-s-c-r-198/) **Published:** December 20, 2025 **Author:** LawFoyer **Excerpt:** The judgment in Amish Devgan v. Union of India and Others addresses the constitutional and statutory boundaries of hate speech, freedom of speech and expression, and criminal process in the context of televised media debates. The case arose from allegedly offensive remarks made by the petitioner during a live news debate concerning The Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, wherein references were made to Pir Hazrat Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti, a revered Sufi saint. Multiple FIRs were registered across several States invoking Sections 153A, 295A and 505(2) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The petitioner sought quashing of FIRs, protection from arrest, and consolidation of proceedings under Article 32 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court undertook an extensive doctrinal and comparative analysis of hate speech jurisprudence, identifying three determinative elements—content, intent, and harm. The Court clarified that Section 295A IPC criminalises only aggravated and malicious insults to religion and does not penalise mere offensive or careless speech. It emphasised that the evaluation of hate speech requires contextual and factual inquiry, rendering premature quashing inappropriate at the FIR stage. The Court rejected the plea for quashing but granted interim protection from arrest, subject to cooperation with investigation. Applying the doctrine against multiplicity of FIRs, all subsequent FIRs were directed to be transferred and clubbed with the first FIR at Ajmer. The judgment reinforces constitutional balance between free speech and public order while preserving investigative autonomy. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment in *Amish Devgan v. Union of India and Others* addresses the constitutional and statutory boundaries of *hate speech*, *freedom of speech and expression*, and *criminal process* in the context of televised media debates. The case arose from allegedly offensive remarks made by the petitioner during a live news debate concerning *The Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991*, wherein references were made to *Pir Hazrat Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti*, a revered Sufi saint. Multiple FIRs were registered across several States invoking *Sections 153A, 295A and 505(2) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860*. The petitioner sought quashing of FIRs, protection from arrest, and consolidation of proceedings under *Article 32 of the Constitution*. The Supreme Court undertook an extensive doctrinal and comparative analysis of hate speech jurisprudence, identifying three determinative elements—*content*, *intent*, and *harm*. The Court clarified that *Section 295A IPC* criminalises only aggravated and malicious insults to religion and does not penalise mere offensive or careless speech. It emphasised that the evaluation of hate speech requires contextual and factual inquiry, rendering premature quashing inappropriate at the FIR stage. The Court rejected the plea for quashing but granted interim protection from arrest, subject to cooperation with investigation. Applying the doctrine against multiplicity of FIRs, all subsequent FIRs were directed to be transferred and clubbed with the first FIR at *Ajmer*. The judgment reinforces constitutional balance between free speech and public order while preserving investigative autonomy. **Keywords:** Hate Speech; Freedom of Expression; Section 295A IPC; Multiple FIRs; Media Trials; Article 19(1)(a); Religious Sentiments. ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgement Cause Title*Amish Devgan v. Union of India and Others*ii) Case NumberWrit Petition (Criminal) No. 160 of 2020iii) Judgement Date07 December 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumHon’ble Mr. Justice A.M. Khanwilkar and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjiv Khannavi) AuthorJustice Sanjiv Khannavii) Citation*\[2020\] 14 S.C.R. 198*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Articles 19(1)(a), 19(2), 32 Constitution of India; Sections 153A, 295A, 505(2), 95 IPC; Sections 154, 156(1), 179, 162 CrPC*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsConstitutional Law; Criminal Law; Media Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The case emerged against the backdrop of increasing public scrutiny over media debates and their role in shaping communal discourse. The petitioner, a television journalist, hosted a prime-time debate on the constitutional validity of *The Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991*. During the broadcast, statements allegedly characterising *Pir Hazrat Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti* as an invader and robber were aired. These remarks triggered widespread outrage, culminating in multiple FIRs lodged across different States invoking penal provisions concerning promotion of enmity and religious insult. The petitioner approached the Supreme Court directly under *Article 32*, asserting violation of fundamental rights and abuse of criminal process. The petition raised significant questions regarding the threshold of criminality in speech-related offences, especially in the context of journalistic expression. The Court was called upon to balance the competing claims of free speech and protection of religious dignity while ensuring that criminal law is not weaponised to stifle dissent or expression. The background also reflects the evolving jurisprudence on hate speech, both domestically and internationally. The Court noted the absence of a universal definition and stressed the contextual nature of hate speech adjudication. The judgment situates itself within earlier constitutional precedents that delineate the contours of *reasonable restrictions* under *Article 19(2)*, particularly concerning *public order*, *decency*, and *morality*. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE On 15 June 2020, the petitioner hosted a televised debate concerning challenges to *The Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991*. During the discussion, he uttered phrases referring to *“Aakrantak Chishti”* and *“Lootera Chishti”*, which were translated to mean terrorist and robber. The remarks were alleged to have portrayed *Pir Hazrat Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti* as a coercive converter of religion. Following the broadcast, seven FIRs were registered in different States, primarily under *Sections 153A, 295A, and 505(2) IPC*. The FIRs alleged deliberate insult to religious beliefs and promotion of communal hatred. The petitioner contended that the remarks were inadvertent and that he had intended to refer to *Alauddin Khilji*. He issued a public apology and clarification after the telecast. The petitioner also claimed to have received death threats post-broadcast and lodged a separate FIR seeking protection. He argued that the multiple FIRs amounted to harassment, lacked territorial jurisdiction, and infringed his freedom of speech. Interim protection from arrest was granted by the Supreme Court during the pendency of proceedings. The respondents disputed the apology, contending that the remarks were repeated multiple times, indicating intent. They alleged that the edited upload of the debate amounted to evidence tampering. The States argued that investigation must proceed to ascertain intent, context, and impact of the speech. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether the impugned remarks constitute *hate speech* under *Sections 153A, 295A, and 505(2) IPC*? ii. Whether multiple FIRs arising from a single broadcast are legally sustainable? iii. Whether FIRs can be quashed at the threshold stage under *Article 32*? iv. Whether apology negates criminal intent under *Section 295A IPC*? v. Whether territorial jurisdiction is vitiated under *Section 179 CrPC*? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the Petitioner submitted that the utterances lacked *mens rea* and were accidental. It was argued that *Section 295A IPC* penalises only deliberate and malicious acts, as clarified in *Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P.*. The petitioner asserted that isolated words cannot be divorced from the overall context of the debate. Reliance was placed on *Veeda Menez v. Yusuf Khan* to argue applicability of *Section 95 IPC* concerning trivial harm. The petitioner further contended that registration of FIRs across States without cause of action violated *Article 21* and amounted to abuse of process. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the Respondents submitted that repetition of the offensive words evidenced intent. They argued that apology was an afterthought and could not absolve criminal liability. The respondents relied on *Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P.* to emphasise the cumulative effect of content, context, and impact. The States contended that investigation was essential to ascertain whether the speech crossed the threshold of criminality. It was argued that *Article 19(1)(a)* is subject to *Article 19(2)* and does not protect speech promoting communal disharmony. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Article 19(1)(a) and 19(2), Constitution of India* ii. *Section 295A, Indian Penal Code, 1860* iii. *Section 153A IPC* iv. *Section 505(2) IPC* v. *Sections 154, 156(1), 179, 162 CrPC* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court declined to quash the FIRs, holding that assessment of hate speech requires factual inquiry into *content*, *intent*, and *harm*. The Court observed that the petitioner was not a neutral host but an active participant. It held that apology alone cannot preclude investigation. The Court granted interim protection from arrest, subject to cooperation. Applying *T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala*, all FIRs were directed to be transferred to *P.S. Dargah, Ajmer*, treating subsequent FIRs as statements under *Section 162 CrPC*. **a. RATIO DECIDENDI** The Court crystallised the doctrine that *Section 295A IPC* targets only aggravated insults made with deliberate and malicious intent. Hate speech determination requires a conjunctive evaluation of content, intent, and harm. Premature quashing would undermine investigative process. **b. OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that long-term impact of hate speech on dignity and social cohesion must be considered beyond immediate public disorder. Comparative jurisprudence was discussed to contextualise Indian standards. **c. GUIDELINES** i. Hate speech assessment must consider content, intent, and impact cumulatively. ii. Multiple FIRs for same incident should be consolidated. iii. Apology does not automatically negate criminal intent. iv. Investigation must not be stifled at FIR stage without exceptional circumstances. ## J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment represents a nuanced constitutional balancing exercise. It safeguards free speech while affirming the State’s duty to protect dignity and communal harmony. The Court refrained from acting as a trial court, preserving investigative autonomy. The decision clarifies hate speech jurisprudence and reinforces procedural safeguards against misuse of criminal law without granting blanket immunity to media actors. ## K) REFERENCES **a. Important Cases Referred** 1. *Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P.*, *\[1957 SCR\]* 2. *Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P.*, *\[1997 SCR\]* 3. *T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala*, *\[2001 SCR\]* 4. *Arnab Ranjan Goswami v. Union of India*, *\[2020 SCC Online SC\]* **b. Important Statutes Referred** 1. *The Constitution of India* 2. *Indian Penal Code, 1860* 3. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [The Project Director, Project Implementation Unit v. P.V. Krishnamoorthy & Ors., [2020] 14 SCR 86](https://lawfoyer.in/the-project-director-project-implementation-unit-v-p-v-krishnamoorthy-ors-2020-14-scr-86/) **Published:** December 20, 2025 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The Supreme Court in The Project Director, Project Implementation Unit v. P.V. Krishnamoorthy & Ors. authoritatively examined the scope of legislative and executive competence of the Union of India under Articles 246, 248 and Entry 23 of List I of the Seventh Schedule concerning declaration and construction of national highways over green-field lands. The controversy arose from challenges to notifications issued under Sections 2(2) and 3A(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956 for acquisition of lands for the Chennai–Krishnagiri–Salem National Corridor under Bharatmala Pariyojana – Phase I. The Madras High Court had partially invalidated the acquisition on grounds of lack of legislative competence, arbitrariness in route realignment, and absence of prior environmental clearance. The Supreme Court reversed these findings and held that the 1956 Act empowers the Central Government to declare any land, including non-existing roads and green-field lands, as national highways. The Court applied the doctrine of pith and substance to affirm Parliament’s exclusive domain over national highways and clarified that Entry 13 of List II does not dilute Entry 23 of List I. The Court further held that prior environmental or forest clearance is not a precondition for issuing notifications under Sections 2(2) or 3A, and such clearance is required only before commencement of actual construction. The judgment also clarified judicial restraint in policy decisions, especially infrastructure planning, and laid down a crucial interpretative mechanism under Article 142 to exclude time spent in environmental clearance from the statutory lapse period under Section 3D(3). The decision reinforces federal balance, sustainable development jurisprudence, and limits of judicial review in land acquisition for national infrastructure projects. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The Supreme Court in *The Project Director, Project Implementation Unit v. P.V. Krishnamoorthy & Ors.* authoritatively examined the scope of legislative and executive competence of the Union of India under *Articles 246, 248 and Entry 23 of List I of the Seventh Schedule* concerning declaration and construction of national highways over green-field lands. The controversy arose from challenges to notifications issued under *Sections 2(2) and 3A(1) of the National Highways Act, 1956* for acquisition of lands for the Chennai–Krishnagiri–Salem National Corridor under *Bharatmala Pariyojana – Phase I*. The Madras High Court had partially invalidated the acquisition on grounds of lack of legislative competence, arbitrariness in route realignment, and absence of prior environmental clearance. The Supreme Court reversed these findings and held that the *1956 Act* empowers the Central Government to declare *any land*, including non-existing roads and green-field lands, as national highways. The Court applied the *doctrine of pith and substance* to affirm Parliament’s exclusive domain over national highways and clarified that *Entry 13 of List II* does not dilute *Entry 23 of List I*. The Court further held that *prior environmental or forest clearance is not a precondition* for issuing notifications under *Sections 2(2) or 3A*, and such clearance is required only before commencement of actual construction. The judgment also clarified judicial restraint in policy decisions, especially infrastructure planning, and laid down a crucial interpretative mechanism under *Article 142* to exclude time spent in environmental clearance from the statutory lapse period under *Section 3D(3)*. The decision reinforces federal balance, sustainable development jurisprudence, and limits of judicial review in land acquisition for national infrastructure projects. **Keywords:** National Highways Act, Legislative Competence, Green-field Acquisition, Environmental Clearance, Judicial Review ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgment Cause Title*The Project Director, Project Implementation Unit v. P.V. Krishnamoorthy & Ors.*Case NumberCivil Appeal Nos. 3976–3977 of 2020Judgment Date08 December 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorum*A.M. Khanwilkar, B.R. Gavai & Krishna Murari, JJ.*Author*A.M. Khanwilkar, J.*Citation*\[2020\] 14 SCR 86*Legal Provisions Involved*Arts. 246, 248, 257, 142 of the Constitution; Sections 2(2), 3A–3J, 3D of the National Highways Act, 1956; Environment (Protection) Act, 1986*Judgments OverruledNilRelated Law SubjectsConstitutional Law, Land Acquisition Law, Environmental Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The litigation stemmed from large-scale opposition to the proposed *Chennai–Krishnagiri–Salem (C-K-S) National Corridor*, an eight-lane green-field highway project conceived under *Bharatmala Pariyojana – Phase I*. The Union Government, invoking *Section 2(2) of the National Highways Act, 1956*, declared the corridor as *NH-179A and NH-179B*, followed by acquisition notifications under *Section 3A(1)*. Affected landowners and public interest litigants challenged these actions before the Madras High Court. The High Court questioned the Union’s legislative competence to create a national highway over non-existing roads, doubted the policy decision replacing the earlier Chennai–Madurai corridor, and insisted on prior environmental clearance. This triggered appeals before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court’s intervention was significant as it addressed multiple constitutional doctrines, including federal distribution of legislative power, judicial review over policy decisions, and reconciliation between development imperatives and environmental safeguards. The judgment thus operates at the intersection of constitutional structure, infrastructure governance, and environmental jurisprudence, providing authoritative clarity on the statutory architecture governing national highways in India. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The Union Government approved *Bharatmala Pariyojana – Phase I*, envisaging construction of approximately *24,800 km* of highways with an estimated outlay of *₹5.35 lakh crore*. The project allowed substitution of up to *15% of corridor length* based on feasibility considerations. Pursuant to a meeting dated *19 January 2018* chaired by the Secretary, *Ministry of Road Transport and Highways*, the Chennai–Madurai Economic Corridor was substituted with the Chennai–Krishnagiri–Salem National Corridor. Notifications under *Section 2(2)* declared the new corridor as national highways, followed by land acquisition notifications under *Section 3A(1)*. These actions were challenged before the Madras High Court, which held that national highways could only be declared over existing roads, that environmental clearance was mandatory prior to acquisition, and that the policy shift lacked empirical justification. The Union of India and NHAI appealed, asserting legislative competence under *Entry 23 of List I*, policy discretion under Bharatmala guidelines, and statutory compliance under the *1956 Act*. The Supreme Court examined the statutory scheme, constitutional provisions, and prior precedents to determine the legality of the acquisition process. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether Parliament has legislative competence to declare non-existing green-field land as a national highway? ii. Whether prior environmental clearance is mandatory before issuing *Section 3A* notifications? iii. Whether substitution of corridors under Bharatmala Pariyojana was arbitrary? iv. Whether *Section 3A* notifications lapse due to delay caused by environmental clearance procedures? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellants submitted that *Entry 23 of List I* grants exclusive authority over national highways, including incidental matters such as acquisition. Reliance was placed on *K.T. Plantation v. State of Karnataka (2011) 9 SCC 1* to affirm that incidental encroachment on State powers is constitutionally permissible. It was argued that *Section 2(2)* expressly empowers declaration of “any other highway”, not limited to existing roads. Regarding environmental clearance, it was contended that the *Environment (Protection) Act, 1986* mandates clearance only prior to commencement of construction, not at the acquisition stage. The appellants also argued that the policy decision to substitute corridors was taken by an expert committee and thus immune from judicial interference. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondents argued that *Entry 13 of List II* reserves roads to States, limiting Union power. It was contended that acquisition without prior environmental clearance violated *Articles 21, 48A, and 51A(g)*. The respondents further alleged arbitrariness and lack of empirical basis in altering the original corridor alignment, asserting mala fide intent and absence of public purpose. ## H) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court upheld the Union’s competence and reversed the High Court’s findings. It held that the *1956 Act*, read with *Articles 246 and 248*, authorises Parliament to legislate comprehensively on national highways. Applying the *doctrine of pith and substance*, the Court ruled that *Entry 23 of List I* prevails and is not diluted by *Entry 13 of List II*. The Court clarified that the term *“any land”* under *Section 3A* includes green-field lands and rejected the argument that national highways must be existing roads. On environmental clearance, the Court held that clearance is required only *before commencement of actual construction*, not at the acquisition stage. Regarding policy substitution, the Court characterised the decision as a *policy choice* backed by expert deliberation and held that courts cannot sit in appeal over infrastructure planning unless manifest arbitrariness is shown. Invoking *Article 142*, the Court directed that time spent obtaining environmental clearance be excluded from the *Section 3D(3)* lapse period, relying on *Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board v. C. Kenchappa (2006) 6 SCC 371*. The appeals by the Union were partly allowed, while landowners’ appeals were dismissed. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The Parliament has exclusive legislative and executive competence under *Entry 23 of List I* to declare and construct national highways over any land, including green-field areas, and prior environmental clearance is not mandatory before issuing acquisition notifications under *Section 3A*. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that infrastructure development is essential for socio-economic growth and that excessive judicial interference in policy decisions may impede national development goals. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Environmental clearance must precede construction, not acquisition. ii. Time spent obtaining statutory clearances shall be excluded for *Section 3D(3)* limitation. iii. Courts must exercise restraint in reviewing infrastructure policy decisions. ## I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment significantly strengthens Union authority over national infrastructure while maintaining environmental safeguards through staged compliance. It harmonises constitutional federalism with developmental imperatives and provides certainty to future highway projects. The Court’s interpretative use of *Article 142* reflects pragmatic constitutional adjudication aimed at balancing public interest, environmental protection, and statutory timelines. ## J) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** 1. *K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka* 2. *Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board v. C. Kenchappa* 3. *Somawanti v. State of Punjab* **b) Important Statutes Referred** 1. *Constitution of India* 2. *National Highways Act, 1956* 3. *Environment (Protection) Act, 1986* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Daulat Singh (D) Thr. LRs v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., [2020] 11 SCR 845](https://lawfoyer.in/daulat-singh-d-thr-lrs-v-state-of-rajasthan-ors-2020-11-scr-845/) **Published:** December 20, 2025 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the legality of reopening concluded ceiling proceedings and the validity of a registered gift deed executed prior to statutory cut-off dates under Rajasthan land ceiling laws. The dispute arose when land gifted by an agriculturist father to his son in 1963 was later subjected to reopening under the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973. The State authorities alleged that the transfer was invalid due to absence of acceptance and that the land exceeded the permissible ceiling limit. The Supreme Court undertook a detailed analysis of Section 15 of the Ceiling Act, 1973, determining the limitation framework governing reopening of settled cases. It clarified that the crucial dates are the date of the earlier final order and the issuance of the show-cause notice, and not the final reopening order. The Court also exhaustively examined Sections 122 and 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, reiterating that acceptance of a gift need not be express and may be inferred from conduct, possession, and surrounding circumstances. By relying upon documentary evidence, mutation records, and statements of both donor and donee, the Court held that acceptance was clearly established. Further, the Court harmonized Sections 30C, 30D, and 30DD of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, emphasizing the overriding nature of Section 30DD, which protects bona fide agricultural transfers made before 31 December 1969. The judgment reinforces statutory intent to protect genuine family transfers among agriculturists and curtails arbitrary resumption of land by the State. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the legality of reopening concluded ceiling proceedings and the validity of a registered gift deed executed prior to statutory cut-off dates under Rajasthan land ceiling laws. The dispute arose when land gifted by an agriculturist father to his son in 1963 was later subjected to reopening under the *Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973*. The State authorities alleged that the transfer was invalid due to absence of acceptance and that the land exceeded the permissible ceiling limit. The Supreme Court undertook a detailed analysis of *Section 15 of the Ceiling Act, 1973*, determining the limitation framework governing reopening of settled cases. It clarified that the crucial dates are the date of the earlier final order and the issuance of the show-cause notice, and not the final reopening order. The Court also exhaustively examined *Sections 122 and 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882*, reiterating that acceptance of a gift need not be express and may be inferred from conduct, possession, and surrounding circumstances. By relying upon documentary evidence, mutation records, and statements of both donor and donee, the Court held that acceptance was clearly established. Further, the Court harmonized *Sections 30C, 30D, and 30DD of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955*, emphasizing the overriding nature of *Section 30DD*, which protects bona fide agricultural transfers made before 31 December 1969. The judgment reinforces statutory intent to protect genuine family transfers among agriculturists and curtails arbitrary resumption of land by the State. **Keywords:** Ceiling law, Gift deed, Acceptance, Limitation, Agricultural land, Bona fide transfer ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsi) Judgment Cause Title*Daulat Singh (D) Thr. LRs v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.*ii) Case NumberCivil Appeal No. 5650 of 2010iii) Judgment Date08 December 2020iv) CourtSupreme Court of Indiav) QuorumN.V. Ramana J., S. Abdul Nazeer J., Surya Kant J.vi) AuthorJustice N.V. Ramanavii) Citation*\[2020\] 11 SCR 845*viii) Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 15 & 6 – Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973; Sections 30C, 30D, 30DD – Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955; Sections 122 & 123 – Transfer of Property Act, 1882*ix) Judgments OverruledNonex) Related Law SubjectsConstitutional Law, Land & Tenancy Law, Property Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT The litigation has its genesis in land ceiling reforms in Rajasthan, which sought to redistribute agricultural land while safeguarding legitimate agricultural holdings. The appellant, *Daulat Singh*, was an agriculturist owning extensive land. In 1963, well before statutory restrictions tightened, he executed a registered gift deed transferring a substantial portion of land to his adult son. Ceiling proceedings initiated thereafter were dropped in 1972 after the authority found the transfer valid under the then-prevailing law. A decade later, the State invoked *Section 15 of the Ceiling Act, 1973* to reopen the case, alleging that the earlier order had failed to examine the transfer under *Sections 30C and 30D of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955*. The reopening resulted in declarations of surplus land, which oscillated through different authorities. While the Single Judge of the High Court protected the transfer, the Division Bench reversed it by declaring the gift deed invalid due to alleged absence of acceptance. The Supreme Court was thus required to reconcile conflicting interpretations of land ceiling provisions, gift law, and limitation principles. The decision is significant as it delineates the contours of State power to reopen settled land matters and clarifies doctrinal principles governing gifts within agrarian family structures. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The appellant owned *254.2 bighas* of agricultural land in Rajasthan. On *19 December 1963*, he executed a registered gift deed transferring *127.1 bighas* to his younger son, who was a major at the time. After the transfer, the appellant retained *17.25 standard acres*, falling within the permissible ceiling limit. Ceiling proceedings were initiated but dropped on *15 April 1972* by the Deputy Sub-Divisional Officer, who recorded that *Section 30DD* protected the transfer as it was executed before *31 December 1969*. In *1976*, the State issued a show-cause notice, followed by formal reopening proceedings in *1982*, alleging non-compliance with ceiling laws. The Additional District Collector in *1988* held the gift invalid for want of acceptance and declared surplus land. The Board of Revenue modified the quantum but upheld the surplus declaration. The Single Judge of the High Court set aside the resumption, holding the transfer bona fide and beyond the scope of *Section 6 of the Ceiling Act, 1973*. However, the Division Bench reversed this finding, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether reopening of the ceiling proceedings was barred by limitation under *Section 15 of the Ceiling Act, 1973*? ii. Whether the registered gift deed dated *19.12.1963* was valid in law under *Sections 122 and 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882*? iii. Whether the transfer was protected under *Section 30DD of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955* despite *Sections 30C and 30D*? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the reopening notice was time-barred. It was argued that acceptance of the gift was clearly established by possession, cultivation, and mutation records. The appellant emphasized that *Section 30DD* protected agricultural transfers to sons made before *31 December 1969*. It was further contended that *Section 6 of the Ceiling Act, 1973* was inapplicable as the gift predated *26 September 1970*. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent submitted that the reopening was within limitation. It was argued that absence of explicit acceptance invalidated the gift. The State asserted that the transfer defeated ceiling laws and attracted *Sections 30C and 30D*. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 15 – Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973* ii. *Sections 30C, 30D, 30DD – Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955* iii. *Sections 122 & 123 – Transfer of Property Act, 1882* ## I) JUDGMENT The Supreme Court held that reopening was valid as the notice dated *20.11.1976* was issued within five years of the earlier order. On the gift deed, the Court clarified that acceptance need not be express and may be inferred from conduct. The mutation records, possession, cultivation, and statements of donor and donee unequivocally proved acceptance. The Court further held that *Section 30DD*, with its non-obstante clause, overrides *Section 30D*. Since the transfer was to a son, who was an agriculturist and major, and was executed before *31.12.1969*, it was fully protected. Consequently, no surplus land existed. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** A registered gift deed executed before statutory cut-off dates, supported by possession and conduct, constitutes valid acceptance under *Sections 122 and 123*. Transfers protected under *Section 30DD* are immune from ceiling computation. **b) OBITER DICTA** Authorities must respect legislative classifications once created and avoid mechanical application of ceiling provisions without appreciating statutory exceptions. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Acceptance of gift can be inferred from conduct. ii. Limitation under *Section 15* depends on notice date. iii. *Section 30DD* overrides *Section 30D*. ## J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces agrarian justice by protecting bona fide family transfers and restraining arbitrary State action. It harmonizes property law with land reform objectives while preserving legislative intent. ## K) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Naramadaben Maganlal Thakker v. Pranjivandas Maganlal Thakker*, *(1997) 2 SCC 255* ii. *Asokan v. Lakshmikutty*, *(2007) 13 SCC 210* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Transfer of Property Act, 1882* ii. *Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955* iii. *Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Anita Sharma & Ors. v. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Anr., [2020] 12 SCR 1118](https://lawfoyer.in/anita-sharma-ors-v-the-new-india-assurance-co-ltd-anr-2020-12-scr-1118/) **Published:** December 20, 2025 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The decision in Anita Sharma v. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. constitutes a significant reaffirmation of the settled principles governing adjudication of motor accident compensation claims under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The Supreme Court was called upon to examine whether the High Court was justified in reversing a reasoned award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal by discarding the testimony of a sole independent eyewitness and by importing standards of proof akin to criminal trials. The judgment analyses the evidentiary value of eyewitness testimony rendered by a disinterested bystander acting as a Good Samaritan, the legal consequences of failure to cross-examine a crucial witness, and the improper shifting of burden of proof upon claimants. The Court reiterates that MACT proceedings are summary in nature and governed by preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt. It also clarifies the limited evidentiary worth of an FIR lodged on hearsay and at a belated stage. Importantly, the Court emphasises that the non-examination of an interested respondent who pleads an alternative version of events may give rise to an adverse inference. The ruling further aligns compensation jurisprudence with the principles laid down in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi by granting future prospects to the deceased’s income. The judgment thus restores claimant-centric justice and reinforces the benevolent object of accident compensation law. **Content:** ## **A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE** The decision in *Anita Sharma v. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd.* constitutes a significant reaffirmation of the settled principles governing adjudication of motor accident compensation claims under *the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988*. The Supreme Court was called upon to examine whether the High Court was justified in reversing a reasoned award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal by discarding the testimony of a sole independent eyewitness and by importing standards of proof akin to criminal trials. The judgment analyses the evidentiary value of eyewitness testimony rendered by a disinterested bystander acting as a *Good Samaritan*, the legal consequences of failure to cross-examine a crucial witness, and the improper shifting of burden of proof upon claimants. The Court reiterates that MACT proceedings are summary in nature and governed by *preponderance of probabilities*, not proof beyond reasonable doubt. It also clarifies the limited evidentiary worth of an FIR lodged on hearsay and at a belated stage. Importantly, the Court emphasises that the non-examination of an interested respondent who pleads an alternative version of events may give rise to an adverse inference. The ruling further aligns compensation jurisprudence with the principles laid down in *National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi* by granting future prospects to the deceased’s income. The judgment thus restores claimant-centric justice and reinforces the benevolent object of accident compensation law. **Keywords:** Motor Accident Claims; Preponderance of Probabilities; Eyewitness Testimony; Burden of Proof; Future Prospects ## **B) CASE DETAILS** ParticularsDetailsJudgment Cause Title*Anita Sharma & Ors. v. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Anr.*Case NumberCivil Appeal Nos. 4010–4011 of 2020Judgment Date08 December 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumJustice Surya Kant and Justice Aniruddha BoseAuthorJustice Surya KantCitation*\[2020\] 12 SCR 1118*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 166, 168, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsMotor Vehicles Law; Tort Law; Civil Law ## **C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT** The litigation arose from a fatal road traffic accident that occurred in March 2009, involving a privately owned car and an unidentified truck. The deceased, a salaried employee and income tax assessee, succumbed to complications arising from accident-related injuries several months later. His dependents invoked *Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988*, seeking just compensation from the owner-cum-driver and the insurer of the car. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, awarded compensation after attributing negligence to the car driver. The High Court of Rajasthan, however, overturned this award. It disbelieved the sole eyewitness on grounds that he neither lodged the FIR nor was named in hospital records, and further presumed that the FIR was lodged by the owner-cum-driver, thereby inferring absence of negligence. This appellate interference raised fundamental questions concerning the approach to evidence in MACT proceedings, the role of eyewitnesses who act as *Good Samaritans*, and the extent to which technicalities can defeat substantive justice. The Supreme Court’s intervention was necessitated by the High Court’s failure to appreciate the statutory object of the Motor Vehicles Act as a social welfare legislation. The judgment situates itself within a consistent line of authorities cautioning courts against adopting hyper-technical standards while adjudicating accident compensation claims. ## **D) FACTS OF THE CASE** The deceased, aged *34 years*, was travelling from Ghazipur to Varanasi in a Wagon R car driven by respondent no. 2, who was also its owner. At approximately *10:20 PM*, the car met with a collision involving an oncoming truck. All occupants sustained injuries. The deceased was initially treated at the District Hospital, Ghazipur, then referred to *BHU Varanasi*, and subsequently underwent prolonged treatment in Rajasthan. He ultimately died on *10 December 2009* due to complications traceable to the injuries suffered in the accident. The claimants, comprising the widow, minor children, and mother of the deceased, pleaded that the accident occurred due to *rash and negligent driving* of the owner-cum-driver. They relied substantially on the testimony of *Ritesh Pandey (AW-3)*, an independent eyewitness who deposed that the car was being driven at high speed and negligently overtook vehicles before colliding head-on with the truck. He further stated that he transported the injured persons to the hospital. The Tribunal accepted this version and awarded compensation of *Rs. 16,08,000*. The High Court reversed the award by doubting the credibility of AW-3, placing undue reliance on the FIR lodged two days later by a third party on hearsay, and by applying criminal law standards of proof. ## **E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED** i. Whether the accident was caused due to rash and negligent driving of the owner-cum-driver of the car? ii. Whether the testimony of an independent eyewitness can be discarded for failure to lodge an FIR? iii. Whether strict standards of proof applicable to criminal trials apply to MACT proceedings? iv. Whether adverse inference can be drawn against claimants for non-examination of interested respondents? ## **F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the appellants submitted that the High Court committed a grave jurisdictional error by reappreciating evidence contrary to settled principles governing *Section 166* claims. It was argued that *AW-3* was a wholly independent witness with no connection to the deceased and that his testimony remained unshaken due to absence of effective cross-examination. The appellants contended that the FIR was lodged by a third party on hearsay and could not override direct ocular evidence. Reliance was placed on *Parmeshwari v. Amir Chand* to assert that non-filing of an FIR by a Good Samaritan cannot discredit his testimony. The appellants further sought enhancement of compensation by claiming future prospects in terms of *Pranay Sethi*. ## **G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS** The counsels for the respondents submitted that the accident was caused solely due to negligence of an unidentified truck driver. They relied on the FIR and investigation report to contend absence of fault on the part of the car driver. It was argued that AW-3 was a planted witness and that the High Court was justified in drawing adverse inference due to his conduct and absence from medical records. ## **H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS** i. *Section 166, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988* – Application for compensation ii. *Section 168, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988* – Award of compensation iii. *Section 114, Indian Evidence Act, 1872* – Presumptions ## **I) JUDGMENT** The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment and restored the Tribunal’s award with modification. The Court held that the High Court overlooked material facts and misdirected itself by assuming that the FIR was lodged by the owner-cum-driver. The Court found that the FIR was lodged by a third party on hearsay, two days after the accident, and was possibly influenced by proximity to the owner-cum-driver. The Court accorded significant weight to the testimony of *AW-3*, emphasising that he was an independent eyewitness and a *Good Samaritan*. His failure to lodge the FIR was held to be natural and reasonable. The Court criticised the High Court for ignoring the legal effect of non-cross-examination, holding that failure to challenge a witness amounts to tacit admission. The Court reiterated that MACT proceedings are governed by *preponderance of probabilities*, relying on *Parmeshwari v. Amir Chand*, *Sunita v. RSRTC*, and *Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz*. It further held that the owner-cum-driver’s failure to step into the witness box justified an adverse inference against him. On compensation, the Court applied *National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi* and granted *40 percent* addition towards future prospects, directing recalculation by the Tribunal. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio decidendi lies in the reaffirmation that *strict rules of evidence and criminal standards of proof do not apply to motor accident compensation claims*. The Court held that credible eyewitness testimony, if unshaken, is sufficient to establish negligence on a balance of probabilities. It further held that failure to cross-examine a crucial witness leads to an inference of acceptance of his version. The evidentiary value of an FIR is limited, especially when lodged belatedly and on hearsay. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that courts must adopt a humane and pragmatic approach while dealing with accident victims and Good Samaritans. Excessive suspicion towards independent witnesses discourages public assistance to accident victims and undermines access to justice. **c) GUIDELINES** i. MACT cases must be decided on *preponderance of probabilities*. ii. Testimony of Good Samaritans must not be disbelieved on technical grounds. iii. Failure to cross-examine material witnesses attracts adverse inference. iv. FIRs lodged on hearsay have limited evidentiary value. v. Future prospects must be granted in terms of *Pranay Sethi*. ## **J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS** The judgment restores doctrinal clarity in motor accident jurisprudence. It curbs appellate overreach and reinforces the welfare-oriented character of the Motor Vehicles Act. The ruling strengthens evidentiary standards favouring victims while balancing fairness to insurers. It also advances the Good Samaritan doctrine by judicial recognition. The decision serves as a guiding precedent ensuring that procedural technicalities do not eclipse substantive justice in accident compensation claims. ## **K) REFERENCES** **a) Important Cases Referred:** 1. *Parmeshwari v. Amir Chand*, *\[2011\] 1 SCR 1096* 2. *Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab*, *\[1994\] 2 SCR 375* 3. *Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz*, *\[2013\] 10 SCR 480* 4. *National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi*, *\[2017\] 13 SCR 100* **b) Important Statutes Referred:** 1. *Motor Vehicles Act, 1988* 2. *Indian Evidence Act, 1872* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [The State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. v. U.P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd. & Anr., [2020] 11 SCR 821](https://lawfoyer.in/the-state-of-madhya-pradesh-anr-v-u-p-state-bridge-corporation-ltd-anr-2020-11-scr-821/) **Published:** December 20, 2025 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The judgment adjudicates upon the legality of rejection of technical bids in a public procurement process and delineates the boundaries of judicial review in tender matters. The dispute arose from a Notice Inviting Tender dated 02.12.2019 issued by the Public Works Department, State of Madhya Pradesh for construction of an elevated corridor in Indore. The bid of U.P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd. was rejected on the ground of suppression of material facts relating to a prior FIR and charge-sheet concerning collapse of a bridge constructed by it. The High Court interfered and directed issuance of a Letter of Intent in its favour, holding that no “investigation” was pending on the date of bid submission. The Supreme Court reversed this view by interpreting paragraphs 11 and 13 of Appendix-I-A conjointly with Clause 7(b) of Annex-I and the definition of fraudulent practice under Clause 4.3(b). The Court held that filing of a charge-sheet amounts to being “indicted” and non-disclosure thereof constitutes suppression of a material fact. The Court further upheld rejection of Rachana Construction Co. on the ground of failure to satisfy Clause 2.2.2.2(ii) relating to experience of one similar work. The ruling reiterates judicial restraint in contractual matters, emphasizes transparency in public tenders, and affirms that public interest cannot override mandatory disclosure requirements. Keywords: **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment adjudicates upon the legality of rejection of technical bids in a public procurement process and delineates the boundaries of judicial review in tender matters. The dispute arose from a *Notice Inviting Tender dated 02.12.2019* issued by the *Public Works Department, State of Madhya Pradesh* for construction of an elevated corridor in Indore. The bid of *U.P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd.* was rejected on the ground of *suppression of material facts* relating to a prior *FIR and charge-sheet* concerning collapse of a bridge constructed by it. The High Court interfered and directed issuance of a Letter of Intent in its favour, holding that no “investigation” was pending on the date of bid submission. The Supreme Court reversed this view by interpreting *paragraphs 11 and 13 of Appendix-I-A* conjointly with *Clause 7(b) of Annex-I* and the definition of *fraudulent practice under Clause 4.3(b)*. The Court held that filing of a charge-sheet amounts to being *“indicted”* and non-disclosure thereof constitutes suppression of a material fact. The Court further upheld rejection of *Rachana Construction Co.* on the ground of failure to satisfy *Clause 2.2.2.2(ii)* relating to experience of one similar work. The ruling reiterates judicial restraint in contractual matters, emphasizes transparency in public tenders, and affirms that public interest cannot override mandatory disclosure requirements. **Keywords:** Public procurement, suppression of facts, indictment, tender conditions, judicial review ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*The State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. v. U.P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd. & Anr.*Case Number*Civil Appeal No. 4002 of 2020*Judgement Date*08 December 2020*Court*Supreme Court of India*Quorum*R.F. Nariman J. and K.M. Joseph J.*Author*R.F. Nariman J.*Citation*\[2020\] 11 SCR 821*Legal Provisions Involved*Clauses 2.2.2.2(ii), 2.6.2(a), 3.1.6, 4.3(b) of NIT; Appendix-I-A paras 11 & 13; Annex-I Clause 7(b)*Judgments Overruled*None*Related Law Subjects*Administrative Law, Contract Law, Public Procurement Law* ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The dispute emanated from a competitive tender floated by the *State of Madhya Pradesh* for construction of an elevated flyover corridor measuring *7.473 kilometres* with an estimated cost of *₹272.66 crores*. The tender framework prescribed strict technical eligibility conditions and mandatory declarations regarding criminal antecedents and pending investigations. The process attracted eleven bidders, including *U.P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd.*, *Rajkamal Builders Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.*, and *Rachana Construction Co.* The tendering authority rejected the technical bid of UPSBC for *non-disclosure of an FIR and subsequent charge-sheet* arising from a bridge collapse in *Varanasi*, which resulted in fatalities. The rejection was grounded on *paragraph 13 of Appendix-I-A* and *Clause 7(b) of Annex-I*. The High Court, however, held that since *investigation* had culminated in a charge-sheet, no investigation was pending, thereby nullifying the allegation of suppression. Parallelly, the bid of *Rachana Construction Co.* was rejected for failure to demonstrate completion of *one similar work of 25% of the project cost*, as mandated under *Clause 2.2.2.2(ii)*. The High Court upheld this rejection. The appeals before the Supreme Court raised critical issues on interpretation of tender documents, meaning of *“indicted”*, scope of disclosure obligations, and permissible limits of judicial intervention in tender processes. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE The *Notice Inviting Tender dated 02.12.2019* required bidders to submit technical and financial bids in prescribed formats. *UPSBC* submitted its bid quoting *₹306.27 crores*. However, prior to submission of the bid, an *FIR dated 15.05.2018* had been lodged against UPSBC relating to collapse of a bridge constructed by it, causing *15 deaths and multiple injuries*. A *charge-sheet* was subsequently filed, and though trial was stayed by the Allahabad High Court, the criminal proceedings subsisted. In the technical bid, UPSBC certified under *paragraph 11 of Appendix-I-A* that it had not been *convicted or indicted*. Under *paragraph 13* and *Clause 7(b) of Annex-I*, it further certified that no investigation was pending. The State rejected the bid holding that non-disclosure of the FIR and charge-sheet amounted to *suppression of material facts* and a *fraudulent practice* under *Clause 4.3(b)*. UPSBC approached the High Court, which accepted its contention that *investigation* as defined under *CrPC* ends with filing of charge-sheet, and therefore no disclosure obligation survived. The High Court further relied on public interest, noting the bid was lower by *₹9 crores*. In contrast, *Rachana Construction Co.* relied on a contract with *DFCCIL* for two road overbridges valued at *₹76.87 crores*. The State held that this did not satisfy the requirement of *one similar work* of *₹68.17 crores*. The High Court affirmed this view. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether non-disclosure of an FIR and charge-sheet amounts to suppression of material facts under the tender conditions? ii. Whether filing of a charge-sheet constitutes being *“indicted”* within the meaning of *paragraph 11 of Appendix-I-A*? iii. Whether courts can substitute their interpretation of tender clauses over that of the tendering authority? iv. Whether public interest based on lower financial bid can override disqualification due to suppression? v. Whether completion of two bridges under one contract satisfies the requirement of *“one similar work”*? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for UPSBC submitted that the bid format strictly required disclosure only of *pending investigations*. It was argued that once a charge-sheet is filed, investigation concludes, and therefore no obligation to disclose subsists. Reliance was placed on *Caretel Infotech Ltd. v. HPCL* to contend that bidders cannot be penalised beyond the express format requirements. It was further contended that the rejection order only invoked *Clause 7(b)* and not the *fraudulent practice clause*, rendering subsequent reliance impermissible. The principle of *contra proferentem* was invoked to assert that ambiguity must be interpreted in favour of the bidder. Public interest was emphasized by highlighting the lower bid amount. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the State submitted that *paragraphs 11 and 13 of Appendix-I-A* must be read conjointly. Filing of a charge-sheet amounts to being *indicted*, irrespective of pendency of investigation. Suppression of such fact was argued to fall squarely within *Clause 4.3(b)* defining *fraudulent practice*. For *Rachana Construction Co.*, it was argued that *Clause 2.2.2.2(ii)* requires completion of *one similar work*, not aggregation of two bridges. Judicial interference was contended to be impermissible unless the interpretation was perverse. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Clause 2.2.2.2(ii) of NIT* ii. *Clause 4.3(b) – Fraudulent Practice* iii. *Clause 7(b) of Annex-I* iv. *Paragraphs 11 and 13 of Appendix-I-A* v. *Clause 2.6.2(a) – Material Misrepresentation* ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment favouring UPSBC and restored the State’s rejection of its bid. The Court held that *indictment* occurs upon filing of a charge-sheet, and non-disclosure thereof constitutes *suppression of material facts*. The Court emphasized that *fraudulent practice* includes omission and incomplete disclosure. The Court reaffirmed settled principles of judicial restraint in tender matters as laid down in *Tata Cellular*, *Jagdish Mandal*, *Central Coalfields*, and *Afcons Infrastructure*. The Court upheld rejection of *Rachana Construction Co.* and directed issuance of *Letter of Intent* to *Rajkamal Builders* at the same financial bid quoted by UPSBC. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio rests on the interpretation that *paragraph 11 of Appendix-I-A* mandates disclosure of indictment independent of pending investigation. Filing of a charge-sheet satisfies the test of indictment. Suppression thereof vitiates the bid and attracts *Clause 4.3(b)*. Judicial review cannot override tender authority’s interpretation unless perverse. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that tender formats must evolve to eliminate ambiguity and ensure comprehensive disclosures. It cautioned that public interest cannot be reduced to mere financial savings when integrity and transparency are compromised. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Disclosure obligations extend beyond literal wording when read contextually. ii. Filing of charge-sheet constitutes indictment for tender purposes. iii. Courts must defer to tender authority’s interpretation unless perverse. iv. Financial advantage cannot cure disqualification for suppression. ## J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces ethical transparency in public procurement and restricts judicial overreach in contractual matters. It clarifies that disclosure norms must be interpreted purposively and not mechanically. The decision strengthens integrity standards while preserving administrative discretion. ## K) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Tata Cellular v. Union of India*, *\[1994\] 2 Supp SCR 122* ii. *Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa*, *\[2006\] 10 Supp SCR 606* iii. *Central Coalfields Ltd. v. SLL-SML (JV)*, *\[2016\] 4 SCR 890* iv. *Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corp.*, *\[2016\] 3 SCR 551* v. *Caretel Infotech Ltd. v. HPCL*, *\[2019\] 6 SCR 950* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* ii. *Public Procurement Tender Conditions (NIT)* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ### [Titty Alias George Kurian v. The Deputy Range Forest Officer, [2020] 13 S.C.R. 1230](https://lawfoyer.in/titty-alias-george-kurian-v-the-deputy-range-forest-officer-2020-13-s-c-r-1230/) **Published:** December 19, 2025 **Author:** **Excerpt:** The judgment examines the legal consequences of possession and seizure of a turtle allegedly protected under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. The controversy arose when forest officials seized a turtle from the respondent and registered offences under Sections 2, 9, 39A, 49A and 51 of the Act. The decisive issue before the Supreme Court was whether the seized turtle belonged to a species notified under Part II of Schedule I, thereby attracting penal consequences. The Veterinary Surgeon’s certificate identified the turtle as Indian Flap Shell Turtle (Lissemys punctata), whereas Schedule I, Part II includes only Indian Soft-shelled Turtle (Lissemys punctata punctata). The Court analysed the statutory scheme, scientific classification, and evidentiary value of the identification report. It reaffirmed the limited but significant jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to prevent abuse of process where basic statutory ingredients of an offence are absent. The Supreme Court concluded that continuation of prosecution would be legally unsustainable as the seized turtle was not a notified species. The judgment reinforces strict construction of penal statutes and underlines that wildlife offences must rest on precise statutory inclusion rather than assumptions or broad biological similarities. **Content:** ## A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE The judgment examines the legal consequences of possession and seizure of a turtle allegedly protected under the *Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972*. The controversy arose when forest officials seized a turtle from the respondent and registered offences under *Sections 2, 9, 39A, 49A and 51* of the Act. The decisive issue before the Supreme Court was whether the seized turtle belonged to a species notified under *Part II of Schedule I*, thereby attracting penal consequences. The *Veterinary Surgeon’s certificate* identified the turtle as *Indian Flap Shell Turtle (Lissemys punctata)*, whereas *Schedule I, Part II* includes only *Indian Soft-shelled Turtle (Lissemys punctata punctata)*. The Court analysed the statutory scheme, scientific classification, and evidentiary value of the identification report. It reaffirmed the limited but significant jurisdiction of the High Court under *Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* to prevent abuse of process where basic statutory ingredients of an offence are absent. The Supreme Court concluded that continuation of prosecution would be legally unsustainable as the seized turtle was not a notified species. The judgment reinforces strict construction of penal statutes and underlines that wildlife offences must rest on precise statutory inclusion rather than assumptions or broad biological similarities. **Keywords:** Wild Life Protection Act, Schedule I, Species Identification, Section 482 CrPC, Quashing of Proceedings, Turtle Species ## B) CASE DETAILS ParticularsDetailsJudgement Cause Title*Titty Alias George Kurian v. The Deputy Range Forest Officer*Case NumberReview Petition (Criminal) No. 593 of 2018 in Criminal Appeal No. 758 of 2018Judgement Date09 December 2020CourtSupreme Court of IndiaQuorumHon’ble Mr Justice Ashok Bhushan and Hon’ble Ms Justice Indu MalhotraAuthorJustice Ashok BhushanCitation*\[2020\] 13 S.C.R. 1230*Legal Provisions Involved*Sections 2, 9, 11, 12, 39A, 49A, 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972; Section 482 CrPC*Judgments OverruledNoneRelated Law SubjectsCriminal Law, Environmental Law, Wildlife Protection Law ## C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT The judgment arose from a recurring conflict between wildlife enforcement mechanisms and individual criminal liability under special penal statutes. The *Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972* is a stringent legislation aimed at conserving fauna by criminalising hunting, possession, and trade of specified species. However, its enforcement is contingent upon precise statutory classifications. The present case tested the limits of prosecutorial discretion when scientific identification does not align with statutory schedules. The Kerala High Court exercised its inherent powers under *Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* to quash criminal proceedings at the threshold. This exercise was challenged before the Supreme Court on the ground that disputed questions relating to species classification required trial and expert evidence. The Supreme Court initially interfered, but upon review, recalled its earlier order and upheld the High Court’s reasoning. The background of the case reveals the practical difficulty faced by courts in reconciling scientific taxonomy with rigid statutory schedules. The legislature, while drafting *Schedule I*, employed precise zoological nomenclature. The enforcement agencies, however, often proceed on general names without verifying scientific exactitude. This judgment underscores that criminal liability under environmental statutes must be grounded in exact statutory conformity. The decision also reinforces that *Section 482 CrPC* is not excluded merely because the statute involved is a special law. Where the foundational requirement of an offence is absent, continuation of prosecution itself constitutes abuse of process. The background thus situates the judgment at the intersection of environmental conservation, criminal jurisprudence, and procedural safeguards. ## D) FACTS OF THE CASE On *25 July 2016*, forest officials of the *Ranni Forest Flying Squad Range* seized a turtle from the possession of the respondent, *Titty alias George Kurian*, at *Karumbanakulam*. The officials registered an offence alleging violation of *Sections 2, 9, 39A, 49A and 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972*. A charge sheet was subsequently filed before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-II, Kanjirappally. Following the seizure, the turtle was sent for expert identification. The *Senior Veterinary Surgeon* examined the animal and, through a letter dated *26 July 2016*, certified that the turtle was an *Indian Flap Shell Turtle* with the scientific name *Lissemys punctata*. Acting upon judicial directions, the turtle was released back into its natural habitat on *27 July 2016*. The respondent thereafter approached the Kerala High Court by filing *Criminal M.C. No. 2720 of 2017*, seeking quashing of the proceedings. The primary contention was that *Indian Flap Shell Turtle (Lissemys punctata)* was not included in *Part II of Schedule I* of the Act, which lists *Indian Soft-shelled Turtle (Lissemys punctata punctata)*. The High Court accepted this contention and quashed the proceedings. Aggrieved, the *Deputy Range Forest Officer* filed a criminal appeal before the Supreme Court. The appellant argued that the distinction between the two turtles involved scientific complexity and could only be determined during trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court reconsidered its earlier interference and re-evaluated the factual and statutory matrix. ## E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED i. Whether possession of *Indian Flap Shell Turtle (Lissemys punctata)* constitutes an offence under the *Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972*? ii. Whether the turtle seized falls within *Part II of Schedule I* of the Act? iii. Whether the High Court was justified in exercising powers under *Section 482 CrPC* to quash proceedings at the threshold? iv. Whether continuation of prosecution without statutory inclusion amounts to abuse of process? ## F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the appellant submitted that the High Court erred in quashing the proceedings without permitting trial. It was argued that *Indian Soft-shelled Turtle (Lissemys punctata punctata)* and *Indian Flap Shell Turtle (Lissemys punctata)* are closely related and belong to the same species group. Such classification, according to the appellant, involved technical and expert determination which could only be resolved through evidence. The appellant further contended that *Section 482 CrPC* should be exercised sparingly, particularly in matters concerning wildlife protection, where public interest and ecological concerns are paramount. Premature quashing, it was argued, undermines the deterrent purpose of the Act and weakens enforcement. ## G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS The counsels for the respondent submitted that criminal liability under the *Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972* is strictly species-specific. The *Veterinary Surgeon’s certificate* unequivocally identified the turtle as *Lissemys punctata*, which does not find mention in *Schedule I, Part II*. In the absence of statutory inclusion, no offence could be said to exist. It was further argued that the turtle had already been released within two days, rendering further examination impossible. Thus, the prosecution lacked foundational evidence. Continuation of proceedings would amount to harassment and abuse of judicial process, justifying invocation of *Section 482 CrPC*. ## H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS i. *Section 9, Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972* – Prohibition of hunting ii. *Sections 11 and 12* – Exceptions permitting hunting iii. *Section 51* – Penalties iv. *Part II, Schedule I* – Protected animal species v. *Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* – Inherent powers of High Court ## I) JUDGEMENT The Supreme Court allowed the review petition and dismissed the appeal. The Court carefully examined the statutory framework and factual record. It noted that *Section 9* prohibits hunting only of animals included in *Schedules I to IV*. Penal consequences under *Section 51* arise only when such inclusion is established. The Court placed decisive reliance on the *Veterinary Surgeon’s letter*, which identified the turtle as *Indian Flap Shell Turtle (Lissemys punctata)*. It contrasted this with *Item No. 8 of Part II, Schedule I*, which lists *Indian Soft-shelled Turtle (Lissemys punctata punctata)*. The Court observed that while the latter is an infraspecies of the former, the statute criminalises only the specific infraspecies named. The Court rejected the argument that expert evidence at trial was necessary. It held that when the admitted material itself negates statutory applicability, compelling the accused to face trial would be unjust. The High Court’s exercise of jurisdiction under *Section 482 CrPC* was found proper and consistent with settled principles. **a) RATIO DECIDENDI** The ratio of the judgment lies in the principle that penal liability under the *Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972* arises only when the animal involved is expressly included in the statutory schedules. The Court held that *Lissemys punctata* and *Lissemys punctata punctata* are not interchangeable for the purpose of criminal prosecution. Scientific proximity cannot substitute statutory precision. The Court further held that inherent jurisdiction under *Section 482 CrPC* can be exercised where the uncontroverted material on record shows absence of an essential ingredient of the offence. Wildlife protection objectives, though significant, cannot override fundamental criminal law principles. **b) OBITER DICTA** The Court observed that enforcement agencies must exercise greater caution in wildlife prosecutions. Mechanical invocation of penal provisions without verifying statutory schedules leads to unnecessary litigation. The judgment implicitly cautioned against conflating conservation goals with criminal culpability without legal basis. **c) GUIDELINES** i. Wildlife offences must be registered only after confirming statutory inclusion of species. ii. Scientific identification reports should be carefully matched with statutory nomenclature. iii. High Courts may quash proceedings where foundational statutory requirements are absent. iv. Penal statutes must be strictly construed, even in environmental matters. ## J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS The judgment reinforces the doctrine of strict construction of penal statutes. It clarifies that environmental protection, though vital, cannot be pursued by diluting criminal law safeguards. The decision promotes legal certainty by insisting on precise statutory compliance. It also strengthens the role of *Section 482 CrPC* as a corrective mechanism against unfounded prosecutions. For law students, the case is instructive on how scientific evidence, statutory interpretation, and procedural law converge. It demonstrates that criminal liability cannot rest on assumptions or ecological sentiment but must be firmly anchored in legislative text. ## K) REFERENCES **a) Important Cases Referred** i. *Titty Alias George Kurian v. The Deputy Range Forest Officer*, *\[2020\] 13 S.C.R. 1230* **b) Important Statutes Referred** i. *Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972* ii. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973* **Categories:** Case Analysis --- ## Pages ### [Home](https://lawfoyer.in/) **Published:** November 14, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ###### Stay Ahead with Legal Updates & Skills # Law Made Easy and Accessible to All For FREE updates on legal events, news and for FREE academic resources subscribe our newsletter Subscription Form Subscribe [ Join Our Community ](https://chat.whatsapp.com/CgQuNPJgPh65hJAfncBaSt) ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Copy-of-Orange-and-Brown-Illustrative-Leadership-Management-Book-Cover-Medium.png) ## Latest Updates Select Category Achievers Archive Acknowledgement Drafts Agreement Draft Arbitration and Conciliation Law Arbitration Drafts Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita Call for Blogs Call for Papers Case Analysis Civil Law Cases Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) CLAT Company Law Constitutional law Constitutional Law Cases Contract Law Contract Law Corporate Law Corporate Law Cases Courses & Workshops Criminal Law Cases Environmental Law Environmental Law Essay Competitions Events Evidence Law Cases Family Law Cases Indian Contract Act, 1872 (ICA) Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code Intellectual Property Law International Law Internship Internship Review Interpretation of Statutes IT Law & Cyber Law Labour Law Legal Drafts Legal Notes Legal Subjects Legislation Amendment Competitions Moot Courts Other Competitions POCSO Cases Practice Quizes Quiz Uncategorised Webinar [ ![images-4](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/images-4.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/vcprf-international-moot-court-workshop-2026-organized-by-veritas-centre-for-policy-research-foundation-vcprf-register-by-30-september-2026/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) [VCPRF - 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[ How do I submit my research for publication? ](#collapse-90c953c6ab2a014bd695) "Submitting your work is simple! Just follow our online submission process, and get published in no time." [ What is the LawFoyer Internship Program? ](#collapse-1a886146ab2a014beae5) "Gain hands-on experience through internships that focus on legal research, writing, and the use of AI in law." [ How can I stay updated on upcoming legal events and opportunities? ](#collapse-6968ba26ab2a014beae5) "Stay connected! Our events and opportunities section is updated regularly with the latest in legal news and events." [ Who can access LawFoyer's resources and workshops? ](#collapse-90c953c6ab2a014beae5) "LawFoyer is open to all learners—students, professionals, and anyone passionate about law!" --- ### [Terms & Conditions for the Internship](https://lawfoyer.in/non-disclosure-agreement/) **Published:** February 10, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** # NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENT THIS AGREEMENT MADE ON THIS DATE DAY OF 2026 # BY AND BETWEEN **LawFoyer,** a unit Vagmi Legal Ventures, a Partnership Firm incorporated under the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008 and the Companies Act, 2013 and having its registered office in Lucknow is the party OF THE **ONE PART;** # AND ***Student*** selected for the Internship, is the party OF THE OTHER **PART;** *PARTY 1* and COMPANY shall hereinafter be referred to as such or collectively as **“Parties”** and individually as **“Party”. **WHEREAS** both the Parties herein wish to pursue discussions and negotiate with each other for the purpose of entering into a potential business arrangement. **AND WHEREAS** the Parties contemplate that with respect to the Proposed Transaction, both the Parties may exchange certain information, material and documents relating to each other’s business, assets, financial condition, operations, plans and/or prospects of their businesses (hereinafter referred to as **“Confidential Information”,** more fully detailed in clause 1 herein below) that each Party regards as proprietary and confidential; and **AND WHEREAS,** each Party wishes to review such Confidential Information of the other for the sole purpose of determining their mutual interest in engaging in the Proposed Transaction; # IN CONNECTION WITH THE ABOVE, THE PARTIES HEREBY AGREE AS FOLLOWS: 1. **“Confidential and/or proprietary Information”** shall mean and include any information disclosed by one Party (Disclosing Party) to the other (Receiving Party) either directly or indirectly, in writing, orally, by inspection of tangible objects (including, without limitation, documents, prototypes, samples, media, documentation, discs and code). Confidential information shall include, without limitation, any materials, trade secrets, network information, configurations, trademarks, brand name, know-how, business and marketing plans, financial and operational information, and all other non-public information, material or data relating to the current and/ or future business and operations of the Disclosing Party and analysis, compilations, studies, summaries, extracts or other documentation prepared by the Disclosing Party. Confidential Information may also include information disclosed to the Receiving Party by third parties on behalf of the Disclosing Party. - The Receiving Party shall refrain from disclosing, reproducing, summarising and/or distributing Confidential Information and confidential materials of the Disclosing Party except in connection with the Proposed Transaction. - The Parties shall protect the confidentiality of each other’s Confidential Information in the same manner as they protect the confidentiality of their own proprietary and confidential information of similar nature. Each Party, while acknowledging the confidential and proprietary nature of the Confidential Information agrees to take all reasonable measures at its own expense to restrain its representatives from prohibited or unauthorised disclosure or use of the Confidential Information. - Confidential Information shall at all times remain the property of the Disclosing Party and may not be copied or reproduced by the Receiving Party without the Disclosing Party’s prior written consent. - **Within seven (7) days** of a written request by the Disclosing Party, the Receiving Party shall return/destroy (as may be requested in writing by the Disclosing Party or upon expiry and or earlier termination) all originals, copies, reproductions and summaries of Confidential Information provided to the Receiving Party as Confidential Information. The Receiving Party shall certify to the Disclosing Party in writing that it has satisfied its obligations under this paragraph. - The Receiving Party may disclose the Confidential Information only to the Receiving Party’s employees and consultants on a need-to-know basis. The Receiving Party shall have executed or shall execute appropriate written agreements with third parties, in a form and manner sufficient to enable the Receiving Party to enforce all the provisions of this Agreement. - Confidential Information, however, shall not include any information which the Receiving Party can show: - is in or comes into the public domain otherwise than through a breach of this Agreement or the fault of the Receiving Party; or - was already in its possession free of any such restriction prior to receipt from the Disclosing Party; or - was independently developed by the Receiving Party without making use of the Confidential Information; or - has been approved for release or use (in either case without restriction) by written authorization of the Disclosing Party. - In the event either Party receives a summons or other validly issued administrative or judicial process requiring the disclosure of Confidential Information of the other Party, the Receiving Party shall promptly notify the Disclosing Party. The Receiving Party may disclose Confidential Information to the extent such disclosure is required by law, rule, regulation or legal process; *provided however,* that, to the extent practicable, the Receiving Party shall give prompt written notice of any such request for such information to the Disclosing Party, and agrees to co-operate with the Disclosing Party, at the Disclosing Party’s expense, to the extent permissible and practicable, to challenge the request or limit the scope there of, as the Disclosing Party may reasonably deem appropriate. - Neither Party shall use the other’s name, trademarks, proprietary words or symbols or disclose under this Agreement in any publication, press release, marketing material, or otherwise without the prior written approval of the other. - Each Party agrees that the conditions in this Agreement and the Confidential Information disclosed pursuant to this Agreement are of a special, unique, and extraordinary character and that an impending or existing violation of any provision of this Agreement would cause the other party irreparable injury for which it would have no adequate remedy at law and further agrees that the other Party shall be entitled to obtain immediately injunctive relief prohibiting such violation, in addition to any other rights and remedies available to it at law or in equity. - The Receiving Party shall indemnify the Disclosing Party for all costs, expenses or damages that Disclosing Party incurs as a result of any violation of any provisions of this Agreement. This obligation shall include court, litigation expenses, and actual, reasonable attorney’s fees. The Parties acknowledge that as damages may not be a sufficient remedy for any breach under this Agreement, the non-breaching party is entitled to seek specific performance or injunctive relief (as appropriate) as a remedy for any breach or threatened breach, in addition to any other remedies at law or in equity. - Neither Party shall be liable for any special, consequential, incidental or exemplary damages or loss (or any lost profits, savings or a business opportunity) regardless of whether a Party was advised of the possibility of the damage or loss asserted. - Both the Parties agree that by virtue of the Parties entering into this Agreement neither party is obligated to disclose all or any of the Confidential Information to the other as stated in this Agreement. The Parties reserve the right to disclose only such information at its discretion and which it thinks is necessary to disclose in relation to the Proposed Transaction. - Both the Parties agree that this Agreement will be effective from the date of execution of this Agreement by both Parties and shall continue to be effective till the Proposed Transaction is terminated by either Party by giving a thirty (5) days prior notice, in case either Party foresees that the Proposed Transaction would not be achieved. Notwithstanding anything contained herein, the provisions of this Agreement shall survive and continue after expiration or termination of this Agreement for a further period of five year(s) from the date of expiration. It being further clarified that notwithstanding anything contained herein, in case a binding agreement is executed between the Parties in furtherance of the Proposed Transaction, the terms and conditions of this Agreement shall become effective and form a part of that binding agreement and be co-terminus with such binding agreement and shall be in effect till theterm of such binding agreement and shall after its expiry and or early termination shall continue to be in force in the following manner: 1. 5 years after the termination of the binding agreement; or 2. 5 years after the expiry of the binding agreement (Whichever is earlier) - Each Party warrants that it has the authority to enter into this Agreement. - If any provision of this agreement is held to be invalid or unenforceable to any extent, the remainder of this Agreement shall not be affected and each provision hereof shall be valid and enforceable to the fullest extent permitted by law. Any invalid or unenforceable provision of this Agreement shall be replaced with a provision that is valid and enforceable and most nearly reflects the original intent of the unenforceable provision. - This Agreement may be executed in two counterparts, each of which will be deemed to be an original, and all of which, when taken together, shall be deemed to constitute one and the same agreement. - The relationship between both the Parties to this Agreement shall be on a principal­ to-principal basis and nothing in this agreement shall be deemed to have created a relationship of an agent or partner between the Parties and none of the employees of COMPANY shall be considered as employees of PARTY. - This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of India. Both parties irrevocably submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts in Lucknow, for any action or proceeding regarding this Agreement. Any dispute or claim arising out of or in connection therewith, or the breach, termination or invalidity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the provisions of Procedure of the Indian Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, including any amendments thereof. The arbitration tribunal shall be composed of a sole arbitrator, and such arbitrator shall be appointed mutually by the Parties. The place of arbitration shall be Bangalore, **India** and the arbitration proceedings shall take place in the English language. - Additional oral agreements do not exist. All modifications and amendments to this Agreement must be made in writing. - The Agreement and/or any rights arising from it cannot be assigned or otherwise transferred either wholly or in part, without the written consent of the other Party. # **Terms and Conditions once your internship has been approved by LawFoyer –** 1). Once your internship tenure has begun the Intern is required to abide by all the Internship Guidelines notified in the Internship Group or otherwise. The notice to leave the internship in between needs to be given 5 days prior. In case you fail to do so, LawFoyer has the right to take any legal action that they deem fit. 2). If you bad mouth, spread false rumors or defame LawFoyer in any form – written, spoken, painted, etc. or, if you are caught doing any such activity then LawFoyer reserves the rights to cancel your internship and initiate legal action against you. 3). As an intern, you are not allowed to join or leave any WhatsApp group of LawFoyer, on your own. Only the members of team LawFoyer are entitled to either add or remove you from the groups. 4). In case you commit any of the following violations, LawFoyer is entitled to take strict legal action against you. ## **Violations: –** **– violating Internship Guidelines or disrespecting or undermining your Supervisor’s authority.** **– not handing in the work assigned to you before the pre-mentioned deadline.** **– not handing in the work report before the pre-mentioned deadline.** **– not treating your co-workers with respect.** 5). In case any dispute arises regarding any matter, between you and LawFoyer, the decision taken by LawFoyer may prevail. 6). This agreement will be governed by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. LawFoyer reserves the sole authority of appointing an arbitrator. The place of arbitration will be Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh, India. --- ### [Internship](https://lawfoyer.in/internship-lawfoyer/) **Published:** February 21, 2021 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** #### One-Month Virtual Internship Training Programme in Data Privacy Law and Compliance ##### Develop Practical, Industry-Relevant Skills in Privacy Law, Data Protection and Regulatory Compliance ##### Application Deadline: 12th August 2026 **———————————————-** --- ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/New-LITP-Legal-Drafting-Internship-Poster-1-724x1024.jpg) ## About LawFoyer LawFoyer is a student-centered legal education and information portal focused on empowering the next generation of legal professionals. We provide law students with free access to a broad range of resources including the latest news on legal job opportunities, exam study materials, career guidance straight from industry experts, and much more. LawFoyer’s intiative include LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research \[LIJDLR\] which is a peer-reviewed ISSN indexed Open Acces International Law Journal; LawFoyer Academy which aims at making legal education easy and affordable for all; LawFoyer Law Library which provides access to Articles, Case Analyses, Law Subject Notes, Skill Specific Guidebooks, and wide range of free resources. Central to our mission is nurturing law students’ talents. LawFoyer organizes National legal writing competitions, quizzes, and other contests open to students across the country. These competitions offer platforms for participants to showcase their skills, win exciting prizes, and gain visibility within the legal community. ## About the Internship Training Programme The **LawFoyer Virtual Internship Training Programme in Data Privacy Law and Compliance** is a structured, one-month experiential learning programme designed for law students, recent graduates, and early-career legal professionals interested in privacy law, technology law, regulatory compliance, and privacy operations. This programme is not merely a series of lectures. Participants will work on a simulated client organisation throughout the internship and apply legal principles to realistic business situations. Every week will combine: - Mentor-led live training sessions; - Guided statutory and regulatory readings; - Practical case studies and simulations; - Legal research and professional drafting; - Weekly assignments; - Mentor feedback and improvement guidance; and - A final privacy-compliance capstone project. By the end of the internship, participants will have developed a connected portfolio of privacy-related work products, including a personal-data inventory, privacy notice, consent assessment, data-flow map, preliminary Data Protection Impact Assessment, and personal-data breach response memorandum. ## Why Join This Programme? Data privacy is rapidly becoming an essential area of legal and corporate practice. Organisations increasingly require professionals capable of understanding not only statutory obligations but also how privacy requirements operate across websites, mobile applications, internal departments, vendors, technology products, and business processes. This internship will help participants develop the ability to: - Understand the foundational principles of privacy and personal-data protection; - Analyse the Indian data-protection framework; - Identify personal data, processing activities, stakeholders, and compliance obligations; - Review privacy notices and consent mechanisms; - Understand the operational handling of individual rights and grievances; - Prepare data inventories and data-flow maps; - Conduct preliminary privacy risk assessments; - Understand DPIAs, privacy by design, and privacy governance; - Examine vendor and processor relationships; - Respond to simulated personal-data breaches; - Compare selected elements of Indian privacy law with the EU GDPR; and - Communicate privacy risks and recommendations professionally. The programme’s intended learning outcomes include the ability to identify personal-data processing, assess legal applicability, prepare foundational privacy documentation, undertake preliminary gap assessments, and present advice to legal and non-legal stakeholders ## Mentors ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/WhatsApp-Image-2026-07-28-at-10.59.45-AM-1-768x1024.jpeg) **Ms. Shivani Patel** **(Information Security Analyst at FIS Global)** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/WhatsApp-Image-2026-07-28-at-11.01.01-AM-773x1024.jpeg) **Mr. Devansh Dubey** **(Consultant at A-LIGN)** ## Internship Curriculum and Structure The curriculum is divided into four progressive weekly modules. Participants will work on the same simulated organisation throughout the internship so that each weekly assignment contributes to the final privacy-compliance advisory. ###### **Week 1: Foundations of Data Privacy Law** - Introduction to Privacy and Personal-Data Protection - Indian Data-Protection Framework and Applicability **Primary Skills Assessed:** Issue identification, actor classification, data analysis, and legal applicability. ###### Week 2: Privacy Notices, Consent, Rights and Grievances - Privacy Notices, Consent and Lawful Processing - Rights of Individuals and Grievance Management **Primary Skills Assessed:** Legal drafting, transparency analysis, consent evaluation, and user-facing communication. ###### Week 3: Privacy Governance, Data Mapping and DPIA - Data Mapping, Records and Privacy Governance - Privacy Risk Assessment, DPIA and Privacy by Design **Primary Skills Assessed:** Data mapping, privacy-risk analysis, compliance documentation, and practical decision-making. ###### Week 4: Personal-Data Breach Response and Professional Practice - Personal-Data Breaches and Incident Response - Comparative Privacy Law, Careers and Capstone Presentation **Primary Skills Assessed:** Incident analysis, legal reasoning, evidence preservation, and crisis communication. **———————————————-** ## Internship Perks - Certificate of Internship to all Interns - Certificate of Excellence and Letter of Recommendation to Best Interns - Offline Internship Opportunity to Top 3 Excellent Performers of the Batch at Supreme Court of India with [**Eximius Law Partners LLP**](http://eximiuslegal.in/ "Eximius Law Partners LLP") at their firm situated in New Delhi. - Certificate of Publication for each Publication with [LawFoyer](https://lawfoyer.in/) and [**LIJDLR \[LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research\]**](https://lijdlr.com/) & Discounted Publication Opportunity with LIJDLR. - Exclusive Access to Live & Recorded Training Sessions, Courses & Doubt Sessions curated only for Interns with a personalized LMS Dashboard at [**LawFoyer Academy**](https://academy.lawfoyer.in/) - Feature and Shoutout on Social Media Pages of LawFoyer to Best Interns - LawFoyer Membership and Paid Opportunities to Interns showcasing par excellence performance (at LawFoyer’s Discretion and on the basis of Due Analysis of Intern’s Work) ## **Department:-** - Data Privacy Law and Compliance ## Internship Start Date - 20/08/2026 ## **Eligibility:-** - Undergraduate law students from any law college or university recognized by BCI. - Postgraduate law students. - Students specialising in cyber law, technology law, corporate law, or regulatory studies. - Students interested in privacy consulting, in-house legal work, policy research, compliance, or privacy operations. ***Upon Approval of application for the Internship a Preliminary Assessment Test (PAT) will be conducted for shortlisting candidates for the Internship. More details will be shared upon Approval.*** **———————————————-** ## **Application Form** closed **———————————————-** --- ### [Contact Us](https://lawfoyer.in/contact/) **Published:** November 14, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** # Contact Us #### Need assistance? Our friendly and knowledgeable support team is ready to help you navigate your legal journey. ###### Get in touch ## Seamless Communication, Global Impact. Need assistance? Our friendly and knowledgeable support team is ready to help you navigate your legal journey. Whether you have questions about courses, publications, or competitions, we’re just a click away. Connect with us for seamless support, tailored to your needs. Email Support lawfoyer@gmail.com contact@lawfoyer.in Let's Talk Phone : +91 8574723478 ## Send us a message Contact Form DemoFirst Name Last Name Email Subject Your Message Submit Form --- ### [About Us](https://lawfoyer.in/about/) **Published:** November 14, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** # About Us #### Join our community of learners and start your journey towards success. ## About LawFoyer: LawFoyer is an internationally recognized legal education platform dedicated to making law more accessible and understandable for everyone. The platform offers a comprehensive range of educational services, including workshops, webinars, bootcamps, courses, and study materials, along with expert academic assistance for time-sensitive assignments. Through its ISSN-indexed International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research, which is recognized by over 300+ Databases/Libraries, LawFoyer provides students and professionals opportunities to publish their research efficiently and affordably. The platform keeps learners informed about the legal world by publishing updates on events, opportunities, and daily legal news through its website. Additionally, LawFoyer actively engages students through various competitions and co-curricular activities, including national academic quizzes with cash prizes, international research paper competitions, and internship programs partnered with law firms, where students receive training in legal research, writing, drafting, and the application of modern technologies like AI in legal practice. ![Logo for LawFoyer featuring a teal framed 'L' icon and the brand name 'LawFoyer' with the subtitle 'A daily dose for inquisitors' on a white banner.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/LawFoyer-Logo-no-bg-2026-1024x1024.png) version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"? ### Educational Services: Skill development workshops, webinars, bootcamps, courses, study materials, legal articles, case analysis, and expert academic assistance. version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"? ### International Journal ISSN-indexed peer-reviewed journal listed in 300+ databases/libraries offering fast-paced, affordable publishing opportunities. version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"? ### Legal Information Regular updates on events, competitions, and legal news through our website. version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"? ### Competitions & Training: National quizzes with cash prizes, research paper competitions, and internship programs with law firms focusing on legal skills and AI integration. #### Meet Our Team ## The Gems of LawFoyer ![Professional headshot of a man in a navy suit, light blue shirt, and black tie, smiling at the camera.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/amal-s-Small-480x450.png) Adv. Amal Singh CEO & Founder [ Linkedin-in ](https://www.linkedin.com/in/amal-singh/) [ Envelope ](mailto:lawfoyer@gmail.com) ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/rajarshiiiisd-971x1024.jpg) Adv. Rajarshi Tripathi COO & Co-Founder ![A man in a black suit and tie holding a brown leather-bound notebook labeled 'Legal Briefs' outdoors in a park.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/WhatsApp-Image-2026-05-20-at-10.58.26-PM-e1779306056736-300x296.jpeg) Adv. Manik Tindwani Educator & Mentor ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/1757848147575.jpg) Antavya Singh Senior Content Creator & Learning Manager ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/prakahr-e1784451809154-294x300.jpeg) Prakhar Singh Associate Content Manager ![Professional headshot of a man in a dark suit and blue tie against a neutral gray background, looking at the camera.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/11074b0c-8d7c-42d0-9cea-57dbe3b1f4ad-Small-240x300.jpg) Gyanu Patel Chief Content Manager ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Ritesh-e1709143715471-1003x1024.jpg) Ritesh Singh Shekhawat Associate Content Manager ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/20240226_161419-scaled-e1709498463499-300x300-1.webp) Amaan Arif Creative Head (Marketing) ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/isha.webp) Isha Saxena Creative Head (Marketing) ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Sourabh-e1706383061925-300x300-1.webp) Sourabh Kumar Creative Head (Marketing) ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/hardik-singh-768x774.jpg) Hardik Singh Associate Content Manager #### Trusted by over 17000+ Law Students & Legal Professionals and a community of 3 Lac+ Learners, hailing from: ![Item 1](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/1-1.png) ![Item 2](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/2-1.png) ![Item 3](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/3-1.png) ![Item 4](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/4-1.png) ![Item 5](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/5-1.png) ![Item 6](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/6-1.png) ![Item 6](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/8-1.png) ![Item 6](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/9-1.png) ![Item 6](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/10-1.png) ![Item 6](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/11-1.png) ![Item 6](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/12-1.png) ![Item 6](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/13-1.png) ![Item 6](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/14-1.png) ![Item 6](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/15-1.png) --- ### [Quiz Page of LawFoyer Quiz](https://lawfoyer.in/quiz-access-page-national-quiz-competition-by-lawfoyer/) **Published:** November 25, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## 25th LawFoyer Quiz on (Constitutional Law & Indian Polity) ## Note:- Quiz link will work at 7pm on 29th March, 2026. [ Click to access quiz ](https://forms.cloud.microsoft/r/5vfnUa7mGx) ## Important **Guidelines** - **Format of Quiz:** Quiz shall take place online, and a paper will include multiple-choice questions**.** - The participant can take this exam on their laptop or mobile phone. - The platform for the quiz will be google Forms, Microsoft Forms, etc. - In the case of the same marks, time will be considered (a person who submits early will be given preference). ## **Rules & Regulations** - **Total 60** Multiple Choice Questions **(MCQ(s))** - The time allotted will be **25** minutes. (This includes time for filling the basic details like Name, email, etc.) - **Every question carries 04 marks & there will be no negative marking.** - The Result will be declared on **5th April 2026.** [ Click to access quiz ](https://forms.cloud.microsoft/r/5vfnUa7mGx) ## Note:- Quiz link will work at 7pm on 29th March, 2026. --- ### [Cancellation/Refund Policy](https://lawfoyer.in/cancellation-refund-policy/) **Published:** May 25, 2021 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** This Refund Policy applies to all paid offerings provided by **LawFoyer** through its platforms, including **LawFoyer Academy** (academy.lawfoyer.in), unless a specific course, workshop, quiz or program page clearly states a different refund rule. ### 1. General Rule: No Refunds All fees paid to LawFoyer for any paid offering are non refundable. This includes but is not limited to certification courses, paid workshops, bootcamps, paid quizzes, competitions, paid training sessions, paid study materials, subscriptions, all access products and any other paid offerings offered of LawFoyer. Once a learner has enrolled in or paid for any such offering, no refund will be processed under any circumstances, except as specifically provided in this policy or in any express refund term mentioned for a particular program. ### 2. Exception: Cancellation by LawFoyer or Specific Program Policy LawFoyer will process a refund only in the following limited situations: 1. The concerned course, workshop, quiz, program or other paid offering is cancelled by LawFoyer, and the learner does not opt for any alternate batch or program offered in its place. 2. A specific course, workshop, quiz or program page expressly mentions a different refund policy, in which case that specific policy will apply for that offering. In case of cancellation by LawFoyer, the refundable amount, if any, will be initiated by LawFoyer within 30 days from the date of public announcement of such cancellation. ### 3. Banking Details and Learner’s Responsibility For processing a refund, LawFoyer may require correct banking or payment details from the learner, where automatic reversal to the original payment mode is not possible. If, despite reasonable follow up from the side of LawFoyer, the learner does not share the required and accurate banking or payment details within 30 days from the date on which LawFoyer first requests such information, LawFoyer shall not be liable to refund the amount in any manner thereafter. The responsibility to provide correct and timely details rests solely with the learner. ### 4. How to Raise a Refund Request Where Allowed Where a refund is allowed under this policy or under a specific program policy, the learner must send a written request to: **Email:** lawfoyer@gmail.com The email should clearly mention the learner’s full name, registered email address, contact number, transaction details, and the name of the course, workshop, quiz, program or the respective paid offering for which the payment was made. Only written requests sent to the above email ID will be considered for refund processing, wherever permitted. ### 5. Relationship with Other Policies This Refund Policy shall be read together with the applicable Terms and Conditions, Privacy Policy and specific program terms published on LawFoyer platforms. In case a specific course, workshop, quiz or program page contains an express refund clause that is different from this general policy, the specific clause for that offering will prevail for that particular transaction. ### 6. Amendments to this Policy LawFoyer reserves the right to modify, amend or replace this Refund Policy at any time at its sole discretion. The latest version will always be available on the official LawFoyer website or relevant platform page. Learners are advised to review the Refund Policy periodically and before enrolling in any paid offering. By enrolling in any paid offering of LawFoyer, the learner acknowledges that they have read, understood and agreed to this Refund Policy and any specific refund terms mentioned for the respective program. --- ### [Verify Certificate Credentials](https://lawfoyer.in/verify-certificate-credentials/) **Published:** July 7, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** --- ## LITP AUG 2025 \[table id=65 /\] --- ## LITP JUNE 2025 \[table id=57 /\] --- ## LITP 2024 \[table id=48 /\] --- ### [LawFoyer's Research Internship Training Program Guidelines](https://lawfoyer.in/internship-lawfoyer/internship-guidelines/) **Published:** February 11, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## About LawFoyer LawFoyer is a student-centered legal education and information portal focused on empowering the next generation of legal professionals. We provide law students with free access to a broad range of resources including the latest news on legal job opportunities, exam study materials, career guidance straight from industry experts, and much more. LawFoyer’s intiative include LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research \[LIJDLR\] which is a peer-reviewed ISSN indexed Open Acces International Law Journal; LawFoyer Academy which aims at making legal education easy and affordable for all; LawFoyer Law Library which provides access to Articles, Case Analyses, Law Subject Notes, Skill Specific Guidebooks, and wide range of free resources. Central to our mission is nurturing law students’ talents. LawFoyer organizes National legal writing competitions, quizzes, and other contests open to students across the country. These competitions offer platforms for participants to showcase their skills, win exciting prizes, and gain visibility within the legal community. ## LawFoyer and Its Vision LawFoyer has the following vision: - Making Law easy and accessible for all - Making Legal Education and Practical Training affordable - Promoting the use of AI and Modern Tech in Law - Creating Employment Opportunities by networking stakeholders ## What will we Cover? In LawFoyer’s Legal Research Internship Training Programme we will cover: - Legal Research (Basic to Advanced) - Legal Writing (Basic to Advanced) - Legal Drafting (Fundamentals and Modern Methods) - Using Artificial Intelligence and Modern Tech in Legal Research, Writing and Drafting - Ethics, Tactics, Tools, and Techniques of Efficient Legal Practice ## Internship Curriculum **Module 1**: Introduction and Induction Training **Module 2**: Case Finding, Reading, Analysis, and Briefs **Module 3**: Legal Research and Writing **Module 4**: Citations, Proofreading and Formatting Fundamentals **Module 5**: Legal Drafting **Module 6**: Acing Academics, Ethics and Legal Tactics **Bonus Workshops** on Moot Court and Mooting; Mediation Law of India, and many more ## Eligibility for Internship & About LPAT Any Law Student studying law in any law college or university recognised by Bar Council of India or University Grants Commission of India is eligible to apply via this link: [Click here](https://lawfoyer.in/internship-lawfoyer/) Upon Receipt the Internship Applications will be either Approved or will be Rejected. Upon approval of the Internship Application, a free **LawFoyer’s Preliminary Assessment Test (LPAT)** will be conducted, which will be the basis of shortlisting the candidates for the LawFoyer’s Internship Training Program. This MCQ test of 120 Marks is designed to evaluate your basic understanding of law, legal reasoning, and related skills. It is mandatory to score atleast 50% marks (atleast 60 out of 120) to qualify for the Internship Training Program. The decision of LawFoyer regarding the results of LPAT and selection of interns will be final. The date on which the Test is to be conducted will be notified to all the Applicants via Mail and Internship Updates WhatsApp Group. Please read the following details regarding LPAT: #### Test Format 1. The test will consist of 30 Multiple Choice Questions (MCQs). 2. Each question has four options (a, b, c, d), out of which only one is correct. 3. All questions carry equal marks of 4 points each. 4. The total marks for the test are 120 (30 questions × 4 marks). #### Time Limit - You have 45 minutes to complete the entire test. - You will have to manage your time wisely. It’s recommended to spend about 1 minute per question. #### Scoring - Each correct answer will earn you 4 marks. - There is no negative marking for incorrect answers. - Unattempted questions will receive zero marks. #### Question Types The test includes a variety of question types: - Application of law to practical scenarios for testing Legal Acument and Aptitude (Ability to Learn and Apply Law) - Basic legal knowledge - Legal Reasoning - Logical Reasoning - Mathematical and Quantitative aptitude - General knowledge of legal research, writing, drafting, and technology - MS Word features relevant to legal work - Basic understanding of legal internship ## Internship Perks - Certificate of Internship to all Interns - Certificate of Excellence and Letter of Recommendation to Best Interns - Certificate of Publication for each Publication with [LawFoyer](https://lawfoyer.in/) and [LIJDLR \[LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research\]](https://lijdlr.com/) & Discounted Publication Opportunity in LIJDLR. - Exclusive Access to Live & Recorded Training Sessions, Courses & Doubt Sessions curated only for Interns with a personalised LMS Dashboard at [LawFoyer Academy](https://academy.lawfoyer.in/) - 50+ AI and Non-AI Tools for use in Legal Practice - Feature and Shoutout on Social Media Pages of LawFoyer to Best Interns - LawFoyer Membership and Paid Opportunities to Interns showcasing par excellence performance (at LawFoyer’s Discretion and on the basis of Due Analysis of Intern’s Work) ## Internship Guidelines **A. Guidelines for Interns** - Be a Good Learner - Ask Queries and Clarify Doubts - Complete all mandatory Assignments according to the Guidelines - Use and practice the tools and techniques that will be taught - Submit assignments before Deadline - Attendance is Mandatory in all Live Training Sessions / Doubt Sessions - The code of conduct shall be formal and no misbehavior with any Team Member or any Co-Intern will be tolerated **B. Attendance** - Attending every Live Training Session / Workshop / Doubt Session is Mandatory. - Watching the Recordings of Training Sessions on LMS Dashboard is Mandatory. - Attendance will be recorded in an Attendance Form. - Attendance forms will be shared in Live Sessions or Doubt Meetings ONLY. **C. Internship Registration, Tenure, & Live Sessions** - All the Applicants who will qualify the LPAT Test with atleast 50% score will recieve a separate mail on Final Approval of their Internship after being short-listed and they may join the notified Internship Batch’s WhatsApp Group (the link of which will be provided in the Mail, by or before the Internship Commencement Date notified in the Approval mail. - All short listed interns will also be provided with FREE Access to our Recorded Internship Trainings on the LMS Dashboard of LawFoyer Academy - It is **mandatory for every intern to register** as an intern using the **internship registration form** which will be notified in the group. - Post registration, every registered intern will be alloted and mailed a **unique legal researcher code** which shall be used by the intern while submitting the assignments during internship. \[**Note:** This code is alloted to ensure privacy of intern during internship.\] - The internship tenure will be of 28 days from the date of registration of intern. It can be extended on request of the intern or if such extension is deemed fit for holistic development of the interns. - There will be minimum 5 Recorded or Live Training Sessions and minimum 2 Separate Live Doubt Sessions during internship tenure on case finding, case analysis writing, article writing, research paper writing and legal drafting. - All the internship guidelines shall be binding on all the interns and shall be duly adhered during the internship tenure. **D. Assignments** - During your internship tenure, you will have the option of submitting either of the following set of Assignments for being eligible for the Internship Certificate: - Set 1: **Assignment 1, 2 & 3** OR - Set 2: **Assignment 1 & 4** OR - Set 3: **Assignment 1 & a video of about 45 to 60 seconds on any topic of law or any legal news or update explaining it or briefing it.** - The details of all the Internship Assignments are as follows: - **Assignment 1** **(Case Finding Session Meeting Notes)** - The first Recorded Module or Live Training Session will be on Case Finding - An intern needs to make notes of that session in MS Word (docx. format) and submit it using Assignment 1 Form provided in the LMS Portal - Font Style: Times New Roman; Font Size: 12 for Normal text, 14 for Headings; Headings shall be bold and center-aligned, notes can be in pointers to keep it brief; there is no word limit. - Time Alloted for submission of this assignment: 2 days from the conclusion of the Live Training Session or such date as may be notified in the Internship Group - **Assignment 2 (Case Analysis on alloted case)** - The second Recorded Module or Live Training Session will be on Case Analysis Writing - After the session, every Intern will be alloted a case for writing a Case Analysis - An intern needs to write a Case Analysis on the alloted case in MS Word in about 1500-2000 words - A template for writing this case analysis will be shared with interns in the Internship Group - Time Alloted for submission of this assignment: 5 days from the date of conclusion of the Live Training Session or as may be notified in the group - **Assignment 3 (Legal Blog / Article on alloted Topic)** - The third Recorded Module or Live Training Session will be on Legal Article / Blog Writing - After the session, every Intern will be alloted a topic for writing an Article / Blog based on their interests - An intern needs to write an Article / Blog on the alloted topic in MS Word in about 2000-3000 words - Guidelines for writing this Article / Blog will be shared with interns in the Internship Group - Time Alloted for submission of this assignment: 5 days from the date of conclusion of the Live Training Session or as may be notified in the group - **Assignment 4 (Research Paper on Topic Chosen by Intern)** - The fourth Recorded Module or Live Training Session will be on Legal Research paper Writing - After the session, every Intern will be required to submit a Legal Research Paper on the topic chosen by the Intern - An intern needs to write the research paper on the chosen topic in MS Word in about 3000-5000 words - Guidelines for writing this Research Paper will be shared with interns in the Internship Group - Time Alloted for submission of this assignment: 7 days from the date of conclusion of the Live Training Session or as may be notified in the group - The Approved Research Papers will be published at a discounted rate on LIJDLR which will be notified via mail. Upon payment of the nominal publication fee the paper will be published - It is NOT MANDATORY to submit Research Paper for being eligible for Internship Certificate, it is discretionary for the Interns to choose Set 1, 2 or 3 of Assignments as mentioned before. - **Assignment 5 (Legal Draft on a Hypothetical Case Problem)** - The final Recorded Module or Live Training Session will be on Legal Drafting - This Assignment is discretionary and NOT MANDATORY, it is left to the discretion of the Intern if he / she wants to get their drafts evaluated or not - After the session, every Intern may submit a Legal Draft based on a hypothetical problem which will be provided by the LawFoyer - An intern needs to draft the Legal Document in MS Word. - Templates and Guidelines for drafting this Legal Document will be shared with interns in the Internship Group - Time Alloted for submission of this assignment: 5 days from the date of conclusion of the Live Training Session or as may be notified in the group - Specific guidelines related to each assignment will be notified in the internship group. - The aforementioned assignments are to be submitted through the assignment submission forms, which will be provided in the groups, before the notified deadline. - Deadlines for submission will be notified in the group ONLY. - The assignment submission forms will be provided in the group ONLY. - The List of Cases alloted, topics for Blogs / Articles alloted, will also be notified in the group ONLY. - After submission, all assignments will be reviewed and if needed the Editorial Team will mail you the corrections to be made and notify respective interns in the group too. - **Rejection of Assignment:** - **First Rejection:** If the assignment is rejected for the first time, a review mail stating corrections and suggestions will be mailed to the intern. - **Second Rejection**: If the assignment is rejected for the second time, a review mail along with a warning of termination will be mailed to the intern. - **Third Rejection:** If the assignment is rejected for the third time, a review mail along with a notice of termination will be issued to the intern. - A chance to restore the internship will be provided to intern who will show due dilligence and will comply to the guidelines provided. **E. Learning Management System (LMS) Portal for Interns** - **Q. What is LMS?** - It is a Learning Management System on which the interns will be provided with exclusive access to the recorded lessons and a lot of free learning resources including: - Recordings of Live Sessions of this Internship - Module-wise pre-recorded video lessons - E-Books, Notes, Resources, & Important links - Training Videos on Important Tools and Techniques - Webinars & Workshop recordings - Other details regarding the LMS will be shared in the Internship Group - **Q. How will it benefit Interns?** - 24\*7 access to lessons to clarify doubts & strengthen skills - Aids completion of assignments before deadline - Increases efficiency of work as you can revise concepts and methods easily and that too at anytime, anywhere - **NOT EVERYONE WILL GET THE ACCESS TO LMS!** - **Q. Who will get Access?** - ONLY the registered intern who will successfully pass the **LPAT Test** with alteast 50% score as stated and described before, will get access to LMS. - Access will be REVOKED on termination of internship. - Access will be REVOKED after completion of internship tenure. - **Q. How to get Access?** - Team LawFoyer will notify the method of accessing the LMS to all Interns via a training video and a detailed guideline which will be shared on the group - **Q. When can an Intern access** **it?** - After clearing and passing the LPAT Test with atleast 50% score; AND - After registration as an Intern using link provided in the group. - **Q. What if an Intern** **fails the LPAT Test?** - No access of LMS will be provided that case; AND - Guidelines related to Internship Eligibility will apply in that case. **F.** **Action on Non-Compliance** **Internship will be immediately terminated on:** - failing to attend meetings or timely watch Recorded Modules on LMS Dashboard; - non-submission of assignment before deadline; - not correcting the errors notified via mail to the intern by Editorial Team before Deadline; - misbehaving with any team member of LawFoyer; - misbehaving with any other intern during internship. **Exceptions:** - In case of unforeseen emergencies no termination will take effect; - On showing sufficient cause for any non-compliance, the intern will be excused; - If recording of the sessions are completely watched on LMS immediately after missing such session / meeting; - If assignments which were delayed are submitted anytime before completion of internship tenure after showing sufficient cause for such delay; - If such compliance is waivered voluntarily by LawFoyer or by breach of Guideline by LawFoyer. **Effect of Termination** - Intern will be removed from all Internship Groups. - Intern will not be entitled to any perks of internship except: - Certificate of Publications (if any, due) - Review of Assignments Submitted (if any, due) **Features on Social Media and Shoutouts** - Best Works of Interns will be featured on the Social Media handles of LawFoyer. - **Excellent Performers:** - A list of Excellent Performers will be featured on the Social Media handles after completion of Reviews of each of the Assignments. - A cumulative List of Excellent Performers will also be featured on Social Media handles after completion of Internship Tenure and it shall be named “Legal Researchers of the Month”. - Criteria for this title: “Excellent Work” remark accorded to any of the assignments during review process by LawFoyer’s Editorial Team. - **Budding Lawyers**: - A list of Budding Lawyers will be featured too on the Social Media handles after completion of Reviews of each of the Assignments. - A cumulative list of Budding Lawyers will also be featured on Social Media handles after completion of Internship Tenure and it shall be named “Budding Lawyers of the Month”. - Criteria for this title: “Really Good Work” remark accorded to any of the assignments during review process by LawFoyer’s Editorial Team. - **Diligent Learners:** - A list of Diligent Learners will be featured too on the Social Media handles after completion of Reviews of each of the Assignments. - A cumulative list of Diligent learners will also be featured on Social Media handles after completion of Internship Tenure and it shall be named “Diligent Learners of the Month”. - Criteria for this title: “Good work, but improvements required” remark accorded to any of the assignments during review process by LawFoyer’s Editorial Team. **G. Guidelines for LawFoyer** - A mandatory notice of non-compliance shall be provided to intern before termination - An opportunity to show sufficient cause and to be heard shall be provided to every intern before termination - A reasonable notice of the following shall be provided to award sufficient opportunity to interns for: - conduction of meetings (at least 12 hours before such meeting) - submission of assignment (at least 5 days before deadline of submission) - correction of mistakes in assignment reviewed (at least 4 days before completion of internship tenure) - The above-given guidelines shall not be binding on LawFoyer and are merely directory in nature, final discretion of taking any / all decisions regarding the internship training programme is vested with LawFoyer ONLY. --- ### [Shipping Policy](https://lawfoyer.in/shipping-policy/) **Published:** December 19, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## Digital Services Only At LawFoyer (www.lawfoyer.in), we are an educational platform providing exclusively digital and online services including: - Educational workshops and webinars - Online bootcamps and courses - Digital study materials - Virtual academic assistance - Online publication services through our ISSN-indexed journal - Digital access to legal news and updates - Virtual training programs and competitions ## Service Delivery Methods All our services are delivered through digital means: - Live online sessions for workshops, webinars, and bootcamps - Digital course access through our learning platform - Electronic delivery of study materials and resources - Online submission and publication process for our international journal - Virtual access to competitions and training programs - Remote academic assistance and consultation ## No Physical Shipping As an educational platform focused on legal education and professional development: - We do not ship any physical products - No shipping address is required for our services - All materials and resources are provided digitally - Access to all services is granted through our online platform ## Access and Support If you experience any technical issues accessing our: - Online courses or workshops - Digital study materials - Journal submission platform - Competition portals - Training resources Please contact our support team at \[support email\]. We are committed to responding to all inquiries within 24 hours. ## Questions? For any questions about our digital services or access methods, please reach out to us through our website contact form or email. Last updated: December 19, 2024 --- ### [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/events/) **Published:** May 23, 2021 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/images-4.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/vcprf-international-moot-court-workshop-2026-organized-by-veritas-centre-for-policy-research-foundation-vcprf-register-by-30-september-2026/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) #### [ VCPRF – International Moot Court Workshop, 2026 | Organized by Veritas Centre for Policy Research Foundation (VCPRF) | Register by 30 September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/vcprf-international-moot-court-workshop-2026-organized-by-veritas-centre-for-policy-research-foundation-vcprf-register-by-30-september-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 20 September 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Integral_University_Lucknow_logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/integral-university-india-in-collaboration-with-menoufiyauniversity-al-minufiyah-egypt-organized-by-integral-university-lucknow-submit-abstract-by-20th-october-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ Two-Day International Conference on “Forensic Sciences for Advancing Justice: Integrating Law, Medical Science and Technology” | Organized by Integral University, India in collaboration with MenoufiyaUniversity AL Minufiyah, Egypt | Submit Abstract by 20th October 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/integral-university-india-in-collaboration-with-menoufiyauniversity-al-minufiyah-egypt-organized-by-integral-university-lucknow-submit-abstract-by-20th-october-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 19 September 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/image-1-1024x333.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/10th-sgtu-moot-court-competition2026-organized-by-moot-court-society-school-of-law-sgt-university-register-by-5th-october-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ 10th SGTU Moot Court Competition,2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, School of Law, SGT University | Register by 5th October, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/10th-sgtu-moot-court-competition2026-organized-by-moot-court-society-school-of-law-sgt-university-register-by-5th-october-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 19 September 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/National_Forensic_Sciences_University_Logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/national-legal-hackathon-organized-by-school-of-law-forensic-justice-and-policy-studies-national-forensic-sciences-university-nfsu-register-by-24-september-2026/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ National Legal Hackathon | Organized by School of Law, Forensic Justice and Policy Studies, National Forensic Sciences University (NFSU) | Register by 24 September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/national-legal-hackathon-organized-by-school-of-law-forensic-justice-and-policy-studies-national-forensic-sciences-university-nfsu-register-by-24-september-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 18 September 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/images-3.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-abstracts-ccadr-journal-for-alternate-dispute-resolution-organized-by-chanakya-centre-for-alternative-dispute-resolution-ccadr-cnlu-register-by-15th-october-2026-1159-p-m/) [Call for Blogs](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-blogs/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ CALL FOR ABSTRACTS — CCADR JOURNAL FOR ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION | Organized by Chanakya Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution (CCADR), CNLU | Register by 15th October 2026 | 11:59 p.m.](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-abstracts-ccadr-journal-for-alternate-dispute-resolution-organized-by-chanakya-centre-for-alternative-dispute-resolution-ccadr-cnlu-register-by-15th-october-2026-1159-p-m/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 18 September 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/images-2.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/11th-justice-murtaza-husain-memorial-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-unity-moot-court-committee-unity-p-g-college-lucknow-register-by-30th-september-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ 11th Justice Murtaza Husain Memorial Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Unity Moot Court Committee, Unity P.G. College, Lucknow | Register by 30th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/11th-justice-murtaza-husain-memorial-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-unity-moot-court-committee-unity-p-g-college-lucknow-register-by-30th-september-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 14 September 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/IMG_0227-1024x1024.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/vidhika-volume-2-issue-3-organized-by-nyaya-shastra-submit-by-20th-september-2026/) [Call for Blogs](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-blogs/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ VIDHIKA – Volume 2 Issue 3 | Organized by Nyaya Shastra | Submit by 20th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/vidhika-volume-2-issue-3-organized-by-nyaya-shastra-submit-by-20th-september-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 12 September 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/images-1.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/medexon-international-mediation-competition-2026-organized-by-dexon-global-register-by-20-october-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ MEDEXON INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION COMPETITION, 2026 | Organized by Dexon Global | Register by 20 October 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/medexon-international-mediation-competition-2026-organized-by-dexon-global-register-by-20-october-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 10 September 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/images.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/k-m-bashir-memorial-student-constitutional-forum-2026-organized-by-vakkom-moulavi-foundation-trust-vmft-event-on-24-25-september-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ K.M. Bashir Memorial Student Constitutional Forum 2026 | Organized by Vakkom Moulavi Foundation Trust (VMFT) | Event on 24 & 25 September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/k-m-bashir-memorial-student-constitutional-forum-2026-organized-by-vakkom-moulavi-foundation-trust-vmft-event-on-24-25-september-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 8 September 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/images.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-abstracts-international-conference-on-international-arbitration-organized-by-school-of-law-mahindra-university-hyderabad-in-collaboration-with-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ Call for Abstracts: International Conference on International Arbitration | Organized by School of Law, Mahindra University, Hyderabad, in collaboration with Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Submit Abstract by 15 September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-abstracts-international-conference-on-international-arbitration-organized-by-school-of-law-mahindra-university-hyderabad-in-collaboration-with-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 6 September 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/logo-1024x850.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/synergy-where-law-meets-society-case-study-competition-2026-organized-by-vivekananda-school-of-law-and-legal-studies-vslls-vivekananda-institute-of-professional-studies-techn/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ SYNERGY: WHERE LAW MEETS SOCIETY – CASE STUDY COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by Vivekananda School of Law and Legal Studies (VSLLS), Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies – Technical Campus (VIPS-TC), through the Centre for Social Sciences | Register by 20th October 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/synergy-where-law-meets-society-case-study-competition-2026-organized-by-vivekananda-school-of-law-and-legal-studies-vslls-vivekananda-institute-of-professional-studies-techn/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 2 September 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/HNLU_Logo1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-international-arbitration-organized-by-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur-register-by-20-september-2026/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION | Organized by Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Register by 20 September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-international-arbitration-organized-by-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur-register-by-20-september-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 1 September 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/logo.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-papers-capital-law-review-organized-by-capital-law-review-submit-by-4-september-2026/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ CALL FOR PAPERS – CAPITAL LAW REVIEW | Organized by Capital Law Review | Submit by 4 September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-papers-capital-law-review-organized-by-capital-law-review-submit-by-4-september-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 30 August 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Rajiv_Gandhi_National_University_of_Law_Logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/6th-rfmlr-tta-demystifying-series-certificate-course-on-cross-border-ma-and-foreign-investment-organized-by-rgnul-financial-and-mercantile-law-review-rfmlr-rajiv-gandhi-natio/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ 6th RFMLR – TT&A Demystifying Series: Certificate Course on Cross Border M&A and Foreign Investment | Organized by RGNUL Financial and Mercantile Law Review (RFMLR), Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab (RGNUL) | Event on 9th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/6th-rfmlr-tta-demystifying-series-certificate-course-on-cross-border-ma-and-foreign-investment-organized-by-rgnul-financial-and-mercantile-law-review-rfmlr-rajiv-gandhi-natio/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 29 August 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/images-2.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/2nd-international-conference-on-human-rights-organized-by-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-abstract-submission-deadline-by15th-september-2026/) [Call for Blogs](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-blogs/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ 2nd International Conference on Human Rights | Organized by Xavier Law School, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata | Abstract Submission Deadline by15th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/2nd-international-conference-on-human-rights-organized-by-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-abstract-submission-deadline-by15th-september-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 25 August 2026 0 [ ![II LM University logo: shield emblem with temple on left and the text II LM University to the right.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/logo-iilm-greater-noida.webp) ](https://lawfoyer.in/all-india-1st-mock-trial-competition-2026-organized-by-school-of-law-iilm-university-greater-noida-register-by-20th-september-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ ALL INDIA 1ST MOCK TRIAL COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by SCHOOL OF LAW, IILM UNIVERSITY, GREATER NOIDA | Register by 20th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/all-india-1st-mock-trial-competition-2026-organized-by-school-of-law-iilm-university-greater-noida-register-by-20th-september-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 20 August 2026 0 [ ![Geeta Institute of Law logo with an orange emblem and bold text: GEETA INSTITUTE OF LAW, Panipat, Delhi NCR.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/images-1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/international-seminar-on-artificial-intelligence-for-inclusive-growth-transforming-law-management-commerce-and-society-organized-by-geeta-institute-of-law-gil-panipat-delhi/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON “ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH: TRANSFORMING LAW, MANAGEMENT, COMMERCE AND SOCIETY” | Organized by Geeta Institute of Law (GIL), Panipat, Delhi NCR, India | Submit Abstract by 15th October 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-seminar-on-artificial-intelligence-for-inclusive-growth-transforming-law-management-commerce-and-society-organized-by-geeta-institute-of-law-gil-panipat-delhi/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 17 August 2026 0 [ ![Logo featuring stylized red letters NJU above a line, with the word DELHI beneath and Devanagari script along the top.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/images.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/online-certificate-course-on-competition-law-digital-markets-artificial-intelligence-4-week-executive-certificate-programme-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-event-scheduled-on-22/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ Online Certificate Course on Competition Law, Digital Markets & Artificial Intelligence: 4-Week Executive Certificate Programme | Organized by National Law University Delhi | Event Scheduled on 22nd August – 12th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/online-certificate-course-on-competition-law-digital-markets-artificial-intelligence-4-week-executive-certificate-programme-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-event-scheduled-on-22/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 17 August 2026 0 [ ![Manipal University Jaipur logo with orange emblem and laurel wreath, 'INSPIRED BY LIFE' ribbon, and bold text 'MANIPAL UNIVERSITY JAIPUR' with '(University under Section 2(f) of the UGC Act)'](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/images-1.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/posh-trainer-certification-programme-empowering-workplaces-ensuring-dignity-building-safe-environments-organized-by-faculty-of-law-manipal-university-jaipur-in-collaboration-with-manipal-univer/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ POSH Trainer Certification Programme: Empowering Workplaces, Ensuring Dignity, Building Safe Environments | Organized by Faculty of Law, Manipal University Jaipur, in collaboration with Manipal University Jaipur Teachers Empowerment Center (MUJ TEC) | Event Scheduled on 18th & 19th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/posh-trainer-certification-programme-empowering-workplaces-ensuring-dignity-building-safe-environments-organized-by-faculty-of-law-manipal-university-jaipur-in-collaboration-with-manipal-univer/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 17 August 2026 0 [ ![Logo of RGNUL Patiala with scales of justice over a map of India, gold laurel border, and the motto 'Knowledge Empowers'](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/images.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-papers-rgnul-financial-and-mercantile-law-review-rfmlr-volume-xiv-issue-i-organized-by-rajiv-gandhi-national-university-of-law-punjab-rgnul-submit-by-september-15-2026/) [Call for Blogs](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-blogs/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ Call for Papers: RGNUL Financial and Mercantile Law Review (RFMLR) Volume XIV Issue I | Organized by Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab (RGNUL) | Submit by September 15, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-papers-rgnul-financial-and-mercantile-law-review-rfmlr-volume-xiv-issue-i-organized-by-rajiv-gandhi-national-university-of-law-punjab-rgnul-submit-by-september-15-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 17 August 2026 0 [ ![Seal of a national law university with scales of justice, an open book, and laurel wreath in blue](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/HNLU_Logo1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-blogs-nitisara-blogspace-organized-by-kautilya-society-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur/) [Call for Blogs](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-blogs/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ CALL FOR BLOGS | NITISARA BLOGSPACE | Organized by Kautilya Society, Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-blogs-nitisara-blogspace-organized-by-kautilya-society-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 1 August 2026 0 [ ![NMIMS logo featuring a shield emblem with laurel leaves and the text 'SVKM'S NMIMS Deemed to be UNIVERSITY'](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/NMIMS--1024x683.webp) ](https://lawfoyer.in/nyaya-setu-the-ai-justice-policy-convention-3rd-edition-organized-by-svkms-narsee-monjee-institute-of-management-studies-nmims-indore-25th-august-2026/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ Nyaya Setu – The AI & Justice Policy Convention (3rd Edition) | Organized by SVKM’s Narsee Monjee Institute of Management Studies (NMIMS), Indore | 25th August 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/nyaya-setu-the-ai-justice-policy-convention-3rd-edition-organized-by-svkms-narsee-monjee-institute-of-management-studies-nmims-indore-25th-august-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 1 August 2026 0 [ ![Logo of the National University of Study and Research in Law, Ranchi: a green shield with scales of justice, a laurel-style border, and NUSLR initials, plus the university name banner at top.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/images.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/national-workshop-on-code-court-future-the-nuances-applications-and-legal-literacy-surrounding-ai-in-india-organized-by-chair-on-consumer-research-and-policy-ccrp-national-university-of-study/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ 30-Hour Certificate Programme on the Consumer Protection Laws in India and the United Kingdom | Organized by Chair on Consumer Research and Policy (CCRP), National University of Study and Research in Law (NUSRL), Ranchi | Register by 13th August 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/national-workshop-on-code-court-future-the-nuances-applications-and-legal-literacy-surrounding-ai-in-india-organized-by-chair-on-consumer-research-and-policy-ccrp-national-university-of-study/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 1 August 2026 0 [ ![Seal of St. Xavier's University, Kolkata, featuring a sunburst with a cross, palm tree, tiger, checkerboard shield, and the Nihil Ultra motto on a banner.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/SXUK-Crest.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/national-workshop-on-code-court-future-the-nuances-applications-and-legal-literacy-surrounding-ai-in-india-organized-by-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-in-association-with-t/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ National Workshop on Code.Court.Future: The Nuances, Applications, and Legal Literacy Surrounding AI in India | Organized by Xavier Law School, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata, in association with the Technology Counsel Foundation (TECOF) | Register by 15th August 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/national-workshop-on-code-court-future-the-nuances-applications-and-legal-literacy-surrounding-ai-in-india-organized-by-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-in-association-with-t/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 1 August 2026 0 [ ![Logo of Dr. M.G.R. Educational and Research Institute featuring a two-tone shield with gear, books, caduceus, and DNA symbols, laurel wreath, and the motto 'Strive to Excel'](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/d74328a820ac2dfff2c23680c67bd515.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/dr-a-c-s-1st-national-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-moot-court-society-faculty-of-law-dr-m-g-r-educational-and-research-institute-deemed-to-be-university-chennai-register-by-1/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) #### [ Dr. A.C.S. 1st National Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, Faculty of Law, Dr. M.G.R. Educational and Research Institute (Deemed to be University), Chennai | Register by 15th August 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/dr-a-c-s-1st-national-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-moot-court-society-faculty-of-law-dr-m-g-r-educational-and-research-institute-deemed-to-be-university-chennai-register-by-1/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 1 August 2026 0 [ ![Seal of National Law University Chandigarh featuring scales of justice, an open book, and laurel branches in blue.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/HNLU_Logo1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-articles-koitur-people-of-nature-special-edition-organized-by-centre-for-law-indigenous-studies-school-of-law-humanities-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnl/) [Call for Blogs](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-blogs/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ Call for Articles: KOITUR – People of Nature (Special Edition) | Organized by Centre for Law & Indigenous Studies, School of Law & Humanities, Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Submit by 16th August 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-articles-koitur-people-of-nature-special-edition-organized-by-centre-for-law-indigenous-studies-school-of-law-humanities-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnl/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 23 July 2026 0 [ ![Logo of Frontiers Welfare Society, an NGO, featuring two stylized figures (black and red) reaching toward each other in a circular seal with the organization name around the edge and 'Non-Governmental Organization' beneath.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/frontiers_welfare_society_ngo_logo.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/beyond-academics-how-to-build-the-skills-that-define-successful-professionals-national-webinar-under-frontiers-welfare-society-ngo-organized-by-frontiers-welfare-society-register-by-24th-july/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ Beyond Academics: How to Build the Skills that Define successful professionals, National Webinar under Frontiers Welfare Society (NGO) | Organized by Frontiers Welfare Society | Register by 24th July 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/beyond-academics-how-to-build-the-skills-that-define-successful-professionals-national-webinar-under-frontiers-welfare-society-ngo-organized-by-frontiers-welfare-society-register-by-24th-july/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 19 July 2026 0 [ ![University seal featuring a tiger resting on a checkered pedestal beneath a palm tree and crescent moon, surrounded by a ring that reads 'Xavier's University' with a motto and a yellow ribbon reading 'Nihil Ultra'.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/images.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/vox-legis-xaveriana-volume-ii-organized-by-xavier-society-of-law-and-justice-xslaj-under-the-aegis-of-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-event-on-19th-july-20/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ Vox Legis Xaveriana – Volume II | Organized by Xavier Society of Law and Justice (XSLAJ) under the aegis of Xavier Law School, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata | Event on 19th July, 2026 (Sunday)](https://lawfoyer.in/vox-legis-xaveriana-volume-ii-organized-by-xavier-society-of-law-and-justice-xslaj-under-the-aegis-of-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-event-on-19th-july-20/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 18 July 2026 0 [ ![Seal of the University of Rajasthan featuring a central torch and book, surrounded by text and the year 1947.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Rajasthan_University_Logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/14th-ufylc-ranka-national-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-university-five-year-law-college-ufylc-university-of-rajasthan-jaipur-register-by-31st-august-2026-1159-pm-ist/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) #### [ 14th UFYLC–Ranka National Moot Court Competition 2026 | Organized by University Five Year Law College (UFYLC), University of Rajasthan, Jaipur | Register by 31st August 2026 (11:59 PM IST)](https://lawfoyer.in/14th-ufylc-ranka-national-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-university-five-year-law-college-ufylc-university-of-rajasthan-jaipur-register-by-31st-august-2026-1159-pm-ist/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 17 July 2026 0 [ ![Green circular gear-like emblem with radial spokes on a black background, resembling an abstract logo](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Official-logo-1024x777.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/kartavya-2026-campus-ambassador-programme-kiit-samvidhan-mahotsav-organized-by-kiit-centre-for-constitutional-law-studies-and-research-cclsr-kiit-school-of-law-kiit-deemed-to-be-univer/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ Kartavya 2026 Campus Ambassador Programme – KIIT Samvidhan Mahotsav | Organized by KIIT Centre for Constitutional Law Studies and Research (CCLSR), KIIT School of Law, KIIT Deemed-to-be University | Register by 25th July 2026 (11:59 PM IST)](https://lawfoyer.in/kartavya-2026-campus-ambassador-programme-kiit-samvidhan-mahotsav-organized-by-kiit-centre-for-constitutional-law-studies-and-research-cclsr-kiit-school-of-law-kiit-deemed-to-be-univer/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 16 July 2026 0 [ ![Pink circular logo with a dancing woman in a sari superimposed on the outline of India; 'WICCI' appears above, and along the arc reads 'Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium'.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/TNLRC-logo.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/women-in-the-workforce-challenges-representation-and-labour-law-perspectives-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-in-association-with-lex-lumen-research-journal-llrj-event-h/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ WOMEN IN THE WORKFORCE: CHALLENGES, REPRESENTATION AND LABOUR LAW PERSPECTIVES | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) in Association with Lex Lumen Research Journal (LLRJ) | Event held on 25th July 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/women-in-the-workforce-challenges-representation-and-labour-law-perspectives-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-in-association-with-lex-lumen-research-journal-llrj-event-h/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 9 July 2026 0 [ ![Amity University Lucknow Campus logo featuring a blue shield with a yellow flame and the campus name text](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Amity_University_Lucknow_logo_24a31fd30f.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/international-faculty-development-programme-on-governance-law-and-sustainability-in-the-21st-century-organized-by-amity-law-school-amity-university-uttar-pradesh-lucknow-campus-register-by-04-j/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ INTERNATIONAL FACULTY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME ON GOVERNANCE, LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY | Organized by Amity Law School, Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Campus | Register by 04 July 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-faculty-development-programme-on-governance-law-and-sustainability-in-the-21st-century-organized-by-amity-law-school-amity-university-uttar-pradesh-lucknow-campus-register-by-04-j/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 2 July 2026 0 [ ![Circular emblem of Chanakya National Law University, Patna, featuring an open book with a flame above it and a scales motif, surrounded by the university's name in English and Hindi.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Chanakya_National_Law_University_Logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/catalyst-3-0-startup-law-and-policy-summit-2026-organized-by-chanakya-national-law-university-cnlu-patna-register-by-15th-july-2026/) [Call for Blogs](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-blogs/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ CATALYST 3.0: Startup Law and Policy Summit 2026 | Organized by Centre for Innovation, Incubation and Legal Entrepreneurship (CIILE), Chanakya National Law University (CNLU), Patna | Register by 15th July, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/catalyst-3-0-startup-law-and-policy-summit-2026-organized-by-chanakya-national-law-university-cnlu-patna-register-by-15th-july-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 24 June 2026 0 [ ![Red stylized emblem with bold vertical strokes forming a lettermark, the word DELHI in red letters beneath, flanked by horizontal lines; Devanagari script at the top.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/National_Law_University_Delhi_logo-1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/credit-based-certificate-course-on-the-new-criminal-laws-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-nlud/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ CREDIT-BASED CERTIFICATE COURSE ON THE NEW CRIMINAL LAWS | Organized by National Law University Delhi (NLUD)](https://lawfoyer.in/credit-based-certificate-course-on-the-new-criminal-laws-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-nlud/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 23 June 2026 0 [ ![Logo for WICCI Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium, showing a dancing figure over a map outline on a pink background, with curved text surrounding.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/TNLRC-logo.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/tnlrc-essay-writing-competition-2026-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-under-wicci-register-by-26-june-2026/) [Essay Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/essay-competitions/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ TNLRC ESSAY WRITING COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) under WICCI | Register by 26 June 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/tnlrc-essay-writing-competition-2026-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-under-wicci-register-by-26-june-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 14 June 2026 0 [ ![Apex University logo: blue and gold shield with an open book and torch motif, branding for the institution](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/apex_university_logo.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/jus-novum-au-nationwide-law-fest-2026-organized-by-moot-court-society-apex-school-of-law-apex-university-jaipur-in-collaboration-with-district-legal-services-authority-jaipur-district-reg/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ Jus Novum – AU Nationwide Law Fest, 2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, Apex School of Law, Apex University, Jaipur In Collaboration With District Legal Services Authority, Jaipur (District) | Register by 8th August 2026, 2026 for Hybrid & Online Competitions and 2nd September, 2026 for one day (Offline) Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/jus-novum-au-nationwide-law-fest-2026-organized-by-moot-court-society-apex-school-of-law-apex-university-jaipur-in-collaboration-with-district-legal-services-authority-jaipur-district-reg/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 14 June 2026 0 [ ![Stylized red logo with Devanagari text above and the word DELHI in large red letters.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/National_Law_University_Delhi_logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/centre-for-environmental-law-policy-and-research-celpr-national-law-university-delhi-organized-by-collective-for-environmental-action-cea-under-the-aegis-of-the-centre-for-environmental-law-p/) [Call for Blogs](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-blogs/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ Call for Blogs | Centre for Environmental Law, Policy and Research (CELPR), National Law University Delhi | Organized by Collective for Environmental Action (CEA) under the aegis of the Centre for Environmental Law, Policy and Research (CELPR), National Law University Delhi](https://lawfoyer.in/centre-for-environmental-law-policy-and-research-celpr-national-law-university-delhi-organized-by-collective-for-environmental-action-cea-under-the-aegis-of-the-centre-for-environmental-law-p/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 9 June 2026 0 [ ![Judiciary emblem: scales of justice between laurel branches with a graduation cap on top.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/IMG_0227-1024x1024.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/vidhika-a-quarterly-law-journal-vol-2-issue-2-organized-by-nyaya-shastra-submit-articles-papers-by-15-june-2026/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ VIDHIKA – A Quarterly Law Journal (Vol. 2, Issue 2) | Organized by Nyaya Shastra | Submit Articles & Papers by 15 June 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/vidhika-a-quarterly-law-journal-vol-2-issue-2-organized-by-nyaya-shastra-submit-articles-papers-by-15-june-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 9 June 2026 0 [ ![Logo for Trinity Institute of Professional Studies (TIPS): circular seal with a stylized central figure, 'TIPS' lettering, and a banner reading 'Light to Enlighten'.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/0x0-1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-shri-o-p-tandon-memorial-mock-trial-competition-2026-organized-by-trinity-institute-of-professional-studies-tips-register-by-2nd-august-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) #### [ 3RD SHRI O.P. TANDON MEMORIAL MOCK TRIAL COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by TRINITY INSTITUTE OF PROFESSIONAL STUDIES (TIPS) | Register by 2nd AUGUST 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-shri-o-p-tandon-memorial-mock-trial-competition-2026-organized-by-trinity-institute-of-professional-studies-tips-register-by-2nd-august-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 9 June 2026 0 [ ![Logo of Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab, Patiala, with scales of justice over a map of India and the motto 'Knowledge Empowers'.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Rajiv_Gandhi_National_University_of_Law_Logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/2nd-edition-of-one-week-faculty-development-programme-on-integrating-indian-knowledge-system-and-law-organized-by-centre-for-advanced-studies-in-human-rights-casihr-rgnul-punjab-in-association-w/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ 2nd Edition of One Week Faculty Development Programme on Integrating Indian Knowledge System and Law | Organized by Centre for Advanced Studies in Human Rights (CASIHR), RGNUL, Punjab in association with Centre for Advanced Studies in Labour Welfare (CASLW), RGNUL, Punjab | Register by 9 July 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/2nd-edition-of-one-week-faculty-development-programme-on-integrating-indian-knowledge-system-and-law-organized-by-centre-for-advanced-studies-in-human-rights-casihr-rgnul-punjab-in-association-w/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 3 June 2026 0 [ ![Logo for YU Delhi featuring large red stylized letters 'YU' above the word 'DELHI' with decorative lines and a Sanskrit motto at the top](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/National_Law_University_Delhi_logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/celpr-nlu-delhi-eldf-essay-writing-competition-first-edition-organized-by-centre-for-environmental-law-policy-and-research-celpr-national-law-university-delhi-nlu-delhi-register/) [Essay Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/essay-competitions/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ CELPR NLU Delhi – ELDF Essay Writing Competition (First Edition) | Organized by Centre for Environmental Law, Policy and Research (CELPR), National Law University, Delhi (NLU Delhi) | Register by 8th June 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/celpr-nlu-delhi-eldf-essay-writing-competition-first-edition-organized-by-centre-for-environmental-law-policy-and-research-celpr-national-law-university-delhi-nlu-delhi-register/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 29 May 2026 0 [ ![Bennett University logo: shield crest on the left with blue 'BENNETT UNIVERSITY' text and red 'TIMES OF INDIA GROUP' subtitle on the right.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/download-4.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-artificial-intelligence-legal-governance-and-sustainable-development-constitutional-regulatory-and-sectoral-perspectives-ailgs-2026-organized-by-the-centre-for-law/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, LEGAL GOVERNANCE, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: CONSTITUTIONAL, REGULATORY AND SECTORAL PERSPECTIVES (AILGS-2026) | Organized by the Centre for Law, Technology and Innovation, School of Law, Bennett University | Submit Abstract by May 28, 2026 | Register by July 1, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-artificial-intelligence-legal-governance-and-sustainable-development-constitutional-regulatory-and-sectoral-perspectives-ailgs-2026-organized-by-the-centre-for-law/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 25 May 2026 0 [ ![Circular logo with black and red arcs, featuring stylized orange acronym letters in the center and the slogan 'Transform your dreams to reality' along the top edge.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/images.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/one-week-national-workshop-on-research-methodology-research-ethics-and-publication-strategy-organized-by-shri-ram-college-of-law-muzaffarnagar-ncr-register-by-30th-may-2026/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ ONE WEEK NATIONAL WORKSHOP ON RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, RESEARCH ETHICS AND PUBLICATION STRATEGY | Organized by Shri Ram College of Law, Muzaffarnagar – NCR | Register by 30th May 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/one-week-national-workshop-on-research-methodology-research-ethics-and-publication-strategy-organized-by-shri-ram-college-of-law-muzaffarnagar-ncr-register-by-30th-may-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 23 May 2026 0 [ ![Logo of S. K. Law College, Muzaffarpur featuring a globe, scales of justice, and a red circular border.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/download.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/two-day-national-seminar-on-women-law-and-social-change-in-india-navigating-rights-justice-contemporary-challenges-and-pathways-to-empowerment-organized-by-sri-krishna-jubilee/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ TWO DAY NATIONAL SEMINAR ON: “Women, Law and Social Change in India: Navigating Rights, Justice, Contemporary Challenges and Pathways to Empowerment” | Organized by Sri Krishna Jubilee Law College | Register by 5th July, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/two-day-national-seminar-on-women-law-and-social-change-in-india-navigating-rights-justice-contemporary-challenges-and-pathways-to-empowerment-organized-by-sri-krishna-jubilee/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 23 May 2026 0 [ ![CANONSPHERE logo featuring a black shield emblem on the left](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/CanonsphereBanner-2.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-client-counseling-competition-2026-by-canonsphere-organized-by-canonsphere-register-by-2nd-july-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ 1st Client Counseling Competition 2026 by Canonsphere | Organized by Canonsphere | Register by 2nd July, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-client-counseling-competition-2026-by-canonsphere-organized-by-canonsphere-register-by-2nd-july-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 21 May 2026 0 [ ![Seal of HP National Law University Shimla with scales of justice, mountains, sunburst wheel, trees, and a red HPNLU Shimla banner.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Himachal_Pradesh_National_Law_University_Seal.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/2-day-online-workshop-on-right-to-information-rti-organized-by-legal-aid-clinic-himachal-pradesh-national-law-university-hpnlu-shimla-in-collaboration-with-vidhi-vimarsh-initiative-register/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ 2-Day Online Workshop on Right to Information (RTI) | Organized by Legal Aid Clinic, Himachal Pradesh National Law University (HPNLU), Shimla, in collaboration with Vidhi Vimarsh Initiative | Register by 30 May 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/2-day-online-workshop-on-right-to-information-rti-organized-by-legal-aid-clinic-himachal-pradesh-national-law-university-hpnlu-shimla-in-collaboration-with-vidhi-vimarsh-initiative-register/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 15 May 2026 0 [ ![Logo for Lawyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research, with a teal-framed monogram on the left and ISSN 2583-7753 below.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/LIJDLR-LOGO-e1686747498749.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-papers-lawfoyer-international-journal-of-doctrinal-legal-research-issn-no-2583-7753-vol-4-issue-2-get-free-crossref-doi-e-certificate-of-publication-indexing-in-350-internat/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ Call for Papers: LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research \[ISSN No:- 2583-7753\] | Vol 4 Issue 2 | Get Free CrossRef DOI, E-Certificate of Publication, & Indexing in 350+ International Libraries & Databases including Stanford, Harvard, Oxford, IIM Bangalore, HeinOnline, Manupatra & many more: Submit Manuscript by June 15](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-papers-lawfoyer-international-journal-of-doctrinal-legal-research-issn-no-2583-7753-vol-4-issue-2-get-free-crossref-doi-e-certificate-of-publication-indexing-in-350-internat/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 13 May 2026 0 [ ![Logo for MAIMS: a red emblem with a stylized sun above an open book on the left and bold red 'MAIMS' text on the right, with Hindi motto beneath the book.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/download-3.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/5th-maims-mock-trial-competition-2026-organized-by-maims-mock-trial-society-department-of-law-maharaja-agrasen-institute-of-management-studies-maims-new-delhi-register-by-23-august-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) #### [ 5th MAIMS Mock Trial Competition, 2026 | Organized by Maims Mock Trial Society, Department of Law, Maharaja Agrasen Institute of Management Studies (MAIMS), in collaboration with the Bar Council of Delhi | Register by 23 August 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/5th-maims-mock-trial-competition-2026-organized-by-maims-mock-trial-society-department-of-law-maharaja-agrasen-institute-of-management-studies-maims-new-delhi-register-by-23-august-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 12 May 2026 0 [ ![Bennett University logo with a shield crest on the left and blue BENNETT UNIVERSITY text; 'TIMES OF INDIA GROUP' below.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/download-2.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-artificial-intelligence-legal-governance-and-sustainable-development-constitutional-regulatory-and-sectoral-perspectives-ailgs-2026-organized-by-centre-for-law-te/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ International Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Legal Governance, and Sustainable Development: Constitutional, Regulatory, and Sectoral Perspectives (AILGS-2026) | Organized by Centre for Law, Technology and Innovation (CLTI), School of Law, Bennett University | Submit Abstract by 28 May 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-artificial-intelligence-legal-governance-and-sustainable-development-constitutional-regulatory-and-sectoral-perspectives-ailgs-2026-organized-by-centre-for-law-te/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 4 May 2026 0 [ ![Seal of Cochin University of Science and Technology: red circular emblem with an open book, sunburst, palm tree, and tower, and the university name at the bottom.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/download-1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/eighth-one-week-annual-summer-school-on-understanding-indian-consumer-and-competition-law-organized-by-school-of-legal-studies-cochin-university-of-science-and-technology-cusat-register-by-may/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ Eighth One Week Annual Summer School on Understanding Indian Consumer and Competition Law | Organized by School of Legal Studies, Cochin University of Science and Technology (CUSAT) | Register by May 25, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/eighth-one-week-annual-summer-school-on-understanding-indian-consumer-and-competition-law-organized-by-school-of-legal-studies-cochin-university-of-science-and-technology-cusat-register-by-may/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 2 May 2026 0 [ ![Logo with stylized red letters 'ND' above a line and the word 'DELHI' beneath; Devanagari script at the top.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/download.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/certificate-course-on-construction-contracts-and-disputes-organized-by-centre-for-law-urban-development-clud-in-collaboration-with-society-of-construction-law-india-scl-india-register-by/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ Certificate Course on Construction Contracts and Disputes | Organized by Centre for Law & Urban Development (CLUD) in collaboration with Society of Construction Law India (SCL-India) | Register by 4th May 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/certificate-course-on-construction-contracts-and-disputes-organized-by-centre-for-law-urban-development-clud-in-collaboration-with-society-of-construction-law-india-scl-india-register-by/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 2 May 2026 0 [ ![Seal of Maharajas Govt. Law College, Ernakulam: circular emblem with an open book and tassel symbol inside, and text around the edge reading the college name and location.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/download-1-1.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-papers-national-conference-on-shaping-the-future-of-legal-education-innovation-practice-and-reforms-organized-by-government-law-college-ernakulam-submit-abstract-by-7-may-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ CALL FOR PAPERS- NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SHAPING THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUCATION: INNOVATION, PRACTICE AND REFORMS | Organized by Government Law College, Ernakulam | Submit Abstract by 7 May 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-papers-national-conference-on-shaping-the-future-of-legal-education-innovation-practice-and-reforms-organized-by-government-law-college-ernakulam-submit-abstract-by-7-may-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 26 April 2026 0 [ ![Circular red seal of Panjab University with a rising sun over a river and bridge, 1947.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/download.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/uils-student-law-review-call-for-papers-vol-iii-issue-ii-organized-by-university-institute-of-legal-studies-uils-panjab-university-chandigarh/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ UILS STUDENT LAW REVIEW – CALL FOR PAPERS (VOL. III, ISSUE II) | Organized by University Institute of Legal Studies (UILS), Panjab University, Chandigarh](https://lawfoyer.in/uils-student-law-review-call-for-papers-vol-iii-issue-ii-organized-by-university-institute-of-legal-studies-uils-panjab-university-chandigarh/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 26 April 2026 0 [ ![Circular logo for National Law University, Jodhpur, India, featuring an orange–green wave and a red book with 'We, the People of India' and the motto 'Knowledge is Empowerment' around the edge.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/download-1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/nluj-cips-one-day-national-workshop-on-intellectual-property-and-sports-2026-virtual-organized-by-centre-for-intellectual-property-studies-cips-national-law-university-jodhpur-register-by-2/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ NLUJ-CIPS One Day National Workshop on Intellectual Property and Sports, 2026 (Virtual) | Organized by Centre for Intellectual Property Studies (CIPS), National Law University, Jodhpur | Register by 25 April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/nluj-cips-one-day-national-workshop-on-intellectual-property-and-sports-2026-virtual-organized-by-centre-for-intellectual-property-studies-cips-national-law-university-jodhpur-register-by-2/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 26 April 2026 0 [ ![KIIT logo and banner for Kalinga Institute of Industrial Technology – School of Law, with official motto text shown.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/download.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/from-inclusion-to-impact-women-entrepreneurship-digital-rights-esg-accountability-corporate-governance-reforms-organized-by-kiit-school-of-law-register-by-30-april-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ From Inclusion to Impact: Women Entrepreneurship, Digital Rights, ESG Accountability & Corporate Governance Reforms | Organized by KIIT School of Law | Register by 30 April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/from-inclusion-to-impact-women-entrepreneurship-digital-rights-esg-accountability-corporate-governance-reforms-organized-by-kiit-school-of-law-register-by-30-april-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 26 April 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/favicon-1024x1024.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/one-day-international-conference-on-interdisciplinary-leadership-organized-by-academic-and-research-wing-arw-kindsouls-welfare-foundation-early-bird-registration-20th-april-2026-late-registr/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ ONE DAY INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTERDISCIPLINARY LEADERSHIP | Organized by Academic and Research Wing (ARW), Kindsouls Welfare Foundation | Early Bird Registration: 20th April 2026 | Late Registration: 25th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/one-day-international-conference-on-interdisciplinary-leadership-organized-by-academic-and-research-wing-arw-kindsouls-welfare-foundation-early-bird-registration-20th-april-2026-late-registr/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 10 April 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/images.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-aump-virtual-client-counselling-competition-2026-organized-by-amity-law-school-amity-university-madhya-pradesh-register-by-24th-april-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ 1ST AUMP VIRTUAL CLIENT COUNSELLING COMPETITION, 2026 | Organized by Amity Law School, Amity University Madhya Pradesh | Register by 3rd May, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-aump-virtual-client-counselling-competition-2026-organized-by-amity-law-school-amity-university-madhya-pradesh-register-by-24th-april-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 9 April 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/National_Law_Institute_University_Logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/admissions-open-master-of-cyber-law-and-information-security-mclis-program-2026-national-law-institute-university-nliu-bhopal-register-by-30-april-2026-written-test-10-may-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ Admissions Open: Master of Cyber Law and Information Security (MCLIS) Program 2026 | National Law Institute University (NLIU), Bhopal | Register by 30 April 2026 | Written Test: 10 May 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/admissions-open-master-of-cyber-law-and-information-security-mclis-program-2026-national-law-institute-university-nliu-bhopal-register-by-30-april-2026-written-test-10-may-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 8 April 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/1676478113380.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/ruas-sol-moot-court-competition-2-0-organized-by-school-of-law-m-s-ramaiah-university-of-applied-sciences/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ RUAS, SOL Moot Court Competition 2.0 | Organized by School of Law, M. S. Ramaiah University of Applied Sciences](https://lawfoyer.in/ruas-sol-moot-court-competition-2-0-organized-by-school-of-law-m-s-ramaiah-university-of-applied-sciences/) [ ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/) 8 April 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/nmims-indore-1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/nyaya-setu-the-ai-justice-policy-convention-3rd-edition-organized-by-samatva-the-legal-aid-awareness-cell-nmims-indore-register-by-12th-april-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ NYAYA SETU – THE AI & JUSTICE POLICY CONVENTION (3rd EDITION) | Organized by SAMATVA – The Legal Aid & Awareness Cell, NMIMS Indore | Register by 12th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/nyaya-setu-the-ai-justice-policy-convention-3rd-edition-organized-by-samatva-the-legal-aid-awareness-cell-nmims-indore-register-by-12th-april-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 3 April 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Rajiv_Gandhi_National_University_of_Law_Logo.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-expanding-horizons-of-human-rights-fundamental-freedoms-and-fundamental-rights-in-the-age-of-globalisation-organized-by-rajiv-gandhi-national-university-of-law-rgnul/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON EXPANDING HORIZONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF GLOBALISATION | Organized by Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law (RGNUL), Punjab | Submit Abstract by 12th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-expanding-horizons-of-human-rights-fundamental-freedoms-and-fundamental-rights-in-the-age-of-globalisation-organized-by-rajiv-gandhi-national-university-of-law-rgnul/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 30 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/LOGO-1024x322.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/crime-scene-investigation-competition-vils-1st-inter-university-event-organized-by-vignan-institute-of-law-under-vignans-foundation-for-science-technology-research-deemed-to-be/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATION COMPETITION (VIL’s 1st Inter-University Event) | Organized by Vignan Institute of Law, under Vignan’s Foundation for Science, Technology & Research (Deemed to be University) | Register by April 20, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/crime-scene-investigation-competition-vils-1st-inter-university-event-organized-by-vignan-institute-of-law-under-vignans-foundation-for-science-technology-research-deemed-to-be/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 28 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Adamas_University_Logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/6th-adamas-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-adamas-university-register-by-26-march-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) #### [ 6th ADAMAS MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by ADAMAS UNIVERSITY | Register by 4th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/6th-adamas-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-adamas-university-register-by-26-march-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 25 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/HNLU_Logo1-1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/ten-day-national-faculty-development-program-on-emerging-ip-jurisprudence-and-evolving-trends-of-ip-teaching-research-organized-by-dpiit-ipr-chair-at-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ TEN-DAY NATIONAL FACULTY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM ON EMERGING IP JURISPRUDENCE AND EVOLVING TRENDS OF IP TEACHING & RESEARCH | Organized by DPIIT-IPR Chair at Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | 6TH APRIL – 16TH APRIL, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/ten-day-national-faculty-development-program-on-emerging-ip-jurisprudence-and-evolving-trends-of-ip-teaching-research-organized-by-dpiit-ipr-chair-at-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 23 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Nlujodhpur.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-nluj-cclrp-national-essay-writing-competition-2026-organized-by-centre-for-consumer-law-research-practice-national-law-university-jodhpur-submission-deadline-15th-april-2026/) [Essay Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/essay-competitions/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ 1st NLUJ-CCLRP National Essay Writing Competition, 2026 | Organized by Centre for Consumer Law Research & Practice, National Law University, Jodhpur | Submission Deadline: 15th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-nluj-cclrp-national-essay-writing-competition-2026-organized-by-centre-for-consumer-law-research-practice-national-law-university-jodhpur-submission-deadline-15th-april-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 21 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/DME-logo-1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/%e0%a4%b8%e0%a4%ae%e0%a4%97%e0%a5%8d%e0%a4%b026-annual-inter-college-sports-meet-organized-by-dme-sports-society-delhi-metropolitan-education-event-dates-25th-30th-m/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ समग्र’26 – Annual Inter-College Sports Meet | Organized by DME Sports Society, Delhi Metropolitan Education | Event Dates: 25th – 30th March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/%e0%a4%b8%e0%a4%ae%e0%a4%97%e0%a5%8d%e0%a4%b026-annual-inter-college-sports-meet-organized-by-dme-sports-society-delhi-metropolitan-education-event-dates-25th-30th-m/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 21 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/images.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/smt-shakuntala-devi-3rd-international-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-moot-court-society-school-of-law-galgotias-university-register-by-26th-march-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) #### [ Smt. Shakuntala Devi 3rd International Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized Moot Court Society, School of Law, Galgotias University | Register by 26th March, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/smt-shakuntala-devi-3rd-international-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-moot-court-society-school-of-law-galgotias-university-register-by-26th-march-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 19 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/DME-logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-intersections-of-traditional-knowledge-systems-and-the-future-law-culture-sustainability-and-collective-well-being-organized-by-dme-law-school-noida-register-by-20/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTERSECTIONS OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS AND THE FUTURE: LAW, CULTURE, SUSTAINABILITY, AND COLLECTIVE WELL-BEING | Organized by DME Law School, Noida | Register by 20th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-intersections-of-traditional-knowledge-systems-and-the-future-law-culture-sustainability-and-collective-well-being-organized-by-dme-law-school-noida-register-by-20/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 19 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/National_Law_University_Delhi_logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-national-law-university-delhi-khaitan-co-certificate-course-on-taxation-laws-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-register-by-29th-march-2026/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ 1ST NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY DELHI – KHAITAN & CO CERTIFICATE COURSE ON TAXATION LAWS | Organized by National Law University Delhi | Register by 29th March, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-national-law-university-delhi-khaitan-co-certificate-course-on-taxation-laws-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-register-by-29th-march-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 19 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/XSLAJ-Logo-Black-PNG-1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/the-4th-xavier-mediation-competition-2026-xmc26-organized-by-the-xavier-society-of-law-and-justice-xslaj-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-register-by-18-ma/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ The 4th Xavier Mediation Competition 2026 (XMC’26) | Organized by The Xavier Society of Law and Justice (XSLAJ), Xavier Law School, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata | Register by 21st March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/the-4th-xavier-mediation-competition-2026-xmc26-organized-by-the-xavier-society-of-law-and-justice-xslaj-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-register-by-18-ma/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 17 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Integral_University_Lucknow_logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-case-analysis-competition-2026-organized-by-environmental-law-society-els-faculty-of-law-integral-university-lucknow-register-by-20th-march-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ 3rd Case Analysis Competition, 2026 | Organized by Environmental Law Society (ELS), Faculty of Law, Integral University, Lucknow | Register by 20th March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-case-analysis-competition-2026-organized-by-environmental-law-society-els-faculty-of-law-integral-university-lucknow-register-by-20th-march-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 15 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/images-1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-smt-krishna-neotia-memorial-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-school-of-legal-studies-the-neotia-university-register-by-21st-march-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) #### [ 1st Smt. Krishna Neotia Memorial Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by School of Legal Studies, The Neotia University | Register by 21st March, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-smt-krishna-neotia-memorial-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-school-of-legal-studies-the-neotia-university-register-by-21st-march-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 13 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/National_Law_Institute_University_Logo-1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-nliu-national-symposium-on-securities-law-capital-markets-2026-organized-by-national-law-institute-university-bhopal-register-by-23rd-march-2026/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ 1st NLIU National Symposium on Securities Law & Capital Markets, 2026 | Organized by National Law Institute University, Bhopal | Register by 23rd March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-nliu-national-symposium-on-securities-law-capital-markets-2026-organized-by-national-law-institute-university-bhopal-register-by-23rd-march-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 13 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/cropped-cropped-LEX-GAZETTE-1-1024x367.webp) ](https://lawfoyer.in/2nd-judexis-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-lex-gazette-academy-register-by-12th-april-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) #### [ 2ND JUDEXIS MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by Lex Gazette Academy | Register by 12th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/2nd-judexis-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-lex-gazette-academy-register-by-12th-april-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 13 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/images.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/ruas-school-of-law-moot-court-competition-2-0-2026-organized-by-school-of-law-m-s-ramaiah-university-of-applied-sciences-msruas-bengaluru-register-by-30-march-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) #### [ RUAS School of Law Moot Court Competition 2.0, 2026 | Organized by School of Law, M. S. Ramaiah University of Applied Sciences (MSRUAS), Bengaluru | Register by 30 March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/ruas-school-of-law-moot-court-competition-2-0-2026-organized-by-school-of-law-m-s-ramaiah-university-of-applied-sciences-msruas-bengaluru-register-by-30-march-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 12 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/HNLU_Logo1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/international-trade-law-summit-2026-the-wto30-reimagining-multilateralism-in-international-trade-law-organized-by-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur-register-b/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW SUMMIT 2026 “The WTO@30: Reimagining Multilateralism in International Trade Law” | Organized by Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Register by 20 July 2026 (till 11:59 PM IST)](https://lawfoyer.in/international-trade-law-summit-2026-the-wto30-reimagining-multilateralism-in-international-trade-law-organized-by-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur-register-b/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 12 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/legalwiki_logo.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/legal-startup-online-pitching-competition-2026-2-0-be-the-next-founder-organized-by-legalwiki-register-by-15-march-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ Legal Startup Online Pitching Competition, 2026 – 2.0 \[Be the Next Founder\] | Organized by LegalWiki | Register by 15 March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/legal-startup-online-pitching-competition-2026-2-0-be-the-next-founder-organized-by-legalwiki-register-by-15-march-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 12 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/gehu-logo.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/intellectus-2026-minds-in-motion-organized-by-school-of-law-debate-society-graphic-era-hill-university-register-by-17-march-2026-0600-pm-ist/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ Intellectus 2026 – Minds in Motion | Organized by School of Law (Debate Society), Graphic Era Hill University | Register by 17 March 2026 \[06:00 PM (IST)\]](https://lawfoyer.in/intellectus-2026-minds-in-motion-organized-by-school-of-law-debate-society-graphic-era-hill-university-register-by-17-march-2026-0600-pm-ist/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 12 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/download.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-political-economic-social-issues-of-2025-organized-by-amity-law-school-amity-university-chhattisgarh-submit-complete-paper-by-19-march-2026/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ International Conference on Political, Economic, & Social Issues of 2025 | Organized by Amity Law School, Amity University Chhattisgarh | Submit Complete Paper by 19 March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-political-economic-social-issues-of-2025-organized-by-amity-law-school-amity-university-chhattisgarh-submit-complete-paper-by-19-march-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 12 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/TNLRC-logo.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/webinar-on-the-15-founding-mothers-of-the-constitution-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-register-by-27-march-2026-at-1159-pm/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Webinar](https://lawfoyer.in/category/webinar/) #### [ Webinar on “The 15 Founding Mothers of the Constitution” | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) | Register by 27 March 2026 at 11:59 PM](https://lawfoyer.in/webinar-on-the-15-founding-mothers-of-the-constitution-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-register-by-27-march-2026-at-1159-pm/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 12 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Tamil_Nadu_Dr._Ambedkar_Law_University_logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-blockchain-technology-transforming-law-governance-and-the-digital-economy-organized-by-the-department-of-cyberspace-law-and-justice-school-of-excell/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ International Conference on “Blockchain Technology: Transforming Law, Governance, and the Digital Economy” | Organized by The Department of Cyberspace Law and Justice, School of Excellence in Law, The Tamil Nadu Dr. Ambedkar Law University (TNDALU) | Register by 30 March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-blockchain-technology-transforming-law-governance-and-the-digital-economy-organized-by-the-department-of-cyberspace-law-and-justice-school-of-excell/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 5 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/unnamed-1-1001x1024.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-international-conference-on-social-sciences-research-in-the-age-of-ai-ssraai2026-part-of-the-etltc-2026-conference-series-organized-by-etltc-organizing-committee-japan-usa-r/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ 3rd International Conference on Social Sciences Research in the Age of AI (SSRAAI2026) – Part of the ETLTC 2026 Conference Series | Organized by ETLTC Organizing Committee, Japan & USA | Register by 1 June 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-international-conference-on-social-sciences-research-in-the-age-of-ai-ssraai2026-part-of-the-etltc-2026-conference-series-organized-by-etltc-organizing-committee-japan-usa-r/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 5 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/National_Law_Institute_University_Logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/nliu-law-review-call-for-papers-volume-xv-issue-ii-organized-by-national-law-institute-university-bhopal/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ NLIU LAW REVIEW – CALL FOR PAPERS \[Volume XV, Issue II\] | Organized by National Law Institute University, Bhopal](https://lawfoyer.in/nliu-law-review-call-for-papers-volume-xv-issue-ii-organized-by-national-law-institute-university-bhopal/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 3 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/delhi_campus_logo.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/nyaya-samvardhan-north-western-region-pro-bono-conclave-organized-by-pro-bono-club-school-of-law-forensic-justice-policy-studies-national-forensic-sciences-university-delhi-campus-regis/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ Nyaya Samvardhan: North-Western Region Pro Bono Conclave | Organized by Pro Bono Club, School of Law, Forensic Justice & Policy Studies, National Forensic Sciences University, Delhi Campus | Register by 15 March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/nyaya-samvardhan-north-western-region-pro-bono-conclave-organized-by-pro-bono-club-school-of-law-forensic-justice-policy-studies-national-forensic-sciences-university-delhi-campus-regis/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 3 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/1675939498809.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-state-level-vidhi-%e0%a4%b8%e0%a4%82%e0%a4%97%e0%a5%8d%e0%a4%b0%e0%a4%be%e0%a4%ae-2026-a-two-day-law-fest-organized-by-dr-d-y-patil-law-college-pimpri-pune-register-by-22nd-march-2/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ 1st State Level Vidhi-संग्राम 2026– A Two-Day Law Fest | Organized by Dr. D Y PATIL LAW COLLEGE, PIMPRI, PUNE | Register by 22nd March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-state-level-vidhi-%e0%a4%b8%e0%a4%82%e0%a4%97%e0%a5%8d%e0%a4%b0%e0%a4%be%e0%a4%ae-2026-a-two-day-law-fest-organized-by-dr-d-y-patil-law-college-pimpri-pune-register-by-22nd-march-2/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 1 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Logo.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/session-the-future-of-law-ai-odr-legal-technology-organized-by-law-firm-ready-event-on-28th-february-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ SESSION: The Future of Law: AI, ODR & Legal Technology | Organized by Law Firm Ready | Event on 28th February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/session-the-future-of-law-ai-odr-legal-technology-organized-by-law-firm-ready-event-on-28th-february-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 27 February 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/images-2.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/master-dayanand-1st-national-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-school-of-law-legal-studies-sanskaram-university-register-by-20th-march-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) #### [ MASTER DAYANAND 1ST NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2026 | Organized by School of Law & Legal Studies, Sanskaram University | Register by 20th March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/master-dayanand-1st-national-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-school-of-law-legal-studies-sanskaram-university-register-by-20th-march-2026/) [ Antavya Singh 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If you do not agree with our use of cookies, please modify your browser settings accordingly. --- ### [Result of 16th LawFoyer Quiz on Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) & Indian Penal Code (IPC)](https://lawfoyer.in/result-of-16th-lawfoyer-quiz-on-bhartiya-nyaya-sanhita-bns-indian-penal-code-ipc/) **Published:** November 23, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## You can find your rank/score by searching your name in the search box. **Keywords:** 1. Those who have attempted quiz after 05:35 pm have been marked as late entry. They will get E-Certificate. 2. Disqualified candidates are those who have not completed the registration. 3. In the case of the same marks, as stated in the quiz guidelines earlier, Time will be considered (A person who submits early will be given preference). --- \[table id=41 /\] --- ### [Certificate of 16th LawFoyer Quiz on Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) & Indian Penal Code (IPC)](https://lawfoyer.in/certificate-of-16th-lawfoyer-quiz-on-bhartiya-nyaya-sanhita-bns-indian-penal-code-ipc/) **Published:** November 23, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## You can find your rank/score by searching your name in the search box. **Keywords:** 1. Those who have attempted quiz after 05:35 pm have been marked as late entry. They will get E-Certificate. 2. Disqualified candidates are those who have not completed the registration. 3. In the case of the same marks, as stated in the quiz guidelines earlier, Time will be considered (A person who submits early will be given preference). --- \[table id=40 /\] [Download Certificate](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1eV4_QMrh83gs9MDOHFnbdsXyTTPUSpw6?usp=sharing) --- --- ### [Campus Ambassadorship Guidelines](https://lawfoyer.in/campus-ambassadorship-guidelines/) **Published:** November 4, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## **About LawFoyer’s Campus Ambassadorship Programme** LawFoyer’s Campus Ambassadorship Programme is a student-centric initiative aimed at empowering law students across India by providing them with unique learning and earning opportunities. The programme is designed to nurture the next generation of legal professionals by offering a platform for students to engage with LawFoyer, develop essential practical legal skills, and contribute to the growth and development of the legal education community while earning incentives for their efforts. ## **LawFoyer’s Vision for Campus Ambassadorship Programme** LawFoyer envisions the Campus Ambassadorship Programme as a means to: 1. Foster a culture of continuous learning and skill development among law students 2. Provide opportunities for students to gain practical exposure to the legal industry 3. Create a network of student leaders who can drive positive change in the legal education landscape 4. Promote the use of technology and innovative tools in legal practice ## **Objectives of the Programme** The primary objectives of LawFoyer’s Campus Ambassadorship Programme are: 1. To provide law students with learning and earning opportunities on a task-incentive basis, where students are rewarded for completing assigned tasks 2. To establish a network of student representatives who can effectively promote LawFoyer’s initiatives, events, and resources on their respective college campuses 3. To encourage the development of practical legal skills among law students, including legal research, writing, drafting, and the use of AI tools in legal work 4. To raise awareness about LawFoyer’s FREE Internship Training Program and other educational initiatives, encouraging law students to participate and benefit from these resources ## **Eligibility and Joining Process** LawFoyer’s Campus Ambassadorship Programme is open to all law students in India who are passionate about legal education and are willing to contribute to the growth of the legal community. Interested students can simply join the programme by registering through the provided online form: ## **Duration of the Programme** The Campus Ambassadorship Programme is designed as a 3-month engagement. Every Campus Ambassador will be initially recruited for a 3-month tenure, during which they will be expected to complete assigned tasks and contribute to the programme’s objectives. Upon request and based on the Ambassador’s performance, LawFoyer may consider extending the tenure to ensure continuity and sustained impact. ## **Tasks and Incentives** All tasks and their corresponding incentives will be clearly communicated to the Campus Ambassadors through the dedicated Campus Ambassador Group. The tasks assigned to Campus Ambassadors may include, but are not limited to: 1. Content creation, such as writing articles, blog posts, or social media content (optional) 2. Circulating information about LawFoyer’s events, workshops, and initiatives on their respective college campuses 3. Sharing college event information with LawFoyer for free promotion and cross-collaboration 4. Conducting sessions or workshops to educate fellow law students about key practical legal skill sets, such as legal research, writing, drafting, and the use of AI tools in legal practice 5. Inviting and encouraging law students to join LawFoyer’s FREE Internship Training Program to develop their skills and gain practical exposure 6. Spreading awareness about LawFoyer’s various initiatives, including LawFoyer Academy and LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research 7. Any other tasks specifically assigned to individual Campus Ambassadors based on their skills, interests, and the programme’s requirements ***Incentives for completing tasks can be both monetary and non-monetary, depending on the nature and complexity of the task.*** LawFoyer reserves the right to determine the appropriate incentives for each task, which will be clearly notified to the Campus Ambassadors along with the task details. ## **Task Completion and Reporting** To ensure transparency and fair distribution of incentives, Campus Ambassadors will be required to submit a task completion report for each assigned task. The report should be submitted using the designated task completion form provided in the Campus Ambassador Group. The form will require the Ambassador to attach proof of completion, such as screenshots, photos, or other relevant evidence, depending on the nature of the task. The specific requirements for proof of completion will be clearly outlined in the task description. For example, if a task involves circulating information about a LawFoyer event on WhatsApp, the Campus Ambassador will be expected to provide screenshots of all the WhatsApp conversations or groups where the information was shared. This will help LawFoyer verify the completion of the task and ensure that the Ambassador receives the appropriate incentive. ## **Perks and Benefits** In addition to the task-specific incentives, Campus Ambassadors will be entitled to a range of perks and benefits as a token of appreciation for their dedication and hard work. These include: 1. Free publication opportunity in the prestigious LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Research 2. Complimentary access to premium courses offered by LawFoyer Academy for the duration of the 3-month tenure 3. Social media shout-outs and recognition on LawFoyer’s official handles 4. Free access to all monthly quizzes conducted by LawFoyer during the 3-month tenure 5. Performance-based remuneration for top-performing Campus Ambassadors 6. Certificate of Appreciation acknowledging the Ambassador’s contribution to the programme 7. Preference in selection for internship opportunities at LawFoyer 8. Access to exclusive content curated for LawFoyer interns through the Learning Management System (LMS) Portal 9. Opportunity to join the Student Editorial Team of LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research 10. Free LawFoyer customized kit for best-performing Campus Ambassadors ## **Learning Management System (LMS) Portal** LawFoyer’s Campus Ambassadorship Programme includes access to a dedicated Learning Management System (LMS) Portal, designed to support the learning and development of the Ambassadors. **What is LMS?** The Learning Management System (LMS) is an online platform that provides Campus Ambassadors with exclusive access to a wide range of learning resources, including: 1. Recorded sessions and webinars conducted by legal experts 2. Module-wise study materials and e-books 3. Training videos on essential legal tools and techniques 4. Quizzes and assessments to test knowledge and understanding 5. Discussion forums to interact with fellow Ambassadors and LawFoyer mentors **How will it benefit Campus Ambassadors?** The LMS Portal offers numerous benefits to Campus Ambassadors, such as: 1. 24/7 access to learning materials, allowing for flexible and self-paced learning 2. Opportunity to deepen knowledge and understanding of legal concepts and practices 3. Ability to develop practical skills through interactive training videos and quizzes 4. Platform to network and collaborate with like-minded law students from across India **Who can access the LMS Portal?** Access to the LMS Portal is granted exclusively to registered Campus Ambassadors. LawFoyer will provide each Ambassador with unique login credentials upon successful registration and onboarding. **When can Campus Ambassadors access the LMS Portal?** Campus Ambassadors will have access to the LMS Portal throughout their 3-month tenure. Access will be revoked upon completion of the tenure or in case of termination of the Ambassador’s participation in the programme. ## **Incentive and Perk Grant Process** Campus Ambassadors will be eligible for incentives and perks based on the successful completion of assigned tasks. To ensure fairness and transparency, the following process will be followed: 1. Completing a task is mandatory to receive the corresponding incentive or perk. However, the completion or non-completion of a task will not affect the incentives for previously completed tasks or future tasks. 2. All incentives and perks will be subject to audit, approval, and confirmation by Team LawFoyer. The team will review the task completion reports and the attached proof to verify the successful completion of each task. 3. Once approved, the incentives and perks will be disbursed to the Campus Ambassadors within a stipulated time frame, which will be communicated to the Ambassadors in advance. ## **Guidelines for LawFoyer** To ensure the smooth functioning of the Campus Ambassadorship Programme and to provide Campus Ambassadors with sufficient time to complete their tasks and responsibilities, LawFoyer shall adhere to the following guidelines: 1. Provide at least 24 hours’ notice for any meetings, events, or webinars that require the Ambassador’s participation 2. Allow a minimum of 7 days for the completion and submission of assigned tasks 3. Grant at least 5 days for making corrections or improvements to submitted tasks, if required, before the end of the programme tenure 4. LawFoyer reserves the right to modify or amend the guidelines for the Campus Ambassadorship Programme as deemed necessary at any point of time for any purpose. Any changes, if made, will be communicated to the Campus Ambassadors in a timely manner. The final decision regarding any aspect of the programme rests with LawFoyer. ## **Code of Conduct** As representatives of LawFoyer, Campus Ambassadors are expected to maintain the highest standards of professionalism, integrity, and ethical conduct. Ambassadors should: 1. Act in the best interests of LawFoyer and their respective educational institutions 2. Refrain from engaging in any activities that may harm the reputation of LawFoyer or their college/university 3. Not misuse any information, resources, or intellectual property provided by LawFoyer for personal gain or any purpose not explicitly permitted by the programme guidelines 4. Treat fellow Ambassadors, LawFoyer team members, and other stakeholders with respect and courtesy 5. Adhere to all applicable laws, regulations, and these guidelines while participating in the programme ## **Termination** LawFoyer reserves the right to terminate a Campus Ambassador’s participation in the programme in case of: 1. Failure to complete assigned tasks within the stipulated deadlines 2. Misrepresentation or misuse of LawFoyer’s name, logo, or resources 3. Misconduct or unprofessional behavior that violates the code of conduct 4. Violation of any of the programme guidelines or terms and conditions 5. In the event of termination, the Campus Ambassador will not be entitled to any further incentives or perks, except for those already earned for completed tasks before the termination date. ## **How this programme is Beneficial for Campus Ambassadors?** LawFoyer’s Campus Ambassadorship Programme offers a unique and exciting opportunity for law students across India to gain practical experience, develop essential skills, and contribute to the growth of the legal education community. By participating in this programme, Campus Ambassadors will have the chance to: 1. Enhance their knowledge and expertise in various aspects of law 2. Develop crucial skills such as legal research, writing, drafting, and the use of AI tools 3. Gain exposure to real-world legal challenges and opportunities 4. Network with fellow law students, legal professionals, and industry experts 5. Earn incentives and perks for their hard work and dedication 6. Make a meaningful impact on the legal education landscape in India LawFoyer is committed to providing Campus Ambassadors with the support, resources, and guidance they need to succeed in this programme and beyond. We look forward to welcoming a diverse and talented group of law students to our Campus Ambassadorship Programme and working together to shape the future of legal education in India. --- ### [Download Certificates of 15th National Quiz on Indian Contract Act & Specific Relief Act](https://lawfoyer.in/download-certificates-of-15th-national-quiz-on-indian-contract-act-specific-relief-act/) **Published:** October 4, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## **Steps to download certificate:** - **Search your name in the table below** - **Certificate number will be shown in front of your Name.** - **Click on the download certificate option button which is available below the table and you will be redirected to google drive**. --- \[table id=37 /\] --- [Download Certificate](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/10ejEjTf8Hb2lXRijlMdHFNaDusoNkj0_?usp=sharing) --- --- ### [Results of 15th National Quiz on Indian Contract Act & Specific Relief Act](https://lawfoyer.in/results-of-15th-national-quiz-on-indian-contract-act-specific-relief-act/) **Published:** October 4, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## You can find your rank/score by searching your name in the search box. **Keywords:** 1. Those who have attempted quiz after 05:35 pm have been marked as late entry. They will get E-Certificate. 2. Disqualified candidates are those who have not completed the registration. 3. In the case of the same marks, as stated in the quiz guidelines earlier, Time will be considered (A person who submits early will be given preference). --- \[table id=36 /\] --- ### [Download Certificates of 14th National Quiz on Indian Constitutional Law & Indian Polity](https://lawfoyer.in/download-certificates-of-14th-national-quiz-on-indian-constitutional-law-indian-polity/) **Published:** August 21, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** --- ## **Steps to download certificate:** - **Search your name in the table below** - **Certificate number will be shown in front of your Name.** - **Click on the download certificate option button which is available below the table and you will be redirected to google drive**. --- \[table id=33 /\] --- [Download E-Certificates](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1_4-vaHpeETGiLrF9NNejj0ZrSP8fA4CZ?usp=sharing) --- --- ### [Results of 14th National Quiz on Indian Constitutional Law & Indian Polity](https://lawfoyer.in/results-of-14th-national-quiz-on-indian-constitutional-law-indian-polity/) **Published:** August 19, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## You can find your rank/score by searching your name in the search box. **Keywords:** 1. Those who have attempted quiz after 05:35 pm have been marked as late entry. They will get E-Certificate. 2. Disqualified candidates are those who have not completed the registration. 3. In the case of the same marks, as stated in the quiz guidelines earlier, Time will be considered (A person who submits early will be given preference). --- \[table id=32 /\] --- --- ### [Student Editorship Guidelines](https://lawfoyer.in/student-editorship-guidelines/) **Published:** May 11, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## About LawFoyer LawFoyer is a student-centered legal portal focused on empowering the next generation of legal professionals. We provide law students with free access to a broad range of resources including the latest news on legal job opportunities, exam study materials, career guidance straight from industry experts, and much more. LawFoyer’s intiative includes LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research \[LIJDLR\] which is a peer-reviewed ISSN indexed International Law Journal; LawFoyer Academy which aims at making legal education easy and affordable for all; LawFoyer Law Library which provides access to Articles, Case Analyses, Law Subject Notes, Skill Specific Guidebooks, and wide range of free resources. Central to our mission is nurturing law students’ talents. LawFoyer organizes National legal writing competitions, quizzes, and other contests open to students across the country. These competitions offer platforms for participants to showcase their skills, win exciting prizes, and gain visibility within the legal community. ## LawFoyer and Its Vision LawFoyer has the following vision: - Making Law easy and accessible for all - Making Legal Education and Practical Training Affordable - Promoting the use of AI and Modern Tech in Law - Creating Employment Opportunities by networking stakeholders - Building Law Professionals out of Law Students ## What will we Cover? In LawFoyer’s Student Editorship Program, we will cover: - Insights into the Domain of Editing, Proofreading, Reviewing, Assessment, Mentoring and Management - Legal Research (Advanced Methods) - Legal Writing (Advanced Methods) - Legal Drafting (Advanced Methods) - Advanced Methods of Utilizing Artificial Intelligence and Modern Tech in Legal Research, Writing, and Drafting - Ethics, Tactics, Tools, and Advanced Techniques of Efficient Legal Practice - Training and Workshops on Practical Legal Professional Practice and Field Work - Training and Workshops on Personal Branding, Content Creation, Strategising, and Acting like a Legal Professional ## Student Editorship Curriculum **Module 1**: Introduction and Induction Training **Module 2**: Fundamentals of Editorial Review, Assessment, Mentoring and Efficient Management **Module 3**: Advanced Legal Research (Going beyond the Books – Compliance Reporting and Practical Legal Research) **Module 4**: Advanced Legal Writing (Going Beyond 4 Walls – Empirical Investigations and More) **Module 5**: Advanced Legal Drafting (including Petty and Major Legal Document + Contract Drafting) **Module 6**: Acing Practical Legal Work, Academics, Ethics and Legal Tactics **Bonus Workshops** on Moot Court and Mooting; ADR, Negotiation Plan Designing, & Mediation Law of India, Corporate Litigation, Criminal Litigation, Civil Litigation, Contract Drafting, and many more ## Student Editorship Perks - Certificate of Appreciation cum Certificate of Editorship to all Student Editors - Certificate of Excellence cum Letter of Recommendation to Best Student Editors - Feature as Student Editor (as a part of the Editorial Team) with [LawFoyer](https://lawfoyer.in/) and [LIJDLR \[LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research\]](https://lijdlr.com/) - Exclusive Access to Live & Recorded Training Sessions and Courses curated only for Student Editors with a personalized LMS Dashboard at [LawFoyer Academy](https://academy.lawfoyer.in/) - 100+ AI and Non-AI Tools for use in Legal Practice - Feature on the Web channels of LawFoyer and Shoutout on Social Media Pages of LawFoyer to all Student Editors - LawFoyer Membership and Paid Opportunities to Student Editors showcasing par excellence performance - Advanced Trainings on Legal Research, Writing, Drafting, and Oration - Additional Sessions on Advanced Use Cases of AI and Modern Technology in Litigation and Judiciary - Honorarium to Exceptional Performers of the Editorship Program (Monetary Incentive) - Free access to National Level Quiz Competitions of LawFoyer - Opportunity to improve Oration Skills by Mentoring Students on Legal Research, Writing, and Drafting - Free Access to E-Books, Legal Drafts, MCQ Compilations, Notes, Advanced Tools and Techniques, and many more perks that will save you valuable time and money. ## Editorship Guidelines **A. Guidelines for Student Editor** - Be a Good Learner - Maintain Confidentiality of facts, information and data about the Internal Matters Disclosed during the Editorship Tenure and not to use, share, or publically exhibit any such fact, information, or data related to internal matters of LawFoyer or LIJDLR - Ask Queries and Clarify Doubts - Complete all Tasks assigned according to the Guidelines - Use and practice the tools and techniques that will be taught - Complete the tasks before Deadline - Attendance is Mandatory in all Live Training Sessions - The code of conduct shall be formal and no misbehavior with any Team Member or any Co-Editors will be tolerated **B. Attendance** - Attending every Live Training Session / Workshop conducted by the Editorial and Management Team of LawFoyer or LIJDLR is Mandatory. - Attendance will be recorded in an Attendance Form or via such other methods as notified. - Attendance forms will be shared in Live Sessions or Doubt Meetings ONLY. **C. Editorship Registration, Tenure, & Live Sessions** - It is **mandatory for every student editor to register** as a Student Editor using the **student editor registration form** which will be notified in the group. The student editor registration form will also include a **NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENT** which shall be duly agreed and adhered to by every registered Student Editor. - The editorship tenure will be of minimum 28 days from the date of registration of the student editor. It can be extended on request of the student editor. - There will be minimum 5 Live Sessions during editorship tenure on fundamentals of editorship, advanced legal research, advanced legal writing, advanced legal drafting, and workshops on Civil / Criminal / Corporate Litigation etc. as prescribed in the perks of editorship. - All the editorship guidelines shall be binding on all the student editors and shall be duly adhered during the editorship tenure. **D. Tasks to be assigned to Student Editors** **(Role and Responsibilities)** - During your editorship tenure, you will be asked to do the following tasks: - Aiding the Editorial Board in Proofreading and Editing of Manuscripts received by LIJDLR & Reviewing Assignments submitted by Interns using our Efficient Review Methods (will not take more than 20-30 mins a day) (**mandatory**). - Mentoring Students on Legal Research, Writing, and Drafting (**optional**). - Content Creation for Social Media Handles of LawFoyer (**optional**). - Attending other Workshops and Webinars to learn other Practical Skills for Professional Growth (**mandatory**). - Such other similar Editorial or Management tasks assigned by the Editorial Team. - Specific guidelines related to each task to be assigned will be notified in the editorial and management group. - The aforementioned tasks assigned are to be completed using the methods that will be notified in the groups AND taught in the sessions, before the notified deadline. - Deadlines for completion will be notified in the group ONLY. - The task to be assigned will be provided in the group ONLY. - The supervisors / senior internship managers / core team members of LawFoyer will closely monitor all the work done by each and every student editor. **E. Learning Management System (LMS) Portal for Student Editors** - **Q. What is LMS?** - It is a Learning Management System on which the student editors will be provided with exclusive access to the recorded lessons and a lot of free learning resources including: - Recordings of Live Sessions of this Editorship Program - Module-wise pre-recorded video lessons - E-Books, Notes, Resources, & Important links - Training Videos on Important Tools and Techniques - Webinars & Workshop recordings - Other details regarding the LMS will be shared in the Editorial and Management Group - **Q. How will it benefit Student Editors?** - 24\*7 access to lessons to clarify doubts & strengthen skills - Aids completion of assigned tasks before deadline - Increases efficiency of work as you can revise concepts and methods easily and that too at anytime, anywhere - **EVERYONE STUDENT EDITOR WILL GET THE ACCESS TO LMS!** - **Q. Who will get Access?** - EVERY registered student editor will get access to LMS **provided that the induction and introductory training session was duly attended by such student editor**. - Access will be REVOKED on termination of editorship. - Access will be REVOKED after completion of editorship tenure. - **Q. How to get Access?** - Team LawFoyer will notify the method of accessing the LMS to all student editor via a mail, group notification or training video containing a detailed guideline as to how to access the LMS portal. - **Q. When can an Student Editor access it?** - After registration as a Student Editor using link provided in the group; AND - After **attending the induction and introductory training session** . - **Q. What if a Student Editor fails to attend **the induction and introductory training session** ?** - No access of LMS will be provided that case; AND - Guidelines related to non-compliance & termination will apply in that case. **F.** **Action on Non-Compliance** **Editorship will be immediately terminated on:** - failing to attend meetings; - non-completion of assigned tasks before the deadline; - not correcting the errors notified or not following the guidelines notified to the Student Editor by the Editorial Team / Core Team of LawFoyer before the notified Deadline; - misbehaving with any team member of LawFoyer; - misbehaving with any other Student Editor during editorship tenure. **Exceptions:** - In case of unforeseen emergencies no termination will take effect; - On showing sufficient cause for any non-compliance, the student editor will be excused; - If recording of the sessions are completely watched on LMS immediately after missing such session / meeting; - If assigned tasks that were delayed are submitted anytime before completion of editorship tenure after showing sufficient cause for such delay; - If such compliance is waivered voluntarily by LawFoyer or by breach of Guideline by LawFoyer. **Effect of Termination** - Student Editor will be removed from all Editorship and Internship Groups. - Student Editor will not be entitled to any perks of editorship except: - Honorarium (if any, due) – except if the cause of termination is such that justified denial of such honorarium; - Review of Assigned Tasks (if any, due) – except if the cause of termination is such that justified denial of such review of assigned tasks; and - any other perks which the Team LawFoyer deems fit and justified in light of the cause of termination and repute of the student editor so formed during the editorship tenure. **Honorarium (Monetary** **Incentives) and Features on Social Media and Shoutouts** - Best-performing Student Editors will be featured on the Social Media handles of LawFoyer and their contribution will be acknowledged publically through such shoutouts. - **Excellent Student Editors:** - A list of Excellent Student Editors will be featured on the Social Media handles after completion of all the tasks assigned for the limited student editorship tenure. - Criteria for this title: “Excellent Work” Remark - Such remark of excellence can only be given by Core Team Members and Senior Internship Managers who are closely monitoring the work of Student Editors. - **Budding Editors** **of Month**: - A list of Budding Editors will be featured too on the Social Media handles after completion of all the tasks assigned for the limiter student editorship tenure. - Criteria for this title: “Really Good Work” Remark - Such remark of really good work can only be given by Core Team Members and Senior Internship Managers who are closely monitoring the work of Student Editors. - **Honorarium and its Eligibility** - “Honorarium” refers to the monetary and non-monetary incentive given to a Student Editor in honour of his / her contribution in the Editorial and Management Team of LawFoyer and LIJDLR. - Not every “Excellent” Student Editor will get Honorarium, but only the one(s) who will fulfil the below given eligibility criteria for Honorarium. - **Eligibility for Honorarium is as follows**: - The Student Editor must have “Excellent Work” remarks - The Student Editor has diligently attended all the sessions during the editorship tenure - The Student Editor has duly complied with all the guidelines of the Student Editorship Program and has shown “Professionalism” and “Aptitude” - The Student Editor has duly performed at least 10 tasks assigned by the Editorial Team and has devoted at least 20 hours to the Editorial Team - Such student editor deserves and is entitled to such Honorarium which shall be calculated and estimated on the below given basis. - If there are multiple (more than one) Student Editors eligible for the Honorarium then each of such Student Editor shall get separate honorarium on the “task – hour basis” following the “differential piece wage method” as described below further. - **Basis of Calculation / Estimation of Editorship Honorarium for Best Performing Student Editor** **(Differential Piece Wage Method Policy)** - (**Explanation:** For every statement where the word “Task” is used, a “Task” refers to a single point of instruction to do a single or a series of actions for a single specific time duration on the basis of such single point of instruction. Also, the task to attend any meetings, engage in any conversations, and other communications shall be excluded from the purview of the definition of “Tasks”. (**For example**: If in a single meeting or conversation a set of instructions were given wherein 3 actions were asked to be performed by the Core Team then these three actions shall be construed as a “single point of instruction”. And, where in a single meeting or conversation two different sets of instructions were given wherein 2 different actions were asked to be performed at separate time durations then these there 2 actions shall be construed as 2 different tasks.) - **If the number of tasks assigned to the Student Editor were:** - more than 10 tasks but less than 20 tasks – Rs. 500’s value of Honorarium - more than 20 tasks but less than 30 tasks – Rs. 1000’s value of Honorarium - more than 30 tasks but less than 40 tasks – Rs. 1500’s value of Honorarium - more than 40 tasks – Rs. 2000’s value of Honorarium & Rs. 250’s value of Honorarium for each set of additional 10 tasks after and beyond the 40 tasks. - **If the number of hours devoted by the Student Editor were:** - more than 20 hours but less than 30 hours – additional Rs. 500’s value of Honorarium - more than 30 hours but less than 40 hours – additional Rs. 1000’s value of Honorarium - more than 40 hours but less than 50 hours – additional Rs. 1500’s value of Honorarium - more than 50 hours – additional Rs. 2000’s value of Honorarium & Rs. 250’s value of Honorarium for each set of additional 10 hours after and beyond the 40 hours - **Option to Set Off and Barter vested with Student Editor:** If the student editor wants then the student editor shall have the option to get access of LawFoyer’s premium courses, or other similar resources (including personal mentorship) instead of reciept of the honorarium, with the permission of the Editorial and Management Team & the Core Team of LawFoyer & LIJDLR. - **Option of Encashment vested only with LawFoyer and LIJDLR:** The discretion to grant honorarium in form of monetary encashment or in form of a non-monetary LawFoyer Gift Kit or such other benefit in lieu of such monetary encashment shall be vested only with the editorial and core management team of LawFoyer and LIJDLR. The value of “non-monetary LawFoyer Gift Kit or such other benefit” shall be calculated using the same basis as described above. - **Calculation of “Hours” for the Purpose of Estimation of Honorarium:** For calculation of hours, the Core Team Members and the Senior Internship Managers shall keep a record of tasks assigned and the time duration notified for completion of the task. For each day assigned, the work hours shall be calculated as 1 hour. Also, the hours consumed in meetings, conversations, and other communications shall be excluded from the purview of the definition of “Hours”. For example, if for a task 4 days were provided then the work hours shall be construed as 4 hours. **G. Guidelines for LawFoyer** - A mandatory notice of non-compliance shall be provided to student editor before termination - An opportunity to show sufficient cause and to be heard shall be provided to every student editor before termination - A reasonable notice of the following shall be provided to award sufficient opportunity to student editors for: - conduction of meetings (at least 12 hours before such meeting) - completion of assigned task (at least 2 days before deadline of submission) - correction of mistakes in assigned tasks so completed (at least 3 days before completion of editorship tenure or such deadline notified, whichever is earlier) - To duly comply with the guidelines and fulfil all promises and obligations including the ones pertaining to the perks and honorarium so mentioned in the aforementioned editorship guidelines. - It shall be the duty of the Editorial, Management, and Core Team of LawFoyer and LIJDLR to minimise the time consumed by the student editor and to not overburden any Student Editor during the editorship tenure so that their studied, academics, or other interests are not prejudiced. - The above-given guidelines shall not be binding on LawFoyer and are merely directory in nature, final discretion of taking any / all decisions regarding the student editorship program is vested with LawFoyer ONLY. --- ### [Download Certificates of 13th National Quiz on Indian Contract Act & Law of Torts](https://lawfoyer.in/download-certificates-of-13th-national-quiz-on-indian-contract-act-law-of-torts/) **Published:** June 20, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** --- ## **Steps to download certificate:** - **Search your name in the table below** - **Certificate number will be shown in front of your Name.** - **Click on the download certificate option button which is available below the table and you will be redirected to google drive**. --- \[table id=30 /\] --- [Download Certificates](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1GooN-tKwzguu8xmrAvVDps_-JBSX44u_?usp=sharing) --- --- ### [Results of 13th National Quiz on Indian Contract Act & Law of Torts](https://lawfoyer.in/results-of-13th-national-quiz-on-indian-contract-act-law-of-torts/) **Published:** June 20, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## You can find your rank/score by searching your name in the search box. **Keywords:** 1. Those who have attempted quiz after 05:35 pm have been marked as late entry. They will get E-Certificate. 2. Disqualified candidates are those who have not completed the registration. 3. In the case of the same marks, as stated in the quiz guidelines earlier, Time will be considered (A person who submits early will be given preference). --- \[table id=29 /\] --- [Download Certificate](https://lawfoyer.in/download-certificates-of-13th-national-quiz-on-indian-contract-act-law-of-torts/) --- ### [Download Certificates of 12th National Quiz Competition on Indian Constitutional Law](https://lawfoyer.in/download-certificates-of-12th-national-quiz-competition-on-indian-constitutional-law/) **Published:** April 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** --- ## **Steps to download certificate:** - **Search your name in the table below** - **Certificate number will be shown in front of your Name.** - **Click on the download certificate option button which is available below the table and you will be redirected to google drive**. --- \[table id=28 /\] --- [Download Certificate](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1wofE9oSfEX9Bjhq8qHIlviAEQQr4QAQw?usp=sharing) --- --- ### [Results of 12th National Quiz Competition on Indian Constitutional Law](https://lawfoyer.in/results-of-12th-national-quiz-competition-on-indian-constitutional-law/) **Published:** April 25, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## You can find your rank/score by searching your name in the search box. **Keywords:** 1. Those who have attempted quiz after 05:45 pm have been marked as late entry. They will get E-Certificate. 2. Disqualified candidates are those who have not completed the registration. 3. In the case of the same marks, as stated in the quiz guidelines earlier, Time will be considered (A person who submits early will be given preference). \[table id=27 /\] --- ### [Download11th National Quiz Competition on Indian Contract Act Certificates](https://lawfoyer.in/download11th-national-quiz-competition-on-indian-contract-act-certificates/) **Published:** February 24, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** --- ## **Steps to download certificate:** - **Search your name in the table below** - **Certificate number will be shown in front of your Name.** - **Click on the download certificate option button which is available below the table and you will be redirected to google drive**. --- \[table id=26 /\] --- [Download Certificate](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1S0FgFEJz2tQrh1HNMhf_yCrVlC0Tjs8D?usp=sharing) --- --- ### [Results of 11th National Quiz Competition on Indian Contract Act by LawFoyer](https://lawfoyer.in/results-of-11th-national-quiz-competition-on-indian-contract-act-by-lawfoyer/) **Published:** February 24, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## You can find your rank/score by searching your name in the search box. **Keywords:** 1. Those who have attempted quiz after 05:45 pm have been marked as late entry. They will get E-Certificate. 2. Disqualified candidates are those who have not completed the registration. 3. In the case of the same marks, as stated in the quiz guidelines earlier, Time will be considered (A person who submits early will be given preference). \[table id=25 /\] --- ### [Administrative Law Notes](https://lawfoyer.in/administrative-law-notes/) **Published:** January 27, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** [ ![Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Administrative-Law-1024x1024.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/notes-on-administrative-law/) [Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/category/articles/administrative-law/) [Articles](https://lawfoyer.in/category/articles/) [Legal Subjects](https://lawfoyer.in/category/legal-subjects/) #### [ Notes on Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/notes-on-administrative-law/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/manikbhai/) 21 January 2024 0 [ ![Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Administrative-Law-1024x1024.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/administrative-discretion-under-administrative-law/) [Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/category/articles/administrative-law/) [Articles](https://lawfoyer.in/category/articles/) #### [ Administrative Discretion under Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/administrative-discretion-under-administrative-law/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/manikbhai/) 15 January 2024 0 [ ![Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Administrative-Law-1024x1024.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/ombudsman-cvc-lokpal-and-lokayukt/) [Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/category/articles/administrative-law/) [Articles](https://lawfoyer.in/category/articles/) #### [ Ombudsman, CVC, Lokpal, and Lokayukt](https://lawfoyer.in/ombudsman-cvc-lokpal-and-lokayukt/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/manikbhai/) 14 January 2024 0 [ ![Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Administrative-Law-1024x1024.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/writs-and-writ-jurisdiction-under-administrative-law/) [Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/category/articles/administrative-law/) [Articles](https://lawfoyer.in/category/articles/) #### [ Writs and Writ Jurisdiction under Administrative Law](https://lawfoyer.in/writs-and-writ-jurisdiction-under-administrative-law/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/manikbhai/) 14 January 2024 0 --- ### [Registration Page 11th Quiz on Indian Contract Act](https://lawfoyer.in/registration-page-11th-quiz-on-indian-contract-act/) **Published:** January 22, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** --- ## **Important Guidelines** - **Format of Quiz:** Quiz shall take place online, and a paper will include multiple-choice questions**.** - The participant can take this exam on their laptop or mobile phone. - The platform for the quiz will be google Forms, Microsoft Forms, etc. - In the case of the same marks, time will be considered (a person who submits early will be given preference). - The link will be shared 24 hours prior to the start of the quiz. ## **Rules & Regulations** - **60 MCQ(s).** - The time allotted will be **25** minutes. (This includes time for filling the basic details like Name, email, etc.) - **Every question carries 04 marks & there will be no negative marking.** - The Result will be declared on **24th February 2024**([www.lawfoyer.in](https://lawfoyer.in/)). --- ### [Test](https://lawfoyer.in/test/) **Published:** January 20, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** --- ### [Download 10th National Quiz Competition on (Indian Evidence Act) Certificates](https://lawfoyer.in/download-10th-national-quiz-competition-on-indian-evidence-act-certificates/) **Published:** January 13, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** --- ## **Steps to download certificate:** - **Search your name in the table below** - **Certificate number will be shown in front of your Name.** - **Click on the download certificate option button which is available below the table and you will be redirected to google drive**. --- \[table id=24 /\] --- [Download Certificate](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1Q28n_Eamx9c130oEMB7ZHbuzxaJDUnBC?usp=sharing) --- --- ### [Results of 10th National Quiz Competition on Indian Evidence Act by LawFoyer](https://lawfoyer.in/results-of-10th-national-quiz-competition-on-indian-evidence-act-by-lawfoyer/) **Published:** January 13, 2024 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## You can find your rank/score by searching your name in the search box. **Keywords:** 1. Those who have attempted quiz after 05:30 pm have been marked as late entry. They will get E-Certificate. 2. Disqualified candidates are those who have not completed the registration. 3. In the case of the same marks, as stated in the quiz guidelines earlier, Time will be considered (A person who submits early will be given preference). --- \[table id=23 /\] --- --- ### [Download 6th National Quiz Competition on Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) Certificates](https://lawfoyer.in/download-6th-national-quiz-competition-on-code-of-criminal-procedure-crpc-certificates/) **Published:** June 14, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** --- ## **Steps to download certificate:** - **Search your name in the table below** - **Certificate number will be shown in front of your Name.** - **Click on the download certificate option button which is available below the table and you will be redirected to google drive**. \[table id=12 /\] --- [Download Certificate](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/174yprY8TRxkScwZaDk1OL_SkLGixn9Uk?usp=sharing) --- --- ### [Results of 6th National Quiz Competition on Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC)](https://lawfoyer.in/results-of-6th-national-quiz-competition-on-code-of-criminal-procedure-crpc/) **Published:** June 14, 2023 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## You can find your rank/score by searching your name in the search box \[table id=11 /\] --- ### [LAWFOYER ONE-MONTH VIRTUAL INTERNSHIP TRAINING PROGRAMME IN DATA PRIVACY LAW AND COMPLIANCE](https://lawfoyer.in/internship-lawfoyer/lawfoyers-internship-training-program-guidelines/) **Published:** May 8, 2025 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## INTERNSHIP GUIDELINES & TERMS AND CONDITIONS ### Develop Practical, Industry-Relevant Skills in Privacy Law, Data Protection and Regulatory Compliance --- ## 1. INTRODUCTION The **LawFoyer One-Month Virtual Internship Training Programme in Data Privacy Law and Compliance** (“Internship Programme” or “Programme”) is a structured, practical and skill-oriented training programme intended to provide participants with exposure to **privacy law, personal data protection, regulatory compliance and privacy operations**. The Programme is designed to go beyond conventional lecture-based learning. Interns will be exposed to practical exercises, simulated organisational scenarios, compliance documentation, legal research, professional drafting, data-mapping exercises, privacy-risk assessment and other activities intended to develop industry-relevant privacy and compliance skills. These Guidelines and Terms and Conditions shall govern participation in the Internship Programme. Every selected intern is expected to read them carefully and comply with them throughout the internship tenure. Registration for, participation in, or continuation with the Internship Programme shall constitute acceptance of these Guidelines and Terms and Conditions. --- # PART I — PROGRAMME STRUCTURE ## 2. DURATION OF THE INTERNSHIP 1. The Internship Programme shall ordinarily be conducted for a period of **one month**. 2. The internship shall be conducted entirely in **virtual/online mode**, unless LawFoyer specifically announces an offline activity or opportunity separately. 3. The Programme is structured around progressive learning modules relating to Data Privacy Law and Compliance. 4. The Programme may include: - Live mentor-led training sessions; - Practical exercises; - Statutory and regulatory readings; - Case studies; - Simulated organisational scenarios; - Privacy compliance exercises; - Data-mapping activities; - Privacy notice and consent analysis; - Legal research; - Professional drafting; - Weekly or module-wise assignments; - Data Protection Impact Assessment-related exercises; - Breach-response exercises; - Doubt-clearing and interaction sessions; - Recorded learning material; - Mentor feedback; and - A final privacy-compliance/capstone exercise. 5. LawFoyer may reasonably modify the sequence, structure, activity format or delivery methodology of the Programme where required for academic, professional, technical or operational reasons. --- ## 3. LIVE TRAINING SESSIONS 1. There shall ordinarily be **eight (8) live training sessions** during the one-month Internship Programme. 2. Live sessions will generally be conducted on **weekends**, depending upon the professional availability and schedules of the mentors, speakers and industry professionals conducting the sessions. 3. Sessions will ordinarily be scheduled during the **evening, generally after 6:00 PM IST**, unless a different time is communicated in advance. 4. Since the mentors and speakers may be working professionals, the exact date and timing of a session may depend upon their professional availability. 5. Interns are therefore expected to maintain reasonable flexibility regarding the session schedule. 6. Where any unavoidable change, postponement, rescheduling or cancellation occurs, the revised details shall be communicated through the official Internship WhatsApp Group. 7. A change in the announced schedule due to the professional commitments, emergencies or unavoidable circumstances of a mentor or speaker shall not by itself create any entitlement to compensation or any other claim against LawFoyer. --- # PART II — OFFICIAL COMMUNICATION ## 4. INTERNSHIP WHATSAPP GROUP - An official **Internship WhatsApp Group** shall be created or designated for communication relating to the Internship Programme. - The WhatsApp Group shall be treated as the **primary official communication channel for operational internship updates**. - **Details concerning:** - Live session dates; Live session timings; Meeting links; Assignment notifications; Assignment deadlines; Submission forms; Reading material; Recorded sessions; Mentor instructions; Changes in schedule; Important notices; Forms;Certificates; and Other programme-related instructions may be communicated through the WhatsApp Group. - **Session details and session-related updates shall be communicated through the official WhatsApp Group only**, unless LawFoyer specifically chooses to communicate them through an additional channel. - Every intern is responsible for regularly checking the Internship WhatsApp Group. - **Failure to notice an announcement because an intern:** muted the group;did not check the messages;changed their WhatsApp number without informing LawFoyer;deleted the group;exited the group; or otherwise failed to monitor official communications shall ordinarily not constitute a valid ground for exemption from a deadline or programme requirement. - Interns shall not use the official group for: - Unrelated advertisements; - Promotional messages; - Spam; - Political or religious discussions unrelated to the Programme; - Unsolicited marketing; - Chain messages; - Unrelated links or media; or - Any communication that disrupts the academic and professional purpose of the group. Queries should be raised respectfully and, wherever possible, in a manner that may also assist other interns facing the same issue. --- # PART III — REGISTRATION AND INTERN IDENTIFICATION ## 5. MANDATORY INTERNSHIP REGISTRATION 1. Selection or addition to the Internship WhatsApp Group shall not, by itself, amount to completion of internship registration. 2. Every selected participant shall be required to complete the **Internship Registration Form** circulated by Team LawFoyer. 3. Submission of the registration form within the notified period shall be mandatory. 4. Interns shall provide complete, current and accurate information in the registration form. 5. Providing false, misleading or materially incorrect academic, identity or contact information may result in cancellation of internship registration. --- ## 6. UNIQUE INTERN ID 1. Upon successful registration, each intern may be allotted a **Unique Intern ID**. 2. The Unique Intern ID may be used for: - Attendance records; - Assignment submissions; - Performance evaluation; - Internal administrative records; - Certificate processing; - Verification purposes; and - Other internship-related activities. 3. Interns must ensure that their Intern ID is correctly entered wherever required. 4. An intern shall not use, submit or represent another participant’s Intern ID. 5. Any attempt at impersonation, proxy attendance or fraudulent submission may constitute serious misconduct. --- # PART IV — ATTENDANCE POLICY ## 7. MINIMUM ATTENDANCE REQUIREMENT 1. **A minimum of 80% attendance in the live training sessions is mandatory for successful completion of the Internship Programme.** 2. Where eight live sessions are conducted, an intern must ordinarily attend **at least seven (7) out of eight (8) live sessions** to satisfy the 80% attendance requirement. 3. Attendance shall be calculated on the basis of live participation recorded through mechanisms determined by LawFoyer. 4. Attendance may be recorded through one or more of the following: - Attendance forms; - Meeting attendance reports; - Login records; - Intern ID verification; - In-session responses; - Polls; - Attendance codes; or - Any other reasonable method adopted by LawFoyer. 5. Merely joining a session momentarily, submitting an attendance form without substantially attending the session, using another person’s credentials, or engaging in proxy attendance shall not constitute valid attendance. 6. LawFoyer may disregard attendance where there is reasonable evidence of manipulation or misrepresentation. --- ## 8. RECORDINGS OF SESSIONS 1. **Recordings of live sessions will ordinarily be made available to interns**, subject to technical availability and applicable restrictions. 2. Recordings are provided primarily for: - Revision; - Reinforcement of concepts; - Reviewing difficult portions of a session; and - Catching up in exceptional cases where a live session was missed. 3. Watching a recording ordinarily **does not convert an absence from a live session into live attendance**. 4. Interns who miss a session should watch the relevant recording as soon as reasonably possible. 5. LawFoyer may, in exceptional circumstances and upon sufficient cause being shown, consider relaxation of the attendance requirement at its discretion. 6. Availability of a recording should not be treated as a substitute for live participation where live attendance is required under these Guidelines. --- ## 9. EXCEPTIONAL ABSENCE An intern who is unable to attend a live session because of: - Medical emergency; - Examination; - University-mandated academic obligation; - Family emergency; - Serious technical disruption; - Force majeure; or - Any other genuine and unavoidable circumstance may communicate the reason to Team LawFoyer. Any relaxation shall be considered **case-by-case and at the discretion of LawFoyer**. Merely informing LawFoyer of an absence does not automatically result in the attendance being marked as present. --- # PART V — ASSIGNMENTS AND PRACTICAL WORK ## 10. MANDATORY ASSIGNMENTS 1. Practical assignments form an integral component of the Internship Programme. 2. Where an assignment, exercise, case study, project or capstone is specifically designated as **mandatory**, its completion shall be necessary for successful completion of the Programme. 3. Assignments may include, inter alia: - Personal-data identification exercises; - Data inventory preparation; - Data-flow mapping; - Privacy notice drafting/review; - Consent mechanism assessment; - Data-principal rights exercises; - Grievance-management exercises; - Vendor/privacy-risk assessments; - Preliminary DPIA exercises; - Privacy-by-design exercises; - Breach-response memorandum; - Legal research; - Compliance-gap analysis; - Comparative privacy-law exercises; and - Final privacy-compliance capstone work. 4. Specific assignment instructions shall be provided separately. 5. Interns must carefully comply with the prescribed: - Format; - Word limit, where applicable; - Template; - File type; - Naming convention; - Citation requirements; - Submission procedure; and - Deadline. --- ## 11. ASSIGNMENT DEADLINES 1. Assignment deadlines shall be communicated through the Internship WhatsApp Group, LMS or any other official channel designated by LawFoyer. 2. Interns are responsible for submitting assignments before the notified deadline. 3. Merely completing an assignment without submitting it through the prescribed method shall not constitute submission. 4. Submissions made through personal WhatsApp messages, direct messages, email or any other channel may not be considered unless such method has specifically been permitted. 5. Where a Google Form, LMS submission portal or designated submission link is provided, interns shall use **only the prescribed submission mechanism**. 6. Requests for extension should, wherever possible, be made before expiry of the relevant deadline. 7. Extensions may be granted only where sufficient cause exists and shall remain subject to LawFoyer’s discretion. --- ## 12. QUALITY OF ASSIGNMENTS Completion of an assignment does not merely mean uploading a file. Interns are expected to demonstrate reasonable diligence and professional quality. Submissions may be evaluated on factors including: - Identification of relevant legal issues; - Understanding of privacy and data-protection principles; - Application of law to facts; - Research quality; - Accuracy; - Legal reasoning; - Practical understanding; - Structure and organisation; - Drafting quality; - Compliance orientation; - Attention to detail; - Citation quality, where required; - Professional presentation; - Originality; and - Compliance with assignment instructions. LawFoyer may require an intern to revise or resubmit work that is materially incomplete, incorrectly prepared or inconsistent with the assignment instructions. --- # PART VI — ORIGINALITY, RESEARCH ETHICS AND USE OF AI ## 13. ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL INTEGRITY All assignments must represent the intern’s own genuine work. The following are prohibited: 1. Plagiarism; 2. Copying another intern’s work; 3. Permitting another person to copy one’s work; 4. Submitting substantially identical assignments through multiple interns; 5. Fabricating cases, statutory provisions, regulatory requirements, citations, facts or authorities; 6. Falsifying research results or compliance findings; 7. Submitting work prepared by another person as one’s own; or 8. Any other form of academic or professional dishonesty. Such conduct may result in rejection of the relevant assignment and may, in serious cases, lead to termination from the Programme. --- # PART VII — CONFIDENTIALITY, PRIVACY AND MATERIALS ## 14. CONFIDENTIALITY Interns may receive access to case studies, simulated organisational information, internal training materials, exercises, templates, mentor presentations, meeting links and other programme resources. Unless expressly stated otherwise, interns shall not: - Circulate restricted programme material outside the internship batch; - Share private meeting links; - Distribute recordings; - Upload training recordings publicly; - Sell or commercially redistribute programme materials; - Share restricted templates or internal exercises; - Misrepresent programme materials as their own proprietary material; or - Use confidential material for an unauthorised purpose. Any confidentiality instruction specifically communicated for an exercise shall be strictly followed. --- ## 15. PRIVACY AND PERSONAL DATA In administering the Programme, LawFoyer may process information relating to interns for legitimate internship-related purposes such as: - Registration; - Communication; - Attendance; - Assignment administration; - Evaluation; - Certification; - Verification; - Internship records; and - Programme improvement. Interns are expected to provide only accurate information and to avoid unnecessarily sharing sensitive personal information in public internship groups. Where any exercise involves hypothetical or simulated personal data, interns must handle such information in accordance with the instructions provided. --- ## 17. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRAINING MATERIAL 1. Ownership of pre-existing LawFoyer materials, mentor materials and third-party materials shall remain with their respective owners. 2. Access to programme material does not transfer intellectual-property ownership to the intern. 3. Materials are provided primarily for the intern’s personal educational and professional development. 4. Recording, reproduction, commercial redistribution or public dissemination of protected programme material without authorisation is prohibited. 5. An intern retains authorship over original work created by the intern, subject to any separate terms communicated for publication, showcasing, assessment or collaborative exercises. 6. LawFoyer may seek the intern’s consent before publicly featuring or publishing substantial original work where such consent is appropriate. --- # PART VIII — PROFESSIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT ## 18. EXPECTED CONDUCT Every intern shall maintain professional standards throughout the Programme. Interns are expected to: 1. Communicate respectfully with mentors, organisers and fellow interns; 2. Maintain professionalism during live sessions; 3. Join sessions in a timely manner; 4. Avoid unnecessarily disrupting training sessions; 5. Ask relevant questions in an appropriate manner; 6. Respect differing opinions during professional discussions; 7. Follow instructions issued by mentors and Team LawFoyer; 8. Maintain confidentiality; 9. Meet assignment deadlines; 10. Avoid academic dishonesty; 11. Maintain decorum in WhatsApp groups and online meetings; and 12. Conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the standards expected of a legal and compliance professional. --- ## 19. PROHIBITED CONDUCT The following may constitute misconduct: - Harassment; - Bullying; - Abusive or threatening communication; - Discriminatory remarks; - Personal attacks; - Deliberate disruption of sessions; - Impersonation; - Proxy attendance; - Plagiarism; - Fraudulent submissions; - Unauthorised circulation of recordings; - Sharing restricted meeting links; - Misuse of fellow interns’ personal information; - Repeated spam or unauthorised promotion; - Misrepresentation of association with LawFoyer; - Misrepresentation of internship performance or awards; - Any conduct that materially interferes with the Programme; or - Serious breach of these Guidelines. --- # PART IX — LEARNING MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AND DIGITAL ACCESS ## 20. LMS/ONLINE LEARNING RESOURCES Where LMS access or other digital learning resources are provided: 1. Access shall be for the registered intern personally. 2. Login credentials shall not be shared. 3. Interns may receive access to: - Session recordings; - Reading material; - Templates; - Guides; - Exercises; - Reference materials; - Recorded workshops; - Additional learning resources; and - Other resources determined by LawFoyer. 4. LMS access may be limited to the internship tenure or such additional period as LawFoyer may decide. 5. LawFoyer may revoke access upon termination from the Programme or in cases of misuse. --- # PART X — CERTIFICATION ## 21. CERTIFICATE OF INTERNSHIP A **Certificate of Internship/Completion** shall be issued only to interns who successfully fulfil the applicable completion requirements. Unless specifically relaxed by LawFoyer in exceptional circumstances, an intern must: 1. Complete the Internship Registration process; 2. Maintain **at least 80% live-session attendance**; 3. Complete and submit **all mandatory assignments**, where assigned; 4. Complete the final capstone/project, where prescribed; 5. Make required corrections or resubmissions, where directed; 6. Comply with the professional Code of Conduct; and 7. Not remain in material breach of these Guidelines at the completion of the Programme. Mere selection, registration or addition to the WhatsApp Group shall not create an automatic entitlement to a certificate. --- ## 22. CERTIFICATE OF EXCELLENCE AND LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION The **Certificate of Excellence** and **Letter of Recommendation (LOR)** are performance-based distinctions and shall be awarded only to selected Best Interns. ### Minimum Eligibility To be considered for these distinctions, an intern must ordinarily: - Maintain **100% attendance in all live training sessions**; - Complete **all mandatory assignments**; - Submit assignments within prescribed timelines; - Complete the work properly and in accordance with instructions; - Demonstrate high-quality legal and compliance analysis; - Maintain professional conduct throughout the Programme; and - Complete the final capstone/project satisfactorily, where applicable. ### Important Clarification **100% attendance and completion of all assignments are minimum eligibility requirements and do not create an automatic entitlement to a Certificate of Excellence or Letter of Recommendation.** Selection of Best Interns may additionally take into account: - Quality of assignments; - Accuracy; - Research ability; - Practical application; - Analytical ability; - Drafting quality; - Participation; - Responsiveness to feedback; - Improvement during the Programme; - Professionalism; - Consistency; - Initiative; and - Overall performance. The final determination of Best Interns shall rest with LawFoyer and the concerned mentors/evaluators. --- # PART XI — PERFORMANCE-BASED OPPORTUNITIES AND PERKS ## 23. TOP PERFORMER OPPORTUNITIES Subject to the applicable programme announcement, outstanding interns may become eligible for additional performance-based opportunities, including: - Certificate of Excellence; - Letter of Recommendation; - Social-media feature or professional shoutout; - Publication opportunities; - LawFoyer membership or other opportunities; - Future paid or professional opportunities at LawFoyer’s discretion; and - Offline internship opportunity for selected top performers, where applicable. These opportunities are **merit-based and discretionary** and shall not be treated as automatic entitlements arising merely from completion of the Internship Programme. --- ## 24. OFFLINE INTERNSHIP OPPORTUNITY FOR TOP PERFORMERS Where the particular batch announcement provides an offline internship opportunity to the **Top 3 Excellent Performers**, selection shall be based upon an overall assessment of performance during the Programme. Relevant considerations may include: - Live attendance; - Assignment quality; - Capstone performance; - Professionalism; - Participation; - Consistency; - Legal and analytical ability; - Privacy-compliance aptitude; and - Overall mentor evaluation. Selection as a top performer may remain subject to the requirements, availability, policies and final approval of the organisation or professional establishment providing the offline opportunity. Travel, accommodation and other logistical arrangements, unless specifically stated otherwise, shall not be presumed to be provided by LawFoyer. --- # PART XII — FEEDBACK AND MENTOR INTERACTION ## 26. MENTOR FEEDBACK 1. Mentors may provide general or individual feedback on assignments and exercises depending upon the format and size of the batch. 2. Interns should treat feedback as an opportunity for professional improvement. 3. Where corrections or resubmission are specifically required, interns shall endeavour to make them within the prescribed period. 4. The nature and extent of individual feedback may vary depending upon: - Number of participants; - Nature of assignment; - Mentor availability; - Programme schedule; and - Academic requirements. --- ## 27. PROFESSIONAL INTERACTION WITH MENTORS Participation in the Programme does not create an entitlement to: - Personal mentorship beyond the Programme; - Personal contact details of mentors; - Employment; - Internship placement with a mentor’s employer; - Individual recommendation; - Professional referral; or - Continued communication after completion of the Programme. Interns shall respect the professional boundaries and availability of mentors. --- # PART XIII — NON-COMPLIANCE AND DISCIPLINARY ACTION ## 28. GROUNDS FOR ACTION Appropriate action may be taken where an intern: 1. Engages in proxy attendance or impersonation; 2. Misbehaves with mentors, LawFoyer representatives or fellow interns; 3. Harasses another participant; 4. Misuses personal information; 5. Shares restricted recordings or programme materials without permission; 6. Shares private meeting links with unauthorised persons; 7. Materially disrupts training activities; 8. Provides materially false information during registration; or 9. Commits any serious or repeated breach of these Guidelines. --- ## 29. POSSIBLE ACTIONS Depending upon the nature and seriousness of the matter, LawFoyer may: - Issue an advisory; - Issue a warning; - Disallow particular attendance; - Restrict access to programme resources; - Remove the participant from the Internship WhatsApp Group; - Suspend participation; - Terminate the internship; or - Withhold internship certification where completion requirements have not been fulfilled. Disciplinary action shall ordinarily be proportionate to the nature of the non-compliance. --- ## 30. OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN Except in cases involving serious misconduct, security concerns, harassment, fraud, impersonation or circumstances requiring immediate action, LawFoyer may provide the concerned intern with a reasonable opportunity to explain the circumstances before taking major disciplinary action. LawFoyer may consider genuine emergencies and sufficient cause while determining the appropriate action. --- ## 31. EFFECT OF TERMINATION Where an internship is terminated: 1. The participant may be removed from official internship groups and digital resources; 2. LMS or other restricted access may be revoked; 3. The participant may cease to be eligible for the Certificate of Internship; 4. The participant shall ordinarily cease to be eligible for performance-based internship perks; and 5. Any other consequences specifically notified in relation to the Programme may apply. --- # PART XIV — TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL MATTERS ## 32. INTERNET AND DEVICE REQUIREMENTS As this is a virtual Internship Programme, interns are responsible for arranging: - A suitable internet connection; - A functional device; - Access to WhatsApp; - Access to the designated meeting platform; and - The ability to open and submit standard document formats. Individual internet or device failures shall not ordinarily constitute an obligation upon LawFoyer to repeat an entire live session. Recordings, where available, may be used for academic catch-up. --- ## 33. SESSION RECORDING AND SCREENSHOTS Interns shall not independently record, livestream or redistribute a training session without prior authorisation. Screenshots, photographs or excerpts from sessions shall not be used in a misleading, defamatory, commercial or unauthorised manner. LawFoyer may record sessions for educational, quality, administrative or programme-related purposes. Where appropriate, participants may be informed that the session is being recorded. --- # PART XV — GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS ## 34. NATURE OF THE PROGRAMME The Programme is an **educational and practical internship-training initiative**. Participation in the Programme shall not by itself: - Constitute employment; - Create an employer-employee relationship; - Constitute a promise of future employment; - Guarantee placement; - Guarantee an external internship; - Guarantee publication; - Guarantee a Letter of Recommendation; or - Guarantee selection as a Best Intern. Performance-based opportunities shall remain subject to their separately applicable criteria. --- ## 35. CHANGES TO FACULTY OR MENTORS The names of mentors, trainers or speakers associated with the Programme may be changed where professional commitments, emergencies or operational circumstances require. Where reasonably possible, LawFoyer shall endeavour to ensure that the Programme continues with suitably qualified professionals. A change of mentor or speaker shall not invalidate participation in the Programme. --- ## 36. MODIFICATION OF SCHEDULE LawFoyer reserves the right to reasonably: - Reschedule a session; - Change a session date; - Change a session timing; - Change the meeting platform; - Combine or divide sessions; - Modify an assignment; - Extend a deadline; - Modify programme activities; or - Make other operational adjustments where required for effective administration of the Internship Programme. Relevant changes shall be communicated through the official Internship WhatsApp Group or another designated official channel. --- ## 37. NO GUARANTEE REGARDING SPECIFIC OUTCOMES The learning outcomes of an internship depend significantly upon the intern’s own participation, preparation, practice and effort. LawFoyer does not guarantee that participation alone will result in: - Employment; - Professional qualification; - Regulatory certification; - Mastery of data-protection law; - Selection by an employer; - Publication; or - Any particular professional or academic result. --- ## 38. PROFESSIONAL AND LEGAL DISCLAIMER Training materials, hypothetical problems, mentor discussions and compliance exercises provided during the Programme are intended primarily for **educational and professional training purposes**. They should not be treated as a substitute for: - Independent legal advice; - Professional privacy consulting; - Regulatory advice; or - Advice concerning a specific organisation or factual situation. Any simulated client organisation used during the Programme is intended to facilitate practical learning unless specifically stated otherwise. --- ## 39. FORCE MAJEURE AND UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES LawFoyer shall not be responsible for delay, postponement or disruption resulting from circumstances reasonably beyond its control, including: - Internet or platform outages; - Natural disasters; - Government restrictions; - Medical emergencies; - Serious technical failures; - Unforeseen professional commitments of speakers; - Public emergencies; or - Other force majeure circumstances. Where reasonably practicable, alternative arrangements shall be communicated to interns. --- ## 40. INTERPRETATION If any ambiguity arises regarding the interpretation or application of these Guidelines, the interpretation adopted by **Team LawFoyer for administration of the Internship Programme** shall apply, subject to applicable law. Any exception, relaxation or concession granted in an individual case shall not automatically create a precedent or entitlement for other participants. --- ## 41. AMENDMENT OF GUIDELINES LawFoyer may make reasonable amendments to these Guidelines where necessary for: - Academic improvement; - Regulatory reasons; - Operational requirements; - Technical requirements; - Protection of participants; - Programme administration; or - Any other legitimate programme purpose. Material changes affecting ongoing interns shall be communicated through the official Internship WhatsApp Group or another designated communication channel. --- # PART XVI — IMPORTANT COMPLETION MATRIX RequirementCertificate of InternshipCertificate of Excellence / LOR ConsiderationInternship RegistrationMandatoryMandatoryLive Session Attendance**Minimum 80%****100% Mandatory**Where 8 sessions are held**At least 7/8****8/8**Mandatory AssignmentsAll must be completedAll must be completed properlyCapstone Project, if prescribedMandatoryMandatoryCompliance with DeadlinesRequiredStrongly assessedQuality of WorkSatisfactoryExcellentProfessional ConductMandatoryMandatoryParticipation & EngagementExpectedAssessedMentor/Evaluator AssessmentSatisfactoryExcellent overall assessmentAutomatic entitlement?Only after meeting completion requirements**No — merit-based selection**--- # PART XVII — KEY POINTS EVERY INTERN MUST REMEMBER 1. The Programme is of **one-month duration**. 2. There will ordinarily be **eight live training sessions**. 3. Sessions will **usually be conducted on weekends**, generally during evening hours. 4. The **exact session schedule and related details will be communicated through the official WhatsApp Group**. 5. Interns must complete the mandatory registration process and use their allotted **Intern ID**, wherever required. 6. **Minimum 80% live attendance is mandatory for the Certificate of Internship.** 7. Where eight sessions are conducted, an intern must ordinarily attend **at least seven sessions**. 8. **All mandatory assignments must be completed** for successful completion of the Internship Programme. 9. Recordings will ordinarily be provided, but watching a recording does **not ordinarily substitute live attendance**. 10. Interns must maintain professional behaviour with mentors, organisers and fellow interns. 11. Plagiarism, fabricated research, proxy attendance and unauthorised sharing of recordings are prohibited. 12. **Certificate of Excellence and Letter of Recommendation are reserved for Best Interns.** 13. To be considered for the Certificate of Excellence/LOR, **100% live-session attendance and proper completion of all mandatory assignments are minimum requirements**. 14. Meeting those minimum requirements does **not automatically guarantee** a Certificate of Excellence or LOR; overall performance will be evaluated. 15. Performance-based opportunities, including any Top-3 offline internship opportunity, remain subject to final evaluation and applicable conditions. --- ## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND ACCEPTANCE By registering for and participating in the **LawFoyer One-Month Virtual Internship Training Programme in Data Privacy Law and Compliance**, the intern confirms that they have read, understood and agreed to comply with these Internship Guidelines and Terms and Conditions. Every intern is expected to approach the Programme with **professionalism, integrity, curiosity, discipline and a genuine willingness to learn and apply the principles of privacy law and regulatory compliance**. **Team LawFoyer** *Making Legal Education Practical, Accessible and Industry-Relevant* --- ### [Privacy Policy](https://lawfoyer.in/privacy-policy/) **Published:** January 16, 2021 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## **1. Preamble and Scope of the Privacy Policy** This Privacy Policy is being issued by **LawFoyer**, a premier and internationally recognized legal education and information platform headquartered at Lucknow, India. LawFoyer has established itself as a trusted and authoritative source of knowledge in the field of law and legal education. Through its multiple platforms, including but not limited to **lawfoyer.in**, **news.lawfoyer.in**, **academy.lawfoyer.in**, **lijdlr.com**, and other domains and sub-domains under its effective control, management, and supervision, LawFoyer has consistently provided comprehensive services in the realm of legal education, including the conduct of workshops, webinars, bootcamps, academic courses, national and international competitions, internships, training programs, publishing opportunities, legal news, case analyses, and academic articles. This Privacy Policy is to safeguard the privacy rights of every user, participant, subscriber, researcher, and visitor of the above-mentioned platforms. The policy not only reflects LawFoyer’s commitment to protecting personal data but also demonstrates its compliance with applicable Indian law, including the **Information Technology Act, 2000**, the **Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules, 2011**, the **Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021**, and the recently enacted **Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023**, which is soon to be brought into operation. Furthermore, the drafting of this Privacy Policy is guided by the constitutional recognition of privacy as a **fundamental right** under Article 21 of the Constitution of India as pronounced by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in *Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)*. The scope of this Privacy Policy extends to all forms of data collected and processed by LawFoyer across its platforms, whether the data pertains to registered students, guest users, authors, researchers, or any third party interacting with the platform. The policy is binding upon every individual accessing or availing LawFoyer’s services and is to be read in harmony with the Terms of Service which form an integral part of the legal framework governing the relationship between LawFoyer and its users. ## **2. Collection of Personal Data and Information** LawFoyer, being a digital-first legal education entity, necessarily collects certain categories of information from its users for the purposes of identification, registration, academic participation, publication, certification, and compliance with legal obligations. The categories of information collected include, but are not limited to, name, contact details such as email and phone number, academic qualifications, professional background, user-generated content such as articles, blogs, and research papers, device information including IP address, browsing patterns, operating system, and cookies, as well as transactional information including payment metadata for course enrolments, subscriptions, or competition registrations. Sensitive personal data such as passwords or financial information is collected only where strictly necessary and always with explicit consent. In line with the directives of the Reserve Bank of India, LawFoyer does not store credit card or debit card numbers on its servers. All such data is processed through RBI-compliant payment gateways that utilize **tokenisation** and **card-on-file regulations**. This ensures that LawFoyer is fully compliant with RBI’s framework on recurring payments and e-mandates. The data collection process at LawFoyer is always accompanied by due intimation and a requirement for informed consent. Users are made aware of the purposes for which their data is being collected and are provided with the choice to either consent to or decline the collection of such information. In cases where consent is not granted, LawFoyer reserves the right to restrict access to those services which are dependent upon the processing of such data. ## **3. Purpose and Use of Personal Data** LawFoyer uses personal data strictly in accordance with lawful purposes, ensuring that such use is limited, proportionate, and necessary to achieve the intended objectives. The primary purposes for which data is processed include enabling seamless access to LawFoyer’s educational services, managing registrations for events and academic competitions, facilitating peer-reviewed publications, processing lawful financial transactions, issuing receipts and law compliant invoices, publishing academic contributions, providing users with newsletters and legal updates, and ensuring compliance with statutory mandates including those under **CERT-In Directions, 2022** which require the retention of information and communication technology system logs for a minimum period of 180 days within India. LawFoyer also processes data for ensuring security of its platforms, fraud detection, cybersecurity incident management, and to comply with directions of law enforcement authorities and competent courts of law. Marketing communications, including emails and newsletters relating to academic opportunities, may also be sent to users who have voluntarily opted to receive such communications, with an option to withdraw such consent at any point of time. ## **4. Consent, Legal Bases, and Withdrawal of Consent** All data processing activities at LawFoyer are undertaken on the basis of clear, specific, and informed consent provided by the users, except where the processing is necessary for compliance with legal obligations, enforcement of contractual rights, or protection of legitimate interests of LawFoyer. The consent sought is free from coercion, unambiguous, and capable of being withdrawn by the user at any time. ## **5. Web Tracking and Analytical Technologies** In order to enhance user experience and ensure efficient operation of its platforms, LawFoyer uses lawful web-tracking technologies. These web-tracking technologies may be session-based or persistent and may include functional cookies that enable navigation, analytical cookies that allow LawFoyer to monitor usage trends and advertising that facilitate relevant academic promotions. LawFoyer ensures that no web-tracking web-tracking technologies operates in a manner inconsistent with Indian law and that all such technologies are employed with transparency and consent. ## **6. Sharing, Transfer, and Disclosure of Data** LawFoyer may share user data with third-party processors including cloud service providers, IT vendors, payment aggregators, and academic partners, provided that all such entities are bound by confidentiality obligations and contractual clauses ensuring the lawful and secure processing of data. LawFoyer does not sell user data to third parties under any circumstances. Cross-border transfers of data may take place where servers or service providers are located outside India. Such transfers are made only in accordance with applicable Indian law, including the DPDP Act, which contemplates government notifications restricting certain jurisdictions. Until such restrictions are in force, LawFoyer assures users that adequate contractual and technical safeguards will be employed to protect user data irrespective of its geographical location. ## **7. Data Retention and Security Practices** LawFoyer retains personal data only for as long as is necessary to fulfill the specific purposes for which the data was collected or to comply with applicable laws. For example, payment and financial records may be retained for audit and taxation purposes, while academic contributions may be retained for archival and indexing purposes in LawFoyer’s ISSN-recognized journal. Security measures adopted by LawFoyer conform to globally recognized standards, including **IS/ISO/IEC 27001**, and involve encryption of sensitive information, firewalls, restricted access to personal data, and routine security audits. In compliance with **CERT-In Directions, 2022**, ICT logs are retained within India for a minimum of 180 days, and cybersecurity incidents are reported to CERT-In within the prescribed timelines. ## **8. Rights of Users** LawFoyer respects the rights of its users over their personal data. Users are entitled to exercise their right to access, correct, update, and erase their personal data. They may also request data portability wherever technically feasible and legally permissible. Furthermore, users have the right to withdraw consent and to register grievances with the designated Grievance Officer. With the notification of the DPDP Act, users will further enjoy the right to nominate a representative to exercise their rights in case of incapacity or death. LawFoyer has established internal mechanisms to address such rights requests within statutory timelines. Requests may be submitted to the Grievance Officer through email communication. ## **9. Grievance Redressal and Data Protection Officer** To ensure transparency and accountability, LawFoyer has appointed a **Grievance Officer cum Data Protection Officer (DPO)** whose contact details are as follows: **Grievance Officer** Mr. Amal Singh Email: Phone: +91 9044790516 Timings: Monday to Saturday, 10:00 AM to 6:00 PM IST In compliance with the **Consumer Protection (E-Commerce) Rules, 2020**, all grievances shall be acknowledged within **48 hours** and resolved within **30 days**. ## **10. Modifications to the Privacy Policy** LawFoyer reserves the absolute right to amend or update this Privacy Policy from time to time to reflect legislative changes, judicial pronouncements, or operational necessities. Users shall be notified of any material modifications through the platform website and continued use of the services post such via platform website shall be deemed as consent to the amended policy. --- ### [LawFoyer’s Self-Paced Virtual Internship Training Program Guidelines](https://lawfoyer.in/lawfoyers-self-paced-internship-training-program-guidelines/) **Published:** April 28, 2026 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## LawFoyer’s Self-Paced Virtual Internship Training Program Guidelines ## About LawFoyer LawFoyer is a student-centered legal education and information portal focused on empowering the next generation of legal professionals. We provide law students with free access to a broad range of resources including the latest news on legal job opportunities, exam study materials, career guidance straight from industry experts, and much more. LawFoyer’s intiative include LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research \[LIJDLR\] which is a peer-reviewed ISSN indexed Open Access International Law Journal indexed at 350+ International Libraries and Databases including, inter alia, Harvard HOLLIS Library, Oxford SOLO Library, LSE, Manupatra, CrossRef and many more; LawFoyer Academy which aims at making legal education easy and affordable for all; LawFoyer Connect which provides real – time updates on latest legal internship and job opportunities; LawFoyer Law Library which provides access to Articles, Case Analyses, Law Subject Notes, Skill Specific Guidebooks, and wide range of free resources. Central to our mission is nurturing law students’ talents. LawFoyer organizes National legal writing competitions, quizzes, and other contests open to students across the country. These competitions offer platforms for participants to showcase their skills, win exciting prizes, and gain visibility within the legal community. This Self-Paced virtual internship training program is a part of our *pro bono* educational initiatives fostering the larger mission to empower young legal minds and to foster amongst them – the spirit of contributing to a “*Viksit Bharat*“! ## Our Internship Partners and Instructors Eximius Law Partners LLP is a full-service law firm registered under the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008, providing exceptional legal services in Delhi NCR. With a team of experienced advocates led by Adv. Mr. Bipin Kumar (25+ years of experience) and Adv. Mr. Suresh Chandra Sharma (Advocate on Record at Supreme Court with 18+ years of experience), the firm offer comprehensive legal solutions across corporate, banking, real estate, and litigation practices. The law firm stands on the pillars of professional integrity, client-centric approach, and result-oriented strategies. The firm takes pride in maintaining the highest standards of legal practice while ensuring accessible and practical solutions for their clients. Their team’s extensive experience in various legal domains enables us to provide nuanced and effective legal counsel tailored to each client’s unique needs. The esteemed Law Firm is specialized in Corporate Law, Banking Law, Real Estate, Consumer Law, Arbitration & Mediation Law, IPR, NCLAT Matters, Writ Petitions, Civil Law, and Constitutional Law Matters. The Firm has represented its clients in numerous forums across India including the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and Hon’ble Delhi High Court. This Self Paced Internship Training Program is being designed, structured and created under the aegis, guidance, mentorship of and in collaboration with industry experts from Eximius Law Partners LLP as well as other working professionals practicing at Hon’ble Supreme Court and at various Hon’ble High Courts including, Advocates on Record. The instructors have imparted rigorous and in-depth trainings to interns on legal research, legal writing, advanced legal drafting and utilization of modern legal technology. This Self Paced Internship Training Program aims to impart practical legal training to law students and law graduates with an added advantage of remote and flexible learning. ## LawFoyer and Its Vision LawFoyer has the following vision: - Making Law easy and accessible for all - Making Legal Education and Practical Training affordable - Promoting the use of AI and Modern Tech in Law - Creating Employment Opportunities for Law Students and Law Graduates by networking stakeholders ## What will we Cover? In LawFoyer’s Self Paced Internship Training Programme we will cover: - Expert Led Training Sessions on Advanced Legal Drafting Methods *(Self Paced)* - Expert Led Training Sessions on Legal Research, Legal Writing and Techniques of Efficient Legal Practice in the Higher Courts *(Self Paced)* - Expert Led Training Sessions on Using Artificial Intelligence and Modern Tech for Legal Research, Writing, Drafting and Practical Legal Work *(Self Paced)* ## Internship Curriculum and Structure **Module 1**: Introduction and Induction Training *(Recorded)* **Module 2**: Expert Led Trainings Sessions on Legal Drafting and Practice in Higher Courts *(Recorded)* **Module 3**: Case Finding, Reading, Analysis, and Briefs *(Recorded)* **Module 4**: Legal Research and Writing *(Recorded)* **Module 5**: Citations, Proofreading and Formatting Fundamentals *(Recorded)* **Module 6**: Acing Academics, Ethics and Legal Tactics *(Recorded)* **Bonus Workshops** on Mooting and Trial Advocacy; Mediation Law of India; Supercharging Litigation and Academics with AI, and many more *(Recorded)* ## Eligibility for Internship & About LPAT Any Law Student studying law in any law college or university recognized by Bar Council of India or University Grants Commission of India is eligible to apply. Any law student willing to apply for this Self Paced Internship Training Program may send an email to along with CV and Cover Letter. (**Note**: The subject of the application mail shall be “*Application for LawFoyer’s Self Paced Internship Training Program*“). LawFoyer may invite internship applications from time-to-time and may also notify some other methods of applying for the Internship – in such case – the applications made via such notified method will also be duly considered. (**Note**: The internship will be notified via this page only: ). Upon Receipt the Internship Applications will be either Approved or will be Rejected. Upon approval of the Internship Application, in case a huge volume of applications are received for a particular month – then – a ***LawFoyer’s Preliminary Assessment Test (LPAT)*** may be conducted, which will be the basis of shortlisting the candidates for the LawFoyer’s Self Paced Internship Training Program for that particular month. This MCQ test of 120 Marks will be designed to evaluate your basic understanding of law, legal reasoning, and related skills. It is mandatory to score atleast 75% marks (atleast 90 out of 120) to qualify for the Internship Training Program. The decision of LawFoyer regarding the results of LPAT and selection of interns will be final. The date on which the Test is to be conducted will be notified to all the Applicants via Mail and Internship Updates WhatsApp Group. Please read the following details regarding LPAT: #### Test Format 1. The test will consist of 30 Multiple Choice Questions (MCQs). 2. Each question has four options (a, b, c, d), out of which only one is correct. 3. All questions carry equal marks of 4 points each. 4. The total marks for the test are 120 (30 questions × 4 marks). #### Time Limit - You have 25 minutes to complete the entire test. - You will have to manage your time wisely. It’s recommended to spend about 1 minute per question. #### Scoring - Each correct answer will earn you 4 marks. - There is no negative marking for incorrect answers. - Unattempted questions will receive zero marks. #### Question Types The test includes a variety of question types: - Application of law to practical scenarios for testing Legal Acument and Aptitude (Ability to Learn and Apply Law) - Basic legal knowledge - Legal Reasoning - Logical Reasoning - Mathematical and Quantitative aptitude - General knowledge of legal research, writing, drafting, and legal technology - MS Word features relevant to legal work - Basic understanding of legal internship ## Internship Perks - Certificate of Internship and Letter of Recommendation to all Interns - Certificate of Excellence and Social Media Shoutout to Best Interns - Offline Internship Opportunity to Top 3 Excellent Performers of the Batch at Supreme Court of India with Eximius Legal at their Chambers in New Delhi. - Certificate of Publication for each Publication with [LawFoyer](https://lawfoyer.in/) and [LIJDLR \[LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research\]](https://lijdlr.com/) & Discounted Publication Opportunity with LIJDLR. - Exclusive Access to Recorded Training Sessions, Courses & Doubt Sessions curated only for Interns with a personalized LMS Dashboard at [LawFoyer Academy](https://academy.lawfoyer.in/) - 50+ AI and Non-AI Tools for use in Legal Practice - LawFoyer Membership and Paid Opportunities to Interns showcasing par excellence performance (at LawFoyer’s Discretion and on the basis of Due Analysis of Intern’s Work) - **Note:** This is an unpaid internship, no stipend of monetary perks are payable to any Intern. This is merely a Free Training Program for Law Students where they can master the basics of Litigation and Practice under the Guidance of esteemed Professionals of the Bar and can gain more knowledge of legal research, writing , drafting and practice than an offline internship may provide. ## Internship Guidelines **A. Guidelines for Interns** - Be a Good Learner - Ask Queries and Clarify Doubts - Strive to Complete all mandatory Assignments according to the Guidelines (*as specified from time to time*) - Strive to Complete all Modules of the Internship LMS Portal / Course, which will be provided to all the Interns - Use and practice the tools and techniques that will be taught - Submit assignments before Deadline (*as specified from time to time*) - It is Mandatory to go through at least 75% of the Recorded Training Sessions / Doubt Sessions - The code of conduct shall be formal and no misbehavior with any Team Member or any Co-Intern will be tolerated - Follow LawFoyer’s Social Media Channels to Stay Updated regarding Internship updates, notifications, opportunities and shoutouts. - Provide Honest Qualitative Review of Internship Training Program on Completion of Internship Training Program for Qualitative Improvement of the Training Program. - Strive to be socially proactive during the internship by engaging in social proactivity tasks during the Internship Tenure. **B. Attendance** - It is mandatory to go through at least 75% of the Recorded Training Sessions / Workshops / Doubt Sessions via the Internship’s LMS Dashboard provided via LawFoyer Academy. - Attendance will be recorded Automatically as soon as a particular session is watched completely and marked as completed. **C. Internship Registration, Tenure, & Self Paced Sessions** - All the Applicants who will qualify the LPAT Test with atleast 75% score will recieve a separate mail on Final Approval of their Internship after being short-listed and they may join the notified Internship Batch’s WhatsApp Group (*the link of which will be provided in the Mail, by or before the Internship Commencement Date notified in the Approval mail*). - All the short listed interns will be assigned a Mentor from whom they can directly ask and resolve their queries and can easily coordinate to seek help as and when needed. The details of the Mentor assigned will be shared via Mail to the Interns itself. - All short listed interns will also be provided with FREE Access to our Recorded Internship Trainings on the LMS Dashboard of LawFoyer Academy. - It is **mandatory for every intern to register** as an intern using the **internship registration form** which will be notified in the group. - Post registration, every registered intern will be alloted and mailed a **unique legal researcher code** which shall be used by the intern while submitting the assignments during internship. \[**Note:** This code is alloted to ensure privacy of intern during internship.\] - The internship tenure will be of 28 days from the date of registration of intern (as per Standard BCI Norms). It can be extended on request of the intern or if such extension is deemed fit for holistic development of the interns. - There will be various Self Paced Pre Recorded Training Sessions and if needed, Separate Live Sessions or Live Doubt Sessions maybe conducted – on unanimous request of the interns – during the internship tenure on advanced legal drafting and practice in Higher Courts. - All the internship guidelines shall be binding on all the interns and shall be duly adhered during the internship tenure. **D. Mandatory Internship Assessment Tests** **/ Assignment(s)**: - In case, a huge number of Interns are shortlisted for the Self Paced Internship Training Program, LawFoyer may either conduct *“**Two Mandatory Assessment Tests”*** of the Interns during the course of Internship ***or*** may also specify practical *“**Assignments**”* during the course of Internship. - The Team ***LawFoyer reserves the right to dispense with the condition of Mandatory Tests*** and ***may allow*** eligibility for Internship Certificate ***merely on submission on required Assignment(s)***. - The Team LawFoyer may at its sole discretion exempt some or all interns from the aforementioned condition in exceptional situations subject to submission of the specified assignment within 60 days counted from the date on which such exemption was so granted. - ***To be eligible for Certificate of Internship the Intern needs to either Qualify these mandatory assessment tests with minimum 50% Marks in each Assessment Test or Submit the Assignment mandated by the Team LawFoyer for being eligible for Internship Certificate.*** - In case 2 Mandatory Assessment Tests are conducted, the Format, Structure and Curriculum of the Mandatory Assessment Tests will be as follows: - **First Mandatory Internship Assessment Test (*related to the Self Paced Sessions on Advanced Legal Drafting conducted by Mentors from Eximius Legal*)**: - This will be an MCQ Test consisting of **25 Multiple Choice Questions** of **4 Marks each** and no negative marking for wrong answers. In toto, this will be a 100 Marks MCQ Test which will aim to test “whether the Intern has diligently watched the recordings of Sessions on Advanced Legal Drafting conducted by our Internship Partners and Professionals during the internship or not?” - This Test will consist of questions based on learnings from all the Self Paced Sessions on Advanced Legal Drafting related provided in the LMS Dashboard of the Internship Training Program. - This test will be conducted on the date designated by Team LawFoyer which will also be notified to all the Interns at least 48 hours before the date of test. - This will be a Timed Test and **20 Minutes** will be provided for attempting this Test. - **To qualify this Test, an Intern must score minimum 50% marks (i.e. 50 out of 100 Marks)**. - **Advisory Note for Interns:** Interns will be advised to create handwritten or typed notes of all the Self Paced Sessions for quick revision before the Assessment Test. - **Second Mandatory Internship Assessment Test (*related to the Self-Paced Modules on Advanced Legal Research , Case Finding, Legal Writing, Using Legal Technology, and Modern Methods of Legal Drafting) in the Internship LMS Portal*)**: - This will be an MCQ Test consisting of **25 Multiple Choice Questions** of **4 Marks each** and no negative marking for wrong answers. In toto, this will be a 100 Marks MCQ Test which will aim to test “whether the Intern has diligently watched or studied from the Recorded Self-Paced sessions of the Internship LMS Portal on Legal Research, Case Finding, Legal Technology, Legal Writing or not?” - This Test will consist of questions based on learnings from all the Self-Paced Recorded Sessions provide in the Internship LMS Portal during the Internship Training Program. - This test will be conducted on the date designated by Team LawFoyer which will also be notified to all the Interns at least 48 hours before the date of test. - This will be a Timed Test and **20 Minutes** will be provided for attempting this Test. - **To qualify this Test, an Intern must score minimum 50% marks (i.e. 50 out of 100 Marks)**. - **Advisory Note for Interns:** Interns will be advised to create handwritten or typed notes of all the Self-Paced Sessions in the Internship LMS Portal for quick revision before the Assessment Test. **E. Assignments (Practical Assignments – which might be assigned to the Interns):** - During your internship tenure, the Team LawFoyer **may** at its discretion allow the Interns to submit either of the following assignments ***instead of*** / **or** / ***in addition to*** The ***Mandatory Assessment Tests*** (as the case maybe): - **Assignment Type 1**: **Notes of any 4 Self Paced Sessions of Internship LMS** (*Details will be shared by Internship Mentor or via Internship Group* *or via LMS *Dashboard**) - **Assignment Type 2: Drafting of Legal Documents as taught in the Self Paced Modules** (*Details will be shared by Internship Mentor or via Internship Group* *or via LMS *Dashboard**) - **Assignment Type 3: Legal Research & Writing Assignment** **Task** (*Details will be shared by Internship Mentor or via Internship Group* *or via LMS Dashboard*) - Common Guidelines for Assignment Submission: - Interns shall draft assignments in MS Word (docx. format) and submit it using Assignment Forms or via Mail – as maybe directed / specified by the Internship Mentor or via Internship Group. - This Assignments shall be submitted before the “Ultimate Deadline” notified to the Interns via the above-mentioned WhatsApp Group or as notified by the Internship Mentor. - This Assignments shall be created ONLY using the respective “Assignment Templates” attached in the “Exercise Files” of the “Practical Assignments Module” of the Internship LMS Portal or such other templates as shared and provided by the Internship Mentor or via Internship Group. Specific Templates may be shared by Team LawFoyer for specific assignment types. - Font Style: Times New Roman; Font Size: 12 for Normal text, 14 for Headings; Headings shall be bold and center-aligned, notes can be in pointers to keep it brief; there is no word limit. - Time Allotted for submission of each assignment: **7 days** from the date of conclusion of the Self Paced Internship Training Program **or such date** as may be **notified as “Ultimate Deadline”** in the Internship Group, whichever is later. - In case of “*Assignment Type 2: Drafting of Legal Documents*“, an Intern will be required to submit a Legal Draft of a particular legal document (as taught in the self paced sessions) – based on a hypothetical case problem which will be provided by the LawFoyer in the “Practical Assignments” Module, as instructed by the Internship Mentor or as instructed in the Internship Group. The relevant Legal Draft Templates, Guidelines and Hypothetical Case Problem for drafting this Legal Document will either be attached or provided in the Practical Assignments Module of the LMS Portal, or will be shared with interns in the Internship Group, as per the Discretion of Team LawFoyer. - **Rejection of Practical Assignment:** - **First Rejection of Practical Assignment:** If the assignment is rejected for the first time, a review mail stating corrections and suggestions will be mailed to the intern. - **Second Rejection** **of Practical Assignment**: If the assignment is rejected for the second time, a review mail along with suggestions will be mailed to the intern with a notice to submit the corrected assignment within 3 days. - **Third Rejection of Practical Assignment:** If the assignment is rejected for the third time, a review mail along with a final review will be issued to the intern. No submission is entertained for review after Third Rejection. - **Absolute Rejection of Late Submissions:** If the assignment is submitted after the prescribed ultimate deadline, the assignment is by itself rejected, and no review mail is sent to such intern for the assignment submitted. - On every review, the editorial team of LawFoyer reviewing the assignments, might award the following kinds of remarks for review of drafts: “(1) Excellent; (2) Very Good; and (3) Good”. - **Certificate of Excellence**: - Interns showcasing excellent performance in assignments or scoring more than 70% in either of the Mandatory Assessment Tests will be awarded with the **Certificate of Excellence**. - ***Excellent Performers*** of Internship Program ***will be granted FREE Access to Premium Courses of LawFoyer Academy*** including: (1) Advanced Certification Course on Supercharging Litigation and Academics with AI; and (2) Advanced Certification Course on Legal Research and Writing. - **Social Proactivity Tasks (Optional) and Certificate of Appreciation:** - LawFoyer may also notify some additional **“Social Proactivity Tasks”** such as creating a professional LinkedIn Profile, creating a professional CV and Cover Letter, sharing learnings from Self Paced Modules / Internship on LinkedIn and other activities on Social Media Channels. - The Method, Mode, Format, Deadline and other Important instructions for completing such tasks will be notified to the Interns via Internship Group created for this purpose. - After the completion of such tasks, the interns will be required to mandatorily fill the **Task Completion Form** which will be shared with the Task notification itself. - After the Completion of Internship Tenure, the final report will be prepared by Team LawFoyer to review and revaluate that which of the Interns have completed the Social Proactivity Tasks, and such interns will be awarded a “**Certificate of Appreciation**” for being socially active and contributing to LawFoyer’s growth. This Certificate of Appreciation will be distinct from “*Certificate of Excellence*“. **F. Learning Management System (LMS) Portal for Interns** - **Q. What is LMS?** - It is a Learning Management System on which the interns will be provided with exclusive access to the recorded lessons and a lot of free learning resources including: - Self Paced Learning Modules containing Recordings of Previously Conducted Live Sessions of this Internship - Module-wise pre-recorded video lessons on Legal Research, Writing, Drafting and using Modern Legal Tech - E-Books, Notes, Resources, & Important links - Training Videos on Important Tools and Techniques - Webinars & Workshop recordings - Other details regarding the LMS will be shared in the Internship Group - **Q. How will it benefit Interns?** - 24\*7 access to lessons to clarify doubts & strengthen skills - Aids in preparation for Mandatory Internship Assessment Tests - Aids completion of practical assignments before deadline (if opted for submission) - Increases efficiency of work as you can revise concepts and methods easily and that too at anytime, anywhere - **NOT EVERYONE WILL GET THE ACCESS TO LMS!** - **Q. Who will get Access?** - ONLY the registered intern who will successfully pass the **LPAT Test** with alteast 75% score as stated and described before, will get access to LMS. - Access will be REVOKED on termination of internship. - Access will be REVOKED after completion of internship tenure. - **Q. How to get Access?** - Team LawFoyer will notify the method of accessing the LMS to all Interns via a training video and a detailed guideline which will be shared on the group - **Q. When can an Intern accessit?** - After clearing and passing the LPAT Test with atleast 75% score; AND - After registration as an Intern using link provided in the group. - **Q. What if an Internfails the LPAT Test?** - No access of LMS will be provided that case; AND - Guidelines related to Internship Eligibility will apply in that case. **G.** **Action on Non-Compliance** **Internship will be immediately terminated on:** - failing to attend meetings or timely watch Recorded Modules on LMS Dashboard; - failing the Mandatory Internship Assessment Tests by scoring less than 50% Marks in any test; - non-submission of assignment before deadline; - not correcting the errors notified via mail to the intern by Editorial Team before Deadline; - misbehaving with any team member of LawFoyer; - misbehaving with any other intern during internship; - breach of any terms and conditions of Internship notified to the Interns on Internship Group or otherwise by any other means of communication. **Exceptions:** - In case of unforeseen emergencies no termination will take effect; - On showing sufficient cause for any non-compliance, the intern will be excused; - If recording of the sessions are completely watched on LMS immediately after missing such session / meeting; - If assignments which were delayed are submitted anytime before completion of internship tenure after showing sufficient cause for such delay; - If a Supplementary Mandatory Internship Assessment Test is organised for such Interns who failed to attain the Minimum Marks (i.e. 50% Marks) in the Test for being eligible for the Internship Certificate. (**Note:** This discretionary power is only vested with Team LawFoyer, which shall only be exercised in consultation with and with permission of Eximius Legal. This power shall be excercised sparingly and in exceptional circumstances only). - If such compliance is waivered voluntarily by LawFoyer or by breach of Guideline by LawFoyer. **Effect of Termination** - Intern will be removed from all Internship Groups. - Intern will not be entitled to any perks of internship except: - Certificate of Publications (if any, due) - Review of Assignments Submitted (if any, due) - Result of Mandatory Internship Assessment Tests (if any, conducted before such Termination came into effect) **Features on Social Media and Shoutouts** **to Excellent Performers** - Excellent Performers of the Internship include all the following categories of performers and all the excellent performers will be given social media shoutout and exceptionally outstanding works of Interns may be featured on the Social Media handles of LawFoyer, at the discretion of LawFoyer. - **Excellent Performers:** - A list of Excellent Performers will be featured on the Social Media handles after the results of both Mandatory Internship Assessment Tests is announced and as soon as the Internship comes to an end. - A cumulative List of Excellent Performers will also be featured on Social Media handles after completion of Internship Tenure and it shall be named “Excellent Performers of the Month”. - Criteria for this title: This title is accorded to an Intern when the score in any of intern’s Mandatory Internship Assessment Tests is more than 90% or secures “Excellent” remark in any of the submitted assignment(s). - **Budding Lawyers**: - A list of Budding Lawyers will be featured too on the Social Media handles after the results of both Mandatory Internship Assessment Tests is announced and as soon as the Internship comes to an end. - A cumulative list of Budding Lawyers will also be featured on Social Media handles after completion of Internship Tenure and it shall be named “Budding Lawyers of the Month”. - Criteria for this title: This title is accorded to an Intern when the score in any of intern’s Mandatory Internship Assessment Tests is more than 80% but less than 90% or secures “Very Good” remark in any of the submitted assignment(s). - **Diligent Learners:** - A list of Diligent Learners will be featured too on the Social Media handles after completion of Reviews of each of the Assignments. - A cumulative list of Diligent learners will also be featured on Social Media handles after completion of Internship Tenure and it shall be named “Diligent Learners of the Month”. - Criteria for this title: This title is accorded to an Intern when the score in any of intern’s Mandatory Internship Assessment Tests is more than 70% but less than 80% or secures “Good” remark in any of the submitted assignment(s). **G. Guidelines for LawFoyer** - A mandatory notice of non-compliance shall be provided to intern before termination - An opportunity to show sufficient cause and to be heard shall be provided to every intern before termination - A reasonable notice of the following shall be provided to award sufficient opportunity to interns for: - conduction of meetings (at least 12 hours before such meeting) - conduction of Mandatory Internship Assessment Test (at least 3 days before conduction of such Test) - submission of practical assignment (at least 7 days before deadline of submission) - correction of mistakes in practical assignment reviewed (at least 4 days before completion of internship tenure) - The above-given guidelines shall not be binding on LawFoyer and are merely directory in nature, final discretion of taking any / all decisions regarding the internship training programme is vested with LawFoyer ONLY. --- ### [Free Legal Drafting AI Tool by LawFoyer - Nyay Sarthak](https://lawfoyer.in/nyay-sarthak/) **Published:** June 4, 2026 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** LawFoyer’s Nyay Sarthak | Free Legal Drafting Web Application Free Legal Drafting Web Application # LawFoyer’s Nyay Sarthak A simple legal drafting gateway for students, advocates, researchers, and professionals. Press Start, sign in with your own Google Account, allow the required permissions, and begin using the drafting application. Start → **1 Click** Start button for app launch **Google Sign-In** Use your own Opal account **Free Drafting** Built for practical legal work ## Start legal drafting with a guided access flow. FREE APP 1 **Press Start**The app opens in a secure application window. 2 **Sign in securely**Use your personal Google account directly with Google. 3 **Allow required permissions**Approve only the permissions shown by Google for this app. 4 **Begin drafting**Use Nyay Sarthak for structured and practical legal drafting assistance. Status: Waiting for user to press Start. ## Use LawFoyer’s Nyay Sarthak Some secure login systems block direct iframe rendering in many browsers. This page therefore avoids the broken embedded frame and opens the app through a secure Start flow. LawFoyer’s Nyay Sarthak Start ⚖️ ### Start the free legal drafting app Press Start to open LawFoyer’s Nyay Sarthak through Google. The LawFoyer page will remain open for the user. ✓Sign in with the user’s own Google account. ✓Allow all mandatory permissions requested by Google. ✓Return to this LawFoyer page anytime during drafting. Start → Your browser blocked the app window. Please allow pop-ups for this LawFoyer page, then press Start again. Disclaimer: This tool may commit errors. Kindly review, verify, and edit every draft carefully before using it. --- ### [Terms & Conditions](https://lawfoyer.in/terms-conditions/) **Published:** May 25, 2021 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **TERMS OF SERVICE** :- ## **1. Preamble and Binding Nature of the Terms** These Terms of Service constitute a legally binding agreement between **LawFoyer**, having its registered office at Lucknow, India, and every person who accesses or uses its platforms, including but not limited to **lawfoyer.in**, **academy.lawfoyer.in**, **news.lawfoyer.in**, **lijdlr.com**, and any other domain, sub-domain, or application operated under the effective control, supervision, and management of LawFoyer. The terms set forth herein govern the use of all services, whether such services pertain to academic workshops, bootcamps, journal publications, online courses, internship training programs, research paper competitions, legal news services, or any other product or offering provided by LawFoyer. By accessing LawFoyer’s platforms, browsing the content, registering for any program, submitting contributions for publication, or availing any paid or unpaid service, the user expressly acknowledges that he or she has read, understood, and agreed to be bound by these Terms of Service. These Terms shall apply equally to individuals accessing the platform for free as well as to those availing paid subscriptions, competitions, or services. The Terms also incorporate the **Privacy Policy**, which shall be deemed an inseparable component of this agreement, and together they form the complete contractual relationship between LawFoyer and the user. ## **2. Eligibility, Legal Capacity, and Registration Obligations** It is a fundamental requirement that all users accessing LawFoyer’s services must have legal capacity to contract within the meaning of the **Indian Contract Act, 1872**. Minors below the age of eighteen years shall be permitted to use LawFoyer’s services only with the knowledge and verifiable consent of their parents or lawful guardians. The user represents and warrants that all information furnished during registration, including name, contact details, academic qualifications, and professional background, is true, complete, and accurate. LawFoyer reserves the right to suspend or terminate access if it is discovered that the user has furnished false information, impersonated another individual, or otherwise acted in violation of these Terms. Users are responsible for maintaining the confidentiality of their account credentials and for all activities that occur under their accounts. LawFoyer disclaims any liability for damages arising from unauthorized use of an account due to negligence of the user in maintaining security of login credentials. ## **3. Nature of Services and Disclaimer of Legal Advice** LawFoyer’s mission is to democratize legal education and provide access to high-quality legal knowledge through digital and academic means. Services include workshops, webinars, bootcamps, courses, publication opportunities on its website and in its **International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research**, legal news and updates, internship and job opportunities, case commentaries, and academic blogs. Notwithstanding the academic nature of the services, LawFoyer categorically states that none of the content published on its platforms, whether authored by LawFoyer or by third-party contributors, constitutes legal advice. The content is intended solely for educational and informational purposes. LawFoyer does not provide legal representation, does not create an attorney-client relationship with any user, and shall not be held liable for any reliance placed upon the educational material published on its platforms. Users are expressly advised to consult a duly qualified legal professional before acting upon any legal matter. ## **4. User-Generated Content, Submissions, Intellectual Property** and Content Retention LawFoyer provides opportunities for users to submit academic content including research articles, blogs, case analyses, and competition entries. By making such submissions, the user grants LawFoyer a **worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free, perpetual, and irrevocable license** to host, publish, distribute, reproduce, and archive the submitted content across all its platforms, databases, partner repositories, and indexing services. LawFoyer retains editorial control and reserves the right to accept, reject, edit, or remove user submissions at its sole discretion, without the requirement to furnish reasons. By submitting content, the user represents and warrants that the work is original, free from plagiarism, not infringing upon intellectual property rights of third parties, and compliant with academic integrity. Users indemnify LawFoyer against all claims, liabilities, and damages arising from third-party allegations of infringement, plagiarism, or unlawful content. All proprietary content created and published by LawFoyer, including study material, curated notes, case analyses, headnotes, editorial enhancements, design, logos, and branding, are protected under the **Copyright Act, 1957** and the **Trademarks Act, 1999**. Users are strictly prohibited from reproducing, republishing, scraping, or commercially exploiting such proprietary content without express written authorization. Unauthorized reproduction shall invite civil as well as criminal liability under applicable Indian law. If any ree/short is posted by LawFoyer on any of its social media channels, communities or other channels under its effective control and management then it shall be contrued that such reel/short is shared by LawFoyer in good faith for legal education, commentary, humour, criticism, review, and transformative meme-based expression. The limited third-party audio, video, image, dialogue, or reference used in this post belongs to its respective copyright owner, author, producer, broadcaster, platform, or original creator. LawFoyer does not claim ownership over any such third-party material. The use of any limited clip, screenshot, meme template, audio, or reference is intended only for bona fide educational, critical, review, commentary, awareness, and entertainment purposes. LawFoyer believes such use may fall within legally recognised exceptions, including fair dealing principles under applicable copyright law, wherever applicable. Proper credit has been given wherever the source or creator is known. This post is not intended to infringe, dilute, misappropriate, commercially exploit, defame, insult, or harm the reputation of any person, artist, producer, platform, brand, channel, or copyright owner. Any views, dialogues, expressions, or acts appearing in the third-party clip belong to the original work or creator. LawFoyer merely uses limited material for meme-based educational expression and does not endorse unlawful conduct, offensive statements, or third-party claims shown in the original clip. If you are the copyright owner, authorised representative, original creator, or concerned party and believe that any material has been used improperly, please contact us at lawfoyerpromotion@gmail.com with relevant ownership details and the post link. Upon receiving a valid and specific request, LawFoyer will review the concern in good faith and take appropriate action, including credit correction, modification, restriction, or removal, where legally required. As part of routine website management, editorial review, and technical maintenance, LawFoyer reserves the right to modify, archive, unpublish, or remove any content, posts, articles, opportunities, announcements, or user-submitted material hosted on its platforms, including but not limited to news.lawfoyer.in (LawFoyer Connect), at its sole discretion and without prior notice.With specific reference to job postings, internships, call for applications, and other career-related opportunities published on LawFoyer Connect, the platform follows a dynamic content-update model and ordinarily retains only the most recent updates for a limited period. As a matter of policy, such opportunities may be retained for approximately three (3) months from the date of publication, after which they may be archived or removed to ensure relevance, accuracy, and usability for users. LawFoyer shall not be under any obligation to preserve, store, or maintain historical listings indefinitely, and shall not be liable for any loss of access, reliance, or consequences arising from the removal, archival, or modification of such content. Users are advised to independently track deadlines, save relevant information, and exercise due diligence before acting upon any opportunity listed on the platform. ## **5. Academic Integrity, Prohibited Conduct, and Community Standards** LawFoyer is committed to upholding the highest standards of academic integrity and expects the same from its users. Users are prohibited from submitting plagiarized content, impersonating others, using LawFoyer’s services for cheating or academic misconduct, or uploading defamatory, obscene, threatening, or otherwise unlawful material. Any activity that undermines the security of the platform, such as hacking attempts, dissemination of malware, denial-of-service attacks, or circumvention of access controls, shall be treated as a grave violation and reported to the appropriate authorities under the provisions of the **Information Technology Act, 2000**. LawFoyer shall cooperate fully with law enforcement agencies and CERT-In in investigating such violations. LawFoyer also prohibits the exploitation of its platforms for advertising, spamming, or promotion of unrelated products and services without prior authorization. LawFoyer reserves the right to block, remove or alter any such advertising, spamming or promotion in contravention of these terms of service. ## **6. Payments, Fees, Subscriptions, and Refunds** Where LawFoyer charges fees for certain services, including academic bootcamps, publication fees, or subscription packages, such payments are to be made only through RBI-regulated payment gateways. LawFoyer strictly adheres to **RBI’s card-on-file tokenisation norms**, ensuring that no card numbers or sensitive financial data are stored on its servers. Recurring subscriptions or automated debits shall be implemented strictly in compliance with **RBI’s e-mandate framework**, requiring prior consent and user authentication. LawFoyer shall issue invoices inclusive of applicable taxes (if any), and users are obliged to provide accurate billing details. Refunds, where permissible, shall be governed by clearly stated refund policies for each program or subscription. LawFoyer reserves the right to decline refunds for services already availed or where significant administrative or editorial effort has been expended. Wherever, LawFoyer provides “Lifetime Access” for any of its free or paid offerings (including courses, workshops, webinars, subscriptions or other offerings), it shall mean “access granted until the winding up of operations by LawFoyer”. ## **7. Limitation of Liability and Exclusion of Warranties** To the fullest extent permissible under law, LawFoyer disclaims all warranties, express or implied, including warranties of accuracy, reliability, merchantability, and fitness for a particular purpose in relation to the content published on its platforms. LawFoyer makes no guarantees regarding uninterrupted availability, error-free functionality, or absolute security of its digital platforms, although it employs reasonable security practices as mandated under the **SPDI Rules**. LawFoyer shall not be liable for any indirect, incidental, special, punitive, or consequential damages arising out of the use of its services. In any event, LawFoyer’s liability shall be capped at the amount paid by the user for the service in question during the twelve months preceding the claim. This limitation is essential to protect LawFoyer’s ability to continue offering affordable and accessible educational services. ## **8. Indemnification by Users** Every user agrees to indemnify, defend, and hold harmless LawFoyer, its officers, employees, representatives, and affiliates from and against all claims, damages, losses, liabilities, costs, and expenses arising from breach of these Terms, infringement of intellectual property, submission of unlawful content, or any unauthorized use of LawFoyer’s services. ## **9. Content Removal, Takedown, and Compliance with Indian Law** LawFoyer adheres strictly to Indian legal requirements concerning intermediary liability. In consonance with the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in *Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015)*, LawFoyer shall remove or disable access to content upon receipt of any information of violation of terms or a valid court order or a notification from a lawfully authorized government agency. This ensures that user rights to free speech are balanced with compliance obligations. Notwithstanding the above, LawFoyer reserves the right to voluntarily remove or restrict content that violates its Terms, threatens its operational integrity, or exposes it to legal risk, without incurring liability towards the user. ## **10. Governing Law, Jurisdiction, and Dispute Resolution** These Terms of Service shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of India. All disputes arising from or in relation to these Terms shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts at **Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh, India**. LawFoyer, however, reserves the right to seek interim or injunctive relief in any competent jurisdiction where its intellectual property or legal interests are threatened. In the event that parties agree to resolve disputes through arbitration, such arbitration shall be conducted under the **Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996**, with the seat of arbitration in Lucknow and proceedings conducted in the English language. ## **11. Modification of Terms and Notification** LawFoyer reserves the unequivocal right to modify, amend, or update these Terms of Service at its sole discretion. Any material change shall be communicated through clear notifications on the website, and continued usage of the platform post-notification shall constitute acceptance of the revised Terms. Users are encouraged to periodically review the Terms of Service to remain updated about their rights and obligations. LawFoyer shall not be held liable for any claim of ignorance of modified terms once due notice has been provided. ## **12. Severability, Waiver, and Entire Agreement** If any provision of these Terms is found to be invalid or unenforceable under applicable law, such provision shall be severed without affecting the remaining provisions. Failure of LawFoyer to enforce any right or provision shall not constitute a waiver of such right. These Terms, read together with the Privacy Policy, constitute the entire agreement between the user and LawFoyer, superseding all prior understandings. By accessing and using LawFoyer’s platforms, users unequivocally consent to be bound by this agreement (including the Privacy Policy, Disclaimers, Refund Policy and any other policies so notified on any of the LawFoyer’s platforms) and acknowledge that LawFoyer has discharged its obligations of disclosure, fairness, and compliance in full measure. *Effective from Date: 01.01.2024* ————————————- --- ### [Disclaimer](https://lawfoyer.in/disclaimer/) **Published:** February 16, 2021 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** This Legal Disclaimer is issued by **LawFoyer**, a premier and internationally recognised legal education and information platform headquartered at Lucknow, India. LawFoyer operates through multiple platforms and domains, including but not limited to **lawfoyer.in**, **news.lawfoyer.in**, **academy.lawfoyer.in**, **lijdlr.com**, and other domains and sub domains (including, its social media channels and communities) under its effective control, management and supervision. By accessing or using any LawFoyer platform, you agree to be bound by this Legal Disclaimer, together with the applicable Terms and Conditions, Privacy Policy, Refund Policy and any specific programme or journal guidelines. ## 1. Educational and informational purpose only All content, courses, articles, blog posts, journal publications, webinars, workshops, bootcamps, competitions, videos, social media content and any other material made available through LawFoyer platforms are provided **for general educational and informational purposes only**. Nothing on any LawFoyer platform: - constitutes legal advice or legal opinion, - is intended to address the facts or circumstances of any specific case, or - should be relied upon as a substitute for professional advice from a qualified advocate or other competent professional. Users must seek independent legal advice from a duly qualified advocate or professional before taking any decision or action based on any information obtained from LawFoyer. ## 2. No advocate client or professional relationship Accessing or using LawFoyer platforms, enrolling in any course, attending any webinar or workshop, participating in any internship training programme, competition, consultation, mentoring session or interacting with LawFoyer or its representatives by email, messaging applications, calls, social media, comment sections or any other mode **does not create any advocate client, advisor client, fiduciary or other professional relationship** between the user and: - LawFoyer, - any of its founders, officers, employees or team members, or - any faculty member, mentor, editor, reviewer, or resource person associated with LawFoyer. Any interaction through LawFoyer platforms is limited to learning, training and information sharing. It is not a formal engagement for legal representation, legal opinion, case strategy, drafting for specific litigation, or any other professional service unless there is a separate written agreement executed outside the platform. ## 3. Not a law firm and no solicitation LawFoyer is a **legal education, information and career support platform**. It is **not a law firm, legal practice or lawyer referral service** and does not hold itself out as such. Nothing on LawFoyer platforms: - is intended to solicit work or advertise legal services in violation of the Advocates Act, 1961 and the Bar Council of India Rules, - constitutes an invitation to form an advocate client relationship, or - should be interpreted as targeted advertising or solicitation of briefs or professional employment. Any reference to practising advocates, law firms, chambers, experts or professionals on LawFoyer platforms is only for educational, academic, mentoring, speaking or collaborative purposes. ## 4. No guarantee of accuracy, completeness or currency LawFoyer strives to ensure that legal and academic content is accurate, reliable and up to date. However: - laws, regulations, rules, notifications, circulars and judicial precedents change frequently, - interpretations of law may differ among courts, tribunals, regulators and scholars, and - inadvertent errors or omissions may occur. Accordingly, **LawFoyer does not guarantee** and expressly disclaims any warranty, representation or undertaking, whether express or implied, regarding: - accuracy, completeness, reliability, suitability or currency of any content, - applicability of any content to a particular set of facts, or - outcome of any legal proceedings, academic evaluation or professional process. Users are solely responsible for independently verifying any legal, academic, professional or factual information before relying upon it. ## 5. Academic integrity and proper use of services LawFoyer offers educational support services, including courses, workshops, bootcamps, study materials, internship training programmes, journal publishing opportunities, and in some cases academic assistance and guidance for assignments or projects. Users agree that: - they will use LawFoyer content and services only for lawful and ethical purposes, - they will comply with the academic integrity rules, honour codes and regulations of their universities, colleges, employers or professional bodies, and - they will not use LawFoyer platforms to engage in or support any form of academic misconduct, plagiarism, impersonation, cheating or submission of work that is not their own. LawFoyer is **not responsible** for any disciplinary, academic, professional or institutional action taken against a user due to misuse or unethical use of content, drafts, guidance, templates or academic assistance obtained from LawFoyer platforms. ## 6. No guarantee of jobs, marks, ranks or outcomes LawFoyer provides information and support relating to internships, jobs, career opportunities, publications and academic performance. LawFoyer may also share success stories, testimonials and examples. However, **LawFoyer does not guarantee**: - any internship, job, placement, interview, publication, conference selection, scholarship, admission, promotion or professional engagement, - any particular marks, grades, ranks, academic results or examination outcomes, or - any specific legal, financial or professional result from enrolling in its courses or using its platforms. All such outcomes depend on multiple external factors, including the user’s effort, performance, institutional policies, market conditions and decisions of third parties that are beyond the control of LawFoyer. ## 7. Third party content, journal publications and external links LawFoyer platforms host and disseminate content authored or submitted by third parties. This includes but is not limited to: - research papers, articles, case comments, notes, book reviews and other manuscripts published in **LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research (LIJDLR)**, - guest posts, blogs, opinion pieces, news updates, event announcements and opportunities on **lawfoyer.in** and **news.lawfoyer.in**, and - content, presentations or materials shared by external speakers, partners or institutions. In respect of all such third party content: - opinions, views, interpretations, analysis and conclusions are strictly those of the respective authors or contributors, - LawFoyer does not endorse or guarantee the correctness, legality or completeness of such content, and - LawFoyer is not responsible for any consequences arising from reliance on such third party content. LawFoyer platforms may also contain links to third party websites, platforms, resources, advertisements or social media pages. These are provided for convenience only. LawFoyer does not control and is not responsible for: - availability, content, policies, practices or security of any third party website, or - any loss or damage arising out of or in connection with use of such third party websites, services or resources. If any ree/short is posted by LawFoyer on any of its social media channels, communities or other channels under its effective control and management then it shall be contrued that such reel/short is shared by LawFoyer in good faith for legal education, commentary, humour, criticism, review, and transformative meme-based expression. The limited third-party audio, video, image, dialogue, or reference used in this post belongs to its respective copyright owner, author, producer, broadcaster, platform, or original creator. LawFoyer does not claim ownership over any such third-party material. The use of any limited clip, screenshot, meme template, audio, or reference is intended only for bona fide educational, critical, review, commentary, awareness, and entertainment purposes. LawFoyer believes such use may fall within legally recognised exceptions, including fair dealing principles under applicable copyright law, wherever applicable. Proper credit has been given wherever the source or creator is known. This post is not intended to infringe, dilute, misappropriate, commercially exploit, defame, insult, or harm the reputation of any person, artist, producer, platform, brand, channel, or copyright owner. Any views, dialogues, expressions, or acts appearing in the third-party clip belong to the original work or creator. LawFoyer merely uses limited material for meme-based educational expression and does not endorse unlawful conduct, offensive statements, or third-party claims shown in the original clip. If you are the copyright owner, authorised representative, original creator, or concerned party and believe that any material has been used improperly, please contact us at **lawfoyerpromotion@gmail.com** with relevant ownership details and the post link. Upon receiving a valid and specific request, LawFoyer will review the concern in good faith and take appropriate action, including credit correction, modification, restriction, or removal, where legally required. ## 8. 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Built as a lightweight browser app. No speech audio is stored by this page. --- ### [THE INDECENT REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN (PROHIBITION) ACT, 1986](https://lawfoyer.in/the-indecent-representation-of-women-prohibition-act-1986/) **Published:** May 13, 2026 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ### THE INDECENT REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN (PROHIBITION) ACT, 1986 ## BARE ACT WITH SHORT NOTES Annotated Bare Act | Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986Annotated Bare Act – India# The Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986 Provision-wise statutory text with practical legal notes, Supreme Court authorities, statutory footnotes, and connected procedural references. ## Statutory Snapshot - Act Number**60 of 1986** - Assent Date**23 December 1986** - Commencement**2 October 1987** - Extent**Whole of India** - Offence Status**Cognizable and bailable** - Administering Ministry**Ministry of Women and Child Development** Toggle themePrint / Save PDF Google Translate ### Contents [1. Short title](#s1)[2. Definitions](#s2)[3. Advertisements](#s3)[4. Publications](#s4)[5. Search and seizure](#s5)[6. Penalty](#s6)[7. Companies](#s7)[8. Cognizable and bailable](#s8)[9. Good faith protection](#s9)[10. Rule-making power](#s10)[Case Law Bank](#casebank)[Footnotes](#footnotes)**Use:** Read the provision first, then the legal note below it. **Cases:** Every case name below carries its legal citation and judgment link. **Language:** Use the floating translate button to read the full reader in another language. ## 1. Short title, extent and commencement **(1)** This Act may be called the Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986. **(2)** It extends to the whole of India.[1](#fn1) **(3)** It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint.[2](#fn2) Legal NoteThe Act is a special penal statute. Its object is to prohibit indecent representation of women through advertisements, publications, writings, paintings, figures, and other modes of representation. Practical NoteAny complaint should identify the impugned material, medium, publisher, advertiser, distributor, and the exact manner in which women are allegedly depicted indecently. ## 2. Definitions In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires: **(a)** “advertisement” includes any notice, circular, label, wrapper or other document and also includes any visible representation made by means of any light, sound, smoke or gas; **(b)** “distribution” includes distribution by way of samples whether free or otherwise; **(c)** “indecent representation of women” means the depiction in any manner of the figure of a woman, her form or body or any part thereof in such a way as to have the effect of being indecent, or derogatory to, or denigrating, women, or is likely to deprave, corrupt or injure the public morality or morals; **(d)** “label” means any written, marked, stamped, printed or graphic matter, affixed to, or appearing upon, any package; **(e)** “package” includes a box, carton, tin or other container; **(f)** “prescribed” means prescribed by rules made under this Act. Legal NoteClause (c) is the interpretive centre of the Act. The depiction must be examined by its effect, context, message, audience impact, and whether it denigrates women or injures public morality. [Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, (2014) 4 SCC 257](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/195958005/) is the strongest Supreme Court authority for a context-based reading. Nudity or semi-nudity by itself is not enough. The material must be judged as a whole, by contemporary community standards. Connected Authorities[Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 881](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1623275/) explained obscenity under Section 292 IPC, but its older Hicklin-based approach now stands narrowed by [Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, (2014) 4 SCC 257](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/195958005/). [Chandrakant Kalyandas Kakodkar v. State of Maharashtra, (1969) 2 SCC 687](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/25099/) and [Samaresh Bose v. Amal Mitra, (1985) 4 SCC 289](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1383068/) support whole-work reading and distinguish vulgarity from punishable obscenity. ## 3. Prohibition of advertisements containing indecent representation of women No person shall publish, or cause to be published, or arrange or take part in the publication or exhibition of, any advertisement which contains indecent representation of women in any form. Legal NoteThis section covers direct publication and participation in publication or exhibition. Liability may extend beyond the first publisher when a person arranges, causes, or takes part in the offending advertisement. The prohibited content must still satisfy Section 2(c). A complaint should plead the advertisement, its circulation, and why the depiction is indecent, derogatory, denigrating, or morality-injuring. Supreme Court Note[Ajay Goswami v. Union of India, (2007) 1 SCC 143](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/561137/) recognised Sections 3, 4 and 6 as part of the statutory framework controlling obscene or indecent publication, while refusing broad prior restraint against newspapers. The ratio helps in two ways. The Act is a recognised penal mechanism, but courts should not convert decency concerns into excessive censorship without examining the statutory ingredients. ## 4. Prohibition of publication or sending by post of books, pamphlets, etc. No person shall produce or cause to be produced, sell, let to hire, distribute, circulate or send by post any book, pamphlet, paper, slide, film, writing, drawing, painting, photograph, representation or figure which contains indecent representation of women in any form: **Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to:** **(a)** any book, pamphlet, paper, slide, film, writing, drawing, painting, photograph, representation or figure: **(i)** the publication of which is proved to be justified as being for the public good on the ground that such book, pamphlet, paper, slide, film, writing, drawing, painting, photograph, representation or figure is in the interest of science, literature, art, or learning or other objects of general concern; or **(ii)** which is kept or used bona fide for religious purposes; **(b)** any representation sculptured, engraved, painted or otherwise represented on or in: **(i)** any ancient monument within the meaning of the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958; or **(ii)** any temple, or on any car used for the conveyance of idols, or kept or used for any religious purpose; **(c)** any film in respect of which the provisions of Part II of the Cinematograph Act, 1952, will be applicable. Legal NoteSection 4 is wider than Section 3. It covers production, sale, hire, distribution, circulation, and postal transmission of listed materials. The proviso is legally important. It protects material justified for public good in science, literature, art, learning, or other objects of general concern. It also preserves bona fide religious use, ancient monuments, temple-related representations, and films governed by Part II of the Cinematograph Act, 1952. Supreme Court Note[Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, (2014) 4 SCC 257](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/195958005/) directly concerned prosecution under Section 292 IPC and alternatively Section 4 of this Act. The Court quashed the proceedings after applying the contemporary community standards test. The legal issue was whether a photograph of Boris Becker with his fiancée was obscene or indecent. The ratio is that the court must examine the photograph, article, background, and social message together. The anti-racism message defeated the allegation of indecency. [S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal, (2010) 5 SCC 600](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/161931631/) held that Sections 4 and 6 could not be used against an interviewee merely for expressing views. The Act mainly targets publishers, advertisers, and disseminators of indecent portrayals. Films and Artistic Context[Manohar Lal Sharma v. Sanjay Leela Bhansali, (2018) 1 SCC 770](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/122203851/) refused directions for FIR registration under Section 4 before completion of certification processes. The Court discouraged pre-judgment of creative works. [Bobby Art International v. Om Pal Singh Hoon, (1996) 4 SCC 1](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1400858/) held that scenes of nudity, rape, and abuse in Bandit Queen had to be read with the film’s social message. The scenes were not treated as titillation. Broadcast and Public Good[Director General, Directorate General of Doordarshan v. Anand Patwardhan, (2006) 8 SCC 433](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/206282/) supports the value of serious social, political, educational, or artistic content when expression is attacked as improper. These film cases do not dilute Section 4. They show that the court must distinguish exploitation of women from material that exposes violence, oppression, discrimination, or social wrongs for public understanding. ## 5. Powers to enter and search **(1)** Subject to such rules as may be prescribed, any Gazetted Officer authorised by the State Government may, within the local limits of the area for which he is so authorised: **(a)** enter and search at all reasonable times, with such assistance, if any, as he considers necessary, any place in which he has reason to believe that an offence under this Act has been or is being committed; **(b)** seize any advertisement or any book, pamphlet, paper, slide film, writing, drawing, painting, photograph, representation or figure which he has reason to believe contravenes any of the provisions of this Act; **(c)** examine any record, register, document or any other material object found in any place mentioned in clause (a) and seize the same if he has reason to believe that it may furnish evidence of the commission of an offence punishable under this Act: **Provided** that no entry under this sub-section shall be made into a private dwelling house without a warrant: **Provided further** that the power of seizure under this sub-section may be exercised in respect of any document, article or thing which contains any such advertisement, including the contents, if any, of such document, article or thing, if the advertisement cannot be separated by reason of its being embossed or otherwise from such document, article or thing without affecting the integrity, utility or saleable value thereof. **(2)** The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, shall, so far as may be, apply to any search or seizure under this Act as they apply to any search or seizure made under the authority of a warrant issued under section 94 of the said Code. **(3)** Where any person seizes anything under clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-section (1), he shall, as soon as may be, inform the nearest Magistrate and take his orders as to the custody thereof. Legal NoteSearch and seizure under this section require a Gazetted Officer, State Government authorisation, territorial authority, reasonable belief, and compliance with prescribed rules. Entry into a private dwelling house requires a warrant. Seized material must be reported to the nearest Magistrate for custody orders. Connected LawThe Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Rules, 1987 prescribe seizure procedure. The seizure list should record the officer, place, person from whose custody articles are seized, and description of articles. The reference to Section 94 CrPC should now be read with the corresponding BNSS framework where proceedings arise after the commencement of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. ## 6. Penalty Any person who contravenes the provisions of section 3 or section 4 shall be punishable on first conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, and with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, and in the event of a second or subsequent conviction with imprisonment for a term of not less than six months but which may extend to five years and also with a fine not less than ten thousand rupees but which may extend to one lakh rupees. Legal NoteSection 6 is the penal consequence for contravention of Section 3 or Section 4. The charge should first establish the prohibited act and the indecent representation under Section 2(c). For subsequent conviction, the statute prescribes a minimum imprisonment of six months and minimum fine of ten thousand rupees. Supreme Court Note[S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal, (2010) 5 SCC 600](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/161931631/) is important for limiting criminal prosecution where the accused did not publish or advertise any indecent representation of women. [Ajay Goswami v. Union of India, (2007) 1 SCC 143](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/561137/) confirms that Section 6 supplies punishment for non-compliance with Sections 3 and 4. ## 7. Offences by companies **(1)** Where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company, every person, who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: **Provided** that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment, if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. **(2)** Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall be proceeded against and punished accordingly. **Explanation.** For the purposes of this section: **(a)** “company” means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and **(b)** “director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm. Legal NoteThis provision creates vicarious liability. Mere designation is not enough in a well-drafted complaint. The role, control, responsibility, consent, connivance, neglect, or due diligence defence should be addressed. For corporate advertisers, publishers, platforms, agencies, printers, or distributors, the complaint should plead who controlled publication and who had knowledge or responsibility. Connected Authorities[S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1302578/) is useful by analogy. It requires specific averments that the accused was in charge of and responsible for the company’s business. [Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Pvt. Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/96973002/) is useful where corporate arraignment is debated. Its application depends on the wording and facts of the special statute. ## 8. Offences to be cognizable and bailable **(1)** Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, an offence punishable under this Act shall be bailable. **(2)** An offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable. Legal NoteThe offence is cognizable, so police action is not barred merely because the offence is not treated as non-cognizable. It is also bailable, so bail follows as a statutory entitlement subject to ordinary conditions. Procedure NoteWhere the case is registered after 1 July 2024, procedural references should be aligned with BNSS, 2023. The substantive offence under this Act remains governed by the Act itself. ## 9. Protection of action taken in good faith No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against the Central Government or any State Government or any officer of the Central Government or any State Government for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done under this Act. Legal NoteThe protection is limited to action done or intended to be done in good faith under the Act. It does not protect mala fide action, action without authority, or action outside the statute. Practical NoteChallenge to seizure or prosecution may still lie where authorisation, reasonable belief, territorial jurisdiction, seizure procedure, or Magistrate custody compliance is defective. ## 10. Power to make rules **(1)** The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules to carry out the provisions of this Act. **(2)** In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely: **(a)** the manner in which the seizure of advertisements or other articles shall be made, and the manner in which the seizure list shall be prepared and delivered to the person from whose custody any advertisement or other article has been seized; **(b)** any other matter which is required to be, or may be, prescribed. **(3)** Every rule made under this Act, shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before each House of Parliament, while it is in session for a total period of thirty days, which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in making any modification in the rule or both Houses agree that the rule should not be made, the rule shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so, however, that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that rule. Legal NoteSection 10 supports delegated rule-making. Its most practical function is to regulate seizure procedure and seizure lists under Section 5. Connected RulesThe Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Rules, 1987 came into force on 2 October 1987. They define authorised officer and prescribe seizure documentation. ## Provision-wise Supreme Court Case Law Bank Sections 2(c), 4 and 6### [Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, (2014) 4 SCC 257](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/195958005/) **Issue:** Whether publication of a nude photograph with an article could attract Section 292 IPC and Section 4 of this Act. **Ratio:** Hicklin is not the correct controlling test. The contemporary community standards test applies. The material must be read as a whole, with its context and message. **Use:** Principal authority for Section 4, visual material, and context-based assessment. Sections 3, 4 and 6### [Ajay Goswami v. Union of India, (2007) 1 SCC 143](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/561137/) **Issue:** Whether newspapers should face broad restrictions to protect minors from obscene content. **Ratio:** Existing statutory controls, including this Act, already regulate obscene and indecent publications. Broad prior restraint was not justified. **Use:** Supports a balanced reading between statutory prohibition and freedom of expression. Sections 4 and 6### [S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal, (2010) 5 SCC 600](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/161931631/) **Issue:** Whether comments in an interview could justify criminal complaints under several provisions, including Sections 4 and 6 of this Act. **Ratio:** The Act targets indecent portrayal through publication or advertisement. Mere expression of opinion in an interview cannot be stretched into Section 4 liability. **Use:** Useful for quashing complaints where the accused is not a publisher, advertiser, or disseminator of indecent representation. Section 4 and films### [Manohar Lal Sharma v. Sanjay Leela Bhansali, (2018) 1 SCC 770](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/122203851/) **Issue:** Whether FIR registration could be directed against a film team under Section 4 and other offences before certification assessment. **Ratio:** Courts should not prejudge creative works before statutory certification. Criminal process cannot be invoked merely on apprehension. **Use:** Important for film-related complaints and Section 4 allegations involving pending certification. Section 4 proviso and art### [Bobby Art International v. Om Pal Singh Hoon, (1996) 4 SCC 1](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1400858/) **Issue:** Whether objectionable scenes in Bandit Queen justified restraint on exhibition. **Ratio:** Scenes of nudity or sexual violence may be permissible when they are central to portraying social evil and are not inserted for titillation. **Use:** Strong authority for artistic, social, and public-good context under Section 4. Section 4 and social expression### [Director General, Directorate General of Doordarshan v. Anand Patwardhan, (2006) 8 SCC 433](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/206282/) **Issue:** Whether a documentary could be refused telecast on public broadcaster grounds. **Ratio:** Serious social, political, educational, or artistic value must be considered when expression is attacked as improper. **Use:** Useful where Section 4 objections concern documentary, social, or educational material. Section 2(c) allied test### [Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 881](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1623275/) **Issue:** Meaning of obscenity under Section 292 IPC. **Ratio:** The Court applied the then-prevailing obscenity test, but also recognised the need to balance expression with public decency and morality. **Use:** Historical authority. Use with caution after Aveek Sarkar. Section 2(c) allied test### [Chandrakant Kalyandas Kakodkar v. State of Maharashtra, (1969) 2 SCC 687](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/25099/) **Issue:** Whether a literary story amounted to obscenity. **Ratio:** The work must be considered as a whole. Literary merit and contemporary social morality are relevant. **Use:** Useful for literary, artistic, and narrative works challenged under Sections 2(c) and 4. Section 2(c) allied test### [Samaresh Bose v. Amal Mitra, (1985) 4 SCC 289](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1383068/) **Issue:** Whether a Bengali novel was obscene. **Ratio:** Vulgarity is not automatically obscenity. The question is whether the material depraves and corrupts likely readers. **Use:** Helpful to resist mechanical prosecution based on isolated words, passages, or images. Section 7 allied corporate liability### [S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1302578/) **Issue:** What pleadings are required for vicarious liability of company officers. **Ratio:** The complaint must contain specific averments that the person was in charge of and responsible for business conduct. **Use:** Persuasive by analogy for Section 7 complaints against company officers. Section 7 allied corporate liability### [Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Pvt. Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/96973002/) **Issue:** Whether company officers can be prosecuted without properly proceeding against the company in vicarious liability cases. **Ratio:** Corporate criminal liability must be pleaded and structured carefully when the offence is committed by the company. **Use:** Relevant when prosecution under Section 7 is brought against directors, managers, partners, or officers. ## Statutory Footnotes and Research Notes 1. The words “except the State of Jammu and Kashmir” were omitted by Act 34 of 2019, section 95 and the Fifth Schedule, with effect from 31 October 2019. 2. The Act came into force on 2 October 1987 through notification No. G.S.R. 821(E), dated 25 September 1987, published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, section 3(i). 3. The Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Rules, 1987 were notified through G.S.R. 822(E), dated 25 September 1987, and came into force on 2 October 1987. 4. Section 5 should be read with the 1987 Rules. The rules are most relevant to seizure procedure and seizure-list preparation. 5. The current India Code text does not insert a separate digital publication clause into the Act. Digital publication issues may require reading this Act with the Information Technology Act, 2000, IT Rules, 2021, BNS, 2023, BNSS, 2023, and BSA, 2023, depending on facts. ## Core Reading Order First, identify whether the material falls within advertisement, publication, distribution, circulation, or exhibition. Second, apply Section 2(c) to the depiction. Third, test the material through context, whole-work reading, public good, art, literature, science, learning, religion, monuments, temple usage, and film certification exceptions where applicable. Fourth, examine who published, caused publication, arranged publication, distributed, sold, or controlled the material. Fifth, assess search, seizure, company liability, bail, and penalty provisions. Annotated Bare Act Reader for legal study, drafting support, and provision-wise reference. **Also Read: [Notes on Indecent Representation Act, 1986](https://lawfoyer.in/notes-on-indecent-representation-of-women-act-1986/)** --- ### [](https://lawfoyer.in/25th-quiz-results/) **Published:** April 5, 2026 **Author:** Rajarshi Tripathi **Content:** ## **You can find your rank/score by searching your name in the search box** **Keywords:** 1. Those who have attempted quiz after 07:35 PM have been highlighted with “red color” and are considered as “late entry” and participants with “Duplicate Entry” as well have been marked with “red color”. They will get E-Certificate. 2. Disqualified candidates are those who have not completed the registration. 3. In the case of the same marks, as stated in the quiz guidelines earlier, Time will be considered (A person who submits early will be given preference). \[table id=71 /\] --- ### [Result of 24th LawFoyer Quiz on (Contract Law + Law of Torts)](https://lawfoyer.in/result-of-24th-lawfoyer-quiz-on-contract-law-law-of-torts/) **Published:** January 31, 2026 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## You can find your rank/score by searching your name in the search box. **Keywords:** 1. Those who have attempted quiz after 07:35 PM have been highlighted with “red color” and are considered as “late entry”. They will get E-Certificate. 2. Disqualified candidates are those who have not completed the registration. 3. In the case of the same marks, as stated in the quiz guidelines earlier, Time will be considered (A person who submits early will be given preference). \[table id=70 /\] --- --- ### [Law of Torts - Notes](https://lawfoyer.in/law-of-torts-notes/) **Published:** January 12, 2026 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Law-of-Torts-Notes-2-1024x724.png) From CLAT preparation to semester examinations, the Law of Torts remains an indispensable subject. These comprehensive and concise notes on the Law of Torts will assist law students, law aspirants, and law graduates in preparing for semester assessments as well as other competitive examinations! **TOPIC****NOTES****Introduction to Law of Torts****[Click Here to Read](https://lawfoyer.in/introduction-to-law-of-torts/)****General Defences of Torts****[Click Here to Read](https://lawfoyer.in/general-defences-of-torts/)****Negligence: Professional, Medical and Contributory under Law of Torts****[Click Here to Read](https://lawfoyer.in/negligence-professional-medical-and-contributory-under-law-of-torts/)****Vicarious Liability under Law of Torts****[Click Here to Read](https://lawfoyer.in/vicarious-liability-under-law-of-torts/)****Rule of Strict and Absolute Liability****[Click Here to Read](https://lawfoyer.in/rule-of-strict-and-absolute-liability-under-law-of-torts/)****Defamation under Law of Torts****[Click Here to Read](https://lawfoyer.in/defamation-under-law-of-torts/)****Nuisance under Law of Torts****[Click Here to Read](https://lawfoyer.in/nuisance-under-law-of-torts/)****Remoteness of Damages under Law of Torts****[Click Here to Read](https://lawfoyer.in/remoteness-of-damages-under-law-of-torts/)****Trespass under Law of Torts****[Click Here to Read](https://lawfoyer.in/trespass-under-law-of-torts/)****Remedies for Torts****[Click Here to Read](https://lawfoyer.in/remedies-for-torts/)****Abuse of Legal Procedure under Law of Torts****[Click Here to Read](https://lawfoyer.in/abuse-of-legal-procedure-under-law-of-torts/)**To request notes on any topic or subject feel free to contact us at lawfoyer@gmail.com! For more such law notes visit **[www.lawfoyer.in](https://www.lawfoyer.in)** --- ### [Result of 23rd LawFoyer Quiz on Constitutional Law of India](https://lawfoyer.in/result-of-23rd-lawfoyer-quiz-on-indian-constitution/) **Published:** December 3, 2025 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## You can find your rank/score by searching your name in the search box. **Keywords:** 1. Those who have attempted quiz after 07:35 PM have been highlighted with “red color” and are considered as “late entry”. They will get E-Certificate. 2. Disqualified candidates are those who have not completed the registration. 3. In the case of the same marks, as stated in the quiz guidelines earlier, Time will be considered (A person who submits early will be given preference). \[table id=67 /\] --- ### [LawFoyer's Archive](https://lawfoyer.in/achievers-archive/) **Published:** October 31, 2025 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** # Achievers Archive ## India’s First Legal Achievers Compendium A prestigious initiative by LawFoyer — celebrating the achievements of law students and young professionals across India. From national moots to debates and research paper writing competitions, we honor those defining the future of law. We celebrate your Wins! [ Submit Now ](https://forms.gle/L1god7e54fwN6ANZ7) ## Celebrating Excellence Across India’s Law Schools At LawFoyer, we believe that every achievement deserves a spotlight. The Achievers’ Archives is a curated recognition platform designed to celebrate law students and emerging professionals who have excelled in reputed academic and skill-based competitions. ### “Turning legal excellence into inspiration, one achiever at a time.” From moot courts, essay writing, research papers, youth parliaments, to debates and MUNs, this initiative provides national visibility to genuine achievements — helping winners gain the recognition and professional reach they deserve. ![Grey and Blue Simple 3D Digital Marketing Agency Instagram Post](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Grey-and-Blue-Simple-3D-Digital-Marketing-Agency-Instagram-Post.png "Grey and Blue Simple 3D Digital Marketing Agency Instagram Post") moot courts essay writing research papers youth parliaments debates MUNs - version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"? - version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"? - Hover Over Each Event - version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"? ## ACHIEVERS’ CATEGORIES Who We Celebrate At LawFoyer Achievers’ Archives, we honor the brightest legal minds whose accomplishments inspire the next generation of law students and professionals. From moots to research, debates to leadership, every category reflects excellence, dedication, and a passion for the law. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/ChatGPT-Image-Nov-1-2025-12_08_31-AM-Medium.png) ### Moot Masters Honoring the finest advocates who’ve excelled in prestigious national and international moot court competitions. [ Check Eligibility ](https://lawfoyer.in/moot-masters-what-can-be-included/) ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/WhatsApp-Image-2025-11-01-at-00.16.29_b3cb3b88.jpg) ### Legal Writers Recognizing excellence in essay, blog, or research paper competitions. [ Check Eligibility ](https://lawfoyer.in/legal-writers-what-can-be-included/) ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/WhatsApp-Image-2025-11-01-at-00.16.30_fb6f3516.jpg) ### Debate & Dialogue Leaders Featuring top performers in Youth Parliaments, MUNs, and legal debates. [ Check Eligibility ](https://lawfoyer.in/debate-dialogue-leaders-what-can-be-included/) ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/WhatsApp-Image-2025-11-01-at-00.20.28_ef0c5c21.jpg) ### Academic & Scholarly Achievers Honoring academic toppers, medalists, and university awardees. [ Check Eligibility ](https://lawfoyer.in/academic-scholarly-achievers-what-can-be-included/) ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/WhatsApp-Image-2025-11-01-at-00.24.52_44fda30f.jpg) ### Emerging Professionals Spotlighting young graduates making impactful contributions to the legal industry through innovation and integrity. [ Check Eligibility ](https://lawfoyer.in/emerging-professionals-what-can-be-included/) ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/WhatsApp-Image-2025-11-01-at-00.24.52_9906b813.jpg) ### Legal Reform Champions Outstanding Participants in government-recognized or university-led *policy drafting*, *law reform*, *public consultation projects*. [ Check Eligibility ](https://lawfoyer.in/legal-reform-champions-what-can-be-included/) ## Achievers ![20260816_235010 - SIBGHATHULLAH KHAN](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/20260816_235010-SIBGHATHULLAH-KHAN-767x536.jpg "20260816_235010 - SIBGHATHULLAH KHAN") [Sibgathullah Khan Subaan of Osmania University Receives Commendation Certificate at Telangana Minorities Excellence Summit ](https://lawfoyer.in/sibgathullah-khan-subaan-of-osmania-university-receives-commendation-certificate-at-telangana-minorities-excellence-summit/) [Read More](https://lawfoyer.in/sibgathullah-khan-subaan-of-osmania-university-receives-commendation-certificate-at-telangana-minorities-excellence-summit/) ![Three people on a stage during an award ceremony: a woman in a beige saree on the left, a recipient woman in the center receiving a certificate, and an older man in a vest handing the award. Garlands decorate the front of the stage.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/IMG_20260731_110923-Harshita-768x715.jpg "Oplus_131072") [Harshita Singh Patel Secures Second Prize in National-Level Research Paper Writing Competition on Vision for Viksit Bharat ](https://lawfoyer.in/harshita-singh-patel-secures-second-prize-in-national-level-research-paper-writing-competition-on-vision-for-viksit-bharat/) [Read More](https://lawfoyer.in/harshita-singh-patel-secures-second-prize-in-national-level-research-paper-writing-competition-on-vision-for-viksit-bharat/) ![Group of people on a stage posing for a photo at a formal event, several holding certificates, with a banner and Indian flags behind them.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/IMG-20260614-WA0082-1-768x512.jpg "IMG-20260614-WA0082 (1)") [HNLU Earns Prestigious Citation of Honour for Advancing a Culture of Service and Voluntary Blood Donation ](https://lawfoyer.in/hnlu-earns-prestigious-citation-of-honour-for-advancing-a-culture-of-service-and-voluntary-blood-donation/) [Read More](https://lawfoyer.in/hnlu-earns-prestigious-citation-of-honour-for-advancing-a-culture-of-service-and-voluntary-blood-donation/) ![Group of formally dressed people posing with a large trophy on a flower-decorated stage at a law college award ceremony.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/IMG-20260412-WA0021-Karan-kumar-1-768x354.jpg "IMG-20260412-WA0021 - Karan kumar (1)") [Karan Kumar, Sameer Sanjay and Satya Sanatan of Central University of South Bihar Win the 1st L.P. Shahi Memorial National Moot Court Competition 2026 ](https://lawfoyer.in/karan-kumar-sameer-sanjay-and-satya-sanatan-of-central-university-of-south-bihar-win-the-1st-l-p-shahi-memorial-national-moot-court-competition-2026/) [Read More](https://lawfoyer.in/karan-kumar-sameer-sanjay-and-satya-sanatan-of-central-university-of-south-bihar-win-the-1st-l-p-shahi-memorial-national-moot-court-competition-2026/) ![Three smiling students in suits pose with certificates, a trophy, and a large prize check outdoors in front of white flowering bushes.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/IMG-20260412-WA0012-Khushi-Kumari-1-edited-768x1366.jpg "IMG-20260412-WA0012 - Khushi Kumari (1)") [Khushi Kumari, Alok Ranjan, and Priya Bharati of Gopal Narayan Singh University Excel at 1st L.P. Shahi Memorial National Moot Court Competition 2026 with Best Speaker Recognition ](https://lawfoyer.in/khushi-kumari-alok-ranjan-and-priya-bharati-of-gopal-narayan-singh-university-excel-at-1st-l-p-shahi-memorial-national-moot-court-competition-2026-with-best-speaker-recognition/) [Read More](https://lawfoyer.in/khushi-kumari-alok-ranjan-and-priya-bharati-of-gopal-narayan-singh-university-excel-at-1st-l-p-shahi-memorial-national-moot-court-competition-2026-with-best-speaker-recognition/) ![2246553A-DF04-411B-B082-3E2077B75D74 - Adrija Bhattacharya](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2246553A-DF04-411B-B082-3E2077B75D74-Adrija-Bhattacharya-768x1007.jpeg "2246553A-DF04-411B-B082-3E2077B75D74 - Adrija Bhattacharya") [Adrija Bhattacharya and Sejal Joshi of Vivekanand Education Society’s College of Law, Mumbai University Triumph at LJ School of Law Client Counselling Competition 2026, Securing Winner Title with Best Counsel Honour ](https://lawfoyer.in/adrija-bhattacharya-and-sejal-joshi-of-vivekanand-education-societys-college-of-law-mumbai-university-triumph-at-lj-school-of-law-client-counselling-competition-2026-securing-winner-title-w/) [Read More](https://lawfoyer.in/adrija-bhattacharya-and-sejal-joshi-of-vivekanand-education-societys-college-of-law-mumbai-university-triumph-at-lj-school-of-law-client-counselling-competition-2026-securing-winner-title-w/) ![WhatsApp Image 2026-04-12 at 3.25](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/WhatsApp-Image-2026-04-12-at-3.25.18-PM-768x768.jpeg "WhatsApp Image 2026-04-12 at 3.25") [Centre for Financial Markets and Regulatory Systems, NLIU Bhopal Successfully Hosts 1st National Symposium on Securities Law and Capital Markets 2026; Khushi Kalyani Gautam & Suhana, Yash Arjariya & Ayush Tiwari, and Kyra Mehra & Ananya Rakheja Shine as Top Achievers ](https://lawfoyer.in/centre-for-financial-markets-and-regulatory-systems-nliu-bhopal-successfully-hosts-1st-national-symposium-on-securities-law-and-capital-markets-2026-khushi-kalyani-gautam-suhana-yash-arjariya-a/) [Read More](https://lawfoyer.in/centre-for-financial-markets-and-regulatory-systems-nliu-bhopal-successfully-hosts-1st-national-symposium-on-securities-law-and-capital-markets-2026-khushi-kalyani-gautam-suhana-yash-arjariya-a/) ![IMG_8427 - Adrija Bhattacharya](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/IMG_8427-Adrija-Bhattacharya-768x512.jpeg "IMG_8427 - Adrija Bhattacharya") [Adrija Bhattacharya, Sejal Joshi, and Taanya Dash of Vivekanand Education Society’s College of Law Secure 2nd Runners-Up Position at LJ School of Law Ahmedabad National Parliamentary Debate Competition, 2026 ](https://lawfoyer.in/adrija-bhattacharya-sejal-joshi-and-taanya-dash-of-vivekanand-education-societys-college-of-law-secure-2nd-runners-up-position-at-lj-school-of-law-ahmedabad-national-parliamentary-debate-co/) [Read More](https://lawfoyer.in/adrija-bhattacharya-sejal-joshi-and-taanya-dash-of-vivekanand-education-societys-college-of-law-secure-2nd-runners-up-position-at-lj-school-of-law-ahmedabad-national-parliamentary-debate-co/) ![Participants](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Participants-768x576.jpeg "Participants") [HNLU Team Secures Runner-Up Position at the 23rd Willem C. Vis East International Commercial Arbitration Moot, Hong Kong ](https://lawfoyer.in/hnlu-team-secures-runner-up-position-at-the-23rd-willem-c-vis-east-international-commercial-arbitration-moot-hong-kong/) [Read More](https://lawfoyer.in/hnlu-team-secures-runner-up-position-at-the-23rd-willem-c-vis-east-international-commercial-arbitration-moot-hong-kong/) ![Poster-Press-Release-scaled](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Poster-Press-Release-scaled-1-768x1153.jpg "Poster-Press-Release-scaled") [National Law University Delhi Enters QS World University Rankings by Subject 2026 ](https://lawfoyer.in/national-law-university-delhi-enters-qs-world-university-rankings-by-subject-2026/) [Read More](https://lawfoyer.in/national-law-university-delhi-enters-qs-world-university-rankings-by-subject-2026/) [ Full Archive ](https://lawfoyer.in/category/achievers-archive/) [ Submit Achievement ](https://forms.gle/L1god7e54fwN6ANZ7) ### Why Be a Part of LawFoyer Achievers’ Archives? At LawFoyer Achievers’ Archives, being featured isn’t just about recognition — it’s about visibility, credibility, and career elevation. version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"? ### National Exposure Gain visibility across LawFoyer’s nationwide audience of students, educators, law firms, and professionals. Your achievement will be showcased on the LawFoyer website, shared on our social media channels, giving your success a platform that reaches thousands. version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"? ### Perks 1. E-Certificate of Recognition. 2. Legal Research & Drafting Internship Opportunity with LawFoyer 3. Free Access to Certification Course of [**LawFoyer Academy.**](https://academy.lawfoyer.in/all-courses/) 4. Free Yearly Job and Internship Updates via [**LawFoyer Connect**](https://news.lawfoyer.in/) 5. 50% Discount on Publication with **[LawFoyer International Journal.](https://lijdlr.com/cfp-lawfoyer-international-journal-of-doctrinal-legal-research/)** version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"? ### Inspire and Lead by Example Your journey will motivate countless law students across the nation who aspire to follow similar paths. By sharing your experience and strategies, you become a mentor figure, shaping a culture of achievement, ethics, and perseverance in legal education. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/elementor-media-wheel-widget-1024x396.png) ### Be Part of the LawFoyer Community 😉 Join a dynamic network of achievers, authors, researchers, and young professionals supported by LawFoyer’s ecosystem. Get opportunities for collaborations, research features, internships, and mentorship, connecting you with India’s growing circle of emerging legal leaders. ### Be Seen. Be Celebrated. ## CALL FOR ENTRIES – 2025 EDITION Submissions are now open If you’ve represented your institution, won a reputed competition, or published outstanding legal work — it’s time to get featured. The LawFoyer Achievers’ Archives (2025 Edition) is now open for submissions, offering you a chance to be featured among India’s most promising legal minds. By sharing your story, you don’t just gain recognition — you become part of a national network of achievers, educators, and professionals who are redefining legal excellence. Whether it was a victory earned through tireless preparation, a paper that challenged conventional thought, or a debate that inspired meaningful discourse — LawFoyer wants to showcase your success to the world. [ Submit Now ](https://forms.gle/L1god7e54fwN6ANZ7) ## Submission Process - **Fill the Submission Form** — Provide your details, achievement proof, and event description. - **Verification by LawFoyer Editorial Team** — Authenticity check with institution/organizer. - **Feature Publication** — Your profile appears on LawFoyer Achievers’ Archives and social channels. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/data-analysis_5033267.png) ## Eligibility - Open to students from recognized law colleges/universities (NLUs, Govt & Reputed Private). - Recent graduates (up to 2 years) may apply. - Only verified competitions and institutional achievements are accepted. ❌ Private ed-tech contests or paid startup events excluded. --- ### [EMERGING PROFESSIONALS – WHAT CAN BE INCLUDED](https://lawfoyer.in/emerging-professionals-what-can-be-included/) **Published:** November 2, 2025 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## EMERGING PROFESSIONALS – WHO ARE ELIGIBLE #### **1. Early-Career Legal Achievements** Recognizing young law graduates (within 2 years of graduation) who have achieved measurable professional milestones. **Examples:** - Selection as a Judicial Clerk / Research Associate in Supreme Court, High Court, or Law Commission. - Securing a position or recognition at a top-tier law firm, corporate legal department, or arbitration center. - Notable professional contribution in litigation, corporate advisory, or legal drafting. - Acting as a legal associate or counsel in a landmark or socially significant case. #### **2. Legal Innovation & Entrepreneurship** For individuals who are using technology, creativity, or entrepreneurship to improve legal systems or access to justice. **Examples:** - Founding or co-founding a legal-tech startup, legal research platform, or awareness initiative. - Developing tools (apps, websites, AI systems) that simplify legal education, documentation, or case research. - Launching an innovative legal education or community platform recognized by law schools or media. - Creating digital resources or social media initiatives promoting legal literacy. #### **3. Policy, Governance & Public Service** Recognizing graduates contributing to public policy, governance, or justice system reforms. **Examples:** - Serving as a policy fellow, legal consultant, or researcher with a government department, think tank, or NGO. - Contributing to a law reform project, public policy consultation, or draft legislation. - Participation in recognized research fellowships or policy programs (e.g., NITI Aayog, Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy, PRS India, etc.). - Publishing impactful research on law, governance, or social justice. #### 4**. Social Impact & Legal Advocacy** For those extending their legal knowledge to create real-world social or community impact. **Examples:** - Running legal aid, community service, or awareness programs on rights, justice, or constitutional values. - Representing or supporting underprivileged or marginalized groups through legal or policy advocacy. - Mentoring students through law school outreach initiatives or pro bono legal research. - Volunteering with national commissions, NGOs, or social justice organizations. #### **5. Recognitions, Awards & Fellowships** Highlighting achievements that mark exceptional promise in a young legal professional. **Examples:** - Receiving an industry award, fellowship, or academic scholarship post-graduation. - Shortlisted or featured in national legal media or publications (e.g., Bar & Bench, LiveLaw, SCC Blog). - Selected as a delegate or representative for international legal or policy forums (e.g., UN, UNESCO, WTO simulations). #### **Ideal Eligibility Summary** CriteriaRequirement**Experience**Completed Graduation not before 2 years**Recognition Type**Verified professional, academic, or innovation-based**Proof Needed**Certificate, publication link, media mention, or official appointment letter --- ### [ACADEMIC & SCHOLARLY ACHIEVERS – WHAT CAN BE INCLUDED](https://lawfoyer.in/academic-scholarly-achievers-what-can-be-included/) **Published:** November 2, 2025 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## ACADEMIC & SCHOLARLY ACHIEVERS – WHO ARE ELIGIBLE #### **1. Academic Toppers & Merit Holders** Recognizing students who have achieved exceptional academic distinction in their law school or university examinations. **Examples:** - Securing first position or gold medal in overall course performance (e.g., B.A. LL.B., LL.B., LL.M.). - Being recognized as a university topper or rank holder for the semester or final year. - Inclusion in the Dean’s List / Academic Excellence List by recognized law universities or NLUs. #### **2. University & Institutional Awards** Featuring law students honored by their universities or external bodies for their academic excellence or legal research capability. **Examples:** - Receiving a Vice Chancellor’s Award, Chancellor’s Medal, or Certificate of Academic Excellence from the university. - Awards from reputed academic institutions such as NLU Delhi, NALSAR, NLUJ, or Delhi University Faculty of Law for academic achievement. - Recognition at university convocations or academic ceremonies for scholarly distinction. #### **3. Scholarly Excellence & Research Fellowships** Highlighting students who have shown consistent academic rigor through research assistantships, scholarships, or institutional research roles. **Examples:** - Selected as a Research Assistant / Teaching Associate at a National Law University or recognized institution. - Awardees of academic scholarships, fellowships, or grants based on merit or research contribution. - Students undertaking doctoral or LL.M. research projects with significant academic merit. #### **4. Eligibility Snapshot** ParameterRequirement**Who Can Apply**Law students (UG/PG) or recent graduates recognized for academic excellence**Proof Required**Certificate, medal citation, transcript, or university announcement**Institution Type**Recognized NLUs, Government, or Reputed Private Law Colleges**Nature of Recognition**Merit-based, academic, or institutional award --- ### [LEGAL WRITERS – WHAT CAN BE INCLUDED](https://lawfoyer.in/legal-writers-what-can-be-included/) **Published:** November 2, 2025 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## LEGAL WRITERS – WHO IS ELIGIBLE #### **1. Essay Writing Competitions** Recognizing winners, finalists, and commendation holders from national or institutional essay competitions focused on law, policy, or governance. **Examples:** - Winning entries from Law Commission of India Essay Competition, National Human Rights Commission Essay Contest, NUJS Essay Writing Competition, or NALSAR Legal Writing Challenge. - Top essays selected in constitutional law, gender justice, or international law themes hosted by reputed universities or government institutions. #### **2. Research Paper Publications / Competitions** Featuring students or graduates whose research papers have been **published or presented in reputed academic journals or conferences** or winners / runner-ups of National / International Research Paper Writing Competitions. **Examples:** - Publication in peer-reviewed or indexed journals such as *LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research (LIJDLR)*, *NLSIU Review*, *NLUJ Law Review*, or *Jindal Global Law Review*. - Research papers accepted for academic symposiums, national seminars, or UGC-listed or Scopus Indexed journals. - Papers selected for law school research paper writing / research memo writing competitions or legal think-tank presentations. #### **3. Blog / Article / Legal Essay Writing Competitions** Including law students who’ve written impactful, analytical blogs or articles for credible legal platforms that contribute to public discourse or practical understanding of law and who have performed outstandingly well in National / International Blog / Article / Legal Essay Writing Competitions **Examples:** - Performed outstandingly well in Article / Blog / Essay writing published on recognized legal platforms such as *LawFoyer*, *Bar & Bench*, *SCC Online Blog*, *LiveLaw*, or *iPleaders*. - Analytical or opinion-based pieces on emerging legal issues, judicial decisions, or policy reforms. #### **4. Recognitions & Awards** Highlighting those who’ve received formal acknowledgment for their writing or research contributions. **Examples:** - Awards for Best Paper, Best Author, or Outstanding Legal Research in academic competitions. - Certificates of distinction or merit issued by universities or journals recognizing scholarly excellence. - Invited authors or student editors for university legal journals. ### **Eligibility Snapshot** ParameterRequirement**Who Can Apply**Law students (UG/PG) or recent graduates (within 2 years)**Proof Required**Certificate, publication link, or editorial acknowledgment**Platform Type**University journals, law reviews, reputed legal websites, or institutional events**Focus Areas**Legal analysis, policy research, constitutional law, human rights, corporate law, etc. --- ### [MOOT MASTERS – WHAT CAN BE INCLUDED](https://lawfoyer.in/moot-masters-what-can-be-included/) **Published:** November 2, 2025 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## MOOT MASTERS – WHO ARE ELIGIBLE #### **1. National & International Moot Court Competitions** Recognizing students who have excelled in *recognized and reputed* moot court competitions that test advocacy, research, and drafting skills. **Examples:** - Winners, Runners-Up in Surana & Surana Moot Court Competitions (hosted by various NLUs). - Participants securing awards in Philip C. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition, Henry Dunant Humanitarian Law Moot, Stetson Environmental Law Moot, or Vis International Arbitration Moot. #### **2. Individual Excellence Awards** Featuring mooters who’ve demonstrated individual brilliance through specialized recognitions in national-level events. **Examples:** - **Best Speaker / Oralist Award** at any recognized moot court competition. - **Best Researcher / Memorial Award** winner in a national or international moot. - **Best Team Memorial / Written Submission Award** for outstanding legal drafting and argument structure. #### **3. Representation & Institutional Pride** Recognizing students or teams who’ve represented their law schools, universities, or India in international rounds or achieved distinction at the national level. Examples: - Representing India or an NLU/private law university in the international rounds of Jessup, Stetson, or Vis Vienna Moots. - Achievements in invitational moots hosted by national law universities, bar associations, or government bodies. - Finalist teams or award-winning participants at UN or international law-themed moots organized by reputed institutions. #### **4. Eligibility Snapshot** **Parameter****Requirement****Participants**Law students (UG/PG) who have represented their institution in recognized moot courts.**Event Type**Moots organized by reputed universities, bar associations, or international organizations.**Proof Required**Certificate, official event result, or announcement link.**Team/Individual**Both accepted, but individual contribution should be specified. --- ### [LEGAL REFORM CHAMPIONS – WHAT CAN BE INCLUDED](https://lawfoyer.in/legal-reform-champions-what-can-be-included/) **Published:** November 2, 2025 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## LEGAL REFORM CHAMPIONS – WHO IS ELIGIBLE #### **1. Policy Drafting & Law Reform Initiatives** Recognizing individuals or teams who have contributed to drafting model policies, legislation, or law reform recommendations in collaboration with universities, research bodies, or government departments. **Examples:** - Participation in NITI Aayog, Law Commission of India, or State Legal Services Authority projects related to law reform. - Students who drafted or co-authored model bills, research reports, or consultation papers for government bodies or think tanks. - Members of university research centers such as Centre for Law & Policy Research (CLPR), Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy, or Centre for Public Policy Research (CPPR) working on legal frameworks. #### **2. Public Policy & Governance Research** Featuring law students or graduates who have worked on policy analysis, governance evaluation, or rights-based initiatives that influenced real-world discussions or reforms. **Examples:** - Policy fellows or research interns at PRS Legislative Research, Centre for Civil Society (CCS), Observer Research Foundation (ORF), or UNDP India. - Contributors to public consultations, government white papers, or draft submissions for ministries or commissions. - Students conducting empirical or socio-legal research on topics like environmental law, gender justice, or access to justice. #### **3. Legal Awareness & Community Advocacy** Recognizing impactful student initiatives that bridge the gap between law and society through education, advocacy, or community outreach. **Examples:** - Organizing legal literacy and awareness campaigns under university legal aid cells or NGOs. - Participating in grassroots legal projects addressing gender equality, environmental justice, or constitutional rights. - Leading student research for judicial reform discussions or law school-based public awareness programs. #### **4. International or Institutional Recognition** Including achievers who have represented India or their universities in international law and policy competitions or consultations. **Examples:** - Delegates or representatives in UN Policy Drafting Competitions, Global Legal Hackathons, or International Law Commissions. - Recognized participants in law and governance forums organized by institutions like the World Bank, OECD, or Commonwealth Legal Education Association (CLEA). #### **5. Eligibility Snapshot** ParameterRequirement**Who Can Apply**Law students or recent graduates (within 2 years) involved in verified law reform, policy, or advocacy initiatives**Organizing Bodies**Government agencies, universities, law research centers, NGOs, or international institutions**Proof Required**Certificate, project acknowledgment, or official publication/report link**Outcome Focus**Policy drafting, legal research, reform recommendations, or advocacy initiatives with measurable impact --- ### [DEBATE & DIALOGUE LEADERS – WHAT CAN BE INCLUDED](https://lawfoyer.in/debate-dialogue-leaders-what-can-be-included/) **Published:** November 2, 2025 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## DEBATE & DIALOGUE LEADERS – WHO IS EILIGIBLE #### **1. Youth Parliaments & Policy Dialogues** Recognizing law students who have actively participated in Youth Parliaments, Policy Debates, or Public Governance Simulations organized by reputed academic or government institutions. **Examples:** - Winners or finalists in National Youth Parliament Competition (NYPC), NLSIU Youth Parliament, Parliament of India’s National Youth Parliament Series, or NLU-based Youth Assemblies. - Outstanding speakers or delegates at policy forums or constitutional law discussions hosted by universities or think tanks (like NITI Aayog, Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy, or Chambers of MSME). #### **2. Debates (National, Legal & Academic)** Featuring participants who have excelled in legal or policy-oriented debate competitions testing reasoning, persuasion, and legal understanding. **Examples:** - Winners or runners-up of NLIU National Debate, AIU Inter-University Debate, or Bar Council-sponsored Legal Debates. - Best Speaker or Finalist awards in university-level or national inter-collegiate debate competitions addressing issues like constitutional rights, gender equality, and criminal law reform. #### **3. Model United Nations (MUNs)** Highlighting law students who have excelled in MUNs, where diplomacy, negotiation, and argumentation intersect with international law and governance. **Examples:** - Best Delegate, High Commendation, or Outstanding Delegate awards at Harvard Model UN India, NLU MUN, or Jindal Global Model UN. - Participants who demonstrated policy-based solutions and advocacy rooted in legal frameworks during committee sessions. #### **4. Policy & Legal Discourse Events** Recognizing participants in public speaking forums, panel discussions, or mock assemblies related to law, governance, and social issues. **Examples:** - Speakers at TEDx or university law symposiums discussing contemporary legal reforms. - Notable contributors to interdisciplinary policy summits or mock legislations organized by reputed law schools or NGOs. #### **5. Eligibility Snapshot** ParameterRequirement**Who Can Apply**Law students (UG/PG) who have participated in recognized debates, Youth Parliaments, or MUNs**Event Type**University, Government, or Institutional-level competitions**Proof Required**Certificate, award announcement, or official link**Individual/Team**Both allowed (individual contribution must be clear) --- ### [Certificate of 22nd LawFoyer Quiz on Indian Contract Act](https://lawfoyer.in/certificate-of-22nd-lawfoyer-quiz-on-indian-contract-act/) **Published:** September 27, 2025 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## **Steps to download certificate:** - **Search your name in the table below** - **Certificate number will be shown in front of your Name.** - **Click on the download certificate option button which is available below the table and you will be redirected to google drive**. --- \[table id=64 /\] --- [Download Certificate](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1gZCDg1hdND1itfHXlzwbGrj95-nGiL4E?usp=sharing) --- --- ### [Result of 22nd LawFoyer Quiz on Indian Contract Act](https://lawfoyer.in/result-of-22nd-lawfoyer-quiz-on-indian-contract-act/) **Published:** September 27, 2025 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## You can find your rank/score by searching your name in the search box. **Keywords:** 1. Those who have attempted quiz after 07:35 PM have been highlighted with “red color” and are considered as “late entry”. They will get E-Certificate. 2. Disqualified candidates are those who have not completed the registration. 3. In the case of the same marks, as stated in the quiz guidelines earlier, Time will be considered (A person who submits early will be given preference). \[table id=63 /\] --- --- ### [test](https://lawfoyer.in/test-2/) **Published:** September 2, 2025 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/plugins/unlimited-elements-for-elementor/images/placeholder.png) ](#) [Graphic Designer](#) Minimum$50,000 Per Year [Unlimited Elements](#)Tel Aviv, Israel Full Time Remote Seeking a skilled Graphic Designer proficient in Sketch, Photoshop, animation, and data analysis. The ideal candidate will have a strong portfolio showcasing creative design solutions and the ability... 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](https://lawfoyer.in/national-workshop-on-code-court-future-the-nuances-applications-and-legal-literacy-surrounding-ai-in-india-organized-by-chair-on-consumer-research-and-policy-ccrp-national-university-of-study/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [30-Hour Certificate Programme on the Consumer Protection Laws in India and the United Kingdom | Organized by Chair on Consumer Research and Policy (CCRP), National University of Study and Research in Law (NUSRL), Ranchi | Register by 13th August 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/national-workshop-on-code-court-future-the-nuances-applications-and-legal-literacy-surrounding-ai-in-india-organized-by-chair-on-consumer-research-and-policy-ccrp-national-university-of-study/) Deadline: August 13, 2026 [ ![Seal of St. Xavier's University, Kolkata, featuring a sunburst with a cross, palm tree, tiger, checkerboard shield, and the Nihil Ultra motto on a banner.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/SXUK-Crest.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/national-workshop-on-code-court-future-the-nuances-applications-and-legal-literacy-surrounding-ai-in-india-organized-by-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-in-association-with-t/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [National Workshop on Code.Court.Future: The Nuances, Applications, and Legal Literacy Surrounding AI in India | Organized by Xavier Law School, St. Xavier's University, Kolkata, in association with the Technology Counsel Foundation (TECOF) | Register by 15th August 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/national-workshop-on-code-court-future-the-nuances-applications-and-legal-literacy-surrounding-ai-in-india-organized-by-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-in-association-with-t/) Deadline: August 15, 2026 [ ![Logo of Dr. M.G.R. Educational and Research Institute featuring a two-tone shield with gear, books, caduceus, and DNA symbols, laurel wreath, and the motto 'Strive to Excel'](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/d74328a820ac2dfff2c23680c67bd515.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/dr-a-c-s-1st-national-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-moot-court-society-faculty-of-law-dr-m-g-r-educational-and-research-institute-deemed-to-be-university-chennai-register-by-1/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Dr. A.C.S. 1st National Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, Faculty of Law, Dr. M.G.R. Educational and Research Institute (Deemed to be University), Chennai | Register by 15th August 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/dr-a-c-s-1st-national-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-moot-court-society-faculty-of-law-dr-m-g-r-educational-and-research-institute-deemed-to-be-university-chennai-register-by-1/) Deadline: August 15, 2026 [ ![Seal of National Law University Chandigarh featuring scales of justice, an open book, and laurel branches in blue.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/HNLU_Logo1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-articles-koitur-people-of-nature-special-edition-organized-by-centre-for-law-indigenous-studies-school-of-law-humanities-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnl/) [Call for Blogs](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-blogs/) [Call for Articles: KOITUR – People of Nature (Special Edition) | Organized by Centre for Law & Indigenous Studies, School of Law & Humanities, Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Submit by 16th August 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-articles-koitur-people-of-nature-special-edition-organized-by-centre-for-law-indigenous-studies-school-of-law-humanities-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnl/) Deadline: August 16, 2026 [ ![Logo of Frontiers Welfare Society, an NGO, featuring two stylized figures (black and red) reaching toward each other in a circular seal with the organization name around the edge and 'Non-Governmental Organization' beneath.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/frontiers_welfare_society_ngo_logo.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/beyond-academics-how-to-build-the-skills-that-define-successful-professionals-national-webinar-under-frontiers-welfare-society-ngo-organized-by-frontiers-welfare-society-register-by-24th-july/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Beyond Academics: How to Build the Skills that Define successful professionals, National Webinar under Frontiers Welfare Society (NGO) | Organized by Frontiers Welfare Society | Register by 24th July 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/beyond-academics-how-to-build-the-skills-that-define-successful-professionals-national-webinar-under-frontiers-welfare-society-ngo-organized-by-frontiers-welfare-society-register-by-24th-july/) Deadline: July 24, 2026 [ ![University seal featuring a tiger resting on a checkered pedestal beneath a palm tree and crescent moon, surrounded by a ring that reads 'Xavier's University' with a motto and a yellow ribbon reading 'Nihil Ultra'.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/images.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/vox-legis-xaveriana-volume-ii-organized-by-xavier-society-of-law-and-justice-xslaj-under-the-aegis-of-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-event-on-19th-july-20/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Vox Legis Xaveriana – Volume II | Organized by Xavier Society of Law and Justice (XSLAJ) under the aegis of Xavier Law School, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata | Event on 19th July, 2026 (Sunday)](https://lawfoyer.in/vox-legis-xaveriana-volume-ii-organized-by-xavier-society-of-law-and-justice-xslaj-under-the-aegis-of-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-event-on-19th-july-20/) Deadline: July 19, 2026 [ ![Seal of the University of Rajasthan featuring a central torch and book, surrounded by text and the year 1947.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Rajasthan_University_Logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/14th-ufylc-ranka-national-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-university-five-year-law-college-ufylc-university-of-rajasthan-jaipur-register-by-31st-august-2026-1159-pm-ist/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [14th UFYLC–Ranka National Moot Court Competition 2026 | Organized by University Five Year Law College (UFYLC), University of Rajasthan, Jaipur | Register by 31st August 2026 (11:59 PM IST)](https://lawfoyer.in/14th-ufylc-ranka-national-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-university-five-year-law-college-ufylc-university-of-rajasthan-jaipur-register-by-31st-august-2026-1159-pm-ist/) Deadline: August 31, 2026 [ ![Green circular gear-like emblem with radial spokes on a black background, resembling an abstract logo](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Official-logo-768x583.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/kartavya-2026-campus-ambassador-programme-kiit-samvidhan-mahotsav-organized-by-kiit-centre-for-constitutional-law-studies-and-research-cclsr-kiit-school-of-law-kiit-deemed-to-be-univer/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Kartavya 2026 Campus Ambassador Programme – KIIT Samvidhan Mahotsav | Organized by KIIT Centre for Constitutional Law Studies and Research (CCLSR), KIIT School of Law, KIIT Deemed-to-be University | Register by 25th July 2026 (11:59 PM IST)](https://lawfoyer.in/kartavya-2026-campus-ambassador-programme-kiit-samvidhan-mahotsav-organized-by-kiit-centre-for-constitutional-law-studies-and-research-cclsr-kiit-school-of-law-kiit-deemed-to-be-univer/) Deadline: July 25, 2026 [ ![Pink circular logo with a dancing woman in a sari superimposed on the outline of India; 'WICCI' appears above, and along the arc reads 'Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium'.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/TNLRC-logo.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/women-in-the-workforce-challenges-representation-and-labour-law-perspectives-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-in-association-with-lex-lumen-research-journal-llrj-event-h/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [WOMEN IN THE WORKFORCE: CHALLENGES, REPRESENTATION AND LABOUR LAW PERSPECTIVES | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) in Association with Lex Lumen Research Journal (LLRJ) | Event held on 25th July 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/women-in-the-workforce-challenges-representation-and-labour-law-perspectives-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-in-association-with-lex-lumen-research-journal-llrj-event-h/) Deadline: July 25, 2026 [ ![Amity University Lucknow Campus logo featuring a blue shield with a yellow flame and the campus name text](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Amity_University_Lucknow_logo_24a31fd30f.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/international-faculty-development-programme-on-governance-law-and-sustainability-in-the-21st-century-organized-by-amity-law-school-amity-university-uttar-pradesh-lucknow-campus-register-by-04-j/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [INTERNATIONAL FACULTY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME ON GOVERNANCE, LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY | Organized by Amity Law School, Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Campus | Register by 04 July 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-faculty-development-programme-on-governance-law-and-sustainability-in-the-21st-century-organized-by-amity-law-school-amity-university-uttar-pradesh-lucknow-campus-register-by-04-j/) Deadline: July 4, 2026 [ ![LawFoyer Logo no bg 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/LawFoyer-Logo-no-bg-2026-768x253.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/advanced-certification-course-on-intellectual-property-laws-of-india/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Advanced Certification Course on Intellectual Property Laws of India](https://lawfoyer.in/advanced-certification-course-on-intellectual-property-laws-of-india/) Deadline: June 27, 2026 [ ![Circular emblem of Chanakya National Law University, Patna, featuring an open book with a flame above it and a scales motif, surrounded by the university's name in English and Hindi.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Chanakya_National_Law_University_Logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/catalyst-3-0-startup-law-and-policy-summit-2026-organized-by-chanakya-national-law-university-cnlu-patna-register-by-15th-july-2026/) [Call for Blogs](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-blogs/) [CATALYST 3.0: Startup Law and Policy Summit 2026 | Organized by Centre for Innovation, Incubation and Legal Entrepreneurship (CIILE), Chanakya National Law University (CNLU), Patna | Register by 15th July, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/catalyst-3-0-startup-law-and-policy-summit-2026-organized-by-chanakya-national-law-university-cnlu-patna-register-by-15th-july-2026/) Deadline: July 15, 2026 [ ![LawFoyer Logo](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/LawFoyer-Logo-no-bg-2026-Medium-768x252.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/27th-lawfoyer-quiz-on-the-constitution-of-india/) [Quiz](https://lawfoyer.in/category/quiz/) [27th LawFoyer Quiz on (The Constitution of India): Prizes worth Rs. 25K + | Cash Prizes, Smart Watch, Earbuds and much more | Bonuses for All Participants worth Rs. 5K+ | Register by 18th July, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/27th-lawfoyer-quiz-on-the-constitution-of-india/) Deadline: June 6, 2026 [ ![Apex University logo: blue and gold shield with an open book and torch motif, branding for the institution](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/apex_university_logo.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/jus-novum-au-nationwide-law-fest-2026-organized-by-moot-court-society-apex-school-of-law-apex-university-jaipur-in-collaboration-with-district-legal-services-authority-jaipur-district-reg/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Jus Novum - AU Nationwide Law Fest, 2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, Apex School of Law, Apex University, Jaipur In Collaboration With District Legal Services Authority, Jaipur (District) | Register by 8th August 2026, 2026 for Hybrid & Online Competitions and 2nd September, 2026 for one day (Offline) Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/jus-novum-au-nationwide-law-fest-2026-organized-by-moot-court-society-apex-school-of-law-apex-university-jaipur-in-collaboration-with-district-legal-services-authority-jaipur-district-reg/) Deadline: July 31, 2026 [ ![Stylized red logo with Devanagari text above and the word DELHI in large red letters.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/National_Law_University_Delhi_logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/centre-for-environmental-law-policy-and-research-celpr-national-law-university-delhi-organized-by-collective-for-environmental-action-cea-under-the-aegis-of-the-centre-for-environmental-law-p/) [Call for Blogs](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-blogs/) [Call for Blogs | Centre for Environmental Law, Policy and Research (CELPR), National Law University Delhi | Organized by Collective for Environmental Action (CEA) under the aegis of the Centre for Environmental Law, Policy and Research (CELPR), National Law University Delhi](https://lawfoyer.in/centre-for-environmental-law-policy-and-research-celpr-national-law-university-delhi-organized-by-collective-for-environmental-action-cea-under-the-aegis-of-the-centre-for-environmental-law-p/) [ ![Judiciary emblem: scales of justice between laurel branches with a graduation cap on top.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/IMG_0227-768x768.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/vidhika-a-quarterly-law-journal-vol-2-issue-2-organized-by-nyaya-shastra-submit-articles-papers-by-15-june-2026/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [VIDHIKA – A Quarterly Law Journal (Vol. 2, Issue 2) | Organized by Nyaya Shastra | Submit Articles & Papers by 15 June 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/vidhika-a-quarterly-law-journal-vol-2-issue-2-organized-by-nyaya-shastra-submit-articles-papers-by-15-june-2026/) Deadline: June 15, 2026 [ ![Logo for Trinity Institute of Professional Studies (TIPS): circular seal with a stylized central figure, 'TIPS' lettering, and a banner reading 'Light to Enlighten'.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/0x0-1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-shri-o-p-tandon-memorial-mock-trial-competition-2026-organized-by-trinity-institute-of-professional-studies-tips-register-by-2nd-august-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [3RD SHRI O.P. 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K. 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left](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/CanonsphereBanner-2.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-client-counseling-competition-2026-by-canonsphere-organized-by-canonsphere-register-by-2nd-july-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [1st Client Counseling Competition 2026 by Canonsphere | Organized by Canonsphere | Register by 2nd July, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-client-counseling-competition-2026-by-canonsphere-organized-by-canonsphere-register-by-2nd-july-2026/) Deadline: July 2, 2026 [ ![LawFoyer Logo no bg 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/LawFoyer-Logo-no-bg-2026-768x253.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/advanced-certification-workshop-on-ai-powered-legal-research-writing-and-drafting/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Advanced Certification Workshop on AI-Powered Legal Research, Writing and Drafting](https://lawfoyer.in/advanced-certification-workshop-on-ai-powered-legal-research-writing-and-drafting/) [ 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](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-nluj-cclrp-national-essay-writing-competition-2026-organized-by-centre-for-consumer-law-research-practice-national-law-university-jodhpur-submission-deadline-15th-april-2026/) [Essay Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/essay-competitions/) [1st NLUJ-CCLRP National Essay Writing Competition, 2026 | Organized by Centre for Consumer Law Research & Practice, National Law University, Jodhpur | Submission Deadline: 15th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-nluj-cclrp-national-essay-writing-competition-2026-organized-by-centre-for-consumer-law-research-practice-national-law-university-jodhpur-submission-deadline-15th-april-2026/) Deadline: April 15, 2026 [ ![DME-logo-1](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/DME-logo-1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/%e0%a4%b8%e0%a4%ae%e0%a4%97%e0%a5%8d%e0%a4%b026-annual-inter-college-sports-meet-organized-by-dme-sports-society-delhi-metropolitan-education-event-dates-25th-30th-m/) 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IST)](https://lawfoyer.in/international-trade-law-summit-2026-the-wto30-reimagining-multilateralism-in-international-trade-law-organized-by-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur-register-b/) Deadline: July 20, 2026 [ ![legalwiki_logo](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/legalwiki_logo.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/legal-startup-online-pitching-competition-2026-2-0-be-the-next-founder-organized-by-legalwiki-register-by-15-march-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Legal Startup Online Pitching Competition, 2026 – 2.0 [Be the Next Founder] | Organized by LegalWiki | Register by 15 March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/legal-startup-online-pitching-competition-2026-2-0-be-the-next-founder-organized-by-legalwiki-register-by-15-march-2026/) Deadline: March 15, 2026 [ ![gehu-logo](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/gehu-logo.jpeg) 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Submit Form --- ### [Result of 20th LawFoyer Quiz on Indian Contract Act](https://lawfoyer.in/result-of-20th-lawfoyer-quiz-on-indian-contract-act/) **Published:** June 14, 2025 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## You can find your rank/score by searching your name in the search box. **Keywords:** 1. Those who have attempted quiz after 07:35 PM have been highlighted with “red color” and are considered as “late entry”. They will get E-Certificate. 2. Disqualified candidates are those who have not completed the registration. 3. In the case of the same marks, as stated in the quiz guidelines earlier, Time will be considered (A person who submits early will be given preference). --- \[table id=54 /\] --- --- ### [Certificate of 20th LawFoyer Quiz on Indian Contract Act](https://lawfoyer.in/certificate-of-20th-lawfoyer-quiz-on-indian-contract-act/) **Published:** June 14, 2025 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## **Steps to download certificate:** - **Search your name in the table below** - **Certificate number will be shown in front of your Name.** - **Click on the download certificate option button which is available below the table and you will be redirected to google drive**. --- \[table id=56 /\] [Download Certificate](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1c-xX0GIAXi-8AwSANvcgTWk4JczGMYQF?usp=sharing) --- --- --- --- --- ### [Certificate of 19th LawFoyer Quiz on The Constitution Law of India](https://lawfoyer.in/certificate-of-19th-lawfoyer-quiz-on-the-constitution-law-of-india/) **Published:** April 26, 2025 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## **Steps to download certificate:** - **Search your name in the table below** - **Certificate number will be shown in front of your Name.** - **Click on the download certificate option button which is available below the table and you will be redirected to google drive**. --- \[table id=53 /\] --- [Download Certificate](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1rVq87D2mEfhva4Ny6s4LvkvYQ82AEvKZ?usp=sharing) --- --- ### [Result of 19th LawFoyer Quiz on The Constitution Law of India](https://lawfoyer.in/result-of-19th-lawfoyer-quiz-on-the-constitution-law-of-india/) **Published:** April 26, 2025 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## You can find your rank/score by searching your name in the search box. **Keywords:** 1. Those who have attempted quiz after 05:35 pm have been highlighted with “red color” and are considered as “late entry”. They will get E-Certificate. 2. Disqualified candidates are those who have not completed the registration. 3. In the case of the same marks, as stated in the quiz guidelines earlier, Time will be considered (A person who submits early will be given preference). --- \[table id=52 /\] --- --- ### [Test Post](https://lawfoyer.in/test-post/) **Published:** March 29, 2025 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** Select Events Quiz Courses & Workshops Webinar [ ![images-4](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/images-4.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/vcprf-international-moot-court-workshop-2026-organized-by-veritas-centre-for-policy-research-foundation-vcprf-register-by-30-september-2026/ "VCPRF - International Moot Court Workshop, 2026 | Organized by Veritas Centre for Policy Research Foundation (VCPRF) | Register by 30 September 2026") [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) [VCPRF - International Moot Court Workshop, 2026 | Organized by Veritas Centre for Policy Research Foundation (VCPRF) | Register by 30 September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/vcprf-international-moot-court-workshop-2026-organized-by-veritas-centre-for-policy-research-foundation-vcprf-register-by-30-september-2026/ "VCPRF - International Moot Court Workshop, 2026 | Organized by Veritas Centre for Policy Research Foundation (VCPRF) | Register by 30 September 2026") Deadline: [ ![Integral_University_Lucknow_logo](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Integral_University_Lucknow_logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/integral-university-india-in-collaboration-with-menoufiyauniversity-al-minufiyah-egypt-organized-by-integral-university-lucknow-submit-abstract-by-20th-october-2026/ "Two-Day International Conference on “Forensic Sciences for Advancing Justice: Integrating Law, Medical Science and Technology” | Organized by Integral University, India in collaboration with MenoufiyaUniversity AL Minufiyah, Egypt | Submit Abstract by 20th October 2026") [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) [Two-Day International Conference on “Forensic Sciences for Advancing Justice: Integrating Law, Medical Science and Technology” | Organized by Integral University, India in collaboration with MenoufiyaUniversity AL Minufiyah, Egypt | Submit Abstract by 20th October 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/integral-university-india-in-collaboration-with-menoufiyauniversity-al-minufiyah-egypt-organized-by-integral-university-lucknow-submit-abstract-by-20th-october-2026/ "Two-Day International Conference on “Forensic Sciences for Advancing Justice: Integrating Law, Medical Science and Technology” | Organized by Integral University, India in collaboration with MenoufiyaUniversity AL Minufiyah, Egypt | Submit Abstract by 20th October 2026") Deadline: [ ![image-1](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/image-1-1024x333.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/10th-sgtu-moot-court-competition2026-organized-by-moot-court-society-school-of-law-sgt-university-register-by-5th-october-2026/ "10th SGTU Moot Court Competition,2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, School of Law, SGT University | Register by 5th October, 2026") [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) [10th SGTU Moot Court Competition,2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, School of Law, SGT University | Register by 5th October, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/10th-sgtu-moot-court-competition2026-organized-by-moot-court-society-school-of-law-sgt-university-register-by-5th-october-2026/ "10th SGTU Moot Court Competition,2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, School of Law, SGT University | Register by 5th October, 2026") Deadline: [ ![National_Forensic_Sciences_University_Logo](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/National_Forensic_Sciences_University_Logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/national-legal-hackathon-organized-by-school-of-law-forensic-justice-and-policy-studies-national-forensic-sciences-university-nfsu-register-by-24-september-2026/ "National Legal Hackathon | Organized by School of Law, Forensic Justice and Policy Studies, National Forensic Sciences University (NFSU) | Register by 24 September 2026") [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) [National Legal Hackathon | Organized by School of Law, Forensic Justice and Policy Studies, National Forensic Sciences University (NFSU) | Register by 24 September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/national-legal-hackathon-organized-by-school-of-law-forensic-justice-and-policy-studies-national-forensic-sciences-university-nfsu-register-by-24-september-2026/ "National Legal Hackathon | Organized by School of Law, Forensic Justice and Policy Studies, National Forensic Sciences University (NFSU) | Register by 24 September 2026") Deadline: [ ![images-3](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/images-3.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-abstracts-ccadr-journal-for-alternate-dispute-resolution-organized-by-chanakya-centre-for-alternative-dispute-resolution-ccadr-cnlu-register-by-15th-october-2026-1159-p-m/ "CALL FOR ABSTRACTS — CCADR JOURNAL FOR ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION | Organized by Chanakya Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution (CCADR), CNLU | Register by 15th October 2026 | 11:59 p.m.") [Call for Blogs](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-blogs/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [CALL FOR ABSTRACTS — CCADR JOURNAL FOR ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION | Organized by Chanakya Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution (CCADR), CNLU | Register by 15th October 2026 | 11:59 p.m.](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-abstracts-ccadr-journal-for-alternate-dispute-resolution-organized-by-chanakya-centre-for-alternative-dispute-resolution-ccadr-cnlu-register-by-15th-october-2026-1159-p-m/ "CALL FOR ABSTRACTS — CCADR JOURNAL FOR ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION | Organized by Chanakya Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution (CCADR), CNLU | Register by 15th October 2026 | 11:59 p.m.") Deadline: [ ![images-2](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/images-2.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/11th-justice-murtaza-husain-memorial-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-unity-moot-court-committee-unity-p-g-college-lucknow-register-by-30th-september-2026/ "11th Justice Murtaza Husain Memorial Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Unity 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College, Lucknow | Register by 30th September 2026") [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) [11th Justice Murtaza Husain Memorial Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Unity Moot Court Committee, Unity P.G. College, Lucknow | Register by 30th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/11th-justice-murtaza-husain-memorial-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-unity-moot-court-committee-unity-p-g-college-lucknow-register-by-30th-september-2026/ "11th Justice Murtaza Husain Memorial Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Unity Moot Court Committee, Unity P.G. College, Lucknow | Register by 30th September 2026") Deadline: [ ![IMG_0227](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/IMG_0227-1024x1024.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/vidhika-volume-2-issue-3-organized-by-nyaya-shastra-submit-by-20th-september-2026/ "VIDHIKA – Volume 2 Issue 3 | Organized by Nyaya Shastra | Submit by 20th September 2026") [Call for Blogs](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-blogs/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [VIDHIKA – Volume 2 Issue 3 | Organized by Nyaya Shastra | Submit by 20th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/vidhika-volume-2-issue-3-organized-by-nyaya-shastra-submit-by-20th-september-2026/ "VIDHIKA – Volume 2 Issue 3 | Organized by Nyaya Shastra | Submit by 20th September 2026") Deadline: [ ![images-1](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/images-1.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/medexon-international-mediation-competition-2026-organized-by-dexon-global-register-by-20-october-2026/ "MEDEXON INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION COMPETITION, 2026 | Organized by Dexon Global | Register by 20 October 2026") [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) [MEDEXON INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION COMPETITION, 2026 | Organized by Dexon Global | Register by 20 October 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/medexon-international-mediation-competition-2026-organized-by-dexon-global-register-by-20-october-2026/ "MEDEXON INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION COMPETITION, 2026 | Organized by Dexon Global | Register by 20 October 2026") Deadline: [ ![images](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/images.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/k-m-bashir-memorial-student-constitutional-forum-2026-organized-by-vakkom-moulavi-foundation-trust-vmft-event-on-24-25-september-2026/ "K.M. 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(HNLU), Raipur | Submit Abstract by 15 September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-abstracts-international-conference-on-international-arbitration-organized-by-school-of-law-mahindra-university-hyderabad-in-collaboration-with-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu/ "Call for Abstracts: International Conference on International Arbitration | Organized by School of Law, Mahindra University, Hyderabad, in collaboration with Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Submit Abstract by 15 September 2026") Deadline: [ ![logo](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/logo-1024x850.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/synergy-where-law-meets-society-case-study-competition-2026-organized-by-vivekananda-school-of-law-and-legal-studies-vslls-vivekananda-institute-of-professional-studies-techn/ "SYNERGY: WHERE LAW MEETS SOCIETY – CASE STUDY COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by Vivekananda School of Law and Legal Studies (VSLLS), Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies – Technical 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![HNLU_Logo1](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/HNLU_Logo1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-international-arbitration-organized-by-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur-register-by-20-september-2026/ "INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION | Organized by Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Register by 20 September 2026") [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) [INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION | Organized by Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Register by 20 September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-international-arbitration-organized-by-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur-register-by-20-september-2026/ "INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION | Organized by Hidayatullah National Law 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](https://lawfoyer.in/6th-rfmlr-tta-demystifying-series-certificate-course-on-cross-border-ma-and-foreign-investment-organized-by-rgnul-financial-and-mercantile-law-review-rfmlr-rajiv-gandhi-natio/ "6th RFMLR – TT&A Demystifying Series: Certificate Course on Cross Border M&A and Foreign Investment | Organized by RGNUL Financial and Mercantile Law Review (RFMLR), Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab (RGNUL) | Event on 9th September 2026") [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [6th RFMLR – TT&A Demystifying Series: Certificate Course on Cross Border M&A and Foreign Investment | Organized by RGNUL Financial and Mercantile Law Review (RFMLR), Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab (RGNUL) | Event on 9th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/6th-rfmlr-tta-demystifying-series-certificate-course-on-cross-border-ma-and-foreign-investment-organized-by-rgnul-financial-and-mercantile-law-review-rfmlr-rajiv-gandhi-natio/ "6th RFMLR – TT&A Demystifying Series: Certificate Course on Cross Border M&A and Foreign Investment | Organized by RGNUL Financial and Mercantile Law Review (RFMLR), Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab (RGNUL) | Event on 9th September 2026") Deadline: [ ![images-2](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/images-2.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/2nd-international-conference-on-human-rights-organized-by-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-abstract-submission-deadline-by15th-september-2026/ "2nd International Conference on Human Rights | Organized by Xavier Law School, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata | Abstract Submission Deadline by15th September 2026") [Call for Blogs](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-blogs/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [2nd International Conference on Human Rights | Organized by Xavier Law School, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata | Abstract Submission Deadline by15th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/2nd-international-conference-on-human-rights-organized-by-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-abstract-submission-deadline-by15th-september-2026/ "2nd International Conference on Human Rights | Organized by Xavier Law School, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata | Abstract Submission Deadline by15th September 2026") Deadline: [ ![II LM University logo: shield emblem with temple on left and the text II LM University to the right.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/logo-iilm-greater-noida.webp) ](https://lawfoyer.in/all-india-1st-mock-trial-competition-2026-organized-by-school-of-law-iilm-university-greater-noida-register-by-20th-september-2026/ "ALL INDIA 1ST MOCK TRIAL COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by SCHOOL OF LAW, IILM UNIVERSITY, GREATER NOIDA | Register by 20th September 2026") [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) [ALL INDIA 1ST MOCK TRIAL COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by SCHOOL OF LAW, IILM UNIVERSITY, GREATER NOIDA | Register by 20th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/all-india-1st-mock-trial-competition-2026-organized-by-school-of-law-iilm-university-greater-noida-register-by-20th-september-2026/ "ALL INDIA 1ST MOCK TRIAL COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by SCHOOL OF LAW, IILM UNIVERSITY, GREATER NOIDA | Register by 20th September 2026") Deadline: [ ![Geeta Institute of Law logo with an orange emblem and bold text: GEETA INSTITUTE OF LAW, Panipat, Delhi NCR.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/images-1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/international-seminar-on-artificial-intelligence-for-inclusive-growth-transforming-law-management-commerce-and-society-organized-by-geeta-institute-of-law-gil-panipat-delhi/ "INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON “ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH: TRANSFORMING LAW, MANAGEMENT, COMMERCE AND SOCIETY” | Organized by Geeta Institute of Law (GIL), Panipat, Delhi NCR, India | Submit Abstract by 15th October 2026") [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) [INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON “ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH: TRANSFORMING LAW, MANAGEMENT, COMMERCE AND SOCIETY” | Organized by Geeta Institute of Law (GIL), Panipat, Delhi NCR, India | Submit Abstract by 15th October 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-seminar-on-artificial-intelligence-for-inclusive-growth-transforming-law-management-commerce-and-society-organized-by-geeta-institute-of-law-gil-panipat-delhi/ "INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON “ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH: TRANSFORMING LAW, MANAGEMENT, COMMERCE AND SOCIETY” | Organized by Geeta Institute of Law (GIL), Panipat, Delhi NCR, India | Submit Abstract by 15th October 2026") Deadline: [ ![Logo featuring stylized red letters NJU above a line, with the word DELHI beneath and Devanagari script along the top.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/images.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/online-certificate-course-on-competition-law-digital-markets-artificial-intelligence-4-week-executive-certificate-programme-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-event-scheduled-on-22/ "Online Certificate Course on Competition Law, Digital Markets & Artificial Intelligence: 4-Week Executive Certificate Programme | Organized by National Law University Delhi | Event Scheduled on 22nd August - 12th September 2026") [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) [Online Certificate Course on Competition Law, Digital Markets & Artificial Intelligence: 4-Week Executive Certificate Programme | Organized by National Law University Delhi | Event Scheduled on 22nd August - 12th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/online-certificate-course-on-competition-law-digital-markets-artificial-intelligence-4-week-executive-certificate-programme-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-event-scheduled-on-22/ "Online Certificate Course on Competition Law, Digital Markets & Artificial Intelligence: 4-Week Executive Certificate Programme | Organized by National Law University Delhi | Event Scheduled on 22nd August - 12th September 2026") Deadline: [ ![Manipal University Jaipur logo with orange emblem and laurel wreath, 'INSPIRED BY LIFE' ribbon, and bold text 'MANIPAL UNIVERSITY JAIPUR' with '(University under Section 2(f) of the UGC Act)'](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/images-1.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/posh-trainer-certification-programme-empowering-workplaces-ensuring-dignity-building-safe-environments-organized-by-faculty-of-law-manipal-university-jaipur-in-collaboration-with-manipal-univer/ "POSH Trainer Certification Programme: Empowering Workplaces, Ensuring Dignity, Building Safe Environments | Organized by Faculty of Law, Manipal University Jaipur, in collaboration with Manipal University Jaipur Teachers Empowerment Center (MUJ TEC) | Event Scheduled on 18th & 19th September 2026") [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) [POSH Trainer Certification Programme: Empowering Workplaces, Ensuring Dignity, Building Safe Environments | Organized by Faculty of Law, Manipal University Jaipur, in collaboration with Manipal University Jaipur Teachers Empowerment Center (MUJ TEC) | Event Scheduled on 18th & 19th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/posh-trainer-certification-programme-empowering-workplaces-ensuring-dignity-building-safe-environments-organized-by-faculty-of-law-manipal-university-jaipur-in-collaboration-with-manipal-univer/ "POSH Trainer Certification Programme: Empowering Workplaces, Ensuring Dignity, Building Safe Environments | Organized by Faculty of Law, Manipal University Jaipur, in collaboration with Manipal University Jaipur Teachers Empowerment Center (MUJ TEC) | Event Scheduled on 18th & 19th September 2026") Deadline: [ ![Logo of RGNUL Patiala with scales of justice over a map of India, gold laurel border, and the motto 'Knowledge Empowers'](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/images.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-papers-rgnul-financial-and-mercantile-law-review-rfmlr-volume-xiv-issue-i-organized-by-rajiv-gandhi-national-university-of-law-punjab-rgnul-submit-by-september-15-2026/ "Call for Papers: RGNUL Financial and Mercantile Law Review (RFMLR) Volume XIV Issue I | Organized by Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab (RGNUL) | Submit by September 15, 2026") [Call for Blogs](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-blogs/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Call for Papers: RGNUL Financial and Mercantile Law Review (RFMLR) Volume XIV Issue I | Organized by Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab (RGNUL) | Submit by September 15, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-papers-rgnul-financial-and-mercantile-law-review-rfmlr-volume-xiv-issue-i-organized-by-rajiv-gandhi-national-university-of-law-punjab-rgnul-submit-by-september-15-2026/ "Call for Papers: RGNUL Financial and Mercantile Law Review (RFMLR) Volume XIV Issue I | Organized by Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab (RGNUL) | Submit by September 15, 2026") Deadline: [ ![Seal of a national law university with scales of justice, an open book, and laurel wreath in blue](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/HNLU_Logo1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-blogs-nitisara-blogspace-organized-by-kautilya-society-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur/ "CALL FOR BLOGS | NITISARA BLOGSPACE | Organized by Kautilya Society, Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur") [Call for Blogs](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-blogs/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [CALL FOR BLOGS | NITISARA BLOGSPACE | Organized by Kautilya Society, Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-blogs-nitisara-blogspace-organized-by-kautilya-society-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur/ "CALL FOR BLOGS | NITISARA BLOGSPACE | Organized by Kautilya Society, Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur") Deadline: [ ![NMIMS logo featuring a shield emblem with laurel leaves and the text 'SVKM'S NMIMS Deemed to be UNIVERSITY'](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/NMIMS--1024x683.webp) ](https://lawfoyer.in/nyaya-setu-the-ai-justice-policy-convention-3rd-edition-organized-by-svkms-narsee-monjee-institute-of-management-studies-nmims-indore-25th-august-2026/ "Nyaya Setu – The AI & Justice Policy Convention (3rd Edition) | Organized by SVKM’s Narsee Monjee Institute of Management Studies (NMIMS), Indore | 25th August 2026") [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Nyaya Setu – The AI & Justice Policy Convention (3rd Edition) | Organized by SVKM’s Narsee Monjee Institute of Management Studies (NMIMS), Indore | 25th August 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/nyaya-setu-the-ai-justice-policy-convention-3rd-edition-organized-by-svkms-narsee-monjee-institute-of-management-studies-nmims-indore-25th-august-2026/ "Nyaya Setu – The AI & Justice Policy Convention (3rd Edition) | Organized by SVKM’s Narsee Monjee Institute of Management Studies (NMIMS), Indore | 25th August 2026") Deadline: August 25, 2026 [ ![Logo of the National University of Study and Research in Law, Ranchi: a green shield with scales of justice, a laurel-style border, and NUSLR initials, plus the university name banner at top.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/images.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/national-workshop-on-code-court-future-the-nuances-applications-and-legal-literacy-surrounding-ai-in-india-organized-by-chair-on-consumer-research-and-policy-ccrp-national-university-of-study/ "30-Hour Certificate Programme on the Consumer Protection Laws in India and the United Kingdom | Organized by Chair on Consumer Research and Policy (CCRP), National University of Study and Research in Law (NUSRL), Ranchi | Register by 13th August 2026") [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [30-Hour Certificate Programme on the Consumer Protection Laws in India and the United Kingdom | Organized by Chair on Consumer Research and Policy (CCRP), National University of Study and Research in Law (NUSRL), Ranchi | Register by 13th August 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/national-workshop-on-code-court-future-the-nuances-applications-and-legal-literacy-surrounding-ai-in-india-organized-by-chair-on-consumer-research-and-policy-ccrp-national-university-of-study/ "30-Hour Certificate Programme on the Consumer Protection Laws in India and the United Kingdom | Organized by Chair on Consumer Research and Policy (CCRP), National University of Study and Research in Law (NUSRL), Ranchi | Register by 13th August 2026") Deadline: August 13, 2026 [ ![Seal of St. Xavier's University, Kolkata, featuring a sunburst with a cross, palm tree, tiger, checkerboard shield, and the Nihil Ultra motto on a banner.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/SXUK-Crest.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/national-workshop-on-code-court-future-the-nuances-applications-and-legal-literacy-surrounding-ai-in-india-organized-by-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-in-association-with-t/ "National Workshop on Code.Court.Future: The Nuances, Applications, and Legal Literacy Surrounding AI in India | Organized by Xavier Law School, St. Xavier's University, Kolkata, in association with the Technology Counsel Foundation (TECOF) | Register by 15th August 2026") [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [National Workshop on Code.Court.Future: The Nuances, Applications, and Legal Literacy Surrounding AI in India | Organized by Xavier Law School, St. Xavier's University, Kolkata, in association with the Technology Counsel Foundation (TECOF) | Register by 15th August 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/national-workshop-on-code-court-future-the-nuances-applications-and-legal-literacy-surrounding-ai-in-india-organized-by-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-in-association-with-t/ "National Workshop on Code.Court.Future: The Nuances, Applications, and Legal Literacy Surrounding AI in India | Organized by Xavier Law School, St. Xavier's University, Kolkata, in association with the Technology Counsel Foundation (TECOF) | Register by 15th August 2026") Deadline: August 15, 2026 [ ![Logo of Dr. M.G.R. Educational and Research Institute featuring a two-tone shield with gear, books, caduceus, and DNA symbols, laurel wreath, and the motto 'Strive to Excel'](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/d74328a820ac2dfff2c23680c67bd515.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/dr-a-c-s-1st-national-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-moot-court-society-faculty-of-law-dr-m-g-r-educational-and-research-institute-deemed-to-be-university-chennai-register-by-1/ "Dr. A.C.S. 1st National Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, Faculty of Law, Dr. M.G.R. Educational and Research Institute (Deemed to be University), Chennai | Register by 15th August 2026") [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) [Dr. A.C.S. 1st National Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, Faculty of Law, Dr. M.G.R. Educational and Research Institute (Deemed to be University), Chennai | Register by 15th August 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/dr-a-c-s-1st-national-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-moot-court-society-faculty-of-law-dr-m-g-r-educational-and-research-institute-deemed-to-be-university-chennai-register-by-1/ "Dr. A.C.S. 1st National Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, Faculty of Law, Dr. M.G.R. Educational and Research Institute (Deemed to be University), Chennai | Register by 15th August 2026") Deadline: August 15, 2026 [ ![Seal of National Law University Chandigarh featuring scales of justice, an open book, and laurel branches in blue.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/HNLU_Logo1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-articles-koitur-people-of-nature-special-edition-organized-by-centre-for-law-indigenous-studies-school-of-law-humanities-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnl/ "Call for Articles: KOITUR – People of Nature (Special Edition) | Organized by Centre for Law & Indigenous Studies, School of Law & Humanities, Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Submit by 16th August 2026") [Call for Blogs](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-blogs/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Call for Articles: KOITUR – People of Nature (Special Edition) | Organized by Centre for Law & Indigenous Studies, School of Law & Humanities, Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Submit by 16th August 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-articles-koitur-people-of-nature-special-edition-organized-by-centre-for-law-indigenous-studies-school-of-law-humanities-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnl/ "Call for Articles: KOITUR – People of Nature (Special Edition) | Organized by Centre for Law & Indigenous Studies, School of Law & Humanities, Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Submit by 16th August 2026") Deadline: August 16, 2026 [ ![Logo of Frontiers Welfare Society, an NGO, featuring two stylized figures (black and red) reaching toward each other in a circular seal with the organization name around the edge and 'Non-Governmental Organization' beneath.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/frontiers_welfare_society_ngo_logo.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/beyond-academics-how-to-build-the-skills-that-define-successful-professionals-national-webinar-under-frontiers-welfare-society-ngo-organized-by-frontiers-welfare-society-register-by-24th-july/ "Beyond Academics: How to Build the Skills that Define successful professionals, National Webinar under Frontiers Welfare Society (NGO) | Organized by Frontiers Welfare Society | Register by 24th July 2026") [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Beyond Academics: How to Build the Skills that Define successful professionals, National Webinar under Frontiers Welfare Society (NGO) | Organized by Frontiers Welfare Society | Register by 24th July 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/beyond-academics-how-to-build-the-skills-that-define-successful-professionals-national-webinar-under-frontiers-welfare-society-ngo-organized-by-frontiers-welfare-society-register-by-24th-july/ "Beyond Academics: How to Build the Skills that Define successful professionals, National Webinar under Frontiers Welfare Society (NGO) | Organized by Frontiers Welfare Society | Register by 24th July 2026") Deadline: July 24, 2026 [ ![University seal featuring a tiger resting on a checkered pedestal beneath a palm tree and crescent moon, surrounded by a ring that reads 'Xavier's University' with a motto and a yellow ribbon reading 'Nihil Ultra'.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/images.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/vox-legis-xaveriana-volume-ii-organized-by-xavier-society-of-law-and-justice-xslaj-under-the-aegis-of-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-event-on-19th-july-20/ "Vox Legis Xaveriana – Volume II | Organized by Xavier Society of Law and Justice (XSLAJ) under the aegis of Xavier Law School, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata | Event on 19th July, 2026 (Sunday)") [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Vox Legis Xaveriana – Volume II | Organized by Xavier Society of Law and Justice (XSLAJ) under the aegis of Xavier Law School, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata | Event on 19th July, 2026 (Sunday)](https://lawfoyer.in/vox-legis-xaveriana-volume-ii-organized-by-xavier-society-of-law-and-justice-xslaj-under-the-aegis-of-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-event-on-19th-july-20/ "Vox Legis Xaveriana – Volume II | Organized by Xavier Society of Law and Justice (XSLAJ) under the aegis of Xavier Law School, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata | Event on 19th July, 2026 (Sunday)") Deadline: July 19, 2026 [ ![Seal of the University of Rajasthan featuring a central torch and book, surrounded by text and the year 1947.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Rajasthan_University_Logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/14th-ufylc-ranka-national-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-university-five-year-law-college-ufylc-university-of-rajasthan-jaipur-register-by-31st-august-2026-1159-pm-ist/ "14th UFYLC–Ranka National Moot Court Competition 2026 | Organized by University Five Year Law College (UFYLC), University of Rajasthan, Jaipur | Register by 31st August 2026 (11:59 PM IST)") [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) [14th UFYLC–Ranka National Moot Court Competition 2026 | Organized by University Five Year Law College (UFYLC), University of Rajasthan, Jaipur | Register by 31st August 2026 (11:59 PM IST)](https://lawfoyer.in/14th-ufylc-ranka-national-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-university-five-year-law-college-ufylc-university-of-rajasthan-jaipur-register-by-31st-august-2026-1159-pm-ist/ "14th UFYLC–Ranka National Moot Court Competition 2026 | Organized by University Five Year Law College (UFYLC), University of Rajasthan, Jaipur | Register by 31st August 2026 (11:59 PM IST)") Deadline: August 31, 2026 [ ![Green circular gear-like emblem with radial spokes on a black background, resembling an abstract logo](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Official-logo-1024x777.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/kartavya-2026-campus-ambassador-programme-kiit-samvidhan-mahotsav-organized-by-kiit-centre-for-constitutional-law-studies-and-research-cclsr-kiit-school-of-law-kiit-deemed-to-be-univer/ "Kartavya 2026 Campus Ambassador Programme – KIIT Samvidhan Mahotsav | Organized by KIIT Centre for Constitutional Law Studies and Research (CCLSR), KIIT School of Law, KIIT Deemed-to-be University | Register by 25th July 2026 (11:59 PM IST)") [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) [Kartavya 2026 Campus Ambassador Programme – KIIT Samvidhan Mahotsav | Organized by KIIT Centre for Constitutional Law Studies and Research (CCLSR), KIIT School of Law, KIIT Deemed-to-be University | Register by 25th July 2026 (11:59 PM IST)](https://lawfoyer.in/kartavya-2026-campus-ambassador-programme-kiit-samvidhan-mahotsav-organized-by-kiit-centre-for-constitutional-law-studies-and-research-cclsr-kiit-school-of-law-kiit-deemed-to-be-univer/ "Kartavya 2026 Campus Ambassador Programme – KIIT Samvidhan Mahotsav | Organized by KIIT Centre for Constitutional Law Studies and Research (CCLSR), KIIT School of Law, KIIT Deemed-to-be University | Register by 25th July 2026 (11:59 PM IST)") Deadline: July 25, 2026 [ ![Pink circular logo with a dancing woman in a sari superimposed on the outline of India; 'WICCI' appears above, and along the arc reads 'Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium'.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/TNLRC-logo.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/women-in-the-workforce-challenges-representation-and-labour-law-perspectives-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-in-association-with-lex-lumen-research-journal-llrj-event-h/ "WOMEN IN THE WORKFORCE: CHALLENGES, REPRESENTATION AND LABOUR LAW PERSPECTIVES | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) in Association with Lex Lumen Research Journal (LLRJ) | Event held on 25th July 2026") [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [WOMEN IN THE WORKFORCE: CHALLENGES, REPRESENTATION AND LABOUR LAW PERSPECTIVES | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) in Association with Lex Lumen Research Journal (LLRJ) | Event held on 25th July 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/women-in-the-workforce-challenges-representation-and-labour-law-perspectives-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-in-association-with-lex-lumen-research-journal-llrj-event-h/ "WOMEN IN THE WORKFORCE: CHALLENGES, REPRESENTATION AND LABOUR LAW PERSPECTIVES | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) in Association with Lex Lumen Research Journal (LLRJ) | Event held on 25th July 2026") Deadline: July 25, 2026 [ ![Amity University Lucknow Campus logo featuring a blue shield with a yellow flame and the campus name text](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Amity_University_Lucknow_logo_24a31fd30f.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/international-faculty-development-programme-on-governance-law-and-sustainability-in-the-21st-century-organized-by-amity-law-school-amity-university-uttar-pradesh-lucknow-campus-register-by-04-j/ "INTERNATIONAL FACULTY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME ON GOVERNANCE, LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY | Organized by Amity Law School, Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Campus | Register by 04 July 2026") [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [INTERNATIONAL FACULTY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME ON GOVERNANCE, LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY | Organized by Amity Law School, Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Campus | Register by 04 July 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-faculty-development-programme-on-governance-law-and-sustainability-in-the-21st-century-organized-by-amity-law-school-amity-university-uttar-pradesh-lucknow-campus-register-by-04-j/ "INTERNATIONAL FACULTY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME ON GOVERNANCE, LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY | Organized by Amity Law School, Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Campus | Register by 04 July 2026") Deadline: July 4, 2026 [ ![Circular emblem of Chanakya National Law University, Patna, featuring an open book with a flame above it and a scales motif, surrounded by the university's name in English and Hindi.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Chanakya_National_Law_University_Logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/catalyst-3-0-startup-law-and-policy-summit-2026-organized-by-chanakya-national-law-university-cnlu-patna-register-by-15th-july-2026/ "CATALYST 3.0: Startup Law and Policy Summit 2026 | Organized by Centre for Innovation, Incubation and Legal Entrepreneurship (CIILE), Chanakya National Law University (CNLU), Patna | Register by 15th July, 2026") [Call for Blogs](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-blogs/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [CATALYST 3.0: Startup Law and Policy Summit 2026 | Organized by Centre for Innovation, Incubation and Legal Entrepreneurship (CIILE), Chanakya National Law University (CNLU), Patna | Register by 15th July, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/catalyst-3-0-startup-law-and-policy-summit-2026-organized-by-chanakya-national-law-university-cnlu-patna-register-by-15th-july-2026/ "CATALYST 3.0: Startup Law and Policy Summit 2026 | Organized by Centre for Innovation, Incubation and Legal Entrepreneurship (CIILE), Chanakya National Law University (CNLU), Patna | Register by 15th July, 2026") Deadline: July 15, 2026 [ ![Red stylized emblem with bold vertical strokes forming a lettermark, the word DELHI in red letters beneath, flanked by horizontal lines; Devanagari script at the top.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/National_Law_University_Delhi_logo-1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/credit-based-certificate-course-on-the-new-criminal-laws-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-nlud/ "CREDIT-BASED CERTIFICATE COURSE ON THE NEW CRIMINAL LAWS | Organized by National Law University Delhi (NLUD)") [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [CREDIT-BASED CERTIFICATE COURSE ON THE NEW CRIMINAL LAWS | Organized by National Law University Delhi (NLUD)](https://lawfoyer.in/credit-based-certificate-course-on-the-new-criminal-laws-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-nlud/ "CREDIT-BASED CERTIFICATE COURSE ON THE NEW CRIMINAL LAWS | Organized by National Law University Delhi (NLUD)") Deadline: [ ![Logo for WICCI Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium, showing a dancing figure over a map outline on a pink background, with curved text surrounding.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/TNLRC-logo.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/tnlrc-essay-writing-competition-2026-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-under-wicci-register-by-26-june-2026/ "TNLRC ESSAY WRITING COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) under WICCI | Register by 26 June 2026") [Essay Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/essay-competitions/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [TNLRC ESSAY WRITING COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) under WICCI | Register by 26 June 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/tnlrc-essay-writing-competition-2026-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-under-wicci-register-by-26-june-2026/ "TNLRC ESSAY WRITING COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) under WICCI | Register by 26 June 2026") Deadline: June 26, 2026 [ ![Apex University logo: blue and gold shield with an open book and torch motif, branding for the institution](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/apex_university_logo.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/jus-novum-au-nationwide-law-fest-2026-organized-by-moot-court-society-apex-school-of-law-apex-university-jaipur-in-collaboration-with-district-legal-services-authority-jaipur-district-reg/ "Jus Novum - AU Nationwide Law Fest, 2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, Apex School of Law, Apex University, Jaipur In Collaboration With District Legal Services Authority, Jaipur (District) | Register by 8th August 2026, 2026 for Hybrid & Online Competitions and 2nd September, 2026 for one day (Offline) Competitions") [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) [Jus Novum - AU Nationwide Law Fest, 2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, Apex School of Law, Apex University, Jaipur In Collaboration With District Legal Services Authority, Jaipur (District) | Register by 8th August 2026, 2026 for Hybrid & Online Competitions and 2nd September, 2026 for one day (Offline) Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/jus-novum-au-nationwide-law-fest-2026-organized-by-moot-court-society-apex-school-of-law-apex-university-jaipur-in-collaboration-with-district-legal-services-authority-jaipur-district-reg/ "Jus Novum - AU Nationwide Law Fest, 2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, Apex School of Law, Apex University, Jaipur In Collaboration With District Legal Services Authority, Jaipur (District) | Register by 8th August 2026, 2026 for Hybrid & Online Competitions and 2nd September, 2026 for one day (Offline) Competitions") Deadline: July 31, 2026 [ ![Stylized red logo with Devanagari text above and the word DELHI in large red letters.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/National_Law_University_Delhi_logo.png) 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Delhi](https://lawfoyer.in/centre-for-environmental-law-policy-and-research-celpr-national-law-university-delhi-organized-by-collective-for-environmental-action-cea-under-the-aegis-of-the-centre-for-environmental-law-p/ "Call for Blogs | Centre for Environmental Law, Policy and Research (CELPR), National Law University Delhi | Organized by Collective for Environmental Action (CEA) under the aegis of the Centre for Environmental Law, Policy and Research (CELPR), National Law University Delhi") Deadline: [ ![Judiciary emblem: scales of justice between laurel branches with a graduation cap on top.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/IMG_0227-1024x1024.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/vidhika-a-quarterly-law-journal-vol-2-issue-2-organized-by-nyaya-shastra-submit-articles-papers-by-15-june-2026/ "VIDHIKA – A Quarterly Law Journal (Vol. 2, Issue 2) | Organized by Nyaya Shastra | Submit Articles & Papers by 15 June 2026") [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [VIDHIKA – A Quarterly Law Journal (Vol. 2, Issue 2) | Organized by Nyaya Shastra | Submit Articles & Papers by 15 June 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/vidhika-a-quarterly-law-journal-vol-2-issue-2-organized-by-nyaya-shastra-submit-articles-papers-by-15-june-2026/ "VIDHIKA – A Quarterly Law Journal (Vol. 2, Issue 2) | Organized by Nyaya Shastra | Submit Articles & Papers by 15 June 2026") Deadline: June 15, 2026 [ ![Logo for Trinity Institute of Professional Studies (TIPS): circular seal with a stylized central figure, 'TIPS' lettering, and a banner reading 'Light to Enlighten'.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/0x0-1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-shri-o-p-tandon-memorial-mock-trial-competition-2026-organized-by-trinity-institute-of-professional-studies-tips-register-by-2nd-august-2026/ "3RD SHRI O.P. TANDON MEMORIAL MOCK TRIAL COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by TRINITY INSTITUTE OF PROFESSIONAL STUDIES (TIPS) | Register by 2nd AUGUST 2026") [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) [3RD SHRI O.P. TANDON MEMORIAL MOCK TRIAL COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by TRINITY INSTITUTE OF PROFESSIONAL STUDIES (TIPS) | Register by 2nd AUGUST 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-shri-o-p-tandon-memorial-mock-trial-competition-2026-organized-by-trinity-institute-of-professional-studies-tips-register-by-2nd-august-2026/ "3RD SHRI O.P. TANDON MEMORIAL MOCK TRIAL COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by TRINITY INSTITUTE OF PROFESSIONAL STUDIES (TIPS) | Register by 2nd AUGUST 2026") Deadline: August 2, 2026 [ ![Logo of Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab, Patiala, with scales of justice over a map of India and the motto 'Knowledge Empowers'.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Rajiv_Gandhi_National_University_of_Law_Logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/2nd-edition-of-one-week-faculty-development-programme-on-integrating-indian-knowledge-system-and-law-organized-by-centre-for-advanced-studies-in-human-rights-casihr-rgnul-punjab-in-association-w/ "2nd Edition of One Week Faculty Development Programme on Integrating Indian Knowledge System and Law | Organized by Centre for Advanced Studies in Human Rights (CASIHR), RGNUL, Punjab in association with Centre for Advanced Studies in Labour Welfare (CASLW), RGNUL, Punjab | Register by 9 July 2026") [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [2nd Edition of One Week Faculty Development Programme on Integrating Indian Knowledge System and Law | Organized by Centre for Advanced Studies in Human Rights (CASIHR), RGNUL, Punjab in association with Centre for Advanced Studies in Labour Welfare (CASLW), RGNUL, Punjab | Register by 9 July 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/2nd-edition-of-one-week-faculty-development-programme-on-integrating-indian-knowledge-system-and-law-organized-by-centre-for-advanced-studies-in-human-rights-casihr-rgnul-punjab-in-association-w/ "2nd Edition of One Week Faculty Development Programme on Integrating Indian Knowledge System and Law | Organized by Centre for Advanced Studies in Human Rights (CASIHR), RGNUL, Punjab in association with Centre for Advanced Studies in Labour Welfare (CASLW), RGNUL, Punjab | Register by 9 July 2026") Deadline: [ ![Logo for YU Delhi featuring large red stylized letters 'YU' above the word 'DELHI' with decorative lines and a Sanskrit motto at the top](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/National_Law_University_Delhi_logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/celpr-nlu-delhi-eldf-essay-writing-competition-first-edition-organized-by-centre-for-environmental-law-policy-and-research-celpr-national-law-university-delhi-nlu-delhi-register/ "CELPR NLU Delhi – ELDF Essay Writing Competition (First Edition) | Organized by Centre for Environmental Law, Policy and Research (CELPR), National Law University, Delhi (NLU Delhi) | Register by 8th June 2026") [Essay Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/essay-competitions/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) [CELPR NLU Delhi – ELDF Essay Writing Competition (First Edition) | Organized by Centre for Environmental Law, Policy and Research (CELPR), National Law University, Delhi (NLU Delhi) | Register by 8th June 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/celpr-nlu-delhi-eldf-essay-writing-competition-first-edition-organized-by-centre-for-environmental-law-policy-and-research-celpr-national-law-university-delhi-nlu-delhi-register/ "CELPR NLU Delhi – ELDF Essay Writing Competition (First Edition) | Organized by Centre for Environmental Law, Policy and Research (CELPR), National Law University, Delhi (NLU Delhi) | Register by 8th June 2026") Deadline: June 8, 2026 [ ![Bennett University logo: shield crest on the left with blue 'BENNETT UNIVERSITY' text and red 'TIMES OF INDIA GROUP' subtitle on the right.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/download-4.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-artificial-intelligence-legal-governance-and-sustainable-development-constitutional-regulatory-and-sectoral-perspectives-ailgs-2026-organized-by-the-centre-for-law/ "INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, LEGAL GOVERNANCE, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: CONSTITUTIONAL, REGULATORY AND 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(AILGS-2026) | Organized by the Centre for Law, Technology and Innovation, School of Law, Bennett University | Submit Abstract by May 28, 2026 | Register by July 1, 2026") Deadline: May 28, 2026 [ ![Circular logo with black and red arcs, featuring stylized orange acronym letters in the center and the slogan 'Transform your dreams to reality' along the top edge.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/images.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/one-week-national-workshop-on-research-methodology-research-ethics-and-publication-strategy-organized-by-shri-ram-college-of-law-muzaffarnagar-ncr-register-by-30th-may-2026/ "ONE WEEK NATIONAL WORKSHOP ON RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, RESEARCH ETHICS AND PUBLICATION STRATEGY | Organized by Shri Ram College of Law, Muzaffarnagar – NCR | Register by 30th May 2026") [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [ONE WEEK NATIONAL WORKSHOP ON RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, RESEARCH ETHICS AND PUBLICATION STRATEGY | Organized by Shri Ram College of Law, Muzaffarnagar – NCR | Register by 30th May 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/one-week-national-workshop-on-research-methodology-research-ethics-and-publication-strategy-organized-by-shri-ram-college-of-law-muzaffarnagar-ncr-register-by-30th-may-2026/ "ONE WEEK NATIONAL WORKSHOP ON RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, RESEARCH ETHICS AND PUBLICATION STRATEGY | Organized by Shri Ram College of Law, Muzaffarnagar – NCR | Register by 30th May 2026") Deadline: May 30, 2026 [ ![Logo of S. K. Law College, Muzaffarpur featuring a globe, scales of justice, and a red circular border.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/download.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/two-day-national-seminar-on-women-law-and-social-change-in-india-navigating-rights-justice-contemporary-challenges-and-pathways-to-empowerment-organized-by-sri-krishna-jubilee/ "TWO DAY NATIONAL SEMINAR ON: “Women, Law and Social Change in India: Navigating Rights, Justice, Contemporary Challenges and Pathways to Empowerment” | Organized by Sri Krishna Jubilee Law College | Register by 5th July, 2026") [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [TWO DAY NATIONAL SEMINAR ON: “Women, Law and Social Change in India: Navigating Rights, Justice, Contemporary Challenges and Pathways to Empowerment” | Organized by Sri Krishna Jubilee Law College | Register by 5th July, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/two-day-national-seminar-on-women-law-and-social-change-in-india-navigating-rights-justice-contemporary-challenges-and-pathways-to-empowerment-organized-by-sri-krishna-jubilee/ "TWO DAY NATIONAL SEMINAR ON: “Women, Law and Social Change in India: Navigating Rights, Justice, Contemporary Challenges and Pathways to Empowerment” | Organized by Sri Krishna Jubilee Law College | Register by 5th July, 2026") Deadline: July 5, 2026 [ ![CANONSPHERE logo featuring a black shield emblem on the left](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/CanonsphereBanner-2.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-client-counseling-competition-2026-by-canonsphere-organized-by-canonsphere-register-by-2nd-july-2026/ "1st Client Counseling Competition 2026 by Canonsphere | Organized by Canonsphere | Register by 2nd July, 2026") [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) 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Initiative | Register by 30 May 2026") [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [2-Day Online Workshop on Right to Information (RTI) | Organized by Legal Aid Clinic, Himachal Pradesh National Law University (HPNLU), Shimla, in collaboration with Vidhi Vimarsh Initiative | Register by 30 May 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/2-day-online-workshop-on-right-to-information-rti-organized-by-legal-aid-clinic-himachal-pradesh-national-law-university-hpnlu-shimla-in-collaboration-with-vidhi-vimarsh-initiative-register/ "2-Day Online Workshop on Right to Information (RTI) | Organized by Legal Aid Clinic, Himachal Pradesh National Law University (HPNLU), Shimla, in collaboration with Vidhi Vimarsh Initiative | Register by 30 May 2026") Deadline: May 30, 2026 [ ![Logo for Lawyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research, with a teal-framed monogram on the left and ISSN 2583-7753 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Harvard, Oxford, IIM Bangalore, HeinOnline, Manupatra & many more: Submit Manuscript by June 15](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-papers-lawfoyer-international-journal-of-doctrinal-legal-research-issn-no-2583-7753-vol-4-issue-2-get-free-crossref-doi-e-certificate-of-publication-indexing-in-350-internat/ "Call for Papers: LawFoyer International Journal of Doctrinal Legal Research [ISSN No:- 2583-7753] | Vol 4 Issue 2 | Get Free CrossRef DOI, E-Certificate of Publication, & Indexing in 350+ International Libraries & Databases including Stanford, Harvard, Oxford, IIM Bangalore, HeinOnline, Manupatra & many more: Submit Manuscript by June 15") Deadline: June 22, 2026 [ ![Logo for MAIMS: a red emblem with a stylized sun above an open book on the left and bold red 'MAIMS' text on the right, with Hindi motto beneath the book.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/download-3.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/5th-maims-mock-trial-competition-2026-organized-by-maims-mock-trial-society-department-of-law-maharaja-agrasen-institute-of-management-studies-maims-new-delhi-register-by-23-august-2026/ "5th MAIMS Mock Trial Competition, 2026 | Organized by Maims Mock Trial Society, Department of Law, Maharaja Agrasen Institute of Management Studies (MAIMS), in collaboration with the Bar Council of Delhi | Register by 23 August 2026") [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) [5th MAIMS Mock Trial Competition, 2026 | Organized by Maims Mock Trial Society, Department of Law, Maharaja Agrasen Institute of Management Studies (MAIMS), in collaboration with the Bar Council of Delhi | Register by 23 August 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/5th-maims-mock-trial-competition-2026-organized-by-maims-mock-trial-society-department-of-law-maharaja-agrasen-institute-of-management-studies-maims-new-delhi-register-by-23-august-2026/ "5th 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She has qualified UGC-NET in her maiden attempt. ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/WhatsApp-Image-2022-12-17-at-5.42.51-PM-modified-150x150.png) 0 Modules 0 E-Certificate 0 + ### Free IPC Text Materials and lot more ## Course Commencing From January 15, 2023 ## Course Fee ### Free Trail ₹ 0 /3 Days - Valid for 3 days - Live Classes via Google meet, Zoom, Microsoft Teams [ ](https://lawfoyer.in/register-certification-course-ipc/) ### Beginner ₹ 1999 /Course - Course Duration:45 Hours - Number of classes: 3-4/week - Live Classes via Google meet, Zoom, Microsoft Teams - FREE:- Ebooks [ ](https://lawfoyer.in/register-certification-course-ipc/) ### Professional ₹ 2499 /course - Course Duration:45 Hours - Number of classes: 3-4/week - Live Classes via Google meet, Zoom, Microsoft Teams - FREE: Ebooks - FREE 2000+ Legal Drafts - FREE Ebooks & Notes on Criminal Procedure Law & Evidence law [ ](https://lawfoyer.in/register-certification-course-ipc/) ## 13 Major modules covering entire structure of IPC ## Live Classes & Doubt Solving Sessions ## Important Case Laws ## Flow Charts and Diagrams ## Assessment Tests ## Course Outline There are 13 main sections to the course, each containing one or more of the chapters we believe are most important for students to read in order to have a firmer grasp of India’s substantive criminal law. Covering topics such as criminal culpability, abetment, offences against the State, the body, and sexual offences, this course provides a comprehensive understanding of the Indian Penal Code and its organisational framework. The course is designed to be highly interactive, which will keep students engaged, and it covers every nuanced idea of substantive criminal law. With the goal of making the subjects addressed by the Indian Penal Code more accessible, the ideas, definitions, and explanations have been streamlined. The primary goal of offering this course is to equip all students with a comprehensive, exam-friendly understanding of the topic. ## Why this Course? - It covers the entire syllabus. - Smart description and easy bifurcation of the concepts. - Easy to understand with the help of graphical elucidations. - Important cases covered. - Assessment to test your knowledge. # Course Syllabus [ Introduction ](#collapse-bc228306ab2aed357102) 1. Introduction to Indian Penal Code [ General Principles Of Criminal Liability ](#collapse-8417e716ab2aed357102) 1. General Principles Of Criminal LiabilitY [ General Exceptions ](#collapse-3dad4e06ab2aed357102) 1. Introduction 2. Mistake and Judicial Act 3. Accident and Necessity 4. Infancy and Insanity 5. Intoxication and Consent 6. Other Defences 7. Private Defenses as General Exception [ Offences against the State ](#collapse-05703d06ab2aed357102) 1. Offences Against the State (Under Sections 121, 121A, 122, 123 & 124A IPC) 2. Offences Promoting Enmity Between Different Groups (Section 153A & section 153B) [ Abetment ](#collapse-4eaf51b6ab2aed357102) 1. Essentials of Abetment 2. Abettor 3. Concealing Designs or Plans to commit offences [ Criminal conspiracy ](#collapse-0f74a486ab2aed357102) 1. Criminal Conspiracy & Crime 2. Punishment for Criminal Conspiracy [ Joint and Constructive Liability ](#collapse-4f7de416ab2aed3583cc) 1. Common intention under Section 34 2. Common Object under Secion 149 [ Offences against body ](#collapse-296220d6ab2aed3583cc) 1. Culpable Homicide and Murder 2. Hurt and Grievous Hurt 3. Miscarriage and Abortion 4. Wrongful Constraint and Wrongful Confinement 5. Criminal Force and Assault 6. Kidnapping and Abduction [ Offences against property ](#collapse-04c4b0c6ab2aed3583cc) 1. Introduction 2. Theft and Extortion 3. Robbery and Dacoity 4. Criminal Misappropriation and Breach of Trust 5. Cheating and Mischief 6. Criminal Trespass [ Offences against Women ](#collapse-4e2a66c6ab2aed3583cc) 1. Crimes against women 2. Sexual Offences 3. Unnatural Offences & Cruelty 4. Marital rape and Section 375 5. Amendments to Anti- Rape laws in India [ Offences Relating to Marriage ](#collapse-d8ff8126ab2aed3583cc) 1. Mock or invalid Marriage 2. Offence of Bigamy 3. Adultery 4. Cruelty [ Defamation ](#collapse-01172126ab2aed3583cc) 1. Introduction and Types 2. Exceptions of Defamation # Who should take this course? 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](https://lawfoyer.in/vcprf-international-moot-court-workshop-2026-organized-by-veritas-centre-for-policy-research-foundation-vcprf-register-by-30-september-2026/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) #### [ VCPRF – International Moot Court Workshop, 2026 | Organized by Veritas Centre for Policy Research Foundation (VCPRF) | Register by 30 September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/vcprf-international-moot-court-workshop-2026-organized-by-veritas-centre-for-policy-research-foundation-vcprf-register-by-30-september-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 20 September 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/National_Forensic_Sciences_University_Logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/national-legal-hackathon-organized-by-school-of-law-forensic-justice-and-policy-studies-national-forensic-sciences-university-nfsu-register-by-24-september-2026/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ National Legal Hackathon | Organized by School of Law, Forensic Justice and Policy Studies, National Forensic Sciences University (NFSU) | Register by 24 September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/national-legal-hackathon-organized-by-school-of-law-forensic-justice-and-policy-studies-national-forensic-sciences-university-nfsu-register-by-24-september-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 18 September 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/HNLU_Logo1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-international-arbitration-organized-by-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur-register-by-20-september-2026/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION | Organized by Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Register by 20 September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-international-arbitration-organized-by-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur-register-by-20-september-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 1 September 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Rajiv_Gandhi_National_University_of_Law_Logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/6th-rfmlr-tta-demystifying-series-certificate-course-on-cross-border-ma-and-foreign-investment-organized-by-rgnul-financial-and-mercantile-law-review-rfmlr-rajiv-gandhi-natio/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ 6th RFMLR – TT&A Demystifying Series: Certificate Course on Cross Border M&A and Foreign Investment | Organized by RGNUL Financial and Mercantile Law Review (RFMLR), Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab (RGNUL) | Event on 9th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/6th-rfmlr-tta-demystifying-series-certificate-course-on-cross-border-ma-and-foreign-investment-organized-by-rgnul-financial-and-mercantile-law-review-rfmlr-rajiv-gandhi-natio/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 29 August 2026 0 [ ![Geeta Institute of Law logo with an orange emblem and bold text: GEETA INSTITUTE OF LAW, Panipat, Delhi NCR.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/images-1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/international-seminar-on-artificial-intelligence-for-inclusive-growth-transforming-law-management-commerce-and-society-organized-by-geeta-institute-of-law-gil-panipat-delhi/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON “ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH: TRANSFORMING LAW, MANAGEMENT, COMMERCE AND SOCIETY” | Organized by Geeta Institute of Law (GIL), Panipat, Delhi NCR, India | Submit Abstract by 15th October 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-seminar-on-artificial-intelligence-for-inclusive-growth-transforming-law-management-commerce-and-society-organized-by-geeta-institute-of-law-gil-panipat-delhi/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 17 August 2026 0 [ ![Logo featuring stylized red letters NJU above a line, with the word DELHI beneath and Devanagari script along the top.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/images.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/online-certificate-course-on-competition-law-digital-markets-artificial-intelligence-4-week-executive-certificate-programme-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-event-scheduled-on-22/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ Online Certificate Course on Competition Law, Digital Markets & Artificial Intelligence: 4-Week Executive Certificate Programme | Organized by National Law University Delhi | Event Scheduled on 22nd August – 12th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/online-certificate-course-on-competition-law-digital-markets-artificial-intelligence-4-week-executive-certificate-programme-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-event-scheduled-on-22/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 17 August 2026 0 [ ![Manipal University Jaipur logo with orange emblem and laurel wreath, 'INSPIRED BY LIFE' ribbon, and bold text 'MANIPAL UNIVERSITY JAIPUR' with '(University under Section 2(f) of the UGC Act)'](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/images-1.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/posh-trainer-certification-programme-empowering-workplaces-ensuring-dignity-building-safe-environments-organized-by-faculty-of-law-manipal-university-jaipur-in-collaboration-with-manipal-univer/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ POSH Trainer Certification Programme: Empowering Workplaces, Ensuring Dignity, Building Safe Environments | Organized by Faculty of Law, Manipal University Jaipur, in collaboration with Manipal University Jaipur Teachers Empowerment Center (MUJ TEC) | Event Scheduled on 18th & 19th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/posh-trainer-certification-programme-empowering-workplaces-ensuring-dignity-building-safe-environments-organized-by-faculty-of-law-manipal-university-jaipur-in-collaboration-with-manipal-univer/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 17 August 2026 0 [ ![NMIMS logo featuring a shield emblem with laurel leaves and the text 'SVKM'S NMIMS Deemed to be UNIVERSITY'](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/NMIMS--1024x683.webp) ](https://lawfoyer.in/nyaya-setu-the-ai-justice-policy-convention-3rd-edition-organized-by-svkms-narsee-monjee-institute-of-management-studies-nmims-indore-25th-august-2026/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ Nyaya Setu – The AI & Justice Policy Convention (3rd Edition) | Organized by SVKM’s Narsee Monjee Institute of Management Studies (NMIMS), Indore | 25th August 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/nyaya-setu-the-ai-justice-policy-convention-3rd-edition-organized-by-svkms-narsee-monjee-institute-of-management-studies-nmims-indore-25th-august-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 1 August 2026 0 [ ![Logo of the National University of Study and Research in Law, Ranchi: a green shield with scales of justice, a laurel-style border, and NUSLR initials, plus the university name banner at top.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/images.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/national-workshop-on-code-court-future-the-nuances-applications-and-legal-literacy-surrounding-ai-in-india-organized-by-chair-on-consumer-research-and-policy-ccrp-national-university-of-study/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ 30-Hour Certificate Programme on the Consumer Protection Laws in India and the United Kingdom | Organized by Chair on Consumer Research and Policy (CCRP), National University of Study and Research in Law (NUSRL), Ranchi | Register by 13th August 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/national-workshop-on-code-court-future-the-nuances-applications-and-legal-literacy-surrounding-ai-in-india-organized-by-chair-on-consumer-research-and-policy-ccrp-national-university-of-study/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 1 August 2026 0 [ ![Seal of St. Xavier's University, Kolkata, featuring a sunburst with a cross, palm tree, tiger, checkerboard shield, and the Nihil Ultra motto on a banner.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/SXUK-Crest.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/national-workshop-on-code-court-future-the-nuances-applications-and-legal-literacy-surrounding-ai-in-india-organized-by-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-in-association-with-t/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ National Workshop on Code.Court.Future: The Nuances, Applications, and Legal Literacy Surrounding AI in India | Organized by Xavier Law School, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata, in association with the Technology Counsel Foundation (TECOF) | Register by 15th August 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/national-workshop-on-code-court-future-the-nuances-applications-and-legal-literacy-surrounding-ai-in-india-organized-by-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-in-association-with-t/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 1 August 2026 0 [ ![Logo of Frontiers Welfare Society, an NGO, featuring two stylized figures (black and red) reaching toward each other in a circular seal with the organization name around the edge and 'Non-Governmental Organization' beneath.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/frontiers_welfare_society_ngo_logo.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/beyond-academics-how-to-build-the-skills-that-define-successful-professionals-national-webinar-under-frontiers-welfare-society-ngo-organized-by-frontiers-welfare-society-register-by-24th-july/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ Beyond Academics: How to Build the Skills that Define successful professionals, National Webinar under Frontiers Welfare Society (NGO) | Organized by Frontiers Welfare Society | Register by 24th July 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/beyond-academics-how-to-build-the-skills-that-define-successful-professionals-national-webinar-under-frontiers-welfare-society-ngo-organized-by-frontiers-welfare-society-register-by-24th-july/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 19 July 2026 0 [ ![University seal featuring a tiger resting on a checkered pedestal beneath a palm tree and crescent moon, surrounded by a ring that reads 'Xavier's University' with a motto and a yellow ribbon reading 'Nihil Ultra'.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/images.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/vox-legis-xaveriana-volume-ii-organized-by-xavier-society-of-law-and-justice-xslaj-under-the-aegis-of-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-event-on-19th-july-20/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ Vox Legis Xaveriana – Volume II | Organized by Xavier Society of Law and Justice (XSLAJ) under the aegis of Xavier Law School, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata | Event on 19th July, 2026 (Sunday)](https://lawfoyer.in/vox-legis-xaveriana-volume-ii-organized-by-xavier-society-of-law-and-justice-xslaj-under-the-aegis-of-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-event-on-19th-july-20/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 18 July 2026 0 [ ![Pink circular logo with a dancing woman in a sari superimposed on the outline of India; 'WICCI' appears above, and along the arc reads 'Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium'.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/TNLRC-logo.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/women-in-the-workforce-challenges-representation-and-labour-law-perspectives-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-in-association-with-lex-lumen-research-journal-llrj-event-h/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ WOMEN IN THE WORKFORCE: CHALLENGES, REPRESENTATION AND LABOUR LAW PERSPECTIVES | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) in Association with Lex Lumen Research Journal (LLRJ) | Event held on 25th July 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/women-in-the-workforce-challenges-representation-and-labour-law-perspectives-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-in-association-with-lex-lumen-research-journal-llrj-event-h/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 9 July 2026 0 [ ![Amity University Lucknow Campus logo featuring a blue shield with a yellow flame and the campus name text](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Amity_University_Lucknow_logo_24a31fd30f.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/international-faculty-development-programme-on-governance-law-and-sustainability-in-the-21st-century-organized-by-amity-law-school-amity-university-uttar-pradesh-lucknow-campus-register-by-04-j/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ INTERNATIONAL FACULTY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME ON GOVERNANCE, LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY | Organized by Amity Law School, Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Campus | Register by 04 July 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-faculty-development-programme-on-governance-law-and-sustainability-in-the-21st-century-organized-by-amity-law-school-amity-university-uttar-pradesh-lucknow-campus-register-by-04-j/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 2 July 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/LawFoyer-Logo-no-bg-2026-1024x337.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/advanced-certification-course-on-intellectual-property-laws-of-india/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) #### [ Advanced Certification Course on Intellectual Property Laws of India](https://lawfoyer.in/advanced-certification-course-on-intellectual-property-laws-of-india/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 30 June 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/LawFoyer-Logo-no-bg-2026-1024x337.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/advanced-certification-course-on-mooting-and-trial-advocacy/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) #### [ ADVANCED CERTIFICATION COURSE ON MOOTING AND TRIAL ADVOCACY](https://lawfoyer.in/advanced-certification-course-on-mooting-and-trial-advocacy/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/manikbhai/) 7 June 2026 0 [ ![Circular logo with black and red arcs, featuring stylized orange acronym letters in the center and the slogan 'Transform your dreams to reality' along the top edge.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/images.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/one-week-national-workshop-on-research-methodology-research-ethics-and-publication-strategy-organized-by-shri-ram-college-of-law-muzaffarnagar-ncr-register-by-30th-may-2026/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ ONE WEEK NATIONAL WORKSHOP ON RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, RESEARCH ETHICS AND PUBLICATION STRATEGY | Organized by Shri Ram College of Law, Muzaffarnagar – NCR | Register by 30th May 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/one-week-national-workshop-on-research-methodology-research-ethics-and-publication-strategy-organized-by-shri-ram-college-of-law-muzaffarnagar-ncr-register-by-30th-may-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 23 May 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/LawFoyer-Logo-no-bg-2026-1024x337.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/advanced-certification-workshop-on-ai-powered-legal-research-writing-and-drafting/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) #### [ Advanced Certification Workshop on AI-Powered Legal Research, Writing and Drafting](https://lawfoyer.in/advanced-certification-workshop-on-ai-powered-legal-research-writing-and-drafting/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 21 May 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/LawFoyer-Logo-no-bg-2026-1024x337.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/advanced-certificate-course-on-dpdp-act-2023-law-compliance-and-practice/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) #### [ Advanced Certificate Course on DPDP Act, 2023: Law, Compliance and Practice](https://lawfoyer.in/advanced-certificate-course-on-dpdp-act-2023-law-compliance-and-practice/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 19 May 2026 0 [ ![Seal of HP National Law University Shimla with scales of justice, mountains, sunburst wheel, trees, and a red HPNLU Shimla banner.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Himachal_Pradesh_National_Law_University_Seal.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/2-day-online-workshop-on-right-to-information-rti-organized-by-legal-aid-clinic-himachal-pradesh-national-law-university-hpnlu-shimla-in-collaboration-with-vidhi-vimarsh-initiative-register/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ 2-Day Online Workshop on Right to Information (RTI) | Organized by Legal Aid Clinic, Himachal Pradesh National Law University (HPNLU), Shimla, in collaboration with Vidhi Vimarsh Initiative | Register by 30 May 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/2-day-online-workshop-on-right-to-information-rti-organized-by-legal-aid-clinic-himachal-pradesh-national-law-university-hpnlu-shimla-in-collaboration-with-vidhi-vimarsh-initiative-register/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 15 May 2026 0 [ ![Seal of Cochin University of Science and Technology: red circular emblem with an open book, sunburst, palm tree, and tower, and the university name at the bottom.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/download-1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/eighth-one-week-annual-summer-school-on-understanding-indian-consumer-and-competition-law-organized-by-school-of-legal-studies-cochin-university-of-science-and-technology-cusat-register-by-may/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ Eighth One Week Annual Summer School on Understanding Indian Consumer and Competition Law | Organized by School of Legal Studies, Cochin University of Science and Technology (CUSAT) | Register by May 25, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/eighth-one-week-annual-summer-school-on-understanding-indian-consumer-and-competition-law-organized-by-school-of-legal-studies-cochin-university-of-science-and-technology-cusat-register-by-may/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 2 May 2026 0 [ ![Logo with stylized red letters 'ND' above a line and the word 'DELHI' beneath; Devanagari script at the top.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/download.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/certificate-course-on-construction-contracts-and-disputes-organized-by-centre-for-law-urban-development-clud-in-collaboration-with-society-of-construction-law-india-scl-india-register-by/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ Certificate Course on Construction Contracts and Disputes | Organized by Centre for Law & Urban Development (CLUD) in collaboration with Society of Construction Law India (SCL-India) | Register by 4th May 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/certificate-course-on-construction-contracts-and-disputes-organized-by-centre-for-law-urban-development-clud-in-collaboration-with-society-of-construction-law-india-scl-india-register-by/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 2 May 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/HNLU_Logo1-1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/ten-day-national-faculty-development-program-on-emerging-ip-jurisprudence-and-evolving-trends-of-ip-teaching-research-organized-by-dpiit-ipr-chair-at-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ TEN-DAY NATIONAL FACULTY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM ON EMERGING IP JURISPRUDENCE AND EVOLVING TRENDS OF IP TEACHING & RESEARCH | Organized by DPIIT-IPR Chair at Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | 6TH APRIL – 16TH APRIL, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/ten-day-national-faculty-development-program-on-emerging-ip-jurisprudence-and-evolving-trends-of-ip-teaching-research-organized-by-dpiit-ipr-chair-at-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 23 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/National_Law_University_Delhi_logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-national-law-university-delhi-khaitan-co-certificate-course-on-taxation-laws-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-register-by-29th-march-2026/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ 1ST NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY DELHI – KHAITAN & CO CERTIFICATE COURSE ON TAXATION LAWS | Organized by National Law University Delhi | Register by 29th March, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-national-law-university-delhi-khaitan-co-certificate-course-on-taxation-laws-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-register-by-29th-march-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 19 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/TNLRC-logo.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/webinar-on-the-15-founding-mothers-of-the-constitution-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-register-by-27-march-2026-at-1159-pm/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Webinar](https://lawfoyer.in/category/webinar/) #### [ Webinar on “The 15 Founding Mothers of the Constitution” | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) | Register by 27 March 2026 at 11:59 PM](https://lawfoyer.in/webinar-on-the-15-founding-mothers-of-the-constitution-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-register-by-27-march-2026-at-1159-pm/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 12 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/500x300_609517-untitled-design115.webp) ](https://lawfoyer.in/workshop-on-real-estate-litigation-navigating-the-evolving-world-and-emerging-trends-2026-organized-by-christ-deemed-to-be-university-bangalore-register-by-25th-february-2026/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ Workshop on Real Estate Litigation: Navigating the Evolving World and Emerging Trends 2026 | Organized by CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Bangalore | Register by 25th February, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/workshop-on-real-estate-litigation-navigating-the-evolving-world-and-emerging-trends-2026-organized-by-christ-deemed-to-be-university-bangalore-register-by-25th-february-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 21 February 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/NAAC-Logo-2025-webp-1.webp) ](https://lawfoyer.in/online-international-faculty-development-programme-ifdp-law-technology-and-governance-in-digital-space-organized-by-bennett-university-noida-register-by-12-march-2026/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ Online International Faculty Development Programme (IFDP) “Law, Technology and Governance in Digital Space” | Organized by Bennett University, Noida | Register by 12 March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/online-international-faculty-development-programme-ifdp-law-technology-and-governance-in-digital-space-organized-by-bennett-university-noida-register-by-12-march-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 18 February 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/1630618748635.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/aspire-cohort-2-organized-by-lawfirmready-register-by-26th-february-2026/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ ASPIRE COHORT 2 | Organized by LawFirmReady | Register by 26th February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/aspire-cohort-2-organized-by-lawfirmready-register-by-26th-february-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 13 February 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/SageX-Logo-black-1024x432.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/women-children-the-new-criminal-laws-understanding-protection-rights-and-reforms-organized-by-sage-winter-school-sage-university-register-by-22-february-2026/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ Women, Children & the New Criminal Laws: Understanding Protection, Rights and Reforms | Organized by SAGE Winter School – SAGE University | Register by 22 February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/women-children-the-new-criminal-laws-understanding-protection-rights-and-reforms-organized-by-sage-winter-school-sage-university-register-by-22-february-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 1 February 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/images-2.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/esg-2-0-law-policy-and-practice-value-added-course-organized-by-vivekananda-school-of-law-and-legal-studies-vslls-vivekananda-institute-of-professional-studies-technical-ca/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ ESG 2.0 – Law, Policy and Practice (Value Added Course) | Organized by Vivekananda School of Law and Legal Studies (VSLLS), Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies – Technical Campus (VIPS-TC) | Register by 28th February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/esg-2-0-law-policy-and-practice-value-added-course-organized-by-vivekananda-school-of-law-and-legal-studies-vslls-vivekananda-institute-of-professional-studies-technical-ca/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 24 January 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/LawFoyer-Logo-no-bg-2026-1024x337.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/5-day-certification-course-on-technology-laws/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) #### [ 5-DAY CERTIFICATION COURSE ON TECHNOLOGY LAWS](https://lawfoyer.in/5-day-certification-course-on-technology-laws/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 17 January 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/two-credit-certificate-course-on-labour-codes-organized-by-rajiv-gandhi-national-university-of-law-rgnul-punjab-register-by-16th-january-2026/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ Two-Credit Certificate Course on Labour Codes | Organized by Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law (RGNUL), Punjab | Register by 16th January 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/two-credit-certificate-course-on-labour-codes-organized-by-rajiv-gandhi-national-university-of-law-rgnul-punjab-register-by-16th-january-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 4 January 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/the_lawscape_logo.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/trade-law-in-the-digital-age-navigating-e-commerce-cybersecurity-free-national-webinar-organized-by-the-lawscape-webinar-on-21-december-2025-sunday/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Webinar](https://lawfoyer.in/category/webinar/) #### [ Trade Law in the Digital Age: Navigating E-Commerce & Cybersecurity (Free National Webinar) | Organized by The Lawscape | Webinar on 21 December 2025 (Sunday)](https://lawfoyer.in/trade-law-in-the-digital-age-navigating-e-commerce-cybersecurity-free-national-webinar-organized-by-the-lawscape-webinar-on-21-december-2025-sunday/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 11 December 2025 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/OIP-1.webp) ](https://lawfoyer.in/national-webinar-on-consumer-awareness-by-mar-gregorios-college-of-law-on-9th-december-2025-register-now/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ National Webinar On Consumer Awareness by Mar Gregorios College of Law on 9th December, 2025 | Register Now!](https://lawfoyer.in/national-webinar-on-consumer-awareness-by-mar-gregorios-college-of-law-on-9th-december-2025-register-now/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/manikbhai/) 25 November 2025 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/the_lawscape_logo.jpeg) 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[Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ Financial Frauds & Digital Arrest: Legal Insights and Safeguards | Organised by Legal Aid Clinic, Himachal Pradesh National Law University, Shimla | 15th November 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/financial-frauds-digital-arrest-legal-insights-and-safeguards-organised-by-legal-aid-clinic-himachal-pradesh-national-law-university-shimla-15th-november-2025/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/manikbhai/) 4 November 2025 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/logo-1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/3-day-workshop-on-real-estate-project-management-financing-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-register-by-27th-october-2025/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ 3-Day Workshop on Real Estate Project Management & Financing| Organized by National Law University, Delhi | Register by 27th October 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2025](https://lawfoyer.in/five-day-national-workshop-on-write-to-rise-a-virtual-programme-on-research-publication-skills-lex-gazette-academy-faculty-of-law-vivekananda-global-university-jaipur-last-date-to-regist/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/manikbhai/) 25 September 2025 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/download-1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/2-day-online-workshop-on-preventing-sexual-harassment-at-home-workplace-in-public-spaces-organized-by-legal-aid-clinic-nliu-bhopal-4th-5th-october-2025/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ 2-Day Online Workshop on “Preventing Sexual Harassment at Home, Workplace & in Public Spaces” | Organized by Legal Aid Clinic, NLIU Bhopal | 4th – 5th October 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/2-day-online-workshop-on-preventing-sexual-harassment-at-home-workplace-in-public-spaces-organized-by-legal-aid-clinic-nliu-bhopal-4th-5th-october-2025/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/manikbhai/) 22 September 2025 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/73c835_451b6b53a27248c0aa901055b389116emv2.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/free-webinar-on-careers-in-law-in-madhya-pradesh-organized-by-law-firm-ready-date-of-the-event-14-september-2025/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ Free Webinar on “Careers in Law in Madhya Pradesh” | Organized by Law Firm Ready | Date of the event – 14 September 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/free-webinar-on-careers-in-law-in-madhya-pradesh-organized-by-law-firm-ready-date-of-the-event-14-september-2025/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/manikbhai/) 10 September 2025 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/images.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/contemporary-international-trade-and-changing-global-legal-order-a-discussion-organized-by-upes-dehradun-school-of-law-6th-september-2025/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ Contemporary International Trade and Changing Global Legal Order- A Discussion | Organized by UPES Dehradun, School of Law | 6th September 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/contemporary-international-trade-and-changing-global-legal-order-a-discussion-organized-by-upes-dehradun-school-of-law-6th-september-2025/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/manikbhai/) 2 September 2025 0 [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ 2-Day Advanced Certification Workshop Supercharging Litigation and Academics with AI](https://lawfoyer.in/workshop-legal-ai-for-law-students-and-legal-professionals/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 26 August 2025 0 [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ 5-Day Advanced 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](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 31 December 2024 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/AMity-LOGO-compressed.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/amity-law-school-is-organizing-national-seminar-on-24th-25th-oct-2024-win-prizes-worth-rs-15000/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Webinar](https://lawfoyer.in/category/webinar/) #### [ Amity Law School is organizing National Seminar on 24th & 25th Oct 2024: Win Prizes worth Rs 15000/-](https://lawfoyer.in/amity-law-school-is-organizing-national-seminar-on-24th-25th-oct-2024-win-prizes-worth-rs-15000/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 27 September 2024 0 [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ CERTIFICATION COURSE ON USING AI IN LEGAL WORK FOR LAW STUDENTS AND LEGAL 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Course](https://lawfoyer.in/mastering-the-art-of-legal-research-a-comprehensive-certification-course/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 17 June 2024 0 [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Webinar](https://lawfoyer.in/category/webinar/) #### [ Amity University, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow campus is organizing a National Seminar on Legal and Poetic Values of Vanavil K. Ravi from September 8th & 9th, 2023](https://lawfoyer.in/amity-university-uttar-pradesh-lucknow-campus-is-organizing-a-national-seminar-on-legal-and-poetic-values-of-vanavil-k-ravi-from-september-8th-9th-2023/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 27 August 2023 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/WhatsApp-Image-2023-07-23-at-16.56.13-Small.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/mastering-the-indian-evidence-act-a-10-day-certification-course-organized-by-lawfoyer/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) #### [ Mastering the Indian Evidence Act: A 10-Day Certification Course organized by LawFoyer](https://lawfoyer.in/mastering-the-indian-evidence-act-a-10-day-certification-course-organized-by-lawfoyer/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 23 July 2023 0 [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ FREE 3 Day One Shot Master Class on Indian Evidence Act organized by LawFoyer:- Register By July 18](https://lawfoyer.in/free-3-day-one-shot-masterclasses-on-indian-evidence-act-by-lawfoyer/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 17 June 2023 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/amity-university-vector-logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/amity-law-school-noida-organizes-value-added-course-2023/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ Amity Law School, Noida, organizes Value Added Course 2023 on, “Navigating Intellectual Property Rights Vis-à-vis Emerging Concept of Artificial Intelligence”:- Register By June 25](https://lawfoyer.in/amity-law-school-noida-organizes-value-added-course-2023/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 12 June 2023 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/AMity-LOGO-compressed.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/5th-national-amity-fdp-june-2023/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Webinar](https://lawfoyer.in/category/webinar/) #### [ 5th National Amity Faculty Development Program (Hybrid) on “Accentuating the Importance of the Amalgamation of Related Disciplines in the Domain of Law”: Register by June 15](https://lawfoyer.in/5th-national-amity-fdp-june-2023/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 27 May 2023 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/AMity-LOGO-compressed.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/national-seminar-amity-lucknow/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ National Seminar on Right to Privacy And Data Protection in Digital Era- Issues and Challenges, attempt to propose solutions to emerging issues related to the individual’s right to privacy and data protection organized by Amity University Lucknow](https://lawfoyer.in/national-seminar-amity-lucknow/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 27 December 2022 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/WhatsApp-Image-2022-06-25-at-3.49.10-PM.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/amity-law-school-uttar-pradesh-hosted-the-4th-national-amity-faculty-development-program-hybrid-from-20th-june-to-26th-june-2022/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) #### [ Amity Law School Uttar Pradesh hosted the 4th National Amity Faculty Development Program (Hybrid) from 20th June to 26th June 2022](https://lawfoyer.in/amity-law-school-uttar-pradesh-hosted-the-4th-national-amity-faculty-development-program-hybrid-from-20th-june-to-26th-june-2022/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 26 June 2022 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Background-300x113-1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/workshop-on-intellectual-property-rights/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ Workshop on Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) – Patent & Designs process:-](https://lawfoyer.in/workshop-on-intellectual-property-rights/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 3 October 2021 0 [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) #### [ 5-Days workshop on Research Methodology & Drafting By LawFoyer](https://lawfoyer.in/5-days-workshop-on-research-methodology-drafting-by-lawfoyer/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 30 August 2021 0 --- ### [Legal Topics](https://lawfoyer.in/legal-topics/) **Published:** January 18, 2021 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** - LAW OF TORTS - [Text Material](https://lawfoyer.in/chapter-wise-content "https://lawfoyer.in/chapter-wise-content") - [Leading Case Laws](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kGdMjLeWETuSLzb3-x5x7Z_ZsWAMhLc1/view?usp=sharing) - [Others](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1alnvVPlrFo-WkhuPvYeLo0LG_3smp4fw?usp=sharing) - THE INDIAN CONTRACT ACT (1872) - [Bare Act](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wBSlDBh1fNU02uneiXbp0lXeFwUgOXZ3/view?usp=sharing) - [Text Material](https://lawfoyer.in/topics-of-contract "https://lawfoyer.in/topics-of-contract") - [Leading Case Laws](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1sgD0QKOXTv0nnrw1YVsBanO_t2zATath/view?usp=sharing) - [Others](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1ATG7oVWUMBykivAQweMHRV4E05rm1WnJ?usp=sharing) - CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT - [Bare Act](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1dR1p3rjzrgSNRJO_sGy-yLSji-aHX13J/view?usp=sharing) - [Leading Cases](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_C8ZGJn-ftFGcfVyaiLiR1un6CiPdR8r/view?usp=sharing) - [Others](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1xv1s2X9RsOQT3X2g5E3uoXMlp8R91NlB?usp=sharing) - ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAW - [All Bare Acts](https://lawfoyer.in/environmental-law-bare-acts "https://lawfoyer.in/environmental-law-bare-acts") - [Text Material](https://lawfoyer.in/environmental-law/ "https://lawfoyer.in/environmental-law/") - [Leading Cases](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ByvrO4QhTUoq5x5M2lI_iqxKwWQ9vGiZ/view?usp=sharing) - [Others](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/11Ir3Pa-1JGghKZ-Wp2L1H00QWdL_XDWf?usp=sharing) - MOTOR VEHICLE ACT - [Bare Act](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1BpuuNgaofjQ-t9cxPptoooHmnRMAFxiK/view?usp=sharing) - [Motor Vehicle (Amendment) Bill 2019](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JzY73wQxodIBCKpfMxj5sk4NvQDbyyDy/view?usp=sharing) - [Leading Case Laws](https://drive.google.com/file/d/18XQlKalmie0p-6r6fAwyoWKolLKrhjl3/view?usp=sharing) - [Others](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1qEWXY_8dOsiD4zJlddwe0ZcyDU070OJA?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1qEWXY_8dOsiD4zJlddwe0ZcyDU070OJA?usp=sharing") - SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT - [Bare Act](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1x-J85Znlj2ZJVEex6uiyT0tAf9kb5zt6/view?usp=sharing) - [Leading Case Laws](https://www.latestlaws.com/related-judgements/213/sc-judgement-on-specific-relief-act-1963/) - [Others](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1a-_4lRIxKkMAV_G7uBrj1M-nqG7aq4k3?usp=sharing) - JURISPRUDENCE - [Text Material](https://lawfoyer.in/jurisprudence/ "https://lawfoyer.in/jurisprudence/") - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA - [Bare Act](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1FuObfPTh9tddl_RdbEIM5pb_Cl1KniAK/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1FuObfPTh9tddl_RdbEIM5pb_Cl1KniAK/view?usp=sharing") - INDIAN PENAL CODE (IPC) - THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (CRPC) **MORE UPDATES COMING SOON** **!!!** --- ### [Moots](https://lawfoyer.in/moot-courts/) **Published:** May 21, 2021 **Author:** LawFoyer --- ### [MUNs, Youth Parliament & Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/muns-youth-parliament-other-competitions/) **Published:** May 21, 2021 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Integral_University_Lucknow_logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/integral-university-india-in-collaboration-with-menoufiyauniversity-al-minufiyah-egypt-organized-by-integral-university-lucknow-submit-abstract-by-20th-october-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ Two-Day International Conference on “Forensic Sciences for Advancing Justice: Integrating Law, Medical Science and Technology” | Organized by Integral University, India in collaboration with MenoufiyaUniversity AL Minufiyah, Egypt | Submit Abstract by 20th October 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/integral-university-india-in-collaboration-with-menoufiyauniversity-al-minufiyah-egypt-organized-by-integral-university-lucknow-submit-abstract-by-20th-october-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 19 September 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/image-1-1024x333.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/10th-sgtu-moot-court-competition2026-organized-by-moot-court-society-school-of-law-sgt-university-register-by-5th-october-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ 10th SGTU Moot Court Competition,2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, School of Law, SGT University | Register by 5th October, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/10th-sgtu-moot-court-competition2026-organized-by-moot-court-society-school-of-law-sgt-university-register-by-5th-october-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 19 September 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/National_Forensic_Sciences_University_Logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/national-legal-hackathon-organized-by-school-of-law-forensic-justice-and-policy-studies-national-forensic-sciences-university-nfsu-register-by-24-september-2026/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ National Legal Hackathon | Organized by School of Law, Forensic Justice and Policy Studies, National Forensic Sciences University (NFSU) | Register by 24 September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/national-legal-hackathon-organized-by-school-of-law-forensic-justice-and-policy-studies-national-forensic-sciences-university-nfsu-register-by-24-september-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 18 September 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/images-2.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/11th-justice-murtaza-husain-memorial-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-unity-moot-court-committee-unity-p-g-college-lucknow-register-by-30th-september-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ 11th Justice Murtaza Husain Memorial Moot Court Competition, 2026 | Organized by Unity Moot Court Committee, Unity P.G. College, Lucknow | Register by 30th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/11th-justice-murtaza-husain-memorial-moot-court-competition-2026-organized-by-unity-moot-court-committee-unity-p-g-college-lucknow-register-by-30th-september-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 14 September 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/images-1.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/medexon-international-mediation-competition-2026-organized-by-dexon-global-register-by-20-october-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ MEDEXON INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION COMPETITION, 2026 | Organized by Dexon Global | Register by 20 October 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/medexon-international-mediation-competition-2026-organized-by-dexon-global-register-by-20-october-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 10 September 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/images.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/k-m-bashir-memorial-student-constitutional-forum-2026-organized-by-vakkom-moulavi-foundation-trust-vmft-event-on-24-25-september-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ K.M. Bashir Memorial Student Constitutional Forum 2026 | Organized by Vakkom Moulavi Foundation Trust (VMFT) | Event on 24 & 25 September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/k-m-bashir-memorial-student-constitutional-forum-2026-organized-by-vakkom-moulavi-foundation-trust-vmft-event-on-24-25-september-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 8 September 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/logo-1024x850.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/synergy-where-law-meets-society-case-study-competition-2026-organized-by-vivekananda-school-of-law-and-legal-studies-vslls-vivekananda-institute-of-professional-studies-techn/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ SYNERGY: WHERE LAW MEETS SOCIETY – CASE STUDY COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by Vivekananda School of Law and Legal Studies (VSLLS), Vivekananda Institute of Professional Studies – Technical Campus (VIPS-TC), through the Centre for Social Sciences | Register by 20th October 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/synergy-where-law-meets-society-case-study-competition-2026-organized-by-vivekananda-school-of-law-and-legal-studies-vslls-vivekananda-institute-of-professional-studies-techn/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 2 September 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/HNLU_Logo1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-international-arbitration-organized-by-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur-register-by-20-september-2026/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION | Organized by Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Register by 20 September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-conference-on-international-arbitration-organized-by-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur-register-by-20-september-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 1 September 2026 0 [ ![II LM University logo: shield emblem with temple on left and the text II LM University to the right.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/logo-iilm-greater-noida.webp) ](https://lawfoyer.in/all-india-1st-mock-trial-competition-2026-organized-by-school-of-law-iilm-university-greater-noida-register-by-20th-september-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ ALL INDIA 1ST MOCK TRIAL COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by SCHOOL OF LAW, IILM UNIVERSITY, GREATER NOIDA | Register by 20th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/all-india-1st-mock-trial-competition-2026-organized-by-school-of-law-iilm-university-greater-noida-register-by-20th-september-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 20 August 2026 0 [ ![Geeta Institute of Law logo with an orange emblem and bold text: GEETA INSTITUTE OF LAW, Panipat, Delhi NCR.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/images-1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/international-seminar-on-artificial-intelligence-for-inclusive-growth-transforming-law-management-commerce-and-society-organized-by-geeta-institute-of-law-gil-panipat-delhi/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON “ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH: TRANSFORMING LAW, MANAGEMENT, COMMERCE AND SOCIETY” | Organized by Geeta Institute of Law (GIL), Panipat, Delhi NCR, India | Submit Abstract by 15th October 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/international-seminar-on-artificial-intelligence-for-inclusive-growth-transforming-law-management-commerce-and-society-organized-by-geeta-institute-of-law-gil-panipat-delhi/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 17 August 2026 0 [ ![Logo featuring stylized red letters NJU above a line, with the word DELHI beneath and Devanagari script along the top.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/images.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/online-certificate-course-on-competition-law-digital-markets-artificial-intelligence-4-week-executive-certificate-programme-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-event-scheduled-on-22/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ Online Certificate Course on Competition Law, Digital Markets & Artificial Intelligence: 4-Week Executive Certificate Programme | Organized by National Law University Delhi | Event Scheduled on 22nd August – 12th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/online-certificate-course-on-competition-law-digital-markets-artificial-intelligence-4-week-executive-certificate-programme-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-event-scheduled-on-22/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 17 August 2026 0 [ ![Manipal University Jaipur logo with orange emblem and laurel wreath, 'INSPIRED BY LIFE' ribbon, and bold text 'MANIPAL UNIVERSITY JAIPUR' with '(University under Section 2(f) of the UGC Act)'](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/images-1.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/posh-trainer-certification-programme-empowering-workplaces-ensuring-dignity-building-safe-environments-organized-by-faculty-of-law-manipal-university-jaipur-in-collaboration-with-manipal-univer/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ POSH Trainer Certification Programme: Empowering Workplaces, Ensuring Dignity, Building Safe Environments | Organized by Faculty of Law, Manipal University Jaipur, in collaboration with Manipal University Jaipur Teachers Empowerment Center (MUJ TEC) | Event Scheduled on 18th & 19th September 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/posh-trainer-certification-programme-empowering-workplaces-ensuring-dignity-building-safe-environments-organized-by-faculty-of-law-manipal-university-jaipur-in-collaboration-with-manipal-univer/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 17 August 2026 0 [ ![Green circular gear-like emblem with radial spokes on a black background, resembling an abstract logo](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Official-logo-1024x777.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/kartavya-2026-campus-ambassador-programme-kiit-samvidhan-mahotsav-organized-by-kiit-centre-for-constitutional-law-studies-and-research-cclsr-kiit-school-of-law-kiit-deemed-to-be-univer/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ Kartavya 2026 Campus Ambassador Programme – KIIT Samvidhan Mahotsav | Organized by KIIT Centre for Constitutional Law Studies and Research (CCLSR), KIIT School of Law, KIIT Deemed-to-be University | Register by 25th July 2026 (11:59 PM IST)](https://lawfoyer.in/kartavya-2026-campus-ambassador-programme-kiit-samvidhan-mahotsav-organized-by-kiit-centre-for-constitutional-law-studies-and-research-cclsr-kiit-school-of-law-kiit-deemed-to-be-univer/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 16 July 2026 0 [ ![Apex University logo: blue and gold shield with an open book and torch motif, branding for the institution](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/apex_university_logo.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/jus-novum-au-nationwide-law-fest-2026-organized-by-moot-court-society-apex-school-of-law-apex-university-jaipur-in-collaboration-with-district-legal-services-authority-jaipur-district-reg/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ Jus Novum – AU Nationwide Law Fest, 2026 | Organized by Moot Court Society, Apex School of Law, Apex University, Jaipur In Collaboration With District Legal Services Authority, Jaipur (District) | Register by 8th August 2026, 2026 for Hybrid & Online Competitions and 2nd September, 2026 for one day (Offline) Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/jus-novum-au-nationwide-law-fest-2026-organized-by-moot-court-society-apex-school-of-law-apex-university-jaipur-in-collaboration-with-district-legal-services-authority-jaipur-district-reg/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 14 June 2026 0 [ ![Logo for YU Delhi featuring large red stylized letters 'YU' above the word 'DELHI' with decorative lines and a Sanskrit motto at the top](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/National_Law_University_Delhi_logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/celpr-nlu-delhi-eldf-essay-writing-competition-first-edition-organized-by-centre-for-environmental-law-policy-and-research-celpr-national-law-university-delhi-nlu-delhi-register/) [Essay Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/essay-competitions/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ CELPR NLU Delhi – ELDF Essay Writing Competition (First Edition) | Organized by Centre for Environmental Law, Policy and Research (CELPR), National Law University, Delhi (NLU Delhi) | Register by 8th June 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/celpr-nlu-delhi-eldf-essay-writing-competition-first-edition-organized-by-centre-for-environmental-law-policy-and-research-celpr-national-law-university-delhi-nlu-delhi-register/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 29 May 2026 0 [ ![CANONSPHERE logo featuring a black shield emblem on the left](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/CanonsphereBanner-2.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-client-counseling-competition-2026-by-canonsphere-organized-by-canonsphere-register-by-2nd-july-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ 1st Client Counseling Competition 2026 by Canonsphere | Organized by Canonsphere | Register by 2nd July, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-client-counseling-competition-2026-by-canonsphere-organized-by-canonsphere-register-by-2nd-july-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 21 May 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/images.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-aump-virtual-client-counselling-competition-2026-organized-by-amity-law-school-amity-university-madhya-pradesh-register-by-24th-april-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ 1ST AUMP VIRTUAL CLIENT COUNSELLING COMPETITION, 2026 | Organized by Amity Law School, Amity University Madhya Pradesh | Register by 3rd May, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-aump-virtual-client-counselling-competition-2026-organized-by-amity-law-school-amity-university-madhya-pradesh-register-by-24th-april-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 9 April 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/LOGO-1024x322.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/crime-scene-investigation-competition-vils-1st-inter-university-event-organized-by-vignan-institute-of-law-under-vignans-foundation-for-science-technology-research-deemed-to-be/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATION COMPETITION (VIL’s 1st Inter-University Event) | Organized by Vignan Institute of Law, under Vignan’s Foundation for Science, Technology & Research (Deemed to be University) | Register by April 20, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/crime-scene-investigation-competition-vils-1st-inter-university-event-organized-by-vignan-institute-of-law-under-vignans-foundation-for-science-technology-research-deemed-to-be/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 28 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Nlujodhpur.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-nluj-cclrp-national-essay-writing-competition-2026-organized-by-centre-for-consumer-law-research-practice-national-law-university-jodhpur-submission-deadline-15th-april-2026/) [Essay Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/essay-competitions/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ 1st NLUJ-CCLRP National Essay Writing Competition, 2026 | Organized by Centre for Consumer Law Research & Practice, National Law University, Jodhpur | Submission Deadline: 15th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-nluj-cclrp-national-essay-writing-competition-2026-organized-by-centre-for-consumer-law-research-practice-national-law-university-jodhpur-submission-deadline-15th-april-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 21 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/DME-logo-1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/%e0%a4%b8%e0%a4%ae%e0%a4%97%e0%a5%8d%e0%a4%b026-annual-inter-college-sports-meet-organized-by-dme-sports-society-delhi-metropolitan-education-event-dates-25th-30th-m/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ समग्र’26 – Annual Inter-College Sports Meet | Organized by DME Sports Society, Delhi Metropolitan Education | Event Dates: 25th – 30th March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/%e0%a4%b8%e0%a4%ae%e0%a4%97%e0%a5%8d%e0%a4%b026-annual-inter-college-sports-meet-organized-by-dme-sports-society-delhi-metropolitan-education-event-dates-25th-30th-m/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 21 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/XSLAJ-Logo-Black-PNG-1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/the-4th-xavier-mediation-competition-2026-xmc26-organized-by-the-xavier-society-of-law-and-justice-xslaj-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-register-by-18-ma/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ The 4th Xavier Mediation Competition 2026 (XMC’26) | Organized by The Xavier Society of Law and Justice (XSLAJ), Xavier Law School, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata | Register by 21st March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/the-4th-xavier-mediation-competition-2026-xmc26-organized-by-the-xavier-society-of-law-and-justice-xslaj-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-register-by-18-ma/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 17 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Integral_University_Lucknow_logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-case-analysis-competition-2026-organized-by-environmental-law-society-els-faculty-of-law-integral-university-lucknow-register-by-20th-march-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ 3rd Case Analysis Competition, 2026 | Organized by Environmental Law Society (ELS), Faculty of Law, Integral University, Lucknow | Register by 20th March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-case-analysis-competition-2026-organized-by-environmental-law-society-els-faculty-of-law-integral-university-lucknow-register-by-20th-march-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 15 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/National_Law_Institute_University_Logo-1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-nliu-national-symposium-on-securities-law-capital-markets-2026-organized-by-national-law-institute-university-bhopal-register-by-23rd-march-2026/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ 1st NLIU National Symposium on Securities Law & Capital Markets, 2026 | Organized by National Law Institute University, Bhopal | Register by 23rd March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-nliu-national-symposium-on-securities-law-capital-markets-2026-organized-by-national-law-institute-university-bhopal-register-by-23rd-march-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 13 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/HNLU_Logo1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/international-trade-law-summit-2026-the-wto30-reimagining-multilateralism-in-international-trade-law-organized-by-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur-register-b/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW SUMMIT 2026 “The WTO@30: Reimagining Multilateralism in International Trade Law” | Organized by Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Register by 20 July 2026 (till 11:59 PM IST)](https://lawfoyer.in/international-trade-law-summit-2026-the-wto30-reimagining-multilateralism-in-international-trade-law-organized-by-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur-register-b/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 12 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/legalwiki_logo.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/legal-startup-online-pitching-competition-2026-2-0-be-the-next-founder-organized-by-legalwiki-register-by-15-march-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ Legal Startup Online Pitching Competition, 2026 – 2.0 \[Be the Next Founder\] | Organized by LegalWiki | Register by 15 March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/legal-startup-online-pitching-competition-2026-2-0-be-the-next-founder-organized-by-legalwiki-register-by-15-march-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 12 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/gehu-logo.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/intellectus-2026-minds-in-motion-organized-by-school-of-law-debate-society-graphic-era-hill-university-register-by-17-march-2026-0600-pm-ist/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ Intellectus 2026 – Minds in Motion | Organized by School of Law (Debate Society), Graphic Era Hill University | Register by 17 March 2026 \[06:00 PM (IST)\]](https://lawfoyer.in/intellectus-2026-minds-in-motion-organized-by-school-of-law-debate-society-graphic-era-hill-university-register-by-17-march-2026-0600-pm-ist/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 12 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/delhi_campus_logo.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/nyaya-samvardhan-north-western-region-pro-bono-conclave-organized-by-pro-bono-club-school-of-law-forensic-justice-policy-studies-national-forensic-sciences-university-delhi-campus-regis/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ Nyaya Samvardhan: North-Western Region Pro Bono Conclave | Organized by Pro Bono Club, School of Law, Forensic Justice & Policy Studies, National Forensic Sciences University, Delhi Campus | Register by 15 March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/nyaya-samvardhan-north-western-region-pro-bono-conclave-organized-by-pro-bono-club-school-of-law-forensic-justice-policy-studies-national-forensic-sciences-university-delhi-campus-regis/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 3 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/1675939498809.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-state-level-vidhi-%e0%a4%b8%e0%a4%82%e0%a4%97%e0%a5%8d%e0%a4%b0%e0%a4%be%e0%a4%ae-2026-a-two-day-law-fest-organized-by-dr-d-y-patil-law-college-pimpri-pune-register-by-22nd-march-2/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ 1st State Level Vidhi-संग्राम 2026– A Two-Day Law Fest | Organized by Dr. D Y PATIL LAW COLLEGE, PIMPRI, PUNE | Register by 22nd March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-state-level-vidhi-%e0%a4%b8%e0%a4%82%e0%a4%97%e0%a5%8d%e0%a4%b0%e0%a4%be%e0%a4%ae-2026-a-two-day-law-fest-organized-by-dr-d-y-patil-law-college-pimpri-pune-register-by-22nd-march-2/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 1 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/TNLRC-logo.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-brochure-making-competition-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-register-by-4-march-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ TAMIL NADU LEGAL RIGHTS CONSORTIUM (TNLRC) – BROCHURE-MAKING COMPETITION | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) | Register by 4 March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-brochure-making-competition-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-register-by-4-march-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 25 February 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/panjab_university_students_liberty_union_logo.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/%e0%a4%9c%e0%a4%a8%e0%a4%be%e0%a4%a6%e0%a5%87%e0%a4%b6-%e0%a4%b5%e0%a4%bf%e0%a4%ae%e0%a4%b0%e0%a5%8d%e0%a4%b6-article-writing-competition-organized-by-the-panjab-university-students/) [Essay Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/essay-competitions/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ जनादेश विमर्श – Article Writing Competition | Organized by the Panjab University Students’ Liberty Union | Register by 26 February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/%e0%a4%9c%e0%a4%a8%e0%a4%be%e0%a4%a6%e0%a5%87%e0%a4%b6-%e0%a4%b5%e0%a4%bf%e0%a4%ae%e0%a4%b0%e0%a5%8d%e0%a4%b6-article-writing-competition-organized-by-the-panjab-university-students/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 23 February 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/DME-logo.webp) ](https://lawfoyer.in/dme-mun26-model-united-nations-2026-under-juscosmos-2-0-competition-contours-of-law-nexus-of-justice-organized-by-delhi-metropolitan-education-dme-register-by-28th-february/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ DME MUN’26 (Model United Nations 2026) Under JusCosmos 2.0 – Competition Contours of Law, Nexus of Justice | Organized by Abhivyakti – The Literary & Debating Society, Delhi Metropolitan Education (DME) | Register by 10th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/dme-mun26-model-united-nations-2026-under-juscosmos-2-0-competition-contours-of-law-nexus-of-justice-organized-by-delhi-metropolitan-education-dme-register-by-28th-february/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 22 February 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Chanakya_National_Law_University_Logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/4th-national-client-counselling-competition-organized-by-chanakya-national-law-university-patna-register-by-22-march-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ 4th NATIONAL CLIENT COUNSELLING COMPETITION | Organized by Chanakya National Law University, Patna | Register by 22 March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/4th-national-client-counselling-competition-organized-by-chanakya-national-law-university-patna-register-by-22-march-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 21 February 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Integral_University_Lucknow_logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-case-analysis-competition-2026-environmental-law-society-els-faculty-of-law-integral-university-lucknow-register-by-20th-march-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ 3rd Case Analysis Competition, 2026 | Organized by Environmental Law Society (ELS), Faculty of Law, Integral University, Lucknow | Register by 20th March, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-case-analysis-competition-2026-environmental-law-society-els-faculty-of-law-integral-university-lucknow-register-by-20th-march-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 19 February 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/logo-new-home.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/yuva-sansad-1-0-organized-by-prestige-institute-of-management-and-research-gwalior-register-by-30-march-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ YUVA SANSAD 1.0 | Organized by PRESTIGE INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT AND RESEARCH, GWALIOR | Register by 30 March 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/yuva-sansad-1-0-organized-by-prestige-institute-of-management-and-research-gwalior-register-by-30-march-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 18 February 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/images-1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/nyaya-abhyuday-2-0-techno-legal-fest-organized-by-school-of-law-forensic-justice-and-policy-studies-slfjps-national-forensic-sciences-university-register-by-11th-march-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ NYAYA ABHYUDAY 2.0 – TECHNO LEGAL FEST | Organized by School of Law, Forensic Justice and Policy Studies (SLFJPS), National Forensic Sciences University | Register by 11th March, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/nyaya-abhyuday-2-0-techno-legal-fest-organized-by-school-of-law-forensic-justice-and-policy-studies-slfjps-national-forensic-sciences-university-register-by-11th-march-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 15 February 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/National_Law_Institute_University_Logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-nliu-r-k-dewan-paper-presentation-conference-organized-by-cell-for-studies-in-intellectual-property-rights-csipr-national-law-institute-university-nliu-bhopal-register-by-24-f/) [Call for Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ 1ST NLIU – R.K. DEWAN PAPER PRESENTATION CONFERENCE | Organized by Cell for Studies in Intellectual Property Rights (CSIPR), National Law Institute University (NLIU), Bhopal | Register by 24 February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-nliu-r-k-dewan-paper-presentation-conference-organized-by-cell-for-studies-in-intellectual-property-rights-csipr-national-law-institute-university-nliu-bhopal-register-by-24-f/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 13 February 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/1630618748635.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/aspire-cohort-2-organized-by-lawfirmready-register-by-26th-february-2026/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ ASPIRE COHORT 2 | Organized by LawFirmReady | Register by 26th February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/aspire-cohort-2-organized-by-lawfirmready-register-by-26th-february-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 13 February 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/AVANTIKA-UNIVERSITY-1024x423.webp) ](https://lawfoyer.in/2nd-pan-india-essay-writing-competition-2026-organized-by-avantika-university-register-by-20-february-2026/) [Essay Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/essay-competitions/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ 2nd Pan-India Essay Writing Competition, 2026 | Organized by Avantika University | Register by 20 February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/2nd-pan-india-essay-writing-competition-2026-organized-by-avantika-university-register-by-20-february-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 3 February 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Himachal_Pradesh_National_Law_University_Seal.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/national-article-writing-competition-organized-by-centre-for-human-rights-and-disability-studies-chrds-himachal-pradesh-national-law-university-shimla-register-by-15-february-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ National Article Writing Competition | Organized by Centre for Human Rights and Disability Studies (CHRDS), Himachal Pradesh National Law University, Shimla | Register by 28 February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/national-article-writing-competition-organized-by-centre-for-human-rights-and-disability-studies-chrds-himachal-pradesh-national-law-university-shimla-register-by-15-february-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 28 January 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/1707113615488.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/themisia-4-0-organized-by-deccan-education-societys-shri-navalmal-firodia-law-college-pune-register-by-4th-february-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) [Quiz](https://lawfoyer.in/category/quiz/) #### [ THEMISIA 4.0 | Organized by Deccan Education Society’s Shri Navalmal Firodia Law College, Pune | Register by 10th February, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/themisia-4-0-organized-by-deccan-education-societys-shri-navalmal-firodia-law-college-pune-register-by-4th-february-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 24 January 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/logo.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/lex-carnival-2026-5th-amity-law-fest-juris-trek-organized-by-amity-law-school-amity-university-uttar-pradesh-lucknow-campus-register-by-31st-january-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ LEX CARNIVAL 2026 (5th Amity Law Fest – Juris Trek) | Organized by Amity Law School, Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow Campus | Register by 31st January 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/lex-carnival-2026-5th-amity-law-fest-juris-trek-organized-by-amity-law-school-amity-university-uttar-pradesh-lucknow-campus-register-by-31st-january-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 22 January 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/LOGOHIRES1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/essay-writing-competition-organized-by-the-cyber-blog-india-register-by-10-february-2026/) [Essay Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/essay-competitions/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ Essay Writing Competition | Organized by The Cyber Blog India | Register by 10 February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/essay-writing-competition-organized-by-the-cyber-blog-india-register-by-10-february-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 20 January 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/NFSU_logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-national-pro-bono-and-legal-aid-conclave-the-justice-synergy-organized-by-national-forensic-sciences-university-register-by-15th-february-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ 3rd National Pro Bono and Legal Aid Conclave – “The Justice Synergy” | Organized by National Forensic Sciences University | Register by 25th February, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/3rd-national-pro-bono-and-legal-aid-conclave-the-justice-synergy-organized-by-national-forensic-sciences-university-register-by-15th-february-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 17 January 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/images-1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/small-voices-big-rights-1st-national-essay-competition-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-register-by-1st-march-2026/) [Essay Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/essay-competitions/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ Small Voices: Big Rights: 1st National Essay Competition | Organized by National Law University, Delhi | Register by 1st March, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/small-voices-big-rights-1st-national-essay-competition-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-register-by-1st-march-2026/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/manikbhai/) 14 January 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/new-logo-1024x156.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/verdictus-2-0-annual-law-fest-organized-by-navrachana-university-school-of-business-and-law-register-by-12th-january-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ VERDICTUS 2.0 – Annual Law Fest | Organized by Navrachana University, School of Business and Law | Register by 12th January, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/verdictus-2-0-annual-law-fest-organized-by-navrachana-university-school-of-business-and-law-register-by-12th-january-2026/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/manikbhai/) 5 January 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/HNLU-Logo.png.webp) ](https://lawfoyer.in/global-trade-careers-the-wtos-30-year-legacy-and-future-pathways-organized-by-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur-register-by-28-january-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ Global Trade Careers, The WTO’s 30-Year Legacy, and Future Pathways | Organized by Hidayatullah National Law University (HNLU), Raipur | Register by 28 January 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/global-trade-careers-the-wtos-30-year-legacy-and-future-pathways-organized-by-hidayatullah-national-law-university-hnlu-raipur-register-by-28-january-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 4 January 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/National_Law_Institute_University_Logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-applications-the-capital-tank-1st-nliu-cfmrs-investment-challenge-2026-organized-by-national-law-institute-university-bhopal-register-by-20-february-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ Call for Applications: The Capital Tank: 1st NLIU–CFMRS Investment Challenge, 2026 | Organized by National Law Institute University, Bhopal | Register by 20 February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-applications-the-capital-tank-1st-nliu-cfmrs-investment-challenge-2026-organized-by-national-law-institute-university-bhopal-register-by-20-february-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 24 December 2025 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/images.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/rgnul-sam-legislation-drafting-competition-2026-centre-for-advanced-studies-in-cyber-law-and-artificial-intelligence-casca-rajiv-gandhi-national-university-of-law-rgnul-punjab-last/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ RGNUL–SAM LEGISLATION DRAFTING COMPETITION, 2026 | Centre for Advanced Studies in Cyber Law and Artificial Intelligence (CASCA), Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law (RGNUL), Punjab | Last Date to Register for the Event – 15th January 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/rgnul-sam-legislation-drafting-competition-2026-centre-for-advanced-studies-in-cyber-law-and-artificial-intelligence-casca-rajiv-gandhi-national-university-of-law-rgnul-punjab-last/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 24 December 2025 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/CanonsphereBanner-2.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/judgment-unfolded-case-law-narration-competition-2026-organized-by-canonsphere-event-scheduled-on-10th-and-11th-january-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ Judgment Unfolded: Case Law Narration Competition 2026 | Organized by Canonsphere | Event Scheduled on 10th and 11th January 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/judgment-unfolded-case-law-narration-competition-2026-organized-by-canonsphere-event-scheduled-on-10th-and-11th-january-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 11 December 2025 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/logo-b.webp) ](https://lawfoyer.in/4th-national-mediation-competition-organized-by-the-chanakya-centre-for-alternative-dispute-resolution-ccadr-at-chanakya-national-law-university-patna-inaugural-ceremony-on-10-january-2026/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ 4th NATIONAL MEDIATION COMPETITION | Organized by The Chanakya Centre for Alternative Dispute Resolution (CCADR) at Chanakya National Law University, Patna | Inaugural Ceremony on 10 January 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/4th-national-mediation-competition-organized-by-the-chanakya-centre-for-alternative-dispute-resolution-ccadr-at-chanakya-national-law-university-patna-inaugural-ceremony-on-10-january-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 12 November 2025 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/NLUD-Big-Logo-1024x158.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-fairsquare-nlu-delhi-national-essay-competition-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-register-by-30-november-2025/) [Essay Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/essay-competitions/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ 1st FairSquare NLU Delhi National Essay Competition | Organized by National Law University, Delhi | Register by 30 November 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-fairsquare-nlu-delhi-national-essay-competition-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-register-by-30-november-2025/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 12 November 2025 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/1747586810831.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-volunteers-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-month-of-december-2025-online-volunteer-programme/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) | Month of December 2025 – Online Volunteer Programme](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-volunteers-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-month-of-december-2025-online-volunteer-programme/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/manikbhai/) 5 November 2025 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/download-26.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-articles-slogan-writing-poster-making-competition-by-the-pro-bono-club-faculty-of-law-university-of-lucknow-in-collaboration-with-we-youngsters-foundation-submit-by-november-10-202/) [Call for Blogs](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-blogs/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ Call for Articles, Slogan Writing & Poster Making Competition by the Pro Bono Club, Faculty of Law, University of Lucknow in collaboration with We Youngsters Foundation \[Submit by November 10, 2025\]](https://lawfoyer.in/call-for-articles-slogan-writing-poster-making-competition-by-the-pro-bono-club-faculty-of-law-university-of-lucknow-in-collaboration-with-we-youngsters-foundation-submit-by-november-10-202/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/manikbhai/) 21 October 2025 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/download.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/pactum-concorde-inter-collegiate-mediation-competition-virtual-organised-by-thakur-ramnarayan-college-of-law-mumbai-register-by-15th-november-2025/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ Pactum Concorde: Inter-Collegiate Mediation Competition (Virtual) organised by Thakur Ramnarayan College of Law, Mumbai | Register by 15th November, 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/pactum-concorde-inter-collegiate-mediation-competition-virtual-organised-by-thakur-ramnarayan-college-of-law-mumbai-register-by-15th-november-2025/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 19 October 2025 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/logo-new-1024x240.png) 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Papers](https://lawfoyer.in/category/call-for-papers/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ 2nd Student Conclave on “ Sustainable Choices, Empowered Voices : Rethinking Consumption Through the Lens of Gen Z” | Organized by Delhi Metropolitan Education (DME), Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University (GGSIPU), New Delhi | Submission of Abstract – 26th October 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/2nd-student-conclave-on-sustainable-choices-empowered-voices-rethinking-consumption-through-the-lens-of-gen-z-organized-by-delhi-metropolitan-education-dme-guru-gobind-singh/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/manikbhai/) 25 September 2025 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/ignitac25-2nd-ignatius-trial-advocacy-competition-organized-by-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-9th-to-11th-of-october-2025/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Moot Courts](https://lawfoyer.in/category/moot-courts/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ IGNITAC’25- 2nd Ignatius Trial & Advocacy Competition | Organized by Xavier Law School, St. Xavier’s University, Kolkata | Register by 3rd October 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/ignitac25-2nd-ignatius-trial-advocacy-competition-organized-by-xavier-law-school-st-xaviers-university-kolkata-9th-to-11th-of-october-2025/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/manikbhai/) 3 September 2025 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Regular-logo-600x600-14.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-amity-client-counselling-competition-2025-organized-by-amity-university-lucknow-campus-uttar-pradesh-deadline-25th-august-2025/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ 1st Amity Client Counselling Competition, 2025 | Organized by Amity University Lucknow Campus Uttar Pradesh | Register by 25th August, 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-amity-client-counselling-competition-2025-organized-by-amity-university-lucknow-campus-uttar-pradesh-deadline-25th-august-2025/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/manikbhai/) 19 August 2025 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/AMity-LOGO-compressed.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/amity-law-school-is-organizing-lex/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ Amity Law School is organizing its 2nd Amity National Law Fest- Lex Carnival 2023 to be conducted on March 1st & 2nd 2023](https://lawfoyer.in/amity-law-school-is-organizing-lex/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 7 February 2023 0 --- ### [Essay Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/essay-competitions/) **Published:** May 21, 2021 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** [ ![Logo for WICCI Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium, showing a dancing figure over a map outline on a pink background, with curved text surrounding.](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/TNLRC-logo.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/tnlrc-essay-writing-competition-2026-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-under-wicci-register-by-26-june-2026/) [Essay Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/essay-competitions/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) #### [ TNLRC ESSAY WRITING COMPETITION 2026 | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) under WICCI | Register by 26 June 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/tnlrc-essay-writing-competition-2026-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-under-wicci-register-by-26-june-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 14 June 2026 0 [ ![Logo for YU Delhi featuring large red stylized letters 'YU' above the word 'DELHI' with decorative lines and a Sanskrit motto at the top](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/National_Law_University_Delhi_logo.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/celpr-nlu-delhi-eldf-essay-writing-competition-first-edition-organized-by-centre-for-environmental-law-policy-and-research-celpr-national-law-university-delhi-nlu-delhi-register/) [Essay Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/essay-competitions/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ CELPR NLU Delhi – ELDF Essay Writing Competition (First Edition) | Organized by Centre for Environmental Law, Policy and Research (CELPR), National Law University, Delhi (NLU Delhi) | Register by 8th June 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/celpr-nlu-delhi-eldf-essay-writing-competition-first-edition-organized-by-centre-for-environmental-law-policy-and-research-celpr-national-law-university-delhi-nlu-delhi-register/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 29 May 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Nlujodhpur.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-nluj-cclrp-national-essay-writing-competition-2026-organized-by-centre-for-consumer-law-research-practice-national-law-university-jodhpur-submission-deadline-15th-april-2026/) [Essay Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/essay-competitions/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ 1st NLUJ-CCLRP National Essay Writing Competition, 2026 | Organized by Centre for Consumer Law Research & Practice, National Law University, Jodhpur | Submission Deadline: 15th April 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-nluj-cclrp-national-essay-writing-competition-2026-organized-by-centre-for-consumer-law-research-practice-national-law-university-jodhpur-submission-deadline-15th-april-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 21 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/panjab_university_students_liberty_union_logo.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/%e0%a4%9c%e0%a4%a8%e0%a4%be%e0%a4%a6%e0%a5%87%e0%a4%b6-%e0%a4%b5%e0%a4%bf%e0%a4%ae%e0%a4%b0%e0%a5%8d%e0%a4%b6-article-writing-competition-organized-by-the-panjab-university-students/) [Essay Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/essay-competitions/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ जनादेश विमर्श – Article Writing Competition | Organized by the Panjab University Students’ Liberty Union | Register by 26 February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/%e0%a4%9c%e0%a4%a8%e0%a4%be%e0%a4%a6%e0%a5%87%e0%a4%b6-%e0%a4%b5%e0%a4%bf%e0%a4%ae%e0%a4%b0%e0%a5%8d%e0%a4%b6-article-writing-competition-organized-by-the-panjab-university-students/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 23 February 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/AVANTIKA-UNIVERSITY-1024x423.webp) ](https://lawfoyer.in/2nd-pan-india-essay-writing-competition-2026-organized-by-avantika-university-register-by-20-february-2026/) [Essay Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/essay-competitions/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ 2nd Pan-India Essay Writing Competition, 2026 | Organized by Avantika University | Register by 20 February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/2nd-pan-india-essay-writing-competition-2026-organized-by-avantika-university-register-by-20-february-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 3 February 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/LOGOHIRES1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/essay-writing-competition-organized-by-the-cyber-blog-india-register-by-10-february-2026/) [Essay Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/essay-competitions/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ Essay Writing Competition | Organized by The Cyber Blog India | Register by 10 February 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/essay-writing-competition-organized-by-the-cyber-blog-india-register-by-10-february-2026/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 20 January 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/images-1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/small-voices-big-rights-1st-national-essay-competition-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-register-by-1st-march-2026/) [Essay Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/essay-competitions/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ Small Voices: Big Rights: 1st National Essay Competition | Organized by National Law University, Delhi | Register by 1st March, 2026](https://lawfoyer.in/small-voices-big-rights-1st-national-essay-competition-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-register-by-1st-march-2026/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/manikbhai/) 14 January 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/NLUD-Big-Logo-1024x158.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-fairsquare-nlu-delhi-national-essay-competition-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-register-by-30-november-2025/) [Essay Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/essay-competitions/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Other Competitions](https://lawfoyer.in/category/others/) #### [ 1st FairSquare NLU Delhi National Essay Competition | Organized by National Law University, Delhi | Register by 30 November 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/1st-fairsquare-nlu-delhi-national-essay-competition-organized-by-national-law-university-delhi-register-by-30-november-2025/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 12 November 2025 0 --- ### [Webinars](https://lawfoyer.in/webinars/) **Published:** May 21, 2021 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/TNLRC-logo.jpeg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/webinar-on-the-15-founding-mothers-of-the-constitution-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-register-by-27-march-2026-at-1159-pm/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Webinar](https://lawfoyer.in/category/webinar/) #### [ Webinar on “The 15 Founding Mothers of the Constitution” | Organized by Tamil Nadu Legal Rights Consortium (TNLRC) | Register by 27 March 2026 at 11:59 PM](https://lawfoyer.in/webinar-on-the-15-founding-mothers-of-the-constitution-organized-by-tamil-nadu-legal-rights-consortium-tnlrc-register-by-27-march-2026-at-1159-pm/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 12 March 2026 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/the_lawscape_logo.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/trade-law-in-the-digital-age-navigating-e-commerce-cybersecurity-free-national-webinar-organized-by-the-lawscape-webinar-on-21-december-2025-sunday/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Webinar](https://lawfoyer.in/category/webinar/) #### [ Trade Law in the Digital Age: Navigating E-Commerce & Cybersecurity (Free National Webinar) | Organized by The Lawscape | Webinar on 21 December 2025 (Sunday)](https://lawfoyer.in/trade-law-in-the-digital-age-navigating-e-commerce-cybersecurity-free-national-webinar-organized-by-the-lawscape-webinar-on-21-december-2025-sunday/) [ Antavya Singh ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/antavya/) 11 December 2025 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Conference-on-‘Exploring-the-Evolving-Dynamics-of-Protecting-Women-and-Child-Rights-in-the-Modernized-World-2.webp) ](https://lawfoyer.in/unlaw-the-law-a-multispecies-reflection-2-0-organized-by-awaaz-leadership-labs-all-event-date-october-12-2025/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Webinar](https://lawfoyer.in/category/webinar/) #### [ Unlaw the Law: A Multispecies Reflection 2.0 | Organized by Awaaz Leadership Labs (ALL) | Event Date: October 12, 2025](https://lawfoyer.in/unlaw-the-law-a-multispecies-reflection-2-0-organized-by-awaaz-leadership-labs-all-event-date-october-12-2025/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/manikbhai/) 11 October 2025 0 [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Webinar](https://lawfoyer.in/category/webinar/) #### [ Free Online Masterclass on Mediation Act, 2023: Provisions & Procedure organized by Lawfoyer: Register by Jan 18](https://lawfoyer.in/free-online-masterclass-on-mediation-law-of-india-organized-by-lawfoyer-register-by-jan-12-copy/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 14 January 2025 0 [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Webinar](https://lawfoyer.in/category/webinar/) #### [ Free Webinar on New Criminal Laws A Comparative Analysis](https://lawfoyer.in/free-webinar-on-new-criminal-laws-a-comparative-analysis/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 19 November 2024 0 [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Webinar](https://lawfoyer.in/category/webinar/) #### [ Free Online Webinar on Understanding India’s Income Tax System: A Comprehensive Overview For Law Professionals by LawFoyer: Register by Oct 19](https://lawfoyer.in/free-online-webinar-on-understanding-indias-income-tax-system-a-comprehensive-overview-for-law-professionals-by-lawfoyer-register-by-oct-19/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 8 October 2024 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/AMity-LOGO-compressed.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/amity-law-school-is-organizing-national-seminar-on-24th-25th-oct-2024-win-prizes-worth-rs-15000/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Webinar](https://lawfoyer.in/category/webinar/) #### [ Amity Law School is organizing National Seminar on 24th & 25th Oct 2024: Win Prizes worth Rs 15000/-](https://lawfoyer.in/amity-law-school-is-organizing-national-seminar-on-24th-25th-oct-2024-win-prizes-worth-rs-15000/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 27 September 2024 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/image.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/free-online-webinar-on-changing-facets-of-federalism-in-21st-century-by-lawfoyer/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Webinar](https://lawfoyer.in/category/webinar/) #### [ Free Online Webinar on Changing Facets of Federalism in 21st Century by LawFoyer: Register by August 23](https://lawfoyer.in/free-online-webinar-on-changing-facets-of-federalism-in-21st-century-by-lawfoyer/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 5 August 2024 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/image.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/free-online-webinar-on-gender-equality-and-constitution-addressing-legal-perspective-by-lawfoyer/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Webinar](https://lawfoyer.in/category/webinar/) #### [ Free Online Webinar on Gender Equality and Constitution addressing legal perspective by LawFoyer: Register by March 16](https://lawfoyer.in/free-online-webinar-on-gender-equality-and-constitution-addressing-legal-perspective-by-lawfoyer/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 18 February 2024 0 [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Webinar](https://lawfoyer.in/category/webinar/) #### [ Free Online Masterclass on Mediation Law of India organized by Lawfoyer: Register by Jan 12](https://lawfoyer.in/free-online-masterclass-on-mediation-law-of-india-organized-by-lawfoyer-register-by-jan-12/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 23 December 2023 0 [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Webinar](https://lawfoyer.in/category/webinar/) #### [ Amity University, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow campus is organizing a National Seminar on Legal and Poetic Values of Vanavil K. Ravi from September 8th & 9th, 2023](https://lawfoyer.in/amity-university-uttar-pradesh-lucknow-campus-is-organizing-a-national-seminar-on-legal-and-poetic-values-of-vanavil-k-ravi-from-september-8th-9th-2023/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 27 August 2023 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/AMity-LOGO-compressed.jpg) ](https://lawfoyer.in/5th-national-amity-fdp-june-2023/) [Courses & Workshops](https://lawfoyer.in/category/courses-workshops/) [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Webinar](https://lawfoyer.in/category/webinar/) #### [ 5th National Amity Faculty Development Program (Hybrid) on “Accentuating the Importance of the Amalgamation of Related Disciplines in the Domain of Law”: Register by June 15](https://lawfoyer.in/5th-national-amity-fdp-june-2023/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 27 May 2023 0 [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Webinar](https://lawfoyer.in/category/webinar/) #### [ Webinar On Right to Information and Good Governance in India: Contemporary Issues & Challenges:- Register by May 21](https://lawfoyer.in/webinar-on-right-to-information-and-good/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 12 May 2022 0 [Webinar](https://lawfoyer.in/category/webinar/) #### [ Webinar on Judiciary as a career after Law:- Register by July 24](https://lawfoyer.in/webinar-on-judiciary-as-a-career/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 9 July 2021 0 [ ![](https://lawfoyer.in/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Background-300x113-1.png) ](https://lawfoyer.in/webinar-on-importance-of-commercial/) [Webinar](https://lawfoyer.in/category/webinar/) #### [ Webinar on Importance of Commercial Law For Today’s Business:-Register by July 9](https://lawfoyer.in/webinar-on-importance-of-commercial/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 6 July 2021 0 [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Webinar](https://lawfoyer.in/category/webinar/) #### [ Free Webinar: ‘How to Introduce Yourself in An Interview’: Register by May 1](https://lawfoyer.in/free-webinar-how-to-introduce-yourself-in-an-interview-register-by-may-1/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 2 May 2021 0 [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/category/events/) [Webinar](https://lawfoyer.in/category/webinar/) #### [ Free Webinar: ‘Litigation as a career after law’. Register by April 14](https://lawfoyer.in/webinar1/) [ LawFoyer ](https://lawfoyer.in/author/anurag/) 9 April 2021 0 --- ### [Submit Post](https://lawfoyer.in/submit-post/) **Published:** May 22, 2021 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** Event Submission Please enable JavaScript in your browser to complete this form. Name of Organiser \* Email \* Phone \* About the organizer About the Event \* Add Media VisualCode or Upload all the details Drag & Drop Files, Choose Files to Upload You can upload up to 4 files. Submit --- ### [Debates](https://lawfoyer.in/debates/) **Published:** May 21, 2021 **Author:** LawFoyer --- ### [Judgements & Requested Material](https://lawfoyer.in/landmark-judgements/) **Published:** January 23, 2021 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** - **[All Bare Acts](https://lawfoyer.in/all-bare-acts)** - [**Legal Maxim & Phrases**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1g_FXERL1KqL-OOsdtaRDfDcDBE54r8tr/view?usp=sharing) - [**Judgments that changed the course of India**](https://lawfoyer.in/judgements-that-changed-the-course-of-india "https://lawfoyer.in/judgements-that-changed-the-course-of-india") - [**Some Landmark Judgements of Supreme Court Of India**](https://lawfoyer.in/landmark-judgements-of-supreme-court-of-india "https://lawfoyer.in/landmark-judgements-of-supreme-court-of-india") - [**2016 Important judgements**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1UqzqW1ozIOBOyUvRxxk7TpXr2SD4q-Mu/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1UqzqW1ozIOBOyUvRxxk7TpXr2SD4q-Mu/view?usp=sharing") - [**2017 Important judgements**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1iVSrNaP2j7B67z236CqfEmQHhUkZGWDi/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1iVSrNaP2j7B67z236CqfEmQHhUkZGWDi/view?usp=sharing") - [**2018 Important judgements**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1TOAsWLlEpvRS9nEjAmLZkGYrAzhNzPg6/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1TOAsWLlEpvRS9nEjAmLZkGYrAzhNzPg6/view?usp=sharing") - [**2019 Important judgements**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/11wTc6ul1Kr0uymHBdbgNTC-BXYA81rWG/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/11wTc6ul1Kr0uymHBdbgNTC-BXYA81rWG/view?usp=sharing") - [**Editorial Articles (daily Updated)**](https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1l2e6AOfABGHf3NDL1DII3ErkrAZWiT0h?usp=sharing) - **[National Education Policy 2020](https://www.education.gov.in/sites/upload_files/mhrd/files/NEP_Final_English_0.pdf)** --- ### [TOPICS OF CONTRACT](https://lawfoyer.in/topics-of-contract/) **Published:** January 29, 2021 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** - [WHAT IS A CONTRACT ?](https://lawfoyer.in/what-is-a-contract "https://lawfoyer.in/what-is-a-contract") - [ESSENTIALS OF A VALID CONTRACT](https://lawfoyer.in/essentials-of-a-valid-contract "https://lawfoyer.in/essentials-of-a-valid-contract") - [What Is Free Consent?](https://lawfoyer.in/what-is-free-consent "https://lawfoyer.in/what-is-free-consent") - [Contingent Contracts](https://lawfoyer.in/contingent-contracts-under-indian-contract-act "https://lawfoyer.in/contingent-contracts-under-indian-contract-act") - [REVOCATION OF OFFER & ACCEPTANCE](https://lawfoyer.in/revocation-of-offer-acceptance "https://lawfoyer.in/revocation-of-offer-acceptance") - [WAGERING AGREEMENT](https://lawfoyer.in/wagering-agreement "https://lawfoyer.in/wagering-agreement") - [COMMUNICATION OF OFFER / ACCEPTANCE & PERFORMANCE](https://lawfoyer.in/communication-of-offer-acceptance-performance "https://lawfoyer.in/communication-of-offer-acceptance-performance") - [Quantum Meruit](https://lawfoyer.in/quantum-meruit-doctrine-under-the-indian-contract-act "https://lawfoyer.in/quantum-meruit-doctrine-under-the-indian-contract-act") - [CONSIDERATION UNDER CONTRACT](https://lawfoyer.in/consideration-under-indian-contract-act "https://lawfoyer.in/consideration-under-indian-contract-act") - [VALIDITY OF AN AGREEMENT WITHOUT CONSIDERATION & SUIT BY A THIRD PARTY TO A CONTRACT](https://lawfoyer.in/validity-of-an-agreement-without-consideration-suit-by-a-third-party-to-a-contract "https://lawfoyer.in/validity-of-an-agreement-without-consideration-suit-by-a-third-party-to-a-contract") - [CAPACITY TO CONTRACT](https://lawfoyer.in/capacity-to-contract "https://lawfoyer.in/capacity-to-contract") - [OBLIGATIONS OF PARTIES TO CONTRACT \[ PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT \]](https://lawfoyer.in/obligations-of-parties-to-contract-performance-of-contract "https://lawfoyer.in/obligations-of-parties-to-contract-performance-of-contract") - [BY WHOM A CONTRACT MAY BE PERFORMED (SECTION 40-42)](https://lawfoyer.in/by-whom-a-contract-may-be-performed-section-40-42 "https://lawfoyer.in/by-whom-a-contract-may-be-performed-section-40-42") - [INJUNCTION & TYPES](https://lawfoyer.in/injunction-types "https://lawfoyer.in/injunction-types") - [ACCEPTANCE](https://lawfoyer.in/acceptance "https://lawfoyer.in/acceptance") - [DISCHARGE OF A CONTRACT](https://lawfoyer.in/discharge-of-a-contract "https://lawfoyer.in/discharge-of-a-contract") - [LEGALITY OF OBJECT & CONSIDERATION](https://lawfoyer.in/legality-of-object-consideration "https://lawfoyer.in/legality-of-object-consideration") - [PENALITY & LIQUIDATED DAMAGES](https://lawfoyer.in/penality-liquidated-damages "https://lawfoyer.in/penality-liquidated-damages") - [SUIT FOR DAMAGES](https://lawfoyer.in/suit-for-damages "https://lawfoyer.in/suit-for-damages") - [VOID AGREEMENT](https://lawfoyer.in/void-agreement "https://lawfoyer.in/void-agreement") - [ANTICIPATORY & ACTUAL BREACH OF CONTRACT](https://lawfoyer.in/anticipatory-actual-breach-of-contract "https://lawfoyer.in/anticipatory-actual-breach-of-contract") - [PROPOSAL / OFFER \[SECTION 2(a)\]](https://lawfoyer.in/proposal-offer-section-2a "https://lawfoyer.in/proposal-offer-section-2a") - [EFFECT OF REFUSAL TO ACCEPT OFFER OF PERFORMANCE & PARTY TO PERFORM PROMISE](https://lawfoyer.in/effect-of-refusal-to-accept-offer-of-performance-party-to-perform-promise "https://lawfoyer.in/effect-of-refusal-to-accept-offer-of-performance-party-to-perform-promise") - [LIABILITY OF JOINT PROMISOR & PROMISEE](https://lawfoyer.in/liability-of-joint-promisor-promisee "https://lawfoyer.in/liability-of-joint-promisor-promisee") - [QUASI CONTRACTS](https://lawfoyer.in/quasi-contracts "https://lawfoyer.in/quasi-contracts") - [PERFORMANCE OF RECIPROCAL PROMISES](https://lawfoyer.in/performance-of-reciprocal-promises "https://lawfoyer.in/performance-of-reciprocal-promises") - [Specific Contracts Under The Indian Contract Act, 1872](https://lawfoyer.in/specific-contracts-under-the-indian-contract-act-1872/ "https://lawfoyer.in/specific-contracts-under-the-indian-contract-act-1872/") - Indemnity, Guarantee, Bailment, Pledge and Agency --- ### [Environmental Law](https://lawfoyer.in/environmental-law/) **Published:** February 17, 2021 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** - [Environmental Law & The Indian Constitution](https://lawfoyer.in/environmental-law-the-indian-constitution "https://lawfoyer.in/environmental-law-the-indian-constitution") - [Environment Protection Act, 1986](https://lawfoyer.in/environment-protection-act-1986 "https://lawfoyer.in/environment-protection-act-1986") - [National Environmental Policy, 2006](https://lawfoyer.in/national-environmental-policy-2006 "https://lawfoyer.in/national-environmental-policy-2006") - Other Laws and Environment (IPC, CrPC, Torts) - [Law of Crimes and the Environment](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jHkqv8VRYV3ZQIzRhfyUM7SeGoo4enaT/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jHkqv8VRYV3ZQIzRhfyUM7SeGoo4enaT/view?usp=sharing") - [Law of Torts and the Environment](https://drive.google.com/file/d/14fVdLQ8cggDZtZixr-oXgeMN-HdWobKe/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/14fVdLQ8cggDZtZixr-oXgeMN-HdWobKe/view?usp=sharing") - [National Laws, Policies and Framework pertaining to Water](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1npGXgIrDRMor3RBJgE6CCrmV5TBLGOTa/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1npGXgIrDRMor3RBJgE6CCrmV5TBLGOTa/view?usp=sharing") - [Agriculture Policy and Urban Development Policy](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1YBOAEmsD3nlaMmrLFpUqcbsSSDrWst36/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1YBOAEmsD3nlaMmrLFpUqcbsSSDrWst36/view?usp=sharing") - [Abatement of Pollution](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1K0nW7ydW1VX2uIs2sAggYKOC9xdfRsin/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1K0nW7ydW1VX2uIs2sAggYKOC9xdfRsin/view?usp=sharing") - [Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal/Toxics](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1y_VA1ciTDfu4J6nld-nTl_FXye5YgCXS/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1y_VA1ciTDfu4J6nld-nTl_FXye5YgCXS/view?usp=sharing") - [Municipal Solid Waste Management](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1FDap8lyHunc2HDRgc8YAVT5j4i1PWrRT/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1FDap8lyHunc2HDRgc8YAVT5j4i1PWrRT/view?usp=sharing") - [E-Waste Management](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1bdHVwZvvkgROD7BzlnSOm_U0sEkNsKL7/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1bdHVwZvvkgROD7BzlnSOm_U0sEkNsKL7/view?usp=sharing") - [Conclusion](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kbPOjXRWaXUlM4t3u6IE5ZsHWtcliPAu/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kbPOjXRWaXUlM4t3u6IE5ZsHWtcliPAu/view?usp=sharing") - The Scheduled Tribes & Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 & Forest Conservation Act, 1980 - [Introduction & Threats to Forests](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1WfV0DW-I3xKBTu0GvrwwbnF4IiRoKzvz/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1WfV0DW-I3xKBTu0GvrwwbnF4IiRoKzvz/view?usp=sharing") - [The Forest Conservation Act, 1980](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DgcZC7Vy5WUGILKamWkZhndRxUGAZc_-/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DgcZC7Vy5WUGILKamWkZhndRxUGAZc_-/view?usp=sharing") - [The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1f71a6xF2eUiKbL9mseEIS7nwG7ny3ouJ/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1f71a6xF2eUiKbL9mseEIS7nwG7ny3ouJ/view?usp=sharing") - [Conclusion](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DSbG97D7XrSIZb9YUy0n9oOpZJflHFha/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DSbG97D7XrSIZb9YUy0n9oOpZJflHFha/view?usp=sharing") - Panchayats Extension to Scheduled Areas (PESA) Act, 1996 - [Introduction](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1hACWWwdmh7GDC-l_xroRhXGuTNWzmKwX/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1hACWWwdmh7GDC-l_xroRhXGuTNWzmKwX/view?usp=sharing") - [The premise of the Act](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1udJ_LToHmDbNUZ5vvefxq5x6hgKCxN7m/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1udJ_LToHmDbNUZ5vvefxq5x6hgKCxN7m/view?usp=sharing") - [Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas Act, 1996 & Problems in Implementation of PESA & Conclusion](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1PTmhlCZ7Hu6gQG1YVEyUYLvqVV27RtLG/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1PTmhlCZ7Hu6gQG1YVEyUYLvqVV27RtLG/view?usp=sharing") - Wild Life Protection Act, 1972 - [Introduction](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Jz1pOKJcWjM3quPDghZV7P11x_1pUk56/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Jz1pOKJcWjM3quPDghZV7P11x_1pUk56/view?usp=sharing") - [Wildlife Conservation](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_sZwfSJE72rQz0LChX84MS87_fPViRTG/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_sZwfSJE72rQz0LChX84MS87_fPViRTG/view?usp=sharing") - [The Wildlife in India](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1cuKsDt6xcZ3VqaJTx72KLYeqkwa-Cgkl/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1cuKsDt6xcZ3VqaJTx72KLYeqkwa-Cgkl/view?usp=sharing") - [Wildlife Conservation and Constitutional Mandate](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jBlYqeMyCVDlnMbpa4Vw0tEimWZ-i40Z/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jBlYqeMyCVDlnMbpa4Vw0tEimWZ-i40Z/view?usp=sharing") - [History of Wildlife Conservation in India](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1gSxfa9bPVX9RnNQRVr95rBGH-Kg14jOo/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1gSxfa9bPVX9RnNQRVr95rBGH-Kg14jOo/view?usp=sharing") - [Protected Areas](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1OEdk5ZRfWn9GQK712A4AQJDWByyce-4m/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1OEdk5ZRfWn9GQK712A4AQJDWByyce-4m/view?usp=sharing") - [International Norms for the Protection of Wildlife](https://drive.google.com/file/d/18MSuGNzOk15gHuJhAW64SPdW7VnWCrzT/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/18MSuGNzOk15gHuJhAW64SPdW7VnWCrzT/view?usp=sharing") - [Conclusion](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1srn5EW_0HFmsCh1MNhuFj0UYUDLrtcCP/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1srn5EW_0HFmsCh1MNhuFj0UYUDLrtcCP/view?usp=sharing") - Coastal Regulation Zone and Coastal Regulation Management - [Introduction](https://drive.google.com/file/d/16-aprms1qXu1Vj3OAt6aIob1f81pAcfb/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/16-aprms1qXu1Vj3OAt6aIob1f81pAcfb/view?usp=sharing") - [Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) & CRZ Notification and its Objectives](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1z7YehNh4HOzVkm3TYZzpZcEGMvOOuxlk/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1z7YehNh4HOzVkm3TYZzpZcEGMvOOuxlk/view?usp=sharing") - [Brief Overview of CRZ Notification & Merits and De-merits of CRZ Notification](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ueZW3pd5RH1TuqYiyGLuLN_HQ5u853wm/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ueZW3pd5RH1TuqYiyGLuLN_HQ5u853wm/view?usp=sharing") - [Strengthening CRZ, Some Violations of CRZ, Coastal Regulation Zone Notification Amendment 2010 & Conclusion](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1EsfwKp3-pC5nPzJRykFiCzqgCNw9SsDy/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1EsfwKp3-pC5nPzJRykFiCzqgCNw9SsDy/view?usp=sharing") --- ### [Jurisprudence](https://lawfoyer.in/jurisprudence/) **Published:** April 25, 2021 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** ## TEXT MATERIAL #### **[Introduction and Sources of Law](https://lawfoyer.in/definition-nature-scope-importance-of-jurisprudence/ "https://lawfoyer.in/definition-nature-scope-importance-of-jurisprudence/")** 1. Definition and Meaning of the term ‘jurisprudence’ 2. Nature & Scope of Jurisprudence 3. Importance of Jurisprudence #### **[Schools of Jurisprudence](https://lawfoyer.in/schools-of-jurisprudence/ "https://lawfoyer.in/schools-of-jurisprudence/")** 1. Analytical School 2. Historical School 3. Sociological School 4. Philosophical School 5. Realist School 6. Comparative School 7. Natural Law School. #### **[VARIOUS SCHOOLS OF LAW](https://lawfoyer.in/various-schools-of-law/ "https://lawfoyer.in/various-schools-of-law/")** 1. Austin 2. Roscoe Pound 3. John William Salmond 4. Hans Kelson 5. Jeremy Bentham #### **[SOURCES OF LAW](https://lawfoyer.in/sources-of-law/ "https://lawfoyer.in/sources-of-law/")** 1. NATURAL & POSITIVISTIC DEFINITION OF LAW 2. SOCIOLOGICAL & REALISTIC DEFINITION OF LAW 3. SIGNIFICANCE OF LAW 4. Primary/Principle & Secondary Sources of Law 5. Judicial Decisions or Precedents & Kinds of Precedents 6. The doctrine of Stare Decisis 7. Ratio Decidendi 8. Obiter Dicta --- ### [BARE ACTS](https://lawfoyer.in/all-bare-acts/) **Published:** February 12, 2021 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** A, [B](#JUMP-TO-B "#JUMP-TO-B"), [C](#JUMP-TO-C "#JUMP-TO-C"), [D](#JUMP-TO-D "#JUMP-TO-D"), [E](#JUMP-TO-E "#JUMP-TO-E"), [F](#JUMP-TO-F "#JUMP-TO-F"), [G](#JUMP-TO-G "#JUMP-TO-G"), [H](#JUMP-TO-H "#JUMP-TO-H"), [I](#JUMP-TO-I), [J](#JUMP-TO-J), [L](#JUMP-TO-L "#JUMP-TO-L"), [M](#JUMP-TO-M "#JUMP-TO-M"), [N](#JUMP-TO-N "#JUMP-TO-N"), [O](#JUMP-TO-O "#JUMP-TO-O"), [P](#JUMP-TO-P "#JUMP-TO-P"), [R](#JUMP-TO-R "#JUMP-TO-R"), [S](#JUMP-TO-S "#JUMP-TO-S"), [T](#JUMP-TO-T "#JUMP-TO-T"), [U](#JUMP-TO-U "#JUMP-TO-U"), [W](#JUMP-TO-W "#JUMP-TO-W") ## A **[Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Nwfqmfw_VWcmCca2Prz1LDLvjaF2UDhZ/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Nwfqmfw_VWcmCca2Prz1LDLvjaF2UDhZ/view?usp=sharing")** **[Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims)Act, 2017](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JjzGackYMjXn4h_-x0EOBm4THGR7xutO/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JjzGackYMjXn4h_-x0EOBm4THGR7xutO/view?usp=sharing")** **[Anti-Hijacking Act, 2016](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1prNr5mAkkZVq9E0Hwi5ZobirP6WyySUd/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1prNr5mAkkZVq9E0Hwi5ZobirP6WyySUd/view?usp=sharing")** **[Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_woJVuwb06deJMfAcEhbR1O8F8zoEWqd/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_woJVuwb06deJMfAcEhbR1O8F8zoEWqd/view?usp=sharing")** **[The Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1WiICdEut9pUUA4fsbwZx9yAR6Lb1TRUu/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1WiICdEut9pUUA4fsbwZx9yAR6Lb1TRUu/view?usp=sharing")** **[Academy of Scientific and Innovative Research Act, 2011](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jX388LEmtSnHrV3gofwzbDyPO6Hsp8bg/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jX388LEmtSnHrV3gofwzbDyPO6Hsp8bg/view?usp=sharing")** **[Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1maTE3JA0R-j_rJspMxoVJxvBtFe4BHSQ/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1maTE3JA0R-j_rJspMxoVJxvBtFe4BHSQ/view?usp=sharing")** **[Assam Rifles Act, 2006](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ZhRv_tfB_Ri6Ni-5HWw1hQ1zzz8pdx_X/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ZhRv_tfB_Ri6Ni-5HWw1hQ1zzz8pdx_X/view?usp=sharing")** **[Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council Act, 2005](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DXdlma7_tAis_wUCzIxDDK5H4QNvMeTE/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DXdlma7_tAis_wUCzIxDDK5H4QNvMeTE/view?usp=sharing")** **[Actuaries Act, 2006](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1N3gMMe4dP-GBAYxONds4wYDSsrI6QyhQ/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1N3gMMe4dP-GBAYxONds4wYDSsrI6QyhQ/view?usp=sharing")** **[Advocates Fund Act, 2001](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1fiRpNYRFEHEhlH5b1nvXQWgFJ0FgksJE/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1fiRpNYRFEHEhlH5b1nvXQWgFJ0FgksJE/view?usp=sharing")** **[Airports Authority of India Act, 1994](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Z-jjb_sdK9qOqykVW5mfZ-U4TqcKmT0d/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Z-jjb_sdK9qOqykVW5mfZ-U4TqcKmT0d/view?usp=sharing")** **[Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1SMfssawAI_5VdwcmeE38LYewUHAkho_x/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1SMfssawAI_5VdwcmeE38LYewUHAkho_x/view?usp=sharing")** **[Anti-Hijacking Act, 1982](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1KSmtJ5nBs7YNIpqPJNqhHxZjrJ04vXda/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1KSmtJ5nBs7YNIpqPJNqhHxZjrJ04vXda/view?usp=sharing")** **[Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1G-2qQ_iE8rJVjU4UCWPg7NDhNSxB4tgB/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1G-2qQ_iE8rJVjU4UCWPg7NDhNSxB4tgB/view?usp=sharing")** **[Atomic Energy Act, 1962](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1YoU9p4e6iIMHAWt4P2PkM5fmeaV4ZfvV/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1YoU9p4e6iIMHAWt4P2PkM5fmeaV4ZfvV/view?usp=sharing")** **[Advocates Act, 1961](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Nr481CisW36wkvH9BGWe8S83etz-g_bO/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Nr481CisW36wkvH9BGWe8S83etz-g_bO/view?usp=sharing")** **[Arms Act, 1959](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Sq-bUATDA-a0tvyFrSZ8Reesi450bOyS/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Sq-bUATDA-a0tvyFrSZ8Reesi450bOyS/view?usp=sharing")** **[Aircraft Act, 1934](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1K2dXSQTaIYHDdYMtdLNU1v6y78ZDoHqy/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1K2dXSQTaIYHDdYMtdLNU1v6y78ZDoHqy/view?usp=sharing")** [**Apprentices Act, 1961**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1n7I0JheDFRfDME5rqxDY5i-e3yFNFuNU/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1n7I0JheDFRfDME5rqxDY5i-e3yFNFuNU/view?usp=sharing") **[Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1aso-qS9JP6o-3_XFqObforZuCRjJMyGt/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1aso-qS9JP6o-3_XFqObforZuCRjJMyGt/view?usp=sharing")** **[Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India Act, 2008](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1rLCYxtZr3eqO1LdnpJfKxXJ9VKltChFW/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1rLCYxtZr3eqO1LdnpJfKxXJ9VKltChFW/view?usp=sharing")** ## B - [**Banning of Unregulated Deposit Schemes Act, 2019**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1d_dhm0Pja9INU94j85JwhpdBUv0y74kS/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1d_dhm0Pja9INU94j85JwhpdBUv0y74kS/view?usp=sharing") - [**Bihar Value Added Tax Act, 2005**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kA0dDcpaN6fD917EE-ruI9OvNDPzoEzg/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kA0dDcpaN6fD917EE-ruI9OvNDPzoEzg/view?usp=sharing") - [**Bureau of Indian Standards Act, 2016**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1qbYscY0Qh2pR5USKGHBWcOlCpO5M8oqC/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1qbYscY0Qh2pR5USKGHBWcOlCpO5M8oqC/view?usp=sharing") - [**Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) and Imposition of Tax Act, 2015**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1gP_4iZp4gG5IO2fuvq2vtO-qJbN-8twK/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1gP_4iZp4gG5IO2fuvq2vtO-qJbN-8twK/view?usp=sharing") - [**Biological Diversity Act, 2002**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1utjBcsR6bsX5RDBwiSEeNxNkWfj-EEz9/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1utjBcsR6bsX5RDBwiSEeNxNkWfj-EEz9/view?usp=sharing") - [**Bihar Reorganisation Act, 2000**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1XKIk9fjARzXhBVpFPz9zFxvZucmNheur/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1XKIk9fjARzXhBVpFPz9zFxvZucmNheur/view?usp=sharing") - [**Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1H6wY6qzbe65DxkS__dSFGVIyZC5Gz9M-/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1H6wY6qzbe65DxkS__dSFGVIyZC5Gz9M-/view?usp=sharing") - [**Banking Regulation Act, 1949**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Gfk1y3tNnO0XBMpFik3qvxuKoxZ-upgn/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Gfk1y3tNnO0XBMpFik3qvxuKoxZ-upgn/view?usp=sharing") - [**Boilers Act, 1923**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1V-O-_cYIMgpF5YTu9Y8KjtaxYCxKHwwH/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1V-O-_cYIMgpF5YTu9Y8KjtaxYCxKHwwH/view?usp=sharing") - [**Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1J2Oc_IsKVZ9IZEurrimucFBLvJoiPay3/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1J2Oc_IsKVZ9IZEurrimucFBLvJoiPay3/view?usp=sharing") ## C [**Commercial Courts Act, 2015**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ZvR3LR4_PWUqFmCL6lvd3Ub4TrKjtdPR/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ZvR3LR4_PWUqFmCL6lvd3Ub4TrKjtdPR/view?usp=sharing") ## [Constitution Of India, 2019](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1FuObfPTh9tddl_RdbEIM5pb_Cl1KniAK/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1FuObfPTh9tddl_RdbEIM5pb_Cl1KniAK/view?usp=sharing") [**Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act, 2015**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1L20ldf02oojjSkAMA0EWXpATllkGrkhH/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1L20ldf02oojjSkAMA0EWXpATllkGrkhH/view?usp=sharing") [**Central Educational Institutions (Reservations in Teachers Cadre) Act, 2019**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Wb4WbKdxf_1T6gt6rd7f5fWFUFPspyLm/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Wb4WbKdxf_1T6gt6rd7f5fWFUFPspyLm/view?usp=sharing") [**Central Goods and Services Tax (Extension to Jammu and Kashmir) Act, 2017**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/18aMBkIhdyW4ZEh1VEL9iP1P3gqB4GEnk/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/18aMBkIhdyW4ZEh1VEL9iP1P3gqB4GEnk/view?usp=sharing") [**Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mwkx4vG9O8MV59YIorxQzAXXszLj6X7-/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mwkx4vG9O8MV59YIorxQzAXXszLj6X7-/view?usp=sharing") [**Compensatory Afforestation Fund Act, 2016**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1UAjVpsDH3sbv8CtrlXgDvNgPohgcVIHk/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1UAjVpsDH3sbv8CtrlXgDvNgPohgcVIHk/view?usp=sharing") [**Companies Act, 2013**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1GYDAzYpRXDTcuCa0fiJ7Zwmgd07pESBA/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1GYDAzYpRXDTcuCa0fiJ7Zwmgd07pESBA/view?usp=sharing") [**Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1E71Psfyhi159AB9BMgknczzuAnXjomwE/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1E71Psfyhi159AB9BMgknczzuAnXjomwE/view?usp=sharing") [**Clinical Establishments (Registration and Regulation) Act, 2010**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JSu53_LOGBQdZDTQ9tU1pjQTZ7D62XdO/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JSu53_LOGBQdZDTQ9tU1pjQTZ7D62XdO/view?usp=sharing") [**Coinage Act, 2011**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1magNN0nwjlWgp34oiU4OsM7ojluuPlAd/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1magNN0nwjlWgp34oiU4OsM7ojluuPlAd/view?usp=sharing") [**Central Universities Act, 2009**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1-RcTbaUcIPN3qbh-92BXD9F8QKTQcp0c/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1-RcTbaUcIPN3qbh-92BXD9F8QKTQcp0c/view?usp=sharing") [**Collection of Statistics Act, 2008**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/18nnUnvdOviFDBu8nTI_Pp6Pxf7hHv6TU/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/18nnUnvdOviFDBu8nTI_Pp6Pxf7hHv6TU/view?usp=sharing") [**Carriage by Road Act, 2007**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1A_nD6k6VJSTjfhmncPpZ9ECla_ADXLF4/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1A_nD6k6VJSTjfhmncPpZ9ECla_ADXLF4/view?usp=sharing") [**Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1PodnsXjW1LEP0B_6NOx8ELwh_ayUWWXN/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1PodnsXjW1LEP0B_6NOx8ELwh_ayUWWXN/view?usp=sharing") [**Cantonments Act, 2006**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/17eRQ3ZiCSI1uSrrbXz35I7oMYG9zhXLk/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/17eRQ3ZiCSI1uSrrbXz35I7oMYG9zhXLk/view?usp=sharing") [**Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act, 2006**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Wb4WbKdxf_1T6gt6rd7f5fWFUFPspyLm/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Wb4WbKdxf_1T6gt6rd7f5fWFUFPspyLm/view?usp=sharing") [**Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1j01Rvp0-zbWZ-GpZObm52VBdZHunvJeH/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1j01Rvp0-zbWZ-GpZObm52VBdZHunvJeH/view?usp=sharing") [**Coastal Aquaculture Authority Act, 2005**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Pl8mt3MC7jxQ1E6SeMxvE2_L6SQsn6y6/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Pl8mt3MC7jxQ1E6SeMxvE2_L6SQsn6y6/view?usp=sharing") [**Credit Information Companies (Regulation) Act, 2005**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ZIT7xMOjI0Ft1u-zPkNBaSiID8dMbPL8/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ZIT7xMOjI0Ft1u-zPkNBaSiID8dMbPL8/view?usp=sharing") [**Customs and Central Excise Laws (Repeal) Act, 2004**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1OuKTyjTytcn8x1yXqR0bJUN82m__msUH/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1OuKTyjTytcn8x1yXqR0bJUN82m__msUH/view?usp=sharing") [**Competition Act, 2002**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1IuMJuRRox0G1MZPvrcNXtIhzsRtszkLp/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1IuMJuRRox0G1MZPvrcNXtIhzsRtszkLp/view?usp=sharing") [**Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (Prohibition of Advertisement and Regulation of Trade and Commerce, Production, Supply and Distribution) Act, 2003**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/18iLDyBIxpFka6Qdy55ObMS9tnHSBBg6o/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/18iLDyBIxpFka6Qdy55ObMS9tnHSBBg6o/view?usp=sharing") [**The Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1fSgPYWwCsiKWgWYYwP2YZuT9EEghNrqs/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1fSgPYWwCsiKWgWYYwP2YZuT9EEghNrqs/view?usp=sharing") [**Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1j01Rvp0-zbWZ-GpZObm52VBdZHunvJeH/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1j01Rvp0-zbWZ-GpZObm52VBdZHunvJeH/view?usp=sharing") [**Code of Civil Procedure Act, 1908**](http://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A1908-05_0.pdf) [**Chemical Weapons Convention Act, 2000**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1xZQdgPwd2ztEsRyy4FDZpJcHq1uaxCko/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1xZQdgPwd2ztEsRyy4FDZpJcHq1uaxCko/view?usp=sharing") [**Coal India (Regulation of Transfers and Validation Act, 2000**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1vCfF6acVBlcj57gRLVBo2yGc-kpaKFDA/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1vCfF6acVBlcj57gRLVBo2yGc-kpaKFDA/view?usp=sharing") [**Central Road and Infrastructure Fund Act, 2000**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1zlTK2K_XvvTnunZHGXis4oh5eFTgfXyH/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1zlTK2K_XvvTnunZHGXis4oh5eFTgfXyH/view?usp=sharing") [**Central Industrial Security Force (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1999**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1m12jQh95c9L4tHGz2SL2mzIgJK73z6TC/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1m12jQh95c9L4tHGz2SL2mzIgJK73z6TC/view?usp=sharing") [**Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1fxdb0KXODeOd1MwqgncdE4DMuOd5gqfB/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1fxdb0KXODeOd1MwqgncdE4DMuOd5gqfB/view?usp=sharing") [**Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 1991**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1AQ0Fooqyx4Zz3IQz9ybBVRrugm7WMwV1/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1AQ0Fooqyx4Zz3IQz9ybBVRrugm7WMwV1/view?usp=sharing") [**Commission of Sati (Prevention ) Act, 1987**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1BypXtGD3wjqbqbme0aeU5KlwEyc8i8EM/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1BypXtGD3wjqbqbme0aeU5KlwEyc8i8EM/view?usp=sharing") [**Consumer Protection Act, 1986**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1VebYu6Q5pcQVOdGNCA9LawH_PT7D_d4_/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1VebYu6Q5pcQVOdGNCA9LawH_PT7D_d4_/view?usp=sharing") [**Chit Funds Act, 1982**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/11_t58tqRatpNfv07VFvsNrBBQ_6E_GKQ/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/11_t58tqRatpNfv07VFvsNrBBQ_6E_GKQ/view?usp=sharing") [**Carriage by Air Act, 1972**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_L3EQERUKp387coOUohhta-8zUNLcaEE/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_L3EQERUKp387coOUohhta-8zUNLcaEE/view?usp=sharing") [**Contempt of Courts Act, 1971**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Kpu5WZ54irNHGuvgdw4fsEMYuNlIzN5S/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Kpu5WZ54irNHGuvgdw4fsEMYuNlIzN5S/view?usp=sharing") [**Central Boards of Revenue Act, 1963**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1foBU1znTY-FJ3DSW0LA1YwkML8P0_Ue5/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1foBU1znTY-FJ3DSW0LA1YwkML8P0_Ue5/view?usp=sharing") [**Customs Act, 1962**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1u6ycDSM5xTlkDFiJxQADwKSXqwoAyfPR/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1u6ycDSM5xTlkDFiJxQADwKSXqwoAyfPR/view?usp=sharing") [**Copyright Act, 1957**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Xzjeff_1ov5lx6w0KnMo04cEsoyd0vpO/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Xzjeff_1ov5lx6w0KnMo04cEsoyd0vpO/view?usp=sharing") [**Citizenship Act, 1955**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1-0lLnMaR59iKCmSZMR198DTU30LiS_0F/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1-0lLnMaR59iKCmSZMR198DTU30LiS_0F/view?usp=sharing") [**Cinematograph Act, 1952**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ScmNaZ9cUn1K4jesBCXurQIP_CaEyTuZ/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ScmNaZ9cUn1K4jesBCXurQIP_CaEyTuZ/view?usp=sharing") [**Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_rlelyImH4eVo7hm2T9JfOYMvM0waayH/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_rlelyImH4eVo7hm2T9JfOYMvM0waayH/view?usp=sharing") [**Census Act, 1948**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mnqjvNHiLIMfoz4TWHT49KNLBCNCsFj-/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mnqjvNHiLIMfoz4TWHT49KNLBCNCsFj-/view?usp=sharing") [**Central Silk Board Act, 1948**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1sr4pAaT5kTPdSNi-5458G4b2cneOMaRe/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1sr4pAaT5kTPdSNi-5458G4b2cneOMaRe/view?usp=sharing") [**Cantonments (House Accommodation) Act, 1923**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mKCGiJMOYC1OiJGjWctfJSv_51et1VY-/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mKCGiJMOYC1OiJGjWctfJSv_51et1VY-/view?usp=sharing") [**Co-operative Societies Act, 1912**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1YeRjEPAngN1jh2tkO5fOGrS66Pcylc62/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1YeRjEPAngN1jh2tkO5fOGrS66Pcylc62/view?usp=sharing") [**Cattle-Trespass Act, 1871**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Ah_1Bu7RPc8NH_YexD1J1RvWU_fQGU9N/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Ah_1Bu7RPc8NH_YexD1J1RvWU_fQGU9N/view?usp=sharing") [**Court Fees Act, 1870**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1odAq062Y3UKgYCYmxtiBv7Dgf7NvK51l/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1odAq062Y3UKgYCYmxtiBv7Dgf7NvK51l/view?usp=sharing") ## D [**Delimitation Act, 2002**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Po3hoKa4KvKtUaV0HjYqGSsARgoubuGz/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Po3hoKa4KvKtUaV0HjYqGSsARgoubuGz/view?usp=sharing") [**Dr. Rajendra Prasad Central Agricultural University Act, 2016**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1PWmbC92yYf0TyrUaOacICnuv6KPmCj5Z/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1PWmbC92yYf0TyrUaOacICnuv6KPmCj5Z/view?usp=sharing") [**Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Act, 2006**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Hlzr1PS9fLwMSmTBzE498vEJmM6U2aLU/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Hlzr1PS9fLwMSmTBzE498vEJmM6U2aLU/view?usp=sharing") [**Disaster Management Act, 2005**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/13jIHdAl-la46vUooSzwO5Q46gcfVbwJc/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/13jIHdAl-la46vUooSzwO5Q46gcfVbwJc/view?usp=sharing") [**Delhi Municipal Corporation (Validation of Electricity Tax) Act and Other Laws (Repeal) Act, 2002**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1MinAC6F3SczWufhontEquO5N3blUuUo5/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1MinAC6F3SczWufhontEquO5N3blUuUo5/view?usp=sharing") [**Designs Act, 2000**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t2whamWHgg5xOqoEovg0gvbB7KZ41j4H/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1t2whamWHgg5xOqoEovg0gvbB7KZ41j4H/view?usp=sharing") [**Direct-Tax Laws (Miscellaneous) Repeal Act, 2000**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lYcdOqaM1zbUcZD3aCZXCwbs56KUzZiD/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lYcdOqaM1zbUcZD3aCZXCwbs56KUzZiD/view?usp=sharing") [**Delhi Development Authority (Validation of Disciplinary Powers) Act, 1998**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/17HWl-P9HX45u7ImNorWhQlhwi5qcvAGF/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/17HWl-P9HX45u7ImNorWhQlhwi5qcvAGF/view?usp=sharing") [**Diplomatic Relations (Vienna Convention) Act, 1972**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jWEBnAkZM2OjPIDonS7lj_N0JeakpWGa/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jWEBnAkZM2OjPIDonS7lj_N0JeakpWGa/view?usp=sharing") [**Depositories Act, 1996**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mBod9iJkKYUyjsGxk3dFanDt4aNLdvsc/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mBod9iJkKYUyjsGxk3dFanDt4aNLdvsc/view?usp=sharing") [**Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Wbd24syLOCO5dR1kBhXTk97V07-PEWbq/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Wbd24syLOCO5dR1kBhXTk97V07-PEWbq/view?usp=sharing") [**Dadra and Nagar Haveli Act, 1961**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_YI7I0rg3PIYO08J9dywaABxAImXTtER/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_YI7I0rg3PIYO08J9dywaABxAImXTtER/view?usp=sharing") [**Damodar Valley Corporation Act, 1948**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1C9jTKrK-nfr_tiHE_3CAuoAokwTYto7d/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1C9jTKrK-nfr_tiHE_3CAuoAokwTYto7d/view?usp=sharing") [**Divorce Act, 1869**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jDaggcsyzqVQmmCavODQMaFHTIGVGhCU/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jDaggcsyzqVQmmCavODQMaFHTIGVGhCU/view?usp=sharing") ## E **[Environment (Protection) Act, 1986](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mQAfiXlcryxBdiPIZGHqUVunEp1Xed3i/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mQAfiXlcryxBdiPIZGHqUVunEp1Xed3i/view?usp=sharing")** **[English and Foreign Languages University Act, 2006](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1XdDHqoJB5iqI_0x9tg3t-nP4Q5BoIZhG/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1XdDHqoJB5iqI_0x9tg3t-nP4Q5BoIZhG/view?usp=sharing")** [**Electricity Act, 2003**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Sy8Zdy4l9nS2nahZtfvknElA8RZQ_SJZ/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Sy8Zdy4l9nS2nahZtfvknElA8RZQ_SJZ/view?usp=sharing") [**Energy Conservation Act, 2001**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1YYF28lB5PmFJ9cAw1icRihNwhZNRZzRj/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1YYF28lB5PmFJ9cAw1icRihNwhZNRZzRj/view?usp=sharing") [**Employment of Manual Scavengers and Construction of Dry Latrines (Prohibition) Act, 1993**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1XkgQ8K5UbFgEgZCltMwxbsCt_BtD_oRh/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1XkgQ8K5UbFgEgZCltMwxbsCt_BtD_oRh/view?usp=sharing") [**Extradition Act, 1962**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jfvAlTrxfyJxXQ5P56Vsbe-Xx8dkRXNZ/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jfvAlTrxfyJxXQ5P56Vsbe-Xx8dkRXNZ/view?usp=sharing") [**Essential Commodities Act, 1955**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1tufakKefkzx4wPb4AjIO6Xxu8Cs1UJbd/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1tufakKefkzx4wPb4AjIO6Xxu8Cs1UJbd/view?usp=sharing") [**Employees Compensation Act, 1923**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Xoe6Pa62rj-riNQiNATCgokmAwQoEwcI/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Xoe6Pa62rj-riNQiNATCgokmAwQoEwcI/view?usp=sharing") **[Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1cvJtXkqfDi4TmcIuT83rtMJCDlTnYW99/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1cvJtXkqfDi4TmcIuT83rtMJCDlTnYW99/view?usp=sharing")** ## F [**THE FOREST (CONSERVATION) ACT, 1980**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/14Ah_ItMTgPrpqiYOfRS36FFnabxVuVSV/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/14Ah_ItMTgPrpqiYOfRS36FFnabxVuVSV/view?usp=sharing") [**Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act, 2003**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jwgzhvL4tAYO7SHwujS7LQOMnhqg0CLu/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jwgzhvL4tAYO7SHwujS7LQOMnhqg0CLu/view?usp=sharing") [**Fugitive Economic Offenders Act, 2018**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/18pbqnrh3J95qx_VR1kMy1v7_ITROi5I2/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/18pbqnrh3J95qx_VR1kMy1v7_ITROi5I2/view?usp=sharing") [**Factoring Regulation Act, 2011**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1gPSMbx2aK0xyXvyCpxfc7U5fh0duIly2/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1gPSMbx2aK0xyXvyCpxfc7U5fh0duIly2/view?usp=sharing") [**Footwear Design and Development Institute Act, 2017**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ShhNtZrQzdDzygFF47jGMNZe8XaBsx7j/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ShhNtZrQzdDzygFF47jGMNZe8XaBsx7j/view?usp=sharing") [**Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1fLDUQ55cEhQYf3jep0SyHH9orBSooAkq/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1fLDUQ55cEhQYf3jep0SyHH9orBSooAkq/view?usp=sharing") **[Foreign Aircraft (Exemption from Taxes and Duties on Fuel and Lubricants) Act, 2002](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1WYuvM0BcF2yFdyeP5gI4bgr4XhCyRiCG/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1WYuvM0BcF2yFdyeP5gI4bgr4XhCyRiCG/view?usp=sharing")** [**Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1uoupYREKgwDZcuye5sxkDy8dHmmjUqFT/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1uoupYREKgwDZcuye5sxkDy8dHmmjUqFT/view?usp=sharing") [**Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1A2_TMgstmr16xvmjizUF1fYx7lOPzWDq/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1A2_TMgstmr16xvmjizUF1fYx7lOPzWDq/view?usp=sharing") [**Foreign Marriage Act, 1969**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LEvKGvZveT5EMs9qGxz-yEq3YMRCkQzb/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LEvKGvZveT5EMs9qGxz-yEq3YMRCkQzb/view?usp=sharing") [**Fatal Accidents Act, 1855**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1K-_qRoUT7jbwFKf-_O3ITTknv4iqehPy/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1K-_qRoUT7jbwFKf-_O3ITTknv4iqehPy/view?usp=sharing") [**Factories Act, 1948**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JBEco1u7FLUkD1uhjefS2MKIr_Kb7-Xe/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JBEco1u7FLUkD1uhjefS2MKIr_Kb7-Xe/view?usp=sharing") ## G **[General Clauses Act, 1897](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jH5-Xo2ZQM9ps2mYqmURsUaxM_U6tku6/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jH5-Xo2ZQM9ps2mYqmURsUaxM_U6tku6/view?usp=sharing")** [**Geneva Conventions Act, 1960**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1aE2zyBjIN0UX1wB18iO_tduMVv3uluu9/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1aE2zyBjIN0UX1wB18iO_tduMVv3uluu9/view?usp=sharing") [**Gram Nyayalayas Act, 2008**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1BFSoj3o1jLJi8pNV0F1XglAF4c8CRBGb/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1BFSoj3o1jLJi8pNV0F1XglAF4c8CRBGb/view?usp=sharing") [**Goods and Services Tax (Compensation to States) Act, 2017**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1qDvsnQSKzFsDmjhdavL9CF1Mx2MkGOnq/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1qDvsnQSKzFsDmjhdavL9CF1Mx2MkGOnq/view?usp=sharing") [**Government Securities Act, 2006**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/13tzXYGJC4R_N-QCGAxoEZFOtlH7nWC1c/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/13tzXYGJC4R_N-QCGAxoEZFOtlH7nWC1c/view?usp=sharing") [**Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jr9GX5_9FsrjFPq7G1C8rtIkZa7AHzNR/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jr9GX5_9FsrjFPq7G1C8rtIkZa7AHzNR/view?usp=sharing") ## H [**Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (Prevention and Control) Act, 2017**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1n-ev_Ed8qZYFkDuFwXrA3GLAmdFMuyUe/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1n-ev_Ed8qZYFkDuFwXrA3GLAmdFMuyUe/view?usp=sharing") [**Haj Committee Act, 2002**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_rss3BvJlQ4GrOwMcpxfeHBtM0-YjhK1/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_rss3BvJlQ4GrOwMcpxfeHBtM0-YjhK1/view?usp=sharing") **[Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1SroG44KgiRb6WH5LXhcv9QIU8JlyHWLN/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1SroG44KgiRb6WH5LXhcv9QIU8JlyHWLN/view?usp=sharing")** [**Hindu Marriage Act, 1955**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1d7DUXeCLTIbkTQrekVUWadGZDjcxk1lU/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1d7DUXeCLTIbkTQrekVUWadGZDjcxk1lU/view?usp=sharing") ## I [**Indira Gandhi National Tribal University Act, 2007**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1bl6u4bi_IdxBZqxS-cNR8p9hfaCm1pU6/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1bl6u4bi_IdxBZqxS-cNR8p9hfaCm1pU6/view?usp=sharing") [**Indian Institute of Petroleum and Energy Act, 2017**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_iQ58D0tHA3hMozMUuV3ltQEMiysTgwx/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_iQ58D0tHA3hMozMUuV3ltQEMiysTgwx/view?usp=sharing") [**Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/177Q00zq0XzHF3GB6GCLAz6PDZFOiEkC-/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/177Q00zq0XzHF3GB6GCLAz6PDZFOiEkC-/view?usp=sharing") [**Indian Institutes of Information Technology (Public-private Partnership) Act, 2017**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1tazrMtaQv79rCH6Vj0ZAIcF-eAT8sCMp/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1tazrMtaQv79rCH6Vj0ZAIcF-eAT8sCMp/view?usp=sharing") [**Integrated Goods and Services Tax (Extension to Jammu and Kashmir) Act, 2017**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1KkDdvW_Fk9DjFh6MYFQA4oeDkrFoGl5c/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1KkDdvW_Fk9DjFh6MYFQA4oeDkrFoGl5c/view?usp=sharing") [**Indian Institutes of Management Act, 2017**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lzztOVz-XUnTCKY8kb9a6PyUXyPx9kFx/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lzztOVz-XUnTCKY8kb9a6PyUXyPx9kFx/view?usp=sharing") [**Indian Institutes of Information Technology Act, 2014**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1M6BSY_OiPMOYiux7UxfJCPb7Vd1qdUo4/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1M6BSY_OiPMOYiux7UxfJCPb7Vd1qdUo4/view?usp=sharing") [**Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1shfwKWxJC2p66veFC5paUXyh533V2UDC/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1shfwKWxJC2p66veFC5paUXyh533V2UDC/view?usp=sharing") [**Industrial Development Bank (Transfer of Undertaking and Repeal) Act, 2003**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1J53AWX3KUgkLvNYPrfYqCcm610_mhoSi/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1J53AWX3KUgkLvNYPrfYqCcm610_mhoSi/view?usp=sharing") [**Indian Maritime University Act, 2008**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1vCuwS_Y8UsDUa6HulXP3wb0_vGWM_Ax5/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1vCuwS_Y8UsDUa6HulXP3wb0_vGWM_Ax5/view?usp=sharing") [**Indian Council of World Affairs Act, 2001**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Pji11jgrBS6g510fqJqpU721e2_glc3y/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Pji11jgrBS6g510fqJqpU721e2_glc3y/view?usp=sharing") [**Information Technology Act, 2000**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kqdGpTLf_FDxPyZcX0MkqcyV2eFX-T_E/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kqdGpTLf_FDxPyZcX0MkqcyV2eFX-T_E/view?usp=sharing") [**Immigration (Carriers Liability) Act, 2000**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1OaXbGOR2SYCn9W6Sm_w0hbTAz_oAPWOq/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1OaXbGOR2SYCn9W6Sm_w0hbTAz_oAPWOq/view?usp=sharing") [**Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority Act, 1999**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_NJdPJzDf_3r6WcerMssA-2HGeW-Dkh_/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_NJdPJzDf_3r6WcerMssA-2HGeW-Dkh_/view?usp=sharing") [**Institutes of Technology Act, 1961**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1bjp4pLpPYCRiiQJl3bC0P0Ov7zNCgV2B/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1bjp4pLpPYCRiiQJl3bC0P0Ov7zNCgV2B/view?usp=sharing") [**Income-tax Act, 1961**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1tGJ6mHyeOEjKML8IhlJuRAChS-JsKx1B/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1tGJ6mHyeOEjKML8IhlJuRAChS-JsKx1B/view?usp=sharing") [**Indian Statistical Institute Act, 1959**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1TPlMaU7ry5UKUHSvKN4WJz5sOYy5oiTX/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1TPlMaU7ry5UKUHSvKN4WJz5sOYy5oiTX/view?usp=sharing") [**Indian Nursing Council Act, 1947**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1iOd59TeHGClqSV2MuGtOLH-1NWcCwucy/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1iOd59TeHGClqSV2MuGtOLH-1NWcCwucy/view?usp=sharing") [**Indian Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1933**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wC9OMoCJ0XzmWnL4Appem9Lbpx_l_ppv/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wC9OMoCJ0XzmWnL4Appem9Lbpx_l_ppv/view?usp=sharing") [**Indian Partnership Act, 1932**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Yls6sBcFDZaKw7-pVJaOv-jly942uRyY/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Yls6sBcFDZaKw7-pVJaOv-jly942uRyY/view?usp=sharing") [**Indian Forest Act, 1927**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DhoK41hi21thD94x7KFKYtvULFu7NS1v/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DhoK41hi21thD94x7KFKYtvULFu7NS1v/view?usp=sharing") [**Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/15wp7qecPGr7yakQly1UHkHsIVxhS7gwX/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/15wp7qecPGr7yakQly1UHkHsIVxhS7gwX/view?usp=sharing") [**Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Tj2MaHrvrgV1ZZ0QWoRKoJBXqGmB3x21/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Tj2MaHrvrgV1ZZ0QWoRKoJBXqGmB3x21/view?usp=sharing") [**Indian Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1925**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Uc3bv7_2dEcZphbB9mNHM4Hip-ChdoQN/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Uc3bv7_2dEcZphbB9mNHM4Hip-ChdoQN/view?usp=sharing") [**Indian Succession Act, 1925**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/165Mi9D6QScllAxGAzeAnv5yGfqxnNonb/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/165Mi9D6QScllAxGAzeAnv5yGfqxnNonb/view?usp=sharing") [**Indian Naval Armament Act, 1923**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ErEAHBY3vbDRNvizxnuQzqY-UkXH6vSm/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ErEAHBY3vbDRNvizxnuQzqY-UkXH6vSm/view?usp=sharing") [**Indian Ports Act, 1908**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/128hvCckn487zPnccKFrUgJXrWG33eS5B/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/128hvCckn487zPnccKFrUgJXrWG33eS5B/view?usp=sharing") [**Indian Post Office Act, 1898**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lcdG-b2bJ8CfRJZeZzLwhAIQFLLp-OkN/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lcdG-b2bJ8CfRJZeZzLwhAIQFLLp-OkN/view?usp=sharing") [**Indian Easements Act, 1882**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/133gC2i2USQoVSU74jfKiA7IBp8qwrcyh/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/133gC2i2USQoVSU74jfKiA7IBp8qwrcyh/view?usp=sharing") [**Indian Trusts Act, 1882**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1eE1lR1k3a19g14JNFD6djiTaYZnWNUGm/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1eE1lR1k3a19g14JNFD6djiTaYZnWNUGm/view?usp=sharing") **[Indian Evidence Act, 1872](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1MW3pfcSUXgkgeerdGDRyysyFn79jsJIb/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1MW3pfcSUXgkgeerdGDRyysyFn79jsJIb/view?usp=sharing")** [**Indian Contract Act, 1872**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/10ruNEA4tM6bXw-HzZEiqOY6TA32eZFD7/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/10ruNEA4tM6bXw-HzZEiqOY6TA32eZFD7/view?usp=sharing") [**Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ufSj3T6pHLZGJPzDErRs-a2LEFmMevG9/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ufSj3T6pHLZGJPzDErRs-a2LEFmMevG9/view?usp=sharing") **[Indian Penal Code](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JctKdSZkgBKxonSrHMQ7kEa2A3bP_YMd/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JctKdSZkgBKxonSrHMQ7kEa2A3bP_YMd/view?usp=sharing")** [**Indian Bills of Lading Act, 1856**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1m2AWDRZid_eROdZ2jWUOuXWlQMTMHQMM/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1m2AWDRZid_eROdZ2jWUOuXWlQMTMHQMM/view?usp=sharing") ## J [**Jawaharlal Institute of Post-Graduate Medical Education and Research, Puducherry, Act 2008**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Vpepd45SBN9R7zWUASZ8z00NDTprNvlC/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Vpepd45SBN9R7zWUASZ8z00NDTprNvlC/view?usp=sharing") **[Judges (Protection) Act, 1985](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1OTDFxT0u6dptRrmqs7yQTfM4O-sNiWQE/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1OTDFxT0u6dptRrmqs7yQTfM4O-sNiWQE/view?usp=sharing")** [**Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1W9iDK_3_dht7GZz_X6ihTyFKKvQdami2/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1W9iDK_3_dht7GZz_X6ihTyFKKvQdami2/view?usp=sharing") [**Joint-Stock Companies, 1857**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HSjmjyI85SfOSoNBsjrArPTZQXzdL2k4/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HSjmjyI85SfOSoNBsjrArPTZQXzdL2k4/view?usp=sharing") ## L [**Land Improvement Loans Act, 1883**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Q_EMJwOzmbeE-hf1AOBQ6XcatmXp8DAU/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Q_EMJwOzmbeE-hf1AOBQ6XcatmXp8DAU/view?usp=sharing") [**Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wqWC1eJIBGs4WoNBl2wHWkwh8V68IwYS/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wqWC1eJIBGs4WoNBl2wHWkwh8V68IwYS/view?usp=sharing") [**Land Ports Authority of India Act, 2010**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1qw7-RI6UmJ_WN8SDwNN8_HoDgPWn5wqc/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1qw7-RI6UmJ_WN8SDwNN8_HoDgPWn5wqc/view?usp=sharing") [**Legal Metrology Act, 2009**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1PNZxG0gALXM1XCkswicqCHPuoKAhYi8X/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1PNZxG0gALXM1XCkswicqCHPuoKAhYi8X/view?usp=sharing") [**Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1YIZo0r34F1VvYwcxt9ki8b0qOl7mJjLr/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1YIZo0r34F1VvYwcxt9ki8b0qOl7mJjLr/view?usp=sharing") [**Leaders and Chief Whips of Recognised Parties and Groups in Parliament (Facilities) Act, 1998**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1aG_mAnVjCioJVlpUkzNFovycwP2jTIzy/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1aG_mAnVjCioJVlpUkzNFovycwP2jTIzy/view?usp=sharing") [**Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1pDfQ6QYg6mUN6u16RvfppEptoUOZ2BUJ/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1pDfQ6QYg6mUN6u16RvfppEptoUOZ2BUJ/view?usp=sharing") [**Leaders And Chief Whips of Recognised Parties And Groups in Parliament (Facilities) Amendment Act, 2000**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_k_6tV8YPvbavShASK3sqp4Ro8TY3Bpi/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_k_6tV8YPvbavShASK3sqp4Ro8TY3Bpi/view?usp=sharing") **[Legal Representatives Suits Act, 1855](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jDYFF-kqTq-XV8z_Qj8sdbOzNc-RVs--/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jDYFF-kqTq-XV8z_Qj8sdbOzNc-RVs--/view?usp=sharing")** [**Limitation Act, 1963**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DfFG0zTdGv6567rZSC5ZdezXo0SwB0Ot/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DfFG0zTdGv6567rZSC5ZdezXo0SwB0Ot/view?usp=sharing") ## M **[Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1QPC2oruvjbZRU02WT8CV3Gqnac9ZmvM1/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1QPC2oruvjbZRU02WT8CV3Gqnac9ZmvM1/view?usp=sharing")** **[Mental Healthcare Act, 2017](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kn_A46LCsGDozvWQTUUP6wCP3xM9ZgXK/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kn_A46LCsGDozvWQTUUP6wCP3xM9ZgXK/view?usp=sharing")** [**Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1qp90jdo2J-qrOrug3uXeJJlBL_-CDH5H/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1qp90jdo2J-qrOrug3uXeJJlBL_-CDH5H/view?usp=sharing") [**Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/16yNx0EcZihJUDbH61VNsU7gmDo3mEEYk/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/16yNx0EcZihJUDbH61VNsU7gmDo3mEEYk/view?usp=sharing") **[Manipur University Act, 2005](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ZzOkWMT4aauRVQqsQf5L6iqYgG7bIR5B/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ZzOkWMT4aauRVQqsQf5L6iqYgG7bIR5B/view?usp=sharing")** **[Municipal Taxation Act, 1881](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1GchlvslnTLXyn-nQ8tcX2oU9SEzUAVnZ/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1GchlvslnTLXyn-nQ8tcX2oU9SEzUAVnZ/view?usp=sharing")** **[Merchant Shipping Act, 1958](https://drive.google.com/file/d/15kLwQOjatq8x7k-Vwefii4z0UnhChOLz/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/15kLwQOjatq8x7k-Vwefii4z0UnhChOLz/view?usp=sharing")** [**Minimum Wages Act, 1948**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jFUaZC8tMH0ZBcPDtTWO2wED7X-qK661/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jFUaZC8tMH0ZBcPDtTWO2wED7X-qK661/view?usp=sharing") [**Mines Act, 1952**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/17oG3rVWsko53D_PIrPBaL1xSzr6yyOAw/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/17oG3rVWsko53D_PIrPBaL1xSzr6yyOAw/view?usp=sharing") [**Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1yB-vMj7EODbEW1fE9dCzQBjX7x2o_tjJ/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1yB-vMj7EODbEW1fE9dCzQBjX7x2o_tjJ/view?usp=sharing") [**Multi-State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DBJpRkdZPNPLX4AC1cwbYtKXGnDVh7FM/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DBJpRkdZPNPLX4AC1cwbYtKXGnDVh7FM/view?usp=sharing") [**Metro Railways (Operation and Maintenance) Act, 2002**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1N99zew6_K5DA7CVTjSY72CU2dXjTUqi7/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1N99zew6_K5DA7CVTjSY72CU2dXjTUqi7/view?usp=sharing") [**Mizoram University Act, 2000**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1GoBHDReOcbcKZiImk2afxsBJ2Sev4I19/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1GoBHDReOcbcKZiImk2afxsBJ2Sev4I19/view?usp=sharing") [**Madhya Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1YAzJJQjBh0gH8xndvE-0hUb-rssCRA1F/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1YAzJJQjBh0gH8xndvE-0hUb-rssCRA1F/view?usp=sharing") [**Multimodal Transportation of Goods Act, 1993**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Yw2cRg7M2Fe6imJSUtxXPxl3-5acbqs7/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Yw2cRg7M2Fe6imJSUtxXPxl3-5acbqs7/view?usp=sharing") [**Motor Vehicles Act, 1988**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Y3K65qAfo38nJsy61_W7HpRkgq8Tcg5y/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Y3K65qAfo38nJsy61_W7HpRkgq8Tcg5y/view?usp=sharing") [**Mental Health Act, 1987**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1RD9GqJW3tysBHaNMXIjulRCtv5D6jorh/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1RD9GqJW3tysBHaNMXIjulRCtv5D6jorh/view?usp=sharing") [**Maternity Benefit Act, 1961**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1g0WCatBDtT6MCgGBD0YPsNgE_YwL4Zyw/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1g0WCatBDtT6MCgGBD0YPsNgE_YwL4Zyw/view?usp=sharing") ## N [**Notaries Act, 1952**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1TavcSWp3evs2dYQyOTFEn-wXxjpnTAyt/view?usp=sharing) [**National Cadet Corps Act, 1948**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/10lCiOVU1Ba7ZKeKICnseDzoOW3iIprme/view?usp=sharing) **[New Delhi International Arbtration Centre Act, 2019](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HklB4x7VMFnqTfrCnMkIh7S3c9jn0wNR/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HklB4x7VMFnqTfrCnMkIh7S3c9jn0wNR/view?usp=sharing")** [**National Commission for Backward Classes (Repeal) Act, 2018**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DB7V-LUm7Gq2HaSzzclxS7M6_8v2Pehv/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DB7V-LUm7Gq2HaSzzclxS7M6_8v2Pehv/view?usp=sharing") [**National Sports University Act**, 2018](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1o1WffZay0bFhTVUJ8jbzLxnivYW1ob8i/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1o1WffZay0bFhTVUJ8jbzLxnivYW1ob8i/view?usp=sharing") [**National Waterways Act, 2016**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/16-0kv8JNviMbAIJEV2xvOIlCKtDPdybs/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/16-0kv8JNviMbAIJEV2xvOIlCKtDPdybs/view?usp=sharing") [**National Food Security Act, 2013**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1zqCixhA5msi50rzao7nSOU_TYpk_rAmM/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1zqCixhA5msi50rzao7nSOU_TYpk_rAmM/view?usp=sharing") **[National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1B36pp7pp9KcgS8n4gNTeboWx1QE6GF0X/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1B36pp7pp9KcgS8n4gNTeboWx1QE6GF0X/view?usp=sharing")** **[Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1D6ZbdkdlflhVjrJ1dX2in_lOoORJIZxV/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1D6ZbdkdlflhVjrJ1dX2in_lOoORJIZxV/view?usp=sharing")** [**National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro-Sciences, Bangalore Act, 2012**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/10HcXbWb4ZffIuum300vqFFS0pBxeXww5/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/10HcXbWb4ZffIuum300vqFFS0pBxeXww5/view?usp=sharing") [**National Capital Territory of Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Second Act, 2011**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_p48LO3WHxIomqEGLJW4ZH-k-7jYGAAS/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_p48LO3WHxIomqEGLJW4ZH-k-7jYGAAS/view?usp=sharing") [**National Capital Territory of Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Act, 2011**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1olkhwOUjBCLp-187FmOZnGCzTT6Me8e9/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1olkhwOUjBCLp-187FmOZnGCzTT6Me8e9/view?usp=sharing") [**Nalanda University Act, 2010**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/16m0Fbn-JUzRolVMMvlFY_Si4qWfn1ZlB/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/16m0Fbn-JUzRolVMMvlFY_Si4qWfn1ZlB/view?usp=sharing") [**National Green Tribunal Act, 2010**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/16fq8j4VSG_T8jtnPkAGisy2k5PgfFE_f/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/16fq8j4VSG_T8jtnPkAGisy2k5PgfFE_f/view?usp=sharing") [**National Capital Territory of Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Second Act, 2009**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1QhXZSmDqj_zEGTZNqooR82wthjL8g1vD/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1QhXZSmDqj_zEGTZNqooR82wthjL8g1vD/view?usp=sharing") [**National Capital Territory of Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Act, 2009**](http://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A2009-24_0.pdf) [**National Jute Board Act, 2008**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lTzzm_D6Gs4y10kTV3UcEa3phK1G3Ema/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lTzzm_D6Gs4y10kTV3UcEa3phK1G3Ema/view?usp=sharing") [**Nation Waterway (Kakinada-Puducherry Stretch of Canals and the Kaluvelly Tank, Bhadrachalam-Rajahmundry Stretch of River Dodavari and Wazirabad-Vijayawada Stretch of River Krishna) Act, 2008**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1hQ577WIKu4-QWdvB5Hhz3TmRC8KxzRHg/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1hQ577WIKu4-QWdvB5Hhz3TmRC8KxzRHg/view?usp=sharing") [**National Waterway (Talcher-Dhamra Stretch of Rivers, Geonkhali-Charbatia Stretch of East Coast Canal, Charbatia-Dhamra Stretch of Matai River and Mahanadi Delta Rivers) Act, 2008**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1i1nFUq9LBtDsiq1uLnmprz8T7C4QMIN9/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1i1nFUq9LBtDsiq1uLnmprz8T7C4QMIN9/view?usp=sharing") [**National Investigation Agency Act, 2008**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1rwIvdfwiI7McnDg4J7Hjt78ghzDcWjsm/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1rwIvdfwiI7McnDg4J7Hjt78ghzDcWjsm/view?usp=sharing") [**National Rural Employment Guarantee (Extension to Jammu and Kashmir) Act, 2007**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Y2GImRJdQuNx5w7IykznZXQqW0-oTiGI/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Y2GImRJdQuNx5w7IykznZXQqW0-oTiGI/view?usp=sharing") [**National Institutes of Technology, Science Education and Research Act, 2007**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1o9dp2L5DgqUoZz1xMa2V37OD2I7YAzeC/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1o9dp2L5DgqUoZz1xMa2V37OD2I7YAzeC/view?usp=sharing") [**National Capital Territory of Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Act, 2007**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1hQFdA7ef11AgonXN-pFegQct9Mre_LBi/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1hQFdA7ef11AgonXN-pFegQct9Mre_LBi/view?usp=sharing") [**National Institute of Fashion Technology Act, 2006**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/12xzq5-u81FH7ICGcnXgIdlJ-We8sJFez/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/12xzq5-u81FH7ICGcnXgIdlJ-We8sJFez/view?usp=sharing") [**National Commission for Minority Educational Institutes Act, 2004**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/12PFjIrqRfsOV5s_1zGIDntRjvhKl5DGx/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/12PFjIrqRfsOV5s_1zGIDntRjvhKl5DGx/view?usp=sharing") [**National Trust for Welfare of Persons with Autism, Cerebral Palsy, Mental Retardation and Multiple Disabilities Act, 1999**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1gxF1mvOuIICpchug_cdvuxoEIUCg9T6o/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1gxF1mvOuIICpchug_cdvuxoEIUCg9T6o/view?usp=sharing") [**National Institute of Pharmaceutical Education and Research Act, 1998**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1w1kD3Fpd4WlODMXsMH_lRGFLh1XE5Cmd/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1w1kD3Fpd4WlODMXsMH_lRGFLh1XE5Cmd/view?usp=sharing") **[National Environment Appellate Authority Act, 1997](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1uNlwH5M6YzRNwfHj9gj2njf8Gwo1opZv/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1uNlwH5M6YzRNwfHj9gj2njf8Gwo1opZv/view?usp=sharing")** [**National Commission for Backward Classes Act, 1993**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1SxmJ3FQW6ybudXVw5zw8TS2FliAQescY/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1SxmJ3FQW6ybudXVw5zw8TS2FliAQescY/view?usp=sharing") [**National Commission for Minorities Act, 1992**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HJYVeezPg7Zcvn8CKU31dsSq-zWCsX9G/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HJYVeezPg7Zcvn8CKU31dsSq-zWCsX9G/view?usp=sharing") [**National Commission for Women Act, 1990**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1qTApGMXpSOTCRmqCuWGSrt5WzpkCrinS/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1qTApGMXpSOTCRmqCuWGSrt5WzpkCrinS/view?usp=sharing") [**National Highways Act, 1956**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/10cFOWnBnHAm8i-SMpDhnuLB8euIzy1Pv/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/10cFOWnBnHAm8i-SMpDhnuLB8euIzy1Pv/view?usp=sharing") ## O **[Official Secrets Act, 1923](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1E5pD9Hp8YqzaG6YvQECg4zNdssZg6btQ/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1E5pD9Hp8YqzaG6YvQECg4zNdssZg6btQ/view?usp=sharing")** **[Obstructions in Fairways Act, 1881](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1z3lwzjR-bMLMU6KBy3xONFH3xhe1sjdJ/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1z3lwzjR-bMLMU6KBy3xONFH3xhe1sjdJ/view?usp=sharing")** **[Oriental Gas Company Act, 1857](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1V0egT3zkoanr4Me5LuPv4pneywA0MHZE/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1V0egT3zkoanr4Me5LuPv4pneywA0MHZE/view?usp=sharing")** **[Orissa (Alteration of Name) Act, 2011](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1n8iqyKTsSnxuw9UCAgp-18dtbt9dFSXt/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1n8iqyKTsSnxuw9UCAgp-18dtbt9dFSXt/view?usp=sharing")** **[Offshore Areas Mineral (Development and Regulation) Act, 2002](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ycvQZSQWkLBNdPf1rI34gbtVf0i6UER4/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ycvQZSQWkLBNdPf1rI34gbtVf0i6UER4/view?usp=sharing")** **[Official Languages Act, 1963](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lxdT6MZzXZFiIaztwDPo5GCVMwMF0oeB/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lxdT6MZzXZFiIaztwDPo5GCVMwMF0oeB/view?usp=sharing")** ## P **[THE PUBLIC LIABILITY INSURANCE ACT, 1991](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1oi_lhQ7ANSEhCaI7poy0U5V8BlFUaw_6/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1oi_lhQ7ANSEhCaI7poy0U5V8BlFUaw_6/view?usp=sharing")** [**Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority Act, 2013**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1KlabmB02gFmrGdDFY69oP0TerJSNO8f-/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1KlabmB02gFmrGdDFY69oP0TerJSNO8f-/view?usp=sharing") [**Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1YLmqAiR-kEn451dUVjso1nzNhkHf2Dm5/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1YLmqAiR-kEn451dUVjso1nzNhkHf2Dm5/view?usp=sharing") [**Prisoners Act, 1900**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1CVWDaXWHkYdleF7GiWe39zRHts3TxJXE/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1CVWDaXWHkYdleF7GiWe39zRHts3TxJXE/view?usp=sharing") [**Panjab District Boards Act, 1883**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1QnfsE0R0N_QvPMh_Q96DEcS-ZvmhW2Nz/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1QnfsE0R0N_QvPMh_Q96DEcS-ZvmhW2Nz/view?usp=sharing") [**Powers-of-Attorney Act, 1882**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1WZmP0lSU6od4DS7YiMwB_Nh4nmn0_lig/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1WZmP0lSU6od4DS7YiMwB_Nh4nmn0_lig/view?usp=sharing") [**Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1FYoyvMbXXJQ11ftlBpzg-PI5EGCx40P_/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1FYoyvMbXXJQ11ftlBpzg-PI5EGCx40P_/view?usp=sharing") [**Pensions Act, 1871**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_Mzo4dRbNOmsxHhvWy31XDJh398hZek6/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_Mzo4dRbNOmsxHhvWy31XDJh398hZek6/view?usp=sharing") **[Probation of Offenders Act, 1958](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jEPHYqM3OX3HZ5lkzdnOw4WDrb856vHR/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jEPHYqM3OX3HZ5lkzdnOw4WDrb856vHR/view?usp=sharing")** [**Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1SzkXorbaIAGB2m_vYZDuc36gwusMMq2v/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1SzkXorbaIAGB2m_vYZDuc36gwusMMq2v/view?usp=sharing") [**Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1g5aC3crvkFoT61ZRKoXEGkSnyQUKZQI0/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1g5aC3crvkFoT61ZRKoXEGkSnyQUKZQI0/view?usp=sharing") [**Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1YbJ0hwCwklqE-94ijyWz56edAxl99nHw/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1YbJ0hwCwklqE-94ijyWz56edAxl99nHw/view?usp=sharing") [**Pharmacy Act, 1948**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1rO6cHOKo88kqplexAIhWs4d4jzRRpyuM/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1rO6cHOKo88kqplexAIhWs4d4jzRRpyuM/view?usp=sharing") [**Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/17NSbR5vn8n2QWTN9z5Fgi0fWlL7bVWIX/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/17NSbR5vn8n2QWTN9z5Fgi0fWlL7bVWIX/view?usp=sharing") [**Payment of Wages Act, 1936**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ad5qmh6ORb9Rg2vBzEi1h64HbyTnqXtv/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ad5qmh6ORb9Rg2vBzEi1h64HbyTnqXtv/view?usp=sharing") [**Petroleum Act, 1934**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/19Y9Poh595_v2YUjJGoRwvWeTj6jg_gHW/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/19Y9Poh595_v2YUjJGoRwvWeTj6jg_gHW/view?usp=sharing") [**Provident Funds Act, 1925**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Kr1pFMV195fl5qjXQghrmqWi6uM9rx9v/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Kr1pFMV195fl5qjXQghrmqWi6uM9rx9v/view?usp=sharing") [**Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers and their Rehabilitation Act, 2013**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Rjz2ymN4zEoqWeX7T_VKKIdKHi0pBJPq/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Rjz2ymN4zEoqWeX7T_VKKIdKHi0pBJPq/view?usp=sharing") [**Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Holo4dkrVDQiy2l2KK__wtKhzNlrW_nA/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Holo4dkrVDQiy2l2KK__wtKhzNlrW_nA/view?usp=sharing") [**Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jVBXFzqYfqL05fzSV8r2qT54I-AW8czL/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jVBXFzqYfqL05fzSV8r2qT54I-AW8czL/view?usp=sharing") [**Produce Cess Laws (Abolition) Act, 2006**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1rB7E2fCCexgRsfnMYN1sfJ0FDDqn2SSk/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1rB7E2fCCexgRsfnMYN1sfJ0FDDqn2SSk/view?usp=sharing") [**Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act, 2006**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1RAMUKk1g6KxC9nbwwM6CvBE85y9Rinr4/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1RAMUKk1g6KxC9nbwwM6CvBE85y9Rinr4/view?usp=sharing") [**Pondicherry (Alteration of Name) Act, 2006**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1q-uuGqZBCUolMGbZffjpSg6YahMcVL_N/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1q-uuGqZBCUolMGbZffjpSg6YahMcVL_N/view?usp=sharing") [**Private Security Agencies (Regulation) Act, 2005**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1nFPRwSKhCuNrD5ZMSmYarN0CxGgR5i_l/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1nFPRwSKhCuNrD5ZMSmYarN0CxGgR5i_l/view?usp=sharing") [**Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/10sUrZ2tWrrKGYgQYCm7IqoMD8OQ3awSx/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/10sUrZ2tWrrKGYgQYCm7IqoMD8OQ3awSx/view?usp=sharing") [**Prevention of Terrorism (Repeal) Act, 2004**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1f7xRnODnx4VIE24AQts-6ZDIls7oH7dB/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1f7xRnODnx4VIE24AQts-6ZDIls7oH7dB/view?usp=sharing") [**Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/14gngwpeNHh8lmUdA5yfxok1AdaXi6CT1/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/14gngwpeNHh8lmUdA5yfxok1AdaXi6CT1/view?usp=sharing") **[Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers Rights Act, 2001](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1RbrwzNH_IY_NH5CY8ceLzq1fJcgEGQ_q/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1RbrwzNH_IY_NH5CY8ceLzq1fJcgEGQ_q/view?usp=sharing")** [**Provisions of the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1NO7i_8SquvtlPMdLcQlcOauaYM3McO0F/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1NO7i_8SquvtlPMdLcQlcOauaYM3McO0F/view?usp=sharing") [**Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HwV5640Cr5YFtTm4q83_Y_8BOOBjuIHt/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HwV5640Cr5YFtTm4q83_Y_8BOOBjuIHt/view?usp=sharing") [**Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ZIHQIZg4hdkLmKG3XvRPahAczK4zYH4D/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ZIHQIZg4hdkLmKG3XvRPahAczK4zYH4D/view?usp=sharing") [**Public Records Act, 1993**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1J3sx2_7gJmB4pM7UVD_YfyeMTXM-sin8/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1J3sx2_7gJmB4pM7UVD_YfyeMTXM-sin8/view?usp=sharing") [**Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1prDVM4KEAB9A1zykpWjfojwBFKCwSAL0/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1prDVM4KEAB9A1zykpWjfojwBFKCwSAL0/view?usp=sharing") [**Patents Act, 1970**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mubU74n1BF3Ghe4JGDPUAoyY5-lod_da/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mubU74n1BF3Ghe4JGDPUAoyY5-lod_da/view?usp=sharing") [**Pondicherry (Administration) Act, 1962**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1m09GCbZEh86V624Pg2mz7AXetsXt9EtU/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1m09GCbZEh86V624Pg2mz7AXetsXt9EtU/view?usp=sharing") **[Prevention and Control of Infectious and Contagious Diseases in Animals Act, 2009](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1FSbtxIohLiglIhEXLop_y-O6jpwf_FXc/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1FSbtxIohLiglIhEXLop_y-O6jpwf_FXc/view?usp=sharing")** [**Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HZHdsnP1yXqIdaqVJehOIMwGOWOX2C0r/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HZHdsnP1yXqIdaqVJehOIMwGOWOX2C0r/view?usp=sharing") ## R [**Rajiv Gandhi Institute of Petroleum Technology Act, 2007**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1xgvjdgCmNpSsaKj8HCiqNEA9r0iH8y3K/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1xgvjdgCmNpSsaKj8HCiqNEA9r0iH8y3K/view?usp=sharing") [**Rajiv Gandhi University Act, 2006**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1xILpqve982zkrL0iyZO0pb6H-C6e1sXx/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1xILpqve982zkrL0iyZO0pb6H-C6e1sXx/view?usp=sharing") [**Right of Information Act, 2005**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1PDGaa2cPjcy-svZ2Ghhj9unwSONmwK-5/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1PDGaa2cPjcy-svZ2Ghhj9unwSONmwK-5/view?usp=sharing") [**Repatriation of Prisoners Act, 2003**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1dgJk2hvIWeM42GPRtQEFA4TNFHZh7lSy/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1dgJk2hvIWeM42GPRtQEFA4TNFHZh7lSy/view?usp=sharing") [**Rehabilitation Council of India Act, 1992**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1evxJX6rRRtYBJDSa8N2x4uAb-JiQtiRA/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1evxJX6rRRtYBJDSa8N2x4uAb-JiQtiRA/view?usp=sharing") [**Railways Act, 1989**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1dFvA9VCga5EbHjepzzZziMRLK11Bwnlb/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1dFvA9VCga5EbHjepzzZziMRLK11Bwnlb/view?usp=sharing") [**Religious Societies Act, 1880**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1bn_TWi9XWDNuegJ0fvFj419BJZQ1cC4p/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1bn_TWi9XWDNuegJ0fvFj419BJZQ1cC4p/view?usp=sharing") [**Repealing and Amending Act, 2017**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1j0xvCqfC8vH7efmVF8L6DkLzJbag5_Bq/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1j0xvCqfC8vH7efmVF8L6DkLzJbag5_Bq/view?usp=sharing") [**Repealing and Amending (Second) Act, 2017**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/11UhWa9M14isH_4nDF77IuuQeQ2Br0MbP/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/11UhWa9M14isH_4nDF77IuuQeQ2Br0MbP/view?usp=sharing") [**Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1o_YhnzLyMJnehB0E5Zw-kea7O4Te4EJ0/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1o_YhnzLyMJnehB0E5Zw-kea7O4Te4EJ0/view?usp=sharing") [**Rajiv Gandhi National Aviation University Act, 2013**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1VhUGKMiwjFv6BnMXZHQcbWGhMuUv5V2A/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1VhUGKMiwjFv6BnMXZHQcbWGhMuUv5V2A/view?usp=sharing") [**Rajiv Gandhi National Institute of Youth Development Act, 2012**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1MKX49aCKqRp0bvltTEcjFmrw5JaWxqhp/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1MKX49aCKqRp0bvltTEcjFmrw5JaWxqhp/view?usp=sharing") [**Registration Act, 1908**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1gDBtigx5dpwFFJ5DGmSgPlvu7K7J4Y6H/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1gDBtigx5dpwFFJ5DGmSgPlvu7K7J4Y6H/view?usp=sharing") [**Railway Protection Force Act, 1957**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/16wnmHb93XS0Juud9Slimr9xC4KWe20m2/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/16wnmHb93XS0Juud9Slimr9xC4KWe20m2/view?usp=sharing") [**River Boards Act, 1956**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/13wwqzp2DSYfNqjMUIpHPQBVRbaG_PtQt/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/13wwqzp2DSYfNqjMUIpHPQBVRbaG_PtQt/view?usp=sharing") [**Reserve Bank (Transfer to Public Ownership) Act, 1948**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1hq6sarR1QN2a9Xd7CMz3UGmEKkx5xt7x/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1hq6sarR1QN2a9Xd7CMz3UGmEKkx5xt7x/view?usp=sharing") [**Regional Centre for Biotechnology Act, 2016**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ZQZOFk21kSI9qCZCtRqfWnwwDMBcI5_G/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ZQZOFk21kSI9qCZCtRqfWnwwDMBcI5_G/view?usp=sharing") [**Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016**](http://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A2016-16_0.pdf) [**Rani Lakshmi Bai Central Agricultural University Act, 2014**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1nj5g7ziorQC_xpGX6VYNb5B-kPu3bFH0/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1nj5g7ziorQC_xpGX6VYNb5B-kPu3bFH0/view?usp=sharing") [**Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/12qNm4NUjvht_fReiYoBnROi_3Jo8gGhV/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/12qNm4NUjvht_fReiYoBnROi_3Jo8gGhV/view?usp=sharing") ## S [**Specified Bank Notes (Cessation of Liabilties) Act, 2017**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Wc3tcTUeq5mZaFLFl0db4yTAIQtA0TMO/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Wc3tcTUeq5mZaFLFl0db4yTAIQtA0TMO/view?usp=sharing") [**Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1El-REAIlXkFs7mwf6LISxnNX6HimpUhj/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1El-REAIlXkFs7mwf6LISxnNX6HimpUhj/view?usp=sharing") [**School of Planning and Architecture Act, 2014**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/15IBJvaSedRTVWGveab4RsHL1d4wieDkG/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/15IBJvaSedRTVWGveab4RsHL1d4wieDkG/view?usp=sharing") [**Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/19O9H1AzwHP0nNXqLzvrqY0gvB5s5keRE/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/19O9H1AzwHP0nNXqLzvrqY0gvB5s5keRE/view?usp=sharing") **[Societies Registration Act, 1860](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1XHH5BHUqrqyKbNVIvE1dBwqYmAbu5G5P/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1XHH5BHUqrqyKbNVIvE1dBwqYmAbu5G5P/view?usp=sharing")** [**State Bank of India Act, 1955**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1NE40GgA92Js8i-tjgyHmh27wkiBkoKiC/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1NE40GgA92Js8i-tjgyHmh27wkiBkoKiC/view?usp=sharing") **[Special Marriage Act, 1954](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1emGnVg4O3JoEsV5rc8_d1UulKIHegFjJ/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1emGnVg4O3JoEsV5rc8_d1UulKIHegFjJ/view?usp=sharing")** [**Salt Cess Act, 1953**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1YHS1AcJwG6r9olLiC2WBwPxIdNhwUUvN/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1YHS1AcJwG6r9olLiC2WBwPxIdNhwUUvN/view?usp=sharing") **[Seaward Artillery Practice Act, 1949](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LjLyzkJcqRFYiEQfkKWH9rrmBNNFFHK5/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LjLyzkJcqRFYiEQfkKWH9rrmBNNFFHK5/view?usp=sharing")** [**Sugarcane Act, 1934**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1XzNW64P78IV71qr8gXIt9wVjI3ivPEV5/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1XzNW64P78IV71qr8gXIt9wVjI3ivPEV5/view?usp=sharing") [**Sale of Goods Act, 1930**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1yhYx52Dia3fMiO2VR5iS7LFEa4RQAYrA/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1yhYx52Dia3fMiO2VR5iS7LFEa4RQAYrA/view?usp=sharing") [**Science and Engineering Research Board Act, 2008**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mqSPa98RwZXTQt_r1-ncfxfemj6QbMRK/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mqSPa98RwZXTQt_r1-ncfxfemj6QbMRK/view?usp=sharing") [**South Asian University Act, 2008**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/110YCBcnYzOmJ_GHXsWbg_7FDc6l9k63R/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/110YCBcnYzOmJ_GHXsWbg_7FDc6l9k63R/view?usp=sharing") [**Sports Broadcasting Signals (Mandatory Sharing with Prasar Bharati) Act, 2007**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1gSdWPfJigjYiauwodiuyT4oVKC325gBg/view?usp=sharing) **[Sashastra Seema Bal Act, 2007](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1EiMxizBpcFGsbzre01EHB-FfXNFyHr1W/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1EiMxizBpcFGsbzre01EHB-FfXNFyHr1W/view?usp=sharing")** [**Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Wn9YOoE5iPVHlGZ_HkXMBERK9pqXlnNh/view?usp=sharing) [**Sikkim University Act, 2006**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1UKQpyJRpzxU9GtwGReVgJqBZuwOCQaYo/view?usp=sharing) [**State Emblem of India (Prohibition of Improper Use) Act, 2005**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Kb4Ei-Jwl4Wo3da9G6hNKA9aB_791UEI/view?usp=sharing) [**Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Repeal Act, 2003**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1A8gNKGq7Os1Vzx4YoPdPuaMzOT9mJoA_/view?usp=sharing) **[Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1uPRIVKXKJfcMrvJrdbjP8RIfFqafwoW4/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1uPRIVKXKJfcMrvJrdbjP8RIfFqafwoW4/view?usp=sharing")** [**Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Safety of Maritime Navigation and Fixed Platforms on Continental Shelf Act, 2002**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/16DPgyUodHrFNuiUHtwu8yrkOi3XGR4r_/view?usp=sharing) [**Semiconductor Integrated Circuits Layout-Design Act, 2000**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DJiOcx0F0GbckY_a72OtyStSe7htC3oQ/view?usp=sharing) [**SAARC Convention (Suppression of Terrorism) Act, 1993**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/14Xj_0mxI_jiQpJnP0zaEZOHyZf-4PRoe/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/14Xj_0mxI_jiQpJnP0zaEZOHyZf-4PRoe/view?usp=sharing") [**Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/19p4b2j88VjXdT3djLl-5Cea4lzxJzu-y/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/19p4b2j88VjXdT3djLl-5Cea4lzxJzu-y/view?usp=sharing") [**Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LczbfCWtvoGXv7Ww7SEZOaQyxENCiSjQ/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LczbfCWtvoGXv7Ww7SEZOaQyxENCiSjQ/view?usp=sharing") [**Sugar Cess Act, 1982**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/14OKTpxnvvXASp84oU2IGjPSjCHs12DhE/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/14OKTpxnvvXASp84oU2IGjPSjCHs12DhE/view?usp=sharing") [**State of Nagaland Act, 1962**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1IGQ98aMVj8vsQVJFoxaYKuc8V4jsrPRM/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1IGQ98aMVj8vsQVJFoxaYKuc8V4jsrPRM/view?usp=sharing") [**Special Economic Zones Act, 2005**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1UvN-PsgtqW5sweeGfn0ozG4anhbkz1Ic/view?usp=sharing) **[Specific Relief Act, 1963](https://drive.google.com/file/d/18u9bc5-ZGmTpOjlmujQoSMI-hiE7uDiT/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/18u9bc5-ZGmTpOjlmujQoSMI-hiE7uDiT/view?usp=sharing")** ## T **[Transfer of Property Act, 1882](https://drive.google.com/file/d/10ALaRtrzXHazCiu7mNG5sVDjdc7QLKCF/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/10ALaRtrzXHazCiu7mNG5sVDjdc7QLKCF/view?usp=sharing")** [**Tea Act, 1953**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1e-Emw4nxMVp0_aMM0B_DqVPd1eTjmyLW/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1e-Emw4nxMVp0_aMM0B_DqVPd1eTjmyLW/view?usp=sharing") [**Territorial Army Act, 1948**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lsLzlgIebeEMhciyNdvoXZ3_ARByiRsP/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lsLzlgIebeEMhciyNdvoXZ3_ARByiRsP/view?usp=sharing") [**Trade Unions Act, 1926**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1sgz4couV9v4cz3UCk8KOoOV_9THW_-2g/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1sgz4couV9v4cz3UCk8KOoOV_9THW_-2g/view?usp=sharing") **[Tamil Nadu Legislative Council Act, 2010](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wbPMZXYQWE5ngTlHFakK4Or9G67v-KcI/view?usp=sharing "http://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A2010-16_0.pdf")** [**Tyre Corporation of India Limited (Disinvestment of Ownership) Act, 2007**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kzFfavWWO7hM2mLDiqieMxRidNrS8FC4/view?usp=sharing) [**Tripura University Act, 2006**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1N0kMoFtPMplnSshE4t40qkMY00UNUtWq/view?usp=sharing) [**Trade Marks Act, 1999**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1IZ9X15AddoPqzLA_AoekAlXkusVAzFT_/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1IZ9X15AddoPqzLA_AoekAlXkusVAzFT_/view?usp=sharing") [**Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1995**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1yjWNs6983tZL4LJBj0zDKoiOmauiQjbE/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1yjWNs6983tZL4LJBj0zDKoiOmauiQjbE/view?usp=sharing") [**Technology Development Board Act, 1995**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1na_VSUdr9bPVpuUCkwQvixgPsw3df7SR/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1na_VSUdr9bPVpuUCkwQvixgPsw3df7SR/view?usp=sharing") ## U [**Unorganised Workers Social Security Act, 2008**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1HPHIMkn25r4lRri8TwfVJKdD61_-TSMX/view?usp=sharing) [**Uttaranchal (Alteration of Name) Act, 2006**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/13d3q9DrcHBdByB94alZRhBawGOp8xKrU/view?usp=sharing) [**Union Duties of Excise (Electricity) Distribution Repeal Act, 2006**](http://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A2006-30_1.pdf) [**University of Allahabad Act, 2005**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1C98MzhFKkZpO78GGaczQYjD5RvuAnyRf/view?usp=sharing) [**Unit Trust of India (Transfer of Undertaking and Repeal) Act, 2002**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/173iCCq9ybkqSKWUrCO_T2eX9KPiIMtwK/view?usp=sharing) **[Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2000](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1n9Jm2MKJhxhLhVA7QspMwpVHT3-em-Sa/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1n9Jm2MKJhxhLhVA7QspMwpVHT3-em-Sa/view?usp=sharing")** **[Union Territory Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1XR8CQo-5SB9dDgViPQhIqvuxyu0SU1d8/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1XR8CQo-5SB9dDgViPQhIqvuxyu0SU1d8/view?usp=sharing")** ## W [WATER (PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF POLLUTION) CESS ACT, 1977](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1BijTPuM7p1lGIkwAAW1SVuVFlk72Ejkd/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1BijTPuM7p1lGIkwAAW1SVuVFlk72Ejkd/view?usp=sharing") [WATER (PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF POLLUTION) ACT, 1974](https://drive.google.com/file/d/18BTi8_irPTB67EAX-tv87I4IV2ajH5j7/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/18BTi8_irPTB67EAX-tv87I4IV2ajH5j7/view?usp=sharing") [**Warehousing (Development and Regulation) Act, 2007**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/12KQax9NlENvXBEiRmRBTp6V2FquhWaFn/view?usp=sharing) [**Working Journalists (Fixation of Rates of Wages) Act, 1958**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kG8EVL-psbtB7DRFenw3BwV6ferlpPMb/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kG8EVL-psbtB7DRFenw3BwV6ferlpPMb/view?usp=sharing") [**Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2014**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1usbcta5uc4AnBPi_g-nQ2qAMpKdofgrT/view?usp=sharing) [**Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act, 2005**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1AzisuMJhfhUjVaJcembkDwD0fCA5TG2i/view?usp=sharing) [**Waqf Act, 1995**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1eG0jTj09pJgqmkQ6Rjp1lbu0jJaPIJrc/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1eG0jTj09pJgqmkQ6Rjp1lbu0jJaPIJrc/view?usp=sharing") [**Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kJEjGGviR4rkpOr9zTR15_PNct5nrF3t/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kJEjGGviR4rkpOr9zTR15_PNct5nrF3t/view?usp=sharing") --- ### [PUBLISHING AGREEMENT CUM DECLARATION](https://lawfoyer.in/publishing-agreement-cum-declaration-2/) **Published:** March 13, 2021 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** **THIS AGREEMENT (hereinafter called the Agreement) is made in the year 2021, between LawFoyer (hereinafter called the “Publisher”) and** \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ **(hereinafter called the “Author”) and \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ (hereinafter called “Co-Author”).** **WHEREAS the Author desires the Publisher to publish the Author’s work titled** **\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_, (hereinafter called the “Work”), and Publisher desires to publish the Work;** NOW THEREFORE in consideration of the promises hereinafter set forth and for valuable consideration, receipt whereof is acknowledged, the parties agree as follows: ### Grant of Publishing Rights 1. The Author hereby grants and assigns to the Publisher, its successors, representatives, and assigns, the sole and exclusive right to publish (i.e., print, publish, and sell) the Work in the English language in all forms during the full term of copyright and any renewals and extensions thereof, except as provided herein. 2. The Publisher shall have the sole and exclusive right to publish or to license the Work for publication in the English language or in any other language in India and in any other foreign country, except as provided herein. 3. The Author shall execute and deliver to the Publisher any and all documents which the Publisher reasonably deems necessary or appropriate to evidence or effectuate the rights granted in this Agreement. 4. 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Place: Date: --- ### [Environmental Law Bare Acts](https://lawfoyer.in/environmental-law-bare-acts/) **Published:** February 9, 2021 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** - [Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Nwfqmfw_VWcmCca2Prz1LDLvjaF2UDhZ/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Nwfqmfw_VWcmCca2Prz1LDLvjaF2UDhZ/view?usp=sharing") \[As Amended Upto Date in 1987\] - [Biological Diversity Act, 2002](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1utjBcsR6bsX5RDBwiSEeNxNkWfj-EEz9/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1utjBcsR6bsX5RDBwiSEeNxNkWfj-EEz9/view?usp=sharing") - [The Compensatory Afforestation Fund Act, 2016.](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1UAjVpsDH3sbv8CtrlXgDvNgPohgcVIHk/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1UAjVpsDH3sbv8CtrlXgDvNgPohgcVIHk/view?usp=sharing") - [Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 \[EPA\]](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mQAfiXlcryxBdiPIZGHqUVunEp1Xed3i/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mQAfiXlcryxBdiPIZGHqUVunEp1Xed3i/view?usp=sharing") - [Factories Act, 1948](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1gPSMbx2aK0xyXvyCpxfc7U5fh0duIly2/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1gPSMbx2aK0xyXvyCpxfc7U5fh0duIly2/view?usp=sharing"). - [Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980](https://drive.google.com/file/d/14Ah_ItMTgPrpqiYOfRS36FFnabxVuVSV/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/14Ah_ItMTgPrpqiYOfRS36FFnabxVuVSV/view?usp=sharing"). - [Forest (Conservation) Rules, ](https://drive.google.com/file/d/13Gw3Dd-HZ2z_u9hzpMI4BBsi4HpUhvMH/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/13Gw3Dd-HZ2z_u9hzpMI4BBsi4HpUhvMH/view?usp=sharing")2003 - [Indian Easement Act, 1882](https://drive.google.com/file/d/133gC2i2USQoVSU74jfKiA7IBp8qwrcyh/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/133gC2i2USQoVSU74jfKiA7IBp8qwrcyh/view?usp=sharing"). - [Indian Forest Act, 1927](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DhoK41hi21thD94x7KFKYtvULFu7NS1v/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DhoK41hi21thD94x7KFKYtvULFu7NS1v/view?usp=sharing"). - [National Environment Appellate Authority Act, 1997](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1uNlwH5M6YzRNwfHj9gj2njf8Gwo1opZv/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1uNlwH5M6YzRNwfHj9gj2njf8Gwo1opZv/view?usp=sharing") - [National Green Tribunal Act, 2010](https://drive.google.com/file/d/16fq8j4VSG_T8jtnPkAGisy2k5PgfFE_f/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/16fq8j4VSG_T8jtnPkAGisy2k5PgfFE_f/view?usp=sharing") - [Noise Pollution (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2000](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1udum6KwrGq44GQj3BcwXU3qbxALGyJ3v/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1udum6KwrGq44GQj3BcwXU3qbxALGyJ3v/view?usp=sharing") - [Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1oi_lhQ7ANSEhCaI7poy0U5V8BlFUaw_6/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1oi_lhQ7ANSEhCaI7poy0U5V8BlFUaw_6/view?usp=sharing") - [WATER (PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF POLLUTION) ACT, 1974](https://drive.google.com/file/d/18BTi8_irPTB67EAX-tv87I4IV2ajH5j7/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/18BTi8_irPTB67EAX-tv87I4IV2ajH5j7/view?usp=sharing") - [Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1BijTPuM7p1lGIkwAAW1SVuVFlk72Ejkd/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1BijTPuM7p1lGIkwAAW1SVuVFlk72Ejkd/view?usp=sharing"). - [Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kJEjGGviR4rkpOr9zTR15_PNct5nrF3t/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kJEjGGviR4rkpOr9zTR15_PNct5nrF3t/view?usp=sharing"). - [Wild Life (Protection) Rules, 1995](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1UNSpaAWeHY0C9vGwhHWwpz7-Wyw8Q4yd/view?usp=sharing "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1UNSpaAWeHY0C9vGwhHWwpz7-Wyw8Q4yd/view?usp=sharing") --- ### [Landmark Judgements of Supreme Court Of India](https://lawfoyer.in/landmark-judgements-of-supreme-court-of-india/) **Published:** January 17, 2021 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** - [(2015) 7 Supreme Court Cases 681 \[ State of M.P. v. Madanlal \]](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1njqx5-Qn464W-hIT7dl5__2MHOVAkFNC/view?usp=sharing) - [(2015) 1 Supreme Court Cases 192 \[Charu Kurana v. Union of India\]](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1GfMIqPYpYhuJT7NoHWwlrjsn8PuHdd9G/view?usp=sharing) - [(2014) 7 Supreme Court Cases 640 \[Malathi Ravi v. B.V. Ravi\]](https://drive.google.com/file/d/14Czj6mZuL_eDCgWqPXuR0smUxy8qWFYS/view?usp=sharing) - [(2013) 7 Supreme Court Cases 77 \[Shyam Narain v. The State of NCT of Delhi\]](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1a32nl2hrlde3CDJASzil-dWRZXoToTfQ/view?usp=sharing) - [(2014) 12 Supreme Court Cases 636 \[Shamim Bano v. Asraf Khan\]](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kL-mL4NzZfjxkaO-_dNpBwnFLtSrTBgA/view?usp=sharing) - [(2013) 4 Supreme Court Cases 1 \[Voluntary Health Association of Punjab v. Union of India\]](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1EwE_tCEfeRUcdqXDzzygVjJoeY7SKoIR/view?usp=sharing) - [(2015) 9 Supreme Court Cases 740 \[Voluntary Health Association of Punjab v. Union of India\]](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1BY_He_7r2CL8pSOgFI6zDeyEwIc59zkd/view?usp=sharing) - [(2014) 16 Supreme Court Cases 433 \[Voluntary Health Association of Punjab v. Union of India\]](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1s7FiQV-6G-KnfYZuW79MLud3aoPrAmfp/view?usp=sharing) - [(2014) 9 Supreme Court Cases 1 \[Manoj Narula v. Union of India\]](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JfP5aTjv7f_uh8qF3vGTHW4JzhqCu5fk/view?usp=sharing) - [(2012) 8 Supreme Court Cases 1 \[Mehmood Nayyar Azam v. State of Chhattisgarh\]](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1inrPGvzA6AIbpQmeGKzNM1gJfhysWBxC/view?usp=sharing) - [(2013) 4 Supreme Court Cases 244 \[Sooguru Subrahmanyam v. State of A.P.\]](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_tvStfFtZuE2RdDBQaJg6m0krljPP5yV/view?usp=sharing) - [(2012) 12 Supreme Court Cases 274 \[K. Suresh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.\]](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1QBVHWuG1ongsvkPKwEMM38EHI4fS1ogw/view?usp=sharing) - [(2015) 5 Supreme Court Cases 705 \[Shamima Farooqui v. Shahid Khan\]](https://drive.google.com/file/d/15v8yTcYLz1tHositG3McbxJQ3EMNYYJK/view?usp=sharing) - [(2015) 4 Supreme Court Cases 1 \[ K.P. Manu v. Chairman, Scrutiny Committee for Verification of Community Certificate \]](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jZoaESiMaonl93d2Nn-3_BpSDLQBEsB4/view?usp=sharing) - [(2015) 6 Supreme Court Cases 353 \[ Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena \]](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Ojm_ts3-tlGP8YJPo7xoXFUJz3dbWR6D/view?usp=sharing) - [(2015) Supreme Court Cases OnLine SC 1229 \[ Krishna Bhatacharjee Vs. Sarathi Choudhury \]](https://drive.google.com/file/d/13ftL0y9lQaDQrDPO9cIJTInRtsY2JRbi/view?usp=sharing) > These Cases have been taken from the book compiled by ‘ Jharkhand State Legal Service Authority. The book is also available at the offcial website of JHALSA(www.jhalsa.org) > > – YEAR OF PUBLICATION (FEB,2016) --- ### [Judgements that changed the course of India](https://lawfoyer.in/judgements-that-changed-the-course-of-india/) **Published:** January 23, 2021 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** - **Jury decision overturned by High Court (KM Nanavati v State of Maharashtra) – 1961** This case is notable for being the last case when a jury trial was held in India. KM Nanavati, a naval officer, murdered his wife’s lover, Prem Ahuja. The jury ruled in favour of Nanavati and declared him “not guilty” which was eventually set aside by the Bombay High Court. - **Amendment masquerades as law (IC Golaknath v State of Punjab) – 1967** In the highly famous case of Golaknath V State of Punjab in 1967 the Supreme Court ruled that Parliament could not curtail any of the Fundamental Rights of individuals mentioned in the Constitution. Parliament’s overarching ambitions nipped in the bud (Keshavananda Bharti vs State of Kerala) 1973. - **Elected representatives cannot be given the benefit of doubt** A highly notable case which introduced the concept of “basic structure” of the constitution of India and declared that those points decided as basic structure could not be amended by the Parliament. The case was triggered by the 42nd Amendment Act. - **Beginning of the fall of Indira Gandhi (Indira Gandhi v Raj Narain) – 1975** In this landmark case regarding election disputes, the primary issue was the validity of clause 4 of the 39th Amendment Act. The Supreme Court held clause 4 as unconstitutional and void on the ground that it was outright denial of the right to equality enshrined in Article 14. The Supreme Court also added the following features as “basic features” laid down in Keshavananda Bharti case – democracy, judicial review, rule of law and jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Article 32. - **A step backward for India (ADM Jabalpur v Shivakant Shukla Case) – 1976** In this landmark judgment, the Supreme Court declared that the rights of citizens to move the court for violation of Articles 14, 21 and 22 would remain suspended during emergencies. Triumph of individual liberty (Maneka Gandhi vs UOI) 1978. - **Overlapping zones of laws rectified thanks to a writ petition** The case caused a huge uproar over the definition of Freedom of Speech. The court ruled that the procedure must be fair and the law must not violate other Fundamental Rights. - **Parliament limited by itself (Minerva Mills v Union of India) – 1980** In this landmark judgment, the Supreme Court of India in 1980 strengthened the doctrine of the basic structure which was propounded earlier in the Keshavananda Bharti Case. Two changes which were made earlier by the 42nd Amendment Act were declared as null and void by the Supreme Court in this particular case. - **Constitutional validity of individual rights upheld (Waman Rao v Union of India) – 1981** This case was a landmark decision in the constitutional jurisprudence of India. This case has helped in determining a satisfactory method of addressing grievances pertaining to the violation of fundamental rights by creating a fine line of determination between the Acts prior to and after the Keshavananda Bharati case. - **Maintenance lawsuit sets precedent (Mohd Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano Begum) – 1985** The petitioner challenged the Muslim personal law. The Supreme Court ruled in favour of Shah Bano and granted her alimony. Most favoured it as a secular judgment but it also invoked a strong reaction from the Muslim community, which felt that the judgment was an encroachment on Muslim Sharia law and hence led to the formation of the All India Muslim Personal Law Board in 1973. - **MC Mehta v Union Of India – 1986** A PIL filed by MC Mehta in 1986 enlarged the scope and ambit of Article 21 and Article 32 to include the right to healthy and pollution-free environment. - **Reservation in central government jobs (Indra Sawhney v UOI November) – 1992** The constitutional bench of the Supreme Court held in this matter that caste could be a factor for identifying backward classes. - **Wrangle over Supreme Court judge appointments (Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record – Association and another versus Union of India) – 1993** The National Judicial Appointments Commission Act and Constitutional amendment Act passed in 2014 aimed at replacing the collegium system of appointing Supreme Court judges. The act was struck down as unconstitutionalby the Supreme Court in October 2015. - **Power of President’s Rule curtailed (SR Bommai v Union of India) – 1994** This landmark case had major implications on Center-State relations. Post this case the Supreme Court clearly detailed the limitations within which Article 356 has to function. - **Scam-tainted politicians – 1997** The Hawala scandal was an Indian political scandal involving payments allegedly received by politicians through four hawala brokers, the Jain brothers. In 1991, an arrest linked to militants in Kashmir led to a raid on hawala brokers, revealing evidence of large-scale payments to national politicians. The prosecution that followed was partly prompted by a public interest litigation. Many were acquitted, partly because the hawala records (including diaries) were judged in court to be inadequate as the main evidence. The high court decreed that the CBI had not brought on record any material which could be converted into legally admissible evidence. - **Foundation for a female workforce (Vishaka v State of Rajasthan) – 1997** In this case Vishakha and other women groups filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) against State of Rajasthan and Union of India to enforce fundamental rights for working women under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. This resulted in the introduction of Vishaka Guidelines. The judgment of August 1997 also provided basic definitions of sexual harassment at the workplace and provided guidelines to deal with it. Hence the importance of the case as a landmark judgment. - **Afzal Guru’s death sentence sparked protests – 2002** Afzal Guru was sentenced to death on February 2013 for his role in the December 2001 attacks on the Indian Parliament. The judgment faced widespread criticism on three grounds – lack of proper defense, lack of primary evidence and judgment based on collective conscience rather than rule of law. - **Justice deferred in Best Bakery case – 2003** The Best Bakery was burned down, killing 14 people on March 1, 2002 as part of the 2002 Gujarat violence. The Supreme court, in a rarest of rare case, ordered a re-trial outside of Gujarat in which nine out of the seventeen accused were convicted by a special court in Mumbai in 2006. - **State of Tamil Nadu V Suhas Katti – November 2004** This was notable for being the first case involving conviction under the Information Technology Act, 2000. A family friend of a divorced woman was accused of posting her number online on messenger groups which led to her being harassed by multiple lewd messages. The accused was later convicted and sentenced. - **Rameshwar Prasad v Union Of India – 2005** In this case, the petitioner challenged the constitutional validity of a notification which ordered dissolution of the legislative Assembly of the state of Bihar. The dissolution had been ordered on the ground that attempts were being made to cobble a majority by illegal means and lay claim to form the government in the state which if continued would lead to tampering with constitutional provisions. The Supreme Court held that the aforementioned notification was unconstitutional. - **Victims of sexual assault or not? (Om Prakash v Dil Bahar) – 2006** The Supreme Court in the above case declared that a rape accused could be convicted on the sole evidence of the victim in spite of medical evidence not proving that it was rape. - **Priyadarshini Mattoo case – October 2006** In this matter the Supreme Court had commuted the death sentence awarded to prime accused Santosh Singh (son of former IPS officer), to life imprisonment for the rape and murder of the 23-year-old law student, Priyadarshini Mattoo. - **Jessica Lal Murder Case – December 2006** A model in New Delhi working as a bartender was shot dead and the prime accused Manu Sharma, son of Congress MP Vinod Sharma who was initially acquitted in February 2006 was later sentenced to life imprisonment in December 2006 by a fast track hearing by the Delhi High Court. On 19 April 2010, the Supreme Court of India approved the sentence. - **Sanjay Dutt plays prisoner in real life – 2007** Well-known actor Sanjay Dutt was sentenced to five year imprisonment by the Supreme Court for illegal weapons possession in a case linked to the 1993 serial blasts in Mumbai. The Supreme Court also cited that the circumstances and nature of offence were too serious for the 53-year-old actor to be released on probation. - **Nithari serial murders – 2009** A Special Sessions Court awarded death sentence in 2009 to Surinder Koli and Moninder Singh Pandher for the murder of a 14-year-old girl. The murders believed to have been committed through 2006 involved instances of cannibalism. Pandher was later acquitted by the Allahabad High Court and was released on bail but Koli’s death sentence was upheld by both the High Court as well as the Supreme Court. - **Aarushi Talwar murder – 2008** A case which received heavy media attention involved the double murder of 14-year-old Aarushi Talwar and her 45-year-old domestic help in Noida. After five years a Sessions court convicted both her parents Rajesh and Nupur Talwar and sentenced them to life imprisonment. - **Section 377 case (Naz Foundation v Govt of NCT of Delhi) – July 2009** In 2009 the Supreme Court declared Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 as unconstitutional. The said section earlier criminalised sexual activities “against the order of nature” which included homosexual acts. This judgment however, was overturned by the Supreme in December, 2013. - **Meagre closure for controversial Ayodhya (Ayodhya Ram Mandir Babri Masjid Case) – September 2010** The high court of Allahabad had ruled that the disputed land in Ayodhya where the Babri Masjid was situated before it was demolished in 1992 shall be divided into three parts. Two-thirds of the land was to be awarded to the Hindu plaintiffs and one-third to the Sunni muslim Waqf board. - **Child sexual assault not to be taken lightly – 2011** The Supreme Court restored the conviction and sentence of six-year rigorous imprisonment imposed on two British nationals who were acquitted by the Bombay High Court in a paedophilia case. The Bench directed the accused to serve the remaining period of sentence. In a landmark judgment the Supreme Court observed “Children are the greatest gift to humanity. The sexual abuse of children is one of the most heinous crimes”. - **Vodafone’s name cleared in tax battle (Vodafone-Hutchison tax case) – January 2012** The Supreme Court ruled in favour of Vodafone in the two-billion-dollar tax case citing that capital gains tax is not applicable to the telecom major. The apex court also said that the Rs 2,500 crore which Vodafone had already paid should be returned with interest. - **Clean chit to Prime Minister Narendra Modi – 2012** In April 2012 the Supreme Court appointed Special investigation Team (SIT) gave current Prime Minister Narendra Modi a clean chit in the post-Godhra Gulberg massacre case citing that it found no evidence against him. Narendra Modi went on to become the Prime Minister of India with a huge mandate. - **Mohd Ajmal Amir Kasab v State of Maharashtra – 2012** The Supreme Court observed that the acts on November 26, 2008, had shaken the collective conscience of Indian citizens and had confirmed the death sentence awarded to prime accused Ajmal Kasab by the trial court and affirmed by the Bombay High Court, for waging war against India. - **NOTA Judgment – 2013** In 2013, the Supreme Court introduced negative voting as an option for the country’s electorate. According to this judgment an individual would have the option of not voting for any candidate (None-Of-The-Above) if they don’t find any of the candidates worthy. - **Patent troubles of Pharma company Novartis (Novartis v Union of India & Others) – 2013** Novartis’ application which covered a beta crystalline form of imatinib, a medicine the company brands as “Glivec”, which is very effective against chronic myeloid leukaemia (a common form of cancer) was denied patent protection by the Intellectual Property Appellate Board. The Supreme Court in its ruling upheld the board’s decision which eventually led to the medicine being made available to the general public at a much lower cost. - **Illegalising convicted MPs and MLAs (Lily Thomas v Union Of India) – July 2013** The Supreme Court of India, in this judgment, ruled that any member of Parliament (MP), member of the legislative assembly (MLA) or member of a legislative council (MLC) who was convicted of a crime and awarded a minimum of two-year imprisonment, would lose membership of the House with immediate effect. - **Uphaar fire tragedy (Sushil Ansal vs State Thr Cbi) – March 2014** August 2015: Eighteen years after 59 people were killed in a fire in Delhi’s Uphaar cinema, the Supreme Court held that the prime accused did not necessarily need to go back to jail as they were fairly aged. The court further held that “ends of justice would meet” if the accused paid Rs 30 crore each as fine. - **Nirbhaya case shook the nation – March 2014** Four out of the five accused in the horrific gang-rape case of Nirbhaya were convicted and given the death sentence. The case also resulted in the introduction of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 which provides for the amendment of the definition of rape under Indian Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedures, 1973; the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. - **Recognising the Third gender (National Legal Services Authority v Union of India) – April 2014** In a landmark judgment the Supreme Court in April, 2014 recognised transgender persons as a third gender and ordered the government to treat them as minorities and extend reservations in jobs, education and other amenities.In a landmark judgment the Supreme Court in April, 2014 recognised transgender persons as a third gender and ordered the government to treat them as minorities and extend reservations in jobs, education and other amenities. - **Section 66A revised (Shreya Singhal v Union of India) – March 2015** Controversial section 66A of the Information Technology Act which allowed arrests for objectionable content posted on the internet was struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in March 2015. - **Yakub Memon sentenced to death (Yakub Abdul Razak Memon V State of Maharashtra and Anr) – July 2015** Yakub Abdul Razak Memon was convicted and sentenced to execution by hanging in March 2015 for his involvement in the 1993 Bombay serial blasts. His conviction sparked a nationwide debate on capital punishment in India. - **Dance bars functional again – October 2015** The Supreme Court in July 2013 passed a judgment directing the state government to reopen dance bars in Maharashtra which had earlier been banned under the Maharashtra Police Act. The resultant ban by the Bombay High Court was stayed. --- ### [Chapter Wise Content](https://lawfoyer.in/chapter-wise-content/) **Published:** January 21, 2021 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** - CHAPTER 1 THE NATURE OF TORT - [Nature & definition of tort](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ZfZyq-lalhg-DtfcF2zoBg-G-uDCRa7p/view?usp=sharing) - [Essentials of a Tort ‘ Injuria sine damno, Damnum sine injuria ‘](https://drive.google.com/file/d/16-v183L4VIZYexkE_PwODcTHV8q0V2HP/view?usp=sharing) - [Mental Element in Tortious Liability, Malice in Law & Fact](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1GabDg5N4ySTvPsUQm3nFDkukOPFbpNL2/view?usp=sharing) - CHAPTER 2 GENERAL DEFENCES - [Volenti non fit injuria](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kWpBd1twLM2tnqJzWLXQnegKdNsUsMSx/view?usp=sharing) - [Plaintiff the wrongdoer & Inevitable Accident](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ufPf3gPSDMPcsZB6VwqovHywnvuKGYPJ/view?usp=sharing) - [Act of God & Private Defence](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1u37Mv94DFXbI2LPKg3y-E5F6wrmVxqRP/view?usp=sharing) - [Mistake,Necessity & Statutory Authority](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1zgX95NPG1U9D4zfmqWwXqd_jWL1_8Gzc/view?usp=sharing) - CHAPTER 3 CAPACITY - [Act of State](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1EBGj0k1bkda__C8S3qaVotp6L6A0emo2/view?usp=sharing) - [Corporations](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1abJpOS29skL_SeDNRkOGS9ro4e-7-yiU/view?usp=sharing) - [Minor,Capacity to sue, Pre-natal injuries etc…](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1P-mP-WZ9z8gYLoY4kWwFMzfV_1j8IWc7/view?usp=sharing) - [Independent, Composite, independent & Joint Tortfeasors](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1P-mP-WZ9z8gYLoY4kWwFMzfV_1j8IWc7/view?usp=sharing) - [Husband and Wife](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DgloFr_IYuO0VBTSTvDDlVHvuDMY2HoQ/view?usp=sharing) - [Persons having Parental, Quasi-parental, Judicial & Executive authority](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1zgX95NPG1U9D4zfmqWwXqd_jWL1_8Gzc/view?usp=sharing) - CHAPTER 4 VICARIOUS LIABILITY - [Principal, Agent & Partners](https://drive.google.com/file/d/14I1apnl-k6AloWE_BX5qzKr9G8JMbun4/view?usp=sharing) - [Master and Servant, Hospital cases, Fraud of servant](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1XINioyQtl-nVq4QfjT3aRx2yw3vsY9gz/view?usp=sharing) - CHAPTER 5 [VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF THE STATE](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Sjen72AXiBOfJzgU5Ia6kmpP9X8AV4Sn/view?usp=sharing) - Position in England & India, Negligence of military servants - Kasturi Lal bypassed, Loss to property, Death/Injury to persons - CHAPTER 6 [REMOTENESS OF DAMAGE](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1pKovJs0PIuCv_7H0F-V8Y3RM0DdDDCLL/view?usp=sharing) - Remote and Proximate damage, The Wagon - Mound Case, Wagon Mound followed in subsequent cases - CHAPTER 7 [TRESPASS TO THE PERSON](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1esVn63rp4Sc7ZJ_hmQa9JX6HlFKHf-V3/view?usp=sharing) - Assault & Battery, False Imprisonment, Total Restraint - Means of Escape, Lawful/Unlawful detention, Remedies - CHAPTER 8 [DEFAMATION](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1sxpQj0ltcRvfVX7m6E68rVwcFTqAg_Rs/view?usp=sharing) - Libel & Slander, Essentials of Defamation - Inj. against publication, Communication b/w husband & wife - Defences (Privilege) - CHAPTER 9 [NUISANCE](https://drive.google.com/file/d/11tsmXjK92HkKMhxcpFNdtSoAZnwwtLpx/view?usp=sharing) - Public & Private Nuisance, Its essentials - Interference with use or enjoyment of Land Injury to property - Damage, Nuisance on highways - Effectual & Ineffectual defences - CHAPTER 10 [ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1aVbABZ2u5vmjIDk2BP22802Vrw7LO6AT/view?usp=sharing) - Malicious Prosecution, Absence of reasonable & probable cause - Malice & Damage - CHAPTER 11 [NEGLIGENCE](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1qfSXnr30_kOmXF8s51brYojULAtH14g1/view?usp=sharing) - Essentials of Negligence, Duty of care to the plaintiff - Breach of duty, Damage & Nervous Shock - CHAPTER 12 [MEDICAL & PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1vYuUmDaiesYmMoDgynSCfWYIqC7ylo14/view?usp=sharing) - Negligence by Professionals, Doctor’s duty of care - CHAPTER 13 [CONTRIBUTORY & COMPOSITE NEGLIGENCE](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1yat31kf1QsUS7MJkcrziLKDkYbaKLJmr/view?usp=sharing) - The Last Opportunity Rule, Rules to determine Contributory Negligence, Children in custody of adults - CHAPTER 14 [LIABILITY FOR DANGEROUS PREMISES](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1aN3_a6YK758WOSQ-6Om0QqkG1zjH1iTZ/view?usp=sharing) - Obligation towards lawful visitors, trespassers & children - CHAPTER 15 [LIABILITY FOR DANGEROUS CHATTELS](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ZtHftl2qpYSk3SwSqdRRT_dJMZ3Ma9el/view?usp=sharing) - Liability towards immediate & ultimate transferee - Things dangerous & not dangerous per se - Application of the rule in Donoghue v. Stevenson - Uiifair Contract Terms Act, 1977 & Consumer Safety Act, 1978 - CHAPTER 16 [RULES OF STRICT AND ABSOLUTE LIABILITY](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1o4Qio2cYYcUsF-KIjHIO54ixzq6lLYvO/view?usp=sharing) - Rules In Rylands **v**. Fletcher & M.C Mehta **v**. Union Of India - The Rule Of Strict & Absolute Liability - CHAPTER 17 [LIABILITY FOR ANIMALS](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1PWQKamBW4qKkd1tuO_gxiYi6bfd6lHR3/view?usp=sharing) - The Scienter Rule, Cattle Tresspass, Ordinary liability in Tort - CHAPTER 18 [TRESPASS TO LAND](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1TTEwLmR7jO-JMejFchszkmCcpOJ2ZF62/view?usp=sharing) - Entry with a licence & Remedies - CHAPTER 19 TRESPASS TO GOODS, DETINUE CONVERSION - [TRESPASS TO GOODS](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1FHpMOeXgkcsUwaIfF9-oO1twX70mcxJe/view?usp=sharing) - [DETINUE](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1-9NvJEeixquMgpsbtbmPek83tix9yQC7/view?usp=sharing) - [CONVERSION](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1yyyaRFsaTab3kCaypbglArgSNjW0Evho/view?usp=sharing) - - CHAPTER 20 [INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT/BUSINESS](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1S7Yy2kDfdq_CMXweJN5bPWzC7BwZJl3F/view?usp=sharing) - Inducing Breach of Contract, Intimidation & Conspiracy - Malicious falsehood, Passing Off - CHAPTER 21 [LIABILITY FOR MISSTATEMENTS](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1U0Mb8igcb63z17k6tKVXEJDBfJV0BsOw/view?usp=sharing) - Deceit or Fraud (False Statement of Fact, Mere Silence) - Negligent Misstatement, Innocent Misrepresentation - CHAPTER 22 [DEATH IN RELATION TO TORT](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1oMNqdc0OZ8Hnwq5tLu4D5M8n0phMzSfJ/view?usp=sharing) - Effect of death on a subsisting cause of action, How far is causing of death actionable in tort? - The Rule in Baker v. Bolton, Death due to breach of contract - Fatal Accidents Act 1855, Compensation payable under a Statute - CHAPTER 23 [DAMAGES, CLAIM AND COMPENSATION](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1wVG1leNbSkaq169kP55Cdjp-V0My6cTv/view?usp=sharing) - Pubic Law Remedy, Claim for damages, Army encounter - Compensation to riot victim, Doctrine of vicarious liability - Onus on doctor to prove his innocence, Negligence Compensation - CHAPTER 24 REMEDIES - [Damages (Attendant’s expenses, Interest on damages,](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1R6cbhirrv5vUVwO4gB7cF6xEWDulnD7N/view?usp=sharing)[Under Fatal Accident Act 1855](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1R6cbhirrv5vUVwO4gB7cF6xEWDulnD7N/view?usp=sharing) ) - [Injunctions, Effect of the receipt of Gratuity, Provident Fund](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1oiYZA6tybWqAt4O6VksGoiatnz-KGFcW/view?usp=sharing) - [Specific Restitution of Property, Extra Judicial Remedy](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1-ISptJ-rt9j_xylrBMrMzUT9-woxNPT-/view?usp=sharing) --- ### [BLOG](https://lawfoyer.in/blog-2-2/) **Published:** January 19, 2021 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** - **PRE-ARREST NOTICE – SECTION 41-A OF CRIMINAL POCEDURE CODE** January 3, 2021 Written By Kishan Dutt Kalaskar Retired Judge Under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, the right to life has been offered a principal status by the judiciary. Article 21 and 22 ensure against arbitrary detainment and arrest and the legal judiciary now. In a few cases, it has defended this interest and restricted the leader’s power to make pointless arrest and confinement. [READ MORE](https://www.vidhikarya.com/legal-blog/PREARREST-NOTICE--SECTION-41A-OF-CRIMINAL-POCEDURE-CODE) - **NRI’s Power of Attorney to sell property in India** December 18, 2020 , Written by :- Kishan Dutt Kalaskar Retired Judge There might be numerous occasions in an individual’s life wherein he may be required to manage assets, properties, financial balances, and so forth, however,under certain circumstances, he may not be in the right condition to fittingly execute his/her obligations because of unanticipated conditions like being sick, being abroad (in the event of an NRI) or the individual is too old to perform his obligations. [Read More](https://www.vidhikarya.com/legal-blog/NRIs-Power-of-Attorney-to-sell-property-in-India) - **Forestry in India** December 15, 2020 ,Written By KETKI JALTARE ‘I speak for the trees for they have no tongues…!Dr. Seuss (American Author) Forestry in India is a significant rural industry and a major environmental resource. India is one of the ten most forest-rich countries of the world. Together, India and these other 9 countries account for 67 percent of total forest area of the world. [Read More](https://www.vidhikarya.com/legal-blog/Forestry-in-India) - **Advise to revisit contracts and the law to avoid present legal tensions in future post Covid.** December 15, 2020 Written By Paul P P Force Majeure and its Applicability? Force majeure events are those beyond the control of the parties to the contract, which typically free parties from fulfilling contractual obligations, when prevented by such an event. While commonly mistaken to mean an “act of God” the expression force majeure extends beyond [Read More](https://www.vidhikarya.com/legal-blog/Advise-to-revisit-contracts-and-the-law-to-avoid-present-legal-tensions-in-future-post-Covid) - **Employment Contract – Validity of Employment Bond** December 14, 2020 Written By :Kishan Dutt Kalaskar Retired Judge Employment Contract – Validity of Employment Bond By Kishan Dutt Kalaskar An employment contract is an agreement that discusses in detail the working rapport of a company and an employee. It helps both parties to comprehend their obligations and the stipulations of employ [Read More](https://www.vidhikarya.com/legal-blog/Employment-Contract--Validity-of-Employment-Bond) - **Police Clearance Certificate** December 9, 2020 Written By : Kishan Dutt Kalaskar Retired Judge A Police Clearance Certificate (PCC) is an official record given to a person by the Indian Police or an approved Indian Government official. It recognizes any criminal records that an individual may have against their name and, gives a clearance certificate if such records are clear which, might be needed for Indian or foreign nationals who are residing or have resided in India,for the following purpo [Read More](https://www.vidhikarya.com/legal-blog/Police-Clearance-Certificate) - **IS COVID-19 SUSTAINING SUSTAINABILITY?** November 25, 2020 Written By : KETKI JALTARE As per World Health Organization: “Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) is an infectious disease caused by a newly discovered corona virus. Most people infected with the COVID-19 virus will experience mild to moderate respiratory illness and recover without requiring special treatment. Older people, and those with [Read More](https://www.vidhikarya.com/legal-blog/IS-COVID19-SUSTAINING-SUSTAINABILITY) - **The procedure for filing a complaint against a lawyer** November 25, 2020 Written By : Kishan Dutt Kalaskar Retired Judge The procedure for filing a complaint against a lawyer Lawyers are the medium through whichhis client connects with thejudiciary. However, as the demand for the legal industry has increased, it is also noticed that mishaps in thisindustry have increased. Some lawyers tend to use this situation [Read More](https://www.vidhikarya.com/legal-blog/The-procedure-for-filing-a-complaint-against-a-lawyer) - **Adultery under the Indian Law** November 11, 2020 Written By : Kishan Dutt Kalaskar Retired Judge Adultery under the Indian Law The word adultery derived its meaning from the Latin verb adulterium that means – to corrupt. According to the dictionary meaning, a married man commits adultery if he has intercourse with a married woman with whom he has not entered into wedlock. However [Read More](https://www.vidhikarya.com/legal-blog/Adultery-under-the-Indian-Law) - **Frivolous Complaints under the Sexual Harassment Act** November 11, 2020 Written by : Kishan Dutt Kalaskar Retired Judge Frivolous Complaints under the Sexual Harassment Act & Inappropriate behaviour at the workplace does not only make the workplace unreliable and threatening for women, but it also discourages their ability to convey themselves in the present contending world in accordance with the circumstances [Read More](https://www.vidhikarya.com/legal-blog/Frivolous-Complaints-under-the-Sexual-Harassment-Act) - **A BRIEF NOTE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT: THE RIGHTS OF VICTIMS AND LIABILITIES OF RESPONDENTS OF** November 4, 2020 Written By : SP ASHWIN BALAJI A brief note on the Domestic Violence Act,2005. The rights of victims and the liability of respondents.Protection of Domestic violence Act was enacted in 2005 to ensure the safety and security of women in shared household. The Act recognises the physical, emotional, sexual [Read More](https://www.vidhikarya.com/legal-blog/A-BRIEF-NOTE-ON-DOMESTIC-VIOLENCE-ACT-THE-RIGHTS-OF-VICTIMS-AND-LIABILITIES-OF-RESPONDENTS-OF) - **EMERGING CHALLENGES RELATING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN INDIA!!!** October 5, 2020 Written By : KETKI JALTARE “All Human Beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” Human Rights are the basic rights and freedom that belong to every person in the world from birth until death. They apply regardless of where you are from, what you [Read More](https://www.vidhikarya.com/legal-blog/emerging-challenges-relating-to-human-rights-in-india) - **Hindu Succession Act** September 14, 2020 Written By : Kishan Dutt Kalaskar Retired Judge Question of Law Whether excluding daughter from the entitlement in HUF is valid? Whether the married daughter loses her privileges after marriage? The Supreme Court consisting of the Division Bench of Three Judges before whom the matter was raised on some question of law with regards to The Hindu Succession Act. [Read More](https://www.vidhikarya.com/legal-blog/Hindu-Succession-Act) - **A new Parliament: Supreme Court judgment giving go-ahead to Central Vista revamp is a missed opportunity** The founding fathers of the Indian Constitution called on Nandalal Bose to adorn its pages with illustrations that would capture the essence of the new republic. Bose’s choices were a mélange – mythical figures – Krishna, Arjuna, Rama, Sita; sovereigns – Ashoka, Akbar, Tipu Sultan, Shivaji; freedom fighters – Rani Laxmibai, Gandhiji, Netaji all found place alongside motifs from Ajanta, Mahabalipuram [Read More](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-edit-page/a-new-parliament-supreme-court-judgment-giving-go-ahead-to-central-vista-revamp-is-a-missed-opportunity/) - **Let us remove all doubts: Reproductive rights are essential** Women have been the worst sufferers of Covid-19 due to multiple reasons. The pandemic warrants a reminder that reproductive rights are human rights – they are essential and urgent. It may not be wrong to say that human rights were introduced in India right back in 1950 with the development of the Constitution [Read More](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/voices/let-us-remove-all-doubts-reproductive-rights-are-essential/) - **Do animals have rights?** Humans are the most evolved species of animal kingdom. They have created the institution of ‘State’ that has in turn given rise to the concept of ‘Rights’. Certain interests were recognized as so important that they were designated as Rights i.e. something which is correct, or rightfully belongs to the bearer or something that is to be lawfully permitted to [Read More](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/legally-speaking/do-animals-have-rights/) - **Neither is suicide a crime, nor can one be driven to it** Shashi Tharoor, Rhea Chakraborty and now Arnab Goswami. The social and electronic media are baying for their blood, accusing them of driving somebody — wife, lover, and creditor respectively — to suicide. As argued in earlier columns, this is moral and logical nonsense. Historically, suicide has been a crime [Read More](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/Swaminomics/neither-is-suicide-a-crime-nor-can-one-be-driven-to-it/) --- ## ElementsKit items ### [dynamic-content-widget-21a120d9-99](https://lawfoyer.in/elementskit-content/dynamic-content-widget-21a120d9-99/) **Published:** January 5, 2026 **Author:** LawFoyer **Content:** - [International Journal](#) - [Journal Website](https://lijdlr.com/) - [Call For Papers](https://lijdlr.com/cfp-lawfoyer-international-journal-of-doctrinal-legal-research/) - [Latest Issue](https://lijdlr.com/volume-3-issue-4/) - [Legal Opportunities](https://news.lawfoyer.in/) - [Achievers Archive](https://lawfoyer.in/achievers-archive/) - [Our Courses](https://academy.lawfoyer.in/) - [Resources](#) - [Articles](https://lawfoyer.in/articles/) - [Case Analysis](https://lawfoyer.in/case-analysis/) - [Legal Drafts](https://lawfoyer.in/legal-drafts/) - [Events](https://lawfoyer.in/events/) - [Submit Event](https://lawfoyer.in/submit-event-2) - 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